THE CONCEPT OF EXISTENCE AND THE STRUCTURE OF JUDGMENT: A THOMISTIC PARADOX

THE PRECISE ROLE of existence as related to judgment has increasingly engaged the attention of Thomistic metaphysicians in recent years.[1] The plethora of articles and books whose attention has been bent to the elucidation of the issue might lead us to suspect that little more can be said on the subject. A warning signal that this suspicion is not well founded is the appearance of several studies that have challenged the thesis that the metaphysics of St. Thomas advances towards its fruition thanks to a disengagement of exigencies discovered in the famous "judgment of separation."[2] Even though the thesis has been argued that the interpretations given the Thomistic being *(esse)* by Jacques Maritain and Etienne Gilson are by no means equivalent doctrines, the names of these two illustrious philosophers are frequently linked by the opponents of what might well be called a "metaphysics of separation" and what has in fact been referred to as "existential Thomism."[3] The expected reaction against the Existentialism of the post-World War II era has resonated within Thomistic circles as well. The present essay is by no means a contribution to the literature of Thomistic revisionism, pro or con, but is written in the spirit of a man who, in fact a non-revisionist, is convinced that all has not yet been said about

[1] E.g., R. Henle," Existentialism and the Judgment," in *Proc. Amer. Cath. Phil. Ass.* (1947), pp. 40-53; H. Renard, " The Metaphysics of the Existential Judgment," *New Scholasticism,* (1949), pp. 887-394; S. Mansion, "Philosophical Explanation," *Dominican Studies* 3 (1950), pp. Joseph Owens, "Judgment and Truth in Aquinas," *Mediaeval Studies,* (1970); Ambrose McNicholl, " On Judging," *THE THOMIST,* 88 (1974), pp.

[2] E.g. G. Lindbeck, "Participation and Existence," *Franciscan Studies* XVII (1958), pp. 107-125. Literature relevant to the issue is marshalled by Lindbeck.

[3] E.g., *ibid., passim.*

the role of existence and judgment, that the role of the judgment of separation, of a properly negative dimension to all metaphysical propositions and conclusions, is sufficiently dense and rich that we can assume confidently, unless proven otherwise, that there is more to the doctrine than meets the eye.

St. Thomas's teaching that human understanding bifurcates into two terminal operations, expressed by distinct *verba* of the mind, is so well known that it suffices here merely to restate the doctrine. Two acts grasp two aspects of being which, thanks to subsequent reasoning, are known to be non-identical or "really distinct." The synthesizing, composing, or "togethering" function of the act of existing, an activity which forms no part of any synthesis but which is the catalyst in which the principles of nature are annealed into unity, is reiterated cognitively and hence intentionally by the intellect in the act of judgment.[4] Judgment thus is a re-play of the principles of the real. So far as existence is concerned, judgments exercise in a spiritual way the very existential composing which is going on in the real at any one moment of time. The verb "to be" consignifies in the mind the active composing

•*In I Sent.,* d. 38, q. l, a. 3, Sol.: "Cum in re duo sint, quidditas rei, et esse eius, his duobus respondet duplex operatio intellectus. Unde quae dicitur a philosophis formatio, qua apprehendit quidditates rerum, quae etiam a Philosopho, in III *De Anima,* dicitur indivisibilium intelligentia. Alia autem conpreh.endit esse rei, componendo affirmationem, quia etiam esse rei ex materia et forma compositae, a qua cognitionem accipit, consistit in quadam compositione formae ad materiam, vel accidentis ad subjectum. *In I Sent.,* d. 29, q. 1, a. 1, Sol.: ". .. omnis causa habet ordinem principii ad esse sui causati quod per ipsam constituitur; " *In I Semt.,* d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3: "... quod cum esse creaturae imperfecte repraesentet divinum esse, et hoc nomen 'qui est' imperfecte significat ipsum, quia significat per modum cujusdam concretionis et compositionis": *In I Sent.,* d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2: "Sed intellectus noster, cujus cognitio a rebus oritur, quae esse compositum habent, non apprehendit illud esse nisi componendo et dividendo; " *In Librum Boethii de Tri:n.,* q. *5,* a. 3, *Resp.:* "ex congregatione principiorum rei in compositis, vel ipsam simplicem naturam rei concomitatur, ut in substantiis simplicibus." (Although the angelic essence is composed with the angelic existence, angelic *esse* does not play the role of composing act, of synthesizing act, due to the simplicity of the angelic nature.); cf. as well: *In X Meta.,* lect. 11, n. 1093; *In I Periherm.,* lect, *5,* n. 22.

in which being *(esse)* consists in the real, and it consignifies that composing in the very temporality in which it is discovered to be.[5] This cognition of the composite as composite is counterpointed by the cognition of the composite as simple, meaning thereby the composite *as though it were simple:* e.g., "walking man" abstracting from whether or not the man is here and now, in this moment of time, actually walking. Therefore the act of .simple understanding cognizes synthesized essences, whereas the act of judging cognizes their here and now being synthesized in existence. Thomistic *esse* thus plays the double role of positing things in being as their absolute act-no other act can be said to be the act that it is unless it be; and, language here is necessarily awkward-being-their-very-being as well as composing all of the essential principles constituting" thinghood" into unity. The very unity of any essence, for St. Thomas, is its being.[6] Essences, abstracting from existence in either the real or in the mind, are neither one nor many.[7] *Esse* is the being of things and their being-composed: the *esse* of composite creatures is existential synthesizing activity ,[8]

But every one of the propositions forming the above para-

•*In I Periherm.,* lect. *5,* n. "- - - hoc verbum EST consignificat compositionem, quia non earn principaliter significat, sed ex consequenti; significat enim primo illud quod cadit in intellectu per modum actualitatis absolute: nam EST, simpliciter dictum, significat *in actu esse;* et ideo significat per modum verbi . • . vel *simpliciter* vel *secundum quid:* simpliciter quidem secundum praesens tempus; secundum quid autem secundum alia tempora. Et ideo ex consequenti hoc verbum EST significat compositionem."

•*De Ente et Essentia,* c. 8, (ed. M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, Paris, 1948), pp. !M-25: " Unde si queratur utrum ista natura sic considerata possit dici una vel plures neutrum concedendum est, quia utrumque est extra intellectum humanitatis, et utrumque potest sibi accidere. . . . Similiter si unitas esset de ratione eius, tune esset una et eadem Socratis et Platonis et non posset in pluribus plnrificari: " cf., *Summa Theol.,* I. l; *De Ver.,* q. 1, a. l; *De Pot.* q. 8, a. 16, ad 8; *Quodl.* X, q. 1, a. 1. Unity in St. Thomas, being the indivision of an *ens* from its *esse,* is a negative way of considering being. Essences are one in being composed and *esse* is that active composing (cf. footnote 4),

[7] *De Ente et Essentia* (ed. *cit.),* c. 8, pp. 28-25.

[8] Cf. footnote 4.

graph is a conclusion of an act of metaphysical reasoning. Not one of those propositions is understood in some kind of privileged intuition. In this case, a number of truths are known but the content of these truths is not cognized properly in any act of simple understanding, in any " vision." The verbal copula "is " has been distended into playing the role of subject as well as predicate in a series of judgments which are results produced by syllogistic reasoning on exigencies initially grasped immediately in experience.[9] As so distended into operating as a subject of predication or as a predicate affirmed or denied of some other subject, being-in the sense of existence-has shifted radically from the initial role that it plays in *all* human knowing. In the cognition of things as being, grasped intellectually in and through sensation, existence is *never* affirmed or denied as though it were some object known, some " meaning " or intelligibility thrown up before "the screen of the consciousness." " Screen," of course, is a metaphor weighted with our idealist inheritance. What is known directly, according to Thomistic epistemology, is the thing sensed and it is not known *as sensed* but *as it is.* Nowhere in non-scientific judgments is existence known as subject or predicate but everything else that is known is known as either existent or non-existent, or as existent or non-existent in this or that way. This scandal for a mind bent on conceptualizing everything when confronted with non-conceptualizable existence is no scandal at all for the non-philosopher in any waking moment of his life: he is constantly affirming and denying and these affirmations and negations all bear on existence, the " factor " cognized in judgment. The author has argued that the " fact" of existence is in no way distinct from the Thomistic *esse.*[10] When I know that "It is raining" or "My friend's hair is turning grey," I am knowing *esse,* subsequently understood by the metaphysician

[9] On experience and man's knowledge of existence, cf. E. Gilson, *Being and Some Phifasophers* (Mediaeval Studies of Toronto, second print., 1961), pp. 190-215.

[10] F. Wilhelmsen, "Existence and Esse," *The New Scholasticism, 50* (1976), pp. 20-45.

as absolute act (in the first case) and as synthesizing as well as absolute act (in the second case). In both instances I can switch the words I use and easily speak of " the fact of raining " and "the fact of my friend's greying hair."

But the shift from knowing being as fact and knowing existence in the series of propositions that cluster around a philosophy of *ens commune* or *esse commune* [11] is the entire shift from non-metaphysics to metaphysics. To subject existence to some predicate or to make existence the predicate of some subject, using all the while the verb " to be," is to wrench the verb "to be "out of its normal usage. The obvious danger here consists in making the subject " existence " exist as a subject of being or in making the predicate " existence " exist as an inhering and determining form. The avoidance of this temptation is the heart of the present study. After all, both are declared, thanks to the copula, "to be." The judgment, "John is a man" entails that the subject," John," exists; but the judgment "Existence is an act "-a commonplace in Thomistic metaphysics-does not mean or intend to mean that the subject, " existence," exists in its own right as an act-at least not in the way in which John exists as a man. A comparable case can be found in judgments proper to the Aristotelian philosophy of nature: e.g., "Substantial form is the act of first matter" is not intended to affirm the subsistence of substantial form, its actual being as a thing in itself. But the metaphysical statement about existence is far more radical. Form is not declared not to be form but is declared not to exist, in philosophy of nature; but in Thomistic metaphysics, it is precisely existence

[11] E.g., *In Meta. prooemium:* "Ex hoc apparet, quod quamvis ista scientia praedicta tria [primae causae, principia maxime universalia, et id quod est a materia immunis] consideret, non tamen considerat quodlibet eorum ut subiectum, sed ipsum solum ens commune." *Ibid.:* "Quia secundum esse et rationem separari dicuntur, non solum illa quae nunquam in materia esse posssunt, sicut Deus et intellectuales substantiae, sed etiam ilia quae possunt sine materia esse, sicut ens commune; " cf.,: M. Glutz, "The Formal Subject of Metaphysics," *THOMIST,* 19 (1956), pp. 59-74 and "Being and Metaphysics," *The Modern Schoolman, 35* (1958), p. 272, n. 2.

which is declared not to exist. Quite evidently there is a distinction between denying that principles in general exist and denying that the principle through which all other principles are in being is itself being or exists. The prior but accidental characteristics of the Thomistic *esse,* stressed so frequently by Father Joseph Owens, heighten a unique paradox which has no analogue in the order of nature.[12] Creatures are, through an *esse* which is a *quo* and not a *quod.*[13] Since *esse* is not a *quod, esse* is not a subject of anything at all.

The issue touches the very question of the possibility of metaphysics and of man's capacity to make significant and true propositions about being. A metaphysics of being as existing must, among other things, square itself with Kant's insistence that metaphysics lacks any object discovered in experience, that metaphysics is a perennial temptation to convert laws into quasi-realities.[14] As interesting as it would be to approach the question in the light of Kant's rejection of metaphysics, this essay r:estricts itself to the problem as encountered in the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. Within this metaphysics, it shall be argued, the temptation to turn existence into a privileged object in a world of objects is avoided thanks to the techniques proper to the judgment of .separation which, in this case, emerges as an instance of the " way of negation," the *via negationis.*[15]

The incipient metaphysician puzzling over the mystery of being seems at the outset of his investigation to be gored on the horns o:f a dilemma: either he tries to conceptualize the

[12] J. Owens, *An Elementary Christian Metaphysics* (Milwaukee, Bruce, 1962), pp. 68-79; *An Interpretation of Existence* (Milwaukee, Bruce, 1968), pp. *57-59,* 74-78; "The Accidental and Essential Character of Being in the Doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas," *Mediaeval, Studies,* 20, pp. 1-40.

[13] *Summa Contra Gent.,* II, c. *52; In Boethii de Heb.,* lect. 2.

"I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* tr. by F. Max Muller (2nd. ed., rev., Macmillan, N. Y., 1927), Second Division. Transcendental Dialectic, pp. 288-251.

[15] For typical texts, cf. *In Boeth. de Trin.,* I, I; *Summa Theol.,* I, 8, 4; *De Pot.,* 7, 2-5; *In I Sent.,* 8, 1, I; 22, I, S: *Summa Contra Gent.,* I, 14; I, 28; *Comp. Theol.,* 2.

verbal copula or he tries to convert the copula into the substantive, " being." It would seem initially that he has no other way to talk about being. Being thus is going to function variably as subject and predicate if the novice philosopher is to be released from the pre-philosophical awe at the dizzying truth that things are, an awe whose only response is the hortatory "Is-Is-Is" which overwhelmed Parmenides. But Parmenides subsequently worked himself free of the grip of his experience in order to reason about its meaning.

The experiment consisting in disengaging the copula from its normal function in predication and expanding it into a conceptual object forces the mind to reduce "Is " to nothing at all. No-thing is "Is." Conceptualized "Is," hence, is equivalently nothing. The very vacuity and indetermination of "Is," thus conceived, coupled with the realization that experience has never yielded an " Is " that talked, walked or ate, ineluctably necessitates the judgment, " Is is not." In a word: " Is," as thought conceptually as an object, simply blanks itself out because "Is" is no subject (in the scholastic sense of the term) at all, and certainly not a subject of itself. As St. Thomas puts it in his *In Boethii <le Hebdomadibus:*

In respect to being *(ens)* , however, *esse* is considered as in itself something that is common and non-determined which becomes determined in two ways: in one way from the side of the subject which has *esse;* in another way from the side of the predicate, as when we say of a man, or of any other thing, not that it is in an unqualified way but that it is such and such, e. g. black or white.[16]

Being *(ipsum esse)* considered "in itself" as "something" common and non-determined is always determined concretely

[16] " Circa ens autem consideratur ipsum esse quasi quiddam commune et indeterminatum: quod quidem dupliciter determinatur; uno modo ex parte subjecti, quod esse habet; alio modo ex parte praedicati, utpote cum dicimus de homine, vel de quacumque alia re, non quidem quod sit simpliciter, sed quod sit aliquid, puta album vel nigrum."; *In Boetk. de Hebdom.,* lect. 2, n. 22-23, p. 396 (In this and other references to the commentary on the *De Hebdomadibus,* the edition used is: Marietti, *Opuscula Tkeologica,* V. II, 1954),

in the real either by the subject which has being or by the predicate which determines the being of the subject. But the *esse* as such cannot quite be said to exist, to be: *"lpsum enim esse nondum est."* [11] The sense of the statement hinges upon the tricky adverb *"nondum." "Dum* " usually carries a temporal sense and so too does *"nondum."* : " not quite " but, possibly, "later on." The temporal sense can be more forcefully expressed by interjecting a *"nihil."* Aquinas could have written, *"Ipsum esse nihil dum est"* and this would have meant that *esse* is nothing right now, nothing in the "while" which is the present, but that it will be. Had St. Thomas wished simply to cancel *esse* after the manner of Hegel he would have written: *"lpsum esse nihil est."* But his use of the *"nondum,"* expanding its force beyond any temporal connotation, suggests a delicate precision in his use of language. That he is altering the original meaning of the sentence found in Boethius to suit his own metaphysics indicates an even more refined delicacy: " ' To Be' itself does not quite exist." This does not mean that " to be " will eventually come to exist as a subsisting existence, thus swamping creatures in a pantheism. Neither does this mean that " to be " is simply zero, nothing at all. The issue is clarified by St. Thomas's comparison of "to be" with "to run."

" To run " and " to be " signify in the abstract whereas " a being" (ens) and "a runner" signify in the concrete:

> For to run and to be are signified in the abstract, like whiteness; but what is, i. e. a being and a runner, are signified in the concrete, like white ... just as we cannot say that to run itself runs, so too we cannot say that to be itself is: but, just as that which is, is signified as the subject of being, so that which runs is signified as the subject of running. [18]

[17] *Ibid.,* n. 21, 23.

[18] " Nam currere et esse siguificantur in abstracto, sicut et albedo; sed quod est, idest ens, et currens, siguificantur sicut in concreto, velut album . . . sicut non possumus dicere quod ipsum currere currat, ita non possumus dicere quod ipsum esse sit: sed sicut id ipsum quod est, significatur sicut subjectum essendi, sic id quod currit siguificatur sicut subjectum currendi " ; *ibid.,* n. 22-23.

A facile misunderstanding of the text would have Aquinas stating that whereas an abstract consideration of *esse* does not exist in the real because no abstractions as abstract exist in the real, consequently *esse* understood as existing must be understood concretely. But this is not what he says. The thrust of his thinking lies in another direction: " to run " does not run and " to be " does not exist precisely because neither is a subject: " *ipsum esse non. significatur sicut ipsum subiectum essendii sicut nee currere significatur sicut subiectum cursus."* [19] The reason why neither " to be" nor " to run " can be made to signify concretely is that they are not subjects of themselves, those very acts. They are not things. Acts are not acts of themselves. *"Ipsum esse noodum est, quia non attribuitur sibi esse sicut subiecto essendi."* Even God, *esse tantum, esse purum,* [20] *ipsum esse subsistens,* [21] is not a subject of Himself. In the *De Hebdomadibus* texts the subject which exists and which consists (" *atque consistit"* [22]) is that which subsists in itself: " *idest in seipso subsistit."* [23] When the very nature is identical-

[19] *Ibid.,* n. 23.

[20] *Ibid.*

[21] *De Ente et Ess.,* c. 4, n. 26, (ed. cit., p. 34), n. 27, (p. 35): "Si autem ponatur aliqua res quae sit esse tantum ita ipsum esse sit subsistens, hoc esse non recipiet additionem differentiae quia iam non esset esse tantum sed esse et praeter hoc forma aliqua; et multo minus recipiet additionem materiae quia iam esset esse non subsistens sed materiale ... oportet quod sit aliqua res quae sit causa essendi omnibus rebus ex eo quod ipsa est esse tantum." That God is not a subject of Himself is constantly emphasized: God, whose essence is His existence, is His own essence: *Summa Contra Gent.* 1, 21-22; *Summa Theol.,* 1, 2-3; *Comp. Theol.,* 10-11. Two middle terms establish the truth in the *Comp.:* the simplicity of God and His lack of potency: "In Deo autem, cum sit simplex . . . non est invenire duo quorum unum sit per se, et aliud per accidens ... in quocumque essentia non est omnino idem cum re cuius est essentia, est invenire aliquid per modum potentiae, et aliquid per modum actus, nam essentia formaliter se habet ad rem cuius est essentia . . . In Deo autem non est invenire potentiam et actum, sed est actus purus; est igitur ipse sua essentia."

[22] *De Hebdom.,* 1, 2, n. 23.

[23] *lbiil.* (Nor does the "non-being-in-a-subject" of *esse* mean that thereby it is in the genus of subtance; cf. *In I Sent.,* d. 8, q. 4, a. 2, ad 2: "Ens enim non est genus. Haec autem negatio ' non in subjecto' nihil ponit; unde hoc quod dico, ens non est in subjecto, non dicit aliquod genus: quia in quolibet genere oportet

ly existence, God, the very notion of subject must be denied. (For this reason "to know" in God is "to be": the denial of both subject of being and object of knowledge in God heightens the distinctions between being and knowing in creatures wherein knowing is being but not being after the manner of a subject.[24]) *Ens* and *currens* signify in the concrete because they are existing subjects. The same simply is not true of the respective acts rendering them beings and runners. Experientially nobody ever encountered an "Is" running!

Subsequent reasoning in the *De Hebdomadibus* establishing the same conclusion is drawn from the structure of participation. If *esse* cannot be a subject of itself then it follows that every subject of *esse* participates in "something" which is more common than itself. Drawing conventional instances of participation from the order of nature--Socrates participates in man; subjects participate in accidents; matter participates in form; effects participate in their causes-St. Thomas distinguishes between the participation of an individual in an essence from the participation of all essences in being.[25] Essential participation looks to the more particular participating in the more universal, but being-ipsum *esse-is* "the most common": *"communissimum."*[26] Englobing, as it doe.s, every particularity and every "universality," the Thomistic being (ens) is as common as it is concrete: *"communissimum, tamen*

significare quidditatem aliquam, ut dictum est, de cujus intellectu non est esse. Ens autem non <licit quidditatem, sed solum actum essendi, cum sit principium ipsum; et ideo non sequitur: est non in subjecto, ergo est in genere substantia; sed oportet addi: est habens quidditatem quam sequitur esse non in subjecto.")

•• *Quodl.*, 7, q. I, a. 4: "et propter hoc notitia secundum considerationem istam non est in anima sicut in subiecto."

•• *Op. cit.*, n. 24, p. 397: "Ipsum esse enim non potest participare aliquid per modum quo materia vel subiectum participat formam vel accidens: quia ... ipsum esse significatur ut quiddam abstractum. Similiter autem non potest aliquid participare per modum quo particulare participat universale: sic enim etiam ea quae in abstracto dicuntur, participare aliquid possunt, sicut albedo colorem; sed ipsum esse est communissimum: unde ipsum quidem participatur in aliis, non autem participat aliquid aliud."

••*Ibid.*

concretive dicitur." [21] The barn participates in a white color which is broader than the barn, a quality more universal than the reality painted white because there are white things which are not barns. But nothing is "outside" of being *(ease).* Therefore things participate in existence through which they are beings *(entia)* as do concretes participate in abstracts. Initially, *esse* is established as not being a subject of itself. Subsequently subjects of *esse* are established as not being related to *esse* as less common natures are related to more common natures. That which already exists and hence participates in being can subsequently participate in a host of essential perfections which are not itself. But only *esse* cannot participate in anything more profound than " itself " : " *ipsum autem esse non possit aliquid participare."* [28] Here we encounter the central thesis of Thomistic metaphysics: *esse* is absolutely prior, presupposing nothing whereas everything else presupposes *esse,*[29] absolutely common to all but not common as is a universal to a particular or a genus to a species, because absolutely concrete and exhaustive of the total reality of everything that is.

[27] *Ibid.,:* " Sed id quo<l est, sive ens, quamvis sit communissimum, tamen concretive dicitur; et ideo participat ipsum esse, non per modum quo magis commune participatur a minus communi, sed participat ipsum esse per modum quo concretum participat abstractum."

[2]. *Ibid.*

[29] *Summa Cont. Gent.,* 2, 21: " EfEectussuis causis proportionaliter respondent: ut scilicet effectus in actu causis actualibus attribuamus, et similiter effectus particulares causis particularibus, universalibus vero universales . . . Esse autem est causatum primum: quod ex ratione suae communitatis apparet. Causa igitur propria essendi est agens primum et universale, quod Deus est. Alia vero agentia non sunt causa essendi simpliciter ... Esse autem simpliciter per creationem causatur, quae nihil praesupponit: quia non potest aliquid praeexistere quod sit extra ens simpliciter; " *Summa Theol.,* 1, 4, ad 3: "Dicendum quod ipsum esse est perfectissimum omnium; comparatur enim ad omnia ut actus. Nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi inquantum est; unde ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum, et etiam ipsarum formarum. Unde non comparatur ad alia sicut recipiens ad receptum, sed magis sicut receptum ad recipiens: " *De Pot.,* q. 3, a. 4,: " Primus autem effectus est ipsum esse, quod omnibus aliis effectibus praesupponitur et ipsum non praesupponit aliquem alium effectum."

Rounding out his reasoning, St. Thomas points out that *esse* signifies in an abstract fashion that which exists in a concrete fashion. But "man," signified abstractly, or "white," can participate in other attributes. *Ipsum esse,* equally signifying abstractly, cannot concretely participate in anything at all. His last reason buttresses his fir.st: *esse* is never an existing subject of anything at an.so

In the highly technical language of the *De Ente et Essentia,* this means that whereas every nature abstracts from all being *(esse),* no nature can be prescinded ("cut away," separated absolutely) from any being *(esse)* that it might have.si The " Being " of Parmenides is a classical warning: " being," separated absolutely from the many, thus reducing them to non-being, renders unintelligible the multiple grasped in sensorial experience. Thomistic *esse* is relatively separated and hence is " separable " but is never actually separated from the many which are, after all, beings, .subjects participating in existence, itself participating in nothing conceived of as being more profound than itself.

The copula " is," disengaged from its normal function as signifying the fact that things are and converted into a conceptualized object "Is," itself cut away from some concrete subject of being, is simply nothing. That principle through which things are is itself just nothing when separated absolutely from the concrete beings of which *esse* is the very being. The so-called abstraction of the copula turns out, upon inspection, to be a subtle substitution of judgment for abstraction, thus confounding two distinct terminal intellectual acts: " Is is not " is a negation trying to do duty for an abstraction which cannot be pulled off successfully by the mind. The intentional erasure of a pure" Is" presumed to be presented to the intel-

[8°] Cf. footnotes 25-28.

[81] *De Ente et Essentia,* c. 8, n. 8-10 (ed. cit., p. 26): "Ergo patet quod natura hominis absolute considerata abstrahit a quolibet esse, ita tamen quod non fiat precisio alicuius eorum; " the same teaching couched in slightly different language is found later in the *Summa Theol.,* I, *85,* 1, ad 1.

ligence in an abstract way is really a masked negation which is forced on the mind when it tries to do the impossible, to understand *esse* as though it were an essence, hence a subject. The Hegelian trick is to articulate a mental blankout as though it were a judgment.[32] Just thinking the identity of thought with itself, Hegel's concept of being, is simply not thinking at all. All of this simply points to the profound truth of Gilson's contention that there is no proper concept of existence.[33]

The thesis, advanced by St. Thomas in the *De Hebdomadibus* and repeated by him elsewhere, that *esse nondum est*[34] is not reducible to the thesis *esse rwn est esse.* This can be expressed paradoxically, as I have done, in the formula: *esse* neither is nor is not.[85] This last would be a violation of the principle of non-contradiction only in terms of the second formula, " To Be is not To Be." But the paradox is less a paradox on one level when we take into account the widely accepted Thomistic dictum that principles are not things and that only things exist. The paradox is more a paradox when we note that, in exercised act, *esse* itself *is* non-contradiction.[86] But non-contradiction cannot be an instance of a class falling under itself.[37] St. Thomas's insistence that " to be " does not itself

[82] *The Logic of Hegel,,* tr. by W. Wallace (second ed., revised and augmented, Oxford: Clarendon, esp. pp. 80-50; F. Wilhelmsen, *El Problema de la Trascendencia en la Metafisica Actual* (Edicione,s Rialp, Madrid, 1968), pp. 59-74; *The Paradoxical Structure of Existence* (University of Dallas Press, second ed., 1978), pp. 71-85.

[88] *Op. cit., loc. cit. et passim.*

[84] *De Div. Nomin.,* c. 8, l. 1: "- - - nee sic proprie dicitur quod *esse* sit, sed quod per *esse* aliquid sit."

[85] F. Wilhelmsen, *The Paradoxical Structure of Existence,* pp. 59-64. Expressing the matter in another way, we can say that both *"esse est"* and " *esse non est"* are nonsense, or at least non-affirmable. To affirm *esse est* is either to begin an infinite regress of existences of existences or else to affirm an analytic proposition which, if true of the *esse* of creatures, would, because necessarily true, entail either that they are not creatures or that their *esse* is identically God's. Hence it is vital to a creationist metaphysics to consider " *esse est* " a non-proposition in which case its denial is also a non-proposition.

••*Ibid.,* pp. 90.

[87] The Law of Non-Contradiction is not "(p)-(p.- p.)," since this "proposi-

exist but that things continue to exist so long as they are, and that they continue to be as they are so long as their principles are being synthesized into a unity of being by the composing act which is existence, points to the transcending (but not " transcendent," hence not " separated ") character of the act of existing. The very articulation of the principle of non-contradiction in signified act follows on the principle's being-done in exercised act: that being-done, both in the real and in the mind, is *esse.* Explicitation of the principle is a kind of intellectual re-play which cannot, in turn, ,subsume under itself the act which is being signified or re-played and which, in truth, is doing the re-play. *Esse* does not obey some putative " law of non-contradiction " because *esse* is non-contradiction. [38]

But if the verbal copula can never be disengaged as a pure object for speculation, could the verbal copula be converted to the substantive and thus stand before the intelligence as do all objects? Substantive here is understood as a subject atomically considered and not as a participial substance. [39] Were being an object among objects, being would absorb them all.[40]

tion " would establish an illegitimate totality (cf., A. Whitehead and B. Russell, *Principia Mathematica* (Cambridge, 1907), I, pp. 37 ff.) The proper statement of the Law is not in terms of bound variables but free ones, that is, not in terms of *aU* propositions but of *any.* Cf. the treatment in "Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types," in C. Marsh, ed., Bertrand Russell: *Logic and Knowledge* (New York: Putnam, 1956), pp. 64-69. However, I have denied that either " *esse est" or* " *esse non est"* is a proposition; hence the law is not flaunted.

[38] Cf. notes 35-7.

[39] W. N. Clarke, "What Is Really Real?" in *Progress in Philosophy,* ed. by J. McWilliams (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1955), p. 71-75. Clarke argues that, for St. Thomas, the subject of metaphysics is a participial substantive.

[40] J. Owens, "The Physical World of Parmenides," *Essays in Hon01.tr of Anton Charles Pegis,* ed. by J. R. O'Donnell, (Toronto: Pont. Inst, of Med. Studies, 1974); esp. pp. 386-387: "The procedure [of Parmenides] suggests that one aspect intuited in them ["all things "] is that they exist. This is the aspect of being. It is seen in them all. Whatever lacked it would be not-being. The dichotomy is devastatingly clear. Being is intuited as an aspect with conceptual content that extends to every other positive aspect .•• The being in which the thought takes place seems intuited as an object with a conceptual content of its own, a content that leaves only not-being outside its embrace."

The experiment 0£ Parmenides clearly demonstrates that whereas cats and horses and dogs are distinguished from one another by differentiating characteristics there is simply no difference between beings that is not being itself. l£ we put the object " being " in a line-up with all other objects, these last would simply disappear. This metaphysical murder 0£ the many by the one cannot be avoided when being is made a subject 0£ itself, a non-participial substantive, hence a subject whose predicates tum out, upon inspection, to be identically itself. Both the effort needed to conceptualize the " Is " and the effort needed to convert the " Is " into the monolithic subject "Being" come to the same metaphysical bankruptcy. The pseudo-object " Being "-totally without inner differentiation-is no more experienced in the real than is the verbal " Is." St. Thomas has already warned us that *esse* is not the subject of itelf. Neither quasi-conceptualized " Is " nor quasi-conceptualized " Being " *exists* and we thus come foll circle back to our original problem: how can we think and reason about an " Is" that, on the surface at least, seems refractory to efforts at bagging it conceptually. Hegel's identity 0£ being with nothing and Parmenides's reduction 0£ everything to a Being which itself is only thought but never experienced are two sides 0£ the same coin. "Is" is Nothing and the substantivizing of "Is" into an object nihilates everything else. One road leads us to the conclusion that things are through nothing at all and the other road leads us to the conclusion that nothing at all is.

This metaphysical Hamlet without the Prince 0£ Denmark is the play without the player £or any metaphysics that either denies or suppresses the evident truth that the existence cognized in judgment can be conceptualized and hence subjected to predication only on the condition that metaphysics be considered a basically negative enterprise that reasons to truths about being but that never achieves any " vision " or objectification 0£ being.

St. Thomas's strategy in this regard involved a delicate parting of the ways from the earlier Aristotelian and Boethian

position according to which the " divine science," metaphysics, or "philosophical theology " investigated realities which are separated from matter and motion.[41] In his *In Boethii de Trinitate,* Aquinas pointed out that there are beings which are simply separate in existence from the material order and these beings can be known in two ways: as they are " the common principles of all things; "[42] and " insofar as they are beings in their right."[43] These first principles " are most evident in themselves"[44] but "our intellect regards them as the eye of an owl does the light of the sun, as *The Metaphymcs* says."[45]

[41] Literature on the *separatio,* while rather recent, is still extensive: cf., L.-B. Geiger, *La participation dans la philosophie de s. Thomas* (Paris, Vrin, 1942), pp. 317-341, and" Abstraction et separation d'apres saint Thomas," *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques,* V. 48, 1948, pp. 328-339; D. J. Robert, "La Metaphysique, science distinct de toute autre discipline philosophique selon s. Thomas d'Aquin," *Divus Thomas* (Piacenza), V. *50,* 1947, pp. 206-223; L. M. Regis, "Un livre ... La philosophie de la nature. Q.uelques apories," *Etudes et Recherches. Philosophie,* V. I, pp. 138-140; Maurer, Armand, *St. Thomas Aquinas-The Division and Methods of the Sciences,* (tr. of Quest. V and VI of his Commentary on the *De Trinitate* of Boethius, (Pontifical Inst. of Med. Studies, Toronto, 1963), Int., pp. vii-xl.; F. Wilhelmsen, *Man's Knowledge of Reality* (Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 5th. print, 1965), pp. 193-196, esp. footnote 3; J. Owens, "Metaphysical Separation in Aquinas," *Mediaeval Studies,* V. 34, 1972, pp. 287-306. For literature reducing the *separatio* to the classical third degree of abstraction: Cf., J. Maritain, *Short Treatise on Existence and the Existent* (N. Y., Pantheon, 1948), pp. 28-40; M. V. Leroy, "Abstractio et separatio d'apres un texte controverse de s. Thomas," *Revue Thomiste,* V. 48, 1948, pp. 51-3.

[42] *Thomas van Aquin, In Librum Boethii de Trinitate, Questiones Quinta et Sexta,* Nach dem Autograph Cod. Vat. lat. 9850 mit Einleitung herausgegeben von Paul Wyser, 0. P. (Fribourg, Societe Philosophique, 1948) Q. V, a. 4, Resp., n. 9-14; p. 47: " .. Autem uniuscuiusque determinati generis sunt quaedam communia principia, quae se extendunt ad omnia principia illius generis, ita etiam et omnia entia secundum quod in ente communicant, habent quaedam principia, quae sunt principia omnium entium." (Subsequent references to *In Lib. Boethii de Trin.* are from this edition) .

[43] *Ibid.,* n. 6-11, p. 48: "Huiusmodi ergo res divinae, quia sunt principia omnium entium et sunt nihilominus in se naturae completae, dupliciter tractari possunt: uno modo, prout sunt principia communia omnium entium; alio modo, prout sunt in se res quaedam."

[44] *"Ibid.,* "Quia autem huiusmodi prima principia, quamvis sint in se maxime nota ... ".

[45] *Ibid.,* n. 12: "... tamen intellectus noster se habet ad ea ut oculus noctuae ad lucem solis, ut dicitur in *II Metaphysicorum."*

They are knowable only in their effects. Quite evidently St. Thomas wanted to differentiate :first philosophy from sacred theology. Philosophically these Things of God are known " only to the extent that their effects reveal them to us." [46] Appealing to the famous Pauline insistence in *Romans* that " the invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made," [47] St. Thomas opts for a metaphysics whose subject matter is not God but "being as being." [48] God and the angels are " called separate " because by nature they cannot exist in matter and motion. But there is a second way in which principles are understood as " separate." Although always encountered by us as existing in matter and motion, these principles need not exist in this fashion. Because they need not exist as concretized in material natures, the principles in question do not depend on matter and motion in order that they might be, unlike mathematical objects which are understood in abstraction from sensible matter but which exist only therein. [49] Metaphysics investigates the existentially separated, God and angels, only as principles and causes of its own subject, being as existing.

The teaching is dense in significance [50] but for our purposes

••*Ibid.,* n. IS: "... per lumen naturalis rationis pervenire non possumus in ea nisi secundum quod per efl'ectus in ea ducimur."

[47] *Epistle to the Romans,* I, 20.

••*Op. cit.,* n. 16-19; "Unde et huiusmodi res divinae non tractantur a philosophis nisi prout sunt rerum omnium principia, et ideo pertractantur in illa doctrina, in qua ponuntur ea, quae sunt communia omnibus entibus, quae habet subiectum ens inquantum est ens."

•• *Ibid.,* n. 36-40, p. 48, n. 1-3, p. 49: "Uno modo sic quod de ratione ipsius rei, quae separata dicitur, sit quod nullo modo in materia et motu esse possit, sicut Deus et angeli dicuntur a materia et motu separati; alio modo sic, quod non sit de ratione eius, quod sit in materia et motu, sed possit esse sine materia et motu, quamvis quandoque inveniatur in materia et motu, et sic ens et substantia et potentia et actus sunt separata a materia et motu, quia secundum esse a materia et motu non dependent, sicut mathematica dependebant, quae nunquam nisi in materia esse possunt, quamvis sine materia sensibili possint intelligi."

[5°] Cf., A. Maurer, *St. Thomas Aquinas-The Division and Methods of the Sciences,* pp. vii-xl; J. Owens, "Metaphysical Separation in Aquinas," *Med. Studies,* V. 34, pp. 287-306. (Cf. footnote 41).

here it suffices to point out that St. Thomas has removed the subject of metaphysics from any direct cognition in the act of simple understanding. The *In Boethii de Trinitate* texts mesh perfectly with St. Thomas's repeated insistence, forcefully expressed in the *Summa Theologiae*, that the human intellect can actually understand nothing at all in this life except by converting to phantasms in which the intellect grasps the intelligible content through which it is in act thanks to the intelligible species. The phantasm is not only a principle which initiates by specifying the process terminating in intellection but the phantasm is a permanent principle as he states in the Boethian commentary.[51] The intellect needs the phantasm to understand anew what was previously understood and to understand in a deeper fashion what was previously understood."[52] For St. Thomas these propositions presented no difficulty whatsoever. That man understands things by converting to phantasms "is evident from experience."[53] Therefore, the proper objeot of an intellect joined to a body is a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter."[54] Given that these material natures-which, of course, can and do exist spiritually and universally in the mind-properly exist in material individuals, it follows that to understand them "completely and truly"[55] is to understand them as being in existing particulars, the nature of stone in this stone and the nature of horse in this horse. Although these natures are exercised in a spiritual and im-

[51] *Op. cit.*, Q. 6, a. ad 5, n. 15-16, p. 65: "... quod phantasrna est principiurn nostrae cognitionis ut ex quo incipit intellectus operatio, non sicut transiens, sed sicut perrnanens, ut quoddarn fundarnenturn intellectualis operationis."

[52] *Summa Theol.*, I, 84, 7, Resp.: "Unde rnanifesturn est quod ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligit, non solurn accipiendo scientiarn de novo sed etiam utendo scientia iam acquisita requiritur actus irnaginationis et ceterarum virtutum. . . . S.ecundo, quod quando aliquis conatur aliquid intelligere, format sibi aliqua phantasmata per rnodum exemplorurn, in quibus quasi inspiciat quod intelligere studet;" *In II Sent.*, d. q. a. ad 3; *De Ver.* q. 10, a. ad 7; a. 8, ad l; q. 19. a. l; *Cont. Gent.*, 1, c. 73 et 81; *De Mem. et Remin.*, 1, 3.

[53] *Summa Theol.*, I, 85,

[54] *Ibid.*, I, 84, 7.

[55] *Ibid.*

material fashion in knowledge, that which is known properly is material and individuated in its own extramental existence. Man through intellection thus contemplates his own proper intellectual object by grasping it in experience, in and through phantasms. Were the proper object of the intellect" separated forms " not subsisting in sensible things, as the Platonists hold, then the intellect would be able to understand without converting to phantasms.[56] The Platonic error, according to Aquinas, consists in attending only to the spiritual and universal mode of being of what is intellected and in suppressing the truth that this known reality exists in its own right materially and individually and is known by a faculty of a soul which is the form of a body itself.[57] St. Thomas rules out the Platonic noetic because it violates the evidence of experience.[58]

It follows that human knowledge of the suprasensible is the result of an ascent from the visible to the invisible.[59] But just as the owl or the blind man has no proper knowledge of the visible, so too the human intelligence has no proper knowledge of the spiritual. In no manner is the intellect bent on thinking about the spiritual order released from its dependence on the sensorial order, on phantasms.[60] In the *Summa Theologiae,*

[66] *Ibid.:* " Si autem proprium obiectum intellectus nostri esset forma separata; vel si formae rerum sensibilium subsisterent non in particularibus, secundum Platonicos non oporteret quod intelleotus noster semper intelligendo converteret se ad phantasmata."

[57] *Ibid.,* 85, 1: "Plato vero, attendens solum ad immaterialitatem intellectus humani, non autem ad hoc quod est corpori quodammodo unitus, posuit obiectum intellectus ideas separatas."

[68] Cf. footnote 53.

[59] *Ibid.,* 84, 7: "lntellectus autem humani, qui est coniunctus corpori, proprium obiectum est quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens, et per huiusmodi naturas visibilium rerum etiam in invisibilium rerum aliqualem cognitionem ascendit."

[00] *Ibid.,* 84, 7, ad 3: " Dicendum quod incorporea, quorum non sunt phantasmata, cognoscuntur a nobis per comparationem ad corpora sensibilia, quorum sunt phantasmata. Sicut veritatem intelligimus ex consideratione rei circa quam veritatem speculamur. Deum autem, ut Dionysius <licit, cognoscimus ut causam, et per excessum et per remotionem; alias etiam incorporeas substantias in statu praesentis vitae cognoscere non possumus nisi per remotionem, vel aliquam comparationem

man's knowledge of the incorporeal is said to be effected by a comparison with the corporeal or by what Aquinas calls, following Dionysius, a remotion. This remotion is evidently a judgment of separation in which the characteristics oi corporeity are denied of the spiritually exisitent. The *In Boethii de Trinitate* points out that the phantasm can function in three ways: [61] in natural philosophy and in the natural sciences- and, we might add, in our day to day non-scientific understanding-phantasms represent what they signify positively: they directly carry to the mind the nature understood; in mathematical knowledge the phantasm-symbolrepresentsimaginatively in that the object known is, so to speak, quasi-constructed in the imagination in a way in which it does not exist

ad corporalia. Et ideo cum de huiusmodi aliquid intelligimus, necesse habemus converti ad phantasmata corporum, licet ipsorum non sint phantasmata;" *In Boethii de Trin.*, q. *5*, a. 3, n. 8-10, p. 67: " Et sic immediate potest concipere intellectus quidditatem rei sensibilis, non autem alicuius rei intelligibilis."

[61] *In Boeth. de Trin.*, q. 6, a. 3, n. 20-23, p. 63: " Sed terminus cognitionis non semper est uniformiter. Quandoque enim est in sensu, quandoque in imaginatione, quandoque autem in solo intellectu. Quandoque enim proprietates et accidentia rei, quae sensu demonstrantur, sufficienter exprimunt naturam rei, et tune oportet quod iudicium de rei natura, quod facit intellectus, conformetur his quae sensus de re demonstrat; n. 31-32, p. 64, n. 1-9, p. 64: Quaedam vero sunt, quorum iudicium non dependet ex his, quae sensu percipiuntur, quia quamvis secundum esse sint in materia sensibili, tamen secundum rationem definitivam sunt a materia sensibili abstracta. ludicium autem de unaquaque re potissime fit secundum eius definitivam rationem. Sed quia secundum rationem definitivam non abstrahunt a qualibet materia, sed solum a sensibili, et remotis sensibilibus conditionibus remanet aliquid imaginabile ideo in talibus oportet quod iudicium sumatur secundum id quod imaginatio demonstrat. Huiusmodi autem sunt mathematica, et ideo in mathematicis oportet cognitionem secundum iudicium terminari ad imaginationem, non ad sensus, quia iudicium mathematicum superat apprehensionem sensus;" n. 14-21: "Quaedam vero sunt, quae excedunt et id quod cadit sub sensu et id quod cadit sub imaginatione, sicut cadit sub imaginatione, sicut illa quae omnino a materia non dependent neque secundum esse neque secundum considerationem, et ideo talium cognitio secundum iudicium neque debet terminari ad imaginationem neque ad sensum. Sed tamen ex his, quae sensu vel imaginatione apprehenduntur, in horum cognitionem devenimus vel per viam causalitatis, sicut ex effectu causa perpenditur, quae non est effectui commensurata, sed excellens; vel per excessum vel per remotionem, quando omnia quae sensus vel imaginatio apprehendit, a rebus huisumodi separamus."

in the real; but in metaphysics, the phantasm functions *negatively*. In first philosophy the mind negates that the principles understood or subjected to predication are as they are presented conceptually and symbolically to the inquiring intelligence. The " remotion " or removal of the marks of corporeity involve an "excess" in the separable principles.[62] There is simply more of being in what we are reasoning about than there is contained in the conceptual and symbolic tools with which we perforce work.

But in metaphysics our conclusions do not bear directly on " separated " beings. They are known only in effects as causes and principles. Metaphysical judgments terminate in the " separable," in principles which can exist in both a material and a spiritual way. Therefore metaphysical judgments, including conclusions, never reach a cognition of any existing *subject* in any direct way, but only of truths bearing on the being of all subjects of existing. The separability of the Thomistic *esse* releases that first of all principles from the dilemma detailed earlier. Were *esse* separated absolutely from things, *esse* would be turned into a subject of itself and the multiplicity of the real would collapse into the totalitarianism of Parmenidean being. In turn, for reasons indicated earlier, this abstractly concretized "Is" would be identically nothing. St. Thomas's judgment of separation is relative and not absolute: in no sense denying the being of the material order directly and properly known by man, the metaphysician denies that being is necessarily material; the ultimate statement of this separation is the declaration that no nature is identically its own existence, that an account of a nature *qua* nature is not an account of the being of that nature. Non-subsisting *esse* is no conceptual object and hence escapes the Kantian criticism of a metaphysics without an object phenomenally represented in experience, thus falsifying the Kantian conclusions. The non-subsisting or "non-existing" paradox of the Thomistic *esse*

[62] Cf. footnotes 60 an.d 61.

removes it from any dialectic because only objects can enter into the "in-itself, outside-of-itself, and in-and-for-itself" of Hegelianism. If the Thomistic *esse* cannot be affirmed, then neither can it be denied; if neither a:ffirmablenor deniable, then it is not susceptible to being swept into a higher synthesis.[63] Thomas's synthesizing *esse* is not a product of a prior clash between thesis and antithesis, affirmation and negation, but is rather synthesizing activity itself. It is absolutely prior to the principles of nature which are composed in virtue of that very *esse.* As absolutely prior to both affirmation and negation, it is non-contradiction in act and hence not subject "to itself" as to any law presumed to be itself even more prior.

An especially powerful text in the *De Potentia Dei* both illustrates and demonstrates the peculiar noetic structure of the Thomistic *esse* in metaphysical discourse:

> In reply to the first objection it should be said that, although the first cause which is God does not enter into the essence of created things, nevertheless the *esse* of created things cannot be understood except as derived from the divine *esse.*[64]

Materially existing essences which are the proper objects of the human intellect are grasped thanks to the intellect's conversion to phantasms in which these natures are known as existing in singulars. This knowledge of natures, no matter how exhaustive it might be, never yields any knowledge about being *(esse),* which is directly cognized only in judgment. No essence is its existence or being. Therefore no essence can be a point of departure for any knowledge about the Cause of existence, God. God as cause does not" enter," is not included, in any cognitive act that ticks off the generic and specific notes constituting any given nature. Biology and agriculture and physics and the like are a-theistic. But the very subject of

••Cf. footnote *35.*

•• Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod licet causa prima, quae Deus est, non intret essentiam rerum creaturarum; tamen esse, quod rebus creatis inest, non potest intelligi nisi ut deductum ab esse divino." ; *De P()t.,* q. 3, a. *5,* ad 1.

metaphysics, *esse,* according to St. Thomas, is intelligible *orily* as "deduced from the divine 'to be'." The character of not-being-a-subjeot of the Thomistic *esse* prohibits it from being " caught " and " pinned " as are other subjects waiting on predication. *Esse,* not a nature in creatures, simply is " not there" as a thing to be intellected because *esse* is the being of whatever else is "there." A non-subsisting *esse* is ultimately explicable only as " deduced from " Subsisting *Esse.*

Metaphysical separation distinguishes a subject for philosophical investigation which subject is not really a subject at all. Contradiction is avoided, as argued, because this subject of predication is known not to he a subject of being because it is being, hence not a subject of itself. There could be nothing deeper than *esse* capable of functioning as a subject for *esse.* It follows that all predications made about existence in Thomistic metaphysics are analogical and these analogies function within judgments of negation: e.g., act is determination in the orders of substance and operation but act is the determined in the order of existence. A good example of this is St. Thomas's insistence that *esse* is the perfection of all perfeotions.[65] Perfection in ordinary usage suggests the completed and the finished, be that a work of art or a natural reality. But the" completed" bespeaks the " already done or made " and *esse* is never an " already done " or "made." Unless the judgment of negation is exercised on the previous judgment concerning *esse* as perfection of perfections, *esse* collapses into the non-sense of being as past.

But the role of negative judgment is not exhausted in denying that *esse* " is " as affirmed or denied in metaphysical discourse. Something comparable to this kind of negation occurs in quantum physics in which symbols-such as " particle "-do duty for ultimate sub-atomic principles which simply cannot be objectified in any Aristotelian sense at all and

[65] *Summa Theol.,* I, 4, 1, ad S; *De Ver.,* q. 1, ad IS; *Summa Theol.,* I, 5, 1 et ad 1.

which can only be symbolized.[66] But although comparable, the two cases are by no means instances of a common genus. No sub-atomic particle is ever cognized directly but existence is directly cognized in judgment. Mathematical conceptualization of an "x" which is never positively experienced but only concluded to is not univocally related to the metaphysical conceptualization of existence. Existence as the fact of being,[67] in no way distinct in the real from the Thomistic *esse,* is cognized in every moment of our conscious lives. The problem-we return to our point of departure-looks to the refractory character of this fact of being when converted into a subject for predication, when lifted from that act which grasps existence-more accurately, the existent as existent-to another act, the cognizing of natures, which simply must conceive of that which is not a nature as though it were one. Possibly for these reasons the triadition would have it that metaphysics is a science a little too high for man, that were he content to live in an existing world, existence would be no problem for him, that existence becomes a problem only when he takes " it " seriously rather than concentrating seriously on the things which are.

But even when the metaphysician is making the necessary negative corrections concerning the structure of being, he is doing so in and through judgments-and the very formal structure of judgment must be denied to be adequate, even in its usage in metaphysical reasoning. In a word: the judgment of negation must be prolonged from the *esse* affirmed in metaphysics to propositional structures through which these affirmations and negations are made. The configuration of judg-

•• The statement is a commonplace in literature concerning the structure of modern science: e.g., Sir A. Eddington, *Nature of the Physical World,* (New York: Macmillan, 1929); P. Duhem, *Le Systeme du Monde. Histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platon a Copernic,* (Paris, 1917); W. Heisenberg, *Physics and Phuosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science* (New York: Harper & Row, 1958).

[67] F. Wilhelmsen, "Existence and Esse," *The Now Scholasticism,* 50 (1976), pp. 20-45.

ment as an intellectual activity and as an *ens rationis* belies the truth of every metaphysical judgment unless that configuration be formally denied of the truths asserted in metaphysics.

The thesis can be expressed as follows: St. Thomas's articulation of the principles entering into the unity of judgment demands the exercise of the judgment of negation when these judgments are metaphysical. Under any other supposition the Thomistic *esse* of general metaphysics is contradicted by the Thomistic teaching on judgment as a special topic within Aquinas's noetic.[68]

The basic theory of judgment for Aquinas can be expressed schematically. As a being of reason or as mind-dependent being the judgment is a product of the activity of the intelligence.[69] Given that every exercise of being is absolutely prior to that which is being exercised, the actual rational existing, the *esse,* of any judgment is absolutely prior to the subject-predicate components which are thereby posited in mental being.[70] Given that the *esse* positing and synthesizing any composition is formally caused by, hence results from, the principles thus posited, the judgment is *as* it is thanks to its essential components. Causes are causes of one another in different orders. The verb.al copula signifies the being of predicate in subject and thus signifies the role of *esse* as composing activity; this consignification follows on the verbal copula's role as signifying absolute act, simply being.[71] When this being of a predicate in a subject is caused by being in the real and when the intellect, in totally reflecting upon itself in act through reflection to the phantasm, knows thus its own conformity to the real, the *esse* of predicate in subject is an *esse verum* as known, the truth as

[68] The proposition is consubstantial with the priority of metaphysics over theory of knowledge in Thomistic philosophy.

[69] *Summa Theol.,* I, 3, 4, ad !!: "... alio modo esse significat compositionem propositionis, quam anima adinvenit coniungens praedicatum subiecto."

[70] Cf., my "The Priority of Judgment over Question: Reflections on Transcendental Thomism," *International Philosophical Quarterly,* V. 14, n. 4, 1974, pp. 475-493.

[71] Cf. footnote *5.*

known.[72] The relation between the functioning of existing in the real and the functioning of existence in the mind is not to be understood as though it were a mere parallelism. Judgment reiterates intentionally, if I am pardoned a neologism, the" on-going" synthesizing of the real in being. The middle term here is the intentional structure of the act of knowing which, for purposes of the economy of this study, is taken as being established as a conclusion prior to judgment theory in Thomistic epistemology. That man in judgment directly knows material things to exist is not dependent on the theory of intentionality: the latter is a conclusion and the former is an evident fact. To know is to be other as other; knowing is not a matching or copying of the real by the mind but a re-being of the real in the mind according to conditions laid down by being produced by a spiritual activity in a spiritual way.[73]

Analogous to the manner in which the act of existing both posits and synthesizes the principles of nature into unity, the *esse verum* posits and synthesizes into rational being a composition of essential principle.s.[74] Schematically, these principles can be enumerated as follows: subject stands to predicate as does potency to act,[75] as does the determined to the determining,[16] as does matter to form.[77] The Platonic temptation to lift ab-

[72] *In I Sent.,* d. 19, q. 1, a. 1, Sol: "et in ipsa operatione intellectus accipientis esse rei sicut est per quamdam similationem ad ipsum, completur relatio adaequationis, in qua consistit ratio veritatis"; d. £3, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1: "Tertio modo dicitur esse quod significat veritatem compositionis in propositionibus, secundum quod ' est ' dicitur copula: et secundum hoc est in intellectu componente et dividente quantum ad sui complementum;" cf., *In II Sent.,* d. 34, q. 1, a. 1, Sol.; *In I Periherm.,* 1, *5.*

••*Summa Cont. Gent.,* I, c. *53; De Ver.,£, £;De Pot.,* 8, 1; 9, *5; Q. Quodlibet.,* 7, q. 1, a. 4.

[14] *In Boeth. de Trin., 5,* 3, n. 9-11, p. 38: "Secunda vero operatio respicit ipsum esse rei, quod quidem resultat ex congregatione principiorum rei in compositis; " cf., *In I Sent.,* d. 38, 1, 3, Sol.

[75] The intentional reiteration of the principles of the real in judgment *is* detailed in: *Summa Theol.,* I, *85, 5,* ad 3.

•• *In I Sent.,* 38, 3, ad. £.

[77] E.g., *Summa Theol.,* I, 16, £.

stractions to the level of separate subsistence is rooted precisely in the truth that the intellect, when predicating meaning of meaning, must take the meaning of an abstract subject *as though it were a substance,* hence a subject of existing.[78] St. Thomas identified this aberration in his treatise *On the Virtues* where he remarked that virtues which signify in the abstract are often taken to signify in the concrete and thus are handled by the mind as though they were what they are not: things.[79]

A comparable trick can be played by the mind on itself in metaphysical discourse and this trick can be avoided only by a constant use of the judgment of negation. When being *(esse)* functions as a subject of predication, it must perforce operate as a subject of being-which *esse* is not, as argued earlier. In functioning as a subject in the *ens rationis* which is judgment, *esse* plays the role of a determined potency and ultimately the role of a specified matter. Unless the philosopher is aware of what is going on he is open to subtly converting metaphysics into logic. The Thomistic *esse* is in every sense act and in no sense potency but the very judgment, a conclusion, declaring this to be true declares it of a subject and hence of a potency. As utilized by the intelligence as a subject for significant predications, *esse* carries the role of a determined potency and not of a determined act, of a specified substance or subject, or an informed matter. The Thomistic metaphysician must deny this entire structure to being even as he insists on the being· true of the predications exercised by a man with the metaphysical *habitus.* Given that the "Is" of speech is a mimesis of the " Is " of things; given, again, that this " Is " intellected directly in judgment and signified by the copula is made to do the non-natural duty of functioning as a subject of being; given that " Is " is never a subject of being, it follows that every metaphysical statement of this type collapses into the nonsense metaphysics it is thought to be by Kantians and

[78] *In Lib. Bo,eth. de Trin. 5,* 8, n. 1-6, p. 41; *Summa Theol.,* I, 84, 1.
[79] *De Virtutibus,* a. 11.

positivists unless accompanied by a series of negative judgments which preserve the truths affirmed but which deny the rational modes under which these truths are affirmed. Any reifying of the principles of nature is in itself a sufficiently grave error but at least it is a mitigated error because these principles-matter and form and the rest- are principles of things. But the conversion of the being of things into a being itself, a thing totally open to all kinds of subsequent determinations ,as are all things, opens itself to the Kantian attack against a metaphysics which objectifies principles which are simply never experienced as objects in any proper sense of the term. There is no " intuition of being " in the metaphysics of St. Thomas, at least as we understand the term intuition in modern philosophical terminology.

What is true of " existence " as a subject is analogously true of " existence" as a predicate, making the proper shift from potency to act. All predicates are acts in the logical order but they are acts in the Aristotelian sense of acts as determinants and specifications. In the judgment which states that "The ultimate perfeotion is existence," the predicate determines the subject as do all predicates determine all subjects. Nonetheless, Aquinas never ceases to inform us that *esse* in no .sense determines but in every sense is determined.[80] The proposition is true but its noetic structure belies that truth unless consciously denied. Scandal here is avoided because Thomistic truth is not meaning but a "being-known-to-be."[81] When the quasi-predicate 'existence" is predicated of the subject "God," the subject is determined rationally by the predicate according to the formal structure of judgment as under.stood by Aquinas. But the " existence " predicated, he tells us, is simply *not* God's act of existing.[82] Were it God's act of Being we would grasp God directly in judgments affirming Him to exist. "Existence"

[80] *In I Sent.*, d. Q3, 1, l; *De Pot.,* 7, fl, ad 9.

[81] *Summa Theol.,* I, 16, *Q; In I Sent.,* d. 19, *5,* 1, ad 7; *De Ver.,* 1, 3 and 9; *Cont. Gent.* 1, *59; De An.,* 3, 11.

[82] *Summa Theol.,* I, S, 4, ad fl.

here is taken in its second sense of signifying the composition of propositions-" *quam anima adinv'enit coniungens praedicatum subiecto."* [83] (An equivocation based on current English usage must be avoided: "mtional" is not opposed to "real" as is "non-being" to "being." Rational "being" *is real being* but it is not extramental being: rational being is being not as exercising existence but as exercised by an intelligence). Were existence taken in the first sense, existence would signify concretely as a subject of being; but *esse* always signifies, as indicated, *in abstracto.* What is known, thus, is not the Being of God " *non possumus scire esse Dei* "-nor is His Essence which is His Being known-" *sicut nee eius essentiam."* [84] *"Scimus enim quod haee propositio quam formamus de Deo, cum dicimus: Deus est, vera est."* [85] This truth about the noetic structure of predication made 0:f existence heightens the peculiar structure of metaphysical discourse. Man knows that things exist in judgments bearing immediately on things sensed and perceived. From that primitive and direct knowledge men reason to the existence of causes not at this moment sensed and perceived directly. In no situation do men, in the normal course of perceiving things and reasoning to the existence of other things, worry about the exact metaphysical status of the " is " they are knowing all along the spectrum of their day to day cognizing of the real. The metaphysican-in St. Thomas's understanding 0:f the role 0:f first philosopher-makes a series of judgments about God as Cause 0:f the being of the things that are. The essence of God is simply blacked out because God's essence is His existence, and existence, even the existence of the most trivial thing in the universe, cannot be held before the mind as though it were an intelligible object, subject for predication, or predicate 0:f some other subject. If we cannot objectify in some privileged idea the being of anything, then how could we pull off this act in the case of He Who Is? *Esse,* to fall under the scope 0:f the metaphysical *habitus,* must

••*Ibid.* ••*Ibid.* ••*Ibid.*

operate as though it were a variety of essential or natural principles of which *esse* in truth is their being but which are not identically *esse.*

A subject in the proper Aristotelian sense of the term as a subject of ,a science must have *some* proper intelligibility of its own permitting it to operate as a subject of predication. Given the peculiar paradox of the Thomistic judgment and theThomistic *esse,* this proper intelligible subjectification must be denied Thomistic metaphysics. *Esse* is not precisely the subject of metaphysics. The *ens inquantum ens,* or *ens ut ens est* retains the participial substantive as the " subject matter" of the discipline. Given that *esse* is not subsistent but is the principle of anything that might subsist; given that *esse* is both prior to and " accidental " *(largo modo)* to substance and hence cannot play the role of substance or subject proper to anything subjected to predication, *esse* cannot " stand before" the mind as the subject of the discipline of metaphysics. *Esse* simply is not something *there* to be captured in sensation and perception from which an intelligible species could be abstracted by the agent intellect. The indirect conceptualization of *esse* cannot be so expanded by the mind that it is cut away from the concept of *ens.*

St. Thomas hammers this home in *Quodlibetales IX* [86] in a

[86] *Quodlib., IX.* 3, c: "Respondeo dicendum, quod esse dupliciter dicitur, ut patet per Philosophum in V Meta., et in quadam Glossa Origenes super principium Joan. Uno modo, secundum quod est copula verbalis significans compositionem cujuslibet enuntiationis quam anima facit; unde hoc esse non est aliquid in rerum natura, sed tantum in actu animae componentis et dividentis; et sic esse attribuitur omni ei de quo potest propositio formari, sive sit ens, sive privatio entis; dicimus enim caecitatem esse. Alio modo esse dicitur actus entis in quantum est ens; idest quo denominatur aliquid ens actu in rerum natura; et sic esse non attribuitur nisi rebus ipsis quae in decem generibus continentur; unde ens a tali esse dictum per decem genera dividitur. Sed hoc esse attribuitur alicui dupliciter. Uno modo ut sicut ei quod proprie et vere habet esse vel est; et sic attribuitur soli substantiae per se subsistenti: unde quod vere est, dicitur substantia in I Physic. Omnia vero quae non per se subsistunt, sed in alio et cum alio, siv.e sint accidentia sive formae substantiales aut quaelibet partes, non habent esse ita ut ipsa vere sint, sed attribuitur eis esse. Alio modo, idest ut quo aliquid est; sicut albedo dicitur

theological context in which he is discussing the Three Persons of the Trinity. Of interest within the economy of this study is his insistence that the subsisting whole in creatures, *ens*, " results "from the principles integrated by *esse* as synthesizing activity. [87] But unless *esse* integrates and thus unifies into substantial reality, no *ens* exists. Whereas *esse* posits essence in all its principles by being the very existing of essence, that without which essence is simply nothing, *esse* is a formal result of essence and is thus "quasi-constituted" by the principles of e.ssence.[88] But this occurs only in that which subsists, substance, and properly speaking the name *ens* is only given to what " has existence": i.e., to whatever subsists. [89] In turn, essence, understood strictly, is not the existing thing but is that by which what is is *what* it is.[90] The *res*, taken from *"rear, reris,"* deriving from " to think," can apply indifferently to an essence existing in the intelligible or thought order of being and it can apply to that which is " *ratum et firmum in natura."* [91] The

esse, non quia ipsa in se subsistat, sed quia ea aliquid hahet esse album. Esse ergo proprie et vere non attribuitur nisi rei per se subsistenti; huic autem attribuitur esse duplex. Unum scilicet esse resultans ex his ex quibus ejus unitas integratur, quod proprium est esse suppositi substantiale."

[87] *Ibid.;* cf., F. Wilhelmsen, "Existence and Esse," *The Ne,w Scholasticism,* V. L, n. 1, 1976, pp. 20-45.

[88] *In IV Meta.,* lect. 2, n. 558: "Esse, enim, rei quamvis sit aliud ab ejus essentia, non tamen et intelligendum quod sit aliquod superadditum ad modum accidentis sed quasi constituitur per principia essentiae. Et, ideo hoc nomen ens quod imponitur ab ipso esse, significat idem cum nomine quod imponitur ab ipsa essentia."

[89] *In XII Meta.,* lect. 1, n. 2419: "Ens dicitur quasi esse habens, hoc autem solum est substantia, quae subsistit."

[00] *De Ente et Essentia,* c. 1, p. 4: " sed essentia dicitur secundum quod per earn et in ea ens habet esse."

[91] *In I Sent.,* d. 25, q. 1, a. 4, Sol.: "Respondeo dicendum, quod, secundum Avicennam, ut supra dictum est, hoc nomen 'ens,' et 'res' differunt secundum quod est duo considerare in r.e, scilicet quidditatem et rationem ejus, et esse ipsius; et a quidditate sumitur hoc nomen ' res.' Et quia quidditas potest habere esse, et in singulari quod est extra animam et in anima, secundum quod est apprehensa ab intellectu; ideo nomen rei ad utrumque se habet: et ad id quod est in anima, prout 'res ' dicitur a ' reor, reris,' et ad id quod est extra animam, prout 'res ' dicitur quasi aliquid ratum et firmum in natura. Sed nomen entis sumitur ab esse rei."

"ratum" (from reor)-the "reckoned", or "calculated" or " measured " and hence " thought "-suggests precisely what is denoted in English by " thing " : *something* determined and fixed in the real: if not determined and fixed in the real, then certainly not measured or calculated in thought. But the word "being," *ens,* is taken from *esse.*[92] St. Thomas's *ens* is only *ens* because it "has 'to be'." *"Ens dicitur quasi esse habens."* [98] *"Nomen entis ab esse imponitur."* [94] St. Thomas's *esse* is not a scientific subject isolated from the concept of *ens* because that very concept is intelligible only in the light of *esse. All* human knowing is about beings *(entia)* in one or another manner but only metaphysics understands them precisely in that which renders them beings. This " existing," as argued throughout, simply bypasses both conventional "objectification" and, if I be permitted again a neologism, " subjecti:fication."

Thomism is beyond the conventional attack launched by Kantians and neo-positivists and the genius of Aquinas was such that the principles in question were already operating in his own metaphysics. The Thomistic metaphysics of being transcends the well-known Kantian and positivist critique of a metaphysics with no experienced object. St. Thomas never said that *esse* was such an object: on the contrary, he denied it. The testimony of the *De Hebdomadibus* renders the conventional attack against metaphysics an arrow aimed at a rationalist target that was never there when St. Thomas Aquinas did his thinking on these issues. In turn, the Hegelian dialectic assumes that only objects exist. Hegel does not have the subtle noetic needed to handle acts that St. Thomas has. Hegelian vacant being engendering its own opposite is exactly what Hegel thought it to be: Nothing at all-hence 1as irrelevant for metaphysical discourse as are all dialectical philosophies. Thomism transcends the dialectic. Absorbing the valid insights of Parmenides's insistence that being must include its own dif-

••*In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 1, a. 1, Sol: "Nomen entis ab esse imponitur."
••*In XII Meta.*, Iect. 1, n.
•• Cf. footnote

ferences, St. Thomas's metaphysics escapes the monism of Parmenides by refusing to convert existence into a subject of itself. And Thomistic metaphysics can do all this because it constantly has at hand the negative tool of judgment which denies that metaphysical truths are as we know them. Even the very structure of that act, judgment, which affirms being"' must be denied to represent noetically the supreme mystery that it carries to the mind.

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THE DIRECT /INDIRECT DISTINCTION IN MORALS

THE PRINCIPAL TOOL within the Catholic moral tradition for dealing with conflict-situations has been the principle of double effect. Reflecting upon and expanding certain remarks of Aquinas on the indirect voluntary, moralists have refined the principle and applied it to an increasing number of moral issues since the second half of the 16th century up to the pre.sent day.[1] The central nerve of the principle is the notion that evil should never be the object of direct intention whether as an end *(per se et propter se)* or as a means to a good end *(per se sed non propter se)*. Three of the four well-known conditions for legitimate application of the principle are aimed at insuring indirect voluntariety (a permitting rather than an intending will) relative to an act which one foresees will have both a good and an evil effect. First, the *finis operis,* the inner object or constitutive intentionality of the act itself, as distinguished from the effects of the act, must be morally good or at least indifferent. Just as in structuralist thought a literary piece has an intersubjective intentionality or

[1] For Aquinas, the indirect voluntary refers to the foreseen but unwilled effect of an *omission,* (cf. I-II, q. 6, a. 3). It was Medina, Vasquez and their followers of the latter half of the 16th century who extended the concept to apply rather to the foreseen but unintended effect of a *commission.* Cf. J. Ghoos, "L'acte a double effet," *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovaniensis,* 1951, v. 27, pp. 30-52. J. Ghoos, whom I here follow, disagrees with J. Mangan who believes that Aquinas actually developed the notion of the indirect voluntary to apply to commissions in his article on self-defense (II-II q. 64, a. 7) and that subsequent authors perfected the principle of double effect in meditation upon this article; cf. "An Historical Analysis of the Principle of Double Effect," *Theological Studies,* 1949, v. 10, pp. 41-61. P. Knauer disagrees with Ghoos's criticisms of Mangan; cf. "The Hermeneutical Function of the Principle of Double Effect," *Natural LOJW Forum,* 1967, v. rn, p. 183. An earlier study which Mangan attacks and Ghoos defends is that of V. Alonso, *El principio del doble efecto- en los comentadores de Santo Tomas de Aquino,* Rome, 1937.

life of its own independent of the intentions of the author, so in traditional moral theology an act is viewed in its immediate and constitutive result *(finis operis)* as having an intersubjective moral meaning independent of the concrete intention of the agent and the consequences of the act. This *finis operis,* moreover, is the principal moral index; if it is morally evil the act can never be deemed objectively good, but at best subjectively inculpable due to extrinsic guilt-reducing factors such as ignorance, fear, passion and the like. The second condition is that the agent's intention must encompass only the good effect of the act and not the evil effect. The third condition is that the evil effect of the act must not mediate the good effect; the evil effect must not be the means willed whereby the good effect is produced. There is a fourth condition, viz., that there must be a proportionate reason for positing such a polyvalent moral act. This last condition has little bearing upon ensuring the indirect voluntariety of the act and can be viewed as a teleological or quasi-utilitarian consideration about consequences. It concerns more directly the production of the good than the deontological rightness or fittingness of the act.

I

Until recently most twentieth century Catholic authors have acknowledged the broad moral relevance of the principle of double effect and of the embodied distinction between an intending (direct) and permitting (indirect) will. During the last decade, however, several authors, led by P. Knauer,[2] have insisted that in analyzing the moral meaning of a human decision, we have considered the act posited too abstractly and absolutely, treating it too readily as a unit of meaning which is by itself susceptible of a moral index.[8] These authors prefer

[2] *Op. cit.,* pp.

[•] The problem of describing human action is thorny, as Bentham knew and a number of modern philosophers have discovered. There seems to be room for many plausible descriptions of an action depending upon the *context.* Within a purely aesthetic context understood as such the action of killing a man

to treat the posited act or means as a constitutive part or stage of a larger whole, which whole is the primary object of one's intention and thus is the only true unit of moral significance. The traditional emphasis, on the *ex objecto* evil of an act prior to consideration of any circumstance or intention, it is claimed, has led to conclusions which are too literal, mechanical or artificial, conclusions which are in some cases morally erroneous.

An oft-cited example is that of ectopic pregnancy where the embryo is developing within the fallopian tube. When medical authority began describing the tube as pathological in itseH prior to the lodging of the embryo therein, Catholic moralists applied the principle of double effect and allowed doctors to excise the tube with the intention of curing the pathology in the realization that while the act saved the life of the woman it would destroy the non-viable embryo which was present in the excised tube. The object of the act performed was characterized as the good act of " excising a malfunctioning organ " and the death of the embryo was viewed as an oblique side effect only indirectly willed. These same moralists forbade doctors to shell out the embryo from the tube thus correcting the problem while leaving the tube and the woman's fertility intact.

with a gun might be legitimately described as a beautiful flourish of the arm and hand. In most ordinary contexts, however, and certainly in the context of morality, part of whose very definition includes the note of concern about the import of our interventions on sentient beings or persons as such, (Cf. Frankena, *Ethics,* 2nd ed., N. Y., Prentice Hall, Chap. 6) the immediate result of this kind of action is so important that it must be brought out explicitly in the description of the act. To answer the question: What did he do? in our moral context it does not suffice to stop at the physical movements of the agent and say merely "He fired a gun" or to elide the means into a good purpose and say simply "He saved the life of his friend." If so extreme a means is used to attain even so noble a goal it is necessary that the means be explicitated in our description of what is done. We must say: He killed a man in order to save the life of his friend. To maintain that moral experience demands this explicitation of "important" acts is not yet to commit oneself to a particular moral theory. Such a position on action-description is compatible with act-utilitarianism as well as with a strict deontologism. Cf. Eric D'Arcy, *Human Acts* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 18 ff. and Paul Ramsey, *Deeds and Rules. in Christian Ethics* (N. Y.: Scribner's 1967), pp. 192 ff.

This was considered a directly intended killing of the embryo and the direct intention of an intrinsically evil act even as a means to a proportionate good was not allowed.

Today several contemporary Catholic moralists believe that the shelling out of the embryo is morally preferable on the grounds that on balance it causes less evil than the excising of the tube; even though both methods kill the embryo and save the mother, the former method avoids the mutilation and reduction of fertility of the woman. The more conservative among this group like G. Grisez attempt to construe the shelling out of the embryo in such circumstances as still comprising an indirectly intended causation of evil by placing less stress upon the physical action done and more upon the intention in their description of the act.[4] Others, however, criticizing more radically, feel that the whole traditional emphasis upon the distinction between direct and indirect intentionality is misguided, and that it should be downplayed or even discarded in favor of the principle of the proportionate good or the lesser of two evils, a principle which, on their view, more closely expresses the true substance of the moral enterprise and harmonizes more closely with our moral experience.

Among this second group we find Van der Marek [5] and Van der Poel.[6] Influenced by P. Knauer they begin by insisting that the question: "What act is being done?" cannot be answered by pointing to the immediate causal result alone of the intervention. Rather, a proper description of a human act must encompass and emphasize the foreseen end motivating the act. (The intention, in fact, becomes the paramount feature in a proper description of a human act *qua* human.) A human act is not merely a physical or causal intervention in the world.

• Grisez, as we will see below, attempts a more nuanced analysis of the causal relationship between the act and its effects.

[5] Cf. *Toward A Christian Ethic*, N. Y., Newman Press, 1967, Chap. 2.

[6] Cf. "The Principle of Double Effect," in *Absolutes in Moral Theology?*, ed. Chas. Curran, Washington, Corpus Books, 1968, pp. 186-210, and *The Search for Human Values*, N. Y. Paulist Press, 1971, Chap. III.

An act as *human* act must be viewed as an organic whole whose two aspects are the constitutive causal intentionality of the act *(finis operis) and* the end-in-view. The aspects considered isolatedly and in themselves should not be given any moral weight or index for the good or the bad. Only the totality of the act is a proper candidate for moral adjudication. [7] Finally, the sole criterion of moral desirability is whether or not this entire whole is seen to be community-building in the long term. In the example cited, the shelling out of the embryo would be preferable to the excision of the tube on the ground that it constitutes an intermediate *pre-moral* stage in a larger totality of intersubjective moral meaning whose principal determinant is the end-in-view, viz., the saving of the life as well as the fertility of the mother. The moral desirability of this complex of factors is judged on the grounds that it is more community-building (utility-maximizing) than the more conservative alternative of excising the tube with the embryo. It gains the day because, although it causes the death of the embryo, it preserves full fertility while the other alternative diminishes the woman's physical integrity while also killing the embryo. The human act comprehensively viewed, then, is deemed morally correct. The immediate physical intervention performed (the shelling out of the embryo) is construed as partaking of the *positive* moral good of the whole human act. As such, morally speaking, it can be not only permitted but even directly intended as part of the totality of factors which is seen as producing more good in the situation than any other possible complex of factors. The moral act is here analyzed in terms of decision / consequences rather than in terms of act / consequences; the emphasis on means (or action) so paramount in traditional moral theology falls away and the *finis operis* of the act performed must take its place alongside the more mediate effects of the action.

[7] Cf. Bruno Schiiller's criticism of Van der Marek for construing "homicide" as a mere physical aspect of an act, an aspect which in itself does not yet constitute a unit of intersubjective meaning. "Neuere Beitrage zum Thema ' Begriindung sittlicher Normen" *Theologische Berichte* 4, Einsiedeln: Benziger, 1974, pp. 137-188.

Though his own position owes much to this type of analysis, R. McCormick correctly criticizes these authors for not carving out precise criteria for deciding *when* a piece of behavior may legitimately be construed as " an intermediate stage " in a larger complex of meaning. He asks whether" every pre-moral evil which occurs in any way in conjunction with my activity 'may' be reduced to an intermediate stage?" [8] For example, "is the killing of innocent children to get at the enemy's morale simply an 'intermediate stage ' of an action describable as 'national self-defense?'" [9] Irrespective of what these authors might personally hold on these questions, there is nothing in these theories to preclude an affirmative answer. So, it is difficult to see how these theories would differ from a thoroughgoing act-utilitarianism. Act-utilitarianism is a completely future-oriented theory which strives to choose the act in a situation which it is foreseen will produce the best consequences for society as a whole. It de-emphasizes almost entirely considerations concerning the causal act itself. It views all acts as utilmately morally neutral when viewed apart from a situation and is open to the possibility of any act becoming a *positive right·· makin.g characteristic* in some situation. Talk of intrinsic moral evil of acts in any sense is avoided and rules forbidding actions if invoked at all are secondary rules of thumb or open-ended empirical generalizations necessary only because people often lack the time, perspicuity or emotional control to assess each new situation *ab ovo.* The constant criticism of act-utilitarianism over the years has emphasized especially its inability to coherently encompass what philosophers have called " duties of perfect obligation " like justice, fidelity, reparation and gratitude.10

[8] *Ambiguity in MO'l'al Choice,* Pere Marquette Lecture, 1978, p. SO. See also Paul Ramsey's critique of these views as applied to the morality of organ transplants by Van der Poel, *The Patient as Person,* Yale Univ. Press, pp. For a response to Ramsey by R. McCormick see" Transplantation of Organs: A Comment on Paul Ramsey," *Theological Studies* 1975, V. 86, No. S, pp. 508-509.

[9] *"Ibid.*

[10] Because of these criticisms many utilitarians have moved to a rule-utilitarilMl-

The more conservative ethicist Germain Grisez agrees with other contemporary moralists that the traditional textbook handling of the principle of double effect over.stressed the physical causality of the act.[11] He retains, however, the importance of the direct-indirect distinction in morals and does not so thoroughly demote the relevance of the causal means posited. Grisez is concerned to avoid utilitarianism by remaining within the framework of the principle of double effect. But he does attempt a refinement on the criteria for determining when an evil produced in or by an act might be construed as indirectly willed in an act which in its overall thrust is aimed at the production of a proportionate good. He invokes the practical indivisibility of the act by human choice as a sufficient condition for deciding which aspects of the act are to be construed as

ism (of which there are many variations) wherein greatest happiness considerations (utility) are seen as giving rise to certain very stringent rules of practice which must be adhered to strongly or for some even absolutely and universally if the greatest happiness for society at large is to be procured. These rules are justified by their utility and acts only by their conformity to the rules in question. Some have argued that the distinction between rule- and act-utilitarianism cannot be consistently maintained. (Cf. Lyons, *Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism* (N. Y. Oxford University Press, 1965) and Jan Narveson, *Morality and Utility* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), pp. Hl3-140.) John Rawls, himself not a utilitarian, presents the best defense of the coherence of a distinction between act- and rule-utilitarianism and the superiority of the latter in " Two Concepts of Rules," *The Philosophical Review,* Vol. LXIV (1955), pp. 3-32. Cf. also J. Margolis's criticism of Rawls in *Values and Conduct* (N. Y., Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 160-171. Cf. also H. J. McCloskey's criticism of Rawls in "An Examination of Restricted Utilitarianism," *Philosophical Revi1'W,* 1957, V. LXVI, pp. 466-485. For a nuanced version of rule-utilitarianism see Richard B. Brandt, " Toward a Credible Form of Utilitarianism" in *Morality and the Language of Conduct,* ed. Castaneda and Kakhnikian (Detroit, Wayne State Univ. Press, 1963). The similarities between philosophical discussions in utilitarian theory and contemporary discussions in Catholic moral theology are concisely presented by John R. Connery, S. J. in "Morality of Consequences: A Critical Appraisal," *Theological Studies,* 1973, V. 34, pp. 396-414. Cf. also McCormick's "Notes on Moral Theology," *Theological Studies,* 1975, V. 36, pp. 93-99 and Bruno Schuller, *op. cit.,* pp. 109-81.

[11] Cf. Grisez, *Abortion: the Myths, the Realities and the Arguments* (N. Y., Corpus Books, 1970), pp. 321-346. The same doctrine is presented in less technical terms in Grisez and R. Shaw, *Beyond the New Morality* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), pp. 138-149.

means and which as effect. He maintains that when an act is posited with two effects (one good and one evil), if no other act *does* intervene or *could in practice* intervene between the action posited and one or other of the effects then the effects should be said to be produced with equal immediacy. In such a case, moreover, the good effect may without arbitrariness be considered as the sole object of direct intention while the evil is considered as merely permitted. In other words, if the good effect emanates from the act posited with equal causal immediacy as the bad effect it is not then related to the bad effect as means to an end and thus if there is present a proportionate reason, then the act is morally permissible. If the good effect does or could conceivably arise from a causal act which is posterior to a more original act which causes the evil effect, then this more original act must be construed as aiming at evil alone and is morally :forbidden.[12]

Pursuant to his principle, Grisez contends that one cannot justify the commission of adultery by a mother aiming to be released from a concentration camp in order to succor her children, because the saving effect would not be present in the one act which is also adulterous but in a subsequent human act-that of the person who orders their release. In such an instance adultery would be intended as an evil means to a good end. On the other hand, a mother who saves her child by purposely interposing her body as a shield against an attacking animal is justified since the very performance which is self-destructive is also with equal immediacy protective. Organ transplants which involve the deprivation of the life of the donor (e.g., a father giving his heart for his son) are immoral because the two aspects, excision and implantation are factually separable; this

[12] " Regardless of intention, the structure of the act is what it is. It does not change simply because one's intention is directed toward one aspect rather than the other. Even though, in emotional terms, a person may not feel that he intends the destructive aspect of the action, nevertheless it is inescapable that he intend it inasmuch as it is required as the means to reaching the end toward which his feelings are directed." Grisez and Shaw, *Bey<md the New Mondity*, p. 141.

for Grisez translates into the killing of one as a means to the saving of the other. Capital punishment is not morally justifiable: the argument from deterrence, even if factually defensible, is " ethically invalid, because the good is achieved in other human acts, not in the execution itself." [13] Grisez does, however, allow an abortion to save the life of the mother, because here the removal of the fetus produces at once (with equal causal immediacy) the good effect and the bad effect. The shelling out of the ectopic embryo is also morally permissible because the one same act which produces the death of the embryo produces with equal immediacy the saving of the life of the mother.

II

McCormick welcomes Grisez's refinements upon the criteria for discriminating between direct and indirect voluntariety but criticizes him for not pressing far enough his critique of traditional Catholic moral theory, and specifically for not bringing under question the very moral relevance of the direct-indirect distinction in general.[14] Why must we say that a person turns against the good when an evil means toward a good end is the direct object of an intending will? Is a directly intended homicide always an evil *in se* and if so, why? Does not the end sometimes justify the direct intention of an evil means? McCormick's own view is closer to that of Bruno Schiiller by whom he is heavily influenced but whom he also criticizes, as we shall see. Schuller retains the moral decisiveness of the direct-indirect distinction only in a drastically reduced number of cases. In line with the traditional doctrine he agrees that one can never posit an act which is morally, intrinsically evil. But he differs from the tradition in the identification of such acts which are intrinsically evil. He draws a clear-cut distinction between two types of evils which may constitute the *finis operis*

[13] *Abortion, the Myths, the Realities and the Arguments,* p. 336.
[14] *Ambiguity in Moral Choice,* p. 49 fl'.

of human acts, moral evil and non-moral evil.[15] An act is intrinsically evil with the effect that it is never to be directly intended only if it in its immediate causal nature *(finis operis)* constitutes in itself a *moral* evil and not if it constitutes only a non-moral evil. And the only act which seems to qualify for Schuller is an act of scandal.[10] To directly will and commit scandal is never justifiable by a good end, no matter how important, because scandal is *ex objee;to* a moral evil in itself. The *finis operis* of any of the other acts traditionally labelled intrinsically evil is for Schuller only a non-moral evil. As examples he cites,. e.g., homicide, lying, sterilization, which effect the non-moral evils of death, error, infertility, and so on. For Schuller such acts may, morally speaking, be directly intended and performed if there is a proportionate reason, if, in other words, the positing of such non-morally evil acts constitutes the lesser of two non-moral evils in a situation. Concurring with Schuller thus far McCormick remarks relative to the axiom that the end does not justify the means, "If it means that a non-moral good (end) does not justify a morally bad means, it is correct. If, however, it is understood to mean that no good end (whether the good be moral or non-moral) can justify a *non-moral* evil means, it is false; for it is precisely the good end envisaged that justifies causing or permitting a non-moral evil."[11]

As I mentioned, McCormick will have difficulty with other aspects of Schiiller's position, but before I enter into this allow me to set forth a confusion of which I believe this whole new

[15] Other authors influenced by Knauer and Schuller speak of "pre-moral evil" (Fuchs) and of "ontic evil" (Janssens). All of these terms are synonymous and seem to be identical in meaning with the concept of *malum physicum* of the tradition. Cf. J. Fuchs, "The Absoluteness of Moral Terms," *Gregorianum,* 1971, V. pp. 415-457 and L. Janssens, "Ontic Evil and Moral Evil," *Louvain Studws,* V. 4, pp. 115-56.

[1]. Cf. "Direkte Totung-Indirekte Totung," *Theologie und Philosophie,* V. 47, pp. 841-857.

[17] "Notes on Moral Theology," *Theological Studies,* March 1976, V. 87, n. 1, pp. 76-77.

school (Schiiller, Fuchs, Janssens, McCormick *et* alii) is guilty. It is the confusion between I) the *finis opens* of a human act and 2) the effect brought about in the act. The first refers to the tendency or intentionality of the act, which *includes* the note of the *causality* of the act as well as the effect; whereas the second is simply the immediate effect of the act. The first concept refers to the £act that the act *is aimed causally at* " *X* " while the second refers to the " X " in and of itself. Applied to the case of direct homicide, £or instance, one must not conflate but distinguish between the non-moral evil immediately effected (death) and the free causation of that same non-moral evil (homicide) .[18] What must be remembered is that what precisely demands justification here is homicide and not the immediate effect which is death; the question, in other words, is whether homicide can be the object of direct intention £or a good end. We must agree that" death" is not, in itself, a moral concept- it refers to a non-moral, ontic or pre-moral evil-but the concept of the free causation of death has at least minimal *moral* meaning in itself prior to consideration of intention and circumstances; such an act might well be construed as intrinsically evil in a weaker sense than that of the manual tradition.[19] This would allow us to speak of the principle of the lesser moral evil as one of the basic principles guiding actions in morals.

Why does an act have always to be morally overriding in itself in a situation to be construed as a bearer of moral meaning in itself? (Let us grant £or the sake of argument that

[18] Cf. similar criticisms by G. Ermecke levelled especially against J. Fuchs in "Das Problem der Universalitiit oder Allgemeingiiltigkeit sittlicher Normen innerweltlicher Lebensgestaltung," *Munchener Theologische Zeitschrift,* 1973, V. 24, pp. 1-24. Cf. also J. Fuchs response, "Sittliche Normen-Universalien und Generalisierungen," *op. cit.,* V. *25,* 1974, pp. 18-33. See also Paul Quay's searching critique of the trend to de-emphasize acts and means, "Morality by Calculation of Values," *Theology Digest,* 1975, V. 23, pp. 347-364.

[1]· This resembles closely the very strong tradition in Anglo-American ethics of *prima-facitJ* moral duties fathered by W. D. Ross in his works *The Right and the Good* (Oxford, Clarendon, 1930), and *Foundation of Ethics* (Oxford, Clarendon, 1939). For the most systematic critical evaluation of this whole tradition see 0. Johnson, *Rightness and Goodness* (The Hague, Martinus Nijhofl', 1959).

" scandal " does constitute such an overridingly evil act.) It seems to me that " direct killing of an innocent," for example, might well be construed as a bearer of negative moral meaning, onstage as it were, even if one goes on to say that theoretically it might be morally tolerated in some drastic situation. It could be characterized as "intrinsically evil," though in a weaker sense than that of the tradition. This would mean that it would not always be forbidden whatever the circumstances. And if it is performed when it is morally tolerable it would *not* produce moral guilt but it would still be a bearer of certain moral claims and generate what I will call *creative regret.* This will demand further explanation below.

But the argument may be pressed in still another way-in terms of moral rules.[2°] From this point of view the question which is being asked is whether the fact that we sometimes are allowed *not* to follow a particular rule in action entails that the rule does not apply in any way in that case, or that, in other words, it is not really a *moral* rule. Can two rules be said to apply to a situation in a moral sense even when they apparently give contradictory advice and we clearly cannot follow both in practice? Now if two such rules were constantly to clash, it would certainly be a sign of basic and systematic incoherence. Moral dilemmas do occur, however, where two rules which we usually fol1ow happen in this particular case to point in divergent directions. In such cases what is the status of the rule we do not follow? I may, for instance, experience at one and the same time the moral obligation to return a gun by Saturday morning because of a promise to do so and the moral obligation not to return it because of my knowledge that the owner has decided to commit homicide with it on that day. It is clear that my overall moral duty is not to return it, but do I explain my decision by saying that no promise is broken,

•o I am indebted to Bernard Williams and Roger Trigg for the substance of this discussion. Cf. Williams, "Ethical Consistency," *Pmceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1965,* p. 124, and Trigg, "Moral Conflict," *Mind,* 1971 V. 80 pp. 41-55 *(passim).*

because a promise by definition does not hold in such cases? that the fact of the promise exercises no moral claim in such situations? The fact that we feel the need to apologize and make amends for a broken promise even in such a situation indicates :an awareness of a continuing moral demand. It is clear that one should not feel remorse or guilt in such situations but he is certainly morally more sensitive if he feels regret. And part of the meaning of regret is that what I have freely caused is in some way evil and I wish I had not been pressured by the situation to do it. It is to the credit of such thinkers as Schuller, Fuchs, McCormick and J.anssens that they at least speak of such acts in terms of non-moral, pre-moral or ontic *evil.* Their position is clearly removed from that of situationists like Fletcher (and possibly of Van der Marek and Van der Poel) who construe an act like homicide when it is called for as a positive moral good or a positive right-making characteristic within the situation and see no need at all of speaking of regret or mere toleration.

It is clear that where I would differ from the Schuller school is in the fact that I would construe concepts such as homicide as bearers of a negative *moral* meaning (as intrinsically evil in a weak sense) and not merely as bearers of negative ontic or pre-moral meaning. Death is clearly a non-moral evil, but a moral nuance must be maintained between death and homicide. In a moral system the willful causation of death (the human act of homicide) should retain a minimal negative *moral* index. To treat it as a mere non-moral evil leans too far in the direction of act-utilitarianism or situationism which demands the voiding of the intrinsic moral meaning of all action concepts. My view maintains that the *prima-facie* moral meaning of certain negative acts continues to make a moral claim even though such acts may be tolerated because of other features of the situation. The fact that homicide is not a complete or closed moral concept need not take it out of the arena of moral meaning even when it is viewed in isolation.

I would thus construe acts such as homicide, lying, stealing,

etc., as morally intrinsically evil, but in a *weak* sense. By this I mean that they are not for this reason disallowed whatever the consequences, and here I abandon the strong sense of " intrinsically evil " found in the textbook tradition. Such acts are to be construed as the object of a negative moral "ought" but of moral " ought" which is not always decisive or overriding but is *always relevant* in every situation. Objects of such negative moral " oughts " or claims would never be viewed as positive right-making or love-making characteristics of a situation; they may at best become morally tolerable in some situations. The presumption is against them and they are in need of justification. A moral imperative (and meaning) is generated by them in the sense that if the good end sought could be achieved in some other way which avoids them and procures at least an equal amount of good this other must be done. Moreover, even when in some situation an action which is viewed as intrinsically evil in this weak sense can be legitimately posited it is viewed as a source of *creative* regret. In other words, in such cases one's moral obligation would not cease but one would be obliged to actively attempt to make up for the evil wrought. The perpetration of such acts is to be strongly avoided even if it is not necessarily always forbidden, but can never be considered a positive moral feature in any situation. Even though the telling of a falsehood, for example, may be allowed in a particular situation, it can never become a plus-moral feature-a positive right-making characteristic in any situation. As Arnold Isenberg has noted, one can never say of a situation that everything about it is bad except that a falsehood was told.[21]

III

Let us now turn to McCormick's disagreements with Schuller on the question of direct-indirect intention. As we said, he

[21] Cf. " Deontology and the Ethics of Lying," in *Ethics,* ed. Thomson & Dworkin, (N. Y.: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 178.

agrees with Schuller that the direct-indirect distinction is absolute and decisive only in the cases where full *moral* evil is what is directly willed (e.g., scandal). He disagrees with Schuller's further claim, not as yet mentioned in this essay, that the direct-indirect distinction has *no moral relevance whatsoever* in the other cases where what is being willed and caused is pre-moral evil like death, sterility, and the like. He claims that it does have some significance even here albeit not ultimate significance. With this I agree, but I must part company when he develops the justification for the significance. We must avoid direct killing more than we avoid indirect killing, he says, but not on the traditional deontological grounds, but .solely on teleological ones.[22] He cites the oft-discussed case of judicial murder wherein a person is faced with the dilemma of allowing hundreds to die in a potential riot which might be prevented if he framed and had sentenced to death an innocent man. He claims that we feel it would be morally wrong to directly will the killing of this innocent man, not because the act is in itself unjust (deontological grounds) but because we feel that the long-range evil consequences which would accrue to direct killing are so much greater than those which accrue to indirect or accidental killing (teleological grounds) . Direct killing is wrong in a case where indirect killing may be right because of the effects of the precedent set by justifying such killing. The logical implication is that, if in fact it could be shown that the effects were not more devastating, then the direct killing would be equally as acceptable as indirect killing. It is the high improbability that this would ever be true which for McCormick lends absoluteness to the rule against direct killing. Why is judicial murder wrong? "Is it not precisely because we sense that taking the life of this innocent man in these circumstances would represent a capitulation to and encouragement of a type of injustice which in the long run would render many more lives vulnerable? Yet our judgment would be different if the death

[22] *Ambiguity in Moral, Choice,* pp. *56-65,* and

of the one innocent man were incidental (indirect) ." [28] It is clear that McCormick has espoused a type of rule-utilitarianism to cover the vast majority of moral issues. Rule-utilitarians while denying that there are any theoretical behavioral absolutes (rules of action never to be broken whatever the consequences) do espouse certain *practioal* absolutes (rules which in the ordinary circumstances of life are never to be broken). The rules comprising these practical absolutes are virtually airtight. Individual acts are justified only by a direct reference to these rules. The utilitarian quality of the theory remains in the fact that the rules themselves (and changes of rules) are justified solely by the principle of utility, or community-building, that is, by showing that the universal conformity to such fundamental rules will produce a greater degree of happiness or wish-fulfillment in society at large, or in McCormick's case that the lesser evil will be produced. It is in principle possible, though in fact improbable, that society will change enough so that the most fundamental of these rules .should cede to others which would now be seen to be utility-maximizing. Individual actions in situations are justified by their conformity to these rules while the rules themselves are justified by utility and utility alone; this last is the sole ultimate ground of morality. But the grounds adduced by McCormick and other rule-utilitarians in the judicial murder case are only partially correct. I agree with McCormick in his utilitarian-type assessment that more than likely the precedent set by the direct killing of the innocent man will brutalize sensitivities and thus lead to greater long-term evil than allowing the incidental death of even fifty men by riot. In a similar way the use of psychological bombing raids directly destroying whole cities in order to induce surrender of the enemy is a type of practice which if adopted would gradually debase the moral currency and produce more evil in the long-term. As Bernard Williams

[23] Cf. *Ambiguity in Moral Choice,* 1973, Pere Marquette Theology Lecture, p. 64. (Parenthesis mine.)

has pointed out such act-utilitarianism fosters the pre-emptive strike.[24] In a society of utilitarians known to be utilitarian a person knows that you feel obliged to do anything (even something very evil) if you can foresee that it will prevent something more evil. Knowing your readiness for this, he, as a proper utilitarian, will be ready to do something very evil to prevent your evil, and so on. The realization that there is a down-spiraling, pre-emptive logic built into utilitarianism is sufficient to support the proposition that direct killing ought to be avoided with greater rigidity than indirect killing, or even that stringent mles should be set up in this regard. In the riot case the killing of the one man to save fifty could be forbidden even on long-term utilitarian grounds as McCormick holds.

But a closer reflection upon our moral experience reveals that the possible consequences are not the only reason *nor* the *principal* reason why we are appalled at the suggestion that the innocent man be directly framed and killed or that we exploit the psychological effects of bombing the innocent. The reason we are appalled, I submit and hope to show, is because of the crass indignity visited upon an innocent man, because we feel that an *innocent* bystander is being *used* as a means to avoid certain merely tragic deaths which it is foreseen will occur. We experience the same horror at a doctor who would deem to kill a perfectly healthy man in order to obtain transplants to save the lives of five other people. Our horror does not arise primarily out of the thought of what might happen to society if such a practice became the rule. The immediate and principal horror is directed toward the present injustice irrespective of precedents and long-term consequences. The feeling is that it is unfair-and the attempted reduction of fairness or justice to considerations of utility has been the stumbling block of utilitarians from Mill to the present-day.

A proof of our position can be constructed by slightly modi-

2. Cf. *Morality: An Introduction to Ethics,* (N. Y.: Harper & Row, p. 104.)

fying the last case. What if the killing of the one person in the case of the doctor in search of transplants to save five people could be kept completely *secret* and there were no question of bad precedent being set? Would not McCormick, making sole use of teleological criteria as he does, have to condone the doctor because the good consequences of what he does (saving five lives) is better than the evil consequences (the death of the one)? And yet our feeling still remains that injustice would have been done.

Defenders of rule-utilitarianism, using arguments developed by Rawls, attempt to wriggle out of this conclusion by stressing the publicity requirements of the rules of which they speak. Their rules, they claim, are not summary-rules or empirical generalizations, but rules of practice and " it is essential to the notion of a practice that the rules be publicly known as definitive." [25] Rule-utilitarian rules are rules which we are willing to universalize publicly, that is, rules which we prescribe publicly not only to ourselves but to all other men in relevantly similar circumstances. What I would be urging the rule-utilitarian to do, then, in the modified case I present, is to take a step backward and ask whether the rule "Never kill one to save five except when you can keep the affair a secret" would be a rule which he is willing to make part of the public moral code and to urge on *utilitarian grounds* alone as a part of moral education for our children. The rule-utilitarian might feel that when publicity requirements are highlighted then clearly consequential considerations alone will be sufficient to explain the moral outrage we experience at such a prospect. But what is clear is that even allowing for publicity and precedent-setting the proper evaluation of the consequences of such a rule is *prima-facie* still problematical. Asking ourselves whether or not greater welfare will accrue when secrecy is possible, the answer is that it may be that greater welfare would accrue if such a public rule were introduced or again it might not. A

[25] Rawls, " Two Concepts of Rules," *Philosophical Review,* 1955, V. LXIV, p. !'t4.

certain hesitancy remains. What is clear, however, is that there is *no* hesitancy in our immediate moral condemnation of this act. Prior to any consideration about potential repercussions upon society we feel that an injustice is being done which is at least *prima-facie* morally reprehensible whether it is kept a secret or not. And it is this aspect of immediate apodicity which is difficult to explain on utilitarian grounds.[26] It seems to us that even if in fact greater welfare could be produced by having such a rule of practice it would still be *prima-facie* condemnable on other grounds, e.g., on grounds that it is unfair, that it violates equal rights, the dignity of the individual or the like. And whatever the final moral resolution it is at least clear within our moral experience that independently grounded moral claims are clashing-I would dub them claims of dignity versus claims of welfare.

A closer analysis of McCormick's position shows that he really conflates two different and distinct claims. He cites teleological considerations as the sole ground for both 1) the central substance of our conviction that evil directly willed is worse than evil indirectly willed, and 2) our conviction that the rule against some directly willed evils (e.g., direct killing of the innocent) should be airtight or virtually exceptional, a *prac.tioaJ,* absolute. I can agree with the second point but not with the first. The practical airtightness of the rule may be dictated by extrinsic teleological considerations, that is, the play of human rationalization, the setting of precedents, the weakening of human determination not to be a cause of evil, and the like. However, in most cases, the primary intrinsic ground for our conviction that the direct willing of evil (as end

[26] Most Anglo-American moralists, both utilitarians and deontologists, agree that it is quite evident what the correct act is in hard cases like that of judical murder and the case we here present and that an ethical theory which leads to an opposite conclusion must be either modified or dropped. Schuller denies that the actual duty of the protagonist in such cases is so immediately evident. For the sake of argument one can agree with him. He fails to see, however, that there is a *prima facie* duty which is very evident and which seems to rest on non-utilitarian grounds. Cf. Schuller, *Theologische Berichte,* V. 4, pp. 17fl-173.

or as means) is worse than indirect willing arises from the fact that direct willing of evil often constitutes a violation of what I will call "dignity-values " as opposed to " welfare-values." I will attempt to clarify what I mean by this distinction.

IV

Historians of ethics classify the various theories for justifying moral obligations under one of two basic headings, teleology or deontology. Teleologists (utilitarians for one) derive moral obligations like justice from the sole moral imperative that welfare must be maximized. For teleologists the only reason why it is imperative that justice be done is because in fact it will produce a greater degree of some non-moral value, e.g., desire-fulfillment, in, say, society at large. At the heart of deontological theory, however, is the idea that certain obligations like justice are independently grounded and must be met even if a lower degree of desire-fulfillment might in fact ensue.

On my view, the intuitions which generate the distinction between teleology and deontology in obligation-theory relative to human actions give rise to an analogous distinction when one construes his moral theory in the form of an axiology or value-theory. And it is this felt-distinction which gives rise on the level 0:f action to the felt-difference between direct and indirect causation of evil, as we shall see. It is my view that within an axiological :framework there are at base two radically different kinds of reason why actions are wrong. They may be wrong because they violate one or other of two basic but variously important value types. They are wrong because they I) affront dignity reduce welfare (desire-fulfillment) . Values of welfare and values of dignity are two irreducible value-types and though they are ultimately commensurable in terms of degrees of value-in-general [27] values of dignity are to be con-

[27] By value-in-general I mean the " good," which is the most fundamental concept in morals. It is equated neither with values of welfare nor with values of dignity, which axe subsets of the good. My theory then is not ultimately deontological, completely dissociating the right from the good. It conceives

sidered as of far greater importance and must be given far greater weight in a conflict-situation than values of welfare.

Values of welfare center about the fulfillment of whatever potentials for action and enjoyment an entity might have, life, health, pleasure, power, etc. Thus the welfare-values of birds will be different from those of apes and the welfare-values of men will differ from those of both in that besides exercise and food they will include such things as aesthetic enjoyment, scientific knowledge and religious feelings.

Values of dignity, however, have little or nothing to do with the desirability of fulfilling potencies or exercising faculties, with what Rawls has summarized under the title of " the Aristotelian principle." [28] The values of dignity are such things as self-respect, autonomy, fidelity, justice, trust, integrity and the like. Though there will necessarily be some connection between these values and the values of welfare, values of dignity are in large measure independent of the latter. Values of welfare might be lost to a great degree or even entirely (when life is lost) without a person necessarily losing his dignity. Whether a man dies with dignity or without dignity, whether he dies the death of a free man or the death of a slave depends in large measure upon *how* he dies, upon the position of the will of free agents in regard to his death. The values of dignity introduce a quasi-aesthetic dimension into morality. It is these values which cause us to speak of certain actions as fitting or unfitting, as decent or indecent.

Because man's consciousness is self-consciousness his existence is characterized by freedom and precisely because of this freedom (but not solely) does he dwell in the dimension of dig-

of both dignity-values and welfare-values as components of the good of man. It denies, however, that dignity values can be translated in terms of welfare values and vice-versa. The ultimate concept in my moral theory can then be termed love if love is understood as the will to do always in every situation what produces the greatest overall good for man with sensitivity for the differences between the different orders of values.

••*Of. A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), Chap. VII, No. *65,* pp.

nity and indignity and does he experience the emotions of self-respect and indignation. Dogs can be afraid, or even jealous, but hardly indignant. Morality is only secondarily a system for maximizing welfare-values. It is more fundamentally a system regulating the interaction between free self-conscious agents who, because they are free and self-conscious, experience certain very special kinds of desires or needs which if trampled upon produce the special moral emotion of indignation.

Dignity values are of different types. In cases of social morality, e.g., abortion, killing one to procure organ transplants for five others, framing a black man to quell a riot, and the like, the dignity-values involved are primarily those of justice or fairness. A man may legitimately .sacrifice his life to save that of others but this is an act of supererogation or what Russell Grice has called an ultra obligation, a weak type of obligation which does not imply that other people have a corresponding right to expect it from him [29] and *a fortiori* no right to directly extract it from him. In cases of *individual* morality like voluntary euthanasia and suicide, direct willing of death is worse than the oblique or incidental willing allowed under the double effect rule because another class of dignity-value is violated, what I shall call for want of a better name, "nobility-values." Under this category I include such values as courage, self-respect and religious gratitude. Durkheim in his classical work on suicide neglected the importance of these values. As a result he considered irrelevant the position of a person's will relative to the renunciation of his own existence. He lumped together under the title of "suicide" a martyr's dying for the faith, a mother sacrificing her.self for her child and the merchant who kills himself to avoid bankruptcy. Schopenhauer was more sensitive to dignity-concerns when he remarked that the real reason why suicide must be condemned had to do with self-conque.st. The Christian abhors suicide because he views his life as a gift from a " graceful reality " and suicide as the

2. Cf. Russell Grice, *The Grounds of Moral Obligation,* (Cambridge, University Press), Chap. 4.

supreme act of ingratitude and lack of trust. He views suffering not as the ultimate evil but as redemptive and creative of depth of existence and dignity.[30] It is clear that different authors have located and grounded dignity in different ways but many have distinguished it against mere welfare.[31] The task of the Christian ethicist is to discover the religious (and distinctively Christian) dimensions of dignity.[32]

But what has all this to do with the direct-indirect distinction in morals? The direct-indirect distinction is, to my mind, an important second-level moral distinction. It is rooted in and is expressive of a more basic first-level moral distinction, the distinction between the more important dignity values and less important welfare values. It is valid because it generally generates conclusions which coincide with the conclusions generated by the more basic dignity / welfare value distinction. It is moreover practically valuable as a tool because of its greater tangibility. Because value-considerations are often murky, it is important to have a distinction and principle which nuances the more basic distinction hut which trades directly on the level of actions. Actions are more tangible, clear and verifiable than are values, and for this reason rules-of action are important in moral education. We must not underestimate the human willingness to take the easier path when moral duties

[30] For an interesting investigation into an adequate delimitation of the concept of suicide read R. F. Holland, "Suicide," in *Moral Problems,* ed. J. Rachels, (2nd ed., N. Y., Harper and Row, 1975), pp 388-401.

[31] In the words of Robert Brumbaugh, " Ever since there has been a discussion of choice, there has been an intuitive conviction that while some values are additively related, others cannot be. There is no cash price, no degree of comfort, that can persuade a Socrates to give up his pursuit of wisdom or a Beowulf his quest for glory and honor." "Changes of Value Order and Choices in Time," *Values and Valuation.* (ed. John W. Davis, Knoxville, Univ. of Tennessee Press, 1972), p. 51.

[32] A fuller discussion would have to introduce a phenomenology of the religious dimensions of reality as " graceful," which would provide the deeper ground for the salience of dignity-values over welfare-values, a ground which undergirds the considerations of freedom to which we have pointed. For an interesting discussion in this direction see Frederick Carney, "On Frankena and Religious Ethics," *The Journal of Religious Ethics,* 1975, V. III, pp. 7-26.

seem the least bit clouded. Without explicitly realizing it, many authors have emphasized the importance of the direct-indirect distinction in morals without understanding that its importance arises out of the fact that it parallels, at the level of action, the lived experience of the deeper distinction between dignity and welfare and out of the correlative fact that dignity is experienced as far more important than welfare in human interactions. I believe, for instance, that Paul Ramsey's reasons for opposing direct euthanasia even in sad or hopeless cases are dignity considerations. [33] He does not consider direct euthanasia to be an act of injustice but rather a copping-out on the obligation we have of caring for and companying with the dying. The primary operative imperative in these cases, he insists, is "Never abandon care!" It is clear that this imperative centers about dignity-values because compliance with it may well actually lessen welfare and result in more suffering for the patient. For Ramsey this imperative is complied with by one who by using drugs to ease a patient's pain indirectly hastens the dying man's death. It is not complied with if one in his action aims at directly bringing about the patient's death. In direct euthanasia continued " companying" with the dying person in his dying is not possible; we, in a sense, walk off the scene and take the easy way out under the banner of " death with dignity."

Ramsey makes an exception of two cases where the distinction between direct and indirect euthanasia is no longer relevant. The cases he has in mind involve a person who is in a deep irreversible coma or one who is in ultra-severe intractable pain. The point is that since there is no apt recipient of care in these cases you fulfill the imperative "Never abandon care" equally as well by direct killing as by indirect or simply " letting die." McCormick disagrees with Ramsey's exceptions here on the ground that it is in principle impossible until death to know

[33] *The Patient as Person,* (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1970), p. 158. Cf. also "The Indignity of Death with Dignity," *Hastings Center Studies,* V. 2, No. 2, May, 1974, pp. 47-62.

if some form of personality or consciousness remains and because on Ramsey's grounds it would be difficult to argue in favor of the personhood and protection of the unborn fetus.[34] But McCormick concurs that here the direct-indirect principle is parasitic upon the more substantive principle "Never abandon care!" What he does not realize is that Ramsey's operative principle is valid because it embodies concern for an important dignity-value and is not valid simply on utilitarian grounds, that is, simply because in the last analysis a greater welfare might be produced by erecting such a principle into a practice.

V

The Oxford moralist, Philippa Foot, feels that the distinction between doing and allowing (commission-omission) is really the fundamental operative moral distinction in most conflict cases where the principle of double effect was traditionally applied and that the distinction between direct and indirect intentionality is secondary and valid only because it happens to often coincide with the doing / allowing distinction.[35] Failure to bring aid to the starving blacks of the Sahel region of Africa, thus allowing them to die, may be evil but not as evil as would be sending them poison, which violates the negative duty not to kill. Doing something to procure someone's death is worse than doing nothing to prevent someone's death from occurring. Doing evil violates the stronger negative duty of non-interference with another's good while allowing evil violates the less stringent positive duty to bring aid to others.

Michael Tooley disagrees wholeheartedly with Mrs. Foot. He claims that the doing-allowing distinction (and the correlative distinction between negative and positive duties) seem basic only because of other distinctions present in the situations

••Cf. "The New Medicine and Morality," *Theology Digest,* Vol. U, No. 4, Winter, 1973, pp. 312-314.

35 - The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect," *The Oxford Rwierw* 5 (1967), pp. 5-15. Cf. esp. p. 11 :fl'. Reprinted in *Moral, Problems,* (ed. James Rachels, N. Y., Harper and Row, !lnd ed.), 1975.

considered. He feels that the more basic distinction upon which the doing-allowing distinction is parasitic is a distinction within intention. "If a person performs an action he knows will kill someone else, this will usually be grounds for concluding that he wanted to kill the person in question. In contrast, failing to help someone may indicate only apathy, laziness or selfishness ... the fact that a person knowingly allows another to die will not normally be sufficient ground for concluding he desired that person's death. Someone who knowingly kills another is more likely to be seriously defective from a moral point of view than someone who fails to save another's life." [36]

Tooley continues that if we assume identical intentions in the case of doing or allowing evil the distinction between doing and allowing left thus by itself seems morally irrelevant. By way of example he asks us to compare the following: I) Jones sees Smith will be killed by a bomb unless Jones warns him. Jones's reaction is: "How lucky, it will save me the trouble of killing Smith myself." So Jones allows Smith to be killed by the bomb although he easily could have warned him. 2) Jones wants Smith dead and therefore shoots him. Tooley concludes, correctly I believe, that there is no significant difference between the wrongness of Jones's behavior in these two cases.[37] It is thus erroneous to draw a distinction between doing and allowing evil and hold that we have a stricter obligation to avoid the first more than the second. Performing an action in order to cause another's death is in itself no worse than omitting a performance with the intention of procuring his death. "The difference in our intuitions about situations that involve giving aid (positive duty) to others and corresponding situations that involve not interfering with others (negative duties) is to be explained by reference to probable differences in the intentions operating in the two situations and not by reference to a dis-

[36] "Abortion and Infanticide," *Philosophy and Public Affairs,* 2 (1972), p. 59.

[37] James Rachels provides a similar example in an article which defends a position almost identical with Tooley's. Cf. "Active and Passive Euthanasia," *New England Journal of Medicine.* Vol. 292, No. 2, Jan. 9, 1975, p. 79.

tinction between positive and negative duties. For once it is predicated that the motivation is the same in the two situations we realize that inaction is as wrong in the one case as action is in the other." [38]

I believe that Tooley's analysis goes far in dispelling the moral importance of the commission-omission distinction. This distinction is at best a practical rule of thumb, ·a third-level distinction which functions fruitfully only because of other truly operative distinctions with which it happens to coincide. What Tooley's analysis reemphasizes, however, is the importance of the position of the will, of intention, in our moral intutuitions. If intention is *so* important, so also is the distinction between direct and indirect voluntariety which bears upon intention. What we must be careful to avoid is the growing utilitarian tendency of de-emphasizing means by construing them simply as somehow inter-ingredient with ends. The distinction between means and end must be maintained as well as the distinction between an evil directly aimed at as a means and an evil foreseen but not directly aimed at in the perpetration of an action (means). As I have noted, the position of the will, of freedom, relative to the evil performed is at the root of considerations of what I have called considerations of dignity and which I have strongly distinguished from values of welfare.

It is because of the lived-experience of a tension between two distinct types of value (dignity and welfare) that the distinction between deontology and teleology has constantly cropped up in the history of moral theory from Plato to the present day. **It** is the same lived-experience, I believe, which unconsciously motivated traditional moralists to introduce the distinction between the direct and indirect causation of evil as a practical

••Tooley, *op. cit.*, pp. 59-60. (Parentheses mine.) For an attempted refutation of Tooley's argument see Richard Louis Trammell, " Touley's Moral Symmetry Principle," *Philosophy and Public Affairs,* 1976, V. *5,* No. 3, pp. 305-313. See also Trammell, "Saving Life and Taking Life," *The Journal of Philosophy,* 1975, V. 72, No. *5,* pp. 131-137.

rule mediating the more fundamental value distinction. The direct killing of the innocent, for example, is worse than the indirect killing thereof in mo.st cases, primarily because it carries with it both types of disvalue, indignity and ill-fare, whereas indirect killing when there is a proportionate reason causes ill-fare alone. To aim at an innocent man's death as an end or even as a means to a good end is usually to treat him as an object, as a non-person (a non-freedom), as a mere means, whereas to aim at a proportionate good knowing that evil to another person will also arise as a not-aimed-at side-effect is to produce some illfare but is not a violation of dignity. Even this much should be avoided as much as possible but the latter may be tolerable whereas the former could hardly ever be.

And what must be re-emphasized against McCormick and others is that the central substantive reason why direct killing of an innocent (e.g., in the case of judicial murder cited above) is wrong is not because of extrinsic utilitarian considerations about the great good for society at large, but because the dignity of a person, an equal, a freedom, is being violated. Dignity values are most clearly in evidence in cases of justice and social morality, but they are also present in cases of individual morality, e.g., suicide or mutilation. Besides the general hierarchy of dignity values over welfare values a hierarchy within the realm of dignity-vcalues itself would have to be established as well as within the realm of welfare values. This will prove to be a massive but richly rewarding task as the history of recent axiology has .shown.[39]

•• For a review of the work which has already been done since the late 19th century see J. N. Findlay, *Axiological Ethics* (London, Macmillan, 1970). For a more elaborate treatment of Findlay's own theory of values see Findlay, *Values and Intentions* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1961), esp. 227-394. See also Nicholas Rescher's analysis of welfare-values in "Welfare: Some Philosophical Issues," *Values and Valuation* (ed. John William Davis, Knoxville, Univ. of Tennessee Press, 1972), pp. 221-232.

VI

My insistence upon the immorality of the direct causation of evil as end or means need not be interpreted as a repetition of the strong traditional thesis of the manuals. There is, for example, the thorny problem as to whether the direct killing of the innocent is intrinsically evil in the very strong sense that it can never be done whatever the consequences. This would constitute a *theoretical behavioral absolute,* and it may not prove possible to ground such absolutes on the level of action in morals. It seems that theoretically some feature could always be conjured up to relativize any behavioral principle. But this possibility need not prevent me from maintaining that direct causation of evil is *always* morally intrinsically evil in the weaker sense which I have described aibove. The direct causation of evil falls, in other words, among those acts which have in themselves a negative moral index on which count they are generally to be avoided, and even in those situations where they may be allowed or tolerated because of the other features of the situation they retain their negative moral index and beget those moral claims of creative regret mentioned about. But over and above this, certain of these acts which are intrinsically evil in this weaker sense are so devastating for human dignity as well as human welfare that a *practical behavioral absolute* must be set up in their regard. The prohibition of the direct killing of the innocent is one of these as well as the prohibition of rape or of medical experimentation without informed consent. The absolute prohibition of even such an act may not be justifiable on intrinsic or theoretical grounds, but intrinsic factors coupled with extrinsic factors may warrant the absolute proscription of its perpetration in practice by means of setting up a quite airtight taboo. In fact this may be pedagogically necessary for the purposes of adequate moral education, given the " empirical " fact of human rationalization and egoism. Part of our moral duty may be to keep a distinction alive (here the direct-indirect distinction) by drawing a clear fixed line on the tangible level of

action even though a theoretical clear fixed line does not exist at the level of values. As James Gustafson has noted in a rather recent article, the fact that a softening precedent is set may be sufficient reason for setting up a boundary of duty. [40]

For these extrinsic reasons, especially, then, I believe that Christians should be taught *never* to entertain the possibility of directly killing one innocent even for the purpose of saving the lives of many innocents. Theoretically, the absoluteness of the behavioral imperative not to kill an innocent may not be clearly sustainable (in a fantastic case where someone threatens to kill 100,000 if you do not kill one) because it is possible that an overwhelming quantity of welfare may override a small consideration of dignity. On the other hand, moral education should teach that in practice we should not even entertain the possibility in our imagination of ever perpetrating the direct killing of the innocent. It should not be a live option. "Act *as if* you should never directly kill the innocent" is our practical absolute. What I am maintaining is that we should retain certain "virtually exceptionless norms" [41] in ethics, or in other words that the "unthinkable" [42] should be retained as a category of moral thought. With Bernard Williams, I believe that the subversion of morality at the hands of utilitarianism must be resisted. Reflecting upon the pre-emptive logic within utilitarianism and the potential debasement of moral integrity of which it is capable, he advocates resistance in the form of adherence to practical absolutes. "Enough people, enough of the time, it seems, have to be prepared to stick at doing various things, whatever the consequences may be. That means that enough people, enough of the time do not have to think as utilitarians; they have quite definitely to think as non-

[40] "Monogolism, Parental Desires and the Right to Life," *Perspectives in Biology and Medicine*, XVI, pp. 529-559.

[41] Cf. Donald Evans, "Paul Ramsey on Exceptional Moral Rules," *The American Journal of Jurisprudence*, 1971, V. 16, p. 209.

[42] Cf. Bernard Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism," in *Utilitarianism For and Against* (Cambridge, University Press, 1973), p.

utilitarians. Nor will it do for them to preserve at the back of their mind the utilitarian rationale in coexistence with the required moral bloody-mindedness. For they have to be able to resist utilitarian temptation in the most difficult circumstances, when much obvious harm will follow from resisting it, and for that their non-utilitarianism has to be very deeply engrained." [43]

It is clear that underlying Williams' emphatic plea is a concern for values other than utilitarian welfare, for values of dignity. It is also clear that he sees the need for absolutes on the level of action to which one is willing to commit oneself. The direct-indirect distinction and the correlative principle of double effect, both carefully nuanced, remain, to my mind, valuable principles in our effort to carve out this non-utilitarian road between right and wrong on the level of action.

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••*Morality: An Introduction to Ethics* (N. Y. Harper and Row, 197!'l), p. 105-6.

WHITEHEAD'S TRANSFORMATION OF PURE ACT

IN AN EFFORT to avoid any final bifurcation into two realms of being and becoming, as in Plato, Aristotle argued that only concrete particulars were fully actual, with forms only derivatively existent as the forms of these actualities. Yet under pressure from his understanding of the basic contrast between matter and form in terms of potentiality and actuality, Aristotle was driven more and more to identify form and actuality .[1] Thus the immaterial reality of God becomes a pure, unchanging actuality not readily distinguishable from Plato's form of the Good, although Aristotle seeks to endow it with an interior life of ceaseless activity of "thinking." As pure actuality God is thus conceived as pure form, without matter. How pure form can engage in ceaseless activity of any sort is not clearly explained.

Thomas Aquinas was able to explain the activity of immaterial being primarily by freeing the basic polarity of potentiality and actuality from its exclusive identification with matter and form. **It** was also possible to apply this contrast to form and *esse* or the act of being. Purely immaterial forms, such as angelic intelligences, could not create themselves by their own power, but were dependent upon the creative act of God whereby they received their own act of being. Thus pure form was in potency to this act of being. As infinite *esse,* God was pure actuality without any admixture of potentiality, and by the same token he was pure activity in no wise limited by any element of form.[2]

[1] Here see Ivor Leclerc, "Form and Actuality," pp. 169-89 in the book he edited, *The Rdevance of Whitehead* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1961). Pages 169-71 summarize this problem for Aristotle; the rest of the essay shows how Whitehead successfully maintains the distinction between form and actuality.

[2] The nature of the act of being is ably explained by Etienne Gilson in his *Being and Some Phuosophm-s* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies,

This solution was not without its difficulties. God's relation to form is not clarified thereby. We have the formula, that his essence *is* his existence, i.e. his infinite *esse*, but this seems to have the force of making him sheer existence devoid of any essence whatever, since any element of form would in him represent a potentiality not fully enacted. Then God becomes radically unknowable, except insofar as it is possible to know him without the mediation of form.

The most acute difficulty, however, emerges from religious concerns. The perfection of God is expressed as pure act, but pure act appears to be devoid of all receptivity. Receptivity is understood in terms of passive potentiality, which pure act emphatically excludes. Besides, divine perfection must be unchanging, for that which is already perfect can only change for the worse. Yet receptivity to the world and to our sorrows and achievements is undeniably part of divine perfection, as Charles Hartshorne has eloquently shown us years ago.[8] He speaks for a widespread contemporary sensitivity, a sensitivity implicitly acknowledged hy ingenious attempts to affirm such personal receptivity while at the same time preserving the classical immutability of God.[4] In addition, if none of our achievements are received into the divine life and have an effect upon his, they seem lacking in any ultimate significance. Though in itself pure self-giving activity, the Thomistic God of pure act, because utterly devoid of all receptivity, strikes many of our contemporaries just as static and unyielding as the unity of pure form. Thomas succeeded in transforming pure act from pure form to pure activity. We must now complete the transformation by reconceiving this activity in a way so as to include receptivity.

chapter five, and *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas* (New York: Random House, 1956), chapter one.

•*The Divine Relativity* (New Haven: Yale Univerity Press, 1948).

•See particularly W. Norris Clarke, S. J. "A New Look at the Immutability of God," in *God Knowable and Unknowable,* ed. Robert J. Roth, S. J. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1978), and my response, " The Immutable God and Father Clarke " in *The New Scholasticism,* 49 / (Spring 1975), 189-99.

For this undertaking we need a fresh analysis of change. There are constantly different characterizations of actuality throughout the flux of time; this is the massive deliverance of our common experience. The problem is to isolate and identify the unchanging element of actuality amid such change. Traditionally this unchanging actuality was the essence of the enduring substance which remained the same throughout the exchange of accidental differences. It was able to support such accidents by its underlying material substratum, which served as its potentiality passively receptive to enactment by these successively different accidental forms. In that case, however, the enduring substance is not fully concrete, for it must abstract from these accidental characteristics in order to preserve its unchangingness. Whitehead replaces the enduring substance with a series of unchanging atomic actual occasions. Then " the fundamental meaning of the notion of ' change ' is ' the difference between actual occasions comprised in some determinate event'." [5] In other words, change no longer describes the external adventures of one substance, but the variations among successive unchanging actualities.

At first sight this appears highly paradoxical. Whitehead is widely regarded as the modem Heracleitean, for whom everything is constantly changing. The world appears as a spatio-temporal volume of continuous change, and the actual occasion is simply the smallest atomic unit of this flux. How can he say that it is unchanging?

Yet whatever we designate as the really real must be unchanging. For were it to change, it would lose whatever reality it had before. We can only identify it and refer to it in terms of its unchanging features. Whitehead's occasion is unchanging for still another reason: it forges a fully determinate bond with every item in its universe. It is constituted by its internal relatedness to its past. Since this past is fully determinate,

[6] Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York: Macmillan, p. 114. (Hereafter cited as P.R.)

it cannot alter any of these relations without violating this fundamental character.

Events or occasions need not change in an all-pervasive flux. Our sense that they must is derived from our inveterate habit of regarding the flux from the standpoint of enduring things. In a flux things must change, for they are identified statically, without a temporal index, rarely in terms of the four dimensions space-time. As a spatiotemporal volume, however, an enduring thing may be regarded as a single event subdivisible into an entire series of atomic actual occasions. Each of these occasions is a determinate unity, but a unity not only of spatial characteristics (such as a thing possesses) but also of temporal characteristics. This spatiotemporal occasion is what it is, and cannot change without losing its .self-identity. This self-identity embraces its total concreteness in every detail, unlike the underlying identity of the enduring thing which abstracts from all its possible changes.

Though each occasion is atomic and unchanging, so that the *fundamental* meaning of change is the difference between successive actual occasions, there are two derivative senses of change *within* the occasion, corresponding to the two kinds of division of an occasion which Whitehead distinguishes, the coordinate and the genetic. Neither kind divides the occasion into smaller actualities, for it is already the smallest event which is fully concrete and actual. Each concerns only aspects of this total actuality, abstracting from its full concreteness.

Consider first some perfectly static enduring object. Each of its successive occasions monotonously repeats its characteristics. Yet these characteristics may be spatially variegated, such that the actuality as a whole unifies a great many different qualities. It is one actuality, even though a spatial division will display such differences from part to part. If we divide the occasions temporally, however, each will be identical with the next.

Now suppose the series is dynamic, like a quickly moving particle. Its successive occasions will differ from one another

in location. If it is continuously dynamic, no matter how finely we subdivide the temporal region, each will differ from its neighbor, even if we go below the threshold of the atomic occasion itself. In that case we would not be distinguishing simply occasions from one another, but dividing the regions of individual occasions *coordinately,* according to their spatiotemporal determinate being. Just as one actuality may embrace a multiplicity of spatial differences, so it can embrace a multiplicity of temporal differences. In terms of these the actuality is constantly changing within itself.

Despite this changing display of spatiotemporal features, however, the occasion is unchanging in the more fundamental sense of forming a determinate bond with every item in its universe. It is internally related to every actuality in its causal past, and it cannot alter any one of these relations without altering the actuality it has become and will remain. As a spatiotemporal event it is that dynamic event which it is, and nothing else. "It never changes. It only becomes and perishes."[6] But it is as that dynamic motion it has inherited from its dominant past. To be internally related to that dominant causal past means to be affected thereby, and to reproduce the same dynamic motion it received.

Yet this determinate unity of unchanging internal relatedness does not simply spring into being ready-made. The casion must first become the unity which it is by a process of unification of these multiple internal relations or prehensions. The manifold of causal influences must be reduced to coherence by a process of concrescence, i. e.,. the growing together of these prehensions into a concrete being. If we analyze this concrescence, we divide the occasion genetically, describing its various stages of growth. This is only a derivative sense in which the occasion is changing, as the successive genetic phases of becoming differ from one another in their degree of determinateness and unity. In concrescence there is a process of

[6] Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas* (New York: Macmillan, 1933), p. 262.

determination, divided into phases from the most indeterminate to the completely determinate. But this is a division of the becoming, not the being, of the occasion.[7] It is not primary change in the sense of a succession of fully concrete actual events.

If we introduce the distinction between dynamic and static, it is important to recognize that there is no simple correlation, such that becoming is dynamic and being is static. Being is static *with respect to* becoming, for once a process of concrescence has attained its determinate concrete result (its so-called " satisfaction ") , it can no longer be divided into different phases of growth. Yet that same concrete actual event can be highly dynamic in its being, tracing out, for example, in its various coordinate divisions the thrust of a quickly moving particle. Likewise an enduring object, entirely static in its being, may be dynamic with respect to the coming into being of the various occasions which constitute it.

Concrescence as the growing together of various internal relations is the act whereby the actual occasion becomes to be what it is. This act of becoming may be compared with the Thomistic *esse* or act of being. Each is the dynamic power of being whereby an actuality is. Whereas for Thomas an external Creator communicates to each finite creature its act of being from his own infinite abundance, the act of becoming is intrinsic to each occasion as its inherent self-creation. It manages to bring itself into being through its own activity of unifying its causal influences. In both cases, however, the act is a pure activity resulting in being. Insofar as a creature exercises its creativity, it is in act and not in potentiality. In concrescence an occasion takes its data, which are in a state of potentiality for it, and transforms these into a fully determinate actuality. In the instant of the unity of its " satisfaction," it has transformed

[7] For a further discussion of the difference between the being or occurring of an event, and its becoming, coupled with a defense of temporal atomicity, see my " The Duration of the Present," *Pkifosophy and Pherwmenological Research* 85 / I (September, 1974), 100-106. For the interrelationship of these two modes of division, see my " Genetic and Coordinate Division Correlated," *Process Studies* l / 8 (Fall, 1971), 199-9W9.

all of its potentiality into sheer actuality. But this attainment is merely relative, as it then serves as potentialiy for supervening acts of becoming.

Admittedly, this is a novel and unusual way of conceiving the contrast between actuality and potentiality. [8] In part it stems from a revised understanding of change, which no longer needs any potential substratum supporting different accidental enactments. Material causes still designate that out of which an actuality is composed, but they need no longer signify *present content* but rather the *past concreteness* from which the present actuality is derived. Recently Barrington Jones has defended just .such an interpretation for Aristotle.[9] This has been challenged as not doing sufficient justice to Aristotle's alleged notion of prime matter. [10] Of course, if material causes refer to the concreteness of past actualities, and these actualities derived their material causes from .still more distantly past actualities *ad infinitum* (the universe being everlasting, without beginning for Aristotle), no prime matter is ever needed. Prime matter is only needed as the ultimate, absolutely formless " stuff " of things if matter is primarily interpreted in terms of the present content of an actuality in contra.st to its form.

Another source of our novel contrast between actuality and potentiality is Whitehead's revised understanding of efficient causation. Here terms can be slippery, and Whitehead tends to use the word " efficient cause " in its modern sense of referring to past events which are causally efficacious on present outcomes.11 We wish to adopt the more original meaning of *efficiens* as that which brings about the being of some actuality. In the Thomistic view God as creator is under.stood to be

[8] On this new interpretation, see Richard M. Rorty, "Matter and Event," in Eman McMullin, ed., *The Concept of Matter* (Notre Daine: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968), pp. 497-524, esp. 510f, 514f.

[9] "Aristotle's Introduction of Matter," *Philosophical Review* 88 (1974), 474-500.

[10] William Brenner, "Prime Matter and Barrington Jones," *The New Scholasticism* 50 / 2 (Spring, 1972), 228-28. Yet see my response, "Prime Matter, Barrington Jones, and William Brenner," *Ihld.*, 2!!9-81.

[11] Cf. PR, pp. 86f, 184, 185, !!88.

the ultimate efficient cause of every finite actuality, with proximate past actualities as secondary causes mediating this communication of *esse,* the act of being. Here efficient causation is the productive ,act whereby an active cause brings about a passive effect. Yet if Whitehead's temporal atomism is correct, we confront a dilemma. Cause and effect must refer to two distinct actual occasions. When the occasion which is the effect is present, the occasion (s) functioning as its cause (s) must be already past, since the cause is earlier than its effect. Yet the cause must be present in order to be active. Whitehead resolves this dilemma by reversing our ,ordinary identifications of activity and passivity. Since the present actual occasion is active in its present immediacy, he proposes that active effects produce themselves out of passive causes. Thus each occasion as an instantiation of creativity, as its own act of becoming, is se1£-creative. As such each occasion is its own efficient cause, by its own concrescence bringing itself into being.

Whitehead's own historical comparisons obscure this. He tends to analogize creativity with prime matter: "'Creativity' is another rendering of the Aristotelian 'matter,' and of the modern 'neutral stuff'." [12] Yet he heavily qualifies the analogy: creativity "is divested of the notion of passive receptivity, either of 'form,' or of external relations; it is the pure notion of the activity conditioned by the objective immortality of the actual world." [13] The only similarity between prime matter and creativity is their utter formlessness, and the fact that neither can exist except in correlation with form. Creativity is not merely pure activity, and we have seen that prime matter may be more of an interpretative hypothesis to explain Aristotle than an integral part of his own theory. Since creativity designates that by virtue of which the present occasion comes into being, it is properly understood as the efficient cause.

Since what Whitehead calls the material cause is best understood as the efficient cause, perhaps his efficient causes are best

[12] PR, p. 46. See Rorty, p. 517, n. 85.
[1·] PR, pp. 46f,

understood as material causes. Thus the past actual occasions of the actual world constitute the matter-the past concreteness-out of which the present occasion produces itself. Moreover, these past occasions are potential in that they are patient to whatever external relations they may enter into. If a present occasion is conditioned by a past one, an asymmetrical relation is thereby formed; the present occasion is internally related to the past one, but it in turn is only externally related to the present one. As for the past occasion, its activity was exhausted in its act of coming to be; then it is completely what it is, yet open to whatever external relations supervening occasions may establish. According to Whitehead's principle of relativity, " it belongs to the nature of a ' being ' that it is a potential for every ' becoming '." [14]

In terms of this reconceptualization, the traditional dictum that " matter individuates " takes on new meaning within the Whiteheadian economy. It is difficult to understand this principle as long as matter is conceived as present content. The best we can .say is that matter diversifies form without uniquely specifying it, just as molten lead enables us to make many lead soldiers from a single mold. These lead soldiers are " individuated " by the molten lead, however, only insofar as this present content bears traces of that past concreteness in which it is rooted, rendering *this* portion of the molten lead different from *that* portion. A purely formless content would lack even this differentiation, and so be deprived of any basis for individuation.

In an event-ontology " individuation " takes on a sharpened meaning. In a substance-ontology it is sufficient to be able to uniquely specify each substantial actuality, allowing an area of potentiality for their future development and change. An event, on the other hand, is first individuated when it is completely determinate, entering into a fixed bond with every item in its past universe. Whitehead writes that " 'Determination'

"PR, p. 33.

is analysable into ' definiteness ' and ' position,' where ' definiteness ' is the illustration of select eternal objects, and 'position ' is relative status in a nexus [i.e., group] of actual entities." [15] Here ' position ' means much more than abstract location according to some Cartesian coordinates.[16] It is the concrete insertion of an actuality into its determinate niche with respect to all the past actualities it draws upon and to which it is internally related. In this sense the matter of the past actualities uniquely specifies it.

There is also a sense in which form individualizes. Traditionally, this alternative has usually been rejected because every level of specification, no matter how precisely designated, always indicates a class which could have more than one member bearing that specification. Also, forms serve as universals, and this role seems incompatible with any role in indicating the particularity of determinate actualities. Nevertheless, some sense of the appropriateness of form in this role was affirmed by Duns Scotus, whose " haecceity " or "this-ness" is little more than a name indicating a function which some sort of " form " should fulfill. Whitehead proposes that while finite levels of specification may only delimit classes, infinite levels of specification could delimit individual actualities. With infinite specification, these classes shrink to embrace the particular individual. This, at least, is one way to make sense of his distinction between finite and infinite abstractive hierarchies. The vertex of a finite abstractive hierarchy constitutes a complex form,[11] while the inexhaustibility of infinite hierarchies marks the inexhaustibility of describing actualities by means of concepts.[18]

This individuation of the particular determinateness of a concrete actual occasion, however, cannot take place independently of past actual occasions providing the potential matter.

[16] PR, p. 88.

[16] Cf. PR, pp. 295-97.

[11] Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York: Macmillan, 1926), p. 248.

[18] *Ibid,* p. 245.

The forms conceptually entertained yield only finite levels of specification. Though perfectly definite at that level of specification, they lack the determinateness of infinite specification. If we were to restrict ourselves to such forms in defining the entire realm, then the realm would consist in a multiplicity of discrete entities, with small but definite gaps between them. If so, the criticism levelled by Hartshorne and Hall against Whitehead's theory of forms holds. As Peirce clearly saw, the realm of possibility must be continuous. Between any two pure forms of possibility, there is always a third, *ad infinitum.* Surely this is true of all the shades of color, and all other forms expressive of simple qualities. We propose therefore to conceive of forms a.s definite with respect to their own finite level of specification, but indeterminate with respect to the infinity of sub-levels of specification below this level. Thus every finite form includes an infinity of sub-specifications, all sharing in the same common specification. Each of these infinite specifications marks the determinateness of an actuality, but *qua* possibility, this determination is not yet made. Possibilities always come in clusters, to be separated from one another by actualization.

Thus the ideal possibility provided by God for each particular actualization (in Whitehead's theory) cannot determine its actuality. The form of the determinateness may be given, but not in isolation, for as possibility it is always given with its immediate neighbors. Nor can the various conceptual operations of the concrescence, whereby the actual occasion maneuvers itself into deciding the form of its satisfaction, provide complete determinateness. The form of the outcome, which may be technically described as the occasion's final modification of its subjective aim, only indicates some finite level of specification. This form must be supplemented by matter to render the occasion iully concrete and determinate. Thus the final contrast combines this final form with a content derived from past concrete actualities. These are ingredient in the concrescing occasion not in their full concreteness, but under the guise of

some "perspective" or aspect.[19] These aspects are those parts of the past concreteness which are consonant with the overall form the occasion has finally determined. This form provides a definite but finite level of specification which is then "filled in" by the various infinite levels of specification derived from those prehensions of past concreteness integrated into the final determinate outcome.

This rich interplay of form and matter, whereby past actualities contribute their determinateness to the determinateness of present actualization, somewhat explains Whitehead's dissatisfaction with the usual contrast between universals and particulars:

> The notion of a universal is of that which can enter into the description of many particulars; whereas the notion of a particular is that it is described by universals, and does not itself enter into the description of any other particular. According to the doctrine of relativity which is the basis of the metaphysical system of these lectures, both these notions involve a misconception. An actual entity cannot be described, even inadequately, by universals; because other actual entities do enter into the description of any one actual entity. Thus every so-called 'universal' is particular in the sense of being just what it is, diverse from everything else; and every so-called 'particular' is universal in the sense of entering into the constitutions of other actual entities.[20]

Every actual occasion is uniquely situated in the region of its concrescence, yet perspectival aspects of its determinateness may be ingredient in the actualizations of supervening occasions. In this sense the particular occasion functions as a "universal." This is made possible by the multiple locatedness of the forms which characterize its determinateness.

Nevertheless, Whitehead insists that the objectified occasion cannot be adequately characterized as a complex eternal object. As long as he is simply referring to finite levels of specification, this is correct. Yet the further determinateness of the past is made available to present occasions only through the mediation

[19] PR, pp. 337f.
[20] PR, p. 76.

of forms, for they alone possess the power of multiple location. The problem is resolved by noting that while the individuation whereby determinateness is fully and uniquely achieved requires the mediation of infinitely specified this individuation is only possible through the agency of past actualities functioning in the role of matter. Neither by itself is sufficient; individuation requires the joint operation of these two principles.

Even so, this is not enough. A third dimension in addition to the form and matter is required. The occasion is also individuated by its act of becoming, its own particular exercise of creativity. In the terms proposed by Richard Rorty, each act of becoming is unrepeatable, in contrast to the forms or even the objectified actual occasions which are repeatable in the sense that they can be ingredient in other occasions. The act of becoming is unique; it will never occur again. This is achieved, he contends, through the expedient of "taking time seriously " by identifying actuality with event. Each event is unique in happening only once and thus being uniquely specified spatiotemporally. Therein lies the secret oi its actuality: - its unrepeatability.

This is correct so far as it goes, yet we must recognize that time is derivative from creative acts of becoming, and not the other way around. Each act of becoming is unique and unrepeatable because any multiplicity which presents itself for unification can only be unified once. Any second unification of that data would be radically incompatible with the first: this is the deepest meaning of the standard maxim that no two things can occupy the same place at the same time. While a determinate past is compatible with a range of infinitely dense real possibilities, it can only issue into one exclusive actuality. While this basic incompatibility is the fundamental reason for the unrepeatability, there is a secondary reason: according to the principle of relativity, the first actualization would be a potential datum in the becoming of the second actualization. Thus the data of this multiplicity would no longer be identic&l

with the multiplicity the first actualization faced. The outworkings of these principles, when applied to finite actualities, generate the temporal succession of our familiar sense of time.

Each act of becoming is unique and unrepeatable in that it is self-creative. Only it is so situated as to be able to unify the diversity it confronts. Thus for Whitehead God can only create himself; he cannot create other actual entities in their full determinateness. This determination must await their own self-decision whereby modifications of the form (or ideal possibility) received from God are married to the matter received from past concreteness.

Yet while determinateness can only be derived from past concreteness, the unrepeatability of actuality is not so dependent. "Material " actualities derive their determinateness from past actualities, but there is one " immaterial " actuality whose existence does not depend on this past. Its act of becoming is nontemporal, the act of unifying the bare multiplicity of eternal objects in one primordial envisagement of God. By the principle of relativity this act is unrepeatable, uniquely specifying the one God. "Unfettered conceptual valuation, 'infinite' in Spinoza's sense of that term, isonlypossibleoncein the universe; since that creative act is objectively immortal as an inescapable condition characterizing creative action." [21]

This primordial envisagement is a complete act of becoming, unifying without remainder the eternal objects. Hence it is both fully actual and unrepeatable, yet also immaterial in the sense of being underived from any past concreteness. For this very reason it is deficient in determinateness. Whitehead describes the primordial nature into which this envisagement issues as " free, complete, primordial, eternal," yet also " actually deficient." [22] It is a complete act of becoming, yet lacking in the determinate concreteness only past actuality can supply. As an immaterial actuality, then, Whitehead's God is infinite and nontemporal, but abstract, requiring the concrete supple-

[21] PR, p. 378.
[22] PR, p. 5!!4.

mentation his consequent nature of temporal receptivity can provide.

Since unrepeatability describes actuality, actuality cannot simply be identified with concrete determinateness. All finite, purely temporal actuality is so determinate, but this is not the defining characteristic of actuality according to Whitehead. Nor is it merely activity by itself. It is the activity of receptive unification terminating in the unity of actuality. This is "decision," which " constitutes the very meaning of actuality." "'Actuality' is the decision amid 'potentiality.'" [23] The decision is indifferently the act of deciding and its outcome. Yet while these two aspects of unification and unity may be distinguished in every act of becoming, they are inseparable.

In the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, pure act signifies the identity of pure actuality and pure activity. Actuality and activity cannot be identified from Whitehead's perspective. Activity entails receptivity, while actuality as fully complete, fully per-fected, can no longer be receptive. Nonetheless actuality and activity are inseparable dimensions of the act of becoming, which complement one another in the divine instance.

Pure actuality is not ascribable to God alone. Every act of becoming fully actualizes itself by synthesizing the potentiality it receives into a completely determined unity. In its own consummation it is completely actual, while in turn serving as a potential for supervening occasions according to the principle of relativity. This principle is merely one form of the ultimate category of creativity, which requires that every multiplicity generate a unity. [24] Insofar as each actualization produces one more being requiring unification, it stimulates the emergence of the supervening concrescence which will unify it. There is a definite rhythm about this in all finite occasions: the activity of actualization results in determinate actuality, which in turn serves as the potentiality for further actualization, *ad infinitum.*

This temporal rhythm does not apply to God's immaterial,

[23] PR, p. 68.
[24] PR, pp. 31f.

nontemporal act of envisagement of the pure forms, which may be described both as active and actual. In itself it is continually active, and cannot be exhausted by any prior objectifications of itself.[25] In his temporal nature, whereby God acquires concrete novelty from the world, God is purely active in his unlimited receptivity. In this side of his nature God is "incomplete," [26] for its completion would require the creative unification of all determinate actual occasions. This completion could only be accomplished if time were to come to an end, which is an impossibility in the light of creativity's insatiable rhythm and the utter unlimitedness of divine receptivity. Yet in his temporal being God is both active and actual at the same time, for he draws upon his nontemporal actuality as providing him with the means of unifying that which he continually receives from the world.

For Whitehead, activity is not transeunt causality but creative unification. The prior cause is not the active agent producing being, but merely the passive component of this creative activity. Activity is then impossible without receptivity, for creative unification must first receive the multiplicity it unifies. As the unification of all the pure forms God is complete and nontemporal, but lacking in the concreteness and novelty that only the world can give. Moreover, were he to dwell in the solitary splendor of "thinking on thinking," his receptivity would be limited. As such he could be perfectly nontemporal, but not everlasting. His everlastingness requires the ongoing multiplicity of everfresh temporal occasions. Only as fully receptive to their novel actuality could he achieve newness of activity.

Thus in the special sense in which we have defined materiality, God is both material and immaterial. In his nontemporal nature God is immaterial as not being constituted by any past concreteness he receives. However, since his recep-

[25] This claim is substantiated in my "The Non-Temporality of Whitehead's God," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 13 *I* 8 (September, 1978) 847-76.

[26] PR, p. 5!M.

tivity is unlimited, and since God derives his concreteness and novelty from temporal actuality, he is also material. Yet it is only as nontemporal that God's act of becoming is complete, as the complete ordering of all possibilities. Thus it is in the guise of possibility that God is objectified as a potentiality for any given actual occasion. God is both material and immaterial, but it is only as immaterial that he influences the world directly. Possibility is thus the divine species of potentiality. In both species, potentiality is not severed from actuality by some fixed gulf. Potentiality and actuality are .simply different aspects of one another. Just as what is subjective in itself is objective in another, so what is actual in itself is potential in another.

The potential is that which is not yet actual. In classical thinking, the potential is conceived solely from this perspective, so that potentiality is in itself the mark of incomplete actualization. As such God could have no potentiality. Whitehead, in relativizing the concepts of potentiality and actuality, introduces a multiplicity of perspectives: that which is not yet actual [in some supervening occasion] has already become fully actual [in itself]. In fact, what has become fully actual in itself will therefore be .something not yet actual in another, and so on, *ad infinitum,* thereby generating the endlessness of time. Since whatever is actual in itself is potential in another, this sense of potentiality cannot be conceived as a deficiency in God to overcome. In fact, it is precisely as potential that God is causally efficacious in the world.

Actualitie.s are purely active with respect to themselves, since the potentiality they transform into full actuality is derived from other actualities. Given this material component, their only activity is the exercise of their own self-creativity. Finite occasions, however, are restricted in their receptivity. The contrast between God and the many occasions of the world is not a constrast between pure activity and an activity with an admixture of potentiality, but between infinite and finite activity. Worldly occasions are finite because the worlds they

unify are so limited. God's world embraces the inexhaustibility of possibility and the whole of actuality, without beginning and without end. Infinite activity is uniquely divine, and it rests firmly upon infinite receptivity.

In one sense, then, God is not unchanging. He is not unchanging in the sense of being no longer receptive to growth. Past actuality as the completion of temporal becoming is unchanging in this sense, but the completeness of God's nontemporal actuality merely serves as the means whereby he creatively unifies the temporal actuality he continuously receives.

Unchangingness in this sense would be a defect, for it would limit God's activity by undercutting his ongoing receptivity. This is the principal difficulty with Thomas' identification of pure actuality and pure activity. Pure actuality, if conceived as sheer form, must be unchanging. Pure activity, conceived as nothing but transeunt causality, is no less void of receptivity, and hence can be identified with the unchangingness of pure actuality. Once activity is seen to incorporate receptivity, however, activity and actuality must be formally distinguished, even though inseparable, since every activity of unification terminates in the actuality of unity.

Just because God is not unchanging in this particular sense does not mean that he is simply changing. There is change in God, which can be measured by the difference between successive stages of his concrete temporality, but this is simply the derivative sense of change discussed above in terms of genetic development. In the more fundamental sense of being a single everlasting process of concrescence, God is always beooming, never changing.

The process of growth admits of subordinate change. Yet growth may be devoid of the defect noted in our initial discussion of change. All depends upon whether growth is analyzed in terms of some underlying unchanging substratum, or in terms of concrescence. If there is substantial endurance, then there are accidental replacements. In change the old, dispensable at-

tributes are lost, and new ones take their place. If God is originally perfect and complete, nothing could be lost to be replaced, and hence God cannot change. If growth is understood rather as concrescence, there is no underlying persistent sameness, but a single all-inclusive process of unification which progressively orders all the contents towards a final unity. Only in the total process is the unity to be sought. If the unity of the actuality is found in some abstractible feature short of the whole, then those elements not included in this essence are lost insofar as there is any growth beyond them. If the unity resides in the whole of the process, however, they are taken up and incorporated into that integrated totality: "how an actual entity *becomes* constitutes *what* that actual entity *is.*" [21]

Perfect being as a completed actuality including absolutely all temporal actualities is unattainable as long as time shall last. There will always be more actualities to include within this whole. Yet such an unattainable goal also portrays an unworthy ideal for God. It is not religiously ultimate as that which is supremely worthy of worship, for it would lack all receptivity to our needs and values. Perfect becoming, on the other hand, is both possible and valuable. It is the pure infinite activity integrating into its ultimate unity whatever is actualized in the world, and the dynamic source of all our values urging us on towards fineness of achievement.

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[21] PR, p. 84, italics his.

KARL RAHNER'S THEORY OF SENSATION

IN AN AGE when theories of sense perception include a wealth of physiological and psychological sophistication, Karl Rahner's theory might seem like an anachronism, an unnecessary resurrection of a pre-scientific and long-abandoned theory. But this is so only if we misunderstand the direction of Rahner's approach to the problem of sensation.

The usual contemporary treatment of sensation is empirical. The method is to take a cold, hard, philosophical look at the workings of sensation in order to determine its ontological structure. Such an approach necessarily entails information gathered from the various sciences which deal with the complex act of human sensation. Rahner, however, does not proceed in this empirical way. His method is to determine what the ontological structure of sensation *must be*[1] given certain previous factual and logical commitments. In other words, Rahner approaches the problem of sensation with a transcendental methodology.

Kant's theory of mind in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is not arrived at by examination of, and reflection on, the workings of mind; it is a deduction of what mind must be, given certain prior, intellectual commitments. Kant had previously determined both that man did, in physics and mathematics, possess synthetic, necessary knowledge and that, agreeing with Hume, this necessity could never come from experience. The *Critique*, then, is a deduction of what mind *must be*, given these two prior commitments. The force of Kant's intellectual achievement can only be understood within the context of his transcendental method.

Rahner's theory of sensation proceeds in a transcendental manner similar to Kant's. Rahner begins his deduction of the nature of sensibility with two previously established intellectual commitments: the nature of knowledge as the self-presence of

being and the seemingly contradictory fact that human knowledge is receptive. It is only in grasping the strength of these initial commitments that the force of Rahner's transcendental deduction of the nature of sensibility can be understood.

Therefore, my exposition of Rahner's theory will follow the precise form of his transcendental deduction. The *first* part will be an exposition of Rahner's commitment to the essence of knowledge as self-presence of being. The *second* part will take this commitment, along with the obvious fact that man's knowledge is intentional, and attempt to determine what the ontological structure of man *must be* in order to explain these facts. The *third* part is an attempt to outline the mechanics of .sensation. The previous section will determine what sensation must do; this section will determine how it goes about doing what it does. To again use Kant's deduction as an example: Kant first determines that mind must form (cause) experience; he then attempts to show how it does so by means of a transcendental determination of time. Rahner's theory of sensation also ends with a treatment of its " mechanics."

Two possible difficulties must be clarified before we begin our exposition of Rahner'.s theory. The first is that his theory is primarily contained in *Spirit in the World,* his doctoral dissertation, which is itself an exposition of Aquinas' metaphysics of knowledge. I am going to assume that Rabner has dealt creatively enough with the Thomistic texts to entitle him to call the theory of sensation presented in *Spirit in the World* his own-though a grounding in Thomistic principles is certainly undeniable. This assumption [1] will simplify my task. Rabner is concerned with proving that the metaphysics of knowledge which he presents is Thomistic. Thus, he devotes much time and effort to defining and explaining Thomistic terminology and trying to bring its multiplicity into a clear, essential unity.

[1] This assumption, though incapable of verification here, is not unfounded. Rahner's dissertation was rejected as a work of Thomistic scholarship by Martin Honecker.

This paper is not concerned with whether Rahner's theory is Thomistic. I believe that the fundamentals of Rahner's theory, at no point, are based on any argument from authority, but are grounded independently of Aquinas. Therefore, this paper presents the theory as Rahner's own and attempts to avoid, in the presentation, the confusion-even within Rahner himself-of Thomistic terminology.

The second difficulty that must be clarified is that the sense knowledge in question in Rahner's theory is not "pure" sensation, but human sensation. Pure sensation, uninformed by intellect, never occurs in human experience.

> Statements about sensibility which apprehend its essence completely cannot be made unless they already express the essence of thought simultaneously. [2]

> Sensibility is therefore originally and not subsequently . . . always already spiritualized and standing under the spontaneous formative power of the spirit. [8]

Human knowing is an integral unity of sense and intellect. This unity cannot be proved; it is a fact of experience. Man does not first sense and then think, he senses things only as already informed with intelligibility, and knows things only as turned toward the world. Kant was keenly aware of the chaotic flux of sense data which would be pure sensation. It was the absence of such flux in human experience which compelled Kant to view human knowing as composed of both a material and a formal element in an integral unity.

Rahner is in a similar position, though for somewhat different reasons. Pure sensation, as a limit idea, would not be Kant's chaotic flux, but an undifferentiated being-with-another,4 where there is no distinction between subject and object; everything is subjective, or everything is objective. According to this limit

•Karl Rahner, *Spirit in the World,* trans. by William Dych (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), p. 67.

•*Ibid.,* p. 808.

•The exact meaning of this phrase call only be clarified later.

idea, an animal would experience no entitative distinction between himself and what he senses.

However, human experience is not this undifferentiated unity of being-with-another, but the "objective intuition of world in space and time." [5] Thus, human knowing must be an integral unity of sense and intellect in which neither component can be understood outside the totality.

Human sense perception can only be thoroughly grasped within the context oi a theory of mind; just as human intellect can only be grasped within a theory oi sensation. Therefore, in presenting Rahner's theory oi sensation, it must be understood at the outset that, even though we will be emphasizing sensation, it is only an aspect of the larger totality of human knowledge. Sensation is" always already spiritualized," always informed by intelligibility.

I: A PRIOR COMMITMENT: THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE

Rahner's theory oi sensibility is founded upon a logically prior theory of the nature of knowledge, a theory which is as easy to state as it is difficult to understand. It is, by no means, an original theory. Rahner attributes it to Aquinas and, at least a certain formulation of it, to Hegel. Knowing, for Hahner, is simply the self-presence of being. Knowing and being are convertible. Being is, in its very meaning, luminous to itself.

> The essence of being is to know and to be known, in an original unity which we have called the self-presence of being, the luminosity of being for itself.[6]

The intensity of a being, that is, the " amount " of being that a being has, determines that being's self-luminosity. When a being knows, its being and what it knows are identical. " The intellect and what is known are the same." [7] We will totally

[5] Rahner, *Spirit* , •. , p. 46.

• Karl Rahner, *Listening to the Word*, trans. by Joseph Donceel (an unpublished manuscript), p. 85.

[7] Rahner, *Spirit* •.. , p. 70.

misunderstand this proposition if we attempt to interpret it solely in the light of human cognition. We might then be forced to say that the human intellect, in knowing a rock, becomes that rock "intentionally." This is, at the very least, misleading. The proposition, correctly interpreted, means that the intellect has, as its proper object, itself in its self-luminosity, in its fullness. That which the intellect properly knows is the perfection of its own being. "The known is a perfection of the knower." [8] The intellect knows of otherness only through the fullness of its own being. An angel, as the limit idea of pure intellect, knows of others only through its own essence as openness to being. Its own actuality is its only object. And this is not to be anthropomorphically understood as any anguished search for self-knowledge. Of itself being is already luminous, already knowing and known.

> That which is, to the extent that it is, is not something which may be experienced and known only in obscure urges, in the chaotic turmoil of dark powers. Of itself at least, it is luminous, it has always been light. [9]

This principle that knowing is the subjectivity of being, that being and knowing are an original unity, Rahner calls the "first statement of a general ontology." [10] It is this principle that serves as a prior given in his transcendental deduction of the nature of sensibility. Therefore, the strength of his theory of sensibility depends upon the strength of this first principle.

The problem is that an adequate attempt to show the deduction by which Rahner moves from a fact of experience to this first principle would involve a paper in itself. I wish here, then, for the sake of completeness, only to indicate that this first principle is not merely an assumed axiom, but is itself the result of a transcendental deduction based on the experiential fact of man's question about being. Any question implies some

[8] *Ibid.*
[9] Rahner, *Listening* ... , p. 85.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 87.

knowledge of what one is asking about, otherwise one could not ask. Thus, the question about being-in-its-totality already implies a basic intelligibility of all being. This means that any being, in its essence, necessarily includes an ordination toward possible knowledge. This necessary relation between being and knowing can only be understood if they are, fundamentally, the same reality.[11]

Rahner's fundamental principle of ontology, the identity of being and knowing, is also the ground of German Idealism, especially reaching its climax in Hegel. Rahner clearly distinguishes his own understanding of the first principle from that of Hegel. In an Hegelian interpretation of the original unity of knowing and its object, "it seems impossible that there exist any being that is not at once knowing and known in identity."[12] Hegel conceived of being as univocal and this forced him into a pantheistic interpretation of the identity of being and knowing. Rahner avoids this interpretation by seeing the concept of being, in its essence, as analogical. Thus, absolute being, as the prime analogate, would, in the fullness of its being, be the fullness of knowledge, total self-presence of total being. But, inasmuch as a being is not absolute, inasmuch as a particular being has an element of non-being at its very core, it would lack total self-presence, total knowledge. The degree of self-knowledge, then, corresponds to the degree of being. This degree of being is intrinsically variable and conceivable on a continuum from absolute self-presence to absolute self-ab.sence.

> We must, in principle, consider . . . being not as something unchangeable, always and everywhere the same, not, so to speak, as a constant quantity, but rather as a variable function .... Being is an analogous concept and this analogy shows in the purely analogical way in which each single being returns to itself, can be present to itself.[13]

We now have the starting point from which to begin Rahner's

[11] *Ibid.,* p. 3lf. [12] *Ibid.,* p. 37. [13] *Ibid.,* p. 39.

transcendental deduction to the nature of sensibility. Being is, of itself, knowing-self. This conception of being is, however, a fluctuating one. It cannot be pinned down to a determined meaning of self-presence. It can be asserted, though, that" the degree in which being knows itself and is known corresponds perfectly to and varies with the variability of being." [14]

Such a conception of knowledge is radically different from theories which base themselves solely on human knowing. Human knowing seems to be primarily characterized by intentionality. Human knowing is a relation to objects, an interaction with other beings, a dispersion among beings, a grasping of other beings, a coming to them. A large tradition in epistemology has centered on the problem of how such intentional knowledge happens, of how man bridges the gap between subject and object.

The convertibility of being and knowing, however, rearranges this entire problematic. Knowledge is subjectivity, not a relation to objects, and the problem of bridging the gap becomes a pseudo-problem.

> Rather the problem is how the known, which is identical with the knower, can stand over against the knower as other, and how there can be .a knowledge which receives the other as such. It is not a question of " bridging" a gap, but of understanding how the gap is possible at all.[15]

This is the very essence of the transcendental question that leads Rahner into what the nature of sensibility *must be.* The transcendental question is not the bridging of the gap, but the getting of the gap. If being is knowing, and we have seen that this is an intellectual commitment that Rahner cannot avoid, how can a receptive knowing, a potential knowing-which man's surely is-be possible at all? [16]

" *Ibid.,* p. 40.

[15] Rahner, *Spirit ...* , p. 75.

[16] Another aspect of this question would be an interesting deduction in its own right: How non-knowing beings are possible at all, if being and self-presence are correlative?

Rahner answers this question by a transcendental deduction into the nature of man as incarnate spirit, as spirit in the world; a deduction into man's being as weak and, therefore, sensible. Sensibility is the weakness of man's spirit.[17] Sensibility explains the gap and answers the transcendental question.

II: THE NATURE OF SENSIBILITY: A DIALECTICAL UNDERSTANDING

The previous section presented the question which Rahner's theory of sensibility is intended to answer. As revealed in man's question about the totality of being, he is spirit, that is, " absolute openness for all being."[18] If he is this openness, and being is knowing, why is not all being present to him in self-knowledge? If the totality of being is man's formal object, why is it not his actual object? How can human knowing be receptive, if the object known is an ontological perfection of the knower?

> How can there be a knowledge of another as such in which this other is the proper object of the knowledge, that is, in which there is no knowledge antecedent to the other, in which the other is known through the object of this knowledge, which object is identical with the knowing?[19]

In other words, and this question is the point of departure for a concept of sensibility, how can the proper object of human knowing be the other, and at the same time be the self?

If the first principle of Rahner's fundamental ontology states that only that which the knower is, is known as proper object, and yet man's proper object is other beings, then Rahner is transcendentally forced to conclude that man's being is the being of otherness.

[17] The fact that sensibility is an indication of the weakness of man's spirit is not meant to imply that it is an unfortunate appendage. From another viewpoint, sensibility indicates the strength of man's being, since it is how he is spirit.

[18] Rahner, *Listening* ... , p. 80.

[19] Rahner, *Spirit* ... , p. 78.

That being which intuits receptively must be the being of another as such. Antecedent to any apprehension of a definite other, the knower of itself must have already and always entered into otherness.[20]

A being that knows receptively must not be its own being, but the being of another. Its own being must be being for and to another, not for and to itself.

Yet, this other that the being of the receptive knower is to (for), cannot itself be another being, since, then, it too would entail some amount of self-presence and be to and for itself. Therefore, this other must be absolute otherness, empty and indeterminate in itself. It must be the" wherein" of the being of an existent, a " wherein " which separates the being from itself. This "wherein," this "real non-being," [21] Aquinas calls "prime matter." However, Rahner has arrived at it as a metaphysical principle in a different way from either Aristotle or Aquinas before him.

The possibility of receptively knowing another ontological actuality demanded that the knower himself be the being of another " in such a way that everything that is its own is by that very fact another's." [22] In other words, receptive being must be material. This material receptibility is sensibility.

Yet, here Rahner seems to have worked himself into difficulty. Receptivity demands materiality, that is, it demands that the ontological structure of a being be a " being-away-from-self-with-the-other ." However, objective intuition, man's intuition of objects in space and time, demands some being-present-to-itself in order to separate itself from otherness, that is, demands some immateriality.

It is clear from the paradoxical nature of such an intuition (human) ... that the essence of sensibility can be apprehended only by defining it dialectically from two sides.[23]

Thus, man is a sentient knower. He does not first sense and

[20] *Ibid.,* p. 79.
[21] *Ibid.,* p. 80.
[22] *Ibid.*
[23] *Ibid.,* p. 81.

then know, but has one act of knowledge that is the undivided unity of being-away-from-self-with-another and, at the same time, self-presence over against the other. As sentient knower, man is not present to himself as totally separate from otherness, yet, he is not totally with the other.

The being of the sentient knower is present-to-itself, but this being is precisely the undivided mid-point poised between a total abandonment to the other and an intrinsic independence over against the other. [24]

Sensibility as the Act of Matter

Knowledge is the self-presence of being. If man's spirit is the being of otherness, then man's self-reflection is originally, not subsequently as in angels, the self-reflection of otherness. What is first known is the other, which other the sentient knower is, in its very ontological structure. Man does not know otherness because he" humps into it." Man's being is the being of otherness and, as self-presence, is the being of an otherness that is himself. Man does not know by reaching out to the things of the world and bringing them into him. Man knows because, in his fundamental, ontological structure he is already a "reached-outness" into the world. His very being, as self-presence, inherently includes the world (as empty anticipation).

In the final analysis, therefore, the sensible object does not penetrate into the interior of sensibility, but sensibility as the act of matter has already moved out into the exterior of the world (being-away-from-self-with-other), and as an act over against matter (being-present-to-self) is always of such an intensity of being that whatever enters into its medium is by that fact already reflected upon itself, is already conscious, and only means a formal delimitation of that possession of the world which sensibility already and always is through its being. [25]

In other words, sensibility as material is, in its essence, the empty, indeterminate medium for worldness. Sensibility as act of matter is nothing in itself but the potency to become

••*Ibid.*

2· *Ibid.,* p. *95.*

world, the "indifferent subject of several possible whatnesses." [26] Yet,-and human sensibility can only be under.stood within this constant dialectic-sensibility as the act of spirit, as act reaching out toward the self-presence of its being as spirit, has such an intensity of being that whatever is in its medium is known immediately, is reflected upon itself. This self-reflection does not occur because of any mysterious process, but because being is, of itself, knowing. The sensed-object is only the formal delimitation (as form limits the privative infinity of potency) of the complete, though anticipatory, possession of world that sensibility, as act of matter, always already is.[27]

If sensibility is understood in the above metaphysical sense as spirit always ontically entered into the otherness of world, many of the traditional problems about sensation become pseudo-problems. Rahner specifically points out one such pseudo-problem which, when recognized as such, aids in an understanding of his own view of sensation. The traditional problem is whether, in sensation, man perceives an affection of his own sensibility or the actual "outside world." Put in a more popular way, whether color is in the thing or "in one's head." The question is a pseudo-one, since the answer is

> ... neither the one nor the other because the interiority of sensibility as the act of matter is precisely its exteriority, and vice versa .... [28]

Any separation between sensibility and the thing itself is only possible because of an act transcending matter, that is, because of human .sensibility as act of spirit. Sensibility as act of matter is not a being in itself, but an indeterminate potency for being.

Sensibility as the Act of Spirit

Rahner has stressed that sensibility can be understood only in its dialectical unity as act of matter and act of spirit. As

•• Rahner, *Listening* .•. , p. 112.

[27] It is in its anticipatory possession of world that sensibility is the form of space and time. This character of sensibility would be a paper in itself.

[28] Rahner, *Spirit* ..• , p. Slf.

an act of matter it is already and always otherness, but as act of spirit, the otherness which sensibility is, is itself a component of spirit's own ontological structure. Rahner attempts to explain sensibility as the act of spirit by the concept of emanation.

As spirit, man is openness to being. In its fullest intensity spirit, as openness to being, would be immediately self-present, self-luminous. But man is not spirit at its fullest intensity, he is spirit at its weakest intensity, spirit as soul, spirit as being of the other, as form of body. Thus, his spirit does not have the "being-power" to give itself to itself in knowledge.

> By itself it (human spirit) cannot give itself immediately to itself; it comes to itself only insofar as it receptively allows another to encounter it, and without this receptive letting-self-be-encountered by another it is itself not present to itself.[29]

Thus, in its natural desire to be self-present, human spirit has a drive to let itself intuitively encounter otherness. This drive of spirit is its emanation of sensibility.

Emanation, as Rahner conceives it, is not meant in a temporal or metaphorical sense, but is a metaphysical expression of the causal dependence on spirit, while, at the same time, keeping intact the conception of sensibility as "'outside the soul' so to speak."[80] Sensibility is produced by spirit, but not as something totally extrinsic to spirit. On the other hand, sensibility as a power produced by spirit is something other than the essential core of spirit.

> From this conception there follows the relationship, conceivable only dialectically, between the essential core of an existent and the powers emanating from it.[81]

Therefore, human sensibility, as ability to intuitively encounter otherness, as body, is a power of spirit and possessed by spirit as its own. Sensibility, as power of spirit, is part of man's ontological structure.

Rahner's conception of sensibility as the emanation of spirit

[29] *Ibid.,* p. 244. [80] *Ibid.,* p. 95. [81] *Ibid.,* p. 256.

has certain undeniable Hegelian overtones. Hegel's spirit, in its drive to be self-conscious, lets otherness emanate from itself, although this otherness is always only a dialectical moment within spirit's own movement toward self-consciousness. It must be realized, however, that for Rahner the otherness of sensibility which .spirit has emanated is itself an openness to actual otherness, an otherness which is not simply a moment of spirit itself.

III: THE MECHANICS OF SENSIBILITY: MATTER AND MOTION

We have traced Rahner's transcendental deduction of the nature of sensibility. He began with two intellectual commitments: that being and knowing are convertible, thus, the first known object is the self, and the seemingly contradictory notion that human knowing begins with the other. These two facts were the transcendental impetus to his definition of sensibility.

> Sensibility is the knowledge possessed by a being that, in order to have the other as its first object, must itself be the act of being of matter. [82]

The deduction of the definition was simple! If the knowing being knows only its own being, then the knower whose first object is otherness must be the being of otherness.

This deduction has determined what sensibility must be, but there is still a further question in order to complete a satisfactory transcendental deduction. It is a "*how*" question. Kant concluded that the mind had to be the power to form experience, but he still felt it necessary to give some indication of the mechanics or this formation. Rahner is now in a similar position.

Rahner's *"how"* question is essentially this: How can the other that is first known be both other and the knower's own self? How can the sense object in the medium of sensibility be, at the same time,

•• Rahner, *Listening* •.• , p. 110.

... a reality of the sense knower, its determination, and the determination of the known object which shows itself through its own activity.[83]

To answer this question, Rahner focuses on the nature of the otherness of matter as the ground of motion and inner-worldly causality.

What a being is in all its determinations, inasmuch as it is act, is the production of its own being, its own ontological ground.

But this says that this ground as such cannot be determined at all by an influence which is extrinsic and subsequent to its own potentiality and to its own self-constitution, by an influence which is an inner-worldly cause.[84]

If there is to be, then, any inner-worldly causation, a real principle of absolute indeterminateness, real non-being, non-act-but-potency-for-act, i.e., matter, must belong to the ontological structure of the being "affected." This absolute indeterminacy of matter is the basis for the possibility of motion and, therefore, of sensation, which is a peculiar type of motion.

Matter as indeterminateness must be understood as both one and many at the same time, in much the same way that absolute space, as the concrete expression of matter, is a unity which possesses the capacity to admit of many parts. Just as there is not a plurality of "spaces" in the multiplicity of spatial beings, so, there is not a plurality of matters in the multiple material beings. However, the unity of matter is not such that it excludes "a sundering in the multiplicity of many things."[85]

Now, this unity of matter, which unity is not destroyed by the materialization of many individuals, is the ground for the possibility of motion. Motion is an act of the mover, but motion is in the thing that is moved. The motion of a billiard ball is the act of the player, he takes credit for it, but it is the billiard

[83] *Ibid.*, p. 110.
[84] Rahner, *Spirit* ... , p. 841.
[85] Rahner, *Listening* ... , p. 111.

ball that really possesses the motion. This type of motion (motion in the proper sense) in which the act of one being takes place within another presupposes the indeterminacy, the materiality, of both the mover and the moved. Such inner-worldly causality is only possible in material beings.

An immaterial being is total self-determination. In material beings part of their ontological structure is indeterminacy. Even though this indeterminacy is limited by information as this particular being, this limitation does not eliminate the original unity of matter as privatively infinite indeterminacy. Even though matter is limited by form to being this particular being, matter, as retaining its essential unity, is still a potentiality to be other beings. This potentiality, as privatively infinite, is a potentiality to be the totality of material beings, that is to say, "retains the potentiality for absolute space." [36] Since the matter of each individual material being retains its essential unity, each material thing, in its very ontological structure as material, is (potentially) the matter of another material being, is potentially the real spatiality of the other. [37]

Every being is the act of being what it totally is. A being that has potentiality as part of its ontological structure, is a drive toward the actualization of this potency. Therefore, every material being, in its drive to actualize itself, seeks to realize its potential. *But,* this potential has been shown to be the real spatiality of the other being. The material being, in its drive to be fully the being that it can be, strives to actualize as itself the real indeterminacy (the matter) of another material being.

> This self-realization can be in the matter of the other because the real spatiality of the patient, because of the unity of matter, is already and always the greater potentiality of the agent. [88]

Rahner's problematic has been to show "how" his conception of sense knowledge is mechanically possible, how the sense object can be both its own determination and that of the knower. Having developed the nature of matter and motion, he

••Rabner, *Spi'rit* ... , p. 348. ••*Ibid.,* p. 349. ••*Ibid.*

is now in a position to answer. The fullness of a material being is only realized in the never-fully-eliminated-indeterminacy of another material being. A material being realizes itself only in the matter of another material being. Matter is, then, a medium, a " neutral ground " in which one act can, as it were, be "shared " by two material beings, in which one identical act is the product of two agents. Two beings can produce one identical act, because the act happens in the one matter in which both share.

Therefore, to act on another, to cause another to become rather than to be, implies that the agent must necessarily realize self outside of self, and that the patient, as medium for the agent's self-realization, must also be outside of self. In other words, inner-worldly causality is grounded in material beings.

Rahner has shown that the self-realization of the material agent must happen in, be borne by, the matter (potency) of another material being. *But,* this potency of the other (the patient) "must be produced in advance by the form of the patient." [39] **It** must be produced by the patient precisely as potency for the self-actualization of others within the patient himself.

Sensibility, then, is precisely spirit's emanation as the power of the potency for the self-actualization of other material beings.

> Therefore, the received (the patient's self-determination) and the emanating (the agent's self-determination) influence cannot be distinguished in their intrinsic quiddity, but only in the fact that the agent realizes this quiddity as its own in the matter of *another,* while the patient realizes the same quiddity as its own in its *own* potency borne by itself.[40]

Rahner is here at the center of sensibility. The sense object realizes its own essence anew in the medium of sensibility. Thus, the sense object is being (acting) in sensibility. However, sensibility is *also* spirit's act of being the potency for the

[39] *Ibid.,* p. *359.* [40] *Ibid.*

self-actualization of material objects. Therefore, sensibility's self-actualization is identical with the self-realization of the sensed-object. This identity-not likeness, but identity-is sensation.

The above is the crux of Rahner's theory of sensation. Sensibility is indeterminacy and, thus, potency to be the medium for the self-realization of any material object. However, it is an indeterminacy that is an emanation of spirit, an act of spirit for itself, an indeterminacy that spirit is ontically present to. In producing the indeterminacy of sensibility as total-though anticipatory-possession of world, spirit is producing the self-actualization of the sensed-object as part of its own ontological structure. Because this production of world is anticipatory (potential) , the sense object determines the " being-thusnes.s," but not the being, of sensibility. Therefore, the .sense in act *really* is the sensed in act. Human knowledge, as sense knowledge, is able to explain how knowledge can retain its character of self-presence, and yet be receptive.

CONCLUSION

We have seen that Rahner conceives of sensibility as an emanation of spirit. This emanation, in its essence, is the medium for the .self-realization of other material objects. The nature of this medium is immediately distorted if it is viewed as an organ of ingestion.

> We have not grasped the of sensation if we understand the senses as passageways through which things enter into us.[41]

The medium which spirit emanates is a being-for-otherness, an indeterminacy which lets the self-realizing acts of others be in it. 'The medium of sensibility does not mutilate othemesses, but is the means for their perfection.

As was pointed out in the beginning, such a conception of sensibility will seem immediately strange to those who have

u *Ibid.,* p. 45.

approached sensibility empirically (a method which Rahner believes is irrelevant to the question 0£ .sensibility[42]) · However, those who have followed Rahner's arduous transcendental path encounter a theory of sensation which possesses an intellectual force and satisfaction rare indeed in the treatment of such a common and complex .subject.

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•• *Ibid.,* p. 82.

LOCKE, HUME, AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CAUSALITY

IN BOOK I of his *Treatise,* in a section entitled "Why a cause is always necessary," [1] Hume presents several logical attacks on the principle of efficient causality. These attacks purport to show that the causal principle is neither intuitively nor demonstratively certain and can be denied without a contradiction. The purpose of this paper is to analyze and evaluate one of these logical criticisms.

Prefacing his logical analysis of the causal principle, Hume says:

> 'Tis a general maxim in philosophy, that *whatever begins to exist, must have a cause of existence.* This is commonly taken for granted in all reasonings, without any proof given or demanded. 'Tis suppos'd to be founded on intuition, and to be one of those maxims, which tho' they may be deny'd with the lips, 'tis impossible for men in their hearts really to doubt of.[2]

The causal principle is thus an assumption "taken for granted" by philosophers. It is thought to be an axiom of the mind, "founded on intuition," and indubitably true. [3]

Hume then proceeds to analyze several demonstrations which have been put forth in defense of the causal principle. Three philosophers are singled out, viz., Hobbes, Clarke, and Locke. Hume claims that the fallacy of *petitio principii* is common to all of their arguments. It is his treatment of Locke's demonstration that I wish to question. It is clear that Hume thinks that (i) Locke does, in fact, offer us a demonstration of the causal

[1] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature,* ed. by L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford, 1888), I, iii, 3, p. 78.

[2] *Ibid.,* pp. 78-79.

[3] Hume thinks that intuitive and demonstrative certainty belong only to unalterable *relations of ideas,* viz., resemblance, proportion in quantity and number, degrees of any quality, and contrariety. The causal principle does not fit into any of these relations and is therefore neither intuitively nor demonstratively certain.

principle, and (ii) in this demonstration Locke begs the question. I submit that both of these claims are false.

According to Hume'.s account, Locke negatively demonstrates [4] the causal principle by way of a *reductio ad absurdum* argument. In short, the denial of the causal principle entails the absurd, unacceptable consequence that *nothing* can cause an object's existence. As Hume says:

> Whatever is produc'd without any cause is produc'd by *nothing,* or in other words, has nothing for its cause. But nothing can never be a cause, no more than it can be something, or equal to two right angles. By the same intuition that we perceive nothing not to be equal to two right angles, or not to be something, we perceive, that it can never be a cause; and consequently must perceive, that every object has a real cause of its existence.[5]

Cast in simple *modus tollens* form, the demonstration says:

1. **If** an object is produced without a cause, then it is produced by *nothing*
2. But *nothing* cannot be the cause of an object
3. Therefore, it is produced by a real (i.e., external) cause.

Hume claims that this argument begs the question. To say, in the major premise, that if an object lacks a cause or productive principle, it is produced by nothing, assumes *nothing* to be its cause. The very point in question, however, is whether an object need have *any* cause. And so, as Hume says:

> 'Tis sufficient only to observe, that when we exclude all causes we really do exclude them, and neither suppose nothing nor the object itself to be the causes of the existence; and consequently can draw no argument from the absurdity of these suppositions to prove the absurdity of that exclusion.[6]

[4] I am using ' negative demonstration ' in this context in the same way Aristotle does in the *Metaphysics.* Although the law of contradiction is the most self-evident of all principles, Aristotle claims that it can be " negatively demonstrated " by drawing out the absurd consequences of its denial. For example, if one denies the law of contradiction, then all things become one and there are no differences between things. See Aristotle's *Metaphysics,* IV, S, l006a12ff.

[5] *Treatise,* I, iii, S, p. 81.

[6] *Ibid.*

The absurd supposition is that *nothing* can be considered to be a cause of an object's existence. The antecedent of the major premise, however, excludes *all* causes, including nothing. Therefore, *nothing* cannot be reinserted in the consequent without a *petitio pincipii.*

In his formulation of Locke's alleged demonstration of the causal principle, Hume seems to focus on Locke's often repeated claim that it is impossible for *nothing* to cause being. For example, in the fourth book of the *Essay,* in the c0ntext of the defense of a dem.onstration of God's existence, Locke says that it is "of all the absurdities the greatest, to imagine that pure nothing, the perfect negation and absence of all being, should ever produce any real existence." [1] Hume seems to think that Locke holds to the following strict disjunction, viz., either an object is produced by nothing or is produced by some actually existing external cause. Hume formulates this disjunction conditionally as the major premise of a simple *modus tollens* argument.

My contention, however, is that, according to Locke, the causal principle is an *indemonstrable* principle, resting on the *intuition* of clear and distinct ideas. The best way to show this is to let Locke speak for himself. Locke presents at least two accounts of the causal principle, viz., in his first letter to Stillingfleet and in his argument for the existence of God in the fourth book of the *Essay.* In both of these accounts, contrary to Hume's interpretation, Locke asserts that the causal principle is not the conclusion of a demonstration, but rather an *intuitively* certain principle.

At this point, a note on Locke's use of 'intuitive certainty' is in order. Locke thinks that knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement between ideas. Intuitive knowledge exists when the understanding perceives an *immediate* agreement or disagreement between any two ideas. As he says:

[7] John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,* Vol. II, ed. by A. C. Fraser (New York, 1959), Book IV, Ch. X, p. 812.

Thus the mind perceives that *white* is not *black,* that a *circle* is not a *triangle,* that *three* are more tban *two* and equal to *one and two.* Such kinds of truths the mind perceives at the first sight of the ideas together, by bare intuition; without the intervention of any other idea: and this kind of knowledge is the clearest and most certain that human frailty is capable of.[8]

No intervening idea (Locke calls them " proofs ") acts as a middle term when a truth is grasped intuitively. The mind simply sees a necessary, immediate connection of agreement or disagreement between ideas. The *perception itself* guarantees the certitude of the proposition. Locke thinks that the causal principle is intuitively certain in this sense. As he says in his first letter to Stillingfleet,

But " every thing that has a beginning must have a cause," is a true principle of reason, or a proposition certainly true; which we come to know by the same way, i. e. by contemplating our ideas, and perceiving that the idea of beginning to be, is necessarily connected with the idea of some operation; and the idea of operation, with the idea of something operating, which we call a cause; and so the beginning to be, is perceived to agree with the idea of cause, as is expressed in the proposition: and thus it comes to be a certain proposition; and so may be called a principle of reason, as every true proposition is to him that perceives the certainty of it.[9]

Locke's point in this pas.sage seems clear enough: the mind perceives that the " idea of beginning to be " agrees with the " idea of some operation " (which includes within it the idea of a cause, i.e., "something operating"). Locke does not explicitly say that the two ideas in question *immediately* agree, without the intervention of other ideas, but the immediacy requirement is satisfied by the fact that the causal principle is a " true principle of reason." Such principles are all intuitively certain. Locke makes this clear when he says:

... are not ideas, whose agreement or disagreement, as they are expressed in propositions, is perceived, immediately or by intuition,

[8] *Ibid.,* Ch. II, p. 177.
[9] *The Works of John Locke,* Vol. IV (London, 1828), pp. 61-62.

the true principles of reason? And does not the certainty we have of the truth of these propositions consist in the perception of such agreement or disagreement? And does not the agreement or disagreement depend upon the ideas themselves? nay, so entirely depend upon the ideas themselves, that it is impossible for the mind, or reason, or argument, or anything to alter it? [10]

Since the causal principle is a " true principle of reason," it must be intuitively certain, resting upon the " ideas themselves," the agreement of which is perceived immediately.

Locke is even more explicit as to the intuitively certain character of the causal principle in the fourth book of the *Essay.* Here he employs the causal principle as one of the premises of an argument for the existence of God. Locke claims that "man knows, by an intuitive certainty, that *nothing can no more rroduce any real being, than it can be equal to two right angles."* [11] This assertion, as O'Connor rightly points out, is just an unusual way of stating that whatever begins to exist must have a cause. [12] As a premise in the demonstration of God's existence, the causal principle is itself an *undemonstrated,* intuitively certain proposition. Combining the causal principle with another intuitively certain proposition, viz., " that there is some real heing," Locke proceeds to demonstrate the conclusion that " *from eternity there has been something."* [13] It is important to emphasize that the causal principle functions in the argument as an *intuitively* certain ratherthandemonstrated principle.

It is clear, then, from Locke's own accounts in his first letter to Stillingfleet and in the fourth book of the *Essay,* that Hume's claim about Locke offering us a demonstration of the causal principle is unwarranted. Just as one does not have to demonstrate, even negatively, that white is not black or that a circle is not a triangle, so too one does not have to demonstrate that

[10] *Ibid.,* p. 62.
[11] *Essay,* Book IV, Ch. X, p. S07.
[12] D. J. O'Connor, *John Locke* (New York, 1967), p. 180.
[1·] *Essay,* Book IV, Ch. X, p. SOS.

whatever begins to exist must have a cause. The mind's perception of the *immediate* agreement between the idea of beginning to be and the idea of cause is so clear that the *perceptwn itself* guarantees the certitude of the principle. As Locke says, the causal principle is a " true principle of reason," depending upon the " ideas themselves," and is thus unalterable. Demonstration always requires a middle term or "proof," some intervening idea. The mind's intuitive perception of the ideas involved in the causal principle, however, does not require such a middle term. And, since the causal principle is indemonstrable, the *petitio principii* charge does not apply.

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RECENT STUDIES ON NEWMAN: TWO REVIEW ARTICLES

I. REAPPRAISING NEWMAN ON DEVELOPMENT*

FEW READERS OF Newman have ever been neutral in reacting to his writings: devotees frequently succumb to the convincing appeal of his arguments; adversaries usually seem unduly controlled by their own biases. Nor have Newman's works been particularly favored by the climate of theological opinion. During his Roman Catholic years (1845-90), for example, Newman frequently labored under a double cloud of suspicion-among members of the church he had left as well as among members of the church he had entered. Then at the turn of the century, the ambiguous appropriation of Newman's writings by various Modernists effectively dimmed his reputation in Roman Catholic theological circles for several decades. Not surprisingly, the earliest attempts at a theological reassessment of Newman tended to be both cautious and distorted. The caution was double-pronged: few theologians wanted to criticize a cardinal too stringently; even fewer relished attracting the attention of still vigilant anti-Modernists. The distortion frequently came through compressing Newman's terminology into conventional scholastic categories without attending to his quite varied meanings; again, distortion arose from utilizing Newman's response without sufficient attention to his original questions and purposes. In contrast to the extensive work of their colleagues in history and literature, it is comparatively recently that theologians have re-discovered and attempted to restore the portrait of Newman the theologian.[1]

**Newman on Dooelopment. The Search for an Explanation in History.* By Nicholas Lash. (Shepherdstown, West Virginia: Patmos Press, 1975), Pp. xii, $17.50.

[1] For a bibliographical guide to Newman studies, cf. M. Svaglic, "John Henry Newman, Man and Humanist," *Victorian Prose* (edited by D. DeLaura; New York: Modern Language Association of America, 1973). pp. 115-165; C. Dessain, "Newman's Philosophy and Theology," *ibid.,* pp. 166-184. On the emergence of Newman studies in Europe, see the articles by W. Becker, B. Dupuy, and A. Boekraad in *The Rediscovery of Newman* (edited by J. Coulson, A. Allchin; London-Melbourne: Sheed and Ward / London: S. P. C. K., 1967), pp. 147-194.

In particular, readers of *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine* have tended to be more concerned about extracting a ready-made, orthodox theory of development than with understanding either Newman's personal view of diverse developments or the complex paths of doctrinal history as such (cf. pp. 145-156).[2] Given Newman's penchant for cumulative, inter-locking argumentation the apparently modest concern of Lash's study is then really more challenging than might first appear: " to understand, as fully as possible, the multiple themes and patterns of argument in the *Essay* so as to be able, without unfaithfulness to Newman's thought, to provide the materials on the basis of which theologians may tackle the further question: what light can the *Essay* cast on the significantly different situation in which christian theology today attempts to come to terms with the problem of change and continuity in christian doctrine? " (p. 4).[3]

If all might agree that" Newman's aim in writing the *Essay* was apologetic" (p. 10), readers' expectations do not necessarily coincide with its author's purpose. First, the *Essay* is more practical than theoretical: Newman's quest was to locate *where* the apostolic church is at present, rather than to delineate *what* the church is or should be. Secondly, the *Essay* is more personal than probatory: " it was not the ' evidence ' which he was watching, but his own state of mind in regard to that evidence" (p. 11). Accordingly, readers who expect a logical demonstration of the truth of catholicism may be puzzled by the persuasive presentation of " the fruit of a complex, personally acquired appreciation of the concrete facts of christian history " (p. 17). And theologians who are searching for a systematic theory of doctrinal development may be disappointed that Newman's so-called" theory" is really more tentative and problematic than is conventionally recognized. "What Newman needed, and what he sought to provide in the *Essay,* was a 'view' of christian history" (p. QO).[4]

For an ecumenical revaluation, cf. J. Coulson, A. Allchin, M. Trevor, *Newman: a portrait restored* (London-Melbourne-New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965).

[2] Lash earlier suggested that Walgrave's search for a synthesis in *Nl?/Wman the Theologian* (New York Sheed & Ward, 1960) obscures the aim and method of the *Essay* (cf. "Second Thoughts on Walgrave's 'Newman'," *The D01JJnside Review* LXXXVII [1969], 339-350).

[3] For an indication of Lash's developing views on doctrinal development, compare his "Dogmas and Doctrinal Progress," *Until He Comes* (edited by N. Lash; Dayton: Pflaum Press, 1968), pp. 3-33, with "Development of Doctrine: Smokescreen or Explanation?" *New Blackfriars* Lii (1971), 101-108.

[4] While Lash *(The Downside Review* LXXXVII (1929], 341) has suggested

Attempting to grasp Newman's view is a tantalizing task. First, his recourse to history is not an appeal to a chronicle of presumably objective facts; instead, selected facts are viewed in light of an initial interpretative hypothesis, around which the facts purportedly fall into place. Accordingly, the *Essay* employs an argument from antecedent probability-" a more or less well-founded claim that it is reasonable to expect that, in a particular case, the data bear witness to one state of affairs rather than another" (p. 31). Not surprisingly, present-day readers, accustomed to more direct and systematic styles of proof, may have misgivings about the subtleties of "Newman's method of argument in 'concrete matters'" (cf. pp.

Yet it should be recognized that " Newman's fundamental concern is with the negative force of the arguments from ' antecedent probability' in the *Essay*, although the form in which these arguments are presented is often misleadingly positive" (p. 41). For example, it was certainly Newman's intention to show his contemporaries that Roman Catholic doctrine and practice were not necessarily corruptions of the apostolic church; yet it would be gratuitous to over-extend his arguments to imply that the papacy of Pius IX was the ideal, normative form of church government. It is even easier to overlook his fiduciary or confessional attitude towards language and approach to evidence. Admittedly, a fiduciary or confessional stance, though more congenial to personal religious commitment while running some risk of uncritical credulity, is unlikely to appeal to theologians of analytic or historicist temperament.[5] Perhaps one reason the theological community today is more appreciative of Newman can be found in its hermeneutical consciousness that is more willing to recognize the legitimacy and value of the fiduciary and confessional.

The *Essay's* leitmotiv, " the development of an idea" (pp. 46-78) is well-known to most readers, who recognize the Platonic resonance to Newman's use of "idea "-that is *quoad se* immutable but

some similarities between Newman and Collingwood *(The Idea of History;* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), it would seem profitable to compare Newman's attempt at "taking a view" with the hermeneutical process as described by H.-G. Gadamer *(Truth and Method;* New York: Seabury Press, 1975; reviewed by R. Innis, *THE THOMIST* XL (1976],

[5] The contrast between analytic and fiduciary use of language is developed by J. Coulson, *Newman and the Common Tradition* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970); Newman's portrait of development as a "living idea" obviously fits well with the fiduciary tradition where "language is living organism whose function *is* to reconcile the past and present experience of a community " *(ibid.,* p. 4).

" changes *quoad nos* during the course of its realisation in human history " (p. 53).[6] What may escape readers' attention, however, is Newman's emphasis on "the independence and sovereignty of a 'real' and 'living' idea" (p. 51) and on "that objectivity of God's word, and its priority over the response of man, which is at the heart of his theological concern and is the ground of the ' dogmatic principle' " (p. . Insofar as this Platonic facet is correlated with a doctrinal postula:te, unsuspecting idealists, even while disavowing dogmatics, might well be captivated by Newman's adroit apologetics.[7] Yet it is more likely that modern readers will be captives of their own expectations; accepting development as a commonplace fact and so anticipating a systematic interpretation of doctrinal development, they may fail to realize that for Newman, " as a pioneer, it was the *fact* of ' development ' which he offered as a 'hypothesis,' as an alternative to 'immutability,' on the one hand, and ' corruption' on the other " (p. 56) .

Instead of a well-honed theory," the *Essay* undoubtedly contains, in rudimentary form, the seeds of a number of such theories " (p. 56). One then should recognize a measure of fluidity in Newman's thematization of development and a latent tension between contrasting, perhaps incompatible, conceptualizations of history. By allowing that Newman's view of development is only inchoately articulated, " it is not surprising that different controversial needs, and different aims, should give rise to different specifications of that 'theory' in the [fifteenth University] sermon, the *Essay,* and the *Perrone Paper"* (p. 61).[8] Thus, crediting Newman with a theory

[6] Briefly, an "idea" is identified as "the potentially or actually apprehended representative of the whole object; " an " aspect" is " any partial knowledge of the idea (and so of the object) from a particular point of view" (p. 50); thus, the "development of an idea" is identified as the process "by which aspects of an idea are brought into consistency and form" (p. 51).

[7] For example, Newman's apologetic appeal to the unity of the fact and "idea " of Christianity intertwines prescriptive argumentation and historical description, while playing on the expectation that things should turn out the way they did (cf. pp. 94-98). Though outside the scope of Lash's present work, an in-depth comparison of the *Essay* with the *Apologia pro Vita Sua* and *Grammar of Assent* should prove profitable; cf. the preliminary work of J. Robinson, "The *Apologia* and the *Grammar of Assent," Newman's APOLOGIA: A Classic Reconsidered,* edited by V. Blehl, F. Connolly (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964), pp. 145-164, and R. Colby, "The Structure of Newman's *Apologia pro Vita Sua* in r.elation to his Theory of Assent," *The Dublin Review* CCXXVII (1953), 140-156; reprinted in *Apologia pro Vita Sua,* edited by D. DeLaura (New York: Norton, 1968), pp. 465-480.

[8] To obviate Roman Catholic criticism of the *Essay,* Newman prepared a Latin

of homogeneous evolution is misdirected, even though "he undoubtedly regards gradual, homogeneous growth in which nothing of the past is lost or forgotten as the ideal" (p. 68). Newman's attempt to view the process of development as expanding and irreversible seems motivated by a combination of apologetic concerns, theological convictions, and spiritual autobiography. One wonders, however, whether the proclivity of catholic theologians to espouse homogeneous theories of development owes more to the requirements of orthodoxy in the wake of Modernism than to confrontation with the demands of critical history?

In any event, theologians should be alert to the difficulties implicit in the familiar individual-society analogy of development (cf. pp. 60-64) and in biologistic interpretation of historical process (cf. pp. 71-75); Newman, at least, "never lost sight of the fact that the use of organic imagery and terminology in the *Essay* is only metaphorical or analogical" (p. 71). At times, however, the correspondence is neatly drawn: just as an "idea" can never be completely delineated, so the general process of development can never reach a term. Yet neatness can be deceptive; it may be well to recall that for Newman the development of Christian belief and practice can be marked by five possible kinds of development (political, logical, historical, ethical, metaphysical). It may also be worth noting that "both the overall development of the christian 'idea,' and the development of a particular doctrine, or 'aspect' of that idea, are two-stage processes. The first stage is the development from implicit awareness to explicit articulation in a body of doctrine. The second stage is the further elaboration of that body of doctrine" (p. 78). Moreover, this inherent complexness indicates the inadequacy of using simple analogies and tidy theories to understand doctrinal development.

A good illustration of this complexity is found in Lash's analysis of the *Essay's* principle of "interpreting the 'earlier' by the 'later'" (pp. 80-113).[9] Although such topics as Newman's metaphorical use of literary criticism (pp. 83-86) and mystical sense of scripture (pp. 90-94) seem primarily of concern to specialists, of more general interest is the way that Newman's personal conviction that "new"

summary of its main features for the consideration of Giovanni Perrone (1794-1876), professor at the Collegium Romanum; the resulting "Newman-Perrone Paper on Development" has been published by T. Lynch in *Gregorianum* XVI (1935) 402-447.

[9] This principle, among other issues, is at stake in the current infallibility debate, cf. P. FitzPatrick, "Infallibility-a Secular Assessment," *The Irish Theological Quarterly* XL! (1974), 8-11.

revelation is impossible aligns so readily both with his platonic premise that the whole " idea " must have been present from the beginning and with his expectation that the "later " is an authentic interpretation or prophetic fulfillment of the "earlier." In similar manner, subsequent theologians found a convenient alignment between a presumed deposit of revealed truths, a process of logical explicitation, and a propositional presentation of doctrine. While the *Essay,* as well as subsequent theology, may have been satisfied with an unrefined concept of revelation (cf. pp. 98-102),[10] theological revisions after Vatican II indicate the need for reconsidering the roles of revelation, tradition and magisterium in theories of doctrinal development.

Consequently, criteriological questions are inescapable: while it is possible to suggest historical continuity by chronological description, any claim to logical continuity raises " the problem of the normative standpoint" (pp. 114-145). If, for example, Newman did not share either the deterministic or optimistic views of " progress " entertained by many of his contemporaries, nonetheless his eloquent descriptions of developments as " natural," " inevitable," or "necessary" effectively persuade readers that such developments are" true "-what has happened is what ought to have happened. [11] Persuasion, of course, is the metier of an apologist; nevertheless, Newman's arguments as such are "dangerously inadequate and one-sided if divorced from their original context and erected into a systematic criteriology" (p. mo).

A further factor in the *Essay* is the relationship between the developmental process and its authentication by church authority (pp. 121-134). Lash detects the survival in the *Essay* of Newman's *Via Media* distinction between " prophetical " and " episcopal " tradition so that the process of development is seen as occurring in the former and coming to term in the latter by solemn ecclesiastical deci5ion. Inadvertently, the *Essay* double-faults by insufficiently indicating, first, that the content of the " episcopal " tradition is itself subject to historical development and, secondly, that authorita-

[10] P. Misner, "Newman's Concept of Revelation and the Development of Doctrine," *He;ythrop Journ<il* XI (1970),

[11] The assumption, once common among Roman Catholic theologians, that doctrinal development represents cumulative, irreversible "progr.ess " in understanding revelation seems to be more an acceptance of the conventional wisdom of the nineteenth century than a critical assessment of the changing, " successive structurings of Christianity's theological and dogmatic tradition" (P. Misner, "A Note on the Critique of Dogmas," *Theological Studies* 34 [1973], 690-700; phrase quoted from p. 700).

tive ecclesiastical decisions are not exclusively normative for authenticating development.

Given the efflorescence of ultramontane ecclesiology in mid-nineteenth century and its survival until Vatican II, neither of these flaws received much critical attention until recently. [12] Symptomatic of the shifting ecclesiological ethos in Newman's own day is the fact that his rather innocuous remarks "On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine" [13] occasioned his delation to Rome, even though a few years earlier Pius IX had consulted the catholic world prior to the proclamation of the Immaculate Conception. [14] Nonetheless, Newman's emphasis on the normative importance of the reception of doctrine by the catholic community persisted, as is evident in his initial hesitancy about, as well as his eventual acceptance of, Vatican I's *Pastor Aeternus*. [15] Newman's feeling that " future popes will explain and in one sense limit their own power " (p. 136) may have been of some consolation to his contemporaries, if not our own, but it leaves unanswered such criteriological ques-

[12] On the emergence of ultramontane ecclesiology, cf. H. Pottmeyer, *Unfehlbarlceit und Souveriinitiit: Die piipstliche Unfehlbarlceit im System der ultramontanen Elclclesiologie des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Mainz: Matthias-Grunewald-Verlag, 1975), reviewed in *Theologicil Studies* 37 (1976), 161-164; R. Costigan, "The Ecclesiological Dialectic," *Thought* 49 (1974), 134-144; C. Langlois, "Die Unfehlbarkeit-eine neue Idee des 19. Jahrhunderts," *Fehlbar? Eine Bilanz* (edited by H. Kling; Zurich-Einsiedeln-Cologne: Benziger Verlag, 1973), pp. 146-160.

[13] This work, which originally appeared in *The Rambler* in 1859, has been republished with an introduction by J. Coulson (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961); cf. V. Biehl, "Newman's Delation," *The Dublin Review* Q34/486 (Winter, 1960-61), Q96-305, and "Newman, the Bishops and *The Rambler*," *The Downside Review* 90 197Q, Q0-40, where pertinent archival material has been published.

"On the consultative role exercised by the hierarchy, cf. J. Hennesey, "A Prelude to Vatican I: American Bishops and the Definition of the Immaculate Conception," *Theological Studies Q5* (1964), 409-419.

[15] Cf. *The Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman* XXV (edited by C. Dessain, T. Gornall; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), reviewed by J. Miller in *THE THOMIST* XXXVIII (1974), 37Q-375; for background material on Newman's attitude towards Vatican I, cf. C. Dessain, "What Newman taught in Manning's Church," *Infallibility in the Church* (with A. Farrer et al.; London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1968), pp. 59-80; J. Holmes, "Cardinal Newman and the First Vatican Council," *Annuarium Historiae Conciliorum* 1 (1969), 374-398, and "Liberal Catholicism and Newman's *Letter to the Dulce of Norfolk*," *The Clergy Review* 60 (1975), 498-511; J. Altholz, "The Vatican Decrees Controversy, 1874-1875," *The Catholic Historical Review* LVII (1971-7Q), 593-605; G. Swisshelm, "Newman and the Vatican Definition of Papal Infallibility," *St. Meinrad Essays* lQ/3 (May, 1960), 70-88.

tions as the following: how can the normative meaning of authoritative declarations be determined? What is the normative meaning of authoritative definitions if they allow a spectrum of legitimate interpretations? What modifications are legitimately introduced into the meaning of authoritative pronouncements through the process of reception by historically and culturally different christian communities? Is the reception of any authoritative declaration by different christian communities ultimately the decisive practical criterion for judging that declaration's evangelical authenticity? [16]

Such questions are, of course, not answered in the *Essay.* Yet they must be faced today and Lash's work makes a doubly significant contribution to the quest for answers: first, his critical analysis of the *Essay* clearly delineates its accomplishments without glossing over its limitations; this is particularly important insofar as "the objective statement of the importance of the problem for the *status controversiae* between Roman Catholicism and other branches of Christendom makes Newman's *Essay* the almost inevitable starting point for an investigation of development of doctrine." [17] Secondly, the *Essay's* questions, answered and unanswered, are effectively used by Lash as a springboard, not as a solution, for summarily discussing current issues in the theology of development.

In fine, Lash's mastery of Newman materials in tandem with a consummate attention to accuracy have produced an extremely valuable reference for all future consideration of the *Essay.* Yet the literary result is a chiaroscuro of strengths and weaknesses. While the work is a rich lode of information, its mining presupposes fairly extensive familiarity with Newman's thought and terminology; novice Newmanists, who surely would be aided by a reliable companion for reading the *Essay,* may find that the author's spartan style, while a bit of relief in an age of verbosity, sometimes issues in delphic pronouncements. In addition, the critical apparatus tends to be unwieldy: parenthetical references are cryptographically inserted within the text; explanatory notes are located at the end of the text (pp. 157-205); complete citations are given in the extensive bibliography (pp. 209-243); however, the index

[16] Cf. the question raised from a "structuralist" perspective by P. Misner, *Theological Studies* 34 (1973), 699; for a recent treatment of the problem of transmission of doctrinal statements, cf. G. O'Collins, *The Case Against Dogma* (New York-Paramus-Toronto: Paulist Press, 1975), reviewed by A. Dulles in *Theological Studies* 37 (1976), 147-149.

[17] J. Pelikan, *Development of Christian Doctrine* (New Haven-London: Yale University Press, 1969), p. 3.

of references to Newman's writings and another index to authors are helpful (pp. 245-264). Inadvertently, by its frequent comparison of passages from the 1845 and 1878 editions of the *Essay*,[18] the work demonstrates the need for a comparative and critical edition.[19] These short-comings will prove to be particularly regrettable if they prevent Lash's revisionist work from getting the widespread attention it deserves both as a notable contribution to Newman studies as well as a challenge to theorists to construct more viable models of doctrinal development.

II. NEWMAN'S SEARCH FOR CERTAINTY*

Newman's writings have always had a fascinating ambivalence. More than one reader has been prompted to raise the same question which Charles Kingsley once voiced: "What, Then, Does Dr. Newman Mean?"[1] Although few have questioned Newman with Kingsley's impudence and imprudence, even theologians and philosophers have sometimes found Newman's meaning less than limpid.

At first sight, it is tempting to ascribe any difficulty in reading Newman to the prolixity of Victorian prose; yet anyone trying to summarize Newman's arguments soon finds that a purported summary can easily be longer than the original. If the attempt to improve Newman's presentation is presumptuous, still there is a real, though not immediately apparent difficulty: twentieth-century Americans may easily miss the overtones and analogies of Newman's usage. Not only is Newman's diction that of nineteenth century Oxford; not only is his phraseology frequently indebted to the

[18] The first (1845) edition of the *Essay* has been republished as a Pelican classic (Harmondsworth-Baltimore-Victoria [Australia]-Ontario: Penguin Books, 1974), edited by J. Cameron, who took the liberty of modernizing the original orthography and deleting or altering Newman's footnotes; the second (1846) edition has only a few changes which Lash notes in an appendix (pp. £07-£08); the third, revised (1878) edition, which has more significant changes, is available in a number of editions (e.g., Westminster, Maryland: Christian Classics. 1968).

[19] A critical edition of Newman's *Apologia* has been prepared by M. Svaglic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967); a critical edition of *The Idea of a University,* prepared by I. Ker (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), is reviewed by H. Chadwick, *The Times Literary Supplement,* 3,883 (August 13, 1976), 100£f.

**Faith and Doubt. The Unfolding of Newman's Thought on Certainty.* By William R. Fey. (Shepherdstown, West Virginia: Patmos Press, 1976). Pp. xix, ££9. $16.95. (page numbers in parentheses refer to this work).

[1] This question is the title of Kingsley's pamphlet in the controversy that eventually led Newman to write his *Apologia pro Vita Sua;* the basic texts along with commentaries have been published in an edition by D. DeLaura (New York: Norton, 1968); Kingsley's pamphlet is reproduced, pp. 310-40.

dignified eloquence of the King James version or the measured elegance of classical literature; not only are his arguments and allusions quarried from both patristic theology and the Anglican divines; in addition, his philosophico-theological vocabulary reflects his inter-action with such diverse movements as calvinistic evangelicalism, roman scholasticism, and scientific empiricism.

In presenting his ideas, Newman combined his talents as litterateur and historian, apologist and pastoral counsellor, with those of philosopher and theologian. The ensuing eclecticism has often left readers puzzled, if not disagreeing, about what Newman meant. Nor have readers really been aided by those procrustean analysts who have insisted on fitting Newman to the categories of their respective systems, rather than taking him on his own terms. Admittedly, tmiling Newman's thought is challenging; since he "was able to enter into states of mind which he did not personally share," [2] he often argued opposing sides of a question with equal zeal. Yet this spirit of fairness frequently yielded to his penchant for persuasion; when advocating his own views, the magic of his rhetoric sometimes out-paced the force of his logic. It is not altogether surprising then that some of his contemporaries, like those of Socrates, accused Newman of deception. [3] And much to Newman's dismay, even his friends on occasion failed to grasp the import of his writings. [4]

An important key to interpreting Newman's writings is a recognition of their autobiographical stimulus; his works were generally prompted by " some especial call, or invitation, or necessity, or emergency; " the *Grammar of Assent* is " nearly the only exception." [5] This disclaimer notwithstanding, Newman long felt himself called to write such a work and made repeated attempts over

[2] N. Lash, *Newman on Development* (Shepherdstown, "\Vest Virginia: Patmos, 1975), p. 16U, n. 39.

[3] For example, Newman's veracity was at issue in the exchange with Kingsley, who initiated the controversy with an aspersion *en passant:* " Truth, for its own sake, had never been a virtue with the Roman clergy. Father Newman informs us that it need not, and on the whole ought not to be; that cunning is the weapon which Heaven has given to the saints wherewith to withstand the brute male force of the wicked world which marries and is given in marriage. Whether his notion be doctrinally correct or not, it is at least historically so " *(Apologia pro Vita Sua,* edited by D. DeLaura [New York: Norton, 1968], p. 298).

[4] Such was initial reaction to the manuscript of his *Grammar of Assemt;* cf. C. Harrold, *John Henry N&wman* (London/ New York *I* Toronto: Longmans, Green, 1945; Hamden, Connecticut: Archon, 1966), p. *I9I5.*

[5] *John Henry Newman, Autobiographical Writings,* edited by H. Tristram York: Sheed & Ward, 1957), pp. 272-273.

a twenty-year period before hitting on what he considered a satisfactory approach. [6] Indeed, the *Grammar* represents Newman's lifelong concern-from his first Oxford University sermon in through his *biglietto* speech as cardinal-designate in 1879 [7]-about certainty in religious matters. Just as his *Apologia* can be considered theological biography-the odyssey of a man making up his mind in religious matters, so the *Grammar* can be characterized as biographical theology-a discussion of how people go about making up their minds about religious matters. [8]

Nonetheless, if Newman's religious pilgrimage has fascinated dozens of biographers, [9] his analysis of the journey to faith has often seemed more confusing than clarifying. The *Grammar,* for example, starts rather awkwardly with a seemingly prosaic set of definitions whose importance is not immediately evident. Similarly, it is not initially apparent that Newman's object" is to show that "you can believe what you cannot understand" and that "you can believe what you cannot absolutely prove." [10] Such a bald assertion might well cause readers to pause for reflection. Even those sympathetic to Newman's admirable pastor.al concern both for defending the faith of uneducated Catholics and for fostering belief among contemporary sceptics cannot help asking: how can there be certainty in religious matters without understanding? Or without proof?

These questions are but samples of many incongruities, if not contradictions, found in Newman's explanation of the relationship of faith and reason. Yet one may well wonder whether the seeming inconsistencies are really Newman's or more those of his critics? [11] Unfortunately, too many commentators have victimized Newman

[6] *Ibid.,* pp. 269-270.

[7] The respective texts are to be found in Newman's *University Sermons.,* introduced by D. MacKinnon and J. Holmes (London: SPCK, 1970), pp. 1-15, and W. Ward, *The Life of John Henry Newman* (London / New York / Bombay/ Calcutta; Longmans, Green, 1912; Westmead: Gregg, 1970), II, 459-462.

[8] Cf. J. Robinson, "The *Apologia* and the *Grammar of Assent," Newmans APOLOGIA: A Class.ic Reconsidered,* edited by V. Blehl and F. Connolly (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964), pp. 145-164.

•On Newman biography, cf. M. Svaglic, "John Henry Newman, Man and Humanist," *Victorian Prose,* edited by D. DeLaura (New York: Modern Language Association, 1973), pp. 115-129. J. Altholz, "Some Observations on Victorian Religious Biography: Newman and Manning," *Worship* 43 (1969), 407-415.

[10] C. D.essain, *John Henry Newman* (London: Nelson, 1966[1]: Stanford: University Press, 1971[2]), p. 148.

[11] For an evaluative survey of previous studies, cf. C. Dessain, "Newman's Philosophy and Theology," *Victorian Prose,* pp. 171-7.

by drawing broad-stroke conclusions from isolated passages. Many have failed to appreciate that "although Newman discussed one problem of faith and reason throughout his life, he concentrated on different sides of it at different times " (p. xiii) . For example, his youthful association with Evangelicalism made him distmstful of reason, yet ,subsequently fellowship with the Oriel Noetics deepened his desire for intellectual content in religious matters (pp. 1-4).

Too few, however, have attempted to work through the issues as Newman once struggled through them: to back-track his thought to its various sources; to trail the twists and turns as he probed difficulties, proposed tentative solutions, revised his positions, and then revised them again; to gaze with him over the changing panorama where some objects appear luminously clear, while others remain shadowy; to explore the path of faith that leads ex umbris et imaginibus in veritatem. [12]

Empiricism, Roman Theology, Scientism

The point of departure for Newman's philosophical investigation of faith and doubt was the empiricist tradition in general and Locke in particular. Newman's relation to Locke has been variously evaluated-from superficial resemblance to outright dependence; similarly, Newman has been seen as using Locke as a position to be rejected or a model to be corrected or a view to be expanded (p. 7). Fey finds that Newman, following the precedent of his beloved patristic theology which utilized Plato for its own purposes, employed Locke's language with an enlarged meaning (p. 8). For example, if Newman took " experience " as his starting point for reflecting on faith and reason, still " he felt that Locke had distorted the facts of experience to fit his own arbitrary theory; " thus, " instead of taking man as a pure reasoning machine, Newman recogized that man is a complex sensing, reasoning, feeling, believing and acting animal" (pp. 9-10).

The contrast between Newman and Locke is evident in their different conceptualizations of faith. Locke understood faith as the assent to a proposition made, not on the deductions of reason, but on its alleged proclamation by God; accordingly, " the whole strength of the certainty depends upon our knowledge that God revealed it" (p. 17). Newman, on the other hand, " took faith as he found it "-with " a variety of paradoxical properties " (p. : faith, though presupposing " a certain frame of mind,

[12] These latin words were Newman's self-chosen epitaph (C. Dessain, *John Henry Newman,* p. 169).

certain notions, affections, feelings, and tempers," is not simply a subjective viewpoint, "not a mere conjecture" (p. 29); and, even if most people believe " because they are disposed in certain ways," faith is " not merely a disposition to act in a certain way " (pp. 31-2), nor "an assent to the conclusion of an argument" (p. 36); " faith, though it implies a venture, is not a determination to risk everything on what may be false" (p. 34); faith is an absolute assent, not because one is confident of an opinion, but because faith, like knowledge, " is, in some sense, an objective grasp of what is the case " (p. 36).

Newman's entrance into the Roman Catholic Church in 1845 brought his developing explanation of faith into " confrontation with Roman categories" (pp. 38-54). On the one side, Newman's non-scholastic terminology troubled some of his new co-religionists who detected taints of both fideism and Hermesianism (pp. 42-3).[13] Simultaneously, Newman, after briefly displaying a new convert's readiness to conform, managed to incorporate various aspects of Roman theology within his personal view of faith.

For example, although Newman had earlier concluded that " there is a distinctive informal use of reason found in evaluating religious matters," the Roman distinction between a judgment of credibility and an act of divine faith enabled him " to emphasize that informal reasoning alone cannot explain the distinctiveness of faith" (pp. 38-9). Similarly, this distinction helped Newman revise his earlier opinion that ' the fact of revelation occurring is the object of a human analysis resulting in the opinion that God " may have spoken," while the content of that revelation is " the object of faith's certain assent;" the Roman view that " the object of divine faith is not the conclusion of an argument but God Himself revealing Himself *(revelatio et res revelata)"* enabled Newman to see that "the fact and the content of revelation can be the object, although in different ways, of both the former human and perhaps certain judgment and the latter uniquely certain assent " (p. 40). Accordingly, "divine faith is not the acceptance of the conclusion of an argument, nor the acceptance of a particular way of looking at the world; it is an acceptance of God revealing a definite message" (p. 180).

Around 1860, Newman turned his exploration of faith in a new direction in order to meet the agnostic difficulties of a family friend,

[13] Fey's statement that "George Hermes had been condemned in an encyclical published only weeks after Newman reached Rome" (p. cf. p. 60, n. 81, where the encyclical is identified as the *Qui Pluribus* of November 9, 1846) is misleading, since the works of Hermes (1775-1831) had already been condemned eleven years earlier by the brief *Dum acerbissimas* of Septemher 1835.

William Froude (1810-79), an Oriel alumnus who became a distinguished railroad engineer and a researcher in hydrodynamics. " Froude maintained that anyone who sought intellectual integrity must withhold certain assent in religious matters since they must be qualified as tentative and revisable in the same way that scientific statements must be qualified as open to change" (p. rn7). The basic difference between Newman and Froude was one of first principle and methodology. For example, when Froude insisted that no truth has been achieved without a habit of sceptical caution, Newman replied that " no great thing was done without the reverse habit, viz. that of conviction and faith" (pp. 130-1). Again, where Froude felt that people deal differently with religious belief and " the ordinary affairs of life-as if instinct were to guide them in the one case, logic in the other," Newman came to hold that" there is a common pattern of concrete reasoning which we use in everyday inferences and in those leading to religious belief" (p. un).

Newman's dialogue with Froude, however, was not simply a study in contrasts. If " Froude too quickly assumed that the scientific method is the paradigm of all knowing," Newman seems to been "overconfident about the certain advance of science" (p. 132). Newman, apparently trying to have the best of both worlds, on the one hand distinguished " the popular, practical, personal evidence of Christianity " from scientific methodology, and on the other, asserted that " Christianity is proved by the same rigorous scientific process which science employs " (p. 132). Fey then appears justified in finding that "a great deal of Newman's ambiguity seems to have resulted from a failure to appreciate fully the methods of experimental science" (p. 133; cf. pp. 142-5).

Newman on Knowledge

The Victorian debate between science and religion was genemlly more polemical and less perceptive than the Newman-Froude exchange where the participants were life-long correspondents [14] with Froude becoming' for Newman the personification of Locke's position on the nature and limits of human knowledge" (p. 54). Although Newman could agree with Froude that knowledge sometimes depends on the uncertain method of theory and experiment, nonetheless, " not all coming to know is a matter of justifying a belief or testing a conjecture" (p. 135). Similarly, while" Newman would agree with Locke that to know is to be certain " (p. 82),

"Newman was in the process of writing Froude a long letter on assent and certitude at the time of the latter's sudden death abroad; cf. W. Ward, *The Life of John Henry Newman,* II, 466, (text).

Newman disowned Locke's tendency "to limit genuine knowledge to what is clear and distinct and therefore abstract" (p. 68). Not only did Newman "allow certain knowledge of what is obscure " (p. 79); more basically, insofar as "what we aim at is truth in the concrete," Newman felt that "arguments about the abstract cannot handle and determine the concrete " (p. 82).

Newman in effect challenged Locke's presuppositions about knowledge and abstraction, about judgment and certitude. Finding the situation " more complicated than either Locke or Plato seemed to allow," Newman 'wanted to stress the "fulness of meaning" gained in experience and to emphasize the importance and depth of meaning of concrete individuals over against the abstract nature of the species' (p. 79). In the process, Newman "borrowed much of Locke's terminology" (p. 81) while using some of Hume's examples (p. 89, n. 92). Expressional similarities, however, can be deceptive: just as the sceptically inclined may choose to read Newman as a " primer of infidelity " (p. xi), so casual philosophers may accuse him of nominalism. Linguistic affinities and latinate accusations aside, " the main train of his thought remained that of a moderate realist" (p. 79).

In contrast to Locke's definition of knowledge as "nothing but *the perception of the connexion of and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any o.f our ideas"* (p. 69), knowledge, for Newman, is not always nor merely a logical process: *'coming to know* in the sense of coming to grasp " the real state of things " is not at all like *justifying a claim to know* by appealing to better known claims which lead to this claim in the way that premises lead to a conclusion" (p. 107). While for Locke, " certainty is beyond us " (p. 71), Newman's "matter of fact" approach to knowledge resulted in a different appraisal (p. 95): "if knowledge were always uncertain, we could never be sure we were ever mistaken . . . we could never be sure that one opinion is closer to the truth than another opinion" (p. 100).

Yet how are we to judge whether our reasons for considering ourselves certain are really sufficient? Following Locke must we be "content to measure our assent according to available evidence" (p. 71) and so calculate certitude on some sliding scale? In a way reminiscent of his earlier search for " tests" for authentic development, Newman experimented with a variety of " tests " for certain truth: theoretical self-consistency, reception in the past and present universal acceptance (pp. 109-13). Newman also 'seems to have drifted into a " voluntarism" where after a complex and persuasive inference, we decide to be certain' (p. 114). These and a variety of other options were laboriously explored by Newman in his private

papers [15] before he eventually reached his final position (pp. 173-*195).*

By examining Newman's papers, Fey has detected some interesting parallels. Just as Newman eventually abandoned his search for a *via media* between Protestantism and Catholicism, he also became dissatisfied with " hypothetical middle positions " which viewed knowledge as " a progressive balancing of extremes " (p. 123). Applying a "law " of development to knowledge (p. 131),[16] Newman eventually' argued that the very" nature of man" involves a " process of change " or growth, analogous to other growths, that is, an internal development of powers, appropriating and turning to account what is external' (p. *125)* .

In light of these explorations, Newman concluded that knowledge "is not a matter of subjective impressions, opinions and beliefs apart from evidence which more or less justifies them" but " a unique relation between knower and thing known; " in effect, " within a vast and complex intellectual activity we sometimes grasp the way things are" (p. Hll). Consequently, certitude is neither the product of some " mysterious infallible faculty " (p. 107) nor the proof derived from a series of undeniable premises; " there is no ultimate test of truth besides the testimony born to truth by the mind itself" (pp. lOSff.). Correspondingly, Newman's insistence on the irreversibility of certainty, his refusal to allow degrees to certainty, is " due to the fact that we have recognized or grasped that something is true and truth does not allow of more or less " (p. 117) .

In sum, Newman can be credited with defending "a complex intellectual activity in direct touch with experience, too rich and far-reaching to be captured in a syllogism" (p. 154). Yet what is critically needed, but lacking, is "to explain the unique and immediate relation with experience which is human knowledge" (p. *155).* Fey finds that 'Newman's own empiricist and nominalist tendencies, his lack of interest or ability in "metaphysics," and the " practical character" of his work-prevented him from developing his own thought in this direction' (p. *155)* .

[15] Many of these archival manuscripts, which Fey used in his study, have since been published in *The Theological Papers of John Henry Newman on Faith and Certainty,* prepared and edited by J. de Achaval and J. Holmes (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976).

[16] However, in contrast to the conventional view that extracts an organic theory of development from Newman's *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine* (1845), Lash, *Newman on Development,* p. *56,* finds that "the *Essay* contains in rudimentary form the seeds of a number of such theories, the systematic elaboration of which might show that they are not mutually compatible."

Appraisal

Any analysis of Newman's rich and variegated view of faith and reason is an ambitious undertaking that requires ample time and talent; a good measure of both have been invested in this study, which in its original form was appropriately a doctoral dissertation at Oxford, Newman's alma mater. This study's basic strength stems from Fey's familiarity with, and expert handling of, Newman materials in both the text and the extensive notes at the end of each chapter. Fey's control of sources, both published and archival, enables him to re-create the pivotal features of Newman's dialogue with Locke and Froude, to trace the development of Newman's views through a series of terminological and ideological shifts, and to detect the concomitant instances of ambiguity and inconsistency. Consequently, Fey is able to challenge, if not to correct, the spurious charges of nominalism, psychologism, voluntarism, etc., conventionally alleged against Newman. But probably what will prove most valuable to future students of the *Grammar of Assent* is the succinct delineation of the principal facets of Newman's thought on faith and reason; as a bonus, such an examination is expedited by a comprehensive index.

Unfortunately, Fey's achievement is marred by some organizational defects. First, while the arrangement of material according to selected themes (e.g., faith and reason, knowledge and empiricism, etc.) has the advantage of presenting particular aspects of Newman's thought as separate units, the resulting redundancy is a decided disadvantage; one wonders whether a strictly chronological format might have been pursued more successfully. Secondly, the introduction of current philosophical issues usually comes across as a series of side-trips, more distracting than conducive to the presumed purpose of comparison: it would seemingly have been better either to deal with such material at greater length or to relegate it to an appendix. Finally, it would have been helpful if the author had been more attentive to telling readers where, if not why, he was going.

Yet in comparison with others who have attempted to explore Newman's thinking on faith and reason, Fey's study merits high marks; moreover, Fey displays considerable talent for writing philosophy both insightfully and incisively. Hopefully, then, Fey's initial contribution to Newman studies will be followed by others of similar, if not increased, strength.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Body as Spirit: The Nature of Religious Feeling. By CHARLES DAVIS. (New York: The Seabury Press, 1976). Pp. 181. Index. $8.95.

Grown out of an intimate acquaintance with the Christian faith and an increasing disenchantment with some of its expressions, Charles Davis's plea for a more sensuous religion bears the marks of a profound ambiguity. It presents the achievement of a mature, disciplined theologian who raises all the pertinent questions about Christianity today and refuses to be satisfied with simplistic answers. The first chapter and especially the last chapter of his book display a discerning mind and an unusual acumen in dealing with the intricate questions of religious epistemology. Yet Davis's study also articulates (though not always articulately) a longing for the kind of religion which Christianity has never been and probably never will be: a religion in which feeling is primary. Part of its ambiguity results from a romantic vagueness about the question how far the tradition within which the discussion takes place can be stretched without breaking. The term " romantic " does not suggest that Davis is naive whenever he is not critical. Even while defending a thesis reminiscent of the early Schleiermacher, Davis insists on adequate distinctions. He refuses to equate religion with religious feeling and, unlike his romantic predecessors, remote and recent, he does not posit an identical feeling at the root of the variety of religious traditions. As we learn in the first chapter, religious feeling is always mediated by a specific tradition, since it has no perceptible object to specify it as other feelings do, including the feeling of finitude. Its awareness of wholeness or totality or depth or dependence takes man " out and beyond his ordinary self, out of and beyond the limited world in which he lives and opens him to what is unlimited and unapprehensible, though felt as utterly real and blissful" (p. 31).

A similar theological sophistication is displayed in the last chapter's discussion of how critical questions must be raised in a religious tradition, a thoughtful exposition of the complex issues involved in a critical reflection upon a historical faith. All too often such a reflection forgets its own historical character. " There is no absolute reason, stripped of all prejudgments, allowing us to engage in a critical reflection that would dominate the cultural materials through purely objective techniques" (p. 149). Precisely! One finds oneself wishing the same self-conscious criticism had been applied to the questions raised in chapter two and continued to the next to last chapter. Unfortunately here we fail to detect the same tough-minded determination to go to the bottom (that is, by Davis's own definition, the formative processes) of the problems besetting the Christian religion. The problems are real enough. Who would deny that Christianity

has granted the body at best a grudging recognition and that it has thereby created major conflicts in the areas of sexual morality, religious spirituality and the belief in an afterlife? But Davis seldom moves beyond the questions as we actually confront them today and remains mostly content with hinting, in one or two paragraphs, at the direction where a possible solution may lie. He concludes his chapter on sexuality by declaring sexual love the most common path to mystical union and self-transcending dedication (a statement that must remain unconfirmed in any religious faith known to me) and has nothing more to say about the traditional cult of celibacy than " that it is possible to conceive of it as a genuine call, though a rare one" (p. 142). A similar abdication of a genuine critique in Davis's own, tradition-conscious, sense appears in the chapter on death where he simply suggests the possibility of a "conditional immortality," that is, one reserved to those "whose deepest identity is a dynamic relationship to God " (p. 103). A conclusion as momentous and revolutionary would appear to require some justification of its ability to be incorporated within the Christian tradition. In the interesting chapter on the isolated ego the author advocates as sole remedy for our disastrous objectivism "the expansion of consciousness outward into the world to rediscover God as immanent in reality" (p. 79). This wide-reaching conclusion is made concrete only by a rejection of a renewed emphasis upon spiritual life. Again, some attempt should have been made toward a justification of such a momentous reversal of the entire Christian tradition.

I suspect that those repeated instances of avoiding the ultimate issues are not altogether fortuitous in a man of Davis's caliber. To me at least they appear to be the discouraged reaction of a sensitive mind that has been too long shackled to a system of thought which, impervious to problems, made any search for their origin and their solution futile. Davis's book reflects an attitude of fatigue and resignation. Yet its best pages show what he is capable of doing and undoubtedly will do when he is ready for it.

Lours DuPRE

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Husserlian Meditations. By RoBERT SOKOLOWSKI. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974.) 296 pages. Index.

Professor Sokolowski's first book on Husserl, *The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhofl', 1964), helped to mark the fruition of Husserl studies in this country. That book's erudition, as exhibited by its easy familiarity with the published and unpublished

texts of this extremely difficult thinker, is matched in Sokolowski's newest book, *Husserlian Meditations.* But whereas the first book attempts 'primarily to provide a historical sketch of the development of a major concept in Husserl's thinking, the present work has a rather different theme and structure. The principal theme of the book is to show how Husserl tries to define what it means to be human and therefore " truthful." As the title suggests, the book is structured as a series of " meditations " on significant ideas in Husserl's thinking. These meditations have as their guiding thread the .consideration of two major concepts: the idea of presence and absence, and the related idea of parts and wholes.

It is impossible in a brief review to do justice to any single chapter or meditation of this book, much less to all nine of them and the interesting appendix on logic and mathematics in *Formal and Transcendental Logic.* Each chapter takes up a different but crucial aspect of Husserl's thinking and attempts to present Husserl's more or less final view of that aspect. Within these chapters, Sokolowski manages to depict these viewpoints and their development as clearly as anyone who has written on this dense material. Sokolowski's ability to make Husserl both intelligible and appealing is exhibited most evidently in his power to produce excellent examples for Husserl's sometimes almost opaque concepts. In Chapter Two, for example, "Identity in Absence and Presence," Sokolowski provides nine different examples of what Husserl means by his distinction .between "empty" and "filled" intentions. An empty or "signitive" intention is one in which an object, state of affairs, word, decision, or memory image is somehow intended by consciousness (i.e., talked about, wished for, recalled, etc.) , but is not actually *pesent* to consciousness. An empty intention (e.g., my *thinking* about swimming in the lake) becomes a filled intention when the object of the intention comes to intuitive presence (e.g., when I actually swim around in the lake). Sokolowski's examples gives us precisely what is lacking in Husserl's own discussions of these concepts in the *Logical Investigations* and in .*Formal and Transcendental Logic.* For someone who has struggled through one of these works, these examples tend to evoke feelings of admiration and relief: admiration for the skill of the person who produced them; relief on the part of the reader whose own rather " empty "· grasp of Husserl's meaning is " filled " by intuitive examples.

Throughout the book, Sokolowski stresses the fact that Husi;erl's phenomenology ought not be construed as a kind of "subjective idealism." Consciousness, although " absolute " in the sense of being the field necessary for the appearance of anything, is always consciousness of something *transcendent:* the object of experience is never " captured " in experience itself. Consciousness functions to confer meanings upon the objects which are *given* in experience. In a phrase reminiscent -of Kant, Sokolowski em-

the primaey of experience for Husserl: "Thinking is parasitic 011 and dedicated to experiencing and cannot replace it, but experiencing without thought is opaque and dull" (p. 74).

Tlw first six chapters include helpful treatment of such themes as "How to Intuit an Essence," "Identity in Manifolds," "The Many Kinds of Reflection and Inner Time," "The Life-World and the Ego," and many others. But in my opinion, these early, chapters provide a solid background and introduction for what I take to be the *major* theme of this book, ***vh,*** how phenomenology can be understood as part of man's historical quest to be trnthful. Sokolowski claims that, although the historical situation changes, "... the theme of philosophy, being and being truthful and man having a world, does not change " (p. 267). In Chapter Seven, "Raising Questions about Appearances," Sokolowski draws an analogy between Socrates and Husserl, as a way of explaining the significance of the *epoche,* long one of the least understood notions in Husserl's philosophy. In the *epochc,* we are told, even though the mundane beliefs and judgments about the existence of the world (the "natural attitude") are suspended, at the same time everything is somehow retained; nothing is " lost " through the *epoche.* "How do these acts, judgments, and objects persist within the philosophical attitude? We cannot understand what philosophy is unless we understand how they are still available in the detached consciousness of philosophy, which preserves-and even justifies-these things while somehow disassociating itself from them" (p. 180). For Sokolowki, the *epoche* is the explicit form of what the genuine philosopher, or anyone involved in the quest for truth, .has always had to do. To seek the truth means to question the natural or conventional interpretation of the world, while nt the same time remaining within that same world as a human being. Sokolowski asks: " How can Socrates be a loyal Athenian and yet distinguish his philosophical life from being Athenian?" The answer is that Socrates is hoth Athenian and philosopher. As philosopher, he makes himself conscious of his existence as an Athenian within the natural attitude pr<'suppoS<'dby his fellow citizens. Socrates's effort to illuminate the world disclosed by that attitude ended by making him an enemy of important segments of Athens. Sokolowski concludes from this that "Transcendental philosophy is left with the permanent burden of appearing incomprehensible to those who do not examine natural conviction ... " (p. 181).

This discussion of the importance of philosophical detachment in the quest for truth is continued in a fascinating dialogue which ends Chapter Seven. In the dialogue, we are told that the quest for truth belongs not just to the philosopher, hut to any human being who wants to exist as *h11111a11,* and not as an unreflective consciousness. In the dialogue, one Sp<'aker remarks that, although everyone makes some effort to exercise truth, not many talk about tmth in a systematic way. When the other

speaker responds that he will leave such talk "to the experts," the first speaker replies that "You take a great risk if you do•· (p. 20-i). What does this risk involve? As we learn in Chapter Nine, the principal risk is that to leave one's understanding of what is true ancl fals(•, real and mrrc appearance, to· the " experts " is never to become fully human, never explicitly to take over responsibility for attempting lo *be* truthful. To be truthful is not blindly to take over judgments made by someone else, but to become involved in the very activity of philosophical reflection and criticism. To make a philosophical judgment one's own requires that one work his own way through it-for only then is one really responsihl1• for having *achieved* the truth which one claims to possess. This responsihilit.y for truth" ... is implied in Husserl's insistence that phenomenology beg-ins with each person's own subjectivity and his explicit reflection on it " (p. 247).

Sokolowski does quarrel with Husserl. over an important point. Husserl apparently believed that the way to true autonomy lay in making the transcendental turn to phenomenology. Here he was guided by the Enlightenment ideal of Reason. But according to Sokolowski. it is not ne<:t•s-sary to become a phenomenologist to exist as a truthful human being. Husserl was too bound up in the ideal of rational scienc1• to see how the rigorous language of science and phenomenology could he transmitte1l to those in the natural attitude, i.e., he could not sec the rclevanc1• of plll'-nomenology for those who did not practice it. Husserl docs not manag1• to show how philosophy can" straddle" the natural altitude ancl tlw phenomenological attitude (p. 269). But as Sokolowski indicates, if philosophy (taken as the ability to make oneself aware of the world that one is in, in order to appraise and assess it) is to maintain its public prescnee, there is required a mode of discourse which is accessible to those who have not taken the transcendental turn to phenomenology. This politically-orienter! criticism of Husserl's phenomenology, presented as it is by one of Husserl's most notable American commentators, is an important first strp toward the recognition of the limitations of Husserl's thinking for crucial human affairs. But as a first step, the criticism is perhaps too muled. For many years now in Europe, some social and political philosophers have accused Husserlian phenomenology of being the cxemplifi!'ation of the *impotence* of bourgeois philosophy. They claim that phenom(•nology is a continuation of the idea that philosophy is an affair of elite intt'llcctuals far r('llloHcl from the problems of actual human <'Xistcnce. The notion Ihat philosophical truth can be achieved only by th<' return to the splu·re of !'onsC"ionsm·ss of the individual ego testifies to the fact that bourgeois sol'idy has lic·i·11 splintered into isolated, atomic "selves," as a rcsnlt of tlU' vi<'w that c·ac-h individual is responsible only for himsrlf. The social <'ritic-s of phenomenoloey see it as a retreat from th<' imperatives of rontrmporary life. as a re-

fusn.l to enlist philosophy on the side of world-altering *praxis,* as a re-affirmation of the proposition that the chief aim of philosophy is to provide spiritual and intellectual insight for the politically naive and in-t•fTcctive bourgeoisie, much in the same way that religion provides comfort for the less educated.

Professor Sokolowski does not carry his criticism far enough in this dirt>clion, although it is clear enough that he has become dissatisfied with the fact that Husserl's philosophy, and the ever-growing research and inlt'rpretation which surrounds that philosophy, appears to have so little direct relevance for the pressing problems of human existence. Might this book be a sign that Sokolowski is beginning to work his way *out* of the scholarly exegesis of Husserl as an end in itself? Has he begun to conclude that the genuine task of phenomenology (as philosophy) is to help make mankind aware of the need to question the structure of our world, in order to show how to *change* it in light of the discovery of higher possibilities? For the primary aim of this book is not the careful and illuminating analyses of difficult themes in Husserl's phenomenology; these analyses serve as a means to the major task of posing such questions as: What docs it mean to *be* human and truthful? What is omitted from the scientific interpretation of man, if not precisely his capacity to *be* truthful, thus human? What relation d.oes phenomenology have to traditional philosopical concerns, and to the social, political, and economic affairs of contemporary human existence? This book is a kind of summons which bids the phenomenologist to take his work in a new way. Sokolowski warns the phenomenologist not to lose himself so completely in the obscure reaches of Husserl's thought that he forgets that the task of philosophy is a *public* one. Part of the task of the philosopher is to show to the rest of thoughtful mankind that much of what passes for" wisdom" is sophistry. And although one truthful way of being " present " in the world is to be able to be " absent" from it at times by means of reflective criticism, the phenomenologist must remember that the point of this " absencing " is to be able to *act* within the human world on the basis of what has been learned about it through such criticism. Sokolowski wants the phenomenologist to recognize that genuine autonomy is not merely the power of the rationn1 ego to make independent judgments, but is also the power of the whole self to *exist* as a genuine human *agent* within the historical, public world.

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Theology for a Nomad Church. By Huao AssMANN. Trans. Paul Bums. Maryknoll: 1976.

Assmann begins by calling the reader to a deeper understanding of the political dimensions of the Christian faith and to the task of developing a political theology. The call for a political theology, however, is subject to all sorts of misunderstandings. It could be interpreted as a call to return to the theocratic society of the middle ages-a society of a Constantinian or Byzantine sort. It could also be interpreted as a call to develop a 'leftwing Constantinianism," as Assmann calls it (p. 100). According to such a political philosophy, the Church would simply switch its loyalties from right to left, but would once again exert the same sort of heteronomous authority which she exercised in the middle ages. Assmann is not interested in this type of political theology or in the restoration of " Christendom," to which it leads. In that respect, in spite of his severe criticism of the theology of the secular (p. 57), he nevertheless affirms the attempt of the theologians of the secular to redefine the relationship between the Church and the world.

In an attempt to clarify his understanding of political theology, Assmann refers to the " new European political theology " of Metz and Moltmann. He is in essential agreement with several of the main theses of this new theology, particularly Metz's attempt to break free of the privatized understanding of Christian faith, his quest to recover the "dangerous memory, the subversive contents ... in the Christian message" (p. 81), and his understanding of the Church as an institution of social criticism. Assmann also utilizes Moltmann in later sections as he continues to develop his understanding of political theology. He is particularly appreciative of Moltmann's distinction between religions of promise, with their focus on the future, and epiphany religions, which are essentially the pagan religions so severely attacked in the Biblical writings and which function to legitimate the *status quo.*

Assmann begins the development of his own political theology where Moltmann and Metz end theirs. Although he sees their work as a positive contribution which moves theology away from identification with the *status quo,* he is critical of both theologians at several points. He accuses Metz of retrenchment in the face of the attacks by reactionary theologians. Metz's distinction between political theology (theory) and political ethics (practice) comes in for particularly heavy criticism by Assmann who sees it as a retrenchment with regard to his position on the relationship of theory and practice. He also criticizes European political theology for its failure to relate itself to any systematic social analysis and for its fear of any and all ideological commitments. Although he himself is aware of the excesses to which an ideological approach can lead, Assmann believes

that ideological insights, properly used, can serve a positive function (p. 93). He is of the opinion that the Europeans' avoidance of sociological analyses and their excessive fear of ideology have resulted in sociological vagueness on the one hand and an inability to name the agents of oppression on the other. This vagueness and this inability in turn have done much to weaken the revolutionary impact of their writings and thus to diminish their practical relevance.

Expanding on the efforts of Moltmann and Metz, Assmann continues his own attempt to develop a Latin American political theology. He first addresses himself to the problem of a redefinition of the terms "politics" and "political." These words, according to Assmann, must be understood in such a way as to enclose within their meaning both those acts which are ordinarily thought of as private and those which are understood as public or political in the strict sense. Assmann is concerned to point out that in this new and broader definition of politics, the intention is not to repress or deny the importance of intimacy or of personal and interpersonal relalations in human existence or even to lessen the intensity with which this dimension of life is experienced. Rather the intention is to call attention to the fact that all so-called personal relationships also have a political side. As an example (Assmann does not give any), one might point to the sexual behavior of a couple. Certainly a couple's love-making practices are or ought to be the ultimate in intimacy. Nevertheless, these very practices assume a "political" dimension as soon as the couple becomes concerned about the problem of population growth in the late twentieth century. An awareness of the way in which one's sexual behavior is related to this public problem has in fact influenced the sexual behavior of many couples. The question of the role of each sex in marriage might serve as another example. The interaction patterns between husband and wife, ordinarily thought of as a part of the "private" sphere, assume a political dimension as soon as the partners become aware and concerned with the problem of human liberation as it related to the male and female roles.

Although these examples are not related to issues which stand at the top of Assmann's priority list, they do serve to illustrate his point that the separation which we seek to make between private and public life is untenable and that "politics" and "political" are terms which require a much broader definition than we ordinarily attribute to them. Undoubtedly most people will find this awareness of the political dimensions of their most intimate acts an awareness which they would prefer to do without. Nevertheless, Assmann makes his point very convincingly. The awareness, once awakened, can scarcely by repressed. One might justifiably argue, however, that Assmann, in spite of the logic of his argument, is introducing a linguistic confusion here. To be sure, most if not all so-called private acts include a political (social) dimension of which most people

are not aware and of which they need to become aware. Does this mean, however, that these acts are "political" in the same sense as a mass demonstration or a traditional political campaign? Is not the use of the same word to describe two acts which are similar in some respects but dissimilar in others somewhat questionable? The point could perhaps be made with more linguistic sophistication.

At the end of this effort to redefine politics, Assmann summarizes his point by saying that all other dimensions of human activity (technology, science, and even individuality) require a broader why-or meaning. Politics, as newly defined, provides that broader context within which this why or meaning can be discovered (p. 33).

A second theme to which Assmann now turns has to do with the relationship between politics as redefined and faith. In order correctly to articulate this relationship Assmann believes it is necessary to move beyond the concept of "applying" insights derived from the faith to particular political situations. Rather, he suggests that the meaning of Christian faith must be understood in such a way as to do justice to the political dimension of faith itself. This political dimension of faith, without which it is not Biblical faith, derives from the fact that the Christian faith is an historical reality meant not merely to be intellectually affirmed but to be lived. As an historical entity, however, it can be lived only within and in relation to a particular historical context. This means that any act of faith is at the same time, though not exclusively, a political act. It is not necessary to derive insights from the faith and apply them to politics. Merely to live the faith in relation to a particular historical situation is to assume certain political positions and to be committed to certain political goals. For the liberation theologians, of course, the chief of these goals is the liberation of the members of the human community.

Assmann appeals, in so arguing, to a number of Biblical traditions. He lays the greatest stress on the Exodus and the prophetic traditions. In the Exodus, Yahweh calls upon his people to live out their faith by their commitment to the liberation struggle led by Moses. But this act of faith is also and obviously a political act. Israel's act of faith in Yahweh involves her in a political struggle with the greatest political power of the age, Pharoah and all that he represents. Indeed, the Exodus is portrayed as a political struggle between Yahweh and Pharaoh for control of history and the future. The plagues are a part of the divine strategy and Moses is the "outside agitator" or "organizer." (These terms are the reviewer's.) Israel is assigned, on the basis of faith, an important role in this struggle.

The prophetic call to Israel to return to the true faith likewise includes an important political dimension. Even the prophets' vigorous attack on idolatry contains important political implications since the importing of foreign religious practices was a part of the political policy of detente with

Assyria and other foreign powers pursued above all by Manassah but also by other Israelite kings. This means that Israel's renunciation of Assyria's gods was interpreted as renunciation of Assyrian suzerainty. More obvious examples of the prophets' call for political expressions of the Yahwist faith could be mentioned, however, such as their exhortations to Israel's leaders to renounce foreign treaties or Jeremiah's call to surrender to the Babylonian forces beseiging Jerusalem. Unfortunately Assmann does not offer any of these examples but contents himself with generalizations such as the statement on page *35* that political theology "in biblical exegesis ... lays stress once again on the meaning of the Exodus as the original principle on which the whole biblical concept of God and faith is based; on the historical and political nature of prophecy; on the prohibition of institutions trying to ' capture ' God in images . . ." Although Assmann admits the need for the theology of liberation to discover and expound on such subversive and dangerous Biblical memories as those mentioned above, he contributes little to this discovery or exposition. One is grateful for the extensive discussion of such themes as dependence and development and would not wish to have these discussions shortened; nevertheless, one also comes away from a reading of the book with the wish that those sections which might be called theological in the strictest sense of the word had been equally developed.

These references to the prophetic and Exodus traditions lead logically to Assmann's next point. Once again he affirms Metz's and Moltmann's effort to develop a political theology but asserts that the Latin American version of political theology must take a specific form, namely that of a theology of liberation. This theology must be related specifically to the Latin American historical context in which it finds itself. This context results above all from the failure of the decade of development in Latin America and from the insights discovered by Latin American social scientists, especially economists, as a result of this failure. First of all, the failure of development revealed to the economists the inadequacy of the neo-capitalistic theories upon which the development approach was based. The social scientists now substituted a new theoretical understanding of the Latin American social and economic reality. The key concept in this new understanding is the concept of dependence. Latin American societies are seen as dependent on the developed societies of the northern hemisphere, particularly the United States. The base of this dependence is economic, but on this economic base is built up a political, military, and cultural dependence. This dependent relationship is maintained with the help of internal structures in Latin American society-the latifundia and the oligarchies with whom foreign interests align themselves and with whom they share the spoils of their economic exploitation. In this way, the foreign-based multinational Corporations are able to tie their own interests

to those of the ruling groups within in Latin American societies. Should a revolutionary government assume power in a Latin American society and threaten American economic interests, the multinationals in collusion with the displaced oligarchy, the American State Department, or the CIA work to destabilize the situation and restore a government favorable to American (economic) interests. Because development theories and strategies do not challenge but reinforce and strengthen both these social and economic structures within Latin America and the dependency relationship between Latin America and the developed countries, they do not alleviate but exacerbate the social problems of Latin American society. Development enriches the already rich countries of the north, as studies on the flow of the capital have revealed. It further enriches the already rich oligarchies and latifundia of Latin America, while it further impoverishes and enslaves the Latin American masses. Indeed, according to these economic theorists, it is only because the rich nations of the north, with the help of internal collaborators, were able to reduce the Latin American nations to the state of dependence that the metropolitan countries of the north were able to develop themselves. The price of their development was the underdevelopment of the colonial and neo-colonial societies of Latin America and the rest of the third world. From this perspective underdevelopment is seen not as a mere failure on the part of third world societies to develop but as the shadow cast by the development of the first world. Development and underdevelopment are organically related. The one is possible only in its particular relationship to the other. Nations of the third world *are not* underdeveloped. They *have been* underdeveloped.

From this point of view, it is obviously nonsense to call for more development as the cure for the problems of Latin America since it is precisely the dynamics of development which have caused the immense social problems of the continent in the first place. What the new theories demand is the liberation of Latin American societies from their dependence on the developed countries of the north. This is the prerequisite for any kind of social progress. This goal cannot be attained by reform, as it requires radical changes in the power structures of Latin America. It is naive to think that those in power will voluntarily agree to reforms which will significantly weaken their control. What is required is a revolution. The precise form which the revolution should take in Latin America is the subject of some disagreement among and within various revolutionary groups within Latin America, though there appears to be increasing willingness to embrace the methods of violent revolution.

When Assman and the other representatives of the liberation school speak of the theology of liberation, they speak within the theoretical framework described above. This theoretical framework is accepted by them as the most adequate analysis of present Latin American social reality. They

accept it more or less *in toto,* including the call to join the revolutionary struggle for liberation. This latter call Assmann and the other liberation theologians seek to relate to the gospel call to obedience and faith. Indeed, they understand faith as the act of participation in the struggle for liberation.

It is at this point that Assmann and liberation theology depart most drastically from European political theology. European political theology is unwilling to adopt so rigorous an ideological framework or to call so unequivocally for concrete political action. Such a call, for Metz, would be the prerogative not of political theology but of political ethics. This reluctance of European political theology to commit itself to concrete practical political action is its most serious shortcoming in the eyes of the liberation theologians. It is related to the Europeans' understanding of the relationship between theory and practice. In spite of their desire to make theology more relevant, the Europeans remain committed to an idealistic epistemology according to which truth is discerned speculatively and articulated theoretically. Such "truth" may then provide guidelines for action or may be applied to action. Liberation theology on the other hand not only understands the Christian faith as ACT and emphasizes in an almost absolutist way the preeminence of act over idea, of praxis over theory. It even assigns epistemological priority to practice. According to its epistemological theory, truth is discovered only in the doing, not through contemplation or speculation. To European political theologians, this one-sided emphasis on praxis is unacceptable. It flies too much in the face not only of western theological but of the entire western intellectual tradition. Here again, one is faced with what seems to this reviewer to be a false alternative. Both the idealistic epistemology of the Europeans and the pragmatic one of the Latin Americans seem incomplete. The actual relationship between theory and praxis appears to be far more dialectical then either approach would indicate.

The exhortation to revolutionary action presents a further difficulty. It is not that the call to express one's faith by participation in the revolutionary struggle for the liberation of the Latin American masses is in any sense incompatible with Christian faith. One would, however, before joining the fray as a Christian, like to know a bit more about both the revolutionary means and the revolutionary ends. Assmann does include several paragraphs in his book which somewhat set our minds at ease with regard to the ends. Although consistently emphasizing that " liberation " must not be assigned so broad and " spiritual " a meaning that its basic economic and political dimensions become obscured, he nevertheless clearly states that his understanding of liberation includes more than economic and political elements. Thus, on pages 140-141, Assmann writes, " Man does not appear as a spontaneous product of structures, even though

these are the necessary conditioning material of his ' birth ' as a new man. If the formative context of material structures is not joined by the loving process of call and response, the result is a simple product of the environment and not the new man."

On the question of revolutionary means, Assmann is more equivocal. He does affirm the inevitability of conflict both within the church and in society at large if commitment to the liberation struggle is taken seriously; in fact, he is critical of those post-conciliar reformers who are so naive as to think that significant change can be brought about without notable conflict. Most of them are concerned exclusively with ecclesiastical reform, says Assmann, and it is questionable if even that can be attained without significant conflict. Nevertheless, in spite of the positive role it assigns to conflict as a necessary means of change, Assmann's book is far removed from the spirit of violence which characterizes some revolutionary literature. Conflict is clearly kept in its place as a means to an end and is never portrayed in the apocalyptic colors which it receives in some writings. It is also obviously a broader concept for Assmann which could include both violent and non-violent manifestation. As regards the violence-non-violence question itself, Assmann is non-committal. The general tenor of the book indicates that Assmann would prefer the least violent means of achieving liberation but would not rule out on principle the violent revolution. One might wish that he had considered more adequately the potential of non-violent revolution of the Gandhian style. This subject, however, is not really discussed in detail in the book although there are several sections which might logically have included some discussion of it-for example the section on strategies and tactics (p. 119-125) and the last chapter on " The Christian contribution to liberation in Latin America " (p. 129-45). There is no mention in the book of any of the extensive writings on the subject of non-violent revolution or of the work of Dom Helder Camara in Brazil which is deliberately patterned after the campaigns of Gandhi and King. This later is all the more remarkable as Dom Helder has analyzed the problem of Latin America in much the same terms as Assmann, but is attempting to apply the methods of non-violence to bring about the structural changes for which Assmann and other theologians of liberation call.

Assmann's heavy emphasis on sociological analysis and political action, along with his failure to deal at greater length with the concerns of traditional theology, even when he mentions areas of traditional theology which need much more intensive work and which relate to his basic concern for liberation, has led to the accusation that he has reduced the gospel to a social and political program. He could have taken some of the power out of this criticism had he devoted more attention to the question of the compatibility of revolutionary violence with the Christian

faith. He chose not to do so, however, probably fearing to alienate many of the revolutionary groups with whom he so strongly, and from the reviewer's point of view, rightly, identifies. In spite of these weaknesses and the vulnerability of Assmann's work to this criticism, a careful reading of certain crucial paragraphs will show that this accusation is not entirely justified. To be sure, these paragraphs are fewer and more ambiguous in Assmann than in either Gutierez or Segundo, who themselves have had the same accusation directed at them. Nevertheless, they are present in all three theologians.

In a section in which Assmann speaks of theology as "critical reflection on human history" (p. *56-65),* he is concerned to distinguish the theological mode of such reflection from other, non-theological modes. In attempting to make this distinction he emphasizes that, "for critical reflection on human history to become theology, it must have the distinctive characteristic of reference to faith and the historical embodiments of this faith-the Bible and the history of Christianity." To be sure, this statement, which appears to assign a central role to the Bible and Church history is hard to reconcile with other statements such as the one on page 104 that the " text " of the theology of liberation is " our situation, and our situation is our primary and basic reference point " or the declaration that in contrast to the usual views of exegetes who " work on the sacred text," theologians of liberation " work on the reality of today" (p. 105). The difficulties are alleviated, however, if one understands that for Assmann the Bible and Church history are important not in and of themselves but as embodiments of Christian faith and if one then remembers that faith has been a central concern of Assmann throughout the book. One may, indeed, disagree with Assmann's interpretation of Christian faith. One may even say that he has distorted it beyond recognition. One should not, however, fail to acknowledge that he is concerned throughout the book to witness to the faith as he understands it and is in no way seeking to eliminate it or to reduce the gospel to a social and political program. He is not even rejecting the traditional methodologies of theology. He is rather seeking to expose the extent to which western ideologies have influenced the results to which these ever so " objective " methodologies have come. That he himself is ideologically influenced he is perfectly willing to admit. This is a part of the point-viz. that the theologian should be aware of his or her own ideological prejudices and of the role they play in his or her theologizing. At this point, one comes face to face with a confrontation of cultures and all the accompanying problems in communication. Before passing judgment on the theology of liberation, a western theologian would do well to remember that the hermeneutical situation in which third world theologians find themselves is fundamentally different from that of the western theologian who lives among the privileged of the privileged.

Frequent reflection on Matthew *25* might serve as a warning to those in the rich nations who are too eager to condemn liberation theology and its sister theological movements as " mere political and social movements."

A second theme of explicitly Christian nature introduced by Assmann is that of eschatology. Biblical eschatology, says Assmann, reveals the "provocative" nature of God's call. God's call to faith is a call away from the comfortable, settled, established existence of the present *status quo* and a call into God's promised future. Faith is faith in this promised future and frees the believer to live in hope for that future. Through faith, the future of God breaks into the present and challenges its structures and powers. It is this faith in the promises of God which provides to the believer a basis for his or her involvement in the struggle for liberation. At the same, however, Biblical eschatology reminds the believer that *God's* promised future transcends any future which humanity can realize for itself within the limits of history. God's promised future is concrete enough to be a real threat to any *status quo,* be it the capitalist one of the present or a socialist one which may, and according to the liberation theologians should, displace the present one. From the point of view of liberation theology, socialist society may be a parable of the Kingdom. It is far from being the reality itself, however (p. 68-70). Biblical eschatology reminds the believer of this fact.

The most tantalizing and profound theme of explicitly Christian nature which Assmann introduces in his book is the theme of death and resurrection. In a section in which he wrestles with the difficult question of the rationale for dying for one's brother, Assmann says that this is the "point at which the essence of human activity . . . becomes inaccessible to scientific inquiry-including theological inquiry " (p. 85). The act of dying for a sister or brother, the ultimate act of love, is ultimately inaccessible to rational analysis; the final, mysterious efficacy of love embodied in history ultimately eludes human understanding. This act, seemingly so futile, is affirmed by faith to be the ultimately efficacious act. The paradigm act in relation to which it receives its meaning is the central Christian mystery of the death and resurrection of Christ, as Assmann clearly states on pages 143-44.

The few sentences in which Assmann introduces this theme are among the most interesting in the book. They are, however, extremely vague and poorly articulated. One wonders if he is trying to say something like what Moltmann has said in his latest book, *The Crucified God.* There are indications, such as his call for a theology of the cross, that he may, indeed, be moving in a similar direction. If so, it is unfortunate that Moltmann's book was not available to him.

Assmann's book leaves much to be desired in organization, clarity, the-

ological exposition and systematic presentation. Still, it raises important questions. These may not all be theological in the traditional sense. But some of them are. To these he gives very unsatisfactory answers, as he himself would admit. The incompleteness of the answers, however, ought not to lead to a rejection of the questions. Even the " non-theological " questions which Assmann raises, such as the question of how Latin American economic and political reality ought to be interpreted, are questions which the theologian can ill afford to ignore.

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Death, Dying, and the Biologic<ilRevolution. By ROBERT M. VEATCH. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977. Pp.

This book is overwhelming. The amount of research, background reading, reflection and analysis displayed both in the text and in the rich and extensive footnotes is overwhelming. Overwhelming too is the diversity of fields within which Dr. Veatch works and from which he derives his balanced and nuanced conclusions. He declares a protocol of interdisciplinary approaches and carries it out in dealing with ethics and morality, philosophy and theology, biological and medical sciences, law, and political and social science. He attempts to construct not only guidelines and ideals for individual decision making, but also models for social policy and legal enactment. The range of problems is well summarized in his last paragraph:

> The human can and must decide what death means, when we may appropriately treat individuals as if they were dead; when, if ever, it is acceptable for patients or their agents to refuse medical treatment; when, if ever, patients should not be given potentially meaningful and useful information about their condition; and when it is reasonable to make use of the mortal remains of the newly dead so that others may live longer or better (p. 805).

Dr. Veatch's basic attitudes, which run through this book and command his conclusion, are in my opinion clearly correct. He consistently insists that, while scientific and social data are important, any :final decision in these areas is a fully human and therefore a moral decision. He deploys his basic conviction in a series of particularized principles that deserve quotation:

> In all our discussions, certain moral principles are central. These themes underlie the arguments of this book:

(1) patients' control of decisions affecting their death and dying; preservation of patients' freedom and dignity in the last of it;
(3) rejection of the assumption that moral policy expertise is the exclusive prerogative of technical experts;
(4) substitution of the patient's agent, normally the next of kin, when the individual is unable to act; and
(5) modification of public policy to allow individual autonomy and dignity to the greatest extent tolerable to the moral sense of society (p. 11).

Before addressing any of the particular problems, Dr. Veatch undertakes as a necessary basis the definition of death not only theoretically but also in empirical and observable criteria. He lists four main philosophical or theological positions on the " essentially significant change at death " (p. 53) . He attempts to determine for each position what would be the place " to look to determine if a person has died " (p. 53) and to set forth the relevant medical criteria.

The first chapter raises one of the fundamental problems in Dr. Veatch's total position. Above, I listed theology as one of the disciplines included in Dr. Veatch's armamentarium. But there is a notable difference in its use. The other disciplines are deeply used and are internally effective in the development of his position. However, though he recognizes the existence of religion and theology and refers to them, theology appears to be inoperative in his explicit thinking. His Christianity may be a vague and unrecognized source of his ethical convictions, but it does not appear to influence his overt argumentation.

Among the conceptions of man's nature he lists a soul-body position, but he refers to it in cavalier terms amounting almost to ridicule. " The soul as an independent nonphysical entity that is necessary and sufficient for a person to be considered alive is a *relic from the era of dichotomized anthropologies* (p. 42, emphasis added). Again, "The soul remains a central element in the concept of man in most *folk* religion today" (p. 31, emphasis added) . He compounds the pejorative presentation of the soul-body position by using Descartes as an example and apparently seriously discussing the pineal gland business-to my mind, one of the sillier ideas proposed by Descartes.

At least two radically different philosophical positions should be recognized. There is the soul-body dichotomy of Platonism and Cartesianism in which the soul and the body are metaphyically distinct entities, united in some sort of operational arrangement and in which the real self is the soul. There is the ontic integralism of Aristotle, St. Thomas and subsequent metaphysicians in the Thomistic tradition. Man is an ontological unity of entitative components including a spiritual reality that is the basis of his ability to exercise immaterial activities in cognition and volition and

serves also as the unifying factor of his total reality. This is a highly sophisticated metaphysical doctrine; it is not "folk religion" and it is not a "relic." [1]

Although this doctrine provides an ontological definition of death-the dissolution of the unity of man and the departure of the spiritual form-it cannot easily be translated into empirical criteria. It is clear that, since the proof for the spirituality of man is drawn from his immaterial activities in cognition and volition, as long as a person remains capable of these activities the soul is present; at the other extreme, when all vital activities have ceased, the soul is gone. It does not seem possible to determine with certitude either metaphysically or empirically the exact point of dissolution that lies in between. For this reason Catholic pastoral practice has assumed the possibility of the presence of the soul for some time after apparent death.

In Dr. Veatch's list the criteria which would correlate best with the Thomistic position appears to be those correlated by him with the "irreversible loss of the capacity for bodily integration" (Table I, p. 52). Unity of operation is an essential result of the substantial nature of man. If the body is maintained artificially simply as a group of individual organs, tissues and/or cells, dissolution would appear to have taken place.

In developing a draft as both a model public policy statement and a model legal statute, Veatch begins with a consideration of the Kansas statute (1968) and reviews it largely in the light of Ian Kennedy's criticism. I find Veatch's criticism sound and persuasive. He then examines a "better" model, that of Capron and Kass. He is in general agreement, as am I. However, he proposes to expand their model statute and to change "irreversible cessation of spontaneous brain functions" to "irreversible cessation of spontaneous cerebral function" (for Veatch's argument see pp. 71-72).

Acceptable criteria within the besouled body metaphysics would seem to be the "irreversible cessation of spontaneous respiratory and circulatory functions" (p. 76). I would accept also the substitution of the "irreversible cessation of spontaneous brain function" in cases where the previously mentioned functions are being artificially maintained. There seems to be no ontological difference between maintaining "living" human cells in a culture and maintaining "living" tissues in a formerly human body. I thus much prefer the "whole brain" statement to the replacement of "brain" by "cerebral" in Veatch's rewrite of the Capron-Kass proposal. The "cerebral" rewrite might allow the pronouncement of death in cases where the "lower" functions of the brain might be able

[1] See my article "St. Thomas and the Definition of Intelligence" in *The Modem Schoolman,* Vol. Liii (1976), pp. 885-846.

to maintain a unified spontaneous vital activity. Because of the greater comprehensiveness of the term "brain" functions, I think it fits the metaphysical besouled body concept as well as the "irreversible loss of the capacity for bodily integration" and the "irreversible loss of consciousness" views, at least in the safe sense that anyone pronounced dead by the Capron-Kass criteria would certainly be dead under these latter views. There may indeed be some risk of treating a corpse as a living human being (which Veatch regards as an affront to human dignity [2]), but I believe this risk is preferable to the reverse risk.

Two important points should be emphasized. First, Dr. Veatch holds for objective moral standards and, I surmise, for objective metaphysical positions. He cannot allow that law-or a Gallup poll showing majority opinion-can violate basic moral principles. On the other hand he recognizes the problem of establishing public policy in a pluralistic-almost anarchic-society.

> In a pluralistic world, different philosophical interpretations may well have to operate simultaneously. We may wish to give patients and their agents some choice in deciding the meaning of death in their individual cases. If we are dealing at the conceptual level with philosophical choices about what is essential to human living we may have to tolerate philosophical pluralism. (p. 56).

How to deal with pluralism?

> In a democratic society, however, we have a well-established method for dealing with a diversity of religious, moral or philosophical perspectives. It is to allow free aud individual choice as long as it does not directly infringe on the freedom of others and does not radically offend the common morality (pp. 72-73).

The pluralism, it should be noted, is not one of scientific opinion, but of philosophical and theological convictions.

> But the crucial policy question is at the conceptual level: should the individual in irreversible coma be treated as dead? No medical answers to this question are possible. If I am to be pronounced dead by the use of a philosopical or theological concept that I do not share, I at least have a right to careful due process (p. 61).

In his proposed statute Veatch therefore undertakes to allow some choice to the dying person (or his agents):

> It is provided, however, that no person shall he considered dead even with the announced opinion of a physician solely on the basis of an ir-

[2] "... it is an affront to the dignity of individual persons to treat them as alive if they are dead" (p. 36; also passim elsewhere).

> reversible cessation of spontaneous cerebral functions if he, while competent to make such a decision, has explicitly rejected the use of this standard or, if he has not expressed himself on the matter while competent, his legal guardian or next of kin explicitly expresses such rejection (p. 76).

This gives rise to my only positive criticism of Veatch's model. The allowing of freedom is good-and necessary-but, contrary to his argument against total anarchy of choices (p. 75), it places no limit to the wishes of the patient (or his agents).

Aside from this, I believe Veatch has put together the conflicting social and intellectual positions into a reasonably sound proposal for a legal definition of death. Incidentally, I quite agree that *there is a need* for a legal determination and, certainly, not simply because of the special problem raised by transplants.

In Chapters *3* through *5,* Veatch examines the problem of dealing with the terminally ill. In general he rejects direct killing (except perhaps in very rare cases-not however to be legalized); he defends the right of the patient (or his agents) to refuse or terminate treatment. I find his review of the various positions and distinctions (e. g. direct-indirect; ordinary-extraordinary) reasonable and perceptive. He rightly insists that relevant decisions should not be made by physicians or medical committees.

In Chapter 6 he examines the right of the patient to full knowledge of his condition. In principle he concludes that the patient should be fully informed, though he allows the possibility of rare exceptions.

Chapter 7 deals with the disposition of the "remains." His discussion is sensible, humane and his position reasonable.

This book brings to bear an enormous amount of evidence on a wide variety of situations and does a good job in dealing with the complexities and confusions of the basic issues. For a long time to come, anyone treating these matters will have to take account of Dr. Veatch's book.

His strong emphasis on moral principles and on the rights of the patient is most necessary in a culture where utilitarianism, materialism and technical professionalism are bringing us to moral bankruptcy and depriving human beings of freedom, dignity and responsibility in the living of their lives. These must be protected in living and in dying-in this "last quest for responsibility."

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Justification in Ear.lier Medieval Theology. By CHARLES P. CARLSON, JR. The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1975. viii + 149 pp. Guilders *35.*

This book is an outgrowth of its author's doctoral dissertation (1964) at the University of Colorado, presumably in medieval history. Of its two principal sections, the first examines the theology of justification as it is set forth in the major medieval commentaries on Romans (those available in printed editions); the second investigates it as an object of speculation for theologians and canonists. The type of theological literature surveyed in the latter section is quite varied: the standard compendia of theology and canon law, but works on the sacrament of penance and penitentiaries as well. Indeed, Carlson's title suggests a field of inquiry more modest than he has in fact laid out, for his survey of justification-theology spans the period from Ambrosiaster to Scotus and the Nominalists, closing with a discussion of the impact of the received doctrine of justification upon the young Luther.

To state Carlson's thesis is by no means an easy task, for he is attempting to sustain at least three theses at different levels of inquiry. The thesis closest at hand is that medieval theologians, with a large measure of homogeneity and continuity, treated the theology of justification as a sort of appendix to their theology of the sacrament of penance. A droplet in Ambrosiaster supposedly reflecting such a connection becomes a flood-tide in the Nominalists. The second thesis is more ambitious: the history of medieval theology is the story of the loss of authentic Paulinism until its recovery by Luther, inasmuch as the Apostle's doctrine of justification can be taken as the touchstone of true Paulinism. The third thesis is still more global. It is associated with Reiko Oberrnann's thesis that in knowing and rejecting late medieval Nominalist theology, Luther can truly be said to have known and rejected an authentic and valid account of Catholic belief. Carlson seems to be submitting his study as a sort of prolegomenon to Oberrnann's thesis: what Luther learned from and rejected in Nominalism had been going on all along. The Nominalist doctrine of justification and penance developed in continuity with medieval justification-thcology as a whole.

Several general comments are in order. First of all, Carlson seems to think that Paul's doctrine of justification vis-a-vis "works of the Law" is completely uniform in all its contexts of use. The author has no sense of the diverse *Sitzen-im-Leben* of Paul's letters: that the justification-discussion and the " works of the Law " in Galatians, for example, might have been conditioned by different factors than the discussion of these same themes in Romans. Secondly, the elusive "evangelical sense" of justification which Carlson takes as his measure is never fully defined. One is left with the impression that it is Luther's account of justification

which he means to identify with Paul's, although recent Pauline scholarship (e.g., E. Kiisemann) has made this identification less than totally congruent. Thirdly, Carlson lacks a sure grasp of technical terms in the history of theology. Frequently (pp. 40, 69, 85) he refers to the" forensic" character of medieval justification-theology without appreciating that it was Luther who hardened the judicial metaphor into a literal description rather than the pre-Nominalist medieval tradition (cf. *Summa Theologiae* I-II, 113, 2 ad 2). Similarly, Carlson is uncertain what" semi-Pelagianism" means. He taxes Giles of Rome with this charge (p. 62), although in the text in question Giles is not considering the role of the will or of works in the *initium fidei* (the crux of the semi-Pelagian controversy). A fourth untoward general feature is a sectarian bias that rears its head from time to time: e. g. Pseudo-Raymo of Halberstadt is charged with " strident ... narrow sacerdotalism" (p. 40), although the cited texts make no direct mention of the ministry of priests. His footing is unsteady even on friendlier Reform ground, however, as in his assertion that medieval theology was completely ignorant of Luther's imputational theory of justification since it relied on a " divine acceptation " theory (p. 138). Carlson does not seem to be aware that the formal model of explanation (although not the conclusions drawn therefrom) are exactly the same for both and that Luther derived his imputational theory from its currency in Nominalism.

Apart from these more general deficiencies, however, Carlson's study is marred by a host of factual errors. In Ambrosiaster's mention of a " *sacramentum divinitatis* " as part of the threefold law which lays sin bare, he sees a reference to baptism or at least to cultic practice (p. 19), whereas at that period and in dependence upon the Old Latin Bible it would appear to have the meaning of the revealed mystery or plan of God, the divine law. Pseudo-Haymo's *"illa duo mutuo sunt conjuncta, ut unum sine altero hominem non possit justificare* " is misinterpreted as referring to baptism and penance (p. 38); the sentence which follows (introduced by " *nam* ") makes it clear that it is in fact baptism and *fides Dominicae passionis* which Pseudo-Raymo is describing as the two requisites for justification. Carlson's assertion that no medieval theologian " attempted to formulate a concept of justification in terms of Aristotelian metaphysics" (p. 63, n. 110) is wide of its mark as well; indeed, it is flatly contradicted when he later claims that Thomas had recourse to "a complex excursus into Aristotelian metaphysics " in order to explain the ontological priority of the moments of the process of justification (p. 121).

Carlson's account of the axiom *facienti quod in se est Deus non denegat gratiam* is incomplete, for he asserts that it was first used by Alexander of Hales. However true this may be for the precise *wording* of the axiom, its meaning has a history prior to its verbal formulation by Alexander. Riviere has indicated patristic antecedents for the substance of the axiom,

notably in a text of Origen which Alexander cites in connection with his own formula (cf. *Revue des Sciences Religieuses,* 1927, pp. 93 ff.). Its nearest antecedents are in the twelfth century-in the *Sententiae divinitatis,* in Abelard, Radulphus Ardens and later Stephen Langton-as Landgraf has pointed out (cf. *Dogmengeschichte* I/1, pp. 249ff). Carlson never troubles to inquire *why* such an un-Augustinian point of view could have been crystallized into a basic axiom of medieval justification-theology, what conditions could have conspired at the beginning of the twelfth century to provide fertile ground for this axiom. It would seem that an ignorance of the semi-Pelagian controversy is to blame. That it was still known at the end of the ninth century is evidenced by a letter of Amolon of Lyons to Gottschalk in which he refers to the Council of Orange, although erroneously dating it in the pontificate of Leo the Great *(PL* 116:96C). At some time before the twelfth century, however, the semi-Pelagian controversy is lost to medieval consciousness; neither the pertinent works of Augustine (only selectively available in *fiorilegia)* nor the decrees of the Council of Orange (squirreled away in papal archives) seem to have been known. *This* is the reason why the axiom *facienti quod in se est* could have arisen unchallenged as it did; the axiom is at least materially semi-Pelagian, suggesting that man must contribute his share of willing and working to the beginnings of faith. When Carlson turns to Bonaventure's account of the axiom (pp. 118, 126), he lacks an appreciation of the latter's softening of the semi-Pelagian overtones therein; he considers Bonaventure's account *per modum dispositionis* to be all of a piece with the Nominalist account.

It is with his treatment of Aquinas's justification-theology, however, that Carlson's factual inaccuracies degenerate into a falsification. His contention that Aquinas identifies the righteousness imparted in justification with the infused moral virtue of justice is simply wrong; like the other infused moral virtues, infused justice has the same material object as the corresponding acquired virtue (I-II, 63, 4 & ad 2), whereas righteousness operates in a quite different field (I-II, 113, 1). Aquinas's notion of *fides formata per caritatem* is also misconstrued. Carlson understands this in terms of charity exercising *intrinsic* formal causality upon faith and cites Nygren to this effect: "Faith is the matter, and as such it is insubstantial and powerless. Love is the form . . . which by setting its stamp or ' forma' upon faith, gives to faith, too, worth and real being" (pp. 119-120, n. 33). Now that charity exercises intrinsic formal causality vis-a-vis faith is explicitly denied by Thomas (cf. II-II, 4, 4 ad 2; 23, 8 ad I). The comprehensive reality of justification must seize and energize the whole of the person justified. Admittedly Thomas relates the aspects and moments of this actuality to different schemes of explanation than does Luther, for example. Beyond the generic desire for the *bonum promissum* under

gratia operans, which imperates the assent of faith; beyond the entitative proportion to God Himself conferred by habitual grace; beyond the commitment of intellect to the God of promise, there is, in Thomas's scheme, need of a further fashioning of man for the comprehensive destiny to which he has been called and for which he is being justified. This comes about by charity, which describes that aspect of the total justification-phenomenon whereby man is transformed in his appetite to will and love with constancy his destiny as a destiny of personal love and friendship. It is in completing this directionality of the man being justified to his consummate justification in divine fellowship that charity is said to " inform" faith. Luther may have described this comprehensive reality of justification in terms of different moments or varied the functions assigned to those moments; but Thomas understood it in this way. For this reason, Carlson's contrast of " formed " with " unformed " faith (pp. 59-60, n. 102) is not completely accurate for it is one and the same *habitus* of faith in both cases (II-II, 4, 4), properly supernatural. But only in the case of " formed " faith does the comprehensive reality of righteousness energize the justified person and submit him fully to the economy of divine love.

Three further defects characterize Carlson's exposition of Aquinas's teaching on justification. First of all, it is limited only to an examination of Question 113 of *Prima Secundae.* It is inconceivable to me how justification which is a formal effect of grace can be studied without a thorough examination of the preceding context on grace (qq. 108-112), especially for a fuller treatment of the capacity and function of free-will vis-a-vis grace and works. It is perhaps too much to expect Carlson to advert to Thomas's mysticism of grace in his treatment of Indwelling and of the gifts of the Spirit. This truncated perspective results in more errors concerning Thomas's true teaching. In keeping with his overall thesis, Carlson maintains that for Aquinas justification is basically something negative, the remission of sins (p. 119), whereas the very text to which he refers makes it clear that " remission of sin " designates only the *terminus a quo* and not the positive *terminus ad quem* of justification (I-II, 113, 1). Carlson insists that " contrition " is required for justification and construes contrition as meaning the same thing as it does in the sacrament of penance. But for Aquinas the movement of free-will withdrawing from sin is only the correlate of a positive movement of the will toward the justfying God- and both movements are *per prius et posterius* effects of *gratia operans* positing the very act of the will. Carlson's exposition could have been considerably improved if at some point he had noted the difference between grace as *operans* and as *cooperans* and between the resources and role of the will in each case. Connected with this is a second defect. Carlson nowhere remarks the radical break between the justification-theology of the young Thomas of the *Sentences* and *De Veritate* and that of the mature

Thomas of the *Summa.* It was Thomas's discovery of the historical and doctrinal phenomenon of semi-Pelagianism, sometime after 1259, which accounts for this shift; it is precisely this shift which H. Bouillard made an object of study thirty years ago. Nowhere is this break more dramatically signalled than in Thomas's explanation of the axiom *facienti quod in se est* in the *Summa* (I-II, 109, 6 ad *Q).* Yet Carlson insists that Thomas " adds relatively little of substance " and that " the overall development is one of continuity " (p. 115). The third defect is bibliographical. Neither the older (e.g. Bouillard) nor the more recent pertinent studies (e.g., Seckler, Schillebeeckx, Pesch, McSorley, Pfiirtner) figure in Carlson's account in any important way; in fact, he is completely ignorant of the latter.

Errors such as those noted here cannot fail to affect Carlson's assessment of pre-Nominalist medieval justification-theology. He characterizes it as " rationalistic " rather than " mystical " (p. 77) and " static " rather than "dynamic" (p. 69). He insists on a thoroughly homogeneous line of development from the Fathers to the Nominalist theologians, yet, as I noted above, he misses a crucial tum in Thomas Aquinas which distinguishes his account of justification from both his predecessors and his successors.

The text is replete with typographical errors, which, although merely bothersome in English, can be baffling or even seriously misleading in Latin.

In summary and with regret, this reviewer is forced to judge this book to be a highly unreliable guide to its subject. It is outdated in its polemical tone toward the whole of Catholic justification-doctrine; both the historical heads and the ecumenical hearts of Catholic and Lutherans have gone beyond such tactics to discover a fundamental agreement in these matters.

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Bonhoeffer: Exile and Martyr. By EBERHARD BETHGE. Edited and with an Essay by John W. de Gruchy. New York: The Seabury Press, 1976. 191 pages. $7.95.

Those who are familiar with Eberhard Bethge's definitive biography of Dietrich Bonhoefl'er might well question whether another book by him could contain anything significantly new or different that would make its reading worthwhile. I want to assure you that this work, written approximately six years after the biography, provides fresh perspectives on issues in Bonhoeffer studies that recommend it even to the most knowledgeable scholars. It does not compete with but complements the biography by

focusing attention on several of the more central and debated elements in Bonhoeffer's life and thought.

Bonhoeffer: Exile and Martyr consists primarily of seven lectures delivered by Bethge in South Africa in the autumn of 1973. The subjects dealt with are the following: credible ministry, a church of integrity, true ecumenism, the dilemma of exile, Christian political involvement, authentic theology, and modern martyrdom. Beyond this the book contains a valuable Introduction by Bethge on " The Response to Bonhoeffer," an exploratory essay by editor John W. deGruchy entitled " Bonhoeffer in South Africa," and an Appendix by Bethge on "A Confessing Church in South Africa? Conclusions from a Visit." Lest one wrongly conclude that the book is about Bonhoeffer and South Africa, I wish to point out that only the last two essays mentioned are addressed to that question. The bulk of the book is essentially Bethge's exposition and interpretation of Bonhoeffer's life and thought *per* se-which, of course, is not without meaning for the struggle going on today in South Africa.

What are some of the interesting insights which Bethge shares with us in this latest publication? First, he points out that today Bonhoeffer is more appreciated by the church in East Germany, which has lost its privileges, than by the church in West Germany, which still enjoys certain legal supports from the state. Reading between the lines, one has the distinct impression that Bethge is disappointed, perhaps even bitter, over the relative neglect of Bonhoeffer in West Germany, not only by church officialdom but even by many theologians. This neglect is undoubtedly due to an inability to accept his role in the conspiracy against Hitler, an action which calls in question the Lutheran doctrine of the two Kingdoms and which some still associate with unpatriotism.

Bethge clearly has this problem in mind in his chapter on modern martyrdom, where he makes what I believe to be a convincing case for accepting Bonhoeffer as a modern Christian martyr. He not only admonishes Protestants for not giving more attention to the lives and fate of distinguished Christians, but also argues that, whereas in earlier times martyrdom was the result of bearing witness to the name of Jesus Christ in a hostile world, today it often is the result of bearing testimony on behalf of a threatened *humanum.* To be sure, Bethge acknowledges that modern martyrs such as Bonhoeffer are " guilty martyrs," but this derives from their identification with a church which is itself guilty of complicity in injustice.

This brings us to another important point made by the author, namely, Bonhoeffer's increasing disappointment during the late 1930's with the Confessing Church in Germany and with the ecumenical movement-the two church groups with which he was so closely associated and which had seemed so promising. Except for a brief glorious moment at Fano the

ecumenical church refused to take a firm stand regarding the German Church Struggle. Even worse, the Confessing Church was silent when the noted ecumenist Siegmund-Schultze and theologian Karl Barth were run out of the country by the Nazis; and in 1938 almost all Confessing Church pastors took the oath to Hitler, the Council of Brethren of the Confessing Church dissociated itself with Barth's stinging letter to the Czech Hromadka, and the Confessing Church remained silent after the notorious Jewish persecution on "Crystal Night." Do these developments not help explain, asks Bethge, Bonhoeffer's entrance into the conspiracy against Hitler, where he found humanistic liberals who were willing "to be there for others " when the church was not? Do they not explain his " flight into the exile of complete incognito " ?

These experiences also form the context for understanding Bonhoeffer's desire for the transformation of the church for a " world come of age " which interprets itself less and less in religious terms. Bethge's chapter on "Authentic Theology " was for me the most significant in the book, for in it he wrestles with the meaning of Bonhoeffer's "non-religious interpretation " of Christian faith, especially its implications for the church. He believes Bonhoeffer, by word and deed, gave an answer to the questions posed by Feuerbach concerning the truth and reality of faith, and he explicates this by a brilliant " filling out " of the brief " Outline for a book " that Bonhoeffer sketched in prison but never lived to write. I do not want to disclose in a review the details of this " reversal of Feuerbach," but I can assure prospective readers that this section alone is worth the price of the book.

As you can detect, my response to *Dietrich Bonlweffer: Exile and Martyr* is quite positive. I have some reservations about Bethge's relative inattention to the "middle period" of Bonhoeffer's life and thought, his advocacy of a clear-cut distinction between the preaching and pastoral offices of the ministry, and what comes across as almost special pleading for the rightness of Bonhoeffer's conspiratorial role and his recognition as a martyr. But these are minor matters when compared to the richness of this contribution by Bonhoeffer's closest friend and confidant during those last fateful years of his life. The message of this book is relevant not just in South Africa but wherever the church is trying to learn what it means to be " the Church for others."

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The Poetry of Civic Virtue: Eliot, Malraux, Auden. By NATHAN A. ScoTT, JR. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976. xi + 160 pp. Index. $8.50.

The organizing theme of Nathan Scott's new book he defines as " the virtues proper to the City." Both the concept of the City and that of its requisite virtues he takes from the thought of Charles Williams: " the City " refers not to a political unit in the usual sense, but to *communitas* as such, the shared spiritual life that Williams calls " Coinherence," and the virtues proper to it are those that constitute its necessary formative conditions, namely Substitution, Exchange, and Sacrifice, those qualities of character by which we "bear one another's burdens." Most modern literature, says Scott, is strangely silent about these qualities and the central human discipline that they compose. Rather it tends to express an attitude of despair regarding human fellowship on any level higher than that of collaboration for subsistence and to look upon the metropolis as "crushingly and absolutely *against* the human virtue." This has led, he says, to widespread rejection of the interhuman world in favor of the radical inwardness, the turn to Infinite Subjectivity, that is the subject of what Walter Strauss has called the Orphic theme in modern literature. Scott's own purpose is to offer some examples of exceptions to the general trend, exemplars of another style of imagination that takes the world of men to be a world of Coinherence.

Those he chooses are T. S. Eliot, Andre Malraux, and W. H. Auden. His treatment of them in this regard, especially of the latter two, is deft and interesting. There are some problems, however, that emerge during the course of his discussion. These have to do in part with his interpretations of the authors and their works, but they are related more directly and importantly to matters of fundamental conception. The nature of these problems can be elucidated most effectively if we consider first the most successful chapter of the book, the one on Auden, and work backwards.

Auden, says Scott, was resolutely opposed to all the manifestations of Orphic subjectivism in modern literature. The task of poetry is not the creation of new, alternative worlds in imagination, but witnessing to the truth of the objective world created by God. Nor should it foster apocalyptic dreams of escape from the tensions of historical existence, but should remind us that our home is not in a specious eternity but in" the ordinary, unexceptional world of our earthbound career," and that it is in this quotidian world that we must learn to " love one another or die." It is Auden's increasing understanding and affirmation of this principle in his later poetry that leads Scott to say that the major divide in Auden's career was not between the pre- and post-1940 verse, as so many have supposed, but between the poems up to and including *The Age of' Anxiety* (1947) and those beginning with and continuing from *Nones* (1951). In the later

phase, he says, Auden develops a new poetic personality that is no longer bullying, caustic, or imperious, but quiet, equable, and urbanely courteous, and a new, profoundly comic vision that asserts, in a spirit of praise and thanksgiving, our deep involvement in the things of earth.

Auden has been frequently criticized for a withdrawal in his later phase into privacy and apoliticialism. Scott argues cogently that this interpretation requires revision, that what Auden was actually engaged in was a searching reconceptualization of what it is that constitutes the political dimension of human life. The major influence on Auden's thinking here was Hannah Arendt's *The Human Condition,* of which he wrote a very thoughtful review in 1959. Arendt sees modern society as reversing the roles of what had been the household and the *polis* for the Greeks, so that the public realm, which had been the place where man had pursued not merely life, but the good life, has now become entirely dominated by concern with subsistence, while mutual participation in humane activity and the life of the spirit now takes place only in the private realm. In Auden's own summary: " What a modern man thinks of as the realm where he is free to be himself and to disclose himself to others, is what he calls his private or personal life, that is to say, the nearest modern equivalent to the public realm of the Greeks is the intimate realm .... " It is the adoption of this position, says Scott, that makes a work such as *About the House* (1965) not at all a retreat into apoliticalism, but the expression of a profoundly *political* concern. What Auden here and in his other later volumes was engaged in was an effort to restore a sense of what the good life is that all healthy politics must pursue-a life of Coinherence and *caritas.* It is this life that constitutes the true City to which man is called.

With the Auden chapter it becomes fully clear how Scott conceives his theme. Civic virtue, as he conceives it, need have little to do with problems of organization in society on the large scale. There is truth, of course, in this conception, and as an interpretative pattern it fits Auden's later thought quite well. The problem arises in its application to Malraux and Eliot. Malraux was himself active in the public realm, and his concern with living authentically within the tension between " being " and " doing " included an appreciation of the importance of political action in the usual modern sense. Exactly how Malraux's pattern of thought compares with Auden's in this respect is never discussed, however. This is not to say that they are fundamentally in conflict, but only that the nature of their differences and of their possible essential congruity could be made clearer. A concluding chapter that would have looked back on all three figures and compared them would seem a real necessity in a book of this sort, but it is not offered. The discussion of Malraux itself, nevertheless, is extremely interesting. It surveys all of Malraux's novels and interprets them as concerned not with the absurdity of man's condition, as in some respects

they might appear at first reading to be, but with the underlying brotherhood of man that can triumph over the elements of absurdity and isolation that are constantly present in concrete situations.

The chapter on Eliot, on the other hand, is the least satisfactory of the three. Eliot probably felt more keenly even than Malraux the importance of political action for the formation of a well ordered society as the necessary foundation for a well ordered spiritual life, and he wrote extensively on that theme, not only in the works that are obviously directly on that topic, such as *The Idea of a Christian Society* and *Notes Toward the Definition of Culture,* but also in numerous shorter essays written throughout his career, and some excellent studies have been written on this aspect of his thought, such as those by John **D.** Margolis and Roger Kojecky. Scott, however, ignores all of this to concentrate only on those aspects of Eliot's thought, especially as represented in the *Four Quartets,* that fit his theme as he has conceived it. To set aside Eliot's explicit social thought in a treatment of his work as a " poetry of civic virtue " seems strange enough in itself, but especially so when at the end of the chapter he finds fault with Eliot for not giving more attention to social theologians:

> In one area of his mind he was, unquestionably, drawn to styles of Christian thought (as represented, say, by such figures as Dame Julian and Walter Hilton and St. John of the Cross) that were not calculated to give him a firm purchase on those issue of history and *paideia* with which he was centrally preoccupied; and one wishes that. . . . he might have paid greater attention to the caroline tradition of Anglican divinity and to such modern Anglican thinkers as Frederick Denison Maurice and Scott Holland, Charles Gore and William Temple, for, in this line, he might have found theological idioms more pat to his purpose.

One wonders, however, if all this means is more pat to Scott's purpose. Eliot may have very well known his own purpose, and this would seem to have been more comprehensive than any that Scott credits him with. The real problem here seems to lie in Scott's own rather narrow conception both of the civic and of the religious.

The negative reference to Eliot's interest in the mystical side of the Christian tradition has a bearing on another problem implicit in Scott's analysis-his conception of the right direction of theological thinking in the modern world. This is a theme that he introduces at the beginning of his book but does not develop to full clarity. Basically, what he says is that the modern theological imagination tends to reject " all those supernaturalist postulates of classical theism that have tended in effect to locate human existence at a point of intersection between the two spheres of Nature and Supernature." Scott shares this attitude, but is also distrustful of some of the alternatives that are currently offered, particularly the Orphic-subjectivist that he sees developing out of Heidegger's theory of

poetry. His attitude toward Heidegger, however, is not primarily negative; rather he seems to want to affirm Heidegger's idea that mankind is a conversation, that the being of men only becomes actual " in the organic togetherness of their sociality," but to rescue him from subjectivist interpretations. He also approves what he considers Heidegger's opposition to " the general outlook of scientific positivism," by which Scott means the manipulative tendency that Heidegger called *"rechnendes Denken."* This use on Scott's part of the term "positivism" is significant and may provide the key to an important aspect of the difficulty he has in dealing with a poet like Eliot. It is a very narrow conception of positivism, one that enables him explicitly to oppose it, while remaining largely unaware of the substantial residue of latent positivism in his own thought that leads him to acquiesce in the modern imagination's rejection of classical theism and of the idea of a level of being that transcends the natural and also to distrust subjectivity to the point that any interest in it (as in the case of Eliot's responsiveness to the appeal of Christian mysticism) seems infected with an unhealthy subjectivism. Neither Eliot nor Auden, however, would have been embarrassed by words such as " supernatural " or " theism," and if Eliot believed in the importance of remaining true to the objectivity of the historical world in which man is called to participate in the life of Incarnation, he also considered it essential to attend to the right ordering of the subjective pole of human intention-to join the great contemplatives of the Christian faith in " the purification of the motive/ In the ground of our beseeching."

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Bernard of Clairvaux, *Five Books on Consideration. Advice to a Pope.* Translated by John D. Anderson and Elizabeth T. Kennan. (Cistercian Fathers Series n. 37: The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux, vol. 13). Kalamazoo, Michigan: Cistercian Publications. 1976. Pp. 222. $12.50.

The well-known *De consideratione ad Eugenium papam* of Bernard of Clairvaux has had at least two English translations (George Lewis, Oxford 1908, and anonymously-but by Ailbe J. Luddy-Dublin, 1921), but the present translation by Professors Anderson and Kennan is the first to be based on the new critical text of Jean Leclercq and Henri Rochais (Rome 1963). It is a judicious translation of Bernard's advice to his former subject Eugene III (1145-1153) about the papal office, and reads very well

indeed. The famous passages on the Roman people and 4.4: pp. 111, 114-115) and on the" two-sword" theory (4.7: pp. 117-118) are rendered crisply and compellingly. The only sort of slip I could detect in the whole work was in Bernard's prologue (p. where " Since your majesty so admirably condescends, why does my hesitancy persist," does not quite catch the rhetoric of " Maiestati igitur tam dignanter cedente, quidni cedat pudor?" The preface by Elizabeth Kennan nicely places the *De consideratione* in a full setting; the appendices (pp. 183-191} by Bernard Jacqueline on the manuscripts, sources and influence of the work are well-conceived; the notes to the text (pp. are very helpful.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

Academia Scientiarum Polona: *Nicolai Copernici de Revolutionibus: Libri Sex.* Pp. 431; Zl.250.

Brill: *Homo Religiosus in Mircea Eliade, An Anthropological Evaluation* by Jolm Saliba. Pp. 210; Gld. 48.00.

Bucknell University Press: *Phenomenology, Structuralism, Semiology,* edited by Harry R. Garvin. Pp. 230; $7.50.

University of California Press: *Marxism and Literary Criticism* by Terry Eagleton. Pp. 96; $2.65.

Cambridge University Press: *Method and Appraisal in the Physical Sciences: The Critical Background to Modern Science,* edited by Colin Dawson. Pp. 344; $28.50.

Cornell University Press: *Understanding Wittgenstein* edited by Godfrey Vesey. Pp. 285; *$5.95.*

Eerdmans: *More than Man: A Study in Christology* by R. F. Aldwinckle. Pp. 311; $8.95.

Fortress: *Invitation to Theology: An Intr,oduction to Reflection on the Christian Mythos* by T. W. Jennings, Jr. Pp. 184; *$5.95.*

Knecht: *Theologische Akademie,* Vol. 13 edited by Johannes Beutler and Otto Semmelroth. Pp. 120.

Munksgaard: *Danish Yearbook of Philosophy,* Vol. 13. Pp. 248; D.kr. 60.00.

Philosophical Monographs: *Deep Structure* by Douglas F. Stalker. Pp. 48; $25.00 the series.

Princeton University Press: *The Existentialist Critique of Freud: The Crisis of Autonomy* by Gerald N. lzenberg. Pp. 354; $16.50. *Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences,* Vol. 7, edited with a Foreword by Russell McCormack. Pp. 489; $28.50.

Routledge and Kegan Paul: *A Dictionary of Philosophy* by A. R. Lacey. Pp. 239; $8.95.

Seabury Press: *Transcendent Selfhood: The Rediscovery of the Inner Life* by Louis Dupre. Pp. 118; $8.95.

Editions de Solesmes: *Le mystere du Corps et du Sang du Seigneur: la messe d'apres saint Thomas d'Aquin* by Paul Neu, O.S.B. Pp. 218; FF. 33.00.

Yale University Press: *The Romantic Will* by Michael G. Cooke. Pp. 279; $15.00.