"SACRA DOCTRINA" REVISITED: THE CONTEXT OF MEDIEVAL EDUCATION

TROMAS GILBY COMPARES the *Summa Theologiae* to " a palimpsest, on which the original has been recast but not completely rubbed out." [1] His point, the components of the medieval *lectio-disputatio* method, is a guide to a reading that is attentive to the language and issues that the *Summa* borrows and incorporates into its discourse. The comparison to a palimpsest suggests the task, not of a recovery of texts, as though the *Summa* were a kind of *Ephraem rescriptus*[1] but of a reading that is alert to how the underlay may shape the surface, the actual *Summa* text. That is not an exercise of precious erudition, but quite often the only way of grasping the plain sense of the text.[2] The kind of reading required is not an original, historical exegesis of every word, but a reading informed by the historical research already done on the methods, language, and status of problems in the age of the *Summa*.[3] In particular, specific difficulties occasioned by the

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[1] *Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae,* Latin Text and English Translation. Introductions, Notes, Appendices, Glossaries, 60 vol. (London, New York, 1964-76), Vol. 1, T. Gilby, ed., *Christian Theology,* p. xxii (hereafter cited as ST EngLat, with volume number, editor, title, page).

•See, for example, *ibid.,* Vol. 7, T. C. O'Brien, ed., *Father, Son and Holy Ghost,* p. 66, n. *e;* Vol. 14, *idem, Divine Government,* p. 82, n. *c;* pp. *65-66,* n. *l-r,* with pp. 176-181; Vol. 31, *idem, Faith* pp. 205-218.

•Such readily available works as: M.-D. Chenu, *La theologie au xii• siecle* (Paris, 1957); idem, *La theologie comme science au xiii• siecle,* 3d ed. (Paris, 1957); idem, *Toward Understanding St. Thomas,* tr. A. Landry, D. Hughes (Chicago, 1964), esp. pp. 79-96; Yves M.-J. Congar, *History of Theology,* tr. Hunter Guthrie (Garden City, 1968), esp. pp. 69-143; David Knowles, *Evdution of Medieval Thought* (pa., New York, 1962); Fernand van Steenberghen, *Aristotle in the West* (Louvain, 1955); also in A. Fliche, V. Martin, *Histoire de l'Eglise* (Paris, 1935-), Vol. 18; James A. Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas d'Aquino: His Life, Thought and Work* (New York, 1974). Also the less accessible but invaluable prefaces of R. A. Gauthier, ed. *Sententia Libri Ethicorum* and *Tabula Ethicorum,* in *S. Thomae* occurrence of terms unusual in St. Thomas's vocabulary, or by a passage where a literal reading simply yields no sense,[4] demand reckoning with what has not been " completely rubbed out."

Question One of the *Summa* is surrounded by an embarrassment of rich commentary. The claim of these pages, however, is that Question One calls for a first, surface reading that is guided by its historical, academic setting; that such a reading lessens the perplexities admitted by commentators, past and present.[5] Yet another effort to interpret this opening Question is not a vain exercise, for the *Summa Theologiae* stands as a classic, and its introductory Question is " at once one of the keys to St. Thomas's thought, and one among the admissible conceptions of theological knowing."[6]

The first and unmistakable indicator of the setting and purpose of Question One is the Prologue to the *Summa,* wherein the author immediately acknowledges his office as *catholicae veritatis doctor,* having the charge of teaching in a way suited *ad eruditionem incipientium.* The setting of the whole work, then, is the university lecture hall, the procedures of which

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Aquinatis, Omnia Opera, vol. 47 (Rome, 1969), esp. 1: pp. 179*-201*, and Vol. 48 (Rome, 1971), esp. pp. xiii-xxv.

[4] Such an awareness would have prevented the birth of the hybrid English lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas that takes its definitions of Latin terms from Lewis and Short, its citations (some without conversion to its own form of reference) of occurrences from L. Schlitz: *Thomas Lexikon,*

[5] James A. Weisheipl, "The Meaning of *Sacra Doctrina* in the *Summa Theologiae* I, q. I," *The Thomist* 88 (1974): 49-80 provides a complete bibliographical background for understanding the problems and interpretations. His own thesis-signalled in such a statement as: " *Sacra doctrina* is not identified with scholastic theology, but with the original revelation of God to man, and can be called theology only in the etymological sense of the term, *sermo de Deo,* which every believer has" (p. 79)-is one of the occasions prompting the present article; I obviously think that *sacra doctrina* is very scholastic. But the position I adopt here also takes into consideration Per Erik Persson, *Sacra Doctrina: Reason and Revelation in Aquinas,* tr. J. A. R. Mackenzie (Philadelphia & Oxford, 1970); and the earlier, G. F. van Ackeren, *Sacra doctrina. The Subject of the First Question of the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Rome, 1952).

[6] M.-D. Chenu, "Preface," in *Saint Thomas d'Aquin, Somme theologique* I, H.-D. Gardeil, ed., *La Theologie,* la., *Prologue et Question 1* (Paris, 1968), p. 5.

underlie the Prologue's allusion to the *librorum expositio* and the *occasio diS'putandi.* The author obviously intends to fit this new summary of theology into the actual conditions of the academy. Free at Rome from the Paris obligation to the text of Peter Lombard's *Sentences,* St. Thomas put aside an already begun revision of his own *Sentences* commentary and chose instead to compose his independent, concise and clear presentation of the complete material proper to *sacra doctrina.*[7] The academic setting and intent enter the meaning of Question One and its terminology.

The function and purpose of that Question, the Prologue also makes clear, are epistemological, as epistemology means literally the rationale, *logos,* of a science, *episteme.* The graphics of the editions [8] should not distract from the recognition that the words printed after the title of Question One as an introduction are in fact the last statement of the Prologue:

> And in order to keep our efforts within definite bounds, we must first look into what *the character and scope of sacra doctrina itself.*[9]

In its most rudimentary division the *Summa* has as its components Question One and then all the rest, developed according to what Question One determines the character (*qualis* sit) and range *(ad quae se extendat)* of *sacra doctrina* to be.

One index to the evolution of theology in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries is the progressive clarification of the status of *sacra doctrina* as *scientia,* as an intellectual discipline. **It** would be both 'odd and uncharacteristic if St. Thomas did not address this epistemological issue; if in his major work he avoided the almost universally discussed problem of the science of theology, the problem, indeed, of what we call" scholastic theology." [10] Of course he did not avoid the issue; Question

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[7] See James A. Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas d'Aquino,* pp. 216-219.

[8] It need hardly be mentioned that the titles of Questions and of Articles were composed out of the author's own prefaces, and " cut in " by editors.

[9] Et ut intentio nostra sub aliquibus certis limitibus comprehendatur, necessarium est primo investigare de ipsa sacra doctrina, *quaUs sit et ad quae se extendat* (la. Pro!.; emphasis added) .

[10] See: Weisheipl, "Meaning of Sacra Doctrina, pp. 54-57, 71, 79; H.-D. Gardeil, *La Theologie* (see note 6), pp. 109-110, which conclude: "II r.este que le probleme

One art. 6 ad 3 clearly indicates that throughout *sacra doctrina* means an intellectual discipline, the rationale of which is under debate; having given the distinction between making judgments *per modum inclinationis* and making them *per modum cognitionis,* art. 6 ad 3 concludes:

> The second way of making judgments is characteristic of *sacra doctrina* in keeping with the fact that it is acquired *through study . ...* [11]

An interpretation of Question One consistent with the academic setting and with the epistemological intent can provide a comfortable explanation of the language and structure of Question One. Scanning the surface can be a useful preliminary to more penetrating analyses of this cardinal text. And as often is the case with the *Summa,* the opening article of Question One contains in germ the development of the topic in subsequent articles. In particular the first statement of the Reply in art. 1 applies to its topic two qualifiers: *sacra doctrina* is a *doctrina praeter philosophicas disciplinas;* it is a *doctrina secundum revelationem divinam.* [12] In light of the setting of the Question in the medieval school, the first qualifier connotes the range of questions to be put to *sacra doctrina;* in light of the epistemological intent, the second qualifier presages St. Thomas's personal way of answering such questions.

Doctrina praeter philosophicas disciplinas

To read the phrase *praeter philosophicas disciplinas* in its place in the text as a modifier that puts *sacra doctrina* into question is simply to reckon with the scholastic method shaping the *Summa.* " Putting into question " is the method of teaching and learning that makes up the medieval *quaestio disputata.*

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de la theologie science, dans le sens d'Aristote, est bien pose, sinon resolu, quand S. Thomas intervient."

[11] Secundus modus judicandi pertinet ad hanc doctrinam secundum quod *per studium habetur . . .*

[12] Responsio. Dicendum quod necessarium fuit ad humanam salutem esse doctrinam quamdam secundum revelationem divinam, praeter philosophicas disciplinas quae ratione humana investigantur.

The search for understanding begins by proposing its topic as, at least hypothetically, open to opposite, alternative predicates, and concludes by a resolution in favor of one of them.[13] The quasi-rubrical *utrum* (whether or not) signals that method;[14] the design of the article, the basic unit of discourse, carries it out. But interpreters often seem to have assumed that Question One is measuring the philosophical sciences-and finding them inferior-through the presupposed meaning and eminence of *sacra doctrina.* Calling a topic into question, however, involves quite the reverse. Here methodologically and pedagogically the meaning of *sacra doctrina* is the unknown; its status and qualities are called into doubt through the known existence, qualities, and rank of the philosophic disciplines. Hypothetically-" for the sake of argument " means something here-these are taken as the familiar, the well-grounded; they serve as the best way to achieve the purpose of calling *sacra doctrina* into question: to determine *qualis sit* and *ad quae se extendat.*

The simple preposition *praeter* in the formulation of the inquiry and in the statements of the conclusion in art. 1[15] has just the comparative force wanted.[16] But the point of this comparison rests on the meaning of the term of reference, the *philosophicas disciplinas.* Here is an expression that St. Thomas does not use frequently.[17] That suggests that it may occur here, not as a casual variant, but as his pointed recourse to academic idiom. To phrase a problem in terms customary in the schools is sensible pedagogy. But a twentieth-century reader may face the interpretative task of sharing the suppositions that determined the straightforward meaning of terms for the author and his contemporaries. As to *philosophicas disciplinas* one aid to the interpreter is the *Didascalioon* of Hugh of St. Victor.[18] Whether or not St. Thomas is expressly alluding to that work really does not matter.[19] The program

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[13] See ST EngLat, Vol. 1, T. Gilby, ed., *Christian Theology* (hereafter Gilby, ed. *Christian Theology),* Appendix 1, "Structure of the *Summa."* pp. 43-46.

" . . . hac dictione, utrum, utimur solum in oppositis ex necessitate; in aliis autem ex suppositione tantum, quia sola opposita ex natura non contingit simul existere" *(In Meta.* X, lect. 7, n. 2060).

[15] Videtur quod non sit necessarium praeter philosophicas disciplinas aliam doctrinam haberi.

Dicendum quod necessarium fuit . . . esse doctrinam secundum revelationem divinam praeter philosophicas disciplinas . . . .

Necessarium igitur fuit etiam praeter philosophicas disciplinas quae per rationem investigantur sacram doctrinam per revelationem haberi.

[16] Charlton T. Lewis, Charles Short, *A Latin Dictionary* (Oxford, impr. 1969): " *praeter* ... 2. In particular: a. Comparatively of that which goes beyond something else; *beyond, above, more than;* Of that besides which there is something else, in addition to, besides, together with," ... (p. 1434).

[17] He more readily uses *scientiae philosophicae,* as in art. 3 ad 2; art. 4. The *Tabula aurea* does not list the phrase *philosophicae disciplinae.* The phrase does

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occur in *In Boethii De Trin.* V, I ad 3, which, significantly as will be shown, is a discussion of Hugh of St. Victor's *Didascalicon.* The term used in *In Sent.* I, prol. q. 1, a. 1 is *physicae disciplinae;* for the interchange of *phuosophicae* and *physicae,* see *In Boethii De Trin.* II, 3, obj. 3, *5,* 8; *sed contra* l; ad 3, ad *5,* ad 8.

[18] Editions: J. P. Migne, *Patrologiae cursus completus, Patres latini,* vol. 176, *Eruditioni& didascalicae libri septem,* 739-838 (hereafter, PL); Charles Henry Buttimer, ed., *Hugonis de Sancto Victore Didascalicon de stiidio legcndi: a Critical Text* in *Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Latin,* 10 (Washington D. C., 1937) (hereafter, Buttimer). Translation (based on Buttimer): Jerome Taylor, *The Didascalicon of Hugh of St. Victor* (New York, 1961; repr. 1968) (hereafter, Taylor). Buttimer's text limits the contents of the *Didascalicon* to six books; Book VII in PL is an independent work, *De tribus diebus.* (Buttimer, p. vii) .

[19] This is simply an implication of the place of the *auctoritates* in medieval studies: on any point the bibliography was, first of all, manageable, the master could have an exhaustive awareness of it; secondly, on any point he was expected to deal with the received texts. Such generalities suffice to explain the presence of documents in any discussion, whether or not a firsthand citation is involved. So much being said, it is still interesting to note two striking lexical parallels with the *Didascalicon* that appear in the Prologue of the *Summa,* the setting for Question One. The Prologue begins with the statement: "... catholicae veritatis doctor non solum provectos debet instruere, sed ad eum pertinet etiam incipientes instruere." The unusual term *provecto&* occurs also in *In Hebr.* VI, lect. 1 n. 276, where it is given as a term deriving from a gloss; it is coupled with *incipientes,* and used as equivalent to *perfecti* in reference to spiritual progress. But in the same sense as it appears in the Prologue of the *Summa, provectos.* occurs in the *Didas.calicon:* "Satis, ut puto, aperte demonstratum est provectos et aliquid amplius de se promittentibus, non idem esse propositum cum incipientibus" (5.10. Buttimer, p. 111; PL 798). The lament over hindrances to learning because of poor teaching methods in the Prologue has these parallels in the *Didascalicon:* " Scholares vero nostri aut nolunt aut nesciunt modum congruum in discendo servare, et idcirco multos studentes, paucos sapientes invenimus. Mihi vero videtur non minori cura providendum esse lectori ne in studiis inutilibus operam suam expendat, quam ne in bono et utili proposito tepidus remaneat" (3, 3. Buttimer p. *53;* PL 768). "... Cum igitur de qualibet arte agimus, maxime in

of Christian education in the *Didascalicon* had a prominent influence that extended well into the fifteenth century; [20] simply because of the currency of its ideas the *Didascalicon* can shed light on art. 1, and thereby on the whole of Question One.

The first article sets the problem into a historical frame, its verbs being chiefly in the historical-past tense: *necessarium fuit* (obj. and throughout the Reply); [21] it also connects the problem raised with salvation, *ad salutem.* The *Didascalicon* has as the title for its Book One, *De origine artium:* [22] the first source and need for the body of learning Hugh will outline is the fact that Divine Wisdom has enlightened the soul. The process necessary for the soul's well-being and restoration from sin consists in the pursuit through " philosophy " of the wisdom that will in turn liken the soul again to Divine Wisdom.[23] What will be needed for the likening of the soul to God

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docendo ubi omnia ad compendia redigenda sunt, et ad facilem intelligentiam evocanda, sufficere debet id de quo agitur quantum brevius et apertius potest explicare, ne si alienas nimium rationes multiplicaverimus, magis turbemus quam aedificemus lectorem. Non omnia dicenda sunt quae dicere possumus, ne minus utiliter dicantur ea quae dicere debemus. Id tandem in unaquaque arte quaeras quod ad earn specialiter pertinere constiterit" (3, *5.* Buttimer p. *56;* PL 770). See also *5,* 8. Buttimer pp. 108-109; PL 796.

[20] See Roger Barron, "L'inf!uence de Hugues de Saint-Victor," *Recherches de theologie ancienne et medieval,e* 22 (1955)*:* 56-71; *idem, Science et sagesse chez Hugues de Saint-Victor* (Paris, 1957); Taylor, pp. 4-5, who notes the influence of the *Didascalicon's* leading ideas on thirteenth-century masters.

[21] The present tense in the *sed contra* is simply a verbal inconsistency, a not infrequent occurrence in the *Summa.*

[22] See Taylor, pp. 7-8.

[23] " Omnium expetendorum prima est sapientia, in qua perfecti boni forma consistit. Sapientia illuminat hominem ut seipsum agnoscat, qui caeteris similis fuit, cum se prae caeteris factum esse non intellexit. lmmortalis quippe animus sapientia illustratus respicit principium suum, et quam sit indecorum agnoscit ut extra se quidquam quaerat, cui quod ipse est satis esse poterat. Sic nimirum mens rerum omnium similitudine insignita, omnia esse dicitur, atque ex omnibus compositionem suscipere, non integraliter, sed virtualiter atque potentialiter continere, et haec est ilia naturae nostrae dignitas quam omnes aequaliter habent, sed non omnes aeque noverunt. Animus enim corporeis passionibus consopitus et per sensibiles formas extra semetipum abductus, oblitus est quid fuerit, et quia nil aliud fuisse meminit, nil praeter id quod videtur esse credit. Reparamur autem per doctrinam, ut nostram agnoscamus naturam et ut discamus extra non quaerere quod in nobis possumus invenire. Summum igitur in vita solamen est studium

and the subvention of its needs identifies the components of " philosophy " : theoretical, moral, and " mechanical " knowledge, along with logic, developed for their effective pursuit.[24] A further identification of the "philosophic disciplines " or " the arts " through their historical origins is especially clear in Book One's explanation of the rise of logic,[25] and in Book Three's sketching of the ancient authors whose writings founded, as it were, the needed, particular disciplines.[26] The concrete connotations of "philosophic disciplines," then, are: a theological educational theory and the twelfth- and thirteenth-century renaissance mentality, an understanding of education as a process of retrieving and mastering the body of knowledge developed in antiquity. [21] The " philosophic disciplines " are not, therefore, just philosophy in the abstract, but a body of knowledge with a theoretical rationale and an identifiable history or lineage.

The alternate arguments (objections and *sed contra)* in the opening article of the *Summa* come down on the side respectively of the sufficiency of the philosophic disciplines alone, or of the God-inspired knowledge of Scripture. Such a division is also present in the broad breakdown of Question One into art. 2-8 and art. 9-10. That parallels, as a matter of fact, the main

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sapientiae, quam qui invenit felix est, et qui possidet beatus" I, 1. Buttimer, pp. 4-6; PL 741-742) . The last sentence is from Boethius, *De syllogismo hypotlwtico.* PL 64, 831; as is the idea, *perfecti boni forma,* and indeed the vocabulary (especially the meaning of *disciplina-see* note 36) , the basis for the division of the sciences derives as well from the ideas, albeit reworked, of Boethius; see Taylor, pp. 7-11. A restatement of the purpose of "philosophy" appears in Book Two: "Hoc ergo omnes artes agunt, hoc intendunt, ut divina similitudo in nobis reparetur, quae nobis forma est, Deo natura, cui quanto magis comformamur tanto magis sapimus. Tune enim in nobis incipit relucere quod in eius ratione semper fuit; quod quia in nobis transit, apud ilium incommutabile consistit" (2, I. Buttimer, p. 23; PL 751). See also l, 8. Buttimer, p. *15;* PL 747.

••See 1, 9, 10,11. PL 747, 749, 750.

·5 1, 11. Buttimer, pp. 18-22; PL 749-751.

•• 3, 2. Buttimer, pp. 49-52; PL 765-767. This "history of the arts " gives its proper nuance to the expression *scientiae humanitus traditae, In Boethii De Trin.* II, 2 ad *5.*

[27] See M.-D. Chenu, *Toward Understanding St. Thomas,* pp. 24-31; G. Pare, A Brunet, P. Tremblay, *La renaissance du Xll• siecle* (Montreal, 1933).

division of the educational program proposed by the *Didascalicon:* for the "reader " or student of the arts, Books One to Three; for the reader of the Scriptures, Book Four to Six.[28] These clear lines in Hugh's plan support the presumption that the term " philosophic disciplines " in art. 1 has a sharply defined meaning: the body of knowledge pursued by the student of the arts. This, finally, leads to the most decisive supposition the term bears. It is not just a cumbersome way of referring to philosophy; to take the term for philosophy as a distinct branch of study, in the way" philosophy" appears in a modern curriculum, is simply anachronistic. The first two *Summa* arguments against the need for a *doctrina praeter philosophicas disciplinas* assert their exhaustiveness. These arguments rely for their force on the supposition that the philosophic disciplines stand for the whole corpus of human learning. That supposition corresponds to the stated program of the *Didascalicon,* its first four books being given over to showing the organized body of disciplines necessary for the pursuit of wisdom:

> To open the way to the knowledge of what ought to be read, or at least of the main things to be read, this work in the first part sets forth the origin of all the arts, then their description and division, i. e. how each one either contains another or is contained by it. Thus it divides philosophy from its topmost down to its least parts.[29]

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[28] " Instruit hie liber autem tam saecularium quam divinarum lectorem: unde in duas partes dividitur, quarum unaquaeque tres habet distinctiones: in prima parte docet lectorem artium, in secunda divinarum lectorem." (I, c. 1. PL 176, 741). Hugh of St. Victor's epistemology is not the issue here, but it is useful to mention that Taylor, pp. 33-36, shows clearly that the division is not an imprecise anticipation of St. Thomas's distinction between philosophy and theology-as an earlier period in Thomistic studies was bent on showing. In Hugh's conception the two concentrations are part of the one pursuit of wisdom, interrelated and mutually supportive. Still, the separation in the discourse of the *Didascalicon* would lend itself to the different perception of the problematic concerning theology in the 13th century.

[29] Ut autem sciri possit quid legendum sit aut quid praecipue legendum sit, in prima parte primum numeral originem omnium artium, deinde descriptionem et partitionem earum, id est quomodo unaquaeque contineat aliam vel contineatur ab alia, secans philosophiam a summo usque ad ultima membra (Praef. Buttimer,

That program and intent, in continuity with the Christian *paideia*, represent an ideal: a definable, all-encompassing circle of learning that forms a complete human education. One text may be chosen to indicate Hugh's conception of the organic coherence of this sum of knowledge:

> In any case the foundation of all learning lies in the liberal arts and these above all others must be at one's fingertips as the means without which a philosophic discipline cannot explain or decide anything. These seven are so interconnected and interdependent for their discourse that even should only one of them be lacking, the others cannot make one a philosopher. Wherefore in my eyes they go astray who, heedless of the inner coherence of the arts, choose to learn some through which, the others being neglected, they believe they can become fully educated.[30]

The term *philosophica disciplina,* as will become clearer, is all-embracing, in the formal sense of including all that is required in the pursuit of conformity to divine wisdom. Into that conception he particularly integrates the seven liberal arts, the *trivium* and the *quadrivium:*

> These are the best kinds of tools, so to speak, and the basic elements for preparing the mind's way toward full possession of the truth of philosophy. That is why they received the names "trivium" and" quadrivium," as though being the passageways (viae) for the intent mind to enter the secret courts of *Sophia.*[31]

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p. 2; PL 741). Taylor, p. 9, here cites as background Vitruvius (fl. 1st cent. B. C.), *De architectura,* ". . . The curriculum of disciplines (*encyclicos disciplina)*, like a single body, is composed of the disciplines as so many members."

[30] Verumtamen *in septem liberalibus artibus* fundamentum est omnis doctrinae quae prae caeteris omnibus ad manus habendae sunt, utpote sine quibus nihil solet aut potest *pkilosophica disciplina* explicare et definire. Hae quidem ita sibi cohaerent et alternis vicissim rationibus indigent, ut, si vel una defuerit, caeterae philosophum facere non possunt. Unde mihi errare videntur qui, non attendentes talem in artibus cohaerentiam, quasdam sibi ex ipsis eligunt et, caeteris intactis, in his se posse fieri perfectos putant (3, 4. Buttimer, p. 55; PL 769; emphasis added) .

[31] Sunt enim quasi optima quaedam instrumenta et rudimenta quibus via paratur animo ad plenam philosophicae veritatis notitiam. Hine trivium et quadrivium nomen accepit, eo quod his quasi quibusdam viis, vivax animus ad secreta sophiae introeat (3, 3. Buttimer, p. 53; PL 768).

As the following text indicates, philosophy includes all " science " ; the members of the *trivium,*. grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric are integrated under logic; the members of the *quadrivium,* arithmetic, music, geometry, astronomy, under mathematics:

> The division of philosophy is into the theoretical, the practical, the mechanical, and the logical disciplines. These four include every form of knowledge. The term "theoretical" translates as "speculative " ; " practical," as " concerned with acting," in other words " ethical " because morals consist in acting well; " mechanical " means " imitative" in that its concerns are things that humans produce; "logical" means "having to do with speech," since logic treats of words. The division of the theoretical is into theology, mathematics, and physics.[32]

The literally all-inclusive force of *philosophicae disciplinae,* as the text *Ut autem sciri possit* proposes the purpose of the *Didascalicon, "secans philosophiam a summo usque ad ultima membra,"* can be appreciated from the formal meaning of *philosophia* and *disciplina:*

•• Philosophia dividitur in theoricam, practicam, mechanicam, et logicam. Hae quattuor continent omnem scientiam. Theorica interpraetatur speculativa; practica, activa, quam alio nomine ethicam, id est moralem dicunt, eo quod mores in bona actione consistunt; mechanica, adulterina [imitative], quia circa humana opera versatur; logica, sermocinalis, quia de vocibus tractat. Theorica dividitur in theologiam, mathematicam, et physicam (2, I. Buttimer, p. 24; PL 725). Note also the following: Quattuor tantum diximus esse scientias, quae reliquas omnes continent, id est, theoricam, quae in speculatione veritatis laborat, et practicam, quae morum disciplinam considerat, et mechanicam, quae huius vitae actiones dispensat, logicam quoque quae recte loquendi et acute disputandi scientiam praestat .. (1, 11. Buttimer, p. 22; PL 750). Philosophia dividitur in theoricam, practicam, mechanicam. Theorica dividitur in theologiam, physicam, mathematicam. Mathematica dividitur in arithmetican, musicam, geometriam, astronomiam. Practica dividitur in solitariam, privatam, politicam. Mechanica dividitur in lanificium, armaturam, navigationem, agriculturam, venationem, medicinam, theatricam. Logica dividitur in grammaticam, dissertivam. Dissertiva dividitur in demonstrativam, probabilem, sophisticam. Probabilis dividitur in dialecticam, rhetoricam. In hac divisione solummodo divisivae partes philosophiae continentur. Sunt aliae adhuc subdivisiones istarum partium, sed istae nunc sufficere possunt. In his igitur si solum numerum respicis, invenic3 xxi; si gradus computare volueris, xxviii reperies. . . • (3, 1. Buttimer, p. 48; PL 765) .

> The fact is that every science or discipline, or any form of knowledge whatsoever, is a part of philosophy, whether as a separate branch or as an integrating component. A discipline is a science having determinable limits, within which its subject matter is fully pursued.[33]

The formal meaning of *philosophia,* deriving from its defining purpose is:

> Philosophy is the love and the pursuit of wisdom,[34] and in a certain way friendship with wisdom: not with that kind of wisdom having to do with tools or the knowledge and skill of some craft, but with that wisdom which is beyond all need and which is living mind, the one primal exemplar of all reality. This love of wisdom means the enlightenment of the understanding mind by that absolute wisdom, and in a sense the drawing and summoning of the mind to itself, so that the quest for wisdom is seen to be friendship with the godhead and pure mind.[35]

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[33] Est tamen prorsus omnis scientia sive disciplina sive quaelibet cognitio pars philosophiae, sive divisiva sive integralis. Disciplina autem est scientia quae absolutum finem habet, in quo propositum artis perfecte explicatur 30. Buttimer, p. 47; PL 764). There is an interesting comment on the *quaelibet cognitio* of this text: Duo sunt genera scripturarum. Primum genus est earum quae sunt appendicia artium. Artes sunt quae philosophiae supponuntur, id est, quae aliquam certam et determinatam partem philosophiae materiam habent, ut est grammatica, dialectica et caeterae huiusmodi. Appenditia artium sunt quae tantum ad philosophiam spectant, id est, quae aliqua extra philosophiam materia versantur. Aliquando tamen quaedam ab artibus discerpta sparsim et confuse attingunt, vel si simplex narrata est, viam ad philosophiam praeparant. Huiusmodi sunt omnia poetarum carmina . . . , tragoediae, comediae, satirae, heroica quoque et lyrica et iambica et didascalica, quaedam fabulae quoque et historiae, illorum etiam scripta quos nunc philosophos appellare solemus, qui et brevem materiam longis verborum ambagibus extendere consueverunt, et facilem sensum perplexis sermonibus obscurare, vel etiam diversa simul compilantes quasi de multis coloribus et formis, unam picturam facere (3, 4. Buttimer, p. 54; PL 768-769).

[34] See Boethius, *In Porphyrium dialogi.* PL 64, 10-11.

[35] Est autem philosophia amor et studium et amicitia quodammodo sapientiae, sapientiae vero non huius quae in ferramentis quibusdam, et in aliqua fabrili scientia notitiaque versatur, sed illius sapientiae quae nullius indigens, vivax mens et sola rerum primaeva ratio est. Est hie autem amor sapientiae intelligentis animi ab ilia pura sapientia illuminatio et quodammodo ad seipsam retractio atque advocatio, ut videatur sapientiae studium divinitatis et purae mentis illius amicitia (1, 2. Buttimer, pp. 6-7; PL 743). Note also the following: Onmium autem humanarum actionum sen studiorum quae sapientia moderatur finis et intentio ad hoc spectare debet: ut vel naturae nostrae reparetur integritas vel

As the love and pursuit of wisdom, philosophy is a key part in human restoration, reintegration, and salvation. Thus its comprehensiveness:

> . . . clearly blind impulse does not take hold of the acts of the rational soul, but rather a controlling wisdom always precedes them. This being admitted, we say in consequence that to philosophy appropriately belong not only those studies that concern the nature of reality or moral training, but also the rationale of all human actions and pursuits. Accordingly we may define philosophy in this way: philosophy is the discipline fully investigating the meanings of all realities, human and divine.[36]

To catch the force of *philosophicae disciplinae* for the medieval mind, then, it is best to underline Hugh's acceptance of *disciplina* as a definition of philosophy in its highest function:

> He [Pythagoras] made philosophy to be the learning of those realities that truly exist and that have received an unchanging substance.[37]

The term *disciplina* is used also in the sense of the moral ascesis required by the pursuit of wisdom.[38] In a second meaning it describes the mode of thinking proper to mathematics, as the *Didascalicon* comments on Boethius's division

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defectuum, quibus praesens subiacet vita, temperetur necessitas ... Hoc est omnino quod agendum est ut natura reparetur et excludatur vitium, integritas vero naturae humanae duobus perficitur, scientia et virtute, quae nobis cum supernis et divinis substantiis similitudo sola est (I, *5.* Buttimer, p. 12; PL 745).

[86] --- restat ut rationalis animae actus caeca cupiditas non rapiat, sed moderatrix semper sapientia praecedat. Quod si verum esse constiterit, earn non solum ea studia in quibus de rerum natura vel disciplina agitur morum, verum etiam omnium humanorum actuum seu studiorum rationes, non incongrue ad philosophiam pertinere dicemus: secundum quam acceptionem sic philosophiam definire possumus: Philosophia est disciplina omnium rerum humanarum atque divinarum rationes plene investigans. . . . (I, 4. Buttimer, p. II; PL 744). Taylor here notes parallels in Cicero, Augustine, Cassiodorus and others; but that *humanas* for mechanical arts, *divinas* for the sciences is proper to Hugh; p. 183, n. 27. See also n. 23 above.

[87] Philosophiam autem earum rerum quae vere essent suique immutabilem substantiam sortirentur disciplinam constituit (I, 2. Buttimer, p. 6; PL 743). Taylor, p. 181, n. 20, gives as source here, Boethius, *De arithmetica* I, 1. PL 63, 1079.

[88] See Praef.: Postremo legentibus vitae suae disciplinam hie liber praescribit (Buttimer, pp. 2-3. PL 750); this is carried out in 3, 12-19 (Buttimer pp. 661-69. PL 773-778).

of the sciences.[39] But primary is the sense expressing the kind of knowledge in which the purpose of philosophy is most fully achieved; this links the *Didascalicon* to an epistemological lineage deriving from Boethius and continuing throughout the middle ages: The following texts suffice to complete the background of *philosophicae disciplinae* in Question One of the *Summa:*

> Philosophy is the art of arts and the discipline of disciplines, i. e. the term of all the individual arts and disciplines. Any form of knowledge may be called an art that is made up of the rules and precepts for an art, e. g. the knowledge of handwriting. Or it can be called a discipline when it is complete, as in the " doctrinal " science [mathematics]; or it can be called an art when it deals with the plausible and the probable; a discipline, when it discourses with strict argumentation on matters having necessity;[40] This is a distinction between an 1art and a discipline intended by Plato and Aristotle.[41] Another alternative is that the name " art " can be given to what is brought about in some workable material through a process of making; e. g. as in architecture; the name " discipline " can be given to what remains a process of thought, carried out simply by reasoning, e.g. as in logic.[42]

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[89] Boethius remarks: In naturalibus agitur rationabiliter, in mathematics disciplinabiliter, in divinis intellectualiter versari oportet *(De Trinitate* £. PL 64, HMO; cf St. Thomas *In Boethii De Trinitate* VI, 1); the *Didascalicon* refers to mathematics as *doctrinalis. scientia,* 2, 8. Buttimer, pp. 25-27. PL 758; see Taylor, p. 196, n. 7). On the history of *disciplina* from Boethius on, see M.-D. Chenu, "Notes de lexicographie philosophique medievale; Disciplina" in *Revue des sciences philosophique& et theologiques* 85 (1986): 686-692.

[40] For these lines Taylor cites, p. 196, nn. 4-7; Cassiodorus and Isidore of Seville. Where Rugh has *disciplina quae dicitur plena,* Cassiodorus *(Ins.titutiones* II, ii, 7) has, . . . *quae discitur plena.*

[41] Taylor, p. 197, n. 8, cites Isidore, *Etymologiae* I, i, 8 as the source of this remark.

[42] Philosophia est ars artium et disciplina disciplinarum, id est ad quam omnes artes et disciplinae spectant. Ars dici potest scientia quae artis praeceptis regulisque consistit, ut est in scriptura; disciplina, quae dicitur plena, ut est in doctrina. Vel ars dici potest quando aliquid verisimile atque opinabile tractatur; disciplina quando de his quae aliter se habere non possunt veris disputationibus aliquid disseritur. Quam difl'erentiam Plato et Aristotelis esse voluerint inter artem et disciplinam. Vel ars dici potest quae fit in subiecta materia, et explicatur per operationem, ut architectura; disciplina vero quae in speculatione consistit et per solam ratiocinationem, ut logica (2, 1. Buttimer, pp. 28-24; PL 751-752).

The ideal of the *Didascalicon,* a definable, all-encompassing circle of learning that makes human education to be a pursuit of wisdom, indicates St. Thomas's point in calling *sacra doctrina* into question over against the philosophic disciplines. The right of *sacra doctrina* to enter that closed circle is the issue. His conversance with Hugh's educational program appears in *In Boethii De Trinitate,* V, 1 ad 3. This cites and interprets the *Didascalicon* (3, 3). The mind's capacities are perfected through the liberal and mechanical arts, and through the theoretical and practical (moral) sciences. All the branches of a humane education, the *trivium* and the *quadrivium,* are subordinate preparations or instruments for the theoretical and practical sciences. These stand supreme in the organic whole, bringing about the mind's full comprehension of the truth, and its guidance for the direction of the moral life. In placing its question the *Summa's* opening article accepts pedagogically this self-contained organism of human learning as given and finally founded. There is, of course, an academic abstraction here; *sacra doctrina* is what Augustine was concerned with and Anselm, Abelard, the *antiqui* and the *moderni* at Paris. But the abstraction permits a challenge to the *droit de cite* of *sacra doctrina* that can be precisely laid down through the meaning of the philosophic disciplines. That academically laden term signals the author's intent to dispel the ambiguities and equivocations still besetting the understanding of theology as an intellectual discipline. The basis for putting *sacra doctrina* into question in art. 1 once grasped, the contents and progress of art. stand clearly as coherent developments of that questioning. The status and study of the highest forms of human learning set the issues and the criteria confronting *sacra doctrina.*

First of all, art. present challenges from the canons that determine how the philosophic disciplines themselves excel lesser forms of learning, and how they have their own gradation in rank. These have their eminence in the body of learning because they are sciences; accordingly art. question the status of *sacra doctrina* by comparing it to the sciences. The sciences have their mark of yielding universal and necessary knowledge because they proceed from certain and evident principles (art. 2); each has its proper unity as an organized body of knowledge (art. 3); their broad division is into the theoretical and the moral sciences (art 4) ; and in each case the particular disciplines have structured rank proportionate to their degree of certitude and autonomy (art. 5). *Sacra doctrina* faces a more exacting measure in art. 6-8. Among the nobler sciences, the theoretical, the highest is wisdom in its full sense, *prima philosophia,* metaphysics; there is also a practical wisdom, the highest form of prudence: thus the questions raised in art. 6. The specific unity and primacy of metaphysics derives from its supremely intelligible subject (art. 7); as the first philosophy it has a defensive and reflexive function over itself and all the theoretical sciences (art. 8). How does *sacra doctrina* stand up against these canons?

The articles in their disposition and articulation of problems obviously employ Aristotle's division of the intellectual virtues.[43] More is at stake, however, than simply employing a convenient logical device. The *Summa* stands as the high point of medieval intellectual progress; its time coincides with the full impact of Aristotle's coming to the West; and of Aristotle, not simply as the provider of the *Organon* for right methods of thinking, but Aristotle *Philosophus.* The possession of the more complete Aristotelian corpus, and the standing finally accorded it in the arts faculty at Paris, opened up a complete natural vista on the world of nature (the physical treatises), of man *(De anima)* and his moral life (the *Ethica nova),* and of the ultimate causes of all things (the *Metaphysics).* The philosophic disciplines thus include a body of learning that parallels the whole range of concerns addressed by *sacra doctrina.* The clear presence of Aristotle in art. 2-8 and of his sciences, theoretical and moral, suggests St. Thomas's personal attitude towards *sacra doctrina* as an intellectual discipline. Aristotle's secular philosophy exhibits vigor, discipline, preciseness; to St. Thomas's way of thinking *sacra doctrina* should be faced with criteria no less exacting. With characteristic tough-mindedness he will not concede that *sacra doctrina* has simply an affective certitude or a merely equivocal claim to being an intellectual discipline. Its being a *scientia salutis* does not exempt it from facing up to the vindication of its proper rights and dignity among all intellectual disciplines. Instead a need for vindication presses more urgently.[44]

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[43] Aristotle, *Ethics* VI, 3-13.

As to art. 9-10, the academic setting connoted by *philosophicas disciplinas* also explains the way they put *sacra doctrina* into question. Because they apparently do not fit into a logical schematization, some have suggested that these articles are in Question One simply as a gesture of deference to convention; that, had St. Thomas revised the *Summa*, he would have dropped them. Further interchange of *sacra doctrina* and *sacra scriptura* throughout the question has often baffled interpreters, and these two articles compound that puzzle. Yet the difficulties are at least lessened simply by averting to the fact that the first step in the medievals' pursuit of learning is the *expositio.* The question or *disputatio* is not an independent, dialectical exercise, but rises out of and remains bound up with texts, received *auctoritates* in the various fields of learning.[45] They loom so large that St. Thomas can remark:

> Further, the subject matters of the various sciences are all treated separately and in different books.[46]

Because all the human disciplines have their book, their *scriptura,* part of calling *sacra doctrina* into question is the challenge to its book, *scriptura huius doctrinae.*[41] The texts proper to the philosophic disciplines, especially the scientific treatises, con-

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" " En une periode non moins dure que la notre, ou l'Eglise etait non moins contestee de l'interieur, Thomas d'Aquin a su faire droite au monde, et d'abord au monde de la raison, a l'encontre d'un pietisme qui n'allait pas sans un 'mepris du monde,' dans un spiritualisme charge de mediocres residus" (M.-D. Chenu, "Preface," *Saint Thomas. d'Aquin, Somme theologique* 1, p. 6).

••See M.-D. Chenu, *Toward Understanding St. Thomas,* pp. 126-149.

•• Praeterea, quae sunt diversarum scientiarum distinctim et in diversis libris determinantur (*In Sent.* I, prol. !'l contra).

[47] On the *authentica scriptura* for a science, see la. 31, !'l & 4; 77, 8 ad l; 3a. 45, 3 ad !'l; *In Sent.* II, 18, !'l, 2 ad l; *De veritate* XV, 1 ad 1.

duct their discourse in straightforward language, bearing a unified, determinable meaning (art. 10, obj. 1). The *scriptura huius doctrinae,* on the other hand, suffers the seeming liability of a language that is frequently metaphorical,[48] and in some parts open to many senses; "whatever does not have one meaning has no meaning."[49] Thus *sacra doctrina* has to defend its text, its *auctoritas,* and art. 9-10 are integral to the process of the whole question. As for the puzzlement over the easy interchange of *sacra doctrina* and *sacra scriptura* or *doctrinai scientia,* and *scriptura* throughout the Question, the formulation of art. 10 in the preface to the Question should be clarification enough:

> whether the sacred text proper to this discipline should be expounded in many senses.[50]

The *expositio* is both first in and inseparable from the academic process, even by academic statute. The *scriptura huius doctrinae* does not have the force precisely of *canonica scriptura,* a term St. Thomas uses carefully when the primacy of biblical authority is an issue (as in art. 8 ad 2); rather it means simply the use of the text, the active *expositio* as essential in the discourse of this discipline. The interchange of terms faced the medievals with no ambiguity simply because the *expositio* is an intrinsic component of the learning-teaching process.[51]

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[48] Poetica non capiuntur a ratione humana propter defectum veritatis qui est in eis . . . (la2ae. 101, 2 ad 2); Ex tropicis locutionibus non est assumenda argumentatio . . . *(In Boethii De Trin.* II, 3 ad 5); see also *In Pe:riherm.* I, lect. 7, n. 87; *In Poster.* I, Prooem.

[49] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, 4.10065b5-10.

[50] utrum scriptura sacra hujus doctrinae sit secundum plures sensus *exponenda.*

[51] St. Thomas himself sketchily indicates the academic ideal and the connotations of the *expositio scripturae* in its scholastic setting: Ex istis autem principiis ad tria *proceditur* in sacra scriptura . . . Proceditur tertio ad contemplationem veritatis in *quaestionibus.* sacrae scripturae: et ad hoc oportet modum etiam esse argumentativum, quod praecipue servatur in *originalibus* sanctorum et in isto libro [i. e. the *Sentences],* qui quasi ex ipsis conflatur *(In Sent.* I, prol. 5). The italicized terms will be recognized as technical and referring to the method of

Doctrina secundum revelationern divinam

The phrase in art. 1, the first line of the Reply, *doctrina secundum revelationem divinam,* implies the resolution of the problems placed by force of *praeter philosophicas disciplinas.* Two meanings of the preposition *secundum* open the way for testing such a claim. The first, immediately linked with the derivation of *secundum* from *sequor,* is " following after," in time, succession, rank, value. The first meaning of the stated conclusion of art. 1, then, is that there is need for *sacra doctrina* as a teaching following on divine revelation, genetically or sequentially. The second, extended meaning that *secundum* has is" agreeably with," " in accord with," according to " ; it takes on the idea of conformity or fidelity to a model.[52] The second meaning of the conclusion stated in art. 1, then, is that there is a need for *sacra doctrina* as a teaching in keeping with, conformed to divine revelation. In the phrase *secundum revelationem divinam* the force of the preposition on its object word indicates that the term " revelation " in Question One stands for both the divine act communicating knowledge, and the knowledge communicated.[53] The whole phrase in its first sense relates particularly to art. 1. 9, 10; in its second sense, to art. 2-8.

A Teaching following on Divine Revelation: art. 1

In stating that *sacra doctrina* must exist as it is a teaching following on divine revelation the conclusion of art. 1 vindicates it on the basis of origin or genesis. The substitution of *per* for *secundum* in the restatement at the end of the Reply confirms such a reading:

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learning; see M.-D. Chenu, *Toward Unders.tanding St. Thomas,* for *proceditur* and *quaestio,* pp. 93-96; for *original,es,* pp. 131-152.

[52] Lewis and Short, pp. 1654-55.

[53] Per Erik Persson, *Sacra Doctrina,* pp. 19-40 indicates the importance of the concept of revelation to an interpretation of *sacra doctrina:* his use of 2a2ae. 171-175, on prophecy, to establish the meaning of the concept is not very satisfying; see also Victor White, "St. Thomas's Concept of Revelation," *Dominican Studies* I (1948) : 3-34. Question One in fact seems to assume the two senses of revelation and to work with their implications in the progress of the discourse.

> It was necessary as well, therefor, that, over and above the human disciplines that reason develops, a *sacra doctrina* be acquired through revelation.[54]

That closing restatement, however, raises a doubt. Is it correct to construe *secundum revelationem divinam* grammatical- and for sense as the modifier of *sacra doctrina,* an intellectual discipline? Which amounts to saying, should *sacra doctrina* be taken to mean an intellectual discipline? Is not art. 1 simply arguing to the conclusion that for salvation men need revelation as teaching, need to be taught by divine revelation? That is the meaning which the language of art. 1 is made to serve in its adaptation by Vatican Council I, the dogmatic constitution, *De fide catholica,* c. 2, *De revelatione.* The two arguments in the Reply are viewed as establishing the need of a revelation communicating truths surpassing reason and truths within the range of reason, in order that men might have the information *(nota fierent)* and instruction *(instruantur)* they require for salvation.[55]

That the necessity of divine revelation is not the main or formal conclusion of art. 1 can be argued on extrinsic grounds: the stated intent of the Prologue to pursue the study of *sacra doctrina* concisely and economically, avoiding useless questions and repetition. The human need for God's help towards a knowledge of the truth is the concern of la2ae.109, 1; the need for a response in faith to God teaching both truths above reason and those within its range engages 2a2ae. 2, S & 4. The development of the *Summa,* however, is not unfailingly consistent with its planned conciseness. The occurrence of the articles cited, then, does not rule out the possibility that the issue in art. 1 is also the need for divine revelation.[56]

[54] Necessarium igitur fuit etiam praeter philosophicas disciplinas quae per rationem investigantur, sacram doctrinam per revelationem haberi. The active, originating sense occurs elsewhere in the Question, e.g. art. 2, art. 6 ad 3, where revelation is pointed to as the source of the principles of *sacra doctrina.*

[55] Denz.-Sch. *3005.*

[56] Note that St. Thomas uses the same arguments, *In Sent.* III, 24. 3, i, to prove the need for faith with regard to both truths above reason and those within its grasp.

Some internal evidence against that reading can be adduced from the formulation of the first and last statements of the Reply, and of the intermediary conclusions of each of the arguments:

1. The conclusion is that for human salvation there was need that there be a teaching in keeping with divine revelation.[57]

Q. Therefore it was necessary to man that for his salvation he be made aware of certain matters through divine revelation.[58]

8. In order therefore that man's salvation proceed more effectively and more surely it was necessary that there be an instruction about the divine through God's revelation.[59]

4. **It** was necessary as well, therefore, . . . that a *sacra doctrina* be acquired through revelation.[60]

The claim being made here is that statement 4 repeats statement 1, reenforced by the conclusions expressed in statements 2 and 8. The verbal difference is not great; statements 1 and 4 can be read in such a way that *doctrinam secundum (per) revelationem divinam* simply is a repetitive paraphrase of the *nota fierent per revelationem* / *per divinam rev'elationem instruantur* of statements 2 and 8. A textual interpretation that sees the verbal difference as significant, however, does have the value of a reading consistent with the author's academic setting and intent.[61]

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[67] 1. Dicendum quod necessarium fuit ad humanam salutem esse doctrinam quamdam secundum revelationem divinam . . .

[68] £. Unde necessarium fuit homini ad salutem quod ei nota fierent quaedam per revelationem divinam . . .

[69] 3. Ut igitur salus hominis et convenientius et certius proveniat necessarium fuit quod de divinis per divinam revelationem instruantur.

[00] 4. Necessarium igitur fuit etiam ... sacram doctrinam per revelationem haberi.

[61] The reading of the Latin text given here for statement 4 (note 60) is that used in Gilby, ed., *Christian Theology* (see p. xvii), and in A.-D. Sertillanges, ed., Saint Thomas d'Aquin, *Somme Theologique,* vol. 1, *Dieu* 1 (Paris, Tournai, Rome, 19£5), the edition of the Revue des Jennes. That text Gilby identifies as from Bibliotheque Nationale ms. 15347, but the Revue des Jeunes edition he cites gives as the source the municipal library of Laon, ms. 160 (see G. Thery, "Notes sur le texte latin," in *Dieu* I, p. 13). Thery notes that the Parisian family of 13th-and 14th-century manuscripts which the Laon text fairly represents differs

The *Summa* text can at times be bafflingly ambiguous or elliptical. Sometimes St. Thomas's carelessness causes the problem. More often, however, difficulties for a modern reader arise because of the author's pedagogic economy. He limits himself to introducing the student gradually to a complex problem, and endeavors to employ terms of academic currency. Language that has become obscure in a later era because merely allusive was in its own time evocative and clear just because the allusions were to the completely familiar.[62] In the present case it is quite possible that the referent and model for art. 1 is the *Didascalicon.* As has been mentioned, its Book One, *De origine artium* argues from the illumination of the soul by divine wisdom to the need of philosophy for " the restoration of our nature and the removal of deficiency." It is an altogether appropriate parallel to identify *sacra doctrina* as *doctrina secundum revelationem divinam,.* as having its origin in divine revelation, and its reason for existing, man's *salus:* salvation, to be sure, but salvation understood as the reintegration of man as an intelligent being. Such an introduction of the topic also permits the identification of *sacra doctrina* as *scientia salutis,* so that the student may become immediately aware of the one meaning of *sacra doctrina* on which all the *magistri* agreed.[63]

Still, the decisive factor from the academic setting of art. 1 is the force of the methodological juxtaposition of *doctrina praeter philosophicas disciplinas* and *doctrina secundum revelationem divinam.* The reading which that justifies is this: given the fact of divine revelation-argued on the basis of man's need-there is also need for a branch of human learning following on divine revelation, over and above that body of knowledge developed in the philosophic disciplines.

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from the Roman line reflected in both the Piana and Leonine editions. Neither of these two has the single word *etiam* given here in note 60; nor is the word in the Latin text of the 1968 revised edition of Question One issued to replace Sertillanges (see note 6 above). No claim that statement 4 is a consequent can be made on the basis of the *etiam,* but the claim is a tantalizing temptation.

[62] See ST EngLat, vol. 14, T. C. O'Brien, ed., *Divine Government,* Introduction; p. *65,* notes *1-'f;* p. 98, note *q;* Appendix "The Use of Aristotle"; Appendix 8, " The Dionysian Corpus."

••See Yves M.-J.Congar, *History of Theology,* pp.

An argument *ad absurdum* consists simply in looking at the questions asked in art. 2-8. To take the point of art. 1 to be revelation as teaching-to take that as the meaning of *doctrina secundum revelationem divinam--requires* that art. 2-8 ask their questions of divine revelation. That reading is simply outlandish.

The full text of art. 1, however, offers a direct and telling confirmation that its intent is to establish the need of *sacra doctrina* as a human discipline. In a *Summa* article the Reply often establishes merely a basic resolution of the issue at hand; the sharpening of the meaning is left to the responses to the opposite arguments, the objections. Here the ad 2 of art. 1 brings out that the genetic meaning of *doctrina secundum revelationem divinam* is linked in the author's mind with the qualitative or distinguishing meaning of the phrase. Because *sacra doctrina* is a teaching following on divine revelation, it is a teaching in keeping with or conformed to divine revelation. The ad 2 makes the statement, *diversa ratio cognoscibilis diversitatem scientiarum inducit.* Because there is divine revelation, there is a human teaching consequent upon it; divine revelation is not simply the communication of new information; it invests the same realities considered by the secular disciplines with new meaning, with new intelligible value. The fact of God's self-communication establishes the need for a *doctrina secundum revelationem divinam.* A *doctrina praeter philosophicas disciplinas* has a right to exist, is in fact required, because the secular disciplines do not exhaust the intelligibility of the real.

Even staying with simply the genetic sense of *secundum revelationem divinam* there is, finally, a reason for reading art. 1 as concluding from the need of revelation to the need of a teaching following upon it. " The encounter of God revealing and man believing sets up a logic. Why not? For science is as proper to man as song." [64] These words are a reminder of an intermediate step left unexpressed by art. 1. A person's first

[64] Gilby, ed., *Christian Theology,* p. 85.

encounter with God revealing is belief.[65] The affirmation here of a *doctrina-a* logic in that sense-comes out of an understanding of belief. That act is not a logic, not a discursive discipline, even though St. Thomas does like to compare a believer's attitude towards God with that of pupil to master.[66] But belief in itself is simple assent, a cleaving to God Himself as He attests the truths of salvation. The assent is accompanied, however, by thought, by pondering: *cum assensione cogitatio;*[67] it is a movement of mind not yet fulfilled by vision.[68] The personal cleaving to God, belief in its essence, prompts many human responses: the Cathedral of Chartres, the paintings of Fra Angelico, the music of Bach, the poetry of the liturgy. And, in St. Thomas'.s view, thinking.[69] For to be human includes puzzling over the terms and concepts in which the realities that God attests stand before the mind. The human need to deal with the intellectually unresolved pondering integral in belief requires a *doctrina,* a learning and a teaching that in .some degree quiets belief's restless pondering; enriches understanding; ensures a fidelity worthy of the truths authenticated by the divine witness to whom faith clings. At the point reached in the Reply of art. 1 the qualities of " holy teaching " remain undetermined; but the underlying conviction of the need for it signals the intent that *sacra doctrina* be as robust and sublime as the believer's mind can sustain.[70] Read with an eye to the full problematic of Question One, the term *sacra doctrina* in art. 1 is not left as open in meaning as Cajetan and other commentators have claimed.

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[65] See note *56* above.

[66] See 2a2ae. 2, 8.

[67] *Ibid.,* 1, an explanation of the act of belief, which the medievals expressed through this isolated text from Augustine, *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 2. PL 44, 968. See ST EngLat, Vol. 81, T. C. O'Brien, ed., *Faith,* Appendix 4, "Belief: Faith's Act."

[68] --- motus animi deliberantis nondum perfecti per plenam visionem veritatis (2a2ae. 2, 1). Note the anonymous definition of "articulus fidei" as perceptio divinae veritatis tendens in ipsam *(ibid.,* 1, 6 *sed contra; In Sent.* III, *25,* 1, i ad 4).

[69] " That Christian teaching is *scientia* in the generic sense, namely of sure, articulate, and intellectual knowledge in the mind, will be allowed by those for whom adhesion to God is more than a complete gamble in the dark or a blind loving in which reason and intelligence play little part. Theories of grace which neglect or suppress the proper activities of human nature ... or of faith subsuming non-rational elements, have a long history: St. Thomas was acquainted with them but does not share them " (Gilby, ed., *Christian Theology,* p. 75; see also p. 68).

A Doctrine fallowing on Divine Revelation: art. 9-10

As qualifying *sacra doctrina* on the basis of its origin, the phrase *secundum revelationem divinam* also implies solutions to the problems raised in art. 9-10, and the inner continuity of these articles with the concerns of Question One. Since *sacra doctrina* originates through divine revelation, its *auctoritas,* the *scriptura sacra hujus doctrinae,* is the book in which revelation has been handed down. The discourse of this discipline includes the language and logic of God's address to man in the Bible. For *sacra doctrina* to deal in metaphor is perfectly appropriate, because the divine purpose of accommodating human ways underlies the metaphorical language of Scripture. (art. 9) The interpretation *(expositio)* of its text requires *sacra doctrina* to attend to meanings that may be multiple, because in revealing God has attached meaning, not only to words, but to the realities signified by the words (art. 10 & ad 1). The points made in the last two articles, then, follow quite directly from *sacra doctrina* taken as a teaching :following on divine revelation; the articles are not an unnecessary appendage. Having its origin in the divine revelatory communication, *sacra doctrina* is bound to the medium chosen for the divine message.[71] The place within a discipline of its proper book and author emphasizes the link between *sacra doctrina* and its *scriptura.* By origin it rests on the contingent fact of God's revealing at all, and on the contingently chosen, historical events of salvation, the divinely intended meanings of both the words describing those events and of the events themselves. That gives *sacra doctrina* its paradoxical character: it is a science of the contingent. The de facto divine economy must always be the final measure of the loftiest of theological speculations. Concretely the mystery of Christ is decisive as criterion of every intelligible construct. Because *sacra doctrina* is *secundum revelationem divinam* it is *secundum scripturas.*[72] As for the way the *Summa* itself pursues *sacra doctrina,* the significance of art. 9 & 10 is that the sequence of the *Summa* plan appropriate to the learning of a discipline *(ordo disciplinae)* is a teacher's choice, as abstraction is a mental choice. St. Thomas chooses to follow, not the historical pattern, but a pattern of intelligibile priorities; but he does not intend the abstraction in disregard of the final criterion of *sacra doctrina:* God's concrete ways of communication with men.[73]

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[70] Hehr. 11, 6, *Sine fide impossible est placere Deo ...* Cum igitur ad ea quae sunt fidei philosophia non possit, oportet esse aliquam doctrinam quae ex fidei principiis procedat *(In Sent.* I, pro!., 1 *Contra):* Cum enim homo habet promptam voluntatem ad credendum, diligit veritatem creditam et super ea excogitat et amplectitur si quas rationes ad hoc invenire potest (:fa2ae. 2, 2, 10).

[71] See Gilby, ed., *Christian Theology,* p. 108.

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[72] "The only necessity known to theology lies in the logic of drawing necessary conclusions from what is freely given" (ibid., p. 117). "The discourse of Christian theology is carried throughout on our assent to this declaration of God's will, and on our acceptance of a power we cannot postulate from reasoning and a mercy we cannot earn. . . . Hence Christian theology differs in kind from philosophical theology; its subject is more than the God of the philosophers who can be inferred as the integrator of the universe about us, but God himself, the Father revealed in the Son, the Father to whom we are born by the Spirit . . ." (ibid p. 48).

[73] "Let us recall what St. Thomas is about. His capital theme [in this treatise] is the transcendence of God, and his first purpose to fill out the meaning of the phrase, not to arouse devotion, to explain what Christians think, not to breathe their awe, and to speak the theological language of science not of sympathy--the two are distinct, though complementary. If light is given, then warmth may follow. . . . Yet make no mistake, the theological movement is from, not to, the Christian assent, 'not to establish the articles of faith, but to stretch out from them to light up something else (la. 1, 8).' St. Thomas is not a philosophical theist who also happens to be a convinced believer from another part of himself. His character is not split by the distinctions he draws. Nor do they thrust divisions into single realities. . . . The special aspects or 'formal objects' he isolates for the sake of systematic treatment are abstractions, valid so long as we are aware of what we are about, and do not transpose them back as they stand into the world of concrete things" (ST EngLat, Vol. 8, T. Gilby, ed., *Creation,* Introduction, p. xxii).

A Teaching in keeping with Divine Revelation

The *secundum revelationem divinam* qualifies *sacra doctrina* in a second way: it is a teaching in keeping with, conformed to divine revelation. That is its chartering and distinguishing characteristic in relation to other specifically constituted branches of human learning. The point occurs first in the statement already mentioned, *diversa ratio cognoscibilis diversitatem scientiarum inducit* (art. 1 ad Q). Specification by the formal, objective interest engaging them, of acts, powers, virtues and ways of knowing is one of the constant themes in St. Thomas's works.[74] For him that is the only decisive basis for determining the *qualis sit,* and consequently the *ad quae se extendat* for *sacra doctrina.* The introduction of that norm in art. 1 ad Q is indication from the outset that the challenge in Question One is to determine the credentials of *sacra doctrina* as an intellectual discipline distinct from and surpassing the other human disciplines. The capital text in the Thomistic corpus on the specification and division of the sciences, *In Boethii De Trinitate* V & VI, has as a central statement:

> And therefore it is necessary that the division of the speculative sciences be founded on the formal differences of their subject matters as knowable.[75]

The tone and thrust of the argument developed in that work of St. Thomas's early career form an enlightening background on the epistemology of *sacra doctrina* raised in art. 3. That article is clearly the single most telling index to the interpretation of Question One.

The concluding statement in the Reply needs but the briefest comment:

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[74] On the meaning of this crucial element in St. Thomas's thought, see ST EngLat, Vol. 18, T. Gilby, ed., *Principles of Morality,* Appendix 11; Vol. 31, T. C. O'Brien, ed., *Faith,* Appendix l; Vol. 33, W. J. Hill, ed., *Hope,* Appendix 4.

[75] Et ideo oportet scientias speculativas dividi per differentias speculabilium inquantum speculabilia sunt *(In Boethii De Trin.·* V, 1). The speculative or theoretical sciences are foremost in his mind, and most completely fulfil the meaning of *philosophicae disciplinae;* they form the model for discourse. Note that art. 4 characterizes *sacra doctrina* as primarily speculative.

In consequence of the fact that *sacra scriptura* has for its consideration matters that are divinely revealed ... all matters that are divinely revealable come together under the one formal objective of this science.[76]

The statement is the indication of the questioned unity of *sacra doctrina,* and thereby of its specific being as a discipline, with its own internal, undivided coherence and its distinctness from every other human discipline. The solution follows from a description of the *consideratio* of *sacra doctrinas* i. e. its typical act as an intellectual discipline. The *consideratio* of *sacra doctrina* is concerned with the *reve"lata,* simply because it is a teaching following upon divine revelation.[77] The inference that the *divinitus revelabilia* are its unifying and constitutive objective is, as is usual with St. Thomas, a matter of going *ab esse ad posse,* from the actual exercise of *sacra doctrina* to the discovery of the quality or character that empowers it for such an act.

Given St. Thomas's general understanding of specification, and its being obviously the issue in art. 3, it is surprising that any reader could miss the import of *divinitus revelabilia* in the conclusion. The term does not stand for the later scholastics' " virtually revealed," i. e. deducible from the data of revelation. Nor does it have the meaning given it in the fanciful interpretation that it covers truths which, in distinction from the *revelata,* could possibly be revealed, but need not be because they are accessible to unaided reason.[78] In its context *revelabilia* means simply the quality, the formal interest, or intelligible value in every subject matter that engages the act of *sacra doctrina.* Even the examples in art. *3* ad 2, the *sensibile,* the *visibile,* the *audibile* leave no room for missing the force of *revelabilia.*

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[76] Quia igitur sacra scriptura considerat aliqua secundum quod sunt divinitus revelata . . . omnia quaecumque sunt divinitus revelabilia communicant in una ratione formali hujus scientiae.

[77] Consideratio importat actum intellectus veritatem rei intuentis. Sicut autem inquisitio pertinet ad rationem, ita judicium pertinet ad intellectum. Unde et in speculativis demonstrativa scientia dicitur judicativa inquantum per resolutionem ad prima principia intelligibilia de veritate dijudicatur. Et ideo consideratio maxime pertinet ad judicium (2a2ae. 53, 4; see also *In Boethii De Trin.* V, I). The meaning of *consideratio* has a general importance for reading the *Summa:* it signals judgment or resolution of the issue at hand in the phrase so frequently occurring, *considerandītm est,* especially after a recital of opinions.

[78] See E. Gilson, *Le Thomisme,* 5th ed. (Paris, 1947), pp. *15-25;* cf. T. C. O'Brien, *Metaphysics and the Existence of God* (Washington, 1960: repr. 1970), pp. 186-189.

The impact of art. *3* on the interpretation of the rest of the Question becomes clear from an awareness of the author's intent. In being engaged formally by the *revelabilia, sacra doctrina* is constituted a teaching in keeping with or in conformity with divine revelation. Thus:

> Likewise *sacra doctrina,* remaining one science, can consider matters treated in diverse philosophic sciences under the one formal objective, namely as they are divinely revealable; the import is that *sacra doctrina is like an imprint of God's knowledge, which is a knowledge, one and undivided, of all things.*[79]

> In the most exact sense *sacra doctrina* develops conclusions about God as he is the highest cause: it does so not simply as to what is knowable through creatures ... but also as to what is known to himself alone and communicated to others through revelation.[80]

The formal objective in whatever it considers gives any science its distinctive identity and status; for *sacra doctrina* the *revelabile* expresses its formal objective that as such constitutes it a *quaedam impressio divinae scientiae,* a *doctrina secundum divinam revelationem.* The judgments of *sacra doctrina* are determinations based upon *quod notum est (Deo) sibi soli de seipso. The revelabile* as formal objective means that in effect what typifies *sacra doctrina* is its engagement by the truth value, the intelligibility of what it considers, to God's own mind. The second meaning of *doctrina secundum revelationem divinam* in art. 1, therefore, becomes clearer and enriched. A teaching in accord with divine revelation, *sacra doctrina* is in continuity with the divine knowledge itself.[81] The *secundum revelationem divinam* qualifies this holy teaching not merely by reference to objective revelation as a collection of dogmas or a body of new information, but by reference to the truth value in whatever *sacra doctrina* considers: the inner intelligibility, the order, purposeful and salvific relationships of the objects of God's own knowing.[82]

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[79] Et similiter ea quae in diversis scientiis philosophicis tractantur potest sacra doctrina, una existens, considerare sub una ratione inquantum sunt divinitus revelabilia, *ut sacra doctrina sic sit velut quaedam impressio divinae scientiae, quae est una et simplex omnium* (art. 3 ad 2; emphasis added) . The *potest* means formal capacity, the power given by its being *doctrina secundum revelationem divinam.*

[80] Sacra autem doctrina propriissime determinat de Deo secundum quod est altissima causa: quia non solum quantum ad illud quod est per creaturas cognoscibile ... sed etiam quantum ad id quod notum est sibi soli de seipso et aliis per revelationem communicatam (art. 6).

A simple yet striking indication of how this meaning of *secundum revelationem divinam* controls the whole Question and answers the challenge put by the philosophic disciplines is the listing of key phrases in art. thus *doctrina secundum revelationem divinam;*

> *art. 2: is a science:* because it argues from. principles known in a higher science, that, namely of God and the blessed.[83]
>
> *art. 4: is both theoretical and practical:* even as God by the one knowledge knows himself and his works.[84]
>
> *art. 5: is superior to all others:* because it has its degree of certitude from the light of God's knowledge... ,[85]
>
> *art. 6: is wisdom:* in the most exact sense *sacra doctrina* develops conclusions about God as highest cause . . . as to what is known to himself alone and communicated to others through revelation.[86]

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[81] Hujus scientiae principium proximum est fides sed primum est intellectus divinus, cui nos credimus; sed fides est in nobis ut perveniamus ad intelligendum quae credimus, sicut si inferior sciens addiscat superioris scientiam, tunc fierent ei intellecta et scita quae prius erant tantummodo credita (In *Boethii De Trin.,* II, 2, ad 7). Sicut autem sacra doctrina fundatur super lumen fidei, ita philosophia super lumen naturale rationis. Unde impossibile est quod ea quae sunt philosophiae sint contraria iis quae sunt fidei, sed deficiunt ab eis *(ibid.* 3).

[82] . . . sacra tamen doctrina comprehendit sub se utramque (theoretical and practical knowledge), sicut et Deus eadem scientia se cognoscit et ea quae facit (1. 1, 4).

•• quia procedit ex principiis notis superioris scientiae, quae scilicet est Dei et beatorum.

•• et Deus eadem scientia se cognoscit et ea quae facit.

[85] quia certitudinem habet ex lumine divinae scientiae . . . Compare art. 5 with 1a. 26, 4 on God's self-knowledge as blessedness.

•• propriissime determinat de Deo . . . etiam quantum ad id quod notum est sibi soli de seipso et aliis per revelationem communicatam.

art. 7: has God as subject: all things are discussed in *sacra doctrina* from the point of view of God, either because they are God or because they stand in relationship to God as their beginning and end.s[7]

art. 8: has a defensive function: thus *sacra scriptura* engages in disputation with anyone denying its principles, since it has no science higher than itself.ss

> ad 8: its proper authorities are those of the canonical Scriptures, arguments from them having the force of necessity.s[9]

art. 9: employs metaphor rightly: God cares for all beings in a way suited to their nature.[90]

art. 10: rightly interprets its book in many senses: God is the author of sacred Scripture, in whose power it lies to adapt not only words . . . but also things to bear meaning.[91]

The use made of *divinitus revelabilia* as a medium of argumentation throughout the Question indicates the implications in art. 1 of *secundum revelationem divinam,.* meaning in keeping with divine revelation. The force intended is plainly stated in the recapitulation of art. 4 that *sacra doctrina* has a formal interest in what it considers: *prout sunt divino lumine cognoscibilia.* From the key phrases indicated, the meaning of *divinitus revelabilia* becomes equivalent to the *divinitus intelligibilia* in their reference to *sacra docfrina* as a wisdom *per modum cognitionis, pM studium acquisita* (art. 6 ad 3). St.

[87] omnia pertractantur in sacra doctrina sub ratione Dei, vel quia sunt ipse Deus vel quia habent ordinem ad Deum ut ad principium et finem. Cf. la. 14, *1-5,* 8 on the order in God's knowledge.

[88] Unde sacra scriptura cum non habeat superiorem scientiam disputat cum negante sua principia.

[89] Auctoritatibus autem canonicae Scripturae utitur proprie ex necessitate argumentando.

[00] Deus omnibus providet secundum quod competit eorum naturae.

[91] auctor sacrae Scripturae est Deus, in cujus potestate est ut non solum voces ad significandum accommodet . . . sed etiam res ipsas.

Thomas's theological epistemology presented here in fact expresses the dynamics of *sacra doctrina:* how in actual exercise the *revelabilia* constitute its distinctive act. The *revelabilia* specify and justify a distinct branch of human learning because they are first and continuously before the mind as the *credibilia.* Thus art. 2 emerges as the link between the simple assertion in art. 1 that *sacra doctrina* has its right to exist because it is a teaching in keeping with divine revelation, and the expansion on that point in art. 3. The transition consists in these words of art. 2:

> *sacra doctrina* believes the principles revealed to it by God.[92]

These principles, capsulized in the articles of faith, have their own distinctive inner truth and intrinsic evidence as they are known *lumine superioris scientiae, quae scilicet est scientia Dei et beatorum.* Belief in these principles is assent to their own inner truth; [93] that assent has a necessary and pervasive influence on *sacra doctrina* in its actual exercise. Belief is other than the theological act, which is a learning *per studium acquisita;* but the belief suffuses the theological process. Because the *revelabilia* stand before the mind first and continuously as the *credibilia,* they share in an all-encompassing quality: *sub communi ratione credibilis. Et sic sunt visa ab eo qui credit* (2a2ae.l, 4 ad 2). This is the non-empirical evidence of the *revelabilia;* because of belief *sacra doctrina* faces them as true, as attested by God to bear their proper intelligibility and truth in the divine mind. The ontological and salvific standing of the objects in God's own knowledge engages the vital process of *sacra doctrina* as an intellectual discipline.

The proper, divine truth of the *revelabilia* is the decisive criterion. From it the *via negativa* of theology is preset. Accepted as divinely true, the *revelabilia* stand as conceptual media that cannot express the inner, divine intelligibility of these truths. *Sacra doctrina* must, then, be consciously self-limiting. The *via negativa* receives acknowledgement in art. *5* ad 1 and ad 2, in art. 8 ad 2, with the classification of the kinds and degrees of needed support theology derives from its various resources. A general description of limitation is given in 2a2ae. 2, 10 ad 2:

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[92] doctrina sacra credit principia sibi revelata a Deo.

[93] eaeae. 1, l; e & ad e; see ST EngLat, vol. 81, T. C. O'Brien, ed., *Faith,* pp. ern-e15.

> Arguments brought forth in support of the teaching of faith are not demonstrations capable of leading the mind to clear understanding. The teaching of faith does not cease to be of things unseen. What these arguments do is remove deterrents to faith, namely by showing that what is proposed for belief is not an impossibility [94]

Yet these same words also suggest another common quality of the *revelabilia,* believed as true. The *non esse impossibile* alludes to the law of being and of intelligibility, the principle of non-contradiction. No " exterior " law of being or of thought rules God; rather God, to Whom faith assents as the First Truth, by being is the law for all being and by being the truth the measure of all intelligibility. As true and thus as possessing that common quality implied in the *non esse impossibile,* the *revelabilia* that are in themselves the *divinitus intelligibilia* are to a degree *humanitus intelligibilia.*[95] The positive efforts of *sacra doctrina* to perceive *quomodo sit verum quad dicitur* [95] are not irrelevant to divine truth. The proper intelligibility in the divine mind includes and ratifies the common human intelligibility of every truth *sacra doctrina* considers. Confidence in that St. Thomas expresses *per oppositum* in the following:

> Because faith rests upon infallible truth and it is impossible to give a valid proof of what is contrary to truth, it is clear that alleged

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•• Rationes quae inducuntur ad auctoritatem fidei non sunt demonstrationes quae in visionem intelligibilem intellectum humanum reducere possunt. Et ideo non desinunt esse non apparentia. Sed removent impedimenta fidei, ostendendo non esse impossibile quod in fide proponitur.

•• . . . Deus interius inspirando non exhibet essentiam suam ad videndum, sed aliquod suae essentiae signum, quod est aliqua spiritualis similitudo suae sapientiae *(De veritate* XVIII, 3).

•• *Quodl.* IV, 18.

proofs advanced against the faith are not demonstrations at all but refutable arguments.[97]

The *revelaiilia* accepted as truths are communicated in Sacred Scripture. Thus the divine intelligibility of God himself, of man, and of the world is communicated in human concepts and language. These are invested with meanings intended to teach what is known to God alone about Himself and His ways with men. The final two articles of Question One are not only integral to the whole; they indicate how its *auctoritas,* accepted as medium of revelation, supports *sacra doctrina* as a search for intelligibility. Highlighted by their frequently metaphorical quality, the humanness of the scriptural words is a sign. In them God has communicated what is known only to Himself of Himself; in accepting the *revelabilia* so embodied as true, *sacra doctrina* has the assurance that whatever meaning and intelligibility it can discern in them are truly divinely intended.[98] It deals with the *scriptura sacra hujus doctrinae* not as myth, but as truth:

> Poetry uses metaphors for the sake of imagery, in which we naturally delight. . . . But *sacra doctrina* uses them because of a human need they serve.... [99]

The primacy of the literal sense of Scripture, even if it be a *sensus plenior* (art. 10, ad 1, ad 9l, ad 3), confirms the continuity of the human with the divine truth values. *Sacra doctrina* can be sure that it remains a teaching in conformity with divine revelation, in continuity, therefore, with the divine *mind-quaedam impressio scientiae divinae-in* being true to itself.

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[97] Cum enim fides infallibili veritati innititur, impossibile autem sit de vero demonstrari contrarium, manifestum est probationes quae contra fidem inducuntur non esse demonstrationes, sed solubilia argumenta (art. 8) .

•• "... While recognizing its limitations-for by reasoning out our experience of the world God is signified not realized, inferred as a conclusion, not directly appr.ehended, known in his effects, not in himself, and by faith, though he speaks to us in person, he is strained to in darkness and clutched at through sacramental images-St. Thomas is by no means content to treat the words of theology merely as gestures towards the unknown, which may relieve our feelings yet without having any objective bearing on the truth living there. He thinks that half a loaf is better than no bread at all. . . ." (ST EngLat. vol. 3, Herbert McCabe, ed., *Knowing and Naming God,* Introduction, T. Gilby, pp. xxix-xxxx).

•• Poetica utitur metaphoris propter repraesentationem, repraesentatio enim naturaliter homini delectabilis est . . . Sed sacra doctrina utitur metaphoris propter necessitatem et utilitatem . . . (art. 9 ad I).

Over and above the philosophical disciplines, there is a teaching and learning following on and in keeping with divine revelation. The *secundum divinam revelationem* gives it its right to exist, its charter, and its nobility among all human disciplines. For anyone who fulfils the office of *catholicae veritatis doctor* the vindication in Question One of the *Summa* of the rights and dignity of *sacra doctrina,* however, suggest that a Christian theology begins with the conviction that it is dealing with God's own truth; for St. Thomas, it must not be unworthy of its origin and of its identity as *doctrina secundum revelationem divinam.*

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TWO THEOLOGIANS OF THE CROSS: KARL BARTH AND JURGEN MOLTMANN

GOD WITHOUT WRATH brought men without sin into a kingdom without judgment through the ministrations of a Christ without a cross."[1] H. Richard Niebuhr's aphoristic judgment on liberal theology has become classical, and even those who would still recognize the goal of the nineteenth century experiment as their own can agree that Niebuhr exposed a fatal weakness. Because they failed to appreciate the positive function of symbol and myth, theologians from Schleiermacher through Harnack tended to lose the transformative power exercised by many central motifs of the traditional Christian imagination.

There followed the neo-orthodox reaction, initially with the modesty of a " marginal note " or " pinch of spice,"[2] eventually monumental in scope and significance. Amidst the apocalyptic cultural upheaval wrought by World War I, men like Barth, Brunner, that "dreadnought" Gogarten,[3] and the rest rediscovered the illuminative force of precisely those symbols which had embarrassed liberalism. Barth and his confreres styled themselves theologians "between the times"; today, while their self-nomer may have proved correct in an ironic sense, their work of retrieval remains a permanent contribution.

The present article rests on two assumptions. I share Bernard Lonergan's understanding of theology as the enterprise which seeks to mediate the Christian religion and contemporary culture,[4] and I would accept also David Tracy's insistence that such mediation involve a stringently critical correlation of its two poles.[5] I am furthermore convinced that the symbol of the cross of Christ not only stands at the heart of the Christian religion but also possesses a unique illuminative and transformative potentiality, one which renders it relevant and perhaps in some sense necessary to the common human task of achieving, or better, opening to authentic self-transcendence.

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[1] H. Richard Niebuhr, *The Kingdom of God in America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1959), 193.

[2] So Barth characterized his own theology in *The Word of God and The Word of Man* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), 98.

[3] This is Barth's appellation, cited by Heinz Zahrnt in *The Question of God* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1967), 45.

Hence it would seem worthwhile to pursue an investigation which will follow the neo-orthodox retrieval of that central symbol through more recent attempts at its mediation. For the present I have chosen to focus on two theologians, Karl Barth and Jurgen Moltmann. The reasons for that selection are, perhaps, obvious. Barth's influence simply pervades twentieth century Western Christianity. His works still occupy a privileged place in many Protestant seminary curricula, and in Roman Catholic circles, I would submit, his spirit perdures especially in the prolific contributions of Hans Kung.[6] By the end of World War II it seemed to many that Barth had said all there was to say in systematic theology, and among those who held this opinion was Jurgen Moltmann.[7] Moltmann's own widely read works now attest, however, that he has reconsidered.

The present study will proceed by seeking to extricate Barth's theology of the cross from his *Church Dogmatics*[8] in order to compare and contrast it with Moltmann's *Crucified God*.[9] The

[4] B. Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), ix.

[5] D. Tracy, *Blessed Rage for Order* (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), 45-46.

[6] Emilien Lamirande offers a general survey of "The Impact of Karl Barth on the Catholic Church in the last half century" in *Footnotes to a Theology: The Karl Barth Colloquium of 1972*, edited by Martin Rumscheidt (*SR* Supplements, 1974), 112-141.

[7] J. Moltmann, "Politics and the Practice of Hope," *The Christian Century* 87 (1970), 289. M. Douglas Meeks offers a thorough study of Moltmann's background and development in *Origins of the Theology of Hope* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974).

[8] Henceforth CD. All references will be to the English translation published 1936-1969 by T. and T. Clark, Edinburgh.

[9] Henceforth CG. All references will be to the English translation by R. A. Wilson and John Bowden (New York: Harper and Row, 1974).

major interest will lie beyond the contents of these theologies in the theological performance which the content represents, that is, in the theologies precisely as mediations of the symbol of the cross. Such an interest can be termed dialectical;[10] it will focus on the relation between concept and performance in each theology and, should a discrepancy arise, seek to determine why. To anticipate, the study will conclude first that, while Barth and Moltmann differ significantly in the content of their respective theologies of the cross, those differences can be understood to stand in a relation of developmental continuity. Second, notwithstanding their concrete differences, both share a common horizon defined negatively by what I shall term a mystification of religious experience.

Karl Barth

Barth's major treatment of the cross finds its natural place in the fourth volume of the *Church Dogmatics*, in which he constructs a doctrine of the atonement. He elaborates the volume on a christological foundation which yields a tripartite division.[11] A first line of reflection, beginning from the divinity of Christ, considers the humiliation of the Son of God who became man, revealed and bore the divine judgment on sin, and in thus justifying man grounded his faith. If this exercise of Christ's priestly office corresponds to a past dimension of Christian existence, reflection on the exaltation of the Son of Man manifested in the resurrection uncovers his present kingly office, exercised as he directs the sanctified community into the freedom of a life of love. Finally, the self-witness of the God-Man who now sends his Spirit includes a prophetic moment of promise which calls the community to a life of witness established in hope.

This fourth volume presents a thoroughly soteriological christology, striking in its architectonic symmetry.[12] An underlying triad, divinity-humanity-unity, generates a whole further series: priest-king-prophet, justifica tion-sancti:fication-promise, past-present-future, faith-charity-hope, etc. Barth claims originality when he aligns the doctrine of the two natures of Christ with that of the two states, correlating Christ's divinity with his humiliation, his humanity with his exaltation.is Again, Barth seeks to recapture the eschatological dimension of Christian existence when, to Luther's doctrine on justification and Calvin's on sanctification, he adds a treatise on promise and hope.[14] Finally, he would correct an individualizing tendency among the Reformers by emphasizing the ecclesiological dimension of his soteriology.is

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[10] See Lonergan, *op. cit.*,

[11] Barth provides an overview of his doctrine of atonement and its structure m CD IV/1, 79-154.

It is in the first of the three sections of the volume that Barth focuses most directly on the *cross.* Already, when dealing in his second volume with mercy and righteousness as divine attributes is and with the divine command as judgment,1[7] he has offered sketches of the later development which are more substantial than anticipatory.

Barth establishes his starting point by placing the cross within the context of Jesus' life, a life dominated from the outset by the note of suffering.is Through such a life, and especially in its culmination, Christ relieves us of the burden of attempting to measure, accuse, or judge ourselves.i[9] In suffering and bearing the cross he presents the definitive divine proof that human existence is sinful and subject to divine wrath. In this manner Christ judges man. All men are sinners, objects of a divine wrath which kills, destroys, and annihilates. By condescending to become man, Christ *exposes* the human condition under God's judgment.

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[12] D. Otto Weber yields to the temptation to construct a chart in *Karl Earths Kirchliche Dogmatik* (Neukirchener Verlag des Erziehungsvereins GMBH, 1967), 197.

1· CD IV/1, rn3-Hl6.

"Ibid., 144.

[15] *Ibid.,* 149-150.

[16] CD II/I, 368-406.

[17] CD II/2, 733-781.

[18] CD IV/I, *163-165.*

1· *Ibid.,* 217-222.

Furthermore, in Christ the encounter between the divine and such humanity takes place in an event in which the divine judgment is executed.[20] As Head and Representative of the race Christ becomes " the one great sinner "[21] in whom God finds nothing pleasing to love;[22] instead, he unleashes his wrath to strike and smite. The righteousness of God is revealed when he condemns and punishes Christ, as the judge becomes the judged.[23] This could only happen, however, because Christ remained Son of God and hence himself God even while becoming man.[24] Any other would have been annihilated, but in Christ's endurance of divine wrath the divine omnipotence is known.

Matters might have remained there. In the cross of Christ God's wrath satisfied itself.[25] By condemning and punishing sinful man God fulfilled his divine justice precisely in its character as *iustitia distributiva.*[26] In the cross of Christ, God executed his judgment on mankind. But matters did not, of course, stop there. Jesus died in horror. To his anguished prayer in the garden of Gethsemane, God responded only with Satan's ultimate act of power, exercised through Judas, the Jews and Pilate.[27] But if Jesus died in horror at this concealment of God's lordship, he also died obedient.[28] Alone among men he made no effort to evade the human condition of sin and guilt, to deny the justice of God's judgment. And God rewarded Jesus' obedience by raising him from the dead.

Only with the new event of resurrection[29] does the full meaning of the cross emerge. God's righteous act of condemnation and punishment is simultaneously and as such the definitive act of divine mercy.[30] By the resurrection God fulfills his eternal covenant of love with man.[31] He, not sin, has the final word, and thus he justifies himself. Again, he justifies Christ his Son who assumed the sin and guilt of the human race. As a sovereign judge God determined that the price of sin would indeed be paid, but by himself in the person of Christ rather than by man. All men, as guilty sinners, have been wiped out on the cross. The old aeon has passed, and the new age of grace has commenced.[32]

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[20] CD II/2, 743-750.

[21] CD IV/I, 259.

[22] CD II/2, 748.

[23] CD IV/1, 213, 223-224.

[24] CD II/I, 400.

[25] *Ibid.,* 465; IV/I,

[26] CD II/I, 391.

[27] CD IV/1,

[28] *Ibid.,* 163, 191-199.

[29] *Ibid.,* 296 ff.

[30] *Ibid.,* 309.

[31] CD II/2, 735.

So brief a sketch fails probably even to suggest the expansive subtlety of Barth's theology of the cross. One cannot but admire the marvelous texture of this thought which recapitulates a wealth of Christian tradition moving out from both testaments of scripture through the Fathers, Anselm especially among the medievals, and the Reformers. Perhaps at least the major thrust of that movement stands out. Barth's theology of the cross consists fundamentally in a doctrine of justification within which the concept of substitution plays an absolutely central role.[33] Christ replaces mankind on the cross. With this much ascertained, one can and must interrogate Barth's theology critically.

To begin at the heart of the matter, this theology of the cross centers on the idea of penal substitution. Barth inherits the idea from Luther and Calvin, and it found expression before them in the medieval and patristic eras. The concept has evoked an almost equally venerable objection to which Peter Abailard gave classical form in his response to Anselm of Canterbury.34 Abailard found Anselm's innovative doctrine of satisfaction repugnant to a Christian religious sensibility because it presented God as a vicious tyrant who took pleasure in the suffering of his innocent Son. Abailard really did misread Anselm, but Barth seems eager to forestall a similar criticism of his own work. He writes:

> Thus we do not have here-as in the travesty in which this supreme insight and truth of the Christian faith is so often distorted-a raging indignation of God, which is ridiculous or irritating in its

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[32] CD IV/I, 96, srn.

[38] *Ibid.,* 272.

'''*In Rom.* S.19-26. Eugene Fairweather provides an English text in *A Scholastic Miscellany: Anselm to Ockham, Library of Chrfatian Classics,* vol. IX (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1957), 282-288.

senselessness, against an innocent man whose patient suffering changes the temper of God, inducing in him an indulgent sparing of all other men, so that all other men can rather shamefacedly take refuge behind his suffering, happily saved but quite unchanged in themselves.[85]

Barth draws a broad line of defense, and two counts in this complex self-justification can be granted quickly. First, his doctrine in no way implies that the cross brings about some whimsical change " in the temper of God " ; for Barth the cross is above all the act of God himself by which he fulfills his eternal covenant. Second, Barth's doctrine has nothing to do with men " happily saved but quite unchanged in themselves." He scorns such a view as "nominalistic," [36] and his own interpretation insists on the intrinsic objectivity of man's redeemed state.

A third count does invite scrutiny. How does Barth avoid presenting " a raging indignation of God . . . against an innocent man " ? His answer lies precisely in the manner in which he conceives of substitution. When Christ became man, he did not assume an abstract human nature; he entered into solidarity with all other men in their sinful and guilty concreteness as subject to divine wrath. Hence God smote, not an innocent man on the cross, but one guilty.

At this point there emerges an ambiguity in Barth's discourse. Most often he simply asserts the substitution: " He is the unrighteous amongst those who can be so no longer because he was and is for them." [37] Yet at times Barth offers a qualification:

> And this man was sinful in the sense that he was the Bearer of our sin and took our place before God, and therefore accepted God's sentence and punishment for us. As our Head and Representative, he was sinful, and died for sin.[38]

Still, in the present context of Barth's self-defense, the qualification must not be pressed. If Christ was sinful only as Head

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3. CD II/I,

•• CD IV/1, 91.

"'*Ibid.*,

•• CD *758.*

and Representative, he surely did not suffer only under that rubric. Against the integrity of Christ's suffering, an insistence on the qualification could well lead to a " raging indignation ... against an innocent man."

With or without the qualification, one feature of Barth's theology of the cross stands out quite clearly. It becomes the purpose of the incarnation to provide a victim for the divine wrath. This remains the case even if the victim is himself God, even if the victim is subsequently rewarded, and even if all other men gain justification through his suffering. Barth's insistence on the priority of the divine motive of love[39] does not delete the fact that a central moment in his schema consists in the punishment of a victim by a wrathful God. It is significant that Barth misinterprets biblical sacrificial imagery in precisely this direction.[40] Christ becomes the sacrificial victim onto whom the sin of the world is directed; that sin is destroyed when the holocaust is complete.

Given the centrality of this scheme of penal substitution, the ambiguity in Barth's claim not to present a "raging indignation . . . against an innocent man " reappears. Either Christ is sinful only as Head and Representative, in which case there would be a sense in which God's wrath fell upon an innocent victim, or Christ is simply sinful, in which case the proximate function of the incarnation would be to provide a victim, initially innocent as divine but sinful in becoming man, for the divine wrath. Or one might go a step further: since God is eternally what he does in time,[41] one might affirm that God is himself eternally sinner. The ambiguity in Barth's discourse, it would seem, heads towards incoherence.

In sum, Barth's theology of the cross in its first moment, that of the satisfaction of the divine wrath, can evoke two objections. While Abailard might protest against a vindictive God in the name of Christian religious sentiment, one can also challenge the coherence of Barth's discourse. Yet Barth might well sweep both objections impatiently aside. Regarding the first, his critique of human religiosity is well known. As for the second, he employs ample biblical documentation for the language he presents. Hence, he could reply, the demand for coherence reaches beyond his theology to the very Word of God, so that what is at stake is a matter of faith. To raise the issue of coherence would be to cling to those human norms of reason which belong to the old, unjustified man who perished with Christ on the cross. And to urge either objection would be one more tactic of sinful man in his flight before the scandal of God's judgment. So Barth might reply, with some apparent justification. It is indeed a fact that Scripture presents the image, however shocking, of a wrathful, vengeful God. There is as well a sense in which the criterion of coherence proves inappropriate to biblical language. Hence it becomes important to determine more precisely what Barth is in fact doing when he constructs his theology of the cross.

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[39] CD IV/1, *253* f.

[40] *Ibid.,* 94, 172.

[41] *Ibid.,* 204.

Barth's own account of his procedure deserves first hearing. He claims that his theology takes its starting point from facts,[42] but facts of a special kind. Unlike any others, they admit of no analysis into datum and interpretation.[43] The facts in question are revelatory divine actions or self-attesting events. In coming to know such facts man is absolutely passive; everything in such knowledge is wholly determined from the side of its object, or more accurately subject, the acting and revealing God who communicates not only the knowledge in question but even man's capacity for it. It is such self-attesting events which evoked the witness of the prophets and apostles recorded in Scripture. The same facts can be known by means of that witness only through the action of the Holy Spirit in prayer.[44]

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[42] *Ibid.,* 160, 224, 244, 332, 336.

[43] CD II/2, 776.

[44] "The revelation of this secret is really a matter for the Holy Spirit, and not for our spirit . . . . In actual fact, it can only be achieved in prayer." CD II/2, 751-752.

Theology follows up on such knowledge once the theologian has been converted to the biblical mode of thinking.[45] The Bible offers a paradigm of human thought obedient to its object, and even the biblical conceptual categories share that privileged status. The first function of theology is simply to repeat the facts of revelation in scriptural language.[46] From such repetition it can advance to a further *intellectus fidei,* but always in obedience to its object. Such obedience demands the rejection of any system, for a system would constrain the Word of God to conform to merely human norms.[47] Instead the theologian must strive always to speak concretely, adding his voice in witness to the divine acts of self-revelation. Methodological considerations apart from this concern for concreteness or obedient objectivity are relegated to a position of relative insignificance.

More specifically, the facts from which theology proceeds are those contained in the biblical story of Jesus Christ. Noetically, Barth affirms, this may be a story about Jesus, but it is no religious interpretation of him, certainly no myth. Ontically it is Christ's own story, known only through the self-attestation of the Son of God.[48] This supremely objective history precedes any *fides qua* and, *pace* Schleiermacher, determines the truth of Christian experience.[49]

In prayer and under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, then, one learns that on the cross he himself has been exposed as a sinner, and also that Christ has suffered the divine wrath in his place. One learns further that in the resurrection God has pronounced on him an ultimate verdict of grace. Barth offers his theology of the cross as a" reconstruction" of those events.[50] Taking his cue from the forensic character of the biblical message, he elaborates his doctrine of justification. Yet no concept, not even a biblical one, must be allowed to generate a system; when he is finished, "Barth is quick to point out that besides forensic categories the Bible uses others as well, financial, cultic, and military, and to clear himself of any charge of systematizing he briefly constructs an alternative but equivalent doctrine in sacrificial categories.[51] Finally, he insists that his theology cannot produce the events to which it attests;[52] his aim is modest, to deepen one's understanding and ultimately to point back to the action in which God has made his decision for man.

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[45] CD IV/I,

[46] *Ibid.,* 249-250.

[47] CD II/I, 875.

[48] CD IV/I, 117.

[49] *Ibid.,* 248-249.

[50] CD 11/2, 757.

Thus Barth on Barth, but an alternate account of his performance may be offered. The works of Bernard Lonergan contain hermeneutical resources for a dialectical analysis; in the case of Barth, the analysis will seek to determine the difference, if any, between what he says he is doing when he constructs his theology of the cross and what he in fact does. The analysis will seek further to locate the root cause of such a difference. Along the way it will clarify the sense in which the Barthian response to the two objections proposed above stands and in what sense it ultimately founders.

The analysis can begin by probing the biblical mode of thinking which Barth makes normative and paradigmatic for his theology. He admits the obvious, that this is a human mode of thought.[53] If one takes this admission more seriously than does Barth himself, one might proceed to give more weight to the enterprise of critical historical scholarship than Barth accords it. In the development of their discipline exegetes have forged methodologies-literary and form criticism and the rest-which offer tools for exploring the archeology, as it were, of the biblical texts; with these tools they have uncovered more than a glimpse of the dynamic tradition processes, in its oral and written stages, from which the New Testament emerged.

That tradition process drew its impetus from the existential impact exercised by the words, deeds, and destiny of Jesus of Nazareth; those who participated in the process faced the task of transposing to verbal form, of articulating and communicating, the meaning originally incarnate in Jesus. To this end the imagination provided a major instrument. Hebrew religious culture offered a context in which to tell the story of Jesus and, in the very telling, to make sense of it. The same culture, and soon the Hellenistic world as well, contained a wealth of particular images and symbols through which the meaning of Jesus might be apprehended and evoked.

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[51] CD IV/1, 273-283.

[52] CD Il/2, 776.

[58] For an explicit statement see Barth, *Dogmatics in Outline* (New York: Harper and Row, 1959), 12-13.

So, for example, some scholars have recently emphasized the world of late Judaism with its apocalyptic expectation as the original matrix for Christian thought.[54] If apocalyptic defined the horizon, the whole Hebrew Bible placed a treasure trove of symbolic categories at the service of the Christian kerygma. Exegetes attempt to reconstruct the process by which Jesus became the Son of Man, the prophet who was to come, the Messiah, suffering servant, the Lord.

Critical historical research thus points to a tradition process in which one can discern the dominant role of the imagination. In Lonergan's terms, this biblical mode of thinking corresponds to the operation of symbolic consciousness at a sophisticated level.[55] In the New Testament a complex heritage of religious imagery and symbolism is employed to unpack the meaning carried by the event of Jesus, and in that very use the heritage is reinterpreted. Barth himself highlights a clue to the imaginative character of the process when he accepts the existence of legend and saga, if not myth, as literary forms within the New Testament.[56] One further note may be added: within Lonergan's analysis of cultural advance through stages of meaning, the imaginative operations which formed the New Testament constitute a religious differentiation of consciousness within the world of common sense.[57]

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[64] Notably Ernst Kiisemann. See "The Beginnings of Christian Theology" in *New Testament Questions of Today* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970).

[55] Lonergan, *op. cit.*, 307.

•• CD IV/1, 336.

[67] On stages of meaning, see Lonergan, *op. cit.*, 85-100, 305-318; for his analysis of common sense, see *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1958), 173-iM3.

In sum, the biblical mode of thinking exhibits an imaginative character which suggests an identity with the symbolic mode of religiously differentiated common sense. The latter, then, is what Barth makes normative and paradigmatic for his theology of the cross; perhaps this clarification of his major methodological option can serve to illumine certain features of that theology.

It was suggested above that Barth's notion of penal substitution, when subjected to the glare of discursive reason, heads towards incoherence, but also that Barth might well reject the norm of coherence as inappropriate to Scripture and, by implication, to his own theology. The sense in which such a Barthian disclaimer might be justified can now be determined. Biblical language achieves dramatic impact through its symbolic quality. As symbolic, however, it can follow psychological rather than strictly logical laws, and where discursive reason abhors contradiction, the symbolic imagination can revel in a *coincidentia oppositorum.* For this reason Scripture can draw its hearer into the dynamic tension of God's wrathful mercy and Paul can shock his reader with the spectacle of a Christ who was made sin for us.

The symbolic texture of biblical thought can also throw light on Barth's concern for concreteness in theology. Lonergan offers a very modest definition of symbol as an image which evokes or is evoked by a feeling.[58] Since feeling in turn determines the shape of a person's experience and hence constitutes his fundamental orientation or stance toward reality,[59] it is the affective dimension of symbol which renders it powerful to generate transforming religious experience, a conversion of the felt meaning out of which an individual lives.[60] In this context Barth's concern for concreteness becomes a desire to preserve in his theology something of the dramatic, existential intensity characteristic of primary religious experience in its symbolic mediation. Only in this manner can theology perform efficaciously the practical office of witness which Barth assigns it.

[58] Lonergan, *Method in Theology,* 64-69.

[59] *Idem,* " The Philosophy of Education " (Lectures at Xavier College, Cincinnati, 1959; text from tape recording), fourth lecture.

[60] *Idem, Insight,* 533-534, 561-562, 723-724.

Yet the symbolic mode of religious common sense thought and expression has definite limits. Historically these limits surfaced through the christological and trinitarian controversies of the classical patristic period; in response there began the movement towards a technically precise, metaphysical mode of thought which was to serve as a control of the meaning-dimension of Christian symbol.[61] The same limits surface in Barth's theology as well.

Symbolic consciousness does not know itself as such. While it generates a wealth of insight into the human condition, it still constitutes but a starting point for cultural development, and only in light of further breakthroughs does a reflective grasp of its character become possible.[62] Specifically, it was only after the differentiations of theoretical and historical modes of thought had occurred that symbolic consciousness could be delimited, described, and defined. These further modes of thought, however, lack the concreteness and affective power of symbolic consciousness. And where the latter tends to identify value with the object or situation which evokes the feelings in which value is apprehended, or where it accepts a vivid image as explanatory,[63] these other modes of thought would shatter such imaginative enchantment. And Barth's reaction to them is a resounding *Neinl*

For example, in its unquestionably orthodox understanding of the theological enterprise, Vatican I suggests an analogy with science. Developing the analogy, Lonergan explains the difference between the common sense apprehension of religious meaning and value found in Scripture and a properly theological understanding.[64] The difference lies in a shift of perspective from the *prius quoad nos* to the *prius quoad se.* Thus, for instance, Christian reflection took its starting point from the experience of redemption in Christ Jesus and moved through a *via inventionis* to arrive at some understanding, always imperfect and obscure, of the Triune God. From there it could proceed in the reverse direction through a *via doctrinae* to speak first about God, One and Triune, then creation, and finally redemption. The analogy with science remains, of course, only analogy; while science may arrive at what is first in the *ordo essendi,* theology respects the divine mystery and hence reaches only what is first in the *ordo cognoscendi.*

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[61] *Idem,* "Origins of Christian Realism," in *A Second Collection* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1974), 289-261.

[62] *Idem, Insight, 585.*

[68] *Ibid.,* 588.

[64] *Idem, De constitutione Christi ontologica et psychologica* (Rome: Gregorian University, 1964), 42-49.

Even this orthodox understanding of theology involves a shift; one moves away from the existential viewpoint of immediate religious experience, the viewpoint of common sense, to the detached viewpoint of objective theory. Barth, however, will have none of it. Taking his stand with the biblical mode of thinking, he insists that theology operate always from the viewpoint of the Pauline *pro nobis.*[65] Hence there must be no separation of Christology from soteriology, no reflection on a *Logos asarkos,*[66] and most emphatically no natural theology.[67] All such developments stray too far from God's saving act in Christ; at best they become sterile abstractions, at worst idolatry.

If Barth bans theory in favor of existential immediacy and concreteness, he reacts with equal vigor to short-circuit the function of the historical enterprise within theology. He notes that the problem of the distance between God and man has assumed a new form in the modern era.[68] Previously conceived in spatial terms, since Lessing the problem has taken a temporal twist: How is one to bridge the gap of two millenia separating the Christ event from contemporary man? This is the question which dominated nineteenth century liberal theology, and Barth perceives it still at work among his contemporaries, and especially Rudolf Bultmann.

Barth's own response to the issue is forceful and direct. A Christian, unless he resists the gracious working of the Holy

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[65] CD IV/1, *50,* 278.

[66] *Ibid.,* 52.

[67] CD II/2, 748; IV/I, 45-46.

[68] CD IV/I, 287 ff.

Spirit, encounters his living savior, Christ, the risen one who had been crucified. In fidelity to this encounter a theologian will surrender to biblical control his merely human norms of thought; specifically, the impact of this faith-encounter reduces the fact of historical distance to a mere epiphenomenon. The real problem, the one which bears theological significance, lies deeper. It consists in the existential crisis precipitated by the scandal of redemption in which divine judgment threatens to annihilate man in his sinful pseudo-autonomy. Barth employs this deeper crisis to unmask the real interest of the historical enterprise, which in his estimate becomes an evasive tactic generated by man's need to hide himself, like Adam and Eve, from the approach of God's judgment.

This firm rejection of both historical consciousness and systematic order deserves some respect. Regarding the former, when the nineteenth century plunged theology into the medium of history, a Pandora's box flew open, and while it took courage to pose the valid and inevitable questions which emerged, the material results were often effete. Historically, Barth in fact rescued the Christian heritage from a positivistic rationalism which tended to reduce faith to a mirror of bourgeois society. Much the same can be said for Barth's mistrust of system and theory; few would deny that rationalism, though of another sort, dessicated the earlier orthodoxies whose reign was closed by the nineteenth century adventure. Hence Barth's negative moves find some justification, although the success of his endeavor remains open to further evaluation.

To begin with the last point, Barth explicitly rejects system and theory, but the consistency of his actual practice with this methodological stance seems doubtful on two counts. First, he invokes the Pauline *pro nobis* as the normative perspective for theological reflection. Alongside this, however, he also asserts the existence of an " order of revelation " governing the biblical concepts, an order not expressly stated in Scripture but to be discerned there and then employed by the theologian.[69] These two principles, the *pro nobis* and the order of revelation, would seem to stand in some tension, if not outright conflict.

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[69] CD II/I, 876.

Thus, for example, what is first in the Pauline perspective is clearly the cross and resurrection of Christ, and Barth insists that these constitute the revelatory event *par excellence,* the concrete event from which all theology flows. In that event, however, is revealed the fulfillment of God's eternal covenant, which in turn occupies first place in the order of revelation. Barth's preference lies patently with the latter, and because of the predominance with which he employs it to order his theology, he attracts the charge of so prizing God's eternal decision as to evacuate not only human history but even *Heilsgeschichte* of any real significance. All has been decided in eternity, and events occur simply to make the decision known. In this employment of the order of revelation Barth would seem to be following something very similar to Lonergan's *ordo cognoscendi,* and at the expense of the very concreteness in the name of which he prohibits any departure from the biblical perspective.

Second, and more briefly, Barth prohibits the inflation of any single biblical category into a full-blown system. Yet, his protestations notwithstanding, the nexus of forensic categories which undergirds his central doctrine of penal substitution heads in exactly that direction, and the merely verbal distinctiveness of the cultic alternative which he offers to clear himself of such a charge serves only to underline the coherence of the juridical system he erects.

Barth's exclusion of system founders on these two points. While he declares systematic thought incompatible with the biblical mode and hence illegitimate in theology, he fails to extend this principle beyond the level of formal statement into his own performance. Next, he also seeks to defend the biblical mode of thought against the inroads of historical consciousness, and he builds his defense on an appeal to" facts."[70] To bolster this appeal Barth elaborates a doctrine of revelation in which he absolutizes the passivity of the recipient in order to attribute all activity to the self-revealing God. By this maneuver he intends to secure the objectivity of revelation against the historicist threat to dissolve it into a subjective, merely human dialectic of data and interpretation.

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[70] CD IV/I, 160.

What does this maneuver involve? As phenomenological description Barth's insistence on the passivity of the recipient of revelation would seem correct. Such passivity does characterize the experience of the individual who encounters the transforming power of religious symbol. But Barth moves directly from this description to a supernatural explanation: The power is divine, that of the Holy Spirit actualizing the biblical witness, evoking faith, confronting the individual with the living Word of God. When Barth invokes this supernaturalistic dualism, he ignores the mediating role of religious symbol; one may attribute the experience to the Holy Spirit, but not without noting that the power which overwhelms the individual springs from his own psyche. But because Barth does ignore this infrastructure of revelation, his explanation becomes a mystification. It turns out that the criterion really operative in his appeal to "facts" lies in the felt meaningfulness of religious symbol. Hence it comes to light, with no little irony, that Barth's theology of the cross is a theology of experience no less surely than is Schleiermacher's, but one which does not know itself as such.

Jurgen Moltmann.

The theology of the cross which Moltmann constructs in *The Crucified God* takes the form of "a critical and liberating theory of God and man."[71] As a practical theory Moltmann's theology joins the general movement of contemporary thought away from speculative contemplation,[72] and he gears it specifically to meet the crisis generated at present for the church by the tension between identity and relevance.[73] Yet Moltmann claims to introduce no fundamental novelty; rather, he is taking up contemporary resources in order to complete the intention of Luther's theology. If Luther's rediscovery of Paul and the doctrine of justification issued in reform of the church, Moltmann would extend that dynamic to society at large.H And if Luther grasped the cross as the key to Christian theology,[75] Moltmann would apply that principle to purge theology of all traces of general religious monotheism.[76] Aiming to complete the reform of both Christian praxis and the Christian understanding of God set in motion by Luther, he would at the same time and by this very means sublate the conflict between theism and atheism.[77]

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[71] CG, 25.

[72] *Ibid.,* 238.

[73] Moltmann takes this as the theme for his first chapter, "The Identity and Relevance of Faith," CG, 7-31.

At the outset of his project Moltmann proposes to negotiate the current dilemma between traditional christology and the more recent" Jesuology" by setting historical and eschatological methods in reciprocity.[78] An historical approach uncovers in the life of Jesus three theological dimensions which lead to the cross and there become open questions. Against the legalism of his fellow Jews Jesus preached the coming kingdom of God as an event of grace and justification for the godless. Further, he presented himself as the *kairos* in such a way that his person and word became identical; a decision for him was a decision for the kingdom. And in response to this claim the Jews condemned him as a blasphemer. Next, while Jesus was no Zealot, his preaching did in fact undermine the politico-religious basis of the *Pax Romana;* Pilate made no gross error in crucifying him as a rebel. Finally, Jesus had lived and preached the gracious nearness of God his Father, and this God rejected and abandoned him at the end. Thus Jesus died with a shriek of horror, enduring the torment of hell, godforsaken.

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[74] *Ibid.,* 69.

[75] *Ibid.,* £08.

[76] *Ibid.,* £36.

[77] *Ibid.,* £49-£55.

[78] The paragraphs which follow summarize Moltmann's use of historical method in christology (chapter four), eschatological method (chapter five), and his corresponding development of trinitarian doctrine (chapter six).

If an historical approach leaves open the questions concerning the law, authority, and God which Jesus's cross poses, it also supplies analogues to the eschatological method with which Christian faith moves backwards to illumine Jesus's history and death from his final destiny. That movement begins from a " primal datum," the resurrection. Easter faith was grounded in a " seeing," and from this revelation formula associated with Old Testament theophanies Moltmann derives the .structure of the risen Christ's appearances: they involved a foretaste of the coming glory of the kingdom, together with a recognition of Jesus through the marks of crucifixion. This structure in turn governs the appropriateness of the apocalyptic symbol, resurrection, to the exclusion of notions like revivification or immortality. And since the central theme of apocalyptic lay in the victory of God's righteousness, a re.spouse to the theodicy question posed by world history, the symbol of resurrection remains appropriate and meaningful still.

The Easter experience gives rise to a transformed, specifically Christian sense of time. What for Jewish apocalyptic lay only in the distant and uncertain future has already now occurred for one person, Jesus, and his resurrection constitutes an unambivalent divine promise. This promise, in turn, has an effect in the present; the power of God's future is already at work in history, rendering possible even now reconciliation, grace, and creative love in the midst of an unredeemed world of strife and legalism. And the power of this future extends backward to determine the significance of Jesus's ministry and death. The resurrection negates the negation imposed on Jesus's word and person by the cross; there emerges the character of the cross as the eschatological saving event in which Jesus became the Messiah who died for us. In light of the resurrection Jesus is recognized as the incarnation of the coming God. Under the alienated conditions of this present world, God's kingdom takes the form of the cross.

Moving back from the resurrection to determine the significance of the cross as a divine action, Moltmann inquires what the cross means for God himself. Thus far in Christian thought a theistic concept of God, derived from extra-Christian sources, has blocked the stringent pursuit of this question. Traditional theism originates in man's projection of the religious need bound up with his finitude and mortality, and hence it excludes on the part of its God any capacity to suffer. Because they presupposed such divine *apatheia,* the Fathers of Nicaea found it impossible to ascribe Christ's sufferings to God himself. Luther, however, attempted to establish the cross as the basic principle of theological epistemology, and he advanced the tradition with his realistic interpretation of the *communicatio idiomatum.* Yet in the end he also compromised, failing to break through the theistic confines of the doctrine of Christ's two natures, and he omitted as well to raise the question of the relationship between the dying Son and the other divine persons. Traditional theism, then, has dominated Christian thought, and it has had an effect. At least since the medieval period the doctrine of the Trinity has been reduced to an isolated, irrelevant exercise in speculation so that Schleiermacher, for example, could finally relegate it to an appendix in his *Glaubenslehre.*

Hence Moltmann would open anew the theopaschite question which Nicaea prematurely closed. Starting from Christ's horrified death-cry, he focuses on what happened between the Father and the Son on Calvary. The Pauline witness establishes that the Father sent and delivered up his Son to die :for godless men, and also that the Son entered into this voluntarily, delivering himself up for sinners. The Son then suffers death, a death in which he is rejected, abandoned, and sacrificed by his Father. But, Moltmann insists, the Father suffers as well. He does not suffer in the .same way as Christ, but he suffers in grief at the loss of his Son. And finally, from this union of wills even in their moment of profoundest separation, there comes forth from the suffering of Father and Son the Spirit of their love which justifies the godless. God thus constitutes his existence as love in the event of the cross, and in that event the Trinity is set in motion as an eschatological process of liberation.

Scanned from the dual perspective of Jesus's history and eschatological faith, the cross demands a Trinitarian doctrine as its only adequate explication. This doctrine allows Moltmam1 to sublate the conflict between theism and atheism, positions which he views as dialectically linked. While theism moves from the finite, limited, imperfect cosmos to posit an infinite, omnipotent, perfect deity, atheism finds the same phenomena better explained by blind destiny or annihilating nothingness. Both options are equaly alienating: theism exalts God at man's expense, and in the political sphere it legitimates structures of oppression. Atheism in turn transfers the divine attributes from God to man only to end by deifying the state. One strand of atheism, however, breaks the pattern. Moltmann reads the metaphysical rebellion of Albert Camus and Max Horkheimer's " longing for the totally other " as forms of negative theology generated by an authentic if desperate impulse of love. With this, the only serious kind of atheism, Moltmann finds his own theology in solidarity; they meet in their concern for the eschatologically open questions of suffering and righteousness, and Moltmann would hope to lead such negative theology back to a recognition of the source which sustains its love.

At one point in *The Crucified God* Moltmann recalls Barth's view of Trinitarian doctrine as a closed circle,[79] and the image he hits upon captures much of the difference between the two theologians. Barth operates from behind the clearly defined line with which he marks off the sphere of faith and biblical thinking from the modern, secularized modes of thought which he traces to Descartes.[80] Theologically his division signifies the distance between the respective worlds of grace and sin, and at the entrance to the former he erects the scandal of the cross. Moltmann, on the other hand, takes nothing if not an open approach as he constructs his position in a deliberately dialogic fashion. While Paul and Luther supply his fundamental insights, he finds no difficulty in orchestrating their voices with those of Habermas, Whitehead, and especially Hegel.

[79] CG,

[80] CD IV/I,

Moltmann's open style of theologizing might be expected to lead him into regions anathematized by Barth. Does it really cause a basic rift between the two? One index to the distance between them can be provided by the weight Moltmann assigns to historical inquiry. Barth, it was seen, dismisses the historical problematic as peripheral, a diversionary tactic in face of the threat of divine judgment. Moltmann then would seem to differ *toto caelo* when he proposes to construct his christology by a reciprocal use of historical and eschatological methods. Where for Barth Jesus is known as the Christ through the self-witness of the Word of God, Moltmann would subject that confession to a double verification:[81] its basis in the person and history of Jesus must be ascertained, and its relevance to the contemporary mind must be demonstrated. With this demand to ground the kerygma Moltmann would apparently open the closed circle of Barth's theology to the chaotic influx of historical consciousness. More positively, with this demand he calls for an explicitly historical and hermeneutical turn in theological method.

One may note, however, that Moltmann enters the field only after the" New Questers" have done their work. Where Barth, facing the threat of history as Bultmann posed it, could discern no mediation between the biblical thinking of faith and the unbelief, as he judged it, of secular historical thought, Bultmann's disciples challenged their master and effectively domesticated the issue he raised.[82] Moltmann, then, enters a minefield which has already been swept.

Beyond this general consideration it may prove instructive to observe Moltmann's approach to a particular historical issue. When he follows the direction of the New Quest in setting Jesus' s cross within the context of his life and ministry, Moltmann reaches a single point which bears fundamental significance for his entire project. Jesus died, not only a blasphemer to the Jews and a rebel to Pilate, but rejected and abandoned by the Father. This theological dimension of the cross constitutes for Moltmann both the origin of christology and the key to his own Trinitarian doctrine.

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[81] CG, 84.

[82] After a close scrutiny of the historical arguments adduced for their presentation of Jesus's existential selfhood by the "New Questers," Van A. Harvey concludes that they " tend to corrode the balance of judgment which is the *sine qua non* of critical history . . . by soliciting the heaviest possible assent to a historical judgment which is, in this particular case, most tenuous." *The Historian and the Believer* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1969), 193.

To establish the point he appeals to Mk 15.37, and his argument deserves to be quoted:

> According to Mark 15.37 he died with a loud incoherent cry. Because, as the Christian tradition developed, this terrible cry of the dying Jesus was gradually weakened in the passion narratives and replaced by words of comfort and triumph, *we can probably rely* upon it as a kernel of historical truth. *Jesus clearly died* with every expression of the most profound horror.[83]

Even if one were to grant Moltmann his evidence, he seems to use it as a springboard. To move from the probable historical kernel of a loud, incoherent cry to the final statement in the passage requires quite a leap. On the same page Moltmann accepts Jesus's words in Mk 15.34, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?", as a post-Easter community interpretation, only to launch, two pages later, into " an interpretation of the words of Ps 22.2 *as Jesus spoke them."* Having reproached Bultmann's position on the death of Christ for being " too biographical and psychological," [84] Moltmann himself concludes that

> The rejection expressed in his dying cry, and accurately interpreted by the words of Ps must therefore be understood strictly as something which took place between Jesus and his Father, and in the other direction between his Father and Jesus, the Son-that is, as something which took place between God and God.[85]

In what sense does this constitute an historical argument? Clearly when Moltmann sets historical and eschatological methods in reciprocity, it is the latter which dominates. With history such as this Barth would have little quarrel.[86]

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[83] CG, 146, emphasis added.

[84] *Ibid.,* 148.

[85] *Ibid.,* 151.

Since Moltmann's apparent openness to historical inquiry does not in fact lead him to breach Barth's closed circle, his own criticisms of Barth may prove more useful in bringing the differences between them to light. First, Moltmann warns that Barth risks " a loss of contact with the reality of unredeemed humanity,"[87] and the charge seems accurate. Because of Barth's emphasis on the objectivity of redemption, he at times clearly downplays the significance of both sin and human suffering.[88] Moltmann extends the same charge in more general form against Hegel;[89] the weakness of Hegel's system lies in a tendency to sublimate concrete history into the concept of atonement, and Moltmann echoes those who assign the reason for this weakness to a" lack of eschatology." And since Hegel's theory of revelation as Moltmann himself describes it bears a marked formal similarity to that of Barth, Moltmann's criticism of Hegel reaches Barth as well.

This first line of criticism connects two points: a lack of concern with the concrete human predicament with its key elements of sin and suffering, and an undeveloped eschatology. To avoid these deficiencies in his own work Moltmann orchestrates a variety of resources. He draws on the exegesis of Ernst Kasemann to reconstruct the apocalyptic horizon of primitive Christianity. The critical theory of Horkheimer and Habermas offers an instrument for analyzing concrete human suffering in its full, political dimensions. The more romantic Marxism of Ernst Bloch, with its explicit focus on biblical eschatology, suggests a mediating synthesis of the two interests. By using resources such as these Moltmann travels well beyond the bounds of Barth's theology, and yet the resulting difference may be seen as a matter of development rather than opposition. Barth had already pointed the way toward Moltmann's appropriation of eschatology when he developed his treatise on hope to supplement those of the Reformers on faith and charity. Again, Barth had stressed ecclesiology precisely in order to overcome an individualistic tendency in the theology of the Reformers and this, coupled with his own underscoring of the political dimension of the cross,[90] set the stage for Moltmann's dialogue with Bloch and the Frankfurt school.

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[86] Moltmann reveals an affinity with Barth when on p. 74 he writes: "The modern distinction between fact and interpretation, which we assume in natural science and history, is inappropriate to the understanding of the 'word of the cross'." While the criticism of that distinction which Moltmann borrows from the Frankfurt School is a compelling one, Moltmann's use of the criticism would seem itself ideological. Another clue to the manner in which Moltmann's performance belies the apparent seriousness with which he would regard historical inquiry emerges on p. 136: "The theological conflict between Jesus and the contemporary understanding of the law can explain his rejection as a blasphemer, and in some circumstances his condemnation by the Sanhedrin, *if such a trial is historical.* . (Emphasis added.) Here, it would seem, historical data become relatively dispensable illustrations of theological principle.

[87] CG, 67.

[88] See, for example, CD IV/1, 350, where Christ is the " One who alone is truly rejected and truly suffers." Elsewhere Barth can assert that while men may continue to sin, after the cross that sin no longer counts.

[89] CG, 89-90.

Moltmann offers one other major criticism of Barth: " Remarkably, I .see the critical limitation of Barth in the fact that he still thinks too theologically, and that his approach is not sufficiently trinitarian." The difference between them would lie in the fact that Moltmann succeeds in making

> a trinitarian differentiation over the event of the cross. The Son suffers and dies on the cross. The Father suffers with him, but not in the same way. There is a trinitarian solution to the paradox that God is ' dead ' on the cross and yet not dead, once one abandons the simple concept of God.[91]

While Barth certainly does not achieve Moltmann's "trinitarian solution," his discourse does manifest an affinity with it. Barth can state, for example, that

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[90] CD II/I, 386-387. Passages such as these inspire Friedrich Wilhelm Marquardt's controversial reinterpr.etation of Barth in *Theologie und Sozialismus: Das Beispiel Karl Barths.* Marquardt argues that the primary factors which generated Barth's theology were the bankruptcy of liberalism and Barth's concrete politico-economic involvement with his congregation at Safenwil, while Barth's christological turn would be a subsequent development.

[91] CG,

> ... He took our place because He was God's eternal Son, because it was manifest in Him that God's eternal being is mercy, because there is nothing more real and true behind this substitution, *because this substitution is the very essence of God's own being, of his divinity*.[92]

If Moltman's reform of the Christian understanding of God in light of the event of the cross moves him beyond Barth, that move can likewise be seen as a consistent development of the actualistic strain in Barth's thought.

Hence, although Moltmann engages in criticism of Barth, his own position on each of the points he raises can be read as a continuous development rather than an abrupt break with Barth's theology. Even the phrasing of the second criticism in which Moltmann pinpoints lingering monotheism as Barth's "critical limitation" can suggest that he finds Barth's position otherwise fundamentally sound. This surmise is verified when, in *The Crucified God*, Moltmann falls into line with Barth on a number of substantial issues.

First, Moltmann focuses more intently than Barth on Jesus's abandonment by the Father,[93] but like Barth he sets this aspect of the cross within the general context of a doctrine of justification interpreted through the concept of penal substitution.[94] Next, Moltmann allies himself with Barth's effort to defend the objectivity of the divine act of redemption. He opposes Bultman's move to dissolve the event-character of cross and resurrection through existential interpretation, and he extends the debate into a new generation when he faults the same tendency in the otherwise commendable effort made by Dorothee Soelle to deprivatize the Christian message.[95] Finally, the Barthian notion of" objectivity" animates Moltmann's vigorous critique of natural theology, and while he turns to the Frankfurt School for sophisticated tools of analysis, behind Moltmann's use of them lies a familiar theme. If Christian theology becomes a critical theory of God, " This criticism is directed from the crucified Christ to man in his attempt to know God, and destroys the concern which guides him to knowledge." [96]

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[92] CD II/l, 875.

[93] Thus Moltmann can state that "The transcendence of the crucified Christ is not metaphysical, but the transcendence of concrete rejection." CG, 98.

[94] The affinity is clear when Moltmann writes, "His cross includes rejection by the Father, in which, in the context of his resurrection, election and atonement are revealed." CG, 55. Or again, "... God (himself) suffered in Jesus, God himself died in Jesus for us. God is on the Cross of Jesus 'for us', and through that becomes God and Father of the godless and godforsaken. He took upon himself the unforgivable sin and guilt for which there is no atonement, together with the rejection and anger that cannot be turned away, so that in Christ we might become his righteousness in the world." CG, 19ft.

Thus Moltmann repeats the central motifs of Barth's theology of the cross: penal substitution, the objectivity of the divine act, and the corresponding polemics against both Bultmann and natural theology. Finally, Moltmann grounds the "eschatological method " which dominates his project in an understanding of revelation which bears striking resemblance to that of Barth. In the course of introducing this method Moltmann raises the question of the appropriateness of the symbol of resurrection for expressing the " primal datum " of Christian faith. The starting point for his response lies in the appearances of the risen Lord. How, in turn, does Moltmann establish this starting point? He appeals to the meaning of the biblical " seeing " formula, which indicates that

> The activity lies with the one who appears or who makes someone else appear. The man affected by the experience is passive. He experiences the appearance of God in his knowledge of God. It is the seeing of something which is given to someone to see. It is not therefore the seeing of something which is always there. Nor is it a seeing that can be repeated and can be verified because it can be repeated . . . God is disclosing something which is concealed from the knowledge of the present age of the world. He is revealing something which cannot be known by the mode of knowledge of the present time.[97]

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[95] *Ibid.,* 61-63.

[96] *Ibid.,* 69. To the same effect, "It is the suffering of God in Christ, rejected and killed in the absence of God, which qualifies Christian faith as faith, and as something different from the projection of man's desire." *Ibid.,* 87.

[97] *Ibid.,* 167.

As in Barth's position, man is passive in his knowledge of the event of resurrection. God imparts such knowledge in his self-revealing activity, and any further verification must await the *eschaton.* At most one can probe and test the meaningfulness of this revelation, as Moltmann does in his dialogue with Camus and Horkheimer.[98]

Since Moltmann's basic methodological option thus coincides with Barth's, it comes as no surprise that their theologies of the cross attract similar objections. First, at the heart of his doctrine of penal substitution Moltmann portrays a Father who, though grieving, abandons his dying Son to the torment of hell. If Barth sought to defend himself against Abailard's classical protest, Moltmann faces its sharp renewal in Dorothee Soelle. She excoriates

> Denkschemata, die sadistisches Verhalten für normal halten, und in denen angebetet, verehrt, und geliebt ein Wesen wird, dessen "Radikalität," "volle Absicht," und "höchste Schärfe" eben das Vernichten ist. Die äusserste Konsequenz des theologischen Sadismus ist die Anbetung des Henkers.[99]

Second, Moltmann claims to improve on Barth when he "abandons the simple concept of God," but this leaves his Trinity a conundrum.[100] Without some notion like that of the divine nature or substance, Moltmann's grieving Father and dying Son become figures out of nowhere. He would reserve the term "God" for the drama they enact on the cross and the process which issues from it, but the meaning of the term lapses into vagueness. Moltmann's anti-metaphysical purge of monotheism, if carried out consistently, may heighten the image of divine suffering,[1?] but only by blurring the background of the image into incoherence.

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[98] On the basis of this view of revelation Moltmann argues against Bultmann that "... his death on the cross for us can be understood as a *proof* of his resurrection. To understand the significance of his death is to understand his resurrection." *Ibid.,* 186.

[99] Cited by Hans Georg Koch in "Kreuzestod und Kreuzestheologie," *Hl'!l'der Korrespondenz* 29 (1975), 149.

[100] Walter Kasper notes that Moltmann's failure to integrate an analogical approach to language about the divine into his dialectical standpoint commits him "with iron logic" to the necessity of both evil and redemption. See Kasper, "Revolution im Gottesverstiindnis? ", *Theafogische Quartalschrift 158* (1978), especially 11-14.

Finally, Moltmann grounds his eschatological method with an uncritical appeal to biblical discourse. That discourse clothes the faith-perception of divine causality in concrete images which function appropriately within the biblical mode of symbolic consciousness. But uncritically accepted, such discourse generates a supernaturalistic dualism, and when Moltmann appeals to this as an explanatory principle he, along with Barth, evokes the charge of mystification.

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[1.1] Moltmann's concern here is to overcome the alienating effect which some ascribe to the impassible God of traditional theism. As Francis Fiorenza perceptively notes, however, Moltmann ends up by ontologizing suffering when he elevates it to an inner-trinitarian event, and by this transcendent displacement of the problem of the surd he only aggravates the theodicy problem. See Fiorenza, " Critical Social Theory and Christology," *Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America,* vol. 80 (1975), especially 86-88.

"PERSONA HUMANA"- ON SEXUAL ETIDCS: AN INTERPRETATION

P*ERSONA HUMANA,* the Vatican's Declaration on Sexual Ethics, has come in for less criticism than did *Humanae Vitae,* but there has been a tendency to see in the document a lack of an appropriate pastoral and sympathetic approach to the moral issues raised in it. From one point of view this is hardly a defect: the Declaration is evidently meant to be read within the context of faith-it merely reminds believers of traditional Catholic principles on sexual morality- and it is only to be expected that those who do not share the faith will find its teaching hard to accept. From another point of view, however, there is something to be said for the criticism, since even sincere believers have found the document difficult to accept. One could go further: *Humanae Vitae* was unacceptable to many Catholics, but at least they could *understand* it; *Persona Humana,* however, they find both unacceptable and incomprehensible.

I take it for granted in this paper that *Persona Humana* is essentially a religious document, and my aim is to identify the source of its incomprehensibility *as a relig'iousdocument.* I propose to do this in three steps: first I shall examine the connection between finality and naturalism in the context of moral ohjectivism and subjectivism; secondly I shall look at the implications of finality for human dignity, and the possibilities of the alternative mechanist vision of man; thirdly I shall distinguish three senses of 'finality,' and I shall argue that the Declaration is concerned with the third of these senses.

I

The basic theory of *Persona Humana* is by no means new or peculiar to it: it can also be recognised in *Humanae Vitae* and, in one form or another, in countless Church documents on moral matters. One could therefore be forgiven for assuming that, as usual, the morality of the matters discussed in the Declaration is settled in terms of natural law, as was certainly done, explicitly enough, in previous documents. This would explain why many find the document hard to accept, but not why they find it hard to understand: at least, such an explanation would not make plain why it is less comprehensible than, say, *Humanae Vitae.* Certainly natural law plays a significant part in the argument of *Persona Humana:* it appears frequently, especially at the beginning (*PH* 8, 4, 5).[1] What makes this document hard to understand, however, is that the natural law argument is taken further than in previous moral statements of the Church, and that it assumes a form which may have appealed to its authors as more subtle than a direct appeal to natural law, but which can only be puzzling to many readers. I refer to the document's argument from finality.

In so far as it can be presented without specifically Christian elements, i. e. elements drawn from scripture and tradition, the argument is concerned with what we mean by moral goodness and with how we come to recognise it in actions. It thus bears on the two principal questions of ethics, questions which in the Anglo-American context are often put *verbally,* in the form, ' What is the meaning of " good " ?', and, ' How do we know what things or actions are good?'. Now, without going into the finer distinctions between descriptive, prescriptive and emotive uses of moral words, the answers to these two questions fall into two broad classes: either goodness is something objective and can be known as such, or it has no existence outside the moral agent and can be known only in terms of his subjective processes. It is in the context of this debate that the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith has approached ' various questions concerning sexual ethics ' and its position is quite uncompromising: moral goodness is objective and it is known through the dignity and finality of man and his nature *(PH* 3, *5,* 7,8, 9, 10, 13); it is not subjective, and it cannot be known through the intentions and motives of the agent *(PH* 4, *5,* 7, 9), nor is it merely relative to the agent *(PH* 4, *5,* 13). The decision for objectivity against subjectivity in sexual morality is not argued for-it is assumed as self-evident, both to reason and in revelation *(PH* 3, 4, 10). The intuitions of reason and revelation are seen as working together and as confirming each other: what is objective for one cannot be subjective for the other.

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[1] References in the text are to the paragraphs of *Persona Humana, A. A. S.* LXVIII (1976).

I leave to one side, as beyond the scope of this paper, the assumptions of revelation on the matter; what I do make bold to ask is, whether moral objectivism is intuitively obvious to unaided human reason. The role of intuition in moral matters has been much debated over the centuries, but one objection to it seems to survive all explanations and qualifications of intuitionism: if something is intuitively obvious, why do not all men accept it? Unless one agrees with the early G. E. Moore that inability to accept objective moral norms can be attributed only to some sort of moral blindness parallel to color blindness,[2] intuitionism tends to fall down-there seems to be no special faculty by which one 'sees' moral norms in the same way in which one sees colors and shapes.[3] What then are we to say if some men think that moral norms are subjective? Is it self-evident that they are wrong-that they are 'morally blind?' If so, they are morally blind in distinguished company. For not only the defenders of the various kinds of situation ethics have held this-and they are patently in the Congregation's sights___.butalso the sentimentalists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the emotivists and prescriptivists of the twentieth. And what are we to say if some others think that moral norms are relative? If one accepts Hare's distinction between subjectivism and relativism as between concepts be-longing respectively to ethics and morality, then the subjectivists are joined by those who, like Wittgenstein, do not admit the possibility of propositions of absolute value (and it must be remembered that Wittgenstein, consistently with this view, did not regard ethics as part of philosophy).[5] In this sort of thinking moral norms lack any sort of transcendent and absolute character, and a naturalist subjectivism is reinforced by an epistemological scepticism. The Congregation's backing of moral objectivism involves, I think we must agree, taking on a formidable array of adversaries. One thing which will unite them all, no matter what their other differences are, will be a denial that a cognitivist and/or descriptivist application of moral words is intuitively preferable to their various subjectivist interpretations. They will certainly not agree that moral objectivism is intuitively obvious: they will be inclined to think that this is a point that ought to be proved rather than assumed.

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[2] See my *The Ethics of G. E. Moore: A New Interpretation,* Assen, Van Gorcum, 1976, ch. IV, esp. p. 74.

[3] See my 'Moral Cognitivism: More Unlikely Analogues,' *Ethics* LXXXVI (1976), *252-55.*

The Declaration can be easily understood as equating objectivism with descriptivism and as dismissing the various insights of subjectivism out of hand. I shall argue that the document need not be understood in this way, but one could hardly blame the reader who concluded that this is what it means and therefore rejected it as naive. Moral language, after all, cannot be detached from its subject-matter in a theoretical manner: it does not *describe* things from which the agent contemplatively stands aloof. Rather, moral language and moral acts are intimately united, as warp and weft of the moral life: the agent is *engaged* in his moral discourse, since by it he commits himself to a certain course of action and commends-and sometimes prescribes-that course of action to others. There are thus elements in moral language which can validly be described

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• See his article, 'Ethics,' in J. O. Urmson (ed.), *The Concise Encyclopaedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers,* London, Hutchinson, 1960, pp. 186-44, esp. pp. 140-42; reprinted in R. M. Hare, *Essays on the Moral Concepts,* London, Macmillan, 1972, pp. 39-54, esp. pp. 47-49.

• *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,* 6.4-6.43; 'A Lecture on Ethics,' ed. Rush Rhees, *Philosophical Review* LXXIV (1965), 3-12.

as subjective; they are there because, *pace* Socrates, virtue is *not* knowledge, at least not in its ordinary sense, and man needs more than objective information to make him lead a good life-he needs motivation, and this ultimately can come only from within. To deny, or to seem to deny, the overwhelmingly *personal* importance of subjective elements in moral deciding is to make one's moral opinions, not merely unacceptable, but rather quite incomprehensible.

But the Congregation has by no means confined itself to taking on the subjectivists and relativists: it has not adopted objectivism as such, but only a certain type of objectivism, and therefore it must also oppose many objectivists. The objectivity of moral norms is linked in the Declaration, as I have noted above, with 'finality.' It is on an issue such as this that conflict is possible within objectivism. Where moral objectivism differs from moral subjectivism is in the possibility of disagreement on moral matters: since a subjectivist holds that moral norms are merely expressions of personal likes and dislikes, he must also hold that it is as ridiculous to argue over moral matters as it is to dispute matters of taste; the objectivist, on the other hand, must hold that we argue over right and wrong in fundamenally the same sense in which we argue over any other matter of opinion-that is, he must hold that it is in principle possible to agree on a criterion against which opinions can be measured. In the objectivist view, we can argue (over the facts) because we can agree (on the criterion). But then, of course, the disagreement can be pushed a stage further back. Very often there may be a second-order disagreement lurking behind a first-order one: it is impossible to discuss the facts because there is no agreement on first-order criteria, and this agreement is sought through some prior agreement on second-order criteria. But it is possible that such agreement is lacking, and we are faced with the grim possibility of an infinite regress: indeed, that regress is certain, unless we can at some stage agree. At least the subjectivist can console himself with the thought that he has avoided an infinite regress: for him there can be no moral disagreement at all, let alone about appropriate criteria. But the objectivist is faced with a paradox, viz. that in order to discuss moral matters with an opponent he must agree with him on where to start. And that leads to an odd but understandable opening gambit-if the starting-point could be agreed on through discussion it is arguable that there would be no more (i.e. no first-order) disagreement; that there is first-order disagreement is a sign that second- (and nth-) order disagreement will not be achieved through discussion either; apparently the only way out of the dilemma is, if not to *stipulate* the starting-point, at least to declare it to be *intuitively obvious.* Particularly if one can claim to have the *'maior et sanior pars'* on his side, one is in the (superficially) strong position of being able to say that (a) agreement in moral matters can be achieved only if the right starting-point is selected; (b) since moral truth, like all truth, is one, there can be only one such starting-point; (c) all mankind (or, if you like, 'right reason ') agrees that this particular starting-point is the only right one; (d) this starting-point cannot be demonstrated-indeed it resists demonstration-therefore it is intuitively obvious; (e) *c* and *d* reinforce each other; (f) any other starting-point is counter-intuitive; (g) therefore, for practical purposes, this starting-point, no matter how far back it may be in the theoretical sequence of criteria, can always be validly used as a second-order criterion.

Now the Congregation has declared the finality of human nature to be the intuitively obvious starting-point, and it has employed it in practice as a second-order criterion: it has therefore parted company with many objectivists. But the matter is more complex, for it is precisely at this point that the subjectivist apparently (but not really, as we shall see) parts company with the objectivist. Where then are we to put the official Church position?

The subjectivist and the objectivist seem to differ in this way. The objectivist, since he admits the reality of moral disagreement, generally has to go outside the act or situation being discussed, and determine its value in terms of some intuitively obvious extrinsic criterion. Hence the subjectivist tends to be a deontologist, while the objectivist tends to be a teleologist. (This could be hotly disputed-it certainly has been, in the past. I cannot here defend at length what seems to be an oversimplification, except to remark that a deontologist who claims to be also an objectivist never to seems to satisfy anyone on the point except himself, and that a subjectivist who claims to be a teleologist is soon forced into inconsistency.) The objectivist, in other words, in his search for a universally cogent criterion, is sooner or later forced to ask what the act under discussion is *for*. The inner logic of all this can be illustrated in terms of the search for a criterion which I have outlined above. If two people disagree over the value of a horse, agreement may be very much assisted if someone else points out to them that they are arguing from different criteria: that while one of them looks at horses with farm work in mind, the other can see horses only in a racing context, and that, therefore, their ideal horses are ideal for different purposes. The solution of moral disagreements is not quite so simple, but the objectivist-teleologist tends to make it look rather simple. He will declare, for example, that it is intuitively obvious that good acts give pleasure and and that bad acts cause pain: that this is the case because a man's acts are designed to give pleasure in the same way that a knife is designed to cut.

Now we have the paradox: the ground of disagreement between subjectivist and objectivist has become their common ground. I£ the objectivist concludes to the criterion just mentioned, viz. pleasure, he once again joins up with his subjectivist adversary. What unites them now is called 'naturalism': the .subjectivist measures morality in terms of motives, intentions and feelings in a way that is by no means specifically moral-i. e. it is naturalist-and the objectivist will tend to settle on some criteria! purpose which also is not specifically moral. They have in common what Moore called the 'naturalistic fallacy ',[6] which for practical purposes is much the same as what Hume called the argument from 'is ' to 'ought.' [7] In either case there is an argument from fact to value: an act is declared to be right because it brings about some end which is merely immanently and relatively good, and this goodness of the end is measured, respectively, in terms of subjective facts such as feelings, or in terms of objective facts which seem to be given and in no way relative to the individual moral agent. Yet both approaches imply relativity *to something,* because the criteria employed are not regarded as absolute, but as contained within the general ambit of whatever we can call ' facts ' : a conclusion about what we *ought* to do is drawn from something that *is* the case.

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[6] *Principia Ethica,* Cambridge, University Press, 1908, *passim.*

Now *Persona Humana* defines goodness and its knowability, not in the relativist-subjectivist terms of motives and intentions, but in the objectivist terms of human nature, finality and dignity (and 'vocation,' *PH* 3). The question must now be faced: are these terms meant to be facts or values? If the former, the Declaration seems to argue from an 'is ' to an ' ought ' and to commit the naturalistic fallacy; furthermore, if finality is a fact, the Declaration will run afoul of certain basic convictions of contemporary man. If, on the other hand, these terms are meant to point to values, are they to be taken as self-evident values, or is there some explicit or implicit warrant for their peculiar status? The Declaration does not agree with many objectivists, at least with utilitarians and suchlike; but has it altogether escaped the charge of naturalism? And if it has done so, has this been achieved only at the cost of objectivity?

II

The problem of *Persona Humana* has so far been identified as follows: the Declaration takes for granted that moral norms cannot be interpreted subjectively, and even within objective explanations it rejects all those which do not rely on human nature, dignity and finality. My task now is to outline a further ground of incomprehensibility in the document.

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[7] *A Treatise of Human Nature,* III, i, I.

Undoubtedly what will stick in the throats of many is the whole concept of finality. Some readers will recognise their digestive problem and thus be clearly aware of why they find the Declaration so hard to understand, but most will not identify this concept as the cause of their dissatisfaction. It is of this latter majority that I am writing. To many people, whether reared in the natural law tradition or not, the concept of finality is so obvious that they cannot fathom the difficulties which others experience in accepting it. Certainly the concept is central and obviously so to the authors of the Declaration. There is no problem in that; I am not concerned to explain the document to those who find it already cogent and relevant-rather I am trying to identify the source of difficulty for the many who find it hard to .swallow but cannot say why.

One is inclined to think, once one begins to meet ' finality ' in *Persona Humana,* that the word is operating and will continue to operate in a natural law sense, i. e. in the sense in which ' nature ' is used by Aristotle to denote what a given thing ought to be, in terms of its end or perfection.[8] This is in itself is likely to draw the fire of those who oppose finality, but the matter is compounded in the Declaration by a consistent use of the word, in all the passages cited earlier, of acts, faculties or organs. The finality of an organ may be linked with the finality of a nature, but through a human nature it is connected with a human *person;* the finality of an act, furthermore, does not come into question except in a moral context, and it does not enter that context unless it is the *act of a person.* What seems to be involved, therefore, is the finality of a human person: his acts, his organs, his nature have a finality because *he* has a finality. It is no overstatement to say that many people find this idea highly objectionable.

Suppose for a moment that I play the devil's advocate. One of the most disturbing things about the role of finality in moral theory is the way in which it was developed at the

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[8] *Politics.* I 2, 1252h29f.

Both Plato [9] and Aristotle [10] think of virtue as the skill peculiar to man as man, and that a man is good to the extent that he possesses the appropriate to man as such, just as a general is good to the extent that he possesses the of strategy, and a doctor, to the extent that he is endowed with the of medicine. Virtue, or ' skill,' is thus tied to the concept of' function' (epyov): just as a horse has an appropriate function and is judged to be good or bad in terms of that, and similarly with eyes, ears and knives, so man has a function and is judged good or had according as he fulfills it. To use the language of the schools, man thus has a ' *finis operis,'* pretty much in the same sense as his acts have one-and just as the rightness or wrongness of his acts is calculated in terms of conformity or otherwise between his *fines operantis* and the *fines operis* of the acts concerned, so also he himself will be good according as he develops an which respects his *epyov.* This is confirmed by Aristotle's understanding of ' the good for man ';[11] which is not so much *merited* by virtue as *caused* by it. Consequently, while one may read Aristotle to mean the good for man as a realisation of his nature (by way of passing from nature as to nature as TeA.or;), one may also understand him to mean by that good a mere fulfilment of function. But if a man has a function in that sense he seems to he completely depersonalised and objectised, and it hardly makes .sense to talk of morality to a being whose perfection consists in fulfilling his function in the same sense as a knife does.

To that point I shall return later. In the meantime it is not beside the point to note how easy it is to reduce the very notion of finality to absurdity. Finality implies a being who chooses ends and means: its paradigm is the purposiveness of *human* choosing. Hence, unless the existence of God is admitted or proved already, and unless He is assumed to assign a purpose

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• *Republic* I, S52B-S54C.

[10] *Nicomachaean Ethics* I 7, 1097a15 fl'; II 6, 1106a1S fl'. Cf. W. F. R. Hardie, *Aristotle's Ethical Theory,* Oxford, Clarendon, 1968, pp. 28 fl'.

[11] *Ibid.,* I 2, 1094bl-10, 1098a16f; etc.

to whatever exists in an anthropomorphic fashion, finality outside human choosing can be made to look ridiculous. This ridiculing is done from the point of view of mechanism, the antithesis of finalism; they are two fundamentally different approaches to whatever exists, based, as Leibniz[12] notes, on (respectively) efficient and final causes: it is possible to say, as he reminds us, that we have eyes *and therefore* we see, or that we have eyes *in order to* see. He was able to overcome the dichotomy between the two viewpoints, at least to his own satisfaction, but perhaps what is needed is an explanation that allows men to answer the question' Why?' without imposing a finalist explanation willy-nilly.

What is necessary, in other words, is a critical attitude which is further demanded by the very nature of moral deciding. It would be possible to take a purely mechanist attitude to the world if one's involvement with it were merely theoretical, because then it would not be affected by one's own purposes or *fines operantis;* but once a practical interest develops in the world, the opposition between mechanism and finalism becomes a moral issue. In the first place, mechanism lines up unequivocally with subjectivism and relativism: if moral disagreement is impossible because there is nothing objectively moral to know and hence to argue about, it follows that there are no *fines operis,* no functions to respect, and hence no moral dilemmas about conformity between *f.pya* and human choices-the only purposes are human purposes, or *fines operantis;* which are *put into* the world rather than *found* there. In the second place, any form of objective naturalism will be finalistic and therefore unacceptable on mechanist terms, so that the finality of *Persona Humana* must either be different from that of utilitarianism and other systems, or else it must, like them, escape from the objectivist *cul-de-sac* by a sort of subjectivist detour.

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[12] *Discourse on Metaphysics* XVII, XIX-XXII, esp. XIX; *Monadology,* #78-81; see Yvon Belaval, *Leibniz: Introduction a sa philosophie,* Paris, Vrin, 3rd ed., 1969, pp. 256-62, and C. D. Broad, *Leibniz: An Introduction* (ed. C. Lewy), Cambridge, University Press, 1975, pp. 165-69. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* @ 8, 1050al0 ff.

So many objectivist systems, after all, have evaded mechanist objections only through a denial of their own premises, viz. through a retreat to subjectivism. Utilitarianism, for example, obviously had subjectivist feet of clay despite its objectivist pretensions: pleasure, no matter how you measure it and no matter how you insist on its objectivity-through-universality, is patently a highly subjective thing; when, however, it is erected into an objective *end* of human action it provokes the question, 'Why *should* man act only for pleasure?', and the safest countermeasure is no longer to insist on it as a *finis operis,* but to accept it as a mere *finis operantis.* Yet what is from one point of view a denial of its own premises (as I called it above) is from another aspect the logical conclusion from those very premises: if pleasure is the end of man's actions, and if man has no *finis operis,* then pleasure is merely his *finis operantis.* We have thus left the moral sphere ,altogether.

The arguments we have been examining explain the sea-change from utilitarianism to pragmatism and instrumentalism. Dewey, for example,[18] accepted 'ends-in-view' (subjective) and rejected, as' self-contradictory," ends-in-themselves' (objective) because, while he could *see* that each individual act had a ' final quality ' or immediate purpose for its performance, he could not agree that this quality was the same as some mysterious 'quality of :finality.' Within such thinking, utilitarianism is far too rubsolutist: instrumentalism is its relativist cousin, a sort of moral mechanism which, as in the thinking of James and Whitehead, is strongly influenced by a process philosophy of science, in which each end achieved becomes a means to a further achievable end. But every such end, achieved or achievable, is or was the end *of someone,* and this is a far more palatable idea than that of an 'end-in-itself,' i. e. of an end which is just *there* and not assimilated by any particular human being. That is why Kurt Baier has argued[14]

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[1]· See his *Theory of Valuation* in the *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science,* Chicago, University Press, 1939, II, esp. pp. 40-57 (' The Continuum of Ends-Means').

"The Meaning of Life, Canberra, Commonwealth Printer, 1957, pp. 19 ff.

that it is a serious misconception of science to think that it has deprived the universe and human existence of ' meaning ' and' purpose' (that is, of finality in the objective sense of *finis operis):* by opening up the truth of the world for more and more people, science has, in fact, allowed them to *give* a meaning and purpose (subjective sense, of course: *finis operantis)* to the world and their lives-a thing which they were unable to do as long as they were ignorant of the facts. He sees this as vastly preferable to thinking that there is a meaning in the world already, put there by God and demanding recognition by human agents-a meaning which he outlines through a caricature of the Christian worldview.[15] The only unobjectionable finality, it seems, is of the subjective variety.

The link between this and the scientific spirit is obvious but nonetheless interesting. The question which a mechanist instinctively asks is, 'Why should there be a purpose for everything? Why can't things just exist, without needing to be justified through some mysterious purpose or meaning?' The question that Baier puts concerning man is much stronger: it is not, 'Why does man *need* a purpose? ', but, 'How *can* man have a purpose?', in the sense that being-a-man is *incompatible* with having a *finis operis.* Having a purpose is value-neutral with regard to things: we do not think any less of a dog or a row of trees because it does not have a purpose, nor do we necessarily think more of it because it has one; but to attribute that sort of purpose to a human being is not neutral-it is offensive. We do not ask someone, ' What is your because the question would he an insult, as if we regarded him as some sort of gadget or animal-we would equivalently be asking, 'What are you *for?* '.[16] Baier himself remarks that his analysis follows Kant's end-in-itself formula of the categorical imperative: [17] no human being should be treated purely as a means but also, always, as an end. Quite obviously he is also calling on the basic existentialist insight that man is not like a paper-knife-that he is not an object with an essence from which flows a purpose and which is dictated by the purpose, but a subject with an existence from which flows an essence through his own creative, radical choices.[18] This whole way of thinking is utterly opposed to the functionalist view of man professed by Plato and Aristotle: it might be admitted that a good knife is good for cutting, and so on, but how could one answer the question, 'What is a good man good for?'? So just as the scientific world picture contains no 'purpose' for the world as a whole, it attributes none to man either. It does indeed rob him of any purpose assigned to him by someone other than himself, but only because it sees him as 'a being with no purpose allotted to him by anyone but himself.'[19]

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[15] *Ibid.,* pp. 3 f.

[1·] *Ibid.,* p.

[17] *Grundlegung,* ed., pp. 63-69.

The debate over finality is, as the title of Baier's lecture would suggest, a;bout the 'meaning of life:' finalism is based on the conviction that, unless the meaning can be *found* in man and his world, any meaning which man allots himself may well be an illusion, whereas mechanists maintain that, unless man *puts it into* the world, it is programmed for him and into him and he is thereby depersonalised and objectised. That this is an ethical debate was made clear by Wittgenstein in his 'Lecture on Ethics:' 'Now instead of saying "Ethics is the enquiry into what is good" I could have said Ethics ... is the enquiry into the meaning of life.'[20] Not that he would disagree with Baier: he remarked to Friedrich Waismann that in his opinion ethics was a thrusting against the limits of language, even if the tendency, the thrust, pointed to something.[21] The question itself is therefore, for him, nonsensical, but if, as he there admits, it is significant that man asks the question, we are justified in asking why man asks it and whether he can hope for an answer.

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[18] Thus Sartre, *L'existentialisme est un humanisme.* See the translation by Philip Mairet, *Existentialism and Humanism,* London, Methuen, 1948, pp. 26 ff.

[19] Baier, *loc. cit.*

[20] 'Lecture on Ethics,' cit., p. 5.

[21] *Philosophical Revierw* LXXXIV (1965), 12 f; cf. also his 'Lecture' and the *Tractatus, loc. cit.*

One must begin by noting the ambiguity of the expression, 'the meaning of life.' I have already noted that the meaning may be understood as found in life (objective) or as read into life (subjective). There is, however, a further ambiguity lurking rubout, viz. in the meaning of 'meaning' itself. Modern (especially Anglo-American) philosophers find it hard to refrain from sniggering at 'the meaning of life' because of this ambiguity. The ambiguity is perhaps more obvious in the word 'meaningful.' One has only to think of the contemporary (cynical?) use of such expressions as 'meaningful encounter,' 'meaningful discourse,' etc., to see what I mean. 'Meaningful' is used here in a sense completely different from that in logic, where it can be applied only to sentences and (perhaps) words. Is this ambiguity equivocal or analogical? The modern philosopher is inclined to the former, and the evidence is largely on his side. Hence he is inclined to ask whatever there could be in common between the two questions, 'What is the meaning of this sentence?' and 'What is the meaning of life?'. The transition from the former to the latter would seem to be much the same as that noted by Wittgenstein:[22] '"A new-born child has no teeth."-"A goose has no teeth."-"A rose has no teeth.",' in which a passage is made from sense to nonsense *via* a common grammatical form. In Wittgensteinian language, 'What is the meaning of this sentence?' and 'What is the meaning of life?' might have the same *surface* grammar, but their *depth* grammars are entirely different. We cannot find the meaning of life in the same way in which we find a meaning in a sentence, and therefore any meaning in life must be one that we *put* there. Such a solution is both subjectivist and relativist: as with many psychologists (e.g. Frankl) who treat their clients by encouraging them to find a meaning for their lives, *any* meaning will do.

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[22] *Philosophical Investigations,* tr. G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford, Blackwell, 8r<l ed., 1967, pp. 22lf.

The fundamental problem in understanding *Persona Humana* is thus the finality of man. Yet the Declaration is by no means ruled out of court. The mechanist may try to make finalism look ridiculous; he may make out that mechanism and associated subjectivism are more .sensitive to the dignity of man; but his arguments *ad hominem* and his *reductiones ad absurdum* give him a very hollow victory; for, after all the argument, man still asks about the meaning of life. As Joske points out in a recent study of the matter, [28] it is hard to take seriously, outside philosophy, the comparisons which I outlined above between the meaning of a sentence and the meaning of life, and all the logic-chopping in the world will not stop man from worrying whether life is perhaps meaningless after all. Philosophers have therefore tended to retreat from this position as too extreme: nowadays they are satisfied with saying that if philosophy cannot demonstrate the meaningfulnes of life, neither can it prove that life is insignificant. Even this is unsatisfactory, since people are left with the impression that they have been 'agonising about a conceptual muddle.' [24] Joske therefore maintains that an activity is meaningless if it is either 'worthless' or 'pointless' or' trivial' or 'futile ',[25] where the words concerned are, as Joske himself admits (claiming it as an advantage) and as a subsequent critic, Frank White, points out (as a decided disadvantage), given stipulated meanings rather than their meanings in ordinary discourse.[26] Yet Joske's contribution is valuable at least in this, that he distinguishes between the significance of human life in general and that of a particular human life, for while the latter obviously supports the notion of a meaning put into or read into life the former is basically objective and (just as obviously) the basis of the latter; and he makes it abundantly clear that when the question of the

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[23] W. J. Joske, 'Philosophy and the Meaning of Life,' *Australasian Journal, of Philosophy* Lii (1974), 98-104.

[2] *Ibid.,* p. 96.

[25] *Ibid.,* pp. 97-100.

•• *Ibid.,* p. 97; Frank White, 'The Meaning of Life,' *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* Lill (1975), 148-50.

meaning of life comes up it is about an *objective* worthlessness, pointlessness, triviality or futility. He also points up the link between futility and moral subjectivism: ' The martyr is a martyr not simply for integrity but also for truth. Yet if relativistic subjectivism is true, the self-sacrifice is vain, for truth is not at stake. The martyr for the lost cause becomes, not silly, but pitiful.' [27] It is evident that *Persona Humana* takes the same attitude: the meaning of life is a real problem for people, not a merely verbal dispute, and the Declaration can see a solution of the problem, not in a subjectivist escape, but in an objectivist confrontation. This is to take the heroic alternative, for, as we have seen, the Declaration does not disprove subjectivism but merely rejects it, and then, taking it for granted that the problem of the meaning of life can be answered objectively, must yet answer it in a way that is not offensive to the dignity of the human person. How will it steer between Scylla and Charybdis?

III

The Declaration *seems* to use the word ' finality' offensively, but obviously the offense is not intended. The manner and style of the document are 'off-putting,' but its teaching can nonetheless be expressed in a way that appeals to modern man's sense of his dignity and autonomy. This can be done, I suggest,. by an appeal to the Declaration's *implicit context.*

Let us return to Baier for a moment. His position, as outlined above, is that it is offensive to attribute a purpose to man (and therefore, apparently, to his acts): each individual man is the only possible source of such purpose for himself and his *acts-fines operantis,*. not *fines operis.* This, as I have remarked already, is sheer subjectivism-if life has a meaning, *any* meaning will do for Baier. But, as Joske commented, this subjectivism is linked with a sense of the futility of life: if *any* meaning will do, *no* meaning will do just as well. Maybe man does not have a purpose in the offensive sense condemned by

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[21] Joske, p. 101.

Baier, but, unless this sense of futility is to be inexplicable, his life must have *some* sort of purpose or meaning.

Evidently some distinctions are necessary. Let me illustrate. One can do any number of things with a tennis racquet, but its *purpose* is its *function* within the game of tennis. It is also handy for measuring the height of the net, and the loser might hit the winner over the head with it, but this is not what it is *for.* There is a limit to the number of possible *fines operantis* which can be imposed on it: one could not fly to the moon on a tennis racquet, for example. The purposes of the agent must respect the purposes and possibilities of the instrument: keeping closer to the language of *Persona Humana,* the finality of the agent (which I shall call hereafter F1) must respect the finality of the instrument (or *finis* operiB'-which I shall call F2). It will be objected immediately that this cannot apply to man if he has no *F2,* but we have also seen that it is difficult to think of man as having *only* an F1 or some indefinite number of *Fi's.* The point can be brought out by slightly modifying our example. True, we are not concerned with any F2 which is given to man by something or someone outside him, but evidently his F1 must respect *something:* at the very least there are some things which man *cannot* do, and there seems to be a common conviction that there are many other things which he *ought not* do. Let us leave this 'something' undefined for the moment, and call it *Fa.*

The finality which is considered unworthy of man might be called 'functional finality.' *F2* is unworthy of man because thereby he is reduced to an object; because he is essence before he is existence, like a paper-knife or a racquet; because he is definable in terms of his function; because his morality is heteronomous. F1, on the other hand, is intuitively inadequate to explain moral experience-if all a moral agent had to do was to consent to his own F1, the agony of moral decision would be inexplicable, even if an F1 explanation would guarantee that the agent was subject rather than object, existence rather than essence, indefinable rather than functionally definable, autonomous rather than heteronomous. For, *pace* Sartre, we do not experience ourselves as pure existence or subjectivity, and, *pace* Kant, we do not experience ourselves as purely autonomous and indefinable.

Fa can be neither of these. What it is can be illustrated from the related problem of the Good. Between the Platonic Idea of the Good and the subjectivist 'good for me' is Aristotle's 'good *for man* '.[28] To the Idea of the Good (a pattern or Form) there corresponds *F*2-also an essence, pattern, function, a rational object of the will; to 'the good for me' corresponds *Fi*, something which is good because I will it. The ' good for man ' corresponds to Fa-it is neither voluntarist nor rationalist, but either something of each or entirely unlike either. It is what I propose to call 'transfunctional finality.'

Now if *Fi* and *F2* are the only possible alternatives (and much discussion of finality seems to presume this), then *Fa* will suffer the fate of the excluded middle. But then much the same could be said of Aristotle's 'good for man.' It could be urged that this Good is either objective or subjective; that the conceptual thinking behind it is either realist or nominalist; that, therefore, the ' good for man ' is either a;bsolute Good or the relative good for each man. Similarly, *Fa* would be either F1 or F2: there would be no alternatives to *finis operantis* and *operis*, and the moral agent would either give his own meaning to life or else find one there readymade. Since, as we have seen above, Aristotle's use of function-language in talking about the good for man makes the reader suspect that he assimilates that good to the ideal Good of Plato, who uses the same function-language (and who so functionalises man that the individual can be defined in terms of his function within the state), so also one is inclined to think that *Fa* is really only *F2* in disguise.

The possibility of an *Fa* rests on the possibility of a finality which is objective without being functional. This in turn rests on the possibility of man's being indefinable, at least in some sense. Supposing man's end is the vision of God: is this a matter of absolute necessity, as a knife is ordered to cutting (F2), or is it purely contingent, entirely definable through the choice of the individual man (F1)? Evidently it is neither-it is the end of a free human being, and inasmuch as man is free he is indefinable in terms of function: 'the man is free ... who exists for his own sake and not for another's'.[29] The end of a free man is not logically prior to him, as its function is prior to the paper-knife, and therefore he cannot be defined in terms of his own finality. Nor, on the other hand, can his finality be defined in terms of man, for this would reduce him to absolute contingency, and nothing is so contingent that it is not *somehow* necessary.[30] If man is free, he is yet given in some sense, and must therefore choose from certain given possibilities. Now, since neither man nor his finality is causally prior to the other, neither can be defined in terms of the other: [31] rather, they are *interdefinable.* In an important sense therefore, man is indefinable, and this indefinability rests on his freedom. *Fa* is thus not reducible to *F2* since it is finality peculiar to a subject, not an object; nor is it reducible to Fi, since it is objective, not subjective. It is thus objective without being functional: it is the objective finality of a subject. I have therefore called it 'transfunctional finality,' because it is a finality that transcends function, and is thus the finality of something that is an end-in-itself and therefore cannot have a function.

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[28] *Nicomachaean Ethics* I *fl,* 1094b6 and *passim*.. I pointed above (part II) that ' the good for man ' may be understood in Aristotle either as a realisation of human nature or as a ' mere fulfilment of function.' It will be evident that here I am adopting the former interpretation.

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[29] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* A 2, 982b25; Ross translation. Note how St Thomas uses this passage in *Contra Gentiles* II 48: 'Liberum est *quod sui causa est'* (emphasis added).

[30] *S. Th.* I 86 3c: 'nihil enim est adeo contingens quin in se aliquid necessarium habeat.'

[31] Cf. St. Thomas, *In I Eth.* I 9: 'Prima autem non possunt notificari per aliqua priora, sed notificantur per posteriora, sicut causae per proprios effectus.' Cf. also Cahal Daly, *Natural Law Morality Today,* Dublin, Clonmore & Reynolds, 1965, p. 12: '. .. man is defined by his relation to God; which is to say that he cannot be positively and adequately defined at all; but that he shares, in his degree, in the mystery of God.'

Notice that this conclusion will stand, no matter what *Fa* is: finality and human dignity have been shown to be compatible, and we need not look for the meaning of life outside man himself. Nonetheless it is important to man that he know his end, and I have suggested above that his end might be the vision of God. It is interesting that White, in his reply to Joske,[32] finds a parallel between the beatific vision and loving: each activity is ' meaningful ' without having a point, end or purpose beyond itself. He admits[33] that one might object that loving does have a point, but he argues that this involves a confusion between ' internal 'points, or aims *(=fines operis)*, and ' external 'points, or points without qualification (= *finis operantis)* : loving can and does have a variety of aims, but it is quite pointless. Presumably the same would apply to the beatific vision, and, indeed, to life itself. If the meaning of life is an objective orientation to the vision of God, this is not its point or purpose: it is merely interdefinable with the worthwhileness or intrinsic merit of life itself.

When the meaning of life is understood in this way it is plain that, after all, it is not quite so unlike the meaning of a sentence. For a sentence gets its unity from its meaning--or rather its unity *is* its meaning, since without a meaning it is nothing more than an aggregation of completely unconnected elements. Now life also consists of a multiplicity of elements, and man naturally seeks to unify them. Any unity at all will qualify as a meaning, but obviously the meaning will vary according as it is given by the moral subject, or found there by him (and both of these are possible also for a sentence), or, finally, present in it after the manner of an *Fa.* Moreover, as with a sentence, the *meaning* is not the same as the *truth.* It is possible to give a meaning to a sentence, or to find one there, which, however pleasant or comforting it may be, is either false or unverifiable. It is the same with life. Hence when Jacques Leclercq[34] talks of a' *rCduotion Al'unite'* as the object of moral philosophy, he links it with a plan of life related to the meaning of life, but he evidently regards it as logically distinguishable from the ' *reduotion Al'Un* '-a mystical activity by which one arrives at what is, in his eyes, the *true* meaning of life, which one might even describe as its *'sensus plenior,'* and which is accessible only within a religious view of the world. We shall see below that a religious approach is ultimately necessary, but first of all we ought to ask whether life may be unified in a non-mystical way.

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[32] *Cf.* fn. 26, *art. cit.,* p. 149.

[33] *Ibid.*

[34] *Saisir la vie à pleines mains,* Tournai, Casterman, 2nd ed., 1962, pp. 17, 226; cf. *passim.*

A life is typically unified when it is planned. A ' plan of life ' may relate to any of our three senses of ' finality,' but when it is qualified as 'rational' it is restricted in an important way. The application of ' rational ' to ' plan of life ' was made by W. F. R. Hardie in his article, 'The Final Good in Aristotle's Ethics ' :[25] he there distinguishes between a ' dominant' and ' inclusive ' end, and argues that Aristotle held that a rational plan of life involved the recognition of a single dominant end-a point of view with which Hardie strongly disagrees. This terminology, both of 'rational plan of life.' and of' inclusive' and 'dominant' ends, has been taken over by John Rawls.[86] The value of this terminology is open to doubt-it is significant that it is not employed by Hardie in his later work, *Aristotle's Ethical Theory*-but it does open the way to a solution of our problem.

A dominant end is placed 'beyond all actions to give them value-it gives to a person's willing and rational choosing the unity which is lacking *(ex hypothesi)* in the person himself, and thus, according to Rawls, it is the basis of fanaticism. The inclusive end, on the other hand, is merely the ordering of one's activities according to the priorities of a rationally planned life. And St. Thomas, according to Rawls,[87] agreed with Aris-

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••*Philosophy* XL (1965), 277-95; reprinted in J. M. E. Moravcsik, *Aristotle: A Collection of Critical Essays,* London, Macmillan, 1968, pp. 297-322.

[86] *A Theory of Justice,* London, Oxford University Press, 1972, #63-65, 83-84.

[37] *Op. cit.,* p. 554.

totle on the end as dominant, even though (or, perhaps, because) Hardie argues that the pursuit of a dominant end, unlike that of an inclusive end, is necessarily incompatible with altruism:'ls Rawls would be right if there could be no other sense of 'finality' than F1 and *F2,* i.e. if the only possibilities were a rational ordering of life according to subjectively assessed ends within some ' inclusive ' end, or the fatalistic acceptance of some ' dominant' end. But St. Thomas did not regard the choice as so restricted.

An acceptance of *Fa* leads to the conclusion that man is neither *autonomous* (which would follow from an F1 explanation) nor *heteronomous* (from an *F2* explanation), but (to use a word applied by Oskar Kraus to the ethics o:f Franz Brentano a[9]) *orthonomous:* reason, will and natural inclination are united in moving man towards his end and are known as such connaturally, according to the delicately balanced ethical psychology of St. Thomas.[40] The word 'orthonomous' suggests right (op06r;;) reason acting as law *(v6μ,or;;),* and thus a natural law theory, but a natural law understood as directing man towards an *Fa,* not an *F2.* This means, as Joseph de Finance argues,[41] that reason's role is to *constitute* moral value rather than merely to *declare* it; but, once again, this constitution does not take place after the manner of an F1, but entirely in terms of an (or rather, *the)* *Fa.* Man, moral value, and natural law are interdefinable.

It is at this point that one must turn from philosophy to

•• Moravcsik, *art. cit.,* p. 316-20.

[89] Introduction to the third edition of *Vom sittlicher Erkenntnis* (Leipzip, Felix Meiner, 1934) , translated by Roderick M. Chisholm and Elizabeth H. Schneewind, *The Origin of our Kndwledge of Right and Wrong,* London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969, p. 166. Cf. Brentano's own words, *ibid.,* p. 18 (n. 23): 'We call a thing *good* when the lov.e relating to it is correct. In the broadest sense of the term, the good is that which is worthy of love, that which can be loved with a love that is correct' (emphasis in original). Cf. also his letter to Kraus, March 24, 1904, *ibid.,* pp. 111-13.

[40] See *De Veritate* 22 5; *De Malo* 6; *S. Theol.* I-IT 19, 4; 21, l; 71, 6; 90, l; 94, 2; 97, 3.

[•1] *Ethique Generale,* Rome, Presses de l'Universite Gregorienne, 1967, pp. 168-84.

religion. Philosophy may conclude that the end of man is (instead of ' might be ') the vision of God: this is the linchpin of the moral system of St. Thomas, for whom man is ' *imago Dei,' 'quodammodo omnia,' ' capax Dei.'* But his good for man,' unlike that of Aristotle, is *transcendent,* not immanent, and therefore can be certainly known only with the aid of revelation.[42] Further, even if philosophy could discover with certitude that Fa was the vision of God, the problem would remain of how each man was to conform his Fi to Fa- of how he was to go beyond a notional assent to a real assimilation of his own finality, known in all its particularity through some sort of connatural knowledge. This, I suggest, is, like friendship for Aristotle, a grace: hence the psychological device of restoring peace of mind by helping people to discover a meaning for their lives-but *any* meaning will not do, since nothing would make life more meaningless than a delusion about its meaning.[48] If it is grace to discover that life has a meaning, and, more important, what that meaning is, then we have almost certainly left philosophy behind. On such matters we cannot be satisfied with speculation, but in philosophy we can hardly do more, and therefore we turn to religion. Not that there is anything surprising in this. Wittgenstein not only defined ethics in terms of the meaning of life; he also maintained that ethics belonged to ' the mystical,' along with all other things that cannot be put into words, and that, although the problem of life *demands* an answer, no answer could be put into words; even the question itself could not be put into words: ' What we canot speak about we must pass over in silence.[44] The meaning of life is both question and answer, but only for the human subject: philosophy can only falsify the problem by conceptualizing it and by reducing the questioning subject to a questioned object. To such a conceptualized question there can be no answer that will satisfy the person engaged in the problem, and philosophy issues in silence. It is in that silence that religion and revelation have their place.

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[42] I cannot agree with Ralph Mcinerny, 'Naturalism and Thomistic Ethics,' *THOM/ST* XL (1976), 222-42, that St. Thomas is a naturalist in ethics, even to the limited extent allowed by Mcinerny. There is no space to argue the point here.

[43] Cf. White, *art. cit.,* p. 150, who, however, talks about an ' illusion.' I have preferred to follow J. L. Austin's important distinction between 'illusion' and ' delusion ' : see *Sense and Sensibilia,* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1962, pp. 20-25.

[44] *Tractatus* 6.4-7.

It seems to me that, if *Persona Humana* is to make any sense to contemporary man (who, after all, finds it hard to understand natural law theory), then its linking of objectivity and finality with the dignity of human nature and person must be understood within the context which I have outlined in this paper. The problem is that 'finality' is generally understood either functionally or subjectively and that, since the reader will certainly not gain the impression that its sense in the Declaration is subjectivist, he will deduce that it must be understood there functionally. The problem, unfortunately, is serious: *Persona Humana* will be not so much rejected as ignored if it is taken to be concerned with functional finality. The problem canot be overcome through some sort of translation: humanism (with mechanism and subjectivism) and Christianity are philosophically irreducible, and the only sense of ' finality ' for a mechanist is Fi. On the other hand, exponents of the document must make it clear that the finality which is the objective criterion of finality is not *Fz* but *Fa.* Otherwise they will find their listeners and readers affronted by what they will rightly regard as completely unworthy of man. But if ' finality' is explained in the transfunctional sense outlined here, and if its essential openness to a religious explanation of man is emphasized, then it will be more easily seen why the Church takes this uncompromising stand on sexual matters.

We are now in a position to answer the questions put at the end of part I of this paper. Fi and *Fz* are naturalist explanations of morality: the finality that each of them denotes is a fact, not a value. It is because *Fz* is a brute fact,. something which is given and confronts the moral agent whether he likes it or not, that it is such an affront. But the *Fi* to which the subjectivist and mechanist retreat is no better. Just because I put a meaning into life instead of accepting what I find there does not make my meaning a value. It is not less a fact than is functional finality. *Fs,* on the other hand, being both objective and transfunctional, is no more a fact than is the subject of which it is the objective purpose: that .subject is a value, and is ordered towards the subject and ground of all value. It is interesting that *Persona Humana (PH* 9) explicitly denies that facts are a criterion for the moral value of human acts: evidently there is no intention to argue from ' is ' to ' ought,' nor to lapse into a naturalist explanation of morality. Its conclusions about sexual morality are derived from values, not facts, and ultimately from the value of man himself. Nor is this achieved at the expense of objectivity. The value concerned is indeed that of a subject, but it is objective nonetheless.

It might be urged, in the light of all this, that the Church's position on sexual ethics could be better argued in personalist terms. There can he no doubt that such an argument might have a more immediate appeal than what is apparently a dry and depersonalised deduction from natural law. There is, however, a serious difficulty in the way of a personalist and interpersonalist justification of the Church's moral teaching, and that is the problem of showing *why* the human person should be the principal criterion of morality. If the human person is taken as a fact, nothing whatever can be proved: the essential thing is to show that the human person is a value. Now moral value is in a certain sense transcendent, and nothing immanent to humanness will suffice to ground it, or to explain how it is that man is .so attracted and obligated by it. In the long run, it seems to me, one would have to return to some sort of *Fa* in order to show the force of personalist arguments. But one need not, and should not, stop there. If the arguments of the Declaration are presented in a cold academic fashion they will fail to convince; and perhaps the best way in which to present them to people who wish in a spirit of faith to see its relevance to their lives would be to go beyond *Fs* to a valid personalist ethic.

My concluding point is semantic. ' Finalitas ' is an ugly word, at least to my ears, and its abstract form is somewhat inadequate and misleading for the concrete reality it is meant to denote. For these reasons, and for other reasons peculiar to English, the word ought not be rendered by' finality.' The word is too uncommon; and to the extent that it is used at all, its meaning as given in the dictionaries will not easily adapt to such phrases as ' essentially contradicts the finality of the faculty.'[45]

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••Translation of the Society of St Paul, Homebush, N. S. W., 1976, p. 9.

EVIL IN AN EARTHLY PARADISE: IVAN KARAMAZOV'S "DIALECTIC" AGAINST GOD AND ZOSSIMA'S "EUCLIDEAN " RESPONSE

IN BOOK FIVE of *The Brothers Karamazov* Ivan launches an attack against "the idea of God" which (though a great part of its appeal is unmistakably emotional) has often been thought by Dostoevsky's critics to be unanswerable on purely rational grounds.[1] In 1891 Vasily Rozanov called Ivan's" dialectic"" directed against religion" the most powerful that had ever been enunciated and asserted that " one of the most difficult tasks of our philosophical and theological literature in the future " would " undoubtedly " be that of constructing " a refutation of this dialectic." [2] Forty years later E. H. Carr stated categorically that Ivan's indictment of God" is not answered, and could not be answered, on the rational plane,"[3] thereby indicating that he believed Rozanov's anticipation of an eventual refutation of Ivan to have been vain. Since Carr virtually all major Dostoevskyans have repeated either his view that Ivan is unanswered within *The Brothers Karamazov* itself or his view that Ivan is unanswerable in actual fact. Representative of those critics who belong to the first group are Rene FiilOp-Miller, who thought Dostoevsky believed the answer to Ivan to lie "in a truth that speculative logic could never grasp-the proof of God through Christ;"[4] Avrahm Yarmolinsky, who thought the novel as a whole "no more a logical answer than is the section on Zossima;"[5] and Richard Peace, who perceived Zossima's response to Ivan to be based upon" revelation" and "non-Euclidian logic."[6] Among those prominent Dostoevskyans who have insisted that Ivan's position is logically unassailable are Ernest Simmons, who believed that "on a purely rational basis, as Dostoevsky recognized, Ivan's thesis is absolutely unanswerable;"[7] Eliseo Vivas, who was certain that "Dostoevski knew perfectly well that in his own terms Ivan could not be answered;"[8] Edward Wasiolek, who thought Ivan's rebellion "deep and powerful and *unanswerable;"*[9] Konstantin Mochulsky to whom Ivan's argumentation seemed "completely irrefutable;"[10] and Robert

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[1] Ellis Sandoz *(Political Apocalypse: A Study of Dostoevsky's. Grand Inquisitor* [Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1971] p. 109, fn. 17), observes: " The problem of theodicy in Ivan's presentation of it is, in fact, not so 'unassailable' as Dostoevsky believed it to be." Although Professor Sandoz recognizes that Ivan's argument may be logically refuted, he does not identify its vulnerability, and he repeats the widespread and mistaken belief that Dostovsky himself thought Ivan rationally invincible. What Dostoevsky believed to be " unassailable " was not Ivan's attack against God but rather his "thesis" that "the senselessness of the suffering of children " leads logically to the conclusion of " the absurdity of *historical* reality," not the absurdity of "God's world" (my italics; see the letter of 10 May 1879 to N. A. Lyubimov in Jessie Coulson, *Dostoemsky: A Self-Portrait* [London: Oxford Univ. Press, p. The only study I have seen that argues the rationality of a major part of the theocentric position in *The Brothers Karamazov* is the valuable and persuasive essay of Roger L. Cox in *Between Earth and Heaven; Shakespeare, Dostoevsky, and the Meaning of Christian Tragedy* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969). Cox's essay, however, though it provides a much-needed corrective to the usual view of its subject, focuses upon the Grand Inquisitor's indictment of Christ and is not directly concerned 'with " the problem of God."

• Vasily Rozanov, *Dostoevsky and the Legend of the Grand Inquisito'I',* trans, with an afterword by Spencer E. Roberts (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, pp. 107-08, 108-09.

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[3] Edward Hallett Carr, *Dostoevsky (1821-1881): A New Biography* (London: G.eorge Allen and Unwin, 1931), p. 289.

[4] Rene Fii!Op-Miller, *Fyodor Dostoevsky: Insight, Faith and Prophecy,* trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Scribner's, 1950), p. 57.

[5] Avrahm Yarmolinsky, *Dostoevslcy: His Life and Art,* 2nd ed. (London: Arco Publications, 1957), p. 385.

[6] Richard Peace, *Dostoyevsky: An Examination of the Major Novel,a* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1971), pp. 278, 276.

[7] Ernest Simmons, *Dostoevsky: The Making of a Novelist* (London: J. Lehmann, 1950), p. 282.

[8] Eliseo Vivas, "The Two Dimensions of Reality in *The Brothers Karamazov," Sewanee Review, 59* (Winter, 1951), p. 48.

[9] Edward Wasiolek, *The Major Fiction* (Cambridge: M. I. T. Press, 1964)' p. 161.

[10] Konstantin Mochulsky, *Dostoevsky: His Life and Work,* trans. Michael A. Minihan (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1967), p. 615.

Lord, who thought it odd that anyone should even imagine that Ivan could be answered in logical terms. "It was Lossky," Professor Lord writes, "who found it necessary to point out that the answer to Ivan's argument cannot be formulated in terms of 'reasoning theses,' if only because Ivan is the quintessence of rationality, having (to his eventual misfortune) woven his entire existence into a tissue of rational critique." [11]

The basic problem which absorbs Ivan in "Pro and Contra" is the problem of earthly happiness, both individual and collective. Does the Earthly Paradise exist or not? If it exists, what is required to discover it? If it does not exist, is it realistic to suppose that human beings may create it, and, if so, how? In short, is "the right road" to happiness-looked at rationally and realistically-a theocentric or an anthropocentric thoroughfare? Ivan's answers to these questions are that the Earthly Paradise has been so far only a dream, that this dream, however, can eventually be fulfilled, but that its fulfillment can only be the product of man without God. In support of his position Ivan argues, first, that God, if He exists, is an unacceptable ally to man in his search for happiness because He is unjust, second, that the specifically Christian formula for happiness is a cruel hoax because it is radically ill-adapted to the reality of human nature, and, third, that a theocentric formula for happiness is in any case unrealistic because in the end God is only an idea in finite minds.

Since Ivan raises issues in "Pro and Contra" which are manifestly too complex to be explored profitably in a single article, I propose here to focus upon the first of his arguments, namely, that God is unjust. [12] My thesis is that through the character of the Elder Zossima Dostoevsky reminds us of the often forgotten and frequently denied fact that a plausible theodicy may be constructed on purely rational grounds.

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[11] Robert Lord, *Dostoevsky: Essays and Perspectives* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1970), p. XIII.

[12] It might be argued that "the problem of God" is ultimately of little consequence to Ivan since he explicitly states that it is "God's world" that he rejects and not God Himself. Ivan makes it clear, however, that the *fundamental,* object of his indictment is God and that, in implying that one need not condemn God while condemning His creation, he is simply choosing in the first phase of his argument to attack God indirectly. Ivan's twofold object in "Pro and Contra"

In supporting his charge of divine injustice Ivan mentions and rejects four familiar theodicies whose hollowness, he maintains, must be glaringly evident to any reasonable person who is capable of responding compassionately to those pointless sufferings often inflicted upon young children by brutal adults. The first of these theodicies consists in the claim that such sufferings are just retribution for" the sins of the fathers." Ivan finds this line of defense both intellectually absurd and morally repellent. It may seem reasonable, he implies, to regard suffering as just punishment for the grown-ups who have " eaten the apple and know good and evil," but to conceive it as just punishment for their children, who are " so far innocent," it is necessary to adopt reasoning that is " of the other world " and which is " incomprehensible for the heart of man here on earth " (V, 4; .[13] The second theodicy which Ivan rejects is that which is based upon an anticipation of future punishment for the oppressors of innocent children. Punishing oppressors, he says, cannot cancel out the fact that their innocent victims "have already been tortured," and therefore the possible existence of hell is irrelevant to the question of divine justice (V, 4; Thirdly, Ivan rejects the attempt to justify God's ways to man with the argument that suffering is the inevitable result of man's knowledge of good and evil and that such knowledge is well worth its horrible cost because it provides man with the

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is to call attention to the vast amount of innocent suffering on earth and to suggest (through the Grand Inquisitor) a method of eradicating it. But the premise upon which his whole argument is based is that the chief cause of such suffering is the impact upon men's minds of "the idea of God," specifically as it is manifested in Christ. The cause of human happiness demands that the authority of God (along with that of Christ) be displaced by that of "the clever people"-this is Ivan's thesis. The main point to observe in Ivan's characterization of his "rebellion" is not that he rejects the world as it is (Zossima does this too) but that he identifies this world as God's (as Zossima will be seen to refuse to do).

[13] This and all subsequent quotations from *The Brothers Karamazov* are repeated from the Constance Garnett translation (New York: Random House, 1950).

dignity of freedom of choice. Ivan perceives that moral freedom, while it may often seem ennobling to those who possess it, frequently functions only as an instrument of degradation for innocent children. However precious, therefore, is man's knowledge of good and evil, it cannot make injustice seem like justice, and "the whole world of knowledge," Ivan believes, must be rejected if its cost is innocent suffering (V, 4; 287). Finally, the argument that all will be put right" in some remote infinite time and space " Ivan again finds irrelevant to the question of God's guilt or innocence. Although a " future harmony " may indeed suffice to comfort all " hearts," its establishment, he maintains, cannot cancel out the injustice of permitting the innocent to " furnish material to enrich the soil " for that harmony (V, 4; 289, 280-81, 290). In sum, Ivan insists that conventional attempts to make God seem just are utterly lacking in substance. He concludes, therefore, that an honest man who values justice has no choice but to reject God.

There can be little question that if the arguments Ivan dismisses are all that can be offered in defense of God, the rebel is, indeed, unanswerable, as numerous Dostoevskyans have maintained. It is important, therefore, to observe at the outset that Zossima's answer to Ivan's indictment of God at no point relies upon any of those "non-Euclidian" theodicies which Ivan rejects. Zossima, for example, never mentions the argument that innocent children suffer for their fathers' sins, and the unacceptability of this argument must be .supposed to be as clear to him as to Ivan. For one thing, although the Eider's proposed method of eliminating cruelty to children is utterly incompatible with that method proposed by the Grand Inquisitor (Ivan's deputy prosecutor in the Trial of God), his unalterable opposition to such cruelty is plain. " I've seen in the factories," he says, "children of nine years old, frail, rickety, bent and already depraved. The stuffy work.ship, the din of machinery, work all day long, the vile language and the drink, the drink-is that what a little child's heart needs? He needs sunshine, childish play, good examples all about him, and at least a little love. There must be no more of this, monks, or more torturing of children, rise up and preach that, make haste, make haste!" (V, 3; 378). In addition, Zossima explicitly describes children as " sinless like the angels " (V, 3; 383) and thereby implicitly repudiates the notion that there is no " wholly undeserved suffering for there are no wholly innocent people."[14] Thus the implication in this statement that the " torturing of children," as well as of adults, constitutes justifiable punishment or " purification " must be thought to be as "incomprehensible" for Zossima's "heart" as for Ivan's. Moreover from his statement that children are " sinless " it seems fair to deduce that Zossima perceives their pointless sufferings to be unequivocally unjust and all attempts to justify them, therefore, to constitute both moral and intellectual distortion.

Similarly, although Zossima has a good deal to say on the subject of hell, he does not imagine any more than does Ivan that the idea of future retribution can be a basis for a theodicy. Hell exists, Zossima believes, but it is in his view a condition rather than a place, "the suffering of being unable to love." Nor does Zossima perceive this hellish disability to be imposed upon a lost soul by a punishing God. Rather he conceives it to be the inevitable consequence of a soul's having rejected love until in " a real sense " it is impossible to experience.

> For he sees clearly and says to himself," Now I have understanding and though I now thirst to love, there will be nothing great, no sacrifice in my love, for my earthly life is over, and Abraham will not come even with a drop of living water (that is the gift of earthly, active life) to cool the fiery thirst of spiritual love which burns in me now, though I despised it on earth; there is no more life for me and will be no more time! Even though I would gladly give my life for others, it can never be, for that life is passed which can be sacrificed for love, and now there is a gulf fixed between that life and this existence." (VI, 3; 387).

That Zossima does not perceive hell to be a creation of Infinite Being is clearly implied in his notion that its suffering is controllable by-and only by-those who experience it. The righteous in paradise, for example, cannot "in their infinite love" call the lost souls up to Heaven. For by so doing" they would only multiply their torments, for they would arouse in them still more keenly a flaming thirst for responsible, active and grateful love which is now impossible." Still, in the " timidity " of his heart, Zossima imagines " that the very recognition of this impossibility would serve at last to console them. For accepting the love of the righteous together with the impossibility of repaying it, by this submissiveness and the effect of this humility, they will attain at last, as it were, to a certain semblance of that active love which they scorned in life, to something like its outward expression" (V, 3; 388). Having rejected the substance of happiness forever, the lost may still come to rest under its shadow but, as on earth, the choice of happiness or wretchedness is theirs and not God's. There will be some, Zossima imagines, " who remain proud and fierce even in hell, in spite of their certain knowledge and contemplation of the wbsolute truth." Such as they " will burn in the fire of their own wrath for ever," though they need not, for their suffering manifests their own will, not God's. So far from attempting to base a theodicy upon an anticipation of hell, Zossima appears to perceive hell as a condition which God deplores and which finite beings make up for themselves in opposition to His will.

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[14] Perry D. Westbrook, *The Greatness. of Man; An Essay on Dostoevsky and Whitman* (New York: Thomas Yoselofl', 1961), p. 77.

Nor does Zossima attempt to vindicate God by arguing that suffering by broadening awareness contains or produces some compensating value. Commentators have sometimes assumed that Dostoevsky himself perceived some maturing value in sin despite, or even because of, the suffering it produces. Temira Pachmuss, for example, suggests that Alyosha's innocence contains relatively little merit. " In trying to evade temptations and suffering, Alyosha misses the whole purpose of earthly life. . . . Since he has never really experienced these earthly pleasures, nor given them the opportunity of showing him their charms, he cannot be considered to have triumphed over them."[15] But manifestly Alyosha's conception of "the whole purpose of earthly life" is incompatible with that which is suggested by Professor Pachmuss. The "charms" of sin are sheer illusions, and the "ladder" of sin, as Alyosha tells Dmitri, is precisely what a realist will never go near, if he "can help it" (III, 4; 129). Likewise in Zossima's view, sin does nothing but obscure the Eternal Light of "God's truth," and "the whole purpose of earthly life" is to experience the happiness of perceiving, loving, and manifesting that Light.

Whatever truth may be implicit in the flippant observation that Dostoevsky teaches us to "sin our way to Jesus,"[16] it is not supported by the teaching of Zossima. The whole basis of the Eider's emphasis upon the value of experience is simply his awareness that the processes by which happiness is attained-understanding and adjustment-are inevitably dependent upon experience. But since Zossima conceives happiness to be a condition of at-oneness with "God's world"-as the Grand Inquisitor conceives it to be a condition of at-oneness with a particular sort of human world-it seems clear that he does not attach the slightest value to sin. As the Grand Inquisitor deplores the senseless suffering which he alleges to result from attempts to live in "God's world," Zossima deplores the senseless suffering which he alleges to result from attempts to live in all other worlds, and the experience which is valued by each is rigidly limited. We have, as Father Pai:ssy says," the divine promise" that the Eternal Light of God's truth will one day shine throughout the earth and that every being will live, grow, and die in its radiance and within its warmth (II, 5; 69). Our responsibility, in Zossima's view, is not to "sin our way to Jesus" but rather, by reflecting His Eternal Light, to hasten the day when "the divine promise" will be fulfilled.

Finally, Zossima manifests no inclination to try to justify

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[15] Temira Pachmuss, *F. M. Dostoevsky: Dual,ism and Synthesis of the Human Soul* (Carbondale, III.: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1963), p. 162.

[16] Attributed to D. H. Lawrence in C. M. Woodhouse, *Dostoevsky* (London: Arthur Baker, 1951), p. 89, fn. I.

God by arguing that, though He wills or permits injustice now, He will " in some remote infinite time and space " establish "universal harmony." Without doubt Zossima would agree with Ivan that an eschatological defense of God is ultimately inadequate. Unlike Ivan, however, who postulates only a "future harmony," Zossima postulates the idea that universal harmony is a present as well as a future reality and beyond that that God wishes men to experience this harmony in time as well as in eternity. In Zossima's view God "made Himself like unto us from love " to light the way not only to a future happiness but also to that Earthly Paradise which He created for us in the very beginning and from which we have strayed.

Any productive attempt to understand Zossima's theodicy must start with the observations, first, that no explicit statement of it appears in *The Brothers Karamazov* and, second, that the implied statement of it is not to be found in what the Elder says about faith or love but rather in what he says about the nature of reality. The validity of these observations is suggested by Dostoevsky himself in a letter dated 24 August/ 5 September 1879 and addressed to C. P. Pobedonostsev. In this letter Dostoevsky observes, first, that Zossima's " answer " to the prosecution's "theses" is "not in fact direct" or "point by point" but instead appears "only by implication," and, secondly, that the "answer" to Ivan's "atheistical propositions " " is presented as the direct opposite of the view of the world"[17] which Ivan enunciates. In an earlier letter, dated 10 May 1879, Dostoevsky pointedly described that portion of Russian youth represented by Ivan as "divorced from reality."[18] He thereby indicated that in his own judgment Ivan's indictment of God, so far from being unanswerable, seemed contrived or made up rather than grounded in fact. Whether Dostoevsky was right his readers are likely to insist upon determining for themselves, and rightly so. The crucial points to observe, however, are that Dostoevsky tells us plainly that Zossima's theodicy is implicit and that it is implicit, not in his statements about the value of faith or love, but in his world-view, which is "the direct opposite" of Ivan's.

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[17] Jessie Coulson, *Dostoevsky: A Self-Portrait* (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1962), p. 224.

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 219-20.

In opposition to Ivan's postulate that "God's world" is pervaded with injustice, Zossima postulates that its identifying qualities are beauty, goodness, and truth. "Truly," he says, "all things are good and fair, because all is truth" (VI, I; 351). Since the Elder's awareness of evil, nastiness, and deception is at least as profound as Ivan's, it follows that by "all things" he cannot possibly mean everything that exists or occurs. Thus his characterization of "all things" functions primarily to tell us that, in opposition to Ivan, Zossima perceives a sharp distinction between "God's world" and historical reality. In Zossima's view, "God's world" is a" paradise," and all of that injustice to which Ivan calls our attention is the creation not of God but of men.

That these opposing conceptions of the nature of reality imply incompatible conceptions of the nature of God and ultimately of His power and responsibility seems self-evident. If God is the creator and sustainer of a world in which the innocent are brutalized, He is by definition a spirit of injustice and cruelty. If, on the other hand, He is the creator of a" paradise" in which the innocent must be presumed to be mistreated in opposition to His will, He is by definition a spirit of justice and love. It appears that the underlying issue in the argument is the extent of God's power. Ivan assumes the nature of God to be so broad as to possess Him with the attribute of limitless omnipotence. He is capable of lying, as well as of telling the truth, of willing or permitting present injustice, as well as of willing and permitting the eventual establishment of " universal harmony," of destroying His creation, as well as of sustaining it. Ivan, in short, assumes that " there is no law for God " (XI, 9; 789). Zossima, on the other hand, assumes God's nature to impose rigid limits upon His power. God cannot, in Smerdyakov's words, "tell a lie even in one word." He is not capable of willing or permitting His creatures to despoil His creation but only of willing and permitting them to support and bless it. He is not capable of destroying " Himself and His own creation," an eventuality for which Zossima imagines certain proud satanic souls to yearn. Rather-in opposition to " the wise and dread spirit of self-destruction and non-existence "-He is purely " the God of life " (VI, 3; 388). In short, Zossima assumes that there *is* a law for God and that His very nature makes it impossible for Him to disobey it. Ivan's world-view ineluctably produces the conclusion that God is unjust, for it implies that He can eliminate earthly injustice but does not choose to. But equally Zossima's world-view ineluctably produces the conclusion that God is just, for it implies that He wishes to banish injustice from the earth hut is so far unable to.

If "reason alone" is our instrument of judgment Zossima's defense of God appears to be as unassailable as does Ivan's indictment of Him. On the cosmic plane, for example, unjustifiable suffering, so far from manifesting the will of God, manifests the will of a spirit that is directly opposed to God's. To the possible objection that this spirit " that denies " justice operates under the license of the spirit that affirms justice, Zossima's position simply requires a denial of the allegation. The devil is not a part of God's plan, but its antagonist, not in the most infinitesimal degree essential to illuminate the good, but, on the contrary, the extinguisher of its light. With Absolute Goodness the " criticism " and " events " which the devil in Ivan's nightmare alleges to be essential to life (XI, 9; 780) are entirely incompatible. " Men are made for happiness " (II, 4; 61), Zossima believes, and that" hosannah" which the devil alleges God to regard as " not enough for life " (XI, 9; 780) is actually all that God wishes life to evoke from men. In the end, Zossima believes, " man will find his joy only in deeds of light and mercy" (VI, 3; 381), and what Ivan's devil calls "the indispensable minus" (XI, 9; 787) will then be universally understood to be utterly superfluous. The foil of evil, so far from being thought essential to make the good comprehensible, will be seen to have all along obscured the good.

As unjust suffering always manifests the will of Satan it often manifests the will of human beings. To the possible objection that by giving men the freedom to oppose the good God indirectly manifests evil, Zossima's position again requires a simple and unequivocal denial of the premise. "Freedom of choice in the knowledge of good and evil " is emphatically not " a gift of God." The locus of such freedom is finite minds, and its existence is purely subjective. " God's world" is characterized by Moral Law, not Moral Freedom. Hence Moral Freedom can be experienced only by a withdrawal from " God's world." Since" God's world" is the only real world, it follows that Moral Freedom is a phantom freedom, an illusion of a choice which within reality does not exist.

But even if we grant that Moral Freedom is, metaphysically speaking, an illusion, we must still confront the fact that it acounts for an enormous amount of suffering. Is not the God who empowers His creatures to create the illusion of" freedom of conscience " ultimately responsible for their consequent wretchedness even though He does not and cannot create the thing itself? Once more Zossima's position requires a rejection of the implied premise. Something in man's God-given faculties makes possible the creation of this illusion, to be sure. This 'something," however, does not reflect God's will and His power. On the contrary, it reflects a frustration of His will and a limitation upon His power. In short, for evoking and sustaining the illusion of Moral Freedom, men themselves are to blame. The alternative hypothesis is logically tenable only if one postulates with Ivan the existence of a self-divided Deity. That Zossima's God wishes men to *imagine* that they are free to oppose His creation is as unthinkruble as that He actually gives them such freedom.

Finally, to the objection that God might have prevented innocent suffering by the simple expedient of not creating finite beings in His image, Zossima's position once again requires a categorical denial of the charge. To assume that God is free not to create finite beings in His own image is simply to assume that He is free to transcend His nature, which the Elder's position cannot allow. Assuming that God foresaw that His creatures would misuse their God-like power of creativity, His love could not have permitted Him to forestall their consequent suffering by leaving them uncreated, for to adopt that method would require that He be a spirit of " non-existence " instead of, or in addition to, being " the God of life."

Fundamentally the issue which separates Ivan and Zossima is the extent of God's power. If everything that is done on earth is a manifestation of divine will, Ivan's conclusion that God is unjust seems logically irrefutable. If, on the other hand, divine will is sometimes thwarted on earth, logic may easily lead to Zossima's conclusion that God is "inexhaustible love." But whether God's power is absolute, as Ivan contends, or contingent, as Zossima believes, is obviously one of those "problems not of this world" which, as Ivan observes, are beyond the capacity of "Euclidian earthly " minds to resolve with " reason alone." Thus the very most that either antagonist can reasonably anticipate is to become convinced through observation and reflection that one of the two opposed premises concerning the extent of God's power is true and that the other is false. If "reason and experience, which have been passed through the crucible of analysis," convince Zossima that all earthly injustice exists without-in any real sense-either the active or passive concurrence of human beings, he can only perceive his own premise to be "fantastic" and Ivan's to be realistic. By the same token if reason and experience convince Ivan that human beings themselves-in a real sense-will or permit the existence of injustice, he must perceive his own premise to be" divorced from reality" and Zossima's to reflect the truth. Whichever the case, insofar as they are impelled to resolve their problem on the plane of apparent truth, neither may rely upon pure reason. Rather each must utilize reason in combination with reality as he himself experiences it.

That the experience of both Ivan and Zossima suggests the power of God to be contingent rather than absolute seems undeniable. Pure reason, of course, can as readily support the premise that God willed or permitted Smerdyakov to smash the skull of Fyodor Pavlovitch as the premise that Ivan himself willed and permitted it. Experience, however, vividly and unrelentingly suggests to Ivan that his father's murder manifested his own will rather than God's. That Ivan actually possesses or does not possess the power to thwart God's will and that God possesses the power to enforce His will at all times are obviously problems which can never be conclusively resolved on a rational plane. It seems clear, however, that the only rational resolution which may be conceived to make sense to Ivan personally is one which implicates himself and exonerates God.

From Ivan's perspective the premise of God's limitless power must be conceived to be merely a speculative possibility, whereas the premise of man's power to oppose God, in contrast, must be conceived to reflect reality. Ivan insists that he wants to "stick to the fact" (V, 4; Q89). But in clinging to the premise that God is unopposable in the face of his seemingly ineradica;ble awareness of his own power to despoil " God's world" he must reject "the fact" and in its place substitute the "romantic" assumption that reality is exactly the opposite of what he apprehends it to be. The merely speculative possibility may, of course, be correct and the apparent truth may be an illusion. But to take a stand on that ground requires a peculiarly blind and perhaps perverse sort of faith. In the end it appears that it is precisely because Ivan lacks this sort of faith, or lacks enough of it, that his rebellion fails.

If Ivan's indictment of God, though rationally supportable, is detached from reality as the prosecutor himself apprehends it, Zossima's defense of God is readily identifiable as a rationalistic interpretation of evidence which the monk himself has observed at first hand. One morning during his army days Zossima became intensely aware of vividly contrasting phenomena. "The sun was shining, the leaves were rejoicing, and the birds were trilling the praise of God." Everything seemed " warm and beautiful." But simultaneously he experienced within himself " something vile and shameful " (VI, 2; 355) . His observation of this stark contrast between an external joy and an internal wretchedness impelled him to reflect upon the primary cause of happiness and misery. It scarcely seemed possible that he was responsible for all the sweetness around him and that God was responsible for the bitterness in his heart. On the contrary, the probability seemed to be exactly the opposite: The splendor around him was the creation of God and his malaise of spirit was the result of certain irrational and destructive acts of his own.

Having adopted this hypothesis, Zossima arrived at the same twofold conclusion his elder brother had reached years before: Life is in truth "paradise," and for all the apparent vanity, nastiness, and injustice of "God's world," he himself, along with every other man and woman, was personally responsible (VI, 1; 343, 344; VI, 2; 359-60; VI, 3; 384). There seemed to be simply no other plausible explanation for a joy that seemed to exist of itself and for his own apparent power to spoil it both for himself and for others. To imagine that he was not responsible for the despoilment of " God's world" would require him to repudiate the value of observation, and to imagine that he alone was responsible would require him to make the implausible assumption that in this respect he was unique among human beings. As reason in detachment from experience *permitted* Ivan to conclude that " none are guilty " except God, reason and experience together *impelled* Zossima to conclude that all are guilty except God.

While it is clear that Zossima's defense of God reflects both reason and experience, it appears also to reflect his conception of Christ. Alyosha tells us that it is upon Christ that the "edifice" of a theodicy is "built" (V, 4; 292), and Zossima makes it quite clear that he himself perceives Christ to be the supreme earthly witness to God's absolute beauty, goodness, and truth. We have observed the Eider's theodicy to be rooted in the idea that the world is a paradise whose harmony is temporarily obscured only because many of its inhabitants fail to make themselves responsible for the sin that inevitably spoils it. For a time this idea, though rationally and empirically derived, seemed to Zossima to be the end product of a " seed " implanted in his consciousness by his brother Markel. But at some point, concerning which the novel is silent, it occurred to Zossima that the seed of Markel and all such seeds derive ultimately from the supreme example of Christ. Markel's acceptance of his responsibility " to all for all " was, after all, merely verbalized, whereas Christ's was resplendently actualized. Moreover Markel, like any man, could only accept his responsibility for the " sins of all," whereas Christ took the sins themselves upon His innocent self. In the light of such considerations as these, the seed of Markel came to Zossima to seem only one of many relatively pale reflections of the one real seed incomparably manifested in Christ.

In the interest of fair judgment, however, it will be important for some readers to remind themselves that a judgment of Zossima's theodicy is not necessarily related to a judgment of Christ. The Elder's story explicitly identifies the source of his theodicy as his rational and realistic response to a specific experience in which considerations of Christ played no part. To .say, then, that Zossima perceives Christ to be the supreme earthly image both of God's goodness and of His dependence upon man for the actualization of His will is not to say that his theodicy is based upon faith or religious mysticism. It is immediately based upon the " truth " about God which he discovered through reason and experience. That Zossima ends by identifying it with Christ means only that he came at last to perceive in Him the perfect embodiment of that truth.

The central problem to which Dostoevsky seeks a resolution in *The Brothers Karamazov* is the problem of happiness. Fundamentally he perceives this problem to admit of only one of two possible re.solutions: either the Earthly Paradise must be *created* by man alone or it must be *discovered,* or rather *rediscovered,* by man with the help of God. Ivan's initial argument is that man must refuse to rely upon God in his search for happiness because God is a morally unacceptable ally. Ultimately it can be shown, I believe, that this argument is so constructed as to appeal primarily to the " man of feeling " rather than to the man of reason or to the man who insists upon forging a bond between feeling and reason. In addition, I believe it can be shown that it is a relatively minor part of Ivan's position, which is, fundamentally, atheistic rather than anti-theistic or even anti-Christian. Because Dostoevsky's critics, however, have mistakenly insisted that Ivan is invincible in this part of the field, it has seemed worthwhile to address a serious response to what is actually more like an elaborate feint than a genuine attack. Whether " reason alone " supports an anthropocentric or a theocentric resolution of the problem of happiness is a question to which the present analysis is too restricted to suggest an answer. Demonstrably, though, reason cannot be said to support a rejection of the theocentric method on the ground that God is unjust, for it may with equal power support the conclusion that He is just.

Dostoevsky's recorded anxiety that his answer to Ivan might not be understood[19] constitutes a fairly plain warning that this answer is not to be inferred from anything so obvious as Zossima's lyrical utterances on the subjects of faith or love. Nevertheless, when we observe the indirectness with which Zossima responds to Ivan, it is relatively easy to understand why Dostoevsky's critics have failed to perceive the essentially rationalistic nature of the *Karamazov* theodicy. What is difficult to explain is the insistence of numerous Dostoevskyans that a rationalistic answer to Ivan is impossible to construct. Surely few illustrations of the fact that reason is " a knife that cuts both way" (XII, 10; 882)[20] are more widely known than that which appears in the traditional formulation of the problem of suffering: Either God is all-powerful, in which case He is unjust, or He is all-loving, in which case, of course, He is not all-powerful. That the first part of this statement has been remembered and the second part forgotten by scholars to whom both parts might reasonably be expected to be as familiar as their alphabets must constitute one of the most extraordinary displays of selective memory in the history of ideas.

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[19] Expressed in the letter to C. P. Pobedonotsev, dated 24 August/5 September 1879, Coulson, *op. cit.*, p. 224.

[20] Although I believe this phrase may be justly applied to every concept that appears in *The Brothers Karamazov*, I should perhaps observe that the novel itself employs it only with reference to psychology.

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BONAVENTURE AND AQUINAS ON GOD'S EXISTENCE: POINTS OF CONVERGENCE

HE CELEBRATION OF the seventh centenary of oth Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas in 1974 had as ne of its beneficial effects a great renewal of interest in the thought of each. This was manifested first of all by the presence of hundreds of participants from all parts of the world at the two Congresses which took place in Rome, the first at the "Angelicum" in April, and the second at the" Seraficum" in October. These Congresses also had the effect of stimulating an intensive study of the thought of the two great thirteenth century masters by the large number of philosophers and theologians who were present. This careful examination of their thought is certainly well merited, and especially in the case of Bonaventure, long overdue. What I should like to do in this paper is to single out for consideration a question which occupies a pivotal position in the thought of each, i. e. the problem of the demonstration of the existence of God, and to attempt to see the relationship of their respective approaches to this problem. In this way, by taking a question which is of central importance to each, it is to he hoped that our considerations here at the epicenter might more readily illuminate more peripheral issues.

What, then, is the relationship between these two great doctors concerning the existence of God? Is there a fundamental and irreconcilaible difference between them, as some have maintained,[1] or is it, perhaps, that they are in substantial agreement

[1] This would seem to be the position of Jean Chatillon for example in his excellent article, "De Guillaume d'Auxerre a saint Thomas d'Aquin: !'argument de saint Anselm chez les premiers scholastiques du XIIIe siecle," *Spicilegium Beccense,* (Paris: 1959), I, fl09-fl31.

but approach the question from different perspectives,. as others would have it?[2] Or are the approaches of the two 13th century masters so different that they simply cannot be compared, as others have claimed?[3]

We shall attempt to find a solution to these questions and thus to .see the relationship between Bonaventure and Thomas on this question of the demonstration of the existence of God. We shall take the Bonaventurean approach to the proofs for God's existence as our methodological point of departure, and therefore, our procedure will be as follows: one,.we shall present a brief exposition of Bonaventure's position in order to afford us a point of departure and basis for comparison: and secondly, we shall examine in what sense, if any, his position would agree with that of the Angelic Doctor.

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In Bonaventure there are three principal lines of argument which demonstrate the existence of God.[4] The first of these arguments rests upon the fact that the existence of God is a truth which is innate in the rational soul. As the Seraphic Doctor notes in *De Mysterio Trinitatis:*

> Concerning the first way we proceed thus, and it is shown both by authorities as well as by arguments that the existence of God is impressed on all rational minds.[5]

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[2] This would seem to be the position of Anton Pegis in his very fine article, "The Bonaventurean Way to God," *Medieval Studies,* XXIX (1967), See also his study, "Four Medieval Ways to God," *Monist,* LIV (1970), 317-358.

[3] The position taken by Gilson in his classic work on Bonaventure, *La Philosophie de saint Bonaventure* (Paris: Vrin, 1943), p. 118.

[4] The three principal texts in which St. Bonaventure takes up the question of the demonstration of God's existence are the following: *In I Sent.,* d. 8, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2: *De Mysterio Trinitatis,* q. 1, a. 1: *Itinerarium Mentis in Deum,* especially, c. 5.

[5] "Circa igitur primam viam sic proceditur, et ostenditur tam auctoritatibus quam rationibus quod Deum esse sit omnibus mentibus rationalibus impressum." *Questiones Disputatae de Mysterio Trinitatis,* q. 1, a. I (S. *Bonaventurae Opera Omnia,* vol. V) (Quarrachi, 1891), 45. This edition of St. Bonaventure will be used throughout. The translations are my own. The Latin text is given so that comparison may be made with the original.

This knowledge of the existence of God is innate, since the very nature of the rational soul is to be an image of God. Thus Bonaventure goes on to remark, again in the *De Myst. Trin.:*

> The knowledge of this truth, namely that God exists, is inborn *(innata est)* in the rational mind insofar as it has the nature of an image, by reason of which a natural appetite is fixed into the soul, and knowledge and memory of that in whose image it is made, and toward Whom it naturally tends, is also impressed, in order that in Him it might be made blessed.[6]

But although the knowledge of God's existence is innate, this is not at all to say that the proofs by which the existence of God is demonstrated are useless or unnecessary, or that we somehow have a direct vision of the essence of God. The truth which we know indubitably, the *verum indubitabile,*[7] is not of God's *essence,* but rather of His *existence.* It is this latter distinction which enables one to explain a very vexing problem. If knowledge of the existence of God is inborn in every rational creature, how does it happen that so many men in the course of human history have denied His existence? This denial is caused by three types of errors which can prevent the intellect from affirming what is, in itself, the most evident of all truths. The first of these errors is caused by a mistake in *conception,* and thus pagans have worshiped carved stone or wood as God. The second type of error to which the human mind sometimes falls victim is that of a faulty *reasoning process,* and thus some have been led to conclude that because the wicked sometimes prosper and the just suffer evil a just God does not exist to redress these injustices. And thirdly, there is another type of error in which the intellect either because of frailty, inability or perversity becomes so immersed in the world of sense that it does not carry its reasoning process through to its logical conclusion, but stops short and worships material things, as the Egyptians worshiped the sun.[8]

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[6] "Cognitio hujus veri (i. e. Deus est) innata est menti rationali in quantum tenet rationem imaginis, ratione cujus insertus est sibi naturalis appetitus et notitia et memoria illius ad cujus imaginem facta est, in quem naturaliter tendit, ut in illo possit beatificari." *De Myst. Trin.,* q. 1, a. 1, concl., vol. V, 49.

[7] *De Myst. Trin.,* q. 1, a. 1.

All of these errors which lead to a denial of the existence of God are a result of misconceptions concerning His essence, but yet the truth of His existence itself remains a *verum indubitabile.* The soul is present to itself and, as an *imago Dei,* in knowing itself, it also knows God who is more intimately present to it than it is to itself.

> In like manner the knowledge of itself is fixed into the rational soul, because the soul is present to itself and is itself knowable. But God is most intimately present to the soul itself and is Himself knowable. Therefore the knowledge of its God is fixed into *(inserta est)* the very soul itself.[9]

The second type of demonstration which St. Bonaventure undertakes proceeds from creatures, that is, from the effect to the cause. The created world of sense experience, reflecting as it does the Divine Beauty, is a ladder by which we may ascend to God, according to the *Itinerarium.*[10] All creation proclaims the existence of God. As Bonaventure remarks:

> In like manner this same thing is shown by the second way, thus: every truth which all creatures proclaim is an indubitable truth. But the existence of God is proclaimed by every creature. Therefore, etc. But that every creature proclaims the existence of God is shown from the ten self-evident conditions and suppositions.[11]

Creatures, then, when seen from a Bonaventurean point of view have a kind of diaphanous character which allows the light of the presence of their creator to shine out of them. But while all creatures proclaim their creator, there is a hierarchical structure in the universe, and thus the divine light shines more brightly in some than in others. Some creatures reflect only traces of the Divine Artist inasmuch as they must be referred to God as their source and cause. These are called *vestigia Dei.* There are other creatures which are made to God's own image and are related to Him not only as their cause and source but also as the moving object which draws them. These are called *Imago Dei.* Still others are made not only to God's image but also to His likeness through Grace, and God is related to these as an indwelling gift.[12]

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[8] *De Myst. Trin.,* q. 1, a. 1, concl., vol. V, 49.

[9] "Item inserta est animae rationali notitia sui, eo quod anima sibi praesens est et se ipsa cognoscibilis: sed Deus praesentissimus est ipsi animae et se ipso cognoscibilis: ergo inserta est ipsi animae notitia Dei sui." *De Myst. Trin.,* q. 1, a. 1, n. 10, vol. V, 46.

[10] *Itin. Mentis in Deum,* c. 1, n. 2, vol. V, 297.

[11] "Item ostenditur hoc ipsum secunda via sic: omne verum, quod clamat omnis creatura, est verum indubitabile: sed Deum esse clamat omnis creatura: ergo, etc.--Quod autem omnis creatura clamet Deum esse, ostenditur ex decem conditionibus et suppositionibus per se notis." *De Myst. Trin.,* q. 1, a. 1, n. 10, vol. V, 46-47.

Thus by a contemplation of the visible, sensible world, whether it be external to man, the *vestigia Dei,* or as he enters into his own soul, seeing there the *imago Dei,*. man can, from creatures, rise to a knowledge of the existence of God. Not that from such considerations the concept of God is *constructed,* but rather :from such contemplation the soul is led to *discover* God, with whose image it is ineffaceably stamped.[13] Thus the second way has led us back to the first, and becomes in its turn the starting-point of the third, the immediate evidence of the existence of God.

It is at this point, through the third way for which we were prepared by the first and second, that the existence of God becomes most manifest. In this third way the mind, which in the first way went *into itself* as *imago Dei* and discovered God, and in the second way went *outside of itself* to contemplate the light of the creator shining in His creation, now looks *above itself.*[14] Now as the mind looks above both itself and creation it sees the evidence of Truth itself in which God is First Truth and the source of all other truths. The mind now sees that it cannot deny the existence of God without at the same time destroying the very possibility, condition and ground of every other truth. Since God *is* truth, He is also the

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[12] *Sermo IV: Christus Unus Omnium Magi-ster,* nn. 16-17, vol. V,

[18] Gilson, *op. cit.,* p. 118.

,. *ltin. Mentis in Deum,* c. 1, n. c. *5,* n. 1, vol. V, source of all truth.[15] Let the mind but admit one truth, though this truth be that there is no truth, and it has at the same time asserted the necessity of a First Truth, for without such a First Truth, no other truth would be possible, and this First Truth can only be God.[16] Thus the intellect is led to see in the most evident manner possible the necessity and the indubitability of the truth, " God exists."

From this we can see that each of Bonaventure's proofs is related to the others. Their starting-point is the soul's knowledge of God, which is produced by its intimate, metaphysical union with Him. So profound is this metaphysical union between the soul and God, that God cannot but be manifest to it and be present to it in the truth it apprehends. The soul therefore has a natural aptitude to grasp God. These several points can be summarized very well by the following text from the *Commentary on the Sentences:*

> But God alone is most perfectly conjoined to the soul. For He is joined to it according to truth- and intimacy. For God alone because of His simplicity and spirituality descends into *(illabitur)* the soul, so that he is truly in the soul and is more intimate to the soul than the soul is to itself. All of these four arguments can be reduced to one, namely to this, that the soul is born to perceive the infinite good which God is .. *Y*

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We have now seen, very briefly, the position of Bonaventure concerning the demonstraibility of the existence of God. I should now like to attempt to answer the questions which were posed at the outset, namely how is the position of Bonaventure related to that of Thomas Aquinas? Are they irreconcilably opposed to each other because of basic epistemological decisions irrevocably made, Thomas opting as he did for Aristotelian empiricism and Bonaventure for Platonic Augustinian participation and exemplarism? I should like to try to argue that this is not at all the case and that the areas of agreement between the two great doctors may be greater than is sometimes thought.

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[15] *In I Sent.*, d. 8, p. 1, a. 1, q. *!fl,* concl., vol. I, *155.*

[16] *De Myst. Trin.*, q. 1, a. 1, n. *5*, vol. V, *50.*

[17] " Solus autem Deus est qui perfectissime conjungitur. Nam conjungitur secundum veritatem et intimitatem. Solus enim Deus propter summam simplicitatem et spiritualitatem illabitur animae, ita quod secundum veritatem est in anima, et intimior animae quam ipsa sibi. Omnes enim hae quatuor rationes ad unam reducuntur, scilicet ad hanc, quia nata est anima ad percipiendum bonum infinitum quod Deus est ..." *In I Sent.*, d. 1, a. 8, q. *!fl,* concl., vol. I, 41.

Let us start with a question posed by St. Thomas which is frequently cited as evidence of the opposition between himself and Bonaventure, that is, the solution which he gives to the question " *Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum,"* [18] "Whether the Existence of God is Self-evident." *(Summa Theol.,* I, q. 2, a. 1) . In denying that the existence of God is self-evident, is he not, at least covertly, attacking the position of Bonaventure who did indeed affirm that the existence of God is most evident and indeed indubitable? [19] Here we must note quite carefully that it is one thing to say that the existence of God is a truth most evident in itself and an indubitable truth, and quite another to say that it is a self-evident proposition and hence indemonstrable. Bonaventure did indeed affirm the first, but never taught that the existence of God was either self-evident or indemonstrable. Hence the text of St. Thomas cited above cannot be used as a basis from which to argue that Bonaventure and Thomas are in fundamental opposition to each other on this point.

It is also frequently argued, on the basis of the texts of Bonaventure that we have considered, as well as many others, that since the Seraphic Doctor holds that knowledge of the existence of God is innate *(innata, impressum, inserta,* etc.) in the rational creature such a position would be flatly contradicted by Aquinas. Here it would seem that, in the answer that one would give to such a question, much would depend on the way in which one is prepared to interpret St. Thomas. If one takes the position that Thomas held that the human intellect is a kind of Lockean *tabula rasa,* then of course the answer would be in the affirmative. It must he noted, however, that this is not the only possible way of interpreting Aquinas as many highly respected commentators, such, for example, as Marechal, Maritain, Jolivet, etc.[20], have shown, and further that in order to effect such an interpretation one is forced to leave out of consideration many texts, particularly from the *-De Ventate,* among other places,[21] which argue strongly against this interpretation. Thomas does state quite clearly for example in the *Summa contra Gentiles,* III, c. 38, " *Naturali ratione* statim *homo in aliquem Dei cognitionem pervenire potest* " (By natural reason man can '*immediately* arrive at some knowledge of God) . If this knowledge of God is *immediate,* it would seem to be given with and by the nature of man.

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[18] *Summa Theol.,* I, q. £, a. 1.

[19] *De Myst. Trin.,* q. 1, a. 1, concl., vol. V, 49.

Further, there is his interpretation of the famous text of John Damascene, concerning knowledge of God's existence which occurs in the *Summa Theol.* I, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1, *"Nemo quippe mortalium est, cui non hoc ab eo naturaliter insitum est, ut Deum esse cognoscat,"* in which he asserts that no mortal being is without the natural possession of the knowledge *oi* God's existence. Some students of St. Thomas, most notably Etienne Gilson, hold that Bonaventure interpreted these words in a, very strong way while for St. Thomas they meant only that whereby we may acquire the knowledge of God.[22] This interpretation, however, does not seem to he justified by the text of St. Thomas in question *(Summa Theol.,* I, q. 2, a.1, ad 1) . Here St. Thomas argues that the meaning of Damascene's statement concerning our natural knowledge of God can be understood from man's quest for happiness. That is to say, that since all men by nature seek beatitude, and since God is their final beatitude, they must at least have some vague knowledge of Him, else they would not seek Him. But to say that man has a vague or confused knowledge of God is to say much more than that he merely has a power by which he can come to such knowledge.[23] Further, if one compares this text of Thomas with the one of Bonaventure that we cited earlier concerning the innate knowledge of God's existence which man must have if he is to seek Him as his ultimate source of beatitude (note 5 above-De *Myst. Trin.,* q. 1, a. 1, concl.), far from supporting Gilson's position that Thomas understood Damascene to mean only that man has the power by which he can come to know God, the collation of the texts of Bonaventure and Thomas seems to indicate clearly the closeness of their thought on this point rather than the difference alleged by Gilson. The comparison of these two texts seems to force one to the conclusion that the two doctors are saying very similar things on this problem.

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[20] *Le point de depart de la metaphysique* (Bruxelles: Desclee, 1949). Cahier V, *passim,* but especially pp. 303-305, 348, 350. See also Jacques Maritain, *Sept Ler;ons sur l'etre* (Paris: 1933), pp. 52-57, 66-67, 101 ff.; J. Maritain, *Distinguer pour unir* (Paris: 1932), pp. 424-425, 770; Regis Jolivet, *L'lntuition intellectuelle et le probleme de la metaphysique* (Paris: 1934), pp. 6, 67, 74-77.

[21] For a fuller treatment of this question, together with a collation of some of the more important texts of St. Thomas relative to this question see my article, " The Problem of Intellectual Intuition in the Metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas," *Sapienza,* 1974, 352-360.

[22] Gilson, *op. cit.,* pp. 104-105.

One final point, and that is a difficulty which we encounter in the *Itinerarium Mentis in Deum,* c. 5. Does Bonaventure not say here that it is the divine being which is first known and renders knowledge of everything else possible? And if he holds this view isn't the opposition between these two great masters so fundamental as to preclude any meaningful rapprochement? This is certainly an interpretation of Bonaventure which has, regrettably, been common enough to merit the explicit treatment of it by the Quarrachi editors,[24] an interpretation which they lament. And rightly so, it would seem, since it is clear enough from the first chapter of the *Itinerarium* forward that all intellectual knowledge takes its origin in the senses. It is not the divine being itself which is grasped by apprehension but rather we arrive at this through a process of resolution.[25] That is, the creature cannot be fully understood for what it is, *as* creature, in its radical existential contingency, unless resolution is made back to its ultimate cause and source. It is true, in order to make such a resolution the *esse divinum* is necessary.[26] In this sense we must indeed have a knowledge of God which is innate. But here we must be wary of misunderstanding Bonaventure, for the *esse divinum* which is known and which is the light by which the intellect sees all else, is not a *lumen quod,* that is, the object which is seen or grasped by apprehension, but rather a *lumen quo,*[27] that by which we see and understand all else, creatures as creatures, ourselves as images of God Himself as first cause of our being and ultimate source of our beatitude.

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[23] This seems to be the sense of both *Summa contra Gent.,* III, c. 38, as well as *Summa Theol.,* I, q. !'!, a. 1, ad 1.

[24] See their remarks in their Scholion to the *Itinerarium,* vol. V, nn. 8, 9, pp. 315-316.

Could St. Thomas agree on any of these points with Bonaventure in which he stresses the necessity of the *divinum esse* as the *lumen quo* of the human intellect? Again, the answer would seem to be in the affirmative, and again the distance between the two doctors does not seem to be as great as some would have it. After all, when asking the question in the *De Veritate* (q. 11, a. 1) whether or not men can be properly called teachers, or God alone, Thomas remarks at the conclusion of the *corpus* of the article that the light of human reason which has been given to man by God is, in a certain sense, a similitude of divine truth. As a consequence all human learning ultimately has its efficacy from the Divine Light which is God and who alone teaches us interiorly. Thus Thomas remarks:

> But this light of reason by which such principles are known to us is placed in us by God. With the result that there is in us a certain similitude of uncreated truth. Wherefore, since all human teaching cannot have efficacy except in virtue of this light, it is clear that it

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[25] *De Myst. Trin.,* q. 1, a. 1, concl., vol. V, 49-50.

[26] *Itin. Mentis in Deum,* c. 3, n. 3, vol. V, 304.

[27] On this point see the remarks of the Quarrachi editors in their Scholion to the *Itinerarium,* vol. V, n. 7, p. 315.

is God alone who principally and interiorly teaches, just as nature principally and interiorly heals.[28]

This text certainly does not seem to argue very strongly for the position which would find in the two great 13th century thinkers a fundamental and irreconcilable opposition. Certainly, one must say quite frankly that Thomas's proofs for the existence of God, all of which take as their starting point some fact drawn from the world of sense, e.g., moved movers, are quite different from those of Bonaventure. Here one notes quite clearly a difference not only in starting-points but also in perspective, as well as the general spirit which pervades their respective doctrines. But it would seem to be equally true to say that those who give the impression that there is a fundamental and radical opposition between the two are greatly overstating the case. Rather, it would seem, from what we have seen, that there is a substantive agreement between them.

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[28] " Huiusmodi autem rationis lumen, quo principia huiusmodi sunt nobis nota, est nobis a Deo inditum, quasi quaedam similitudo increatae veritatis in nobis resultantis. Unde, cum omnis doctrina humana efficaciam habere non possit nisi ex virtute illius luminis; constat quod *solus Deus est qui interius et principaliter docet,* sicut natura interius etiam principaliter sanat." *De Veritate,* q. 11, a. 1. My emphasis.

BOOK REVIEWS

Structural Analysis of Narrative. By JEAN CALLOUD. Translated by Daniel Patte. Philadelphia: Fortress Press and Missoula: Scholars' Press, 1976. Pp. xv, 108. $3.95.

What is Structural Exegesis? By DANIEL PATTE. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976. Pp. vi, 90, with annotated bibliography and index.

Both books under review offer an exposition and a defense of a method of reading--structural exegesis-together with some examples of the method at work. Both are short, inexpensive, introductory without being *simpliste.* Together or separately they would be valuable as textbooks in a course on exegesis. Patte's book contains a useful annotated bibliography.

Both books are introductory and introductions are typically of two kinds. There is the introduction that leads the novice into an already well-established discipline within which there is broad agreement at that early level, e.g. the average textbook in logic, chemistry, biology etc. Such introductions are pedagogical and are rarely substantively controversial. A second kind of introduction is less an introduction *to* a discipline as the introduction *of* one. Calloud and Patte, while relying on a corpus of basic research, tend towards being introductions of the second type. Their style is, accordingly, somewhat contentious; they write, so to speak, against an antagonist; they not only present a theory but presume that there is an opposing theory to be dislodged. This contentiousness is not a fault so much as a contextual characteristic.

Calloud's discussion (p. 19 ff) of actantial roles is an example. He claims that" ... the *actors* (or personages) can be reduced into' actantial roles'." (In parentheses may I remark that, while Patte's translation reads well in general, I think that where he uses " personages " he should have used " characters ". We do not in English refer to the personages of a novel but to its characters.)

By the reduction of a character to an actantial role Calloud appears to mean the kind of symbolization that is familiar from grammar or logic. Thus, if one is doing logic one is not interested in the details of "John and Mary went to the game"; one is concerned with its logical structure and it is that alone which is symbolized. Calloud's example of a typical reduction is interesting since it shows clearly how what he is doing resembles and differs from the familiar logical reduction. The expression: "Peter got up, said good-bye and went home " can be reduced to the functions *disjunction* and *departure* and to the *actant.* The expression is an instance of the form "actant: disjunction-departure." This form could be instantiated in other expressions, e. g. " Priscilla waved and ran off," " The dog turned and slunk away." At this level the expressions are equivalent in much the same way as, in grammar or logic, otherwise different sentences may be equivalent.

There is, however, a notable difference. In logic the non-formal meaning of the sentence is excluded; in Calloud's analysis the reduction is to a different level. The function *departure,* for example (the term 'function' comes from Propp's *Morphology of the Folktale,* a seminal work in the structuralist tradition, the Russian original of which was published in ,
is instantiated in a range of verbs. But it is a restricted range-restricted or defined by the meaning of the term "departure "-and distinct from, or opposed to, another range, e. g. the range designated by the term " arrival."

The subject of the verb--" Peter left "-can be reduced to *actant.* Once again we are familiar with grammatical reduction so that, from the perspective of grammar, "Peter," "Paul," "Petronella" and "Priscilla" may be equivalent or, if they differ, they differ grammatically by being subject, direct object, indirect object, etc.

Similarly, from the perspective of criticism, characters identified in a story by proper names are written of as "hero," "villain," "confidant," etc., and sometimes in drama a character is identified only by such a general title as "messenger," "first murderer," etc.

I have no desire to claim that the structuralist movement in criticism, or the formalist movement which preceded it, is saying what has been commonly said from time immemorial. By no means. But what structuralism has done, and continues to do, is to make explicit and codify literary criticism. It is time, therefore, when thinking of structuralism to think in a larger historical perspective than the polemical context within which it first emerged. As is well known, French structuralism developed in opposition to an excessively biographical tradition in French literary criticism and against a militantly subjectivist interpretation of existentialism. Within this context structuralist criticism heralded a return to the text and, to some extent at least, an elimination of the subject. The intellectual climate of literary criticism in North America-both in the United States and Canada-was quite different. There was the new criticism whose major exponents were not wholly ignorant of the Russian formalist movement and there were two great, if controversial, theorists, Kenneth Burke in the United States and Northrop Frye in Canada. Outside North America there were other not altogether dissimilar movements. In general the critical tide was running strongly against biographical criticism and that kind of dramatic criticism which concentrated on character against action. It is important, in my opinion, to try to link the French development with the indigenous one. Kenneth Burke's study of Augustine's *Confessions* is, I think, arguably close to structuralist exegesis.

Furthermore, and this is the fundamental theoretical reason for pointing out familiar moves, if a method of reading is sustainable it rests on a pre-reflective base. Gadamer's hermeneutical theory, for example, is claimed by its author to be a reflective description of what happens when one reads. Similarly, structuralist exegesis must be grounded in the pre-reflective practice of reading structurally. We are involved in structures which the exegesis makes plain. Structuralist discovery is in a sense the discovery of the familiar-arriving where we started and knowing the place for the first time.

Ricoeur in an oft-quoted phrase has written that structuralism is Kantianism without the subject. This is the nub of the theoretical argument. Calloud associates his reduction of the named character to the *actant* with a discussion of personal identity which points to this central theoretical stance. In an evocative but unclear sentence he writes: "We could think that the reduction affected the process alone, while the actor Peter would remain equal to himself as if the human 'subject' could keep his identity as an autonomous invariant through the vicissitudes of real life (p. 19)." Calloud in this passage seems to deny identity. It should be stressed, however, that his remarks affect only one particular theory of identity and one, moreover, that few hold. It is possible to consider human identity over time as the absolute invariance of some element or part of the whole; but there is, I think, no need to think of identity in this way nor is it necessary to interpret Aristotle in this way, although it is possible to do so.

Returning to the identity of a literary character Calloud writes: "A personage in a narrative is not constituted by a physical or psychical invariant but rather by a series of variations on a *syntactic invariant.* The illusion of a personage with a stable identity which is reinforced by the power of the proper name is nothing but a 'narrative effect'." Calloud is quite correct, I think, to suggest that a fictional character or, more generally, a narrative character is constituted syntactically. This is to point out that the creations of literature are constituted by the writing-the oppositional background may be, perhaps, the kind of reading that issued in such questions as the famous one about the number of children in the Macbeth family. But what is meant by "illusion"? "Illusion" often means "mistaken appearance," "not truly so," or it may mean "virtual" in the sense given by Susanne Langer to that term. In this sense the world of literature is an illusory or virtual world in contrast to the real world in which we go about our everyday affairs. But then "the illusion of a personage with a stable identity" is no more-and no less-than the surrounding illusions of fiction (and all narrative is fundamentally fiction; historical writing requires of the reader a further act of application; the fundamental fictional character of historical writing accounts for the fact that we can read with profit historical works which we know to be

" untrue ") . Calloud seems to take " illusion " in the other sense-as delusion. We are deluded into taking a personage with a stable identity when the reality, that is the fictional reality, of the situation is not this. I find that he presents no convincing argument for this position.

Perhaps, however, a personage or character is nothing but a narrative effect. Patte (pp. 21-22) explains the term "meaning effect " which he gets from Greimas's writings and gives an example. He compares the term " sound effect " with it and this may give a clue. A sound is a relation between physical waves and an ear. The waves can be analysed " in themselves " but then it is not sound but waves that are being investigated. Similarly one can analyse an expression " in itself " apparently without reference to the interpreter but what then is being analysed? The analogy breaks down because the reduction effected in the analysis is not to a pre-semiological object but a semiological object. Patte's example is of a woven blanket. The weaver is constrained by the physical structures of the loom and the wool available. Then, ". . . as a first approximation . . . the 'meaning effect' results from the interaction of the weaver's (author's) intentionality and of the two structures (loom and set of coloured threads) (Patte, p. 21) ." This question arises: are the structures referred to in this example at the same level as the functions to which narrative is reduced? Whatever is written in English, for example, can be " reduced " to the twenty-six letters of the alphabet, to the grammatical and syntactical structures of English, to thematic structures such as those suggested by Calloud and taken over by Patte, i. e. the functions *departure-arrival* and so on. Quite plainly these structures are on quite different levels.

If this is Calloud's meaning then certainly a character is a narrative effect as is everything else. It is equally the case that the character is constituted syntactically or rhetorically and that one of the means is the use of the proper name. On the other hand, it may be that 'the identical *actant* is required for the narrative structure itself since without the identical *actant* the narrative falls apart into discrete functions. Thus, in the story of the temptation of Jesus in the desert, it is required that the character who fasted for forty days and nights is the same character who is tempted. Identity, therefore, occurs, at the level of structure although the *specification* of that identity occurs elsewhere. So when Calloud writes that " the ' Peter' of the process ' Peter got up ' is not quite identical with the ' Peter ' of the canonic statement, 'Function: Departure-Actant: Peter '," he is correct but not because there are two "Peters " in the story. He is correct because the canonic statement is a reflection on the narrative and the term " Peter " in the reflective discourse is used differently than the term "Peter" in the narrative discourse. The term " Peter " in the reflective discourse refers to the term in the narrative discourse whereas, in the narrative, the term " Peter " refers to its meaning, or to the character constituted by that and associated terms as meant.

Both Calloud and Patte in their display of the method in practice consider individual texts. Both are concerned with exegesis. They bring their theoretical horizon to bear on individual texts; they are less concerned to discern narrative structures in sets of texts. A grammatical example will clarify: the grammarian who attempts to work out the grammar of a language considers particular sentences but his purpose is to discover the set of structures displayed in the language; the student learning " grammar " often has to parse individual sentences and here his purpose is to show how particular structures are embodied in them. Similarly, a structuralist like Claude Levi-Strauss analyses a corpus of myth to discover invariant structures, and Roland Barthes analyzes sets of fashion-texts to discover the structures of fashion-writing. In their examples, Patte and Calloud show how particular texts embody structures. Their exegesis is something like parsing a sentence. This is not a criticism; exegesis is something like parsing, as anyone who, not being very good at Latin, has tried to construe Vergil knows. The approach of both Calloud and Patte in their analyses is to discover in the particular the traces of the general structure but also, because of the level of analysis, to interpret. In other words, they must come back to the particular in all its details in a way in which the grammatical analysis of a sentence need not. One must therefore ask how illuminating their exegesis is. Of the three exemplary interpretations offered in the two books-Calloud's interpretation of the temptation story and Patte's analysis of the parable of the Good Samaritan and of the opening verses of the Epistle to the Galatians-Patte's treatment of the parable of the Good Samaritan seemed to me the most satisfactory. His interpretation succeeds in taking account of details of the story which some interpretations treat as incidental detail or local colour. The other examples are, to my mind, less satisfactory and at times labour the obvious.

The parable is fictional, the story of the temptation of Christ is " historical." The inverted commas indicate a rhetorical difference first but the more profound difference between rhetoric and history must also be investigated. Patte does indeed raise the question of history in his theoretical section (see esp. pp. 6-14) but his treatment requires much elaboration. The question of the distinction between the meaning of the text and the author's meaning, for example, is very rapidly dealt with. And in this connection Patte seems seriously to misunderstand the nature of history. He writes: "History is made up of a succesion of ' authors ' : to reach them is to reach the very fabric of history." Reflection for a moment on political history, economic history, social history is sufficient to show that this is simply not the case. Initially this may seem an adequate description of intellectual history but there is an intellectual history that is not at all like this-Lebreton's history of the dogma of the Trinity, for instance, which is the record of a long-drawn-out argument which took place in many minds, in many places and over a considerable time. To reach an individual author's mind (prescind from the author's mind/text controversy) is interpretation, not history. On this view history is not simply meant. It should be admitted that a philosophy of history is not Patte's central concern and that to some extent at least he is using " the historian " as a pedagogical contrast to make his own views appear more clearly. Another example of contentious rhetoric.

In summary, then, while both books make good introductions they should be used carefully and argumentatively. I have indicated some points of argument. Argument would be fruitful and would assist in carrying out the task which the books set themselves, namely the introduction of a mode of analysis. The mode is still, within the English-speaking world, somewhat foreign; it is not yet the domesticated mind.

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Some Questions about Language: A Theory Of Human Discourse And Its Objects. By MORTIMER J. ADLER. LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co., 1976. Pp. 189. $17.50.

The strongest asset of Mortimer Adler's book is its systematic and structured analysis of language. Clarity reigns throughout Adler's exposition of his philosophical doctrine. And his is a systematic and wide-ranging presentation and study of the problems and questions he raises. From the outset, he states the scope of his philosophy of language, and says that its task is " to construct a theory that attempts to explain the reality or fact of communication which I have taken as its point of departure " (p. 5).

Adler's main concern lies in discussing how men communicate on the level of common discourse. From this, one can appreciate how men are able to communicate on a philosophical level: only a selected number of refinements have to be made. Furthermore, Adler then asks: With what aspects does a philosophical theory of language not involve itself? Even though it obviously concerns itself with statements whose purpose is communication, he says it does not involve itself with their truth or falsity. Furthermore, as one develops a philosophy of language, it should be free from any prior ontological, psychological, and epistemological commitments. Neutrality is required.

The author summarizes his own task in stating that any theory of language must raise and answer three central questions: 1) What confers referential meaning on marks and sounds which are otherwise meaningless? Adler answers that the development of referential meaning occurs by " the voluntary imposition of meaningless notations on the objects of our apprehension" (p. 171). 2) What do meaningful words refer to when they have referential significance? He argues that " apprehended objects are the referents of the name-words we use" (p. 171). 3) Does ordinary language do what it appears to do? By answering the first two questions, Adler says that this third question is answered affirmatively.

It has already been mentioned that Adler has achieved clarity in presenting his philosophy of language. He consistently defines his terms. For one of the problems which has plagued philosophy throughout the ages has been this failure to use terms and words critically. Philosophers have used words interchangeably, they have failed to express clearly what these involve, and this in turn has resulted in misrepresentations and misinterpretations. Adler has rendered the reader {and philosophy) an important service in the clarity and precision of his presentation.

There is a need to pursue Adler's contention that a theory of language should not involve any prior ontological, psychological, and epistemological commitments. The reason is obvious: the aim is to develop a philosophy of language in itself; it should attempt to be as independent as possible from any unnecessary philosophical pre-suppositions. However, Adler admits that one has to make a selected number of commitments to account for the existence of things other than language. " The only justification it (a theory of language) can ever give, or ever needs to give, for such posits is that they are indispensable to the explanation that is called for " (p. 8) .

Adler states these posits: 1) the mind is at least analytically distinct from the body; 2) the existence of certain acts of the mind such as perception, memory, imagination, and conception (all of which are acts of apprehension) and acts of judgment and reasoning; 3) the existence of the products of the acts of apprehension, which he groups under the heading of subjective ideas; and 4)" the existence of the objects apprehended by subjective ideas, as distinct both from the subjective existence of ideas and from the real existence of things " (p. 78) . This leads to certain critical questions. Are these posits acceptable? Could one not posit other explanations which he believes are as necessary? With the positing of the above, does Adler truly free himself from making unnecessary prior ontological, psychological, and epistemological commitments? Has he achieved neutrality?

Adler's only justification for these posits is that it is " indispensable " to the explanation. Is not this asking, in effect, for a suspension of proof? Moreover; he presents us with an epistemology which becomes increasingly defined as he proceeds in the book. He specifically develops the fourth posit above and eventually defends a knowledge of the universal. He argues that this is a fund'amental element of a philosophy of language and there is certainly no disagreement here. The criticism of Adler is that his theory of language (or anyone else's) is more interlocked and dependent upon an epistemology than he seems to admit. A person's epistemology will have a significant effect upon one's philosophy of language.

There is one more specific comment about Adler's book. The Bibliographical Appendix at the end of the book is of great value. It cites those works which are pertinent to the discussion of a philosophy of language, whether they are in agreement, partial agreement, or disagreement with the author's own viewpoint.

Finally, Adler's contributions and insights in the area of developing a philosophy of language, whether or not one eventually accepts his theory in its entirety, are well worth studying-indeed, studying well. Adler does present a coherent analysis, and is successful in presenting us a solution to the problem of language other than the " linguistic philosophies " which are available.

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The Way of the Word: The Beginning and the Establishing of Christian Understanding. By JOHN C. MEAGHER. New York: Seabury, 1975. 234 pages. $9.50.

This work inserts itself into a major contemporary debate in the area of the history of doctrines in early Christianity. The debate began with Walter Bauer's book *Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest Christianity* (German original 1934), and has been furthered in the United States, especially by Helmut Koester of Harvard and James M. Robinson of Claremont in their joint book, *Trajectories into the New Testament.* Bauer's thesis briefly stated is that the usual way of presenting early Church history is wrong. This usual way has it that in the beginning the Church was one in faith but later on heretics arose and sowed seeds of error and dissension. On the contrary, Bauer says, orthodoxy and heresy were both present from the first Easter morning, so to speak, and what is more, heretical teachers were the first to bring the gospel to many parts of the ancient world. His best examples of this are East Syria (the Osrhoene) and Egypt. (The origins of Christianity in Egypt are quite obscure, and it is commonly said that Bauer staked too much on the argument from silence. In any case, James McCue has recently challenged Bauer's views with respect to the Valentinian Gnostics.) Bauer concludes that in fact there was no division into orthodox and heretical thought throughout the Second Century; it was an invention of the early Third Century Church of Rome, projected back onto a fluid past.

Meagher's is the first book-length attempt by a Roman Catholic to address itself to this challenging thesis. As such it is both courageous and ambitious. The author does not, however, endeavor simply to follow in Bauer's tracks. Rather, he turns the question around to ask how one arrived at doctrinal certainty in first century Christianity. Thereby he shifts the study from patristics to New Testament studies. Indeed, after a sharp introductory chapter in which he poses the question, the rest of the book investigates the principal theological clusters within the New Testament (Paul, Luke and the [other] Synoptic Gospels, Acts, John, the later Pauline and Johannine Schools, and other New Testament evidence) for an answer. The concluding chapter tries to formulate the various New Testament answers into a coherent synthesis useful for us today as we face especially the problem of doctrinal pluralism. The fundamental criterion for discerning truth and error turns out to be having, or better, participating in, the mind of Christ. This is attained through study of the scriptures and the gift of the Spirit, through a study of history, and the common sense of the universal Christian community. The axiomatic principle remains that Jesus is the One.

It will be seen then that the question addressed by the book is sophisticated and important, the answer is faithful to the New Testament data and, while not solving all our present-day problems for us, true so far as it goes. But frankly, the long middle section of the book I found almost unreadable. The author knows the New Testament texts well and can draw upon them with considerable synthetic power. But he does not seem to know how to take a text and analyze it in such a way that the reader who also knows the text finds his remarks illuminating and interesting. As a result, the book falls between stools, between an original and serious contribution to biblical theology and a witty survey for undergraduates unfamiliar with the texts, between exegesis and systematic theology.

The author shows himself to be a remarkable combination of philosopher, systematic theologian, *Neutestamentler,* canon lawyer and bellelettrist, but he has not yet, it seems, brought these gifts into a disciplined and lucid unity. He suffers from no apparent doctrinal prejudice and may therefore be described as Catholic in the best sense, both old-and new-fashioned.

There are no notes to chapter seven and the conclusion. There is a full index of biblical references but none of names or subjects. The Greek is transliterated.

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America in Theological Perspective. Edited by THOMAS M. McFADDEN. New York: Seabury Press, 1976. 248 pp. $9.95.

This collection of essays, all but two of which were delivered at the 1975 convention of the College Theology Society, ought not be ignored out of a surfeit of Bicentennial literature. Although the thirteen essays are of uneven quality, and of such a broad range that the classroom utility of the volume may be minimal, this collection does give evidence of the real ferment in American theological thought today, especially as theologians and other scholars attempt to understand and assess the impact of the American experience on American religion, and vice versa. In this sense, then, the book may provide a useful overview of some of the significant issues at play in the American theological scene today.

The first section of the book deals with the American Catholic experience from a variety of disciplinary perspectives. Historian James Hennesey's sketchy overview of the periods of American Catholic history may be a useful summary statement for undergraduates, but (of necessity?) is so brief that it barely satisfies anyone already familiar with the contours of the story. Hennesey does make one point which is asserted again and again throughout the volume: namely, that the classic melting-pot theory is inadequate for an understanding of the specific character of American Catholics.

Daniel Maguire's essay might be described in the jargon of the sixties as a probe" *towards"* an American Catholic moral theology. Maguire asserts that what is needed now is an " eclectic traditionalism " which searches both the mainstream and the byways of American Catholic moral thought, in quest of theological and experiential resources which may be retrievable in the contemporary scene. Once one takes this tack, of course, the criteriological question looms as most significant: by what standards do we assess the relative valuableness of the many components of our American Catholic *traditio?* And further, what warrants do we bring forth to establish the validity of our criteria? I hope that Maguire addresses this question in another essay soon; his attentiveness to the particularity of the Catholic moral-theological tradition, in both its happy and unhappy manifestations, should put him in a position to make an extremely valuable contribution to this discussion. The present essay is a fine overview of the Catholic tradition with which we must deal; it could have been fleshed out more thoroughly by an "Americanizing" of some of his themes. The point, of course, is that a genuine inter-disciplinary approach is essential here.

Isaac Hecker as the author of a uniquely American apologetic is the subject of Joseph Gower's piece. According to Gower, Hecker attempted to invert the terms of previous American Catholic apologists: rather than defending Catholicism against nativist charges of " twin loyalties," Hecker attempted to demonstrate that the democratic polity of American society demanded Catholicism's natural theology as a support for its often-inarticulate anthropological assumptions. Much more work needs to be done on this, of course, but this intriguing perspective may provide some clues and roots for an American Catholic fundamental theology. At best, Hecker emerges from this essay as a uniquely creative proto-sociologist of religion, showing a sensitivity to the intersection of the sacred and the political which, lacking the methodological rigor of an Emile Durkheim, at least anticipates the basic thrust of his work. Again, this may be a valuable resource for American Catholic thinkers addressing the civil religion question.

Elizabeth McKeown's essay on the emergence of Catholic identity in the United States takes late-19th and early-flOth century American Catholic leadership to task for its inability to articulate a specific American Catholic identity beyond the flag-waving super-patriotism of the World War I period. According to McKeown, this failure (among others) led to a loss of American Catholicism's cutting edge vis-a-vis society and government policy, a loss from which she claims we are still suffering today. The point has been made before, of course, and needs, I think, to be tested against the burgeoning research of social scientists into the real pluralism of the Catholic ethnic. The critical point, in my judgment, goes unaddressed in this essay: what are the resources available to us today in constructing an American Catholic identity? Or, prescinding from this, is *an* American Catholic identity a desirable goal? Ought we not to develop, theologically, our understanding of" local Church" before attempting to define ourselves nationally?

The second section of the volume considers the broad question of the relationship between religion and culture in America. The section begins with an interesting survey of the Radical Reformation groups' impact on the American political and religious scene by Franklin Littell. In Littell's judgment, the common denominator among the various non-magisterial reformation groups was their ecclesiology of the True Church as a " covenant people " united in voluntary membership. Thus, in the beginning, the radical sects offered the opportunity to take a specifically confrontational stance towards the host culture in which they found themselves. An increasing privatization in their understanding of " separation," however, dulled this prophetic edge to the point where Littell can note, with no little chagrin, " Oneida of the Puritans is now a successful silverplate corporation. Amana of the Pietists is now an exceedingly prosperous corporation producing woolens, freezers, and microwave ovens." Littell claims that the designation " sect " makes little sense in such an atmosphere. The data which Littell offers here might well be put into conversation with Max Weber's theory of social change, i.e. the constant interaction of "dominant forces" and "countervailing trends," as well as with Weber's thoughts on the routinization of charisma, for some interesting results.

Thomas Hanley's article on Church/State relations in the Revolutionary era brings out the interesting, and often overlooked, point that the religious context of the Revolution was not only anti-Anglican (and in that sense, disestablishmentarian), but also the enthusiasms of the Great Awakening. Beyond this, I think Hanley's data need to be put into dialogue with constitutional lawyers and political philosophers to come to some real fruition.

The next four essays deal, directly or indirectly, with the civil religion debate. Marie Augusta Neal's article is an excellent, in-depth critique of the civil religion. Her key point seems to me to be that a " civil " religion is inadequate in an increasingly global world, particularly when as believers and citizens we confront the many issues of the development question. According to Neal, at America's stage of development the civil religion is demonic, both in terms of national self-understanding and in terms of our relations with developing nations and peoples. Neal calls for a "theology of relinquishment " to supplant the distorting tendencies of the civil religion. This, I think, needs to be considerably nuanced in terms of international political and economic realities. As a theological position, it is a useful riposte to the uncritical boosterism of such as Billy Graham. As a policy program, I should like to see some hard evidence as to what reliquishment means, domestically, and what its concrete effect would be internationally. Neal's case is not aided by a gratuitous assertion that China's ability to deliver health care and education without cost somehow indicates a superior ethical evaluation of human worth. This hardly correlates with what we know of the untold suffering inflicted on China's indigenous cultural and religious systems by the lunacies of the " Great Leap Forward" and the Cultural Revolution. Nevertheless, I find this to be the best critical article yet in this wide-ranging debate, and I hope that more is forthcoming.

Marie Schneider reclaims Thomas Aquinas's useful distinction between *religio* and *pietas* as an aid in avoiding any deification of the nation through the civil religion. And by recalling John Courtney Murray's claim that a natural law theory was foundational to the political structuring of the United States, Schneider points to a resource which American Catholics would do well to offer their nation as it struggles with the whole range of " law and order " issues. Further thoughts on how the principles of the common good and subsidiarity could be made applicable today would be most useful here, too. I do wish, though, that there had been more sensitivity in this essay to the ambiguity of *all* religions. Schneider rightly notes a tendency to apotheosize (if such a word exists) the American civil religion, but fails to apply this critique to the Churches as well. The Catholic experience with ultramontanism could well provide us with some resources for dealing with this distorting tendency in our civil religion.

John Mawhinney's essay on H. Richard Niebuhr is a first-class piece of work, providing a valuable tool for understanding the development of Niebuhr's theology. Niebuhr's insistence that Protestantism is fundamentally a *movement,* a way of life, rather than an institution, may be a particularly useful resource for American ecclesiologists today. Is this, though, a particularly *American* tendency in Niebuhr? What do the experiences of the radical denominations (as in Littell's essay) tell us about the waxing and waning fates of the " movement " denominations? How can Niebuhr's abiding sense of the need for a theology of God's sovereignty to correct the demonic tendencies in American Protestantism be reclaimed as a resource for dealing with the civil religion question today? These issues might well be addressed in the future, for which this excellent piece prepares us.

Shailer Mathews's contribution to Modernism is the subject of Francis Fiorenza's essay. The latter's distinction between "evangelical" and " modernistic " Liberalism is particularly useful for sorting out the various trends at work in turn-of-the-century American religion. Like Hecker, Mathews worked out of a particular sociological point of view, in this case, his assertion that all doctrinal statements are radically conditioned by their social context, or, in his terms, by the "social mind-set" prevalent culturally at the time of their formulation. This point is useful in the civil religion debate, for, against such critics as Richardson and Moltmann, Mathews helps us to see that there is not a " Christian Gospel " *here,* against which can be juxtaposed a civil religion *there.* Both the Christian Churches and the civil religion are affected by the social context in which they live (as well as by each other), and the question is the quality of this interaction. Further, according to Fiorenza, Mathews's work reminds us that the modernist approach can be a principle of critique, demonstrating the relativity of all cultural and theological patterns, rather than simply a principle of idolization (as it seems to be seen in Niebuhr's *Christ and Culture,* for example) .

Part Three of *America in Theological Perspective* is, to me at least, the most fascinating section of the volume. Three essays, each from a different perspective, probe our prospects as a nation and a culture.

The section begins with David Thomas's article on the "alliance" between technocracy and religion in America. The themes here (exclusive focus on means rather than ends, the dehumanizing tendencies of a production-manic culture, the demonic attempt to ultimately control all facets of the human experience) have been covered many times before; Thomas pulls these together in a creative synthesis that suggests that the function of the religious spirit in America today is not to clamor for a repristination but to be a vehicle through which an overarching vision of national and cultural purpose may be built. Technique cannot, of itself, provide this vision. According to Thomas, the religious community may be able to. I would hope that this theme could be probed further, perhaps in conjunction with ongoing research into the civil religion and the peculiarly American forms of the Churches. Thomas is somewhat vague on what " religion " is and therefore does not pose or answer the question of how this new vision is to be proposed by Churches intimately involved in technological society. Granted that there is no Archimedean point on which we can stand, how are we to achieve the objectivity which vision-building calls for?

Leonard Biallas's essay "America: The Myth of the Hunter" is, in my judgment, the gem of this entire collection. Using a Jungian framework of a primal " monomyth," Biallas traces the development of American self-understanding through the first two stages of this " archetypal mythology of the heroic quest," initiation and maturity, then proposes that we are today in the third stage of the mythic process, the stage of death/resurrection. Of particular interest here is Biallas's contention that, in order to" pass over," or better, pass through this third stage, the exclusively masculine American hero-type must confront and appropriate the qualities of its anima, finally emerging as an androgynous archetype synthesizing the most creative dimensions of its bi-polar existence. The fourth stage of the monomyth, apotheosis, can never be achieved, and will always stand before us as a horizon (and, I would think, as a judgment on the present moment). Still, according to Biallas, we shall never even have this before us as a vision unless we are willing to confront our need for transformation in the stage of death/resurrection. This wonderfully written piece should be of real utility in both classroom and adult-education settings.

The volume closes with Russell Jaberg's assault on the anthropocentricity which has characterized American self-understanding insofar as we are the heir of the Renaissance world-view. Jaberg proposes "planetology," a recovered sense of the earth as *our earth,* as an alternative perspective. His illustrations of the demise of the anthropocentric world-view are fascinating (in art, music, technology). Jaberg seems to me to be addressing the questions posed by the " limits to growth " movement, and insofar as he finds resources in the Christian tradition for a dialogue with this perspective--an increasingly significant one, I think-he needs to be listened to.

The College Theology Society and Prof. McFadden are to be thanked for this volume. Although I have concentrated on what seem to me to be weaknesses of the various essays, there is much of merit here, especially for those who are involved already in the American theological fray. What strikes me most from reading through these divergent articles is the need for an interdisciplinary approach to the question of an "American theology." In most cases, the essays are weak precisely when the author " skips " from his or her field onto "foreign" territory. I look forward to the day, hopefully not too long-removed, when theologians, philosophers, psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, literary critics, economists, and "people of good will " in general will be able to think together about the need for a national vision and purpose which is so evident from this book.

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Christians, Politics, and Violent Revolution. By J. DAVIES. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1976. Pp. $4.95.

History and the Theology of Liberation. By E. DussEL, translated by J. Drury. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1976. Pp. xvi and 189. $8.95; pbk. $4.95.

Freedom Made Flesh. By I. ELLACURIA, translated by J. Drury. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1976. Pp. ix and $8.95; pbk. $4.95.

Orbis offers us three excellent new publications in an area that is of very much concern to the modern Christian. One might expect that the common theme would logically be that of the theology of liberation, but a closer analysis of the three shows that they are better treated under the common problem of violence. This theme of violence is one of the major bases in each work. A basic attitude is established in each work in regard to violence, and, in fact, Davies and Ellacuria devote the major sections of their books to it. The question for our authors is: How does the contemporary Christian confront violence? Is it an option? Can it be a legitimate means in the expansion of the Kingdom? All these questions are faced in these three works.

The answers that are presented in the books are interesting since they are presented from different perspectives. Davies is an English theologian who carefully examines the problem in the light of traditional theology and modern history. Ellacuria is a Spanish Jesuit who has labored most of his life in Central America and combines his own pastoral reflection with the theological analysis of Rabner. Dussel is a native Latin American who writes out of a very strongly European education. Of the three Davies seems to offer the most interesting and complete work. He is very careful not to generalize and does not make sweeping statements. One senses the calm, logical carefulness that characterizes much of modern British philosophy and theology. Dussel, on the other hand, tries to synthesize history, economics, and theology. Dussel is less careful than Davies and has the tendency to make too general statements. An example of his thought is the following: " The hippy movement is a rebellious movement within the affluent society. Our rebelliousness is quite different, and is much more meaningful " (p. 80). That statement is too subjective and needs a more careful explanation. Ellacuria seems to go over the road of much of modern thought on Jesus and politics in the first two sections and really doesn't add too much new analysis. In part three, the author comes alive with a section on Violence and the Cross that is very provocative. His analysis of violence and aggressiveness adds a further dimension to much of the modern debate on violence.

Violence, although not new to mankind, is new to the realm of modern theology. It seems basically to undermine many modern values that were until recently untouchable. The traditional nonviolent approach of Gandhi is seemingly being replaced by modern reactions that are definitely violent, such as those of Guevara and Torres. What will be the option for the contemporary Christian? Dussel offers some very positive steps which would serve as a basis for the whole discussion. He argues that rootlessness as the common denominator of much modern alienation is the principal cause of violence: that is, oppressed peoples lack roots and therefore traditions. More and more people today in the areas that we call the Third World are seeing that this lack of roots on their part is leading to a state of alienation and that this in turn allows for all types of institutional violence. Violence has been caused by this lack of roots (pp. 28-29). Modern mankind is determined to be responsible for its own future and for its own identity. Theology must imperatively, as Davies suggests (p. 4), reflect on this situation. Ellacuria goes a step further and insists that modern theology because of the whole incarnational experience is able to be the redemption of violence (chapter seven).

Both Dussel and Davies give a good historical overview of traditional Christian thought in regard to violence. Often mentioned in the two works are the statements of Thomas Aquinas on the killing of a tyrant and the argument for a just war: Dussel (pp. 122-181) and Davies (pp. 164-168). All three of the works invoke *Gaudium et Spes* in its understanding of modern society and violence.

Davies, interestingly enough, is able to present us with seven positions of Christians in the past and present who are opposed to the mixing of religion and politics (pp. 10-48). These are generally stands that one has heard at one time or another. Ellacuria offers a grouping of three positions under which the contemporary Christian might view The first group is that represented by Charles de Foucauld. This position recognizes that alienation and violence are basically the results of sin. But there is no direct challenge to these two evils but rather the choice of a silent "witness of kindness, humility and peace" (p. 218). This position advocates showing a nearness and participation in the life of those who are victims of alienation or violence. This position might be characterized as the no-violence response. A second position or option is seen in those who follow the tradition of Gandhi and Martin Luther King; that is, a **non**-violent reaction to violence. This position seems to see evil as residing not in men but rather in the system and in structures. The work of the Christian is to change the structures and passively resist the violence employed to thwart such change. The third position is one that that is expressed by Torres. This option believes that violence has reached such a state today and in fact has become institutionalized and so much a part of our reality that the only way to counterattack is with another form of violence. " The only way left was recourse to arms " (Ellacuria, p. . Davies, much like Ellacuria, will not choose which option the modern Christian ought to take: "None of this means that we can choose for others. I am not concerned to recommend violent revolution or oppose it in particular situations but to clarify the ground for possible decisions " (p. 5) . Dussel, while not presenting the various options that are possible, does offer the possibility of first seeing that anyone's response is always conditioned by economics, politics and religion. He states, " each individual can discern for himself where his own option lies, if he remains open to the process itself. To avoid the option is to betray our Christian commitment " (p. 165).

One of the common points for the whole discussion of violence is the agreement of all three authors on the reality of institutionalized sinful structures. Davies and Ellacurfa are in agreement that the basic problem of violence is the effect of sin on man and his society. Whether we use the term of Davies, " oppressed consciousness," or that of Ellacuria " aggressiveness," we have effects or roots of sin. Dussel uses terminology more familiar to the reader: "We must realize that sin and its power is oppressing us and forcing us to live in a situation of injustice " (p. 144).

Davies and Dussel make a sound argument for seeing the modern situation in terms of historical development. Dussel devotes a major part of his book to a general and rather quick view of history (pp. 37-135). One just wonders about the thoroughness of this approach, especially since he begins with the neolithic culture and moves to the present. Davies, on the other hand, limits his historical perspective to post-1600.

One last interesting area in the book of Davies is his use of the works of Calvin and Knox in regard to Christians and the use of violence. Oftentimes in Catholic writings this dimension is overlooked. I think that these selections offer a good development of those ideas laid down in the *Secunda Secundae* of Aquinas.

Each of these three works can, of course, be read in its own right. Each work presents a complete and thorough understanding of the con. text of contemporary violence. I might suggest that Dussel could be read first and then either Ellacuria or Davies for greater theological depth. Davies demands much more careful reading and reflection than the other two. Ellacuria presents an interesting and very pastoral approach. These three works will give the reader a good grip on the whole modern problem of violence. Each work enables us to see the theological complexity surrounding the choice which the Christian must make.

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Summa Theologiae. By ST. THOMAS AQUINAS. Latin text, English translation, Introduction, Notes, Appendices, Glossaries and Indices. Published by Blackfriars in conjunction with McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, and Eyre & Spottiswoode, London.

Volume 81. FAITH (QaQae. 1-7). Translated by T. C. O'BRIEN, 1974. Pp. 248. $15.00.

Covering the first seven question on faith, this volume of the *Summa* begins with a step-by-step analysis of just what is the object of faith and what is not. Establishing the formal objective as God Himself as First Truth, St. Thomas goes on to demonstrate that it is not merely a proposition that is known, but that correct epistemology requires knowledge to terminate in reality itself. The question of differentiating between faith and evidence is given attention in a methodical manner, and then the author discusses the role of articles of faith. He does this generally under the rubric of "appropriateness,"-an approach which theology often utilizes when it considers the practice of the Church.

In examining the acts of faith from the perspective of inner and outward acts, the author is careful to show that while belief is principally a reliance on God speaking, yet secondarily and indispensably it is concerned with what He speaks. Here St. Thomas explores the range covered by explicit faith, including the. mystery of the Incarnation and the Trinity. To complete this view there is an investigation into the outward act proper to faith and whether this is necessary for salvation. The fourth question treats of faith as a virtue, asks in what faculty of man it resides, how it is related to charity and the other virtues, theological and intellectual. The fifth deals with the problem of who can have faith: men and angels, devils and heretics, and whether faith can vary from one person to another. The last two questions are concerned with the origin and cause of faith (here the translator indicates St. Thomas's development of view over his previous writings) and with its effects in terms of fear and purification of heart.

At every step of the way the editor and translator, T. C. O'Brien, proves himself to be what we have come to expect: the master. After taking in his brief Introduction to the whole area of faith, one might do well to tackle the Appendices. They are four, and each pinpoints and then probes a key problem in the understanding of St. Thomas. The first appendix sets forth the terminology of scholastic theology (and of St. Thomas) on objects and virtues of faculties, and of faith in particular. The use of the phrase " formal objective " for formal object seems a very useful clarification. The second appendix is a profound investigation of the relationship of faith to grace and to encounter with God. Here he shows the development in St. Thomas's thinking and his dependancy on themes and concepts of Sacred Scripture. Particularly illuminating is the brief account of " two views of faith." Appendix *3* is a rewarding journey through the dark labyrinth of epistemology. The editor's own sure and steady step and the handy light he is able to throw before the reader are fine contributions to the over-all clarity of the entire treatise on faith. The fourth appendix explores the background and the meaning of some traditional theological phrases in this subject area: *cum assensione cogitare,* (where O'Brien seems to differ somewhat with J. Pieper's analysis) and *Credere Deo, credere Deum, credere in Deum.*

Whether the foregoing are the best features of the volume or whether the copious footnotes throughout the text are, is perhaps a moot point. At any rate, in this volume one has the best of both. The contemporaneity of St. Thomas' treatise is sensed repeatedly as O'Brien points out (1) that the author does not work with a hypostatization of the Church (as, e.g. Maritain does?), (2) that the Athanasian Creed is not Athanasian, (3) the difference between the act of faith in one who already has the virtue and the one who is receiving it for the first time, (4) the "appropriateness" of belief, given man's destiny, at least as non-contradictory, (5) that man's capacity for God differs from that of other creatures insofar as they share only in God's goodness, whereas man also is called to share in His blessedness, (6) that faith is a *progress* towards God and that one naturally accepts the teacher before he accepts what he teaches. There are many more informative notes awaiting the reader, valuable insights that promise to make it a pleasurable exploration. On page 100 the translator notes that the Piana reading is " contradictory to the point of the article." I wonder. The objection St. Thomas is dealing with is twofold, and while this variant reading considers only one, yet it appears consistent with the point of the article. There is obviously a limit to how much one can put into a single volume, yet if there could have been more, I would have liked to see a brief comparison between St. Thomas's approach and that of J. H. Newman, with the latter's distinction between notional and real assent. Anyhow, T. C. O'Brien is an exceptional theologian at his best throughout this volume, With remarkable skill and success he accomplishes what the senes as a whole intended to do: to make St. Thomas's own thought more readily accessible to the contemporary reader. Most auspiciously does this book begin the QaQae series.

Volume 32. CONSEQUENCES OF FAITH (2a2ae. 8-16). Translated by THOMAS GILBY, O. P., 1975. Pp. 163. $11.00.

Father Gilby, the general editor of the series, translates and edits this second and concluding volume on the topic of faith, what might be called its corollaries. Question 8 studies the Gift of Understanding. Taking for granted his treatment of the Gifts in the laQae, St. Thomas investigates the relationship of this Gift to faith itself, whether it is something that all men have, or whether it is given only to some people like other charisms described in the New Testament, or whether only these, but also all those in the state of grace have this Gift. The editor notes here that St. Thomas somewhat modified the idea he had expounded in the laQae, so that he no longer distinguishes this Gift from others in terms of contemplative versus practical, but in terms of insight versus judgment. To account for the scriptural and the traditional listings of the beatitudes and fruits of the Spirit, St. Thomas finds a convenient way of correlating them with this and other Gifts of the Holy Spirit. The same basic procedure, now abbreviated, is applied to investigate the Gift of Knowledge. (For no apparent reason, the translator sometimes uses " Knowledge," sometimes " Science.") The longest of the series, Question 10 discusses disbelief in general. It applies principles expounded in the laQae, to show how disbelief is a sin, how it is in the mind (as distinct from the will) and how it can vary from one person to another. The questions asked here can be quite dated in some respects, yet the careful reader as well as the inquiring pastor may find here principles quite consonant with documents of Vatican II on topics of religious freedom, tolerance, ecumenism, etc. For instance, what is one to say of baptism for an infant who is to be adopted? Indeed, St. Thomas's very procedure as a theologian has a bearing on the contemporary theological methodology too, for he takes clearly as his starting point, " The custom of the Church enjoys the greatest authority and ought to be jealously maintained in all matters. The very teaching of Catholic theologians gets its authority from the Church." (p. 77) The next questions, on heresy and apostasy, are surely colored by the times of the author, yet the basic truths enuntiated can be applicable to any time, ours being no exception. The questions treating blasphemy, although in some contemporary manuals given as sins against religion, are here studied as sins against faith and as sharing in its gravity. In this way the author is able to make clear also how this type of sin, insofar as it is against the Holy Spirit, is " more unforgivable " than other mortal sins. Question 15 treats of blindness of mind and dullness of sense, and sees them as opposed to the Gift of Understanding. As the Gift is held to be necessary for salvation, so the privation of it in either way is a sin. And St. Thomas predictably is able to justify Gregory the Great's position that these failings arise from sins of the flesh. The section concludes with a more or less perfunctory investigation as to the appropriateness of the commandments of the Old Law relative to faith and its attendant Gifts.

While it is almost inevitable that there will be printing or typographical errors in works of this sort, my impression is that there has been improvement in this department in the more recent publications of this series. However, one notable error appears on page 9 in this volume, where the English text is bungled, omitting a rather important idea of the Latin: *sed quaedam alia ad fidem ordinata etiam hoc modo intelligi possunt.* Apart from this, the Introduction is as brief as can be (half a page) and the notes are both exceptionally sparse and brief. This criticism has to weigh all the more inasmuch as there is a complete lack of appendices. Still the volume is an integral part of the series and in that respect carries its own weight, and does it substantially.

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From Belief to Understanding: A Study of Anselm's Proslogion *Argument for the Existence of God.* By RICHARD CAMPBELL. Australian National University Press, 1976. Pp. QQ7.

Over the past few decades there has been a renaissance in Anselm studies, both articles and books, in Europe and America. The recognition of the power and depth of Anselm's thought has been responsible for this outburst. And the overwhelming point of much of this study has had to do with one of the most famous arguments, if not the most famous argument, in the history of western philosophical and theological thought. This is the argument for the existence of God found in the beginning of the *Proslogion.*

There has been a wide variety of analyses and assessments of Anselm's proposal. Some have seen serious weakness in *Proslogion* II, particularly concerning the status of existence. Some have seen *Proslogion* I-IV as an unfolding of faith seeking understanding, not an argument for God's existence. Still others have seen such gross fallacies, particularly in *Proslogion* II, that any analysis is so much paper and ink wasted. A dominant motif in our century has been to make a distinction between two arguments in *Proslogion* II and III and though accepting the fallaciousness of the first, many have found the second not only free from the weaknesses of the first but a cogent and valid argument in its own right. Other examinations have found a third argument that supersedes both one and two.

Obviously, all of these claims cannot be true, and there seems to be some urgency for yet another interpretation Recent writers have seen a unity of *Proslogion* II and III which reveals a profound complexity. Campbell's book *From Belief to Understanding* is an attempt to begin with this latter phase of interpretation.

Of course, each interpreter has his or her own theological and philosophical assumptions. Yet one responsibility of any interpreter is to do historical justice to the thinker under question. Campbell claims that " only those understand Plato who philosophize with him " and his aim is to do just that with Anselm (p. 1). Campbell's approach is more historical than philosophical or theological, and his criticisms are largely aimed at the misunderstandings and misinterpretations of other interpreters. His explicit purpose is to give a "new interpretation " of Anselm's argument that will " sweep aside these misconceptions " and will " make it possible to grasp exactly what Anselm's argument is and how it could have appeared plausible to one with as acute a mind as he undoubtedly had" (p. 5). We now turn to Campbell's interpretation.

I

Campbell claims that the first thing we must do is to get the " dialectical structure " of the argument, which includes " three stages," clearly before us (p. 5) . This is to be contrasted to the dominant modern interpretation, as mentioned above, which claims that Anselm gives not one but two or three different arguments. Campbell provides his own translation of *Proslogion* II-IV and indicates in the margins the thesis and stages of the argument (pp. 6-9). The key to Campbell's interpretation is his claim that Anselm sets forth a "single formula" from which the three stages are generated. That is, Anselm is not arguing from a " definition," as so many moderns claim, but sets forth an " initial identification " of the God to whom he is praying (p. 25). It is crucial to understand Campbell's distinction that a " formula" is not a " definition." An important point of a good definition is that the *definiens* state the essential property of the *definiendum.* With the formula, however, one can deny claims about God but this does not provide reasonable grounds for denying claims about the identifying formula (p. 27) . What Anselm is doing is setting forth a formula which he feels no reasonable person can deny and which all can understand. The formula is: "You (God) are 'something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought '" (p. 31). This identification is programmatic and not the starting point of the argument.

The stages, stated succinctly on page 153 and developed in detail in chapters 4, *5,* and 6, are as follows: (1) Stage one begins with Anselm's response to the " fool " who claims there is no God. This is the starting point of the argument. When this self-same fool hears what I say," something-than-which-none-greater-can-be-thought," he understands what he hears. This stage ends with the assertion that that-something-than-which- exists, *existit,* both in the understanding and in reality (p. *95)* . Stage two begins with the claim that that-than-which-none-greater-can-be-thought to be is something which cannot be thought not to be (p. *95).* He concludes this stage with the claim that this is greater than what can be thought not to be. In *Proslogion* II and the first part of *Proslogion* III, Anselm argues that such a nature as something-than-which-none-greater-can-be-thought (cogitari--Campbell translates this " thought " rather than " conceive " but I see no good reason given for the translation) " truly is " and goes on to show that such a nature cannot be thought not to be. Both of these stages deal with an " unnamed something," for it has not been established that God is the only such thing.

Campbell makes two points concerning the dialectical structure of the argument: first, there is the contrast between third person descriptions, which appear in stages I and II, and second person pronouns, which appear in the third stage; second there is the movement from indefinite descriptions in the first two stages to the definite description in stage III.

(3) The third stage begins with the thesis that. God so truly is that he cannot even be thought not to be (p. 19). For if the mind could think of something better, then the creature would rise above the creator, which is absurd. Furthermore, whatever else there is, except God alone, can be thought not to be. Hence, only in the last half of *Proslogion* III is the claim made that God is that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought. *Proslogion* IV merely re-affirms this conclusion. So we have a three-staged argument and stages in a total argument are not alternatives (p. 16) . With this general over-view of Campbell's proposal, we can now critically examine some of the important issues he raises.

II

Contemporary philosophers have been concerned with the philosophy of language, and Campbell shows, as anyone who has studied the *Proslogion* with care knows, that Anselm's philosophy of language reveals profound insights. Anselm's use of the indefinite description: "I say, something-than-which-none-greater-can-be-thought, deals with the significance of words in a public manner, not a subjective or private affair" (p. 40). What words signify is thoughts and thus for Anselm there is a close link between thought and language. Anselm is using the medieval doctrine that this word-act suffices to designate an " intentional object " (p. 43) . In short, thought is specified in terms of words so that from hearing the words we move to understanding them. Words result from our interaction with reality and some parts of reality can be articulated by our understanding. This is Anselm's claim for his formula (p. 219).

A second issue, and one that may come as a surprise to some, is Campbell's argument that. Anselm needs Kant's treatment of " exists " for his argument to be consistent (p. 55) ! Since, " for Kant's reasons, it is crucial to Anselm's argument that existence is not a determining property," then exists " is not a ' real predicate ' " (p. 55) . Furthermore, " Kant did not show that ' exists ' adds nothing to the concept of the subject of an existential judgment" (p. 55). Rather, Anselm uses it as a determining predicate which is added to the subject but does not enlarge it (p. 56) . Anselm's concept of existence is that it "is in reality," i.e., "is in reality" means "to exist " (p. 75) . Since much has been made of a distinction between " existence " in *Proslogion* II and *Proslogion* III, we must examine Campbell's position.

In stage II Anselm is still searching for an understanding of his belief that God is such a being than-which-none-greater-can-be-thought. Campbell notes the shift in terminology between stages I and II from *intellectus* to *cogitari,* from understanding to thought. Anselm now wishes to show the unthinkability of its not being, i. e., that this something cannot be thought not to be. Two new propositions are now introduced: (1) for it can be thought to be something which cannot be thought not to be, (2) which is greater than what can be thought not to be (p. 91). This is a crucial translation for *esse* is not translated to mean "there exists" but "to be." Campbell continues by claiming that Anselm is concerned with the " thought potentials of this thing " and if he had wanted " exists " then he would have used *"existit"* as he had in *Proslogion* II (p. 91). If there are two arguments in *Proslogion* II and III, then do they argue for different conclusions or for the same conclusion? *Proslogion* II argues that there exists something-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought, both in the understanding and in reality but *Proslogion* III argues that this something-than-which-none-greater-can-be-thought so truly is that it cannot even be thought not to be. This latter conclusion is not existential in nature; hence he is not arguing for the existential conclusion in *Proslogion* III as he did in *Proslogion* II. Secondly, stages I and II have proceeded in third person language and thus the very grammar of chapter II ties it closely with the first part of chapter III. Hence *Proslogion* II and the first half of III have different logical characters, " being arguments to different conclusions" (p. 16). But though they are different arguments, they represent two stages in a three-stage argument. The critical point is that there is no existential conclusion in *Proslogion* III, nor can one be derived (p. 120). Hence one must borrow the existential conclusion from *Proslogion* II and since Anselm has already established that existential conclusion, he is now claiming that the existence of this thing "so truly is" that it cannot even be thought not to be (p. !QI).

Anselm does not hold, as Hartshorne seems to indicate that he does hold, that " logically necessary " is the same as " inconceivably otherwise " : " cannot be thought not to be " is not the same as " necessarily exists " (pp. *105,* 104). If Anselm's " cannot be thought not to be " is to imply "logically necessary " then there would be no synthetic *a priori* proposition (p. 107). He concludes that Hartshorne makes the same mistake as Gaunilo by transforming " that-than-which-none-greater-can-be-thought " into " that which is greatest of all things" {p. 108). I wish that he had footnoted this since I know of no place where Hartshorne has performed this Gaunilian feat. And, of course, his claim that Hartshorne is a " covert positivist " also lacks development. Hartshorne, like Malcolm and Barth, makes the *modal* distinction between *two* kinds of existence and claims that *Proslogion* II supports "contingent existence "-it may or may not exist either in the understanding or in reality-but *Proslogion* III substantiates "necessary existence "-it cannot be conceived not to exist. Is Campbell arguing that existence in *Proslogion* II is necessary existence and that *Proslogion* III adds that it 'so truly is' means that it has such a secure ground that it cannot be thought otherwise (p. 121)? If so, then what does *Proslogion* III add to the existence in *Proslogion* II? Whereas Hartshorne, Malcolm, and others are arguing that the status of existence is ambiguous in *Proslogion* II, they go on to argue that it is not vague in *Proslogion* III but "cannot be thought not to be " is "necessary existence." Campbell admits that in two passages of the reply it seems that Anselm means that the two ideas under discussion are equivalent; nevertheless, " the argument is not fully spelt out" (p. llQ). Nothing that Anselm says implies that this thing exists of logical necessity (p. 116). What Anselm is arguing is that ' true being ' is being in the strict and absolute sense, that existence has such a secure and sound ground that it cannot be thought otherwise and thus, ' true being ' concerns the " ground of being " (pp. IQQ, IQ3). Anselm is talking about existence as not derivative and thus dependent, but self-sufficient: its existence is its being. Is there a difference between existence as "independent, self-sufficient or complete" and "necessary existence"? Sufficient existence may be necessary, contingent, or impossible. Certainly Anselm's argument is not that " that thing ' so truly is ' that it cannot be thought not to be " is impossible. His minimal assumption is its possibility. His argument is an effort to indicate the status of divine existence. Nor would contingent existence fulfill the requirement that Anselm lays down since " may or may not be " does not fulfill " that-than-which-none-greater-can-be-thought." Hence, necessary existence would fulfill the requirement that Anselm lays down. (There is a difference between the way Anselm interprets' necessary '-self-sufficient, complete-and Hartshorne's interpretation of necessary as necessarily-somehow-actualized. Both begin with the God of worship to understand God's nature and existence, but Hartshorne's position seems more palatable to the contemporary world.) The upshot of Campbell's discussion is that Anselm does not provide the existential conclusion in *Proslogion* Ill, and the attempt to derive this conclusion on the part of Hartshorne, Malcolm, and others has been "completely demolished" (p. mo). But if the suggestions made above have any validity then the " demolishing " has not been as " complete " as Campbell suggests.

I turn to one last issue, namely, the problem of interpretation. I have said very little about the last three chapters. In chapter 7 Campbell sets forth the formalization of the argument to show its validity. From Anselm's nine premises he develops a set of abbreviations for Anselm's nonlogical vocabulary, then puts forth the logical rules of *modus ponens, modus tollens, reductio ad absurdum,* induction and double negation and demonstrates the formal validity of Anselm's argument. He also makes some helpful suggestions on what we mean by proof. In the last two chapters, " The Force of the Argument " and " The Relevance of the Argument," he is cautious concerning how far Anselm intended to prove or argue for the existence of God, but he does claim against Stotz's negative judgment that a part of Anselm's purpose is to argue for the existence of God (p. 173). He is also cautious about how relevant Anselm is for the contemporary world. It is here that interpretation becomes important. He suggests two approaches: the historical, which deals with textual, exegetical, semantical and historical analysis and hence is uninvolved; the ahistorical, which many contemporaries follow, uses past thinkers as examples and pays little attention to the historical gap (p. Q09). These are "traps that philosophers fall into." Campbell suggests a third posture, namely, Anselm is exploring the intelligibility of the language in which he is articulating his belief and hence he presents us with a " model from which we can learn " (p. Q13). We need to explore " belief in the face of the radical criticism of its intelligibility " (p. Q13).

Another possibility would be as follows: we can ask if Anselm discovered something about the relation of deity to existence and about the relationship of divine existence to ordinary existence, and then further ask, would this be of assistance to our contemporary complex religious situation? The question of God, of the nature and existence of God, has been forcefully raised throughout the past century down to our own day. Anselm's proposal, re-interpreted so as to confront *our* religious, scientific, ontological situation, can be of help in spelling out the theistic context in terms of which we can organize our life and thought. Campbell's book gives some help via the historical meaning of Anselm's proposal; he makes some valuable suggestions from the standpoint of philosophy of language and suggests a three-staged argument interpretation. These are valuable suggestions and worthy of being studied in the ongoing attempt more adequately to understand and appropriate Anselm's proposal for our world.

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Sartre and the Sacred. By THOMAS L. KING. University of Chicago Press, 1974.

This is a good book; I like it. It combines some of the scope of Mauser's commentary with some of the grasp of ontology displayed by Blackham, and that is a noteworthy coupling. King taught me things about some of the portions of Sartre's thought which I know very well. His discussion, in the second chapter, of the introduction to *Being and Nothingness* is a model of clarity, brevity, and insight. His treatment of the major themes of *The Transcendence of the Ego* in the fourth chapter is admirable. In addition, for one who like myself has learned much from Sartre but is not about to read the two thousand pages of Sartre's latest effort on Flaubert, King provides much information. Indeed, it appears to be from the vantage-point of this book that King interprets the other Sartrean texts he uses. But, more importantly, his effort is an improvement on many commentaries on Sartre in that he gives almost equal weight to criticism and to exposition. One is accustomed to reading brilliant expositions of Sartre's thought like those of Desan which are followed by critical sections which suggest that the author never read his own exposition. I will be frank to say that one of the weaknesses of King's work is his almost uncritical use of other critics who make mistakes which he does not make. Perhaps it is the demand placed upon writers of dissertations for " documentation " which leads him to curious moves like citing Merleau-Ponty's uncritical diatribe, "Sartre and Ultra-Bolshevism," instead of the most trenchant criticism of the early Sartre that we have, the chapter called "Interrogation and Dialectic" in *The Visible and the Invisible.* Sartre did not deign to reply to the first and left it to Simone de Beauvoir to set fire to that straw man. On the other hand, Sartre's moving and revealing eulogy, "Merleau-Ponty Vivant," is clearly a response not only to " Eye and Mind " but also to what Sartre knew was the one point over which he and Merleau-Ponty were irrevocably at odds, his identification of consciousness with nothingness.

But this is too good a book to justify more than a few lines of complaint on secondary matters. I applaud the author's understanding of the fact that Sartre's literary efforts should be treated as intense phenomenological description. We have had all too many tracts which have tried vainly to derive Sartre's philosophy from his literature or his literature from his philosophy rather than treating them as two independent moments of the same effort, each of which yields results which the other will not yield. Since Sartre has explicitly said that the kind of effort he made on Flaubert, that is, existential biography, is the proper philosophic genre, which he had to work for forty years to find, King in endorsing the Flaubert book stands out as a critic who takes an author at his word until he has massive evidence that he should not do so. That virtue does have the vice of weakening those chapters of the book where King relies heavily on the book on Genet and that on Baudelaire. Sartre has also said explicitly that, when he wrote those books, he did not have the proper tools for social analysis that he forged in writing *Critique de la raison dialectique.* It was indeed Merleau-Ponty who turned Sartre to this task in the late forties and early fifties but the task was not accomplished until the writing of the *Critique.* But King knows that, as an expositor, he is also an interpreter, and he is clearly aware that there is no such thing as *the* interpretation, even though not every interpretation is equally admissible. As an unusually accurate interpreter, he is allowed to use these texts of Sartre to emphasize one of the major points of his book, namely, that Sartre's refusal of the sacred is not a neglect of that aspect of the life-world but an acknowledgment of it.

The problem, of course, is how that acknowledged aspect is to be understood. Following the mystic tradition of which he is a student, King tells us that the sacred is at least the significantly other. That characterization is clearly insufficient. The air in which we live and breathe and have our being is significantly other than any human being or the collection of human beings, as are a few other things like electromagnetic fields. No, I am not being sarcastic. The point to the experience of the sacred is not that it is other but what kind of other it is. That is why Sartre locates the experience of the sacred in the human other. Objects of a merely physical type no more make me to be an object than they oppress me. Only beings which are *also* subjectivities do that. King points out rightly that Sartre has always found the human other a threat without sufficiently noting that the same imperviousness which makes the other a threat also makes him an opportunity. Sartre came close to overcoming that omission in *ORD* by employing something else he learned from Merleau-Ponty: that to constitute is to be constituted, and since the human is his *praxis*, that is, he is a constituting being, he is also constituted. King shows his awareness of this conception when he emphasizes the claim Sartre makes in *CRD* that men make their own history. But King neglects the other half of that epigram with which Sartre begins the book: "History makes men precisely insofar as men make history." I am not sure of the reason for this omission unless it is because King does not seem to have taken the idea which Sartre learned from Hegel that negation is a joining as well as a separating as seriously as Sartre does. Had he done so, he would have had additional support for his correct contention that Sartre's views are to be regarded as developmental rather than as a series of radical conversions.

I am suggesting, of course, that Sartre remains devoted to the irreducibility of the pairs of opposites and that is one place where I fear King and I are on a collision course. His last chapter strongly suggests that Sartre allows and perhaps even envisions an eventual reconciliation of the opposites. Quite frankly, if he has done that in the Flaubert book, I am both astounded and dismayed. I would not be surprised to find that book presenting another necessarily temporary dialectical synthesis resulting from the *overemphasis* on the social in *CRD,* just as *CRD* represents an antithesis resulting from the *overemphasis* upon the individual in *BN.* King's account of the Flaubert book does not forbid that reading, and I much prefer it, since in Hegelian dialectic the move from one stage to another is by the personal and impersonal overemphasis upon the prior stage. I can, however, understand King's preference since his major goal in this book is to show that Sartre and the mystic tradition are not entirely incompatible even though mystics have most often sought to deny the final validity of the pairs of opposites, either through reconciliation or through escape from the wheel. King also sees clearly that this is an issue contingent upon the decision one makes about the chief point of dispute between Sartre and the rest of those whom others have called " existentialists." Their contention has been that the experience of nothingness carries as an integral aspect a negative affective tonality which *is itself* a motive for looking beyond the pairs of opposites. Even Merlean-Ponty, in what we have of the last revision of his thought, appears to be headed in that direction. Sartre has always opposed this aspiration, insisting that the affective tone of the experience is due in part to what the human brings to it, that is, to his freedom. As Merleau-Ponty so aptly put it, Sartre's dialectic is "truncated." There is and can be no final synthesis. But let me add immediately that King is an honest broker. He says bluntly that he is not trying to make Sartre into a mystic or even an unknowing Christian. What he has tried to do is to show that Sartre's concern with the sacred and even with a particular Christian variety of the sacred makes him one from whom the most dedicated of the faithful can learn. Sartre is the Other but he is not the Enemy.

There is much more to this book than I have mentioned, of course, including sensitive treatments of some of Sartre's literary efforts and informative renderings of some of the concerns of mystics both east and west. Because the book is a good one, I have discussed only King's major themes. Let me conclude this review by recalling that at its outset I remarked that King's effort is notable because it is a judicious mixture of exposition and criticism. I strongly suspect that in some of the places where I have taken issue with the author my doing so stems from the fact that the book is that combination but only that. It does not reflect any lengthy speculative or creative effort in philosophy. I realize that the context in which doctoral dissertations are written is scarely conducive to such effort, so that King cannot be held entirely and perhaps not even primarily responsible for this omission. Nevertheless, there is nothing like wrestling with a problem yourself to help you to understand more fully what another man does when he deals with it. I think that King has another good book in him-a book by King on the issues, not a book by King on somebody else. If he writes that book, I will read it, and if he writes another book on Sartre after he does that one, I will read it too, because it will be even better than this one. Meanwhile I urge the reader to buy *Sartre and the Sacred.* It is well worth the time and effort.

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Reason and Argument. By P. T. GEACH. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976. Pp. 99.

This cultivated, this delightful, this droll little book has but one drawback: what to do with it. One could not use it as an introductory logic text-except for Chapters 10-16 and perhaps 17. But even here the propositional calculus is treated in streamlined and cursory fashion and the presentation is a quick sketch. One could not apply its offerings to the understanding of judgment, belief, certainty, or evidential confirmation; for the book fails to distinguish adequately among explicit, implicit, dispositional, conscious, *de dicto, de re,* and all the other standard dichotomies of belief which flourish in contemporary philosophy. Nor can it be called a catalogue of epistemological or logical results. And although each of its splendidly terse chapters concludes with interesting discussion questions, it is too charming to be a textbook. It is, as the author says in his introduction, a book for self-improvement to give the reader enough formal logic to encourage the hope and the desire for rationality but enough informal logic to leave him eased with the thought that good logic is not necessarily the preserve of specialists or a form of abstract art arising out of *Principia Mathematica.*

The book has nineteen chapters with an average length of three to five pages per chapter. Fundamental epistemological and logical topics are touched on and the orientation is toward acknowledgment of correct forms, themes, and schemes for reasoning and away from formal preciosity. All topics are presented heuristically and the author has used both Venn Diagrams and Lewis Carroll Cells, the latter to particular advantage in representing multi-termed arguments and in analysing valid plurative arguments-those making quantificational use of terms like " most " and " more than half of." The reviewer knows of no book similar in purpose and in length which gives such substantial treatment to plurative arguments.

The printing and binding are very good and the typefaces are easy to read. Most typographical errors are negligible except for one on page 86 where *Tractatus* proposition is incorrectly referred to as and the reviewer feels that the German original should have appeared in a footnote. The book is recommended as a supplement to a standard logic text in an introductory course and as a fine useful primer to any reader interested in logic but wary of technicalities.

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Aristotle on Emotion. By W. W. FORTENBAUGH. New York: Harper & Row, 1975. Pp. 101.

The major thesis of this book is that a more rigorous and sophisticated examination of the emotions was begun in the Academy in Plato's old age, and is reflected in his *Philebus* and *Laws,* and this interest was intellectually consummated in Aristotle. Further, it is Aristotle's solution of the relationship of intellectual work and the emotional life that has the most important implications for his views of the natures and purposes of art, politics, ethics, language, etc.

Professor Fortenbaugh briefly discusses some of the many passages in Plato's "Socratic" and middle dialogues which set forth a view of the opposition of reason and emotions; for example, in *Republic* 604a10ff, Plato extends the supposition of opposition between reason and emotion in an argument against the arts, especially tragedy and comedy. The intensity of the emotions that these bring forward (and their quality) disturbs rational order, for the individual and, consequently, for the body politic. Following Plato's ensuing suggestions in the later dialogues, Aristotle sees a cooperative relationship rather than an opposed relationship between intellectual work and the emotions in a healthy human being. Art, for example, serves the bio-social functioning of the individual and thus is given not only a legitimate but also a necessary place within the state.

Generally speaking the book is interesting but overly brief. Its brevity does much to limit or scuttle crucial themes connected with the topic, especially Aristotle's view of choice *(proairesis)* as a combination of the passional and the intellectual *(orektikos nous* or *orexis dianoiatika, NE* 1139a32) and, with such a discussion, the explanation Aristotle provides for weakness of the will *(acracia).* Indeed, Professor Fortenbaugh's failure to attend to these properly cannot be quite excused by brevity, for it is a failure to deal with the topic at a central albeit difficult point. As such, it indicates a superficiality which makes inroads in the overall suggestiveness of the book.

It would also be fair to criticize the book for its slighting a genuine tension in Plato's pre-old-age discussions of the problem of emotion. I don't want to impose my own theory of this matter for that would be especially unfair since the book is primarily concerned with Aristotle and not Plato. Nevertheless, there is obviously an emotion which is harmonious and correlated with intellectual vision by Plato: the emotion of beauty (and/or love). That the book makes no mention of this is because, it seems, in its brevity, it cannot explore the complex matter of the restrictions and demands on Plato and Aristotle arising from the levels on which their discussions are pursued. A lengthier work is needed for this important matter.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

Beauchesne: *De la Connaissance selon S. Thomas d'Aquin,* by Joseph Moreau. Pp. 132; n. p.

Beck: *De Generatione et Corruptione: Expositio D. Thomae Aquinatis in Libros Aristotelis,* edited by F. E. Kelley. Pp. 211; DM 45.00.

University of California Press: *Truth and Ideology,* by Hans Barth. Pp. 201; $12.95.

Fortress Press: *Karl Barth: His Life from Letters and Autobiographical Texts,* by Eberhard Busch. Pp. 569; $19.95.

Griiner: *The Problem of the Contingency of the World in Husserl's Phenomenology,* by Sang-ki Kim. Pp. VIII, 102; $12.95.

Herder: *Die Heilsbewurftigkeit des Menschen: A_nthropologische Vorfragen zur,* by P. Welte. Pp. 144; DM 25.00. *Der Tod Jesu: Deutungen im Neuen Testament,* by K. Kertelge. Pp. 233; DM 34.00.

University of Indiana Press: *Imagining,* by Edward S. Casey. Pp. 240; $12.50.

Lang: *Theological Aesthetics: The Role of Aesthetics in the Theological Method of Hans Urs von Balthasar,* by J. A. Kay. Pp. 105; Fr.19.80.

University of Oklahoma Press: *Bonaventure and Aquinas: Enduring Philosophers,* edited with Introduction by R. W. Shanan and F. J. Kovach. Pp. 194; $9.95 cloth, $3.95 paper.

University of Ottawa Press: *The Sexual Language: An Essay in Moral Theology,* by Andre Guindon. Pp. 276; n. p.

Pennsylvania State University Press: *Intentionality: A Study of Mental Acts,* by Richard E. Aquila. Pp. 168; $13.50.

Princeton University Press: *A Theory of Human Action,* by Alvin I. Goldman. Pp. 230; $3.95 paper.

Purdue University Press: *Phenomenology and Literature: An Introduction,* by Robert R. Magliola. Pp. 208; $10.95.

Editions Rodopi: *A Study of Literary God-Talk,* by Thomas F. Merrill. Pp. 201; n. p.

Schocken Books: *Readings in the Philosophy of Moses Maimonides.* Pp. 464; $5.95 paper.

Van Gorcum: *Providentia Divina: The Theme of Divine Pronoia in Plato and Aristotle,* by A. P. Bos. Pp. 36; Dfl.6.30.

Yale University Press: *Treatise on the Passion; Treatise on the Blessed Body; Instruction and Prayers,* Vol. 13, *The Yale Edition of the Complete Works of Thomas More,* edited by Garry E. Haupt. Pp. 364; $35.00.