STRUCTURALISM IN BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION AND THEOLOGY

NOTHING IS MORE characteristic 0£ contemporary biblical interpretation than the emergence of new methodologies designed to open new arenas for research. As interpreters have adopted new approaches, they have become increasingly self-conscious about the methods and presuppositions at work in the analyses they undertake. A symptom of this self-consciousness in American biblical interpretation has been the publication, by Fortress Press in Philadelphia, of a series entitled Guides to Biblical Scholarship. At first the perimeters of the series appeared to be clear cut. The dominant methods were ready at hand: textual criticism, literary (source) criticism, form criticism, and redaction (composition) criticism.[1] But when Beardslee and Habel wrote the books on literary criticism, when Tucker wrote the book on Old Testament form criticism, and when Perrin wrote the book on New Testament redaction criticism, they found themselves defining the literary nature of the biblical materials in broader terms than the traditional practitioners of biblical literary-historical criticism.

The shift in these books indicates that the cultural context of interpretation is on the move. Interpreters are remolding literary-historical methods on the basis of new perceptions in the culture. The author of a recent issue in the NT section of

[1] The editor of the Old Testament contributions is Gene M. Tucker; the New Testament, Dan 0. Via, Jr. The series., through most of 1976, contained the following books: Ralph W. Klein, *Textual Criticism of the OT* (1974); Norman Habel, *Literary Criticism of the OT* (1971); William A. Beardslee, *Literary· Criticism of the NT* (1970); Gene M. Tucker, *Form Criticism of the OT* (1971); Walter E. Rast, *Tradition History and the OT* Edgar V. McKnight, *What is Form Criticism?* (1969); William G. Doty,, *Letters in Primitive Christianity* (1973); Norman Perrin, *What is Redaction Criticism* (1969); J. Maxwell Miller, *The OT and the Historian* (1976); Edgar Krentz, *The Historical-Critical Method* (1975).

the series asserts that interpreters must recognize the new cultural setting for interpretation and refashion methodology to accommodate the new perceptions. The new method is " structural exegesis," and the author of the book claims that " the very introduction of structural methods in exegesis implies a shift in the exegete's preunderstanding of the biblical text." [2]

By now it is evident that a revolution, in the sense of T. S. Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,* is occurring in the field of biblical study. [3] During this kind of revolution V'arious groups and interpreters emerge with distinctive forms of the new methodology. [4] It is necessary for such variety to emerge, since various combinations of analysis and synthesis constitute any mature area of study. This situation, however, makes every explanation of the transition run the risk of being an oversimplification.

This article explores implications of structural exegesis for biblical interpretation and theology during the last quarter of the twentieth century. The author presupposes that future methods will employ certain kinds of structural techniques of analysis and synthesis, though it is a matter of debate whether structural techniques will dominate the field or be incorporated with other techniques. Since structural study is invading virtually every area of study, [5] it is impossible to cover even a majority of areas which relate to biblical interpretation and

[2] Daniel Patte, *What is Structural Exegesis?* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1976), p. 1. This study has heen expanded as *Structural Exegesis: From Theory to, Practice* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1978) with a French parallel, *Pour une Exegese Structurale* (Paris: Seuil, 1978) .

[3] This work is part of a series entitled "International Encyclopedia of Unified Science," Vol. !'!, No. !'! (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1970). The nature of scientific revolutions is discussed, pp. 9!'!-173. Though references to this book are "in the air" in discussions of methodology, J. D. Crossan referred explicitly to this book, and outlined the nature of the "revolution " in biblical studies as he sees it, at a meeting of the Chicago Society of Biblical Research, February 19, 1977.

[4] *Ibid.,* p. 76. He further indicates, p. 1, that there must he a long fermentation period where two major disciplines compete.

[5] An excellent collection of essays which shows the broad spectrum of structural studies is found in *Introduction to Structuralism,* ed. Michael Lane (Harper Torchbooks; New York: Basic Books, 1970).

theological formulation. The methodological transition will be discussed on the basis of books and articles recently published in America-some which are authored by Americans and some which are translations of French or German publications.

FROM HISTORICAL PARADIGM TO LINGUISTIC PARADIGM

Structural analysis, according to most interpreters, seeks understanding within a linguistic paradigm rather than a historical paradigm.[6] Over the past two hundred years a historical paradigm has been establishing itself as the perceptual framework in which biblical study proceeds. The key to a historical paradigm is the perception that all things result, over a period of time, from a cause or causes.

The first method to emerge within the historical paradigm was textual criticism. The method arose when interpreters discovered that the wording of books in the Bible varied from manuscript to manuscript, and often the variations were a touching point for differing theologies. The conclusion arose that variations had been produced through a complex process of alteration and error. The reproduction of manuscripts without benefit of the modern printing press caused variations in wording. Textual critics developed a scientifically precise method for unravelling the genetic process whereby corruptions of the earliest text were present in 15th and 16th century manuscripts.[7]

Literary-historical study of the Bible gradually moved from textual criticism to literary criticism. Literary criticism arose in the study of the narrative books in the OT and the NT. This analysis was designed to discover the historical process through which the biblical documents came into existence. Duplications in OT stories led to the isolation of strands of narrative tradition

[6] See Patte, *Structural Exegesis*<., pp. 1-20. To understand how the term "paradigm" is being used in this section, see Kuhn, *Scientific Revolutions*, pp. 10-51.

[7] See W. G. Kiimmel, *The New Testament: The History of the Investigations of its Problems* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1972), pp. 40-50. B. M. Metzger, *The Text of the New Testament: Its Transmission, Corruption and Restoration* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 95-246.

which had been incorporated into the narrative books, and chronological dates were established for these strands in order to facilitate the reconstruction of the history of Israel.[8] Extensive word for word agreement between Matthew, Mark, and Luke convinced NT interpreters that some kind of direct literary dependence existed between these Gospels. Extensive analysis produced the majority view that Matthew and Luke had used copies of Mark and a sayings source as they composed their Gospels. Chronological dates were as.signed to these sources, and this dating became an important ingredient for writing the history of earliest Christianity.[9] Literary analysis was performed in direct consort with historical perceptions. While the text critic had accepted the challenge to write the history of the textual variants, the literary critic analyzed the biblical books to discover the sources which had been used for their composition. By assigning da.tes to the sources, new insight was gained into the history of Israel and early Christianity.

The historical paradigm began to raise even further possibilities for uncovering the detailed history of Israel and early Christianity. Reasonable success with textual criticism and literary criticism encouraged the interpreter to write the history of individual sayings and stories from their earliest setting to their incorporation into a source which was used by a later author. The earliest setting for these materials was perceived to be oral, and form criticism arose as the method whereby information about the oral settings was gathered. The form critic searched for the situation in the life of the people in which the saying or story received its particular form.[10] For the form critic, the conclusions about the existence of written sources

[8] See 0. Eiss£eldt, *The Old Testament: An Introduction* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), pp. 171-!'l09, 219-241.

•See P. Feine, J. Behm, W. G. Kiimmel, *Introduction to the New Testament* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1966), pp. 88-58, 70-71, 84, 105-106, 132-188.

[10] See *Old Testament Form Criticism,* ed. J. H. Hayes (San Antonio: Trinity University, 1974); W. G. Doty, *Contemporary Nmo Testament Interpretation* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1972), pp. 58-69; McKnight, *Form Criticism,* pp. 21-88, 51-56.

had to be accommodated to the results of the history of a saying or story as it was revealed through form analysis. The form critic applied his analytical tools within the framework of textual and literary criticism, and the challenge was to use each method as a complement to the other for the purpose of clarifying aspects of the history of the religious community.

The most recent literary-historical method has been redaction or composition criticism.[11] This method arose from an interest in displaying the forces at work in the composition of the final documents. Analysis of manuscripts, literary sources, and oral forms had left the documents without holistic interpretation. The redaction critic begins by accumulating information with regard to the alteration and rearrangement which an author performed on a written source (editing or redacting) and he moves on to observe the characteristic vocabulary and phraseology of the author (style of composition). In addition, the interpreter gathers statistics about characteristic vocabulary and phraseology, and he analyzes the structure and arrangement of stories and sayings. These data are the basis for identifying the literary, theological, social, and historical forces at work as the author composed the document. With this methodology, literary analysis within a historical paradigm has come full circle. The initial concern was the exact wording of each verse, and this analysis led deeper and deeper into the history that produced parts of the texts until interpreters set the goal of understanding the complex factors which were at work in the composition of entire books.

During the past one hundred years, these methods have gradually attained the status of being central for understanding biblical literature with integrity.[12] These disciplines were nurtured by Protestantism, and they have become a standard feature of Roman Catholic biblical interpretation.[13] This is the

[11] See N. Perrin, *Redaction Criticism,* pp.

[12] Van A. Harvey, *The HisfJorian and the Believer* (New York: Macmillan, 1966). The subtitle of the book is " The Morality of Historical Knowledge and Christian Belief."

"R. E. Brown, J. A. Fitzmyer, R. E. Murphy, *The Jerome Biblical, Commentary* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. xvii: "It is no secret that the

manner in which a paradigm establishes itself within a mature discipline of study and research.[14] Within this paradigm, literary-historical analysis has been considered the natural base for a hermeneutic of the biblical texts. If the steps from exegesis to theology are difficult, the theologian has accepted the task with courage and creativity.

Especially during the last *25* years, however, biblical interpreters have been searching for broader methods to explore literary, theological and religious-philosophical aspects of the biblical material. Amos Wilder has persistently encouraged a more general literary approach to NT literature, and his proposal has borne rich fruit during the last decade.[15] Ernst Fuchs and Gerhard Ebeling have searched for a more theological method of interpretation based on the power of "word," and their efforts are manifest in a number of works consciously unfolding a "theological hermeneutic."[16] Also, biblical interpreters have been aware that Edmund Leach wrote essays on "The Legitimacy of Solomon" and "Genesis as Myth" using a "structural anthropological" method.[11] But only within the last five years

last fifteen or twenty years have seen almost a revolution in Catholic biblical studies-a revolution encouraged by authority, for its Magna Carta was the encyclical *Divina Af]lante Spiritu* (1943) of Pope Pius XII. The principles of literary and historical criticism, so long regarded with suspicion, are now, at last, accepted and applied by Catholic exegetes." Cf. Ktimmel, *New Testament: The History*, pp. Ul0-406; Krentz, *Historical-Critical Method*, pp. 1-5.

[14] Kuhn, *Scientific Revolutions*, pp. 10-34.

[15] Amos Wilder, *Early Christian Rhetoric: The Language of the Gospel* (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1971); *Grace Confounding* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1972); *Theopoetic: Theology and thtJ Rdigious Imagination of Our Time* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1976); Dan 0. Via, Jr., *The Parables: Their Literary and Existential Dimension* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1967); J. D. Crossan, *In Parables* (New York: Harper & Row, 1973); R. C. Tannehill *The Sw01·d of His Mouth* (Philadelphia and Missoula: Fortress and Scholars, 1975); R. W. Funk, *Jesus as Precursor* (Philadelphia and Missoula: Fortress and Scholars, 1975); N. Perrin, *Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1976).

[16] E. Fuchs, *Zum Hermeneutischem Problem in de;r Theologie; Die existentiale Interpretation* (Ttibingen: Mohr, 1959); G. Ebeling, *Introduction to a Theological Theory of Language* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1973); R. W. Funk, *Language, Hermeneutic, and Word of God* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966); P. J. Achtemeier, *An Introduction to the New Hermeneutic* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1969).

[17] E. Leach," Legitimacy of Solomon: Some Structural Aspects of Old Testament

has " structuralism " become a serious methodological term within the arena of American biblical interpretation. By now, structural exegesis is gaining .such a foothold that biblical interpreters enter into detailed comparison of structural exegesis with literary-historical analyses of the same texts.[18]

Instead of understanding biblical texts as compositions arranged over time, the structural exegete perceives biblical literature as the linguistic expression of structures of meaning. These structures of meaning work, in one way or another, among all beings who communicate through language. In other words, as a per.son speaks a sentence and people understand him, so also religious people in Israel and Christianity told stories and recited hymnic or proverbial speech, and people in that cultural area and in many others at later times understood and participated in the meaning which had come to expression in, those texts. The model for under.standing Israel and Christianity, therefore, is language rather than history, and the systematic study of language arises out of the question, " How is it possible for people to cofilmunicate by speaking sounds in a sequence?"

When language rather than chronology becomes the model for understanding, the exegete seeks to explain the presence and interrelation of semiological systems in biblical texts. A semiological system is an organized system of signs *(semeia).* The fundamental semiological system is language. Words are signs which signify meaning referents.[19] A semiological .system is a functional system. Its function is communication. In order for the constituents of a semiological system to function as communicators, they are set forth in structured relations. These structured are semiotic structures, and they reflect underlying meaning structures.

History," *European Journal of Sociology,* 7 (1966), pp. 58-101. *Genesis as Myth and Other Essays* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1969).

[18] See *Interpretation,* 28, No. 2 (April, 1974); *Semeia:,* 1-2 (1974); *Structural Analysis and Biblical Exegesis,* ed. R. Barthes et al. (Pittsburgh Theological Monograph Series, 8; Pittsburgh: Pickwick, 1974); *Biblical Research,* 22 (1977).

[19] Patte, *Structural Exegesis,* pp. 27-80.

The common ground for the literary-historical exegete and the structural exegete is the text, and both seek to interpret the text with precision. But the structural exegete approaches the text with an interest in its particular expression of structures of meaning which make it possible to understand any text. Structural analysis begins with investigation of a particular semiological system. To analyze a story completely, an interpreter must investigate at least three semiological systems: (a) the narrative system; (b) the cultural or mythical system; and (c) the semantic system.

A sample of analysis on the level of the narrative system may demonstrate the procedure.[20] One of the most well worked texts in American circles to establish the fruitfulness of structural exegesis is the parable of the Good Samaritan (Lk **10:** 30-35). Analysis of the parable begins by detecting the basic functions of narration which exist in Lk 10: *30-35.* The opening verse (10:30) relates that a man departs from Jerusalem in anticipation of arriving in Jericho. Thus, the entire story emerges within the structure of departure and arrival, and we expect the final sequence of the story to have emerged out of successful arrival at Jericho. Since the final verse **(10:** 35) relates that the man is still at an inn and has not yet arrived at Jericho, the entire story occurs within the departure/ arrival structure which was introduced in the first verse. The structuralist starts, then, with the initial observation that departure / arrival is a basic function within narrativity.

Interruption of the arrival of the man in Jericho creates the setting in which other people participate in the action. Robbers, a priest, a Levite, and a Samaritan come into the story from somewhere (we do not know from where), and the first three arrive and depart. But the structural interpreter perceives that there is a different dynamic within the arrival and departure of these people. Arrival of the robbers brought about a confrontation between the robbers and the traveling man, and

••This analysis is based on *ibid.,* pp. 37-41. The initial debates over the structural analysis of the Parable of the Good Samaritan are found in *Semeia*

through this confrontation they deprived the man of his ability to continue traveling. Here the structuralist perceives five more functions: confrontation, conjunction/ disjunction, deprivation/ attribution, mandating/ acceptance or refusal, and domination/ submission. The robbers *confronted* the traveling man and deprived him of the physical well-being which gave him the power to travel. Through this action the narration raises a *mandate* for someone to help the wounded man. As the priest, Levite, and Samaritan arrive, the question is whether or not they will *conjoin* with the wounded man and attempt to *attribute* to him that of which he has been *deprived* (health) or *disjoin* from the wounded man to go on their way. In other words, confrontation has interrupted the departure / arrival structure. Through confrontation, the traveling man was deprived of the ability to continue the initial structure of departure / arrival. Both the priest and Levite disjoin the action, thus refusing the mandate raised by the action. The Samaritan conjoins with the action, accepts the mandate raised by the narration, and attempts to attribute to the wounded man that of which he has been deprived. As the narrative ends, it appears that the story will not allow the action of the robbers to dominate. The story teller presents a protagonist who dominates (potentially) over the robbers.

This analysis suggests that six meaning structures underlie the narrative account: (1) departure/ arrival; (2) confrontation; (8) deprivation/ attribution; (4) mandating/ acceptance or refusal; (5) conjunction/ disjunction; and (6) domination/ .submission. This analysis implies that we understand this story because we understand these meaning structures. The goal of the analysis has simply been to discover the meaning structures which we use. When we have discovered the meaning structures which make it possible for us to understand the story, then we can move beyond the narrative system to other semiological systems.

Before moving on, however, we must take one more look at the structure of narrativity. Through the action in the story,

someone is attempting to communicate a message to a listener. Therefore, the act of telling the story, or writing it, introduces another meaning structure: communication/reception. As soon as we hear or read the first words of the story, we know that someone wants to communicate a message by telling a story. Or, if we do not" know" this, we" presuppose" it. The structural exegete brings this presupposition to systematic expression, and thus a seventh meaning structure underlies this narrative account: communication / reception.

If a person perceives this analysis of the parable of the Good Samaritan to be entirely foreign to his or her sensibilities, one of the reasons may be that he or she has usually come to the Bible with literary-historical questions. In fact, literary-historical understanding has become the important base for nurturing a life of faith or formulating theology. In other words, not only biblical interpreters but also believers and theologians have thought, spoken, and written primarily within a historical paradigm for understanding. In contrast, structural analysis is conducted out of a desire to understand how communication takes place at all. The presupposition is that if we know how communication takes place, perhaps we can begin to understand the fundamental relation of religious understanding to other kinds of understanding. The analyst is concerned to know what semiological systems make it possible for people to understand the story. Thus, he approaches the text within a linguistic paradigm. If, through analysis, he discovers the way in which systems of communication are functioning in biblical material, comparison of this material with other material anywhere and everywhere may help us to understand with precision the likenesses and differences which exist, in terms of structures of meaning, between biblical literature and other literature, both religious and secular.

BIBLICAL ANALYSIS IN A NEW KEY

Once the structural e:x;egete begins to analyze a story to display the systems of communication which function in it, he or

she may choose to proceed in a number of different ways. In the analysis of the parable of the Good Samaritan, Patte prefers to use a model of narrative structure proposed by A.-J. Greimas.[21] This model applies the principle of binary opposition to the spheres of action of the main characters in the story. In turn, Greimas'.s work is an extension, with modifications, of V. Propp's analysis of Russian folktales. Propp, desiring to produce a system of classification for folktales, concluded that the *functions* of the characters rather than thematic features or characters *per se,* are the constant dimension within narratives.[22] Greimas, on the basis of Propp's analysis. of Russian folktales and E. Souriau's analysis of 200,000 dramatic .situations in classical play.s,[23] has applied a rigorous deductive methodology for the purpose of establitihing structural analysis as a theoretical science similar to that of the physicist.[24] Greimas proposes that it is possible to reduce all of the *functions* within narratives to seven "canonical functions."[25] All of these functions are at least partially man.ifested in the parable of the Good Samaritan, and they have already been introduced in the previous section.

The deductive procedure includes one further dimension. The functions of narrative have their matrix within actions of characters. Again, the specific actions and the specific characters are not the point of interest. Underlying all actions and characters are a limited number of roles which any character may

[21] A.-J. Greimas, *Semantique structural: Recherche de methode* (Paris: Larousse, 1966); *Du sens: Essais semW.tiques* (Paris: Seuil, 1970); "The Interpretation of Myth: Theory and Practice," in *Structural Analysis of Oral Tradition,* ed. P. Maranda and E. Kongas Maranda (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1971), pp. 81-Ul; "Les actants, les acteurs et les figures," in *Semiotique narrative at textuelle,* ed. C. Chabrol (Paris: Larousse, 1973). See Patte, *ibid.,* pp.

[22] V. Propp, *Morphology of the Folktale* (Austin: University of Texas, 1968); " Transformations in Fairy Tales," in *Readings in Russian Poetics,* ed. L. Matejka and K. Pomorska (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1971), pp. 94-114. See P. Ricoeur, "Biblical Hermeneutics," *Semeia,* 4 (1975), pp. 39-50.

[23] E. Souriau, *Les deux mille situations dramatiques* (Paris: Flammarion, 1950).

[2]. See J. Calloud, *Structural Analysis of Narrative* (Philadelphia and Missoula: Fortress and Scholars, 1976), pp. xi-xv.

[25] See *ibid.,* pp. 14-18; Patte, *Structural Exegesis,* pp. 40-41.

fill. For example, the character may be the subject of the action, or he may receive the object of the action. Greimas, using Lucien Tesniere's analysis of a sentence as a drama which includes a process, actors, and circumstances, [26] has constructed an *actantial model* which reduces all " actantial roles," " spheres of action," or "actants" (varying terminology for the same dimension) to six structural constants. The six actants, plus the direction in which actants influence one another, form the actantial model. The model, with its manifestation in the parable of the Good Samaritan, looks like this: [21]

SENDER	OBJECT	RECEIVER
(?)	(Health)	(Wounded Man)
	t	
HELPER	SUBJECT	OPPONENT
(donkey, oil, wine, money, innkeeper)	(Samaritan)	(Robbers and effect of their action)

Using this model, the exegete hopes to display the structure of the overall action which occurs in the narrative. The arrows in the diagram show the direction in which three kinds of underlying action move. Each kind of action is called an axis. The arrows on the top line display the axis of communication in the narrative: a Sender is .sending an Object to a Receiver. In Patte's application of this model to the parable of the Good Samaritan, someone (through Jesus' telling of the story) is attempting to *send* health (the object) to a wounded man (the receiver) . Patte indicates that the Sender is often hidden or abstract. The Sender of a communication through a story is often God, chance, a society as a whole, or conscience. [28] In this story it would appear to be God or the ideals of the Jewish community as they come to expression through Jesus. The arrow from the Subject to the Object displays the axis of volition: a Samaritan (subject) *wants* to bestow health (ob-

[26] L. Tesnier.e, *Elements de syntaxe 11tructurale* (Paris: Klincksieck, 1959). See Ricoeur, "Biblical Hermeneutics," p. 46.

[27] Patte, *ibid.,* pp. 41-52; "Structural Network in Narrative: The Good Samaritan," *Soundings,* 48 (1975), pp. 221-242.

[28] Patte, *ibid.,* p. 43.

ject). The Subject of the narrative is not the Sender of the communication; rather he projects the Object which the Sender is attempting to send to a Receiver. The arrows on the bottom line display the axis of power: the Subject wants' to do something, but he can only do it if he has the power which enables it. The Opponents of his action are the robbers and the effects of their action. Only if the Samaritan has the power to overcome that which the robbers have done, can his volition become action. The Samaritan has a number of Helpers: know-how, oil, wine, donkey, money, innkeeper. They contribute to his power to overcome the forces which have caused the problem.

Immediately the question arises, " What is the value of this analysis for understanding the parable of the Good Samaritan?" Patte admits that this analysis is not yet exegesis, but he considers it to be " the necessary prelude " to a mythical and semantic analysis. The foregoing exploration has analyzed simply the functional and actantial structure of the narrative. Therefore, " meaning" has not yet become the object of the analysis. Patte considers this analytical procedure to provide the means by which subtypes of narrative genre can be identified. Through an extensive application of the actantial model to discover the pattern with which functions and actants are manifested within texts, he envisions the possibility of distinguishing among "evangelical parables, example stories, Jewish parables, and Hellenistic parables " in the field of NT study.[20] The dominance of a particular subtype of narrative within Christianity or Judaism would contribute to our understanding of the basic message communicated by these historic groups.

FROM NARRATIVE STRUCTURE TO MYTHICAL AND SEMANTIC STRUCTURE

For the structuralist, exegetical results begin to appear when the analysis moves to the level of mythical structure and semantic structure (the second and third semiological systems). Ex-

[29] *Ibid.,* p.

actly how the analysis should move from narrative structure to these two other levels of structure is a matter of some debate. Patte suggests thatLevi-Strauss's transformational model, which displays a fundamental opposition and its resolution through a series of secondary oppositions, should be the means of making the transition to the mythical structure.[30] Levi-Strauss proposed that the trickster figure in American mythology could be understood through this model:

Initial Polarity Life	First Triad	Second Triad
	Agriculture	
		Herbivorous animals
		Carrion-eating animals (raven; coyote)
	Hunting	
		Beasts of prey
	Warfare	
Death		

The initial opposition in the cultural setting is Life vs. Death. This opposition can be mediated only through a cultural form which admits a mediator. When agriculture becomes the functional form of life and warfare the functional form of death, mediation is possible through hunting. Hunting can mediate because it shares an aspect both of warfare and agriculture which agriculture and warfare do not share with each other. An equivalent function is shared by warfare and hunting: killing. An equivalent object is shared by hunting and agriculture: food. Therefore, the hunter has the potential for relationships with both the warrior and the farmer which the warrior and farmer do not naturally have with each other. But the hunter and the farmer become opponents within the cultural setting, and this creates the need for further mediation. In the American mythology, the mediation is expressed through stories where carrion-eating

[30] C. Levi-Strauss, " The Structural Study of Myth," in *Structural Anthropology* (Anchor Books; New York: Doubleday, 1967), pp. 202-228. See Patte, *ibid.*, pp. 76-83.

animals (ravens and coyotes) are featured as trickster figures. In these stories, beasts of prey are equivalent to hunters, and herbivorous animals are equivalent to farmers. Beasts of prey kill animals for food. Herbivorous animals gather plants for food. Carrion-eating animals gather (but do not kill) animals for food. Therefore, carrion-eaters share the same food with beasts of prey but function like herbivorous animals in the manner in which they procure their food.

Patte wishes to move from his analysis of narrative structure in the parable of the Good Samaritan to an analysis of the mythical structure, using Levi-Straus's transformational model. Patte abstracts the model in this form for the transition: [31]

Initial Polarity	First Triad	Second Triad	Third Triad
-A1	-A2	-Aa	-A4
	B2	BB	B4
+A1		+As	+A4

For Patte, the parable of the Good Samaritan manifests only the *poles* of the second triad (-A3 and +A3), and by a reverse process of analysis he posits the *poles* of the first triad (-A2 and +A2). The story does not allow one to know the poles of the initial opposition (-A1 and +A1). Since his actantial analysis reveals that the Samaritan is the Subject of the story, Patte proposes that the Samaritan reprents +A3. Using Levi-Strauss' formula for the transition, he decides that the mythical structure is: [32]

[81] D. Patte, " Comments on the article of John Dominic Crossan," *Semeia,* 2 (1974)' p. 119.

[82] *Ibid.,* pp. 79-82; " Structural Network," pp. 239-240.

Initial Polarity	First Triad	Second Triad
-A1 (?)	-A2 (robbers)	-Aa (wounded man)
		BB (healed man)
	B2 (equivalent to Samaritan)	+Aa (Samaritan)
	+A2 (ideal religious person)	
+A1 (?)		

The mediating element (B_3), according to Patte's analysis, is not expressed in the parable of the Good Samaritan. Its absence suggests that the parable is a polemic genre which confronts an established myth with a new myth. The reconciliation and mediation offered by the Jewish myth are not valid; Jesus and early Christianity introduce a specific alternative-eschatological myth. Only this alternative myth offers true reconciliation and mediation.[83]

If a person were to accept this diagram as illuminating how the parable of the Good Samaritan mediates polarities in Palestinian society,[84] then he or she has a means of talking about a mythical or cultural structure which has manifested itself in NT literature. Many other stories should be manifestations of this same cultural structure. It is important to notice, however, that Patte has attempted to move from narrative structure to mythical structure without any analysis at the level of semantic (elementary or deep) structure. For this reason he does not attempt to fill in the terms for the initial pole in the transformational model. The initial polarity can be revealed

[83] Patte, "Comments," pp. 119-l!H.

[84] A revision of this application of the transformational model to the Parable of the Good Samaritan is presented below.

only by analysis at the level of the semantic semiological system.

Dan Via has undertaken an energetic project to uncover the structure of the semantic semiological system at work in NT literature. He, like Patte, accepts Levi-Strauss's hypothesis that a basic polarity is mediated within a cultural setting by myths which reflect transformations. Via proposes that Christian texts derive from a binary structure at the semantic (elementary or deep) level which takes a holistic, generic form at the mythical (cultural) level. The binary principle is death / resurrection (new life) and the generic form is tragicomedy.

Via considers death / resurrection to be a fundamental polarity underlying Hosea, the Pauline letters, the Gospel of Mark, and Aristophanes's comic plays. This binary feature, then, is manifest in Israelite culture, Hellenic culture, and Greco-Roman culture. Displaying all the forms of this polarity on a grid, Via unfolds the transformations of death / resurrection as this structure is expressed in the literature available to us. In the Israelite literature this opposition is expressed as: unclean / clean; far / near; disobedience / obedience; lose land / keep land; not listen / hear; disobey / obey; be deceived / know; forget / remember; perish from the. land / possess land; die / live; [85] Israel's rebellion / prophet's struggle with Israel and God; abandonment/ word; God destroys / God restores. [86] In the Hellenic culture the polarity is expressed primarily as: contest (agon) /victory procession (+ marriage) .[87] In the NT literature it is expressed as: death/ resurrection; cross / word; foolishness / wisdom; weakness / power; letter / spirit; verbal conflict with hostile authorities / victory in debate and assertion of authority. In the Gospel of Mark, this structure manifests itself in the generic form of tragicomedy. [88]

Around the turn of the century, the *Religionsgeschichtliche Schule* attempted to establish a causal-genetic relation between

••Dan 0. Via, Jr., *Kerygma and Comedy in the New Testament: A Structuralist Approach to Hermeneutic* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975), p. 60.

•• *Ibid.,* p. 51.

[87] *Ibid.,* pp. 45-51.

[88] *Ibid.,* pp. 40-45, 54-66, 71-108.

the dying-rising motif in Mediterranean literature and death-resurrection in the NT literature. Literary-historical interpreters insisted that direct literary influence had to be proven to uphold this hypothesis, and analysis of the vocabulary from Israelite traditions and conceptions from contemporary Jewish beliefs denied the hypothesis any dominant status among biblical interpreters. Via approaches the same motif from the standpoint of the elementary binary structure of the human mind. His thesis is that death / resurrection, a fundamental mode of thought among human beings, manifested itself in the dominant cultural group within the Mediterranean world.[89] Therefore, the Paull.ne letters and the Gospel of Mark manifest an essential aspect of the semantic (or elementary) structure of human thought which found various forms of expression in the Mediterranean world.

Since the structuralist asserts that each level of analysis should help to illuminate the other levels of analysis, Via's analysis should contribute to Patte's analysis. Via's analysis suggests that the initial polarity in Patte's transformational model is death/ new life. This polarity emerges from the semantic (elementary or deep) structure which dominated Mediterranean culture. The parable of the Good Samaritan should reflect this semantic structure at the mythical and narrative levels. Therefore, Patte's transformational model should display death / resurrection in the generic / mythical mode of tragicomedy. Patte's analysis of the canonical functions and his construction of the actantial model will represent the manifestation of the semantic and mythical structures at the surface level of narrative parable.

Via's analysis challenges Patte's analysis of the mythical structure of the parable of the Good Samaritan. Primarily, it calls into question Patte's conclusion that the wounded man represents the negative pole of the second triad (-A8) . Application of Via's analysis to Patte's transformational model would result in a model which looks like this:

•• *Ibid.,* p. 40.

Initial Polarity	First Triad	Second Triad
-At (New Life)	-A; (ideal religious person)	-As (Priest and Levite)
		Ba (wounded man)
	n2 (equivalent to Samaritan, e.g., rejected prophet)	+As (Samaritan)
	+A2 (robbers, prostitutes, tax collectors)	
+A1. (Death)		

In other words, perhaps the wounded man is the means by which the opposition between the Jerusalem temple clientele (priest and Levite) and Samaritans (who have a temple on Mt. Gerizim) is mediated. Robbers, prostitutes, and tax collectors would share with the rejected prophet in being ostracized by society. The rejected prophet would have in common with the ideal religious person his claim to religious authority in society. Thus, the rejected prophet is a mediator between the ideal religious people and religious outcasts. The Samaritan is the functional equivalent of the rejected prophet, and the Priest and Levite are the functional equivalents of the ideal religious person. The wounded man can be a mediator. He holds in common with Samaritans an experience of rejection and assault, and he holds in common with the priest and Levite an association with Jerusalem, the center of Judean history and worship.

If this construction of the transformational model were accepted by both Via and Patte, then we would possess a detailed analysis of the parable of the Good Samaritan at all levels: narrative, mythical, and semantic. Few, if any, complete analyses exist, however, since this kind of analysis of biblical literature

is still in its infancy. It will undoubtedly take a number of years before structural analysis of biblical literature attains the kind of maturity reflected by literary-historical analysis. Types of structural analysis different from those presented in this article will be developed and applied. Already, a non-binary structural approach has been developed to analyze the relationships between various types of gods, leaders, servants, victims, etc.[40] Modified forms of structural analysis which use insights from Freud and Aristotle have also been introduced.[41]

FROM STRUCTURAL EXEGESIS TO THEOLOGY

At last the question arises: "What is the direct import of structural biblical interpretation for theology?"[42] Undoubtedly the most energetic answer to this question is being formulated by Erhardt Giittgemanns.[48] He asserts that theology must be formulated on the basis of a "Generative Poetics." This means that theology can and should be formulated out of the principles and conclusions which result from a "semantic grammar." In other words, as we now possess grammars describing the way in which biblical *languages* function, so also a grammar can be developed which explains the manner in which biblical *meaning* functions. When a thorough structural exegesis of biblical tradition has been achieved, then a grammar of biblical meaning can be established. After this is accomplished, theology can be generated by transforming biblical meaning into modern cultural forms. "Theology thereby becomes the science of the

•• David L. Petersen and Mark Woodward, "Northwest Semitic Religion: A Study of Relational Structures," *Ugarit-Forachunge:n,* 9 (1977).

[41] E. g., Rene Girard, *La violence et le sacre* (Paris: B. Grasset, 197Yl), asserts that the fundamental mythical structure of culture is "collective victimage."

[42] If biblical interpretation has any relation to theology, then much of the preceding has at least implicit ramifications for the theological enterprise. I must, at the outset of this section, indicate my gratitude to my colleague, Edward A. Yonan, who gave generously of his time to discuss the implications of structuralism for theology and philosophy of religion.

••Four of his essays have been published in English translation with the title, "Erhardt Giittgemanns' 'Generative Poetics'," *Semeia,* 6 (1976).

operations and transformations between texts 'given' to us in the tradition and texts to be 'produced' today ..." [44]

There is another aspect of Giittgemanns's work which is just as striking as the emphasis on "Generative Poetics," and he shares this with structuralists like Jean Calloud and Daniel Patte. The mode of analysis adopted by these three men reflects a theoretical orientation which has many features in common with the "transcendental theology" of Bernard Lonergan. All four share the desire to formulate a theory which approximates the contemporary standards of scientific theorizing. This leads to an equation of their structural method with that of algebra and physics. It also emphasizes that scientific pursuit is simply the systematic application of principles derived from common sense and that the goal is to develop a unified science for all disciplines of study. [45]

Within this theoretical framework, these men share a series of presuppositions. First, they perceive explanation and understanding to exist in hierarchical levels. Knowledge is gathered and reflected upon in qualitatively different ways depending on the level of analysis. Second, equivalent structures exist in myriads of places throughout different spheres of knowledge. This leads to "isotopic" or "isomorphic" analysis. [47] Third, models, lists, diagrams, and graphs are essential heuristic tools to' be used in analysis, because they are initial abstractions of reality which stimulate detailed research and call for synthetic explanation. [48] Fourth, all of these men are interested in functional analysis. Aspects of human activity which have previ-

[44] *Ibid.,* p. 3. D. Patte seems to envision something similar to this in *Structural Exegesis,* p. 75.

••Bernard Lonergan, *Method m Theology* (New York: Herder & Herder, 1972), pp. 3-6, 25; Giittgemanns, "Generative Poetics," pp. 9, 12; Calloud, *Structural Analysis,* pp. xii, 44; Patte, *Structural Exegesis* pp. 18-19, 77-80., 84; "Structural Network," pp. 226, 233-240, 241, n. 3.

••Lonergan, *ibid.,* pp. 9-10; Giittgemanns, *ibid.,* pp. 4-5, 8; Calloud, *ibid.,* pp. 7-8; Patte, *Structural Exegesis,* pp. 22-23, 25-27, 33-34, 37, 58-59.

«Lonergan, *ibid.,* p. 21; Giittgemanns, *ibid.,* pp. 5-6.

••Lonergan, *ibid.,* p. 22; Giittgemanns, *ibid.,* p. 9; Calloud, *ibid.,* pp. 6-7; Patte, *Structural Exegesis,* pp. 36, 41-51, 59, 84; "Structural Network," pp. 22-23.

ously been misunderstood can now be illuminated by description of their function.

A notable di:fferenceebetween Lonergan's programmatic work and that of Giittgemanns, Calloud, and Patte is manifest in their respective interests in texts. Lonergan apologizes (with tongue in cheek) to the readers of *Method in Theology* for citing *so* few Christian texts.[49] He considers the concern with texts to be a " functional specialization " with which he need not deal extensively in a discussion of method. For Giittgemanns, on the other hand, the texts are primary, because they are the basis on which an analytical grammar can be established for writing contemporary theology. It is not clear that Giittgemanns would be satisfied with a description of his work in terms of a functional specialization, since for him the possibility of a " Generative Poetics " both begins and ends with the human being as "communicator." While Lonergan sees the end of his analysis as " communication," his beginning point is not so directly grounded in the human being as a linguistic being.

According to Paul Ricoeur, hewever, the fundamenta.1 issue is whether a theologian accepts structuralism as an ideology or as a method which illuminates a segment of reality. Lonergan's transcendental method runs the risk of categorizing dynamic, synthetic fields of research. In other words, it is extremely difficult for a transcendental mode of analysis to maintain contact with the mimetic character of human activity. If a method of investigation cannot maintain this contact, it does not satisfy the demand for reference to human existence which a total science must fulfill. The structural method as applied by Calloud, Patte, and Giittgemanns also runs this risk.

Ricoeur proposes to use structural methods to analyze the production of speech, both oral and written.[50] This analysis would clarify religious discourse and reveal the limit-expressions of religious language. This understanding must be linked with understanding of the limit-experiences of human life which emerges from systematic reflection upon symbolic knowledge. The task, then, is to provide " a method of *mutual* clarification

••Lonergan, *ibid.,* p. xii.

[50] Ricoeur, "Biblical Hermeneutics," pp. 66-78,

of the limit-expressions of religious language and the limit-experiences of human life." [51] It is possible to develop such a method if we " find concepts which preserve the tension of the symbol within the clarity of the concept." By this means, theology may be formulated as " a *conceptual* language which preserves the *tensive* character of symbolic language." [52]

Ricoeur suggests that structural analysis should play a decisive role within theology but that theologians should avoid structuralism as an ideology. If theologians accept structuralism as a method, one of the major influences would be upon their use of texts. The recent crisis in theology is, to a great extent, related to the uneasiness theologians experience in using biblical and other texts in their theological systems. As a result, the use of biblicaL texts in theology is more of an art than a science.[53] One effect of structural methods can be to provide a means by which the theologian may systematically use insights from religious texts in the formulation of theological discourse. If we think such a theology would be stilted and uncreative, we have yet to encounter the plurality of meanings in language and the manifold structures of meaning in texts.

CONCLUSION

Structural analysis is rapidly gaining a place alongside other methods in modern biblical interpretation. A major issue appears to be the relationship of structuralist method to structuralist ideology. Daniel Patte asserts that "a preunderstanding of the text is imposed upon the exegete by his culture," [54] recent modern culture possesses a new sensitivity toward a " plurality of meanings," [55] and structural study is the primary means by which a satisfactory hermeneutic can be developed in our time.[56] Erhardt Giittgemanns proposes that a Generative Poetics, es-

[51] *Ibid.,* p. 34.
[52] *Ibid.,* p. 36.
[53] David H. Kelsey, *The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975), esp. pp. 158-216.
[54] Patte, *Structural Exegesis,* p. 6.
[55] *Ibid.,* p. 14.
[50] *Ibid.,* pp. 14-20.

tablished through structural analyses, is " a methodologically and scientifically reflective textual theory that can stand up to contemporary standards 0£ scientific theorizing, succeeding' existential interpretation ' which is the only earlier text theory that has been consistently thought through." [57] Paul Ricoeur claims that structural analysis is successful only if it analyzes the text as discourse or discourse as the text. [58] This kind of structural analysis may enrich an existential hermeneutic. [59] If, however, structural analysis is linked with an ideology which " treats any ' message ' as the mere ' quotation ' of its underlying ' code,' " it is " a dead end." [60]

The issue underlying these assertions may be stated in another form. Biblical interpretation and theology exist at the interface between religious faith and cultural understanding. Some structuralists possess a neo-medieval interest in a unified science which displays the interrelation 0£ all ways 0£ thinking and acting. Other structuralists may presuppose that religious faith possesses a unique dynamic which precludes the possibility 0£ analyzing its structures in relation to structures 0£ meaning throughout the universe of knowledge and action. Few biblical interpreters are able to ignore the broad hermeneutical questions which hover over their analyses. These questions, implicit or explicit, are opening new fields of research for the exegete.

Structural analysis and structuralist ideology have entered the world 0£ the biblical interpreter and the theologian. Only the future will reveal whether this is the harbinger of a decisively new way 0£ understanding reality or whether it is an additional component within the perspective through which twentieth century people already view their world. [61]

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[57] Giittgemanns, "Generative Poetics," p. 13.
[58] Ricoeur, "Biblical Hermeneutics," p. 67.
[5]. *Ibid.,* p. 64.
[60] *Ibid.,* p. *65.*
[61] I am grateful to the Institute for Ecumenical and Cultural Research at the campus of St. John's University, Collegeville, Minnesota, for providing the congenial setting to begin the research for this article.

THE SIXTH WAY OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

WHEN ONE THINKS of arguments for God's existence which SL Thomas Aquinas records *with appr01;al,* one thinks of *a posteriori* arguments. Aquinas disapproves of, and argues *against*[1] the *a priori* argument of St. Anselm; forcefully and conclusively, in my view. Moreover, the *a posteriori* arguments one thinks of are arguments whose point of departure is some fact or other *observed in the world of sense experience,* at least to some extent: the fact of motion, the fact of an order of efficient causes, things for which it is possible to be and not to be, the graded perfections of things, the fact that things without knowledge (natural bodies) act for an end. And not only that, one thinks quite immediately, and most often only, of the *Summa Theologiae,* I, q. 3, the locus of the Five Ways; sometimes, though considerably less often, one also thinks of the *Summa contra Gentiles,* Bk. I, ch. 13.

Maritain, in describing his own Sixth Way, which he regards as an addition to the Five Ways which Aquinas records in the *Summa Theologiae,* is careful to point out wherein it differs from the Five. One of the points of difference which he emphasizes is the fact that his Sixth Way is *not* based on a fact observed *in any way* in the world of sense experience. It is based, rather, on a peculiar intuition, an intuition intimately connected with an intellectual experience of intellectual experience, with an " experience of the proper life of the intellect." [1] It is during such an experience, Maritain notes, that the intuition on which his Sixth Way is based occurs, the intuition that I, this thinking I, have always existed.[2] And so, whereas the arguments which Aquinas records begin in this way: there exist things in motion

[1] Jacques Maritain, *Approaches to God* (trans. from the French by Peter O'Reilly) (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1954) p. 73.

[2] *Ibid.,* pp. 73-75.

(sensed-observed), or there exists an order of efficient causes (based on sense observation) , etc. through the others of the Five Ways, and then seek to make explicit what is implied by these facts, ultimately the existence of God as the First Unmoved Mover, as the First Uncaused Efficient Cause, etc.; Maritain's Sixth Way begins as follows: there exists an I (namely, I myself) which has always existed (introspectively based, i.e., based on Maritain's inner awareness of intellectual activity) , and then seeks to draw out the implications of this fact, ultimately the existence of God as Being and Thought and Self in pure act.

Now, if one goes beyond the *Summa Theologiae,* I, q. 2, a. 3, and beyond the *Summa contra Gentiles,* Bk. I, ch. 13, and looks to the *Summa Theologiae,* I, q. 79, a. 4-an expanded version of which is found in the *De Spiritualibus Creaturis,* a. 10-, one finds there a discussion, part of which (and a part which is only instrumental to the main point of the article) is an argument for the existence of God, also an *a posteriori* argument, but one which is closer to Maritain's Sixth Way *in its point of departure* than it is to any of the Five Ways. The point of departure here is an *introspective* one, though clearly not an intuition that the I has always existed, a point of departure based on a fact which any man can experience about himself *as a knower:* that he abstracts universal forms from their particular conditions, thereby making them actually intelligible.[3]

The purpose of this paper is to consider the text of the *Summa Theologiae,* I, q. 79, a. 4, along with its expansion in the

• The actual use to which Aquinas puts this introspectively based claim in the *Summa Theologiae,* I, q. 79, a.4, c., and in the *De Spiritualibus Creaturis,* a.10, is this: he employs it as evidence for his view that the agent intellect is "aliquid animae," a power which *inheres in* the human soul, as opposed to being a separated substance, as in the view of Avicenna and Averroes. He does not, as a matter of fact, employ it as the point of departure for this argument for God's existence. What he employs in this way is rather the introspectively based claims that 1) the human soul has an imperfect intellect, !'2) which gets at the truth by a kind of movement, and 3) is intellectual by participation. But there is a connection between the latter three claims, on the one hand, and the former, on the other hand; as will become clear below, pp. 381-8!'2.

De Spi,ritualib'USC1·eaturis, a. 10, with a view to presenting, and making as clear as possible, the argument for God's existence contained in it. Let us call this argument the Sixth Way of *St. Thomas Aquinas,* by way of similarity to, as well as distinction from, the Sixth Way of *Maritain.* It is not being claimed that Aquinas himself would ever have used this argument as an *ex professo* argument for God's existence; that would perhaps be a difficult claim to substantiate, and in any case it is philosophically irrelevant. The attempt here is to present the argument, to reformulate its premises for reasons of economy and clarity of presentation, and to make as clear as possible the evidence which Aquinas gives, or would give, for their truth.

Before proceeding to the task, it will be helpful to quote, and to set out in a way; which will facilitate comparisons between them, the relevant portions of the texts of the *Summa Theologiae* and of the *De Spi,ritualib'USCreaturis.*

The *Summa Theologiae,* I, q. 79, a. 4, c.

It is necessary that there be above the intellectual soul of man a superior intellect, from which the soul obtains the power of understanding.

For what is such by participation, and what is mobile, and what is imperfect, always requires something prior to itself which is such by its essence, and which is immobile, and perfect.

Now the soul of man is said to be intellectual by participation in intellectual power; a sign of which is the fact that it is not totally intellectual, but only in one of its parts.

The *De Spiritualibus Creaturis,* a. 10, c.

It is necessary that there be above the soul of man an intellect on which its intellectual act'lvity depends; that this must be so can be made clear in three ways.

First of all, because whatever belongs to something by participation is, prior to that, in something else substantially; e. g., if iron is on fire, it would be necessary that there be something which is fire by its own substance and nature.

Now the soul of man is intellectual by participation; for it does not engage in intellectual activity with any or all of its parts, but only with its highest part.

It is necessary, therefore, that there be something above the soul which is an intellect according to its whole nature, from which the intellectuality of the soul derives, and on which its intellectual activity depends.

Secondly, because it is necessary that there be prior to every mobile thing something which is immobile with repect to that motion; e. g., above all al-

terable things there is something which is not alterable, e. g., a heavenly body; for every motion is caused by something immobile.

Moreover, it attains to the understanding of truth with a certain sort of motion, namely that of argumentation.

Now the intellectual activity of the soul of man proceeds by a sort of motion; for the soul understands by moving from effects to causes, from causes to effects, from the similar to the similar, and from opposites to opposites.

It is necessary, therefore, that there be above the soul an intellect the intellectual activity of which is fixed and at rest and without any discursive movement at all.

Thirdly, because it is necessary that actuality be simply prior to potentiality in another, although in one and the same thing potentiality is prior to actuality; and similarly because it is necessary that prior to every imperfect thing there be something which is perfect.

It is also such that its intellectual activity is imperfect; both because it does not know all things, and because it passes from potentiality to actuality with respect to those things which it does come to know.

It is necessary, therefore, that there be some superior intellect, by which the soul is aided in its activity of understanding.

Now the soul of man is in the beginning in potentiality to what is intelligible; and its subsequent intellectual activity is imperfect, because it never in this life attains to the whole of intelligible truth.

It is necessary, therefore, that above the soul there be an intellect which is always in a state of actuality, and totally perfect in its understanding of the truth.

1. The main point of the *Summa Theologiae,* q. 79, a. 4.

The main point of this article is to show that the agent intellect is " aliquid animae," i. e., a power found *in* the human soul, by way of opposition to the view of Avicenna and Averroes, among others, that the agent intellect is a *separated* entity, i.e., *not in* the human soul as one of its powers.

The discussion in the body of the article may be summarized as follows:

a) There must be, above the human intellectual soul, a superior intellect, from which the soul obtains its power of

understanding.-The argument for this claim can be taken, it seems to me, as the *analytic portion* [4] of an argument for the existence of God as something which is an Immobile and Perfect Intellect *Per Se.*

b) Some (e.g., Avicenna and Averroes) have claimed that this *separated* superior intellect is the *agent intellect,* and that its function is to illuminate phantasms, thereby making them actually intelligible.

c) But, even if one grants that there is such a *separated* agent intellect, one must also grant that there must be " *in* ipsa anima humana," *intri"nsW*to the human soul itself, a power by which *it* makes phantasms actually intelligible. Two reasons are given for this claim. 1) In the case of other natural things, there are also, besides their *universal* agent causes, the proper and *intrinsic* powers of the individual things themselves, derived of course from their universal causes. For example, it is *not* the sun alone which generates man; but there is *in* individual men a power by which they generate other individual men. Now, there is nothing in the physical world more perfect than the human soul. And so, if less perfect things are endowed with their appropriate *intrinsic* powers, the human soul too must be endowed with its own appropriate *intrinsic* power, derived of course from some superior intellect (a universal agent cause with respect to individual human souls) by which (power) the human soul can illuminate phantasms, thereby making them actually intelligible. Q) We know that there is such a power *in* us *by experience* with ourselves *as knowers,* when we perceive that we abstract universal forms from particular conditions, which is to make phantasms actually intelligible. Now, activities belong to things only by virtue of principles which are *formally intrinsic* to them. " Therefore, it is necessary that the power which is the principle of this action be something intrinsic to the soul." [5]-1£ one formulates this second reason as follows:

[4] See below, section pp. 378-79, for the meaning of " analytic portion." And for the argument which can be taken as the analytic portion, see below, section 3, pp. 379-80.

[5] Unless otherwise noted, all quotations from Aquinas in this paper are from the *Summa Theologiae,* I, q. 79, a. 4, c., i.e., the *body* of the article.

"We abstract universal forms from particular conditions;" and if one then points out that this is an *empirical,* claim (Aquinas says: "... experimento cognoscimus ...", "... we know this by experience ...") whose truth is based on our experience, introspective, with ourselves as knowers; then this second reason can be taken, it seems to me, as the *synthetic premise* [6] of an argument for the existence of God as an Immobile and Perfect Intellect *Per Se.*

2. " Synthetic premise " and " analytic portion " in *a posteriori* arguments for God's existence

A brief word of explanation is in order with respect to my employment of the expressions " synthetic premise " and " analytic portion." By " synthetic premise " I understand a proposition whose truth (or falsity) [7] is established on the basis of experience, whether sense-observational or introspective. Every *a posteriori* argument for the existence of God has at least one synthetic premise. For example: " There exist things in motion " is the synthetic premise of the First Way; its truth is based on sense observation; " There exists an order of efficient causes " is the synthetic premise of the Second Way; its truth too is based on sense observation. The synthetic premise of an *a posteriori* argument has a twofold task: 1) it *asserts existence* of something given to experience, and fl) *attributes some feature* to that of which it has asserted existence. In the First Way, for example, *being in motion* is the feature attributed to the physical things whose existence has been asserted.

By " analytic portion " I understand a set of propositions the truth (or falsity) [8] of each of which is based on analysis, i.e.,

• See below, section for the meaning of " synthetic premise." And for further comments with respect to the synthetic premise of this argument for God's existence, see below, section 3, *a,* p. 379.

•Though both truth and falsity of synthetic propositions cau be established on the basis of experience (i. e., the truth of the true ones, and the falsity of the false ones), it is clear that the synthetic premise of an argument for the *truth* of the claim that God exists ought to be a *true* one.

• As m the case of synthetic propositions, here too, both the truth of true analytic propositions and the falsity of false ones can he established by the

on the meanings of terms alone,[9] without any recourse to experience. In the First Way, for example, the analytic portion consists of the two interrelated propositions: 1) *Whatever is in motion is moved by another,* and 2) *Seoondary movers do not move unless they are moved by a first mover,.* the truth of each of which is established without any recourse to experience. The task of the analytic portion of an *a posteriori* argument is to make explicit what is implied by the *feature* (e.g., *being in motion* for the First Way) attributed to some existing thing (s) in the synthetic premise. The First Way pursues, and completes, its analytic task in terms of what it does *for,* and *with,* the two propositions just noted.

S. Synthetic premise and analytic portion in Aquinas's Sixth Way

a) Synthetic premise: **"I** exist as a thing which understands by abstracting universal forms from particular conditions." - There are two things to be noted here. 1) In order to avoid the difficulties some have had with respect to our knowledge of other minds, I think it better to formulate the synthetic premise here in terms of " I," instead of in terms of " We," as it was formulated above in section 1. 2) The *feature* being attributed in this synthetic premise is: *thing whfoh un<lerstands by abstracting universal forms from particular conditions.*

b) Analytic portion. The function of the analytic portion can be said to be an attempt to answer this question: What does *this feature* imply, namely the feature: *thing which understands by abstracting universal forms from particular conditions?* The answer, briefly put, is as follows:

i) To understand in this way, i.e., by abstracting universal forms from particular conditions, is 1) to understand by par-

appropriate method. And, again, it is clear that the analytic propositions contained in an argument for the *truth* of the claim that God exists ought to be *true* ones.

[9] I am employing the expression " based on the meanings of terms alone " as a present-day, and easily understood, equivalent of what Aquinas would say in this way: based on the *natures* and *properties* and *activities,* etc., of things *absolutely considered.*

ticipation ("... the soul of man is said to be intellectual by participation in intellectual power; a sign of which is the fact that it is not totally intellectual, but only in one of its parts ..."), with movement ("... it attains to the understanding of truth with a certain sort of motion, namely that of argumentation ..."), and 3) imperfectly ("... it is ... such that its intellectual activity is imperfect; both because it does not know all things, and because it passes from potentiality to actuality with respect to those things which it does come to know ...").

ii) But whatever is such by participation, and is mobile, and imperfect, requires something prior to itself; and not just another which is, like itself, also participating and mobile and imperfect, but something which is such *by its essence,* and is immobile, and perfect. ("... for what is such by participation, and what is mobile, and what is imperfect, always requires something prior to itself which is such by its essence, and which is immobile, and perfect ...")-This concludes the analytic portion.

c) Conclusion drawn from *a* and b: Therefore, there must exist a prior intellect-ultimately, if not immediately, one which is an Intellect by its essence (and not by participation), and is immobile (knows what it knows without passing discursively from one thing to another), and perfectly (knows *all* things, and does *not* pass from potentiality to actuality in any of its knowing)-by which the human soul is aided in its understanding (". . . it is necessary, therefore, that there be some superior intellect, by which the soul is aided in its activity of understanding ...").

rl) *Quid nominis Dei:* But by the word" God" we understand such a prior intellect ("... but the separated intellect, according to the teaching of our faith, is God Himself . . .").

e) Conclusion. Therefore God exists. This follows obviously, and in course, from *c,* and *d.*

4. Reformulation 0£ the premises

From the immediately preceding, we have the following as the premises of this argument:

a) I exist as a thing which understands by abstracting universal forms from particular conditions.

b) To understand in this way is to understand by participation, and with movement, and imperfectly.

c) Whatever understands in this way requires something other, an *aliud*,. an intellect prior to it, as a cause on which it depends.

d) This prior intellect must be ultimately (if not immediately) an Intellect *by its essence,* immobile and perfect.

What follows herein is an attempt to present, as clearly and as convincingly as possible, the evidence which is, or would be, forthcoming from Aquinas with respect to the truth of these reformulated premises.

5. The evidence for the truth of premises *a* and *b*

Before presenting the evidence for the truth of a proposition, one must make clear exactly what is being claimed by the proposition, i. e., one must make clear its sense or meaning.

Those of man's intellectual activities which are ordered *to getting at the truth about things* are analyzed by Aquinas into 1) simply apprehending, the product of which is a notion or idea or meaning or concept (I use these as equivalents) , *definition* being its most desirable product, 2) composing and dividing, the product of which is a proposition, either affirmative or negative, and 3) reasoning, the product of which is an argument. This is familiar doctrine. But the point I want to emphasize here is the analytic priority of the products of the activity of simply apprehending with respect to the products of the activity of composing and dividing, and of the activity of reasoning. That is, the products of simply apprehending are *per se* constituents of the products of composing and dividing, and of reasoning. This means, of course, that neither composing and dividing, nor reasoning, can take place if simply apprehending has not taken, or is not taking, place. It can be said, then, because of its analytic priority, that what is minimally characteristic of human understanding is simply apprehending.

To.perform an act of simple apprehension is either *to form first,* or *to entertain anew,* a meaning or concept or notion or idea or definition, or " nature absolutely considered." [10] But such first formation, or entertainment anew, takes place via man's sensory capacities, first formation via the external senses, entertainment anew via the internal senses, especially via the imagination which produces and retains phantasms. The human intellect is an intellect which focusses on common or shared features of individuals or particulars which are present to sense, and Aquinas emphasizes *presence to sense.* If there are no individuals present to sense-either to external sense or to imagination-the intellect cannot focus on their common or shared features. It is this sort of activity, which any thinking man can experience within himself, which Aquinas has in mind when he says: "... we know this by experience, since we perceive that we abstract universal forms from their particular conditions, which is to make them actually intelligible." To say 1) to abstract universal forms from particular conditions, 2) to focus on common or shared features of individuals present to sense, 3) to form first a concept or meaning, etc., 4) to entertain absolute forms; but the human soul *is not* the intellect or property or activity absolutely, 6) to render the potentially intelligible phantasm actually intelligible-these are, all of them, different ways of talking about the activity of simple apprehension.11

Now, the fact that we first form, and entertain anew, universals in this way, i.e., by focussing on common or shared features of individuals present to sense, points to a number of things. It points to the fact that, in the beginning, the human soul is an empty or blank tablet, a *tabula rasa,* on which nothing is written, but on which *everything can be* written. In the beginning, man knows nothing, then something, then progressively

10 immediately preceding footnote.

11 It is to be noted that *4,* i. e., entertaining a concept anew, temporally presupposes *3,* i. e., first forming a concept. Apart from this difference, all of frese are simply different ways of saying the same thing. This same thing is either *3,* i. e., *first forming* a concept, or *4,* i. e., *entertaining* a concept *anew.*

more and more, so that there is a passing from a state of emptiness accompanied by a state of potentiality to a state of greater and greater actuality, but in such a way that man never comes to know all things. These things, which any thinking man can experience within himself, are clearly what Aquinas has in mind when he writes: "... it [the soul of man] is ... such that its intellectual activity is imperfect; both because it does not know all things, and because it passes from potentiality to actuality with respect to those things which it does come to know." It is to be noted that when man comes to know some things, from not knowing anything at all, he does this by forming a *plurality* of concepts.

Secondly, it points to the fact that the human soul gets at the truth about things *by a kind of movement.* First of all, there is the movement of composing and dividing, the putting together, or the separating, of these or those concepts *froni aniong the plurality* it has formed, with a view to pronouncing the " ita est " of the judgment. And beyond that, there is the movement of reasoning, the putting together, or the separating, of judgments, with a view to pronouncing, again, the " ita est " of another judgment with respect to the conclusion drawn. These things, which any thinking man can experience within himself, are clearly what Aquinas has in mind when he writes: "... it [the soul of man] attains to the understanding of truth with a certain sort of motion, namely that of argumentation."

It also points to the fact that the human soul is intellectual by participation-" per participationem." This means that although the human soul can and does entertain universals, or forms, considered absolutely-this, according to Aquinas is fundamentally what it means to be intellectual-the human soul is nonetheless *not;* in its essential nature, an intellect. That is, the human soul *has* an intellect by which it can and does entertain absolute forms; but the human soul *is not* the intellect which it has. The human soul has other powers besides, e.g., vegetative and sensory powers. And it is this (which any living man can experience within himself) which Aquinas has in mind

when he writes: "... a sign of which [i. e., of the fact that the soul of man is intellectual *by participation]* is the fact that it is not totally intellectual, but only in one of its parts."

The preceding is a rough and ready elucidation of the *meaning* of proposition *a,* i. e., of the proposition: "I exist [12] as a *thing which understands by abstracting universal forms from particular conditions.* That is, a thing which understands by abstracting universal forms from particular conditions is a thing whose *analytically* first intellectual activity is that of simply apprehending, which clearly requires that it be a thing which understands, or is intellectual, only imperfectly, and with movement, and by participation. And so, proposition *a* entails proposition *b;* so that, if *a* is true, so is *b.* But not only that. It is not at all difficult for any thinking man *to experience, within himself as a knower,* each of the separate points being claimed by propositions *a* and *b.* With respect to the point being claimed in proposition *a,* it is clear, as Aquinas notes, that we are assured of its truth *on the basis of observation or experience, introspective experience to be sure, but experience nonetheless:* "... *we know this by experience,* since we perceive that we abstract universal forms from their particular conditions." And *we* might add, with respect to the three points being claimed in proposition *b,* that we are assured of their truth, too, on the basis of introspective experience: 1) "... since *we perceive* that we have an imperfect understanding, i. e., since we perceive that we do not know all things, and that we pass from potentiality to actuality with respect to those things which we do come to know; [13] 2) ". . . since *we perceive* that we

[12] To say "I exist" means that I am different from nothing, different from other existing things (if there are any), independent of human knowing (if there are any other humans), yet capable of causing other humans to know me. I say, "if there are any other things, and any other humans," because "I exist" is *introspectively* based. It is clear that I cannot know of the existence of things other than myself, whether human or not, on the basis of *introspection.*

[13] The *De Spiritualibus Creaturis,* a. 10, c., *implies* the distinction between passing from potentiality to actuality *in the beginning,* i. e., when the intellect *first forms* a concept, and passing from potentiality to actuality when the

attain to the understanding of truth with a certain sort of motion, when we compose and divide, and when we argue; "[14] and S) "... since *we perceive* that we are not totally intellectual, but only in one of our parts."[15]-And so, not only does the truth of the point being claimed in proposition *a entail* the truth of the three points being claimed in proposition *b,* but all four of these separate points can be experienced to be true, and with no great difficulty, by any thinking man. And it is precisely because all four can be experienced to be true that propositions *a* and bin conjunction can be viewed as *the synthetic premise* for this *a posteriori* argument for the existence of God.

6. The evidence for the truth of premise *c.*

We move on now to the *analytic portion* of the argument. The task, at this point, is to make it clear that a thing which understands in the way in which the human soul does-i. e., by abstracting universal forms from particular conditions, and imperfectly, and with movement, and by participation-that a thing which understands in this way *is,* indeed *must be,* a thing which understands or is intellectual *per aliud.* To make this clear requires 1) making clear the *sense* or *meaning* of premise *c,* and 2) making clear the *evidence* for the truth of what is claimed by premise *c.*

intellect *entertains anew,* or considers anew, a concept already formed: "... the soul of man is in the beginning in potentiality to what is intelligible; and its subsequent intellectual activity is imperfect, because it never in this life attains to the whole of intelligible truth."

[14] The *De Spiritualibus Creaturis,* a.10, c., adds the following details to the idea of the *discursive* movement of man's intellect: "...the soul understands by moving from effects to causes, from causes to effects, from the similar to the similar, and from opposites to opposites."

[15] The *De Spiritualibus Creaturis,* a.10, c., adds the following clarification of the notion of the *intellectual by participation:* "...the soul of man is intellectual by participation; for it does not engage in intellectual activity with any or all of its parts, but only with its highest part," i. e., what is intellectual *per se* or *per essentiam* understands *by any one of its parts,* and not only by means of *but one* of the parts of its nature, even the highest one. This is somewhat better put in what follows immediately, by way of *explicitly* characterizing what is intellectual *per essentiam.* Such a thing would be an intellect "according to its whole nature," which is more appropriate than " with any or all of its parts," as though God had powers or parts which are distinct from His essence.

It is to be noted that the evidence for the truth of this premise is *not, nor can* it be, derived from an appeal to experience, since the premise is put forth as a *necessary* one. The evidence is, must be, analytic; it must be in terms of the intelligible interconnections among natures, properties, activities, etc., *absolutely consi,dered*.[16] It is also to be noted that the procedure at this point in this argument for God's existence can be interpreted as. being similar to the procedure at a parallel point in the First Way. That is, having noted *on the basis of sense observation* that there exist things in motion, Aquinas argues *on analytic grounds* that whatever is in motion, is *(must be)* in motion *per aliud* (omne quod movetur *ab alio* movetur) . His analytic argument for the claim that whatever is in motion *must be*[17] in motion *per aliud,* comes down to arguing that it is *precisely because it is in motion,* that a thing in motion is in motion *per aliud.* Similarly, having noted *on the basis of experience (introspective)* that: I exist as a thing which understands by abstracting universal forms from particular conditions, and which understands only imperfectly and with movement and by participation; Aquinas argues *on analytic grounds* that whatever understands in this way *is,* indeed *must be,* a thing which understands *per aliud,* i.e., with dependence on another; and this is so, he argues, *precisely because* it is a thing which understands *in this way.*

Turning, now, to the *sense* or *meaning* of premise *c,* it seems reasonable to begin by pointing out the *relevant* sense of *dependency.* There are doubtless any number of dependencies which the human intellect has, being the imperfect sort of intellect which it is. It depends on sense-observable objects, on the external senses, on the imagination. But these are dependencies with respect to the *provision of an object.* The relevant dependency here is a dependency with respect to *the activity of*

[16] See above, footnote 9.

[17] The necessity here is to be construed with the expression " per aliud." That is, it is that whatev(Or is in motion be in motion *per aliud,* i. e., *with dependence on another.*

abstmcting universal forms from particular conditions, a dependency with respect to the activity of illuminating phantasms, in themselves only potentially intelligible, and thereby rendering them actually intelligible. This is the dependency of one *efficient cause* on another *efficient cause;* more precisely, the dependency of a *particular* efficient cause on a *prior* efficient cause, which, according to Aquinas, is a *superior or universal* (to some extent or other) efficient cause.

What does this dependency amount to? Aquinas characterizes it-in the article on which we are reflecting, the *Summa Theologiae,* I, q. 79, a. 4, c.-in the following ways:

1) the human soul *acquires or obtains* its *power of understanding from* some superior intellect ("... it is necessary that there be above the intellectual soul of man a superior intellect, from which the soul *obtains* the *power* of understanding.")

2) the human soul is *helped* in its *activity* of understanding by some superior intellect ("... it is necessary, therefore, that there be some superior intellect, by which the soul is *aided* in its *aotivity* of understanding.")-(" ... it is necessary, therefore, that there be something above the soul ... , on which its intellectual *aotivity* depends," *De Spintu,alibus Creaturis,* a. 10, c.).

3) the human soul's *power* to understand is *derived from* some superior and more universal intellect ("... it is necessary to say that there is in it [i.e., in the soul of man] a *power derived from* a superior [and universal] intellect, by which [power] it can illuminate phantasms.")-(" ... it is necessary, therefore, that there be something above the soul . . . , from which the *intellectuality* of the soul *derives,"* the *De Spiritualibus Creaturis,* a. 10, c.) .

4) the human soul's *power* to understand is a power *participated from* some superior intellect ("... it is necessary to po.sit in the soul of man itself some *power participated from* that superior intellect.")

5) the human soul *participates* its *intellectual light from* this superior intellect ("... the soul of man *participates* its *intellectual light* from this [superior intellect; in the context, God] itself.")

If, first of all, one equates " power of understanding " with "intellectual light;" and if, secondly, one equates" acquires (or obtains) from" and "is derived from" and "participates from "-and this is what Aquinas appears to be doing here-, then this prior, this superior and universal, intellect is both the universal *effioient cause* (brought out by " acquires from " and " is derived from ") and the universal *exemplar* cause (brought out by "participates from") of the human soul's *power* of understanding. But, not only that. If one equates " by which the soul is *aidedJ* in its *aotivity* of understanding " with " on which its intellectual *aotivity depends,"* which is what Aquinas clearly intends; then this superior intellect is also the universal efficient cause of the human soul's *activity* of understanding. And so, Aquinas is claiming that the relevant dependency here is twofold: [18] there is 1) dependency for the *acquisition of .its power* of understanding, and dependency for the *perfarmanoe of its aotivity* of understanding.

What, now, does it mean to say that the human soul *aoquires* its *power* of understanding, i. e., its power of abstracting universal forms from particular conditions, from this superior intellect? Does this mean that the prior intellect is the efficient cause of the *existenoe* of the human soul, a soul with the power of understanding, i.e., with an agent intellect? Or, does it mean that this prior intellect causes *only the power* of understanding which is in the human soul? Could the efficient cause of the human soul's *power* of understanding cause such a power without causing the human soul itself to exist? Consider that the human soul would not be a human soul without this power. And so, it appears that to produce a *human soul* is to produce a soul with this power. Or, to produce the *power* is to produce a soul with this power. If the human soul is the *proper subjeot* of this power, then to produce the power entails producing the

[18] The *De Spiritualibus Creaturis,* a.10, c., also claims that the dependency is twofold, but expresses it somewhat differently: ". . . from which [superior intellect] the intellectuality [i. e., *power* of understanding] of the soul derives, and on which its intellectual activity *[eius intelligere]* depends."

subject, and to produce the subject entails producing the power. Hence, to acquire this power, to derive this power, to participate, i.e., to have a share in, this power-this must mean *to depend* on this prior intellect for its *very existence* as a human soul.

Though the human soul, as we have noted, depends in two ways on this superior intellect: 1) for its *very existence* as a thing with the *power* of understanding, and 2) for the *performance of the activity* of understanding; this is not all. Not only cannot the human soul (with its power of understanding) *exist* without having been efficiently *produced* (brought into being) by this prior intellect; neither can it *continue to exist* without the constantly applied universal efficient causality of this prior intellect, for what *begins* to be cannot *continue* in its existence *in absolute independence.* Nor can it *perform its activity* without the constantly applied universal efficient causality of this prior intellect. The human soul *begins* to exist, *continues* to exist, and *performs its activity* only under the universal agent or efficient causality of this prior intellect. This, then, is a rough and ready account of the *sense* or *meaning* of premise *c.*

What, now, is the *evidence* (analytic) [19] which Aquinas gives for the truth of what premise *c* claims, i. e., that an intellect which understands imperfectly and with movements and by participation is, indeed must be, an intellect which understands *per aliud,* with dependence on another-another which is an intellect prior to it?

Before making clear Aquinas's *evidence* for the truth of what premise *c* claims, it will be helpful to note that although I have been likening the structure of *the analytic portion* of Aquinas's Sixth Way to the structure of the analytic portion of the First Way, there is this difference. The First Way formulates its analytic portion in terms of *two* basic propositions: 1) whatever is in motion is moved by another, and 2) secondary movers do not move unless they are moved by a first mover; his Sixth Way, on the other hand, formulates its analytic portion in terms

[19] See above, pp. 385-86.

of *but one* basic proposition: for what is such by participation, and what is mobile, and what is imperfect, always requires something prior to itself which is such by its essence, and which is immobile, and perfect. In the First Way, Aquinas *first* argues that a thing in motion is in motion *per aliud,* with dependence on *another.* And then, in a .separate argument, in which he is concerned with the *nature* of this *aliud,* he argues that this *aliud,* this other, must be (ultimately, at any rate) a First Unmoved Mover. That is, he argues *secondly and separately* that there must be among these others, these *alia-on* the supposition that there is a causally related or ordered plurality of them-one which is a First Unmoved Mover. In his Sixth Way, however, he argues *directly* from the characteristically inferior intellectuality of the human soul to another (an *aliud)* intellect which he *immediately* characterizes as an Intellect *per essentiam,* and immobile, and perfect. He does not entertain the supposition of a causally ordered plurality of separated intellects. Now, because it seems to me to be easier and more satisfying, both psychologically and logically, to proceed after the manner of the First Way, I have chosen to lay out the analytic portion of Aquinas's Sixth Way in *two* parts: I) the first arguing---'from the characteristically inferior intellectuality of the human soul-.simply *that* the human soul must depend on another (an *aliud)* intellect prior to itself (this is the argument for premise c); and 2) the second arguing-again from the characteristically inferior intellectuality of the human *soul-beyond the simple fact* of this dependence on another intellect, to a crucial claim about the *nature* of this other, i.e., that it must be an Intellect *per essentiam,* and immobile, and perfect (this is the argument for premise d) .

It will be helpful at this point to state, in most general terms, what the analytic portion of the First Way and that of Aquinas's Sixth Way have in common with the analytic portion of any *a posteriori* argument for God's existence which Aquinas records with approval:

l) **If** there exists an A which is such-and-such, then it must

be such-and-such *per aliud,* i.e., with dependence on another which is prior to it (premise *c,* in most general terms) .

1£ there exists an A which is such-and-such *per aliud,* then there must exist an *aliud* which is such-and-such *per se,* i. e., *per essentiam* (premise *d,* in most general terms) .

One can see quite readily, with respect to this general formulation, why I said above that it is easier and more .satisfying to proceed in *two* parts. For, it is one thing-and in a way not too difficult-to see in A's such-and-suchness that it must depend on an *aliud.* But, it is quite another thing-and in many ways considerably more difficult-to see in A's such-and-.suchness that the *aliud* on which it depends must be such-and-such *per se,* or *per essentiam.* Cannot one ask, and most reasonably: Why cannot this *aliud,* though prior to A, be in turn, like A itself, something with a dependence on still another, etc.? Cannot one ask: V\Thy cannot there be an infinite regress?

We turn, now, to give an account of Aquinas's *evidence* for the truth of what is claimed in premise *c.* His evidence can be seen, at least at first glance, as consisting of three parts: 1) whatever participates in something requires as prior to itself the other (the *aliud)* in which it participates; 2) whatever is mobile requires as prior to itself the other (the *aliud)* which moves it; 8) whatever is imperfect requires as prior to itself the other (the *aliud)* in relation to which it is said to be imperfect. This is how Aquinas puts it: " For what is such by participation, and what is mobile, and what is imperfect, always requires something prior to itself which is such [here, intellectual] by its essence, and which is immobile [here, in understanding], and perfect [in understanding]." It is to be noted again [20] that although Aquinas here *immediately* characterizes this *other* as being intellectual *per essentiam,* and immobile, and perfect; we, nonetheless, are *not* at this point concerned with *that crucial claim* about the *nature* of this other intellect, but *only* with the claim *that* man's intellectual soul necessarily requires another intellect, prior to itself, on which it depends.

••See above, p. 390.

Parts *2* and *3* of Aquinas's evidence are easily seen to be *instances* of the general claim that whatever (call it A) is in potency, *qua* in potency, cannot actualize itself, and so needs another (call it B) to actualize it (A), another which is in act precisely with respect to that with respect to which it (A) is in potency. Part *3* is in part *explicitly* characterized as a passing from potency to act: "... [the soul of man] passes *from potentiality to actuality* with respect to those things which it does come to know; " and in part clearly *implies* .such a passing: "... [the soul of man] does not know all things." In pointing out that the soul of man does not know all things, Aquinas is clearly *implying* that it is always in a state of potency to knowing more things than it knows at some given point in time. Part *2* clearly *implies* a passing from potency to act: "... [the soul of man] attains to the understanding of truth with a certain sort of motion, that of argumentation." In reasoning, the soul of man puts together concepts into propositions, and propositions into arguments. Obviously, it does this by passing from a prior state of *potency,* a prior state of *being able* to put together concepts into propositions, and propositions into arguments. It is not difficult to see that the human soul, qua potential with respect to *knowing* the truths it comes to know, needs another and prior inteilect, one in act with respect to knowing those truths, to account for its passing from potentiality to actuality. This need for another and prior intellect is what we referred to above as a *dependency for the performance of its activity of understanding* (pp. 888-89).

Part *1,* too, can be *seen* as an *instance* of the general claim that the potential, qua potential, cannot actualize itself, and so needs another, the actual, to actualize it. But this is perhaps not as easily seen here with respect to part *1,* as it was with respect to parts *2* and *3.* Consider that to be *intellectual* is to be capable of entertaining absolute forms; and that to be intellectual *by participation* is to be capable of entertaining such forms without its being the case that this capability is the substance or essence of that which is so capable. That the hu-

man soul is intellectual by participation has a clear sign in the fact that it is *not wholly* intellectual ("... [the soul of man] is not totally intellectual ..."); the totality of its capability or power does not consist in its intellectuality, but it has other powers besides, both sensory and vegetative ("... [the soul of man] ... has many other powers, e.g., sensitive and vegetative ones;" the *Summa Theologiae,* I, q. 79, a. 1, ad 3). If the human soul were identical *in its essence* with its intellectuality, i. e., if it were intellectual *per essentiam,* or if this intellectuality were its essence, it would *not* be a soul with sensitive and nutritive powers as well; for the sensitive and nutritive powers are clearly *material* powers, powers requiring *bodily* and *material* organs, and intellectuality is without such a requirement. This does *not* mean, however, that something which has intellectual capability *without* accompanying sensitive and nutritive capacities is for that reason intellectual *per essentiam.* The angels, for example, according to Aquinas, have intellectual capability without sensitive and nutritive capacities, and are nonetheless *not* intellectual *per essentiam.*[21] They are immaterial *in their essencesand* it is this essential immateriality which is the source *in them* of their power to understand. So, too, the human soul is immaterial (though not totally) in its essence, and it is this essential immateriality which is the source *in it* of its power to understand.

What, now, is it about something which is intellectual by participation, something which has the capability of entertaining absolute forms without its being the case that this capability is this thing's essence-what is it about such a thing that it needs, depends on,. another intellect? And *what* is this need a need *for; what* is this dependency a dependency *for?* Whereas parts *2* and *3* focussed on dependency *for operating,* does part *1* focus on dependency for *coming into existence* and *continuing in existence* (see above, p. 391)? If this is so, then there must be-and one must be able to show it-a necessary connection between essence-power distinction, on the one hand, and

[21] The *Summa Theologiae,* I, q.79, a.4, ad 4.

essence-existence distinction, on the other hand. For a thing in which essence and existence are distinct is clearly, Aquinas would note, a thing which needs a cause (efficient) of its *existence,* cannot itself be this cause, and so needs *another,* depends on *another,* capable of being the cause. (And, of course, if the thing in question is intellectual, the cause on which it so depends must also be intellectual) . Not so, as regards the *powers* of a thing in which there is an essence-power distinction; for the powers of a thing are proper accidents consequent upon the species of the thing, Aquinas would note, and so are caused (as by a *particular* efficient cause, but not independently of a *universal* efficient cause) by the *essence* of that thing. [22]

But, Aquinas would note, the essence of a thing in which there is an essence-power distinction is also the the *receptive cause,* of the powers of which it is the efficient cause, and so is related to them as potency to actuality. From this it is clear that a thing in which there is an essence-power distinction cannot be pure act, since there is potency in it. And since it is only in the case of a thing which is pure act, a thing having absolutely no potentiality in it, that essence and existence are identical; it is clear that a thing in which there is an essence-power distinction must also be a thing in which there is an essence-existence distinction.

And so, it becomes clear that part *1,* too, is an *instance* of the general claim that the potential, qua potential, cannot actualize itself, and so needs another, the adual, to actualize it. Whatever is *intellectual by participation,* i. e., a thing capable of entertaining absolute forms without its being the case that this capability is identical with the essence of the thing, must also be a *being by participation,* i.e., a thing which exists without its being the case that existence is identical with its essence, a thing in which essence and existence are distinct and related as potentiality to actuality. Such a thing needs a cause of its existence, cannot itself be this cause, and so needs another

••See the *Summa Theologiae,* I, q.3, a.4, c.; also the *De Ente et Essentia,* ch. *5,* paragraph no. 80.

capable of being the cause. Since the thing here with such a need is *intellectual,* it is clear that the other on which it depends for filling this need must also be (at least) *intellectual.* So much for Aquinas's evidence for the truth of premise c.

7. The evidence for the truth of premise *d*

Premise *d* claims that this prior intellect on which the human soul depends-for *beginning* to be, for *continuing* in being, and for its *abstractive intellectual activity-is,* indeed must be, 1) an intellect " by its essence," or in the words of the *De Spiritualibus Creaturis,* an intellect " according to its whole nature," [28] 2) an intellect which is *immobile* in its intellectual activity, or in the words of the *De Spiritualibus Creaturis,* an intellect " the intellectual activity of which is fixed and at rest and without any discursive movement at all [i. e., the discursive movement from effects to causes, from causes to effects, from the similar to the similar, and from opposites to opposites]," [24] and 8) an intellect which is *perfect,* or again in the words of the *De Spiritualibus Creaturis,* an intellect "which is always in a state of actuality, and totally perfect in its understanding of the truth." [25] This prior intellect, thus, according to premise *d,* is a thing in which there is absolutely no potentiality, a thing which is Pure Actuality. Put very simply, premise *d* claims that if there exists an A which is an intellect *per aliud,* there *must be* a B which is an intellect *per seas* A's only adequate (efficient) cause. And taking into account that a thing in which there is an essence-power distinction *must also be* a thing in which there is an essence-existence distinction, [26] premise *d* is claiming that if there exists an intellect in which there is an essence-existence distinction, there must exist an intellect in which essence and existence are identical as its only adequate cause.

Having made the immediately preceding remarks by way of clarifying in some way the *sense* or *meaning* of premise *d,* we

••The *De Spiritualibus Creaturis,* a.IO, c.

2. *Ibid.*

2. *Ibid.*

26 See above, pp. 393-894.

are now in some sort of position to present Aquinas's *evidence (analytic)* for the truth of what this premise claims. It should be pointed out, if it is not already quite clear, that a consideration of the evidence for premise *d* is intimately connected with a consideration of the question of an infinite regress. One can ask, and quite reasonably: Why cannot this *aliud,* this other intellect, though prior to the human soul, be in turn, like the human soul itself, something with dependence on still another and prior; and why cannot this latter, in turn, be of the same sort, i. e., an intellect with dependence on still another and prior; and so on, *ad infinitum?* That is, why *must* this *aliud* be a *per se;* why can it not be, like the human soul itself, a *per aliud?*

The consideration here will become very determinate and quite pointed, if one asks: How is 1) the question of an infinite regress related to Q) the question of the *per se* character of the *aliud?* That is, which is the conclusion, and which is the premise? Which follows from which? Does the *per se* character of the *aliud* follow from the impossibility of an infinite regress? If so, on what grounds can it be shown that an infinite regress is impossible? Does the impossibility of an infinite regress follow from the claim that the *per aliud* necessarily requires the *per se* as its only adequate cause? If so, how can this be shown?

It is my view that, in this part of the analytic portion [27] of any *a posteriori* argument for God's existence which Aquinas would record with approval, the latter is the case, i.e., that the impossibility of an infinite regress follows from the claim that the *per aliud* (here, an intellect in which there is an essence-existence distinction) necessarily requires the *per se* (here, an Intellect in which essence and existence are identical) as its only adequate cause. That is, once one has established the principle that the *per aliud* necessarily requires the *per se* as its only adequate cause, two things follow: I) the impossibility of an infinite regress, by a simple employment of *contraposition* and *reductio,*. and Q) the existence of God, by agreeing on this as

[27] See above, footnote 4.

a *quid nominis Dei,* i.e., an Intellect in which essence and existence are identical. Since I have argued this at length elsewhere,[28] I shall simply summarize the heart of it here, but not without trying to clarify my former effort, since it is not without its defects.

1) It is extremely important, to begin with, to bear in mind that the *per aliud* in this context is a *per aliud* with respect to *existence.* It is just as important to bear in mind that the attempt here is an attempt to reflect on the *implications* of such a *per aliud,* a *per aliud* with respect to *existence,* a thing in which essence and existence are distinct. What is clear, right off, is that such a thing is *completely dependent* on another as on an efficient cause. Such a thing needs a cause, and cannot itself be this cause; and so there must exist in the world something *capable of* causing it. So that the world can be divided into A (the thing in which essence and existence are distinct) and B, the cause of A. *A totally* depends on *B alone.* The question here becomes: *What* is *capable of* causing A? Or, what *alone* (in the sense of *by itself only)* can cause A *totally?*

The sort of efficient causality operative here needs to be made very clear. Aquinas distinguishes efficient causes into: a) causes of *becoming,* and b) causes of *being.* A cause of becoming is a cause which can be described as *giving* form to matter by its activity, e. g., parents with respect to the generation of their new-born child. Such an efficient cause presupposes the existence of *matter,* and performs its activity, or operates, *in time.* A cause of *being* is distinguished into: a) that which *keeps* (as opposed to *gives)* form in matter by its activity, e.g., the sun by its light and heat with respect to the child already born; and b) that which *gives* existence to, and *keeps* it in, essence. The former sort of cause of being, like a cause of becoming, presupposes the existence of *matter,* and operates *in time;* but unlike a cause of becoming, it cannot cease to be

[28] Joseph Bobili:, *Aquinas On Being and Essence: A translation and interp1·etation* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1964; second printing 1970), pp.

without resulting in the ceasing to be of its effect. The second sort of cause of being does *not* pre.suppose the existence of *essence* (in the way in which the two other sorts of efficient cause pre-suppose the existence of *matter), nor* does it operate *in time.* **It** is this sort of efficient causality which is operative here. **It** is clear, on reflection, that this sort of efficient causality is nothing other than God's creative causality, i.e., the giving of existence.

3) The existence of an essence-existence composite cannot be retained by it, if the source of this existence were to be removed, or if it were to cease to be. Some examples will help clarify the point here. The marble which becomes a .statue *receives* its shape (at the hands of the sculptor) , and *retains* that shape for a great length of time (given normal conditions), even at the removal, or at the ceasing to be, of the sculptor; but in such a way that the shape never becomes, even for the briefest of moments, an element of the nature of marble. Similarly, water *receives* heat (from some source of heat, like fire) , and *retains* it, at least for a time (given normal conditions), even though the source of heat is removed. And again, in such a way that the retained heat does not ever become an element of the nature of water. Similarly again, air becomes illuminated, or *receives* illumination, from some source of light, like the sun; but its being illuminated ceases at the removal of the source. For Aquinas, who was not aware of the fact that light *takes time* to travel from its source, both the illumination of the air and its ceasing to be illuminated were instantaneous. But this in no way takes away from the point of his example, indeed, it is what constitutes the point. A thing in which there is an essence-existence distinction *receives* existence, and *retains* it, only so long as the source of this existence is exerting its causality. Existence is *not* related to essence, from this point of view, as shape is to marble; nor as heat to water. A thing in which there is an essence-existence distinction cannot *retain* its existence *even for the briefest of moments* if the source of this existence were to be removed.

4) What exists, exists *right now.* That is, the past is always gone, and the future is never here. So that B, the cause of A, must, like A itself, exist *right now. A totally* depends on *B alone-right now.*

Bearing this four-point summary and clarification in mind, one can see quite readily that a universe of essence-existence composites-whether there be but *one* such thing, or a *plurality;* and if a plurality, whether they are ordered in a causal series or not, and whether there is an infinite number of them or not-such a universe would be a non-existent universe. Such a universe would be a universe of things each of which *needs a cause,* no one of which (things) can cause itself (this is. impossible), no two of which can cause each other (this, too, is impossible)-a universe of *nothing but effects.* It would, therefore, be a non-existent universe. And so, one can see that if there exists a *per aliuil* with respect to *existence,* there must exist a *per se* with respect to existence, as its only adequate cause.

* * * * *

So much, then, with respect to presenting, reformulating, clarifying the meaning of, as well as pointing out, the evidence for the truth of, the claims of Aquinas's Sixth Way, his introspectively based argument for the existence of God, his argument *from the agent intellect.* The hope now is that the reflections herein recorded will suffice to initiate a studied and critical response, a response which may bear fruit in the sense that it may contribute in some way to the formulation of an argument for God's existence which is at least on the way to becoming a "genuine proof, a rationally valid way leading to a firmly established certitude," [29] such as Maritain has claimed for *his own* introspectively based proof, his highly subtle and deeply meditative Sixth Way.

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[29] Jacques Maritain, *Approaches to God,* p.

THE MEDICAL PARADIGM IN ARISTOTELIAN ETHICS

THE ROLE OF models and paradigms in theorizing has once again a certain respectability in contemporary circles, especially in the area of the philosophy of science.[1] Such reasoning by analogy is an ancient art, however, as we can see with its perhaps most famous practitioner-Socrates, who is forever comparing men to horses, tanners, carpenters, etc. Then as now, there is a danger in such usage, in that the model employed may lead to inferences that the thing modelled does not warrant. The model may be overextended or misapplied. And yet, it almost seems that we must reason in such a fashion, accepting its risks, because it involves the essentially necessary procedure of going from the familiar to the unfamiliar, using the former to light our way into the latter. The use of models and paradigms has been taken to task many a time in recent years for its errors, but the tendency (and need) to use them seems ineradicable, at least if we are to speak of man and his world. In speculative theorizing, it is easier (though this is not conclusive) to argue that models are dispensable at a certain point, but they are an essential component in practical theorizing, where we compare and contrast the various areas of human concern and the spheres of human activity.

[1] Models and their roles in scientific theorizing were hotly debated early in this century. Recently, the debate has picked up again, especially over the question whether models play more than a merely formal role in theories. The following are some of the better known recent studies: M. Black, *Models and Metaphors* (Cornell Univ. Press, 1962); M. B. Hesse, *Models and Analogies in Science* (Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1966); and M. Bunge, *Method, Model, and Matter* (Boston: D. Reidel, 1973). For an interpretation of ancient philosophy in this vein, see W. A. Shibles, *Models of Ancient Greek Philosophy* (London: Vision Press, 1971). Shibles vic-.vs models from a logical or formalistic perspective and so does not touch upon the more 'material' approach of this essay.

It is upon this latter realm that I would like to focus, with a look to Aristotelian ethics, where medicine functions as a model for method and content considerations in regard to the moral life.

The topic of medicine's influence on ancient philosophy is not a new one,[2] but I propose to examine the issue from a slightly different perspective which-so far as I know-has not been taken before at least in regard to Aristotle. Whereas there have been studies on Aristotle's use of medical analogies in his ethics-and there are various approaches to this-none of them has explicitly posed the matter in the form indicated above: that is, whether the use of this particular paradigm affects the claims of Aristotle's moral philosophy. We can re-phrase the matter in the light of considerations drawn from contemporary meta-ethics: How does the medical model employed in Aristotle's ethics fare when it comes up against questions about the justification of the moral stance as a whole? Is it a valid or a helpful paradigm, or, if not, what of Aristotelian moral philosophy today? This is a mouthful of query to pose for oneself, and it may seem all out of proportion for a paper of this length. However, to be safe, and to leave the door open for further researches along this line, I shall only indicate some of the ground to be covered and limit myself accordingly in this treatment.

The first section will attempt to give some background to Aristotle's ethics by delineating medical ideas before and during

• Some of the more recent studies on this topic are: W. Jaeger, "Greek Medicine as Paideia," c. 1 of *Paideia,* Vol. III (New York: iliford Univ. Press, 1944), 3-45; W. Jaeger, "Aristotle's Use of Medicine as a Model of Method in His Ethics," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 77 (1957), 54-61; W. Jaeger, *Diokles von Karystos: Die Griechische Medizin und die Schule des Aristoteles,* Auflage (Berlin: DeGruyter, 1963); J. Longrigg, "Philosophy and Medicine: Some Early Interactions," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 67 (1963), 147-75; G. E. R. Lloyd, "Aspects of the Interrelations of Medicine, Magic, and Philosophy in Ancient Greece," *Apeiron* 9/1 (May 75), 1-17; G. E. R. Lloyd, "The Role of Medical and Biological Analogies in Aristotle's Ethics," *Phronesis* 13/l (1968), 68-83. The following study is not confined to Greece but seeks to offer a more cross-cultural view of the topic: G. E. Mueller, "Philosophy and Medicine," *The Personalist* 50 (Spring 69), !268-88.

his time, in order to detect streams of influence upon the Stagirite. Thus, we shall see how some of the key ideas in Aristotle's moral philosophy are those of prior and contemporary ancient medicine. In sections two through five, I will consider the :followingtopics :from Aristotle's ethics: II. The Final Good and Man's Function; III. The Doctrine of the Mean; IV. Perception as the Link Between Psychology and Ethics; and V. Right Reason and the Man of Practical Wisdom. These subjects all deserve-and have received-independent scrutiny, but I shall view them only within the confines of the perspective I have chosen, them all together very nicely. Finally, I will attempt, on the basis of the previous examination, to draw some conclusions about the model of medicine and its role in Aristotelian ethics, to see how that ethics is thereby affected.[3]

I. Streams of Ancient Medicine.

Although there have been attempts to trace the art or science of medicine back to ancient Egypt, it is generally argued that medicine and philosophy are the twins of the Greek enlightenment around the late sixth and fifth centuries B. C. Almost :from its beginnings, medicine and philosophy have influenced one another. This influence has been variously estimated, and one of the commonly noted drawbacks of medicine's association with early (natural) philosophy-besides its admitted gain of being ' scientized ' by the latter-is that the universalistic speculations of philosophy tended to hamper medicine's effort to be an empirical science concerned with health and

[3] This study is focused on the *Nicomachean Ethics* (EN) of Aristotle and does not pay explicit heed to some of the possibly supportive materials from the *Eudemian Ethics* and the *Magna Moralia.* Partially, this is to avoid having to argue about authenticity in regard to these works, but even more, it is because my case can be made without recourse to these other tracts. If included, they would only confirm the conclusions reached.

I have employed Burnet's text for the Greek: *The Ethics of Aristotle,* ed. w. intro. and notes by John Burnet (London: Methuen, 1900). Unless otherwise noted, the English translation will be from *The Basic Works of Aristotle,* ed. w. intro. by R. McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941).

cure.[4] In order to understand this relationship further, we must briefly note the two medical traditions in ancient Greece.

One of the two 'schools', some of whose works we still possess, was that of Hippocrates of Cos, the 'father of medicine'. Numerous works survive in this tradition, and we know many other titles of works not extant. Though most oi the writings fall within the lifetime of Hippocrates (late 5th-early 4th centuries B. C.), it is generally agreed that he did not write all of them, and we are even unable to tell whether he wrote any, or which. It is, however, beyond doubt that he had a great deal to do with the type of research that is depicted in the the treatises we do possess. The Hippocratic tradition was the .so-called' empirical ' tradition in Greek medicine, although this term should not be unilaterally applied, since there was cross-fertilization with other streams. We shall examine it closer in the sequel by looking at one of its famous tracts. Plato mentions Hippocrates twice in the Dialogues, in the *Protagoras* (Sllb-c) and in the *Phaedrus* (270c-e), and the later reference contains a brief description of the Hippocratic method-which agrees with the method as we find it operating elsewhere. Plato himself, however, was also influenced strongly by the other stream of ancient medicine, the Western or Sicilian stream.

The Sicilian 'school' of medicine has a number of famous names, including Alcmaeon of Croton, Diogenes of Apollonia (the classification is according to view, not locality), Empedocles of Acragas, and Philistion of Locri. It is this branch-if one may take the liberty of grouping all these authors together-that was probably more affected by the naturalistic speculations of early philosophy. It is Empedocles and Diogenes, at least, who are often accused of mixing natural philosophy and cosmological speculation with medicine, to the detriment of the latter. Another Western influence or representative of medical ideas were the Pythagoreans. Alcmaeon used to be

[4] On the joint evolution of philosophy and medicine in ancient Greece, see especially Longrigg's article (note above), which points out repeatedly (150-51, 155) the beneficial and harmful effects of each on the other.

classed as a junior member of the group, and he hails from the same city, but the precise relation is not clear. In general, it is not only difficult to determine the precise relationship of one of these thinkers to another, but even more, it becomes almost impossible to determine whose ' influence ' worked down upon Plato and Aristotle in any specific sense. The safest procedure is to say all. This is not too bold, moreover, because the ancient world-especially the Athens of Plato and Aristotle-witnessed an amazing dissemination of ideas. It is likely that Plato and Aristotle were influenced by writers from both streams of medicine. For our purposes, it is not necessary to untangle the precise relationships, but only to indicate, especially in regard to Aristotle, how some of the ideas, and the methodology, of medical writers worked an influence. For this purpose, we shall look now at a representative passage of each of the two '.streams ' mentioned above.

A pivotal text which indicates a number of the central conceptions of ancient medicine is attributed to Alcmaeon:

> Constitutive of health is a state of equality *(luovoµla)* among the powers *(8uvaµw;),* moist-dry, cold-hot, bitter-sweet, etc. On the other hand, a state of domination *(µovapxla)* among them is productive of disease. For the domination of one member of a pair is destructive of the other. Disease occurs through the immediate agency of an excess of heat or cold, for example, occasioned by taking too much or too little nourishment, and localized in the blood, marrow, or brain. But it is also engendered in these at times from external causes-waters ... the locality •.. and the like. Health, however, is the proportionate blending *(u6µµETpo> KpafJ'i>)* of the qualities. [5]

One can note several familiar ideas in this passage. For one, there are the familiar opposites of Pre-Socratic philosophy which were eventually (by Empedocles) reduced to four (cold-

•The translation is taken from T. J. Tracy, S. J., *Phyl!Wlogical Theory and the Doctrine of the Mean in Plato and Aristotle* (Chicago: Loyola Univ. Press, 1969), 22-23. The original fragment is 24B4 in Diels-Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker,* 6th revd. ed., 3 vols. (Berlin: Weidmann, 1952). Tracy's study, it should be noted, is the most exhaustive work on its topic, and it contains abundant textual evidence and support.

hot, wet-dry) and linked with the four elements (earth, air, fire, water) to become the ultimate building blocks of Aristotle's universe.[6] As soon as these are introduced, moreover, we are made aware of the need for a correct mixture. Whereas, in Aristotle, there is a cosmological exigency for this to occur, here it is required in order to have a healthy, properly-functioning organism. Disease is explained as the dominance of one opposite over the others, its 'self-assertion' over the rest, its 'refusal to take its proper place', as it were. We also note that the opposites are said to be powers and that they are both external and internal to the organism: the equilibrium of the organism is composed of a certain ratio or balance of opposites, as is the world outside of itself in which it is located. Hence, that external world may play as important a role in its health as its own internal states. The ideal condition is one where the disparate elements are ' blended ' in a proper mixture.[7]

Empedocles and Diogenes tended to mix the general theory of opposites with cosmological speculation-evinced by the (arbitrary, perhaps) reduction oi basic qualities to four, or the giving of supremacy to one (Diogenes's air) over the rest. Our next passage comes from a work of the *Corpus Hippocraticum;* it is entitled *On Ancient Medicine* (OAM), and its author argues vigorously against the introduction of ' speculative ' elements into medical theory. He condemns the use oi "empty postulates " ([8] in medicine as irrelevant and barren, and his own concentration is upon proper diet for producing or maintaining health. An oft-quoted and most significant text from his work is the following:

[6] Cf. *De gen. et corr.* 330a30-b9 and 334b8-335a31.

[7] Note the political imagery that is used here in a medical context. G. Vlastos, "Isonomia," *American Journal of Philology* 74 (1953), 337-66, has proposed that the basic ideas and terms originated in a political context, from which they migrated to medical and ethical contexts later on. See also his " Equality and Justice in Early Greek Cosmologies," *Classical Philology* 4£ (1947), 156-78.

[8] See "On Ancient Medicine" (OAM), in Hippocrates, *Opera,* Vol. I, trans. by W. H. S. Jones, Loeb Classical Library No *5£:* 1 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1948), c. I, £0-£1, pp. 1£-15.

... Depletion produces many other evils, different from those of repletion, but just as severe. Wherefore the greater complexity of these ills requires a more exact method of treatment. For it is necessary to aim -at some measure. But no measure, neither number nor weight, by reference to which knowledge can be made exact, can be found except bodily feeling. Wherefore it is laborious to make knowledge so exact that only small mistakes are made here and there. And that physician who makes only small mistakes would win my hearty praise. Perfectly exact truth is but rarely to be seen. For most physicians seem to me to be in the same case as bad pilots; the mistakes of the latter are unnoticed so long as they are steering in a calm, but, when a great storm overtakes them with a violent gale, all men realise clearly then that it is their ignorance and blundering which have lost the ship.[11]

This author assumes the same basic notion of contrariety as did Alcmaeon, and he focuses upon the ideas of depletion and repletion and their correction by dietary measures. He is acutely aware of the difficulties of generalization, and so, even though he speaks of a mark or a measure at which the physician should aim *(µhpov* TLPO<; *crroxaawrBai)'* he is wary of taking this in an absolute or general sense. If there is some imbalance of the vital constituents needed for health and proper functioning, the physician must pay close attention to the case at hand-no abstract measure or number will do. Rather, the doctor must gauge the success or failure of his treatment according to the responses *(a'tuBriaw)* of the individual patient. The whole point of medical treatment is to make ' this man ' or ' that man ' as healthy as can be-as *he* can be- here and now, and to treat him according to general rules as an idealized case might kill him or simply leave him .sick as he is.[10] There is a great stress

• OAM, IX, 9-29, pp. 26-29. Although the author of OAM concentrates on diet, other factors were also considered important in producing and preserving health. There are tracts in the *Corpus Hippocraticum* dealing specifically with proper exercise and the right external environment. See Tracy, 82-76, for a careful analysis of OAM and some of these other works.

[10] See OAM, X ff., where the author .emphasizes the different constitutions and states of men. One must begin treatment on the proper level and achieve the best one can there, before moving on. The ancient physicians were well aware of the need for individual consideration and distinguished between ' absolute ' and 'relative ' health. See Tracy, 72-78 note *56.* As we shall see, Aristotle

on knowledge of all the circumstances in this passage, a sentiment which concurs with the author's anti-hypothesis view. This is also why the image of the pilot is brought to bear: more boats than one have been sunk by 'textbook pilots.' As we shall see, these cautions are all well taken by Aristotle, as well as the later medical tradition. [11]

Before moving on to the *Nicomachean Ethios* in order to view the influence of such medical ideas, we should make a comment or two about Plato. His influence upon Aristotle is usually taken to be ' rationalistic ' ; and we take Aristotle to be ' waxing Platonic ' in precisely those places where he goes beyond the visible, empirical world (at least we say that he is 'least himself ' when he does so) . Hence, it may come as a mild surprise to find that Aristotle's e:µipiricism was probably fostered at the Academy too. Plato's knowledge of Hippocratic method has already been noted. On top of this, there are numerous references to medicine, and constant uses of the doctor as the paradigm of the true artist, throughout the Dialogues. [12] The central account of justice in the *Republio* is based on a medical model, with its notion of proper role and function being paramount. Much of Plato's medical knowledge was doubtless gained from the Pythagoreans, who combined cosmological theory with moral views and a dietetic regimen. For one, they emphasized strongly the interdependence of physical and psychic health, [13] a notion that Plato also adopted (cf. the use of music in character development in the *Republic;,* for instance). This Pytha-

makes a similar distinction between the absolute good and the good relative to each person, and for the same reason.

[11] One of the ' later ' doctors was Diodes of Carystos, who may have studied at the Lyceum while Aristotle was still alive, and who certainly was influenced by the principles of Aristotle's empirical method, made formally explicit in the Stagirite's logical works. He is thus an instance of philosophy's retro-action upon medicine. See Jaeger's *Diokles von* .. . (note 2 above).

[12] Cf. *GO'l'gias* 463e f.; *Laws.* 720a f. and 857b f.

[13] On the Pythagorean role in early medicine, especially the interrelation of physical and psychic health, and the relation of both to religion in a wide sense, see F. Wehrli, "Ethik und Medizin: Zur Vorgeschichte der Aristotelischen Mesonlehre," *Museum Helveticum* 8 (1951), *56-62.*

gorean influence is pronounced throughout Plato's career, and we can see it very much in the later *Philebus* and *Timaeus.* The cosmological theory of mixture in the *Philebus* is quasi-medical, and it is no accident that, at the end of the dialogue, ' the good ' is found to lie in a mixture of five types of things, the chief of which is "measure" (66a), which is followed by "the beautiful" *(ro KaA.6v)*.[14] Finally, section 69e-86a of the *Timaeus* is mentioned in the Menon Papyrus [15] along with twenty other medical authorities of the time, and Galen thought it important enough to write a commentary on it.[16] All this .shows that the presence of medical analogies in Aristotle's ethics-actually, his work as a whole-is accounted for in a number of ways, and we need no longer attribute Aristotle's empirical interests to his father's profession or to hi.s zoology course in Asia Minor. His passion for the empirical seems not to have been unaffected by his friends, the Platonists.

[14] Aristotle also stressed *TO Ka.Mv* as that which has supreme worth. ffitimately, moral actions are done for its sake. Although it has been variously rendered as 'the noble' and 'the beautiful', it contains all of these implications and cannot be limited to any one of them alone. It seems that the man who strives to realize *TO Ka.A.Ov* in his life is very close to the Kantian who is filled with 'reverence' towards the moral law and his duty. Cf. EN 1115bl3-14; l099al5 ff.; and 1169al5-b2.

[15] Meno was a student of Aristotle who wrote a treatise on previous medical opinionB, much in the vein of Aristotle's own canvasses of his predecessors. The remnants of this work have been published as W. H. S. Jones, *The Medical Writings. of Anonymus Londinensis* (Cambridge, England: 1947). Meno refers, among others, to Plato's *Timaeus* (esp. 69e-86a) as a previous medical authority. See Tracy, *25* ff.

Another author mentioned by Meno is Philistion of Locri, whom we noted earlier as belonging to the 'Western' stream of medicine. His etiology of diseases is preserved in the document (XX *25* ff., or fr. 4). Philistion was a kind of intermediary figure between Eastern and Western medicine. He had an influence on Plato's *Timaeus* and is mentioned in the second Platonic epistle (314d ff.). Also, there are vestiges of a tc1eology of nature (</>6tTis) in his work, an idea which may have influenced Aristotle, especially since the teleology is one towards 'form' (.Xoos). See "Philistion of Locri," in *Paulys Real EncycZopadie der Classischen* ed. by Wilhelm Kroll, Vol. XIX (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1938), cols. 2405-2408.

[16] Sec Tracy, 78.

II. The Final Good and Man's Function.

The influence of medicine on Aristotle's ethics has been viewed from at least two perspectives, one of them [17] concentrating upon general methodic considerations, and the other [18] upon the support rendered by the paradigm to specific Aristotelian positions. Since the former relations are operative in the latter, I shall concentrate on these and seek to show how the medical paradigm, which has been briefly exhibited above, is at work. Hence, the next four sections will he devoted to the study of specific Aristotelian doctrines, in the light of the operative medical model.

Medicine is a practical rather than a theoretical science; it is an art, a productive science which has an aim-namely health. Hence, in order to gauge its own success or failure, it must have a notion of the result to he attained before it sets to work. As Aristotle puts it, according to his theory of the four 'causes ', the final cause is prior to the activity; it is the formal cause awaiting and motivating its own actualization. In order that an activity be intelligible, in order that its outcome be understood, there must be a formality that is aimed at (or can later be discerned as goal that has been reached) . In the early medical literature, we find the use of the word ' form ' (ei8os),[19] which expresses this need. There, as in Aristotle-and Plato *(Rep.* 353al0 ff.), we find form linked to function. We attain the form of something, produce it, rather, in the thing, when the thing performs its proper function the way it should. The doctor produces health (the form) in the patient when the body of

[17] See Jaeger, JHS (note 2 above).

[18] See Lloyd, *Phronesis* (note 2 above). Lloyd notes three examples in Aristotle's ethics where medical and biological analogies are used in a supportive role: (1) the doctrine that man has a function as man; (2) the doctrine that moral excellence is both determinate and yet also relative to individuals; and (3) the conception of the good or morally sound man as the ideal moral standard. See esp. 81-82.

[19] See Jaeger, *Paideia* (note 2 above), 20 and Tracy, 314. At *Metaphysics* 1032bl-34, Aristotle speaks of ' health' in terms of formal and final causality, a usage which ties in with the doctors' employment of dllos.

the latter is f4nctioning properly as a result of treatment. In Plato, the soul and the state achieve their proper form when they function properly in all their parts, and so as a whole. Thus, when Aristotle applies the medical paradigm to ethics, he too asks about the form of man, and seeks to discern his proper function, knowledge of which is required in order to cure or to maintain in good health. Just as a doctor who does not know what health consists of cannot help a patient, so also is a statesman of no use, if he does not know the proper function of man.

In mentioning' man's function', whether in Aristotle or any of the subsequent ethicists who base themselves upon him, we hit upon something of a raw nerve. For this just happens to be one of the most defended (at least in former times) and most impugned notions in moral philosophy. Aristotle, in line with the medical tradition, and after the example of Plato, introduces it as a matter of course in trying to explain the nature of happiness as man's chief good-that at which all things (including man) aim. Happiness turns out to be an activity, man's best activity, and so it requires a specification of man's proper function. This, Aristotle believes, he can do. It is .somewhat amazing how he then goes about the definition of man's function *(€pyov)* as if it were obvious to everyone, while this notion is so thoroughly enigmatic to scores of moralists after him.

The famous passage on man's function occurs at 1098al9, and, in its course, Aristotle employs two basic analogies in order to argue: (a) the analogy from the crafts (flute-player, carpenter, tanner) and (b) the analogy from parts of the body (eye, hand, foot). Accepting these analogies as valid almost as soon as they are proposed, he then shows that man's proper function is obviously distinct from (even if inclusive of) vegetables and beasts. At first, it seems that Aristotle wants to say that man's proper function is " an active life of the element that has a rational principle" (1098a7-8). This would be a rational life in the world through everyday activity. At the end of the passage, however, Aristotle intimates a difficulty, for

there he suggests that since there may be one virtue (*apen1)* of the soul above all the rest-and so one ' part ' of the soul somehow sundered from the rest, the human good, or happiness, may well lie in the activity of that part alone. As is well known, he in fact opts for this second alternative in the tenth book of the *Nioomachean Ethics* (EN), where he equates perfect human happiness with the activity or function of contemplation. This seeming dichotomy has been no source of joy to Aristotelian scholars, and it highlights the debate over whether it is valid to extend the medical paradigm into the ethical realm.

Aristotle's discussion of man's function, in relation to those of plants and beasts, as well as his delineation of types of ' lives ' (wealth, honor, etc.), may be taken in more than one way. It can be read either as a purely descriptive account, or as a normative one which involvces hierarchical implications. [20] Now, it is not difficult to grant the former point of view, that man occupies a specific rung or link in the great chain of being, and one would have to be a pretty thoroughgoing existentialist of the Sartrean breed to question the fundamental difierence between a man and a cactus-and all this implies about behavior. One can do even better and argue that ' man ' has a sort of ' essence ' in that he is capable of certain ' human ' modes of functioning (viz., acting) which are proper to him, and which enable discussions about 'human behavior' even to get started. [21] Unfortunately, this only approaches the problem, and

[20] Cf. J. C. Davies, " Aristotle's Conception of 'Function' and Its Relation to His Empiricism," *Emerita* 37/1 (1969), Davies attempts to show how Aristotle sought to unite a naturalistic with a functional (teleological) account of things, and notes how this often caused a strain in the Stagirite's philosophy.

[21] See S. Clark, "The Use of 'Man's Function' in Aristotle," *Ethics* (July Clark is one of the few predominantly favorable expositors of Aristotle in regard to this subject. One finds oneself agreeing with Clark, but also lamenting his failure to be more specific in regard to the crucial notion of ' rationality '. I am not aware of any follow-up articles by him making good this deficiency.

Though not obvious in the title, Clark's attempt to isolate the properly ' human ' role of man receives fortification in Mary Midgley's extremely stimulating article, "The Concept of Beastliness: Philosophy, Ethics and Animal Behavior," *Philosophy* 48 (April 73), 111-35.

Aristotle himself moves the discussion beyond fact to norm. He argues that man has a peculiar function *M man*, over and above his function as *this man* (e.g., tanner) , and that he therefore *ought* to perform this one function better than all of the others, since his happiness lies in it. This argument is extremely difficult to accept, precisely because it is so difficult to decipher what Aristotle could mean.[22] If he means to refer to his first definition of happiness, then the definition of man's function will be so broad as to be practically useless-despite his later attempts to render it more specific. The " rational life " will be rendered more definite through the mean doctrine and the moral virtues, but these face similar problems. If, on the other hand, the reference is to the second definition of happiness, then that will make the argument simply unacceptable, not only because it seems impossible to specify a single one of man's activities and to designate it as more properly human than all the rest, but also because there would be widespread disagreement about such an activity as the flnal goal of all men *qua* men. The common wisdom which Aristotle so respected in ters of morality would hardly agree that Achilles should have gone home to contemplate in Phthia for the rest of his life, instead of dying before the walls of Troy in pursuit of the noble *(To KaA6v).* Chances are that Aristotle would not have agreed either.

One way of putting the difficulty faced here by Aristotle is to say that he is confronted with a choice of opting for man's

[22] B. Suits, "Aristotle on the Function of Man: Fallacies, Heresies, and Other Entertainments," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 4/1 (Sept. 74), makes as good an attempt as any to decipher Aristotle's meaning. Suits offers ten possible interpretations of Aristotle's phrase ' man's function ' and finds none of them acceptable. He then goes on to argue for a plurality of human functions-all of them proper and essential-based on a comparison of man to a " chamber pot." (38)

Another discussion of human behavioral propriety is P. Alexander's "Normality," *Philosophy* 48 (April 73), *137-51.* Alexander points out that the notion of psychic health is much more problematic than physical health and relates both to the statistical notion of ' normality ', which eventually becomes normative in a certain social group.

end in (a) an inclusive or (b) a dominant or supreme sense.[23] The former would refer to a life of many properly 'human' activities, integrated or harmonized in some fashion into a whole life; while the latter would specify one activity of man to locate his perfection and happiness in that. The latter alternative-which appears to be Aristotle's final choice-reduces all (moral) activity to concerns about means, while the former would allow that man may himself be a setter of ends, as well as a discoverer of means, all in a complete and whole life, of course. Though such an interpretation of Aristotle, which the Stagirite himself could have chosen, falls on more sympathetic ears, it still faces some difficulties, as we have seen, due to its dependence on the medical paradigm. But more of this later.

It is obvious, then, that Aristotle's unassuming attempt to extend the notion of 'health' into the ethical realm *via* the concept of proper functioning as norm has run into difficulties that are not easily resolvable. If man had a single proper function as man, it would be simple to judge whether he was morally healthy or not. As it is, the notion of human functioning has split into a thousand different activities, and so the question becomes: What standard of health is to be applied in gauging the propriety or impropriety of each of them? When he faces this question, Aristotle resorts to his doctrine of the mean, also a medical idea, as we have .seen. To an extent, it allows him to hold off the critics for a while.

III. The Doctrine of the Mean.

In order to explicate the notion of happiness as the final good, Aristotle has called upon the concept of proper function, which is related to form. It now remains to be determined what proper (versus improper) functioning is, for which purpose Aristotle introduces the notion of virtue (*aper'Tj)*. At this point, the notion has no moral overtones as yet, and it simply means 'excel-

••This distinction is made by W. F. R. Hardie, "The Final Good in Aristotle's Ethics," in *Arisfotle: A Collection of Critical Essays,* ed. by J. M. E. Moravcsik, (New York: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1967), 297-322.

lence '. The next task, therefore, is to determine the precise nature and types of virtue. Just as a physician must penetrate further into the notion of healthy (viz. 'virtuous') activity- which he seeks to foster in the patient, so the moral philosopher (the politician) must press on to ask about the nature of spiritual (ethical) health, or moral virtue. In pursuing this kind of investigation throughout the rest of EN (especially II-V), Aristotle is not at all .so limited in his outlook on virtue (and so, function) as the previous discussion seemed to indicate. At any rate, the transition to a consideration of virtue and the related doctrine of the mean is perfectly smooth: " Since happiness is an activity of the soul in accordance with perfect virtue, we must consider the nature of virtue; for perhaps we shall thus see better the nature of happiness" (1102a5-8).

Aristotle begins the discussion of virtue by dividing the soul into two parts: the rational and the irrational (1102a26 ff.), a division which foreshadows the later separation of intellectual (see VI) and moral virtues. It is the moral virtues that concern Aristotle, and to which the mean doctrine chiefly applies, although the intellectual virtues are very much involved in the moral life as well (at least .some of them). The reason for this initial delineation of the soul is justified in terms of medicine: just as the man who would heal eyes or body must know about these, so also the politician, whose aim is similar, must know about the human soul.

It is interesting to see how Aristotle prepares us for the introduction of the mean doctrines-almost as if he knew he would be misunderstood. Apparently he was, even in modern times, as anyone can see by looking to the cautions and warnings of modern expositors who never fail to put us on guard. He begins by noting that states of character arise out of like activities, wherefore we must look to these. They, in turn, must be according to the" right rule" which is reserved for later. Lest we suspect that he is introducing an absolutist legalism, Aristotle warns that "the accounts we demand must be in accordance with the subject matter; matters

concerned with conduct and questions of what is good for us have no fixity, any more than matters of health" (1104a8-5). In each case, the agents themselves (notably, the ethical agent must effect his own cure) must decide on what is appropriate *(rov Kaipov)* to the occasion, as in the arts of navigation and medicine. But we are entitled, at least, to state generally that excess and defect both damage the object (or subject) , whether it be a boat, a body, or a soul (character). And so, we enter into the discussion of moral virtue (spiritual health) through the doors of the nautical and medical analogies.

A closer examination of Aristotle's definition of virtue in terms of the mean reveals its close dependence upon the paradigm of the medical art:

> Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i. e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it. Now it is a mean between two vices, that which depends upon excess and that which depends upon defect; and again it is a mean because the vices respectively fall short of or exceed what is right in both passions and actions, while virtue both finds and chooses that which is intermediate. Hence in respect of its substance and the definition which states its essence virtue is a mean, with regard to what is best and right an extreme. [24]

There are a number of crucial things to be noted in this passage. All of them have been seen by commentators and expositors of Aristotle, not always together, unfortunately. First, the mean is, in a sense, an extreme: Aristotle is not advocating an *aurea mediocritas* or a doctrine of *in medio tutissimus ibis.* Second, virtue is not a simple mixture of other components, or a number defining the exact quantity of some mixture; virtue itself is not a is *at* the mean *(f.v μ,f:cr6rTJn).* It is a state of character which involves a certain measured relationship of actions and / or emotions, which may either exceed or fall short of what the situation demands. [25] Furthermore, besides involving

[24] EN 1106b36-1107a8.

[25] See W. F. R. Hardie, "Aristotle's Doctrine That Virtue Is a Mean," *Proc. of the Amtotelian Society 65* (1964-65), 183-fl04. Hardie emphasizes the applica-

the passions and actions, the mean applies to choice as well. The confinement of the mean to one or more of these (but not all) has only resulted in an unjustified limitation of the mean doctrine, and hence, to claims about its general inadequacy.[26] Third, the mean is determined "relatively to us." We are not speaking of an absolute mathematical middle, nor of a strict proportion, but, as Aristotle has already cautioned us, the mean may be different in each case. There is an absolute mean, to be sure, which is different from the relative mean, just as there is an ideal state of health, and a state of being healthy which we are presently able to (and should) attain. Hence, if a doctor- or an ethician-ignores the facts of the case-the situation relatively to us, damage to one's physical or moral health will result.[27] And fourth, the relative mean is determined by a rational principle (A.6ycp), as the man of practical wisdom (o *cf>p6viμ,oi;)* would determine it. This is an attempt to offer guidance in a matter where we are still-admittedly-involved in generalities. This reference to the man of practical right reason indicates fur-

tion of the mean doctrine to both internal passions and external actions. He is negative towards the attempt-which we will make later-to link the ethical mean with Aristotle's psychology and physiology.

••Cf. J. 0. Urmson, "Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 10 (July 78), 228-80. Urmson adds choice to action and emotion as an arena in which the mean may be attained. In doing so, he is able to show how Aristotle's discussion of continence (EN VII) is linked to that of temperance by way of the mean doctrine. His chart on p. 226 is illuminating and worth consulting. He also argues that, although there sometimes seem to be problems in applying the mean doctrine, this is due, usually, to a misreading of the situation, rather than to the general inadequacy of the doctrine itself. Cf. 227-80.

[27] We have already noted this distinction in regard to medicine (see note 10); here, Aristotle acknowledges it in his doctrine. Cf. EN 1106a24 ff., where he uses an example from diet or nutrition to show that the mean must be taken relatively to us. 'Vhat is the right amount for Milo, the wrestler (who reputedly ate an ox in a day), is not necessarily the right amount for another man.

On the distinction between the good in itself (absolutely or without qualification) and the good relatively to each man, see *Metaphysics* 1029b2-18 and EN 1129b4-6. In both places, Aristotle emphasizes that men should attempt to have the good relative to them approximate the absolute good; in other words, he is exhorting men to make moral progress.

ther the flexibility that Aristotle deems necessary in reasoning about such matters.

Little more need be .said about the role of the medical paradigm in this elaboration of excellence of character, or virtue. But one specific point is too closely related to medicine to be bypassed in silence. We recall the phrase in OAM: "to aim at some measure" *(µfrpov nvos <rroxa<ranOai)* (c. IX). In Aristotle, we find a similar phrase repeated on numerous occasions: "to aim at the middle" *(roil µ,e<rov&v et'TJ <rroxa<rnK'Tj)* (1106b15-16, 28). It is tempting to speculate that Aristotle is consciously imitating here the doctrine of the ancient medical tract, with an ethical application.

It is hardly necessary to proceed here with a precise examination of the mean doctrine as applied to specific passions, choices, and actions. That has been done often enough. Also, scholars have claimed that the doctrine breaks down in certain instances, such as justice-where even Aristotle was on guard (1133b 33 :ff.),[28] while others have defended Aristotle by saying that the doctrine is fundamentally correct and only the particular applications are erroneous sometimes, due to a misreading of the situation that obtains.[29] But Aristotle can also be vindicated by simply paying close attention to his own broad interpretation of the mean in terms of suitability *(ro Kaipov* and *ro 7TpE7Tov),* which is determined by the *phronimos* according to right reason. It is in this direction, then, that we must proceed in order to discover the precise meaning of the mean doctrine. As we shall see, the medical background functions even there, in part by way of Aristotle's physics and psychology.

[28] Cf. W. D. Ross, *Aristotle* (London: Methuen, 1971 (1949), 207 and US-15.

[2]. See Urmson, 27-30 (also note 26 above). A number of feelings or dispositions in Aristotle's ethics do not seem to be classifiable as 'mean' dispositions. Among them are: righteous indignation, shame or modesty, friendliness, dignity, truthfulness, and wit. The problem of placing them is discussed by W. W. Fortenbaugh, "Aristotle and the Questionable Mean-Dispositions," *Trans. and Proc. of American Philol. Assoc.* 99 (1968), 203-31. See also Fortenbaugh's recent more general study *Aristotle on Emotion* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 11175).

Before going to this, it should be noted that the mean doctrine played a pervasive role in the *Corpus* of Aristotle; it is not confined to the ethical realm. In the *Politics*, for instance, he speaks of hitting the mean in a fusion of democracy and oligarchy (1294b14 ff.), of the importance of a "well-mixed" (rich and poor) middle class in order to have a stable constitution or state (1296b38-1297a8), and of the downfall of states because of a bad mixture of just such a kind (1307a5-11). Just as a nose which is too small, or 'too snub,' will end up being no nose at all, so also, a constitution that is too lopsided will result in the disappearance of the state altogether (1309b18-35). "The same law or proportion equally holds in states." [80] And if we turn to the *Rhetoric* (cf. especially c. II on the proprieties of speaker and audience) [81] and the *Poetics* (1458b 11-16), the same passion for proportion and opportuneness and proper mixture greets us. It is no objection to say that these ideals are Greek ideals in general. Indeed, they are as any familiarity with the drama and the sculpture of the 5th and 4th centuries will tell but that only says that Aristotle inherited a paradigm whose influence was pervasive. [82] Truth has never suffered because of its dispersion alone. Even after Aristotle, the basic notion of the mean remained in philosophy for a long

••Although, as Aristotle, one does not want to read the mean doctrine in pure quantitative terms, it is also clear that quantity cannot therefore be ignored altogether. Qualitative differences are often the result of quantitative changes, as the examples illustrate. One can pile just so many bricks on a roof before it collapses, and there is a very thin (quantitative) line between humorous sarcasm and cruelty. This quantity-quality relationship was clearly seen by Hegel. See his *Science of Logic*, trans. by A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), esp. 366-71.

·[1] Cf. also *Rhetoric* 136lb6 ff., where Aristotle points out that the norm for beauty must be adjusted to age, so that one does not judge an old man by the same standard as a young one. Cf. also L. W. Rosenfield, "The Doctrine of the Mean in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*," *TheJoria* 31 (1965), 191-98.

••Cf. W. J. Oates, "The Doctrine of the Mean," *Philosophical Review* 45 (1936), 382-98. Oates traces the origins of the mean doctrine back to two general sources: (1) the maxims of early gnomic poetry, and (2) the notion of 'limit' *('1repas)* in Pythagorean teaching. The former shows the pervasiveness of the general idea in Greek culture. See also Vlastos (note 7 above) and Wehrli (note 13 above).

time, both in a physiological and in an ethical sense, the two being-as in Aristotle-closely related.[33] It is to this topic that I now turn.

IV. Perception as Link Between Psychology and Ethics.

"It is no easy task to find the middle," warns Aristotle (1109a24-25). The reason for this is that finding the mean involves doing the right things, in the right way, at the right time, with the right motive, etc. (1115b15-U; 1106bl4-28). Not only is each of these aspects difficult to determine in itself, but the action ' according to the mean ' must involve all of them in order to be properly performed. All of these facets of the act are particular, even though the act as a whole is determined according to a general principle. Hence, what is at issue here concerns the application of general principles (here, the mean) to specific cases. In regard to medicine, we already noted that patients must be treated and cured as individuals, and the doctor's prescription is proper only if it takes stock of the whole situation with all of its individuating factors. The only way to hit the mean, we were told in OAM (c. IX) , is through recourse to "bodily feeling" (TO'u *uwµ,aror;rT,v atuO'YJuiv).*[34] By this is meant the patient's physical response to the treatment. But there is a counterpart to this-the only way in which a doctor can know and aim at the mean is by paying close attention to such circumstantial evidence as the patient's bodily response to treatment. Hence, the doctor himself must rely on perception in order to discern the mean. It cannot be calculated in the abstract. This is precisely what Aristotle says is necessary in the ethical realm. It is through his theory of sense perception, moreover, that he is able to fortify his position on the need for

[33] There was a close relationship between Stoic physics (pneuma theory) and Stoic ethics. The two areas were connected through the notion of ' right reason ' (6p0os l\O'}'os). See Johnny Christensen, *An Essay on the Unity of Stoic Philosophy* (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1962). Cf. also M. J. Seidler, *Right Reason in Stoic Ethics* (Unpublished M. A. Thesis, St. Louis University, 1975), esp. c. III: " The Physical Groundwork for Stoic Orthological Ethics," 48-92.

[34] OAM, IX, 17-18, pp. 26-27.

perceptive awareness in order to determine the ethical mean or what is proper.

The final chapter of the *Posterior Analytics* and the first chapter of the *Metaphysics* both concern the dependence of intellectual knowledge upon sense discrimination, which is (temporally) prior. In the EN, Aristotle states: "Now of first principles we see some by induction, some by perception, some by a certain habituation, and others too in other ways." (1098b 8-4) This also indicates the dependence of some rational principles upon a•perceptive base. In the case of the mean doctrine, the truth of the position or principle is seen in, and depends upon, perception. To be more precise, Aristotle's mean doctrine is closely related to, as well as dependent upon, his account of the nature of sensation in *De Anima.*

Aristotle has already explained how the world is constituted of the four elements, each of which is ' made up' of a pair of opposite qualities. In *De Anima* (423b26 ff.), he explains how our senses, too, are comprised-in a fashion-of opposites: ". . . the sens·e itself is a ' mean ' between any two oppo.site qualities which determine the field of that sense. . . . What is ' in the middle ' is fitted to discern." (*ws Tfjs oiov p.EO"ÒT'YJTOS OV'O"'YJS • • • TÒ yàp µE'O"OP KptTtKÒ*) • Though he is speaking mainly of the sense of touch here, Aristotle says that the power of sensation generally results from its being a " certain ratio Or power *in* a magnitude " (ovS' *T, at0"0'Y]CJ'W* µeye0os *EO"TW, a>..Aa.* A6yos *TES Kat Svvaµis EKEtPov)* (424a27-29).[85] The reason why a sense power in a physical, spatial sense organ is able to sense qualities of external objects is that it occupies a sort of mean position. If the stimulus is either too extreme in either direction, or too' neutral ',[86] then we cannot sense it with our

•• The interpretation of this passage is often seen as problematic, especially as concerns the precise relation of sense and sense organ. See Ross's version here at which is the interpretation I am following.

••Aristotle is not quite right in his observation about our supposed inability to sense something at the 'neutral ' point. This is true, perhaps, in regard to temperature, but it does not hold for all cases of touching. For instance, we can use the tip of one finger to feel the tip of another, at least as regards their texture.

given sense apparatus. Our sense power, which is in a mean state, cannot-ironically-sense a mean state in an external object. This may lend support to the position which holds Aristotle to be avoiding a strict mathematical determination of the mean (viz., a numerical midpoint), if this conclusion may be applied to the ethical realm. At any rate, this theory of perception seems to be linked diirectly with the ethics by way of an oft-quoted passage, which is now quoted once more:

> To perceive then is like bare asserting or knowing; but when the object is pleasant or painful, the soul makes a quasi-affirmation or negation, and pursues or avoids the object. To feel pleasure or pain is to act with the sensitive mean towards what is good or bad as such. Both avoidance and appetite when actual are identical with this: the faculty of appetite and avoidance are not different, either from one another or from the faculty of sense perception; but their being *is* different.
> To the thinking soul images serve as if they were contents of perception (and when it asserts or denies them to be good or bad it avoids or pursues them). That is why the soul never thinks without an image.[87]

In its linkage of perception and the sensitive mean with the notions of pleasure and pain-which are respectively pursued and avoided as goods or evils as such, as well as in its junction of perception and thinking, this passage serves as a direct transition to the discussion of similar notions in the ethical realm.[88]

[87] Cf. *De anima* 43la8-16. For the Greek text and accompanying translation, see *On the Soul, Parva Naturalia, On Breath,* trans. by W. S. Hett (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1957, Loeb Classical Library No. 17), pp. 174-77.

[88] On 'perception' as a link between the *De anima* and EN, see W. W. Fortenbaugh, "Aristotle's Conception of Moral Virtue and Its Perceptive Role" *Trana. and Proc. of American Philol. Assoc.* 95 (1964), 77-87; and E. H. Olmstead, "The 'Moral Sense' Aspect of Aristotle's Ethical Theory," *American Journal of Philology* 69 (1948), 42-61. Another important article on this topic, early but often referred to, is J. L. Stocks, *"Logos* and *Mesotes* in the *De Anima* of Aristotle," *Journal of Philology* 33 (1914), 182-94.

The notion of a moral sense or perception brings to mind the modem intuitionist ethics of Moore and Ross, both of whom were influenced by Aristotle in this regard. This topic is discussed by B. Baumrin, "Aristotle's Ethical Intuitionism," *New Scholasticism* 42 (Winter 68), 1-17. His proposal is opposed by J. T. King, "Aristotle's Ethical Nor:-Intuitionism," *New Scholasticism* 43 (Winter 69), 181-42,

In any case, the ethical mean-the proper choice, action, or emotion that is demanded by a situation-must be (can only be) determined through perception. Aristotle is emphatic on this point, and he frequently repeats that " the decision rests with perception" (€v rfi ſ, Kpt<Tii;) ,[19] when it comes to determining the proper response. He points out that the ' perception ' he refers to " is another kind of perception than that of the qualities peculiar to each sense." It is more like what occurs in ' incidental ' or ' indirect • sensation, such as of " the son of Diares" *(De Anima* or of the triangular :figure before us This kind of act is the bottom step, as it were, in the syllogistic of moral reasoning.[40] Aristotle compares it to intuitive reason (vovi;) which forms the upper limit. While it sometimes seems that he is not sure of this comparison,[41] at other points he expressly comes out in favor of it (1143a35 £.): "And intuitive reason is concerned with the ultimates in both directions .... the particulars; 0£ these therefore we must have perception, and this perception is intuitive reason." (Kai 0 VOV<; TWV E<TXaTWV e71" aµ,o.porepa • . . EK T(J)V Ka(J' EKa<TTa Ta Ka0o1\0V • TOVTWV OVV EXEW bei ai<T0T}<TW, aVT'T} 0• E<TTi VOV<;.) What he means is that the proper application of the ultimate principles (viz., the mean doctrine and its diversification in the moral virtues in II-V) depends upon a grasp of the particular situation. That which is to be done must be discerned in the light of principles, while these mu.st be " intuited " *in* the particular areas of application or exercise. In moral perception, principles and particular actions are ' perceived ' or intuited together.

Another word for perception is 'seeing'. The morally perceptive man ' sees' what ought to be done, what is the mean in any case, just as the doctor' sees' (due to the reactions of the

a slightly rabid article, to which Baumrin successfully-I think-replies with "Classifying Aristotle's Ethics," *New Scholasticism* 44 (Winter 70), 158-61.

[39] Cf. EN 1109b22; 1118a2; and 1126b4-5.

[40] See EN 1094bl9 ff., where Aristotle speaks explicitly of premisses and conclusions.

[41] Cf. EN 1142a28 f.

patient, and his general condition) how he .should direct his treatment. The author of OAM is very concerned about the need to take into account all of the factors of the case in order to be able to render a proper judgment. The mean is missed if one does not" see" (KanSe'iv) what the concrete case requires.[42] The good doctor-and so, the fortunate patient-is one who has a careful and a practiced ' eye ' for details-seen, of course, in the light of general principles. Likewise, that man is good who is able to ' see ' what action is required of him in a particular case, and then chooses and pursues it. The tragedy of human lite is that many men do not even know how to discern the good, much less strive for it if they do. Aristotle refers us numerous times to those with experience in life: they know the proper mean of action because " experience has given them an eye (to) ... see aright." *(Sia yap To f.K Tij<> f.µ1mpla<; oµµa opwaw opBw<>)* (1143bl3-14). It is significant that Oedipus, who ' stumbled ' in life, who ' missed the mark ', put out his eyes because they did not ' see '.[43]

I mentioned earlier that the link of perception with pursuit and avoidance (of pleasures and pains respectively) also serves as a transition from the psychological area into ethics proper. This notion is obviously a medical one as well, in that patients' pleasurable or painful reactions to treatment gauge the doctor's success or failure. Given the needed addition of reasoning to simple perception (which occurs through linking images to thought) , Aristotle may simply proceed to the ethical sphere, where pleasure and pain play a similar criteria! role. " For moral excellence is concerned with pleasures and pains. . . ." *(7rep£ ?]Sova<; yap Kat AV"TT'U')EO"TtV 'lj apmJ)* (1104b9) . Just as pleasure (or absence of pain) is an indicator of physical health, so in moral behavior or human excellence, pleasure is an indicator of propriety. Of course, things are a bit more complicated here, since Aristotle distinguishes between the real and the apparent good, as it were (1113a15 £.) , which is another way of saying

•• OAM, IX, 22 f., p. 26 f.

••I owe this comparison to Olmstead (note 38 above), 57.

that pleasure is not *per se* an indicator of moral excellence, since men can-and do-feel pleasure in doing the wrong things (and vice versa, in regard to pain) . The norm has to be more precisely determined. Through our analysis of perception in relation to the mean, and through our final reference to experience and its 'eye', we are brought naturally now to Aristotle's discussion of the man of practical wisdom (O*cppovip,oi;)* who sees things for what they are and chooses and acts according to the right rule. In the moral exemplar who-we should recall-was mentioned in the original definition of virtue, Aristotle seeks to find final concretion for his moral theory. It is in the good man that the medical paradigm comes to its final fruition and also exhibits its ultimate limitations.

V. Right Reason and the Man of Practical Wisdom.

One experiences some disappointment as one advances through the EN, since the descent to particularity, especially a.s concerns moral virtue, is never completed. We are told that we should aim at the mean, and have seen that this requires perception of the particular circumstances. While accepting this, we are still led to ask about the concrete criterion to which we can refer when estimating and judging our actions and responses. The mean is determined, says Aristotle, according to the " right rule" *(opOoi;* .Myoi;), and we want to know further what this rule consists of. Aristotle raises this sort of question quite specifically at the start of EN VI. The lengthy passage which follows is crucial to his point of view:

> In all states of character we have mentioned, as in all other matters, there is a mark to which the man who has the rule looks, and heightens or relaxes his activity accordingly, and there is a standard which determines the mean states which we say are intermediate between excess and defect, being in accordance with the right rule. But such a statement, though true, is by no means clear: for not only here but in all other pursuits which are objects of knowledge it is indeed true to say that we must not exert ourselves nor relax our efforts too much or too little, but to an intermediate extent and as the right rule dictates; but if a man had only this knowledge he would be none the wiser-e. g. we should not know what sort of

medicines to apply to our body if some one were to say ' all those which the medical art prescribes, and which agree with the practice of one who possesses the art.' Hence it is necessary with regard to the states of the soul also not only that this true statement should be made, but also that it should be determined what is the right rule and what is the standard that fixes it.[44]

Aristotle here admits that the mean doctrine and the notion of " right rule "-which has been employed throughout the ethics (note also the constant ' aim ' metaphors [45]) -need :further specification; and he uses a medical example to make this point. The Stoics were in a similar hot .seat later on, since they too employed the notion of " right reason " (*op8'0r;* Myor;) to describe moral rectitude, and were pressed to specify and elaborate its content.[46] It is interesting that Aristotle and the Stoics finally resorted to the same expedient-the moral exemplar as the concrete norm. Aristotle first draws the discussion of right rule or reason into that of practical wisdom (*cf>p6v'Y}<Tt<;*): " the right rule is that which is in accordance with practical wisdom " (1144b28-24). Now, practical wisdom, which is concerned with the particular, is precisely the "perception" we saw earlier, the " perception " of concrete factors and the universals embedded ill' them, which the man of experience-who ' sees '-possesses (1142a23 ff.). Thus, right reason leads to practical wisdom, which turns, instead, to perceptive experience belonging to the proverbial good man 0:f all traditions. In a sense, this maneuver constitutes an evasion of the initial demand to specify-theoretically-the " mark" or " standard " at which we .should aim to acquire or keep moral excellence or health.[47] But the evasion is hardly a very blameworthy one, since sooner or later most moral philosophers have recourse to a similar standard.[48] In

"EN 1138bl6-34.

[45] Cf. EN 1094a24; ll03b32-35; ll06bl5; 1106b36-1107a8; 1109a22-23; 1115bl9-20; and 1144b21 f.

[46] See Seidler, *Right Reason in Stoic Ethics* (note 33 above), esp. cc. II and IV.

"Cf. W. J. Oates, *Aristotle and the Problem of Value* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), 279 ff.

[48] Aristotle has great respect for ' sound common reason ', as it were, and in a sense his ethics is simply an unearthing of the presuppositions of this common point

the hustle and bustle of life, " perhaps the good man differs from others most by seeing the truth in each class of things, being as it were the norm and measure of them" (1118a82-88). That is why we should look to him and aim as he aims.

Like the physician's, Aristotle's norm for moral excellence is flexible or variable. There is room for individual discernment and decision (choice) to fit the particular cases, and there is also reference to general principles which are embodied in particulars and make these intelligible. Aristotle certainly holds that the structure of the universe is defined in certain ways, so that a man is able to orient himself by objective realities; but, on the other hand, there is a good deal of variability in the actions that 'fit' particular situations, as they are objectively defined. Hence, Aristotle is neither a relativist nor a simple absolutist in ethics; rather, his position may be described in terms of a "flexible universality." [411] He would deny both (a) that moral excellence is an invariable (the same for everyone no matter what) and (b) that it is a purely arbitrary or conventional matter. [5.0] The moral standard is flexible "like the leaden rule used in making the Lesbian moulding " (1187M9-80). It is this flexibility and adaptation to circumstances that Aristotle has in mind when he speaks of the distinction between the good absolutely and the good relatively to us.[51] We should

of view. Cf. EN 1098b9-12, 24-29. Kant also conceived his ethics to be an elaboration-or a justification-of 'sound common reason'. This is made explicit in the very structure of his *Groundwork of the Metaphysics ctf Morals:* we begin with common morality and work ' up ' towards a philosophical ethics. Also, like Aristotle, Kant found the moral exemplar useful, though he was wary of abusing him. The Stoics, too, were forced to resort to the wise man as the concrete norm for morality, whenever they were pressed to instantiate the norm of 'right reason'.

••Cf. J. Owens, "Nature and the Ethical Norm in Aristotle," *Acts of the XIVth International Congress of Philosophy,* V (Vienna, 2-9 Sept., 1968), 442-47 and "The Grounds of Ethical Universality in Aristotle," *Man and World* 2 (May 69), 171-98. Owens sketches a distinction between a rigid and a flexible universality, comparing the former to a phalanx of soldiers which advances all in a row and the latter to a group of commandos who blanket and penetrate an area. See *Man and World,* 182.

[5°] Cf. Lloyd, *Phronesis* (note 2 above), 76.

[51] See notes 10 and above.

begin with the latter and slowly work up towards the former.[52] Each man must begin at the stage where he is and attain the best possible there, before he moves on to higher goalS' of perfection. This entails a doctrine of moral progress, which corresponds-once again-to the gradual improvement of one who is ill, or at least 'out of shape '.

The varying standard of excellence, based on medical ideas, was integral to Aristotle's philosophy. The doctor's recognition of the patient's peculiarities, which must be taken into account during the treatment, corresponds directly to the philosopher's awareness of the principle of matter as a limiting factor in the universe. At *Physias* 194a33-bl5, Aristotle explicitly notes that " the doctor must know the sinew;" likewise, the politician must know the state, and each man himself. The best state, or the absolute good, may not be attainable at a certain time, by a certain person, in a certain way, etc.; but one should be reconciled to this fact and strive for the best possible, given the circumstances.[53] At the end of the EN (1180bl ff.), Aristotle points out once more that both knowledge of principles, as well as experience, are required by the doctor, gymnastic instructor, and the politician. One must know health and goodness in the absolute, but one must also know how to fit the standard to individual cases. The Greeks were, in general-for all their 'idealism', very much aware of (human) limitation, and they took account of this fact in their theorie.s.[54] Rather than dilute

[52] Unlike the early Stoa, Aristotle thought that moral progress (viz., degrees of goodness) was possible. Cf. 1l 73al5-28, where he says that there are " degrees " of goodness. The Stoics actually admitted as much, though they refused to speak of it in the same manner. They would say that a man slowly ' approached' virtue or moral goodness, and did not actually possess it until he reached it in its entirety. One could charge that this is just to play with words, but the Stoics were serious about it and considered anyone not ' perfect ' as ' bad ' or ' foolish '. The Middle Academy (viz., the ancient Sceptics) did not shirk its role as critic of this doctrine.

••See *Politics* 1288b25 and 133lb39-1332a8.

••Plato (cf. *Statesman* 294a fl'.) already saw the need for laws to supplement men's moral weakness, as well as the justification for exceptions, which are demanded by the specific situations to which general laws are sometimes very ill fitted. The rule of law is a general ' second-best' approach, with which we must make do. For Aristotle's preference of individual treatment over general laws, along with his recognition of the need for laws, see EN X, 9 (1l 79a83 ff.) •

the goals posed within such an attitude it makes them more achievable. And that is why these norms and goals have been operative throughout two miUenia of Western history. The age of the 'superman' operates with a totally different mentality, whose effects are still working themselves out today.

VI. Evaluation of Aristotelian Ethics in the Light of the Medical Model.

Now that we have examined in some detail the role of medical analogies in Aristotle's moral philosophy, it is time to turn to a more direct appraisal of the suitability of the model. It is taken for granted that every analogy limps. Our aim will be to locate where this occurs. Another way of speaking about the sufficiency of models and analogies (which constitute models) is to distinguish the latter into positive, negative, and neutral analogies, as it were.[55] The positive analogy in a case of modelling deals with the points of similarity between the foci of a comparison, while the negative and neutral analogies deal with those properties of the model (here, medicine) which are either not shared or about which we do not *know* whether they are shared by the thing modelled. It is in the area of the latter-the negative and the neutral analogies-that we must now search for a moment. It will be obvious in this that we come to some of the difficulties and objections that have commonly been raised against Aristotle or his type of ethics. Also, some of these have been noted earlier in this study, while others have not.

One of the initial difficulties faced by Aristotle above concerned his concept of proper human functioning, in which lies the happiness that all men seek. We noted at the time that there are two possible interpretations of this: (a) an inclusive and (b) a dominant or exclusive one. In effect, we chose to put aside the latter as obviously deficient and concentrated, instead, upon the former as more adequate and true. It is not enough to separate man from animals and to argue for a 'human ' essence in the sense of a nature comprised of distinctive powers of operation-that tells us nothing, or not much, about human

[55] See Resse (note 1 above), 7-10.

conduct (in the normative sense which is sought). On the other hand, it is too limiting to locate man's excellence or' virtue' in the activity o:f contemplation alone, and to call the active moral life perfect and happy only in a secondary sense or degree (1178a8-9) . Aristotle may be granted his argument that happiness and perfect :functioning need (and do) go together-versus a more empirical (utilitarian) notion of happiness, [56] but the problem still remains because the notion of proper functioning is so opaque.

The problem may be stated again in terms of means and ends. Aristotle took-if we read him in the exclusive sense-the end of human activity to be set, and practical reasoning to be concerned only with the determination of the means towards that end:

> We deliberate not about ends but about means. For a doctor does not deliberate whether he shall heal, nor an orator whether he shall persuade, nor a statesman whether he shall produce law and order, nor does anyone else deliberate about his end. They assume the end and consider how and by what means it is to be attained .... [57]

Now this simply does not seem to be true. It is initially plausible if we conceive the moral good on a very close analogy with the physical (medical) good, namely health. But as soon as we do this, it becomes a generality, a triviality which Aristotle himself seems to recognize as such. To be sure, everyone wants to be healthy, as well as happy. And everyone would also like a ' healthy soul ', if we mean by this something like mental health. As a matter of fact,. these ends are commonly granted and, furthermore, the means to them are also quite determinable. However, as soon as' health' becomes moralized, that is, made into a notion of moral excellence, the whole matter comes under fire

[56] See R. W. Simpson," Happiness," *American Philosophical Quarterly* (April 75), 169-76. Simpson lays out the differences between an empiricist account of happiness (based on pleasure and desire) and a more ' ontological ' account (based on satisfaction and will). However, he does not argue 'metaphysically' for the latter, but bases his comments more upon a general analysis of experience.

[57] EN 1113b3-5.

and dissension occurs. It seems that 'health' in a moral sense is not a simple end at all, to which the means can clearly and easily be found. Practically, *we* all find that the search for ends, and the evaluation 0£ them, is one 0£ the most difficult tasks 0£ our live.s. 1£ the final end 0£ man becomes complex rather than simple, inclusive rather than exclusive, then man is forced to search for ends as well as means.

We noted how open-ended the search for virtue becomes. The movement proceeds through the notion 0£ the mean to the " right rule " according to which the mean is concretely determined. This notion of right reason is gradually tied to that of practical reasoning, which is then explicated in terms of intuitive perception, as it were. Finally, the concrete standard of moral behavior is lodged in the man of practical wisdom, the good man. While this is a natural outcome of the movement in EN, it also poses a problem. As the concrete norm of virtue, the good man may simply produce frustration. For one, if the exemplar is conceived in too broad a sense as ' morally healthy', then he is useless to us in our daily, particular deliberations. On the other hand, if his virtue is conceived too specifically, then he will not be useful to us either.[58] The Stoics said, besides, that the wise man is as rare as the phoenix, and no one can wait until he appears.[59] We must do our own moral reasoning (as we must do our own acting) . Again, the medical analogy with the physically healthy man breaks down. Even if a good man could be found, the fact that we recognize him as ' good ' already suggests that we have a handle on moral knowledge ourselves (or so we think, at any rate), so that the encounter is at most psychological or motivational in its worth.

It has been suggested, with .some truth, that Aristotle's ethics is simply the expression of a cultural ideal, and that this is the reason why the Stagirite can speak so reassuringly about the set character of the good or virtuous life.[60] To be sure, there is

[68] Cf. Lloyd (note above), *Phronesis*, 78-79.

[59] Cf. Seneca, *Epistle* 1 and *De tranquillitate* 7, 4.

[60] This is the thesis of A. W. H. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), esp. 316-54.

plenty of evidence of such conditionedness in EN, as there is– one should point out-in Cicero's *De officiis* and Mill's *Utilitarianisrn,* and plenty of other tracts on the moral life. Many of the ends taken for granted are cultural to varying degrees.[61] The fact that the medical notion of ' health ' is too general to be applied usefully in ethics-too disputed a notion-is what allows this splintering effect to take place. Along with this charge of cultural 'bias', it is sometimes asserted that Aristotle has no notion of a prescriptive ethics, no doctrine of duties in a strict (Kantian) sense.[62] Though this is also true to some extent, there are things that can be said here in Aristotle's defense.[63] Aristotle distinguishes quite clearly, for instance, between doing the proper thing and doing the proper thing properly, as it were (similar to Kant's distinction between ' according to ' and 'for the sake of' duty) ; and he is very much aware of the role of proper motivation in the assessment of the moral goodness of actions. His treatment of such points may be 'lost' in the greater whole of his ethics, but they are there.[64] It has been said that the Greek notion of excellence or virtue which is .shared by Aristotle (and supported by the health analogy), is "inimical to the concept of moral responsibility," and that "Aristotle is fortunate in not being opposed by a

[61] Cf. Aristotle's portrait of the "great-souled" mau at EN ll23a33-1125a35, which is obviously 'culturally conditioned'.

[62] Adkins belabors this point. See also Owens, *Man and World,* 187, who argues that ethical universality in Aristotle is not prescriptive in a legal sense (whether law be external or internal); rather, it emerges from the activity of choice in the face of an objective nature and within the context of a culture (amid other cultures both now and historically). Owens points, in both of his articles (note 49 above), to contemporary studies in structuralism and cultural dynamics to support his view (which he takes to be Aristotle's as well). He does find, in the Stagirite, a doctrine of moral obligations based on 'the seemly'. Cf. *Man and World,* 184-85.

[63] Some of them are very well said by R. J. Sullivan, "The Kantian Critique of Aristotle's Moral Philosophy: An Appraisal," *The Review of Metaphysics* 28/1, no. 109 (Sept. 74), 24-53. Sullivan argues directly, for part of the essay, against Adkins and his interpretation of Aristotle.

[64] Cf EN 1144bl ff., esp. IL 13-14 and 11. 25-28, where Aristotle distinguishes between doing the reasonabJ.e thing and doing it for the right reason. He speaks of this as the difference between natural virtue and virtue in the strict or dominant sense *(oilrw Kal* 7) <f>vrr1K7J *aper7J* 7rpos *r7Jv Kvpla;v).*

Thrasymachus." [65] But I wonder if Aristotle really fares any worse in such an encounter than anyone else, or whether anyone else fares any better-if, in fact, there is .something to be feared by ethicists here.

I think that Aristotle has an answer-as does Kant-for the likes of Callicles, Thrasymachus-and Kai Nielsen,[66] for that matter-although I can only indicate here the general direction in which it can be developed. To the man who asks: " Why .should I be moral? " Aristotle would reply: " for the sake of the noble" *(Tov KaA.ov evEKa)* (ll20a23) .[67] Moral actions are related to the class of the " seemly" (emEtKEta) (ll 75b24 f.) and need no justification other than their own value-there is no need to appeal to a self-interest argument based on utilitarian assumptions. What is " seemly " may differ according to the circumstances, as we have seen above, but there is nevertheless room for an objective morality founded on (human) reason in the face of a reasonable world (a world of objective relationships which must be honored) .[68] This notion needs further refinement, to be sure, and it will probably be dismissed outright by some as " metaphysical muck." [69] However, I think that it is essentially compatible with a basically Kantian perspective in reply to the same problem (a view which seems to receive more respectability nowadays), in terms of which reason plays a kind of' constitutive' role in morality, instead of being consigned to a merely instrumental role (as in Hume) .[70] As reasonable and free beings in the world, we are within the moral order whether we choose or not. Our choice lies only in regard

[66] Cf. Adkins, 337 and 347.

[66] See Kai Nielsen, " Why Should I Be Moral?" *Methodos* 15/59-60 (1963), 275-306. There is plenty of other literature on this topic, and our discussion can only point the way, leaving off at, perhaps, a most interesting juncture. Nielsen's essay is famous-and provocative--enough to serve as an example of the type of question it raises, and on what grounds it is usually raised.

[67] See also EN 1115b13-14; 1099a15 ff; and esp. 1169a15-1169b2.

[68] Cf. Owens (note 49 above), esp. *Man and World,* 184-85.

[69] Nielsen, 280.

[70] See Vincent C. Punzo, "Autonomous Morality and Reason: A Meta-Ethical Perspective", *The New Scholastici-sm,* LI/4 (Autumn 1977), 470-93.

to conformity or non-conformity, in deciding whether to honor ourselves (and others like us) for what we are. The question about being moral can arise only in a Hobbesian wasteland (which happens to he as blatantly metaphysical as any other 'world'), or a Thrasymachean one. Faced with it, Aristotle would probably react as would a doctor if his patient asked him: "Why should I be healthy?" For, despite the problems we noted above, there is a fundamental legitimacy in the medical analogy at this point.

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THE ONTOLOGICAL BASIS 0}' HUMAN RIGHTS

THE FOCUS OF this essay is not the topic of human rights itself but instead what is preliminary to it: whether there is a real, i. e., ontological, basis in man for the claim that he is the subject of inalienable rights; whether rights are due him in virtue of his very nature rather than because society or the state chooses to confer them upon him? Looked at from another angle, the focus can be formulated thus: whether man ultimately exists totally for society or exists in some significant sense for himself?

What prompts the formulation of this problematic is the contemporary concern for what is called " the quality of life." This concern has become the occasion for the most recent and, perhaps, serious challenge yet to the doctrine of natural right. For example, the wealthy nations fear that the present growth of world population, especially in the poor nations, threatens the future of the human species,[1] while progress in the field of genetics enlivens the hope of eradicating hereditary defects through " genetic engineering " and, hence, of halting the " pollution of the gene pool." [2] These two visions lead, in the minds of some,[3] to the inescapable conclusion that the doctrine of inviolable, i.e., natural, rights is incompatible with the good of society as a whole and is, therefore, to be repudiated as erroneous

[1] Sir Julian Huxley, "The Impending Crisis," *The Population Crisis..* Edited by Larry K. Y. Ng. Bloomington & London: Indiana University Press, 1970; p. 27. For response to this view of the world problem, see my article, " The Social Encyclicals and the ' Population Problem '," *Social Justiae Review,* Oct., 1972.

[2] For a perceptive discussion of the moral problems involved in genetic engineering, cf. Paul Ramsey, *Fabricated Man; The Ethics of Genetic Control.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970.

[3] - A New Ethic For Medicine and Society," *California Medicine,* Vol. 118 # 3, September, 1970; pp. 67-68.

or at least made subservient to the exigencies of social survival. The latter seems to be the position taken by B. F. Skinner: "Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are basic rights. But they are the rights of the individual and were listed as such at a time when the literatures of freedom and dignity were concerned with the aggrandizement of the individual. They have only a minor bearing on the survival of a culture." [4] This position derives its force from an appeal to the principle, ' the good of society (in some sense of the word ' good ') has precedence over the good of the individual (in some sense of the word ' good ') ,' which appeal seems to carry with it the implicit rider that all human rights are *social* rather than *natural* in origin. If this position is accepted, then the inference is automatic that, since even the right to life is conferred by .society, it too may be rescinded in order to preserve the greater good of the community. What is at stake here is not simply the question of society's authority to execute convicted murderers and the like but the innocent as well; e.g., those who are deformed, retarded, carriers of hereditary diseases, or whose existence is adjudged " meaningless " or " devoid of value." One cannot help asking, for example, whether Professor Garrett Hardin, in his proposal that the freedom to procreate he rescinded, [5] grasps the full import of his plea that we deny the validity of the United Nations' *Declaration of Rights.* Specifically, one wonders why, if, in the name of social .survival, we can properly deny the freedom to procreate, can we not also deny, in the name of social survival, the freedom to exist.

To be sure, the defensibility of the doctrine of natural right presupposes the doctrine's compatibility with the good of the social body. But the requirements of compatibility are, in this case, reciprocal, for the question of what constitutes the good of .society is inextricably bound up with the fundamental ques-

• B. F. Skinner., *Beyond Freedom and Dignity.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 197Q; p. 180.

[5] Garrett Hardin, " The Tragedy of the Commons," *Science,* December 18, 1968, pp. IQ43-IQ48.

tion of rights, i. e., with the question of the liberties to which the individual member of society is entitled. If, for example, it is accepted that rights are social in origin, there is no escaping the conclusion that the human being exists ultimately for society. This is the basis of totalitarianism, as the name itself implies. If, on the other hand, it is accepted that rights, such as the right to life, are natural in origin, i. e., that they follow from what a human being is by nature, then the conclusion must be drawn that he exists, in some significant sense, for his own sake, as well as for society. This is the foundation for democratic society. The first paragraph of the *Deelaration of Independenoe* asserts that all men possess, as " God-given " and " inalienable," rights, such as "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," and that it is for the protection of these rights that governments are formed and dissolved; Article One of the United Nations' *Declaration of Human Rights* reaffirms this claim by stating that rights are conferred by human nature, not by the State.[6] And at Nuremberg the Allies tried and convicted the Nazis of " crimes against mankind " for their wholesale extermination of Jews and non-Aryans, despite the fact that the laws of Germany permitted and even demanded genocide.[7]

Thus, whether they realize it or not, those who see the abrogation of human rights as a condition for the preservation of the quality of life challenge the foundations of democratic theory. Admittedly, the dependence of democratic theory on the doctrine of natural right does not in itself justify this doctrine, any more than the inference of totalitarian theory from the doctrine of the .social origin of rights justifies it by a *reductio ad absurdum.* All that follows is that democratic theory presupposes the doctrine of natural right. The question, therefore, is whether there is any basis in reality for the claim that man does not exist totally fo:r society, whether alongside his very con-

•A copy of the United Nations' *Declaration of Human Rights* appears as an app<)ndix to Maurice Cranston's book, *What Are Human Rights.?* New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., Inc., 1973.

[7] R. W. Cooper, *The Nuremberg Trials.* Middlesex & New York: Penguin Books, 1947; p. 39.

siderable social obligations he has natural title to autonomy over certain areas of his life, areas over which society has no legitimate control? In other words, what is it about a human being which supposedly entitles him to natural, i. e., inalienable, rights?

* * * *

This essay purports to furnish answers to the above questions. The answers are set forth in three major parts. The first and most important part consists in the attempt to show that man's capacities for knowing and choosing reveal him to. be by nature a self-perfecting, autonomous being, which is to say, a whole. Accordingly, any treatment of him as a mere part of society is a violation of the natural order and an outrage against reason. Here a word must be said about the attention given in this essay to man's cognitive operations, lest the reader begin to wonder, as he proceeds through its first part, what epistemology has to do with the ontological basis of rights. That such a question should arise at all must be attributed to modern philosophy's severance of epistemology from metaphysics, of knowing from being. The unhappy results of this severance are reflected in the question now regarded as fundamental to epistemology, "How does the mind get its ideas?" Not only does this formulation reduce knowing to a mere perception and consideration of ideas or representations, thereby cutting the intellect off from extramental reality, it cannot fail to regard the intellect as an instrument rather than as a power of man's essence, so that he loses all claim to being essentially different from sub-rational beings. Denied a unique interiority, he is, therefore, externalized and regarded as no more than another part, a sophisticated part, to be sure, of the natural environment. As such, man must submit to manipulation along with the rest of the environment. [73] In contrast, it is argued below: that knowing is a *becoming,* a way of being, and, hence, that the fundamental epistemological question is' How does man *become* a knower?' Insofar as we learn what a being is through a knowledge of what it does, the

•• Skinner, *op. cit.,* pp. 24-25, *58-59,* and esp. p. 202.

justification for the " epistemological " approach is that it enables us to answer the question, ' What is it about a human being which supposedly entitles him to natural, i.e., inalienable, rights?' Yet, just because of the exigencies of this topic, no attempt is made to provide anything more than a general discussion of human knowing.

The second part of this essay addresses itself to the so-called " naturalistic fallacy" by demonstrating the bridge by which reason proceeds from the consideration of what things are to the consideration of how they ought to be treated. For the objection is sure to be raised that, no matter what man naturally is, we cannot legitimately pass from " an is to an ought," from £acts to values.[8] The third part concentrates on the relationship that obtains between what man is and the right to life. For, although a discussion of the topic of rights itself is outside the scope of this essay, the completion of the latter undertaking demands that the relationship between ontology and rights be made explicit, particularly with regard to the distinction between justifiable and unjustifiable homicide, mercy-killing and suicide.

I

In the writings of Thomas Aquinas, one finds two principles that pertain to the topic of this essay. The first has to do with immanence: ". . . the higher a nature, the more intimate to that nature is the activity that flows from it." [9] The second has to do with extensiveness: "... the higher a power is, the more universal is the object to which it extends." [10] Far from being disparate or mutually exclusive, these two principles complement each other; indeed, a proportion exists between them: the more immanent a being is, the more extensive are its powers.[11] As argued below, the acts of knowing and choosing testify to

[8] David Hume, *A Treatise on Human Nature,* Bk. III, I, 1.

[9] Thomas Aquinas, *C. G. IV,* 11.

[10] Thomas Aquinas, *S. Theol.,* I, Q. 71, a. 1.

[11] Pierre Rousselot, *The Intellectualism of St. Thomas.* Tr. by James E. O'Mahony. New York: Sheed ai'id Ward, Inc., 1935; pp. 28-29.

man's intrinsic superiority over brute animals and all material nature, for such acts originate only in a seli, an *Iy* in a unique center of conscious being. That is why he is properly said to be a *whole.*[12] He is present in all his parts, gathering them up and unifying in a unique selfhood his entire being; he thereby *possesses* his being in and through his *self.* Yet the intimacy and personalness of his activities stretch outwards to the whole universe. Through the act of knowing, he unifies in his unique self a fragmented external world; through the exercise of his will, he reshapes the material world, as well as his own being, in the image and likeness of the highest ideals. Now, although immanence and extensiveness cannot be separated, the one from the other, it is immanence that is primary; extensiveness follows from it. All man's activities and operations originate in his unique selfhood and terminate there. Hence, it is correct to say that man is a being who exists not only in himself but for himself.[13]

A. KNOWING

That knowing is a self-perfecting operation-i. e., an operation that originates and terminates in the knower and for the fulfilment of the knower-can be verified by the following observations.

In order to know anything, I must enter into a subject-object relationship; for when I know, I know *something.* Knowing, then, has two components: an object that is known and a subject who knows. But it is a relationship in which the knowing subject (a) *becomes* the object, the thing known; and in which the subject (b) *dominates* and *possesses* the object. If either of these conditions were lacking, knowledge would be impossible.

(a) The claim that knowing is a *becoming,* a *way of being,* rather than a mere apprehension of ideas or representations, fol-

[12] Jacques Maritain, *The Person and the Common Good.* Tr. by John J. Fitzgerald. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966 (paperback); p. 49, n. 28.

[13] Aquinas, *S. Theol.,* I, Q. *65,* a. 2.

lows from the veridical character of knowledge. Although we do not attain a complete and perfect knowledge of anything, and although we often entertain as true judgments which are in fact false, we nevertheless can, and do, attain a true and objective knowledge of things in the universe. For example, we know the real essence of man, of brute animals, and of plants, i.e., we know what they are, for we grasp the essential clifferences among them. The latter point has its confirmation on the practical level in the fundamentally different ways in which we treat them. But a true and objective knowledge of things would be out of the question if any third thing intruded itself between the knower and the thing known. For then the intellect would apprehend what is at best a representation of the thing which, instead of providing a true and objective knowledge of it, would provide only a knowledge of the representation itself. Indeed, as Thomas Aquinas observes,[14] if knowledge consisted of knowing mere representations of things, then contradictories would be simultaneously true, since in each case one's knowledge would conform to its object, namely, the mere representation. Thus, the concept that the intellect forms of the thing's essence cannot stand between the knower and the known as some third thing which serves as a representation of the known, as a picture of one's wife, say, is an image-sign of her. Because the objectivity of knowledge is a self-proclaiming fact, our knowledge of things can be accounted for only by the inference that nothing, not even an accurate picture or representation of the known, .stands between the latter and the intellect. This is the warrant for the claim that the intellect *becomes* the known in the act of knowing it.[15]

But since the objectivity of knowledge demands that the subject know the object *as other*, the identification between knower and known must be formal rather than material or absolute. This demand inspired Aristotle's brilliant theory of abstraction: [16] the intellect seizes the intelligible structure, the

[14] *Ibid.,* I, Q. 85, a. !'l.
[15] Aristotle, *De Anima,* Bk. III, Ch. 4.
[16] *Ibid.,* 4!'l9b HHS.

essence, of the concrete existent perceived by the senses. By deindividualizing and, therefore, universalizing it, the intellect proportions it to its own immaterial nature, thereby apprehending it under the aspect of its *whatness* or knowability.[11] Since, in knowing, the intellect actually becomes the thing's essence, it must be said that the intellect actually becomes the thing known, for it thereby possesses its interior form, possesses that by which the thing is what it is.[18]

Thus, while the thing *as known* and the thing as it exists in extramental reality are identical in essence, they differ in existence, the former having intentional or cognitional existence, the latter having physical existence.[19] Nevertheless, it is correct to say that the intellect becomes the thing it knows, but it does so by raising it to its own level, the level of spiritual existence. For what we know are not essences themselves but things, existents. The completion of the act of knowing is in the operation of judgment whereby the intellect restores the abstracted essence to the material image of sensation. And since this image is the product of the perceptions of the external senses, which faculties are in direct contact with the existent, judgment-e. g., 'This creature approaching me is a man '-is the vehicle by and through which the subject knows the object in its actual existence. Indeed, a mutual interaction occurs between the apprehension of essence and judgment. For we cannot know what a thing is without simultaneously, though implicitly, knowing that it is, either as an actual or a possible being. As Thomas Aquinas says,[20] all concepts are reducible to the concept of being.

[17] Maritain, *Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism.* Tr. by Mabelle L. and J. Gordon Andison. New York: Philosophical Library, *1955;* pp. 156-158.

[18] Cf. Josef Pieper, *Reality and the Good.* Tr. by Stella Lange. Chicago: Henry Regncry Company, 1967; pp. 30-31.

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] Aquinas, *De Veritate,* I, l; Joseph Owens, *An Interpretation of Existence.* Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1968 (paperback), Ch. II; Maritain, *Existence and the Existent.* Tr. by Lewis Galantiere and Gerald P. Phelan. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1957 (paperback); pp. 85-37, n. 13.

Thus, not only does the intellect become the essence of the thing known, it also, and at the same time, duplicates, on the level of intentionality, the thing's existence; in a true sense, the knower becomes the thing known.

It now remains to establish claim b), that in the subject-object relationship which characterizes the knowing operation, the subject possesses and dominates the object, the known. The first of the two principles attributed to Thomas Aquinas at the outset of this section is appropriately reiterated here: "... the higher a nature, the more intimate to that nature is the activity that flows from it." It was said above that this principle pertains to immanence and that immanent activity, such as knowing, originates only in a self, in a unique center of conscious being. Such uniqueness is implied throughout the above discussion insofar as knowledge consists in the subject knowing the other *as other*. But this is possible only by virtue of the intellect's capacity to proportion the thing known to itself, to raise it to its own level of existence, which it accomplishes by freeing the essence of the thing from its materiality. It is impossible to separate the uniqueness of the knowing subject from the capacity to possess and dominate the thing known. The intimacy of the ties that bind these two realities together emerges quite clearly from the following consideration.

Without the knower's knowledge of himself as the subject who knows the object, there could be no knowledge. For to know the thing as object, i.e., *as other*, it is necessary that the knower simultaneously know himself as the subject who is knowing. Consider, for example, expressions such as 'I know that . . .' Again: I have an explicit consciousness of myself which gives birth to such observations as "Here I sit writing about my self-consciousness." But this is not the only kind of consciousness involved in knowing; for it is not a knowledge of myself as subject but as object. It is a reflexive knowledge by means of which the intellect turns back upon itself, producing a concept of itself. Hence, the self that I know in such observations as the above is myself *as object.*

But to know anything, it is also necessary for me to have another kind of consciousness, what Maritain calls[21] the" concomitant consciousness." If knowing is more than the blind assimilation of data-as occurs when information is put into a computer-, I must, in knowing something, simultaneously know myself as the subject who knows. Indeed, even reflexive consciousness presupposes concomitant consciousness, for to reflect upon myself in the act of thinking or working is to enter into a subject-object relationship: to know myself reflexively, as an object, is to be conscious of myself as the knowing subject, even though the latter is, in this case, myself. Since concomitant consciousness is a knowledge of myself as subject, rather than object, it is not a conceptual knowledge; it is a knowledge of the self not *as known* but *as knower*. For, insofar as conceptual knowledge requires the abstraction of the intelligible form from the material image of the concrete existent, it presupposes the subject-object relationship. But, as demonstrated above, this relationship presupposes also that the subject knows himself as the knower of the object. Concomitant consciousness, then, is not explicit or reflexive consciousness but is implicit in explicit consciousness and embedded in all conceptual knowledge.

* * * *

The self-perfecting character of knowing follows from the fact that it is an immanent rather than a transitive activity. For the latter kind of activity perfects not the agent but the object on which the agent acts; e.g., surgical activity benefits the patient, not the surgeon. Unlike transitive activity, where the agent's activity is externalized, passing to some object outside the agent, knowing is internalized, perfecting the agent insofar as to know is to become the thing known.[22] Such would not be the case if the thing absorbed the knowing self. But, owing to the immanence of its act, the self retains possession ofitself: it knows itself as a unique center of conscious being, while at the same time existing as the thing known.

[21] Maritain, "The Immortality of Man," *Revi&w of Politics*, Vol. 8, 1941, pp.. 415-416; cf. also Epictetus, *Discourses*, Bk. I, Ch. XX.

[22] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Bk. IX, Ch. 8 1050a !'l4-1050b1.

That knowing is, by virtue of its immanence, a higher form of possession of another than is transitive activity may be demonstrated by the following observation. Our dominion over the material world, although increasingly stupendous, is never complete. We successfully bend material being to our will only by manipulating and changing it, as when we extract nourishment from the ingestion of meat or get building materials by felling trees, crushing rock, and, in the case of plastics, by rearranging the molecular structure of natural materials. Yet the inner being of matter always resists even our most violent efforts to dominate and possess it completely. Our bodies can assimilate only certain elements of what we eat; wood rots and concrete cracks and crumbles. Therapeutic drugs have undesirable side-effects and we must confront problems of atmospheric pollution caused by fuels obtained by the conversion of natural resources. But, in the act of knowing, on the other hand, we dominate material beings completely without doing violence to them, insofar as we thereby possess them *as other.*[23] For, as noted above, the intellect possesses the thing known in the latter's essential being. All of which, it may be observed in passing, attests to the superiority of intellectualism over voluntarism. It is clearly better to possess a thing worthy of possession than merely to exert one's will over it, i.e., to have a merely external relation to it.[24]

The possessive or dominative aspect of knowing brings us to a consideration of the second of the two principles cited at the outset of this section: "... the higher a power, the greater the number of objects to which it extends." Extensiveness and immanence are related as effect to cause. It is just because of its immanence that a power is a knowing power, for in virtue of its perfect reflexivity-its consciousness of itself as a subject-, it knows other beings *as other,.* and accordingly has the capacity to enter into the subject-object relationship that characterizes the knowing operation. But, as shown above, knowing

[23] Rousselot, pp. 25-26.
[24] *Ibid.,* pp. 20-21.

1s a becoming. Man, therefore, becomes other beings, albeit on the level of intentionality.

Per impossibile, the desire in a sub-rational being to become another being would be tantamount to desiring its own destruction. The donkey, for example, could not become a lion without annihilating itself.[25] But this is not so with regard to rational beings. Since a thing is knowable insofar as it is, i.e., insofar as it has being (the formal object of the intellect is being), rational beings have the capacity to know all that is; and since to know is to become the other *as other,* they have the capacity to be all that is. By interiorizing external being, through knowing, an imperfect subject of a rational nature, although limited in its natural being, can become, on the level of intentional being, everything that exists and, in that manner, can transcend the limitations of its own nature while retaining possession of its unique selfhood. For, as argued above, the act and fulfillment of the intellect consist not in the apprehension of essences or the lmowledge of mere concepts but in the attainment of existence, i.e., the attainment of the act of existing of the thing known, by duplicating it through the act of judgment. The knower thereby dominates external reality in a most perfect way, since he becomes and thus possesses it as it is in its essential being-as *other.* It is true possession because it is the self, or which becomes it without being absorbed by it. Thus, to know is not to make or to receive anything but, rather, to exist in a way that is superior to the mere fact of existing as an independent substance.[26]

B. CHOOSING

Insofar as choice is consequent upon deliberation and deliberation is consequent upon knowledge, it is clear that choice is consequent upon reason. Hence, choice, i..e., practical reason,

[25] Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Insight; A Study of Human Unders.tanding.* New York: Philosophical Library, 1957; p. fl66; and Maritain, *Scholasticism and Politics.* Transl. ed. by Mortimer J. Adler. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1960 (paperback); p. 130.

[26] Maritain, *Degrees. of Knowledge,* p. 118; Rousselot, pp. flO-fll, *fl5-fl6.*

is an extension of intellection, i. e., theoretical or speculative reason.[21] Like the act of knowing, then, the act of choosing originates in an *I,* in a unique center of conscious being.[28]

The immanence of the act of choice is revealed, also, in the fact that it is a self-perfecting act, whether exercised out of self-interest or out of interest in the well-being of others. Even when one acts altruistically, one inevitably acts for one's own fulfilment, insofar as the decision to perform any act follows from a realization, however inexplicit and deeply submerged in other objectives, that the action will have a bearing on one's sense of self, self-respect, integrity, etc. Like all choices, an altruistic choice implies a desire for one's own fulfilment and happiness. Is it not true that the altruist finds his fulfilment in working for the good of others? Even the masochist, in his own twisted way, seeks happiness through his pain and degradation.

It would be quite mistaken to suppose that the question of personal fulfilment is purely or primarily a matter of attitude and, as such, is the preserve of psychology. Indeed, for an immanent being-a being who is aware of himself as a unique self-it is impossible to act at all without acting for his own self-perfection just because his very being is to be *a self.* It is an *ontological neaessity* that all his actions originate m a unique center of conscious being and terminate there.

* * * *

The principles set down above with regard to knowing and choosing undergird the correlation between a being's dignity, or degree of ontological perfection, and its capacity for immanence. The more perfect a being, the more completely is it an intellectual substance; the more completely it is an intellectual substance, the more autonomous and self-perfecting it is; in other words, the more completely does it exist for its own sake. From plants to animals to human beings, material nature presents a spectrum of beings possessed of the capacity to move

[27] Pieper, *op. cit.,* p. 49.

[28] Maritain, *Existence and the Existent,* Ch. and *Neuf Ler;ons sur lea Notions Premieres de la Philosophie Morale.* Paris: Pierre Tequi, 1951; pp. 81 & 165.

themselves by a vital interior principle. Only at the level of man, however, is this interior principle truly immanent and, therefore, truly intimate to the activity which flows from it. The activities of sub-rational beings-growth, assimilation, propagation-, although originating in a principle that is increasingly interiorized in proportion to the increase in sensory and neurological complexity, are the products of blind reflexive or, at best, instinctual powers, and for that reason are more characteristic of the species than of the individual member. ' Intimate ' in this context refers primarily not to what comes from within, where the word ' within 'is taken in a spatial sense, but rather to what is singular, or better yet, unique in the individual agent. Of the three categories of living being enumerated above, man alone acts from a genuinely unified center of unique being, the self. As a knower, he can judge the proportion between means and ends and thereby take responsibility for his actions. Just as, on the level of knowing, it is the *I,* the unique self, who knows, so, on the level of practical activity, it is the unique self who chooses specific means for specific ends. Yet not even man's actions flow entirely from a unique interiority, for, as a member of the human species, each individual man is to a large degree governed by inclinations and drives which are common to his species. In other words, an individual human being's conduct is governed largely by his essence. Not even his intellect and will are identical to his unique self, since they are characteristic of the human species.[29] Man is not fully self-perfecting because he is not fully autonomous. Perfect autonomy belongs to God alone because, as the Absolutely Perfect Being, He is completely and perfectly an intellectual substance. Consequently, His activity is perfectly immanent and, accordingly, flows entirely from His unique selfhood.[30]

To appreciate this, it is necessary to recall that immateriality is the basis of knowledge: a thing is knowable to the extent

[29] Maritain, "Spontaneite et Independence," *Mediaeval Studies,* Vol. 4, Aquinas, *Contra Gentiles,* IV, Ch. 11.

[30] Aquinas, *loc. cit.,* and *S. Theol.,* I, Q. 18, a 3

that it is free from matter. Since matter contracts and limits, human knowledge depends on the previously discussed process of abstraction, whereby the intellect universalizes and, actualizes the intelligibility of the concrete particular. The freer a being is from matter, therefore, the more intelligible it is, and if that being is a substance, its capacity to know will be the greater. As the most perfect being, God cannot be limited; but since matter constricts and limits, He must be immaterial. Now to be a completely and perfectly immaterial substance is to be the complete and perfect intellectual substance, and since knowing is a self-perfecting act in which the knower, the self, becomes the known, God must be the absolutely personal being, the perfect Self. Accordingly, He operates by no principles which do not flow from His own uniqueness. The absolute perfection of God demands, moreover, that He not be dependent on anything outside Himself, which is to say that He knows all things by knowing Himself.[31] It is, on the other hand, man's imperfection and finitude which account for his dependence on things external to himself for his knowledge. He is an imperfect intellectual substance. But he overcomes his fragmented, limited existence through knowing and choosing beings external to himself. As noted above, however, knowing is the more perfect form of possession of another thing, for knowing consists in becoming the other *as other*. Whereas in choosing the will achieves only an external possession of the thing, in knowing the intellect achieves possession of the thing's interior form, or essence.[32]

* * * *

In summary: The above analysis of knowing and choosing demonstrates that man, in the words of Thomas Aquinas, " stands on the horizon between two worlds." [33] On the one hand, he shares the world of material beings; he is an imperfect intellectual substance insofar as his essence and self are not

[31] Aquinas, S. *Theol.*, I, Q. 14, a. 4.
[32] *Ibid.*, Q. a. 5.
[33] Aquinas, *C G.* II, 68.

identical with each other. He is, therefore, largely dominated by the structures and inclinations of his human nature. He does not, consequently, possess a perfect life and being. To the extent of this limitation, he is a part of the human species, which means that, in a very important sense, he is subordinate to society, exists for the benefit of the whole. For to the extent that he is not a unique center of conscious being and autonomous activity, his nature is common to the species, i.e., he is the same as all men. Simply on the basis of this sameness, there is no warrant in the real order of things for ascribing to an individual human being spheres of life and endeavor which transcend the life of the social group and the environment. For of several things among which no significant difference may be found, the value of the many over the individual follows from the sheer fact of superior numbers.

On the other hand, this same analysis reveals each human being as one who the world of intellectual substances; he is a being who, by virtue of his capacity to know, performs an act of perfect immanence, a self-perfecting act. For, in becoming, on the level of intentionality, the thing known, he becomes that thing *as other,* while retaining his unique selfhood; hence, he perfects himself. To the extent that he is an intellectual substance, he is a unique center of conscious being. Similarly, his capacity to choose establishes him as an autonomous being, a self-determining agent, who freely pursues goals for his fulfilment as a unique .self and takes personal responsibility for his choices. This immanence, this unique interiority, is the basis in the real, i. e., the ontological, order for ascribing to each human being spheres of life and endeavor which transcend the life of the social group.

In contrast, sub-rational beings do not exist in any .significant sense for their own sakes and, on that account, they are expendable for the good of the species. This is not to suggest that they have no value in themselves. Insofar as they exist, they have ontological value, but whatever their value, it is subordinate to the good of the species. Thus, while there is something

intuitively immoral in wantonly crumpling a rose or killing an animal, it is the insight into the ontological difference between rational and sub-rational beings which underlies our readiness to prune a rose for the vigor of the rose bush and kill animals for food or to kill diseased animals to prevent them from infecting other members of their species or to preserve the balance of nature, etc., but which, at the same time, produces moral revulsion in us at the thought of killing human beings for eugenic purposes or using involuntary patients to further medical science. The Nuremberg Trials and the United Nations' condemnation of genocide testify to the reality of that moral revulsion. To commit murder, to interfere with a man's freedom of conscience, to obstruct his freedom to seek the truth, etc., all this is to violate the natural order and, consequently, to outrage reason. For such actions use a being who is an end in himself as a mere means to an end, as a mere object of scientific or social purpose. In other words, the claim that certain rights, such as the right to life, are natural follows from the conclusion that they are due to a human being because of what he is naturally, i. e., by essence, and not because of what society chooses to allow him.

II

It is time to face the objection that rights cannot be grounded in reality because it is impossible to derive an *ought* from an *is*. The realm of value, the objection maintains,[84] is quite apart from the realm of fact.

The doctrine of the dichotomy between fact and value, which today enjoys widespread acceptance, particularly in Anglo-American philosophical circles,[85] represents the outlook of Nominalism. This is clearly the reason for D. J. O'Connor's rejection of Thomas Aquinas's view that morality is grounded in

[84] Hume, *loc. cit.*

[85] E. g., P. H. Nowell-Smith, *Ethics.* Marmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1954 (paperback), and Charles L. Stevenson, *Ethics and Language.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965,

objective reality and is accessible as such to human intellect.[36] The influence of Nominalism also evinces itself in psychology, as is clear from the writings[37] of B. F. Skinner whose rejection of the reality of what he calls the " autonomous man " is rooted in a Positivism which prevents him from admitting anything in man that distinguishes him from the rest of material nature. The essences of things are not to be found under the scrutiny of a method which can apprehend only what is measurable-sensible properties of things. Hence, because the dignity and freedom of man are grounded in his essence as a self-perfecting being, Skinner is led to shift the locus of human activity from within man himself to the natural and social environments. Like .sub-rational beings, then, man is to be treated as a mere part of the environment rather than as a whole or a self.

If things did not have essences or if, at least, we could not know what they really were, then, in order to establish the position that rights are naturally due man, it would be necessary, as the nominalists correctly maintain, to show that the basis of any right is some property in him. But, just as it is erroneous to suppose that goodness is identifiable with any natural property-to follow G. E. Moore's line of criticism[38]—, so is it erroneous to suppose that rights are so identifiable. However, this essay, as is clear from its first section, rejects the claims of Nominalism. As argued above, things do have essences and, depending on the degree of freedom they enjoy from the domination of matter, we know, in varying degrees, their essences, including the essence of man. From his perceptible activities, we know him to be by nature a rational animal, and, hence, a self-perfecting being. Now to appreciate the legitimacy of the transition from fact to value and *a fortiori* the legitimacy of the transition from the conclusion that man is a self-perfecting being to the conclusion that he is naturally entitled to

[36] D. J. O'Connor, *Aquinas and Natural Law.* London: Macmillan, 1967 (paperback), pp. 16, !M, & 85.

[31] Skinner, *op. cit.,* pp. 58-59, 193-196.

[88] G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica,* Ch. II.

rights, it is necessary to state explicitly what has been implicit throughout this essay: the dependence of ethics upon metaphysics, upon the intellect's capacity to go beyond the sensible properties of things to an apprehension of their intelligible structures.

Consider, to begin with, the real, rather than merely logical, distinction between essence and existence. Regarded in itself, essence, or *what a thing is,* belongs to the realm of potency. In itself it does not exist but is only a possible existence. Existence, on the other hand, belongs to the realm of actuality, or to *what really is;* in fact, existence is the primary reality, for nothing is real except that it exists. That the distinction between essence and existence is real, rather than merely logical, is supported by the impossibility of inferring the one from the other. From our knowledge of what a thing is, we cannot infer that it exists, nor from the mere knowledge that a thing exists can we infer what it is.[89]

Now each existent is a composite of essence and existence (each finite existent, that is); its essence specifies its existence, determines it to be a this or a that, while its act of existing makes the essence real, i. e., actualizes its potency to be. But the fact that a thing exists does not mean that its existence signals the complete actualization of its essence. Nature is dynamic. Things stretch forth to the actualization of the possibilities contained in their essences, possibilities the actualization of which is demanded for each existent's fulfilment: the acorn stretches forth to become an oak tree, the larva to become a caterpillar and finally a butterfly, and the child to become a man.[40] Looked at from another angle, essence belongs to the realm of necessity, existence to the realm of contingency. Given a certain essence, a specific intelligible determination, that essence expresses unchanging necessities: the interior angles of a triangle are equal to the sum of two right angles and man is a rational animal. These will always and necessarily be true; each

[89] Etienne Gilson, *Being and S<>me Phuosophe:rs.* Toronto, 1952; pp. 168-172.

[10] Cf. Henry B. Veatch, "Non-Cognitivism in Ethics: A Modest Proposal For Its Diagnosis and Cure," *Ethics,* January, 1966; pp. 102-116.

is what it is. But whether there shall be triangles or human beings is not to be determined by the intelligible necessities of their respective essences. Indeed, the realm of existence is the realm of contingency, within which things are beset by the vicissitudes of material forces. To enter the realm of material existence is to enter the world of the unpredictable and the adventurous.41 Existents are engaged in a constant struggle to complete the striving of their essences. Lacking the proper soil and temperature, the acorn will decay and, even under optimum conditions, it may be snatched by a squirrel for winter food; the child born of stupid parents, into a backward community, with few educational opportunities and rudimentary public health facilities may be a genius or possess robust health, while the child born of intelligent parents, into a culturally sophisticated environment with advanced public health facilities may be stupid or die of pneumonia before reaching adulthood.

Yet, despite the myriad contingencies of this existence, man, the knower, perceives what things are, eventually coming to an understanding of their ideal type of fulfilment. Consider, for example, the farmer whose experience with crops enables him to distinguish good crops from bad. This ability presupposes his understanding, however inexplicit and bound up with practical tasks it may be, of the essence of corn, barley, oats, etc. Similarly, from an understanding of man's essence, we grasp its finalities, and it is from this grasp that we infer what conduct befits him and what does not. For the striving, the stretching forth, of things towards the increasing actualization of their essences reveals to the intellect the intelligibility of nature. Perceiving the ideal type that is grounded in the actuality of things, reason concludes that it is good, i. e., desirable, that each existent attain the fulfilment of its essence. Perceiving that man is a rational and, hence, a self-perfecting being, reason concludes that it is good, i. e., desirable, that he actualize the potencies of his essence. His essence demands for its completion that he be free to exercise his self-perfecting activities, for to obstruct this

"Aristotle, *Physics,* Bk. II, Chs. 4-6.

exercise would be to violate the integrity of his being-an outrage of reason. As noted above, it is immoral to wantonly destroy a rose bloom or an animal. This is a violation of their being. But their being is not self-perfecting; they do not exist for their own sake; hence, they may be used-killed or manipulated-for some higher good. Man presents a different case. Just because of what he is, he may not be used as a mere to any end.

Thus, the objection that an *ought* cannot be derived from an *is* rests upon a philosophy which fails to understand that *oughtness,* far from inhabiting a realm beyond things, has its ground in being. For what ought to be is what the intellect perceives to be intended, i.e., stretched towards, or called for, by the existent's essence. Now it is desirable that a thing attain the fulfilment of its being. And since the desirable is what is good, it follows that *the good ought to be.*[42] Goodness, like Truth, Unity, and Beauty, is coterminous with Being in that it is Being perceived under the aspect of its desirability. In other words, being, that which is, is desirable. It is desirable that a dog, for example, possess all that belongs to the fullness or completeness of its being, which fullness or completeness is dictated by the exigencies of its essence; acute hearing, say. The absence of this acuteness is an evil, for it frustrates the completion, i.e., the actualization, of its being. By the same principle, the absence of the capacity to know intellectually in a dog is not an evil, since that capacity is not demanded by the dog's essence; hence, the actualization of that capacity is not a condition of the completion of the dog's specific being. But, with man, not only is the capacity to know intellectually a necessary constituent of his essence, so that it is desirable, which is to say, good, that he exercise that capacity, so that, accordingly, he *ought to* exercise it and *ought to be permitted* to exercise it; it is also, for the same essential reason, desirable that he be allowed to exercise his autonomy. In virtue of what man actually is-a rational being

••Heinrich Rommen, *The Natural Law.* Tr. by Thomas Hanley. St. Louis & London: E. Herder Book Co., 1947; Ch. 8.

possessed of free choice-, it is desirable and thus, good, that he pursue his self-perfection. Hence, he *ought* to be permitted to do so.

III

As stipulated by the opening sentence of this essay, the focus has been the real, or ontological, basis of human rights, not the topic of rights itself. Consequently, no attempt has been made to enumerate the specific rights that naturally belong to a self-perfecting being, such as man, or to discuss political, social, and economic rights.[43] Topics such as these exceed the scope of this essay. Nevertheless, the very task of demonstrating the ontological basis of 'rights requires a preliminary discussion of fundamental human rights or moral rights, i. e., of those rights which do not belong to a man by virtue of a particular station or position in life but which belong to every man simply because he is a man, rights which are entailed by the conclusion that he is a self-perfecting being. Otherwise, the bridge between the ontological basis of rights and natural rights themselves will remain problematic. For, as we have already seen, an essential part of such a preliminary discussion is a response to those who maintain that the attempt to ground rights in nature inevitably falls victim to the fallacy of going from an *is* to an *ought.*

The fundamental human rights that immediately and obviously follow from the conclusion that man is a self-perfecting being are those such as the right to life, to personal freedom, the right to pursue one's own perfection as a rational and moral being, etc.[44] As the right to life is the primary right, a discussion of it alone should be sufficient to illustrate the connection between rights and man's ontological structure.

Mere existence is, perhaps, an ambiguous value. But insofar as a man must exist in order to exercise his capacity for self-perfection, the right to life is of primary value; all other rights

••Cranston, *op. mt.*, p. 24.

[44] Maritain, *The Rights of Man and Natural Law*. Tr. by Doris C. Anson. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948; pp. 71-72.

are secondary to it in importance, for they presuppose it. Accordingly, the direct killing of an innocent man, i.e., murder, is the most blatant violation of man's essence as a self-per..: fecting or rational being. It is the extreme example of using him as a mere means to an end; it is the act which completely and finally frustrates the striving of his being and, consequently, which unequivocally denies the truth that he exists, in some significant sense, for his own sake. Because his capacity for self-perfection has its basis in his very essence as a being possessed of immanent powers, such as knowing and choosing, it can justifiably be deduced that the right to life does not depend on the presence in man of qualities which are accidental to that essence, such as degree of intelligence, health or wholeness of body, skin color or external factors, such as socio-economic circumstances. [45] To think so is to .subscribe to a biologism which regards man's higher faculties as no more than sophisticated manifestations of biological instincts and, consequently, to evaluate human life according to standards of animal vitality. On the epistemological level, .such a valorization of accidental qualities rests on a positivistic philosophy in that it excludes all considerations about the worth of human life, confining itself instead to what are amenable to the methodology of the sciences: sensible, measurable properties. According to these perspectives, a seriously deformed or crippled human being possesses little worth because worth is determined on the basis of either his capacity to " produce " for society or his capacity to participate in a hedonistic or egotistical way of life. The same assessments, are made with regard to a terminal patient suffering great pain. Yet, even under such extreme circumstances, human beings are capable of achieving depths of self-realization that are impossible under more benign circumstances.46 For, as a rational being, man attains his self-perfec-

••Yves Simon, *The Philosophy of Democratic Government.* Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1966 (paperback); p. 203.

[46] Johannes Messner, *Social Ethics.* Tr. by J. J. Doherty. Revised Edition. St. Louis & London: B. Herder Book Co., 1965; p. 27.

tion by transcending the limitations of his finite, temporal self. Through the immanence of knowing, he achieves ever higher levels of reality as he identifies himself ontologically with Being and its facets, Truth, Goodness, Beauty, and ultimately with the fullness of Being, God; and all the while he retains his own unique selfhood. To be sure, man is not always free to choose his circumstances, but he is free to determine how he shall respond to them.[47] Hence, owing to the transcendent and, therefore, pervasive reality of the aforesaid *desiderata,* the deformed, the moribund, and the pain-ridden can attain their self-perfection by choosing to respond to their circumstances in accordance with their desire to possess Being, Goodness, Truth, and Beauty in their lives.

It will doubtless be objected that, even granting this conception of human value, it does not cover the seriously retarded, the hopelessly comatose, and the unborn, for, being incapable of functioning as rational beings, they cannot be regarded as self-perfecting. But herein lies a fallacious equivocation which may well have its roots in the Cartesian conception of man as a. thinking being. It is correct to say that those suffering extensive brain damage, as well as the prenatal child whose development is incomplete, lack the capacity for rational and even conscious activity. But what is meant by this use of " capacity " is that, owing to some neuro-physiological impediment, or lack of development, such people cannot exercise their natural capacities for rational activity or consciousness. Only because man by nature possesses the capacity for such activities does it make sense to say of a given man that he lacks the " capacity." Properly speaking, we do not say this of a particular brute animal or inanimate being hut of the whole species. Hence, the correct conception of man is not that of Descartes but rather that of Aristotle: man is a " rational animal." The superiority of such a conception is that it defines man in terms of his essence or nature, not in terms of capacities which properly belong to that essence. Because man is a rational animal, he

[47] Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics,* Bk. III 1109b 30-lllOa 80.

has the capacity to know; but until that capacity is actualized in particular acts of knowing, it remains in a state of potency. Yet it would be absurd to suppose that man is rational or a knower only when he is engaged in the act of knowing or only so long as his neurocortical faculties are unimpaired. Similarly, the prenatal child cannot be said to be less than a human being simply because these faculties are yet in anascent or inchoate stage, for these faculties and their potency for development are proper to the essence *man.*

It is, therefore, as much a violation of man's essence as a self-perfecting being directly to kill the retarded and the unborn as it is directly to kill the physically and mentally whole. For, in terms of man's essence, considerations such as degree of physical health, degree of intelligence, stage of neurocortical development, etc., are irrelevant to the question of whether he is a human being. The ontological basis for the right to life is the essence *man* as it is embodied in this and that existent human being.[48]

* * * *

The assertion that the right to life has an ontological basis is bound to provoke questions about the validity of the distinction between justifiable and unjustifiable homocide. If it is justifiable to kill an unjust aggressor and for the state to execute a condemned criminal, this cannot be because, in virtue of performing unjust actions, they have .suffered an ontological transmutation. The question arises, therefore: if it is wrong to kill the innocent because man is by nature a self-perfecting being, then why is it not equally wrong to kill unjust aggressors in self-defense and condemned criminals?

This question does not constitute a fatal objection to the argument of this essay. From the position that certain rights, such as the right to life, are due man because of what he is by nature, it does not follow that these rights cannot justifiably be suspended or abrogated in specific cases. For the outrage

[48] Simon, Zoe. *cit.*

of murder does not consist merely in the killing of a human being but in the *unjust* killing of him. It is in his being killed unjustly that the victim is used as a mere means to an end. As Kant insisted,[49] to execute a condemned criminal is to treat him as an end in himself-as an autonomous agent-in that the execution holds him accountable for his crime. The justification for such killings lies in the appeal to justice. So, too, in the case of unjust aggression. The right to life surely implies the right to protect one's life. Having exhausted all other means of protecting himself against his attacker, the intended victim may justifiably kill him. A distinction might be drawn here between the possession of a right and the *exercise* of that right.[50] The criminal does not lose possession of his right to life; that right is inalienable for the simple reason that his essence is inalienable. But in the name of justice he forfeits the right to exercise that right.

Conversely, induced abortion, mercy-killing, eugenic killings, killing the innocent, whether for personal reasons or for the good of the state, etc., are all examples of murder-i. e., morally unjustifiable killing-in that each uses a human being as a mere means to an end. The position, presented at the outset of this essay, that society has the right to decide who shall live and who shall die, who shall be allowed to have children, etc., in order to ensure" the quality of life," seeks its justification in society's obligation to protect itself from the moral and political chaos that accompany overpopulation, famine, pollution of the natural environment, etc. But the error of this position is two-fold. First, the members of a teeming population cannot reasonably be accused of injustice simply because they are members of a population whose rapid growth exceeds the capacity of the economy or natural environment to accommodate such increase. They have not, therefore, forfeited the right to exercise their

[49] I. Kant, *The Metaphysical Elements of Justice.* Tr. by John Ladd. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1965 (paperback); pp. 99-106.

[50] Maritain, *Man and the State.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956; p. 102.

right to life. Second, the position rests on a faulty conception of the common good and ultimately on a faulty conception of man. Since each man, woman, and child is a self-perfecting being, the common good cannot be realized at the expense of any innocent human being. Society constitutes a reality but only in a secondary sense, for it is a *col"lective* whole; individual human beings are the primary realities inasmuch as each constitutes a substance with its own natural principle of unity. The collective whole called ' society ' exists for the sake of these primary substances insofar as it derives its *rationale* and organization from their needs. Because each member of society is a self-perfecting being, the common good is realized only in laws, institutions, and policies which offer him the social, economic, political, cultural, and moral conditions for his fulfilment. Among sub-rational groups, as we have seen in the first part of this essay, no common good is possible. Lacking the capacity for truly immanent activity and hence, for self-perfecting activity, each member of the bee-hive, say, exists totally for the good of the hive; each is a mere part of the whole, and since, by definition, the good of the whole is the good of each of its parts, the good of each bee is realized in its being sacrificed for the sake of the hive.[51]

But the deliberate killing of innocent human beings, even for the noblest of ends-the survival of the species, for example-cannot contribute to the common good, let alone to human progress, for each man is a whole within the social whole, not a mere part of it. Such a procedure is, therefore, intrinsically immoral, as it subverts man's essence by treating him as a mere part. Far from furthering the common good, it destroys it. The survival of the human species is in itself an ambiguous achievement. What was said above with regard to human existence applies also to the species; mere survival is nugatory. Survival derives its proper and full value from the fact that it enables a human being to perfect himself.

[51] Maritain, *The Person and the Common Good,* Ch. IV.

A word about suicide must be said in connection with the validity of the distinction between justifiable and unjustifiable homicide. Some suppose that suicide is not an intrinsically immoral act because it is his own life that the suicide voluntarily terminates. Implicit in this supposition lies the failure to understand that the immorality of directly destroying human life follows from the objective structure and finalities of the human essence and from the intrinsic end of the act itself. The question of whether the suicide was committed freely, like the question of the suicide's motive, pertains to a consideration of moral guilt and personal responsibility but not to any consideration of the objective morality or immorality of the act. For the same reason that the direct killing of an innocent man is immoral, so is suicide immoral: the suicide treats himself as a mere means to an end, in this case, as a mere means to his personal ends. Nevertheless, he thereby subverts his essence as a self-perfecting and self-determining being. Just as others are bound to treat him with justice, so is he bound to treat himself with justice.

CONCLUSION

The thrust of this essay has been to establish the claim, underlying the doctrine of natural right, that rights are due man in virtue of what he naturally and really is and not in virtue of social prerogative. That what man is can be rationally grounded and explicated only through a metaphysical approach is doubtless a scandal to some and a perplexity to others. For, despite its astounding scientific and technological achievements, ours is an age of intellectual darkness, an age of metaphysical blindness. The influences of Nominalism, Positivism, and Irrationalism conspire to persuade modern man that the intellect, far from having the capacity to know what things are, is confined to a knowledge of their sensible properties or, at least, to a knowledge of our measurements of them. But, if their essences are unknowable, then the things that confront us in the world must remain unintelligible and the " dignity of man " can be no more than a high-sounding phrase lacking all basis in reality.

Man must appear a material being essentially no different from sub-rational beings.

The reason for this devastating egalitarianism is clear. The denial of the intelligibility of things is also the denial of the immaterial, for, as argued above, a thing is knowable to the extent that it is free from the constrictions and opaqueness of matter. The essence of a material thing is not material-though being the intelligible formula of the thing, it is its formal cause, i.e., it accounts for the kind and order of its material properties. Thus, the denial of the intellect's capacity to know anything but sensible properties or impressions reduces all of Nature, including man, to so much material to be manipulated and expended by the will of society. It is no coincidence that the rise of the totalitarian state and with it a gigantic technology, rendered monstrous for want of a guiding vision and which increasingly debases man, should parallel the decay of faith in the intellect and the emergence of an anti-metaphysical outlook. As Collingwood has maintained,[52] the decline of metaphysics signals the decline of civilization.

Yet, men everywhere, whether educated or not, have understood-at least with a practical knowledge and in varying degrees-the special dignity of man. The universality of this insight is confirmed, if nowhere else, in the growing demand of peoples throughout the world for freedom and national identity. It is to the credit of Thomistic philosophy that it shares with this common sense knowledge an understanding of the proportion that exists between intellect and reality and, hence, of the intellect's natural capacity to know the essences of things. Growing out of the very soil of common sense, the doctrines of Thomism express the systematic development of speculative intellect's purifying reflections upon it. Thus, rather than being an exotic doctrine imported *a priori* to justify the rights of man, the metaphysical argument for that doctrine represents the natural movement of the intellect from the data of our percep-

•• R. G. Collingwood, *An Essay on Metaphysics.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957; pp. 234 & 343.

tions of the sensible world to the ontological principles underlying them. Remaining steadfast in its claims on behalf of intellect and of the intelligibility of Nature in the midst of the chaos spawned by philosophical agnosticism and irrationalism, Thomistic philosophy offers a rational, ontologically grounded, defense of the rights and dignity of man.

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THE THEOLOGIAN OF "HUMANAE VITAE"

I

THE SEARCH FOR a papal " ghostwriter" should never be construed as an attempt to undercut the authority of the pope for whom a theologian wrote. *Humanae Vitae* is the work of Pope Paul VI. It was his original decision that an authoritative pronouncement of the Church teaching would be made. It was in virtue of his power and authority that the birth control commission was first charged with, and later augmented in membership for the task of, advising him in this matter. He it was who took the question out of the competency of the Second Vatican Council and reserved it to himself. He it was who passed judgment on the Commission's work, rejected it and then sought other counsel. The decision and teaching embodied in *Humanae Vitae* are Pope Paul's. However, these facts should never be so affirmed as to deny the legitimate agency of other people in the achievement of this encyclical and its teaching. And this is where the significance of Gustave Martelet enters in.

The teaching of *Humanae Vitae* was first made public on Monday, July Q9th, 1968. Two days later, at a weekly general audience Pope Paul took a rather personal tone and spoke to those present about some of his feelings during the long time of the encyclical's preparation. But he stopped short of commenting on the encyclical itself:

> We will not speak to you now about this document, partly because the seriousness and delicacy of the subject seem to transcend the ordinary simplicity of this weekly talk, and partly because there are already and will be more publications on the encyclical available to those interested in the subject. [1]

[1] Paul VI, "Address to a generd audience, July 81, 1968," English translation in *The Pope Speaks* 13 (1968) 206; cf. *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* 60 (1968) 527-580: "Le Nostre parole."

In the text of this speech as it is recorded in *theActaApostolicae Sedis,*.there is a footnote at this point offering for example Gustave Martelet's *Amour eonjugal et renouveau coneiliaire.* No other work or author is mentioned. No further information as to date or place of publication is given regarding the one work cited. Nevertheless this reference is easily identifiable as the small, 47-page monograph which the printer Xavier Mappus of Lyon published for Gustave Martelet in 1967. Here is an essay that was written at least a year before the encyclical now being cited as an aid to anyone trying to understand the papal teaching! A Spanish theologian surveying the literature on *Humanae Vitae* did not hesitate to draw out for his readers the fullest implications:

> When Paul VI ... referred to the works that treated this, explicitly citing only one work, that of Martelet, he gave to the clear and comprehensive exposition of this essay the most authoritative praise possible.[2]

Logic can only proceed to ask, when the pope said there " will be more publications on the encyclical," was this not a reference to Martelet's apologetical works that appeared so soon after the encyclical's presentation to the public? [3] Indeed, there had been

[2] Manuel Cuyas, "En torno a la *Humanae Vitae,"* in *Selecciones de Libros.* Actualidad Bibliografica de filosofia y teologia (June, December 1969), p. 43: " Cuando Pablo VI . . . se remiti6 a las obras que lo trataban exprofeso citando explicitamente una sola obra, la del P. Martelet, hizo de la diafana y compendiosa exposici6n de este opusculo la mas autorizada alabanza que cabia."

[3] Martelet's apologetic on behalf of *Humanae Vitae* can be considered to have begun with his announcement and presentation of the encyclical at a press conference in Paris's National Bureau of Public Opinion on Monday morning, July 29th, 1968. (V. *La Croix,* Tuesday, July 30, 1968, "Apres la publication de l'encyclique, Le P. Martelet: Un appel a l'authenticite integrale de l'homme.") Though the papal document was dated July 25th, 1968, its general publication did not occur until the 29th of July when carefully planned press conferences similar to the one in Paris occurred throughout the world. In order that the encyclical and its official translations might be presented along with some appropriate context and commentary, a competent authority was chosen to address the press and to answer any questions. Four days later, on Friday night, August 2nd, Martelet was heard on French national radio in a two-hour broadcast of a panel-discussion on the encyclical. The broadcast was dominated by the brilliant and forceful exchange between Martelet

considerable journalistic speculation after the publication of *Humanae Vitae* identifying Gustave Martelet as the very author of the encyclical. And even some noted theologians made their contribution to such speculation.[4] However, there were some

and Marc Oraison, a priest and physician who had done much popular writing on sexuality. (V. *La Croix*, Tuesday, August 6th, 1968, "Au micro d'Europe no. 1: un debat sur l'Encyclique.") One week later, on Friday, August 9th, Martelet published in the Paris daily, *La Croix*, an article entitled, "The Pope's Duty and His Right." This essay made plain that it was merely an introduction to a series of articles which was to appear in the same and by means of which the author hoped to express in a more considered manner those things which, under the exigencies of a radio talk-show, he feared he had not made clear enough *(V. La Croix*, August 11th and Hth, 1968, "L'encyclique et l'Eglise des consciences; " August 13th: " Vrai et faux principe de totalite.") In the September issue of the magazine *Chretiens d'aujourd'hui* there appeared yet another article: " Pourquoi le pape a parle et ce qu'il a voulu dire." These brief, journalistic efforts were soon followed up by more extended and scholarly efforts: two lengthy essays " Pour mieux comprcndre l'encyclique 'Humanae Vitae'," in the November and December issues of Louvain University's *Nouville Revue Theologique* 90 (1968) 897-917, 1009-1064. In the meantime, Martelet had been giving numerous conferences and lectures aimed at defense and catechesis of the encyclical's teaching. He had even written a letter to the editor of London's *Sunday Times*. intending to clarify ideas which one of that newspaper's reporters attributed to him. *(V.* " Lettre au Sunday Times" in *Existence humaine et amour* (Paris, 1969). pp. 193-195.) All this effort came to something of a climax with the publication on February 9?6th, 1969 of *Existence humaine et amour*. Martelet had assembled for publication in paperback-book form the material which had originally appeared in *Nouvelle Revue Tkeologique*, this time reworked and written so as to present an even more clear and cogent argument. Appended to these essays were all the articles from *La Croix*, the essay from *Chretiens d'aujourd'hui*, and the letter to the editor of the *Sunday Times*. In the preface Martelet stated his intention to make his material available to as wide an audience as possible and in a more permanent form.

•At the same time Martelet was pursuing his apologetical task in France, there were others, on the continent, in England and America, who were identifying him with the very composition of the encyclical itself. On August 4th, within a week of the encyclical's publication, Martelet's photograph appeared on page one of London's *Sunday Times*, heading an interview article entitled " The Jesuit Behind the Encyclical Says: It's Up to You." On Monday, August 5th, a similar article appeared in the Dutch newspaper *De tigd*, "Adviseur paus. (G. Martelet) over encycliek. Het individuels geweten op eerste plaats." And in the *New York Times* of Sunday, August 11th, an article on *Humanae Vitae* identified Martelet as one of the key advisors to the pope *(V.* "Pope Counseled by Secret Panel: conservative 12-man group advised on encyclical," by Robert C. Doty.) Soon other publications picked up these or were recounting similar

counter-voices, other experts who, while they might accept the rumor of Martelet's role in the composition of the papal teaching, were not so ready to admit of any paramount significance in this for our understanding of the encyclical.

Denis O'Callaghan, a moral theologian on the faculty of Saint Patrick's College in Maynooth, Ireland, reviewed Martelet's work *Existence humaine et amour*, finding it, " a well balanced apologia for *Humanae Vitae."* [5] But O'Callaghan also had his reservations. While he found Martelet's arguments intelligent and discerning, in the final analysis he was not entirely convinced of their appropriateness to the matter at hand:

Opinions may differ as to how far this is a fair and literal interpretation of *Humarwe Vitae.* Even though the Pope avoids the distorted position of *Casti Connubii,* which used *sin* and *wrong action* as interchangeable terms, it is somewhat unreal to read his concept of intrinsic evil in terms other than those of his predecessors, Pius XI and Pius XII.[6]

rumors. Much of this journalistic speculation amounted to little more than an incidental remark in the midst of an article dealing with the papal teaching or public reaction to it. But there were also some newspaper reports offering lengthy and elaborate explanations of the encyclical's process of composition. Whatever expression it took, all such speculation was alike in claiming to be based upon the most unimpeachable but, of course, equally unmentionable sources. Despite this claim, reports could vary even in the same newspaper. *The Tablet* of London first cited, " Fr. Gustave Martelet, S, J., who was thought to have been the chief 'ghost writer' of the encyclical," (v. August 10th, 1968 [vol. 222] "The Argument Goes On: Further Catholic Reactions to *Humanae Vitae"),* only to follow up this notice a week later with a considerably reduced estimation of his role: " It is also believed that there were two previous drafts of the encyclical. The first was written by a special commission of the Doctrinal Congregation while Cardinal Ottaviani was pro-prefect. The membership of this commission is not known, though it is reported that Fr. Gustave Martelet, the French Jesuit, worked on it for a time before withdrawing because of illness." (*v.* August 17th, 1968, [vol. 222] "The Background to the Encyclical"). Bernard Haring, in an article entitled "The Encyclical Crisis," *(Commonweal* 88 [1968] 593) drew attention to what he called the extraordinary significance which the encyclical gives to the role of rhythm creating naturally fertile and infertile periods. He identified in this the influence of specific theologians and thus was able to conclude: "Father Lcstapis, S. J., and Father Martelet, S. J .... are clearly among the superconsultors."

[5] Denis F. O'Callaghan, *"Humanae Vitae* in Perspective: Survey of Recent French Writing," in *Irish Theological Quarterly* 37 (1970) 316.

[6] *Ibid.,* pp. SI 7-318.

Another member of Maynooth's faculty was even more critical of the value of Martelet's work. Father Patrick McGrath, S. J., was one of the encyclical's staunchest defenders and a rigorous interpreter of the pope's teaching in the face of those who he considered were attempting to water it down. In an article "On Not Re-interpreting *Hum.anae Vitae,"* McGrath said of Martelet's interpretation of the encyclical:

> It is easy to sympathize with the difficulties that moral theologians have experienced since the publication of *Humanae Vitae;* nevertheless, there can, I believe, be only one opinion about Martelet's theory-it is not a fair interpretation of the encyclical. Indeed, it it is not easy to see how it could be called an interpretation in any significant sense.[7]

It is interesting to note, however, the somewhat paradoxical situation that while Martelet's critics will challenge, and in at least one instance, deny outright any value to Martelet's interpretation, none attempts to deny Martelet a role in the authorship of the work. In fact they all are satisfied to hand on the conjectures about Martelet's part in the composition of the encyclical. Denis O'Callaghan had spoken of "Martelet who has been credited with some responsibility for drafting *Humanae Vitae."* [8] And McGrath repeats the allegation almost verbatim, citing" a defense of the encyclical by Gustave Martelet, a French Jesuit who is generally credited with some responsibility for drafting *Humanae Vitae."* [9]

What are we to make of this? The meaning of it all is hardly clear. The theologians' remarks only add to the confusion of Gustave Martelet's significance as regards *Hum.anae Vitae.* But the task of looking for a papal " ghost writer" cannot be left to journalists, for it is a properly theological task.

To interpret a papal statement with accuracy we must know some of the theological sources that were influential in the

[1] P. J. McGrath, "On Not Re-interpreting *Humanae Vitae,"* ITQ 38 (1971) 130.

• O'Callaghan, p. 317.

• McGrath, p. 130.

formulation of its teaching. Moreover, those sources usually make themselves known to us, for the ghost writer's task is not complete with the composition of the encyclical; rather after the publication of the document, it is the ghost writer's duty to make available through his own writings authoritative interpretation of the papal teaching.

For example, John Noonan, in his history of contraception, shows himself keenly aware of the decisive role played by particular theologians in the formulation of papal teaching. In fact, Noonan insists, not only did Arthur Vermeersch, " the most influential moral theologian of the first part of the twentieth century," help to draft Pius XI's *Casti connubii,* but it was some of this theologian's peculiar pride and temperament that went into determining the self-righteous tone and severe character of this papal statement:

> Vermeersch had been stung by Lambeth's [the Anglican bishops' meeting in August of 1930 was the first Christian authoritative body to approve of contraception] reference to Liguorian doctrine on good faith, in the Conference Report's declaration that Rome' recognized that there are some occasions where the rigid maintenance of principle is impossible ' .... Vermeersch's view was that the common good demanded that good faith be destroyed in the confessional. 'Let not confessors,' the encyclical declared, ' permit the faithful to err about this most serious law.' [10]

However, Noonan is careful to note that the encyclical's meaning cannot be entirely reduced to the influence of this one theologian. Despite the comprehensive and synthetic treatment accorded marriage in *Casti Connubii,* there can still be discerned the thought of yet another author, and his contribution makes for a significantly different perspective and treatment of at least one vital issue:

> If Vermeersch's work was the sole guide to the interpretation of the encyclical, or if the document had used the broad term ' onanism', sterilization would have fallen within the encyclical's condemnation. But ... against the background of this recent question

[10] John T. Noonan, Jr., *Contraception* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), pp. and 431.

Casti Connubii spoke specifically and separately on sterilization. The section was principally drafted by Francis Hurth, a German Jesuit. [11]

Noonan is certainly neither without precedent nor alone in taking this approach toward an understanding o:f the encyclical. It is not uncommon to read in the literature after *Casti Connubii* interpretations of the encyclical that invoke the opinion of a certain writer while inferring the quoted author's peculiar authority regarding the question at hand. And so the American moralist, John Ford, could say:

It seems more likely that this passage of the encyclical refers to the motives of the contracting parties rather than to an end to which marriage is objectively and essentially related. This is the interpretation given to it by Father Franz Hurth, *whose opinion perhaps has peculiar weight.* [my emphasis] [12]

But regarding *Humanae Vitae*, the ghostwriter and his authority are neither so prominent n'or apparent.

[11] *Ibid.,* p. 430.

[12] John C. Ford, S. J., "Marriage: Its Meaning and Purposes," in *Theological Studies* 3 (1942) 372. One of Francis Hurth's students has given us a description of the career of a papal consultant and ghost writer. It is worth quoting this at some length in order to see more clearly the nature and function of this "office": "Before coming to the Gregorian University Fr. Hurth was professor of moral theology for twenty years (1915-35) at the Jesuit theologate at Valkenburg, Holland. At Valkenburg, besides writing many articles for periodicals, he had prepared a printed volume *De VII mandato* and a complete set of mimeographed notes on all the other topics pertaining to the course of moral theology. His notes on sexual physiology and psychology and his collection and analysis of replies of the Holy See on the use of the generative faculty comprise the best treatments of these topics that I have ever seen,. As far as I know, none of this material was ever made available in strictly ' published ' form. While he was professor at the Gregorian University, his publications largely consisted of articles in *Periodica,* especially in the form of commentaries on pronouncements of the Holy See. Very likely it was not through his writings or his teaching that Fr. Hurth exercised his greatest theological influence. His was the behind-the-scenes influence of consultor to the Holy Office and, it seems, to Pius XI and Pius XII; it was generally supposed in Rome that he had more than a little to do with the composition of *Casti Connubii;* and it is hardly a wild guess to assume that he was in some sense a theological ghost writer for Pius XII." From "Notes on Moral Theology" in *Theological Studies* (1963)

After the publication of *Humanae Vitae,* there was some speculation that Joseph Fuchs, S. J., a German moral theologian at the Gregorian University and a member of the birth control commission, had had a role in the composition of the encyclical.[13] No douhti such .speculation was prompted by the "peculiar weight" of this theologian's opinion which Noonan has described in these terms: " Fuchs had succeeded to the mantle of Vermeersch and Hurth a.s the leading Jesuit authority in Rome on marital morality." [14] However, between the time of Noonan's observation (1965) and the publication of the encyclical (1967), something had occurred to jeopardize seriously Fuchs's hitherto undisputed position of authority in these matters.

Initially Fuchs entered the birth control controversy defending the Church's traditional teaching on the morality of contraception; but during his participation on the papal birth control commission's proceedings, his convictions underwent a decided reversal of opinion.[15] Fuchs emerged from the final session of the commission (April 13th to June 28th, 1966) on the side of those theologians favoring a change in the Church's traditional teaching. This fact is of paramount importance, for it must certainly have eliminated him from any direct role in the composition of a papal .statement so decisively reaffirming the Church's traditional teaching. Significantly, Fuchs issued no public statement after the publication of *Humanae Vitae.*

Now, if indeed the mantle of authority had slipped from Fuchs's shoulders, did Gustave Martelet inherit it? **If** so, how was this accomplished? The complete answer to these questions will be found only in a detailed history of the birth control de-

[13] Cf. *The Tablet* (London), Saturday, August 17th, 1968 (vol. 222), p. 827: "Several sources have denied that Fr. Joseph Fuchs, the German Jesuit, a professor of moral theology at Rome's Gregorian University, was a member [of a conjectured Holy Office commission that prepared *Humanae Vitae]."*

"Noonan, p. 501.

[15] Cf. John Horgan's "The History or the Debate," in *On Human Life* by John Horgan et al., London: Burns & Oates, 1968, pp. 7-26. Also Ambrogio Valsecchi's *Controversy:* the birth control debate 1959-1968. Trans. from the Italian by Dorothy White, Washington, 1968.

bate and the composition of the encyclical. This task, at least as regards the composition of the encyclical, has yet to be adequately essayed. For the most part this is because much of the documentation is inaccessible in what was, perforce, a secretive process. However, the documentation is available by which one might discern the influence of Martelet's thought in the encyclical and the significance of this for our understanding of the pope's teaching. In the remainder of this paper we shall survey Gustave Martelet's writings in order to understand the character and content of his theology, and then we shall attempt to determine whether and to what extent his work is a recognizable influence in the encyclical.

II

It is perhaps a surprising fact, but Gustave Martelet is not a moral theologian.[16] Even the most cursory glance at his bibliography is sufficient to make us aware that Martelet's writings on the morality of contraception are occasional works born out of the theological strife of a debate only tangentially related to the bulk of this theologian's literary efforts. Martelet's serious theological works leading up to the birth control debate dealt with themes from dogmatic theology: for example, sacramentality, Christology, revelation. After his *apologiae* for *Humanae Vitae,* it is to similar dogmatic themes that Martelet returns. And so Martelet's writings on contraception must be seen within a perspective: his essays on the morality of contraception are not the product of a long term wrestling with questions of sexual or marital morality but are rooted instead

[16] Gustave Martelet was born September 1916, at Lyon, France. He pursued his secondary education at the diocesan minor seminary, Saint John Baptist, and two years of philosophy at the major seminary in Lyon before entering the Society of Jesus in 1935. After completing the traditional program of religious formation, he went on to the Society's Gregorian University at Rome where he earned the doctorate. Since he taught fundamental theology and dogma at the Jesuit scholasticate, Lyon-Fourviere. He moved with this faculty to Paris in 1973, where he continues to teach with occasional lecturing at the Gregorian University. Cf. "Note biographique sur l'auteur," p. 5 of G. Martelet's *Victoire sur la mort* (Lyon,

in his work with fundamental theology and dogma. This fact will direct our first inquiries into Martelet's theology, for we should know something of the character of his dogmatizing.

Martelet's doctoral dissertation provides us with a good vantage point from which we might begin our inquiry, for a student's work such as this reveals the theological and methodological formation that shaped the young theologian's mind and the foundation upon which the maturer theologian's thought is built. Presented to the faculty of the Gregorian University at Rome in April of *1955,* Martelet's dissertation is a study of First Corinthians 10: 1-11 with special attention to Paul's use of Old Testament texts in his presentation of the themes of baptism and the eucharist. This epistle's numerous references to baptism and the eucharist and Paul's treatment of these themes in terms of Old Testament typologies had often made First Corinthians a source of special interest for the Catholic dogmatist. However, principles of developed in modern times called into question much of the traditional dogmatizing that had proceeded so confidently from these texts.

In his dissertation, Martelet singles out the work of Chrysostom and Augustine, for each represents a characteristic tendency in the patristic commentaries. Martelet shows us how Chrysostom was so intensely aware of the originality of the present Christian dispensation that he tended to neglect the proper spiritual significance of the Old Testament figures, seeing them merely as foreshadowings or prophecies of the eucharist and baptism. On the other hand, Augustine was so taken with the profound spiritual sense of the Old Testament figures that he often tended to blur any distinction between the old covenant and the new era of grace, making no significant distinction between the manna in the desert and the eucharist of the Christian assembly.

By such comparative study, Martelet was able to distinguish and give clearer expression to the more comprehensive and sophisticated use which Paul made of the typological method and thus to discern more precisely the significance of Paul's sacramentalism:

Whatever were the tendencies of these two great doctors, if one wishes to be faithful to St. Paul he must hold at once for both the richness of the preparation [i.e., the Old Covenant] and the incomparable plenitude of the accomplishment [i.e., the new dispensation] ... such seem to us to be the true dimensions of pauline thought. With an acute sense of the originality of the Christian present, St. Paul illuminates retrospectively the biblical past which thus gives to the Christian sacramental reality its past figurative depth ... [this] pauline point of view [is that] in which the moments of history come together without becoming confused and are distinguished but not separated. [17]

What we recognize in this conclusion and the style of inquiry that led to it is a familiarity with scripture and a critical handling of tradition that are the hallmark of the *nouvelle theologie*.[18] Here is a dogmatic theologian who brings to his work a keen awareness of the significance of scripture and history for dogmatic questions. And even more significantly, there is no evidence here of an uncritical defensiveness of tradition 'or the methodical application of one particular philosophical commitment or of .scholastic categories.

Between the publication of Martelet's dissertation in 1956 and the publication of Martelet's first book-length study, *Victoire sur la mort* (154 pages) in 1962, came at least twenty essays. However, it is the book-length study which concerns us not merely because of its comparative length but because it marks a significant point of development in Martelet's thought. Here he brings together ideas from his previous work and gives them an expression and unity which will contribute decisively to his later wrestling with the problematic of contraception.

[17] G. Martelet, "Sacrements, figures et exhortation en I Cor. x, 1-11," in *Recherches de Science religieuse* 44 (1956) 359: "Quoi qu'il en soit d'ailleurs des tendances de ces deux grands Docteurs, il faut tenir tout ensemble si l'on veut etre fidele a saint Paul, et la richesse de Ia preparation, et Ia plenitude incomparable de l'accomplissement ... Telles nous semblent etre Jes vraies dimensions de la pensee paulinienne. Avec un sens tres aigu de l'originalite du present chretien, saint Paul eclaire retrospectivement le passe biblique qui donne ainsi a l'actualite sacramentaire chretienne sa profondeur figurative passee."

[18] Martelet's method obviously owes much to the work of both Jean Danielou and Henri de Lubac. He makes explicit allusion to this debt in his *Les idees maitresses de Vatican II* (Bruges., 1966), p. footnotes 1 and

Martelet's *Victoire sur la mort* had its origin in a contemporary pastoral problem rather than in speculative theology-the phenomenon of a growing Marxist movement among the French working classes and the challenges which this posed for traditional Christian faith.[19] This small work was originally intended to be little more than a republication, only slightly edited, of some earlier essays. However, in the process of preparing them for publication in book form Martelet came to a significant conclusion:

> The more I tried in effect to make some corrections . . . the more it appeared to me necessary to reorganize these essays, allowing myself to be led entirely by the evidence which had not ceased to pile up since then: the object of debate between the Church and atheism is, through his relationship to God, man himself.[20]

One might object that such a theme was hardly new, in fact the contention of de Lubac's *The Drama of Atheist Humanism* had been precisely that Marxist atheism, in claiming to save man, only resigns him to a worse fate: reducing man to a purely utilitarian status, making him the servant of an historical destiny most men will never see, the final victory of the classless society. But what is significant in Martelet's work is that here humanism is no longer merely a thematic guide but a scientifically applied critical method:

[19] This phenomenon first drew the attention of theologians in the decade of the 1940's. Henri de Lubac had published his *The Drama of Atheist Humanism* as early as 1944. But the Marxist challenge continued to draw the attention of theologians throughout the 1950's. When the entire July *1956* issue of *Lumiere et vie* was devoted to a study of communism in contemporary France, Martelet's contribution was the essay, "Atheisme et marxisme." Martelet returned to this issue several times again. In 1957 he wrote " Foi et monde moderne" and "l'Atheisme marxiste, tentation et reveil du Chretien" for the *Revue de l'Action populaire.* These essays and two others that also appeared in *Revue de l'Action populaire* in 1960 formed the basis for Martelet's book-length study, *Victoire sur la mort.*

[20] G. Martelet, *Victoire sur la mart* (Lyon, 1962), p. 7: "Plus nous essayions en effet de faire quelques corrections . . . plus il nous est apparu necessaire de reorganiser ces quelques essais, en nous laissant conduire entierement par !'evidence qui n'avait cesse de grandir en nous depuis lors: l'objet du debat entre l'Eglise et l'atheisme, c'est, a travers son rapport a Dieu, l'homme lui-meme."

To claim that between the Church and atheism man himself is the question, is to claim the central place of anthropology. We call anthropology a doctrine about man, elaborated in terms of the functions or duties of universal human situations, such as work, society, religion, love or death ... thus it is that Marxism has or is, just as Stoicism had or was, an anthropology. Likewise a Christian anthropology exists. And it is that of which we wish to speak.[21]

In raising the question of the adequacy of a Marxist anthropology Martelet gives added depth and substance to de Lubac's criticism of the Marxist conception of man and history. Martelet's method is to focus precisely upon a certain aspect of that humanity that Marxism overlooks. Martelet chose a " universal human situation " which Christian faith and thought have confronted directly but for which atheistic Marxism has no really satisfying answers: man's mortality. However, Martelet's choice of this particular criterion upon which to challenge the adequacy of a Marxist view of man is not entirely opportunistic; for death is indeed one of the determinants of the human condition, and so it cannot help but make for a decisive test case for any program or philosophy making claims on, for, or about man. How do you explain death? What is its significance for the scheme of things?

In order to do that [i.e., raise the anthropological question], it has seemed necessary to us to consider man's relation to death, but because death, like nature, constitutes a supreme embrace of man in this world, it is the limiting situation *par excellence,* and the irrefutable test of the truth of our understanding of man.[22]

[21] *Ibid.,* p. 8: " Dire qu'entre l'Eglise et l'atheisme, l'hommc meme fait question, c'est dire la place centrale de l'anthropologie. Nous appelons anthropologie une doctrine sur l'homme, elaboree en fonction des situations humaines universelles, comme sont le travail, la societe, la religion, l'amour ou la mort ... C'cst ainsi que le marxisme a ou est, comme le stoicisme avait ou etait, une anthropologie. Il existe pareillement une anthropologic chretienne. C'est d'elle que nous voulons parler."

[22] *Loe.* cit.: " Pour le faire, ii nous a paru neccssaire de considerer le rapport de l'homme a la mort. Non que christianisme y reduise l'homme, mais parce que la mort comme la nature, constitue un englobant supreme de l'homme dans le monde; elle est la situation limite par excellence, et le test irrefutable de la verite de nos propos sur l'homme."

Later, in Martelet's work on conjugal love and the morality of contraception, he will employ a similar methodology to challenge an emphatically personalist image of man that seems to reduce man's physical or biological nature to a mere utilitarian factor subject to quite arbitrary domination by man's rational faculty. Martelet will insist that the body or the flesh, man's biological nature, must be taken more seriously than that as constitutive element of the universal human condition. But here in this work first formulated as a theological challenge to the adequacy of a marxist-atheist image of man is where Martelet's theological anthropology was developed as a critical tool for theology.

The second half of *Victoire sur la mort* is given over to a more detailed description of a Christian anthropology. And it is here that Martelet develops his thought on the relation between man and nature:

> When Saint Paul said to the Christians that the ' world ' is for them (I Cor he neither meant to overrate these men nor to naturalize them. Neither to overrate them in leading them to believe that Christianity promised them a way of immediate domination over nature, which would dispense them from all work and from all properly human effort. Nor did he intend to naturalize them by leading them to believe that man is nothing other than a transitory power for domination of the world. He wished simply to situate them as men, along the most classical lines of biblical anthropology, such as appears in Psalm 8, where it is said to God of man: 'Thou hast made him little less than a god, and dost crown him with glory and honor. Thou hast given him dominion over the works of Thy hands; Thou hast put all things under his feet.' [23]

•• *Ibid.,* p. 87: "Quand saint Paul dit aux Chretiens que le ' monde ' est a eux, ii ne pretend ni les surfaire, ni Ies naturaliser. Ni les surfaire en leur donnant a croire que le christianisme leur assure une sorte de domination immediate sur la nature, qui les dispenserait de tout travail et de tout effort proprement humain. Ni les naturaliser en Ieur laissant croire que l'homme n'est rien d'autre qu'un pouvoir passager de domination du monde. II veut seulement !es situer comme ho=es, dans la ligne la plus classique de l'anthropologie biblique, telle qu'elle apparait dans le psaume S•, OU ii est dit a Dieu de l'homme: 'A peine le fis-tu moindre qu'un dieu, le couronnant de gloire et de splendeur; tu l'etablis sur l'oeuvre de tes mains, tout fut mis par toi sous ses pieds.'"

Here we meet an important theme in Martelet's work which will become even more significant in the birth control debate because of the question of to what degree man can licitly intervene in the processes of nature. Later in this same essay Martelet indicates more precisely the extent and character of man's dominion over nature:

Nature must be spiritually accounted for, and not simply dominated by technology ... The more we affirm man's rights over nature, the more we sound the depths of man's constitutive dependence upon a Gift [i.e. Creation], which he marvelously enriches, perhaps, but in whose activity he is existentially included; for he understands himself only as he discerns in nature the ineradicable sign of his own Source.[24]

Here Martelet is making what is at least in effect a critical challenge to the validity of man's technological domination of nature. This is another principle which Martelet will invoke when he turns to a consideration of the morality of contraception.

The next work of Martelet's to concern us is, again, a book-length study, this time an even more extended effort: *Les idees maitresses de Vatican II* pages, published in 1966) . This work is the product of Martelet's experience as a *peritus* at the Second Vatican Council. In the preface to this work, the seminary professor from Lyon describes how he came to be at the Council:

Called to Rome, as early as the first session, by the very recently appointed bishop of Fort Archambault (Chad), the author of this book became little by little, by reason of daily association, a theologian, as were some others, for the French-speaking bishops of equatorial Africa. Without being an official *peritus* of the Council, he was able to follow, as early as the second session, all the conciliar debates, to work in different commissions, and render whatever

[24] *Ibid.,* p. 89: "Ia nature doit etre spirituellement comprise, et non pas seulement techniquement dominee ... Plus on affirme done Jes droits de J'homme sur la nature dans le mondc, plus aussi on approfondit la dependance constitutive de I'homme par rapport a un Don, qu'il e!aborc merveilleusernent peut-etre, rnais clans lequel ii est existcntiellement compris et qu'il ne comprend lui-merne qu'en y dechiffrant le signe indestructible de son propre Principe."

services a professional man in such circumstances understood to be required of him and for which he was prepared. [25]

Though none of the chroniclers of the Council singles Martelet out for any special attention, all note his presence at meetings and his participation on conciliar commissions.[26] It is principally with regard to the preparatory work of two documents, the dogmatic constitution on the church and the pastoral constitution on the church in the modern world, that we see him most mentioned. From what we have already seen, we know that the section of *Gaudium et Spes* which treats of atheism and the mystery of death would have provided sure interest for Martelet.

The nearest thing we have to a description of Martelet's work at the council is a reference from Xavier Rynne which for all its obliqueness is no less vivid and suggestive:

> Rising to speak on Monday, October 1963, for the first time since his brief remarks opening discussion on the schema *(de ecclesia)* Cardinal Ottaviani ... began by an attack on three of the *periti* or council experts (unnamed but assumed to be Rahner, Ratzinger, and Martel et) whom he accused of soliciting various groups of bishops in favor of a married diaconate. [27]

Though he had arrived after the first session and even then only

•• G. Martelet, *Les idees matfresses de Vatican II* (Bruges, 1966), p. 10: "Appele a Rome, des la premiere session,, par l'Evcque tout recemment nomme de Fort-Archambault (Tchad), l'auteur de ces lignes est peu a p.eu devenu, par raison de cohabitation joumaliere, theologien, parmi d'autres, des Evequcs francophones d'Afrique equatoriale. Sans etre expert officiel du Concile, ii a pu suivre, des la 2• session, tous !es debats travailler dans difl'erentes commissions, et rendre quelqu'uns des services pour lesquels un homme de metier peut, en de telles circonstances, s'cntendre requis et se croire prepare."

[26] Roberto Tucci notes Martelet's presence as a clerical expert in attendance at the meeting of the Central Subcommission working on Schema 13 *(Gaudium et Spes)* in Ariccia during the first week of February, *1965,* in his "Introduzione storico-dottrinale alla Constituzione pastorale *Gaudium et Spes."* In *La Chiesa e il mondo contcmporane;o. nel Vaticano* TI (Turin,, 1966), pp. 17-134 Antoine Wenger notes Martelet along with Danielou, Cougar and other *periti* in agreement with Cardinals Garrone and Wright of the doctrinal commission treating the Constitution on the Church in his *Vatican* II: *chronique. de la troisieme session* (Paris, 1965) .

[27] X. Rynne, *The Second Session* (New York, 1968, 1964), p. 114.

in the capacity of a bishop's personal consultant, Martelet is here pictured amid the most eminent *penti* and active in the promotion of a significant innovation in Church order,

If Martelet appears in Rynne's vignette decisively in the ranks of the liberal majority of the Council, this impression is only affirmed by Martelet's own writings. In a report on the work of the Second Session, Martelet says:

> Certain members of the Curia have said, during the second session: "Let them chatter! When they have finished, we will take things in hand once again." If it was their intention it was an illusion. What happened during the second session was not chatter. In the strange guise of a Latin very often roughly handled, there was a mystery of word and spirit. Through certain Council speeches of unequal value-how could it be otherwise?-consciences were expressed and, searching the conscience of others, sometimes without their knowing it, the dead ground of deep-rooted habits was dug up and turned over, barren stubble and meadows without grass ... the ground of faith was tilled, that will receive the shower of grain cast by the Sower.[28]

And Yves Cougar has more than once called attention to Martelet's studies of the Council and its work, calling Martelet's essay, " The Church and the World: toward a new conception," a remarkable study of that profound transition effected by the Council in its Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, a transition from a medieval notion of the relation between the temporal and the spiritual which was conceived juridically and politically and lasted right up until this Council only to be re-

[28] G. Martelet, "Horizon theologique de Ia deuxieme session du Concile," *Nouvelle Revue Theologique* 86 (1964) 450: "Certains membres de Ia Curie auraient dit, au cours de la deuxieme session: ' Laissons-les caqueter! Quand ils auront fini, nous reprendrons Jes choses en mains.' Si le propos est veritable, ii etait illusoire. Ce qui s'est passe durant la deuxieme session n'est pas du caquetage. Dans l'etrange appareil d'un latin souvent malmene, ce fut un mystkre de parole et d'esprit. A travers des certaines d'interventions, de valeur inegale-eomment en saurait-il autrement?-des consciences se sont exprimees et, cherchant Ia conscience des autres, ont parfois a leur insu, fouille et retourne la couche morte des habitudes invetkrees, des chauves steriles et des prairies sans herbe . . . la terre arable de la foi, qui recevra la volee des grains lances par le Semeur."

placed by one conceived on the " anthropological plane of personal belief." [29]

Martelet's book-length study, *The Major Ideas of Vatican II,* is significant not only for its treatment of the Council arid its work but also for the style and method Martelet employs in his analysis. Martelet's synthetic treatment is not well represented by this less-than-happy attempt at an English translation of the title. The subtitle, " introduction to the spirit of the Council " is more to the point, for Martelet's study is based upon what he claims to have observed as three characteristic approaches of the Council to its work: a return to the sources, especially liturgical and biblical; the resolution of paradoxes in the mystery of Christ; and renewal according to the signs of the times- the Church's dialogue with the world. If this scheme bears more than a slight resemblance to the program of the " nouvelle theologie," this is not without some measure of justification; the " spirit" of the work of Congar, Danielou and de Lubac was indeed a significant influence upon the work oi the Council. In fact some have seen the Council as a vindication of these theologians from the cloud of doubt and suspicion cast upon their work by *Humani Generis.*

But Martelet's appraisal of the Council's work is not merely that of a student who can do no more than recognize the influences of his teachers. Martelet sees something more; the council fathers did more than just follow the program of the "nouvelle theologie":

> Having thus assured a genuine return to the sources, safeguarding that paradoxical union of contraries which means its sincere adherence to the mystery of Christ, the Council inaugurates a spiritual renewal of the signs, which is identified in our days with an integral love for man and his world ... the word ' integral ' is without doubt one of the key words of this Constitution. It is because of this in any case that the Council characterizes ceaselessly here the way in which it approaches the vocation of all men and of the entire man.

[29] Yv.es Cougar, "Commentary on Part I, Chapter IV of *Gaudium et Spes,"* in *Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II,* vol. 5 (New York, 1969), p. fn. 9.

See notably *Gaudium et Spes* 10,2; 11,1; 57,l; 59,l; 61,1; 63,l; 64,l; 75,l; 75,3; 91,l ...[30]

Martelet's own thoughtful considerations of a Christian anthropology made him particularly attentive to the vital importance of the image of man in *Gaudium et Spes.* Commentators on this document have at times voiced the criticism that the image of man in the council's statement is not a complete one, but is much too optimistic. Thus the American moralist Richard McCormick said of Vatican II's openness and sensitivity to contemporary expressions of man's needs and desires:

> The Second Vatican Council, in its great document on the Church in the Modern World, showed itself highly sensitive to these resonances, so much so that at times it appears to have forgotten that man was, is and always will be sinful man.[31]

The tendencies which McCormick identifies here would not be the cause of such apprehension for a dogmatic theologian like Martelet who can insist that *Gaudium et Spes's* very positive regard for contemporary man is part of a larger, more integral notion of man contained in this Council's work. Martelet would insist that the Council employed an integral Christian anthropology which could quite adequately take account of man's sinful inclination while at the same time allowing for that other perspective upon man which focuses upon his capacity to respond gracefully to God's initiative. As a dogmatist, and more than any moral theologian, Martelet was aware of the importance of this integral notion of man, the fuller image of man,

[80] G. Martelet, *Les idees...* , pp. 186-187: "Ayant done assure un vrai rctour aux sources, sauvegardant cette paradoxale union des contraires qui signifie son adhesion sincere au Seigneur, le Concile inaugure un renouveau spirituel des signes, qui s'identifie de nos jours avec un amour *integral* de l'homme et de son monde... Ce mot " integral " est sans doutc un des mots cles de cette Constitution. C'est par Jui en tout cas que le Concile caracterise sans cesse ici la maniere dont ii aborde la vocation de taus les hommes et de tout l'homme, Voir notarnment *GS*, 10, 11, l; 57, l; 59, 1, 61, l; 63, l; 64, l; 75, l; 75, 3; 91, 1 ..."

[81] R. McCormick's "Foreword" to J. F. Dedek's *Contemporary Sexual Morality* (New York, 1971), pp. vii-viii.

the comprehensive Christian anthropology, that underlies *Gaudium et Spes's* teaching. And, as we shall see, Martelet will insist upon the importance of an adequate anthropology in the controversy over the morality of contraception.

Now that we have acquainted ourselves with the character of Martelet's theologizing as a dogmatist, we can at last turn to a reading of his work on conjugal morality and contraception.

Martelet first broached the topic of conjugal morality in a rather indirect manner when in 1958 he wrote an article, "L'eglise, la loi et la grace," for the Jesuit publication *Christus.* In this essay Martelet was concerned principally with the role and function of law in Christian morality, and he uses the example of the Church's rather strict judgment on matters of conjugal morality as illustration of this:

> That the Church demands in an absolute manner certain behavior of human morality is a great scandal for many Christians, and even more so for non-Christians. For the former it seems that the Church would be more ' spiritual ' if she soon abandoned her pretensions to legislate regarding human values. For the others, the Church is mdulging an illusion in pretending to go beyond man, she cannot so speak of him knowingly. With one or the other it seems that the Church's intervention in man's world is not only out of place, but, why not say it, harmful. Doesn't she only end up burdening man with the yoke of an impractical law? So for example take what she teaches regarding fidelity. In the name of love, she makes fidelity a requirement without compromise. And thus the law of the Church leads, by means of the condemnation of onanism, to the slow but sure destruction of love.[82]

[32] G. Martelet, "L'eglise, la Joi et la grace," in *Christus 5* (1958), 205: " Que l'Eglise exige de fa<;on absolue des comportements de moralite humaine, tel est un des grands scandales de beaucoup de chretiens, et a plus forte raison de non-chretiens. Il semble aux premiers que I'Eglise serait plus ' spirituelle' si elle abandonna't une bonne fois ses pretensions a legiferm· sur les valeurs humaines. Pour !es autres, l'Eglise serait dans !'illusion a pretendre depasser l'homme; elle ne peut done parler de Jui en connaissance de cause. Aux uns comme autres, ii semble que son intervention dans le monde humain soit deplacee, et, pourquoi ne pas le dire? nocive. N'en vint-elle pas a faire peser sur l'homme le jong d'une Joi impraticable? C'est ainsi, par exempie, qu'en faisant de la fidelite, au nom meme de !'amour, une exigence sans compromis possible, la Joi de l'Eglise aboutirait, a trav.ers la condarnnation de l'onanisme, a Ia lente mais sure destruction de !'amour, au norn meme de la vie."

In answering this objection to the role and function of law in Christian morality, Martelet's method is at one with all that we have seen of his work thus far. He insists upon an integral Christian anthropology, that is an image of man which takes into consideration the concept of law within the encompassing perspective of the doctrine of grace. Here, Martelet is simply further elaborating his theological anthropology by insisting upon grace as a constitutive factor in a truly Christian image of man:

> Law is for the Church nothing other than the expression of man which Jesus Christ makes possible in the order of grace. Thus there is not, in the eyes of the Church, any justifiable scandal in the face of the law, because there is no authentic requirement of the law which is not like the simple reverse side of grace ... Without doubt the Church knows that man, as generous as he may be, cannot by himself live all his truth as a man, since this truth divinely surpasses him. But, instead of preaching discouraged abandon before that which is humanly impossible, she declares the necessity and announces the possibility of a complete spiritual rebirth of man. 'Unless he be born again of water and the spirit, no one can enter into the Kingdom.' Nicodemus, already initiated into this mystery by Christ himself, did not recognize in it the customary themes of his own wisdom, no more so does modern man. And more than one Christian finds himself in the same situation. That is nevertheless the only consequence to which logically the Church can lead us.ss

••*Ibid.*, p. !214: "La loi n'est, pour l'Eglise, rien d'autre que l'expression de l'homme, tel que Jesus-Christ le i:end possible dans l'ordre de la grace. Il n'y a done pas, aux yeux de l'Eglise, de scandale justifie en face de la loi, parce qu'il n'y a pas d'exigence authentique de la loi qui ne soit comme un simpl.e envers de la grace.

Sans doute l'Eglise sait-elle que l'homme., si genereux qu'il soit, ne peut par lui-meme vivre toute sa verite d'homme, puisque, cette verite le depasse divinement. Mais, au lieu de precher !'abandon decourage devant ce qui est humainement impossible, ell.e declare la necessite et annonce la possibilite d'une renaissance spirituelle totale de l'homme. ' Nu!, s'il ne renait de l'eau et de !'Esprit, ne peut entrer dans le Royaume.' Nicoderne, jadis initie a ce rnystere par le Christ lui-meme, n'y reconnaissait pas Jes themes coutumiers de sa sagess.e; l'homme moderne, non plus. Et plus d'un chretien se trouve dans le meme cas. C'est pourtant la seule consequence a laquelle nous accule logiquement l'Eglise."

This work is as good as any with which to understand Martelet's peculiar and characteristic contribution to the birth control debate. The ·essay is hardly remarkable for any innovation or dramatic insight; however, this does not deny the originality of his contribution. Martelet, as a professor of fundamental theology and dogma, brought to the birth control debate the simple witness of a Christian anthropology. His role was that of repeatedly calling attention to fundamental aspects of this Christian image of man such as his propensity to sin and his capacity for grace.

Martelet's next literary effort on the topic of conjugal morality was the essay, "Mariage, amour et sacrement," which he published in the 1963 issue of *NouveUe Revue Theologique.* Martelet's method here is similar to that which we have seen in his previous works: it is at once sensitive to the biblical witness and the relevance of history. He begins with a consideration of Paul's teaching on marriage:

> Wanting to explain the love that husbands should have for their wives, Saint Paul evokes the love of Christ for the Church. He does this citing the text from Genesis: 'For this reason a man shall leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two shall become one flesh.'[34]

And then Martelet proceeds to draw out what he sees as the doctrinal content of Paul's teaching here:

> His point of departure, thus, is that which all the Fathers use who commented on this passge, it is the mystery of the incarnation. This mystery is obviously inseparable from the life, the death, the resurrection and the ascension of Christ, the Mission of the Spirit and the sacramental and charismatic origin of the Church as the Body of Christ, in the unfailing ministry of the apostles and their successors.[35]

[34] G. Martelet, "Mariage, amour et saerement," *Nouvelle Revue Theologique* 85 (1963) 577: "Voulant .expliquer l'amour que les maris doivent a Ieurs femmes, S. Paul evoque l'amour du Christ pour l'Eglise. Il le fait en alleguant le texte de la Genese: 'Voici done que l'homme quittera son pere et sa mere pour s'attacher a sa femme et les deux ne furent qu'une seule chair."

[35] *Ibid.,* p. 578: "Son point de depart, ainsi que celui de tous les Peres qui vont commenter ce passage, est le mystere de !'Incarnation. Ce mystere n'est

Ivforeover, Martelet's method is no opportunistic use of Paul's allusion to the mystery of the incarnation, for Martelet is quick to insist upon the equal significance of the other mysteries of the Christian faith. And so marriage is approached from every angle that doctrinal theology will provide, and a balance is achieved between the demands of the incarnation on the one hand and the resurrection on the other. Both the eschatological and the temporal are given their due recognition: death, the fact of sin and the limitations of life, as well as the life of the spirit and charismatic gifts of grace that carry us beyond merely creaturely possibilities. Martelet radically situates marriage amidst the mysteries of the Christian faith. This dogmatic approach insists that marriage must be seen in the light of each of these mysteries.

However, there is a danger to be observed here in Martelet's emphatically dogmatic approach to this sensitive moral issue. Martelet's overriding dogmatic concern makes him somewhat ,uncritical of the traditional moral terminology even when the inadequacy of such terminology is apparent. While Martelet admits the language of the two ends is inadequate and misleading, he is willing to retain this language, inadequate as it may be, because this distinction of the two ends helps to bring to bear upon the Christian conception of marriage a certain eschatological note which is essential for an integral Christian view of man and his possibilities:

> It happens that a certain way of speaking about the primary and secondary ends of marriage is misleading as regards the true place of human love in the sacrament [of marriage]. This formulation seems to subordinate the 'personal' love of the spouses to the 'biological' end which is generation. Properly understood, however, this doctrine thus enunciated is basically unassailable. Ordered by human generation, the biology of love is even in its lowliness of an incomparable grandeur. As for the 'personal' love of the spouses, it remains nevertheless conjugal, that is to say, a func-

evidemment pas separable de la vie, de la mort, de la Resurrection et de !'Ascension du Christ, de la Mission de !'Esprit, et de la naissance charismatique et sacrementelle de l'Eglise comme Corps du Christ, dans le ministere indefectible des Apotres et de leurs successeurs."

tion of the generic growth of man and linked to a carnal condition which should not pass for the last word on love. In so much as it is conjugal, love will disappear: 'they neither marry nor are given in marriage ' Jesus says in speaking of the world of the Resurrection (Mt. 22;30). If love properly speaking is not transitory-' love never ends' (I Cor 13;8)-its conjugal forms are transitory. The doctrine of the ends of marriage is required by this evidence, no less than by the absolute value of the fruit of love which is the human person engendered. [86]

By the time Martelet wrote his second essay on marriage, the Council debates on this subject had already begun and the battle lines were well drawn. And so in his *1965* article for *Nouvelle Revue Theologique,* "Morale conjugale et vie chretienne," he could say:

Evidently there exists a crisis concerning conjugal morality in the Church. After a renewal of the spirituality of marriage, which is yet far from having borne all its fruits, grave problems have appeared. Undoubtedly they have existed for a long time, but one still was able, if not to ignore them, at least, for better or worse, to integrate them. Now, ... it is no longer so. Many Christians, laity and priests, are tempted to think that the traditional doctrine on this subject no longer has meaning. [37]

••*Ibid.,* p. 585: "Il arriv·e qu'une certaine maniere de parler des fins primairc et secondaire du mariage donne le change sur la place reelle de !'amour humain dans le sacrem.ent. Cettc formulation semble subordonner I'amour 'personnel' des epoux a la fin ' biologique ' de la generation. Bien comprise cependant, cette doctrine ainsi enoncee est, en son fond, inattaquable. Commande par la generation de l'homme, le 'biologiquc ' de !'amour est jusqu'en son humilite meme d'une incomparable grandeur. Quant a !'amour 'personal' des epoux ii reste neanmoins conjugal, c'est-a-dire fonction de la croissance generique de l'homme et lie a une condition charnelle qui ne saurait passer pour le dernier mot de !'amour. En tant que conjugal, !'amour disparaitra: 'neque nubent, neque nubentur ' dit Jesus en parlant du monde de la Resurrection (Mt 22, 30) ... Si !'amour proprement dit n'est pas transitoire--' la charite ne passe pas' (I Cor 13, 8)-ses formes conjugalcs le sont. La doctrine des fins du mariage est commandee par cette evidence, non moins que par la valeur absolue du fruit de !'amour qui est l'homme engendre."

·7 G. Martclet, "Morale conjugale et vie chretienne," *NRT* 87 (1965) 245: "Il existe evidemment une crise de la morale conjugale au sein de l'Eglise. Apres un renouveau de spiritualite du mariage, qui est encore loin d'avoir porte tous ses fruits, des problemes graves sont apparus. Sans doute ils existaient dcpuis longtemps, mais on pouvait encore, sinon Jes ignorer, du moins, vaille que vaillc,

That Martelet is not merely reacting conservatively is evident from the fact that he has obviously listened closely to the arguments on all sides, for there is now something new in the way he defines the traditional doctrine on marriage. Martelet has come under the influence of personalism and his definition of the traditional doctrine reflects this:

> In short this doctrine is basically this: the sexual act, wherein conjugal love finds its most personal and original language, is legitimate when it is realized in marriage, and nothing in this love is artificially undertaken against the fecundity, even merely possible, which characterizes this act.[38]

Here Martelet refers to sex as a language, "personal and original," but this is not so surprising. What is really surprising is that Martelet has even cast the prohibition against contraception in equally personalist terms: "la fecondite meme simplement possible." Procreation is no longer a duty or an end, but the quite simply possible result of that love between people which we call conjugal love. And it should be noted that Martelet says here this is the way of love and not the way of nature. Love is that response to another which cannot exclude the language of fecundity without making the language of love itself impersonal and artificial.

The degree to which Martelet has accepted and assimilated the personalist conception of marriage is even more evident in the ethic which he sees following from these doctrinal precepts:

> The ethic thus defined implies two things: the sexual language at the heart of marriage wherein human love objectifies itself represents the most absolute form of personal exchange possible. Secondly, this language recognizes, among other things, a negative

!es integrer. Desormais ... ii n'en va plus meme. Nombre de chretiens, Iaics ct pretres, sont tentes de penser que la doctrine traditionnelle a ce sujet n'a plus de sens."

[38] *Loe. cit.,* "Resumee sans appret, cette doctrine est au fond Ia suivante: l'acte sexuel, ou l'amour conjugal trouve son langage le plus original et le plus personnel, est Jegitime lorsqu'il est accompli clans le mariage, et que rien clans !'amour n'est artificiellement entrepris contre la fecondite meme simplement possible qui le caracterise."

norm, that of never undertaking what falsifies, in their normally possible fecundity, the life structures wherein love is expressed.[39]

However, it might be objected, here we see in the midst of all this personalist language another criterion of morality introduced: life structures, " les structures de la vie." One might see in this Martelet's attempt to quietly slip in the demands of a biological imperative which we associate with natural law theory. However, further on in this essay Martelet defines more precisely what he means by this term:

It is true, indeed, in order to express in a few words some difficult things, that the spirit is not nature, the spirit transcends nature by means of conscience, freedom and love. But the spirit is not however in man without nature. I call here ' nature ' all the external conditions to which man is related in his body and which, because they are indispensable to his physical and cultural life, are thus not at the mercy of his freedom. Man is not himself without relation to this world, without dependence on it, though he can never be reduced to it. Neither pure transcendence without conditioning-that which is proper to God-nor pure conditioning without transcendence-that which would reduce him to the rank of things-man is, essentially, that which one can call a *conditioned transcendence.* [40]

Martelet's thought here is a refinement and application of his

•• *Loe. cit.,* " L'ethique ainsi definie implique deux choses: la premiere, que le langage sexual a l'interieur du mariage OU l'amour humain s'objective represente Ia forme d'echange interpersonnel la plus absolue qui soit; la seconde, que ce langage se connait, entre autre, une norme negative, celle de ne rien entreprendre qui altere, en leur fecondite normalement possible, les structures de la vie ou s'exprime l'amour."

[40] *Ibid,* p. 248: " TI est vrai en effet, pour dire en peu de mots des choses difficiles, que !'esprit n'est pas la nature, lui qui la transcende par la conscience, la liberte et l'amour. Mais l'esprit n'est pourtant pas dans l'homme sans la nature. Nous appelons ici 'nature' l'ensemble des conditions exterieures a quoi I'homme se rapporte en son corps et qui, indispensables a sa vie physique et culturelle, ne sont pas pour autant a la merci de sa liberte. L'homme n'est pas lui-meme sans appartenir a ce monde, sans en dependre, lui qui pourtant ne s'y reduit jamais. Ni rure transcendence sans conditionnement--ce qui n'est le propre que de D:cu!-ni pur conditionnee sans transcendance--ce qui le ramenerait au rang des chcses-l'homme est, par essence, ce que l'on peut appeler une *transcendance conditionnee."*

original considerations in *Victoire sur la mO'rt* regarding a Christian anthropology and more precisely the relation between man and nature. In that work toward a Christian anthropology, Martelet chose death as the ultimate horizon of man's existence; here it is man's corporeity which Martelet sees as conditioning man's transcendence in such a way that man does not have the freedom arbitrarily to dispose of his body for his own purposes. The body conditions or defines even love. And so to seek radically to alter or avoid those conditions is to assault our humanity itself.

Martelet's next important work on conjugal love is the small monograph, *Amour conjugal et renouveau conciliaire.* It is something of a response to Canon Louis Janssens's equally small but provocative work, *Mariage et feoondite* (Paris, 1967).

Canon Janssens had been one of the first Catholic theologians to come out in favor of the use of the anovulant pill for both therapeutic and contraceptive purposes. As early as 1958 in an article for *Ephemeri<les Theologicae Lovaniensis,* entitled, "L'inhibition de l'ovulation est-elle moralement licite? " Janssens was among the first Catholic moralists to argue for the legitimate use of such anovulants for therapeutic purposes. Then in a 1963 article, " Morale conjugale et progestogenes," Janssens argued forcefully that the temporary sterilization provided by such medical means did not violate the integrity of the structure of the marriage act. His stance was controversial and made him suspect with the conservative Roman curia in charge of planning for the Second Vatican Council. Perhaps this explains why such an eminent authority as Janssens was not present at the Council. However, the personalist conception of marriage carried the day in the Council's teaching, and Janssens saw this as something of a vindication of his own earlier stance regarding the legitimacy of the contraceptive use of the pill. In the work, *Mariage et fecondite,* Janssens celebrated the emphatically personalist character of the Council's teaching and its implications for the question of birth control.

Martelet begins his *Amour conjugal et renouveau conciliaire* in full agreement with Janssens's basic contention:

Conciliar teaching in conjugal matters sets out from a personalist conception of love to which Canon Janssens has just drawn attention in a pamphlet entitled, *Mariage et fecondite.* The conciliar teaching on marriage remains undecipherable for him who has not understood the original character of this encounter of persons.[41]

Martelet is in no way critical of this fundamentally personalist stance which the Council had taken, nor does he try to qualify it in any way. Rather he insists upon the recognition of its full significance for conjugal morality:

This personalist conception of conjugal love immediately does away with a number of ambiguities, it fills up many lacunae and does justice to more than one false problem which burdened a certain image of conjugal love which was theologically common. It disperses notably some tenacious survivals of a dualism which could not be .allowed to pass for the expression par excellence of the spiritual value of man and of love. Because of such a doctrine, one had to distinguish in conjugal love-to the point of opposing them-between the physical encounter of bodies on the one hand and the friendship of souls-this alone being truly spiritual-on the other.[42]

Martelet's concern then is to show how this personalist conception of marriage is founded upon or grounded in dogmatic or doctrinal principles that form the fundamental structure of *Gaudium et Spes'*s teaching:

Marriage is thus an alliance of love whose meaning is outlined on the triple horizon of the human dignity of the spouses, the some-

"G. Martelet, *Amour oonjugal et renouveau conciliaire* (Lyon, 1967), p. 6: " La doctrine conciliaire en matiere conjugale releve d'une conception p.ersonnaliste de l'amour sur laquelle le chanoine Janssens de Louvain vient d'attirer !'attention clans une brochure intitulee *Mariage et fecondite.* La doctrine conciliaire sur le mariage demeure indechiffrable pour qui n'a pas compris le caractere original de cette rencontre des personnes."

••*Ibid.,* p. IS: "Cette conception personnaliste de !'amour conjugal dissipe d'emblee de nombreuses equivoques, elle comble bien des lacunes et fait justice de plus d'un faux probleme dont se trouvait une certaine representation, theologiquement courante, de !'union conjugale. Elle se separe notamment des survivances tenaces d'un dualisme qui ne doit pas passer pour !'expression par excellence de la valeur spirituelle de l'homme et de l'amour. En fonction d'une telle doctrine, on devrait distinguer clans !'amour conjugal jusqu'a les opposer, la rencontre des corps et l'amitie seule vraiment spirituelle des ames."

times tragic greatness of their mission, and the holiness of the sacrament that unites them.[43]

With his usual preoccupation with an integral Christian anthropology, Martelet is here concerned to employ the three dogmas of creation, sin and redemption as a backdrop against which he hopes to outline the fuller significance of the Council's personalist .stance. This is a method which by now we have come to see as quintessentially characteristic of Martelet's work. However, Martelet's point here is not that this is his own original insight but that these dogmatic considerations are inherent in *Gaudium et Spes's* perspective upon the Church and the contemporary world.

However, Martelet's essay is not without its challenge of Janssens's argument, though it is a quiet and gentle challenge. Martelet concludes the first part of this essay with a question:

> Would we be wrong to say that there exists, regarding conjugal love, a genuine conciliar renewal and that it is the result of a personalist orientation, if one calls personalist the practice of never speaking of man without taking account, in conjugal love as in all domains, of his freedom as a person?[44]

But it is a question that poses a considerable challenge to Janssens's triumphalism, for it seeks to win some acknowledgement of the contention that *Gaudium et Spes's* treatment of conjugal love is in final analysis the fruit of a doctrinal renewal based upon a return to a Christian anthropology emphasizing the dignity of man rather than the product of a particular philosophical method that has enabled the council fathers to look at man in a way in which they could not have done so before. The answer to this question is probably not so simple as to satisfy the claims

[43] *Ibid.,* p. 6: "Le mariage est ainsi une alliance d'amour dont la signification se profile sur le triple horizon de la <lignite humainc des epoux, de la grandeur parfois tragique de leur mission et de la saintete du sacrement qui lcs unit."

[44] *Ibid.,* p. !i!O: "Avions-nous tort de dire qu'il existe, a propos de l'amour conjugal, un vrai renouveau conciliaire et qu'il est a coup sur d'orientation personnaliste, si l'on appelle personnaliste le fait de ne jamais parler de l'homme sans tenir dans l'amour conjugal comme en tons les domaines, de sa liberte de pcrsonne?"

of either l\IIartelet or Janssens; for it is not a simple either/ or situation-either the council fathers drew upon a doctrinal tradition or employed a novel philosophical insight. It is more likely that in some measure such philosophical speculation as is represented by personalist thought led to the rediscovery and novel application of the traditional theological doctrine of man's dignity and stewardship over creation.

Nevertheless, Martelet's own resolve in this work is to relate the Council's teaching on conjugal love to the deeper theological and doctrinal currents present in *Gaudium et Spes* and by this means to give greater clarity and precision to that teaching. Thus Martelet's first endeavor is to show how the Council's teaching on the dignity of the spouses (their rights as well as their duties) is a con·elative of *Gaudium et Spes's* use of the image of man as lord of creation (*Gaudium et Spes* 12, 3; 24, 3; 14, 2). But Martelet's point is to insist that *Gaudium et Spes's* teaching is based upon and implies a fuller, more complex image of man that includes a recognition of his fragility along with his eminent dignity. After quoting *Gaudium et Spes* 26, 2, on the rights of man to food, clothing, living conditions, work, education, etc., in proportion to his proper dignity, Martelet concludes:

> So many rights affirmed evoke in half-light a spiritual being whose grandeur is inseparable from his fragility. [45]

Martelet's application of this insight regarding the ambiguity of man's dignity/ humility makes for a very careful and insightful description of the dynamics of conjugal love:

> This is to say that the Council does not see in conjugal love an easy and spontaneous success of the human heart. The work of a free gift which presumes a constant surpassing of one's self, love, the love of the spouses for one another, is a costly call to permanent conversion of hearts. To such a vocation the human being cannot respond only by instinct, for he is, in his depths, divided. That which the Council said regarding progress is equally

•• *Ibid.,* p. 9: " Tant des droits affirmes evoquent en contre-jour un etre spirituel dont la grandeur est inseparable de la fragilite."

correct with regard to love: 'For a monumental struggle against the powers of darkness pervades the whole history of man. The battle was joined from the very origins of the world and will continue until the last day, as the Lord has attested. Caught in this conflict, man is obliged to wrestle constantly if he is to cling to what is good. Nor can he achieve his own integrity without valiant efforts and the help of God's grace.' [46]

Martelet's method here is very simple, but its effect is of considerable significance. He is merely taking what the Council said of progress in one section of *Gaudium et Spes* and applying it to what the Council said of conjugal love in another part of this same document. The strength of the analogy resides in the applicability of the doctrine of sin and grace to conjugal love as well as to our understanding of progress. **But** the effect here is especially significant because of a tendency so to stress the rights and freedom of the spouses as to forget that man's need is as much to overcome himself and not just master nature and the reality around him:

To be the image of God and by that a person is not limited to the simple fact of dominating the world, but culminates in the power of loving.[47]

Part Two of this essay begins with a lengthy and developed consideration of the arguments of those who favor a further development of the Church's teaching on conjugal morality beyond that of *Gaudium et Spes* and in favor of the morality of

••*Ibid.,* p. 11: " C'est dire qu.e le Concile ne voit pas dans l'amour conjugal une reussitc facile et spontanee du coeur humain. Oeuvre d'un libre don qui suppose un constant depassement de soi-meme, l'amour des epoux, l'un pour l'autre, est un appel couteux a la conversion permanente des coeurs. A une telle vocation l'etre humain ne saurait repondi;e seulement par instinct car ii est, en son fond, divise. Ce que <lit le Concile a propos du progres n'a pas moins de justesse a propos de l'amour: ' Un dur combat contre les puissances des tenebres passe a travers toute l'histoire des hommes, commence des les origines il durera, le Seigneur l'a <lit, jusqu'au dernier jour. Engage dans cette bataille, l'homme doit sans cesse combattre pour s'attacher au bien: et ce n'est qu'au prix de grands efforts, avec la grace de Dieu, qu'il parvient a realiser son unite interieur.' (GS 37, 1) ."

[47] *Ibid.,* p. 14: "Etre image de Dieu, et par lit une personne, ne se limite pas au simple fait de dominer de monde, mais culmine dans le pouvoir d'aimer."

birth control. This part of the essay is as distinguished for its comprehension of the arguments of the proponents of birth control as it is for Martelet's own incisive response to them. Martelet spends the first four pages setting forth with a clarity sometimes not always present in the works of the innovators themselves the arguments critical of *Gaudium et Spes* because of its failure to affirm the goodness of contraception. And moreover he concedes the cogency of these arguments:

> This is a truly impressive argumentation and one which will not permit any simple response. [48]

And so when Martelet finally turns to his own response to these arguments, he begins with a firm and clear denial of an argument which had become representative of one strong rejection of contraceptive morality:

> On account of the conciliar principle from which we must proceed, we must avoid certain current formulations of conjugal morality. We speak here of that naivete which would identify human 'nature' with animal spontaneity ... that ingenious monstrosity to which the Council did justice in declaring: 'The sexual characteristics of man and the human faculty of reproduction wonderfully exceed the dispositions of lower forms of life (GS 51,3). There is a way of establishing conjugal morality on the conformity of man to nature, which is very ambiguous. To be moral amounts, here, to following a nature which it is, however, man's mission to transform. For, Genesis tells us, all: beasts and vegetables, fish of the sea and animals of the field, in a word nature, all is given over to the power of man. He thus has the right and the duty rightly to dispose of them and to master them. [49]

[48] *Ibid.,* p. !M: "Argumentation vraiment impressionnante et qui ne tolere chez qui vent lui repondre aucun simplisme."

[49] *Ibid.,* pp. fl4-fl5: "En raison du principe conciliaire dont nous devons partir, il nous fait ecarter certaines formulations courantes de la morale conjugale. Ne parlous pas de ces naivetCs a la lumiere desquelles on identifierait ' nature ' humaine et spontaneite animale, ... ces monstruoEites ingfoues dont le Concile 11 fait justice en declarant lui-meme: 'La sexualite propre de l'homme, comme le pouvoir humain d'engendrer, l'emportent merveilleusement sur ce que existe aux degres inferieurs de la vie (GS *51,* 3); il existe une maniere de fonder la morale conjugale sur Ia conformite de l'homme a Ia nature, qui est bien ambigue. Etre moral revient, ici, a suivre une nature qu'il est pourtant de Ia mission de

But we now reach the heart of Martelet's own argument as he carefully qualifies this fundamental assumption:

However, without taking away from the required domination by man, it is necessary to raise immediately an apparently contradictory corrective. Man subdues and must subdue the elements of the world, but his triumph brings him new constraints as well. The more he increases his technical proficiency, the more the edifice of law and structure which he domesticates requires of him burdensome efforts ... To rule over nature, is for man to integrate himself to his best advantage in this world, to incorporate himself in it and not to be absorbed in it, ... the relation of man and nature, the spiritual relation of creatures, are thus more subtle than an ideology of the unconditioned rule of man over the earth would let him at first think. To rule is also to submit, and the true overcoming of nature by man is never his contempt for nature. [50]

Contraception may well be a technological assault upon our humanity in an area requiring the careful exercise of love and will rather than simple mechanical success.

Next Martelet applies his "ecological" principle to man's dominion over himself:

This paradox of a creative work wherein man assumes its [nature's] own requirements and by that overcomes it, can serve moreover to understand and perhaps to define the body. Man is that being who cannot dominate nature without first accepting that he must be docile to it not only with his body, but also in his body. The body is not for man a robot instrument of the spirit, a tool which

l'homme de transformer. Car, nous dit la Genese, tout: betes et vegetaux, poissons de la mer et animaux des champs, en un mot nature, tout en elle est livre au pouvoir de l'homme. II a done le droit et meme le devoir d'en disposer vraiment et de s'en rendre maitre."

[50] *Ibid.,* p. fl5: "Et pourtant, sans rien retrancher de cette domination necessair.e de l'homme, il faut apporter aussitOt un correctif apparemment contradictoire. L'homme s'assujettit et doit s'assujettil' les elements du monde, mais son triomphe lui vaut aussi des nouvelles contraintes. Plus il s'eleve dans la technique, plus l'edifice des lois et des structures qu'il domestique reclame de lui de lourds efforts... Regner sur la nature, c'est pour l'homme s'integrer davantage a ce monde, s'y incorporer et non pas s'en abstraire ... De la nature a l'homme, les rapports spirituellement createurs sont done plus subtils qu'une ideologie du regne inconditionne de l'homme sur le monde le laisserait d'abord penser. Regner c'est aussi se soumettre, et la vrai reussite de l'homme sur la nature n'est jamais son mepris."

one handles extraneously without regard to its rhythms and its laws. From the elementary necessity of breathing in order to live to that of sleeping, through that of eating and survival, man is caught in a net of needs, which determine all of his bodily condition and which govern his dominating insertion in the world.[51]

Martelet's specific application of this principle to the morality Qf conjugal love comes in the midst of his critique of a technological prowess that has been callous if not outrightly hostile to our humanity:

Having all too often distractedly crossed the threshold which separates at this point nature from the human, one now risks misconceiving the correlatives which our bodies presume and realise between nature and spirit. Why should we be surprised that human sexuality itself should be physically conditioned? Would it be inhuman for the person to be accountable, in the list of his duties and rights in sexual matters, to structures, functions and rhythms which condition the truth of man in this domain? Without doubt, in man sexuality is integrated with the person in a very profound and very explicit way quite different from the function of sleep, or eating or respiration. All the more reason better to understand at what point the profound integration of sexuality governs the spiritual authenticity of man and woman.[52]

[51] *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26: " Ce paradoxe d'une oeuvre creatrice ou l'homme assume ses propres conditions et par la s'y soumet peut servir d'ailleurs a comprendre et peut-etre a definer le corps. L'homme est cet etre qui ne peut dominer la nature qu'en acceptant d'abord de lui etre docile non seulement par son corps, mais aussi dans son corps. Le corps n'est pas pour l'homme un instrument robot de l'esprit, un outil que l'on manie de l'exterieur sans egard a ses rhythmes et ses lois. Depuis la necessite elementaire de respirer pour vivre jusqu'a celle de dormir, a travers celle de se nourir et celle de durer, l'homme est pris dans un reseau de necessites, qui relevent toutes de sa condition corporelle et qui commande son insertion dominatrice au monde."

[52] *Ibid.*, p. 27: "Pour avoir souvent franchi distraitement le seuil qui separe sur ce point la nature et l'humain, on risque maintenant de meconnaitre !es correlations que notre corps suppose et realise entre la nature et l'esprit. Quoi d'etonnant pourtant que la sexualite humaine soit, elle aussi, physiquement conditionnee? Serait-il inhumain que la personne doive renir compte, dans le bilan de ses devoirs et de ses droits en matiere sexuelle, des structures, des fonctions et des rhythmes qui conditionnent la verite de l'homme en ce domaine? Sans doute, en nous, la sexualite s'integre-tcelle a la personne d'une fac;on bien plus profonde et bien plus explieite que toute autr.e fonction de de nourriture ou de respiration. Raison de plus pour mieux comprendre a quel

Later in the final part of this essay, when considering the position which Pope Paul had taken in various addresses, Martelet makes the statement:

> The Church has never seen in nature or its functions a purely biological reality, but a living index of the demands of God and the spiritual being of man.[53]

This statement serves, among other things, to point out a prominent characteristic of Martelet's work: it is profoundly conservative. To say such a thing risks belaboring the obvious except if it helps us to see that Martelet's conservatism is not an intransigent antiquarianism. Here Martelet is insisting upon a certain respect for nature and its processes which has traditionally characterized the Church's approach to sexuality; however, Martelet's conservative stance, here at least, is something much more than the insistent and simple reiteration of old formulas, for here this doctrine of the abiding will of God in his work of creation is given a significantly new expression: it is the index of a truly human ecology.

Gustave Martelet's contribution to the birth control debate was a distinctive one and a significant one. For he was a dogmatic theologian who sought to bring to the debate the witness of a fuller, more complete image of man. His method was a traditional dogmatic schema, a Christian anthropology, with which he assessed at various times personalist and technological images of man which he felt were dangerously inadequate, that is, incomplete or onesided, in their account of the human condition. At least this is the estimation one might make of Martelet's work with the advantage of ten years of historical distance from the debate.

A contemporary chronicler of the birth control debate, John Horgan, gives us what was the estimation of Martelet's work

point l'integration profonde de la sexualite commande la verite spirituelle de l'homme et de la femme."

[53] *Ibid.,* p. 43: " L'Eglise n'a jamais vu dans la nature ou ses fonctions une realite purement biologique, mais un vivant indice des volontes de Dieu et de l'etre spirituel de l'homme."

as the debate neared its end, on the eve of the encyclical's publication. It is an evaluation with none of the specification we have attempted, and yet it is portentous:

He is widely known as the most articulate exponent of the conservative case since Fr. Fuchs became one of the majority on the commission [i.e., the papal study].[54]

Noonan described Fuchs as heir to the mantle of Vermeersch and Hurth as *the* Roman moral authority on marriage and sexuality. Perhaps in the estimation which Horgan gave to Martelet's work we have seen the mantle of authority slip in common consensus from the shoulders of Fuchs to those of Martel et.

III

We need not read very far along in *Humanae Vitae* before we discover that the conception here of the moral problematic involved in contraception is at one with Martelet's own. In Part I, the encyclical begins by considering various factprs in modern society which have brought about a new problematic regarding the morality of contraception. After taking note of several contemporary phenomena such as rapid population increase, increased economic and social pressures to limit the size of one's family, the effect of education and the value placed upon it, and the new dignity accorded women, the encyclical concludes to what it obviously views as *the* phenomenon of paramount importance for the question at hand:

But the most remarkable development of all is to be seen in man's stupendous domination and rational organization of the forces of nature to the point that he is endeavoring to extend this control over every aspect of his own life-over his body, over his mind and emotions, over his social life, and even over the laws that regulate the transmission of life.[55]

"'John Horgan, "The History of the Debate," in *On Human Life* (London, 1968)' p. 25.

[55] Paul VI, *Humanae Vitae,* section 2, English translation: *The Pope Speaks* 13 (1968) 330; *Acta Apostolicac Sedis* 60 (1968) 482: "Denique illud praescrtim animadvertendum est, hominem tam mirifice profecissc in naturae viribus cum

It might be said that the language used here to convey the sense of technology's all-pervasive presence in our lives makes for an almost Orwellian or Huxleyan vision of the rational control of life; however, the encyclical makes no such explicitly negative judgment. Instead it merely calls our attention to a contemporary reality in language that more or less indirectly suggests overextension of that phenomenon to the point of danger. In working out a Christian anthropology, Martelet handled this same subject with equal subtlety. While aware of the biblical tradition that man has been charged with a stewardship over self and creation that amounts to a kind of sovereignty, Martelet recognized factors in contemporary life that threatened to overextend this sovereignty into an arbitrary and unconditioned domination of self and nature which ultimately would be destructive of both man and the creation entrusted to him.

A proper dominion of man over nature and himself was a primary concern of Martelet in his effort to answer the extreme utilitarianism inherent in a Marxist ideology of man. Writing in in his *Victoire sur la mort,* Martelet had cautioned: "Nature must be spiritually accounted for and not merely technically dominated." Martelet raised this issue of man's rational domination of nature and self once again in 1967 in his consideration of Vatican II's teaching on marriage, *Amour conjugal et renouveau conciliaire.* The phenomenon which *Humanae Vitae* describes in terms of man's "stupendous domination and rational organization of the forces of nature " and the extension of this control even to the most personal aspect of the individual's life is the same phenomenon which Martelet warned against when he spoke of " an ideology of the unconditioned rule of man over the earth." Martelet made that statement in his exposition of Vatican II's teaching on marriage in the face of what he felt were tendencies so to emphasize the Council's personalist view of man as to give man an unconditioned, arbitrary

moderandis tum ad rationem scite componendis, ut hanc moderationem ad totam suam vitam proferre conetur: hoc est, ad suum corpus, ad sui animi vires, ad vitam socialem, ad ipsaque leges propagationem vitae regentes."

rule over nature and himself. Now there had been other conservative theologians, such as the priest-sociologist Stanislas de Lestapis, who had inveighed against alleged dangers inherent in a contraceptive culture, but only Martelet so specifically identified these dangers as the effects of a technological culture in which the manipulation of man and nature threatens to reduce everything to the problem of more efficient machinery.

Again, when we turn to Part Two of *Humanae Vitae*, we discover at the very outset of this doctrinal section of the encyclical that a significant element of Martelet's own conception of the problematic involved in the morality of contraception is the decisive note here. This section begins:

> The question of human procreation, like every other question which touches human life, involves more than the limited aspects specific to such disciplines as biology, psychology, demography or sociology. It is the whole man and the whole mission to which he is called that must be considered: both its natural, earthly aspects and its supernatural, eternal aspects . . . This is what we mean to do, with special reference to what the Second Vatican Council taught with the highest authority in its pastoral Constitution on the Church in the world of today.[56]

Here is a theme which we have already seen is central to and distinctively characteristic of Martelet's own theologizing. The encyclical's theme of the "whole man "is at one with Martelet's insistence upon an integral Christian anthropology which alone considers man in the fullest scope of his origin and destiny, his natural powers and their capacities under grace. We have already seen how Martelet's professional preoccupation with dogmatics made him particularly sensitive to the importance of this

[56] *Ibid.*, section 7, *TPS* p. 383; *AAS* p. 485: "De propaganda prole quaestio, non secus atque quaelihet quaestio humanam vitam attingens, ultra particulares alias eiusdem generis rationes-cuiusmodi eae sunt, quae biologicae aut psychologicae, demographicae aut sociologicae appellantur-ita circumspicienda est, ut totum hominem, totumque, ad quod is vocatus est, munus complectatur, quod non tantum ad naturalia et terrena, sed etiam ad supernaturalia et aeterna pertinet ... Quod sane facturi sumus, ea praiecipue in memoriam redigentes, quae recens hac de re Concilium Vaticanum II, Constitutione pastorali edita a verbis *Gaudium et spes* incipiente, summa auctoritate exposuit."

integral image of man, and this is what led him to state so clearly the comprehensive Christian anthropology that underlies the Council's teaching:

> The word ' integral ' is without doubt one of the key words of this Constitution. It is by means of this in any case that the Council ceaselessly characterizes here the way in which it approaches the vocation of men and of the entire man.[57]

In his work on conjugal morality, Martelet employed this anthropological theme in order to give further clarity and precision to the Council's "personalist" doctrine of married love and procreation. However, it is interesting to note the precise effect to which this theme is employed in the encyclical. Invoked here at the beginning of the doctrinal part of the encyclical, it effectively disarms the immense. pressure and sense of urgency created in the birth control controversy by massive data from the natural and social sciences-biology, psychology, demography and sociology. And it does this in a way that allows us to focus, at least momentarily, upon other dynamics, specifically, human love as the moral act of a free and intelligent being:

> This love is above all fully *human,* a compound of sense and spirit. It is not, then, merely a question of natural instinct or emotional drive. It is also, and above all, an act of the free will, whose thrust is such that it is meant not only to survive the joys and sorrows of daily life, but also to grow, so that husband and wife become in a way one heart and one soul, and together attain their human fulfillment.[58]

Now this image of marriage presented in Section 9 of the encyclical might at first glance seem to be little more than a reference to Vatican H's personalist reconception of marriage,

[57] G. Martelet, *Les idees ...* , pp. 136-137.

[58] Paul VI, *Ilumanae Vitae,* section 9, *TPS* p. 333; *AAS* p. 486: " Est ante omnia amor plane *humanus,* hoc est sensibilis et spiritualis. Quare non agitur solum de mero, vel naturae vel afl'ectuum, impetu, sed etiam ac praesertim de liherae voluntatis actu, eo scilicet tendente, ut per cotidianae vitae gaudia et dolores non modo perseveret, sed praeterea augeatur; ita nimirum ut coniuges veluti cor unum et anima una fiant, suamque humanam perfectionem una simul adipiscantur."

but a closer look reveals it to be a significantly new exploration of that personalist image that shows the prominence of an anthropological principle-man's freedom, married love as " an act of the free will."

The novelty of this conception can be seen more clearly if we follow carefully the development of the encyclical's thought in Part Two. In the opening Section 7, the theme of" the whole man" was first introduced. In Section 8 several images of man-in-marriage are considered. Fir.st an image of marriage taken from natural law: "Marriage ... is the provident institution of God the Creator, whose purpose was to effect in man His loving design." Next, a personalist image: "husband and wife, through that mutual gift of themselves ... develop that union of two persop.s.... " Then an image from sacramental theology: "The marriage of those who have been baptized ... represents the union of Christ and His Church." But in Section 9, it is the moral image of marriage that is focused upon with greatest significance: " It is also, and above all, an act of the free will, whose thrust is such that it is meant not only to survive the joys and .sorrows of daily life, but also to grow... ."

This moral image derived from Christian anthropology plays a role of paramount importance in this encyclical, for it decisively shifts the focus of the birth control debate from a preoccupation with the prowess of technology to answer urgent problems of biology, economics, demography and psychology to the more personal issue of the happiness of the couple and how this is based upon the dynamics of intelligence and will in the act of love. For example, in Section 10, when the concept of "responsible parenthood" is introduced, the encyclical speaks of that rightful control which the spouses should exercise over their fertility, specifying the appropriate means to such control as personal resources and not mechanical devices:

> In relation to the tendencies of instinct or passion, responsible parenthood means that necessary dominion which reason and will must exercise over them. [59]

[59] *Ibid.,* section 10. This is the translation in Robert G. Hoyt's *The Birth*

The language here of " necessary dominion " is in decided contrast to the encyclical's opening remarks suggesting man's *gratuitous domination* and rational organization of nature. The contrast is beween mere technical control *(moderationem)* of nature and a truly human dominion *(dominationem)* or rule over nature, between a mechanical device that assures automatic control and a more humane discipline that respects rather than obviates the subtle dynamics of emotion, reason and will that should be involved in every act of human love. Later in the section on the morality of artificial contraception this contrasting of mere mechanical effectiveness and truly humane control is brought out all the more clearly, when it is said:

> She [i.e., the Church] urges man not to betray his personal responsibilities by putting all his faith in technical expedients.[60]

This same motif by means of which focus is shifted from technical expediency to humane discipline continues in the final section of the encyclical, the pastoral directives, where it quite logically becomes the invitation to a practical ,asceticism:

> For if with the aid of reason and of free will they are to control their natural drives, there can be no doubt at all of the need for self-denial.[61]

This adroit use of the personalist conception of marriage viewed within the perspective of the anthropological notion of free will and reason was a principal characteristic of Gustave Martelet's appraisal of Vatican II on marriage. And its appearance here in the encyclical is the clearest evidence of his hand in the doctrinal formulation of the encyclical's teaching.

When we turn to Part III of the encyclical, the pastoral directives, once again we are confronted by a conception of the prob-

Control Debate (Kansas City, 1968), p. ml. Cf. *TPS,* p. 334: "With regard to man's innate drives and emotions, responsible parenthood means that man's reason and will must exert control over them," and AAS, p. 487: " Si deinde ad impulsus innatos et ad animi affectus spectamus, paternitas conscia necessariam dcclarat dominationem/, quam ratio et voluntas in eosdem exerceant necesse est."

[60] *Ibid.,* section' 18, *TPS* p. 339; AAS p. 494: "Ac praeterea hominen incitat, ne se officiis suis abdicet, technicis artibus sese committens."

[61] *Ibid.,* section 21, *TPS* p. 340; *AAS* p. 496: "Nihil profecto est dubii, quin naturae impetibus, rationis liberaeque voluntatis ope, imperare asceseos sit opus . . . "

lematic involved in birth control that is quite readily recognizable as part of Martelet's own working out of the problem. This section begins by speaking of the Church's solicitude for men:

> She knows their weaknesses, she has compassion on the multitude, she welcomes sinners. But at the same time she cannot do otherwise than teach the law. For it is the law of human life restored to its native truth, and guided by the Spirit of God.[62]

A footnote to this passage in the encyclical refers to Romans 8; however, it could as well have referred to the passage in Martelet's 1958 essay, "L'eglise, la loi et la grace," in which we have already seen him answer the objection that the Church's morality in conjugal matters is impractical and too much to ask of man. Martelet's response then, as the encyclical's now, is an appeal to ,an integral Christian anthropology which takes account of the relation between law and grace in the Christian perspective on man. For the law which the Church teaches is in fact the grace of Christ which restores man's integrity: "Law is for the Church nothing other than the expression of man which Jesus Christ makes possible in the order of grace." [63]

What are we to make of the foregoing evidence? With some confidence it can be claimed that each of the three parts of *Humanae Vitae* begins with a principle that we first saw developed in Martelet's works. And thus it can be argued that the outline of the pope's response to the birth control controversy is indeed conceived in terms of Martelet's own thought. Moreover, as we have seen, not only the outline but a significant part of the doctrinal teaching is also recognizably Martelet's work. However, here is where further questions arise, for such an analysis hardly exhausts the encyclical's teaching. In fact it omits a great deal, for little or no reference has been made herein to the significant use made in the encyclical of two traditional

[62] *Ibid.*, section 19, *TPS* p. 340; *AAS* p. 495: "Scilicet eorum infirmitarem cognoscit, miseratur turbas, peccatores excipit; facere autem non potest quin legem doccat, quae reapse propria est vitae humanae ad suam germanam veritatem restitutae, atque a Dei Spiritu actae."

[63] Cf. footnote 33 above, G. Martelet's "L'eglise, la loi et la grace," *Christus* 5 (1958) fl05.

doctrines from moral theology: natural law theory and the doctrine of two ends of marriage and their mutual interdependence.

For example, Section of the encyclical insists upon the inseparable connection "willed by God" between the two meanings of the conjugal act. And there is nothing here that is distinctively Martelet's formulation or thematically identifiable with his thought. In fact the language is much more identifiable with Joseph Fuchs's formulation of the problem before his change of mind during his participation on the birth control commission.64

Or if we look at Section 17, we find that its description of the consequences of artifical contraception sounds more like Stanislas de Lestapis's description of the contraceptive culture.[65]

What are we to make of this? Could this be evidence of the hand of other ghost writers, just as *Casti connubii* evidenced the influence of both Vermeersch and Hurth? This is of course a possibility, but I think a rather remote one. For two reasons: in a work of such brevity and limited focus as *Humanae Vitae* (witness the comparative length and comprehensiveness of *Casti connubii)* there is just no room for more than one hand. Of course, this does not rule out the possibility of Martelet's employing other people's ideas. For example, de Lestapis's arguments on the dangers of a contraceptive culture. But more im,.. portantly and perhaps more cogently, to insist that even the traditional language of morality in the encyclical still reveals Martelet's hand, is an answer most consistent with the character of Martelet's own theologizing.

Martelet was not by profession a moral theologian; therefore he could at best bring to the aid of traditional moral theology the knowledge and intelligence of a dogmatic theologian and Christian anthropologist which might shore-up or even corroborate the teaching of traditional moral theology but could not replace or go beyond those traditional terms themselves. More-

••John F. Dedek makes this explicit in *Contemporary Sexual Morality* (New York, 1971), pp. 109-110, where he compares *Humanae Vitae,* section *Hi,* with Josef Fuchs's *Theologia Moralis Generalis,* vol. I (Rome, Gregorian University, 1968), p. 45.

[65] Cf. Stanislas de Lestapis, *Family Planning and Modern Problems* trans. from the French (N. Y., 1961).

over, we have already seen at least one instance when Martelet's overriding concern for dogmatic integrity made him overindulgent of a moral terminology which he himself recognized as quite inadequate. Just as in 1963 in his essay, "Mariage, amour et sacrement," Martelet was willing to accept the unhappy distinction between primary and secondary ends of marriage because this seemed to preserve an eschatological sense of the Christian conception of marriage, so it seems that Martelet ·in the composition of *Humanae Vitae* was quite willing to accept the traditional language of natural law theory and the two ends of marriage. In his own dogmatic conception of the birth control issue as a confrontation between technological domination on the one hand and humane dominion on the other, Martelet probably felt his Christian anthropology was sufficient dogmatic evidence to support the traditional moral teaching even though the language of that teaching constituted a very imperfect expression of the truth.

Moreover, there is something psychologically satisfying in such an argument, for if indeed the mantle of authority had fallen from Fuchs's shoulders to those of Martelet, the dogmatic theologian could not have felt very comfortable wearing such dignity-by-default. In this sense, Martelet would only be showing a measure of respect for Fuchs's original authority if he reverted to Fuchs's earlier work as the best possible reformulation of the traditional moral teaching in these matters. In final analysis, this means that Martelet as a dogmatic theologian was able to provide the broad outline of an answer to the problematic of the morality of artificial contraception, but the precise content of that teaching would have to be left to the moralists.

Finally, this interpretation of the encyclical as the dogmatic outline for a moral response is borne out by Martelet's own apologetical works written after the encyclical's publication. In these writings Martelet is quite aware of the inadequacies of the encyclical. It is not an entirely satisfying statement and this is due in some measure to its "outline" character, what Martelet }iere as its " peremptory style " :

Why don't we say it outright? The encyclical *Humanae Vitae* exacts a serious effort from him who would understand it. It treats of such profound problems, in such a peremptory manner, that it shocks us, indeed it scandalizes us.[66]

It is interesting to note how his ·apologetical intent leads Martelet to present a definition of an encyclical that is so cautiously limited in scope as almost to reduce such papal statements to the status of simple hortatory injunctions devoid of much or even any reasoned argument. And yet this is not an unfair description of *Humanae Vitae:*

In fact, an encyclical is nothing other than a means by which the pope makes everyone and primarily Christians stop and think about something important, of grave consequence, about which many things have been said, even very intelligent things, but regarding which, however, one risks forgetting a certain essential thing, to which he wants to call everyone's attention. To explain the essential thing is always difficult and for that very reason it is something which it is easy to forget.[67]

However, Martelet is not invariably defensive in his apologetics. He concedes the inadequacy of expression given the moral content of the encyclical's teaching:

It is a fact however that this vocabulary of "intrinsically evil" used by both encyclicals to denounce in contraception something truly wrong, sadly allows one to believe that this always represents in itself the most grave failure of love. This is one of the *lacunae* of both *Casti connubii* and *Humanae Vitae,* that neither one nor the other sufficiently protects its readers from the awful errors of such a misunderstanding.[68]

•• G. Martelet, *L'existence humaine et l'amour* (Paris, 1969), p. 183. "Pourquoi ne pas le dire franchement? L'encyclique *Humanae Vitae* exige de qui veut la comprendre un effort serieux. Elle tranche des problemes si profonds, d'une faSQn si peremptoire, qu'elle nous choque, voire nous scandalise."

[87] *Ibid.,* p. 185: " De fait, une encyclique, est-ce autre chose qu'un moyen dont le pape dispose pour faire reflechir tout le monde et d'abord les chreticns sur un meme sujet, important, capital, et sur lcquel on exprime une foule de choses, intelligcntes bien siir, mais au milieu desquelles on risque cependant d'oublier un certain essentiel, qu'il faut a tout prix rappeler. Exprimer l'essentiel est toujours difficile et c'est bien pour cela qu'on risque de l'oublier."

[0"] *Ibid.,* p. 28: "C'est un fait cependant que ce vocabulaire d'intrinsequement deshonnete, employe par Jes deux encycliques pour denoncer clans la contra·

And yet, it is important to see that while Martelet admits the encyclical fails to give entirely adequate and cogent expression to its teaching, he never concedes that the principle behind the articulation is wrong. Thus *Humanae Vitae* stands as a seriously incomplete .statement, a dogmatic warning to Christian laity and moralists that something important has been forgotten, something which moral theology, and especially the traditional moral teaching, cannot quite adequately express, but something to which dogmatic anthropology was especially sensitive. With artificial contraception the subtle dynamics of love and will have been technologically surpassed, and something of human freedom now suffers. Understood in this sense, *Humanae Vitae* becomes a fog horn in the night warning us of a danger that must be avoided, but incapable in itself of giving us .satisfactory description of that danger. And this is almost the image which Martelet himself uses to describe *Humanae Vitae:*

An encyclical is basically like radar on a ship or a plane. Its purpose is not to impede our advance but to detect mortal dangers and to orient our course in a direction which is healthy,[69] --- If the captain of the Titanic had been able to discern in time the iceberg with which his ship was about to collide, he would have cried out in the night "Stop everything," which quite certainly would have panicked the crew, but which would have saved the entire ship. The encyclical *Humanae Vitae* is, we believe, that cry.[70]

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ception un vrai desordre, Iaisse malheureusement croire que celle-ci represente *toujours* en elle-meme Ia forme *la plus grave* des defauts de l'amour. Telle est une des Iacunes de *Casti Connubii* et *d'Humanae Vitae* aussi, que l'une et l'autre protegent insuffisamment Ieurs Iecteurs contre les mefaits redoutables d'un tel contresens." [sic]

•• *Ibid.*, p. 186: "Une encyclique, c'est au fond comme un *radar* sur un vaisseau ou un avion. Elle n'a pas pour but d'arreter notre course mais de detecter des perils mortels et d'orienter notre marche dans une direction qui soit toute de vie."

[70] *Ibid.*, p. " Si le commandant du *Titanic* avait pu discerner a temps l'iceberg que son navire allait heurter, ii aurait crie dans la nuit un 'Arretez toutes ' qui aurait, a coup sur, affole l'equipage, mais qui aurait sauve le vaisseau tout entier. L'encyclique *Humanae vitae* est, croyons-nous, ce cri."

BOOK REVIEWS

Luther and tke Mystics. By BENGT R. HOFFMAN. Augsburg Publishing House: Minneapolis, 1976. Pp. $9.95.

Up until comparatively recent times, Protestant scholars have rejected any suggestion of the possibility of the influence of medieval Roman Catholic mystical theology on Martin Luther's doctrine on justification and the Christian life. The same is true, *a fortiori,* of any dependence by Luther on Roman Catholic mystics, such as Johann Tauler and the Frankfurter, the anonymous author of the *Theologia Germanica.* These theologians have consistently maintained that it was against such theology and piety that Luther launched his reform. To see any of these influences in him is to distort his understanding of the Gospel, and to reduce Luther's doctrine either to the theology of work-righteousness of Roman Catholicism, or the subjectivism of the Enthusiasts.

Professor Bengt Hoffman, of the Gettysburg Lutheran Seminary, strongly contends that the opposite is true. In his view, Luther's doctrine on justification and the Christian life does indeed contain elements properly belonging to mystical theology, which he maintains are essential to the understanding of the richness of Luther's thought. Furthermore, he argues that a definite " kinship ", both in doctrine and in piety, exists between Luther and the German mystics, especially, Tauler and the Frankfurter. Nor, in his judgment, is this affirmation to be restricted to the early works of Luther. To fail to take seriously these sources of Luther's doctrine is in fact to distort his teaching, and to dilute the theological significance of Luther's personal experience of the power of the Gospel. Hoffman counters the argument that this approach introduces elements totally foreign to Luther's reform. Too long, he writes, has Protestant theology been dominated by an antithetical approach: whatever is of Reformed and Evangelical theology must at every point be diametrically opposed to Roman Catholic theology. "The quality of Luther's faith", he writes, " was 'ecumenical ' in the sense that it bonded Luther to an essential element in Roman Catholic reflection which is trans-institutional in nature."

Although admitting that his thesis is not one held by the majority of scholars in the mainstream of Luther studies, Hoffman, nevertheless, does not consider himself alone in his position. Several contemporary Protestant and Roman Catholic theologians have written scholarly works

which, he believes, support his thesis. His dependence on them is evident. Included among them, for example, are the Protestant scholars Rudolf Otto, Heiko Oberman, Bengt Hagglund, and Roman Catholics such as Irwin lserloh, Erich Vogelsang, and Jared Wicks.

Hoffman divides his work into three major sections. In Part I he presents a kind of *status quaestionis,* in which he gives an excellent historical survey of the anti-mystical interpretation of Luther's doctrine. In this he includes the arguments of representative theologians of the Classical Orthodox, Liberal, and Neo-orthodox Schools. In contrast he presents in a summary fashion the thought of the theologians noted above, whom he characterizes as members of the Pneumatic School. In this discussion the main lines of Hoffman's thesis emerge, and the necessary presuppositions are made for the detailed analysis in Part IL

It is in Part II that Hoffman's scholarship is most obviously evident. He lets Luther speak for himself. Numerous are the citations from Luther's works, spanning his whole career as a theologian and preacher. Thus based on Luther's own texts, he proceeds to discuss such points as the reality of the mystical union of the Christian with Christ, participation of the believer in the life of God, the transforming power of faith, progress in conformity to Christ in His mysteries, growth in faith and sanctification, and the mystical experience both of anguish and of desolation before the majesty and transcendence of God *(gemitus)* and the transporting bliss *(raptus)* consequent on the divine presence.

In Hoffman's understanding all these various aspects of the mystical life have as their foundation and source Luther's insistence that the justified Christian has entered into real mystical union with Christ. Central to Luther's doctrine is the fact that faith brings the Christian into contact with the saving mysteries of Christ's death and resurrection, which effect in him what was experienced by Christ: death to sin and newness of life. The saving mysteries of Christ, seen as trans-historical realities, have, therefore, a certain dynamic significance in justification, and are the continuing forces in effecting the conformation of the Christian to Christ and the resulting progress in sanctification. This, of course, is attributed to faith, and in no sense is there any suggestion of the role of works or merit. Thus Hoffman's interpretation of Luther remains faithful to his understanding of the primacy of faith in the order of justification.

But as Hoffman notes, this teaching of Luther concerning the reality of the Christian's mystical union with Christ is not original with him. Its inspiration, and indeed its theological formulation, is taken from St. Augustine, who terms Christ in His justifying and sanctifying activity the *sacramentum et exemplum.* Luther employs the same terminology, with the same meaning, in his works, notably in his *Commentary on Galatians* of 1531.

Further insight into the reality of this mystical union with Christ can be gained, according to Hoffman, by carefully attending to the meaning and significance of Luther's use of marital imagery to describe this union. So intimately is Christ united to the believer, the bride, that a marvelous and mysterious exchange takes place between them: Christ's righteousness is bestowed on her as her very own, and the believer's sinfulness is assumed by Christ, the Bridegroom. Luther explains this mystical exchange by an analogous, and with him original, application of the traditional formula of the *communicatio idiomatum.* Again here the emphasis is on faith. And, as Hoffman notes, one should not seek the source of this teaching in speculative theology, but rather in the experience through faith of the gracious God. For as Hoffman makes clear, mystical theology for Luther is *sapientia experimentalis, non doctrinalis.*

As a summary, he restates his thesis: we do not do justice to Luther's theology of justification and the Christian life by concentrating exclusively on the objective and the forensic. Alongside the external word of the Gospel proclaiming the saving power of Christ's death and resurrection "for us", there is the complementary reality of Christ's saving mysteries working "in us", transforming us into his likeness. In Luther's view, therefore, the freedom bestowed by the Gospel is not simply a declaration of grace, but an experience of joy and inner change.

In Part III Hoffman discusses Luther's doctrine on the angels, life after death, the validity of exorcism, and the phenomenon of charismatic healing. He is arguing here, it clearly seems, against those rationalists who reject Luther's teaching on these points.

In *Luther and the Mystics* Professor Hoffman is primarily concerned with challenging Protestants to re-evaluate not only their understanding of Luther's relationship with his Roman Catholic heritage, but also their understanding of his doctrine on justification and the Christian life. This is asking for much, and will undoubtedly result in strong criticism by many disciples of the Reformer. Nor will criticism be lacking from the Roman Catholic side. From the Roman Catholic perspective, Professor Hoffman manifests at times a confusion and imprecision concerning the nature of the mystical, and what Catholics would properly consider the supernatural. But his book will undoubtedly stimulate fruitful dialogue between the two traditions.

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Franz Brentano: *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle.* Edited and translated by ROLF GEORGE. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975. $13.50.

Franz Brentano's dissertation, *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle,* is a classic of modern Aristotelian scholarship. Its content, however, has been by and large digested and superseded by contemporary Aristotelians; so, in this sense, the significance of its belated translation is more historical than philosophical. But Brentano's philosophy itself is by no means merely of historical interest; it still attracts the attention of phenomenologists of various kinds as well as analytic philosophers interested in epistemology. Brentano's reistic ontology, however, does not seem to enjoy the same kind of popularity as his descriptive theory of intentional psychology. Perhaps this is rightly so. At any rate, the present work under review can be construed not only as an interpretation of Aristotle's metaphysics but also as Brentano's first step towards his later development of reism, and in that sense we can discuss it as a clue to his ontology.

Brentano pursues the ideal of *philosophia perennis* under the influence of the exact method of the natural sciences and with the religious conviction of rational theism. His dissertation is an attempt at a rigorous investigation of being as being, the prototype of which he finds in Aristotle. Its aim is to show a possible deductive inference in the coherent system of reasoning in Aristotle's metaphysics. Brentano's argument is roughly as follows.

Aristotle says: "Being is said in various ways." The several senses of being fit into a fourfold distinction: I) accidental being, 2) being in the sense of true being, 3) being of the categories, and 4) potential and actual being. Accidental being is out of the question for ontology, since science cannot deal with it. Being in the sense of true being is not an ontological topic either, because it and its opposite, i. e., non-being in the sense of being false, are only in the thinking mind and not in the external world. Brentano believes that the subject of metaphysics should comprise only extramental being in the external world, and, accordingly only the last two senses of being are truly ontological.

Brentano's exegesis of the sense of potential and actual being in Aristotle is neither interesting nor particularly original. However, the central thesis of the work, that being in the sense of the categories, in particular, substantial being, is the most basic, and the other categories can coherently be inferred from substantial being, is important. This thesis repudiates Kant's and Hegel's complaints that Aristotle haphazardly raked his categories together for a round number of general concepts. Before Brentano, Trendelenburg, rejecting Kant's and Hegel's critiques, hypo-

thesized a grammatical origin for Aristotle's categories in order to find something which could have served him as a guide in determining them. But Brentano rejects this explanation as superficial, since it lacks an ontological principle, although there are unmistakable correlations between Aristotle's categories and grammatical relations.

Brentano emphasizes the importance of Aristotle's view that the categories are not merely a framework for concepts but also themselves real concepts, extra-mental and independent beings. Being is not divided according to the schema of the categories like a univocal concept, i. e., as a genus into its species, but rather in the manner of a homonym which is differentiated according to its various senses. But the use of ' being ' for different categories is not a mere accidental likeness of names. There is among the senses of being a unity of analogy which is a two-fold one, namely, not only an analogy of proportionality, but also an analogy of the same *terminus* (p. 58). The second kind of analogy, in Brentano's view, occupies an intermediate position between the univocal and the merely equivocal. It is not only the equality of relations which holds for various senses of being, and which distinguishes them from chance homonyms, but also the analogy with respect to one and the same *terminus* (p. 65). Among the categories it is substance which is being in the first and proper sense. The remainder are called being since some are quantities, others qualities, others affections, etc., of that which has being in this primary sense (Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VII, I. 1028 a 18).

The categories are the highest genera of being and are the highest predicates of first substance, which underlies all other beings. They differ from each other because of the different relations they have to first substance. Categories also differ from each other according to their different manners of predication. Being which is divided into categories is asserted in relation to some one thing; but, since the categories are distinguished according to their manner of existence within primary substance, a deduction of the classification of categories will not be impossible (p. 94). Brentano thinks there is no doubt that Aristotle could have arrived at a certain *a priori* proof, a deductive argument for the completeness of the distinctions of categories (p. 96).

This deductive proof for the division would begin with the distinction between substance and accident (not accidental being). Substance will not allow of further division, and it accordingly forms the first category. The latter, accident, can be divided into two classes: absolute accidents and relations (p. 97). Relation, whose tie with substance is weakest, and which thus has being in the least degree, forms the final category. But absolute accident can be divided into its relation to the first substance and the manner in which things are predicated of the latter. Three classes of absolute accident can be distinguished. The first includes those

accidental predicates of primary being which are attributed to it as properly existing within it. These are inherent accidents; namely, quantity, which comes to substance from the side of the matter, and quality, which comes to it from the side of form. The second class of absolute accidents contains those predicates which belong to it partly from within and partly from without, which are more in relation to substance than in substance, and which are called operations. It, too, contains two further categories, viz. action and affection. Finally, there is the class of absolute accidents proper, when the predicate is borrowed from something outside the subject, divided into the where and the when; this exhausts the number of possible modes of predication. Yet we have only eight categories. A branch to having and posture, however, can be derived from the second class, operations, to make the number of categories ten (pp. 114-115).

Brentano strongly defends the above thesis that the doctrine of categories develops with a kind of necessity (p. 180). We need not go into the details of his defense which is rigorously argued with the support of extensive textual analyses. As for his deductive demonstration, Professor Rolf George, the translator, is right in remarking that Brentano may have imputed more systematic coherence to Aristotle's pronouncements than the texts warrant. But the important point is, he argues, that all the categories bear the name 'being' with respect to one being, namely, the being of the first category, and that every other category is *of a being* rather than a being. If metaphysics is the science of being as such, then it is clear that its main object is substance. " Hence the first philosopher must research the principles and grounds of substance. His primary, most distinguished, and in a sense only, task is to consider *what it is"* (p. 148).

This conclusion has a rather important effective-historical significance in that Brentano calls for a renewal of the quest for being which will react against the philosophy of German Idealism in which being is always saturated with the activity of mind. It is not an accident that Heidegger finds a clue for his quest for Being in this work of Brentano since he formulates his ontology as the overcoming of the philosophy of modern subjectivity. He says: "The first thrust to this question of Being struck me in my long pursuit of Aristotle, above all in the guide for Franz Brentano's dissertation. The question disturbed me more and more: what is the determining unity in this manifold meaning? What is Being? "[1] Although Heidegger's thought on Being does not share anything with

[1] Martin Heidegger, " ti'ber das Zeitverstandnis in der Phanomenologie und im Denken der Seinsfrage," in *Phiinomenofogie-lebemdig oder tot?,* edited by Helmut Gehrig, Karlsruhe, 1969, p. 47.

Brentano's doctrine of being, it is worth noting that both take the common ground of departure.

While Brentano gave a new impetus to thinkers like Heidegger with his interpretation of Aristotle, he did not remain a faithful follower of the philosopher. He rejected Aristotle's theory of forms as a fiction, and the concept of thinking body as incoherent and halfway materialistic. Oskar Kraus may be right in his claim that Brentano was actually neither an Aristotelian nor a Scholastic.[2] But he is wrong in saying that Brentano outgrew the philosophy of Aristotle. Brentano rejected important theories of Aristotle such as those of *eidos, morphe, dynamis,* and the teleological view of *physis,* and the dialectical concept of *synolon.* He kept only the most general concept of the first substance as individual, particular, and real being, and never pursued the ontological principle of the determining unity in the manifold meaning of being. A few words on the development of his reistic ontology may be called for in order to see how Brentano proceeded from the conclusion of his dissertation.

In his lucid critique of Brentano, Gustav Bergmann states that there are no connexions of any kind, neither relation nor nexus nor pseudonexus, in Brentano's world,[8] and that he is so resourceful and so embattled a nominalist that he believes he can manage in a world wholly without universals.[4] His ontology starts and ends in a 'truncated world,' and there is no idea in his world. However, it is obviously impossible to pursue the principles of substance starting from a barren concept of " what it is " without recourse to thinking mind.

Brentano, therefore, brings being in the sense of true being in Aristotle back for what turns out to be an epistemic solution of the ontological question. As we saw above, Brentano excluded true being from ontological inquiry, because it is only in the thinking mind and does not exist in the external world. Now the focus of his quest for being shifts to the problems of a true judgment, and here he turns to Aristotle's correspondence theory. This development necessarily entails his theory of *irrealia* as a domain of being. A true judgment corresponds with reality. But if the truth of the statement " There is no dragon " were to reside in a correspondence between the judgment and an object, what would the object be? Brentano's answer to this question is: what corresponds to a judgment can be either a thing or a non-thing. He initially formulates two kinds of *irrealia:* I) the immanent objects that are mental or intentional objects of Scholastics, and 2) the content of correct judgments and interest-phenomena.

In his later development, Brentano turns away from this concept of

[2] Oskar Kraus, *Franz Brentano,* Miinchen., 1919.

[8] Gustav Bergmann, *Realism,* Madison, 1967, p. *256.*

[4] *Ibid.,* p. 272.

irrealia, and comes to believe that one can only think about real things, and *irrealia,* that is, *entia rationis,* are only fictions which are always dependent on the real factuality. This position is his reism.[5] Take something impossible, for example, a round square. The impossibility is that of combining a round shape and a square shape, both of which however are real. Another more complicated example is the idea of some being in the mode of potentiality, such as a being which is capable of moving. These potential beings as such have no reality, and we can think about them only on the basis of a concept of actuality whose understanding is therefore presupposed.

Brentano argues for the hypothesis that complication in thinking exists not because of the multiplication of real objects through non-real objects, but through the multiplication of a peculiar modification of relations of thinking being to the real objects.<i It is impossible to understand something sometimes as a thing and sometimes as a non-being, because there is no concept which can be common to the real being and non-real. It is vJways the case that representations of physical and psychological things are hidden behind an alleged representation of the non-real. However, it is a thinking being who has the real being with some mode of representation, judgment or interest as the object.[7] The concept of the substance which is directly given to our intuition and its representation is included in all representations of the accidental.

This position of reism naturally brings Brentano to the difficulty that the highest genus of individual, particular and real being as such cannot be developed into any kind of the ontological principle of the determining unity of and in the manifold meaning of being. I mentioned earlier that Brentano never pursued this notion of unity; but even if he did, he could not have gone anywhere from the utterly vacuous statement, "real being is." Furthermore his reism undermines the very basis of his modified version of Aristotle's correspondence theory of truth. Anton Marty sharply critized Brentano for eliminating all the non-reals as fictions. Marty's opposition is based on the conviction that the objectivity of truth is tied to the acceptance of the unreal states of affairs, and that making them into mere fictions would result in subjectivistic and psychologistic falsifications of concepts of truth and knowledge.s

:Marty's attack on Brentano's reism and Brentano's defense of it center around the ontological status of relations and theories of manifold modes of representation and corresponding modes of judgment. The most

[5] The best book to trace this development is: Franz Brentano, *Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen,* Bern & Miinchen, 1966.

• *Abkehr,* p. 342.

[7] *Ibid.,* p. 248.

[8] See Meyer-Hillebrand's account of Marty's critique of Brentano in *Abkehr,* pp. 72-79.

interesting point in their conflict is that Brentano's reism takes a linguistic turn. He believes that an accident that is relational has only a relational name. Also abstract expressions are altogether not true names, but originate as a result of a fiction. Therefore, genera of the real and *entia rationis* are nothing but *entia elocutionis,* fictions of language, and are to be eliminated from his ontology. From this vantage point of a completely stripped, poverty-stricken concept of real being, he rejects Aristotle's theory of forms as a fiction and criticizes the latter's *dynamis* and *energia.* " (T) he being in the potentiality as well as actuality are fictions... They have rather damaged his metaphysics." [9]

In the sense that Brentano accepts only the first category of substance as the ontological category, there is a remarkable continuity in the development of his ontology. The only problem is that this development is doomed to shipwreck because it cannot open any encompassing horizon for the ontological quest for determining unity of being. His only possible ontological statement becomes " the real thing is " which seems to interest some linguistic philosophers. D. B. Terrell says: "Even though language appears to contain names that designate all sorts of irreal objects, we can show by linguistic analysis that our thought can afford to do without them. All references can be eliminated by translation into a language containing only the names of *realia,* i. e., persons and physical things." [10] Here the central issue becomes the problem of *Etwas-vorstellen,* and not that of being. Therefore, if Brentano's reism has further possibility only in the direction of linguistic analysis, it amounts to an euthanasia of his ontology.

Certainly, Brentano's brilliant dissertation did not evolve into a renewal of the quest for being in the grand manner of classical ontology. His theology was incompatible with the ontology of Greek thinkers. And in the system of German Idealism he only saw a pitful degeneration of philosophy. The influence of positivistic natural sciences on him and his complete oblivion of the historical-political dimension of being prevented him from seeing the greatness of German Idealism. Nevertheless, his dissertation is still worth careful reading. Students of Aristotle and analytic philosophers will find it rich in thought-provoking insights.

Professor Rolf George, the translator, should be praised for his good work. He successfully translated this difficult work into readable English, and also made it accessible to all students of philosophy by translating all Greek and Latin quotations.

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[9] *Abkehr,* p. 376.

[10] D. B. Terrell, "Brentano's Argument for Reism," in *The Phuosophy of Franz Brentano,* edited by Linda L. McAlister, London, 1976, p.

The Humanity of God. By EDMOND BARBOTIN. New York: Orbis, 1976. Pp. 310. *$Hl.95.*

The author proposes to employ an anthropological approach to Christian mystery " that will consist in a very simple analysis of lived experience, to the exclusion of every systematic approach" (p. fl4). No cursory exposition can do justice to Barbotin's analysis of human experience of God, but it may be possible to give some appreciation of his context by rehearsing a few of his major themes.

God reveals himself to us through the humanity of Jesus Christ, making use of the same means we use to make ourselves known to another: that is, he uses voice, eyes, facial expression and gestures to manifest himself. This means that it is necessary to know man in order to know God's will in relation to man. The author presents and refutes what he sees as possible objections to this approach. To those who might claim that this method risks measuring the revelation of God by man's own scanty knowledge, he replies that using our human experience to deepen our knowledge of God does not deform God's revelation of himself any more than do the words of the Bible. Another possible objection stems from man's ignorance and suggests that this approach seeks to clarify the obscure in terms of the more obscure. But, Barbotin notes, to say that man does not know everything, does not mean that he knows nothing. Furthermore, even the most ignorant man possesses experiential knowledge of himself. He knows what it is to live, to think, to speak, to act, to rejoice, to sorrow, etc. God does not choose the way of science, but the way of universal human experience, to reveal himself. Because God's saving love is meant to encompass the whole human race, God presents himself in a form that is familiar to everyone-the form of a living man. Finally, to the objection that this approach is necessarily anthropomorphic, really treating of man under the pretext of talking about God, Barbotin replies that when God reveals himself at the beginning of salvation history, he does so, not by revealing the mystery of his inner being, but by showing what he is in relation to man-the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Since human experience is the only experience we know, it is only in terms of such experience that communication with God can be established. In speaking in an anthropomorphic way, God does not in any way compromise his transcendence. He uses human language to manifest himself as the Most High and Wholly Other. The Incarnation abolishes anthropomorphism as a stylistic form by making it a reality. There will never again be danger of talking about God in a too human way. In the communication between God and man, God always makes the first move. Therefore, man may legitimately " respond " to God by traveling the same road in the opposite direction. This

approach is saved from the danger of anthropomorphism because it is a response to God's initiative. Basically, Christianity is an encounter, a meeting of two persons, and it cannot, therefore, be defined in terms of only one of the persons involved in the meeting. While it is true that we go to the Father through Jesus Christ, it is also true that we go to the Father *only* through Jesus Christ. There is no danger in following this road since it is the one Jesus Christ Himself pointed out. The book is divided into three sections-all within this overall intention-which deal respectively with Measures of Existence (Space and Time); Media of Revelation (the Word, Hand, and Face of God); and Two Encounters between Man and God (the Visit and the Meal).

Old Testament writers use spatial language to express what is nonspatial, and the language of immanence to express transcendence. Spatial language shows how divine perfections infinitely surpass the virtues of man: "0 Lord, your kindness reaches to the heavens; your faithfulness to the clouds" (Ps. 36). God's transcendence, presence, dominion, and ments reach all creatures wherever they are in the universe. Since man is subject to the laws of space, he naturally expresses his ideas in spatial language. When man seeks to communicate with God, the "Most High", he lifts up his hands and eyes. When man feels the need to abase himself before God, he bows, kneels, or prostrates himself. The interventions of God in history are represented as "descents", as in Ps. 144: 5: "Incline your heavens, 0 Lord, and come down". Certain places, moreover, are revered as the sites of God's encounters with man (such as Mount Horeb), or as the place where Yahweh dwells (such as the Temple at Jerusalem). In becoming man, God assumes a human body situated in space and time and he accepts the limits of spatiality. Jesus moves in a particular geographic area, and he is bound by the same material dimensions that limit other men. He submitted to all the necessities of the human condition and underwent an experience that is authentically human, an experience of being in the world, not only the world of things, but also the world of men. In speaking to men, Jesus uses paradoxical statements that force the mind to go beyond the literal interpretation to the true spiritual meaning. Through the consciousness of Jesus, God embraces the whole universe. In his humanity and divinity, Jesus reconciles heaven and earth, far and near, human and divine, eternal and temporal. By using the language of human experience scripture is able to express the transcendent mystery of God.

Because God's plan of salvation unfolds in history, man's experience of time cannot be separated from the Christian experience. Because God himself transcends time, he is designated as "The Eternal One". Certain points of time are selected as privileged moments of divine intervention in human history, as Isaiah indicates: "In a time of favor I answer you,

in the day of salvation, I help you" (49: S). Religious observances were frequently used by the Israelites to recall God's plan of salvation: the Sabbath observance, the Passover, the Jubilee Year, among others. Israel customarily used religious ritual to help her re-live her history and to express the essential meaning of her special election by God. In the New Testament as well as the Old, many linguistic devices are used to show that God transcends time. In Revelation, for example, God is designated as "The Beginning and the End", the "First and the Last." In addition, we find the eternity of Jesus introduced. He, as the Eternal Word, was present "In the beginning". Jesus is portrayed as appearing "in the fulness of time". Unlike other men, Jesus experiences the fulness of time in the plenitude of the lived moment. By his salvific will, he gathers into his consciousness the totality of human duration. In Jesus human time is redeemed and sanctified. God is not only a God who speaks but, before all else, a God who is silent. This silence of God is essential to his mystery though man sometimes finds it difficult to bear. God broke his eternal silence to reveal his plan of salvation for man. In the history of Israel, we find a consistent rhythm of silence alternating with word. God speaks his definitive word to man in the person of Jesus Christ, yet the mysterious alternation of silence and word continues. During the hidden years in Nazareth Jesus is silent; he experiences the silence of death on Calvary; his Ascension is followed by a long period of silence. This method of alternating word and silence is a way of affirming God's transcendence. The silent God is also the Subsistent Word who cannot be confined to any category because he is" Wholly Other." God's word does not wait for man to come but goes out to meet him, seeking encounter, nearness, and even intimacy with every man. God Himself is present in his word. Just as my word is, in a certain sense, myself, since it expresses and communicates me, so the word of Salvation is Jesus Christ. This is why in accepting or rejecting the Gospel message, men are accepting or rejecting Christ Himself. Yet the Word is always a living word that must be always proclaimed anew. No one who receives the Word can keep it to himself; it must be proclaimed to all nations 1md even to the ends of the earth.

Man's work is the result, not only of an idea or word in the mind, but also of the hand that carries out what the mind proposes. Scripture often represents the works of God as issuing from his hand, and man, too, is pictured as being fashioned by the hands of God. The whole history of Israel is the story of God's saving interventions effected "with his strong hand and outstretched arm" (Jer. In Jesus Christ, the divine and human hands become forever one, and the " hand of God " is no longer a metaphor but a living reality. Throughout his public life, Jesus effects healings of both body and soul by the touch of his hand. After his

ascension, he continues to work cures through the instrumentality of his disciples: "The hand of the Lord was with them ..." (Acts 11: 21). This same ministry is carried on today through the sacramental economy of the Church. Man has always yearned to see the face of God, yet God by his very nature is invisible. This creates a problem for man who has a tendency to e.quate the invisible with the non-existent. Since man's intimate relationship with God was destroyed by sin, man has always experienced reverential fear in God's presence. This fear, however, always remains in tension with man's longing to see God, the source of all good. When man seeks God's favor, he prays, "Let the light of your countenance shine upon me" (Ps. 4: 7). When God withdraws his favor, man cries out, "Why do you hide your face and consider me your enemy?" (Job 3: 24). Man's own interior disposition determines whether God will be kindly or hostile towards him. Jesus Christ is the supreme response to man's imploring prayer to see God. Just as a human being by his presence to others affirms his own existence, so God shows his reality by taking a human form. But the words of Jesus and the signs that he worked force man to probe beyond his identity as a carpenter's son to his higher mysterious identity as Son of God.

The whole of salvation history is an account of God's visits to man: He establishes his covenant with Noah; He calls Abraham and makes a promise to him; through Moses, he calls the Israelites from slavery to freedom. He also visits man by means of significant events, such as the Flood or the plagues that were visited upon the Egyptians; these events may be either salvific or penal or both, depending upon the perspective from which each is viewed. God also visits the individual at times, either through dreams or visions, or in the secrecy of his own conscience. The visit of God is both longed for as a saving event and dreaded because of the judgment it brings. In the New Covenant, God comes to visit his people in person to proclaim the Good News of man's redemption and salvation. Jesus repeatedly visits man by his signs, curing the sick, giving sight to the blind, raising the dead, and forgiving sins. Man, however, is always left free to accept or reject God's visit. Through the Church, Christ's visit to his people is prolonged until the end of time. But each person also receives this gracious visit of Christ who comes to anyone who is willing to receive him.

The visits of God achieve their fullest significance in the most social of all man's activities, the meal. The meal, for the Israelites, became a ritual act which both signified and effected the unity of the Chosen People. Through the Passover Meal and the Feast of Unleavened Bread, they continually recalled God's saving acts and renewed their fidelity to his Law. In response to the prayer of Moses, Yahweh quenches the people's thirst in the desert and sends them manna from heaven. The

covenant of God with Moses was sealed by a sacred meal. Isaiah pictures salvation in terms of food and drink: "All you who are thirsty, come to the water! You who have no money, come, receive grain and eat" (Isa. 55: But man needs more than material food, for as Jesus points out: "Not on bread alone is man to live, but on every utterance that comes from the mouth of God" (Matt. 4: 4). During his public life, Jesus repeatedly uses the meal as an occasion for revelation of character or for salvation. A nuptial banquet is used as a symbol of the coming of the Kingdom: "Happy is he who eats bread in the Kingdom of God" (Luke 14: 15). The two occasions of the multiplication of loaves not only recall the Exodus but also prefigure the institution of the Eucharist. The Last Supper brings to completion the Jewish Passover and transcends it, giving men in a ritual meal the fulfillment of his promises and a thanksgiving, a Eucharist, for the salvation of men.

For Barbotin the very ambiguity of human mediations makes them suitable " signs " of God, signs that still make possible the freedom of the act of faith always required of man. The Incarnation both reveals man to himself and effects his salvation. Through unbelief, man denies himself and the meaning of life. Jesus Christ, the Incarnate Word, is absolute, universal meaning, " a meaning that recapitulates and restores all things and hands them over to God " (p. 309). Although Barbotin's aim to approach the Christian mystery by way of " a very simple analysis of lived experience to the exclusion of every systematic approach " is a very laudable one, it presents a number of problems, and one in particular that seems to deserve comment. In *The Humanity of Man,* in which he lays the ground work for the present volume, he observes that an author expresses himself in his works and that in his use of words he expresses "the world as he sees it and wants it to be..." (p. 151). Since man cannot divorce himself from his work, when Barbotin analyzes " lived experience ", this analysis must inevitably proceed from his own " lived experience". In this instance, the author, being a Christian, sees the world as a Christian sees it, and interprets human experience in terms of his Christian faith. Furthermore, being a Christian steeped in a certain theological tradition (in this instance, a scholastic one), his interpretation is necessarily colored by the very sort of systematic approach he seeks to exclude. Barbotin, of course, cannot be faulted for being what he is, or for interpreting human experience as he sees it and believes it to be. I think the difficulty (which faces all phenomenologists) lies in the fact that he has not sufficiently limited his goals by stressing the fact that his interpretation of human experience necessarily stems from that Christian perspective from which it is neither possible nor desirable that he divorce himself. Such a clarification would not only prevent

misunderstanding, but would also help to support his thesis. For, as he himself makes clear in the *Humanity of Man,* ". . . the scholar who is attuned to the social, moral, and religious convictions of another will be more likely to interpret them accurately than one to whom they are alien" (p. 9). In this sense, Barbotin is undoubtedly better qualified than many of his critics to approach the Christian mysteries in the light of human experience.

Barbotin classifies himself as a phenomenologist and it is evident that he has been influenced to some extent by Maurice Nedoncelle, and more strongly perhaps by Maurice Merleau-Ponty. His aims parallel in some respects those of Heidegger and Kant but they are more suggestive than definitive. Perhaps he has been most strongly influenced by the *Pensees* of Pascal. Like Pascal, Barbotin intends to write from lived experience devoid of all presuppositions, but like Pascal he cannot escape the fact that his own faith colors all his interpretations of human experience. This should not in any way detract from Barbotin's achievement. *The Humanity of God* is based on a much richer anthropology than underlies most Christology. As a result, he has produced a beautiful work: he writes with simplicity, clarity, and a lyricism rare in theological work. Avoiding technical terms, he writes in a leisurely, meditative fashion that evokes a keen awareness of the value of everyday experience and deep appreciation of the significance of God's intervention in human history.

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E:i:istentialism and Sociology: A Study of Jean-Paul Sartre. By IAN CRAIB. Cambridge University Press, 1976. Pp. vii + 242. $18.50.

It would seem strange that a book with this title and sub-title would begin by complaining that Sartre's name has wrongly become synonymous with existentialism. But in other respects also the title and sub-title do not quite identify the subject of this fascinating study. The book begins by presenting Sartre's understanding of intentionality, the 'self,' and language as they are found in *Being and Nothingness;* then in terms of this understanding the author criticizes sociological studies of Goffman, Garfinkel, and Schutz. Stressing the continuity between *B & N* and Sartre's later *Critique de la raison dialectique,* Craib then outlines the formation of social structures as found in the latter work. These structures serve as the basis for a sustained critique of Alvin Gouldner's *Wildcat Strike;* both Sartre's and Gouldner's works are concerned with

the spontaneous formation of groups. But in addition to criticizing some of Gouldner's assumptions, Craib also renders Gouldner's work more widely significant. The existentialism that is introduced into sociology is basically a refusal to allow that sociology can be finally objective; rather, objective (or analytic) sociology must be considered as only a moment in an ongoing and total process. A purely analytic sociology would present " group pressures," "markets," "bureaucracies," etc., as objective facts, that is, as social forces that like physical forces are simply part of the " given." This would leave them as wholly contingent and incapable of further explanation. Using Sartre, Craib would argue that these "givens" are more or less free human creations, even if this freedom is alienated at the moment it is exercised. Craib's critique of various sociological studies consists in his effect to introduce free human projects into the subject matter of sociology, not to render it arbitrary, but to render it more intelligible.

In *B & N* Sartre rejected a certain study of Flaubert that tried to explain Flaubert's psychology by breaking his psyche down into a set of basic drives: grandiose ambition, feeling of invincible power, etc. Then these elements were recombined to give us Flaubert. This is the analytic method in psychology; it would offer the reader a set of basic drives as " inexplicable original givens." Sartre urged that such a method arbitrarily resigns itself to being incomplete (Why was he ambitious? etc.) and renders Flaubert a behavioral object. Sartre proposed " existential psychoanalysis " as a way of avoiding these limitations; later he would illustrate what he meant in his increasingly complex accounts of Baudelaire, Genet, and Flaubert himself. In each case he tried to avoid such " givens " and reveal each personality in its project and in its freedom. It might be said that what the present work of Craib does is to take the outlines of existential sociology developed in *ORD* and apply them to works of contemporary sociology to break down their " inexplicable original givens " and allow for the free human project of those being studied. For example: *Wildcat Strike* tells of the different attitudes towards authority of those who work in a gypsum factory and those who work in a neighboring gypsum mine. The difference is left as an unexplained fact. But considering the different social structures of *ORD* and how they relate to praxis, the difference of attitides becomes comprehensible. And, just as the value of *B & N's* existential psychology only became evident through Sartre's later studies of individuals, so the value of *ORD's* existential sociology becomes more evident in the present work. Craib is not trying to show that sociology and philosophy should be brought ---as if they were two separate entities-but rather that when one is d'.>ing wciology one is necessarily doing philosophy, and vice versa.

Sartre is famous for his many criticisms of the *petit bourgeois,* who seems to stand apart from human activity and regard it objectively from a distance. Such a description could also apply to the ideal of many sociologists: they strive for a scientific objectivity in which they do not allow their own subjectivity to intrude. Just as the present critique does not allow pure objectivity to sociology, so it will not finally allow that the sociologist is a pure receptive subject: he is inevitably trying to attain some objective standard (e. g., to *be* a "sociologist," to *be* "original," to justify his methodology, etc.); thus he can never be a pure subject gazing at the human process. It is only by knowing himself as part of the process that he can hope to understand it. This has often been recognized by sociologists, but in the present study it is developed creatively and at some length. Thus Craib applies a basic theme of *ORD* to sociology, for he urges that the pure objectivity of sociology and the pure receptive gaze of the sociologist are at best only moments in an ongoing process to which all of us, sociologist and sociologized, are both immanent and transcendent. And the perennial conflict in sociology between " scientific neutrality " and " social responsibility " is shown to refer to alternating moments in the dialectical process.

It would seem that some familiarity with both Sartre's *ORD* and Gouldner's *Wildcat Strike* would be necessary for a full understanding of Craib's study; but the insights presented in his study will probably induce many readers to refer back to these mutually illuminative works. Craib has an easy familiarity with Sartre and presents his thought in a very condensed manner, but with order and a singular clarity. After presenting each point of Sartre, he uses this point as the basis for a critique of some particular sociological study as well as a critique of the " sociologists." Craib's method is so clear and orderly that one is never left wondering who is saying what. The final result is that one is left with a unified understanding of what Sartre's existentialism has to offer sociology and sociologist, and one is also left with gratitude to Craib for entering so deeply into both sociology and existentialism that they are not seen as separate; when Craib is doing one he is evidently also doing the other.

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The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory. By RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovitch, 1976. Pp. $17.95.

Ambrose Bierce defines philosophy in *The Devil's Dictionary* as "a route of many roads leading from nowhere to nothing." The definition receives some apparent support from the multitude of problems raised, methods employed, and solutions advocated by contemporary philosophers and from their readiness to excommunicate each other from the enterprise of philosophy. It is no wonder many people confronted with this seeming babble of contradictory voices turn either to a total skepticism about the problems, methods, and solutions or to a rigid dogmatism which is but the other side of skepticism. One way to escape the predicament is to bypass the schools and movements and to face the issues directly, but this response often means simply increasing the noise level. Another is to listen more attentively to the disputes among philosophers in order to find the elements of possible unity within the diversity of approaches and to take both conflict and unity as a key to a richer perception of human questions and their likely answers. Few have equalled the success of Richard J. Bernstein in the second endeavor. His earlier book *Praxis and Action: Contemporary Philosophies of Human Activity* (Philadelphia, 1971) brought together the work of Marxists, existentialists, pragmatists, and analysts in elucidating the concept of action. In *The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory,* he has achieved a similar linkage for the debate about the status of the social sciences.

The starting point for *The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory* is the dominant conviction of mainstream social scientists that their task is to develop a science of society in essential continuity with the natural sciences. They too must work towards "testable and well-confirmed theories which explain phenomena by showing how they can be derived in non-trivial ways from our theoretical assumptions." If the social sciences evidence a shortage of testable and well-confirmed theories, it is a result of their relatively recent origin and of their complex human object, not of an intrinsic difference of approach required for the study of society. A methodological principle at play here is the importance of maintaining a neutral stance in all that concerns value. The social scientist like the physicist or the chemist may have personal preferences, but his work as a scientist must remain value-free. A fact-value dichotomy enters into the undertaking procedurally if not in terms of a basic ontology. Bernstein discusses the general orientation under the heading "empirical theory," and he identifies its advocates as the "mainstream" because they have dominated the professional societies, the universities, and the journals which control the currents of the relevant disciplines.

The figures that occupy the center of his presentation of empirical theory are the sociologist Robert Merton and the philosopher Ernest Nagel. In focussing on Merton and Nagel, he quite consciously selects authors who have been sophisticated about the difficulties of social and political theory, but who in the end have given the mainstream its form and its power.

To speak of a mainstream is, of itself, to suggest that there are other currents moving at the same time and in tension with it. In the intellectual order, one could almost establish a rule according to which any powerful tendency will inevitably elicit movements resisting it. The resistance to empirical theory in the social sciences became most evident in the 1960's when people within as well as without the academic disciplines grew preoccupied not only with the difficulties of establishing adequate theories of society but also with the conceptual and moral hazards involved in the simple transfer of strategies useful in analyzing chemicals to the effort to understand human society. A major factor in producing this preoccupation was the strife over the war in Southeast Asia and over the socio-economic inequities of even advanced nations. When a person had observed the ways in which value-free investigation of things and people serve manipulative and ideological purposes, he came more easily to ask about the basic assumptions of the investigation and to think about possible alternatives. What Bernstein does, after having followed the mainstream for a chapter, is to take up the debate as it arises through some of the principal philosophical orientations of the twentieth century. The remaining three chapters consider "language, analysis and theory," " the phenomenological alternative," and " the critical theory of society."

In *Praxis and Action,* Bernstein stressed the success of analytic philosophers in clarifying the elements involved in talk about human activity in general as well as in the special activity of speech itself. The work of the later Ludwig Wittgenstein on language and life-forms and of J. L. Austin on speech acts was the seminal influence in moving others towards a critique of the positivism which had seemed so closely linked to analysis in the books and essays of a Rudolf Carnap and an A. J. Ayer. The second chapter of *The Restructuring of' Social and Political Theory* shows the impact of this critique on the theory of the social sciences. Despite significant divergences, philosophers like Isaiah Berlin, Peter Winch and A. R. Louch come together in insisting that " if we are to understand what human beings *are,* then we must understand the models that dominate their thought and action." Thus the neat division between the subjective and the objective, the private and the public, which have pervaded the mainstream, fall down since the division will function neatly for neither the subject nor the object in the social sciences. The

impossibility of a perfect division in this area becomes still more striking in the controversy about scientific paradigms stirred by Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* and in the unhappy attempt of some social scientists to use the notion *paradigm* as a path out of the tangles cited by Berlin, Winch, and Louch. For his own part, Bernstein leaves no doubt that he views recent language analysis as adding much to the appreciation of speech and action and of the exigencies of social theory. But he is not uncritical. He faults Winch for a descriptivism which becomes in the end intellectual skepticism and moral relativism, Louch for a neglect of the undeniable place of generalization in social science, and Kuhn for a vagueness which has left his concepts open to absolutely contradictory uses. Nonetheless, he judges that "these thinkers have contributed to the creation of a new universe of discourse where we are more profoundly aware of the complex ways in which linguistic practices, concepts and institutions shape political and social reality."

Language analysis and phenomenology seem at times so disparate that they can be labelled together as *philosophy* only by the oddest manipulation of terms. Yet Bernstein makes it obvious that the interest of so many analytic philosophers in " human beings as self-interpreting creatures " must lead them into conversation with the phenomenologists for whom the analysis of intersubjectivity and the stress on theory as an interpretative process have always been at the core. The distinction of the American philosopher Wilfred Sellars between the " scientific image of man-in-the-world " and the "manifest image of man-in-the-world " provides the framework for the presentation of the phenomenological alternative. Sellars claims that the first ideal-type (according to which human beings are "complex physical systems different in degree, but not in kind from the rest of nature ") must be taken as correct for purposes of theory and that the manifest image of common sense discourse with its radical discrimination between persons and things must be allowed priority only in the moral order. Where the phenomenologists have differed from Sellars is in not granting the scientific image a priority *quoad se.* For Edmund Husserl, the key to relating the structures of objective science and the life-world lay in " a transcendental phenomenology grounded in transcendental subjectivity " and not in an intellectual stereoscope which finishes by making the behavioral sciences fully dependent on the natural sciences. It was, however, Alfred Schutz who dealt most directly with social and political issues and who occupies the main position in Bernstein's treatment of phenomenology. Schutz was at one with the mainstream theorists in accepting the methods of controlled public inference for the study of society and in insisting on the value-free character of such study. Still he refused to accept the sharp distinction between " what is physical and therefore observable like any non-human

physical process-and what is mental, or supposedly private and jective, and inaccessible to observation." The social scientist engages in the interpretation of the life-world in which he is also a participant, but he does so in objective ways subject to the norms of a scient.ific community, What Schutz offered in his own labors was a method for studying the multiple realities confronting a people in their varied activities, a method which would relate each realm to the other without diminishing any of them.

Bernstein takes the phenomenologists to have made a convincing case for the distinctiveness of social and political reality and for extending inquiry beyond the determination of regularities between dependent and independent variables. As one might expect, however, his judgment is not wholly affirmative. He obviously sympathizes with Schutz's own criticisms of Husserl's transcendental reduction, and he comes to challenge the former for having failed to develop adequately some of the strategies (for example, for the study of different types of social structures) and concepts (for example, *constitution* and *because-motives)* at the heart of his project. But, above all, the difficulty with Husserl and Schutz is that they did not offer a method for evaluating competing interpretations-in the end they join the likes of Winch in a dangerous descriptivism. Critique has, in contrast, been the over-riding accomplishment of the Frankfurt School from the beginning. Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and others have drawn on G. W. F. Hegel and Karl Marx for the elements of a critical theory which would be guided by "a practical interest in radically improving human existence." The gaps between theory and practice, fact and value, descriptive and normative theory, have never been absolute for them. Jurgen Habermas continues to bridge the gaps today in his far-reaching synthesis of the work of C. S. Peirce and J. L. Austin on semantics and speech-acts with the critical orientation of the dialectical philosophers. He demonstrates the connection between knowledge and interest and, in doing so, establishes a new categorical scheme which allows not only for a cognitive concern for work and communication, but also for human emancipation. This last interest is what calls for a social science which would be essentially critical and normative.

In his latest writings, Habermas has been elaborating a theory of knowledge which makes much of the conceptual and perhaps existential possibility of an " ideal speech act," that is, of a speech act which would transpire against a societal background without the blocks to the attainment of truth which have affected every actual community in history. Writing *The Restructuring of Social and Political Philosophy* could not have been an ideal speech-act since there is no ideal' community of discourse, but Richard Bernstein's book is in many respects a model for

the philosophical enterprise at this juncture. Like Habermas, he binds the most important strands of contemporary thought together in discussing a major cultural problem. The method is dialectical: each strand retains its own features, and there is no danger of their collapsing into an undifferentiated unity. Bernstein gives every movement or tendency its due, and he is always critical. Thus, although he would dispute with mainstream social science, he insists, against many of his fellow critics, on recognizing the degree to which empirical theory does succeed. Where the mainstream theorists over-emphasize the promise of value-free, objective research into social patterns, a theorist like Winch or Schutz or Habermas tends to erect new categorial walls which obscure the power of research into the "factual" order for the study of society. Bernstein is, then, looking for more than an accurate juxtaposition in his survey; he is trying to lay the groundwork for a more penetrating social science. One does follow " a route of many roads " in *The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory*, but roads cease to lead him "from nowhere to nothing."

A review would not be in the spirit of Richard Bernstein without a few critical comments concerning its flaws. One difficulty which should impress the social scientist throughout is the paucity of attention to particular social and political problems and to specific theories. The author presupposes a knowledge of these problems and theories on the part of his reader, but the tendency to remain on an abstract level deprives the writing of a needed concreteness. A brief summary of Merton's revision of Durkheim's analysis of suicide statistics is not enough to give the theoretical reflections flesh and blood. A more significant weakness-and something similar happens in *Praxis and Action-is* that Bernstein closes his book with a summary of his previous chapters and not with a restructuring of social and political theory a la Bernstein. It is not that he fails to make his thought known, but that he does so solely in the context of presenting and criticizing the thought of others. The restructuring is still in the future. Of course, the pattern of the book is dialectical; and hence the movement to the future depends on the confrontation with all the inherited features of the present. But it would seem that a properly dialectical approach would finish with a fresh exploration of the questions from the critic's position. Where the dialectic should bring Bernstein now is to a distinctively personal effort to do the restructuring. If anyone wishes to anticipate him in this worthy task, he would do well to begin with *Praxis and Action* and *The Restmcturing of Social and Political Theory.*

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Knowing and Acting. By STEPHEN TOULMIN. New York: Macmillan, 1976. Pp. 310.

In the preface to *Knowing and Acting: An Invitation to Philosophy*, Stephen Toulmin says he:

> set out to produce a book that can serve as preparatory background reading about philosophy, and about the philosopher's tasks and interests, of a kind that will serve not just 'Intro Philosophy' students, but also students of the humanities, social sciences and behavioral sciences more generally.

Toulmin might have claimed in this same preface to have written a book which could serve as an introduction to his own philosophical work. There are few introductory philosophy texts which call upon so many of their author's own philosophical insights as does this one. For those unacquainted with the work of this post-Wittgenstein philosopher the present text might provide a basic map of Toulmin's own philosophical territory. For those well read in the Toulmin corpus the text could provide some intellectual reminiscing and further insight into the structure of Toulmin's enterprise. As with most living philosophers, Toulmin's work is still evolving. However a basic structure has emerged, and *K1Wwing and Acting* encapsulates much of it. For this reason, I review *Knowing and Acting* as an introduction to philosophy and also note those aspects of the text which seem characteristic of Toulmin's work as a whole.

Knowing and Acting is divided into four parts. Each indicates an approach to philosophy and then shows some of the intellectual problems consequent upon that approach. Depending on one's view of philosophy one might be tempted to exclude some of the approaches from the domain of " real philosophy " but Toulmin recognizes each and considers each in turn. This recognition is in keeping with his character. Toulmin is not contentious. Although he is often critical, indicating limits and weaknesses to specific positions, he wants to "keep the conversation going." Indeed, one might claim that in the end his work will stand as an act of reconciliation in twentieth-century thought. He has an unusual grasp and " feel " for varied views and he has an equally unusual ability to communicate the sense of these views to others. Part I, titled, " What Are We to Make of Ourselves?" begins with narrations of remembered childhood puzzlements which were philosophical in character. On one occasion while the Toulmins were at the family vacation cottage:

> I found myself using the front bedroom, which was normally my elder sister's room and had a fine pa.ir of heavy deep-red curtains across the window. Sitting up in the unaccustomed bed. I was intrigued by something about those richly colored curtains. What color were they? What was their color exactly? … I found to my perplexity that they looked slightly different when I was using my left eye alone …

This narration leads to a discussion of philosophical questions: What are philosophical questions and how do the questions occasioned by the red curtains relate to traditional philosophical issues?

Leaving these reflections, Toulmin notes perplexities about time and number, about personal moods and music and about feelings and authority. All this is done with the ease of a seasoned story teller and one finds oneself recalling one's own childhood and saying: " Yes! I too wondered about that." Yet Toulmin is no mere raconteur. Interwoven with these stories are his reflections on why particular puzzles are philosophical and how they differ from psychological or natural science puzzles which could be occasioned by the same experiences. One senses a naturalness to philosophical thought and sees a place for this in ordinary life. This reflects one of Toulmin's working positions: he does not relegate philosophy to academia and scholarly conferences only, but sees philosophy rising out of ordinary life experience and believes it should strive to remain in touch with the thinking and the experiences of non-professional philosophers.

Initiating what will become a pattern in the book, the Third Chapter considers the major difficulty generated by thought about the issues developed in Part I, and is titled, " Fatalism and its Paradoxes." By now the reader is well prepared for the experiential opening, but another of Toulmin's approaches is added. The author reviews some of the prominent arguments about fatalism from the twentieth century, from ancient times {Aristotle's sea fight) and medieval times. He concludes:

> it is important to acknowledge the full force of (the fatalist) case ... it is only by giving the fatalist his head and letting him pursue his arguments to extreme conclusions that we can bring to light the paradoxes and difficulties built into his position (p. 88).

Toulmin then takes each kind of fatalist argument and shows how it eventually leads to paradox.

The final Chapter of Part I, opens:

> It is time to grasp the nettle. All the sciences on which the contemporary arguments for fatalism rely are themselves ' rational enterprises' .. as such, all of them . . are possible *at al,l* only on the condition that the ' causal explanations ' to which they lead do not discredit totally the possibility that human thought and action can be ' rational.' (p. 44)

In a move born of critical philosophy Toulmin shows that rationality is a pre-condition to fatalist arguments. This is paradox and Toulmin returns to this division of cause-rational human nature later, for he sees it as " one continuous preoccupation of philosophers throughout the history of their discussions " (p. *45)* . In reflecting on the whole of Part I, one realizes that Toulmin has established a theme for the whole book. The

reader has been led from ordinary perplexity through history of philosophy to reason-giving about reason.

Reason-giving about reason is not a new theme for the author. His first book was *The Uses of Argument* and one of his early noted endeavors was *The Place of Reason in Ethics.* What *Knowing and Acting* does is to examine:

> The ways philosophers have attempted-and still attempt-to give account of "reason " and " rationality " and to resolve our perplexity and misconceptions about the relationship between rationality and causality (p. 47).

Part II, "The Philosopher as Geometer," opens with what is, in fact, an introduction to the next three parts of the book: Toulmin now begins to characterize the whole of Western philosophy.

Toulmin first considers reasons for beliefs and thought. Philosophers have traditionally addressed the issue with three questions: "What is it to have good reasons for believing the things we do? What is it to know something? And how can claims to knowledge, or well founded belief, be defended rationally against challenge? " (p. *55).*

In turn, philosophers have approached these questions from three major directions. First, some see the answers dependent upon " our capacity to recognize certain permanent and necessary ... features and relations " of the world which exist independent of ourselves. Thus philosophy is engaged in producing " objectively rigorous arguments in which ' solid evidence ' is used to provide ' firm support ' for our beliefs." For such philosophers the " crucial question is, By what standards are we to judge when our arguments are really rigorous?" Other philosophers see the answer dependent upon " general consensus between human beings, which unites all human thought and action in ways that conform to certain general and universal ... patterns or principles." Thus philosophy involves " relating our own experiences to intellectual preconceptions that are congenial ... to the established corpus of human ideas and beliefs." Here the " crucial question " is, " How do certain patterns of ideas become established, and so prove convincing to any experienced audience? " A third group thinks that " the context within which we can act and think in a rational matter is set by modes of interaction between human thought and the world. Giving reasons then involves location of ourselves and our hearers jointly in a common world of perceived objects and problems." The key question becomes, " What is it then, about the world, about ourselves, and about our problems created by their interaction that makes the activity of ' giving reasons ' what it is " (p. 57) .

Such an analysis of styles is found elsewhere in Toulmin's work. In this book, however, the analysis concerns philosophy itself. Toulmin claims

that there are different styles of philosophy. Each has its advantages and its limitations. No one of them is *the* philosophical approach. Rather the several styles:

> are signs ... that the full agenda of philosophy is richer and more complex than any one of the three approaches ... And the best way to feel our way into each of the three approaches will be to start by reconstructing the initial contexts--intellectual, cultural, and social-within which they first carried charm and conviction (p. 58).

Any reader of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* must be struck by echoes from that work. A word has no isolated, absolute meaning. One must find its context, its language game. The same word means different things in different language games and each language game embodies a whole form of life. To understand the language game one must learn the form of life. Philosophers have applied Wittgenstein's concepts to explanations across disciplines and to explanations within disciplines during various periods of history. Toulmin argues that the concept applies to the whole enterprise of philosophy itself. Philosophy is not just a form of life with its own ideals, its own language and its own method. Philosophy has more than one ideal, method and language. There are three distinct sets of ideals and methods in philosophy. Toulmin is claiming more than mere schools of thought, for schools of thought may occur within any one of the ideals, methods and languages. Nominalism, Naive Realism and Moderate Realism all operate under the same disciplinary ideal and the same rules of reason-giving.

It is Toulmin's thesis that at a given point in history philosophy began. At other points whole new views of philosophy were introduced. These varied styles now exist side by side. To come to any understanding of these styles of philosophy one must come to understand their context, the form of life they embody. Toulmin begins each discussion of a style of philosophy by considering the social, cultural, and intellectual context which gave rise to that philosophy. He then goes on to enunciate the explanatory idea of each philosophy style and how each leads to serious intellectual difficulties. The "Nature of the World" approach of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes and others leads to skepticism. The " Structures of Human Thought " with its " common sense " approach ushered in with the new human sciences and recognition of human diversity leads to relativism. The "Thought and the World" with its "critical" approach and its recoguition of commonalty despite the great diversity easily leads to statements so " vague, sweeping and unspecific " as to be useless.

In his final chapters Toulmin tries to " continue the conversation." He notes that instead of seeing these three styles of philosophizing as rival theories, one can view them as complementary. One can then get on with

the tasks at hand. First, one can " identify ... the issues that have preoccupied philosophers from the beginning ... to the present day." Toulmin names five:

1. the nature of nature, and the conditions on which the natural world is accessible to human understanding.
   the status of mind, and the conditions on which mental functioning can yield well founded knowledge and beliefs.
8. the significance of rationality, and the standards by which reasoning can be judged good or bad/sound or unsound/adequate or inadequate.
4. the role of language, and the conditions on which beings can employ language intelligibly for expression, communication, and/or critical debate.
5. the claims of the good, the right, and the beautiful, and the manner in which human aims, needs, and creative purposes bear on the soundness and acceptability of our ethical and aesthetic views, and so on, and so on. (p

Second, one can work out an account of human nature which makes sense of what is known to be possible to human beings in each of the above five areas. Toulmin offers several specific recommendations for accomplishing this task. Finally, he notes how this understanding of human nature might be mobilized in relation to a philosophy of human action, this being one area he mentioned early in the work but did not address throughout the greater part of the text. He ends with the invitation to philosophy: "... put this book aside, face the philosophical problems that you find most perplexing in your own mind and begin tackling them for yourself, and in your own ways " (p. 310) .

What judgments may be passed on *Krwwing and Acting?* If one is seeking a book about philosophy for the students of the humanities, social sciences, and behavorial which Toulmin mentions in his preface, this one will serve well. Indeed some moderately advanced philosophy students might profit from his insight and his ability to explain and classify major movements in the history of the subject. Toulmin has ability to get at the conditioning structures of philosophical works, and a flair for explanatory metaphors.

Since he has studied the natural and social sciences he is able to use examples from these areas which are helpful to those outside philosophy. The work done on *The Concept of Time, The Fabric of the Heavens,* and *The Architecture of Matter* as well as *The Philosophy of Science,* and *Human Understanding* and other science-oriented books makes Stephen Toulmin an apt translator or philosopher for those in scientific disciplines. It is not that he uses scientific jargon. He doesn't. Indeed his books contain little technical language of any sort. He has a predilection for ordinary English. However, he is capable of calling upon the scientific disciplines for examples or for purposes of comparison. He exhibits none of the

timidity about the sciences that marks some introductory philosophical texts.

This very familiarity with the sciences and the author's equal, if not greater, competence with the varied theories of the philosophers makes one question whether *Knowing and Acting* would be a useful text for the introductory course.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

Allen and Unwin: *Contemporary British Philosophy: Personal Statements,* edited by H. D. Lewis. Pp. 344; £9.50.

University of Chicago Press: *Culture and Practical Reason,* by Marshall Sahlins. Pp. *252;* $18.00.

Desclee et Cie: *Existant et Acte d'Etre,* Tome **1,** by Benoit Pruche. Pp. 214; $9.50.

Duckworth: *Questions in the Philosophy of Mind,* by David Pears. Pp. 296; no price given.

Josef Knecht: *Die Wurde des Menschen und die Religion,* by Bernhard Welte. Pp. 112; 14.80 DM.

Kosel: *Ueber den Begriff der Sunde,* by Josef Pieper. Pp. 146; 14.80 DM.

Mowbray: *Byzantine Theology: Historical Trends and Doctrinal Themes,* by John Meyendorff. Pp. 180; no price given.

Nijhoff: *The Origins and Characteristics of Anabaptism: Proceedings of a Symposium,* edited by the Faculty of Protestant Theology at Strasbourg. Pp. 245; F.110.

Oxford University Press: *The Philosophy of Mind,* edited by Jonathan Glover. Pp. 170; $6.95.

Reidel: *Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos,* edited by R. S. Cohen. Pp. 754; hardcover $64.00, paper $34.00.

Rodopi: *Original Sin: Two Major Trends in Catholic Interpretation,* by G. Vandervelde. Pp. 334; no price given.

Seabury Press: *Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity,* by Karl Rahner. Pp. xv, 470; $19.50.

Stanford University Press: *The Matrimonial Trials of Henry VIII,* by H. A. Kelly. Pp. 234; $14.00.

Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht: *Theologische Fragen nach der Kirche,* by R. Hermann. Pp. *335;* 58.00 DM.

Van Gorcum: *Inleiding tot de Symbolische logica,* by **H.** C. deSwart and H. G. Hubbeling. Pp. 141; F. 24.50.