GRACE AND LIBERATION: AN INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY

THE OCCASION OF this essay is the liberationist interpretation of Christianity as it is being proposed by the theology of liberation. While the soundest and most coherent and vigorous version of liberation theology stems from Latin America, still this theological movement has touched fundamental human drives and modern exigencies, and liberation themes are being proposed on all continents. But not always with the same success. For liberation theology interprets Christianity as intrinsically and fundamentally related to this world, and life in it, with particular emphasis on the political and social structures of human existence. And, as a matter of fact, either this idea or the manner in which it is proposed has certainly not gained a general acceptance.

Right at the outset we wish to enter a distinction between the theology of liberation, or the many theologies of liberation of particular authors, and the liberationist interpretation of Christianity. Every particular understanding of Christianity is and should be deeply incarnated or inculturated in the particular situation of the people out of which it emerges and which it seeks to address. This is particularly true of the liberation theologies which have integrated into their method of understanding of Christianity social, economic, political and cultural analyses of the world in which they arise. But precisely to the degree in which a theology of liberation is bound to a situation that is peculiar or unique, that theology is not exportable to an area where the social and cultural conditions are different.[1] For this

[1] The principle of ineulturation involves a tension between the universal and its particular manifestations and requires a nuanced interpretation of what is essential and normativ.e in Christian faith experience as distinguishable from its explicit expression in cultural forms. Just as Christians of former mission areas were asked

reason we speak of the liberationist interpretation of Christianity in an effort to look for that properly Christian component that lies beneath any particular liberation theology. The liberationist interpretation of Christianity attempts to deal with that which is distinctively Christian and therefore universal in Christian faith itself in whatever part of the world and in conjunction with whatever particular social analysis that may be used.[2]

While this distinction is helpful, there is still more to be said, and other questions to be answered. The liberationist interpretation of Christianity presents Christian salvation in such a way that it is seen as intrinsically and fundamentally, although not exclusively, related to and having bearing upon life in this world in all of its forms and activities. Even granting the distinction just mentioned, it is still not commonly agreed by general Christian consciousness that Christian salvation includes this inner worldly and historical dimension as an essential and constitutive one.[3] The question that is raised, therefore, is whether or not this claim of liberation theoolgy is true, and in what sense? Is the liberationist interpretation really a theology at all, or, is it simply a movement which is more or less a product of culture, but supporting itself extrinsically with Christian idealism and rhetoric? Is the liberationist interpretation of Christianity really a social movement that has adapted Christian language and slogans in order to seek its particular goals? Or, on the contrary, is this really a theology and there-

to inculturate western Christianity into their local situations, so now it seems western Christianity is beginning to be asked to receive back and adapt into western traditions insights gained in the third world.

[2] " Distinction " does not mean " separation " ; there can be no expression of pure Christian faith outside of culturally relative human forms.

[3] " Essential " and " constitutive " mean that if this dimension is lacking Christian faith life would be inauthentic as is implied by the famous sentence of 1971 Roman Catholic Bishops' Synod: "Action on behalf of justice and participation in the transformation of the world fully appear to us as a constitutive dimension of the preaching of the Gospel, or, in other words, of the Church's mission for the redemption of the human race and its liberation from every oppressive situation." 1971 Synod of Bishops, *Justice in the World,* Introduction.

fore a statement of a universally normative dimension of Christian faith and life? Can one say, finally, that today the Christian symbol "salvation" is intrinsically and essentially bound up with " liberation " ?

In order to make this claim convincingly one must address history, the history of Christian faith experience. That is to say, if this understanding is correct, it cannot be a totally new claim, one that is alien to or lacks all continuity with the tradition of Christian self-understanding. More positively, one must be able to show how, whether implicitly or explicitly, Christian self-understanding has included a basic dimension aptly termed " liberation " in its conception of salvation. The question of this essay, therefore, is this: What exactly is the connection between Christian salvation and liberation? And in response we hope to demonstrate that the history of the Christian understanding of the effects of grace can quite correctly be understood as " liberation " and in what sense this is especially true today. To do this, we shall begin with a brief discussion of the symbols " salvation," " grace " and " liberation " and how they may be seen as interrelated. The second part will offer a very brief interpretation of the history of the theology of grace. And in the third we shall bring these data to bear on the liberationist interpretation of Christianity in the form of some general propositions.

I. SALVATION, GRACE, LIBERATION

The most basic concepts of Christianity are often the most vague and unclear. This is certainly the case with the notions of "salvation" and "grace." In discussing briefly the interrelationships between salvation, grace and liberation we shall define how these terms are understood in this essay and at the same time clarify the project.

Salvation is Grace

The primary symbol or type for salvation in the religion of the Old Testament is " exodus." There one has a people freed

from bondage or captivity or slavery to a foreign master and entering into a new relationship with God, a new life of chosenness and predilection by God symbolized in a covenant. What really happened back then?, if one might pose that irreverent question; or, since that question cannot be answered historically, what was believed by the ancient Hebrews to have happened? Undoubtedly there was an historical event, an escape, and a newly-won freedom on the part of this people. And coupled with this Scripture testifies to the vivid realization that whatever happened to this people transcended their own capacity for freedom and power of self-determination; it was a gift, something received from God; it was grace.[4] Here one has the basis to determine the essential characteristics of the notion of salvation. Certainly the word itself includes the idea of "being freed from" and "being freed for." Moreover, it was and is essentially religious. This means that "salvation" refers first of all to historical events and experiences that transcend human capacity and which are celebrated as God acting in history.[5]

These qualities are epitomized in the New Testament faith in Jesus as the Christ. For the Christian, in the advent of Jesus, his life, death and resurrection, one has the concrete and unsurpassable event in history manifesting the saving love of God for the human race. He is the Christ; he is savior. In the terms of Karl Rahner, Christ is the definitive real symbol of God's saving grace. And in the power of God's freely bestowed love or grace mediated through him we are freed from sin, from the Law, from the power of evil itself, and from death. In him God's universal salvific will is revealed. God's actual saving

[4] See Ruben A. Alves, *A Theology of Human Hope* (New York: Corpus Books, 1969), pp. 87 ff.

[5] This can be seen in terms of the principle of sacramentality which maintains that human beings in this world can only encounter God through this world of concrete symbols and events. This need not be radically contrasted to a prophetic Word tradition of understanding grace and salvation since ultimately "word" is also a human symbol and needs mediation. See Franz Leenhardt, "This is My Body," in *Essays on the Lord's Supper,* ed. by O. Cullmann and F. Leenhardt (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1958), p. 35.

activity for all peoples of all time is made known; in short, the force and power of God's active love for all mankind and history itself is shown to us. In the words of Paul: God " has made known to us in all wisdom and insight the mystery of his will, according to his purpose which he set forth in Christ as a place for the fulne.ss of time, to unite all things to him, things in heaven and things on earth" (Eph 1.9-10).

Grace is nothing else than God's love for humankind. When one addresses " salvation " in terms of the symbol " grace," there are two consequences that should be noted. First of all, the primary emphasis falls on what has classically been called subjective as opposed to objective redemption. In this way, then, theories of objective redemption, many of which tend toward anthropomorphism and mythology, will be left aside.[6] When salvation is conceived of in terms of grace one focuses on the concrete and historical manifestations of the effects of God's saving love within the Christian economy. This is certainly the dominant concept of the New Testament itself, for the primitive community of faith was constituted by the pouring out of the Spirit and lived in the experiential enthusiasm of its gifts and charisms. Here then salvation appears as an economy, a working of God in a history of human events.

The other side of this approach consists in the fact that salvation is viewed in terms of its breaking forth in this world. Certainly the meaning of " salvation " is eschatological. IBtimately, salvation cannot but reach its climax in the end-time and on the other side of history, both for the individual and for the race, without risking at the same time being undermined in its very foundation. However, it must also be said that *that* salvation is begun now and is taking place within history. Salvation, although it is the end of history, can only be conceived of by human beings within history and as being worked out now through history. Tradition has generally maintained

• This is not to deny that ultimately such theories are necessary for systematic theology. They should, however, conform to concrete historical data and a consistent anthropology and cosmology.

that there is a continuity between the human person in his entirety now and him. who is saved; and there is a continuity between the love of God experienced now (grace) and final union with God. Without such a continuity life in this world cannot be conceived as having an ultimate intrinsic value or worth. Therefore, while from one limited point of view life in this world and history may seem. minimized relative to eschatological salvation, in fact it is maximized. For on the one hand, without God's grace (salvation), what ceases to exist in this world passes permanently out of existence. And on the other, what is caught up in God's love (grace) in this world will remain. The history of salvation in this world is strictly speaking continuous with eschatological salvation, to the same extent that it will be transformed.

Grace is Liberation

The proposition that the effect of grace in human life is liberation and exactly what that might mean is really the point at issue in this essay. And this will be developed on two levels, the personal and / or the interpersonal level and the social or public or institutional level. A brief statement here of the method of going about that is in order. That method may be characterized as experiential and historical.

There can be no affirmation about grace, or about God or about anything for that matter, outside of experience. Any and all theology of grace must lie on some bed-rock of religious experience as its ground. The term "experience " as can be seen is used very broadly here and this assertion is almost tautological. But it is not for all that unimportant. Too often assertions about grace are as utterly gratuitous as grace itself and seem to rest on mere extrinsic authority. And yet the important question of the very possibility of experiencing God or grace directly cannot be ignored. And this is rendered more complex because the history of theology divides on the problem into a subjective mystical tradition that says Yes and an

objective tradition that .says No.[7] There are strong reasons for affirming both sides of this question and grave dangers of misconception if one affirms either side exclusively; illuminism, for example, on the one hand, and pure extrinsicism and authoritarianism on the other. Therefore we accept the position of Rahner, namely that one can and does experience grace but not " as grace," [8] because this .statement is strictly dialectical. A both "Yes" and "No" answer to the question of the experience of grace seems necessary because the movements of grace are so embedded in human nature and personality, so united with it, that they are indistinguishable from the self-transcending capacities of human personality itself. The problem of grace, then, becomes one of discernment and for the purposes of this essay the history of the theology of grace will be the guide.

As a first definition of grace it may be said that grace is the love of God for the human per.son individually and for the race. And since the action of God cannot be adequately distinguished from God himself, and insofar as God's love actually reaches and touches human beings, one may say grace is the self-presence of God in a personal way to human beings. The actuality of this love and presence of God to the person will certainly make a difference in one's concrete experience; but as God's authentic presence it cannot be explicitly affirmed outside of faith, that is, a religious experience which despite its intensity always remains a form of faith. And to protect the fact that we do not really have a totally unquestionable and unambiguously direct perception of grace as grace in this world, it will be better to speak of the experiential aspect of grace as the " effects of grace."

Secondly, this essay is historical. The history of the theology of grace is a history of the articulation and interpretation of Christian religious experience. Or, it is a history of religious

" See for example Francis Clark, " Grace Experience in the Catholic Tradition," *Theology Digest,* XXIII (Autumn, 1975), 226-284.

[8] Karl Rabner, "Concerning the Relationship betw.een Nature and Grace," *Theological lnvestigationa,* I (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1961), 800.

experience interpreted theologically in the light of the message of Jesus and the reality of Christ as this is recorded in Scripture. Christ is the norm for interpreting religious experience as grace by Christians through the centuries. But at the same time, in each of the great epochs of Christian history beginning with Augustine, these interpretationi have taken place in the context of different cultures and special problematics and this has resulted in a wide variety of " languages " or understandings of Christian grace and its effects. This history, then, will provide the data for an attempt at a synthetic understanding which will reach out for the common themes and the central continuous affirmations throughout that history.

Two further procedural questions remain to be explained. First, the historical treatment of grace is limited to the period beginning with Augustine and stretching to the present and does not include the New or Old Testament records of religious experience; this is quite deliberate. For with Augustine the understanding of grace undergoes a radical shift, one that remained decisive for theology in the west. In the New Testament "grace" refers to God's absolutely gratuitous favor in regard to human beings. It describes this quality of God in all of his dealings with humanity in the Christian dispensation. Quite simply the whole Christian economy in all of its aspects is grace. Cornelius Ernst too has recognized this quality and expresses it well:

> Grace becomes then an open concept capable of embracing the whole of God's gift of himself to man, and so capable of indefinitely various further particularization. It is not as though we were to itemize God's gifts and call one of them 'grace'; it is rather that 'grace' qualifies the whole of God's self-communication as a gift beyond all telling.[9]

One might say that the concept of grace is adjectival, not in reference to the syntactical usage of the word but to its func-

[9] Cornelius Ernst, *The Theology of Grace* (Notre Dame, Indiana: Fides Publishers, Inc., 1974), p. Yl9.

tion in a system of understanding. God is gracious and all of his loving dealings with human beings are grace.

With Augustine, however, the understanding of grace becomes substantive. Grace is subject matter spoken of; it is the object of reflection. At first sight this may seem regrettable because the language of grace is exposed to the danger of objectification or even reification, a problem which becomes especially acute in scholasticism. But at the same time what occurred in this shift is really the placing in a new and direct focus of the problem of a Christian anthropology. Beneath and implied in the theology of grace from Augustine onwards, despite the many different contexts in which the question was addressed, are the absolutely fundamental questions for Christian understanding: What is the nature of the human creature in relation to God; what is the interrelation between God and the race in Christian understanding? The theology of grace raises explicitly for theological reflection the basic suppositions for all other Christian understandings: How does God relate to and deal with the human person, the race, the world? It is this basic and narrowly focused question which interests us here.

One other methodological consideration has to do with the symbol "liberation" as a hermeneutical principle. The word "liberation" is a substantive form of the verb meaning to set free, to release from restraint or bondage. As a verbal symbol it embodies a host of meanings that cluster around various experiences of freedom, autonomy and human liberty. It is chosen as a central symbol for interpreting the effects of grace for several reasons. God's grace and salvation have always been conceived in terms approaching some form of "liberation" as the words "salvation" and "redemption" themselves indicate. And shifting to the present, the experiences of freedom and liberation in various forms are very much part of modem culture. The consciousness of being in history and the relative freedom from the past that historical consciousness mediates, the experience of human autonomy and a new ability and responsibility to control, in some measure, both nature and

history, the tendency to define the very nature of the human person as freedom, all these cultural factors make the symbol " liberation " very germane to modern culture and at the same time pose the question of the relation between these experiences and the effects of grace. And finally the phenomenon of liberation theology, which explicitly links action for social and political justice with Christian salvation and therefore grace, is dependent both on the themes of modern culture and Christian theology and so this linkage invites testing.

The symbol " liberation " is used heuristically, that is, we shall try to inform the term " liberation " with the content and meaning that is given by the history of the theology of grace. This does *not* make Augustine, for example, a liberation theologian in the sense of that title today. Quite on the contrary, the attempt is to discover what Augustine said in terms of liberation, and consequently the meaning of liberating grace in the theology of the past. Despite the twisting and turning of this history, certain constant, continuous and common themes will stand out. Only after this process is completed may it be asked how these understandings of how God relates to the world in grace are to be interpreted further :for today. The method, then, is one of retrieval which both interprets the past history of the theology of grace from a contemporary point of view and fully allows contemporary affirmations to be informed by the Christian experience of the past.

Salvation is Liberation

Salvation is grace. But grace is liberating and the effect of grace is liberation. Therefore, salvation is liberation. If the logic o:f the reasoning of this project, which has been presented in simple syllogistic form here, is sound, the conclusion .should be that the meaning of salvation includes some form of liberation. Of course the exact content of the symbol "liberation " remains to be determined. And before embarking on that investigation we shall conclude this prolegomenon by highlighting the precise questions that are at stake in the proposition that

" salvation is liberation," especially insofar as it is approached through the theology of grace.

The issue appears differently from different points of view but in each case it is a fundamental and comprehensive question that is at stake. In the first place we are seeking a synthetic and descriptive theology of grace, one culled from major Christian thinkers of the past. On the one hand, in such a theology of grace, one uncovers the dynamics of salvation in this world because grace is the concrete or actual and therefore objective mediation of God's salvific will to persons and the race. On the other hand, the theology of grace also defines a Christian anthropology and hence provides the fundamental groundwork for Christian spirituality or piety. One thus sees that another dimension of the issue is that of a general theory of the Christian life, that is, an overarching understanding of the relationship between God and human beings rather than an elaborated practical piety. Moreover, the question of how grace operates in Christian life and in human lives, when generalized, becomes the question of history. In fact, then, we shall investigate the basic data for a theology of salvation history insofar as this is simply a more precise naming of the general working of grace in history. And if one conceives of grace as universally operative in the world and in history, one is also laying the foundations for a theology of history. These, then, are the questions we hope to respond to in the investigation of salvation, grace, liberation.

II. GRACE ON THE PERSONAL LEVEL

A survey of the history of the theology of grace since Augustine in a few pages can really be no more than a series of generalizations. To facilitate the task we have chosen four figures as representative of major epochs of theological understanding in the west: Augustine, Aquinas, Luther and Karl Rahner. These men have played a major role in determining the language of grace both for their own period and subsequently. It can almost be presumed that in thinkers of this stature a uni-

versa! problematic is being addressed in their thought and a central theme is expressed in their understanding. It is presumed that most are familiar with their doctrines on which these summary observations and interpretations are based.

Basic Problems and Constant Themes

The legacy of Augustine to the theology of grace was a conception that finally came to sharp focus in his prolonged controversy with Pelagius or with what he understood to be Pelagianism. Grace is understood in the context of and relative to human freedom and love. In Augustine's thought grace is closely identified with the immanent working of the Spirit of God within the human personality. For the profoundly questioning mind of Augustine grace alone responds to the question of the ultimate .source of human goodness, to the question: Why is there human goodness at all in the world? Ultimately, he says, it is God's grace that is responsible for self-transcending love and the consequent expanding of the horizon of freedom beyond mere choice of objects or decisions based on self-centered designs. This understanding has been written into the doctrine of the Church. For his part Augustine did not extend the working of grace universally beyond the Christian order of things. But it follows from the Augustinian doctrine that where there is authentic self-transcending love, there God's saving grace is operative.

During the course of the thirteenth century and through the assumption of the categories of Aristotle's philosophy of nature, the context for understanding grace radically shifted. The climax of this development is seen in Aquinas's later treatment of grace in his *Summa Theologiae.* Although the central Augustinian assertions remain, Aquinas's understanding of grace is at bottom fundamentally different. In his thought grace is seen relative to the human person and race as finite and limited, as created " nature." In this context grace is a new power and nature, elevating and supernatural, and also divinizing because through this habitual gift to the soul one " participates " in

God's own life. Grace is absolutely and metaphysically necessary for attaining eternal salvation because the finite created nature is teleologically incapable of reaching the supernatural and revealed goal of communion with God to which we are called. Human beings, then, precisely as human beings, are transformed and raised up by the infusion of a new quality and level of being called grace.

Although such themes as the absolute transcendence and sovereignty of God carry over from the *via moderna* into the reformers, still the development in Luther's theology of grace is really a sharp break with the scholastic mode of thought. Here the understanding of grace is set in the context of an interpersonal relationship between God and the human person with the Word as the mediator. Grace is defined relative to human sinfulness: God's grace is forgiving. Although this theme is common to both Augustine and Aquinas, it is central to Luther and explained by him in considerably different fashion. Grace is God's mercy, forgiveness and love for the sinner as a person, and in and through this personal relationship, sustained by the Word and an actual faith response, the sinner is transformed even while concupiscence or sin remains.

Much of Rahner's earliest theology of grace, while it retains an absolutely fundamental position in his thought, is directed to overcoming the problems which had become inherent in the scholastic language of grace. Starting from scholastic premises, he argues to the primacy of uncreated grace and thereby overcomes the objectivism of scholastic categories by justifying personalist categories for talk about grace.[10] Secondly, arguing against extrinsicism he establishes the unity of the natural and supernatural orders and thus overcomes the dualism implicit in the then current neo-.scholasticism with his concept of the "supernatural existential." [11] The real advance in the theology

[10] Karl Rahner, " Some Implications of the Scholastic Concept of Uncreated *Theological Investigations,* I, pp. 819-846.

[11] Karl Rahner, " Concerning the Relationship between Nature and Grace," *op. cit.,* pp.

of grace mediated by Rahner then occurs when he views grace in the context of universal human history and eschatology.[12] God's salvific will is universal, and grace is God's personal offer and presence of himself to all people across the whole of history. While all the major themes of the past are preserved in Rahner's understanding, there is a decided shift and development here for grace is seen as operating generally and universally outside the boundaries of Christianity in a concrete existential way as well as in a public and social way in other religions.

Here then are four fundamental aspects and themes, all of which, except the last, are in a sometimes greater, sometimes lesser, degree common to the history of the Christian understanding of grace. Grace is God's love for human beings, a love that affects, converts and transforms human freedom and loving, a love that is accepting and forgiving, a love that raises a person up to become a " new kind of existence "; and, it may be added, since this love is universally offered to and operative in all human beings, it is at work transforming history.

The Effects of Grace

The effects of grace as they are manifested in religious experience can be drawn out still further from the history of the theology of grace. Once again the intention here is simply to present a synthetic overview which must consist in no more than the briefest statements of the major themes underlying the theologies of grace of the past. In each case these themes may be articulated in terms of the symbol "liberation."

Liberation from Oneself.

Although present as well in the other authors, this effect of grace stands out in Luther because of the experiential and personalistic manner in which he frames his understanding. Through faith one receives forgiveness and acceptance by a

[12] See Rahner's three articles on salvation history in *Theological Investigations,* V (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1966), pp. 95-158.

divine and cosmic power with the tenderness of a personal God. In the experience of God's grace, God's favor, benevolence, mercy and love, a person is accepted precisely as he is, in spite of his unworthiness and sin. In psychological terms, just as one gains his identity in others' reaction or response, so here the Christian gains an "absolute identity," one that is ultimately positive even though it includes judgment, because of God's love. A per:son can accept himself, both his present and his past, in spite of the finitude, sin and irresponsibility that have gone to constitute the self. This is an enormously liberating experience. And in places Luther's descriptions of the effects of grace, although he uses a vastly different language, are remarkably close to the effects of grace as seen by Aquinas in such terms as "elevation," "divinization" and "participation" in the divine life.[18] By an almost mystical union with Christ, according to Luther, and in a love relationship symbolized in a bridal image, the liberation from self transforms Christian life into life on another plane.[14]

Liberati-On from Sin.

Augustine too described grace as liberating one from sin but in a way quite different from Luther. Here .sin is seen as egoism. By sin is meant the turning of human motive and intention and consequent behavior back in upon itself so that value outside the self is not enjoyed in itself but used for the self. The

[13] This correlation is made on the basis of "experience" in its broadest sense of a way of perceiving and responding to reality. In fact the experience underlying Luther's theology and that underlying Aquinas's theology are vastly different methodologically. In contrast to Luther, Aquinas's personal experience remains largely hidden because of the metaphysical, objective and "scientific" quality of his thought. But at the same time the Aristotelian world view and the whole theological milieu which was in part shaped by it constitute a medium of experience. For a comparison of the theologies of Luther and Aquinas at this elementary level sec Otto Pesch, "Existential and Sapiential Theology-the Theological Confrontation between Luther and Thomas Aquinas," *Catholic Scholars Dialogue with Luther,* ed. by Jared Wicks (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1970), pp. 61-81.

[14] Martin Luther, *The Freedom of the Chris.ti.an Man,* in Dillenberger, *Martin Luther* (Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co., 1961), p. 61.

person as a center of consciousness is a center of reality and what is beyond the self is drawn into the self and exists for the self. Sin is thus both a mode of existence and the activities flowing from this stance of autonomy and hubris. Human freedom is trapped or bound *within itself* so that self-transcendence, any desire for the good as such, is impossible. Grace breaks this self-enclosed state of human existence. Grace liberates human freedom from sin by engendering in the personality, in the human mind and will, a delight and desire transcending the self and responding to value outside the .self and for its own sake. Augustine is most explicit about this liberating effect of grace in the actual moment of conversion and in the life of the believer who lives his life for God. But at the same time he recognized experiences before his own final Christian conversion as impulses of grace causing .self-transcendence.[15] Thus the working of grace and its liberating effect is a process that need not be limited in such a way that God is seen as the only explicit motive for acting; it need not be limited to the realm of explicitly religious experience, although this indeed is its goal.

Freedom to Love.

In Augustine the freedom to love is simply the other side of freedom from sin. Grace does not destroy free choice; quite on the contrary it establishes it, expands its horizon and guarantees it.[16] Quite consistently with current understanding, Augustine saw the human personality as a mixture of freedom and determinism. Such was the power of habit and custom to bind freedom itself from within, that despite the power to choose this or that object it is not in the power of freedom to love authentically. God alone through the power

[1]· For example, what may in effect be called Augustine's first conversion to "truth" was a self-transcending experience which he credited to God's grace. *The Confessions of St. Augustine,* Bk. III, Ch. 4 (Garden City, N. Y.: Image Books, Doubleday, 1960), pp.

[16] Augustine, " On the Spirit and the Letter," Ch. LI! in *Basic Writings of Saint Augustine,* I, ed. by Whitney Oates (New York: Random House, 1948), pp. 498-*500.*

of his grace enables freedom to love. This freedom to love, liberty, as Augustine called it, does not strictly speaking add to or multiply the concrete opportunities or objects of free deCision. Rather grace releases freedom from its inner constriction and positively gives it a new horizon and scope, a new motive. The power to love, to delight in good and value outside the self and ultimately the supreme good, God, engenders a whole new existence in a person precisely by altering his fundamental orientation. Grace literally frees one from all objective law because the very ideal that the law points to becomes internalized; the Spirit of love is the generating force of behavior. Quite simply, grace is the force of God working in human existence moving it in love.

Liberati-Onfrom Nature.

In Aquinas, the reason why human beings need grace is that they do not have the power within themselves to achieve the goal for which they were intended, i. e., the utterly transcendent goal of union with God. Human nature is a capacity for personal communion with God even while the active power to achieve this is lacking. This new principle of activity is grace. Grace thus liberates the human person from finitude, from the limited and limiting aspects of his nature. The expansive power, both as a habit and as a *motus,* [11] opens up human being-in-this-world to a higher possibility, to a higher form of activity and love that is destined for a goal that utterly transcends native possibilities, namely, personal union with God.

Liberati-Onfrom the World.

This important theme of liberation from the world is found in all theologies of grace but is most clearly expressed in Luther. By one's union with Christ through grace one shares in Christ's kingship, so that " every Christian is by faith so exalted above

[17] The action of creatures "depend upon God in two respects: in one way, · because they have the form whereby they act from him; in another, because they are moved by him to action," Th. Aquinas, *S. Theol.,* I-II, q. 109, a. 1.

all things that, by virtue of a spiritual power, he is lord of all things."[18] This is not a physical power, but power springing from union with God as transcendent and absolute. As mentioned earlier, in very different terms but expressive of the same theme, Aquinas speaks of being raised up or elevated by grace in such a way that one participates in divine life; one shares a divine kind of existence.[19] The taking cognizance of this union with God in religious experience is at the same time an experience relativizing everything that is finite. Grace therefore frees one from all fear of the world; it is a relativization of every cultural product and a liberation from ultimate fear of every human institution. The world and its history, as Rahner puts it, is demythologized and demystified.[20]

Liberation from Death.

The human person, according to Augustine, desires to be. The internal desire not to cease to exist in time as all other things do, not to pass away but to be permanently, incorruptibly, absolutely, and eternally, grounds the dynamism of life itself. Grace responding to that desire, both by turning one towards God and acting as the medium of the experience of God, liberates from death and establishes human being as autonomous. "If you begin by wishing to exist, and add a desire for fuller and fuller existence, you rise in the scale, and are furnished for life that supremely is."[21] Of course death, and the suffering in this world which is an integral part of death, must still be undergone. And death retains its threatening and fear-

[18] Luther, *op. cit.,* p. 68.

[19] Grace, insofar as it is a habit and an accident, is not an entity but rather a mode of being of the human person (his soul); and this mode of being is a participation in divine goodness and love itself. *(Summa Theologiae,* I-II q. 110, a. 2, ad 8 & ad 2.) This cannot be experienced directly according to Aquinas, but it can be known inferentially and imperfectly in such experiences as "delight in God." ST, I-II, q. 112, a. 5.

[20] Karl Rahner, "Christianity and the 'New Man,' " *Theological Investigations,* V, pp. 140-148, 152-158.

[21] Augustine, "On Free Will," Bk. III, vii, 21, in *Augustine: Earlier Writings,* ed. by John H. S. Burleigh (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1958), p. 405.

ful aspect, but not ultimately so. To the extent one is grasped by God's grace and surrenders to it, in the same measure can death be met with peace. Grace liberates from the ultimate terror of death and transforms it from a passion into an action. It liberates also from the terror of time and history and releases constructive energy in a context of hope.

Liberatwn for God (and His Designs).

Liberation *from* is also a liberation *for.* In all theologies of grace the effect of grace is a liberation for God. In Augustine through grace one loves God as the source and ground of all goodness. In Aquinas one's whole nature is recreated through its permanent attitudes (virtues) and in its action toward union with God. In Luther one is by grace already united with God and thus saved; but from a good tree good fruits come. One may add that liberation for God is a liberation that enables God's will to be done. Grace liberates human beings for the designs of God.

Liberation for the Neighbor.

Although explained in different ways by different theologies of grace, liberation for the neighbor appears in all as an essential element and in some as the very criterion for the operation of grace in human life. In Aquinas grace informs the whole person and in the will it appears as charity. And charity, which is primarily love of God, plays itself out towards salvation through the moral life of love of neighbor. This conception has the advantage of integrating grace into the whole of life as it moves through history. In Luther, however, the liberating effect of grace for the neighbor is dramatically and idealistically represented. An essential component of God's grace is a spontaneously and utterly gratuitous, altruistic love of neighbor. *Catritas* in Luther means primarily love of neighbor, and one does not love the neighbor in order to love God, nor does one love God through the neighbor. Rather, having received grace a per.son is internally liberated and turns to the neighbor for his own sake. The Christian is a servant without desire for re-

ward.[22] In Rahner, finally, love of God and love of neighbor, although they can be distinguished objectively, tend to merge into a single transcendental reality of self-transcending experience at the very deepest level of experience.[23] And here one has rejoined the Augustinian existential tradition: Where there is self-transcendence, there is the movement of grace.

Liberation for the World and History.

The affirmation that grace effects a liberation in human personality for the world and for history is both a climax and a turning point in the argument presented here. The discussion has centered up to now on the effects of grace within the human person; indeed the history of the theology of grace is narrowly focused on the personal reality of grace. But at the same time the effects of grace include a liberating or opening out of personal existence to God and his designs, to the neighbor, and consequently to the world understood as other people in history. Salvation as it is begun in this world in a life under the influence of grace is a concrete, visible and external life lived among other people in a public way. To say that the effects of grace are lives lived for the world and for history, therefore, is to shift the whole context of the discussion to that of the public or historical effects of grace, the question of the history of salvation, the social manifestations of grace and a theology of history. It is to this that we now turn.

III. GRACE IN HISTORY

The modern conception of human existence is characterized by a historical consciousness, a consciousness of being in history.

92 " Here faith is truly active through love, that is, it finds its expression in works of the freest service, cheerfully and lovingly done, with which a man willingly serves another without hope of reward; and for himself he is satisfied with the fullness and wealth of his faith." Luther, *op. cit.,* pp. 73-74.

••See Karl Rahner, "Reflections on the Unity of the Love of Neighbour and the Love of God," *Theological, Investigations,* VI (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1969), pp. !lSl-249. The theme is developed again from a slightly different point of view in " Experience of Self and Experience of God," *Theological Investigations,* XII (New York: The Seabury Press, 1975), pp. 1!l!l-132.

Moreover it is taken for granted that human beings in some degree have responsibility for history; otherwise the many expressions either implicit or explicit of guilt for certain human conditions would make no sense. In some degree human beings can control history, modify its course, alter its conditions. Human history is an opening towards the future and all share the responsibility to make it a better world and a better future for others with us and after us. So strong is this responsibility felt by many, and so enormous the project it entails, that it is often accompanied by an unwillingness to be distracted from the task, especially by religion.[24] Thus the other side of historical consciousness and its sense of autonomy is the secularized consciousness. By this is meant a feeling of being at home in this world and in time, a loss of an interventionist God who will solve our problems, a view of the world as the raw material for human creativity.

These developments have in turn placed a considerable burden on the self-understanding of Christianity which has in the past been overly concerned with private life and a personal salvation that practically speaking referred to life after death. Many of our conceptions from the past, which we are quite rightly slow in changing but must change nevertheless, so stress a mythic conception of God and our absolute dependence on his interventions that they are in almost visible conflict with that other everyday conception of reality. Culture thus has forced Christian theology to look again at the doctrines of eschatology, the doctrines of salvation and salvation history, the doctrine of how grace is operative in the world and in human history at large, the doctrine of the Christian life. We are less inclined to accept cosmological theories of salvation or redemption at face value or uncritically, or to imagine God entering history in a visible and direct way as an additional factor in a chain of events.[25] If God works in history it must be in and

••Karl Rahner, "The Mission of the Church the Humanizing of the World," *Doctrine and Life* (April, 1971), 174-178.

••An objective theological theory and systematic conceptualization of God's nature and how he has effected Redemption objectively is the term of theological

through the agency of the human beings who make history. And God's objective salvation must be seen first of all and concretely as the effects of God's grace first in human community in a personalist sense and then in wider "objective" societal structures which emerge through history. To grasp objective salvation, that is, salvation going on outside the individual as an a priori invitation, one must begin by seeing grace working publicly in history.

The question which will be addressed in this third section thus concerns the public working of grace. Can saving grace be understood in a way that furthers social responsibility? And can this grace be seen further as a factor underlying the external and public events of history? And, finally, is such a view totally discontinuous with previous theologies of grace or can Christian tradition be adapted without violence to this new historical context which increasingly forms the matrix for our understanding?

Raimer on Grace in the World and in History

Much of Rahner's early theology is an effort to mediate between the scholastic theology that preceded him and the modem world. There are three themes, generally accepted today, from his theology of grace which may serve as an introduction to the further consideration of grace in the context of history.

The first point is Rahner's conception of the unity of the natural and graced orders of human existence. He argues this position from the doctrine of the universal .salvific will of God. Given this teaching from Christ's revelation, one must also affirm that human nature or the human person is different from what he would have been had not God willed salvation, since human existence is totally dependent on God's will and intention. Human "nature," then, as it actually exists must be under the influence of its "supernatural" end, goal and calling. Hu-

understanding and not its point of departure. Given the post-enlightenment situation of modern theology one cannot begin one's theological understanding from. a preformed objective theory.

man existence embodies within itself a tendency or dynamism or positive drive for its salvific end, a dynamism which is itself grace or gift, but which informs all human-being. In this way Rahner breaks down every dualistic conception of the natural sphere and that of grace, the kingdom of man and the kingdom of God, the secular or profane and the religious. Grace is part of the whole of human life and existence in all its aspects. One must view the whole of the human sphere, the world, positively because it is under the influence of grace.[26] Grace is one with human nature and inextricably interwoven with human life and activity. In no way, except where it is a sinful rejection of grace, can the world or life in it be viewed negatively. Its very existence is grounded in an offer of a personal encounter with God which is grace.[27]

A second contribution of Rahner is his explanation of the unity of profane and salvation history which, in a sense, is a mere corollary of the former thesis that emerges when it is placed in the context of history. Given God's universal salvific will it must follow that every single being has an actual and concrete opportunity or occasion to encounter saving grace; otherwise, the universal salvific will of God would make no sense. Rahner explains how this can occur through a conception of implicit revelation and implicit faith; whenever a person transcends himself in a moral act he is implicitly responding to God's self-communication or offer of himself in grace. In this way any radical dualism between secular and general salvation history is broken down. There is but one history. The history of the race we know, and the whole of this history, is a history of salvation grounded and supported throughout its length by the permanent, ever active and effective offer of

•• Thus the terms " world " and " sin " are not synonymous terms and need not necessarily he correlated.

[27] See Karl Rahner, "Concerning the Relationship between Nature and Grace," pp. 297-817. Also relevant are his articles "Nature and Grace," *Theological Investigations,* IV (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1966), pp. 165-188, and "The Order of Redemption within the Order of Creation," *The Christian Commitment* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968), pp. 88-74.

God's grace. And as a Christian one must believe that this grace ultimately triumphs over the petty evil of human beings. In short, one cannot a priori and consistently view secular history and its human mechanisms negatively.[28]

One last theme from Rahner's theology of grace will lead to a consideration of some formal theses for a theology of history. Rahner is insistent on the fact that one's encounter with salvation occurs in one's encounter with the everyday world. Without prejudice to organized religious or church life, " it occurs always in an encounter with the world and not merely in the confined .sector of the sacred or of worship and ' religion ' in the narrow sense; it occurs in encounters with one's neighbor, with one's historical task, with the so-called world of everyday life, in and with what we call the history of the individual and of communities."[29] This is so because salvation and grace are really identical. " Grace is really this .salvation itself, for it is God himself in his forgiving and divinizing love."[30] This concrete existential and historical point of view also allows Rahner to understand God's universal and eternal saving will and the concrete offer of his divinizing and forgiving self-communication, i.e., his actual self-communication in history, as materially unified, co-extensive and mutually causative. God's universal saving win causes saving history, and actual salvation history is the ground of this saving will, so that actual historical salvation *is* in this sense the saving will of God itself.[31] From this perspective it follows that a theology of history or saving history cannot really be established by a-priori reasoning. In formulating a material theology of history, one must look

[28] See Karl Rahner, "History of the World and Salvation History," *Theofogical Investigations,* V, pp. 97-114. While this may seem an unduly positive view of history, it is so only from the point of view of Christian *faith* in God. This same history is also one of human irresponsibility, sin and guilt so that such a view of history can only be one of faith.

[29] *Ibid.,* pp. 98-99.

[30] *Ibid.,* p. 98.

[31] Karl Rahner, "Salvation," *Sacramentum Mundi,* V (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), p. 430.

at the actual events of history, both inside the religions and beyond them, as well as at Christianity. But at the same time, relying on a theology of grace and viewing the effects of grace in an experiential and quasi-empirical way, one can outline some formal theses or themes relative to how and where this saving history becomes manifest.

Themes for a Liberationist Theology of History

Within the context of the evaluation of the world and of history as found implied in Rahner's theology of grace, what can be said from the history of the theology of grace that has bearing on an interpretation of God's grace working in history? In what way can grace, or God acting through his grace, be seen as operative in society and history, and this in a liberating way? By answering these questions we approach a liberationist interpretation of .salvation history.

Grace as a Liberation from the World and for the Neighbor.

As a first theme, clearly present in Luther's theology of grace, grace as a liberation from the world and for the neighbor is most important and fundamental. The contact with God mediated through Christian revelation or through any religious experience which in Christian understanding may be called an effect of God's grace, relativizes the world and history precisely insofar as one is grasped by the transcendence of God. And at the same time, one is liberated in gratitude for dedicated service to the neighbor in Luther's terms; one is freed for self-transcending love in Augustine's. Although formulated as a personal experience here, in fact there will be no such thing as a " liberation " movement for others unless there are internally liberated people who are freed from this world and fear of its powers and institutions. There can be no authentic or altruistic action for others that is not ultimately the result of God's internal liberating grace. Thus what seems at first sight to be a personal effect of grace is really in its full dimensions essentially interpersonal. The effect of grace is essentially social, and

urges human personality towards expansiveness and self-transcendence.

God Acts in Loving Human Freedom.

This assertion is based on Augustine's and, afterwards, the Christian doctrine of the necessity of prevenient grace for any and all self-transcending and saving acts of love. To appreciate this insight one must ask, as Augustine did, the simple but fundamental question of why there is or how there could be any authentic moral goodness or love at all in this world. Relying on his own personal experience as well as on Scripture (for Scripture reveals both sin and grace correlatively), Augustine responded with his doctrine of the absolute priority of grace. From this it follows that God and his grace are at the root of all love in this world; wherever there is authentic love in this world, there God is acting. This is the precise point of his argument against Pelagius. And here one has a first principle for understanding how God acts in history without resorting to either mythological or interventionist views of God performing on the same level as other causes in the chain of natural events. God's grace, God's effective presence, is the driving and sustaining force of all human goodness and love, and this is the ultimate basis of every form of authentic, that is, self-transcending human community, no matter how basic and natural any particular communitarian form may seem.

G@d Acting in the World.

That it is God who is at work in the world in loving human freedom is explained by Aquinas's notion of cooperative grace. Under the category "operative grace" Aquinas examines the effects of grace within the human personality, namely, justification and sanctification. Cooperative grace refers to the effects of grace as it is seen flowing through human freedom out into the world and the public sphere in action.[82] There can

••For the division (or, better, distinction, for it is the same grace) between operative and cooperative grace, S. T., I-II, q. 111, a.!!; for the effects of operative

be no danger of Pelagianism here when one grasps the fact that this whole dynamism from start to finish is initiated and sustained by the impulse and drawing of God's grace.[38] In this way, in the lives of the prophets, the saints and every self-transcending person, grace or God's action breaks through into the public sphere of everyday life and makes God's action visible, tangible, concrete and real in the world. In the words of William James, the saints are the authors and increasers of goodness in this world: they mediate goodness. Empirically they are a genuine creative force for society; they tend to make real and actual a degree of virtue, an ideal, that would not even be assumed as possible without them. " They are the impregnators of the world, vivifiers and animators of potentialities of goodness that but for them would lie forever dormant." [34] The saint is "an effective ferment of goodness, a slow transmuter of the earthly into a more heavenly order." [35]

God's Action for God's Designs.

Another theme from Aquinas may be exploited for a theology of history. Obviously one does not find a strong sense of history in St. Thomas in the contemporary sense of our historical consciousness and sensibility of process moving toward an open future. Quite on the contrary his whole theology of grace is firmly structured by teleology, and teleology is quite different from eschatology. But since they are structurally cousins, it would not be illegitimate to transform Aquinas's teleological affirmations into the context of collective human history. In Aquinas one has the basic affirmation, in TeSelle's words," that grace opens up a possibility which does not lie within the scope

grace, namely justification, q. 113; and for the effects of cooperative grace, namely "merit," q. 114.

[88] Substantially the same view appears in Augustine where he maintains that grace does not destroy freedom but sustains it while at the same time loving freedom is a consent to the power and movement of grace. *On the Spirit and the Letter,* Ch. LX, *Basic Writings of Saint Augustine,* p. 512.

••William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (New York: Collier Books, 1961), p. 284.

•• *Ibid.,* p. 285.

of man's natural powers and is not implied by his being a man." [36] In an historical and eschatological context a doctrine of cooperative grace implies that, through grace and people animated by grace, possibilities in and through history tending towards God's design in history, but which are not possible by human powers alone, are opened up and worked out by God through graced human agency. In scriptural language, God's action in and through human loving is moving toward the goal of his kingdom, the kingdom of communion, harmony, peace and reconciliation. Certainly this is not observable in history on the grand scale nor does it imply a notion of steady progress since it is open to reversal. It is an object of faith. And when it occurs, even in a partial way, it is precisely the work of grace since such a goal manifestly exceeds human capabilities.

It may be well here to consider for a moment Luther's theology of grace because he departs from Aquinas (and Augustine) precisely on this point of teleological dynamism. [37] There seem to be even fewer grounds in Luther for a theology of history than in Aquinas because for him one is saved *now,* already, in an actual interpersonal relationship with God through Christ's word. Moreover, there is a tendency to distinguish the graced person from his works, his faith in God from his life in the world, the two kingdoms. In Luther, freedom and action for the neighbor are not in themselves salvific but rather presuppose salvation and flow from it. These strong distinctions by Luther were felt to be necessary during his time in order absolutely to rule out every kind of Pelagianism in the theology of grace. After that is admitted, and assuming an existential and historical point of view, one must affirm that there can be no radical distinction between what a person is and what he does; the two are mutually implied in each other. But also in the existential order one can combine the Thomistic and

[86] Eugene TeSelle, "The Problem of Nature and Grace," *The Journal of Religion,* XLV (1965), pp. 234-241.

[87] Brian Gerrish, *Grace and Reason: A Study of the Theology of Luther* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), pp. 131-138.

Lutheran emphases in an already-not-yet tension that responds in a salutary manner to the question of understanding the Christian life in the broader context of history.[38] "Already": We are saved already by God's forgiveness and this gives the Christian an absolute freedom sustained by grace to respond to the neighbor. If there is no salvation experienced in faith now, there can be no ground for hope in the future. Thus salvation experienced now through grace is a precondition for freedom to turn to the world. "Not yet": At the same time we are not yet either personally or as a group or as a race saved. What we are now must be .sustained by grace in our action and this action is likewise constitutive of our being. Thus Lutheran and Thomistic spiritualities can be seen as complementary and, held in tension, they serve to correct the dangers on both sides.

A Liberationist Theology of History

Personal sin is overcome by grace because it is both God's personal forgiveness and the transforming power of his Spirit turning egocentrism into love. But in order to build a theological understanding of history, one must pass from the level of the interpersonal to the more general and objective level of the collective, societal and public. Here one encounters the concept of " social sin." The notion of " social sin " is highly paradoxical and complex and the few remarks made here will scarcely do justice to the reality. This brief analysis is meant simply as a general definition to engender clarity in the discussion since the concept of social sin is frequently abused.

•• This may be done because the methods and conclusions of Luther over against either Aquinas or Trent are not contradictory despite the language of the canons of the *Decree on Justification.* Scholastic suppositions underlie this Tridentine statement, despite its Scriptural phrasing, and as Otto Pesch has shown, the basis or ground of understanding, the method and consequently the meaning, of Luther and scholasticism are not contradictory but simply different because assertions are made from different points of view. See Otto Pesch, *art. cit.* It should be added that Calvin's introduction of the distinction between justification and sanctification meets this problem squarely and at the same time retains the Reformation's emphasis on the divine initiative with respect to justification.

Social Sin.

The prime analogate for " sin " is personal sin, and this may be understood objectively as a human action injurious to another person or the self. Sin is also" against God" as it were indirectly; i. e. in so far as both the subject offending and the person offended are God's own creation, the injury is against his loving will. Secondly, and much more basically, sin refers to selfish acts and the basic egoism from which they flow. Here sin is defined subjectively and appears both as an inner condition of human existence and as the source out of which objective sin flows. Self-sufficient autonomy means that one makes of him-
side the self; sin uses other persons as means for self-enhance-
self-transcendence, fails to recogniz·e and respond to value out-
self a kind of center of all reality. Consequently one fails at
ment. Sinful behavior can be seen as an attempt to draw the outer world into the self in a more or less conscious effort at subjugation. Thirdly, that which makes sin strictly speaking sin and not simply an evil is consciousness, some measure of freedom and responsibility. The scholastic distinction between material and formal sin is useful here. That which the concept of morality adds to law is precisely freedom and responsibility. One should only speak of sin properly so-called when there is some element of knowledge, freedom, intention and responsibility, for guilt which is the correlate of sin can only be a function of responsible freedom.[89]

What can be said of personal sin can also be said of social sin, but *only* analogously. The ability to make this transition to a concept of social sin at all rests on two primal suppositions. The first is the phenomenon of interdependence and the fact that human existence is essentially social. There is no such

[89] One could of course define sin objectively and mean human action that is against God's will whether the actor is aware of it or not. In this usage, however, the concepts of " evil " and " sin " tend to merge and on the level of social sin this causes enormous confusions. Moreover, even if one imagined a perfect society with objectively just social structures and material wellbeing, sin in its deepest sense would remain, for it is part of the existential human condition. Ultimately, one must resist the temptation to objectify completely both sin and salvation.

thing as total human independence; on every level of existence, although on some levels more than others, there is an interlocking of human subjects with the result that our actions always influence others. The second supposition is that the systems of culture and society that govern or pattern this interaction are created by and sustained by human beings themselves. From the most general and deepest level of culture, as a system of meanings and values, to the most particular of institutions that regulate human interchange, social structures have their origin in and continue to exist through the agency of human wills. As Peter Berger puts it: "Despite the objectivity that marks the social world we experience, it does not thereby acquire an ontological status apart from the human creativity that produced it [and continues to sustain it]." [40]

To proceed with the analogy, then, because the social systems or institutions by which human affairs are structured are not part of nature but functions of human freedom and able to be changed, insofar as they victimize, oppress, or are generally harmful and damaging to persons, they are "sinful" at least in an objective or material sense. Secondly, the intentional creation of and knowingly deliberate participation in institutions that are harmful to and destructive of human life is sinful in an exact sense of the term, that is, subjectively and formally. But here it is most important to note that these institutions depend on human wills *collectively,* and that groups, institutions and societies do not have an internal consciousness and center of freedom in the same way a human person does. Therefore the *kind* of personal responsibility is radically different from that involved in one's control over the self and the *degree* of personal responsibility will vary enormously according to the level of participation and the ability to alter a situation. For example, some social institutions, such as language, become so instinctively internalized that they function almost like "second nature."

[40] Peter Berger, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor books, Doubleday, 1967), pp. 60-61.

When one considers all these factors at once it becomes evident that "social sin" is somewhat paradoxical. For to the extent that behavior becomes purely social, that is, routinized, unreflective and objective, it ceases in the same measure to be formally sinful and approaches an objective evil situation. Precisely insofar as sin is social it must be revealed or disclosed as sin to human consciousnesses.[41] Moreover there are probably very few or no social institutions that do not discriminate and cause harm to some people. All human beings, then, are caught in a web of social sin and all suffer implicitly or explicitly from guilt and need deliverance, salvation and liberation. But over and above this general condition, there are many instances of blatantly selfish institutions that with a more or less explicit intent oppress and destroy some to the benefit of others. But even here one has to be careful in assigning guilt or judging intentions. On the one hand because of interdependence one can kill from afar with no knowledge or awareness or intention. On the other hand, by definition, all responsibility for social sin is shared responsibility within a wide spectrum of degree. Because institutions and systems always appear objective relative to individual awareness or power of action, general prophetic denunciations and accusations often meet resistance where a reasoned appeal to good will might not.

God's Action through Grace against Sin.

In the light of the themes gathered from the history of the theology of grace and given the concept of social sin presented here, we can now go on to propose some theses regarding how God acts in history against sin in a liberating way.

First of all the saving and liberating effect of grace occurs primarily in the individual personality.[42] In the inner life of

[41] Personal sin, too, must be disclosed to a person, for how else could one know he could he other or more than he is? Grace then is also revelatory, for it discloses to humanity that the way things are is not so necessarily and can ultimately he different.

[42] This is an ontological statement. In a chronological sense grace is mediated

the person, salvation and liberation from sin are materially and formally identical. This first proposition prevents the confusion of an immediate identification of liberating grace with an external personal or social liberation. One must affirm that a person who lives in prison or slavery can still be saved in a religious sense both in this world and ultimately. And inversely, a person externally free and affluent may be deprived of inner salvific freedom. Thus the transition from poverty or oppression to wealth and political freedom should not be confused *tout court* with the salvation of that subject in the Christian view. But this is not an affirmation denying any connection between grace and political or social freedom as will be shown in what follows.

Secondly, action for liberation of others on the part of any person, or participation in liberation movements, witnesses first of all to his or her own "salvation" or salvific liberation. Such social action, if it is authentic, is salvific liberation first of all for the participants themselves. Here liberation refers to the self-transcendence that is intrinsic to the saving faith that is informed by and works through charity in Roman Catholic terms, or in the freedom for self-transcending love of neighbor that stems from being saved in Lutheran terms. At this point, however, one must note the paradox of grace and good works. The moment one focuses on one's own .salvation in liberation activity, the project is rendered ambiguous from a religious point of view. Grace generates spontaneous action for the neighbor. The use of liberation activity for the neighbor to gain salvation for oneself or for any other personal goal is no witness to the inner liberating action of God's grace. And, needles:s to say, participation in liberation movements for self-

to any individual through a community so that one may wish to view the objective means of grace in a community as prior to its operation in any given person. Such a view, however, should be seen as practical and functional. Logically, persons are prior to community. And ontologically, although the individual and the community exist in a mutually causative relation, one should avoid the tendency that flows from this insight to reify community, to view community as a substantial being.

ish motives can scarcely be confused with virtue of any sort, let alone the force of grace.4$

Thirdly, action for liberation, that is, the concrete performance of love of neighbor, is a participation in God's action in the world. The assumption here is that all genuine love of neighbor is initiated and sustained by God's liberating grace. All Christians are agreed that .salvation is a work of God and of his grace, and there can be no correlation of the idea of liberation with that of salvation except insofar as it is a work of God. Here, then, human freedom is seen as a kind of instrument or agency of the movement of grace in the world. It may he added that insofar as this action for liberation is grounded solidly in the religious sphere and .sustained by God's grace, it will have as its primary goal that other persons may *be* more and not simply have more.

Fourthly, the primary objective of liberative action that is an effect of saving grace is the person of the neighbor; this action is a form of love of neighbor. Insofar as the neighbor is a victim of social or institutionalized oppression or violence, one must, in order to be of any real and permanent assistance, strike at the roots and causes of this objective situation. But such an action is positive; its goal is exactly the same as that of the good Samaritan, namely, helping the neighbor in his specific need. This point is made to offset several confusions. One concerns the theme of conflict. Christian action for liberation cannot be in its first movement and intention conflictual, that is, simply and directly aimed against persons. It is not an overcoming of formal sin except in the .self. It attacks social sin not in its formal or subjective aspect because the Christian ought not accuse other persons of formal sin or make

•• Here one sees that the judgment of intentions, the question of formal sin, works both ways. For this reason the term " sin " is a highly volatile and often counter-productive category in public rhetoric. It often confuses justice with subjective virtue, and thereby projects a superior moral attitude. In its public discourse (as opposed to its theology) liberation movements would be more effective arguing towards objective justice against objective injustice rather than against sin.

them his mortal enemies. Rather liberative action in the Christian view should address structures and institutions precisely as such, insofar as they appear objective and cause harm to other persons. These are the .*effects* of sin, perhaps even in a formal sense, but they are not necessarily formal sin as such, that is, a function of a conscious intention and responsible freedom on the part of many who are involved. This conclusion has many practical consequences for the attitudes and rhetoric of the liberationist interpretation of Christianity.

Again, *all* institutions are ambiguous. Precisely because institutions are based on general laws and common patterns of behavior, the most just society cannot be equally beneficial to all. Therefore there is always and everywhere a constant need for social commitment on the part of Christians in any culture and society. "Social disease" will always exist and thus there will ever be a focus for active love of neighbor that is the effect of liberating and saving grace. One does not have to live in the third world to understand the practical import of a liberationist interpretation of Christianity. The social concern that is essential and constitutive of authentic Christian faith life, therefore, will always include *de facto* a concern for justice.

The practical question of how best to help the neighbor, to find a solution to his oppressive situation, is not and cannot be decided by Christian revelation or theology. These are practical and even scientific questions which can only be solved by expertise and practical judgment. Grace supplies only the inner ground and source of action, its motivation, and the formal criterion of the infinite value of the human person. Ethics and practical disciplines must work out the strategies and tactics of love of neighbor. In short and a priori, therefore, Christian action for liberation in itself commits one to no ideology. One does not necessarily have to be a Marxist to love one's neighbor effectively, or to accept a liberationist interpretation of Christianity. [44]

"It may be, of course, that in this or that historical situation a Marxist analysis is appropriate and should provide the theoretical basis for the most effective practice of love of neighbor.

Fifthly, the building of just social structures cannot be simply equated with salvation since even in the most objectively just social order the inner sinfulness of human beings would remain.[45] Human existence will not cease being affected with concupiscence and its consequences despite objective circumstances of law, justice, order and collective affluence. In £act, it seems, the more the material affluence of a people, the greater is the temptation to sin. Here the themes of grace as both judgment and divine forgiveness and acceptance of a people or society in spite of sin are most relevant and important. On the one hand, then, the positive force and effort at fashioning just .social structures for the common good are intrinsic and constitutive of Christian faith and the salvation mediated through it, so that without this dimension and concern Christian life would be inauthentic. But on the other hand, one cannot identify Christian salvation with an objective social order or structure independent of a subjective dimension because there can be no real salvation without an inner conversion of freedom itself.

Sixthly, actual love of neighbor displayed in action is also an offer of grace to all who benefit from this action precisely to the extent that it is an offer of altruistic or sel£less love that invites a similar response. Moreover it is a" conviction of sin" £or those guilty of or responsible for the injury of others in the same way that the externalization of the message of Christ confronts sin formally and is a call to repent, a call to conversion. There is a conflictual element in the liberationist interpretation of Christianity just as there is in the gospel. It is this note that the symbol " liberation " adds to " development," which connotes progressive amelioration without radical change. "Liberation " suggests change that is more radical, and even discontinuity, and this is certainly applicable where grace challenges sin and appeals for conversion. On the one hand, however, this conflict does not apply to Christian action

•5 This point is made forcefully by Langdon Gilkey in his new book *Reaping the Whirlwind* (New York: Seabury Press, 1977), pp.

against other people. On the other hand, if structures are essentially injurious to people, then one should aim at radically altering them.

It would be wrong, however, if the negative and conflictual element of the gospel and grace became exclusive and dominant as is the tendency in the Latin American liberationist interpretation of Christianity. Because of the social situation of that continent, whose social structures are viewed as radically or essentially oppressive, the word "development" which means growth within a system has a negative and pejorative connotation, whereas "liberation," which includes the idea of changing a system or structure, is a positive symbol. But since a change in any system will involve the resistance of those whom it favors, liberation involves conflict. And this element of conflict pervades the symbol in an almost exclusive way, even when "liberation" is correlated with "salvation" and the role of the Church. This is a clear instance of the particularization of a theological symbol. It seems clear that in a situation where institutional structures were essentially sound but abused, "development" would be a positive symbol and "liberation," insofar as it meant radical change of a system, would be negative. Correlatively, on the level of Christian interpretation, one must be careful not to view grace as exclusively a force against sin; it is also a positive force of love. And Christianity is not only a prophetic religion of judgment; it is also a vehicle for the positive building in cooperation with others of graced structures in the world. It should be noted that this is not a criticism of the liberationist interpretation of Christianity insofar as it is applied to the Latin American context, but rather a critique of one of the particularisms of that theology which is not universally applicable and which should not, therefore, be affirmed in an exclusive or normative sense.

It thus appears that saving grace at work in the human personality is not and cannot be a purely personal phenomenon in any individualistic sense precisely because it liberates a person by effecting spontaneous openness to the neighbor. In this way one can see how the whole economy of grace is histori-

cal; faith, love and hope are mediated in this world through the agency of people. Not only the message of Christ, but even more fundamentally and beyond the sphere of Christianity grace itself is mediated historically. One cannot separate the internal and personal working of grace from its visible and outward manifestations in the lives of people insofar as they affect other people. God works in the human personality and in history through the agency of human beings.

Social, Grace.

The grace which first of all has its effects within the personality is also social insofar as it is a force of self-transcendence concretized in behavior. And insofar as grace becomes real and tangible in concrete human activity it can become institutionalized as any other human activity can. As Rahner has pointed out, the grace underlying human history does not remain merely secret but breaks through into the public sphere and often takes an organized form.[46] From the Christian point of view, the paradigmatic example of institutionalized or social grace is the Christian Church, at least in its ideal state. But other religions are also examples of social grace and in specific concrete cases may be better historical agents of grace than the Christian Church. And since one cannot separate the history of grace from profane or secular history, one might expect examples of social grace in everyday historical existence as well. It should be noted further that secular humanism itself functions as a religion for many in our culture. But more particularly, the family, insofar as it nurtures the members and fosters mutual love, might be considered a graced social pattern of existence. Other more voluntary organizations dedicated to the welfare of others, such as a hospital or Alcoholics Anonymous, may be institutionalized forms of love and are therefore social grace.

•&Rabner, "History of the World and Salvation History," *op. cit.,* pp. 99-100. See also Karl Rahner, "Christianity and the Non-Christian Religions," *op. cit.,* V, pp. 125-181.

This shift of focus from the personal to the public, historical level of understanding, and the use of the concept of " social grace," entails a double movement or dynamism to God's action in history. This may be seen in a simultaneous inward and upward movement on the one hand, and on the other an external and downward movement, both, however, always within history itself. The inward liberating grace experienced by people, both by individuals and within groups, externalizes itself and moves upward so to speak in a process of objectification. It becomes institutionalized. At the same time, those institutions influence others, especially those who are socialized into them. Not only the ritual patterns of worship and the linguistic world of doctrine, but also the language and social patterns of care and concern and service of others may be regarded as external grace for the world. In this way, the action of God in history through grace may be seen as " objective," a movement which ultimately rests on the stuff of graced human freedom (s), but which at the same time enjoys an objective social and public visibility. It is true that an exclusive emphasis on this objective and organizational side of the dynamism of grace could lead to repressive social action in the name of God (as in the case of Augustine with the Donatists). But a moment's reflection on such policy is enough to reveal that coercive action or repressive social and political structures are by their very nature a contradiction of a grace that both externally appeals to freedom and internally liberates it.

But just as social sin is a complex and nuanced, indeed a paradoxical, concept, so too is social grace. Insofar as an organization becomes objectified and routinized it may lack precisely the spontaneity and self-actualized intention of self-transcending love that is the fruit of grace. The original intention and motive and direction may be lost.[47] Moreover, there are probably no examples of pure social grace any more than

•?Moreover, dehumanizing activity might be the actual reality inside the outer form and contrary to its primary intention. Modem hospitals are often a good example of this.

there are of pure social sin. And still another caution must be introduced. No theology of grace, and consequently no Christian view of history, can fail to recognize the tragic side of the human enterprise. The Cross of Christ is the permanent Christian symbol of the ever-present and all pervasive reality of sin. This sin is located in the human spirit itself, collectively and in each person; it is rooted within human freedom itself; and therefore it is part of the very stuff of history. Thus no human structure that serves to release the human spirit in freedom can ensure that the exercise of that freedom will not be sinful. Two consequences flow from this, the one objective and the other subjective. Objectively, it is impossible to affirm a progressivist evolutionary view of the history of grace because of the constant presence of sin within human freedom. And subjectively, a spirituality whose inner life is animated by a desire to participate in God's action in history must include within itself the possibility if not the necessity of failure if it is not to run headlong into disillusionment.

The Goal of History.

Having said that, however, we may still ask after the goal of history in a penultimate sense. Granted that ultimate or final salvation is to be realized outside of history in the Christian vision, and granted the stark reality of sin, still one may inquire as to the goal of history *in this world* on the supposition that this goal cannot be considered as completely discontinuous with the former. May we not say that the goal or purpose of grace in this world is to build more and more institutions which incarnate, mediate and foster in the world the effects of grace, namely, forgiveness, self-transcending love, communities of reconciliation and concern? And if this is the case, is not this also an expression of the goal of history under the influence of grace?

To say that the kingdom of God is the goal of the history of this world is not to assert that this goal will or ·can be achieved, not at least by human beings. For history is not na-

ture, but a function of human freedom, and that freedom is marked by sin. The future is open and uncertain, except that it will certainly not exclude sin. To say that the kingdom of God is the goal of this our history in time, therefore, is to make a religious statement. Like "utopia" it is a proposition which both judges the contemporary situation and draws forth creative energies for the future. It is an affirmation of a hope that is based on faith, a hope in something that manifestly exceeds human possibility. And yet it is a conviction that generates a desire to make one's own life an agent of God's possibility.

This view is not inconsistent with certain themes in the tradition of the theology of grace especially as seen in Aquinas and Augustine. If one interprets Aquinas from within a context of a consciousness of history, that is, by shifting his teleological understanding of human nature into an historical and eschatological context, one can say that God's action in and through human loving by cooperative grace is moving toward the goal of his kingdom, the kingdom of communion, harmony, peace, reconciliation. This goal is not totally discontinuous with our history but realized in it and through it. Therefore the limited but real goal of God's grace in and for history is that grace become more and more the substance and ground of historical and cultural institutions. Grace is thus God's action in history, through human freedom, tending toward the fulfillment of his own designs in history.

CONCLUSION

As a conclusion to this essay, four observations may be made concerning a liberationist theology of history as seen from the perspective of a theology of grace. The first is that one cannot separate the sphere of so-called secular history from the sphere of the operation of grace. There is but one history and the whole of it is supported by and under the influence of the immanent working of God through his grace. Wherever there is self-transcendence and altruism, in whatever form, there one can find the working of grace.

Secondly, whereas the direct saving action of God's grace is experienced within personal freedom, once the context is shifted to the interpersonal and social levels, one must also attend to the objective consequences of self-transcending action toward others. "Love and do what you will" attends to personal salvation, but not to the effects of graced human behavior within interpersonal or social contexts. We have only considered in this essay a first stage of a theory of social grace, namely, the theological grounding of such a concept. In order for it to be operative there must be research into the kind of altruistic behavior required in a given situation. What forms of graced action should be institutionalized? What will be the effects of this or that institution or social policy? These are questions that require study by the human sciences and Christian social ethics, and responses must be consonant with the particularities of circumstance. Once one admits a concept of social grace, one that is also objective and external, then one must also look carefully at the objective consequences of social behavior.

Thirdly, this view of grace should provide the basis for a spirituality which is both modern and genuinely Christian. It would be a spirituality that sees the operation of grace made manifest precisely in a "building of the earth" in history, among people, in public institutions that shape human lives. As such, this spirituality would be the very opposite of one that called for a withdrawal from the "world," from secular and profane activities. For this spirituality would see grace as a call to participate in history. This Christian spirituality would entail an immersion in the processes of history; in the public events and crises, large and small, that influence other lives in this world; in the corporate institutions and structures that shape and govern human existence in the world; in the small or local institutions or ways of life that often oppress and dehumanize this group or render that one powerless and passive. In this spirituality the idea of "saintliness" could not consist in a "state of life," but would only apply existentially and concretely to some form of engaged behavior. Not only would there

be no double standard of Christian "perfection," the natural tendency to predicate "perfection" of a life of detachment, withdrawal and contemplation over against an active life in the world would be simply reversed. Monastic life, although it may be justified as a particular way of life, could in no way appear as standard or ideal.

Finally, this view of history and its consequent spirituality may be seen as fundamentally in line with the Christian understanding of grace. One must not view God and the human person in competition. God works within and guarantees human autonomy and its ability to transcend itself. From a merely human point of view, then, the goals of history laid down here are goals which strictly transcend human capabilities. But in Aquinas's terms, grace is precisely needed to accomplish that which transcends the finite and limited powers of human nature. There can be no correlation between liberation and salvation unless liberation is seen as the work of grace, for Christians are all agreed that saving liberation is God's work and not that of human beings. But if one recalls that grace works through human freedom and not independent of human response and action, then there is no need to fear Pelagianism. In the words of Rahner:

> When the basic relationship between God and the world is correctly viewed, excluding any anthropomorphic "synergism," the action of God appears as the possibility and dynamism of the action of the world, which moves in self-transcendence to its fulfillment.... World history may well be regarded as humanity's self-liberation from self-alienation. History in this sense takes place in moral action made possible by God's action, as a moment of rightly understood of man, given to mankind as its task.[48]

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[48] Karl Rabner, "Salvation," *Sacramentum Mundi,* V, p. 487.

THE MEDIEVAL QUESTION OF WOMEN AND ORDERS

TAKING ITS START from Peter Lombard's *Sentences* (c. 1148),[1] the medieval discussion of the sacrament of ordination went beyond his text to raise a question whose answer must have seemed so obvious that Lombard felt no need to mention it: whether male sex is a requirement for ordination. Many of the elements necessary to ask and to answer this question had already been assembled in Gratian's *Decretum* (c. 1140).[2] But it is not until the thirteenth century that it achieved either juridical or theological articulation.[3] The elaboration of the question of women and orders occurred in the context of the general twelfth century movement toward systematization in canon law and theology; its development reflects the pattern of interaction between these two sciences.[4] If the medieval conclusions to this question are to be used in the present-day discussion of women's ordination,[5] they must be understood in terms of this historical development.

[1] *Libri 4 Sententiarum* (Quaracchi, 1916), vol. 2.

[2] Ida Raining, *The Exclusion of Women From the Priesthood: Divine Law or Sex Discrimination?,* tr. by Norman R. Adams (Metuchen, N. J.: 1976), pp. 7-39, sets out the major texts in the *Decretum* that bear on the question of women and ordination. See also the discussion below.

[3] Of the later literature of canon law, the *glossa ordinaria* of the *Decretum* and several decretals and their glosses (particularly the decretal *Nova Quaedam)* are important for the statement of the question and will be treated below. In theological literature of the period, the question is raised explicitly for the first time, as far as I can ascertain, by Bonaventure and, shortly afterwards, by Thomas Aquinas (see below).

[4] For the interaction of canon law and theology, see J. de Ghellinck, *Le Mouvement theologique de XII• siecle* (2nd ed., Brussels, 1969), pp. *52-65,* 203-213, 416-510.

[5] As in the Vatican "Declaration on the Question of the Admission of Women to the Ministerial Priesthood" (Vatican City: Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 1976), no. 1, pp. *5-6.*

At the heart of the theological movement of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was the injunction of 1 Peter 3:15-"Always be ready to make a defense to any one who calls you to account for the hope that is in you."[6] Peter Lombard and his thirteenth century followers worked in the tension between the extremes of inarticulate fideism and overly articulate rationalism. Their arguments and conclusions depended as much on internal coherence as on the teaching of Scripture or the church. Not until the fourteenth century was the tension broken with the rise of a new fideism. The shift in theological perspective and method from Peter Lombard to Duns Scotus (or William of Ockham) is reflected in the developing discussion of women and orders, so that, by the end of the period considered here, Duns Scotus can attribute the exclusion of women from ordination solely to the will of Christ.

The process that led from Peter Lombard to Duns Scotus requires closer examination. As the various commentators on the *Sentences* expanded and refined their treatment of the sacrament of orders, room was made for the eventual posing of the question about the ordination of women. Once the question had been raised it could be developed according to the interests and concerns of the individual commentator. At the same time as this theological development was taking place, the decretists and decretalists who commented on the growing body of canon law influenced the theologians not only in the arrangement of their subject matter but in the nature of their conclusions. This was especially the case in regard to the sacraments.[7]

What I propose to do here is to trace the development of the question of women and orders in the *Sentence* commentaries of Alexander of Hales,[8] Albert the Great,[9] Bonaventure,[10]

[6] de Ghellinck, *Mouvement,* pp. 279-284.

[7] *Ibid.,* pp. 449 ff.

[8] *Glossa in Quat:uor Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi* (Quaracchi, 1957), vol. 4.

[9] *Commentarii in 4 Sententiarum,* in *Opera,* ed. A. Borgnet (Paris, Vives, 1894), vol. 20.

[10] *Comnientarium in 4 Libros Sententiarum,* in *Opera* (Quaracchi, 1882), vol. 4. Also *De Sacramentis,* in *Opera Omnia,* ed. A. Ohlmeyer (Miinster, 1958), vol. 26.

Thomas Aquinas,[11] and Duns Scotus,[12] and then relate this process briefly to the most important advances in canon law in this period as they bear on the question of women's ordination.

THE SENTENCES AND THE EARLY COMMENTATORS

In Book 4 of the *Sentences* Peter Lombard considers the sacraments and the last things. The sacrament of order is treated under two headings: Dist. 24 on the kinds of ecclesiastical orders and Dist. *25* on the problem of heretical ordinations. Seven grades of orders are enumerated in Dist. 24 and their institution is attributed to specific acts of Christ (c. 1-12).[18] Chapters 13-19 tie together the loose ends of episcopal office, prophet and cantor. Heretical ordinations are the nominal subject of Dist. *25* (c. 1) though major attention is given to the matter of simony (c. 2-6), with final references to the age of the ordinand (c. 7).

Alexander of Hales (c. 1223-1227) progresses beyond this arrangement to divide the subject somewhat more analytically. His commentary on Dist. 24 is straightforward, asking only what order is and how many orders there are. But in regard to Dist. *25* he is able to abstract from Lombard's concerns and pose two questions: who is incapable of receiving major or minor orders; and what are the causes which disqualify one for orders? This allows him to reduce the types of irregularity to disabilities of body, mind (illiteracy, infidelity, schism) and relationship (a. 1). The latter category is a catch-all which encompasses "depraved dispositions" of every sort.[14] Simony

[11] *Oommentum in 4 Librum Sententiarum,* in *Op&ra Omnia,* ed. S. Frette (Paris, Vives, 1874), vol. 11.

[12] *In Libri 4 Sententiarum,* Dist. 25, q. 2 (Paris, Vives, 1894): *Opus Oxoniense,* vol. 19; cf. *Reportata Parisiensia,* vol. 24.

[13] See de Ghellinck, *Mouvement,* pp. 827-833, for a discussion of Lombard's doctrine of the development of the seven grades of orders and the sources on which he drew.

[14] These are of various sorts: those dispositions not related to other persons, e.g., epilepsy; those related to other persons, e. g., in regard to one's carnal father (illegitimacy), or to one's spiritual father (heretical baptism); all other relational tranagressions, e. g., murder, simony and the like.

becomes a special case of this last disability. It is noteworthy that Alexander makes numerous references to the *Decretum* and later decretals, though he nowhere mentions the subject of women and orders.

Commenting on the *Sentences* in the years Hl41-45,[15] Albert the Great includes under Dist. 24 not only the various aspects of orders but the question of who may receive this sacrament (a. 7). The most significant insight is his distinction between those things which are *de necessitate Sacramenti* and those which are *de bene esse* (art. 7). A further distinction between the possession of sanctity and the conferral of priesthood (a. 82) is also important. Sanctity confers the likeness of priesthood, Albert argues, but not the priesthood itself. This is in keeping with a traditional anti-Donatist position (which, in this period would also be anti-Waldensian or Albigensian), but it also makes possible the later opinion (Thomas, Duns Scotus) that orders can validly, though not licitly, be conferred on a boy who has not yet attained the use of reason-but not on a woman.[16] Dist. 25 follows Alexander's basic arrangement, so that heretical ordination and simony fall under the heading of the dispensation (conferral) of the sacrament of order. In a separate treatise *De sacramentis,* however, the disposition of the material about orders differs markedly from the *Sentences* commentary. Although there are no notable departures in content, Albert here directs his attention to the character imprinted by the sacrament (considered only briefly in the commentary on Dist. 24, c. 84) and to the power of the keys.[17] Alexander had touched on the subject of binding and loosing (Dist. 24, a. 10), though Lombard had not mentioned it. Now Albert gives it detailed treatment. The need for theological reflection on the power of the keys seems to have been prompted as much by the canonists' preoccupations with the subject as

[15] James A. Weisheipl, 0. P., *Friar Thomas D'Aquino: His Life, Thought and Work* (New York, 1974), p. 40.

[16] Thomas, *In 4 Sent.,* Dist. 25, q. 2, a. I, *quaestiuncula* 2. Duns Scotus, *ln 4 Sent.,* Dist. 25, q. 2 (p. UlS).

[17] *De sacr.,* tract. 8, q. 4, 5.

by its intrinsic relationship to the theology of orders. The question of ordination of women does not arise in either the *Sentences* commentary or *De Sacramentis.*

Thomas Aquinas

Credit should probably go to Bonaventure for first raising the question explicitly in his commentary (1250-54)[18] once the work of Alexander and Albert had created the categories in which it could be asked. But because of Thomas Aquinas's association with Albert, his work will be discussed here first, even though it is slightly later than Bonaventure's chronologically.

Thomas wrote on the *Sentences* between 1252-1256 in Paris.[19] His division of the material is considerably more complex than his mentor's. Three questions occur to him in relation to Dist. 24: whether there ought to be order in the church (q. 1); what the distinctions of order are (q. 2); and other matters related to orders-tonsure, episcopal power, and vestments (q. 3). Numerous articles and *quaestiunculae* accompany each question. Similarly, three questions arise in regard to Dist. 25: on those who ordain (q.l); on those who are ordained (q. 2); and on simony (q. 3). With the creation of a category in which to consider the recipient of ordination, Thomas opens Dist. 25 to the question of women and orders. Article 1 of question 2 puts the matter succinctly: " whether the feminine sex is an impediment to the reception of orders." [20]

For Thomas, impediments to ordination are of two sorts: defects. of nature and conditions of external fortune. Female sex, minority (for boys) and lack of the use of reason are all defects of the first sort (art. I); slavery, homicide, illegitimacy, and physical defects are of the second (art. 2). Thomas's argument about the natural defect of women's nature is the reason for his rejection of the possibility of women's ordination.

[18] F. Stegmiiller, *Repertorium Commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi* (Wurzburg, 1947), vol. 1, p. 56.

[19] Weisheipl, *.Thomas,* pp. 358-359; but cf. Stegmiiller, *Repertorium,* p. 393, who dates this work to 1254-1256.

[20] Utrum sexus femineus impediat ordinis susceptionem.

Thomas adduces three strong arguments on behalf of the opinion that female sex is not an impediment to ordination: (1) prophecy is greater than priesthood, and women have been prophets; (2) order pertains to some perfection or preeminence, and women have possessed such *praelatio* under both the old covenant (Deborah judging Israel) and the new (the case of abbesses), demonstrating it particularly in martyrdom and religious life; (3) the power of order pertains to the soul, and the soul is without sex. In opposition he places two arguments. The fir.st is directly scriptural-women may not teach in the church (I Tim. 2: 12 ff.) . The second rests only indirectly on Scripture: the tonsure is required for ordination, even though it is not of the necessity of the sacrament; but Scripture forbids women to cut their hair (I Cor. 11). In his solution Thomas refines Albert's distinction of those things which belong to orders *de necessitate* and *de bene esse.* He discriminates instead between that which is *de necessitate sacramenti* and that which is *de necessitate praecepti propter congruitatem ad sacramentum.* [21] If the former is lacking, there is neither *sacramentum* nor *res sam-amenti;* if the latter is missing, it is possible to receive the *sacramentum* but not the *res sacramenti.* On the basis of this distinction, Thomas concludes that the male sex is the object of both kinds of necessity in regard to ordination. Even if a woman should undergo the entire rite of ordination, Thomas argues, she would not receive the sacrament of orders.

The fundamental defect of woman's nature which makes her incapable of ordination is her natural state of subjection (*quia mulier statum subjeotionis habet)* • Thomas' s interpretation of references in the Decretum [22] to *diaconissae* and *presbyterae* was determined by his view that women were by nature incapable of ordination (hence could not have been " ordained " in the early church) . For him, as for the decretists, *diaconissa* could only mean a woman who shares in some act of a deacon (i. e., reading the homily in church-which an abbess could do) ,

[21] Solutio I (pp. 52-53) .

[22] C. 23, q. 1, c. 23; Dist. 32, c. 19.

while *presbytera* signified an older woman, specifically a widow. Thus possible historical evidence for some sort of ecclesiastical ordination of women was ruled out of court *de facto* by Thomas.

Bonaventure

Bonaventure follows much the same organizational scheme as Thomas and reaches similar conclusions. Dist. 24 is divided into two parts of two articles each. Part I is concerned with the sacrament of orders in relation to those things which determine it: the sign of orders and orders in general. Part II deals with the grades and dignities of orders, first in regard to the character imprinted and then in regard to number. In Dist. 25 Bonaventure divides his material into articles on the power of ordaining (a. 1) and on those who are able to receive orders (a. 2). Simony is subsumed under the latter topic, rather than being treated separately. The question of women's ordination seems to fall naturally into place under the topic of the requirements for receiving orders. Art. 2, q. 1 asks whether the male sex is required for the reception of orders; subsequent questions deal with the use of reason, single marriage (*indivisio carnis*- i. e., bigamy), and the condition of freedom.

The requirement of sex is established by Bonaventure's conclusion that neither *de iure* nor *de facto* are women able to receive orders. The conclusion is in agreement with Thomas, though the reasoning process differs in important respects. Unlike Thomas, Bonaventure begins from the "common opinion" that women ought not to be admitted to holy orders, and he cites several important texts from the *Decretum* in support of this view. In addition to the references to *diaconissae* and *presbyterae,* Bonaventure quotes the prohibition of consecrated women (nuns) from handling sacred vessels and linen or censing the altar.[23] He admits that there is some question as to whether women are even capable of being ordained, but he resolves his doubts about this by appealing to the "sounder and more prudent opinion of the doctors" (*saniorem opinionem*

[23] Dist. 23, c. 25.

et prudentiorem doctorum) [24] that women's incapacity for ordination is *de facto* as well as *de iure.* Only the conclusion to this argument is quoted by the Vatican Declaration, and that without any indication of the " probable " status that Bonaventure had attached to it: that women cannot be ordained is, according to Bonaventure, not so much the church's doing as the result of a natural incapacity which prevents them from receiving orders.

The process by which Bonaventure arrived at this conclusion is determined by the problematic laid out at the beginning of the question. The opinions cited against the necessity of male sex for the reception of orders closely parallel Thomas's list: Deborah judged Israel; abbesses have exercised authority; orders are relevant to the soul, not the flesh; and women have exhibited *praelatio* in martyrdom and religious life. But the reasons advanced for the necessity of maleness for ordination depart significantly from Thomas's arguments. (1) There must be a natural possibility or aptitude for any order-but tonsure is not possible for women (cf. I Cor. 11). (2) It is necessary that the person being ordained bear the image of God, " because in this sacrament the person *[homo]* in some way becomes God or divine, since he participates in the divine power" -but it is the male *(vir)* who is the image of God by reason of sex (cf. 1 Cor. 11:7).[25] (3) Spiritual power is conferred in ordination-but women are not able to receive or exercise such power (cf. I Tim. 2:12). (4) All orders are preparatory for the episcopacy, and the bishop is the spouse of the church-but women cannot be husbands, hence neither can they be bishops, so access to orders is only for men *(virorum)*. The second and fourth opinions cited for the necessity of male sex for ordination tum the argument in a different direction from Thomas's presentation. The inclusion of these arguments among the affirmative opin-

[24] *Doctorum* most likely refers to the can.onists.

[25] ... quia in hoc Sacramento homo quodam modo fit D.eus sive divinus, dum potestatis divinae fit particeps; sed vir ratione sexus est *imago, Dei,* sicut dicitur primae ad Corinthios undecimo ....

ions leads Bonaventure to a more complex position than Thomas's assertion of women's inferiority due to their state of subjection. His reasoning is strikingly familiar to the modern reader: " In this sacrament the person who is ordained signifies Christ the mediator; both because the mediator was only in the male sex and because he can be signified by the male sex, the possibility of receiving orders belongs only to men, who alone can naturally represent and, in accordance with the reception of the character, actually bear the sign of him." [26] Bonaventure argues forcefully, but nevertheless concedes that his conclusion is only the " more probable " *(probabilior)* position, though it can, he claims, be proved by many authorities.

In the commentaries of Thomas and Bonaventure, the discussion of holy orders unfolded at nearly the same time to reveal a question as to why women could not receive this sacrament. Within their responses to this question there are differences in emphasis and treatment of the major negative and affirmative opinions and in the way objections are resolved. But the fundamental structure of the question of orders is set by them, as is the answer to the question of women and orders.

John Duns Scotus

In the commentary of John Duns Scotus on the *Sentences* (Oxford, c. 1298-1300),[21] there is little that is new. In fact, the question of women's ordination seems to have become so commonplace that it is simply combined with the question of the age necessary for ordination *(aetas puerilis)* in Dist. 25, q. 2. The cited, however, all refer to the impediment of sex. Although the opinions presented are predictable, the inclusion of canonical arguments at the beginning of the question rather than in the resolution is somewhat novel. The position

••In hoc enim Sacramento persona, quae ordinatur, significat Christum mediatorem; et quoniam mediator solum in virili sexu fuit et per virilem sexum potest significari: ideo possibilitas suscipiendi ordines solum viris competit, qui soli possunt *natural,iter repraesentare* et secundum *characteris suscl!]Jtionem* actu signum huius ferre.

•• Stegmiiller, *Repertorium,* p.

that sex would not be an impediment to ordination is supported by Gal. 3 (: 27 ff) -since there is no difference between male and female in Christ, neither is there any difference between them in the sacraments of the evangelical law. The *Decretum* is also cited as evidence of women who have had ordination: *presbyterae* (Dist. 32., c. 19) and *diaconissae* (Dist. 27, q. 1, c. 23). On the opposing side, however, is Dist. 23, c. 25 of the *Decretum,* which forbids women to handle the consecrated vessels and linens. Scriptural support for the negative opinion is offered by I Cor. 11, in which women are forbidden to cut their hair, thus making them unable to receive tonsure. Scotus's resolution of the problem is a refinement on the solutions of Thomas and Bonaventure. He distinguishes three ways in which a person can be excluded from orders: on the basis of not being able to receive it reverently and properly; not being able to receive it licitly (in accord with the law, *praeceptum);* and not being able to receive it *de facto.* Women are a case of this third mode of exclusion.

The *de facto* inability of women to receive orders is not determined by the church, Scotus argues, but by Christ. It depends solely on his will, since "the church would not have presumed to deprive the entire sex of women, without any fault of their own, of an act which would licitly have been theirs, and which might have been ordained for the salvation of woman and others in the church through her. . . . "[28] It should be noted that unlike Thomas, Scotus does not locate the incapacity in woman's nature (neither as it was created nor as it came to be after the Fall); nor does he place it, as Bonaventure does, in a natural or physical inability to represent the male Christ. Rather this incapacity is due solely to the will of Christ, upon which the church bases its practice. In citing this opinion of Duns Scotus, the Vatican Declaration omits the last clause quoted above, as well as the remainder of the sentence; com-

[28] Non enim Ecclesia praesumpsisset totum sexum muliebrem privasse sine culpa sua, actu, qui posset sibi licite competere, qui esset ordinatus ad salutem mulieris et aliorum in Ecclesia per earn, ...

pletion of the sentence makes a substantive difference in interpreting the force and intention of Scotus's argument. For he goes on to say that apart from the will of Christ, the exclusion of women from orders " would seem to be a very great injustice, not only to the entire sex, but also to a few specific persons *[paucis person.is];* but now, if by divine law ecclesiastical order could licitly belong to woman, this would be for their salvation and the salvation of others through them." [29] Underlying Scotus's argument, therefore, is the presumption that the ordination of women would have considerable pastoral benefits which could not rightly be ignored by the church except on the instruction of Christ. This means that for Duns Scotus the prohibition of women teaching or holding authority (I Tim. 2) is not just an apostolic opinion but the will of Christ.

On this voluntaristic base Scotus constructs his response to those arguments that do not find sex an impediment to ordination. His refutation makes use of a number of arguments employed by earlier commentators. He argues that Jesus did not install his mother in any grade of order in the church, hence no other woman could receive orders; that natural reason is in accord with this position, since after the Fall women can have no degree of eminence in the human race; and that Christ's law makes no distinction between male and female in the realm of grace and glory, but quite properly does make such distinctions in regard to the degrees of excellence held in the church. [80] The treatment of legal sources accords with the interpretations offered by Thomas and Bonaventure: *presbytera* refers to the wife of a priest among the Greeks, or among the Latins, a widow, and may also indicate the position of authority exercised by an abbess among her nuns; *diaconissa* may also refer to an abbess or to anyone who reads the homily during matins. [81]

•• . . . quia hoc esse videretur maxima injustitia, non solum in toto sexu, sed etiam in paucis personis; nunc autem si de lege divina licite posset competere mulieri ordo Ecclesiasticus, posset esse ad salutem et carum et aliorum Pill:

[80] *In 4 Sent.,* p. 140.

•1 *Ibid.,* p. 141.

No question of orders is involved in the case of either the *presbytera* or *diaconissa.*

Theology and Canon Law

The development of medieval theological consideration of the question of women and orders was the result of a three-fold process. The process began by an opening out of the discussion of holy orders so that room was made for the question of women's ordination to arise. Once the question was asked explicitly, it underwent a development and shift in emphasis, though several constants remained throughout the various treatments of the question. The third and as yet unaccounted-for aspect of this process was the influence of developments in canon law. These are of considerable importance in understanding the evolution of medieval thought on the subject of women and orders. For aside from the internal logic of the commentaries themselves, there were other forces which worked to move Bonaventure to raise a previously unasked theological question: what was the reason for the church's practice of ordaining only men?

Not the least among the external forces that led to the asking of this question was the continued development of canon law after the widespread acceptance of Gratian's *Decretum.* Already within that collection were numerous texts with definite, though not always articulated, implications for the status of women in the church and the possibility of their ordination. Some of these have been touched on in the examination of the *Sentences* commentaries; here I list only the most important documents.[82] Dist. 23, c. *25* prohibits women from touching consecrated vessels and linens and from censing the altar; c. 29 of the same distinction prohibits women, however learned and holy, from teaching men.[33] Dist. 32, c. 19 mentions women

[82] See Raming, *Exclusion,* pp. 7-39, for analysis of these materials.

[••] Mulier, quamvis docta et sancta, viros in conventu docere non presumat. Laicus autem presentibus clericis (nisi ipsis rogantibus) docere non audeat. *Corpus Juris Canonici,* ed. A. Friedberg (Graz, 1959), vol. 1, col. 86.

who were called *presbyterae* among the Greeks.[34] Similarly, C. 27, q. 1, c. 23 contains a reference to *diaconissae,* anathematizing those who marry after receiving ordination.[35] The exclusion of women :from the sacred sphere of liturgical objects and practices is the subject of several chapters in the book *De consecratione.* Dist. I, *de cons.,* c. 41-42 permits only consecrated (i.e., ordained) men to handle consecrated vessels and vestments.86 Dist. 2, *de cons.,* c. 29 forbids the practice of women taking communion to the sick.[37] And Dist. 4, *de cons.,* c. 20 prohibits women from teaching or baptizing.[38]

As the influence of the *Decretum* spread, these points of canon law gained a certain amount of familiarity among educated churchmen, theologians and canonists alike. Raming

[3·] Mulieres que apud Graecos presbiterae appellantur, apud nos autem viduae, ooniores, univirae et matricuriae appellantur, in ecclesia tanquam ordinatas constitui non debere. Friedberg, *Corpus,* vol. 1, col. Ut2.

[85] Diaconissam non debere ante annos quadraginta ordinari statuimus, et hoc cum diligenti probatione. Si vero susceperit ordinationem, et quantocumque tempore observaverit ministerium, et postea se nuptiis tradiderit, iniuriam faciens gratiae Dei, hec anathema sit cum eo, qui in illius nuptiis convenerit. Friedberg, *Corpus,* vol 1, col. *1055.*

[86] C. 41: In sancta apostolica sede statutum est, ut sacra vasa non ab aliis, quam a sacratis Dominoque dicatis contrectentur hominibus. Ne pro talibus presumptionibus iratus Dominus plagam inponat populo suo, et hi etiam, qui non peccaverunt, pereant, quia perit iustus sepissime pro inpio.

C. 42: Vestimcnta ecclesiae, quibus Domino ministratur, et sacrata debent ease et honesta, quibus in aliis usibus non debent frui, quam ecclesiasticis et Deo dignis offitiis; que nee ab aliis debent contingi aut offerri, nisi a sacratis hominibus, ne ultio, que Baltasar regem percussit, super hoc transgredientes veniat, et corruere eos faciat ad ima.

Both in Friedberg, *Corpus,* vol. 1, cols. 1304-1305.

[87] Pervenit ad notitiam nostram, quod quidam presbiteri in tantum parvipendant divina misteria, ut laico aut feminae sacrum corpus Domini tradant ad deferendum infirmis, et quibus prohibetur, ne sacrarium ingrediantur, nee ad altare appropinquent, illis sancta sanctorum committuntur. Quod quam sit horribile quamque detestabile, omnium religiosorum animadvertit prudentia. Igitur interdicit per omnia sinodus, ne talis temeraria presumptio ulterius fiat; sed omnimodis presbiter per semetipsum infirmum communicet. Quod si aliter fecerit, gradus sui periculo subiacebit. Friedberg, *Corpus,* vol. 1, cols. 1323-1824.

[88] Mulier, quamvis docta et sancta, baptizare aliquos vel vires docere in conventu, non presumat. [Ex Concilio Cartagiensi V.] *Gratian:* Nisi necessitate cogente. Friedberg, Corpus, vol. 1, col. 1367.

gives a detailed analysis of the relevant texts and the history of their interpretation.[89] Rather than repeat her discussion of this material on the work of the decretists and later the decretalists, I want simply to single out the most crucial advances in each of these areas.

Commentators on the *Decretum* appeared in rapid succession and glossed most of the *loci* that bear on the question of women and ordination. Among the glossators, Johannes Teutonicus exercised considerable influence. Writing between 1212-1215, he assimilated into his commentary the work of earlier glossators as well as the decretals of Innocent III. Published after the IV Lateran council and finally revised by Bartholomew of Brescia in 1240-45, the commentary of Johannes Teutonicus quickly became the *glossa ordinaria* to the *Decretum.*[40] The discussion of C. 27, q. 1, c. 23 (on deaconesses) therefore achieved a currency far beyond mere individual opinion. Johannes Teutonicus used the earlier gloss of Huguccio almost verbatim in explaining why women were incapable of ordination: "I respond that women do not receive the character (of order) because of the impediment of their sex and the constitution of the church."[41] This opinion is new to decretist literature with Huguccio and Teutonicus.[42] Its influence can be felt in the developing theological opinion of the *Sentences* commentaries.

The *Decretum* had legitimated papal legislative authority and in its aftermath came a multiplication of papal decretals. Gregory IX commissioned Raymond of Pefiaforte, O. P., a canonist and his personal chaplain, to make a systematic compilation of these decretals, which was published in 1234 as the *Compilatio Nova* (or *Liber Extra).* The two most important

[89] Raming, *Exdusion,* pp. 44-69 (on the *Decretum)* and pp. 78-93 (on the decretalists) .

[40] J. F. von Schulte, *Die Geschichte der Quelfon und Literatur des. Canonischen Rechts* (Stuttgart, 1875), vol. 1, pp. 172-174. Also Raming, *Exclusion,* p. 65.

[41] Respondeo, quod mulieres non recipiunt characterem impedimente sexu, et constitutione ecclesiae. *Glossa Ordinaria* as found in the edition *Decretales D. Gregorii Papae IX suae lntegritati: una cum glossis.* (Rome, 1552) .

[42] Raming, *Exclusion,* p. 62.

decretals are *Nova Quaedam* (Innocent III, !QIO) , which prohibits abbesses from giving a blessing to their nuns, hearing confessions, reading the Gospel, or preaching in public,[43] and *Dilecta* (Honorius III, rn22), which deals with the kind of jurisdiction exercised by abbesses.[44] The inevitable glosses followed on these and other decretals in the collection, until Bernard of Parma's commentary (c. IQ45) became the *glossa ordinaria* on Gregory IX's collection. Bernard's gloss on *Nova Quaedam* extends the range of liturgical functions prohibited to women: once, perhaps, women could read the gospel at matins, and for this reason were called *diaconissa;* but not only can they not teach or preach, they cannot touch sacred vessels; neither can they veil their nuns or absolve them; and they cannot exercise judgment, except perhaps, according to custom, those among them who were of the nobility. Bernard concludes: " in general, the office of a man is forbidden to women." [45]

An independent but nevertheless influential commentator, Henricus Segusia (Hostiensis) offered a .similar explanation in his *Summa Super Tituli Decretalium (Summa Aurea)* c. 1250-IQ53.[46] "But in addition to the above mentioned regulations,"

•• Nova quaedam *nuper, de quibus miramur non modicum,* nostris sunt auribus intimata, quod abatissae *videlicet in Burgensi et in Pcdentinensi diocesibus constitutae,* moniales proprias benedicunt, ipsarum quoque confessiones in criminibus audiunt, et legentes evangelium praesumunt publice praedicare. . . .
of Gregory IX, in Friedberg, *Corpus,* vol. 2, Lib. *5,* tit. 88, *De Poenitent.* c. 10, cols. 886-887 See also Raming, *Exclusion,* pp 70-74.

.. Dilecta in Christo filia abbatissa de Bubrigen, transmissa nobis petitione monstravit, quod, quum ipsa plerumque canonicas suas et clericos suae iurisdictioni subiectos propter inoebedientias et culpas eorum officio beneficioque suspendat iidem confisi ex eo, quod eadem abbatissa excommunicare eos non potest, suspensionem huiusmodi non observant, propter quod ipsorum excessus remanent incorrecti. Quocirca *discretioni tuae* mandamus, quatenus dictas canonicas et clericos, ut abbatissae praefatae obedientiam et reverentiam debitam impendentes, eius salubria monita et mandata observent, *monitione praemissa* ecclesiastica ccnsura *appellatione remota* compellas. Friedberg, *Corpus,* vol. 2, col. 201. See Raming, *Exclusion,* pp. 75-78; and for the commentators on both texts, pp. 78-98.

•• . . . et generaliter viri officium mulieribus est interdictum. *Decretales,* col. 1870. Raming, *Exclusion,* pp 81-82.

••Schulte, *Geschichte,* pp. 128 ff. Raming, *Exclusion,* p. 88.

he writes, "sex is also a requirement (for ordination) : for orders are not conferred on a woman *(mulieri)* but on a man *(homini),* as Ambrose [Ambrosiaster] commented on Timothy (I Tim. 3: 11) ... for they ought not to be tonsured, nor may the hair of a woman be cut ... nor can they exercise the power of the keys ... nor even ought they serve at the altar ... although they may read the Gospel at matins" [47] The gloss of Hostiensis is a further instance of the interaction between canon law and theology in regard to women and orders.

Although direct contacts cannot be demonstrated between the canonists and theologians of the thirteenth century as the question of ordination of women developed, the similarity of arguments, the reliance on specific canonical texts, and the importance of the friars in the schools of both canon law and theology all argue for a common universe of discourse in which this question was considered. To judge from the general interpenetration of theology and canon law in the systematization of each discipline, it is reasonable to expect that the dialogue between the two would easily extend to a subject that was relevant to both. [48]

Conclusion

Medieval reflection on the question of women and ordination did not develop in a straightforward manner, and, while there was general agreement that women were incapable of ordination, the theological justifications of this opinion varied greatly. The *Sentences* commentators were far from being of one mind on the subject. When the question was first raised in theological discussion, Bonaventure clearly acknowledged the uncertainty

" Sed et praeter regulas supradictas requiritur sexus: nee enim mulieri, sed homini sunt ordines conferendi, sicut dicit Ambrosius ad Timotheum ... quia nee tonsurari debent . . . nee mulieris coma amputanda est . . . nee potest potestatem clavium exercere ... nee etiam ad altare servire debet . . . potest tamen evangelium dicere ad matutinam. *Summa Aurea,* col. 188, as quoted in Raming, Exclusion, pp. 211-!Wl (note 90 to p. 83) .

••For a similar process in an earlier period, see de Ghellinck, *Mouvement,* pp. 537-547 (on Hugh of St. Victor and the "species quadriformis sacramentorum" in the canonists and theologians).

of his conclusion that neither *de facto* nor *de iure* were women able to be ordained. He did, however, attempt to bolster his opinion by labeling it the " more prudent " view, one which enjoyed the support of many saintly authorities. When Thomas Aquinas addressed himself to the topic a few years later, he did not doubt the certainty of his conclusions, but he based them on arguments that differed greatly from Bonaventure's-namely, the incongruity between woman's natural state of subjection and the degree of eminence signified by the sacrament of orders. Finally, when Duns Scotus came to consider the question of sex as an impediment to ordination, he removed the discussion almost entirely from the realm of reasoned discourse by appealing solely to the will of Christ as the basis of women's exclusion from ordination.

In its appeal to the conclusions of medieval treatments of the question of women and orders, the Vatican " Declaration on the Question of the Admission of Women to the Ministerial Priesthood " ignores both the historical development and the textual and theological context of the opinions which it cites. In so doing, the Declaration makes the medieval discussion appear far more uniform than it in fact was, and gives to medieval opinion a degree of authority which, for the most part, it did not claim for itself. The views of Thomas Aquinas are passed over in silence by the Declaration, presumably because his arguments are among those medieval opinions which " modern thought would ... rightly reject." [49] By rejecting the most forcefuly articulated medieval position against the ordination of women, the Declaration is compelled to fall back on the opinions of Bonaventure and Duns Scotus. It is therefore crucial in evaluating the weight of the medieval evidence to know that Bonaventure regarded his conclusion as *pobabilior, sanior,* and *prudentior.* Yet the Declaration gives no indication of Bonaventure's own reservations. Further, the Declaration quotes but a fragment of a long and complex sentence from Duns Scotus, citing only his appeal to the will of Christ as the

•• Declaration, no. 1 (p. 6).

reason why women cannot be ordained, and ignoring completely Scotus's stress on the pastoral good that could have come to the church from the ordination of women. By wrenching his conclusion out of context, the Declaration misrepresents the nature of Duns Scotus's opposition to the ordination of women.

Finally, in failing to take account of the influence of established liturgical practice on the development of canon law, and neglecting as well the interaction of medieval canon law and theology (especially as represented in the *Sentences* commentaries), the Declaration regards theological opinion and doctrinal development in a vacuum. Taken in isolation from the disciplinary developments which occasion them and which they in tum legitimate and reinforce, such theological opinions are given a certain timeless status in the Declaration and a degree of authority that is warranted neither by the intention of their authors nor by the logic of historical argument.

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POSSIBILITIES OF RELIGIOUS SKEPTICISM

CERTAIN PHILOSOPHERS OF religion would describe themselves as religious skeptics. A number believe, indeed, that their orientation should be shared by all. Other philosophers of religion think that religious skepticism is impossible; or at any rate that it is, and should be seen by all to be, an inappropriate stance to adopt. In this paper I wish to set out an approach of my own to the possibilities of religious skepticism. My discussion will focus on states of doubt that arise in relation to the Biblical tradition.[1] And I will say at the outset that I have come to regard the matter as more complex than either of the aforementioned groups would suggest.

I. PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION

Opposing Viewpoints on Religious Skepticism. Let us begin by considering a sampling of remarks made by representatives of the two opposing viewpoints. A leading representative of the former is Kai Nielsen. Nielsen suggests that even "believers characteristically have doubts; even the man in 'the circle of faith' is threatened with disbelief."[2] And the difficulties which

[1] This study arises from a background in Christianity, and from reflection on states of doubt in relation to it. I would emphasize, accordingly, that the account I shall offer is thus restricted in its intended scope.

The present paper might usefully be read in conjunction with a companion piece, "Understanding and Agreement in Religion," *The Modern Schoolman, 55* (1978). That study includes, in particular, a fuller discussion of the notion of "faith awareness," introduced in section II below. I would hope, however, that my suggestions about religious skepticism will be found to be well supported by the present analyses, together with the further research herein envisioned.

• Kai Nielsen, "In Defense of Atheism," reprinted in Norbert O. Schedler, ed., *Philosophy of Religion* (New York: Macmillan, 1974), p.

arise in this context are by no means idle ones: " some come to reject a religious orientation altogether because of such considerations." [3] The considerations in question, whether they originate within or without the circle of faith, take a number of different forms. Thus there can be said to be " varieties of religious scepticism." [4] But it can in general be remarked concerning the orientation of skeptics that it involves " a rejection of religion 'because they find Christianity unpersuasive, incredible.' " [5] And well they might, according to Nielsen. For when fully elaborated the difficulties which even many believers feel become general and powerful critiques of religious faith. In relation to the major Western traditions, at any rate, it must be said that " religious belief or commitment is not even reasonable, let alone justified." [6] Again, it is possible to produce certain arguments-arguments of relevance to all-which " show why we should be sceptics." [7]

On the other side of the picture we find philosophers who question the viability of a skeptical orientation. A leading spokesman for this group is D. Z. Phillips. Phillips recognizes the possibility of religious rebellion, in which one *comes* to " reject and defy" one's tradition and its God.[8] He also notes that it happens that "a person cannot bring himself to react in a certain way; he has no use for a certain [religious] picture of the situation." [9] Beyond cases of these sorts, however, the doubts

[8] Kai Nielsen, *Scepticism* (London: Macmillan, 1973), p. *3.*

• *Ibid.,* p. 4.

[5] *Ibid.,* p. *5.* The contained quotation is from Ninian Smart, *Philosophers and Religious Truth* (New York: Macmillan, 1970), p. 9.

•Kai Nielsen, *Contemporary Critiques of Religion* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), p. 136.

[7] Nielsen, *Scepticism,* p. 9. Among various other philosophers who express some form of religious skepticism the following might in particular be mentioned: Antony Flew, Ronald Hepburn, and Alasdair Macintyre. See, for example, Flew's *God and Philosophy* (London: Hutchinson, 1966); Hepburn's *Christianity and Paradox* (New York: Pegasus, 1968); and Maclntyre's portion of *The Religious Significance of Atheism* (New York: Columbia, 1969).

[8] D. Z. Phillips, *Faith and Philosophical Enquiry* (New York: Schocken, 1971), p. 31.

• *Ibid.,* p. 100.

which people—and especially philosophers—express are more questionable in nature and origin. A proper analysis of these doubts results in negative light being cast on certain features of the people's own thinking. Very often, for example, an individual's difficulty with religious proposals stems from some "craving for generality"—some tendency to assimilate in an illegitimate way these proposals with certain others.[10] In any event, according to Phillips, it is possible to "refute scepticism about ... religion."[11] Alternatively it can be said that if a person has a correct grasp of relevant matters "his understanding of religion is incompatible with scepticism."[12]

General Characterizations and Distinctions. The general views here sketched are developed at length by the writers we have referred to, among others. And we might, I think, feel some initial attraction to points which are expressed by them both. But we might also feel a certain unclarity about the issue, at least as it emerges from the above remarks. For the notions employed—doubt, personal inability, rejection of an orientation, skepticism—tend to be somewhat hazy in general, let alone in application to religious phenomena. We might do well, accordingly, to approach our investigation by making some initial characterizations and distinctions.

Taking up the concept of doubting, first of all, I would offer

[10] *Ibid.,* p. 68. See also, for example, p. 72.

[11] *Ibid.,* p. 201.

[12] *Ibid.,* p. 88. See also Phillips's books *The Concept of Prayer* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965) and *Religion Without Explanation* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1976). Three other writers whose essays indicate that they might properly be grouped with Phillips on this matter are Paul L. Holmer, Norman Malcolm, and Harry A. Nielsen. See, for example, Holmer's "Atheism and Theism: A Comment on an Academic Prejudice," *Lutheran World,* 18 (1966); Malcolm's "Is it a Religious Belief that 'God Exists'?" in John Hick, ed., *Faith and the Phifoaophera* (London: Macmillan, 1964); and Nielsen's "Kierkegaard's Metaphysical Crotchet," *Proceedi'ngsof the American Catholic Philosophical Association,* 46 (1972). I wish to make clear that I am not suggesting, in relation to either of the two groups of philosophers, that there would be internal agreement on all points of significance.

the following general characterization. An individual will be aaid to be in a *state of doubt* with regard to a set of proposals if he finds that in relating himself to those proposals his thinking is dominated by a difficulty or difficulties-difficulties of a sort that could be expressed in terms of considerations going against them. I would point out that what is being offered here is an account of our concept of a particular state. In connection with this account we can come to mark a number of important distinctions. Thus a state of *doubt,* as I shall speak of it, is different from one in which the person involved *simply fails to arrive* at any orientation, and also from one in which the person involved *simply rejects* the proposals at hand. (However, both a state of *uncertain-by because of consideTati.ons against* and a state of *rejection or denicil because of considerations against* can, for purposes of the pre.sent discussion, be regarded as types of states of doubt. We might think of them as minimal and maximal types of such states in terms of their degree of intensity.) We should also distinguish between being in a *state* of doubt and being merely to some degree *troubl.ed* by doubt-an experience that can befall even those who embrace a set of proposals. It must be added, however, that while we can draw these various lines in the abstract, it is not always clear, at the level of the concrete, how a particular case is to be described.

Sometimes it can be said that the occurrence of a state of doubt reflects negatively on the individual's own thinking. For sometimes the process of communicating a set of proposals is direct and public in character, involving on the part of everyone concerned only procedures which are straightforward and open to general assessment. In cases of this sort the process can be said to be certain in its proper results. And in some cases of this sort the results are such as to preclude a person's thinking being dominated by a particular difficulty. To the extent that this is found to hold, but only to the extent that this is found to hold, a judgment will be in order that in principle no one should be in the state of doubt in question. A judgment will be in order, that is, that if anyone possesses the required human

capacity, and receives a full exposure to the proposals, he can and should avoid the state.[18]

Sometimes too, however, reflection on one person's state of doubt gives rise to a strong judgment concerning others. To the extent that the consideration a doubter expresses is of general and public relevance there arises, as we might put it, a prima facie argument that others should share his state. Of course, in a case of this sort another possibility also arises-the possibility that whatever the consideration's perceived force for the individual, it can by others be seen to reveal a misapprehension or mistake, rather than to indicate a genuine problem with the proposals. On the other hand, to the extent that the consideration a doubter expresses is individual and private in its significance the possibility just mentioned will not arise; but then the occurrence of his state will not have a tendency to argue that others should come to share it. The implication that others should come to share a state of doubt will emerge to the extent that, but only to the extent that, two conditions are jointly fulfilled: first, that the consideration expressed is of general and public relevance; and second, that the consideration indicates a genuine problem with the proposals.

In connection with these points we might distinguish two senses of the term "skepticism." These I shall call the "weak sense" and the "strong sense," respectively. "Skepticism" in the weak sense will apply to any state of doubt, regardless of the individual's views about implications concerning others. "Skepticism" in the strong sense will apply only to a state of doubt in which the individual thinks that a strong implication emerges-a strong implication, that is, that others should share

[18] I would emphasize that while I shall sometimes speak, as I have just above, of states of doubt "reflect(ing) negatively" on people's *thinking,* there is not here any question of a negative reflection on the *people themselves.* For an individual may, for example, fail to possess the required human capacity; or-more likely in the present context-fail to receive a full exposure to the proposals. Similarly, when I come to speak of certain skeptical orientations as being "inappropriate," I shall be using the term absolutely, rather than as implying any judgment concerning individuals.

his state. Orientations of the former sort might be appropriate to the extent that judgments are not in order that in principle no one should be in the states in question, and accordingly to the extent that the related processes of communication do not yield results of certainty which would preclude a person's thinking being dominated by the difficulties. Orientations of the latter sort will be appropriate to the extent that the implications mentioned above do in fact emerge, and accordingly to the extent that the two associated conditions are jointly and strongly fulfilled.

Let us now seek to apply these general points to difficulties which arise vis-a-vis Christianity.

II. STATES OF DOUBT IN RELATION TO CHRISTIAN TEACHINGS: AN INVESTIGATION OF CASES FROM FIVE CATEGORIES

Clearly a great many difficulties are expressed concerning Biblical religion. They are not, however, entirely without common features. Rather they might-at least for purposes of our inquiry-be grouped into certain general categories. Thus, while we could not consider every type of case which would be relevant to our concerns, we might, by investigating an example from each category, achieve the broad outlines of a " perspicuous representation." [14] I shall begin the present section by expressing a perspective on the grouping of religious doubts. Then I shall undertake an examination of cases from the various categories that might be marked off. Finally I shall note some complexities to be encountered at the level of the concrete and particular.

General Perspective. My approach to the grouping of doubts in this area involves relating them to the state enjoyed by believers-or, more accurately, to the state those seeking to communicate the Scriptural mesage hope will come about. I call

[14] The term " perspicuous representation " is from Wittgenstein. I hope he would approve of the use I make of it in this paper. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations,* tr. by G. E. M. Anscombe, 3rd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1968) Part I, sec. 122.

the state in question the state of " awareness adequate to faith," or " faith awareness " for short. By way of characterizing this state we might say that an individual will be said to enjoy it when, and insofar as, he perceives what is proposed to him as a life of faith-a particular complex of affirmation and relationship and activity-in such a manner as to feel called to make the deepest and most definite personal response. (Such an individual will, accordingly, view his actual faith or non-faith in terms of his response to the life-possibility thus perceived.) Although a characterization of this sort is very general, it seems clear that many persons who have encountered the Scriptural message fail to enjoy a state of faith awareness. It also seems clear that insofar as a person's state departs from the one in question, he may find that his thinking in relation to the religious proposals is dominated by a difficulty or difficulties-difficulties of a sort that could be expressed in terms of considerations going against them. He may, that is, be in a state of doubt. Reflection on this and other points can give rise to the following suggestion: that the categories of doubt that might be marked off vis-a-vis Biblical religion correspond to an internal complexity in the state of awareness adequate to faith; and that each category might thus be characterized as representing a departure from this state along a certain determinate line. In light of research to date I believe that this suggestion is borne out through a consideration of the relevant phenomena.

Investigation of Cases. The specific view I have come to adopt is that we might appropriately mark off five categories of religious doubt, with each category corresponding in the way indicated above to what we might call an aspect of faith awareness.[15] We proceed, accordingly, to an investigation of five

[15] For fuller discussions of the aspects of faith awareness see " Understanding and Agreement in Religion." I would mention at this point that my five-fold scheme for categorizing religious doubts, and my distinguishing of five aspects of faith awareness, have arisen from a common body of research; and that reflection on each topic has helped to clarify my thinking in relation to the other. I would

selected cases. In light of the concerns of our study let us pursue in each instance the following two lines of inquiry: (a) Would a judgment be in order that in principle no one should be dominated by the present difficulty? (b) Does a strong implication emerge that others should come to share a difficulty of this sort? If we can achieve satisfactory answers to questions such as these in connection with the range of doubts we take up, we will be in position to resolve-at least tentatively-the general issue of the possibilities of religious skepticism.

*

Case (1)

> " People speak about the ' Christian message.' But in fact this tradition's ideas seem to have become altogether amorphous in our day. I find nothing proclaimed any longer which is sufficiently defined or articulated to make a genuine impression."

(a) The present difficulty relates to features of the religious proclamation. However, the proclamation's actual features are other than they are here taken to be. For there is in fact available in our day, as in the Biblical period itself, an articulated religious message: a message, in brief, of the threefold presence of God to the world-as Father, Son, and Spirit-and of the risks and opportunities which arise for mankind in connection with the threefold divine presence. It is true, of course, that there have been various efforts, during the long history of this tradition, to produce developments in the formulation of its message; but the primary aim of such efforts, at least among the orthodox, has been to bring into full prominence and availability the message's essential elements. And the community of believers, albeit sometimes only with time and effort, maintains a sense of what elements are essential. Any person of faith awareness has, according to one formulation or another, a grasp

add that while I indeed find my approach a natural one, and one which serves well our inquiry's purposes, I would not wish to claim that no alternative schemes of categorization could be appropriate. For other cases which I would group with those to be examined in the present study see note 19 below.

of the elements in question. The person at (1) manifests by his remarks that he does not. Thus his state of doubt, and others which can be grouped with it, might be said to belong to the following category: ones which represent an inadequate familiarity with the essential elements of the Christian proclamation.

In leading people to an adequate familiarity along this line religious teachers need only undertake a suitable form of written or oral exposition. And those being instructed need only exercise in an appropriate way an ability to read or listen. The present communication process is clearly quite direct and public in character. Accordingly it can be said to be quite certain in its proper results. Further, these results are such as to preclude a person's thinking being dominated by the present difficulty. Accordingly the judgment would very strongly be in order that in principle no one should be dominated by it.

(b) Turning to the question of implications concerning others, we might note that the consideration at (1) is highly general and public in its relevance. The Christian tradition indeed presents itself as offering a message of salvation, something it could hardly do if its ideas were altogether amorphous. Further, if its ideas were of this character they would be of this character for all; and all would be able to come to see that they were deficient in this respect. Clearly, however, while the present consideration has great force for the individual it does not indicate a genuine problem with the religious proposals. Even with efforts at producing new formulations of the traditional message, this message is not lacking in definition. Therefore reflection on this state of doubt fails to give rise to a strong judgment that others should come to share it.

Case (fJ)

> "I'm acquainted with Biblical teachings. But there seems to be nothing like proper evidence in support of them. Most believers are rather unconcerned about matters of fact in relation to their religious ideas; and those who are thus concerned point to things which are totally inadequate to the purpose. In light of this must it not seem a rather inco-

herent proposal to speak of seriously entertaining the teachings in question? "

(a) This difficulty pertains to a point of "logic" or "grammar." However, one who expresses it does not have a correct view as to the type of point that is here relevant. Questions of evidence properly arise in connection with ideas rooted in an interest in how things are, or have been, or are likely to be. But the primary roots of the present religious ideas are rather different. These ideas, as expressions of momentous themes and promises, arise from and relate to concerns about how things might ultimately be regarded; and also about how things, in the first instance oneself, might ultimately come to fulfillment. And while matters of fact are indeed relevant in the embracing of this tradition-Christianity could not be what it claims to be if, for example, certain beliefs about the life and preaching of Jesus should turn out to be false-the function of an interest in the relevant facts is simply to provide an adequate context in which the religious teachings might, in their own proper way, be entertained. An understanding, at least tacit, of these and related points forms a second aspect of an awareness adequate to faith. The state of doubt expressed at (2) reveals a falling short along this line. Thus this and associated states of doubt might be characterized as follows: they involve an incorrect grasp of Biblical ideas' roots and connections in life and thought, and thus of their logic or grammar.

In helping an individual come to achieve a correct grasp of these matters, there is required of the instructor only appropriate types of explanation and correction. And there is required of the individual himself only an adequate exercise of insight into the various points that are made. The procedures here involved are at least rather straightforward, and also open to general assessment. The process of communication can thus be termed rather certain in its proper results. And the results in question would be such as to keep a person from being dominated by a difficulty in this category. Thus it could rather strongly be said that the occurrence of such a difficulty reflects negatively on the individual's own thinking.

(b) With regard to our other line of inquiry, it .should be said that the first condition for an implication concerning others is at least rather strongly fulfilled. Biblical religion proposes to go beyond and complete, not to conflict with, natural human structures of thought. But presumably anyone would find it a " rather incoherent proposal " to speak of seriously entertaining a set of teachings in the absence of proper supporting evidence-if the teachings are such that demands for supporting evidence are appropriate. And presumably anyone would regard efforts at establishing certain facts, for example, about the life and preaching of Jesus, as "totally inadequate to the purpose "-if the purpose is to provide an evidential basis for the affirmation of religious themes and promises. Here, therefore, there is a considerable tendency toward arguing that others should share the difficulty. On the other hand it must be said that the second condition is at be.st fulfilled only rather weakly. As the above discussion brings out, the present consideration suggests a fundamental misapprehension or mistake. The difficulty here expressed would indeed have great force in connection with certain proposals, but not in connection with the central proposals of this religious tradition. Thus we find again at (2) that there emerges no strong implication concerning others.

Case (3)

> " To me the very notion of a sphere beyond the natural has an aura of unreality about it. What status does such a notion have within a contemporary framework of thought? I sometimes have the feeling in listening to Christians that I'm listening to people from a totally different culture. And in this I'm surely not alone."

(a)' To approach a characterization of the present difficulty, let us focus on the expression " a contemporary framework of thought." This phrase might be taken to include a reference to concepts, suppositions, beliefs, theories, practical principles, and the like. Now adherents of the present tradition are not unwilling to discu!s the .status of their message for contemporary

thought. Nor are they insensitive to the various difficulties which arise along this line. Still they maintain a perception, or a supposition, that the essential teachings of their religion can be at home with any proper framework that is developed.[16] Statement (3) clearly indicates, with reference to the concept of transcendence, a failure to share this aspect of faith awareness. Thus the present state of doubt, and others which can be related to it, might he .said to belong to the following category: doubts which manifest a lack of supposing that the essential teachings of Christianity can fit in with a viable framework of thought.

In reflecting on the question of whether a judgment would be in order that in principle no one should be dominated by such difficulties we should notice that a framework of thought, as explicated above, comprises a variety of elements. Accordingly we find that a variety of processes may be involved in a person's coming to enjoy the type of awareness believers intend. In connection with certain elements-for example, a common supposition about the sort of mes.sage preached by Jesus-the procedures can be fairly straightforward, and also open to general assessment. For here there is required only a presenting and acknowledging of recent scholarship, educated opinion, and so on. In connection with other elements-for example, the supposition that there might be a single highest path to human fulfillment-the procedures will be relatively less straightforward, and also less open to general assessment. For here there may be required the .suggesting and concurring with various types of dialectical or more personal consideration. Still other elements will fall in between. The element at issue in case (3) itself can perhaps be viewed in this way. Sometimes a perception of the viability of the concept of transcendence seems to arise or take hold rather naturally. But sometimes again

[1]. This point should not be taken to deny that believers may come to feel the need-sometimes as a result of encountering difficulties raised by others-for a certain refinement of their teachings; or even for a certain reorganization of perception with regard to the essential and the inessential.

it does not. When it does not those seeking to communicate the religious teachings might undertake more explicit efforts-for example, some species, formal or informal, of metaphysical analysis and argumentation. The process thus initiated would seem to have some claim to being direct and public in character, due to the fact that broad criteria of rationality and empirical adequacy can be employed in metaphysical discussions. There seems, however, to enter into the acceptance of any ultimate account a personal dimension of at least some significance. Thus the claim in question would not here be as strong as in connection with certain other elements.[17]

In connection with each element of the present aspect the results intended by believers would indeed preclude a corresponding difficulty. We find, however, some diver:sity in the extent to which these results can be termed certain. Accordingly in certain cases the statement could somewhat strongly be made that if a person possesses the relevant capacity, and receives a full exposure to Christian teachings, he can and should avoid the state of doubt. In other cases, however, any statement along this line would appear to be somewhat weak. On this matter the third category exhibits a considerable range.

(b) Let us turn now to the question of implications concerning others. The consideration at (3) might seem to give ri:se to a prima facie argument of at least some force that others should share the state. Adherents of the Scriptural tradition do suppose, in every age, that the notion of a sphere beyond the natural is genuinely viable. And it is quite true that this individual is not alone in his difficulty with it. Still it might be suggested that the condition in question is not here fulfilled as strongly as in prior cases. For what one group finds genuinely viable,--at least with regard to a matter such as the present-

[17] Support for the present point can be found in discussions offered by Diogenes Allen and Basil Mitchell. Sec Allen's *The Reasonableness of Faith* (Washington-Cleveland: Corpus Books, 1968); and Mitchell's *The Justification of Religious Belief* (New York: Seabury, 1974). See also Norbert O. Schedler, editor's introduction to Chapter Six, "Process Thought: Toward a New Theism? " in Schedler, ed., *op. cit.* (note 11).

is not necessarily what another does or should. We might in this context view with favor a form of expression offered by the doubter himself: that we are here faced with two different "cultures," cultures separated by a fundamental difference of concept. Only this remark would not carry any suggestion that the thinking of Christians is somehow essentially inferior. Of course, the point about two cultures cuts both ways. Thus it might seem somewhat plausible to hold that the present consideration manifests a genuine problem, rather than a misapprehension or mistake. It might be thought, however, that there is at least some question about the fulfillment of this latter condition as well, in light, for example, of the genuine if limited possibilities of theistic analysis and argumentation. In light of all this it should perhaps be said concerning the present case that both the required conditions are fulfilled to some degree, but neither is fulfilled to a high degree.

We might recall at this point the other cases in this range to which we have alluded. Once again they would appear to fall on either side of our main example. In the one case-in which doubt is focused on a common supposition about the sort of message preached by Jesus-the consideration's relevance would be more general and public; but at the same time it could more strongly be said that there is revealed a misapprehension or mistake. And in the other case-in which doubt is focused on the supposition that there might be a single highest path to human fulfillment-it could more strongly be urged that there is indicated a genuine problem with the religious proposals; but at the same time the significance of the consideration expressed would be more individual and private.

Here too, then, we find some diversity. But the upshot for our study can he simply stated: in connection with none of the present cases does there arise a strong judgment that others should share the state of douht.[18]

[18] It might be wondered, of course-both here and in relation to other categories--whether our examples are truly representative. This indeed is a matter for further investigation. An additional factor which might be treated in such investigation

Case (4)

> " I have a familiarity with key Biblical ideas-for example, those of sin and rebirth. And I have no intellectual problems or objections to raise against them. My difficulty is that I can arrive at no clear grasp of what it would be like to view oneself in their terms."

(a) This difficulty might be discussed in relation to a further aim of those seeking to communicate the Biblical message. The aim is that people will come to see how they might regard their concrete situations, and the situation of the world around them, in light of the central religious themes. That they will come to see how they might regard themselves, for example, as part of a people under the Father's loving care; and again, as being in need of rebirth in union with the Son; and still again, as called to participate, through the guidance and strengthening of the Spirit, in a renewal of the face of the earth. If a person discovers genuine meaning along these lines he shares a fourth aspect of an awareness adequate to faith. The person at (4) reveals by his remarks that he has failed to do so. Accordingly, his and similar states of doubt might be characterized in the following way: they involve a failure to find adequate concrete and personal significance in the themes of the Biblical tradition.

In directing an individual to some parts of the above significance a religious teacher can refer to publicly observable objects and conditions. By and large, however, he must rely on suggestions for personal reflection in light of his own and others' discoveries in this area. And while there indeed seem to be relevant similarities amid the diversity of human .situations-people of every age and culture have found significance in the religious themes-it is the individual himself who must under-

would be the strength and scope which a doubter may *expressly claim* for the consideration he raises. Thus, for example, if the doubter at (3) were to say that *no one could rationally entertain* the notion of a sphere beyond the natural, his consideration would have greater general and public relevance; but it also would more strongly suggest a misapprehension or mistake. On the other hand, if this doubter were to say only that *he and others like him see no merit* in a notion of this sort, the two points would be reversed.

take the reflection on his own case; and the appropriate outcome of such an effort is at least very difficult to judge in any a priori and external way. It emerges that the present procedures are rather less .straightforward, and also less open to general assessment, than those we have previously discussed. The process of communication must therefore be termed rather uncertain in its proper results. The results hoped for by religious teachers would preclude a person's thinking being dominated by a difficulty in this category. But even so it could only rather weakly be said that the occurrence of such a difficulty reflects negatively on the individual's own thinking.

(b) Taking up our other line of inquiry, let us notice that the second condition for an implication concerning others is rather strongly fulfilled. Believers may indeed hope that others will achieve a clear grasp of how they might view themselves in Biblical terms. But as the above discussion brings out, there would be only a thin basis for maintaining that if a person fails to do so he fails to achieve something which, even in principle, he can and should achieve. Thus there would be only a thin basis for maintaining that the consideration at (4) reveals a misapprehension or mistake. On the other hand it would seem that the first condition is here fulfilled only rather weakly. The present difficulty is of course not uncommon; and the similarity among human situations might be thought to have some relevance in this context as well. But in general the fact that one person fails to find adequate significance in a certain set of themes has little tendency to argue that others also should fail to do so. Here again, therefore, no strong implication of the sort in question emerges.

Case (5)

> " Sometimes I find myself attracted by the way of life proposed in the Scriptures. But however it may be with others it is beyond me to imagine that I could ever come to maintain it. What more is there to say?"

(a) The present difficulty might be viewed in light of still another hope of those undertaking religious communication

efforts. For surely it is hoped that those who encounter the Scriptural message will think that they might maintain the way of life it proposes: that they might develop an attitude of selfless love, for example; or discern and follow paths which contribute to the ultimate renewal of all things. But how is it that one might think this? Persons of faith awareness would say that their ability to fulfill-and to be fulfilled by-a life of faith derives not from a source within themselves so much as from a source that lies beyond. These persons have a sense, as we might put it, of the availability to themselves, and indeed to the whole world, of certain qualities spoken of in the religious message-qualities like love, knowledge, power, and so on in a measure that might be termed unconditioned. The remarks at (5) manifest a departure from faith awareness along this line. Thus the state of doubt they express, and others which can be associated with it, might be said to belong to the following category: ones which represent r.,n insufficient sense of the availability of unconditioned qualities such as those which the Scriptures proclaim.

The individual in our example asks at the end, " What more is there to say?" Now those seeking to impart the religious message will surely wish to say .something that might help him and others come to share their sense. But appropriate remarks in this context would seem most often limited to expressions of encouraging witness. In fact, such witness must be largely nonverbal in character, the community of believers seeking to manifest by their lives, individual and corporate, the presence of the above qualities in their midst. In connection with such efforts a person might, if he is properly open, come to share the type of awareness in question. But then again he might not. And, if he does not, then, given the depth to which the relevant modes of sensitivity must here become actualized, there would indeed seem to he very little if anything further that can be said. We see, in light of this, that the present communication process is most indirect and private in character. The results intended by believers would indeed keep individuals from being

dominated by the present difficulty. But these results can scarcely be termed results of certainty. Accordingly a judgment would only very weakly be in order that in principle no one should be dominated by the difficulty.

(b) With regard to the question of implications concerning others, let us notice that there could be very strong grounds for saying that this consideration indicates a genuine problem with Scriptural proposals. Believers' hopes aside, it would seem that a person might be well exposed to the religious community, and attempt to respond to that exposure in an appropriate way, and yet find it beyond him to imagine, in the circumstances in which he finds himself, his maintaining a life of faith. It should be clear, however-and indeed is to the present doubter-that the general and public relevance of this difficulty is very slight. That an individual is unable to gain a sense of the availability of unconditioned love, knowledge, and power is indeed a matter of significance. But the significance relates, in terms of our inquiry, almost entirely to the individual himself. Thus reflection on case *(5)* also fails to give rise to a strong judgment that others should come to share the state of doubt.

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This concludes our examination of cases. We have, to be sure, investigated only a handful of examples. It is my belief, however, that others that might be taken up tend to support our five-fold scheme of categorization; and also the types of analysis we have offered in connection with each ca,se.[19] If this

[19] Among other expressions of doubt the following arc ones which could be associated with (1) - (5), respectively. (I') "I'm aware of Christianity's doctrinal formulas, But it is hard to see in them anything like a set of ideas for regulating one's life and thought." (2') "Although I have been open to a convincing revelation that I should embrace the present tradition, no such revelation has ever occurred." (8') " In spite of what religious people themselves wish to say, it seems most plausible to view belief in God along Freudian or similar lines." (4') "Certain parables and sayings of Jesus have a kind of universal meaning. By and large, however, they seem to me to have very little bearing on contemporary modes of life." (5') "I indeed hope for the best with regard to the future of the world. But that it might come to a state of total fulfillment-this I cannot sense as a live possibility."

belief is borne out through further research and reflection, it will emerge that we have achieved the broad outlines of a perspicuous representation of the phenomena.

Complexities and Refinements. Before proceeding to a tentative resolution of our topic let us mention a number of complexities to be found at the level of the concrete and particular. First, an individual may experience difficulties with Christian proposals, and yet not be in a state of doubt, as we have characterized this state at the outset. The difficulties here would strictly involve certain failures of personal response, rather than considerations going against the proposals. Similarly, an individual may simply reject the life-possibility offered to him by Christianity, again with no reference to such considerations. It is worth mentioning that the present states can occur in conjunction with an awareness adequate to faith. Indeed they are ones which, in some measure or other, believers recognize in themselves.

With regard to genuine states of doubt it should be noted that, due to vagueness or ambiguity of expression, a person's difficulty may not, at least to begin with, easily be located within any one of our categories. An example of a vague expression would be the following: " I know what is said by the Biblical tradition, but I have no idea whether I should embrace it." The difficulty here indicated may be somewhat like that expressed at (fl) , involving an incorrect grasp of relevant logical matters. Or it may be somewhat like that expressed at (4), involving a failure to find adequate personal significance. But which, if either, of these interpretations would be proper it is at this point impossible to say. Again, we might consider the things that can be suggested by a remark such as the fallowing: "I just can't believe in an all-perfect God when there's such evil and suffering in the world." Here, I believe, we have an expression which is at least three ways ambiguous. This person may, somewhat like the person at (1), have an inadequate familiarity with what the religious proclamation says concerning God-mistakenly supposing, for example, that it says God gives man

what is desirable in the short run, or from man's own point of view. Or he may, somewhat like the person at (3), be unable to see how a recognition of evil and an employment of traditional concepts of deity can be part of a single, coherent framework of thought. Or he may, somewhat like the person at (5), be so struck by the suffering of the innocent that he finds it impossible to gain any sense of the availability of unconditioned love, knowledge, and power. Which of the three states the remark expresses would have to be made clear through additional discussion.

Further, an individual's thinking in relation to Christian proposals may be dominated by difficulties of more than one type. He may regard them, for example, as incapable of being seriously entertained due to lack of supporting evidence; and at the same time as bearing little real relationship to his own concrete situation. Again, an individual's state of doubt, although one which could be designated by .a single description, may involve a complex interweaving of strands. In this connection we might again advert to the various types of force which the presence of evil can exert on a person's thinking.

Another point to be noted is that difficulties like those which dominate the thinking of religious doubters can also to some degree affect the thinking of believers. The latter may be troubled, for example, about the contemporary viability of certain essential Biblical teachings. If their thinking is thus affected to too great a degree, however, they will no longer enjoy an awareness adequate to faith. It should be added that it is not always clear whether or not such should he said to be the case.

Finally, as suggested by the above, it may be difficult-even for the individual himself-to know just how his state should be characterized: whether it should he said to be a state of douht, or rather one of the others into which this state shades off-a state of simple failure to arrive at any orientation; a state of simple rejection; or a state in which there is faith, or faith awareness, but at the same time a being troubled by doubt.

III. RESOLUTION OF THE TOPIC

Summary and Resulting Account. Let us now bring into survey the results of our investigation, and indicate their bearing on the issue at hand. Our aim, as originally stated, has been to discern the possibilities of religious skepticism, as these arise in the context of the Biblical tradition. To this end we elaborated certain general characterizations and distinctions, and in particular marked off two senses of the term " skepticism "- a weak sense applying to any state of doubt, and a strong sense applying only to a state of doubt in which the individual thinks a strong implication emerges concerning others. In an effort to see whether orientations of either sort could be appropriate we undertook, in relation to examples from each of five categories, two corresponding lines of inquiry. Our results can be summarized as follows.

(a) With regard to the question of whether a judgment would be in order that in principle no one should be dominated by the difficulty we have seen a progression of cases. We have seen, that is, that the associated communication processe.srange from the very certain to the very uncertain in their proper results. Thus, while in each case the results intended by those seeking to impart the Scriptural message-viz., a sharing in some aspect of faith awareness-would preclude the corresponding category of difficulties, the grounds for saying that the occurrence of such difficulties reflects negatively on the people's own thinking would range from the very strong to the very weak. To the extent that states of doubt fall within earlier categories, but only to this extent, it could be said that in principle all can and should avoid them.

(b) With regard to the question of whether a strong implication emerges that others should share the difficulty our cases form a spectrum. In connection with (1) the first condition-that of general and public relevance-is fulfilled to a very high degree; but the second condition-that of indicating a genuine problem with the proposals-is fulfilled only to a very low degree. In connection with (5) the points are exactly reversed:

the second condition is fulfilled to a very high degree; but the first condition is fulfilled only to a very low degree. Cases (2), (3), and (4) fill out the spectrum to which we have alluded. Our study accordingly suggests that in connection with doubts in earlier categories-the first and second, and some portions of the third-it could be said with this or that degree of strength that there arises a prima facie argument concerning others; but at the same time it could be said, again with this or that degree of strength, that the consideration reveals a misapprehension or mistake. And our study suggests that in connection with doubts in later categories-other portions of the third, and the fourth and fifth-it could be said with this or that degree of strength that the consideration indicates a genuine problem with the proposals; but at the same time it could be said, again with this or that degree of strength, that there is little tendency toward an argument concerning others. If all this is further confirmed through additional investigation there will emerge the following general results. In connection with no state of doubt concerning Christian teachings are the two conditions required for the present implication jointly and strongly fulfilled. And thus in connection with no such state of doubt does there in fact arise a strong judgment that others should come to share it.

The results here indicated-supposing they are correct-give rise to the following account of our topic. An orientation of skepticism in relation to Christianity will be possible in any case in which a person does not enjoy a state of faith awareness. Insofar as it involves doubts in earlier categories an orientation of skepticism in even the weak sense will be an inappropriate one. It might, however, indeed be appropriate insofar as it involves doubts in later categories. On the other hand, no orientation of religious skepticism in the strong sense will ever be appropriate.

Assessment of Initial Viewpoints. We might return now to the two viewpoints noted at the outset, and to an assessment of them in light of our study. With regard to the remarks of Kai

Nielsen I think we might say the following. It is surely correct to hold that even believers can "have doubts," or be "threatened with disbelief." That is, even persons who enjoy states of faith awareness can be troubled, and severely troubled, by difficulties. Indeed it can happen that the difficulties come to dominate their thinking in relation to Biblical religion; in which case, no longer sharing an awareness adequate to faith, they might well "reject a religious orientation altogether." Further, we have seen a verification of the idea that there are "varieties of religious scepticism." And we can perhaps approve of the suggestion that religious skeptics-or some of them-find the proposals of this tradition "unpersuasive, incredible." However, there is nothing in our study to support Nielsen's idea that there are general and powerful critiques of reliITTousfaith. If the results indicated above are correct, there will not be any strong grounds for saying that religious commitment could not be "reasonable" or "justified." And there also will not be any sound arguments which show that all persons "should be sceptics." Remarks of these latter sorts, expressing skepticism in the strong sense, will be regarded by anyone who comes to accept our account as reflecting some incorrect view of the situation.[20]

Turning to the remarks of D. Z. Phillips, we have seen that an individual might indeed come to "reject and defy" his tradition and its God. This form of non-belief can even occur among those who enjoy a state of faith awareness.[21] Again, it

[20] This is not to say that it will be easy, either to see or to set out, just what the incorrect view is. And certainly I have not fully addressed the various considerations put forward in Nielsen's own writings. Readers familiar with them, however, will perhaps anticipate my belief that they mainly express doubts belonging to our seCQnd and third categories. It should be noted in this connection that Nielsen himself recognizes that considerations of the latter type have less general and public relevance than those of (what I should classify as) the former. See his remarks on the position of Tziporah Kasachkoff in *Scepticism,* pp. 94-95.

[21] It might be noted that Phillips himself appears, at least sometimes, to recognize the present point. Fully quoted, the remark indicated in note 8 reads as follows: "The rebel must see the kind of relationship God asks of the believer before he can reject and defy it. He sees the story from the inside, but it is not

can happen that an individual "cannot bring himself to react in a certain way;" or that he finds that he "has no use for a certain religious picture. The proper analysis of cases that might be described in these ways seems somewhat unclear at the general level. The former phrase perhaps suggests a state of awareness adequate to faith; the latter perhaps a genuine state of doubt. Further, it emerges that an account of certain states of doubt results in negative light being cast on the people's own thinking. And in particular it emerges that an account of certain such states--for example, that expressed in our second case--points to an improper "craving for generality." However, the present study does not suggest that negative light is cast on the thinking of all persons in a state of doubt. It does so only with regard to the thinking of those whose difficulties fall within earlier categories. On the other hand, many who declare themselves to be religious skeptics think that others should come to share their orientation. If the term "skepticism" is employed in this strong sense--but only if it is employed in this strong sense--the general results here suggested support Phillips's final contentions: the contentions, that is, that one can "refute scepticism about . . . religion;" and again, that a correct grasp of relevant matters is "incompatible" with it.[22]

a story that captivates him." However, at other times Phillips appears to rule out the possibility here indicated. Thus he says at one point that the rebel "does not see the point of religion as the believer does, since for the believer seeing the point of religion is believing" (*Faith and Philosophical Enquiry,* p. 12). If Phillips's "see(ing) the point of religion as the believer does" can be equated with my "sharing an awareness adequate to faith," this latter remark would seem to entail that no one who enjoys a state of faith awareness can fail to be a believer.

[22] However, I do not think that Phillips's own bases for these contentions are adequate. In the remark indicated in note 11 he suggests that one can refute skepticism simply by showing "that there is a real difference between the presence and absence of ... religious considerations." And in the remark indicated in note 1!'l he suggests that skepticism is incompatible with a mere recognition that religious "understanding . . . [must involve] passion." But it seems possible to imagine a person who recognizes these points nevertheless adopting an orientation of skepticism in the strong sense. (And *a fortiori* it seems possible to imagine such a person adopting an orientation of skepticism in the weak sense.)

Philosophical approaches other than our own might of course be undertaken to the possibilities of religious skepticism. **But** it can be said, I believe, that-whatever their authors' orientations-any which hope to be adequate must take account of the complexities set out in the present paper.

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WHICH ALLEGORY FOR RELIGIOUS TRUTH: PLATO'S CAVE OR NIETZSCHE'S ZARATHUSTRA?

IN THE ERA of renewal in Christian theology and religious education since the days of Vatican Council II, those involved in Christian education have been stimulated by the publication of a considerable amount of material, not derived from theology, but rather from social science, speaking of religion as being intrinsic to both man and society. From psychology and sociology, authors such as P. Berger, R. May, R. Bellah, A. Maslow-to mention but a few of those one could cite-have provided the Christian educator with material which makes it possible to speak once more of essential religious values, of the meaning of creativity, spontaneity, liberation and transcendence, all of which are seen by such authors as lying at the center of the religious dimension of personal and social life.[1] A new sense of freedom and dignity is provided by such authors in a way which many religious educators find expressive of .some of the basic features of Christian faith, and which give to the work of the Christian educator a new and vigorous task of promoting individual creativity and a personal sense of transcendence in the midst of a largely materialistic and computerised society.

It is then with a sense of trepidation at the prospect of treading on certain fashionable feet that, in this short essay, I call attention to what appears to be a philosophical dilemma confronting the theologian and the religious educator, a dilemma born from reflection on the use of social science in the task of

[1] R. May: *The Courage to Create,* W. W. Norton, N. Y., (1975); *Love and Will,,* W. W Norton, NY., (1969); A. Maslow: *Religious Values and Peak Experiences,* Viking, N. Y., (1970); P. Berger: *Rumour of Angels,* London, Pelican, (1971); T. Luckmann: *The Invisible Religion,* London, Macmillan, (1967).

promoting Christian faith. My suggestion is that we clarify in our minds once more what lies at the philosophical root of our work as Christian educators. There can be no doubt that from both sociological and psychological perspectives a good deal of contemporary literature perceives an essential 'religious' dimension to man and society. But the question to which we are attempting to address ourselves in this essay is this: does the use of the term 'religious' by authors not particularly committed to, or affiliated with, any theistic tradition, much less the Christian tradition, carry with it a valid expression of what is considered authentically religious by the Christian tradition? Conversely, is there to be found in the Christian tradition anything which might find that tradition at odds with the contemporary usage of the word 'religious'?

Unfortunately, posing the question in this manner might convey the false impression that Christianity has, at least in the mind of this author, a hold on the meaning of 'religious' to which all else must submit. It is certainly not our intention to make this claim, much less to ask for a return to some form of rigid Barthianism, or to deny important features of secularization. The main stream of Christian theology would seem to demand that truth be found in the world, and, on the basis of the doctrines of creation and incarnation, the world is the locus of God's revelation, and that is where the Christian is called to live his faith.

The philosophical issue which seems to be at stake is this: Is there anything about the world in itself which is presupposed by Christianity to such an extent that, if this philosophical understanding is radically undermined and a revolutionary kind of philosophy substituted, it would render it impossible for the Christian faith to be articulated in such terms, without that faith becoming quite different from what it has been traditionally? Put in simpler terms: is there any philosophical sense in which what is 'religious' might be utterly opposed to what is Christian? Clearly, this is a most difficult task, and one which many will find irrelevant in the modern climate. Let us be

grateful that serious authors find man ' religious ', that they provide us with a meaningful sense of the term ' religious', and take the matter from there. What is more, is not the theologian following a time-hallowed method of drawing on contemporary thought in expressing his faith? If a ' new beginning' is philosophically necessary, then that is fine, for Christian faith has never tied itself down to one form of philosophy. Such arguments appear to be acceptable in many Catholic and Protestant theological circles, and the arguments for such broad ' ecumenism ' are to many persuasive. What then is the purpose of raising our philosophical questions?

The clarification of the philosophical issue would seem to be important to one who is concerned to preserve what ought to be preserved as essential to the Christian tradition. Nowhere more than in the classroom is the Christian aware of this, and conscious also of his responsibility in the matter. Clearly the task of fully clarifying the philosophical questions we pose is an enormous task beyond the possibility of a brief essay. Nonetheless, a start can be made in the following manner, by the contrast of two allegories: the allegory of the cave, which is to be found in Book Seven of Plato's *Repu,blic,* and the allegory of Zarathustra in F. Nietzsche's famous work *Thus Spoke Zarathustra.* [2] I would claim that the choice of these two particular allegories is not an arbitrary one. On the one hand, Plato's allegory, together with its context in the *Repu,blic* and within the writings of Plato as a whole, lies at the heart of what has, for two thousand years, been understood as philosophy in Western civilization. On the other hand, Nietzsche's allegory of Zarathustra can be seen as thoroughly modem, insofar as it clearly represents, in the hands of Nietzsche, an explicit rejection of what is Platonic, of what is philosophy, and more generally, of what is essential, in Nietzsche's estimation, to the intellectual content of Western civilization, and that includes Christianity. Nietzsche rightly perceived that, insofar as Chris-

• Plato: *The Republic;* F. Nietzsche: *Thus Spoke Zarathustra,* in *The Portable Nietzsche* (ed.) Walter Kaufmann, Princeton, Viking Press, (1954).

tianity proposes belief in a higher reality than this world of change, it finds the framework of Plato's thinking congenial to an expression of faith, and that Christian theology has made ample use of the philosophical tradition in expressing itself through the ages since the Church Fathers.[3]

A second reason, of a theological nature, would seem to validate our proposed contrast of the two allegories. In certain philosophical and theological circles today the gulf which separates the classical and the modern is increasingly apparent. Not only in 'death of God' theology, but also in the work of those who have attempted to re-state the meaning of Christian faith in the modern age in a totally new idiom, it is seen that they now do so on the clear understanding that what is modern involves a total rejection of the philosophical past, and that a ' new beginning ' is necessary. Hence, for example, H. Cox could state (ten years ago) that "the irrepressible emergence (of the secular city) establishes a new situation which renders former ways of thinking and doing wholly obsolete,"[4] whilst on the European scene, a Catholic theologian could state that "the old manner of approaching the problem of God has become quite unintelligible. One can no longer think and speak about God in the way which the older generation of believers-and the official Church also-frequently still do."[5] Examples could be multiplied of contemporary theologians who are prepared to take this approach, and who, on the basis of historical thought, are prepared to say that a ' new beginning' is necessary. What are in general understood as traditional expressions of faith are now deemed redundant and ought to be superseded. What is past is gone. The future of faith demands creative thought of the present.

• F. Nietzsche: *The Use and Abuse of History,* translated by A. Collins; Library of Liberal Arts, Bobbs-Merrill. N. Y., (1949), pp. 49-50; *Beyond Good and Evil* in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche* (ed.) W. Kaufmann, Modern Library, N. Y., (1968), pp. 193, 25Vl5B.

• H. Cox: *The Secular City,* Macmillan, N. Y., (1965), p. 117.

• W. H. Van de Pol: *The End of Conventional Christianity,* Newman Press, N Y., (1967), p. 147.

And here we have a third, and perhaps most important, reason for our proposed contrast. Traditional faith is attacked for the most part by such theologians on the basis of history. To .speak of a' new beginning' in theology, and therefore in religious education, is to engage, for the most part, in a historical criticism of both classical thought and the Christian tradition. The present form of secular and scientific society, it is claimed, is quite different from what has previously been seen on earth. A radically new form of .society demands an equally radical mode of expression of faith. Implicitly at least, this is to reject the traditional philosophical basis of Western civilization. It equally implies a search for a new basis, a new ground for one's understanding of values and of faith.

If historical criticism is the means by which the philosophical and theological traditions of Christianity are today challenged, it is also the historical sense which is responsible for the emergence of a new understanding of values. Hence the historical sense comes to be an essential feature of what is modern. Once reason has been discredited as the basis of virtue in society, historical thought can he seen as coming into its own to fill the vacuum.[6] It is precisely at this point that one can perceive the importance of the image of Zarathustra, who rejects the traditions of philosophy and theology on the basis of history, and at the same time is the creator of a truly historical existence of historical 'virtue.' In any contrast of the classical and the modern, Zarathustra stands as an all-important image, for he presents us with a 'new beginning,' based on creativity and liberation. In many respects, he epitomizes a new kind of philosophy-historical existence-in his denunciation and rejection of tradition.[7]

At the same time, the claim can be made that the philosophi-

[6] Cf. L. Strauss: *Natural Right and History,* Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, (1971), ch. 1, pp. 9-34.

[7] Nietzsche examines the different ways in which the nature of historical existence can be understood, arriving at his own radical understanding of history in his essay: *The Use and Abuse of History,* translated by A. Collins, Library of Liberal Arts, Bobbs-Merrill, N. Y., (1957).

cal tradition which stems from Plato and Socrates has been extremely influential in informing the traditions of Christianity. If Plato is the philosopher of reason, then philosophy until modern times can be seen as the pursuit of truth by reason. Many of the Christian Fathers, and clearly Augustine and Aquinas, could find in the philosophical tradition an ally for the expression of Christian faith. At the very least, reason was seen by the intellectual greats of the Christian tradition as being in a state of harmony with faith; there is no necessary contradiction between faith and reason. Faith complements reason, and faith supersedes reason, but without nullifying the findings of reason. Hence, Christian theology could make good use of what is essential to the philosophical mode of thinking about reality and about man himself. Augustine could speak about 'that noble philosopher Plato'[8] and could state elsewhere that "these philosophers, then, whom we see not undeservedly exalted above the rest in fame and glory, have seen that no material body is God, and therefore they have transcended all bodies in seeking for God. They have seen that whatever is changeable is not the most high God...."[9]

Plato's allegory of the cave indicates to us precisely this point concerning the nature of human existence. It is not in terms of this changing life amid the shadows of conventionality that man finds truth but in his ability to emerge from the cave into the broad light of the higher realm. Truth transcends not only material things, but also the world of change and opinion (perspective). Life on earth (the cave) presupposes the light of truth, and human fulfillment consists in the continuous search and enquiry into the nature of truth. It would seem to imply also a certain dissatisfaction with the comforts of this world, together with a certain pain and suffering at leaving an accustomed world of opinion for that of the unknown. It is Plato's argument, and it would seem also to be that of Augustine, that only insofar as man has knowledge of a higher reality

• St. Augustine: *De Trinitate,* 15;
• St. Augustine: *Oity of God,* ch. 6.

is he capable of the life of virtue. The search for truth makes justice, courage, moderation and wisdom possible. By the same measure, only insofar as society makes virtue its goal is society capable of rising above the evil to which every form of government is prone. Hence, transcendent truth makes virtue possible both for the individual and for society. For both Plato and for Augustine, man is understood both as a rational and as a social being, whose knowledge and virtue are dependent on life in society. Human virtue is both personal and public. Perhaps it is only such an understanding of virtue which makes possible, in the first instance, the writing of such a book as Augustine's *Confessions.*

But what is of most importance to our present concern is the kind of religious education to which such an understanding of reality gives rise. For both Plato and Augustine, the life and the pursuit of virtue is based on knowledge-knowledge which ultimately transcends a world of change and of opinion (shadows). This knowledge would seem to constitute the basis of human fulfillment and hence of education. Philosophical virtue (for Plato) and theological virtue (for Augustine) would seem to be essential to the humanization of all other forms of science. As Plato tells us in the *Republic,* the end of society and hence of education must be the life of virtue which makes possible the presence of justice in society.[10] But clearly, it is transcendent truth which makes virtue possible in the first place. There is a distinctly 'religious' understanding of Plato's teaching on virtue, based as it is on a teleological understanding of human fulfillment, which of course receives a definitely Christian transformation in the hands of Augustine. But it would nevertheless be correct to say that when Augustine speaks of making God the object of human esteem, the God who is revealed in the Word, he does so in a manner which does not nullify what Plato tells us concerning the life of virtue and transcendent teleology. Where Plato can ascribe virtue to the efforts of the philosopher, Augustine ascribes virtue to the power and grace of God. There

[10] Plato: *The Republic,* Book 4.

is then a much deeper sense of man's humility in the theological virtue of Augustine. However, what is common to Plato and Augustine is that they both find human fulfillment not in the life amid the shadows of a changing world, but ultimately in the higher reality of Goodness, which for Augustine the Christian is the God who creates virtue and answers to the human search for truth. Human fulfillment (which includes all human pursuits-and therefore the sciences) is taken up into a religious context. All of human existence is seen in religious terms. Man's end or goal in life is essentially religious. But in reflecting on the allegory of the cave, one common misinterpretation must be laid to rest. Life in the cave does not lead to a passive or static mode of human existence. Rather, it is incumbent on man to strive for the higher realm of Truth and progress in virtue. To remain content within the cave is to opt for ignorance and injustice. Classical thought does not therefore supply us with an option out of social and personal responsibility. The very ' other-worldliness ' of classical teleology demands a constant striving after justice in this world. The religious nature of existence issues in an active striving for social justice, not a life of negligence, although Plato does add in the allegory that, in so doing, the philosopher will enrage the cave-dwellers and become the object of their wrath. [11]

It is clear therefore that on the basis of the classical understanding of virtue and knowledge, religious education gives rise to a broad search for truth, to a way of life which searches throughout the whole of human existence for truth, for truth transcends cultural boundaries. In specifically Christian terms, the Christian is called upon to search for Truth in every human endeavor, including the sciences, with the assurance that God is to be found not solely within the institutions of Christianity

[11] One might also add that on reading Plato's description of movement from the cave to the light, it is difficult to speak of a dualism. The cave and the light are two dimensions of one human reality. Neither can it be said that the allegory affords an overly-intellectualized view of existence. While maintaining a teleological view of life, the allegory and *The Republic* as a whole are concerned with the social nature of existence.

but throughout the created world. It is an understanding of life which could lead Augustine to incorporate so much of the thought of Plato and Cicero into his Christian theology, and enable Aquinas to search and find truth in the philosophy of Aristotle and the Islamic philosophers. It is an understanding of religious education which gave rise to a broad Christian humanism in the West.

One could, at this point of the discussion, conclude that what has been described here is a highly idealistic understanding of religious education which certainly in modern times has failed badly. There can be no denial that Christians have indeed failed to live up to such high ideals. Of their nature, ideals are beyond complete implementation. However, the human betrayal of such ideals does not falsify the ideals themselves. Clearly, what we are trying here to describe is the intellectual foundation of traditional religious education. It goes without saying that .such an understanding of religious education has in our times been radically attacked, and in no more fundamental manner than in the work of F. Nietzsche. But the power of Nietzsche's argument against Christianity is not based solely on cheap shots against the way Christians have failed to live up to their ideals. The force of his argument is directed against the intellectual foundations (philosophical and theological) of traditional education. It is no disgrace to admit in all humility that one has failed to live up to the demands of Christian ideals. It is the traditional Christian belief that the higher one's ideals, the more demanding will these ideals be on one's life. But it is here that Nietzsche attacks Christianity, in the very strength of its humility. Zarathustra attacks Christianity not because it has failed, but because it has succeeded in including the whole of human culture under the aegis of virtue, and thereby has kept before man his humility as a servant under the authority of a transcendent God.[12]

It is the contention of Nietzsche that such a religious understanding of the world, based as it is in the West on Platonic

[12] Cf. F. Nietzsche: *Beycmd Good and Evil,* aphorisms 46-48, pp. 250-254.

philosophy and Christian theism, has given rise to a completely arid and deadly understanding of education in modern times. Belief in objective realities in philosophy and theology has, so he argues, led to the emergence of modern science and to the false belief that human fulfillment is to be found in the knowledge of objective realities and an approximation of man to these higher realities. A world dominated by the pursuit of objective (transcendent) truth cannot, he maintains, actually *do* anything of itself. It can but imitate what is already presupposed to exist, but of itself it remains totally uncreative. Clearly then, to follow this line of argument, both philosophy and Christianity (together with modern science) are to be held responsible for a dead culture, a culture which can do nothing other than imitate past civilizations, and claim that on the basis of a theoretical understanding of reality it knows the truth. In our age, Nietzsche claims, such a deadly process has reached its apogee. Modem technological society has reached the point where the vast majority of its inhabitants simply imitate in a slavish manner what they presuppose to be pre-existent truth. The effect of this belief is to reinforce in society whatever is common to the whole, to the 'herd,' and to eliminate any real individuality. Modem men are nothing of themselves. Culture within a technological society is dead, and by the same token the basis of this dead culture, belief in transcendent virtue and belief in a transcendent God, have also died in the minds of men. But as Nietzsche tells us in *Bey<md Good and Evil,* this inevitable end is due to the 'prejudices of the philosophers' who have falsely presumed the existence of truth which men are called upon to discover. This has been the great illusion in Western civilization which has led to the tragic circumstances in which man today finds himself.

If Nietzsche provides us with one of the most devastating criticisms of modern society, he is also the provider of a new humanism, a new way of thinking and acting which will enable man to recover from the illusions of philosophy, science and Christianity. If culture is to be rejuvenated, then 'will to

truth,' that 'mighty lie of Plato '[13] must give way to a new understanding of 'truth,' an understanding of which does not rest in the illusion of a transcendent realm such as Plato or Augustine might envisage, but an understanding of ' truth,' the 'new truth' of Zarathustra, that the meaning of life is dependent on the historical perspective of each individual self. If the means by which traditional philosophy proposes for man to discover truth is by the use of reason, the ' new truth,' that of perspectivity, is based on will-to-power, or the power of assertiveness of each historical individual. If at the end of the 18th century one finds Hume and Kant skeptical of the power of reason, one finds Nietzsche clearly engaged on the destruction of any understanding of human existence based on reason.

It is no exaggeration to .say that it is Nietzsche's purpose to attack and destroy in a radical manner what lies at the heart of traditional philosophy in the West and traditional Christian theism. He thereby attacks also the kind of education which in general has characterized Western civilization in post-Socratic and Christian times. Par excellence, Nietzsche is the philosopher capable of providing the twentieth century with the philosophical basis for a post-Christian age. It must be emphasized that what Nietzsche proposes is not a re-shufB.ing of the categories of philosophy and Christianity, but rather a new *kind,* a new mode altogether, of human existence. This new kind of philosophy rests on the outright rejection of objective and transcendent truth in all of its manifestations, to be replaced by the understanding that if there is nothing of any permanence in human existence, then the whole of existence is a matter of perspectivity in the midst of utter change. How to deal with the fact of utter relativism is the basis of the new humanism. The traditional understanding that reality is intelligible and that its inherent intelligibility can be discovered by human reason must now give way to the view that existence is thoroughly contingent and relative and that any expression of ' new truth ' is synonymous with an individual's creativity, or the personal

[18] *Ibid.,* aphorism I, p. 199.

expression of one's perspective on life. Man himself is now in a position to bestow meaning on the world. As such he assumes the role of creator and forsakes that of servant. If the logic of Plato's allegory of the cave is to focus human existence on the light of transcendent truth, the logic of the allegory of Zarathustra is to focus attention on *this* world exclusively, on the creative ability of each individual to liberate oneself from the past, and through this freedom to create one's own future. If classical philosophy sees human fulfillment in terms of eventually leaving the cave for the higher realm of the light of truth, the nature of historical existence, as depicted by Nietzsche, entails a living in the present moment, in the creation of one's own cave, and the rejection of any possible exit to a higher realm of existence. Needless to say, the cave of one's own making is also historical and therefore must ultimately perish. But that would seem to be the law of existing things.

Zarathustra represents a new kind of' philosophy,' based on the assertion of the individual self. It builds on the death of what has been the basis of philosophical and Christian education. Nietzsche's famous work *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* represents in many ways the climax of Nietzsche's thought, and hence the allegory contains most, if not all, of what is entailed in his revolutionary 'philosophy'. Where Plato can speak of truth which is to be found through enquiry in the public realm of society, on the basis of reason, which is common to all human beings, Zarathustra represents the supreme individual, the first to start from the falsehood of otherworldly truth. In a philosophy of individualism such as Zarathustra represents, the individual despises otherworldliness for it represses individuality and denies to the self an all-sufficient perspectivity. Zarathustra must then be *free* to create his own perspectivity, his own 'truth,' his own meaning, which is asserted.[14] Where Platonic freedom would seem to imply liberation from the concerns of wealth, power and glory for the pursuit of the life of virtue, Zarathustran freedom claims liberation from the pursuit of

[14] *Ibid.,* aphorism 10, p. 206.

transcendent virtue for the assertion of self-made values. Rejection of the higher realm of truth and justice means for Zarathustra liberation from authority of every kind, and from principles of morality which burden the individual like a camel in the desert.[15] Zarathustra is then the 'new philosopher' insofar as he is the 'free spirit' and can find within himself the power to create what is new. If Platonic virtue demands the guidance of emotion by reason, Zarathustran 'virtue' entails the free expression of the affections and emotions unrestrained by the dictates of reason. Hence Zarathustra is first and foremost a poet, capable of expressing profound sentiments. (In contrast, Plato would seem to be highly dubious about giving pride of place to the poet in his Republic, for the very reason that poetry gives higher regard to the emotions and affections than to reason.)

At the same time, there is clear indication in the allegory of Zarathustra that, given the predicament of contemporary society under the domination of Christianity, philosophy and science, together with the crowd's desire to remain in the comfort which these traditions provide, Zarathustra indicates to us that such creative individuals will be very rare indeed. Having failed to convert the crowd into disciples Zarathustra realizes that he ought not henceforth to endeavor to do so, for he speaks a 'new truth' which will be comprehended only by the rare few: (unlike Jesus in the Gospel, who was able to convert many because he spoke of a truth which the multitude could understand). There is, therefore, a sense in which Nietzsche claims for the 'new philosopher' the rarity and nobility of Socrates, provided one remembers that the nature of virtue in each case is dramatically in contention. The 'virtue' of Zarathustra is not transcendent, it is of his own making. It is not discovered by reason, it is created by his own will. If the great virtues of Socratic life are wisdom, justice, courage and moderation, the 'virtues' of Zarathustra are expressions

[16] F. Nietzsche: *Thus Spoke Zarathustra,* Zarathustra's Speeches: On the Three Metamorphoses: pp. 187-140.

of the will and of emotions-namely love, joy, sympathy, pity, hatred, disdain. Lacking any rational principle or standard by which virtue might be distinguished from vice, Zarathustran ' virtue ' claims to have moved beyond such distinctions as justice / injustice, good / evil. The ' free spirit ' which is the ' new philosopher' clearly gives rise to a' new morality.' In the metamorphosis from camel to child, the great demon ' Thou shalt ' must be destroyed.[16] In despising moral principle in preference for the expression of the self, Nietzsche clearly aimed at the destruction of morality, that is to say, the tradition of moral philosophy since Socrates. At the same time, such a radical historical view of existence is likewise at odds with the morality of the New Testament, in which, generally speaking, human action is directed by the Will of the Father. The Christian is called upon to love the neighbor because God has first loved man, and has created man with a common human dignity. Not only does Zarathustra despise such a theistic ethic, but he also despises the love of the neighbor, accounting it part of the morality of the slave. Zarathustra preaches love of the friend-the one with whom there is an affective and emotional reciprocity. This, he would seem to be saying, is the morality of the master, of the one who has creative power. Love of the neighbor is the love of what is common. Elsewhere, Nietzsche tells us, it is the Christian expression of ' Platonism for the masses.'

But what is of great significance in Nietzsche's portrayal of Zarathu.stra is that, besides exhibiting certain qualities of the poet and the philosopher, Zarathustra *appears* to be a very' religious' figure, that is to say, in the allegory, there is a clear intention on the part of Nietzsche to deck Zarathustra in some of the most attractive characteristics of Christ in the New Testament. This characteristic of Nietzsche's thought is first made clear in *Beyond Good and Evil,* in his discussion of 'What is Religious.' For reasons already suggested, there is a vitriolic denunciation of Christianity by Nietzsche, but at the same time, there is admiration for the discipline, the strength of will

[16] *Ibid.,* pp. ISS-189.

and purpose of the saint. In Nietzsche's estimation, this will and ascetieal drive has unfortunately been misdirected insofar as it has been focused on a transcendent reality, God. Thus fundamental movement of the will has been weakened by the illusion of an other-worldly reality, namely, God. To revive its original strength, the will must understand itself anew. It must he seen that the will is the expression of man himself. There is, in Nietzsche, room for optimism. " It seems to me," he tells us, " that the religious instinct is indeed in the process of growing powerfully-but the theistic satisfaction it refuses with deep suspicion." [11] The reverent and ascetical discipline of the saint is to be retained, whilst the object of Christian reverence, God, the transcendent Reality, must be rejected. The image of Zarathustra provides us with an indication of how to he 're-ligious' whilst at the same time rejecting what is fundamental to Christianity. Henceforth, man's love, reverence and discipline are to be directed towards himself and that group of friends (perhaps the term community is applicable here) where there is possible the free expression of the self. But in this depiction of human existence, man has forsaken the humility of the servant of the Lord for a status of autonomous master of his own future. The virtue of the Christian saint is hut a perversion of will-to-power. Zarathustra loves the earth, and loves man for his own sake, for in the eyes of Zarathustra there is no other dimension to existence providing man with transcendent purpose and guidance.

As Zarathustra reveals in his relationship to the tightrope-walker, he is very solicitous and sympathetic towards others.[18] He can appear pious, joyful and affectionate. But his ' virtue ' is of his own making. He is the lover of man for his own sake, not for the love of God. He is ' virtuous ' only insofar as he is able to extricate himself from the group or whole of mankind, that is to say, from society and its institutions. The individual must find meaning within himself, not within society. If the

u F. Nietzsche: *Beyond Good and Evil,* aphorism 58, p. !i56.

[18] *Thus. Spoke Zarathustra,* p. Ul.

Hobbesian view of man is that he is a creature of passion in need of rational society for assuaging a state of conflict, the relationship of Zarathustra to society is completely severed. The meaning of existence consists in the free expression of the passions without rational restriction. What is most evidently lacking in Zarathustra is the central Socratic virtue of justice or harmony brought about in both individual and society by reason.19 The free expression of the passions as portrayed by Zarathustra appears on the contrary to be a celebration of conflict between individual and society from which the individual is in a constant state of liberating himself. Clearly Nietzsche must despise Christianity for its preaching of humility and conferring of comfort, when for Nietzsche the meaning of existence consists in a life of activity, of continual liberation and freeing oneself *from* tradition in order to be free *for* oneself. But because he portrays something of the love and reverence of the saint, Zarathustra *appears* 'religious.' He is something of a Christ-like figure, whilst at the same time despising both Christ and the Christian tradition. The 'religious' nature of Zarathustra can appear only insofar as he frees himself from Christian theism, from belief in the existence of a transcendent Reality who creates man. Zarathustra may portray religious attitudes, but at no time does he allow for language about God.

Clearly, the logic of Zarathustra's historical existence-life in the present, the creation of the future, the forgetting of the past (tradition)-does not lead to belief in any transcendent reality. Rather, it leads to a reliance on oneself and in one's own ability to 'transcend' what is a relative and meaningless existence by providing one's own meaning to existence. Whatever 'truth' there is in historical existence is created by the subject. Whatever one's conclusions about Nietzsche might be, it would seem that he has done theology a service by demonstrating that a serious commitment to the belief that the whole of existence is thoroughly historical (changing) is not compati-

10 *Ibid.*, p. 181.

ble with the Christian tradition and its central doctrine, namely ' Credo in unum Deum.'

It is equally clear from a reading of the allegory of Zarathustra that Nietzsche intended, as we have noted above, to portray the emergence of the 'new nature ' of historical existence as quite discontinuous with the past. Discontinuity rather than continuity is the logic of a thoroughly historical existence. As Zarathustra tells us in his first speech, the human spirit must pass through these metamorphoses-from camel to lion, and from lion to child-before the ' new nature ' emerges.[20] The child is representative of new life, a new beginning, he is innocent of the past, he looks forward to the future, a future which is radically open to the creative abilities of the self now liberated from obedience to the authority of a higher reality. But whilst the image of the child is attractive, perhaps invigorating and conducive to enthusiasm, Nietzsche's use of the image must be contrasted with the important image of the child in the New Testament, where the salient characteristic would seem to be one of humility and obedience to the Will of the Heavenly Father. The image of the child in the New Testament is in acute contrast with the meaning of the image of the child in the allegory of Zarathustra.

THE EDUCATIONAL DILEMMA

The contrast between the two allegories not only provides us with two contrasting views of what is philosophy, but also two equally contrasting views of what amounts to education and more particularly, religious education. At the same time, Nietzsche affords us some clarification of some fundamental issues. In both allegories, the dimension of the religious is seen as essential to human existence, btit the meaning of transcen-

so As Nietzsche describes these metamorphoses, it is clear that the camel typifies the life of obedience to higher realities, with which man is burdened. The lion typifies revolt and resentment against authority, but is capable solely of revolt. Hence the need to the final metamorphosis of the child. The child knows nothing of the previous stages. His existence is discontinuous with the past.

dence in the one is based on the rejection of the meaning of transcendence in the other. In the allegory of the cave, man transcends the world of opinion and conventions (shadows) by the discovery of the light of knowledge. If we are correct in saying that Zarathustra creates his own cave, then transcendence consists in the continuous assertions of the will over what is recognized as utter contingency. Clearly, the meaning of education in this contrast is equally at stake. How is the Christian educator to deal with this situation? Resolution of this important philosophical issue would seem to lie in the answer to that ancient question: what think ye of truth? Is it possible for us as Christian educators to reject the traditional understanding and the traditional doctrinal statements concerning a transcendent God, to say that we can utter nothing whatsoever about that Reality, and still remain faithful to the tradition of Christianity? I think not. If the Christian theologian and educator rejects what is the traditional philosophical and theological ground for statements about God, then on what human ground, if any, does Christian theism rest? If the answer is-on historical existence--then it would seem that Nietzsche is more consistent on this score than many contemporary theologians. If by human existence we mean historical existence, then Nietzsche demonstrates that historical existence does not lead to belief in any transcendent Reality, but to acceptance of this contingent world alone, in which man is fated to live out his own meaning, a meaning which is equally subject to the evanescent quality of history. One suspects that man is thus called upon to live in the belief that there is nothing of any lasting or permanent importance to his .life. Life is destined to futility.[21]

One must re-emphasize: as theologians and as Christian educators, what do we really mean when we say that all reality is .historical? Can we say that there is a historical dimension to existence but that there is a higher realm which transcends the historical, or are we as serious about history as is Zarathustra,

[11] On thi& issue, see once again L. Strauss: *op. cit.*, p. *is* f.

to the point where we must say that every aspect of existence is time-bound and destined to perish? Finally, what dangers are there in beginning with a general understanding of what is religious and then trying to 'fit' Christianity into this general category of 'religion' discerned in modern society? Our argument is that not all that appears 'religious' is consonant with Christian faith. As a result of our contrast, it would appear that the Christian tradition has much to say about what constitutes the meaning of religion-with which it can perceive some affinity-and what understanding of religion is incompatible with faith.

Clearly, it is impossible to formulate answers to all of these questions here, but I suggest that they are fundamental questions which lie at the heart of both theology and religious education. The philosophical context in which we use such fashionable terms as freedom, liberation, creativity, spontaneity is of vital importance. If we are correct in claiming that the two allegories provide us with quite different meanings of what is philosophy, then it would seem to follow, in the opinion of this writer, that it is quite inadequate for Christian theology to employ what are the philosophical implications of the allegory of Zarathustra and still remain faithful to the essential elements of the Christian tradition.

It would likewise seem to follow that the language of liberation in the mouth of the Christian must presuppose some understanding of a transcendent God, and that it is equally inadequate to say that such a Reality is to be denied objective status, but emerges and is to be found within the realm of the subjective exclusively. An implication of the allegory of Plato is that if truth is to be discovered by reason, then movement from the cave to the light is a very personal endeavor. Both the love of, and some degree of knowledge of, the light must be appropriated by the subject if there is to be human fulfillment. But that is a quite different matter, as we have seen, from the position of Nietzsche, exemplified by Zarathustra, who creates his own truth, and very consciously rejects all forms of objec-

tivity. As a variation on a Zarathustran theme, religious education will be seen as the creation of the self,[22] in the continuous rejection and overcoming of tradition. If truth lies ultimately within the subject then the role of the educator consists in serving the purposes of the self. It is not possible, in this context, to use any language about God. Rather, education is concerned with the expressions of the creative self in some personal relationship to other creative selves.

If, as we suggest, Christian theology must resist any such radicalization of historical existence, then at some point in its theology it would seem imperative to speak of a transcendent and objective God. The traditions of Christianity would thus seem to be indispensable to contemporary theology. In its finest expressions, this Christian tradition. has always spoken of an integration between the sacred and the secular. To separate the two entirely would seem to be at variance with both Augustine and Aquinas. But, needless to say, an authentic expression of the tradition does not entail any claim to a total possession of truth about God, and therefore authoritarianism would seem to be a perversion of the tradition. The allegory of the cave does not lend itself to any form of dogmatism, that is to say, to any equation of one's opinion with truth, for man in the cave can but perceive dimly and with a good deal of imprecision among the shadows of earthly existence. But to presuppose the truth means that one is constantly ·engaged in life in a search for the truth, and this is the task of education.

At the same time, to claim once more that faith and reason must be seen as compatible is to claim that reason involves us in the search, inquiry, discovery and integration of truth into human experience, in a manner never fully achieved in this life. A central issue would seem therefore to be whether one seeks

u Nietzsche grudgingly finds for traditional Christian institutions a very subsidiary role. They continue to offer shelter and security to those who are incapable of finding within themselves the will (power) which makes true individuality possible. Within this minor role, traditional faith is no longer the highest expression of the human soul, but synonymous with human weakness.

truth by reason, or whether truth is created by each self, or community of selves, and coincides with one's historical horizon or perspective. In the latter case, truth is quite relative to the time and culture of history, whilst in the former case, a historical being has a relative understanding of truth which ultimately transcends human understanding. Truth in this context is permanent, and human understanding is limited. Given this· philosophical 'stand-off,' one suspects that the Christian tradition will find itself at variance with much of social science, which for the most part, particularly in its precursors Weber and Durkheim, adopts a historical view of society, and at the same time, engages in a thorough critique of knowledge-perhaps in much the same vein as did natural science during the nineteenth century.

On examining what are the philosophical presuppositions and the basis of social science, one finds not only a deep commitment to a thoroughly historical view of existence, but also that sense of ' new beginning ' in our age, which is derived from the historical view. The age of metaphysics is generally seen as part of a past age, a defunct society. If man is to be' religious' in a modern sense, then he must ' confront the traditions ' (P. Berger), he must find a sense of 'religious' from within (cf. Luckmann'.s *Invisible Religion).* But at the same time, as we have seen in the case of Zarathustra, this' religious' dimension can be achieved only by ' resenting ' and finally overcoming traditional Christianity. It is achieved, and is part of, the establishing of man as *master* in his world. Religious attitudes may be *in,* but language of, and the claim to *know,* God is clearly to be eliminated.

If these severe philosophical difficulties are recognized by those of us within the Christian tradition, one must hasten to add that the current confrontation does not allow one to revert to a comfortable smugness which acts on the assumption that in our institutions we Christians are the proud possessors of the truth, and that intellectual inertia is now possible. This point of pride is perhaps where Christian education has in the past

been prone to move, and in so doing has short-circuited the educational process of enquiry and discovery of truth. The impetus of the Platonic allegory is that the life of virtue must be vigorously pursued throughout life. The Christian tradition provides one with the assurance (perhaps not the scientific ' proof ') that virtue and truth are to be found and that human fulfillment is bound up with its pursuit. In this sense, man is indeed responsible for truth. His very fulfillment as a human being is dependent upon it, and upon his own effort to discover truth, aided of course, and empowered by, the grace of Gld.

However, the danger today, in both Christian theology and education, would seem to lie not in any continued passivity or in some form of dogmatism, but in the rejection of the whole tradition in preference for a thoroughly human mastery over the world. It is a situation which C. S. Lewis aptly described several years ago in terms of God now being in the dock, and having to justify his ways before the bar of human (scientific?) opinion. Something of this danger was sensed also at Vatican Council II. While recognizing the great strength of human culture, it was also recognized that:

> Thinking that they have found serenity in an interpretation of reality everywhere proposed these days, many look forward to a genuine and total emancipation of humanity wrought solely by human effort.[28]

The same Pastoral Constitution goes on to re-affirm that man begins his pursuit of truth on the basis of reason, and that " his intelligence is not confined to observable data alone." [24]

Difficult as it may be in a society born to doubt and skepticism, it would appear that the Christian tradition and its educational processes are committed to the language of assurance and confidence concerning man's fulfillment, a confidence derived not from the assertion of human autonomy and mastery

[91] Pastoral Constitution on *The Church in the Modem World* in *The Documents of Vatican 11,* (ed.) W. M. Abbott, Guild Press, N. Y., (1966), p. i08.

•• *Ibid,* p. US.

over the world, but from the assurance which the *servant* has in the exercise of his stewardship and responsibilities in the world. It is a confidence derived from the knowledge, but not the exclusive possession, of transcendent truth that is to be found in the shadows of this world.

In establishing in our own minds what constitutes for us in Christian education an understanding of religious education with which Christian faith is philosophically compatible, an important touchstone would seem to be bound up with our answer to the question: Is philosophy (the pursuit of truth by reason) possible in our scientific society? If this question is answered affirmatively, then we operate from the basis that truth transcends both human understanding and society.

If: on the other hand, we conclude that philosophy in this traditional sense is no longer possible, and that reason is no longer the guiding-light of human understanding, then on what human basis do we as Christians attempt to base our theism? Some current trends in theology would seem to prefer to answer in terms of human experience understood exclusively in an inter-personal or inter-subjective sense. Not reason, but will and affections form the basis of meaning and values. It is here that we are confronted by Zarathustra. Establishing historical will and affections as the basis of values at the expense of reason does not provide us with sufficient ground for belief in a transcendent Reality.[25] We can but believe in our own act of transcendence. To say that God is experienced in this

[96] I suspect that this issue was a major concern also to Karl Barth, who was very much aware that, in liberal theology after Schleiermacher, the conclusions of L. Feuerbach were made possible by theology's move away from the transcendent objective nature of God. Barth, of course, was unable to move towards natural theology, and found his answer in rigorously establishing the 'infinite qualitative difference' between God and man. Barth's solution is beyond the framework of our discussion here, but nevertheless the theology of K. Barth remains a constant thorn in the side of that sort of Christian theology which would wish to eradicate any language or understanding of a transcendent Deity. Cf. K. Barth: *From Rouaseau to Ritachl; Protest;ant Thought in the 19th Century,* London, (1959); also Barth's Introductory Essay in L. Feuerbach's *The Esaence of Chriatianity,* translated by G. Eliot, Harper, N. Y., (1957).

act of transcendence remains an assertion without any philosophical foundation, as the allegory of Zarathustra hauntingly shows. Theism is thus reducible to one's own assertion, but then there can be no distinction between Jesus and Zarathustra, between Christ and anti-Christ. It is then with respect and gratitude that the Christian educator can employ some of the insights of social science into the social reality of religion, for both theology and social science are deeply concerned about the humanization of the world. Unfortunately, the great divide between the two traditions seems to center on the cause of dehumanization. The Christian tradition generally believes that man is dehumanized when he and his society *reject* the pursuit of transcendent ideals. The historical view generally holds that man is dehumanized *because* he has pursued such ideals and continues to do so at a time when society has changed.

Hence, it is with the greatest misgivings that one would see traditional philosophy vanquished and replaced by a new *kind* of basis for Christian theology and Christian education.

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PRAETER INTENTIONEM IN AQUINAS

HENRY SIDGWICK MAINTAINED that one must intend the foreseen consequences of acts.[1] More recent philosophers have asserted propositions about intention which are in agreement with Sidgwick's view at least to the extent of denying the possibility that the foreseen consequences of one's act can be separated from one's overall intention in acting.[2] On such views one cannot distinguish between those foreseen consequences of one's acts which are intended and those which are not intended but "merely consented to " or, as scholastic philosophers and theologians often say, " permitted." [3]

A number of philosophers have taken issue with views of intention having this implication.[4] And philosophers sympathetic to the scholastic tradition are likely to share this scepticism.[5] The doctrine of the double effect presupposes at least this: that one can direct his intention to the good effect of his action and withhold it from the bad effect if the latter is not a means

[1] Henry Sidgwick, *The Metlwds of Ethics* (7th ed., New York: 1966), p. 202.

[2] See Roderick M. Chisholm, "The Structure of Intention," *The Journal of Phuosophy,* 67 (1970), pp. 636-637, and Hector-Neri Castaneda, "Intentions and the Structure of Intention," *The Journal, of Phuosophy,* 68 (1971) pp. 456-459.

[3] See Chisholm, *op. cit.,* pp. 639-641.

[4] See G. E. M. Anscombe, *Intention* (2nd ed., Ithaca: 1963), pp. 41-45, and "Modern Moral Philosophy," in J. J. Thomson and G. Dworkin, eds., *Ethics,* (New York: 1968), pp. 199-200; J. L. Austin, "Three Ways of Spilling Ink" in *Phuosophical Papers,* ed. by J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock (2nd edition, London, Oxford, New York: 1970) pp. 278-279; A. Kenny, "Intention and Purpose, *"The Journal of Phuosophy,* 63 (1966), pp. 642-651; B. N. Fleming, "On Intention," *The Philosophical Review,* 73 (1964), pp. 307-310. G. Pitcher, "'In Intending' and Side Effects," *The Journal of Phuosophy,* 67 (1970) pp. 663-668. J. M. Boyle Jr. and T. D. Sullivan, "The Diffusiveness of Intention Principle: A Counter-Example," *Philosophical Studies,* 31 (1977) pp. 357-360.

[5] See Anscombe's response to Sidgwick in "Modem Moral Philosophy," pp. 199-200.

to the former.[8] 0£ course, this notion of "direction of intention ,, is open to abuses [1] and it has itself been the subject of criticism (and abuse) since the seventeenth century.[8]

This controversy over one aspect of the nature of intention raises three important questions: 1) Is it possible to distinguish between what the agent intends in acting and what he foresees will follow from his acting but does not intend? If we can make such a distinction, where is it to be drawn? What components of all that comes about by one's acts and decisions are such that they can be outside one's intention? 8) And why should the difference between what one intends and what one foresees but does not intend be important for the definition and moral evaluation of kinds of human acts?

This third question requires a long answer; I will set it aside and concentrate on the first two. I propose to begin to answer these questions by considering Aquinas's views on what is intended and what is outside or beside the intention-on what Aquinas calls " *praeter intentionem."* Such an investigation is a promising starting point for several reasons, among which is the fact that Aquinas is one of the chief architects of the tradition in which the doctrine of direction of intention was developed.[9]

On what is within the agent's intention

According to Aquinas intention is an act of the will whose object is the end. But intention is not a simple willing of the end; it is a willing of the end insofar as the end is " the term

• See A. Kenny, " The History of Intention in Ethics," *The Anatomy of the Soul,* (Oxford, New York: 1978) pp. 140-141; J. B. Gury, S. J., *Compendium Theologiae Moralis,* Vol. 1 (!rod ed. Rome, Turin: 1869), p. 7.

•See G. E. M. Anseombe, "War and Murder," in R. Wasserstrom, ed., *War and Morality* (Belmont, Calif.: 1970), pp. 50-51, and John C. Ford, S. J., "The Morality of Obliteration Bombing," in *ibid.,* pp. 26-29.

[8] See Paseal, " Letter VII," *Provincial Letters,* and more recently, Stanley Windass " Double Think and Double Effect," *Blackfriars,* 44 (1968), pp. 257-266.

•See Kenny, *ibid.,* and Joseph Mangan, S. J., "An Historical Analysis of the Principle of Double Effect," *Theological Studies,* 10 (1949), pp. 41-61.

of something ordered to it," [10] that is, " insofar as the means are terminated in the end." [11] Thus, " we are not said to intend health because we will it but because we will to arrive at it through something else." [12] The very nature of intention, therefore, requires that the agent intend the end he has in acting.

But what about the means one chooses to achieve his end? Are one's chosen means *praeter intentionem* or are they within one's intention? Since something can be within the intention in at least two ways-that is, either as the object of an act of intention or as something to which this object is essentially related-it is necessary to resolve this question into two questions. Is the means chosen by an agent an object of his intention? And, is the means chosen by the agent related to his intended end in such a way that it must be included in his intention of this end?

Aquinas says various things which suggest that the means as such is not the object of an act of intention. First of all, he contrasts the *intending* of the end with the *willing* of the means in various places.[13] Secondly, the means are the object of choice [14] and since choice involves a comparison of the various alternative means among themselves and not in their order to the end,[15] it does not seem that the means as such is an object of an act of intention. Indeed such an act is presupposed: one chooses a means because of its relation to one's intended end, but this intention has the end as its object. The selection of a means requires comparison among available means; this act

[10] S. T. 1-Il, 12, 1, ad 4.

[11] *De Veritate* q. 22, a. 14. See also *In II SentJ., dist.* 88, q., 1, a. 8; *De Veritate* q. 22, a. 18, c and ad 16.; S. T. I-IT, 12, 2; Odo Lottin, " L'intcntion morale de Pierre Abelard a St. Thomas d'Aquin," in *Psyckologie et Morale Aux Xlle et Xllle Siecles,* Tome IV (Louvain: 1954), pp. 462, 471; Kenny, *ibid.,* p. 188.

[12] S. T. I-II, 12, 1 ad 4.

[18] See S. T. I-II, 12, 1 ad 4 and 12, 4; *De Veritate* q. 22, a. 14.

u S. T. I-II, 18.

[16] *De Yeritate* q. 22, a. 18 ad 16: diccndum quod intentio est actus voluntatis in ordine ad rationem ordinantem ea quae sunt ad finern in finern ipsum; sed electio est actus voluntatis in ordine ad rationem comparantem ea quae sunt ad finem ad invicem.

clearly has the means as its object but it is an act of choice and not of intention.[16]

However, there is evidence that for Aquinas the object of an act which is chosen as a means very often becomes an end and as such the object of an intention. Three textual considerations show this.

First, Aquinas argues that one may intend not only the ultimate end but also intermediate ends. One intends the end insofar as it is a term of the motion of the will. " Term " may be taken in two ways: as an ultimate term and " as something in between which is the starting point of one part of the motion and the end or term of another. Thus in the motion whereby one goes from A to C through B, C is the ultimate term, but B is a term though not an ultimate term. And there can be intention of both."[17] Aquinas's use of the analogy of motion does not seem to exclude that which has been chosen as a means from being the " something in between "[18] exemplified by point B. Insofar as B is chosen as one among a set of alternative ways of getting from A to C, it is a means.

Second, there are various texts in which objects are said to be intended which could not be ultimate ends and which are very often chosen as means. Aquinas argues that it is possible to intend two things at once. One of the ways in which this is possible arises when the two intended objects are related to one another. After referring to S. T. I-II, rn, 2, the text just discussed, he says: " However someone intends at the same time both the proximate and the ultimate end, as (when he intends) both medicine and health."[19] Clearly, the use of medicine is not only intended as an intermediate end but also chosen a means.

[16] *De Veritate* q. 22, a. 15 shows this difference of objects: " sed eligere est actus voluntatis, secundum quod ratio proponit ei bonum ut utilius ad finem. Intendere vero secundum quod ratio proponit ei bonum ut finem consequendum ex eo quod est ad finem."

[17] S. T. I-II, 12,

[18] " *aliquod medium* "

S. T. I-II, 12, 8: "sicut confectionem medicinae, et sanitatem."

In discussing active, *per se* scandal Aquinas points out that stealing and homicide are specific sins on account of the specific harm to one's neighbor which is intended. Likewise in the case of scandal in which one does something sinful with the intention of leading another into sin.[20] Similarly, in the case of lying; one is formally a liar when he speaks what is false with the intention of deceiving.[21] In general, it is the intended object which defines the species of a sin.[22] The relevant point is that these objects which clearly are intended are not ultimate ends but rather proximate ends which in many cases have also been chosen as means.

Third, the object of the external act which must be brought about-at least in many cases-if the choice of the means is to be effective stands to the will as a quasi-end [23] which must be intended by one who intends to perform such an act.[24] This object, which must be brought about if there is to be an external act, is identical with the means chosen except that in the former case it is a state of affairs to be realized in the world outside one's choices whereas in the latter it is a state of affairs selected from among alternatives as more useful for achieving one's intended end.

In sum: the means insofar as it is the object of choice is not the object of intention. But an act which has been chosen as a means is often also an end and so far forth is intended. Thus, it does not follow from the fact that an act has been chosen as a means that its object is not the object of an intention.

Furthermore, the object of an act of choice, just as such, is within the intention and cannot be *praeter intentionem* because intention bears on the end insofar as it can be achieved by certain means. The intention not only provides the reason

•o S. T. II-II 48, 8; see also I-II 78, 8 ad 8.

11 S. T. II-II 100, 1; see also I-II 72, 8 ad 2.

22 Discussed below pp. 662-68, notes 50-52.

••See S. T. I-II 20, 4; 72, S ad 2.

•• S. T. I-II 78, 8 ad 1.

for the choice of the means; by its very nature it includes reference to such a choice. Moreover, what is *praeter intentionem* lacks an order to the end.[25] The means necessarily involve such an order. They are by their very nature *propter finem.* Finally, the connection between the intention of the end and the choice of the means is so intimate that the will can intend the end and will the means by a numerically identical act. " For when I say: ' I will medicine on account of health,' I designate only one motion of the will. The reason for which is the fact that the end is the reason for willing the means." [26]

There is, however, a text which appears to contradict this conclusion. In *Summa Oontra Gentiles* 3, 6 Aquinas answers an objection to the effect that evil cannot be *praeter intentionem,* since, if it were, willful sins would not be voluntary. [21] He responds by saying that although evil is *praeter intentionem,* it is nevertheless voluntary-but not *per se.* His explanation is as follows:

> For intention is of the ultimate end which someone wills on its own account: but there is also a willing of that which someone wills on account of something else, even if he does not will it *simplieiter:* thus he who throws merchandise into the sea for safety's sake does not intend the throwing over of the merchandise but safety; he does not will the throwing over *simpliciter* but for the sake of safety. Similarly someone wills to do an inordinate act on account of the pursuit of some sensible good, not intending the inordinateness and not willing it *simpliciter* but on account of the pursuit of the sensible good.[28]

[25] See In *IV Sent.* 4, q. 1, a. 1 ad 2: "•.. quae praeter intcntionem accidunt carent ordine ad finem." See also S. T. I-II, 102, 1: "... ea enim quae casu eveniunt praeter intentionem finis, vel quae non serio fiunt sed ludo, dicimus esse inordinata."

.. S. T. I-II 12, 4; see also *De Veritate* q. 22, a. 14.

11 S. O. G. 8, *5.*

•• *S. C. G.* 8, 6. " Intentio enim est ultimi finis quern quis propter se vult: voluntas autem est ejus etiam quod quis vult propter aliud, etiam si simpliciter non vellet; sicut qui projicit merces in mari causa salutis, non intendit projectionem mercium, sed salutem; projectionem autem vult non simpliciter sed causa salutis. Similiter propter aliquod bonum sensibile consequendum aliquis vult facere inordinatem actionem non intendens inordinationem, neque volens earn simpliciter

It should be noted, first of all, that Aquinas's statement that one intends only the ultimate end is inconsistent with his teaching in *De Veritate* 22, 14 and S. T. I-II 12, 2. Secondly, he does not *say,* although he does suggest, that the throwing over is *praeter intentionem.* Rather he says that it is not intended. Thirdly, this example is complicated by the fact that the throwing over is an unwanted means to one's end in the sense that one would prefer not to have to choose it.

Perhaps Aquinas is simply using " intend " in a stricter and narrower sense here than in the *De Veritate* and the *Prima Secundae;* [29] if this is so there would seem to be no real contradiction in his overall teaching on intention.

Confusion will arise only if one overlooks the fact that " intention " is being used more broadly and " *praeter intentionem* " more narrowly in S. C. G. 8, 6 than in other relevant texts. Thus, in the broader sense of " intention " the throwing overboard of the merchandise is the object of an intention; it is an end of sorts. One must aim to achieve it and might have to struggle to achieve it or to use means to achieve it. Moreover, the throwing overboard is certainly a chosen means and as such cannot be *praeter intentionem* in the broader sense of the expression.

Nevertheless, it seems to me that the broader sense of " intention" and the narrower sense of " *praeter intentionem"* are to be preferred. The comparison between the throwing over of

sed propter hoc." It appears that this is the only text in which Aquinas argues this way. See Robertus Busa, S. J., *Sancti Thomae Aquinati.a Operum Omnium Indices et Concordantiae,* Sectio II, Concordantia Prima, Vol. 1!!, entry No. 42817/ 02142 through 02885, pp. 244-!!46. Here are listed all 148 occurrences of the phrase " praeter intentionem " in the Thomistic corpus. These citations make clear that Aquinas consistently adheres to the Dionysian dictum that *malum* is *praeter intentionem;* but only in *S. C. G.* 8, 6 does he suggest that he believes that what is formally evil (and thus *praeter intentionem)* is the object of an act of choice.

se Mangan, *op. cit.,* pp. 47-48, explains this text by supposing a development in Aquinas's thought between the writing of S. C. G. 8, 6 and the writing of the *Prima Secundae,* but the doctrine of S. T. I-II, 12, !! also appears in the earlier *De Veritate.* I am, however, in agreement with and in debt to the substance or Mangan's argument.

the merchandise and the inordinateness of sin in *S. C. G.* 3, 6 is not illuminating and might be misleading. The two things are related in very different ways to the agent's intention. The throwing overboard is clearly a means to achieving safety. By contrast the inordinateness of the sinful act is a property of the act; *it* is not a means to bringing about an end. The sinful act can be a means and its object is intended [30] but the inordinateness is not identical with or part of this object. In general it does not seem that the inordinateness of a sinful act is either intended as an end or, except in special cases, chosen as a means. In short, the broader sense of *praeter intentionem* articulated in *S. C. G.* 3, 6 prevents our distinguishing between things bearing very different relations to the intention of the agent.

Aquinas's discussion of intending evil in the *Prima Secundae* is consistent with the view taken in criticizing *S. C. G.* 8, 6. Moreover, it shows that one need not limit the object of intention to the ultimate end in order to preserve the truth of the dionysian dictum that evil is *praeter intentionem.* Aquinas says:

> It should be said that evil cannot be intended for its own sake by anyone; it can be intended in order to avoid another evil or to pursue another good as has been said. And in such a case someone chooses to pursue a good which is *per se* intended without avoiding harm to another good. Thus a lustful person wishes to enjoy pleasure without offense to God; but given these two options would rather incur an offense against God than be deprived of pleasure. [31]

If the sense of the first two sentences is understood in light of Aquinas's example, they may be understood as follows: something may be intended such that if it is intended some evil will be voluntarily brought about. This evil is not chosen as a means but it is voluntarily brought about by one's preference not to forego the good involved-and thus it may be said tQ

S. T. I-II, 72, 8.

·1 S. T. I-II, 78, 1 ad 2.

be intended in some sense. But being intended in this sense is, as we shall see, compatible with being *praeter intentionem.* [82] There is no need, therefore, for Aquinas to say that the throwing overboard of the merchandise is *praeter intentionem,* since the evil of that act is *praeter intentionem* even though the choice of this means falls under the agent's intention. As in the case of sin where the object of the act is intended and the inordinateness of the act is *praeter intentionem,* so in the case of a bad or unpleasant choice-the state of affairs chosen must fall within the agent's intention but the privation which renders this state of affairs evil is *praeter intentionem.* [38]

To sum up this section: the agent intends the end of his action; he does not intend the means as such. But in many human acts that which is chosen as a means is also intended as an end. Moreover, the means are intimately connected with the intended ends in such a way that one's chosen means cannot be *praeter intentionem.* Both ends of actions and means to these ends are within the agent's intention.

On What is outside the Agent's Intention

Perhaps the best known text in which Aquinas claims that an effect of an act falls outside the agent's intention is his discussion of killing in self-defense. Such an act is justified under certain circumstances only if the assailant's death is *praeter intentionem.*

It should be said that nothing prevents a single act from having two effects of which only one may be intended while the other, indeed, may be *praeter intentionem.* Moral acts receive their species from what is intended and not from what is *praeter intentionem* since this is *per accidens* as is clear from what has been said above. Therefore, from an act of someone defending himself a double effect can follow; one, indeed, the conservation of one's own life, the other the killing of the assailant. [84]

••See below pp. 659-60 and materials cited in notes 40-42.

••See *De Malo* q. 1, a. S.

•• S. T. II-II 64, 7.

Several observations are in order before drawing any conclusions from this text.

First, the effect of the assailant's being killed appears to be a foreseen and predictable consequence of the type of act of self-defense being considered. The use of" *quandoque"* to describe the frequency of the deadly consequence's following from an act of self-defense suggests that the assailant's death is not a natural and totally predictable consequence of the defensive act as such.[35] But there appear to be types of self-defense in which the use of the minimum force needed to preserve one's life[86] does have the assailant's death as a natural and certainly foreseeable consequence.

At this point an objection may arise along the following lines. What follows naturally or for the most part from a certain act seems too closely united to the act to be separable from the intention of the agent in performing that act. At least one Thomistic text may seem to support this view; in commenting on Chapter 5 of Book II of Aristotle's *Physks,* Aquinas says:

> For what always or frequently is joined to an effe.ct falls under the same intention. It is foolish to say that someone intends something and does not will that which is frequently or always joined to it.[87]

But this text does not give support to the objection just stated; it does not show that what is *praeter intentionem* must be an infrequent or accidental concomitant of an act. The context of this quote makes this clear; this context is the discussion of the distinction between *per se* and *per accidens* effects. The sentences preceding those quoted are as follows: " Hence whatever takes place in the effect outside the intention is *per accidens.* And I affirm this if that which is outside the intention follows in few cases." [88] These sentences make clear that what is *praeter intenticmem* is not identical with what accompanies

""Ad4.

••This is stated to be another requirement for the moral justification of a deadly act of self-defense.

[81] *In Octo Libros Physicorum Ariatotelis Expositio, lib. loot.* VIII (par. 8); see also *lect.* XII, (par. !t).

••*Ibid.*

an effect infrequently or accidentally, a point Aquinas makes elsewhere.[39] The condition on which Aquinas affirms his acceptance of the first sentence would not be required if what is *praeter intenticmem* were thus understood. Thus what falls under the intention and is therefore inseparable from what is intended can be *praeter intentionem.*

My interpretation of this text is confirmed by a passage in *De Malo* which makes the same point in different terminology.

> . . . it should be said that sometimes an accidental effect is joined to it in few cases and rarely (*ut in paucioribus et raro)* ; and then the agent need not intend in any way the accidental effect while he intends the effect *per se.* But sometimes an accident of this type is attached either always or for the most part to the effect which is principally intended; and then the accident cannot be separated from the intention of the agent. If, therefore, something evil is joined only infrequently to the good which is intended, it is possible to be excused from sin; for example if someone cutting down a tree in a forest where people rarely pass, kills a person by cutting down the tree. But if the evil is joined either always or for the most part to the good which is intended *per s-e,* one is not excused from sin although he does not *pe1'se* intend this evil.[46]

This text seems to be based on the same insight as the text from *In II Physics;* the effects which follow always or for the most part cannot be separated from one's intention. But,

[39] *S. C. G.* 8, 6; "sciendum est quod non omne quod est praeter intentionem oportet esse fortuitum vel casuale, ut prima ratio proponebat. Si enim quod est praeter intentionem sit consequens ad id quod est intentum vel semper vel frequenter ... , non erit fortuitum nee casuale; esset autem casuale, si sequeretur ut in paucioribus." The use of this text is not meant to suggest that Aquinas does not often identify what is fortuitous and accidental with what is *praeter intentionem.* Indeed, his most frequent use of the phrase *"praeter mtentionem* " is in this connection. See *Sancti Thomae Aquinati-8 Operum Omnium Indices et Concordantiae, loc. cit.* But Aquinas is not using what is *casuale, fortuitum* or *per accidens* to define what is *praeter intenticmem;* it is rather the other way around. So this text from *S. C. G.* 8, 6 is not inconsistent with his common usage. The discussion in *Jn Octo Libro1 Physicorum Am.toteli-8 Expositio lib.* 2, *lect.* XIII (par. 2) which appears to contradict this interpretation is limited to the teleology of nature and is, therefore, not relevant.

[46] *De Mal,o* I, 8 ad *15.* See also *In Decem Libro1 Ethicorum Amtotelis ad Nichomackum, lib.* 2, *lect.* 12, # 512, for a similar analysis without reference to intention.

Aquinas says, they are not *per se* intended. They are treated throughout as accidental effects; and accidental effects are defined in the body of this article as what are outside the agent's intention.[41] Presumably we could say that they are intended *per acci<lens.* Elsewhere Aquinas identifies what is related *per accidens* to the agent's intention and what is *praeter intentionem*.[42]

In sum, we can distinguish what is *per se* intended and what is *per accidens* intended. And we can distinguish two kinds of accidental effects: those which follow rarely and those which follow always or for the most part. The former are not intended in any way. The latter, although they are not *per se* intended and thus can be called *praeter intentionem,* cannot be separated from the agent's intention; he must, in the language of *In II Physics,* will them. In any case, the objection fails: the death of the attacker is *praeter intentionem* even though it can be foreseen with certainty to follow; it is not *per se* intended. This is not to deny that in some sense it cannot be separated from the agent's intention, or that it is *per accidens* intended or that it is in some sense willed by him.

A second observation on S. T. II-II 64, 7 is necessary; the killing of the assailant is not, in the case Aquinas is considering, the means used by a person defending himself.[48] It is not, in other words, *praeter intentionem* in the way that the throwing over of the merchandise was suggested to be in *S. G. G.* S, 6. This is not to say that one cannot intend to kill someone as a means to saving one's life. In fact, Aquinas makes use of this possibility to save St. Augustine's prohibition of killing in self-defense. St. Augustine, he says, regarded as sinful that case in which" someone intends to kill a man in order to free himself from death."[44] So Aquinas admits that the killing of another

[41] *De Milo* 1, S c at the beginning. This is a common identification; see *Sancti '1.'homae Aquinatis Operum Omnium Indices et Concordantiae, loc cit.*

•• See S. T. I-II I; 8, and 78, I ad

[48] This has been a controverted question; for bibliography and discussion see Mangan, *op. citi.,* pp. 44-49.

••Ad I.

may be within the intention (presumably as a means) but contrasts it with the kind of deadly self-defense which can be morally justified.[45] This contrast seems to imply that Aquinas regards the killing which he here calls *praeter intentionem* not as a means but as a consequence of the act of self-defense-as "what follows from the necessity of the end" in Cajetan's language.

Besides this contrast with the kind of lethal self-defense proscribed by St. Augustine, Aquinas contrasts the killing which is *praeter intentionem* in some types of self-defense with killing by someone in a public capacity who "intending to kill a man for his own self-defense, refers it to the common good." He gives examples of the soldier fighting against enemies and the officer of the law fighting a thief.[46] This contrast presupposes that the death of the attacker is not a means in those cases where Aquinas regards it as *praeter intentionem,* as it is in those cases where it is intended.[47]

Finally, in addition to this textual evidence, it seems reasonable that the death of the attacker need not be what saves the life of one defending himself. One can defend his life by insuring that the assailant, being dead, can threaten no more; in this case the death is a means. But one can attempt to thwart the attack in such a way that the assailant's death is not what ends the threat, but is rather a consequence of what stops the attack. In such a case one is not saved because the assailant is dead but the assailant dies because one has stopped the attack.

[45] Cajetan in his commentary on S. T. II-II 64, 7 which accompanies it in the Leonine edition makes this distinction clearly: "lntellige bene distinctionem litterae, scilicet quod dupliciter potest referri occisio alterius ad conservationem vitae propriae: primo, ut medium ad finem; secundo, ut consequens ex necessitate finis. Et ut in littera dicitur, multum interest altero modo se habere. Nam et finis et medium ad finem cadunt sub intentione; ut patet in medico, qui intendit sanitatem per potionem vel diaetam. Id autem quod consequitur ex necessitate finis non cadit sub intentione, sed praeter intentionem existens emergit: ut patet de debilitatione aegroti quae sequitur ex medicina sanante."

[46] S. T. II-II 64, 7c.

[47] This point is made by Mangan, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-49, and suggested by Cajetan's comments on S. T. II-II 64, 7.

It seems possible to generalize from this case. The death is a foreseen causal consequence of the act of self-defense; in many cases it is an immediate and natural consequence; but it is *paeter intentionem.* Can we say, therefore, that any causal consequence of an act is such that if it is not one's end or one's means then it can be *paeter intentionem?* I think that such a generalization is warranted for several reasons.

First, there are several texts in which Aquinas distinguishes what is foreseen and what is intended. In discussing whether the gravity of a sin is increased by greater harm, he distinguishes between harm which is neither foreseen nor intended, harm which is foreseen but not intended, and harm which is both foreseen and intended. His example of harm which is foreseen but not intended is a case of someone who crosses a field in order to fornicate. This person causes harm to what is growing in the field " knowingly but not with a mind for harm." [40] Such a consequence is--or could be-a natural and totally predictable effect of crossing the field and yet it can be *paeter intentionem.* Similarly, Aquinas says that " one who goes to the market in order to eat, either always or most of the time finds a multitude of people although he does not intend this." [49]

Second, Aquinas's account of the relation between what is intended and what is *praeter intentionem* in sinful acts makes use of a distinction between what is intended and what is foreseen. There are two components in the notion of sin according to Aquinas: first, there is the voluntary act, and second, there is the inordinateness of the sin. Of these, Aquinas says, the first is related *per se* to the sinner, the second *per acddens.* The sinner intends the first but not the second, which " is related *per*

'"S. T. I-II 78, S. The quoted section translates "scienter licet non. animo nocendi."

••*De Malo* 1, 8 ad 17. Other predictable consequences of acts which Aquinas says are *praeter intentionem* _are the harm to one's body which sometimes follows the sin of gluttony: *De Malo* 14, 2 ad 4; the corruption of the soul which follows sin; *In II Sent. dist.* 85, q. 1, a. *5,* ad 4; the punishment that follows sin: S. T. I-II 72, *5;* 87, 1 ad l; and death and other defects which follow from sin: S. T. I-II 85, *5.*

aooidens to the intention of the sinner." [50] The sin gets its species by the intention of the sinner.[51] Several articles later Aquinas says "the inordinateness of the sin is *praeter intentionem peccantis,* as was said above." [52] The reference no doubt is to the earlier article where the inordinateness is said to be *per accidens* related to the intention of the sinner.

The fact that the inordinateness of sin-a property of the sinful act and not a consequence of it [53]-is *praeter intentionem* is relevant to my argument because this property of sinful acts is as closely or even more closely related to these acts than the causal consequences of acts are to the acts. The inordinateness of the sinful act always accompanies the act,[54] but it is distinct from the intelligibility of the intended end.

It should be noted that my use of the fact that the inordinateness of sin is *praeter intentionem* to support my view that foreseen consequences can be *praeter intentionem* is not a misuse of disparate teachings on unrelated subjects having nothing in common except the fact that both are cases of what is *praeter intentionem.* Aquinas himself uses an example of a case in which a causal consequence is *praeter intentionem* to illustrate a case in which the evil is not intended-and in particular, a case in which the evil of the sin of adultery is *praeter intentionem.*[55]

Third, there is nothing about the nature of intention which requires that one intend those effects which follow from one's

[50] S. T. I-II 72, 1 "aliud autem, scilicet inordinatio actus, per accidens se habet ad intentionem peccantis."

[51] *Ibid.,* see also S. T. I-II 109, 2 ad 2, and ill 88, 4.

[52] S. T. I-II 72, 8; see also 75, 1. Aquinas also states that the sinner's turning away from the ultimate end is *praeter intentionem; In II Sent.* dist. 84, q. 1, a. S; and that the *aversio* involved in sin is *praeter intentionem; Quall8tiones Quodlibetales* VI, q. 9, a. 2.

[53] See Alvin Goldman, *A Theory of Human Action* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: 1970) pp. *25-26,* for an account of this relation. He calls it " conventional generation."

[54] See *De Malo* 1, Sad 17.

[55] *De Malo* 1, S. The case Aquinas uses as the illustration here is his frequently used example of the gravedigger's finding treasure while digging the grave. The finding of the treasure is *praeter mtentionem.*

end. Intention is an act of the will bearing on the end insofar as it is the term of something ordered to it, namely, the means. The causal consequences of an intended act appear to have no position in this ordering relationship. They are clearly not means to the realization of the object of this act; they are not chosen in order to bring about the object, but arise from its realization. Moreover, there is no reason to think they must be a part of this object. This object is the state of affairs which the means are meant to bring about, and this state of affairs cannot be an indeterminate set of predictable causal sequences but a definite state of affafrs recognized to be good.[56] Not all that one sees will come about by his action can be part of the good he aims to realize in that action. Some consequences are a matter of practical indifference; others do not contribute to the good to be realized but instead detract from it. Such consequences cannot be part of the good which specifies the act of intention.[57] In short what is neither ordered to the intended end nor a part of the good which specifies this order does not fall within the intention. The causal consequences, like many other properties of acts, do not meet either of these conditions.[58]

These last two considerations suggest a basis for distinguishing between what is intended and what is *praeter intentionem;* both the inordinateness of sin and the causal consequences of acts can be outside the intention presumably because these need not be part of what is, as such, proposed to the will as good. They are not part of what the will tries to realize by the choice of means. Presumably whatever is essentially connected

[••] See *De Veritate* 8, here Aquinas makes clear that even the concrete specification of an end which is required for it to be concretely realized can be *praeter intentionem:* " si intentio alicujus agentis feratur ad aliquid unum tantum, praeter intentionem cjus erit, et quasi casuale quidquid sequatur, quia accidit ei quid est principaliter intentum ab eo; sicut si aliquis intenderet facere aliquod triangulatum, praeter intentionem ejus esset quod esset magnum vel parvum."

[••] I owe the key points in this paragraph to Germain Grisez and the editorial staff of *The Thomist;* I thank Grisez for help in criticizing earlier drafts of this paper.

[•a] I cannot consider here the important question of the morality of bringing about various states of affairs which are *praeter intentionem.*

with this good or the will's resolve to achieve it will be within the intention but whatever is not so related to this good will be outside the intention.

In conclusion: St. Thomas holds that an agent intends both the ends of his acts and whatever functions as an end. The agent's chosen means are not as such intended. But they are intimately related to the intention of the end and cannot be *praeter intentionem.* However, whatever does not function as an end of action or a means to the end can be *praeter intentionem,* even if it is a natural consequence or a property of what is within the intention, if it can be separated from the goodness of the end intended or the resolve to achieve that good. Thus, we have Aquinas's answers to the first two questions I posed at the outset of this paper: it is possible to distinguish what is within the intention from what is foreseen but is not within the intention and this distinction can be drawn at the point where ends and means are separated from concomitants and non-essential properties of ends and means.[511]

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DESCARTES, RATIONALITY AND GOD

IT IS GENERALLY recognized that the relation between Cartesian science and theology is the key to Cartesian rationalism. Does Descartes's physics derive from a theological metaphysics or does the latter conform to the former? Views on this matter have varied greatly. What has emerged as the accepted interpretation regards Descartes's theology as the core of his metaphysics, to which his rationalism is subordinate.[1] The minority view, challenging what is known as Descartes's "sincerity," insists that Cartesian science is autonomous and that the theology is an elaborate exercise in prudence.[2] These views agree in that peaceful coexistence is not possible; supremacy must be granted to either the rationalism or the theology. A third view sees Descartes equally embracing both and thereby failing to see their tension, i. e., that coexistence is attempted but at the price of inconsistency.[3] Most re-

[1] Cf. L. J. Beck, *The Metaphysics of Descartes* (London, 1965), pp. 136-7: "The argument of the *Meditations* is that when we know the nature of God, any doubts we may have are legitimately set at rest. . . .this knowledge of God is the apex of all Cartesian metaphysics and any attempt to interpret this metaphysics without this essential theology is a complete travesty of his views. Metaphysics is about God."

[2] Cf. H. Caton, "The Problem of Descartes' Sincerity," *The Philosophical Forum* 2 (1971), pp. 855-70. Caton concludes from an examination of the " Notes Against a Programme " that Descartes's considered opinion is: " that when an author confronts his readers with a contradiction between the laws of nature and Scripture, it may be inferred that he does not believe Scripture. . . . the basis of this inference rule is Descartes's belief that in the event of a clash between reason and faith, it is impossible not to give precedence to reason" (p. 866).

[3] Cf. N. Kemp-Smith, *Studies in the Philosophy of Descartes* (London, 1900). Commenting upon the voluntaristic theory of error in *Medit.* IV, Kemp-Smith expresses this tension as follows: " Being always careful to respect, even in minor matters, the doctrines of the Church, he not only conforms to the theological doctrine of the freedom of the will in all its absoluteness, but insists on it in a way that shows his conformity to be complete. To it he is ready to sacrifice his most cherished convictions, even his rationalism " (p. 112).

cently, Harry Frankfurt has urged that both coexistence and consistency can be achieved. In "Descartes on the Creation of the Eternal Truths "[4] Frankfurt argues that de.spite its absence from Descartes's publications the doctrine of the divine creation of the eternal truths is indispensable to Descartes's metaphysics and that Descartes consistently held to both his rationalism and theology because there is in fact no conflict-reason and revelation apply to separate and discontinuous realms. Arguing primarily on the basis of unpublished texts, Frankfurt claims that the theology of the creation of the eternal truths testifies to a threefold bifurcation within Cartesian philosophy: 1) science and metaphysics concern distinct realms of truth, reason and revelation are their equally legitimate respective modes of access, and 8) Descartes's epistemic conception of truth is one of coherence vs. correspondence, i.e., logical consistency rather than absolute knowledge of the nature of things. In this way Frankfurt seems to effect a compromise between the extremes of sincerity and insincerity.[5] The purpose of the present discussion is to see whether such a mediation is possible. By considering aspects of Descartes's major published work, the *Meditations,* in the light Frankfurt's analysis I hope to show that such a threefold bifurcation is unfaithful to Descartes's intentions, that the issue indeed comes down to rationalism vs. theology and that in such a contest revelation gives way to reason.

The Theological Problem

As early as *Medit.* I Descartes informs us that knowledge both in the sciences (whose " firm and lasting foundations " the *Meditations* is to provide) and in pure mathematics (i.e., the eternal truths, who.se concretized form is the science of nature)

'H. Frankfurt, " Descartes on the Creation of the Eternal Truths," *The Philosophical Review,* LXXXVI, I (January 1977), pp. 86-57 (hereafter cited as "F ").

•Frankfurt's only explicit reference to the sincerity question is in a footnote on p. *58;* however, he refrains from discussing its link to the theory of the divine creation of the eternal truths. This is a central question, whose r.esolution, I hope to show, will demonstrate the implausibility of Frankfurt's account.

requires a theodicy. God is at once the gravest threat as well as the most certain guarantee for the truths of reason. For if God is evil reason is untrustworthy; if God is good reason can be trusted. As Descartes puts it in *Medit.* I:

> ... how do I know that I am not deceived every time that I add two and three, or count the sides of a square, or judge of things yet simpler, if anything simpler can be imagined? But possibly God has not desired that I should be thus deceived, for He is said to be supremely good. If, however, it is contrary to His goodness to have made me such that I constantly deceive myself, it would also appear to be contrary to His goodness to permit me to be sometimes deceived, and nevertheless I cannot doubt that He does permit this.[6]

Reason is dubitable if God's power is in the service of an evil will, for divine omnipotence does not entail divine beneficence. God's goodness does not follow analytically from the concept of God as do omnipotence and creativity, which is why separate proofs must be given for. existence and goodness in *Medit.* III and goodness is omitted as a divine attribute through the first three *Meditations.*[7] The central theological problem is thus the reconciliation of divine power and goodness, so that a theodicy meant to guarantee Cartesian science via a demonstration of God's veracity appears to be the surface project of the *Meditations.* Frankfurt thinks otherwise, claiming that Descartes is concerned primarily with the problem of skepticism. In his *Demons, Dreamers and Madmen* he states: "How Descartes' reasoning about reason is to be understood becomes clearer when account is taken of the general nature of his enterprise in the *Meditations.* He is largely concerned with the

[6] Descartes, *Meditations,* in *The Philosophical Works of Descartes,* tr. E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (London, 1969), Vol. I, p. 147 (hereafter cited as "HR").

[7] With respect to the dubitability of divine goodness, "in order to be able altogether to remove it, I must inquire whether there is a God as soon as the occasion presents itself; and if I find that there is a God, I must also inquire whether He may be a deceiver; for without a knowledge of these two truths I do not see that I can ever be certain of anything" (HR I, 159). This dependency of all reasoning upon God is reiterated in the Synopsis of *Medit.* V.

problem of skepticism."[8] This is a strange claim in light of Descartes's own remarks about the skeptics, the overriding theological problematic of the *Meditations,* his commentary on the skeptical arguments in *Medit.* I, and remarks to Mersenne about the true enemy of the work. In a letter to Hyperaspistes, Descartes says of the skeptics that "It is only in name, and perhaps in intention and resolve, that they adhere to their heresy of doubting everything. . . . Certainly I have never denied that the sceptics themselves, as long as they clearly perceive some truth, spontaneously assent to it."[9] Descartes, rightly or wrongly, regards skepticism as a pretense, not a legitimate position or threat, because of its self-refuting character. Commenting on his apparent use of such argumentation in *Medit.* I (the critique of the senses and the waking-dreaming confusion), he explains that he "felt some disgust in serving up again this stale dish"[10] but that it was in the service of detaching the mind from the senses, i. e. in the service not of seriously entertaining skepticism but of moving the search for truth to a higher plane. The target of Descartes's project is not skepticism but Aristotelianism. As he explains to Mersenne:

> And I may tell you, between ourselves, that these six Meditations contain all the foundations of my Physics. But please do not tell people, for that might make it harder for supporters of Aristotle to approve them. I hope that readers will gradually get used to my principles, and recognize their truth, before they notice that they destroy the principles of Aristotle.[11]

The replacement of Aristotle is to be complete. Aristotle's metaphysics a]J.d philosophy of nature must be superseded by their Cartesian counterparts. The inseparability of physics from metaphysics is as true for Descartes as it is for Aristotle. We will return to this issue of the separability of physics from

[8] H. Frankfurt, *Demons, Dreamers and Madmen* (New York, 1970), p. 174.

[9] Letter of August, 1641. In A. Kenny, *Descartes: Philosophical Letters* (London, 1970), p. 119 (hereafter cited as "K").

[10] Reply to Objections II; HR II, SI.

[11] Letter of January, 1641; K., 9!'l.

metaphysics below, as it is one of the points Frankfurt wishes to establish. The surface plan of the *Meditations* is thus not an attack upon the skeptics but a replacement of Aristotle by means of a coincidence of a providential God and Cartesian rationality whose expression is the of the eternal truths (metaphysics) to the study of nature (physics). In particular, divine goodness, which is questioned in *Medit.* I and grappled with in the ensuing five Meditations, rather than divine power, which is never questioned as such, becomes the crux of the theodicy. When Frankfurt deals with God it is in terms of the extent of God's power vis-a-vis human reason (judging divine omnipotence as "incoherent") or the relation of God's intellect to His will in creating the eternal truths, while dismissing the notion of an evil God as inconceivable.

The issue of God's power, while a central problem, when taken alone tends to misrepresent the heart of the contest between rationalism and theology. This concerns the apparent victory of the *cogito,* whose certainty is the paradigm of clarity and distinctness, over an all-powerful God at the beginning of *Medits.* II and III. The supremacy of the *oogito* over omnipotent deception would render all controversies about divine malevolence superfluous. It would likewise indicate a triumph of rationalism over theology and the later theology of the *Meditations* could be dismissed as Cartesian insincerity.[12] In what follows I hope to show that this judgment, while ultimately sound, is premature if based on the contest between God and the *cogito* in *Medits.* II and III.

Misleadingly, the issue does seem to reduce to rationalism or skepticism if the question is solely that of power. Just prior to the demand for proofs of God's existence and goodness in *Medit.* III Descartes brings the problem sharply into focus:

'"G. Kruger is of this opinion concerning the *cogito* of *Medit.* II, stating that "self-consciousness constitutes itself in defiance of all omnipotence. This is not 'Christian inwardness'; rather, here begins in philosophy as such the rebellion against Christianity that we call Enlightenment." In "Die Herkunft des philosophischen Selbstbewusstscins," *Logos,* 22 (1933), p. 246. This passage is quoted approvingly by H. Caton in *The Origin of Subjectivity* (New Haven, 1973), p. 125.

But every time that this preconceived opinion of the sovereign power of a God presents itself to my thought, I am constrained to confess that it is easy to Him, if He wishes it, to cause me to err, even in matters in which I believe myself to have the best evidence. And, on the other hand, always when I direct my attention to things which I believe myself to perceive very clearly, I am so persuaded of their truth that I let myself break out into words such as these: Let who will deceive me, He can never cause me to be nothing while I think that I am, or some day cause it to be true to say that I have never been, it being true now to say that I am, or that two and three make more or less than five, or any such thing in which I see a manifest contradiction.[13]

Taken by itself this passage suggests an either/or of skepticism in the face of omnipotent deception about one's own existence and the truths of mathematics and logic (for God can exercise such power " if He wishes it ") or rationalism (because human reason claims, justifiably or not, to defy such power). The view of K. Dorter is that this passage clearly implies rationalism. He writes:

The doctrines are thus wholly incompatible-one making certitude possible, the other making it impossible-and there seems to be no way of resolving the dilemma without simply rejecting one of the premisses. . .. Had the theological premiss been preferred, the result could only have been skepticism. . .. reason must be given precedence ... if skepticism is to be avoided.[14]

As Descartes makes plain in the sequel, what is needed is a theodicy so that reliance upon human reason is not in defiance of divine power but in accord with divine goodness, rendering the judgment by Dorter in need of confirmation by the failure of such a theodicy. While Dorter and others find this confirmation in the much discussed circularity, I intend to show this via God's inscrutability, the same inscrutability Frankfurt sees as the ground of the separate but equal statuses of reason and revelation.

Frankfurt adopts the compatibilist position by showing that

[13] HR I, 158-9.

[14] K. Dorter, "Science and Religion in Descartes' *Meditations," Tke Tlwmist,* XXXVII (1978), pp. SH-6.

the notion of an all-powerful deceiver is " incoherent," i. e, that it exceeds the bounds of rationality, thereby leaving reason intact and free from the threat of skepticism. In *Demons, Dreamers and Madmen,* p. 175, he writes:

> Descartes takes his task to be precisely to show that the skeptic's *reductio* argument cannot be generated. He attempts this by offering a proof that there is an omnipotent deity who is not a deceiver and whose existence entails that reason is reliable ... that there are no good reasons for believing that reason is unreliable--that the mistrust of reason is not supported by reason and that it is accordingly irrational.

And this is because the evil genius, whose power and deceit Frankfurt equates with those of God, is an unintelligible notion:

> Descartes comes to recognize, moreover, that the demon hypothesis is not itself coherent. Infinite power entails infinite goodness, he observes, and the notion of an omnipotent being who is evil is not an intelligible one. The demon hypothesis turns out to be self-contradictory and thus it cannot serve as a good reason for skepticism" (p. 175).

Though this is a bit hasty, we can ask at this point-if divine omnipotence entails divine goodness why does not Frankfurt conclude that human reason is in accord with the divinely created eternal truths? Frankfurt resorts to God's inscrutability to separate reason from divinely created truth, hut in what does God's inscrutability consist if it does not mean recalcitrance to human reason, i. e. a malevolent if not questionable will in creating truths inaccessible to human reason? Conversely, what does God's goodness mean if not a divinely created harmony between the eternal truths and human reason? Divine goodness and inscrutability cannot simultaneously be maintained, though Frankfurt interprets this as Descartes's position.

In any case, as we have seen, Descartes's theology is designed not to counter skepticism but to aid in overthrowing Aristotle and the entailment which Frankfurt sees between divine omnipotence and goodness is something that Descartes himself states is in need of demonstration. Frankfurt's skeptical aporia is thus illegitimate and his charge of incoherence seems to beg

the question since the rationality to be validated judges on the meaning of such a validation. The " irrationality " of the threat to human reason by the hypothesis of an all-powerful and evil God cannot be " rationally " dismissed without reversing the roles of God and man with respect to the creation and access to truth. As Frankfurt himself points out in "Descartes on the Creation of the Eternal Truths " the doctrine of divine inscrutability is the Cartesian response to the charge of incoherence, but while Frankfurt concludes from this that Descartes's theology posits an ultimate unintelligibility at the seat of things and a consequent separation of what is " first for us " and " first by nature," we will maintain that the " first for us " is also in fact the" first by nature" according to Descartes, i.e. that reason renders faith superfluous because divine inscrutability fails to vindicate God from possible malevolence rather than being the capstone of His omnipotence.

The manifest aim, then, of the theology of the *Meditations* is to have a good .God provide an objective validation for human reason, whose hallmark is the law of noncontradiction, i. e. to guarantee that what human reason cannot help but regard as true is in fact true. In the *Meditations* the validation concerns the rational faculty itself rather than the status of its objects, the eternal truths, since the doctrine of the created nature of these truths is not present. Its logical place would appear to be in *Medit.* I in the context of God's malevolence, i. e. that human reason is jeopardized because God may have created truths contradictory to human reason. Or perhaps it should appear in *Medit.* III after a proof of God's goodness since creation of truth by a good God is the theology most in harmony with a divine sanction for human reason. But it appears nowhere in the *Meditations,* leaving one to suspect that perhaps God's benevolence is the problem. It is only by regarding this hypothesis of a possibily evil God as unintelligible that Frankfurt can maintain the centrality of the divine creation of the eternal truths to Descartes's metaphysics, i.e. by not linking inscrutability to the question of malevolence.

After offering two proofs of God's existence Descartes can apparently supply the attribute of goodness. For God as a perfect being has all perfections and in a unified way, so that He harbors no errors, defects or potentiality. Goodness thus follows axiomatically from the perfection of the divine nature. As Descartes asserts in *Medit.* ill, " From this it is manifest that He cannot be a deceiver, since the light of nature teaches us that fraud and deception necessarily proceed from some defect." [15] In addition to the weakness of the claim that deception arises only from imperfection, to assert this on the basis of the very natural light which is dependent upon God's goodness is again to beg the question.[16] Nonetheless, we are asked to believe that God is constrained to be veracious by His very nature, thus providing us with a theologically grounded metaphysical justification of Cartesian science.

To repeat, science is wedded to a metaphysics, the issue of Cartesian rationalism turning on which is primary. The link between physics and metaphysics is explicitly stated by Descartes at the beginning of *Medit.* IV.:

> And it seems to me that I now have before me a road which will lead us from the contemplation of a true God (in whom all the treasures of science and wisdom are contained) to the knowledge of the other objects of the universe.17

In what follows I will argue that the Cartesian road is other than it appears but not because, as Frankfurt claims, the regions

[15] HR I, 171.

[18] Stated in terms of God's faculties, "Although it may appear that the power of deception is a mark of subtlety or power, yet the desire to deceive without doubt testifies to malice or feebleness, and accordingly cannot be found in God" (HR I, 172). Since God's will is that of an omnipotent being, and it is axiomatic that powerlessness is the motive for deception (the inclusion of malice being redundant), power and will combine in God to yield benevolent omnipotence. Nevertheless, that will and power are conjoined by goodness does not signify, 1111 Descartes says in the Correspondence, that they are two aspects of fundamentally unitary divine nature. Here in the *Meditations* they are treated as separate faculties, so that a problem with one causes a problem in their cooperative operation.

[1·] HR I, 172. This passage suggests a correspondence vs. a eoherence theory of knowledge.

of science/reason and theology/revelation are heterogeneous (which I also believe they are for Descartes) and hence independent, but because, to repeat, revelation is subordinate to reason. The relation of Cartesian rationalism to theology will be discussed in terms of a) the divine nature, b) its relation to the founding of Cartesian science via the critique of teleology and c) its role in the creation of the eternal truths.

The Divine Nature

The unitary character of God's attributes, significantly absent from the *Meditations,* is asserted when Descartes speaks specifically of this issue in the context of the divine creation of the eternal truths. To Mersenne in May, 1630, Descartes explains that, "In God, willing, understanding and creating are all the same thing without one being prior to the other even conceptually." [18] Before seeing the consequences of such a divine unity it is interesting to observe its human counterpart, the unitary *cogito.* The accepted account of Descartes's anthropology, also subscribed to by Frankfurt, is that, while in God intellect and will are inseparable, in man they are distinct faculties. *Medit.* IV is generally adduced as evidence. However, the nature of the *cogito* must be gleaned from the *Meditations* as a whole.[19] Frankfurt's account is the following:

[18] K., p. 15.

[19] In brief (and omitting many points of interpretation which would have to be argued at length) the progressive articulation of the soul throughout the *Meditations* has the following charartcer. In. *Medit.* I, which does not mention the will explicitly apart from its launching of the doubt as an act of resolution, we have a critique of the faculties of sense, imagination and intellect. The will first makes its appearance in *Medit.* II as belonging to a non-substantial *cogito* comprising every conceivable mode of thought, one of which is willing, without identifying the soul as a one or a many. It is simply "a thing which doubts, understands, [conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels" (HR I, 158). Following the mediated conception of consciousness concluding *Medit.* II we find from *Medits.* III- V a faculty conception, epitomized in *Medit.* IV by a passive intellect and an active and judging will, this latter faculty our similitude to God. However, the *Meditations* conclude by revoking such a faculty conception. Distinguishing the mind from the body in *Medit.* VI, Descartes explains that: " When I consider the mind, that is to say, myself inasmuch as I am only a thinking

Descartes does not explain just why it is a mistake to distinguish God's understanding and His will. The following general line of argument would have been available to him, however, given his views on the relevant subjects: in humans, the understanding is a passive faculty; but since it is inadmissable to ascribe any passivity to God, the divine understanding must be construed as active; and this means supposing that, like the divine will, it necessarily has an effect upon its object. It is plausible to conjecture that Descartes came to this theory through his association ... with the Oratory of Cardinal Berulie. The central feature of Berulle's theory was its particular emphasis upon the unity and simplicity of God's nature. [20]

We agree. Descartes's unification of God's powers is the doctrine of the Oratory; however, as we will try to show, its rationale is not merely to distinguish the divine from the human soul but, as Descartes explains to Mersenne, for the purpose of "adapting theology to my style of philosophy." [21] Moreover, in the light of the likewise unitary *cogito,* perhaps this is the real similitude between man and God-a nature which is at once willfully rational-and hence the apotheosis of the human soul as the correlate of divine inscrutability. [22] For the seeming gulf between man and God which is consistent with the tradi-

thing, I cannot distinguish in myself any parts, but apprehend myself to be clearly one and entire. . . . And the faculties of willing, feeling, conceiving, etc. cannot be properly speaking said to be its parts, for it is one and the same mind which employs itself in willing and in feeling and in understanding " (HR I, 196). The denial of a faculty conception is more straightforward in the *Passions* I, 47: " For there is within us but one soul, and this soul has not in itself any diversity of parts; the same part that is subject to sense impressions is rational, and all the soul's appetities are acts of will " (HR I, 858). In different parts of the *Meditations* we get different soul doctrines depending upon the problem being considered. It is likewise with God. In the *Meditations* the absence of the doctrine of the divine creation of the eternal truths is coupled with a faculty conception so that God's will can be isolated as a threat to reason, while in the correspondence the creation of the eternal truths is coupled with a unitary divine soul. Accounting for this shift will reveal the relation between Descartes's theological metaphysics and non-theological physics.

•• F., p. 41, note 7.

[11] Letter of January, 1641; K., p. 98.

[22] Cf. H. Caton, "Will and Reason In Descartes' Theory of Error," *The Journal of Phifosophy,* Vol. LXXII, No. 4, February 1975, pp. 87-104.

tion of a finite human understanding vis-a-vis an infinite God is at the same time a concealed threat to this tradition since God is totally mysterious; again, not with respect to power but with respect to will. As Descartes puts it in *Medit.* IV:

And certainly there is no doubt that God could have created me so that I could never have been subject to error; it is also certain that He ever wills what is best; is it then better that I should be subject to error than that I should not? [23]

That is, can we reconcile divine goodness with what from the anthropocentric point of view raises a question about such goodness? Rather than a convincing proof of such goodness Descartes shrouds the divine will in mystery by offering a conclusion concerning physics following from the separation of human and divine knowledge:

Knowing that my nature is extremely feeble and limited, and that the nature of God is on the contrary immense, incomprehensible, and infinite, I have no further difficulty in recognizing that there is an infinitude of matters in His power, the causes of which transcend my knowledge; and this reason suffices to convince me that the species of cause termed final, finds no useful employment in physical [or natural] things; for it does not appear to me that I can without temerity seek to investigate the [inscrutable] ends of God.[24]

In the name of piety we must remain ignorant of God's purposes, whose will is therefore unintelligible to human reason. Our tentative suggestion as to what conclusions to draw from this is as follows. If God's will is unintelligible to human reason we can no longer assert God's goodness. For judging God to be good in the absence of reasons (i.e., judging from faith) violates what Descartes calls in *Medit.* IV the liberty of spontaneity, the willful resolve to follow one's reason in all matters. Reason and faith are thus not only separate but mutually exclusive because from the epistemological and anthropological points of view the cognitive and psychological imperatives of

[23] HR 1, 178.
[24] *Ibid.*

the liberty of spontaneity leave no room for faith. And since faith defers to human reason we again must suspect that the theodicy in the *Meditations* is tailored to be ambiguously consistent with both traditional and novel doctrines. This is borne out by the way in which Cartesian mechanicism overcomes teleology.

Mechanicism vs. Teleology

The elimination of final cause from nature, i.e. the critique of Aristotelian physics, is accomplished by exacting a non-traditional conclusion from what Descartes claims to be traditional premisses. Since nature is created rather than *causa sui,* if there are to be any purposes in nature they can have their source only in the divine mind as God's intentions at the time of creation. But since these intentions are unknowable we cannot impute final cause to nature. Cartesian nature thus appears as the consequence of the theological postulate of an incomprehensible Creator. Descartes thus separates the world into the non-human or non-telic and the human or telic by regarding final cause as nothing more than an anthropomorphic projection. He robs nature of ends and locates them in mind, but since it is the divine rather than the human mind, mechanicism emerges as a theological consequence rather than a rational assertion on purely scientific grounds. The hiddenness of God's aims simultaneously testifies to a science of nature via exclusively efficient causes and an expression of faith. And there is to be no conflict between these points of view because "we must trust to this natural light only so long as nothing contrary to it is revealed by God Himself." [25] Presumably what God does reveal is not final cause, which would force revisions within mechanicism, but a vindication of efficient cause by the coincidence of Cartesian science and the eternal truths He created. The either-or of mechanicism (reason) or teleology (faith) thus hinges on the interpretation of Descartes's negative theology. However, Descartes cautiously appears to avoid this

[25] *Principles,* I, 28; HR I, 281.

either-or concerning the status of his physics by restricting efficient causality to the human account of nature rather than the inner workings of nature, which is the province of the divine mind. He seems to opt for a proto-Kantian duality of outward mechanicism (appearance) and inner teleology (thing-in-itself). This is the view of Frankfurt, who bases his opinion not only on the epistemological implication of the negative theology but also on the reconciliation of science and religion this allows Descartes to effect with respect to the Galileo controversy which Descartes took great pains (in vain) to avoid. In his *Demons,. Dreamers and Madmen* Frankfurt explains that

> Descartes adopts neither the position of the Church nor that of Galileo. His alternative neatly avoids the point of contention between them and makes it unnecessary for him to deny the autonomy either of science or of revelation. Galileo and the Church fought because each claimed special access to the nature of things. . . . Descartes, on the other hand, leaves God's truth to God and claims for science only a truth sufficient for man .... His solution ... has a Kantian flavor: men may content themselves with certainty about phenomena and leave the noumenon to God" (pp. 184-5).

Frankfurt adds that he does not wish to *press* this analogy any further; however, he uses it to support what might after all turn out to be the fulcrum on which his interpretation rests-a distinction between physics as the human account of nature and metaphysics as the divine account. We must therefore question the analogy, for whereas it is clear that for Kant the science (i.e., lawfulness) of nature is limited to the phenomenal realm this is not the case for Descartes. For Descartes the laws of nature are at the same time the eternal truths as created by God, such that their certainty stands or falls together. Consequently we cannot rest with a dualism of noumenal teleology and phenomenal mechanics because the phenomenal is also questionable if mechanics is none other than enmattered eternal truth. If we cannot be sure of God's creation of truth we can-

••Cf., however, what Descartes tells Mersenne in April, 1684 after referring to the fate of Galileo: " I desire to live in peace and to continue the life I have begun under the motto that to live well you must live unseen " (K., p. 26) •

not be sure of its corporeal manifestation as mechanics (but Descartes says we are). Thus we either accept both an unintelligible metaphysics and physics or ground them both in human reason minus a divine guarantee. The following is what Frankfurt concludes from the divine inscrutability by assuming that Descartes's physics can be detached from his metaphysics of the eternal truths. God's transcendence produces

> a decisive and ineradicable uncertainty concerning the relation between the class of judgments required by rational considerations and the class of judgments that correctly describe the inherent nature of reality (F., p. 50) ... Descartes' vision ... is that the world may be inherently absurd ... there may be a discontinuity *in principle* between what we can understand and what God knows. Rationality may be nothing more than a convenient collective form of lunacy, which enables those who suffer from it to communicate with each other, but which isolates them all from what is ultimately real. (F., p. 54) ... the assertion that reality as it is in itself may be in principle unintelligible to us exempts reason from having to regard itself as a competitor of transrational modes of access to truth. (F., p. 55) ... Descartes' doctrine ... renders human reason and divine revelation discontinuous (F., p. 57).

We are asked to believe that Descartes's epistemology is thus one of coherence vs. correspondence, but this goes against Descartes's explicit statement in *Medit.* VI [27] and renders physics open to ultimate skepticism if we can show the intimacy of Cartesian physics and metaphysics. For we would be forced to move from an inscrutable God to an equally inscrutable metaphysics to an equally inscrutable (i.e., skeptical) physics. As the passage from *Medit.* VI shows, the clear and distinct ideas are the epistemic correlates of the metaphysical eternal truths. In fact the distinction between metaphysics (essence) and physics (existence) is collapsed in Frankfurt's initial cita-

[27] Concerning the true nature of external bodies, Descartes claims that "they are perhaps not exactly what we perceive by the senses . . . but we must at least admit that all things which I conceive in them clearly and distinctly, that is to say, all things which, speaking generally, are comprehended in the object of pure mathematics, are truly to be recognized as external objects" (HR I, 191). The purely mathematical and bodily thus coincide.

tion of Descartes's doctrine of the divine creation of the eternal truths (F., p. 36). Descartes explains to Mersenne that with respect to" the mathematical truths which you call eternal ... it is God who has laid down these laws of nature." [28] Pure mathematics, deceptively distinguished in *Medit.* I from sciences concerning actual existence, is in fact the essence of actual bodies. With respect to God, then, we must inquire not into the possibility that He can create essences which would be alien to our science but why He would choose to do so. An inscrutable metaphysics renders physics erroneous, i. e. simply wrong, no matter how "coherent" it may be.[29]

The incompatibility of Frankfurt's proto-Kantian distinction between outward mechanicism and inner teleology with Descartes's comprehensiveness of efficient causality is clearly indicated in what Descartes tells Regius. Concerning the refutation of the Aristotelian substantial forms (and for Descartes Scholasticism is nothing but Aristotle plus God), Descartes gives Regius (who openly rejected them) the following advice, which can perhaps be taken as an admission of Descartes' own tactics:

I should like it best if you never put forward any new opinions, but retained all the old ones in name, and merely brought forward new arguments. This is a course of action to which nobody could take exception, and yet those who understand your arguments would spontaneously draw from them the conclusions you had in mind. For instance, why did you openly reject substantial forms and real qualities? Do you not remember that on p. 164 of the French edition of my *Meteors,* I expressly said that I did not at all reject or deny them, but simply found them unnecessary in setting out my explanations. If you had taken this course, everybody in your audience would have rejected them as soon as they saw they were useless, but you would not have become so unpopular with your colleagues.[30]

[28] Letter of May 27, 1630; K., p. 14.

[29] It should also be borne in mind that the practical side of physics, technology, would be difficult to legitimate if nature operated at some level in accordance with God-given purposes. Technology requires the detheologizing of nature in order to make it amenable to " mastery and possession."

[30] Letter of January, 1642; K., pp. 126-7.

In the *Meditations* Descartes is following his own advice. While the traditional terminology is retained, in that final cause is not said to be a fiction but merely " finds no useful employment in physical [or natural] things," [31] Descartes pours new wine into these old bottles by allowing the force of the argument to demolish this traditional doCtrine by implying that its non-use rests on its non-existence. This ploy of " adapting theology to my style of philosophy " was seen very clearly by Leibniz, who expresses the relation between Cartesian theology and physics as follows:

> I am told that Descartes established so well the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. I fear that we are deceived by such beautiful words. For the God or perfect being of Descartes is not a God such as one imagines, and as one would wish, that is to say, just and wise, doing all things for the good of the creatures so far as is possible, but rather he is something approaching the God of Spinoza, that is to say, the principle of things, and a certain sovereign power called primitive, which puts all in action, and does all that can be done; which has no will nor understanding, since according to Descartes he does not have the good for the object of his will, nor the true for the object of his understanding. For he did not wish that his God act according to some end, and it is for that reason that he excluded from philosophy the quest for final causes, under this clever pretext that we are not capable of knowing the purposes of God ... " [32]

In agreement with Leibniz, we can say that nature becomes detheologized by its dependency upon a God which has correspondingly become naturalized, the inscrutability of God's will being the personification of non-teleological nature.

The shift from nature to God in order to discuss final cause was necessary because a mechanical physics precludes a discovery of teleology by an inspection or investigation of nature itself. In fact, it would be difficult to prove in the first place that God existed as a wise and beneficent Creator by reflecting upon a nature showing no signs of such wisdom and goodness.

[31] *Me<lit.* IV; HRI, 178.

[32] Leibniz to Malebranche [?J, June, 1679. In A. Robinet, *Malebranche and Leibniz* (Paris, 1955), pp. 114-!!0.

While in *Medit.* IV Descartes there£ore proceeds immediately to the divine nature and from there back to nature, the difficulties of going from nature to God are mentioned in the Correspondence. To Mersenne Descartes wrote, in a somewhat equivocal manner, that" the number and the orderly arrangement of the nerves, bones, and other parts of an animal do not show that nature is insufficient to form them, provided you suppose that in everything nature acts in exact accord with the laws of mechanics, and that these laws have been imposed on it by God," so much so that" I have found nothing whose formation seems inexplicable by natural causes." [38] The inner teleology and functional wholeness of living things, which was regarded by the Aristotelian tradition as the paradigm of natural purposiveness, is demoted to the status of the effect of natural, mechanical actions. The insertion of God as the source of this mechanics falls short of reinstating nature as purposeful and thereby becoming a natural sign of the intentions of God because God is said to create mechanics and not substantial forms, which are therefore its mere surface phenomena, thus reversing the relation suggested by Frankfurt. Organic, functional wholeness is replaced by a mechanical disposition of parts, a genesis of structures as opposed to the actualization of form or goal. Why God should create teleology by the intermediary of mechanistic physics truly points to the inscrutability of God's will.

The non-organic realm likewise offers no guide to God. In spite of the seemingly beneficent nature of God as revealed in his creation of such things as the sun, Descartes writes to Hyperaspistes that " it would be childish and absurd for a metaphysician to assert that God, like some vainglorious human being, had no other purpose in making the universe than to win men's praise; or that the sun, which is many times larger than the earth, was created for no other purpose than to give light to man, who occupies a very small part of the earth." [34] The

••Letter of February 1689; K., pp. 68-4.

••Letter of August, 1641; K., pp. 117-8.

manifest teleology is undercut by declaring it to be at best a partial view, and, more importantly, a view from an anthropocentric bias rather than the detached metaphysical attitude. God's larger aims are still not revealed in His creation, which shows that the problem raised in *Medit.* I about defining God's goodness from the anthropocentric point of view either pro (via nature's provisions) or con (via the fact of deception) is now undercut and with it the theological objections that God's goodness sometimes requires human deception. God's inscrutability is pushed so far as to render either alternative unanswerable. In terms of human reason, God's nature becomes unintelligible to the point of non-relevance, however a non-relevance grounded on the opposition between human reason and Divine purpose, i.e. Cartesian. vs. Aristotelian/Christian science.

The conclusion from the rejection of teleology via God's unknowability about the relation of nature, God, and reason is the following. Nature, by not revealing God's intentions, does not point to God. God's proof depends solely upon the logical implications of the idea of Him found within the *cogito,* whose "proof" of God is in fact an exercise of rational autonomy. It seems that the order of creation has been reversed. God becomes the creation of the God-independent *cogito,* the lone trans-natural within nature as a whole. And the divine nature is in accord with its "natural " origin in that it becomes the personification of mechanical nature. God as mechanical versus purposeful nature is thus in accord with the overall plan of the mastery and possession of nature, which would be impossible to adjust to nature as the instantiation of divine order and goodness. That the absurd nature of God's inscrutability culminates in a theology of irrelevancy when it comes to the question of truth based in faith in God or grounded in rational autonomy is seen finally in the doctrine of the creation of the eternal truths (on which Frankfurt chiefly rests his case) and the reasons for its exclusion from the *Meditations.* The following interpretation is proposed as an alternative to the one by Frankfurt.

That the truths of logic and mathematics are created by God is stated by Descartes only in the Correspondence and the Replies to the Fifth and Sixth Sets of Objections. The doctrine's inclusion in the *Meditations* would, as we have indicated, appear logically to belong in *Medit.* I, the doubt concerning human reason pertaining to the questionable correspondence between human rationality and divinely created truth. Or, with His reappearance in *Medit.* III as a threat to reason, we would perhaps expect to find the doctrine accompanying the proofs of divine goodness. But we are disappointed again. That the divine creation of the eternal truths appears nowhere in the *Meditationa* (Descartes's chief metaphysical work) must therefore be explained in terms of the doctrine itself-the theology upon which it is grounded and its import for the emancipation of reason from God.[85]

In 1630 Descartes communicates the doctrine of the divine creation of the eternal truths to Mersenne in the Letters of April 15, May 6, and May The mathematical-eternal truths are said to depend on God as His willful creations. If they are independent from God this would be " to talk of Him as if He were Jupiter or Saturn and to subject Him to the Styx and the Fates." [86] In the name of preserving God's unlimited power an intellectualism of independently valid eternal truths is denied. They exist neither apart from God nor exclusively in God's intellect. Their existence and necessity depend upon God willing them into being. Since God's will cannot change, even though it is initially free (which is explained again by the incomprehensibility of His power and the perfection and immutability of His nature, which eliminate potentiality and hence change) these willed truths are eternally the same. The extent of God's power is such that " we can assert that God can do everything that we can comprehend but not that he cannot do what we

•• J. Ree states our conclusion when he observes concerning the eternal truths as created by an unknown God that Descartes's "humanization of essence and his dehumanization of God endangered not only traditional theology but also all belief in God" in *Descartes* (London, 1974), p. 150.

••Letter of April 15, 1630; K., p. 11.

cannot comprehend." [37] Apparently there are no limits or constraints upon God's creative power. In the Letter of May Descartes tells Mersenne:

> You ask also what necessitated God to create these truths; and I reply that just as He was free not to create the world, so He was no less free to make it untrue that all the lines drawn from the centre of a circle to its circumference are equal. And it is certain that these truths are no more necessarily attached to his essence than other creatures are.[88]

While the truths selected are eternally the same because of God's immutability, *which* truths are initially created still depends upon God's discretion, so that, again, what is regarded as necessary and non-contradictory by human reason may not be so regarded and decreed by God, their changelessness notwithstanding. The issue is not so much the immutability of God's will as its initial character in choosing apparently *ex nihilo.*

The revealing passage at the beginning of *Medit.* VI brings the issue of the relation between God and the truths from the perspective of human reason sharply into focus. After remarking that bodies qua pure mathematics may exist because of their dependence upon clear and distinct perception, Descartes adds:

> For there is no doubt that God possesses the power to produce everything that I am capable of perceiving with distinctness, and I have never deemed that anything was impossible for Him, unless I found a contradiction in attempting to conceive it clearly." [39]

Taken by itself this passage clearly subordinates God's creative power to the law of contradiction as understood in accordance with human reason. However, when seen in its context

•• *Ibid;* K., p. 12.

•• *Ibid;* K., p. 15. As Frankfurt points out, this same point about God's power over what human reason judges contradictory is communicated to Mcsland [?] (K., p. 151) and More (K., pp. H0-1).

•• HR I, 185; this controversial passage, which can be understood only on the distinction of power and will in God, is not discussed by Frankfurt.

it can perhaps be rendered consistent with the dependence of logic upon God. Coming after the " demonstration " of God's goodness in *Medits.* III-V, the creative power of God in the service of a good will is what is responsible for the non-creation of the non-contradictory rather than His conforming to norms apprehended as valid apart from and hence binding upon God. As we have seen, God's intellect and God's will cannot be separated. The coincidence, then, between what God may create and what human reason understands as necessary attests not to the supremacy of human reason or an uncreated logic binding upon God and man alike but the harmony of power and goodness in God. Consequently, to show that Descartes does in fact place the autonomy of reason above divine decrees we would have to show that God's will cannot in fact be known to be good. We revert back to the inscrutability of God, which is shown by the relation of intellect and will. If God's attributes yield an uncertain unity such that God's will becomes uncertain, God's power cannot be known to be limited by His goodness. The choices then become either an all-powerful but perhaps evil God, which renders human reason uncertain, or an unknowable God who because of this becomes irrelevant to truth and must by default be replaced by an unsupported human reason.

Descartes handles the traditional problem of the supremacy of God's will or intellect in the following way. As we have seen, the unity of God's faculties is how Descartes ' adapts theology to his purposes.' The amalgam of voluntarism and intellectualism, whereby neither will nor intellect is prior in God's mind, at once does justice to the theologians while straddling the issue. If neither will nor intellect is prior God's decrees can be neither wholly arbitrary nor wholly necessary. But yet they are freely chosen and eternally binding. This combination of creativity and immutability is explained by Descartes as the liberty of indifference of God's will in creating *ex nihilo.* To Mesland [?] he explains:

And even if God has willed that some truths should be necessary, this does not mean that he willed them necessarily; for it is one

thing to will that they be necessary, and quite another to will them necessarily, or to be necessitated to will them.[40]

Descartes then reiterates that what we distinguish as intellect and will cannot be so distinguished in God because in Him they are the same thing. He quotes St. Augustine (*Confessions* xiii.30): "They are so because you see them to be so; because in God seeing and willing are one and the same thing."[41] The freedom of spontaneity is denied to God because it would subject Him to Fate (i. e., rational necessity, the true and the good) and freedom of indifference is granted, which enables Descartes to claim the true and the good as coming from God and in a non-tyrannical or wholly arbitrary way because of the link between God's will and God's intellect. However, despite the insistence on the non-separateness and non-precedence of the will over the intellect in God, the stress does fall on God's will because due to the freedom of indifference (lack of reasons in the form of the true and the good) the emphasis placed upon the eternal truths is their being created rather than being seen, and therefore God's creative power is more of a willing than a seeing. While Frankfurt concludes from this unlimited power of God that there remains an inevitable discrepancy between rationality and truth since "a person may be justified in asserting that a proposition is self-contradictory without being justified in asserting that it is false" (F., p. 50), the voluntaristic emphasis and its devastating consequences for the true and the good were again seen by Leibniz:

Also, by saying that things are not good by any rule of goodness but by God's will alone, it seems to me that one unthinkingly destroys all love of God and all His glory. For why praise Him for what He has done, if he would be equally praiseworthy in doing just the contrary? Where then will be His justice and His wisdom, if there only remains a certain despotic power, if will takes the place of reason, and if, according to the definition of tyrants, what pleases the most powerful is just by that alone?[42]

[40] Letter of May 2l, 1644; K., p. 151.
[41] *Ibid.*
[42] *Discourse on Metaphysics,* para. 11.

Judging the creation of the eternal truths to be disguised rationalism rather than a divine guarantee of it, Leibniz offers the following appraisal, with which the present interpretation agrees:

I cannot even imagine that M. Descartes can have been quite seriously of this opinion ... It was apparently one of his tricks, one of his philosophic feints . . . I suspect that he had in mind here another extraordinary manner of speaking, of his own invention, which was to say that affirmations and negations, and acts of inner judgment in general, are operations of the will. Through this artifice the eternal verities, which until the time of Descartes had been named an object of the divine understanding, suddenly became an object of God's will. Now the acts of his will are free, therefore God is the free cause of the verities ... But if the affirmations of necessary truths were actions of the will of the most perfect mind, these actions would be anything but free, for there is nothing to choose. It seems that M. Descartes did not declare himself sufficiently on the nature of freedom, and that his conception of it was somewhat unusual: for he extended it so far that he even held the affirmations of necessary truths to be free in God. That was preserving only the name of freedom.[43]

Descartes presents God's freedom (not His power *per se)* in such a way that it ends in unintelligibility. To free God from rational necessity the freedom of spontaneity is replaced by the freedom of indifference. But unlike the human soul, wherein indifference liberates the will from the intellect, in God's indifference they are said to merge. This has the effect of mitigating God's caprice but at the price of an unintelligible indifference. The divine jndifference, because of the coalescence of intellect and will, is therefore neither spontaneity nor indifference. It is not only an unknowable composite of the two, but stress on its creative aspect renders it incompatible with God's perfection, i.e., the very immutability which gives created truth its eternality. Descartes cannot at the same time insist on an indifference which gives God creative options and a perfection which implies by the denial of unactualized potentiality that God has no options but acts invariably and once and for

•• *Theodicy,* para. 186.

all. As for the truths themselves, while God's invariability can account for the eternality of the eternal truths once created, why God " chooses " one set rather than another seems both impossible and mysterious. Choosing as such introduces too much latitude into the divine perfection and the impenetrable character of God's will makes its actions exceed the scope of rationality. *Contra* Frankfurt, we must conclude with Leibniz, and more recently Caton,[44] that the doctrine of the creation of the eternal truths is a " philosophic feint," and one whose absence from the *Meditations* is explained by the inscrutability of the theology in which it is couched. For the very extreme type of freedom attributed to God casts an irremediable doubt on the veracity of God. The limitation of God's power by His goodness cannot be demonstrated, the corollary of which is the self-grounded autonomy of human reason in the absence of a transrational guide.

Perhaps the most straightforward statement on the supremacy of reason over faith was the one made in the Notes Against a Programme:

> For as we were born men before we became Christians, it is beyond belief that any man should seriously embrace opinions which he thinks contrary to that right reason that constitutes a man, in order that he may cling to the faith through which he is a Christian.[45]

This remark can be consonant with faith only if God guarantees reason. But because God is unintelligible to reason he does not provide such a guarantee. Rather than follow the attempt of many who try to found reason on God,[46] and in the process

.. Cf. *Origin of Subjectivity,* p. 127: " If God can create contradictory states of affairs, and if his actual creation is not governed by goodness or truth, which themselves are determined by the fiat of the creating will, then any attempt to prove that God guarantees a correspondence between our ideas and the world must shatter upon the rock of God's ' incomprehensibility '."

••HR I, 489.

'"Cf. the compatibilist position of B. Gibson, who states: "The identity of will and intellect in God; the impossibility of separating end from activity in the nature of God Himself; the creation of the verities . • . this is the cen-

try to extricate Descartes from the circularity of God's validation and dependence upon clear and distinct ideas [47] (which in any case would not solve the problem of God's unintelligible will), we must agree with the early view of Gilson [48] that piety and reason are not only irreconcilable but that piety gives way to reason.

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ter and inspiration of the doctrine which leaves the achievement of science intact and yet subordinates it to transcendent claims of a reality whose essence is spirit." In "The Eternal Verities and the Will of God in the Philosophy of Descartes," *Aristotelian Society,* XXX pp. 81-54.

"Cf. A. Kenny, "The Cartesian Circle and the Eternal Truths," *Journal of Philosophy,* 67 (1970), pp. 685-700. Kenny tries to avoid the circularity by a distinction between particular clear and distinct ideas (which as Buch do not require God's guarantee) and the general rule, which 1foes. However, it is difficult to see how the former can really stand on their own in the absence of the latter.

•• Gilson states that the doctrine of the divine creation of the eternal truths " consists essentially in a justificatiG>n of the physics by the metaphysical conceptions that Descartes found in his milieu; it is an adaptation of the theology of the Oratory to the physics of efficient causes." In *La liberte chez Descartes et la theologie* (Paris, 1918), p. 78.

REVIEW ARTICLE

Ongoing Revision. By CHARLES E. CURRAN. Notre Dame, Indiana: Fides Publishers, Inc., 1975. Pp. 300. $10.95.

The subtitle of this volume, "Studies in Moral Theology," indicates that Curran is again presenting a poorly-integrated collection of diverse essays; such an enterprise is markedly different from writing a book. All the familiar strengths and weaknesses of Curran's style are to be found here; they need no extensive rehearsal.

The autobiographical reflections of the ninth chapter reveal something of Curran's conception of his project of recent years along with historical and personal factors which have shaped that project. His major effort has been to educate American Catholics concerning " the right to dissent from authoritative, noninfallible, hierarchical teaching." Many Catholics have gained their ecclesial self-identity by consistently adhering to certain moral teachings; being opposed to abortion, divorce and artificial contraception (among other things) seemed (at least to the popular mind) more integral to being a good Catholic than true faith in Jesus Christ. Curran has labored to overcome such a posiiton and he is to be commended.

Curran's role as a moral theologian in the American Catholic Church continues to be controversial. He enjoys the enthusiastic support of many thoughtful people, but he is vigorously opposed by others equally thoughtful; it goes without saying that less thoughtful and more fanatic individuals line up for and against him, but them we cannot easily calm. I believe that American Catholics and moral theology itself would deeply benefit from any intelligent attempts to still a bit the storm which continues to swirl around Curran. I urge, not a false calm hiding sincere disagreement, but rather that our attention turn away from the ongoing encounter between Curran and those who oppose him. So far at least, it would appear that he has not made as creative and positive an impact as some might claim; but neither, to be sure, does he appear as the villain others see and fear.

Curran apparently considers himself an academic moral theologian, deeply interested in practical questions, but wishing to address those issues in a speculative scientific way. He seems to contrast himself with Bernard Haring who, after his initial more academic successes, consciously devoted his energies to educating the popular mind; Curran regrets that Haring is not doing more speculative work but he respects Haring's present task. Quite apart from Curran's own self-conception, most American Catholics would think of him in terms of his public stands. Even if we grant that he did his homework on the question of dissenting from authoritative,

noninfallible, hierarchical teaching, his impact has come from his public words and actions; he is famous for the courage of his convictions rather than for the intellectual underpinnings of his convictions.

American Catholics and moral theology would ha well-served if Curran would clearly opt (a) to invest his. talents in academic research and teaching, or (b) to engage in more popular tasks, one of which could be to serve as a watchdog ready to challenge any tendencies toward slipping back into a moralistic Catholicism. Either option would be worthwhile. Failure so to opt contributes to continued pain and confusion for the American Church. If Curran were to choose the first option, then his vocal and "official" critics should cease any opposition grounded in their reaction to his public words and actions of the past; he should be given an honest opportunity to do scholarly work in moral theology, and any dialogue should be on scholarly grounds. If Curran were to choose the second option, then he surely can expect continued criticism (which he says does not anger him); more significantly, his supporters should then cease making any exaggerated claims for the intellectual calibre of his work.

If I am reading Curran accurately, he would claim to be opting for academic research and teaching. Surely he is acutely aware of the complexities surrounding moral questions today; he urges that each issue be studied in its complexity and he is quite willing to forego any unifying theory with which the moralist could approach contemporary issues (because such a theory could tend to be too simplistic). This volume, as well as Curran's previous books, reflects such an approach. He speaks of divorce, abortion, death and dying, the natural law, cooperation with moral agents, pluralism, the principle of double effect. But, in most instances, he has only acknowledged the complexity without doing the detailed research which might cast some fresh and helpful light. For example, it is true that divorce is a difficult question today, subject to investigation by sociology, sacramental theology, moral theology, and other disciplines. While the Church would benefit from such a detailed study, I think it can be harmed by the very brief treatment offered by Curran. Granted that he explicitly disclaims having provided any conclusive argumentation for a revised moral position, the fact is that the tone of his chapter 011 divorce points in a particular direction. And the ordinary American Catholic who has heard of Charles E. Curran often does not appreciate intellectual nuances and disclaimers; instead, he considers Curran an expert, a famous moralist whose opinions are respected (or, from the other side, to be scorned). Soon Curran's "position" is being quoted, the "authorities" become angry and defensive, and the Church suffers. I suspect that Curran's fame is presently his worst enemy. I suspect that any less-known moralist would find it difficult to publish a collection such as we find in *Ongoing Revisif>n.*

The quality is quite uneven. At times Curran rigorously argues against, clarifies and refines points proposed by another moralist; even though his arguments are frequently so truncated as to elude popular understanding, the evidence is there that a truly intelligent mind is at work. At other points Curran simply states a position, begging our pardon because he is limited in space and time; such an approach is valid in the lerlure hall but is really not fair in a book. (In general, Curran's repetitiv,) style makes him an excellent lecturer; poor editing often makes the same material very tedious reading.) In one paragraph the argument appeals to a refined audience, while in the next paragraph one finds po;mlarized arguments with no substantive defense. (Note that I am not rejecting the latter mode. I am convinced of its necessity today. However, I do object to Curran's mixture of the two and I think that he would be far more effective were he to opt one way or the other.)

One aspect of Curran's work which is consistently praiseworthy is his use of Vatican II documents. He has clearly reflected upon the *Declaration on Religious Freedom* and his applications are regularly helpful. In general his discussions of Aquinas are also accurate and insightful. However, here again he runs the risks which accompany arguments not developed at great enough length: he can be a bit too dense for the popular mind without being 11ophisticatedenough for a better educated audience. Reference to Scripture can be embarrassingly brief and selective on the issue of divorce, while appreciation of the intricacies of biology in the question of abortion is edifying.

All of this convinces me that Curran, the research scholar, might plan a book on one topic alone. His study of the right to dissent from authoritative, noninfallible, hierarchical teaching has been fruitful, but it might be put to rest or at least left in the protective custody of disciples while Curran studies something new. His analysis of Paul Ramsey produced a truly helpful volume in these days of ecumenical ethics; the full-length book is surely preferable to the one chapter on Ramsey in *Ongoing Revision.* For myself, I would like to see a full-blown development of Curran's interest in pluralism and moral theology, especially as it touches the legal scene in the United States; I am convinced that Curran has the seeds of helpful insights to be drawn from Vatican Il's teaching on religious freedom. Or he might do a study of the possibility of violence in the face of social injustice; Curran has some pregnant suggestions on page 172 but much greater study and development is needed.

Enough people are already producing fresh materials in medical ethics. But what about divorce as a topic for more intense study by Curran? It would be difficult for American Catholics to listen objectively to anything Curran would say about an issue as emotionally provocative as divorce; the most detailed objective arguments would face a skeptical reception

unless they favored a highly traditional approach. Curran, the scholar, should steer away from research which will recall his courageous and outspoken defense of dissent; otherwise, his scholarship will go unappreciated for a time.

I was sincere when I said earlier that it would be worthwhile for Curran to opt for more popular tasks than academic research. The American Catholic Church needs to be taught the moral truths only recently resurrected. Our positions on moral issues (be they contraception or abortion or social justice or homosexuality or drug addiction) should not serve as the primary indication of the quality of our Catholicism. Self-righteous morality, for all its nobility and clarity and purity, is still self-righteous; by definition the Christian is not self-righteous. No-one should doubt that powerful Catholic people wish to return to the happier and safer days of an unambiguous objective morality with which an individual could feel comparatively certain as he judged his own activity and that of his neighbor. Many powerful people would like to bury the truth that one can dissent from authoritative, noninfallible, hierarchical teaching; if they succeed, they will have done a disservice to the Church and that disservice would be far more debilitating than anything Curran might do, because it would be a suppression of the truth.

So many people continue to confuse the many levels of discourse which surround the Christian moral life. Official teachers in the Church have a duty and obligation to teach, but everyone should recall that part of their teaching is that the utimate responsibility for moral decisions lies with the individual conscience; Catholics should faithfully listen to the Magisterium but they are never allowed to forfeit personal responsibility for their own conscientiol.J.S judgments. There is too much official fear of the individual conscience; American Catholic adults should be treated as adults.

In fact, I judge that the matter of conscience is ultimately not the major item of contention between Curran and his critics. Almost everyone agrees that a responsible conscience must be open to the truth, must be duly educated, must be " formed." Activity which is *prima facie* objectionable is excused, if not condoned, whenever there is evidence that the person was acting under physical, mental, or emotional duress or ignorance. Serious people, including Curran, do not justify irresponsible behaviour by invoking freedom of conscience.

The problem seems to be more that some people hear Curran (and others) encouraging Catholics to act contrary to the authoritative, noninfallible, hierarchical teaching. 'The mention of Curran conjures up the image of some moral rebel bent on ruining ecclesial harmony. That is an unfair judgment when leveled at Curran, the scholar; providing intelligent underpinnings for a right to dissent is quite different from en-

couraging irresponsible dissent. Curran, the public moral agent, is perhaps more apt for such fearful criticism. He showed courage in following his own convictions; that courage became contagious as others acted consistently with their own convictions, even when these were counter to the authoritative, noninfallible, hierarchical teaching. The truth is that Curran speaks so much of the right to dissent *and* he has indeed dissented whenever he has judged it appropriate and others have sincerely followed his lead; from this viewpoint, he can appear to be a rebel. In my opinion *Ongoing Revision* witnesses to a tendency continually to look for defects, for mistakes, for errors, for weaknesses in ecclesial moral teaching; revision is surely needed, but Curran's credibility is damaged when he abets the appearance that he is bent only on revision.

There is a further aspect. We have seen already that the individual conscience is ultimately responsible for moral decisions; hierarchical teaching can never displace individual conscience. But there is another "challenge" to authoritative, noninfallible, hierarchical teaching (if one grants the extended sense in which individual conscience is a "challenge" to that teaching). Curran frequently speaks of possible error in authoritative; noninfallible, hierarchical teaching; his research led him to the conviction that error can be present and *Humanae Vitae* was a timely opportunity for Curran courageously to act out his convictions. We must simply grant that Curran is quite accurate: error *is* possible. To deny the possibility of error is to overestimate the human intelligence and discernment of our official teachers. On the other hand, to insist on the possibility of error is not to be unfaithful to the Church. The problem is that Curran can sound as if error is to be found in every hierarchical statement; it can almost seem that the primary task of the moralist is to expose the error in hierarchical teachings. Of course, the hierarchy tires of such moralists.

What *is* the role of the moral theologian? Curran, referring to some not uncommon ecumenical musings about Paul Ramsey, asserts that Ramsey is more Protestant than some people think and that he (Curran) is more Catholic than some people think.

> I wholeheartedly accept the fundamental premise of (Roman Catholic) theology which insists that God often and usually acts mediately with human beings--through the medium of ueation and not just through Jesus Christ, through the medium of the ongoing tradition and not just through the revelation in scripture, through the "koinonia" of the Christian Church with its hierarchical teaching office and not just through an immediate I-Thou relationship between God and the individual (p. 284).

No doubt, Curran means what he says; he is surely more Catholic than some people would judge him to be. However, it is not surprising that to some Curran appears to place himself (and, in theory, all moralists) on a level with the teaching hierarchy. I know of no easy way to balance

(a) the right to dissent within a group which has inaccurately overemphasized compliance over against (b) faithful docility to hierarchical teaching. Each attitude must be protected. If Curran appears to dissent more than he is docile, that does not make him any worse than those who bury dissenting convictions under a lopsided (and fundamentally dishonest) docility. The moral theologian must be honest to his Church and to himself. His dissent is cautious because his opinion is simply not on a par with hierarchical teaching. His docility should not be inauthentic; the Church needs to hear voices which continually search for fuller truth.

In general Roman Catholics need to recognize the provisional status of authoritative, noninfallible, hierarchical teaching. Our first presumption (contrary to Curran on page 55) is that such teaching is true, not false; however, it is true only as far as can be discerned at the present time. The immediate concern is not to search out error, but there is the honest realization that no human statement can adequately cover all contingencies of the human condition. Official teaching should not claim to be definitive for all times; any impression that " the last word has been spoken " should be explicitly avoided. Theologians like Curran cannot be faulted for continually reminding us of the right to dissent when ecclesial documents make unreasonable truth claims. Our official teachers should state the truth as they presently discern it without introductory or closing paragraphs which even remotely claim that the issue is forever settled; exaggerated truth claims are responsible for much of the confusion and pain in the Catholic Church. If this path were followed by the official teachers, it would be likewise reasonable to expect theologians not to attack hierarchical teachings as soon as they are presented.

Someone must serve the Church by countering those who claim that the final word has been spoken. If Curran opts for that role, his service will be valuable; however, as we have already indicated, his value as research scholar will be diminished if not totally destroyed. The American Church needs a renewal of scholarship in moral theology; happily, that renewal appears to be maturing vigorously. I honestly believe that the American Church needs even more to learn that individuals are responsible for their own decisions and that each one always stands uncertain of his own righteousness, but deeply trusting in a merciful God. In the long run, when we look at the " average " American Catholic, the more dangerous threat is not from those who insist on a right to dissent; it is from those who would paint dissenters as unfaithful Catholics, lacking in docility to a hierarchical teaching which has (to hear them talk) definitively spoken the fullness of truth for all people of all ages. Seminary classrooms and theological journals perhaps recognize and appreciate the right to responsible dissent; such an appreciation has certainly not been appropriated by many less well-educated but equally faithful American Catholics. These latter must be informed.

To this point this review has been primarily in response to the ninth chapter of *Ongoing Revision.* I have drawn examples from other chapters of the book as I have discussed how the relationship between Curran and the American Catholic Church might also profitably be revised. Now let me briefly respond to specific points which I consider significant.

Curran's discussion of "Cooperation in a Pluralistic Society" is truly helpful. From one point of view this is a strikingly important issue for contemporary America. To what extent should the American government object to the rights-denying practices of foreign governments? To what extent are stockholders responsible for the practices of large companies? One question generated by the Watergate interlude was whether executive assistants are responsible when they carry out the possibly immoral policy of the chief executive. More parochially, can Catholic hospitals permit (or even encourage) sterilizations and abortions? Aware of the teaching on religious freedom, Curran cautions that any discussion of cooperation should focus on the moral agent rather than on the action; it does make a difference to say that I cooperate with a person (who has a right to follow his own conscience) rather than that I am cooperating in a bad action. Curran characteristically does not draw out all the implications, but he is pointing in an inviting direction. Secondly, Curran distinguishes between cooperation in sterilization (which he could approve) and cooperation in abortion (which he could not approve). The significant point here is that he offers a clear and defensible criterion for his distinction: " One cannot immediately cooperate with another person to act in accord with this person's conscientious decision if such an action is going to cause disproportionate harm to another person or to the public order" (p. .

Curran seems to deviate from this criterion when he discusses legislation concerning abortion earlier in the volume. He is arguing that there should be no *one* Roman Catholic approach. I agree: while some argue for a Constitutional amendment outlawing all abortions, I could easily support a Catholic who would outlaw " abortion on demand " but would not forbid abortion soon after a rape and/or abortion in situations where the mother's health is genuinely and seriously threatened. Recognition of religious freedom leads me to question the wisdom of legislating punishment for a rape victim who aborts the fetus, especially in cases where the mother does not judge a fetus to be human. (Gentle compassion is essential even when the woman thinks the fetus *is* human.) At any rate, I agree that there is no *one* Roman Catholic approach on abortion legislation. However, I reject the lengths to which Curran is willing to go in showing respect for the religious freedom of others. He says: 'If such a large number of people in our pluralistic society do not accept the fact that human life is present in the fetus, then one might argue that there should be no law against abortion, for an abortion law would unnecessarily

restrict their freedom " (p. 135) • And again: " When one is confronted with an issue in which a very large number of Americans believe they should have freedom, then one can argue on the benefit of the doubt that their rights should prevail" (p. 141). It seems that on the issue of abor· tion legislation Curran must balance causing disproprotionate harm to (a) another person and (b) the public order. (The criterion on cooperation quoted above includes these two considerations and they are also listed at the beginning of the discussion of abortion legislation.) He recognizes that some people conscientiously do not judge abortion as harmful to another human person *and* he also recognizes that the public order would be harmed if the law prevented such people from procuring abortions (because their freedom of conscience would be restricted) . Hence, in effect, Curran's discussion of abortion legislation considers only the matter of the public order; ". . . it is the question of the civil law protecting and preserving as far as possible the freedom of the individual and interfering only when the public order requires it " (p. 137) . I strongly disagree. If I am convinced that the fetus is human, then I should work for legislation to protect that human life. Avoiding disproportionate harm to what I sincerely judge to be fetal human life is not a direct attack on the religious liberty of adults who disagree with me. The American political process allows for discussion and democratic legislation; respect for the conscientious convictions of others should not lead me to forfeit my own conscientious convictions. I am not unaware of the complexity of this issue, but I would give more weight to preventing harm to the other person than Curran seems to do; in so doing, I would not want to go to the opposite extreme of allowing disproportionate harm to the public order.

Curran explicitly mentions the possibility of dissent from the Catholic teaching concerning treatment of the dying. Anyone who has read this far knows that I agree with him on the right to dissent from the authoritative, noninfallible Magisterium; however, in this instance his view is less cautious than the matter would seem to warrant. The point at issue: "I grant there is an important difference between the act of omission and the positive act of killing, but in my judgment at the point at which the dying process begins there is no longer that great a difference between the act of commission and the act of omission" (p. 160). He says all the right things: there *is* still a difference between omission and commission, and it *is* difficult to know truly when dying has begun. But implicit in all this is the argument in favor of what has been called positive euthanasia. But, though Curran glances towards positive euthanasia, he fails to provide a single truly substantive argument in favor of it; this runs the risk of inviting too many undiscerning people to quote him as an authoritative Catholic theologian without recognizing that he has provided no authority whatsoever for the opinion he might someday want to espouse.

Curran is surely aware of Ramsey's startling discussion in *The Patient a Pm-son* (pages 161-168), but Ramsey's arguments (for all their sympathy and Sophistication) are ultimately not at all convincing. Curran should not be speaking here of possible error in Church teaching on euthanasia when he can suggest no evidence.

Finally some words about "sin." Curran in recent years has consistently reminded Catholics of the reality of sin and for that reminder we should be thankful. At first glance one might think that traditional Catholics needed to be relieved of a preoccupation with sin; the days of Hell-fire sermons and frequent introspective examinations of conscience are so recent. As a matter of fact, Curran does offer such relief; he consistently has questioned any tendency to find serious personal sin in certain physical actions. But at the same time as he seems to de-emphaize personal sins, he introduces Catholics to a more Lutheran sense of sinfulness. We live in the midst of moral evil and at times our decisions are tainted with such evil.

In the long run this Lutheran awareness of sinfulness could be more important for the American Church than Curran's work on the right to dissent. Catholic moral theology has been deeply influenced by Aquinas's dictum (borrowed from Pseudo-Dionysius): *"Bonum ex integra causa, malum ex quocumque defectu."* For anything to be called good, it must be good in every respect; introduce evil from any angle and the entire reality can be called evil. Apply this to moral activity and the results are stunning. No one can ever directly choose to do something which is evil; if he does, his entire activity is evil. In our day the best example is in areas of social injustice. We can identify the existing injustices, *but* as soon as someone suggests remedial action, someone else will identify the evil in the remedy. If we work to overcome racial prejudice in employment or educational practices, someone will immediately cry " reverse discrimination." If a government oppresses some of its people (even violently), those who suggest corrective measures may be accused of doing violence to the government leaders. Examples are easily multiplied. The point here is that anyone influenced by " *Bonum ex integra causa, malum ex quocumque def'ectu* " is often unable to act in the face of social injustice; any proposed solution is itself evil and so it cannot be chosen. And so we do nothing at all.

My first point would be that to do nothing at all is itself to opt for an evil; to do nothing about existing injustice is evil. The careful person who resists reverse discrimination is thereby choosing to allow direct discrimination to continue, and that is evil! The most careful person then has still not avoided sin (in some sense).

It is here that Curran's reminders about sinfulness are so helpful. There are some circumstance') in wliicli, evil simply cannQt be avoidedi sinful-

ness abounds but we must take action. One can almost hear the call to sin boldly! In many situations Roman Catholics have employed the principle of double effect to resolve this dilemma. There are times, however, especially in cases of social injustice, when rational principles become useless; we must admit and accept that whatever one chooses (even if one chooses to do nothing) , he is choosing evil and to that extent is manifesting human sinfulness.

I carefully avoid saying that the person is choosing to sin. The Catholic can never directly choose to sin; knowingly and willfully to act contrary to God's perceived will is indefensible. But it is likewise true that at times one cannot avoid a sin-ridden situation; one must act even if some form of evil will result. Again, I repeat that traditional moral theology has recognized this reality as it developed the principle of double effect and the criterion of choosing a lesser evil. Curran applies his theory of compromise to these situations where sinfulness is so evident.

My concern here is not so much to be explicitly critical as it is to call for clarification. Curran is on to something helpful but he needs to precise his use of the term " sin." Obviously " sin " is not univocal for Curran. We have already mentioned at least two evident meanings: (I) personal sin and (2) the condition of sinfulness; the former implies far greater individual responsibility than does the latter. The description of the theory of compromise on page 186 seems to say that at times one has no choice but to commit personal sin; if this is an accurate reading I would find it out of place in any Catholic moral theology. However, Curran ends up saying: " From one aspect, in the objective order the act is good because in the presence of sin there is nothing else that can be done. However, from another aspect one recognizes that the act should not be done if there were no sinful situation present." Note the first sentence. If the act is good, it simply cannot be a personal sin. It may involve some sort of pre-moral evil, it may be an inexorable plunge into the muddy waters of sinfulness, but a good action can never be a personal sin; destroying personal friendship with God is never good and can never be conscientiously commanded. Hence, I would argue that Curran is speaking of sinfulness rather than of personal sin when he applies the theory of compromise; if that is an accurate reading, compromise easily finds a home in Catholic moral theology.

Curran notes that there are three sources of conflict situations: (I) human sinfulness, which we have just discussed, (2) human finitude, and (3) the fact that the fullness of the eschaton is not yet here. The theory of compromise applies to those conflict situations growing out of human sinfulness. Curran is to be praised for identifying three sources of conflict situations; his theory of compromise is more defensible when it is seen not to be an effort to handle all conflict situations.

However, just as his theory of compromise forces a clarification of his use of " sin," so does his employment of the notion that the eschaton is yet to come. When discussing divorce Curran says:

Often in the synoptic gospels the moral teaching points out the goal or ideal toward which we must strive, but pilgrim Christians will often fall short of that goal. . . . Christian marital love shares and participates in the love of God for his people and of Jesus for his Church. This is the truly imperative goal and ideal toward which all marital love must tend. . . . But this side of the fullness of the eschaton, the perfection of Christian love cannot always be attained. God's love for us remains the model and the ideal, but our love will at times fall short of that goal. . . . Some people will obviously fall short in their marital commitment because of personal sin-a point which can never be forgotten; but even without personal sin it is not always possible for pilgrim Christians to live up to the fullness of love (pages 103-105).

I have two questions. First, what is" personal sin" for Curran? I am fully aware that he has discussed sin and sinfulness in his writings, but *Ongoing Revision* convinces me that Curran does use" sin" in a non-univocal way. I find nothing wrong with that (" sin " is traditionally spoken analogously in " mortal sin," " venial sin," and " original sin ") , but Curran does need to detail carefully his senses of " sin."

My second question is a bit more narrowly focused. How can Curran speak of a " truly *imperative* goal and ideal" which is "not always possible?" Does God command the impossible? Is God's grace lacking? I am not suggesting that pilgrim Christians can always love with the fullness of love, but Curran has not proved to my satisfaction that pilgrim Christians will not always have sufficient love for this or that particular moment. If the pilgrim Christian refuses to cooperate with God's grace, is that not a personal sin? On the other hand, if the pilgrim Christian is for some reason unable to cooperate with God's grace, is that not a case of human finitude yielding a conflict situation? In other words, does not Curran's category of the "not-yet eschaton " collapse when applied to divorce? I am not opposed to theological attempts to relax the tension between (a) the absolute indissolubility of marriage and (b) the real condition of many couples. Such opposition would amount to nothing more than an unrealistic intransigence. But it must be asked, fairly, if Curran's eschatological perspective offers a satisfactory resolution.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Le Christ Hier, Aujourd'hui et Demain. Ed. by RAYMOND LAFLAMME ET MICHEL GERVAIS. Les Presses de L'Universite Laval: Quebec, 1976. $15.00.

At a time when German-speaking theologians seem to dominate the theological scene not only in Europe but in North America as well, it is good to see a collection of Christological essays appear from a rather quiet part of the theological world: French Canada. In March of 1975 Laval University in Quebec held a colloquium in Christology. This present volume is the collection of papers given at that conference.

The volume contains twenty-two papers ranging over a wide variety of Christological topics. Bernard Sesboiie begins by giving a clear and insightful overview of contemporary Christological thought. Bernard Lonergan (he and Fredrick Crowe present the only articles in English) and Jacques Doyon treat the topic of Christological methodology. Fredrick Crowe and Jacques Gervais study the human mind and consciousness of Christ. The immutability of God and the Incarnation is the topic of Michel Gervais's very thoughtful paper. There are a number of articles on Biblical Christology. Paul-Emile Langevin gives a thorough discussion of Paul's statement in Romans 1:3-4 that Jesus "was made Son of God in power according to the spirit of holiness, by his resurrection from the dead." The Christological significance of the literary structure of John's Gospel is studied by Michel Roberge. Other biblical studies are Jean-Marie Archambault's treatment of Jesus's filial obedience, Evode Beaucamp's analysis of Jesus as our Messianic Hope, and Andre Myre's discussion of Jesus as the Eschatological Prophet. Two essays are of soteriological significance. Jean-Guy Page looks at the relationship between Christ and the Church with regard to salvation of the world. Politics and the life of Jesus is the subject matter for Louis O'Neil's essay. The Christology of three theologians is also studied. The best is Jacques Doyon's treatment of Nicolas of Cusa. Gilles Langevin takes a quick but penetrating glance at Karl Rahner. Edmond Robillard gives a short but detailed presentation of Ignatius of Antioch's Christology in his letter to the Ephesians.

The wide variety and range of the articles makes for interesting reading in itself. More importantly, and what is surprising for such a large compilation of essays, is that almost all of them are of good quality. Only two or three are disappointing. Because this writer is a systematic theologian, he will consider the main articles bearing upon systematic subjects.

The springboard for Lonergan's article is Piet Schoonenberg's book, *The*

Christ. Lonergan is concerned with the fact that Schoonenberg not only maintains that Jesus is a man and person, but that Jesus is only a human person to the exclm1ion of his divinity. To maintain that Jesus is a divine person for Schoonenberg implies that Jesus is not fully human. To deny Jesus's human personhood, which is at the very heart of what it means to be human, is to deny the full humanness of Jesus which the Gospels and Councils make clear is so important. By making distinctions between consciousness, subjectivity, and identity Lonergan tries to show how Jesus can be fully human with a human subjectivity, and yet at the same time be the Son of God in a full ontological sense. "Though his identity was divine, still Jesus had a truly human subjectivity that grew in wisdom and age and grace before God and man and that was similar to our own in all things save sin" (p. 64).

What is important to remember and what Lonergan is at great pains to maintain is that Jesus must be fully human because that is what the Son of God has become and is. Jesus's importance lies in his identity. If Jesus is not the Son of God existing as man, then the whole point and importance of Jesus being a man is lost.

Beneath this explanation of Lonergan's is a deeper question. What sort of incarnational act is it that brings about a oneness of identity and a distinction of natures? This question is a real stumbling-block for many theologians, since in many instances such an act when so conceived seems to eliminate either the divinity or the humanity of Christ. They feel that the way the incarnational act was so often understood in the past undermined the full humanity. Accordingly, Roger Lapointe, "La Postexistence du Fils," and JelJ,n Richard, "'Fils de Dieu ': Reconsideration de !'interpretation adoptioniste," opt for an adoptionist Christology. They feel a purely incarnational Christology establishes insoluble dilemmas which are usually overcome to the detriment of the true humanity of Jesus as portrayed in the Gospels.

This same need to study the incarnational act is seen in Michel Gervais's article: "Incarnation et immutabilite divine." It is a common feeling today that unless ·God does change in becoming man he cannot really be man, and likewise that unless God does change in becoming man his immutable perfection will overpower his humanity. It is God's immutable perfection which keeps him far from the world and man, and when he does enter time and history, he does so to the detriment of creation's and man's integrity. With the immutability of God as a presupposition the incarnational act is very often understood to be the coming together of two incompatible extremes; hence either the full divinity or the full humanity must go.

Gervais rightly maintains that the biblical notion of God's immutability is both moral and ontological. At the same time he wishes to show that

this does not cancel out the other biblical data concerning God's dynamic and active presence in time and history. The question of how it is possible to maintain both becomes critical in the Incarnation. As Gervais states: "Ce probleme se pose avec particuliere acuite dans le Nouveau Testament qui proclame la naissance temporelle du Fils de Dieu lui-meme " (p. Q06).

Gervais very aptly points out that saying God is immutable does not imply that he is static or inert in the Platonic or Aristotelian understanding of God. For the Christian theist God's immutability implies a fullness of life and vitality and not their absence. For Gervais it is the very perfection of God which allows him to engage himself in time and history. This is so much the case that in the Incarnation one can truly say that the history of the man Jesus " est devenue I'histoire de Dieu lui-meme " (p. Qfl3).

Gervais explains well how God's immutability is not incompatible with the Incarnation. It is not detrimental to God's freedom, nor to his actual relation to the world, nor to the reality of the Incarnation. However, he mainly removes stumbling-blocks and opens up the possibility for a traditional understanding of the Incarnation. What is missing is a positive account of the incarnational act which his arguments allow for.

The question then that needs to be studied concerning the incarnational act in the light of Chalcedon is a metaphysical one. What is the nature of an act whereby God truly *is* man, it is truly *God* who is man, and truly *man* that God is? With this kind of question one runs into another difficulty. As Fredrick Crowe puts it: "Metaphysics is in the attic nowadays, with other lumber from the ages" (p. 146). Crowe believes that because of this anti-metaphysical climate, one must put aside metaphysics for the time being and " move to other ground in the hope of finding a common basis" (p. 147). One may move to other ground, but one should not give up altogether on metaphysics just because some do not see its true value. This is especially the case when the fundamental question is of a metaphysical nature. It is senseless to try to find a non-metaphysical answer to a metaphysical question.

To see the incarnational act as compositional, as the coming together of two different modes of existence, one divine and one human, is to misinterpret the nature of the Incarnation. It is not a compositional union of incompatible natures. For it to be such would demand the formation of a *tertium quid* which would be neither God nor man. However, this is how the Incarnation is many times conceived. In order to avoid such an impossible union, theologians tend to opt for a moral union. This is not a real answer since a moral union is not incarnational in any true sense. What one has to grasp, and Chalcedon gives the clue, is that the incarnational act is personal/existential. The Incarnation is the person of the Logos taking on a new mode of existence, coming to exist as a

man, and not the compositional union of natures or modes of being. In the Incarnation the Logos as divine is not changed, nor is what he becomes, man, attenuated. What is new is the mode of the Logos's existence. He comes to exist as man. He comes to be a man.

Once this is grasped, what Crowe and **J.** Gervais have to say concerning the human mind of Jesus and his vision of God as man has an ontological backing. Jesus can have a true human mind, as Crowe wishes to maintain, and his vision of God is not incompatible with his human psychological development, as Gervais wishes to hold. This is so precisely because the incarnational act is that of the Logos taking on a new mode of existence and whatever pertains to that new mode of existence pertains to the Logos. He has a human mind and human psychological development because he exists as man.

Since the majority of these essays are in French, a certain regret must be expressed. This book will not be read by many who might profit from them, especially English-language-bound students. Perhaps this difficulty might find remedy in a future translation.

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The English Catholic Community: 1570-1850. By JoHN BossY. Oxford University Press, 1976. Pp. *365.* Text with appendices and standard bibliography and indices. $24.95.

This book, the first known to the reviewer to treat specially the problem of English Catholicism as an integrated phenomenon from the accession of Elizabeth until the Catholic Restoration in 1850, is important for three principal reasons. First, it advances a special hypothesis as to the peculiar nature of the English Catholic Community and the development of · Catholic mentality over three critical centuries. Second, it advances a general hypothesis regarding both Protestant and non-Protestant English Dissent and places English Roman Catholicism in the latter and, thereby, in the wider tradition of English Dissent. Third, it brings together important historical resources and a novel methodology to illumine the question of what English Roman Catholicism was, not merely as a religious body and tradition but also as a social, cultural, political, economic, and psychological phenomenon.

The method, though fundamentally that of traditional scholarly history, leans strongly toward methodologies usually found in the social sciences; hypotheses are framed with much attention to form and with a clear under-

standing of how provisional is even the best hypothesis; and statistics are widely invoked, sometimes to overturn traditional prejudices, at other times to cast new light on received opinion.

The special hypothesis regarding English Catholicism is this: that the Catholic Community in the period described must be looked on not as a continuation of late-Medieval-early-Tudor Catholicism but as a new creature rising from the ashes of the old religious establishment and more closely tied to its posterity than to its ancestry. Here the author goes against the usual analysis which, in his opinion, strains for too many connections between early Tudor Catholicism and Catholicism under Elizabeth, the Stuarts, and their successors. Of course some continuity is undeniable on pain of there being no such thing as history. The author believes, though, that too much has been made of the sparse indications of continuity and sets out to do more justice to the matter. He is realistic about his hypothesis but notes-the reviewer thinks correctly-that a new hypothesis is at least timely and healthy whether or not it proves to be as successful as the traditional ones.

He discerns three periods of historical development and takes pains to tie them to. social, economic, and political trends of the times. The first period deals with the destruction of the old order and its gradual replacement by a missionary church. This runs roughly from 1570 to 1688. What brought about the death of old forms and attitudes once Anglicanism had become the favored denomination was, in the author's view, a shift in power and influence from clerical to lay institutions, largely as a result of the humanism of the times. Not only the great Catholic magnate families but, even more significantly for the church as a mission society, the gentry as a whole became the political, social, economic, and psychological center of gravity. Strains of anticlericalism grew more pronounced as the laity realized their new power over the disenfranchised clergy. The clergy replied with high-handed attitudes and by there was a clear breach between laity and secular clergy. The successes of the regular clergy only salted secular wounds. And the mutual disaffection continued even into the eighteenth century when a reversal of power and influence began to take place.

The second period traces Catholic life in the age of the gentry (1600-1770) and there is some overlap with the first period, as the dating indicates. This era, unlike the first, was relatively stable. The lay society continued to stand as the center of gravity while secondary power struggles took place among the clergy as the regulars gained ascendancy over the seculars. Of the two general classes of regular clergy, monastic and Tridentine, the author favors the latter, notably the Jesuits. Sometimes he appears, in the reviewer's opinion, to deal unfairly with the monastic clergy. For example, the Benedictines are credited with an identity crisis

which drove one faction into an irrelevant monasticism and another into virtual secularization. But the same split reaction was not peculiar to them or even to the Jesuits. Indeed, the Jesuit mission suffered as much from a similar identity conflict as did any monastic group cited. Surely the Jesuit success lay in Jesuit piety.

Of greatest interest in this period is the author's treatment of the distribution of Catholics in England. We are accustomed to think of the Catholic North and the Protestant South, of the Catholic agrarian society and the Protestant industrial one, etc. And here the author takes some statistical pains to set the record straight. He notes, from a county by county survey, that Catholics were unevenly distributed throughout the North and that the religion of many a manor house charged from Catholicism to Anglicanism and back again almost as often as a new generation took over. Moreover, while the Catholic society of the North and Midlands was predominantly agrarian and the industrial centers Anglican or dissenting Protestant, the reason Catholicism succeeded in agrarian society was not that such society was more primitive, conservative, traditionalistic, and naturally predisposed from its history, but because missionary efforts were more successful there. This is an important point, if true, because it disarms the criticism that a continuous tradition of English Catholicism did endure-contrary to the special hypothesis-by showng that Catholic successes were novel missionary successes. The author here cites a parallel with Quakerism in the eighteenth century. Now the proper question, given this, is why missionary success was so comparatively small in industrial centers. Here the author's explanation is less convincing than is his presentation. The urban character and proximity of the established church cannot explain everything, because certain centers were Catholic by local option. In addition, the Northwest remained virtually impervious to Roman Catholicism but Protestant Dissent did occur and such dissent always implies the existence of some missionary spirit if not full missionary effort. The author also tries to locate the Catholic search for identity in its idiosyncratic adoption of fasts, days, and rituals, all reflecting a new devotional piety. It may be that the peculiarity of Catholic practices was a sign of self-identity for Catholics, but this can hardly be true of devotionalism in piety which predominated in the seventeenth century and remains one of the significant interdenominational phenomena of the age. The treatment of missionary and clerical questions is thorough and worth reading, not least of all for the interesting statistics (pp. 208-229).

The third period runs from 1770-1850 and brings Catholicism to full denominational status. During this period a number of important changes occurred. The previous stability, in the author's view a reflection of social and economic stability, had allowed the accumulation of lees. With the economic and political problems of the 18th century, though, the lees were

stirred and a further reorganisation took place. Power began to pass from the gentry back into the hands of the Catholic secular hierarchy. Great Churchmen, notably Challoner, appeared. If the first period represented an extrication from the medieval past and the second a formation during a period of relative stability, the third period brought English Catholicism into an age of adjustment to a modern world. Urbanism replaces bucolicism, the missionary endeavor gains not only momentum but more organization, and the gentry begin to supply an increasingly large number of their sons to the ranks of the secular clergy; after 1770 the seculars gradually replace the regulars in urban centers. In retrospect population changes mirrored these dynamics. Between 1600 and 1650, the number of Catholics increased, underwent a slight contraction from 1650 to about 1670 and then increased up into the eighteenth century. Matters improved with the Relief Act of 1778, and the author notes that the Irish immigration from 1770 onwards did not so much transform the English Catholic Community as it accelerated a transformation already induced by changes from within English society and quite likely to continue whether there had been such an immigration or not. The Irish were more catalytic than causative of change. This brings the author into conflict with the Newman-Wiseman hypothesis that the Catholicism of the 19th century was a second spring filling a vacuum. He believes that this view is tendentious and ill-founded because it grounds the Catholic renaissance in the wrong conditions and does not do credit to a development already in evidence from before the transitional date of 1770. Again, in line with the special hypothesis, the author stresses continuity within Catholic Dissent and hesitates to look either outside or back into the Middle Ages. With the restoration of the hierarchy, the history is completed and the author now advances to his general hypothesis regarding all English religious dissent.

English Catholic nonconformism is an instance of one of two alternatives to ecclesiastical tension rising from within the Established Church. In his opinion, Protestant convictions have provided the spur to every sizeable movement or revival of religious feeling in England. But there has been a recurrent conflict between the institutional Church and the religious opinions predominant in the nation. Where the institution has not been accommodating enough, the result has been separation and the growth of dissenting Protestant bodies. By contrast, movements of reaction which have periodically strengthened the hold of the institutional Church have also given rise to dissent, but to dissent of a nonProtestant kind-in the later years of Elizabeth to English Catholic Dissent.

Thus the Catholic community in the period described should be viewed along a spectrum of dissent, some Protestant, some nonProtestant. Examples of Protestant dissent include Presbyterianism; examples of non-Protestant dissent include Catholicism, Quakerism, and Unitarianism. And these facts preclude the treatment of English Catholics as a papist minority

standing against both the Established Church and the other forms of religious dissent, both Protestant and nonProtestant. Indeed, to regard English Catholicism as one among many dissenting sects is, whether right or not, less tendentious than the alternative. The author concludes the book with a charming sociological analysis of English dissent as supplied by a visitor from another planet who has had the opportunity to survey English religious behavior between 1570 and 1850.

Now the special hypothesis, however attractive and plausible, does not, in the reviewer's opinion, explain anything which could not be explained in other ways. In fact, it sometimes appears to ignore what may be anomalous facts. For instance, in the provisions of the Relief Act of 1778, Catholics are termed "protesting Catholic dissenters." Catholics so resented this label thal! they had it stricken from the 1791 Relief Bill. Evidently *they* did not regard themselves simply as a case of dissent. Other dissenting factions have usually borne the epithet with longanimity. So the fact that Catholics did not may tell against the special hypothesis, unless the Catholics of the time were mistaken in their view of themselves. And, even if the special hypothesis can account for uncomfortable facts like this one, its real advantage lies in its subsumption under the general hypothesis, which, if true, is an elegant explanation of all of English Dissent. But because of the structure of the argument, the plausibility of the general hypothesis depends on the plausibility of the special, not vice-versa. And an alternative special hypothesis which did regard English Catholicism as standing against a non- (and sometimes anti-) Catholic monolith would fragment English dissent enough to overturn the general hypothesis which insists on a more egalitarian attitude toward the Catholic position. It may be, though, that there is no general phenomenon of English Dissent and that we are dealing with many separate phenomena.

The author's case is, however, masterfully argued. The writing is careful and often dense. The treatment of particular issues, even if the status of the special and general hypotheses remains problematic, is sympathetic and full of insight and feeling, for the author never loses either his sense of humor or his compassion for the sufferings of human beings on both the institutional and the dissenting sides of the religious question. The book abounds in delightful vignettes of Catholic life. And even where the prose is uninspired, it excites sympathy for the English Catholics who have held on to their faith from Elizabethan times. Whether or not Catholics can claim blood descent from English dissenters, they can claim fraternity of spirit. And this is always what has been of most importance to thoughtful people of any nationality, any heritage, any cultural or religious persuasion.

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Ontologie der Innerlichkeit. Reditio Completa und Processio Interior bei Thomas von Aquinas. By RETO L. FETZ. Freiburg: Universitatsverlag, 1975. Pp. 199. S.Fr.30.00.

This is a contribution to our understanding of two dialogues between Thomas Aquinas and philosophers. The first is that between Thomas and Neo-Platonism, with Thomas imbibing influential structures and ideas from Neo-Platonism. The second is the conversation between Aquinas and modern philosophy after Descartes and Kant. Karl Rahner's doctoral dissertation, *Geist in Welt* (which his professor, the Thomist, Honecker, found unacceptable but which gained attention immediately upon its publication in 1939), had examined in detail the relationship of Aquinas's epistemology to transcendental philosophy, especially that of Kant. Rahner was particularly concerned with the relationship of the transcendental powers of the intellect to their material, the world present in images and species. This movement of the transcendental Thomists had been begun by J. Marechal and was continued not only by Rahner but by Lonergan and Coreth. Here is a further stage in the dialogue between Aquinas and post-Kantian philosophy. Fetz's introduction to his tightly composed book of two hundred pages shifts the attention away from Kant to Hegel.

The German Idealists, Schelling and Hegel, knew little of medieval thought, although the end of the Enlightenment had brought Romanticism's enthusiasm for everything medieval. But this medieval replacement of Hellenism was accomplished through the idealization of the late German Middle Ages, even including the Reformation. In their profound indebtedness to Neo-Platonism, Schelling and Hegel knew more about Meister Eckhart than about Thomas Aquinas, and Fetz refers to Hegel as the " German Proclus."

Idealism saw itself as fulfilling what Kant had left undone, overcoming those final dualisms (subject and object, morality and speculation) by showing how spirit was the all-embracing paradigm. The task which Fetz has set for himself is the examination of the radical interiority of the human mind, the self-reflective power of spirit. He takes as his primary text one from the *Summa contra Gentiles* IV (11) where, recalling the *De Ente et Essentia,* Aquinas moves upwards through the hierarchy of being until he reaches intellectual creatures. " Nam intellectus humanus, etsi seipsum cognoscere possit, tamen primum suae cognitionis initium ab extrinseco sumit .... " The task of the book is to explain this inner process by which the human mind can reflect upon itself beneath and within an object. In this central text Aquinas describes intellectual life as an emanation. So the human mind resembles the divine mind creative of the cosmos. Fetz considers not only the self-penetration of the created spirit's intellectual power but the externalization of the created intellect. For the objects of

knowing come from without, and the human mind does not function without phantasms, even a phantasm of its own spiritual self-penetration.

Fetz introduces his chapters of difficult epistemology with a historical study where Aristotle, Pseudo-Dionysius, Proclus and other Neo-Platonic thinkers are considered. This concludes in a return to the text from the *SCG* to see the influence of Neo-Platonism in Aquinas's thought. The two major sections of the book treat procession, return, and externalization in human knowledge. Finally, Fetz contrasts this process in the human mind with the godhead.

The conclusion of Fetz's book indicates that in this area Aquinas is first of all influenced by Neo-Platonic thought-from various sources but particularly from Augustine. What I missed at the end of the study were some observations upon three further areas. First, the Trinity is the climax of spiritual interior process. There the processes and the spiritual realizations are eternal and personal. The book stops short of this. Second, the promise of some comparison with Hegel is not fulfilled. At least some sketch of lines of comparison in this area between Aquinas and Idealism is needed. Third, there is no mention of the relationship of mysticism to this process of self-return in the ground of the soul. Again Meister Eckhart comes to mind, for he too is strongly Neo-Platonic; he too is a bridge between Scholasticism and Idealism. For Eckhart the ground of the soul, the point of self-realization of the created spiritual powers, is not closed and complete, but open. There we find the *scintilla animae* (a phrase used by Aquinas and Plotinus) where nature allows grace to reduplicate the very life of the deity: the generation by Father and through Spirit of the Son. We can hope that Reto Fetz will use this work as the beginning for these further studies.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

Karl Alber Verlag: *Schelling* by Werner Marx. Pp. 156; no price given.

Allen and Unwin: *Aristotle* by John B. Morrall. Pp. 120; $14.50 cloth, *$6.50* paper.

Brill: *Calvinism and Scholasticism in Vermigli's Doctrine of Man and Grace* by John P. Donnelly. Pp. 235; Gld. 68.00.

University of California Press: *Reason and Argument* by Peter T. Geach. Pp. 99; $2.95.

Cornell University Press: *Boethius's De Topicis differentiis,* translated with Essay and Notes by Eleonore Stump. Pp. 287; $18.50.

Fides/Claretian: *Light on the Epi-stles; Light on the Gospels* by John L. McKenzie. Pp. 120; $4.95 each.

Fundaci6n Universitaria Espanola: *Desenvolumiento y vitalidad de la Iglesia,* Vols. I-III by Juan G. Arintero, 0. P. Pp. *539,* 538, 519; no price given.

Harper and Row: *The Celebration of Discipline* by Richard J. Foster. Pp. 178; $7.95.

International Society for Neoplatonic Studies: *The Significance of' Neoplatonism* edited by R. Blaine Harris. Pp. 370; $20.00.

Liiromedel: *Glaube und geschichliche Verantwortlichkeit* by Edgar Almen. Pp. 475; D.M. 50.00 cloth, D.M. 28.35 paper.

Macmillan: *Aristotle for Everyone* by Mortimer Adler. Pp. 206; $8.95.

New York University Press: *Ethical Writings of Maimonides* by Raymond Weiss and Charles Butterworth. Pp. 306; $28.50.

Martinus Nijhoff: *Theory and Practice: An Essay in Human Intentionalities* by Nathan Rothenstreich. Pp. 239; Gld. 37.50.

Open Court: *Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study* by Roderick M. Chisholm. Pp. 230; $10.50.

Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies: *Gersonides on God's Knowledge: A Translation and Commentary* by Norbert M. Samuelson. Pp. 323; $15.00.

Princeton University Press: *The Mystery of the Mind: A Critical Study of Consciousness* by Wilder Penfield. Pp. 123; $3.45.

Regis College Press: *Trinification of the World: A Festschrift in Honour of Frederick E. Crowe* edited by Thomas A. Dunn and Jean-Marc Laporte. Pp. 329.

Scottish Academic Press: *The Doctrine of the Trinity* by Eberhard Jlingel. Pp. 110; £3.25.