RESURRECTION TRADITIONS AND CHRISTIAN APOLOGETIC

IT IS VERY difficult to account for the origin of the Christian Church unless it is conceded that Jesus's disciples and the apostle Paul really did undergo experiences which convinced them that Jesus himself had been raised from the dead and had personally made an appearance to them. But it is another question entirely when one asks whether their own interpretation of their experiences was the correct one. Not infrequently it has been suggested that the conviction of Jesus's resurrection was simply the product of their own minds.[1] It is this suggestion, primarily, that Christian apologetic has to deal with, and it is the contention of the present essay that the apologetic arguments commonly employed are unconvincing. It is a peculiar difficulty of the problem that it arises directly out of New Testament studies and yet leads the inquirer into a field of psychological theory in which the New Testament specialist has no professional competence. This has not, however, deterred New Testament scholars from raising the possibility of psychological explanations and apparently refuting them. It may therefore be worthwhile for a fellow New Testament specialist to point out that, even to the eye of the layman in psychology, there seem to be obvious possibilities which have not been thoroughly considered, and which might prove somewhat difficult to demolish.

The purely psychological explanation of belief in the resurrection (as this explanation is commonly understood) is conveniently summarised by C. F. D. Maule as follows :

[1] See, e.g., Maurice G-Oguel, *La Foi a la Resurrection de Jesus dans le Christianisme Primitif* (Paris, 1933), pp. 109-117, 393-396, also Wilhelm Bousset, *Kyrios Christos,* ET by J. E. Steely (Nashville, 1970), p. 106.

What is more widely believed, so far as I can ascertain, is that the Christian Church took its rise not indeed from a deliberate falsehood but from a sheer, honest misapprehension-assisted, perhaps, by superstitious awe and hallucination. For some reason (which, it is presumed, may be psychologically explained) these men and women became mistakenly convinced that their adored leader was alive again. A hoary old theory such as that the women went to the wrong tomb, or (a theory that was known as long ago as St. Matthew's Gospel) that the body was surreptitiously taken from the tomb, is still sometimes revived. On this showing, some of them genuinely found an empty tomb-emptied by some rationally explicable means unknown to them-which, it is suggested, assisted their belief that Jesus had risen. For, after all (it is urged) the traditions do say that Jesus himself predicted his resurrection; so that, even if the disciples were temporarily shaken by the disastrous death, it is hardly surprising if courage returned into their consciousness and they began to rally: they remembered the predictions; hope reasserted itself; the wish became father to the thought; he *must* have risen again-he *had* risen again: Alleluia! the Lord *is* risen indeed.[2]

According to this summary of the psychological argument, the genesis of belief in the resurrection had three elements. Two of these are in fact psychological in character: the disciples' recollection of predictions Jesus himself had made about resurrection; and their swift recovery of hope after his death. The third, the discovery of a grave which was empty for some ordinary, natural reason, served to confirm the belief which had grown out of the first two.

What does Christian apologetic have to say in reply? Defenders of the Christian account have had something to say about all three aspects of the explanation. Since it would be helpful to be able to establish some objective historical fact which would count in their favor, over against the more hazardous process of determining the subjective mental state of the recipients of resurrection appearances, a fair amount of attention has been paid to the third aspect, and it has been forcefully argued that the various natural explanations of the

[2] C. F. D. Moule, *The Phenomenon of the New Testament:* Studies in Biblical Theology, Second Series 1 (London, 1967), p. 9.

empty tomb are unconvincing. The most plausible is perhaps the one advanced some time ago by Kirsopp Lake, on the basis of the story in Mk. 16: 1-8. The women went by mistake to a different tomb which happened to be empty. A young man who chanced to be on the spot at the time told them that Jesus's body was not there but somewhere else. They ran away in fright, believing that they had seen an angel who had told them of the resurrection. [3] But this explanation is very unlikely. Its inadequacies have been sufficiently pointed out by **J. C.** O'Neill:

> It is possible that the women mistook the tomb, but very unlikely that anyone would be present to tell them their mistake. If a gardener were present, it is unlikely that he would startle women who had come to anoint a body. If he did startle them, it is unlikely that he would allow them to run off without reassuring them. [4]

In any case, the Marean young man is an angel, and his assertion that Jesus is not there is simply a dramatic device which prepared for the announcement of resurrection, not a recollection of words actually spoken at the time. [5] Lake's theory is untenable, because it lacks plausibility and takes the story as too literal an account of what actually happened. With this we may agree. But the rejection of the theory as a whole does not necessarily require us to reject the basic sugestion that the women went to the wrong tomb. O'Neill admits that this is a possibility.

At this point, however, we should find ourselves confronted with a further apologetic argument. If the women went to the wrong grave, then the right grave would still contain the body of Jesus. And in that case, the Jewish authorities would have been able to produce the body, so as to put a stop to the

[3] Kirsopp Lake, *The Historical Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus Christ* (New York, 1907), pp. 68-69, 250-252.

• J. C. O'Neill, " On the Resurrection as an Historical Question," *Christ, Faith and History*, ed. S. W. Sykes and J. P. Clayton (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 205-19; seep. 210.

• *Ibid.*, p. 211.

proclamation of Jesus's resurrection. That they were not able to do so constitutes strong proof that the right tomb was known to be empty. Thus, W. Pannenberg quotes Althaus:

> The resurrestion kerygma "could not have been maintained in Jerusalem for a single day, for a single hour, if the emptiness of the tomb had not been established as a fact for all concerned".[6]

And O'Neill remarks:

> If the first witnesses to the appearances of Jesus believed that he had been raised from the dead, their assertion could have been refuted by producing the body.[7]

Furthermore, the story of the guard on the tomb in Mt. 27: 62-28: 15 is evidence that the opponents of Christianity were forced to accept that Jesus's tomb was empty and to invent an explanation. The story is designed to show that it would have been impossible for the disciples to have stolen the body, and also to explain how a rumor to this effect had arisen. It is therefore evidence that this was the form taken by Jewish polemic. To quote Alan Richardson:

> St. Matthew's Gospel provides evidence that years later the Jewish anti-Christian polemic had to invent the charge that the disciples of Jesus had stolen the body, because they could not deny that the tomb had been found empty.[8]

(The explanation is obviously unlikely. The enthusiasm and devotion of the first Christians, which in some cases led them to sacrifice their own lives, could not have been the result of deliberate fraud.[9])

This line of argument, however, is not as strong as it might at first sight appear. It is at least possible that even if the authorities knew that Jesus's body remained where it had been

[6] Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Jesus-God and Man* (London, 1968), p. 100. See also Gerald O'Collins, *The Easter Jesus* (London, 1978), p. 48.

[7] *Art. cit.*, p. !W9; cf. O'Collins, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

[8] Alan Richardson, "The Resurection of Jesus Christ," *Theology*, Vol. 74 (No. 610, April 1971), pp. 146-54; see p. 158; cf. O'Collins, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

[9] Wolfhart Pannenberg, "Did Jesus Really Rise from the Dead? ", *New Testament Issues*, ed. Richard Batey (London, 1970), pp. 102-107; see p. 114.

buried they might not have wished to disinter it for public display. Might not a public exhibition of the corpse have constituted a threat to public order? A Jerusalem crowd which had been roused once again to enthusiasm for Jesus's movement by the powerful preaching of the apostles might conceivably have been provoked to riot by the sight of his body. Popular reaction is not always logical, and many of the apostles' hearers may have had only a hazy notion of the precise import of their message. But in any case the apparent production of the body could not have provided any conclusive evidence to controvert the apostles' claim, and one suspects that those who make so much of the argument are unconsciously influenced by the conditions of the twentieth century, when anonymous and disintegrating corpses may be identified by means of their dental history and the more esoteric methods of the forensic laboratory. How long would a corpse in first century Palestine have remained identifiable with any certainty? R. Robert Bater has argued that it may have been a long time before the Christians attracted enough publicity for their claims to be put to the test.[10] Even if this is incorrect, there may well have been a certain time gap between the original Easter experience and the apostolic preaching in Jerusalem, as Acts suggests. The resurrection appearances were probably spread over a period of time,[11] and the disciples may well have waited until their collective and cumulative experiences assured them that the first appearance was not an illusion on Peter's part. If this was .so, no one would have been able to say for certain whether a corpse in the tomb where Jesus had been buried was really the body of Jesus or not. His followers would have denied it, since they were absolutely convinced that they had seen him raised from the dead. And those Jews in Jerusalem who were impressed by the apostles' spiritual fervor and obvious conviction would have believed them. The simplest

[10] R. Robert Bater, "Towards a More Biblical View of the Resurrection", *Interpretation,* Vol. 23 (No. 1, January 1969), pp. 47-65; see especially p. *56.*

[11] Joachim Jeremias, *New Testament Theology: Part One* (London, 1971), p. 301.

answer to the question of why the authorities failed to produce the body may be that the lapse of time since the crucifixion would have rendered it unrecognizable, and the action pointless. Nor is the Matthean story of the guard very strong evidence that the tomb was known to be empty. If we accept the usual dating of this gospel, the controversy it reflects was taking place (outside Palestine) at a time subsequent to the fall of Jerusalem. There is nothing to show that it reflects an earlier controversy before the devastation of the city and its inhabitants, when some people might still have been in a position to know whether the grave was empty or not.

If, then, we have no substantial independent evidence that this was so, the possibility remains open that the women did go to the wrong grave. But even if they went to the right one there remains the alternative possibility that the Jewish authorities had themselves removed the body. They might well have seen some danger in Joseph of Arimathea's overhasty act of piety. To have Jesus buried in an individual and identifiable tomb might cause trouble. The grave might become a place of pilgrimage in memory of the popular prophet from Galilee,[12] and attract sympathetic crowds who would regard Jesus as a martyr to the pagan tyranny of Rome, and might consequently threaten the public peace. In that case they might have removed the body elsewhere, to some common grave. Nor would they have been likely to produce it to refute the apostles' preaching at a later stage. To produce a corpse out of a common grave would be even less convincing, from the point of view of its identification, than to disinter it from an individual tomb.

This historical component of belief in the resurrection of Jesus is therefore ambiguous in character. We may grant the truth of the tradition that certain women went to a grave which they supposed to be that of Jesus, and found it empty, and that

[12] See James D. G. Dunn, *Jesus and the Spirit* (London, 1975), p. 120: "In the history of religions (not least Judaism-Matt. 23.29/Luke 11.47) the sacredness of a dead prophet's tomb or burial place is a regular feature."

this tradition may have played a part in confirming, if not originating, the resurrection faith. But the question which has to be settled is whether the discovery of the empty tomb is capable of a natural explanation. If it is not, then we have a piece of historical evidence which would count in favor of the objectivity of the resurrection appearances. But if it is, then the possibility that the appearances were simply the product of human psychological processes must remain open. We have argued in favor of the second alternative. Let us note, however, that we have not actually *disproved* the resurrection itself. What we have disproved is the validity of certain apologetic arguments commonly used as positive support for the Christian belief. The possibility that the women went to the wrong grave does not logically exclude the possibility of the bodily resurrection of Jesus from the tomb in which he had really been buried. And if what happened was that the Jewish authorities removed the body from the original place of burial, the same conclusion follows. Resurrection from a common grave is just as conceivable, in strict logic, as resurrection from the tomb of Joseph of Arimathea.

Another originating factor has been held to be Jesus's own predictions of future resurrection. These predictions would have led his disciples to expect some miraculous restoration after his death, and may have played a part in producing the resurrection appearances. To this suggestion Christian apologetic has a ready reply. A. M. Ramsey points out that if Jesus did make any predictions of future vindication, these were probably of a mysterious nature and somewhat incomprehensible to his followers. He continues:

> ' The disciples were not anticipating the Resurrection. It is possible to dismiss at the outset any view that their belief in it sprang from a projection of their own expectations.' [13]

We may add that the more common it has become to cast doubt on the passion and resurrection predictions as the authen-

[13] Michael Ramsey, *The Resurrection of Christ* (London, 1946), p. 89.

tic words of the historical Jesus, the stronger Ramsey's argument appears to become. It has been re-stated recently by B. Rigaux, who writes:

' On ne recourt plus non plus a l'idee d'hallucination. Psychologiquement, cette idee ne resiste pas a la critique. Elle suppose aussi une foi que rien ne preparait. Elle attribue aux predictions de Jesus une valeur que l'exegese conteste et une intelligence de la Resurrection que les textes leur refusent.' [14]

Jesus made no such clear prophecies of personal restoration to life as would lead the disciples to expect to encounter him raised from the dead.

Before we consider the validity of this line of apologetic argument, let us look at the remaining component of belief in the resurrection, i. e. the speedy recovery of hope and confidence on the part of the disciples. The likelihood of any such reaction is strongly denied hy Pannenberg. He points out that Jesus's death must have exposed the disciples' faith to extreme stress: it cannot possibly have remained unshattered. In such a situation one could hardly suppose that it was their own enthusiastic imaginations which produced the resurrection appearances. [15] It seems, then, that the Christian apologist can legitimately argue that neither the mental nor the emotional condition of Jesus's followers was such as to produce the visions of the risen Lord which they experienced.

These arguments, however, become rather less convincing if they are considered in the light of various principles of Jungian psychology. The case of the apologist rests on the presupposition that what is under consideration is the conscious memories and conscious hopes of Jesus's followel'.s. No such memories or hopes existed, at the conscious level, as would create the resurrection appearances. But according to Jung it is the unconscious mind which may sometimes produce visions. They occur, he claimed, when a person is suffering from a psychic dissociation:

[14] Beda Rigaux, *Dieu l'a ressuscite:* Studii Biblici Franci.scani Analecta 4 (Gembloux, 1973), pp. 346-347. Cf. O'Collins, *op. cit.,* p. 31.

[18] *New Testament Issues,* p. 119t.

. that is, when there is a split between the conscious attitude and the unconscious contents opposed to it. Precisely because the conscious mind does not know about them and is therefore confronted with a situation from which there seems to be no way out, these strange contents cannot be integrated directly but seek to express themselves indirectly, thus giving rise to unexpected and apparently inexplicable opinions, beliefs, illusions, visions, and so forth. [16]

It is precisely in the case of " the very people who are least prepared for such phenomena and least inclined to believe in them" that visionary images may be produced. [11] If we set this quotation from Jung side by side with the words of A. M. Ramsey cited above, we may be inclined to ask whether Ramsey's assertion, if true, does not prove the exact opposite of what he intended. At any rate, the apologetic force of his argument is considerably weakened. At the conscious level, doubtless, the disciples' state of mind was just as Pannenberg and Ramsey picture it. But this gives us all the more reason to ask whether, at the unconscious level, different forces were at work which were much more favorable to the production of visions of the risen Jesus. This requires further investigation. Let us first note that in the case of two of the people named as witnesses to the resurrection, i.e. Paul and James, it is highly likely that there was precisely the conflict between conscious and unconscious attitudes which Jung described. Paul originally persecuted the Christians, and James had not accepted his brother's claims during his lifetime. In both cases there may have been a high degree of conscious resistance to the possibility that Jesus could have been vindicated by God by means of resurrection. If so, we should have promising conditions for the production of visions of the risen Christ out of the unconscious minds of the people concemed. [18]

[16] C. G. Jung, *Civilization in Transition:* Collected Works, Vol. IO (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964), p. 319.

[17] *Ibid.,* pp.

[18] Pannenberg would object at this point that what he calls the psychiatric concept of vision is primarily concerned with mental illness. One cannot apply it without further ado to religious phenomena, and the New Testament texts

So far we have established a negative result. We have shown cause to doubt the effectivenes of apologetic designed to prove that the resurrection appearances were not simply the product of the minds of the recipients. But the representatives of this apologetic might reasonably require some more positive evidence to show that a psychological explanation is plausible. They might point out that the psychological processes attributed to Paul and James do not account for the experiences of Peter and the other original disciples. In the one case we have conscious rejection of the claims of Jesus coupled with an unconscious realization of their truth, in the other the conscious acceptance of Jesus during his lifetime. They might ask how we propose to account for the numinous element inherent in all the recorded experiences [19] and particularly prominent in the experience of Paul, who understood the event as a theophany [20] in which he had seen the being to whom he attributes the divine title *Kvpwi;;* (I Cor. 9: l; cf. Acts 9: *5;* 22: 8; 26: 15). In short, a convincing refutation of the usual Christian apologetic requires the production of a coherent psychological explanation which takes account of as many aspects of the resurrection traditions as possible.

The tentative explanation outlined here proceeds in three stages. First, it will be argued that the numinous element in the resurrection appearances suggests, in Jungian terms, that the visions were in part due to the activation of the archetypes of the collective unconscious. Secondly, a correlation will be established between the archetypes and the historical fate of Jesus. Thirdly, we shall attempt to show how the impact of the death of Jesus upon the original disciples and upon Paul

give no evidence that mental illness was a causative factor in the production of the resurrection appearances. *(Jesus-God and Man,* pp. 94-95). Jung, however, claims that" a vision is a phenomenon that is by no means peculiar to pathological states." *(Civilization in Transition,* p. 314, n. 1). Since it is the applicability of Jungian theories to the New Testament evidence which is under consideration here, it is Jung's viewpoint which is accepted.

[19] J. D. G. Dunn, *op. cit.,* pp. 127-131.

[20] H. J. Schoeps, *Paul: The Theology of the Apostle in the Light of Religious. History* (London, 1961), p. 54.

might have activated the archetypes and caused the resultant images to be presented to consciousness as visions of the risen Christ.

Jung applied the term" archetypes" to what he called" the primordial images common to humanity," that is, "the inherited possibilities of human imagination " which explain the universal appearance of identical motifs in myth and legend at all times and in all cultures.[21] They are" the most ancient and the most universal thought-forms of humanity." They lie buried in the deepest layer of the unconscious, where they " lead their own independent life."[22] Jung described these contents of the unconsc10us as:

> the hidden treasure upon which mankind ever and anon has drawn, and from which it has raised up its gods and demons ....[23]

The emergence of an archetype to consciousness, in whatever form, may exercise " a numinous or a fascinating effect."[2]. The numinous quality of the archetypes is in fact basic to the Jungian understanding of them. If it should be possible to understand the visionary experiences of Paul and the rest as the manifestation and external projection of an archetype, the numinous element in the experiences would be accounted for.

This brings us to the second stage of the explanation. We need to establish a connexion between the archetypes and what happened, and was believed to have happened, to Jesus. This is by no means difficult. Jesus died by crucifixion, and was believed to have been restored to life: the archetypal motif of rebirth, immortality, or resurrection as the sequel to death is of wide occurrence, and the manifestation of the archetype is traceable in many forms.[25] We find the theme of the god who experiences death and rebirth,[26] and of the hero's self-

[21] C. G. Jung, *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology:* Collected Works, Vol. 7 (London, 1966), p. *65.*

[••] *Ibid.,* p. 66.

[••] *Ibid.,* p. 67.

['''] *Ibid.,* p. 70.

[••] Victor White, *God and the Unconscious* (London, 1960), p. *25!l.*

[••] C. G. Jung, *Symbols of Transformation:* Collected Works, Vol. *5* (London, 1967), pp. 887-SSS.

sacrifice for the attainment of immortality.[27] Furthennore, there is a particular variant of the theme of life out of death which is of especial interest to the argument we are pursuing. This is the image of the tree which is both the tree of death and the tree of life.[28] Within Christianity this becomes related to the cross upon which Jesus was crucified:

> " In this world of images the Cross is the Tree of Life and at the same time a Tree of Death ...[29]

If this is so in later Christian legend, and if the image is a universal one, deriving from the appropriate archetype, it is possible that the motif may have been latent in the Christian mind from the very beginning. It is perhaps worth noticing that in the New Testament the word *g-UA.ov* is used both for the actual cross (Acts 5: 30; Gal. 3: 13) and also for the mythical tree of life (Rev. 2: 7; 22: 2), just as in the Old Testament we find the same word r;;t for the tree of life in Gen. 2: 9 and for the' tree' upon which the criminal is hanged in Deut. 21: 22-23. At any rate, it seems clear that what the New Testament presents as a sequence of events which happened to Jesus of Nazareth has some considerable affinity with the primordial images of the collective unconscious.

We come, thirdly, to the most important question of all. How can these theories be fitted together so as to provide an explanation of the visionary experiences which Christians regard as resurrection appearances? We could begin with the suggestion that the actual historical manifestation, in Jesus's death by crucifixion, of the one aspect of the archetype of death and new life might have led to its activation, and have produced a visionary manifestation of the other, complementary, aspect. But we need to consider also the various situations of some of the people concerned. In Paul's case we might suppose that the following process took place. The claims made for Jesus by the Christians he was persecuting may

[21] *Ibid.,* p. 412.
[••] *Ibid.,* pp. 246-247.
[2·] *Ibid.,* p. 2SS.

have made a deep impression upon him. Since, however, the possibility that they might be valid would have been wholly unacceptable on the conscious level, any such conviction would be totally repressed into the personal unconscious. It would be able to achieve consciousness only as a vision of something external to Paul himself. This is the explanation of Paul's experience given by Jung himself in the course of his discussion of autonomous psychic complexes which may exist independently of the central ego-complex and so remain unconscious until brought to light by some psychological upheaval.

" Saul, as he was then called, had unconsciously been a Christian for a long time, and this would explain his fanatical hatred of the Christians, because fanaticism is always found in those who have to stifle a secret doubt. That is why converts are always the worst fanatics. The vision of Christ on the road to Damascus merely marks the moment when the unconscious Christ-complex associated itself with Paul's ego. The fact that Christ appeared to him objectively, in the form of a vision, is explained by the circumstance that Saul's Christianity was an unconscious complex which appeared to him in projection, as if it did not belong to him. He could not see himself as a Christian; therefore, from sheer resistance to Christ, he became blind and could only be healed again by a Christian. We know that psychogenic blindness is always an unconscious unwillingness to see, which in Saul's case corresponds with his fanatical resistance to Christianity." [30]

We should have to add that this vision must also have become linked in some way with the manifestation of the contents of the collective unconscious, that is, with the activation of the appropriate archetype which is able to impart the numinous quality to the experience. The obvious link would be the impact made on Paul by the crucifixion of Jesus, as we have already suggested. The substantial nature of this impact is indicated by his later concentration upon a *theologia crucis.* In his pre-conversion state he must consciously have seen the crucified Jesus as subject to the divine curse. If, at the same time, the claims of the Christians he was persecuting were

•• C. G. Jung, *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche:* Collected Works, Vol. 8 (London, 1969), pp. 307-308.

having their effect at the unconscious level, a conflict situation would arise which was specifically related to the crucifixion. Now a situation of distress, Jung maintained, may bring about the activation within the unconscious of the relevant archetype.[31] We might therefore suppose that inner conflict related to the crucified Jesus might bring about the constellation of the archetype of the tree of death which is transformed into the tree of life, and that the way would be prepared for the revelation of Jesus as restored to life again. It is true that Paul's references to his vision of the risen Christ contain no overt allusions to the tree of life motif. But this might be explained on the grounds that the activated archetype has to attract to itself conscious ideas in order to become perceptible and capable of conscious realization.[32] Paul's conscious ideas about Jesus's restoration would be those he had acquired from his acquaintance with the claims the first Christians were making, and these were concerned with the presentation of Jesus as the glorious celestial Messiah.[38] It would be this picture which would provide the structure of his own vision. The vision itself would occur at the climax of the conflict situation, and provide its resolution. We may conclude that it is by no means impossible to construct a psychological explanation of the resurrection appearance to Paul.

In the case of the original followers of Jesus it might appear more difficult, since the kind of inner conflict attributed to Paul can hardly be attributed to them. We can, however, suggest one or two possibilities. We may plausibly suppose that the tragic and brutal death of their leader, and the destruction of all their conscious hopes, constituted so formidable a shock as to bring about the temporary withdrawal of their psychic energies from the outer world and their regression to the inner world of the unconscious. Certainly the execution of Jesus was an event which would have required a fresh orienta-

[31] *SymboT,s of Transformation,* p. 294.

[32] *Ibid.*

[38] Barnabas Lindars, "Re-Enter the Apocalyptic Son of Man," *New Testament Studies,* Vol. 22 (No. 1, October 1975), pp. 57-72; see especially pp. 61-62.

tion on their part. At such times, Jung claimed, there occurs the introversion and regression of the libido, it.s entry into the interior world of the unconscious, and this effects the constellation of the primordial images which are relevant to the need of the moment. Their emergence to consciousness may be experienced as a revelation. [34] In the case of Jesus's disciples immediately after his crucifixion, the prime need would have been to counteract the brute fact of his death. The emergent archetype, therefore, would have been that of death and resurrection.[35] The more impossible the conscious acceptance of the idea of resurrection, the more likely that it would be projected in the form of an external vision. The experiences of Peter and the rest could, perhaps, be accounted for in this fashion. The case of James is probably more akin to that of Paul. We should have to postulate a similar conflict between conscious and unconscious attitudes towards Jesus, resulting in the external projection of an unconscious acceptance of Jesus's me.ssiahship. H. C. Snape suggests that when James heard of the appearances his attitude towards his brother unconsciously began to change, and that " in the depths below his consciousness he began to realize that if Jesus was Messiah as Jesus's brother he had a claim to take his place provisionally." Jesus will have appeared to him as Messiah at the moment when this new orientation emerged to consciousness.[36]

••*Symbols of Transformation*, pp. 293-294.

[35] I am grateful to the Editor in Chief of *The Thomist* for drawing attention to the possibility that 'resurrection ' should be distinguished from ' immortality ' as a Jungian type. Jung himself appeared to make no distinction, and one certainly feels that he was wrong not do so. From the theological point of view the two concepts differ considerably, and this should make some difference, one would think, to the argument we are pursuing here. Further reflection, however, that the objection would be answ.ered, from the Jungian viewpoint, in terms of the principle we have already mentioned: the activated archetype has to attract conscious ideas in order to become perceptible. At least one of the conscious ideas prevalent in first-century Judaism was a belief in resurrection. It could therefore be argued that the archetype of death and life would manifest itself in this form to Paul and to Jesus's original disciples.

•• H. C. Snape, "After the Crucifixion or ' The Great Forty Days ' ", *Nurrwn*, Vol. 17 (1970), pp. 188-199; see especially p. 198.

It is along these lines that one might perhaps argue the case that the resurrection appearances were the product of the minds of those who experienced them. The explanation sketched here would meet some further apologetic arguments to which we have not so far referred. J. D. G. Dunn, in his book on the nature of early Christian experience, admits the possibility that the visions of the risen Christ may have been "all in the mind," but argues that "the weight of probability" favors the Christian interpretation. [37] Why, he asks, should the first witnesses assume that they had seen Jesus, rather than an angel? We should reply that it was the person of Jesus, and especially his death, which evoked the psychological reactions which produced the visions. He refers also to the fact that the experiences of Peter, James and Paul were independent of each other. This is true. But we have suggested that there was a basic psychological mechanism common to them all, i. e. the projection into the external world of unconscious contents rejected by, or unavailable to, the conscious mind. Probably all the experiences involved the activation of the archetypes of the collective unconscious, and, as we have just remarked, it was the personal fate of Jesus which provided the stimulus. There is enough common ground here to facilitate the production of similar visions without any direct influence of one recipient upon another. Lastly, Dunn alludes to "the divine significance so quickly attributed by monotheistic Jews to one of their fellows." [38] But this would be readily explained by the numinous nature of the archetypes.

In the light of the argument developed here, we might ask, in conclusion, whether the apologist for the Christian interpretation of the resurrection appearances has any other options which remain open. J. D. G. Dunn suggests that psychological explanations may simply throw light on the recipient's mental mechanism without providing an exhaustive account of what took place.[39] Despite all that has been said so far, it might

[87] *Op. cit.* pp. 131-132.
[88] *Ibid.,* p. 132.
[89] *Ibid.,* p. 107.

still be legitimate to argue that the psychological processes here described may have served as the vehicle for divine revelation. Although Jung sometimes spoke as though 'God' were nothing but the highest archetype, he strenuously denied that he was trying to replace God by a psychic image. The psychic image, on the contrary, might perhaps become a receptacle for divine grace.[40] In the case of the resurrection appearances, then, we should have to ·say that the kind of reactions we have postulated were the means by which Paul and the rest were able to perceive the real personal presence of the risen Christ, and that it was this presence which ultimately set the psychological processes in motion, ·enabling the unconscious mind to create and project the resurrection visions. We are familiar with a somewhat similar phenomenon in everyday life. Our recognition of the presence of our friends and acquaintances depends upon our own mental synthesis of a multitude of sense impressions, and also upon our memories of previous encounters, so that in one sense it is we ourselves who create the people we meet. This does not, however, disprove their objective existence, and it is their actual arrival within our field of sense perception which sets in motion the process of recognition. It might be along lines such as these that Christian apologetic would have to proceed.

It would still be necessary, however, to find some criterion to justify a decision in favor of the Christian interpretation. What follows is a tentative suggestion only. It is that if the resurrection appearances are set within the wider context of the theistic faith of the biblical tradition, the Jungian explanation may appear less than adequate.

Let us reiterate the two alternatives. The resurrection appearances may have been *solely* the product of the activation of the archetypes. Alternatively, the experiences may genuinely have been experiences of the presence of a divine, transcendent reality, *mediated,* however, through these human psychological processes. From the point of view of the recipients, the events

•• Victor White, *op. cit.,* p. 258.

may be classed under the general heading of theistic religious experience. That this is so has been made plain as a result of various studies of the significance of the use of the term *l/Jifa01J* in connexion with the resurrection appearances (Lk. 24: 84; Acts IS: SI; 26: 16; I Cor. 15: 5-8; *cf.* Acts 9: 17). Fergus Kerr [41] notes that in the Septuagint *l/JifaO'fJ* commonly refers to the appearances of the Lord, or the Angel of the Lord, and he sees this as constituting a model for the language of the credal fragment quoted by Paul in I Cor. 15: "there is every likelihood that Paul aligned the appearances of the risen Jesus with Old Testament theophanies." [42] Luke also saw Paul's Damascus road experience as belonging to this tradition. He refers to the light from heaven, and he describes Paul's reaction as prostration, which would be an appropriate response to a disclosure of the divine presence. If this is how the experiences of resurrection appearances are to be understood, then, fundamentally, the question we are asking is the same as the more general question of whether God is really the absolutely transcendent reality, or only the dominant image of the collective unconscious. Can the psychological processes postulated by Jung provide an entirely adequate account of the religious experience which is reflected in the biblical writers' theistic beliefs? If they cannot, then it would be logically possible to maintain that in the particular case of the experiences of the risen Christ the Christian interpretation may be required as a means of explanation.

[41] Fergus Kerr, O. P., "Paul's Experience: Sighting or Theophany?", *New Blackfriars*, Vol. 58 No. 686 (July 1977), pp. 304-313. He refers also to the article on *opaw* by W. Michaelis, in the *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*, Vol. V, ET: G. W. Bromiley (Michigan, 1967), pp. 315-382. I am indebted to the Editor in Chief of *The Thomist* for the reference to Kerr's article.

[42] Fergus Kerr, *art. cit.* p. 310. I have myself argued elsewhere that the numinous, theophanic element was especially prominent in the case of Paul. Christ called him in the same way that the Lord of the Old Testament had called the prophets, and he consequently identified Christ in some wtty with the Lord of the prophetic revelation. (Margaret E. Thall, "The Origin of Pauline Christology," *Apostolic History and the Gospel*, eds. W. Ward Gasque and Ralph P. Martin (Exeter, 1970), pp. 304-316; see pp. 313-315).

I suggest that a comparison between the characteristics of biblical theism and Jung's account of the archetypes may at least cast some doubt on whether the latter can sufficiently account for the former. According to Jung, the archetypes are very ancient thought-forms. [43] They are typical thought-forms, moreover, activated in response to typical situations, constantly repeated:

> The archetypal structure of the unconscious corresponds to the average run of events. [44]

And they are derived ultimately from very primitive perceptions of the world of nature. For example, the rising and setting of the sun, with the regular alternation of day and night, imprints itself upon the primitive psyche, and produces the primordial image of the divine hero born from the sea, who travels to the West in the chariot of the sun, traverses the depths, engages in combat with the serpent of night, and is reborn again in the morning. The image is a counterpart of the natural process, enabling a kind of participation in it. [45] It seems rather doubtful whether psychological processes of this kind could wholly account for the religious experience which is reflected in the theistic faith of Deutero-Isaiah and the first chapter of Genesis, or for the experience which produced the prophetic confidence in God as the J,ord of history. The Creator of Genesis and Deutero-Isaiah is not the mythical projection of the forces of nature: he is wholly transcendent over them. Could the experience of such a Creator have arisen from a primitive form of perception in which the deity and the natural process are ultimately identical? And the first Christians' experience of the risen Christ led them, not to abandon the theism of the Old Testament, but to understand Christ in terms of it, as instrumental in the creation of the universe. Furthermore, the God who is experienced as active in human history is the God who brings about new events, creates new

••See above, p. 9W7.
.. *Symbols of Transformation,* p.
•• *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche,* pp. 158 fl'.

possibilities, and changes the expected and routine order of things. Could this kind of experience of God derive solely from typical unconscious reactions to the repetitive sequence of typical events? Again we may note that belief in Jesus's resurrection did not turn his followers into adherents of a nature religion. Rather, it caused them to take their situation within history with the utmost seriousness, as those living in the last age, called upon to make a radical decision in the present moment and commanded to preach to all nations within the space of human history which should remain, so giving this final period of history its ultimate significance. Lastly, whatever the explanation of the experiences from which the Christian faith took its origin, one can surely claim that they were primary religious experiences of a new and creative kind. It is questionable whether new and creative apprehensions of the divine presence can originate in psychological processes which are the product of ancient and typical thought-forms. [46]

The possibility remains open, therefore, that the theistic faith of the biblical writers does relate to some strictly transcendent reality, and that it is in terms of this ultimate reality that the resurrection appearances are to be understood.

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•• There seems here to be a fundamental inconsistency in Jung's exposition of the nature and function of the archetypes. On the one hand, they are said to be typical patterns of response to typical situations: very ancient thought-forms deriving from perception of regular natural processes. On the other hand, the claim is made that it is to the archetypes that all forms of cultural creativity, scientific, artistic and religious, are to be ascribed: "All the most powerful ideas in history go back to archetypes." *(The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche,* p. 158). This appears self-contradictory.

DIVINITY AND IMMORTALITY IN ARISTOTLE: A " DE-MYTHOLOGIZED MYTH" ?

IT HAS BEEN said that " the Olympian gods, though they were manifest in nature, had not made the universe and could not dispose of man as their creature with the same unquestioned right of ownership which the ancient Near Eastern gods exercised." [1] Knowing their gods as they did and believing that they themselves were also of divine origin, the Greeks were prompted to harbor feelings which bordered on disrespect and jealousy. It is in this mood that Pindar complains in his Sixth Nemean Ode that common ancestry with the gods does not translate itself into equal power and equal rights:

> Of one race, one only, are men and gods. Both of one mother's womb we draw our breath; but far asunder is all our power divided, and fences us apart; here there is nothingness, and there, in strength of bronze, a seat unshaken, eternal, abides the heaven. (After Cornford.) [2]

Such a lack of awe for the deities was bound to have repercussions on Greek philosophy, the most important being perhaps the admirable serene and philosophical approach to death which characterized most of the Greek thinkers. One might even say that the basic premise of all Greek arguments concerning the immortality of the soul is based on their belief in its divinity, a belief which is found also at the root of their lack of awe. In this sense, the basic premise of the soul's divinity depends on the Orphic myths, as interpreted by the Hellenes, which was taken seriously by all Greek philosophers. The Frankforts' commentary goes like this:

[1] H. and H. A. Frankfort, "The Emancipation of Thought from Myth," in *The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 374.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 374.

The initiate of the Orphic mysteries, for instance, not only hoped to be liberated from the 'wheel of births' but actually emerged as a god from his union with the mother-goddess, 'queen of the dead.' The Orphic myths contain speculations about the nature of man which are characteristically Greek in their tenor. It was said that the Titans had devoured Dionysus-Zagreus and were therefore destroyed by the lightning of Zeus, who made man from their ashes. Man, in so far as he consists of the substance of the Titans, is evil and ephemeral; but since the Titans had partaken of god's body, man contains a divine and immortal spark.[8]

I. *De-mythologizing the Myth.*

Aware of the force of the Orphic myth in their culture, even the most dedicated philosophers would take seriously the myth of the Titans' destruction and recognize a necessary relation between an immortal substance and a sort of participation in the divine Being; this would be done by taking the explanatory nucleus of the myth and incorporating it into the description of those natures which are supposed to be immortal, such as the one of the" mind" or" Nous." The greatest representative of "empiricist" philosophy in Greece, the Stagirite, seems to guarantee with his authority the scholarly value of such a procedure; he writes in Bk. XII of his *Metaphysfos* the following confession on the occasion of his dealing with the first substances:

Our forefathers in the most remote ages have handed down to their posterity a tradition, in the form of a myth, that these bodies are gods and that the divine encloses the whole nature. The rest of the tradition has been added later in mythical form with a view to the persuasion of the multitude and to its legal and utilitarian expediency; they say these gods are in the form of men or like some of the other animals, and they say other things consequent on and similar to these which we have mentioned. But if one were to separate the first point from these additions and take it alone- that they thought the first substances to be gods-, one must regard this as an inspired utterance, and reflect that, while probably each art and each science has often been developed as far as possible and has again perished, these opinions, with others, have

[8] *Ibid.*

been preserved until the present like relics of the ancient treasure. Only thus far, then, is the opinion of our ancestors and of our earliest predecessors clear to us.[4]

We might call this method the" demythologizing of myth." Its justification lies in the assumption that there is a very metaphysical nucleus in all true myths. The Frankforts concur in that Aristotelian evaluation, and they exhort us to take mythical explanations into consideration as a philosophical, rational, matter. "Myth then "-they write in another contribution to the already-mentioned book-" is to be taken seriously, because it reveals a significant, if unverifiable, truth- we might say a metaphysical truth." [5] Accordingly, we may safely state that both Aristotle and the Frankf orts view myth as a function of speculative reason. Kant, upon pointing out the essential trait of pure reason, .seems to make room for such a contention, since reason, according to the author of the *Critique of Pure Reason,* is nothing but the same mind which, in its capacity as understanding, wa.s already concerned with the "whatness" of things. The only difference consists in the fact that, insofar as the mind is fascinated with the" why" and the "how," it is led to draw conclusions in search of ever more fundamental explanations and thus deserves the name of " Reason." As a result, the philosopher of Koenigsberg reduces the essence of reason to a frenzied drive in the pursuit of the unconditioned condition according to the following principle: reason, he writes," *follows the principle that, if theconditionedisgiven, the whole sum of conditions, and therefore the absolutely unconditioned, must be given likewise,* the former being impossible without the latter." [6] In this sound conception of reason, as can be easily seen, the nature of the conditions on which the mind relies is not confined to that with which science is concerned. Any explanation, even of the metaphysical kind, is acceptable as long as it seems to be necessary to the mind's drive toward

[4] Aristotle's *Metaphysics,* XII, 8, 1074bl-15.

[5] H. and H. A. Frankfort, " Myth and Reality," *op. cit.,* p. 7.

[6] Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft,* B436. The italics are mine.

full accountability. By way of expanding this thought, Guthrie firmly protests against the remarks of Levy-Bruh! concerning certain assumed pre-logical Platonic accounts by placing the difference not in the nature of reason, but only in the different perception of the premises that it uses: " It is not "-he writes-" that the human mind ever worked on entirely different lines, but simply that in the then state of knowledge the premises from which men reasoned were so different that they inevitably came to what are in our eyes very odd conclusions." [7] In .sum, myth is but one of the three possible courses that are available to *speoulative* reason in its essential pursuit of "sufficient reasons," according to the principle that Leibniz made so famous: (a) an extreme right course, the one of *science*, which relies on the discovery of necessary physical " laws " as sufficient reasons, (b) an extreme left course, the *mythical* account, to which the primitive mind would resort whenever its limited natural observation of the immediately surrounding objects did not offer an acceptable account, and finally, (c) the middle course, which is the one traced by Kant in his theory of " philosophical belief," and which consists in resorting to metaphysical accounts when and if no one can find any other sufficient "wherefore" in the realm of nature. Consequently, whenever a .scientific theory is not available nor can be adduced by anyone, myth and the Kantian " belief " cannot help but fully coincide with each other " in substance." This, in Aristotle's view, would be the case with the Aristotelian metaphysical solution just mentioned. They differ from each other only in the sense that the metaphysical thought is totally free from imaginative representations, whereas the mythopoeic thought finds in imagination a kind of necessary vehicle for its own expression and its popular acceptance-as pointed out by the Stagirite-and perhaps even for its own conception. But as the Frankforts warn us: " The images . . . are products of imagination, but they are not mere fantasy. It is essential that

[7] W. K. C. Guthrie, *The Greek Philosophers from Thales to Aristotle* (New York: Harper aud Row, 1960), p. 13.

true myth be distinguished from legend, saga, fable, and fairy tale ... true myth presents its images and its imaginary activity. It perpetuates the revelation of a 'Thou'." [8] In the Frankforts' opinion, " It is likely that the ancients recognized certain intellectual problems and asked for the 'why' and ' how,' the ' where from ' and ' where to.' Even so we cannot expect in the ancient Near Eastern documents to find speculation in the predominantly intellectual form with which we are familiar and which presupposes strictly logical procedure even while attempting to transcend it." [9] In other words, the primitive mind may be described as lacking in experience, in sharpness and in abstractive power, and therefore as being unlike that of the present generation; the primitive mind can be said to be ultra-sensitive to emotional stimulation and inclined to judge everything in terms of a limited experience, according to which the concept of causal activity rests only on the observation of human interaction; but it cannot be indicted on the grounds of 'illogicity' or even 'pre-logicity.' "We shall find"-say the Frankforts-" that if we attempt to define the structure of mythopoeic thought and compare it with that of modem (that is scientific) thought, the differences will prove to be due rather to emotional attitude and intentions than to a so-called pre-logical mentality." [10] In other words, there is still hope of coming to right conclusions through a careful " demythologizing " procedure, such as the one taught by Aristotle.

[8] H. and H. A. Frankfort, "Myth and Reality," *op. cit.,* p. 7.

[9] "Myth and Reality," *op. cit.,* p. 6. It should be added that, by the same token, primitive mentality does not indulge in poetic " personifications." It rather conceives causality altogether in terms of " persons," due to the fact that the empirical observation has not yet been able to *observe* the actual causal process of inanimate nature, having been restricted to focusing upon the final product only. In this respect the warning issued by the Frankforts is correct: " This does not mean (as is so often thought) that primitive man, in order to explain natural phenomena, imparts human characteristics to an inanimate world. Primitive man simply does not know an inanimate world. For this very reason he does not 'personify ' inanimate phenomena nor does he fill an empty world with the ghosts of the dead, as ' animism' would have us believe." *(Op. cit.,* pp. 5-6.)

[10] " Myth and Reality," p. 19.

2. *Myth and Analogy.*

By way of parenthesis, let us insert an aside concerning the conscious use of imagination as a means to the build-up of the explanatory" myth." We might point out that medieval philosophy, and Kant himself in later times, was going to resort to the same kind of help. The medieval thinkers also borrowed concepts that apply only to creatures and used them to" represent" *somehow* God's Being, which *properly* cannot be" represented " conceptually because it is not a finite entity; but at the same kind of help. The medieval thinkers also borrowed borrowed " concept." They called this operation the "logic of analogy," and justified it on the grounds that through thinking we can come to the conviction that God exists and possesses in an infinite manner the same perfections that we only possess finitely, and that consequently such perfections can be "represented " by means of our corresponding concepts as long as we make in our minds an inner correction-which is not itself representable-, namely, that God's perfections are such as ours but in *kind* only, not in intensity, thus pointing to the infinite excess that characterizes whatever is divine.

Friedlander presents Plato's method in the same light: "In the unique, unrepeatable, and unsurpassable Platonic world, the myth has its necessary place. Its formal changes tell us something about Plato's growth or, to speak more carefully and correctly, about the growth of Plato's work. But whether they are playfully anticipating, whether they are guides along the path, or, finally, whether they show eternity incorporated in this world of nature and history, the myths invariably have one element in common. Mythology is fiction mixed with truth *(Republic* 377A) . This formulation does not mean it is arbitrary, but rather that it is deeply embedded in the nature of being and the human knowledge of this being. Pure truth belongs to God." [11] Perhaps we might put together the theory of " analogy " and the Kantian description of " belief " to

[11] Paul Friedlander, *Plato* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 209.

describe the nature of myth. We would say then that since we do not *know* its object we cannot have a true concept of it; but, on the other hand, being able to reach it with certainty through " thinking" or belief, we only need an analogical expression to communicate to others what we are thinking. The analogical expressions may he more or less accurate, more or less naive, according to the thinking habits and the differences in temperament and power of abstraction that the different civilizations may have been endowed with, but the object about which we are thinking can be perfectly correct. We can detect these two steps in Plato's justification of his dwelling for so long on the myth of Tartarus towards the end of his *Phaedo;*

Step I:

> Now to insist that these things are just as I have described them would not befit a sensible man;

Step II:

> but a belief that this or something similar is the truth about our souls and their habitations-since the soul has been shown to be immortal-is proper and worth banking on *(Kiv8vvevo-ai)* for one who thinks as we do. The venture is a splendid one, and one must, so to speak, sing such things over to oneself like a charm. That is why I have been telling my story at such length. [12]

[12] *Phaedo,* 114d. In *Phaedrus,* Plato draws a clear line between the nucleus *(if;vx7J 7rcura a!Mvaros),* which is the nature of the soul, and the mythical form. See 245a5 ff. He does the same in the *Phaedo.* From 84c up to 9lc, Socrates takes care of a disturbing whispering that is going on between Cebes and Simmias and that he views as a sign of disagreement with something he may have said. What he utters at that point seems to be a prelude to the reply to their respective objections. In it we are told that we should not give in to the frustrating sceptical attitude that the exceptional dexterity the Sophists were able to show in the use of the "pro-con" argument tends to create. To the contrary, we should persevere in the hardnosed research, not only to convince ourselves of the truth as much as possible, but also to defeat those "people who are quite unconcerned about the truth of any question which may come up in debate, but devote all their effort to persuading the company to adopt their own thesis" (9la-b). But what is really important is that such a digression-which is also a dramatic transition to the examination of the steering objections raised by Simmias and Cebes--though coming immediately after the digression on transmigration, bears only on the main thesis of the dialogue, namely, on the immortality of the soul itself,

W. K. C. Guthrie, in his monumental study on Plato (vol. IV of *A History of Greek Philosophy),* concurs in this interpretation when he takes note of Plato's epistemological humility to praise it as an indication of a .sharp sense of moderate realism:

As dialectic progresses, the field of mythical expression is reduced and the philosopher's aim is to reduce it as far as possible: but unlike his greatest pupil he would never deny that there are some truths, and those the greatest, which can never be demonstrated by the method of dialectical reasoning.[13]

It might well be the case that the very illustrious disciple who is being contrasted herein with the Master was doing nothing more than corroborating Plato's position, as interpreted by Guthrie. In fact; we have already had the opportunity to encounter in Aristotle's *Met.,* XII, 8,1074bl-15 a clear treatise detailing a method as to how to " de-mythologize " the myths without losing sight of the valuable truth they always contain. Now, what Guthrie refers to, in this context, is precisely one more illustration of the same technique volunteered by the Stagirite. Aristotle, indeed, is speaking of " The school of Hesiod and all the theologians," who, as he points out, "thought only of what was plausible to themselves, and had no regard to us. For, asserting the first principles to be gods and born of gods,"-with which he is in full agreement, as we heard him telling us in 1074b5-15-, "they say that the beings which did not taste of nectar and ambrosia became mortal; and clearly they are using words which are familiar to themselves, yet what they have .said about the very application of these causes is above our comprehension. For if the gods taste of nectar and ambrosia for their pleasure, these are in no wise the causes of their existence ..." [14] Obviously, then, his disagreement with Hesiod and with the theologians bears only on the " additions,"

which is the *nucleus* of the transmigration, not on the " additions " that give it colorfulness (see: 84cl, 84c5-6, 84d4-8, 85bl0-c, 85e3-86a3, 86b5-7, 86e6-87a4, 87a9-b2) .

[18] W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy,* vol. IV: "Plato" (Cambridge: University Press, 1975), pp. 363-365.

"Met., III, 4, 1000a9-17.

of which he spoke in Bk. XII, not on the main bulk of the myth, which had to do only with the divinity of the fir.st substances. To put it in modern terms-in Bultmannian terms, to be specific-we ought to agree that, although the form of the structure which embodies mythic symbolic phenomena may be invalid, the content is always valid. Hence, Bultmannian " demythologizing " cannot be essentially different from that proclaimed by Aristotle. As David M. Rasmussen puts it: " The basis of the Bultmannian enterprise of demythologization is constituted by the assumptions that religious phenomena are primarily myth: that the form in which such language manifests itself obscures the reality that it attempts to present. If it is possible to find a way to free the intention of myth from the rigidity of its expression, one may discover the true and real message contained in mythic-symbolic phenomena. Myth then presents a fundamental problem, a hermeneutical problem. Myth raises the question of understanding. [15]

3. *Aristotle's Platonic Period.*

Aristotle, coming from the Platonic School himself, did not fail to .show some clear traces of Platonic idealism for quite some time before finding his own personal position; for example, in the dialogue *Eudemus,* one of his early writings which was written under the impact of the grief caused to him by the premature death of one of his beloved young disciples. In it he still conceived of the soul as a form *in itself* (eiBos n), not as the form *of something* (eiBos *nv6s),* that was to become the trademark of pure Aristotelianism. [16]

Characteristically, in this work, the mythological theories which could be found in Plato's books-such as the theories on the heavenly origin of the soul, on its temporary banishment to the earth, and on its eternal repatriation-had .still the upper hand. [11] If we listen to Jaeger, the genuine empiricism of Aris-

[15] David M. Rasmussen, *Mythic-Symbolic Language and Philosophical Anthropology* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhofl', 1971), p. 11.

[16] See *Eudemus, fr.* 45 (according to the Teubner Edition of the *Aristotelis fragmenta).*

[17] See *Eudemus, fr.* 44.

totelianism was diametrically opposed to the kind of Platonism that the Stagirite shows, mainly in connection with the problem of immortality. Jaeger writes: "Aristotle's Platonism comes out most clearly in the main subject of the dialogue, the doctrine of immortality. Later on he held that the essential problem of psychology was the connexion between the soul and the bodily organism, and he claims to have been the first to recognize the psycho-physical nature of mental phenomena. The first result of the discovery of these psycho-physical relations was inevitably to undermine the Platonic belief in the permanence of the individual soul, and the only part of his original conviction that Aristotle could retain was the belief that pure *Nus* is independent of the body. All the other functions of the soul, such as reflection, love and hate, fear, anger, and memory, involve the psycho-physical unity as their substratum and disappear together with it." [18] We will have the opportunity to see that, despite the empirical accuracy of Aristotle's psychological observations of his mature period, he never went so far as to affirm that the soul breaks into parts when the subject dies, and that only the upper part of it is divine and survives. That will be one more confirmation of the contention that Aristotle's conception remained always dependent upon a kind of critical acceptance of the Greek myth of the Titans.

In the *Protrepticus:-which* was not written in the form of a dialogue, but rather was conceived with a proselytizing purpose in mind and was addressed as a letter of exhortation to Themison, a prince of Cyprus with whom Aristotle had become acquainted through the mediation of his friend Eudemus-the Stagirite wanted to convey the message that philosophy cannot be avoided at all. Either we ought to philosophize, he thought, or we ought not. If we ought, then we ought. If we ought not, then also we ought (in order to justify this view). Hence in any case we ought to philosophize.19

[18] Werner Jaeger, *Aristotle* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962) p. 49.
[1]. *Fr.* 51. See Jaeger, *op cit.,* pp. 56-57.

Jaeger links Aristotle's *Protrepticus* to Plato's inspiration as follows: "Just as in the *Eudemus* Aristotle took the *Phaedo* for model, so in the *Protrepticus* he frequently followed the work that contained Plato's criticism of the Sophists' protreptics, namely the Euthydemus." [20] And, certainly, as to being a clue to the kind of conception of the soul that Aristotle must have had at that time, the *Protrepticus* sounds strongly Platonic. One would have to say that in the *Protrepticus* he took a position that was the antipode of the conception he was going to hold in the *De Anima.* It is clear, indeed, that whereas in his mature stage he believed that the natural state of the soul is inseparable from the actual information of the body, on which it depends in order to know the surrounding objectsy in the *Protrepticus,* to the contrary, the soul was supposed to be suffering from heavenly nostalgia, unable to know anything without extreme difficulty, always hoping to be released from the bodily chains and thus to be able to fly to its place of origin- at least if the passage in Iamblicus's *Protrepticus* in which this point of view is expressed is genuinely Aristotelian, as Jaeger contends. [21] However, perhaps a thorough examination of Aristotle's mature production will prove that the claimed change never went so far nor was so radical. For even in the *De Anima,* as well as in *Met.* XII, Aristotle still held the ontological reach of the mind's focus in such a high esteem, that he thought that the intellectual part of the soul was the only and true divine element of the soul. In fact, if we analyze correctly and thoroughly the text which deals with the agent intellect in the *De Anima,* as we propose to do in the course of this paper, the apparent contrast with the following excerpt made by Iamblicus out of Aristotle's *Protrepticus* vanishes at once: " :Man has nothing divine "-we read in that passage-" nor blessed except the one thing worthy of trouble, whatever there is in us of *Nus* and reason. This alone of what we have seems immortal and divine." [22] If this is true, it would mean that

[20] *Op. cit.,* p.

[21] Iamblicus's *Protrepticus,* p. 60.11, 10-15; see Jaeger, *op. cit.,* ch. IV, p. 100.

[22] *Aris.totle, fr.* 61. See Jaeger, *op. cit.,* p. 49.

even when he had reached the peak of his critical power, Aristotle could not dismiss from the traditional myths the metaphysical element which they contained, whenever he had to account to himself the " meta-scientific " processes of the mind. This hint leads us one step further in our investigation. By-passing, therefore, the works of his travelling period, in which he openly indulged in his Platonic leanings without contradicting his previous positions, let us go straight to the crucial creation that Aristotle left us in terms of psychology: the *De Anima.*

4. *Aristotle and his Respect for Myth.*

The book, *On The Soul,* is decisive in determining to what extent Aristotle really held the thesis of immortality. Following as it does those previous works, in which myth had a substantial part to play-for which there was no apology-, one must wonder fir.st of all whether in the *De Anima* also the myth of the divinity of the soul is still upheld, and whether, if it is, the philosophical rigor that is used in this new methodology does not counter and neutralize its effect to the point of forcing upon us the conclusion that the soul, albeit divine, is not immortal. As for the first problem, Jaeger is .still impressed by the mythological traces that plague it. Speaking of book III, in particular, where the thesis of the is lavishly expounded, he accuses Aristotle of being under a strong Platonic spell and of neglecting the canons of scientific discussion.[23]

Jaeger'.s learned opinion deserves the most considerate attention. Concerning the mythological aspect of his remarks, one ought to agree with him fully. But then, we should learn to read Aristotle's approach to myth, which in no way bespeaks sloppy scholarship. For him, indeed, the myth of the divinity of the soul is to be screened out and interpreted as a metaphysical account of something which otherwise cannot be accounted for. This attitude show.sup very clearly in Bk. XII of his *Metaphysics,* where he organizes his whole research about

[2]. Werner Jaeger, *Aristotle,* ch. XIII, p. 882.

the nature of the primary substances-and most particularly about the First Mind-on the basis of a hint that is provided by the old myths. In this remarkable testimony, which we already mentioned,[24] two main features stand out. First, that Aristotle agrees so fully with the *substance* of the myth that he too is led to posit divine .substances when it comes to giving a fundamental account of the universe. Second, that those tenets thus screened, sifted and scrutinized-namely, the beliefs in the divinity of each one of the first substances-are in Aristotle's view the only truths which have been able to survive the .successive ups and downs of both philosophy and the sciences while those branches of knowledge were going through periods of the highest achievements and the lowest depressions.[25] In this light, of course, the clear recourse to the divinity of the agent intellect in the *De Anima*, which for centuries kept highly regarded scholars baffled, makes full sense. It is not a sign of surrender and defeat, as some have believed, or," a recognition of the cardinal difficulty in any naturalistic theory of knowing and intelligence,"[26] as Randall puts it. It is, on the contrary, such a well-reasoned conclusion that it has survived the vicissitudes of both philosophy and science and has remained intact even when many philosophical systems and scientific theories were losing credence and were fading from serious consideration. It is, in sum, an account that imposes itself upon any mind in search of understanding, if and when science fails to provide an explanation. For this reason, Aristotle, the eminent naturalist and scientist of his time, embraced it without hesitation, just as he believed in the mythical origin of the first substances in general. One can see, indeed, that he is not disposed to question such tenets, but rather, if anything, he is ready to buttress the thesis of the divinity of the First

[24] See here, footnote # 4. See also *Met.*, A (XII), 1074a38-1074bl5.

[25] By qualifying these truths as " relics " of a universal wreckage and by failing to mention anything else, Aristotle does not support the English translation, which adds "with others." See 1074bl2-13.

[26] John Herman Randall, Jr., *Aristotle* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1965), p. 103.

Mind, which is more closely related to the divinity of the human mind.[21]

This is all the more remarkable, because this whole discussion comes as the natural outcome of an exhaustive examination of substances and of their causes; in the course of this examination the problem of the separability of formal causes from their material effects-and consequently also of the separability of the very special kind of formal cause that is the human soul from the human body, mainly after the corruption of the composite-comes to the forefront. What is .striking about this is that Aristotle displays here the same confidence and the same conviction concerning the "possibility " of immortality that we can see coming through in his *De Anima*.[28] And the chronological order of the publication of these two treatises does not affect the result of the comparison. For whether Book XII of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* was written at the end of the philosopher's career-as was the general belief until Jaeger guided the scholarly interpretation in the opposite direction-, or whether it should rather be said to be the fruit of the early stages of his literary production, as Jaeger would have us think, the basic coincidence between the two treatises is a mighty argument in favor of the heavy influence that the old myth exerted on Aristotle's account of the human soul. Furthermore, in both cases we confront a high caliber exercise in philosophy. For either way there is continuity of thought and in both alternatives one can see that the Stagirite is not ashamed of searching out the metaphysical element from the old myths and injecting it into his philosophical body of doctrine whenever the scientific accounts prove insufficient to .satisfy our curiosity. Thus, it becomes clear far from being a sign of defeatism, the recourse to purified mythological reasons is, in his view, one of the highest philosophical achievements. Because, if we assume that Bk. XII is not only prior to the *De Anima*, but constitutes also an outline of Aristotle's sys-

[27] See *Met.*, 1074bl5-1075all.
[28] See *Met.*, 1070a25-26.

tern, then the insinuation made in the *Metaphysics* can be said to have been brought to the status of metaphysical *fact* in the *De* Anima-provided, of course, that the problematical text concerning the agent intellect be interpreted in the light of the whole work. On the other hand, if it is the *De Anima* that came fir.st, then Bk. XII would be a work of the Stagirite's mature age in which there would be no way to detect the least trace of denial or the most hidden .setback. Even if one focuses on the purely negative tone of the statement regarding immortality in Bk. XII, the same striking continuity of thought comes to light. The reason is that, in his *Metaphysics,* Aristotle does not have to go over the positive findings established in the *De Anima,* because in Bk. XII he is concerned only with the *absolute* possibility of an independent status for natural forms in general, and such a possibility has to be viewed only in terms of the notion of the corresponding forms.

There is no reason, therefore, to deny that the reference to the divinity of the agent intellect in the *De Anima,*. III, is an echo of the Titans' myth. But, on the other hand, it should not be overlooked that such a divine principle is actually being invoked precisely as the fundamental condition of possibility for the most wonderful process that can be found on earth, namely, human thought. It is, therefore, a metaphysical argument. This is, of course, an invitation to analyze the development of Aristotle's argument for immortality as presented in the *De Anima.*

5. The" De Anima": the Problem.

In order to reach a better understanding of Aristotle's position in that work it is necessary to realize that his concern in it, as in Bk. XII of his Metaphysics, is the immortality of the whole human soul, even when he seems to be referring to a kind of dividing process involving the agent intellect, as can be seen in chapter V, book III, of the *De Anima.*[29] But, as of now, we

[29] See *De Anima,* III, 5, 430al0-15. For the discussion of this text, see my article, "Aristotle's Agent Intellect: Myth or Literal Account? ", *The Thomist,* 40 (1976), pp. 505-535.

might say, as a rule of thumb, that the apparent dismemberment of the soul should be interpreted in function of Bk. XII of the *Metaphysics*,. as well as in the light of the whole context of the *De Anima-i*. e. taking into consideration the goal and the methodology of the composition, as well as the meaning given or allowed to the words" mind" and" soul" in the work. Now, beginning with Bk. XII, it is clear that it is the soul, not the agent intellect, that is at stake in it, since the Stagirite is speaking therein of the separability of substantial forms, of which the soul-not a particular faculty of it-is a very special case.[30] Aristotle seems to be very conscious of the meaning that the word *vov<>* is being given in this context, so much so that, in order to preclude any danger of having it taken to mean the faculty of understanding *(mind)* and not the substance "human soul," which it occasionally clearly means in the *De Anima*,[31] he uses very carefully the adjective *1Tas*, which can have a quantitative connotation as well as a distributive one, instead of its pendant *0A0<>*, which can never be given a distributive sense. This nuance was sharply realized by the Latin translator who was in charge of translating the treatise on the soul for St. Thomas Aquinas.[32] It is as though both were saying that not all kinds of soul are immortal, but only the human soul, which is also called *vov<>*;[33] or, to put it more explicitly, that the power of thinking fully qualifies on its own as a genuine soul, despite the fact that it is not found in all living beings.

••Even the word soul is mentioned unequivocally. See *Met.*, 1070a 24-26.

[81] So, whereas in the *De Anima*, III, 9, 432b25-30, *mind* stands for the faculty of understanding as counterdistinguished from the other faculties of the soul, in *De Anima*, III, 2, 413b24-30, and III, 4, 429b25-30, the same word stands for the whole soul, although the latter is being designated by reference to its status as the ultimate source of the power of understanding.

[82] The Latin translator, too, avoids the adjective " *tota"* while settling for the distributive " *omnis* " : " In quibusdam enim nihil prohibet, ut si est anima talis, non omnis, sed intellectus." This is taken from William of Moerbeke's translation, as it appears in *Metafisica de Arist6teles* (edici6n trilingue por Valentin Garcia Yabra, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1970), vol. II, p. 205. In Moerbeke's translation: 1070a24-26, paragraph 1040.

[83] See *Met.*, XII, 1070a25-26.

The reason for this is that the generic notion of soul which is at work in Aristotle's discourse is so open that many kinds of soul can be encompassed by it. For, in the Stagirite's mind, soul is to be understood in terms of powers, i. e., as the source of "the powers of self-nutrition, sensation, thinking, and motivity." [34] According to this, two extreme cases are possible: one, in which there is only a single power at work-as is the case with a plant's soul-and another, where all the powers are involved, as is the case with the human soul. But in any event, the structural complication is always such that the powers are encompassed by one another according to an ascendent scale, and this necessarily raises the question as to whether the highest power's source is also the source of the lower powers, in which case the distinction of powers would be only logical, not physical; or whether it is not so absorbing, in which case the distinction of powers would entail also a real separability. Interestingly enough, Aristotle does not seem to be in a hurry to answer this question. For it would seem that he prefers to wait until the study of the understanding faculty has been brought to an end, in the expectation, undoubtedly, that it will yield such results that the problem about the unity of the soul will automatically be resolved:

> Turning now to the part of the soul with which the soul knows and thinks (whether this is separable from the others in definition only, or spatially as well) we have to inquire (1) what differentiates this part, and how thinking can take place. [35]

Indeed, his expectation is quite in order because, in fact, the striking difference between this faculty and the others is such that it cannot help but bring at once with it the necessary conclusion that the power of understanding must ultimately be totally independent of the body and of its organs. [36] Furthermore, to the extent that the corollary of immateriality that we have just drawn from the nature of the mind is also the con-

••*De Anima,* II, 2, 418bl-15.

[85] *De Anima,* III, 4,

•• See *op. cit.,* Bk. III, 2, 418b24-30.

dition of possibility of immortality, we are forced to wonder whether such a power-in case it is really separable from the others-should not be said to be immortal forever. But from there to wonder about the immortality of the whole soul is only one small step: it takes only the realization that the soul is one and indivisible, and that its parts cannot be separated from one another. [37] It is in this vein that Aristotle raises the following question, which seems to contain the core of the real problem of the immortality of the soul:

> We have no evidence as yet about mind or the power to think; it seems to be a widely different kind of soul, differing as what is eternal from what is perishable; it alone is capable of existence in isolation from all other psychic powers. All the other parts of the soul, it is evident from what we have said, are, in spite of certain statement to the contrary, incapable of separate existence though, of course, distinguishable by definition. [38]

This quotation does indeed cut straight through to the heart of the issue, as in it the real difficulty comes fully to the fore. For one thing, in this passage, the " mind " is conceived of as "the power to think" while it is being designated also as a " kind of soul," thus implying that it is *the* only form of the whole human being. For another thing, while its right to immortality is being emphasized in contrast with the destruction-bound destiny that belongs to the lower powers considered in themselves and on their own, the real puzzle begins to build up. It arises precisely at the conjunction of two apparently unrelated assertions, namely, that (1) the lower powers cannot subsist by themselves after death, and that (2) they are really inseparable from the power to think, which is immortal, although they differ from it *GOnceptually.* This immediately sug-

[87] Already in Bk. I, chapter *5,* Aristotle had realized that every indication tends to point in the direction of indivisibility. See 410bl0-16 and 4llb5-13. As to the lingering doubt which seems to have been at work all along, it seems to have subsided in chapters 8 and 10. See *op. cit.,* 8, 432a20-432hl-5. In the *De Anima,* III, 4, 429a20-30, he even seems to take for granted that the whole soul is immortal to the extent that it is "immaterial" in its entirety.

[38] *Op. cit.,* Bk. III, 4, 429a25-429h5.

gests the following riddle: How can the only soul of man be both at once, absolutely independent of the body in one respect, and inseparable from it in another respect? For the same human soul, inasmuch as it is a " substantial form," cannot be immortal, but at the same time, insofar as it is a very special kind of substantial form, it "must" be separable from the body. Now, either this constitutes an open contradiction, or it creates such a baffling problem, that even the " pilot-ship " Platonic relationship type 0£ solution loses its oddity and lack of likelihood. Aristotle puts it in this way:

> We must not understand by that which is "potentially capable of living" what has lost the soul it had, but only what still retains it ... ; the body corresponds to what exists in potentiality; as the pupil *pins* the power of sight constitutes the eye, so the soul *plus* the body constitutes the animal.
>
> From this it indubitably follows that the soul is inseparable from its body, or at any rate that certain parts of it are (if it has parts)-for the actuality of some of them is nothing but the actualities of their bodily parts. Yet some may be separable because they are not the actualities of any body at all. Further, we have no light on the problem whether the soul may not be the actuality of its body in the sense in which the sailor is the actuality of the ship.[39]

This may well be one of the strong indications that led Jaeger to indict Aristotle with the charge that he is still too dependent on Plato as well as on the old myths. Without having to agree with the pejorative aspect of Jaeger's indictment, it is incumbent upon us to recognize that at that time-whatever the date of this treatise may be-Aristotle could not see Plato's position in that respect as evidently absurd. The enormity of the problem had much to do with this confession, unquestionably. And, certainly, he should be praised for this, and for having reduced the problem to its finest lines-namely, to the difficulty in understanding the nature 0:f a soul which, being one, seems to be inseparable from matter insofar as through some of its powers it is the essential form of some of the body's

[39] *De Anima,* Bk. Ill, £, 412b£5-413al0.

parts, while at the same time, through its highest parts it is totally independent of matter and thus should be altogether immaterial. This excruciating dilemma did not escape the penetrating insight of Aristotle's Western Commentator, as can be seen from the following quotation taken from Aquinas's *Commentary on the "De Anima* ":

... we can certainly conclude that no soul can be separated from its body-at least certain parts of the soul cannot be separated, if the soul can be said to have parts. For obviously some 'parts' of the soul are nothing but actualities of parts of the body; as we have seen, in the case of sight, that it is the eye's actuality. On the other hand, certain parts of the soul may well be separable from the body, since they are not actuality of any corporal parts, as will be proved when we come to treat of the intellect. [40]

Thus, taking into account that the human intellect cannot in any way be blended with matter, [41] the problem comes down to this: How can the soul at once be both the form of the body and avoid being blended with the bodily parts? It would seem that Aristotle's solution, which is implicitly spread throughout the whole treatise, calls for the clearance of two *incognita:* 1. Is it true that " informing " and " being blended with matter " are essentially inseparable? 2. Is it possible that the human soul is the substantial form of two different subjects at once?

6. *The Soul as a Form.*

As for question number one, the answer is " no," if we take seriously the notion of substantial form that is given to us by

[40] *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis in ArisfJotelis Librum de Anima Commentarium,* cura ac studio Angeli M. Pirotta, 0. P., S. T. L., Ph.D.; Turin, 1925, lectio II, paragraphum 242; translated into English by Kenelm Foster and Sylvester Humphries in *De Anima in the Version of William of Moerbeke and the Commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas:,* edited by Dr. W. Stark, with an introduction by Ivo Thomas, 0. P., M.A. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 178.

[41] See *De Anima,* III, 4, 429a20-30: "Thus that in the soul which is called mind (by mind I mean that whereby the soul thinks and judges), is, before it thinks, not actually any real thing. For this reason it cannot reasonably be regarded as blended with the body: if so, it would acquire some quality, e.g., warmth or cold, or even have an organ like the sensitive faculty: as it is, it has **none.**"

Aristotle himself-namely, that it is the actuality of something potential. [42] For it is possible to conceive a subject whose potentiality is entirely and exclusively aimed at the actuality of intellectual knowledge, as is the case with the human individual. But this answers the second question as well, since in this sense we would have to say that the human soul informs the human body as a purely " animal " being, and at the same time constitutes the essential determinant of the human composite, as a "human" being.

This leads us to the following solution in outline, which is fully vouched for by Aristotle in the *De Anima*. Since the essence of substantial form consists in being the essential determinant of the subject, it follows that the soul must be said to be the essential determinant of both, the living body, and the living composite, precisely insofar as both are " living " beings. On the other hand, however, we know that the living human *composite* is capable of operating in a totally immaterial way at times and thus presupposes an immaterial substantial determinant, whereas the living body as such does not need such immaterial foundation. This essential .situation of the soul leaves us with the obligation of understanding the human soul accordingly, i.e., as enjoying a very special status among substantial forms, and as being placed in a border region between material things and purely spiritual entities, from which it can provide its determinant causality to subjects so heterogeneous in nature. It is our task, therefore, to show that this is Aristotle's position, and that it is not contradictory but is rather absolutely possible.

Firstly: the information of the body on the part of the soul is proclaimed very clearly by Aristotle. He tells us that the soul is the source of the living body in all respects-namely, not only as being both the origin and the final end of its movement, but also and mainly, insofar as it is the essence of the whole living body. This entails, of course, that were it not for

[42] See *op. cit.*, II, 4, 415b8-15: "... the actuality of whatever is potential is identical with its formulable essence."

the human .soul, the human " living " bodies that we see all around us would not even exist. This is most unquestionable from the Stagirite's point of view, "for in everything "-as he puts it-" the essence is identical with the ground of its being, and here, in the case of living things, their being is to live, and of their being and their living the soul in them is the cause or source." [43] This amounts to the famous Thomistic " *Vivere enim viventibus est esse* "-i.e., the being of living beings consists in living-, which is the way in which Aquinas tried to formulate the same Aristotelian insight. [44]

The boldness of this position enables the Stagirite to state something that Plato would never have been able to utter, namely, that the soul is so much the substantial form of this corruptible body of ours, that it can even be said to be ONE with it-with a substantial unity, of course, not with an essential one, the former consisting of the essential relation that links a potency to its act. In this connection, the following text is worth quoting in its entirety:

> This is why the soul is the first grade of actuality of a natural body having life potentially in it. The body so described is a body which is organized. The parts of plants in spite of their extreme simplicity are 'organs'; e.g., the leaf serves to shelter the pericarp, the pericarp to shelter the fruit, while the roots of plants are analogous to the mouth of animals, both serving for the absorption of food. If, then, we have to give a general formula applicable to all kinds of soul, we must describe it as *the first grade of actuality of a natural organized body.* That is why we can wholly dismiss as unnecessary the question whether the soul and the body are one: it is as meaningless as to ask whether the wax and the shape given to it by the stamp are one, or generally the matter. Unity has many senses (as many as 'is' has), but *the most proper and fundamental sense of both is the relation of an actuality.* [45]

••*Op. cit.,* II, 4, 415b8-15. See also I, *5,* 410b10-16, and 411b5-13.

.. See *0011),mentary on the "De Anima,"* Bk. II. ch. I, paragraph 242; p. 178. See also Aquinas's treatise *Questiones de Anima,* XIV, *ad Sm.* (in the new edition by James H. Robb, Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1968, p. 203): "Ad octavum dicendum quod anima dicitur forma corporis in quantum est causa vitae, sicut forma est principium essendi. Vivere enim viventibus est esse, ut dicit Philosophus in *De Anima."*

•• *De Anima,* II, I, 412a!l.5-4!2bl0. The italics are not in the text.

Secondly: on the other hand, the soul is also the essential determinant of the whole " composite " insofar as the latter too is a "living being." One might wonder in what sense, different from the one we just took into consideration, can the composite be a living being. In Aristotle's view, however, that is no real problem, since he clearly envisages a higher kind of " life " in which only the whole individual man, as such, can share. He mentions it when he is talking about the divine life in the famous Bk. XII of his *Metaphysics.* He emphatically states: "And even life belongs to God; for the actuality of the mind is life, and God is actuality." [46]

Thirdly: If the .soul, then, is the substantial form of both the living human body and the whole human composite, but, on the other hand, there is only one life in the human individual, it follows that the soul informs these two living subjects as one and a unique substantial form and that it carries out both informations in one stroke. This accounts for the striking continuity of operations that exists between the body and the mind. It is here Aquinas obtained his typical kind of epistemology, which is based on the double axiom that states that there is no human knowledge without a return to the phantasm, because we are so equipped that we cannot grasp the intelligible if it is not in the sensible. Aristotle puts it thus:

> The faculty of thinking then thinks the forms in the images ... ; but sometimes by means of the images or thoughts which are within the soul, just as if it were seeing, it calculates and deliberates what is to come by reference to what is present ... [47]

From here to a conception of the mysterious faculty called "memory" which would be able to bring together, on the one hand, the Kantian faculty of pure sensibility, in its capacity as a power rooted in the twilight zone that reigns between pure understanding and empirical sensibility, and, on the other, the Thomistic *sensus communis,* which is a faculty working in tight cooperation with the intellect,-there is only a short distance. After all, both of these conceptions are based on a grasp of

••*Met.,* XII, 107ftbft5-ft7. *"De Anima,* ill, 7, 48Ib8-IO.

" pure time " as the unifying characteristic of Being,[48] and this would authorize the rapprochement of memory to the Heideggerian appropriated *LOGOS.* In this sense, Aristotle cannot account for memory if it is not in relation to pure sensibility. This, at least, is what the following quotation seems to suggest:

Why we cannot exercise the intellect on any object absolutely apart from the continuous, or apply it even to non-temporal things unless in connexion with time, is another question. Now, one must cognize magnitude and motion by means of the same faculty by which one cognizes time [i. e., by that which is also the faculty of memory], and the presentation [involved in such cognition] is an affection of the *sens'l.UJ communis;* whence this follows, viz. that the cognition of these objects [magnitude, motion, time] is effected by the [said *sens'l.UJ communis,* i. e. the] primary faculty of perception. Accordingly, memory [not merely of sensible, but] even of intellectual objects involves a presentation: hence we may conclude that it belongs to the faculty of intelligence only incidentally, while directly and essentially it belongs to the primary faculty of sense-perception. [49]

••There is a striking similarity between the *sensus communis,* in which memory is rooted, and pure sensibility. Even the *a priori* character of the pure forms of space and time seem to be found by Aristotle in the *sensus c01nmunis,* which, as it would seem, is another name for pure synthesis and productive imagination. A few concepts taken from *De Memoria et Reminis.centia* force us to lean towards such an identity. So, he describes the *sensus communis* as "the primary faculty of perception," or " the primary faculty of sense-perception," and even as " the faculty by which one cognizes time" (See 450al0-15). He tells us that memory " is a function of the primary faculty of sense-perception, i. c., of that faculty whereby we perceive time." (45lal5-!W). --On the other hand, the strong efforts he makes to emphasize the fact that we do not get hold of space and time in an *a posteriori* manner, are remarkable. One misses, of course, the enlightening language in which Kant couches that thought, but even in the midst of such an oddity of expression, the message comes clear enough even in Aristotle's *De Memoria:* "There is- let it be taken as a fact-something by which one distinguishes a greater and smaller time; and it is reasonable to think that one does this in a way analogous to that in which one discerns [spatial] magnitudes. For it is *not by the mind reaching out towards. them,* as some say a visual ray from the eye does [in seeing], that one thinks of large things at a distance in space (for even if they are not there one may similarly think them); but one docs so by a proportionate mental movement. For there are in the mind the like figures and movements [i.e., 'like' to those objects and events]." *(De Memoria,* 452b5-15. The italics are not in the text).

••*De Memoria et Reminiscentia,* ch. I. 450a8-15; translated by J. I. Beare, in

Furthermore, as we just read, he must also be puzzled by a problem that he never had the opportunity to solve on his own, but that was taken over most successfully by Immanuel Kant- namely, the question of the possibility of metaphysics "as a science." Indeed, if one acknowledges, as Aristotle did, that " we cannot exercise the intellect on any object absolutely apart from the continuous, or apply it even to non-temporal things unless in connection with time," two questions pop up immediately to the mind: (1) Why is it so?, (2) Is it possible for the mind, " while existing .separate from spatial conditions to think anything that is separate," which is the same as to say, Is Metaphysics *as a science* possible at all? [50]

But these limitations that ensue to the "mind," if we understand it as a "faculty," from the interdependence of the knowing faculties, are not the only shortcomings that it endures. Even in connection with the drive towards the Good, the mind alone proves to be insufficient. It needs the cooperation of the appetite, which, itself, is rooted in some way in the bodily aspect of the composite. Mind, of course, is taken here as "pure reason," not as " practical reason," in which sense it already presupposes a strict cooperation with the appetite. [51] But all of these illustrations of interdependence between the upper faculties and the bodily powers of the soul prove one thing: namely, that it is the whole, numerically one soul of the in-

The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon, Random House, New York.

••*De Anima,* III, 7, 411lb15-)!0.

[51] See *De Anima,* III, 9, 432b25-433a5: " Further, neither can the calculative faculty or what is called ' mind' be the cause of such movement; for mind as speculative never thinks what is practicable . . . not even when it is aware of such an object does it at once enjoin pursuit or avoidance of it; e.g. the mind often thinks of something terrifying or pleasant without enjoining the emotion of fear ... Further, even when the mind does command and thought bids us pursue or avoid something, sometimes no movement is produced; we act in accordance with desire, as in the case of moral weakness." See also *op. cit.,* III, 10, 433a20-25: " That which moves therefore is a single faculty and the faculty of appetite; for if there had been two sources of movement-mind and appetite-they would have produced movement in virtue of some common character. As it is, mind is never found producing movement without appetite."

dividual man, which is situated in the borderline between material and purely spiritual substances holding a unique status among substances. As Aquinas puts it so well: *"manifestum est quod ipsa est in confinio corporalium et separatarum substantiarum constituta."* [52] As a result, and on the basis of this approach, there is no need to fear any more an excruciating dilemma that might have affected Plato, namely, that either the soul is to be granted a substantial being of its own, which forces us to view its union to the body as an accident, or we consider such a union as a substantial unity, but then we must give up any hope of .seeing the soul survive the body's death. The dilemma, says Aquinas, vanishes if we remember that the very being of the soul actualizes the body in such a way that a human composite comes into existence, a composite which enables the soul to pertain to a certain species, a nature's record which would fall beyond the soul's scoring ability if it began to exist since the outset according to its own natural power of survival only, without being a " human" soul.[53]

In the light of the foregoing remarks it becomes crystal clear what is meant when we say that the sensitive and the nutritive parts of the soul, as well as the faculties of imagination and even the possible intellect, are not separable. It certainly does not mean that they perish altogether while the agent intellect remains ... ; it can mean only two things: (I) that it is not by reason of them that the whole soul is separable, and (2) that they do not disappear altogether, but become idle, as it were, in accordance with the new " extraordinary " way in which the .soul begins to exist after death. As St. Thomas puts it, upon the dissolution of the composite the soul ceases to be an *actual form* while still remaining a *form* by nature and by right. [54]

[52] See *Quaestiones de Anima,* I, *in corpore;* p. 60.

[53] See *op. cit.,* I, *ad primum;* p. 60: "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Iicet anima habeat esse completum, non tamen sequitur quod corpus ei accidentaliter uniatur, tum quia illud idem esse quod est animae communicatur corpori ut sit unum esse totius compositi, tum etiam quia etsi possit per se subsistere, non tamen habet speciem completam sed corpus advenit ei ad completionem speciei."

[54] See *op. cit.,* I, *ad 10m.;* p. "Ad decimum dicendum quod eorrupto corpore

7. *The Argument for Immortality.*

In conclusion, it would seem that all we have been told by Aristotle thus far is that absolutely the soul could survive without the body, if (I) there were a way for it to prescind from the bodily help, and if (2) there were a proportionate reason for such an "abnormal" state to become an eternal reality. For, after all, we have been told time and time again that the normal and natural state for man is to live " *in a body."* Can these two *sine qua non* conditions be cleared?

Let us begin with condition number two. No better reason, one would say, can he given than the involvement of the soul with a certain essential good that requires an eternal afterlife. Obviously, the "natural" interest of the composite as such does not do it, for it does not call for, nor can it be achieved by, an eternal survival. Such a survival, on the contrary, would be totally antithetic to the natural good of the composite which essentially depends on the interaction of faculties. But, besides the composite as a sub.stance, there may be another substance that stands to gain something because its nature will not be fulfilled as long as its infinite drive is not matched by an infinite object, and this can be achieved only in an immaterial sort of existence. Now, that seems precisely to be the case with the human soul, provided that its natural demands be taken into consideration in their entirety. Accordingly, Aquinas, who places himself precisely at this vantage point, sees no incompatibility between an immortal life and the nature of the soul. "In regard to the seventh objection "-he writes-" one mu.st say that if the soul is united to the body it is only for two solid reasons, namely, for the sake of the substantial perfection of the species as well as for the sake of the accidental good of the same, which consists in the acquisition of that kind of knowledge which can come only through the sense. For that is precisely the kind of knowledge that suits human nature. This natural course, on the other hand, does not preclude altogether

non perit ab anima natura secundum quam competit ei ut sit forma licet non perficiat materiam actu ut sit forma."

another way of understanding which is proper to the detached souls of children and men, since such an activity is not bound to look after the good of the species, but is rather concerned with suiting the soul inasmuch as it is in a state of separation." [55]

With this approach, St. Thomas is certainly bound to score points in his capacity as an Aristotelian scholar, in contrast with Averroes's system that makes out of the possible intellect a common faculty for the whole of mankind. This is so because the Thomistic version fits better in the Stagirite's general scheme than the Averroistic interpretation, which does not account for the " individual " experience of the composite; upon such " individual " experience of the composite, on the other hand, Aristotle placed the whole of his argument, as can be seen from the long excursuses on the interaction of faculties that is required according to him in order to account for a simple act of individual knowledge,[56] as well as from the research goal of the whole treatise of the soul.

As for condition number one, Aristotle is rather generous in providing the human soul with an enticing and rewarding object, higher than which there is none. For such a final cause, which is supposed to account for the whole existential motion of our mind and our will, must be a kind of unmoved move,[57] and only what is desirable and intelligible at once can be said to be such a mover.[58] But what is so, moves first insofar as it is intelligible and only through its being understood does it move as desirable.[59] Now, the realm of intelligibility encompasses every being, i.e., whatever is "positive "-as opposed to non-being, which is its opposite-, but most of all, what is

"" *Op. cit.,* I, *ad 7m.;* p. 62.

[56] See *op. cit.,* II, *in* c.; p. 69: "Sed haec positio [Averroes, *Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De Anima,* III, 20, lines 29-80, stare non potest ... Sic igitur si intellectus possibilis sit substantia scparata secundum esse ab hoc homine sive ab illo homine, impossibile est quod intelligere intcllectus possibilis sit hujus hominis vel illius."

[57] See *Met.,* XII, 7,

[58] *Ibid.*

[59] *Ibid.,* lines 20-80.

simple and in act.[60] Hence, since what is desirable is to be intelligible, the best must coincide with the ontologically first.[61] And, since as the ontologically first, it is also the ultimate final cause-which, by definition, must move by simply being beloved, in contrast with the other motors, which move upon being moved[62]—it must be, not contingently, but" by necessity," and thus it is the supreme good, the first motor, the or first principle,[63] a being that cannot "not be," i.e., a being which is absolutely and simply.[64] As such, it gives rise to everything, and thus the heavens and nature depend on Him.[65]

It is well known that, in Aristotle's conception, the notion of creation is missing altogether. For this reason the First Being can be the only through knowledge and love, this being also the only way for a motor to be able to move without being moved. For our purpose, however, it is enough to have found in Aristotle's writings a clear-cut assertion of the fact that God is the final cause of all intelligence, and that He can exercise such a teleological causality, not only because of His own infinite Being, but also because we are allured by a kind of love of Being which tends to be equal with the love that God has of Himself and thus cannot be fully satiated if it is not through an exhaustive knowledge of God's Being. However, this kind of ontological love is such that, even as it is being satiated only according to a finite measure, it would keep on moving the mind for ever-as it moves the Heavens eternally[66]—if only the mind could get rid of the distractions of the body and concentrate on its object in contemplation. Now, positively, the soul is fully equipped to perform a full concentration on God's Being, provided that the obstacles be removed adequately. For the object of thought, if we consider thinking in ac-

[60] *Ibid.*, lines 30-34. Here he is referring to the two series of opposites. He concentrates on the positive one: Being, One, Substance, as opposed to non-being, non-one, non-substance.

[61] *Ibid.*, 1072a34-1072bl.

[62] *Op. cit.*, 1072b4-5.

[63] *Op. cit.*, 1072b5-ll.

[64] *Op. cit.*, 1072blS.

[65] *Op. cit.*, 1072b13-14.

[66] *Op. cit.*, 1074a37-SS.

cordance with its essence, is Being, which is also Good by essence; and this entails that all measurements of Being, including the fullness of the same, are open to the mind and belong to its scope: "And thinking in itself "-says Aristotle-" deals with that which is best in itself, and that which is thinking in the fullest sense bears on that which is best in the fullest sense." [67] Aristotle goes so far, in establishing the divine destiny of the mind, as to define the understanding as the " house " of Being, where Being can be found " in act," which is precisely what shows best the divine origin and the divine nature of the mind. [08] After all, by nature, though not with the same intensity, the human soul can enjoy the same divine life, since the latter is nothing but the "act of understanding." [69] We

[67] *Op. cit.,* 1072hl8-19.

[68] *Op. cit.,* 1072b22-25. I translate directly: "because the understanding is the natural container and correlate of the actually intelligible substance, without the actual possession of which it cannot be fully in act, this probably being the reason why on one hand the intellect deserves the attribute ' divine ' precisely inasmuch as it is in act, not inasmuch as it is a faculty of the soul, and, on the other hand, it is the act of contemplation that constitutes the mind's most pleasant and highest activity."

[69] *Op. cit.,* 1072b27. It is extremely significant that here Aristotle dissociates the concept of life from all chemical reactions since he makes the point that even God, who is pure and subsistent Spirit, is alive. The reason is that " the perfecting act of the understanding is life, and God is such an act." *(Met.,* 1072b26-28) . Furthermore, there is here a clear implication that God is the act of all minds. This, of course, makes full sense even within Aristotle's philosophy, and it is not necessary to resort to the Arabic common agent intellect. Being as Logos suffices, since it is Logos that triggers the process of understanding, whether in a successive way, or all at once, as is the case with the angels. Now, the only source that can be assigned to this *a priori* givenness of the presence of Being " as a whole," must be traced to a certain participation in God's self-knowledge. Aquinas, upon extricating the ultimate related Aristotelian implications, stumbled, as it were, on an Aristotelian account of the Christian conception of eternal life-which in Christ's words is " that they may know thee, the only true God, and him whom thou has sent, Jesus Christ" *(John,* 17, 3-4)-, since he treated the beatific intuition of the blessed as the perfect act of knowledge of the Aristotelian mind (see: *Summa Contra Gentiles,* III, ch. 51). That this is a truly Aristotelian approach becomes clear if we notice that not even Aristotle himself could find another way of defining God than as perfect life in the sense of perfect knowledge of the whole of Being. " His subsisting perfection "-he writes-" is therefore the eternal and most noble life, Thus we must conclude that God is an eternal and most noble being and that not only does

are even said to enjoy it in fact on rare occasions, namely, whenever we indulge in contemplation, an experience that the Stagirite thinks should enable us to realize how wonderful God's life really is.[70]

The constant emphasis which is being placed all along on the difference of performance between God's intellectual life and ours, together with the clear link that is being established between our beatifying apprehension of Being and our personal individual acts of sense perception, understanding of particular objects, hope and reminiscence,[11] leads us to conclude that it is the whole soul that is being considered in regard to eternity, not only a part of it. For this reason, the famous pas.sage devoted to the nature of the agent intellect comes as a shock, and should be taken as a particular problem or as a possible objection against the thesis that Aristotle maintained the immortality of the soul. As we already decided,[12] we are not going to repeat here what we have already .said elsewhere concerning this passage. Let it be said, though, that as a rule of thumb, the meaning of such a paragraph must be interpreted in a way that does not contradict the context nor the throng of solid conclusions that we have reached so far.

8. *Ontological Foundation of the Soul's Indivisibility.*

As further confirmation of the foregoing thesis, the translation of Aristotle's psychological doctrine into ontological terms clearly shows that it is the whole being of the soul that transcends the limitations of matter in the sense that it can both make and become everything "without exception." The very text of *De Anima*, while strongly emphasizing that it is one and the same soul that carries out both of these two trans-

he possess an unceasing and eternal life, but that he is indeed eternal life." *(Met.,* 1072b28-30). As a result, insofar as God is the act of the understanding whereby we are led to pursue the comprehension of Being, and taking into account that this act is life and ontological truth, we might give an Aristotelian interpretation to the following evangelical saying as well: ***"I** am the way, and the truth, and the life"* (John, 14, 6).

[70] *Op. cit.,* 1072h24. See also 1072b14-18.

[n] See *op. cit.,* 1072b15-18.

[72] See here, footnote # fl9.

formations, does not fail to hint that if the soul enjoys such a lofty prerogative it is precisely because its own nature consists in such an intensity of being that in it being can be present to itself "in totality."

As for the unified way of operating that characterizes the soul, the passage that justifies the reference to both the positive and the negative aspects of the soul's activity clearly suggests it if only we use the Greek version [73] and carefully fill in it the terms that are not mentioned but are most certainly understood, as we are going to show in the footnote by conveniently resorting to the use of square brackets:

Since just as in the whole of nature there is something that is the matter of all and every genus (that which is all of them in potency) and something else that is the cause and the effective principle, whereby nature produces everything, and which behaves towards the former as the art does in regard to the material, so also and by necessity the same distinctions hold true within the soul. For there is first that mind whereby [the soul] becomes all things, and there is also that mind whereby [the same soul] makes [actually intelligible] all [the potential intelligibles], and this is a positive state, such as light.

Using this interpretation, it becomes quite clear that the active mind stands for a special aspect of the soul, i.e., for an aspect of a certain being with a very peculiar intensity of being that enables it to do what no other kind of being can do, namely, "to know." Consequently, any characteristic that is allotted to the agent intellect belongs to the whole soul as well. This should be enough to allow us to conclude that, if the agent intellect is immortal, the soul is by the same token equally separable from the human body. But there is more to it. Since the possible intellect equally stands for the soul's being taken in still another respect, it follows that whatever sub-

[1]. The Trendelenburg version of *De Anima*, ill, 5, 430al0-15 might be filled in as follows:

'E7reL 0' *i!J<J'?rep EV a?r&.<J'TJ rii <f>v<!'eL E<J'Tl 711 'TO µev i!I\?] eKa<J"Tlj1 "fEvEL (TOVTO oe {J 7rciPTa Ovv&.µet €KeLva), 0e TO a(Tiov Kai trOL1]TtK6v, 7rOteiv 7r&.vra, olov 1J TfXV?J 7rpos r1/v i!I\?]v ?rf?rovOev, ava"fK?J Ka.I EV rii 'fvxfi V?ravxeiv ra.vra.s ras oia.<f>opas. Ka.1 frnv a µ'Ev rowvros vovs rcp ?ravra. [ii 'fvxii] "flve<J'Oa.i, aoe rcp [i] a.vr1/'fvxii] ?ravra. (ra. ovvaµei VO?J'TU EVEp"felv. VO?)TU] 7rDLELV, @s 'TIS, ofov 'TO •*

stantial property is predicated of both the soul and the agent intellect, should be predicated also of the possible intellect and for the same reason. It does not matter, therefore, in the least, if the following text clearly singles out the agent intellect as being immortal and impassible:

and it is just this mind which is separable and impassible and unmixable in force of its being essentially in act.[74]

For it is precisely the reason why it is immortal that is explicitly predicated as belonging exclusively to the active mind, not necessarily immortality as a characteristic. Furthermore, even the emphasis therein being placed on the reason for immortality is not without such a sufficient ground that somehow it tends to favor our own interpretation, since it is precisely insofar as the .soul is destined to be an active mind, and thus to share directly in the light of God, that it is said to call for the possession of such an outstanding prerogative-the simple characteristic of " immateriality " that is mentioned in connection with the possible intellect confining itself to making immortality no more than a *possible situation,* but never, nor precisely, *a natural goal of the human soul.* As Aristotle puts it, what is active is always worthier of honor than what is passive.[75] Accordingly, there is no reason to dismiss the thesis that was just established on grounds which hardly could be questioned, all the more .so that the puzzling sentence which was alleged against it is far from even having the semblance of an "exclusive" type of statement. On the contrary, it is no more than a mere positive " assertion" which concentrates on the reasons why the agent intellect must be independent of the body, without prejudging in the least whether or not the possible intellect has grounds of its own to claim the same privilege for itself. In this sense, far from constituting an objection, the problematic statement does rather show all the characteristics of a true confirmation of the whole soul's immortality, which was-as we already know-so deeply entrenched in Aristotle's mind throughout the writing of the *De Anima.* Furthermore, within St. Thomas's interpretation of that work, this criticism seems

n *J)e Anima,* III, 430al7-18.

[76] See *op. cit.,*

to place the immortality thesis beyond all reasonable doubt. Indeed, were it not for this conviction that Aquinas ascribes to him, Aristotle could not have said, as he did while referring to the possible intellect alone, that the mind must be immaterial-and thus impassible in the strict sense-because it must be able to become everything.[76] Now, the only way to reconcile the misleading emphasis placed on the eternity of the agent intellect with the genuinely Aristotelian thesis that both the agent intellect and the possible intellect are impassible in the strict sense is to accept the position that both faculties are nothing but partial functions of one and the same being, which is called " soul."

Furthermore, if we try to explicate the ontological make-up of the soul, it becomes clear that the very agent intellect itself already constitutes the first level of the soul's own actuality as borne out by the entire book XII of Aristotle's *Metaphysics.* As a sample of such a direction, let us concentrate on one significant passage, contained in that book, in which the Stagirite is bent upon countering an objection aimed at questioning the basic principle of his epistemology, according to which the mind cannot perform the act of understanding without literally becoming the object which is to be understood. As the objection goes, if such a theory is brought to bear on " divisible," " composite," objects, it forces us at once into an absurd impasse. In that case, indeed, we must admit that in order to assimilate such an object the mind must become successively each one of its parts, thus splitting into as many parts itself as the object has parts of its own.[77] Aristotle meets the challenge headlong in the following passage:

> Or, is it that whatever lacks matter is indivisible-this being the case with the human mind or even with any of the composite things that the mind may get hold of at any given time (since the mind is not fulfilled with this or that particular thing but only with a certain whole which is the supreme good and is different from any

[76] See *op. cit.,*

[77] See *Met.,* XII, *De Anima,*

one of those particular things)-and that such is also the way in which subsistent and self-thinking thought behaves for ever? [78]

The message that comes clear and loud through this passage is fortunately most reassuring. We are told that there is no danger whatsoever that the mind should transform itself into the different parts of a composite object and thus shatter all around into pieces.[79] 'Ve are then reassured that this is so precisely because if the understanding can reach the object at all it is only in the light of the all-enlightening-gathering-collectedness that is the *LOGOS.* In other words, the threat so dramatically being contemplated by the objection vanishes at once in the face of the essence of the mind, in virtue of which the understanding is always bent upon covering the totality of being-whether being does actually show up in the mind as the place of all actual forms,[80] or whether it does so only as *LOGOS,* in which human beings come to know all particular things both as "beings" and as "bound together." But by the .same token, it is essential to mind to be free from" matter," since the latter is the " *other* " of being and thus cannot but bring about division and limitations. Accordingly, in order for the object to become known, it must first leave out at the doorsteps of the mind any trace of matter, since it is a necessary requirement that it become one with the being of the mind precisely in the light of *LOGOS.* But correlatively, the mind too must be able to transform itself into the object in the light of being, and this calls for the being of the soul to be of a very unique nature.

Fortunately, the clues that should lead us to the discovery of such a nature are already in our possession. For one thing, it has been solidly established that no object can be objectively grasped if it is not through what might be called the *LOGOS* or the Kantian transcendental object=X. But this entails that, whenever any object becomes actually present to the mind, it

[78] *Met.,* XII, 9, 1075a6-11.

[79] See *Met.,* XII, 1075a5-6.

[80] When mind is at its best, as in God, it has only one object, namely, infinite Being both in totality and in detail. See *Met.,* XII, 1074b83-35.

is the whole of Being that becomes equally present all at once as a whole comprising not only that particular being but also what Karl Rahner would call the actual "excess "-i.e., as an actual being standing out against its ontological background, thus bearing out the rather baffling conception presented in Parmenide.s's fragments 4 and 5.[81] On the other hand, if the soul, in its capacity as the possible intellect, can actually become the object as emerging from the ontological background in totality, it must be such that in it Being in totality is always and already actually present to itself precisely in its capacity as *LOGOS,* i.e., as an enlightening background. Should we not say, therefore, that the agent intellect is nothing but the soul insofar as in it Being " as *LOGOS* " is always and already present to itself "as subject," and that the possible intellect, in turn, is the same soul insofar as in it Being " as subject " can become all the beings that are simply outlined in *LOGOS?*

In this sense, the essence of the mind can be retained as being common to all kinds of mind, while at the same time allowing for specific differences in the midst of their variety. Mind, in this light, would be no more than the same and only one Being of beings simultaneouly considered in two complementary respects, namely, (I) insofar as in its capacity as subject it is present to" *itself as presence in totality,"* and (2) inasmuch as in its capacity as such a .subject it is already and always actual according to the way in which, *as presence,* it is itself (Being) in an uninterrupted state of actuality. H Being as presence is always actual but not as fully itemized, we call it the agent then the mind as .subject is not thereby prompted to be all forms at once but is only empowered to become each one of them at a time, as it encounters them, with the help of an active power capable of carrying

[81] See Diels-Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokrater,* vol. I, Weidmann, fragments 4 and *5,* p. 232; Kathleen Freeman, *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, Mass., 1962), *fr.* 4, p. 42: " Observe nevertheless how things absent are securely present to the mind; for it will not sever Being from its connection with Being, whether it is scattered everywhere utterly throughout the universe, or whether it is collected together." ; *fr. 5, Ibid.:* " It is all the same to me from what point I begin, for I shall return again to this same point."

out such a transformation-i. e., because then the mind as subject is only "possible" and thus is actual only inasmuch as it "is" already all things "potentially." If, on the contrary, *as presence* Being is actual precisely as fully itemized, i.e., as the actual totality of all possible forms, then as subjective mind it is never potential, but is always and already all things in actuality-automatically, as it were. In this case there is neither a possible intellect, nor an active mind: there is only a mind. Plato's theory, as a hybrid position, does not fit in this partition, although if we overlook for a moment the potentiality of the Platonic mind, it would draw closer to the latter alternative. Whether or not as such it is tenable is irrelevant here. What really counts is that, as pointed out by Aquinas, its lack of need for an agent intellect is a good illustration of the concept of the latter. As St. Thomas puts it:

> The reason why Aristotle came to postulate an agent intellect was his rejection of Plato's theory that the essences of sensible things existed apart from matter, in a state of actual intelligibility. For Plato there was clearly no need to posit an agent intellect. But Aristotle, who regarded the essences of sensible things as existing in matter with only a potential intelligibility, had to invoke some abstractive principle in the mind itself to render these essences actually intelligible. [82]

The minimum required for the essence of mind is therefore the presence of Being as *LOGOS.* In other words, in Aristotle's conception the human mind is a creator that can bring into being through knowledge all the possibilities outlined in Being as *LOGOS,* and precisely in exactly the same order in which they are found therein. It is, so to say, a replica of the actual world. For it is always one and the same Being which lies at the bottom of both the world and the mind. While acting in nature in its capacity as *LOGOS,* it assigns a role and a place to each thing, whereas, while working in the mind in the same capacity, it lets all things be again "in thought." Aristotle himself suggests the commonality of the principle that presides over the ontical differentiation both in nature and in the mind,

[82] St. Thomas's *Commentary on Aristotle's "De Anima,"* Bk. III, *5,* paragraph 731.

when he suddenly switches from the treatment of the objection with which we have been busy thus far to the question of the role of Being (as the Supreme Good) in the physical world. "Now," he asks himself," in what sense is that Supreme Good, which constitutes the perfection of the mind, a real whole?" Furthermore, he insists: "Assuming that it is an object from the point of view of the subject, is it the case that as an object it is to be conceived of as an 'in-itself,' or should it rather be thought of as Logos, i. e., as the ontological order? Or ought we to interpret it as being both at once?" [83] Then, with a rather Kantian bent, he decides in favor of the latter alternative. It is both, he surmises, namely, God and the ontological order, or, to put it more accurately, the ontological order as grounded in God, just as the good of an army is to be placed in the order that comes to it through its general in command. On closer examination, what he seems to be suggesting is that, since the concept of " being " does already include the fundamental relationship of all things to God, it is only by grasping all things in Being conceived as *LOGOS* that the mind can be perfected with an objective knowledge of the world. Perhaps we might explain Aristotle's position by showing its reducibility to Kant's critical account. For in the *Critique of Pure Reason* [84] the concept of *ens,* which is the concept of objectivity (of the transcendental object=X) in which alone we can grasp the particular objects, bespeaks both the totality of beings in the pure synthesis of thought and their relation of dependence to the *ens realissimum,* which matches the concept of *ens* in content and thus accounts for the source of all possible predicates about the world. But be it as it may, this sudden and unexpected shift in attention cannot help but bring forth another inner association of ideas that undoubtedly was going on in Aristotle's mind. It reminds us indeed that this human intellect is, as it were, a replica of the physical world, with one significant difference, though, namely that in the outside world the Being of beings is never actual as such prior to its blooming into the particular beings that it lets be, whereas in the mind-which " ac-

••See *Met.,* 1075al0-15. ••See *Critique of Pure Reason,* A575-580; B608-608.

tually" is always and already all things insofar as the" latter" are only in a state of potentiality-the Being of beings can really be said to be actually present precisely insofar as it is only that, the "Being " of beings. Seth Benardete puts it in a striking way: "The being of beings can only exist potentially; it can only be *nous pathetikos,* which in its becoming causes its being to vanish. Being is not thinking, but the being of beings comes close to the being of thinking." [85]

CONCLUSION.

Undoubtedly, in the *De Anima* Aristotle had already achieved such a definite philosophical personality, that it does not make sense to accuse him of being still attached to Platonism. What clearly and forever separates him from Plato is his conception of the fonn in general and the human soul in particular as being an in contrast with the n which is essential to the Platonic view. It is precisely this new approach that further complicated the problem of the soul's immortality within his philosophy. [86] However, although Aristotle is no longer a Platonist, he may still be a typically Greek thinker, and to this extent, he is likely to be still under the spell of Orphic myths.

In fact, as we are confident to have shown, every indication tends to suggest that the repeated references to the divinity of the mind-with all their essential repercussions on the nature of the soul-betray, to say the least, a desperate effort to emphasize the " extraordinary " and baffling powers of the human soul. Unfortunately, the text alone does not yield any further information about our query. But, if we combine with this clear-cut indication a very significant clue provided by the Greek inability to account for the origin of the mind through a real " creation "-an inability which is shared by

[85] Seth Benardete, "Aristotle, De Anima III, 3-5," in *The Review of Mtrtaphysics,* 28 (1975) N. 4, p. 618.

[86] Aquinas clearly saw the difference in *Summa Theofogiea,* I, 87, 1, c.: "The difficulty in solving this question arises from the fact that the soul united to the body can understand only by turning to the phantasms ... Did this not proceed from the soul's very nature, but accidentally through its being bound up with the

Aristotle in his capacity as a Greek thinker-we find ourselves with a very strong inclination to take the reference to the divine status of the soul *ad pedem literae,* on the grounds that the soul-mind is a being essentially incompatible with any process of" generation." For, it having been established that the soul is immaterial, it follows that corruption cannot have a hold on its substance, which by the same token cannot have been caused through any of the infinite possible ways of "natural" causality, which are all essentially inseparable from the mechanics of " generation." As a result, there was only one alternative left to the Stagirite, namely, to account for the existence of such an " *a-natural* " being in terms of a direct participation in the eternal being of the gods. This entitles us to place also the great Aristotle in the company of those Greek thinkers that Professor Tresmontant associates with a " divine " type of immortality, and thus is forced to contrast with those philosophers who correspond to the Judea-Christian tradition, in terms of which our *creatural,* status £ails to warrant any claim on our part to an "essential" type of immortality. [87]

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body, as the Platonists said, the difficulty would vanish; for in that case, when the burden of the body was once removed, the soul would at once return to its own nature, and would understand intelligible things simply, without turning to phantasms, as is exemplified in the case of other separate substances."

[87] See Claude Tresmontant, *Le probleme de l'ame* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1971), p. 187: "The teaching about the soul's immortality had a clear meaning within the Orphic and the Pythagorean traditions as well as in Plato and Plotinus, on the one hand, and the Agnostics, on the other. For if the soul is divine by nature, if it already existed when it came down to the body, if it was but a fragment of the divine substance, then it is easily conceivable that it will go on existing in the future just as it was eternal and uncreated in the past when it had not yet entered the body. If we are divine by nature, then we know that we are immortal. 'We feel, we experience immortality in us.'

From the Hebrew, Jewish, and Christian points of view, though, things get more complex. Given that the human soul is not divine by nature, and that it is not uncreated bu started to exist only twenty, thirty or fifty years ago, how can we be sure that it will keep on existing when it has ceased to inform a certain amount of matter and thus has stopped constituting the body that I am? "

AESTHETIC SUBJECTIVITY AND GENERALIZED EMPIRICAL METHOD

THE GENERALIZED EMPIRICAL method proposed by Bernard Lonergan [1] effects a mediation through self-appropriation of the subject's intelligent, reasonable, and responsible intentionality. More precisely, the work of Lonergan is a quite thorough maieutic of intelligent and reasonable consciousness, of what Lonergan would call the second and third levels of conscious intentionality, [2] and a significant pointer to the other levels. The developing articulation of the dynamics of the fourth level, the level of responsible or existential consciousness, is currently the principal concern of many of Lonergan's students. [3] What constitutes self-ap-

[1] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957); as applied to theology, *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972).

[2] On the levels of consciousness, see *Method in Theology*, Chapter One. Lonergan there discusses four levels. Consciousness is so structured as to move by questioning from experience of the data of sense and of the data of consciousness (the empirical level) to insight into the experienced data and conceptualization and formulation of one's insights (the intelligent level), and then to reflection on the adequacy of one's understanding and to judgment in accord with the adequacy reflectively grasped (the reasonable level), and finally to deliberation, decision, and action, i.e. to constitution of the world and of oneself (the responsible or existential level). In the lecture, "The Subject" (A *Seoond Collection,* edited by William F. J. Ryan, S. J., and Bernard J. Tyrrell, S. J., Philadelphia: Westminster, 1974, pp. 69-86, cf. esp. p. 80), Lonergan adds a lower level of dr.eaming consciousness, and in *Philosophy of God, and Theology* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1973, p. 38), he adds a highest level of religious love.

[3] Scholars Press is undertaking the publication of papers delivered at the annual Lonergan Workshops held at Boston College. The volumes, edited by Frederick Lawrence, will be entitled *Lonergan Workshop*. One volume was published in 1978. Almost all of the papers in some way reflect concern with the mediation of existential subjectivity. Furthermore, an annual seminar at the American Academy of Religion meeting is devoted to the study of what Lonergan means by dialectic, a functional specialty in Lonergan's method that is correlated with the fourth level of consciousness.

propriation of the level of consciousness concerned with evaluation, deliberation, decision, and action? The present paper proposes to advance discussion of this issue.

The core of my argument is to the effect that the self-appropriation of existential subjectivity depends on a maieutic of consciousness distinct from but complementary to that proposed by Lonergan, a second mediation of the subject as subject, a psychic mediation of one's dramatic artistry, of the aesthetic subjectivity whose concern is to make a work of art out of one's living:[4]

The aesthetic and dramatic dimension of our being attends the operations which occur at all levels of conscious intentionality. There is a drama not only to one's self-constitution as existential subject and to one's constitution of the world through decisive action but also to one's pursuit of intelligibility and truth. [5] The drama is more than adverted to in Lonergan's

[4] It is obvious, then, that I am employing the term, aesthetic subjectivity, in a manner quite different from the usage of Hans-Georg Gadamer *(Truth and Method,* New York: Seabury, 1975). For Gadamer, the term is pejorative, and designates an immediacy of taste that would empty the work of art of its distinctive claim to truth. In my usage, the term also designates an immediacy of feeling, but to a world already mediated and constituted by meaning. As such, it is not simply the immediacy of empirical consciousness to data of sense, but permeaks all of the levels of conscious intentionality disclosed by Lonergan. Thus, insights, judgments, and decisions are all dramatic events; permeating their quality as intentional operations is a dispositional character, a quality of feeling, of " mass and momentum," of energic compositions and distributions, without which "our knowing and deciding would be paper thin" (Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology,* pp. 30-31). When I speak of aesthetic subjectivity, I am referring to the following facts: " Because of our feelings, our desires and our fears, our hope or despair, our joys and sorrows, our enthusiasm and indignation, our esteem and contempt, our trust and distrust, our love and hatred, our tenderness and wrath, our admiration, veneration, reverence, our dread, horror, tenor, we are oriented massively and dynamically in a world mediated by meaning. We have feelings about other persons, we feel for them, we feel with them. We have feelings about our respective situations, abont the past, about the future, about evils to be lamented or remedied, about the good that can, might, must be accomplished" *(Ibid.,* p. 31).

[5] That feeling permeates not only existential consciousness but also cognitive levels is clear from the illustrative instance of insight with which Lonergan opens the first chapter of *Insight:* Archimedes running naked from the baths of Syracuse, crying excitedly: " I've got it! " See Bernard Lonergan, *Insight,* p. 3.

repeated references in *Insight* to the struggle between the desire to know and the flight from understanding. [6] The mediation I am proposing, then, is an objectification of the whole of conscious intentionality in its dramatic dimension. Nevertheless, its special importance emerges only when one asks whether there is an access to the data of interiority that will allow self-appropriation at the level of existential subjectivity to be as complete, as thorough, and as explanatory as that which Lonergan renders possible at the levels of intelligent and reasonable subjectivity. Thus it is not without reason that Lonergan's discussion of feelings [7] occurs, not when he is explicating our cognitive operations, even though these too are permeated by affectivity, but when he is articulating his notion of the human good, of the concern for value that is the distinctive mark of the fourth, existential level of consciousness.

It will be obvious from my argument that I believe that the archetypal psychology of C. G. Jung contains the seeds of a potential contribution to the aesthetic mediation that is the focus of my concern. But Jung proves useful only as a consequence of a dialectical encounter between his phenomenology of individuation and Lonergan's heuristic account of human development. [8] As it stands, without such a dialectic, Jung's project is mired in the quicksands of romanticism, in a short-circuiting of the finality of the subject due to an inadequate treatment of the problem of evil. But to discover the relation of the self-transcendence of intentionality to the psyche is to obviate the difficulties raised by Jung, whose extraordinary familiarity with the psyche was not matched by an appreciation of the self-transcendent dynamism of the imperatives of authentic consciousness. [9]

[6] For example, *ibid.*, pp. 199-203, and pp. xif.

[7] Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, pp. 30-34.

[8] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight*, pp. 458-479

[9] For Lonergan, the self-transcendent capacities of the lev.els of intentional consciousness are normative for authenticity. Corresponding to each level is a precept, and the complex of imperatives constitutes the law of human nature. The imperatives or " transcendental precepts " are: Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be

Aesthetics amd the existential subject

In this section I propose to argue from Lonergan's analysis of the role of feelings at the fourth level of consciousness and from his discussion of the relationship of symbols to feelings, first, that aesthetic subjectivity in the form of dramatic artistry is the psychic correlative of moral and religious intentionality; second, that aesthetics is the basis of ethics; third, that aesthetic or dramatic self-appropriation is the key to self-appropriation at the fourth level; and fourth, that these three conclusions ground a methodological affirmation of a psychic conversion through which aesthetic self-appropriation becomes possible.

The existential subject, then, is the subject as evaluating, deliberating, deciding, acting, and in one's actions constituting

reasonable, Be responsible, Be in love. See *Method in Theology,* p. !W. The failure of the Jungian project is summarized by Paul J. Stern, *C.* G. *Jung: The Haunted Prophet* (New York: Dell, 1976), pp. 256 f.: "The myth of the emergence of the God-man was the culmination of Jung's quest for the great synthesis that would resolve his inner duality. This quest also led Jung to propound a variety of other syntheses: the fusion of religion and empiricism in analytic psychology; the coupling of ego and unconscious in the archetype of the self; the confluence of spirit and matter in the symbols of alchemy; the blending of the singular and the universal in the collective unconscious.

"But in the last analysis Jung's search for the Holy Grail of conjunction failed. His syntheses did not eventuate in genuine union; they were makeshift soldering jobs, contrived amalgamations, rather than transcendent integrations of the opposites.

"In the intellectual realm, Jung's great synthesis remained very much at the level of mere verbal operations whose superficialities were concealed by an impressive array of erudition. Jung's often-noted lack of lucidity, his turgid style, the leakiness of his logic, his inability to distinguish between hypotheses and facts are as many telltale signs of this lack of integration." Stern balances this harsh judgment with an appropriate recognition of Jung's intimations of forthcoming differentiations and integrations of human consciousness. I view Jung as a precursor of a very important movement in the evolution of consciousness, a movement that he could not himself systematize because of his inadequate conceptualizations conceming the intentionality of the human spirit. I have suggested elsewhere that the root of Jung's problem lies in misplacing the opposites, a fact that appears most obviously in his hopelessly jumbled treatment of the problem of evil. See "Dramatic Artistry in the Third Stage of Meaning," in *Lonergan Workshop II* and "The Theologian's Psyche: Notes toward the Reconstruction of Depth Psychology," in *Lonergan Workshop I.* See also "Aesthetics and the Opposites," *Thought,* June, 1977.

the world and oneself. Existential consciousness is a level of consciousness distinct from but sublating the three levels of consciousness constitutive of human knowing. It is consciousness as concerned with the good, with value, with the discrimination of what is truly worthwhile from what is only apparently good.

The discussion of the existential subject as a notion quite distinct from the cognitional subject is a relatively recent development in Lonergan's thought. It reflects the emergence of a notion of the human good as distinct from the notions of the intelligent and the reasonable. Lonergan acknowledges this development and the attendant recognition of the role of feelings in existential subjectivity.

In *Insight* the good was the intelligent and the reasonable. In *Method* the good is a distinct notion. It is intended in questions for deliberation. It this worthwhile? Is it truly or only apparently good? It is aspired to in the intentional response of feeling to values. It is known in judgments of value made by a virtuous or authentic person with a good conscience. It is brought about by deciding and living up to one's decisions. Just as intelligence sublates sense, just as reasonableness sublates intelligence, so deliberation sublates and thereby unifies knowing and feeling.[10]

Feelings, then, and with them the whole of the psyche, are no longer integrated by knowledge, as *inlnsi,ght,* but by self-constituting existential subjectivity. In *lnmght,* the psyche "reaches the wealth and fullness of its apprehensions and responses under the higher integration of human intelligence."[11] In *Method in Theology,* both human intelligence and the psyche are sublated and unified by the deliberations of the existential subject, for affective apprehensions of potential values mediate between cognitive judgments of fact and existential judgments of value. The new notion of the good, then, involves a relocation of the significance of the psyche for generalized empirical method.

[10] Bernard Lonergan, *"Insight* Revisited," *A Second Collection,* p.

[11] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight,* p. The psyche is implicitly defined in terms of "a sequence of increasingly differentiated and integrated sets of capacities for perceptiveness, for aggressive or affective response, for memory, for imaginative projects, and for skilfully and economically executed performance." *Ibid.,* p. 456.

The import of this relocation becomes more pronounced when we consider the relationship of symbols to the feelings in which values are first apprehended. "A symbol is an image of a real or imaginary object that evokes a feeling or is evoked by a feeling." [12] One's affective capacities, dispositions, and habits "can be specified by the symbols that awaken determinate affects and, inversely, by the affects that evoke determinate symbols." [13] Thus " affective development, or aberration, involves a transvaluation and transformation of symbols. What before was moving no longer moves; what before did not move now is moving. So the symbols themselves change to express the new affective capacities and dispositions." [14] And affective capacities and dispositions, as we have seen, initiate one's existential response to potential values and satisfactions. They are the effective orientation of one's being.[15]

The transformation and transvaluation of symbols, then, goes hand in hand with one's affective development. But it can be understood only when one realizes that symbols follow other laws than those of rational discourse.[16] The function of symbols is to meet a need for internal communication that rational procedures cannot satisfy.[17] The elemental, pre-objectified meaning of symbols finds its proper context in this pro-

[12] Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology,* p. 64.

[13] *Ibid.,* p. *65.*

[14] *Ibid.,* p. 66.

[15] *Ibid.,* p. *65.*

[16] " For the logical class the symbol uses a representative figure. For univocity it substitutes a wealth of multiple meanings. It does not prove but it overwhelms with a manifold of images that converge in meaning. It does not bow to the principle of excluded middle but admits the *coincidentia cppositorum,* of love and hate, of courage and fear, and so on. It does not negate but overcomes what it rejects by heaping up all that is opposite to it. It does not *move* on some single track or on some single level, but condenses into a bizarre unity all its present concerns." *Ibid.,* p. 66.

[17] " Organic and psychic vitality have to reveal themselves to intentional consciousness and, inversely, intentional consciousness has to secure the collaboration of organism and psyche. Again, our apprehensions of values occur in intentional responses, in feelings; here too it is necessary for feelings to reveal their objects and, inversely, for objects to awaken feelings. It is through symbols that mind and body, mind and heart, heart and body communicate." *Ibid.,* pp. 66 f.

cess of internal communication. The interpretation of the symbol thus has to appeal to this context and to its associated images and feelings.[18]

Such an interpretation of symbols and of their relation to feelings and to the intention of value is obviously significant for one's evaluation of the significance of dreams. Thus Lonergan manifests a clear sympathy for those schools of dream interpretation that think of the dream "not as the twilight of life, but as its dawn, the beginning of the transition from impersonal existence to presence in the world, to constitution of one's self in one's world."[19] Later I shall argue for the privileged position of the dream in the task of internal communication that is the proper role of symbols for human consciousness. For the moment, though, I wish simply to correlate what I mean by aesthetic subjectivity with the dimension of our being marked by the reciprocal influence of symbols and feelings in our initial response to values. Aesthetic subjectivity is the psychic correlative of our intentional existential orientation in the world mediated by meaning.[20] Already it would

[18] *Ibid.,* p. 67.

[19] *Ibid.,* p. 69. This represents a different evaluation of the function of the dream from that proposed by Lonergan in *Insight,* pp. 194-196.

[20] That there must be such a psychic correlative is argued also by Lonergan in *Insight:* "Man's concrete being involves

(1) a succession of levels of higher integration, and

(2) a principle of correspondence between otherwise coincidental manifolds on each lower level and systematizing forms on the next higher level. Moreover, these higher integrations on the organic, psychic, and intellectual levels are not static but dynamic systems; they are systems on the move; the higher integration is not only an integrator but also an operator; and if developments on different levels are not to conflict, there has to be a correspondence between their respective operators.

"... On the intellectual level the operator is concretely the detached and disinterested desire to know. It is this desire, not in contemplation of the already known, but headed towards further knowledge, orientated into the known unknown. The principle of dynamic correspondence calls for a harmonious orientation on the psychic level, and from the nature of the case such an orientation would have to consist in some cosmic dimension, in some intimation of unplumbed depths that accrued to man's feelings, emotions, sentiments. Nor is this merely a theoretical conclusion, as R. Otto's study of the non-rational element in the *Idea of the Holy* rather abundantly indicates." *Insight,* p. 532. Cf. also pp. 546 f.:

appear that a disciplined exploration of one's psychic being would complement intentionality analysis and would mediate one's self-appropriation especially of the existential level of one's being. Through such an exploration, one would be investigating the aesthetic or dramatic dimension of one's moral and religious responses. There must be a psychological contribution to the position on the .subject, one that would aid especially moral and religious self-appropriation and that would facilitate the sublation of an intellectually self-appropriating consciousness by moral and religious subjectivity. [21] Such a mediation would contribute to the articulation of what Lonergan calls foundational reality, [22] i.e., to the basic explanatory and dialectical position on the subject.

Lonergan has articulated foundational reality in terms of religious conversion, moral conversion, and intellectual conversion. But neither religious nor moral conversion is a matter of religious or moral self-appropriation. Neither is a matter of explanatory self-knowledge, as is intellectual conversion. [28]

" [The] unrestricted openness of our intelligence and reasonableness not only is the concrete operator of our intellectual development but also is accompanied by a corresponding operator that deeply and powerfully holds our sensitive integrations open to transforming change . . . . Man's explanatory self-knowledge can become effective in his concrete living only if the content of systematic insights, the direction of judgments, the dynamism of decisions can be embodied in images that release feeling and emotion and flow spontaneously into deeds no less than words." In " Dramatic Artistry in the Third Stage of Meaning," I have identified the sensitive operator as psychic energy and have related my understanding of this sensitive dynamism to Jung's.

[21] On the sublations here referred to, see Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, pp. 241-243. What I am seeking is a way to render moral and religious self-appropriation as much a matter of explanatory self-knowledge as is the intellectual self-appropriation aided by *Insight.* I am suggesting that we can develop a psychological self-mediation that would display the ground of one's being as a moral and r·eligious subject, by uncovering the symbols that awaken and fail to awaken one's affective responses, and by enabling one to trace the story of the transvaluation of symbols in one's sensitive orientation.

••Sec Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, pp. 267-269.

•• Strictly speaking, intellectual conversion has two meanings for Lonergan. There is a sense in which, as Lonergan says, the Church reached intellectual conversion at the Council of Nicea. That is, a particularly vexing and critical problem was resolved by the exercise of human intelligence as orientated beyond the *priora*

The position on foundational reality would seem to demand .some explanatory understanding of religious and moral conversion.24 In effect, what I am suggesting amounts to the affirmation of a psychic conversion that would be the base of moral and religious self-appropriation, that would play the same function in explanatory existential self-knowledge as the aesthetic dimension of subjectivity itself play.s in the decisions of the concrete existential subject. As aesthetic subjectivity is the ground of moral and religious response, by being the locus of the apprehension of values, so aesthetic self-appropriation is the ground of moral and religious self-appropriation. Authentic self-appropriation in an explanatory mode is conditional upon the release of the capacity to disengage in explanatory fashion the orientation of one's spontaneous symbolic system on the move. This release is psychic conversion. As contributing to explanatory existential self-understanding, it aids the sublation of intellectual conversion by a moral and religious conversion that are advancing in a mediated possession of

quoad nos to an affirmation of the *priora quoad* even though the latter affirmation involves prescinding from the familiarity of images that correspond to the content of one's affirmation. Thus the meaning of the Nicene definition of consubstantiality was expressed by Athanasius: "All that is said of the Father is also to be said of the Son, except that the Son is Son, and not Father." See Bernard Lonergan, *The Way to Nicea: The Dialectical Development of Trinitarian Theology* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1976), p. 47. But this exercise of human intelligence was not mediated to itself by cognitional analysis. The Nicene definition issues from intelligence in act, but is not accompanied by a reflective account of what precisely one is doing when one is so using one's intelligence. The second and most proper meaning of intellectual conversion is the change in one's being brought about by cognitional analysis. Thus Lonergan in *Method in Theology* equates intellectual conversion with this explanatory self-understanding in the third stage of meaning. Intellectual conversion is a liberation from long-ingrained habits of thought and speech about one's knowledge, a liberation "that is to be had only when one knows precisely what one is doing when one is knowing." See pp. 238-240.

•• Explanatory understanding is not critical grounding but critical mediation. Moral and religious conversion are self-grounding, self-authenticating. Explanatory understanding of them would move beyond descriptive phenomenology to a formulation ba&ed on insights that fix terms and relations by one another: i.e. beyond the *priora quoad nos* to the *priora quoad se.*

themselves, i.e. the moral and religious subjectivity of interiorly differentiated consciousness in the third stage of meaning. [25]

The mediation of aesthetic subjectivity

In an attempt to grasp the immanent intelligibility of an explanatory mediation of aesthetic subjectivity, I suggest that we begin with an interpretation of Lonergan's writings and of what we are about in studying his work. Let us regard the thought of Lonergan as the mediation by meaning of our intentional immediacy. Lonergan provides us with at least one statement that encourages such an interpretation. "Besides the immediate world of the infant and the adult's world mediated by meaning, there is the mediation of immediacy by meaning when one objectifies cognitional process in transcendental method and when one discovers, identifies, accepts one's submerged feelings in psychotherapy." [26] Obviously the immediacy mediated by meaning in these two processes is not that of the infant, who lives exclusively in a world of immediacy, but that of the adult, of the subject who lives in a world mediated and constituted by meaning and motivated by

[25] The third stage of meaning is the epoch in the history of consciousness upon which we are called to enter in our time, an epoch in which meaning is controlled neither by practicality nor by theory but by a differentiation of consciousness that occurs through explanatory self-understanding on the part of human interiority. See Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, pp. 93-96. As intellectual conversion, so psychic conversion can have two meanings. The first is analogous to the intellectual conversion *in actu exercito* manifested in the Nicene treatment of consubstantiality. It is manifest in many religious and literary documents and in the lives of countless men and woman even in the first, common-sense stage of meaning. It corresponds to the first meaning of genuineness in Lonergan's treatment of this topic in *Insight* (see p. 475). The second and proper meaning, however, is the third-stage meaning I am giving to the term in this paper: the release of the capacity to disengage in explanatory fashion-with terms and relations fixing one another-the dynamic process of one's spontaneous symbolic sensitivity on the move. As such, it is dependent on intellectual conversion and *per consequens* on moral and religious conversion. See Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, p. 243, for a treatment of intellectual conversion as following upon religious and moral conversion.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 77.

value.[27] The immediacy that itself is mediated by meaning in transcendental method and in psychotherapy is an intentional immediacy to the human world, to a world mediated and constituted by meaning.

Transcendental method and psychotherapy are similar processes, then, in so far as they render known what previously was conscious but not objectified. In the one case this is the structure of intentional cognitional operations, in the other the energic compositions and distributions that are one's feelings.[28] Nonetheless, there is a significant difference between the two processes, for transcendental method aims at an explanatory self-understanding, where the terms and relations of intentional process fix one another. Psychotherapy is neither so thorough nor so explicitly explanatory in its objective. Nonetheless, as we shall see, it *does* provide us with a clue to our solution. Perhaps a heuristic structure of psychotherapies would point the way to a mediation of explanatory knowledge of the aesthetic and dramatic components of our being.[29] Basic to this heuristic structure would be a distinction between primordial immediacy and second immediacy.

Primordial immediacy is the experiential infrastructure of conscious human performance. It is the subject as dreaming, experiencing, inquiring, understanding, conceiving, formulating, reflecting, judging, deliberating, evaluating, deciding, acting. Its basic structure has been disengaged by Lonergan's intentionality analysis. Second immediacy is the mediated recovery of primordial immediacy through explanatory self-appropriation, through transcendental or generalized empirical method, which, strictly speaking, mediates not only cognitional process but the

[27] See Lonergan, " Dimensions of Meaning," in *Collections: Papers by Bernard Lonergan*, edited by Frederick E. Crowe (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), pp. 252-255.

[28] On feelings as intentional, see Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, pp. 30-33.

[29] On the need for a heuristic structure of psychotherapies, see Bernard Tyrrell, " ' Dynamics of Christotherapy ' and the Issue of a *De Jure* Psychotherapeutic Pluralism" in *Lonergan Workshop II.*

process and structure of intentionality as a whole. But because of the origin of the fourth level of intentional consciousness in the affective apprehension of values by feelings, explanatory self-appropriation of existential consciousness will be dependent upon an explanatory mediation of a:ffectivity, of authentic subjectivity, of dramatic artistry. And because the levels of cognitional consciousness are continuous, not only in an upward moving direction with existential consciousness, but also in a downward moving direction with dreaming consciousness, it seems reasonable to propose that the dream's significance reaches up to existential subjectivity, indeed that it might be the key to the knowledge not only of existential consciousness but to the aesthetic and dramatic dimension that permeates the single thrust of intentional consciousness to intelligibility, truth, reality, and value.[30]

The negotiation of one's dreams may begin in a psychotherapeutic context, but their finality and ultimate significance must be extended beyond the narrow confines of ordinary psychotherapy and into the context provided by the third stage of

•• This proposal is obviously not without its difficulties. First, two leading proponents of a hermeneutic of dreams, Freud and Jung, are dialectically opposed to one another as far as their interpretative principles are concerned. Furthermore, I will disagree with both Freud and Jung. Secondly, a leading philosophical investigator of Freud, Paul Ricoeur, has relegated dreams to the lowest level of symbols, the level of sedimented symbolism with nothing but a past. See Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation,* translated by Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale, 1970, pp. 504-506). Thirdly, many psychologists have turned from the depth therapy that works with dreams to the height therapies that concentrate on conscious but unobjectified cognitional and existential orientations. Nonetheless, Bernard Tyrrell, an advocate of the height-therapy approach, has indicated that my position emphasizing depth approaches and his concentration on height therapies are complementary. See his paper referred to in the previous footnote. While I concur with Tyrrell's judgment, I also admit that, before the dream can function as central to an explanatory mediation of affectivity, and so of existential subjectivity, its function in the infrastructure of primordial immediacy will have to be both clarified and vindicated. Several of my own papers are contributions to this task, most notably "Dramatic Artistry in the Third Stage of Meaning." Because of the complexity of the issue, I can do no more here than refer the reader to this paper and to my book, *Subject and Psyche: Ricoeur, Jung, and the Search for Foundations* (Washington: University Press of America, 1977).

meaning, whose base is transcendental method as articulated by Lonergan. Then it will be acknowledged that the same dreams that provide some forms of psychotherapy with a principal .source of data on the client are in fact dramatic ciphers in a symbolic mode of the emergence or failure of emergence of authentic intentionality. [31] From the standpoint of my position on psychic conversion, the negotiation of dreams is basically the mediation of the drama that permeates the struggle between the dynamism for self-transcendence and the inertial counterweight of self-absorption, and particularly as this drama affects our sensitive consciousness. Dreams provide materials for one's work of dramatic artistry, images for insight, reflection, and decision in the forging of a work of dramatic art. They provide access to the plots and themes [32] that are operative in both one's cognitional structuring and one's decisive shaping of the world. They provide to consciousness an accessibility to the sometimes otherwise mute intentionality of the subject. They interpret the subject in his or her dispositional immediacy to the world mediated by meaning, his or her affective and so real self-transcendence. [33]

Jung calls the capacity of waking consciousness to negotiate the imaginal configurations of dreams the transcendent function.34 Transposing Jung's insight into the framework of a gen-

[81] I have argued this rather major claim in the last-mentioned paper and book. To verify and affirm the claim for oneself, however, one must be thoroughly familiar with the dimensions of one's subjectivity which Lonergan has disclosed. My statement of the function of dreams departs somewhat from that presented by Lonergan in *Insight,* pp. 194-196, though it is consonant with his few remarks on dreams in *Method in Theology.* In a public dialogue session at the 1977 Boston College Workshop, Lonergan indicated agreement with my restatement of the position of *Insight* on the dream.

[82] On the distinction of plots and themes, see Joseph Flanagan, "Aesthetic Conversion," in *Lonergan Workshop II.*

[83] On dispositional immediacy as distinct from but interlocked with cognitional immediacy, see Robert Doran, *Subject and Psyche,* Chapter Two.

•• C. G. Jung, "The Transcendent Function," in *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung, Vol. 8: The Structure and Dynamics ·of the Psyche,* translated by R. F. C. Hull (Princeton: Princeton University Press, Bollingen Series XX, 1969), pp. 67-91.

eralized empirical method as proposed by Lonergan, we might say that, when the transcendent function becomes habitual, it enables the existential subject to receive, interpret, affirm, evaluate, and negotiate symbolic materials for the drama of one's emergence as an authentic subject. I regard the transcendent function so understood to be conditioned by psychic conversion.

The function of psychic conversion within generalized empirical method may be understood, then, in terms of the relations of sublation that obtain among the various levels of consciousness. Lonergan has spoken of the sublation of the sensitive stream by understanding, of sensitivity and understanding by reasonable judgment, and of experience, understanding, and judgment by existential .subjectivity. The operators of these successive sublations are, respectively, questions for intelligence, questions for reflection, and questions for deliberation. But prior to waking experience, there is dreaming consciousness. It is in the dream that we first become conscious. And so in addition to the sublations specified by Lonergan, there is the sublation of the dream by waking consciousness through memory, and then by understanding, judgment, and decision. The dream is a set of symbols arranged in a dramatic .sequence, whose meaning can be read by interpretative understanding and reasonable judgment, and in whose regard decisive action can be taken by the existential subject. Dream symbols are operators effecting the internal communication of organism, psyche, and mind. The ground theme of the internal communication is set by the concerns of the dramatic artist to make a work of art out of his or her life, by the inescapable task of the existential subject as free and responsible constitutive agent of the human world. This ground theme is the basic a priori of human consciousness. It is this theme that promotes human experience to understanding by means of questions for intelligence, and understanding to truth by means of questions for reflection. So too this basic a priori promotes knowledge into action, but in a thetic and constitutive manner, through questions for deliberation. The data for these questions are appre-

hended in feelings; the feelings are linked with symbols; and the symbols that tell the story of the dramatic base of our existential performance are unlocked in our dreams. This narrative can be understood, the understanding can be affirmed as correct, and the self-knowledge thus gained can be employed in the ongoing constitution of one's world and concomitantly of oneself. Such is the basic scheme of the contribution of psychic conversion to our development. The ultimate intentionality of psychic conversion is thus coextensive with the total sweep of conscious intentionality. Through psychic conversion, the psyche is conscripted into the single transcendental dynamism of human consciousness toward the authenticity of self-transcendence.

It may be, too, that psychic conversion throws special light on the first of the transcendental precepts that Lonergan links with the levels of consciousness: Be attentive. Psychic conversion allows us to speak of attentiveness as contemplation, letting-be, listening, responsivity, active receptivity. With the release of the transcendent function, dream interpretation consists in the attentive reception of dreams as already interpretative of the subject in his or her dramatic artistry; in insight into what is thus received; in the reflective judgment that the insight is correct; and in the responsible negotiation of this self-knowledge in the thetic projects of the existential subject.

The unconscious and the dream

The psyche of the dreaming subject frequently is called the unconscious. More properly, though, it is better conceived as the beginning of consciousness. What is unconscious is all energy in the universe that is not present to itself. Energic compositions and distributions at the neural level are elevated to consciousness in the systematization and representation granted them by the dream. At this point energy becomes psychic energy. It is informed not just physically, chemically, and botanically, but psychologically. The underlying neural manifold so integrates its own physical and chemical aggregates

as to promote its elevation to the higher integration of the dream. The dream thus discloses in sensitive consciousness a complex of underlying physiological transformations. It integrates these transformations by granting them psychic representation in the form of elemental symbols. These symbols then can find their own higher integration as they are sublated into waking consciousness through memory, into intelligent consciousness by insight, into truthful consciousness by reflective understanding of the adequacy of one's insight, and into responsible consciousness by decisions which in turn will operate further transformations of the underlying sensitive manifold. Dream .symbols thus provide materials for one's work of dramatic art.

Our understanding of psychic energy is still quite rudimentary. We know that there are different kinds of dreams or, better, different kinds of symbols that integrate underlying physiological transformations. We can list at least seven ideal types. The :first have to do with dreams of the night, the other six with dreams of the morning.[35]

Dreams of the night will not concern us here, for the reasons that they involve merely a psychic integration of physiological processes, are very seldom subject to recall, and are usually devoid of existential or dramatic significance. Dreams of the morning, however, have to do with the materials presented to one's dramatic pattern of experience for the .shaping of a work of living artistry. The :figures and themes of these dreams may take six distinct forms. Two of these are personal, one archetypal, one anagogic, one prophetic, and one synchronistic.

Personal dreams of the morning may be either primarily symbolic or almost entirely literal in their meaning. What qualifies

[35] On the distinction of dreams of the night and dreams of the morning, see Bernard Lonergan, " Dimensions of Meaning," p. 263. The distinction is, I believe, not so much temporal as existential. Dreams of the night are occasioned by somatic disturbance. In dreams of the morning, " the existential subject, not yet awake and himself, still is already busy with the project that shapes both him himself and his world " *(Ibid.)* . Lonergan here draws from Ludwig Binswanger and Rollo May.

them as personal is that the figures in these dreams are taken from the acquaintances of one's own dramatic existence, and that the themes relate directly to this existence. But in some instances the figures and places are symbolic of complexes or undercurrents in one's own psychological interiority and in other instances they mean the actual personages and locations they represent. Moreover, the dream does not attempt to read the events in one's existential living against a background of more universal significance. Thus, in a fundamentally literal personal dream, one meets one's boss, with whom in waking life one has an unspoken .strained relationship. In the dream one bites the bullet and begins to assert oneself and one's own intentions in a more forthright manner. The dream is quite direct. Nor is it in all likelihood a matter of Freudian wish-fulfillment, but is better interpreted as an indication of a real existential possibility, desirability, necessity. A bit more symbolically, a graduate student struggling through a make-it-or break-it course from an extremely demanding teacher dreams of being pursued, hunted, by the professor, who is intent on killing or decisively wounding him. More symbolically still, a man is about to cross a bridge .suspended over a dangerous chasm, but just before he sets foot on the bridge it collapses into the ravine below. It is not time to attempt a transition, to "cross the great water." [36]

Dreams become archetypal to the extent that the symbolic figures that constitute them, whether they be taken from one's personal waking life or are strangers, assume a more universal and usually mysterious significance permeated with deeply resonant emotion. The themes of archetypal dreams are taken from the more or less universal mythical reflections of human possibility embodied in the traditional lore of many widely divergent nations and cultures. Certain symbols lend them-

•• This is an expression that frequently appears in the Chinese book of oracles, *I Ching* or *Book of Changes.* On the *I Ching* and Christian discernment of spirits, see Vernon Gregson, "Chinese Wisdom and Ignatian Discernment," *Review for Religious,* Vol. 88, no. 4, July, 1974, pp. 828-885.

selves easily to archetypal significance and interpretation: water, fire, maternal symbols, animals. But these symbols, as in personal symbolic dreams, are imitative analogues of the natural figures they represent. A maternal symbol means, not one's personal mother, but the life-giving or destructive powers of nature. And the symbol is set into a context in which it participates in a story that is clearly mythical in its significance. In such dreams, the process of one's existential living is interpreted against the backdrop of more or less universal human themes of development and decline.

Anagogic dreams differ from archetypal dreams in that the context in which they set the symbols they employ is an ultimate context of human redemption or loss. Anagogic symbols may be taken from nature but their meaning is super-natural. Thus a Christian mystic may dream on the night between Holy Thursday and Good Friday of a conflict that represents the drama of human salvation being remembered and celebrated by his church community at this time. The meaning of anagogic dreams is even more ineffable than that of archetypal dreams. Contemplation of the ultimate mystery alone begins to be an appropriate existential response, for such dreams are most likely to be interpreted as originating more or less directly from the realm of absolute transcendence. While a correct philosophical theology will regard God as the first agent in every event, and thus also in every dream, there are some dreams in which the process of universal instrumentality [37] engages the individual subject directly as a principal actor in world constitution or discloses to him immediately an ultimate context of love and awe.[38]

[87] On universal instrumentality, see Bernard Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas,* edited by J. Patout Burns (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), pp. 80-84.

[88] The distinction of archetypal and anagogic meaning is Northrop Frye's, and appears in *The Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 116-138. I have drawn on it in an effort to provide a needed differentiation of symbols beyond that arrived at by Jung. For Jung, the self is " a borderline concept, expressing a reality to which no limits can be set." C. G. Jung, *Collected Works, Vol. 1!2: Psychology and Alchemy.* (Prince-

Prophetic dreams may be either literal or symbolic, and the symbolism may be personal, archetypal, or anagogic. What these dreams do is actually foretell an event that will occur in the external drama of human life. Synchronistic dreams, which also may be either literal or symbolic, reflect an external event that is occurring at the same time it is being dreamt. In either prophetic or synchronistic dreams, there is not so much a challenge to a decision as the reporting of a fact.

As indicated above, our scientific understanding of the energic processes that are integrated in these different varieties of dreams is extraordinarily incomplete. Obviously what is occurring is that unconscious neural-physiological process is finding a higher integration in psychic representation. It is entering into consciousness, and will find yet higher forms of conscious integration to the extent the dream is remembered, understood correctly, and responded to in attitude or, as the case may be, decision. But, despite our relatively inchoate understanding of psychic energy, it is possible to indicate heuristically the method that must be employed in studying it. The method is genetic, for the basic heuristic assumption is development. A study of development demands an appreciation of the upwardly but indeterminately directed dynamism of the world of possible experience, understanding, and judgment. Such dynamism is finality as a present fact heading for fuller being, more specifically differentiated perfection. Finality is unconsciously operative in neural process, but is elevated to consciousness in the dream and is conscripted into the conscious intention of a living work of art by the psychically converted subject genuinely engaged in the dramatic pattern of experience.[89]

ton: Princeton University Press, Bollingen Series XX, 1970, p. 855). Such a notion is inflationary. Anagogic ciphers of absolute transcendence are images of God's action or call, not properly speaking of the self.

[89] The notions of finality, development, genetic method, and genuineness are explained in Bernard Lonergan, *Insight,* Chapter 15. I have related them more amply to psychic energy in " Dramatic Artistry in the Third Stage of Meaning."

The transcendental imagination

There are many correspondences between the imaginal configurations mediated through psychic conversion and the Kantian-Heideggerian transcendental imagination.[40] But the latter is transposed out of the formalism of German philosophy and into the context of a maieutic of concrete subjectivity. For Heidegger, the transcendental imagination institutes primordial time, not only as the form of inner sense, but as the very constitution of the immediacy of understanding and mood that is *Dasein.* But the time-structure of imagination, and thus of our concern for the world, is fragile and disproportionate. Thus existential psychiatry would regard neurosis as the victory of a temporal disproportion. Anxiety weights the disproportion in favor of the future, guilt in favor of the past. In either case, the spontaneity of the subject is paralyzed. At the extremes of either disproportion, the subject utters the " I am nothing" of depression or the " I am everything" of inflationary schizophrenia, and not the "I am this" of self-possession. The recovery of the primordial time-structure of one's immediacy is thus therapeutic. It involves a progressive and cumulative reconciliation of the duality of human subjectivity.

The opposites are, I believe, best formulated by Lonergan, for whom there is a tension in all development between limitation and transcendence.[41] In human development, this tension is conscious. It is a tension between the .self as one is and the self as one is to be. It is appropriately negotiated by correct apprehensions of the starting-point, the term, and the process between them at any stage of one's development, so that there is a correspondence between the facts of one's development and one's apprehension of these facts. Coincident respectively with limitation and transcendence, one may, at least descriptively, list past and future, body and intentionality, matter and spirit,

••For Heidegger's retrieval-some would say mauling-<>f the transcendental imagination from Kant's first critique, see Martin Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1951).

" See Bernard Lonergan, *Insight,* pp. 472-475.

instinct and archetype, potentiality and project, origin and outcome, the unconscious and consciousness. The psyche is essential to the establishment of the reconciliation of these related dualities.[42] It functions by releasing images that integrate underlying biological manifolds but that are also the materials for insight, reflection, and decision in the forging of a work of dramatic art. The images reflect in a personal, archetypal, or anagogic fashion the present economy of the duality of the subject. The reconciliation of the duality, however, is not to be conceived of as a removal. The opposition is ineluctable.[43] But it is destructive of dramatic artistry only when it is displaced by bias and consequent misunderstanding. As Paul Ricoeur insists in *Fallible Man*[44] and Lonergan in his treatment of genuineness,[45] the disproportion is ontological, not psychological. It is the disproportion of infinitude and finitude in the human subject.

The discovery and cultivation of the psychic mediator of limitation and transcendence may begin in psychotherapy, but because its fruition is in the dramatic stage of life, the process of a differentiated psychic self-transparency is better understood as a matter of aesthetics than of psychotherapy. If values are apprehended in feelings, aesthetic subjectivity lies at the basis of existential subjectivity, or morals and religion. Loner-

••See C. G. Jung, "On the Nature of the Psyche," *Collected Works, Vol.* 8: *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche,* pp. The mediatory role of the psyche is located heuristically by Lonergan, for whom human development is a matter of the appropriate interlocking of organic, psychic, and intellectual development. "In the organism both the underlying manifold and the higher system are unconscious. In intellectual development both the underlying manifold of sensible presentations and the higher system of insights and formulations are conscious. In psychic development the underlying neural manifold is unconscious and the supervening higher system is conscious. . . . Organic, psychic, and intellectual development [in the human subject] are not three independent processes. They are interlocked with the intellectual providing a higher integration of the psychic and the psychic providing a higher integration of the organic." Bernard Lonergan, *Insight,* pp. 467, 469-470.

[48] *Ibid.,* p. 474.

"Paul Ricoeur, *Fallible Man,* translated by Charles Kelbley (Chicago: Regnery).

·G Bernard Lonergan, *Insight,* pp. 475-478.

gan's opening of generalized empirical method upon a fourth, existential level of consciousness concerned not with intelligibility or truth but with value is also an opening of method onto aesthetic consciousness. Ethics is radically aesthetics, and the existential subject for whom the issue is one of personal character is at base the aesthetic subject, the dramatic artist.

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AQUINAS'S ROUTE TO THE REAL DISTINCTION: A Note on *De ente et essentia*

THIS BRIEF CHAPTER from one of Aquinas's earliest works has occasioned much disagreement on the part 0£ commentators not only with respect to the validity 0£ the argumentation found therein, but also with respect to Thomas's purpose in penning the same. Thus it is often contended that in this chapter he offers an argument based on one's understanding 0£ essence *(intellectus essentiae* argument) in support of real distinction or real composition 0£ essence and existence in creatures. [1] Not only is the validity of this argumentation contested by many, but some maintain that it was not even intended by its author to establish such real distinction or composition. [2] In a subsequent phase of what appears, at least at first sight, to be continued argumentation for this same distinction and composition, reference is made to the impossibility of there being more than one being in which essence and existence are identical. Surprisingly, the importance of this part of Thomas's argumentation is passed over lightly or even ignored by many commentators.

[1] For discussion of this argument see C. Fabro, *La nozione metafisica di partecipazione,* 2nd ed. (Turin, 1950), pp. 218-219; U. degl'lnnocenti, "La distinzione reale nel 'De ente et essentia ' di S. Tommaso," *Doctor Communis* 10 (1957), pp. 165-73; L. Sweeney, "Existence/Essence in Thomas Aquinas's Early Writings," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 37 (1963), pp. 105-109 (Sweeney lists passages from other early works where the *intellectus essentiae* approach is also found); J. Bobik, *Aquinas on Being and Essence* (Notre Dame, Ind., 1965), pp. 162-170; J. Owens, "Quiddity and Real Distinction in St. Thomas," *Mediaeval Studies* 27 (1965), pp. 1-22 (seen. 2 of Owens's study for further references); A. Maurer, *Thomas Aquinas. On Being and Essence* (Toronto, 1968), pp. 21 ff.

[2] See Maurer, *op. cit.,* pp. 22-23; Owens, *op. cit.,* pp. 12-14. As Owens also indicates in note 2, A. Forest denies that this argument leads to real distinction of essence and existence. See his *La structure metaphysique du concret selon saint Thomas d'Aquin,* 2nd ed. (Paris, 1956), pp. 148-49.

Immediately thereafter Thomas offers what seems to be a philosophical argument for God's existence. One might wonder whether or not this argument of itself pre.supposes real distinction and / or composition of essence and existence as its point of departure. It could hardly do so, of course, for those who deny that it was Thomas's intention to establish such distinction and / or composition in the preceding sentences. According to one interpretation it is only after having established God's existence by means of this argument that Thomas is in a position to conclude to real distinction of essence and existence in creatures.[3] According to another view, what appears to be an argument for God's existence is really not intended by Thomas to serve as such after all.[4] Given these varied interpretations of one and the same text, therefore, further clarification seems to be desirable with respect to Thomas's intent in writing this chapter. Hopefully, the following remarks will contribute in some way to this.

For the sake of context, it will be recalled that Thomas begins this chapter by announcing as his purpose an examination of essence as it is found in separate substances, that is, in the soul, in intelligences, and in the First Cause.[5] While all acknowledge the simplicity of the First Cause, he continues, some endeavor to introduce composition of form and matter into intelligences and into the soul. He suggests that Avicebron (Ibn Gabirol) is responsible for this theory in his *Fons vitae.* Thomas then observes that this view, that separate substances are composed of matter and form, is generally rejected by the philosophers. Thomas apparently agrees with them in holding

•See Owens, pp. 15-19. Note his remark on p. 19: "The foregoing considerations make clear that the real distinction between essence and existence cannot be known prior to the demonstration of the existence of God."

• E. Gilson, "La preuve du De entc et essentia," *Acta Ill Congressus Thomistici fnternational,is: Doctor Communis* 8 (Turin, 1950), pp. 257-60; "Trois le<;ons sur le probleme de l'existence de Dieu," *Divinitas 5* (1961), pp. 26-28.

[6] "Nunc restat videre per quern modum sit esscntia in substantiis separatis, scilicet in anima et in intelligentia et in causa prima." *Le "De ente et essentia" des. Thomas d'Aquin,* ed. M. D. Roland-Gosselin, repr. (Paris, 1948), pp. 29.82-80.1). All citations will be from this edition.

that the strongest argument against admission of such composition in separate substances rests upon the fact that they are equipped with the ability to understand. After developing this point in some detail he concludes that there is no matter-form composition in the soul or in intelligences. But there is, he immediately adds, composition of form and existence *(esse).* In fact, he cites the *Liber de causis* in his support. [6]

Thomas then argues for the plausibility of this view, that intelligences are composed of form (essence) and existence, by noting that it is form that gives existence to matter, not vice versa. Therefore, while it is impossible for one to find matter without some form, it is not impossible for there to be some form without matter. In a separated substance, therefore, the essence or quiddity will be identical with the form itself, while in a composite substance the essence includes both form and matter. [7]

After isolating two further differences that will obtain between the essences of simple substances and those of composites, Thomas suggests that while simple substances are forms alone without matter, their simplicity is not so great as to free them from all potentiality and thus render them pure act. [8] The importance of this text should be emphasized because in it Thomas indicates his purpose in introducing the subsequent argumentation, that is, to show that substances whose essences are not composed of matter and form are not so simple as to be identical with Pure Act. It seems, therefore, that he is going to have to establish the presence of some kind of mixture of act and potency, some kind of composition in such entities, if

[6] *Op. cit.,* pp. 30.1-32.6. For Thornas's reference to the *De causis* see p. 82.2-6: " Sed est ibi cornposicio forrne et esse; unde in cornrnento none propositionis libri *De causfa* dicitur quod intelligentia est habens forrnarn et esse; et accipitur ibi forrna pro ipsa quiditate vel natura sirnplici." For the text from the *De causis* see the edition by A. Pattin, published by the *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie,* p. 69: " Et intelligentia est habens *yliathim* quoniarn est esse et forrna . . .".

[7] *Op. cit.,* pp. 32.7-33.18.

[8] " Huiusrnodi autern substantie, quamvis sint forrne tantum sine materia, non tarnen in eis est ornnirnoda sirnplicitas naturae ut sint actus purus, set habent permixtionern potencie, et hoc sic patet " (p. 34.4-7).

he is to maintain his thesis. Since he then immediately introduces what appears to be argumentation for distinction ("otherness") of essence and existence, the distinction and composition for which he is about to argue must be sufficient, in his eyes, to eliminate total simplicity from such entities. In short, if the non-simplicity he is about to defend in such entities is not purely logical or conceptual but obtains in some way in the order of reality, it would seem that the distinction and composition of essence and existence that he proposes therein should also be more than logical or conceptual. Merely logical or conceptual composition of such entities will hardly be sufficient for him to support his claim, that such entities are not in fact pure actualities. It would seem, then, that it was his intention in the subsequent argumentation to establish some kind of real distinction and composition of essence and existence in separate substances. Acknowledgement of this point does not, however, necessarily show that the first argument or the first phase of his argumentation results or was even intended to result in such real composition and distinction.9

Here, then, Thomas introduces the first phase of that argumentation, the well known *intellectus essentiae* approach. Whatever is not included in the notion of an essence or quiddity comes to it from without and enters into composition with it. But every essence or quiddity can be understood without anything being understood with respect to its existence *(esse).* Therefore, existence is distinct from essence unless, he adds, there is something whose quiddity is its existence.[10] Here it seems that the first phase of the argumentation ends.

• Fabro distinguishes three arguments in the text that follows and suggests that the first (the *intellectus essentiae* argument) is logical in nature, while the other two are metaphysical. As he divides the text the second argument is based on the impossibility of there being more than one *ipsum esse subsistens,* while the third reasons from the fact that the *esse* of the creature is extrinsically caused and ends by applying the Aristotelian act-potency couplet to the relationship between essence and *esse.* See his *La nozione metafisica ...* , pp. 218-220. One might regard these as three arguments or perhaps more accurately as three phases of one continuous argumentation.

[10] "Quicquid enim non est de intellectu essentie vel quiditatis hoc est adveniens

In support of the major, the contention that whatever is not included in the notion of an essence or quiddity comes to it from without and enters into composition with it, Thomas observes that no essence can be understood without those things which are parts of the essence.[11] And in support of the minor, that an essence or quiddity can be understood without its existence also being understood, Thomas appeals to two examples. One can understand what a man is, or what a phoenix is, without knowing whether it exists in reality.[12]

extra et faciens compositionem cum essentia ... Omnis autem essentia vel quiditas potest intelligi sine hoc quod aliquid intelligatur de esse suo ... Ergo patet quod esse est aliud ab essentia vel quiditate. Nisi forte sit aliqua res cuius quiditas sit ipsum suum esse" *(op. cit.,* 34.7-16).

[11] "... quia nulla essentia sine hiis que sunt partes essentie intelligi potest" (p. 34.9-10).

[12] "... possum enim intelligere quid est homo vel fenix et tamen ignorare an esse habeat in rerum natura" (p. 34.12-14). For interesting discussions of the proper translation of *ignorare* in the text just cited see R. Masiello, "A Note on Essence and Existence," *The New Scholasticism* 45 (1971), pp. 491-94 and J. Owens, "'Ignorare' and Existence," *The New Scholasticism* 46 (1972), pp. 210-19. Masiello contends that the text cited in n. 11 above should be rendered: "I can know what a man is or a phoenix, and yet I can ignore (i.e., leave out of consideration) whether they have existence in the nature of things" (p. 491). Owens argues in part from parallel passages in Thomas's *Commentary on the Sentences* and concludes that the more common meaning of *ignorare* should be retained for this passage: "I can know what a man is or a phoenix, and yet not know whether he has being in reality" (p. 214). He finds this translation more consistent with the logic of the paragraph (pp. 215-16). As to possible sources for Thomas's argumentation here, Avicenna's general influence on the *De ente* and on this chapter has been highlighted by others (see for instance, Roland-Gosselin, *op. cit.,* p. 187; A. Forest, *op. cit.,* 148 ff.; F. Van Steenberghen, "Le probleme de l'existence de Dieu dans le 'De ente et essentia' de saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Melanges Joseph De Ghellinck,* S. J. (Gembloux, 1951), pp. 837-847). William of Auvergne's influence as a source for Thomas in writing this particular chapter and even this particular argument has also been stressed. See Roland-Gosselin, p. 187; Van Steenberghen, *op. cit.,* p. 840; and Maurer, *op. cit.,* pp. 23-24. For another likely source wherein both man and phoenix appear as examples, see the following from Algazel: "Similiter, cum intelligis, quid est homo, non est necesse te intelligere eum esse vel esse album. Nee tamen pates eum intelligere, nisi intelligas quad est animal; quamvis non satisfaciat tuo intellectui hoc exemplum, eo quod tu es homo et omnes alii qui nunc sunt. Pone ergo aliud exemplum-sicut de phoenice vel de aliquo alio extraneo---d ibi manifestabitur tibi, quia esse accidentale est omnibus quae sunt. Animal vero essentiale est homini, similiter color nigredini et numerus

It would seem that the term " understand " is being taken here to signify fairly comprehensive knowledge, the kind that is sufficient for one to grasp a thing's essence and, therefore, its essential parts. One might wonder whether Thomas would in other contexts concede such knowledge to us either with respect to the essences of separate substances or with respect to those of sensible substances. He has here just stated, it will be recalled, that every (*omnis)* essence or quiddity can be understood without its existence also being understood. In other contexts dating more or less from this same period in his career, Thomas greatly restricts man's capacity to arrive at knowledge of the essences of immaterial substances. [13] Perhaps this is why he here turns to sensible substances, one fictitious (phoenix) and one real (man), in offering evidence for his minor. But even in the case of sensible substances Thomas is reluctant to admit that one can arrive at knowledge of them that penetrates to their specific differences. Hence, one might still wonder whether, in his view, merely generic knowledge of .such a corporeal essence is sufficient to show that one can understand its essence without also being aware of its existence. Owens has connected Thomas's procedure in the present argument with his earlier discussion in the same *De ente* of the possibility that one may consider an essence or nature absolutely or in itself, without taking into account either

quaternario." " *Logica Algazelis,* Introduction and Critical Text," ed. by Ch. Lohr in *Traditio* 21 (1965), p. 247: 26-33. For another citation of the phoenix example, see Thomas, *In II Sent.,* d. 3, q. 1, art. 1, ed. Mandonnet (Paris, 1929), V. 2, p. 87: "Quaedam enim natura est de cujus intellectu non est suum esse, quod patet ex hoc quod intelligi potest esse cum hoc quod ignoretur an sit, sicut phaenicem, vel eclipsim, vel aliquid hujusmodi."

[13] See, for instance, his *Expositio super Librum Boethii de Trinitate,* ed. B. Decker (Leiden, 1959), Q. 6, art. 3, especially pp. 221: 7-10 and 222: 21-223: 5, and dating, according to J. Weisheipl, from 1258-1259. He dates the *De ente* before *1256.* See his *Friar Thomas d'Aquino. His Life, Thought and Work* (Garden City, New York, 1974), pp. 381 and 136-37; pp. 386 and 79. Not only does Thomas here deny that one can arrive at direct insight into the essence of God or of other separate substances, he also eliminates the possibility of one's attaining to some positive but obscure knowledge of their essences by knowing them in terms of their genus and accidents.

its existence in an individual thing or its existence in the mind. In light of this Owens concludes that " merely generic knowledge of a thing as a body, therefore, amply suffices to show that the quidditative content of anything corporeal does not include existence." [14]

To return to Thomas's argument, then, let it be granted that one can have such generic knowledge of a corporeal essence without being aware that it exists. Thomas has argued that whatever is not included in one's understanding of an essence or quiddity comes to it from without and enters into composition with it. He now concludes that existence is other than essence or quiddity .[15] If this " otherness " or distinction of

[14] For Owens see his " Quiddity and Real Distinction . . .," pp. 8-4; 6-7; and p. 7 for the citation in our text. For Thomas see the *De ente,* c. 8, pp. 28-29, and especially pp. 24: 1-26: 10. Note the following: "Ergo patet quod natura hominis absolute considerata abstrahit a quolibet esse, ita tamen quod non fiat precisio alicuius eorum" (p. 26: 8-10). For another interesting treatment of three ways in which nature (or essence) may be considered see Thomas's Quodlibet 8, q. 1 art. I. There Thomas explicitly acknowledges his debt to Avicenna for this distinction: "Dicendum, quod, secundum Avicennam in sua *Metaphysica,* triplex est alicuius naturae consideratio. Una, prout consideratur secundum esse quod habet in singularibus; sicut natura lapidis in hoc lapide et in illo lapide. Alia vero est consideratio alicuius naturae secundum esse suum intelligibile; sicut natura lapidis consideratur prout est in intellectu. Tertia vero est consideratio naturae absoluta, prout abstrahit ab utroque esse; secundum quam considerationem consideratur natura lapidis, vel cuiuscumque alterius, quantum ad ea tantum quae per se competunt tali naturae." *Quaestiones quodlibetales,* ed. R. Spiazzi (Marietti: Rome-Turin, 1956), p. 158. This work also dates from Thomas's first Parisian period, that is, Christmas, *1257.* See Weisheipl, *op. cit.,* p. 867. One might wonder whether this Avicennian view of the three ways in which nature may be considered continued to be so central to the later Thomas, but that issue cannot be pursued here. For more on the Avicennian background see Owens, "Common Nature: A Point of Comparison Between Thomistic and Scotistic Metaphysic.s," *Mediaevtil Studies* 19 (1957), pp. 1-4. For two very different ways in which this Avicennian doctrine was interpreted and applied by Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines, see my " Godfrey of Fontaines and Henry of Ghent's Theory of Intentional Distinction between Essence and Existence," *Sapientiae procerum amore. Melanges Medievistes ofjerts a Dom Jean-Pierre Mi.iller 0. S. B. a l'occasion de s.on 7(fome anniversaire. Studia Ansdmiana* 68 (Rome, 1974), pp. 298-800; 804-06. On the difficulty of one's arriving at knowledge of essential differences in sensible entities (and in spiritual substances), see *De ente,* c. *5,* p. 40: 8-18. For the editor's listing of other texts wherein Thomas acknowledges this same difficulty with respect to knowledge of sensible substances see *op. cit.,* n. 2.

[15] See the text cited above in n.10.

essence and existence is indeed real in Thomas's eyes, it would seem that he could immediately conclude that existence comes to essence from without and enters into composition with it. Interestingly enough, however, he will appeal to the point that existence comes from without only when introducing what we shall regard as the third phase of his argumentation, that is, the (apparent) proof for God's existence.[16] And only after completing that proof will he conclude to the act-potency structure or composition of essence and existence in such caused beings, and hence of the intelligences.[17] Here, however, he limits himself to the conclusion that essence and existence are other or distinct in such entities.

J\1oreover, if one were to extract Thomas's argumentation from the following context, one might wonder whether it has in fact established real otherness or real distinction of essence and existence in such entities. One might counter that it shows only that it is different for one to recognize something as possible (to know what it is) and to recognize it as actual (to know that it exists). Granted that this entails two different intellectual operations, often referred to as simple apprehension and judgment, does it establish the reality of two really and ontologically distinct principles in such a being, an essence principle on the one hand, and an existence principle *(esse)* on the other, which latter would be required to account for the fact that the entity in question does exist and therefore can be so recognized? One might rather contend that it only establishes logical or conceptual distinction, the distinction between that which is grasped by one's concept of what something is, and one's judgment of it as actually existing.[18] But perhaps

[16] *Op. cit.*, p. 35.3-11.

[17] *Op. cit.*, p. 35.19-36.3.

[18] For this see Maurer, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23; Owens, "Quiddity and Real Distinction ---;" pp. 10-14. See in particular his remark on p. 12: "Just in itself, consequently, the inspection of the thing's quidditative content shows only a conceptual distinction between the thing and its being." There Owens also stresses the point that this argument from inspection of a thing's quiddity is "but a stage in a larger demonstration. It is the initial step toward proving the existence of the first efficient cause, subsistent being" (p. 17). While agreeing with him in

the difficulty lies in assuming that Thomas ever intended this argument to stand alone. Perhaps this is why he immediately conjoins to it a second argument or, as we prefer to regard it, a second phase in his argumentation.

To return to his text once more, then, Thomas has concluded that essence is not to be identified with existence unless, perhaps, there is some entity whose quiddity is its very existence *(esse).* He immediately attempts to show that there can be at most one such being, whose quiddity is its existence *(esse).* So far he has not assumed that such a being does, in fact, exist. His contention is rather that if there is such a being, it must be unique. In every other being, therefore, essence and existence are not to be identified.[19] Presumably, this conclusion will obtain, in Thomas's view, whether or not this one possible and unique exception does exist. It should also be noted that Thomas does not restrict this contention to corporeal entities or to separate entities, but applies it to every being with this one possible exception.

In order to show that there can, at most, be one being in which essence and existence are identical, Thomas now suggests that there are three different ways in which something can be multiplied: 1) by the addition of some difference, as a generic nature is multiplied in species; 2) or by reason of the fact that the same kind of form is received in different instances of matter, as when a specific nature is multiplied in different individuals; 3) or else in that one thing exists in separation but another instance of the same is received in something else. If,

the main on both of these points, my interpretation will suggest that the *intellectus essentiae* argument is but the initial step in a larger demonstration that leads to real otherness and distinction of essence and existence (phase two) and then only to the existence of the first efficient cause (phase three) . Owens rather makes the argument for God's existence a necessary step for concluding to real distinction or otherness of essence and existence (see the text cited in my note 3 above, and see below).

[19] *Op. cit.,* p. 34.15-32. Note in particular: "Nisi forte sit aliqua res cuius quiditas sit ipsum suum esse. Et haec res non potest esse nisi una et prima . . ." (15-16) ". . . Uncle oportet quod in qualibet alia re preter earn aliud sit esse suum et aliud quiditas vel natura seu forma sua " (30-32) .

for example, there were a separated heat, it would thereby be distinguished from non-separate or received instances of heat. [20]

But if it be maintained that there is a thing which is *esse* or existence alone so that existence itself is subsistent, continues Thomas, then no difference can be added to it. For then it would no longer be existence alone but existence plus some form that would differentiate one subsisting *esse* from another. [21]

Much less, continues Thomas, will it do for one to have recourse to the second alternative, that is, to multiply subsisting existences by suggesting that different instances of the same are received in different parts of matter. In that eventuality, counters Thomas, one's hypothetical subsisting existences would not be existence alone, but material existence. [22] Presumably, the second alternative is rejected because it would imply that the allegedly pure and subsistent existences would not be pure existence, but instead existence plus individuating instances of matter. Again Thomas finds the proposal self-refuting.

Rather than return explicitly to the third alternative, according to which one subsisting existence exists apart or in separation from all else, and other instances of existence are received in something else, Thomas immediately reasserts his conclusion as established. There can only be one thing which is its very existence *(esse)*.[28] The implication is that the third alternative really concedes his point. Then there would only be one separate and subsisting existence. In all others, exis-

[20] *Op. cit.*, p. 84.16-24.

[21] *Op. cit.*, p. 84.24-27.

[22] *Op. cit.*, p. 84.27-29.

[23] *Op. cit.*, p. 84.29-80: "Unde relinquitur quod talis res que sit suum esse non potest esse nisi una." For similar developments of the ways in which multiplicity or plurality may be accounted for see *In I Sent*, d. 8, q. 4, a. 1, ad 2; *Comp. theol.*, c. 15. In the latter text, as Fabro remarks, the process is both simplified and rendered metaphysically more rigorous; "Duplex est modus quo aliqua forma potest multiplicari: unus per differentias, sicut forma generalis, ut color in diversas species coloris; alius per subiectum, sicut albedo." *Opuscula theologica. Vol. I* (Marietti, 1954), p. 17. For Fabro see *op. cit.*, p. 220.

tence would be received by something else. But this is to acknowledge that any such being would consist of existence and that which receives it.

Having eliminated, at least to his own satisfaction, the possibility of there being more than one entity in which essence and existence are identical or whose essence is its existence, Thomas then draws the conclusion: [Wherefore,] it necessarily follows that in every other entity apart from this unique possible exception, existence and quiddity (or nature or form), must differ (literally: "must be other"). Whence it also follows that in the intelligences essence (form) and existence differ.[24]

Certain comments are in order as regards this phase of Thomas's argumentation. First of all, his conclusion does not appear to be hypothetical. It is true that he has not yet attempted to show that God, that unique entity whose essence is his existence, does in fact exist. But this does not imply that his immediate conclusion with respect to other entities is hypothetical.[25] His reasoning is rather that there can at most be one being whose essence is its existence or in which essence and existence are identical. In all other entities essence and existence differ whether or not that unique possible exception to the rule does in fact exist. If he has successfully shown that it is impossible for there to be more than one being in which essence and existence are identical, then he can conclude to factual otherness of essence and existence in all other entities. It is true that in other contexts he first offers a demonstration of the existence of God or accepts this as given and then, by way of contrast, moves on to factual otherness of essence and

••*Op. cit.*, p. 34.30-p. *35.2.* See the final sentence of the text cited in n. 19 above. It is immediately followed by Thomas's application of his conclusion to the intelligences: "Undc oportet quod in intelligenciis sit esse preter formam, et ideo dictum est quod intelligencia est forma et esse."

[25] Here my reading differs from that proposed by L. Sweeney, "Existence / Essence in Thomas Aquinas's Early Writings," pp. 116-117. At this point in the text Sweeney finds Thomas concluding to "at least a hypothetical otherness and composition of form / *esse* in intelligences" and to factual otherness and composition only after the proof for God's existence (p. 117).

existence in all else.[26] But that is not his procedure here. He rather reasons here from the impossibility of there being more than one being in which essence and existence are identical to their factual otherness in all other entities.

Secondly, the argument and its conclusion are not restricted to separate intelligences. On the contrary, Thomas first concludes to otherness of essence and existence in all else, with the one possible exception. Then only does he make the more particular application to separate intelligences.[27]

Thirdly, in Thomas's eyes the validity of this phase of his argumentation does not presuppose his subsequent proof for God's existence. If one may distinguish between otherness or diversity or distinction of essence and existence, on the one hand, and composition of the same as of potency and act, on the other, it is the former that he has attempted to establish

[2]. See for instance, his procedure in the *Summa Contra gentiles.* In Bk I, c. 13, he offers a series of arguments for God's existence. In c. 22 he concludes that in God essence and existence *(e11se)* are identical. In Bk II, c. 52, he offers a series of arguments to show that in created intellectual substances there is some composition because in them *e11se* and *quod est* (existence and essence) are not identical (" lnvenitur enim in eis aliqua compositio ex eo quod non est idem in eis esse et quod est") . The first argument presented is interesting for our purposes. If *esse* is not present in some subject, there will be no way in which it can be united with something that is different from itself *(praeter esse).* But *esse,* insofar as it is *ess.e,* cannot be diversified. It can only be diversified by something that is other than *esse.* Thus the *esse* of a stone is distinct from *(aliud ab)* the *esse* of a man (presumably because the essence of the stone is different from its existence and different from the essence of the man) . Therefore, continues Thomas, that which is subsistent *esse* can only be one. But, observes Thomas, he has already shown that God is his own subsisting *esse* (Bk I, c. 22) . Therefore, nothing apart from God can be its own *esse.* Therefore, in every substance apart from God, (its) substance (essence) and its *es;Je (existence)* are other (or distinct) . Granted that this argument takes God's existence and the fact that he is his own *esse* as given, if valid in itself it should hold whether or not one has already established these two points. Given the structure of the *Contra gentiles,* it is only natural for Thomas here to appeal to his earlier treatment of each of these points. But if its structure had been otherwise, as in c. 4 of the *De ente,* the same conclusion should still follow, it would seem, because it is based on the impossibility of there being more than one being whose essence is its *esse* or existence.

[27] *De ente,* pp. 84.80-35.2.

in this step. It is only after introducing his proof for God's existence that he will conclude to potency-act composition of essence and existence in the intelligences. [28]

In sum, if, as appears to be the case, Thomas is here contending that in all beings with one possible exception essence and existence are really not identical, then it seems unlikely that he would agree with the claim that one must first have demonstrated God's existence in order to demonstrate the real distinction between essence and existence. [29] If it is impossible for there to be more than one being whose essence is its *esse*, then it follows that in all other beings essence and existence are not identical. And this follows whether or not that single exception has already been assumed or proven to exist, or whether it is simply regarded as a possibility.

To return once more to Thomas's text in the *De ente,*. only now does he address himself to the question of God's actual existence. Everything that belongs to something is either caused by the principles of its nature (as man's ability to laugh), or comes to it from without: from some extrinsic principle (as light's presence in air is due to the sun). Although Thomas does not explicitly refer to it here, a third possibility should be mentioned. That which belongs to a thing might be identical with that thing itself. But, continues the text, existence itself cannot be caused (efficiently) by the form or quiddity of a thing, for then something would produce itself. So much for the first possibility. Therefore, it is necessary for every such thing whose existence *(esse)* is other than its nature to derive

[28] *Op. cit.*, pp. 35.19-25. Central to his reasoning there is the notion that that which receives something from something else is in potency to that which it receives, while that which is received in it is in act. Having by then established to his own satisfaction both the fact that that whose essence differs from its existence receives its existence from something else and the existence of God, Thomas is in position to conclude that the quiddity or form which is the intelligence is in potency with respect to the existence it receives from God, while that existence is received after the manner of an act. Hence the presence of act and potency in intelligences, though not of matter and form when taken strictly.

[29] Sec Owens, " Quiddity and Real Distinction in St. Thomas," p. 19, as cited in my note 3 above.

that existence from another. So much for the third possibility to which reference was made above. Thomas has eliminated it by concentrating on entities in which essence (nature) and existence differ.[80] And such non-identity, he has just maintained, is true of every being, including intelligences, with only one possible exception. He continues: because that which exists through another must be traced back to that which exists of itself as to its first cause, there must be something which serves as cause of existence for all (other) entities by reason of the fact that it is existence alone. Otherwise, observes Thomas, one would regress to infinity in a series of caused causes.[31]

At this point in his argumentation, therefore, he has concluded to the factual existence of that single possible being to which he had previously referred, that being whose essence is its *esse*. According to the interpretation presented above, this does not indicate that only now does Thomas believe that he has established the factual otherness of essence and existence in all other things. He has rather used the very factual otherness and distinction of essence and existence as his point of departure for the present step in his argument which is, or so it seems to this writer, an argument for God's existence and a highly interesting and metaphysical one at that. For it is based on a metaphysical conclusion which, according to the interpretation presented above, he has established in phase two of his argumentation, that is, real otherness or real distinction of essence and existence in all beings with this single exception.

[30] According to the reading being proposed here, Thomas has already established such distinction between essence and existence in the second phase of his argumentation. Admission of such non-identity strengthens his contention that the existence of such a being derives from something else or that it is efficiently caused: " Ergo oportet quod omnis talis res cuius esse est aliud quam natura sua habeat esse ab alio" *(op. cit.,* p. 35.10-11). It appears to us that he takes this non-identity of essence and existence to be real, granted that in the *De ente* he will not apply the terminology " real distinction " to essence and existence here or in his application of them as potency and act to the intelligences.

[31] *Op. cit.,* p. 35.3-16. As should be clear from the above, it is our view that this is intended by Thomas to be an argument for God's existence. For another opinion see the references to Gilson in n. 4 above.

Certain difficulties might be raised against this interpretation of Thomas's procedure. First of all, one might wonder why he found it necessary or even helpful to include this argument for God's existence in the immediate context, if it is not a necessary step in his effort to establish real otherness of essence and existence in creatures and in intelligences. Secondly, one might wonder whether Thomas either intended or succeeded in establishing real otherness or real distinction of essence and existence in the second phase of his argumentation, especially so since we ourselves have, along with others, acknowledged certain reservations about his intention to do so in the first phase (the *intellectus essentiae* argument).

As regards the first difficulty, one obvious reply is to suggest that Thomas included the argumentation for God's existence for the sake of completeness, in order to .show that the single possible exception to universal otherness of essence and existence is more than a possibility, an actuality. But the following lines of his text present another reason for his introduction of this argumentation here. He now returns to the structure of those intelligences with which so much of his earlier discussion was concerned. It is [therefore] clear, he remarks, that an intelligence is a form and *esse* and that it receives its existence from that first being which is existence alone, and which is God. While the first point had been established before his introduction of the proof for God's existence, the second point follows from that same proof. "There must be something which is the cause of existence for all things by reason of the fact that it is existence alone." [32] Because the intelligence receives its existence from another, it is in potency with respect to that existence, and that same existence which it receives is its act. Therefore, the quiddity or form or essence which is the intelligence is in potency with respect to the existence it receives from God. Thus, reasons Thomas, one does find

••*Op. cit.*, p. 85.16-19. For the text just cited see p. 85.18-14: "... oportet quod sit aliqua res que sit causa essendi omnibus rebus ex eo quod ipsa est esse tantum ...".

potency and act in intelligences, but not matter and form (unless the latter terms be applied equivocally) .[33]

In sum, therefore, Thomas has found it helpful to introduce the argumentation for God's existence in order to establish the point that existence is related to essence in separate intelligences as act to potency. Therefore, even though he had rejected matter-form composition in the same, he has retained act-potency composition therein. And it was to establish this very point that he had initiated the general discussion including the first and second phases of his argumentation for otherness of essence and existence and the proof for God's existence.[34]

As regards the second difficulty, it would seem that if, in other contexts, after having established God's existence in fact or taken it as a given, Thomas can reason by way of contrast from the impossibility of there being more than one entity in which essence and existence are identical to real otherness or real distinction of the same in every other being, then the same conclusion should follow from his procedure in the present text.[35] And this conclusion should follow whether or not such

[88] *Op. cit.,* p. 35.19-25.

[••] *Op. cit.,* p. 34.4-7.

[85] See, for instance, his procedure in *CG* II, c. *52,* as indicated in n. 26 above. According to the second argument offered there it is impossible for there to be more than one *esse separatum per se siibsistens.* Therefore, nothing else apart from this being (God) can be its own *esse.* In his *Tractatus de substantiis separatis* he once again endeavors to show that if spiritual substances lack matter, they must still be distinguished from God. Some potency is found in them insofar as they are not *esse* itself but rather participate in it. There can only be one self-subsistent being which is *esse* itself, just as any form could only be one if it should be considered as separate. Therefore, it is impossible apart from this one exception for there to be anything which is existence *(esse)* alone. '· :·:st igitur in quocumque praeter primum et ipsum esse tanquam actus et substantia rei esse tamquam potentia receptiva huius actus qui est esse (ed. by F. Lescoe, [West Hartford, Conn., 1963], p. 79). While he does not explicitly state that essence and existence are " really " distinct in creatures in either of these texts, the distinction and hence the composition for which he is arguing is surely intended to be extramental, not merely something that results from different ways in which one and the same ontological principle may be viewed. For some interesting reflections on Thomas's failure to identify explicitly as real the kind of distinction for which he was ultimately arguing in the *De ente stJe* Owens, *op. cit.,* pp. 19-22.

a single and unique exception does in fact exist. Since in these other contexts he has already had occasion to offer argumentation for God's existence or else to take this as granted, he naturally assumes it as a given in reasoning to real otherness of essence and existence in all else. But in the *De ente* he has not yet introduced his argumentation for God's existence. Hence, or so it seems to this writer, he need not and does not presuppose the existence of God in order to conclude to real otherness of essence and existence in other entities. The impossibility of there being more than one being in which essence and existence are identical is sufficient ground for him to conclude to their factual otherness in all else.

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GADAMER'S HERMENEUTICS AND ORDINARY LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY*

H.-G. GADAMER begins the third and final part of his *Wahrheit und Methode* with these words from Schleiermacher: "Alles Vorauszusetzende in der Hermeneutik ist nur Sprache," or in English, "Language is everything and the only thing which is to be presupposed in hermeneutics." [1] The use of this quotation and the fact that the conclusion of Gadamer's major work on hermeneutics is devoted to an investigation of language gives a clear indication, I think, that, at least as Gadamer conceives of it, hermeneutics has its basis in a philosophy of language and, to be more precise, in a philosophy of language as it is ordinarily spoken. For the *Riickverwandlung in Sprache*, the transformation back into language which he says is the task of hermeneutics, is meant specifically as a transformation of written texts back into spoken dialogue or conversation, i.e., *Gespriich.* Accordingly, at the heart of the theory of hermeneutics lies a philosophical account of *Gespriich.*

That offers us, who have grown up and dwell within the Anglo-American tradition of language analysis, a unique possibility for what Gadamer calls a *Horizontverschmelzung,* a merging of a foreign frame of thinking with our own. I find that fortunate, for heretofore, however much we may have tried to appropriate this or that kind of thought coming to us from the Continent, e.g., existentialism, phenomenology, Marxism, and so forth, we have run up against the ineluctable fact that

*Editor's note: the author of the present article, P. Christopher Smith, is the translator of Hans-Georg Gadamer's *Hegd's Dialectic;* cf. the Review Article in this present issue of *The Thomi:Jt* by Moltke S. Gram on pp. 822-880.

[1] H.-G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode* (Tiibingen: Mohr, 1965), p. 861. Henceforth, WM.

the French and Germans who do these things are more at home in them than we are. Oftentimes, therefore, we seem reduced to reporters of the newest fashions in European philosophy. But with hermeneutics, I think, our chances for a true assimilation are much better and that precisely because the concern of thought for both hermeneutical inquiry and our own philosophical analysis is the same, namely language, and in part at least, language as it is .spoken, ordinary language. In the course of this paper I would like to give a preliminary indication of the overlap of ordinary language philosophy with hermeneutics, the overlap on which, I suggest, a valid merging of horizons might be established. And I would like to suggest as well what profit there could be if such a merging were accomplished. Let me proceed directly to an example which should give my idea of combining hermeneutics and language analysis some credibility.

Perhaps the most elegant application of Gadamer's hermeneutical theory is to be found in his essay on Hegel's *verkehrte Welt.*[2] Those who have tried their hand at Hegel at some time or other-and I number my.self among them-will admit that the section of Hegel's *Phenornenology of Mind* which deals with the *verkehrte Welt* is one of the most inscrutable texts in a book no part of which can easily be made sense of. The *verkehrte Welt,* then, would test the mettle of any interpretative technique. How does Gadamer approach the matter? By attempting to clarify the *ordinary use* of *verkehrt* and the other words near it in the semantic field over which it ranges. Gadamer'.s approach to the text relies upon the double use of the word in German. On the one hand, it is used in a value-free sense which relates to the position of something and thus functions as does *umgekehr,t* or inverted, i. 'e., reversed, backwards, inside out, etc. On the other hand, it has a range of uses relating to perverted, which imply at least some degree of evaluation. The example Gadamer cites is the German expression,

[2] H.-G. Gadamer, *Hegel's Dialectic,* trans. P. Christopher Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), pp. *35-53.* Henceforth, HD.

"Das ist eine verkehrte Welt," meaning roughly, "That's a topsy turvy world." Here the inversion is more than a change in position; in this use of *verkehrt* a twisting of things is implied. Things are not in the order or relationship they *ought* to be in. Gadamer is led from this sense to the satirical, where what is *verkehrt,* slaves playing masters, masters playing slaves, etc., is presented that way deliberately in order to clarify "e contrario," as he puts it, the perversity or *Verkehrtheit* of what we had thought ought to be the right relationship. All these uses of *verkehrt,* Gadamer contends, are at work in Hegel's presentation and understanding of the *verkehrte Welt,* and for us to understand the text, these uses are what we need to know.

Now just how close Gadamer comes to ordinary language philosophy in this procedure is made explicit in the following passages: " Ordinary German usage," he writes,

> quite confidently distinguishes between *falsch* (false) and *verkehrt* (inverted or backwards). Of course an answer which inverts things or gets them twisted is not correct, but the elements of truth are recognizable in it and only need to be put right. A false answer, on the other hand, contains no such possibility of making it right. Thus, for example, the information someone gives you can be called *falsch* if it is deliberately given with the intent of deceiving-but in such a case it could not be called *verlcehrt.* For an answer which is *verkehrt* is always one which was meant to be correct and which turned out to be false (HD *52* n) .

The principle here, one which extends to all of Gadamer's interpretations of Hegel, and which in fact underlies his hermeneutics as a whole, is that native language as it is spoken is the root of all philosophy and thus in interpreting a philosophical text one must put the dead ink on the page back into the context of such live language as it is spoken. The vitality of Hegel's philosophy derives from his native tongue, German, and Schwabian German in particular. Thus the value of his thought lies not in any artificial expressions which he invents-thesis, antithesis, synthesis, might be said to come under this heading-but rather in his explication and application of the rich meaning contained in *Aufheben, an und fur sich* and, of

course, *verkehrt.* Hegel's speculation, Gadamer argues, is valuable not because of some sort of correspondence to a supposed logical structure of a reality apart from ordinary language, but because of its subtlety and sensitivity in unfolding the significances of the language-constituted reality within which we always already find ourselves underway.

What is the conception of language which underlies such a hermeneutical method as Gadamer's interpretations of Hegel employ? Again I quote from *Hegel's Dialectic:*

> ... it was only after the new information theory had brought modern science to its perfection that the problem of the dependence (and relative independence) of our thought on (from) language came into full view. . . . Thought is dependent upon the ground of language insofar as language is not merely a system of signs for the purpose of communication and transmission of information. Where there is real language, the thing to be designated is not known prior to the act of designation. Rather within our language relationship to world, that which is spoken of is itself first articulated through language's constitutive structuring of our being in the world (HD 115).

This passage makes evident that for Gadamer there is no extra- or pre-linguistic reality which language could be said to picture. Language does not chart reality and give us information about it; it constitutes reality. Thus information theory's idea of a logically perfected language freed from the inadequacies of ordinary speech is misconceived from the start. Perfect, exact, could only mean adequate for the subject to signify objective reality precisely and' scientifically.' However, if language does not work that way, if it does not signify a reality external to itself, the whole idea of a perfect language becomes meaningles.s. And in practice any attempt to find a more exact, rigorous terminology for ' reality ' would lead to the uprooting and withering of language.

Striking about all of this is its similarity to Wittgenstein's criticism of his early work and his own return to ordinary language. There is a difference in what specific object is criticized- logical atomism as opposed to Hegel's and Husserl's methodical

Wissenschaft-and an important difference in the purpose of the criticism, which we shall come to subsequently. Nevertheless in a number of respects the criticism is virtually identical with Gadamer's revision of Hegel and Husserl. For Wittgenstein too reached the conclusion that language usually does not chart or map a pre-given reality, though at the time he wrote the *Tractatus* it seemed to him that that was its function. In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein had maintained that "the ultimate constituents of the world are a unique set of atomic facts whose combinations are pictured or mirrored in the relations among symbols in a logically perfect language " and that the " world can be described completely by knowing all these atomic propositions " and that " there is one basic use of language: to convey information." As a consequence, " all language which conveys information is exact and determinate." [3] Obviously, in criticizing this view, as Wittgenstein does in his *Philosophical Investigations,* he is criticizing the very same thing which Gadamer's hermeneutic theory places in question: language as precise designation.

Gadamer, whose sense of history is far greater than Wittgenstein's, traces the informational concept of language to what he believes to be its origin in Plato's attempt to combat Sophistic rhetoric by overcoming the *dunamis ton onomaton,* the power of names, which the latter so skillfully exploited. It seemed to Plato that words had an almost demonic potential for asserting themselves in the place of that which they name. Accordingly, he becomes the first in a tradition which seeks to get at the things in themselves apart from the distortions and inaccuracies of language as it is spoken, a tradition which develops through Leibniz's projected ideal of a universal notation to precisely the sort of endeavor to which Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* is committed. The task in this tradition has always been a double one. First, there is the critical task of displaying

• I quote here sev.eral of the list of assumptions which Gross finds basic to the *Tractatus. Cf. Barry Gross, Analytic Philos.ophy* (New York: Pegasus, 1970), p. 143.

the insufficiency of language as it is spoken ordinarily, the vagueness of its correspondence to what is, or worse, its lack of correspondence to anything at all. (Metaphysical talk is the Sophism at which Wittgenstein takes aim.) Second, there is the positive task of replacing ordinary language with an invented sign-system which will precisely correspond to the structure of what is. Beginning with Plato the paradigm for this project becomes the 'language' of mathematics: "Thus the *word* just as the number becomes the mere sign of a well defined and, accordingly, pre-known reality" (WM 390). Now, though Wittgenstein does not concern himself with the origins of it, it is precisely this theory of language which his own self-criticism leads him to reject.

The change in Wittgenstein's position apparently resulted from the intrusion of certain ' linguistic ' phenomena which the tidy theory of the *Tractatus* was unable to account for. Gestures, curses, greetings, exclamations such as Water! Ow! Help!-all these must be counted as language, yet none can be accounted for in terms of a theory which tells us that language should be precise designation of some sort of reality ' in itself.' Thus it became evident that a false expectation was perhaps blocking the phenomenological investigation of the subject matter. Wittgenstein now calls for an unpredjudiced examination of the phenomenon of language: " Don't say: ' There *must' ...* , but look and see." [4]

Significantly for our purposes, what he sees is what Gadamer sees: language as it is spoken, live language in the context of human activity or *die Lebenswelt.* That is not a perfected exact system of invented signs, but something quite different: ordinary language, inherited, traditional language:

> Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, of houses with additions from various periods and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses (PI § 18).

[4] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations,* trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Macmillan: New York, 1958), § 66. Henceforth, PI.

The modern additions are the languages of the sciences. Wittgenstein's primary concern now, however, is with the irregular diversity of the inner city.

And what is the language that is found there? It is language in the context of the human world, the world of buying things, building things, playing games, singing, joking. "The *speaking* of language is part of an activity, or a form of life" (PI § 23). It follows then, just as it does in Gadamer's hermeneutic theory, that understanding something which has been said is possible only within the context within which it was said, i. e., within a world or a form of life.

And there are other implications of the insight which Wittgenstein reaches here. First, it becomes clear that there is what Gadamer calls an inner unity between the word and the world. As a form *of* life language *forms* life, shapes it, constitutes the world of the things we deal with. As Heidegger and Gadamer following him have also seen, I do not have atomic perceptions which I then proceed to signify; I do not hear sounds, but wind in the chimney and 'wind' and 'chimney' *are* for me only because language lets them be, brings them into the open as the things they are. Wittgenstein's way of putting this same thing is in terms of language frames. The world of things among which we live is seen as it is because it is framed in the language we speak. Secondly, and as a consequence, our relationship to language cannot be that of a reflective consciousness devising signs or termini for a world which we wish to dispose over. It cannot be that of subject to object, for I do not so much invent language as I find myself underway within it. I don't create language; I learn it. It is alway.s there already like the city in which I was born and in which I dwell. *Now this implication is not fully comprehended by Wittgenstein,* though I think it ought to be a conclusion drawn from the standpoint which the *Philosophical Investigations* attains. In this respect Gadamer is more consistent and deeper. Ultimately, in fact, it is his hermeneutically oriented philosophy of human finitude which alone can provide the ontological and linguistic legitimization for any would-be ordinary language philosophy.

How Gadamer and Wittgenstein differ here can best be elucidated by reference to the model to which both of them advert continually: *das Spiel,* i.e., game or play. In Wittgenstein the contextuality of language is to be made clear in terms of *Spraahspiele* or language games. Whatever form of life I am involved in, building a house, buying apples and so on, is an activity based on language and therefore it could be said that it is ' played ' according to the rules of that particular language game. To act in the language-constituted world I must know the language and that means knowing how it is ' played ' under the circumstances. To use Wittgenstein's expression, understanding means knowing the rules and thereby knowing " how to go on " when someone has said something to me. It means knowing what behavior, linguistic or otherwise, is called for in response to what has been said. Further, it is essential to note that the game aspect of spoken language shows how it exceeds the limits of any informational sign-language. As part of life or activity it does not purport to represent reality and therefore its utterances are not properly spoken of as true or false, but, as Austin points out, as felicitous or infelicitous. That means that they either fit the game or are out of place in it. The judge who begins the trial proceedings with" Batter up!" has said nothing true or false though he has said something which could be meaningful in another context. Language then is to be understood in its proper application in the circumstances. Its meaning is not some thing which it describes, but its use and this, the contextuality of language, is what the 'game' metaphor is meant to indicate.

Certainly there is a great deal here which corresponds to the theory of language underlying Gadamer's hermeneutics. For Gadamer hermeneutics, taken in his sense of interpretation of written texts, implies, as we know, a *Riiakverwandlung in Spraahe.* The dead letter, that means, is to be restored to life by converting it back into speech, the spoken word. Only in this way can the task of hermeneutics be accomplished, the understanding of meaning (*verstehen von Sinn)* be brought about. Now Gadamer too sees all *verstehen* as part of a process,

part of an activity, or to use Wittgenstein's expression, part of a *Lebensform.* Gadamer's way of putting this same thing is to say that *verstehen* is *sich-verstiindigen* with another person in a situation. All live language is dialogue, is *GeS'priich.* Thus the hermeneutical task of reviving what lies dead in the written text means restoring it to the context in which it was said to someone. And it means as well that I as one who would under,. stand must be enabled to stand in the position of the one who is spoken to by the text. To use the example given above, if the text says "Batter up! ", I must know how to go on in the life form or language game in which that is said. It is the task of hermeneutics to extend the part 0:f the city of language in which I am active and with which I am familiar to the part in which the language of the text is spoken. That would hold as well if the text spoke of *die verkehrte Welt:* one must reach an understanding *(sich verstiindigen)* within the" live meaning of words as they are spoken " and that, as Gadamer puts it, means knowing how they are to be *applied* (WM 291): In understanding, he says, "there is always some .sort of application of the text to be understood to the situation of the interpreter" (WM 291). Put in Wittgenstein's terms that means that the language games I play must be brought to overlap with the game played in the text, i. e., that the text speaks to me as one who is addressed and that I respond to it within contexts, mine and its, which have become continuous with one another. (That incidentally is the essence of *Horizontverschmelzung,* which I spoke of at the outset of our inquiry.)

The example which Gadamer uses to make this very Wittgensteinian point is that of the command (WM 316). A command, as he .says, can only exist where someone is there who should obey it and" Understanding a command means knowing how to apply it [follow it] in the situation in which it is given" (idem). Thus, Gadamer continues, if a historian finds a command in a text and wishes to *understand* it, he must go through the same process which the one to whom it was originally addressed completed before the latter carried it out: he must

grasp how it applies in the given context or 'game' ; he must see how to go on. This example, like that of the curse, which Gadamer also uses (HD 95), makes clear that he, just as much as Wittgenstein, has gotten beyond the traditional conceptions of understanding and meaning which prevailed as long as philosophy had devoted itself exclusively to language as the *logos apophantikos,* the statement, true or false, corresponding to and representing states of affairs. Like Wittgenstein's 'language game ' Gadamer's hermeneutics shows that the proposition or statement *(Satz)* is an abstraction if it is considered out of the context in which it is uttered. The full meaning of any statement can be understood only if the reason why it is said is grasped as the setting for the' constative' meaning. For Gadamer, as we shall see, that holds not only for curses and commands, but for the statements of speculative philosophy as well:

> ... the speculative statement is not a judgment restricted in the content of what it asserts any more than a single word without a context or a communicative utterance torn from its context is a self-contained unit of meaning. The words which someone utters are tied to the continuum in which people come to understand each other, the continuum which determines the word to such an extent that it can even be ' taken back.' Similarly, the speculative statement points to an entirety of truth, without being this entirety or stating it (HD 96).

Thus when Hegel speaks of the *verkehrte Welt,* that too is addressed to somebody and can only be understood if I know when and why someone would say something like that. I need to know when and why such an idiom is ordinarily used.

However, though there is this close correspondence between Wittgenstein's use of *Spiel* and Gadamer's hermeneutical intentions, there is a point at which the two thinkers diverge, and that precisely in regard to what the *Spiel* metaphor makes visible about the language event underlying all understanding. What does Gadamer tell us of *Sprachspiele?* It might be said that in his case it is the 'play' traits of the family whose resemblances make up *Spiel* which concern him and not the

'game' traits. Why do we enjoy play? because authentic playing, not competitive sport to be sure, but, say, playing the violin, playing a part in a play, dancing, is egoless. Playing, if it comes off, releases us from the constrictions and inhibitions of self-consciousness. In play we are not aware of ourselves. (Conversely, it is the spoil-sport's *(Spielverderbers)* insurmountable self-consciousness which makes him unable to 'play along.') Now it is this feature of play which Gadamer seizes upon: "The subject of the play is not the players," he says, " rather the play can only be said to manifest itself through the players" (WM 98). Thus there is something deceptive about the surface structure of "I play a game," as Gadamer, availing himself of Huizinga's analyses, goes on to point out (WM 99n). The depth structure is " The game plays through me," for it is not I who play, but the game itself. "The most basic sense of *Spielen,"* Gadamer tells us, " is that of the Greek middle. Thus we say that something is played out *(sich abspielt)* or that some thing is in play (im *Spiele)"* (WM 99). That would indicate that *Spielen* cannot be understood as a form of *my* doing something (WM *idem),* and that is the point which Gadamer carries over into his analysis of the *Sprachspiel,* the language game:

> Language games are that in which we as learners-and when do we cease to be that?-are raised to an understanding of world. Thus we can refer here once again to what we established about the nature of play, namely, that the relationship of the players to the play cannot be understood as a relationship of subjectivity [to its object], since, on the contrary, it is the play that plays in that it draws the players into itself and thus becomes itself the actual subject of the play (WM 464).

That brings to light something which Wittgenstein did not see. To be sure, he maintains that language must be understood in reference to how it occurs in a context, but he does not grasp what that means in regard to the subject-object model of speaking; Wittgenstein gets caught in the surface grammar of " I play a game " and he extends that mistake into his analysis of language games. For him the playing of a Ian-

guage game is still seen as something which I do and consequently, as something which fits within a subject-object structure. For Gadamer the play character of language makes clear that I am not so much an agent as a participant. But that is missed by Wittgenstein, who sees the human being as the center and who thus thinks of language activity as the *actus* originating in the *agens,* the *agere* of the human subject. In this he is followed by Austin and Searle, for whom *speech acts* become primary.

Wittgenstein and those who followed him are, I would contend, not quite radical enough. They do see that language is much more than propositions or statements *(Siitze)* invented by man to correspond to states of affairs, and it is that insight which leads them to abandon the programme of perfecting ordinary, spoken language by replacing its ambiguities with exact signs precisely designating a supposed extralinguistic reality. But the *critical* intention remains with them as a frame which biases their vision of language and thus confounds the effort to which Wittgenstein devotes himself with such brilliance and intensity, the effort to avoid presuppositions and to *see* language as it is. Wittgenstein wishes to mark off where we use words properly from where we are misled by them. In the very same passage, in fact, where he announces the phenomenological project-" we must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place "-he announces the critical project as well: "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language " (PI § 109). That last statement puts Wittgenstein squarely within the tradition which comes from Plato, that very tradition which Gadamer has told us we must get behind if we really are going to see the phenomenon of language. It will be recalled that Plato too was motivated by just such a de.sire to break the spell cast by language in sophistic misuse of it. That led him to distrust ordinary spoken language and to seek a kind of thought purified of the *dunamis tOn ononiatOn,* a kind of thought which would correlate exactly to the logical struc-

ture of reality. That led later to the ideal of an invented sign-language *(Zeichensprache)* which would 'cure' the inexactitude of ordinary talk.

Now it seems to me that one cannot reverse this attack on spoken language completely if one does not abandon its therapeutic motive. That shows in Wittgenstein. His rejection of the informational sign-tool in the service of human objectification of the world is really only a qualification. Wittgenstein emphasizes that just to have assigned a label to a thing is not yet to have made a' move' in a language game; it is only preparatory to that. The sign wins life only when the game is played in which it serves and the game implies many other kinds of words with other kinds of use. Each sign is a *tool* along with other sorts of tools, commands, requests, greetings, etc., in the "carpenter's box" of language. In this respect Wittgenstein goes beyond the semiotic theory of the *Tractatus,* which argued that the primary tool of language was the sign and the primary function of language, designation. Furthermore he sees that the ideal of an invented perfect language is somehow misconceived and that language should be " in order " as it stands. Still, he wants man to prevail over language, to dispose over it, and that leads him to maintain the tool concept even if signs are now seen to be just one of many tools at man's disposal. The tool aspect of language is focused upon to the exclusion of other things precisely because of the critical intention which Wittgenstein shares with the linguistic tradition extending from Plato onwards. The idea is to purify us of misuses of language, " idling " or " language on a holiday," so that we can *use* language properly. Only in this way can it be insured that we have power over language and not it over us. In short Wittgenstein's vision of philosophy as therapeutic critique prevents his escape from the subject-object conception of language; man remains for him the speaking subject with words of all kinds there for him to employ.

It is this critical intention, I think, which keeps Wittgenstein and those who followed him in the tradition of language analysis

from hearing the double sense of the German *Sprachgebrauch.* To them it sounds so reasonable that language usage is how *we* employ, use words. But once the word, *Gebrauch,* is translated as use, a dimension of it is shut off. *Gebrauch* means use, but it also means custom and this last comes much closer to showing us how language actually works. Insofar as language is a custom, we do not invent it, but rather find ourselves always already underway within it, and making use of language would not be so much employing it, " doing something with words," as conforming to it. Proper usage is not invented by individuals except in the extreme case of artifical languages, the regularized suburbs of the city of language. Proper usage is customary in ordinary language and that means that we play according to its rules, not ours. Here, in contrast to what Wittgenstein suggests (PI§ 83), we cannot" make up the rules as we go along."

In contrast, Gadamer, whose intention is hermeneutical rather than critical, is able to see what eludes Wittgenstein: our embeddedness in language or what he calls the *Umschlossensein unser selbst durch die Sprache.* It is not as though there were a world of things and opposite that a self which knew them before formulating and communicating its knowledge in language. For language is there first as that which makes knower and world possible in the first place, " die Mitte in der sich Ich und Welt zusammenschliessen" (WM (449). Thus the speaking of a language is not picking up a tool when I need it, for I never find myself first in a languageless condition in which I then reach for a word to communicate something I know:

> Learning to speak does not mean being introduced to the use of an instrument already there for the designation of the world we know and are familiar with; rather it means acquiring familiarity and knowledge of the world itself as it is encountered by us.
>
> We grow up; we learn to know the world, to know people and ultimately ourselves in that we learn to speak.[5]

[5] H.-G. Gadamer, *Kleine Schriften I* (Ti.ibingen: Mohr, 1967), p. 96. Henceforth, KS.

Consequently, Gadamer does not seek to free us *from,* but to free us *for* the power of language. Die Sprache spricht-" It is quite literally more correct to .say that language speaks us than that we speak it" (WM 439)-and the hermeneutical task is to hear what it says. The whole emphasis in hermeneutics is not on getting or having something at our disposal, *verfugen iiber,* but on yielding and fitting in, *sich fiigen.*[6] The language event" is not our doing something to the thing [language], but the doing of the thing itself " *(idem)* . To understand we must give in. All understanding takes place *within* the universal medium of language, Gadamer tells us. That means that no *vorstellen* of language is possible, no getting it around in front of us at our disposal. As long as we cling to the critical intention, however, we remain in the position of a self-conscious .subject over against a language which we expect to get control *of.*[1] Un-self-conscious participation in the event of langauge is thereby closed off to us. In refusing to yield to what transcends us, we become, as it were, the *Spielverderber des Sprachspieles.*

This decisive difference between having language at our disposal and being underway within it shows up most sharply in Wittgenstein's and Gadamer's contrasting treatment of vagueness. In turning to ordinary language both, of course, acknowledge vagueness. \Vittgenstein accepts it because on most occasions vague or inexact statements *work* quite as well as they need to, better in fact, than the purified propositions of scientific language. "Stand over there!" is usually a better tool than "Stand 2.57 meters from points X and Y! " Gadamer too ac-

[6] In contrast, Pears, quite properly, I think, speaks of Wittgenstein's "extreme anthropocentrism." David Pears, *Lud!wig Wittgenstein* (New York: Viking Press, 1971)' p. 179.

[7] Pears *(<Yp. cit.)* points out that the critical concern is what unifies the whole of Wittgenstein's philosophy. Like Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason,* Wittgenstein undertakes a sort of *Polizeiaktion.* In Wittgenstein's case this is to establish the limits of the proper use of language and thereby to expose the invalidity of language which proposes to operate beyond these limits. That holds for both the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations.* It is this Kantian sense of critique which I have in mind when I speak of Wittgenstein's critical intention.

knowledges vagueness in spoken language, but its usefulness as such is not the issue. What is at issue is the violation of natural language which takes place in the attempt to produce exact, scientific terminology:

> In respect to the live meaning of the words of spoken language, to which, as Wilhelm von Humboldt correctly points out, a certain breadth of wavering is essential, the "term' is a petrified word and the terminological use of the word an act of violence perpetrated on language (WM

What very often happens is that in creating a term for precise designation a " word already in use is cut out of the fullness and breadth of its semantical relationships and pinned down to a determinate sense" (idem). To develop terminology **in** this way is to move in a direction precisely the opposite of that taken by hermeneutics. For hermeneutics, in seeking to bring the dead word back to its life in spoken language, opens the word up into the unbounded variety of meaning which issues from it. The hermeneutic experience, Gadamer says, is an experience of the "open-endedness of the meaning event, which cannot be closed off" (WM 448). Vagueness, ambiguity, then, is significant as an indication of the actual relationship which I have to language as a speaker of it. I am underway within the event of language, which continually transcends me. I go from place to place within the city of language in which I dwell, all the while never being able to see the end or beginning of any of the innumerable streets which lead to and from any point where I happen to be. Vagueness, accordingly, is a manifestation of the infinitude of language as a whole in relationship to the finitude of human speaking: it is evidence of the boundless hermeneutic reality which exceeds whatever can be said now, and thus it make.s apparent why I find myself following the streets of language, so to say, without a map, and why as Gadamer asserts, "speaking in no way means putting at one's disposal and making predictable " (WM 429).[8]

[8] **It** should be pointed out, however, that Wittgenstein himself bears witness to the ultimacy of the hermeneutic experience of finite awareness. For all of

All of this, it seems to me, is of the greatest significance for the programme of ordinary language analysis. For one thing, if Gadamer's hermeneutic conception of language is correct, ordinary language philosophy could be given a justification for itself which, as its positivist critics have rightly perceived, it presently lack; and, for another, it would acquire speculative content in place of the inconsequential matters with which it too often has concerned itself. As regards the first point, there is, I think, a patent circularity in the undertakings of Austin and others when they try to solve philosophical 'problems' by recourse to the authority of ordinary usage, all the while maintaining that language is something we invent and use for our purposes. If language *is* invented for our use, why should we make a fetish of it? Why should we ever submit to its authority? That would mean becoming the tool of our tools-something which hardly seems defensible.[9] But recourse to ordinary

his emphasis on the ' tool ' aspect of language Wittgenstein is not at all insensitive to the fact that we are underway within language. The " Preface " to his *Philosophical, Investigations* gives a clear demonstration that he experienced being within the medium of language without any overview of the whole. As a result, his insights could never be put together as a system; they could only be formulated as inconclusive "observations " *(Bemerlmngen)* made from any number of points of view within the subject matter:

. . . my thoughts were soon crippled if I tried to force them on in any *single* direction against their natural inclination.-And this was, of course, connected with the very nature of the investigation. For this compels us to travel over a wide field of thought criss-cross in every direction.-The philosophical remarks *(Bemerkungen)* in this book are, as it were, a number of sketches of landscapes which were made in the course of these long and involved journeyings (Pl " Preface," p. ix) .

There is no *Verfiigen-iiber* here, but only *Sich-fiigen,* following wherever the *Gesprach* of his " thinking aloud " might lead him.

[9] Austin meets this criticism with an argument reminiscent of Edmund Burke's defense of tradition against the French Revolution; it is the argument of English conservative empiricism:

. . . our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connections they have found worth marking, in the lifetimes of many generations: these surely are likely to be more numerous, more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonably practical matters than you or I are likely to think up in our armchairs of an afternoon (J. L. Austin,

language would be justified, I think, if Gadamer's insight into the structure of our relationship to language as a city within which we are "zu hause" were made the foundation. Obviously, then, to learn the truth of things we would have every reason to turn to the center of language in which the truths of our world present themselves. That would mean decided shift in emphasis though, for instead of asking the *critical* question, how we do things with words, we would pursue the *hermeneutical* endeavor of coming to understand how words do things with us.

A renewal of concern with language as apophantic could be the result of this shift in emphasis. It will be recalled that Wittgenstein and Gadamer both emphasized non-apophantic modes of discourse, commands, curses, etc., in order to display, first, the limitations of a theory of propositions which says that language pictures a world apart from itself and, second, the contextuality of language. Ordinary language philosophy has followed Wittgenstein in this by stressing the performative over the constative aspect of language. But what if it is seen that language is not primarily a tool which performs functions, does things? One would be led back to language insofar as in it world is displayed, insofar as it lets things be, insofar as it is apophantic. Gadamer's hermeneutics makes this possible without reversion to a picture theory of language. For apophantic language, it is now seen, does not re-present what is; it presents it: "In der Sprache stellt sich die Welt selhst da" (WM

"A Plea for Excuses " in V. C. Chappell, *Ordinary Language* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 46).

For my part, if this were the only argument in support of traditional language, I would join the ' revolutionaries ' in saying away with it. For it is not so sure at all that men of the past would have invented the best tools for their own circumstances to say nothing of ours. It would in fact be reasonable to assume that the past is much more a legacy of perpetuated misuses and inaccuracies than a fund of useful language. If language were a tool, then we should be radically pragmatic about it. Not the traditional, but that with 'cash value' now is what we should consider worthy. Expediency is the measure of tools. If a tool does not work, we throw it out. The tool itself deserves no respect, has no authority. But language is not a tool, so neither this argument nor Austin's is to the point.

.[10] Nor is the contextuality of language lost sight of. As regards any statement, the issue remains what occasioned it, except that the concern now is not so much a matter of *praxis*, i.e., what purpose the statement wa.s meant to perform, as it is a matter of *theoria:* what the *question* is which the statement answers in presenting world as it does (cf. WM 844 ff. on the "hermeneutic priority of the question") . The contextuality of understanding (*Verstehen)* is maintained and the foundation of dialogical, spoken language is preserved. In the realm of theory too, Gadamer .shows us, nothing is said out of the blue. What is said is both response and question-response to what has been said and a question addressed to me, who must know how to ' go on ' in the unending process of *Sich-verstandigen.*

There would be nothing lost in the return to the apophantic which hermeneutics makes possible. On the contrary, much would be gained. For instead of going on endlessly about men eating poppies in a field or red-headed goldfinches which might be woodpeckers, and the like, instead of making minute ' distinctions ' or spelling out all the ' rules ' for when I can say " Open the door! ", we might come to see the reality of the *verkehrte Welt* or what it means to say the *die Wahrheit des Seins ist das Wesen.* I have taken examples from Hegel here, for Gadamer shows us how such theoretical, speculative philosophy as Hegel's can be rehabilitated: as a phenomenological exposition of the reality constituted or ' framed,' as Wittgenstein would .say, in language as we speak it. Nothing less than this rehabilitation of speculative thought is what a merging of ordinary language philosophy with hermeneutics would make possible.

[10] The hermeneutic return to apophantic language obviously restores a principal concern of the *Tractatus,* specifically, that with *Welt* as the latter is displayed in language. However, the fatal weakness of the *Tractatus,* its picture theory of language, would not be found in Gadamer's language idealism, in which *lch* and *Welt* are both seen to originate in the matrix of language. Never in Gadamer would it be said, " Wir machen uns ein Bild der Tatsachen " (Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philos<Yphicus* (London: Routledge, Kegan, Paul, 1961) !U).

EXCURSUS

An initial reaction to the views expressed above has suggested a need for both some clarification and some revision.* The questions raised dealt primarily with the following issues, each of which, it turns out, bears upon the others: the meaning of *apophantic,* as opposed to *constative* and *performative* language (cf. pp. 313-14 above), truth and falsity as these occur in each of these kinds of language, the criterion of correctness for what is said, and, finally, the role of the sayer-his interests and his' self '-in what is said. Let me address these points in that order.

My use of *apophantic* here relies on Heidegger. Gadamer, as far as I know, does not use the expression in the sense I mean it. In *Sein und Zeit* Heidegger writes the following:

> In contrast [to making a judgment, *Urteil], logos* as speaking amounts to *deloun,* i. e., making open and plain that which is being spoken of. Aristotle explained this function of speaking more specifically as *apophainesthai. Logos* lets something be seen *(phainesthai),* namely what is being spoken about, and that *for* the one speaking-hence the Greek middle-or for the ones speaking with each other. Speaking 'lets be seen', *apo,* i.e., coming from that itself which is being spoken of. In speaking *(apophansis),* to the extent it is genuine, *what* is said should be drawn *out of [apo]* that being spoken of, so that in what it says the communicative speaking makes what it is speaking of clear and accessible to the other person. That is the structure of *logos* as *apophansis.* Not all ' speaking ' has *this* property of making clear in the sense of laying bare and letting be seen. Pleading (*euche)* , for example, makes clear too, but in a different way *(Sein und Zeit* § 7, B).

Significantly, Heidegger makes a distinction here among *three* modes of *logos* or speaking: there is speaking which reveals, speaking which makes a judgment and speaking which performs some function, or as Austin was later to specify it, speaking in which the illocutionary and perlocutionary forces predominate, e.g., pleading. What is a particular interest is the

* The discussion in question followed the original presentation of this paper at the Williams College Conference on Hermeneutics in January, 1977.

distinction made here within what Austin calls the constative: we do make judgments about states of affairs, Heidegger tells us, but that is not what speaking does originally: *"Logos* in any case does not mean judgment *[Urteil] primarily* ..." *(idem).* For a *Sachverhalt* to be established *(konstatiert, constate)* in a judgment *die Sachen* must be in the open, and it is apophantic speaking as bringing into the open, letting shine forth, *apophainesthai,* therefore, which makes the speaking of a judgment possible in the first place. Further, it should be noted that *apophainesthai,* not *apophainein* is the basis of *apophansis* as Heidegger understands it, i.e., the middle and not the active form. Establishing in a judgment *(konstatieren, constater)* is indeed a speech act, but the letting show *(phainesthai)* of *apophainesthai* is not. The latter starts from, *apo,* what is displaying itself, not from the subject-agent. That is what Gadamer also is getting at when he says that the *Spiel* of the *Sprachspiel* must be understood in the sense of the Greek middle (cf. WM 99 and p. 306 above). It is in these two respects, then, that of being distinct from and prior to constative speaking and that of being" medial," that I speak of Gadamer's turn to the *apophantic.*

One final clarification is called for on this point. Heidegger's distinction between poetic language, which I would call apophantic, and language which stands in correspondence to an object, raises the question of the status of philosophical language. In Gadamer's opinion it lies in between these two and thus points in two directions: forwards into assertion and judgment and backwards into the primary event of *apophansis.* He makes this point in regard to the *spekulativer Satz* in Hegel, which in fact is not only a *Satz* in Wittgenstein's sense of a proposition picturing the structure of a state of affairs other than itself, but also something which "besteht in sich," something which stands self-contained in itself revealing its own meaning. In this last respect it is, he adds, like poetry and artworks (HD 96). What makes Hegel so fascinating is this ambivalence of his *speculativer Satz:* ". . . it aims towards the objectivity of the thought, but it also returns from it in

the reab.sorption of all objectification into the sustaining power and shelter of the word" (HD 94). But that holds not only for Hegel. The extraordinary feature of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* is that its own *Siitze* have this same speculative ambivalence, hence the necessity for reading the original German. For in pinning down a set meaning, any translation tends to close off the radiation back into the apophantic, to destroy the poetic dimension of what is said there.

Keeping this distinction between apophantic and other modes of discourse in mind, let us proceed to the question of truth and falsity in speaking, a question which the very example I took from Gadamer to display his proximity to ordinary language philosophy makes inescapable (cf. p. £98 above). Obviously, just as there are kinds of discourse, there are kinds of falsity, and these too need to be distinguished. In this regard I would speak of obfuscation, misrepresentation and mystification as at least some of the ways in which saying something false is possible. (My suggestions here are tentative to say the least, for it would be presumptious to expect finality in an issue such as this one, which apparently baffied even Plato (cf. *The Sophist)*). Apophantic speaking does not misrepresent something; it mis-presents it, which is to say that what is to be seen does not .show forth clearly in it, but is obscured, darkened instead. There is nothing esoteric about this. On the contrary, we have all experienced this phenomenon in discussions which for no want of good will in the participants still end more in confusion than in "getting clear." And in fact there is no discussion which does not lead to .some confusion along with the experience of "Aha! I see." Anyone who doubts this need only turn to Plato's dialogues to see the unavoidable equifundamentality of *lethe* and *anamnems*, concealment and insight, to which I refer. But he can find it as well in the "dialogue of the soul with itself" in which one's own thoughts just don't get quite clear and one is left in a muddle.

Such obfuscation, however, is quite different from misrepresentation of ' the facts,' be that intentional (lying) or uninten-

tional. Misrepresentation presupposes things already clear which can now be misrepresented. The original unity of the apophantic event has to have split into a subject on the one side and 'facts' on the other, and apophantic language, to have petrified into word-tools for use by a speaker agent. This *is* our situation most of the time and thus it would be quite wrong to say that we *never* use words to represent states of affairs and that language is *never* communication of true or false information. For in this derivative condition, in which we usually find ourselves, these things are the case. Now Gadamer does not deny this; his effort is only to show that, though words can be tools, they are not that originally, and that though there can be communication of information and misinforming, there is behind that the more fundamental *Gesprach* in which communication means entering the community of the shared world constituted in the language we speak.

That leaves mystification, by which I mean falsification through what Wittgenstein terms the 'metaphysical' use of words. Here we have moved furthest from the origin of the apophantic, for words which had sunk to use objects are now misused. In such misuse a *Blendwerk* is constructed which, because of the power of words to bewitch our intelligence, gives the appearance of saying something but which in fact is disengaged from reality and spins free, no longer meaning anything, but casting its spell all the same. Again, there is no denying that the *dunamis wn onomaton* which enchants us here must be fought off. There is clearly a need for being critical: one must bring words " on a holiday "-our own glib use of ' the self ' these days is a good example-back to their use in context. My point is only that it is not enough to have done just that. One must see that use in context presupposes apophantic disclosure of world. Wittgensteinian critique must therefore lead back to hermeneutics, and a preoccupation with critique would 'block our way.

Corresponding to the three levels of falsity are at least three standards of correctness: the criterion by which use is to be

judged right or wrong is ordinary use, that by which a statement of fact is so judged is its correspondence to the facts and that by which apophantic speaking, its evidentness. This last, however, does not give us what we would like: a criterion guaranteeing certainty. For what is' evidently so 'in apophantic saying might be obfuscation. So the question inevitably arises here, how we can know for sure, with certainty.

That question, the question of evidence, drove Husserl to Descartes and to the project of founding in the transcendental ego. And it is a question which drives us all, for we are all moved by what Nietzsche calls *der Wille zur Wahrheit,* a will to be sure in the double sense of secure and certain. (Descartes' word is *securitas.)* It is this will which makes us flee the" thunderstorm " of the original *apophainesthai* or showing forth of what is in poetic language. For in fact there can be no certainty here as much as we might will it. In what is said in the *poiesis* of original speaking some things show up clearly, others dimly, and others are concealed altogether. The 'evident' here is that which appears and we must accept that here appearance and reality, *Scheinen und Sein, phainesthai kai einai,* cannot be distinguished. But beginning with Socrates and Plato, Nietzsche tells us, philosophy lost its nerve, its willingness to be deceived (cf. *Die frohliche Wissenschaft,* "Vorrede "). And like them we too are repelled by the prospect that at the very origin of things no scientific, methodical criterion of truth is available to us. We all seek a *Grund* behind appearance, a *fundamentum inooncussum* which will give us clear and distinct, certain truth. But with regard to apophantic speaking we would do well, I think, to heed what Aristotle tells us: " *TO yap aKpif3e<; ovx* o*µoiw<; EV a7Tacn roi<; Aoyoi<; E7TE:,,,Yf'TYJ'TEOV"* : *(Nomachean Ethics* I iii I) -the same measure of exactitude is not to be sought at all levels of our discourse.

That does not in the least imply, however, that apophantic speaking is relative to the person who is speaking and that we must resign ourselves here to a clash between individual positions each of which has as much claim to be true as any other.

For the apophantic event happens *between* individuals in the *Mitte der Sprache.* With that we have arrived at the question of the importance of the sayer in understanding of what has been said or better said, his unimportance.

One of the merits of Gadamer's turn away from the constative to the apophantic instead of to the performative is that it shows that there are cases when the explaining away of what is said by reduction of its meaning to an expression either of the interests of the sayer or of some existential complexity in his ' self,' is misplaced. In contrast, the turn which Anglo-American philosophy has taken to the performative, where illocutionary and perlocutionary force become the primary concern, must lead unavoidably to one or the other of these reductions; for performative 'meaning' is to be sought in the reason *why* a person says what he does and, in the final
such reasons are bound to be socio-economic or psychological. The principal reason ' why ' someone says something in apophantic language, however, is the question which his statement addresses, and in this sphere of speaking that is the only 'why' that need concern us. The issue in apophantic language is *what* is said, the subject matter, not the sayer.

In this regard too Plato is instructive. To be sure, in Gadamer's view Plato is the beginning of the end, as it were (cf. p. 300 above), but he is also the end of the beginning, for in his work the search for insight, *episteme,* has not yet suppressed the *Gesprach* character of language, rather it continues to rely on the latter. In Plato's dialogues each participant begins with his particular interests, yet in the course of the conversation each is liberated from those interests so that he can follow the movement to the subject matter beyond his personal preconceptions, expectations and opinions *(doxai);* each is freed to *learn,.* to see the truth of the matter which displays itself in language, in *was zur Sprache kommt.* Now clearly there is a difference between dialogue of this sort and an argument between competing interests. Competing interests win, one over the other, and which wins is a function of power. In the case of

an argument between interests the power involved is the persuasive power of words, the *dunamis wn onomaton.* Are we always sophists though? Is there not some justification for Plato's differentiation between the rhetorical *makros logos* and a philosophical discussion? Everyone knows that a good discussion *(Gesprach)* is not won by anybody. Consider in this regard Plato's distinction between having learnt *(memathekenai)* and having been persuaded *(pepeisthai)* (*Gorgias* 454 ff.) and the parallel distinction we have made between the *Spiel* of *Sprachspiel* and competition (cf. pp. 305-06 above), where " winning isn't everything-its the only thing."

Finally, if *what* is displayed apophantically is not to be understood as an expression of some interest, neither is it to be understood as an expression of an existential problematic in the person who .says it. Just as there is language which is to be taken as a ' symptom' of interest, i.e., ideology, there is language which is to be taken as a ' symptom ' of psychological disturbances or of the 'self's' attempt to project itself forward in existing anxiously towards death. But surely these languages are not the whole of language, rather only special instances of speaking. Gadamer's point in stressing what I have called apophantic language is that in it, at least, the *mens auctoris* is not a concern; not the per.son who says something, but something said, is central. And the issue again is not why *he* said it, ' why ' here calling for a psychological or existential explanation, but *what* he said and why *it* was said, ' why ' meaning ' in answer to what question.'

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GADAMER ON HEGEL'S DIALECTIC: A REVIEW ARTICLE *

GADAMER ADDRESSES a crucial hermeneutical problem confronting any attempt to make sense of Hegel's description of dialectical reasoning. His argument is ambitious. He gives us a general characterization of Hegel's theory of dialectical reasoning. And he supplements this with an examination of paradigmatic cases of dialectical reasoning in Hegel's texts. Gadamer's effort is instructive: it teaches us how far we must yet go in order to piece together the parts of Hegel's arguments. We must learn, for one thing, how Hegel's own account of what he is doing has misled us into taking what is at least a plausible philosophical argument for something it is not and cannot be unless we choose to ignore the text and accept Hegel's interpretation of that text. For another, we must finally learn to face the fact that we have no right to expect any set procedure or method of argument from Hegel. Here I shall examine Gadamer's descriptions of three instances of Hegel's dialectic in order to answer two questions: (I) Are they faithful to Hegel's text?; and (2) Does either Hegel's text or Gadamer's description of what goes on there exhibit any distinctive logical structure? Take them in turn.

a. The Inverted World *(die verkehrte Welt)*

This form of consciousness occurs in the *Phenomenology of Mind* at the conclusion of Hegel's description of the forms of consciousness (pp. 208-18). Gadamer tells us in *Hegel's Dialectic* [2] that Hegel shows "how contradictory the consciousness of this object is in the form it presents itself to us," and, further, shows " the movement in which the consciousness under observation learns of these contradictions itself . . . . " (p. 89). Gadamer begins with the notion of a thing and its properties, saying that " [t]he truth

*Hans-Georg Gadamer: *Hegel's Dialectic,* transl. P. Christopher Smith (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976). Cf. also the article by Gadamer's translator. P. Christopher Smith. in this present issue of *The Thomist,* pp. 3££ ff.

[1] G. W. F. Hegel: *The Phenomenology of Mind,* transl. J. B. Baillie (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1964); henceforth PM.

•Henceforth HD.

intended by the 'thing with properties' is not the 'thing with properties' but rather force and the play of forces" (HD, p. 37). In what Hegel calls the form of perception *(die Wahrnehmung),* we are shown "that the truth intended by the thesis of the 'thing with properties' is not the 'thing with properties' but rather force and the play of forces" (HD, p. 37). For Gadamer the dialectical point of the Inverted World is "that when I take the opposite ... to be true 'in and for itself,' the truth is necessarily of itself" (HD, p. 46). The Inverted World displays itself as the reversal of another world. Gadamer says: "[I]t is the 'true, supersensible' world which contains both aspects [both appearance and reality] and which divides itself into this opposition and thereby relates itself to itself" (HD, p. 49).

Gadamer makes two points. Every form of consciousness in the *Phenomenology* generates contradictions. What we intend by any form is really something other than what we claim to intend. Compare these claims with Gadamer's description of the sections of the *Phenomenology* from Sense Certainty *(sinnliche Gewissheit)* through the Inverted World *(die verkehrte Welt)*. But first the background: Sense Certainty claims that we can individuate or single out particulars in our perceptual experience (PM, pp. 150ff.). Hegel's conclusion is that we succeed in intending only what is universal or what is common to many particulars (PM, p. 159). This neither exhibits a contradiction nor does Hegel's text show us that the object of our intention is really something other than we take it to be. Gadamer claims otherwise. But let us first listen to Hegel.

Sense Certainty claims that we are able to make successful individuating references by certain linguistic vehicles. Hegel's argument purports to show that our use of such expressions as "this" and "now" merely singles out common properties. But this does not demonstrate a contradiction in Sense Certainty. It demonstrates something about our state of enlightenment about certain ways of individuating things. The intention (Hegel's *Meinen)* of using an expression in a certain way is unsuccessful if the use of such an expression is different from what we thought it to be. In order to generate a contradiction, however, it must first be shown that we are engaged in a *successful* use of an expression. The lack of such a use prevents a logical relation of any kind from obtaining between the description of our use of an expression and the description of a contradiction which it supposedly entails.

Sense Certainty is something other than it had been taken to be. Some of us attempt to individuate by the use of linguistic ex-

pressions which, if Hegel is right, only denote what is common to many. The outcome of Sense Certainty is that we are aware that the way in which we make individuating references is false. But it does not show that we really intend the relation in a thing of what Hegel calls a medium and the properties in that medium (PM, p. 163). Nor is the relation between a thing and its properties what we really intend although we erroneously claim to intend only particulars. Gadamer's reconstruction falters here. He does not distinguish between situations in which we fail to make a *successful* reference at all and the very different situations in which we make a *mistaken* reference. Sense Certainty demonstrates the former, not the latter.

Hegel's text bears this out. Hegel begins the section on Sense Certainty-and this is what Gadamer ignores-with a discussion, not of what individuates something, but rather of how we can successfully make individuating references to what we experience. The attack focuses on indexicals. We cannot refer successfully to something we experience by using such locutions as " here " and " now " because they can be used to apply indifferently to any number of particulars; hence, they cannot be used to single out any particular uniquely (PM, pp. 151 ff.). And Hegel goes on to argue in the same way about other cases of what we have learned to call indexical expressions: we cannot, for example, successfully make an individuating reference by relating our use of a word to expressions in the first person singular. Indexicals like **"I"** can be used in different contexts. This reproduces the problem indexicals are supposed to solve (PM, pp. 154 ff.). None of this implies a contradiction. Nor does any of it, as Gadamer claims, imply that we really succeed in referring to something to which we had not intended to refer. Let me explain.

Hegel does not conclude that what we really succeed in mtending is a universal or common property when we think we intend particulars. The argument shows that we can deploy indexicals on many different occasions to denote many numerically different particulars. It assumes that indexicals cannot be used to make identifying reference to particulars if the same indexical can be used on several occasions to refer to many different particulars. We can, if Hegel is right, use such expressions to identify many different particulars on as many different occasions. What follows is that we do not suceed on any given occasion in using such an expression to make individuating references. This is not to say, as Gadamer imputes to Hegel, that the occasions on which we unsuccessfully try to refer to particulars are really occasions

on which we refer to common properties. The collapse of reference is not itself another kind of reference; hence, Sense Certainty cannot lead us to a contradiction.

Gadamer claims that what Hegel calls Force and Understanding *(Kraft und Verstand)* is what we unwittingly intend when we say that we are describing a relation between a thing and its properties. This cannot be the case. We do not intend a thing and its properties simply because there is no *thing* to intend. What we *do* intend at the beginning of Perception is what Hegel calls a medium. This is the fact that certain properties are bundled together. There is no transition, dialectical or otherwise, between a mode of consciousness in which we intend a perceptual particular and one in which we intend a force and its expressions. The section on Force and Understanding *(Kraft und Verstand)* is not, therefore, a record of what we really intend all along when we falsely think we intend a thing with properties. It is only one way of construing the relation between a thing and its properties.

The distinction between a particular and the characteristics it instantiates runs across the thing-property and the force-expression distinctions. We can distinguish a particular from the properties it instantiates when we take what we observe to be a thing possessing properties. But the expression of a force is not exempt from this distinction. What Hegel calls an expression of force is how something presents itself to us by acting on our sensory apparatus. But the expression, however else it may be related to the force which causes it, still presents itself as a particular with properties. We have not, therefore, moved beyond the distinction between a thing and its properties. We have only duplicated it at another level. The force-expression relation, then, reproduces all of the difficulties of its predecessor. Hegel's text is incompatible with Gadamer's reading because one of these forms of consciousness is not the truth of its predecessor but rather another embodiment of the difficulty which undermines the previous form of perceptual consciousness.

This threatens Gadamer's appeal to satire as a way of understanding Hegel's notion of the Inverted World (HD, pp. 48 ff.). That appeal breaks down on the distinction between duplicating something and satirizing it. The inversion of roles-what Gadamer calls "this reversal in which everything is the opposite of itself"-does not distinguish *two worlds* (HD, p. 48; cf. PM, pp.
Hegel's text purports to show that the inversion of properties--a world in which something has a property that is the exact opposite of what it has in another world-generates two different *worlds.* Consider how this comes about.

The Inverted World is a version of Hegel's distinction between the sensible and supersensible worlds. What Hegel calls a force and its expression in the *Phenomenology* has already collapsed because the notion of a force has all of the relevant characteristics of the common properties it was supposed to individuate. The Inverted World allegedly solves this problem by introducing a new particular which has a characteristic which its counterpart in the sensible world lacks. Inversion requires the postulation of a different world. It cannot make do with the assumption that the particulars in the world we perceive appear to have qualities which they lack. Hegel has already rejected this way out by showing that the relation between a property and what has it cannot be explained by anything which we see in the world open to our sensuous inspection. The alternative is to postulate another world in which the particulars really have the properties which the particulars in the world which we experience only appear to have. Gadamer says that everything is the opposite of itself in the Inverted World (HD, p. 48). This is true; but it disqualifies the appeal to satire as an exegetical instrument. *For the notion of satire can be applied in the context both of what Hegel calls the supersensible and of the sensible world.* But since this is possible, satire cannot explain how inversion generates two different worlds. Yet Hegel argues that an attempt to relate a particular to its properties by putting the particular in one world and relating it to the properties which appear to us in another merely duplicates the problem we want to solve. The inversion cannot, then, take place in one and the same world; hence, satire cannot improve our understanding of inversion just because it does not generate a world in which the characteristics of things we see are supposedly explained by the characteristics of things which we do not see.

b. The Master-Slave Relation *(Herrschaft und Knechtschaft)*

This is Gadamer's account of what goes on in the *Phenomenology* beginning with *Die Wahrheit der Gewissheit seiner selbst* (HD, p. 57). Hegel introduces the notions of Life, Desire, and Recognition *(das Leben, die Begierde,* and *die Anerkr'i.nung)* as a way of making the transition from the section on Ii'orces and Understanding to the Master-Slave Relation. Gadamer begins: Understanding Life assumes that somebody "must already know himself, i.e., be self-consciousness" (HD, p. 59). Self-awareness is an instance of life: the content of awareness in such a case is identical with the subject of awareness.

Desire is a mode of self-awareness but, on Gadamer's account, " knows itself to be dependent on the object of desire as something

other than itself" (HD, p. 63). Desiring assumes that something is desired. From all of this Gadamer infers that, for Hegel, self-consciousness occurs whenever the self recognizes another center of consciousness. And this is paradigmatically demonstrated in the case of the relation between the social roles of a master and his slave. The master is dependent upon the slave in order to be a master; hence, the master must be dependent in order to be a master: "The truth of the independent consciousness is accordingly the consciousness of the bondsman " (PM, p. .

The notion of Life does not emerge from the section on Force and Understanding as Gadamer describes it. Hegel says that what we call the inner natures of things or laws of understanding are really mental fictions. When we claim that they exist, we say something about the fact of our mental activity in understanding perceptual objects. Hegel's text does not say that acts of consciousness assume acts of self-consciousness. The upshot of Hegel's examination of Consciousness is that these fictions merely duplicate the problem which he has already raised about how we come to know phenomenal states of affairs. And this does not show that every act of consciousness assumes an act of self-consciousness.

But worse is to come. Suppose we say that the outcome of the section on Consciousness is that all contents of consciousness are mental. The same scenario can be written for a world in which every object of awareness is mental that Hegel has just written for the problems besetting our claims to know a perceptual particular and its properties. What Hegel calls the Inverted World illustrates this. The supersensible world can occur in a description of a completely idealistic world. The problem of the Inverted World is not that it is idealistic but rather that it duplicates the problems of the sensible world. The difficulties infecting duplication occur independently of whether the world being duplicated is or is not the product of minds.

Hegel says at the end of the section on *Bewuj3tsein* that the ways in which we distinguish particulars from common properties are so many devices which we contrive: they are mental fictions. But the conclusion of the section is that, mental fictions or not, what is wrong with them is that they duplicate the phenomenon to be explained. To say that something is mental does not escape the problem that besets the form of consciousness which Hegel calls Sense Certainty. The conclusion to which that section drives us is not that we have finally learned to accept the fact that the objects of Sense Certainty are mental. That is Gadamer's conclusion. It is not Hegel's. The conclusion to which Hegel argues

is that even an appeal to mental constructs merely duplicates the problem that it was meant to solve. To say that something is mental is an incidental feature of what goes on here.

c. Being-Nothing-Becoming *(Sein-Nichts-Werden)*

Hegel says that the concept of Being is identical with the concept of Nothing. He also claims that the concept of Becoming is constructed out of a combination of the two other concepts. Both cause trouble. If the first two concepts are identical, then in what sense are they presented to us as different? Waiving this question only confronts us with another: Assuming that they are identical, then how can Becoming be a construct of two concepts which are really one and not two?

Gadamer's exegesis divides into these parts:

(1) "Being and Nothing are 'different only in belief.' ... [I]f both were purely thought by themselves neither would be distinguishable from the other" (HD, p. 87).

(!'!) "Being and Nothing exist solely in passing over or transition itself, as Becoming" (HD, p. 89).

(3) "[l]n Being, just as in Nothing, nothing determinate is thought. What is present is empty intuiting or thinking .... But even if nothing other than empty intuiting or thinking is present, the movement of self-determination, that is, of Becoming, is there" (HD, p. 91).

Consider each of Gadamer's claims in turn.

Claim (1) cannot explain how the concepts of Being and Nothing are different only in belief. If Gadamer is right, two states of belief can differ even though those belief states have one and the same object. Hegel's distinction, then, is between identity of concepts and a difference between our states of enlightenment about the relation of those concepts. Thus if, as Gadamer alleges, " both were purely thought by themselves," there would not be a distinction between two beliefs concerning their relation: a difference in state of enlightenment would be impossible.

Both difference and identity are here. But Gadamer locates them in the wrong places. Suppose there are two different belief states with respect to one and the same concept. Each state must have a different content in order to account for the difference in mental states. And this only generates a vicious infinite regress. We begin by asking how one and the same concept can appear to be two concepts. We then appeal to a difference of intention-what Hegel calls *das Meinen-to* explain the difference. This yields a difference

in the contents of the two intentions. But once we distinguish between the identity of the original two concepts and the difference between the two contents, we have the same problem all over again: How can the two contents be only apparently different but really the same? And this reproduces the very problem it was supposed to solve. A difference of epistemic content violates one of the conditions of the solution of Hegel's problem; namely, that we are to explain how the concepts of Being and Nothing are really identical although we can state our epistemic relation to them only in terms of two different contents. The contents of our states of enlightenment about the original concept in turn become themselves concepts with respect to which we can be in various states of enlightenment. Hegel's problem must either be solved at the very outset with respect to our epistemic relation to the concepts of Being and Nothing or it cannot be solved at all. Gadamer's first claim is, therefore, philosophically ruinous for Hegel.

Claims and (3) are vulnerable in two places. Being and Nothing, Gadamer tells us, "exist solely as passing over or transition." He also says that this transition is "the movement of self-determination." The former goes at once: If Being and Nothing are the same concept, then there can be no transition at all except in our awareness of the fact that they are the same. And without transition there can be no Becoming.

The latter alternative to which Gadamer appeals survives only slightly longer. Suppose, as Gadamer does, that the transition in question takes place in the context of determinate being: To say that there is a passage from Nothing to Being is, on this alternative, to say that something which is potentially f at time t is actually f at a later time t'. But this, though true, still breaks down on two difficulties. The notion of determinate being cannot be used to explicate transition just because what makes something determinate can be fully specified without any reference to time. Determinate being does not, then, assume transition. And, what is equally damaging, to say that determinate being is just the passage in time from something's having f potentially to something's having f actually, though it rescues the notion of transition, has nothing logically to do with the Hegelian concepts of Being and Nothing. Not with Being, because that notion, as we have seen, can be specified independently of time. Not with Nothing, because something's being, say, potentially f is still a determinate property of that thing; therefore, something's being potentially f cannot be a case of its being nothing just because the thing is determinate.

Gadamer's reconstruction of Hegel's arguments successfully alerts us to the hermeneutical dangers surrounding Hegel's text. It is a serious mistake to expect any of Hegel's arguments to conform to what he himself says about them. It is an even more serious mistake to expect philosophically plausible arguments to illuminate what Hegel says by attributing them to him. And it is foolhardy to assume that what Hegel calls dialectic is a distinctive kind of reasoning.

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BOOK REVIEWS

S. Thomae de Aquino. Opera Omnia, iussu Leonis XIII **P.** M. edita. XXVIII. *Expositio super Isaiam ad litteram,* cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum. Editori di San Tommaso, Santa Sabina (Aventino}, 1974. Pp. 85+293. Documents and Indexes.

During the twelve years that the late Father Pierre-Marie de Contenson, **O.P.** (d. 7 July 1976}, was Director General of the Leonine Commission (among other things), he supervised the publication of the last twelve fascicles, comprising seven volumes, of the critical edition of the complete works of St. Thomas Aquinas. Based on the most sophisticated techniques of textual criticism, developed mainly by the French Dominicans over the past twenty or more years, these volumes were published in the universally acclaimed new format that has been the envy of scholars engaged in editing medieval Latin texts. The most important feature of this Leonine method is the statistical establishment of the stemma upon which rests the entire reconstructed text as it came (so it is hoped) from the mind, if not always the hand, of St. Thomas himself. The ultimate *proof* of the critical text is to be found in the superb prefaces that introduce each text published within the past twelve years. The present volume is no exception. This is a superb piece of work which determines the twenty-three pecias of *Super lsaiam,* establishes the stemma of the manuscript tradition, and reconstructs the text-all explained in an illuminating preface by Fathers **H.** F. Dondaine and Leon Reid, and accompanied by a critical apparatus containing every detail the most exacting scholar might demand. The volume will contribute immeasurably to our historical understanding of the Bible in the High Middle Ages, and especially of the content of Aquinas's teaching as a *cursor biblicus* during his early academic career. In what follows, a brief description will be given of some of the technical conclusions to which the editors have come; fuller observations will be made regarding historical points that may prove of greater interest to readers of this journal.

St. Thomas wrote the original in his own hand *(manii sua)* and bequeathed it together with his other books to his faithful companion Reginald of Piperno. What remains of the autograph was preserved in the Dominican Library at Naples until 1354. All the extant MSS of the *Super Isaiam* (except **P)** contain a colophon more or less intact that explains the history of the manuscript tradition:

So ends the commentary *(sententia)* and exposition *(expositio)* "ad litteram" on Isaiah according to Friar Thomas d'Aquino, which Friar Jacobino of Asti of the Province of Lombardy, then studying in the General Studium at Naples, transliterated into legible script together with a fuller rendering of the authorities *(auctoritatum).* He also arranged *collationes* in certain places on various passages; and this he did for the benefit of the Friars of our Order and that copies could be made of the aforesaid writings. (Bologna, Bihl. Univ. MS 1655, f. 70va)

The *littera inintelligibilis* of St. Thomas is, of course, notorious and it is a wonder that a man like Jacobino of Asti could be found, apart from Reginald, to make such an amazingly accurate transcription (cf. § 38, p. 41*-43*)-this despite the fact that at times he slipped up on his readings, misplaced some of Thomas's own *collationes,* and sometimes expanded the wrong citations or expanded them too much. The only independent date associated with Jacobino of Asti is 2 July 1295, when he witnessed a judgment pronounced by the Dominican Prior of Genoa. But the transcription must have been made before 1303, when the Province of Lombardy was divided into Upper and Lower, and after 1290, when Naples became the *studium generale* for the Roman Province of Dominicans. An exemplar of this transcription was known in Paris by 1304, when it was listed by the university stationers as "Item super ysayam, xxiij pecias" (CUP II, p. 108). Nevertheless Tolomeo of Lucca, writing around 1320, could say, "Scripsit etiam super Isaiam *sed raro invenitur."* This last phrase was repeated by Bernard Gui, who correctly identified the work as a *Postilla.* No doubt, compared to the 59 extant MSS of *Super Job,* the 16 extant MSS of *Super Isaiam* would make the work relatively "rare".

Today only a fragment-about one-fifth-of the entire autograph exists, namely the postill on chapters 34-50:1. This is now bound with the autograph fragment of *Summa contra gentiles* and part of *In Boeth. De trin.* in Vatican MS Vat. lat. 9850 as ff. 105ra-114vb. The manuscript volume was discovered by Pietro Antonio Uccelli and elaborately published by him at Milan in 1847; later, in 1876, it was presented by the diocese of Bergamo to Pope Pius IX. Besides this autograph fragment (A) only sixteen complete manuscript copies and two fragments are known, but all are derived from the transcription made by Jacobino of Asti (a). For most of the text the manuscript tradition is relatively simple. From chapter *5,* line 404, to the end of Isaiah, which contains 66 chapters, the apograph (a) can be reconstructed basically from Bologna, Bihl. Univ. 1655 (Bo), from Florence, Laurenziana, Plaut. XXIV (F), and from *IT,* which is the consensus of five other MSS copied from the same source as F. In this substantial part of the text-roughly 62 of the 66 chapters-Seville, Colombina 7-6-3 (Sv) is a direct copy of Bo. But in the opening part of the text, that is, from the Prologue to chapter *5,* line 404, Sv represents a distinct tradition apparently dependent upon an earlier stage of *a.* Thus the 66

chapters of *Super lsaiam* in *Q3* pecias can be divided into four sections or "zones" (cf. § *15,* p. QI*):

I – the Prologue to chap. 51: 7 (line 404), which derives from *a.* (1), which seems to be an early stage of the transcription made by Jacobino of Asti;
II - chap. 5: 17 (line 405) to chap. 33. which derives from *a.* (2), which seems to be the final stage of Jacobino's transcription;
III - chap. 34 to 50: 1, which is the autograph (A) with minor corrections; and
IV - chap. 50: 1 to the end of Isaiah, which again derives from *a.* (2), the final transcription by Jacobino.

On this basis the reconstruction of the m1ssmg autograph was fairly straightforward, even though it is obvious that St. Thomas wrote in great haste, jotting down incomplete and sometimes incorrect references *(auctoritates)* , and thereby creating many problems that have been nicely solved by the Leonine editors. As P. Gils notes (p. l 7*a), the kind of" blunders" in the autograph are the exact opposite of what one would expect from a *reportatio.* They indicate a rough, day-to-day preparation for class by a young bachelor pressed for time.

An incidental point clarified by the preface is the relatively good condition of the printed editions of the commentary on Isaiah. The Pisan Dominican Bartholomew of Spina happened to choose a "corrected descendent " (p. 28*, 32*) of Bo, one of the best MSS, for the *editio princeps* (Venice 1527); all other printed editions stem from that text until P. A. Uccelli transcribed the autograph fragment and published it for the first time in 1847.

It should further be noted in passing that the Bible that Thomas used has not yet been identified. Thomas's personal Bible was certainly not that of Viterbo (Bihl. Comm. II. A.Vli-5), as Uccelli hud thought. But neither does it fit into any of the Parisian recensions, not even the Jacobin *Correctorium* established by the Paris Dominicans around *IQ50.* The Canadian editors of the present edition have taken great pains to reconstruct Thomas's Text of the Bible (T) from the lemmata given in the comment, but as these are all too brief and the autograph so short, it is premature to pass any judgment on the Bible Thomas had in hand when he commented on Scripture. A minor point, for example, is the reading of Thomas's Text for Is 6: I wherein a whole phrase is inserted that is not found in the Vulgate, Septuagint, or Massoretic text, namely, "et plena [erat] domus a maiestate eius," which Thomas used as the theme for his Prologue to the *Lectura super Joannem.* It would seem that the Marietti (1952) reading of this phrase is wrong: "et plena erat *omnis terra* maiestate eius " (p. la) . Throughout the entire commentary on Isaiah, it should be noted, the present editors continually have to "correct" Thomas's references with the more precise reference, *rectius ...* , which usually

refers to chapter numbers other than that given by Thomas even in the autograph. The solution to these and many similar problems cannot be given until a fuller concordance is made of the biblical references *as Thomas knew them,* presuming, of course, that his memory and concentration rarely faltered!

On first reading, the postill *Super Isaiam* appears to be composed of two parts of different *genre:* chap. 1 to 11, and 12 to the end (cf. § 14, p. 20*). Even I. T. Eschmann described the first as" written in the usual form of a scholastic University commentary composed by the Master in Theology; the theological developments are frequent and abundant." Concerning the second part, Eschmann noted that " these developments are lacking and the exposition confines itself to a merely literal gloss " (" A Catalogue of St. Thomas's Works," n. 20, p. 395 in E. Gilson's *Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas,* New York 1956). From this Eschmann concluded that these two parts were composed at two different times. While it is true that there are *some* (Chap. 1-8 and chap. 11) theological elaborations, questions, and solutions in the first part, these can all be found in the two main sources of Thomas's commentary, namely the *Glossa ordinaria,* and the Postill on Isaiah by Hugh of Saint-Cher, O.P. (cf. § 46, pp. 52*-53*). On more careful reading, we must say that the whole commentary of St. Thomas comprises a single unity and that all of it was composed at the same time. Contrary to Eschmann's suspicions, they are not two literary *genres,* but a single *genre* proper to the *cursor biblicus* (cf. § 14, p. 20*). It seems that the young Thomas, like many other young teachers, spent too much time in explaining the first eleven chapters, then realized that time was running out; so he proceded as he should have from the start, namely *cursorie.*

One of the conspicuous features of the commentary (even in the autograph), which it shares with the *Super Ierem,iam,* is the presence of *collationes.* The authenticity, nature, and purpose of these *collationes* have long been a puzzle to Thomistic scholars. Destrez thought them to be interpolations due to Jacobino. But as Documents V to XII of the autograph demonstrate, twenty-four *collationes* are in the *littera inintelligibilis* of St. Thomas, while six "schemes" (or six complex diagrams) are in the familiar hand of Reginald of Piperno! These *collationes* and diagrams are always on the top, side, or bottom margin of particular folios. Jacobino of Asti merely transcribed both the text and *collatio,* variously inserting the latter at the end of Thomas's comment on a particular verse or putting them at the end of the chapter (but note postill on 31:9, 64, referring to chap. 30, 324 ff.).

The first question that comes to mind is, What is the exact meaning of *collatio* in this context? What do these *collationes* represent? The classical meaning of *collatio* as " gathering " or " comparison " had already

expanded by the time of Cassian's *Collationes Patrum.* Even the spiritual "readings" or "conferences" after supper noted in Du Cange, Niermeyer, or the *Medieval Latin Wor<l-List* do not cover the peculiar meaning of the term as used in the *Super Isaiam.* The opinion of Fr. Gils (p. 17*a) is most helpful and suggestive: that which is essentially the "spiritual" part of a commentary, or what the ancients called " the mystical sense " of Scripture. But it would seem that the precise meaning of the term *collatio* extended to " spiritual associations " of a biblical passage needs not only to be further studied, but also noted in medieval Latin word-lists.

The more difficult problem is the disturbing testimony of William of Tocco, given both in the *Hystoria* (chap. 31) and in the Process of Canonization *(Fontes,* pp. 346-47), that after Thomas puzzled, fasted, and prayed over a difficult passage in Isaiah for many days and nights, he called Reginald from his sleep and said, "Write *in quaterno super Ysaiam."* What did Reginald write? Certainly not the text of which we have the autograph. And most likely not the *schemes* or diagrams in the margin. So this problem must remain unresolved for the present.

The most reasonable explanation for Reginald's diagrams in the MS is given by the Leonine editors H. F. Dondaine and L. Reid when they say that there was once a complete autograph, perhaps with some dictated passages; but it was the work of a young author who did not judge the work worthy of publication; Reginald however, occasionally utilized it for the preparation of a course of lectures or sermons (p. 19*).

More important for the present state of our knowledge is the literary *genre,* the date of composition, and the proper title of *Super Isaiam.* These are purely historical questions and in no way reflect upon the excellence of the textual work produced by the Leonine editors.

There can no longer be any doubt, as the editors demonstrate, that this commentary is the integral work of a *cursor biblicus,* a rare recognition in itself and worthy of special note. The editors clearly state that this commentary is a course of lectures given by the *baccalarius biblicus* and that this commentary is "the first theological work of St. Thomas" (§ 13, p.

Experts in the orthography of St. Thomas place *Super Isaiam* chronologically after the *reportatio* of Albert's lectures on pseudo-Dionysius (after 1248) and before the *Scriptum super III Sententiarum* (around 1254-55). Whatever the date and whatever the place, there can be no doubt that *Super Isaiam* was written between the other two autographs (§ 13, p.

In my *Friar Thomas d'Aquino* (p. 45) I suggested that the *doctrinae sterilitas* that so disturbed Sixtus of Siena in Thomas's *Super Ieremiam, Super Threnos,* and part of *Super Isaiam* may be due to the fact that they were given by Thomas in Cologne as a bachelor under Albeit.. I also said:

Normally such biblical commentaries or glosses do not survive, for as a rule they are not worth preserving. If the three works ar·e indeed the result of Thomas's

cursory lectures on the Bible, then we have in them a rare opportunity to examine the type of work a *cursor biblicus* was likely to produce.

Now that we know that Thomas's *Super lsaiam* is the work of his years as *cursor biblicus* (whether at Cologne or Paris), we are in a position to understand better the kind of work done by the *baccalarius biblicus.* For this we should be most grateful.

Further, I have argued in my book (pp. *50, 53,* 71-72 *et passim)* that Thomas was never a *cursor biblicus* at Paris. Rather, he was sent by the Master of the Order to Paris in 1252 " *ad legendum Sententias,"* and not to lecture cursorily on the Bible. Having agreed that *Super Isaiam* is the work of a biblical bachelor, the editors suggest that the work must have been composed at Paris during the academic year *1252-53* (§ 13, p. 20*). This argument follows if we assume Mandonnet's hypothesis that " the normal course of studies " for a secular cleric also held for the friars. This hypothesis is still open to doubt. The chronology of the autograph in itself does not indicate *where* it was composed, whether at Cologne under Albert or at Paris before the *Sentences.* Since I am not convinced of Mandonnet's hypothesis, I would tend to place the composition of *Super lsaiam* at Cologne some time before the summer of 1252, rather than at Paris during the academic year *1252-53.* But this is an historical point, still open to discussion.

But a far more important historical point concerns the true and accurate title of this work. It is obvious that the words *Expositio* and *ad litteram* are derived from the colophon of Jacobino of Asti (§ 14, p. 20*). But if the word " expositio " is to have any technical meaning at all, its use here is radically different from its better-known use in *Expositio super Job ad litteram (Opera Omnia,* Leon. ed. XXVI). The title *Expositio* in the latter sense is a clearly defined, well-known literary *genre* that is practically equivalent to an *Ordinatio.* But in all the medieval lists of the authentic writings of Thomas this work is usually entitled simply *Supei· Ysaiam,* sometimes *Glossa super Ysaiam,* or more precisely *Postilla super Isaiam,* as in Bernard Gui's list. In the highly authoritative list of Nicholas Trevet, "Litteralis etiam expositionis in Job edidit librum unum" is clearly distinguished from "Item super Isaiam, Jeremiam et Threnos postillas conscripsit" *(Annales,* p. 288). Nicholas of Lyra also called it a *postilla,* as the editors note (§ 1, p. 3*), although he thought it was a *reportatio.* The phrase "ad litteram" also comes solely from the colophon of Jacobino, but all it really means is " literal," as any *cui:sorie* reading should be, a.s opposed to "spiritual," "mystical," "moral," " symbolical," and the like, even though on numerous occasions in the commentary Thomas does give a "mystical" sense, e.g., *Mystice:* ... (66, 183, etc.). But this is only briefly and in passing.

Since the *sole* source for both "expositio" and "ad litteram" is Jacobino

of Asti's colophon, in this writer's opinion it would have been more faithful and accurate historically to entitle the present text of St. Thomas simply *Postilla super Isaiam.* If the editors had chosen the other term used by Jacobino, namely *Sententia,* that would have been better, but still inaccurate and misleading. Consequently, the title of this work as given, *Expositio super Isaiam ad litteram,* has nothing in common, in any technical and historical sense, with the more important *Expositio super Job ad litteram.* In the writer's opinion the choice of title is unfortunate, but at this stage nothing can be done about it.

These historical observations and minor differences of view, however, in no way detract from the critical excellence of textual reconstruction manifested so clearly in this volume, both in its preface and in its definitive text. This addition to the Leonine *Opera Omnia* of St. Thomas must rank as one of the finest, most exquisite, thorough and superb examples of what a critical edition should be in our day. Here textual criticism and technical proficiency join in a happy marriage that should produce much fruit for future scholars, both biblical and theological. This particular volume will be indispensable for serious students of the Bible in the Middle Ages.

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Teleological Explanations: An Etiological Analysis of Goals and Functions. By LARRY WRIGHT. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1976. Pp. *153.* $10.00.

The venerable debate over final causes has been revived in the last score of years in the form of a debate over the place of teleological explanation in science. Although most philosophers of science writing today believe that teleological explanations are appropriate in at least certain areas of science, there is little agreement on how teleological statements are to be analyzed so as to justify that inclusion. Each of our authors gives a comprehensive account of teleology and contributes significantly to the ancient debate.

Larry Wright, having authored many recent articles on the subject, is the most prolific writer today on teleology. His book, however, contains little new material, borrowing heavily from his articles not only in content but also verbatim in some sections, and without inforn1ing the reader.

Perhaps the most critical issue in the d.ebate is whether teleological statements presuppose mind. Wright claims they do not, arguing that teleological descriptions of nonhuman subject matter are metaphorical ex-

tensions of teleological descriptions of human behavior. Metaphors need not be capable of literal paraphrase. Rather, some are indispensable precisely because they can express things for which there are no literal paraphrases. The extended meanings may become so thoroughly accepted, as in the case of " guinea pig " and " Pollyanna," that the original comparisons are forgotten and the metaphors become dead. "It will be the central contention of this essay that teleological expressions in most nonhuman applications represent dead anthropomorphic metaphors" (p. QI).

In metaphors, something is retained and something is dropped. The part that is dropped is any reference to or implication of mind. " In general, I will argue that the feature of human teleology which transfers to nonhuman cases is that when we say ' A in order that B,' the relationship between A and B plays a role in bringing about A. It is this which is being pointed out, rather than intelligence and conscious purpose" (p. QI).

Wright staunchly defends the objectivity of teleological judgments. Evidence for them is as good as is evidence for other judgments, and intersubjective agreement and reliability are as high: " goal-directedness is often obvious on its face. . . . Occasionally there simply is no question about it: the rabbit is fleeing, the cat stalking, the squirrel building a nest. Certain complex behavior patterns seem to demand teleological characterization" (p. Q3).

It is common to all teleological statements, whether about goal direction or functions, that they are explanations. " For it is the central logical property of teleological characterizations that they explain what they characterize. When we say 'A in order that B,' or 'A for the sake of B,' we *ipso facto* answer a question of the form 'Why A? '" (p. Q4).

A teleological explanation is a causal explanation with a forward orientation. The problem is to explain just what gives it this forward orientation. Although the analyses of Wiener et al., Braithwaite, and Nagel are all causal, they " cannot accommodate a substantial range of clear and objective goal-directed behavior, and furthermore, they manage to include a range of demonstrably nonteleological behavior as well" (p. Q9). A valuable contribution of Wright's is his refrain that teleological judgments are routinely and reliably made even when the structure and internal mechanisms are unknown. We are very good, he reminds us, at identifying fleeing rabbits even though we may know little or nothing about their physiology or habits. The theories mentioned above err precisely because they bring in structural detail (p. 30). This argument would seem to be directed especially at all cybernetic analyses of teleology.

The work of Charles Taylor *(The Explanation of Behavior*, 1964) is examined in considerable detail. Wright regards Taylor's preliminary analysis-that behavior occurs for some end if it is required for that end-as being congenial to his own on the ground that it allows teleological

judgments to be made without knowledge of internal structure. Nevertheless, he rejects Taylor's requirement formula, for, as he says, a stalking animal may well have as a goal the obtaining of food even though it finds its prey trapped or dead, making stalking unnecessary (p. 35). Wright's own formula is " S does B for the sake of G if: (i) B tends to bring about G [and] (ii) B occurs because (i.e., is brought about by the fact that) it tends to bring about G " (p. 39) .

The relation of the behavior to the goal has long been a puzzling one, especially in view of the missing goal problem (the fact that S may do B for the sake of G even though G does not occur) and the multiple goals problem (the fact that two instances of B might be identical when the instances of G are different) . Wright's solution, although he regards the entire teleological statement as causal, is to interpret the relation very loosely, as expressed by " brings about, is the type of thing that brings about, is required to bring about, or is in some other way appropriate for bringing about some specific goal" (pp. 38, 39). Whether a relation so elastic is sufficiently discriminating remains to be seen.

Because Wright's formula does not mention internal structure, it has wide application. " S could be an organism, a mechanism, a lump of quartz or a forest fire; so long as what S *did* could be shown to depend on its having certain consequences, S's behavior is teleological" (p. 59). He acknowledges that his analysis would render much in physics as exhibiting goal-directed behavior, such as the behavior of electrons described by Pauli's exclusion principle.

> Pauli's exclusion principle ... states that the electrons associated with any atom must array themselves among the permissible, discrete energy states such that no more than one electron occupies any energy state. This establishes a *final* condition or result controlling the behavior of electrons in certain sorts of interaction. So the behavior of electrons is in these cases explained by appeal to the fact that it brings about that result. According to (T) [Wright's formula], . . . this is just what it means to say behavior is teleological or goal-directed. . . .the electron did such-and-such *in order to* avoid occupying the same energy state as another electron (pp. 70, 71).

Wright is not here talking about metaphorical license. Metaphors in teleology demand no theoretical defense, for surely we can compare anything to anything else. Examples from physics are frequently used as test cases for a teleological theory because to many they have seemed to be the clearest cases of the nonteleological. If electrons behave teleologically, not to mention events covered by the various laws of conservation and thermodynamics (p. 71)), then it is hard to see how anything can be excluded. Teleology becomes universal, a function of how events are described-consequences Wright elsewhere rejects.

The key feature of Wright's analysis is that it explains the forward

orientation of teleological statements in terms of what he calls consequence-etiologies. "There is a sense in which invoking a consequence-etiology is just explaining behavior teleologically .... it is the consequence-etiological form that the paradigm and the metaphorically extended cases have in common. And since the metaphors are dead, we may say that having this sort of etiology is literally just what it is for behavior to be teleological" (p. 73).

One of the areas of dispute in the theory of teleology is the relation of goal directed behavior and functions. Wright sees them as different in that goal direction is a property of behavior while being a function is a property of either behavior or objects. Chairs and windpipes, being objects, have functions but not goal direction. Fresh water plankton, in varying their distance below the surface, exhibit behavior and have both: the goal of the behavior is to keep light intensity constant, but the function is to keep the oxygen supply constant (p. 74).

Paralleling the looseness already noted in the connection between goal directed behavior and the goal is the looseness between a function and that which has the function, this time accomplished by statements hard to reconcile. Wright says both that the function of X is always a consequence of X's being there (p. 77), and that Z may be the function of X even when Z is not a consequence of X's being there. He has in mind two familiar classes: defective artifacts, for example, a windshield washer switch that does not work, and defective organs, for example, an epiglottis that does not close. We flag the word "function" in some way to show that such cases are variant (pp. 112, 113). The difficulty Wright is wrestling with here suggests that the problem of goal failure has its parallel in things having functions even though they do not work. To this one could add that the problem of multiple goals seems to have its parallel in identical things having different functions. Both parallels suggest that goal direction and functions are very close indeed.

Functions, as well as goal direction, are analyzed in terms of consequence etiology. In addition to a function's being a consequence of X, reference to a function also explains why X is there. This is clear from the fact that "What is the function of X?" and "Why is X there?" are both answered by the same reply (p. 80). Thus the two central features of ascriptions of goal direction are also central features of ascriptions of functions: to ascribe is to explain and the explanation is by consequence etiology. Wright's formal analysis of functions, reflecting these two features, is "The function of X is Z if: (i) Z is a consequence (result) of X's being there, [and] (ii) X is there because it does (results in) Z" (p. 81).

A major problem in the analysis of functions is how to give an account that will do justice to the functions of human artifacts while covering the functions of the parts and processes of organisms. Some, such as Braith-

waite, Nagel, Canfield, and Ruse, simply ignore the problem. It is a sign of progress in the field that Wright, Wimsatt ("Teleology and the Logical Structure of Function Statements," *Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science,* 1972), and Woodfield (below) try for a more comprehensive theory. Wright divides functions into the conscious and the natural. The division does not indicate a difference in meaning, for the formal analysis serves both. Rather, it indicates a difference in origin. Where the function comes from is " a matter of mere etiological detail " (p. 97) . " Accordingly, the consequence-etiological analysis begs no theological questions: the organs or organisms logically could get their functions through God's conscious design; but we can also make perfectly good sense of their functions in the absence of divine intervention " (p. 97) .

Wright holds, as does Wimsatt, that both conscious and natural functions have their origin in selection: conscious election and natural selection. " For just as conscious functions provide a consequence-etiology by virtue of conscious selection, natural functions provide the very same sort of of etiology as a result of natural selection" (p. 84). Wright sees the difference between conscious and natural selection as only " the slightest change in nuance" (p. 84) and warns the reader that it would be "obscurantist ... to drive much of a conceptual wedge between conscious and natural consequence-selection " (p. 87) . The concept of natural selection is an extension of that of conscious selection (p. 85). Wright, like Wimsatt, believes that selection does not require a selector (pp. 86, 105), implying that design may not require a designer and even suggesting as much (p. 105).

The final chapter is devoted to arguing that his analysis is adequate to account for deliberate and intentional human action, attacking arguments which say that such behavior cannot be the result of mechanical factors.

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Teleology. By ANDREW WOODFIELD. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1976. Pp. 232. $16.95.

Andrew Woodfield's only previous work on teleology has been "Darwin, Teleology, and Taxonomy," *Philosophy,* 1973. His *Teleology,* however, is clearly a major contribution to the subject.

Woodfield begins by offering a historical perspective, reviewing Aristotle's doctrine of final causes, the Renaissance reply, and the teleological metaphysics of Leibniz. There follows a rather extended account of his

own methodology and assumptions, during the course of which he discusses and rejects Kant's projectionist account (that teleological descriptions are projections of the observer and make no claims about the objective world), showing the influence of McFarland's recent and excellent *Kant's Concept of Teleology*. He disclaims any attempt to reduce teleology to anything else (p. 21), but, nevertheless, regards teleological statements as conceptually complex, with his task one of identifying the underlying conceptual components (p. 85).

Preliminaries aside, Woodfield turns to examining the views of several predecessors. Braithwaite's plasticity theory of goal directed behavior succeeds in providing an implicit definition of " goal " which partially overcomes Scheffier's multiple goal challenge, but it has the fatal defect that it is easily trivialized. Any causal chain can be made into a multiple chain (thereby providing the variancy the plasticity theory requires) simply by refining the criteria of identity of the elements of the chain. This produces the familiar problem of a theory that includes too much, rendering even a snowball overcoming an obstacle and rolling downhill a goal directed system (p. 46). Further, because the goal must be reached in order to identify plasticity, Braithwaite's theory cannot handle certain cases of multiple goals nor cases where goal direction rides on a single causal chain. Contrary to Braithwaite, the proper view of plasticity in teleology is that it " is merely *evidence* of goal-directedness, nor constitutive of it " (p. 102).

Woodfield finds Sommerhoff's analysis more sophisticated than Braithwaite's and deserving of more attention than it has received. Sommerhoff's division of goal directed behavior into searching, aiming, and keeping paradigms gives it wide scope. Nagel's well known analysis is derived largely from Sommerhoff's but is less general in that it is appropriate primarily to keeping behavior. However, Sommerhoff errs in that he does not distinguish goals from functions. His system, like Braithwaite's, has difficulty with goal failure and multiple goals. In addition, he is committed to recognizing too many goals, including, in the case of a rat running a maze, " at least one ' goal ' per limb movement, at least one per orientation response, at least one for every stage in the maze. . . . I do not deny it is possible to discover, with the aid of a theory, that animals have more goals than we originally thought. But this is going too far" (p. 67).

Woodfield also sees difficulties in Sommerhoff's (and Nagel's) requirement that the variables in the analysis be epistemically independent. The description of this requirement lends itself to several interpretations. On one interpretation, the independent requirement goes too far, ruling out the variables also of directively organized systems (p. 69). On two others, it is simply irrelevant (pp. 69, 70). On Woodfield's preferred reading, it makes directively organized systems disastrously relative, relative either to the observer or to the stage of science at a given time. In the latter case, it

would have been correct for Boyle to view a gas-filled balloon as a directively organized system but it would not be correct for us to do so (p. 72).

Turning to Charles Taylor, Woodfield argues that his original T-law, "Whenever B is required for G, B occurs," because of various provisos added by Taylor, in effect was modified to something like" Very often when B is a means to G, then, subject to the other provisos, S does B" (p. 80). This means that Taylor's T-law is not, as Taylor supposed, something to be contrasted with a causal law, but merely a kind of causal law, vastly diminishing Taylor's achievement. "What Taylor is really arguing is that it is an empirical matter whether causal laws of a rather special type, in which the antecedent is described in terms of a certain relational property, are always replaceable by causal laws of equal or greater nomological force, in which the antecedent is described in terms of its intrinsic properties. This is an interesting question, but it has little to do with teleology " (p. 74).

Taylor's analysis is grouped with Wright's, which, in Woodfield's paraphrase, says that " behavior is teleological if it is being brought about by its tendency to produce a certain result" (p. 82). Woodfield believes this analysis is subject to counterexamples. A pendulum "oscillates in the way that it does because the initial conditions are such that this kind of oscillation tends to restore equilibrium." This is claimed to be a counterexample because " the fact that an event occurs because it restores a balance of forces is not enough to establish that it occurs *in ordei· to* restore the balance" (p. 83). Were it not for the fact that Wright, as we have seen, allows teleological descriptions in physics, one would expect him to deny the counterexample by denying the claim of consequence etiology.

A second argument Woodfield directs against the Taylor-Wright analysis is that, if the goal is confirming a law, then every lawful event is rendered teleological. "That is to say, by occurring, the event brings about a situation which consists of the law's having been confirmed. Therefore, on Taylor's definition, it occurs for the sake of according with the law " (p. 84).

In reviewing theories such as those of Braithwaite, Sommerhoff, and Taylor, theories which seek to explain teleology in terms of patterns of behavior, Woodfield, like Wimsatt, finds it regrettable that no attempt is made to analyze goals (p. 85). Purely behaviorist theories succeed in making teleology empirical, but "the observed behaviour, however complex, is always consonant with an indefinite number of goal-hypotheses " (p. 103).

The second half of the volume is devoted to Woodfield's own complex but interesting analysis. He takes "in order to" and "in order that" as the standard or normal forms for all teleological statements. This means that functions are not identified on the basis of the use of the word " function," for, although "The function of the heartbeat is to circulate the

blood" talks about a function, so does, according to Woodfield," The heart beats in order to circulate the blood." The former is called a function statement; the latter, a functional teleological description, or functional TD (pp. 108, 109).

Woodfield claims that a function statement does not explain-if it seems to, it is because of communication by context-but that a functional TD does (pp. 109, 136). The issue becomes clouded, however, because his method of analyzing function statements is to cast them first into functional TD form, then analyze that in a way that does claim explanation. He also says that " the essence of teleology lies in the welding a causal element and an evaluative element to yield an explanatory device " (p. 206).

Woodfield finds that the relation between a function and that which has the function is causal and that functions are such only relative to ends (both theses argued for in my" Neutral Functional Statement Schemata," *Philosophy of Science,* 1971, using the word "goal" instead of "end") and that these ends are either goods or apparent goods.

Like Wright, Woodfield separates functions into two kinds, dividing them on the basis of the presence or absence of mental attributes (p. 206). Whereas Wright called the two kinds of natural functions and conscious functions, Woodfield, mindful that not all mental actions are conscious (pp. 167, 171), calls them natural functions and artificial functions (pp. 111, 113).

Artificial functions are those determined by the purpose of a designer or user. The artificial functional TD is "X does/has A in order to do G," which, after analysis, is rendered "X does/has A because S believes (A= >G and G is good) (p. 206). The symbol "= > " stands for "causally contributes to." "G," of course, stands for "goal." Woodfield devotes a great deal of attention to goals. The goal is not the same as an end but is a kind of end. A goal is an apparent good. It is an intentional object. Because of the intentional operator " believes," A need not really contribute to G and G need not really be good. Artificial functions clearly cover the large category of human artifacts. It is interesting to note how smoothly this analysis handles malfunctioning artifacts, such as Wright's defective windshield washer switch.

Although Woodfield, like Wright, suspects that the concept of natural functions is derived from that of artificial functions (p. 211) and although the intentional element is part of the essence of artificial functions, he removes it from natural functions. The possibility that biological functions have ends because of the purposes of God is dimissed on the grounds that people talk of such functions who do not believe in God (p. 121).

A natural function contributes to a biological end. Such an end is not what appears good but what is good for the organism or the species. (Woodfield does not say how a function should be classified if that which

appears good is good. Is it artificial or natural or both?) Although survival is the common specific good (p. 183), the more general concept of goodness is needed when doing meaning analysis," because it is essential for an analysis of 'function' that the end or ends remain unspecified" (p. 119). He acknowledges, perhaps with a little trepidation, that the presence of " good " in the analysis makes a natural functional TD evaluative. However, he denies that this pushes him into the projectionist camp of Kant or that it renders natural functions subjective. Nevertheless. he both emphasizes the concept of goodness, as when it appears in the formal analysis, and downgrades it to being a sign for something else. " So the evaluative element does play a role in the explanation, but it does so only by hinting at the relevant causal pathway .... The role of the possibly non-objective term ' good for S ' is to indicate that the causal chain goes through an end of the system " (p. 189).

Natural functions are of two kinds: biological functions and behavior functions. Biological functions cover the large category of parts of organisms. The schema for biological functional TD's is" X A in order to do F" which is analyzed into ' X does/has A because A=>F and F is good" (p. Q06). "F," standing for "function," is, of course, not an intentional object. The word " because," though appearing in all analysans, is especially significant in natural functions. "Functional TD's specify a function and assert that the function is a reason for the item's being there. Since a functional TD is an intrinsically explanatory statement, the word 'because' should figure in its analysis." (p. 186) This is similar to Wright's insistence that function statements provide a consequence etiology of the thing having the function.

Artificial functions, being functions, also exhibit " because " in their analysans. They explain why X does/has A in terms of an intentional object, a goal. Woodfield excludes intentional objects in his analysis of biological functions. However, when intentional objects are dismissed, backward causation may become a problem. Presumably it is to avoid that problem that he says that functions are normally of types, not individuals (p. Q08). Yet, since functions are sometimes ascribed to individuals, another approach is also offered. "This heart beats because *other* hearts have beaten in the past and have contributed to the blood circulation of their owners who were the ancestors of the owner of this heart .... [or] this heart beats because its own past beating has benefited the owner by helping him to survive." This explanation involves, as he acknowledges, " fudging time-references, thereby creating the illusion that the cause of the present beating is the fact that it will have a beneficial e1fect" (pp. Q09). Others will no doubt see fudging time references and creating illusions as a signal that the analysis has made a wrong turn.

Woodfield's analysis is unusual in that it explains goal directed behavior

in not one but two ways. The first way is by postulating a core concept of purpose that is mentalistic and then extending it. The standard form for this, which he calls a purposive TD, is "S does B in order to do G" and this is analyzed into "S does B because S believes (B=>G and G is good) (p. 206). As in the case of artificial functional TDs, mental phenomena come in at two places, for goals are intentional objects and believing is an intentional action. The problem of goal failure does not even arise. Since goals are intentional entities, it is not goals that fail but only the reaching of goals, which is a practical problem for the organism but not a theoretical one for the philosopher. The problem of multiple goals is also easily handled.

Human beings and the higher animals provide the paradigm cases of goal direction. Although goals were introduced as intentional objects, lower organisms and even servomechanisms may exhibit goal direction and have goals by virtue of extension by means of metaphors which, having become dead, now have literal meaning (p. 202) and quasi-beliefs or belief analogues (p. 207). Woodfield goes so far as to say that future robots may be able to rejoice, act willingly, feel gratitude, appreciate, etc. (p. 222). However, he does not say what this new literal meaning of goals is or explain how quasi-beliefs differ from beliefs. He does say that quasi-bdiefs involve representation but does not raise the issue of how there• can be representation without intention.

The second way goal directed behavior is explained is functionally. The standard form for this kind of TD, called a behavioral functional TD, is "S does Bin order to do F "which translates to" S does B because B=>F and F is good " (p. 206). " Birds, for example, sit on their eggs because sitting on their eggs contributes to hatching their young, and hatching young is good (for the species)" (p. 209). This formulation allows one to consider complex instinctual behavior as teleological without postulating eitheT an internal mental state or a designer. Further, it emphasizes the similarity between some goal directed behavior and biological functions. Both are natural functions, both appeal to the idea of something being good; neitheT presupposes mind.

Goal directed behavior is to be described with purposive TDs only if the subject matter is capable of having goals and beliefs. If not, goal direction is to be described with behavioral functional TDs. However, since Woodfield allows metaphorical extension and belief analogues to be used in in counting goals, there seems to be no effective boundary determining where purposive TDs stop and behavioral functional TDs begin, making everything below the behavior of human beings and the higher animals subject to two analyses.

Thus Woodfield divides teleological statements into four types, each formulated in a standard way: purposive TDs, behavioral functional TDs,

artificial functional TDs, and biological functional TDs. Purposive TDs and artificial functional TDs appeal to goals, which are intentional objects, being apparent goods; behavioral functional TDs and biological functional TDs appeal to actual goods, which are more or less identified with individual or species survival.

Woodfield's work, like Wright's, is knowledgeable, up-to-date, and polemical. Because of smaller print, in addition to the greater number of pages, it is more' than twice as long. Whereas Wright's volume contains only a brief index of names, Woodfield's has both an adequate index and a select bibliography. However, both volumes constitute significant statements in the venerable search for a better understanding of teleology, and both are recommended.

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The Identities of Persons. Edited by AMELIE OSKENBERG RORTY. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press. Pp. 337. $14.50 cloth; $4.85 paperback.

This collection of articles written by a number of senior philosophers and assembled by Amelie Rorty will probably not be of interest to those with just a casual interest in philosophical questions. These writers deal with such questions as the necessary and sufficient conditions for membership in the class of persons, the physical and psychological traits that distinguish members of this class from members of other classes, the specific traits, qualities, and relationships deemed necessary for survival of a continuant person, and the various psychological and moral components of the responsible person. The various candidates for the " I," self, or person are introduced in this work, and the problems encountered in espousing any candidate are reviewed. Introduction of empirical candidates, for instance, runs the risk of establishing a protean entity as the self, and the introduction of moral or non-physical candidates runs the risk of their being defined as a " something-perhaps-a-nothing-I-know-not-what ", or a simple soul existing beyond experience.

Personhood is often identified with traits and characteristics that survive through time. David Lewis argues what is essential to personhood is the connectedness and continuity of mental experiences. One's present mental states should be a momentary stage in a continuing succession of stages (p. 18). These stages should be connected by bond of similarity and by laws of causal dependence'. Crucial to survival of the person is the identity of

that stage which presently exists with that stage which will exist in the future. Lewis defends this twofold answer to one problem in the rest of his article by claiming that the aggregate of relation-related person stages is the continuant peTson. He identifies the relation-relatedness of person stages with the identity-relatedness relationship of these stages, and this identification enables him to claim that the presently existing stage of a person's existence need not necessarily be a stage of one single continuant person. And his definition of the person as an aggregation of interrelated stages enables him to define individuals that only retain degrees of relatedness as persons. Lewis's proposals have the distinct advantage of not justifying the existence of more persons than should reasonably be asserted, and it eliminates the possibility of overpopulation in the enumeration of persons.

Georges Rey suggests that persons may survive and yet not continue to exist, meaning that two different persons may survive from one previously existing individual. He argues that what is of concern to a person's survival is the " not necessarily identical continuity of our functional personal embodiment" (p. 59). It is not sufficient to identify the person with a continuity of psychological states, memories, or recollections, for the person is the physical embodiment of these states. This is what is preserved through states of fission, fusion, dream states, amnesia and other states. He argues that a person may undergo profound psychological change, lose all memory of past experiences, relations, and identities, and still survive because a continuity in the functional personal embodiment remains. Thus, something akin to habits of behavior, patterns of action, or behavioral embodiments marks the distinctiveness of persons. The notable difficulty with this view, however, is the problem of precisely defining the functions of personal embodiment.

John Perry argues that Locke's definition of person in terms of the empirical person stages is faulty because it allows intermediate cases that are neither clear-cut cases of death or survival. He argues for a " human theory " model of the person in which the person at one time and a person at another time are the same if they are in a relation that generates psychological connectedness. Stages of the human being are so related to stages of persons that such person stages are usually related if the stages of the human being are related. These human stages are normally related because human brings have the same brain during changes from one stage to another. A number of different relations, such as having the same brain or having brains with certain relationships, will be sufficient to allow us to define a person. Concern for events that befall one's future person-stages is justified by his definition of the person because the desire for some events to occur or for some presently planned "projects" to be effectuated and completed by one's

self is a rational desire. Persons identify with events when they assert relative degrees of participation in the events by imagining various sensory and cognitive experiences from the events. Perry sees identity as derivative from the person-stage and human-stage relations, and this enables him to explain why events that occur to one's future stages are of interest to the present stage of a person.

Derek Parfit objects to the idea that both identity and mental continuity are important to the issue of personal identity. Identity cannot be all that matters to personal survival because in the case of the fission of persons identity is lost. And Lewis's relation of mental continuity (R-relation) forms a relation of two-non-identical persons, and this is not an identity. Lewis holds that the R-relation corresponds to the identity-relation, his I-relation, and is a relation between continuant stages. Parfit replies that psychological continuity and normal cause are the criteria for the identity of the person and uses the continuity of the brain as an example of this. Parfit objects that the R-relation and the I-relation coincide in two ways and not just one, and this destroys Lewis's thesis. Parfit's theory would lead to what some would feel to be overpopulation while Lewis's theory may lead to situations where properly existing persons may not be justifiably individuated or enumerated.

Sidney Shoemaker argues that the relationship of psychic to physical states of the body is mediated by volition. Psychophysical links are seen between volitions and movements that are constitutive of the action (p. And sense experiences mediate connections between beliefs and bodily circumstances. The body that identifies a person is that which is volitionally-sensorially related to a person's desires and beliefs, and not to that which is biologically connected in the ordinary word. This volitional and sensory embodiment is necessary because other persons can only be known by the volitional-sensory embodiments. Shoemaker conceives of the mind as an immaterial substance that not only produces immaterial states and mental states but can also motivate various types of physical bodies by means of an " adaptor " mechanism (p. rn6) . The author concludes his study of volitional-sensory connections to physical bodies by pointing out that one cannot draw necessary conclusions from behavioral presuppositions to mental states even though volitional-sensory embodiment distinguishes persons of necessity.

David Wiggins sets out to defend the non-circularity of theories that argue that continuity is part of the essence and identity of persons and to defend "a conflicting insight" suggested by this theory (p. 140). He proceeds to point out the problems in holding to Bishop Butler's notion that" memory makes personal identity" (p. 148) and argues that co-consciousness is the primary condition of identification of person stages. Memory of being causally related to an event alone cannot be criterion for iden-

tity because it requires that the person who remembers causing the action be the person who caused it. Memory only serves as a partial validation of the continuity of the person. He holds that life histories must be united to memories to verify the identity of persons who cause events. The presence of an event of one undivided life history to another event in a life history is the clearest indication of the presence of an identical person (p. 156). Wiggins concludes by amending Locke's definition of the person so that it is an animal that is a typical member of a species that is thinking, considering itself to be thinking, and that is alive. Memory is one of the many crucial elements in the existence of a person, but alone it cannot identify a continuously existing person.

Daniel Dennent develops a typology of theories for the identification of persons into the categories of rationality, intentionality, stance, reciprocity, verbal communication, and consciousness, and suggests that they are dependent upon one another. Defining the concept of an intentional system as a system whose operations can be explained and predicted by ascription of beliefs and desires to it, he places persons in the category of second order intentional systems that is composed of individuals that have beliefs, desires, and other intentions. Persons are not only second order intentional systems, but are also third order systems because they can act in relation to another individual so that the other will recognize that a particular response is to be elicited. Third order systems are capable of giving non-natural meaning. And this definition of the identity of persons is enriched with Harry Frankfurt's definition of the person as a second order volitional system in which the individual wants to have specific motives, desires, and beliefs. This volitional condition exists because of the existence of a self-consciousness that makes of man an "Anscombian reason-asker and persuader" (p. 193). Dennent concludes by noting the intrinsically normative character of the person that is rich beyond most expressive capabilities.

Bernard Williams argues that the Kantian tendency in moral philosophy to treat persons in abstraction from their character, or life-projects, histories, and goals misunderstands fundamental principles of the identities of persons. He objects to Parfit's contention that psychological connectedness is the most important issue in regard to personal identity because beneath the character that is formed by these connected elements is the ordinary idea of a self or person which undergoes these changes. Denial of this would shatter the person into a serial arrangement of selves. But admitting the existence of something other than just psychological connectedness as being that which matters to personal identity enables one to understand the scalar quality of relations of persons to their various stages and to various stages of other continuant persons.

Ronald de Sousa's article "Rational Homunculi " is an excellent study of the problems created by positing a multitude of minimally rational struc-

tures, or homunculi, that unite to compose the person. To cite examples of rational inconsistency in the detachment of wants, desires, or actions is not a necessary and sufficient basis for arguing the existence of a multitude of homunculi in the person. The case of akrasia, or doing that which is desired less, is not sufficient for splitting the person into rival agencies (p.
And his discussion of the rational criteria that would be deemed sufficient for this splitting is convincing, but admittedly circuitous. While there are not sufficient grounds for holding that the person is a constellation of homunculi, there are also not adequate grounds for holding that the person ought to be only a single rational structure. For incompatibility of wants, desires, and actions within a person is quite possible and logically permissible.

In " Identification and Externality " Harry Frankfurt argues that it is hasty to conclude that all desires, actions, and wants must be those of some person, urging that some movements that are commonly attributed to persons are most properly attributed to a body alone. He maintains that externality and internality of passion is not a matter of the attitudes of the person toward the passion, even though these attitudes should not be wholly disregarded. Internality is not entailed by the person's approval of a passion. The internality of a passion can only be determined if the passion is genuinely attributable to the person. The problem of the externality and internality of the passions raises the question of the meaning of a person's identification with passions, and other actions or wants, and the continuity of the person. Resolution of this question would possibly lead to resolution of the justifiable limitations and boundaries that can be imposed on the person and the self.

Terence Penelhum sets out to discuss the implications of Hume's contention about the fictional status of the unity of the self. His concern is not to consider the justification of Hume's idea, but only tc elaborate the instructive conclusions that can be properly derived from this notion. Hume regards passions as simple and hence unanalysable, but the way in which passions arise can be studied. Passions are experienced if they are pleasing or displeasing and if they are connected to the self. Hume's view of the fictitious character of the self makes the generation of such passions as pride or shame groundless and incoherent because they could not be connected to a self as an object. This point of Penelhum's refutes Hume's argument for the falsehood of our beliefs about the unity of the self. The boundaries of the self may be elastic, but the relation of the passions to the self indicate that a unitary self or object of these passions must exist.

Charles Taylor holds that the notion of a morally responsible self must rest on the capability of making strong evaluations concerning moral choices. The capability to evaluate not just the utilitarian consequences of actions, but to understand how ethical choices affect the whole character

and depth of human person is significantly related to the concept of the self. The ability to make weak moral evaluations, in which only the functional or utilitarian consequences of actions are evaluated, does not capture the uniqueness of the person. Neither does the Sartrean notion of radical choice in which an agent inexplicably moves to one or another moral alternative without the ability to articulate the causes of the choice capture the unique characteristics of the self. What determines the uniqueness of the self and manifestly exhibits the distinctness of the responsible self is the ability of the person to plumb the depths of moral choices and struggle from abstruseness to articulation and clarity in this process.

In her concluding article, Amelie Rorty quickly distinguishes characters, figures, persons, individuals, presences, and selves to show how the conventional concept of the person as the locus of unity of choice is justifiable. Maintaining distinctions between these entities would help to eliminate much confusion in the study of the person. The distinctions among these entities are very clearly and artfully drawn, and Rorty's point about the need to distinguish the concept of the person from these other literary and dramatic figures is well made.

This work must be read with a great deal of attention. But it is one that should be read by all who must deal with the issue of the identification, definition, and limitation of the concept of the person. The quality of scholarship in the assembled articles is excellent. The concepts dealt with are most difficult and often resist clarification and simplification. The sheer obscurity of the subject matter makes for extreme difficulties in composition, style, and language. But all of the writers have dealt with these masterfully. The work has succeeded in showing the richness and elusiveness of the concept of the person, a point upon which almost all of the authors agree. The book could have been improved somewhat by providing brief summaries just before the articles. I feel that this would have given a greater unity to the book and facilitated its reading. But it is nonetheless a book of enduring value, not only for the first-rate articles that it has joined under one cover but also for the excellent bibliography.

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Imagination. By MARY WARNOCK. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1976. Pp. fll3. Index. $13.95.

Mrs. Warnock, who has previously published books on ethics, on existentialism, and on the philosophy of Sartre, here offers a study of the nature and epistemological role of imagination as conceived by various modern thinkers. She begins with the problematic that the British empiricists

inherited from Descartes (what we are aware of is the content of our consciousness, i.e., mental objects or ideas) and then traces the theme of imagination as interpreted in this context through the analyses of Hume, Kant, and Schelling, and then through the combined philosophical and literary-critical reflections of Coleridge and Wordsworth on their own experience of creative imagination. These thinkers lead her to the conclusion that imagination plays a necessary role in interpretation even of what is before our eyes, but she also makes clear that they give no adequate account of what is actually meant by an image. She therefore turns to some more recent thinkers for aid in exploring that question-in particular, Brentano, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Jaspers, Ryle, Wittgenstein and Sartre. The result is her conclusion that: " Imagination is our means of interpreting the world, and it is also our means of forming images in the mind. The images themselves are not separate from our interpretations of the world; they are our way of thinking of the objects in the world."

Her inquiry itself is genuinely philosophical. It is far more than just the history of an idea; rather she is interested in discovering the truth of the matter, and she seeks it through a process of asking searching questions of each of her authors. This leads her in what is basically the direction of a critical realism in which imagination plays a pivotal role in the movement from data to understanding: " It seems to me," she says, " both plausible and convenient to give the name 'imagination ' to what allows us to go beyond the barely sensory into the intellectual or thought-imbued territory of perception." Her analysis of the nature of the image itself moves from what, in the language of earlier tradition, would be called an *objectum quad* (she cites Locke to the effect that " idea" is " whatsoever is the object of understanding when a man thinks ... whatever is meant by *phantasm, notion, species* or whatever it is that the mind can be employed about when thinking ") toward a conception of the image as *objectum quo-as* when she says, commenting on Sartre: "Indeed, apart from this direction towards something else, the image itself is nothing. This is the first essential feature of the image, that it is a *kind* of consciousness, a *way of thinking* of something." For many the special value of this book will lie in the way she makes clear, through the questions she addresses to her sources, that this movement from *objectum quad* to *objectum quo* is inexorable once one begins to look more deeply into the matter than did the empiricists.

This very consideration, however, touches on one of the shortcomings of her study. It would be inappropriate to ask an author to enlarge the historical scope of a treatment of such a theme (she acknowledges at the beginning that imagination is a vast subject and that she is not trying to cover all aspects of it) , but a study that is philosophical as well as historical could benefit from a larger perspective that would make it possible to point

out, for example, the derivation of Locke's vocabulary from earlier usage reinterpreted to make such terms as " idea," " phantasm," and " species " refer to a private *objectum quod.* (Mortimer Adler also discusses this very issue and quotes the same passage from Locke in his article, " Little Errors in the Beginning," in the January, 1974, issue of this periodical.)

There is another, more serious, deficiency to this book, however, which is related to its ultimate intent. The historical and philosophical inquiry into the role of imagination in perception and thought takes up the bulk of the book, but in her concluding chapter Mrs. Warnock says that her main concern is with the relationship between imagination and emotion, a theme prepared for only in part in the preceding 196 pages. This in itself is a subject worth studying, but her allotment of only a few pages in her conclusion to this theme makes it impossible for her to go into it with the same analytic skill she employed regarding the question of the nature of the image, and in fact her discussion of this issue is not only extremely brief, but not very well conceived. She says that the power of imagination " is not only intellectual. Its impetus comes from the emotions as much as from the reason, from the heart as much as from the head." " Emotion " and " heart " here are unanalyzed terms, and they unfortunately remain so. If she had continued her inquiry a little further she might have asked questions about them that could lead toward a more differentiated conception of the impetus that she subsequently refers to also as "the feeling of infinity." This might have led to a theory of the motivation of imagination by what Bernard Lonergan calls " transcendental notions " or what Eric Voegelin, drawing on Plato, calls " the tension toward the beyond." Such a theory would involve a differentiation between the underlying tension of existence and the feelings that accompany the intentional operations it gives rise to and would make it possible to regard both the emotions and the operations of imagining, questioning, etc., as equally expressions of a single underlying dynamic.

As it is, Mrs. Warnock simply equates this with emotion and declares, with Wordsworth and J. S. Mill, that" imaginative emotion" has intrinsic value. The limitation of the perspective she thereby takes up is made clear by a comparison with C. S. Lewis, to whom she refers in her last pages. She cites Lewis's concept of joy as described in *Surprised by Joy* as an example of the sort of imaginative emotion she is thinking of. She then says that "Lewis himself, in the end, minimizes the importance of such experiences, on the grounds that in themselves they are not religious experiences. But he is wrong to play them down." Actually what Lewis said was not that they are not religious experiences, but that they derive their value from their function as signs pointing beyond themselves. In fact, from the viewpoint of the phenomenology of religion, one would say that they are indeed religious experiences, but one would have to go on to ask

what sort of religious orientation they define. In the *Critias* both Hellas and Atlantis express divinely founded orders, but that of the Atlantians has a sinister character and an affinity for the depths of night. From the accounts we have of Hitler, listening to Wagner was for him a type of religious experience. W. H. Auden said of his own art of poetry that poetry is magic-and dangerous. He distinguished between the true sacred and mere enchantment and said that " ... the coming of Christ in the form of a servant ... puts an end to all claims of the imagination to be the faculty which decides what is truly sacred and what is profane." Lewis makes his own point clear on the page immediately preceding the one Mrs. Warnock refers to; he says regarding his eventual conversion to Christianity that when it happened it was not at all a matter of great emotion: " ' Emotional ' is perhaps the last word we can apply to some of the most important events. It was more like when a man, after long sleep, still lying motionless in bed, becomes aware that he is now awake." The judgment of truth, when it is authentically reflective and critical, is not an emotion, even if it may have profound implications for the affective life.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

Editions Bellannin: *Du Bien Supreme* by Peter Abelard; translated with an Introduction by Jean Jolivet. Pp. *135;* $7.50.

Boekencentrum: *De betekenis van Jezus' mensheid: Een onderzoek naar de de christologie van Karl Rahner* by L. Schellevis. Pp. 157; F. *35.*

Cambridge University Press: *A Theory of Universals: Universals and Scientific Realism* by D. M. Armstrong. Pp. 149; $16.95.

Editions du Cerf: *L'homme pecheur devant Dieu: Theologie et anthropologie* by F. Bussini. Pp. 197; FF. *56.00; La communication* de *Dieu: Par-dela utile et inutile: Essai theologique sur l'ordre symbolique* by A. Delzant. Pp. 364; FF 92. *Dieu different: Essai sui· la symbolique trinitaire* by Ch. Duquoc. Pp. 149; FF 29.

Columbia University Press: *Ortega as Phenomenologist: The Genesis of Meditation on Quixote* by Philip W. Silver. Pp. 175; $13.50.

Cornell University Press: *Beast and Man: The Roots of Human Nature* by Mary Midgley. Pp. 377; $12.50. *Virtues and Vices* by James D. Wallace. Pp. 170; $13.50.

Herder: *Eine Untersuchung zum Ursprung des Denkes bei Thomas von Aquin* by G. POltner. Pp. 214; no price given.

Hilversum, Gooi and Sticht: *Jezus, hoeksteen of struikelblok? Wat zijn verhaal ons te zeegen heeft* by Jans Smit. Pp. 192; no price given.

Indiana University Press: *Presence and Absence: A Philosophical Investigation of Language and Being* by Robert Sokolowski. Pp. 188; $15.00.

Luther-Agricola Society: *Certainty, Assent and Belief: Hintikka's Epistemic Logics and Cardinal Newman's Discussion of Certitude* by H. Kirjavainen. Pp. 204; no price given.

Macmillan: *The Psychological Basis of Morality: An Essay on Value and Desire* by Frederick Moore. Pp. 106; $8.95.

Mohr: *Menschwerdung: Eine historische und dogmatische Untersuchung uber das Motiv der Incarnation des Gottessohnes bei Thomas von Aquin* by Wilhelm Mostert. Pp. 194; DM *65.*

Oxford University Press: *Becoming and Being: The Doctrine of God in Charles Hartshorne and Karl Barth* by Charles Gunton. Pp. 236; £. 10.00. *Purpose in a World of Chance: A Biologist's View* by W. H. Thrope. Pp. 124; $9:95:

Patmos: *Tradition und Kirche: Die philosophische Hermeneutik Hans-Georg Gadamers als Heransforderung des theologischen Selbstverstiindnisses* by B. Hilberath. Pp. 344; DM 38.

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