ON JUDGING EXISTENCE

IN A PREVIOUS, mainly historical, article [1] I drew attention to a general trend among reputable Thomists to jettison the notion of judgment as the mental synthesis-or disjunction-of two concepts, and to envisage it as a simple and original act of the intellect by which a conceived form is attributed to a reality that is, ultimately, apprehended as singular and denoted by the subject of the judgment, with the result that only one concept is implied in the act of judging. This conclusion seems to be implied even in the opinion of those who hold the " two concept " theory, for they require a final act by which the mind compares its conceptual union with a like synthesis in what is objectively known and then pronounces on the identity-or lack of it– of both syntheses, in an assertive act which completes the judgment. In that case, it is only this final act which is characteristic of the judgment; the preceding acts (apprehension, conception, comparison, perception of the identity or diversity of the terms) are at most preliminary. It is clear that to understand a proposition is not the same as to judge. One can understand without judging, as when one grasps the meaning of a question or posits a hypothesis before it has been verified.

At the end of the same article I surmised that the chief reason why the "two concept" theory found favor is the assumption that our primary judgments are ideal ones, such as first principles, predicated definitions, and other such abstract and universal judgments, which are all essential rather than existential. This assumption may be due to the fact that both in logic and in critical theory there was an almost exclusive concern with the type of knowledge found in science; and science

[1] " On Judging," in *The Thomist* 88 (1974), pp. I must apologize for my delay, due to other commitments, in completing the article.

is expressed in the form of statements that are ideal and universal. Science however is a highly sophisticated and artificial kind of knowledge; and it should surely be evident that one cannot even begin to examine the nature and validity of such an organized and derivative form of knowledge unless one has first of all inquired into the nature and validity of basic human knowing as such. This is the line taken by those who are most prominent in critical theory today.

It can hardly be denied that ideal and essential judgments may be formed out of two concepts that have previously been abstracted. But the question is: is it necessary that it should be .so? Are two concepts required by the very nature of the act of judging? Moreover, granted that there may be two concepts which are used as subject and predicate, it can be asked whether the concept used as subject functions as a concept? The essential question must be this: what is required by the very nature of the act of judging? If it is found that there are authentic judgments which do not involve more than one concept, then no more can or need be postulated.

At the outset it is well to note that we are not here concerned primarily with propositions but with judgments. Peter Strawson has insisted on the difference between what he calls the " sentence " and the " assertion." He holds that the sentence, or proposition, is what carries meaning but is never, as such, either true or false. Only when it is asserted does it become capable of being true or false.[2] Although some of the Oxford school of Analysts disagree with Strawson I accept his distinction, in the .sense that to form a proposition is not the same thing as to judge. It is the logician who studies the nature and forms of propositions; and from his point of view he is entitled to speak of two concepts as of two terms. The perspective adopted in this article is more psychological than logical;

•"On Referring," *Mind* 59 (1950); also in A. Flew (Ed.): *Essays m Conceptual Analysis*, London, 1956, pp. For qualifications cf. E. J. Lemmon: "Sentences, Statements and Propositions," in B. Williams and A. Montefiore (Eds.): *British Analytical Philosophy*, London, 1966, pp. 78-107; and W. Quine: "Mr. Strawson on Logical Theory," *Mind* (1953), pp. 433-451.

it deals with the act itself of judging rather than with its conceptual or linguistic expressions.

Phenomenology

To find the true nature of judgment one should begin with a consideration of the various types of judgment, or what may be called a phenomenology of judgment, not only because every hypothesis must be based on facts or factual usage, but also because, if there are various types, what is proper to one type or class might mistakenly be conceived a! essential to all.

For the reason mentioned above it will not be necessary to consider all the classes of propositions treated by logicians even where they are in agreement, which is not always the case. Here however it is pertinent to recall that some modern logicians find fault with Aristotle and the Scholastics for assuming in their logic that the basic type of proposition is the categorical attribution (or negation) of a predicate to a subject. The reason for this is that their logic was realistic, in the sense that it presupposed a view of reality as composed of substances with real accidents. This, for the modern critics, is a gratuitous assumption; and logic, if it is to be purely formal, should not be linked to any particular view of reality. Moreover the traditional logic is, it is claimed, unable to do justice to the type of proposition characteristic of mathematics where one is dealing, not with the attribution of properties to a subject, but mainly with relations between classes; for mathematics treats above all of classes; and the nature of the objects which it considers is determined by mutual relations to others of the same kind. No one will deny that logic should, as far as possible, be purely formal, and deal with all the types of proposition, and of inference, needed to satisfy the exigencies of thought and of the sciences. Yet, if we are to talk about the act of judging we can only begin from experience of this as it is actually exercised. The appeal to reality is very much in place in a psychological consideration of judgment, even if it is out of place in logic. Yet one wonders how the logician can speak of classes of objects without previously having had some knowledge of them and

of their properties by which they can be classified. If the judgment of relation (xRy) is logically irreducible, it need not be so from a more realistic point of view, for we can proceed to determine the relations between classes and their members only when we have first asserted that there are such things as classes and relations.

Another criticism levelled by many moderns at Aristotle is that his logic deals above all with propositions in which an essential property is attributed to a subject, whereas most of the propositions which we ordinarily use do no more than state a simple fact. Whatever the justice of the criticism, one can only heartily agree with the requirement that an adequate logic, and even more so a theory of judgment, should take account of this type of proposition or assertion; and this would seem to imply a logic based more on the recognition of facts than on intelligible content, or comprehension. It does appear that the humble factual judgment has been underestimated; and one of the main themes of this article is that its fundamental role and value should be acknowledged.

The author whom I find most helpful in the attempt to classify, from a more realistic point of view, the various types of judgment is J. Austin.[3] Starting with the rhetic act (using words to convey meaning) he distinguishes three main ways in which this act takes place. There is the simple locutionary act of saying something; the illocutionary act which, while saying something, also does something; and the performatory act which moreover produces an effect in the hearer, as when one imposes a name, or pronounces the fateful words in the marriage rite: " I take you as my lawful wife." These latter acts are neither true nor false, but apt or otherwise. Similarly, the rhetic act (as distinct from the merely phonetic or phatic act) , which uses words in conformity with a definite vocabulary and grammar and with a sufficiently defined meaning and reference, does say something; but at the same time it also carries out a certain

•*How T'o Do Things with Words,* Oxford, 196!'l, pp. 47 ff.; "Performative-Constative," in H. Brera (Ed.) : *La phtilos.crphie analytique,* Paris, pp. !'!76 ff.

£unction, and hence is in fact illocutionary. It is therefore in this latter class that we will find "total speech acts," or the basic forms of judgment.

Although Austin modified his categories somewhat as he continued his researches he seems to have felt that the major types of illocutionary act are the following: verdictive, those which imply passing a sentence, as, e.g.: "I judge, or absolve," etc.; exercitive, expressing the exercise of some authority or power, as e. g., "I command, or forbid, or give charge of," etc.; commissive, when one promises, intends, or goes bail, etc.; behabitive as when one excuses himself, thanks, or curses, etc.; and expositive. In this last class we find various types of speech-activity, such as affirmation, negation, description and classification. It is in regard to the first three of these that we can speak meaningfully of truth and falsehood; and these are, in Austin's terminology, called constative acts of speech, the principal ones being affirmation and negation. It is true that Austin did not regard his classification as definitive; in fact he insisted that only a lengthy collaboration between experts in different fields of research could lead towards a .satisfactory "linguistic phenomenology." It is, however, at least interesting to note that he came to pick on constative utterances as particularly important and as alone capable of truth and falsehood. This seems to suggest that if we look for the nature of the act of judging we will find it in such acts, since all the other typeg appear to presuppose them.[4] P. Strawson seems also to take this for granted when he writes: "The central fact to cling to is that the primary mode of appearance of *propositions* is assertion; and this gives us a reason for saying that, of many propositional styles, the primary one is what is also primarily the assertive style."[5]

The Analysts who have made a special study of the language

•For further discussion of Austin's views cf. M. Furberg: *Locutionary and lllocutionary Acu: A Main Theme in J. L. Austin's Philosophy,* Goteberg, 1963.

•*Individuals. An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics* (1959), Methuen PB, London, 1965, p. 151.

of moral discourse deal with another class of judgments, namely normative or practical ones. These do not state what is the case but what should be done; not that which is but that which ought to be. Such judgments can be either in the form of imperatives (e.g.," thou shalt not kill"), and then belong to the class which Austin calls performatory; or in theoretical and general form (e.g. "murder ought not be committed"), and implies assertion. Since the imperative form is evidently not essential to judgment as such I shall take account of the normative judgment only in so far as it implies assertion.

Concentrating now on the assertive type of judgment I propose the following classification, not as exhaustive but as sufficient for the purpose of this article. This kind of judgment may have to do with purely logical entities (the *entia rationis* of the Scholastics), as when one asserts that man is a species; here we are dealing with a form of implication or of inclusion of a member in a class or of a one class in another. In regard to this kind of judgment it should be noticed that one can only speak of a determinate class in relation to another, usually larger, class whose members are the only objects taken into consideration. This class of all the objects taken into consideration when determining another class is known to logicians as "the universe of discourse" to which this class belongs. This class is defined in relation to the class (known as its complement) of all the objects of the universe of discourse which do not belong to the class so defined, so that the logical sum of both classes is equivalent to the universe of discourse. The universe of discourse does not include all possible objects but only all those which are taken into consideration by the speakers. The class and its complement are determined by this preliminary restriction. If one pushes this classificatory activity to its limits one would eventually arrive at the supreme class of all that can be an object, that is, of all that is or can be; in other words, one is led to the notion, but the logical one, of being; and to trace this to its roots is, as I hope to show later, to be led back to the plane of real existence, so that even these

judgments have their foundation in knowledge of reality and therefore of concretely existing things.

Assertive judgments concerning real as opposed to logical being may be either essential or existential. Essential ones can be of various types. They may state principles (e.g.: "whatever comes to exist has a cause ") ; they may predicate a definition (e.g.: "man is a rational animal"); they may be attributive, both when they predicate a property of its subject (e.g.: " man is able to know truth or to study philosophy ") and when they attribute an accident which is not a property (e.g.: " some men are fat") . All such judgments are ideal and abstract, but there is also the singular essential judgment, as when we state that Dante is the author of the *Divine Comedy.* The existential judgment is found in two main forms: an existential judgment in a wide sense, as in the examples: " Peter is a student of philosophy, Peter is studying;" or in a strictly existential form, when, namely, actual existence is attributed to an individual subject (e.g.: "Peter exists; I am; being is"). These latter judgments are always concrete.

Ideal Judgments

It is generally agreed that the predicate signifies some formality that is conceived in an abstract way. Such a concept presupposes a process of abstraction by which it is derived, at least in the last analysis, from some concrete object that is known. If, as the defenders of the two-concept theory hold, the subject of the judgment represents also a previously formed concept, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to explain the strictly existential judgment, with the result that they will be regarded either as incomplete judgments, or as not judgments at all. This, however, is quite contrary to common experience and use; and this already suggests that one should not confine attention to ideal judgments in the search for what is characteristic of judgment as such. To do so would be to make the mistake of seizing on something that is found only in one class of judgments and regarding it as essential to all.

One reason why such judgments have been taken as typical may be that, besides being clear and of most concern to scientists, they .seem to be simple and therefore primitive. In fact, however, they are the result of a complicated mental process; and their apparent simplicity hides their really composite nature. The type of relationship asserted between subject and predicate in the ideal judgment is quite different from that asserted in the singular and existential one. If one were to look only to the grammatical form of the proposition it would seem as though the same type of relationship is found in both. If, however, one examines the logical form of the ideal proposition it will appear that the assertion has to do with the mutual implication of two concepts or terms rather than with the fact that a predicate belongs to a given subject. If, for instance, I state that whatever is finite is caused, I use the attributive mode. But the .same thought is conveyed through the logical form: " finiteness implies causality; " or by the formula: " if x finite, x is caused, for all values of x." Here there is no direct reference to the existential order; there is question only of the relation between two notions.

From this it would at first appear that the proposition is adequately characterized by the function of implication; and this is indeed the stand taken by many of those modern logicians who .set out to make logic a completely formal system. This is a perfectly legitimate ideal, but it seems to call for some reservations or qualifications. In the first place it .should be noted that implication itself is far from being a simple or self-evident notion. Andre Darbon, in reference to Russell's attempt to formalize logic, has pointed out that implication presupposes the notions of truth, error and combination; [6] and indeed it seems to me to pre.suppose such other basic notions as number, multitude, unity, division; and these, from a critical perspective, are all based on the prior notion of being.[7] Moreover, if the proposition is defined in terms of implication (as

[6] *La phifosophie des mathematiques,* Paris, 1949, pp. 10-11.

[7] Cf. *ST,* Ia 11, ad 4; *In m.i;ta.* 4, S.566; 10,4.1989-98; *De p()t.* 9.7 ad 15.

that which implies itself) , it will be found to presuppose the three principles of identity, of excluded middle, and of non-contradiction if it is to be recognized as valid.[8] If implication is neither a .simple nor an original notion, the kind of proposition which is defined in terms of implication cannot be regarded as primary.

Even if it is granted that, in terms of a purely formal system, implication may be taken as a primitive and indefinable notion, with the consequence that the proposition will be defined through implication, it must be remembered that a purely formal logistic system is constructed on the basis of extensionality alone, for the logic of classes is one of extension. Such a logic, however, presupposes one of intentionality, since classification must depend on comprehension; for a class means a collection of similar objects, that is, of objects which possess some characteristic in common. In other words, one may, adopting a purely extensional point of view, construct an abstract and completely formal system hinging on the notion of implication. Such a system will offer an exact and symbolic representation of thought processes divorced from all relationship to reality. Thought will then be treated from the sole point of view of the relationship between concepts whose content or comprehension has been excluded so that their extension alone will be taken into account. This will entail that the proposition be conceived as implication, or seen in terms of the inclusion of an individual in its class or as the determination of a relation. But whether such a system is self-sufficient is quite another matter. Thought does not occur in a vacuum, even ii it can, and indeed-in formal logic-must, be represented as such.

Thought is, first and foremost, knowledge. Knowledge is, essentially, relative to reality, to what is; and truth is found primarily in this relation. Logic has its own form of truth, although I would prefer to speak rather of correctness than of truth; but to hold that this is the only kind of truth that matters is to fall into the excess of logicism. Logic alone cannot tell

[8] Cf. Darbon, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-1!!.

us what is real or existent, whereas knowledge, or at least the intellect as knowing, seeks what is real; and the philosopher, like the scientist, is concerned above all with reality. A fully formalized logic seems to be assembled inductively from the processes typical of the sciences, and especially of mathematics; whereas a complete logic should also exhibit the processes at work in all kinds of knowing, scientific or not. To keep one's feet on the firm ground of experience in this way will insure that logic is set in the context of research into the origin of basic notions and into the validity of knowledge derived from experience and of first principles. In this way, logic could treat of the formal elements of those processes by which man knows reality, always of course assuming-as I do here-that he is capable of knowing reality. This may not be a legitimate assumption in pure logic, but such an approach has at least the merit of recognizing its assumptions; and I can only agree with those writers who maintain that a presuppositionless logic is impossible, since logic demands a number of elementary truths as support. [9]

To adopt this realistic .standpoint is to pass beyond a too exclusive concern with the proposition and its logic to consideration of the full-blooded and vital act of judgment; and in this act we find assertion or affirmation (or negation) as characteristic and as directed towards what is or is real. For the judgment, basically, is an assertion that something is or is so and so. To discover its fundamental structure we must tum to the activity itself, as we find it in our experience, rather than to its logical expression. Admittedly, this transfers the discussion from the field of logic to that of psychology; but to do this is to " rescue " the judgment and to restore it to the context where it should first of all be considered.

The transition from the logical to the psychological plane may conveniently be made by reflecting for a moment on the

•E.g.: L. Brunschvicg: *Les ages de l'intelligtmce*, Paris, 1984, p. 77; A. Darbon, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-6; 72-78; F. Gonseth: *Qu'est-ce-que la logique*, Paris, 1987, pp. 11, 12, 60. Cf. E. Jacques: *Introduction au probleme de la connaissance*, Louvain, 1958, p. 806.

formulation of the affirmative categorical judgment taken as the basic type. The formula S is **P** is not only an assertion; it is the assertion of an identity. Except in the case of a tautology, however, the subject and predicate are not identical. This might seem to indicate that we are dealing with implication rather than assertion; but if we set the formulated judgment in the context of actual thinking and knowing, we can see that we are indeed dealing with an assertion, although this, as is natural and only to be expected, leads beyond knowledge to its object. The identity that is asserted is then found not to obtain between the subject and predicate as such, but in the known object; for what is asserted is this: that reality, denoted as subject, is identically the same reality that has the attribute or quality designated by the predicate. Taking as example the ideal judgment already mentioned, the sense of the statment: " whatever is finite is caused," is expressed by saying: "that being which is finite is identically the same being as that which is caused." [10] This undel'.standing of the judgment not only shows how there can be at the same time assertion and identity; it also brings clearly into view the fact that every judgment, as a vital activity, implies in one way or another a reference to the concrete and existential order.

[10] Cf. *C. gent.* 1.36; *ST,* Ia 85.5 *ad* 3; 13, 12. In this last place Aquinas says: "In every true affirmative statement, although the subject and predicate signify what is in fact in some way the same thing, they do so from different points of view. This is true not only of statements in which the predicate means something that only happens to belong to the subject, it is also true of those in which it expresses part of what the subject is. Thus it *is* clear that in ' a man is white' although ' man ' and '(a) white ' must refer to the same thing, they do so in different ways, for 'man' and 'white' do not have the same meaning. But it is also true for a statement such as 'man is an animal.' That which is a man is truly an animal: in one and the same thing is to be found the sensitive nature which makes us call it an animal and the rational nature which makes us call it man . . . The difference between subject and predicate represents two ways of looking at a thing, while the fact that they are put together affirmatively indicates that it is one thing that is being looked at" (trans. of H. McCabe, 0. P., in the Blackfriars edition, vol. 3, p. 95). In my previous article (p. 817, nn. 177, l 78) I referred to :Fr. McCabe's criticism of the attempt of K. Wall, 0. P., to show that the affirmation entails at least a partial identity, in the ideal order, between subject and predicate.

One of the main points which I wish to make in this article is precisely this fact, that such a reference is to be found as implied in all our judgments. This seems to follow, first of all, from the psychology of knowing, at least as this is understood by Aquinas and his followers. It is his constant teaching that human knowing is integrated out of activities which are intellectual and sensitive, so blended as to form one dynamic unity; and that the connatural activity of the intellect requires the concourse of the imagination, not just when the concept is first formed but as long as the act of the intellect endures. There is no concept, not even of the most immaterial being, without an accompanying image.[11] Since this image is derived from contact through the senses with the material and existent world, the act of the intellect, and its concept, retain this relationship to the existential order, even where there is question of our most abstract concepts. This is clear enough in concrete judgments which bear directly on existing singular beings. In other kinds of judgment, such as the ideal ones, the image continues to symbolize the object previously grasped through the senses even though the object is no longer physically present; in this case, the judgment relates immediately to the object present in thought, and mediately to the really existing object. In judgments about purely fictitious beings the reference is to an object that is only thought about, but this object is conceived on the pattern of real beings that were at one time known. We may perhaps illustrate this by means of some examples.

In the pure existential judgment the subject stands for a particular existent being, as, for instance, when I affirm: " Peter exists." In the attributive existential judgment, e.g. "Paul is a doctor," the logical subject is still a non-conceptual term, and what it refers to could be indicated by pointing with one's

[11] Cf. *ST,* la, 84.7; 85.1ad5; *5* ad 2; *In Boet. de Trin.,* 6.2 ad *5; Inlib.dememor.* 2.814; to avoid any possible misunderstanding one should note that the image is not taken here in its purely subjective reality but as representing the object known, i.e., as endowed with characteristics (this color, size, shape, etc.} which are not its own just in so far as it is an image but are due to the object repres.ented and are to be traced back to it.

finger; the subject denotes a really existing individual. In the attributive universal judgment, e. g., "man fulfils himself by means of work," the logical subject is, of itself, an abstract concept; when it is used as the subject of an assertion it does not function merely as having abstract signification, as it would if it were used as a predicate; its function is to denote a singular existent being, while this being is characterized by means of some formal or essential quality. Such a judgment can be reformulated in this way: " that individual existing being denoted as man is identically the same as the individual who fulfils himself through work." In the ideal and abstract judgment, e.g. "every finite being is caused," the logical subject is an abstract and universal concept, or perhaps a transcendental one, which however is used to indicate, through the mediation of imagination, that which is real (the finite being that exists) and which is grasped under some universal aspect (as caused).

Subject of Judgment

If all judgments retain, implicitly at least, a reference to the real and existential order, it seems clear that our primary and basic judgments are those which refer explicitly to that order; and in my previous article I tried to show that there is a growing consensus on this point. One decisive consequence of this is that the role of the subject of assertion must be sought through examination of this kind of judgment; and here there can be no question of signification in the strict sense of the word. The subject stands for an individual and existing reality; and this can only be denoted, for every concept abstracts from the individual characteristics. This is particularly clear where there is question of proper names. As J. S. Mill puts it: "Proper names are not connotative: they denote the individuals who are called by them; but they do not indicate or imply any attributes as belonging to those individuals ... these names are simply marks used to enable those individuals to be made subjects of discourse." [12]

[12] *A System of Logic*, I, c. IV, § *5;* eighth edition, London, 1949, p.

The conclusion to which these reflections are leading can now be stated, and then further explained and strengthened. No judgment has, as its subject, anything that is purely conceptual, whether this is taken as essential or as accidental. The judgment, as assertion, affirms (or denies) an identity in relation to subject and predicate; and this identity is not found in regard to the concept which may figure as subject in the judgment but in regard to the reality denoted by the subject and which alone has the formal element predicated in the judgment. The role of the logical subject is to indicate the real subject as having the form which is predicated of it. That is to say, the subject in the judgment does not formally represent or signify; its role is properly that of denoting; and it always, in one way or another, stands for, or leads back to, an object found in the existential order, and primarily the physical existential order, although the judgment may then be used to refer to objects whose existence is ideal. When therefore an abstract term, or a concept, enters into a judgment as its subject it ceases to function in the way proper to a concept and fulfils the role of indicating some concrete object. In short, the subject of the judgment is never an abstract concept functioning formally as such; it is always, at least mediately, an existing object, and the proper role of the subject term is to indicate this.

This conclusion depends, to a great extent, on the claim that the basic type of judgment is that which hears directly on concrete and singular existent beings such as we come in contact with through ordinary human experience, and not the ideal and abstract type such as we find in the sciences, however important or privileged these may be in other respects. In my previous article I quoted a number of thinkers, both thomistic and non-thomistic, who not only agree but insist on this fact which has been so often overlooked. Before I go on to strengthen this claim I would like to state it in the words of another acute thinker who has expressed it far better than I could hope to do. In the work already quoted,[18] A. Darbon writes: " Kant

[18] Note *5;* p. 190 (my translation) .

has maintained, and this is one of his teachings which deserves to be retained, that the judgment, not the concept, is the complete act of knowledge. 'To think means exactly this: to judge.' We can make no other use of concepts than to judge by their means, for they are nothing else than predicates of judgments. That is to say that the concepts of quantity, figure, etc., do not take on their full meaning except on condition of being used in the last resort by judgments of this kind: 'This is a quantity, that is a figure.' But this is to say that the subject of these judgments of perception is no longer a conceptual term but a thing of our experience. And it is to it that we attribute a mark of reality; or rather we judge that it forms part of that reality in which we live and move, and of which we have only an obscure feeling, not distinct thought. The concept, in its final use, serves only to determine this indistinct, intuitive and global experience of reality, or rather certain fragments of it which we have singled out; and it itself takes on a character of reality only indirectly and in reference to this experience. Doubtless we cannot think, in a certain sense, of anything that is not real, although we can think of it badly and in thinking of it deform it. But, once more, to think is to judge and not to conceive. And what is real is the subject of this judgment, whereas its predicate, even though it signifies something when the judgment is true, does not express *it* fully; it does not preserve all its substantial reality, any more than the drawing of a tree on a sheet of paper, however exact it may be, transposes the being of the tree onto the paper. Similarly, when one detaches the concept from the judgment by which it communicates with reality, and by which it is at least a means of expression, and having thus isolated it one elevates it to the dignity of a real essence, one confers this honor on it at precisely the moment when it loses all right to this honor. The concept is a garment with which we propose to clothe reality; and realism is the philosophy which says: it is the habit that makes the monk." [14]

[14] In the next paragraph he goes on to say, in effect, that in the abstract sciences, such as mathematics and logic, concepts are not applied to perceived objects, and

A thoroughgoing attempt to clarify the position exemplified in this passage should undertake an investigation into linguistic and logical usage. Since this is out of the question here I must at least refer to the notable contribution towards such a research made by P. F. Strawson, all the more so since his general thrust seems to be in the direction of the position adopted here. In the first part of his book *Individuals* he shows that our conceptual scheme of things includes the scheme of a common spatio-temporal world, and that the central position in that scheme is filled by particulars, among which the basic ones are those which are directly locatable and are or possess material bodies.[15] Among these a privileged role is played by what we call persons. In the second part he deals with subjects and predicates. The link between both parts consists in this, that the particular is the paradigm of a logical subject for us. " Particulars are paradigm logical subjects; an expression that is also, or purports to make, an identifying reference to a particular, is the paradigm of a logical subject-expression." [16]

Taking the assertive as the basic form of judgment he first of all notes that to be an object of reference distinguishes appearing in discourse as a subject from appearing as a predicate, whereas universals only can be predicated. He then sets out to find a basis for this distinction, contrasting his own views with those of various other authors. [17]

they thus attain to a higher level of generalization. But there thought becomes symbolic, representing the unknown objects, to which concepts are applied, by means of letters and signs. The sign thus plays the role of subject without really being so. To relate x, as member of a class, to y by the formula xRy is not to make a judgment. Such a formula is neither true nor false; and if we don't know what we are judging there is no judgment. All that such a formula does is to provide the schematic outline of a possible judgment.

[15] Cf. p. !W4 (of the edition quoted, note 5).

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 234. For comparison with St. Thomas, cf. *ST* la, 85, 3.

[17] G. Frege ("On Concept and Object," and " On Sense and Reference," in *Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*, edited by M. Black and P. Geach, Oxford, 1952; J. Cook Wilson: *Statement and Inference*, 2 vol., 1926; B. Russell: "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism," *Monist*, 1918-1919; P. Geach: "Subject and Predicate," *Mind*, 1950; W. Quine: *From a Logical Point of View*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1953; *Methods of Logic*, 2nd ed., New York, 1959.

He first examines a grammatical criterion for the distinction. The act of referring to a thing in a proposition is found never to be the same as the act of predicating that thing; what is referred to is an object, while what is predicated is a concept. Objects have a certain completeness, but predicates are incomplete for they demand completion in a proposition. I take this to mean that universals do not have an autonomous role in our conceptual scheme. They are essentially incomplete. To make sense, a predicate stands in need of a subject as a point of reference; it has to be completed by being tied to a subject. But there is no logical subject unless we presuppose particulars as objects that are, at least relatively, complete in themselves.

Next he proposes a categoria1 criterion for the distinction, distinguishing universals into sortal and characterizing. The former (e.g., water, dog) supply a principle for distinguishing and counting the individual particulars which it collects (e.g., pool of water, terrier) and does not presuppose any such antecedent principle. The characterizing universal, such as verbs and adjectives (e.g., wet, barking), supplies such a principle only for particulars already distinguished or distinguishable in accordance with some antecedent principle or method. It is distinctive of the sortal universal that it has instances, whereas what is proper to the characterizing universal is to characterize. From this it appears that only universals, or complexes containing universals, can be predicated, while particulars, as such, are never predicated.

In order to explain the correspondence between these two different criteria Strawson goes on to consider the conditions for introducing terms into a proposition. The condition for a particular is that it identify by referring, and this implies that a definite empirical proposition be true, and be known by the speaker to be true. "Particular-introducing expressions carry a presupposition of empirical fact, in the shape of propositions, known to users of the expression, which suffice to identify the particular in question." [18] No such condition is needed for the

[1]. *Ibid.,* p. 248.

universal; all that is required is that its meaning be known. The subject-expression presents a fact in its own right and as, to that extent, complete; hence it can never be a predicate. The predicate-expression in no sense presents a fact in its own right, and is, to that extent, incomplete. It can be completed only by explicit coupling with another expression.

It should be noted that Strawson'.s analysis has dealt with our conceptual system in relation to the world of everyday experience. The universals of which he speaks are above all those whose instances, or inferiors, are known through ordinary experience, and which he therefore aptly calls " empirical universals." It is these which, he maintains, cannot be fully known except in reference to individuals. One might argue in favor of another class of universals which might possibly be fully known without such a reference to any individual; but it is surely legitimate to base an analysis on the way in which we do, in. fact, make use of universals in our ordinary judgments about the world of common experience. When a universal is so used, as a predicate, it is incomplete in comparison with the logical subject; and without particulars there is no logical subject. Hence the philosopher of language, as Strawson says in another work,[19] " must recognise the need for such linguistic or other devices as will enable (him) both to classify or describe in general terms and to indicate to what particular cases our classifications or descriptions are being applied . . . we can surely acknowledge that we can form no conception of experience, of empirical knowledge, which does not allow of our becoming aware in experience of particular items which we are able to recognise or classify as instances of general kinds or characteristics. We must have the capacities for such recognitions and classifications, i. e., we must have what Kant calls intuitions."

If, as Strawson contends, the logical subject of a .sentence is primarily a particular, we have every right to regard as basic those judgments which refer to such particulars and which

[19] *The Bounds of Sens!!*, London (Methuen), 1966, pp. 47-48.

carry a presupposition of an empirical fact known to the speaker. This is the main point I wish to make at present; but one further precision made by Strawson must be kept in mind.[20] There are certain single empirical statements which contain no particular, such as: "it is raining; snow is falling." These, he holds, do not introduce particulars into discourse; they provide a basis for such introduction, that is, for the conceptual step from empirical fact to particular and ultimate facts. Here we seem to be dealing with a particular type of universal which does not need a subject, although in order for the proposition containing it to be valid as a statement with truth value it must be made in a definite context. He calls this type of universal a "feature universal," and inclines to the view that beneath every sortal universal there is a feature universal from which it is derived since the sortal can collect only those individuals which have certain features in common. But since features are grasped only in individuals it seems as if one should postulate at least the possibility of an individuator in order to conceive the feature universal. Strawson at any rate does not regard propositions of this sort as subject-predicate propositions, for they contain two distinguishable elements without the contrast between completeness and incompleteness which marks the distinction of subject from predicate. But he will grant that such propositions provide the basis for constructing subject-predicate propositions, and that these are needed if we are to refer to particulars.

All this does not mean that a predicate concept may not be used as a subject. "Whenever you have something that can be identifyingly introduced into a proposition, and can be brought under some principle of collection of like things, then you have the possibility of that thing's appearing as an individual, as a logical subject."[21] This possibility will be discussed in the next section, but at this stage I would point out that a predicate concept can be used as a subject only if one

[20] *Individuals,* pp. ff. On the same point cf. A. Lalande, *Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie,* 7th. ed., Paris, 1956, pp. 811-813 *(Predicat).*

[21] *Ibid.,* p.

already knows how to use it as a predicate, and if one knows the logical role of the concept. I can, for instance, make the classificatory judgment: " blue is a color; " but such a judgment is intelligible only to one who is already able to use color predicates, in such judgments as: " this coat is blue, this flag is green, etc." These judgments are primary and descriptive. From such as these we can take the predicate (blue) and use it as a subject, namely to denote one member of the class of all colored things. In other words, the universal must first be grasped as predicable. It acquires meaning only by being first predicated of a subject, and thereafter it can be used as a logical .subject, although its function then, I would maintain, is no longer to signify but to denote.[22]

If the predicate, as such, is always universal, one may ask about its relationship to what, in Scholastic philosophy, is known as the logical universal, since the "quasi property" of this universal is commonly said to consist in its capacity to be predicated of many individuals; and this discussion may shed .some light on the question mentioned a short time ago about the possibility of knowing a universal without reference to any particulars.

If the classic work of John of St. Thomas [23] be taken as representative, the Scholastic understands the logical universal as the abstracted nature conceived by the mind as in relation to the individuals from which it has been abstracted, and as capable of being predicated of them. As abstract, possessing unity through precision from its inferiors, and as negatively common it is apt to be in many inferiors; and such aptitude is the foundation of logical universality. Formally, however, the logical universal regards the aptitude of the abstracted nature to be predicated of its inferiors; it is the relation of universality

[22] For some reflections in the preceding three paragraphs I am indebted to Fr. P. Bearsley, S. M., in the first (unpublished) part of his dissertation *Some Fundamental Features of Human Empirical Knowledge* presented at the Pontifical University of St. Thomas, Rome, 1973.

[23] *Ars Logica,* II, q. 3, a. *5;* 2nd. ed., by Reiser, 0. S. B. *(Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus,* Torino, 1948), pp. 333-336.

conceived by the mind as existing between that nature and its inferiors, in so far as that nature can exist in them as identified with them; and this is a logical, not a real, relation, for it exists only in so far as it is thought. The " quasi property " of such a relation is predicability or the aptness to be referred to many under the aspect of predication. The relation of actual predication follows on this.

The first thing to note is that it is not the same thing to know a universal, for which one act of simple apprehension by the mind seems to be sufficient, and to know it formally as universal. For this there is needed not only a complex apprehension through which it is known in relation to a determined subject, but many such apprehensions, since, in most cases at least, it has to be .seen in relation to different subjects. Thus, John of St. Thomas points out that to know the universal as such one must have positive knowledge of the term from which it has been abstracted. [24] A concept, by itself alone, does not reveal its universality. The fact that I have a concept of redness does not in any way make known that this quality may be found in many different objects. For this I must have recourse to experience, for it is my experience of a spatio-temporal order of reality that provides the notion of a merely numerical multiplicity:· The abstract nature represented in the concept exhibits itself as essentially one, and as capable of being participated by many individuals; but this latter aspect comes to light only when the nature is set in relation to its inferiors. In other words, and as again John of St. Thomas notes, inferiors are known as inferiors only when known as able to contain and contract the universal nature. [25] He seems to have no doubt that, in order to know a universal, one must first know of the existence of its inferiors: " The existence of many individuals can alone be the foundation for a universal unity to be abstracted and rendered apt for predication." [26] What at any rate seems to be

••*Ibid.,* 334a45-bl 7.

••*Ibid.,* 336bl 7-!l7.

•• *Ibid., b* " Existentia autem plurium individuorum solum potest esse fundamentum, ut abstrahatur unitas universalis et reddatur apta ad istam praedicationem."

agreed on by most Scholastics is that the logical universal is formally known as such when it is known as apt to be predicated of its inferiors. In that case, it can be distinguished formally from the predicate in so far as, when so used, it is tied only to one inferior by actual predication, whereas as universal it connotes the possibility of being referred to many such inferiors.

The Scholastics who write on this subject seem to assume that predication is the actualization of the aptitude of the universal to be referred to an inferior as existing in it and identified with it. This, if I am not mistaken, implies that for a universal nature to be seen in relation to a given inferior there is no need of a second concept. If, therefore, to judge is, in essence, to relate the universal nature to an individual instance of it, there is no need of two concepts, although, as I shall later point out, there is need of two apprehensions, as far as the normal judgment is concerned. Moreover, if the logical universal is known as apt to be predicated of many inferiors, it is natural for the act of predication to follow immediately. This may perhaps imply that, in normal and direct forms of knowing, there never is a concept without a judgment, since the concept is always, in such cases, derived from some experienced object, and therefore spontaneously grasped in relation to it. I am inclined to think that such is indeed the case. This would help to explain why Descartes, Malebranche, Renouvier and Kant regarded the judgment as the first act of the mind (for Descartes, of the will), and why Kant, dissatisfied with the prevailing logical theory of judgment, looked for its explanation by reference to the unity of apperception. [27]

If, finally, one looks for what the Scholastic would regard as the ontological background to the view that particular and empirical judgments are primary for man, he will doubtless be led to the teaching that every concept of ours is a determination of the concept of being, which includes, actually though only implicitly and in a confused way, all that is. Whatever we

[1] *KrV*, Anal. Concept., c. 2, sect. 8; A 90-94.

conceive, we conceive as " a being that is ... ," even though it is only the metaphysician who is attentive to the " being" component of his concept and to its implications; precisely because this component is ever-present it is taken for granted and neglected, if not denied. Although the word " being" is usually translated as " that which is," and this is certainly part of the content of the concept, yet, for St. Thomas, what is expressed in the concept of being is primarily and directly existence itself, not as factual givenness, but as the act of existence, the immanent source of actuality, perfection and intelligibility in all that is.[28] Every other concept, therefore, carries, through this primary concept of being, a relation to the existential order, even when we think of a non-existent object, for this is conceived on the analogy of an existent one. The function of the subject in judgment is to express this existential reference; it is not that of representing something that is abstract. This is shown most clearly in the singular judgment; and that is at least one reason why this type of judgment can lay claim to be the most typical and basic type among all the many kinds possible to the human mind. The subject of such a judgment is certainly not an abstract concept, nor a term representing one; it is a particular, represented by a term whose function is to denote it.

I would sum up this section by suggesting that there are two fundamental types of judgment: one that is simple and elementary; the other complex and derived. The simple type is that in which the subject does not signify or represent but denotes; and what it denotes is a particular known through experience. Such a judgment may be either existential or attributive, the former when what is said to belong to the subject is existence itself as expressed by the act of judging; the latter when a conceived form is expressed as a predicate and attri-

[28] Cf. *In I Sent.* 8, 4, 2 ad 2: "Ens autem non dicit quidditatem, sed solum actum essendi, cum sit principium ipsum; " *In I met.* 4.2:553: " Hoc vero nomen ens imponitur ab actu essendi; " 556: " hoc autem nomen ens significat ipsum esse; " *De vei'.* I.I ad 3 in cont.: "Ratio autem entis ab actu essendi sumitur, non ab eo cui convenit actus essendi."

buted to the subject. In the complex type of judgment the subject is indeed a concept but, by being used as subject its function is not to signify (although of course it retains its signification) but to denote in a mediated way .something existent, while the predicate is a conceived form that is attributed to it; and many of these complex judgments are classificatory. The existential aspect of such a judgment comes to light if it is equivalently expressed in this way: that being S (existent, or conceived on the analogy of existent being) which is member of class xis also member of class. y, for all values of S.

In order therefore to discover the nature of the act of judging one should examine the first, or simple, type; and since the pure existential judgment presents special difficulties it is advisable to consider first the attributive existential judgment, and then to pass on to the judgment that predicates existence alone.

The Attributive Existential, (Concrete Judgment)

Since the subject of this type of judgment (e.g.: "this table is oval; " " Peter is a clerical student ") is singular it does not signify or express a concept. Its function is to denote a singular existent being. The speaker could just as well indicate this individual thing by pointing with his finger-which is tantamount to saying" this "-and at the same time uttering the predicate. This predicate signifies some element, essential or accidental, in the make-up of the thing so indicated; for short it can be termed essential in so far as it does not, of itself, have to do with the existential order, for it is, as such, universal and abstract. It is represented by means of a concept which has been obtained by abstraction. The fundamental structure of this kind of judgment, therefore, would appear to consist in this: that a formal element of the known object is abstracted and represented in the mind by a concept, and that it :functions as a predicate when it is referred to the object :from which it has been abstracted and which is denoted by the subject term. The judgment is the attribution of such a form (P) to that subject. There is no question of a comparison of one concept with

another but of a universal concept, which expresses some intelligible aspect of the known object, with the actual entity which has been known in the first place. The identity expressed in the judgment is found, not in the mental order, but in the existential order, since that entity which is denoted by the subject is identically the same entity in which the formal element signified by the predicate has been apprehended.

This implies that, from the Scholastic point of view at least, one has to distinguish here between a direct and an indirect type of knowing. The judgment involves direct knowledge in which an intelligible aspect of the known object, obtained through abstraction, is represented in the concept which is an intrinsic constituent of the immanent act of knowing. It also involves knowledge of the individual entity in which that intelligible form has been grasped; and this entity, the real object of knowledge, is reached only indirectly by the mind in so far as it remains in " continuation " [28a] with it through the whole sensitive process by which objects are in the first place known. Singular beings, as such, are known only in this indirect way, by what St. Thomas calls *"conversio supra phantasma,"* [29] by a certain " *refiexio* " [30] or return through the sense faculties to the object in its individuality. The judgment, therefore, presupposes two apprehensions. One is direct, by which the universal concept is formed which is to play the role of predicate in the judgment. The other is indirect; it does not result in the formation of a new concept but brings the mind back to the individual object perceived through the mediation of the senses, and allows the conceived form to be attributed to it as to its subject. St. Thomas sums all this up in his usual terse way in a text which also indicates that, for him, our basic judgments have to do with singular objects known by means of the senses: " In human beings the complete judgment of the intellect is a-

[2]-- *De ver.,* 10, 5.

[29] Cf. *ST* la, 84, 7; 85, I ad S, ad 5; *5* ad 2; 86, I; 2a2ae, 173, 3; *In 3 anim.* 8 (713).

••*De ver.,* 10, *5* ad 2; *De anim.* 20 ad l in contr.

chieved through' conversion' back to sense objects, which are the first beginnings *(principia)* of our knowledge, as was pointed out in the First Part." [81]

This is, as far as I can see, what some Scholastic writers [82] mean when they say that the judgment requires a complex apprehension, or that thought, in judging, moves on two levels. By a concept one *thinks* an individual being as an essence but, since this is a simple apprehension, one cannot distinguish the two levels. Only when the reference to existent reality is explicitly grasped can the concept be seen in relation to the object from which it was derived, and this level (of indirect apprehension) be recognized as distinct from the level of simple apprehension. This entails a certain reflection on the process by which the abstract concept has been formed, a reflection which is spontaneous and which allows the singular to be attained as such. Since the object is now attained under two distinct formalities; e.g. as Peter and as a student, the judgment is possible and follows naturally. The relation to the object can then be seen to characterize the intellect and to reveal its nature. In other words, the intellect can, in this reflective way, grasp its own nature as ordained to what is real.[83]

It is by reason of this reflection that the concept is able to function as a predicate. The concept, for instance, of " whiteness," cannot be a predicate in a concrete judgment unless it is referred to a subject; then it is no longer "whiteness" but " white," as when one pronounces: " this paper is white." The predicate, originally at least, is not signified by an abstract term but by a concrete one which implies a reference to the subject. I will return to this point in a moment.

[81] "In nobis perfectum iudicium intellectus habetur per conversionem ad sensibilia, quae sunt prima nostrae cognitionis principia, ut in Primo habitum est" *(ST* 2aitae, 173, 3). cf. *De ver.* 12, 3 ad 2; 28, 3 ad 6.

[32] E.g., J. Isaac, 0. P.: "Sur la connaissance de la verite," *Revue de Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques,* 3ft (1948), pp. 887-850. He agrees (pp. 888-840, 848) that the judgment does not require two concepts, and that our primary judgments bear on singular facts.

[88] The role of reflection is basic in any consideration of the *truth* of the judgment. In these pages I am concerned only with the *nature* of judgment.

Although the judgment, as formulated, requires two *terms* it does not imply two *concepts,* but it does imply two apprehensions. The subject, as such, does not represent a concept. What it does represent is that kind of knowing which is called indirect and which leads the intellect, immediately or mediately, to the object from which the whole knowing process begins and which is either an actual existent or, if it is internal to the knower himself, is grasped on the analogy of such an existent. The subject, therefore, is a pure medium leading to that object in which the formality signified by the predicate-concept has has been apprehended. Its function is correctly described as denoting or indicating. The simple and essential nature of the act of judging is revealed in the action of a person who, without expressly forming a proposition, indicates by pointing with his hand a definite object, at the same time uttering the predicate, e.g., "red," or " student." The etymology of the word "predicate " bears this out, for it seems that the word comes from the root " *deik* " whose original meaning is: to show or indicate.84

When the predicate of a judgment is said to be an abstracted form which is referred, by means of the subject, to the object in which it was apprehended, the word "abstract" is not to be taken verbally, as meaning" obtained through abstraction;" and this is true of all concepts. What is obtained in this way may, however, be designated either by means of a concrete term or by means of an abstract one, depending on the type of abstraction in question. Our primary judgments are those which make use of concrete terms, such as " man," " red," "moving," which denote concrete and singular beings, whereas judgments using abstract terms (humanity, redness, motion) are secondary and derived. The concrete term signifies the universal in so far as it is a whole; it designates individuals according to that which they all have in common, while it does not explicitly express that by which one such individual differs

••Cf. A. Emout et A. Meillet: *Dicticmnaire etymologique de la langue latine,* 3rd. ed., Paris, 1951, p. 307 (Dieere).

from another. In this kind of judgment the same thing is known in two different ways, universally (by means of a concept) and in its singularity (by means of the "return to the senses.") .

Abstract terms refer to those notions which, in Scholastic terminology, are obtained through formal abstraction, although St. Thomas also uses the term " precision," in so far as the universal prescinds from the individuating material conditions of the singular existent. Those authors who see the judgment as consisting of two concepts seem to have this kind of concept in mind, perhaps because they are most common in the sciences. But these notions are not the ones which are originally and spontaneously formed in the mind, as are those generic and specific ones which are expressed in concrete terms and predicated of individuals. These are obtained by what is called total abstraction. The notion expressed in an abstract term is the fruit of a further mental process, one which is more constructive than abstractive. For not only does the knower prescind from the subject in which the form is realized but the abstract notion is considered, in a quasi-fictitious manner, as though it were a form given in itself. Whiteness, for instance, is treated as if it were a pure form, and almost as though it were a substance in itself.[35]

No one will doubt that it is possible to form judgments which employ only such abstract terms, as, for example, when one says: " truth is found in conformity of the mind with reality; " or: " morality is regulation of action by right reason." The speculative sciences, and especially philosophy, make constant use of this type of judgment, which does not seem to have any immediate relation to individuals. However, one may note first of all that, if such abstract terms are to function as subject in an assertion, they must always be understood, not as simply abstract, but as qualified by a genitive which is implicitly un-

[85] Cf. chap. I ("La notion centrale du realisme thomiste: !'abstraction,") of G. Van Riet's *Problemes d'Epistemologie,* Louvain/Paris, 196(), where the well-known texts of St. Thomas on abstraction are quoted and discussed.

derstood. The term " wisdom," for instance, when used as a subject always means "the wisdom of ...", and hence implies a reference to an individual. As P. Geach puts it: "an abstract noun (or noun-phrase) referring to the form can indeed occupy the place of the subject, but cannot be the whole of the subject; the form being signified, *in recto* as Aquinas would say, by an abstract noun, we must add a mention *in obliquo* of the individual whose form it is; ' the wisdom of Socrates ' and ' the redness of Socrates's nose' give us designations of forms, the spurious proper names ' wisdom ' and ' redness ' do not . . . ' Of ' is a logically inseparable part of the sign ' the wisdom of ...',indicating the need to put a name after this sign; and this need is what makes the sign suitable to express a form, since a form, as Aquinas says, is more properly termed *entis* than *ens* (la, 45, 4) ." [36] Geach goes on to explain that the difference between using a form as predicate and as subject is due, not to the form itself, but to the way it is used. "To get a reference to the form into the subject-place in our proposition, we need to refer to the form by an expression which, together with a reference *in obliquo* to that in which the form is found, will compose a complex name that can be logical subject." [87] The form can be used as subject because it is, in this " oblique " and implicit way, individualized by reference to a particular subject.

••"Form and Exiswnce," in *Aquinas,* a collection of essays edited by A. Kenny, London/Melbourne, pp. 85, 86; cf. H. McCabe, 0. P., *ibid.* ("Categories"), pp. 89-90.

[87] *Ibid.,* pp. 86-87. In another essay (" Nominalism ") in the same collection Geach criticizes what he calls the " two-name theory of predication." The Aristotle of *De lnterpretatione* held that "the simplest form of predication contains not two names, but a name and a verb; and names and verbs are assigned essentially different characteristics. A name is always tenseless; a verb is, or may be, tensed. A name is a possible logical subject; a verb is essentially predicative" (p. 140). As for Aquinas, " he explicitly rejects the two-name theory of predication and truth. Subject and predicate terms have different roles: a subject relates to a *suppositum,* a predicate to a form or nature, and the truth of an affirmative predication consists in con-formity-the form that exists intentionally in the mind, signified by the predicate, answers to the "form in the thing *(indicat rem ita se habere s.icut est forma quam de re apprehendit)"* (pp. 152-158).

What Geach here calls " a reference *in obliquo* " does not seem to be the same as the kind of indirect apprehension *(continuatio ad sensus)* of the Scholastics. A conceived form is always abstracted from the matrix of sense knowledge. It may then be said to be abstract to one degree. Its natural role is to function as a predicate, as it does when that individual is named in which this form has been found; and this demands the " continuation through sense " as expressly recognized by the intellect. The conceived form may, however, be carried to a further, or second, stage of abstraction by being considered in itself alone, as it were in isolation. It is then abstracted not only from sense knowledge but from relation to such knowledge. This seems to be what Geach say,s is referred to by " the spurious proper name." For this to function as a subject it has to be drawn out of its isolation by being named by an expression that will include a reference *in obliquo* to that in which the form is found in the first place. That expression will be a complex name (e.g. " the wisdom of ... ") which can be a logical subject. This" oblique" reference presupposes the ever-present basic mediation, or continuation, of sensibility. In other words, the universal is then considered as an individual.

The same point is made, in a different way, by K. Rahner.[38] Abstraction, he says, implies that the cognitive process starts from the world as reached through the senses. Of its nature, then, it connotes this " *conversio supra phantasmata"* and a certain return to sense objects. Such" conversio "is the distinctive and intrinsic characteristic of abstraction. One can distinguish two phases in the cognitive process, although the process itself is one and intrinsically implies both of these phases.

By abstraction a form is obtained, whether essential or accidental, which is represented in a universal concept. As abstracted from individuals it retains the capacity to be referred to them. If its content is thought of in an absolute way, independently of its capacity to be referred to individuals, for instance just as " whiteness," it is represented as something singular which, once more, has a form which demands to be represented

[88] *Geist in Welt,* Miinchen, 1957, Part II, c. S; pp. 182-187.

by a universal concept (e.g.," coloration"). Whiteness would then signify that which, by reason of a certain coloring, becomes white; it is signified as though it were a kind of substance.39 The reason for this is that human knowledge always takes place in the same way, or retains the same structure. This structure is adapted to grasping concrete objects by means of abstraction and through " conversion to sense knowledge," and therefore to knowing an abstract form in relation to the individual in which that form was apprehended. When this abstract form becomes, in turn, an object of knowledge, another abstraction (the second stage already mentioned) takes place, and hence also a reference to some concrete individual. The abstract form no longer functions just as a concept (as it does in judgment) but as subject of the form that has been led to a further stage of abstraction.

From this Rahner concludes that nothing can be thought as universal unless at the same time it is grasped as related, immediately or mediately, to a concrete datum previously given to sense; or, in other words, that the universal concept is never known except simultaneously with the " conversion to sense." All knowledge that is objective always refers the universal concept to some concrete "this." Hence the concept should not be distinguished (as a predicate) from the judgment, as one element from the whole act, but rather as a possible from an actual synthesis; for the universal concept is already of itself ordained to some possible subject. Similarly, the judgment is already implied, as possible, in the concept insofar as this implies a reference to a subject through continuation with sense. From this it follows that " the only function of the subject is to indicate in stable fashion that determinate *suppositum* to which it must be referred as the general element of the predicate." [40] Moreover, " There is no objective knowledge except when the knower refers something known in general to a *supposi,tum* which exists in itself. The judgment has to do before all with a *suppositum* subsisting in itself ... to which it attri-

••Cf. St. Thomas *In 5 meta.* 9.894; *In Boet. de hebd.2.24; De anim.* 2 ad S.
•• *Op. cit.,* p. 186 (my trans.) .

butes that which signifies the quiddity of this subject." [41] The upshot of all this is that " for the human consciousness there is no knowledge except in an affirmative synthesis, and this judgment is not a joining of concepts, as though these were the absolute elements of thought, and judgment only their subsequent union; but judgment is the application of what is known to something which is in itself." [42]

These reflections of Rahner concern the judgment in so far as it is, originally at least, objective knowledge. Treating of the same kind of knowledge St. Thomas says: " The mind on the other hand can consider in abstraction what it knows in the concrete, for although we know things that have their forms in matter it can nevertheless untie the two and consider the form as such . . . the created mind has the capacity by nature to see the concrete form or concrete act of existence in abstraction by analysis." [43] For a.bstract knowledge to be rendered objective it must be referred to the subsisting individual by means of a concrete term, because " our intellect signifies concretely whatever it signifies as subsisting" [44] Objective knowledge signifies the composite insofar as it is a synthesis of a form and of the *suppositum* in which that form inheres. The structure of the judgment is such as to be able to express that synthesis; and that structure perseveres in the judgment even when there is no longer any immediate question of a concrete object but of an abstract form which is taken as an object of knowledge and which, therefore, as taking the place of subject in judgment, stands in the place of some concrete thing. [45]

"*Ibid.*

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 187.

[43] " Intcllectus noster potest in abstractione considerare quod in concretione cognoscit. Etsi enim cognoscat res habentes formam in materia, tamen resolvit compositum in utrumque, et considerat ipsam formam per se ... intellectus natus est apprehendere formam concretam et esse concretum in abstractione " (*ST* la, 12, 4 ad 8); trans. of H. McCabe, Blackfriars ed., III, p. 17.

[44] " Intellectus noster quidquid significat ut subsistens, significat in concretione" (*1 C. gent.* 80).

[45] Cf. Rahner, *op. cit.*, p. 188. This psychological approach seems to harmonize

From all this it seems clear that in the judgment, although there are two terms, and two apprehensions, there is no need of two concepts. What the judgment does, essentially, is to apply, through predication, a form conceived in the mind to an object that is presupposed as known from the start and which is denoted by the subject. This simple essence of the act of judging is expressed in assertion or affirmation. It is the central and indeed supreme act of the intellect, that which characterizes it insofar as it is spiritual and therefore open to the limitless horizon of reality. It would be a fatal error to seek the nature of judgment only in its logical formulation. As a vital and original act of the intellect its nature and its simplicity are expressed in the verb " is " by which knowledge is referred to its object in a conscious and personal way. In the answer to such a question as: " Is Peter present? " the same simplicity appears in the succinct reply: " yes," which is a short form of the judgment: "Peter is present."

So the judgment does not express any new knowledge such as would be afforded by a new concept distinct from that signified by the predicate. What is new in the judgment is rather the consciousness of the one concept as related to its original object; that is, explicit attention to that reference to the concrete object known through the senses which remains intrinsic and implicit in the form abstracted from that object. The intellect, by means of its double apprehension, direct with regard to the concept, and indirect with regard to the perceived object, is led to express its awareness that the form abstractly conceived in itself is present in the perceived object, and that therefore it can be predicated of it. The judgment is precisely the affirmation of this pertinence as consciously recognized, or the affirmation of the objectivity of that which has been conceived by the mind, as St. Thomas notes in the following text: "When the intellect conceives that which is a rational and mortal animal, it has in itself the likeness of a man; but it does not

with the logical one of Geach and Miller (distinguishing first from second levels of predication) to which I refer later on; cf. notes 58, 80, 119.

therefore know that it has this likeness, because it does not make the judgment: 'man is a rational and mortal animal.' Hence only in this second activity of the intellect is there found truth and falsehood, for this implies that not only does the intellect possess the likeness of the thing that is known but that it has reflective knowledge of this likeness, in knowing and discerning (or dijudicating) it ".[46]

Although St. Thomas does at times speak of the judgment in a different way, I think it can be shown that this theory as to the nature of the simple attributive judgment has solid support in his writings. He constantly teaches that our primary and basic judgments are those which have to do with material and singular beings.[47] As to judgment itself he says that in it there is expressed " a comparison of a concept with a thing by means of the act of composing or dividing; "[48] that the intellect " in every proposition applies a form signified by the predicate to some thing signified by the subject, or removes it from it; "[49] that the intellect " composes and divides by applying intelligibles previously abstracted to things."[50] In a particularly pertinent text he writes: "Indirectly and by a quasi-reflection, on the other hand, the intellect can know the singular, because, as mentioned before, even after it has abstracted species it can-

•• " Cum enim intellectus concipit hoc quod est animal rationale mortale, apud se similitudinem hominis habet; sed non propter hoc cognoscit se hanc similitudinem habere, quia non iudicat hominem esse animal rationale et mortale: et ideo in hac sola sccunda operatione intellectus est veritas et falsitas, secundum quam non solum intellectus habet similitudinem rei intellectae, sed super ipsam similitudinem reflectitur, cognoscendo et diiudicando ipsam" (In *6 meta.* 4.1236). Cf also the "classic" *De ver.* 1.9, and *In I peri.* 3.9, where he writes: "Cognoscere autem praedictam conformitatis habitudinem nihil est aliud quam iudicare ita cssc in re vel non esse: quod est componere et dividere; et ideo intellectus non cognoscit veritatem, nisi componendo et dividendo per suum iudicium." Cf. also *C. gent.* 1.59.

47 E.g. *ST* Ia 84, 7 and 8; 85.3; 2a2ae 173.3; *De ver.* 12.3 ad 2; 28.3 ad 6.

•• " Designatur comparatio incomplexi ad rem per notam compositionis vel divisionis" (C. *gent.* 1.59).

•• " In omni propositione aliquam formam significatam per praedicatum vel applicat alicui rei significatae per subiectum, vel removet ab ea" *(ST* Ia 16.2).

56 " Componit autem aut dividit applicando intelligibilia prius abstracta ad res " (0. *gent.* 2.96)

not actually understand by means of them except by a return to sense images in which it understands the species, as Aristotle says. Therefore, in this sense, it is the universal that the intellect understands directly by means of the species, and singulars (as represented in sense images) only indirectly. And it is in this way that it formulates the proposition, 'Socrates is a man'." [51] To "form" *(format)* this original and basic type of judgment nothing more, then, is needed than direct knowledge of the universal (in a concept) and indirect knowledge of the individual (through "conversion to the senses") which is represented by the subject. In the judgment the predicate is not attributed to the *concept* of the subject but to the" thing signified by the subject," which is therefore more accurately said to be denoted than .signified.[52]

[51] " Indirecte autem, et quasi per quamdam reflectionem, potest (intellcctus) cognoscere singularia: quia sicut supra dictum est, etiam postquam species intelligibilcs abstraxit, non potest secundum eas actu intelligere nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, in quibus species intelligibiles intelligit - - - Sic igitur ipsum universale per speciem intelligibilem directe intelligit, indirecte autcm singularia quorum sunt phantasmata. Et hoc modo format propositionem: Socrates est homo" (ST Ia 86.1; trans P. T. Durbin, Blackfriars ed., 13, pp. 91-93). The realism assumed by St. Thomas shows through this text, and even more s-0 in the following: " Cum enim contradictio ex affirmatione et negatione constituatur, utraque autem harum ex praedicato sit et subiecto, praedicatum et subiectum dupliciter possint sc habere. Ant enim coniuncta sunt in rerum natura, sicut homo et animal; aut sunt disiuncta, ut homo et asinus" (In 6 *meta.* 4.1225; cf. 1228, 1229).

[52] It should be pretty clear by now that in my investigations so far I have taken account only of the normal kind of judgment by which human beings ordinarily communicate among themselves. It seems reasonable to assume that the essential nature of judgment may be found through analysis of this normal type of activity; but it may be prudent to qualify the theory proposed above by slating that its validity is claimed at least for that type of activity. Whether it is valid for every single type of judgmental activity is another question; and in the next section of this article a rather unique kind of such activity will be con-Eidered. Moreover, the reflections in these pages originally form part of a course on the critical theory of knowledge, usually called epistemology, and lead up to the question: where do we find that judgment which is absolutely primary, in the sense of being implied by every other one, while it does not imply any other prior one? Such a judgment will be, in a very special way, unique. If, as I think is the case, it is found to bear on the unique notion of "being," it will not have to be explained by either formal or total abstraction. In reference to being, ab-

Although a purely logical treatment of judgment, as consisting of two terms and a verb, has led many writers to conclude that it necessarily implies two concepts, logic may also be invoked in favor of the theory outlined in these pages. A conceptual term can represent the known object in a proposition only when it is set in a relation of subjection to another concept; it can take the place of the concrete object only if another concept is related to it as predicate. This is why logicians constantly liken the relation of predicate to subject to that of form to matter; and this relation is one of inherence of the form in matter as its subject rather than of one concept to another. As St. Thomas puts it: "The predicate is as it were the formal part of the enunciation, the subject its material part;" [53] "When the intellect forms a composition it takes two (components), one of which is taken as formal in relation to the other; hence it takes it as existing in another; and this is why predicates are to be understood formally; " [54] " When we put a term in the subject place we think of it as referring to something, whereas in the predicate place we think of it as saying something about the thing, in accordance with the saying 'predicates are taken formally (as meaning a form), subjects are taken materially (as referring to what has the form)'." [55]

stract and concrete terms are identical (entity-being *(ens);* reality-real) since the notion of being is supremely universal and transcendental, and predicable of everything that in any way exists or is i·eal. It signifies both what is r.eal and its reality. Nor will such an absolutely primary judgment necessarily be one that does in fact occur in normal human conversation, except as implied in ordinary judgments, for normal conversation does not deal with the foundations of thought. If there is a unique act at the source (not chronological, of course) of thought, it is only to be expected that the normal activity of judging may assume a unique form, or perhaps even give way to a different type of knowing, such as an intuitive grasp that might only with difficulty be described as a judgn1ent.

58 " Praedicatum est quasi pars formalis enuntiationis, subiectum autem est pars materialis ipsius" (In *1 perih.* 10.160).

••"Cum intellectus compositionem format, accipit duo, quorum unum se habet ut formale respectu alterius; unde accipit id ut in alio existens, propter quod praedicata tenentur formaliter" *(In 9 meta.* 11.1898).

55 " Intellectus id quod ponit ex parte subiecti trahit ad partem suppositi, quod vero ponit ex parte praedicati traliit ad naturarn formae in supposito existentis,

The reason for this analogy is that, in the judgment, it is the predicate which expresses the intelligible or determining element of knowledge, while the subject is the means by which the intellect reaches its object under the formality represented by the predicate. " If there are two things so related that one is the ground *(ratio)* for understanding the other, one of them will be quasi-formal, the other quasi-material; and so those two comprise only one intelligible thing, since form and matter result in one thing. Hence the intellect, when it understands one through the other, understands only one thing, as is apparent in vision: light is that by which color is seen, and hence it is formal in relation to color; and thus color and light form one visible thing, and both are attained in the act of seeing." [56] More briefly: " The ground *(ratio)* for knowing a thing, in so far as :it is known, is its form, because it is due to the form that knowledge actually takes place. Hence, just as one existing thing results from the union of form and matter, so too the ground of knowing and the thing known are one known thing; and on account of this the one act of knowing, according to both habit and act, extends to both precisely as ground and thing known." [57] In this way the unity of the complete act of knowledge, that is, of the judgment, :is affirmed; while judgment stands revealed as that kind of knowledge by which an object is reached as subject (matter) under the formality of

secundum quod dicitur quod praedicata tenentur formaliter et subiecta materialiter " *(ST* la 13.rn; trans. H. McCabe, *loc. cit.* p. 95); cf. Sa 16.7 ad 4; 9c. and ad 3; *In 3 sent.* D. *5,* exp. text.

5. " Si enim aliqua duo se ita habent quod unum sit ratio intelligendi aliud, unum eorum erit quasi formale, et aliud quasi materiale; sic ilia duo sunt unum intelligibile, cum ex forma et materia unum constituatur. Unde intellectus quando intelligit unum per alterum, intelligit unum tantum intelligibile, sicut patet in visu: lumen enim est quo videtur color, unde se habet ad colorem quasi formale; et sic color et lumen sunt unum tantum visibile, et simul a visu videntur " (De *ver.* 8.14 ad 6)

57 " Ratio cognoscendi est forma rei inquantum est cognita, quia per earn fit cognitio in actu. Unde sicut ex materia et forma fit unum esse, ita ratio cognoscendi et res cognita sunt unum cognitum; et propter hoc utriusque, inquantum huiusmodi, est una cognitio secundum habitum et secundum actum " *(In 3 sent.* 14.1. sol. 4). Cf. *ST* Sa 16.7 ad 4.

the predicate (form); while the only concept required, as such, is that expressed by the predicate.[58]

One can now see how the judgment, seen from this point of view, is altogether necessary as a remedy to counterbalance the analytical character of the intellect in its function of conceiving, and as a means to make knowledge measure up more fully to its object. Objects, as they exist, have their own unity, but they cannot be fully and at once comprehended, under all their aspects, by the human mind. This objective unity is fragmented when what is known is subjected to analysis by the mind; it is represented by many different concepts, all of which reveal some partial aspect of it. In the act of simple apprehension one aspect or formality of the object is seized on by the mind which, by mentally separating this form from its subject, introduces a certain division into the object as known. It is the judgment which restores this original unity insofar as it takes this form, withdrawing it from its intellectual isolation, and applies it to the subject where it belongs, and so *realizes* it. The intellect, as simply apprehending, possesses the form drawn from the object. Adverting to the abstractive process by which this form has been acquired, and hence making its indirect reflection on its "continuance " with sense knowledge, the intellect becomes aware that that form belongs to the original object; and in the act of judging it restores this form to the object. This may indeed be one reason why the legal term" judgment" is used to designate this act; it can be seen as a decree declaring that the form belongs to the object and must be restored to it. As judgments about the same object, or class of objects, are multiplied, the various formalities expressed in them are all referred to the one object. In this way knowledge increases, while at the same time the unity of knowledge is preserved.[59]

[58] For a modern presentation of a similar view *cl.* P. Geach: "Subjects and Predicates," *Mind,* N. 236 (Oct. 1950), pp. 461-482. But Geach would doubtless call for far gTeater logical precision on my part.

[59] Cf. *ST* Ia 14.14; 58.4; 2a2ae 60.1 ad 1; C. gent. 1.58.

Another characteristic of judgment can now be appreciated, that it makes possible the passage from the notional to the existential order. By the formation of the concept the process by which the object (by means of its *species)* is impressed (under a given formality) on the mind is brought to completion; and this process is relatively passive, in the sense that the mind is assimilated to its object. An inverse process begins with the judgment, and here the mind is more active than passive. To explain this in cognitional terms (of Scholastic theory) one would say that the intellect, as conceiving, is one with its object, and indeed identical with it according to its being as known (its *"esse intentionale* "). The mind, as judging, has "something proper to itself," [60] namely the awareness of the presence of the conceived form in the known object, and hence also of the existence of that object, so that by its judgment it brings the intellect back to that object as it is in itself, and hence as existing. Judgment thus brings thought back from the ideal realm of abstract notions to the concrete world of existing beings. In this way it bridges the gap between thought and volition, between speculation and action; for the will and action bear on things as they are concretely given in their own individual existence. This also helps to explain why it is that our judgments fall so easily under the influence of the will and indeed of passion (as with prejudices), and why so many judgments can be called voluntary, as for instance those concerned in the act of faith. [61] At the same time some light is thrown on another characteristic of judgment, namely its binding nature. One who judges commits and pledges himself, as though binding himself in a full and complete act by which he expresses himself (insofar as the act includes reflection) and the object of his judgment. This is most apparent when one is called before a judge or court of inquiry as a witness; by his judgment he pledges himself in a concrete and definitive manner. [62]

[60] " Aliquid sibi proprium " *(De ver.* 1.8).

[61] Cf. *ST* la2ae 17.6; 2a2ae 2.9.

[62] One is reminded of Gabriel Marcel's stress on witness as commitment, as, e.g., in his *The Philosophy of Existence* (London, 1950), pp. 67-76.

This characteristic of judgment also draws attention to its central importance in the critical examination of knowledge with regard to its validity and truth, by leading to recognition of the distinction between the notional and the existential orders. As was pointed out earlier on (cf. above, n. 10), the identity affirmed in judgment does not hold as between subject and predicate as such, or in the mental realm, but only in the object, which is primarily a concretely existing thing, and which is identically that subject which has the form signified by the predicate. The judgment effects the transition from the mental world to that in which such real identity is found. This is aptly called its transnotional value or function, for the judgment is not just representative; it is also existential, as St. Thomas so often insists, holding that what is most distinctive of the judgment is that it has to do with existence.[63]

Before we go on to deal with this aspect of the judgment it may not be out of place to suggest that one reason why so many of his followers[64] turned away from what .seems clearly St. Thomas's notion of judgment may be traced to a certain essentialism due, I am inclined to think, to the mathematical procedure introduced into philosophy by Descartes, and to the influence of the evidently successful science of mathematical phys,ics. Mathematics makes for clarity and accuracy, and is closely akin to logic. Both sciences confine themselves to a world of abstract entities where real existence is of no significance and where real motion is reduced to its quantitative coordinates. Philosophy, enviously aiming at similar clarity and accuracy, allowed itself to be drawn entirely into the timeless

[63] Cf. *In Boet. de Trin. 5.3; In 1 sent.* 19.5.l ad 7'; 38.1.3; *In 1 perih.* I.10; 8.108.

[64] There may be others, but Ferrariensis seems to be a notable exception, to judge by his commentary (n. 6) on *C. gent.* 1.59: "Compositio et complexio in intcllectu non intelligitur tamquam sit aliquid per actum intellectus constitutum quod ex pluribus conceptibus componatur ita quod ex illis fiat unum sicut ex materia et forma .... Quod de re incomplexa concipit (iutellcctus) rei ad extra attribuit, et sic indicat ita esse in re sicut concipit de ipsa . . . Ita videlicet quod subiectum dicit rem cui intellectus aliquid de ipsa conceptum attribuit, et praedicatum dicit formam quam de ipso prius incomplexe conceperat, et posterius cum complexione ad rem intelligit et dicit."

and motionless world of ideal relationships; all the more so because thought, again mainly due to the influence of Descartes, came to be regarded exclusively as consisting of ideas present to the mind. Such conceptualism focused attention on the essence at the expense of existence, which crune to be seen as mere factual givenness, and therefore of as little importance to the philosopher as to the scientist; and it imprisoned thought within the immanent realm of the abstract and universal. Such trends could only lead to idealism and essentialism. It is surely significant that the rediscovery, starting in the period 1930-1940, of existence as act, and of its central role in the metaphysics of St. Thomas, has gone hand in hand with the rediscovery of the nature and proper function of judgment. The return to existence as act and to judgment as the complete act of knowledge by which alone existence can be attained lies behind the marked realism of more recent Thomists, in contrast to the semi-idealism which had been so prevalent, and against which E. Gilson wrote so trenchantly in the thirties. [65]

The Pure Existential Judgment

As I embark on this final section I am quite aware that a vast amount has been written in recent years on the question of existence, both from the ontological point of view, and from the analytical and linguistic angle which considers the meaning of existence when used as a predicate, and asks if existence can really function as a predicate. It is beyond my scope or competence to deal with all this literature. What I can hope to do is to keep as close as possible to the texts of St. Thomas and to examine how the notion of judgment, as it has been outlined in these pages, can square with what St. Thomas teaches about the way we know existence. From the start I place myself on

•• Especially in *Le realisme methodique,* Paris, 1986; *Realisme Thomiste et critique de la connaissance,* Paris, 1939. C. Fabro treats briefly but vigorously of the change--0r lack of it-in the Thomist school itself and in the Neo-Scholastics by which St. Thomas's notion of the act of existing *(esse ut actus)* was abandoned in favor of that of existence *(ess.e in aetu),* in his *Partecipaai01!6* e *causalita,* Torino, 1960, pp. 603-629.

the side of those Thomists who maintain that, for St. Thomas, being is primarily the act of existing (cf. n. 27, above) which is" that which is most intimate and deep in all things, since it is formal in regard to all that is in a thing." [66] "the actuality of all things, and even of forms themselves," [67] "the actuality of all acts, and hence the perfection of all perfections." [68] This insight, which is shared by some leading Thomists of today, [69] is excellently summarized by W. Norris Clarke, S. J. in these words: " In penetrating beyond the mere *fact* of existence of some being, affirmed by a knower distinct from itself, to the inner *act* of existence *wi,thin* the being itself, which objectively grounds the true affirmation about it, he (St. Thomas) has provided a far more intrinsic analysis than hitherto available in more essence-oriented, essence-dominated, conceptions. For the first time the fact of ·actual existence as immanent act and perfection is formally and technically integrated into the metaphysical analysis of the constitutive structure of being, being thereby ' unveiled ' as constituting the very root of all the ontological perfection within a being, including its intelligibility, which now appears as the very light of existence itself shining through the manifold prism of essences recognized as diverse modes of active presence." [70]

The initial problem set by existential judgments concerns the meaning of the copula, the verb "is." Although this verb

[66] " Esse autem est illud quod est magis intimum cuilibet, et quod profundius omnibus inest" (*ST* Ia 8.1).

[67] "Ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum, 11t etiam ipsarum formarum" (*ST* Ia 4.1 ad 3), cf. *ibid.*, 2 and 3.

[68] " Hoc quod dico *esse* est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum " (De *pot.* 7.2 ad 9); cf. *ST* laflae 2.5. ad 2.

[69] Among others: C. Fabro: *La nozione metafisica di partecipazione secondo S. Tommaso d'Aquino* (1939), 2nd. ed., Torino, 1949; E. Gilson: *Le Thomisme,* 4th. ed., Paris, 1942; L. B. Geiger: *La participation,* Paris, 1942; J. de Finance: *Etre et Agir,* Paris, 1945; L. De Raeymaeker: *La Phifosophie de l"Etre,* Louvain, 1946; J. Owens: *An Elementary Christian Metaphysics,* Milwaukee, 1963. For a brief history of the "recovery" of this Thomistic notion of "esse" cf. Sister Helen James John: " The Emergence of the Act of Existing in Recent Thomism," *Intern. Phil. Quart.* pp. 595-600.

[70] " What is Most and Least Relevant in the Metaphysics of St. Thomas Today," *Intern. Phil. Quart.* 14 (1974), p. 416.

is not expressed in such judgments in all languages, some of which simply juxtapose the terms which express the subject and the associated idea, or tense the verb which is used, it will be found that "is " is either understood or equivalently expressed. This is not surprising, since " is " is as co-extensive as being; and being, as has already been noted, although implied in every concept, is usually not explicitly expressed either. What is ever-present is simply taken for granted, while attention is concentrated on the distinctive features *oi* what is known. At any rate, the fact that "is" figures as copula in most languages of our cultural context is sufficient reason to inquire into its meaning.

A first distinction is made by St. Thomas when he writes: " The verb ' to be ' is used in two ways: to signify the act of existing, and to signify the mental uniting of predicate to subject which constitutes a proposition; " [71] and again: " There are two uses of ' to be ' in speech ... One way is to use it as the verbal copula which signifies the composition made by the mind in all of its enunciations: hence this ' to be ' does not refer to real existence but to the act by which the mind composes and divides (i.e., forms propositions) . In this way 'to be ' is attributed to everything about which a proposition can be formed, whether it is a being or a privation of being; for we say that blindness exists. The other use of ' to be ' is to express the 1act of being in so far as it is being, namely that by reason of which anything is said to be actually given in reality." [72]

When he deals with this distinction St. Thomas usually notes that when one replies to a question about the existence of things

[71] " Esse dupliciter dicitur: uno modo, significat actum essendi; alio modo, siguificat compositionem propositionis, quam anima adinvenit coniungens praedicatum subiccto " *ST* la, 3.4 ad 2; trans. of T. McDermott, Blackfriars ed., II, p. *33.*

[72] " Esse dupliciter dicitur . . . Uno modo, secundum quod est copula verbalis significans compositionem cuiuslibet enuntiationis quam anima facit: uncle hoc esse non est aliquid in rerum natura, sed tantum in actu animae componentis et dividentis. Et sic esse attribuitur omni ei de quo potest propositio formari, sive sit ens, sive privatio entis; dicimus enim caecitatem esse. Alio modo esse dicitur actus entis inquantum est ens, id est quo aliquid denominatur ens actu in rerum natura" *(Quodl.* 9.3).

(an est?) the ' to be ' of the reply concerns the truth of the proposition, i. e., it signifies the mental uniting of predicate to subject; but that the truth of the proposition is in turn grounded on the fact of the existence-or non-existence-of the subject in question. [73] He 1also notes that when one answers the question " Does God exist? " in the affirmative, the ' to be ' of the answer does not signify God's actual existence (which, as identical with his being, is unknown to us) but only the truth of the proposition, while God's actual existence is the ground of such truth. [74]

For St. Thomas, therefore, the copula in the judgment has at least two distinct functions. One is logical, as the sign of the reliation between subject and predicate. The other is existential and refers to the affirmation (or negation) which constitutes the essence of the judgment in so far as it is the final and complete act of knowing, an act by which the mind passes from the notional realm to the realm in which the known object is originally given; and this is, first and foremost, the realm where individual and concrete objects are found as physically existing. As he himself puts it: " this verb ' is ' does not directly and principally signify (mental) composition but only in consequence of what it primarily signifies; for what it signifies first of all is that which is grasped as absolute actuality by the intellect; for' *is,'* simply as such, means to be actual." [75] From this point of view the judgment can be described as " the operation of the intellect in accepting the existence of a thing as it is in itself by means of a certain assimilation to it." [76]

[78] Cf. *ST* la 48.2 ad 2; *In 5 meta.* 9·895-896.

[74] Cf. *ST* la 3.4 ad 2; 2.2 ad 2; *De pot.* 7.2 ad l; *C. gent.* 1.12; *In 1. sent.* 33.1.1 ad 1.

[75] "Hoc verbum *est* consignificat compositionem, quia non earn principaliter significat, sed ex consequenti; significat enim primo illud quod cadit in intellectu per modum actualitatis absolutae: nam *est,* simpliciter dictum, significat in actu esse " *(In 1 perih.* 5·22). cf. L. Lavelle: *De l'Etre,* c. 5, D (2nd ed., Paris, 1947, pp. 158-162), where, having distinguished the existential from the logical function of the copula, he points out that the existential judgment is implied in every other one, since the subject, the predicate and the relation between them exist, and thus bears witness to the universality of being.

[76] " Ipsa operatio intellectus accipientis esse rei sicut est, per quamdam similationem ad ipsum" *(In 1. sent.* 19.5.1).

In view of the opinion of philosophers such as Kant and B. Russell that existence can never be a predicate, or that as a predicate it refers to propositional functions rather than to things, it is necessary first of all to indicate some kinds of statements which seem to predicate existence but in reality do not do so. This is best seen in reference to negative judgments which are often adduced to show that existence cannot be a predicate, for this reason: if a subject is said not to exist it cannot have a reference, with the result that no predication concerning it is possible. P. Geach has dealt with this difficulty, and in so doing draws attention to three kinds of denials of existence which must carefully be distinguished.[77]

In such statements as " Cerberus does not exist " there is the ostensible use of a proper name, but one is not really using such a name since there is no such thing as Cerberus. In this case, " exist " is not a genuine predicate, not even of the name Cerberus. In a second class of statements use is made of a descriptive and predicable expression, such as " dragon." Here the expression is not used as a name but as a logical predicate, for the meaning of " dragons do not exist " is " nothing at all is a dragon; " and hence the use of such an expression does not imply the existence of what it signifies, even when it figures grammatically as subject. When such an expression is used affimiatively existence is not really a predicate either. The correct formulation is not: " a so-and-so (an F) exists," nor even: "there is an F;" but: "some things have F-ness." This throws some light on statements concerning privations, as when one affirms: "evil exists." The correct meaning of such a statement is: "some things have defects;" and the' to be' of such a statement refers, as St. Thomas pointed out, to the mental uniting of subject and predicate.[78] So also in the statement: " God exists," existence is not a predicate, since it does not refer to God's act of existing. The subject" God" is not used as a proper name but as a descriptive, predicable term; and the

[77] " Form and Existence," Kenny, *loc. cit.*, pp. 41-48.

[78] *ST* la 48, 2 ad 2; *0. gent.* 8.9, at the end.

meaning is: something or other is God. To be used as a proper name it would have to .signify "the one and only God;" then it can serve, if not rigorously as a proper name, at least as a definite description.

In a third class of statement, continues Geach, existence can be a genuine predicate when used in reference to definite individuals, as when Jacob said: "Joseph is not, and Simeon is not." Even if Joseph and Simeon had been dead when Jacob uttered this lament the phrase would have been perfectly correct and significant. Although the bearers of those names no longer existed, yet the names themselves, used as subjects, still had reference, as Wittgenstein pointed out.[79] Since names are timeless, reference by naming does not admit time qualifications; hence negative propositions of this sort raise no special difficulty. Geach concludes that when St. Thomas defines judgment through its power to express ' to be ' he is speaking primarily of this kind of ' to be ' which can be a predicate. To mark the difference between this use and the .second one mentioned above, one might say, for instance, "God is" (where existence is a predicate, **and " God** is not " would mean that God, like Joseph, had died), as distinct from "God exists."[80]

Although the ' to be ' of this third type of statement refers principally to the " absolute actuality " of individuals as they concretely exist in themselves, it is clear that the judgment may be used to affirm or deny other kinds of existence. **It** is indeed true that " to signify existence is the distinctive mark of affirmation, and to signify non-existence is the distinctive mark of negation,"[81] yet whatever can exist in any way can form the object of the judgment, according to the particular mode of its existence. Thus St. Thomas, commenting on a passage in Aris-

[79] *Philwophical Investigations,* I. 40.

[80] In the article quoted in note 58, on pp 469-478, Geach suggests the terminology of "first order predicate" (which can significantly be attached to the name of an object), and " second order predicate " whose sense is complete only when attached to a first order one, as in the example " God exists."

[81] " Significare esse est proprium affirmationis, et signifieare non esse est proprium negationis" *(In 1 perih.* 8.U).

totle, says: " When he says here ' what is ' and ' what is not ' he should not be understood as referring only to the existence or non-existence of the subject, but to this: that the thing signified by the predicate should be in the thing signified by the subject. For when we say ' the raven is white ' we signify that something is which is not, even though the raven does exist." [82] For St. Thomas it is the form that determines the kind of existence peculiar to each being, for it is by reason of its form that anything has existence. Since he explains knowledge in terms of form (technically known then as *species)* and since mental acts and forms can be known through reflection, judgments concerning " ideal " or immanent realities are possible; yet these, as noted earlier on, imply a relation to the realm of " real " existence. This is the realm that concerns us at present and of which St. Thomas speaks when he says that if the form in question pertains to the essence of a thing (e.g., the rational soul in man), that thing is said simply to be *(dicetur habens esse simpliciter)* ; if the form is extraneous to the essence, that thing will be said to be in a particular and qualified way *(non dicetur esse simpliciter, sed esse secundum quid)* .[88]

This appears to be what Geach has in mind when he writes: "Existence in sense C (the third of those mentioned earlier) is, according to Aquinas, always existence in respect of some form: *quodlibet esse est secundum form.am aliquam* (la *5.5* ad 8. For it is in this sense of ' exist ' that we say a thing goes on existing; and for a thing to continue to exist is for it to be the same X over a period of time, when X represents some *Begriffswort;* and this in turn means the persistence in an individual of the form expressed by the predicable expression ' X '." [84] While this is clear enough, it could be taken to imply that there

[82] " Non est autem intelligendum quod hoc qu-0d dixit: *quod est* et *quod non est* sit referendum ad solam existentiam vel non existentiam subiccti, sed ad hoc quod res significata per praedicatum insit vel non insit rei significatae per subiectum. Nam cum dicitur 'corvus est albus' significatur quod non est, csse, quamvis ipse corvus sit res existens " *(ibid.,* 9.4; cf. *In 1 sent.* 19, 5.1 ad 5),

[88] *In Boet. de hebdom.* ft.ft7.

[••] *Op. cit.,* p. 48.

is no real difference between the attributive and the pure fonn of the existential judgment. To affinn that Peter is could apparently be equivalent to stating that Peter continues to possess the same essential form. I don't know if Geach would agree to this, but it does seem to correspond to what Fr. Regis has to say on this matter. [85]

Fr. Regis regards the judgment as the mental union of two concepts, basically the noun-concept representing the quiddity, and the verb-concept which represents both accidents and existence. The direct object of the judgment is therefore the unified concepts, and its immanent term is the enunciation. It is not concerned directly with reality but with our knowledge of it, and what the ' to be ' of judgment signifies is primarily the identity of attribution. With regard to existence he maintains (against E. Gilson) that if one follows St. Thomas he cancertainly speak of a concept of existence; [86] and that the existence affirmed by the judgment is not the act of existing itself but the mode-substantial or accidental-of existence proper to mobile being. Consequently, one should not speak of existence as the object (i.e. the objective cause) of the judgment but only as its measure, in the sense that it is the measure of the truth or falsity of the mental union of concepts which constitutes the essence of the judgment.

Apart from the fact that Fr. Regis misleadingly looks on the judgment as formed by the union of two concepts he seems here to confuse two quite distinct things, the judgment as object of simple reflexive apprehension, and the act itself of judging; and it is strange that he has no difficulty in allowing that the existence of the act of judging is apprehended by the act of judgment itself, while denying that the existence of real beings can be so apprehended. [87] If the judgment does no more than affinn the substantial or accidental mode of 'being of its object it will

[85] L. M. Regis, 0. P.: "The Knowledge of Existence in St. Thomas Aquinas," *Modern Schoolman* 28 (1951), pp. 1!21-1!27; cf. *Epistemology,* New York, 1959, pp. 312-814; 321 ff.

••He quotes *In 1 perih.* 1.5; 3.11; 5.17; 6.2; 8.17, etc•

[87] Cf. J. Owens: *An Elementary Christian Metaphyaics,* p. 254, n. 5.

be difficult indeed to show how the judgment "Peter is" can differ from this one: "Peter is a man." Even if the former does imply that Peter continues to be the same kind of being that he formerly was, it is precisely this continuance in being that is affirmed, rather than the fact that he is a human being. In other words, although the form is principle of existing, it is not identical with it; and what the pure existential judgment affirms is simply that Peter is. Fr. Regis seems to assume that if existence is to be predicated it must first of all be conceived; and since a concept is, of its nature, abstract and universal, and hence can represent only a form, such a judgment could not have to do with actual existence as it is found in individuals. The distinction between existence as objective cause and as measure is not at all convincing, for a measure, to function as such, must surely be known; and since actual and singular existence admittedly cannot be adequately grasped conceptually, the conclusion should be, not that it is not known, but that it can be known only through the judgment. To avoid confusions like this it might be better to make use of a precise terminology; to say, for instance, that while *existence* (a formality considered abstractly and in itself) can be represented in a concept, *to exist* (actual and singular existing of an individual being) can be reached only by the act of judgment.

This is the line of approach taken by E. Gilson who, however, goes to the opposite extreme in his eagerness to underline the existentialist character of the genuine thought of St. Thomas.[88] He begins with the same difficulty, namely that, at least in the ordinary kind of judgment, what is predicated must first be conceived; and that what is conceived is necessarily a form or quality and prescinds from the order of actual existence. Hence, he concludes, that which is distinctive of actual existence cannot be represented in a concept. There is therefore no concept of existence as it is actually exercised in an individu-

[88] Cf. P. I, c. 1 (Existence et Realite) of *Le Thomisme* in the third (Paris, 1941) and successive editions; *L'Etre et l'essence* (Paris, 1948), esJ>"cially cc. 9 and 1{}. The same ideas are found in his *Being and Some* Toronto, 1949.

al being. Existence in this sense (i.e. "to exist") can only be expressed in the judgment, and indeed only in the pure existential judgment, as when I affirm: "Peter is." To conceive actual existence is to transform it into an abstract formality, and to transfer it from the existential to the essential order; and if it were a predicate, the existential judgment (e.g." being is ") would be turned into an ideal and essential one (" being is being ") . In other words, in the judgment " being is existing," the copula either has an existential function, and the judgment would be equivalent to "being exists existing," an evident tautology, or the copula has only the function of uniting subject and predicate, and then the judgment would not affirm existence, and the meaning would be " being is being." [89] Gilson is thus forced to conclude that while the attributive judgment consists of two concepts joined by the copula (which does not then signify actual existence), the pure existential judgment has no predicate. It is composed of a subject and of the act of existing; and the verb " is " is not then a copula, but simply the affirmation of the act of existence. It is by this act of judgment alone that actual existence is grasped.

Gilson has the uncanny knack of sensing, as it were, the direction in which a co.rrect solution to a problem may be found, although he is not always so successful in working out the details of that solution. I find it difficult to accept his contention that the attributive existential judgment (e.g. "Peter is studying ") is not really existential, for such a judgment does surely assert not only that Peter is a student but also that he is a really existing being. Moreover, the pure existential judgment is left, so to speak, hanging in the air, as though no conceptual activity preceded or prepared it. But even if there were no preceding concept of actual existence this would not mean that it was unknown. The knowing activity which results in the concept of the object as known (e.g., as student, or as being) comprises the whole process of " continuation

••For similar views cf. E. Brisbois: "Qu'est-ce l'existence," in *Rev. Phu. Louvain* 48 (1950)' pp. 185-219.

through sense " which links the intellect to the concrete and existing object; and it is this indirectly representative knowledge-intellectual as well as sensitive-that finds expression in the verb and in the judgment. The fact that there is no adequate *concept* of actual existence does not imply that there is no *knowledge* of it; and it is precisely such knowledge that, as Gilson insists, can find adequate expression only in the judgment. One might say that the judgment has reference to actual existence by reason of its subject, not by reason of the predicate which, as such, is an abstract formality.

While Gilson opens up the interesting possibility of a judgment which has no concept, he also affirms that there is no predicate in the pure existential judgment. This might lead one to suspect that here there is really no judgment at all, especially if one retains the " two concept " notion of judgment; and it could seem to cast doubt on the notion of judgment which I have put forward as being the simple act by which the intellect refers a conceived form to the object denoted by the subject.

Here one must start from facts; and it can hardly be denied that the pure existential judgment is truly a judgment. If I am asked whether such a thing as a space-ship or a laser beam exists, and I reply that it does, I surely intend to make an assertion; so too the servant of the German noble visiting Italy who scribbled "Est! Est! Est! " on the inn in Montefiascone to indicate that he had found excellent wine there. Nor does the judgment need to have a predicate, at least in the opinion of St. Thomas, who writes: " a simple enunciation can be formed from just a noun and a verb, but not from other parts of speech without these." [90] When he says that in the phrase " Socrates is" the "is" must be taken as a substantial predicate [91] he means that " is " in its full and proper sense is attributed only to substances, while all other kinds of being are said to be only

[90] " Potest autem ex solo nomine et verbo simplex enuntiatio fieri, non autem ex aliis orationis partibus sine his " *(In 1 perih.* I, 6) .

[91] *In 5 meta.* 9.896.

in a certain manner.[92] He combines these considerations in the following passage: " This verb ' is ' is sometimes predicated in itself in the enunciation, as when one says ' Socrates is: ' by which we intend to signify nothing else than that Socrates really exists. Sometimes however ' is ' is not predicated in itself, as principal predicate, but as joined to the principal predicate in order to connect it to the subject; as when one says' Socrates is white ' it is not the intention of the speaker to affirm that Socrates really exists but to attribute whiteness to him by means of the verb ' is; ' and hence in such cases ' is ' is predicated as joined to the principal predicate."[93]

From this it appears that the judgment, simply as such, does not require more than the subject and the verb; and since the subject of the judgment, as such, is not a concept, for its role is to denote rather than to signify, it follows that there can be a judgment without any concept at all. This implication mu.st, at fir.st sight, appear paradoxical and disconcerting. Yet it must be remembered-and this probably is the main. point which Gilson wished to make-that the pure existential judgment is unique, since other forms do require at least one concept. The reason why this judgment is unique is that, as Kant had noted, but not for the reason he gave, existence as actually exercised cannot be a predicate in the same formal way as other aspects of real being; it cannot figure as the third term in a judgment and at the same time retain its properly existential value. The predicate, as third term in the judgment, always expresses some formal determination of the subject; but actual existence is not a form but that by which every form is rendered actual. "Any

[92] *Quodl.* 9.3.

[93] " Hoc verbum *est* quandoque in enuntiatione praedicatur secundum se; ut cum dicitur *So!Yl'ates est:* per quod nihil aliud intendimus significare quam quod Socrates sit in rerum natura. Quandoque vero non praedicatur per se, quasi principale praedicatum, scd quasi coniunctum principali praedicato ad connectendum ipsum subiecto; sicut cum dicitur *So!Yl'ates es.t albus* non est intentio loquentis ut asserat Socratem esse in rerum natura, sed ut attribuat ei albedinem mediante hoc verbo *est;* et ideo in talibus *est* praedicatur ut adiacens principali praedicato " (In *2 perih.* 2.2rn).

form is compared to existence itself as potency to act;" [94] for " existence is the actuality of every form or nature . . . hence existence itself must be compared to the essence which is other than itself, as act to potency." [95] In general, for St. Thomas at any rate, " existence itself is the most perfect of all things: ... it is the actuality of all things and even of forms themselves. Hence it is not compared to others as that which receives to that which is received, but rather as that which is received to that which receives." [96] The actuality expressed by existence-more accurately, one should say by "existing "-can only be represented by the fullest actualization of knowledge; and this is the act of judgment.

The psychology of judgment, within the Thomistic tradition at least, seems to demand this. The knower, as actually knowing, is identical (intentionally, not physically) with what is known, in respect of the formality under which the object is attained. Knowledge implies intentional identity between the knower and the essence-or some formal aspect-of what is known. But it is precisely the actual existence, the physical "existing," of the known object, and of the knower, that distinguishes one from the other. With regard to this" existing" there can be no identification, and hence no adequate conceptual knowing. The only act of the intellect that is able to grasp actual existence as completely actual is the judgment, always presupposing that it is the final phase of a unified process, intellectual and sensitive, that reaches continuously from mind to object; for it is by means of the senses, and principally the sense of touch, that we come into contact with the world of physically existent beings, just as the only way in which actual

[94] " Forma aliqua comparatur ad ipsum esse ut potentia ad acturn " *(De anim.* 6 ad 8).

[95] " Esse est actualitas omnis formae vel naturae ... oportet igitur quod ipsurn esse cornparetur ad essentiam quae est aliud ab ipso, sicut actus ad potentiarn " *(ST* Ia 8.6).

[96] " Ipsurn esse est perfectissirnurn ornniurn: . . . est actualitas ornniurn rerurn et etiarn ipsarurn forrnarurn. Unde non cornparatur ad alia sicut recipiens ad recepturn: sed rnagis ut receptum ad recipiens " *(ibid.,* 4.1 ad 8; cf. *De pot.* 7.2 ad 9).

existence can reveal itself to us is through action. It is also presupposed, in Thomistic psychology, that what knows is, strictly speaking, neither the intellect nor the sense faculty, but the person, the individual knower, whose substantial unity (of soul and body) is reflected in the dynamic unity of the one knowing-process which integrates both intellectual and sense elements.[07]

What is lacking in the conceptual phase, and present in the judging phase of knowing as one of its distinguishing marks, is the consciousness of this distinction, as regards real existing, between the knower and what is known. The knower is aware that his physical existence is distinct from that of the known object. The actual existence of the object is known even though it cannot be adequately conceptualized; and it is this knowledge which finds expression in the act of judgment, which is therefore rightly characterized as the act by which existence is either affirmed or denied. Perhaps this is what St. Thomas has in mind when, contrasting the "*simplex notitia,*" involved in all kinds of knowing, with "*scientia visionis,*" he says that the latter has to do with what is "*extra genus notitiae,*" as, for example, when there is question of the knowledge of the existence of things.[08] This curious phrase seems to indicate that, for him, the knowledge of existence is of a quite different kind from all other ordinary kinds. In another place, he draws a contrast between the way an angel knows existence (as concretely exercised in the existent being) and the human way. The human intellect's connatural way is to know concrete forms and concrete existing in abstraction, "*per modum resolutionis cuiusdam.*"[99] This phrase seems to stand for the indirect type of knowing implied in the "return to the senses." The pure existential judgment would then express the basic orientation of the intellect towards its primordial object, namely being as primarily .signifying existence as act. This basic thrust of the mind underlies all its conceptual activity, and can therefore

[97] Cf. *De ver.* 2.6 ad S; SS.IS ad 7; *In de anim.* 1.101.52; *De anim.* 19; *Quorll.* 9.7; *ST* Ia 75.2 ad 2. cf. B. Lonergan: *Collection,* New York, 1967, c. 14.

•• *De ver.* S.S ad 8; cf. 1.2 ad 8.

•• *BT* Ia 12.4 ad 8·

be described as intuitive, or even-to use Heidegger's favorite phrase-pre-conceptual, a pre-grasp *(Vorgriff)* of being as existence.

The author who, to my mind, has made the most successful, or at least the most interesting, attempt to unravel the kind of knowing involved in the pure existential judgment is Maritain,[100] whose theory I shall try to summarize as best I can. The background to his theory is formed, if I am not mistaken, by the convergence in his mind of two trends of thought which seem to have developed independently of each other before he realized that they could and should be fused. One trend led to the ,recognition of the primacy, in the philosophy of St. Thomas, of existence as act.[101] The other was a growing awareness of the importance for St. Thomas of the kind of knowing called " by connaturality "[102] which Maritain explained as an intuitive and pre-conceptual, although intellectual, knowledge which is :it work when we know either ourselves or singular material beings,[103] and which is operative in the artist as creative intuition where an affective element plays the role normally filled by the concept.[104]

Maritain begins by recalling that our concepts are normally derived by way of abstraction which employs the internal image of the known object. The usual kind of judgment, which is attributive, makes use of a predicate obtained in this abstractive manner and which signifies some formal aspect of the object, which it then attributes to the subject. In this way one can form the concept of existence, in the same way namely as

[100] "Reflexions sur la nature blessee et sur !'intuition de l'etre," in *Revue Thomiste* 68 (1968), pp. 5-40.

[101] Cf. " L'Existentialisme de saint Thomas," in *Esistenzialismo (Acta Pont. Academiae Romanae S. Thomae Aq.*, Nova Series, vol. 13), Roma, 1947, pp. 40-64; *Court traite de l'e:i:istence et de l'existant*, Paris, 1947, ch. l, pp. 42-60 (English version: *Existence and the Existent*, New York, 1956, pp. 82-44).

[102] Cf. *ST* 2a2ae 45.2; and la 1.6 ad 8.

[10]. Cf. "On Knowledge through Connaturality," in *Review of Metaphysics*, 4 (1951) pp. 478-481; *The Range of Reason*, London, 1958, ch. 8.

[10]. *Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry*, New York, 1958 (Meridian PB, 1955), chs. S-4.

one forms the concept of any other reality, and this concept of existence can function as predicate in the attributive judgment. But this concept belongs to what, in Aristotelian terminology, is known as the first degree of abstraction. It signifies existence as it is normally understood in everyday, or non-philosophical, language; and "to exist" in this sense is simply "to be *there"* (etre *la),* to be present in the world of the speaker, as when one affirms that the presence of a spy in the military forces is certain. This is what modern Thomists refer to as " *esse in actu* " as distinct from " *esse ut actus;* " and Maritain proposes to use the Heideggerian term *Dasein* to signify existence in this sense. It is well expressed in the French phrase: " il *y* a."

This concept follows on the sense knowledge by which the singular existent being is reached. When, for instance, I know a rose, I form a sensible image of some aspect of it, e.g. its color, which is due to the intentional (in the cognitive sense) action of the rose on the eye. When the intellect, making use of the image, forms the concept of color, it is also conscious of the act of seeing insofar as it depends on the intentional activity of the rose, and therefore it is also conscious of the existence of the rose. In other words, existence is already known; it is present to the mind, and hence spiritualized, but only in remote potency since it is present only mediately as implied in the consciousness of the act of seeing. Existence is then known by means of a concept. There is explicit knowledge of the object but only implicit knowledge of its existence. One who knows that " the rose is there" does not yet explicitly know the existence of the rose, for he knows the presence of the rose only by means of a concept which is not its adequate substitute. The existence is known in the way in which a form is known, as though it belonged to the order of essence rather than of actual existence; and there is no explicit recognition, at this level, of the distinction of existence from essence. This type of existential judgment can be called a judgment of presence. In it the subject is attained as present in the world of the speaker;

what it says, in effect, is: this is here. The existence in question is not existence as such but as relative to the world of things. The existential reference belongs, in the copulative assertion, to the subject and predicate rather than to the copula, whereas in the truly existential judgment it belongs to the copula; and this first concept of existence, although in itself analogical, is used as if it were univocal, since it simply means: " present to my world."

The intellect makes use of this concept 0£ existence (as *Dasein) in* three main ways. First of all, in ordinary language about things, as when one says: " Peter is there." The " is " in this case functions merely as copula, and only the " there " is used existentially as referring to a particular subject. What " is " then does is to attribute " there " to such a subject. In the second place, the concept of existence is used in the same way in the natural sciences, as when one asserts: " the dinosaur no longer exists," i.e., is no longer present in our world. Finally, it is also so used in natural philosophy (which moves in the first degree of abstraction), and in such philosophical systems as Dialectical Materialism where it has the additional meaning of " to make, or produce." Maritain thinks that it is also in this sense that it is used by Phenomenologists, and that the constant temptation for the Christian philosopher is to conceive existence only in this way, for instance when he speaks of the existence 0:f God, as though God simply were" there", in some kind of invisible world; and he suspects that Heidegger thought of existence only in this way.

It is possible, however, to raise this concept to the third degree of abstraction. The philosophers who are truly metaphysicians can do this if they realize that the concept of being is analogical; yet, if they lack the intuition of " existing " as such, or reach it only implicitly, they still have only conceptual knowledge of it. This was the case with Bergson, who conceived being as duration, as distinct from Spinoza who conceived being as univocal. **It** is also true, for Maritain, of Aristotle whose intuition of being centered on essence rather than on existence,

and who thought of being in the same way as the other transcendental notions, so that existence was conceived as though it were some kind of essence. Such a concept is obtained through abstraction in the third degree. It can not only precede the genuine intuition of existence and being but can block it, in so far as existence is then conceived on the pattern of other acts, for instance in the way that " to understand " is called an act in relation to the intellect. There is a fundamental difference between the two cases, for, with regard to understanding, the intellect is already presupposed as existing, whereas the intellect, or any other power, is nothing at all if it does not actually exist.

To make clear the difference between these two usages of existence as *Dasein* one could say that in the simple judgment of presence (in the first degree of abstraction) , existence is reached as just a *fact* (as given in the world), whereas in the metaphysical judgment (in the third degree of abstraction) it is reached as *act* but as not intrinsically different from other acts.

In order to gain adequate knowledge of existence in its uniqueness as the actuality of all acts one has to pass beyond this essentialized notion of existence; and this can only occur when the mind reaches an intuition of actual existence pure and simple. Such an intuition is embodied in a judgment, but not in any attributive kind of judgment. This is the pure existential judgment, what may be called the metaphysical existential judgment, which differs from all others, and finds expression in such words as: " I am; reality is; things exist." Through this intuitive judgment existence as act is spiritualized, no longer only in potency but in act, by means of an intellectual act (the intuitive judgment) which is proportionate to existence in its unique actuality. By this judgment the act of existence is posited in the mind as proportionate to existence as it a.eluates and gives reality to things which exist independently of the mind. Through such a judgment one has knowledge of existence, but there is no concept; it is the act of judging, not

a concept, which corresponds to existence itself as unique act.

Once this intuitive judgmental act has taken place the intellect is able to reflect on it, and by so doing to form the properly metaphysical concept of existence as act. Such a concept is different from all others, for it has not been obtained through abstraction (which would turn it into a form) but through reflection on an intuition through which existence as act is adequately represented in the mind. This concept of existence is in the third degree of abstraction; it is fully metaphysical. It alone does justice to the unique reality and perfection of existence, and hence Maritain proposes to refer to it as *Sein.* This concept, therefore, does not precede the intuitive judgment but follows it as the conceptual expression of what has been made present to the mind through the previous act of judgment.

A Thomist would hardly quarrel with Maritain over that basis of his theory which is the uniqueness of the properly metaphysical notion of existence as act. Nor would he question the power of the intellect to grasp being as existential. It is clear that, for St. Thomas, what the intellect knows as its direct and primary object is being;[9] and being means, first of all, actual existence (cf. n. 7 above). It is presumably for this reason that Maritain can speak of the basic grasp of existence as an intuition.

His distinction of existence as *Dasein* from existence as *Sein* agrees with that of " existence in act " from " existence as act " in the terminology favored by other existential Thomists, and it clarifies existence in act by invoking the notion of presence. Such distinctions enable one to go along with authors like Regis[10] when they hold that the " to be " of judgment cannot refer to actual existence, since no concept is able to represent existence as act. This may be one reason why they regard the judgment as formed by the union of two concepts. Maritain's theory, now opposing this view, has all the more value since he himself formerly advocated it; and it explains why the " to

[9]. Cf. *ST* la2ae 94.2; *C. g1mt,* 2.88, etc.
[10]. *Epistemology,* pp. 821 ff.

be" of judgment does not usually refer to existence as act, while it does lead thought back to the existential order.

Fabro would apparently side with Maritain on this point, to judge by what he had written ten years before Maritain's article appeared. [107] There he maintains that the existence affirmed in judging is not formally recognized either as distinct from essence or as that real and intrinsic principle which is the act of all acts and the proper effect of God; only metaphysicians-and indeed very few of them-can reach this notion of existence. The judgment, as such, affirms only actual existence *(esse in* acfa) , that factual givenness which can be affirmed of every existent, whether in the physical or in the mental order, whether substantial or accidental. The judgment, as such, has to do with different modes of "being actual "-what Maritain calls Dasein-although all such modes are ultimately grounded in existence as act. This enables us to preserve the notion of judgment as affirming that a form is in a subject, in whatever realm of being to which that subject belongs. The "there" of the judgment of presence can be interpreted as such a form. As a result, the property of the judgment, as distinct from the concept, lies in its power to express this mode of existing, namely, existence in a subject. The kind of existence in question will depend on the type of subject, which may be logical, mathematical, scientific, poetical, physical or metaphysical. [108]

Comparing the theories of Maritain and Fabro on the one hand, and that of Regis on the other, it appears that they approach the question of the " *esse* " attained by judgment from different standpoints. Regis, doubtless due to his "two concept " theory of judgment, is forced to the conclusion that the judgment can affirm only the mode of " *esse,"* namely the way that a form is realized in a subject. This conclusion is confirmed by the consideration that " since we cannot give to the *ipsum esse rei* of judgment the meaning of *act of existing* as pure actuality, the only remaining possibility is to give it the

[10]. *Partecipazione e causalita,* pp. 52-68; 285-236.

[108] Cf. also Lonergan, *Verbum,* p. 66, n. S!il.

meaning of *mode of exiffting* " *(op. cit.,* p. 329). This confirmation, however, overlooks the possibility that the judgment, as such, refers neither to *esse* as pure actuality nor to what is merely a mode of existence, but to that *esse* by which things are, or are actuai, namely, to factual existence. This leaves Regis with the problem of explaining how the judgment, seen as having for its direct object the mental synthesis of concepts obtained by simple apprehension, can possibly refer to actual existence.

The approach of Maritain and Fabro is quite different. They begin from the fact that judgment is characterized by the power to affirm actual existence. From this they go on to show that it is therefore able to express *esse* as act, and finally as the act of all acts, pointing out that this last function is possible only when he who judges is a true metaphysician. **It** is precisely because the judgment can express both actual existence and existence as the act of all acts that it is also able to express every mode of existence; while it remains true, as Regis rightly points out, that to express a mode of existence is to signify the existence of a form in a subject, the mode of existence depending on the type of subject in question. This interpretation seems much closer to the thought and to the thoroughgoing realism of St. Thomas. Moreover it fits in with the view that our basic judgments are existential and singular, and that our initial notion of being is not just essential but existential.

Returning now to Fabro, we note that he outlines two steps by which we pass from the confused and initial notion of being which lies at the source of all thought to the metaphysical notion of being. The first step is the acquisition of the methodological notion of being as "that which has existence," where there is explicit recognition of the distinction of subject (essence) from act (existence). Aristotle did not get beyond this stage, seeing existence only factually, as the act of essence and as subordinate to it. St. Thomas took the second step, rising to knowledge of existence as the act of all acts and as object of divine causality.

Some Thomists, continues Fabro, regard as intuitive this

knowledge of existence as act of all acts. That they are somewhat uneasy about this is shown by the fact that they refer to this intuition as abstractive, which seems rather contradictory. Maritain's theory offers one way out of this difficulty, while Fabro prefers to speak of "*risoluzione*" rather than of intuition. The metaphysical notion of being is understood as the term of an ascending process of intellectual clarification of what is meant by potency and act. This, however, demands a foundation in experience and in direct apprehension, and the emergence in consciousness of the ultimate act of existence *(esse ut aotus).* Hence, he admits, one may speak of an implicit intuition, insofar as this apprehension of existence is co-present whenever an existent is known; and this co-presence is the ground of every other kind of presence.

The question that arises at this point is: can such intuitive or semi-intuitive knowledge be properly called a judgment? and it is here that a Thomist would most likely hesitate to agree with Maritain, especially if there is no concept involved in such knowledge. Yet we are dealing with a fully intellectual-or, better, human-act of knowledge; and since what is distinctive of judgment is the power to affirm or deny existence, it can reasonably be maintained that here we do indeed have a judgment, but one that is unique of its kind. As already noted (nn. 90, 93), no more is needed for the judgment than subject and verb; and since the primary sense of "is" refers to actual existence, the intuition, when formulated by using the copula, would seem to take the form of a judgment. In this connection St. Thomas points out that "this verb 'is' . . . signifies first of all that which enters into human understanding as absolute actuality: for 'is,' simply as such, signifies 'to be in act,' and hence it signifies in the manner of a verb."[109] At any rate it does seem that reflection on such an act, whether it be truly a judgment or not, could explain how existence may be conceived by the

[10]. "Hoc verbum *est* ... significat primo illud quod cadit in intellectu per modum actualitatis absolutae: nam *est,* simpliciter dictum, significat in actu esse" (In *1 perih.* 5.78).

genuine metaphysician and yet not be represented in a concept obtained by abstraction and therefore presented as a form rather than as " the actuality of every form." [110]

What does seem certain is that this altogether basic level of intellectual knowing, where there is question of the intuitive grasp of reality as existent, does not involve conceptual activity. As Fr. Lonergan says: "Prior to concepts there are insights. A single insight is expressed only by uttering several concepts. They are uttered in conjunction, and reflection pronounces whether the insight and so the conjunction is correct ".[111] What he means is perhaps made clearer in another place: " Being is not reduced through possibility to intelligibility as to prior concepts; being is the :first concept; what is prior to the first concept is, not prior concept, but an act of understanding; and like other concepts, the concept of being is an effect of the act of understanding. Hence, when it was stated above that intellect from intelligibility through possibility reaches being, an attempt was being made to describe the virtualities of the act of understanding in its self-possession, to conceptualize reflectively the pre-conceptual act of intelligence that utters itself in the concept ' being '." [112] It is doubtful that Lonergan would agree with Maritain in calling this" pre-conceptual act of intelligence " a judgment, although he does certainly regard it as an intuition.

Quite a lot has been written 1.'ecently on this matter of our pre-conceptual modes of knowing; and foremost among Thomists is D. de Petter, 0. P.,[113] whose work has been popularized by his pupil E. Schillebeeckx, 0. P., who sums up this theory for us.[114] De Petter, as Schillebeeckx understands him, takes up the same problem as J. Marechal and his followers

[110] *Ibid.*

[111] *Insight,* p. 808.

[112] *Verbum. Word and Idea in Aquinas,* London, 1968, p. 44.

[113] *Begrip en werkelijkheid,* Hilversum, 1964, esp. pp. 25-186; 168-178.

[114] *The Concept of Truth and Theological Renewal,* London/Sydney, 1968, pp. 18-19, and appendix, pp. 157-206; cf. also his *Revelation et Theologie* (Approches Theologiques, I, Paris, 1965), Part 8, ch. 1.

(Rahner, Coreth, Lenergan and Donceel especially), agreeing with them that concepts alone cannot lead the mind either to truth or to reality. To do this they must be set in the context of a far wider totality, namely the total knowing activity of the mind; and this wider context includes, as the ground of the validity of knowledge, a non-conceptual element. Marechal was of the opinion that this non-conceptual grounding activity is to be sought, not in intellectual acts themselves nor in their content, but in the dynamic structure of the human spirit as intrinsically orientated towards being, and indeed towards infinite being, and hence, at least implicitly, towards God.[115]

De Petter suggests that the non-conceptual dimension is to be found in intellectual activity itself insofar as there is a dynamic and objective element in the *content* of knowledge. The concept, as he sees it, is a limited expression of a prior awareness of reality, an awareness which is not itself expressed since it is implicit and non-conceptual. When man knows, what he knows, i.e., reality, is present to him through a kind of basic awareness which is pre-conceptual and can never be adequately expressed by means of concepts.[116] The knower is conscious-

[115] For a brief introduction to the " transcendental Thomism " of Marechal and his followers, especially Rahner, cf. G. McCool: *A Rahner Reader,* London, 1975, especially his introduction and ch. 1.

[116] Perhaps this line of thought has links with the theory, foreshadowed by Reid, Jacobi, Schelling and Schopenhauer, and developed by Dilthey and then by Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann, which grounds our awareness of existent reality on factors which precede knowledge and pertain to vital or emotive experience. Scheler has given full and explicit attention to this conviction. Actual existence, he contends, is not known but felt. What is known is the essence *(Sosein),* while value *(Wert)* is grasped by affective intuition. It is through lived experience (of such phenomena as resistance, effort, etc.) that beings are attained as existing *(Dasein)* and as real *(Realsein).* What exists is never given as an object *(Gegenstand)* but as what resists *(Widerstand).* Our basic cognitive evidence bears on the relation between our knowledge of essence and our lived experience of existence. This evidence is expressed in the judgment: " something in general exists," and negatively in the judgment: "nothing does not exist;" and every affirmation presupposes the assertion: " something exists." This judgment expresses our most radical philosophical intuition: that being asserts itself over against the abyss of nothingness. Cf. especially his " Idealismus-Realismus," in *Philosophischer Anzeiger,* II, Bonn 1927 pp. 255-324; *Vom Ewigen im Mens.chen,* Gesammelte Werke, Bern, V (1955), in particular pp. ll!MIS.

again in a non-conceptual way-of the inadequacy of his concepts, and he thus transcends his conceptual knowledge. He is cognitively in touch with reality although he cannot give full and explicit expression to this basic type of knowledge. By reason of this "grounding" the concept (as regards its objective content) can *refer* to reality, even though it cannot lead the mind to it as it is in itself. In other words, the concept, through its objective content, points in the direction of the reality which is known; it provides the objective perspective in which this reality is found, although, as abstract, it is unable to place the mind in possession of it. In this way, the concept retains its own validity, limited though it be; for it, and it alone, as set in the wider context of the non-conceptual awareness of reality, can give meaning and direction to the act of knowing. Knowledge, therefore, includes an experiential (i.e., intellectual but non-conceptual) element together with conceptual thought.

If this be the case with all our knowledge of reality, it will be so pre-eminently where the knowledge of actual existence is concerned; and this intellectual though non-conceptual grasp of existent reality may well be what Maritain speaks of as intuition. And since judgment seems to imply reflection, it may be the consciousness of this intuition, as leading to a concept, that finds expression in the pure existential judgment. Since the word "intuition " is ambiguous, and creates difficulties, it might be more advisable to use the term "contuition" favored by some recent writers, although not in quite this particular context.

The question however remains: granted that there is such an intellectual intuition, or contuition, can it be called a judgment? Since the normal type of judgment implies a concept, it is possible that this existential intuition, although expressed in the logical form of a judgment, is not really such. Another possibility is that suggested by the later Wittgenstein-repudiating his former opinion, as well as that of B. Russell-that there is no such thing as an ideal, unique and logical structure common to all forms of language, nor therefore of judgment, and

that every statement functions as it is. Then it would be a mistake to try to reduce all forms of judgment to one basic type which would exhibit the "essence" of judgment, especially if one were to take into account all the mental procedures which belong to the realm of informal logic.

As a last resort in the attempt to answer this question one may turn to the study of propositions which, although they may be distinct from assertions, give expression to them and may be taken to reveal something of their nature. It is on this level of enquiry that most of the recent discussions of the thorny problem: "Is existence a predicate? " have moved; and here I would like to refer to the stand taken on this point by B. Miller, all the more so because he seems to have much in common with Maritain. Against the majority of recent writers on this point, but in company with Frege and Geach,[111] he maintains, in my opinion successfully, that "exists" can be a predicate.[118] This is shown by distinguishing first from second level predication. At the first level " exists " is said of individuals, and has the sense of " actuality." At the second level it is said of kinds of things, and has the sense " there is ... ". Neglect of this basic distinction constitutes a fatal flaw in B. Russell's theory of descriptions, and hence invalidates his thesis that existence can significantly be predicated only of propositional functions.[119]

Miller then goes on to indicate a third sense of " exists," one in which it is used as a proposition; this is what he calls its " propositional " sense. He begins by assuming that predicates are incomplete expressions, for they make sense only as part of a propo.sition. He next suggests that such a thing as a logical-

[117] Cf. P. Geach and M. Black (Eds.): *Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*, Oxford, 1960, p. 146; P. Geach: "Form and Existence," as already quoted, n. 36; "What Actually Exists," *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, Suppl, vol. 42 (1968), pp. 7-16; *Three Philosophers* (with G. E. M. Anscombe), Oxford, 1961, pp. 88-97.

[118] In Defence of the Predicate 'Exists'," *Mind*, 84 (1975), pp. 338-354. The chief defenders of the opposing view are quoted on pp. 338 and 339.

[11]. Cf. "Proper Names and their Di5tinctive Sense," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 51 (1973), pp. 201-210; "Proper Names and *Suppositio Personalis," Analysis*, 154 (1973), pp. 133-137.

ly simple proposition is not inconceivable. By such a proposition he means "not only that it is not composed of other propositions, but even that it has no sub-propositional logical components, e.g., logical subject, logical predicates, quantifiers, etc." [120] Confusion is caused by failing to distinguish theories of predication-which is never logically simple, and theories of proposition. It is possible to conceive of a proposition without subject or predicate, one which functions both referentially and predicatively, and in which both uses are indistinguishable. Such a proposition would have a referent and would affirm something of it.

As examples of such propositions he quotes the Rumanian " *Fulgura* " (literally: " Lightens ") , the German *"Es klappert* " (literally: " It rattles ") or " *Es regnet* " (literally: " It rains ") , and such English phrases as: "It is raining," showing that in these instances there is neither logical subject nor logical predicate, for the proposition has complete sense as it stands; although these propositions are logically simple, their ground is ontologically complex.[121]

The.re is, however, a type of logically simple proposition whose ground is ontologically simple, namely, such propositions as: "Exists," "Is wise," "Is thinking," "Is loving." Among such propositions "Exists" is fundamental. [122] In this case we are not using "exist " twice, once as subject and once as predicate, its functions are simultaneously referential and predicative. It is truly a proposition, with complete sense, and it is logically simple. Miller argues that the logical structure of such existential propositions as " Fido exists" is such that they cannot be true unless " Exists " is true also; and that the

[120] - Thought and Existence," *The New Scholasticism,* 48 (1974), p. 426.

[121] - Logically simple propositions," *Analysis,* 160 (1974), pp. 123-128. This invites comparison with Strawson's "feature universals;" cf. n. 20.

[122] Cf. J. T. Kearns: "The Logical Concept of Existence," *Notre Dame Journal, of Formal Logic,* 9 (1968), p. 322: " It ("exists") is the basic concept of an interpreted system (for thinking about individuals), and it cannot be reduced to more fundamental concepts." Quoted by Miller, *Mind, op. cit.,* p. 338, n. 6.

ontological ground of " Exists " is simple, and indeed unique.[128] As the most preferable rendition of its meaning, in ordinary language, he proposes: " Something, and necessarily only one thing, exists necessarily." [124] In other words, if " Exists " is true, it is necessarily true, although the ground of its truth can be shown only on external grounds; [125] and hence, if true, it would imply that God exists.

Miller's thesis, particularly as the fruit of a quite different approach, lends support to Maritain's contention that at the source of thought we find an existential affirmation of a unique kind which precedes the conceptual distinction of subject from object, while employing the functions of both.[126] For both

[128] Cf. "Thought and Existence," *op. cit.*, pp. 428-435.

[12-] Making Sense of 'Necessary Existence'," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 11, (1974), p. 53. On p. 52 he lists four features of the proposition "Exists."

[125] He outlines such grounds in "The Contingency Argument," *The Monist, 54* (1970), pp. 359-373.

[126] A favorable context for both theories is provided by the conviction, shared by many genetic psychologists and sociologists, that while human knowledge implies both experience and conceptualization, experience is not tied of necessity to any one particular form of conceptualization, and that all forms of conceptualization are socio-historically conditioned. They argue that man becomes conscious of his experience through the conceptual scheme which he receives from his social environment. What is first presented to experience, according to this view, is reality as a continuous totality; and consciousness of self develops only when conceptual aids enable him to differentiate out of this continuous reality. This he does first of all by distinguishing some objects that are permanent and mdependent, and then by apprehending his own self-identity through contrast with such objects. The concepts of object and subject are therefore not altogether primary. Before they can originate there is the confused apprehension of reality, what the Thomist would call the initial apprehension of being. This view would confirm the possibility of a basic intellectual type of knowing where there is no explicit logical distinction of subject from obj·ect, yet which implicitly includes both. Heidegger's contention that man has, as his most distinctive characteristic, a pre-ontological and prelogical grasp of Being would also point in the same direction. Indeed it is characteristic of the whole existentialist movement that its starting-point, as a philosophy, is not man as think1lr, as a subject set over against a correlative object, but man as existent, as aware of himself, through immediate experience, as open to others and to the world. Here also experience (the total experience of self-among-others) is taken to precede the conceptualization which allows one to differentiate consciously between self and others. Cf. John Macquarrie *(Existentialism,* Penguin,

authors, this basic type of knowledge is ontologically simple. Maritain explains this simplicity by reference to actual existence as intuited, but he would agree that such an intuition demands, as its ultimate ontological ground, the existence of God. It can hardly be denied that this convergence of two views which, although independent and from different angles, presuppose a common thomistic frame of reference, is significant. Yet, one must recognize that these two authors are dealing with different topics. To accept " Exists " as a proposition does not commit one to holding for the intuitive kind of knowledge of which Maritain speaks; at least, such a necessary correlation remains to be shown.

If we do correlate the two theses, the knowledge expressed in " Exists " would seem to correspond to that which Maritain refers to existence as *Sein.* Yet, since this is grasped, as such, only by the true metaphysician, to correlate " Exists " with *Sein* may be unduly restrictive. This difficulty could perhaps be met by saying that " Exists " may be a proposition in at least two ways. It could be understood, first, in the same way as such propositions as " *Es klappert;* " it would then refer to existence as factuality, i.e., on the first level of predication. It could also be understood in its own unique way as an ultimately grounding proposition; and then it could be correlated with *Sein (esse ut actus)* and through this to God as *lpsum Esse.* In either case, I think, one is entitled to suggest that at the root of thought there is an intellectual activity of affirmation which finds expression in a proposition which has neither a logical subject nor a logical predicate; and that its correct formulation is simply this: " Exists."

To see thought as grounded ultimately in such an existential affirmation is to stress the realism of the intellect, and in particular of its existential judgment. To refer judgment to actual existence as its primary object does not, as some Thomists fear,

1973, p. 58): "The existentialist begins with concrete being-in-the-world a11.d out of this initial unity self and the world arise as equiprimordial realities."

entail formal recognition 0£ the distinction between essence and existence. The existence affirmed by the judgment, simply as such, is the " there is ... ," or factual existence, which all can and do know. This implies nothing more than recognition 0£ the difference between presence and absence; and a singular existential judgment 0£ this kind will be found to be presupposed by attributive judgments, for these deal with a subject which must first 0£ all, in some sense or another, be given. Since this prior existence is usually taken for granted, the judgment will usually high-light the form, essential or accidental, which is found in the subject, and will hence be attributive; but it is because the judgment can affirm existence in the more basic sense 0£ " being there," or " being actual," that it can express the manner in which the form exists in the subject. This at any rate seems to be the more obvious meaning 0£ the main texts of St. Thomas already quoted.[121] It is only by properly metaphysical reflection that one passes from this knowledge of existence as factual givenness to knowledge of it as act, and finally as that act which, as an intrinsic principle, actuates the essence and all that is in it, and which, in the la.st analysis, must be explained as caused by God. When actual existence is known in this way it may then be grasped as distinct from the essence which it actuates, insofar as essence and existence are known as two intrinsic principles of really existing beings, and not just, in Suarezian fashion, as two states (i.e., possible and real) of one reality. To hold that the judgment refers to actual existence is not to turn all men into metaphysicians, although they may be potentially such; but it does strengthen the conviction that all men are spontaneously realists.

Conclusion

The following diagram attempts to show how our various (categorical) judgments may be divided off from each other, on the basis 0£ the theory outlined in this article:

[127] Cf. especially notes 72, 75,76, 83, 91, 92 above.

			(Logical			
			(Mathematical			
		(Ideal	(Scientific			
		((abstract)	(Physical			
		(	(Poetic, etc.			
	(*Attributive*	(			"To be in"	
	(	(	*(Essential*		*(inesse)*	
	(		((e.g.: "Peter)		of a form	
	(	*(Real*	(is a philos-			
	(	(concrete)	(opher ").			
	(		(			
Judgment	(		(*Existential*		Factual	"To be"
	(		(e.g.: "Peter)		(*esse in*	*(esse)*
	(		is there").		*actu)*	affir-
	(		Judgment of			med as:
			presence.			
	(					
	(			(*Pure Existen-*	"To be as	
	(			(*tial judgment;* >	**act"**	
	(*(Non-Attributive:*	Metaphysical		((e.g.	(*esse ut*	
	(			("Peter is.")	*actus)*	
				(		
				(Ultimate		
				(as ground-		
				ing): "Exists."		

With regard to this division, tentative as it is, it should be noted, first, that it is based on the assumption that ideal judgments always presuppose singular and concrete existential ones, and that these refer to actual existence as £actually given.

Further, most ordinary judgments are of the attributive kind. They include a form signified by the predicate which is attributed to that entity which is denoted by the subject.

Finally, the peculiarity 0£ what I have called metaphysical judgments, which may have no predicate (in the sense of a form) or even no logical subject, would only show that there is no ideal logical £orm £or *all* judgments. Hence, as elsewhere, the exception may serve to prove the rule governing ordinary forms of judgment.

The diagram will, it is hoped, show clearly that the judgment is the cognitive act by which the mind grasps its object as existent; that it is the primary expression, on the level of

knowing, of the basic orientation of the intellect to existent reality.

It may be purely intuitive, in regard to the act of existing (*esse ut actus)* . This is ultimately and logically presupposed, at least implicitly, by all other judgments. The consequent and normal activity of judging makes use of the conceptual function of thought, by affirming that the form signified by the concept is found (exists) in the reality denoted by the subject of the judgment; it relates the abstract concept to the existent reality known in the first place. This is apparent in " real " judgments, out of which the intellect can formulate " ideal " ones. The transition to " ideal " judgments lies in correlating different concepts among themselves as all qualifying the same object. This mental uniting could more correctly be called synthesis, or implication, rather than judgment.

If the line of argument followed in thi.s article is sound, the conclusion is partially negative: the judgment does not require two concepts, nor does it consist in the mental union of two concepts. Positively, the judgment is adequately explained as that simple and original act by which the intellect attributes a form, signified by a concept, to that being to which it originally belongs and which is denoted by the subject of the judgment. It is not claimed that such attribution is needed for every possible type of judgment, in particular for purely existential ones, but that the normal attributive kind of judgment does not require more than this; and that all judgments imply, directly or indirectly, a reference to what has been known, in the first place, as individual and actually existing.

This view of judgment does :full justice to its nature as being, in the words of St. Thomas, the act by which knowledge is brought to completion.[128] It is through this act that the most complete conformity possible for us is established between knowledge and reality. To the dualism of essence and existence in real beings there corresponds, in knowledge, the dualism of concept and judgment. What is represented in the concept per-

[128] *ST* 2a 2ae, " iu<licium f:Ompletivum cognitionis."

tains to the line of essence or of form as found in it. The judgment, in its distinctive role, refers to existence. It is not just knowledge of a thing but, at least in its primary types, of a thing as actually existing. Through the judgment the knower is conformed intentionally to the existence of that which is known. The judgment, as the final and full act of knowledge, gives intentional expression to that existence as actuating the essence and all that is in it.

From the standpoint of consciousness, this means that what corresponds in the mind to the existence actually given in reality is the awareness that the form signified by the concept is the same form that is really found in the known object but according to a different mode of existence: intentional in the knower, real in the object. What most fundamentally distinguishes the knower from the known is each one's individual and actual existence. Due to his awareness of this distinction, which seems to be implicit in every judgment, the knower can express his knowledge of actual existence in the judgment and, in adequate fashion, only in it.

St. Thomas reminds us that " to understand is compared to the intellect as *esse* to essence," [129] and that " the *esse* of what is understood consists in the very act of its being understood." [130] Using these terms, one could say that, just as the *esse* of the concept is the *esse* (and indeed the *guper-esse* which is proper to knowledge) of the act of conceiving, so too the *esse* of the judgment is the *esse* of the act of judging. Thus the *esse* signified by the judgment, namely, that which actuates the known object, is an *esse* which is lived, in ,an intentional way, by the one who judges. If the knower *becomes* what is known insofar as he conceives it, he can be said to *exist* it insofar as he judges, by an existence which is fully his own and which corresponds to the actual and distinct existence of the object.

The circle of knowing is then complete. The process starts

[129] *C. gent.* 1.45: "intelligere comparatur ad intellectum sicut esse ad essentiam."
[1.0] *Ibid.* 4.11: " esse intentionis intellectae in ipso intelligi consistit; " cf. *ST* la, 14.4; 34.l ad f.l; *De pot.* 8.1.

with the direct apprehension of the existent object by means of the senses. This leads to the formation, through abstraction, of the concept which seizes on some formal aspect of the object. This cognitive link between the mind and its object remains as underlying basis of the whole process. Awareness of it, through indirect apprehension, enables the knower to grasp the difference between the mode of existence of that form as it is in the mind and as it is in the object, and so to issue in the judgment which restores the conceived form to the object, now denoted by the subject of the judgment, and to affirm that it really exists in it. The beginning and the end of the process lie in the object as really existing. It is the judgment that preserves the mind from being confined, in Cartesian manner, to the closed world of its own creations, by leading it back to the open world of things as they actually exist; and the mind cannot be satisfied by anything less than this.

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ELEMENTS OF A THOMISTIC PHILOSOPHY OF DEATH

ONE TASK OF any philosopher who holds that the human soul survives .separation from its body is to resolve the dilemma of death: to assign consistent meanings, in terms of both intelligibility and value, to both of our lives, the here and the hereafter. If primacy is given to this life, death easily becomes an inexplicable disaster. If separation is our truly meaningful state, then this life is easily reduced to the trivial or even to evil. Both views have serious moral conse·-quences. The first, as Heidegger has shown, raises the threat of final meaninglessness so that even bodily life can become humanly unlivable. The second is the root of that *contemptus mundi* which overlooks social injustice and other forms of human suffering.

The novelty of Thomas Aquinas's view of the unity of man, which defines the intellectual soul as the one and only substantial form of the body, has long been well recognized.[1] One question that has drawn little explicit attention from his interpreters, however, is whether his view of death is consistent with his view that the natural, humanly good way for a soul to exist is as the form of matter.[2] This paper attempts an introductory

[1] Its classic exposition is in Anton Charles Pegis, *St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century* (Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1934). Sec also his " St. Thomas and the Unity of Man " in *Progress in Philosophy*, ed. James A. McWilliams et al. (Milwaukee, Bruce Publishing Co., *1955),* pp. 153-173.

[2] Pegis has recently pointed out a significant development of St. Thomas's doctrine on the separated soul's mode of existing and operating; early texts make separated souls entirely like the angels and endow them with knowledge and volition superior to what they enjoyed while embodied, while later texts emphasize the nature of the soul as distinct from that of the angels and make our *post-mortem* mode of being and acting somewhat alien, and even contrary, to our nature. See his "The Separated Soul and Its Nature in St. Thomas," in *St. Thomas Aquinas,*

answer to that question; it focuses on Aquinas's philosophy 0£ death, to the exclusion of the theological elements which would have to be included in a complete presentation 0£ his thought. It is further restricted to the *Summa Theologiae* as its source. The legitimacy of a philosophical focus is based on Aquinas's own distinction between philosophy and theology, a distinction which he makes at the very beginning 0£ his master-work *(S.Th.* I, I) .[3] Thomas recalls this distinction twice in the Question which forms the basis of this study, *S. Th.* I, 89, "On the Cognition of the Separated Soul." Thus he says, " We are speaking of the natural cognition of the separated soul. Its knowledge by reason of glory is another question" (article 2). And again: " By reason of their natural knowledge, which we are discussing now, the souls of the dead do not know what is happening here" (article 8). The theory of the separated soul's natural cognition is thus subject-matter for the philosopher. We shall use it as a principle for deducing how Aquinas viewed death in abstraction from such theological doctrines as original sin, grace, redemption, the vision of the divine essence as our supernatural end, and the resurrection of the body.

From that deduction we shall unfold some implications for that soul's other activities, both cognitive and appetitive. We shall then assess the consistency 0£ the natural meaning 0£

J:J!,74-1974; Commemorative Studies, ed. Etienne Gilson et al. (Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1974), pp. 181-158. This doctrinal development was overlooked by several earlier interpreters of Aquinas's philosophy of death, notably P. Glorieux, in "Endurcissement final et gritces dernieres," *Nouvelle Revue ThC-ologique* LIX, 10 (1932), pp. 865-892; by Glorieux again, in *"In Hora Mortis," Melanges de Science Religieuse,* VI (1949), pp. 185-216; by Victor Edmund Sleva, *The Separated Soul in the Phuosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, The Catholic University of America Press, 1940); and by Antonio Royo, 0. P., "Psicologia del alma separada," *La Ciencia Tomista* 82 (1955), pp. 421-447. Ladislas Boros, following the two articles by Glorieux, makes Aquinas a forerunner of his own "final option theory of death" in *The Moment of Truth, Mysterium Mortis,* trans. Gregory Bainbridge, 0. S. B. (Montreal, Palm Publishers, 1962), p. 171, n. 2.

[8] All references, unless otherwise noted, are to the Leonine text of the *Summa,* published at Rome in 1952 by Marietti. Translations of the *Summa* are all the author's.

life after death with the meaning assigned to bodily life. We will thus be able to make an elementary evaluation of Aquinas's resolution of the dilemma of death.

Aquinas's view of how the separated soul understands grows directly out of his theory of human knowing, according to which the human intellect, by its very nature, is ordered to abstract intelligible meaning from sense images, or phantasms, of material things. Thus the human intellect, while not itself an organic power, depends for its activity on the activity of the senses, which are organic powers. The presence of our intellectual soul in a body, then, is no accident-it is a requirement of the nature of human intelligence. The dependence of our understanding on sense images is, moreover, complete: we need phantasms not only for abstraction of a :form at our first understanding of something, but ever after, for our reconsideration of what we have already learned. Nor is the ordering of our intelligence to the understanding of material essences the result of our intellect's conjunction with a body. It is, rather, the other way round: our intellect is, by its very nature, ordered to know material things, and that order, to that particular proper object, calls for the use of sense powers and hence for the soul's information of matter as its bodily instrument:

> ... It is impossible for our intellect, in its present state of life, .. . actually to understand anything without turning to phantasms ... . The human intellect, which is joined to a body, has for its proper object a quiddity or nature existing in a material body .... But such a nature must exist in some individual, which cannot occur apart from corporeal matter .... Whence the nature of a stone, or any material thing, cannot be fully and truly known unless it is known as existing in the particular. But we apprehend the particular through sense and imagination. And thus it is necessary for our intellect, in order to understand its proper object, to turn to a phantasm, in which it can see a universal nature existing in the particular. (S. *Th.* I, 84, 7)

In fact, the force and the purity with which Aquinas presents this empiricism would seem to preclude immortality, on the

principle that a separated soul, lacking phantasms, could have no understanding and, thus deprived of its proper operation, could not exist (I, 75, 6. obj. 8 and reply). This difficulty is the springboard for the treatise on the cognition of a separated soul (S. *Th.* I, 89), whose first article asks whether such a soul can understand anything.

Thomas states the difficulty succinctly: Since the soul by its nature understands by turning to phantasms, and since its nature is not altered by death, and since it has no phantasms to which to turn after death, it would seem that it cannot naturally understand anything:

> ... This difficult question arises because the soul, when joined to the body, cannot understand anything except by turning to a phantasm .... And if this were not due to the soul's very nature, but happened accidentally because of its union with a body, ... the question would be easily answered. . . . If, however, we hold that the soul by its very nature understands by turning to phantasms, since the soul's nature is not changed by death, it would seem that it could understand nothing, since there are no phantasms present to which it could turn. (S. *Th.* I, 89, 1)

The solution to this difficulty links an agent's mode of operating to its mode of existing rather than to its nature, so that the separated soul, having a pure spirit's mode of existing, can also operate in the mode of a pure spirit, by turning not to phantasms but to pure intelligibles:

> The soul has, however, a different mode of existing when united to its body and when separated from it, ... though its nature remains the same. . . . According to the mode of existing in which it is united to the body, the soul has the mode of intellection which turns to the phantasms of corporeal things, which are in bodily organs; but when it is separated from its body, its mode of intellection is by way of turning toward those things which are immediately intelligible, as do other separate substances. (S. *Th.* I, 89, 1)

Hence the possibility of some kind of intellectual activity for a separated soul is established-intelligibility *as such* is not located in material things, but only the particular kind of intelligibility to which we are naturally ordered. Our understanding of immaterial intelligibles is not, in principle, impossible.

Such understanding is not, however, connatural to us, not in keeping with our human nature. Hence for Aquinas a simplistic philosophy of death, which would view us as liberated by death for a higher intellectual life, does not follow. In fact, the mode of intellection of separated substances is above and beyond our nature-" *paeter naturam* "-somehow alien to us and less than perfect. A soul forced to operate in such a mode is as much out of place and under constraint as is a naturally light body when an outside force holds it in a place lower than its own:

> For the soul has a different mode of existing . . . when separated from the body, even though its nature remains the same; not that being united to a body is accidental to it, but is rather due to its very nature; thus neither is the nature of something light changed when it is in its proper place, which is natural to it, and when it is outside its proper place, which is above and beyond its nature. . . . When the soul is separated from its body, it will have a mode of understanding by conversion to those things which are directly intelligible, as do other separate substances .... But to exist apart from its body is above and beyond the capacity of its nature, and to understand without turning to phantasms is also above and beyond its nature. (S. *Th.* I, 89, 1)

The basic principle of Aquinas's philosophy of death is thus laid down, the hint of a pessimism to be developed in the rest of this study. The separated soul possesses a mode of existing and operating which is higher absolutely speaking, but is not so for it. A pure spirit's way of understanding is not ours, and so a soul which understands in that mode understands neither as well as do the pure spirits to whom that mode is connatural nor as well as it itself once did in its own connatural, bodily mode.

The remaining seven articles of *S. Th.* I, 89 specify some of the things we can and cannot know in this preternatural mode. Thus, we can understand other separated souls perfectly, because their mode of existing is the same as our own; we know angels imperfectly, because their mode of existing is too high for our receptive capacity (I, 89, . Our understanding of

those material essences which are our connatural object is less perfect than what it would be in our connatural, embodied mode: instead of being perfect, certain, and proper, it is confused and general (I, 89, 3). As for singulars, a separated soul's knowledge of them is also deficient, even of those which are present to it; while angels are able through infused species to attain a knowledge of all the singulars represented therein, a soul, using as its medium the same infused species, can attain to a knowledge only of those singulars to which it itself bears some special relationship. The intelligibility of all singulars is presented to it, but it requires a medium in order to attain them. Lacking the phantasms which are its connatural medium, it can reach only some of them-those which can be directly linked to its knowledge of itself (S. *Th.* I, 89, 4) . Science, that ideal of human knowing for all Aristotelians, is also diminished in the separated soul; since science resides partly in the intellect and partly in the senses, it remains only partly-in its formal, intellectual part, by which we can actually consider those objects which we have come to know scientifically (I, 89, 5 and 6). But we can only consider them in our new, alien mode-not by turning to phantasms, in which we could have clear, certain and necessary understanding of all the singulars to which a conclusion refers, but by recalling those few singulars to which we had previously established some special relationships. We have only confused and general knowledge of the rest. As for our knowledge of the most crucial set of material natures and singulars-those of the ongoing life of earth **from** which we have departed-Aquinas is even more pessimistic. Of these we have no natural knowledge whatsoever, not even of those to whom we have special ties of previous knowing and affection. Thus the knowledge we have of the objects which are connatural to us-the natures of material things and the singulars in which those natures exist-receives a further limitation. It remains in the realm of memory (I, 89, 8) .

Like owls, then, we see best in the dark-not in the noonday brightness of the spirit-realm of pure intelligibles, but in the night 0£ time and space, of intelligibility darkened by sensible

matter, to which our bodily senses give us indirect access. To the extent that human intellection is a value, death is thus a diminution of meaningful life, even though intellection does go on. But other human goods, too, are diminished by death. Though Aquinas has no further treatise *De Morte* which would draw such conclusions explicitly, his theory of the diminished intellection of the separated soul gives us a principle by which we can conclude to the diminution of several other specifically human goods which directly depend on our natural mode of intellection by conversion to phantasms. Notable among these other diminished human goods are rationality; the intellectual virtues other than science, especially prudence; our natural knowledge of God; conscience; freedom of choice and passion as prerequisites to moral virtue, thus moral virtue generally; and love in its specifically human form of that free choice by which we have dominion over our own acts.

The diminution of our rationality by death, of that mark of the human by which we are defined as specifically distinct from the other animals, is implied by Aquinas's demarcation of different kinds of intellects-divine, angelic, and human. The distinguishing mark of human intelligence is rationality or discursiveness, that is, understanding by way of composing and dividing. Discursiveness is rooted in the kind of object which our intelligence is made to know: sensible, material singulars are composites-of form and matter, of accidents and subject. They thus naturally lend themselves to being understood by an intellectual process which moves, from universal to particular and from accident to substance:

> ... The angelic or divine intellect has immediately and perfectly a total cognition of a thing. Whence in knowing the quiddity of a thing, it knows simultaneously all that we can know through composing and dividing and reasoning. . . . For the proper object of the human intellect is the quiddity of a material thing, which falls under the senses and imagination. But there is a double composition in a material thing. First, that of form with matter, to which corresponds the composition by which the intellect predicates a universal whole of its part; . . . The second composition is

that of accident with its subject: and to this real composition corresponds the composition in the intellect by which an accident is predicated of its subject. (*S. Th.* I, 85, 5, *c* and *ad* 3)

It is, then, not just the animality which is essential to our humanity that is lost when a soul is separated from its body; the ability to reason that is distinctively the mark of human intellection, since it depends on our grasp of material essences through sense and imagination, is diminished. Its range of objects is restricted to those few singulars which we can know in that separated mode.

Having seen that science and the reasoning by which it is generated are deficient in the separated soul, it is easy surmise that the other intellectual virtues, too, suffer a diminution at death. Such is Aquinas's explicit statement in his treatise on "The Duration of the Virtues after this Life," whose second article asks whether the intellectual virtues remain. His answer simply applies to the other intellectual virtues what he has said of the perdurance of science in the separated soul: these virtues are formally in the intellect and materially in the sense powers. Their latter aspect perishes with separation from the body; formally, they remain.

> In regard to phantasms, which are like the material of the intellectual virtues, those virtues are destroyed at the destruction of the body; but as for the intelligible species, which are in the possible intellect, the intellectual virtues remain. . . . Hence the intellectual virtues remain after this life as to what is formal in them, but not as to what is material. (S. *Th.* I-II, 67, 2)

This formal persistence does not, however, mean that science, wisdom, art, prudence and understanding are present and able to function perfectly in a separated soul in some purely intellectual fashion; their material aspect is essential to their full actuation. They are present only germinally, in root (I-II, 67, 1, *ad* 8). While they can be actuated to some extent in that wholly immaterial mode which is *praeter naturam,* such an actuation is inferior to that which we exercise when embodied. A separated soul is thus less wise and prudent, less under-

standing, less artistic and scientific than it was in its previous life. These habituations of human intellectuality *par excellence* are diminished by death.

The case of prudence is especially crucial, for that virtue plays a central role in the totality of a life that can be called human. The habit of choosing well requires a knowledge that discerns actions that are rightly ordered to our last end. Without right knowledge, there is no right choice. Prudence, defined as the right knowledge of things to be done, is thus prerequisite to all moral virtue. Since things to be done are singulars, and since knowledge of singulars is reduced in a separated soul, we find our humanity diminished by death in a particularly important aspect:

> . . . Prudence is the virtue most especially necessary for a human life. . . . But for someone to act well, he must not only act, but do so in a certain manner, namely by right choice rather than from impulse or passion. . . . Right choice, however, has two requirements: the correct end, and what is rightly ordered to that end.... As to what is ordered to the end, a man must be disposed by a habituation of reason, for taking counsel and choosing are acts of reason. Whence we need some intellectual virtue in reason, by which reason is perfected in its knowledge of those things which are means toward the end. And this virtue is prudence. (S. *Th.* I-II, 57, 5)

One surprising omission in Aquinas's treatise on the cognition of the separated soul is a treatment of our natural knowledge of God. But the general theory therein has some implications for that knowledge. One might assume that, since we cannot see God unless we are separated from this mortal life (I, 12, 11) , once the separation is effected, our knowledge of God will take a quantum leap for the better. Since the ordering of our natural knowledge in this life is toward material essences, whose knowledge is not the vision of God, one might think that our *post-mortem* ordering to pure intelligibles would improve our status on that score. But such is not the case. In fact, an analysis of Thomas's theory about how we do come to a natural knowledge of God leads to a conclusion that is quite the reverse.

A separated soul's natural knowledge of God is less, not more, perfect than that of an embodied soul. Viewed philosophically, death is a step away from an understanding of God. This conclusion follows from Aquinas's theories of how we do come to a natural knowledge of God, how we know ourselves in this life and in the next, and how, as knowers (and lovers-of which more later) of God, we are His images in a unique way.

Since all our natural knowledge is taken from sensation, our knowledge of God can extend as far as our knowledge of sensibles can extend. And since sensibles are effects of God, they are inadequate likenesses of Him. Hence from their phantasms we can come to know God somewhat, but not to understand Him perfectly. Specifically, we can know from them that He exists, that He is different from them, and that this difference is not a deficiency in Him but is rather due to His exceeding them in perfection:

> Our natural knowledge originates in sensation: whence our natural knowledge can extend only as far as it can be led through sensible things. From sensibles, however, our intellect cannot reach so far .as to see the divine essence: for sensible creaturs are nonadequate effects of the divine power.... But since, as His effects, they are dependent on Him as their cause, we can be led to know from them whether He exists; and to know those things about Him which must belong to Him as the first cause of all, exceeding all the things He has caused. (S. *Th.* I, 12, 12)

A corollary to this theory provides us with a principle that can readily be applied to the situation of the separated soul: \Ve know God more fully inasmuch as we know more, and the more excellent, of His effects (I, 12, 18, ad 1). Since separated souls have no knowledge of the ongoing events of earth, a development of our knowledge of God after death, based on our increasing knowledge of the progress of history and of nature, is precluded. On this score, our natural knowledge of God is less after death than it might have been had *we* remained embodied. But further, our retained knowledge of material singulars acquired in this life is reduced; it is a general and confused knowledge, for the most part; it is clear but

restricted to memory in regard to those few singulars to which we bear special ties. In this further respect, then, our knowledge of God is also diminished by death.

But there is another, second-order, reduction of our natural knowledge of God at death. Aquinas clearly says that our knowledge of ourselves after death is better than before. In our embodied mode, we can know our own souls only indirectly and imperfectly. The reason is that our intellect, in order to become an intelligible object to itself, must be actuated, and that actuation can only occur through species drawn from, and understood in, phantasms. Thus we can know our souls only indirectly, by catching ourselves in the act of understanding some material sensible (I, 87, 8). On this single score, separation from the body at death improves our intellection. Our souls, actuated by infused intelligible species, are immediately and directly intelligible to themselves, so that we know our own souls-and other separated souls-perfectly (I, 89, 2). Does, then, our newly perfect knowledge of separated souls constitute a knowledge of more excellent effects of God which would yield a higher knowledge of God Himself?

The answer would seem to be negative, in the light of Aquinas's theory of how we men are not just likenesses of God, but images of Him-an image being a likeness which is intended as an expression of its original (I, 98, **1)**. While all of God's effects are His likenesses, we men are His image, expressing Him in our intellectuality generally, but more precisely-and more closely-in those intellectual acts by which we know Him. Since God is pre-eminently a knower and lover of God, we image Him most perfectly in being knowers and lovers of God:

> Since man is said to be to the image of God because of his intellectual nature, he is most of all to the image of God in that respect in which his intellectual nature can imitate God most closely. But an intellectual nature imitates God most closely in this respect, that God understands and loves Himself. *(8. Th.* I, 93, 4)

But death, as we have seen, diminishes our original knowledge of God by diminishing our knowledge of material singulars.

Since our knowing of God is thus diminished, our imaging of God in that knowing is also diminished. A separated soul is thus less Godlike than an embodied one, and cannot serve as a medium for a higher, second-order knowledge of God by way of its own resemblance to Him. While it is true that we know ourselves more perfectly after death, the selves that we thus know are less perfect; as diminished knowers of God, we are diminished images of Him and are thus prevented from that higher knowledge of God which could result from knowledge of ourselves as more excellent among His effects. Enhanced understanding of a diminished image does not yield enhanced understanding of the original. The seriousness of this reduction in our natural knowing / imaging of God is evident when we consider that Aquinas defines our humanity in terms of this imaging (I, 93, 3). Death, by reducing our natural knowledge of God, thus diminishes our humanity at its core.

With such significant diminutions of the cognitive activities of souls separated from their bodies by death, corresponding diminutions of appetitive life will follow, for appetite depends upon an apprehension of the good which is the object of its act:

> There must be some appetitive power in the soul. . . . An inclination follows upon every form. . . . But form is found in a higher way in those who possess knowledge. . . . Thus there must be in them an indination superior to natural appetite. And this higher inclination pertains to the appetitive power of the soul, through which an animal can desire those things which it has apprehended. (S. *Th.* I, 80, 1)

Since the sense appetites, as organic powers, no longer actually exist in the separated soul, it is easily seen that their acts-the passions-will also be lost at death. In fact, passion, defined as the act of an organic power, has bodily change as one of its integral elements (*S. Th.* I-II, 22, 2, *ad* 3). Thus after death we shall feel no sensory love or hate, sadness or joy, anger, fear or boldness. That such feelings are integral to our full humanity in their own right is evident enough: Thomas remarks that it is as right for angels and God to be passionless as it

is for them to be incorporeal, but that passion is as integral a part oi good human behavior as is the possession oi a body (I-II, 59, 4, ad 8) . The liie oi a separated soul, being passionless, thus lacks an integral element oi iull humanity.

But there is more. Just as our cognitive life is diminished after death not just on the sensory but also on the intellectual level, so is our affective liie. Conscience, free choice, moral virtue, and thus love, all become inhibited by the event which separates soul from body. All oi these aspects oi human affectivity depend for their iull actuation on our knowledge oi material singulars, and thus the inhibition oi that way oi knowing has its repercussions on them.

The gap between human knowing and human doing is bridged by practical reasoning, an operation in which we order the former to the latter in a syllogistic process whose conclusion, a singular proposition, is drawn from a universal premise through the mediation of a singular proposition (I, 79, 11). And singular propositions are formed in conjunction with sense knowledge, the apprehension of those singulars about which action is concerned:

> ... The choice of a particular operable is a sort of conclusion of a syllogism of the practical intellect. . . . However, from a universal proposition a singular conclusion cannot be drawn directly, but only through the medium of a singular proposition. Whence a universal principle of the practical intellect does not move us except through the mediation of the particular apprehension of the sensitive part. (S. *Th. I,* 86, 1 *ad* 2)

Now a separated soul, as we have seen, is not totally bereit oi all knowledge oi singulars; it knows itseli and other souls perfectly, it knows imperfectly the angels and God, and it tains memories of some material singulars. Hence some practical reasoning, decisions of conscience, choices, and exercise of virtue remain possible to it. But its range of such activities is considerably diminished because the set of objects toward which it can direct its action is less than what it is for a soul in its connatural, embodied mode of existing and acting. A soul can take a moral stance toward itseli and other souls which

has full understanding as its root. But its stance toward material singulars of the present, toward angels, and toward God will be less perfect, less fully human, less moral, to the degree that its understanding of these is diminished.

If practical reasoning is thus diminished, so is conscience, which is only that particular kind of practical reasoning in which we apply knowledge to an action in such a way as to judge whether that action ought to be done (I-II, 19, 5). The judgment of conscience, however, even when excusably erroneous, renders our will-act either good or evil, for it is the good or evil as apprehended by reason which is the object of our willing:

> . . . Properly speaking, the goodness of the will depends on its object. But the object of the will is proposed to it by reason. For the understood good is the object of the will which is proportioned to it.... And therefore the goodness of the will depends on reason. (*S. Th.* I-II, 19, 3)

To the extent, then, that the deliberations of conscience are restricted by our inability to know the objects connatural to us, the goodness and evil, that is, the moral quality, of our willing will also be restricted.

In fact, this inhibition of practical reasoning in the separated soul means a diminution not only of the goodness or evil of our will acts, but of that freedom of choice by which we have dominion over ourselves. For freedom-that ability to choose between particular operables without which advice, exhortation, precepts, prohibitions, rewards and punishments lose their meaning (I, 83, 1)-depends directly upon our judgment of those particular, thus contingent, operables:

> ... Man acts by judgment. . . . But since that judgment is not from a natural instinct for particular operables, but from a certain comparison by reason, he acts by free judgment, capable of being borne toward diverse things. But reasoning about contingencies can go in opposite directions .... Now, particular operables are contingencies; and therefore in regard to them the judgment of reason is not determined to one but is open to diverse conclusions. Thus since man is rational, he must have free choice. (S. *Th.* I, 83, 1)

The implication for the separated soul is clear enough. Since freedom is rooted in our ability to reason to opposite judgments about the particular operables which are the stuff of human action, whatever reduces the range and clarity of such judgments will also reduce the range and perfection of free choice. The human seriousness of that loss is also clear when we consider that Thomas defines man in terms of his having free choice (I, 83, 1), and distinguishes actions that are properly human from those that we share with the other animals in those same terms:

> . . . Of all the actions done by a man, those alone are properly called human which belong to man as man. But a man differs from the other irrational creatures in that he is the master of his own acts .... Now a man is master of his acts through reason and will. . . . Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from his will after having been deliberated. (S. *Th.* I-II, 1, 1)

Clearly, then, a soul acts less humanly than does a man. Death, once again, is seen to reduce our humanity at its core.

With passion absent and free choice lessened, moral virtue, the habituation toward good actions of those powers by which we act humanly, will also suffer diminution at death. In fact, Aquinas makes the exercise of virtue coincide with the right use of free choice: "The good use of free choice is said to be virtue." (I-II, 55, 1, *ad* 2) An impoverishment of moral virtue, in addition to the impoverishment of intellectual virtue pointed to earlier, is thus another consequence of diminished cognition. First, since prudence directs all the moral virtues (II-II, 47, 7), the lessening of that direction will imply a corresponding lessening of temperance, fortitude and justice. But passion is also essential to moral virtue--at least to those virtues which moderate the passions according to reason, viz., temperance and fortitude:

> ... There must be some moral virtues concerned with operations and others with passions. . . . There must be a virtue directive of actions toward others .... And so justice and its parts have those operations as their proper subject-matter. But in some operations, good and evil are measured according to whether a man himself

is well or ill affected in their regard. And so there must be virtues concerned with interior affections, which are called the passions of the soul-such as temperance and fortitude .... (S. *Th.* I-II, 60,

These last two moral virtues cannot exist without the passions which they regulate, for if one could have virtue without corresponding passions, the sense appetites would exist to no purpose. Virtue, thus, as a properly human perfection, has passion, another human perfection, as one of its essential elements:

... The moral virtues which have passion as their proper subject-matter cannot exist without the passions. The reason is that, if they could, it would follow that virtue would render the sense appetites idle. But it does not belong to virtue to deprive those powers which are subject to reason of their own activity, but to have them follow the command of reason while exercising that activity. (S. *Th.* I-II, *59,* 5)

And so the absence of passion in a separated soul is not only the absence *of* something humanly good in its own right, but it also entails the absence of a further human good, the moral virtues *of* temperance and fortitude. Justice, since it resides in the will, will remain. But like the acts of that will, whose freedom is diminished by diminished cognition, it will be operative in a less than fully human mode and in regard to a reduced range *of* objects from which many material singulars have been excluded. Moreover, the intellectual joy resulting from just actions will lack that overflow into the sense powers which arouses the passion of joy in a just man. Thus is justice, too, truncated in a separated soul:

The moral virtues which are concerned not with passions but with operations can exist without the passions (and justice is this kind of virtue) .... But, still, joy results from an act of justice, at least in the will, where it is not a passion. And if this joy is multiplied by the perfection of justice, it overflows into the sense appetites .... And thus, by such a redundance, to the extent that the virtue is more perfect, it causes greater passion. (S. *Th.* I-II, *59,* 5)

The impoverishment of moral virtue implied by these arguments is stated explicitly in Thomas's article on "Whether the Moral Virtues Remain after this Life." His *responsio* distin-

guishes, as in the case of the intellectual virtues, the formal and material aspects of moral virtue: the ordering of reason is the formal aspect which remains, and the passions are the material aspect which does not (8. *Th.* I-II, 67, 1) .

This formal presence, however, is only a radical or germinal presence, not an actual one which can somehow be fully activated in some non-bodily mode, as if the formal aspect were essential and the material incidental. Justice, as being both formally and materially in the will, remains in full actuation, though truncated in its range of objects and its overflow into sensible joy. But temperance and fortitude are present in a separated soul only in their *seminaHa:*

> The irrational parts will not exist actually in the soul, but only in root in its essence. . . Whence neither will these virtues exist in it in act except in root, in the reason and will where the seeds of these virtues exist. . . . But justice, which is in the will, will remain actually. *(S.Th.* I-II, 67, 1 *ad* 3)

An earlier discussion of whether virtues are in us by birth makes it clear that this seminal presence of temperance and fortitude, formal though it be, is a merely potential presence; it is the aptitudes in reason and will which constitute a natural inchoative virtue that comes to be actuated by habituation. What we shall retain after death then, as far as natural moral virtue is concerned, is what we had from the very origin of human self-consciousness; naturally known first principles of knowing and doing, and a natural appetite for the good of reason. These aptitudes originally enabled us to become temperate and brave. But simply speaking we shall not actually *b'e* temperate or brave after death, any more than we were at birth (I-II, 63, 1).

Death's diminution of passion and free choice, and the consequent diminution of moral virtue, all add up to a diminution of love, which is the appetitive element of our imaging of God. Love, for Aquinas, is both sensory and intellectual, a passion and a volition; both kinds are defined as first acts of appetite in which all other passions and volitions, and thus all our actions, have their origin:

The first motion of the will, and of any appetitive power, is love. But since an act of will, and of any appetitive power, tends toward good and evil as its proper object; and since good is primarily and directly the object of will and appetite, while evil is so only secondarily and indirectly, as opposed to good: thus acts of will and appetite which look to the good are naturally prior to those which look to evil. . . . Thus all other movements of appetite presuppose love, as a sort of root. Whence, wherever there is will and appetite, there must be love, for removal of the first would be a removal of the others. (S. *Th.* I, 20, 1)

Passionate and volitional love are distinguished from each other as one might expect: the primary passion of love is a movement toward a good apprehended by the senses; it is thus an organic activity which involves bodily change as one of its essential elements. Volitional love, on the other hand, is a movement of the will toward an intellectually apprehended good; it is thus an intrinsically immaterial act:

. . . Love is something belonging to appetite, since both have a good as their object. Whence the differences in love are consequent upon differences in appetite. . . . There is an appetite following upon the apprehension of the seeker, but from necessity, not with free choice. And such is the sense appetite in the brute animals, which in men partakes of freedom inasmuch as it obeys reason. Another appetite follows the apprehension of the seeker according to his free judgment. Such is the rational or intellective appetite, which is called will. In both of these appetites, love is the principle of the movement tending to the end which is loved. (S. *Th.* I-II, 26, 1)

Both kinds of love depend on cognition, for an end or good can only be an object of appetite when it is apprehended:

Good is a cause of love inasmuch as it is its object. But good cannot be an object of appetite except by being apprehended. Thus love requires an apprehension of the good which is loved. . . . Thus knowledge is a cause of love for the same reason that the good is, which cannot be loved if it is not known. (S. *Th.* 1-11, 27, 2)

The kind of love which is a passion, and is the fount of all the other passions, cannot of course be present in a separated soul, for corporeal change is one of its essential elements. Volitional love, as the will act in which free choice originates, is a wholly

incorporeal movement; yet it depends directly on our knowledge of singulars, which are connaturally grasped through sense and imagination .

> . . . A cognitive power does not move except through the mediation of the appetitive. Thus our universal reason moves through the particular reason .... And the intellectual appetite, or will, moves through the mediation of the sense appetite. . . . The movements of the sense appetite accompanied by bodily change are called passions; but not so the act of the will. Love ... is thus a passion as the act of the sense appetite, but not as an act of the intellective appetite. (*S. Th.* I, 20, 1, ad 1)

The separated soul's diminished cognition of singulars, due to the absence of phantasms, would thus imply a fundamental diminution of our volitional loving. Just as we cannot love what we do not know, so can we love only deficiently that which we know deficiently. Self-love after death might be enhanced in its intensity as self-knowledge improves in clarity and directness. But our ability to love many other singulars must be weakened, since our knowledge of them is reduced to generality and confusion. Most importantly, our love of God, which is our imaging of Him *par excellence,* must decrease in direct ratio to the decrease in our knowledge of Him, which depends upon our understanding of His effects as likenesses of Him. " For God, inasmuch as He is known more perfectly, is loved more perfectly" (I-II, 67, 6 *ad* 3) would seem to imply that the less perfectly He is known, the less perfectly He is loved.

Diminished knowers, diminished lovers, diminished images of God-Aquinas's separated souls could well make their own the words with which the shade of Achilles greeted Odysseus:

> How did you find your way down to the dark where these dim-witted dead are camped forever, the after-images of used-up men? [4]

While Aquinas's pessimism about death is not total-we do live on, our individual identities intact, enjoying some of our specifi-

[4] Homer, *The Odyssey,* trans. Robert Fitzgerald (Garden City, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1968), p. 200.

cally human activities-we are, simply speaking, something significantly less than fully human after death. Aquinas has said repeatedly that a separated soul is not a man, and has explicitly made our separated mode of existing and operating alien to our nature. The implications of these views constitute a fundamentally pessimistic strain in his philosophy of death which eminently justifies whatever horror of dying we might feel. Achilles spoke of that, too:

> Better, I say, to break sod as a farm hand for some poor country man, on iron rations, than lord it over all the exhausted dead.[5]

But the evil of death is more than just human, more than a psychological pain for us its victims. If we place this description of death in the context of the basic themes of the *Summa* which constitute Aquinas's world-view, it appears as a metaphysical horror, too. The overall synthetic pattern of the *Summa* is evident from the several prologues by which Aquinas locates each of the parts of that work in relation to the whole, which has God as its subject-matter. Within that subject, there are three topics: God Himself, the topic of Part I; the rational creature's movement toward God, the topic of Part II; and Christ, the way by which men tend to God, the topic of Part III. Part I has three sections, the third of which, Questions 44-119, deals with the procession of creatures from God, Who is their principle and end (Prologue to I, 2). Thus an understanding of how creatures proceed from God is part of an understanding of God Himself.

This procession of creatures is treated in three divisions, of which the second, which treats of their distinction, extends from Questions 47 through 102 (Prologue to I, 44). The third part of that division, Questions *50* through 102, treats of the distinction between spiritual and corporeal creatures (Prologue to I, 47); within it occurs Aquinas's famous treatise on man, Questions 75 through 102 (Prologue to I, 50). The famous treatise "*De Hamine*" has two main topics: the very nature of man,

[6] *Ibid.,* p.

Questions 75 through 89, and man's production, Questions 90 through IOQ. The consideration of the very nature of man looks to the essence of the soul, Questions 75-76; to its powers, Questions 77-83; and to its operations, Questions 84-90. Thus Question 89, " On the Cognition of the Separated Soul," which has been the basis of this study, is meant to illuminate the very nature of man, which in turn is part of a study of the distinction between spiritual and corporeal creatures, which in turn is subsumed under a general study of the distinctions among creatures. Those distinctions have their significance as ways in which creatures proceed from God, which procession is, in its turn, due to God Himself, Who is the subject-matter of the entire *Summa.* In thus seeking to illuminate God as He is reflected in the procession of creatures from Him, the *Summa* instances the method it prescribes at I, 12, IQ. The mode of the cognition of the separated soul, which provides the premise for the elements of the philosophy of death unfolded in this paper, thus has an ultimate theological significance: that diminished cognition is a diminished procession from God, a flaw in the relation of rational creatures to God as their principle and end. A separated soul proceeds from, and strives to return to, God in a mode that is less perfect than the mode in which a man can do so. Human death would thus seem to disrupt the very order of the universe.

What, then, of the consistency of this philosophy of death with Aquinas's famous hylomorphic view of man? It would seem to be complete. Having assigned primacy of value to our bodily life, with a mode of cognition that requires phantasms, and having developed a theory of willing and of moral virtue which is consistent with that theory of cognition, Aquinas does not attempt to make our life after death a better, more humanly fulfilled mode of existence. To the extent that our bodily life is natural and good, the event which deprives us of it must be-and is, for Thomas-violent and evil. To the extent that our bodily life is ultimately intelligible in the light of an ordered universe of creatures proceeding from and returning to God,

then death must be-and is, for Thomas-anomalous. His pessimism about death is thus not only consistent with, but a reflexive confirmation of, his optimism about the unity of man. In thus assigning primary intelligibility and value to our bodily life, and reduced intelligibility and value to our disembodied life, he .seizes the dilemma of death by its earthly horn.[6]

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•Adolfo Lippi, C. P., examines the intelligibility of death in this more "existential" aspect in "La Soluzione Tomista di Un Problema Esistenziale: La Morte" *(Sapienza* XIX, 1966, pp. 184-!W7). He argues that death is in principle philosophically inexplicable for Aquinas because he assigns supreme value to the individual person, supreme over the human species as well as over all of nature. Pegis, at the end of " Between Immortality and Death: Some Further Reflections on the *Summa Contra Gentues," The Monist* 58, 1 (January, 1974, pp. 1-15), concludes that death as a spiritual rather than· physical event is " no more and no less a mystery than man himself."

For an analysis of St. Thomas's effort to make our death natural, see my "The Natural Meaning of Death in the *Summa Theologiae,"* forthcoming in the 1978 *Proceedings* of the American Catholic Philosophical Association.

CREATIVITY AND GOD: WHITEHEAD ACCORDING TO HARTSHORNE

CHARLES HARTSHORNE IS understandably sympathetic with the general metaphysics elaborated by Whitehead. His own metaphysical system is a variation on the process theme with Whitehead as a major influence.[1] Hartshorne in turn has commented extensively on Whitehead. Creativity is a major focus of his commentary mainly because of its centrality in his own metaphysics. This paper will try to clarify the differences between Hartshorne and Whitehead concerning the relation of creativity to God.

Hartshorne is puzzled by the fact that Whitehead never identifies creativity with God, while Hartshorne's own metaphysics seems to require it.

> If, in philosophies of beings, God is Being Itself, in a philosophy of creativity should he not be Creativity Itself? Yet Whitehead refuses to say this. Why? I think because he has his attention upon a possible misunderstanding. If we identify divine creating with creating in general, then it seems that the creatures can have no creativity of their own. To avoid this, and to avoid making God

[1] " Undoubtedly the closest parallel to, and probably the strongest influence upon, my philosophy is Whitehead" *(Creative Synth/!$iS and Philc>sophic Method* [London: SCM Press; LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court, 1970), p. xv. Hereafter, cited in text and notes as "CSPM.") But Hartshorne initially arrived at his position independently of Whitehead. " I came to Whitehead already convinced that experience is essentially participation, that any reality we can conceive must be constituted of feeling in some broad sense, that reality is creative process and the future is open even for God . . . that metaphysical freedom is real. . . . The sources of my ideas about God are in good part elsewhere, though I enormously admire Whitehead's discussion of the theistic problem." (In *Philosophical, Interrogations* ed. by Sydney and Beatrice Rome [New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1964), pp. 8it2-28. See *Two Process Philosophers: Hartshorne's Encounter with Whitehead,* ed. by Lewis S. Ford [Tallahassee: American Academy of Religion, 1978], chapter 1.)

the selector of the detailed goods and evils of the world, Whitehead distinguishes between God and creativity. [2]

The concern expressed here is more typical of Hartshorne's works than Whitehead's. One of Hartshorne's strengths through the years has been his clarification of certain basic issues in natural theology. The refrain in many of his writings is: How can we understand the relation between deity and the world so that self-creation is attributable to both? The first paragraph of his systematic metaphysics raises the question as traditional theologians had to deal with it. Later on in CSPM he states: "If the religious issue is as central in metaphysics as it seems to be, to attempt to .settle everything else and only then to ask about 'God' is to be in danger of begging the chief metaphysical questions." [3] But on the same page Hartshorne seems to say it doesn't really matter where you start.

"Neo-classical metaphysics," when its ideas are adequately explicated, is neo-classical natural theology, and *vice versa.* In three several books I have tried to show, at least in outline, how from the mere idea of God a whole metaphysical system follows; one may also proceed in the opposite direction, and show how from general secular considerations one may arrive at the idea of God and a judgment as to its validity. But the two ways of proceeding differ only relatively and as a matter of emphasis. [4]

But even here, Hartshorne suggests that the most important function of philosophy is to clarify the religious issue or theistic question, by whatever means. And the question in a sense dictates the method and kinds of answers to be found. As Hartshorne says, "in metaphysics he who sets the question largely determines what answers can be given." [5]

Hartshorne recognizes that Whitehead wa3 more concerned, as I would put it, with the secular issue or the actual world question. [6] But I don't think he realizes how far apart this puts

•*Whitehead's Philosophy: Selected Essays, 1935-70* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1972), p. 138.

"CSPM 40.

• CSPM 40-1.

• *Amelm's Discovery* (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court, 1965), p· 159.

"CSPM

the two process philosophers. Their views on the relation of God to creativity will serve to illustrate the distance.

The Actual World Question According to Whitehead

The actual world, consisting of a plurality of actual entities, anchors the starting point and development of Whitehead's philosophy of organism. The actual world including ourselves is the basic datum of speculative philosophy.

> We know nothing beyond this temporal world and the formative elements which jointly constitute its character. The temporal world and its formative elements constitute for us the all-inclusive universe .... The actual temporal world can be analyzed into a multiplicity of occasions of actualization. These are the primary actual units of which the temporal world is composed.[7]

The world as a plurality of actual entities is given in immediate experience. But Whitehead is careful to distinguish between immediate experience and presentational immediacy.

> For the theory of the universal relativity of actual individual things leads to the distinction between the present moment of experience, which is the sole datum for conscious analysis, and the perception of the contemporary world, which is the one factor in this datum.[8]

" The perception of the contemporary world " is only one mode of perception and not the most significant for grounding philosophical explanation. One persistent error in the history of philosophy is the limitation of immediate experience to the givenness of presentational immediacy. Rather, we" must-to avoid' solipsism of the present moment '-include in direct perception something more than presentational immediacy." [9] The perceptual mode of causal efficacy delivers the more. Because of the latter we can find in the present moment of experience a non-sensuous perception of the "other." "The pre.sent moment is constituted by the influx of *the other* into that self-identity which is the continued life of the immediate past within

[7] *Religion in the Making* (New York: Macmillan, 1926), pp. 90, 91.
[8] *Symbolism* (New York: Macmillan, 1927), p. 47.
•*Process and Reality* (New York: Macmillan, 1929), p. 125. Hereafter, "PR."

the immediacy of the present." [10] The immediate past is made up of actual occasions. This is the most important sense in which the actual world is given in immediate experience.

Most important because the mode of causal efficacy provides speculative philosophy with its experiential foundation. Individual efficacious actualities given in this mode are the primary metaphysical data. Ultimately, every metaphysical statement must be capable of being justified in terms of the evidence of immediate experience. This is the background meaning for the ontological principle.

But immediate experience in and of itself is a limited resource. In ordinary human experience actual entities are not perceived in their discriminated individuality, in either the mode of presentational immediacy or that of causal efficacy. Immediate experience does not clearly reveal for immediate inspection the characters of actualities. Therefore, it is up to speculative philosophy and the method of descriptive generalization to reconstitute the concretely real by discovering those metaphysical characters which account for actual entities as efficacious forces of process in nature and the sources of our own immediate experience. In other terms, the data of immediate experience necessarily require metaphysical interpretation, for " there are no brute, self-contained matters of fact, capable of being understood apart from interpretation as an element in a system." [11]

What should be clear from this discussion is that the concretely real entities given in our immediate experience of the temporal world are the foundation of Whitehead's philosophy of organism. There is no appeal beyond the plurality of actual entities. In fact, the explanatory purpose of philosophy is to approximate concreteness by exhibiting the relation of more abstract entities to the concrete facts of our experience. " The true philosophic question is: How can concrete fact exhibit entities abstract from itself and yet participated in by its own nature? " [12]

[10] *Adventures of Ideas* (New York: Macmillan, 1933), p. 233. Hereafter, "AI."
[11] PR 21.
[12] PR 50.

The eategoreal scheme summarizes Whitehead's answer to the question. The Category of the Ultimate in particular expresses what it means "to be" in Whitehead's system. Concrescence, or the becoming of an actual entity, is the root meaning of the really real. And the actual world is the becoming of a plurality of actual entities. In this context, it is obvious that creativity is not an actual entity itself or some external agency. Creativity is precisely that principle of dynamism or fusion intrinsic to all instances of becoming. Self-creation of actual entities is the ultimate metaphysical principle which defines immediacy or actuality at the present moment.

Whitehead intends the category of the ultimate, as well as the rest of the scheme, to represent "tentative formulations of the ultimate generalities," [123] and so be truly metaphysical in scope and application. Nevertheless, these generalizations have been constructed to elucidate our immediate experience of entities in the now actual temporal world. Whitehead's use of the term "actual occasion" in the category of the ultimate and elsewhere in the scheme indicates his obligation to entities in the extensive context of the current cosmological epoch. In sum, the actual temporal world of our experience stimulates the "true philosophic question." Then generalizations based on this experience are metaphysical to the extent that they have application to any and all cosmological epochs.

Since Whitehead's method of descriptive generalization is bound from the beginning to the actual temporal world of actual ·entities, metaphysical principles must gain initial credibility in elucidating that actual world. Given this methodological commitment it would necessarily follow that "God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked to save their collapse. He is their chief exemplification." [13] God, like any other actual entity, is subject to metaphysical principles.

God is an actual entity, and so is the most trivial puff of existence in far-off empty space. But, though there are gradations of im-

[12a] PR III. [11] **PR** *5U.*

portance, and diversities of function, yet in the principles which actuality exemplifies all are on the same level.[14]

And in contrast with Descartes, Whitehead states: " In the philosophy of organism, as here developed, God's existence is not generically different from that of other actual entities, except that he is ' primordial ' . . ." [15] This allows for distinctiveness but not categoreal distinctiveness. God's rdation to that ultimate metaphysical principle must be described in the same way.

In all philosophic theory there is an ultimate which is actual in virtue of its accidents. It is only then capable of characterization through its accidental embodiments, and apart from these accidents is devoid of actuality. In the philosophy of organism this ultimate is " creativity; " and God is its primordial, non-temporal accident. [16]

The other " accidents " are the actual entities which make up the actual temporal world. And" Neither God, nor the World, reaches static completion. Both are in the grip of the ultimate metaphysical ground,. the creative advance into novelty." [11]

The Theistic Question According to Hartshorne

Hartshorne's essay in systematic metaphysics, CSPM, reiterates the notion that dominates most of Hartshorne's metaphysical writings: " a single meaning postulate suffices for metaphysics, the explication of the idea of God." [18] I suggest that CSPM is basically one more exercise guided by the theistic question. But let us look at the alternative he associates with Whitehead's system.

Instead of postulating the meaning of " God," we may instead take "concrete entity," concreteness simply as such. Since the abstract presupposes a concrete from which it is abstracted, the general abstraction, " concreteness as such," could not be unexemplified.

"PR 28.
[15] PR 116.
[16] PR 11.
[17] PR 529.
[1]•csPM 2s.

Hence analytic judgments made possible by meaning postulates explicating "concreteness" are necessarily applicable, no matter what the state of affairs may be. Whitehead's metaphysics, for instance, is just the attempted explication of what it is to be concrete (hence also of what it is to be abstract, in so far as the abstract-concrete contrast is inherent in concreteness as such) .[19]

Hartshorne has not developed this approach in CSPM or elsewhere as far as I can tell. If he had, I suspect the outcome would be much the same. Which is to say, it would still be Hartshorne's metaphysics and not Whitehead's.

The above quotation illustrates what metaphysics is all about for Hartshorne. He describes metaphysics " as the study which evaluates *a priori* statements about existence." [20] " Concreteness as such " fits the description because, according to Hartshorne, this metaphysical abstraction could not possibly conflict with any conceivable experience and must be, to that extent, an "innate idea." Consequently, the metaphysician is "the critic of abstractions," as Whitehead would say. "The abstractions are criticized, not, as in science, because they are inaccurate to the facts, but because other *equal,ly general* or even more general abstractions are left out of account, and thus the general meaning of ' concreteness ' is not brought out." [21] Logic, therefore, is the backbone of philosophy.[22] And logical clarity and comprehensiveness are primary standards of metaphysical truth. In metaphysical matters, " Critical rationalism, not empiricism, is the arbiter." [23]

Whitehead would agree that speculative philosophy in major part is a rationalistic enterprise. And he would agree that " rigid empiricism" is doomed to failure.

The metaphysical first principles can never fail of exemplification. We can never catch the actual world taking a holiday from their sway. Thus, for the discovery of metaphysics, the method of

[1] "CSPM 24.
[••] csPM 19.
[21] CSPM
[22] CSPM xvii.
[••] CSPM xviii.

pinning down thought to the strict systematization of detailed discrimination, already effected by antecedent observation, breaks down.[24]

But Whitehead does allow for an " empirical side " to philosophy.[25]

The elucidation of immediate experience is the sole justification for any thought; and the starting point for thought is the analytic observation of components of this experience. But we are not conscious of any clear-cut complete analysis of immediate experience, in terms of the various details which comprise its definiteness.[26]

This difficulty does not deter Whitehead. On the contrary, he seems to stress the importance of a balance between rationalization and direct insight or intuition grounded in situations of immediate experience. " The speculative school appeals to direct insight, and endeavors to indicate its meanings by further appeal to situations which promote such specific insights." [27] The search for metaphysical principles then entails the discernment of form in fact. Public verification requires that " The categoreal forms should come to us with some evidence that they are widespread in experience." [28] This means that immediate experience and direct insights grounded in that experience must be repeatable. In sum, the testing of metaphysical principles, according to Whitehead, seems to demand rationalism and a kind of flexible empiricism.

But then Hartshorne also sees the need for intuition. As he notes, " technical logic alone cannot establish a metaphysics, intuitions being also needed." [29] But the role of intuition is not clear to this reader. The first chapter of CSPM is intended" to put the reader into the intuitive center of the philosophy." [30]

••PR 7.
••See *Two Process Philosophers,* pp. 45-8.
""PR 6.
[07] *Modes of Thought* (New York: Macmillan, 1988), p. !'l86.
[28] *The Function of Reason* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19!'l9), p. 78.
[2]. CSPM xviii.
"°CSPM xxi.

Hartshorne consults experience to reveal creativity as a fundamental metaphysical principle. But the whole discussion is bound into the theological problem of creation. What seems to happen in this context is that immediate experience is used to stimulate our consciousness of the idea of creativity and the category of the ultimate, and then that idea is explicated in relation to another abstraction which also involveS'an intuition, God's creativity. In the end, the God category seems to absorb the category of the ultimate. But let us ignore the God concept for the moment. Let us ask how experience is related to the idea of creativity. Hartshorne indicates that concepts do derive somehow from experience.[31] But how they derive and even that they do derive from experience seems irrelevant in metaphysics. For " metaphysical concepts derive from *any* experience in which reflection occurs, and they will be illustrated in any experience." [32] All that seems to matter is our experience of the concept. Experience of the world of creative entities may be the starting point of metaphysics, but only in the sense of providing the raw material for reflection, and any experience will do to start with. Hartshorne does not seem to need immediate experience of the world to ground the ongoing process of reflection.

This summary may not do justice to Hartshorne. But if it is somewhat accurate then I conclude tentatively that Hartshorne's allusion to Whitehead's system as an attempt to explicate the meaning of the general abstraction " concreteness as such" ignores Whitehead's method of sticking faithfully to this world of actual entities through intuition and immediate experience. To lose sight of this grounding is to lose sight of the primacy of the category of the ultimate and the real world of experience. Hartshorne's alternative is more a metaphysics 0:f abstractions with God as supremely abstract and .supremely concrete Being.

In Hartshorne' s metaphysics the notion of God apparently

[31] CSPM 31.
[••] CSPM 31.

subsumes creativity and becomes the ultimate category of existence.[33] From the vantage point of his own system Hartshorne remarks:

> If reality is essentially creative process ... then objective necessity is merely what all real possibilities have in common, their neutral element, which will be actualized "no matter what " course the creative process may take. This neutral element is creativity in its essential or irreducible aspect, which is inseparable from the necessary aspect of deity.[34]

In fact, Hartshorne identifies creativity and the necessary aspect of deity. Creativity "is the only essence that is eternal, the continuum of undifferentiated potentiality (the bare power of God) that alone precedes every event whatever."[35] Possible actuality is the power of God. The necessary existence of the divine essence constitutes possibility as such which cannot fail of actualization. "Necessary existence is ... an essence, embodied in any and every total state of contingent actuality."[36] The ground of all possibility is therefore necessary. God " is really the content of ' existence' [that is, pure being or creativity], the generic factor of the universe."[37] He is the "Universal of universals, the Form of forms,"[38] the " principle of all principles."[39] Here metaphysics finds its proper object. For the divine essence " is really the entirety of what we can know *a priori* about reality."[40]

Hartshorne's own metaphysics naturally leads him to suggest " that one or two of the remarks by Whitehead about crea-

•• In an unpublished letter to this author, dated May 30, 1968, Hartshorne states, " The basic categories require God's existence, including deity itself as in a sense *the* category."

••*Anselm's Discovery,* p. 43.

•• " Santayana's Doctrine of Essence," in *The Philosophy of George Santayana,* ed. by P. Schilpp (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1940), p. 167.

•• *The Logic of Perfection, and other Essays in Neo-Classica! Metaphysics* (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court, 1962), p. 102.

[81] *Ibid.,* p. 305.

••*Anselm's Discovery,* p. l!l7.

••*Logic of Perfection,* p. 119.

••*Ibid.,* p. 119. Sec CSPM 19: "Metaphysics may be described as the study which evaluates *a priori* statements about existence."

tivity might possibly be applied to God instead ..." [41] But he does resist attributing to Whitehead the notion that creativity is identical with God. He says, according to Whitehead, creativity

> is not identical with God, nor is it an individual, coordinate with or superior to God. It is a mere universal or an ultimate abstraction, *the* ultimate abstraction. Like all universals, it is real only in individuals, including the one essential individual, God. God is not identical with creativity, because you and I are creative too, with our nondivine but real creative action. Whitehead could perhaps here employ scholastic language and say that, just as in Thomism "being" is not simply the same in God and other things, so in his system "becoming" or "creativity," rather than mere being, is the supreme but analogical unity. [42]

Hartshorne somewhat compromises the objectivity of this account by inferring on Whitehead's behalf a categoreal difference between God and other entities.

> For the divine becoming has properties whose uniqueness can be stated in categorical terms; it alone is able adequately to embrace all actuality as its data; it alone goes on primordially and everlastingly in the same individual way, embodying the same individual personality traits; etc. These are not just differences; they are categorical differences, statable in purely general terms (as the "self-existence" of God in contrast to "existence through another" was statable in Thomism). So there is no simply univocal concept here. [43]

Whitehead does affirm these differ·encesbut, on methodological grounds, as I have argued above, he also refuses to view these as categorical. And if such differences were the main reason for choosing analogical rather than univocal predication of being, I suspect Whitehead would be more comfortable with the latter. Perhaps he would say, along with many Thomists,

[41] "Whitehead's Metaphysics," in *Whitehead and the Modern World: Science, Metaphysics, and Civilization, Three Essays on the Thought of A. N. Whitehead* (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1950), p. 41.

[42] *Whitehead's Philosophy: Selected Essays,* p. 185.

[43] *Philosophers Speak of God* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1953), p.

that" being" is one concept which is predicated analogously.[44]

The reference to Thomism in the above quote is revealing of Hartshorne's own metaphysics. To stress categoreal difference and identify creativity with God is to stress the .self-existence of God and the dependence in existence of other beings. Hartshorne, like Thomists, explicitly wants to maintain that God is Creativity Itself and yet creatures are really creative too.

> God, it should now be clear, is not, according to our argument, the " one substance," the sole real individual, but simply the one substance or individual which is *necessary* to reality, or which is constitutive of being .as such, all other individuals being part-constitutive only of accidental aspects of being. Individuality and necessity of existence are not the same, nor is accidental reality unreal reality.[45]

But to what extent is accidental reality real independently of God's reality? Whitehead would have to agree that God is uniquely necessary to the becoming of other entities. But is God's creativity the universal ground of the becoming itself in other entities? Whitehead is committed to saying that creativity as actualized in the plurality of entities which make up the actual world, including God, is the only ground there is. And the ground is plural. Hartshorne seems to conclude that the supreme uniqueness of God's being is the singular ground of being in all others. Creativity is intrinsic to God. The key question is, granted that creativity is intrinsic to other entities as well, is that creativity derived from God's creativity? Do creatures, in their imperfect fashion, share or participate in perfect existence, as the Thomist would say? The answer seems to be " yes " according to Hartshorne. Compare the following:

•• This could imply that conceptual unity requires that " being " be understood as an essence or form. In the last section of this paper, using A. H. Johnson as guide, I will develop briefly the case for creativity as eternal object which does not have to be identified with God. The above discussion of the differences between Whitehead and Hartshorne does not, however, assume or require this particular interpretation of creativity.

••*Man's Vision* of *God and the Logic of Theiam* (Chicago: Willett, Clark & Company, 1941), p. i84.

... with David of Dinant and Bruno I hold the doctrine (called "crazy" by Aquinas) that primary matter, the ultimate potency which all change whatever actualizes, is an aspect of God, his power to form himself and so create form.[46]

God is contained in our existence, not merely as cause of our "coming to be" but as constitutive of the very meaning of "coming to be." [47]

[Divine existence is] the presupposed common medium of all reality. [48]

Whitehead's metaphysical method and his emphasis on the category of the ultimate rather than God prevent him from going this far. There seems to be no place for analogy of participation in being in Whitehead.

Creativity as Eternal Object

We have seen that Hartshorne identifies creativity and the necessary aspect of God. He argues that this is the only eternal object necessary in process metaphysics. "[H]ere I seem not to be Whiteheadian-I think there is but one eternal object; God's fixed essence, as distinct from his contingent actuality." [49] Whitehead would object to such a reduction of the multiplicity of eternal objects to one. But it may be possible, following the insight of A.H. Johnson, to infer that creativity is indeed one of many eternal objects. Then, if we combine this interpretation with the general theory of eternal objects, Whitehead's system can explain how creativity is one in concept but predicated analogically for each instance of becoming. This includes God's becoming.

A. H. Johnson contends that "the term 'creativity' refers to an eternal object and 'also' to the exemplification of that

•• "Santayana's Doctrine of Essence," p. 46.

'"*Man's Vision of God,* p. 47.

••*Logic of Perfection,* p. 99.

•• *Philosophical Interrogations,* p. 847. See CSPM 65: "My position with respect to eternal objects is simply that the necessary or eternal aspect of deity is the only eternal object. I should like to say that this eternal entity is not a multitude but, in the language of classical theism is 'simple'."

eternal object." [50] Johnson's defense of this thesis is all too brief and he seems to misrepresent "'Whiteheadon several points. But the main thesis is established in a convincing manner, I think.

Johnson comments on Whitehead's description of creativity as "the universal of universals characterizing ultimate matter of fact." [51]

> Thus, in Whitehead's broadly Platonic language, creativity is an Idea (eternal object) which is exemplified in particular actual entities. More specifically, the creative process whereby one actual entity appropriates data provided by other actual entities, and so constitutes itself, is an exemplification of the eternal object " creativity." [52]

Another key text is mentioned in an appendix to WTR. [53] There Johnson comments on the statement, "creativity is a character which underlies all occasions." [54]

> The Universal (essence, principle) " Creativity " is exemplified (manifest, present) in particular actual entities (that is, in the process whereby actual entities are objectified in each other in the act of self-creation) .[55]

And, significantly, this reading gains Whitehead's own approval in the margin: "right." [56] Johnson might have been more explicit and listed the term " eternal object." But the general thesis does not seem affected by its absence. Whitehead himself only makes extensive use of the term in SMW and PR. [57] Be-

••*Whitehead's Theory of Reality* (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1962), p. 70. Hereafter, "WTR."

[01] PR 31.

[02] WTR 70.

••"Appendix B," 212-13. "This appendix is composed of photostat reproductions of some marginal notes appended by Professor Whitehead, in 1937, to the rough draft of a manuscript" (WTR 213) .

••*Science and the Modem World* (New York: Macmillan, 1925), p. *255* is the proper citation and " general metaphysical character " the exact phrasing in Whitehead. Hereafter, "SMW."

[00] WTR 221.

[00] WTR 221.

[01] See Christian's *An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), p. 195, for frequency of occurrences in other works.

sides, more explicit confirmation is available on the same page when Johnson clarifies the relation between God and creativity.

He calls attention to paradoxes formulated by D. C. Moxley in this regard and replies:

These apparent paradoxes can be solved by bearing in mind the fact that the term " creativity" is applied to "creativity" as essence (eternal object)- (in this sense " creativity " is the universal of universals) and to " creativity" as exemplified in the self-creative process of an actual entity. The phrase which refers to God as a " creature of creativity " is using the term " creativity " in the second sense. That is to say, God is the "creature" or outcome of his own self directed process of self creation.[58]

And again Whitehead appends: " right." Apart from citing the original text of Whitehead, as I intend to do in another paper, this should count as persuasive evidence in favor of creativity as an eternal object. Johnson makes the association explicit. And as he says, " The ' absence of objection,' by Whitehead, to the details of the exposition of his position is significant." [59] This is especially true with respect to the ultimate principle of creativity which is presupposed by all other elements of Whitehead's categoreal scheme. Here if anywhere we would expect Whitehead to correct a misleading interpretation of his thought.

Johnson goes on to contest Moxley's charge that irresolvable problems arise in connection with Whitehead's comparison of creativity and Aristotelian matter. Admittedly, Johnson does clear up much of the confusion in Moxley's account. But he ignores various uses of "character" in Whitehead's thought. As a result, some confusion remains.

The main source of controversy is found in PR.

" Creativity " is another rendering of the Aristotelian " matter," and of the modern " neutral stuff." But it is divested of the notion of passivity, either of "form," or of external relations; it is the pure notion of the activity conditioned by the objective immortality of the actual world. . . . Creativity is without a character of its

•• WTR ftftl.
""WTR 218.

own in exactly the same sense in which the Aristotelian " matter" is without a character of its own. It is that ultimate notion of the highest generality at the base of actuality. It cannot be characterized, because all characters are more special than itself.[60]

At first glance, Johnson .seems to reduce Whitehead's analogy to a clarification of the relation of abstract creativity to its own concrete exemplification.

The only point they [matter and creativity] have in common is the feature that each is without any specific "concrete" character of its own. Is it not true that an eternal object (e.g., creativity) is abstract, awaiting exemplification in some particular, specific, actual entity? [61]

Or, as Johnson expresses it in the appendix:

As an essence or eternal object, " creativity " has a distinct meaning; but this essence has, of course, no particular concrete character until it is actualized in some actual entity or other. In this sense it is " without a character of its own." [62]

This reading considerably weakens the force of Whitehead's analogy. It is certainly true, but trivial, to remark on Whitehead's behalf that creativity like matter is an abstraction considered apart from actuality. Every eternal object fulfills that description. The dual mode of existence implied in the addition of concrete character to abstract meaning is applicable to any eternal object.

The concrete defines the context in which the unique role of creativity " as primary matter " is properly understood. Primary matter is that fundamental potential principle transcendentally ordered to all actuation in concrete entities. It is the ultimate principle of indetermination relative to all " other " determinations. That does not make it absolute non-being, only relative non-being. Matter in itself signifies minimal determination which is the capability for supporting all other determinations. Similarly, Whitehead's creativity is the ultimate prin-

[60] PR 46-7.
[61] WTR 71.
[62] WTR 222.

ciple of connectedness fusing all other (more special) characters into synthetic unity. And creativity-ordering-other-characters constitutes the meaning of actuality. One main object of Whitehead's reference to primary matter is to emphasize the unique function of creativity in concrete individual beings.

Johnson touches on this point when he states, " also, 'creativity' is a common, general characteristic of all (otherwise different) actual entities; similarity *[sic]* 'matter' in Aristotle's philosophy." [aa] This promising but ambiguous statement is not developed.

But in the sentences which immediately follow, Johnson does seem to capture the most fundamental aspect of Whitehead's reference to Aristotelian matter.

> A further confusion is likely to arise unless one notes, rather carefully, another slightly different usage of the term "creativity." Whitehead sometimes states that" God and the actual world jointly constitute the character of the creativity for the initial phase of the novel concrescence." [64]

Johnson interprets" character of creativity" to mean" the data provided by God and the world of ordinary actual entities." [65] Here he should mention the" .shifting" character of creativity. " This function of creatures, that they constitute the shifting character of creativity, is here termed the 'objective immortality ' of actual entities." [66] This is the sense in which creativity is a character which transports other characters representing objectified actual entities. [67] Then the reference to Aristotelian matter serves primarily to elucidate the role of creativity in objectification. " ' Creativity ' is another rendering of Aristotelian ' matter ' ... it is the pure notion of the activity

""WTR 71.

[0]. WTR 71. Whitehead himself remarks in the margin next to the same text in the appendix, "very careless of me-and yet, a fairly good phrase " (WTR 222).

•• WTR 222.

[68] PR 47.

[61] The term "transport" is meant to convey the function of the type of process Whitehead calls " transition " (see PR 320-22).

conditioned [characterized] by the objective immortality of the actual world." [68]

But Johnson is not very clear on the theory of objectification. In the appendix he concludes that " data used in the creative process are called ' creativity '." [69] He bases this on a text from AI: "this factor of activity (the actual world relative to that [new] occasion) is what I have called 'Creativity'." [70] This compounds rather than dispels the " confusion." For Whitehead himself merely claims that creativity is that "factor " of activity " included in " the actual world. The two terms " creativity " and " actual world " should not be identified.

> The initial situation includes a factor of creativity which is the reason for the origin of that occasion of experience. This factor of activity is what I have called" Creativity." The initial situation with its creativity can be termed the initial phase of the new occasion. It can equally well be termed the " actual world " relative to that occasion.[71]

Creativity is a " part " of the initial situation, an " element " in the actual world. It is the ultimate character (activity, self-creation, fusion, etc.) whose characters (data: God and actual occasions "as objectively real") condition immediate concrescence.

In sum, creativity is both an intrinsic principle of singular concrete beings and also the" means" of objectifying one being in another. The second function is analogous to primary matter in its role in substantial change. But creativity is activity itself not pure passive potentiality.

•• PR 46-7. The insertion of " characterized " may be justified by citing equivalent texts in which the term actually appears. For example: "Actuality in perishing . . . acquires efficient causation whereby it is a ground of obligation characterizing the creativity" (PR 44). "It is the function of actuality to characterize the creativity " (PR 344). " This objective intervention of other entities constitutes the creative character which conditions the concrescence in question " (PR 836). " Each actual occasion gives to the creativity which flows from it a definite character in two ways" *(Religi01i in the Making,* 157).

""WTR 222.

[70] WTR 222. The first set of parentheses should be brackets, indicating transposition of material not contained in the original text. See *Advimtures of Ideas,* p. 280.

[71] *Adventures of Ideas,* p. 230.

Composite Essence of Eternal Objects

Whitehead indicates in SMW that every eternal object can be described in terms 0£ a composite essence.[72] "Individual essence" stands for what an eternal object is in itself or what unique contribution it can make to actuality.

> This unique contribution is identical for all such occasions in respect to the fact that the object in all modes of ingression is just its identical self. But it varies from one occasion to another in respect to the differences of its modes of ingression.[78]

The second sentence refers to the "relational essence" of an eternal object. The relational essence involves all other eternal objects and expresses the unlimited number of ways in which an eternal object can have ingression into actual occasions. That is, in any one occasion, only a selection of an eternal object's relationships to other eternal objects will be effective in the aesthetic synthesis.[74] In sum, as far as ingression is concerned, the individual essence of an eternal object answers the question What, and relational essence the question How.[75]

The individual essence may be described as "determinate" insofar as the essential meaning or "whatness" of an eternal object remains constant. But Whitehead also maintains that the total effectiveness of an eternal object can only be measured in terms of how its relationships to other eternal objects are ordered for relevance in a given actual occasion. Considered in the abstract, the relational essence of an eternal object mere-

[72] SMW ch. x. Whitehead emphasizes this theory in a letter to Hartshorne, dated 1936: "There is one point as to which you-and everyone-misconstrue me--obviously my usual faults of exposition are to blame. I mean my doctrine of *eternal objects."* ("An Unpublished Letter from Whitehead to Hartshorne," in *A. N. Whitehead: Essays on His Philos.ophy,* ed. by George L. Kline (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 199. Whitehead goes on to clarify five points including his theory of the individual and relational essences of eternal objects.

[73] SMW

"SMW

[75] This doctrine of a composite essence, and especially the connection between the individual and relational aspects, is inadequately developed in Whitehead's thought.

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ly represents potential for relevant ordering. In other words, eternal objects are "determinable" in relation to individual actual occasions. "In the essence of each eternal object there stands an indeterminateness which expresses its indifferent patience for *any* mode of ingression into *any* actual occasion." [16] At the same time, the relational essence embodies a demand for *sonie* definite mode or other. For "there is no entity which is merely 'any'." [77] This is the necessary background for understanding Whitehead's comment that an eternal object "introduces the notion of the logical variable, in both forms, the unselective 'any' and the selective 'some'." [78] "The variable is an ingenious combination of the vagueness of 'any' with the definiteness of a particular indication." [79] "Vagueness" implies that the composite essence of each eternal object involves an internal but indeterminate relationship to actuality in general.[80] But "definiteness of particular indication" also implies external and determinate relationships with particular actual occasions. (From the side of the actual occasion, this latter relation is internal.[81]) In brief, the individual essence of an eternal object is only intelligible as a term of particularized relationships with other eternal objects and the actual world of becoming. An eternal object acquires significance through its concrete instances.

Creativity as eternal object is utterly unique among eternal objects just as God is utterly unique among actual entities.

[1] "SMW 248.

[77] *Essays in Science and Philosophy* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1947), p. 118.

[78] PR 174-5.

[79] *Modes of Thought,* p. 145.

[80] I have not found an explicit text to support this usage of "internal." Justification must rest on the interpretation of such passages as: "an eternal object, considered as an abstract entity, cannot be divorced from its reference to other eternal objects, and from its reference to actuality generally" (SMW 229f). In the latter case, "reference" must be internal to avoid the Platonic separation. A purely external relation to actuality would leave an eternal object essentially independent. This is obviously not Whitehead's intention.

[81] SMW 284-5.

What creativity shares with other eternal objects is a composite essence. The individual essence of creativity provides for sameness or identity of character in each instance of becoming. This is the sense in which every entity is equally creative. And the relational essence provides for observed differences of ingression. It accounts ior the fact that each creative entity is unique in its display of creativity. Consequently, one and the same essence is embodied differently in each actual entity. If we grant this understanding of Whitehead's theory of eternal objects and creativity as one eternal object, it follows that creativity can be predicated of God and actual occasions without categoreal distinction.

Hartshorne would be reluctant to accept this view oi analogy for reasons already discussed. Another reason is that he explicitly rejects Whitehead's general doctrine of eternal objects. " I believe that the latter doctrine, so far as I grasp it at all (and I may misconceive it), is to some extent a generally eclectic affair, not wholly pertinent to the. central insight . . . . " [82] Perhaps it is as pertinent as the difference between creativity identified with God and creativity as one among a multiplicity of eternal objects. The latter would allow Whitehead to say that creativity is one metaphysical determinable made determinate in each actual entity by that actual entity. But it need not be equated with the entire content of the primordial nature of God. To be real in relation to the latter means to embody creativity and a selection of other eternal objects. Hartshorne implies that God's entire essence as creativity is somehow embodied in each actual entity. And the result is that God's creation of creatures logically precedes the self-creation of creatures.

> The logical view of the situation is rather that God, being both self-creative and creative of others, *produces* creatures which likewise, though in radically different ways, are self-determining, and also productive of effects beyond themselves. [83]

[82] *Whitehead's Philosophy: Selected Essays;* pp. 163-4. See CSPM xv: "[Whitehead's] doctrine of 'eternal objects ' has always seemed to me, . . . an extravagant kind of Platonism, a needless complication in the philosophy of process."

[83] CSPM 11, my emphasis.

The primacy of the category of the ultimate in Whitehead seems to demand that each actual entity be self-productive in the very act of being self-creative. This is the more radical view as far as a metaphysics of pluralism goes. Since Whitehead grounds existence in each actual entity, a multiplicity of eternal objects does not compromise each actual entity's power of self-definition. Hartshorne is concerned about the possibility of compromise. He suggests that eternal objects as " forms of definiteness," available from all eternity, detract from creatures' power to be self-creative. Referring to a multiplicity of eternal objects, he says: "The ultimate principle is experiencing as partly free or self-creative, and this principle, being ultimate, accounts for definiteness without help from any other principle." [84] Whitehead's own doctrine of composite essence, in my estimation, adequately shows how an eternal object may be understood as relatively definite in terms of its individual essence, and yet only contribute that essence in concrete synthesis. Hartshorne seems to neglect the doctrine of composite essence in his interpretations of Whitehead. [85] But more important, Hartshorne seems to be grappling with a problem peculiar to his own metaphysics and not Whitehead's. If Hartshorne grounds the creative existence itself of creatures in God's existence, then in what sense are creatures truly creative? In metaphorical terms, it depends on what they do with the gift. Perhaps Hartshorne, just because he grounds all existence in God's nature, steers away from a multiplicity of forms of definiteness in order to accentuate the power of self-definition that is left to creatures in his system. It remains to be seen whether such a tactic is very helpful in avoiding a reduction of the plurality of events (= actual entities) to mere states of the divine individual. Whitehead's "problem" is the reverse. If he places so much categoreal emphasis on the independent crea-

"'CSPM 62.

••Approaching it from another angle, Lewis S. Ford notes that " Hartshorne's account makes no distinction between 'definiteness ' and ' determinateness,' terms clearly distinguished in Whitehead's twentieth category of explanation" *(Two Process Philosophers,* p. 64; cf. p. 40 fn. 27).

tivity of creatures, how can he adequately explain creativity in God so as not to compromise God's unique metaphysical status?

Conclusi-On

These and other questions concerning the relation of creativity to God in the thought o:f Whitehead and Hartshorne demand greater attention from commentators. In this paper I have simply tried to suggest that Hartshorne is overly optimistic about the usefulness of his own point of view in clarifying Whitehead. While stressing the priority of the theistic question and the idea of God as the starting point of metaphysics, Hartshorne is also of the opinion that the end result is perfectly compatible with Whitehead's system.

> It is my personal view that a metaphysics can also be integrated by taking as intuitive starting point, not creativity or the category of the ultimate, but deity, defined in Anselm's words as a reality such that none greater (meaning better) can be conceived.... [It can also be shown that] deity exists necessarily and eternally, and in addition, that non-divine creativity must also have actual instances. One will in this way have derived the equivalent of "the category of the ultimate" from the religious idea alone. . . . In other words, the theistic intuition, properly understood and expressed . . . will yield the essence of the Whiteheadian metaphysics.86

According to my discussion above it is certainly questionable whether the essential yield is the same. The degree of difference, however, does deserve further study.

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•• *Whitehead's Philosophy, Selected Essays,* p. 165.

IS THERE A THOMIST ALTERNATIVE TO LONERGAN'S COGNITIONAL STRUCTURE?

ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS in his various works, Bernard Lonergan makes the claim that the cognitional structure he elaborates in *Insight* is capable of further clarification, but *not* of revision. This assertion has often been questioned; here I should like to investigate the possibilities of offering a serious challenge to it.

In particular, I shall be concerned to discover whether, in fact, an alternative may be derived from the selfsame source which Lonergan credits as the point of departure for his own cognitional theory, namely, the epistemology of St. Thomas Aquinas. This study will attempt to show that there are, certainly, alternatives to Lonergan's cognitional theory; but these are all variants of an idealist theory of knowing, and not Thomist.

1. Lonergan's Structure and Its Invariance

The cognitional structure that Lonergan presents in *Insight* is, perhaps, well-enough known; but it will be useful, I think, to outline it here, and amplify it with considerations drawn from his other writings, particularly *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas.* [1]

Lonergan's criticism of any form of empiricism and rationalism consists in the pointed charge that both of these epistemological views reduce human knowing to *one* act or operation, and, in doing so, fail to do justice to *all* the operations that are involved in coming to know. Rather than conceiving knowing as simply one act, Lonergan insists that it

[1] Ed. David Burrell. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967. The chapter originally appeared as articles in *Theological Studies*, between 1946 and 1949.

is a *dynamic structure of operatwns,* in which each operation presupposes and completes the one which preceded it. The structure is characterized as dynamic for two reasons: firstly, because the component elements are themselves activities or operations; and, secondly, because the structure is self-assembling or self-constituting. [2]

Accordingly, Lonergan proposes that human knowing is achieved as the term of the successive operations at three levels of consciousness, the levels, that is, of *experience,* of *intelligen<Je,* and of *reflective understanding.* The first level, that of experience, is characterized by the activity of attending to and apprehending data, whether they be data of sense or of consciousness. (Thus, what characterizes data is not their sensibility; Lonergan is no empiricist, though he might, quite correctly, be styled empirical. Rather what marks data is their aspect of *givenneBs.* And the first step in the human process of coming to know is the apprehension of these data).

But, as Lonergan observes, while an animal is content simply with the data, a man will-at least on occasion-ask a question.3 Under the dynamism of man's pure, detached, disinterested and unrestricted desire to know, man is prodded from the level of experience to the level of intelligence. This level is characterized by the operation of direct insight, which grasps the unity-identity-whole that is given in the data, but is not itself a datum. This act is pivotal and central in Lonergan's cognitional theory, for it mediates man's transition from the level of experience to knowing, properly so called (which, as we shall see, is achieved only at the third level of consciousness). As intelligent understanding, then, this second level does not yet yield knowledge; its product is simply ' bright ideas.' What is to be noted, however, is that is *presupposes* the activity proper to the level of experience (since, without data, there is nothing to be questioned and subsequently understood) , and *completes* it (since the data of experience prompt a question which is answered only at this second level).

•"Cognitional Structure," *Collection,* p.
•*Insight,* p. 10.

However, as has been mentioned, this second level of consciousness is not yet the attainment of knowledge, since the act which characterizes the level of intelligent consciousness (the direct insight) neither exhausts nor fulfills the dynamism of man's desire to know. Thus, while answering a prior question, this operation raises yet another. One questions, in short, the adequacy, truth, certainty of one's bright idea. And thus it is that intelligent inquiry calls forth a third level of operation, that of reflective understanding. At this final level of cognitional consciousnes, one either affirms or denies the sufficiency of the direct insight attained through the activity of the second level. The act by which such affirmation or denial is effected, Lonergan calls the *reflective insight,* indicating that, in this operation, one grasps the sufficiency (or lack thereof) of the evidence for one's direct insight at the level of intelligent consciousness. And it is only with the achievement of this critical judgment that human knowledge, in its proper sense, is attained.

Such, in brief, is Lonergan's cognitional structure. However, not content with simply expounding it, Lonergan frequently and unreservedly claims that this pattern of experience-intelligence-judgment is not open to revision, for the simple reason that any attempted revision would have to appeal to and utilize this very structure. Thus, in *Insight,* Lonergan asserts:

> The impossibility of such revision appears from the very notion of revision. A revision appeals to data. It contends that previous theory does not satisfactorily account for all the data. It claims to have reached complementary insights that lead to more accurate statements. It shows that these new statements either are unconditioned or more closely approximate to the unconditioned than previous statements. Now, if in fact revision is as described, then it presupposes that cognitional process falls on the three levels of presentation, intelligence, and reflection.[4]

In claiming that the pattern by which cognitional operations are inter-related is invariant, Lonergan is not denying the pos-

[4] *Ibid.* p. 885-886. Cf. also " Theories of Inquiry," *A Second Collection,* p. 87; and *Method in Theology,* pp. 18-19.

sibility of further methodological developments, or the attainment of fuller and more adequate understanding of the structure.[5] What *is* claimed is that structural revision is impossible because it would entail a revision of the *reviser*.[6] Here, again, Lonergan is not denying that human nature *cannot* change, " that there could not arise a new nature and a new knowledge to which present theory would not be applicable." [7] Rather the facts of human cognitional process, as it is now constituted, preclude varying the pattern and inter-relationship of the operations that characterize cognitional consciousness.

2. Is there an alternative?

To what extent is Lonergan's claim to have elaborated an invariant cognitional structure open to question? There are, after all, only a limited number of possible alternatives, given that knowing is constituted by the acts we have been discussing. While I shall summarily dispose of some of these alternatives, there is one possibility that seems to be presented by the philosophical tradition to which Lonergan acknowledges his indebtedness and allegiance, i. e. that of St. Thomas. I shall argue, however, that Lonergan's structure is not at variance with that of St. Thomas; and, furthermore, that Lonergan's analysis sheds some clarifying light on St. Thomas's theory.

Given Lonergan's trio of operations, there are only five alternatives to the pattern of inter-relations which he proposes. The first four of these, namely:

I. intelligence-experience-reflection;
intelligence-reflection-experience;
3. reflection-intelligence-experience;
4. reflection-experience-intelligence;

can, I think, be quickly disposed of, and for two reasons. In the first place, none could be considered faithful to the thought of St. Thomas, for whom *nihil in inteUectu nisi prius in sensu.*

•Cf. "Insight Revisited," *A Second Collection,* p. 9l78; also *Method in Theology,* pp. 19-9l0.

•*Insight,* p· 9.77.

' *Ibid.,* p. *885.*

If Lonergan is to be faithful to the Thomist position, he could hardly be expected to adopt any of these possibilities. In the second place, even ignoring Lonergan's professed commitment to a Thomist viewpoint, it is clear enough that each 0:f these four alternatives is a form of rationalism or idealism. And it is also clear that Lonergan does not wish to embrace that particular epistemological option. Nor could he be persuaded to adopt it-and rightly so. For each of these variant patterns makes the *intellectual* act prior to the data which provoke it to operate, whereas Lonergan insists that, without the data, there would be no activity.

The fifth and final alternative, however, is not disposed of quite so easily. In it, the pattern of operations would be:

5. experience-reflection-intelligence.

And given Lonergan's description of the acts which occur on these levels, this pattern would seem to be the very one adopted by St. Thomas Aquinas. Let me explain.

Lonergan characterizes the levels of cognitional consciousness by the operations which occur therein, as we have seen. However, the second and third levels are presented as answering questions which are raised by operations which occur on preceding levels. Thus, the operations of intelligent consciousness attempt to answer the question "What is it? ", addressed to the data of experience. And similarly, reflective consciousness tries to answer" Is it so?" which is the question prompted by the understanding achieved at the level of intelligence.

Now Lonergan refers to these questions respectively as *quid sit?* and *an sit?* For example, in his study of *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas,*[9] he writes:

> The inner word of definition is the expression of an insight into phantasm, and the insight is the goal towards which the wonder of inquiry tends. The inner word of judgment is the expression of a reflective act of understanding and that reflective act is the goal towards which critical wonder tends. The former answers the question, *quid sit?* The latter answers the question, *an sit?*[8]

[8] *Verbum,* p. 94.

And again, in" The Origins of Christian Realism," he observes:

> But in the adult's world mediated by meaning the objects to which we are related immediately are the objects intended by our questioning and known by correct answering. In more traditional language, the objects intended are beings: what is to be known by intending *Quid sit* and *An sit* and by finding correct answers.[9]

Accordingly, then, the cognitional pattern adopted by Lonergan of experience-intelligence-reflection, entails that the question *quid sit* precedes the question *an sit.* Consequently, the fifth alternative to this structure which we have been examining, i.e. experience-reflection-intelligence, would entail that the question *an sit* precedes the question *quid sit.* But this seems to be the very position maintained by St. Thomas; and it is not difficult to adduce textual evidence to support this contention.

For example, in the discussion of whether God's existence can be demonstrated in the *Summa Theologiae,* St. Thomas replies to the objection, that God's existence cannot be demonstrated since we have no knowledge of his essence, in the following manner:

> In order to prove the existence of anything, it is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of the name and not its essence, for the question of its essence *(quid est)* follows on the question of its existence *(an est)* .rn

In like fashion, in his commentary on Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics,* discussing the extent and order of the pre-existent knowledge required for obtaining science, he observes " Hence the question, *whether it is,* precedes the question, *what it is."* [11] And again, as yet another instance, he asserts in the commentary on the *Physics:* "Questio enim *quid est* sequitur questionem *an est."* [12] Thus, at first glance, it would seem that the

• *A Second Collection,* p. HS.

[10].S. T., 1, 2, 2 ad 2 (Translation from *Bo.sic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas.* Ed. Anton Pegis. New York, Random Honse, 1945, p. 21).

[11] I, lect II, n..5. (Translation by F. R. Larcher, *Commentary on the Posterior Analytics,* Albany, Magi, 1970, p. 8).

[12] IV, x.

fifth alternative to Lonergan's cognitional structure was adopted by none other than the Angelic Doctor. In what follows, I want to suggest that this interpretation of St. Thomas's ordering of cognitional acts is not adequate; and that Lonergan's pattern is faithful to, and explicative of, that proposed by Aquinas.

8. Why intelligence precedes reflection

In order to appreciate the insight of Lonergan's analysis, let us return for a moment to the operations which characterize the second level of cognitional consciousness. That level we have seen to be characterized by the act of direct insight, which provides an answer to the question " What is it? "

But how is such understanding achieved? Lonergan explains that such an insight grasps the unity-identity-whole presented in data. That is to say, sense experience provides us with data of color, sound, taste, and so on. But before we can conclude that " something " exists on the basis of these data, we must be able to *unify* data as being the appearances of some *one* thing. Furthermore, we must be able to conclude that these various appearances are of one and the *same* thing; and we must thus be able to perceive a *totality* in the data. Thus, prior to the affirmation "this thing exists," there must be a grasp of "this thing" as a unity-identity-whole. In other words, prior to the question *an sit,* there must be an insight into the referent of the question being asked; otherwise we should not be able to ask if ' it ' exists at all. And such an insight is precisely the function of the second level of cognitional consciousness.

I suggest that substantially the same position is maintained by St. Thomas. In the passage earlier cited from the *Posterior Analytics,* we saw him affirm that the question *an est* precedes the question *quid est.* But this assertion is immediately followed by the following observation: "But 'whether a thing is' cannot be shown unless it is known beforehand what is signified by its name." [13] Similarly, in the *Summa Theologiae,* St. Thomas remarks, in the same passage to which we earlier

[18] I, lect. II, n. 5. (cf. Larcher, *op.* cit., p. S)

referred, that " in order to prove the existence of anything, it is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of the name, and not its essence; " [14] and he concludes by providing the example of the demonstration of God's existence: " Now the names given to God are derived from his effects, as will be later shown. Consequently in demonstrating the existence of God from His effects, we may take for the middle term the meaning of the name *God."* [15] The point is made yet again in the commentary on Aristotle's *Physics:* "ita cum dubitatur de aliquo an sit, oportet accipere pro medio quid significet nomen." [16]

In other words, St. Thomas holds that, prior to our knowledge of the *quod quid est* (which answers the question *quid sit?,* there occurs the prior intellectual act of knowing *an sit.* But, just as clearly, he holds that this latter act is itself preceded by an intellectual operation which grasps what the question is a.bout, i. e. which grasps the meaning of the name of the object about which the question of existence and essence is posed.

I suggest that this understanding of the sequence of cognitional events is precisely Lonergan's point. One obviously cannot ask *what* the essence of something is without a prior grasp that there is a something to ask about. But this latter affirmation is an intellectual operation which has grasped the unity-identity-whole presented in the data, an insight that understands that there is an ' it ' about which to ask the question "does it exist?" As Lonergan remarks in *Insight,"* If insight is needed to see how other tools are be used properly and effectively, insight is similarly needed to use a language properly and effectively." [17]

Accordingly, on Lonergan's view, the reflective insight that affirms existence is preceded by the direct insight that grasps the unity-identity-whole in data. But this does not exhaust man's dynamism to know. One seeks further understanding of what one knows to exist. However, Lonergan's point is that

a S. T., I. 2, 2 ad 2. *(cf.* Pegis, *op. cit.,* p. 21.)
[10] *Ibid.*
[1]•1v. x.
[17] *Insight,* p. 11.

such further understanding is not a new *type* 0£ cognitional operation. It involves rather a further *direct* insight. And the judgment that affirms or denies the adequacy of this understanding is likewise not a different type of operation from the act that affirms existence: both are *reflective* insights.

This I take to be the meaning of Lonergan'.s characterization of cognitional operations as both *recurrent* and their results *cumulative.* The operations are not once-for-all activities; they can be repeated indefinitely. And, precisely *because* they are recurrent, they can yield cumulative results, leading to progressively improving understanding and more secure affirmations. But, rather than posit a host of cognitional acts, Lonergan reduces the intellectual operations in coming to know to two: the acts of direct and reflective insight. These cannot be separated, although they are distinct. And while it is true that he speaks of them as occurring on different *levrels* 0£ consciousness, this is not to deny the possibility of moving from one operation to another in a recurrent fashion. Indeed, his analysis of the data of our cognitional experience affirms that, in fact, we can and must do so.

4. Conclusion

My intention in this brief essay has been to investigate the possibility of an alternative cognitional structure to that proposed by Lonergan. In particular, I have been concerned to determine to what extent St. Thomas might be thought to propose a different pattern. My conclusion is that any theory that hopes to avoid the charge of idealism must be either variant *5* as described earlier (i. e., the pattern experience-reflection-intelligence), or Lonergan's own structure. I have also attempted to argue that St. Thomas does not espouse variant *5,* and that, accordingly, he should not be interpreted as providing an alternative cognitional structure. Furthermore, I suggest that Lonergan's cognitional structure incorporates and explicates the insights that St. Thomas had into cognitional theory.

However, to have achieved this is not to have demonstrated that variant *5* is *not* a viable alternative to Lonergan's ordering of cognitional operations. But, from what has been argued in the course of this investigation, it is not difficult to discern the reasons which could be adduced against it.

Such a structuring of the pattern of intellectual acts would seem to imply one or both of the following positions: (1) that the data on the object whose existence is posited are given to sense in an already-grasped unity; and (2) that our knowledge of the object's existence is an 'intuition' of being, which is prior to our understanding of its essence. The first, it seems to me, is confounded by our experience of apprehending objects. If one grasped sensible data in an already-unified-totality, then one could not explain why one particular sense is unable to apprehend *all* the relevant sense data of the object. And once it is admitted that varied sense data must be unified *by the subject,* it must also be admitted that the act which accomplishes such unification is not itself a sense operation, but rather an intellectual one. For what is grasped is given *in* data, but is *not* itself a datum: and thus the activity which apprehends it cannot be simply a sense faculty.

This rebuttal of the first position itself lays the ground for criticizing the second, i. e., that the existence of the object in question is somehow intuited. Several objections to such a position may be raised. In the first place, intuition theories are themselves generally thought to be a variant of idealism. Secondly, in the words of G. E. Moore: "in every way in which it is possible to cognise a true proposition, it is also possible to cognise a false one," [18] a view which nicely focuses the problem of the ground of certainty regarding intuited knowledge. But, more importantly, to intuit the existence of an object presupposes a prior grasp of ' this object ' to which varied data of experience refer, as I have earlier tried to argue. And to 'intuit' the unity-identity-whole presented in data is not yet to affirm its existence, but only to grasp the intelligibility of

[18] *Principia Ethica.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965, p. x.

the data. Thus not only can an intuition theory as suggested not appeal (as I have earlier tried to suggest) to St. Thomas; I do not think it can appeal to our experience of sensation and cognition.

Finally, it might conceivably be held that Lonergan's structure is correctly ordered, but incomplete; i.e. that there might be operations which he has failed to consider. But Lonergan does not deny that the structure might be modified in detail or by increment of understanding. His point is that the relations between the operations he has identified cannot be revised. For, to demonstrate that some operation or set of operations has been neglected would be to appeal to further data, a grasp of the intelligibility in those data, and an affirmation of the intelligibility in those data, and an affirmation of the adequacy of the evidence warranting such a theory. And this would vindicate the pattern of operations which Lonergan has adopted.

I would suggest, then, that there seems to be no viable alternative to Lonergan's cognitional structure, and certainly none supposedly derived from the Angelic Doctor. But if this is indeed the case, then Lonergan's further claim-that such an invariant structure can provide a " fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further developments of understanding " [19]-deserves-indeed demands-closer and more careful attention.

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[19] *Insight,* p. xxviii.

THE DOCTRINE OF INFALLIBILITY AND THE DEMANDS OF EPISTEMOLOGY:

A REVIEW ARTICLE

I

ONE COULD WELCOME even in advance the effort of a well-established systematic theologian to address in both breadth and depth a topic of such historical, doctrinal, and ecumenical theological significance as the infallibility of the Church. And in fact Peter Chirico's *lnfaUibility: The Crossroads of Doctrine* [1] has many features to commend it. At once broader and more basic than Hans Kiing's *Infallible? An lnquiry*, [2] it makes explicit that ecclesial infallibility is fundamentally a quality of cognition rather than of expression, and, more specifically, that it is the absolute certitude at which the universal community of Christians can arrive in regard to matters of belief and practice. It illuminates how this certitude is a necessary presupposition of any Church teaching that is truly definitive, and how the topic of infallibility thus is, in a sense, " the crossroads of doctrine." It cogently argues that Roman Catholic emphasis on papal and conciliar infallibility, Orthodox stress on the need for ecclesial reception of purported infallible decrees, and Protestant insistence that only God is completely infallible are but complementary elements of an adequate doctrine of ecclesial infallibility. It insightfully recognizes that this adequate doctrine of specifically ecclesial infallibility presupposes an adequate doctrine of the infallibility of human knowledge in general and thus cannot be developed without explicit attention to the latter. It supplies a handy summary of what the First Vatican Council did and did not teach regarding ecclesial infal-

[1] Peter Chirico, S.S., *Infallibility: The Cross.roadsof Doctrine.* Mission, Kansas: Sheed Andrews and McMeel, 1977. xxi + 849 pp. hardback; *$6.95,* paper. Chirico, currently a theological consultant for the Archdiocese of Seattle and a professor at Seattle University, received his S. T. D. from the Gregorian University in 1960. He has published widely, in such journals *as Theological Studies, Chicago Studies,* and *The Journal of Ecumenical Studies.*

[2] Hans Kling, *Infallible? An Inquiry* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1971).

libility. And, overall, it is irenic in tone, orderly in structure, and economical in prose.

It remains, however, that the book exhibits a certain lack of sophistication regarding matters of basic epistemology,[3] notwithstanding the author's professed dependence upon the work of no less an epistemologically-sensitive thinker than Bernard Lonergan.[4] Nor is this lack a mere peripheral defect. On the contrary, it involves ambiguities and outright mistakes that, unfortunately enough, finally render the central categories of the book almost unintelligible and thus largely prevent it from achieving its goal of clarifying, integrating, and completing, within the context of a "natural doctrine of infallibility," the extant elements of an "ecclesial doctrine of infallibility." A summary of Chirico's general argument will set the stage for spelling out this contention.

II

Chirico propounds his case by treating in turn what he calls "universal meanings," " infallible understanding of such meanings," and "subsequent expression of those infallibly grasped meanings."

Universal Meanings. To begin with, the author specifies" experience" as "the actualization of any human potential. To have a discrete experience is to have actualized a combination of one's physical, psychological, intellectual, or volitional capacities within the context of definable circumstances " (p. 5). And an " experiential continuum" is "the totality of actualization undergone by an individual during his lifetime " (p. 5).

A "meaning," in turn, is "a condition of a human person by which his experiential continuum is differentiated in a unified way" (p. 134). It is " a quality of human experience in the world by which that experience is divided and subdivided, sectioned off as it were into underlying unities, removed from the condition of being a totally disconnected stream of consciousness " (p. 52). A meaning "potentially or actually may be consciously understood" (p. 52).

Finally, meanings are either "particular" or "universal"; universal meanings are either " natural " or " Christian "; and uni-

[3] By "epistemology" I mean, broadly, the philosophical or *a priori* study of the human subject's cognitional operations (and, by inclusion, those operations ' contents). This characterization will be amplified during the course of the present article.

[4] After providing a lengthy list of works on which he is depending, Chirico goes on to remark that " the work of Bernard Lonergan has had greater influence on these pages than that of any other writer" (pp. 297-98, n. 8; cf. pp. 298-817, for many additional references to Lonergan's works).

versal Christian meanings are either "first-order" or "second-order." "A particular" meaning is peculiar to a given individual or group, whereas a "universal" or "transcultural" meaning is "that kind of meaning which exists or can exist as a moment of legitimate and necessary development in every man of every age and culture" (p. 134). Universal meanings are "natural" if they are capable of being grasped even by those persons who are living merely at the "simple experiential level of existence," i.e., those "who are existentially unaware of being affected by the risen Christ" (p. 336). An example of a universal natural meaning is "that man is called to understand all creation" (p. 87). Universal meanings are "Christian," on the other hand, if they are capable of being grasped only by those persons who are living at the "experiential-witness level of existence," i. e., those "who recognize through the Christian tradition that they are affected by the risen Christ" (p. 332). Universal Christian or "dogmatic" meanings are "first-order" if they "*immediately* reflect aspects of concrete Church life" (p. 112), while they are "second-order" if they "thematize the process by which first-order meanings or doctrines emerge" (p. 126). The "basic" first-order dogmatic meaning is "the acceptance of the universal presence and activity of the risen Christ" (p. 125). "That Christ was and is true man" (p. 125) and "the Resurrection of the Body" (p. 126) are among the implications of this basic meaning; and "the notion of the development of doctrine" (p. 126) exemplifies a second-order dogmatic meaning.

Infallible Understanding. "Infallibility" in general, for Chirico, "is a quality of a subject" (p. 151). More precisely, it "is that subjective certitude which accompanies self-awareness" (p. 151). Still more precisely, it is that ultimate kind of certitude with which one is aware of oneself and of whatever else that self-awareness immediately implies. "Whatever is so associated with the identity and self-awareness of the subject that its denial means the denial of the subject is infallibly known by that subject" (p. 152).

Now, infallibility, characterized in this way, can qualify the two levels of cognition in "the ordinary limited and not fully aware" human subjects that at present we all are. First, at the preconceptual level one can be supremely certain regarding one's immediate grasp of the existence of self and of non-self: "there is a preconceptual infallibility possible to man, a certitude about his own existence and the existence of other reality that is the accompaniment of his self-awareness as a person" (p. 154). Second, one can achieve supreme certitude as well at the conceptual and judgmental level: here, in its more restricted (and more usual) sense, human infallibility is a feature of "judgments on self and the uni-

verse that are coextensive with one's self-affirmation" (p. 58). We are incapable of ever making such judgments in regard to either "concrete human experience" or "the objects of natural science" or "man's individual and social nature," however; for exhaustive data are never available to us in any of these cases, and thus the possibility of error is never completely excluded (pp. 58-61). There remains one and only one type of case in which exhaustive data may indeed be available to us:

> Having eliminated other possibilities, I would like to suggest that infallibility can exist only with regard to what I have called universal meanings. It is only these meanings that can be reflexively grasped and identified with certitude. . . . Such meanings are the sole recurring locus of infallibility possible to man in the present condition (p. 62).

Just as the range of universal meanings determines the scope of infallible (conceptual and judgmental) cognition, so the previously-mentioned division of that range into "natural" and "Christian" universal meanings has its parallel in a distinction between "natural" infallibility and infallibility "of the faithful." The latter, which the author identifies with what has traditionally been called "infallibility in believing" or "the *sensus fidelium,*" is "the faith agreement . . . that is constituted by the presence of *dogmatic* [= universal Christian] *meanings* in Christians" (p. 880). This agreement is "sometimes explicit but usually implicit" (p. 880). More exactly, these dogmatic or universal Christian meanings, "since they characterize the universality of Christians, exist at least implicitly in both the leaders and the ordinary members of the Church" (p. 209); whereas "the infallible understanding and proclamation of universal Christian meanings by the hierarchy makes explicit what previously may have been only implicit in the minds of most of the faithful" (p. 209). The Church's "explicit awareness of its possession of dogmatic meaning" may be termed "dogmatic understanding" (p. 881).

Subsequent Expression. As is no doubt apparent by now, "infallibility" for Chirico is fundamentally a feature of (interior) cognition rather than of (exterior) expression. "Basically, infallibility has to do with the mind's grasp with certitude of a universal meaning. The expression of such meanings in words, actions, or symbols is an interesting but secondary question" (p. 68). In fact, expressions even at best are by nature inadequate to the interior meanings they would express; for no concrete word, action, or symbol ever conveys its intended meaning even exactly, let alone permanently and in the eyes of all (pp. 270-75). Whether at the "simple experiential" level or at the "experiential-witness"

level, therefore, " there are no words on paper, stone, or tape that have universal validity as relevant expressions of lasting meanings. Such expressions are necessarily relative" (p. 275). And, specifically, at the " experiential-witness " level the " dogmatic statements " that would signify dogmatic meanings are culturally-conditioned approximations at best: "there are no verbal statements of the magisterium-even the verbalizations of an infallible pope or council-that, *as expressions,* have universal validity .... Moreover, even the Scriptures are subject to this relativity of expression " (p. 275). Again, "the same line of reasoning pertains to liturgical and moral expressions" (p. 2.75). Indeed, " Christianity will be saved from absolute relativism only when it explicitly and wholeheartedly recognizes that its stability does not rest on the shaking reed of concrete expressions but on the solid rock of universal meanings " (p. 276).

III

In this section, in order to facilitate my critique of Chirico's argument, I shall present as my own a brief series of fundamental epistemological claims. Though not wholly uncontroverted among epistemologists in general, these claims-albeit in various terminologies-are common at least in the "Catholic" philosophical tradition, and especially in one part of that tradition upon which Chirico himself expressly purports to draw, namely, the work of Bernard Lonergan. [5]

The starting point is one's field of awareness. Within that field there are, I suggest, a number of latent distinctions that careful reflexive analysis can make explicit.

The first and perhaps most obvious distinction is between that primitive awareness which commonly is called "sensing" and that complex awareness which commonly is called "knowing (in the full sense)." Knowing, in its basic instances, [6] is a dynamic com-

•See especially Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957). For slightly different versions of this general philosophical stance, sometimes called " transcendental Thomism " or-better--" transcendental realism " or " discursive realism," see Joseph Marechal, *Le Point de depart de la metaphysique,* V, 2• ed. (Bruxelles: L'Edition Universelle, 1949), and Emerich Coreth, *Metaphysik: Eine Methodisch-Systemiatische Grundlegung* (Innsbruck: Tyrolia, 1961). Coreth provides a useful brief overview of the stance, showing its historical roots, in " The Problem and Method of Metaphysics," *International Philos.ophical Quarterly,* 8 (1968), 408-18.

[6] The concern here is with knowing that is immediate, rather than with either (subsequent) inferential knowing or (subsequent) believing.

posite of " intentional acts," acts-of-awareness with contents distinct from the acts themselves. These acts stand on three levels, of which sensing is merely the first: one sees, hears, touches, etc. The second level is that of "understanding": one makes an intelligible unification of the contents of sensing. The third level is that of " judging " : one attributes actual existence to the intelligibly-unified contents of sensing.[7] In these cases, therefore, knowing is a composite of sensing, understanding, and judging, just as each thing known is a composite of sensed, understood, and judged.

Though sensing is intentional, however, not all primitive awareness is intentional; nor is the knowing which includes sensing the only kind of knowing. For sensing, understanding, and judging all are, as it were, "bipolar" acts-of-awareness. Each act that, at its one pole, is awareness of a content distinct from the act itself concomitantly, at its other pole, is awareness of a content that is identically the act itself. This primitive self-awareness [8] is not a distinct act. Rather, it is a distinct, non-intentional, aspect of each and every act of sensing, (direct) understanding, and (direct) judging, acts which in their other, intentional, aspect constitute knowing of objects (including other subjects). It is the non-reflexive self-presence of the knower as such, by virtue of which he is able to sense not automatically but attentively, understand not mechanically but intelligently, and judge not unwittingly but critically.[9] It remains only to be said that primitive self-awareness, thus characterized, is the first element of that composite which is knowing of the subject, self-knowledge. The second element is introspective understanding, making an intelligible unification of the acts of sensing, direct understanding, and direct judging; and the third element is introspective judging, the attribution of actual existence to that intelligible unity. And these acts of introspective

[7] This is the key point of difference between discursive realism and the " perceptual realist" position of thinkers such as Etienne Gilson and Joseph Owens. For the latter, judging is intuitive rather than discursive: it is the PERCEPTION of fundamentally *a posteriori* " actual existence " IN particular sets of intelligibly-unified data, rather than the ATTRIBUTION of fundamentally *a priori* "actual existence " TO particular sets of intelligibly-unified data. Compare Owens, " Grasp of Existence," in his *Interpretation of Existence* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1968), pp. 14-53, and Lonergan, *"Insight:* Preface to a Discussion," in his *Collection: Papers by Bernard Lonergan* (New York: Herder & Herder, 1967), pp. 152-63.

[8] Lonergan terms primitive self-awareness " consciousness."

[0] To be sure, primitiv.e self-awareness characterizes acts not merely of the knower but also of the decider. This latter range of activity, however, stands beyond the scope of the present

understanding and judging, of course, involve primitive self-awareness in their own turn.

Next, besides knowing a thing (whether object or subject) as an individual unity, one may also come to know it as specifically similar to other things (and dissimilar to still others) insofar as he verifies specific properties in the individual instance. Now, specific properties are verified, on the level of judging, as " concrete "-i. e., in the" material" conditions by virtue of which they specify things here or there and now or then. Prior to being verified, however, specific properties are formulated or conceived, on the level of understanding, as " abstract "-i. e., apart from their " material" conditions and thus as not tied to any particular place or time. Moreover, they may be conceived in either " descriptive" or " explanatory " fashion. In the first case, one conceives them precisely from his own viewpoint, as properties of things taken expressly *quoad me,* of things as related to himself as knowing subject and ultimately to himself as sensing or primitively self-aware subject (e. g., " red " as " such-and-such content of sensing " or " dog " as "warm/noisy /smelly /etc."). In the second case, however, one conceives the specific properties from the viewpoint of the universe, as properties of things taken expressly *quoad se,* of things as related to ·one another within the framework of some general theory (e. g., "red" as "light wavelength of 6500 angstroms" or "dog" as " *canis familiaris* ") .[10]

Finally, the most fundamental distinction of all those which I am here treating is that between things (whether objects or subject) as *"a priori"* and as "empirical." Things as *a priori* are things merely as intended, i. e., as taken in terms of their components merely in outline, their components merely as implied by the immanent operative structure of the knower and as prefigured by that structure even in advance of actual knowledge.[11] (Illustrations are provided by the present account: e.g., whatever else may be said about object and subject, in the basic instances [12] any object known will invariably be a composite of sensed, understood, and judged, and the subject as knowing-an-object will invariably be a composite of sensing, understanding, and judging.) Things as empirical, on

[10] Since the knowing subject is a thing, the relations of things to one another implicitly include the relations of things to the knowing subject; and thus an explanatory conception of a property implicitly includes the descriptive conception of the property.

[11] In terms that may be more familiar to some, *a priori* description is "phenomenology " ; *a priori* explanation, "metaphysics."

[12] See above, n. 6.

the other hand, are things as known, i. e., as taken in terms of their components in detail, their components in that fullness which is ascertainable only through actual knowledge.

An important terminological *caveat* must be added concerning the " abstract " contents of conceiving and the " *a priori* " contents of intending. Abstract contents and *a priori* contents both are sometimes labelled " universal " or, again, " general " ; but the label then has two very different senses. For abstract contents are PRECISIVEL Y " universal." They arise through prescinding from the " material " components of the thing; they presuppose at least some progress of the actual cognitional process; and they express only the intelligible components of the thing. *A priori* contents, by contrast, are HEURISTICALLY "universal." They arise through anticipating the components of the thing; they antecede actual knowing, as question antecedes answer; and collectively they prefigure the thing in the totality of its components, intelligible and "material" as well. If the ambiguity of "universal " or "general" leads one to blur the distinction between " abstract " and " *a priori,"* more extensive confusions are almost certain to follow.

IV

On the plane of its underlying epistemology, and thus well prior to its characteristically theological plane, Chirico's contribution to the discussion of ecclesial infallibility is, I suggest, severely defective. The defects are of two main kinds. First, there are ambiguities, where the position that the author maintains on some crucial epistemological issue is unclear, either because he expresses no position at all or because he appears to be maintaining contradictory positions. The latter problem is bound up with, though not wholly explained by, a disturbing looseness in the meanings attributed to certain key terms. Second, there are mistakes, where the position that the author maintains-whether wittingly or unwittingly-on some crucial epistemological issue is actually at odds with that general philosophical stance by which, on his own allegation, he is greatly influenced and which I have here adopted as correct.[13]

[18] See above, nn. 4 and 5. Although my criticisms of Chirico's book ultimately are framed from the standpoint of what I have called the "discursive realist" philosophical position, especially as articulated by Lonergan, their thrust is not simply or even primarily that the book departs in fact from THAT global position (which it does) but, more basically, that it shows insufficient awareness of the very philosophical issues themselves, and that it thus does not espouse ANY global philosophical position with the clarity, consistency, and completeness which

To illustrate this contention, and employing the distinctions and the terminology set forth in the preceding section, I shall point out what I believe to be seven major defects-three ambiguities and four mistakes-in the epistemological underpinnings of Chirico's two central categories, " universal meanings " and " infallible understanding."

Ambiguities. First, in the line of awareness of objects, where does the distinction between Chirico's "experience" and his "understanding" fall? Specifically, is "experience" in this line simply sensing, so that " understanding" includes direct understanding (and, perhaps, judging)? Or is "experience" not only sensing but also direct understanding-and, perhaps, direct judging as well-so that " understanding " begins only with the reflection proper to direct judging-or, perhaps even more narrowly, the further reflection proper to introspective judging? [14] (The oft-repeated formula, "Understanding is a heightening of experience," provides no help here, for Chirico never explains whether " heightening" is characteristically reflexive or not.) In fact, the author is not very clear on this matter. If one bears in mind the usual correlation of "implicit" with " unreflexive " and " explicit " with " reflexive " (e. g., pp. *52,* 118, 132, 2rn), the first of the following not unrepresentative assertions seems to imply that " understanding " is not necessarily reflexive; the second, that it is.

> When the mind grasps and understands-. . . even without its becoming reflexively aware of its understanding-it sums up and expresses that understanding in some kind of concept (p. 116).

achievement of its stated goals would require. In many respects, therefore, my criticisms will be shared even by those whose own philosophical sympathies lie elsewhere than with discursive realism.

" The difficulty of relating and distinguishing the scopes of Chirico's terms " experience " and " understanding " is further complicated by the ambiguous scope of his term " reflection." For Lonergan, the act of direct judging is, of itself, fully reflexive; and the act of introspective judging constitutes a higher level of full reflection. For discursive realists in the line of Marechal, on the other hand, the act of direct judging is not, of itself, fully reflexive: direct judging is fully reflected only by virtue of subsequent, introspective, judging; and the latter thus constitutes the original level of full reflection. (Compare, e. g., Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding,* pp. 274-847, and Marechal, *Le Point de depart de la metaphysique,* V, ed., 110-SO, 454-61.) Chirico does not appear to be aware of this important difference within the discursive realist tradition; and thus his reader is left to reconcile (I) a tendency in general to profess adherence to the positions of Lonergan and (2) language which more often than not suggests the Marechalian position on this particular point.

To understand is to grasp the unities implicit in experience.... A grasp of the unity in ex'])erience ... can exist only in a single person who is the subject of the appropriate experiences and who sees explicitly in them that which unifies them. . . . The actual grasp of the unity in the data that constitutes the explicit act of understanding can occur only in a single person because understanding is grounded only in personal experience (p. 250).

Secondly, in the line of self-awareness, what is the scope of Chirico's " consciousness" ? Specifically, is" consciousness" limited to the " explicit," " reflexive " realm or does it extend as well to the " implicit," "unreflexive" realm, the realm of primitive self-awareness? (To the extent that Chirico maintains the second position on the preceding issue, the present question becomes this: Is "consciousness" limited to the realm of "understanding," or does it extend as well to the realm of " experience " ?) Again the author is inconsistent. He usually speaks in the more limited fashion of the first position (e.g., pp. 12, 118, 234); but he also sometimes speaks in the more expansive fashion of the second position (e. g., pp. 6, 151, 249).[15]

Thirdly, is the intellectual component of knowing limited to understanding, or does it also include judging? Once more Chirico's stance is not without ambiguity. For the most part, he employs the term " understanding " even when one might expect to read either the more comprehensive terms " knowing " or " knowledge" or the term " judgment " or one of its synonyms. " In that man understands, he outstrips the rest of visible creation" (p. 317, n. 3). Newman draws a distinction between real and notional" understanding" (pp. 115-16).[16] And a key element in an adequate doctrine of infallibility is an adequate doctrine of " infallible understanding" *(passim).* On the other hand, in two important sections (pp. 115-17, 154-63) Chirico contrasts "understanding" as" grasping a unity in data " with " judging" as " verifying the validity of that grasp."

Mistakes. Now, the characterizations of "understanding" and " judging " that Chirico does offer both suffer from the " perceptualist " mistake, the mistake which in general consists of accepting as valid the " common sense " assumption that all forms of aware-

[15] The problem of determining with precision the extension of Chirico's " consciousness," like that regarding his "experience " and " understanding," is further complicated by the ambiguous exte11Sion of his "reflection." (Cf. above, n. 14.)

[16] In fact, however, Newman's distinction regards not kinds of "understanding" but kinds of "assent." See *A Grammar of Assent,* chs. 1-4.

ness are at least analogous to sensing (or, still more narrowly, seeing). For while he avoids the crude perceptualism that simply identifies knowing with sensing, he nevertheless tends to conceive knowing as such-indeed, even the "limit case" of divine knowing-on the perceptual model.

> The more a being can immediately perceive reality, the less it has need of theories. God does not theorize; he simply immediately 'knows' (p. 317,n.3).
>
> By immediate and direct vision, he [i.e., an infinite subject] would know in a single glance all that could be known (p. 151).

More precisely, while he does not portray human understanding as necessarily easy, neither does he portray it as distinctively "intelligent," the shrewd, progressive, and sometimes slow and difficult elaboration of intelligible forms; rather, it is fundamentally a matter just of observing unities in data.

> [Infallible understanding] can exist only in a single person who is the subject of the appropriate experiences and who sees explicitly in them that which unifies them (p. 250).
>
> To understand is to have the requisite data in one's possession and to have noted the unities therein (p. 250).

Nor does the author present human judging as distinctively "critical," the sagacious, skillful, and sometimes merely probable attribution of actual existence, with extensive reflection required on occasion. For, in the first place, one's grasp of actual existence is not only pre-judgmental but even pre-conceptual, and judging is a matter not of grasping existence but of verifying one's grasp of unities in data (pp. 151-54). And, in the second place, judging, like the understanding which it would verify, ultimately is nothing other than perceiving: certitude follows immediately from possessing and attending to all the data pertinent to a given issue, and error is but the consequence of insufficient possession or attention.

> Should all pertinent data be furnished, then man would be infallible (p. 61). When a person is fully aware of all the data brought to his cognizance, then he can make infallible judgments as to such data (p. 159).
>
> [The totally aware but limited individual-whose classic model is the earthly Christ] can err . . . not only because he has not been exposed to all the data in the external world that bear upon the matter, but also because the data embedded in his own person are not fully retrievable (p. 160).

The remaining mistakes to be recounted here all reflect the perceptualist tendency to neglect those distinctions whose recognition

requires not supposed self-perception but intelligent and critical self-knowledge.

Secondly, then, in characterizing "universal meanings," Chirico fails to distinguish adequately between the standpoint of description and the standpoint of explanation, between accounts of things *quoad me* and accounts of things *quoad se.* Instead, he indiscriminately mixes such descriptive terms as "experiential continuum" and "differentiation of consciousness," which possess a built-in reference to the self-aware subject, with such explanatory terms as "potency" and "act," which possess no built-in reference to the subject but rather express things merely as related to one another.[17]

> A meaning is a unified differentiation of the experiential continuum that potentially or actually may be consciously understood (p. 52).
>
> When we speak of universal meanings, we refer to *potential* human developments that would be realizable by all men if their root capacities and exigencies were fully developed. . . . The assertion of universal meanings merely implies that there are some differentiations of consciousness that would constitute a possible and ultimately necessary aspect of the full development of the potentiality of all men (p. 54).
>
> [The pope] must achieve a condition of being in which the universal Christian meanings become so actualized in him that he can proclaim them infallibly to all. This is an ontic condition of existence . . . (p. 232; cf. pp. 62, 87, 134, 213, 226, 250, 331, 333).

Thirdly, in characterizing "universal meanings," the author also fails to distinguish adequately between abstract contents and *a priori* contents. On the contrary, abetted by the ambiguity of "universal" which I noted earlier, he partially identifies them with one another. For, in the first place, his "universal meanings," all "transcultural," are prefigured by the immanent operative structure of the human subject; and thus in this respect they are what I have called *"a priori."*

> In that they [i.e., universal meanings] are *universal,* they are present in every instance of human knowing; they represent the invariant features of every process of human development, including the knowing process; they refer to the relationships and processes which do not change . . . (p. 62).
>
> It is only when one reduces the meaning behind each [concept peculiar to a given age] to its equivalent place in the human dynamic structure that

[17] If we focus on the *a prioTi* aspect of the matter, we may express the difficulty by saying that Chirico mixes his phenomenology-including, in traditional Scholastic terminology, his logic---·andhis metaphysics. (Cf. above, n. 11.)

one can convey the kind of meaning which can be universal . . (p. 88; cf. pp. 64, 97, 190, 204-5, 228, 388).

And, in the second place, although not all " abstract meanings " are universal (p. 55), all " universal meanings" are abstract.

Such universal meanings would obviously be abstract. . . (p. 54).

Universality ... does not pertain to the concrete (p. 187; cf. pp. 54-55, 163, 177, 190, 275, 292).

Fourthly, in characterizing "dogmatic meanings," the author makes what is perhaps his most egregious conflation of all. " Dogmatic meanings," the reader will recall, constitute the "Christian" subset of "universal meanings." Now, something that Chirico calls " presuppositional universality " is what " can and must ground dogmatic meanings for all time" (p. UH). And "presuppositional universality," in turn,

... rests solely upon the basis of what must be present when any person accepts the Christian faith. These necessary presuppositions are, first of all, the presupposition in faith of the all-pervading presence and activity of the risen Christ. This presupposition cannot be proved or disproved by empirical means; it is, however, that which must be accepted from the witness of the past as the distinguishing badge of the Christian tradition. The second necessary presupposition is the presupposition of reason. This presupposition involves all that is contained in the generic processes by which the human person through experience, understanding, judgment, decision, and implementation develops from simplicity and undifferentiation to complexity and differentiation " (p. 130).

To postulate that the meanings which unify presuppositional universality are not in themselves universal is to postulate the disappearance of the risen Christ or of the human subject as we now know him. It is to postulate a Christless Christianity or an imaginary subject of the future who will transcend the processes of historical man up till now (p. UH; cf. pp. 129-36, 332-35).

For Chirico to make " presupposition of faith " parallel to " presupposition of reason " in this fashion, however, is quite incorrect. For an assertion such as " The human person experiences, understands, and judges" expresses something of the human subject's immanent operative structure, the structure that inevitably is in play in every human act. That is to say, it expresses what I have called an " *a priori* " content. An assertion such as " Jesus is Lord," on the other hand, expresses something not of the human subject's immanent operative structure but rather of a cognitional fulfillment-a very basic and important one indeed-which the human subject employing that structure has realized. That is to say, it

expresses what I have called an "empirical" [18] content.[19] The author's confusion here of the empirical order with the *a priori* order is, in effect, a confusion of knowing with intending, answer with question, fulfillment with anticipation.[20]

Now, as the reader has undoubtedly discerned, epistemological defects such as these seven pervasively affect Chirico's very notion of " meanings " and of their distinction into " particular" and " universal," " natural " and " Christian," his notion of human knowing in general, and his notions of "natural infallibility" and "infallibility of the faithful" in particular. Such defects, consequently, tend to make the author's "universal meanings" and "infallible understanding" implausible and ultimately even unintelligible. And in so doing they inevitably bring into question the whole range of more specific claims about ecclesial infallibility in which he employs those basic categories. For although his claims about the object, source, goal, bearers, and expression of ecclesial infallibility are consistent as far as they go, the ambiguities and errors underlying the basic categories frequently not only leave those claims' truth uncertain but even leave their precise meaning unclear.[21] Thus, for example, even after carefully studying Chirico's book one

[18] It is, to be sure, " empirical " in a sense broader than that of the term as Chirico nses it.

[19] The same point may be made negatively: one cannot assert, " The human person docs not experience, understand, and judge," without experiencing, understanding, and judging, and thus without performatively accepting what one verbally rejects; whereas there is no comparable contradiction in asserting, " Jesus is not Lord." The contradiction which the Christian believer sees in the latter case is not, as in the former, an inconsistency immediately between the content of the assertion and the asserting PERFORMANCE itself but rather between the content of the assertion and the believer's own (empirical) CONCLUSION-precisely in consequence of his assertion that Jesus IS Lord-about such an asserting performance. I.e., it immediately is a content-content contradiction, not a content-performance contradiction.

[20] Lonergan argues that the affirmations of the religious believer as such differ from ordinary (or "empirical," in Chirico's sense of the term) affirmations not because the former express *a priori* contents, for they do not, but because they characteristically follow from an apprehension-of-value that itself is nothing other than the cognitive aspect of religious love, a love which the theologian views as a supernatural gift. (Lonergan distinguishes the religious affirmations, on the one hand, and the underlying apprehension-of-value, on the other, as " beliefs " and "faith.") See *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder & Herder, 1972), pp. 115-24.

[21] Predictably enough this is true not only of the author's strictly systematic claims but, *mutatis mutandis*, of his historical claims as well.

still does not know quite what to make of such assertions as the following:

> The universal natural meaning that man is called to understand all creation is not destroyed when a new object enters creation, even if that object be the humanity of the Son of God. However, that subjective meaning would be transformed and fulfilled if the new object were so all-influencing that it touched the subject at every aspect of his existence. In this case, the universal subjective meanings would possess a further universality that derives from the all-encompassing influence of the new object (p. 87).

> One attains infallible understanding only when one achieves a certain universality of being that allows one to grasp the truly universal ecclesial meanings (p. 264).

> That which is particular to each man can be grasped only with more or less probability. Only that aspect of Christ's risen humanity which is universally graspable can be understood with any certainty by men; and it is this universal aspect that can be expressed in dogmatic statements (p. 192).

V

Just as the issues presented by, say, theoretical physics often cannot be addressed except in crude or even erroneous fashion unless one uses mathematical techniques, so the issues presented by systematic theology frequently cannot be done justice apart from the employment of epistemological principles. This is not to say that a systematic theologian must first be a full-fledged epistemologist, any more than it is to say that a theoretical physicist must first be a full-fledged mathematician. What it does point up, however, is that any work in systematic theology is unlikely to be of enduring value unless its author both clearly recognizes the inherent epistemological demands of his particular theological topic and successfully meets those demands, whether by relying entirely upon his own resources or, if necessary, through the assistance of others.[22]

Now, Chirico is to be lauded, in my view, for plainly drawing attention to the fact that the topic of ecclesial infallibility does indeed have inherent epistemological demands, and for beginning to meet those demands by showing that ecclesial infallibility must

[22] Adequate treatment of given theological issues may of course require competencies in many other disciplines besides epistemology---e.g., historiography, linguistics, psychology. Nonetheless, it remains that epistemology, as the discipline which regards the human subject's cognitional operations (and, by inclusion, those operations' contents) in their *a priori* aspects, is in general indispensable to theology in *a priori* and not merely empirical fashion-and, indeed, to those other (empirical) disciplines as well.

ultimately be seen as a special quality of cognitional acts, and thus that an adequate theory of the former presupposes an adequate theory of the latter. From that point onward, however, his efforts are less successful.

For, although present-day theology does not as yet actually possess a satisfactory theory of ecclesial infallibility, present-day epistemology actually does possess elements that undoubtedly are necessary (though not, of course, sufficient) for the development of such a theory-including recognition of distinctions between sensing and knowing and between primitive self-awareness and self-knowing, cognizance of the distinctions and relations among what I have labelled "abstract," "concrete," "descriptive," "explanatory," *"a priori,"* and "empirical" contents of awareness, and precision in the meanings given to such words as " experience," " understanding," and " consciousness." But unfortunately Chirico does not adequately appreciate these elements. He misunderstands some and neglects others, and consequently the greater part of his attempt to make a substantive theological contribution on the present topic is seriously undermined. His book, precisely because of the character and extent of its defects, constitutes a forceful reminder to theologians working on the doctrine of infallibility-and, indeed, to theologians in general-that they minimize detailed attention to epistemology only at their peril.

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JOHN HICK'S LIVES AFTER LIFE

JOHN HICK HAS written extensively on the philosophy of religion. In fact, he has, with the appearance of his book on survival of death,[1] elaborated a rather complete philosophical theology. We find in Hick's writings his argument for believing in God,[2] his concept of religious faith,[3] his proposed solution to the problem of evil,[4] his answer to critics of religious language,[5] and his account of and arguments for life after death. An examination of Hick's works reveals that his concept of after-life is central to his entire view. In this paper I shall indicate how after-life is central for Hick and analyze his description of and arguments for it. I shall also discuss some of the major criticisms of Hick's after-life view and consider how Hick has replied or could reply to these. I shall conclude by offering my own assessment of Hick's view.

I

With regard to the rationality of theistic belief, Hick contends that the arguments for God's existence do not prove

[1] *Death and Eternal Life* (New York: Harper and Row, 1976). Further references to this volume will be within the text and denoted by *DEL*.
Editor's Note: Cf. the review by Bruce Reichenbach of this volume that immediately follows in the Book Review Section.

[2] See esp. *Arguments for the Existence of God* (New York: Seabury, 1971), pp. 101-l!W. Further references to this volume will be within the text and denoted by *AEG*.

[3] *Faith and Knowledge* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957; second edition, 1960), esp. pp. 95-268.

[4] See esp. *Evil and the God of Love* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 279-400.

[5] See esp. "Theology and Verification," *Theology Today,* 17 (April, 1960), pp. l!'!-81, reprinted in *The Logic of God: Theology and Verification,* eds. Malcolm L. Diamond and Thomas V. Litzenburg, Jr. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1975), pp. 188-208. References are to this reprint.

God's existence but show it to be possible *(AEG,* p. xiii). He then goes on to state that any Christian understanding of human existence requires a belief in after-life.[6] For God to create us and then let us be eternally obliterated is inconsistent with Judeo-Christian theism. So, for Hick, a belief in after-life is necessary from the very outset.

We find that a belief in after-life is also central to Hick's attempt to deal with the problem of evil. Stated very briefly, Hick's move here is to say that God's purpose in creating the world was to produce free, moral beings who could, ultimately, commune with God and with one another. Since this purpose requires human free will, moral evil is accounted for. Since it also requires a natural order with natural laws (free beings cannot develop morally in a paradise), natural evil is accounted for. Further, since God's purpose is rarely fulfilled in this present world there must be a series of incarnations (see esp. *DEL,* pp. 414-422) for each person freely to realize his potential, and, ultimately, there must be a state of complete fulfillment *(DEL,* ch. 22). Hence, a doctrine (and defense) of after-life is needed.

Also, Hick's response to the verificationist challenge is in terms of what he calls "eschatological verification." Religious beliefs will be verified after death. Again, an after-life doctrine is needed.

II

In this section I shall give an account of Hick's doctrine of a£ter-life and his argument for the plausibility of this doctrine. Hick contends that it is logically possible for there to be a number of worlds, each in its own space, and all observed by God, but only one being observed by the embodied beings which inhabit these worlds. To explicate his position Hick presents

[6] *DEL,* p. 11. See also "Eschatological Verification Reconsidered," *Religious Studies,* 18 (June, 1977), p. !WI: "Hence I can only say that a Christian understanding of the universe includes a belief in life-after-death as an indispensable component, and if that belief could be proven to be false Christian theism (though not every kind of theism) would thereby be falsified."

cases which he claims to be logically possible of fulfillment.[1]

(1) "We begin with the idea of someone suddenly ceasing to exist at a certain place in this world and the next instant coming into existence at another place which is not contiguous with the first" *(DEL,* p. 280). A man listening to a lecture in London disappears and reappears at a similar conference in New York. The only difference is that he now finds himself in a different conference. We would, says Hick, think this was the same man.

(2) In the second imaginary case the man does not disappear in London but dies in London. When he does ". . . a ' replica ' of him as he was at the moment before his death, and complete with memory up to that instant, comes into existence in New York" *(DEL,* p. 284). Again, says Hick, we would think this was the same man.

(3) The third case" ... is one in which Mr. X dies and his 'replica,' complete with memory, etc., appears not in America, but as a resurrection ' replica ' in a different world altogether, a resurrection world inhabited by resurrected ' replicas world occupying its own space distinct from the space with which we are familiar" *(DEL,* p. 285) . Again, says Hick, we would consider this the same man.

It is important to note here that when Hick speaks of a ' replica ' he always puts the term in quotes. This is to denote that the term is being used in a special way. This is a special usage in which "... it is not logically possible for the original and the ' replica ' to exist simultaneously or for there to be more than one' replica' of the same original" *(DEL,* p. 283).

In order to defend his concept of after-life, Hick must argue against both metaphysical materialism (mind-brain identity theory) and against the bodily continuity hypothesis (the claim that a necessary condition for B at t2 to be the same person as A at t1 is that A and B have the same body).

Hick's argument against mind-brain identity *(DEL,* pp. 112-

[1] These are given by Hick in several places, most :notably in *DEL,* pp. 280-285 and "Theology and Verification," pp.

U6) is that all evidence for it is only mind-brain correlation, i.e., we find that for every mental event there is a corresponding brain event,[8] and, *prima facie*, thoughts and chemicals are clearly *not* identical. Further, epiphenomenalism is rejected *(DEL,* pp. 116-121) because it entails determinism, and the latter is self-refuting. Here Hick appeals to the standard free willist argument that knowledge entails free will, for if determinism were true, knowing, like coughing or burping, would be just a determined event in the universe, neither true nor false, simply an occurrence. Hence, when the determinist claims that determinism is true he refutes himself.[9] Hick offers no argument against idealism, and, indeed, doesn't need to, as that view is compatible with Hick's after-life doctrine *(DEL,* pp. *265-*270). He chooses, however, dualistic interactionism because he thinks it is more in line with our basic instincts.

Against the bodily continuity theory Hick mentions Locke's example of the prince and cobbler changing bodies *(DEL,* p. 288). He also points out Norbert Wiener's claim that individuality does not depend upon numerical identity of the physical constituents of the body ". . . but upon the pattern

[8] Cf. the excellent article by Richard Schlegel, "The Mind-Brain Identity Impasse," *American Philosophical Quarterly,* 14 (July, 1977), pp. 231-238. Schlegel makes essentially the same point as Hick and also quotes a number of neurophysiologists (A. G. Karczmar, W. Russell Brain, Wilbur Penfield) who reject mind-brain identity for just this reason.

[9] " I believe that total determinism does in fact suffer from the crippling circumstance that any argument (whether offered as probative or as probable) for the conclusion that it is rational to believe the total determinist thesis must be logically suicidal, or self-refuting.

The nerve of this claim is that the concept of rational belief presupposes intellectual freedom; so that a mind whose history is determined cannot be said rationally to believe anything or therefore rationally to believe that total determinism is true. Thus any attempt rationally to establish total determinism involves the contradiction that in arguing for it the mind must presume itself not to be completely determined, but to be freely judging, recognizing logical relations, assessing relevance and considering reasons; whereas if the determinist conclusion is true the mind is, and always has been, completely determined and has never been freely judging, etc. Thus if the mind has the intellectual freedom to come to rational conclusions, it cannot rationally conclude that it is not free rationally to conclude " *(DEL,* p. 117).

or' code' which is exemplified" *(DEL,* p. 288). So, says Hick, a genuine ' replica ' can be considered the *same* man as the original.

How will the resurrection world 'replica' of Mr. X (RWX) know he is the same person as Mr. X of this present world (TPWX) ? Because RWX will remember having been TPWX. Also, he will be recognized by other persons in RW on the basis of his having similar personality traits and a similar body (or bodily appearance) .[10]

What would be the nature of RW? It could, says Hick, be like TPW, the only exception being that it is populated solely by people who have died in TPW.[11] In Chapter 14 of *Death and Eternal Life* Hick discusses the article in which H. H. Price uses Berkeley's view of present existence to explicate an after-life existence.[12] Price suggests that the after-life existence *could* be the product of one's *own* mind (rather than God's), or of the integrated total of the desires of many departed souls. Hick disagrees with this subjectivism on the theological ground that, if God's purpose in creating the world is a human-development process, then man needs a stable environment *not* plastic to our human wishes but with its own character and laws. Hick does suggest that Berkeley's view (with God creating the appearance of a physical world) could as easily be true for this *present* life (Price thinks not but

'" " Resurrected persons would be individually no more in doubt about their own identity than we are now, and would presumably be able to identify one another in the same kinds of ways and with a like degree of assurances as we do now " *(DEL,* p. 285) .

11 " --- it will be a real spatio-temporal environment, functioning in accordance 'IYith its own laws, within which there will be real personal life-a world with its own concrete character, its O'A'-U history, its own absorbing and urgent concerns, its own crises, perils, achievements, sacrifices, and its own terminus giving shape and meaning to existence within it. For moral and spiritual growth, as we know it, depends upon interaction with other people within a common environment" *(DEL,* p. 418).

12 "Survival and the Idea of 'Another World,'" *Proceedings of tke Society for PS"Jchical Research,* vol. *50,* part 182 (1953), reprinted in *Classical and Contemporary Readings in the Philosophy of Religion,* ed. John Hick, second-edition (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1970).

doesn't say why!) as for after-life. Or, a physical environment could be provided by God for either or both lives. Hick doesn't see that it makes any difference. The important point to realize, says Hick, is that a disembodied existence is not really disembodied. The mind must supply its own physical body and world (or God must) and experience it/ them *as* physically real.

In *Death and Eternal Life* Hick has made it clear (to my knowledge for the first time) that the resurrection world he has discussed thus far is really only a pareschatological state.

> When we listen to what great religious traditions say about man's future beyond the grave it becomes important to distinguish between eschatologies, or "pictures" of the ultimate state (which may well transcend individual existence as we now know it), and pareschatologies or " pictures " of what happens between death and that ultimate state *(DEL,* p. 12).

In fact, Hick believes there will be a series of resurrection worlds in which each individual lives and dies until such time as that individual has fulfilled the *imago dei* which is within him.

> We cannot know how many such worlds or series of worlds there are; and indeed the number and nature of the individual's successive embodiments will presumably depend upon what is needed for him to reach the point at which he transcends egohood and attains the ultimate unitive state ... *(DEL,* p. 419).

This must be so, says Hick, because God cannot force a person to come to him, but neither can God's plan ultimately fail. The circumstances under which a person is born in TPW (or, presumably, in any RW) are not necessarily as conducive to one's realizing his *imago dei* as are other circumstances. And it would be grossly unfair (and, thus, inconsistent with the nature of the Judeo-Christian God) for God to allow one's final state to be decided under such unequal conditions. To say that all men, regardless of the environment they find themselves in, are equally responsible for their eternal future is a paradox which " ... offends both the soul and the reason " *(DEL,* p. 370).

Thus, Hick argues that there will be a series of resurrection worlds available to each person, and that series will be just as long as that person needs it to be. The ultimate state, the final eschatological resurrection world, will be quite different from the pareschatological resurrection worlds, and that final state will be discussed later in this essay.

III

We now have before us a sketch of John Hick's view of after-life. This section will consist of an account of some of the main criticisms levelled at Hick's after-life doctrine and of how Hick has replied or could reply to them.

The objection of multiple replicas has been set forth by several critics, especially J. J. Clarke.[13] It is possible, says Clarke, for God to reconstitute two (or more) John Hicks in RW. H2 and H3 would have identical memory, character, and intellectual characteristics. Their bodies or bodily appearances would also be identical. Both H2 and H3 are identical with Hl (the original Hick in TPW). But if H2 and H3 occupy different places at the same time they cannot be the same person, for their experiences and mental lives would soon diverge. A choice is left then, says Clarke: one may (1) continue to maintain that Hick can be reconstituted while admitting an indefinite number of Hicks are possible or (2) deny it is logically possible for even one Hick to be resurrected. Clarke thinks (2) is much more rational than (I).

Hick has replied to this charge in at least two places.[14] Hick says that what Clarke describes *is* possible, and if it happened we should not know who the real John Hick was (nor would he!). However, Hick continues, the fact that multiple replication is possible if single replication is possible does not entail that multiple replication must indeed occur. In fact, the Judeo-Christian God would see that it did not. Hick points out that

[13] "John Hick's Resurrection," *Sophia*, 10 (October, 1971), pp. 18-22.

[14] "Mr. Clarke's Resurrection Also," *Sophia*, 11 (October, 1972), pp. 1-8; *DEL*, pp. 290-291.

we must conceive of RWX as being a' replica' of TPWX at the last moment of conscious personal life, otherwise he would not have all his memories. In RW it would he "... subjected to a process of healing and repair which brings it into a state of health and activity" *(DEL,* p. 294). It is conceivable, he says, that we shall have bodies reflecting our inner, natures; not 'replicas' of our present bodies.

Another major criticism has been offered by Alan Olding.[15] Olding suggests that since RW is not spatially connected to TPW (e.g., it is not on some other planet in our universe), it is not possible for the two to be temporally related either. But if this is so it makes no sense to say that RWX appears at the same time as TPWX dies. Nor could RWX recall being on his death-bed, because that is not a past event but an event that occurs in another world.

Hick has replied *(DEL,* pp. 289-290) that Olding really only shows that a synchronization of clocks in RW and TPW would be impossible, not that there could not be a singular time. God would know it was the same time. Further, RWX remembers dying, so for *him* it *is* a past event.

It seems to me that Hick has answered both of these critics quite adequately. It is clear that Clarke is correct in saying that if God had the power to replicate X once he could replicate X as many times as he pleased. But Hick is correct in denying that this refutes his notion of after-life, for that God *can* do something does not mean he will. Further, it would not even be possible for God to do this and remain consistent with what Hick contends is God's ultimate plan. Hick has also successfully replied to Olding, for Olding is assuming an Einsteinian space / time correlation which itself assumes a human observer to make the correlation. Hick needs only God to know the times are the same. And RWX *remembers* dying in TPW. What difference need it make that he cannot check to see whether his memory is correct? There are many events in my present life

[15] "Resurrection Bodies and Resurrection World," *Mind,* 79 (October, 1970), pp. 581-585.

which I cannot check on, but I remember them. My memory can be correct, regardless of the spatial relationship of my present location and my location when I participated in those past events. Indeed, on a Berkeleyian world-view there is no physical world anyway, yet temporal relationships still hold.

In a recent article [16] Robert Audi has argued that RWX just cannot be the same person as TPWX. This ' replica ' is only a duplicate, says Audi; it is not numerically identical with the original. Further, says Audi, Hick is not at all clear about how TPWX gets to RW. The two worlds are not spatially related, so how is travel between them possible? And if X just ceases to exist in TPW and then appears in RW at a later time, how can X maintain his identity through the time gap?

Hick, I believe, can answer Audi quite handily. We must recall that Hick speaks not of replicas but of ' replicas.' He uses the quotes to indicate a special usage in which ". . . it is not logically possible for the original and the ' replica ' to exist simultaneously or for there to be more than one ' replica ' of the same original" (DEL, p. 283). Hick's view is that we should have to expand our concept of" same person" to include the ' replica.' If Audi would define " duplicate " as Hick has defined " ' replica ' " I can see no reason for there to be a dispute between the two philosophers on this matter. As Terence Penelhum has pointed out,[17] whether it is *important* that one be numerically identical with his ' replica ' depends on our *decision* as to whether it is, i. e., are we content to look forward to the after-life of our ' replicas? ' This decision is not something one can legislate about, but it has occurred to me (and also to Hick, cf. *DEL,* p. 285) that I cannot know for sure each morning when I awaken that it is really *I* and not a ' replica ' of me. And I am *not* discontented about this. Is anyone?

Some readers will recall the " transporter " device used on the old " Star Trek " television series. This device did *not* send

[16] "... Eschatological Verification and Personal Identity," *International Journcd for Philosophy of Religion,* 7 (1976), pp. 891-408.

[17] *Survived and Disembodied Exiltence* (New York: Humanities, 1970), pp. 96-97'.

Captain Kirk, Mr. Spock, *et al,* from the starship," Enterprise," to the surfaces of planets. It, rather, destroyed, e.g., the Spock aboard the " Enterprise " and replicated an identical Spock on the planet's .surface. I recall no case in which any of the characters were concerned whether they or their ' replicas ' existed. I think Penelhum is correct about this being a decisional matter, and it is very difficult for me to conceive anyone's being pointed because his ' replica ' lived on rather than his numerically identical " self."

As to the concern about a temporal gap between TPWX and RWX (Penelhum was also concerned about this), I see no problem at all. Evidently there is a temporal gap in the movement of some particles in *this* world now. As Bertrand Russell says:

> As regards motion and change ... people used to think that when a thing changes, it must be in a state of change, and that when a thing moves it must be in a state of motion. This is now known to be a mistake. When a body moves, all that can be said is that it is in one place at one time and in another at another .... Motion consists merely in the fact that bodies are sometimes in one place and sometimes in another. [18]

So, how does X get from TPW to RW? He ceases to exist in TPW and appears (is 'replicated' by God) in RW. This is not logically contradictory, and it is not, therefore, beyond the powers of an omnipotent God. Hick, it seems to me, need not be worried about Audi's criticisms.

IV

In *Death and Eternal Life* Hick has presented a view not only of what a pareschatological after-life may be like but also of what he conceives as the final eschatological state *(DEL,* pp. 450-466).

Hick conceives man's ultimate goal (beyond 'replica' rebirths in a series of resurrection worlds) as a community of

[18] From *Mysticism and Logic,* quoted in James Christian, *Philoso-phy: An Introduction to the Art of Wondering* (San Francisco: Rinehart Press, 1978), p. 186.

egoless selves, personal centers sharing all experience together. This will be a kind of group-mind, it seems to me, in which every mind will immediately experience the life o:f every other mind .

. . . the perfected individual will have become a personality without egoity, a living consciousness which is transparent to the other consciousnesses in relation to which it lives in a full community of love. Thus we have the picture of a plurality of personal centers without separate peripheries. They will have ceased to be mutually exclusive and will have become mutually inclusive and open to one another in a richly complex shared consciousness. The barrier between their common unconscious life and their individual consciousnesses will have disappeared, so that they experience an intimacy of personal community which we can at present barely imagine *(DEL,* p. 460).

There will, says Hick, probably be no physical bodies and, hence, the only time will be subjective time. Hick thinks this will be the final state because :full development of each person as a free, moral being leads to ultimate unification and fellowship. He compares this final state to his own concept of the Trinity, three personal centers harmoniously sharing all experience .

. . . we can say that the three divine selves or consciousnesses are not self-enclosedegos, existing over-against each other, but mutually constitute personal centers whose relationships with one another form a rich and complex unity *(DEL,* p. 461).

It is with this final state that I find the greatest problem. In the first place, it is wholly unclear how these personal centers will maintain their individuality. Hick has already (rightfully, I have contended) rejected bodily continuity as a criterion for personal identity. He has argued for a memory-character trait criterion. But if all selves are to share all experience (including, presumably, memories) , it is difficult, in fact, impossible, to see what differences there can be in characters. Hick has even rejected here, as he did not in the pareschatological RWs, not only physical bodies but even a Berkeleyian view of bodily appearances *(DEL,* p. 468) .

In fact, Hick *canJWt* say how these selves will maintain their identity. He only says

> ... they just *are* so many different selves, each with its own unique character and history, but in the ultimate state they are so harmoniously inter-related as to form the immensely complex personal unity of mankind, a human unity which perhaps requires all these different unique contributions *(DEL,* p.

What a let down! After all the hundreds of pages he has written in clear and careful prose, after even taking up the gauntlet thrown down by the positivists and arguing that religious language *is* verifiable, Hick .finally comes to this. He has, in my judgment, justifiably criticized Tillich and Rahner for their vagueness *(DEL,* pp. 215-217 and 228-825). But those men are at least as clear as Hick is about the ultimate eschatological state. How does Hick think we are in any way enlightened by his statement that ". . . they just *are* (his italics) so many different selves?" And, were that not bad enough, the attempt to explicate this by drawing analogies with the Trinity, one of Christianity's murkiest doctrines, is truly mind-boggling.

Let us be very clear about this. Hick has insisted that personal identity be a central component of man's final state. **"It** is hard to see on what specifically Christian ground one would affirm human immortality and yet not affirm it as involving continued personal identity." [19] This statement, which first appeared in 1970,[20] is nowhere denied, even obliquely, in *Death and Eternal Life.* **It** can not be denied if Hick is to remain faithful to his proposed solution to the problem of evil. Hick must hold out for personal identity to the very end.

The criteria of personal identity are either bodily continuity or memory-character (or both) . **If** the ultimate state reduces all these to nought via a complete sharing unity and a doing away with all bodies and bodily appearances, then we do *not*

[19] *Ood and the Universe of Faiths* (London: Macmillan, 1973, reprinted 1975), p. 186.

[20] *God and the Universe of Faiths,* p. xii.

have individual personal centers but, rather, some kind of" cosmic mind." If that is what Hick is thinking of let him say so. If it is not, then he must explain this as clearly and as painstakingly as he has explained the other parts of his philosophical theology. But, for the present, it appears that Hick ends with individuality and personal identity swallowed up in a unitive state 0£ total harmony and sharing. He may be correct in this, but he is certainly in conflict with his own prior description of God's ultimate plan.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Death and Eternal, Life. By JOHN H. HICK. New York: Harper and Row, 1976. Pp. 495.

1n his characteristic clear and readable style, John Hick has undertaken to explore the numerous current conceptions of life after death. His wide-ranging but critical study basically seeks to establish both the plausibility of the doctrine of personal human immortality and possible modalities of post-mortem existence. Hick stresses that his study of immortality is to be a different approach utilizing the insights present in all the religions of the world, rather than a presentation restricted to Western views of life after death. This he terms the" Copernican revolution in theology," which views " religions as different responses to variously overlapping aspects of the same Ultimate Reality " (p. 81).

Hick rightly notes that the heart of the matter is the nature of man, and to this he repeatedly returns. For example, in Chapter Two he takes a brief look at the doctrine of the soul as a substance, and argues that if the soul is to be interpreted as the locus of personal identity and personality, this doctrine faces the difficulty of accounting for the apparent genetic bases of many of our dispositions and character traits. The evidence is so strong as to encourage us to discard the term " soul " as denoting a spiritual entity; if we are to use the term, we must see it as " a valuing name for the self" (p. 45). Seen as such, it affirms the value of the individual person, but does not make any metaphysical claim about a spiritual, substantial foundation of that self.

Though this would seem to lead to a materialist approach to the human person, Hick chooses not to follow that path. The identity theory, he argues, ultimately fails to show that the relation between brain process and thought process is one of identity rather than mere correlation. The criterion of identical spatial location is inapplicable when applied to language about the mind. Similarly, he rejects epiphenomenalism, for it leads to the self-refuting position of determinism.

What then is Hick's position? Early in the book he writes," In rejecting mind/brain identity, then, we accept mind/brain dualism" (p. mo)' while later he advocates a three-fold analysis: body - soul (mind) - spirit (atman) (p. 450). But if he accepts mind/brain dualism-the view that mind and brain are independent but interacting realities-one wonders not only why he was so quick to dispose of the doctrine of a substantial soul, but also what happened to the strong evidence of genetic determination. Part of the answer to both is that, though Hick approves of multiple stages of

human development through various lives in other worlds, he argues that, contrary to some forms of Hinduism and Platonism, there is no pre-existent soul. "In favour of this being each person's first lifo there is both the positive fact that the individual does *seem* to be formed *ab initio* in the womb from which he is born to this present life, and the negative fact that human beings do not normally remember any previous existence" (p. 457). Thus genetics plays a most substantial role in the creation of the initial embodied individual, whereas in successive lives the karmic bundle of characteristics or psychic structures, which as a psycho-physical being we have become, provides the commencement state for the new incarnate existence. However, the origin of the psychic entity and its relation to the genetic remains problematic in Hick. His shift of emphasis " from the question of origins to the question of ends " (p. 46) hardly suffices to resolve the difficulty.

Further, mind/brain dualism itself comes in two packages: either the mind cannot exist independent of the body and perishes with it, or else the mind is capable of existing independently of the body, so that the death of the latter will affect but not destroy the former. Parapsychology is sometimes looked to as providing substantial evidence showing that the mind is capable of independent existence, and Hick in Chapter Seven briefly looks at its evidence. He concludes that " it is extremely probable that the spirits, particularly the controls, who seem to be communicating directly in the mediumist trance, are some kind of secondary personality of the medium. . . . But when one reads the detailed transcripts of the best sittings with the best mediums . . . one is at least strongly tempted to think that a distinctive still-living mind was communicating " (p. 143). In short, these data suggest the continuing existence of the human person in some form, perhaps even as a discarnate self (mind or soul).

On the other hand, Hick sees no reason to think that the conditions which in this present existence enable us to work toward moral perfection should be altered in the post-mortem world. And, in particular, this applies to our incarnateness. As such, he views with some scepticism the characterization given, for example by H. **H.** Price, of the next life as an image world (Chapter Fourteen). He continues to advocate the irenicism developed in an earlier book, which maintains the necessity of there being some physical obduracy in order to achieve moral perfection. Thus Hick argues for psycho-physical re-creation in future lives, though there is the possibility that in the eschaton the human self " is beyond both matter and time, at least as we know it " (p. 463).

The other issue of importance is whether there is good reason to think that man will live subsequent to his physical death. Hick in Chapter Three debunks the common notion that belief in life after death arose because men desired such a state. " For the most general primitive attitude to the dead of which we have evidence was not one of envy, but more of fear

or pity" (p. 61). Neither did it function as an instrument of control over the masses, utilized as a reward for their present suffering, for only the kings and heroes were promised this life. Howeve'r, "with the emergence of individual self-consciousness and ... of faith in a higher reality which was the source of value " (p. 73) has developed the idea of a desirable immortality. Indeed, there is good reason to think such an immortality reasonable, for unless there is life afte'r death, there is no meaning to life in that human potential will remain unfulfilled and there will be no rectification of the evil and suffering which we experience' in our mortal existence (Chapter Eight).

In the central core of his book, Hick presents first a critical survey of various Christian approaches to life after death-beginning with Jesus and Paul and concluding with both mode'rll-day Protestant and Catholic theo--logians-and then of the various possible pareschatologies, both Western and Eastern. Regarding the former (Chapters Nine to Thirteen), he finds modern theological treatments of the doctrine of immortality characterized either by an uncritical utilization of biblical imagery-as in Moltmann-or by extremely fuzzy thinking, peppered with contradictions-Tillich, Pannenberg, and Rahner. Hick's concern, in the end, is with establishing the doctrine of universal salvation, which he shows to be compatible with Jesus's teaching by the (dubious) treatment of Jesus's statement on eternal punishment as counterfactuals.

In surveying the variety of pareschatologies (Chapters Fourteen to Nineteen) Hick fulfills the earlier promise of providing a broader scope for his Copernican consideration of the issue of immortality, that is, a scope which includes extensive treatment of Eastern as well as Western thought. Toward this end almost one-fourth of the book is spent surveying the doctrine of reincarnation, first as held generally in the East, and then more specifically in Hindu and Buddhist philosophical thought. It is probably because Hick feels that the Western thinker is unacquainted with or more unsympathetic to this doctrine that his discussion is somewhat repetitious. In any case, his conclusion regarding reincarnation is hesitant, largely on grounds of moral and practical significance rather than on grounds of metaphysical difficulties, which are ge'Ilerally only touched on. For example, the whole notion of " bundles " of characteristics, qualities, a11d attributes-Hick's psychic husk (p. 376)-are spoken of as if they can have some sort of independent existence apart from any bearer of them. But surely Aristotle's contention that these need a substance in the form of an ontological existent has a bearing on the metaphysical feasibility of such a view.

In the final three chapters Hick sketches out what he considers to be a possible pareschatology and eschatology. Since man is directed toward the final goal of human perfection-the total realization of his potentialities-he must exist subsequent to his death. But, he argues, a mere two-stage process, as advocated by Christianity, is inadequate, for "it is

debatable whether this [life] would be a prolonged *human* life" and '• whether personal identity can be conceived as holding over unlimited time" (p. 409). Unlimited temporal duration would make recall of our past experience's impossible, for what of the earlier years could be remembered after a million intervening ones? And, without memory of our experiences, subjectively-experienced pe'rsonal identity would be difficult to conceive. Thus Hick opts for our re-embodiment in a finite number of stages, during which we progress toward perfect realization of our full potential. Furthermore, reembodiment will take place in another world in another space. In the final eschaton, he speculates, we will be able to forsake our egohood for the " perfect community of personal relationships " {p. a state which might not require embodied or physical existe'llce as we now know it.

Among other possible criticisms of this eschatology, two are of note. First, it is difficult to see how Hick's many-staged process avoids the objections which he raised against the two-stage process, for even a period of twenty reincarnations taking place over fifteen centuries {to use an example from Hick) would result in the inability of the re-created pe'l'son to recall events in his past incarnation, say in the 5th or even the 12th. Hick's response is that " the moving area of consciousness will have changed continuously from one which includes me, the first JH, to one which includes the JH at the other end of the same personal history. Each link in the chain will be consciously connected with the one next before it, although it may well be that none of them will be directly conscious, in either perception or memory, of the chain as a whole" {pp. One must wonder, however, why this same re'sponse would not suffice to make plausible the two-stage process. Hick's further argument that human moral and emotional characteristics are formed in the face of death and that were death removed there would be no basis for forming " the familiar emotional stuff of human life" (p. 418) likewise is telling against a many-stage afterlife-process, for if we have memory of past lives, death will necessarily take on an entirely new dime'llsion, e.g. it will not be an event to fear.

Secondly, it is difficult to understand why Hick continues to insist that the future worlds in which the individual finds his afterlife are not spatially connected with this present world, though clearly they are temporally related, for the existent must find himself in that world *after* he has left this world. For one thing, Hick merely asserts that " it is logically possible for the'l'e to be any number of worlds, each in its own space," (p. but whether this is so is far from clear. For another, his attempt to rescue the temporal continuity while holding to spatial discontinuity by appealing to memory hardly suffices, for to remember that I died in the past is to recall that I died in a particular place (there). But *there* cannot be understood apart from the place I am now (here) . As such, it would seem that any correlative temporal relation between two worlds-i. e. x's re-creation

in world W is subsequent to his disappearance from world V-presupposes the correlative spatial relation of W to V.

For many, the speculative nature of Hick's discussion of pareschatologies will prove disconcerting, particularly when the possibilities seem so numerous and incapable of definitive determination. Other readers will find the book intriguing, a well-documented resource for the exploration of the many facets of the problem which Hick has considered. Though one need not accept Hick's own view of the- afterlife, the book lays out the issues clearly enough to provide a reasonable point from which to proceed in other directions.

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La pedagogie de la crainte dans l'histoire du salut selon Thomas d'Aquin (Collection "Recherches," vol. 15). By ANDRE GUINDON, O. M. I. Paris/Tournai: Desclee - Montreal: Bellarmin, 1975. Pp. Broche.

In this excellent study, Andre Guindon has undertaken to examine the theme of the contrast between Old and New Law, as *lex timoris* and *lex amoris,* throughout St. Thomas's works. The (Old) Law having been described by Paul as " our pedagogue," we thus have to do with how the " Law of Fear " exercises its pedagory in the history of the race and of the individual. But in making this chronological exploration of St. Thomas's writings, the author presents us with a rathm- thorough investigation of the notions of fear developed by St. Thomas, showing how these kinds of fear are woven into the fabric of man's journey towards God.

Guindon displays considerable knowledge of the writings of St. Thomas, and a most salutary respect for St. Thomas's own interests, plans, methods, and vocabulary. He also shows clearly the social nature of scholarship, making ample and careful use of others' work, and skillfully criticizing their work. Moreover, he expresses himself with clarity. The result is a book which is an extremely useful source of information, and also to anyone who takes the time to ponder it a most suggestive and stimulating aid to reading St. Thomas. It should in tum give rise to much further study. (It is a pity there are no indices.)

But the book has faults. The ones which I regard as most serious have to do with the notions of fear and reverence. In part I, St. Thomas is set apart from his fellow-theologians as the one who has taken his stand with evil as the object of fear. He is shown as using the varieties of evil, *malum poenae* and *malum culpae,* to explain the varieties of fear as they pertain

to the moral life (pp. 47-51). Now, in *ST* 2-U9.l and 2 (cf. Guindon, pp. 244-245), St. Thomas, somewhat later in his life, presents these same doctrines, ending the second article with the statement: "As to whether *malum culpae* can be feared, that was discussed above, when the passion of fear was treated." This is a reference to *ST* 1-2.42.8, and anyone reading it will find he has much to ponder as to whether or not *malum culpae* can really be an object of fear. This, I submit, is a central problem for the Thomistic discussion of fear. Yet we catch only a hint of this problem from Guindon, and only in the most indirect way *(cf.* pp. 859-860).

Also, while Guindon stresses the importance of reverence as that act of the Gift of the Spirit called " fear " which remains even *in patria,* and as the operation of the gift of fear exercised even by Jesus, consideTed as the one who is without sin (p. 246) , it does not seem to me that he provides an adequate discussion of the texts. *ST* 2-2.19.11 takes its stand on the object of fear being *malum possibile.* Fear can remain *in patria* only to the extent that *malum possibile* remains. The evil described as "not to submit to God " will remain *in patria* " as possible for nature, impossible for blessedness," in contrast to the situation *in via* where it is " altogether possible." St. Thomas is describing two modes of the possible; only if "as possible for nature, impossible for blessedness " as a mode of the possible can there be *anything* of fear left in *patria.* And he is surely speaking of the fear of a *malum culpae* (in whatever way that can be feared!) .

Guindon himself (p. 246) interprets *ST* 2-U9.ll in the light of the expression in the *ad* .8: *"defectum naturalem creaturae,"* which he see'S as an adumbration of St. Thomas's position in another work, the *quaestio die-putata De spe* 4 *ad* 2. Thus, at p. *265,* n. 49, he rejects the contention of Dom P. Marc that the threefold evil mentioned in *D·e .spe* 4 *ad* 2 is a doctrinal change by St. Thomas. Guindon seems to be saying that St. Thomas was all along conceiving of the act of filial fear, *in patria,* as having for its object the *defectus naturae,* conceived in its distinction from the *malum culpae.* As I have just argued, the *ST* article seems to have expressly to do with *malum culpae.*

But what are we to think of still a third text of St. Thomas, viz. *ST* 8.7.6? Guindon cites this at p. n. as if it fitted right in, and he urges at the end of the note that we look at the answers to the objections found in that article. When one does so, one has the impression one is looking at still a third position of St. Thomas concerning the object of the act of reverence. True, in the body of the article we have the distinction between *malum culpae, malum poenae,* and still a third object, the divine eminence; thus, one might think one was dealing with something akin to the *De spe* position. The gift of fear *somehow* has to do with the divine eminence. But in the *ad* I it is explained that .gifts as well as virtues properly and essentially relate to the good, and to evil only as a consequence; and the answer goes on to tell us that the gift of fear has to do,

not with the evil that fear has to do with, but rather with " the eminence of the divine good, by whose power some evil can be inflicted." And in the *ad* 2 St. Thomas quickly tosses aside the objection, as not being about the gift of foar at all, because that objection had to do with the sort of fear which has evil for its object. Plainly, the position now is that the gift of fear does not have *any sort of evil* for its object. That is not the position either of the *De spe* or the *ST* 2-2 (and seems at odds also with *ST* 2-2.19.9. *ad* 2 and *ad* 3) . And if reverence, an act of the gift of fear, is a form of fear, what has become of the position that the object of fear is evil? All I mean to argue here is that Guindon should have presented a full-dress discussion of this issue, not the few remarks such as he gives at pp. 77-79 and 246-247. This is especially so in view of his own judgment concerning the importance of the doctrine at stake: thus, at p. 319, he can speak of St. Thomas's keen awareness of the ultimate foundation of fear, namely the finitude of the creature faced with the infinity of God.

A much less serious point: Guindon's use of the expression "la pedagogic nouvelle" for the learning process proper to the New Law (cf. p. 139, p. *323,* etc.). "Pedagogue" suggests the stern discipline proper to the Old Law (cf. p. 134). At p. *330* he speaks with more finesse, in my opinion, using "pedagogic" for the Old Law and "education" for the New.

The book is well proof-read by today's standards, but on p. *359,* the first mode of *amor sui* (wrongly numbered" *3* ") has a lacuna: this at an important moment of the discussion.

The size of the numbers used to designate the notes is inconveniently small.

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Theology in a New Key. By ROBERT McAFEE BROWN. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1978. Pp. 212. *$6.95.*

This appealing book is an introduction to a body of literature, Latin American liberation theology, that is not well-known in the English-speaking world. Thanks to Orbis Books, founded by the Maryknoll Fathers, the principal books and documents of this theology are available in English. Still, since the method of this theology is of recent origin, and since its starting point is very disturbing to the industrialized countries of the West, it is not easy to understand what is being said by this theology. What is this disturbing starting point? According to the theology of liberation, the Gospel can be grasped only if we analyse the concrete form which

evil takes in our society and understand the Christian message as God's initiative summoning and directing us to overcome evil. According to the Latin American theologians, the dominant systemic evil in their society is the international capitalistic system that inflicts on this society economic and cultural dependency, pushes large sections of the population into destitution and early mortality, and creates in the middle classes a distorted perception of reality.

Robert McAfee Brown, a well-known Protestant theologian, is famous for his ability to introduce a wide Christian audience to issues discussed in high theology. Brown writes about learned things in a simple and direct style and relates them to people's experiences. He knows where the mind and heart of the Protestant community are. For him, theology is never a conversation confined to academics: 1t must always involve the believing community. This is so because Christian truth is *propter salutem.* The conversation with the local congregation protects the theologian from losing the thread. The book under review is a brilliant application of this method to an explosive topic. Can one kee'P a congregation in their seats while explaining to them that capitalism may have a distorting effect on the perception of God and divine salvation? Brown does it.

Brown offers us a propaedeutic of liberation theology. The book deals with methodology, with biblical hermeneutics, with the problem of discontinuity and self-identity, with the objections raised against liberation theology by its fair and unfair critics, and with the response of the North American churches to this provocative theology. The relatively short book does not tell us how liberation theology articulates the church's faith in God, how it deals with soteriology, christology, ecclesiology, etc. For these topics we will have to turn to the Latin American authors themselves.

Of special interest to readers of *The Thomist* may be the epistemological issue raised by liberation theology. The new theology rejects any form of neo-Kantian epistemology that defines truth in terms of the mind's fidelity to its own operation. Thus liberation theology repudiates an existentialist approach to theology, the transcendental method, and-for slightly different reasons-a theology based on phenomenology. At the same time, liberation theology also rejects the classical philosophical position that defines truth in terms of the conformity of the mind to the object given. Such an epistemology, liberation theologians argue, concedes a special status to what is (for instance, present society) and demands that we conform our minds to it. For liberation theology, knowledge is part of the worldbuilding process. Since knowledge is based on social foundations and in turn affects the social framework, it cannot be evaluated unless these foundations and these effects are carefully analysed. In this view, knowledge is the theoretic dimension of praxis. The norm of truth is not found in the fidelity to the subject nor to the object, but in the interaction between subject and object in the creation of the human world. The true and the good are inextricably

interconnected. Christian truth creates a consciousness that steers the church toward the promised *shalom,* the pacification of the human family.

Brown's book is disturbing. In the view of the Latin American theologians, the structure of evil has assumed such overriding proportions that the cultural mainstream, including science and philosophy has become gravely distorted. The dominant culture disguises the truth. Since we live in a culture of injustice, the Christian's first impulse in regard to the world is one of suspicion. In Latin America, the critical stance demanded of the Chrstian implies a dangerous and subversive non-conformity in regard to the order imposed by government and economic elite. Latin Americans think that God's truth cannot be mediated to the multitudes unless the world system of injustice is overcome.

The first reaction of the American reader is to reject this theology *as* dangerous radicalism. It is after all very threatening to our social being. But then are we so sure that capitalism is here to stay? In fact, the ever more elaborate criticism of capitalism found in papal teaching-Brown summarizes this development under the title of " the Catholic journey " towards socialism-suggests that we must be willing to listen to the radical critics. In his book, McAfee Brown tries to formulate a responsible reaction of the Christian churches in North America to the new theology from Latin Ame'rica.

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Tramcendent Selfkood: Tke Loss and Rediscovery of tke Inner Life. By Loms DUPRE. New York: Seabury Press, 1976. Pp. llS. $8.95.

Louis Dupre, who has written earlier on Kierkegaard, Marx, Hegel, and religious attitudes, here examines the nature of the self. His major aim in this short but memorable book is to show the need for and the way toward rediscovering the transcendent Mpect of selfhood.

Dupre argues that the objectivist, reductionist, naturalistic attitude in the modem era, leading to a purely empirical view of the self, lies at the heart of today's crisis in our culture. We have lost the sense of our own inwardness, of real subjectivity, of openness toward transcendence and dependence' on it. Against this trend is posed the phenomenological-hermeneutic philosophy initiated by Husserl and Heidegger. Dupre also distinguishes between the transcendent and the sacred, suggesting that the genuine sacred quality has gone from contemporary life and "the center of human piety has moved inward where the self encounters its own transcendence," He distinguishes, too, the concepts of self, person and individual:

the person includes both (subjective) selfhood and (biological) individuality.

How can the self attain transcendence' from within? Dupre explores several paths; and these indicate as well the reality of the supra-empirical self. Traditionally, he notes, ethical consciousness confronted philosophy with a transcendent dimension of self. But the true self is meta-ethical, finding the ground for moral action in its own sense of dependence on the transcendent. A second path starts from alienation-the diseased self-and here Dupre explores the complex area of healing. Third, artistic creations may lead us toward transcendence, symbolizing the ultimately real, even when the art is not overtly religious. Dupre notes that the abstract and formalist movement in the arts may impel the experiencer to go beyond the art-object itself; but this opening up, he suggests, does not suffice to show us transcendence, since for that we also need language. (Here I would demur; a painting by Rothko, for example, can directly evoke a mystical state).

Fourth, drawing on Bergson and Husserl, Dupre develops the way temporality and memory overcome for us the annihilating impact of the notion that the self lives only in the outward present moment. Memory, he suggests, is "the gateway to the soul's ground where God and the self coincide." Next Dupre considers immortality of the self: he weighs what form of bodiliness might be possible for the deeper self beyond the grave. Finally, Dupre explores the experiences of mystics, both Eastern and Western, concluding from these that " the self is *essentially* more than a mere self, that transcendence belongs to its nature .... "

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Unity and Diversity in the New Testament. By JAMES D. G. DUNN. don: SCM Press, 1977. £rn.5o.

Is there such a thing as orthodoxy? Can there ever be a final e<xpression of Christian truth? Was there in the past any single definition of the faith which separated Christians from heretics? Research has shown that even in the first century Christianity was complex and diverse. It is first-century Christianity, as reflected in the New Testament, which is the primary subject of study in this book, and the author is basically concerned with the question of whether there is any ' unifying strand ' to be found in earliest Christianity which identifies it as Christian.

Wth this in mind, Dr. Dunn first examines various aspects of New Testa-

ment Christianity and looks to see whether there is unity within the diversity. He investigates forms of Christian preaching, the earliest confessional formulae, the use of the Old Testament, concepts of ministry and forms of worship, and also religious experience. In all these areas there is a unifying theme to be detected. It is the conviction of the unity between the earthly Jesus and the exalted Christ, as the one through whom God is to be encountered. In a chapter on Christology the author then asks whether one can trace this unity or continuity back to the beliefs of the historical Jesus about himself, and argues plausibly that this is possible. Jesus himself looked beyond the prospect of suffering and death to the hope of vindication by God, and the early Christians' experience of being God's children was founded on Jesus's own teaching and experience. The various ways in which Christ was proclaimed in the early churches can be seen as a development of Jesus's own proclamation in the light of belief in his resurrection. We must also recognize, however, that there are many 'kerygmatic Christs'. The Christology of the earliest Christians was fundamentally forward-looking, concerned with the speedy return of Jesus as the Son of Man: the resurrection foreshadows the final consummation. An important shift took place with the introduction of the language of pre-existence, perhaps through the application of Wisdom terminology to Christ. With the language of pre-existence there comes the concept of incarnation, which gradually opens the door to a Christology which sees the incarnation as the decisive saving moment. This has not quite happened with Paul, but it is beginning to happen in the Fourth Gospel: there Jesus is presented as actually aware of his personal pre-existence, and this forms a marked contrast with the adoptionist outlook of the earliest Christology. Thus, we have different ways of understanding the Christ-event, which are not always wholly compatible with each other. There is no single orthodoxy during the period represented in the New Testament writings. There is only the one unifying element: the assertion of the identity of Jesus and the risen Christ. And the fact of diversity does raise questions for the Church today. Should there be room for equal diversity of expression in the Church's credal affirmations?

In the second part of the book the author asks whether limits were set to the diversity. He investigates Jewish Christianity, Hellenistic Christianity, Apocalyptic Christianity, and Early Catholicism, not as mutually exclusive categories but as " dimensions and emphases within first-century Christianity." He also looks at Christianity in the second century, to see what has be'Come of the earlier trends of thought and belief. He shows that the diversity in the first century was extensive, arguing convincingly that there was, for example, a deeper divide between Paul and Jerusalem Christianity than appears on the surface, and that the latter had affinities with later Ebionism. In all areas, however, a line was drawn at some point to mark off what was acceptable from what was unacceptable, and the

criterion was the assessment of Jesus. The more developed Jewish Christianity represented by the Gospel of Matthew and the Epistle to the Hebrews has already rejected the later Ebionite view of him as the greatest of the prophets, adopted as God's son: Jesus " was son in a unique sense, Wisdom itself and not just her mouthpiece, in a class apart from and immeasurably superior to prophet, angel or Moses" (p. Similarly, whilst some of Paul's teaching was vulnerable to later Gnostic interpretation, his insistence on the importance of the crucified Christ marks out his version of the faith from Gnostic Christianity.

In his concluding section, the author returns to the problem of whether any one form of the Christian faith can be· regarded as normative today, in view of the fact that the New Testament writings do not speak with a united voice. Can the New Testament function as a canon? If it can, we must recognize that it 'canonizes' diversity. We shall have to accept as valid whatever form of Christianity can justifiably claim to be rooted in any one of the strands that make up the New Testament. And that means that the less developed expressions of the faith are to be regarded as normative just as much as the more developed versions.

It is at this point, if not before, that the reader may begin to have an uneasy feeling that perhaps the question of the truth of the assertions about Christ to be found in the New Testament is somehow being evaded, and may want to ask whether this apparently satisfactory concept of equal normativeness really holds good. The numerous circles of early Christians who did not hold the Johannine doctrine of the pre-existence of Christ may not have been aware of it-may not have got to this point in their Christological thinking. But we are not in the same position. We ourselves *are* aware of John's presentation of Christ, and we are therefore faced with the decision as to its truth. Either the life within history of Jesus of Nazareth is at the same time the personal experience of God the Son, or it is only the life of a man, however close that man's contact with God. It is a decision which we cannot escape. For *us,* the notion of equal normativeness may be an attempt to evade the decision. We might also ask whether all those who contributed to the formation of the ideas and beliefs reflected in the New Testament were e'qually profound thinkers, possessed of equally valid religious and theological insight. If not, can we really argue that all their expressions of Christological belief are equally valid for us? If their more profound insights are available to us, why should any Christians today be content with the less profound? In any case, one wonders whether there is much practical relevance in the suggestion that the less developed Christological views within the New Testament can be as normative as the more developed. For the author makes it clear that right from the beginning it was belief in the risen Jesus that the early Christians were concerned with, and not the historical Jesus as such: "the Christian Church is built round the post-Easter kerygmas, not the teaching of the historical

Jesus! " (p. 82). But some of the variations of the Christian faith which confront us today are as much opposed to belief in Jesus's resurrection as they are to belief in the incarnation of God in Christ. The one notion is just as mythological as the other, or so it would be argued. The less developed Christology of the New Testament would be no more acceptable than the Johannine version.

There is no doubt, however, that this book does raise some important questions. It is impressive in a number of ways. The author has a broad and comprehensive grasp of Christianity during the first few centuries, he is extensively acquainted with literature relevant to a whole host of problems in New Testament criticism and exegesis, and he presents his material and argues his case with great lucidity. His work deserves a wide readership.

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Truthfulness and Tragedy. By STANLEY HAUERWAS. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977. Pp. 251.

This collection of previously-published essays is well-integrated, presenting a coherent argument. Hauerwas argues that ethics has become overly rational, inappropriately focused on the decision-making process and the reasons one can muster for a decision. Indeed, any tendency to identify rationality as the distinctively human characteristic, and then to isolate rationality from the complexity of being human, is erroneous method; we are sensitive, emotional, intelligent animals, and serious ethical reflection should consider all these aspects. We need a story if we are to make sense of human living; the novel mirrors human activity more closely than does the syllogism.

Hauerwas's approach is subtle and does not claim to be completely adequate, but it is notably more satisfactory than the attempts of a Joseph Fletcher, who likewise sought to move ethics away from strictly rational decision-making. Fletcher continued to focus on the decision. (Isn't the power of his style rooted in his ability to lure the reader to grapple with a decision in a situation weighted down with anxiety and human tragedy?) Hauerwas shifts our attention from the decision to the one who is deciding. More accurately, Hauerwas looks primarily to the community in which the person lives and acts; that community must have a story which gives it (and its members) direction and focus. The Christian (Hauerwas does not limit his approach to the Christian) lives in the community of the Church whose story is that of Jesus of Nazareth.

The strength and appeal of Hauerwas's method is that it takes tragedy

seriously. Contrary to many contemporary dreams, human life cannot be freed from suffering and pain and evil. Contrary to some ethical approaches, we cannot hope always to be able to choose a clear good, to avoid choosing evil and suffering. Life inevitably involves tragedy. Whereas some have turned to a theory of the indirect voluntary and others to a thc'Ory of compromise, Hauerwas would explicitly look to the Cross, the tragic moment in the story of the Christian community. The Hauerwas approach will appeal to the Christian realist living life with open-ended consistency; it will not appeal to someone raised on the principle of double effect, precisely because Hauerwas emphasizes the open-ended story rather than the orderly (and, for him, not precisely human) syllogism. The principle of double effect considers the decision in a sharply rational way; Hauerwas looks to the story of the community in which we live.

Medicine is a somewhat circumscribed arena of human activity which helps Hauerwas to be more specific. Most recent work in medical ethics is concerned with decisions and reasons. Hauerwas urges a renewal of the truly human covenant between doctor and patient. If the patient lives in a community whose story includes the tragedy of suffering and death, then the patient and doctor could move together through the phases of pained life toward death. There would be no unrealistic demands for total cures yielding painless existence; nor would there be empty rationalizations for the suffering which can never be avoided. Life is tragic; medicine is tragic. The problem for Hauerwas is that the needed community does not seem to be at hand; there is no vital community of vital faith, that is, no community really living by a story which can embrace the tragic. The search for greater rational clarity in making medical decisions, a search which typifies contemporary medical ethics, will not be of ultimate service to medicine; rather we need a living community whose story will allow patient and physician to accept the pains of dying.

The chapter on euthanasia and suicide is weak; it fits only loosely into the book as a whole and the principles for resolving the issues are introduced without preparation or explanation. On the other hand, the consideration of retarded children is well-developed, sensitive, and significantly helpful. Again, to ask what one should do in *thi.s* particular case of a defective newborn is to miss the point; that is a decision-focused approach which is of limited help to us. Instead, Hauerwas asks the general question of why we have children at all. He explores the concept of" gift" (familiar to any Christian) and notes how any parent accepts *any* child, not as possession, but as gift. It is usually difficult to accept the unique personality of *any* child, even though that difficulty is often not apparent until the mature child begins to take leave of parents; the uniqueness of the retarded child is painfuly obvious from the moment of birth (or from the moment when the results of amniocentesis are received). Again, one can see the need to be part of a community whose story can include tragedy.

Those who view ethics as a carefully argued rational science about human activity might find Hauerwas's treatment of retarded children to be just a bit too much like a sermon. It is surely not "preachy," but it does touch the heart at a significant moment in the flow of the argument. But this is a sign that for Hauerwas the story, not the" reason," is the bottom line. For me his argument is cogent and convincing precisely because it does depend upon the story. Parents of a retarded child do not need areason for some one decision soon after the child is born; rather, their lives (before and after the birth of a retarded child) will reflect the qualitative influence of a community whose story embraces the tragic. In Christian terms, parents who live in a community of deep personal faith in Jesus Christ will have attitudes and convictions which will be in evidence as they give birth to, and raise, *any* child, including one which happens to be retarded.

At one point I find the argument defective. Hauerwas says that if a child can (should?) be allowed to die, then it makes no difference if one takes positive action to terminate the life. For him (as for many) a distinction between allowing to die and active intervention is a verbal distinction whose significance is lost upon real parents and real doctors dealing with a real retarded child in front of them. I am not convinced that the distinction is merely verbal, even in this severe case. However, my question is how Hauerwas could decide that in some cases death is preferable. He has argued so well that life and medicine are tragic, that at times we choose to accept suffering and pain; indeed, one is revealing his own inhumanity when he searches for reasons to judge others (e.g., retarded children) as not human or not persons. But Hauerwas clearly allows for cases in which the tragedy is to be not merely deep pain and suffering, but death itself. He would admit that he has not provided the guidelines for such a judgment, except insofar as the people involved have formed in terms of the community's story. Perhaps I am finally not comfortable with Hauerwos's method after all. Perhaps I still need the protective clarity of rational arguments and principles.

It is surely true that I am uncomfortable with a method which would allow for direct action to terminate the life of a retarded child. But I need not reject Hauerwas's entire approach. Rather, I suggest that he search for ways to include rational principles and arguments more explicitly within the framework of his method. I suspect that Richard McCormick could be very helpful at this point. McCormick has been consistently speaking about doing the reasonable thing, doing what reasonable people would do. And McCormick attempts to identify standards and criteria which reasonable people do (and should) employ in the realm of medicine. (Note that I have deliberately chosen ' reasonable " rather than " rational " ; McCormick is working at a truly human ethic, not one that is merely rational and even scientific.) Hauerwas reminds us that "reason"

is itself informed and shaped by the story of the community, that human reason is not coldly and incisively rational. But McCormick continues to work from the conviction that there is something generally true for human beings which can be abstracted from what reasonable humans generally do. I am not suggesting that Hauerwas and McCormick are in basic disagreement; rather, I judge that it would be helpful to develop the complementarity between them. We need to mine the riches of that key notion " human reason " in religious ethics.

Finally, one can be deeply inspired by Hauerwas and still wonder if it is all possible. The community with a story is key for Hauerwas, but he himself is looking rather anxiously for that community in our midst. His is surely not an individualistic ethic, but neither is it a universal ethic; it is a community ethic. This is evident throughout the book; the issue of abortion is one way to make it specific. So much (all?) of the abortion debate today is in the public forum; it is an argument about the law. But Americans really do not share a story which would allow them to resolve the dilemma about abortion. This or that community of believers might reach agreement among themselves on the abortion issue, but we do not know how peaceably to extend that argument to those outside the community. The attraction of Hauerwas's method is that it would involve the development of a true community whose activity is given focus by the community's story; the weakness is that such a community can become isolated, influencing others by example at most. The attraction of our present situation in America is that persons of quite varied convictions can debate legally and offer "reasons" (the abortion debate often can be termed neither rational nor reasonable!) for extending their point of view to include all; the weakness is that the search for a harmonious pluralistic situation can internally weaken the various communities, gradually destroying them as true communities with a story. On balance, I sense that Hauerwas is accurate; in America we are losing those communities. America could not be what it is if we had several truly isolated communities each with a story. But we need to re-learn that one must be a good believing Christian or a good believing Jew (i.e., a truly believing person whose community has a story) before one is a good American. We need a story of deeper significance than the American story, whatever that happens to be. Meeting a young Amish couple on a Greyhound bus forces me to question my own commitment to a community whose story I have said is very powerful.

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Facing Up to Modernity: Excursions in Society, Politics, and Religion. By PETER L. BERGER. New York, Basic Books, 1977, Pp. ix & iss. $11.50.

Peter Berger has defended the possibility of a value-free sociology in many places, and he has attempted such a sociology in a variety of books, including *The Social Construction of Reality* (1966) and *The Sacred Canopy* (1967). He is at loggerheads in this enterprise with many contemporary social theorists who see all social science as essentially value-laden. But Berger has another face which he has never hesitated to reveal. He is a human being with intense moral and religious concerns which he has spelled out in numerous works from *The Noise of Solemn Assemblies* (1961) and *The Precario1ts Vision* (1961) through *A. Rumcr of Angels* (1969) to *Pyramids of Sacrifice* (1974). Both sides of his career appear in the essays and addresses composed over the past dozen years and gathered together now under the title *Facing up to Modernity.*

Even in these pieces, Berger wishes to keep distinct the labors of the sociologist trying " to see the social world as clearly as possible, to understand it without being swayed by [his] own hopes and fears" and the reflections of one who is also " a concerned citizen of the United States in a very troubled period, as well as ... a Christian." Seeing the two threads juxtaposed to each other does help to unravel a puzzle evoked by his writings. Many readers have been surprised that he has maintained an essentially conservative social and religious posture despite the relativizing character of his sociology. What *Facing up to Modernity* makes clear, unsystematic though it is, is that that the conservatism is a consequence rather than an accident. This relationship stands out in a speech delivered at Loyola University of Chicago in 1970 and presented here as an introduction. The sociologist is subversive of any established society inasmuch as he endeavors to look without prejudice at structures which are usually taken for granted and inasmuch as he tends to highlight their contingency and relativity. Thus Berger's essays "Marriage and the Construction of Reality" and " Toward a Sociological Critique of Psychoanalysis " suggest the ways in which one might begin to study the normally hidden and always problematic functions of institutions. But the other side of the sociological revelation of contingency and relativity is the exposure of the precariousness of a human situation in which all social frameworks take on the character of "Potemkin villages" (a metaphor used frequently in Berger's books). A sensible person hesitates, then, to demolish the inadequate buildings of the present in the name of a future village which would itself be man-made and therefore no more godly than the ones demolished. *Facing up to Modernity* issues a strong caveat in the face of critics who would proclaim the virtues of an imaginary socialism as a final alternative to the weaknesses of the capitalistic system and even in the face of those who would lightly propose counter-revolution in the socialist countries. Es-

sential to the whole argument is the claim that the chief difficulties of capitalist and socialist societies come not so much from their diverse economic arrangements as from the rationalization and bureaucratization affecting all modern technological societies.

Berger's conservatism does not rest, however, simply on a recognition of the common weaknesses of social orders. Beyond the shaky walls of the " Potemkin village," he glimpses other dime'll.sions of reality which must be taken into account. It is people who erect the structures, who fend off chaos through them, who suffer from their inadequacies and from their collapse. Berger the moralist protests against the pain inflicted-at times intentionally, at times mindlessly-on people in the present age. His protest goes out no less against the defence of murder in the name of conservatism *(vide* the Calley case) than against its defense in the name of revolution *(vide* the Manson case). In *The Pyramids of Sacrifice,* he argued at great length for a calculus of pain in approaching development strategies for the third world. The argument is more rudimentary in *Facing up to Modernity,* but the protest is present as well as some sociological reflections on the forces which lead people to make each other suffer and on the institutional changes which might operate as an antidote. Of special interest are some essays on the need to separate political conservatism from the support of inhuman social practices and on the importance of encouraging middle-level institutions and local patriotism for the health of larger societies.

The concern of *Facing up to Modernity* goes further than the human reality behind the fragile structures studied by the sociologist. Berger's perception extends-however obliquely-to a reality which transcends the order of the human and the earthly, to a reality which he labelled" supernatural" in *A Rumor of Angels.* Again the tension between value-free descriptions and value-laden judgments is at play. At times, he analyzes the factors making for contemporary secularism and those making for rebellion against it without evidently lamenting either the enduring secularism or the new religiosity of the 1960's and 1970's. Yet, at other moments, it is clear that he takes the struggle against modernity and its austerity as a " rumor " of realms beyond the world envisaged by the secular mind. The last chapter is fittingly a prose poem entitled "New York City 1976: A Signal of Transcendence." And, although he evokes possibilities more than he defends doctrines, he holds to the viability of the Christian response to the " rumors " and the " signals " and his own expectation of the short-lived character of the turn to Eastern mysticism. Throughout these pieces, he admits to his own status as one enmeshed in modernity, but he expresses the hope to experience one of those moments "in which God's presence in history manifests itself in lightning." Then he might speak with the "new conviction " and the " new authority " he considers imperative for Christians at this juncture.

A review must be selective, and some of the questions (for example, American foreign policy and the sexual revolution) raised in *Facing up to Modernity* must go unexamined. To a certain extent, the neglect is justified because of the needs of selectivity, but also because in several cases the discussions now seem somewhat dated. I would simply say that all of the pieces have the grace and insight one comes to expect of Berger's writing. What he does exceptionally well is to pinpoint problems (above all, the self-deceptions of intellectuals) and to hint at paths out of the problems. Once he is beyond the realms of sociology, he tends to beg off excursions into theory; and it is at this juncture that I encounter the greatest difficulty. His interests *should* eventually lead him into the sorts of forbidding arguments and formulations which go by the names *epistemology, ontology, theology* and *ethics.* He continues to operate at the threshold in *Facing up to Modernity* as he does in his more systematic studies. Yet, without these arguments and formulations, one has a right to fear that the ethical positions can become conservative ideology and the theological positions wishful thinking. Periodically he refers to the importancet of Arnold Gehlen's philosophical anthropology in the elaboration of a sound social theory; and I, for one, would much like to see a Berger presentation which would separate Gehlen's provocative emphasis on chaos and order in human life from the uses he allowed of these ideas in fascist Germany. In any event, I sympathize with the central endeavors in *Facing up to Modernity,* but I am also convinced that the author owes his readers the construction of a supportive theory which would make the endeavors at once more vulnerable and more solid.

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The Uncontrolled Chancellor: Charles Townshend and his American Policy. By CORNELIUS P. FORSTER, 0. P. Providence: The Bicentennial Foundation, 1978. Pp. xv, 155. $9.95.

Charles Townshend is a familiar name even to many American school children, because of his sponsorship of certain taxation acts of 1767 which contributed to the discontent of the American colonies on the eve of the Revolution.

Sir Lewis Namier, the dominant figure in eighteenth-century English historiography, wrote on Townshend and promised a biography which he never finished. His co-worker, John Brooks, brought it to completion. But, as the author of this study points out, more than half of the book covers Townshend's life before his entry into the Cabinet.

This concise book by Father Cornelius Forster is therefore welcome as a convenient over-view of the subject. Published in conjunction with the American Bicentennial, it is not intended primarily for specialists in English history but for students of the American scene in search of English background.

This is not to say, however, that the work is derivative or based on secondary sources. The author cites numerous manuscript collections, and he has an original citation for most of his statements. It appears that years of painstaking work went into the book, beginning as a dissertation at Fordham under Ross J. S. Hoffman, who inspired so much research into the intricacies of eighteenth-century English politics.

Few historical landscapes have been combed so painstakingly as that period, Namier establishing the method-close attention to every possible detail, no matter how apparently minor, the gradual construction of a network of relationships which situate the individual politician in his milieu.

It is not an approach to history which makes much use of "big ideas." Namier taught those who came after him to be wary of broad generalizations, and it might almost be said to be the essence of his approach to insist that the trees, when looked at closely, yield patterns quite different from what might be seen by those viewing the forest from a distance.

There is nothing startling in Father Forster's study. Instead, with obvious mastery of his material, he moves ahead with confidence through the maze of eighteenth-century English political life, showing Townshend's rise to prominence (like many politicians of the period, he had powerful relatives, in this case the Pelhams, dukes of Newcastle) and his involvement in both domestic and colonial issues prior to his sudden death, at age 42, only a few months after his sponsorship of the controversial legislation relating to America.

Family connections got him started. Ability and energy continued to propel him. He spent some time in opposition to the government but developed also the knack of deserting one alliance just in time to make another, an ability which in time gained him a reputation for unreliability and the enmity of George III.

Townshend was called the " uncontrolled minister " because, at the time of his American legislation, he used his brilliance and the uncertainties of the political situation to push through measures without regard for their possible repercussions for the government. (He was simultaneously flirting with the opposition.)

Townshend had ambitions for a peerage and possibly the prime ministership, and quite possibly he would have obtained both had he lived longer.

He was a reportedly charming, brilliant, and extremely able man, even if regarded as mercurial and unpredictable. This narrative gives us a clear and concise over-view of the man and his career. His American program was, Father Forster believes, ill-advised and a prelude to disaster.

The book reminds us once again of the complexities behind Britain's policies towards its colonies and of the fact that, given slightly different political and personal circumstances, things might have turned out rather differently. It would have been useful if space had permitted the author to spend more than a single page summing up Townshead's career.

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The Cosmological Argument. By WILLIAM L. RowE. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1975. Pp. 273. $13.50.

Professor Rowe's study focuses on a version of the cosmological argument developed in the eighteenth century by Samuel Clarke. After critically examining various cosmological arguments presented by Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, Rowe decides for Clarke's argument as more fruitful for contemporary philosophical investigation since it employs the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) more explicitly than its medieval counterparts. One of Rowe's central theses is that a version of the PSR is essential to all forms of the Cosmological Argument. Various criticisms purporting to show Clarke's argument *unsound* Rowe submits to probing analyses and finally assesses as failures. The cosmological argument itself, however, cannot be regarded as a *proof* for the existence of a logically necessary being, since its premises either express or rest on the PSR, whose truth value is at best unknown. This first part of Clarke's argument, suitably emended, Rowe regards as showing the reasonableness of theistic belief in the reality of a logically necessary being, though it does not demonstrate such a being's existence. As the author presents it, the second part of Clarke's argument in its attempt to show that such a logically necessary being is the God of traditional theism is somewhat less than successful. This part of Clarke's argument encounters considerable difficulties in its efforts to establish the *infinite* wisdom, power, and goodness of the traditional deity.

This important work is carefully constructed and is packed with arguments challenging for both friend and foe of various proofs for the existence of God. We shall restrict our comments to (1) the author's view of the function of the PSR in Aquinas's second and third ways, and (2) a suggestion the author makes with regard to the clarification of the first part of Clarke's argument.

(1) Without raising questions *as* to the knowability, nature, or truth of the PSR operative in Aquinas's second and third ways, one can wonder

if Professor Rowe has captured the way it so functions. Rowe considers the PSR as the basic assumption underlying Aquinas's rejection of the infinite regress in the second way: if the series of essentially ordered causes proceeds to infinity without terminating in a first member, there could be no explanation of the fact that a certain sort of causal activity is going on; the essentially ordered series would thus be a brute fact without a cause. Rowe thus regards Aquinas as utilizing the PSR to eliminate the possibility that the essentially ordered causal series would be left unexplained. It is doubtful, however, that Aquinas employs the PSR in this manner. In the second way an essentially ordered series of efficient causes is the effect$_1$ to be explained. Since the operation of such a series of efficient causes cannot be it own *intrinsic efficient cause,* Aquinas argues that there must be an *extrinsic efficient cause* (in addition to whatever intrinsic factors are operative) if one is sufficiently to account for the essentially ordered causal series. If there be an infinite number of such extrinsic efficient causes (an actual infinity), then there would be no efl'ect$_1$, that is, a series of essentially ordered efficient causes producing an efl'ect$_2$. Aquinas is trying to argue that the efl'ect$_1$ (the essentially ordered series of efficient causes producing effect$_2$) could not occur as resulting from an infinite number of presently existing extrinsic efficient causes. Such a ruinous explanation would not leave the effect$_1$ as a mere brute fact; it would dissolve it. So the first extrinsic uncaused cause is not poE<ited to overcome an infinite regress; rather it is posited as part of the effort of a scientific realism to achieve a sufficient account of an effect without destroying it.

Professor Rowe's analysis of the third way suffers in our view from a not uncommon conflation of the principle *ex nihilo nihil* with the PSR. Investigating the claim "If at one time nothing existed then nothing would now exist," Rowe remarks that Aquinas's reason for this is simply that something comes into existence only through the causal activity of something already in existence, a version of the PSR. Actually Aquinas's rationale is: that which is not does not begin to be through something which is. This non-causal principle *ex nihilo nihil* is merely an expression of the Aristotelian view that change from non-existence is only from privation, and not from sheer nothingness. (Black as non-white might precede white in a process of change, but it is *not* strictly a *cause* of white). Interestingly, Rowe omits from his own presentation of the structure of the third way Aquinas's causal claim, "Now everything which is necessary either has a cause of its necessity outside itself or not." It is only at this point in the third way that there is an explicit interest in causes. It is here that the PSR explicitly functions, though only as an observation with regard to the possible locations of the total set of necessary causal conditions.

(2) The first part of Clarke's demonstration is represented as consisting of the following three *M* well as the arguments advanced in support of them:

Proposition I: Something or other has existed from eternity.
Proposition II: There exists an independent being {a being that has the reason for its existence within its own nature).
Proposition III: There exists a necessary being.

Rowe assesses Clarke's reasonings in support of Propositions I and II, finds them faulty in different ways, and makes suggestions to remedy the defects. He also analyzes and then rebuts the major criticisms advanced against the inference from Proposition I to Proposition II. Particularly significant, however, is the author's interesting and novel suggestion concerning justification of the inference from Proposition II to Proposition III. The crucial Kantian objection concerning the dependency of the cosmological upon the ontological argument is confronted. Rowe observes that since Clarke rejects the ontological argument it cannot serve as the device to move from the existence of a causally independent being to the existence of a necessary being. Clarke's inference is thus viewed as rooted in the identification of an independent being with one that has the reason for its existence within its own nature and the identification of a necessary being with a logically necessary being, a being whose non-existence is an absolute impossibility. " But a being has the reason for its existence within its own nature only if it exists in every possible world. And clearly if any being exists in every possible world then that being is such that its non-existence is absolutely impossible " {p. 202). On this interpretation Rowe judges the inference from Proposition II to Proposition III to be valid.

This is clearly not an ontological argument, yet its basic insight is obscured, in our view, by its seeming dissociation of causal necessity from logical necessity in the manner of its introduction of the notion of a possible world. One can surely say that, if the independent being concluded to in Proposition II were not self-existent, even though its existence were causally necessary for the existence of the world, it could cease to exist. As capable of not existing such a being would not be a logically necessary one. In fact, however, the causally independent being of Proposition II is self-existent, since as having the reason for its existence within itself it cannot cease to exist. On this basis it can be immediately described as a logically necessary being apart from the notion of a possible world. In fact, it is only *after* recognition of the causally necessary independent being as a logically necessary being that the notion of a possible world is appropriately introduced. Since it is causally necessary the removal of the logically necessary being incapable of non-existence would result in removal of the effect. Yet such a removal can occur only on the verbal level; it is impossible even to conceive of the removal of a causally and logically necessary being incapable of nonexistence. Only the effect can cease to exist, and is thus really removable. One can, therefore, meaningfully talk of the total cessation of the effect while the cause necessarily perdures, and

project the coming into being of another possible world not continuous with the previously existing world. This other possible world could only be brought into being by the self-existent logically necessary being already seen to be a necessary cause of this world. Notice that the independent being of Proposition II emerges as logically necessary because it cannot not exist; it is present in every possible world only because it is in its logical necessity *causally* necessary for this world and any other possible world. One cannot infer Proposition III from Proposition II via the notion of a possible world. The employment of the notion of another possible world is logically dependent upon the validity of this inference and the recognition of the *causal necessity* of the logically necessary being.

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Gospel Power; Towards the Revitalization of Preaching. By JoHN BURKE, 0. P. New York: Alba House, 1978. Pp. xiv & 117. $4.95.

Gospel Power is an honest book. Anyone who has heard Father John Burke, 0. P., or read his previously published works will immediately recognize his thinking on both preaching· and the power of God in His Gospel.

Let this reviewer say at the outset that *Gospel Power* will be of interest not only to preachers but to all those who seek to learn more about how God's power comes to and works in us.

The book is clearly divided into two separate (and almost distinct) parts. The first five chapters deal with preaching in general, the three kinds of sermons, and the liturgical homily. Appendix A, almost 80 pages in length, shows us that, by following and trusting Jesus, we obtain a new power, His power. Appendix B, just one page in length but worth the price of the book, is a very helpful questionnaire for the personal evaluation of a sermon.

Preaching in the Roman Catholic tradition, Father Burke observes, has clearly fallen upon hard times. For example, parish priests, surveys show, rank preaching as the seventh or eighth most important task out of a possible ten. The laity when surveyed generally rank the quality of preaching very low. Very few glory in the fact that they have been sent to preach and almost no preacher lives by preaching alone. It is usually something done on the side in addition to or as part of another regular job.

Another problem is that many preachers are bound to ecclesiastical traditions and attitudes that are foreign to contemporary experiences of authority, government, economics, and family life. In other words, the preacher does not speak the language of today. This suggests that it is

" urgent to explore new avenues of approach to a world which is no longer impressed by remnant feudal customs of respect, dress or structure."

This task is not made easier by seminary training or the preparation of permanent deacons since it prepares them more to be pastors of souls and defenders of the institution than to be fishers of men, as Jesus prepared his apostles.

Father Burke maintains, with considerable evidence to support him, that the poor quality of preaching in the Roman Catholic Church is one of the reasons for lack of faith in today's world. This is highly to be deplored in the United States where there are " professional " Catholics, that is, bishops, priests, permanent deacons, religious brothers and sisters, and only some 80,000 conversions every year, mostly resulting from marriage to Catholics. This is even more difficult to accept when it is viewed in the light of the fact that there are between 80 and 100 million unchurched persons in this country.

Wisely and accurately, Father Burke places the responsibility for renewal and the proclamation of the Christian message in the body of the faithful, that is, as the work of the whole Church and "all the elements of its life." At the same time, he recognizes that the burden (if it can be called that) of the preaching ministry has been given directly to bishops and priests as their primary responsibility. Their primary duty to proclaim the Gospel of God to all persons was amply corroborated in the decrees of the Second Vatican Council.

It is against this background that Father Burke sets the purpose of his book: to explore how the preaching ministry can be renewed so that the People of God can truly find life through the hearing of the Word of God in faith. At the same time, he recognizes that the richness of the Word of God and the diversity of the gifts God has given to His people mean that there is no single model for fruitful preaching.

Father Burke then defines preaching as: "A public act of an authorized minister of the Word, in the name of the Church, orally communicating a personally experienced theological insight into the meaning of divine revelation in such a simple, direct, yet sufficiently developed way, that those who listen may share that insight, in faith, in accordance with their measure of the grace of God." He then proceeds for the better part of Chapter 1 to break down his definition and to explain its various parts, such as "a public act," "authorized minister of the Word," "in the name of the Church," and so on. This chapter is filled with good practical advice. For example, he mildly reproaches those who spend so much time on finding and delivering a good introduction that they almost forget about making the point. He speaks of some preachers who take the first nine minutes and thirty seconds of a ten-minute sermon and throw it away because " so frequently it is only in the last thirty seconds that they come to the point."

While no definition of preaching would be completely satisfactory, this

one causes the reviewer one major problem. By his definition, Father Burke includes catechists among preachers. Though catechists are preachers in the broad sense, the *General Oatechetical Directory,* promulgated by the Sacred Congregation of the Clergy in 1971, makes a distinction between the two. That document recognizes four forms of the ministry of the word depending on the different conditions under which they are practiced and the ends which they strive to achieve. These forms are: evangelization or missionary preaching; the catechetical form; the liturgical, within the setting of a liturgical celebration, especially the Eucharist (for example, the homily); and finally, the theological, which is the systematic treatment and the scientific investigation of the truths of the faith. In brief, the *General Oatechetical Directory* appears to distinguish preaching and catechesis, a distinction that I agree with, while Father Burke sees the teaching of the faith as a part of preaching.

Again, according to Father Burke, theology distinguishes three kinds of preaching *by reason of the kind of faith it engenders.* These three kinds of preaching are evangelization, catechesis', and didascalia, a Greek derivative meaning highest wisdom or doctrine. The form each of these kinds of preaching takes will vary from informal conversation to a highly structured liturgical homily, and, as Father Burke would have it, to a religious education presentation. Something will now be said about the treatment of each of these three kinds of preaching.

While Father Burke has many moving and convincing things to say about evangelical preaching, he sees no need for pre-evangelization in the United States. Prc-evangelization, a special stage recognized by many, enables people to hear the gospel and to accept Jesus as Lord and Savior. In the material order, these are the basic necessities of life such as food, clothing, and shelter. In the spiritual order, they are such things as the ability to grasp the nature of spiritual reality, the possession of a sense of personal worth, a sense of the mystery beyond us, and so on.

Father Burke contends that there is no further need to lay groundwork for the Gospel through pre-evangelization in this country, as it has already been adequately done. This reviewer disagrees. Many millions in the United States do not have either the material or the spiritual minimum to be able to state that they have been properly pre-evangelized. In fact, all good evangelization should be preceded or accompanied by providing, to the extent possible, the basic material necessities and building up the self-worth of those being evangelized.

Apart from this minor disagreement with the author, this reviewer was very pleased with the chapter on evangelization. It properly points out that evangelical preaching proclaims the Word of God to those who have not heard it, have not believed it, or have fallen away from belief. Conversion is seen as a continuing process of growth and the content of evangelical preaching is identified, that is, the events of Christ's coming into the world to bring salvation to sinners {the kerygma). Father Burke

insists several times that this preaching is never the mere recounting of historical facts. It requires that the preachers bring to bear the testimony of their own personal experience, in the Spirit, of the events of Christ's life as they touched them through faith.

Catechesis is the second kind of preaching and is directed to the listener who has been evangelized and has accepted Jesus Christ as Lord and Savior. It builds on evangelization and shows the new believer how to live out his or her new life in Christ, a life that began with conversion.

At some point, Father Burke adds, conversion must become an adult experience when the believer must "knowingly, freely, and gratefully" accept the Lordship of Jesus as his or her Savior. Surprisingly, Father Burke identifies this adult decision as coming, in the Roman tradition, at the age of seven! This writer submits that at that age we are still dealing with the faith of a child. The adult experience of commitment comes much later with maturity.

The content of catechetical preaching is listed as the sacraments and the moral life of love. This reviewer submits that the content of preaching after evangelization should encompass a much wider variety of subjects, such as sin, human and Christian freedom, the Blessed Virgin, the saints, final communion with God, and countless more! This is also the time for continuing preaching on the mystery of God the Father as Creator, the Son as Savior, the Holy Spirit as sanctifier, and the Church which is the Mystical Body of Christ. Here and throughout Father Burke correctly insists that this form of preaching as well as evangelization demands " absolute immersion into the total of Scripture."

The third form of preaching is called didascalia (highest wisdom or doctrine) by Father Burke. It builds on evangelization and catechesis, " carrying the experience of faith to its uttermost reaches of Christian possibility." It leads persons to the fullest union with God the Father through Jesus Christ in the Holy Spirit and to a full penetration into the mystery of Christ.

In didascalic preaching, the preacher actually communicates God's power by which believers can sustain one another, even in persecution, and which enables them to lift up their voices in one united praise of God's glory.

For didascalic preachers this means incorporating the mind and heart of the great saints into their own and then sharing these with the modern audiences, not as an academic exercise but as a vivid experience of God's presence and power in the Christian life today.

Father Burke maintains that preaching on social action properly belongs to didascalic preaching and that it is " unfortunately " taught as a part of catechetics. He states that only adequate formation in the full mystery of Christ can provide sufficient motivation for persevering in activities which very often are divisive and disruptive.

As a catechist, I cannot agree with this. Social justice, the Church's

teaching tells us, is an essential component of the message of Christ and the Scriptures and, thus, of the Church. Preaching and teaching on social justice should permeate every level, including evangelization and catechesis. While it is true that such preaching can be divisive and disruptive, the Gospel power, of which Father Burke speaks so eloquently, effectively communicates this basic element of the Christian message.

Chapter Vis entitled" The Liturgical Homily." After examining a number of definitions of liturgical homilies, Father Burke defines it as " a short sermon integrally related to a liturgical act which inspires the worshipper to participate in the liturgy more fully in faith." A homily is characterized by the *function* it serves in the Christian liturgy and not by its *content.* A liturgical homily, therefore, reveals the liturgy and shows how Christ is touching the worshipper through the sacrament that is being celebrated in faith.

As he does throughout the book, the writer sees the key to the homily as the preacher's own participation in the mystery of the liturgical celebration as a deep personal experience of faith in Jesus Christ as Lord and Savior.

Father Burke then identifies the homily as an extemporaneous speech in distinction to an impromptu or a manuscript speech. The extemporaneous speech, he explains, combines the strengths of the other two. Carefully researched and well prepared beforehand, it is delivered extemporaneously except for particularly effective or important passages which can be read. This is, he notes, the most difficult form of public speaking. All who preach can agree with that evaluation.

Appendix A is really a bonus. In a moving way it discusses, on a very scriptural base, Father Burke's thoughts on how the power of the Gospel is transmitted through preaching, preaching that changes hearts, renews lives, and transforms society. This section can be read either independently of the book or before the first five chapters. This appendix is Father Burke at his best, despite the fact that it could have been published separately without any real loss to the continuity and coherency of the chapters that precede it.

Appendix B could be called a practical conclusion to the book. It is a series of eight questions that allow the preacher to determine whether Father Burke's advice is being put into practice, that is, whether the preacher is really exercising *Gospel Power.* The questions are very good and to the point.

There is no more exciting ministry than the ministry of preaching, concludes Father Burke. His book, *Gospel Power,* will be of considerable assistance to those who seek to revitalize their preaching.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

Columbia University Press: *Hermeneutics and Social Science* by Zygmunt Bauman. Pp. 263, with Index; $15.00.

Cornell University Press: *Boethius's De topicis differentiis,* translated with notes and essays on the text by Eleonore Stump. Pp. 287, with bibliography and index; $18.50.

Doubleday and Co.: *The Timeless Myth of Everyman Reborn* by Frederick Franck. Pp. 187; $12.50, paper $6.95.

Franciscan Herald Press: *Bonaventure and the Coincidence of Opposites* by Ewert H. Cousins. Pp. 310; $12.50.

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Humanities Press: *Philosophy and Its Past* by Jonathan Ree, et al. Pp. llO; $14.00, paper $6.95.

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Ohio University Press: *The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought* by John D. Caputo. Pp. 292; *$13.50.*

Pennsylvania State University Press: *Dimensions of Moral Creativity* by Antonio S. Cua. Pp. 174; $11.75.

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University of Notre Dame Press: *Against the Self-Images of the Age: Essays on Ideology and Philosophy* by Alasdair Macintyre. Pp. 284; $4.95, paper.

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Yale University Press: *Ethics and the Edges of Life* by Paul Ramsey. Pp. 353; $15.00.