THE GRAMMAR OF *ESSE:* RE-READING THOMAS ON THE TRANSCENDENTALS

SIGLA. For ease in argument, Thomas's works will be cited according to the following sigla: DV, *De Veritate;* Sent, *Smiptum* on the *Sentmices;* SCG, *Contra Gentiles;* ST, *Summa Theologiae;* InMet, commentary on the *1Vfetaphysics;* Quod, *Quaestiones Quodlibetales;* lnDivNom, commentary on the *Divine Names.* The number appearing before the siglum indicates a Book or Part number; thus, ' 1 Sent' means the commentary on the first book of the *Sentences* and '4 SCG' means the fourth Book of the *Contra Gentiles.*

ONE OF THE ADVANTAGES of the desuetude into which Thomism has lately fallen is that interpreters of Thomas Aquinas must address fundamentals. The effect of the last decade's convulsions was to break up a discourse within which Thomism figured as something immediate. For such discourse, Thomas was a thinker rather than an artifact; he was an interlocutor, not an instance. But in the immediacy of discourse, peripheral issues often acquired disproportionate force. Familiarity with the basic formulae passed for intelligibility. Today, when scholasticism seems to have the bad odor of an *ancien reginie,* the interpreter of Thomas must work to secure the first things, the central insights, since it is these that are controverted and misunderstood.[1] There is no time for the peripheral and no ground for assuming familiarity. If this is the only advantage of the change of fortune, it is still an important one.

The first thing in Thomism is the doctrine of *esse.* It is first in two ways, as a distinguishing characteristic and as a structuring principle. Its being first as a characteristic needs little demonstration. Even if Giles of Rome is seen as a vulgarizer of

[1] Michel Corbin has described the present state of Thomist exegesis with great acuity in *Le chemin de la theologie chez Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1974), pp. 26-35. His own solution to the current dilemma-the project of the *"lecture speculative* "-resembles the present reading in result, but not in justification.

authentic Thomism, he is evidence that the doctrine of *esse* has characterized Thomism-even constituted it in its uniqueness-from the earliest days.[2] The doctrine of *esse* serves as centerpiece in the encyclopedic commentary of Capreolus, in the Thomistic fundamentalism of certain Renaissance masters/ and even in the unfortunate " Approved Theses of Thomistic Philosophy."[4]

But if the doctrine about *esse* has characterized historical Thomism, it is not the case that the doctrine has informed the reflection of Thomists. The twenty-four "Theses" illustrate the inverse relation between doctrinal peremptoriness and reflective appropriation. The more one insists on *esse* as the shibboleth of some ' true Thomism,' the less room there is for showing how full of questions are Thomas's texts about *esse.* The force of these questions became apparent in the half dozen works published in the years around 1940 by Fabro, Rahner, Gilson, de Finance and others.[5] The questions remain. To insist that the doctrine of *esse* is characteristic of Thomas's thought can only underscore that its work as a principle has yet to be grasped.

As a step towards clarifying this first thing in Thomism, I

[2] See the introduction to the edition of his *Theoremata de ente et essentia* by Edgar Hocedez (Louvain: Museum Lessianum, 1930). The authenticity of Giles's reading of Thomas was challenged as early as Robert Orford's *Reprobationes dictorum a Fratre Egidio in primum Senfontiarum* (1288-1292).

[3] See the essay on Dominic of Flanders by Armando F. Verde, "Domenico di Fiandra, intransigente tomista non gradito nello studio Fiorentino," in *Tomismo e antitornismo, Memorie Domenicane,* N.S. 7 (1976), 304-21, but particularly pp. 310-311.

[4] The list was published in *Acta Apostolicae Sedis,* 6 (1914), 384 ff., and reprinted in the *Enchiridion Symbolorum,* 32nd ed., ##36fll-!i!4. Its native defects were exacerbated in the exposition of Guido Mattiussi, p;-':1led in the *Osservatore* and published as *Le XXIV tesi della filosofia di S. Tornrnaso d'Aquino* (R-0me: Gregorian Univ., 1925); esp. pp. 28-34 and 45-51, where the doctrine of *esse* becomes almost mechanical.

[5] The concurrence of the following books marks something like a turn in the reading of Thomas: C. Fabro, *La nozione metafisica di partecipazione secondo S. Tommaso d'Aquino* (1939); K. Rahner, *Geist in Welt* (1939); the revision of Gilson's *Le Thomisme* (1942); A. Hayden, *L'intentionnel saint ThlYlnas* (l942); J. de Finance, *Etre et agir dans la philosophie de S. Thomas* (1946, composed 1928-37); and L. De Raeymaeker, *Philosophie de l'etre* (1946), revising a Dutch w-0rk of 1944.

want to pick up the theme of *esse* at a point which is often overlooked. It is an obvious one, nonetheless. In Thomas's thinking, there are certain features which accrue to *esse* as such. These are called, somewhat anachronistically, the 'transcendentals.' [6] The transcendentals are, to characterize them logically, terms convertible with ' being ' which are not synonyms for it. They are, to sketch them ontologically, ubiquitous features which express the character of *esse* itself. [7] Thomas's doctrine of the transcendentals is surely familiar in these, its basic claims. But the doctrine is routinely taken as another *fact* about beings, something to be secured by deductive stratagems, something to be presented. It is rarely plumbed. It remains, to use Breton's phrase, " classic and yet poorly known." [8]

I want to re-read Thomas's teaching about the transcendentals. This re-reading will entail, in the first section, a recapitulation of the chief Thomist text which treats of them. Then, second, the reading will penetrate the text by asking about the ' grammar ' of the transcendentals considered as expressions of *esse*. The third and concluding section can then ask about the purport of what the transcendentals do express.

1. The Chief Text on the Transcendentals.

Thomas's most famous handling of the transcendentals opens

[6] Anachronistically, since *'transcendentia'* does not occur in Thomas's writings, with the exception of two dubious works. ' *Transcendentium* ' is found only once, at DV q. 21 a.3. The *Index Thomisticus* also gives nine authentic instances of *'transcendentibus* ', largely in the *Scriptum* and 1 ST. Coinage of the modern sense of the term is attributed by Suarez to a sixteenth century Dominican, Chrysostom Javelli; see Joseph Owens, *An Elementary Christian Metaphysics* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1963), p. 111, n. 1. On the alternate medieval tei·minologies-*passiones entis, proprietates entis, universales intentiones-see* Francis J. Kovach, *Philosophy of Beauty* (Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma, 1974), p. 237, n. 2.

[7] A standard account of convertibility can be had in J. B. Lotz, *Metaphysica operationis humanae, methodo transcendentali explicata* (Rome: Gregorian Univ., 1958), Analecta Gregoriana #94, pp. 125-27. Kovach argues that the transcendentals are defined by just three characteristics: convertibility with ' being ', convertibility with each other, and a merely logical distinction among them giving way to a real identity. See Kovach, *Philosophy of Beauty,* p. 238.

[8] Stanislas Breton, "L'idee de transcendental et la genese des transcendentaux chez Thomas d'Aquin," in *Saint Thomas d'Aquin aujourd'hui* (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1963), 45-74, p. 45.

the set of disputed questions anthologized under the caption *"de veritate."* The aim of that first article is, of course, a definition of truth. By way of definition, Thomas gives a derivation or genealogy of the transcendentals. Truth is to be defined precisely as one of the features of beings. The genealogy, then, is not done in its own right. It would be inexact to read it as a discrete essay on the transcendentals, though this is often done. But the genealogy can be used in place of a treatise on the transcendentals if one follows two cautions. First, it must be remembered that the text is a *quaestio disputata.* Second, it must he remembered that this *quaestio* is part of an inquiry into truth.

A *quaestio disputata* is a specific form with its own rhetoric and its own semantic. Historical studies have described the genesis of the *quaestio,* especially in its legal origins with Irnerius and the jurists of Bologna.[9] The practice of the quodlibetal questions in thirteenth century Paris is equally well annotated.[10] But these studies have not raised with sufficient force the issue of the *quaestio's* mode of discourse. The *quaestio* is not only a rhetorical shape, it is a semantic mode. The *quaestio* is not the same sort of speech as the *tractatus* or the *surnma;* it does not mean in exactly the same way. Much less is it a monograph in the Cartesian or Humean or Kantian mode. The mode of discourse peculiar to the *quaestio disputata* is an exercise of that human *ratio* which is never brought completely to rest, even in the believer.[11] It is, moreover, an' imitation' of the publicly performed exercise of *ratio.* A *quaestio* has, in this respect, important affinities with the chain of philosophic dia-

[9] Most familiarly in Joseph de Ghellinck's *Le mouvement theologique du XIIe siecle* (2nd ed., Brussells: Eds. Universelles, 1948), pp. 233-49 and throughout. The importance of the birth of scholastic discourse in earlier ' technical ' discourses, whether legal or medical, has not been sufficiently appreciated. These origins might explain the idea of the *resolution* or *disposition* of a disputed question, which seems to combine a technician's *solution* with public *persuasion.*

[10] See the long introduction on the practice of *quaes.tiones quodlibetales* in P. Glorieux. *La litterature quodlibetique, II* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1935).

[11] Recall Thomas's insistence on the continued motion of mind within faith at DVq.14 a.I, Compare 4 Quod d.9 a.3 on the necesary use of discursive reason in the teaching of theology.

logues which runs from Plato to Abelard. Because it is an act before a community which it repeatedly constitutes, and because it is an ongoing exercise of *ratio,* what is said in a *quaestio* is not said once for all. The determination is not made in the specious eternity of Cartesian meditation. Rather, the master responds on a particular holy day, within the limits of the *status viae,* explicitly awaiting further inquiry and alternate disposition. The devices of construction in a *quaestio* are not apodictic; they are expository and persuasive. Of course, what a *quaestio* 'records ' is not therefore trivial. But what is recorded has built into it a pedagogical plurality, a plurality of demonstrations and devices. This plurality can become crucial in reconstructing a doctrine spoken through *qua-estiones.*

The second exegetical caution to be kept in mind is that the first *quaestio disputata* in the anthology *De Veritate* intends to answer the question, what is truth? It does so by situating truth in the frame of the transcendentals. But its theme is truth. The turn of the article is thus primarily cognitive; it does not pretend to off.er an ontologist's treatment of the transcendentals. Thomas commonly treats the groundwork of one issue in discussing another. There is nothing wrong with this; it shows his admirable pedagogical aim. But it is wrong to forget which theme is primarily being treated. Certain abridgements come easily when discussing the transcendentals on the way to a notion of truth. These abridgements would have an entirely different significance if the theme were the transcendentals themselves. Part of the work of reading this text from *De Veritate* is to expand its abbreviations.

With such a cautionary prologue, which should be justified in the sequel, it is possible to read the text. Thomas's response begins with an analogy to syllogistic logic. Just as demonstrations must be 'reduced' to certain first principles which are known through themselves, so must it be with the investigation of what anything is.[12] Else there will result a lack of intel-

[12] This *reductio* is not merely an ordering procedure in demonstrations; it is not, say, a rudimentary axiomatization. The *reductio* of logic is a reflection of an ontological hierarchy of dependences and inclusions. See I ST q. 41 a. 2 ad 4m.

ligible grounding and an indefinite regress. What takes the place of syllogistic first premises in the inquiry about what something is? "That which intellect first conceives as most knowable, and into which all conceptions are resolved, is *ens"* (DV q.I a.I [p. *5,* lines 100-103]).[13] For the moment, I will leave *'ens'* untranslated, noting only that it looks like a participle of' *esse*'.[14] This might suggest that *ens* is an instanced acting out of what ' *esse* ' names more directly.

Thomas continues: " it follows that all other conceptions of the intellect are to be taken by addition to *ens.* But nothing can be added to *ens* as something extraneous, in the way that a difference is added to a genus, or an accident to a subject, since any nature whatever is essentially *ens.* ... [O]ther things are added on top of *ens* in this way, in so far as they express its mode *(modus),* which this name *ens* itself does not express" (DV q.I a.I [p. *5,* lines 104-114]). No nature other than *ens* can he added to *ens* by way of dividing it, since every nature is already *ens.* The divisions of natural genera into species and the variety of ' accidents ' which inhere in subjects occur at a level below the modal differentiation of *ens.* How, then, is *ens* to be differentiated? Thomas distinguishes two sorts of modes for differentiation, one special and one general. The first sort is that of the ten categories. The second sort, the general one, is that of the transcendentals. The transcendental modes lie ' above ' or ' behind ' the categories and stand to *ens* in another way. While the categories divide the grades of being into exclusive groups, the transcendentals express modes of *ens* which "follow upon every *ens"* (DV q.I a.I [p..5, line 125]).[15]

[13] I translate from the *Opera Omnia,* Editio Leonina, Tomus XXII: *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate,* cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum [Antoine Dondaine ed.] (Rome: Ed. di San Tommaso, 1970-76). Parenthetical citations will be to the page and line numbers of volume I, fascicle !'l, of this *tomus,* where the text of the Article is found on pages 8-8.

[14] It is indeed a surrogate participle which seems to have been coined by Caesar on analogy to the Greek. See *Dictionnaire etymologique de la langue latine,* ed. A. Ernout and A. Meillet (4th ed., Paris: Kincksieck, 1959), pp. 196-197.

[15] For an elaboration of the difference between the categories and the transcendentals, see Lotz, *Metaphysica operationis humanae,* pp. 18!'l-188.

Thomas next derives the transcendental modes of *ens* by a series of disjunctions. The first of them separates the general modes which accrue to *ens in se* from those which accrue to it *in ordine ad aliud.* The second disjunction divides the modes of *ens in se* into affirmative and negative. The affirmative mode of *ens* in itself is *res.* The negative mode is *unum.* The third disjunction divides *ens* in relation to another: *ens* can be distinguished from the other *(divisio)* or fitted to it *(convenientia).* The mode of *ens* as distinguished is *aliquid.* The mode of *ens* as fitness is in turn divided by a fourth disjunction. Fitness can be with respect to appetite or to intellect. The mode of *ens* as fit for appetite is *bonum.* The mode of *ens* as fit for the intellect is *verurn.* This step yields a first definition of the true: the true is the general mode of *ens* as it is fit for the intellect. The step also completes the argument. Whatever the mind conceives is reducible to *ens,* which comprises five general modes: *res, unum, aliquid, bonum,* and *verum.* A first account of truth is finished.

What is most obviously lacking in this reading of the text is a meaning for ' *ens'.* Every subsequent question about the sense of the text hinges on the construal of that term. The construal is hampered on two counts, one accidental and one substantive. **It** is an accident of linguistic history that English cannot render *'ens* ' as part of a trio of sibling terms-' *ens* ', ' *esS'e* ', ' *essentia* '. The closest one can come is some device of orthography or of coinage. Perhaps it will come to devices for the scrupulous translator; it did in Latin. But what is more difficult about construing ' *enS''* is its participial status. Heidegger has written about the implications of the participial form for metaphysics.[16] He takes the participle as an echo of Platonic participation-as a symptom, that is, of the difference between Being and beings. Setting aside Heidegger's own ends, it is possible to see with him how full of questions is the ontologist's use of participles from the verb ' to be '. Thomas gives

[18] Martin Heidegger, *What Is Called Thinking?,* trs. F. D. Wieck and J. G. Gray (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), pp. *!t19-!t!t!t.*

some help for those questions. He writes, in the text at hand, that " *ens* is taken from the act of *esse,* while the name *res* expresses the whatness or essence of *ens"* (DV q.I a.I [p. 5, lines I37-I39]) .[17] This suggests that *'ens'* names something consequent upon the act designated by the infinitive ' *esse* '. Used as if it were a gerund,' *ens'* seems to name the concrete instantiation of what the infinitive names more generally .[18] Thus, to say that *'ens'* is taken from *'esse'* is more than a lexical remark; it is a remark about the dependence of an instance of being on the act of being.

The same point is made in Thomas's *Scriptum* on the *Sentences,* which was being polished at about the time of the disputation 0£ the first seven Questions in *De Veritate.*[19] In the *Scriptum,* Thomas holds that ' *Qui est'* is indeed the most proper name for God (I Sent d.8 q.I a.I). His fourth argument invokes Avicenna's distinction between a thing's *quidditas* or whatness and its *esse.* The name' *res'* is imposed with regard to *quidditas;* but the name ' *qui est* ' or ' *ens* ' is given in response to the *actus essendi.* Since God is the only being whose *quidditas* is His *esse,* it is most proper that He should take the name ' *Qui est* '. This is standard Thomistic fare. Similar arguments are given some ten years later in the great *Summa's* Question

[17] Compare 4 InMet lect. 22 n. 553, where the point is reiterated.

[18] Though participial in form, ' *ens* ' behaves as if it were a classical gerund- that is, as if it were an oblique case of a reified infinitive. This is what I mean by saying that it is an *instance* of the infinitive. But this suggestion remains obscure inasmuch as the status of the infinitive is itself unclarified. Philology is only of marginal help. It that Latin infinitives were originally verbal nouns which named the action of the verb's stem. This remained the colloquial use throughout Antiquity and was taken over in philosophic writing as convenient for rendering Greek articular infinitives. See L. R. Palmer, *The Latin Language* (London: Faber & Faber, 1954), pp. 317-318, 320-321, 325-326; and Paul Perrochet, *Recherches sur la valeur de l'emploi de l'infinitif subordonne en Latin* (Paris: 'Les Belles Lettres ', 1932), pp. xiii and following.

[19] According to the testimony of Tocco, the *Scriptum* was still in work at the start of Thomas's first Parisian regency (1256). The first set of Questions in DV was disputed during the academic year 1256-57. See James A. Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas d'Aquino* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1974), pp. 358-59 and 362. I will translate from the text of the *Scriptum* in *Opera Omnia* (Parma: 1852-73, rptd. New York: Musurgia, 1948-50).

on divine names (I ST q.13 a.11). What is not standard is any grasp of the import of the relation between *ens* and *actus essendi.* The dependence of ' *ens* ' on the act of being-its being imposed in response to that act-is crucial to the reading of Thomas's teaching on the transcendentals.

This is not primarily a point about terminological constancy in the texts. The terminology is too fluid for that. Not only does Thomas revalue the vocabulary accumulated in Augustine, Boethius, Avicenna, William of Auxerre, and others, he goes on to employ the revalued terms with great flexibility.[20] (This is to be connected with the mode of discourse in Thomas's writings.) Mondin cites various passages in which' *ens'* and' *esse'* seem to be used interchangeably.[21] He even thinks that *'esse'* is sometimes equivalent to *'essentia.'*[22] It is not the case, then, that ' *ens* ' is everywhere used with the full sense of its conceptual relation to *esse.* But when Thomas emphasizes that relation, he *is* speaking carefully.

What is the *esse* of which *ens* is properly a consequence or instance? Clearly, forms of *'esse'* can serve either as copulas or as existential predicates. The infinitive *'esse'* used nominally means something more.[23] Again, passages from the contemporaneous *Scriptum* make this clear. The infinitival *'esse'* designates the first act and intelligibility of *entia.* " *Esse* is the

[20] See Battista Mondin, " St. Thomas Aquinas's Hermeneutics of Being," *Doctor Communis,* 29 (1976), I46-74, pp. *I50-56.*

[21] For example, I Sent d.19 *q.5* a.I ad Im, 2 Sent d.37 q.I a.2 ad 3m; Mondin, p. I57.

[22] I Sent d.19 a.5 a.I, 3 Sent d.6 q.2 a.2 & ad 4m. Mondin also finds ' *ens'* equated with *'essentia'* at I Sent d.I9 *q.5* a.I ad !0lm and d.23 q.I a.I.

•• That ' *esse* ' means something more for Thomas than the existential predicate is what Fabro means by saying that *esse* is not just facticity. See the long Introduction to his *Participation et caus.aliteselon S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Louvain: Pubis. Universitaires & Paris. Beatrice-Nauwelaerts, 196I). This has been challenged at various points recently by Frederick D. Wilhelmsen, "Existence and *Esse," New Scholasticism, 50* (1976), 20-45. If Wilhelmsen's able critique is not wholly convincing, it is in part because he does not engage himself in Fabro's hermeneutic presuppositions. One might also recall, on the question of the distinction between *esse* and existence, that debate sparked earliel' this century by one of Descoqs's pieces. See especially Fabro's epilogue to the fray, "Neotomismo e Suarezismo," *Divus Thomaa* (P), 44 (1941), I67-U5, 420-98.

act of the *ens* ... just as light is the act of what gives light" (1 Sent d.19 q.2 a.2). The intelligible primacy of *esse* is reflected in the hierarchy of attributes belonging to *entia:* " whatever exceeds in *ess'e* is simply m.ore noble than all those which exceed in any one of the things which follow upon *esse"* (1 Sent d.17 q.1 a.2 ad Sm). The hierarchy of attributes includes the attribute of essence, which is nobler as it is more like the highest *esse:* " By however much a quiddity is closer to the divine *esse,* that much less has it of potency, and thus it is a greater simplicity; and thus the more noble those will be which receive a nobler *esse"* (2 Sent d.1, expos. of the first part) . If an *ens* instances *esse,* it must exhibit the features of *esse* as first act, as source of intelligibility, and as chief member of the hierarchy of attributes. To repeat Heidegger's grammatical pun: the beings named by the participle' *ens'* participate the characteristics of *esse. Ens* is an instancing of the source of act, intelligibility, and every perfective attribute. For this reason, *ens* can be construed as the ground *(principium)* of the other transcendentals. It is not the *subjectum* to which they are added; it is, rather, the fullness out of which they are ' abstracted '.

That should suffice for the construal of ' *ens',* which was the first difficulty in the reading. It raises a second difficulty about the genealogy of the transcendentals in *De Veritate.* This second difficulty concerns the status of the five transcendentals as discrete. The transcendentals express general modes of *ens,* but are neither restrictions of it nor additions to it. Neither are the transcendentals parts of *ens.* Thomas summarizes these points in the *ScriptU1n* by saying that the various terms are one in supposit but many in meaning, in intention (1 Sent d.8 q.1 a.3). The distinctions among them are notional and not real. What the transcendentals express as many are 'really' one.[21]

In this respect, the Thomist transcendentals are unlike the Platonic " great kinds " of the *Sophist,* especially as these are rendered in neo-Platonism, and much like the "attributes"

[21] On the exact type of this *diatinctio rationia,* see Lotz, *Metaphysica operationis humanae,* pp. 130-81.

which Aristotle associates with being. Such comparisons are worth outlining for what they say about the status of the transcendentals. The Eleatic Stranger selects the kinds (y€vri) as case studies in the inquiry about the "weaving together of forms" *(Sophist,* 245c-255e, Q60a). Their plurality is the starting point; the task is to explain their mixture in discourse (25la-d; cf. 259a-b). The combination of these kinds-Being, Rest, Motion, Sameness, Difference-illustrates and secures the intelligible combination of attributes reflected in speech. The kinds are originally discrete and derivatively combined.

There is also a plurality of" attributes " in Aristotle. But the plurality is not raised to the level of ontological primacy. Indeed, it is quickly reduced to unity. A case in point is the relation of being to unity, which Aristotle treats in Gamma of the *Metaphysfos* (Gamma 2, 1003b23-1005a18). Aristotle argues that being and unity share " a single nature " though they differ in meaning; " they are associated as are source and cause, and not as being named in one definition " (1003b23-25). The analogical unity of the instances of being enahles the metaphysician, by the practice of his single science, to consider being as being. That unity also seems to ground a reduction of the Contraries (or Forms) of being to an original dyad, which is itself reduced to being considered as *ovo-la* (ens).[25] All Contraries reduce to Unity and Plurality (1005a3-5).[26] But Plurality can be reduced to Unity and Unity equated with Being. Thus, the Contraries fall on an analogical scale organized around the foci of being-and-unity. The Contraries are originally unified and only derivatively discrete.[27]

Thomas's own treatment of the transcendentals is not identical with Aristotle's treatment of the Contraries. This is due at

[25] For a discussion of the Contraries and a reading of the whole passage, Joseph Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics* (2nd ed., Toronto: P. I. M. S., 1963), pp. 276-77 and 259-80 generally.

[26] Apparently the reduction was performed in a (lost) treatise titled 'Selection of the Contraries." See the allusions at 1004a2 and *1005al;* compare Owens, *Doctrine of Being,* p. 278.

[27] For additional passages which might be patched together as a doctrine of the transcendentals, see also *Metaphysics,* 1004bll-20, and *On the Heavens,* 268a3.

least in part to the Augustinian and neo-Platonic lineage of the medieval handling of the transcendentals. [28] But Thomas's remarks on the status of discrete transcendentals seem to be like Aristotle's remarks on the reduction of the contraries (cf. 4 InMet lect.2 nn.549,533.) Thomas does distinguish the various transcendentals, especially the couplets *res-aliquid* and *aliquid-umim,* which might seem to overlap. For Thomas, '*res*' names the essence of an *ens,*. while '*aliquid*' refers to its being different from another. Similarly, *'unum'* asserts that an *ens* is not more than one, while '*aliquid*' says that it is not something else. But it remains unclear to what extent these distinctions are fixed. Indeed, in contemporaneous texts Thomas lists only three transcendentals beyond *ens-bonum, unum, and verum* (1 Sent d.8 q.1 a.3; DV q.21 aa.1,3) There *aliquid* and *res* seem to have been combined in some fashion with *ens* or *unum.* Let me postpone the question of the exact number of the transcendentals until the second section. For the moment, it is important to see that the distinctions among the transcendentals, whatever their exact number, are not hard and fast. Their arrangement according to a particular scheme in *De Veritate* may be only a heuristic device of the sort typical to *quaestiones.* Again, the flexibility in the enumeration of the transcendentals shows the fundamental unity of the transcendental features within *esse,* despite their conceptual plurality. Here, too, the difference between the categories and the transcendentals becomes apparent, since the number of the categories seems fixed.

The text at hand raises a third, and final, difficulty on first reading. The schematic derivation and cognitive import might mislead one into thinking that the fact of the transcendentals

[28] For a chapter in the pre-history of Thomas's genealogy, see Henri Poui!lon, "Le premier Traite des Proprietes transcendentales: La 'Summa de bono' du Chancelier Philippe," *Revue Neo-scolastique de Philosophie,* 4£ (1939), 40-77.

[29] The shorter list of three is also repeated some eight years later in the *QQ. DD. de Potentia,* q. 9 a. 7 ad 6m. The variation in the length can be traced historically to Avicenna's addition of *res* and *aliquid* to an already established list (his *Metaphysica,* I. 6). Thomas's use of the two lists recognizes the various stages in the question.

derives from grammatical rules. It might seem that Thomas is after merely logical entailments among the terms. But, clearly, Thomas sees thait the transcendentals are features of being and not only of talk about being. He does not intend to give an *a priori* deduction; the terms of his disjunctions are drawn from experience. The division into appetite and will, for instance, depends on an acquaintance with souls. Even the distinction between *divisio* and *convenientia* might rest on the experience of participation. This is important. The Thomist derivation of the transcendentals is not meant to be like the Kantian deduction of the categories. It is, rather, a perspicuous arrangement of features discovered in beings. This can be seen clearly in one of the first phrases of the Article in *De Veritate. Ens* is what first" falls (oodit)" into the view of mind. Mind does not beget beings; it is ' gotten ' by them. The arrangement of the features of being derives from an insight into the experience of beings, and not from postulates about the rules which shape human thinking.Bo

Q. The Grammar of the Transcendentals.

Troubled by a lack of rigor in the deduction of *De Veritate,* a number of exegetes have wanted to add other transcendentals, or to re-arrange the list, or somehow to touch up the argument. Some have suggested modality as a transcendental- or the pleasing, or sufficiency, or persistence.B[1] The longest-standing suggestion has concerned the transcendental nature of the beautiful, which was included as a transcendental by Thomas's predecessors and by many of his admirers, down to the most recent.B[2] But these proposals are premature until one has grasped what the transcendentals are. This can be re-

8° Kant's attack on the doctrine 0£ the transcendentals is wide of the mark (see *Critique of Pure Reason,* BUS-16). Bnt even so sympathetic a reader as Kovach slips into a mistakenly *a priori* and judgment-centered rendering 0£ the *De Veritate* argument; see his *Phil,osophy of Beauty,* p. 241.

[81] See the summary in Joseph de Finance, *Connaissance de l'etre. Traite d'Ontologie* (Paris & Bruges: Desclee de Brouwer, 1986), pp. 98-100.

••Most notably, Kovach, *Phuosophy of Beauty,* pp. 245-64.

phrased as the demand that one understand the sense of the discourse in *D'e Veritate* before attempting to edit it.

The derivation of the transcendentals in *De Veritate* rests on the distinction between *ens in sie* and *ens in ordine ad aliud.* This is the crucial disjunction: *res* and *unum* are only the negative and positive ways of characterizing *ens* in itself; *aliquid, bonum, verum* are the negative and positive sides of *ens* in relation to another. If the *in se/ad aliud* distinction is indeed the root of the discourse, then it ought to contain the sense of the list in *De Veritate.* I am not now concerned with the suggestions which have been made for emending the list, though the root distinction could be used to evaluate them. I am concerned rather with the differences between the list of transcendentals Thomas gives in *De Veritate* and the lists he gives elsewhere. Can the root distinction between *in se* and *ad aliud* be used to reconcile the various lists? To repeat, those lists-some of them contemporaneous-give only three transcendentals: *unum, bonum, verum.* It seems thait *res* and *unum* are to be combined under *ununi,* while *aliquid* is to be subsumed under one or both of *bonum* and *verum.* [33]

Such a reduction of the transcendentals can be explained in light of the root distinction. *Ens* taken *in se* is both *res* and *unum.* Since *res* and *unUJn* are related as positive and negative, they can be grasped in one. The same is true, though more discursively, of the features of *ens in ordine ad aliud. Aliquid* is a negative expression o.f *ens* as related; *bonum* and *verum* are specific positive expressions of the same. Since, then, *aliquid* is comprised in either *bonum* or *verum,* it can be expressed by both of them. The reduction of transcendentals from five to three underscores the root distinction, since the reduction is made by bringing out the two disjuncts resulting from the dis-

•• Breton treats this dynamic aspect as something much like the Hegelian dialectic. He thus justifies his ' circular ' reading of the genealogy, his exposition of the movement from being through negation to indivision and plurality, and his dislike for the disjunctions in Thomas's text (respectively, pp. 47-48, 52, and 57 in "L'idee de transcendental ") . This r.eading obscures the basic argument of the text, which is not so much dialectical as hierarchical.

tinction as more important than the differences within each of them. By choosing the last member of each side of the distinction, the reduction also suggests that the genealogy in *De Veritate* is ' dynamic ' rather than ' static '. *Res* is taken up into *unum, aliquid* into *bonum* and *verum;* the second terms seem to be understood as comprising the first.

But this reduction of the transcendentals is still only a step towa.rds discerning their grammar. It runs the risk of being a superficial re-arrangement. The reason for the arrangement has yet to be grasped. It can be found, again, in the root distinction between *in se* and *in ordine ad aliud.* That distinction suggests that *ens* lends itself intrinsically to being understood as both ' in itself ' and ' in relation '. To be an *ens* is to be a member of an order of entities in which the singular is held by relations of *c07lvenientia.* The phrase ' *in ordine ad aliud* ' now becomes helpful. Its use of ' *ordo* ' is crucial. The profoundest sense of the *in se/ad aliud* distinction is the understanding of *ens* as a singular ordered within a whole. *Ens* as such is intrinsically ordinahle. This ordinability is not one of the categories of relation which accrue to being *per accidens.*[84] It is, rather, the fundamental source for the supra-categorial features of *ens.*

Understanding *ens* as intrinsically ordinable clarifies the grammar of those three irreducible transcendentals. By' grammar ' I mean the pattern which renders sense apparent. The grammar of the transcendentals is their internal structure as it is understandable. *Unum* comprises the aspects of *ens in se,* of *ens* as the singular thing which is ordered. It names immediately the unity of a particular. But it also names the particular thing as one thing among many, as one *ens* among many such

[34] This sort of relation is something like the real transcendental relation which was mooted by various neo-Thomists and at length by Krempel, *La doctrine de la relatfon chez saint Thomas* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1952), pp. *554-62.* It seems *to* me that Krempel is plainly wrong; see the reply by M. A. Fiorito and A. Navarrete, "Notas de exegesis tomista: La relaci6n de creatura a creador," *Ciencia y Fe,* 19 (1968), 59-71. But the fundamental !.'elatedness of *ens* is not any real transcendental relation. It is the source of all such relations and is particularly expressed as the relation of creature to creator.

entia. 'Unum' carries the implication of membership in an order of like things, using 'order' as it is used in biology. It names both the unity of this being and the unity of such beings. *Unum* might, then, be glossed as completeness-the completeness both of the singular and of the array of all like singulars.

' *Bonum* ' means, immediately, the fitness of *ens* for the will. This might seem to be a remark about a relation to human will; men desire something and so deem it good. But the relation of things to human wills is a secondary and dependent relation. It depends on the relation of things to the divine will. *'Bonum'* refers most properly to the place of the entity in a divine providence. But this suggests that ' *bonum* ' names the place of the entity in the teleological movement of the creation back to God. Here the notion of order has been enriched. It is not an array of likeness only, but also a duration and a movement. *Bonum* might best be glossed as finality. To be good is to fall under the willed plan of divine providence.

Verum must be understood in the same way. The truth of the human mind depends on the prior truth of things with respect to the divine mind (DV q.1 a.2) . The truth of the thing is its showing forth the divine ' thought ' in it. This serves once again to expand the notion of *ens* as ordinable. What was before understood as a teleological array can now be seen as an intelligible showing forth. *Ens* is ordinable not opaquely, not mutely, but significantly and intelligibly. *Verum* specifies the order comprised in *ens* as an intelligible one, as eminent in range of attributes and in complexity of hierarchical disposition. *Verum* can be glossed, then, as manifestness, understanding this as the communicability and complexity of what is radically intelligible.

Ens itself is intelligibly ordinable.. Seeing this, one understands *unum, bonum,* and *verum* as completeness, finality, and manifestness. This may sound like the results which Rahner and others derive by a ' Transcendental ' reading of Thomas. Rahner's first principle of ontology, for example, is phrased in

terms of the "being-present-to itself" of a "luminosity ".[35] Coreth places the analysis of the transcendentals after chapters on ' the question ' and immediately after a section on being as horizon.[36] But the resemblances between those readings and the present one are superficial. 'Transcendental Thomism' begins always with the ground and horizon for the possibility of human experience. Its justification for this seems to be a sense for the "anthropocentric" elements in Thomas.[37] The present reading begins with the opposite sense-that of Thomas's profound subordination of natural to supernatural in a hierarchy of discourses. It takes as starting point Thomas's fundamental insight into the features of *esse,* which is an antimodern claim about the dominion of being over mind. It tries to discover the grounds for the possibility of *ens* as ordinable, insisting that such order is inherent in *ens.* The starting place is not with the possibility for human experience, but with the foundation for the hierarchy within which human experience will stand. Any resemblances ought to be suspect.

Ens itself is intelligibly ordinable; its transcendental features are completeness, finality, and manifestness. This reading of the transcendentals as the constituents of order finds support from two different doctrines in Thomas. The first, and more obvious, is the notion of the pure perfections of *esse.* The second is the analysis of the beautiful. I will take them up in order.

The pure perfections appear, among other places, in that same article on the Divine Names from the *Scriptum.* Thomas there argues that " *esse* is the first among all perfections of divine goodness, such as *vivere, intelligere,* and the like; and it

[3]°Karl Rahner, *Hearers of the Word,* tr. M. Richards (New York: Herder & Herder, 1969), p. 37.

••Emerich Coreth, *Metaphysilc* ed., Innsbruck, Vienna, & Munich: Tyrolia, 1964), pp. 3£3-4£3, but especially the introductory remarks at pp. 323-£4.

[87] See the measured defense by J. Donceel, "Transcendental Thomism," *Monist,* 58, (1974), 67-85, particularly pp. 67-68. Donceel fails to see the presumption (and radical historicism) in the claim that we ought to revalue Thomas's thought because we have questions he could not have had (p. 84). Such a program can only deafen one to a text.

is something like the principle of the others, having in itself all of them, somehow united into one " (1 Sent d.8 q.1 a.I). Later, in the commentary on the *Divine Names,* Thomas describes three such *vivere, intelligere.*[38] That treatment of the perfections is secured by refeernce to Pseudo-Dionysius. It is not hard to find still other roots for the doctrine. A similar trio is described in Plato's *Sophist* (248e) . It is greatly elaborated by the neo-Platonists. [39] Aristotle uses these perfections to describe the divine life.[40] They correspond, again, to the levels of Aristotelian science: metaphysics/physics, biology, and metaphysics/psychology. [41] Augustine offers them to Evodius as an exemplary hierarchy in an hierarchical argument for God's providence. [42] They appear in more refracted fom1 as the three parts of knowing in the *City of God.*[43] But the most telling parallel for the three pure perfections in Thomas is precisely the three irreducible transcendentals: *existere, vivere, intelligere* correspond to *unum, bonum, verum.* To exist is to be one. To live is to be expressly moving towards a good. To know is to stand in relation to the truth.

One should expect such correlations between the perfections and the transcendentals for two related reasons. First, created *esse* is an image of the divine *esse;* Thomas says this explicitly in the same comment on the *Sentences.* The pure perfections of

[38] Especially paragraphs #633 and following. Cf. 1-2 ST q.2 a.5 ad 2m; 1 ST q.4 a.2 ad 3m. See the discussion in Fabro, *Participation et causalite,* pp. *225-*29 and *252-60.*

[39] For an extensive analysis of the doctrine as it figures in Plotinus, see Pierre Hadot, " :Btre, Vie, Pensee chez Plotin et avant Plotin," in *Les sources de Plotin,* Entretiens Hardt *#5* (Vandoeuvres-Geneva: Fondation Hardt, 1960), 103-41. For the doctrine in Proclus, Stephen E. Gersh, *KIP?]O'IOS aKIP?]TOS: A Study of Spiritual Motion in the Philosophy of Proclus* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973), pp. 16-24 and throughout.

[40] *Metaphysics,* Lambda 7, 1072b26-28.

[41] Alternately, in Aristotle's own terms, the perfections correspond to the triplet Physics-Ethics-Logic *(Topics,* I.14, 105bl9-20). This division became classic from Xenocrates forward and came to influence the doctrine of the perfections; see John Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ., 1977), pp. 23, 63; and Hadot, pp. 125-27.

[42] Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio,* II.3 and following.

[43] Augustine, *De Civitate Dei,* VIII.4; cf. De *Trinitate,* VI.IO.

divine *esse* must be adumbrated in the transcendental features of created *esse.* "[T]he *esse* found in creatures allows one to see the divine *Qui est* by exemplary deduction" (I Sent d.8 q.l a.I ad . " [T]he *esse* of the creature imperfectly represents the divine *esse"* (ad 3m). There is also a second reason for expecting the correlations. The transcendentals are grasped by seeing *ens* as itself intelligibly ordinable. They are, to speak in formulae, the elementary constituents of hierarchy. The pure perfections, in contrast, are grasped by seeing the topmost member of the hierarchy, who sums eminently all of the hierarchical relations. If the transcendentals constitute the minimum view of order, the perfections are the maximum.

But even more fascinating corroboration for the reading of the transcendentals as expressions of order is found in Thomas's aesthetic theory. Thomas analyzes the beautiful as *integritas. consonantia,* and *claritas* (e.g., at I ST q. 39 a.8). But *integritas,* or *perfectio,* is equivalent to *unum. Consonantia,* which Thomas also understands as *proportio,* can be linked with the providential and intentional *bonum.* Finally, *claritas* marvelously expresses the sense of *verum* as manifestness. That there should be this further analogy between the transcendentals and the aesthetic notes can be seen in recalling the connection between order and beauty. Indeed, what is intelligibly ordinable becomes present to the mind most powerfully; a basic aesthetics, one that is ontological, tries to explicate precisely this presence by reference to the innermost structure of *ens.* Unambiguous textual warrant for reading the features of beauty ontologically can be found in Thomas's commentary on the *Divine Names.*[44]

The analogy is exact. Just as the features of *ens* culminate in *veruni,* so the aesthetic features are summed in *claritas. Integritas* is completeness or totality; the beautiful thing is itself complete and forms part of a whole. *Consonantia* is the principle of finality by which various members of the whole are re-

.. Consider the place of *pulchrum* in the argument of the commentary on the *Divine Names,* especially c.4 lect.8 and *c.5,* where Thomas treats the causality of the beautiful and the divine exemplarity.

lated to a first explains the principle in just this fashion while annotating the *Divine Names.*[45] But both *integritas* and *consonantia* presuppose *claritas,* as the order of beings and its return to the topmost member presuppose the manifestness of the members for each other, and the still deeper irradiation of God in all. *Claritas* is the "communication of the divine ' beams ' of light, which is the source of all light."[46] It is the work of the ontologically basic "manifesting light", the *lumen manifestans.*[41]

The analogy to the aesthetic notes helps solve some of the perplexities raised at the beginning of this section. The number of the irreducible transcendentals is three because there are three properties of hierarchical order-whether this order is an order of beings, of perfections, or of resplendence. These three ' properties ' can be understood as themselves part of a hierarchy of *types* of order. There is the order of array, the order of the end, and the order of reflection. The alternate ' transcendentals '-modality, sufficiency, persistence, or whatever-must be understood as further specification of these three types of order which constitute *ens* as ordinable. Perhaps each of these irreducibles ought to be understood as a focus for a set of secondary features.[48] But all such secondary' transcendentals' are to be re-interpreted with an eye to the fundamental insight into *ens* as ordinable. There is no other ground on which a transcendental could stand except this intelligible ordinability. So far as the beautiful is concerned, the present analysis suggests that it should not be considered a fourth irreducible transcendental. Nor is it a species of the good, or some combination of the good and the true.[49] It is, rather, another way of construing the same irreducible attributes of order. If one were going to include it in the scheme of *De Veritate,* it would fall

[45] InDivNom c.4 lect.6 #36\!-67.

[46] InDivNom c.4 lect.5 #340.

[47] For example, 2-2 ST q.142 a.2; see Edgar de Bruyne, *Etudes d'Esthetique medievale* (Bruges: 'De Tempel ', 1947), vol. 3, chap. 10.

[48] This is the suggestion of de Finance, *Connaissance de l'etre,* p. 100.

[••] Kovach's proposal, *Philosophy of Beauty,* pp. 241-42.

not at the level of *unum, bonum, verum,* but at the level of *ens* itself. To say that all beings are beautiful is to state explicitly the importance of intelligible order in the very notion of being.

To summarize: The basic syntax of the transcendentals is contained in three isomorphic triplets. The irreducible transcendentals, *unum, bonum, verum,* are reflected both by the pure perfections, *existere, vivere, intelligere,* and by the marks of the beautiful, *integritas, consonantia, claritas.* The last term of each triplet sums the intelligible ordinability of *ens.* To be is to be true, to be intelligible, and to irradiate the divine ' light '. The grammar of the transcendental features of *ens* suggests that what is instanced by *ens-esse* itself-must be understood as an active manifestation, as an intelligibility, and as an illumination-irradiation. If the transcendentals do form a grammar of *ens,* and if *ens* in some manner expresses *esse,* what does *esse* itself 'mean'?

3. The Purport of *Esse.*

The three irreducible transcendentals are the general modes of *ens.* But *ens* itself stands in some relation to *esse.* The first section suggested that the participle ' *ens* ' was to be read as an instance of the infinitive *'esse* '. That relation has now to be broken into its parts. These are two. In instancing a verb, any participle makes concrete some *act* and makes it concrete as *this act.* Thus, *ens* makes some act concrete and so participates in it as some particular act. But since *esse* is a curious sort of verb and since it is also tied in some way to the topmost member of the universal hierarchy, it seems that *ens* makes concrete act itself and is participation itself. *Ens* instances not just some activity, but act as such. It participates not any quality, but that ordinability which makes participation possible. It will not be possible to study either of these elements in detail. That is not requisite for a reading of the text in *De Veritate.* But it will be possible to connect Thomas's handling of *esse* as act and as participated with other handlings of it. This should complete the reading of *De Veritate* by fleshing out its language.

The kernel of the Aristotelian notion of act is found in the ninth Book of the *Metaphysics* (Theta 6). Act, Aristotle writes, is the " existence 0:f the thing " not in the way of potency. It is like " the one who builds with respect to the one who has the ability to build; like the one who sees with respect to the one who has his eyes closed, but has sight; like what has been separated from the material with respect to the material; and the finished work to what is unworked " (1048a36-b4; other examples at 1048a30-35). It is interesting that so crucial a term is defined by Aristotle ostensively. Thomas explains this procedure as due to the simplicity of act; it is a " first simple notion." [50] Aristotle goes on to distinguish various senses of' act'; he distinguishes, for instance, motions from actualizations (1048b28-30). In subsequent chapters, he discusses the senses of potentiality and the priority of actuality over potentiality (cf. 1048b35-36). He seems to take the sense of act itself as sufficiently established.

"What has he established? Two things come clear in the induction. First, act is an analogous term. Second, it is, in its purest sense, a term of intention and purpose. The technical term ' *evreA.exeZa*' is introduced precisely to denote act as ordered to an end (1047a30-3Q). These two points hint at a richer notion of act as what is constitutive of an intentional hierarchy, a *1Tpoc; iiv* analogy which is also ordered to an end. But the discussion of Book Theta does not posit this hierarchical actuality as the principle of being. It leaves the matter to be grasped inductively. Thomas thus requires something more for his notion of the *actus essendi* than what he finds in the Aristotelian discussion of act.

Thomas finds other warrants in the tradition for his reworking of the notion of act, and not only in the Arabic commentaries. The chief warrant-one that colors the commentaries as well-is the neo-Platonic analysis of evepye'ia.[51] Thomas in-

•• See 9 InMet lect.5 nn.1826-27.

[61] Some neo--Platonists want to take this over as Aristotelian, especially by exegesis of a passage in *Metaphysics,* Lambda 7, 1072b26-28. See Gersh, p. 4. Dillon remarks on the Aristotelian accretions in neo-Platonism, but does not focus on the transformation of the doctrine of *€11ep'Yela.*

herits this directly from Pseudo-Dionysius and the *Liber de Causia.* The neo-Platonic re-interpretation of *Evepye'ia* serves both to expand the the Aristotelian notion and to connect it with notions of intrinsic hierarchical order. This can be seen very easily in Pseudo-Dionysius. In one illustrative passage, Dionysius defines hierarchy as order activity (Evepye'ia), and intelligence .[52] One might see here another variation on the *existere, vivere, intelligere* triplet. But what is more interesting in the present context is the inclusion of within the definition of hierarchy. *'Evepye'ia* is explained by Dionysius as the activity of assimilation to God according to an hierarchically determined aptness.[53] This activity of assimilation according to hierarchical order is in turn divided into purification, illumination, and the giving of perfection.[54] These are distributed by Dionysius among various celestial ranks, but the distribution is then relativized by the assertion that each rank may share in each activity.[55] All are eminently realized in the Godhead. Indeed, all activity proceeds from that Godhead and returns to it.[56]

The parallels with Thomas are striking. In holding for the profound constitution of created beings in the hierarchical transmission of *evepye'ia,* Dionysius has meditatively appropriated Proclus's teaching. But he has also provided the means for opening Aristotle to the Thomist reading. The hierarchy of participated Evepye'ia.-the hierarchy which is constituted by the participation of €vepye'ia-allows one to explain the order of creation, the teleological movement of that order back to God, and the thoroughgoing intelligibility of the order as rooted in

[02] See the exposition in *Celestial Hierarchy,* IILl-2. For an analysis based on these passag.cs, see Rene Roques, *L'univers dionysien. Structure hierarchique du 1nonde selon le Pseudo-Denys* (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1954), pp. 35-131.

[58] *Celestial Hierarchy,* 164D, 165A; Roques, p. 92.

[04] *Celestial Hierarchy,* 165-BC.

[55] See the discussion in Roques, pp. 97-99. Compare Hadot, pp. 128-29.

[58] *Divine Names,* 693B; *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy,* 508D. Roques, pp. 111-16. I leave aside the infinite ' distance ' between creature and creator which is seen as an unlikeness between divine power and created power.

God. In other words, something very much like the Dionysian model of the hierarchical mediation of *evEpyE'ia* is taken over by Thomas to explain the order of beings and, thus, the grammar of the transcendentals. But the model is equally powerful in explaining the purport of *esse* itself. In the same way that all created *esse* is for Thomas by participating in the divine *esse,* so all the Dionysian hierarchical orders are actualized and can act by participation in the one act, the one *evEpylia* of the Godhead.[57] Just as Thomas will say that God, the giver of *esse,* is more intimate to any entity than all secondary causes, so Dionysius will imply that each entity in the hierarchy is closer in its *evEpy{ia* to God than to other entities.[58]

These similarities of formulation and of explanation are helpful for many reasons, though they are not meant to imply any identity of ontology between Thomas and Dionysius. In the reading of *De Veritate,* they are most helpful in suggesting how *esse* might be conceived so that it could be instanced as an *ens* with just the transcendental features of *unum, bonum, verum.* If created *esse* is an act which comprises hierarchical order, and if divine *esse* is such that it stands to created *esse* as topmost member of the universal hierarchy, then one can see how the instance of *esse* will necessarily have the features *unum, bonum, verU?n.* The transcendentals are no more than the hierarchial participability of the divine *esse* itself. This connects with the all-too-familiar but never comprehended Thomist doctrine about the absence in God of a distinction between essence and *esse.* God stands as the topmost member of the most comprehensive hierarchy. God is *Qui est.* He gives to the hierarchy, then, what He is as *Qui est.* He gives, that is, the ordering of beings by participation in Himself. That infuses into created beings the three transcendentals understood as the properties of ordinability, that is, as completeness, finality, and manifestness.

[57] I Sent d.4 q.I a.I ad 2m, d.8 q.l a.I ad 2m, d.19 q.2 a.I; *Celestial Hierarchy,* 168A, *Divine Names,* 698B.

[58] 2 Sent d.I q.I a.4; *Celestial Hierarchy,* 168A. See Roques, p. 115.

Here one reaches an understanding of the intrinsic ordinability of *ens.* The ordinability derives from the hierarchical participation of creatures in *esse.* This should not be viewed passively, as if God's *esse* suffered itself to be participated by creatures. Nor is it to be conceived mechanically, on analogy to some textbook version of neo-Platonic emanationism. Rather, the participation of *esse* is a willed resemblance of the divine *esse* made in creatures. It is the cause of the *verum,* of the intelligible likeness of the divine *esse* and the *esse* in creatures. It is the possibility for both the divine and the human *intelligere,* since it is the unity in likeness of *esse* that allows God to see Himself in creatures and creatures to see each other as images of God. Finally, this gift of *esse* is the ontological basis for the aesthetician's *claritas.* The creation of *esse* can be described metaphorically as a willed irradiation of the light of the divine *esse.* This metaphor is approved in a striking phrase from Thomas's commentary on the *Libe1·de Causis: "Actualitas rei est sicut lumen ejus* "-the thing's actuality is something like its light (I.6) .[59]

To the question, What does the relation of *ens* to *esse* imply for the doctrine of the transcendentals?, there are now two answers. First, the transcendentals make manifest the intrinsic actuality of *esse.* Second, they make manifest the hierarchical structure of the creature's participation in the divine *esse.* There is also a third answer, though it can only be adumbrated here by way of ending.

The transcendental features of *esse* were seen to be isomorphic with the pure perfections of the divine *life-existere, vivere, intelligere.* The only entities which have the capacity for intellection are persons. Thomas understands by 'person' nothing but a subsisting thing within the genus of an intellectual nature.[60] The transcendental features of *esse* are the characteristics of persons. The transcendentals are shadows of the

[59] Compare the metaphor of light at I Sent d.19 q.£ a.£.

[60] Thomas borrows the definition of person, with modification, from Boethius's *De Duabus Naturis,* c.3. It runs throughout Thomas's works, e.g., 4 SCG c.10 n.4, c.48 n.£; I ST q.£9 aa.1,£.

entity which is ·eminently personal. In this way, the Thomist ontology is always to be read from the top down. The question is not, How does one climb up to God on the ontological scale? The question is, rather, How does one truncate the divine way-of-heing in order to see its reflection in creatures?

Because it is read from the top down, any problem in Thomist ontology about the status of the transcendentals is into another context. It is not helpful to ask about the inherence of the transcendentals in *esse,* as if they were accidents. Nor is it helpful to ask how one gets from *esse* to the transcendentals, as if there were an Hegelian mime to be performed. The purest *esse* is a divine being with the attributes of personhood. In Him, all transcendentals are brought together into an existing, living, and knowing unity. That is the ultimate *subjectum* in which the unification of the transcendentals takes place.[61] The three irreducible transcendentals seem to be the constituents of the *sorts* of order. But the highest order, the one which is the cause and principle of the others, is the order within the personhood of God.

It is in this sense that Thomist ontology is ineradicably theocentric. Its first principle and last resort are a person. This person enacts in eminent fashion the features of being which are participated in hierarchical order by other *entia.* By a happy chance of rhetoric, then, the relations among the transcendental features of any *ens* do make up what is truly a grammar. They make up the grammar of the speaking which is creation. The words of that speech are the various *entia.* The purport of that speech is the image of God in created *esse.* This shows how appropriate is the handling of the transcendentals in a question on truth, and how comprehensive is the argument of *De Veritate.*

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[01] Recall Lotz's concluding remark: " Cum ergo transcendentalia de se simplicitatem et illimitationem includent, etiam immo maxime de ente infinito valent; omni vero enti finito ipsa simplicitatis et infinitatis communicant" *(Metaphysica operationis humana,* p. 133).

DISPLACING DAMNATION: THE NEGLECT OF HELL IN POLITICAL THEORY

Man, as by good or ill deserts, in the exercise of his free choice, he becomes liable to rewarding or punishing justice.

-Dante to Can Grande della Scala, Commenting on *The Divine Comedy.*

The most significant consequence of the secularization of the modern age may well be the elimination from public life, along with religion, of the only political element in traditional religion, the fear of hell.

--Hannah Arendt, *Between Past and Future,* Viking, 1968, p. 133.

PROFESSOR J. W. ALLEN once remarked about the man who forms the intellectual transition to Machiavelli and modern theory, that for Marsilius of Padua, "the function of the priest, in fact, is to supplement the action of the police and the judge by the fear of hell." [1] Even Marsilius seemed uneasy with this curious thesis, but his whole political thought was an effort to add to Aristotle's causes of revolution the one he could not have foreseen, the Christian clergy. Since Marsilius had reduced the spiritual power already to pure interiority, this left the priests with nothing to do except perhaps make mischief and civil unrest. And yet, in recalling this hesitation, that perhaps police and judges did need something more than themselves and bare reason to preserve the very public order itself, Marsilius unconsciously placed himself within an aspect of political reflection going back at least to Plato and forward to Hannah Arendt and Lezak Kolakowski.

The very idea of "judges and police," moreover, recalls the

[1] J. W. Allen, "Marsilius of Padua," *Social and Political Ideas of Medieval Thinkers,* F. Hearnshaw, (Ed.) New York, Barnes and Noble, 1923 p. 180.

Stoic and Christian notions of the origin of coercive government in a Fall, while the modern theoretical effort to gain for politics complete autonomy from " the priestly causes of revolution," from the claim that not all things belong to Caesar, has resulted in an attempt to identify " hell " with a worldly political movement or event-a Hitler, a holocaust, a tyranny. In this sense, " hell " has come to be identified with the question known since the Greeks as the worst form of government. " Hell on Earth " has become a viable political polarity against which to define and practically justify political movements and thoughts. This idea seemed stable enough in a culture based on known natural law and values such that the evils to be described were commonly agreed upon. With the introduction of Hegelian methodology in its various forms, however, the distressing possibility that the worst could become the best came to be posed at the heart of practical politics because of the nature of a certain kind of abstract metaphysics.

The intellectual history of political theory, of course, recalls with uneasy equanimity the last days of Socrates, when the best state condemned the best man, the long discourse on the immortality of the soul, the classic context even yet about the relation of human politics to human happiness and meaning.[2] The end of *The Republic,* however, presented something of a different issue. Socrates, in a passage of much power, had raised the still startling issue of immortality at the heart of political discourse. But this time, in *The Republic,* not in the face of death by the state but rather in the inability of the public order to rest if justice was not rewarded and injustice punished did the question of absolute punishment come up. This, be it noted, was already one very large step beyond the Sophoclean notion that vengeance can only be stopped in the polis. And so it seemed clear that since no existing order less than the one formed by the philosopher-king as a direct result of his clear

[2] Cf. the author's "The Death of Christ and Political Theory," *Worldview,* March, 1978; "The Best Form of Government," *The Review of Politics,* January, 1978.

knowledge of the Good could guarantee this, the idea of future rewards and punishments was necessary for the good of the existing political order itself as well as for the apparently theoretically inadequate idea of justice.

Hell is not an exclusively Christian concept, of course, but its history and necessity arise out of justice questions. Certainly, Homer and Vergil themselves remind us of the places below. None the less, the long theological refinement on what precisely " hell " might mean has given it in our eyes distinctly Christian overtones as it has been narrowed and explicitated over the centuries. Here, perhaps, it is well to cite *The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Churches* to recall the theological point of the idea of hell, a point that conditions western political reflections:

> ... In the New Testament Hell ... is an ultimate state or destiny into which souls pass only by God's final and irrevocable judgment .... According to traditional scholastic theology, souls experience in Hell both the *poena damni,* i. e., the exclusion from God's presence and loss of all contact with him, and a certain *poena sensus,* denoted in the Bible by fire, which is usually interpreted as an external agent tormenting them.
>
> Modern theology tends rather to stress the fact that Hell is but the logical consequence of ultimate adherence to the soul's own will, and rejection of the will of God, which (since God cannot take away free will) necessarily separates the soul from God, and hence from all possibility of happiness. This exclusion from Heaven (in which the unrepentant person would from his very character be both unable and unwilling to share) is held to be contrary neither to God's justice nor his love, since he will not force response to the good from any creature against his will.[3]

From this, it is evident that "hell" is a doctrine about the ultimate reality and possibility of human freedom, as well as a recognition that logically evil must be punished and good rewarded. Hell, then, is not so much a doctrine about God as about man and the importance of his actions both within and transcending the polis.

[8] F. L. Cross, (Ed.) Oxford University Press, 1958, p. 620.

The effect of these ideas is nowhere more clear than in Augustine. And as Augustine is in the direct line of both Plato and the New Testament, himself a political philosopher of the greatest moment, it is well to recall that the ultimate " City of Man " and hell are irreversibly connected in his thought. Augustine, in *The City of God,* still wanted to know about the "fire" of hell, about its eternity, its permanence.[4] Yet, the essential point-and this is again the characteristic Christian emphasis-is that the question of hell is the question of the nature of will, not cosmological place or material.

From this point of view, then, Augustine's great contribution to political theory falls precisely within the platonic tradition of properly political thought, namely, can we legitimately expect a rearranging of the civil order to give us all our proper places within the true Good? Can politics, in other words, yield the kind of happiness to which we seem ultimately called? This is the issue that will lie at the heart of all political theory proper and wrench the very minds and states of men. In defining the City of God and the City of Man so that they be not identified with Church or Empire, then, Augustine was careful to deny to actual politics the burden of guaranteeing man's ultimate good. All pecularily "modem" political theory will be a valiant, if vain, effort to retain this impossible burden for itself. And yet, Augustine himself, paradoxically, did not deny that there was such an ultimate good and happiness, nor did he deny it was open to man. What he denied, following Paul, was that it was the product of a political construction or reconstruction depending on mainly human genius, will, or merit.

Augustine, then, placed the center of the whole discussion clearly in will. What unites and divides is the very will, not law or polity. This is why Augustine, in a momentous act, denied justice to be the constitutive element in any existing state. Instead, he replaced justice with a common " love," a will, a recognition that men can in fact choose a politics that is not just and often do. Augustine, therefore, was not concerned with the

•Cf. Augustine, *The City of God,* Book XXI, Chapters *9-15.*

ultimate status of the City of' Man so much to keep men in order in the state as he was to confront the platonic and aristotelian questions about the ultimate locus of human happiness and its relation to political life. Hell, in this sense, was a metaphysical and religious issue, flowing out of the refusal to choose justice and salvation, or rather, flowing out 0£ the choice of one's own form 0£ justice. So Augustine held that it is a choice, a love, that has built the two cities. With this profound insight, Augustine became the founder 0£ " political realism," (along with Thucydides), the notion that more or less unjust societies had to deal with more or less unjust men and that of such will be the abiding condition 0£ men in all generations wherein there are men.

Aquinas, in his Treatise on Law, likewise was concerned with the legitimate place 0£ politics. Aristotle was £or him the main guide, though Aquinas ought never to be read without also realizing that he is Augustine's greatest follower. This meant that the political order does address itself to a certain kind 0£ happiness, to the question that came to be known since Plato's *Laws,* as the Second Best State. Thus, politics has a legitimate area. There are things that do belong to Caesar. But politics does not exhaust the meaning of man nor his happiness even though he be precisely the " social and political animal," as Aquinas translated Aristotle.

In his famous question about the philosophic " necessity " 0£ the divine law, of revelation, therefore, Aquinas argued clearly that civil law could not directly 0£ its own force reach the internal forum of conscience, that it could not punish all wrongs nor reward all rights.[5] Consequently, without some revelation of divine justice and mercy, men would not be able to accept the " rightness " of the whole cosmic order nor of their own political systems, which could never be themselves direct responses to transcending issues. Again, the issue 0£ hell, o:f our ultimate punishment, arose in a political context, this time in Aquinas's question about whether all evils had to be punished

[5] I-II, 91, 4.

by civil law; but here it served to restrict the civil order from claiming absolute power over all mind and act as well as to uphold the basic sense of justice that logically demands the punishment of politically undetected wrong.[6] And "wrong" is conceived in Aquinas to be an act against the kind of rational, free being, whose explanation for what he is lies ultimately in God, not in men. This is precisely why there is a hierarchy of laws so that the law of freedom cannot be set against the law of God that made man to be man in the first place, as Aristotle said.

Aquinas, in the *Contra Gentiles,* wherein he treated of the ultimate consequences of serious fault, again argued on a political analogy but on the Augustinian-Christian premise that it is free will that makes the eternal punishment justifiable, that a " free " creature with no possibility of choosing God or refusing his world is an intrinsic contradiction. Hell thus is part of the necessary consequences to being human in the first place. Thomas Aquinas thus argued:

> Natural equity would seem to argue that one would be deprived of that precise good against which he acted. Because of his act then, he renders himself unworthy of that good. Thus it is that, according to civil justice, anyone who acts against the common good is deprived of that same commonweal either by death or by perpetual exile. Nor is the issue how long the crime took, but what it is against when it did take place.
>
> The same comparison is valid if the whole present life is referred to the earthly estate, and of all eternity to the Society of the Blessed which achieves the ultimate end eternally. So whoever sins against this ultimate end and against charity, through which in the first place exists the society of the Blessed and those tending towards it, ought to be punished eternally even though he only seemed to act for a brief moment of time.[7]

From this point of view, then, the purpose of eternal punishment is to allow freedom the consequences of its metaphysical choice, its own ,seriousness, which is taken against the kind of

• I-II, 96,2.
•*Contra Gentiles,* III, CXLIV.

" good " for which classical political philosophy somehow proposed searching from its beginning in Plato and Aristotle. Hell, thereby, frees politics from an impossible worldly burden inasmuch as it enforces a contingent, imperfect civil order in such a way that the same civil order is not required to exercise absolute justice and punishment.

So long as hell was conceived as a purely religious problem, no doubt, it was largely ignored by political theory, though a reading of the last book of *The Leviathan* will readily show that even the most rigoristic materialist philosopher acknowledged its need to be accounted for, if only to prevent his own political construct from itself becoming the " hell," which indeed it appeared to be. The tendency of liberal theory in modern times, in any case, has been systematically to deny that anything done by man within society, or even without, could be so horrendous as to deserve such a consequence known from theology as hell. This indeed did seem "liberal," though whether the elimination of the absoluteness connected with hell results in a liberal consequence remains to be discussed. Thus from the Enlightenment, we supposedly learned that this doctrine of hell was one that so shackled men that they did not eliminate the social ills they could remove because they assumed hell would ultimately correct all unpunished wrongs. But if hell is " demythologized," so to speak, then it logically follows that evil and destructive social orders, the classical forms of bad rule, need not be seen cyclically as with Thucydides, but programmatically in order that they become objects for political elimination.

This is the project of Rousseau, when he, prophetically, decided to identify the source of evil in the state and civilization not in the Fall as in classic Christianity and in its consequences -in labor, birth in pain, and coercive government, as Augustine and Aquinas saw it-but in the property and governmental relationships themselves. When Aristotle had previously hinted that the human condition itself has a tendency to rebel against its proper limits, its seeming bondage as the lowest of the spiritual beings, because the highest good was properly contemplative

and therefore not directly the product of man's own political making, his own " action," he set the stage for a political theory refusing to accept Aristotle's own limits. This meant, as it historically worked itself out, that the goal of politics could be conceived as an effort to produce a full and proper happiness for man, one proper to him because formed and chosen for him not by " nature " but by man himself. The " optimism " of Enlightenment thought and that flowing from it, even until today, is based upon the rejection of any metaphysical limits to this project.

The other side of reducing the proposal for ultimate happiness to a political project, however, was already revealed in the French Revolution, wherein it became clear that the terror seemed the logical consequence of the optimistic theory. Burke, from his post in England, was not wrong in suspecting that something was radically dangerous about the perfectionist project. His words linger still to echo the thesis that even kings and queens remain human against the first signs of utopian ideologies in modern world:

> This king, to say no more of him, and this queen, and their infant children, (who once would have been the pride and hope of a great and generous people) were then forced to abandon the sanctuary of the most splendid palace in the world, which they left swimming in blood, polluted by massacre, and strewed with scattered limbs and mutilated carcases. Thence they were conducted into the capital of their kingdom. Two had been selected from the unprovoked, unresisted, promiscuous slaughter, which was made of the gentlemen of birth and family who composed the king's body guard. These two gentlemen, with all the parade of an execution of justice, were cruelly and publicly dragged to the block, and beheaded in the great court d the palace. Their heads were stuck upon spears, and led the procession; whilst the royal captives who followed in the train were slowly moved along, amidst the horrid yells, and shrilling screams, and frantic dances, and infamous contumelies, and all the unutterable abominations of the furies of hell, in the abused shape of the vilest of women.[8]

•Edmund Burke, *Reflexions on th:e Revolution in France,* Chicago, Gateway, 19.55, pp. 105-06.

And ever since this time, especially since the post-World War I era, there has been an underground tendency that recognized that an actual this-worldly "hell" was the other side of the perfectionist endeavors. Dostoyevsky had already foreseen that the old theory of tyranny would have to be replaced by a devil incarnate, a hell on earth, which made men believe that bread was really their goal.

Thus, hell has not been abolished as theologically untenable but rather it has reappeared in secular guise. No longer is evil seen to result from the choices of responsible, fallen human persons in their historical ambiguities, but evil has become incarnate. Classes, nations, beliefs are the causes of evil and must be rejected *in toto* since there can be no compromise. The Hegelian dialectic not only broke the absolute dichotomy of good and evil, the one symbolized in the very account of creation in *Genesis,* but it also showed how evil in the world could be "overcome." From the classic point of view, then, this had the effect of assigning evil to groups and movements so that the personalist evolution of western thought was reversed. Individuals could be eliminated-beginning with the king as Burke saw and ending with just anyone as our current revolutionaries teach us-because they bore the sign of visible evil on their foreheads. And their lives literally became a hell since no human traditions governed their existence and limited what could be accomplished against them.

It is at this point that the problem of hell enters modern political thought. For the effort to establish an absolute happiness by political means-a heresy still very prevalent in various Third World religious trends-has its correlative in the elimination of the causes of evil as such so that its embodiment does not lie in human will but in a group or class with no reference to individual choice or moral status.[9] This is why modern vio-

• Burke's observation is worth recalling here: " History consists, for the greater part, of the miseries brought upon the world by pride, ambition, avarice, revenge, lust, sedition, hypocrisy, ungoverned zeal, and all the train of disorderly appetites, which shake the public .... ·These·vices are ihe *causel* of those storms. morals, laws, prerogatives, privileges, liberties, rights of men, are the *pretexts. Jbid.,* p. 20}.

lence pays relatively little attention to personal guilt but justifies itself in terms of variously disguised forms of " collective guilt." Again the old theological issue of original sin becomes re-enacted in a perverse manner within a political context. And in a perfectionist political theory, be it noted, when ultimate happiness is conceived as arriving within the movement down the ages, the elimination from this life through terror is equivalent to hell, to the absolute destruction. The belief that evil can be removed by political action, thus, turns out to be the cause for the secularization of hell as a political instrument to justify the good life. The good life arrives when the evil classes or movements are eliminated. Eric Voegelin touched upon this in *The New Science of Politics:*

> The death of the spirit is the price of progress. Nietzsche revealed this mystery of the western apocalypse when he announced God was dead and that He had been murdered. This Gnostic murder is constantly committed by the men who sacrifice God to civilization. The more fervently all human energies are thrown into the great enterprise of salvation through world-immanent action, the farther the human beings who engage in this enterprise move away from the life of the spirit. And since the life of the spirit is the source of order in man and society, the very success of a Gnostic civilization is the cause of its decline.[10]

The life of the spirit thus comes to be challenged precisely by the life of politics seen as a means to salvation, something consistently denied it in the classical Christian tradition, as well as in Aristotle.

What this consideration suggests, therefore, is an issue rarely faced any more in the heart of political theory, but nevertheless one continually present in often undetected forms. This is whether the modern project of a completely rational politics is possible without a revelation to save reason. The Thomist implication in the Treatise on Law (I-II; 92-4) was that for most reason did need revelation. And it would be deceiving, even on empirical grounds, to maintain that this is still not the question.

[10] Eric Voegelin, *The. New Science of Politie$,* Chicago, University of Chicago Press, l95fl, p. 131.

Leo Strauss, with his ,usual perception, put his finger on the exact issue:

> The natural law which is knowable to the unassisted human mind and which prescribes chiefly actions in the strict sense is related to, or founded upon, the natural end of man; that end is twofold: moral perfection and intellectual perfection; intellectual perfection is higher in dignity than nioral perfection; but intellectual perfection or wisdom, as unassisted human reason knows it, does not require moral virtue. Thomas solves this difficulty by virtually contending that, according to natural reason, the natural end of man is insufficient, or points beyond itself or, more precisely, that the end of man cannot consist in philosophical investigation, to say nothing of political activity. The natural reason itself creates n presumption in favor of the divine law, which completes or perfects the natural law. At any rate, the ultimate consequence of the Thomist view of natural law is that natural law is practically inseparable not only from natural theology-i. e., from a natural theology which is, in fact, based on belief in biblical revelation-but even from revealed theology. Modern natural law was partly a reaction to this absorption of natural law by theology.11

Now, of course, Thomas is somewhat more nuanced than Strauss implied, but Thomas did hold that revelation is necessary for most men to know and keep most of the natural law, while one of the reasons £or this same revelation was precisely the inability of civil law to punish all violations. This clearly suggests that modern theory insofar as it explicitly rejects the idea of reason's limits, so that it claims the possibility to construct rationally the good life, cannot be reconciled with Christianity. And this is the precise origin of the reappearance of hell as a political doctrine and practice, however it be called, in the need to find a cause in public life of human evil.

How is this to be understood? Hannah Arendt has argued that Christianity, when it became established, £aced the same problem in the public order as did Plato in *The Republic.* She argued further that even the French and American revolutionary founders were concerned to emphasize the public function

11 Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History,* Chicago, University of Chicago Pres, 1958, pp. 163-64.

of hell. In the context *qf* Leo StmJiss's Hannah Arendt's reflections are of uncommon significance:

> For the obvious re.asou why the men of the revolution of all people should be so strangely out of tune in this respect with the general climate of their age was that precisely because of the new separation of church and state they found themselves in the old platonic predicament. When they wamed against the elimination of the fear of hell from public life because this would pave the way to " make murder itself as indifferent as shooting plover, and the extermination of the Robilla nation as innocent as the swallowing of mites on a morsel of cheese (John Adams)," their words may sound with an almost prophetic ring in our ears; yet they were clearly spoken not out of any dogmatic faith in the " avenging God" but out of *mistrust in the nature of man.*[12] (Italics added)

This latter, of course, is a remarkable line, since it locates the political necessity for the doctrine of hell exactly where Aquians located the need for revelation with respect to reason.

Naturally, if pure reason closed off from any revelation-the modern project-ends up creating a kind of political hell, then it would follow that political theory must reassess Strauss's restriction about the kind of reason that would save us. John Hallowell was one of the few contemporary theorists to grant the necessary conclusion. In his *Main Currents in Modern Political Thought,* he wrote:

> ... The basic insights of the Christian faith provide the best insights we have into the nature of man and of the crisis in which we find ourselves. That crisis is the culmination of modern man's progressive attempt to deny the existence of a transcendent or spiritual reality and of his progressive failure to find meaning in some wholly immanent conception of reality. Modern man's worship of the Class, the Race, or the State has only further alienated him from reality, plunged him deeper into despair and impelled him further along the road to destruction and annihilation. Only through a return to faith in God, as God revealed himself to man in Jesus Christ, can modern man and his society find redemption from the tyranny of evil.[13]

[12] Hannah Arendt, *Between Past and Future,* New York, Viking, 1968, pp. 138-84.

[13] John Hallowell, *Main Currenfa in Modern Political Thought,* New York, Holt, *1950,* p. *651.*

For Professor Hallowell, then, the alternative to an actual tyranny of evil, a "hell," is not an exclusively rational project, even though, at least in Thomistic metaphysics, rationality need not be opposed to revelation, no matter how much the latter aids the former. The systematic thinking out or the politically activist rooting out of precisely those Christian supplements to pure reason, has left us with the kind of man motivated by no corrective influence. The penalty for thinking in a purely rational manner has been precisely that, pure reason.

Jacques Ellul's recent study, *The Betrayal of the West,* is an effort to trace this consequence. And its essence is the victory of the modern political project, the founding of all right and history and nature on man himself. Classical Christian metaphysics, as Maritain once wrote,

> is a philosophy of being; more than that, a philosophy of the superabundance of being .... Christian philosophy, better than the Greek, has seen that it is natural that immanent activity should superabound, since it is superexisting. Purely transitive activity is transitory .... Immanent activity is "generous," because, striving to be achieved in love, it strives to achieve the good of other men, disinterestedly, gratuitously, as a gift. Christian theology is a theology of divine generosity .... [14]

And it is the disappearance of this universality, this "superabundance," that is most gravely affecting the present civilization. Ellul himself put it quite well:

> It is in our day that Jesus is, in the fullest and most radical sense, being rejected by everything-I mean literally everything-and in every area of man's endeavors: his thinking, his willing, his undertakings, his building of his world, his consumption. It is in our day that Jesus is being, in the fullest and most radical sense, humiliated: simply left aside as possessing no interest or significance in comparison with what man discovers for himself and bestows upon himself....

"Jacques Maritain, *Scholasticismand Politica,* Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday Image, 1960, p. 174. Cf. also F. Wilhelmsen, "The. Christian Undertanding of Being," *The IntercollegiateReview,* Winter•Sprlng, 1978, pp. 87-98.

, .. God's silence means that the world that wanted to be **left** alone is now indeed alone... ,[13]

What is thought to have been unnecessary to reason, then,- that is, revelation-and "what is feared from human nature" combine to make the classical Christian solution almost empirical. The doctrines of revelation and hell are both legitimate and pertinent to the political order itself.

To speak of the absence of precisely what Christianity has said must be added to us if we .would be whole, if we would achieve our very happiness, is, no doubt, paradoxical. Yet, in a real sense, if we consider that much of the duty and function of the modern state is to bureaucratize and organize, to make public, as it were, all the human concerns with poverty and sickness and weakness that Christianity brought initially into the world, a theme R. H. Tawney used to touch upon, then we can see the significance of Edmund Fuller's recent remarks about Professor Gaylin's *"Doing Good" : The Limits of Benevolence:*

One hates to face the limits of benevolence. Ideally, it should be infinite, yet probably only saints could be trusted fully with the care of the helpless, and saints are in short supply. Perhaps true human benevolence is necessary one-to-one, few-to-few, *ad hoc.* That saintly woman of Calcutta, Mother Theresa, knows that she and her sisters cannot minister even to all of Calcutta, but they minister lovingly to each individual's needs as they encounter them.[16]

Benevolence, that secular rendition of Christian charity, cannot retain its value apart from its original inspiration. Ellul himself argues that the contemporary heresy is precisely the belief that what men lack is clothing, food, shelter, and that this is the definition of religion, that of helping the brother. [17] And yet, this is a complete, enclosed humanism, out of which there is no escape, a perfect definition of " hell " in which all relationships are defined exclusively in terms of justice, in

'"Jacques Ellul, *The Betrayal of the West,* New York, Seabury, 1978, pp. 78-79.

. . [1]. Edmund Fuller, Review in *The Wall Street Journal,* May, 1978.

" Ellul, pp. 184-85.

which no one is related to· any one else except by legitimate obligation. From another tradition, this is the implication of the widely-read thesis of **John** Rawls's *A Theory of Justice.* Men, consequently, end up precisely alone-again the classic definition of hell, the existence of a world totally of our own norms and makings, a world of no relationships except those of justice.

Perhaps the best analysis of this result in its Christian implication is in Lezak Kolakowski's "Le diable, peut-il etre sauve? " [18] The question Kolakowski addresses himself to is the significance of the .Christian doctrines of evil and hell, epitomized by the figure of Satan. To do this, he places himself squarely before the modern political enterprise which sets up as a project the proper elimination of evil, again defined variously through Rousseauian tradition as the elimination of property, labor, and coercive government. Is evil, in other words, contingent? Is hell an illusion? To put it in still other terms, what happens if these doctrines are relativized, as they have been in modern thought? Can we reconcile evil, as Kolakowski sees many contemporary Christian thinkers trying to do? [19]

Kolakowski's answer, then, is directly related to the remark of Strauss as to that of Hallowell about the need for what the Christians call "grace" even to be fully natural-a theme also stressed often in Chesterton's *Orthodoxy.* Kolakowski wrote:

> The two complementary ideas which are at the very heart of Christian culture-namely, that humanity has been fundamentally saved by the coming of Christ and that, since man has been chased from a terrestrial paradise, every human being is fundamentally condemned if we consider him in his natural state, without the aid of grace.:___oughtto be considered together to avoid a heady optimism or a despair which could follow a consideration of the two ideas independently of each other.

[1·] Lezak Kolakowski, "Le diable, pcut-il etre sauve? " *Contrepoint,* Paris, #20, 1976, pp. 129-39.

[1·] *Ibid.,* p. **ISi.**

· Without dQubt the Church has {Qr.ma;llydecided that very many are saved and has never formally declared that anyone was condemned. There is nothing in the teaching of the Church which formally excludes the possibility of hell being empty, but we are not permitted to affirm it does not exist. The existence of the devil affirms without ambiguity that evil constitutes a permanent element in the world, that it can never be totally uprooted, and consequently it is vain to hope for a universal reconciliation. One of the fundamental principles of the Catholic Church is that Christ has died not only for the elect but for all. But one of the central theses of the Council of Trent is that the liberty of man is to accept grace or to refuse it, without being able as a result positively to increase its force and that affirmation seems to be a natural consequence of the doctrine of original sin.

Kolakowski, then, went on to argue that these concepts of original sin and the existence of the devil have almost disappeared even in Christian circles. In fact, "the faith in the unlimited perfectability of natural man, in that Parousia that man himself prepares for progressively is prevailing among Christians." [20] Yet, the ideological concepts of a man-made paradise and a society in which all capacities are fulfilled would undermine both the ideas of love and creativity for which they are said to aim. " Complete satisfaction is equivalent to death and partial satisfaction implies suffering. Thus, the whole ideological project is itself a failure. Human corruptibility is not contingent. . . ." [21] Few people would work for progress if they really knew the cost to be paid. And at a more fundamental level, the promise of a terrestrial paradise, to return man to his innocence, attacks the very right we have to remain the individuals we are. [22] Every good work can become corrupt so that some doubt is healthy against the prevalent promethean principle.

Our natural forces are able to find no sure support against evil: all that which we are able to do is to practice the art of placing in balance the contrary dangers. It is precisely this which the Christ-

[20] *Ibid.,* p. 186.
[21] *Ibid.,* p. 186.
[22] *Ibid.,* p. 187.

ian tradition affirms when it maintains that certain effects of original sin are ineluctable and that there can only be salvation through grace.[28]

The reality of grace and devil, the conviction that mankind is free, yet not able by its own efforts to achieve its highest happiness, that being is ultimately gift-oriented, that evil is definable and permanent, that hell is a surety for the belief that not all is compromisable-these serve to refashion our thinking on political theory. This era is caught between a relativism that compromises all and a belief that only the right should and shall prevail. Ultimately, the tyrannies of the QOth Century have been clearly moral evils acting against the human good, a good which is not an abstraction but something in real humans born into this world.

Hell, consequently, does have a proper function in political theory. Like original sin, whenever hell is neglected, it merely returns under another form. The tradition of Aquinas is that all evil will be punished ultimately, that all human evil is precisely chosen. But it need not be the function of politics to punish all evils or to correct all evil choices. This latter is a central political proposition. The effort to create a perfect, self-conceived society on earth invariably seems to result in a kind of incarnate hell. And yet, it seems such an attractive idea, for it does witness to the questions Aquinas asked in the first part of the *Prima Secundae,* to the human search for absolute happiness. When modern political theory decided to base its initial proposition, contrary to the classics, on moral indifference to good and evil with Machiavelli and before him with Marsilius's reduction of all morality to interiority, it set off on a project that was metaphysically impossible. The limits of pure reason, the paradox that man usually cannot know his own good or happiness-the impact of Aquinas's argument for a divine law-seems to be an affront to modern theory.

Nevertheless, again and again, the political consequences of the denial of the existence and definition of evil and its

[18] *Ibid.,* p. 188.

permanent punishment cannot be ignored. Hell is not a neutral or mythical element in the political context. The essence of this means that good cannot evolve from evil, even though out of evil God can draw good, as Paul of Tarsus taught. All of this makes the political enterprise distinctly different from its manner of presenting itself in modern thought. In the modern era, then, evil and hell have become objects and movements to be overcome rather than mysteries lying deeply in the heart of human choice, where Augustine properly placed them. Political theory, in other words, is conditioned by our metaphysics and our theology, as the very structure of the *Summa* suggests to us. What we believe about hell, therefore, remains the touchstone of what we believe about politics. The mystery of evil, of hell, its consequence, is neglected at a very high cost. Plato was not wrong at the beginning of political thought to suspect that immortality, that final punishment and reward, all grew out of the way men must begin their reflections on politics. What finally made it all fit together was when men learned that there were in fact things that did not belong to Caesar. And the first of these is precisely hell, the doctrine of eternal punishment.

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THE ACT OF ANALYSIS

IT WOULD SEEM FAIR to say that the prevailing view of analysis has been largely shaped by Kant's account of the analytic judgment. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* that judgment is presented as one in which" the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as somewhat which is contained (though covertly) in the conception A." It is a judgment " in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is cogitated through identity." Forming it, therefore, involves no " recourse to the testimony of experience," no need to "go outside the sphere of my own conceptions." For example, " I need not go beyond the conception of body to find extension connected with it." I have but to " analyze the conception "-that is, to "become conscious of the manifold properties which I think in that conception." The judgment upon any notion demands only that we " analyze it into its constituent conceptions," thereby bringing into the full light of consciousness those elements "which were already in the subject, although in a confused manner." The product of the analytic act is thus " a proposition that stands firm a priori;" the mind needs" only to extract the predicate from the conception, according to the principle of contradiction, and thereby at the same time become aware of the necessity of the judgment." [1]

The core of the above is also found in the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics:* "Analytic judgments express nothing in the predicate but what has already been thought in the concept of the subject, though not so distinctly or with the same full consciousness." [2]

[1] *Critique of Pure Reason,* trans. Meicklejohn, pp. 7-8. (Willey Book Company, New York, 1900).

[2] *Prologue to Any Future Metaphysics,* p. 14. (The Library of Liberal Arts, Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1950).

Important problems attach to Kant's account of analysis and its product, problems rooted in the stated covert, confused or indistinct presence in the subject-concept of the elements that reflective thought brings to the light of day. Granting the product of analysis that initial status, we are led to ask what, if anything, is given overtly and distinctly to thought. Putting this somewhat differently, we must ask in terms of what, if anything, the subject of analysis is initially known or identified. This, in turn, prompts a question concerning the relationship between what is initially known and that which analysis yields. But these are matters more appropriately dealt with in another context. Let us proceed for now on the assumption that the product of analysis, the extracted predicate, is so given as an element of the subject-concept that the act of analysis unfolds exclusively in accordance with the principles of identity and contradiction. The prevailing view of analysis is based upon that very assumption. Its adherents stress that, as initially present to thought, the subject is seen to contain the predicate -i.e., the subject is known as a complex having the predicate as one of its discrete parts. Accordingly, they would note, the analytic proposition is simply the expression of the knowledge that the predicate, the extracted constituent, is such a part of the complex. And this is to say that there is a relation of direct and complete identity between the relevant part of the complex and the extracted predicate, and a relation of direct but partial identity between the extracted element and the initial complex. The favored examples of the latter, partial identity are the relationship between *male* and *bachelor,* or *unmarried male,* and that between *sibling* and *brother,* or *male sibling.*

Proponents of this essentially conventional approach toward analysis also emphasize that the necessity involved is based on the laws of identity and contradiction. Contracted to the case in hand, these principles tell us, respectively, that a given cogitated element 0£ a subject-concept must be such an element and that it isimpossible for it not to be such an element. Thus *male* must be and cannot not be an element of *unmarried male.*

Rephrased, an unmarried male must be and cannot not be a male. Whence what is now the standard characterization of analysis and its expression in a proposition. Both are held to be unqualifiedly repetitive of what was originally present to thought. To perceive *y* within *xy,* to assert that *xy* is *y,* is to undertake what need not be undertaken, to grasp what has already been grasped, to proclaim what need not be proclaimed. We can indeed note that a bachelor, i.e., an unmarried male, is a male; we are indeed allowed-better, compelled-to assert that an unmarried male is a male; but in neither case have we added one tittle to our initial knowledge, in neither case gone beyond what can only misleadingly be called our starting point. In the words of Anthony Quinton, " an analytic statement is a tautology that repeats itself, asserts no more than it assumes, is an instance of the law of identity whose denial is an explicit contradiction." [3]

The above interpretation o:f analysis permits its adherents to say something of seeming significance relative to the verbal expression of the analytic proposition. The sentence " a bachelor is a male " will of course signify a necessarily true proposition by virtue of the meanings of " bachelor " and " male." Spelled out, " a bachelor is a male " represents a necessary truth because the meaning of " male " is one element in the meaning of " bachelor." In this limited and precise sense, then, we are here concerned with a *verbal* truth and necessity. But, clearly, that an unmarried male *be,* and of necessity, a male has no intrinsic connection with, let alone dependence upon, any word or set of words. The actual identity expressed by the proposition grounds its truth and its necessity; it is hardly the sentence signifying the proposition which brings it about that a male is and must be a male.[4] We could say with equal force that the

•"The A Priori and the Analytic," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,* LXIX, pp. 31-54. This is one part of what Quinton calls the "analytic thesis." Here, he grounds the truth and necessity of the analytic proposition in the principle of identity. But, as we shall see in the two notes that follow, he also presents them as following from words and the conventions governing their use.

• Quinton proposes, *ibid.,* that " a:n analytic statement is one true in virtue of the meanings of the ternts it cohtaufs." Since he defines a statement as "a form

truth and necessity of the proposition *a bachelor is a male* are *conventional* in nature because the proposition is signified by a sentence, " a bachelor is a male," the meanings of whose terms are determined by convention. But conventions do not dictate the only necessity found here-that a male be a male.[5]

Despite their properly incidental and extrinsic relationship to the truth and necessity of the analytic proposition, the roles played by language and its conventions do allow for an empirical study which might virtually pre-empt that reflection upon the elements making up a given concept which constitutes Kantian analysis. To discover the elements that by convention, formal or otherwise, are signified by the words " bachelor " or " brother " is not far removed from the reflection upon the parts that make up the concepts *bachelor* or *brother.* Published, such a discovery would lessen interest on the part of others in any pronouncement by an individual on the results of his personal reflection upon the elements composing the presumably common concept of *bachelor* or *brother.* And assuming Kantian analysis to be the only kind, much the same point could be made concerning the words " cause," " relation," and " good," for example, and the corresponding notions of *eause, relation,* and *good.* If, then, analysis in the Kantian sense constitutes the discipline of philosophy, the consequence of this point for the public expression of that discipline is clear: the study of language will be governing.

It is quite possible that the ordinary understanding of the word " analysis " itself would be compatible with all that has thus far been presented. Do we not mean by " analysis " precisely an inspection of a conceived object and the detailed de-

of words with a meaning attached," he should have said that by virtue of the meanings of its terms a statemcnt-i. e., a sentence-signifies a *proposition* that is analytic, true and necessary. He has confused sentence and proposition.

[5] Quinton, *ibid.:* "necessary truth is a matter of convention." The claim is thus proved: " The meanings that words have is assigned b.y convention. Therefore it is linguistic convention that makes a form of words express a necessary truth." While true, the two statements are irrelevant. He is here speaking of a sentence (" a form of words "), and illicitly transferring what holds of it to the proposition, the "necessary truth," that this form of words expresses.

termination of what; in all its parts or features, it is-a determination manifested in the proposition that we term analytic? And what can either act, the inspection or the consequent assertion, amount to other than the acknowledgment of what the object of the inspection, the subject of the assertion, is actually conceived by you or by me to be? To analyze, it would seem, can only be to mark, to note, to tick off one by one, the conjoined or co-present features of any complex object that is given to thought. Could we conceivably do other than to duplicate, first in the act of analysis, then in the affirmation, what we have before us when we apprehend a given complex? And is it not equally certain that what we here offer as the layman's grasp of the word" analysis" must carry with it a commendation of today's professional emphasis upon the linguistic? In the verbal enunciation of what our conceptual inspection has yielded, we perforce present the elements which, normally by informal communal agreement, are brought to mind by the word used to designate the subject of the proposition. Hence analysis in the ordinary sense may be substituted for by an inquiry into a community's use of words. No doubt there will be required careful study of the various contexts in which a word is used. No doubt, as well, artfully constructed translations of sentences in which a word is found will be required in order to reach agreement in the community as to how its members use the word. But such complications need not essentially change matters. H analysis reveals, for example, that *jazz* is a form of music involving improvisation, certain types of harmony and tone colors, and different syncopated rhythms, the same information could be made available by observing that the word "jazz" is used to signify these very elements.[6]

* * *

•It is of course only a contingent truth that any word has a given meaning; it is thus not necesary that a given set of words signify a necessary truth. In fact, though, to this individual, group or community, a· given set of words may signify a truth that is seen to be necessary. It is contingent that " a bachelor is a male " has the meaning that it is-but what it does signify is necessarily true.

We must now ask the questions to which all of the above has been introductory. Does the proffered account of analysis apply to every operation which involves the inspection of an object of thought and the drawing from it of a feature with which the object can in truth and of necessity be identified? Is the acquired and distinct consciousness of the features or elements of the object nothing more than the noting of one actually given discrete element after another? Is every intelligible complexity on the part of an object of the form *unmarried male* and *male sibling?* Is every assertion that expresses the analyzed object's possession of an element or feature of the form *an unmarried male is a male?* Is it the case that such an assertion can present, in Quinton's words, "no more than it assumes?" Moving to the area of language, must we hold that the signification by a sentence of a necessarily true proposition is only possible by virtue of the inclusion of the predicate in the meaning of the word used to designate the subject, as in the case of "a brother is a sibling"?

One reading, admittedly questionable, of Kant's statements on analysis would have it that this is not actually his view. The English logician, Joseph, calls attention to the seeming implications of Kant's remark that the predicate extracted through analysis is *covertly* contained in the subject-concept. [7] This would suggest that, despite his subsequent description of the analytic judgment, Kant sees analysis as yielding something that is not initially given, something not grasped when the subject is first known. Thus analysis would not be an act in which we do no more than focus upon the *y* within *xy,* but one in which we draw from the subject that which, cognitively speaking, is latent within it.

At this point our attention might be called to another understanding of the word " analysis," one quite at odds with the interpretation of this word noted a while back. Interestingly enough, the terms apt to be used in characterizing this other view of analysis are those often favored by adherents of today's

[1] *An Introduction to Logie,* H; W. B. Joseph, pp. 208-09 ,{Oxford, 2nd ed., 1916).

analytic school in describing their own proper endeavors. The terms in question are "clarifying," "explicating," and " elucidating." If themselves not utterly transparent in meaning, they would at least seem to be inappropriately applied to the act of extracting *y* from *xy, rnale* from *unmarried male.* And it involves no great leap to see them as consonant with the second view of Kant's doctrine on analysis, in which this act is one with discerning the element or elements *covertly* contained in the object present to thought.

Whether or no, consistently or no, such significant elucidation of the subject-concept enters into Kant's understanding of the analytic act, whether or no, as interpreted by those who most frequently use them, such terms as "explicating" and "elucidating" preclude that position on analysis which sees it as essentially akin to the second counting of the patches and colors of an Appalachian quilt, there does exist a notion of analysis radically opposed to that presented at some length above. It is an interpretation of analysis as an act that, in the words of Arthur Pap, involves "cognitive effort " and *progress in knowlcdge.8* A similar understanding of analysis would seem to be present in J. 0. Urmson's claim that contemporary British analytic philosophers see it as their task " to deepen their understanding of . . . such concepts as ' time,' ' relation,' and ' thing ' .... and to master all their nuances, and through an exact and thorough analysis of these concepts, and of commonsense ways of thinking ... to arrive at a better understanding of common sense itself, and, at the same time, a better understanding of reality." [9] The cognitive enterprises there sketched are surely a far cry from the *analysis* of brother into male sibling.

Paradoxically, much the same cognitive effort and progress in knowledge would appear to be involved in Anthony Quinton's

[8] *Elements of Analytic* Philosophy, Arthur Pap, pp. 445-47, (Macmillan, New York, 1949).

• " The History of Philosophical Analysis," *Royaumont Colloquium,* trans. R. ltorty, *The Linguistic Tum,* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1967).

understanding of the relationships among the various elements (necessity, the logical or formal, the conventional, etc.) that :make up the standard position on analysis. For he presents more than one element of the thesis as a " development," a " development or elucidation" of another element.[10] Here, too, we would appear to be far removed from the notion of analysis as a plucking of one or more of its distinct parts from a complex conceptual whole. And remaining within the contemporary scene (though with a bow to Pelagius), should we not see as involving a pronounced cognitive effort, a definite progression in thought, a truly penetrating intellectual act, the declaration that *ought implies can*, that obligation entails ability? How disconcerting it would be were we told by an appropriate authority that only the habits and rules of the English language lay behind the claim-that, a study of the language revealed, by " ought " we simply mean " can " plus some other discrete but, as it happens, unnamable (indeed unknowable, because non-existent) human state juxtaposed in thought to the notion of ability.

But more of this and like instances later, when we shall seek to probe and elucidate the competing notion of analysis which they would seem to embody. Though today no more than a minority would hold to it, this second view of analysis is fairly widespread, accepted, if only implicitly, by all who take philosophy to be more than the detailed exposition of the various features of a given language. However, even its open proponents, unlike the supporters of the more conventional doctrine on analysis, have not spelled out their position in anything like adequate detail. There is, for example, very little in the way of an account of what is surely the decisive factor in any theory of analysis, the precise relationship between the subject of analysis and that drawn from it, between the subject and the predicate of the analytic proposition. This stands in strong contrast to the utter clarity of the subject-predicate relationship central to the dominant contemporary position on analysis, that

[10] *Op. cit.*

of direct identity revealed in the propositional form *xy is y.* Certainly, if intelligibility is to be had by the claim that analysis involves cognitive effort and progression in the move from knowledge of the subject to knowledge of the predicate, it must be determined what sort of subject-predicate relationship obtains other than that of direct identity-and what sort of necessity binds subject and predicate other than that rooted in direct identity. Beyond that, there must be brought out whatever is essentially involved in that analytic act which escapes the status of the inconsequential and simply repetitive. A difficult task, perhaps an impossible one. It may be that only the barest sketch of this sort of analysis is possible, and one largely based on the way of negation: whatever lends triviality to analyses, whatever leads to propositions of the form *xy is y,* must be lacking in that having cognitive significance. Help might also come from instances, presumed or undeniable, of significant analytic sequences. One of these, of course, is *ought implies can.* Another might be a common declaration of the limits of existence: to be is to be singular, i.e., only the .singular, as opposed to the universal, can exist. Then there is the hoary but steadfast *red is a color.* It may be that each of these, and others, will embody the features that we are led in a priori fashion to attribute to progressive analyses. Aided as well by a spirit of conjecture, let us turn to the task of uncovering the features of non-Kantian analysis.

* * *

1. A starting point: the subject of analysis determinately identified.

Perhaps nothing more obvious could be said concerning any analysis than that it must begin with knowledge of the subject undergoing analysis. It must be known *what* is being subjected to the pondering, the probing, the discriminating, the explicating, the elucidating that we see as one with the act of analysis. In a word, analysis must begin with the *identification* of the analyzed-that from which we draw the given predicate, that

whose relationship to the predicate we express in the proposition, that which we perceive as necessitating the predicate. So obvious is this that it might appear to be insignificant. But consider anew Kant's account of the analytic judgment.

Setting aside the qualification "covertly" in his statement that the predicate is contained in the subject-concept, our account of his doctrine on analysis proceeded on the assumption that every " extracted " element is from the beginning explicitly present to thought. This approach was called for, ultimately, in view of his claim that" the connection of the predicate with the subject is cogitated through identity." Were the given constituent element which, extracted, became the predicate not explicitly grasped in the subject as initially known, there would be no ground for equating element and predicate. Accordingly, asked to identify, for example, that from which *male* is analytically drawn, we could only reply *unmarried male;* asked to identify that from which the complete analysis, *male sibling,* is drawn, we could only reply *male sibling.* It is this, of course, that renders Kantian analysis specious as knowledge, that makes of it an exercise in the trivial.

Yet, Kant did speak of the extracted predicate as covertly present in the subject, as what was first known confusedly or indistinctly. This might justify other responses to the requirement that we identify the subject of Kantian analysis, and perhaps justify a different interpretation of that sort of analysis. One response could be that the subject as initially known is in its entirety confusedly or indistinctly grasped, with all of its constituents covertly contained. In effect, then, the subject would not be identified-a rather fatal flaw. Another response would be that the subject first grasped by us is a mixture of the overtly and covertly present. In this case, of course, what is overtly present would be the identifying note of the presumed subject of analysis. But here, too, decisively different options would be available to us, options bearing upon the very nature of the analytic act. That which is initially present in covert fashion could then be perceived merely as conjoined to the

overtly present and identifying feature, in the way that a de'." terminate color or density might be conjoined to a three-dimensional reality first captured by thought, or a flavor conjoined to a fragrance. The corresponding moment in linguistic analysis would be the discovery that another shade of meaning attached itself to the word as initially understood. In neither case, though, could the relationship between starting-point and the subsequently grasped element properly be termed analytic, for there would be no difference between it and that connection which we term factual or empirical. There would be, that is, no *derivation* of that subsequently known from, no discrimination of it within, that initially known.

We are left with the option that the overtly apprehended and distinguishing feature be the proper source of whatever is revealed through the discerning act-through, in a word, *analysis.* Clearly, only what is explicitly grasped could be the ground of what is subsequently apprehended, of what is apprehended as pertaining to the subject of necessity. And since we can attain the subject only in terms of what is initially and overtly given, the upshot is that, formally speaking, the identifying feature is the very subject of analysis. The source of our subsequent, our analytic, knowledge and the subject of our successive discriminations are one and the same. It is, for example, *obligation* which we probe, and which, probed, yields *ability; redness* which we first know and from which we draw *color;* and *existence* that we first grasp and then know as *singular.*

This provides another counter to the possible claim that the subject of analysis is a confusedly known whole, all of its features covertly present. That latent within the subject is what we come to know through analysis, not its subject. Whatever might lie within that initially discerned, whatever is initially unknown, is surely not *what* we analyze, not *what,* meta--phoricaily speaking, we break down into its component features. Nonetheless, there no doubt remains the inclination to see analysis as bearing upon the relatively indistinct or confused.

Within this scheme, the subject would first be given in general outline, followed by the revelation, presumably through analysis, 0£ its specific contours or features. This would perhaps be reinforced by the consideration that analysis is conceived to be progressive in character. As well, because there is the tendency to equate analytical and precise knowledge, there is a like tendency to construe pre-analytic knowledge, that knowledge of the subject with which analysis begins, as relatively if not simply confused.

In fact, the notion of analysis as progressive, as yielding what is initially unknown, demands that the subject of analysis be, relative to that derived from it, both distinctly known and at least as specific in its structure. The examples of analytic derivation that have been offered most certainly embody that relationship. We must know distinctly that specific human state of obligation if we are to discern within it and to draw from it the notion of ability-if we are to be justified in asserting that *ought frnplies can.* Similar conditions must hold if we are to move from *red* to *color* and from *existent* to *singular.* It can of course be maintained that what is known *through analysis* is first present to thought in an obscure way, but this is quite a different matter from holding that what is initially known, the subject of analysis, is indeterminately grasped. There would be more than a slight problem in claiming that the indeterminate could, via analysis, yield the specific. We are hardly able to claim, for example, that the analysis of *can* will yield *ought,* or that the analysis of *color* will yield *red.* And it is equally clear that an indeterminately known subject could not ground the assertion of a necessary link running from it to the predicate. Color need not be red, ability need not be obligation.

It is indisputably true that thought does move from the confused to the precise, from the general to the specific-from, to cite an example, the knowledge of something as a plane figure to knowledge of it as a trapezium. But why conceive of such a process as analysis? Why suggest that it involves the deriva-

tion of trapezium from plane figure? Why suggest what is even more obviously not the case, that a plane figure is of necessity a trapezium? Much the same points should be made concerning the linguistic counterpart of the move from the indeterminate to the precise. We may well grant that the meaning of a word is at first but vaguely known, and then, through one procedure or another, known in its precise sense. But this, surely, is utterly different from the derivation, through analysis, of the precise from the initially general meaning. Call the movement from the confused to the determinate what you will, call "techniques of analysis" whatever devices permit the dispelling of the original confusion, but stop short of equating this operation with analysis in either the Kantian or the present sense, since it is impossible to assert that the mind draws the determinate from the indeterminate, just as it is impossible to assert that the general feature first known is necessarily the distinct object subsequently known. Nor would it do to hold that because the process undergone led to the realization that the object or meaning first vaguely apprehended is actually of the determinate structure *xyz,* the expression of this must take the form *xyz is xyz,* which " analytic" proposition reveals that the process engaged in was that of analysis. That tack would be based on a confusion central to Richard Hare's understanding of analysis, of which more later. The point to be made now is that the object or meaning first indeterminately grasped cannot be known as necessarily of the .structure *xyz.*

A final matter here. Were any "linguistic" approach to involve a process which began with a determinate meaning of a word and which culminated in the discrimination within that meaning of a notion at first latently present, then no quarrel at all would exist. But then it would clearly differ in no germane respect from the sort of non-Kantian analysis that we are trying to articulate. Were we, for example, to start with the precise sense of "ought" and to draw from it that signified by the word " can," we would simply be analyzing *ought* and grasping that it entails *can.* We could, .if we chose,

add the probable claim that the conventions of English dictate that when we use " ought " we also use " can " and that when " can " is not applicable we should not use " ought," but this would not change one whit the nature of the fl.ow of thought from *ought* to *can,* upon which, we may surmise, the conventions in question rest.

No direct identity between subject and predicate.

We come now to a matter referred to more than once a while back. **It** is that the notion of analysis now under study precludes the relationship of direct identity, whether partial or total, between the initial notion and that analytically drawn from it. A paradoxical assertion, given that analysis is precisely the grasp of what the subject *is?* Perhaps. But the absence of such identity is demanded by the strategy of denying to the present notion of analysis whatever rendered the Kantian variety nugatory-and central to analysis as conceived by Kant is the stated "cogitation through identity." Besides, the examples of analytic derivation relied upon thus far prove valuable here as well. Unlike *bachelor* in relation to *male,* the notion of *obligation* does not contain ability as a distinct element, any more than *red* contains *color* as that sort of part. **If** it is held that *ability* and *color* are each distinct elements of the appropriate whole, we must, as was .suggested a while back, ask what the other part is to which each is joined. What is it that, joined to *ability,* constitutes *ought,* and, joined to *color,* constitutes *red?* The search for it will be long and vain. Nor, though the example is doubtless more obscure, can we conceive of *existent* as a composite of discrete notes, one of them being *singular* and the other-what? Something, we may be certain, which involves the note of singularity, something from which we could draw *singular,* and thus not something which, externally related to singular, constitutes with it what would then be the contingent whole *existent.* Here, needless to say, we touch upon the key features of analysis: a complexity other than that embodied in, for example, *male*

an identity other than that holding between *male sibling* and *male,* and thus a necessity other than that expressive of direct identity. We will again take up these matters when we deal properly with the necessity binding subject and predicate in this kind of analysis.

3. Knowledge of the subject without knowledge of the predicate.

It is in knowing the subject that we know the predicate, in knowing the subject's identifying feature that we know the discriminated feature. It is in knowing *ought* that we know *ca.n,* in knowing *red* that we know *color.* Yet, knowledge of the subject is to be distinguished from knowledge of the predicate; more precisely, knowledge of the subject does not have knowledge of the predicate as one of its components, in the way, for example, that knowledge of *unmarried male* contains knowledge of *rnale.* Rather, it is an act in which we first know the subject as identified, and then come to know the predicate-e.g., we know *red* and then come to know *color.* Moreover, analysis is knowledge of the predicate as derived from the identified subject. Thus even while perceiving and enunciating that the subject *is* the predicate, the two objects of thought are held apart. Originally conceived without reference to the predicate, then conceived as that which entails the predicate, the subject is throughout a distinct object of thought.

4. Analysis is independent of the verbal.

It is necessary that what is signified by " red " be what is signified by " color "-assuming the standard understanding of each word. Hence what we call " red " we must also call "color," again assuming standard meanings. It may even be that a convention exists which forbids us to call " red " what we would not call "color." Like conventions might forbid us to apply " obligation" where we would not apply " ability" and to speak of " existent" where ·we would not speak of " singular:" None of this should surprise us, given the bonds of

necessity linking the objects brought to mind by the words mentioned-red and *color, obligation* and *ability, existent* and *singUlar.* In at least one case the bond would be grasped by all, and in the others, no doubt, by those who pronounce on conventions and prepare dictionaries. Hence none of this renders the perceived necessity in one case of the other essentially one with that appropriate to, say, "bachelor" and "male." The one meaning of " bachelor " is *unmarried male,* and to this cognitively terminating function nothing corresponds in the signification of " red " or " ought " or " existent," for each of these represents a unified object from which that analogous to *male* is derived, not marked off as one member of an accidental whole. Here, words and their meanings either set the task or reflect one performed, they do not of themselves complete it. It would be safe to assume that no one would accept the presence of *color* in the definition of " red " unless this were supported by the analytic derivation of *color* from *red.* Like observations could be made with respect to the definitions of "ought" and " being," in the case at least of those who pbnder such states as obligation and existence.

5. The subject is not, through analysis, transformed into the derived predicates.

Analysis reveals *what* a subject is. Hence, following analysis, we might think it required of us to conceive of the subject in terms of the derived predicate. And thus a complete analysis (if such be possible) would lead to the substitution of its product, the set of appropriate predicates, for the subject. Whatever other difficulties might be involved in this view, one crucial problem cannot be ignored. Were a subject to be transformed into that drawn from it, that which had, by supposition, served as the source of the derived set of predicates would have vanished, and the set of predicates would be groundlessly asserted. At best we would be reduced to asserting that the complex of attributes before us is indeed itself. .

Both the transformation of the subject through analysis and

the consequent tautological character of the judgment which this transformation might yield figure in Richard Hare's account of analysis. In an article entitled " Philosophical Discoveries " he offers the study of a Scottish dance, the eightsome reel, and its subsequently gained definition as analogously illustrative of the analytic process and its product. [11] The movement to the definition involves what he terms an element of "discovery," which would be lacking were we to begin, as does the writer of a dancing book, with a stipulative definition of the dance. In the latter case, he notes, statements such as the "eightsome reel is danced in the following way, viz .... , followed by a specification of the steps, will be seen as analytic "-analytic, that is, in the Kantian sense, for "eightsome reel" would mean a dance involving the steps specified. Hare would not have the process leading to the discovery of the <lance's definition "start off" in this way. Such a process will, rather, "start off with a determinate meaning for the term ' eightsome reel ',' and then, through analysis, reach the definition. What " we have to start with is not a definition, but the mere ability to recognize instances of correct performance of the dance," while " what we have at the end is the codification in the definition of what we know." Thus "what we have at the end is different from what we had at the beginning." He then notes: " It is in the *passage* to the definition that the mystery creeps in." The "mystery" (or "puzzle"), we may take it, is in the derivation of the definition from the " determinate meaning" initially grasped, in the perception of the link running from the dance as first known to the set of predicates manifesting its structure.

At this point, allowances being made for the weakness of the analogy drawn, Hare seems to be on the verge of explicating a notion of analysis very much like the one that we have been considering. We are disappointed. When the passage to the definition from the determinate but " unformulated " grasp of the eightsome reel is made, another puzzle enters the scene.

[11] R. M. Hare, "Philosophical Discoveries," *Mind,* LXIX, pp. 145-62.

For, the analysis completed, "we settle down in the comfortable analyticity " provided by the stipulative definition of the eightsome reel found in the book of dancing instructions. That is, we know the truth of that represented by "the eightsome reel is danced thus and so " because by " eightsome reel " we mean *what is danced thus and so.* Gone is the starting point of the passage, gone the determinate notion of the dance which Hare had first contrasted to that given by the dancing book and which had thus precluded the analyticity now proclaimed. That starting point has been changed into the set of predicates which, we were led to believe, had been analytically derived from it. And so, the subject of the analysis-indeed, the analysis itself-has dissolved, leaving us with the fruits of a verbal convention.

The confusion found here is compounded, not dissipated, when Hare states that the "comfortable analyticity" of the dancing book is achieved " after we have discovered that this definition of the term 'eightsome reel' "-the book's-" and no other, accords with our pre-existing but unformulated idea of how the dance should be danced." We thus return to the starting point of the analytic sequence, the " determinate meaning" that was contrasted to the definition achieved at the end of the sequence, and, with that, to a view of analysis that precludes the analyticity related to the stipulative definition. For the exclusive *accord* of the definition achieved with the initial determinate concept of the eightsome reel, the accord between what Hare insists are two" different" notions-" what we have at the beginning" and "what we have at the end "-can, if relevant, only be the analytic derivation of the one from the other. It is thus odd that Hare should use this as the basis of the claim that the result of the analytic process-any analytic process-is a tautological proposition. His approach here may, however, be understood as a moment in the attempt to overcome a flaw in the standard contemporary view of analysis. If analysis is to be minimally significant and not utterly and transparently trivial, it must start somewhere other than at the

end; it must, that is, have a starting point conceived and identified as other than the product of analysis. Further, there must be a relation between the starting point and the product, one that runs from starting point to product-which is to say that the starting point must analytically yield the product. On the other hand, an analytic *proposi,tion,* as it is grasped in contemporary thought, can only involve a direct identity between subject and predicate. Somehow, then, the bond between starting point and product, when it finds expression in a proposition, must be one of direct identity. This is made possible by converting the starting point of analysis into its product-at the cost, needless to say, of rendering the whole procedure nugatory. Hare's mention of an accord between initial and subsequent conceptions of that which is analyzed may be seen as a gesture in the direction of progressive analysis, as an attempt to mitigate the trivialization of the whole affair that is the clear import of the position that analysis ends in a tautological proposition. [12]

[12] Another possible source of Hare's confusion is that he has brought together these two different views of the process under study: I) we discover that what we first had before the mind, the dance as initially known or identified, is the eightsome reel as defined in the book of dancing instructions, and Q) we discover that this, the eightsome reel as defined in the book of dancing instructions, is what we initially though confusedly had before us. View number one would involve the notion of analysis that we are sketching, while the second would see analysis as akin to the emergence of a defined figure out of a fog, each phase of the process prompting the realization-to which no necessity whatsoever attaches-that what was confusedly comprehended the moment before is indeed the more distinct object now present.

Such disparate views of analysis would have their counterparts in the accounts of the act, cited here more than once, presented by Anthony Quinton. Though analysis is explicitly defined as the direct repetition of what was initially given to thought, we have already noted that one of the elements of what Quinton calls the "analytic thesis" is held to be the "development and elucidation" of another. It is fair to assume that the elucidation in question is itself an act of analysis--which means that in this most interesting case analysis is conceived as quite diff.erent from the mere duplication of what has already been assumed. But that is not all, for there is also the position suggested by the following statements made by Quinton concerning certain analyses, offered, ironically, in support of the assertion that every analysis turns about a perceived direct identity: " What is hard is to discover the identity in the first place. But an identity is none the less

6. The necessity found in analysis not based on the principle of identity.

All would agree that analysis is a determination, an explication, and the analytic proposition an expression, of what its

an identity for being deeply hidden." *(op.cit.)* Here too we are certainly to believe that it is through analysis that the deeply hidden identity is discovered. And this means that thel'e is an analysis in which the subject-that which is discovered lo be this and that-is initially known and identified in terms of features other than those, initially deeply hidden, which we come to realize pertain to it. Finally, Quinton offers a notion of analysis as a movement from the general to the specific. Speaking of the relationship between that element of the analytic thesis which concerns necessity and that which has to do with the meanings of terms, he observes: " 'Analytic' as 'true in virtue of meaning' gives a little more clarity of outline to the relatively amorphous notion of the necessary as that which is true in itself, no matter what." *(ibid.)*

As stated above, such conflicting conceptions of analysis may be seen as rooted in the desire to mitigate the trivializing of analysis that is consequent upon the understanding of it as mere repetition. Another attempt to modify this result. is perhaps found in A. J. Ayer's objection to Strawson's "stress on the difference between analysis of the facts of language and analysis of the facts which language describes." He adds: " after all, these two kinds of analysis come down to the same thing. Take, for example, belief-the fact of believing this or that. One may ask what belief is, or one may ask what one is saying when one says ' I believe.'" (The Royaumont Coll., Rorty, *op.cit.,* p. 329) Though on this occasion we are given nothing in support of the claim, Ayer could have had in mind the trivial truth that since *belief* is that signified by the word " belief," to determine the sense of " belief " is to determine what *belief* is, the latter being a " factual " affair if *belief* happens to be imbedded in the factual order. However, on another occasion the approach taken by Ayer is quite different; and while not trivial, it is unacceptable. He writes: " a child who has gained the idea of whales from picture books may learn something new when he is told that whales are mammals ... what he learns, surely, is an analytic truth." ("Phenomenology and Linguistic Analysis," The Aristotelian Society, Symposia, Supp. Vol. XXXIII) This attempt to identify knowledge of fact and analytic truth is wholly in vain. The *fact,* the "something new," that the child learns is: that seen in the picture book is a mammal. The analytic truth supposedly one with this fact is: a true air-breathing, warm-blooded, viviparous *mammal* inhabiting the sea (the meaning of "whale") is a *mammal,* or something of the sort. Whatever Ayer might say, the two propositions are not the same. What the child actually learns is the purely factual conjunction of attributes, those revealed in the picture of the whale and that signified by " mammal," not an analytic truth of the kind offered.

Of course, the interesting question in all this is whether any of the British analysts do acknowledge an act of analysis which yields a non-tautological proposition. If so, would that they were clear about it. Hare, in the article cited, comes

subject is-of what its subject *necessarily is.* An act which one ought to perform *is* an act which one can perform, is necessarily an act which one can perform; an existent is an individual, and is necessarily an individual. This might seem to justify the contention that each and every analytic proposition, even that distinguished from the trivially true (one of the form *xy is* y), even that cognitively effortful and progressive, is at its core an embodiment of the principle of identity, and that its necessity has a like basis, supported, as it were, by this law's obverse, the principle of contradiction, which forbids what *is* something *not to be* that something. It might be granted that such a proposition is not so evidently an instance of identity / contradiction as is a proposition of the kind a *bachelor is a male.* Still, it could be maintained, we are entitled to hold that what ought to be done is necessarily what can be done only because it *is* what can be done, that red is necessarily a color because it *is* a color, and so on. An appealing approach, but one that overlooks a crucial fact. The bond of necessity involved here does not, for example, link the ability to act with the ability to act, but the *obligation to act* with the ability to act. We do not claim that what can be done is necessarily what can be done; we assert that what *ought* to be done is necessarily what can be done. It is *ought,* this precise and distinct notion, that necessitates *can,* just as it is ought that *implies* can. In every instance of significant analysis we claim that it is the subject as identified, as possessed of a determinate attribute or feature, that we perceive to be, that we declare necessarily to be, this or that sort of thing. If this were not the case, if we did not draw the predicate from the subject as necessitated by that subject in its specificity, and if the sole ground of the necessity were that S *is* P, then it could always be countered that perhaps Sneed not be P. *If* it is P, *given* that it is P, then it must be P, just as if it is given that the fruit before me is green, then it

very close to acknowledging just that. But, in that same article, he expressly states his willingness to abandon the act of progressive analysis-the move from initial determinate conception to the definition-which is such a " puzzle " and a " mystery."

must be green. But a priori, precisely as S, need it be P-need the fruit be green? However, the necessity here questioned or denied is the very necessity claimed in the proposition linking ought and can, being and individual, red and color.

* * *

Our sketch is completed. Can we go beyond it? Can we, that is, grasp and adequately express a complexity on the part of a subject other than that having the form *xy?* Can we grasp and manifest a subject-predicate relationship other than that of the structure *xy-y?* Can we discern and display as intelligible a necessity other than that found in *xy is y,* a necessity that links a unified whole and one of its features rather than a necessity that holds between an element (y) and itself?

In some manner each of these has at least been detected. To deal with the first and basic question, should a complexity other than that of the form *xy* be declared unknown, we need only note once more that our favored example, *ought,* defines resolution into that form. *Can* is undeniably a feature of this state; but when it is abstracted, that left behind is precisely the notion of *ought* itself, a notion that involves the predicate in question, *can,* not something standing apart from that predicate. But even in the case of this grounding condition we seek more. Granting the discerning of a subject whose structure is not molecular, what of a positive nature might be said of it? Continuing, what is the relationship between such a subject and its predicate that we can properly term analytic? And what is the necessity that we conceive of as consequent upon the analytic relationship? Better, what are the *relationships,* the *necessities?* For we may not assume that all analytical derivations are identical in the paths that they traverse. We would no doubt hold that in all cases the derived predicate is *intrinsic* to the analyzed subject. The same idea is surely expressed by the use in extended senses of such terms as *included, continued, involved,* and the like. But we may ask whether any of these take us beyond the initial view of analysis as a determination of what a given subject *is.* The characterization of the predicate as an

aspect, a *facet,* a *feature,* a side of the subject would also point to the fact that analysis reveals a relationship of identity between subject and predicate, though these terms would have as well the function of emphasizing the non-direct nature of that identity. They might also represent the predicate as that which emanates from the core or center of the subject, a conception that, as Hare would put it, seems to accord with our original understanding of the link between analyzed subject and derived predicate. A like emphasis on the active, though this time with respect to the analyzing subject, is found in the use of *elucidating, unfolding* and *discrirninating* to represent the drawing of the predicate from the subject. It is a far cry from any of these notions, however, to a comprehension of either the emanation of the predicate from the subject or the corresponding cognitive derivation of the one from the other.

What, then, does permit us to hold with utter conviction that the subject must be the predicate-that red must be a color, that what one is obliged to do must be what one can do, that what exists must be individual? Not, we should note, the inconceivability of the subject apart from the predicate. This approach rests upon the view of the subject-predicate relationship as having the form *xy-y,* and is thus no more than a slight variation on the claim that the principle of identity accounts for the necessity encountered. Its simple inapplicability to the present case is clearly shown by at least two of the examples often cited. *Red* is in fact conceivable apart from the proper notion of *color,* and *ought* is conceivable apart from a discriminated *can.*

No doubt recourse to the *xy-y* structure and to the corresponding criterion of inconceivability lies behind one interpretation of the argument that the predicate pertains of necessity to the subject because it is part of the subject's definition. However, this argument also takes the form of maintaining that the subject-predicate relationship is a necessary one because the predicate enters into the definition of a *unified* subject. But does this would-be explanation amount to anything more than another version of what we have been probing and trying to understand? We are doubtless to assume that each one of the

set of predicates that constitutes the definition is seen as what emanates from the subject, as an aspect or facet thereof, and thus as what pertains of necessity to that subject. We must grant, then, that it either rests upon or is wholly identical with the relationship which it is held to elucidate. The same weakness, manifestly, would afflict an explanation which claimed that a given predicate belongs of necessity to a subject because it is the genus of that subject. We would have to know that the proffered generic notion is a necessary aspect of the subject-which would present to us the very relationship under study. Nor would we be helped at all by the account which bases the necessity in question on the fact that the predicate *presupposes* the subject-as, to choose the likeliest illustration, the obligation to perform an act presupposes the ability to perform it. At bottom what would this come to other than that *ought implies oan,* and that, accordingly, if one is not able to perform a given act he is not obligated to, with the latter formulation being the proximate source of the claim that obligation presupposes ability?

The unsatisfactory character of the above explanation might lead us to settle for the affirmation in this case or that of an analytic derivation grasped merely as different from that found in *a:y is y,* its distinctness vouched for by an insight whose content is not to be probed, the precise nature of the perceived subject-predicate relationship being dismissed as irrelevant. Or perhaps we should even cast aside as lacking in pertinence the grasp of a distinct subject-predicate bond, and simply note the tendency of thouQ'ht to move from knowledge of subject to knowledge of predicate in this case and that, with such movements involving varying degrees of compulsion, each instance measured against the utter coercion found in *xy is y.* But of course it is precisely this approach that would lack pertinence, taking us away, as it does, from the starting-point of our inquiry, the perceived distinctness of certain subject-predicate relationships, and inappropriately emphasizing, if only as a quasi-reference point, the *xy-y* structure. And given the perceived uniqueness of the objective relationship traced in non-

Kantian analysis, it is bootless to challenge ·the significance of our queries concerning it.[13]

Very well, what is grasped, represented, duplicated in the analytic derivation? What do we fasten upon when we link ought and can, existent and individual, red and color? What is expressed when, in this case and that, we claim that S must be P? Other apparent examples of the sort of structure noted and of the bond asserted are also of interest. We would no doubt claim to know that what exists possesses of necessity an inner character or essence. Essence, we would insist, quite as much as individuality, pertains to the *ratio entis,* and is not a feature merely conjoined to the notion of the existent. Moving to a narrower sphere, assuredly the same points can be made with respect to the predicate *sound* and each of these subjects in turn, a trumpet blast, a piano chord, and a screech. Or *action* and, say, sawing wood, pushing a car, and putting a shot. In each instance, the predicate is clearly intrinsic to the subject-that is, expressive of what the subject in its unity *is-is* a proper object of thought derived from the subject, and is known to be a necessary feature of that subject. Is more given to us? Seemingly not. Whatever its obviousness and relative simplicity, not one of these reveals any more definitely the precise pattern that the mind traces when it undertakes an analytic derivation and perceives the necessity involved. Nor, it would seem, do such instances as these: what acts exists, what acts separately exists separately, love implies knowledge, moral sincerity implies the willingness to universalize. We would not take seriously the assertion that such relationships involved no more than the factual co-presence of certain features. We would, that is, have no difficulty in distinguishing such relationships from the following: gold-malleability, copper-conductivity, platinum-ductility, and gas pressure-volume. Nor-to hint at the near

[1]· Reference is made to the "degrees of analyticity" approach taken by W. V. Quine in his famous " Two Dogmas of empiricism," *From a Logical Point of View,* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1953; by M. White, " The Analytic and the Synthetic," *Pragmatism and the American Mind,* Oxford University Press, New York, 1973; and by A. Pap, *Semantics and Necessary Truth,* Yale University Press, New Haven, 1958.

universality of the commitment to the analytic bond-would any such difficulty consciously affiict the advocates of the pronouncements central to the doctrines of ontological monism, epistemological subjectivism, and ethical nihilism, or to those involved in the claimed impossibility of a private language, of a language that is not behavior, of an intellectual operation independent of language, and of a free act. But who would dare to claim, however strong his convictions concerning the presence or absence of an authentic analytic bond, that he is able to comprehend lucidly and able to express quite adequately the nature of that bond?

This might lead us to consider yet another approach to the matter. Two of its embodiments have been of marked influence in the history of philosophical speculation. On the one hand it has been held that our determined and convinced acceptance of certain propositions-our display in some cases of an irresistible intellectual compulsion-is rooted in the native structure of our minds, which causes them to conceive of or shape their objects along specified lines. On the other hand mind has been seen as the free and creative source of forms imposed upon the experienced flux, imparting to it an intelligibility that in itself it lacks. Now, from another perspective, these views might play a fruitful role. In relation to present needs, they are irrelevant. Our concern is with the analytic bond *as it is given to us*, whether its source be mind or its pristine object. This is the relationship that the mind presumably discerns and finds intellectually compelling or gratifying. An intelligible account and manifestation of such a relationship, whether springing from the native constitution of the mind or freely fashioned by the mind, is thus what we seek, not its simple assertion, not the simple claim that the mind finds it compelling. We want to know why the mind finds it compelling. If the relationships said to be imposed upon experience are without intrinsic intelligibility, and if their power to satisfy the mind is held to derive from the unknown structure of mind, they are quite worthless by way of explaining the nature of analytic propositions.

Perhaps we will be forced to apply generally what C. I. Lewis

presents in his account of the most fundamental " a priori ... definitive or analytic " forms thrust upon reality by the mind. These are the " modes of thought embodied in the forms of logic and language .... the forms of valid inference." And they, we are told, can only be caught "in some vague and fleeting insight, because they are so nearly the marrow of our being " and "go back to the point where mind is continuous with the objective and indistinguishable from it." [14] Should we hold that something similar operates when the mind seeks to grasp in their fullness the relationships embodied in various acts of analysis? Were we to take that approach, a problem would arise. However inadequate in an ultimate sense our grasp of this or that analytic bond be, surely it is clearer than our grasp of the mind's asserted continuity with the objective and of the influence that this continuity supposedly has upon the mind's insight into certain cognitive forms. As grounds, then, for abandoning the search for a deeper understanding of what we are about in analysis they must be considered deficient. In fact, as a flawed attempt to explain our inability to comprehend clearly the analytic relationship, the words of Lewis might well prompt us to continue the search. A further source of stimulation should be the dictum concerning mind, or its object, or the relationship of one to the other, that lies behind the flat rejection of any analytic link other than that of direct identity. Even the more modest ah-if-I-could-but-understand-what-is-meant response to asserted instances of non-Kantian analysis should provoke effort here. The task may not in every case be utterly urgent. It is unlikely that the failure to complete it will cause very many anxious spirits to draw back before proclaiming that red is a color or that ought implies can. Still, we should grant, without laying stress upon any particular analytic bond, that it would be of worth to know what we are about when engaged in this distinctive cognitive act.

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[14] *Mind and the World Order,* pp. 284-36, Dover Publication, New York, 1956.

THE PROBLEM OF SYMBOLIC REFERENCE

IT IS PERMISSIBLE THESE DAYS for theologians to dwell on the existential meaning of religious symbols. It is not permissible, however, for a theologian to dwell on just what it is to which these symbols refer. To do so elicits responses such as " that language has no meaning " or " how can you verify that?"

It seems to me that there has grown up a subtle yet unmistakable correlation between two different sets of distinctions. The distinction between symbols and signs common to theology is correlated with the distinction between meaning and reference reported by some philosophers. Religious symbols are accepted as having meaning, but the nature of their reference is either left to obscurity or denied entirely.

I submit that this assumption in theology is in error on two counts. First, symbols are in fact a sub-class of signs; hence, they have reference just as do other signs. Second, the critical thrust within theology as an academic discipline demands that the reference character of symbols be explored. In doing so, I contend, the referent to theological statements becomes the same referent to which religious symbols point while they are giving meaning to our faith and our daily lives.

SYMBOL AND SIGN

It is part and parcel of contemporary theological discussion to distinguish between signs and symbols. Signs are understood as denotative, pointing to a specific object and available for univocal or literal interpretation. Symbols, in contrast, are said to be connotative, open-ended in reference, and not subject to univocal or literal interpretation.

Signs are said to be arbitrary. They have no intrinsic or essential relationship to that which they signify. Signs are em-

ployed in scientific, empirical, or objectivist thinking. A hexagonal shaped road sign means" stop." A triangular shaped road sign means " yield." We know this by convention. There is no intrinsic resemblance between these shapes and the phenomenon of stopping or yielding. Yet a hexagonal sign means "stop" and only " stop." It does not mean anything else. It has a univocal, not an equivocal or ambiguous, signification. Signs are objective and precise in their designation.

Although common parlance relies upon the term " symbol " to include what we have just described as a sign, theologians and philosophers of religion are accustomed to reserving this term for more specific definition.[1] Symbols, like signs, point beyond themselves to something else. They do not exist for their own sake but for the sake of their referent. Beyond this common factor, however, symbols are said to differ from signs.

First, symbols are born out of real life situations. They are not the arbitrary creations of human subjectivity. They cannot be simply replaced by substitute signs at the whim of convention, because their meaning cuts too deeply to allow reformulation without some loss of meaning.

Second, symbols have surplus meaning. They speak to us of many things. A sign may have a one-to-one relationship with its referent, but a symbol has a one-to-many relationship. A symbol is both constant and flexible, thereby making it ever ready for new applications and new insights.

This leads us to a third important feature of a symbol, namely, its ability to open up new levels of reality which are otherwise closed to us. Symbolic language attempts to reach out and grasp that which is not directly known and which re-

[1] The present discussion is intended to represent the views offered by Paul Tillich, *Dynamics of Faith* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957) Chap. III; Paul Ricoeur, *The Symbolism of Evil* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967); Philip Wheelwright, *Metaphor and Relility* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968), noting that Wheelwright's vocabulary of " steno-symbol " and "tensive-symbol " correlate roughly with "sign " and " symbol " as we are using them; Thomas Fawcett, *The Symbolic Language of Religion* (Minneapolis: Augsburg 1971), Chaps. I and

sists exhaustive linguistic description. It takes us beyond appearance to communicate a sense of primary reality.

In so doing, fourthly, it opens up not only external reality but also new regions within one's own soul. Symbols not only designate objects, they also involve the subject. Symbols unlock dimensions and elements of our inner being so as to make us feel at one with that which is most real. Symbols-especially religious symbols-give meaning to life. We orient our action and reflection around our primary symbols. Symbols carry existential significance.

Because symbols are capable of bringing us into touch with reality, fifthly, they themselves must participate in the very reality they seek to represent. They have ontological force and serve to reveal to us being itself. Symbols are not arbitrary projections of human subjectivity. We do not produce them. Rather, they come to us, we might say, by the grace of being itself.

:Finally, it is observed that symbols grow and die. When the situation is ripe, a given symbol works with power. It influences. When the situation changes, one of two things happens. Either new meanings are opened up by the symbol so that it works in new ways, or else it appears irrelevant to human existence and atrophies until it disappears from our awareness. It may then be picked up like any other object and put into a museum to remind us of what life was like in the past.

·Thus, of these two words, " symbol " is the richer multivalent term that is asked to perform countless theological duties. One such duty it is asked to perform, unfortunately, is to mask or hide some equivocal and imprecise theological thinking. But before turning to an example of this in theology, let us examine the distinction between meaning and reference as employed in twentieth century philosophy.

MEANING AND REFERENCE

The distinction between symbol and sign in theology has been quietly and perhaps unobservedly correlated with the dis-

tinction between meaning and reference in the philosophy of language. This is an unwarranted mistake. Although there is no justification for this association, there may be at least a partial explanation.

In retrieving the roots of contemporary philosophical discussion, our attention is drawn to the germinal essay of 1892 by Gottlob Frege," *Uber Sinn und Bedeutung."* There is some debate over the precise English rendering of this title, but agreement seems to be emerging over the translation of *Sinn* as " meaning " or " sense " and *Bedeutung* as " reference." Although the hermeneutical theologian Friederich Schleiermacher drew the same fundamental distinction between *Sinn* and *Bedeutung* some three quarters of a century earlier, it is to Frege that we customarily attribute the influence on twentieth century logic and linguistic philosophy.

Frege argued that meaning and reference are to be distinguished and not confused. Some who followed Frege did not obey his dictum, and the resulting confusion in philosophy just may be a relevant cause of the present confusion in theology.

" Reference " indicates the capacity of a word or sign to point beyond itself, to signify something extra-linguistic. The referent, then, is that to which it points, that which it signifies. The referent need not be only an empirical object, because we often talk about or refer to other things, e.g., ideas, feelings, eras, moods, etc. **It** is in the very nature of a word that it should function as a *sigmtm,* that there should be something that it signifies, something referred to.

The meaning or sense of a word is its *Sinn.* Meaning indicates the necessity for taking seriously the word's context. Words all by themselves do not have any one specific meaning. They are polysemic, i.e., they have the capacity for having many meanings. The particular meaning of a word is determined by its context in the sentence or statement.

Hence, on the basis of Frege, we may say the meaning or sense of a statement is *what* it says, whereas the reference is *that about which* it says it. What a statement says is basically

an internal affair; it concerns the internal arrangement of words, sentence, and context. That about which the statement speaks is external; it is extra-linguistic. It is the real insofar as the real can be presented or re-presented by language. It is what is said about the world.

In the philosophical thinking following Frege, the distinction between meaning and reference became temporarily blurred. The logical atomism *of* Bertrand Russell neglected meaning in the sense *of Sinn* and allowed *Bedeutung* or reference to dominate his language theory. Russell's theory contended in effect that there is no " meaning," only " denotation." Words as the basic atomic signs were considered more fundamental than context. One must understand the words before one can understand the whole, he said. Understanding begins, then, with the direct acquaintance with the objects which are the referents to simple signs. For Russell, in short, referring took the place of meaning and even co-opted the term, " meaning."

It was this step that eventually made the verification principle of logical positivism so deadly to theology. The verification principle asserts that the meaningfulness of a statement is determined by its correspondence to an empirical referent. If one is unable to demonstrate that a given proposition can be verified empirically, then it has no cognitive meaning. Empirical verification has to do solely with the referent of a proposition, not with its contextual meaning. The question of verification -and later the question of falsification-is connected with *Bedeutung* and not *Sinn.* [2]

The body blow this dealt to theology is a story well known. Theological statements could not be verified or in principle falsified in any direct empirical sense because their referent, God, is not subject to independent investigation. Theology appeared to lose the power to make· literal univocal statements about the

•Cf. Anders Nygr.en, *Meaning and Method: Prolegomena to a Scientijfo Philosophy of Religion and a Scientific Theology* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1972) pp. 229-42; Wolfhart Panncnberg, *Theology and the Philosophy of Science* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1976) pp. 206-208; and Earl R. MacCormac, *Metaphor and Myth in Science and Religion* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1976) pp. S9ff.

divine. Religious and theological propositions were not permitted to make any cognitive assertions about the reality denoted by a word such as " God " or a phrase such as " Kingdom of God." Such propositions were denied the status of assertions and were said rather to be expressions, i.e., statements which tell us more about the subjectivity of the speaker than about that which is spoken of.

To parry the punch thrown by the philosophers-that theological language is meaningless-theology needed to :find meaning somewhere other than in the reference quality of signs. The univocal designative nature of signs could not provide a foundation for theological language. So theology turned to the symbol. The task of the symbol would not be to refer us to God but rather to give expression to our human existence. The question would no longer be: to what does the religious symbol refer? It became: what is the function or meaning of the symbol in religious discourse? And the notion of meaning adopted here is not meaning dependent upon *Bedeutung* or reference; it is rather subjective or existential meaning.

The symbol-that rich multivalent bearer of essential meaning-came to the rescue of an ailing theology. Through a rejuvenated theory of symbol and myth (myth as symbols in narrative form) , theology excluded God from empirical reality in order to immunize religious belief from objectivist attack. With symbol we could have meaningful talk about God but do so without reference; and this would avoid the pesky criticisms of the verificationists. It is in this situation that all the distinctions between symbols and signs earlier adumbrated became widely accepted. I suggest that the motive for drawing these distinctions was strongly guided by the desire to avoid the trouble caused by the notion of reference.[8]

[8] I am aware that the precise chronology of this development does not show a cause-effect relationship between the schools of logical positivism and theological existentialism. Bultmann, Tillich, and the Niebuhrs had begun formulating their basic positions in the 19!i?Os and 1980s without direct response to the publications of B. Russell or A. J. Ayer in the 1980s. My argument still stands, however, because the precise articulations· of positivism reflect ·intellectual currents that

The problem is that modern theology has tacitly accepted meaning without reference. But by jettisoning reference we have also left behind the question of truth. With the gradual dissolution of the verification principle due to its shrinking sphere of influence, it is time once again for theology to explore the possibility that its propositions-as well as the more primary religious symbols upon which they are based-may have some reference.

SIGN OF THE KINGDOM

Let us look briefly at a sample argument wherein the wedge between sign and symbol is driven so deep as to leave theology with existential meaning but no reference. The example I am choosing is drawn from a wide discussion on the symbolic nature of the" kingdom of God" as proclaimed by Jesus.

To begin with we point to the observation of Rudolf Bultmann and others that Jesus was mistaken in thinking that the world would end soon. It can be empirically observed that Jesus did not return as the Son of Man and that the eschatological kingdom of God has not been firmly established. Nevertheless, contends Bultmann, what Jesus said about the end of the world expresses Jesus's *understanding of life.* The fact that what Jesus said is not true does not make what he said meaningless. Despite Jesus's mistake regarding the kingdom of God, his message is still valid for us because it presents us with a saving understanding of human existence; it leads to deeper self-understanding. Jesus's prediction that we would on the last day see " the Son of Man coming on the clouds with great power and glory" *means* that Jesus sees humanity as confronted by the immediacy of God and being challenged to decision. The symbol of the Son of Man coming to inaugurate God's total rule on earth does not *refer* to the Son of Man coming to inaugurate God's total rule on earth. Rather, it *means* something personal or existential to the one who is influenced

go back to the 19th century. Verificationism simply represents the most forceful articulation of the challenge to orthodox theology posed by modern science and philosophy.

by the symbol. (If the term " refer " is actually employed in such a discussion, it usually intends to point out the existential meaning.)

What Bultmann has accomplished with this method for interpreting scripture is to bridge the gap between the first and the twentieth centuries through the employment of both historical criticism and hermeneutical appropriation. Historical criticism recognizes the temporal distance between the text and the interpreter, and it seeks to understand the phrase " kingdom *oi* God" in its original context of Jewish apocalyptic. The symbol of God's kingdom had a particular meaning in the time of ,Jesus, and historical criticism is capable of recovering the context that gave it that meaning. Bultmann's existential application of this meaning in the act of interpretation serves to bridge the gap between the ancient Jewish context and our context in the modern world. In both contexts, human beings are concerned with understanding life; therefore meaningful dialogue can take place between people in worlds that are millenia apart.

Norman Perrin extended the Bultmannian hermeneutical approach in his treatment of the " kingdom of God " as a symbol. Perrin added tools drawn from two philosophers: Philip Wheelwright's distinction between steno-symbol and tensive symbol plus Paul Ricoeur's distinction between sign and symbol. Ricoeur's scheme conforms basically to the distinctions listed earlier in the article. Wheelwright's notion of the steno-symbol corresponds to a large extent with what we have been calling a sign, and his notion of tensive-symbol corresponds with what we have been calling symbol.

In the case of Jewish apocalyptic, Perrin says that the symbols used there are steno-symbols, i.e., signs. "Each figure in the story told by the apocalytic seer bore a one-to-one relationship with that which was depicted." [4] The meanings of apocalyptic signs are said by Perrin here to be exhausted in their first or literal intentionality. I interpret Perrin to be saying that

•Norman Perrin, "Eschatology and Hermeneutics," *Jourruil of Biblical Literature,* 9S:1 (March 1974) pp. S-14, reprinted in *Theology Digest,* (Summer 1975) pp. 149-55; Cf. by same author, *Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1976) pp. !l9-S!l.

the function of signs ·or steno-symbols is to refer to something beyond themselves in univocal fashion. In the case of apocalyptic writing, the form of such referring was allegory. Perrin writes, " this thing stood for Antiochus IV Epiphanes, that thing stood for Judas Maccabee, and so forth." [5]

Although Jewish apocalyptic which provides the historical context for Jesus 's teaching was sign-oriented, Perrin wants us to believe that Jesus spoke not in signs but in symbols. On what grounds? Perrin says: "Jesus *refused to give a sign."* [6] This statement of Jesus's refusal appears in four synoptic gospel passages: Matthew 12: 39 and 16=4; Luke 11: 29; and Mark 8: 11-13. With Bultmann in the background, Perrin says Jesus's proclamation of the " kingdom of God " is therefore a tensive-symbol, i.e., it is a "true " symbol and not a sign. Because Jesus refused to give signs, then our responsibility as scriptural interpreters is to explore the manifold ways in which the symbol of the kingdom of God can become existentially meaningful to us.

To the extent that Perrin' s argument depends upon what Jesus did or did not say, it can be dismissed immediately because it hinges upon the logical fallacy of equivocation. Perrin equivocates on the word "sign." One need not go into a lengthy historical discourse defending the multi-level tensive character of apocalyptic symbolism. One need only note that Perrin has taken a definition of " sign " worked out by twentieth century philosophy and superimposed it without qualification upon a first century dialogue. He has employed literary criticism to the complete neglect of the principles of historical criticism, wherein we would first ask just what " sign" could have meant in the context within which Jesus himself used it. Perrin's argument would be valid only if we could be certain that Jesus's own definition of "sign " is identical to that of Wheelwright's "steno-symbol" or Ricoeur's [7]

•Perrin, "Eschatology and Hermeneutics."

•*Ibid.,* Perrin's italics; Cf. *Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom,* p. *45.*

[7] Although ·Ricoeur and Perrin are in· general agreement over the relationship between Jewish apocalyptic and Jesus's proclamation of the coming kingdom of

In the biblical passages *upon* which Perrin relies," sign" has its place in phrases such as "sign from heaven" or "sign of Jonah" *(cr7Jµ,e'2ov, semeion)* . The historical context seems to indicate two things .. First, the people are asking for a sign from heaven, perhaps a definitive revelation, which would establish the authority of Jesus. A second and more dominant dimension to " sign " implied by the context is its reference to judgment, perhaps the judgment scheduled for the end of the world foreseen in the apocalyptic vision. Jesus refers to it as the "sign of Jonah." Jonah, recall, went to the sinful city of Nineveh and proclaimed God's forthcoming wrath. This advance warning allowed the people of Nineveh an opportunity to repent and avoid destruction. Jesus refuses to give the people of his time a similar sign, calling them an " evil generation." The implication is that God's wrath will come suddenly without warning. Jesus criticizes the evil generation for wanting a sign, because they are indirectly asking for the license to continue sinful and debaucherous living right up until the last possible moment. Like John the Baptist, Jesus sees the kingdom of God not only as future but also as having a reality that impinges on the present. Consequently, the message includes the challenge to "repent now."

The sign of Jonah is not the sign of Ricoeur. **It** would be premature to assert on the basis of these four synoptic passages that Jesus used signs strictly in the sense of either tensive-symbol or steno-symbol. (The gospel of John may be different; many of Jesus's activities are referred to as "signs," e.g., the miracle at Cana in John 2, and these signs elicit the multi-dimensional levels of meaning in vrnys characteristic of what we have been calling " symbols.") And crucially in this regard, the apocalyptic discourses of Jesus in the synoptics come in response to a question posed by his disciples: " Tell us, when

God, it is interesting to note that Ricoeur avoids Perrin's fallacy by, first, employing the term " steno-symbol " instead of " sign " in reference to apocalyptic and, second, by not hinging his argument on• Jesus's use of the term "sign." Cf., Ricoeur, "Biblical Hermeneutics," *Semeia* 4 (Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1975)' p. 113.

will this be, and what will be the *sign* of your coming at the close of the age?" (Matthew 24:4 and Luke 21:7). In contrast to the evil generation whom Jesus did not answer because they wanted a sign like Jonah's, Jesus answers his disciples. He does not reveal the precise time of the end-" But of that day or that hour no one knows, not even the Son, but only the Father "-but he lists a number of signs, e.g., nation will rise up against nation, earthquakes in many places, persecutions, etc.

Perrin would have us transpose all these signs into tensive-symbols, and in this process the normal or literal referent would be dropped. He contends that the passages mentioned above dealing with the expected kingdom of God do not refer to what will really happen in the future but mean rather, in Perrin's words, "... that I experience Jesus as ultimacy in the historicality of my everyday, and that experience transforms my everydayness ..." [8] Although the tensive symbol is described as having multiple references, what is subtly promulgated here is that the one reference it no longer has is the literal or objective reference. What Perrin says is that the tensive-symbol's reference is really its existential meaning.

THE REFERENCE CHARACTER OF SYMBOLS

It is my position that the subtle association of symbol with existential meaning to the exclusion of external reference is unwarranted. Even the philosophers of religion who distinguish symbols from signs grant that symbols too have reference. Symbols are a sub-class within the class of signs. Paul Tillich writes: "symbols have one characteristic in common with signs; they point beyond themselves to something else." [9] Philip Wheelwright's tensive-symbol still has reference just as does the steno-symbol; and on occasion the tensive-symbol may " achieve a high precision." [10] Paul Ricoeur repeatedly makes

•Norman Perrin, *The Resurrection According to Matthew, Mark, and Lulce* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1977) p. 88.

•Tillich, *Dynamics of Faith,* p. 41.

[10] Wheelwright, *Metaphor and Reality,* p. 94.

the point that every symbol is a sign, even though every sign may not be a symbol. What characterizes a sign as a symbol according to Ricoeur is its double intentionality. [11] A symbol is not a symbol because it allegedly lacks reference.

H theology is going to come to grips with the reference character of symbols, then certain features of symbols must be once again taken into consideration. First, we acknowledge that symbols have a double intentionality. The two intentionalities are from our perspective inseparable-distinguishable but still inseparable. Paul Ricoeur sees symbols functioning with an analogy of proportion.

> Analogy is a nonconclusive reasoning that proceeds through a fourth proportional term (A is to Bas C is to D). But in symbol I cannot objectivize the analogical relation that binds the second meaning to the first. By living in the first meaning I am drawn by it beyond itself: *the symbolic meaning is constituted in and through the literal meaning, which brings about the analogy by giving the analogue.* Unlike a comparison that we " look at " from the outside, symbol is the very movement of the primary meaning that makes us share in the latent meaning and thereby assimilates us to the symbolized, without our being able intellectually to dominate the similarity. This is the sense in which symbol "gives'; it gives because it is a primary intentionality that gives the second meaning. [12]

This recognition that the symbol " gives " meaning leads to our second consideration: coming in contact with the reference to something beyond the symbol is experienced as a kind of grace. The symbol provides meaning for us; it does not wait for us to superimpose meaning upon it. Though a symbol provides meaning we implicitly recognize it has a stability that transcends the context in which it is found meaningful. In Philip Wheelwright's definition of a symbol, he points out that it is "a relatively stable and repeatable element of perceptual experience," which is " of a more permanent kind than those

[11] Ricoeur, *Symbolism of Evil,* p. 15; see also *Freud and Philosophy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970) p. 8, and *The Conflict of lnterpretat-ioris* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), p. 289.

[12] Ricoeur, *Conflict of Interpretations,* p. 290, Ricoeur's italics.

transient wisps of suggestiveness" resulting from the occasional manipulation of words by poetic genius.[13] Symbols are anchored. They have a kind of staying power that permits them to speak again and again in new ways as the horizons of meaning grow and shift. Such staying power is due to our confidence that there is a referent beyond the symbol.

The meaning a symbol gives to our lives certainly presupposes that we have an existential relationship with the symbol. It is part of our horizon or context of meaning. But if a symbol by definition has a reference to something beyond itself, then its real power is to bind us to that which is beyond. To be related to a symbol that does not refer us to anything further is to be related to a mere object; the symbol becomes a mere thing. What makes a symbol live is its power to mediate a relationship between us and that to which it refers. It is only due to this quality of the symbol that we are able to see the meaning it provides as a gift, as coming to us from beyond us.[14] It is this referential dimension of the symbol that gives it the ability to draw us up into its world of meaning and unite us with essential reality, with the sacred. "Every symbol is finally a hierophany, a manifestation of the bond between man and the sacred." [15]

A third consideration is that symbols for linguistic beings are equi-primordial with experience. Humans are linguistic beings. Reality is mediated through language. And language itself is a part of reality. To continue Wheelwright's definition of symbol begun above, " a symbol, in general, is a relatively stable and repeatable element of perceptual experience, standing for some larger meaning or set of meanings which cannot be given, or not fully given, in perceptual experience itself." [16] In other words, human experience is already meaningful in the experiencing and one is unable to get behind or under the symbol to

[13] Wheelwright, *Metaphor and Recdity,* pp. 92 and 68 respectively.
"Ricoeur, *Conflict of Interpretations,* p. 9188.
[18] Ricoeur, *Symbolism of Evil,* p. 356.
[10] Wheelwright, *Metaphor and Realit11,* p. 9!l.

a more primal level where experience has not yet attained meaningfulness.

Ricoeur goes so far as to say that there are certain primary symbols (e.g., symbols of evil) which are more basic than mythical narratives. Myths enjoy a higher level of articulation; they are narratives or dramatic stories of fabled characters and adventures that employ strings of these more primary symbols. Religious discourse-and then reflective thought in the form of theology-represent a still higher level of articulation. There is no form of human discourse, then, that gets closer to the elementary experiences than the symbol.

A fourth consideration prescinds from the third. If the symbol is co-primordial with experience, then it is impossible for us to locate its referent independently of the symbol itself. The referent of an ordinary sign, in contrast, can be so located. We can clearly distinguish the act of stopping our automobile from the hexagonal sign that signifies such an act. The experiencing of stopping can be had in a context without that sign, e.g., we may stop the car in a driveway or a parking lot; the astronauts may stop their moon buggy miles away from the authority of any such sign. There is no intrinsic relationship between the hexagonal sign and its referent. We could by simple convention decide henceforth to represent the act of stopping with a circular shaped sign, an electronic whistle, or even an artificially induced odor. We are able to separate an ordinary sign from its referent.

But we cannot get our hands on the referent of a symbol without the symbol also being present. There is limited access to the reality revealed by the symbol. The symbol provides the only door. If you change symbols, you change realities. One can experience praying to God, for example, with a symbol such as " Our Father who art in heaven." Without such a symbol the prayer does not refer to God. Hence, it ceases even to be what we know as prayer.

This characteristic of symbolization is important when it comes to the question of verification. If we have no access to

the symbol's referent except through the symbol, then there is no extra-symbolic empirical experience on the basis of which verification can be made. But just because verification of this sort is impossible, we need not jump to the conclusion that there is no reference and hence no truth in symbolization.

The existentialist interpreters of symbols are correct when they contend that there can be authentication of religious symbols even though there may be no verification. If symbols lead to authentic human living, then further verification is said to be unnecessary. I concur with this notion as long as it applies to precognitive faith and meaning for daily life. But when it comes to theology-which is reflection upon faith and meaning in daily life-then more must be said. We will return to this shortly. But first two more in our series of considerations.

The fifth consideration is that symbols are dynamic. Their dynamism concerns us here in two respects: (1) they grow and die and may be resurrected, and (2) they constantly function to open us to newer dimensions of thought.

That symbols grow and die was pointed out at the beginning of this article. As long as the symbol resonates within the horizon of meaning of a people it has power. When the context of meaning changes, the symbol may become irrelevant and die due to lack of attention. The heel-clicking and straight-arm salute that accompanied the "Heil Hitler" during the Third Reich lost its potency in the post-World War II context.

Symbols are historically contingent. There may be some near-universal symbolic structures-e.g., water symbolizing purification, the sky symbolizing transcendence, etc.[11]-but the form taken by the actual symbols of a given historical community are conditioned in part by its unique language and culture. As times change so also do symbols change (although symbols often demonstrate more durability than the times) . If the symbol fails to orient meaning in the newer context, it atrophies. Some symbols, however, have been able to perdure through

[11] Mircea Eliadc, *Patterns in Comparative Religion* (Cleveland and N.ew York: World, Meridian edition, 1963).

repeated changes in cultural context, picking up new nuances with each change yet providing long historical continuity. The symbols of the great religious traditions would provide us with many examples.

It is not impossible to think of a symbol being.retrieved from the past after an intermittent generation or two of neglect. The principles 0£ reinterpretation and application enunciated by the contemporary study of hermeneutics have shown us how this is done. Ancient symbols carry with them an unspoken horizon of meaning. True understanding 0£ such symbols from the contemporary viewpoint requires a fusion 0£ the ancient horizon with the contemporary horizon.[18] Understanding includes participation in the world or meaning in which the symbol had or has its power. It includes a listening to what the symbol says; understanding includes a standing under or submitting to the voice of the symbol. In principle, then, symbols can be resurrected from their death through hermeneutic retrieval.

Another element in the dynamism 0£ symbols is what Paul Ricoeur calls "opening." Ricoeur seems to have two things in mind when he uses this term. On the one hand, he means what Paul Tillich did when he said the symbol opens up or "unlocks dimensions and elements of our soul which correspond to the dimensions and elements of reality." [19] The example Ricoeur gives is the symbol of the Exodus. The story of the Exodus " opens " in the listener a " certain state of wandering which is lived existentially as a movement from captivity to deliverance." [20] This is an opening to meaning, however, not to reference.

On the other hand, and more pertinent to us here, I would like to press Ricoeur into using " opening " to indicate reference as well. Ricoeur says that symbolism " marks the breakthrough of language toward something other than itself-what I call 'opening.' This breakthrough is' saying;' and saying is showing." [21] Ricoeur believes language in general and symbols in

[18] Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York: Seabury Press, 1975) pp. 267-74.

[1]. Tillich, *Dynamics of Faith,* p. 42.

[20] Ricoeur, *Conflict of Interpretations,* p. 66.

"'Ibid.

particular have an ostensive function, i.e., they point out something. If a living symbol has the ability to point out new things, Ricoeur is quick to remind us, then if we listen to what symbols say we will never relax into a smug "I know it all already" attitude. Symbols will keep us open-minded, looking forward to new and fresh revelations from being.[22]

This brings us to the sixth and last consideration which will finish my enumeration: the symbol gives rise to thought. Earlier we said that if symbols are equi-primordial with experience then reflective thought is unable to cut through to a level underneath the symbol. But we are now saying more. The symbol plays an *active* not just a *passive* role in giving rise to thought. Paul Ricoeur stresses: "The symbol gives."[23] What the symbol gives is prompting for thinking. Thinking is basically a process of interpreting symbols. Before thinking becomes speculation it is reflection on something prior, namely, its own presuppositions in the form of symbols. However, thinking eventually redounds to inform the symbol. Reinformed, the symbol gives rise to further thought; and thinking takes on the dynamic form of the hermeneutical spiral.

If religious symbols appear first at the level of faith and lived experience, and if theology is basically a thinking discipline, then theology is a thinking about religious symbols. The symbol percepts are reflected into concepts. But beyond simply reflecting cognitively the meaning that is expressed existentially, theology goes on to speculate about the reference to these symbols. Does "God" refer to God or just to a meaningful human experience? Does Jesus's proclamation of the eschatological "Kingdom of God" refer only to our present self-understanding or to an actual reality coming in the future? Theology

[22] "For philosophy, the Last Day cannot be the dream of some happy ending which lies on the imaginary horizon of our battles. It is in this sense that 'the kingdom of God is at hand.' It is this nearness which keeps history open .... the concept of the 'Last Day' works as a *limiting concept* in the Kantian sense ... (it) shatters the pretension of philosophies of history to express the coherent meaning of all that has passed and all that is to come." Ricoeur, *History and Truth* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, *1965)* p. 12, Ricoeur's italics; [28] Ricoeur, *Confiict of Interpretations,* pp. 288, 289; *Symbolism of Evil,* p. 848.

raises questions regarding the ground and referent of the sym:. bol.

SYMBOLOGY AND THEOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

Theology is the re-presentation (Ogden, Tracy) or re-description (Ricoeur) at the cognitive and rational level of discourse of what has been experienced at the more basic symbolic level. At the theological level of discourse we seek to say with some specificity just what it is that is referred to by religious symbols.

Although theology as a reflective and speculative discipline is grounded in symbols which are more basic, in itself theology seeks to become a system of signs with univocal references. It has a built-in urge to explain, a desire to become precise and objective. It attempts to translate the double intentionality of the symbol into the single intentionality of the statement or proposition. It may require more statements than there are symbols to be interpreted, but the supply of statements available seems to be almost infinite. Is theology, then, attempting to do the impossible? Is it trying to explain systematically the intransigently enigmatic and mysterious dimensions of life? Is it seeking an objectivity about the transcendent unconditioned that Kant has declared unattainable? Is theology by definition intellectual idolatry, creating its own conceptualized gods and then worshipping them?

Although systematic theology occasionally forgets that it is a second order discipline dependent upon symbols more basic, we can not do without it. It is practically inevitable due to human nature. We think. Authentic human living can not be achieved except through self-transcendence and self-affirmation. The human intellect must traverse the road of cognitive distance and critical self-examination before it can come back to itself and affirm itself. Theology may exist at a level once or twice removed from elementary experience, but this is no license for theology to avoid such experience. In our post-Enlightenment culture, theology is necessary for religion to become authentic.

If theology is unavoidable and perhaps even necessary, then

it behooves theology to attempt to reflect in its own systematic movement the same *opening* that characterized the primary symbol. From the outset, then, the theologian must recognize that theology is fundamentally interpretation-a re-presentation of what was previously revealed in the symbol-and then accept the finitude and provisionality this implies. Be open, but proceed!

What then is the referent of religious symbols which will be thematically pointed to in theological statements? If, as we said before, we have no access to the referent of the symbol except for the access which the symbol itself provides, then to what do statements refer that are abstracted from the symbol? The answer is *that which giV'es.* The breakthrough, recall, is that symbols *say;* and saying is showing. The reference for theological assertions is that which speaks to us through the symbol. It is being itself. If our experience with the symbol is that it gives meaning and impetus to reflect upon that meaning, then in reflecting upon the giving we will naturally think about the giver.

By what name shall we know this giver? By the name given us in the symbol. We know there is a giver because a name was given in the symbol. But critical reflection makes us able to distinguish abstractly between the name given in the symbol and the giver beyond. Critical theology is capable of remaining open to that which is beyond the name, to that which the symbol itself refers. Theological statements must employ one name or another due to their historical contingency. Nevertheless, they seek to be open to that which lies beyond the name. The important point here is that theology must seek for the transcendent referent of a religious symbol just to be able to recognize the mystery to which the symbol attunes us. Bernard Lonergan comments, "The transcendent is nothing in this world. Mystery is the unknown. Without a transcendental notion of being as the to-be-known, transcendent mystery can come to be named nothing at all." [24]

.. Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972) p. no.

The mysterious and transcendent giver has revealed itself in different chapters of human history through such contingent symbols as *theos, Yahweh,* Father, Prince of Peace, Emmanuel, *Tao, om,* The Great Spirit, and God. Theological reflection interprets these symbols and then proposes speculative statements referring to that which spoke through these symbols, to that which Tillich calls the god beyond the god of theism.

We have no direct access to that original source of the giving. We must begin with the symbols which are already subject to the contingencies of finite historical experience. Theology consists in a speculative questioning back, in a *Ruckfrage,* that points our attention toward that transcendent giver. In this sense, theology has an element of heuristic fiction. It is a constructive re-description of life's experience. Though a fictional re-description, its aim, as is the aim of theoretical models in science, is finally to gain a more adequate understanding of the real world. It does not lose its concern to make reference to the god beyond the idea of God.[20]

Seeking the answer to the *Riickfrage* is the transcendental move in theology. From the level of discourse found in the religious community we trace our steps back to the more primary level of meaningful symbolic experience. We recognize that the symbol gives meaning and gives impetus to reflect upon that meaning. To ask about that which gives from beyond yet through the symbol is to ask the question of God. Theology eventually must direct its attention in at least a pointing fashion toward the transcendent ground of reality which comes to expression in the symbol. Such transcendental questioning will lead eventually to metaphysical speculation and construction. This is the lot of theology.[26]

One of the few philosophers of religion who has demonstrated awareness that this distinction between meaning (sense) and

[20] Ricoeur, "Biblical Hermeneutics"; see also Patrick Bourgeois, "Hermeneutics of Symbols and Philosophical Reflection in Paul Ricoeur," *Philosophy Today* XV (Winter 1971) p. 235.

[26] Cf. David Tracy, *Blessed Rage for Order* (New York: Seabury Press, 1975) pp. 52-57.

reference could be applied to religious symbols is Paul Ricoeur. Ricoeur has in his own way raised the question I am raising here: what is the referent to religious symbols? His answer is slightly different from mine. Ricoeur says the referent is a limit-experience. In the context of discussing parables of the kingdom of God, he says the " ultimate referent of parabolic language is human experience centered around the *limit-experiences* which would correspond to the *limit-expressions* of religious discourse." [27]

It is difficult to get clear on just how what Ricoeur has said here applies to my own thesis, because Ricoeur is in this instance talking about religious discourse rather than the primary symbol itself. Because religious discourse is already discourse and, hence, like myth, already at a higher level of articulation than the primary symbol reflected in it, for all practical purposes the symbol has become the referent for religious discourse. On one occasion Ricoeur even states it: "The symbol' kingdom of God ' can be termed the common referent of these types of discourse [Jesus's parables] and thus also of their functioning as limit-expressions .... It is this limit-referent which presides over what I shall call the limit-experiences which religious language claims to redescribe." [28]

Later, in order to avoid any whispers that he might be flirting with Barthianism, Ricoeur loses heart in the battle for transcendent reference. He turns again to existential meaning in the spirit of Bultmann and Perrin. "... we must say that the ultimate referent of the parables, proverbs, and eschatological sayings is not the kingdom of God, but the *hitman reality* in its wholeness, as this is indicated by numerous expressions in the works of Norman Perrin." [29]

On this basis, if we press Ricoeur to say just what is the referent of the primary symbol itself, he would have to say the symbol is its own referent. The symbol, recall, is co-primordial

[27] Ricoeur, " Biblical Hermeneutics," p. !14, Ricoeur's italics.
[28] *Ibid.,* p.
[29] *Ibid.,* p. IQ7, my italics.

with the experience of limit. Is he saying that religious discourse can refer us to the symbol but beyond the symbol-which is the limit-there is no further reference? Do we finally end up with only contextual or existential meaning yet no reference? This I take to be the result of Ricoeur's position. Alas, he has surrendered too soon.

Theological method cannot be satisfied with this position. Because the symbol is a sign it must finally refer to something beyond itself. If it does not, the symbol risks absolutizing its own power and adopting the role of an idol for those who come under its religious power. A symbol must somehow cancel itself out, and it does so by permitting us to acknowledge that it points to a reality that transcends it. Religious discourse is usually already aware of this; certainly transcendental theology must reaffirm it.

CONCLUSION

Theology needs to be concerned about the existential meaning of symbols, to be sure, but it should be concerned equally with the reference of those symbols. The symbols themselves give rise to reflective and even speculative thinking, and we should not frustrate the desire to pursue such thinking just because of the scare put in us by the verificationists.

The giving quality of symbols implies at minimum that being itself is a giver. Particular symbols of that giver which appear in certain historical contexts reveal a good deal more in addition. The symbol of the cross conveys to us that self-giving is cosmic in proportion. The symbol of the Easter resurrection and the concomitant promise of the kingdom of God has as its referent a future consummation of all things in the life of the great giver.

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THE "NEGLECTED ARGUMENT" REVISITED: FROM C. S. PEIRCE TO PETER BERGER

IN AN OBSCURE but not entirely neglected article, the American pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce developed an argument which was designed to lead those who follow its directions to an affirmation of the reality of God. The essay, "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God," is actually only a rough sketch of the author's theory, and in some sections the barest outline of his thought. It first appeared in *Hibbert Journal* in 1908, and can be found together with a later and important addition in volume six of the *Collected Papers* of the author.[1] Maddening for those who look to Peirce for logical and scientific rigor, it excited for its author, nevertheless, a "peculiar confidence" and, when its intricacies are explored, it continues to do so for subsequent generations of scholars. In the "innermost nest" of this argument, Peirce has identified an activity of the mind which he describes as a form of pure play; this he proposes as one of the simplest and most certain ways of arriving at the hypothesis of God's reality.

The argument is not entirely original, nor is it, in itself, a proof. In effect, Peirce takes elements from traditional arguments for the existence of God from design, contingency and causality, the immediacy of religious experience, and universal consent. These he places within a prior context to illustrate

[1] *Collected Pap!N's of Charles Sanders Peirce,* Vols. I-VI, eds., Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss; Vols. VII-VIII, ed., Arthur W. Burks (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1960-66), The article, but without the later "additament," appears in *Charles S. Peirce: Selected Writings (Values in a Universe of Change),* ed. Philip P. Wiener (New York: Dover, 1958), pp. 358-879. Subsequent references to this article and other material from Peirce will be incorporated in the text in the standard notation that indicates volume and paragraph from the *Collected Papers.*

their intuitive source and their warrant for truth.[2] The source is the activity of musement which Peirce presents as a peculiarly effective and trustworthy environment for generating the hypothesis that there is indeed a God. The hypothesis must then be tested, and much of the article is a complicated apparatus of deductive and inductive logic to be utilized in the testing process. Peirce's own original contribution to logical theory, abduction, is exhibited in the process whereby the hypothesis is first generated.

Any attempt to fathom the unfathomable will be hazardous, and subject to criticism from those who demand for the God-question more (or less) analysis and precision; Peirce's Neglected Argument is no exception.[3] Yet it contains in its phenomenology of play the hint of an insight which Peirce found intellectually compelling and which later research has remarkably reinforced. In the pages that follow I hope to aileviate some of the neglect of this obscure piece of philosophical literature by exposing its complicated structure for the sake of clarity in pinpointing where, for Peirce, it reveals its particular force. I shall then relate Peirce's notion of musement to some of the subsequent literature dealing with the religious implications of human play. I shall conclude with some reflections on the peculiar qualities of play which may account for the attraction it held for a pragmatist like Peirce, the social historian Johan Huizinga, and the sociologist Peter Berger.

A" NEST" OF THREE ARGUMENTS

An "Additament" to the original article, written m 1910,

•Recent articles have used Peirce's "Neglected Argument" to defend and strengthen arguments from design (Bowman Clarke, "The Argument from Design-A Piece of Abductive Reasoning," *lnte:rnational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5* [Summer 1974]; 65-78) and from religious experience (D. Wiebe, "The Religious Experience Argument," *Sophia* 14 [March 1975]: 19-28). Peirce himself, in a letter to William James (July 23, 1905), claimed that he held a form of the ontological argument *(C.P.,* 8.262).

•One of the most thorough and balanced criticisms can be found in John E. Smith, "Religion and Theology in Peirce," in *Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce*, First Series, eds. Philip P. Wiener and Frederic H. Young (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952). pp. 251-67.

supplies a helpful guide through the ·labyrinthine ways of Peirce's thought.[4] The author tells us that the essay contains a " nest " of three arguments, the innermost of which he terms the " Humble Argument " because no sophistication is needed to follow it through to its conclusion. The process is that of musement, and the conclusion is (technically) only a hypothesis, but one which will be so attuned to the human mind and heart that it will normally issue in belief. The second argument, designated by Peirce the" Neglected Argument" proper (frequently simply the "N. A."), consists of the kind of apologetic needed to vindicate on pragmatic grounds the efficacy of the Humble Argument. These grounds are the natural spontaneity of the act of belief as it originates in an unprejudiced attitude of wonder, and its near-universal occurrence in human nature. Peirce notes that this argument ought to appeal to theologians -an ironic comment, no doubt, considering his caustic contempt for that profession.[5] The third argument, designed for minds trained in logic and science, consists in the application of " logical methodeutic " to the hypothesis and its consequences, to test for validity. Peirce notes, however, that certain peculiarities of the God-hypothesis preclude the type of scientific validation demanded for other hypotheses (6.466, 488-490) .

Before developing each of these in turn, it will be necessary to deal briefly with Peirce's idiosyncratic language, insofar as some key terms function in this article. Pierce distinguishes here between ' argument ' and ' argumentation '. The fom1er he

•Rather early in the article (6.468) Peirce warns: "I can only hope to make the residue of this paper a sort of table of contents, from which some may possibly guess what I have to say; or to lay down a series of plausible points through which the reader will have to construct the continuous line of reasoning for himself." Even after the suggestions in the "Additament," the reader must do considerable work on this article on play!

[5] Peirce views theologians as those who ought to be the scientific-minded students of religious questions, approaching them with impartial objectivity and unprejudiced minds. Instead he can say of metaphysics that " the chief cause of its backward condition is that its leading professors have been theologians " (6.3; *cf.* 6.438).

defines as " any process of thought reasonably tending to produce a definite belief"; and the latter as " an Argument proceeding upon definitely formulated premisses" (6.456). In terms of logical rigor, the argument is more informal; argumentation must conform to the regulated procedures of scientific methodology. (Throughout the article the author takes pains to identify each section as either argument or argumentation.) The act of wonder arises when one contemplates any one or combination of the' three universes of experience'. These three are related to various triadic categories in Peirce's philosophy; in this article they are defined as (1) the universe of ideas, (2) of brute facts and forces in reaction against each other, and (3) of those things (e.g. signs) which can serve as intermediaries between objects and consciousness (6.455). Finally, it is God's 'reality' and not his existence that concerns Peirce, since he assigns existence to the category of secondness-his universe of brute facts and forces (6.495; 8.262).

The " Humble Argument " and Musement

Peirce, the pragmatist, begins his first, "humble" argument by stating at the outset his assumptions: If there is a God, and if this God is benign, and if religious knowledge of God is a good to be sought above all, then

> we should naturally expect that there would be some Argument for His Reality that should be obvious to all minds, high and low alike, that should earnestly strive to find the truth of the matter; and further, that this Argument should present its conclusion, not as a proposition of metaphysical theology, but in a form directly applicable to the conduct of life, and full of nutrition for man's highest growth (6.457).

The author finds such an argument in the activity of a mind set free from all concerns, unprejudiced as to the outcome, meditating on the wonders of the universe in an attitude of musement, the pure play of the mind.

Musement is described as" a certain agreeable occupation of the mind" involving" no purpose save that of casting aside all

serious purpose." Such mental play " has no rules except the very law of liberty." The muser is encouraged to release his mind to enter states of reverie and fantasy. These may take the form of aesthetic contemplation, imaginative castle-building, or the consideration of " some wonder in one of the Universes." This ludic operation of the mind functions indeed as " interlude "; Peirce proposes that it be "indulged in moderately-say through some five to six per cent of one's waking time." It is not purely passive, but begins in attentive receptivity and moves to more active and inquisitive states: "Impression soon passes into attentive observation, observation into musing, musing into a lively give and take of communion between self and self " (6.458-61).

Since he has determined that musement defies all regulation, Peirce must permit the mind to engage in any activity, and to dwell upon any object of attention, real or imagined, but he does caution against confining its operation to anything so task-oriented as logical analysis, reserving that operation for a later moment (6.461). Given human pre-occupation with self, he assumes that the muser will quite possibly move from considerations of the wonders of the external world, to the wonders of the mind, and then from psychological considerations to metaphysical speculation. Peirce suggests several paths such musing may take: the consideration of various instances of beauty throughout the universe; recognition of homogeneities of chemical elements on earth and in the distant stars; perception of similar laws, e.g. the law of growth and development, in each of his three " universes." Seeking beyond these phenomena for their cause, the mind is led to conceive the God who is *Ens necessarium.* [6] It is indeed when the pure pb.y of the mind be-

• This is the term used most frequently for God by Peirce in this article. Peirce also characterizes God as Creator of the Universes (6.483), au infinitely incomprehensible object (6.466); in the Additameut he adds the attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, and disembodied spirit (6.489). Although there is an evolution in Peirce's theism, my own discussion will be limited to the theism inherent in this " Neglected Argument " and other fragmentary comments dating from this later stage of his career. For discussions of development and inconsistency in Peirce's statements about God, see Joseph De Marco," God, Religion, and Com-

comes a more attentive search for causes that Peirce identifies it specifically as ' musement ', and this state of mind will " in time flower into the N. A." (6.458), hypothesizing a God to account for such a universe.

In the Pure Play of Musement the idea of God's Reality will be sure sooner or later to be found an attractive fancy, which the Muser will develop in various ways. The more he ponders it, the more it will find response in every part of his mind, for its beauty, for its supplying an ideal of life, and for its thoroughly satisfactory explanation of his whole threefold environment (6.465).[7]

The " Neglected Argument"

During the development of the Humble Argument Peirce noted that a more scientific mind would wish prematurely to begin critical analysis, but that this should be postponed (6.464). The foll elaboration of the process for scientific validation is the third of his arguments. In between, very lightly sketched, is the argument which he terms specifically the "N.A. ", although it is clear that he uses this designation more commonly for the entire fabric of reasoning presented in the article. This argument, he remarks, ought to appeal to theologians since theirs is the task of making credible on philosophical grounds the natural impulses of religious faith (6.484). "Were the theologians able to perceive the force of this argu-

munity in the Philosophy of C. S. Peirce," *Modern Schoolman* 49 (May 1972): 881-47; and Charles Hartshorne, "A Critique of Peirce's Idea of God," *Philosophical Review 50* (Summer 1941): 516-22.

[7] In a set of responses entitled "Answers to Questions concerning my Belief in God," dating from 1906, Peirce "models " this activity: " I have often occasion to walk at night, for about a mile, over an entirely untravelled road, much of it between open fields without a house in sight. The circumstances are not favorable to severe study, but are so to calm meditation. If the sky is clear, I look at the stars in the silence. . . . Let a man drink in such thoughts as come to him in contemplating the physico-psychical universe without any special purpose of his own; especially the universe of mind which coincides with the universe of matter. The idea of there being a God over it all of course will be often suggested; and the more he considers it, the more he will be enwrapt with Love of this idea. He will ask himself whether or not there really is a God. If he allows instinct to speak, and searches his own heart, he will at length find that he cannot help believing it" (6.501)..

ment, they would make it such a presentation of universal human nature as to show that a latent tendency toward belief in God is a fundamental ingredient of the soul, and that, far from being a vicious or superstitious ingredient, it is simply the natural precipitate of meditation upon the origin of the Three Universes" (6.487).

The element which seems to be dominant in this second stage is the pragmatic force of the conviction arrived at in musement. The God who is assumed to be responsible for the universe, for the mind, for beauty and change, is a God to be loved and adored. One does not merely rest in theoretical contemplation of such a God; one is moved to shape one's life and behavior in certain ways that will be consistent with the God believed to be cause and creator of the universe. For Peirce, it is specifically when the force of a conviction leads to practical results in some overt action that one achieves rest in a state of belief.[8]

Assured from his own experience with the activity of musement, and from knowledge of similar experiences on the part of others, he argues that

> any normal man who considers the three Universes in the light of the hypothesis of God's Reality, and pursues that line of reflection in scientific singleness of heart, will come to be stirred to the depths of his nature by the beauty of the idea and by its august practicality, even to the point of earnestly loving and adoring his strictly hypothetical God, and to that of desiring above all things to shape the whole conduct of life and all the springs of action into conformity with that hypothesis. Now to be deliberately and thoroughly prepared to shape one's conduct into conformity with a proposition is neither more nor less than the state of mind called Believing ... (6.467)

This assumption of universal applicability-a generalization incapable of verification but easily disproved-is tempered in a later section where Peirce acknowledges that "unfortunately, it happens that there is very little established fact to show that this is the case" (6.484). His grounds for defending the assumption in the face of such counterevidence are his convictions

[8] See esp. the essay, "How to Make our Ideas Clear,"

that his own intellectual disposition is normal and, on matters that affect the practical conduct of life, the optimistic viewpoint is more reliable. It is the pessimists who will disagree and they are dismissed as simply deviating from the norm.

Peirce's doctrinaire of the indefensible weakens the total argument, but the more significant issue in this section seems to be his optimism concerning the ability of the human mind to arrive at true hypotheses and theories in the advance of human wisdom. He terms it the " very bedrock of logical truth" to recognize in scientific advance over the ages that "man's mind must have been attuned to the truth of things in order to discover what he has discovered" (6.476). The attunement of mind to the universe is best illustrated in human ability to generate hypotheses-those " spontaneous conjectures of instinctive reasoning "-which prove eventually to be true. Invoking Galileo's notion of *il lume naturale* by which the human mind is guided to truth, Peirce argues that some hypotheses possess as a " sign " of their truth the remarkable confidence they engender. " The N. A. excites this peculiar confidence in the very highest degree" (6.477).

The " Outermost " Argument

The third in Peirce's nest of arguments for the reality of God is an outline of the various procedures for critically analyzing both the hypothesis and its consequences. The summary contains a general set of steps to follow in critical inquiry, not all of which are applicable to the N. A. Peirce outlines three stages of inquiry: retroduction (abduction) , deduction, and induction.

Retroduction is a process of reasoning from an unexplained phenomenon, as consequent, backwards toward a conjecture or hypothesis that, as antecedent, will account for it. The elements of the newly articulated hypothesis comprise the premisses of a syllogism from which the " surprising phenomenon " can then be inferred as conclusion. Abduction is the " neglected argument" in logical theory; Peirce, however, has developed this process in some detail.[9] In this article he describes it in

• 2.755 ff, 2.776 ff, 5.180 ff, 5.196-7.

strong metaphors and assigns to it a pivotal role in the Neglected Argument for the Reality of God:

> The whole series of mental performances between the notice of the wonderful phenomenon and the acceptance of the hypothesis, during which the usually docile understanding seems to hold the bit between its teeth and to have us at its mercy, the search for pertinent circumstances and the laying hold of them, the dark laboring, the bursting out of the startling conjecture, the remarking of its smooth fitting to the anomaly, as it is turned back and forth like a key in a lock, and the final estimation of its Plausibility, I reckon as composing the First Stage of Inquiry. Its characteristic formula of reasoning I term Retroduction ... (6.469).

In the terminology of this article, abduction (retroduction) is argument, not argumentation; it yields only some degree of plausibility and must be tested before one rests in it with belief. For Peirce the peculiar plausibility of the N. A. sets it in a class by itself.

Deduction, the second stage of inquiry, has for its purpose the collecting of consequents of the hypothesis. It operates in two steps: explication of the hypothesis for conceptual clarity, and demonstration, using a method similar to that of Euclid's *Elements* (6.471). Explication remains at the level of argument but demonstration is characterized as the more rule-governed argumentation. Peirce notes that this stage of inquiry if properly performed possesses scientific validity, but, following Kant, the validity guarantees only internal, analytic necessity. "This kind of reasoning deals exclusively with Pure Ideas attaching primarily to Symbols and derivatively to other Signs of our own creation" (6.474). Deduction, therefore, provides only a validating process internal to the logic of the question and cannot guarantee the truth of the hypothesis.

Finally, if one is to lmow if the hypothesis has any bearing on expe1·ience,whether it can be verified at the level of sense, one must move to the third stage of logical inquiry: induction (6.472). This too involves a number of steps-classification, by which the ideas demonstrated in deduction are attached to experience; the "probations" or testing-argumentations; and a

final evaluative step called by Peirce the " sentential " part of induction. Various degrees of inductive certainty are possible at these stages.

Critical Theory Applied to the N. A.

Only after the survey and evaluation of abduction, deduction, and induction does Peirce assess the bearing of these procedures on his Neglected Argument. Abduction has resulted in the hypothesis that there is a God. This hypothesis, for Peirce, has unique status exempting it from some of the critical tests required for evaluating other hypotheses. It is peculiar in that its object is believed to be infinitely incomprehensible. "This leaves the hypothesis but one way of understanding itself; namely, as vague yet as true so far as it is definite, and as continually tending to define itself more and more, and without limit" (6.466) .[10] In the Additament (6.488-490) he designates three additional ways this hypothesis is unique: 1) a remarkably high degree of plausibility. "So hard is it to doubt God's Reality, when the Idea has sprung from Musements, that there is great danger that the investigation will stop at this first stage." 2) the obscurity of the object of the hypothesis does not permit of the type of explication and prediction outlined in the deductive stage of analysis. "How, for example, can we ever expect to be able to predict what the conduct would be, even of an omniscient being, governing no more than one poor solar system for only a million years or so? How much less if, being also omnipotent, he be thereby freed from all experience, all desire, all intention! " 3) the pragmatic force of the hypothesis over the conduct of human life. This aspect is directly related to Peirce's pragmatism and his truth-theory. "According to that logical doctrine which the present writer first formulated in 1873 and named Pragmatism, the true meaning of any

[10] Vincent G. Potter, S. J., discusses the semantic value of vagueness invoked by Peirce for his notion of God in the essay, "Vaguely like *a* Man": the Theism of Charles S. Peirce," in *God Knowable and Unknowable.* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1978), PP• fl41-54.

product of the intellect lies in whatever unitary determination it would impart to practical conduct un.der any and every conceivable circumstance, supposing such conduct to be guided by reflexion carried to an ultimate limit. [11]

Unique and peculiar though it may be, the God-hypothesis must nevertheless be submitted to critical inquiry by those whose minds are trained in the disinterested pursuit of truth. The uncritical may well be overpowered by the " adorability " of the hypothesis as it arises from the euphoria of musement, but this will not be sufficient for those with access to the " edge-tools" which are the "higher weapons in the arsenal of thought" (6.461). These will see that

> The hypothesis, irresistible though it be to first intention, yet needs Probation; and that though an infinite being is not tied down to any consistency, yet man. like any other animal, is gifted with power of understanding sufficient for the conduct of life. This brings him, for testing the hypothesis, to taking his stand upon Pragmaticism, which implies faith in common sense and in instinct, though only as they issue from the cupel-furnace of measured criticism. In short, he will say that the N. A. is the First Stage of a scientific inquiry, resulting in a hypothesis of the very highest Plausibility, whose ultimate test must lie in its value in the self-controlled growth of man's conduct of life (6.480) .[12]

This appeal to the " cash value " of religious belief, its observable impact on the life of the believer, is fundamental to pragmatism as expressed in philosophy of religion. Peirce's colleague, William Jam es, brings his monumental *Varieties of Religious Experienae* to a close with his own " over-belief," the

[11] Bowman Clarke, in "Peirce's Neglected Argument," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 18 (Fall 1977): 277-87, argues that the Additament goes beyond the original article in that it prescribes a more critical evaluation of the hypothesis. He suggests (contrary to the original article and sections of the Additament) that Peirce, in the spirit of Critical Common-Sensism, would no longer grant immunity from explication to the God-hypothesis, requiring for it the same clarity and precision as for other elements in his system of thougl;tt, with which it stands or falls as part of a unitary whole (pp. 285-87).

[12] Peirce originally invoked the name ' pragmatism ' for the type of empiricism he and others were developing iri Cambridge, Mass. After the term became more commonly used, and took on a sense he had never intended, he chose for himself the more unwieldy ' pragmaticism' (6.490).

hypothesis that God must be real since real effects can be observed in the lives of at least some of those who claim encounters with him, and these effects require an adequate cause:

> The further limits of our being plunge, it seems to me, into an altogether other dimension of existence from the sensible and merely 'understandable' world. Name it the mystical region, or the supernatural region, whichever you choose ... Yet the unseen region in question is not merely ideal, for it produces effects in this world. When we commune with it, work is actually done upon our finite personality, for we are turned into new men, and consequences in the way of conduct follow in the natural world upon our regenerative change. But that which produces effects within another reality must be termed a reality itself.... God is real since he produces real effects.[13]

Since Peirce does little more than sketch the methods of deduction and induction, resting his case rather on the pragmatic efficacy of the belief engendered in the free-play of musement, we are directed once more ha.ck to the second, " neglected " argument and to the prior "humble" argument it seeks to vindicate. Rising indeed in play, the argument involves a measure of the more laborious exercise of both intellect and will. The testing of the hypothesis must be accomplished through open-minded criticism and the efficacy of the belief to promote the conversion of one's life in the direction of religious and ethical ideals. For Peirce, the burden of proof for a Christian was not doctrinal orthodoxy, but the gospel of love (6.435-48) .

Nor does the Neglected Argument arise entirely from instinct.[14] The careful direction to the muser that he must begin

[10] William James, *Varieties. of Religious Experience* (Gifford Lectures 1901-1902), XX (New York: University Books, 1953), pp. 515-17. James confesses his debt to Peirce, quoting his 1878 article on pragmatism (" How to Make Our Ideas Clear"), *ibid.,* Lecture XVIII, pp. 444-45. The correspondence between James and Peirce reveals a deep friendship and mutual respect in spite of James's admission of his inability to understand the logical and mathematical aspects of Peirce's philosophy, and Peirce's chagrin at James's lack of concern for precision and scientific accuracy. See Ralph Barton Perry, *The Thought and Character of William James* (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1936), esp. II, pp. 421-440.

[14] This point has been developed in Richard L. Trammell, " Religion, Instinct and Reason in the Thought of Charles S. Peirce," *Transactiona of the Oharlea S. Peirce Soeietv* 8 (Winter 197!!): 8-25.

his contempiation with no expectations as to the outcome, in an attitude of open inquiry, identifies musement with the scientific search for truth. A disinterested, detached approach is associated by Peirce with reason, science, and theoretical speculation; and distinguished from instinct, with its tei:idency to serve as a guide for the more practical pursuits of life. Thus, in spite of the fact that the belief engendered in the Neglected Argument can never meet the standards of scientific proof, the believer will be " logically justified in crossing the Rubicon with all the freightage of eternity" (6.485).

It will be helpful at this point to summarize in outline form the main elements in Peirce's" nest" of three arguments:

I. Humble Argument
   - Directed toward: the uncritical and pre-critical mind
   - Operation: Musement-the free-play of the mind contemplating the wonders of the universe
   - Result: the spontaneous generation of an hypothesis concerning the reality of God: intellectual satisfaction, belief, and adoration
   - Degree of certitude: highest degree of plausibility

II. Neglected Argument
   - Directed toward: natural theologians
   - Operation: apologetic; exhibiting the universality and connaturality of the Humble Argument
   - Result: vindication of the pragmatic force of the Humble Argument and of its uniqueness as a hypothesis compelling belief
   - Degree of certitude: pragmatic certainty correlative with the compelling nature of the hypothesis and its tendency to affect the conduct of life

III. Critical Analysis
   - Directed toward: minds trained in logic and science
   - Operations: abduction, deduction, induction
   - Results: abduction accounts for generation of hypothesis; deduction explicates and demonstrates; induction evaluates
   - Degree of certitude for N. A.: "Peculiar confidence"

Play and Transcendence

We return now to the activity with which Peirce begins and which, in the end, accounts for his peculiar confidence, remarked in each subsequent stage of this argument. It is a ludic or play-like activity of the mind; one that can be shown to bear a family resemblance to other ludic phenomena and experiences which more recent studies have found to be "signals of transcendence." H

Huizinga's *Homo Ludens*

The phenomenology of play sketched by Peirce in his description of musement is remarkable in one sense, in that it predates by thirty years *Homo Ludens,* the seminal work on play by the historian of culture, Johan Huizinga.[16] Although it was not the first theoretical study of the phenomenon of play, *Homo Ludens* was more thorough and far-reaching than its predecessors and has become the touchstone for further research on play, particularly in terms of its implications for philosophy, religion, and anthropology.

The exploration of play-elements in various facets of culture is Huizinga's primary project. For our purposes, however, we must confine ourselves to his phenomenology of play and to the suggestions he makes concerning the relevance of play to the supernatural. These latter are never fully developed, but are suggested throughout his exposition.

In the opening chapter, " Nature and Significance of Play as a Cultural Phenomenon," Huizinga lists the following play characteristics. Although it is the " fun " element in play which he finds to be irreducible, defying interpretation, for Huizinga the primary characteristic of play is freedom. Play involves a voluntary stepping-out of the ordinary routines of life, away from seriousness, beyond the antitheses of wisdom and folly,

[15] Peter Berger, *A Rumor of Angels: Modern Society and the Redis.covery of the Supematu.ral* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1969), chapter 3.

[18] Johan Huizinga, *Homo Ludem: A Study of the Play-Element in Culture* (1938; reprint Boston: Beacon Press, 1955).

truth and falsehood, good and evil, into a sphere of activity recognized as illusion (from *il-luclere,* 'in play') . Its locality as well as its duration are part of this illusion. Play-spaces are the defined boundaries of court, board, stage, or the universe of fantasy; are the chronologies of second quarter, opponent's turn, third act, or 'once upon a time'. Huizinga's models are forms of social play, primarily games, each of which determines its own space and time and creates a world superimposed upon the ordinary world, entered only by assuming the " rules of the game " and agreeing to the illusion. The conscious element, recognizing when one steps into and out of the ludic sphere, is central to Huizinga's analysis.

Play must be disinterested, serving no material, biological or utilitarian function. Its value and significance reside in the activity itself. Play is interlude, intermezzo, a regularly recurring relaxation and the complement to the more serious and confined activities of life. Within the space and time of play a peculiar order reigns. Huizinga explores the overlapping characteristics of the playful and the aesthetic, discovering the elements of rhythm, harmony and beauty in both. Social play is rule-governed and competitive; it tends to promote the formation of play-communities: clubs, teams, secret societies. This latter element and the secludedness of play heighten an aspect of secrecy common to many forms of play, sometimes expressed in costumes, masks, or other garb designed to set the players off from ordinary life.[17]

The parallels with Peirce's notion of free and spontaneous musement are significant. Omissions, where they occur in Peirce, can be accounted for by the fact that he is describing a form of solitary and mental play rather than the rule-structured games and rituals of interest to the historian of culture. Like Huizinga, Peirce suggests ideal times for such activity-the half-light of dawn and dusk-and describes the entrance into the play-sphere in words that underline Huizinga's insistence that human play is characterized by a conscious decision

[1·] *Ibid.,* pp. 1-27.

to move from the ordinary world into that of illusion: " Enter your skiff of Musement, push off into the lake of thought, and leave the breath of heaven to swell your sail. With your eyes open, awake to what is about or within you, and open conversation with yourself; for such is all meditation" (6.461).

Both Huizinga and Peirce find the experience of play a gateway to realities that are more than natural, more than human. Huizinga proposes a theory of adult human play that interprets it as a meaningful activity that transcends materiality. Observing the pervasive occurrence of play-forms throughout human culture, in instances as diverse as law, philosophy, religion, war and poetry, he explores the special quality of the play-phenomenon that links it with the spiritual nature of the human person. Huizinga's theory, hinted at throughout *Homo Ludens,* identifies play with a level of significance beyond the rational. "The very existence of play continually confirms the supra-logical nature of the human situation. Animals play, so they must be more than merely mechanical things. We play and know that we play, so we must be more than merely rational beings, for play is irrational." [18]

At the end of a long and thorough development, in the course of which the author explores the phenomena of play in religious festivity and traces sacred ritual and myth back to primitive play-forms, Huizinga concludes that the activity of play must be uniquely suited for offering access to the divine: "The human mind can only disengage itself from the magic circle of play by turning towards the ultimate." Plato and the Book of Proverbs are quoted in support of this final ludic :fl.ing.[19]

It is important to note the method used by Huizinga in arriving at this final statement concerning play. The social his-

[18] *Ibid.,* pp. S-4.

[19] *Ibid.,* p. 212, citing Plato, *Laws,* 803-4, and *Proverbs.* 8: 22-31. E. H. Gombrich, in "Huizinga's *Homo ludens,"* advises those who wish to come to terms with the book to start with the last chapter and work backward. "As the book grew under his hands it changed from a book about man and play to a meditation about man and God." See *Johan Huizinga 1872-1972;* Papers delivered to the Johan Huizinga Conference, Groningen, December 1972, ed. W. R. H. Koops, E. H. Kossmann, Gees Van der Plaat (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1978), p. 158.

torian is also by profession an etymologist, and much of his progress through *Homo Ludens* is achieved by tracing through various languages and cultures the linguistic expressions for play and its related terms. In addition he uses the play-characteristics assembled in the opening chapter as criteria for viewing such activities as philosophical disputations, warfare, the creative design of a poem or work of architecture, and the formality of legal procedures *sub specie ludi.* The method does not pretend to be scientific, nor is the reference of play to the ultimate offered as the conclusion of an argument. It is, rather, the concluding invitation of a series of provocative insights. During the centenary celebration of Huizinga's birth, one member of the symposium captured his method in these words: "Huizinga, who knew the importance of hypotheses in scholarly research perfectly well himself, it appears, only rarely had use of them. His major works are not based on hypotheses, checked, rejected, reworded and reworked, but on these visions, elucidated, enlarged, commented upon rather than demonstrated." [20] His vision and his invitation were left to another generation of scholars to pursue.

One measure of the truth of Huizinga's vision and insight into the character of play is the influence of *Homo Ludens* on subsequent research. Any survey of the literature of play invariably reveals the frequently acknowledged debt of the authors to the Dutch historian. Prominent among these are works in the history of religion (Hugo Rahner, *Man at Play,* German edition 1948); sociology and anthropology (Roger Caillois, *Man, Play and Game.'J',* French edition, 1958; Iona and Peter Opie, *Children's Games in Streets and Playgrounds,* 1969); theology (Harvey Cox, *Feast of Fools,* 1969; Jurgen Moltmann, *et al., Theology of Play,* ; psychology of religion (Robert E. Neale, *In Praise of Play,* 1969); and sociology of religion (Peter Berger, *A Rumor of Angels,* 1969).[21] Space

•• E. H. Kossmannn " Postscript," in Koops, *et al., op. cit.,* p. 231.

[11] Rahner (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972); Caillois (New York: Free Press, 1961); Opie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969); Cox (Cambridge, Mass.:

does not permit treatment of all of these. For our purposes, we shall focus on the argument concerning the power of play to disclose the transcendent developed some thirty years after *Homo Ludens* by a sociologist attempting a rediscovery of the supernatural. [22]

Berger's *A Rumor of Angels*

Although Peter Berger's professional competence lies in the sociology of knowledge and of religion,[23] the task he undertakes in *A. Ru11wr o.f Angels* is a deliberate stepping beyond the limits of those disciplines and into questions that are or ought to be 0£ concern for the professional theologian and philosopher. Well aware that the relativizing perspective of sociology is alternately cause and effect of what he characterizes as the" alleged demise of the supernatural," he exposes the vulnerability of current secularity to the same type of critique. It too is culturally conditioned. One may still ask questions about truth:

> Once we know that all human affirmations are subject to scientifically graspable socio-historical processes, *which affirmations are true and which are false?* We cannot avoid the question any more than we can return to the innocence of its pre-relativizing asking. (p. 40) [24]

Berger's quarrel is not with the relativizing methods of historians, psychologists and sociologists, whose diagnostician he is by profession, but with those theologians who have seemed to capitulate to them, surrendering their birthright in the name of

Harvard University Press, 1969); Moltmann (New York: Harper & Row, 1972); Neale (New York: Harper & Row, 1969); Berger, *op. cit.;* subsequent references to this work will be from the Anchor edition, 1970, and incorporated in the text.

[22] For other aspects of the religious significance of play, see the author's "Play Springs Eternal," *New Scholasticism 5Q* (Spring 1978): 187-201.

[23] Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1966); Peter Berger, *The Sacred Canopy-Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1967); Peter Berger, *The Precarious Vision* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1961).

[24] Here and elsewhere, italics by the author.

"relevance." [25] He extends to "professional. philosophers and professional theologians (or perhaps, who knows, to teams that combine both types of expertise)" the challenge to explore the anthropological foundations for theological faith (p. 52).

Admitting his lack of expertise in philosophical anthropology and theology he nevertheless proposes the guidelines for a search within the human condition for " signals of transcendence," in an attempt to rediscover empirical foundations for religious belief in the supernatural. For Berger, the supernatural is the designation for that reality which has traditionally been the object of religious faith, "one of ultimate significance for man, which transcends the reality within which our everyday experience unfolds" (p. 2). The signals of transcendence he discloses in his own brief exercise are described as certain " prototypical human gestures " which point beyond the level of human experience toward realities that transcend and give ultimate meaning to that experience:

> By signals of transcendence I mean phenomena that are to be found within the domain of our " natural " reality but that appear to point beyond that reality .... By prototypical human gestures I mean certain reiterated acts and experiences that appear to express essential aspects of man's being, of the human animal as such. (p. 53)

It is in this role of " signal of transcendence " that Berger identifies and discusses the phenomenon of play.

The phenomenology of play sketched in the context of his argument is basically that of Huizinga, to whom Berger acknowledges his debt. In particular, he selects for discussion Huizinga's analysis of play as an activity that sets up a separate universe, with its own rules, space, time, and mode of discourse. For Berger, "play always constructs an enclave within the

[25] Berger's quarrel with theologians continues into the present decade. See his article, " Secular Theology and the Rejection of the Supernatural: Reflections on Recent Trends," *Theological Studies* 88 (March 1977)-: 89-56; also "Responses to Peter Berger" by the theologians he takes to task: Langdon Gilkey, Shubert Ogden, and David Tracy, in *Theological Studies* 89 (September 1978): 486-507. Berger seems to share Peirce's disdain for professional theologians.

world of everyday social life, and an enclave within the latter's chronology as well " (p. 58) . In addition, play provides for adult and child alike a type of elation that is more significant than mere pleasure. Joy is the more appropriate name for this phenomenon, and it is related to the suspension of ordinary time and space:

> Joy is play's intention. When this intention is actually realized, in joyful play, the time structure of the playful universe takes on a very specific quality-namely, *it becomes eternity* .... in joyful play it appears as if one were stepping not only from one chronology into another, but from time into eternity. *(Ibid.)*

Thus joyful play signals a transcendent order with "rumors" of deathless childhood, liberation and peace. Play suspends or brackets the ordinary world of high seriousness and shabby triviality for moments of ecstasy.

In addition to play, the author proposes other clues embedded in *humanitas* pointing to the supernatural: the human propensity for imposing order on reality, humor, hope, and-as counter-gesture-moral outrage in the face of inhuman atrocities. The supernatural order thus signalled is that of Western monotheism. Berger's approach is non-denominational, moving by a method of " inductive faith " from anthropological data to belief in the God who is" not the world and who was not made by man, who is outside and not within ourselves, who is not a sign 0£ human things but of whom human things are signs, who is symbolized and not a symbol" (p. 89) . Such a God, the God of Biblical faith, is totally other yet accessible in human experience and history.

How this can be the case is an aspect of Berger's essay that is very lightly sketched, but strongly evocative of Peirce.[26] Noting that Marx, Freud, Feuerbach and all sociological theories of religion inspired by them interpret religion as a human projection, Berger suggests an alternate model: reflection. The relig-

••As is, of course, his analysis of play, and his interpretation of the capacity of play to lead to religious belief. Berger gives no indication of having been influenced by Peirce's "Neglected Argument."

ious symbols that are dominant in human consciousness may well be at the same time proj·ections and reflections because of a basic analogy between human reality and asupernaturalorder. [27] At any rate, theology ought at least to consider such a possibility. "If the religious projections of man correspond to a reality that is superhuman and supernatural, then it seems logical to look for traces of this reality in the projector himself" (p. 47).

This leads Berger to propose a method of moving inductively from anthropology to theology. The conclusions will not be susceptible to empirical proof; rather they will require a form of faith. But that faith will be empirically rooted. "Put simply, inductive faith moves from human experience to statements about God, deductive faith from statements about God to interpretations of human experience" (p. 57).

Concluding Reflections

Huizinga, Berger, and others who have explored the phenomenon of play in the spirit of *Homo Ludens* have paid no homage to the American pragmatist who designed an obscure argument for God arising out of musement. Yet in Peirce, Huizinga and Berger we can observe over three generations the intellectual "play" of an idea which still eludes empirical analysis. Peirce knew well that too much clarity or precision could distort rather than disclose the truth when one is exploring ultimate realities. Vagueness and obscurity are the best one can hope for as the finite mind peers through conceptual lenses at the infinite. Huizinga and Berger explore the enclave created by the ecstasy of play within the world of serious work, and discover there sacred space, sacred time. The God glimpsed by

[21] Peirce, before him, had relied on Galileo's notion of *il lume naturale* (C.P., 6.10, 6.567, 6.476-77), a type of human racial wisdom resulting from an attunem.ent with the universe, to account for the progress of knowledge, and the ability of human persons to guess (via "abductive leaps") correct theories in the face of an infinity of possible hypotheses. Peirce's God, though infinite, can be conceived only as "vaguely like a man" (5.536). "The hµman mind and the human heart have a filiation to God" {8.262).

each of them remains a hidden God, elusive, yet profoundly present, appealing to human consciousness and affectivity in ways that forever alter the course of individual lives. For Peirce, there was a far more direct mode of encounter: "As for God, open your eyes-and your heart, which is also a perceptive organ-and you see him" (6.493).

There is a sense in which the theoretical speculations, cultural and literary evidence, and experiential data assembled by Johan Huizinga, Hugo Rahner, Robert E. Neale, Harvey Cox, Peter Berger and Jurgen Moltmann constitute inductive "probations " of the hypothesis whose abductive origin is exposed in the Neglected Argument. Peirce expressed optimistic assurance that anyone who entered his type of contemplative play with appropriate openness and freedom from prejudice would arrive at belief in God. The combined research and theory of the later additions to the literature on play are instances of those who in one way or another have performed his experiment and arrived at similar results. Even the scholastic philosopher, Josef Pieper, who disavows any claim to Huizinga's analysis, adds additional confirmation to Peirce's theory in a work whose title has a Peircean ring: *In Tune with the World.*[28]

These approaches are indeed of a different cast from the formal proofs for the existence of God designed by metaphysicians and logicians. In syllogistic inference, the model that suggests itself is not play but the more work-like process of moving according to a set of rules, within the rigid confines of analysis and deduction toward a conclusion which emerges as a product from this process. None of the freedom, spontaneity, and creative fantasy of play is permitted. Discipline prevails. The phenomena of play examined in these pages and found to be conducive to religious faith are the very elements restricted by more rigid scientific analysis. Peirce provides for the latter, but only after the free-play of mind and the "homing instinct" of mind and heart have generated the hypothesis to be examined critically.

[28] Josef Pieper, *In Tune witk the Wo-rld: A Theory of Festivity* (New York: l{arcourt, Brace & World, 1965).

I would suggest that there is a phenomenological source that grounds the speculations of the authors examined in these pages. Each of course draws from a shared experience of the human condition. In that community of experience it seems that the spontaneous activity of play and the impulse of religious belief are rather commonly linked phenomena, especially insofar as they involve also an insight or intuition of cosmic order. This is the factor alluded to in each of these studies which I would wish to bring to the fore for final consideration.

In Peirce it is the order of the " universes " which will initially arouse the wonder of the muser and which-after attentive contemplation-will ultimately lead to the hypothesis of God as Cause and Creator. In Huizinga, one of the remarkable qualities of play is its capacity to fantasize a universe in which absolute order prevails, reflection of an ultimate and eternal order. And in Berger the ecstatic impulse of play dares to hold out as an object of hope a transcendent order characterized by peace, liberation and deathless joy. If the argument for the existence of God from design and order is the most vulnerable to logical criticism, it remains nevertheless the most spontaneous, most natural, and most perduring. And if, as Peirce, Huizinga and Berger suggest, there is an " attunement " of the human person to the universe; if the human person is *homo ludens* precisely because man and woman are each first *imago Dei;* if the transcendent is reflected and " signalled " in the empirical order of human experience-then we can account for the spontaneity of the God-hypothesis though we never adequately demonstrate its conclusion. Nor will it be surprising that belief in God will be the fruit of a mind that is most attentive, most open and most free-a mind at play.

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TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF LATE MEDIEVAL AUGUSTINIANISM

((PLANE NOBISCUM EST AUGUSTINUS." Although these are the words of John Calvin in his *Christianae Religionis lnstitutio,*[1] there were few theologians in the Middle Ages or Reformation who would not have said the same. Throughout the Middle Ages, the influence of Augustine was so comprehensive and his authority so unassailable that virtually no one would have dared to deny his "Augustianianism." Every medieval theologian, at the very least, paid lip-service to the authority of Augustine.[2] In the Reformation too most of the parties involved appealed constantly to the authority of Augustine, and in fact, the entire controversy, in its early stages at least, can be understood as a "Kampf um Augustin."[3] This almost universal desire among theologians to have Augustine on their side persisted well into the modern era when not only Jansenius and Pascal, but also the Dominicans, the Jesuit Molinists, and countless others claimed the authority of Augustine for their respective positions.4 Obviously then, there is a problem here for the historian of Christian thought. Who and what is to be designated as

[1] Quoted in H. Oberman, "'Tuus sum, salvum me fac .' Augustinrevcil zwischen Renaissance und Reformation" in *Scientia Augustiniana,* eds. C. Mayer and W. Eckermann, (Wiirzburg, 1975), pp. 849-898, p. 871.

[2] This of course does not imply an extensive familiarity with Augustine's works themselves. Often Augustine was known primarily through the various *florilegia.* Besides these, Lombard's *Sentences* was perhaps the most influential in transmitting a knowledge of Augustine to the late Middle Ages.

[3] On this, see Karl Baur, *Die Wittenberqer Universitatstheologie und die Anfiinge der Deutsch en Reformation* (Tiibingen, .

•Accordingly, as one would expect, "Augustinianism" has become an endless source of grist for the scholarly mill. In one decade alone there appeared well over *500* s,tudies on the influence of Augustine. Cf. T. Van Bavel, *Repertoire Biblcographique de Saint Augustin, 1950-1960* (The Hague, 1963), nos. and C. Andresen, *Bibliographia Augustiniana* (Darmstadt, 1973).

" Augustinian " when virtually every theologian makes some claim to that term? Would it not perhaps be in the best interests of historiographical clarity to abandon such an ambiguous concept?

The use of the term " Augustinianism " is particularly problematic in relation to late medieval theology.[5] In this field of scholarship, the problem is more than simply one of definition; it involves the very character and configuration of late medieval theology itself, and the concept is an important one in the effort to discern accurately the theological currents of the time. And it is also significant from the point of view of the Reformation " Kampf um Augustin." It is not surprising then that the scholarly debate on this issue has already been carried on for at least three quarters of a century.

The initial impetus behind this debate was, as is still often the case, an interest in the significance of late medieval theology for the Reformation. Thus, at the turn of the century, scholars such as Carl Stange first seriously raised the question of Luther's relationship to the theology of his Order, and more particularly, to the theology of Gregory of Rimini.[6] Soon thereafter, A. V. Muller argued that there was an Augustinian tradition in the late Middle Ages which adhered more closely to the teachings of Augustine than had Thomas Aquinas or Bonaventure.7 This tradition found its representatives in such figures as Simon Fidati of Cascia (d.1348), Hugolin of Orvieto (d.1373), Augustinus Favaroni of Rome (d.1443), and Jacobus Perez of Valencia (d.1470). Moreover, this tradition existed both inside and outside of the Augustinian Order. But the most important

• B. Decker distinguishes between a philosophical and theological Augustinianism in the Middle Ages: "Augustinismus" in *Lexilcon fiir Thwlogie und Kirche* I, 1092-1094. Philosophical Augustinianism, with its distinctive metaphysics, epistemology and psychology, is not our primary concern here. Rather, we are concerned with a specifically theological Augustinianism.

• Carl Stange, " Uber Luthers Beziehungen zur Theologie seines Ordens " in *Neue lcirchliche Zeifachrift,* 11 (1900), *574-585.*

[7] This argument was developed in a series of books and articles, the first of which was *Luthers Theologische Quellen,* (Giessen, 1912). For a complete list of Miiller's relevant works, see E. Stakemeier, *Dl!!I' Kampf um Augustin· auf dem T1identinum,* (Paderbom, 1987), p. 241.

person in this tradition, according to Muller, was none other than Martin Luther in his theological protest against the *moderni.* Muller's attempt was thus to establish the existence of an unbroken late medieval Augustinian tradition which extended into the Reformation.

In 1937 E. Stakemeier took up and defended Muller's basic thesis. In his book, *Der Kampf um Augustin auf dem Tridentirmm,8* he pointed out the genuinely Augustinian position taken by the General of the Augustinian Order at the Council of Trent. Here then, Stak:emeier argued, was a legitimate heir to the late medieval Augustinian tradition which Muller had tried to demonstrate.

But the Muller-Stakemeier approach was not met with an easy acceptance among scholars. Many were of the opinion that much more research was required before their basic thesis could be substantiated. Thus scholars such as M. Schiller and H. Jedin began to produce major monographs on individual members of the Augustinian Order.[9] Other important studies, such as those of A. Zumkeller on Hugolin of Orvieto and Dionysius of Montina, contributed greatly towards :filling the lacunae in modern scholarship's understanding of late medieval theology .[10]

By mid-century, some scholars felt that more general conclusions could already be drawn from this growing body of literature. R. Weijenborg, for instance, felt justified in denying completely the existence of a late medieval Augustinian school.[11] Others with less confidence in the state of scholarship simply

[8] (Paderborn, 1937). Cf. also Stakemeier's article, " Die theologischen Schulen auf dem Trienter Konzil. Die Trienter Augustinerschule " in *Theologische Quartalschrift,* 117 (1936), 466-504.

[9] M. Schiller, *Pradestination, Sunde, und Freiheit bei G1·egor von Rimini,* (Stuttgart, 1934). H. Jedin, *Papal Legate at the Council of Trent, Cardinal Seripando,* tr. F. Eckhoff, (St. Louis, 1947); first published in 2 vols. in 1937. Although Schiller emphasized Gregory's Augustinianism in a somewhat uncritical way, Jedin was especially cautious in regards to the Miiller-Statemeier thesis.

[10] A. Zumkeller, *Hugolin von Orvieto und seine theologische Erkenntnislehre,* (Wiirzburg, 1941), and *Dionysius de Montina: Ein neuentdeckter Augustiner Theologe des Spatmittelalters,* (Wiirzburg, 1948).

[11] R. Weijenborg, " La charite clans la premiere theologie de Luther" in *Revue d'histoire ecclesiastique,* 45 (1950), 617-669.

denied. the influence of any such school on Luther.[12] Most scholars, however, still regarded such conclusions as simply premature, and accordingly, they continued the painstaking scholarly work on the problem. As a result, the :fifties and sixties witnessed the production of many new studies. G. Leff for instance wrote two controversial works on Thomas Bradwardine and Gregory of Rimini.[18] Zumkeller added considerably to his previous studies in four major articles.[14] And W. Werbeck produced a monograph on Jacobus Perez of Valencia.[15]

What is notable about all these studies is that they embodied, more or less implicitly, assumptions and presuppositions on the question of late medieval Augustinianism. Werbeck, for instance, remained skeptical about the legitimacy of positing a late medieval Augustinian theological tradition until much more research was done.[16] In 1965 Bernhard Lohse, in an important article, followed the approach of Werbeck. According to him, the existence of a late medieval Augustinian theological tradition has not been demonstrated. And in any case, Lohse argued, the writings of Augustine himself were more important for Luther than any one current in late medieval theology.[11] Hubert Jedin too, while recognizing the importance of Augustinianism at the Council of Trent, took much the same position. According to him, " the relatively uniform attitude of the Au-

[12] E.g. L. Cristiani, "Luther et saint Augustin" in *Augustinus Magister,* (Paris, 1954), vol. 2, pp. 1029-1038.

[18] G. Leff, *Bradwardine and the Pelagians,* (Cambridge, 1957), and *Gregory of Rimini: Tradition and innovation in fourteenth century thought,* (Manchester, 1961).

"A. Zumkeller, "Hugolin von Orvieto (d.1373) iiber Urstand und Erbsiinde" in *Augustiniana,* 3 (1953), 35-62, 165-193; "Hugolin von Orvieto iiber Pradestination, Rechtfertigung und Verdienst" in *Augustiniana,* 4 (1954), and *5* (1955), 5-51; "Das Ungeniigen der mcnschlichen Werke bei den deutschen Predigern des Spatmittelalters " in *Zeitschrift fiir katholische Theologie,* 81 (1959), 265-305; and " Die Augustinertheologen Simon Fidati von Cascia und Hugolin von Orvieto und Martin Luthers Kritik an Aristoteles" in *Archiv fii.r Reformationsgeschichte,* 54 (1965)' 15-37.

[15] W. Werbeck, *Jacobus Perez von Valencia. Untersuchungen zu seinem Psalmenkommentar,* (Tiibingen, 1959).

[1]· *Ibid.,* pp. 210ff.

[17] B. Lohse, " Die Bcdeutung Augustins fiir den jungen Luther" in *Kerygma und Dogma,* 11 (1965), 116-135.

gustinian hermits at Trent does not postulate the survival of a late medieval Augustinian school," as Mi.iller and Stakemeier had argued.[18] Here then, in Werbeck, Lohse and Jedin we have a second approach to the question of late medieval Augustinianism, namely, that the very existence of such a school is highly dubious.

A third approach to the problem, already evident in the early works of Zumkeller, has been to use the term "late medieval Augustinianism" simply to designate the theology of members of the Augustinian Order. In this way scholars can hold in abeyance the question of the degree of faithfulness to the teaching of Augustine himself, and direct their efforts exclusively to understanding the theology of those who were in the Augustinian Order. Among scholars who follow this approach, Adolar Zumkeller and Damasus Trapp are clearly the most important. In his book-length essay of 1956 Trapp takes" Augustinianism " to designate the theology of members of the Augustinian Order.[19] Augustinian theology thus understood falls into two distinct periods. The first period extends from Giles of Rome (d.1316) to Thomas of Strassbourg (d.1357), during which theologians of the Order were heavily influenced by Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome (this is known as the *schola Aegidiana).* The second period followed Gregory of Rimini (d.1358), and is characterized by a heavier dependence on Augustine himself, even though Giles of Rome remained the official teacher of the Order until 1926 (this is known as the *schola moderna Augustiniana).* Zumkeller takes much the same approach as Trapp in his many earlier studies, and especially in

[18] H. Jedin, *A History of the Council of Trent,* vol. 2, *The First Sessions at Trent 1545-47,* tr. D. Graf, (London, 1957), p. 259. According to Jedin the very attempt to demonstrate the existence of such a late medieval school is mistaken. *Ibid.,* p. 258, n.l.

[19] D. Trapp, "Augnstinian Theology in the 14th Century: Notes on Editions, Marginalia, Opinions and Book-lore" in *Augustiniana* 6 (1956), 146-274. This brilliant essay is not only indispensible for any study of late medieval theology, but it is also a gold mine of historical trivia. One of the most interesting aspects of this work is Trapp's attempt to document the emergence of a genuinely historical consciousness among 14th century Augnstinians by examining the invention of the footnote as a scholarly device.

his 1964 essay on the medieval " Augustinian school." [20] In this latter work, Zumkeller brings Trapp's essay up to date in regard to the more recent research. Zumkeller argues that the theologians of the Order can be regarded as a " school " in the sense that they were unified around Augustine, as understood and taught by their own masters in theology. Moreover, he draws attention to the fact that some members of the Order regarded themselves as a" school": Hugolin of Orvieto, Facinus of Asti and Johannes of Basel spoke not only of" doctores nostri" but also of a" schola nostra." [21] Accordingly, we have here in the work of Trapp and Zumkeller a third answer to the problem of late medieval Augustinianism: such a school existed within the Order of Hermits of St. Augustine.

Before turning to a discussion of the most recent literature on the question, something should be said here about the approaches already described. The first approach-that of Miiller and Stakemeier-rested upon what were clearly premature conclusions, as most scholars now recognize. The second approach -that of Werbeck, Lohse and Jedin-must be seen as a reaction to the earlier Miiller-Stakemeier approach. This reaction rightly stressed the need for caution in drawing any general conclusions about late medieval Augustinianism until much more work was done in this area. But now, in the light of recent scholarship, this reaction appears to be somewhat one-sided and over-cautious. Surely, if one can speak of " schools" at all, one can now speak of a late medieval "Augustianianism," provided that this term is properly defined.

The third approach-that of Zumkeller and Trapp-does in fact do this. But the problem here is in their definition of " Augustinianism." First, it has become increasingly evident in recent years that late medieval theological currents crossed the boundaries of the Orders. And secondly the Zumkeller-Trapp

[20] A. Zumkellcr, "Die Augustinerschule des Mittelalters. Vertreter und philosophisch-theologische Lehre" in *Analecta Augustiniana,* 27 (1964), 167-262. This work, together with Trapp's, constitutes the most important effort to give a comprehensive and synthetic account of late medieval "Augustinianism " to date.

[21] *Ibid.* p. 173.

definition presupposes a theological unity within the Order for which there is inadequate evidence. Indeed, many theologians outside the Augustinian Order were more heavily influenced by Augustine than some of those within the Order. For instance, from within the Order, Thomas of Strassbourg held what might be regarded as a Semi-Pelagian teaching on predestination (i.e. that there is a *ratio praedestinationis* in the creature and that predestination is *post praevisa merita)* .[22] And some scholars have contended that Luther's own teacher in the Augustinian Order, Johannes Paltz (d.1511), held some very different teachings from those of Augustine.[23] On the other hand, from outside of the Order, Thomas Bradwardine (d.1349), a secular priest, mounted a vigorous anti-Pelagian protest in his famous *De Causa Dei contra Pelag,iurn.* Examples such as these could be multiplied. What they indicate is that it is simply inadequate to the complexity of the situation to define " Augustinianism " as the theology of the Order of Hermits of St. Augustine, as Zumkeller and Trapp do.

With these criticisms in mind, we now proceed, in the search for a definition, to the most recent literature on the question. This literature exhibits a properly critical attitude towards previous research, and exercises a degree of caution in its attempts to characterize and define late medieval Augustinianism. The works of Oberman, Steinmetz, Grane and Courtenay are representative of this new trend.

Already, in his *Harvest of Medieval Theology,* Oberman was critical of much of the previous research.[24] A decade later, in his introduction to Eckermann's monograph on Hugolin of Orvieto, Oberman made his criticism more explicit,[25] and sug-

[22] On this, see Joseph L. Shannon, *Good Works and Predestination According to Thomas of Strassburg,* 0. S. A. (Washington, 1940), p. 99.

[23] According to Lohse ("Die Bedeutung Augustins," p. 117, n,4), Paiz "vertrat eine ganz andere Theologie." Cf. Lohse's book, *Monchtum und Reformation. Liithers Auseinandersetzung mit dem Monchsideal des Mittelalters,* (Gottingen, 1963)' pp. 160ff.

[24] ••2nd revised ed., (Grand Rapids, 1967), e.g. p. 181, n.112.

[25] ••Introduction to W. Eckermann, *Der Physikkommentar Hugolins von Orvieto OESA,* (Berlin, 1972), pp. x-vii-xxvi,p. xx. Eckermann's work is vol. *5* of "Spat-

gested that it would perhaps be helpful to describe secular priests such as Bra_dwardine as "Augustinschiiler" rather than as " Augustinians." [26] According to Oberman, one can legitimately speak of a *schola moderna Augustiniana* from the time of Gregory of Rimini, whose influence then extended itself to the establishment of a " via Gregorii" at the University of Wittenberg in 1508, as well as to the discussion of justification at the Council of Trent. [27] In a more recent treatment of the problem, Oberman has seen fit to make some further distinctions within late medieval Augustinianism. [28] Within the *schola moderna Augustiniana* one must distinguish, according to him, between the theology of the Order and what he calls " academic Augustinianism." This " academic Augustinianism " found its foremost representatives in Thomas Bradwardine and Gregory of Rimini in the sense that they best exemplified the movement's unifying characteristic-the attack on the *Pelagiani moderni* in the name of Augustine. [29] For various reasons Greg-

mittelalter und Reformation Texte und Untersuchungen "-a promising series of monographs and texts published by the Sonderforschungsbercich of the lnstitut fiir Spiitmittelalter und Reformation, Abteilung Spiitmittelalterlicher Augustinismus, Tiibingen. This series will include a volume on the *Stand und Aufgaben der spiitmittelalterlichen Augustinismusforschung,* a bibliography of late medieval Augustinianism, and critical editions of Gregory of Rimini, Hugolin of Orvieto, Johannes Hiltalingen of Basel, Johannes Paiz and Johann Staupitz.

[26] *Ibid.,* p. xxi.

[27] *Ibid.,* p. xxii. The establishment of a "via Gregorii" at Wittenberg is disputed. This is owing largely to a paleographical ambiguity in the 1508 revised statutes of the University. What Oberman reads as "via Gregorii," others such as Karl Baur, following Otto Scheel, read as "via Guilelmi" (William of Ockham). See K. Baur, *Die Wittenberger Universitiitstheologie und die Anfiinge der Deutschen Reformation,* (Tiibingen, 1928), p. 9. More recently, Leif Graue has argued convincingly in favor of the " via Guilelmi " reading. See his *Modus Loquendi Theologicus. Luthers Kampf um die Erneuerung der Theologie (1515-18),* (Leiden, 1975)' pp. 136ff.

[28] H. Oberman, " Tuus sum, salvum me fac '. Augustinreveil zwischen Renaissance und Reformation" in *Scientia Augustiniana,* eds. C. Mayer and Vt. Eckermann, (Wiirzburg, 1975), pp. 349-394. For a restatement of the position taken here, see Oberman's *Werden und Wertung der Reformation: Vom Wegestreit zum Glaubenskampf,* (Tiibingen, 1977), pp. 82-140.

[29] *Ibid.,* p. 350. Oberman points out (p. 355) that, while Gregory adopted the same philosophical presuppositions as the various *Pelagiani moderni,* he succeeded in making them the basis of his anti-Pelagianism.

ory's influence far surpassed that of Bradwardine, and culminated in the publication of the 11-volume Amerbach edition of Augustine's works (1490-1506). Gregory's influence then receded, according to Oberman, because of the ready availability of Augustine's works themselves.[30] And "academic Augustinianism" as such ended with Erasmus, for whom Jerome-not Augustine-was the *theologus summus.* Thus there developed, during the time when the confessional lines were hardening, a new and more distanced relationship to Augustine.[31] A third current within the *schola moderna Augustiniana,* represented by Johann Staupitz (d.159l4), Oberman calls an" Augustinreveil." In Staupitz, the *schola moderna Augustinana* begun by Gregory of Rimini was taken out of the university and transformed into a living teaching and preaching for the lay person.[32]

·whether or not one agrees with Oberman's entire schematization of late medieval Augustinianism, it must be acknowledged that some form of what he designates as "academic Augustinianism " was indeed a reality in the late :Middle Ages. There can be no doubt that, through the universities at least, there flowed a current of anti-Pelagian protest in the name of Augustine. It is this aspect of late medieval Augustinianism which David Steinmetz fastens upon as the focus for his discussion of the entire problem.[33] Steinmetz explicitates the most important (and perhaps obvious) principle to be remembered in any discussion of Augustinianism: " The question is not whether a theologian is indebted to Augustine but rather what is the de-

[30] *Ibid.,* p. 357.

[31] *Ibid.,* pp. 357-363. Oberman argues (p. 363) that the authority of Augustine receded in the face of an increasing number of direct appeals to Scripture and a wider Patristic basis of authority. Thus Casper Contarini (d.1542), for example, felt free to disagree explicitly with Augustine. While this may be correct, scholars will not be as ready to concede that what Oberman calls "academic Augustinianism " ended with Erasmus. Against this position one could cite the work of Stakemeier on the Augustinians at Trent (cf. above, n. 8), the work of Jedin on the Augustinian Seripando at Trent (cf. above, n. 9), and indeed, Oberman's own statement on Gregory of Rimini's influence at Trent (cf. above, n. 27).

[32] *Ibid.,* p. 389.

[33] D. Steinmetz, *Misericordia Dei: The Theology of Johannes von Staupitz in its Late Medieval Setting,* (Leiden, 1968), pp. 30-34.

gree and nature of his indebtedness." [84] Bearing this in mind, together with the full complexity of the late medieval situation, Steinmetz defines late medieval Augustinianism in the following way:

> There was in the later Middle Ages a tradition of theology which stressed the centrality of grace for justification and which minimized, without eliminating, the significance of the human contribution. It was a tradition which attempted to preserve the Augustinian heritage against the corroding acids of contemporary semi-Pelagianism .... Wherever the moral capacities of fallen man were overestimated, wherever the sovereignty of the prevenient grace of God was threatened, Augustinian theologians . . . raised their voices in protest. [35]

This then is the fourth approach to late medieval Augustinianism.

Given the inadequacies of the Miiller-Stakemeier approach, of the Werbeck-Lohse-Jedin approach, and of the Trapp-Zumkeller approach, this last one makes abundant sense. Certainly from a *theological* point of view, the anti-Pelagian emphasis was ultimately the most significant unifying aspect of the entire movement. Following Steinmetz, therefore, we should like to suggest that" late medieval Augustinianism" be taken to designate the anti-Pelagian protest in the name of Augustine which arose in the late Middle Ages against the various *Pelagiani rnoderni.* Thus, for example, Gregory of Rimini should be regarded as " Augustinian " even though he may have adopted nominalistic metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions.36 And likewise Thomas Bradwardine must be seen as "Augustinian" despite the fact that he was not a member of the Augustinian Order.

[04] *Ibid.* p. 88.

[35] *Ibid.,* p. 88f.

[36] William Courtenay's warning against seeing in the late Middle Ages a radical polarization on all fronts between Augustinianism and nominalism significant. "Ockhamism Among the Augustinians: The Case of Adam Wodeham" in *Scientia Augustiniana,* eds. C. Mayer and W. Eckermann, (Wiirzburg, 1975), pp. Q67-Q75. It must always be borne in mind that late medieval Augustinianism, as it is defined here, did not necessarily preclude adherence to distinctively non-Augustinian positions on *other* questions.

This approach, however, cannot be accepted wholesale without insisting upon some provisos. First, the work of Leif Grane on the relationship of late medieval Augustinianism to Luther serves as a warning against drawing hasty and simplistic conclusions in this regard.[37] Luther's relationship to this movement remains in many respects ambiguous. And, secondly, Steinmetz's intimation that late medieval Augustinianism was in some way a purer form of Augustinianism than that of Thomas Aquinas or Bonaventure cannot. go unchallenged. What must be remembered is that Thomas and Bonaventure were not driven to a vigorous anti-Pelagian protest by their contemporaries. But, as Johannes Capreolus (d.1444) was at great pains to point out, the *fundamentum* of such an anti-Pelagian protest is without doubt present in Thomas's emphasis on the sovereignty of grace, at least in his mature writings.[38] Thus it is misleading to speak of a "purer" form of Augustinian anti-Pelagianism in the late Middle Ages. For it is only in an age marked by Pelagian tendencies that anti-Pelagianism can become the distinguishing feature of an Augustinian theology.

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[37] Leif Grane, " Gregor von Rimini und Luthers Leipziger Disputation " in *Studia Theologica,* 22 (1968), 29-49. Grane demonstrates that, contrary to a scholarly assumption, Luther did not know or cite Gregory of Rimini until 1519 (p. 82). Grane also points out that on the issue of ecclesiastical authority, Gregory and Luther were far apart at this time (p. 49). See also Grane's "Augustins 'Expositio quarundum propositionum ex epistola ad Romanos' in Luthers Romerbriefvorlesung" in *Zeitschrift fur Theologie und Kirche,* 69 (1972), 804-880; and " Divus Paulus et S. Augustinus, Interpres eius fidelissimus. Uber Luthers Verhaltnis zu Augustin" in *Festschrift fur Ernst Fuchs,* eds. G. Ebeling, E. Jiingcl and G. Schunack, (Tiibingen, 1978), pp. 188-146. In his recent book, *Modus Loquendi Theologicus. Luthers Kampf um die Erneuerung der Theologie (1515-18),* (Leiden, 1975), Graue analyzes in depth Luther's use of Augustine in his lectures on Romans, and argues that Luther was influenced more by Augustine himself than by any late medieval Augustinian.

[38] Capreolus's Augustinian interpretation of Thomas and its importance for the Reformation is examined at length in my forthcoming study, *Luther and Lale Medieval Thomism: A Study in Thoological Anthropology.*

INFALLIBILITY: A REPLY

MICHAEL VERTIN has written a review article on my *Infallibility: The Crossroads of Doctrine.** In the following pages I shall try to clarify what I believe are a number of Vertin's misunderstandings. I shall first summarize my book, and then I shall make a few brief remarks on his criticisms.

SUMMARY

1) *The Meaning of Infallibility.* Human infallibility refers to a certitude in understanding (many would call it a certitude in judg-ment) v.rhich is equal to the certitude that a person has of his/her existence as a human being in the world.

2) *Infallibility can be enjoyed only with regard-to universal meanings.* The certitude of infallibility can exist and be shared with others only if the aspect of reality which is understood is a universal condition of human existence. Thus, while I have a practical certitude that I am sitting at a typewriter on November 12, 1979, this could not be the object of shared infallible certitude. This concrete fact could be known by others at other places and times only with historical moral certitude. However, universal aspects of existence can be known and shared by all with infallible certitude. Thus, there are universal structures of the human person in relationship to .society which can be infallibly known and shared: each person is open-ended and capable of further growth; the experiential pattern of each person is unique; the uniqueness of each person's experiential pattern, the subsequent uniqueness of each person's total understanding, and the vastness of possible knowledge coupled with the concrete limitations of each person-all these together make inevitable

*Michael Vertin, "Infallibility and the Demands of Epistemology: A Review Article," *The Thomist,* October, 1979, pp. 687-65!'.l.

intellectual and personal pluralism. These are examples of *universal meanings,* aspects of reality present to all places, times, and cultures which can be grasped by each individual under appropriate circumstances. These universal meanings may be recurring characteristics of the process by which individuals know and grow, or they may be recurring characteristics of the world in which subjects live-a world which includes other human subjects, the risen Christ, and ultimately the uncreated God.

3) *Universal meanings can be grasped explicitly only by those with appropriate experience.* Experience is here not limited to sense experience but is defined as the actualization of any human potential. This actualization may be occasioned by external stimuli, by internal movements such as the reflecting upon past experience, or even directly by God (as exemplified by the consolation without cause of St. Ignatius). The totality of actualization undergone over a lifetime is called the *experiential continuum.* All understanding depends upon one's experiential continuum, and the act of understanding represents a further actualization of that continuum.

The *potentiality* (= possibility) of grasping explicitly that a certain meaning is universal depends upon the possession of an appropriate experiential continuum. Thus, to have the *potentiality* of grasping that all are conditioned by their environments, one might have to live in a number of environments and witness what happened to the self and others in those environments. This *potentiality* of grasping becomes an *actuality* on the occasion of an appropriate insight. Thus, one can *actually* come to understand explicitly that the self and others invariably adapt to and are changed by the succession of environments.1

[1] I italicize the words "potentiality," "actuality," and "actually" because I wish to alert the reader to the fact that these words in this context have no deep philosophic meaning. They arc used in an ordinary English sense. I mention this became one of my mistakes according to Vertin is to use explanatory terms like " potency " and " act " indiscriminately with descriptive terms such us " experiential continuum." However, the terms he refers to are the terms " potentially " and " actually " used in the ordinary English sense exemplified in the text above.

4) *In addition to the universal meanings accessible to all, there is a universal meaning accessible to those who are initiated into the faith experience of Christianity. That universal meaning is constituted by the resurrection of Jesus Christ.* In his risen humanity Christ becomes Lord. He fulfills as man the possibilities of relating to all creation and to the creator which each human nature is called to but never achieves in visible creation. As human he is present in power to all creation until the end of time. He constitutes an aspect of every encounter with reality whether persons know it or not, just as the attraction of gravity is an aspect of every encounter of material beings whether they know it or not. He is the living Christian universal person. He is known as such by those who share the Christian faith experience.

5) *Christian dogmas are universal meanings implied in the resurrection or in the resurrection as combined with other universal meanings.* Thus, Christ *as man* is risen, and so he reveals that the salvation and completion of persons is to share the resurrection. Implied in his resurrection is our own, as Paul saw. Further, we know that persons grow by authentically expressing themselves and their relationships. Since Christ is present and related to us at all times, the celebration and expression of his living presence is a source of growth in him. This is what the Mass is. Each dogma is derived from the universality of the risen Christ or from a combination of his universality and one or more universal aspects known by the exercise of reason. Because these meanings which are dogmas are universal, that is, aspects of reality for all places and times (including all future times), they are rightly called irreformable.

6) *Dogmatic meanings constitute universal saving truth.* Salvation occurs to the degTee that a person is expanded by a full relationship to all of creation summed up in Christ and through Christ to the uncreated Trinity. Hence, union to reality can be said to be saving. Since dogmatic meanings (not the mere verbal formula which points to these meanings) refer to the universal and enduring aspects of the reality which saves,

they are rightly called universal. saving truths. To have internalized the great dogmas is to have been established in the way of salvation in a basic manner.

7) *The conclusive proof that a meaning is a dogmatic meaning is the acknowledgment by the universal faithful of its presence as an aspect of their faith experiential continua.* Thus, the " proof " of the universality of the risen Christ is the continuous testimony of the great Christian faithful over the centuries. This recognition by the faithful does not make a meaning universal. Rather, it *manifests* that such a meaning has been, is, and always will be dogmatic.

8) *The whole theory in the prior seven points is congruent with the teaching of Vatican I on papal infallibility and with the Orthodox notion of reception.* According to Vatican I, the pope exercises the infallibility of the Church when he acts in the fullness of his office as head of the *universal* Church, when he defines a doctrine of faith or morals binding on *all* persons of *all* ages and cultures, etc. All the conditions of papal infallibility are consonant with the notion that one can be infallible only with regard to universal meanings. However, one cannot know certainly that the pope has actually acted as universal head of the Church and actually fulfilled the conditions of universality (a judgment that individuals have to make) unless the meaning articulated by the pope actually resonates with the faith experience of all the faithful. This is the apparent meaning of the Orthodox notion of reception. Hence, whenever the pope realizes the universal conditions set down by Vatican I, he exercises the infallibility of the Church and his teachings are irreformable *ex sese.* But one can be sure that he actually fulfilled the conditions only when the entire Church receives his teaching.

CoMMENT oN VERTIN's REMARKS

My summary differs from that of Professor Vertin. His contains far more cognitional theory material and far less theological material. He barely adverts to the significance of the

universality of the risen Christ (my points 4 and 5), and he says nothing of substance about the theological content of my points 6, 7, and 8. His summary appears to come from his special epistemological interests. I suggest that he is more concerned with these interests and less with the overall purpose and contents of my book. As a result, despite his evident desire to be fair and accurate, his criticisms consistently misinterpret my meaning and my purpose. Let me rapidly illustrate this generalization in the brief space at my disposal.

Vertin lists three ambiguities. Basically, he desires distinctions of a Lonerganian type. I was aware of all his distinctions when I wrote the book, but I avoided making them because (I) I was focusing on a single point-the infallible grasp of universal meanings-and not on a complete cognitional theory, and (2) I was not writing for professional philosophers but for theologians of infallibility, most of whom have manifested no acquaintance with the intricacies of cognitional theory. Rightly or wrongly, I restricted the distinctions I made to those that were essential for grasping a theory of infallible judgment on universal meanings. I foresaw difficulties enough in getting across these necessary distinctions.

With these points in mind, I shall examine Vertin's assertions of ambiguities. First, I do not distinguish experience, understanding and judging as he would like. Vertin simply overlooks that for me experience is not sense experience but the actualization of any human potential. Hence, understanding and judging are necessarily kinds of experience. Next, he desires that I state whether understanding is reflexive or not, implicit or not. I do not make this distinction because for me understanding can be both. There is an understanding implicit in activity (such as the understanding the bicyclist has of the principles by which he keeps the moving bike upright). There can be explicit understanding. For my purposes both are important kinds of understanding. The implicit kind is often found in the faithful and because of this we can speak of an unarticulated *sensu8 fidelium.* The explicit kind is often present in theologians and

in official church teachers. It derives from and can illuminate the implicit *sensus fidelium.*

Secondly, Vertin wishes that I would clarify whether consciousness refers to the explicit reflexive realm only or also to the implicit unreflexive realm. The answer is that it refers to both; I saw no point in making a distinction that was unnecessary for the purposes of the book.

Thirdly, he wonders whether knowing includes judging or not. The answer is that it does. I regularly use " infallible understanding" for what he would call " infallible judging." As I indicate in the *Introduction* (p. xvii) I vary terminology to challenge readers to get beyond familiar categories so as to grasp my meaning in terms of their experience. I do not think it unreasonable to use the wording " infallible understanding " to indicate a certain judgment.

Vertin lists four mistakes I allegedly make. First, I view knowing on the perceptualist model. Vertin simply misreads my intent. Thus, he cites as an example of my perceptualist mistake the following: "The more a being can immediately perceive reality, the less it needs of theories. God does not theorize; he simply immediately 'knows.'" In this sentence the word "perceive" (just like the word "seen" in the second text he cites) does not mean visualize but "achieve understanding of." This is a good dictionary sense. The gist of my statement is that man's capacity to understand by the slow path of cumulative insight is both his glory and the sign of his limitation. The more perfect a being is, the more it grasps immediately without inferences, deductions, and gradual growth. The example I use has no more to do with the perceptualist model of knowing than has Lonergan's phrase that "God sees in his essence ... the series of all possible world-orders .... " [2]

Vertin also states that I do not portray human understanding as " the shrewd, progressive, and sometimes slow and difficult elaboration of intelligible forms; rather, it is fundamentally a

[2] *Collection: Papers by Bernard Lonergan, S. J.,* ed. F. E. Crowe, S.J. (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967) p. 88.

:rpatte1'just of observing unities in data." He is correct in observing that I do not explicitly portray the difficulties involved in understanding (and judging). I assumed that every intelligent reader would be aware of. these difficulties. However, Vertin is incorrect in saying that I believe that understanding is a "matter just of observing unities in data." My context is the question of the requirements for infallible judgment. The point I make is that for the making of such a judgment a single individual must possess all the data relevant to the question asked. I do assert that the possession of such data is *necessary* for such a judgment; I do not say that it is *sufficient.* To grasp what unifies the data demands more than observation; it demands an insight. Thus, Watson observes all the clues; he lacks the ordering intelligence which unifies them and indicates their significance with regard to the crime. Vertin infers from my emphasis on the need to possess all the data (central to my purposes of showing why infallibility is impossible in concrete cases where data are complex) and from my failure to highlight the place of difficulties in gaining understanding and judgment (in no way central to my purposes) that I think understanding and judgment flow automatically from observing data. To note the unities in data is never an automatic process. If it were, there would never be a lack of insight.

Secondly, Vertin says I confuse descriptive terms like "experiential continuum" with explanatory terms like "potency" and" act." He makes the unusual mistake of imputing to me his technical meaning of" potentially" and" actually," whereas I use these terms in an ordinary dictionary sense. This usage is exemplified in #3 of my summary above and in the footnote connected with that part of the summary. There is no confusion at all because I am not using Vertin's meanings of" potency" and "act."

Thirdly, Vertin faults me for confusing *a priori* and *abstract* contents. This distinction is irrelevant to my purposes. Universal meanings, whether abstract or *a priori* in Vertin's sense, can be infallibly grasped.

Finally, Vertin identifies what is perhaps my "most egregious conflation of all." According to him, I fail to recognize that the risen Christ refers to an empirical content whereas the presuppositions of reason express an *a priori* content; hence, I mistakenly combine them. Let me say that I was quite aware that some of my natural universal meanings (not all of them, as Vertin appears to assume) are what he calls *a priori* contents. I was also aware that Christ risen is what he calls an empirical content. My point is that in different ways both are universally and continuously present to the knowing subject-one as an object outside the subject and the other as a continuous process within the subject. Because both are universal, though in different senses, they can be infallibly grasped either independently, or when operative in the same relationship.

In summary, I believe that Vertin has written a review article which frequently misunderstands my meaning. His failure to grasp the significance of my non-Lonerganian notion of experience, his tendency to read into my account ambiguity and error when I fail to make the kind of distinctions that pertain to his concerns and not mine, his assignment to me of technical terminology when ordinary English meanings are employed, his overlooking of the crucial significance of the universality of the risen Christ, and his tendency to assume that what is not stated is either unknown or rejected-all these, it seems to me, make his review an unfortunate and inaccurate introduction to my thought. I trust that my presentation will help the readers of *The Thomist* to understand better my purposes, concerns and overall view in attempting to rethink the doctrine of infallibility.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Marx and the Bible. By JosE: P. MmANDA. New York: Orbis, 1978. Pp. 202. $7.95.

Jose P. Miranda's *Marx and the Bible* is an extraordinarily erudite and persuasive exegetical study written from the point of view of a passionate commitment to the liberation struggle in the third world.

In the introduction, Miranda states that after years of exegetical study he came to the conclusion that " the Bible, especially Exodus and the prophets, is the revelation of the Transcendent God, the Liberator of the oppressed who fights against the oppressors in their behalf " (p. vii) . This essential message of the scriptures has been eluding us for centuries, claims Miranda. The purpose of his study is to give voice to this message, using the best and most rigorous exegetical methodology. Whether Miranda is successful the reader must judge for himself. In the opinion of this reviewer, this is an important theological work. The tight argument, which reveals intimate familiarity with an enormous corpus of the best contemporary biblical scholarship, is open to question at many points. The study is far too significant, however, to be ignored or to be countered with any but the most serious investigations and logical and theological counter-arguments.

Early on, Miranda declares that his intention is not " to find parallels between the Bible and Marx, but simply to understand the Bible. Our method will be the most rigorous and scientific exegesis." (p. xvii) Except for the Introduction, Chapter I, which Miranda says he included by way of example, and the final Chapter (V) , Miranda remains quite faithful to this intention. Chapters II through IV, which make up the body of the book, are indeed an effort to understand the Bible using the most rigorous scientific exegetical methods.

Before getting into the exegetical body of his book, however, Miranda sheds some light on the role Marx will play in his attempt to understand the Bible. Miranda affirms what various Christian authors have pointed out, namely that " Marx belongs to the category of the prophets of Israel and ... both his messianism and his passion for justice originated in the Bible " (xvii). Because of this messianism and passion for justice, Marx opened up the way for a rediscovery of the Bible's message. In Marx, the biblical polemic against idolatry (the objectifying of God) is reactivated. Marx's social and political iconoclasm represents an attack on the idolatry of the System parallel in many ways to the biblical attack on false gods, who were always the ultimate legitimation of the given system of which they were the apex. Such gods were not gods, but objects used for the

purpose of domination and the purpose of justifying a given social order. They were, in fact, reifications of that order. As his critique of religion makes clear, Marx understood this relationship between the system and its gods, but was unable, in part because of the theology of the time, to distinguish between the false Gods of the System and Yahweh, God of Israel.

Miranda points to the recent papal encyclicals on social issues as evidence of the importance of Marx in the rediscovery of the biblical message. The social encyclicals of Pius XII, John XXIII, and Paul VI have, according to Miranda, all been " riding on Marx's shoulders " (p. xiii. This is actually a quote from Oswald von Nell-Breuning, S.J., in *Stimmen der Zeit,* 180, 1967, 365-74). They have not only taken their diagnosis of capitalistic society from Marx but have also followed Marx in moving beyond a plea for the reform of persons and attitudes to a call for the transformation of structures and institutions (p. xiii).

The introduction thus articulates the hermeneutical orientation from which the exegetical study will be pursued. It is a Marxist orientation insofar as it is committed to the proposition that Capitalism is " the culture of injustice and of the crushing of men carried to extreme perfection and systematic refinement " (p. 254). The axis of this oppressive culture, which according to Miranda is " the transformation of labor into merchandise," has its roots in Greek philosophy, "which conceives of reality only in the form of object."

What Miranda is attacking here, as he makes clear in the following pages, is the millenia-old western epistemology which centers on "the ideal of objectivity " (p. 260). Such an epistemology is capable of producing only one type of knowledge-external, objective, impersonal, manipulative, controlling and dominating knowledge. On this type of knowledge is built not only western science but also western (capitalistic) society, which is the most refined, sophisticated creation of the western " scientific " mind and therefore the most comprehensive and successful attempt to reduce all reality, including human subjects, to objects-the better to manipulate and control them.

One of the merits of Miranda's book is that he articulates this presupposition openly and clearly in his introduction. One can disagree with his Marxist hermeneutic, but, as Bultmann has pointed out, no one reads the scriptures without a pre-understanding. Why should Marxist pre-understanding be any less acceptable, in principle, than one based on the works of Heidegger, Whitehead, or Levi-Strauss? What is important in any exegetical effort is that the interpreter be conscious of his pre-understanding. Miranda is not only clear but lets his readers in on the secret. Any hermeneutic must justify itself by its results. Once again, the reader must be the judge.

Chapter One of the book, which treats private ownership, is somewhat

perplexing in that its connectioh with the rest of the book is unclear. Mi· randa says that. it is offered by way of example. One must guess of what it is to be an example. Apparently it analyzes the institution of private ownership as an example of the objectifying, dehumanizing, and alienating mentality ·of western society. The real point of the chapter is Miranda's insistence that the Church, to be consistent with her own social teachings, should be against private ownership as it exists in the west today. His argument runs like this:

1. The distribution of ownership (differentiating ownership) is simply the accumulated distribution of income. To put it in Miranda's own words, " the injustice in ownership depends ... on the injustice of income."
2. The Biblical tradition and the teaching of the church have denounced unjust distribution of income.
3. The Popes, therefore, ought to draw the conclusion that differential ownership, which is dependent on unjust distribution of income, is incompatible with Christian faith.
4. If they do not take this position, it is because they do not see the relationship between distribution of income and distribution of ownership.

The exegetical study itself, which according to the introduction is Miranda's primary concern, is developed in Chapters II through IV. In Chapter II, "The God of the Bible," Miranda discusses the biblical polemic against idolatry, which he believes is at the heart of the biblical message. This polemic is the biblical authors' way of insisting on the radical difference between their God and any other gods. According to Miranda, " the Bible speaks of nothing but this difference" (p. 43). The difference between Yahweh and other gods is that Yahweh cannot be objectified-i.e. made into an Idol. This Miranda interprets to mean that the relationship between Yahweh and his people is an " imperative, nonneutralizable one " (p. 40). God exists in relationship to his people as *Lord*, as the one who commands. " Israel was obligated to submit to the voice, to the sound of the words and renounce all images ... For Paul the gentiles are under the same obligation " (p. 40, quoting from Otto Michel). To break away from this imperative relationship with God, to prescind from it in order to discuss as a theme of theology and to accumulate knowledge about him as an object, is to turn God into an Idol.

These formal considerations regarding the nature of God and his relationship to his people are not unique to Miranda's study. There are clear echoes of Bultmann and Barth to be heard here. Miranda moves beyond a formal discussion of the nature of God and his relationship with his people, however. His major emphasis throughout the book is on the *content* of the command through which, and only through which, the true God is known. God's command is a command that justice be done! When he is perceived in any other way than. as. the One who demands justice, he is misperceived.

Rather, it is not he who is perceived at all, but an Idol, a figment of the human imagination. To know God is to exist in this indissoluble, non-neutralizable, imperative relationship to him and to heed his voice, the voice of the One who commands justice. To know God is to keep his command and to *do* justice. In support of this position, Miranda not only calls on the prophets (Jer. 22: 13-16; Hos. 4: lb-2; 6:4-4, et al.) but also Paul, who in Romans points out that it is injustice which is suppressing the truth of God (Rom. 1: 18-32).

Becoming more specific, Miranda specifies what " justice " means in the Bible. Arguing that *liesed* in the New Testament and the Septuagint is understood as " interhuman compassion," and that in the Bible *hesed* often occurs in synonymic parallelism with *sedakah* and *miSpat,* Miranda declares that justice as interhuman compassion is God's will for all people but that God reveals himself as the special Advocate of those who are in greatest need of justice and who are powerless to enforce it themselves. These are the poor, the weak, the oppressed. To know God is to practice justice, i.e. interhuman compassion, toward the poor. " God clearly specifies that he is knowable exclusively in the cry of the poor and the weak who seek justice." This is so not merely because of the limitations of the human understanding but because of the transcendence of God, which does not mean that he is an unimaginable and inconceivable God, but that he is accessible only in the act of justice. It is this acute sense of justice and compassion which distinguishes Yahweh from all other Gods.

This understanding of God and of the way he is known in Israel is at the root of the prophets' polemic against the cult. The prophets do not deny that cults can be a sincere seeking for God. But since Yahweh, God of Israel, can be known only as the One who reveals himself in his imperative Word, and since his Word is a command that justice be done towards the poor, a cult which separates knowledge of and service of God from the practice of justice is obviously idolatrous. For the prophets, God is not known through the cult, no matter what form it takes or whose name is invoked, but through the doing of justice. This is merely a corollary of God's transcendence. God cannot be known directly (through cult), but only indirectly, through the cries of the neighbor for justice.

This critique of the cult raises serious questions for Christian worship. If Miranda's observations are correct, what then is the function of cult in the life of the Christian community? Is cult itself simply a pagan anachronism which needs to be eliminated from the life of the believing community? Even if Miranda's analysis should be judged valid according to exegetical criteria, this would not be the only possible conclusion. What would be required is a rethinking of the role of cult in the life of the community. Perhaps the purpose of the cult is not at all to serve as a channel through which God is known or served, but through affective symbols and actions to incorporate believers into the mystery of the God who is known only

through the cries of the poor. Whatever the response on the part of liturgiologists to this critique, it is imperative that it be heard and understood.

At the end of Chapter II, Miranda draws .a conclusion_which is central to all liberation theology-praxis is prior to knowledge. God is known through discipleship, through obedience, through the practice of justice (interhuman compassion) or, as the New Testament puts it, love.

The central thesis in Chapter III is that God's intervention in history takes place according to a definite plan and serves a very concrete goal. Yahweh's intention in all his interventions is to save the oppressed, punish the oppressors, and ultimately to establish his *definitive justice on the entire earth.* Miranda appeals to all strands of Biblical traditions in attempting to establish his point. Referring to a crucial passage in the P source, Miranda points out that the important self-revelatory formula, **"I** am Yahweh," is followed by the words " and *therefore* I will free you of the burdens which the Egyptians lay on you " (Ex. 6: 6-7} . He points out how the same or similar formulations are used by the prophets in conjunction with Yahweh's revelation of himself.

> "The poor and needy ask for water; and there is none,
> Their tongue is parched with thirst
> I, Yahweh, will answer them
> I, the God of Israel, will not abandon them " (Is. 41: 17) .

Miranda refers then to a long series of verses from Isaiah and the Psalter which link the self-revelatory " I " of Yahweh with liberating actions on behalf of the poor and needy. In an extensive section on the Yahwist's theology, he develops the thesis that for the Yahwist, also, God is the One who responds to the cry of the oppressed. Exodus 3: 7-9, the Yahwist's equivalent of Exodus 6:6-7, is a key passage. Here Yahweh has heard the cry of the oppressed and determined to deliver them. Already in Genesis 4: 10 Yahweh curses Cain because he has heard the cry of his brother's blood. According to Miranda, the Yahwist constructs the story of God's intervention in Genesis 12 in direct contrast to the Cain story. As punishment for Cain's murderous act and in vindication of the blood of Abel, God cursed Cain, and brought a curse into history. Through Abraham, however, God intervenes to bless all the people of the earth. Abraham will be a blessing for all, because God signaled him out to " keep the way of Yahweh *by observing justice (sedakah) and right (1nispat)"* (p. 94). Miranda presents many more scriptural arguments from the Yahwist material supporting his thesis that God's interventions in history are directed towards the realization *on earth* of interhuman compassion (justice) through the liberation of the poor and the putting down of the mighty. The New Testament references with which the chapter closes are sketchy, but are developed in more detail in Chapter IV.

Chapter IV ·(" Law and Civilization ") is the· most complicated and problematic of the book, but also the most intriguing. The first section of this chapter seeks to clarify the biblical understanding of the law and its function. The chapter begins with an attempt to establish the meaning of the Hebrew root *shpt* which is ordinarily translated " judge " or "judgment." :Miranda amasses what seems to me significant evidence that this word originally meant "Deliverer," and always of the poor and oppressed, or that it meant " justice." The primitive meaning then would be, " One who does justice by delivering the poor and oppressed from their suffering." This more primitive meaning of the root *shpt* clarifies what the Old Testament means when it speaks of God as judge. God is the One who, in response to their cries, delivers the needy from the hands of their oppressors. It is this intense commitment to the poor of the earth, not primarily his great power, which makes the God of Israel unique among the Gods.

Matthew interprets Jesus's work in this context. Through Jesus's ministry *miSpat* is being realized on earth (p. ms). And in John's gospel Jesus's works are works of interhuman compassion which deliver the needy from their suffering. These works testify to the fact that Jesus is of God, since God has already revealed himself to be the One who delivers the poor. In refusing to recognize the witness of Jesus's works, in rejecting Jesus himself, his enemies reveal that they do not know God or what his interventions in history have been about. They are thus judged by the works themselves.

In the second section of this chapter, Miranda discusses the Law. His concern here is to show the relationship between positive law and *mispat* (right). *MiSpat,* the doing of justice to the poor, "is the only theophany of Yahweh " (p. 137). All positive legislation must justify its existence in terms of its relationship to *miSpat,* which is, in fact, interhuman compassion. This is vividly illustrated, says Miranda, in the original word for laws in Israel-miSpatim (Exodus in: 1, Exodus 15: 9!5). Our understanding of the law, however, is formed by the Sinaitic tradition of the Pentateuch which, as Noth and von Rad have shown, "is the latest of all the themes of the Pentateuch." The Sinaitic tradition presents a particular and a late theologization of the Law, one which is both more religious and at the same time more positivistic than the more primitive understanding of Exodus Ql and 15. The original theologization of the Law should be associated not with the Sinai tradition but with the older Exodus tradition. It is elaborated most concisely in Exodus 18. This chapter shows that the origin of legislation in Israel was not religious at all in the narrow sense. Legislation arose as an attempt to regulate the interhuman affairs of the community in accordance with the demands of the *miSpat* of Yahweh as he revealed them when he delivered Israel from Egyptian slavery. Law thus understood is seen as " the indispensable continuation and apex of Yahweh's intervention

in history " (p. 157). Since *miSpat* is God's will and the goal of the Law, it is also the criterion for judging positive laws. Only those laws which serve to protect and deliver the poor and the needy are legitimate because only they are in accord with the will of Yahweh. Once again, one may ask whether Miranda has formulated this dialectic between law and justice *(miSpat)* adequately, but there is no doubt that he has carefully argued his case and has found considerable scriptural support for it.

In the last section of Chapter IV, Miranda argues that the Law, which was originally an effort to achieve justice on earth and thus a means to an end, has been turned by human civilization to its own rather than God's purpose. Injustice, which entered the world through one man, has become incarnated in the social structures of civilization. The Law, detached from its origin in God's will for *miSpat,* becomes the epitome of these structures, the structure of structures, " the most symptomatic and concentrated expression of a culture and a social system " (p. . As such, the Law is the *primary* structure through which the entire system seeks to justify and defend itself against any criticism or attack. **It** is precisely this function of the Law in society and in religion which Paul saw so clearly and in opposition to which he lived his faith and developed his theology. Likewise Jesus's life and teaching was an uninterrupted protest against this perverse understanding and use of the Law. **It** was essentially this protest which led to his conflict with the scribes and pharisees and to his death. For both Paul and Jesus, God's purpose remain fixed-the establishment of *definitive justice on the earth.* Justice cannot be definitively established through Law, however, which human civilization perverts to its own manipulative purposes. Justice will be established only through faith in the God who hears the cries of the suffering and delivers them, thereby himself establishing justice on the earth. God will save humankind through faith, says Paul, but to do so it will be necessary to " destroy without a trace the entire old civilizing, axiological and organizational structuralization of mankind," a structuralization based neither on faith nor on justice *(mispat)* but on the Law of self-justification.

This, of course, leads into the final chapter titled, " Faith and Dialectics " which we have treated in the beginning of this review. The significance of Marx's dialectical thought is that it makes possible an understanding of the radical critique of human civilization which we confront in the scriptures. Marx, perhaps more than anyone, shares the Bible's passion for justice and, like the Bible, understands justice not as adherence to the positive Law of the land but as deliverance of the weak and the poor, as the overthrowing of the mighty. Marx, like the scriptures (according to Miranda), never loses hope in the triumph of justice *on the earth.* Marx, like Paul and the other scriptural authors and like Jesus· himself, understands sin as a cosmic reality structured into society. For him, sin is incarnate in the capitalist system. Finally, and perhaps most profoundly, both Marx and the scriptures attack

the epistemology on the basis of which.western society has been constructed epistemology based on the "ideal of objectivity." The ethical and social consequences of this epistemology are perhaps best expressed in the statement of Aristotle that "Truth is incompatible with the condition of the slave" (p. 262), i.e. with the condition of that 5/6 of Greek society which had been reduced to objects (commodities). Unfortunately, it never occurred to Aristotle to see that as a judgment of society, but only as a judgment on the slave. Since the essence of the biblical God, however, is to hear the cries of the slaves, to establish community with them, and to fight with them against their oppreosors, *it is precisely with their condition that biblical truth about the biblical God and the biblical world is most compatible.* Marx shared in this biblical rage against the Powers of this age who rule the earth as though it belonged to them. According to Miranda, however, in rejecting the resurrection Marx is insufficiently dialectical. He thus refuses to entertain the ultimate hope in the capacity of matter, under the guidance of God, to transcend death. For Miranda," the negation of the resurrection of the dead is an ideology defensive of the status quo ... it is to kill the nerve of the real hope of changing the world " (p. 284). Miranda ends this fascinating study with the intriguing declaration that the authentically dialectical Marxist and the biblical Christian will be the last to renounce this hope.

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The Historical Constitution of St. Bonaventure's Philosophy. By JOHN F. QUINN. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1973. Pp. 981.

In this long and detailed study, Quinn attempts to realize three objectives: 1) to establish the historical constitution of Bonaventure's philosophy, while respecting its theological context; 2) to compare that thought with the philosophical doctrine of St. Thomas; 3) to contribute insofar as possible to resolving the issues dividing recent and contemporary historians with respect to the first item. In order to set the stage for realizing these objectives, Quinn devotes pp. 17-100 to a careful review of recent and contemporary scholarship on the historical constitution of Bonaventure's philosophy. Here the views of scholars such as De Wulf, Mandonnet, Gilson, Van Steenberghen, Robert, Ratzinger, and van der Laan are considered in chronological sequence. Fundamental points of disagreement still obtain between some of these interpretations, especially between those of Gilson and Van Steenberghen. For instance, is Bonaventure's philosophy (as dis-

tinguished from his theology) to be described more properly as Augustinian or as Aristotelian? To what extent may his philosophy be described as anti-Aristotelian, if at all? Is. one justified in attempting to extract Bonaventure's philosophy from the theological context in which it is presented? To what extent may his philosophy be described as "Christian," if at all? Quinn will return to these issues in the final part of the book, but before doing so engages in a long study of Bonaventure's philosophy.

Quinn's presentation of Bonaventure's philosophy has as its central theme the latter's teaching on natural knowledge. Under this theme he singles out four basic doctrines to which the four .parts of his volume correspond. Thus Part I ("Foundations of Natural Knowledge") is itself divided into three chapters: c. I, "Composition of Body and Soul in Man;" c. 2, "Essence and Nature of the Human Soul;" c. S, "Problem of Plural Forms." Part II (" Powers and Operations of Human Knowledge ") includes c. 4, " Potencies of Human Knowledge; " and c. 5, " Acts and Modes of Human Knowledge." Part III (" Certitude and Illumination of Knowledge ") encompasses c. 6, "Certitude of Natural Knowledge," and c. 7, "Ilumination of Natural Knowledge." Part IV ("Formation and Development of Theological Knowledge ") consists of. c. 8, " Order of Reason to Faith in Theology;" and c. 9, "Problem of Christian Philosophy." In the "General Conclusion " Quinn returns to issues raised in his Introduction such as those mentioned above. His work concludes with an extensive Bibliography (522 entries) and Indices (Analytical, Authors, Historians).

While limitations of space preclude any attempt on our part to summarize the wealth of information contained in this volume, certain points of interest from Quinn's doctrinal exposition will first be noted. Then we shall devote more attention to his final chapters and his concluding section. First of all, it should be observed that Quinn's study of individual doctrinal points in Bonaventure is followed by a comparison with the views of Aquinas. Although this comparative work does prolong his study considerably, it is of interest to any reader already familiar with Thomas's thought. It should also be noted that Quinn's analysis of particular philosophical doctrines in Bonaventure usually leads him to the conclusion that the position in question is neither Augustinian nor Aristotelian, but a truly original solution that can only be styled Bonaventurean.

For instance, in examining Bonaventure's account of body-soul relationship in man, Quinn finds him conversant both with Aristotle and with Augustine, but going beyond them both. In order to account for this union Bonaventure appeals to the natural and inseparable property of unibility, a property that is essential, not accidental, to the soul. It is not a mere relation but an aptitude found in the soul for it to be united to the body (see pp. 125-29). While Quinn judges Aquinas to be infundamental agreement with Bonaventure in holding that the rational soul is naturally inclined toward the human body, the two differ with respect to the natural

generation of man. Rather than appeal to. Bonaventure's adaptation of Augustine's theory of seminal reasons, Thomas defends the succession of forms in the human body. Hence Quinn finds the Aristotelian influence more pronounced on Thomas than on Bonaventure. Still, as Quinn observes, Bonaventure endeavors to show that his interpretation of Augustine is not opposed to a proper understanding of Aristotle on this matter.

In defending matter-form composition in the human soul, Bonaventure .seeks support in Aristotle. While Quinn acknowledges that Aristotle himself does not defend this position, he suggests that Bonaventure has applied Aristotelian principles to the problem without resolving it in Aristotelian fashion. Bonaventure's solution is also influenced by Augustine and by Boethius. Again, therefore, Quinn concludes that Bonaventure has developed a personal and synthetic solution. Quinn finds another " remarkable blending of doctrines from Augustine, Aristotle, and Boethius " in Bonaventure's defense of matter-form composition in angels (p. 157).

In c. 3 Quinn adverts to the fact that some kind of theory of plurality of forms has been assigned to Bonaventure by almost all historians of medieval philosophy as well as by many Bonaventure specialists. Nonetheless, surprisingly different interpretations of Bonaventure's thought on this matter have been proposed. Thus Bonaventure's view of light as a form might be taken to imply plurality of substantial forms in certain inanimate bodies. With painstaking care, Quinn attempts to show that this is not the case. If Bonaventure posits light as a substantial form in heavenly bodies, this does not imply plurality of substantial forms therein. Nor should he be interpreted as positing light as a substantial form in terrestial bodies (pp. Q44-48). Nor should seminal reasons be identified with substantial forms in mixed bodies. ·when a new form is received, the " preceding form remains in the matter, but not as a form; rather, perfected by a nobler form, the preceding form is present as a material disposition with respect to the new form " (pp. Q76-Q77). As regards the forms of animate bodies, including man, Quinn arrives at the same conclusion. Bonaventure defends unity of substantial form, along with plurality of substantial dispositions. In comparing Bonaventure with Aquinas on this point, Quinn suggests that Bonaventure's position allows for plurality of substantial dispositions whereas Thomas's does not. Hence, if one may attribute to Bonaventure " unity in substantial form," one should rather assign to Thomas " a doctrine of uniqueness of substantial form" (p. 311, n. 252).

In c. 4 Quinn considers the various cognitive potencies distinguished by Bonaventure. Regrettably, he finds it necessary to omit consideration of the distinction between memory, intelligence, and will, on the one hand, and the soul on the other (see p. 323, n. 1). While one can hardly fault him for not adding further to this sizable volume, clarification of this issue might have more perfectly set the stage for his consideration of the various

powers of the soul, and especially for his later discussiOn of the relationship and distinction between the agent and possible intellects (see pp. 348:ff.). The precise distinction between them defended by Bonaventure according to Quinn's analysis remains unclear to this reviewer.

In discussing the certitude of natural knowledge in Bonaventure, Quinn presents his division of certitude into different kinds. His distinction between an infallible certitude, on the one hand, and a probable certitude, on the other, is interesting (pp. 450-51). In this same chapter 6 Quinn presents a brief but enlightening discussion of Bonaventure's doctrine on analogical knowledge. His comparison of Bonaventure with Thomas on this point should be read with caution, however, since he seems to take as Thomas's final position his espousal of proportionality and rejection of proportion in the *De veritate* when treating of naming God and creatures (see pp. 484-86, 515).

In c. 7 Quinn devotes considerable attention to the difficult issue of Bonaventure's doctrine of divine ilumination. Here he concentrates on the illumination involved in natural knowledge and distinguishes this both from God's general influence on all things as creative principle of their being and from his special influence on creatures insofar as they share in the life of grace. In sum, he rightly insists that Bonaventure does not here confuse the order of natural reason with that of revelation. The illumination of science is available to man on the purely natural plane (see pp. 539-40}. Here again Quinn finds Bonaventure combining Aristotle and Augustine. With Aristotle he assigns certitude to a sense power because of its ordering to a determinate object, and allots to the intellect a capacity to know all things in some way by means of its own *lumen*, principles, and the similitudes that it abstracts from created things. But to account for the immutable and infallible character of that which it may grasp with certitude, he turns to Augustine's doctrine of illumination. Bonaventure also allows for a natural illumination of wisdom in addition to the illumination of science, and in distinction from an infused wisdom grounded on faith. If the influence of Augustine is predominant in Bonaventure's synthesis on the illumination of natural knowledge, Quinn denies that it is a formally Augustinian position. Augustine's doctrine is modified by so many other doctrines " particularly from St. Anselm and especially from Aristotle," that it can only be regarded as Bonaventurean, not as Augustinian or as Aristotelian (p. 661).

In c. 8 Quinn first concentrates on the constitution of theological knowledge in Bonaventure. In considering different ways in which the " subject " of a science can be understood, Quinn notes that Bonaventure speaks of a subject in one sense as that to which all things in the science are reduced as to a *universal* whole. So understood, the subject of theology is the object of belief insofar as this is understood by the " addition of reason " (p. 678). This understanding of "subject" is to be distinguished from another usage,

wherein the subject is that to which all things in the science are reduced as to an *integral* whole. Taken broadly and in this sense, the subject of theology includes many things by composing and uniting them with one another and by establishing an order between them. Thus the integral parts of theology consist in truths concerning both God and creatures. Taken separately, each of these truths can stand on its own merits and yet, when taken as part of a whole, each is a composite element of theology "in which it is united and ordered to other truths" (p. 678). It would seem, observes Quinn, that faith and philosophy can stand together, "each on its own ground, as parts of the same integral whole of theology" (p. 674). If philosophy is first ordered to faith in an integral way (as part of an integral whole), therefore, once the two are seen to be compatible, they are ordered to one another to constitute a universal whole (p. 678).

In continuing his examination of the union of faith and philosophy according to Bonaventure, Quinn considers the case of the Christian who is also a philosopher. Such a person should be guided by his faith, first of all, to avoid falling into error. Here Quinn apparently has in mind the Christian's reliance on his faith as a negative norm. In addition, he needs the illumination of faith in order to be directed to philosophical consideration of certain truths which he has already accepted on faith. Granted that faith influences the Christian thinker intrinsically insofar as the light of faith is an intrinsic perfection of his mind, still the *lumen* and *habitus* of faith are distinct from the *lumen* of his reason and from his *habitus* of science or philosophy. Hence for Bonaventure, insists Quinn, the illumination of faith remains extrinsic to his philosophical science. It is the man who is a Christian and a philosopher, but his philosophy is not Christian.

Quinn continues to examine this problem in c. 9. It is sometimes contended that Bonaventure's philosophy can be called "Christian" because it is thought to be inseparable from his theology and because it follows a theological order of development. Moreover, Bonaventure holds that an illumination given by faith is required if the philosopher is to avoid error in treating of certain matters, especially divine things, that are accessible to natural reason. Again, certain texts from Bonventure are taken to imply that he has very little respect for natural reason's ability to arrive at truth. Once more, then, the need for Christian philosophy. Quinn counters that if one views Bonaventure's philosophy solely on the *universal* ground of his theology, then Christian philosophy is not its proper title. So viewed, his philosophy is inseparable from Christian faith. But when it is viewed on the *integral* ground of his theology, his philosophy can be set apart from his Christian faith. Under this perspective it is neither inseparable from theology nor dependent on a theological order of development. So viewed, the control exercised by faith over the Christian's philosophical thinking is *extrin.sic* to .his philosophy. Hence, the title "Christian philosophy" will

not accurately name the "science of philosophy as Bonaventure· forms and develops it on the integral ground of his theology" (p. 790).

In short, therefore, there is for Bonaventure a " truly Christian science, which is theological science, but not philosophical science". (p. 808). As regards Bonaventure himself, Quinn acknowledges that he is a Christian theologian, to be sure. But he proceeds as a philosopher whenever this is necessary for him in his effort to make the object of faith intelligible. When he does so proceed, he is a Christian philosopher, but his philosophy is intrinsically and formally philosophical, not Christian (p. 816).

In the " General Conclusion " Quinn returns to the varying interpretations of Bonaventure's philosophy proposed by recent and contemporary historians. Rather than pursue this in detail here, we shall attempt to discern his answers to the questions raised in the opening paragraph of this review. According to Quinn, Bonaventure's philosophical synthesis should not be regarded either as fundamentally Augustinian though supplemented with Aristotelian principles nor as fundamentally Aristotelian with Augustinian inclinations. While he has acknowledged the influence of these and other sources therein, he insistes that its proper title is " Bonaventurean " (see p. 844). Nor does he find support for the Augustinian opposition to Aristotle in Bonaventure proposed by Gilson (pp. 847-51). But if he agrees with Van Steenberghen and others on this point, he rejects Van Steenberghen's view that the most important sources for Bonaventure's philosophical doctrines are Aristotle and his commentators. Rather, according to Bonaventure's own testimony, his most important sources for philosophical doctrines are the Fathers, especially Augustine, and Doctors of the Church. Among the philosophers, however, concedes Quinn, Bonaventure's most important source is surely Aristotle.

Quinn rejects Gilson's contention that Bonaventure's philosophy could not remain true if it were separated from the illumination of faith and the single order of a Christian wisdom. Here he judges De Wulf, Van Steenberghen, and Robert to be correct. Quinn finds that in treating of philosophical problems Bonaventure proceeds according to the method proper to philosophy. His philosophy can be separated from his theology insofar as it is viewed as developed within the integral order of his theological synthesis, though not in accord with its order therein as within a universal whole (that is, as transformed into theology). Hence, as already noted, Quinn rejects efforts to describe Bonaventure's philosophy as " Christian," strongly differing here from Gilson. At the same time he takes exception to Van Steenbergen's complaint that Bonaventure's philosophy is heteronomous, and that he failed to work out fully the proper role of reason and philosophy in developing his theology. When reconstructed according to its own principles, method, and object, Quinn concludes that Bonaventure's philosophy does have its own unity and does constitute a solid philosophical synthesis (see pp. 874-75).

In spite of its great length and its tendency to be repetitious at times, this book is indeed a valuable contribution to Bonaventurean scholarship. Moreover, Quinn's precisions with respect to the problem of Christian philosophy are not only quite helpful with respect to Bonaventure himself, but should admit of application to other medieval thinkers as well, Aquinas included (as Quinn has himself suggested). In sum, his study will be required reading for all future students of Bonaventure and for other serious students of thirteenth-century philosophy.

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Toward Vatican III: The Work That Needs to be Done. Ed. D. 'TuAcY, H. KuNG, and J. METZ. Seabury, 1978, pp. 333. $5.95.

From May to June 1, 1977, a colloquium was held at the University of Notre Dame. It was sponsored by *Concilium,* which was holding its editorial board meeting at the time, and hosted by Notre Dame's Center for Pastoral and Social Ministry and The Catholic Theological Society of America. Seventy-one theologians and social scientists gathered to discuss the topic which provides the title of this volume: *Toward Vatican III: The Work That Needs to be Done.* Rev. Theodore Hesburgh, President of Notre Dame, had this to say concerning the purpose of the colloquium in his letter of invitation to the participants: " The meeting is not designed to be a call for 'Vatican III '-a title which is intended to be symbolic- but rather to block out scholarly research in the theological and in the social sciences which needs to be done before the Church can come to its next critical turning point .... The participants will be asked to articulate the new questions which should occupy our scholarly concerns in the years ahead " (p. 3).

The topic of the colloquium is exciting, and the calibre of those delivering papers is impressive; e.g.: Roland Murphy, Hans Kiing, Edward Schillebeeckx, Avery Dulles, Johannes Metz, Charles E. Curran, Rene Laurentin, Myles Bourke. However, while the present volume, which emerged from the. colloquium, has some high points, many of the contributions are rather disappointing. The disappointment is not so much that there is a great deal that one disagrees with, although there is some of that, but rather that much of what is said seems dry, stale, and unimaginative. In a volume that purports to look to the future and articulate new questions, much concerns old questions and problems and much has been said before. Nonetheless, there are a number of worthwhile pieces, and a few of those deserve comment.

The colloquium· (and resulting .volume) is divided into eight parts. **The** first part contains opening addresses. The next seven parts delineate different topical areas of discussion: Church and Doctrine, Church and Ecumenism, Church and the Individual, Church and Society, Church and Reform, Church and Worship, and Social Scientific Perspectives. There are twenty-seven articles altogether. The following is a sample: "Vatican
lems and Opportunities of the Future: The Bible" by Roland Murphy; "Doctrine and the Future: Some Suggestions" by Carl Peter; "Vatican III: Problems and Opportunities for the Future" by Hans Kiing; "Ecumenism: Problems and Opportunities for the Future" by Avery Dulles; "The Lethargy of Christian Spirituality in Developed Countries: Reasons and Perspectives " by Christian Duquoc and Casiano Floristan; " Canon Law and Reform: An Agenda for a New Beginning " by William A. Bassett; " A Sociology of Belief and Disbelief: Notes toward a Perspective on Religious Faith and Community" by James T. Barry.

One of the more interesting papers was delivered by Myles Bourke: "The Future of the Liturgy: Some New Testament Guidelines." Bourke points out the obvious fact that the liturgy has been a critical area since Vatican II. What is or is not right with the new liturgy has sparked many an argument. One of the points that Bourke wishes to stress, and feels may be overlooked, is that the liturgy is a participation in the present heavenly liturgy of Jesus at the throne of the Father. " The eucharistic worship is united to Jesus's ministry in the' heavenly sanctuary' (Heb. 8:2) ... (p. 244)." Bourke believes that it is this reality which evokes worship and praise of God in the liturgical participant and the realization that God is the wholly other in their midst.

E. Schillebeeckx in the section on Church and Doctrine has an interesting article: " Questions on Christian Salvation of and for Man." **It** is not so much a doctrinal or speculative study of the meaning of salvation for the Christian as a proposal of practical criteria for discerning what a salvation situation or context looks like in reality if it is Christian. Schillebeeckx puts forward such criteria as man's right relation to his ecological environment, his proper relation to social and institutional structures as well as to his culture. For Schillebeeckx Christian salvation has to do with making man whole in himself and in all his relationships. What Schillebeeckx has to say is basically not new, but he does say it in a new and challenging way.

. John Kotre contributes one of the most imaginative papers: "Of Human Fertility:" The title is a little misleading, for it deals with human fertility not in the sense of physical begetting of children, but rather in the sense of bringing to life the spiritual dimensions of human beings. Religion has the "capacity to nourish this very phenomenon " (p. 261).

Kotre points out that popular psychology has helped people to let go of pasts- that were harmful and tci cope with insecure and fluid situations of

modern society. However, Kotre feels that if we are to beget creativity and spiritual life in a child or people in general there need· to be stressed. and engendered such" skills" as" permanence, loyalty, fidelity and duty." He hopes that psychology will "begin to see that limited, contained, rooted selves are the. only kind capable of creativity 1J,nd generativity. Whether psychology will ever do so is another matter altogether " (p. Q67). Kotre may be laying too much stress and hope on psychology. A vibrant Christian community could create the proper environment for growth with or without the aid of popular psychology.

Kotre believes that we.need to stress permanence and fidelity in relations after the manner of Yahweh and his people. He points out that we do not belong to ourselves and therefore cannot look to our own self-fulfillment. We are stewards of our lives. We are owned by God and therefore our first priority is to serve him. Moreover, he says that we need to be pruned if we are to bear fruit. Unlimited and uncontrolled freedom bears no fruit. It just sprawls all over. " To be fertile one cannot grow without limitation " (p. Q69).

Just a few final thoughts on the volume as a whole. In a volume that purports to be global in intention and scope there were large areas that received little or no coverage. Missions and Missionaries, Evangelization, Third World Countries, Eastern European Countries are examples. There was no discussion of the present and future role of Bishops, priests, and religious within the Church. The future development of Church life through World Synods, Bishops' Conferences, parishes, covenant communities was overlooked. The participants also seemed to be unaware of large areas of activity in the Church which could have great bearing on the future. There is, for example, little mention of popular and grass roots renewal among God's people. The Charismatic Renewal is the biggest and most obvious example. The theological, ecumenical, liturgical, and social implications of this renewal are vast and its import on a future Council could be immense, and yet it was mentioned only twice and briefly. The participants seemed to be very much caught up in Western European and American concerns and then only from within a rather narrow academic perspective.

It would be good to gather all of the participants together for another colloquium on the same topic. There is still a great deal of work that needs to be done.

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BOOK QVIEWS

Logic: 1'he Art of Predication and Inference. By DENNIS. C. KANE, **O.P.** Providence, R.I.: Providence College Press, 1978. Pp. 241.

This book, under new cover, is a photo-reproduction of the 1969 edition published by Sheed and Ward, Inc. The text is exactly that of the earlier edition, except for two corrections, which appear in. a different -type face in chapter 9. The text is adequate for an undergraduate course in logic. An attempt is made to present traditional logic and the fundamental concepts of modern logic. One chapter is devoted to noncategorical syllogisms from a nontraditional point of view. This consists of a summary of the kinds of propositions dealt with in the propositional calculus and some rudimentary truth table exercises. In addition, there is use of some nontraditional terminology here and there in the text. In a single undergraduate course one could hardly cover traditional logic to any degree of depth and still present a substantial amount of material from the nontraditional point of view. All textbooks for such courses necessarily emphasize one approach over the other. Thus Father Kane's text, as he himself states in the preface, must be considered a text in traditional logic with a brief introduction to nontraditional logic.

There are quotations at the end of almost each chapter which provide good opportunity for open-ended discussion. The exercises following each chapter are well balanced and require comprehension of the material presented in the chapter. One might also wish for inclusion of quotations and exercises at the end of the chapter on " Logic and Scientific Knowledge." This would provide a more natural transition from the study of logic to its application in other sciences. The text lacks smoothness as a whole. The overall plan of the work is not clearly stated, although the general outline of the *Organon* is followed. The first three chapters deal with predication and words, concepts, and definitions; the next three, with propositions. Argumentation and the categorical and noncategorical syllogisms are treated in chapters 7 through 10. The final chapter, as stated before, is meant as a bridge to dialectical and demonstrative reasoning. The chapter transitions are often rather abrupt.

No logic text is complete without some treatment of induction, this text being no exception. In chapter 7 a brief note is made to distinguish induction from deduction. A fuller treatment of induction is made in the final chapter. The earlier mention of induction describes it as argumentation *a posteriori.* This is to distinguish it from deduction, which is reasoning *a priori,* going from the more universal to the less universal. Such terminology is an unfortunate choice in the face of the many modern understandings of *a priori* and *a posteriori* reasoning. Without further clarification, of which none is given, this usage leaves the impression that traditional logic, i.e. Aristotelian logic, precludes reasoning *a posteriori* from the realm of dem-

onstration. A reading of *11 Analytics*, chapter 12, reveals the creative use Aristotle and St. Thomas, in his commentary on the Aristotelian text, make of demonstration from effect to cause. This kind of *a posteriori* demonstration is heavily used in natural science.

In summary, Fr. Kane is to be thanked for providing undergraduate teachers with a good basic text in traditional logic which can easily be used to provide college students with a well founded introduction to logic. The text does have some shortcomings. To those already mentioned in this review should be added the regret that a new edition under a new publisher yields neither updated examples nor any more extensive textual revision than two error corrections. However, in a day when most contemporary texts approach undergraduate logic from the nontraditional point of view, this text presents a viable alternative. The format is flexible and open-ended, leaving the teacher much freedom for personal adaptation in his or her own course. This may well be the book's greatest asset. This reviewer would seriously consider such a text for an undergraduate course, and could recommend the text to others for similar consideration.

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Images for Self Recognition: The Christian as Player, Sufferer, and Vandal. By DAVID BAILY HARNED. New York: The Seabury Press, 1977. Pp. 224. $10.95.

In his introductory remarks Harned makes some interesting generalizations about what he conceives the theological task to be. These preliminary observations are important for an understanding of what Harned's extremely suggestive work is all about. Theology has a single object: the self-disclosure of the triune God as it is confessed by faith and expressed in the stories and imagery of the Bible. Theology is, furthermore, a practical endeavor and, as such, cannot be divorced from ethics. Thirdly, true to his first two premises, Harned sees theology as a unique discipline among the sciences in that "persons are themselves called into question by their cognitive object instead of finding themselves free to ask of it whatever questions they devise" (p. xi). Next, theology is designed for the nurture of persons and, almost as a corollary, it is as much an art as it is a science since it deals with the life of the imagination. This last point is crucial for Harned's methodolo<:!"y. He insists (following the suggestive work of Austin Farrer) that the Bible is irreducibly imagistic and hence any theological investiga-

tion that is genuinely scientific is " one that recognizes the aesthetic component of a self-disclosure in which substance and form cannot be disjoined " (p. xiii) .

Harned calls his work a " natural theology," but the reader must understand that his description does not mean foundational theology or theodicy. Natural theology, for Harned, accepts the a priori of the Gospel but is " natural " in the sense that its object is not an application of God's self-disclosure but rather concerns itself with " the ordinary experience and self-understanding of people in the light of that revelation" (p. xiii). Natural theology in that sense is "not so much a questioning but a response to being questioned" (p. xv).

It should be clear from these preliminary remarks that Harned is finnly in that tradition that sees theology as being *fides quaerens intellectum,* that his orientation is strongly biblical, and exhibits a major preoccupation with the current interest in image, metaphor, story, and narrative. In that sense his work is not unlike the studies in religion done by Michael Novak or the creative theologizing of John Dunne, but it seems to this reviewer that his work is closest both in theological method and in temperament to that being done by Stanley Hauerwas in the field of ethics. Serious background reading for Harned's work would have to include, beyond the classical theological sources, such " boundary " thinkers as Walter Ong and William Lynch, as well as philosophical phenomenologists such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

At the heart of this book is the argument that three "master images", i.e. player, sufferer, and vandal, derived from our common social world, are important both in relation to the Christian tradition and in ordinary experience. For purposes of explanation we might take the image of vandal. A deep understanding of the image of the vandal, an image that might puzzle the theological reader at first glance, helps us to understand one great mystery of our common life: the human capacity for motiveless evil; the deep urge in the human psyche to destroy or maim just " for the hell of it ". In the case of the vandal the human person is not the subject of multiform natural evils (as in the case of the sufferer) but the initiator of evil. The seemingly irrational evil or destruction causes severe disequilibrium in the human community (alas, we are all aware of this as an existential reality in our culture} . The vandal, then, undermines the basic trust which sustains the normal social acceptance of "playing fair". This master image of the vandal was, of course, laid bare in the brilliant discussion of capricious evil provided by Saint Augustine in Book II of the *Confessions* in the famous "pear tree " episode. The notion of the vandal, then, helps us to understand the self at its weakest, that is, in the state in which the person is most patently in need of, at the very least, a humanizing therapy.

Other chapters pursue· similar analyses of the sufferer and the player. In his summary chapter Harned uses the biblical figure of Adam to tie the image2 together. The " master images " are condensed and crystalized as one reads the story of Adam, who falls through capricious evil. The figure of this fallen Adam stands in dialectical relation to the Christ who becomes Adam as sufferer and player. The biblical image, then, allows us to experience the human images of vandal, sufferer, and player in their deepest, and most salvific, fashion.

This book is not an easy one to read. It demands the close attention of the reader because of the density of the language and the closeness of the argument, and because of the wide-ranging learning that the author brings to bear on his subject. Nonetheless, the attentive reader will be rewarded amply, not only because of the arresting insights in the work but also because the book provides a model that could be emulated with profit. Harned, beginning from a rather conservative theological base, has shown how it is possible to use the resources of contemporary culture without being either reductionistic or naively apologetic. As Vernon Ruland has observed about many works that try to " do theology and literature " or "theology and culture" (in his excellent 1975 publication *Horizons of Criticism),* we often end up with plot summaries and pious homilies. Harned is free of such charges. He makes ample use of modern literature, both fictional and critical (in the section on the vandal Harned uses William Golding's fiction and W. H. Auden's criticism to good purpose), with full respect for the integrity of literary texts and an evident sensitivity to the autonomy of the critical and literary disciplines. He is a close reader of literature and never " forces" the text for his own argument. He is, in short, secure in his theology while open to the latent riches of the human imagination.

It is a compliment to any writer to say that his work is unfinished if the quality of the work means, not that it is incomplete, but that it opens new possibilities of speculation for the reader. What engaged my attention was thinking about other " master images " that would be suggestive not only for self-disclosure but for enlarging our understanding of the religious situation. One image that comes immediately to mind is that of the pilgrim. Pilgrimage has both a corporate character (Christians were early on described as People of the way; we describe our corporate character as a " Pilgrim Church ") and an individual one, as Western literature from the time of Dante and Chaucer down to the novels of the contemporary Catholic writer, Walker Percy, clearly shows. Furthermore, the pilgrim-as opposed, say, to the wanderer-travels purposefully towards a definite goal and, in the Christian dispensation, the goal is an eschatological one. The goal is not separated from the pilgrimage itself. When Saint Thomas Aqu.inas called the Eucharist the *esca viatorum,* he expressed the profound

notion that the Eucharist nourishes *in via* while· pointing to the messianic banquet which is the goal of. the pilgrimage itself. The Christian **pil-**grimage, in turn, is judged and illumined .by the pilgrim way of Christ whose Gospel journey moves purposefully to Calvary and Beyond.

Images for Self Recognition enlarges on two earlier works of Harned *(Grace and Common Life* in 1971 and *Faith and Virtue* in 1973) which explore in depth some of the ideas which are taken up and advanced in this work. Together they make up a striking contribution as Professor Harned continues to show the *nova et vetera* of the theological enterprise.

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Naming, Necessity and Natural Kinds. Edited by STEPHEN SCHWARTZ. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977. Pp. Q77; *$5.95.* Paperback.

The traditional theory of references holds that meaning is given to terms by specifying a conjunction of properties. Any item possessing all of the specified properties is considered to be an object of that species or natural kind, and the meaning of terms is considered to be analytic to the concept of the term. When this theory is applied to proper names, it holds that each proper name refers to a set of descriptions and the item which satisfies all of the descriptions is the referent of the proper name. And this theory also holds that identities obtaining between referents such as the identity " Cicero is Tully " or " Hesperus is Phosphorus " are contingent identities. This theory has been rejected by a group of philosophers who propose a totally different account of reference. They theorize that names have no intension, that names defining naturally occurring species (natural kinds) are not determined in their meaning by intension, and that reference is determined by a causal chain rather than by description. Stephen Schwartz has collected a number of articles by these theorists which criticize various aspects of the traditional theory of reference, and has created a work that should prove to be of importance to natural law theory. This new theory is worthy of serious attention, and I would like to consider some of its points here.

Keith Donnellan's article, "Reference and Definite Description," makes a major contribution to the new theory of reference by noting that reference can occur when description does not take place, or when .it is mistaken. This is so because descriptions can be either referential or attributive. Ref-erential descriptions enable the audience to pick out whatever is being

spoken of and are merely a tool or instrument of·communication. tive descriptions assert something of whatever fits the description. Attributive description .is such that misdescription is logically impossible, while referential description must be admitted so that the. fact of misdescription can be explained. Attributive description does not assume the existence of the referent, while referential description does. Thus, if it is true that reference is possible when description is absent, then what is the means by which reference is made? Donnellan suggests that the causal theory of names will provide an answer.

Saul Kripke asks in his "Identity and Necessity" how it is logically possible to have contingent identity statements. How are statements such as " Cicero is Tully " possible in contingent and non-necessary terms? Kripke asserts that such an identity is necessary if it is true because the names are what he calls "rigid designators". This means that the term refers to the same individirnl in all actual and counterfactual worlds. If "X " is identical to" X" and is also identical to "Y", then Kripke contends that it is necessary that " X" be identical to " Y ". If this were only contingently true, then it would be logically possible for " X " to be identical to " X " and not be identical to "Y " at the same time. Kripke justifies the necessary status of this relationship by distinguishing necessity from analyticity or *a priority.* Necessity refers to the logical or practical impossibility of a state of affairs being other than what it is. Kripke is not saying that identity statements are analytic or *a priori,* but only that they are necessarily as they are if they are true. That the statement that " Aristotle is the teacher of Alexander " is true of necessity can only be known after the properties of these individuals are known, and this shows that the identity is neither analytic nor *a priori.* Because these terms are rigid designators that refer to the same individuals, and hence to each other in each and every possible world, there is no possible world in which they might not be identical. The traditional theory of reference holds that there are few properties to be identified with an item that were identified with it of necessity, and Kripke's radical approach contends that all traits and properties identified with a name are identified of necessity. This thesis becomes most interesting when applied to the mind-body problem, for it holds that if pain is brain state " Q" then it must be that particular state of necessity, and it cannot possibly be any other state.

Hilary Putnam's article, " Is Semantics Possible?," points out a number of problems involved in modern semantic theory. Contemporary semantic theories developed by Katz, Carnap, and others simply elevate all of the errors of the traditional theory by suggesting that reference is made by description of essences and division into natural kinds. Katz argues, for instance, that meaning is a string of " semantic markers " that stand for concepts of the referent. Meaning of the term may be determined analyt-

ically ·by reading off the content of these mEt-rkers. Putnam·. rejects this· by holding that meaning is not to be found by stating a few facts, and adds that terms are defined: because a " stereotype " is accepted as a description of a normal member of a class of items. The " stereotype " facts are determined by a set of core facts that 1J,re adequate to the ta;ik of communicating the meaning. Natural kind terms, such as "lemon" or "gold," are such that certain traits are possessed by normal members, and the " stereotype" is associated with these traits. This "stereotype" determines the normal member and intension of the natural kind item, and the extension and abnormal use of the term can be determined by reference to expert knowledge.

In "Meaning and Reference", Putnam asks whether meaning is determined by analysis of the concepts held by the speaker, citing a rather interesting example. Twin Earth is a planet that is iden.tical to Earth in all respects except that water has the chemical structure " XYZ " rather than "H20 ". This substance is referred to by the same term and acts identically on both planets. Putnam argues that meanings are not in the head because the extension of water is radically different even though the same concept is present in the minds of the inhabitants of Earth and Twin Earth. The mental states of speakers do not dete1mine the meaning of terms, for meaning is not world bound but is the same in all worlds. Terms such as " water" have the same meaning in all worlds in spite .of the intensional content of this term in some worlds. This notion supports the theory of the necessary status of identities obtaining between proper names and also the causal theory of names. The extension of terms is not determined by the concepts of the user but by social factors and the division of linguistic labor.

The traditional theory of reference holds that meaning is prior to reference, and that the specification of properties of an item will lead to meaning and proper reference. William Goosens's article, "Underlying Trait Terms," asks what it is that makes a property relevant in and of itself for the meaning of a term. He contends that a term is semantically relevant if it provides information about whether a term applied to the item has that property. By holding that reference is prior to meaning because of the possibility of referring by methods that do not convey meaning such as ostentation or enumeration, Goosens suggests that reference is determined by noting underlying trait terms. There is no necessary and sufficient relationship obtaining between properties and terms, even though he contends that there is a relationship of this type between underlying trait terms and names. Underlying trait terms confer meaning on terms, but they do not define the referent. The subset of associated properties defines the object and is the basis of characterizing theory. Properties serve many functions, none of which are associated with the meaning of the terms, which is only

provided by the reference of the term, coupled with the core conceptions of the underlying trait terms and the underlying trait terms themselves. Goosens contends that this permits knowledge of the world and not just of language.

The traditional theory of reference holds that reference is made when natural kinds of objects are identified by specifying their essence. W. V. Quine in his " Natural Kinds " suggests that the notion of natural kinds is dubious in that it is foreign te logic and set theory. Quine points out that a relation of similarity is notoriously unclear, even though it is innate in a sense and is almost a necessary condition for ostensive learning. In spite of this, it remains alien to set theory and mathematical logic and may be inadequate for a comprehensive theory of reference. Things are considered to be similar when a common property is shared. But what counts for a property? Set theory would dictate that any two individuals are members of any number of given sets. The problem is exacerbated when the issue of comparative similarity is raised, for sets overlap in these instances. The theory of natural kinds is dealt a fatal blow by the indefinability of terms of similarity. Quine rightly points out that natural science advanced by classifying items on grounds other than similarity, and he suggests that substitutes for the theory of natural kinds be found. Natural kinds are crucially important for subjunctive conditionals, disposition terms and singular causal statements, all of which are alien to scientific theory. If semantic theory and referential theory are to advance, then it would seem that developments of alterations in the theory of natural kinds be made.

Irving Copi replies to Quine's criticisms in a very classical Aristotelian manner. Predication of properties of objects only includes those which are causally related to the existence of the thing in its unique individuality. Science strives to know the essences of things, and considers its task to be complete when it does so. He contends that natural scientists discover necessary truths when they discover the essences of objects, and the discovery of these essences permits natural scientists to predict not only the existence of unknown objects, but their properties also. Modern science can make these predictions because it determines what is essential to objects and then divides them into natural kinds. And while this predictive action is foreign to scientific theory, it is obviously not without value.

Gareth Evans's article, "The Causal Theory of Names," rejects Saul Kripke's theory of reference which holds that a speaker will denote an object if there are reference-preserving links leading back from its use of the term to the item being involved in the name-acquiring transaction. Like upholders of the various description theories, Evans contends that this version of the. causal theory of names ignores the social character of naming. 1Ie amends the causal theory of Kripke so that both the intentions of the .speaker using the. term and.the contextual forces involved in proper refer-

ence are accounted• for. The intention of the speaker must be accounted for because it is incoherent to hold that reference occurs when denotation is temporarily and physically removed from the speaker. Names are not formed simply because someone dubbed an item with ·-a name at some prior time. There must be ·a proper description of the referent and also a correct causal linkage between the various usages of the term. He then proposes that a name is properly given to an item when a speaker in a community uses a name that comes to be commonly used in that community to refer to the item, and when the success of reference relies on the common knowledge existing between the speaker and hearer that the name is used to refer to the item by the members of the community. Evans contends that the connection between a speaker's use of a name and the use of the same name previously is not an important connection, for many names can be used without prior use by other individuals. Reference is made to the dominant source of information, in his theory, and this source does not change from case to case. This does not deny the importance of the community, for proper reference usually requires the existence of procedures for applying terms to items. The advantage of his theory is that it seems to secure the contentions of both the traditional description theory and the new causal theory of reference.

Keith Donnellan's "Speaking of Nothing" poses a paradoxical situation to the causal theory of names by asking how it is possible to have reference to non-existent individuals. He divides statements about the non-existent into those which refer to purely fictional individuals whose existence was never presupposed and those that presuppose the existence of the referent. Statements of the latter type pose problems if it is true that reference requires accurate description. If reference is only possible after properties have been identified, then reference to non-existent individuals is impossible. He resolves this by suggesting that " blocks " develop in the historical communication of the name which terminate the historic explanation of the term. These blocks prohibit any proper reference and also permit mistaken negative existence statements. Statements such as "the present king of France is wise " are logically possible on account of a blockage in the historical communication of this term, which permits reference to non-existent individuals by mistake. The traditional theory of reference would have to contend that such a statement is impossible because no individual in fact exists as a referent that could properly possess the properties required for description and reference.

Alvin Plantinga's " Transworld Identity or Worldbound Individuals" asks how it is possible to refer ·to individuals existing in counterfactually existing worlds. If the identity of individuals is worldbound, then it is im--possible to refer to them in other worlds. But. if the individual is identical in all actual and counterfactual worlds, then identification is possible. This

view, however, en.tails the necessity of relationship obtaining between the individual and its properties and traits. For if traits and properties change as an individual moves through possible worlds, then it would not be possible to identify the individual. But if this is the case, then every change in an individual's properties from world to world entails a change in the identity of the individual, and the impossibility of identifying the same individual through possible worlds. Plantinga resolves this problem by arguing that essential traits and properties retain transworld identity while other traits that are not essential for this purpose are not necessary 11nd do not retain transworld identity.

Naming, Necessity and Natural Kinds should be recognized as an important work in light of the current status of natural law theory. This theory refers to ite:rns by their essence, and then divides them into natural kinds. The essence of the object stipulates the proper end of that individual, which is related of necessity to moral goodness in the case of man. This new theory of reference rejects the notion that the extension of terms is determined by the specification of properties, that natural kinds are logically valid forms of classification, and that reference is made to essences. If these contentions are true, then a fatal blow has been delivered to natural law theory. For the necessary relation between essence and the proper end of an individual is broken if reference is not made to the essence and if the procedure of dividing into natural kinds is invalid. This is a difficult book to understand fully and completely, but the implications of the theories presenteq in it are of such significance that close attention to the work is justified.· Natural law moralists must either invalidate the causal theory of reference, which may not be exceedingly difficult to do on account of the numerous admitted weaknesses in the theory, or they may reconcile this new theory with their own position. This would require natural law moralists to identify a necessary relation existing between moral goodness and some other trait, fact, condition or property in man or related to human existence. That, however, will not be possible unless the notions presented in this work are clearly and fully understood and grasped by whoever chooses to meet this challenge.

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'the Theory of Morality. By ALAN DoNAGAN. The University of Chicago Press, 1977. Pp. xvi +278.

That religion and morality iuay be conceptualized as genuinely distinct entities is hardly all that novel a notion, as the long natural-law tradition in Western thought bears ample witness. The potential problem posed for moral theory· by this distinction may be obscured by the clear and obvious fact that functioning moral traditions tend to be associated with religious traditions and that most people's ordinary moral judgments therefore reflect the general influence of whatever composite religious and moral tradition they happen to be a part, more often than not by inheritance. In secular society, however, the problematic element in the distinction between religion and morality has manifested itself with a vengeance as it were and has taken the form of· the conflicts between the inherited moral tradition, which in the West is, of course, Christian, and various systems of philoophical ethics which seem so contrary to that tradition. It is this situation and its attendant confusion concerning matters moral which serves, so to speak, as the basic background for this book, the stated purpose of which is to determine, first, what a theory of morality is a theory of and, second, what a philosophical theory of morality would be.

With regard to the first of these issues, the author, whose goal after all is a philosophical system which will do justice to traditional morality (and to do so without the problems associated with that other noteworthy philosophical attempt at this, namely intuitionism) , is quite clearly concerned with conceiving morality in terms true to what it has historically meant to moralists themselves, that is, " a standard by which systems of mores, actual and possible, were to be judged and ·by which everybody ought to live, no matter what the mores of his neighbors might be" (p. 1). This way of approaching the subject naturally leads him to consider the contribution made to moral theory by the Stoics, whom the author sees as having been the first to have formulated. a reasonably clear conception of morality understood as a standard for judging systems of mores. Of particular importance, therefore,-especially in view of the actual moral traditions, the Jewish and the Christian, with which the book is most concerned and to which repeated references are made-is the Stoic assumption that there is a divine law, which expresses divine reason and for the ascertaining of which law human reason is, in principle at least, adequate. divine law can, moreover, be distinguished from all other divine commands which do not express divine law, in this sense of divine law, and which are knowable, therefore, only by revelation.

It is in this Stoic spirit that the author rejects both Anscombe's contention that morality can intelligibly be treated as a system of law only by presupposing a divine lawgiver and also her inference that those who deny

the existence of such a divine lawgiver, if they choose to discuss ethical topics, should follow Aristotle's example and do it by way of a theory of the virtues. In response, the author' argues that the conception of morality as virtue is not really an alternative to the conception of morality as law and sees a counterpart "precept of moral law" for each "precept of moral virtue." Moreover, as undoubtedly befits an approach based on such manifestly universalistic principles, he praises the Stoics for having conceived the divine law as valid for all men in virtue of their common rationality in contrast to Aristotle, for example, who " did not succeed in distinguishing moral virtue as such, the virtue of a man as a man, from political virtue, the virtue of a citizen of a good city " (p. 4) .

Like Stoicism (although less obviously so, according to Donagan), Judaism and also distinguished between the divine law, which is binding on all and is in principle at least ascertainable by all, and other, more particular divine commandments which are binding only on some. Obviously, it is these inherited moral traditions which constitute our common morality and with which, therefore, a philosophical theory which seeks to do justice to common morality must come to grips, for " the traditional morality of the Western world must remain largely unintelligible to anybody unwilling to investigate its philosophical and religious foundations " (p. 26) . Making the most, therefore, of the problematic but genuinely traditional distinction between religion and morality as found in Stoicism, Judaism, and Christianity, the author attempts to construct his system of common morality by trying to develop as a philosophical system that part of the Hebrew-Christian tradition which does not depend on beliefs about God.

One of the most intriguing features of this discussion-one which is, unfortunately, treated far too briefly, however-flows from the author's readiness to recognize that, even apart from the obvious linkage in historical communities between Judaism's and Christianity's religious beliefs and the rest of their ethics, there is the additional problem that the common morality of the Hebrew-Christian moral tradition " rests on presuppositions about the nature of the world, of man, and of human action, which are rejected in some venerable cultures, such as Hinduism and Buddhism, and in some post-Christian theories of man, such as B. F. Skinner's radical behaviorism" (p. 28) . Indeed, he actually approaches what is distinctive in the Hebrew-Christian moral tradition's presuppositions in part by a comparison between the implications in its prescriptions for human conduct and the implications in Hinduism's prescriptions.

As perhaps befits a philosophical theory of morality, all this is by way of preparation for the definitive determination of what specifically is to be considered as the fundamental principle of morality, with regard to rational creatures' relations to themselves and to each other. This turns out to be,

not the ;familiar "Golden Rule," but that other traditional candidate for recognition as morality's fundamental principle-" Love your neighbor as yourself "-which Saint Thomas Aquinas recognized at one point as one of the *prima et communia praecepta legis nat1trae,* but which Donagan prefers in what he sees as its simpler and more suitable Kantian form. Of particular interest, perhaps, in this C!,mnection is his attitude to what was, however briefly, a fashionable form of ethical discourse within the not too distant past.

> And finally, there are those who, confounding *agape* with diffuse affectionate sentiment have reduced " Love, and do what you will! " to " Having ascertained the facts of your situation, allow nothing-and especially not the precepts of traditional morality-to deter you from what your affectionate sentiments may prompt!" It should surprise nobody that the results of this vulgar " situation ethics " are sloppy and incoherent (pp.

This is but one of several significant instances in which, while it is only a philosophical and not as such a theological theory, its :fidelity to much of the inherited moral tradition is made decisively manifest, in curious contrast to those recent theological, ethically debilitating tendencies which Phillip Rieff had in mind when he referred to " the strange mixture of cowardice and courage " with which certain religious professionals " are participating in the dissolution of their cultural functions" *(The Triumph of the Therapeutic,* Harper and Row, 1966, p. 16).

A major concern of Donagan's is to elaborate with an appropriate degree of detail and precision the prescriptions of a philosophical theory of morality. Accordingly, the classification and the identification of specific :first-order precepts is of intrinsic importance in his analysis as he has structured it. Admitting that such first-order precepts may be variously classified, Donagan divides them into three groups: "(1) the duties of each human being to himself or herself; (fl) the duties of each human being to other human beings as such; (3) duties arising out of participation in human institutions." This third group he further subdivides according to whether the institutions involved "(a) are among the varieties of purely voluntary contract or (b) are in one way or another imposed on individuals by the civil or noncivil societies of which they are members" (p. 75}. Obviously, it would hardly be possible to comment here on each of the particular prescriptions proposed under these headings. A few, however, call for attention as being both symbolic of the issues involved in this kind of approach to ethical argument and also symptomatic of some special problems such an approach may entail.

Thus, with regard to the first group of duties, the most obvious moral issue is, of course, suicide, with regard to which Donagan quite conspicuously deviates from the direction dictated by the Christian tradition. Sigrii:ficantly, the very way the question of suicide is fl'.amed here is, in-

advertently one suspects,· indicative of the tension entailed: " Are there circumstances in which a human being would not fail to. respect himself as a rational creature by killing himself? " (p. 77). Despite this use of the word "creature," clearly the idea that the human being's condition as a creature of a Creator constitutes in itself a principal ethical limitation upon the legitimate exercise of human freedom is manifestly much too overtly religious an idea to be raised in this analysis. Indeed, were it to be raised could it even hold its own in secular competition with the more modem, amorphous notion of " the possibility of genuinely human life? " Common Christian morality to the contrary notwithstanding, when it is perceived that the possibility of a genuinely human life will cease before biological death, then, as the author sees it, " the case for the permissibility of suicide is strong " (p. 79).

With regard to the second group of duties, another obvious testing ground for fidelity to tradition is abortion. On the basic question of the ontological status of the not-yet-born, Donagan frankly classifies it as a biological question which biology answers " simply and unequivocally: a human life begins at conception, when the new being receives the genetic code " (p. 83). Accordingly, abortion fails as " a possible solution of Malthusian problems within common morality " (p. 171); and it is interesting certainly to observe (given the author's ambition to construct a nontheologically based morality) the way he refers to" the recent revival of the pagan doctrine that abortion is permissible " (p. 168), thus highlighting, inadvertently perhaps, the connection in practice between religion and morality and the specific connection between the Christian religious tradition and the prohibition of abortion. Thus, it would seem that, while this philosophically formulated common morality may be occasionally out of harmony with traditional Christian morality, in some instances it may almost depend on the latter's presence for full effectuation. Significantly, Donagan himself calls clear attention to this by pointing out that " it was as contrary to common morality " that slavery was abolished by a still formally Christian Europe (p. 84). One is reminded of Maritain's view that " Only when the Gospel has penetrated to the very depth of human substance will natural law appear in its flower and its perfection" *(Man a:nd the State.* The University of Chicago Press, 1951, p. 90).

With regard to the third group of duties, Donagan deals in rather quick succession with contracts, property, the family, and, of course, civil society. The discussion of contracts gives him an opportunity to reject the Hobbesian notion that contracts themselves can directly create moral bonds. The problem of property causes him to observe that " all existing civil societies abuse their authority to regulate the access of their members to natural resources " and thus " have brought into question their own legitimacy." (p. 100). Since, however, he considers membership in civil society

essential to a full human life, only extreme cases can, according to the author, justify direct disobedience, general civil disobedience, or rebellion. The institution of the family raises the question of what variety of family structures seems permissible, the permissibility of divorce, and certain varieties of sexual activity. As might be expected at this point in time, what is proposed is somewhat more liberal than the traditional moral positions on these subjects.

Civil society presents the problem of the permissibility of war. Donagan accepts the traditional notion distinguishing between just and unjust wars. If a war is just, he considers it permissible to volunteer to serve in it and impermissible to serve in an unjust war under any circumstances. The problem with just-war theory is, of course, how one determines whether a war is just or not. Incredibly, Donagan declares that it "will usually be the case " that " a member of a civil society can to his own satisfaction determine whether a given war is just or unjust" (p. 111). Obviously, Donagan wants to reduce the practical effects of the presumption of legality accorded to civil authorities' actions and also to counteract the historically observable reluctance of Christians to challenge civil authorities on the issue of whether a war is just or not. These are valid concerns, to be sure, but surely they have their origin-in some significant part at least-in the very real difficulties ordinary people must experience in reaching judgments about so complex a question as the justice or the injustice of any given war.

As these several selected examples should serve to indicate, a serious attempt has been made on a philosophical level to elaborate both the content of and the justification for a rational theory of morality, one which, while it certainly breaks with our inherited common morality on certain specifics, also attempts, with some success, to take more seriously the suggestions of that inherited moral tradition than do some other approaches to the problem of creating and providing a rational foundation for an acceptable common morality. How adequate a moral theory has been produced remains, as it was at the outset, a matter for judgment; and, here, one's own moral tradition-even perhaps a religious one--will inevitably enter into that judgment.

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Hegel's Retreat from Eleiisis: Studies in Political Thought. By GEORGE A&-v.rsTRONG KELLY. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978; Pp. ix, *Q59.* $16.$0.

This book is a collection of eight essays, three of which have been written especially for the present volume, the others having appeared earlier in various journals. It is not a work of one piece, but rather a series of reflections on Hegel's political thought. Yet there is a continuity to it; for Kelly sees his work as an attempt simultaneously to do " archeology " and " renovation," resting on the dictum that " interpretation without renewal is empty; renewal without interpretation is blind" (6). His work is informed by a humanistic concern for the preservation of our cultural heritage as well as for the control of our own destinies through reason. In this way he might be said to be continuing the task begun in his earlier *Idealism, Politics, and History,* now giving Hegel his full attention as well as attempting to " refute" Pelczynski's claim that Kelly's approach cannot speak to our present concerns. Furthermore, the book is not " genealogical," as the title might suggest; it does not trace Hegel's development from his early years to the times in Berlin. Rather, Kelly studies specific and recurring prohlems which arise in any attempt to understand thought and reflect on it in our own context.

The first essay attacks straightforwardly the question of the relationship of Hegel's political writings to his philosophy in general and of politics to philosophy. Against the notions of Pelczynski and others, Kelly argues rightly that Hegel's political thought is inextricably bound up with his system as a whole, with metaphysics in particular, and, above all, with the problems of knowledge. A major aspect of the importance of this is that when Hegel's political thought is understood in this way in its proper context, the ideologizing which has plagued his thought in the hands of others can finally be laid to rest. Hegel is not an ideologist but " a philosopher-like Plato and Aristotle-who was constantly preoccupied by the relationship of the quality of the political order to the generation of knowledge " (8).

After a general but remarkably clear description of Hegel's own conception of philosophy in relation to the history of philosophy and the culture of the times, Kelly argues for the relation of politics to philosophy, the main points of which are summed up in the following passage. In viewing Hegel,

> it is important to grasp what he takes philosophy itself to be, especially in its relationship to living culture, since it is to the creation and preservation of culture in time and through time that the task of politics is ultimately addressed. Second, as the effective v::ssel of culture, the state must be so arranged as to "know," to miderstand, its conscious _purposes. Third, .culture is the vital substance of a people, and philosophy is its culminating expression; they *are* and *exist,* not as noble fan-

tasies that the pain of the present inflicts on the imagination, but IIII shared spiritual realities that reveal the eternal in the human; Similarly, the state exists to incubate and transmit them: there is no transcendence; it is fatuous to theorize something that cannot operate, when the real stakes are in *our* lives and *this* world. Fourth, the human wound administered by self-consciousnessto naturalness must, in a sense, be healed by the medicines of .speculation, which restores, remembers, salvages, reconciles, and justifies. This is also the fate of Europe, transcribed in its arduous recovery of politics. (27)

In this first essay Kelly articulates Hegel's *true realism* and *true idealism* in a way that demands our attention and careful thought.

This first essay forms, together with the last chapter, what Kelly describes as "an envelope" for the rest of the book. He is correct in this, but here more than anywhere else one wishes rather that it were the first page of the letter, continuous with succeeding pages, rather than an envelope. Questions of the relationship between wisdom in one generation or epoch and succeeding political events, questions of the extent and nature of philosophy's impact on politics, and the perplexing question of the rela.-tionship between time and eternity are left unanswered. But such questions must be answered if "renovation" is to be fruitful. Nevertheless, Kelly's articulation of the philosophy-politics question does give a ground upon which one might begin to tackle these questions.

The second essay is on the famous " Lordship and Bondage " passage of Hegel's *Phenomenology,* probably one of the most abused by Hegel's interpreters. Kelly does Hegeliap. studies and politics in general-especially among English- and French-speaking thinkers-a service in reprinting this classical essay here. His attack on Kojeve and on the latter's rape of Hegel's texts is necessary reading for all who have come under the influence of the Frenchman. It should be carefully read by all who would give a Marxist or anthropological twist to Hegel's work. His refutation of Kojeve is unquestionably correct. Kelly shows that Kojeve takes the section of self-consciousness completely out of context and consequently is totally unable to relate it to the rest of the *Phenomenology* and to the task which Hegel set himself. My only criticism of this essay is that Kelly is too polite and too ready to give Kojeve *some* justification in the latter's anthropological interpretation. Whatever merits belong to the Kojevean discussion of man and his condition-and one cannot deny that therp are some-they come under the aegis of Kojeve himself and not that of Hegel.

The third essay continues to build on the Hegelian view of the relations between politics, culture, and philosophy. Here, in a study titled "Social Understanding and Social Therapy in Schiller and Hegel," Kelly turns his focus of attention upon the relation between Hegel, Schiller, and the general culture of the time. His general text here is the *leitmotiv* of the unhappy consciousness, linking the generally religious background of .this con-.sciousness to the secular cultural realities. Kelly argues that it is clear that unhappy consciousness is

anchored in .theJorfeits of Judaism and Christianity, but it also refers to the isolation 'of the artist or political actor in a Philistine world. . . .

Turn-of-the-century Germany was indeed the land of the unhappy consciousness.... The awareness among German intellectuals of building a high culture, a "classicism," and conceivably· of forging keys for unlocking the secrets of the philosophical universe clashed with their all-too-human sensation of local space-time discordancies. Yet, paradoxically, the intellectuals came to recognize that these very tensions of life and work, politics and art, arid fact and airy ideal, made their innovative flights not only the more urgent, but the more universally valid. (55-56)

The tension between the whole and the particulars, the failure of any and every particular act or segment of society to speak to the universal concerns and to the "general will" is the basis of politics. The unhappy consciousness is condemned to unhappiness and alienation so long as it, as a mere "we", as only social, continues its attempts to be completed in a unified whole. Kelly's thesis in this essay is that Schiller laid out the problem which Hegel then took up, first accepting Schiller's aesthetic solution to it, later rejecting it for his own political solution.

The foundation for the problem of the modern state has been posed in this critical chapter. It has been posed as a condition of being divorced from the aesthetic *Sittlichkeit* of the Greeks and yet still related to it in the acute awareness of the "wound" caused by self-consciousness and the advance of the human spirit. In this advance the development of Christianity, which takes within itself a like wound in "the Fall" and, as we shall see shortly, is in time annulled as the true and highest unity of society-this development also adds to the consciousness of alienation: the tension between the natural or physical and the moral, the seeming incommensurability of freedom and duty and beauty, and most of all the clash between humanism and the search for a healing of the wounds of the "we" and the Machiavellianism which governs the philistinism and egocentrism of the developing civil society.

In the next chapter, "The Problem of the Modern State," Kelly's analysis continues, for the moment seemingly independent of Hegel's own thought. This chapter, I think, is Kelly's own bridge between Hegel and our own time. On the background of a brief analysis and criticism of the positions of Rawls, Nozick, Hayek, and Nisbet, Kelly offers a "provisional definition" of the state. The state is not a referee for civil society, not a mere servant of competing interests, not something that civil society itself can "create"; rather, quoting with approval Georges Burdeau, Kelly argues that the state is "the form by which the group finds its unity in submission to law" (101). An extended quotation of his full provisional definition is necessary in order to do him justice here.

Provisionally we may say ·that the state is a network of exchanged benefits and beliefs, a reciprocity between rulers and citizens based on the laws and procedures amenable to the maintenance of community. These procedures are expressive of the

widest. range Qf mutual initiative and compliance that the members· can regularly · practice, and they depend on a consensus that asserts individual freedoms while accepting such constraints as are necessary to the cohesion and self-respect of the whole. Conventional in. its origins as a product of human convenience and reason, the state is "natural" by its mission of creating a climate for· human fulfillment. . . . It is au amalgamation of human inter.ests·and demands: as such 'it mediates the will of the individual with the claims of the primary groups such as the family or profession, with the intense participation of spiritual communities such as churches, philanthropies, guilds, or even " nations," and finally with a discordant catalogue of universal values described as "humanity." (100)

The ultimate basis for this definition is Kelly's argument that the " state emerged historically when the vital aspects of human control and welfare were taken from the spiritual power," the latter being, of course, the Church (99). The development of man's total capacities and culture, the unifying, actually existing locus of the "general will," is no longer the Church and its divine doctrines. When economics and civil society were " freed " from the unification in God's will, nothing took its place. The " idea " of the state arises at this point. Here is the core of Kelly's reflection on Hegel, the polity, and our own human condition. Its further articulation is the concern of the remaining chapters of the work.

Kelly's insight is essentially sound, and we are indebted to him for this work. The union of the Greek *polis* (and of the Platonic-Aristotelian reflection upon it) and the modem civil society, in the face of the very contradiction between *'polis* ' and ' nation-state ', was clearly Hegel's task. His subsequent arguments showing how this Hegelian " solution " differs from any reactionary religious political doctrines as well as from both liberal and conservative trains of thought within liberal-democratic theory and states and marxist theory and states in. any of their numerous forms further clarifies the Helegian idea and the possible ways in which Hegel might still speak to us.

In "Hegel and the Neutral State" Kelly employs a "syntagmatic analysis " of the state, arguing persuasively that the syntagmata are not *simply* civil society . . . state, but rather that there is a syntax between the terms ' state ', ' religion ', ' knowledge, 'conscience', ' caprice'. But the state is not simply a sublimated religion or religious bond; in the face of the collapse of religion as the place of both *regnum* and *sacerdotium* and its reappearance in the private sphere alone, religion remains in the private or civil sphere. In the face of the subsequent rise of civil society and of the glorification of the arbitrary individual wills in competition, the modern state arises as itself the foundation and " encompassing " for both individual and collective realization of· humanity. There is no "either-or " in regard to individuals and the whole, but a unity of identity and difference which is the general will as that which must be if individuals and humanity as a whole a.re to be rea,lized.

In the concluding three chapters Kelly entertains the question of " Hegel

today." He argues that the "gravediggers" of Hegel's neutral state did not succeed in burying him or the idea of the state, but instead substituted either a relatively weak, "referee" idea of neutrality or some other equally ineffective idea. All of the arguments seem to be based upon a fundamental argument that the state cannot be founded on the social whole; the social whole, to be a whole, must be founded on the state. But this is notably not a power state or any repressive form of state. We are not urged to find our wholeness in an " organism " which reduces us to mere elements. Throughout the. book one is reminded of Hannah Arendt's attempts also to bring something of the reality of the *polis* to our own time. Kelly is certainly not Arendt, but the two do share a notion of ' authority' and of the problematic nature of attempting to have a state which is socio-economically founded. In fact, in the masterful essay, "Hegel's America," Kelly turns to Arendt's discussion of 'authority' and its distinction from 'coercive power ', ' tyranny ', etc. He then formulates the idea of authority which must be central to the idea of the state. ' Authority '

> means collective faith in the foundations or fundamental principles of a state and the capacity to translate this faith into leadership, political virtue, and public confidence. Authority is not power; it does not inhere in persons or even exclusively in role-playing persons. It is a subjective sensing of an objective pattern of relations built on social confidence. This is the type of relationship which Hegel's sovereign is intended to cement. (220)

Such a cement and such a subjective sensing are clearly lacking not only i:n the United States but in most modern nation-states. There is indeed no "public," but rather only the "publics " which Dewey so much glorified and which are the unstable anchors in our contemporary alienated life.

The response one makes to this great effort of Kelly to be both true to Hegel in his archaeology and true to us in his renovations will vary according to the perspective of the reader. Secular or non"secular, right, left, or center, there are criticisms to be made and they will be forthcoming. Rather than try very briefly to offer a criticism here-brief and therefore superficial given the complexity of Kelly's task-I would prefer to utter a wish. If Kelly's position, which has now been developed at least in the two works I have· read, is to be adequately criticized and thus inake its optimum contribution to the ideals he holds so dear, then it must be devefoped now in tei·ms of itself. He has laid a foundation through historical for some original thought in politics, the state; and society; he has clearly shown the need for a more adequate theory of the state; I would wish now that he bring his learning and insight to bear directly on a· unified work of one piece which w6uld address directly and systematically; the ·problem of the inodern state.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

University of Alabama Press: *The Word's Body: An lncarnational Aesthe. tic of Interpretation* by Alla Bozarth.Campbell. fp. 190; $15.50.

University of California Press: *History and Human From Marx to Merleau-Ponty* by James Miller. Pp. *9l96;* $17.50.

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University College Cardiff Press: *God and the Secular: A Philosophical Assessment of Secular Reasoning from Bacon to Kant* by Ronald Attfield. Pp. 9l81; £9.50.

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Schocken Books: *Marxism and Hegel* by Lucjo Colletti. Pp. 288; $7.95.

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