TRIUNE SELF-GIVING: ONE KEY TO THE PROBLEM OF SUFFERING

SOME YEARS AGO a witty friend of mine used to make a pretense of defending the view that this is the worst of all possible worlds. Though undoubtedly far from the worst possible, this world plainly falls short of some conceivably better, if not best, scheme of things finite. Discerning savants of the next century or two may look with pity, mixed with a good bit of anger and contempt, on the atrocities committed or officially condoned by that curiously arrogant and morally obtuse creature that some glorify as twentieth-century man. But whatever the judgment from whatever vantage point passed on our period, the current rising tide of troubles raises anew, perhaps more poignantly, the problem of evil in a universe traditionally held to be cradled in the everlasting arms of an all-loving Father. As men, all of us at one time or another must struggle with pain and injustice. As thinkers (at least in some modest sense), we must come to grips with one of the murkiest of puzzles, that, even where it may not afflict the heart, perplexes the mind: how are we to square the dreadful fact of evil with the sweet face of an all-good and all-powerful God? In recent years the problem has been somewhat recast: how can an all-loving God remain unaffected by the suffering of the men he has created? It is to this narrower formulation of the question that this essay addresses itself. The God of classical theism is totally other and unchangeable; as wholly other, he has no need of human love; as unchangeable, he cannot be touched by whatever transpires for the weal or woe of his rational creatures. No matter what evils agonize man in or outside time, God remains self-subsistent, holily self-loving, serene in boundless beatitude. The chasm infinitely dividing God and

man apparently annuls any humanly meaningful sense we might assign to. his being all-loving and all-caring. From one angle such a God evokes, along with trembling awe, a certain moral and aesthetic repugnance. He seems to be *mysterium tremendum et repellens.* Affective disenchantment intimates that an infinitely distant God may he an irrationality, a vestigial idol of an outmoded theology. In place of an Absolute, process-thinkers, notably A. N. Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne, have vigorously argued for a supreme but limited God. Finitist theism has also proved alluring to minds not ordinarily catalogued under process-thought, and of these we have chosen to take a quick look at Nicholas Berdyaev, a legatee in part of Boehme, and Peter Bertocci, an avowed disciple of the American personalist, Edgar Brightman.

First, we shall sketch the main lines of these four finitist approaches. While initially prepossessing, the finite-God case is saddled with a number of difficulties, some of which appear mortal. For all the obscurity that clings to any conceptualization of the strictly divine, the God of classical theism turns out to be incontestably loving and caring not in spite of but because of his immutability and infinity. Nothing inferior to a being of limitless wisdom and power can explain the otherwise paradoxical harvesting of good and harmony out of the evil and poisonous discord in the universe. Secondly, for further light on the still enigmatic features of a loving but nonsuffering God's tie-in with creation, the rational theist who is a Christian can cross the border into theology. In Jesus God suffered and died in some reasonable sense. The suffering of the God-man, however, leaves God impassible. Yet because Jesus is the incarnate revelation of divine life, his death out of love signalizes the self-giving within Godness itself. A nonsufiering but self-giving trinity of persons in God serves as a model for making each man a god. One key to analytical and existential mastery of suffering lies in the renovation of finite spirit in the image of the triune self-giving of infinite spirit.

I

Whitehead and Hartshorne present apparently compelling briefs for a limited God enriched by as well as enriching the world he oversees. Their fundamental position receives, outside a processive perspective, broad substantiation and corroboration from Berdyaev and Bertocci. But any gains accreditable to a more understandable finite status seem outbalanced by losses in the depth and width of divine power and love. In becoming finite, God forfeits Godness: he is nothing but a superhuman, but less than supreme, spirit. Though the precise mode of eternal operation always lies beyond human ken, only an infinite being can bestow his love on finites so as to transmute the devastation spewed by evil into per se goods for the upbuilding of the whole universe.

1. (i) According to Whitehead, the God of classical theism, that is rooted in the power-oriented Semitic idea of the one creator, "is a concept which is clear, terrifying, and unprovable." [1] The only available route to his existence seems to he the misnamed ontological proof originating with Anselm, today by and large dismissed as invalid.[2] Too, an infinite transcendence puts him " completely outside metaphysical rationalization." Thus both the existence and the nature of an infinite God are undisclosable by rational analysis. Moreover, in patterning God after an absolute imperial ruler, the Church has rendered unto God the things that are Caesar's. Enthroned in the sanctuary of classical theism is a Caesar stripped of all human attributes save a naked power, now bafflingly infinitized. In place of this absolutized Power Whitehead conceives of a God that blends reinterpreted features of Aristotle's sel£-thinking thought and the virtues of Jesus Christ. Like Aris-

[1] Alfred North Whitehead, *Religion in the Making* (New York: World, 1960; first published in p. 72.

[2] *Ibid.,* pp. 68-69. From the vantage point of the twenties Whitehead was unable to foresee the upsurge of a surprising interest in and a more surprising support for the Anselmian proof, some of which was stimulated by Hartshome's persuasive elaboration of the argument (especially in *The Logic of Pmjection* [La Salle: Open Court, 1962] and *Anselm's DiscO'Very* [La Salle: Open Court, 1965]).

totle's God, Whitehead's highest entity is not utterly outside the world but is the topmost part within the universe, so grounding and possessing forms that in some sense he thinks them. Unlike Aristotle's God, the supreme actual entity is not only of the world but in the world as well, for, Whitehead maintains, it is more blessed for God to receive as well as give: the world God forms and finalizes, in turn, fashions him. God is dipolar, manifesting two natures or sides, the primordial and the consequent. When we think God abstractively, simply as the repository of the forms and aims that determine and attract entities, we are focusing on his primordial nature, in virtue of which he is an unmoved mover unlimited and dissociated from the world. But in his consequent nature God is a moved mover profiting from the reciprocal causation of the entities whose subjective aims he ordained; in this respect he grows with the development of the world. Through the consequent nature all the tragedy born of contingency is overcome in final harmony; God tenderly gathers up all the fragments of the good and beautiful of perished actual occasions lest they be lost. Poet of the world, he molds its welter into an intellectual beauty and joy to last forever. Further, God not only immortalizes the data of perishing entities but, on his superjective side, capitalizes on them so as continually to endow ever-fresh entities with their income. Making the kingdom of heaven come, superjective action evidences divine love for each individual; God so loves the world that he ceaselessly gives it of himself-a generosity that brings with it divine providence, supreme solicitude for each of his creatures. Indeed not only is he father but brother of us all: " God is the great companion-the fellow-sufferer who understands."

In these real-relational dealings with the world God reflects, with due measure of metaphysical refinement, the virtues of Jesus Christ. "The world lives by its incarnation of God in itself." Here the stock theological term does not mean that God clothes himself in nature as the Word incarnates himself in human nature. However, its use is not whimsy but an indicator that elsewhere the God of and in process metaphysically

idealizes lineaments Christians believe to be unique in their incarnate God. Jesus enfleshes the revelation of the love of God; Whitehead's God is primarily a God of love, tenderly holding all to his bosom. So in the image of the Good Shepherd, he does not drive but persuades his flock. Again, Jesus is sent, as his name signifies, to be savior; in his consequent nature God saves all perished occasions. As Jesus salvifically abandoned himself to suffer with and for his fellowmen, God suffers with and for all creation, compassionating with every least occasion. A God-with-us is no Absolute steelily sequestered in infinite changelessness. His very suffering tempers and helps overcome variegated creaturely sufferings as his sympathy enfolds in divine harmony all that looks fragmentary and dissipated. [3]

(ii) While not strictly classifiable as a disciple, Hartshorne has developed many of Whitehead's insights into a more systematic natural theology that resembles, with the intention of superseding, the scholastic version of God. He trains his guns on two incongruities of traditional theism: an Absolute divorced from creation and an inaccessible Autocrat that is unloving and therefore unlovable. First, asymmetry in the relation between God and the world is indefensible. Divine infallible cognition is necessarily relative: from " God knows there are men " we are bound to infer" There are men." Again, God's knowledge must be actually different if this actual world differs from some hypothetical other world.[4] Just as a world without a creator is unthinkable, so a creator without a real relation to his crea-

•*Ibid.,* p. 68. Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York: Macmillan, 1929), pp. 520-26, 532; *Religion in the Making,* p. 149.

•Charles Hartshorne, *The Divine Rdativity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), pp. 9, 11, 14. In *Two Process Philosophers* (Tallahassee, Fla.: American Academy of Religion, 1973, ed. Lewis S. Ford), David Griffin, " Hartshorne's Differences from Whitehead," pp. *35-57,* and Lewis S. Ford, "Whitehead's Differences from Hartshorne," pp. 58-83, call attention to points of divergence between two major process thinkers not uncommonly taken to be related as master and disciple. However, whether or not we accept Hartshorne's estimate that his relationship with Whitehead might be better designated " pre-established harmony " rather than " intellectual descent," the general and particular lines of affinity between the two seem more numerous and much more significant than several marked dissimilarities.

tion is unintelligible. Secondly, in one respect the God of tradition bears a disquieting likeness to a transcendent tyrant supreme in jealousy of his prerogatives and in infinite £rigidity toward his subjects. In another respect he seems monstrously cruel. A father utterly unconcerned about the well-being or unhappiness of his children would be shunned as shockingly inhuman. Yet a wholly changeless God, perched infinitely high above the flux, has to be literally unmoved by the sorrows and joys, miseries and glories of his creatures. Enwrapped and enrapt in himself alone, he remains totally unruffled by and uninterested in the incalculable suffering of the human realm.

In preference to this internally incoherent monopolar God Hartshorne proposes a highest being that seems consistently both absolute and relative. Absolutely taken, God is metaphysically unique; no other being can be divine. But devoid of all relation to other entities, God reduces to an absolute that is absolutely empty. Hence God is relative, sovereignly so, responsive to the feeblest pulse of actuality. A similar strategy of qualified relativization refurbishes the divine attributes. God cannot not be perfect, all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-loving, but the all of knowledge, power, and love is delimited by rational possibility. He is perfect but only as far as possible, only as thinkable in reference to lower-order beings, only as modifiable through the impact of other actual entities. His all-embracing cognition does not descend to every particular, and his grasp of the future is only vague. Again, God's power is without question the greatest possible, but its exercise must make room for and be fenced .in by spontaneous causal activities. Similarly, divine love, which is not cloistered apart from the causal influx of creation, does not chillingly turn its back on the hurly-burly of events. A loving father, God makes the joys and sorrows of creatures his own, sympathetically resonating with their songs and groans.

From this standpoint the curious gap between Jesus and the heavenly Father is bridged. Jesus truly reveals the inner suffering of God himself. The life and death of Jesus prove that " God really *is* love-just that without equivocation." The

cross symbolizes the outgoing care of and generosity of God in His divine nature. God is inexpressibly co-suffering, taking our cross upon himself, ultimately bringing light and consolation out of humanly uncontrollable evil with its potency for destruction that would otherwise stun the mind and shatter the heart.[5] Thus a concrete God dissolves paradoxes ramifying from an immutable (unrelatable to creation) yet creating (related) God and supplies literal backing for the Christian claim that Jesus as friend and savior is the sign and image of the Father. Yet the relativity of God, we must not forget, does not derogate from genuine supremacy. Not only in but above process, God remains perfect, all-knowing, all-loving, and all-powerful within the limits of intelligibility.

(iii) Though bursting into flower from different soil under another sky, the concept of God in Berdyaev seems remarkably similar to the notion constructed by Whitehead and Hartshorne. The primordial factor is not God but the *Ungrund,* a pre-divine Nothing out of which course God and a freedom uncreatable by God. The creative act betrays a limited creator rather than a stonily immobile Absolute: " Creation of the world implies movement in God, it is a dramatic event in the divine life."[6] God has to be finitized also because man is the offspring of freedom or nonbeing as well as the child of God. The myth of the Fall dramatizes the powerlessness of God vis-a-vis beings able to rebel. In response to the fact of evil, God incarnational-Iy plunges into the cauldron of human living. The death of the Son lifts the veil from tragedy within God himself. A God of sacrificial love, he confronts evil and winces under its blows,

•*Ibid.,* pp. 83, 26, 86, 20, 123-24, 54. *Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism* (Chicago: Willett, Clark, 1941), p. 165; quoted in Ralph E. James, *The Concrete God* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), p. 133.

•Nicholas Berdyaev, *The Destiny of Man,* trans. Natalie Duddington (New York: Harper, 1960; first published in 1935), p. 29. See Hartshorne's remarks on Berdyaev in *Philosophers Speak of God,* ed. Charles Hartshorne and William L. Reese (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 285-87 and 293-94, and the comments and strictures on this self-styled philosopher of freedom in Charles Journet, *The Meaning of Evil;* trans. Michael Barry (New York: Kenedy, 1968). pp. 97-102.

undergoing the tragedy of the cross to triumph over the tragedy of freedom. The extraverted propensity of God arises from his trinitarian personality. The loving give-and-take between God and creatures reflects the personal communion at the heart of his inner life. An inwardly personalistic God has to be outwardly communicative, sharing with creatures even to the point of drinking the cup of sorrow to its dregs.[7]

(iv) The finitist conception of Bertocci also takes its rise from a critical restructuring of traditional Christian experience, this in an American setting.[8] The Mind necessarily superintending and directing agencies to their ends is first and foremost a Person, a cosmic Knower and a cosmic Loving Agent. Though God creates *ex nihilo,* two facts, the one natural, the other personal, block any ascription of infinity. A co-eternal Impediment, a brute given akin to the Receptacle of the *Timaeus,* resists God's efforts to maximize the harmony in the universe. The very creation of free co-creators, moreover, fixes boundaries to his power. Because free, persons map and work out their cosmic careers in partial independence of God. The maturity-creating insecurity that co-creators endure is felt in and by God. His control over future particulars subjected to the checks of freedom, God experiences a certain tension, a suffering through which he grows along with companions he elects to help shape the moral universe. Jesus stands out as the unparalleled example of the fruits of the cosmic Lover in man. Jesus's total openness to divine love releases the re-creation on which God spends his energies to effect in each man and in the whole history of man.[9]

•*Ibid.,* pp. 80, 81, 82, 57.

[8] Under the influence of Brightman, Whitehead, Bergson, and Hartshorne he was converted, Bertocci confesses, to a conception of "change in God in ways similar to Hartshome's view." Peter A. Bertocci, *The Person God ls* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970), p. 25, n. I.

•*Ibid.,* pp. 22-80, 85-87, 290, 814-15; "Theistic Temporalistic Personalism and the Problem of Good-and-Evil," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philo• sophical Association* (Washington: Office of National Secretary, 1977), 51, pp. 61-65. The notion of a co-eternal obstacle derives from Brightman, Bertocci's first major and probably most influential teacher; see Edgar A. Brightman, *A Philoflophy of Religion* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1940), pp. 286-87, 887-89.

2. The advantages of a finite-God concept are undoubtedly numerous. He is not exasperatingly inaccessible and not ineffably transcendent to nor imperturbably walled off from the petty round of creaturely comings and goings. Depths within depths of divine knowledge that classical theism declares impenetrable by rational understanding become in principle available to our minds. While present knowledge may be slim, the human spirit can legitimately aspire to lay hold of the inner workings of a kindred finite spirit, albeit the highest possible, that we call God. But these benefits are purchased at a price that many may judge exorbitant, indeed impossible, to pay. First, qua finite, such a top entity cannot strictly qualify as God. Second, only by being transcendent can God be omnipresently immanent. Third, infinite power is not the antithesis but the executive vehicle of infinite love. Fourth, an anthropomorphism partially undermines the finitist case. Fifth, not irrationality but a certain ineliminable dimension of mystery due to the eternal mode of operation envelops an infinite God.

(i) Only in a Pickwickian sense can a finite God be equated with a supreme being. A nontranscendent part of the universe has to fall short of being its ultimate ground. No matter how superior his metaphysical endowments, a so-called God that functions as a component of the universe has to be reciprocally dependent on lower agencies and, as dependent, must himself be caused. The dependence of a process-imbued God on inferior executive and final causes demands a further explanatory factor. What is ultimately responsible for the ordination of the world to a finite God and a finite God to the world? Surely not God; surely not the world; surely not God and the world taken jointly; for these are precisely the things ordered that need explanation. A cause locked within the system ordered is not the explanation but an explanandum. Compelling a caused cause to act as first cause traps the mind in a vicious circle or an infinite regress. The source of a finite-God-world interlinkage must lie in a cause dwelling outside the factors ordered. In short, to account for agency and order among dependent things, we are bound to conclude to an uncaused or

absolutely first cause usually synonymous with the God of classical theism.[10]

(ii) The finitist thesis posits a false contrast between the transcendence and immanence of God. The super-eminence of God, it is implied, puts him outside the reach of and makes him void of concern for creatures. But transcendence and immanence are not contradictorily but only relatively opposed. Indeed so closely do they comport with one another that in the line of causation God is most immanent in things because he is absolutely transcendent. Immanence does not cancel out but depends on transcendence. The higher the entity, the farther its causality extends. Since an infinite God is pure act or subsisting existence, he causes as his proper effect the existence of each and every actual entity. Since God properly causes the existence that we may take as the most radical, the most formal determination or principle in a thing, he is most intimately present, most formally immanent, in the being and operation of all created things. Lack of absolute transcendence, however, may shorten the entitative gulf of essence between God and man but it also constricts the ambit of divine causality. The nearer the divine nature comes to ours, the more distant becomes his influence on creatures. The closer God is en-

[10] *Summa theologiae* (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1961), I, 2, 8 (henceforth referred to by numerals alone). Though specifically different because of distinct middle terms, all of the five ways terminate in a supreme being variously viewed as an unmoved mover, first cause, and per se necessary being. The second objection argues in terms of what is today called Ockham's razor that nature and reason (plus will) can account for all events without resort to the God-hypothesis. If in the answer to the difficulty we alter nature to read primordial stuff or undifferentiated creativity and substitute a superhuman intellect for reason (and will), the response becomes a repudiation of the finitist-theistic case. Pared down to essentials, a finite God is ordinarily equivalent to an angel or super-angel (see n. 16 below), a mighty finite spirit fashioning the universe with the cooperation, or sometimes in the teeth of the opposition, of a co-eternal stuff or creativity. But no matter how towering the spirit, finite intellect and will fail to qualify as primary "because these are mutable and defectible; we have to reduce all mobiles and defectibles to some primary principle that is immobile or per se necessary." Limitation bespeaks mutability, and mutability bespeaks limitation; this reciprocal implication dooms every brief, however brilliantly presented, for a finite God.

titatively brought to our level, the more he is causally withdrawn and uninvolved. Only the entitatively highest can be causally closest. Only an infinite God can be roost intimately present in every fiber and most sensitively attuned to every pulse of finite things.[11]

(iii) Proponents of a finite God also tend to dichotomize divine power and love. The upshot of the arbitrary splitting of these two attributes is nothing short of a grotesque caricature. A God of unchecked power, process thinkers tell us, tramples on pitiable creatures; super-power makes God a supertyrant ever inclined to hurl thunderbolts down on cringing subjects. So this quasi-Moloch must be toppled and his place ceded to a God of love exquisitely persuading creatures to ideal ends. But transmogrification of an omnipotent God into a neardevil rests on a misconception of the relation between divine power and love. Infinite power does not operate in resplendent and sinister isolation. The zeal with which finitists repudiate infinite power as irrational stems from selective disregard of the overarching wisdom and love that direct and impel divine power. Not classical theists but finitists, in attaching the label "God" to irresponsible power, fabricate the bizarre apotheosis that leaves the intelligent God-seeker disenchanted. For the power of God operates within the constraints, so to speak, of a divine nature untainted by the slightest proclivity for the irrational. The action of God cannot violate a nature one with infinite intelligence. The power of God is the outflow of the

[11] III, 6, 1 ad 1: ". . . creatures are caused by God and depend on him as the principle of their existence. And then because of the infinity of his power, God immediately attains any one thing by his causation and conservation." As I, 8, le and ad 1 and ad S make clear, God entitatively transcends all things but fa causally immanent in every created entity. Sinoe he is essentially existence, he is immediately present in all things as the cause of their existence. While immediately causing existence, God mediately or instrumentally applies causes *secundum fieri* (which cause *this* dog to exist) and causes *s.ecundum esse* (which cause dog, the form of species); I, 104, 1. Unfortunately, this precision is blurred in one widely circulated translation that throughout infelicitously renders *ease,* the act of being, as being (which seems as analytically and linguistically misguided as translating *anima,* the act of a living body, as living being).

divine nature or, more specifically, the executive expression of his wisdom and love.[12] From the side of the per se good, God is first of all love that, with reference to the misery of men, becomes mercy. It is through the exercise of his power that his mercy is effectively broadcast over all his works. God applies infinite power to procure all the goodness possible within a lovingly designed finite frame.[13] In short, divine power at work in the world is an ordered omnipotence. It is limitless power operative within limits, it is power ordered to the delimited goodness appointed by infinite wisdom.[14] Moreover, the refusal of infinite power tends, contrary to the finitist averral, to assure the obstruction rather than the release of God's love. A finite God is a crippled God. He is therefore not more but less loving than an infinite counterpart. The shrinkage of his power drastically curtails the energy and variety of his love. A finitized God bears a likeness to a gifted brain surgeon whose vision has been blurred and hands made wooden by a stroke. Visual distortion and loss of manual flexibility reduce to near-zero efficiency the dexterity that prior to paralysis skilfully canalized his medical wisdom and humane concern. Boxing divine power within finitude also hamstrings the persuasiveness so prized in a nonabsolute God. Persuasion cut off from the resources of omnipotence has to be notably enfeebled, and a good number of the plans to which it is tied have to prove abortive. But infinite power in the ministry of infinite love, infinite power serving as an organ of goodness without stint, guarantees an unrestricted sweep of persuasion that is nothing else than the free play of infinite wisdom and love toward the optimum sowing and reaping of shared divine values in the universe. Only a God of infinite power can be maximally persuasive. His wisdom disposes all things sweetly according to his love and all things firmly according to his power. The sweetness is firmly

[12] I, *25,* 1. Power is differentiated from knowledge and will in God not *"secundum rem* but merely *secundum rationem* insofar as power conveys the import of a principle executing what the will commands and knowledge directs."

[13] I, 21, 4 and I, *25,* S ad S.

[14] I, *25, 5c* and ad 1.

applied and the firmness sweetly applied, for his power is, to repeat, nothing but the executive expression of a loving command articulated with infinite discernment. In an infinite God alone is power maximally loving and love maximally powerful.

(iv) An anthropomorphism lies behind the misrepresentation of God as heartless and despotic. Finitists misuse an otherwise indispensable analogical cognition when they compress God into a rigidly human mold and render a verdict on the good or evil implications of his attributes by measures appropriate only to the human situation. God, because he is God, can be commendably and nonegoistically self-sufficient and all-powerful. To put an infinite God down as cosmically power-drunk seems to be as illogical as upbraiding a father for dictatorial behavior because he sanely thinks himself wiser than his three-year-old son and accordingly directs the child in a nondemocratic fashion that makes only small provision for the exercise of his son's freedom. Apart from its image-ridden character, this anthropomorphic misconstrual springs from a partially univocistic concept of God. In a blunt, arbitrary manner Whitehead lays down the stipulation that the ultimate reason for the world cannot be " wholly transcendent " but must be in and of " the actuality of this world." [15] Like other finites, God is potential, temporalized, growing along with his world that stamps him exclusively as its own. Simple *fiat* probably canonized by Kant's self-denying anti-metaphysics of God determines a priori that only a finite God can meet the requirements of divine attributes scaled down to a finitist framework. Even an infinite God rationally accessible by causal analysis and proper analogy is doomed to fail any test drawn up in accord with finitist standards. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, unbending insistence on the finite in God erases his Godness. However humanly consoling and pictorially appealing, a finite God is an incoherent admixture of attributes. He is eternal and temporal, perfect and always growing, all-knowing and partially ignorant. Univocally conceived, he possesses

[18] *Religion in the Making* p. 59.

strengths and deficiencies that, while tolerable in a sublimated human spirit, seem inadmissible in God.[16]

(v). It would be naive and pretentious to think that these few brief remarks have let the daylight in on every aspect of the problem of the one and the many.[11] Indeed if we fully

[16] I, 3, 7. A finite God would seem to be self-stultifying: as finite, he has to be composed of diverse fact<?rs unified by an extrinsic agency-in short, every fi..'lite is caused; yet as God, he is purportedly the first or uncaused cause.

Though usually not consciously modeled after an angel, the God of finitists bears a striking resemblance to a super-angel (as suggested in n. 10 above) or, in accord with angelic hierarchy, a super-seraph. As unrestricted by matter, the pure form that is angel is relatively infinite (I, 50, 2 ad 4). The *aevum,* or aevitemity, the mode of duration measuring its substance, is relatively *tatum simul* (I, 10, *5* ad 2} and, as unbound by time, is relatively infinite (I, 10, *5* ad 4). Its intellect stocked with the forms of things, a top angel can know the universal causes of nature and causally help shape the course of the universe. Quasi-eternal (insofar as the *aevum* measures its substance) and temporal (insofar *as* it operates in a spiritual time) an angel grows in knowledge through its contact with beings that it causes. (Much of this is verifiable in the treatise on the angels from I, 50 to I, 60.) In "In What Sense Is God Infinite? A Process Perspectice," *The Thmnist,* 42 (January, 1978), pp. 1-13, Lewis Ford's heroic efforts to re-infinitize the explicitly finite God of Whitehead and to disengage himself from the embarrassments of finite theism only serve to underscore further the paradoxes of a finite God or a supreme seraph. He achieves at best an uneasy compromise of irreconcilables: an infinitely actual God everlastingly open to fresh actualization: "God is infinitely actual, yet he can be enriched by the temporal determinate actualization of the present" (p. 11). While agreeing with Whitehead that an infinitely determinate being is self-contradictory (p. 13}, he fails to see that the notion of a supreme (the greatest or infinite in this order) finite (determinate) being is just as intractably self-refuting. A finite God than which we can conceive nothing greater is as impossible *as* the swiftest possible motion or the greatest possible number; indeed, in the case of a finite God, we must think of a beyond-the-finite being to account for the universe. As Fr. William Hill, O. P., shrewdly remarks from another angle in a reply, "A Thomistic View," in the same issue, pp. 14-27, both Whitehead a11d Ford miss the meaning of properly infinite actuality becaustl they cannot or do not conceive of a pure act whose essence is subsistent existence (pp. 16-18}. As maximally formal, God is indeterminate-uncontracted by any restrictive potency (I, 7, 1); but as maximally formal, God is also determinate-he subsists as his own existence. Because a constricted Whiteheadian conceptual vocabulary keeps him from focusing on a God that is, because maximally existential, maximally formal, · Ford has to fall back on a relatively infinite bei11g, a super-spirit consanguineous with a super-seraph.

[11] Like paradoxes also mar the anthropomorphic God of Berdyaev and Bertocci. In addition, space limitations bar a thorough scrutiny of the foundations of process thought. Whitehead's philosophy 0£ nature, with its disastrous a:ppointment of

understand God, we are not understanding God at all. An infinite God whose eternal mode of operation lies beyond our experience can never be more than partially intelligible to finite intellects. The question of the freedom of the creative act seems especially baffling and shrouded in profoundest mystery .[18] But confession of ignorance arising from frank recognition of the outer bounds of metaphysical knowledge does not retroactively blot out or cast doubt on propositions already established, however skimpily here, about the existence and nature of an illimitable God.

3. While the eternal mode of an infinite God may forever slip through the meshes of rational comprehension, the mind can rest analytically satisfied in the knowledge that precisely

primacy to becoming, is ridden with inner contradictions. Unfortunately, some Catholic thinkers enchanted with process-thought oversimplifications seem blind to the numerous incoherencies bedeviling an exaltation of becoming.

[18] The problem of precisely reconciling God's immutability with his decision to create the universe remains for many an impenetrable enigma. I, 19, 8, obj. 4 explicitly raises the difficulty: Because creation is a free act, it was possible for God not to will to create; thus the divine will seems contingent *ad utrumlibet*, and in opting for creation, God introduced change into his nature. Aquinas's response (in Sc and ad 4) uncompromisingly stresses the necessity in divine willing. God's willing of his own goodness is absolutely necessary, and his willing of created goods suppositionally necessary. (The latter is a sort of factual necessity: on the supposition that you are reading this sentence, you must be reading this sentence.) The nonnecessary feature of creation is traceable not to the cause but to the effect (ad 4). A similar question is similarly answered in I. 19, 7: God's will remains unchanged in his willing change in things; and since He cannot be God without being immutable, his free willing of creation does not introduce the potential and novel into divine life but betokens what is suppositionally necessary. The reason for Aquinas's insistence on necessity in divine willing is, as just indicated, clear. Once we do away with immutability, we abandon a rationally tenable God. The thorny problem -0f meshing absolute and suppositional necessity in God shades off into mystery rooted in the impossibility of our analytically comprehending the mode of eternal operation, whereas the insertion of change in the divine nature mires the mind in the paradoxes of a processive God-an irrationality that comes down to a God that cannot be God. We are face to face with a boggling, an insuperable mystery because we cannot precisely conceive or properly represent how an eternal being operates. We are brought up short by the humanly inapprehensible; but such limited knowledge admitting mystery without contradiction seems preferable to a self-contradictory knowledge of a mutable God without mystery.

because he is infinite, precisely because he does not sink into process, he can and does love without limit. The whole meaning of creation and the key to the mystery of human existence lie packed within love without limit: only an infinite God can love creatures with an infinite love. A finite being, sheerly on its own, has nothing to attract, nothing to contribute to, an infinite being. The creation of :finites can gain nothing for an infinite being. How could, why would, God create finites? The only reasonable answer is that he creates because he is God, because he is infinite love: finites are made in view of his infinite goodness.[19] He loves them, once created, with an infinite love because they bear within them the imprint, the likeness, of his infinite goodness. Just as God knows created things in himself as sharers in his divine being, so he wills creatures as imitators of his goodness with the very same love with which he loves his own divine goodness.[20] The very self-sufficiency deprecated as the introversion of a tyrant, furthermore, grounds the divine freedom in creation that betokens a love far greater than that conceivable in the partly necessitated emanation of creatures from a process-dominated God. Since God requires no other good than his all-satisfying infinite goodness, the many-splendored forthgoing of his goodness in creation has its fountainhead not in inexorable necessity but in free generosity. *Bonum est diffusivum sui* refers not strictly but only congruously to divine operations *ad extra.*[21] Out of infinite love God has freely communicated his goodness. Only an infinite being could have freely and lovingly fashioned a finite sharing in the goodness that is himself.

However, the removal of necessity from the creative act, one perceptive historian of ideas charges, makes the act of creation irrational and baseless in itself and in its product.

[19] I, 20, 2. The love of God, in contrast to ours, is creative and infusive of good.

[20] I, 19, 5. Here Thomas indulges in a bit of witty word-play: "Hence he [God] wills that this exist for the sake of this: but not for the sake of this does he will this." In other words, God wills that this means be ordained to this end, but he does not will the means in order that he himself may acquire the end.

[21] *Summa contra Gentiles* (Turin: Marietti, 19!!7), 2, 28 and 85 (henceforth referred to as *CG)*.

... God, even though he *did* create a world, could have no reason for doing so. Nothing in his essential nature made it necessary or desirable for him to bring a universe of imperfect beings into existence: the creative act must therefore be conceived to be entirely groundless and arbitrary in itself, and therefore in its inclusions and exclusions ... a created world is a *groundless* superfluity .... [22]

Unfortunately, Lovejoy is unable to see how an intelligent action can be anything other than a spiritually necessary action. But the world did not emanate from God by natural necessity or from " his essential nature," nor was God ineluctably determined to create by one overriding reason or motive within his intelligence. Yet while not necessitated, his creative act cannot be put down as motiveless and his creation as sheer incidental triviality. He did not create for a necessary reason but for a sufficing reason. Not for a necessary reason: as utterly actualized and fulfilled, he cannot will this or any universe as a means to reaping some fresh benefit. But for a sufficing reason: out of the abundance of his generosity he wills that the universe exist to reflect and to be ordained to his divine goodness. Among an indefinite number of possibilities God freely chose to create this world; freely, but not groundlessly or capriciously, since his choice rests upon a sufficing reason in his wisdom. Analogously, human beings are motivated to make rational choices by nonnecessitating but sufficing reasons. [28] A well-to-do person who generously desires to give an extra $10,000 to one of five possible charitable causes (i.e., he is not bound to distribute any of this money) at length decides to offer the gift to, say, a foreign mission congregation-a decision not necessitated but surely reasonable. Similarly, God, out of an infinite range of options, created this world. His nonnecessitated decision

[22] Arthur Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936), pp. 156-57.

[23] Ruling out as impossible a rational action that is both caused and free, many contemporary thinkers, whether empiricists or idealists, become trapped in a mechanical or psychological determinism. In *Reason and Analysis* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1962), pp. 492-93, Brand Blanshard, after rejecting volitional behaviorism, holds that the rational man must choose " the intrinsically greatest " of alternative goods in a particular situation.

could not be iITational, since it sprang from his wisdom as well as his love. It was not determined but arose from a sufficing reason. Precisely why God opted for this world rather than another, however, is a secret hidden in the abysses of divine wisdom.

Part of the mystery of this particular sufficing reason is of course the inclusion of suffering. This massive fact darkens the universe that wells up from creative wisdom. Suffering is permitted by an all-loving God to take its origin from nature and man. Physical evil is the inevitable outcome of a universe principled in part by matter. The necessity of matter, the iron law of matter, results in decline, disaggregation, dissolution, death.[24] Moral evil, along with the pain it inflicts and punishment built into it, is the bad fruit that is always an imminent real possibility in beings empowered with free will who can and (as the sordid chapters in history testify) often do elect to follow twisted paths.[25] It is incoherent and does no good, we have maintained, to fasten strict suffering upon the divine nature. To deform God because the universe is deformed frustrates rather than promotes hope of solution. A God in any way less than impassible is a God destitute of essential Godness. To make God suffer is to unGod God. A suffering God, we saw too, is a maimed God. His disability severely cramps the scope of relief and remedy he can apply to suffering. It is, however, a God blessedly incapable of suffering who enjoys infinite rein for his knowledge and concern. An *actus purus* unscarred by change can, with infinite ingenuity and most tender care, orient to a superabundance of goodness all the suffering due to nature and man. A disadvantaged divinity, its powers contracted to finitude, could not, as the infinite does, consistently and unerringly draw the greatest good out of the vastest conglomerate of evils.[26]

2. *CG,* !il, 80.

23 Jacques Maritain, *St. Thomas and the Problem of Evil* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 194!il), pp. 15-19.

••I, 49, !il. A God only relatively infinite cannot control and direct all contingencies and human evils to the' intrinsic good (the order) or the universe.

Here we reach a resignation point. No doubt much more refinement and rigor can be brought to the foregoing few slight remarks, but even this scanty presentation does set down in essentials the range and limits of the light that reason alone can throw upon the mind-staggering and heart-gnawing problem of a nonsuffering God vis-a-vis a creation harrowed by suffering. Though a dead end brings to a halt the human mind on its own, suprarational pathways to perhaps further illumination beckon to a Christian believer.

II

In partial justification of a suffering deity finite-God theorists, we saw, limned God the companion as a sort of Jesus writ large. A super-heroic but naturalized Jesus is one unparalleled mythic symbol of a strictly co-suffering God. An analysis principled by Christian faith repudiates rationalist mythology to validate the supernatural in Jesus and pursues some fertile leads toward a tenable conception of the nexus between God and suffering exhibited in the theandric being of Jesus. Recognizing Jesus as the way to the interior of God, we shall explore two points: first, the sense in which God suffered in Jesus and, second, the analogical kinship with suffering in the trinity that we catch sight of through the crucifixion.

1. The curious blurring of the line between the divine and infra-divine in a process perspective permits a quick review of the basis in concrete naming for the familiar statement, " God died on Calvary." Then we shall glance at the everlastingly ongoing character of the divine mercy represented in the death of Jesus.

(i) The de-supernaturized reading of Jesus advocated by Whitehead, Hartshorne, and Bertocci mistakenly portrays God as like Jesus when, in reality, Jesus is like God. Less ambiguously, their account falls shy of the mark by finitizing God

Our second or theological part deals in more detail with the transcendently ordained production of good fruit from the bad tree. See nn. 50-55 and 65-67 below, along with corresponding material in our text.

and by simply failing to grasp that Jesus, while human, is truly divine. Their strategy of what today is question-beggingly labeled demythologization saddles the core of the New Testament with Enlightenment-derived prepossessions. The Jesus of history " purified " by rationalistic exegsis turns out to be a figure overlaid with and distorted by the " dogmas " or myths of what we may style the rationalist faith of anti-faith-on a priori grounds Jesus is debarred. from enunciating supernatural truths and working miracles. A picture of Jesus stripped of his proper Godness does violence to the Gospel message and defaces the perfect image that is the Word equal to the Father. Undeniably an odor of paradox initially clings to the juxtaposition of the claims, " The author of life died for our sins " and " God cannot die." What looks like a *Credo quia absurdum* dissolves in the light of the familiar (but in our day somewhat disregarded) communication of properties. Proper attributes are commonly shared because the divine person personalizes and acts in two distinct natures. " Operations belong to supposits," goes the scholastic maxim, and therefore the one I of Jesus expresses itself in a double field of operation. Without incoherence he can make the superficially conflicting avowals, "Before Abraham was, I am" and "I will be crucified in Jerusalem." From a linguistic angle, only positive concrete terms are veridical vehicles for the communication of properties, because only a concrete name signifies both supposit and attribute. Thus the Christian daringly proclaiming that God died on Golgotha also reverently avers that the holy and immortal God as such did not die.[27]

(ii) In an analytically sharp argument in a moving devo-

[27] III, 16, 1. This rehearsal of a basic solution to one crux in Christology may not be altogether tedious in a period of theological semi-decadence when, one hears, certain European theologians have tried to resurrect the hoary error that there are two persons in Christ. And even a distinguished Anglican theologian of the caliber of John MacQuarrie oddly feels driven to surrender divine impassibility and thereby abandon divine infinity: "A God of love is inevitably vulnerable for there is no love without suffering"; *The Humility of God* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1978), p. 69.

tional essay Gerald Vann sees the death of Jesus as a sign of everlasting divine pity. Clearly Jesus died at a certain point in time, but since the willing of his death originates in the eternal love of God, the death of Christ is an instant perpetually operative in events past, present, and future in the eternal present of God's knowledge. Precisely because God is immutable, he can be constantly there, always involved, timelessly empathizing with men through his mercy manifested in the temporal but time-transcending death of Jesus. In God, Calvary shows, there is an infinite will-to-sorrow and joy. God can experience neither our sorrow nor joy, but his love is a super-magnificent sympathy that gathers up in itself all the richest elements (now purged of imperfections) of our sorrow and joy. So meditation on Calvary pulls back the curtain to show God not as suffering but as boundlessly caring, as illimitable will-to-share, as infinite love giving himself in the making and remaking of man.[28]

A further step seems plausible. Infinite self-giving tells the story of God's relation to man only because his self-giving is inward-directed in a triune fashion. First, the primary analogate of the self-sacrifice of Jesus, which can have no strict counterpart in God, is the triune self-giving that constitutes the Godhead. Second, with this self-giving serving as a model for suprarational moral fulfillment, man is potentially programmed to become Godlike by converting evil into a means for achieving per se goods. Third, though not a tool of philosophical or theological analysis, prayer is required existentially to understand evil and to assimilate triune life. Fourth, thus the human spirit is able to become all things not only by knowledge but also by love that is living union with infinite spirit.

(i) A certain divine logic is lent to suffering when we regard Christ's life-giving death as a pointer and symbol, first :figurative and then acceptably analogical, of the infinite self-communication of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit to one another

[28] Gerald Vann, *The Son's Course* (London: Fontana paperback, Collins 1959), pp. 189-44.

within the unfathomable center of the divine nature. "Philip," Jesus said, "he who sees me sees the Father." [29] Jesus is the incarnate revelation of the wisdom and love of God, his whole life an epiphany of the mind and heart of God. The crowning point of Jesus's earthly pilgrimage discloses one surprising meaning of the mysterious divine interior. The words of Jesus to Philip seem most tellingly verified in the crucifixion. Even now, in pondering a crucifix, we may discover in the dead Jesus coercive evidence for what unstoppingly transpires in the abysses of divine existence. "Greater love than this no man has, than that he lay down his life for his friend." [30] The physical suffering as such that the innocent Christ bore makes the crucifix a thing of horror, a close-to-diabolical invention, but in perfectly accomplishing sacrificial love, the crucified Jesus is exquisitely beautiful. He is the nonmythical hero second to none, without exact precedent or like in myth, who abases himself to \Vin back all men to God.[31] In Jesus on the cross is perfectly realized selfless love, measurelessly prodigal self-giving. It goes without saying that Jesus precisely as crucified no more than metaphorically represents self-sacrifice in the depths of the Godhead. Plainly God as such cannot immolate himself for his creatures. Plainly neither Father nor Son nor Holy Spirit immolates himself for the other two. The holocaust of Jesus on the cross richly suggests inner divine love but it would be philosophically fatal and religiously disastrous to press one side of its import beyond the sheerly figurative.

Nevertheless, Jesus in his moment of unexampled interior self-sacrifice does reenact, with some analogical literalness, the infinite love circulating within the Godhead. In a manner impossible to comprehend, the one Absolute that is God is tripersonally relativized so that each of the three persons totally possesses the one divine nature. The infinite act that is God

[29] John 14:9.

[30] John 15:18. See I-II, 26, 5 ad 8 and III, 47, 8.

[31] Karl Adam, *The. Son of God,* trans. Philip Hereford (New York: Image Books, Doubleday 1960; first published in 1984), pp. 209-11.

is wholly enjoyed by each of the three persons in an unceasing indwelling and interpenetration of nature and operation. The one God is infinite three-personal love. The Father eternally loves the Son and Spirit, the Son eternally loves the Father and the Spirit, the Spirit eternally loves the Father and the Son. The Father gives himself completely in the generation of the Son, then the Father and the Son give themselves to one another in the spiration of the Holy Spirit.

The triple relativity within God is radicated in infinite immateriality. Only because he is infinite spirit or pure act can God be truly God. He is absolutely unchangeable, but since He is infinite, in him nature and action perfectly fuse: so his nature is changeless activity at its highest pitch. A nature less than infinite is marked off from operation. Because God is infinite, he can be three persons yet undivided in nature. Were he other than infinite, the generation of the Son and procession of the Spirit would introduce irremediable cleavage among the persons, with the result that there would not be one God but three gods. On the plane of spirit the more perfect the procession, the more closely united is the fruit with the source of the procession. The more elevated and potency-free the intellectual conception, the more intimately joined is it with the intellect from which it proceeds. Since in God intellection and intellect are utterly without differentiation, the Word is substantially indistinguishable from the mind of the Father from which he proceeds.[32] Because divine knowing and willing are at the summit of immateriality, Son and Spirit can proceed from the Father without splitting the divine nature into three distinct beings.

Furthermore, only because God is infinite can each of the divine persons totally give Himself to the others. In this connection one text seems remarkably pregnant with meaning. "All things have been delivered over to me by my Father; and no one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son and anyone to whom the Son chooses to

••I, 27, I ad 2.

reveal Him." [88] The Father gives *all.* " It is a word embracing infinities." [34] The Son receives all from the Father: all existence, all life, all knowledge, all love, an infinity of these. But it is worth a moment or two, in addition, to fix our eyes on a simple truth, seemingly almost tautologous at first glance, whose implications are unexpectedly rewarding: if the Son receives all from the Father, it is only because the Father gives all to him. Not only does the Father possess the whole of the divine nature but in fathering the Son, he gives the whole of the divine nature to the Son. To be an infinite Father means to generate an infinite Son.[35] To be Father is nothing else than to give all to the Son.[36] As Father, he transmits all his Godness to the Son. In turn, Father and Son totally give their Godness to the Holy Spirit, and, to close the circle, the Spirit totally gives himself in return to the Father and the Son (not of course in the mode of procession) . Thus God inwardly exists, God is internally constituted in infinite love because each of the persons is totally giving himself in the other two. God is infinite self-giving in virtue of the circumincessory communication of the three persons to one another. Indeed this three-personal co-interactivity is infinite self-giving; it is God himself. It is as if the Father emptied himself in pouring himself into the Son and Spirit. It is as if he laid down his life for the Son and the Spirit. It is as if he utterly divested himself of self in an infinite gesture of generosity toward the Son and the Spirit. Each of these propositions is of course a *fagon de parler* garbed in metaphorical dress. The Father cannot evacuate himself, cannot strictly sacrifice himself, cannot de-self himself to the point of nothingness. Yet while imprecise, each of these propositions does con-

••Matthew

••Karl Adam, *The Christ of Faith,* trans. Joyce Crick (New York: Mentor Omega Book, New American Library, first published in 1957), p. 155.

[85] I, 88, ad 4 and I, 88, 8. The *ratio* or objective intelligibility of father is primarily and perfectly realized in the first person of the trinity. The union with difference between father and fathered could not he closer, for so like the Father is the Son that they are distinct not in species or substance but in relation only. Because infinitely Father, he is eternally fathering.

••I, 40, and I, 41, 8.

vey some intimation of the unconditioned self-giving within the life of God. Because immutable, the Father totally pours himself into the Son and the Spirit without loss of his own being. Because supremely deathless, he hands over all his life to the Son and the Spirit without forfeiting infinite life. Because infinite spirit, he delivers all of himself over to Son and Spirit without nothing-ing his own perfection.

Here the thrust of the medieval axiom, *Bonum est diffusivum sui*,[37] assumes its fullest necessitarian sense. For those, like Plotinus and Avicenna, for whom nonnecessary action introduces deficiency in God, the One or highest being has to pour itself forth rung by rung into inferior beings.[38] Since it is the Good, the primal entity is ineluctably required to engender lower orders of being out of itself. The eternal One cannot not produce the many as gradated participations of itself. However, this inexorably determined proclivity to expand, to express itself in the multiple and various, inserts dependence in the One and thereby compromises its all-sufficiency along with its corollary attributes. The irrepressible urge to expression in the manifold, by rooting the many in the One, makes the One implicitly, and incongruously, many. Because this necessitarian interpretation of cosmic origins brings in its train the awkward

[37] According to *De veritate* (Turin: Marietti, 1927), 21, 1 ad 4, diffusion properly refers to the activity of an efficient cause and is said only in the broad sense of other species of causation. But diffusion of the good as such pertains to the final cause, because the good bespeaks perfection and possession of the entire being of a thing, both attainable only in the line of finality. Lesser beings do not spontaneously and automatically irrupt from the divine substance, because God creates with free intelligence *(CG,* 2, 23). Nor are all possibles poured forth infinitely since creation springs from a definite form of the divine mind (I-II, 4 v_d 1). Contrary to Lovejoy, *op. cit.,* p. 76, not "by inconsequence" but by rigorous consequence does Aquinas refuse to assign an infinity of effects inexorably flowing from God. A God bound to generate such an actual infinity could not be actually infinite.

[38] A. C. Pegis, "Necessity and Liberty: An Historical Note on St. Thomas Aquinas," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* (Washington: Office of National Secretary, 1941), Q6, especially pp. 15-21. Benignus Gerrity, F.S.C., *Nature, Knowledge and God* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1947), pp. *565-66,* incisively criticizes emanationism.

fusion of the One with the many, medieval creationists were chary about attaching more than a loose or accommodated sense to the axiom as regards divine operations *ad extra.* Yet the axiom may be accorded the strongest literal force in the divine operations *ad intra,* for no being is more necessary than God, no life more necessary than his interior life. God is necessarily one in nature and three in persons. The Father has to engender the Son, the Father and Son have to spirate the Holy Spirit. The Father has to father, the Father has to give all of himself, all that is the divine *bonum,* to the Son. Circumincessively each of the divine persons is everlastingly "diffusing" or communicating all of himself to the other two. In the perspective of love *Bonum est diffusi,vum sui* may be called one law of divine Iife.[39] God has to love God, each of the divine persons has to love totally the other two, each of the divine persons has to pour himself unstintingly into the other two.[40]

••In the light of the good (the eliciting or finalistically diffusive factor) identical with the divine substance the Father communicates the whole of the divine nature to the Son (I, 41, 3). The same good one with the divine nature of course elicits the joint spiration of the Holy Spirit.

Only while reworking these notes did I run across a like application of this dictum to trinitarian life in Pedro Descoqs, S. J., *lnstitutio-nes metaphysicae generalis* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1925), I, p. 411: ". , , in the Trinity- God communicates himself in the most complete, the most intimate fashion and realizes in the highest degree that perfection of the rarest essence that consists in giving itself to itself: *diffiisivum sui."* However, while emphasizing that the divine love of friendship is absolutely disinterested and totally devoid of egoism (pp. 402-04), Descoqs does not find in the total self-giving of the holy three the divine super-equivalent of crucified love.

••A word or two may be in order concerning expressions that at first blush may look ambiguous or slipshod. (i) If, departing from some contemporaries, we demur at apotheosizing freedom, we cannot be expected to fret over the fact that God, as necessarily centered on his divine goodness, is not free not to be God. (ii) In speaking of law as a necessary pattern of operation within the Godhead, we are of course not using law in its strict Thomistic sense (God cannot prescribe a rule for himself; eternal law applies to the universe; I-II, 93, 1) but with contemporary import, according to which law signifies a uniform pattern of activity in a thing or events. (iii) Our afl'ectivity-laden language is only apparently at loggerheads with the Thomistic theory that the Word proceeds by way of knowledge and the Spirit by way of love. The outstreaming of the :Father's originative life that is the generation of the Son is more than just knowing;

God in his triune life is not, as Whitehead's grating and careless (though not necessarily incorrect) phrase would have it, "the ultimate irrationality." [41] Rather, he is, in a less catchy but more appropriate description, the ultimate rationality or self-sufficient reason for all things, expecially for his rational creatures. His law of life is meant to serve in a participated way as the law of human living. With the light it affords, suffering and foulness in evil may begin to take on some wider and deeper "rationality" or intelligibility. One reading of the verses immediately following the above-quoted line from Matthew promises strongly persuasive, perhaps coercive, support for the claim that out of his ineffably intimate communion with the Father Jesus came to bear witness to this inwardly divine truth, to reveal the great law of trinitarian life as the paradigm for perfected human existence. (Unfortunately, in spite of the fact that they follow fast on the heels of verse 27, verses 28-30 are ordinarily not glossed as the specific sequel to verse 27, i.e., as spelling out unmistakably what Jesus came precisely to reveal about the inner life of God.) lmbedded in these three verses, unquestionably among the most alluring and consoling of New Testament passages, is the secret of human victory over suffering. " Come to me, all of you who labor and are heavy-laden, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon you and learn from me: for I am gentle and lowly in heart, and you will find rest for your souls. For my yoke is easy and my burden light." [42] When we acknowledge Christ as the suffering servant, we penetrate to the bosom of the Father, we learn the Father's inner meaning by existentially learning the meekness and lowliness of the Son. Jesus borne to the ultimate point of

it is a loving-knowing. Though secondary, love is unmistakably present. The Father knows the Son (and the Son the Father) with the most intimate, most love-suffused sort of knowledge.

"Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York: Macmillan 1925), p. 257: " God is the ultimate limitation and his existence the ultimate irrationality." Yet a few lines later less cumbersome language makes the point without straining for effect: "No reason can be given for the nature of God, because that nature is the ground of rationality."

••Matthew 11:28-80.

self-sacrifice mirrors the triune self-giving that originates in the Father. The self-diffusiveness of God in God is absolutely necessary, for without the self-donation of the Father to the Son in the Holy Spirit there would be simply no God. The participated law of life of self-giving, however, is only relatively necessary. If this fallen world was to be justly redeemed, it was necessary that the Son of Man suffer and so enter into glory; and therefore every man must suffer as Jesus did so as to share in his exaltation. At the center of the humble obedience whereby Jesus subjected himself to death on a cross was a self-surrender in union with the will of the Father-a will with which is identified the self-giving that, we saw, is the law of divine life. Schooling in the selflessness of the Father consists in embracing the cross. Out of the self-giving of the holy three well peace and joy, and out of the self-giving exhibited in bearing an " easy " cruciform yoke stream an analogically like serenity and rejoicing.

To some this may sound suspiciously like a thinly disguised effort to pass off a slight reworking of an old and soft spiritual-theological reading of Matthew 11:28-30 as hard theological analysis. Yet familiarity may breed contempt inasmuch as familiarity breeds myopia. Customary acquaintance with persons, things, or texts tends to fuzz perception of striking features below the surface. Our formulation of hopefully fresh analytical probing of this text may limp, but lameness of expression should not entirely deter one from noticing that, apart from its usual spiritual-theological resonances, this text compactly records the intimate association of God *ad intra* with suffering. Though wholly other, the God of Christians does not stand off at an infinite distance from and cold as a polar night to the suffering of man. If each divine person could, he would empty himself, he would lay down his life and nothing himself for the other two. In triple self-giving is achieved the divine super-equivalent of consummatory self-sacrifice.

But there is more; or the more in the awesome fact that man is to ascend to a divine estate may be more aptly and forcibly put. *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion* comes to a

close with the profound words: ". . . the universe is a machine for the making of gods." [8] The human universe has been designed and redesigned to equip men to share in and be built into the very divine life of Jesus. In becoming like Christ, men become like God, or, in the bolder yet tradition-ratified phrase, men become gods. St. Augustine sums up the divine program in a rhetorically striking but theologically sober line: " God became man so as to make men gods." [44] God became incarnate in Jesus so that in him everyone could become an incarnate god. Each is intended to become by adoptive appropriation what Jesus is by nature, a son of God. No antecedent theoretical impossibility forbids the Word of God to assume all human natures (but such an assumption brings with it one inconvenience-it would blot out all ontically personal differences among the individual human natures; each one's I, while indicating a distinct individual human nature, would signify the numerically one and the same personal referent) .[45] Yet in fact, only one human nature has been personalized by the Word. This anointed individual mediates participation in his personal Godness. Inscribed in a human spirit, this shared impress of God revolutionizes him, turns him into a new man-new because, despite the prima facie ring of paradox, he is now a god.[46]

••Henri Bergson, *The Two Sources of Moral,ity and ReUgion,* trans. R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Brereton (New York: Holt, 1985), p. 806. Bergson is not theologizing but dialectically or hypothetically philosophizing about what he takes to be indubitable religious data, the encounters with God of Christian mystics. According to Madeleine Barthelmy-Madaule, *Bergson Adversaire de Kant* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966), pp. 19-97, Bergson's venture neither presupposes nor necessarily disposes toward Christian faith. Inasmuch as Bergson confiines himself to a religion within the limits of experience, his exploitation of mystical experience represents an experimental approach to the problem of God. But the insight quoted in our text leaves off probability and becomes a strict truth in a Christian context.

•• *SeNno* l; PL 88, For other texts see the fine textual study of Victorino Capanaga, 0. R. S. A., " La deificaci6n en la soteriologia agustiniana " in *Augustinus Magister* (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1954), II, pp. 745-54.

[43] Ill, 1, 4, *5.*

•• Elsewhere Augustine clarifies his .bold but accurate language about the deification of man by specifying that we are " deified by his [God's] grace, not bom

BD'num est diffusivum sui operates with absolute necessity within the Godhead; the circuminfluent good totally possessed three times over constitutes the necessarily triune God. Communicated to mankind by a relative necessity whose particular reason lies in the divine wisdom, the self-expansive good issues in participated gods. The world of man is then a nonpantheistic theophany. Human life is surcharged with the presence of God, big with a shared Godness, transfigured by the presence of God in gods.

(ii) Any temptation to romanticizing about a swift, painless, and near-automatic ascent to the plane of the divine is deflected by fresh meditation on the law of self-sacrifice in between the lines of the law of the diffusiveness of the good. Man does not simply evolve into a god over a period of time. Nor, contrary to the claims of gnostics and Spinozists, does he start to dwell in realms divine merely by coming to discern by intellectual discipline alone that he is already a god. Man normally rises to full Godly estate only along the path beaten out by the Word made flesh. The imitation of God mediated through the imitation of Christ is the imitation of the cross. The image of the cross carved in the human spirit transforms a man into a perfect image of God. Humiliation works exaltation, suffering flowers out into power and glory. Every yes said to suffering says no to the old self and more and more shapes a man into a living god imaging the living God.[47]

Of itself suffering tends to disfigure rather than to transfigure the self within.[48] When hotly raged against or bitterly defied or

of his substance "; we are gods in virtue of adoptive grace, not in virtue of the generative divine nature; *Enarratfones in Psal,mos,* 49, 2; PL 86, 865. According to St. Thomas, grace deifying man (I-II, 112, 1) is a subjective divinization only in the line of quality (I-II, llO, 2 ad 2). See M.-M. Labourdette, "Consortes divinae naturae" in *Melanges a la memoire de Charles De Koninck* (Quebec: Les Presses de l'Universite Laval, 1968), pp. 199-204.

[47] This seems implied in the great hymn to Jesus the Lord in Philippians 2:5-11. The disciple existentially proclaiming Jesus Lord shares his lordship by personally reenacting, in some measure, the passion.

[48] Thomas Merton, *No 11!fan Is an Island* (New York: Doubleday Image paperback, 1967; first printed in 1955), pp. 70-74.

grimly endured in the Stoic manner, suffering can debase, brutalize, savage, or, at best, toughen the personality. Only by divine redirection can suffering ennoble man. Power that is the exercise of divine wisdom and love turns suffering into a vehicle to humanize and superhumanize man. What is of itself evil can be made to fructify, consistently and over the long haul, in the per se good. The centuries-old dilemma challenging the reality of God through the problem of evil is not to be lightly dismissed. If, the difficulty runs, God is all-powerful when evils flourish, he cannot be all-good--else he would provide for the abolition of evil; but if he is all-good, he cannot be all-powerful-else he would not hesitate to wipe out all evil.[49] The strength of this argument lies in an insight into the inevitable emergence of evil from evil, but its weakness lies in an oversight, neglect of the import of divine transcendence. Hence the conclusion, which effectively denies an infinite God, is a non sequitur. For it is precisely because God is infinite that he all-lovingly and all-powerfully uses evils for, or extracts from them, equivalent or greater goods. The existence of evils transcendently oriented toward per se goods does not contest but attests a God at once all-good and all-powerful.[50]

God's transcendent ordination of evils to goods may be instructively compared to his transcendent direction of chance events to the intrinsic good of the universe and to the transhistorical goal of history. Flukes happen rarely and lie outside the lines of any proper determination. A chance event may be described as the result of, or simply as the point of intersection of, two independent causal lines.[51] To no proper or determinate cause can be traced the occurrence of an incidental or indeterminate event. In the line of nature only an incidental effect can follow upon an incidental cause. But on the level of divine

[49] I, 22, 2, second objection.

[50] I, 22, 2 ad 2.

[51] The description bears on a chance event or chance as an effect. Viewed properly, as a cause, chance may be defined as an incidental cause of things that happen rarely in the line of finality. *In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis e:xpositio,* ed. P. M. Maggiolo, 0. P. (Turin: Marietti, 1954), II, 1. 8, n. 10 and 1. 10, n. 8.

transcendence or the universal cause casual events are made to subserve a per se good, the intrinsic good of the cosmos or the universe.[52] It would seem pedantic, while listening to a homily or common-sense remark, to cavil at statements like "Because divine providence runs everything, there is no such thing as chance." But laid open to rigorous scrutiny, a proposition of this sort seems technically erroneous or, at best, cumbrously ambiguous.[53] Chance events, while subsumed under a higher order of determination according to transcendent wisdom, remain immanent and naturally nonnecessary and indeterminate.[54] Analogously, but perhaps more ingeniously, infinite goodness and power permit evils, which are only incidentally causative of good, to issue in goods per se intended on the plane of transcendence. Just as the death of the zebra helps preserve the life of the lion, so in the more delicate dimension of moral evil the murderous cruelty of tyrants is divinely exploited as an occasion for the heroic patience of martyrs.[55] On the level of immanence the good tree bears only good fruit and the evil tree only evil fruit, but through divine ordination good fruit can be plucked from evil actions. Infinite wisdom weaves destruction due to malice into a dazzling pattern of moral beauty. Still, it would be a mistake similar to a transcendent suppression of chance to speak as if providential ordination of evil to good rubs out the per se distinction between good and evil. Transcendent determination of essential evil to essential good does not cancel the incidental and indeterminate nexus between good and evil on the level of immanence. Good as such cannot flow from evil as such; only incidentally at times does evil spin off from good on the plane of immanence.

••I, 49, :l.

••In *Prevoir et savoir* (Montreal: Edition de l'Arbre, 1944), pp. 82 ff., Yves Simon rejects as unsatisfactory Bossuet's reduction of chance to a mere formula to paper over our ignorance. Chance, Simon astutely observes, remains ineliminable at the level of immanence. "Indeed only at the level of the First Cause, at the level of the divine decree that *organizes chance* in a design whose ways are unsearchable, is the plurality of causes ultimately unified."

••I, 22, 2 ad I; 108, 7 ad 2; 116, 1 ad !l; *CG,* 8, 74.

•• I, :l2, 2 ad 2. I, 48, 2 ad 8.

The tendency to absorb the immanent within the transcendent is conspicuously reversed among some religious and philosophical rationalists who collapse into immanence what belongs to transcendent finalization. One perceptive contemporary, straining to bar all doors against all possible intrusions of empiricism, casts a causal net so wide that there are no events past or present which are not causally related. The shooting of a gun in Yorkshire and the writing of a poem in Bloomsbury are causally linked because the ancestors of both sportsman and poet crossed the English Channel with William the Conqueror. All events in nature and the human world are knotted together by direct or indirect causal interconnection. [56] A world void of incidental factors and stripped bare of chance, however, is a natural world from which nature has been evacuated, [57] a world in one way not less but more irrational than one with acausal events. The devouring of the indeterminate by the determinate spawns a freakish pseudo-causal network. Thus a Philadelphia congressman is advocating a new energy policy in Washington, D. C., because it is raining in Seattle; and these are happening because Carla, a German shepherd, has just delivered a litter of nine puppies, from which two art; to be culled; because the congressman's niece is repainting her apartment; and so on and on and on. What happens to happen, whatever occurs with collateral contemporaneity, whatever is just factually conjoined but causally disjoined-all these incidentals are now oddly invested with a hard-and-fast necessary connection through an indiscriminate use of the term "because" that comes to connote absurdity. [57"]

Perhaps worse than a super-rationalized nature breeding irrationals without end is a necessitarian scheme that conjures

[56] Blanshard, *op. cit.*, pp. 472-78. Though this impressive work devastates recent brands of positivism and linguistic analysis that have gained a stranglehold on large sectors of English-speaking philosophy, its epistemologically oriented idealism unfortunately lacks a sound philosophy of nature.

[57] *CG*, 8, 72.

[57"] Charles De. Koninck acutely discusses necessity and contingency in (Reflexions sur le probleme de l'indeterminisme," *Revue Thomiste*, 48 (1987), pp. 227-52.

away moral evil, as is the case in Spinoza's monism. In his geometrized fusion of God and nature all features of the universe emanate from God as inevitably as properties spring from the nature of a triangle. In a first stage lumping moral with physical evil and extruding free choice as illusory, murderers are no more blameworthy than poisonous snakes or ill-tempered dogs-their individual essences are aberrant. In a second stage, on the heights of intuitive knowledge, the mind no longer fettered by sense-laden and passion-twisted judgments sees all evil as mere lower-order appearance. From the vantage point of eternity, at the apex named the intellectual love of God, the mind healed of delusions grasps the entire universe as exceptionlessly ordered and wholly beautiful. In the unbroken sunlight of divine understanding of all things in their causes, flaws evaporate, and every bit of experience falls into place as part of the stupendous concert of nature one with the matchless divine substance.[58] The apparently uncompromising scientific rigor and masterly simplicity of this vision have charmed and disarmed some ordinarily hard-headed naturalists,[59] but for all its lure, the Spinozistic outlook betrays, at bottom, an ugly justification of evil. Behind the austere mathematical visage of Spinoza's God lie the mind and heart of a fiend. Out of his nature flows all evil; with cold calculatio_nhe directly causes not only disease but all the vile hatred of man for man.[60] More-

[58] Benedict de Spinoza, *Ethics,* trans. W. Hale 'Vhite, revised by Amelia Hutchison Stirling (London: Oxford University Press, 1980), I, 17, Scholium, pp. 20-U; I, Appendix, pp. 48-46; IV, Preface p. 179; IV, 64, Corollary, p. 238; V, 25, 27, 28, pp. 270-72. A. Wolf, *Spinoza's Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1968; first printed in 1910), I, 10, pp. 59-60. *Metaphysica Cogitata,* I, 8, in Benedict de Spino%:< *Opera quae supersunt omnia,* ed. Charles H. Bruder (Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 184<l), p. 182.

[59] John H. Randall, *The Career of Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), I, pp. 449-50, rhapsodizing over the fruits of Spinoza's determinism, incongruously hails its "causal knowledge" as the ground of freedom to "do whatsoever things are best." Determinism is theoretically unthinkable and practically unlivable; only academics dialectically clever in word-play can cherish the illusion that human choices can be free because they are rigidly determined.

[60] In *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum,* V (quoted in Journet, *up. cit.,* p. 78, n. 85) Augustine writes: "I have not gone mad nor do I say: God creates evil." A God that apes the devil seems morally insane.

over, Spinozist beatitude is not liberation from all illusions but is itself a new, suffocating illusion of the academic mind that can support only a bogus serenity. Spinoza's single-mindedness locks him" in the well-lit prison of one idea." [61] Thinking away all of moral evil and its horrors as mere illusions theoretically banishes and practically surmounts evil no more than tearing out one's eyes does away with the fact that lying battered and bloodied at our feet is the corpse of our murdered mother. The final satisfaction of Spinoza's intellectual love of God is a pseudo-peace because it is grounded in a pseudo-eternity. The *sub specie aeternitatis* of Spinoza is really a *sub specie immobilitatis rnathematicae.* What passes for the eternity of God is simply the timelessness of mathematical forms.[62] Spinoza's God is, in truth, an idealized mathematician engrossed in the contemplation of a mathematical order cognitively detached from the bite of material existents, the corruption due to matter, and the malice erupting from the human heart. But retreat to a redoubt of mathematicized determinism cannot go on forever. Formal abstraction from tension and the dynamic toward the good is an abstraction, not an existential separation- [63] the physical world remains one of movement and final causes, one of conflict, breakdown, and, among men, wickedness. A mathematically rationalized annihilation of suffering and sin is a moral irrationalism. Deducing the total unreality of evil leaves intact brute moral data that cannot not continue to rend the minds and hearts of the most dedicated Spinozists.[64]

[81] This telling phrase occurs in one of G. K. Chesterton's better-known works, but I have not been able to pinpoint the precise place.

[82] Whereas for Aquinas (I, 16, 7 ad 2) universals betokening truths, while timeless and everywhere the same, are eternal only as resident in a transcendent mind, for Spinoza the mind of God is eternal after the model of an immanent mathematicizing intellect.

[88] The dictum, " The good does not exist in mathematicals," is verified in mathematicals that, in abstracting from motion, lack the *ratio* of an end (though the good from the angle of being does belong to mathematicals); *In Metaphysicorum Aristotelis commentaria,* ed. M. P. Cathala, O. P. (Turin: Marietti, 1925), Ill, 1. 4, n. 885; I, 5, 8 ad 4.

•• As the title indicates, Errol Harris in *Salvation from Despair: A Reappraisal of Spinoza's Philosophy* (Nijhoff: The Hague, 1978) discovers in Spinoza revisited

Immanental extrusion of chance and evil not only robs existence of its poignancy but strips nature and human nature of all meaning. The removal of chance, we saw, denaturalizes nature. The erasure of moral evil turns the human drama into a tale without pungency, almost without point, that, from one angle, resembles a farce. History without tragedy is a derealized story, a fantasy of nursery-school mentality. Absolutely speaking, in the line of nature and human action, chance and moral evil do indeed exist as massive and, in part, fearsome facts. But relative to God, on the level of transcendence, they are ordered to the determinate and the per se good. No metaphysical legerdermain, no deductionistic waving of the dialectical wand, can make moral evil vanish. In itself it stays intractably evil, but infinite wisdom, we saw, extrinsically ordains it to the production of per se good. The death of God in Jesus, we remarked also, was the most execrable act in the history of the world. Yet out of this most abominable of horrors sprang the best of goods-the redemption and divinization of the human race. Of itself the crucifixion was unspeakably evil, yet English-speaking people can nonparadoxically designate this darkest of days Good Friday because the love of the Father operative in Jesus directed, on the level of transcendence, his death to the sovereign supernatural good of mankind. Similarly, all the evils plaguing the human spirit can be finalistically turned into a source of greater goods.[65] All the efficiency-killings like those at Auschwitz and in the antiseptic abortion mills, all the crookedness, all the towering malignancy of human existence-all these indelible blotches on human history in themselves defy systemization. They remain

a salvific message for minds tortured by the prospective nightmares of ecological disasters and a nuclear holocaust. His rereading wisely but nonSpinozistically interprets Spinoza's determinism out of existence. Purportedly Spinozistic in inspiration, his kerygma is a nonSpinozistic rationalism promising beatitude through the " measured cadence of the confident yet sober march of triumphant reason " (p. :'l58).

[65] III, l, 8 ad 8. "God permits evils to occur so that he may then draw forth something better. Hence Romans 4:20 says: '"Where sin abounded, grace abounded all the more '."

moral irrationals, without analytical rhyme or reason, yielding no definable *raison d'etre,* disclosing no specifiable theoretical and practical intelligibility. Of itself a world in which much moral imbalance is never redressed does not, at bottom, make sense. The sufficient reason of moral evil and its fruits is not of this world; it is not" subjectified" in human history.[66] Evil becomes understandable only in the light of the cross symbolizing the infinitely transfiguring power of divine wisdom and love. The way of the cross, exemplified in patience under hammer-blows and pinstabs clue to moral evil, is, we saw, the route to upbuilding in Godness. But on this side the greater number of the details of this divine conquest of evil slip through our fingers. Only on the day of the Lord, the transhistorical moment crowning history, will there flash before our eyes the whole drama, the unimaginably complex pattern first unfolded on the day of creation, in which in a trillion-times-a-trillionfold manner contingencies subserve determinate ends and moral evils fructify in per se goods.[67]

(iii) But it takes more than the dry light of the intellect, however valuable, to enter fully into Godness. Besides concatenated discourse there are other avenues, extra-analytical but broadly rational, for examining more searchingly the problem of God vis-a-vis suffering. Surely one of the most precious of these is prayer.[68] To recommend prayer is of course not to disrecommend hard thinking. Prayer serving as an additional channel of light is neither escape from nor substitute for strenuous ratiocination. If it is naive to hold that praying can do double duty as philosophizing, it seems pseudo-sophisticated to hold that philosophy practically dispenses with need for prayer. Here we can only touch on a single point: as communion with God, prayer experientially dilates mind and heart to fuller reception of the loving plan that mysteriously permits evil.

••Charles De Koninck, "The Nature of Man and His Historical Being," *Laval theologique et philosophique,* 4 (n.2, 1949), p. 274.

[67] *Supplementum,* 88, 1e and 2 ad 2.

[68] In our sketchy account prayer epitomizes, i.e., implies rather than excludes, all the constituents of the historic Christian cultus, notably sacrifice and sacraments, that mediate union with God.

For Bergson Christian mystics are the highest flowering of human life in union with the creative currents of divine life. Apparently acentric, they represent the central vocation of man lived to its fullest in dynamic religion. Drinking continually from the fountain of divine life, they become stupendous co-workers with God in molding the spiritual universe.[69] In them fire that spurts out like rockets from divine creativity burns afresh with the most brilliant intensity. Many succeed in accomplishing what is vocationally next-to-impossible, the simultaneous enjoyment of completely contemplative and active lives. A Catherine of Siena and a Teresa of Avila were nearly wholly absorbed in the divine, and through union with the Wisdom that is Love authored masterpieces of spiritual literature. Yet both consumed themselves in revitalizing institutions of the Church and indirectly in helping to remake the society of their day.[70] According to the pragmatic (not pragmatistic) text of Matthew 7: 16, "By their fruits you shall know them" (dialectically applied here by Bergson) , the irrefutable witness of their lives certifies the soundness and fundamental truth of mystics' claims to be in intimate commerce with God. No victims of self-hallucination could produce mystical literature of their sinew or shrewdly succeed in demanding practical pursuits. No moral charlatans could embody the day-in-and-day-out purely spiritual single-mindedness and selflessness observed by clear-sighted companions. In line with the problem of wrestling with evil, we may add, mystics are generally gifted with tremendous capacity for suffering and a facility for exuding a fragrant peace amid the storms and shocks of living. Whatever theory of spirituality we favor, we have to bow to

•• Bergson, *op. cit.*, pp. 221, 243.

[70] *Ibid.*, pp. 216-17. Within a strictly Christian framework we can accord Bergson's conclusion only qualified approval. In *To Deny Our Nothingness* (New York: Dell, 1967), pp. 70-71, Maurice "Friedman perceptively catches two discrepancies between Bergson's concept and the Christian image of a man. In addition to overrating the sheerly pragmatic effects of mysticism, Bergson tends to subordinate the traditional meanings of God and Christian love to creative energy.

the fact that some individuals seem to be souls of predilection, religious geniuses of a sort, dwelling in skyey realms of the spirit. Few can scale the heights of mysticism, yet all can aspire to walk the less elevated path of prayer that without mystical marriage and inward thaumaturgy lead to fruits essentially the same as, but of a lower degree than, those mystics achieve. Through prayer mind and heart become more and more existentially assimilated to the mind and heart of God, with the result that an individual acts as co-creator with divine love stamped with wisdom and expressing itself in power. Prayer frees the mind to see the hand of God not only in a blood-red sunset and snow-capped mountains but also in disease and pain and man's inhumanity to man.[71] Philosophy and theology prove God personal but in prayer we come to know him personally and converse with him in a I-Thou encounter. Addressing God familiarly, loving him as his truest friend, the individual who prays is enabled to judge evil with a modicum of God's wisdom and to accept lovingly ravages of a cancer and brutal blows of enemies (and, at times, friends) as Fatherly discipline toward purification and humility.

(iv) The rationalist outlook itself, is not disenthralled from illusions, and one of the most seductive and longlived is the doughty conviction that knowledge can usher in felicity in abundance. Perhaps the paradigmatic case of philosophy assuming the prerogatives and aims of religion is found in Spinoza's cognitive blueprint for blessedness. Drop the monism and mathematicism; benignly neglect the crude contradiction in a rigid determinism coupled with exhortations to throw off bonds of passion; skip the counter-realistic suppression of evil; and what remains is an initially attractive program for salvation by reason alone, an ideal not uncongenial to some contemporaries. Individual troubles bedevil us and social woes swamp us because, we are told, we shrink from fearlessly constructing the bigger concepts required to solve or avert our

[71] Evelyn Underhill, *Practical Mysticism* (New York: Dutton, 1948; first published in 1915), pp. 168-68.

problems. Meredith's prayerful lines (with perhaps the reference to the Lord deleted or designated mythical) encapsulate rationalist hopes:

> More brain, 0 Lord, more brain! or we shall mar
> Utterly this fair garden we might win.[72]

More brain, more unveiling of the secrets of nature, a surer grasp of the whole sweep of cosmic causation-in this lies the promise of a new Garden of Eden. But the moral barbarity of this scientifically brainiest of centuries belies the easy equation of maximized cognition with salvation. Theoretical knowledge is a *bonum honestum,* an intrinsic good, but not a *bonum per se,* a moral good; it can be used for evil ends.[73] Theoretical knowledge, even the truly metaphysical, exercises small influences on the regimen of appetities making for moral virtue. Thus farflung understanding of the reasons for and the implications of evil and suffering does not empower the human spirit to surmount them. At best a rationalist sage can dispassionately withdraw from evil and suffering by a lonely retreat to a quasi-metaphysical eyrie.

[72] Quoted in Jacques Barzun, *Of Human Freedom* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1939), p. 275. The source, uncited by Barzun, is sonnet XLVIII of poems of "Modern Love" in George Meredith, *Poems:,* I (New York: Scribner, 1910), p. 278. We are using these lines (which in Meredith's context bear on the need for practical wisdom in husband-and-wife exchanges) in Barzun's accommodated sense, with its commitment to pragmatistic meliorism.

[73] Because sought for its own sake, every intellectual good, whether theoretical or practical, is a *bonum hones:tum* (I, 5, 6c and ad 2). But a mathematician and a physicist are only relatively good, i.e., as regards the perfection of the speculative intellect, for their knowledge can be turned to evil purposes. Only the man of good will, whose actions are governed by prudence in line with right desire, is absolutely good. Thus only the good of moral virtue is *bonum per se* or an absolute good; I, 5, 1 ad I; *De virtutibus: in communi* (Turin: Marietti, 1927), 7 ad 2. Even practical knowledge limited to the mode of the knowable (such as moral philosophy), i.e., detached from the mode of inclination, cannot necessarily guarantee a *bonum per se* through good action. On this last point see Charles De Koninck, " The Moral Responsibilities of the Scientist," *Laval theologique et philosophique,* 6 (n.2, 1950), pp. 353-54. For a penetrating, wide-ranging critique of the modem lumping of the *bonum honestum* with the *bonum per se,* described as an identification of freedom and virtue, see Reinhold Niebuhr, *Faith and History* (New York: Scribner, 1949), pp. 70-101,

It is prayer that brings with it the existential knowledge and love required to face rather than fly from evil and suffering and to triumph interiorly over them. In the line of knowledge, according to Aristotle, the human soul can become all things.[74] This cognitive infinite potentiality is surpassed by the gift of God that "infinitizes" man, i.e., endows him with a share in the very life of infinite spirit. Insofar as *he* is graced, insofar as *he* participates in the divine nature, an individual may be said subjectively to become God. But God does not become this individual. In virtue of grace God dwells supernaturally in a soul, where he is present not subjectively but objectively (otherwise God or the soul would forfeit personal identity).[75] In the famous phrase, God is present in the soul "as the known in the knower and the thing loved in the lover."[76] The knower becomes the other as other; the graced soul cognitively becomes God in his Godness, albeit in a dark manner. This knowledge is achieved not in the line of doctrine and discourse but in the affective and intuitive mode. In virtue of the gift of wisdom, so salient in the holy, the mind is connaturally assimilated to God, sympathetically uttering his presence. Because wisdom is rooted in and transfused by charity, the more God is loved, the more he is affectively known, concretely grasped in a loving embrace. In the spiritually mature, discourse effectively drops away, and the mind intuitively gazes upon the truth that God is charity.[77] In a certain sense the will also becomes the good it desires but after the fashion of an outgoing likeness. As a part, each man is naturally and completely ordered to God as a whole. Charity supernaturally explicitates this deepest direc-

a *In Aristotelis librum De anima commentarium* (Turin: Marietti, 1925), ed. Angelo M. Pirotta, O.P., III, 1. 13, nn. 788-90.

75 In "Uncreated Grace-A Critique of Karl Rahner," *The Thomist*, 27 (April-May-October, 1963), pp. 333-56, William Hill, O.P., cautions against dangers implicit in Rahner's endeavor to go beyond an efficiently caused immanence to a formal-causal presence of God in the just.

10 I, 43, S.

77 II-II, 45, 2. *Super Epistolas sancti Pauli lectura*, ed. Raphael Cai, O.P. (Rome; Marietti, 1953), II, *Ad Ephesios*, c. 8, 1. 5, n. 181 (henceforth referred to as Cai). II-II, 180, 6 ad 2.

tiveness. Deiformed and thus transformed into a true friend of God through love poured forth by the Holy Spirit, the will lovingly surrenders itself to God. Now through charity it lives the life of God, for it lives by and for the God who is the life of the soul. Stamped with the likeness of the holy three, the soul participatively images their activity. Living by the originative life of the Father, the soul expresses a word spirating or bursting forth in love. The will remains extraverted, weighted toward more of the all-good, striving to become in appetite wholly love in act and term, a fruition of possession possible only on the other side.[78] More intense prayer causes a deeper penetration of the super-essential life of God. As the intellect embraces God the more, as aspiration is drawn the more into him, the life of God occupies more and more of inner psychic space. The divine super-world-outlook becomes the *Weltanschauung* of the person: God's thoughts become his thoughts. Divine love inflames him with *agape;* God's ways become his ways.[79] *Bonum est diffusivum sui,* the necessary principle of trinitarian life, expands its hegemony over his thoughts and desires. In prayer the soul is more and more quickened with the existential-one might say, the super-existential-or divine understanding that the self-giving of the trinity is analogically mirrored in the crucifixion of Jesus; that the self-giving making suffering fruitful streams from and images the law inscribed in ;divine life; that every man yearning for full stature has the law

[78] *De veritate,* 24, 10 ad 2. I-II, 109, 8. *Expositio super Dionysium, De divinis nom.inibus,* c, 4, l. 10 in *Opuscul,a omnia,* ed. Pierre Mandonnet (Paris: Lethielleux, 1927), II. II-II, 28, 1. Cai, *Ad I Corinthios,* c. IS, l. 1, n. 76. II-II, 25, 7. I, 48. 5 ad 2. I-II, 26, 1, 2. For a thoughtful textual presentation of love see Joseph LeGrand, S. J., *L'Univers et l'homme dans la philosophie de saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Brussels: Desclee de Brouwer, 1946), I, pp. 81-99. See T. C. O'Brien's excellent comments on love and trinitarian presence in Appendix 2, " The Holy Spirit: Love," and Appendix 8, "Mystery for Salvation," in volume 7 of the New English Summa, *Father, Son and Holy Ghost* (I, 88-48), trans. with notes and appendices by T. C. O'Brien (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975), pp. 252-58 and 259•65.

••Isaiah 55: 8: " For my thoughts are not your thoughts nor are your ways my ways, says the Lord." But in the new dispensation the Father shares His transcendent thoughts and ways with men through the gift of the Spirit of Jesus the mediator.

of self-giving written in himself by undergoing suffering; that the problem of suffering is solved, beyond analysis, by suf-*fering-solvitur patiend-0.* Through wisdom one with love the soul is enfolded in peace. The bitterness usually concomitant with the yoke of suffering is changed into sweetness, the labor of daily cross-carrying into rest.[80]

In an autobiographical passage on the effort crucial to initial freedom William James writes:

> The large world that girdles us about puts all sorts of questions to us, and tests us in all sorts of ways. . . . But the deepest question that is ever asked admits of no reply but the dumb turning of the will and the tightening of our heart-strings as we say, " *Yes, I will even have it* so!" ... And hereby we become one of the masters and lords of life.[81]

An inward *fiat* creates the light and life of each inner world. Counteracting the downward drag of the passions and trampling under scores of past failures, the soul fired by fresh courage itakes itself in hand and utters the yes that launches it toward higher realms. But only through prayer does this yes rarely falter and steadily wax more vibrant. Growth is stepwise, and it violates experience to reckon upon other than daily passional recalcitrance and therewith travail, to be met by daily renewed affirmation. Fortified by union with the everlasting yes that is God tripersonally knowing and loving himself, the yes of love-infused wisdom can continually override nay-saying appetites and the noes of evil and suffering. In prayerfully affirming the holy three imaged in the crucified Lord of life, the mind and will (whether of naturally feeble or rugged determination) can, without romanticism or arrogance, aim to be-

[80] 11-11, 45, 8 ad 8. The allusive paraphrasing of Matthew 11: 28-80 is unmistakable (see n. 42 above and related material in our text). *Solvitur patiendo* comes from James Brodrick, S. J., "Father William Doyle, S. J.," in *Tke lriak Way,* ed. F. J. Sheed (New York: Kenedy, 1982), p. 826. ,

[81] William James, *Tke Principles of Psyckology* (New York: Holt, 1890), II, p 578. According to Rollo May, *Love and Will* (New York: Dell, 1974; first published in 1969), p. 269, this passage reflects the willed act of freedom whereby a younger James unshackled himself from an inertia due to depression.

come a master and lord of life by electing to be a humble servant and obedient subject to the God who is subsistent charity. [82]

Self-giving and the yes articulating it, while witnessing to awesome super-being, super-wisdom and super-love, also evoke the charming, the endearing, the intimate. By not too forced a figure, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, we may say, are wedded to one another. Each is wholly espoused to the others; each endlessly utters a yes that is the divine super-equivalent of the yes of nuptial love. The soul saying yes to God in prayer is gradually more espoused to the holy three as they are espoused to one another. Man giving himself in suffering overpasses man; he becomes, adoptively, son of God; his strong yes to suffering is an amorous yes of espousal to the sweet call of the infinitely espoused holy three. [88]

To summarize briefly and conclude. The problem of evil and suffering confronts the mind at the outset of a metaphysics of God. Prior to the compact demonstrations named the five ways, an initial predicament seems to pose an insuperable obstacle to the real possibility of the being all men call God: if an infinitely good being existed, no evil nor its concomitant, suffering, would be despoiling the world. [84] Whitehead and other proponents of a finite God, conceding the point as irrefutable, opt for a God concreted with and involved in the universe, co-suffering and creatively growing along with the creatures he persuasively guides. Unhappily, this appealingly appareled

[82] Cai, *Ad Philippenses,* c. 2, l. 2, nn. 63-66. *Ad Ephesios,* c. I, l. 7, n. *56.*

[82] According to *In libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum expositio,* ed. Angelo Pirotta, O.P. (Turin: Marietti, 1934), VIII, l. 6, nn. 1609-11; IX. l. 3, n. 1794 and l. 14, nn. 1946-48, most men can enjoy virtuous friendship with only a small number, for this requires common life with another or others over a long period; many times it seems best realized in the graced union of Christian husband and wife. The utmost intimacy in the perfect love eternally uniting the persons of the trinity would seem to lend warrant to a figurative espousal among the holy three. The analogical notion of the espousal of God or the Word to the soul has been employed by many spiritual wTiters and notably developed among others by St. Bernard and St. John of the Cross.

[8,] I, 2, 8, obj. 1.

position is infected with fatal flaws. A God only part of the universe seems only a God by courtesy, for he is not the ultimate explanation of things but one more thing to be explained. A nontranscendent God is less than omnipresent and therefore less perceptive of the needs of creatures. Divine love deprived of infinite power is hamstrung and its ambit of persuasiveness drastically constricted. Infinite good and finite evil are not incompatible. Indeed because God is infinitely good, evil is permitted. God does not cause evil and suffering but causes the evils permitted to effloresce into goods. A God that can produce being out of nothing can be counted on to produce moral good out of the "nothing" of evil.[85] Out of the most revolting of events, the tragedy of the cross, God drew the greatest good, human redemption and elevation to Godliness. The self-immolating love of the crucified Jesus analogically imitates the incessant giving of one person to the other persons that constitutes the inner life of the trinity. The self-giving of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit to one another eminently and maximally realizes what is only imperfectly achieved in laying down one's life for one's friend. The nonsuffering God whose self-giving is reflected in the sacrificial love of the crucifix is the model for understanding and triumphing over suffering: the self-crucifixion entailed in suffering is the price the finite spirit must pay to live as a god by participation. Thus the answer to the mystery of suffering is not the paradox of a God-in-the-making but the revelation of gods-in-the-making. The key lies in the infinitely loving power of a non.temporal God to share his own life for the formation of temporalized gods. In giving himself, God gives a share in his self-giving, which, while immune to suffering, stands as the paradigm for all self-donation in pain that overcomes evil and suffering. Through prayer a divinized individual gradually mounts to a purer and more piercing affec-

[85] Moral evil is of course strictly privative but every evil action springs from a voluntary yet nonevil nonadvertence of the will to right reason. Commenting on I, 49, 1 ad 8, 1-Il, 75, 1 ad 8, *CG, 5.* 10, and *De malo,* 1, 88, Maritain shrewdly illuminates this point in *op. cit.,* pp. H-86: "... a mere nothingness ... is the root proper of evil action" (p. 81).

tive knowledge of divine wisdom's direction of suffering. This rdivine light irradiates from the lives and writings of those dowered with choicest gifts of mystical prayer. Soaked in divine life, certain mystics have hungered and thirsted for suffering as for the most delicious bread and supersensible wine. Yet even loyal Christians plodding a more pedestrian path grasp to a notable degree existential truth about suffering: it is purposed to make men more Godlike, and the more Godlike men grow through wisdom and love in prayer, the more meaning suffering takes on. In manfully presenting their backs to burdens, in unpretentiously " offering it up " as they drink deep from the bittersweet chalice, these little ones in their obscurity are attesting that suffering is illumined and vanquished not by the de-deifying of God but by the divinizing of man by gift: the aim of a universe made by an infinite God is the making of finite gods.

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A NEW APPROACH TO GOD'S EXISTENCE

IN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHY and theology the old hegemony of Scholastic thought has crumbled. New categories, biblical, scientific, and existential, have been introduced. Now, instead of academic disputes within a scholastic framework about the real distinction, the meaning of *esse,* etc., the problem of fundamental communication hits us full in the face. " Your categories are not mine; how, therefore, do we agree upon a method of research? " Everywhere one finds the methodological question and intellectual pluralism. Once various view-points have been admitted as legitimate, however, the question of truth is unavoidable. To reply that the Hebrew notion of historical fidelity to God or to people does not coincide with the Greek notion of timeless, abstract truths does not resolve the tension but sharpens it for a Christian thinker. K. Rahner rightly attacked H. Kting's *Infallible?* not so much for questioning papal infallibility as for denying man the possibility of validly affirming speculative truths that transcend the temporal conditions of the knower.[1] Amidst the welter of theologies and philosophies, how does one avoid relativism? How can one justify a permanent commitment to Christ that can be rationally defended and not judged merely a psychological aberration of equal or less value than other personal quirks?

This paper intends to offer an exit from the relativistic conundrum bedeviling modern thought. We do not start with a definition of truth and deduce everything from there. The limitation of such a narrow, Procrustean bed is too obvious. To overcome relativism one must find an Absolute. The only true Absolute in human experience is God. Hence our starting point

[1] K. Rahner, S. J., "Kritik an Hans Kung," *Stimmen der Zeit* 186 (1970), 368-376.

must involve an affirmation of God's existence. Not that the Absolute is known directly in this life; rather He is known mediately in and through an experience that may be qualified as absolute. We intend to offer: 1) a phenomenological description of the moral experience, 2) a proof of God's existence and the continuance of the human person after death, 3) a critique of the proof offered, 4) a reflection on the basic philosophic problem, 5) a redemption of the proof offered, and 6) an indication of some of the dilemmas of thought which the new approach resolves.

PART I: PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION

To avoid the charge of Christian bias, our phenomenological description employs mainly examples of moral behavior elaborated in classical antiquity. Both Achilles and Socrates have haunted Western consciousness from the beginnings of our civilization. The angry son of Thetis rebelliously overturned the heroic code by refusing the huge bribe of Agamemnon communicated by Odysseus. He softened only to the pleas of other members of the embassy for friendship's sake, Patroclus's tears brought a further relentment from ire; finally, the death of this dear friend drove him to commitment, the revenge demanded by justice, knowing full well that his own death followed Hector's. Socrates explicitly imitated Achilles's example, preferring death to betraying the task of philosophizing assigned by the god.[2] In such classical examples four essential characteristics of the moral imperative may be discerned.

1. The moral imperative is *absolute.* Both Achilles and Socrates knew that they should do what they did. This " shouldness " is basic to morality. It is unique, elevating the moral experience above all other value experiences. Possible penchants for ease, quiet, beauty, glory, and science must yield to it. Even family affections may be severed by its demands. No other value gives rise to such heart-rending qualms or exuberant

•Plato, *Apology* 28 b-d.

ecstasy: *Fiat justitia, pereat mundus.* Ultimately grounding this primacy in the hierarchy of values is the absoluteness felt in its demands. One must be ready to die in heeding its voice. That is the first meaning of Achilles and Socrates for us: faithfulness even unto death. They illustrate the limits to which the demand can go. In bidding man to die the moral imperative reveals itself as absolute. It is the ultimate Reality, Being, before which finite being apparently becomes non-being; it is the total fullness into which everything is subsumed. All of finite reality apparently expanding infinity before the individual-the past which constituted him, the present which sustains him and of which he is conscious, and the enticing future of unrestricted possibilities-does not weight in the balance against the absolute demand. As such the moral imperative cannot be equated with any finite experience. For any object which is sensibly or conceptually perceived by a man is thereby limited by him. Once something is recognized as limited, this recognition has already relativized its claims.

The same conclusion may be approached from another point of view. If the distinction between good and evil were not absolute, the very meaning of good and evil as "that which should be done (and avoided)" would be destroyed. Their linguistic significance would have to be judged in terms of some other value. This second normative value could also be relativized, and no compelling reason might be found to move the intelligent man to action. For every conceptual argument can be distinguished. Either the validity of the abstraction taken from a limited sampling or its application to the concrete instance might be questioned.[3] All rules of conduct might be reduced to avoiding pain and seeking pleasure (self-fulfillment), and reason would become merely a tool for exploiting life. The unconscious would rule and death would dissolve in contradiction the natural struggle of the finite subject to perpetuate

[8] Even such a determined defender of the validity of concepts as J. Maritain admitted the difficulty of adequately abstracting a nature from its material instances. J. Maritain, *The Degrees of Knowledge,* trans. G. Phelan et alii, 4th French ed. (New York: Scribner's, 1959), pp. 8-0-S!l?, llO, 176, 205-!l?09,

and absolutize himself. All would be reduced to the equality of the unconscious.[4] The implicit insufficiency of pure, finite reason leads to the next characteristic of the moral imperative.

2. The moral imperative is *supra-rational.* Not only does the moral C}..rperiencefail to find its sufficient ground in sensible experience, but also it lacks a purely rational grounding. What reasons might be advanced to persuade one person to die on behalf of another? This question was brought into sharp focus through the simple plot of Euripides's *Alcestis.* The days of Admetus, king of Pherae, though relatively few, were at an end. The Fates had announced his death. Fortunately for him, however, Apollo in return for a past favor managed to make the Fates drunk and so persuaded them to accept a substitute. At first things seemed easy. Admetus could offer anything at his disposal to the volunteer. He was quickly disillusioned. What were riches to a beggar when dead? What was the use of honor and power if death was to follow immediately? His :friends could not be persuaded; even his aged parents could not be budged. However old they might be, a few more hours in the sun were preferable to nothing at all. Men prefer known evils to the darkness of death. Finally, as despair clouded Admetus's heart, his young wife Alcestis offered herself as a sacrifice for him-and the cad accepted! There is no need to relate how Hercules came to assure the reward of virtue by wrestling with Death and winning back Alcestis. The point has already been made: the moral imperative does not depend upon human reasoning or persuasion for its validity.

The same lesson is to be learned from Achilles. He remained unmoved before the clever tongue of Odysseus. Who could fault the experienced one's cajoleries, supported as they were by Agamemnon's royal munificence? By all the standards of the heroic code Achilles must have accepted. He had attained the humiliation of the king and the recognition of his own pre-

•Cf. H. U. von Balthasar, *Theodramatik I. Prolegomima* (Einsiedeln: Johannes, 1973), pp. 474-499, where the author indicates how Freud, Jung, and Adler con·sistently reduce consciousness and its strivings to the desire for the unconscious.

eminence. Yet his wrath, or-if one prefer-the consciousness of his own personal worth that could not be bought, relativized all previous standards of value. The weakness lay not in Odysseus's lack of talent, but in the inherent constitution of human persuasion. Every word, every concept employed is necessarily finite, limited to its own finite content. No matter how many concepts are piled on top of each other, the final sum must always remain woefully un-absolute. Finitude + finitude = more finitude.

For the same reason the moral conscience cannot be interpreted as the obedient acceptance of a permanent set of precepts regulating action, whether grounded in rational ideals or in a divine revelation a la Sinai. They are but finite expressions. Rather the moral imperative is constituted by an immediate awareness, previous to all rationalizing, that one should do or avoid a certain act in certain circumstances. This awareness may later be universalized, as has been the case countless times in systems of philosophical ethics. Nevertheless, since universal concepts always abstract from the concrete situation, it is possible that other circumstances may invalidate the universality of the conceptual formulations. This possibility has always been recognized in traditional morality by the primacy of place given to prudence, the ability to straddle the gap between principles and their concrete applications. Many times the moral imperative may be a completely unique calling; others might even interpret their conscience in a contrary way. Shakespeare canonized Brutus as " the noblest Roman of them all " for acting in view of the common good. Dante had previously assigned him to the seventh circle of hell for betraying a friend. Achilles knew that he should avenge Patroclus. Moral men today would never dream of justifying the duty of such an" eye for eye" morality, but Achilles knew no other. It was clear to him at the time what should be done, and he gave his life in consequence.

This description apparently presents a very individualistic grounding of morality. Indeed it apparently opens the way to situation ethics and exaggerated theories of the fundamental

option.[5] We are forced at first into such a position by the heavily subjectivistic epistemology of modern philosophy. Universal rational objectivity has long since been heavily attacked, though most philosophers, with the exception of Nietzsche and some existentialists, have attempted to mitigate the consequences in the moral realm. Our starting position, however, is not to be confused with subjectivism as it is commonly understood in the pejorative connotation of the term. Here we are concerned with no private matter of whim or bowing to social pressure. Very often conscience demands an outright resistance to these influences. As has already been indicated, there is an absolute quality about it. All subjective desires for life and happiness are subject to it.[6]

3. The moral imperative is *personal.* This certainly signifies that only a person, one possessing intellect and will, encounters the moral imperative. Still more is intended: the moral imperative is a reality only vis-a-vis other persons. This is un-

[5] The initiator of the fundamental option theory, B. Schuller, S. J., *Gesetz und Freiheit* (Diisseldorf; Patmos, 1966), is much more nuanced and balanced than many subsequent enthusiasts who have draped themselves in his mantle. Nevertheless, the seed of later excesses was contained in Schiiller's transposition of Transcendental Thomism to the realm of moral theology insofar as finite laws \Were referred to the finite subject's acceptance of God's absolute grace. If the latter is decisive for the judgment of moral conduct, laws may be helpful guidelines, but, as non-absolute, they can be infringed without guilt in particular circumstances. Thence flows the danger of situation ethics with its nominalistic stress on the uniqueness of each particular decision and its neglect of the magisterium's normative role. This dilemma parallels the acceptance of pluralism in speculative and dogmatic theology championed by Transcendental Thomists. If pluralism is irreducible, what is the authority of the magisterium and how is truth to be found? Indeed, what is the value of Transcendentalism Thomism itself, if it is only one of any possible number of theological-phllosophical systems? Cf. K. Rahner, S. J., "Der Pluralismus in der Theologie und die Einheit des Bekenntnisses in der Kirche," *Schriften zur Theologie* IX (Einsiedeln: Benziger, 1970), 11-33; R. Harvanek, S. J., "Philosophical Pluralism and Catholic Orthodoxy," *Thought fl5* (1950), fll-51; "The Unity of Metaphysics," *Thought* flS (1953), 375-412.

[6] The development of this article indicates that this " subjective " approach is at least as " objective " as the more intellectualistic attempts to prove God's existence. For the value of reason as a true reflection of reality is maintained. Insofar as reason has objective and universal validity, our proof is objective and universal.

doubtedly clear in the case of Achilles. Odysseus's bribe hardened his resistance. He gave way only to the pleading of friends: Aias, Phoenix, Patroclus. The profound truth of the *Iliad* consists in this, that after Achilles recognized his own power of transcending every finite norm-like Nietzsche's Superman-he also recognized-unlike Nietzsche-that the whole value of being a man, of being himself, rested in the free acceptance of the chains of loyalty that bound him to his friend.

Socrates similarly felt himself bound to philosophize because of his duty to the god. In the *Crito* Socrates resisted all entreaties to flee. His arguments all rested upon the relation that he had with the Laws of Athens, who in a personification identified themselves as his parents and guardians to whom he found himself bound by birth and to whom he had bound himself by living in the city so long. Having profited from their care, it would be wrong for him to renounce them once something difficult was required. Though some have interpreted Socrates's argument as an affirmation of the social contract theory of law,[7] the very personification of the Laws encourages us to recognize that just as no rational reasons can persuade a man to surrender his life, so also no commitment to a mere written record of laws can be total. Only before a person does one acknowledge the full implications of morality. [8]

Some might wish to quibble about this personalistic interpretation of Socrates's death. They might prefer to see him dying for some ideal such as justice, truth, humanity. What could be the content of truth or justice? Just previously was demon-

[7] A. E. Taylor, *Plato: the Man and His Work,* 2nd. ed. (New York: Dial Press, 1936)' pp. 168f., 171£.

[8] Compare this personification with Socrates's impersonal handling of the laws in *Apology* 24 d-e and his refusal to obey human laws in *Apology* 29 c-d and 3!Z c-d. Far from considering laws as subject to men's wills, *Crito* 53 c-d distinguished clearly between men who apply laws and the Laws whose brothers guarantee justice in the life after death. There is a "justice by nature" (51 b) to which human formulations of laws should refer. On the personal, final reference point in Plato's philosophy confer the perceptive article of R. O'Connell, S. J., "The Unknown Socrates's Unknown God," *God Knowable and Unknowable,* ed. R. Roth, S. J. (New York: Fordham U. Press, 1978), 1-22.

strated the insufficiency of any concept to ground the absolute claim of morality, which, in this case, is the function that some would attribute to the idea of truth or justice. This is not to deny that men actually do die for such ideals-and rightly so! But the correctness of an idealistic course of action is not *ipso facto* justified by pointing to intellectual ideals. Too often they serve but as cloaks for an egotistical affirmation of one's own ideas and desires. My idea of *justice* too easily becomes *my* idea of justice, a finite tool which my selfishness manipulates unconsciously or not. The ethereal purity of ideals " exculpates " the bloody hands of too many terrorists. Rather the idealistic appeal is justified only when the abstraction fairly accurately applies to the situation at hand, i.e., the exigencies of the concrete situation justify such abstractions. Once again the primacy of the individual concrete over abstractions emerges.

Two further arguments can be introduced to argue for the basically personal character of true " ideals." First, ideals as instances of thought arise only with language in a social context. They receive their primary denotation from their usage by people in certain circumstances. Though they may later undergo refinements, the process is itself based on the original personal determination of meaning common to all language and thought. Second, a protest in terms of some ideal is only sensible when there is a case of culpable negligence that can be avoided-in other words, when persons are involved. It is vain to protest against sticks and stones, beasts and trees. One does not usually dedicate oneself in the name of an ideal to conserve nature for the sake of the greater glory of redwood trees, but for the men who will receive benefit of spirit from them.

By now it has become clear that the moral imperative as absolute, supra-rational, and personal is not any different from love, that total love which found its perfect expression in the self-sacrificial death of Jesus Christ: "No man has greater love than to give up his life for his friends" (Jn. 15:13). Love is beyond reason but it is far from blind. For love alone gives

the lover eyes to read reality correctly.[9] Some late medieval paintings portrayed Jesus mounting His cross on a ladder in order to emphasize the complete voluntariness of His death. That brings us to the fourth characteristic of the moral imperative.

4. The response to the moral imperative is *free and liberating.* Despite the necessity that one experiences in the moral imperative there is an awareness that what should be need not be. The imperative mood is not the indicative, for there exists an immense abyss between moral and physical necessity-as Immanuel Kant recognized so well. There is a freedom beyond the necessitating concepts and rational laws which reflect the laws of nature. For men there is a higher type of life, a life properly human, that surpasses mere existence. " I dare do all that may become a man; 'Vho dares do more is none," (I, vii, *50* f.), was the anguished cry of Macbeth before his wife's temptations to kill his liege lord Duncan. Paradoxically enough it is only in accepting one's own humanity, in submitting to the moral imperative that the human person is liberated to transcend all finite values. Achilles's love for Patroclus enabled him to escape the fetters of his pride and to be most himself. The mightiest of all enemies, death itself, holds no terrors more for the man who loves. Its mystery can be accepted with the passion of Achilles or the tranquility of Socrates, depending on the different temperaments of those involved. Only in accepting one's own finitude does one transcend, overcome the world.

PART II: THE PROOF

Now that the investigative description is completed, the proof of God's existence resulting from the perception of the moral imperative may be presented. The language necessarily

[9] This Augustinian insight was revived in modern times for the Thomistic tradition by P. Rousselot, S.J., "Les ycux de la foi," *Recherches de Science Religieuse* 1 (1910), 444-475. It is central to the thought of H. U. von Balthasar, *Herrlichlceit* I (Einsiedeln: Johannes, 1961), pp. 168-170.

becomes more abstract and technical, but it refers to the basic situation wherein one person in his relations to another or to others perceives the summons to absolute fidelity-even unto death.

In the moral experience the subject is aware of a value greater than himself because an absolute claim is made upon him. This claim is very concrete both in its circumstances and in its demand. Its absolute content demands ultimately faithfulness even to death. As greater than the subject the value reveals itself as independent of the subject. It does not depend upon his good pleasure. Certainly as the call to death it contradicts every natural desire of the subject (nature, as the principle of continuity in change, strives for self-realization and self-preservation). At the same time the value is a very personal one, for it exists only in relation to the subject perceiving it. Unless Brutus had been there to hear the call 0£ duty, duty would not have spoken in Rome. Combining these two aspects 0£ the moral imperative yields an important conclusion: in obeying the moral imperative unto death the subject cannot totally cease to exist. 'Vere he to be obliterated, the value, which exists only in relation to the perceiving subject, would also cease to exist. But that is impossible. For in such a case the value would be dependent upon the subject-a contradiction 0£ the original experience where the value was recognized as absolute, i.e., greater than the subject. Therefore, if the original value experience was authentic, the subject must somehow continue to exist in relation to the value.

It remains to define more accurately the order in which this moral experience occurs. It is primarily a personal order, i. e., the three terms of the experience are at least personal. The perceiving subject is personal since he is freely addressed by the value. The concrete, finite object which is the occasion for the absolute call is, as already indicated, in the last analysis personally characterized. Finally the Absolute acknowledged and heeded cannot be less than personal. It is certainly different from the personal element encountered in finite men.

Nothing finite can ever sufficiently ground an absolute, and no man of sane and honest mind would ever demand that another die for him. Yet if the Absolute were less than personal, the personal in man, his freedom, his own highest worth, would be subject to something beneath itself. But the original experience of the Absolute showed itself to be greater than man. Hence the Absolute cannot be less than personal. This is what men call God, Christians the tripersonal God.

This argument is not, of course, to be construed in such a way that the Absolute has to have a world in order to exist. Rather it considers the relation of Absolute and finite from the viewpoint of the finite subject, i. e., given a real world of finite subjects, what are the ontological conditions of that relationship? By acknowledging the Absolute in freedom the finite subject joins himself to that Absolute in the most real way possible and so participates in the very reality of the Absolute to one degree or another. (The degree of union would also depend upon the freedom of self-revelation that is the Absolute's.) While remaining personally and naturally distinct from the Absolute the finite subject nevertheless exists totally immersed in the Absolute ruling him.[10] It is this juncture with the Absolute, this unity in diversity, that ensures the continuation of the subject after death. Once the Absolute has freely inserted Himself into the world in the order of love and fidelity established by His very call and presence, the relation of fidelity must continue to hold. Otherwise the Absolute of fidelity and love acts in a way contradictory to the very essence of His Absoluteness. "He remains faithful, for He cannot deny Himself" (II Tim. 13) . He does not so contradict Himself that in the very moment in which He actuates the human person to its highest pitch He destroys it. For it is only when confronted by a death to be freely chosen that the finite subject faces inexorably and must answer the questions "Who am I that I

[10] Personal distinction does not necessarily imply distinction of natures, as the dogma of the Trinity assures us. For creatures the personal distinction implies a natural distinction from God because the finite subject is capable of sinning.

give my life?" and" Who is the Other who demands my life?" For that insight of highest self-awareness and other-relatedness the God of love does not simultaneously love and hate in destroying the creature loving Him. He who has all power over life can also maintain it in demanding it.

part III: A critique

The argument to God's existence from the moral experience generally enjoys the greatest favor and acceptance among ordinary believers; even the greatest of all the rationalists, Immanuel Kant, was moved by it. Yet, whatever its grass roots appeal, the proof just offered will not satisfy professional philosophers in its present form. Leaving aside questions about the possibility of psychological conditioning and subjective delusion, the logical contradiction seems obvious: how can one maintain, on the one hand, that the Absolute is independent of the subject lest it be limited by the perceiving subject and so relativized by his limited perspective and, on the other hand, that the moral imperative, as absolute and implying the Absolute, exists only in relation to a subject, i.e., is somehow dependent upon the subject?

part IV: the MoRE basic problem

To consider that vital objection a thorough study of Western philosophy would be helpful. That being impossible in the limits of the present paper, the fundamental conundrum of Western thought, the problem oi the One and the Many, will be developed.

Let us examine the basis of the central paradox. In order to think at all, the mind must do so consistently, i.e., according to certain laws of thought. The most basic of all laws is the principle of contradiction: [11] something cannot both be

[11] Some interpret the principle of identity as the most basic law of thought. Actually the principles of identity and contradiction imply each other. The principle of identity is affirmed as a law because there is the possibility of diversity, a non-x as well as an x, and because contradiction must be avoided. In any case the following paragraph of the text also covers the statement " x is x " insofar as this tautology has any reference to reality.

and not be in the same place at the same time under the same circumstances .. This law is apparently all-embracing since it concerns being itself; whatever is outside its scope is not only unknowable but also non-existent for man. For a law to be valid all the instances that fall under the law must have some common principle, e.g., animals are not constrained by the law against perjury; the law of gravity pertains to all beings having corporeal bodies, but not to angels. What then do all things thought or capable of being thought have in common? The element common to all beings is precisely their being. Being makes everything one. Simultaneously we must confess that all beings are also different; otherwise we would not need a law to keep them in order. In what are they different, i.e., many? Is it being or non-being? Obviously it must be being since non-being is unknowable and consequently cannot be affirmed. So we are left with the startling rational contradiction that being simultaneously makes everything one and many, the same and different.[12]

This Parmenidean paradox may be illustrated by analysing the structure of the simplest sentence that is employed in discursive thought: " x is " where " x " stands for any possible subject of the predicate " is." Obviously " x " is different from " is " ; otherwise nothing could be said or thought. There

[12] Plato avoided this conclusion by postulating the existence of non-being, or matter. How the non-existent can be affirmed to be boggles the mind as much as Kant's affirmation of the unknowable noumenon. These antinomies result for anyone who considers that reality is known primarily through universal concepts. Aristotle's and Thomas's understanding of matter as *relative* non-being depends upon their affirmation of the reality of the singular instead of the universal idea. But if the singular is the primary reality, from which an abstraction is drawn, does not the abstraction always fall short of representing the richness of the concrete real? P. Rousselot, S.J., *L'intellectualis:me de saint Thomas,* !'tnd. ed. (Paris: Beauchesne, 199l4), pp. 90-95, 108-l!'t4, maintained that Thomas was inconsistent in maintaining the axiom, " science is of the universal." If matter is relative to form, is not the universal form then relative to matter, hence dependent upon it in some way? Or is matter the inverse of the Aristotelian Prime Mover, pure form, viz., that which is related to all and to which nothing is related? The Christian God of St. Thomas, however, transcends Aristotle's pure form and is identified with infinite *esse* in which all singulars participate.

would just be a vast, undifferentiated" is." What differentiates " x " from " is? " It cannot be being since then it would be identical with "is." Similarly it cannot be non-being; in such a case "x" which is constituted as "x" by non-being alone could not be joined to " is," could not be affirmed. Before such a contradiction rational thought is radically put into question-truth cannot be discerned from untruth.

This is much more than mere word-play, for every problem of thought is reduced to the same difficulty. Consider the problem of change. Against the Heraclitean view that nothing remains the same Aristotle made the distinction between substance and accident. A substance is that which remains the same in change, an accident is that which inheres in a substance and disappears to be replaced by another accident, as a man changes his clothes, or a chameleon its color. Yet there is also the fact of substantial change: men and chameleons die. Lest this be seen as a sudden, inexplicable jump from being to non-being, the usual explanation is that the accidental modifications accrue upon the subject, disposing it for a substantial change, as a man is disposed for death by the accidental changes of old age: rickety bones, hardening of the arteries, etc. This solution is most clever, but does not avoid a rational contradiction. For in the instance of accidental change the substance was considered as independent of the accidents; in substantial change, however, the substance was modified by accidents, i. e., somehow dependent upon them. One cannot have his cake (accident) and eat it (substantial change). With that recognition comes a destruction of the mental scheme. If accidents modify the substance, then the substance is always changing just as the accidents are. Consequently there is nothing stable in change. Everything is change. But here we have run into a contradiction again: change only occurs when something goes from one state to another. If change is everything (or everything is changing) , there can be nothing stable to go from one state to another. Therefore change is not change.

No further examples need to be developed here. Let us notice the structure common to both problems just mentioned. In the first example, that of the One and the Many, there is the one being that includes and distinguishes the beings different from itself. Being is limited by nothing; it is absolute. Yet it includes in its absoluteness beings different from itself, beings that are finite. If one is to think at all one must affirm both sides of the dilemma: being and beings. Otherwise there is the static pantheism of Spinoza (Parmenides), the fluid pantheism of Hegel (Heraclitus), or the unrelated chaos of positivism. A similar structure is present in the second example, that of change: there is a substance that is changeless, affected by nothing, absolute in its order. The accidents which are included in the substance as its accidents are finite accidents, not comprising the totality of the substance. If one is to think change at all one must affirm both aspects of change: the absolute and the finite relatives. Yet both cannot be thought together without rational contradiction. [13]

We observe something similar in the problem of Plato's universals, or-in modern parlance-the problem of induction. To think at all one has to employ concepts, yet each concrete instance is different from the universal and stands outside it. An absolute universal embraces all its instances while remaining distinct from them-the structure is the same.

It does not take much reflection to subsume much of modern philosophy under the problem of the One and the Many. Kant

[18] The problem of change must be studied in its *primum analogatum,* the human experience of change. Somehow there is a unity to my being in all the years of change; accidental determinations: my sex, my size, my family relations, my choice of vocation, etc., have all influenced me profoundly, yet the mere sum of such conditioning and choices does not exhaust the "me" who combines them all in a personal unity. There is a strange diversity in unity in me that the moral exhortation "Be yourself!" points out. Who am I if I am not myself? Yet I realize that I am not completely myself. The mystery of my total unity in diversity eludes the potency-act categories which oppose act to its potencies. Such is the limitation of conceptual thought, which by the necessity of abstraction must oppose ideas like external things. The more apt metaphysical category that preserves the mystery is the principle that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, as will emerge later on.

divided reality into phenomena and noumenon while simultaneously uniting them by predicating existence of them both. Whether this existence is considered as the all-inclusive One and the phenomena and noumenon as the l\1any or the noumenon is regarded as the One of which the phenomena are the many manifestations, the basic structure remains the same. Hegel's pure Spirit constantly transcends itself *per omnia saecul,a saeculorum* since it finds the duality of Itself as Object within its own Subjectivity. [14] Whether the One is unlimited, pure Spirit trying to overcome the multiplicity of its past or whether unending Time constitutes the One in which the finite duality of the Spirit's Objectivity and Subjectivity constantly call each other to transcendence, again the problem of the One and the Many has manifested itself. Heidegger for his part wrestles with the relation of *Dasein* to *Sein* and refuses to make a definite statement lest he be caught in a contradiction. This is debilitating to action and love. Moreover, it is a practical impossibility since, in the face of the moral imperative summoning one beyond his own wishing, not to choose and not to decide is already a choice. On a more theoretical plane Heidegger's hesitancy constitutes the methodological problem of today: if every statement reflects only a partial perspective on reality, how can truth be attained? Even the original question of meaning already implies a specific point of view that by its abstraction excludes various aspects *of* reality. The reality (Sein) desired to be known by a specific point of view *(Dasein)* represents the problem of the all-embracing totality and the finite member so embraced. Since the :finite is defined by reference to another limiting, hence finite, object, the problem of the One and the Many has wreaked havoc under a new guise.

"Cf. Q. Lauer, S. J., "Hegel's Pantheism," *Th1JUght* 54 (1979), 1-23, for a different view of Hegel. Actually Fr. Lauer's interpretation of Hegel and the doctrine of the present article are very close, built as they are on ever higher syntheses of lower elements. For this author, however, the syntheses are not a final product of history; instead their fulness has been given in Christ. The One-Many probfom also underlies the Whiteheadian-Thomistic dialogue. Cf. D. Schindler, "Whitehead's Challenge to Thomism on the Problem of God," *Intematicmal Philosophical Quarterly* 19 (1979),

It would be relatively simple to find the same structure in the classical philosophical questions: Idealism-Empiricism, necessary-contingent, subject-object, form-matter, etc. Their implications might be illustrated in other fields: science, law, linguistics, history, etc. But the point has already been made.

From these reflections we can conclude that thought keeps batting its head against the same contradiction. Does one keep on blindly trying to think oneself out of these constant frustrations? Or does this contradiction mark the death of thought? Such a conclusion is much too brutal for most men to contemplate. Not only would an affirmative answer reduce men to beasts, but philosophers would point out that the affirmative answer, being a statement, involves its own contradiction. What a maddening circle!

Fortunately there is a way out of the labyrinth, a thread of hope supplied by love-or, better still, by way of a leap over the walls by those courageous enough to arm themselves with the wings of love. all that has been demonstrated so far has been the incapacity of reason to justify itself. Finite reason can never establish itself as an absolute and so distribute meaning to life. But is our first apprehension of meaning based on an intellectual insight? Does a philosophical argumentation dissuade a despairing suicide case? Meaning has to be perceived, at least seminally, before philosophy starts questioning, or else man would have no clue to what he was seeking. Hegel would have been merely a clever sophist had not his Christian conviction of meaning led him to postulate, in the absence of complete, present lucidity, a fulfillment in the future. The very search for meaning implies an affirmation of meaning-not primarily, as we have indicated, on the level of pure reason, but as a vital reality much more profound. The meaning is given as a gift at the beginning of life. It is love known and craved by every child. As a fact, children deprived of love, however well nurtured in the way of material necessities and luxuries, simply die.[15] The reasoning about love and life comes later.

[15] R. A. Spitz, *The First Year of Life* (New York: International Universities Press, 1965), esp. pp. ft67-284, has clearly indicated the utmost importance of

One may explain the awakening of intellect in the Empiricist tradition as the reaction to pain, the first felt absence of love, or in the Idealistic tradition as the wonder in response to the complete gratuity of love, the wonder that seeks to express itself and grow into greater love. In either case love is the presupposition of thought, the maternal womb from which thought emerges.

PART V: REDEMPTION OF THE PROOF

Love alone gives meaning to life. This is more than a hackneyed phrase sung by crooners to infatuated teen-agers. For the sake of love men can suffer all sorts of losses and dangers, even death. *As love justifies life, it also justifies reason. HERE WE PLACE THE KEYSTONE IN OUR ARCH.* The philosophers have erred in attempting to justify life by human reason alone. Unwittingly they absolutized finite reason and tried to analyze the structure of love by means of reason. It did not take them long to discover the rational contradiction in love, how the Absolute's claim can never be perceived by a relative, finite being. What they did not sufficiently reflect upon was the coincidence of the contradiction of love with the contradiction of rational thought. *The structures of love and reason are identical.* Love involves at least two finite beings, united in and by the absolute claim of love, the Absolute that transcends both of them; in the realm of thought the One is all-embracing, all-powerful Being, limited by nothing outside itself-it is Absolute-the Many are at least two finite beings, separate but joined in and by the thought Absolute of Being that transcends them. *Thought reflects love; since love is the meaning of reality, thought reflects reality.* By this slight twist of perspective the validity of thought is justified, the structure of human love saves the meaning of life, even in its intellectual expression. The Absolute of the love experienced is God-or, in other

the young child's relation of love with his mother as the basis of future human life and growth. Cf. also J. Bowlby, *Child Care and the Growth of Life* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1953), pp. 5Q, 18!?.

words, " God is love " (I Jn. 4: 7) . Since thought is the faithful image of this reality, man can arrive at a natural knowledge of God by the light of his intellect through the experience of created reality, i.e., other human beings whom he loves. There is no intellectual certitude stronger than the intellect's certitude about God, for if God does not exist, thought collapses into self-destroying contradictions (cf. DS 3004, 3026). In fact, all attempts to explain away the moral imperative as a type of psychological determinism have the feet on which they stand cut out from under them. Insofar as they rest upon purely rational analyses for explaining the determinism of psychic functions-no finite experiment or sum of them can justify a necessity of fact-this reasoning only makes sense if freedom is a reality.

This proof of God's existence just offered is clearly not a *denwnstratio* in the Scholastic definition of the term. Rather it presupposes a basic act of natural faith in reason's validity and argues that such a faith involves contradictions unless a greater faith in love and the God of love is maintained. Only in view of this further, natural belief in God is reason justified and recognized as mediating a true knowledge of God.

p ART VI: CONSEQUENCES

We now turn to the consideration of some serious objections and to drawing some conclusions which might recommend better to our audience this somewhat strange manner of thinking.

A. The preceding pages might have rendered some philosophers uneasy. The exposure of rational contradictions seems at first to place into question all discursive thought, a conclusion somewhat ridiculous not only because the average man finds order in the universe through his intellect and orders his life accordingly but also because it would destroy its own premises, the concepts and reasonings which the argument has employed until now. Actually human reason has only been shown its proper limits, not destroyed. Man's reason with its abstract concepts and necessitating laws of logic is not the measure of God's reality.

Only after the mystery, or paradox, of God's love is acknowledged, does human reason find itself justified. For our argument had indicated only the insufficiency of concepts alone to grasp reality, or, in other words, that there is no exact correspondence between concepts and reality. The exact correspondence was between the overall structure of thought and the structure of love in terms of the One-Many paradox. Since thought's structure, found in every judgment, contains the affirmation of a finite reality, capable of conceptualization, joined to an absolute of existence, the relative validity of conceptual formulations must be preserved. Otherwise the structure of thought would dissolve and our whole argument, previously developed in conceptual formulations, would be destroyed.

An even more forceful justification of the concept results from its necessary link to the concrete reality of love. Were the world without humanly perceptible order, love would be frustrated. An effective response to those needing help would be impossible unless the results of one's efforts were relatively predictable, e.g., to save a drowning man it must be known that the propulsion of a life preserver in a certain direction would normally result in its reaching the one in need; without basic regularity all free activity would be ineffective senselessness. Indeed, only against a relatively consistent world order could love have been perceived in the first place. Without it words and gestures, since uncontrollable, would be totally arbitrary, the mere *flatus vocis* of the nominalist nightmare, incapable of communicating love. Thus the fundamental question concerns not the validity of concepts, but the manner in which concepts grasp or reflect reality. Bak'y stated, they are abstractions, and they only approach the mystery of the totality of a given species (or concrete universal) as a limit.[16] Let us indicate briefly the steps to such a conclusion:

[16] Despite major differences the notion of man's conceptual knowledge as an asymptotic approximation to reality is common to both J. Maritain, pp. lif., and C. S. Peirce. Cf. V. Potter, S.J., *Charles S. Peirce on Norms and Ideals* (Worcester: U. of Mass. Press, 1967), pp. 63-67, 76f., 83, 101-109, 141-147, 193-203.

1) The materiality of things, though a barrier to a comprehensive grasp by human reason, is intelligible to the infinite God. This follows from our phenomenological description of morality insofar as morality involves the concrete subject here and now in a particular situation demanding a response. This subject is loved and known by God in his individuality. Love is suprarational because it concerns the individual who ultimately resists all rational categorization. [17]

2) The universe is limited in time and space since the synthetic judgment necessitated by love would be contradicted and relativized if there were an actual, mathematically infinite series (cf. Kant's first antinomy of pure reason). An actual (not potential), infinite series of material realities, which are intelligible in their very singularity and therefore defined by their mutual relations, would contradict every human attempt to abstract a universal concept. For the whole universe enters into the definition of every singular-omnia *se invioem perambulant,* in Rousselot's phrase [18]-and the infinite as such resists conceptualization. Infinity extends so immeasurably beyond finite attempts at measurement that even a degree of approximation could not be recognized. Were the series limited, however, the possibility of an asymptotic approximation to a reality by finite abstractions would be guaranteed. Not that the abstraction of any man in history exhausts the full set of relations constituting the individual members of a natural set. History extends beyond the birth and death of any individual, and the inherited knowledge of the past possessed through language, abstract as it is, never fully substitutes for concrete experience-as the young learn again and again in repeating the mistakes

[17] The real is the singular which is known as snch to the infinite God. Because human reason cannot exhaust the intelligibility of the singular, its abstractions are subject to revision, and it is referred ultimately to God as the guarantor of the validity' of its rational approximations to reality.

[18] Rousselot, *op. cit.,* p. 18. Like Hegel Rousselot recognized the connection between the intelligibility of matter and the relational composition of finite entities. Cf. J. McDermott, S. J., "Un inedit de P. Rousselot," *Archives de Phuosophie* 42 (1979), pp. 91-Hl6.

of their ancestors. Rather the regularities discovered throughout a series or a set would be seen as a sign of a reality still revealing itself on the way to its historical fulness, something much more than just haphazard events in an unending series not subject to measurement. [19]

8) Eternity is therefore to be conceived neither as timelessness, a point outside and above the linear temporal flow (Augustine, Thomas) ,[20] nor equated with the temporal flow itself (Hegel). Rather eternity embraces the temporal flow within itself, always present to each moment of time, as the whole which is greater than the sum of its parts (the distinct moments of the temporal flow), itself enjoying simultaneously rest and motion.

4) The relation of eternity to time, or God to the world, serves as the prime analogate for our conception of reality. The relation of the One and the Many discovered between Being and beings reappeared in the problem of universals. The full reality of the world or man is the totality uniting all beings or

[19] The mathematician's measurement of an infinite series in terms of a repeating, or summarizing, function does not contradict this statement, for mathematics itself is an abstract science and cannot claim a one-to-one application to reality.- Though our previous argument rejected the absoluteness of any logical law, thB principle of contradiction included, we have employed the principle of excluded middle in the preceding paragraph of the text validly since the relation alone of parts to parts was considered, the parts of an infinite series escaping the grasp of the human intellect. The principle of excluded middle, like the principle of contradiction, does not apply to the relation of parts to whole, only of pm-ts to parts.

[20] Augustine, *Confessiones* XI, 11, 13-15, 29-31; *De Trinitate* III, 2f.; IV, 18; V, 5, 16; VI, 10; VIII, 1. Thomas's notion of infinity is much richer than Augustine's. Cf. E. Gilson, "L'inflnite divine chez saint Augustin," *Augustinus 1\!lagister* I (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1954), 569-574; L. Sweeney, S. J., "Lombard, Augustine and Infinity," *Manuscripta* II (1958), 24-40. Nevertheless, Thomas's notion of eternity is not radically different from Augustine's. Certainly Thomas maintained that God's eternity "includes all times" (S. T. I, q. 10, a. 2, ad 4), but only insofar as the immobile explains change. For Thomas God is " extra motum.' In the definition of eternity as *interminabilis vitae tota :nmul et perfecta posses8io,* the " *tota simul* " is affirmed *"ad removendum tempus,"* the *"perfecta" "ad excludendum nunc temporis"* (a. I, ad 4). In our view time and change are included within the very Being of God; His infinite eternity is simultaneously motion and rest.

all men. For the whole of any species comprises more than an a posteriori, assembled conglomeration of individuals. Pure atoms do not exist in a finite world, as is especially clear in the case of man who needs parents and love in order to come to be and to survive. Rather the whole includes individuals in their mutual relations. This metaphysical whole is present to God who intuits simultaneously the one in the many and the many in the one. Our intellects, which cannot join such apparent contraries, can only approach the reality of God's idea by way of asymptotic approximation through ever more comprehensive and exact abstractions.

This reality of universals transcending and embracing all the concrete instances not only restores the medieval theory of the divine ideas and Scotus's *natura c01nmunis,* neither abstract nor a material individual, but also provides a way of understanding the doctrine of original sin and the Mystical Body of Christ (the fall from the original, created unity of mankind in love and the restored, supernatural unity in Christ) that surpasses a sociological, posteriorly constructed unity of individuals initially unrelated. Moreover, the principle that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts can serve as the basis for establishing the hierarchy of the sciences.[21] Each lower science is assumed into the higher, where a new principle of unity employs all the lower laws to attain its own new synthesis not exhaustively governed by those lower laws. At the most fundamental, sub-atomic level, physics can only hope for probabilities.

[21] That the whole is greater than the sum of its parts has been recognized by many modern Catholic thinkers: e.g., M. Blonde!, *L'Action, (1893)* 2nd ed. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950), pp. 250f.; P. Teilhard de Chardin, S.•J., *Le phenomene humain* (Paris: Seuil, 1955), p. 197; K. Rahner, S. J., *Grundkurs des Glauben£* (Freiburg: Herder, 1976), pp. 40f. That insight, common to all transcendental philosophies, is implicit in B. Lonergan's ascending hierarchy of the sciences as the non-systematic manifold, *Insight* (London: Philosophical Library, 1958), pp. 205ff., 255-257. All these thinkers conceive the whole primarily as a future goal of human thought or action. H. U. von Balthasar, *llerrlichkeit* I, pp. 22-26, considers it the mystery underlying the form-matter distinction. Like him we understand the principle as the explanation of the unity of reality and realities.

As higher sciences study more complex molecules and organisms, the increasing complexity allows for greater possibilities of divergence (or development), lower probabilities of prediction. In man and in human society there is freedom within the bounds of nature. Paradoxically, it is on this level of freedom, which admits the lowest probability of prediction, that the more exact probabilities of sub-molecular physics find the norm of their accuracy. In freedom it is acknowledged that reality is composed of tensions between unity and diversity surpassing one-sided, rational simplifications. On the level of freedom is solved the difficulty often raised against attempts to employ probabilities for a basic understanding of reality, viz., probabilities can only be recognized in view of a certitude. The perfect correspondence of mind and reality is achieved in the recognition of the One-Many structure in both mind and love. This correspondence serves as the norm of perfect certitude which conceptual formulations approximate as a limit.[22]

B. The preceding pages may appear at first to break with the Catholic tradition of St. Thomas. Certainly Thomists as far apart as Marechal and Maritain made the principle of identity, or contradiction, the foundation of their systems.[23] Nevertheless, we suggest that there is a deeper continuity between the tradition and this new approach. P. Rousselot, the founder of Transcendental Thomism, espied certain " deformations " or "inconsistencies" in the natural order of Aristotle's metaphysics which necessitated the postulation of a double *finis* for human nature and led him to speak of the " natural " desire for the intuitive vision of God.[24] He acknowledged the " impotence

[22] This should allow a reconciliation of American pragmatism's insistence on probabilities learned through trial, error, and correction with the Scholastic notion of truth as *adaequatio rei et intellectus.*

[23] J. Marechal, S. J., *Le point de depart de la metaphysique* V (Louvain: Museum Lessianum, 1926), pp. 43-53, 430-436; Maritain, pp. 76f., 214-216.

[24] P. Rousselot, *L'intellectualisme,* pp. 185-187, 181, 183-184. As an example of Aristotle's "incoherence" Rousselot, p. 186, mentioned, among others, his doctrine on the soul: though the soul is essentially the form of the body, the separated soul serves as the measure of the soul's nature and operation.

and irreality of human concepts " and " the disproportion between our intelligence and being" when engaged in the realm of material essence.[25] For him the enunciable formulations of logical principles were not sufficient to ground metaphysical reasoning.[26] In later works he criticized certitudes relying on the abstract principle of identity:

> It is a great question to know what this identification is that supposes the disjunction of *the same* and the abstraction. But the perception is interior to the perceived, at least one does not wish to attribute an absolute of existence to an abstraction, to an axiom, which is precisely the error of the [Hegelian] panlogism considered previously .[27]

In *Being and Some Philosophers* E. Gilson illustrated through history the impossibility of constructing any consistent system in the purely rational, conceptual order. In *Le Thomisme* he acknowledged the validity of the Kantian antinomies if philosophy stays wed to the mere combination of concepts.[28] Thus he could show the need for moving from the order of concepts and problems to that of *esse*, or "mystery," as; long as continuity between the two orders was maintained and they were not played off destructively against each other. A. Sertillanges seemed to recognize the approximate quality of the Thomistic tools when he spoke of the "mysteries" involved in Thomas's understanding of being, or substance, act and potency, matter, number, relation, action and passion, and continuity.[29]

Despite his strong commitment to the concept of being and the principle of contradiction, even Maritain was forced at times to employ the language of paradox. He acknowledged

••*Ibid.*, pp. *95,* 91.

•• *Ibid.*, p. *25,* n. 1.

[27] P. Rousselot, S. J., "Metaphysique tbomiste et critique de la connaissance," *Revue Neoscolastique de Louvain* 17 (1910), 502, n. 2; cf. also P. Rousselot, S.J., " Amour spirituel et synthese apperceptive," *Revue de Philosophie* 16 (1910), 240;- " Les yeux de la foi," 462, n. I.

[28] E. Gilson, *Le Thomisme,* 5th ed. (Paris: J. Vrin, 1944), pp. 517f., *Being and Some Philosophers,* 2nd ed. (Toronto: Pont. Inst. of Med. Studies, 1952).

••A. D. Sertillanges, 0. P., *La philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin,* 2nd ed. (Paris: Aubier, 1940), I, pp. 68, *65,* 68, 72, 84, 88, 91, 104; II, p. 8.

the " apparent scandal to the principle of identity " in the unique unity in diversity of knower and known.[80] Indeed, the fundamental convertibility of truth and being is apparently called into question when the basic law of being, the principle of contradiction, maintains, "I am not another," and the primary law of knowledge reads, "I is another."[81] The analogous concept of being contains a diversity in unity,[32] but its "paradox " is admitted by Maritain only in his attempt to reconcile Cajetan's triple abstraction with Thomas's doctrine of the *separatio* effected by a judgment to produce the notion of being; he appealed to an intuition ultimately expressible in an analogous concept to join a supra-intelligible, non-conceptualizable existence to a concept through the mutual causality of judgment and concept.[33] In this way, the static and the dynamic, once juxtaposed, are united. He admits also the " paradox " of consciousness caught between the poles of objectivity and subjectivity that can only be reconciled in God's love.[34] Similarly the " paradox " of the person, part of society while above it, is recognized and resolved with the insight that the person is the source of freedom and love in the existential order;[35]

[80] Maritain, p. Im.

[81] J. Maritain, *Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry* (New York: New American Library, 1974), pp. 169f.

[32] Maritain, *Degrees of Knowledge,* pp. !i!H?-9!14. In *Sept legons sur l'etre* (Paris: Tequi, 1933), pp. 74f., 77-85, U?5, Maritain's concept of being not only contains within it the essence-existence polarity but also allows for motion through a superabundance of being, or a *surcroit,* despite the " apparent conflict of motion and the concept of being." Does not motion introduce plurality even into the heart of this unity? Maritain admits that the action is always distinct from the agent in all beings except God and that essences have primacy over action: *Sept legons,* p. 19!7; *Creative Intuition,* p. 9!69!.

[33] J. Maritain, *Existence and the Existent,* trans. L. Galantiere and G. Phelan (Westport: Greenwood, 1975), pp. 9!9!-34. Other instances where Thomists appeal to mutual causality, e. g., essence-existence and will-intellect in free choice, also exhibit the structure of unity in diversity.

[34] *Ibid.,* pp. 68-79.

[85] J. Maritain, *Scholasticism and Politics,* trans. M. Adler (New York: Macmillan, 1940), pp. 71, 58-68. In the later *The Person and the Common Good,* trans. J. Fitzgerald (Notre Dame: U. of Notre Dame Press) Maritain recognized the same paradox, or tension (p. 77), but attributed the transcendence of the individual person over the whole to grace, the calling of the personal God

the person is the superabundant unity of the soul in knowledge and love, in interiority and communication.[86] Furthermore, Maritain's pre-philosophical, i.e., pre-conceptual, approach to God in terms of the subject's intuition of the thing and himself as limited, fragile existences, which immediately concludes to the God who is love, possesses great similarities with the position of this article.[31]

l\farechal's early writings mentioned the " antinomy" arising from the conflict between man's "natural desire" to possess pure Being and the necessary restrictions of intellection by means of sensible phantasms.[38] This "antinomy" was overcome only by supernatural grace which leads man to the beatific vision.[39] But, if the natural order contains a contradiction, one may well question the absolute application of the principle of contradiction as a natural principle of reason. In a later article on the natural-supernatural relation M'arechal no longer spoke of an antinomy. Instead, he reduced the "natural drive" to a desire " ineffacacious *per se,"* distinguishing it clearly from natural appetite. Though a natural appetite cannot be frustrated *"infra fines naturae,"* the natural desire for perfect beatitude transcends the entire order of nature.[40] Such an explanation

to intimacy (pp. 20-22, 42, 61). Here and elsewhere I find a certain ambiguity in Maritain's distinction of the existential from the supernatural order.

[30] Maritain, *Creative Intuition,* pp. 105-107; *The Person and the Common Good,* pp. 38-42, 47. The notion of person developed in those works possesses more breadth and flexibility than the two expressions of it in *Degrees of Knowledge,* pp. 431-444. This more flexible notion might have served him well in *On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus,* trans. J. Evans (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969), pp. *55-60,* 72, 84, where he could have avoided the necessity of positing a divinized supraconsciousness of self, uniting knowing and loving in a higher region of Jesus's soul beyond the faculty distinction of intellect and will, from which lower region it was divided by a partially permeable partition. Instead of a duality of consciousness within a single soul, could not the supraconsciousness of love and knowledge in unity be identified with the person?

[87] J. Maritain, "A New Approach to God," *The Range of Reason* (New York: Scribner's, 1957), 86-92.

[88] J. Marechal, S. J., "A propos du sentiment de presence chez les profanes et les mystiques," *Revue de Questions Scientifiques* 15 (1909), 424.

•• *Ibid.,* 426.

•• J. Marechal, S. J., "De naturali perfectae beatitudinis desiderio," *Melanges Jose:ph Marechal* I (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1950), 327f.

adequately distinguishes natural and supernatural orders, but the positing of the vision of the desired God beyond the natural order might also put in question the validity of his argument for God's existence in the transcendental order of *egse.* That argument, implicit in *Cahier V,* relies upon the Aristotelian potency-act analysis of :finality.[41] But how may the Aristotelian analysis, based on the dynamism of finite beings to their proportionate goal, be applied to an infinite God *ultra fines naturae,* sought by the desire to know ever more completely? Were the potency-act analysis applicable to the soul's desire for God, it is not clear how any natural, finite potency orientated to an infinite object might be stilled. Yet the impossibility of reaching a term would destroy the basis of the potency-act analysis.

By going beyond these conflicting Thomistic interpretations we have hoped to reconcile their divergent understandings of the existential order, whether it be attained through a concept, an intuition, or a judgment. The grounding of universals in the divine intelligence would prevent the fundamental systematic pluralism (and chaos) into which more recent Transcendental Thomism has tended to drift; the infinite mystery of love would allow real novelty to be joined to the basically conceptual frameworks of Maritain and Gilson. The " sacramental " view of reality, which we uphold in affirming the inherent consistency and meaningfulness of the world without absolutizing it, is in total accord with the teaching of the New Testament and the doctrine of Chalcedon as explicated by St. Maximus Confessor.[42]

In relation to modern thinkers, our position is perhaps closest to that of H. de Lubac and H. U. von Balthasar. Both see

"Cf. J. P. Burns, S. J., "Marechal's Approach to the Existence of God," *The New* 42 (1968), esp. 78-86.

•• The basis of continuity with the teaching of the Scriptures may be seen in the following articles: J. McDermott, S. J., "The Biblical Doctrine of *Ko<vw,.,a,"* *Biblische Zeitschrift* 19 (1975), 64-77, 219-233; "Luke XII, 8-9: Stone of Scandal," *Revue Biblique* 84 (1977), 523-537; "Le. XII, 8-9: Pierre de base," *Revue Biblique* 85 (1978), 881-401. The consequences of these articles are still to be fully developed. For Maximus the Confessor the best introduction remains H. U. von Balthasar, *Kosmische Liturgie* (Einsiedeln: Johannes, 1961); Maximus's teaching about " person " has not been fully exploited.

the paradoxical, or the bi-polar, synthesis as the seal of Catholic truth which keeps its balance in avoiding extremes.[43] In *Surnaturel* de Lubac affirmed the natural desire 0£ the soul to see God intuitively. Lest this seem to place God in obligation to the creature, de Lubac realized that a radical change of perspective had to be effected. Man's desire is really only God's demand implanted in him. In explaining how the natural desire and the divine exigence are reconciled he referred to the mystery of love, " where the paradox is the necessary sign of truth." [44] The experience of the divine love essential to Christianity serves as the norm of Christian thought. De Lubac laid himself open to criticism insofar as he attempted to translate this central mystery into the rational categories of potency and act, desire and its necessary term, and then realized the impossibility of that effort. Many saw therein at least an inadequate formulation, if not a denial, of a natural order capable of supplying a knowledge of God.[45] But, had the experience of love (which need not be supernatural) served as the natural basis of knowing God, de Lubac's position would agree with our own and perhaps escape the criticism of H. U. von Balthasar. [46]

••Cf. H. de Lubac, S. J., *Le 11iystere du sumaturel* (Paris: Aubier, 1965), pp. 209-222, for a list of some of the paradoxes impliit in faith.

u H. de Lubac, S. J., *Surnatui·d* (Paris: Aubier, 1946), pp. 484, 490-494. In *Le mystere du surnaturel* de Lubac emphasized even more strongly the paradoxical quality of the mystery of love that was the heart of the natural-supernatural problematic, as the most fleeting glance at the chapter titles reveals. In this later work his position remains fundamentally the same as in *Surnaturel,* although a certain mellowing vis-a-vis the supporters of the " pure nature " hypothesis is perceptible (p. 103). Insofar as he added precision to his position, he conceived a "pure nature" statically, as it were, before a supernatural finality is bestowed on it (pp. 28, 80-89, 106-110). But the very notion of a static nature is unsatisfying, and de Lubac continually stressed man's inability to conceptualize totally the mystery not only of God but also of man (pp. 203-206, 259-!iW9). This lack of clarity has left the great French theologian open to criticism. We hope that our attempt, which radicalizes his critique of rational systems, will justify his brilliant intuitions.

•• K. Rahner, S. J., "Uber <las Verhii.ltnis von Natur und Gnade," *Schriften zur Theologie* I (Einsiedeln: Benziger, 1954), 829-836; L. Martelet, S. J., "La gratuite du sumaturel," *Nouvelle Revue Theologique* 75 (1953), 675-689.

•• H. U. von Balthasar, " The Achievement of Henri de Lubac," *Thought* 51 (1976), 28, n. 38.

This Swiss theologian has concentrated his attention on surpassing the cosmological and anthropological presuppositions of previous thought in order to open man to the paradoxical mysteries of divine love.[47] In the unity of God's plan the glory of the divine love is revealed in such a way as to transcend all conceptual formulations without destroying the distinction between natural and supernatural orders, even if the line of demarcation must necessarily be left vague. Whereas von Balthasar' s method leads the believer circuitously into the heart of the mystery from which he might meditate the identity in diversity of both orders, we have attempted here a more straightforward approach to a natural metaphysics that reveals the structure of a love both human and divine.

In the final analysis this position may not be far removed from B. Lonergan's. In an early paper he spoke 0:f the philosophical " paradox " :for the finite intellect in the natural desire to see God.[48] His later writings have concentrated on moral conversion and, ultimately, on the gift of divine love which causes the religious conversion that supports all other conversions in the " paradox " of the existential subject who is called to make himself what he is.[49] With this turn to the primacy of the supernatural, must not the self-affirmation of the knower, the heart of *Insight,* be subordinated to the self-affirmation of the lover who knows himself as loved in loving the beloved? In such a case, however, a new understanding of the natural-supernatural relation, overcoming the antinomies of the earlier debate, can be developed.

C. From the understanding of the world-God relation elabo-

n H. U. von Balthasar, *Glubhaft ist nur die Liebe,* 3rd ed. (Einsiedeln, Johannes, 1966), which is a brief sketch of his multivolumed *Herrlichkeit* (Einsiedeln: Johannes, 1961-1969).

[48] B. Lonergan, S.J., "The Natural Desire to See God," *Collection,* ed. F. Crowe (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), pp. 87, 90, 91.

·[9] B. Lonergan, S. J., " The Subject," *A Second Collection,* ed. W. Ryan and B. Tyrrell (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1974), pp. 79, 80-82, 83, 84; *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), pp. 106£., 122f., 235, 240, 248, 278, 840-342; *Philosophy of God, and Theology* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1973), pp. 8-10, U-14, SS, 41, *50-52, 59.*

rated in the previous pages flow several important advantages. No longer need the problem of divine omnipotence and human freedom be shunted aside as a mystery not quite fitting into Aristotelian metaphysics. Instead, this mystery stands at the heart of life's mystery and of philosophical thought. God's omnipotence forces the moral subject to break out of the pleasure-pain syndrome and choose his apparent self-destruction. Yet precisely when under the pressure of the moral demand the subject knows that he is free to reject as well as to accept the divine omnipotence. This conception of freedom likewise places the Thomistic analysis of freedom in its proper context, i.e., a rational attempt to delimit the conditions of freedom and to characterize it as neither irrational nor necessitated.

D. This way of conceiving the world's relation to God offers a solution to the natural-supernatural problematic. Man by his nature can know God, but in a world of sin, exploitation, and suffering the reality of a God who is love may easily be put into question. Only Christ who surpasses the brokenness and ambiguity of human experience can assure man that love is real and that God is love, and by raising the divine claim for fidelity in His own person (Lk. 12: Sf. par.) He alone establishes the new, divinized humanity in love.[50] The supernatural revelation is not so much a collection of ideas as the new reality of love rejoining man to God in Jesus Christ. Ultimately this structure of reality is seen to be sacramental. The sacrament may be defined as the unity in diversity of the finite with the infinite in such a way that in and through a finite form the infinite God makes Himself present to man in a call for the total response of love, and upon man's response is based the eschatological judgment. This is the structure of reality that

[50] The problem of evil and suffering " necessitates " morally, or existentially, a supernatural revelation that surpasses the answers of natural theology. Herein the absolute superiority of Christianity over all other religions is manifestly recognized. Indications of such an argument are given in: J. McDermott, S. J., " The Loving Father and the Tormented Child: Professor Flew and St. Irenaeus," *Thought* 59 (1978), 70-82.

found its conscious culmination in Jesus Christ and is continued in the visible Church, the Eucharist, and all the other sacraments (cf. I Cor. 11: .

E. Finally, it should be noted that, in this new conception, Greek and Hebrew notions of truth are joined. By remaining faithful to God man is rendered capable of perceiving intellectually the objective structure of the reality that reveals God.

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ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY REEXAMINED

ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHERS COMMONLY hold three theses which, taken collectively, put them in a hopeless bind as regards the identification of the bearer of truth. These are: a) that analytic statements are not about any extra-linguistic fact, b) that truth consists in the correspondence of statement to fact, and c) that analytic statements are necessarily true. By accepting a), b) and c) our analytic philosopher is saddled with the following dilemma from which escape appears to be impossible. Either he holds that any proposition, analytic or synthetic, can be called true, or else he holds that only synthetic statements can be said to be true (or false). But given his commitment to a), b) and c) neither alternative is open to him. If he takes the former option he must either deny a) or b) above. If all statements, analytic and synthetic alike, can be the bearers of ' true ', then either analytic statements are about extra-linguistic facts or else truth is not definable as the correspondence of statement to (extra-linguistic) fact. On the other hand, if he takes the latter alternative, namely, that synthetic but not analytic statements can be called true (or false) then, while he may then consistently hold both a) and b), he must abandon c). Unless, therefore, our analytic philosopher gives up either a), b) or c) above, he is ensnared in a dilemma from which there is no escape.

But the trouble is, since a), b) and c) are central to the programme of philosophical analysis, abandoning either a), b) or c) proves to be unpalatable for most analysts. First, as regards a), to admit that analytic statements are about facts would resurrect metaphysics in the old and grand style, as a science of necessary truths about reality. It would then have to be conceded that philosophy does not begin with Kant, that since there is a realm of' transcendent eternal facts which are ex-

pressed by analytic truths, pre-critical dogmatic metaphysics is thereby reinstated in full dress. Second, as regards b), to deny the correspondence view of truth is for our analyst to affirm that the fact, say, that it is now snowing is not itself a sufficient condition for making the proposition "It is now snowing", true. If truth does not consist in the correspondence of statement to fact, it either does not consist in this at all, or else it does not consist only in this. But in either case the proposition that it is now snowing would *not* be made true just because it is as a matter of fact now snowing. But quite apart from how, if at all, such a view would be defended, the point is that no analytic philosopher would ever dream of defending it. Finally, with respect to c), since he holds that analytic truths are logically necessary truths, our analyst clearly cannot deny that analytic statements are true. While a proposition can be true without being necessary, it cannot be necessary without being true. Further, to deny that analytic statements are true is really to deny that they are statements at all. For by no stretch of the imagination can analytic statements be false, so that, if they are not true either and if, as he holds, all and only statements are true or false, then our analyst must deny that analytic statements are *bona fide* statements in the first place. But then his own division of statements into analytic and synthetic statements is undermined.

If, then, he can abandon neither a), b) nor c) and if his holding these three theses precludes his identifying the bearer of truth either with analytic and synthetic statements both or with synthetic statements alone, then our analyst is in trouble as regards the referent of truth, it being impossible for him to hold a), b), and c) consistently with holding either that analytic and synthetic statements both, or that synthetic statements alone, are true.

In the face of this difficulty, what is our analyst to do? How can he continue to affirm that analytic statements are verbal truths, that truth consists in correspondence to fact, and that analytic statements are true without thereby sacrificing any fit and proper referent or bearer for 'true' and 'false'? In answer,

I think it must be freely conceded that there is just nothing the analyst *can* do to loosen the bind in question, that he simply cannot continue to affirm a), b) and c) and at the same time find a suitable bearer of truth. But if this be the case and if, as was said, a), b) and c) are all three of them central to the programme of analytic philosophy, the conclusion would seem to be inescapable that that same programme in philosophy is seriously deficient.

But it is one thing to find a programme deficient and another thing to correct the deficiency. Still, it may not be too presumptuous on our part to suggest a remedy for the analysts' predicament. To begin, let us take as a fixed datum the view that any proposition, be it analytic or synthetic, is the fit and proper bearer of truth. Since this datum is incompatible with the joint truth of a) and b), we must now decide which of these two theses must go. But now, it seems to me that the choice is not at all difficult to make, that there is simply no contest so far as priority and truth go between a) and b). For while it is scarcely deniable that truth consists in a correspondence of some sort as between statement and fact, it seems far from being evident that analytic truths are not truths about any matter of fact. In fact, this long-standing denial that analytic truths have any reference to fact has in recent years been called into question by Professor Veatch. As I understand it, Veatch's telling criticism comes down to this: in any proposition the S-term must be used or else it must be mentioned. But on the assumption that analytic propositions are not about any objective fact, neither alternative makes sense. To explain, suppose, to use Kant's celebrated example, I say "Bodies are extended." Here it is clear that the subject-term "bodies" is not being mentioned; otherwise, I would be predicating the attribute of being extended of the *word* "bodies" and not what the word signifies. The only other option, then, is to say that "Bodies" is not being mentioned here but is rather being used. On this analysis "Bodies" is being used to signify that which is *meant* by the word, the objective content or meaning (in the sense of object

meant) of the word. But in that case the analytic statement in question, " Bodies are extended," turns out to signify an objective fact after all, namely the fact that being extended belongs to the objective essence of body. But this could not be admitted if analytic statements were construed as not expressing any objective fact at all. As, therefore, the denial that analytic statements express any matter of fact invites the absurdity that the subject terms of such statements can be neither used nor mentioned, it follows that that same denial must simply be mistaken.1

Nonetheless, it may be objected here that to the extent that the foregoing argument wrongly assumes that analytic statements are statements of the subject-predicate form, it really comes to nothing. For if analytic statements are hypothetical and not categorical in form, the question as to whether in analytic statements the S-term is being used or being mentioned could not even arise in the first place. But in that case, the supposed absurdity to which the standard view of analytic statements leads, namely, that the subject-terms of such statements could be neither used nor mentioned-that supposed absurdity-would simply go by the board. In other words, so the objection would run, only if analytic statements are wrongly construed as subject-predicate or categorical statements (as they were, for example, by Kant) would the argument which I have just attributed to Prof. Veatch serve to falsify the denial that analytic statements express objective facts.

To answer this objection, we must go to its source and uncover the reason why it is held to begin with that analytic statements are hypothetical rather than subject-predicate statements. That reason, it seems to me, is that analytic statements are construed as being a relation between universals or concepts only. The hidden assumption here, of course, is that no proposition which expresses a relation between universals or concepts can ever be a statement of fact. But to press further, just why should the fact that a state:i;nent expresses a relation be-

1 Veatch, Henry, *Two Logics,* Evanston, Ill. 1969, pp. 76-89.

tween universals or concepts only preclude its being a statement of fact? Why, in other words, must all statements of fact refer to particulars and not to universals? More concretely, why should anyone want to hold, for example, that the inherence of the attribute of being extended in the concept or universal *body* is *not* a fact, whereas, say, the inherence of the property of " thinking about facts " in me now *is* a fact? To these very crucial questions the only answer seems to lie in the presumption that a fact is something which exists in space and time, or if not in space and time both, at least in time. And since no relation between subsistent universals exists in time and since any and all analytic truths express such relations, then no analytic truths express any matters of fact. On the other hand, though, since subject-predicate statements refer to particulars and since particulars are in time, subject-predicate statements are or can be statements of fact.

But surely this presumption is not only wrong but the very reverse of what is the case. For so far from its being the case that all facts are in time, it seems to be true that no facts are in time, that to put facts in time is to confuse facts with events. Events, not facts, are just those sorts of thing which begin, last and cease to be in time. I can say of the writing of this paper that it began at 9:00 A.M., lasted two hours and ended at 11:00 A.M. But the *fact* that the writing of this paper began at 9:00 A.M., lasted two hours and ended at 11:00 A.M. is not *itself* something which began or ceased in time. If, then, not even such a concrete fact as this is in time, then why should it be required that an abstract relation between two subsistent universals be in time in order to qualify as fact? No, so far from being in time or space, facts would seem to be kinds of things which are entirely timeless. But in that case, there would seem to be no truth at all in contrasting analytic propositions like " Bodies are extended " with empirical propositions like " I am now writing about facts" on the point that the latter (when true) do, whereas the former do not, express a matter of objective fact.

But then, if it cannot really be denied that analytic state-

ments are statements of fact, and if we were right in saying that the reasons why analytic statements were in the first place classified as hypothetical rather than as subject-predicate statements was that they supposedly *failed* to express a matter 0£ fact, then there would seem to be no good reason for that classification, no good reason for construing analytic propositions as hypotheticals rather than as categoricals. But in that case, it would follow that the foregoing objection to Professor Veatch's criticism of the concept of analytic truth, namely that that criticism falsely assumes that analytic truths are subject-predicate statements- would simply be groundless.

But even if our would-be analyst cannot accept this rejoinder and continues to insist that analytic statements are hypothetical statements, and hence, statements which fail to designate any matter of fact in or about reality-still, where is he then? For he must then continue to cling to a) , in which case he can no longer hold that analytic and synthetic statements both are true unless, of course, he gives up the correspondence view of truth. Or, should he insist on retaining both a) *and* the correspondence theory b), he would then be forced to deny c), namely, that analytic statements are really and strictly speaking true. But the trouble is, he cannot drop either b) or c) any more than he can drop a) without losing the title of analytic philosopher, since b) and c) no less than a), are necessary ingredients in the analysts' programme.

There is, of course, one other move our analytic philosopher may make. That is to deny that ' true ' is predicated univocally of analytic statements and synthetic statements. That is to say, he can continue to hold a) and c) simultaneously by denying that, when predicated of analytic statements, 'true' does not mean " correspondence to extra-linguistic fact " but something else instead, " correspondence to fact " being the sense of ' true ' when the latter is predicated of synthetic statements. This would allow him to say, consistently, that analytic statements are true but yet do not signify any matter of fact, since now, " correspondence to fact" is what ' true ' means only when ' true ' is predicated of empirical or synthetic statements. True,

he would then be abandoning b) or the view that' true' means *nothing but* " corresponds to a fact," but he would still be salvaging the correspondence view of truth with respect to synthetic statements.

And yet, when carefully scrutinized, this halfway-house position scarcely affords shelter to the analyst. For, for one thing, it is not at all clear what' true' as predicated of analytic statements would mean, if it does not mean' corresponds to a fact'. But second, and what is decisive, it would not even seem to be possible to say with sense that 'true' applies equivocally to analytic statements and synthetic statements. The reason for this is that by the logic of equivocal predication that which is predicated equivocally is so predicated of totally different sorts of things in totally different senses. For example, the word ' pen ' is rightly said to be predicated equivocally of an enclosure for animals and of a writing instrument only because an enclosure for animals and a writing instrument are totally different sorts of thing. But by contrast, analytic and synthetic statements are things of the same sort, namely, statements. Accordingly, since they are not totally different sorts of thing, analytic and synthetic statements cannot be subjects of which 'true' is equivocally predicated.

Stated in summary form, our argument is as follows:

I) Terms which we predicated equivocally are predicated m totally different senses.
2) But the referent of a term varies according to its sense, so that if a term has two totally different senses there are, if the term has reference each time, totally different referents.
3) Thus, one and the same term which has totally different senses, must, if the term has reference at all, in each of its senses have totally different referents corresponding to each of its totally different senses.
4) Therefore, since 'true' and 'false' are predicated of the same referent, namely, a statement, it follows that 'true' cannot be predicated equivocally of analytic and synthetic statements.

It seems, then, that it remains only to prescribe the best medicine by which analytic philosophy may be cured of its ills. That

medicine, though, may prove to be too bitter a pill for the ana. lyst to swallow. There are, it seems, three possible remedies, the best of which may be determined by the effects of each one. These are, (1) denying a), (2) denying b), or (3) denying c).

Taking them in reverse order, to deny that analytic statements are true (c) is to deny either that statements or propositions are the sorts of thing which are true or false, or else to deny that analytic statements are genuine statements. But statements *are* the very sorts of thing which are ' true ' and ' false ' and it is simply arbitrary not to count sentences like " Bodies are extended" as expressing, or as capable of expressing, statements. Second, to deny the correspondence view of truth is to deny, incredibly, that what is *meant* by saying that " Snow is white " is true is that that statement corresponds to the way things are. We are left then, with denying a), namely, that analytic statements do not express any matter of fact. Not only is this denial not counter-intuitive (as is the denial of b) , but no dire consequences follow from it. Of course, one could protest that to deny a) is to resurrect metaphysics in the old style, to lapse into that pre-Kantian dogmatic slumber under the spell of which necessary or analytic statements are construed as signifying matters of fact about the way things really are. But there are fates far worse than this for philosophy, not the least of which is embracing a wide-awake philosophy of analysis which avoids the metaphysical slumber in question at the cost of either denying that analytic statements are true or of abandoning the correspondence theory of truth.

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TRANSCENDENT TIME IN MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR

AS THEY ATTEMPTED to rethink the biblical tradition in terms of Greek philosophy Christian theologians found it natural to relate the contrast between Creator and creation to the Neo-Platonic contrast between transcendent and phenomenal reality. In Neo-Platonism the two poles are tied together by a great chain each link of which represents a phase of the diffusion of reality from the timeless to the temporal plane: from the radical unity of the One beyond all categories, through the unity-in-plurality of intelligible being on its higher levels and its plurality-in-unity on lower levels, through the still more diffuse plurality-in-unity of soul and finally down to the actual flow of time. Eternity *(awn)* is at the highest levels of intelligible reality and embodies its unity as a dimensionless point or timeless present which expands in time into the serial order of past/present/future as well as into the actual succession of moments. Between time and eternity and closely associated with soul is a transcendent time which combines the absence of process in eternity with the serial order of time. In later Neo-Platonism it is conceived of as a' number' or formula embracing the life span of the universe and of its parts. Timelessness is thus seen from this point of view in structural terms, i.e., it is (in the case of transcendent time) the serial order of time stripped of process or (in the case of true eternity) it is that order contracted to radical unity. [1]

Maximus's concept of time rests on his division of reality into three stages (beginning, middle and end) which are de-

[1] S. Gersh, *From lamblichua lo Eriugena* (Leiden: Brill, 1978), p. 72, n. 212; P. Plass, 'Timeless Time in Neo-Platonism,' *The Modern Schoolman,* vol. *55* (1977)' p. If.

fined in a variety of ways. The most important of the triads are 'becoming/motion/rest' *(genesis/kinesis/stasis)* and 'being/ well-being/ ever-well-being.' [2]

'Coniing to be is presupposed by the natural *motion* of all created things and *motion* is naturally presupposed by all *rest* (91.1£17D) .' 'Becoming' or 'being' is the brute, unaccountable fact that there is a creation; it is the absolute dependence and contingence of created being. 'Motion' (or 'change') is the cosmic process-characterized by space and especially by time-in which things achieve individuality and develop toward their destinies. Though it may be diverted into 'evil-being,' Maximus takes a decidedly positive view of creation [8] and sees in it not merely motion but *directed* motion; as ' being ' corresponds to 'genesis,' 'well-being' corresponds to 'motion.' Hence time generally answers to 'well-being' because it has a natural goal-the cessation of motion in ' rest,' i.e., the perfecting of well-being in ever-well-being.

Maximus borrows the Cappadocian notion of ' extension ' *(diastema)* for the middle member of the triad. Time and space are generated by motion from' beginning' to ' end ':

' All that is created has a beginning of existence since it has come to be and an interval *(diastihna)* from the time when it began (91.1397B).' *Diastema* includes both intelligible and sensible creation (91.1072A) and is not only' extension' of the creature through time but ' distance between,' i.e., the infinite gap

2 For a brief review of early theological views on time and motion cf. Hans von Balthasar, *Kosmische Liturgie;* (Einsiedeln: Johannes-Verlag, 1961), 2nd ed., p. 60lf. Other triads are being/choice/grace; power/activity/rest; being/relation/ grace; birth/baptism/resurrection (90.1084B; 91.1073C; 1217Cf; 1237A; 1325B; l392Af) . All references to Maximus are to the Migne *Patrologia Graeca* edition, volumes 90 and 91. For parallels among the triads cf. Polycarp Sherwood, *The Earlier Ambigua of Saint Maximus the Confessor and his Refutation of Origenisrn* (Rome: Herder, 1955), Studia Anselmiana, XXXVI, p. 42£; Balthasar, p. 139f. For faith/hope/charity cf. Lars Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator* (Lund: Gleerup, 1965), Acta Seminarii Neo-Testamentici Uppsaliensis, XXV, p. 338. For a detailed outline of Maximus's ontology cf. W. Volker, *Maximus Confessor als Meister des Geistlichen Lebens* (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1965), p. 23f.

8 Cf. J. Meyendorff, *Byzantine Theology* (New York: Fordham U. Press, 1974), p. 133.

which separates creature from Creator (91.1077A).[4] The single most important characteristic of time is its finitude. What is created is complex (composed either of form/matter or of form/being, 91.1400C), and what is complex is always finite (91.1184-B). The universe, then, is finite space, and its time is finite motion (90.757D; cf. 90.1109A). Both are 'qualified' *(pi5s echon)* and finite because they are limited by the infinity which contains them (91.llSOBf).

The Aristotelian cast of the triad *genesis/kinesis/stasis* (= *telos)* comes out clearly when Maximus argues that all created beings move insofar as they have not yet reached their end (91.1072C). Time flows on until it reaches its end and will not flow at all unless it has an end. In criticizing the Origenist doctrine that the soul may fall back into time after it reaches God Maximus observes that nothing could be more pitiable than a creature never certain whether it has :finally reached its true rest (91.1069C).

Like many Christian writers Maximus uses both '*chronos'* and '*aion*' as words for 'time'.

> Beginning, middle and end are marks of things divided by time *(chronos)* and of things thought of as being in *aion.* For time *(chronos)* has its motion measured and is limited by number; *aion* includes the category 'when?' in its existence and displays extension *(diastasin)* since it has a beginning. If, then, *chronos* and *ai6n* are not without beginning, so much more are things in them not without beginning (90.1085A; cf. 91.1377D).

This follows the common biblical (and Gnostic) use of *aion* as 'large stretch of time' or 'world period' in which the divine purpose of history emerges on a larger scale than it does in the moment to moment flow of *chronos.*[5]

[4] Thunberg (above, n. 2), p. 60f; Ba!thasar (above, n. 2), p. 132f and 600, where *diastema* is rendered 'Abstandigkeit von sich selbst.' Gersh (above, n. 1), p. 59f; 246, n. 195.

[5] Cf. Balthasar (above, n. 2), p. 134ff and *558* for a discussion of *aiiin;* Balthasar compares it to the Indian *kalpa.* Theodore *of* Mopsuestia (PG 66. 897D) remarks that *aiiin* is not to be thought of *as* an independent hypostasis but as a *diastemct* of time, either large or small. Theodoret distinguishes God's true eternity from

Maximus's model of reality is completed by a principle of expansion and contraction *(diastole/systole)* .[6] Being itself and not just the being of things subject to birth and death is in motion according to the principle of expansion and contraction. For being moves from the most general genus through intermediate genera to the species into which it is divided and by which its expansion is limited. Thus being has its beginning and end at the points of maximum expansion and contraction (91.1177 Bf) . If we visualize the triad genesis/motion/rest as flow from the beginning to the end of time along a horizontal axis, we can visualize expansion and contraction as the typically Neo-Platonic fan-shaped flow of being starting from a point and spreading down. It lies on a vertical axis because Maximus thinks of it as a permanent ontological structure. But his sense of biblical history and of eschatology shifts expansion and contraction to the horizontal axis of actual temporal process as well. Christ was incarnated or ' thickened ' to bring mankind together to himself and make it one; in proportion, then, to his making us contract toward unity he expanded himself on our behalf (91.1288A). The pattern thus applies to history: incarnation is God's expansion, deification is our contraction at the end of time. At times Maximus seems to have both ontological structure and historical process in mind. ' God joins together for me the principle of my being and of my well-being in order to reunify the split *(tomen)* and separation *(diastasin)* of these two which I have created. He thus in his wisdom directs me to ever-being' (91.1848D) . That is to say, as the diffusion of the creature's being (conceived of partly in' vertical' Greek tern11l) is contracted upward, the diffusion of his life (conceived of in 'horizontal' terms) is refocused at the end of time. In terms of the incarnation we can say that as Christ expanded

the extension of *aii5n.* The latter applies only to created beings and is not a true *ousia* but ' *anhypostation* ' (PG 82. 680Bf) . The elusiveness of *aion* is nicely illustrated when Volker (above, n. 2, p. 24, n. 8) cites 91.1164BC to show that *aian* and *chronos* 'have no basic difference ' and then (p. 33, n. 4) cites the same passage to show that they ' are clearly distinct.'

6 Thunberg (above, n. 9.!), p. 6Sf and 420.

down into history it becomes possible for history to converge 'forward' to its end.

The most radical form of contraction-God in his total transcendence-corresponds to the One in the Neo-Platonic chain. God can be said to be beyond beginning, middle or end (90.-1085B) or to be beyond' container and contained, beyond time, *awn* and space' (91.1153B) all of which are relative or 'middle' (90.llOSC) while he is the infinite end (90.llOSCD) . He is' infinitely infinite beyond all things' (90.673D) . The paradox of such a negative theology is all the more striking if God is thought of as man's end. For if finite man has an infinite end, he must ' depart from himself ' to reach his final silence and rest (90.1116AB), and apparently along with the cessation of time he himself will be destroyed in order to be fulfilled.[7]

But the biblical Creator is in fact intimately related to creation, and Neo-Platonic ontology itself involves a spectrum of being whose various bands shade into and out of each other. Maximus, too, generates a hybrid state through overlapping categories. If God is the infinite end, he does after all fall into a category and can actually be said to *be* beginning, middle and end because he is creator, provider and completor of creation (90.1088A; cf. 91.Hll 7). This is not so much the flat paradox that God both does and does not fall into certain categories as it is an effort to bracket or subsume time so that it reappears in a higher form between ordinary time and eternity. Thus as the infinite beginning prior to time/space and the infinite end subsequent to time/ space God is a new ' space ' (and a new ' time ') of the saved (90.llOSCf). In terms of the Neo-Platonic structural view 0£ reality we can say that Maximus is taking account of a level at which the order or plan of temporal events (pre/ post) exists without actual process.

[7] On the paradox of nature destroyed in order to be completed cf. Balthasar (above, n. !i!), p. 141£, 851, *605;* Sherwood (above, n. !i!), p. no. For the implicit danger that individuality is lost in Platonic universals cf. Endre v. Ivanka, *Plato Christianus* (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1964), p. 802. The status of the Eelf is problematic for similar reasons in Neo-Platonism; cf. G. O'Daly, *Plotinus.'s Philosophy of the Self* (Shannon: Irish U. Press, 1978).

Maximus's elaboration of this category naturally centers around the Logos, who also *is* beginning, middle and end (90.-808C), who is immanent and transcendent, multiple and single.[8] The logoi of creation-both visible and invisible-were themselves 'prepared' by God before time (90.298Df). They exist in two modes: they are *unified* in the Logos (' all the logoi exist in unity and single simplicity ', 91.681B), and they are also plural because they are patterns for creation in all its *complexity* ('things which differ do so because of their logoi ', 91.1256D). The status of the logoi is inherently vague much as it is in Origen and other earlier theologians who borrowed Platonic intelligible being and revised it in various directions. Logoi are both immanent and transcendent, existing prior to creation yet not identical with God. They can stand in contrast to the temporal created world made up of visible and intelligible being yet they can also be grouped with intelligible being against visible being and can be thought of as intelligibles in highly unified form.[9] Though both the intelligible and visible realms are created and therefore extended, moving and temporal, ' intelligible motion '

s Cf. Gersh (above, n. 1), p. 240f, 263f, 27lf. On the relation of immanence and transcendence cf. Gersh, p. 138, 236£. Maximus occasionally uses the familiar Neo-Platonic metaphysical diagram of center and radii. At the end of time God/Christ will stand in the center of the resurrected saints distributing rewards 'without spatial separation *(diastasis)* from them' (90.1136BC). Here creatures are fused with Christ in the center yet are also spread around him just as radii are at once in and distinct from their common center. In 90.1133B the phrase ' place (*topos)* of prayer ' used in a discussion of h-0w prayer transcends space is a similar fusion of two orders of reality; cf. Balthasar (above, n. 2), p. 588. The man who reaches God will grasp ' in simple and undivided knowledge all of the logoi which pre-exist creation in him, just as the center of a circle contains undivided the ends of the radii extending from **it'** (90.1U!5Df; cf. 91.1081C). God is beyond discursive stmcture, yet in the spaceless divine center there is still an articulated cosmic plan. Balthasar (594) aptly observes that the 'center' here does not so much symbolize the absolute unity of God as the point of transition to the finite world. The visible world is in the intelligible world in the form of logoi, as in Ezekiel's vision wheel lies within wheel (91.669Bf). On the shifting status of Forms (in God's mind, in the Logos, separate) cf. H. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers* (Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1956), vol. I, p. 257ff.

9 Volker (above, n. 2), p. 23; *The Cambridge History of Lateqo Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy,* ed. by A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1967)' p. 497f.

(91.1072A) is superior to perceptible motion and thus constitutes a higher mode of time. The correspondence between the two realms is reciprocal. 'Visible things are symbolic [or 'typical'] of intelligibles, intelligibles are the logoi of visibles,'[10] and visible things are known by 'pneumatic' knowledge which works through the medium of intelligibles (91.669Cf). Maximus can also point to this hybrid ontological level by speaking of the logoi as 'results of God's will' *(thelemata,* 90.296A)-a word which neatly combines dynamic and static, temporal and timeless aspects.[11]

In this way the intelligible/sensible polarity reappears as a dialectic fusion of time and timelessness, i.e., as an' unextended extension' which answers roughly to the Neo Platonic conception of a transcendent 'frozen' time mirroring the actual flow of time. Like the transcendent 'number' of time, the 'primary logoi' created by God are universals or sketches whose details are then worked out in the relative contingency and freedom of time (90.272Af). The Logos has the logoi of each thing prior to time *(pro ton awn0n)* and creates each thing visible and invisible at its proper time *(chronon)* in accordance with them (91.lOSOA). God 'has known' timelessly and never *comes* to know all things. The logoi preexist and are manifested at the proper time *(lwiros)* by 'times and aeons' as time unfolds (91.1328Bff). Christ is foreknown by the Trinity only in his human and not his divine nature, for only the former has any relation to time. The logoi of created things preexist monadically and are revealed to creatures who then come to know themselves [historically] for what they are (90.624Df).

[10] Cf. Plotinus's principle of reciprocity: 'Intuition is bright p0rception, perception is dim intuition' (VI.7.7.30).

[11] Cf. Gersh (above, n. 1), p. 266; 160, n. 156. In Neo-Platonism creation is the result of unwilled, autonomous emanation; hence the phenomenal universe is eternal. Patristic emphasis upon creation as a free act of a sovereign God leads to a corresponding emphasis on the contingency of creation, a view which permits Gregory of Nyssa to offer a striking explanation of the ceaseless 'becoming' of phenomenal existence. Since the universe is unstable (temporal) because it was called into being out of sheer nothing, change is (so to speak) the symptom of a radical ontological anxiety (PG 44.l84C).

In Neo-Platonism the numbers which make up transcendent time do not seem to be Forms, since Forms are not directly connected to temporal processes. They are rather an aspect of Forms, yet are also substantial in their own right insofar as they occupy an independent ontological plane. So, too, the logoi are for JVIaximus closely associated with the serial order of time yet are aspects or expressions of God which do not compromise his unity. In so far as the pretemporal Logos is radically simple it is not a pattern of time: it contains the ' bare patterns of universal truths ' and not ' parables or riddles or histories' (90.1149D). This is the higher, 'unextended' aspect of transcendent reality. At the same time, as the incarnate Son of God the Logos does contain the ' power of all the riddles and types of scripture and the knowledge of all visible and invisible creatures ... He who knows the mystery of the Resurrection knows the purpose for which God created the universe' (90.-1108A). Here the Logos appears as a lower, quasi-' extended' principle corresponding more directly to the course of events and making them a ' typical ' reflection of the transcendent pattern which gives time meaning.

There is accordingly room for an intermediate *gnosis* by which logoi are grasped without reference to matter but still as a plurality of intelligibles (90.292A). Such *gnfJS'is* reflects the temporal structure of creation and can provide insight specifically into providence, which embodies the complex divine economy and especially the plan of the incarnation. During the Transfiguration Moses and Elijah were told about coming events in Jerusalem and about how Jesus's death would fulfill the Old Testament, and they also gained insight into the divine plan for history. The specific 'when', 'how' and 'what' of that plan is knowable only to God, but man can know *that* there is a providential end toward which the flow of events is moving (91.1169A). Moses is the 'type' of providence because he traced for men [the Jews] the complex path leading from the material world [the desert] to the intelligible world [Israel] (91.1168C). Motion (time) itself reveals providence, since in

time we can detect the essential, changeless identity and course *(diexagoge)* which binds and preserves the plurality-in-unity of things according to their logoi (91.1183C). When our mind passes through the order of nature and the intelligible world, it comes to a halt at the 'infinite abyss' of God and there reaches not bare unity but some grasp of the 'ways and logoi of the divine providence for the universe' (91.1408Df). Similarly the reward which Moses received £or his ascent of Sinai was 'knowledge outlining the genesis of time and nature' **(91.lll** 7B). Such passages point to a supratemporal divine plan which catches up the order of time but eliminates its actual flow.

That idea appears in other contexts. The incarnation [12] guar-

12 The specific theory of the *communicatio idiomatum* poses a special problem because to avoid placing Christ below the Father and above man Maximus denies that an intermediate category emerges from the combination of natures (91.1056Df). The unifying factor here is the one *person* of Christ, at once a 'field' and a 'focus' in which divine and human attributes can be held in suspension. Insofar as 'person' is not thought of as a single focus of consciousness it does not constitute an intermediate. But when it is seen as a coherent divine/human personality, it naturally does become in structure something like transcendent time, e.g., omniscience entails simultaneous (timeless) consciousness of the whole content of time. On circumincession cf. Gersh (above, n. 1), p. 253f; Thunberg (above, n. 2), p. 2lf.

Maximus's discussion at 91.1049ff is especially interesting in this respect. The birth of Christ 'creates a new principle of coming-to-be and of birth' *(arche geneseos* and *genneseos,* 1051D). Maximus mentions the paradox of the virgin birth, but there is also an implicit allusion to the first members of the triads *arche/mesotes/telos* and *genesis/kinesis/stasis.,* with the new 'beginning of genesis' arising from the intersection of time and eternity within time itself. In 1049Af he speaks similarly of Christ's incarnation as the creation of a 'new mysterious nature' which arose from his 'transcendent *(hyperousion)* genesis,' and in an analysis of Christ's walking on water he notes that spatial (and temporal) motion is a function of his human nature, yet the functions of both natures are wholly drawn together in the one person. Christ suffered as God since he was not bare man; he did miracles as man since he was not bare God. Thus his sufferings were miracles insofar as divine suffering was a totally new phenomenon ('theandric'). Christ is both 'not man' and 'not not man'; he limited human nature in a new way, as 'man beyond man' (91.1053Df). A heated sword 'cwts' and 'burns' separately and simultaneously; so, too, as man Christ went through the experiences of our nature in a divine mode (1059Af). In 91.120B Maximus uses a series of linked polar adjectives for the incarnated Son: 'suffering/beyond suffering, created/uncreated, finite/infinite.' Christ's free will excluded the need to make moral choices insofar as choice implies uncertainty about outcome (91.29Df; cf. Sher-

antees that we toowill become divine (91.1280D), for the Son who is ' wholly motionless [i.e., timeless] actualized in his human self before their time the things that will be' (90.1186B). That is to say, in the incarnation of the timeless Logos the perfecting of human nature which lies in the future is also present. The doctrine of contraction and expansion reinforces this pattern. As timelessness enters into time, so our temporal being is raised: 'As far as he became man we become God' (91.1885B), and this is the consequence of the ontology undergirding existence. For each man and each angel has his own ' pre-existent logos in God' (91.lOSOB), hence deification is the ultimate supratemporal realization of the timeless pattern which lies behind the lives of all creatures.

All of this also serves to reinforce a typological or allegorical interpretation of temporal events, and Maximus follows his predecessors in using it. He often sees the culmination of time simply as a future event. The closing of the doors in a church shows that the saved *will* enter the intelligible world; the appearance of the sacraments is the beginning of the revelation which *will* occur in heaven (91.698CD); the 'Thrice Holy' indicates the union with higher powers which *will* take place (91.696BC); the end of the ages *(aionim)* has reached us because we are 'just about to ' receive the gift of things ' beyond the ages' *(aiOnas,* 91.821B). Here we are on the horizontal axis of past/present/future. But 'future' also means the cessation of time, and Maximus can also see the future as the divine plan complete and present as a whole. Hence he proceeds in to link present and future by noting that our present virtue and knowledge are ' types ' of the future beyond time. That is to say, to the temporal 'type' there answers not only a future consumation but also a fully realized, timeless ('beyond the ages') history. Through these present tense types, then, God

wood above, n. 2, p. 196, 202f and *Ancient Chris.tian W1"iters: St. Maximus ihe Confessor* (London: Newman Press, 1955), p. 59, 61, 259). Christ, then, apparently had the whole of the future present to him at once yet also shared our temporal human nature. Maximus refers to this kind of free will as ' stable motion' *(stasimon kinesin),* i.e., as temporal choices stripped of time's uncertainty.

always 'becomes *(ginetai)* man in those who are worthy,' and he who has experienced deification has completed the *'geneS'is* of the mystery of undergoing the experience of having become *(genesthai)* divine through grace, though he will never reach the end of always becoming *(ginesthai)* divine.' This intricate Byzantine dialectic of tenses [13] suggests that the deification which lies beyond temporal process is (as something realized in the aorist tense) always present and that it also begins an extended process which is at once complete (in its divine aspect it belongs to the category of the' unextended end') and infinitely expanding (as creatures we will never be totally complete). 'In future ages *(aiosi)* we experience deification by grace and not by our own effort, hence we never cease being deified' (90.320-D). In much the same way, Maximus can say that Christ was present' intelligibly' and' pretypically' in Old Testament times and that now after his earthly life he ' pneumatically ' anticipates his future *parousia* by influencing believers. In his glorified incarnate form he is the precursor of his own ultimate 'pneumatic' *parousia,* for he 'is always creating his *parousia* through virtue and will create it at the end of the aeon' (90.-1137Bf) .[14] Process and completion, time and timelessness, past, present and future somehow overlap in a realized eschatology that embraces every moment of time. Hence while Scripture is finite in the sense that the historical events it describes have happened at points in time, it is infinite and eternal pneumatically because the God who is in it is unbounded (90.465B). The Logos put himself in finite structures (logoi) and thus can be present ' as a whole and always the same in individual things ... he is without beginning in things which have beginning ... as he has contracted *(systeilas)* us to himself so he has expanded *(diesteilen)* himself for us' (91.1285Cf) . In this dialectic of opposites the flow of temporal events is brought to a halt and given coherence in proportion to the presence in it-

[18] Cf. 90.llSlAf. On the metaphysical significance of tenses cf. Gersh (above, n. 1) p. 71; *115,* n. 173; Plass (above, n. I), p. Sf.

"For Christ as his own forerunner cf. Balthasar (above, note 2), p. 522. On the *parousia* in Maximus cf. Balthasar, p. *552ff.*

through' contraction/expansion '-of the timeless divine Logos for history.

Maximus thinks largely in terms of Greek metaphysics, and does not himself raise the question of how faithful he is actually being to the biblical sources to which he appeals, though it is often not clear how much convergence or how much conflict there is between the two traditions which he uses. It is, of course, difficult to isolate specific biblical conceptions without distorting them into issues which biblical writers did not directly entertain or did not entertain at all, and it is equally difficult in many cases to isolate *the* biblical view.[15] The general contrast between Greek and biblical views of time is more properly restated as a specific contrast between Neo-Platonic theories about *time* and the biblical attitude toward *history,* and even then ' history ' cannot be taken in an abstract sense.

The familiar contrast between biblical linear and Greek circular time also needs qualification. Time was linear for the later Platonists, too, insofar as the circumference is from one point of view itself linear because time flows forward along it. Time became cyclic largely through its connection with the spatial shape of cosmic motion in a spherical universe. Moreover, a cyclic view of time does not necessarily entail that events repeat themselves exactly; because of the irrational factor inherent in phenomenal existence the perfection of the intelligible paradigm may be reflected simply in an overall similarity of events. The Neo-Platonic conception of time is relatively abstract because it is a general theory covering the fact of process as such; it does not apply to historical process in particular. Because transcendent time embodies only the general life cycle of species, it is a general sketch rather than a detailed plan for the life o:f individuals. The biblical view, on the other hand, is more specifically linear insofar as it does not arise from speculation about an inclosed universe and its processes but reflects

15 Cf. J. Barr, *Biblical, Words for Time,* Studies in Biblical Theology, 88, flnd ed. (Naperville: Allenson, 1969); A. Momigliano, 'Time in Ancient Historiography,' *History and Theory, Beiheft* 6 (1966), p. lff.

rather awareness of a succession of divinely ordained individual events starting with creation and leading toward a goal. Apart from this, biblical writers do not have a *theory* of history or a *theory* of time and eternity.

If we grasp time from the outside speculatively, it becomes part of an abstract structure: radii lying together in the center, logoi converging in the Logos beyond time and the Logos itself converging with the One. This is typically Neo-Platonic. If our prime point of reference is time itself, we look along its flow to past or future and see events foreshortened. This is a more typically biblical perspective. The Neo-Platonic model rationalizes time by integrating it into a fixed geometric scheme; it literally 'figures' things out. A biblical model, on the contrary, rises from a sense of the unaccountability of things-the premise for grace-and yields a ' surreal ' vision of history which resists rationalizing by metaphysical or historicist schemes. It thus leads to a distinctive conception of the ' date ' of events. The 'Lord's Day', for example, need not be simply the specific date on which the present world will come to an end; it can be any point of time that is shaped by (i.e., both anticipates and participates in) the divine purpose embracing the whole of history. The Lord's Day thus can be present in various contexts: it is every day of watchful decision; it is the day of each man's death; it is the Friday of Christ's death when (in appropriate apocalyptic manner) darkness fell on Jerusalem and the dead arose; it is the Sunday of his resurrection; it is the fall of Jerusalem or the fall of Rome; in later theology it may even be the First Day insofar as creation was supposed to revert to Eden at the end of time. It is all of these, because in eschatological perspective the end of time penetrates the whole of time; since there is a pattern of history, events separate in time are drawn together and superimposed on each other to make up a series all of whose moments coexist simultaneously. When the incarnation is set into this conception, the Logos-at once eternal and immanent-acts like a singularity bending and binding the historical environment to itself. The scattered points of time are linked or 'realized' so that time ceases to be autonomous

process because it becomes, so to say, a clock pointing to every hour. In patristic theology the two traditions are explicitly brought together. On the one side, the abstract Neo-Platonic intelligible paradigm becomes the Logos and transcendent time becomes typological history; on the other side, biblical historical events are linked to eternity and thus integrated into a general ' intelligible ' conception of time.[16]

Biblical writers, of course, share the common-sense understanding of time as a linear flow along which events are separated from each other; they are, for example, interested in the chronicling of past events and in prediction of future events. What is distinctive and elusive is their view of a dimension which is somehow beyond time. To deal with this, they speak of a Creator not bound by time yet typically grasped only through time.

The frequently puzzling use of tenses in Paul's epistles is in part a linguistic phenomenon reflecting *koine* idiom, but it is at the same time an example oi how much an immanent metaphysics affects the very texture of language. That is to say, it is an intuitive, linguistic version of the 'unextended extension' which Maximus works out in conscious metaphysical reflection. Paul's striking use of the aorist may well not so much represent a past *tense* as the non-durative *aspect* inherent in the aorist. He is not thinking in temporal terms but grasps aspects-as the grammatical term 'aspect' suggests-of divine activity which do not fit exclusively into temporal sequence. And even a temporal,' tensed' reading of his verbs comes to the same thing.

16 Cf. IL Urs von Balthasar, *Man in History: A Theological Study* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1968), trans. W. Glen-Doepel, p. 33f: 'The time-transcending point as the point of Christ lies not only 'over,', 'before,' and 'after' time; it tramcends it in such a way that it simultaneously contains it ... r1le1 contains it, however ... by taking time into himself ... [He] enters time and thus hrings his eternity with him into time and transience.' For the contrast b2tween the Greek ' above/below ' and the biblical ' old/new ' cf. R. A. Markus, *81.wculum* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1970), p. 79f. For the telescoping effect on time of biblical eschatology cf. G. Ladd, *A Theology of the New Te.stament* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974), p. 198£. Cf. Simon DeVries, *Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 19'75), esp. p. 33.5f for a study of time and history in the Old Testament.

Those whom he *foreknew,* he also *foreappointed* to be .shaped in the image of his Son so that he might be first among many brothers. And whom he *foreappointed* he also *called,* whom he called he also *justified,* and whom he *justified* he also *glorified* (Romans 8.29,30).

Foreknowledge and foreappointment are parts of an eternal plan, though there is no real difficulty in speaking about them as *past* events. Calling and justifying are even more naturally thought of as past temporal events within the lives of the elect. But when Paul fits glorification into the sequence of past tenses he is suddenly shifting his focus. He is now looking at the whole of existence-from the creator's initial intention to the creature's final perfection-from a point of view which is proleptically retrospective and thus ' surrealistically ' timeless: what will happen in a sense has happened in a timeless aorist' past' tense.

We who *died* to sin, how *shall* we still *live* in it? Do you not realize that we who *were baptized* into Christ Jesus *were baptized* into his death? Hence we *were buried* with him by baptism into death so that as Christ *was raised* from the dead through the Father's glory we, too, *should walk* in a new life. For if we *have become* true sharers of his death, we *shall be* true sharers of his resurrection. We know this: our old man *was crucified* with him so that our body of sin *should be* freed and we no longer *be* slaves to sin. For the one who *died is freed* from sin, and if we *died* with Christ we trust that we *will* also *live* with him, knowing that Christ, who *rose* from the dead, *is* no longer *subject* to dying (*ouketi apothneskei)* , for death no longer *has* power over him. When he *died,* he *died* once for all to sin. Now that he *lives,* he *lives* to God. So, too, you *should th:ink* of yourselves as *dead* to sin but *alive* to God in Christ (Romans 6.2-11).

In this dialectic *tour de force* the ordinary relationship of tenses is again reshuffled so that while Christ's past life and our future destiny retain their ordinary relative positions they are also telescoped into a new kind of present: he who is alive is dead because he died but also came back to life in order to rise in us again during life and after death. For Paul, talk of present ' death ' to sin and ' resurrection ' to new life involves more than a metaphorical parallel to the past death and resurrection of Christ or to the believer's own future death and resurrection.

But it is also less than formal metaphysical language. New life depends on the 'Spirit', which is an objective divine reality (' power ' to Paul) not bound by ordinary temporal structures and not to be confidently manipulated in metaphysical categories either. As carrier of a radically 'new age' or' creation• the Spirit is equally future and present. And because the new creature is absolutely dependent on the free grace of a sovereign creator, the present can no longer be seen as an independent, self-contained part of an autonomous structure. Paul can thus think in terms of new laws of nature governing the new creation, laws which will one day completely supersede the laws of our present universe though now they are only simultaneous with it (much as Augustine's two cities are interwoven) . Up to a point he does think in terms of a timeless, ' metaphysical • design articulated in a set structure which comes to expression in the temporal order of past, present and future. Hence he speaks of the ' fullness of time ', the law is specifically a thing of the past, salvation of the future and the elect are chosen as part of a plan which predates their creation. But a metaphysical, intelligible design accessible to human understanding is not definitive as it is the Greek philosophical tradition. Rather, Paul grasps time and eternity under the category of parenetic, direct address pointed to the present without being bound in it. From this point of view, history-or at least its significance-is transformed into a function of the present, or rather, the rigid natural sequence of tenses is dissolved by the absolute' metaphysical' freedom of action of divine grace. Hence the freedom of Paul's own perspective on time and of his interpretation of history: in the extant epistles, at any rate, his eschatological scheme is largely an *ad hoc* response to present issues, and he simply imposes the categories of present faith on the past (Abraham, the Mosaic law) . It is, moreover, only natural that such a fluid relationship among events would call for a new mode of understanding, and he does characteristically speak of faith or hope rather than simply of knowledge or wisdom.[17]

11 In Romans 4.17f Abraham views his own and Sarah's physical *impotence* as *death,* but through the *potency* of faith they are able to *procreate* life: so we

This conception of history seems again to be at work in the Synoptic eschatological addresses (Mark 13; Matthew 24; Luke 21). Predictions of future events are there couched in notably vague terms and are accompanied by the explicit insistence that only the Father knows specific times. The vagueness is due not merely to the stylized nature of apocalyptic imagery; Jesus's remarks are for the most part concerned specifically with the fall of Jerusalem, but at points they expand to include the final parousia, and it is not clear precisely what the relationship between the two events is supposed to be. Both fall under the rubric ' in those days ' and, in fact, may be thought of as simultaneous, yet the *parousia* is placed ' after the [political] trouble ' (Mark 13. 18 and 24). Whatever the redactional pre-history of our texts may be,[18] they now present a binocular vision slightly out of focus so that events appear as both single and plural. Since the time of divine judgment is unknown, it is seen as possibility, but as *real* possibility rather than *mere* possibility, and that, in turn, transforms history into a parenetic present tense. Moreover, real possibility here is not simply a matter of psychological attitude, i.e., anxious anticipation of the end. The decisive factor is God's sovereign freedom in and over history. That freedom becomes specific by being tied to a particular moment of history, but as a divine judgment it can never be specified or dated in any definitive way from the point of view

should have *faith* in him who *resurrected* Jesus from the *dead.* Paul uses the sequence ' life ' as a formula for temporal existence, but a formula which is independent of time insofar as it can appear in any part of time-in the past of Abraham, in the present new life, in the future resurrection. The formula which shaped Abraham's life reappears 'timelessly' in our present and will reappear in our future. In Colossians 2.20-34 the flow of thought moves easily from 'death' with Christ in a largely present-tense ethical sense to 'death and resurrection' with him in a future eschatological sense. The former is death to outmoded ritual during life, the latter is its ontological corollary: discovery of the 'life hid with Christ in God.' 'Hidden life' comes functionally close to the logoi or' seeds' which in later theology embody the transcendent divine intentions *(thelemata*) behind our lives. Present, future and timeless aorist are again brought together in I Corinthians 13.12: 'Now I *know* partially, then I *shall* know [fully] just as I *was known.'*

[18] Cf. L. Gaston, *No St0ne on Another* (Leiden: Brill, 1970),

of time-hence the use of vague apocalyptic imagery. Hence, too, as in the case of Paul, prediction is cast in parenetic form.[19] Time appears in the imperative mode, which naturally overrides the ordinary linear scheme of time. It is as though points on the line of history are separate but also indistinguishable insofar as they are all equally divine interventions and insofar as their significance derives solely from that fact.[20] In Romans 8 the ' anxious expectation ' of man and of creation as a whole for liberation is apparently closely related to the eschatological distress predicted in these passages in Gospels (cf. I.uke 21. 26 for ' expectation ') . In Romans the distress extends throughout time and points to the end. It is a permanent background condition of fallen creation, and because it is not merely immanent (e.g., despair at the transience of life) but reflects the Creator's intention for his creation, it is fully present at any point of history. The divine plan thus appears less as a static timeless scheme than as a dynamic permanent or persisting future-present. The Synoptic accounts of Jesus's eschatological address focus somewhat more narrowly on specific days or crises, but they too run' dates' together and conceive of divine intervention in history in the first instance in terms of immediate parenesis rather than of a linear scheme.

The even more radical dislocation of ordinary time-sequence in John (his 'realized' or 'anticipated' eschatology) has been much discussed. In the farewell address of the Johannine Jesus (John 13:ff) there is no mention of' days' at all; the future becomes entirely generic and stands in contrast to the specific present crisis of Jesus's departure. As he speaks mysteriously about his ' coming and going ' all the contours which normally specify the future become indistinct and are replaced by the

[19] For the connection between eschatology and parenesis cf. Gaston (above, n. 18), p. *54f,* 340, 364.

[20] Again as in Paul there can be proleptic dislocation of tense. Mark (13: 20) has 'If the Lord *had not shMtened* the days, no flesh *wouU have* survived. But for the sake of the elect he *shortened* the days'. In Matthew 24.22 this is partially adjusted to a future perspective: 'If those days *had not been shortened,* no flesh *would have* survived, but for the sake of the elect those days *will be shortened'.*

promise of the ' Spirit ' or of ' *agape* ', whose power so fundamentally transforms life that conventional concern with time seems irrelevant. Accordingly, like the Synoptic writers, John can speak without sharp distinction of earthly and eternal life and can play on the overtones of the word *mone.*[21]

We might say, then, that in the Platonic tradition one comes to understand time only insofar as one (1) knows (2) the structure (3) of reality. Biblical writers, on the other hand, prefer to speak of (I) trusting (2) the promises (3) of God, and though the divine intention for creation is accessible to us only through temporal categories it is not a product of time. In Maximus this functional parenetic transcendence has shifted toward a formal metaphysical structure in terms of which the divine plan of creation pre-exists in quasi-temporal form answering to a Platonic intelligible paradigm of time. At the same time, Maximus preserves an authentically biblical perspective by adapting the Aristotelian notion of *kinesi,s* through time to an end.

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21 Cf. Gersh (above, n. 1), p. HO,

HUMAN NATURE AND VALUE THEORY

THE CONCEPTION OF VALUE that I wish to propose in this essay has both classical rootage and contemporary awareness. The classical roots are to be found in Plato, Aristotle, and what came to be called natural law theory. I have not been accustomed to using the term' natural law' for my views because of the ambiguous interpretations which the term seems to invite. To some, of course, it inevitably suggests scientific laws, to others fixed orders of creation, and to others perhaps even papal encyclicals. Since none of these is to the point, it seems easier simply to state what one believes without wrestling with a complicated label. Besides, I would not want to be committed automatically to everything that has been put under the heading of natural law. The only point of relevance for the present purpose is the belief that an adequate understanding of value can be based on an adequate understanding of human nature.

Still, within this framework, I claim that in what follows there is a modest contribution to natural law thinking, and this is the contemporary awareness I mentioned. On the whole natural law is probably thought of by most people as a system of ethical principles rather than as value theory. To be sure, the good is a central notion in natural law theory, so that values can hardly be ignored. But the paramount focus is ethical principles. Yet it seems possible, and worthwhile, to single out values as such, in the spirit of contemporary value theory, and try to show that they can be interpreted through an understanding of human nature, that is, the "laws " of our nature. This is the contribution I propose. I would go further and suggest the speculation that natural law theory may be more fruitfully considered as a basis for value theory than as a source for particular moral precepts. An analogous assessment has been made by

others regarding normative ethics vs. metaethics, with natural law being held to be more applicable to the latter than to the former. Without disagreeing with that assessment, the present account focuses strictly on the nature of value.

Four theses need to be established in order to make good on this project. They are:

(1) There is such a thing as human nature.
(2) This nature inclines us, barring interferences, in certain definite directions of activity.
(3) The satisfaction we call value experience is found in the fulfillment of these very inclinations.
(4) Values are thus perfections of our nature, as measured by the good of all-round perfection or, as John Cooper puts it, interpreting Aristotle in *Reason and Human Good in Aristotle*, "human flourishing."

To underscore that these theses are not just truisms, I add the following:

(1) The first thesis is a kind of essentialist principle and is opposed to any nominalism, existentialism, or positivism that would deny an essence of man.
(2) The second thesis is a teleological principle and is opposed to any naturalism, mechanism, or pragmatism that would deny natural purposes or ends.
(3) The third thesis is similar to what John Rawls has called the Aristotelian principle and is opposed to any hedonistic or interest theory of value which ignores the role in value experience of human nature and its inclinations.
(4) The fourth thesis is a perfectivist principle and is opposed to any empirical or descriptive account of values which ignores the role of excellence or normative fulfillment in value experience.

Human Nature

To believe that there is a human nature is to believe that there is an essence of man. An essence in this sense comprises

traits or characteristics or properties or capacities possessed by all human beings whatsoever. This essence is the general essence, in contrast with what some modal logicians call the individual essence, the latter being a property possessed necessarily, or in all possible worlds, by an individual.

The rejection of a general human essence is sometimes based, I suspect, on a confusion of questions. The question about essence is this: Are there characteristics necessary to man such that any being without them would not be human, or, on the other hand, is the term ' human ' only a rough designation for a variety of characteristics any one of which might be dispensable? Now there are other related questions about man which are different from this one but which are often called philosophies of man or theories of human nature. Such questions include: (1) What characteristic of man is most determinative of his behavior? (2) What characteristics are unique to man as compared with other animals? (3) Are there any characteristics of man as a cultural being that are unchangeable, or can he be altered so as to acquire any set of characteristics? These are questions about the dominance, the uniqueness, and the alterability of human traits. Regarding dominance, a thinker might claim, for example, that the survival instinct, or economic interest, or the will to power, or the desire for pleasure, or the love of the good, is all-determining in man's life. Regarding uniqueness, one may focus, for example, on rationality, or language, or political organization, or esthetic capacity, or religious sentiment. Regarding alterability, one may deny that any human characteristics are culturally unalterable, while another may hold that there is some persisting trait, such as a predatory instinct, or a territorial imperative, or an oceanic feeling, or an innate cognitive structure. Such theories are often dubious and in any case controversial. And so, lacking any definitive answer to such questions, someone might conclude that there is no such thing as a human nature-at least none that we can know. But such questions, interesting and important as they are, are not our question about essence.

Ours is more of a logical question, in the broad sense, a question of adequate classification.

Others may reject a human nature because they think the whole thing is a matter of linguistic stipulation, that is, oi how one decides to use the word ' human.' But the question of essence is not about the word ' human.' It is about the beings themselves who happen to be called human, namely, whether these beings have any properties that are essential to them.

Still another concern may be about criteria for establishing such a belief. Is there any evidence to justify, or rationale to prove, that there is a human nature or essence? The classical answer is perhaps the best here: the essence of something is known intuitively by reason through a process of abstraction. That is, one experiences particular things, intuits their common traits, and abstracts the essence conceptually. Nevertheless, if someone does not agree with what is said to be intuited, more help may be needed.

At this point I suggest that we can also appeal to the common procedure used to establish so much of man's natural knowledge, namely, empirical evidence. By this procedure we seek data to confirm a hypothesis and are scrupulous about possible negative instances to the hypothesis. I submit that empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that there are certain essential human characteristics. Below I shall propose a list of such characteristics. My empirical claim is that these characteristics qualify all beings that we call human, with no reported instances to the contrary. Now if any of these characteristics came to be replaced, or significantly modified, in the future, we should have to alter our conception of human nature, or else, were the changes radical enough, it would be the case that the concept of human nature no longer had instances. But such a historical eventuality would not disallow that, under actual world conditions as we know them, there is a stable, identifiable human nature, an essence of man.

A further, but purely speculative, question is whether any oi the characteristics I shall list belong to man with necessity-a

de re necessity such that replacement would be impossible. One task in this question would be to state what such necessity could even mean, and a second would be-granted the first were accomplished-to examine whether any characteristic had such necessity. A promising idea for the first task is possible-world semantics. That is, a characteristic would pertain to a human being with *de re* necessity if that human being has the characteristic in any possible world in which that human being exists. No matter what world was created, or instantiated, if human beings exist in that world and possess some of the same characteristics they would have in any other world in which they existed, then those characteristics could be said to be necessary to man. Now in this sense I am inclined to think that some characteristics might well be necessary to man. For example, it seems inconceivable that human beings in any possible world could lack individuality of personal identity. On the other hand, a characteristic like physical embodiment does not seem to be indispensable, perhaps even in the actual world we know. But this whole subject of necessity belongs to speculative philosophy and is in no way vital to my strictly valuational concerns in this paper. An experientially derived concept of human nature would remain as the basis for our value theory even if the notion of *de re* necessity were judged to be unintelligible or inapplicable.

I propose as a thesis, then, that, whether from direct intuitive abstraction or from empirical confirmation, the following are essential characteristics in man's nature:

1. Physical embodiment
2. Life processes
8. Consciousness, or awareness of environment and self
4. Feeling, or the capacity for pleasure and pain
5. Emotions
6. Reason
7. Free choice, or the ability to initiate action
8. Moral capacity
9. Esthetic sensitivity

10. Creativity
11. Individuality, or uniqueness of self-identity
12. Sociality, or association with others
13. Culture, or susceptibility to constructed patterns of living
14. Cosmic dependence, or reliance on what transcends the human.

To do justice to the claim being made, one ought to go over each item and add remarks to try to convince the reader that, empirically and rationally, the characteristic in question is indeed essential to man. But that would take more space than is available. One or two samples must suffice and then the whole set left as a proposed hypothesis.

Let us pick the first item as one example. Suppose that St. Anthony Hospital has announced that a unique kind of baby was born yesterday and the public is invited to visit it. We rush over to the maternity ward and are told by a nurse that the unique thing about this new baby is that it was born without a body. "What," we exclaim," no crying, no little fingers, no hairless head?" "No," he replies, "nothing like that, no body at all. But stay and enjoy the little thing as long as you please." Surely we would conclude that St. Anthony had given birth to a thought rather than a baby. Human beings just do have bodies in the actual world as we know it.

Regarding the last item, we might argue that if we were not reliant on that which transcends us, it would seem that we could avoid our death at will, contract an expanding universe at will, perform miracles at will. But we cannot do these things. Therefore, we must depend for our mode of existence on a cosmic order and the way it functions. So cosmic dependence is an essential characteristic. Of course if this cosmic order were itself dependent on something more transcendent, we would be too, by transitivity. But that is a further point.

These are dialectical considerations in support of certain characteristics. But I must leave this thesis by appealing to the reader's own empirical and rational scrutiny to determine whether the list needs addition, subtraction, or perhaps nega-

tion. The question is whether there have ever been, or could ever be, any human beings in the world as we know it who are devoid of a body, of life, of consciousness, of feeling, of emotion, of reason, of choice, of morality, of the esthetic, of creativity, of individuality, of sociality, of culture, of cosmic dependence. I believe they are all essential and constitute our human nature. But it should be noted that the general thesis about there being a human nature might still hold up even if the particular list of traits were modified.

Inclinations

The second thesis is that, not only do we have these essential traits or capacities, but they lead us to act in certain specific ways. They are not totally open-ended as to what comes out of them. We shail call these leanings, these directional tendencies, in our nature, ' inclinations.' The term is thus broader than Kant's usage, where it means a deterministic natural tendency in contrast to free causation and duty. In our sense free choice and duty are also inclinations of our nature. In our sense inclinations are any tendencies that we would follow out unless there are interferences or blockages.

It will now be relevant to review our list of essential traits to identify for each trait what its inclinations are, that is, the sorts of activities it leads to. These identifications are also to be based on empirical and rational considerations-sometimes more on empirical observation, as in the case of feeling, and sometimes more on a rational understanding of the essence of a trait, for example, reason. I shall only be able to suggest the inclinations briefly, with a minimum amount of gloss.

Firstly, then, to have a body, in the human sense, is to have a living body, so that it is hardly possible to separate the first two traits on the list. We can even speak of the human body, qua human, as having an inclination to support life. But aside from this, we do speak of certain physical activities qua physical, for example, basic movements and developed skills. These too can be considered bodily inclinations.

Life processes in turn incline us toward survival or preservation, toward growth in obvious ways, that is, maturation of organs and functions at certain stages, and toward flourishing health if there are no interferences. Death is a special problem, since death appears as natural in the end as health does earlier. However, we can look on death as an outside interference, an intrusion of the larger realm of nature upon us, and not the inclination of life *per se,* which is simply preservation and health.

Consciousness as such may seem not to have an inclination as life does. However, I think it is meaningful to say that consciousness inclines us, by its nature, toward a clarity of awareness, or unclouded attention, as contrasted with blurred, depressed levels of awareness. The fact of peculiar distortions that are possible, through drugs and other means, seems to suggest a natural level of clarity that is inherent.

Of feelings, it is obvious from experience that we are inclined toward pleasure rather than pain, except in cases of pain as a warning signal. So obvious is this that some thinkers have tried to make psychological hedonism a supreme law governing all human inclinations and therefore values. But we need not go so far in order to list the obvious inclination, within feeling, toward pleasure over pain.

Emotions are numerous, perhaps innumerable. Rather than name all the ones to which we could say with accuracy that we are inclined, we can at least say that there is such a thing as emotional health to which we are inclined, unless there are interferences. Hope, love, and joy, for example, are healthy emotions, whereas despair, hatred, and morbidity are not. It seems right to say we are inclined toward emotional health rather than illness, just as we are toward physical health.

·when we use reason we inquire after knowledge, we contemplate truth, we engage in reasoning, we make theoretical and practical evaluations, we prescribe courses of action.

Volition inclines us to make choices deliberately and act autonomously, rather than respond as compelled puppets. Our na-

ture leads us to be actors, to initiate actions, and not merely react passively.

When we exercise our moral capacity without derailment, we seek to do actions that are right and because they are right, and to cultivate dispositions or virtues that enable us more regularly to do this. These are the moral inclinations.

Esthetic sensitivity in man leads to the appreciation of beauty and to a fascination with esthetic objects generally.

The creative impulses in our nature lead us not only to the creation of art works, but also to inventions, innovations, and construction of new forms generally. Change, exploration, originality, improvement-these are inclinations of creativity.

Our individuality inclines us to seek and maintain a sense of self-identity as persons throughout life. It also leads us to desire an active self-stature which the existentialists have called authenticity in contrast to being mere slaves or captives of others.

Our sociality leads us to associate in various ways with other people. No man is an island by inclination. Rather we are inclined toward cooperation, toward friendship, toward family life, toward group associations, and toward organization in a state.

As a culturally susceptible being man is predisposed to take on and reflect the customs, institutions, ideas, and other forms of life constructed by man for living in the world. But he is also predisposed to criticize, alter, adapt, these forms, and be a cultural developer anew.

Response to our cosmic dependence leads us, in one important direction, to the expression of this relationship in religious acts, attitudes, and beliefs. Man's religion is the inclination of his sense of the transcendent and his dependence upon it.

We can thus give a list of natural human inclinations that corresponds to our previous list of essential characteristics:

1. Support of life; movement; skills
   Preservation; growth; health
3. Clarity of awareness

4. Pleasure
5. Emotional health
6. Inquiry; contemplation; reasoning; evaluation; prescription
7. Uncompelled autonomous action
8. Right motives; carrying out obligations; acquiring virtues
9. Appreciation of beauty; fascination with esthetic objects
10. Invention; innovation of new forms
11. Self-identity; authenticity
12. Cooperation; friendship; family; group association; state
13. Participation in and shaping of cultural forms
14. Religion.

I must now answer a very evident objection. It is that many people do not exercise such activities as these and hence appear to lack such inclinations and even therefore some of the alleged essential characteristics. There are people who are in poor health, who have little pleasure in life, who do not use their intellect much, who escape their freedom, who choose wrong and vicious actions, who are esthetic blanks, who isolate themselves from other people, who scoff at religion, and so forth. Do not such persons have the same human nature as everyone else? If so, such inclinations must not be inherent in that nature.

In answering this objection, two points must be made. The first concerns the ancient Aristotelian distinction between potentiality and actuality. To identify inclinations in the abstract is to cite potentialities. They designate " the ways we would go," or " what would be the case," provided things went normally, as usual, as accustomed. They are the directions we would follow if not deflected.

The second point is that there are numerous deflecting interferences in the world that prevent these potentialities or inclinations from being unfolded. Some of these obstacles are in the outer cosmos, some in our social arrangements, some in our own traits, such as freedom which has the power to act apart from moral restraint. Inclinations do not enjoy unopposed paths. So, for example, it is no argument against the idea that movement is a natural inclination of the body to point out that some peo-

ple are paralyzed, and it is no argument against clarity of awareness as an inclination to point out that some people do not have it because of seli-administered drugs; and so forth.

I introduce a term of Latin coinage, *sine impedimentis,* to cover this qualification regarding interferences. It serves a similar purpose to " other things being equal," but is more precise. It means " without impediments," that is, " provided there are no impediments," " barring any obstacles," " unless there are interferences," etc. Our view is, then, that human inclinations indicate "the ways we would go" *sine impedimentis.*

Satisfaction

So far we have a theory of essential characteristics and a theory of human inclinations. The particular items listed in each case are not so crucial as the general theses, namely, that there is a human nature and that there are resulting inclinations, although I would also like to think that my particular lists are reasonably complete and accurate.

Now to furnish the link with values we need also a theory of satisfaction. This theory is that the satisfaction which is characteristic of value experience is found precisely in those very sorts of inclinations we have been listing. That is the theory. Any verification of it must, I think, appeal directly to intuitive self-reflection on value experience.

I am taking the term ' satisfaction ' to denote the central subjective experiential tone in value experience. Other terms can be used. ' Pleasure ' is too limiting because it suggests mere hedonism. ' Sense of accomplishment ' is too sparse in feeling connotation and too oriented toward skills. ' Interest ' is also short on feeling connotation and is closer to mere ' attention.' 'Sense of well-being' would be good, and so would 'sense of fulfillment.' But 'satisfaction,' or perhaps Frankena's 'satisfactoriness,' seems best capable of conveying the finality of the feeling and the rewardingness of the subjective experience of value. In any case the factor in question, here called ' satisfac-

tion,' will have to be understood from personal experience of intrinsic values and not from definition. H one does not know from experience what is alluded to by ' satisfaction ' or ' sense of well-being,' an abstract definition will not provide it.

The term ' value experience ' must here be taken in a normative sense, that is, as referring to intrinsic values judged from a rational, critical point of view. It is true that some empirical, descriptive studies call anything in which people have an interest, or find some enjoyment, 'values.' And people do take an interest in, or find enjoyment in, many things opposed to normative intrinsic values, for example, in arson, in misuse of power, in debilitating drugs, and so on. These things are, as we say, their values. There is nothing wrong with this usage if it is clear that the study is merely describing *de facto* likes and dislikes. But normative intrinsic values are what are worth experiencing in themselves regardless of actual likes or dislikes at the moment. It is this sort of normative intrinsic value experience that we refer to throughout when speaking of satisfaction or well-being.

Our claim, then, is that the satisfaction or well-being experienced in normative intrinsic values is an accompaniment of, indeed an inherent associate of, the fruition of our basic human inclinations. We find satisfaction or well-being in the fruition, the fulfillment, the excellent development, of the capacities in our nature. Aquinas puts it thus in his treatise on law (Summa Theol. I-II, 94, 2: "all those things to which man has a natural inclination are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit." Rawls states a similar thesis as follows: "Other things equal, human beings enjoy the experience of their realized capacities (their innate or trained abilities), and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the greater its complexity " (A *Theory of Justice,* p.

But do not people have capacities for hate as well as love, war as well as peace, evil as well as good? Does not everything human come out of human nature?

A complete answer to this objection requires an appeal to a normative criterion of value, which we shall discuss shortly in the next section. The criterion to be defended is that of perfective attainment, or simply human perfection or human flourishing. l£ I may anticipate that criterion, an answer to the current objection would run as follows: Yes, everything human does come out of human nature; but not everything fulfills, unfolds, perfects the human nature in us. Some things weaken or stunt its flourishing, destroy its perfective realization. Our capacity for freedom allows us to do many things that go against the fruition of our other basic inclinations, and so it needs to be governed by the moral inclination so that the total person may flourish. Thus not everything descriptively human need be considered a normative value.

From another perspective the inclinations can be seen as needs. That is, prior to fulfillment the potentialities in us can be considered lacks that require certain sorts of completion in order to attain ends. Thus it would not be inconsistent with our approach to speak of values as satisfactions of basic human needs, or, simply, satisfactions in need-fulfillment. This language is more popular but also subject to more vagueness unless appended to a theory spelling out the context, as we have done in this" natural law" approach to values.

One may ask about satisfaction itself: is it an inclination like the rest? I think we must say it is a general inclination accompanying, or inherent in, all the rest. That is, there is a general tendency in the kind of being we are to take satisfaction in the fulfillments of our various potentialities.

Perfection

Another way of speaking about the flourishing of our potentialities, or the fulfillment of our inclinations, is to say that these represent perfections or partial perfections of our human capacities. Thus values can be said to be satisfactions in the perfections or partial perfections of our human nature.

The term ' perfection ' signifies some kind of maximum attainment, that is, a point of unsurpassability regarding the trait in

question. Absolute perfection would be a maximum that is unsurpassable by any being whatsoever. God is usually thought of as perfect in this sense, in regard to goodness, knowledge, power, and so forth. In the present context, of course, we are talking about relative perfection, that is, the maximum attainments for human beings and, not only that, attainments open to individual human beings with the particular capacities or talents they happen to have.

Our fourth thesis, then, is that human beings find value-satisfaction to the degree that they reach such perfection of their capacities as is open to them. Value would thus be satisfaction in the perfection of our essential capacities. But that would not be literally accurate, since seldom do people reach their maximum attainment in anything. Witness how little of brain capacity we are frequently told we use, not to mention esthetic capacity, moral potential, and so on. Partial perfection-some distance along the way to the maximum-is our common human lot. Consequently, for accuracy, we must revise and say that value is satisfaction in the partial perfection of our essential capacities. We could cover both the common lot of partial perfections and the rare cases of maximum development by the adjective 'perfective,' and thus speak of "perfective attainments." Our final definition, then, and happily the simplest as well, would be this: value is satisfaction in perfective attainment.

This definition refers to what we have had in mind all along, namely, the various types of intrinsic human value. Let us now list these various types with labels corresponding to our two previous lists of essential characteristics and resulting inclinations:

1. Physical value
2. Biological value
3. Psychological value
4. Hedonic value
5. Emotional value
6. Intellectual value.

7. Volitional value
8. Moral value
9. Esthetic value
10. Creative value
11. Existential value
12. Social value
13. Cultural value
14. Religious value.

The main difference between this conception of value and many other approaches to value is that we do not view values as isolated, fragmented states of consciousness in which one tries to identify some common subjective element such as interest, hedonic tone, esthetic balance, or what not. Rather, all these values are seen as resulting from perfective attainments. All these values reflect in some way the overall fulfillment of our essential human nature.

We are thus brought in the end to the notion of overall, unified human perfection or fulfillment, that is, "human flourishing." If the various types of value are distinguishable perfective attainments (more exactly satisfactions in these perfective attainments), then their collective integration would be the total perfective attainment of our nature. Such attainment would be man's highest good; his summum bonum, or simply the good for man. The good is satisfaction in man's nature perfected. Values are partial contributions to that end.

Finally, can we incorporate the traditional notion-familiar in both philosophy and common life-that happiness is somehow the end of human life? Of course. Happiness can be thought of as the general unified satisfaction that we have in all our perfective attainments. Happiness, unlike pleasure, refers to our whole life pattern or plan of life. It is the overall satisfaction in the perfection of our nature. Thus happiness is the subjective completion in the good, as perfection of human nature is the objective completion. For short, happiness can be spoken of as the end of life, provided there is implicit understanding of the objective road to happiness, so that happiness is not reduced

to some kind of vague inner feeling. Overall satisfaction in the perfection of our nature is happiness and as such is the valuational end of life. The moral end, of course, would be to have such a state for everyone. Happiness is not sharply contrasted with virtue here, as it is with Kant, for the perfective attainment integral to happiness includes the moral capacity as well as the others.

Priorities

In this final section I want to ask whether human nature, or rather this human-nature-based value theory, has any relevance for settling certain questions about priorities among values. We are asking this question, remember, not from the moral point of view, which would obviously be central here, but indirectly from the point of view of human nature. Is there any indirect light to be gained from this quarter?

First, we confront the question of whether there is any inherent precedence in the claims of some values over others. Are some values more valuable than others? All depends here on the perspective of such precedence, for there are different sorts of priority. Let us consider three of these in which the essential traits do seem to suggest some precedences. These may be called etiological priority, generic priority, and ontological priority.

Etiological priority refers to any characteristics that are causally prerequisite, at least in the sense of necessary conditions, for the emergence of other values. From this perspective it seems obvious that the elementary psycho-physical characteristics-body, life, consciousness-are causally prior. If we do not have bodily maintenance and conscious awareness, the other values, dependent on these, cannot come to fruition.

Generic priority refers to any characteristics that may be so pervasive in human life that they are qualitatively ingredient in, and required for, the flourishing of other values. And here there seems good reason, rooted in an understanding of human nature, for the traditional prominence given to moral and intel-

lectual virtues. It seems that other values cannot flourish without, or at least are greatly enhanced by, the moral ordering of life conducted by wise practical intelligence. And if moral and intellectual " virtues " does not exhaust what we mean by moral and intellectual " values," since the latter include dimensions and satisfactions beyond the former, it can still be the case that moral and intellectual characteristics have a generic priority among values.

Ontological priority refers to man's relation to the reality that transcends him. This is the characteristic we have spoken of as cosmic dependence, and if this is the natural origin of religious value, then religious value could be thought of as having ontological priority. That is, the effective attunement with that which is ultimately and veridically transcendent would have the greatest ontological claim. This point is different from an analogous point, often made by theological writers, that one's ultimate commitment to what is ultimate determines all other commitments. The latter contention seems to be a point about obligations, or perhaps determinism, rather than about values. Concerning values, the question is simply whether there is a kind of culminating satisfaction-in-fulfillment through relation to the ultimately transcendent. And on this point there is no lack of historical tradition affirming this to be the case. Thus Plato focuses on the Forms and the Form of the Good as the culmination; Aristotle on emulation of the supreme mover; Biblical tradition on personal communion with God; Spinoza on intellectual love of God; and so on. One difficulty is that the nature of reality, or of the transcendent, is the thing most in dispute in philosophy, dividing theists and materialists, etc. Many would deny that religious value is veridical, let alone prior. Another difficulty is that ontological priority is confused with moral priority, leading to other-worldliness; with esthetic priority, leading to pietistic art; and so forth. But the existence of these difficulties would not be incompatible with saying that, from a normative point of view, if a maximum satisfaction-in-fulfillment were obtained through a veridically understood at-

tunement with transcendent reality, that would have a certain claim of priority from the ontological perspective.

A related question concerning priorities is that of the serial ordering or ranking of values. Is it possible to take all the intrinsic values and rank them all qualitatively from maximum to minimum, highest to lowest? I know of no attempt to do this literally with all possible values and subvalues. **But it** might ·seem feasible to make some broad groupings of families of values and endeavor to rank these. The principle of classification here would presumably be the degree of value, that is, the degree of fulfilling satisfaction in perfective attainment. Suppose, then, for example, that someone proposed a ranking like the following:

(1) religious values (14 from the above lists)
(2) freedom and morality (7, 8)
(3) intellectual values (6)
(4) existential values **(11)**
(5) esthetic and creative values (9, **10)**
(6) social and cultural values (12, 13)
(7) affective values (3, 4, 5)
(8) psycho-physical conditions **(1,** 2, 3) .

Would such a ranking he plausible? More exactly, is there anything about human nature that would justify it? This seems very doubtful. For one thing, such a ranking is controversial, would hardly be accepted by all, and yet there seems nothing about the fact that certain capacities are essential to man that places them in such a ranking. Essentiality by itself does not settle hierarchy. For another thing, much depends on the context in which values are experienced. To a person threatened with paralysis, the relearned ability to walk may be a more rewarding satisfaction, intrinsically, than confronting a Picasso or a work in mathematics. Finally, there is the inevitable matter of individual differences. People simply differ in their capability for intellectual work, for moral leadership, for esthetic taste, and so on. **It** seems incongruous to specify a ranking of

values to consist of a fixed list of abstractions apart from the personal centers who are to experience those values.

It follows that if individuality is an essential property in human nature, its presence will be a deciding factor in the composition of the total human good. That is, the pattern or ranking of value emphases will show some variability depending on the individuality, the *haecceitas,* of each person.

But if this is so, does it mean that the experience of the good is entirely r·elative in content to individual preference, taste, or declaration? Is this a valuational relativism of a privatistic sort? The answer must be no, for there are several governing conditions to the contrary that are drawn from other aspects of human nature.

First, since every individual has a common human nature, the types of fulfillment possible, i.e., the intrinsic values, must be the same for all. We are talking, presumably, merely about patterns in Paradiso, or at least Purgatorio, not arrangements in Inferno. One man's food here is not another man's poison; rather, one man's food emphases may differ from another's but have similar nutrition. Intrinsic values may be variably displayed but cannot be replaced by disvalues.

Second, the moral capacity of man is perfected in similar ways, namely, by the execution of obligations and the cultivation of virtues. Among these obligations and virtues are duties to oneself and virtues of proper self-regard. Thus the moral factor would require some ordering of values with a view to maximum personal good. Not any old pattern of value ordering could be acceptable from a moral point of view.

Third, it is certainly possible to look upon ranking statements as hypotheses or generalizations about how most human beings, *sine impedirnentis,* would find maximum value satisfaction. For instance, one might propose that, if etiological priorities are met, rational contemplation, given a fair chance, will be found by most people to be one of the most satisfying values in life. One might identify a small group of topmost intrinsic values, meaning by this that on the whole most people would find these

values most rewarding to their individualized human nature. This is what Mill was worried about in trying to establish qualities 0£ goodness to avoid quantitative hedonism, and there is no reason to think he is not right in his generalizations, though his proof and his hedonism need not be accepted. Plato wants to go further and give a fixed ranking of different types of life, presumably based on their proximity to knowledge. Such proposals too can be considered as hypotheses about degrees of actual human perfective satisfaction, and there may be much truth in some of them. But from the standpoint of human nature, as well as actual experience, it seems that people can derive comparable levels of value experience whether their primary source be that of a thinker, a moral activist, a religious, an artist, or something else.

Of course any life would be enhanced by including as much as possible of all the intrinsic values, provided there were no disproportionate loss in the primary source. And no doubt there are vast differences in the levels of value £ulfilhnent possible to different people due to given capacities and deficiencies. But if different individuals have realized their individual human nature, which might also be called their ideal self or destiny, it does not appear that they must necessarily be inferior to some, or superior to others, in the satisfaction that comes from perfective attainment. Perhaps it might be so in fact; but human nature does not suggest that it must be so.

Finally, for any who believe that human nature has a perfective destiny beyond the natural order, speculation about a more settled ranking of capacities might seem in place in reference to that further realm. The speculation might seem in place since "it does not yet appear what we shall be." But such speculation should probably not count any longer as philosophy.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Two Views of a Recent Book on Cajetan's Role in the Reformation.

Cajetan Responds: A Reader in Reformation Controversy. Translated and Edited by JARED W1cKs, S. J. Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1978. Pp. ii + 292. $19.95.

A FIRST VIEW-The principal part of this work is a translation into English of the lesser works of Cajetan which are related to the Reformation of the 16th century (pp. 47-244). While Fr. Wicks did not judge it necessary to provide a complete version of the writings (he gives only a summary of the less important passages), his book gives us a view, well conceived and put together, of all the writings of the " Cardinal of St. Sixtus " on the Reformation. This is an advantage not furnished to the reader of the original text.

This central part of the work is preceded by an introduction divided into two sections of unequal length. The first is a biographical essay on Cajetan, followed by a brief evaluation of the Cardinal in relation to the Reformation (pp. 1-46). A bibliography (pp. 244-253) and the notes for the introduction and the text of the translation (pp. 255-292) terminate the work.

Clearly, the principal aim of the introduction is to furnish the background against which the twenty-five short works were produced. In fact, we are treated to a presentation of Cajetan's entire life, although some parts of it are analysed with a very special care, as, for example, the years surrounding the trial of Luther. The work of A. Cossio, *Il Cardinale Gaetano e la Riforrna* (Cividale, 1902), despite its uncontested merits, has been surpassed by the works of P. Kalkoff. Influenced, however, by certain theses and prejudices, the German scholar, in more than one place, arrived at conclusions which have to be called too precipitate (cf. Baumer, *Der Lutherpro:zess* in *Lutherpro:zess und Lutherbann*, KLK 32, Munster, L972, pp. 18 ff.) Fr. Wicks, bringing together the fruits of contemporary research, presents a more objective summary, well-balanced and precise, of the events into which Cajetan was plunged at the beginning of the Lutheran Reform.

In passing, it seems well to underline some of the suggestions and attitudes of Father Wicks. He is not taken in by the hoary and tiresome accusations frequently hurled against Cajetan on the condemnation of Reuchlin (p. 8), nor does he trifle with the idea that the Legate was author of the letter sent by Maximilian to Leo X (p. 259, n.41). Fascinating are the reflections based on the information furnished by W. Link after the meeting at Augsburg: "Cajetan told Luther that the second point (faith in the Sacrament) could remain open for the present, since, with some refinement,

or a slight re-definition Luther's view might well stand " (pp. 24 ff., cf. pp. 260 ff., n. 53) . To understand better the attitude of Cajetan, if Link's information is correct, it is necessary to take into account what Cajetan will write in his article on the faith (cf. p. 222 ff.).

In preparing for the meeting at Augsburg (Oct. 1518), Cajetan had before him two writings of Luther. The notes made by the Cardinal, in themselves, constitute the first series of articles, which revolve around two points: the relationship between faith and the sacrament, and the doctrine of indulgences. A note, which is implicitly an answer to Luther's pamphlet on the excommunication, completes the Cardinal's series (pp. 47-98). Wicks notes that a passage of Sacred Scripture cited by Cajetan in favor of Luther, in one of the Cardinal's works, is not found in the writings which antedate his meeting with the Augustinian. Also, he thinks, and with good reason, that the addition was made by Cajetan after reading the written defence presented by Luther, October 14, 1518 (cf. p. 267, n.9). From 1519 to 1521 date his writings on the use of Sacred Scripture, on the institution of the Roman Pontificate and on the propositions of Luther which were condemned by the bull *Exurge Domine:* the 7th, 10th, 15th, 17th, and 28th (pp. 99-153).

Some years later, at the request of Clement VII, Cajetan drew up a memorandum for use by an envoy who was to discuss Zwingli's doctrine on the Eucharist (pp. 154-173). In 1530, and again in 1534, the Cardinal was asked for his views on the marriage of Henry VIII and Catherine of Aragon, a decisive question in the religious future of England (pp. 175-188; 241-244). In relation to the Diet of Augsburg, the Roman Curia envisaged the possibility of an agreement with the Lutherans, based on some concessions. The Pope and a group of his councillors were reluctant to summon a Council, in spite of the urging of Charles V. From another point of view, because of the constant threat from the Turks, the Pope needed to be careful not to alienate the princes who were favorable to the " innovators." He sought from Cajetan, then, advice on possible advances to the Lutherans. Clement VII was interested in at least three of Cajetan's suggestions. It is worthy of note that the idea of dispensing priests of the Latin Rite from celibacy was fiercely fought, for very different reasons, by two laymen: the King of France and the Emperor of Germany (pp. 201-203).

At this time, constantly concerned about Lutheran doctrine, Cajetan composed a series of small works, entitled " Against the Lutherans." The first, written May 3, 1531, is well-known and it has been much used by Catholic theologians. It involves an enigma not yet resolved. Father Wicks indicates its principal elements (p. 287, nn.1-7). The Cardinal knew very well the line to take in answering a work which taught a strictly Lutheran view on the real presence but which rejected the sacrificial value of the Mass and its application to the dead. While, in identifying the sources of the Lutheran pamphlet, it is quite legitimate to appeal to the

Confession of Augsburg or to the *Judicium de Missa* of Melanchthon, it is another thing to try to find in the works of Luther a passage which assembles the texts from the Epistle to the Hebrews on which the principal argument of the Lutherans depends. Indeed, any true argumentation on the subject seems to be lacking in the writings of both Luther and Melanchthon. The book which Cajetan had before him at the time remains unknown until the present day. It should also be noted that the passages of Sacred Scripture to which the Cardinal refers, as well as the form of his argumentation, are much like his way of writing about Zwingli (De Canone Missae Epicheresis, in *Siimtliche Werke*, I, Leipzig, 1906, pp. 288 ff.). The other writings in this series are concerned with communion under both species, the complete accusation of sins, satisfaction, and the invocation of the saints (all themes brought up in the Confession of Augsburg) and, finally, faith and works, one of the principal objects of disagreement between Cajetan and Luther.

The subjects treated by Cajetan are highly varied. Father Wicks relates them both to the events of the period and to the life of the Cardinal. In addition, he makes reference to other outstanding facts of Cajetan's life: the dispute on Averroes and his doctrines at Padua, the reform in the Dominican Order, the Fifth Lateran Council (in which he gave a discourse on the Reform of the Church) . In this area, it is of importance to note that all the editions of the Acts of the Councils from the time of Cajetan (15U) to modern times contain texts that are *mutilated.* Much to be preferred is the edition of Rome, of 1512, which contains the lesser works of Cajetan.

Father Wicks does not pass over the exegetical works of the Cardinal. It has often been said that Cajetan's interest in Sacred Scripture was the result of his meeting with Luther at Augsburg, but Father Wicks shows that this contact had only a secondary influence on the Cardinal's scriptural studies. This seems a truer assessment of the facts of history (cf. A. F. von Gunten, " La contribution des Hebreux a !'oeuvre exegetique de Cajetan," in *Histoire de l'exegese au XVIe siecle: Etudes de philosophie et d'histoire,* 84; Geneve, 1978, pp. 57-60).

It is well to be on one's guard, not to be deceived by the brevity of Father Wicks's work, or by the title of the Introduction, " A Biographical Essay." This author has a complete acquaintance with all the recent studies on the subject which he treats. The bibliography itself is an indication of this fact (pp. 286-258). Every work of any importance is cited. The number and choice of the citations, the questions raised, or even suggested, in these pages show that Father Wicks absorbed and judged intelligently the entire problematic, and that he has given space only to the points which are related to his chosen theme. His presentation is well-balanced and free from polemical spirit. From my own knowledge, I conclude that this biography, in spite of its succinctness, is one of the very best. With some addi-

tions, it merits a separate publication, and it should be translated into other languages.

To present an exposition of the doctrine of Cajetan, to defend it, or merely to judge its value, to say that Thomas de Vio (Cajetan) resolves all the questions which he raises-all these are far from the intent of Father Wicks. His aim is simply to provide those who are interested in the problems of the Reformation with a tool for studying the theological works of one who was a witness of this movement of the 16th century. The choice of Cajetan was a happy one. Grasping the actual climate of the times, without the passions which affected many generations of historians and having a profound understanding of Cajetan's encounter with Luther, the author penetrates to the heart of the teachings of the Legate of Leo X in the innovative movement of the 16th century. Elsewhere, in the present day, one looks in vain, among Protestants as among Catholics, for such a precise delineation of the Cardinal of St. Sixtus, free from superficial or preconceived theses-for example, in G. Henning, K. V. Selge, or 0. H. Pesch. Even so, this is not to say that the author has succeeded in describing perfectly the theological and spiritual viewpoint of Cajetan, nor in portraying exactly its relation to the attitude of Luther. That question remains partially open.

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AN ALTERNATE VIEW-Jared Wicks has made available for the first time in full English translation, or in synopsis, the eleven controversial treatises of Thomas Cardinal de Vio Cajetan, spanning the years 1518-1534. Excellent notes accompany the translations. A brief biography of Cajetan serves as an introduction. Of special interest is Wicks's account of the background and circumstances surrounding Cajetan's meeting with Luther at Augsburg in October, 1518. He provides us with the chronology of the meetings and a summary of the matters discussed. His research does much to put Cajetan's role at Augsburg, and his later involvement in the Reformation controversy, in a new perspective, one most favorable to the Dominican Cardinal.

Eight of the eleven treatises deal with his response to Luther and his movement, two with the Marriage Question of Henry VIII, and one is a critique of the Eucharistic doctrine of Ulrich Zwingli. Readers familiar with the controversial writings of Cajetan's contemporaries, both Catholic and Protestant, will discover in his works a marked difference in style, methodology, and argumentation. They are devoid of all polemics against person-

alities, reveal a conscientious use of sources available to him, are brief and clear. He did not attempt, as did his Catholic colleagues, a line by line response, but rather isolated major dogmatic issues, clarified his opponents' objections, and responded with his own concise arguments.

The treatises dealing with the Lutheran question cover two periods: 1518-1521, the early years of controversy, and 1531-1532 when Cajetan commented on the *Augsburg Confession* and the *Apology* of Melanchthon. The *Augsburg Treatises* of 1518 are in reality a collection of thirteen position papers written by Cajetan for his own benefit in preparation for his meeting with Luther. They reveal his careful analysis of Luther's *Explanation of the Ninety-five Theses,* the *Sermon on Penance,* and the *Sermon on Excommunication.*

In these writings Cajetan discerned two major issues at divergence from Catholic teaching. The first involved a new understanding and description of the nature of justifying faith, which Luther claimed rested solidly on the authority of Scripture. The traditional Catholic formulation of justifying faith as *fides caritate formata* had become in Luther *fides certitudine remissionis peccatorum formata.* Cajetan quickly perceived the far-reaching doctrinal consequences of such a position.

The second point of difference concerned Luther's rejection, on the grounds of the lack of clear scriptural evidence, of the authoritative teaching of Clement VI on the nature, extension, and efficacy of indulgences. Thus in the *Augsburg Treatises* Cajetan responded to various aspects of Luther's doctrine bearing on these two issues. It is significant that at this early date he perceived in germ what will later become the central theses of the Reformation controversy: *sola fides* and *sola scriptura.*

Two treatises of significance followed in 1521. *The Divine Institution of the Pontifical Office* was occasioned by Luther's published *Resolutio* of the thirteenth thesis of the Leipzig debate of 1519, wherein he denied the unique role of the Pope in defining matters of faith. Cajetan's disciplined response, based on carefully selected scriptural and patristic sources, was highly praised by Erasmus.

The ambivalent reaction to Luther's condemnation in *Exurge Domine* of Leo X prompted Cajetan to write *The Five Articles of Luther-A Justi,.. fication for Their Condemnation.* This was a concise statement of formal theological reasons for the condemnation of certain key Lutheran theses, some of which he previously dealt with in the *Augsburg Treatises.*

These works reveal Cajetan's growing conviction that Luther before all else had to be answered by argumentation from Scripture. His experience in Germany had made him aware of the distrust and deep antipathy felt by the German Humanist and early Lutherans toward arguments from Scholastic Theology and Canon Law. To meet the challenge he assiduously dedicated himself from this period on to the study of Scripture, and by the

end of the decade had produced several commentaries of note on the Old and New Testaments.

As Wicks observes, Cajetan's exegetical approach sets him apart from most of his Catholic contemporaries. For example, he insisted, like his master Aquinas, that only the literal sense of the text provides a valid basis for theological argumentation. He also had for his day the rare perception that the Latin Vulgate was a quite fallible translation and needed to be checked frequently against the original. To insure for himself the accuracy of the biblical text he employed Hebrew scholars as assistants, and made consistent use of the New Testament studies of Lefevre d'Etaples and Erasmus. At this time he also advanced a Catholic understanding of the formula *sola scriptura,* the principles for which he had already enunciated in his commentary on the *Summa* of St. Thomas. It was unfortunate for the Catholic cause that Cajetan's scholarly creativity met vehement opposition and only the Pope's intervention saved him from condemnation by the theological Faculty of Paris.

But this study did bear fruit in his treatises of which are a high point of excellence in the controversial literature of the pre-Tridentine period. In response to the *Augsburg Confession* of 1530 he published in May of 1531 *The Sacrifice of the Mass and its Rite-Against the Lutherans.* With arguments drawn exclusively from the New Testament, notably the Epistle to the Hebrews, he offered a solution to the Lutheran objection concerning the sacrificial nature of the Eucharist by showing the unity of Christ's unique sacrifice with the Church's sacrifice, the Mass. Again he earned the enthusiastic praise of Erasmus.

In August of the same year came his treatise on the *Four Lutheran Errors* in which he defended the Catholic position on the question of Communion under both forms, integral confession, satisfaction for sins, and the invocation of the saints.

The treatise *Faith and Works* of addressed questions raised by the *Apology* of Melanchthon concerning the human response in faith to God's gracious action in the human heart. Cajetan's argument included an insightful description of what it means to live in the love of mutual friendship with God, an analysis clearly based on his own exposition of Paul's Epistles and *I John.* Another point of *Faith and Works* concerns the meritorious character of the works of the man reborn by God's grace. In this regard Cajetan utilized as the basis of his response the Pauline theme of the believer's incorporation into Christ. Works are meritorious because they are performed *in Christo et per Christum.*

It would be a serious mistake, however, to limit Cajetan's involvement in the Reformation crisis to a mere defensive and apologetic role. The reform of abuses within the Church, even before the events of 1518, was his passionate concern. Nor was he intransigent and inflexible in his attitude to-

ward the Reformers. His *Guidelines for Concessions to the Lutherans* of 1581 is perhaps the most significant of his Reformation treatises. Written as a memorandum to Pope Clement VII, Cajetan with courage and wisdom outlined a plan for the restoration of the unity of the Church which in his judgment would preserve the essentials of the Catholic faith and, at the same time, make possible an honorable and painless reconciliation for the Lutheran teachers. Based on topics suggested by Melanchthon in the summer of 1530, he proposed, among other things, that clerical marriage in accord with the custom of the Greek Church be permitted for the Germans, that Communion under both forms be allowed in the German liturgy, and that all laws of purely ecclesiastical origin be declared for the whole Church as not binding under serious sin. *The Guidelines* met overwhelming opposition at the Roman Curia.

Wicks gives a probing analysis of why Cajetan had no appreciable influence in changing the course of events in the early Reformation period. His genius itself is in large measure the reason. Two different levels of discourse characterize the dialogue with Luther, especially as regards the 1518-1521 period. Always confining himself to the scientific and formally theological, he failed to perceive and take into account the pastoral and at times deeply religious intent of Luther. In the Reformation war of words Cajetan's disciplined responses had nothing of Luther's passionate appeal to the religious aspiration of the German people. Even his late treatises, with their profound biblical insights, had no impact on the Reformers. They had come too late, but perhaps more significantly, they too were on a different level of discourse. For much of Luther's biblical exegesis rested upon a Christological or tropological interpretation of the sacred text.

His writings did bolster Catholic confidence and self-identity. But he failed to communicate his vision for the renewal of Catholic biblical studies, and to convice his contemporaries that the use of the best of the humanist methods of textual criticism would at the same time effect the revitalization of Scholasticism, especially Thomism. His genius stood alone.

It goes without saying that Jared Wicks has made another major contribution to Reformation studies. *Cajetan Responds* will be welcomed by Roman Catholic and Lutheran scholars who are once more engaged in the task of the reconciliation of the Churches.

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Meister Eckhart, Mystic and Phuosopher. By REINER ScHUID>i£ANN. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978. Pp. 9l69. $17.50.

Have there been five books published in English on Meister Eckhart in this century? The past eighteen months alone have brought us three: C. F. Kelley, *Meister Eckhart on Divine Knowledge* (Yale, 1977); a symposium on Eckhart printed in *The Thornist* (April, 1978); and finally this volume by the professor of philosophy at the New School for Social Research.

Although this book is a translation of a French edition, it owns a fine English style, bright and succinct. Schlirmann recently published in France a book of autobiographical reflections, *Origines,* which attracted wide attention as a first view of life after World War II by a young German. So the author's literary talents enhance this study of Eckhart, for it is aesthetically as well as intellectually captivating.

Schlirmann wants not to explain everything about Eckhart but to unlock the central spark of the mystic: the unavoidably and permanently dynamic Eckhart. "As long as Eckhart's readers attempt to grasp his thought in relations among entities, isolating different philosophical currents like musical motifs, the simple source from which everything springs remains hidden. Eckhart's thinking is such that probably any list of 'theses' drawn from his works will provoke objections and rejectien for diverse reasons" (p. 164).

The format of this book is novel and avoids the labored structure, inspired by dissertations, of a superfluity of quotations and references culled from all the great man's writings. Instead, Schlirmann has carefully chosen three sermons which through exposition and hermeneutic allow the *Meister's* word to emerge and to impress. Each of the sermons contains central motifs of Eckhart's philosophico-theological view of the world and the self: detachment and birth; the quaternity of dissimilarity, similarity, identity and dehiscence; the concluding juxaposition of ontic nothingness opening to the nothingness of the Godhead; and being-born in the being of the Son of God.

Schlirmann points out that these moments are "intensities" for every or for any moment of a person's life; they are not stages in a methodology of prayer or interior ascent. For each of the three chapters exegeting one sermon newly translated, the author provides a second sermon: an expansion upon, an illustration of the teaching in that particular chapter.

The professor at the New School expresses lucidly an approach which has been on the tip of the tongue of other, European scholars. He observes that to remain with a metaphysics of substances is inevitably to be incapable of expressing what Eckhart, as mystic and writer, wants to say.

> Eckhart, no more than any other speculative mystic, thinks of God and the mind as united by some kind of fusion of entities into a common substance; rather,

Got entwird: in the disappearance of the God-Person and of the man-person, in detachment and the great forgetfulness of self, being accomplishes itself. Only this process "is." Breakthrough, on the one hand, birth on the other, are reconciled in the itinerancy of the detached man. (p. 164)

The critical apparatus of the book is sparse, but this should not delude readers and scholars into the opinion that the volume ignores the intellectual sources and milieu of Eckhart. Schilrmann knows medieval thought very well, and his uncovering of Eckhart's words and ideas in Albert or Aquinas is thorough. He unravels and intertwines in a sophisticated way the interplay of Neoplatonism and Aristotelianism in Eckhart. He makes a good case in the final sections for showing that Eckhart finds the different kinds of theories of analogy inadequate for his thought. Schilrmann explains how Eckhart saw true prayer and mystical insight attaining the Godhead beyond God. This "breakthrough" (the word is Eckhart's own creation) to the Godhead-through radical detachment and Zen-like focus upon the present existent-must mean that the philosophical categories which were at hand for the Thuringian Dominican appeared inadequate: not false but inadequate. "The authentic core of Meister Eckhart's thinking is releasement. In the history of ideas, each epoch has its own language, and perhaps releasement precedes its own epoch. Our experience is that it reveals the framework of established metaphysics as too narrow, for releasement is as inexhaustible as being itself .... (There is) an interval in the itinerary of Eckhart into which the theory of analogy cannot reach." (p. 191 f)

No reader will wish that the final pages on Eckhart and Martin Heidegger were absent from this book, but it is not clear why Heidegger enters at this point with such a prominent position. Not that Heidegger has no extensive relationship to Eckhart: as John Caputo's writings also show, he does. Nevertheless, there is a certain aesthetic intrusion as one thinker, among the many influenced by Eckhart, assumes such a major role. Schilrmann's style, not as an author but as a philosopher, resembles Heidegger's. For the reader will find this book to be not only a study of Eckhart but an exposition so lucid and original that it crosses the line from exposition to philosophy.

The final appendix on Eckhart and Zen will lead readers, I hope, to Schilrmann's longer article on this topic in the Eckhart symposium published in *The Thomist* recently.

The book is most controversial and inevitably limited as it reaches its denouement in the question of the Godhead. A valuable discussion of the Neoplatonic influence upon Eckhart's understanding of analogy is interspersed within a slow crescendo leading to the Godhead beyond God.

A perfectly released man literally represents nothing. Being as present and as nothingness arises on the path which Eckhart describes as that of solitude, of the desert and of forgetfulness. Both the philosopher of analogical identity and the

thinker of peregrine identity articulate some kind of presence . . . , Releasement knows that things are there for nothing. Hence nothingness is as valid a title (for God), in Eckhart's ontology, as being." (p. 189)

One can understand that, from the horizon of created beings, God is non-being. Are not, however, some nuances left undeveloped as the pleroma of nothingness in the Godhead is mentioned along with the ontic nothingness of a created, contingent being? How does the nothingness of sin and of grace-enabled apophatic spirituality enter here?

It is rare to find a book on a complicated thinker which is creatively conceived, at times inspiringly written, and always intellectually challenging. A lasting question which the book raises---one which is both superficial and profound-is that of a point of translation. Is " releasement " a satisfactory English word for *Gelassenheit?* Overtones in English from the prefix " re- " unsettle the reader. Is not this German form of *letting* with a syllable of abstraction at either end best reworded as " letting-be? " The author seems to agree, for in the section on Heidegger this English translation is employed.

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Meister Eckhart on Divine Knowledge. By C. F. KELLEY. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977. $18.50.

As readers of this journal know, in recent years there has been a quantum leap in Eckhart scholarship in English. Meister Eckhart has always been a controversial and enigmatic figure, whose works have yielded an astonishing variety of interpretations. It is therefore not surprising to find him once again the subject of intense scrutiny and discussion. Several recent studies have modified our understanding of the fourteenth-century Dominican. Among these, C. F. Kelley's *Meister Eckhart on Divine Knowledge* attempts a sympathetic reconstruction of Eckhart's vision in terms of divine or " principial " knowledge. With this theme as his focus, Kelley uses the full range of Latin and German works to develop a systematic interpretation of Eckhart. He also lays claim to a more than historical inquiry, when he states that the book's purpose is " to introduce the reader not only to the insights of Meister Eckhart, but primarily to the doctrine of Divine Knowledge which, as expounded by him, is to be found in the Word" (p. 16). Kelley thus takes the standpoint of a believer who *thinks with* Eckhart on the theme of divine knowledge.

Kelley claims that the Thomistic influence is decisive for Eckhart, and that Aquinas in tum must be viewed in light of the Pseudo-Dionysius's

negative theology (p. 108). Kelley therefore takes the Neoplatonic strain in Thomas as normative for Eckhart. In particular, Thomas's affirmation of " the isness of Divine Knowledge as supreme Principle " (p. 88) is central to Eckhart, and becomes the focal point for Kelley's interpretation. The foundation of being in divine knowledge is a major theme in the Parisian Questions, where Eckhart states that " God does not know because he is; rather he is because he knows, in the sense that God is unrestricted knowledge and understanding, and knowledge is the foundation of his isness" (p. 174). With this presupposition, Eckhart attempts to preach and write from within the divine intellect and its unity, prior to differentiated, individual being; he speaks not as one on the way to divine knowledge, but as one who has already arrived. Kelley thus defines " principial knowledge " as " the consideration of all things and all manifestations as it were from *within* the Godhead, the unconditioned principle, or *tamquam in p1'incipio infinito"* (p. 250). *Meister Eckhart on Divine Knowledge* is a sustained, well-documented argument for this principal mode of knowing.

We may distinguish the following themes in Kelley's presentation of principial knowledge: the role of knowledge in Eckhart's anthropology; the birth of the Word in the soul; inversion and detachment. First, Eckhart distinguishes between God and the human self primarily in terms of knowledge. God's being consists in unrestricted knowledge, while man's being *qua* individual and creature consists in an unrestricted will to know (pp. 56-58). Second, only the divine Word satisfies the human will to know. As the believing soul receives the Word's revelation, a radical shift of perspective occurs. :For the Word's "birth" in the soul restores it to its primal identity within the Godhead, where the soul becomes one with God himself. Eckhart writes that the Father " begets me as his Son and the same Son ... not only does he beget me as his Son, but he begets me as himself, and himself as me, and me as his being and nature" (p. 129). Kelley notes that this identity is not substantial, but principial; that is, it represents not a fusion of discrete substances, but the original and fecund unity of all things in God, since "that which is in God is God" (p. 100). More precisely, God's unrestricted knowledge embraces all things in its unified act. Further, dwelling within God, the soul comprehends all things in their original unity. As Kelley states, " The end of the intellect is the realization of oneness with the Word, and when this realization is actualized in the ground [of the soul] then all is known principially-' *gleichwie* in the Word.' It is there and only there that the transposition to principial knowledge is effected " (pp. 125-126). The revelation, birth, and reception of the Word thus constitutes the condition and essential content of principial knowledge.

The unity of the Word and the soul requires inversion and detachment. Eckhart distinguishes " a double isness of the creature-in God and in itself" (p. 161). In itself created being remains finite and

and *qua* creature man's knowledge of God proceeds from this individual, subjective standpoint. Principial knowledge, however, inverts this perspective, as it "starts within God and then proceeds to understand all things from the standpoint of divine *insta.sis"* (p. 142). Eckhart's identification of being and intellect leads to a full coordination of the noetic, ontological, and logical dimensions of inversion: the intellect's inversion into the Word as its principle; the ontological inversion of manifest being into the unmanifest Godhead; and in logical terms, the " negation of the negation," that is, the turn to infinite affirmation through negating its restricted-and therefore negative-forms. If we cling to our finite standpoint, this inversion and principial knowledge are inconceivable. Hence, Eckhart insists that only a radical detachment can effect this inversion. Detachment involves " utter dispossession of the self" (p. 217), and acknowledges created being's total dependence on God and nothingness in itself. More precisely, the detached self becomes "poor in spirit": wanting, knowing, and having nothing in itself, the self becomes pure receptivity and "lets God be God" (pp. QQ2-2Q7). In this way, detachment yields inversion and principial knowledge.

Kelley has written a challenging and difficult book. Indeed, *Meister Eckhart on Divine Knowledge* may be a little more difficult than it need be. Its style is somewhat stiff, and Kelley's translations occasionally seem forced. In general, the book's argument could be more clearly delineated. Another problem is a recurring polemic, which interrupts basically sound analyses and makes Eckhart appear more remote from the reader than necessary. On this point, John Caputo's and Reiner Schiirmann's comparisons of Eckhart and Heidegger provide a corrective to Kelley's denial of contemporary analogues to Eckhart's thought. These minor reservations aside, *Meister Eckhai·t* remains a very useful study. It has been painstakingly researched, with extensive notes and a helpful index. From a speculative point of view, the book compels interest not as a definitive study but as suggesting directions for further research. For instance, Kelley's heavily Neoplatonic reading of Thomas is controversial, but may accurately reflect Eckhart's own interpretation of Thomas. Here we see the need for further inquiry into Eckhart's use of Thomas and Albert, and into the Dominican milieu of Cologne. More significantly, Kelley's analysis of principial knowledge provides a powerful, organizing focus that clarifies many of Eckhart's ambiguities. Yet Kelley gives insufficient attention to Eckhart's oscillation between the principial and the distinctively human perspectives. Eckhart himself emphasizes the contrast and tension between the " here " of the human subject and the " there " of its being in God. While detachment and the Word's birth in the soul unify these perspectives, their difference and tension remain in Eckhart's language. In part, the achievement of Eckhart lies in his style, whose vigor, symbolic richness, and

paradoxes enable him to speak from "here" as though from "there." By focusing on prineipial knowledge, Kelley has disclosed one pole of this contrast, and surely for us the more fundamental pole. By minimizing the human standpoint, however, Kelley overlooks both Eckhart's dialectical play between perspectives and his uncanny knack for expressing divine knowledge in human language. A more comprehensive interpretation would attend precisely to those " edges of language " (Van Buren) where the inversion of perspectives occurs. Such an explicitly hermeneutical approach would also involve *thinking with* Eckhart, and would owe a great deal to *Mei.ster Eckhart on Divine Knowledge.*

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Just and Unjust Wars. By MICHAEL WALZER. New York: Basic Books, 1977. Pp. 861. Cloth. $Q5.00.

Modern weaponry, ideology, and disregard for the moral rules dictated by the right to life have combined to made modern warfare savage beyond compare. An important attempt to reestablish the authority of moral rules in warfare has been made in Michael Walzer's *JitSt and Unjust Wars.* This book is a much-needed study of the judgments of contemporary international lawyers and moral philosophers of the justice and morality of modern forms of warfare. Most of the evaluations he presents in this work are correct and accurate, but the moral reasons he gives for many of these evaluations are superficial and obscure because of his apparently positivist view of moral rules and principles (p. 13). Walzer refuses to state explicitly the relevant moral principles that govern the conduct of war, and this must be counted against him. His study would have been more cogent and coherent if he had developed the notions of the community of nations, threat, reconciliation, the right to life and of discrimination in action, and related these more directly to the specific cases he reviewed. I wish to do this and show how an elaboration of these concepts would enhance our understanding of the moral character of some aspects of modern warfare.

He states that the community of nations has rights, and that the violation of these rights constitutes a necessary and sufficient ground for organized political violence (p. 61). He does not state what these rights are, or why their violation is so grave, and what needs to be asserted here is that the community of nations is an interdependent community in which individual member nations can only survive and flourish when their interdependent relationships are just, fair, and equitable. When these qualities

are extracted from these relationships, then interdependent relationships are destroyed, nations cannot flourish, and in some instances, they cannot survive (p. 110). War is a crime when it destroys these interdependent relationships without warrant, and directly threatens the survival of individual member states. No individual state has the right to employ organized political violence to jeopardize these relationships in the absence of a sufficient warrant or due cause.

Because the very vitality of individual states depends on the maintenance of these relationships, it is then the positive duty of all states to promote justice, fairness, and equity in these relationships, and their negative duty to refrain from acts that destroy these values and relations. This negative duty entails the necessity of all states acting so that these values are reasserted if intentional acts of organized political violence have destroyed them. The only moral purpose for the prosecution of war is the actualization of conditions in the power relationship among adversaries which will permit a process of reconciliation to be initiated upon the termination of hostilities which will end in a state of reconciliation and not just " a better state of peace " (pp. 115-6). This is the only morally permissible purpose for the prosecution of war because it alone will reassert the conditions of justice, fairness, and equity in the relationships of interdependency required for the vitality and flourishing of the community of nations. Winning a war will not guarantee the reestablishment of these relationships, but prosecuting it so that a state of reconciliation is realized will achieve this end. War is not morally prosecuted for the purpose of totally destroying the capabilities of self-defense of an adversary, but only so that power relationships may be reasserted that will permit the initiation and successful completion of a process of reconciliation. And soldiers who die in war for anything more than this have died for a morally impermissible objective (p. 110).

The principle which grounds all calculations concerning the morality of war is the principle of the unconditional and absolute claim of persons to the right to life. The rule of war which cannot ever be permissibly overridden is that which prohibits the imposition of threats on those who pose no direct or indirect threat to others. Individual persons, and persons in the associations of nation-states or ethnic groupings, have an absolute and unconditional right to life, existence, and survival. The capability of persons, individually and collectively, to assert radically superior orders of logic, value, and meaning into existence in all domains of human existence is the basis for possession of this right. Claims to this right may be permissibly waived only when heroic, saintly, or conspicuously virtuous deeds are entailed by this forfeiture. Moral agents invalidate their claims to the right to life only when they freely, voluntarily, intentionally, and directly pose a threat to another valid claimant of the right to life. A certainly

permissible condition under which organized political violence may be undertaken is when a threat of this type is proximately and actually present, for this makes the initiation of war identical in morally relevant terms to acts of self-defense by individual persons (p. 12Q). 1£ violence is threatened which is capable of certainly endangering the existence of a state or ethnic group, then the prosecution of war is permissible. Those who have posed a free, intentional, direct, positive, and proximate threat cannot claim the freedoms and protections offered by the right to life because this threatening act directly entails the destruction of higher orders of logic, meaning, and value. Consequently, any act that entails protection for valid claimants is permissible if it does not in turn threaten those who have a valid claim to this right.

These acts of defense, however, must be discriminating to the point where they only inflict violence on those agents who pose the threats. It is never permissible to perform acts or deploy weapons, tactics, and strategies that cannot discriminate between those who pose threat of this nature and those who do not. In war any act that intentionally and indiscriminately kills is a murderous act. And it must be recalled that the intention of the agent does not constitute the moral value of the act, but only contributes to or detracts from its moral value.

I wish to relate these principles to some of the problems Walzer confronts to show why they provide stronger moral reasons for prohibiting certain acts in war. He faces the issue of the conditions necessary for a permissible intervention by a state on the behalf of an adversary in a conflict, and rightly notes that the legalist paradigm is inadequate for determining these conditions (p. 86). In the case of an officially sanctioned governmental act of massacre or massive violation of human rights, it is certainly permissible for other states to intervene to protect those whose right to life is being violated, but it is not obligatory for them to do this. Intervention such as this to protect another's right to life is a conspicuously virtuous deed, and, like all deeds of this type, is non-obligatory. Intervention in this situation is permissible, not because of the manner in which certain acts shock the conscience of humanity, for this is not a moral reason but only a reference to moral psychology. It is permissible when this is the only means available of stopping a massive, positive, and proximate direct threat to those who validly claim the right to life. However, a failure to perform acts of this nature on account of fear is often morally reprehensible. Violent intervention by a state is only permissible when the threat is actual and present, and when it is actualized on account of a governmental policy. If the threat posed is less serious than this, it is permissible to refrain from intervening, and if it is only remote or potential, or if it is the result of the action of a private citizen, then intervention is impermissible.

Walzer objects that the killing of occupation troops by disguised par-

tisans after a formal surrender is an impermissible act of assassination. Because partisans have supposedly abandoned the right to kill after the surrender, Walzer contends that this act of political resistance is murderous. I do not believe that this is as clearly certain as he thinks. For if the partisans' nation was unjustly attacked, then it is not certain that the victors retain a valid claim to the right to life on account of their successful aggression. And the surrender of the defeated nation to an unjust aggressor does not entail an acknowledgment of the validity of the aggressor's claim to the right to life. Hence, killing after the surrender to an unjust attack is not necessarily murder because it is not clear that a valid claim to the right to life has been violated. A valid claim to the right to life does not necessarily attach to victorious but unjust aggressors simply on account of their victory. If this form of disguise is impermissible, then the use of enemy uniforms by commando units should also be prohibited. Any killing done while using this disguise would also be assassination according to Walzer's principles, because of the identity between this and the act of the partisans. I doubt that Professor Walzer would wish to prohibit this form of commando action, but the principle which prohibits partisans from killing occupation troops would prohibit commandos from killing their enemy while under disguise.

The indiscriminate use of organized political violence is correctly condemned by Walzer, but the moral reasons he gives for this are rather weak. The direct, intentional, positive, and voluntary killing of those who surrender, civilians, or neutrals is impermissible because their valid claim to the right to life is violated. And the unintentional killing of these individuals for the purpose of military expediency is either negligent homicide or murder. Weapons that cannot be deployed discriminately, or whose deployment strongly implies the deaths of those with valid claims to the right to life, are also prohibited in these instances. And tactics, strategies, and weapons deployments that pose free, voluntary, positive, and proximate threats to those who pose neither direct nor indirect threats are impermissible violations of the right to life. Reprisals are condemned according to this principle on the grounds that they are unwarranted threats to individuals who are not direct or indirect threats to those making the reprisals. It cannot be assumed, as Walzer does, that wounded combatants have reacquired a valid claim to the right to life on account of their injuries, for they can still conceivably pose a direct or indirect threat if they remain under military command. And those who are directly engaged in the production of weapons or munitions that can only be rationally deployed in a threatening manner may be indirectly and unintentionally killed by attempts to destroy the means by which these are produced. This is the case on account of the fact that the labor of these individuals poses a free, intentional, and proximate, but indirect threat. And because this threat is only indirect,

these noncombatants may not be directly killed, but only indirectly threatened by attacks on the facilities that produce their weapons.

Siege warfare is a particularly difficult form of violence to evaluate because it poses an indirect, but positive, proximate, intentional, and voluntary threat to noncombatants who themselves are neither directly or indirectly threatening. This strategy has the purpose of forcing the surrender of the besieged army by starving it, but it also entails the same threat to noncombatants who are not in any way threatening, and is therefore impermissible. The only type of siege that *is* permissible is that which allows noncombatants to be released and interred in the prison camps of the besieging army, for this does not violate their right to life, even though it does expedite military victory. This limitation is permissible because it is never permissible to obtain military advantages by directly threatening those who have a valid claim to the right to life. Military expediency alone is not sufficient to warrant the violation of the right to life of those who have not invalidated their claim to the right to life.

Walzer's study of the moral character of nuclear deterrence and weapons is faulted by his failure to understand the inherently immoral character of strategic nuclear weapons. This is seen in his analysis of Truman's use of the atomic bomb. Truman justified his use of the bomb against Japan on the grounds that the force it demonstrated saved many Japanese and American lives by making further resistance out of the question. But if he had wanted to demonstrate American power, he could easily called a halt to military operations, and summoned Japanese observers to witness the dropping of the bomb in the uninhabited regions of the Pacific ocean. This would have demonstrated the fearsome power of one plane and one bomb without violating the right to life of thousands of non-threatening noncombatants. In spite of his contentions, the traditional categories of moral discourse apply to nuclear weapons, and they unconditionally condemn their strategic deployment (p. . These weapons are absolutely prohibited on account of the fact that they cannot possibly be deployed in a discriminating manner. Nuclear deterrence is immoral, not because it holds noncombatants hostage, but because it uses weapons that cannot be deployed in a discriminating manner. It is impossible to use these weapons without indirectly and unintentionally posing a threat to those who have a valid claim to the right to life. For not only do the blast and fallout from these weapons threaten presently existing claimants to the right to life, but the effects of radiation threaten those born after the conflict. Nuclear deterrence is an inherently immoral form of deterrence, for it repels threats by means of reprisals rather than by prohibiting military forces from reaching their designated targets. And the reprisals threatened by the use of nuclear weapons are identical in morally relevant terms to any other form of reprisal or retaliation.

The study of the moral dimensions of military command by Walzer is quite valuable, and his point that the moral responsibility of commanders is directly proportionate to their freedom is correct. This principle is an application of the moral rule which holds that the non-possible is the non-obligatory. Walzer notes that commanders must exercise their authority with moral responsibility, but he fails to note that it is exercised on behalf of those who have a valid claim to the right to life. Commanders must assume that orders will be misunderstood, poorly executed, and sometimes disobeyed, and this prohibits them from issuing vague or imprecise orders that do not positively prohibit violations of the right to life of valid claimants. Deaths of these individuals that result from imprecise, vague, and ill-defined orders must be considered as negligent homicide.

Much of *Just and Unjust Wars* is devoted to studying the notion that some actions that violate valid claims to the right to life are permissible when they are required by military necessity. Walzer rightly contends that most often the principle of military necessity is invoked for the purpose of reducing risks to military personnel or to expedite swift victory. While combatants and noncombatants may use any means available against those who pose unwarranted threats, these means must not threaten those who pose no threat. In conditions of extreme emergency, those who do not pose threats may not be attacked directly or indirectly, intentionally or unintentionally, for they still retain a valid claim to the right to life. Military necessity cannot warrant direct attacks on those who pose no threat, and if these noncombatants are caught in combat zones, discriminating weapons, strategies, and tactics must be used to protect their valid claim to the right to life. For it is never permissible to pose proximate threats to those with a valid claim to the right to life if discriminating but costlier tactics, strategies, and weapons may be deployed.

Walzer's work is flawed by an inadequate theory of the structure of the international community and by the absence of explicit elaborations of the moral rules and principles that govern the evaluation of organized political violence. This is not entirely his fault in that the explicit purpose of his work is that of analyzing contemporary positivist theories of international law. The defective character of these theories is seen most clearly in situations of military necessity and extremity where its rules and principles collapse into act-utilitarianism. Walzer's work remains, however, the most complete and comprehensive study of the morality of war to appear in this decade.

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Thinking About Religion: A Philosophical Introduction to Religion. By RICHARD PURTILL. Englewood Cliffs, N. Y.: Prentice-Hall, 1978. Pp. 175.

Richard Purtill's *Thinking About Religion* leaves the reader without the slightest doubt concerning its thrust. He attempts to defend, with the strongest arguments and best methods of justification, the crucial beliefs of Christian religion. Reacting to a current climate of everyday religious opinion which he perceives as "... a generally more emotional and less intellectual approach to religion in recent generations ..," (p. xi), his book is a challenge not only to skeptics but to believers who would hold that religious beliefs are not subject to rational scrutiny and who are wary of entertaining arguments offered by the agnostic or atheist. The book is especially directed towards students whose perplexity leads to the position that religious belief is, finally, an irrational "leap of faith." Purtill indicates that these students "need to understand why anyone holds any religious belief and to consider whether there are grounds for holding one set of religious beliefs rather than another" (p. xii). Therefore, I believe the central question which implicitly unifies his entire book is the following: "Is it *reasonable* to believe in God and an afterlife?", where "reasonable" suggests an appeal to proof, justification, reasoning, and evidence. His answer is an unqualified "yes."

But the reader should not conclude that Purtill's text is merely an exercise in proselytizing. The structure of discussion in each chapter is always dialectical. Positions are met with objections; objections are met with counter-objections. Purtill attempts to be as fair as possible to each aspect of a dispute.

Although Purtill indicates that his book covers "a somewhat different range of material than the usual introductory book" (p. xi) in either "Philosophy of Religion" or "Introduction to Religion," the range of topics is, for the most part, still rather standard. After an introductory chapter which describes "Religion Today" and "Why don't we believe anymore ...?," there are chapters on the problem of evil, arguments for the existence of God, miracles, the historical nature of the Bible, and life after death. Those topics discussed which Purtill conceives of as "different" from the normal range of material are, I suppose, those considered in chapters on eastern religion and "mysticism and drugs," chapters which, I might add, are the weakest parts of the book. There is little discussion of such standard topics as the nature of religious langauge and the relationship between faith and reason.

As with Purtill's former book, *Thinking About Ethics*, each chapter begins with a story or parable "designed to arouse student interest and to raise questions which lead into the discussion of the topic of the chapter"

(p. xii). I found these introductory parables for the most part satisfactory, and I do think that they might provide a helpful teaching instrument; but at least two of these stories reflected a lack of balance which would conflict with the pedagogical intentions of the author. The story introducing the chapter entitled "Knowledge of God: ls God Really Dead?" presents the "Death of God" theologian as a modish immature young man who could not stand up to a devastating attack authored by a more experienced critic, leaving the student with little doubt about who "won" the intellectual skirmish, while the story introducing the chapter on eastern religion is almost a parody of helpless young souls who mindlessly embrace a foreign tradition.

While I cannot discuss the entire range of topics treated by Purtill, I will consider the two topics examined at greatest length by Purtill (he spends two chapters apiece on each): the existence of God and life after death. He indicates that "Historically this describes the central core of belief in the two major Western religions, Judaism and Christianity, and in the Near Eastern religion which most resembles them, Islam" {p. 12-18). Additionally, I found Purtill's discussion of each topic to be the most interesting parts of his book.

The introductory chapter provides a solid foundation for the later discussions. In a clear and nontechnical style (which is characteristic of the entire book), Purtill wonders "Why Don't We Believe Anymore ...?" and offers three typical reasons often cited: the failure of the arguments for God's existence, the problem of evil, and the incompatibility of the scientific perspective and the religious *Weltanschauung.* **It** is the supposed incompatibility of science and religion which dominates the discussion in Chapter l, and it is Purtill's response to this problematic which provides not only the core of that argument for God's existence which Purtill defends but also an underlying motif throughout the book. Purtill suggests that many people are hesitant to embrace religious beliefs because "... questions about the existence of God or about life after death cannot be settled by methods like those of science ..." (p. 4). But, he responds, there is no reason to think that only scientific methods can settle any question, and an appeal to scientific method to support such a claim obviously would be question-begging (p. 4). In fact, Purtill argues, it is the success of science and the universe itself which is properly explained by God's existence.

> The existence of science as embodying successful techniques for dealing with the universe and apparently successful techniques for understanding the universe can be taken as a piece of data: a fact which itself needs to be explained. The religious believer has an explanation for the success of science; in his view the universe orderly and understandable because it has been made by an intelligent Being and made in such a way that we can understand it and learn from it about its maker. (p. 7)

Not only are science and religion compatible, but the metaphysical hypothesis of God's existence is, according to Purtill, the only satisfactory ultimate explanation for the success of science.

Purtill comes back again and again to this same theme. In chapter 4, he presents a combination of the traditional " cosmological " and " teleological " arguments as the " strongest possible argument " (p. 57) for God's existence. Arguing that there must be a *necessary* being which "always exists whether [or not] anything else exists" (p. 54), he says that the necessary being could *not* simply be the material universe itself. In so far as the material universe is not just a random collection of things, only the supposition that an intelligent Being brought it about explains the order of the universe. I'lence, Purtill argues that "... the view that the universe was created by God seems to be the only view that accounts for all the facts, that gives reason a place, that leads us to expect continued regularity and understandability in the universe " (p. 57). Unless we admit the existence of God, we fall into hopeless skepticism: "Arguments of this kind try to show that unless God exists the universe is not finally understandable" (p. 57). Or, we are" trying to convince the critic that he must choose a view which admits ultimate explanations, or else give way to skepticism " (p. 59). Finally, even in his discussion of miracles, he comes back to the same point: " If we really accept the idea that our minds were the accidental result of the workings of mindless forces, we should be haunted by doubts as to whether our apparent understanding of the universe is illusory " (p. 69). Positively, his defense of a "cosmological-teleological" argument is a forceful and compelling discussion in which the student will clearly see that the order and intelligibility of the universe provides at least *some* rational support to the *metaphysical* necessity of positing the existence of God. Negatively, although certain objections are offered, Purtill does not discuss some of the more obvious replies to his argument, e.g., Hume's criticism of the teleological argument.

Purtill's discussion of "Life after Death" (Chapters 9 and 10) is a curious blend of philosophical argumentation and unabashed speculation. First, he attempts to show that the notion of disembodied survival *is* intelligible by responding to some current objections to this notion. For example, critics claim "... that there is no criterion or standard of personal identity which does not depend on bodily continuity" (p. 129), and mental criteria are also inadequate. Therefore, since the believer cannot properly explain what constitutes the uniqueness of the individual soul, the notion of disembodied survival is unintelligible. Purtill responds by defending two criteria for personal identity: the "personality pattern" criterion and the "body animation capacity" criterion (p. 129-80). He sums up his argument by saying the following:

> Though these two criteria are not the ones we use now, it is plainly reasonable to identify as me a future disembodied person with memories identical, with mine,

with my unique personality pattern, and with the capacity to re-animate a body recognizably mine, which began to be conscious at the very instant of my death. While it might be logically possible that this individual is not me, it would be irrational to hold that it is not me. (p. 132)

Purtill ends his discussion of " Life after Death " with a chapter which attempts to " make real " for the believer what life after death would be like. He thinks that a major barrier preventing some people from believing in life after death is their inability imaginatively or reflectively to conceive of this as a real possibility. He speculates that" ... our perception of time and the operation of our memory in life after death might be different from anything we can experience now ... " (p. 138), because our relation to time would be fundamentally changed, seeing or experiencing our past "by somehow participating in God's ' eternal now ' where past events are still present" (p. 141).

As I have already noted, I found two chapters the weakest parts of the book: that on mysticism and drugs and that on eastern religion. First, in the chapter on " Mysticism and Drugs," Purtill argues that "... the kind of experiences which could in principle be induced by drugs would differ in important ways from what are understood to be mystical experiences within the religious tradition" (p. HW). Certainly a discussion of mystical experience is appropriate in a book like Purtill's, but one wonders whether relating this to " drug experiences " warrants an entire chapter and whether this is a capitulation to a false canon of relevancy. Second, the chapter on" Eastern Religion " is *extremely* weak. While attempting to compare and contrast western religious beliefs with " eastern " beliefs, the generalizations are so large concerning " Eastern Religion " that Purtill ends by saying things that either require qualification or are plainly inaccurate. I will give two examples. 'While criticizing eastern notions (God, soul, Karma, reincarnation, which are never adequately explained), he says" ... we run up against the Hindu and *Buddhistic* idea of the identity of atman and Brahman " (p. 104, emphasis mine). Of course, one of the most important ideas concerning even an *elementary* understanding of Buddhism is the Buddha's initial rejection of pre-Buddhistic (especially Hindu) notions of soul and God and his outright rejection of the Hindu notion of *atman* with his doctrine of *anatta* or no-self. In addition, Purtill indicates that" ... defenders of Eastern religion have shown little tendency to give rational arguments of any kind in support of their beliefs " (p. 107). I think this is plainly false, and ·indicates that little, if any, attention has been given by the author to the vast tradition of eastern philosophy and religion. There are many other examples of misleading or inaccurate statements in this chapter, especially when his statements do not accord Buddhism its unique stance.

Overall, Purtill has written a clear, interesting, and challenging book in the philosophy of religion. I predict a substantial classroom success for the

text, although I would hope that he will correct the numerous inaccuracies in the chapter on " Eastern Religion."

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The Ideas of Newman: Christianity and Human Religiosity. By LEE H. YEARLEY. Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978. Pp. xii + 188. $rn.5o.

Interpreting Newman is no easy task. He is such an original and personal thinker that commentators all too frequently find themselves with inadequate categories for analysis. His fate at the hands of the late 19th- and early 20th-century scholastic writers is well documented. The sectarian nature of his conversion from Anglo- to Roman Catholicism often puts many critics in clearly opposing camps. Finally, the very power of his rhetoric and the clarity and candor of his spirit beg some kind of engagement that often enough clouds scholarly objectivity.

By setting his study of Newman in the larger context of comparative religious studies, and by applying the methodologies of that discipline, Lee Yearley provides a fresh and provocative reading of one of the most important thinkers in the history of Christianity. At first blush, the title, " The Ideas of Newman," might seem either naive or presumptuous. Quite the contrary. The author's purpose and focus are sharply set. He addresses himself to an understanding of Newman's life-long foe: religious liberalism. By moving away from traditional theological methods and applying those drawn from the comparative study of religion, Yearley is able to sort out Newman's key ideas, to eliminate or explain apparent contradictions in his thought, and to pull together under the name" Liberal Religion " many of his disparate statements on liberalism. Most importantly, this study highlights Newman's stunning relevance to the religious predicament of our own time. This is one of the most valuable studies of Newman to appear during the past twenty years.

In Chapter 1, "Natural Religion," Yearley examines what he calls "human religiosity," the basic human potential for religion. Key to all of Newman's thought is his belief that human nature is naturally religious. This approach clarifies what might seem a contradiction in Newman's use of the term " natural." Sometimes he opposes " natural " to supernatural. At other times " natural " refers to that which is characteristic of human nature. Thus when he writes of Natural Religion in the *Grammar of Assent* he speaks of our natural capacity for fulfillment through a religious experience of God. At other times he insists that this natural capacity

is merely nature, i. e., impotent without supernatural grace. The characteristics of this religious type (Natural Religion) are: providence, prayer, revelation, sacrifice, and the mediatorial power of a holy person. In showing how Newman formulates these characteristics Yearley suggests how closely he anticipates the thought of writers like Eliade and Van der Leeuw. The chapter is an admirable summary of all Newman says on religion in general and contains a superb study of his tenet that conscience is central to the religious experience.

Chapters and *3* examine Christianity according to two further types of religious ideas one finds in Newman: the fulfillment model and the authority model. These are both types of revealed religion as opposed to natural religion {needing the supernatural) . The fulfillment model is more irenic and stresses the continuity of religious growth. The authority model is more divisive and stresses or at least implies the discontinuity inasmuch as revelation "intrudes" into the human process. Here Newman develops his idea of the economic communication of revelation and the process of "assimilation" which is one of the characteristics of true doctrinal development. Yearley finds one major difficulty in Newman's use of the fulfillment model: his unawareness, not to say ignorance, of other world religions than Judaism and the classical Graeco-Roman religions. He thus feels that, if Newman had made a distinction between phenomenological and historical preparation for the fulfillment of human religious potential by Christianity, he would have been on safer and more consistent ground in facing the problems posed by the claims to truth by other religions and by the difficulty of tracing the historical connections in the gradual " economic " unfolding of revelation to mankind through the ages. In using this fulfillment model Newman thus stresses Christianity's completion and perfection of human religiosity (natural religion) but would have been unable to face, methodologically, the claims of other religions to do the same.

The second religious model Yearley finds in Newman is the authority model. In this model human religiosity is completed not only by the revelation of a revealing deity but by the eventual investing of that revelation in one absolute religious authority. It is in Newman's espousal of this type that Yearley finds the greatest conflict and contrariness in his thought. First of all, it is hard to reconcile this with the fulfillment model. Secondly, even Newman in his insistence on submission to absolute religious authority was increasingly riled by the actual situation within the Roman Catholic community. To remedy this Newman began, largely in correspondence and unpublished writings, to make a distinction between an ideal church authority and the reality of 19th-century Roman Catholicism. Yearley admits, however, that Newman's genius consisted in survival during a period of profound cultural transition between the old and the new and that his temperamental affinity was to a religion that allowed a dynamic tension of opposites rather than one that moved toward total resolution. Thus,

along with liis stress on conscience, Newman always felt quite comfortable with the ultimate mysteriousness on which true religion focused.

In the next chapter, on" Liberal Religion," Yearley pulls together Newman's many diverse statements made over a period of forty to fifty years. In doing this he constructs a composite picture which he sets up as still one more religious "type," Liberal Religion, which has six "principles: (1) human nature is good; private judgment is obligatory; (3) deity is a principle discoverable through examination of evidence; (4) revelation is a manifestation not a mystery; (5) useful goods are primary; and (6) education is salvatory." He then applies Newman's views, positively outlined in the first three chapters, to this religious type and shows quite convincingly how even when rejecting aspects of liberalism Newman was sensitive to its sincere efforts to make religion acceptable to the modern age and did himself lean toward certain valid "half truths" it contained. The conflicts pointed out between the fulfillment and authority models again surface when dealing with these six principles of Liberal Religion.

A final chapter evaluates two aspects of Newman's analysis: "the relation of Christianity to other religions and the view that Liberal religion deforms humanity's religious potential." In dealing with these points Yearley uses further religious models: "(1) one religion is true and all others are false; a single essence underlies all religions; (3) one religion is the fulfillment of all others; and (4) a plurality of true religions exists and a person just affirms one." Yearley suggests that these theoretical models be looked at in this way: the first two models ate poles of a problem that the second two models try to solve. In the final analysis Yearley sees Newman reflecting the fulfillment model and moving toward the plurality model. This conclusion is persuasive when one considers the great stress Newman put on the centrality of conscience and the validity of internal perception. While Yearley cannot accept totally Newman's attempt" to affirm both the sacral quest and the sacral foundation," he does agree with his assessment of liberal religion's inability to fulfill human potential and states that he pevhaps more than any other religious thinker has moved toward a validation of the sacral quest and sacral foundation type of religion for moderns.

Lastly, the book provides a healthy antidote for Harold L. Weatherby's *Cardinal Newman in His Age* (1973), which wrongly argues that Newman relinquished traditional Christian theology for modernist ways. And it deals in a more structural way with matter covered by Stephen Prickett in his recent admirable study, *Romanticism and Religion* (1976). No student of Newman can afford to miss this excellent analysis of the key ideas that underlie all of his writings.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

Beauchesne: *Theologie de l'agonie du Christ* by F-M Uthel. Pp. rn4; 24.Fr.

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