SEGUNDO'S LIBERATION THEOLOGY vs. AN ESCHATOLOGICAL ECCLESIOLOGY OF THE KINGDOM

JUAN LUIS SEGUNDO, S.J.'s five-volume work, a *Theology for Artisans of a New Humanity,* represents a major effort to expound the fundamental tenets of liberation theology, and to delineate in a systematic fashion the effects of that theology upon the various branches of Christian thought.

It is not without reason that Segundo started off his series with a volume on the Church: *The Community Called Church.*[1] For Segundo, the primary Christian crisis today is one of faith, rooted in the apparent alienation of the faith experience from the problems of the modern world. For Segundo, "Why do I believe? " and " In what do I believe? " cannot be separated from the lived experience of the faith's response to the problems of the day. It is in answer to this need, therefore, that Segundo proposes a theology of the Church that will " demonstrate that the content of our faith is a valid response (in faith) to the real problems that form our history" (vii-viii) .

What we propose to do in this article is first to examine the major elements in Segundo's ecclesiology; secondly, to suggest that his views, while acceptable, do not go far enough; and :finally, to propose our own eschatological ecclesiology of the kingdom as a more complete explanation of the role of the Church in the world, and in fact, more adequate to present needs.

Two *caveats* are in order. By his own admission, Segundo does not propose to present a complete theology of the Church. Nor does he mean to imply that" the issues about the Church not treated here are considered less important or less certain" (ix). In spite of his warning, however, it is hard to believe that other dimensions of the Church not treated in his work could

[1] Maryknoll, N.Y., 1973. Page references from this volume will be noted within the text.

be understood to have the same importance in his eyes as those presented here. Whether this is the case or not, however, our purpose is still useful, since we are proposing elements of Christian ecclesiology which we feel *must* be present before a treatment of the community called Church may in any sense be considered adequate.

Secondly, it is probably impossible in the long run to critique Segundo's ecclesiology without treating at the same time his sacramentology. But that will be too much for one article. We hope to write at a later date on that subject. However, since Segundo himself separates his treatment of the Church and his treatment of sacraments by three volumes in his series and by three years between publication, it is probably not improper to understand him to say that each of the volumes may to some ,extent stand separately, and may to some extent be treated separately. This article, therefore, shall be directed only towards treatment of Segundo's ecclesiology.

Segundo's Theology of the Church

Segundo's theology of the Church represents an attempt to answer the question: why the Church? " What is the infinitesimal Christian community supposed to do within the vast community of mankind? " (4) . This is a major question for Segundo because he sees the role of the Church essentially against the larger background of God's universal salvi:fic operation. Segundo's problem, then, becomes how to accept a traditional conception of the Christian community as made up of those who are to be saved, if this can possibly mean that God has condemned all the rest of mankind since the dawn of history that nev.er belonged to this community. But if, on the other hand, God has not so condemned them, why the Church? The point is, then, to explain the role of "a community that is so small compared to the whole human race " (loc. cit.) within God's larger plan of universal salvation.

Segundo begins by proposing that the Church is a *particular*

community at the same time as it is *universal*, and that the early Church simultaneously affirmed both characteristics of the Church and a theology of salvation related to each. The particular theology of salvation is affirmed in Mark 16:15-16: " Go into the whole world and preach the gospel to the whole creation. He who believes and is baptized will be saved; but he who does not believe will be condemned" (8). According to Segundo:

> Here we have a very clear line of thought about salvation, in which salvation appears to be conditioned by the fact of entering the Church through faith and baptism, through faith in Christ's preaching, and through the sacrament which makes one a part of the Church. Salvation is attributed to this (8).

The universal conception of salvation Segundo finds in the last judgment scene in Matt 25:31-46. As Segundo understands the text, Jesus is saying to all humanity" What did you do for me when I was hungry, thirsty, alone, and mistreated? " and he is awarding " eternal life " to all those who " showed true love, that is, to those who truly aided the God-made-man." According to Segundo, such actions are " divine, supernatural actions, and yet required of all men and can be found in them." But the essential point for salvation, according to Segundo, is that the actions are "invested with love ": "The merit of the things they did for other human beings, invested with love, reaches the God who is brother of all and brings them to eternal life " (9-10).

Thus, according to Segundo, " One line of thought attributes salvation to a universal factor such as love; the other attributes it to a particular factor such as entry and permanent membership in the ecclesial community" (10). How, then, are the two dimensions to be synthesized? Segundo's answer to this question provides him with the two-pronged of the role of the Church and formal membership in the Church within God's universal plan of salvation: 1) Christians *know* what non-believers may live in self-giving love but do not know; and 2) Christians carry out God's mission to be a *sign* to the world

of what they know-a summons to the non-believer to receive the enlightenment of the gospel, i.e., the conscious, explicit awareness that creative, self-giving love is the constructive principle in God's saving plan for history. Let us briefly consider Segundo's treatment of each of these points.

The Role of Knowledge

> What distinguishes the Christian ... ? The answer is obvious. Only one thing does: the Christian will not be surprised by the criterion used to judge all men. He will not ask the Lord: When did I see you? For if he is a believer, he is precisely because he has accepted the revelation of this universal plan which culminates in the last judgment. The Christian is he *who <ilready knows.* This, undoubtedly, is what distinguishes and defines him (11).

The point of differentiation for Christianity, according to Segundo, is rooted in the historical actualizing of the universal mystery of salvation in Jesus Christ: "While Christ is a particular reality in terms of his human life, his mystery takes in the universality of human beings" (15). As Segundo sees it, the mystery of salvation is what Paul described as the " divine plan, hidden but universal in its operation, that runs throughout history" (27). That mystery, according to Segundo, has both an historical and universal Incarnation and Redemption. The historical Christ, " the new Adam," the " reconciler of all history," established "a real, original relationship with every single human being" whereby he" engraves the feature of sonship on the face of every human person." As Matt *25:* 31-46 clearly indicates, " All human history has touched his heart." As a result, the historical Incarnation is only the" actual carrying out of the mystery of Christ's Incarnation in a specific time and place ... [as] the visible, historical moment of the universal mystery of his personal relationship with the whole of human history" (14) .

The Redemption is roughly understood in the same way. Its importance is to be found in the fact that it realizes within history the goal of God's plan," allowing human beings to share God's own life in and through Christ" (13) . God's plan is

eternai though it " has its moment in history for fulfillment " (Eph 1: 3-10) (13) . "While Christ is a particular reality in terms of his human life, his mystery takes in the universality of human beings " (15) . Through the " great salvific happening" of Christ's" passover," we are made members of his body and " live the divine life." Because " Christ is the only one who has made this passageway," we "participate in this new creation when we are incorporated into him":

it is through Christ and through communion with his life that human existence is enabled to flourish in accordance with the Father's will. Everything subsists in Christ, and in him everything finds its supreme source of fulfillment, significance, and value (15).

The meaning of the Church is derived from its relationship to the historical and universal mystery of Christ's Incarnation and Redemption. What happens with the historical Christ is the revelation of the mystery of the universal saving reality of Christ. So with the historical Church, there is revealed-made *visible* and *knowJr-the* Church as a universal saving reality. Segundo's words are worth citing here in full:

Thus God's plan has an empirical aspect, which is *salvation history.* This history finds its origin in Abraham and reaches its culmination in the earthly life of Christ. After Pentecost, the paschal Christ continues his visibility and presence in the Church, which is "a visible assembly and a spiritual community" (GS 40). The Mystical Christ (i.e., the Church as a particular reality) and the Cosmic Christ (the Church as a universal reality) are inseparable aspects of the one and only Christian reality. They differ only in terms of faith and the sacraments (visible signs and awareness of the Christian mystery); they do not differ at all in salvation content. Both are inseparable, as are the sacramental sign and the grace signified, as are the historical Christ (who is particular and visible) and his universal salvation mystery. The paschal Christ is the Mystical Christ and the Cosmic Christ at the same time. The Church, as a particular reality, is the conscious and visible sign of the presence of Christ the Savior in the heart of each human being (the Church as a universal reality). Thus by starting with the incarnate Christ and his mystery, we make clear the distinction between, and the inseparability of, the particular reality and the universal reality of Christ's Church (15).

The essential ingredient establishing the relationship of the historical saving Church and the universal reality of salvation is explicitly revealed, according to Segundo, in the Johannine statement that " God is love " (1 Jn 4: 8, 16) . This is the revelation to us by Christ, who is, in fact, God's gift of himself and his very own life to us. Only as a result of this divine gift are we capable of giving of ourselves to others. As a result, anyone's practice of self-giving love in effect indicates that such a person is a recreated being:

> any love man shows for his fellow men, however simple it may be, is divine in origin thanks to the timeless gift God has given to all men. It is therefore supernatural in itself and conducive to eternal life.

Thus it is that the " *object* of all real love between human be·-ings is God as well as the person loved " (25-27) .

Just as the particular Incarnation and Redemption have their universal dimensions, so does God's self-giving love in Christ have its universal dimension in the *"mystery* . . . that runs throughout history . . . from the beginning of humanity to its end" and surpassing all time (27-28). This universal saving love of God becomes historical, however, " in the sense that it [the message of the gospel] lets us know about God loving and operating in humanity and humanity acting with God *even though men may not know it"* (29: italics added) .

What, then, has changed since the time of Christ? According to Segundo, it is that there is now *knowledge* of God's saving plan: " *knowledge* of this loving plan operating as a mystery ... is at work solely from the time Christ came into human history " (28) .

We prescind for the moment from the question of whether or not Segundo is able to retain the historical importance of the death and resurrection of Christ if he understands that event to be only the " visible, historical moment of the universal mystery" of salvation (14). Our question is: what effect does Segundo's understanding of the universal mystery of salvation, present in God's self-giving love and now revealed by the his-

torical Christ, have upon the role of the Church? The answer, in effect, is simply that the Church is the means to make this universal mystery of salvation *known.* Segundo repeatedly argues that there is no salvific advantage to being a Christian. There is only *knawledge* of that which is already amply available to mankind:

> [T]he Church is the consciousness of humanity as it were. She is humanity arriving at full awareness of what is taking place in it (Q9-30).
>
> [The sacrament of baptism] not only confers grace on the Christian [as does baptism of desire] but also *signifies* it: it lets us know it. In essence and mission, the Christian is he who knows, he who is acquainted with the hidden reality of God's gift which passes our way without men knowing it (31).
>
> All men travel the same road, and it leads to salvation: it is the road of self-giving through love. The journey is common to all men. . . . The only thing is that some people on this road, through God's revelation, know something that relates to all; they know the mystery of the journey (SQ).

Mismon Through Sign of Self-Giving Love

The Church that has this knowledge, according to Segundo, has a second essential characteristic: its mission toward the world. For Segundo, the second characteristic logically follows from the first. For once we have ascertained that the Christian community is the community of those who know God's universal saving mystery in Christ-that salvation is in self-giving in love-the question arises as to the value and import of this knowledge. What purpose does it serve the Christian? The answer is that it creates the Church as *mgn* to the world of the Good News of salvation in love. Thus the Christian community's role is to engage the world in *dialogue* regarding the basic questions of meaning in life, and to *respond* by *sign* to those questions, through a life of witness to the world that the fullness of meaning is found in self-giving through love. The difference in the Church is that its practice of saving love is "tied in ... with faith and the sacraments," whereas that which is required of humanity in general is "simply real love" (52) (cf. Matt 25:31-46).

Segundo is thus led to consider the question of the necessity of the Church. For if the saving process of real love is available to the world in general, is the Church really necessary? What is given there over and above what is available outside the Church? According to Segundo, in the Church, the

> dawning of conscious awareness, explicitation, and reflection ... is not simply a higher perfection but a whole new world. It is the world of the human where man plays out what he once played out on the level of instinct [!?]; it is a system of relationships which, through their signification, affects and determines the very roots of life (54).

But how precisely does this" conscious awareness" make a difference, Segundo asks himself. The answer: only in terms of the essential contribution of the Church to the world *(55).* That contribution is seen in terms of the outside world's unconscious movement of self-giving love as a" preparation for the gospel." The role of the Church is to bring that journey forward to" an encounter," in dialogue "between a question that is moving forward and the 'good news' ('gospel') that is waiting hopefully (LG 16)" *(55).* Thus the non-Christian is seen as one who was ever seeking " the good news that the Christian had to give" (56) .

Segundo goes further, however, by arguing that if this saving love, available on the level of humanity in general," is to overcome its intrinsic obstacles, ... [it] must pose questions and encounter the corresponding answers that can only come with full-fledged faith" (56). Why? What does the Christian revelation provide, that this general human love and general beginning-faith experience that resides in it does not have? Segundo argues that the knowledge of the revelation provided by the historical Christ brings an essential experience of certainty of hope, assurance of the worthwhileness of the journey, and courage to persevere to its end:

> The most demanding question of love has to do with its trust and *hope.* Is love worth the effort, when it is so probable it will be shipwrecked? ... The result of this crisis of hope is that ... [one

does] not invest in the experiment the *decisive and total resources which love would require to be truly victorious* (57-58; last italics added).

Rahner points out that ... Even though a person may not allow for the whole scope and hopefulness of Christian love, the very fact that he lives among men who *do love with full-fledged hope and unreservedly will often cause him to resolve his doubts in favor of love.* This love will have been *fully fleshed out,* and it is *for this purpose alone that God revealed his mystery to men* (60; italics added).

This *process of maturing experience* in the bosom of a truly human relationship causes the believer and the nonbeliever to traverse the same road, forcing upon them the same obligations of authenticity and communication. In this process speech and language go through a deep ascesis until the person truly arrives at the major question indicated above ["Who are we? "]. It is at this latter point that one can insert the proclamation of the Good News. Without *this process of dialogue,* without *this growth in authenticity,* and without *this experience of communication,* the proclamation of the faith is in danger of being turned into an ideology or a myth that is unacceptable to our contemporaries (68; italics added).

The Church is, then, a sign because it " has been placed here precisely and exclusively to pass on to men a certain signification, i.e., a message, something to be grasped, comprehended, and incorporated to a greater or lesser degree into the fashioning of history and the world" (81). Thus the primary purpose of the Church is not to be understood in terms of its own members, but rather, as directed toward the good of those outside the Church:

The primary preoccupation of the Church is not directed toward her own inner life but toward people outside. Unlike other organizations founded for the benefit of its own members, the Church is a community sent to those who live, act, and work outside her own narrow limits (81).

To be a Christian is to belong to a community that has been sent into the world (81).

Does any saving purpose reside in the Church, according to Segundo, through its internal life with its members? No. Segundo states: "the Church only aids the salvation of those who

belong to her when their membership corresponds with the function that the Church is called upon to exercise with regard to the rest of the human race" (82). For Segundo, membership in the Church is saving only insofar as it is lived in responsible proclamation of the Good News to the world outside the Church and in dialogue with that world. As soon as life in the Church is " detached from this responsibility " and lived " for the benefit of those who have availed themselves " of the interior life of the Church," then membership in the Church becomes a backward step on the road to salvation. It becomes another form of egotism " (83).

In sum, the Church is a *sign* to the world of what the Church *knows.* The Church expresses that sign through its mission of "service of humanity" (131), leading the world, already" moving toward the ' illumination of the gospel,' " to the enlightenment to be found there (125). The Church takes up the mission of responsible proclamation of its knowledge to the world through its life and dialogue with the world. In this way, the Church shares in the world's creative process by which it is built up out of love (111), and provides the " *leaven* and *salt"* and drive (86), the conscious awareness which is necessary in order to lead the world onward in a life of personal self-giving in responsible love that terminates in the fullest realization of a life of union with God.

Critique

It is not difficult to find many fuzzy areas in Segundo's theology of the Church, not to mention his redemptive Christology. It is the fuzziness of the latter that forms the basis for the imprecision and uncertainties in his ecclesiology. For if salvation is to be found universally in love expressed in self-giving, it is truly difficult to determine what precisely Jesus's death and resurrection added to that process of salvation other than exemplary causality. It is not enough to argue, as Segundo does, that only in the historical Christ is the saving" passover" made possible, when at the same time he argues for a mystery of

salvation present in the whole of human history, which, in the last analysis, is God's universal saving gift of himself to mankind in love. Once Segundo summarizes his redemptive Christology in this way as the particularizing of universal salvation, he can find nothing left for the Church to do but to *know* this (whereas non-Christians can only live it) and responsibly to seek to convey this knowledge to non-believers. But then Segundo has a new problem of trying to indicate clearly what the value of this knowledge is, and he is never able to do so. To say that it leads to greater security in hope or certainty of the road to salvation may be true but it is hardly adequate, especially in today's world where the role of the intellect so often goes unappreciated. We are living in an age that gives priority to *life* and *action* over knowledge. The average non-Christian would rightly question Segundo at this point: what difference does it make whether or not I explicitly know I am on the road to salvation in Christ, as long as I live the life of self-giving on that road? To argue that doubts are resolved through the Christian revelation (60), or that greater possibilities for self-giving are available in this way (58) says little to an age that has come to live comfortably in the midst of uncertainty, and is already living enough of a life of comfortable concern for others to get by satisfying the demands of Christian self-giving.

But it is our purpose here to speak directly to Segundo's theology of the Church and his two-pronged conception of its life of *knowledge* and *sign.* We do not wish to argue that Segundo is wrong in deciphering the role of the Church in this way; we wish, rather, to propose that his ecclesiology does not go far enough, for the following reasons:

I) To begin with, Segundo has fundamentally erred by setting his study of the significance of the Church within the context of the process of attaining salvation. For once he has done this and then looks at the Church, he is almost immediately faced with the question: is the Church necessary for salvation?, and, since he will want to argue that membership in the Church is not absolutely necessary-otherwise what is to be said of all those billions of people who were never in the Church-he is

forced to conclude that one can be saved while not formally being a member of the Church. This then leaves him with no alternative but to affirm that the Church's function is to explicitate the already existing journey of history toward salvation. Thus with the Church comes explicit knowledge of salvation, whereas without the Church there is only implicit knowledge of salvation-implicitly known wherever self-giving love is present.

But I would propose that the heart of the theology of the Church is not to be found against the background of the problem of salvation, though that is surely involved, nor that the role of the Church is simply to explicate what is already unconsciously present in history. One should begin one's study of the Church by seeing the Church first in terms of *an interpersonal relationship b'etween God and Christian believers through Jesus Christ.* The Christian faith experience is not ultimately a process of salvation, but an encounter with God in an interpersonal experience of him through Jesus Christ. It is that experience that indeed *concomitantly* brings salvation, for salvation is to be with God forever in Jesus Christ, but the person of Christ simply cannot be replaced by a process of salvation. The salvation dimension that comes with sharing in God's life, therefore, should never overshadow the fact that Christianity is ultimately rooted in a faith experience with Jesus's Father and with Jesus himself as God's Son and Messiah. Jesus ultimately challenged his hearers to be believers, not to be conscious of what they already implicitly knew.

The difference is hardly an insignificant one. For if in fact Jesus called his disciples through faith to an interpersonal relationship with his Father through him, then, indeed, that is ultimately what is to be understood as the fundamental dimension of the faith experience as we enter into it today, and it is that relationship which is not found outside the faith experience. We might refer to the difference between the believer and the non-believer as explicit faith ("I believe in Jesus Christ") vs. implicit faith (" as often as you did it for one of my least

brothers, you did it for me" [Matt 25: 40]), but such words belie the fundamental difference between life in the Church and life outside that community. When speaking of interpersonal relationships, there is quite a difference between an explicit one ("I know you and love you") and an implicit one ("his/her actions indicate a presence of knowledge and love though he/she does not know it "). True interpersonal relationships are simply not re-presented on an implicit level. They must be made explicit if they are really to be entered into, if there is truly a life to be shared there. It is in fact once they are explicitated and consciously shared in that an obvious difference occurs in the lives of the two who have encountered each other, and it is then that knowledge has its role. For if I know something explicitly, I am able to allow it to enter into and to affect my life in a way barely possible otherwise. Knowledge does make a difference in our lives-especially when it is interpersonal-because I am then able through that interpersonal relationship to realize new levels of human communication and attain depths of being as a person not available on the implicit level. In terms of the matter of salvation, there may be no significant difference there -both may equally be saved (more on this later)-but since human beings are ultimately not things to be saved but persons who attain levels of experience and depth of life through interpersonal experience, understanding the Christian faith experience ultimately in terms of interpersonal relationships constitutes a fundamental difference.

2) Segundo fails to understand fully the *significance of knowledge* as used in the Scriptures. Granting that the Christian community knows what the non-Christian does not know, we must insist that this knowledge brings to the community more than intellectual perception and conviction of purpose. What Segundo fails to bring out is the existential depth that comes with the knowledge of the person of God:

> Knowledge for the Semite is more than a recondite process of understanding because it involves an existential relationship. To know an object is to have a completely real experience of it .... Knowl-

edge of God is attained ... when man shares in God's covenant (Jr 31, 34) and is gradually led to close acquaintance with God.[2]

Knowledge for the Hebrew came in and through *faith,* and to have knowledge or to have faith was to be rooted in the truth. A believer was one who, through knowing the truth, stood as it were on firm soil, and derived solidity, strength, and firmness in life from that position. Not to be in the truth or not to have faith was to believe that one does know the truth when in fact one does not. It is to live as if one is standing on solid ground, when in fact one is standing on sand. It is to have no firmness, no solidity, no support in one's life. On the contrary, one who is in the truth is in touch with reality as it really is. The effect is that the believer derives a *power* from that contact that is otherwise unattainable:

> The summary of God's word is *'emet,* stability and solidity (Ps. 119:160); his promises too are 'emet-they " hold " and possess a carrying capacity on which the whole of man's life can be built as on an unshakable foundation (Ps. 11) .... The people who refer to God in this way have not discovered his solid reality as a static quality, but have experienced him as a dynamic reality proving itself in history. Truth will manifest and impose itself in the future as an unassailable and steadfast reality .... God is the protagonist of history. His mobilizing and leading presence is a most impressive *bearer* of his people's existence.[3]

In terms of the Judea-Christian faith, this means that one who believes in the God who has revealed himself in Jesus Christ shares in the power of God's life, and derives all the strength and stability of his/her life from that existential union with God. It is that power that becomes operative in the believer's life and transforms the quality of his/her future activity. Not only can the believer go forward in history with a power not otherwise available to human beings, but the believer can *transform* history with a power that is simply not present in the same way and to the same degree to the non-believer. If

[2] Xavier Leon-Dufour (ed.), *Dictionary of Biblical Theology,* rev. ed. (New York, 1973), p. 296. Hereafter, Leon-Dufour.

[3] S. J. Heijke, *The Bible on Faith* (De Pere, Wisc., 1966), pp. 6, 8.

knowledge leads to action, as it surely does, then it is simply not possible, under ordinary circumstances, to have the same quality of transformation of history present in the non-believer's activity as is available to the believer, *if* the believer takes advantage of the power of life that is available to him/her in and through that belief. This is surely not to deny a power of life in the activities of non-believers, but it is not the same as that *available* to believers if they choose to live deeply in their faith.

Unbalance is derived from the fact that believers so often do not in fact have existential depth in their knowledge-it is often purely intellectual-and because non-believers, in spite of their lack of knowledge of God in Christ, nevertheless in one way or another are brought into some kind of relationship with Christ through what they do know, or through the compatibility of their lives with Christian living. Matt 25: 31-46 is indeed helpful in this respect, because it indicates a true power that comes to the non-believer from a life of self-giving even though the non-believer does not *know* the true significance of his/her activity. Such non-knowledge could never, however, be said to lead to the same power and effectiveness that activity through knowledge *can* have, nor is there any basis from Jesus's words in Matt 25: 31-46 to imply that. For the Hebrews as well as the early Christians, life from beginning to end was rooted in the power that comes from a life of faith in God, and without that power, there was nothing but aimlessness or power without power.

The man who has faith in God becomes a collaborator with the almighty, since he is not only His creature but also His image (Gn 1, He testifies to this collaboration especially in the domination which he exercises over land and beast (Si 17, Far from cringing before the forces of nature, man ought to master them, a task which he can accomplish if he remains submissive to his Creator in humble trust.

Paul echoes Jesus in teaching that by faith man opens himself to the power of salvation in the gospel (R 1, 16). Faith wins "the knowledge of Christ, and the power of His resurrection, and the fellowship of His sufferings" (Ph 8, 9f). Jesus crucified saves the

believing faithful. For them He is the power of God (1 Co 1, 18.23£). For the weakness of God is stronger than men, and His power manifests itself in the frailty of His witnesses (1 Co 1, 25; 2 Co 12, 9) .... For they have put their belief in the power of God who has raised Christ from the dead (Col 2, 12; 2 Co 13, 4). They are powerfully fortified by His Spirit (E 3, 16) which makes their words the Word of God and communicates to them the power of the divine Word (1 Th 1, *5;* 2, 13). In them acts the incomprehensible grandeur of the divine power which surpasses every thought and expectation (2 Co 4, 7; E 1, 19:ff; 3, 20) .[4]

3) The fact that there is power that comes with faith-a power that is rooted in the believer's share in the life of God-becomes a basis for affirming, against Segundo, that a) there is a *salvation component present in the life of a Christian* which is not simply derived from the Christian's entrance into the Church's mission toward the outside world; and b) this salvation experience is not simply to be explained as no more effective for the attainment of salvation than is the process of salvation available to the non-believer in self-giving love.

As we have already noted, Segundo argues that "the Church only aids the salvation of those who belong to her when their membership corresponds with the function that the Church is called upon to exercise with regard to the rest of the humap. race" (82). That is simply not true. What Segundo fails totally to comprehend is the internal value, majesty, and effectiveness of the Church's life upon its members. In short, what Segundo has totally misunderstood is the role of the sacramental activity of the Church, as we hope to indicate in a subsequent article. Segundo, in his bias toward social activism, roots the total life of the Church in what must be understood as *an* important, but nevertheless only *one* important dimension of the life of the Church. If in fact the Spirit of Christ creates the Chl1rch, and those who are living in the Church are members of the Body of Christ through the power of his Spirit, it makes no sense to argue that that life has no specifically internal saving features.

"Leon-Dufour, pp. 439,

Segundo once again fails to appreciate the importance of interpersonal relationships. A limp analogy may help here. Surely one would never decipher the significance of a human interpersonal love relationship by its effect upon the lives of those outside the relationship, although surely that effect cannot be underplayed in view of the fact that no two human beings may ever be comprehended apart from their lives in the larger community. At the same time, the primary *raison d'etre* for the love relationship-the first area of significance for the love relationship-must be found in terms of the internal life created by that relationship. What happens is that a new creation is formed, by which each of the two members shares intimately in the other's life. That relationship has an effect on the life of each of the partners that simply is not available to either in any other way-not even through a different interpersonal relationship that might have come from a contract with a different marriage partner. The person is in himself/herself irreplaceable.

In terms of the new community formed between believers and God through Christ, a new relationship is established, and this relationship presents its own internal *possibilities* for growth and eternal union that are simply not specifically the same as the life of salvation experienced in the Church's responsible carrying out of its mission toward the world, nor are they the same as the salvation experience available to the non-believer in the implicit process of salvation he/she unknowingly undertakes in self-giving love. The internal life experience has unique characteristics beyond the salvation components available on either of the other two levels. This is not to deny that both in the explicit and in the implicit relationship with God, as well as in the Church's mission activity toward the world, salvation is a proper component. People involved in each type of relationship might equally be saved. But the question here is one of *objective possibilities* for union with God involving salvation. These possibilities are explicitly present in the explicit relationship with God in Christ in faith, and this relationship presents greater objective possibilities for life through the human partner's conscious knowledge of them and subsequent engagement

with them. These possibilities cannot be said to be equally present and available to the human partner who is not conscious of them in the case of the non-believer, nor of no significance apart from the mission life of the Church. The power of these resources is available to the person who has knowledge of them and who can through that knowledge put them into effective expression in his/her internal life of union with God in Christ in his Church.

Segundo catalogues numerous texts from Vatican II to support his one-sided insistence upon the importance of the mission life of the Church (GS cf GS I, 11, 40, 43). What Segundo fails to do is consider all the texts that argue as well for a greater vitality in the internal life of the community of Christ. May we note one text which explicitly sees the mission dimension only realizable if the life of the Church is internally in proper accord:

> Thus, missionary activity among the nations differs from pastoral activity exercised among the faithful, as w.ell as from undertakings aimed at restoring unity among Christians. And yet these two other activities are most closely connected with the missionary zeal of the Church, because the division among Christians damages the most holy cause of preaching the gospel to every creature and blocks the way to the faith for many. Hence, by the same mandate which makes missions necessary, all the baptized are called to be gathered into one flock, and thus to be able to bear unanimous witness before the nations to Christ the Lord. And if they are not yet capable of bearing full witness to the same faith, they should at least be animated by mutual esteem and love (AG 6). (Abbott translation.)

LG 3 notes that in the Eucharistic celebration the " unity of all believers who form one body in Christ (cf. I Cor 10: 17) is both expressed and brought about." In LG 4 Vatican II clearly emphasizes the vitality and power that is present to the faithful in their own interior life:

> The Spirit dwells in the Church and in the hearts of the faithful *as in a temple* (cf. 1 Cor. 3: 16; 6: 19). In them He prays and bears witness to the fact that they are *adopted sons* (cf. Gal. 4:6; Rom. 8: 15-16 and The Spirit guides the Chureh into the fullness of truth (cf. Jn. 16: 13) and gives her a *unity of fellowship* and service.

He furnishes and directs her with *various gifts, both hierarchical and charismatic,* and *adorns her with the fruits of His grace* (cf. Eph. 4:11-12; I Cor. 12:4; Gal. 5:22). By the *power of the gospel He makes the Church grow, perpetually renews her,* and leads her to *perfect union with her Spouse* (italics added).

Christ is seen in the liturgy to be proclaiming his gospel to his faithful (SC 33), thereby bringing them to a greater unity with the" worshiping Church of heaven" (LG 50). Let it be noted that bishops as "shepherd's of Christ's flock" are to be ready to " lay down their life for their sheep" and to " lead the Church to ever-increasing holiness" (LG 41). Moreover, God has chosen " to make men holy and *save them* not merely as individuals without any mutual bonds, but *by making them into a single people,* a people which acknowledges Him in truth and serves Him in holiness" (LG 9; italics added) . I am suggesting that, in these texts, it is not the primacy of the mission to non-Christians that Vatican II had in mind, but the primacy of the internal mission Christians have toward one another, and the vitality of the life of union with Christ that comes through that life.

Segundo apparently could find little Scriptural support for his thesis. Chapter 4 of his work, most specifically devoted to the question of justifying the function of the Church regarding the non-believing community, labors over 1 Cor *5* as a justification for his position, where Paul argues that a deviant Christian should be separated from the Christian community, but not that the Christians should "separate themselves from *pagan* sinners " (79) . But the text was hardly intended by Paul to lead to the conclusion Segundo draws from it, that the "primary preoccupation of the Church is not directed toward her own inner life but toward people outside" (81). The fact is, it is only rarely that the early Christian community turned to a consideration of their responsibilities outside the community, and then only to " baptize " and " make disciples of all the nations " (Matt 28: 19) .

Avery Dulles, S.J., has, as is already well known, amply and accurately argued" how little the New Testament makes of the

Church's responsibility toward the temporal order," that there is nothing in the New Testament to indicate that "there are people called to the Kingdom without also being called to the Church" (a point notably ignored by Segundo), and that the New Testament Church is seen as " existing for the glory of God and of Christ, and for the salvation of its members in a life beyond the grave. It is not suggested that it is the Church's task to make the world a better place to live in." [5]

Perhaps more typical of the theology of Paul is the idea of baptism into the death and resurrection of Christ, leading to the death of the old self and the birth of the new (Rom 6). This new life is manifested precisely by the new-found relationship of each member of the community to every other member, which destroys old barriers to life and creates a new unity of life in Christ:

> Each one of you is a son of God because of your faith in Christ Jesus. All of you who have been baptized into Christ have clothed yourself with him. There does not exist among you Jew or Greek, slave or free man, male or female. All are one in Christ Jesus (Gal 3:26-28; cf. I Cor 12:27-31).

If Paul proclaims the gospel-as he surely does-it is to draw non-believers into a saving relationship to Christ through their baptism into the saving Body of Christ. There is little suggestion in his writings that he ever had any other intention in mind. He does not conceive of the proclamation of the gospel for any other purposes. It is wrong, therefore, to suggest that there is scriptural basis for the thesis that there is no saving significance in the Christian life apart from its mission to non-believers. Rather, the fullness of the life of salvation is present only when the saving life of Christ is entered into within the life of the Church (I Cor 10:16-17) for the loving encounter with Christ by the Church's own members, *and* in view of its mission toward those outside the Christian community. There is no reason for emphasizing either to the exclusion of the other. But even then, the mission of Paul toward the non-believer is under-

[5] Avery Dulles, S.J., *Models of the Church* (New York, 1974), pp. 94-95. Hereafter, Dulles.

taken to draw the non-believer into the fullness of the life experienced within the Christian community and not to a faith experience in Christ apart from the community.

An Eschatological Ecclesiology of the Kingdom

It is for these reasons that I would like to alter Segundo's conception of the Church by proposing a far different perspective-one which Segundo seems almost completely to have ignored. I would see the Church in terms of the larger horizon of the eschatological realization of the kingdom of God, and then understand the Church as the eschatological community revealing and promoting that kingdom.[6]

A more adequate conception of the Church, then, would see the role of the Church in its relationship to the eschatological coming of the kingdom of God. Such a Church would not live for itself, but rather, for the kingdom that is to come. The Church would not preach itself as its goal, would not demand adherence to itself as the goal of human history, but would call for adherence to that which is the goal and the meaning of human existence, namely, the realization of God's kingdom. If the mission of Christ was to proclaim and to call all people to the kingdom, then the Church can do nothing more and nothing less than to carry on that same mission by proclaiming and calling all people to the kingdom.

The Church therefore does not directly call all people to itself but to the kingdom. The Church calls people to itself only insofar as the Church is identified with those who have explicitly been chosen to designate within history the call of the kingdom and who explicitly within history live out a life of designated members of the kingdom. This does not necessarily imply that those who are in the Church will attain the kingdom,

[6] Segundo does state: "The community called Church has, as its fundamental mission, the transmission of the faith. It is commissioned to proclaim that the Kingdom is already here in our midst. In our day this perennial task of the Church entails fundamental obligations" (67). So far as I can determine, this is his only consideration of the Church in reference to the kingdom, and hardly an adequate one.

for they must live a life of responsible membership, but as formal members of the Churoh, they are at least designated as having heard and accepted the call to live a life of responsible membership for the kingdom. Christians thereby enter into the fullest *knowledge* of and present *experience* of a life in union with God in Christ. Thus the call to membership in the Church is an integral part of, though it does not replace the call to, membership in the kingdom. The Church can never make itself a substitute for the kingdom. The Church can never work for its own glory but only for that of the kingdom. Thus it is not simply membership in the Church that is the goal of the Church, nor is membership in the Church a guarantee of membership in the kingdom. The goal of the Church as Church is nevertheless membership in the community of those who have been chosen to live a life of fidelity to Christ and his kingdom in the hope of becoming full-fledged members of that kingdom.

As a result, the Church has at least three functions: 1) to proclaim to the world the fact that history has become eschatological; i.e., history's terminus is not determined by the limits of time and space. The Church proclaims that there is a God who has revealed himself in Jesus Christ and has called all people to a life in eschatological history, which begins with the historical Jesus and ends with the parousia; 2) to live a life of responsible witness to the fact that history is now eschatologically oriented; and 3) to begin to realize-already now-the life of the kingdom within its own life of community. Though Segundo would probably not disagree with the first two functions we have indicated here-for his Church is one which proclaims the Good News through responsible service-he fails to integrate his perspective into the larger context of eschatological history and the theocentric dimension that comes with God's plan to realize *his* kingdom. Nevertheless, it is the third function of the Church's life which we have indicated here that has been especially overlooked by Segundo.

The Church is not simply a witness to the world of the fact that history is eschatological, nor does it simply point the way to the eschatological terminus of history, nor does it i;imply

proclaim the Good News that history is eschatological, but it already now *anticipates* within its interior life the life of the kingdom. Segundo speaks of the Church as a Church " capable of super-charity " (121). But the Church is surely something more than that. It is *anticipation* of the kingdom. We are using the word anticipation here to mean that which precedes something else and gives a foretaste of that thing that is coming; it is an *advanced experience.* Thus the Church is a foretaste of the life of the kingdom. The Church is supposed to give an advanced indication of what the life of the kingdom will be like. This the Church does by being, already in its interior life, evidence of the character of the life of the kingdom. If the Church is not the embodiment of the kingdom, it is at least " the initial budding forth of that kingdom " (LG *5),* the present anticipation of the life of the kingdom. This the Church does by letting shine through it the present power of the life of the kingdom: by living in conformity with the proclamation of Christ, by its sacramental life of baptism and the Eucharist, .and above all by its life of community: the overcoming of the forces of loneliness, deprivation, and oppression which destroy the wholeness of life, and the creation of reconciliation, cooperation, and harmony among human beings which promote wholeness of life. It is the grandeur of this life of community which is to be a sign of the power of the Good News to the world, at the same time as it is an advanced indication of the life that all are to know in the eschaton. The Church is thus meant to be a visible embodiment that pre-views, or makes possible a pre-view, of the life of the kingdom. But this pre-view makes visible, not only to the outside world but also to its own members, the transformation of history into the eschatological age.

In view of the fact that the Church anticipates the kingdom, the Church is also essentially composed of members who may already now be designated by anticipation as *freed.* Because Christians are already now designated for the kingdom, it follows that they are already now defined by their membership in that kingdom and may no longer be defined by their membership in any other "kingdom." Thus it follows that they are *by*

right freed from being rightfully subjected to any lesser power or reality than the kingdom of God: that is, they are freed by right from enslavement to any lesser institution, creed, doctrine, principles, dictatorships, or ruling powers-any forms of subjection or enslavement to anything less than the eschatological kingdom of God (including enslavement to themselves or even, by chance, to the Church) . Christians are by right no longer slaves of sin, death, and the Law under any form. They are no longer to be victims of idols that would claim power over them. They are freed to be themselves before God. Their only subjection is to God and his will for them (Rm 6: 22); but God's will for them is that they be free (Gal 5: 13) .

They are therefore no longer determined by the judgments of human beings upon them. A value is no longer placed upon their heads insofar as they fulfill the prescriptions of any human moral or legal code. They are no longer insignificant beings because their talents are not recognized by humans, any more than they are more worthy human beings because people choose to place a value upon their talents. In other words, the judgments of human beings no longer have any rightful or determining power upon their lives (1 Cor 4: *1-5;* 6: 12) . Christians are what they are, not on the basis of any human determination of their status, worth, or import, but on the basis of their being chosen for membership in the eschatological community of God, and it is that choice and destination that makes them free *for* God and free *from* any lesser reality that would try to prevent them from attaining their destiny in God. Thus if there is any anthropocentric concept that may be said to summarize most completely the gift of God to human beings, it is the fact that he has *made them free.*

Now it is true that Christians are members of the freed community of God not simply for their benefit, but for all mankind. That fact is not to be ignored, in a total picture of the life of the Church. Nevertheless, while the " living God " does intend to be the "savior of all men," he is the savior "especially of those who believe" (1 Tim 4: 10), and that salvation experi-

ence is already rightfully and meaningfully shared in a special way by Christians in their internal life in the Church.

Perhaps the whole matter is best summed up by Avery Dulles in his *Models of the Church.* Dulles argues that the Church, by becoming the " visible expression " of the " actual event of grace," " achieves itself " the " more widely and intensely the faithful participate ... in the actions of the Church whereby men are bound together" in the sacramental life of the Church.[7] The direct "beneficiaries " of the Church's life, then, are " all those who are better able to articulate and live their faith thanks to their contact with the believing and loving Church." It is by the members' life in the Church that " their own spiritual life is sustained, intensified, and channeled in constructive ways." Yet Dulles also argues that "As believers succeed in finding appropriate external forms by which to express their commitment to God in Christ, they become living symbols of divine love and beacons of hope in the world."[8] While Dulles argues to some value in each of the models of the Church outlined in his work, he also holds that the sacramental model "has special merit": "It preserves the community value, for if the Church were not a communion of love it could not be an authentic sign of Christ."[9]

In other words, it is because the Church so intensely enters into its own internal life of union with God in community that it can best hope to carry out its mission activity to the world. The two aspects of Church life should never be disassociated, and the one intimately involves the other. But if primacy is to be placed anywhere, it is upon the building up of the internal life of the Church in its Spirit-filled communion with God in Christ. If the Church is going to have anything to proclaim in its mission to the world, the Church has got first to experience it. And to bring out the importance of that internal experience has been the whole point of this article.

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[7] Dulles, p. 64. [8] Dulles, p. 67. [9] Dulles, pp. 186-87.

KANT ON THE TUTELAGE OF GOD AND NATURE*

Any ATTEMPT TO discuss the Kantian philosophy in terms of the success or failure of specific doctrines, such as the distinction between phenomena and noumena, is premature unless guided by an understanding of what Kant refers to as its *architectonic-the* systematic unity of the various modes of knowledge expressing a prephilosophical Idea which serves as the norm for the possibility as well as doctrinal components of philosophy as metaphysics. As stated by Kant:

> By an architectonic I understand the art of constructing systems. By a system I understand the unity of the manifold modes of knowledge under one idea. This idea is the concept provided by reason-of the form of a whole-insofar as the concept determines *a priori* not only the scope of its manifold contents, but also the positions which the parts occupy relatively to one another. [1]

Kant's architectonic thus becomes a hermeneutics for judging the doctrinal components of his metaphysics as they issue from its Idea. That this Idea is *a priori* points to its prephilosophical (i.e., pretheoretical) origin. And the locus of the prephilosophical is the realm of practice. The Kantian Idea thus concerns the ground of human aotion, for the eros toward metaphysics springs from the " ultimate aim of reason," which is " no other than the whole vocation of man, and the philosophy which deals with it is entitled moral philosophy." [2] Kant's metaphysics is thus a metaphysics of morals since man's moral calling-resting on the two pillars of the categorical imperative and practical autonomy-is its *a priori* beginning. It is in this

*For much in this article I am indebted to my former teacher Peter Van Nuis.

[1] *Critique of Pure Reason,* translated by N. Kemp Smith (New York, 1965), B860. Hereafter designated "CPuR ". This crucial heuristic is reiterated in the Preface to the *Critique of Practical Reason.*

• *CPuR,* B868.

light that we must evaluarte Kant's theoretical assertions, the most problematic being the duality of phenomena and noumena. For while it is true that Kant's purely philosophical arguments turn on this distinction, the Kantian architectonic forces us to recognize that this central bifurcation has its ground in turn in a practical and not a theoretical obligation-the categorical imperative as the overriding metaphilosophical norm. This is shown by Kant's analysis of metaphysics as a natural disposition.

The possibility of philosophy as metaphysics is expressed in a two-fold manner: a) as a theoretical science and b) as a natural disposition. The former is shown to be impossible since pure reason desires what it cannot achieve-a science of metaphysics on a par with the sciences of physics and mathematics. Consequently the question becomes, as in the *Prolegomena*, " Is metaphysics possible at all? " since reason encounters antinomies and dialectical illusions when reaching for the Absolute. However, despite constant failure the attempt nonetheless persists. The possibility of metaphysics thus shifts to its possibility as a natural disposition. That is, we do not ask (as with physics and mathematics) how metaphysics as an actual science becomes possible. We ask, given the perpetual frustration, how metaphysics arises as a natural disposition and in wha:t way this disposition is to be properly directed. The answer to both questions is reason's practical employment. The origin and content of metaphysics is man's eithical nature.

The metaphysical questions-God, freedom and immortality -are the ethically most significant questions since " these ... in turn refer us yet ful'lther, namely, to the problem of *what we ought to do*, if the will is free, if there is a God and a future world." [3] What we ought to do, of course, is obey the categorical imperative. The primacy of practical over theoretical reason is likewise reflected in the ordering of the questions concerning the three metaphysical issues:

[8] *Ibid.*, BS!lS.

1. What can I know?, which points to absolute first cause.

What ought I to do?, which points to freedom as the ground of the moral law.

3. What may I hope?, which points to the transcendental ground of a reconciliation of morality and happiness, the supreme good. [4]

The first question (What can I know?), which is "merely speculative", is answered negatively by the *CPuR.* Knowledge is limited to the sensible and its lawfulness since the Absolute transcends our power to understand. However, since we are driven at the same time to think the unconditioned we find our reason in the awkward position of positing thinkable but unknowable objects. But this is precisely the positive function of the limitation of the understanding, for it permits pure reason to exceed the bounds of sense without contradiction when positing noumena. As Kant explains, " though we cannot *know* these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in position at least to *think* them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears." [5] The noumenal reality of God, freedom and immortality requires and follows from the curbing of theoretical reason's transcendent pretensions, such that Kant finds it" necessary to deny *knowledge,* in order to make room for faith." [6]

The answer to the second and central question (What ought I to do?) is the command to become worthy of happiness by obeying the moral law whose unconditional validity is a " fact of pure reason." This Kantian prime directive assumes the form of a command because in this life morality and happiness are frequently in tension.

The answer to the third question (What may I hope?) addresses this tension by holding out the hope of a coincidence between morality and happiness by means of a divine agency.

[4] *Ibid.,* B832-3.
[5] *Ibid.,* Bxxvi.
[6] *Ibid,.* Bxxx.

This is the function of Kant's moral theology and exposes a possible tension between the unconditional moral demand as the answer to question two and the possibly heteronomous concern £or happiness as the answer to question three. More generally, this is the problem of explaining human action in terms of morality and nature.

The aim of metaphysics as a natural disposition is thus to account £or the categorical demand of the moral law by a doctrine of transcendental freedom and the expectation of happiness proportional to morality by a rational faith in God. At the same time the purity and dignity of the moral law requires that metaphysics be free from the tutelage of God or nature, an anticipation of man's practical autonomy as the Idea animating Kant's metaphysics. The following examination of this metaphysics is therefore undertaken to estimate whether this dual tutelage is in fact escaped. The issues to be treated are a) the dual perspective of freedom and nature as an account of human action, b) the autonomy of the will, and c) the moral theology and the supreme good.

Our starting point is what £or Kant is an unconditionally valid" fact of pure reason "-the moral law:

> The moral law is given, as an apodictically certain fact, as it were, of pure reason, a fact of which we are *a priori* conscious, even if it be granted that no example could he found in which it has been followed exactly. Thus the objective reality of the moral law can be proved through no deduction, through no exertion of the theoretical, speculative, or empirically supported reason ... Instead of this vainly sought deduction of the moral principle, however, something entirely different and unexpected appears: the moral principle itself serves as a principle of the deduction of an inscrutable faculty ... This is the faculty of freedom, which the moral law, itself needing no justifying grounds, shows to be not only possible but actual in beings which acknowledge the law as binding upon them. The moral law is, in fact, a law of causality through freedom and thus a law of the possibility of a supersensuous nature : .." [7]

[7] *Critique of Practical Reason,* translated by L. W. Beck (New York, 1956), pp. 48-9. Hereafter designated *"CPrR* ".

The dogmatic (i.e., uncritical) beginning of Kant's metaphysics is a prephilosophical fact-pure practical reason. From this fact follow the reciprocal doctrines of the obligatory consciousness of the moral law and freedom as the reality of the noumenal self.

As Kant explains in the *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals,* the journey to the noumenal commences with the good will as the mark of practical autonomy. For unlike natural gifts the use of his will is that for which man is totally responsible. Since it allows man to transcend the heteronomous aspects of his nature the autonomy of the will accomplishes both purity of form and freedom of action. Kant thus declares that the good will, though not the complete good (which is morality plus happiness) , is the highest good. Particular goods and talents are good by qualification, i.e., when used by the good will which as such is unqualified good. However, since its goodness consists in obeying the moral law, perhaps it too is a qualified or derivative good. Kant avoids this seeming dependence of the good will on the moral law by showing that the moral law is a self-imposition by the good will. The sentiment of respect mediates between consciousness of and willful subjection to the moral law. But since such a will, which contemplates the law and wills it into being out of respect, in so doing is a good will, the problem of the evil will is a serious difficulty for Kant's account. To account for the possibility of the evil will the autonomy of the will must not be constrained by the sentiment of respect when thinking the moral law, such that both good and evil become, *ex nihilo,* existential choices. The will is thus situated, as Nietzsche says," beyond good and evil". The freedom for evil thus undercuts the " fact " of pure practical reason. This can be avoided by taking the Kantian path of identifying the will with the good will via the spontaneous feeling of respect for the moral law as conceived, but as the price of relegating evil to ignorance or the subhuman. In any case, this is Kant's beginning. And since the law is not imposed upon us by either God or nature it is absolute.

To anticipate a problem to be treated below, this same absoluteness and purity of the moral law raises a question about its possible *modus operandi*. This is not the frequently mentioned charge of heteronomy, which I shall try to show is groundless. It is rather the problem of content. For at this point all we know about the moral law and the good will is that they are tied to the notion of a rational being as such. To act under the moral law is to act under the form of rationality as such, i.e., unconditional universality. The categorical imperative is a formal test whose criteria are universalization and noncontradiction. But the material to be so tested has its source in the morally heteronomous desire for happiness which supplies the content (if not the norm) for every candidate maxim. Since all men as men constitutionally pursue happiness and all men as rational beings obey a categorical imperative which as such is neutral to happiness, the universalization of maxims is impossible, i.e., unintelligible, detached from their origin in man as a natural being. To repeat, the threat here is not heteronomy but the lack of material for universalization in order to avoid purity of form coupled with sterility of content. Sacrificing form to content produces heteronomy, whereas assimilating content to form equates happiness with morality. Since both are rejected by Kant he must find a way of informing the categorical imperative with non-heteronomous content, i.e., specific moral decisions, if not directives.

The Kantian suggestion is that content, i.e., a specific course of action, follows from the *proper* form. After all, the formality of the categorical imperative is precisely what allows it to encompass a multitude of diverse contents. As Kant explains:

> There is, therefore, only one categorical imperative. It is: Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.[8]

From Kant's own point of view the issue concerning the categorical imperative is not whether it can bridge the gap between form and content but whether such an imperative is in fact

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 89.

possible. In order philosophically to save morality from the heteronomy of man's nature we must pass beyond the prephilosophical fact of pure practical reason and provide a transcendental deduction of the categorical imperative as the expression of a morality adapted to a being who is not as such purely rational. The key notion is freedom. Whereas our consciousness of the moral law is the *ratio cognoscendi* of freedom, freedom is the *ratio essendi* of the moral law. Freedom grounds morality by supplying the categorical imperative with a transcendental refuge from the tendency to replace it by nature, thus rendering the categorical imperative impossible. As Kant explains:

> We have finally reduced the definite concept of morality to the idea of freedom, but we could not prove freedom to be real in ourselves and in human nature. We saw only that we must presuppose it if we would think of a being as rational and conscious of his causality with respect to actions, that is, as endowed with a will; and so we find that on the very same grounds we must ascribe to each being endowed with reason and will the property of determining himself to action under the idea of freedom. [9]

In other words, we get not a deduction but the necessity of freedom as a presupposition. It is the consequent noumenal realm which supports freedom as the *ratio essendi* of the moral law and the law as the non-illusory *ratio cognoscendi* of freedom. We can perhaps say that the phenomena-noumena distinction is synonymous with the deduction of the categorical imperative since it provides the locus of positive freedom as self-legislation. For "if freedom of the will is presupposed, morality together with its principle follows from it by the mere analysis of its concept." [10] The noumenal realm, the realm of spontaneity and autonomy, is synonymous with the exercise of pure reason as opposed to the sense-bound understanding. Since this has been shown by the *CPuR* it points to the foundations of ethics as the ultimate intent of Kant's theoretical phi-

[9] *Ibid.,* p. 67.
[10] *Ibid.,* p. 65.

losophy. The limitation of the understanding establishes the reality of pure reason. Pure reason as practical gives *content* to the noumenal realm as morally necessary though theoretically incomprehensible. The justification for the phenomena-noumena distinction is thus man's practical autonomy, which we have seen to be the dogmatic core of the Kantian Idea. As the transcendental ground of the lawfulness of nature (which implies material alien to man's synthesizing understanding) and the categorical imperative (which implies material internally recalcitrant to such self-legislation) man himself becomes the initiator and sustainer of the distinction between appearance and reality. The understanding accomplishes this negatively via its sense-dependence as the seat of the phenomenality of nature,[11] while the will is the positive path to the noumena via its transcendental freedom. In both cases it is the one human reason which is the spontaneous lawgiver (i.e., practical agent) establishing the spheres of both nature and freedom. The philosophical argument for a dualistic metaphysics is paradoxically grounded in the unity of prephilosophical practical reason.[12] If the rationale for positing noumena is

[11] As Kant explains, " The doctrine of sensibility is likewise the doctrine of the noumenon in the negative sense ... the function of which is to curb the pretensions of sensibility; and it is therefore only of negative employment. At the same time it is no arbitrary invention; it is bound up with the limitation of sensibility, though it cannot affirm anything positive beyond the field of sensibility." *CPuR,* BS07, 311.

[12] This point is stated forcefully by Richard Kroner, who writes: "If it is true that practical reason regulates the life of the will and the realm of moral existence, is it not possible that theoretical reason (or intellect) regulates the realm of natural existence, in so far as this realm is regular at all? This indeed is the core of Kant's famous thesis that the intellect prescribes its laws to nature, and this in turn is the gist of his transcendental idealism or phenomenalism. This phenomenalism is the outcome of his ethical subjectivism ... The limitation of nature as the realm of causal necessity and mathematical order is thus a consequence of moral freedom and a postulate of moral reason . . . [and] rests upon the sovereignty of reason over nature, and this sovereignty is the result of ethical subjectivism . . . Kant interprets the relation between theoretical reason (or understanding) and nature by analogy to the relation between practical reason and will. The logical forms, i.e., the highest principles of the natural order, are conceived as norms, rules, regulative concepts-all these terms play a decisive role in the *Critique of Pure Reason.* And

sought exclusively in theoretical reason misunderstandings arise concerning the apparent absurdity of theoretically insisting on the existence of theoretically inscrutable beings and claiming furthermore that such beings are nonphenomenal causes of phenomena. Kant's noumena seem to violate the very injunctions of which he is the author. However, as we have seen (cf. above, p. 28 and note 11) the issue is not entry into some alien world but the necessity of noumena via a demonstration of the derivative and dependent strutus of what confront us as mere appearances. Echoing the Platonic metaphor from the eikastic section of the divided line, just as to be an image implies being an image *of* something which is itself not an image but an original, to be an appearance implies being an appearance *of* something which as such does not appear but serves as the nonphenomenal ground. The doctrine of the noumena is thus the correlative of the derivative status of appearances, such that both doctrines stand or fall together.

The noumena are therefore theoretically necessary despite being problematic. We are obligated to assume them but should resist the temptation to misuse them as causes in the usual sense as applied to phenomena. The " causal " relation between noumena and phenomena must not be conceived mechanically along the inappropriate model of phenomenal causation. Since the appropriate ontological metaphor is the relation of original to copy, the proper" causal" relation is that of ground to consequent. Noumena cause phenomena not " physically " but "originally," as their inner core of spontaneity. That is, phenomena are the way in which the spontaneous, active noumena must appear in our experience subject as they are to our receptive, passive conditions of sensibility. By affecting our senses noumena generate in us an experience of themselves as phenomena. There are not two distinct classes of entities; phe-

all these terms indicate that Kant interprets the operation and function of reason, even in the theoretical field, along the lines of ethical legislation . . . Reason, be it practical or theoretical, is legislator in both fields, but the idea of legislation itself is a practical one." In *Kant's Weltanschauung*, translation by John E. Smith (Chicago, 1956), pp. 65-8.

nomena *are* noumena under subjective conditions of space and time. Kant's critical idealism is therefore an ontological realism. As Kant remarks in the *Prolegomena:*

> Things as objects of our senses existing outside us are given, but we know nothing of what they may be in themselv.es, knowing only their appearances, that is, the representations which they cause in us by affecting our senses. Consequently I grant by all means that there are bodies without us, that is, things which, though quite unknown to us as to what they are in themselves, we yet know by the representations which their influence on our sensibility pro-·cures us. These representations we call" bodies", a term signifying merely the appearance of the thing which is unknown to us, but not therefore less actual. Can this be termed idealism? **It** is the very contrary.13

Just as transcendental subjectivity is responsible for the experience of objects, the noumena are responsible for the objects of experience. The realm of phenomenal causality is thus situated between two noumenal realms of spontaneity. The efficient causation between appearances which produce the order of nature is thus an image of the free causation (i.e., spontaneity) governing the noumenal order.

When applied to man's activity via the spontaneous good will, Kant's phenomena-noumena division has been shown to originate in the mandate of the prephilosophical fact of morality. And since his metaphysics as a whole turns on this philosophical distinction, Kant's most profound philosophical argument becomes incapable of " philosophical " evaluation without thereby begging the question. The critique of Kant's metaphysics as a natural disposition must therefore shift from the critique of pure (theoretical) to pure (practical) reason. For the distinction between phenomena and noumena which resolved the dialectic of pure theoretical reason now reveals itself as a threat to pure practical reason insofar as the autonomy of the will is concerned. The question, to repeat, is twofold-the will's negative freedom from the heteronomous con-

[13] *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics,* translated by L. W. Beck (New York, 1950), p. 36.

cern with happiness and its positive freedom (i.e., autonomy) with respect to the content and norm for its action once happiness is suspended. The issue of counter-causal freedom, i.e., how noumenal causation can persist when phenomenal causation claims to be a complete account of action, will be dealt with below in conjunction with Kant's theological postulate.

The bracketing of happiness via the categorical call to the moral law shows the genuine threat to the will to be a criterion for meaningful content. We must not confuse the ethical problem with the psychological, which for Kant is a matter of moral education rather than moral philosophy. Despite the overwhelming instances of human frailty the absolute and unconditional validity of the categorical imperative is never compromised. Moral weakness is not a concession to the claim of happiness but a proof of the necessarily command character of duty. Though the categorical imperative, as we have indicated, is not as such inimical to happiness its absolute validity must manifest itself in such a way when morality and happiness conflict. Happiness and weakness confirm rather than invalidate the fact of pure (practical) reason. For this reason the problem of content emerges once happiness is removed as its ground, at least as far as any means-end relation is concerned between morality and happiness. We have already mentioned the impossibility of locating happiness in moral action as such. What must be done is to join morality and happiness in such a way as to avoid the heteronomy of morality as a means to happiness and the obliteration of happiness via its subordination to morality. Morality is to be consistent with rather than for the sake of happiness, which consistency is grounded not in heteronomy hut in a moral-rational hope. The problem thus becomes transcendental rather than anthropological. We must therefore disagree with the view of T. M. Greene, who writes:

> In short, morality is said to be the concern of a purely autonomous rational will. Kant's introduction of happiness into his moral scheme is therefore inconsistent with his own principles, and is highly detrimental to them. The" Summum Bonum ",with happiness equated with virtue, is indeed said to be merely an ideal of

reason which must not be made a niotive of action. Yet without the assurance of its reality reason *cannot* be practical! [4]

It is a mistake to insist that Kant must present his morally necessary hope as an assured reality without claiming the type of certainty which Kant expressly denies as desirable or possible. For Kant, such ultimate ignorance safeguards rather than heteronomously undermines pure practical reason. This is not the problem. It rather prepares the problem. Because the will is noumenal (which allows for freedom in the negative) its positive freedom is contentless and its only norm is non-contradictory universalization. [15] To complement this purely logical criterion with material upon which to operate flirts with heteronomy, since if the will requires sensibility for its *modus operandi* its autonomy is an illusion. However, its transnatural status, which remedies the dependence, renders it aimless. Consequently, man's earthly existence must reenter but in such a way as to steer clear of heteronomy. For this reason the problem is on the transcendental plane since it involves the possible dialectical use of pure practical reason in accounting for the possibility of the supreme good-morality consistent with happiness-and in such a way as not to diminish the categorical

[14] In "The Historical Context And Religious Significance of Kant's *Religion,"* as Part I of the Introduction to Kant's *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone,* translated by T. M. Greene and H. H. Hudson (New York, 1960), pp. !xii-iii.

[15] It is significant to observe Kant's tacit admission of the failure of this test, even when backed up by a maxim rooted in one's happiness. This concerns his fourth example in the *Foundations,* p. 41:

> A fourth man, for whom things are going well, sees that others (whom he could help) have to struggle with great hardships, and he asks, " What concern of mine is it? Let each one be as happy as heaven wills, or as he can make himself; I will not take anything from him or even envy him; but to his welfare or to his assistance in time of need I have no desire to contribute." If such a way of thinking were a universal law of nature, certainly the human race could exist, and without doubt even better than in a state where everybody talks of sympathy and good will, or even exerts himself occasionally to practice them while, on the other hand, he cheats when he can and betrays or otherwise violates the rights of man.

demand of morality. This can be accomplished only by a harmony (vs. a means-end relation) between freedom and nature. But the comprehension of such a harmony, along with the split between freedom and nature it is to reconcile, exceeds the competence of theoretical reason. In the interest of practical reason Kant therefore resorts to a theological postulate. Whether Kant's theology is an aid or a detriment to the will's autonomy we will have to see.

Because theoretical reason can demonstrate neither the impossibility nor the actuality of the supreme good coming to be through natural laws, "reason cannot objectively decide whether it is by universal laws of nature without a wise Author presiding over nature or whether only on the assumption of such an Author." [16] What Kant refers to as the "indecision of speculative reason" prompts the following solution of the practical dialectic:

> Since the promotion of the highest good and thus the presupposition of its possibility are objectively necessary (though only as a consequence of practical reason), and since the manner in which we are to think of it as possible is subject to our own choice, in which a free interest of pure practical reason is decisive for the assumption of a wise Author of the world, it follows that the principle which here determines our judgment, while subjectively a need, is the ground of a maxim of moral assent, as a means to promoting that which is objectively (practically) necessary; that is, it is a faith of pure practical reason. As a voluntary decision of our judgment to assume that existence and to make it the foundation of further employment of reason, conducing to the moral (commanded) purpose and agreeing moreover with the theoretical need of reason, it is itself not commanded. It rather springs from the moral disposition itself.17

The tutelage of God or nature is thus resolved in favor of God. If natural laws produce such a harmony the freedom of the will becomes mere appearance. Consequently we must posit a Creator of a morality-happiness harmony in order for the unconditional moral law to pertain simultaneously to man as a natural

[1]. *CPrR,* p. 151.
[11] *Ibid.*

being concerned with happiness. God allows morality to be consistent with happiness without falling prey to the latter's heteronomy and the freedom of the will from natural causation is likewise preserved. However, the God who liberates the will in this way becomes Himself a new threat to its autonomy since the actualization of happiness consistent with the morally autonomous worthiness of such happiness seems predetermined because guaranteed. The only way out of this problem is to deny that God is the cause of the realm of appearances, which would still preserve His role as Creator but limit it to noumena. The human will would cause the realm of moral appearances just as the understanding generates them in the natural realm. The Idea behind Kant's architectonic remains intact, since this is in fact what Kant does. And by so doing he informs us of the ultimate significance and rationale for his philosophical argument for a split between phenomena and noumena following from the transcendental ideality of space and time as well as the limitation of the categories. In the context of explaining how counter-causal freedom is possible, Kant states:

> If I say of beings in the world of sense that they are created, I regard them only as noumena. Just as it would therefore be contradictory to say God is the creator of appearances, it is also a contradiction to say that He, as the Creator, is the cause of actions in the world of sense, as these are appearances; yet at the same time He is the cause of the existence of the acting beings (as noumena) ... Such is the importance of the separation of time (as well as space) from the existence of things-in-themselves, as this was effected in the critique of the pure speculative reason.[18]

Kant's transcendental idealism is thus in the service of and culminates in a theological postulate designed to justify our hope for the supreme good. However, this hope is undercut when it is realized that the true ground of this hope is not God at all but the human will. This is because the realm of appearances (the locus of the harmony of morality and happiness)

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 106. Kant claims the same significance for the deduction of the categories on p. 146.

is denied to God's creation (i.e., such a creation strangely involves a contradiction because the created is synonymous with the noumenal) in order to preserve freedom. But if the realm of appearance is detached from the God-created noumena, their phenomenality must rest on that other creator, the human will. The replacement of God by the human will thus renders such a correspondence a matter of chance (i.e., history) rather than a legitimate" rational faith". Though this grounding in willful autonomy conforms ultimately to the Kantian Idea, this Idea in turn results in transcendental self-deception once the tutelages of God and Nature are abandoned. For the forsaking of the cunning of nature and divine providence (the two agencies capable of guaranteeing such a harmony) produces the transcendental illusion this theology was intended to overcome since the will as pure practical reason must conform to the categorical imperative, which as such is neutral to happiness and void of any norm beyond that of noncontradictory universalization. Purity of form does indeed produce sterility of content.

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ST. THOMAS AND AVICENNA ON THE AGENT INTELLECT

THREE LANDMARKS divide the history of Aristotelianism. The first was the Neoplatonic transformation of Aristotle at the hands of Avicenna, so that the Aristotle received in the Latin Middle Ages was already one garbed in Neoplatonic dress. The second was the desperate but unsuccessful attempt by Averroes to resolve all the inconsistencies in the Aristotelian psychology, on purely Aristotelian grounds. The third landmark was the successful enterprise of St. Thomas Aquinas to remove these same inconsistencies. The purpose of this paper is to examine the first and third of these landmarks, with some references to the second. More precisely, I am concerned here with St. Thomas's attack on Avicenna's notion of the agent intellect, for it represents-or ought to represent-the recognition by Aristotelianism itself that it cannot quite be Aristotelian without also being some.thing in addition. St. Thomas's attack on Avicenna drives home the point that a wider view of man than Aristotle himself was capable of is called for if all the disparate Aristotelian truths about man are to be kept. To locate ourselves within the problem of the agent intellect as it was faced by Avicenna and St. Thomas, we must first turn briefly to Aristotle himself.

I shall not exaggerate if I say that two chapters in Aristotle's *De Anima* have influenced the history of mediaeval philosophical speculation on man more than any one treatise as a whole. The two Chapters I refer to are the fourth and fifth of Book III. In those chapters he discusses the " thinking part of the soul " and the agent intellect. Concerning " the thinking part of the soul " he says that it must be impassible, in itself a pure potency (like a blank tablet on which nothing is written) capable of receiving the forms of all things, and hence unmixed with any

body, i.e., separate from body.[1] This "thinking part of the soul" was later called the "material intellect" (Avicenna, Averroes) or the" possible intellect" (St. Thomas).

Next, in the fifth chapter, he infers the existence of an intellect of a different kind-the agent intellect or agent intelligence of St. Thomas and Avicenna-and he makes the following points. 1) In every class of things, as in nature as a whole, there are two factors: (a) a matter which is potentially all the particulars included in the class, (b) a cause which is productive in the sense that it makes them all (the latter standing to the former as an art to its material) . These two factors must also be found within the soul. 2) The productive or agent intellect is related to the intelligibles in potency, which it makes intelligibles in act, as light is related to colors in potency which it makes colors in act. 3) It is separate (choristos) .[2] 4) It is in act by its essence, impassible, immortal and eternal.

[1] The thinking power is somewhat like sensing, in that it is related to what is thinkable just as sense is related to the sensible (429a 12-17). Since everything is a possible object of thought, mind cannot have a nature of its own (for this would prevent the reception of another) and hence cannot be mixed with body (429a 10-29) . Observation shows that after a strong stimulation of sense we are less able to exercise it than before (e.g a very loud sound), whereas thought about an object highly intelligible renders the mind more and not less capable afterwards of thinking of less intelligible objects. Hence the faculty of sense is dependent on body, whereas mind is separate from it (429a 29-403b 4). Mind is directed to what it is to be water, instead of just water, in other words it is directed to the what-a-thing-is (429b 10-23). Mind is potentially all things, it is like a blank tablet on which nothing is written (429b 29-43a 10).

[2] The Greek *choristos* has been variously translated. In the imperfect edition of St. Thomas's *De Anima,* it is translated as *separabilis.* In the edition of Averroes that I have (Mediaeval Academy) it is translated as *abstractus.* In other works of St. Thomas I have checked (In *II Sent.,* d. 17, q. 2, art. 1 Solut. ed. Mandonnet, pp. 4Z:il-4Z3; *S.C.G.,* II, 78 *Deinde; De Unit. Int.,* cap. 1, Spiazzi #198; *S.T.* I, q. 79, a. *5,* obj. 1) the translation he uses is always *separafos. Separatus* or is the correct translation, rather than *separabilis,* and it was known to all parties concerned. That Aristotle meant that *somehow* the agent intellect is separate *in reality* is clear, because in other places, when it is a question of separate merely *in notion,* he specifies this very clearly. Mathematical objects, he takes pains to explain, are separate in thought (in *logo)* but not in existence *(De An.* III, 7, 43lb 12-16). In some sense the agent intellect is separate in reality. But the question still remains in what sense he means that it is really separate.

Each one of these propositions seems to follow rigorously from solid facts about man's intellectual life, combined with the principles of act and potency. The problems on the agent intellect that interest us here are these. In what way is the agent intellect in act? In what way is it separate? And, depending on how these last are answered, how is it related to the human soul, both functionally and ontologically? Finally, what consequences will the answers have for our view of the unity of man? Since these problems face any intelligent reader of Aristotle's *De Anima,* it is not surprising that they were at the core of Avicenna's and St. Thomas's speculation on man and man's intellect. [3]

Although a highly original thinker, Avicenna develops his position on the intellect in the context of Aristotle's *De Anima.* In the fifth part of his own *Liber De Anima,* Avicenna follows Aristotle in proving the existence of an agent intellect. The human soul passes from understanding in potency to understanding in act. Since a thing is reduced from potency to act only by a being already in act, it follows that the soul is reduced from potency to act by an intelligence in act. Hence there exists an agent intelligence: an intelligence which is of itself actually intelligent, not like our souls, which are of themselves only potentially intelligent. [4]

[3] I have not raised here the problems directly concerned with the possible intellect. These have been brilliantly expressed and examined by Professor Anton Pegis in several places: "St. Thomas and the Unity of Man" in *Progress in Philosophy,* ed. J. A. McWilliams (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co.• *1955),* pp. 153-173; "Some Reflections on *Summa Contra Gentiles* II, *56* " in *An Etienne Gilson Tribute,* ed. C. J. O'Neill (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, *1959),* pp. 169-188; *At the Origins. of the Thoniistic Notion of Man* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1962). In this paper I shall approach the same gen.era! problem Dr. Pegis has treated in his (on the unity and intellectual nature of man), but from a different angle, that of the *agent* intellect, using the Avermist problem of the possible intellect only to throw light upon the conflict between Avicenna and St. Thomas. My debt to Professor Pegis will be clear throughout.

• " Dicemus quod anima humana prius est intellig.ens in potentia, deinde fit intelligens in effectu. Omne autem quod exit de potentia ad effectum, non exit nisi per causam quae habet illud in effectu et extrahit ad ilium." Avicenna, *Liber De Anima,* V, *5* (ed. Louvain, 1968), p. 126, #29-33. The translations of Avicenna and St. 'Thomas in this paper, unless otherwise noted, are mine.

This seems only a beginning. For we may still ask in what sense this agent intelligence is in act, and, if he is to remain faithful to Aristotle, in what sense it is separate. But in fact we have already gone a long way, and Avicenna has already determined his answers to these questions. Return to Avicenna's proof for the existence of the agent intelligence: "We say that the human soul is first intelligent *(intelligens)* in potency, and then becomes intelligent *(intelligens)* in act." [5] The reduction of potency to act on which he focuses is that of the soul, and not the reduction of the soul's *objects* from potency to act. Aristotle's analogy with light, that it reduces potential colors to actual colors, focuses on the transition from potency to act in the *objects of the knowing power.* Aristotle's analogy would seem to mean that the agent intellect is needed to reduce the objects of the intellect from potential intelligibility to actual intelligibility. Yet Avicenna is speaking of potential *intelligens* and then actual *intelligens.*

Hence for Avicenna to say that this other intellect is in act is for him to say that it is actually *intelligens.* In fact, Avicenna says that it must actually have that which it imparts to the soul: the soul does not pass from potency to act " except through a cause which has it [sc. the intelligible form] in act and releases it to the soul." [6] And he says further that "... the cause giving the intelligible form is nothing but the intelligence in act, which possesses the principles of the abstract intelligible forms." [7] For Avicenna, the agent intellect is in act in the sense that it already has what the possible intellect acquires in knowledge, namely intelligible forms. It is as it were a storehouse or *thesaurus* of intelligible forms.

Moreover, from this it follows too in precisely what sense the agent intellect is separate. It must be separate in the sense of a separate substance totally distinct from our soul. If it were a part of our soul, then-given that it actually possesses the

[5] *Ibid.*
[6] *Lib. de An.,* V, *5,* pp. 126-127, #SS-35.
[7] *Ibid.*

intelligible forms-we would already possess all knowledge, and would not pass from not-understanding to understanding. Hence the agent intelligence is a complete, separate substance.

Further, Avicenna's cosmology can precisely locate this being in the scale of separate substances. According to Avicenna's cosmology all being proceeds by a mediate emanation from one supreme Necessary Being. The first intelligence proceeds naturally and necessarily from this First Necessary Being. From the reflection of the first intelligence on the Necessary Being and on itself there naturally proceeds a second intelligence, the first outermost sphere, and the governing soul of this sphere. Through the second intelligence there naturally proceeds a third intelligence, a second, concentric sphere, and a governing soul for this sphere. This emanating chain proceeds in the same way, each intelligence giving rise to a triad beneath it, until we get to the production o:f the last sphere, the sphere of the Moon, and the tenth and last intelligence, related to the sub-lunar world just as the other intelligences are related to their spheres. Now this last intelligence, Avicenna tells us, is the agent intelligence,[8] and it governs our souls just as the higher intelligences govern their spheres.[9] Hence Avicenna's doctrine of the agent intellect unites in one stroke his metaphysics, physics and psychology.[10] It is nothing less than the tenth and last intelligence

[8] Avicenna, *Metaphysice& Compendium* (Nadjat), Liber I, Pars 2, Tractatus 1, C. 1-3 & Tractatus 2, C. 1-3 (ed. N. Carame, Rome, 1926), pp. 66-75, 91-102; *Metaphysica* Tr. 9, cap. 4 (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute Press, 1948), pp. 297-305. Cf. B. Zedler, "St. Thomas and Avicenna in the 'De Potentia Dei,'" *Traditio,* VI (1948), pp. 110-122.

[9] *Metaphysices Compendium* (Nadjat), Liber I, Pars 4, Tractatus 2 (ed. N. Carame, Rome, 1926), p. 195.

[10] The theory of emanation and its connection to psychology has its origin in Alfarabi, Avicenna's predecessor. Cf. Alfarabi, "Letter Concerning the Intellect," in *Philosophy in the Middle Ages,* ed. Hyman and Walsh (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), pp. 215-222, and E. Gilson, "Les sources greco-arahes de l'augustinisme avicennisant," *Archives d'.histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen age,* IV (1929), pp. 27-38: "On voit deja chez Alfarabi que le probleme de !'intellect n'est qu'un cas particulier de la physique clans la tradition dont nous etudions le developpement. L'etroitesse du lien qui rattache la cosmologie a Ia theorie de la connaiss1mce apparait avec plus d'evidence encore dans la doctrine d'Avicenne."

emanated from the Necessary Being, that acts in us when we understand.

For Avicenna the agent intellect is in act in the sense of being a *thesaurus* of intelligible forms. It is separate in the sense that it is a separate, complete substance. How then is it related to our souls, which actually do the understanding? Here once again Avicenna's physics and metaphysics are joined to his theory of knowledge. For Avicenna, to reduce from potency to act is simply to impart what one already has. To cause is not to educe act from potency, but rather to *imprint* or *give* an act, already possessed by the cause, to the effect. Now sub-lunar beings do not cause, says Avicenna, but they only *prepare* for the cause, which is itself outside natural beings.[11] Thus, the production of any form whatsoever requires that a separate substance imprint that form upon prepared material.

The situation of man's intellectual knowledge is but an instance of this more general pattern. The agent intelligence reduces man's possible intellect from potency to act simply by conferring the abstract form on his intellect, and to receive the form thus without matter and material conditions is for the soul to understand. [12] Hence human knowing is just another instance of the agent intelligence governing and ministering to its sub-lunar subjects.

An immediate problem and Avicenna's answer to it are of interest to us here. Given that the agent intelligence is always in act, and the possible intellect always in potency to it, why is it that man does not always understand? To this Avicenna replies that the soul of man must not only be in potency, but it must also be disposed to receive the influence of the agent intelligence. Just as matter receives a new form only when it is sufficiently disposed-and this is the work of sub-lunar " agents "-in the same way the soul of man must be disposed

[11] Avicenna, *Sufficientia,* Lib. I, cap. 10 (Venetiis, 1508). f. 105 v, cited by E. Gilson in "Pourquoi Saint Thomas a critique Saint Augustin," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen age,* 1 (1926), p. 40. Cf.: *Liber De An.,* V, 4, p. 117, #93-98.

[10] *Liber De An.,* V, *5,* p. 144, #66-73.

to receive the abstract form. Man's intellect is of itself merely in potency to the forms of its objects. But man also possesses an imagination, which conserves the concrete sense images of things, and a cogitative power, which can compare, combine and divide those images. Now the actual consideration, examination or comparison of these sense images (an operation of the cogitative power) disposes the soul to receive the influence of the agent intelligence: "... from the consideration of singulars the soul is made apt so that the abstraction emanates into it from the agent intelligence." [13] Thus, understanding is nothing but an emanation from the separate agent intelligence.[14] The agent intelligence is itself always in act, constantly diffusing forms, but its effects only come about when subjects become apt to receive them. Moreover, diversity of forms is due to the diverse preparations of its subjects. The abstract forms constantly emanate from the agent intelligence, and they are necessarily received by our intellect each time it is suitably disposed.[15]

Avicenna takes over as his own the classification of the different states of man's intellect that had become traditional for the commentators on Aristotle.[16] Man's intellect can be related to the intelligibles in various ways, according to the disposition it has toward them. At first it is in absolute potentiality, i.e. in pure potency with respect to the intelligibles. Avicenna calls this state of the intellect *potentia absoluta materialis,* since it is like prime matter in its relation to individual forms. The same intellect can be considered as having received the first intelligibles, the first principles, which it can then use as instruments for acquiring new knowledge, and this state of the intellect Avicenna calls the *intellectus in potentia facili seu intel-*

[13] *Lib. De An.,* V, *5,* p. 127, #39-50.

[14] Cf.: "Ainsi, dans la doctrine d'Avicenne, tout intelligible est regu du dehors et toute abstraction est une emanation . . . ." (Gilson, " Les sources greco-arabes' p. 65).

[15] *Ibid.*

[16] For the development of this tradition, see Gilson, "Les sources greco-arabes," pp. 5-38.

lectus in effectu (in effectu, in act, in relation to the first state of the intellect). And finally, the intellect can be considered in the state of having a perfected aptitude, such that the intellect can exercise its act at will, analogous to the scribe's skill in writing, who knows how to write and can write whenever he wants. This intellect, or state of the intellect, can be considered under two aspects. First, as having the aptitude to acquire knowledge at will, it is called the *intellectus in habitu.* Second, considered as being turned toward the intelligibles, and actually considering them, it is the *intellectus acleptus seu accommodatus.* The word "*accommodatus"* reminds us that it is conferred on the soul from outside it by the separate agent intelligence.[17] In fact, the *intellectus adeptus seu accommodatus* is simply the intelligible forms themselves, as they are conferred on the soul of man.

Now, what is important for our question here is how Avicenna interprets this classification in the light of his doctrine on the agent intelligence. At first glance it may appear that these levels of intellect are various degrees by which the intelligible forms inhere in or are retained by the soul, the higher levels being mid-way points between the potential and the actual presence of intelligible forms. But this is not Avicenna's meaning: "Now if anyone has said that this knowledge [sc. *in habitu]* is in potency but a potency near to the actual, this is false."[18]

How then are we to interpret Avicenna on the various levels of the intellect? That is, in what sense does the material intellect di:ffer from the intellect *in potentia facili,* and how do they from the intellect *in habitu?* How does the intellect change when it learns? Avicenna's answer points up the degree to which man's intellectual life is a heavenly affair, almost totally unconnected with earthly or sub-lunar agents and causal efficacy. Rather than different degrees of the presence of forms in the intellect, these levels of intellect refer to degrees of apti-

[17] *Lib. De An.,* I, 5. Cf. Gilson, "Les sources greco-arabes," pp. 58-74.
[18] *Lib. De An.,* V, 6, p. 141,

tude for union with the separate agent intelligence: " It remains that the last part is true, and that to learn is nothing but to acquire a perfect aptitude of joining oneself to the agent intelligence." [19] The various levels of the intellect, and hence the various levels of learning, are nothing other than aptitudes to be united to the separate agent intelligence. And the highest level of such an aptitude Avicenna calls the *virtus sancta,* the aptitude of the prophet. Finally, the end and felicity of man consists in being liberated from the body, so as to be united perfectly with the agent intelligence: "Now when the soul will be liberated from the body and from the accidents of the body, then it will be capable of being united to the agent intelligence and then it will arrive at that intelligible beauty and perennial joy .... " [20]

Knowledge, whether actual or habitual, is essentially a contact with the higher, intelligible realm. And this means that intelligibility in its proper sense lies only in a transcendent realm. To reach intelligibility is to turn *away from* the material world: science consists in an aptitude for such a retreat, and beatitude consists in the final retreat. (Note, too, that this is Avicenna's answer to the cluster of p:mblems found in the *Aristotelian* psychology.)

Such a doctrine on human knowledge carries with it inevitably a certain doctrine on the human soul. If intelligibility lies only in a transcendent realm, if intelligibility is acquired only by a retreat away from matter, then the human soul, whose distinguishing mark is its ability to understand, cannot in the strict sense be a terrestrial being. That is to say, if intelligibility lies only in a transcendent realm, then the human soul's involvement with matter cannot really be essential to it. Such indeed is the doctrine of Avicenna on the human soul.

As he explains through his famous " flying man " argument, a man suspended in a vacuum, hearing nothing, touching nothing, in short not even knowing whether he has a body or not, can yet know that he exists and that he is essentially a

[19] *Lib. De An.,* V, 6, pp. 148-149, #40-45, p. 150, #63-67.
[20] *Ibid.,* V, *5,* p. 150, #71-75.

soul.[21] Hence man is essentially a soul, and the soul is essentially a spiritual substance. That it perfects the body, that it is the entelechy of a physical, organic body, does not define its essence, but only describes one of the things it *does.*[22] In its essence it is a spiritual substance, and this spiritual substance is the man.

To the question, why then is the soul united to the body? Avicenna answers that they are united both for the sake of the body and for the sake of the soul.[23] But the body helps the soul only to get its first principles. The body helps the soul only to get started-after that, the body becomes purely a burden: "Now the human soul is helped by the body to acquire principles of opining *(e;onsentiendi)* and understanding; then, when it has acquired these, *it will return to itself*. ..." [24] To repeat, such a doctrine on the soul is the natural consequence of a doctrine on the intellect where knowledge is simply an emanation from a separate spiritual realm.

Moreover, the implication for cosmology is also clear: the material world-the world in which the body-soul composite would live, if there were such a true composite-has no inherent intelligibility; and that is why what intelligibility the soul acquires must be poured into it from above. As we can see already, the doctrine of Avicenna, although Aristotelian in language and inspiration, turns out to be more Neoplatonic in broad structure.

Yet, to appreciate the significance of Avicenna it is important to note that his Neoplatonism arises not because he added Neoplatonic elements to Aristotelian ones, nor even because he disguised Neoplatonic views in Aristotelian language. Rather, it would be more accurate to say-and in this I think his true significance lies-that his very Aristotelianism slides back imperceptibly, and by its own momentum, into a Platonic view of man. Maintaining and emphasizing truths that are authen-

[21] *Ibid.,* V, 7.
[2]. *Ibid.,* I, 1, pp. 15-16, #78-80.
[••]*Ibid.,* V, 8.
[••]*Ibid.,* V, 3, p. 104, #22-24, p. 105, #33-36.

tically Aristotelian, he finds himself slipping away-almost inevitably-from other truths equally Aristotelian. The actuality and separateness of the agent intellect, the equation of intelligibility with immateriality-these are Aristotelian propositions clung to tenaciously by Avicenna. Yet, he can do so only by sacrificing other equally Aristotelian truths, such as, that body and soul are essentially parts of a composite and thus by their natures belong together.

The problems that drove Avicenna to what is in truth a Platonic view of man were of keen significance to St. Thomas Aquinas. His own position was in part an answer to them. Yet to see these problems as St. Thomas did, we must see them as one horn of a dilemma whose other end was the difficulties in Averroes's position. In the eyes of St. Thomas, Avicenna was driven to " Platonize " man, in order to ensure the spirituality of the intellect; Averroes, on the other hand, was driven to place the intellect outside man, in order to keep man Aristotelian. Thus, to criticize Avicenna without" de-intellectualizing" man, St. Thomas had to show two things: first, against the presumptions of Avicenna, how a spiritual intellect could truly receive its intellectual knowledge from material things, i.e., how an intellect could be spiritual but with ,an intellectual life essentially involved with material things; second, this time with Averroes in mind, he had to show how, once man was made Aristotelian again, he could still keep his intellect, i.e., how an intellectual substance could also be the form of a body. Now what interests us here is that precisely the same doctrine on man's intellect answers both problems at once.

St. Thomas wastes no time in going to the heart of Avicenna's doctrine. In the *Summa Contira Gentiles,* after summarizing Avicenna's position, he accuses him of" Platonizing," and worse still, of" Platonizing" inconsistently. [25] The upshot of Avicenna's position, says St. Thomas, is that material things in no real way *cause* our knowledge; they may be the *occasion* for our knowledge, but in Avicenna's position, just as in Plato's, the

••St. Thomas, *S.C.G.,* II, 74.

real cause of our knowledge is separate. The only difference between Plato and Avicenna on this point is that for Plato the separate substances causing our knowledge are many, for Avicenna, one.[26]

Since Avicenna's position is at bottom no different from Plato's (although not consistently carried out), it follows that the same fact tells against them both: it is a disproof of their positions simply to observe that, " a person who lacks one sense lacks, also, the knowledge of those sensible things which are known through that sense."[27] Moreover, it is inconsistent for Avicenna to say that a movement toward what is lower, the consideration of phantasms, could dispose us to receive from what is higher, the emanation from the agent intelligence. Hence Plato followed out his root-principle more consistently, by denying that considering the sensibles could dispose us to understand. Thus Avicenna erred both in his root-principle and in following out that principle.[28]

If Avicenna's position were true, argues St. Thomas, then a man blind from birth could possibly acquire knowledge of colors, simply by imagining sounds. For, if conversion to the agent intelligence were the essence of knowledge, then the content of the phantasm would not be *essentially* related to the content of understanding, and so a phantasm of one thing could be the occasion for knowledge of a thing quite different. But this is against the facts. Hence that a man blind from birth cannot acquire proper knowledge of colors shows that knowledge is formally caused and specified not by something separate, but by the phantasms themselves.[29]

Moreover, we know that when the corporeal organs of sense powers are injured (as when the organ for imagination or memory is injured), so that a man cannot produce or retain phantasms, the man is prevented from understanding not only

[26] *Ibid.*

[27] *Ibid.*, trans. J. Anderson (New York: Doubleday, 1956). All translations of *S.C.G.* are by James Anderson, from the edition noted.

[28] *Ibid.*

[29] *Q. De Anima,* 15c.

new things, but also things he has understood in the past.[30] So, phantasms are related to understanding as providing it its proper object:

> And therefore we must say otherwise, that the sensitive powers are necessary for the soul to understand, not *per accidens* as only stimulating it, which Plato held, nor only as disposing it, which Avicenna held, but as representing to the intellective soul its proper object, as the Philosopher says in *III de Anima.*[31]

From all this, reasons St. Thomas, it follows that Avicenna's notion of the agent intellect is mistaken. The agent intellect is not in act in the sense of being actually *intelligens,* but it is in act only in the sense of being actually immaterial, so that it can dematerialize the *species* in the phantasm. The determination or specification of knowledge is provided by the phantasm (which is itself the presentation of the material thing); and so the agent intellect is actual only in the order of exercise:

> ... the intellective soul is indeed actually immaterial, but it is in potency to the determinate species of things. Conversely, the phantasms are indeed actually the similitude of the species of certain things, but they are potential immaterials.[32]

The agent intellect is not a separate substance infusing intelligible forms into our intellects; it is not a *thesaurus* of forms whence we acquire the content of our knowledge. The content of our knowledge is provided by the phantasms, and the agent intellect abstracts intelligible species from the phantasms, since the phantasms, being of the material order, cannot directly act on the potential intellect.[33] Thus the agent intellect is precisely that power which as it were illumines material things so they can act on or determine the possible intellect.

[30] *Ibid.;* Cf. *S.T.,* I, q. 84, a. 7c.

[31] *Q. De Anima,* 15c. Cf. *In Boet. de Trin.,* q. 6, a. 2c; *De Ver.,* q. 2, a. 6c.

[32] *S.T.,* I, 79, 4, ad 4; Cf. *In II Sent.,* d. 17, q. 2, a. 1, *Solut; De Spiritualibus Creaturis,* 10 c. et ad 4; *Q. De Anima,* 5c, et ad 2, ad 3, ad 6, ad 9; *S.C.G.,* II, 77; *S.C.G.,* II, 76 adhuc.

[33] " Intellectum vero posuit Aristoteles habere operationem absque communicatione corporis. Nihil autem corporeum imprimere potest in rem incorpoream. Et ideo ad cau.sandam intellectualem operationem, secundum Aristotelem, non stiffidt sol3 impres,sio sensibili1rni corpomm, sed requiritur aliquid nobilius, quia *agens·*

Since the agent intellect is not actual in the order of formal causality or determination, St. Thomas is not forced to place it outside the human soul. If it were actual in the sense of already possessing the forms acquired by the possible intellect in knowledge, then, as Avicenna rightly saw, it would have to be separate from man's soul, the soul being potential with respect to intelligible forms. So, nothing prevents St. Thomas from saying that it is a power within man's soul.

But to prove that the agent intellect *need* not be separate from man's soul is not the same as to prove that it *is* not. St. Thomas wants to show that Avicenna is wrong not only about the function of the agent intellect but also about its location.

As we have seen, Avicenna's doctrine on the causality of the agent intelligence is but an application of his general view on causality. According to Avicenna, to cause is not to educe the form from the potency of matter, but simply to impart or imprint a form already possessed by the cause, to the effect. Hence the production of any form whatsoever, according to Avicenna, requires that a separate substance imprint the form upon prepared material. The agent intelligence makes corporeal things exist by conferring forms upon prepared matter; it makes knowledge exist by conferring forms upon prepared souls. On this view the natural agent, whether in corporeal things or in knowledge, does nothing more than dispose matter to receive the form by an infusion from a separate substance. All efficacy, as well as all intelligibility, lie in the super-terrestrial order. Fundamentally irrational and unintelligible, matter is given a semblance of order when forms are ingrafted upon it; it remains, however, in its essence outside that order. The situation of man's soul is analogous. In line with his general cosmology, the intelligibility for man's knowledge is received from above.

honorabilius patiente, ut ipse dicit *[De An.* III, 4]. Non tamen ita quod intellectualis operatio causetur in nobis ex sola impressione aliquarum rerum superiorum, ut Plato posuit: sed illud superius et nobilius agens quod vocat intellectum agentem ... facit phantasmata a sensibus accepta intelligibilia in actu, per modum abstractionis cuiusdam. Secundum hoc ergo, ex parte phantasmatum intellectualis operatio sensu causatur." *(S.T.,* I, 84, 6c) Cf. *Quodl.* VIII, Sc.

As Gilson has noted, St. Thomas refutes both Avicenna's cosmology and his epistemology in one stroke, by attacking the foundation of both.[34] On matter and form, St. Thomas argues that the production of a thing does not arise solely through the infusion of form. That which is made is neither form nor matter, but the composite. And since the thing made resembles the maker, it follows that the maker must also be a composite, and not a form without matter, that is, not a separate substance. Hence the generator is a composite, and the form is that by which it generates, and not that which generates: thi,s flesh is engendered through a form in this flesh and these bones, and not by a separate form.a[5] Natural agents not only dispose matter, but also educe forms into actual existence. The conclusion: in nature as a whole, besides superior, universal causes at work, there are also particular causes, active in respect to definite effects.

When we apply this conclusion to the present question, it follows that in a production of knowledge there is a particular active principle. Hence there is not only a universal active principle of man's knowledge, but within the particular man there is a particular active principle: the particular man possesses in his soul an agent intellect.

Again, St. Thomas insists that the agent intellect is a part of the soul, because without it man would in effect be an intellectual cripple. The proper operation of man is to understand: if the principle by which this act comes about is not in man, then man is a monstrosity: *natura esset frustra.* Man would be less an agent in the world than something acted upon.as Every act of understanding would be a miracle.[87] And, worse yet, God's work-and man supposedly is the noblest creature of the terrestrial world-would be deficient in the extreme.as All these

[34] Gilson, " Pourquoi St. Thomas," p. 44.

[35] *De Pot.,* VI, 6c.; *S.C.G.,* II, 76, *Amplius.* Cf. B. Zedler, "St. Thomas and Avicenna in the 'De Potentia Dei,'" pp. 123-125.

[••] *S.C.G.,* II, 76.

[87] *Ibid.*

[38] *S.C.G.,* III, 69, *Amplius.* St. Thomas is, in general, against any inclination to detract from the efficacy of secondary causes, even if for the sake of extolling the

reasons lead to the same conclusion: the agent intellect is a power in man's soul.

To these reasons, which would be sufficient of themselves, St. Thomas adds direct experience. We *experience* ourselves abistracting universals from particulars: "And it is clear from experience that this is true; for one particular man, such as Socrates or Plato, makes things intelligible in act when he pleases, that is, by apprehending a universal form from particulars, when he separates that which is common to all individual men from those things which are peculiar to each." [39] That the agent intellect is a power in man's soul, St. Thomas argues, is verified both by reason and by experience.

Hence for St. Thomas the agent intellect is in act by its essence and separate, but not in act and separate in Avicenna's senses. It is essentially in act in that it is actually immaterial and actual in the order of exercise; it is separate in the sense that the intellectual soul acts independently of matter, and hence possesses its existence *per se* (its existence being communicated to the body so that body and soul exist by the same act of existence and so together constitute one substance), not in the sense of being a complete, separate substance.

St. Thomas's attack on Avicenna's notion of the agent intellect, combined with his rejection of Averroes's position (on the possible intellect), defines his position as truly unique in the history of Aristotelianism. To the "Aristotelianizing" theologians before St. Thomas, the feat seemed impossible: so far

efficacy of spiritual substances and God: "Perfectio effectus demonstrat perfectionem causae: maior enim virtus perfectiorem effectum inducit. Deus autem est perfectissimus agens. Oportet igitur quad res ab ipso creatae perfectionem ab ipso consequantur. Detrahere ergo perfectionem creaturarum est detrahere perfectioni virtutis." In short, St. Thomas stands on its head the "theologist" inclination.

[39] *De Spir. Great.*, lOc., trans. by M. Fitzpatrick and J. Wellmuth (Milwaukee: Marquette U. Press, l!J49); Cf.: "... homo enim abstrahit a phantasmatibus, et recipit mente intelligibilia in actu; non enim aliter in notitiam harum actionum venissemus nisi eas in nobis experiremur" *(S.C.G.,* 11, 76); "Et hoc experimento cognoscimus, dum percipimus nos abstrahere formas universales a conditionibus particularibus, quod est facere actu intelligibilia" (S.T., I, 79, 4c.); "Utramque autem harum operationum experimur in nobis ipsis, nam et nos intelligibilia recipimus et abstrahimus ea" (Q. *De An., 5e).*

as they could see, to reject Averroes was, if not to embrace, at least to approach Avicenna.[40]

By saying that the agent intellect's function is to illumine species contained in phantasms, rather than to infuse an intelligible form into man's soul, St. Thomas has involved man's intellect essentially with material things. The intellect, though spiritual, is both operationally and entitatively united to a body.

To appreciate the implications of St. Thomrus's move on the agent intellect, we must view it in relation to Averroes as well as Avicenna. Against Averroes St. Thomas argued that the possible intellect is a power of man's soul. It is the individual man that unde11stands, a Socrates or a Plato. But the possible intellect is precisely that power which receives intelligible species and by which man understands. Hence each man must have a possible intellect.[41]

By this alone, no problems are yet caused for an Avicennian or Platonic notion of man. Yet, add to this that the agent intellect as well as the possible intellect is a power in man's soul, and the paradox of man appears in full force. For to place the agent intellect together with the possible intellect into man's soul is to say at once that man is spiritual and that his spiritual life is nurtured by material things. If the agent intellect is in man, then its function must be to illumine the very material things in the world in which man-body and soul-lives. (Otherwise, if its actuality were of formal causality man would already know all that he would know.)

Still, it may seem that St. Thomas has not really stepped beyond Avicenna and Averroes, considering their doctrines together. With Avicenna, he has said that the possible intellect is of man; with Averroes, he has said that the agent intellect's role is to abstract species from phantasms. What matter, we may ask, if he also says that the agent intellect is of man? But precisely here is the decisive step. For, when St. Thomas lo-

[40] I refer here to the "Avicennizing Augustinians," such as St. Albert the Great, whom Gilson discusses in " Les sources greco-arabes," *passim.*

[41] *S.T.,* I, 76, le.

cates the agent intellect in man, together with the possible intellect, although it appears that he still merely repeats Averroes concerning its function, he has in £act transformed it into a power almost totally different in function and significance.

Although for Averroes as well as for St. Thomas the agent intellect abstracts intelligible species from phantasms, nevertheles.s the Averroist intelligible species are quite different from St. Thomas's. What the Averroist agent intellect abstracts is just the form; matter-and not just individuated matter, but also common matter-is extraneous to what the Averroist agent intellect abstracts. That which is intelligible is only form-so much so, that if we want to define a natural thing, we have to *add* common matter to our conception.[42] In other words, the Averroist agent intellect merely gleans the forms from the matter-form composites (by means of man's phantasms). It is a super-terrestrial being, and its involvement with matter is only to select eternal species out from it.

When St. Thomas places the agent intellect within man's soul, however, at the same time he radicalizes its function. The Thomistic agent intellect is not a power that merely snatches forms *away from* matter. St. Thomas insists that the intelligible species abstracted by the agent intellect is not the form alone, but the *essence* of the thing, and matter is of the essence of the things we know. So, the intellect abstracts from individuated sensible matter, but not always from common sensible matter. The species of man, for example, includes common matter, flesh and bones, abstracting from this flesh and these bones.[43] Hence for St. Thomas matter does not lie outside intelligibility.

To say then that the agent intellect's function is to abstract intelligible species from phantasms, and that the possible intellect is a power of man's soul, is to say that man's intellect is fed by material things. But for St. Thomas it is to say still

[42] Averroes, *In VII Meta.* t. c. 84 (Venice, 1574), fol. 184-D-G, cited in A. Maurer, "Form and Essence in the Philosophy of St. Thomas," *Mediaeval Studies*, 1951, p. 166.

[43] *S.T.*, I, 85, 1, ad !l.

more. It is to say that man's spiritual intellect is nurtured by material things, *in their very materiality.* Man's intellect is geared not just toward the forms of things-as though it were to snatch them away from the irrational forces of matter, as is the case with Avicenna and Averroes-,but his intellect is geared toward material things as they are, to knowing the very flesh and bones of man, for example.

Of course, man's intellect cannot by itself grasp material things in their very materiality. Yet his intellect is still geared toward material things in their materiality, i.e., just as they are. And that is why his intellect is united to a body. The proper object of man's intellect is the essence of material things. But it is proper to material essences to exist in individuals: it is of the nature of stone, for example, to exist in this or that stone. Now, since man's intellect is proportioned to knowing material things, and since it can't know them as they are unless it knows them as existing in particulars, it follows that to know its proper object the intellect must reflect back on sense images (phantasms), so as to see the universal nature in the particular existent. [44]

To say the least, all this would be a stumbling block to the Greeks and foolishness to the Arabs. For, as Professor Anton Pegis pointed out, "Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus [and let us add Avicenna and Averroes] make matter to enter as an *extraneous* cause into the intelligible structure of reality." [45] The Platonic Forms, the Aristotelian Species and Plotinian Thought-Essences (Avicenna following Plotinus here, and Averroes, Aristotle) constitute the sole intelligibility and order of the world, so that the order of the world is a compromise with the irrational forces of matter. [46] That is why both the Avicennian intellect and the Averroist intellect are concerned only with form, and both their intellects operate only by a retreat away from matter.

[44] *S.T.,* I, 84, 7c.

[45] A. Pegis, "Matter, Beatitude and Liberty," *The Maritain Volume of the Thomist,* V (1943), p. *265.*

[46] *Ibid.,* p. 266.

The world of St. Thomas, however, is intelligible even in its imperfections. The intellect is geared to *being-and* not just toward form-and even matter is intelligible because it participates in being.[47] That is why for St. Thomas to approach inteUigibility is not to retreat from matter, and that is why an intellect whose abode is the material world is not an enigma or tragedy. In sum, placing the agent intellect within man leads St. Thomas to say that intellect feeds on being, not just form. And correlatively, this means that material things in their very materiality-this stick, that stone and that piece of mud-have a share in intelligibility and order. By placing the agent intellect in man, St. Thomas has exalted the humble.

Oddly enough, only in this way can we retain all the Aristotelian insights about man. That man is a matter-form composite-neither the matter nor the form being complete in itself-was Aristotle's great advance in psychology. That man also has operations transcending matter Aristotle insisted upon in those extremely ambiguous texts of *Die Anima* III, 4 and *5.* These truths could only be held together if, first, it was explained how an intellectual substance could also be the form of a body, and second, it was insisted that in his very intellectuality man was involved with material things precisely as they are. To accomplish these tasks was to go beyond Aristotle, in order to retain characteristically Aristotelian truths.

And that is what St. Thomas did. The first point has been not only ably, but also brilliantly, explained by the late Professor Anton C. Pegis. Briefly, man's form is an intellectual substance, since it acts independently (in understanding and willing) of a corporeal organ, i.e., acts *per se.* Since a thing acts as it is, it follows that the soul exists *per se,* i.e., it possesses its own act of existing. This is what it means to subsist, or to be a substance. Since man has other operations which are performed

[47] True, the human intellect does not understand matter directly, but that is due to its weakness, not to its strength. God understands material things directly by causing them to be, since His knowledge is His causality; and angels understand material things in their very singularity through receiving intelligible species from God. See *S.T.,* I, 57,

by the form in conjunction with matter, and since it is the same man that understands and performs these composite acts, it follows also that body and soul together constitute one being. Add these truths together, and the conclusion is that the soul's eX'istenceis communicated to the body. The soul possesses its own act of existing, hence the soul is subsistent, i.e. a substance; but it communicates its existence to the body, hence body and soul together constitute one complete substance, related as matter and form. Therefore the soul of man is both an intellectual substance and the form of a hody. [48]

Second, and this is the point I have explored here, insofar as man's soul is intellectual, its being is spiritual, i.e., its being transcends the body. But man's immaterial cognition itself is received from material things, not as gleaning only the forms from the things, but as geared toward the very being of these material things, all this made possible by the illumination of the agent intellect. [49] Two consequences: first, man is essentially an intellectual substance, whose intellectuality is nurtured by material things themselves, explaining thereby the soul's union with the body; [50] second, matter is allowed entrance into the intelligibility and order of the universe. Thus did St. Thomas's " Aristotelianism " move him beyond Aristotle and his commentators.

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•• *Q. De Anima,* I; *S.T.,* I, 75, 2, et 4; 76, 1, *5.*

•• Sic igitur ex operatione animae humanae modus esse ipsius cognosci potest. In quantum enim habet operationem, materialia transcendentem, esse suum est supra corpus elevatum, non dependens ex ipoo. In quantum vero immaterialem cognitionem ex materiali est nata acquirere, manifestum est quod complementum suae speciei esse non potest absque corporis unione. Non enim aliquid est completum in specie nisi habeat ea quae requiruntur ad propriam operationem ipsius speciei. Sic igitur anima humana in quantum unitur corpori ut forma etiam habet esse elevatum supra corpus, non dependens ab eo, manifestum est quod ipsa est in confinio corporalium et separatarum substantiarum constituta. *(Q. De Anima,* le.)

[50] Why man's intellect should be nurtured by material things is explained by its status of being the lowest of intellectual substances, of itself a pure potency in the order of intentional being. See *Q. De An.,* le.

TIME AND RELATIVITY: SOME PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

NOT ONLY WAS Newton an outstanding mathematician, he was also an astute physicist who clearly saw the difficulties of formulating a solid foundation for the laws of motion. To resolve these difficulties he postulated the existence of absolute time and absolute space-concepts upon which his entire theory of physics rests.[1] Not until the second half of the 19th century, when the principles of electrodynamics became known, was his theory shaken. Plainly, the laws of electrodynamics could not be incorporated satisfactorily into the Newtonian system. Further criticism of the Newtonian world by Mach and Poincare helped open the door to a new concept of mechanics, and through Einstein's publication in *1905* a new vision of the universe emerged-the special theory of relativity.

Relativity establishes a new system of definitions for the reckoning of space and time. Since definitions of physical theories are of course arbitrary, a variety of definitions may give rise to various systems which represent equivalent descriptions of the same physical reality.[2] For example, the same physical space can be described by several geometries resulting simply from a change in the definition of congruence. " All these descriptions," Reichenbach says, " represent different languages saying the same thing; equivalent descriptions therefore express the same physical content. The theory of equivalent description is also applicable to other :fields of physics; but

[1] Sir Isaac Newton, *Mathematical Principles* (Berkeley, 1960), trans., F. Cajori. For the concepts of absolute space and absolute time see: pp. 6-8. Cf. Albert Einstein, *Essays in Science* (New York, 1934), trans., Alan Harris, p. 34.

[2] Hans Reichenbach," The Philosophical Significance of the Theory of Relativity", in *Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist* (New York, 1951), edited by Paul A. Schilpp, pp. ff.

the domain of space and time has become the model case of this theory." [3]

Since different definitions for the description of the same physical reality are possible, this paper will first analyze the definitions and concepts concerning time in Einstein's theory of special relativity. Second, these definitions and concepts will be compared with the philosophical definitions and descriptions of the same physical reality, namely time, in the thought of Aristotle and Aquinas.

Relativity Theory and Objective Time

Einstein's concept of time poses an important philosophical problem. Before relativity, it had always been assumed that the statements of time had an absolute ·significance;that is, the uniform flow of time was independent of the state of motion of the body of reference. This assumption seems to be incompatible with the relativistic idea of simultaneity, for, as Einstein illustrates, the time of a coordinate system is different from the time of any other coordinate system imparted with different velocity: " Every reference-body (coordinate system) has its own particular time; unless we are told the reference-body to which the statement refers, there is no meaning in the statement of the time of an event." [4]

Thus, an observer in motion may have a:s many clocks as there are different bodies in motion with respect to the observer. Which is the clock which corresponds to our planet? There is no such clock-but there ought to be one with respect to the sun, another for those who look at the moon, and so · forth. This seems to destroy the possibility of something we have always taken for granted: the existence of an objective and universal time, valid for all coordinate systems. Bachelard describes the problem in vivid terms:

> This operational definition of simultaneity dissolves the notion of *absolute* time. Since simultaneity is linked to physical experiments

•*Ibid.,* p.

[4] Albert Einstein, *Relativity, the Special and the General Theory* (New York, 1931), trans., Robert W. Lawson, pp.

which occur in space, the temporal contexture is one with spatial contexture. Since there is no absolute space, there is no absolute time ... Therefore from the standpoint of philosophy, it is evident that scientific thought requires a rebuilding of the notions of space and time in terms of their solidarity.[5]

Physicists have tried to solve the problem in various ways, and several have suggested solutions which should be examined carefully. For example, Eddington seems to reject the possibility of absolute time when he says: " There is no absolute ' now ', but only the various relative ' nows ', differing according to the reckoning of different observers." [6] Eddington himself, however, suggests a tentative solution to the question: his distinction between what is" true" and what is" really true". Discussing length (or time) , he says: " The shortening of the rod is true, but is not really true. It is not a statement about reality (the absolute) but it is a true statement about appearances in our frame of reference. The proper length is unaltered; the relative length is shortened." [7] Statements which deal with appearances are, for Eddington, " true "; hut statements dealing with the realities beneath appearances are "really true ".[8] In Eddington's thinking, relativity is not concerned with the absolute reality of physical beings but with mobile beings insofar as they are subjected to spatial reckonings, which depend on the velocity of the inertial system. Even for Einstein there seems to exist an absolute reality which is unaltered by relativity as suggested, for example, by this comment: *"Sub specie aJeternitatis* Poincare, in my opinion, is right. The idea of a measuring-rod, and the idea of the clock coordinated with it in the theory of relativity, do not find exact correspondence in the real world." [9] Thus relativity represents a physical system of

• Gaston Bachelard, "The Philosophical Dialectic of the Concept of Relativity," in *Albert Einstein: Philos.opher-Seientist,* p. 571.

[6] Sir Arthur Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World* (Cambridge, 1958), p. 49.

[7] *Ibid.,* p. 84.

•*Ibid.,* p. 88.

•Albert Einstein, " Geometry and Experience," in *Readings in the Philosophy of Science* (New York, 1958), edited by H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck, p. 19!t.

relations and its evaluation must be made from that perspective.

A famous mathematician and philosopher creates the following model of objective time:

> Change becomes possible only through the lapse of time. The existence of an objective time, however, means ... that reality consists of an infinity of layers of " now " which comes into existence successively. But if simultaneity is something relative in the sense explained, reality cannot be split up into such layers in an objectively determined way. Each observer has his own set of "nows", and none of these various systems of layers can claim the prerogative of representing the obj.ective lapse of time.[10]

Einstein recognized the value of Godel's objection, acknowledging in humble words: "The problem here involved disturbed me already at the time of the building up the general theory of relativity without my having succeeded in clarifying it." [11] Presenting a possible solution to the riddle, Godel observes that the complete equivalence of all observers moving with different velocity subsists only in the abstract space-time of the special relativity theory. The existence of matter, however, destroys the equivalence of different observers and distinguishes some of them from the rest. These are the observers who follow in their motion the mean motion of matter. Godel also seems to suggest the possibility of an absolute motion and absolute time:

> Now in all cosmological solutions of the gravitational equations known at present the local time of all these observers fit together into one world time, so that apparently it becomes possible to consider this time as the" true" one, which lapses objectively.[12]

The Austrian mathematician, however, is not completely happy with his own solution and leaves the problem to others for future consideration. [18]

[10] Kurt Godel, " A Remark About the Relationship Between Relativity Theory and Idealistic Philosophy," in *Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist,* p. *558.*

[11] Albert Einstein, " Reply to Criticisms," in *Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist,* p. 687.

[12] Godel, *op. cit.,* p. *559.*

[1]. *Ibid.,* pp. *560-561.*

From the philosophical viewpoint, we may demonstrate a further difficulty with Godel's conceptualization of time. When he suggests that time consists of an infinity of layers of" now" which come into existence successively, this image appeals to our intuition. But it gives rise to serious logical difficulties already known to the Greeks and Zeno of Elea concerning the nature of a continuum: either a continuum is composed of indivisibles or not; either a line is composed of an infinite number of points (indivisibles) or not; and either time is composed of an infinity of layers of nows (indivisibles) or not. Even small infinitesimals can be divided, as Hilbert says, for no matter how small they are, they can be divided again and again since any small part of a continuum appears to possess the same properties as the whole.[14]

A continuum cannot be composed of indivisibles, for how can something which is essentially divisible be composed of parts which are not? How can extension be attained from indivisible parts, which by definition do not have extension? Aristotle gives three reasons why a continuum cannot be composed of indivisibles; the first:

> Since indivisibles have no parts, they must be in contact with one another as whole with whole. And if they are in contact with one another as whole with whole, they will not be continuous: for that which is continuous has distinct parts: and these parts into which it is divisible are different in this way, i.e., spatially separated. [15]

Essentially, a divisible continuum cannot be made out of indivisibles. If we therefore define points as " indivisibles having position," [16] a line cannot be composed of an infinite number of points. Nor can time be composed of an infinite number of nows. Or, contradicting Godel's own words, time cannot be composed of an infinity of layers of "now", which comes into existence successively. As Aquinas states explicitly:

[14] David Hilbert, quoted by Tobias Dantzig in *Number, the Language of Science* (Garden City, 1956), p. 122.

[15] "Aristotle, *The Works of Aristotle, Physica,* trans., R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, (Oxford, 1962). *VI Phys.,* 1, 231 b 3-6. Aristotle gives another reason to prove this important conclusion. See *ibid.,* 231 b *6-25,* and 232 a 18-20.

[16] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* A 2, 982 a 26.

He [Aristotle] proves that a continuum is not compos.ed of indivisible parts in succession. A point is not successively related to another point in such a way that they constitute a line. Nor is one "now" successively related to another "now" in such a way that they can constitute time. For one thing is in succession to another when there is no middle of the same genus between them, as was explained above. But the middle between two points is always a line. And if a line were composed of points, as was assumed, it would follow that the middle between two points is always another point. And likewise the middle between two "nows " is time. Therefore, a line is not composed of points in succession, nor is time composed of " nows " in succession.17

It is obvious that any theory which presupposes the continuum to be composed of indivisibles encounters serious conceptual difficulties. Godel's brilliant speculation, however, should be examined because his ideas of time and general relativity do not imply necessarily that time is composed of indivisibles, even though Godel believed this to be the case.

The Concept of Time in Aristotle and Einstein

Aside from Einstein's concept of time, there is another problem regarding the unity of " ontological " time which dates back to antiquity. In order to understand the philosophical implications of this problem, it is convenient first to review certain aspects of the nature of time in the thought of both Aristotle and Einstein.

For the Greeks, the difficulty of knowing time springs from its very nature. Time is not a tangible entity-like a tree, for example, which is " there ". Time by definition entails succession, something which is not " all together ", but comes into actuality in parts. [18] The inherent obscurity of time is expressed poetically by Augustine: " What, then, is time? " he says, " If no one asks me, I know; if I want to explain it to someone who

[17] Thomas Aquinas, *In VI Phys.*, lect. 1, n. *5 Commentary on Aristotle's Physics by St. Thomas Aquinas,* trans., Richard S. Blackwell and Richard J. Spath (New Haven, l!J63) Cf. Aristotle, *VI Phys.,* 1, £32 a 18-21.

[18] Thomas Aquinas, *Opusc. De Tempore,* ch. I. Cf. *In II Meta.,* lect. 1, n. 280. *De Sensu et Sensato,* lect. 18.

does ask me, I do not know." [19] As the Spanish philosopher Balmes says, man counts time, but is ignorant of its nature. [20]

In spite of its innate obscurity, however, common man realizes that time depends upon motion. If we imagine that all motions of the world were stopped, could we think of time? It would be impossible; ontologically, time depends on motion, and in the cognitive order we are aware of time through motion, as Aristotle explains:

> But neither does time exist without change; for when the state of our own minds does not change at all, or we have not noticed its changing, we do not realize that time has elapsed, any more than those who are fabled to sleep among the heroes in Sardinia do when they are awakened; for they connect the earlier "now" with the later and make them one, cutting out the interval because of their failure to notice it. So, just as, if the "now" were not different but one and the same, there would not have been time, so too when its difference escapes our notice the interval does not seem to be time ... It is evident, then, that time is neither movement nor independent of movement.[21]

Aristotle refers to those who are fabled to have slept among the heroes or the gods in Sardinia. Through certain incantations some were made insensible and there, it was said, slept among the heroes. When they returned to themselves they perceived the instant of time in which they had lost consciousness with the later "now" in which they awoke, as if they were one. The old fable exemplifies graphically how time depends upon motion.

Since movement is continuous because of the magnitude, time, too, must be continuous:

> But what is moved is moved from something to something, and all magnitude is continuous. Therefore the movement goes with the magnitude. Because the magnitude is continuous, the movement too must be continuous, and if the magnitude, then the time; for

[19] Saint Augustine, *Confessions,* Bk. 11, ch. 14.

[20] Jaime Balmes, *Filosofia Fundamental* (Madrid, 1955), I. VII, ch. I. BAC edition II, p. 560.

[21] Aristotle, *IV Phys.* 11, 218 b 20-35.

the time that has passed is always thought to be in proportion to the movement. [22]

Aquinas elaborates on these relations, and says that time is consequent upon the first motion-namely, local motion, which is motion from place to place in respect to some magnitude. For there seems to be the same amount of time as there is the first motion. [23]

The dimensional continuum of space-time is reappearing on the horizon, for in the dependence of time and motion upon magnitude lies the " ontological " foundation of the time-space continuum of relativity. Space and time are not absolute and independent, as in Newtonian physics. On the contrary, they are interconnected insofar as a mobile in a time *t* goes through a continuous spatial magnitude (x1, x2, xs) .

If time and motion are interconnected, then how can they be distinguished? Are they the same? They are not; what makes them different is that the concept of time, unlike the idea of motion, includes the notion of the before and after. For it is only when we perceive the before and after in motion that we say that time has elapsed. The " before " and " after" of motion does not mean " metric " numbers, but simply an order in the magnitude. A is before B in the magnitude, and between A and B there is a certain magnitude. [24] The before and after of time corresponds to the before and after of motion, and those of motion to different positions in the magnitude, as Aquinas explains:

> This is so because magnitude is quantity which has position. But before and after belongs to the nature of position. Hence, place has a before and after from its very position. And since there is before and after in magnitude, it is necessary that in motion there is a before and after in proportion to the things which are in magnitude and in place. And consequently there is also a before and after in time. For motion and time are so related that one of them always follows upon the other. [25]

[22] *Ibid.,* a 6-13. Cf. Aquinas, *In IV Phys.,* lect. 17, n. 6.
[23] Aquinas, *In IV Phys.,* lect. 17, n. 6.
[2]. Aristotle, *IV Phys.,* 11, a 3.
[25] Aquinas, *In IV Phys.,* lect. 17, n. 7 .

Thus, we say that tirn.e passes when we sense a before and after in motion. When we do perceive a before and an after, then we say that there is time. For time is exactly this: " number of motion in respect to ' before ' and ' after'." [26] Hence, time is not movement, but only movement insofar as it admits enumeration. We discriminate the more or less by number, but more or less movement by time. [27]

Proceeding carefully, we see that time defined as the number of motion is "ontological time". But we can again measure ontological time, for the continuous magnitude underlying motion and time, when it is divided and measured in a "metric" way, divides and measures motion and time. Physicists have done this for centuries, and this constitutes the root of the numerical computation of the relations existing between space and time through motion. Einstein describes these relations as follows:

> In order to have a complete description of the motion we must specify how the body alters its position with time; i.e., for every point on the trajectory it must be stated at what time the body is situated there. These data must be supplemented by such a definition of time, that, in virtue of this definition, these time values can be regarded essentially as magnitudes (results of measurements) capable of observation. [28]

It is obvious that Einstein's time is not Aristotle's ontological time, but its measure: "metric" time. Ontological time is the measure of motion, and metric time measures ontological time. As Einstein says: "We understand by 'time' of an event the reading of (position of hands) that one of these clocks which is in the vicinity (in space) of the event." [29] It is crucial to separate these two complementary levels of the same physical

[26] *Aristotle*, IV Phys., 11, 219 b 1-3. Cf. *ibid.*, 219 a 22-25: "We apprehend time only when we have marked mortion, marked it by before and after; and it is only when we perceived before and after in motion that we say that time has elapsed." Aquinas, *In IV Phys.*, lect. 17, n. 10.

[27] Aristotle, *IV Phys.*, 11, 219 b 3-5.

[28] Einstein, *Relativity*, p. 10.

[2]. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

reality, as Dingle points out in this passage: "It has been supposed that the relativistic theory gives us some insight into what is called the 'nature' of time ... What relativity theory illuminates is not the metaphysical (ontological) nature of time, but the function which time measurement can perform in physics." [30]

Time is measured by measuring the space through which motion takes place. The three coordinates of space, and the one of time, formed a four dimensional continuum long before the theory of relativity was developed, as Einstein himself acknowledged;

> It is a widespread error that the special theory of relativity is supposed to have newly introduced the four dimensionality of physical continuum. This, of course, is not the case. Classical mechanics, too, is based on the four dimensional continuum of space and time; ... the special theory of relativity, on the other hand, creates a formal dependence between the way in which the spatial coordinates, on the one hand, and the temporal coordinates, on the other, have to enter into the natural laws. [31]

This new formal dependence between space and time, which characterizes relativity, reckons space and time in a way totally unknown to previous centuries. For physicists were unaware of the influence of the velocity of the mobile on the reckoning of space and time. This discovery is completely new, and could not have been imagined by the Greek philosophers, Newton, or even Poincare. This new concept of reckoning time and space presents fresh problems to philosophy, and even to physics itself.

Time, Metric Measure, and Levels of Reality

When dealing with both philosophy and science, we should bear in mind the different methodologies that are used and the levels of reality that can be investigated in a single physical

[30] H. Dingle, "Implications of the Special Theory of Relativity", in *Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist,* pp. *550-551.*

[31] Einstein, *Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist,* p. 57.

entity. Recall Reichenbach's notion that was discussed earlier: the use of different definitions may give rise to different but equivalent descriptions of the same physical reality. [32]

The Aristotelian definition of time numbers motion in terms of the before and after. This topological (or ontological) definition simply implies an order in succession. Physicists, however, concretize the measure of time by means of a sophisticated system of mathematical relations. The better we know the reckonings of the relations between space and time, the better we grasp the meaning of these concepts and their interconnections. Herein lies the contribution of the amazing world of Einstein. We should note, however, that the philosophical and scientific descriptions of time are not opposite, but complementary. As Reichenbach explains so well, neither the relativity theory-nor any other physical theory-fully exhausts the description of reality. For example, the irreversibility of time does not find expression in the theory of relativity, but nevertheless:

> We must not conclude that that is the ultimate word which the physicist has to say about time ... A physical theory may well abstract from certain properties of the physical world; that does not mean that these properties do not exist. The irreversibility of time has so far been dealt with only in thermodynamics. [33]

Thus for the interpretation of a physical theory, we must know the level of reality in which its principles operate. In general, the special theory of relativity is concerned with the reckoning of the relations of space and time in two Galilean inertial systems. There are, however, borderline questions posed by relativity which concern-at least for clarification-both the philosopher and physicist. Einstein's concept of relative simultaneity and its implications is one of them. We are now in a position to reconsider the problem posed earlier, namely, the unity of time-but from another level: the ontological, in light of the principles of the philosophy of nature in Aristotle and Aquinas.

[32] Reichenbach, *op.cit.,* pp. fl94-fl96,
[33] *Ibid.,* pp. 305-s06,

The Unity of Time and Philosophical SpecUlation

As noted before, aside from Einstein's concept of time, there is another kind of problem regarding the unity of ontological time which is as old as Greek philosophy: wherever there is motion, there must be time. **But** all bodies are mobile, for all bodies are in place. Hence, it follows that there is time wherever there is motion; and as many times as there are motions. On the other hand, do we not say that two occurrences take place at the same time? Aristotle seems to favor the existence of only one time, but his first argument is far from convincing:

> But other things as well may have been moved now, and there would be a number of each of the two movements. Is there another time, then, and will there he two equal times at once? surely not. For a time that is both equal and simultaneous is one and the same time, ... for if there were dogs, and horses, and seven of each, it would be the same number. So, too, movements that have simultaneous limits have the same time, ... the time of the two changes is the same if their number also is equal and simultaneous ... because the number of equal and simultaneous movements is everywhere one and the same.[34]

Aquinas believed that this was not Aristotle's own solution, because the number which corresponds to time is not the abstract number of mathematics, but the number applied to objects in motion. Seven horses and seven dogs possess the same abstract number seven; but they are different because horses and dogs are different kinds of beings to which the same number seven is applied. Time is the number of motion in respect to the before and after, but" time is not a number abstracted from the things numbered, but existing in the things numbered. Now number as it exists in the things numbered is not the same for all; but is different for different things ..." [35] This distinction is valid even in contemporary physics. Physics is not pure mathematics, but a physico-mathematical discipline that applies mathematics to physical matter. Einstein, for example, is very careful to

••Aristotle, *IV Phys*., 14, *QQ3* b 1-13. Cf. Aquinas, *In IV Phys*., lect. 23, n. *Q.*

[35]Aquinas, *Summa*, I, q. 10, a. 6.

distinguish between " practical geometry " (geometry applied to things) as a branch of physics from "purely axiomatic geometry" (abstract geometry) as a branch of geometry. [36] Although we do not yet have a solution to the unity of time, Aristotle's second argument, using principles completely different from the first, seems to suggest the answer:

> In locomotion there is included circular movement, and everything is measured by some one thing homogeneous with it, units by a unit, horses by a horse, similarly times by some definite time; . . . if, then, what is first is the measure of everything homogeneous with it, regular circular motion is above all else the measure, because the number of this is the best known. Now neither alteration nor increase nor coming into being can be regular, but locomotion can be. This is also why time is thought to be the movement of the sphere, viz., because the other movements are measured by this, and time by this movement. [37]

This is Aristotle's solution of the unity of time; he establishes the main principles leading to the answer but he leaves the problem yet a little unsolved. Aquinas, using Aristotle's principles, provides the elements missing in the Greek's philosophy.

Of course Aquinas's solution of the unity of time is outmoded because it depends on Ptolemy's system of the cosmos, but the idea behind his solution is of interest, even now, for it rests on ontological grounds; it can be summarized in two main principles: (1) the subordination and dependence of all motions on the first, which is the cause of them; (2) the distinction between " intrinsic " and " extrinsic" measures, which reduces all measurements of times to the first time.

In his first principle-the subordination of all motion to the first-Aquinas follows Aristotle's general ideas on measurement and complements what was left incomplete in the *Physics.* We can synthesize Aquinas's ideas in this way: (a) Each thing is measured by some one thing of the same genus, as proved in

[86] Einstein, " Geometry and Experience," in *Readings in the Philosophy of Science,* pp. 190-191.

[87] Aristotle, *IV Phys.* 14, 223 b 13-25.

the *Metaphysics.*[38] (b) Local-motion is the first, simplest and regular of all motions; and circular motion is the first and simplest and most regular of all local-motion, as proved in the *Physics.*[39] (c) It is necessary that time be measured by some determinate time, for example, all times by the day.[40] (d) Now to find the ontological foundation of the first movement, only the first of all circular motion needs to be discovered which is the motion of the first sphere:

> And among all other circular motions, the first motion which revolves the whole firmament in daily motion is the most uniform and regular. Hence that circular motion, as first, and more simple, and regular, is the measure of all motions. Moreover, it is necessary that a regular motion be the measure or number of the others. For every measure ought to be most certain, and this is found in things which are uniformly related. Therefore, from this we can conclude that, if the first circular motion measures all motions, and if motions are measured by time, then it is necessary to say that time is the number of the first circular motion, according to which time is measured, and in regard to which all other motions are measured by time.[41]

In the *Summa,* however, to establish the unity of time Aquinas emphasizes, not the dependence which corresponds to causality, but the subordination of any measure to the first measure in its genus. "For the true reason why time is one, is to be found in the oneness of the first movement by which, since it is most simple, all movements are measured ... For things to be measured by one, it is not necessary that the one should be the cause of all, but that it be more simple than the rest."[42] Furthermore, foreseeing the possibility of other cosmological solu-

[88] Aristotle, *Meta.,* X, 1, 1053 a 24-27. Cf. Aquinas, *In Meta.,* X, lect. 2, nn. 1954-*1955.*

[89] Aquinas, *In VIII Phys.,* lect. 14.

[90] Aquinas, *In IV Phys.,* lect. 23, n. 9.

[41] Aquinas, *ibid.,* n. 10. This is also true of the cognitive order: *ibid:* "Hence there is only one time because of the unity of the first motion. Nevertheless, whoever senses any motion senses time, because mutability in all mutable things is caused by the first motion, as was said above".

[42] *Summa,* I, q. 10, a. 6 and ad 4.

tions different from the Greek conception of the cosmos, and faithful to the above principles, Aquinas writes:

> If movement of the firmament did not begin immediately from the beginning, then the time that preceded was the measure, not of the firmament's movement, but of the first movement of whatever kind ... But if the first movement was another than this, time would have been its measure, for everything is measured by the first of its kind.[43]

The problem is not yet completely solved, for the second principle-namely, the distinction between measures-which reduces all the measurements of time to the first time must be examined. Aquinas distinguishes two kinds of measures: the first is "intrinsic": this measure is in the thing measured as an accident is to subject. This measure is an inherent property of the subject. The second measure is "extrinsic": this measure is not multiplied by the multiplication of the things measured.[44] Now Aquinas applies these two kinds of measures to unify the first time with all other times:

> Therefore the true reason why time is one, is to be found in the oneness of the first movement by which, since it is most simple, all other movements are measured. Therefore time is referred to that movement, not only as a measure is to the things measured, but also as accident is to subject; and thus receives unity from it. Whereas to other movements it is compared only as the measure is to the things measured. Hence it is not multiplied by their multitude, because by one separated measure many things can be measured.[45]

Hence, the first measure measures intrinsically the first time, and extrinsically all the rest of times. And since the latter measure is extrinsic, all the times are reduced to the unity of the first, the time of the first sphere.

The concept of "first" or "intrinsic", namely, the natural standards of the universe by which other quantities are measured, is valid and important in contemporary physics. Physi-

[43] *Ibid.,* I, q. 66, a. 4 ad S.
[44] Aquinas, *II Sent.,* d. 2, q. I, a. 8 ad 1.
[45] Aquinas, *Summa,* 1, q. 10, a. 6.

cists adopt arbitrarily certain standard units, such as the gram or pound, but they are most interested in grasping the universal constants of nature, which in philosophical parlance are equivalent to the intrinsic measures of philosophy: the natural units by which all material beings and motions are measured. Science starts by investigating the relative, in search of the absolute. For as Planck says, the goal of the physicist is to find " in all these data and factors, the absolute, the universally valid, the invariant, that is hidden in them." [46]

These constants always prove to be the same, regardless of the method used for measuring them; and the endeavor to discover them and to trace all physical and chemical processes back to them is, as Planck says again, the very thing that may be called "the ultimate goal of scientific research and study." [47] For Planck, these constants are *c,* the speed of light; *e,* the charge of the electron; and *h,* the quantum of action. For Heisenberg, the universal constants determine the scale of nature, the characteristic quantities that cannot be reduced to other quantities. According to Heisenberg, one needs at least three fundamental units for a complete set of units, and his are the same as Planck's: namely, *e,* the charge of the electron; *c,* the velocity of light; and *h,* the quantum of action. [48] For Dirac, there are but two: *e,* the charge of the electron; and *c,* the velocity of light. He believes that *h,* the quantum of action, will be explained eventually in terms of e.[49] We notice that these outstanding physicists all agree in considering *c,* the velocity of light, to be one of the basic constants of nature, in conformity with the theory of relativity.

Because Ptolemy's concept of the cosmos is outmoded, the ontological unity of time, if it exists, should be found in the context of contemporary physics. Is it possible to to use Aquinas's

•• Max Planck, *Scientific Autobiography* (New York, 1949), trans., Frank Gaynor, p. 47.

" *Ibid.,* pp. 77-78.

•• Werner Heisenberg, *Physics and Philosophy* (New York, 1058), p. 164.

[49] P. M. Dirac, "The Evolution of the Physicist's Picture of Nature," in *Scientific American, 5,* 1963, p. 140.

principles within the framework of relativity? We wish to try a tentative solution to this important issue.

The unity of time in Aquinas requires: (1) a first motion to which all other motions are subordinated; (2) this first motion must be regular, simple, uniform, most certain, and of maximum speed, " because it takes the least time." [50] According to the theory of relativity, the motion of light *c* seems to fulfill these conditions, for the speed of light is a limit which no moving body can ever reach. This extraordinary conclusion, which we owe to relativity, manifests the existence of a mysterious subordination of all movements of the universe to light, for light enters in all equations and formulas of relativity. Therefore: (1) No motion con reach the velocity of light *c*, which implies a subordination of all motions with respect to the motion of light. (2) The velocity of light in the void is simple, uniform, regular, and the maximum speed: $c = 3 \times 10^{10}$ cm/sec. Therefore, the motion of light can be taken as the" first motion", and consequently, its measure would be the "first time "-the objective and intrinsic first time by which all motions and times must be measured. But" why does the special theory of relativity single out, of all possible modes of movements, the movement in a straight line at a constant speed? ... As far as we know there is no reason in the world, except that the world is like this and not otherwise ... that motion in a straight line at a constant speed is, in a sense, the basic state." [51]

We can therefore conclude tentatively that the ontological unity of time depends upon that first motion which is the motion of light, by which, " since it is the most simple, all other movements are measured. [52] Other movements are not multiplied by their multitude, because by one separated and extrinsic

[50] Aquinas, *In X Meta.*, lect. 9l, n. 1947.

[51] J. Bronowski, "The Clock Paradox," in *Scientific American* 208, 2, 1963, p. 142. Cf. Planck, *op.cit.*, p. 47: "The theory of relativity confers an absolute meaning on a magnitude which in classical theory has only a relative significance: the velocity of light. The velocity of light is to the theory of relativity *as* the elementary quantum of action is to quantum theory: it is its absolute core."

[52] Aquinas, *Summa*, I, q. 10, a. 6.

measure, movements can be measured. In this way, many movements are measured by the first, the motion of light *c*, the number of which is time.

Relativity therefore is founded on the principle that the natural state of things is uniform motion in a straight line. In contrast, the Greeks believed that the natural state of motion is motion in a circle. Relativity theory emphasizes the speed of light. The Greeks and Aquinas emphasized the motion of the first sphere and the ontological subordination of all motions and times to the motion and time of this sphere. But in both-relativity theory and Greek philosophy-there exists an" ontological" subordination of all movements to the first motion and time. Consequently, there exists an ontological time.

On another level of physical reality, however, the level of "metric" time, the theory of relativity appears to present great conceptual difficulties to the existence of a universal objective " metric " measure of time. There are as many metric times as different relative velocities between bodies in motion. Godel's stimulating speculation on relativity and time, although very valuable, does not seem to afford a completely satisfactory answer to the problem posed in this paper. Insofar as metric time is concerned, we may conclude that there does not seem to exist an objective and universal metric time.

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THE MODES OF THOMISTIC DISCOURSE: QUESTIONS FOR CORBIN'S *LE CHEMIN DE LA THEOLOGIE CHEZ THOMAS D'AQUIN.**

TO JUDGE ON the public evidence, Michel Corbin's *Le chemin de la theologie chez Thomas d'Aquin* has yet to get a wide hearing. This is understandable. In the din of septicentennial publications honoring Saint Thomas, Corbin's book stands out as particularly forbidding. It is nine hundred pages long, densely written, jargon-ridden,' Hegelian'. But Corbin's book is one of the few things worth hearing from the year of conferences. This is because *Le chemin de la theologie* is a work of passionate intelligence. It labors to institute a new sort of discourse about Thomas by sketching and applying a genuinely reflective practice of interpretation. Yet, what is curious and important, the book fails to reflect on the notion of textual language which it assumes and so cannot measure its departure from Thomas's carefully constructed hierarchy of exegeses.

I want to rehearse Corbin's main arguments in the hope of giving them a hearing. After a short summary limited to the book's large features, I will frame three sets of questions. If the questions press Corbin in addition to drawing him out, it is because his seriousness demands an equal seriousness in any reader. It would do the book no justice only to praise its obvious merits.

I. The Argument

There are three movements in Corbin's argument. The first sets the tone of his reading by distinguishing it from the usual sorts. The second shows that Aquinas's methodological texts do

*Michel Corbin: *Le chemin de la theologie chez Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1974), Bibliotheque des Archives de Philosophie, n.s., # 16.

in fact make up the moments of a single development. This step comprises the detailed reading of four texts-portions of the *Scriptum* on the *Sentences,* Prologue, Questions and 3 of the commentary on Boethius's *De Trinitate,* the first nine chapters of the *Contra Gentiles,* and the first Question of the *Summa Theologiae.* The third movement argues that the end of the development in the *Summa* is indeed an end, the resolution of certain fundamental difficulties (however much it might also be the raising of new ones). I ought to make clear that the division into movements is mine. The order of the book itself is more grandly architectonic. A hermeneutical Introduction is followed by four Chapters, one for each of the methodological texts to be studied. The Introduction and each of the Chapters is divided, an echo of Hegel's symmetries, into four Sections and twelve Sub-sections. Still, the sense of the book can be grasped more easily by seeing it as three movements.

The first movement lays down rules for exegesis. In more than a hundred anfractuous pages, the Introduction wants to justify the practice about to be adopted. Corbin is taking nothing for granted; he wants the text to unfold as if of itself. He begins, then, by diagnosing the state of the theologian-reader who has survived the collapse of rationalism. To such a reader, the medieval texts appear as a place from which to begin afresh, as " the moment from which and after which the way *(le chemin)* begins to bend and to deviate, only to end at impasses " (p. 34) .[1] If medieval texts are to be studied, Thomas Aquinas's writings certainly stand out as prime candidates. But how can this be, since Thomism was part and parcel of the moribund rationalism? Corbin distinguishes, perhaps too perfunctorily, the "sclerotic" Thomism of the recent tradition from Thomas himself.[2] He wants to ignore the former and search out the latter (pp. 36-37).

[1] Parenthetical references, unless otherwise specified, will be made to the pagination of Michel Corbin's *Le chemin de la theologie chez Thomas d'Aquin.* All translations from the book are my own; I have erred consistently on the side of literalness.

[2] For dissents from Corbin, see Dario Composta, " II concetto di teologia in San Tommaso d'Aquino," *Doctor Communis,* 30 (1977), 270-79, pp. 270-72 and 274;

There is more to it. Corbin wants to recover Thomas as an interlocutor on the way of theological thinking, a " master" who is "capable of putting back on the road a unitary and comprehensive discourse which will permit a proclamation of the Word of God in the intellectual categories of today" (p. 37). On the one hand, then, the Thomistic texts cannot be treated in an immediately historical fashion, since that is to focus on the " conditioned presence " of the text and to magnify the distance between reader and writer. But neither can Corbin take Thomas's works in an immediately theological fashion, since that is to focus only on the " unconditioned aim " of the works. Moreover, in so far as the purely theological reading sets itself over against the purely historical and stresses the difference between conditioned and unconditioned, it falls prey to its own love of contraries and founders on three dualities: salvation history against an eternal science, the grace-giving action from God against metaphysical discourse about God, and Hebraic faith against Hellenistic reason (pp. 40-41). These dilemmas of the purely theological reading are to be sublated by recalling that they are nothing but questions put in finite form which ask for answers also in finite form. No finite proposition can ever exhaust the community of interests which motivates the theological reading. That reading then necessarily calls up a plurality of finite expressions, the study of which is the historical reading. And *vice versa.*

The mutual negation-and-dependence gives way to what Corbin names a" speculative reading." Such a reading is bounded by the realization that no human exegesis can ever be purely theological or perfectly so, nor purely and perfectly historical. Rather, history and theology are axes approached asymptotically in the uninterrupted act of reading, as the partial unity of the two (p. 50).

In all of this, Corbin wants to bring the act of reading to self-

Jean-Pierre Torrell, Review of Corbin, *Revue Thomiste,* 75 (1975), 143-49, p. 147. Is it clear to what extent neo-Thomism viewed itself as a *'reading'* of Thomas in the strict sense intended by Corbin?

consciousness, to make a reading which is " lucid about its own fundamental presuppositions" (p. 53) . He wants to deploy historical and theological techniques of reading in the service of the speculative task, which is to revivify a text, with its mixture of distance and nearness, of ' interiority ' and ' exteriority '. The assumption, of course, is that there is something to be vivified, some progress of thought through the texts which can be represented by a progress in the reader. Corbin analyzes this assumption into four propositions (p. 65). (I) The Thomistic corpus contains various complete systems of theology. (2) These systems can best be compared by charting the transposition of formal elements in them. (3) The sum of these systems is a vector of development which is continuous and homogeneous. (4) This vector is the marriage of logical and chronological forces.

Corbin tries to secure the four premisses, and the speculative reading which they characterize, in two ways. First, he attacks the alternatives. Corbin argues that one cannot assume that all the texts are saying the same thing (a purely ' synchronous ' reading; cf. p. 59). Nor can one assume that the different texts, instances of different literary forms, are saying different things (a purely' diachronous 'reading; pp. 70-71). Rather, the speculative reading must combine synchrony and diachrony in the image of a linear movement, of a journey, a *chemin.* But can the fact of such a progression be demonstrated? Not *a priori;* it is only through a detailed reading that the assumptions are justified (p. 76). There is no tertium quid which can be invoked to judge the correspondence of reading and text; there is no text *an sick* to which one can appeal. This does not render all readings equivalent, however. Any reading is still a reading of the work and not the work itself (p. 87) .

Corbin foreshadows the results of a speculative reading for the interpretation of Thomas in the form of a table (p. 92) . It charts the presences and absences of fixed thematic elements from one methodological text to another. The table graphs six such elements against the chronological line of the four texts.

It purports to show that there is a clear progression from the commentary on the *Sentknces* forward. New elements appear in regular fashion. Their appearances can be used to characterize each work (p. 95). Thus, the writings on the *Sentences* are characterized by the structural parallel between theology and philosophy; the commentary on Boethius by the preambles of faith; the *Contra Gentiles* by the double mode of truth; and the great *Summa* by the central place of Scripture and tradition.

What Corbin wants to see in this is not only the progress of Thomas with respect to the scholastic problematic, but a progressive narrowing of the distance between Corbin's own practice of reading and the substance of Thomas's texts. Corbin begins with a notion about the finitude of language. He derives a particular exegetical stance which seems foreign to Thomas's reasoning in the *Sentences.* But Corbin will argue that Thomas comes in the *Summa* to an understanding of the Word of God substantially coincident with the tenet of textual finitude presupposed by Corbin. This coincidence is the ultimate justification for the way of reading.

The reading itself occupies about eight hundred pages. It would be ridiculous to try a summary here. What can be said is this: Corbin carries out the project of the table of presences and absences in enormous detail. The interpretation is marked everywhere by his concern to show the continuity of the *chemin* in Thomas's works. Thus, the *Sentences* is viewed through the philosophy /theology parallel and is criticized as having an angelic view of the possibilities for a human *intellectus fidei.* In the commentary on Boethius, Thomas is seen actively searching for a new grip on the problem. The exteriority of the structural parallel is sublated in the realization that theology is human discourse which must have philosophy already within it (p. 467). The *Sentences'* division into theology and philosophy, into *rationes fidei* and *rationes naturales,* is now replaced by a division within theology between *rationes persuasoriae* and *rationes demonstrativae* (p. 468, n. 167).

The *Contra Gentiles* takes up the doubling of the *intellectus*

fidei as its basic structure, placing all the *ratwnes demonstrativae* before the *persuasoriae,* reasons before similitudes (pp. 630-31). Since the truth of faith reflects the absolutely simple God, any doubling in it cannot stand. Thomas must reduce it by a movement of reason from creatures back to God; this gives rise to the" apologetic illusion" about the work (p. 584). But the posterior unity of the ascent of reason to God does not jibe with the prior unity of the truth as a gift from God. More emphatically, there is a tension between the prior unity of the theology which uses reason as servant and the posterior unity of reason which tries to scale heaven with similitudes. One cannot be superimposed on the other; the course of the development from the *Sentences* to the *Contra Gentiles* has become irreversible (p. 583) . As a consequence, the doubling of the faith in the *Contra Gentiles* must seem unfounded. Its positing of an ascent in two parts, one natural and one supernatural, cannot be referred to its genesis and so must be presented as immediate. This instability in the composition of the work powers a drive to reformulate the issues.

The great *Summa* achieves the reformulation not by returning nostalgically to the prior unity, but by transforming the model 0:f theology for a third time. Theology is now to be seen as the interpretation of the *finite* course of the *revealed* Word of God, embodied in Scripture and tradition. It is the discovery, Corbin thinks, of what would be famous as the doctrine of the *loci theologici.* As the *Summa* resolves the tension of the scholastic problematic, it passes beyond that and inaugurates a new chain of thought.

II. Questions for the Argument

A bare outline of the book cannot do the slightest justice to its argument. Trying to sketch it is like trying to copy in pen-and-ink one of Joseph Turner's marvels of color and light. Even so, I must now overlook the disparity between my sketch and Corbin's work in order to begin three lines of questioning. The questions correspond to the three movements of Corbin's proj-

ect-the characterization of the speculative reading, the demonstration of the continuity of the *chemin* in the texts, and the claim about what is accomplished in the *Summa.* I want to argue that these three points reflect a singular absence in Corbin's book. For all his emphasis on the temporal limitation of language, Corbin seems to see language only as temporally conditioned meanings. He has not sufficiently examined the ways in which language works when it is not responding to temporal pressures. He does not see how the temporal conditioning might be subsumed within a larger view of the nature of texts. This weakens his argument at the three turning-points.

1. Corbin established the speculative reading by tracing the contradiction in the immediately historical and immediately theological practices. What he does not do so well is show how the speculative reading itself ought to proceed. He is not clear about the appropriateness of including historical and theological information in a speculative reading. Is the speculative reading a pastiche of the two (what it sometimes seems), or is it some 'higher' reading which controls them as it makes use of them? The problem of the subordination of philosophy to theology in Thomas is repeated in Corbin with the problem about the subordination of historical and theological 'data' to speculative 'insight'.

There follow both substantive and rhetorical difficulties. The substantive difficulties come in Corbin's failure to explicate the presuppositions of language which might ground his theory of speculative reading. These will crop up again in a moment. The rhetorical difficulties come in trying to decide which discourse it is that Corbin is joining or making. By what canons is it to be judged? A good occasion for the question is Corbin's treatment of the *Contra Gentiles* as a unity. Here he enters a thicket of debate in the journals over the redaction of the *Contra Gentiles* –its plan, audience, date. He does so with open eyes; there are citations of Chenu, M. M. Goree, A. Gauthier, and D. Salman, to pick the obvious contestants (pp. 478, 480, and 484 respectively). Corbin even criticizes the textual evidence in Peter

Marsilius very neatly as he argues against the apologetic theory (pp. 479-82).

All of this is 'good scholarship'. But it is done almost half-willingly and in segregation from the speculative exegesis. It does not seem, moreover, that Corbin intends to be judged by the usual canons. Though he addresses the major positions, he is not interested in being exhaustive. Corbin could, for instance, have strengthened his point against the apologetic thesis by showing that the *Contra Gentiles* was recognized as but a mediocre missionary tool by some of its expert contemporaries.[3] Again, Corbin could have taken up in his consideration of the work's date the claim of Pierre Marc that the period of composition was really Hl69-74.[4] The question of dating ought to be a particularly critical one for Corbin, since any major alteration in the established chronology would break up his *chemin.*[5]

As it is, the scholarly references float in an isolated bubble within Corbin's book, as if they were ornaments only, distractions for a public not yet ready to read him on his own terms. Or perhaps, to say what seems truest, these are notes by Corbin himself, meant to correct certain theories and modify others without any attempt to be comprehensive. The introversion of the discourse is underlined by the absence of a bibliography or any 'apparatus' for reviewing the work's sources.[6] It also ap-

[3] The Dominican Raymond Martini, for instance, reworked the *Contra Gentiles* before using it ' in the field ' precisely to incorporate detailed references to Islamic source.s. Indeed, the parallels between the *Contra Gentiles* and Martini's *Pugio Fidei* led M. Asin Palacios to conclude that Aquinas had plagiarized much of his work. See the *Iluellas de Islam* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1941), p. 67.

• See Marc's *lntroductio* to the *Liber de veritate catholicae fidei* . . ., vol. I (Turin & Rome: Marietti, 1967). Marc's hypothesis is, of course, generally rejected. See Alvaro Huerga, "Hip6tesis sobre Ia genesis de la *'Summa contra Gentiles,'* " *Angelicum,* 51 (1974), 533-57, pp. 540-45.

[5] Composta, for instance, rebuffs Corbin merely by adducing Leo Eider's earlier dating for the Boethius commentary (Composta, p. 278, item (a)). Corbin opens himself for this sort of facile criticism.

[6] This makes it difficult to bring Corbin into conversation with his predecessors. For instance, how are Corbin's charts comparing the thematic structures of the various works (pp. 632-33, 794-95) methodologically more secure than the similar charts of J.-F. Bonnefoy, who wrote an illuminating comparison of the *Sentences*

pears in the inconsistent use of critical editions.[7] Is the model, once again, the autonomous reflection of Hegel's *Phenomenology?* Can such a model be justified in the case of an exegete?

There is a more biting question behind these, one which returns to the use of public scholarship by the speculative reader. How much does Corbin's reading, for instance, depend on an acquaintance with the language of Thomas which is acquired publicly and as if *a priori?* Isn't Corbin's ability to read that language thoroughly (if covertly) dependent on a long chain of philological research, which ought frankly to be admitted and brought to light? If Corbin's reading depends on the public discourse of scholarship, isn't it subject to being judged by that discourse? One might reply that the speculative reading is taught the language of the texts *in actu,* by the texts themselves. But what does it mean, to learn the language from the text itself? Isn't one trapped in the exteriority of the historian's approach to the language-or in the pure interiority of the theological presumption which overlooks language altogether? The fundamental question left unanswered by Corbin's description of the *lecture speculative* is precisely how the *lecture* is possible. What is *"la lecture"* within which these various readings take their places (p. *?*

Corbin wants to dissolve my aibstract questions in his concrete practice.[8] The style of *Le chemin* is that of a reader's

and the *Summa* some forty years ago? See his "La theologie comme science et !'explication de la foi selon Thomas d'Aquin," *Ephemeride!l Theologicae Lovanienses,* 14 (1937)' 4!21-46, pp. 4!2!2-!24.

[7] Torrell has pointed out Corbin's vacillation on the text of a passage from the *In Boethium;* compare Corbin, p. 308 and n. 26, with p. 342. See the remarks in Torrell, p. 148.

[8] I don't mean to suggest that Corbin is uniquely at fault here. Lonergan seems to follow the same path in *Method in Theology.* Recall a crucial point in the chapter on interpretation: " One reaches a point when the overall view emerges, when other components fit into the picture in a subordinate manner, when further questions yield ever diminishing returns, when one can say just what was going forward and back it up with the convergence of multitudinous evidence" *(Method in Theology* [London: Darton, Longman, & Todd, 1972], p. 164). Lonergan seems to be invoking a scientific model-that of statistical emergence. Corbin might be accused of invoking a ' fideistic ' model of illumination. Is either model adequate to the complexities of reading texts?

notes. It records the uninterrupted readings of texts by a reader who faces himself primarily. But, then, the 'abstract' questions become more urgent to the extent that the reading is to be reflective. For all his emphasis on hermeneutics, Corbin seems almost naive about what is fundamentally questionable in the reading of texts. His one approach to the questions is through the axiom of historical conditioning. Is it possible that the historical conditioning occurs in virtue of something else in language which Corbin has not yet touched upon?

2. The second point to be questioned is the notion of the *chemin.* It is easy to think that '*chemin'* appears only as a metaphor for something plainer. But there is much more at stake, as Corbin makes clear in the early sections on diachrony and synchrony (pp. 57-69). The notion of *chemin* is the operative assumption of the speculative reading; without the certainty that there is a course of thinking to be re-thought, the speculative reading would move in a vacuum. It is crucial, then, that the notion be established. Corbin insists that he cannot do so beforehand; it is only *a posteriori* that one can be convinced of the continuous and homogeneous development.

But in the course of the book, the argument seems sometimes to go in the opposite direction. Corbin will sometimes argue that his interpretation is to be preferred *becaus'e* it combines continuity and discontinuity in the way required for an itinerary. When choosing between apologetic and theological readings of the *Contra Gentiles,* for instance, Corbin writes:

> The speculative reading might think nonetheless that only the ' theological ' thesis would permit it to count the Summa against the Gentiles within the itinerary of Thomas Aquinas, since the 'apologetic ' thesis contains a rupture which opposes itself to such inclusion. This would imply a necessary choice in favor of the former [thesis]. But this ought also to be contested, SINCE the passage from one stage of the itinerary to the following presupposes at once a continuity and a discontinuity . . . (p. *512,* emphasis added)

In this passage, as in others, the argument seems to move from the presumption of the *chemin* to a decision about the validity of competing interpretations.

The reversal, questions of rigor aside, might lead one to suspect that Corbin has other motives for preferring a logical development which is also chronological. The reasons are not far to seek on a superficial level: Corbin makes a great point of the Hegelian notions of syllogistic deployment and mediation (p. 801, n. 62; p. 804, n. 64); he insists on the "irreversible" character of the movement along the *chemin* (e.g., p. 534); he analyzes innumerable transpositions in frankly dialectical terms. Still, it is not enough to trot out the label ' Hegelian '. There is something more interesting in Corbin's assumption that the logical and chronological sequences must be matched. It is, first, another version of the assumption that language is to be grasped by analyzing the temporal tension between conditioned expression and unconditioned aim. But it is also, second, one of the chief tenets of the historical reading which Corbin explicitly rejects. I mean the claim that a later reading can take a critical stance towards earlier texts and discern in them immanent laws of change. From this point of view, it would be shocking to think that what is chronologically distanced should not also be more ' decisive '.

This tenet appears as Corbin's fourth presupposition of the speculative reading (p. 65). When justifying it, Corbin takes up the two alternatives-the 'unitarian' reading, which assumes that Thomas is saying the same thing everywhere, and the 'literary' reading, which sorts the works according to discrete literary categories. Both are anti-historical and are criticized by Corbin as such. But the criticism of the literary reading is certainly not complete, though it is interesting inasmuch as it reveals Corbin's prior commitments.

Corbin thinks that Thomas's works are arranged on a line which is at once chronological and logical. The ' literary ' reading, by contrast, prescinds from any chronological sequence to examine the literary type of each work. Corbin complains that the literary reading breaks up any possibility of continuity by fragmenting the project of the corpus.

It is certainly true that the birth of any work is marked by the previous encounter with certain universes of thought, but no less

true that the sources alone, the circumstances of redaction alone can never totally explain the intimate connection of a conditioned expression and an unconditioned aim which characterizes all creation. (pp. 71-72)

Corbin is right. But he has left out of account the possibility of studying the internal ' shapes ' of the " conditioned expressions". I am thinking of the following sort of literary reading. It is possible to interpret the different Thomistic works as levels or grades within an extra-temporal hierarchy of discursive modes. The comments on the *Sentences* were written for a certain audience in a certain format; these are the materials for the historicist's literary reading. But it is also true that the *Scriptum* ' means ' differently than do the other works, in the same way that a poem 'means ' differently than an essay. The *Scriptum* exemplifies a mode of discourse which possesses not only its own stylistic peculiarities, but its own semantic ' distance ' from the objects under discussion. This mode of discourse stands in fixed relations to the alternate modes in the other works. The sum of such relations defines a hierarchy of modes of discourse which can be taken as characteristic of Thomas's *episteme* (to steal Foucault's term)[9]-of a given' age' (to slip back into historicism). This is true not only among the works, but within each work. A given Article in the *Summa,* say, may be a quartet or sextet of voices which differ not only thematically, but semantically-differ not only in what they mean but in how they mean it. For the exegete who is interested in recovering Thomas's thought, it becomes crucial to grasp the hierarchy of possible modes of discourse at Thomas's disposal. That hierarchy is the only true criterion for assessing Thomas's work as an author-or any one of his works.

Such a literary reading eludes Corbin's criticism because it insists, as much as he does, on the unity of corpus. It sees the unity, however, as grounded in a hierarchy of discourses and not in an historical flow. Corbin's assumptions are thus thrown into

• A notion used, for example, in Foucault's *The Order of Things,* a translation of *Les mots et les choses* (New York: Vintage, 1973). Corbin cites this book (p. !'l4), but does not apply its lessons.

relief, since he seems to take for granted the exclusively temporal approach to questions of language.[10] One must now ask: Which exegetical practice better accords with the Thomistic noetic, an exegesis by way of a hierarchy of modes of discourse or the exegesis predicated on historical development? To ask it more bluntly: What better mirrors the Thomistic cosmos, a scale of discourses about God or an historical development governed by immanent necessities?[11]

3. The final line of questioning concerns Corbin's claims about the *Summa.* They are first stated, in the Introduction, by way of paradox: " at the moment when he resolves the problem of his time technically, Thomas Aquinas introduces a new concept, that of the theological loci, and displaces the problematic of theology towards the study of the tradition " (p. 99, italicized in the text) . Corbin traces the course of this doctrine through Trent and Melchior Cano's *De locis theologicis.* Thomas seems to be the father of modernity.

Near the end of the book, Corbin modifies this claim:

> One must guard oneself from identifying too quickly this solution [by Thomas], which is of such great novelty for its epoch, with the thematization which Melchior Cano gave, in the sixteenth century, to the theological loci ... [T]his [latter] enumeration of the loci is inseparable from the double concern for the progress of dogmas and the theological conclusion; the schema is formal in the immediately logical sense of the term .... The theory of the theological loci plays with Cano the role of a point of *immediate departure* received from predecessors, and with Thomas the role of a point of *mediate arrival* engendered on the basis of his itinerary. (pp. 850-51)

But Corbin does want to see the " germ " of Cano in Aquinas. He must hold, then, that Thomas comes to " the consciousness of the historical situation of theology in the midst of the process

[10] Corbin does this despite his recurrent use of phrases which might bring on a discussion about the non-temporal structures in language. He even mentions " Orders of discourse", but does not pause over the phrase (p. 659).

[11] I do not want to tax Corbin on the point of dialectic. But there are dogmatically Hegelian slips in the book. Consider an italicized sentence from page 471: " If the result is an accomplished result, the movement of its genesis necessarily implies its own transformation." The book's arguments are full of such premisses.

of interpretation of the Word of God" (p. 851, italicized). Corbin thinks that Thomas has revalued the techniques of Scriptural interpretation.

> In bringing back all theological argumentation under the guidance of the literal sense alone, in refusing the thicket of ancient allegories and the confusion which, he says, follows on them, in connecting the seriousness of theological science to the rigor of the reading of canonical texts, Thomas Aquinas signs at once the death certificate of the symbolic exegesis of the Fathers and the birth certificate of modern historical exegesis. (pp. 870-71)

The *Summa* in this way completes the Scholastic project as a whole (p. 100).

Corbin seems wrong on two counts, both when he glosses Question 1, Article 10 of the *Summa,* and when he summarizes Thomas's scriptural practice. To begin with the gloss: Corbin mistakes, first, the import of the *ad Im* in the text. The objection which elicits the response can be heard in a number of ways which vary between two poles. The first pole is that of the convinced Aristotelian who doesn't like the vagueness of non-literal propositions. The second pole is that of the prudent Augustinian, who is afraid of the theological anarchy which would follow upon the dissolution of the Biblical text in pure equivocity. Thomas seems more interested in addressing objections near the second pole. He begins by harking back at least to Augustine's *De Doctrina Christiana* and its doctrine of God's use of things as signs.[12] Does the making relative of the *res/signum* distinction reduce signification to a mush? Not at all, because theological argument (and argument in general) is to be taken from the literal sense, upon which all other senses are "founded". But nothing of the richness of Scripture is taken away, "since nothing necessary to faith is contained beneath the spiritual sense, which by the literal sense Scripture does not manifestly give elsewhere" (1 ST q. 1 a. 10 ad lm; cf. Corbin, pp. 870ff.).

[12] Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana,* 1.2.2, the classic passage for the use of a *res* as *signum* in divine revelation.

Is this the coroner's report on Patristic hermeneutics? *Pater* Augustine had written, " the Holy Spirit has magnificently and wholesomely modulated the Holy Scriptures so that the more open places present themselves to hunger and the more obscure places may deter a disdainful attitude. Hardly anything may be found in these obscure places which is not found plainly elsewhere." [13] On the dangers of dissolving the text through overallegorization, Augustine was equally insistent. [14] One could catalogue many more parallels between this one Article on the *Summa* and *De Doctrina Christiainar-as* Thomas is well aware. His reply to the objection is buttressed, after all, by a reference to one of Augustine's epistles (which reference Corbin curiously omits; p. 870). My point is only to suggest that there is profound continuity between Thomas and the Patristic tradition about the practice of exegesis.[15]

The continuity can be seen even more clearly in what Corbin thinks is his crowning evidence-Thomas's doctrine that theological argument can draw only upon the literal sense. Thomas asserts, first, that nothing " *fidei necessarium* " is lacking from the literal. This is a minimum statement; it forestalls esoteric doctrines. Second, Thomas says that all the other senses are " founded " on the literal, rest upon it. He does *not* say that the

[18] *De Doctrina Christiana,* 2.6.8, from the translation by Robertson published as *On Christian Doctrine* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965).

"De Doctrina Christiana, 3.10.15: "if the minds of men are subject to some erroneous opinion, they think that whatever Scripture says contrary to that opinion is figurative. But it asserts nothing except the catholic faith as it pertains to things past, future, and present. It is a history of things past, an announcement of future things, and an explanation of present things; but all these things are of value in nourishing and supporting charity and in conquering and extirpating cupidity." From Robertson's translation. The argument of the first Book of *De Doctrina* concerns exactly the subordination of all exegesis to the rule of charity found in the community of believers.

[15] Even if one wants to say that Thomas is to be read as the champion of the literal sense, this must be understood within the frame of the tradition of exegesis against which Thomas worked. If he corrected it, the correction in many ways took for granted and approved of what had been achieved already. Beryl Smalley seems to think this, despite her own emphasis on Thomas's work with the literal. See *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages* (Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1970)' p. 373.

literal is the pre-eminent sense; he says that it is the foundation. Recall Thomas's doctrine that human knowledge begins with the senses. Does it entail that the work of the human mind is exhausted in physics? On the contrary, that science is only the first grade of a hierarchy which it is our work to climb. In the same way, the literal sense is the beginning of the Scriptural *itinerarium mentis ad Deum.* Finally, Thomas says that theological arguments can only be taken from the literal sense. Neither is this an assertion of the primacy of the literal. It is, rather, an insight into the limits of persuasion. Theological argument is the attempt to persuade someone of the wholeness of the revealed truth. It is necessary, then, that theological argument move from what is most accessible. This is the literal sense. Or, rather, *our* literal sense, since God's literal sense comprehends everything at once.[16]

But that does not raise the literal to any exalted status. One can see this by going back to the work on the *Sentences.* The fifth Article of its first Question asks whether the procedure of theological doctrine is *artifie-ialis.*[17] Corbin reviews the Article (pp. 273-90), but he relegates it to an appendix which the" hurried reader " can jump over (p. 239) . In the expendable Article, Thomas argues that the mode of discourse in theology is *arti-*

[16] I ST q. I a. 10 corpus: "Now the literal sense is what the author intends; but since the author of sacred Scripture is God, who comprehends everything at once by his intellect, it is not inconvenient, as Augustine says, if even according to the literal sense there be many senses in one letter of sacred Scripture."

[17] A small point: Corbin renders' *artificWlis'* as a name for "Ie mode scientifique de la theologie ... le caracter.e de rigueur et d'objective qne doit avoir sa demarche discursive" (pp. 273-74). He cites Vincent of Beauvais, Albert the Great, and Alexander of Hales, all of whom seem to treat *'ars'* as a synonym for *'scientia* '. But Corbin is too quick in making that *'scientia'* into our 'science'. He also fails to mention that *'artificialis'* had a much wider use which may be in the wings of Thomas's discussion. In a British customary of 1266, for instance, the monks are permitted to retain as servants only those who could do the " *opere artificiali"* at which the brothers were incompetent; *Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources,* comp. R. E. Latham, fasc. I (London: Oxford Univ. P., 1975), p. 133. See also the examples under " c. Kunstgerecht" in *Mittellateinisches Wiirterbuck bis zum Ausgenenden 13 Jahrkunderts,* comp. 0. Prinz & J. Schneider, vol. I (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1967), col. 997.

ficialis by being symbolic or parabolic. Theological discourse has three stances: one aims for the destruction of errors; the second wants to teach men how to live; the third intends the contemplation of truth in questions of Scripture. Corbin labels these three stances the apologetic, the parenetic, and the speculative (p. 278). The apologetic and speculative stances, Thomas continues, can use appropriately the types of arguments found in the Fathers and Peter Lombard. The first stance can use, in addition, arguments drawn from any natural analogues.

This arrangement of sources is next juxtaposed with the consideration of the four senses in Scripture. The upshot is the claim that the literal sense can be used only by the apologetic stance, since " no argument can be taken from locutions based on likeness " (1 *Sent. Pro.* q. 1 a. *5* sol) . Corbin finds this "so difficult and so confused" (p. 284); yet it seems clear that Thomas is not giving pre-eminence to the literal sense or to the argumentative mode. It is just the reverse. The three stances of theology are ordered in a hierarchy: Apologetics is the lowest, moral instruction the middle, and speculation the highest term. Generally speaking, all three proceed metaphorically or symbolically, with the exception of the natural arguments in the lowest, apologetic category. This exception is a pedagogical concession. It reflects more on the obstinacy of the hearer than on the value of the figural senses. Despite the progress of the intervening works, it seems that the same concession is in Thomas's mind when he writes Article 10 at the opening of the *Summa.* It is the hierarchy of stances which explains, as Corbin does not, why theological argument is restricted to the literal sense when it argues.

Corbin is also mistaken, I think, in his general conclusions about Thomas's Scriptural hermeneutics. One of the most striking things is Thomas's conservatism in the handling of the texts. If he has no tolerance for the luxuriant interpretations of an Abbot Joachim, he still retains the deeply ' spiritual ' reading of the Old Testament. As de Lubac shows in some detail, Thomas takes over the Scriptural tradition to use it faithfully,

with few and technical modifications.[18] I do not see that Corbin has overturned this view-or that he could. The subordination of literal, natural discourse to the analogical discourse of the revealed is the quintessentially Thomistic understanding of any discursive hierarchy, scriptural or ontological. It is just not the same as the (increasingly impoverished) hierarchy of discourse prevalent at the time of Cano. The revolution Corbin seeks comes not in Thomas, but in a later shift of discursive modality which allowed Thomas to be re-read.

Finally, it is curious that a book which ends by emphasizing the central place of Scriptural exegesis in Thomas neglects or compresses treatment of his Scriptural reflections and exegetical practice. Mustn't Corbin's thesis relegate his own book to the status of a prolegomenon with respect to a study of the Thomistic reading of Scripture? Don't the conclusions which Corbin draws from the *Summa* dictate a return to the itinerary of the *reading of Scriptural modes of discourse?*

The *Summa* is meant, Corbin says, to heal the rift in the *Contra Gentiles* between two realms in the ascent to God. It does this by focusing on the finite course of the revealed Word of God as handed down in Scripture and tradition. Corbin thinks that Thomas heals the rift by appealing to sacred texts. If Corbin sees this as Thomas's achievement, he ought then to ask himself how Thomas understands the 'ontology' of texts. A first answer would be that Thomas understands texts as privileged analogues to the Incarnation of the Son. Why does the appeal to the sacred text heal the rift between 'natural' and 'supernatural'? It does so because a text embodies both fleeting sound and timeless sense, limitation of expression and illimitation of meaning. That is, of course, one of the large reasons why Christ can meaningfully be called 'the Word'. The Thomistic sensibility for the finitude of texts is, then, far from

[18] See Henri de Lubac, *Exegese medievale: Les Quatres Senses. de l'Ecriture,* Second Part: II (Paris: Aubier, 1964), pp. 288-99. De Lubac quotes approvingly from Spicq the following summary: "Ce qui distingue saint Thomas de ses contemporaines ou de ces devanciers, c'est beaucoup plus Ia qualite de son esprit que l'originalite de sa methode ou de ses formules" (p. 294).

the modern sense of the text as an object of historical criticism. For Thomas, the temporality of the text is hierarchically subordinated to the eternity of the divine truth-just as the temporality of the Incarnation is given sense by the prior ordering of divine Persons and of the creation about to be redeemed. If that is paradoxical, it is nonetheless Thomas's view. Any purely temporal or 'horizontal' understanding of textual finitude is to be corrected by seeing the supra-temporal hierarchy of modes of discourse, which speaks of God in its various tongues.

* * *

Let me conclude with less captious remarks. In *Le chemin de la theologie*, Michel Corbin provides an example to the passionate and serious reader of Thomas's works. It is an example of intelligence, vivacity, and honesty. If Corbin has left certain gaps in the reading, if there are things in need of vigorous questioning still, that in no way eclipses the example. It *is* one worth hearing.

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STAGES AND DISTINCTION IN *DE ENTE**: A REJOINDER

I

IN A RECENTLY published article, Fr. John Wippel brings forward an interesting claim. The *De Ente et Essentia* of Aquinas, he proposes, has arrived at a real distinction between thing and being at a stage antecedent to the demonstration of God's existence.[1] However, a number of significant historical and metaphysical tenets lie dormant in this prima facie translucent estimate of the situation. Might not a close look at some of them be in order before undertaking an assessment of Wippel's conclusion?

One implicit assumption, historical in bearing, soon makes itself felt. The article seems to take for granted that mention of real or conceptual character in the distinction should have had some importance in the procedure of Aquinas, so much so that the lack of explicit designation of this character may be referred to as a "failure " (p. 294, n. 35). Undoubtedly the problem was given sharp emphasis in later Thomistic tradition. But did it come into focus in this way in the writings of Aquinas himself? In event of a negative answer, the further question why it did not or perhaps even could not play any notable part in his thought will have to be faced.

A second implicit tenet is metaphysical in character. It bears on the nature of existence. Before demonstrating that God exists can we know *what* existence is, in a way sufficient to determine its real implications? The presumption seems made in

*Pp. 376.90-377.166.

[1] John F. Wippel, "Aquinas's Route to the Real Distinction: A Note on *De Ente et Essentia," The Thomist,* 43 (1979), 279-295. The passag.e dealt with from *De Ente,* c. IV, may be found in the Leonine edition *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia,* XLIII, 376.90-377.166.

the article that existence can be so known before the demonstration that God exists has reached its term. But if existence cannot be known as having the status of a real nature in this epistemological priority, how can one cogently *deduce* conclusions about it, for instance that it is really distinct from what it is actuating? In a word, does not human apprehension of the nature of existence coincide with the metaphysical knowledge that God exists? Yet the claim advanced by Fr. Wippel seems to take for granted that the nature of existence is sufficiently knowable, prior to that demonstration, to permit the inference of real distinction from the finite thing in which existence is received. Can that inference at all be made before the demonstration that existence does in fact subsist as a real nature in a unique primary instance?

A third implicit tenet, closely related to the preceding one, is that from the content of a concept of existence one can reason immediately or almost immediately to its conditions in reality. The implicit supposition seems to be that the concept of existence corresponds to its object in the manner of a concept originally obtained through simple apprehension of a quiddity. Shades of the ontological argument at once arise, even though here the existence, aside from the distinction, is known as real from the start. From the concept of really distinct existence the reasoning projected in Fr. Wippel's article would seem to infer a distinction present in reality, somewhat as from the nature of that than which nothing greater can be thought or of that which is infinite in every perfection an ontological argument infers existence in the real world.

A fourth implicit tenet seems to be that the designation " real " adequately expresses the way things are distinguished from their being, in the metaphysical perspective of Aquinas. Yet, against the Avicennian background of the different ways in which things exist, a background that was common to the metaphysics of the epoch, a thing had to be distinct from its cognitional as well as from its real being. In the sentient cognition of a lower animal seeing a tree, would not the tree be dis-

tinct from the cognitional being it has acquired, even though no human knower were forming different concepts of the two? But on the other hand how could there be real distinction, since no real being is involved? The distinction meant by Aquinas between a thing and its being seems therefore to extend beyond the range covered by the notion " real."

Each of these four seemingly implicit tenets, one may urge, deserves separate and careful examination before proceeding to an in-depth evaluation of the principal claim in Fr. Wippel's article.

II

The distinction between a thing's nature and its being is in fact mentioned frequently throughout the writings of Aquinas. But there is no set formulation for the theme. Distinction, difference, diversity, composition, other than, over and above *(praeter),* incidental to *(accidit),* shared by, received by, are the phrasings used in the way the occasion may demand or the idiom of medieval Latin may suggest.[2] Further, the wording of the terms between which the contrast lies keeps varying. The distinction is located between nature and being, essence and being, quiddity and being, what a thing is and that it exists, something and its being, or simply in the fact that the one is not the other.[3] The formulation seems always flexible in adaptation to the circumstances of the moment.

For clarity in understanding the problems involved, one might recall that in the doctrine already outlined in the *De Ente et Essentia* (c. II) a nature or essence is abstracted in two ways, namely either precisively or non-precisively. Precisive abstraction cuts off and excludes the individuality with-

[2] For instances, see L. Sweeney, "Existence/Essence in Thomas Aquinas's Early Writings," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association,* 37 (1963)' 105-131.

[3] Care should be taken to avoid the later formulation of the terms as *esse essentiae* and *esse existentiae.* They would coincide if Aquinas's acceptation of *esse* were applied to them. On this point see my article "The Number of Terms in the Suarezian Discussion on Essence and Being," *The Modern Schoolman,* 34 (1957), 150-190. On *res* as a term, see infra, n.

out which the nature or essence cannot exist in the real world. Non-precisive abstraction does not exclude the individuality, even while abstracting from it.[4] Since whatever exists in reality is individual, there is no difficulty in seeing that the question of real distinction bears immediately on the nature as individualized in its particular instances. In this perspective the real distinction of nature or essence from being is the distinction between the thing itself and its being. In meaning, therefore, these formulations coincide. The individuality cannot be prescinded from when there is question of distinction in reality.

Aquinas can of course without hesitation, in accord with his sources in the Latin Avicenna, contrast humanity, as Scotus does equinity, with its being.[5] That is an accepted way of speaking. But if the natures so designated are considered as they exist in reality, where real distinction can apply, they coincide with the thing itself. However, from the time of Descartes's clear and distinct ideas the tendency has been to consider mental concepts as the immediate and direct object of human intellection, and to look for clearcut precision in them. The impression thereby given is t,hat a self-contained and finished whole, called the nature or essence, is a term in the distinction. In consequence the interests of clarity are better served today by using the concrete, non-precisive terminology. The distinction calls for phrasing through contrast of thing with being. In point of fact, Aquinas's notion of non-precisive abstraction is hardly known at all today. "Nature" and "essence" accordingly become misleading. The use of a concrete expression, a " thing," seems imperative in order to make clear that nature or essence is here being understood in the sense in which

• See *De Ente,* c. II; p. 373.243-308. Cf. *In I Sent.,* d. 23, q. 1, a. 1, Solut.; ed. Mandonnet, I, 555-557. "Quamvis enim genera et species non subsistant nisi in individuis, quorum est esse, tamen determinatio essendi fit ex natura vel quidditate superiori." Ibid., p. 556.

[5] Cf. "... potest enim intelligi humanitas, et tamen dubitari, utrum homo habeat esse." *In I Sent.,* d. 8, exp. lae partis textus; I, 209. "... potest enim cogitari humanitas et tamen ignorari an aliquis homo sit." Ibid., q. 4, a. 3, Solut.; I, 222.

"Socrates is an essence" *(De Ente,* c. II, p. 373.806; Maurer trans.).

On four occasions, though each time in treating of other topics, Aquinas does use the designation " real " or its equivalent to characterize the diversity or difference or composition or otherness of the thing and its being.[6] On a further occasion, likewise incidentally in dealing with another theme, he explains the distinction between being and quiddity in the way the rational aspect is distinguished from the animal aspect in man.[7] That distinction surely arises from the two different concepts, one specific, the other generic, that the human mind forms to enable it to understand the one real nature. In the epistemology of Aquinas it is clearly enough a conceptual distinction. The passage in which it occurs in the commentary on the *Sentences* parallels exactly the opening lines from which the reasoning in the *De Ente* passage starts. That should be enough to mark the initial distinctions as conceptual. Wippel does not contest this view, but rather sees in it the starting point of a reasoning process that will conclude to a real distinction at a further stage. He acknowledges (pp. n. 9) that the argumentation is continuous throughout the whole passage. From the distinction conceived between a thing (a man, a phoenix) and its being, the reasoning proceeds without interruption in the direction of a real distinction. That is all conceded. The one point at issue is the exact stage at which the real distinction is reached.

For the moment, the consideration to be stressed is that the basis from which the conceptual distinction is taken somehow offers premises from which a real distinction may be inferred.[8]

[6] " --- diversitas realis *"-In I Sent.,* d. 13, q. 1, a. 8, Solut. (I, 807); "differt ... re quidem "-ibid., d. 19, q. 2, a. 2, Solut. (I, 471); "compositum reali compositione *"-De Ver.,* XXVII, 1, ad 8; "differunt realiter *"-In Boeth. de llebd.,* lect. II, Calcaterra no. 82. Cf. "Si enim esset aliud realiter "-ibid., no. 83.

• "... sicut rationale dicitur animali accidere." *In I Sent.,* d. 8, exp. lae partis textus; I, 209. Here "man" is the example. "Phoenix" and. "eclipse" are the examples at *In II Sent.,* d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, Solut.; II, 87.

[8] This may be compared with the way the distinction between universal and, particular, a conceptual distinction, requires real diversity. between being and na·

Correspondingly, that real distinction will presuppose a conceptual distinction in the way a conclusion presupposes its premises. This will mean that wherever and in whatever phraseology Aquinas refers to the distinction as real or describes it as conceptual, the one implies the other for real things. Hence there need be small wonder that on the overwhelming majority of the occasions on which he mentions the distinction between thing and being, he does not show the least interest in specifying whether it is real or conceptual. If it is the one, it is also the other. Outside the five occasional instances just noted, in which the distinction is presented as real in four and conceptual in the fifth, there was no call for the specification. Omission of it elsewhere is neither negligence nor anomaly. Aquinas could have had little if any interest in stating explicitly whether the distinction was real or conceptual. Given the way each implies the other in this particular case, mention of the real or conceptual character was not a matter of concern.

Nevertheless, the question does have keen interest for us today, in the wake of controversies that began some two years after the death of Aquinas. The implications of a conceptual distinction in the case of being and thing demand close scrutiny. To a present-day reader the problem how a conceptual distinction can in a particular case cogently imply a real distinction may indeed seem a hurdle. It was not so for Aquinas, as may be seen in the example cited above (n. 8) . There the conceptual distinction between the universal and the particular required real distinction between quiddity and being. The two cases of course are not exactly parallel. In the one the terms quiddity and being do not coincide with the other two, the universal and the particular. In the present case, on the other hand, the terms are the same for both real and conceptual distinction. In another case that comes to mind in the context of Aquinas, the reasoning process quite obviously starts from a distinction: con-

ture: "Ad hoc enim quod sit universale et particulare, exigitur aliqua diversitas realis ... quidditatis communicabilis, et esse quod proprhim fo l .$erit., d, 13, q. I, !\. 3, Solut.; 1$_1$ 307,

ceived between substance and faculties. It arrives at the sion that there is real difference between the same two terms.[9] But the force of the reasoning depends upon the distinction between thing and being, throwing the question back to the way the concept of being matches the actuality to which it refers. Does it, in a word, portray its object in the exactly fitting way in which concepts immediately conform to the natures of sensible things?

The first problem, then, bears on the way the concepts of nature and of existence are obtained. In the *De Ente,* as in the passages from the commentary on the *Sentences* cited above (n. 7), the starting point is located in real objects such as a man, or in imaginary ones such as a phoenix. In these you can know what the thing is without thereby knowing whether it exists in reality. In regard to the phoenix, the inference is obvious. You can know that a phoenix is a bird that burns itself to ashes every few hundred years and rises rejuvenated, without knowing that one ever existed in the real world. You can know what Socrates was, a man spoken of prominently in Greek history, without knowing that he ever really existed. His real existence in the accepted physical and mental cast has, in fact, been denied and explained away.[10] Similarly you can know what Prester John was, without knowing whether he existed in the course of real history. Knowledge of quiddity does not give knowledge of real existence. You know immediately, of course, that each of these things exists in your own cognition while you

[9] The conclusion is: "et inter essentiam et talem operationem cadit virtus media differens ab utroque, in creaturis etiam realiter, in Deo ratione tantum." *In I Sent.,* d. 7, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2m; I, 177. The difference between the two is shown to be *also* real in creatures, though only conceptual in God. The relation between essence and existence is a necessary step in the reasoning. On the difficulties in the question, see A. Rozwadowski, "Distinctio potentiarum a substantia, secundum doctrinam Sancti Thomae," *Gregorianum,* 16 (1935), 273-281, who notes the connection with the essence-existence problem-" connectitur enim necessario cum compositione ex essentia et esse" (p. 272)-and in regard to one of the arguments the origin in concepts-" Haec fluere videntur ex ipsis conceptibus actus et potentiae" (p. 276).

[10] So Eugene Dupree!, *La legende socratique et les sources de Platon* (Brussels: Robert Sand, 1922), pp. 323-334; 421-426. "... le Socrate parfait n'est que la projection animee du dialogue parfait." p. 830.

are thinking about it. But the quiddity itself tells you nothing about its existence in other people's cognition. Presumably, therefore, not even the knowledge of its existence in your own mind comes from the quiddity, for if contained in the quiddity it would restrict the thing's existence to that particular instance. Existence in your mind would be essential to it.

This last consideration has even wider range. It provides the answer to the objection that existence might be contained within the nature but elude our scrutiny just as specific essences do. The inclusion of existence within the nature would have the Parmenidean consequences of leaving but one being in all reality. The individual existents about which the question arises would have been absorbed. The bough upon which one is sitting for the discussions would have been sawed off. Here seems to lie "the importance of this part of Thomas's argumentation" (stressed by Wippel, p. 279), rather than in any immediate conclusion of real distinction. Its function is to universalize the assertion that a thing is not its own existence, with but one, and as yet hypothetical, exception. The possibility that existence like specific essence may be eluding our concept while all the while present in the nature itself is in this way set aside.

What is the epistemology that lies back of these considerations? It is etched in clearcut lines in the commentary on the *Sentences,* a work of the same early period as the *De Ente.* What a thing is, is grasped through conceptualization, known to Aquinas by designations taken from Latin translations of the Moslems, and called by him "the first operation of the intellect." That the thing exists, is apprehended through judgment, again known through translated Arabic terms and called " the second operation of the intellect," with the order of " first " and " second " taken from their remote background in Aristotle.[11] Accordingly a thing is known from the aspect of its nature or essence through conceptualization, in non-precisive or

[11] *De An.,* III 6, 430a See Aquinas, *In I Sent.,* d. 19, q. *5,* a. 1, ad 7m; I, 489. Ibid., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, Solut.; I, 903. *In IV Metaph.,* lect. 6, Cathala no. 605.

precisive abstraction. That is all a concept just of itself gives. The existence the nature happens to have is not given in the concept, but is grasped through the further and always concomitant activity of judgment. The existence is not known originally through a concept. But what is originally known through judgment can be subsequently conceptualized as something, and represented in conceptualization as that which makes the thing exist or as the actuality of all actualities and the perfection of all perfections.[12] In this mediate way a concept of it is formed, for purposes of thought about it and discussion in its regard. The content of the two concepts can then be compared and the distinction between them probed. The concepts at once appear distinct from each other. The one is of the actuality, the existence. The other is of the potentiality, the nature. To this extent they have objects that parallel the shape of the table, on the one hand, and the wood on the other. But the actuality *(energeia)* or perfection *(entelecheia)* expressed in the concept of existence does not surpass in its nature the quidditative perfection known through simple apprehension and already explained by Aristotle in terms of form. A combination like " actuality of all actualities " is required to pinpoint it in Aquinas to the actuality originally known through judgment. It then refers to existence, but without capacity to express just by itself the fact that something exists. Yet that fact was the actuality originally escaping all conceptualization and grasped only through judgment's synthetic knowing. Now conceived as the actuality of all actualities it is obviously an object different from a finite nature. That suffices for assertion of two conceptually distinct objects.

But is it enough to show at once their real distinction in the thing? Hardly. Could they not be two different aspects of one and the same reality, somewhat as for Aquinas individuality is

[12] See *De Pot.*, VII, 2, ad 9; *ST*, I, 3, 4, c; *In I Periherm.*, lect. 5, Spiazzi no. 73. On the identity of fact and actuality here see F. Wilhelmsen, " Existence and Esse," *The Neu> Scholasticism, 50* (1976), 20-45. For the contemporary problematic in regard to judgment and existence, see Ambmse McNicholl, " On Judging Existence," *The Thomist,* 43 (1979), 507-580.

conceptually distinct from nature while not really distinct from it? Other thinkers have drawn other conclusions. In the approach of Duns Scotus, for instance, there is formal distinction between individuality and common nature in the thing itself, while in Suarez existential being and essential being, though conceptually distinct, are identical in reality. In this case conceptual distinction, just in itself, would seem neither to imply nor to exclude real difference between its terms.

For the purposes of the present discussion, then, there is agreement between Fr. Wippel and myself that the distinction made in the first stage of the *De Ente* passage requires further reasoning in order to arrive at the conclusion that a thing is really other than its being. There is also agreement that the reasoning is continuous throughout the passage. The question at issue is at what stage the real distinction is reached, even though explicit mention of it had no interest for Aquinas himself.

III

A second implicit tenet that requires attention centers on the nature of existence. In accord with the epistemology of Aquinas, already developed at the time (supra, nn. 11-12), existence is not originally grasped as a nature. It eludes the type of apprehension that gives knowledge of what things are. Only when subsistent existence is reached is it known to be a nature. More precisely for present purposes, uncaused existence becomes known first as existence, now attained as a thing and a nature in its highest instance (aliqua res que sit causa essendi omnibus rebus eo quod ipsa est esse tantum-De *Ente,* c. IV; p. 377.139-141). This nature cannot be known by route of mere conceptualization. The route has to be through reasoning from the actuality known in judgment. As a result, the nature so reached cannot be expressed by way of concepts, any more than could the actuality originally grasped through judgment in sensible things. This allows one to see why the concept of existence has been so readily regarded as an empty concept, a blank, an absurdity. The concept of existence cannot express the nature to

which it refers. That nature, the first cause, God, eludes our conceptualization. [13] If we are trying to know *what* existence is in the way we know what finite things are, we cannot help but draw a blank. The nature of existence cannot be the immediate object of a human concept.

Yet to be known as really distinct from the nature it actuates, will not existence first have to be recognized as having in itself the status of a real nature? If it is not yet known to be a real nature, could it not appear merely as an aspect of something that has already been grasped intellectually through conceptualization in regard to its nature, and now is grasped from another angle through judgment? Could not the same identical entity be known as quidditative through one intellectual operation and as existent through another? Could not the difference arise merely from the twofold activity of the mind in regard to one and the same real nature, without involving any addition whatever in reality? That is the way a nature, even when nonprecisively abstracted, is differentiated from its individuation. Why could not its existence remain distinguished from it in just that way, conceptually? The object would be the same in reality, but the two different views would round out a complete picture of it, somewhat as differently tinted plates produce a fully colored print of the one real scene? The same real object would be known through conceptualization as a man, and through judgment as existing.

Only after existence has been known to be a real nature does the impossibility of this situation become apparent. As a real nature existence is infinite and unique. It is all-embracing. Where it is found really in other things, it has to be really over and above their natures. It has to be really different from the things themselves. But the distinction cannot be at all visual-

[13] " Deus, formationem intellectus nostri subterfugit." *In III Sent.*, d. 24, a. 2, Solut. l; ed. Moos, III, 768 (no. 51). On" formatio" in the sense of conceptualizatiqn here, see M.-D. Chenu, "Un vestige du stoicisme," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques*, 27 (1938), 67, n. 3. Cf. "We have no quidditative knowledge of God," A. C. Pegis, "Penitus Manet lgnotum," *Mediaeval Studies*, 27 (1965), *flfl5.*

ized or immediately observed. We can only know that its two terms are really distinct, without intuiting *what* the distinction is. The route is through existence. Knowledge of the distinction parallels quite significantly the way we can know that goodness and the other perfections are to be found in God, without knowing *what* they are in God since in him they are existence itself.[14] The nature of the existence found in creatures through participation is not to be found in the efficiently caused actuality but rather in God. Against this epistemological background Aquinas can accept the patristic assertion (Dionysius, Bernard) that God is the existence of all things.[15]

To know that existence is a nature, then, is to have proved metaphysically that God exists. The two formulations are but the obverse and converse sides of the same coin. They designate the same reasoning process. This should indicate emphatically that a real distinction between a thing and its being cannot be shown until after completion of the demonstration that God exists. Only then is one in a position to see that existence cannot coalesce in reality with any finite thing. It cannot enter in reality into the thing's nature, nor be regarded as a part *(De Ente,* p. 376.97) of that nature, without entailing the Parmenidean consequences. It has to remain really other than the thing.

But what about the objection that all commentators do not regard the reasoning in the *De Ente* as a proof for the existence of God? Gilson is mentioned by Wippel (p. 9!80, n. 4) for this stand. Yet Gilson does not question the cogency and the valid-

[14] "Quicquid autem est in Deo, hoc est suum proprium esse." *De Ver.,* II, 11, c. " Id quod bonitatem dicimus in creaturis, praeexistit in Deo, et hoc quidem secundum modum altiorem." *ST,* I, 13,'2, c. "... in eo praeeistit vita, licet eminentiori modo quam intelligatur vel significetur." Ibid., ad 2m. Wippel, " Metaphysics and *Separatio* according to Thomas Aquinas," *Review of Metaphysics,* 31 (1978), 440, allows "some role" in knowing existence to judgment. The texts, however, seem to assign it the *entire* role in the immediate intellectual apprehension of existence.

[15] "Et ideo esse divinum dicitur esse omnium rerum, a quo omne esse creatum effective et exemplariter manat." *In I Sent.,* d. 8, q. 1, a. 2, Solut.; I, 198. Cf. Gerald B. Phelan, "The Being of Creatures," in *Selected Papers,* ed. Arthur G. Kirn (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1967), pp. 83-94.

ity of the reasoning to God in the *De Ente.* Rather, in a change of view from previous acceptance of it as a Thomistic proof for God's existence, he maintained that historically it had not been presented by Aquinas here in that guise, but only as a part of a process showing that there is composition in the angels. Gilson, however, acknowledges that there is disagreement among the commentators on the point.[16]

The grounds Gilson offers for his later position are two. The first is that the reasoning is not included in the lists of proofs formally offered in the *Summa Theologiae* and the *Contra Gentiles,* or under the corresponding heading (Quod Deus sit) in the *Compendium Theologiae,* and that its operative factor, existence *(esse),* does not play that role in those versions.[17] The second ground is that for Aquinas a proof for God's existence has to start from sensible things in the real world, whereas the reasoning in the *De Ente* passage starts from a distinction between essence and existence, obviously not something sensible.[18]

With regard to the first ground, all reasoning processes not explicitly listed under the heading" that God exists," are automatically ruled out of the demonstration for God's existence properly so called (proprement dite). All the passages in the commentary on the *Sentences* usually brought forward in this regard are thereby set aside.[19] The arguments listed there *(In*

[16] "J'ai done cesse de tenir cet argument pour une preuve proprement <lite de l'existence de Dieu .... il y a desaccord entre les interpretes de saint Thomas sur ce point." E. Gilson, "Trois sur le probleme de l'existence de Dieu," *Divinitas,* V (1961), 28. See also p. 27. On the retractation, cf. sixth edition of his *Le Thomis.me* (Paris: Vrin, 1965), p. 97, n. 85. There, however, Gilson acknowledges the presence of the new notion of *esse* that makes the Five Ways transcend their sources: " saint Thomas ne p.eut pas ne pas avoir presente a la pensee cette notion nouvelle de *l'esse,* qui va lui permettre de transcender, meme dans l'ordre purement philosophique, les points de vue de ses predecesseurs les plus illustres" (p. 97). This should modify somewhat the effect of the earlier blunt statement: "... la notion clef *d'esse,* ou acte d'etre, n'est invoquee dans aucune d'entre elles." Gilson, "La preuv.e du ' De ente et essentia,' " *Docf-Or Com1111Unis,* ID (1950)' 258.

[17] Art. cit., *Doctor Communis,* p. 258; *Divinitas,* p. 27.

[18] Art. cit., *Doctor Communis,* p. 258; *Divinitas,* p. 28.

[19] " ... pourtant, ni dans Pierre Lombard ni dans le commentaire de saint

I Sent., d. 3, div. lae partis textus; ed. Mandonnet, I, 88) as taken from Dionysius and presented as " ways of reaching God from creatures" (vias deveniendi ex creaturis in Deum), with reception of existence *(esse)* explicitly as their operative notion, do not meet the test, apparently because they are not included formally in the list of the Five Ways of the *Summa Theologiae.* The Aristotelian proof from motion, as given with the intermediate conclusion " and this is God " (et hie est Deus-In *I Sent.,* d. 8, q. 3, a. 1, Praeterea sicut; I, 211) was rejected by Gilson because it is formally given as a prooi for the immutability of God, even though the cogency of its reasoning was unquestioned. Similarly the reasoning in the *Contra Gentiles* that parallels the Third Way of the *Summa Theologiae* is not to he classed under the proofs for the existence of God, though it may readily be adapted to that status by a little making over, and has in fact been cast in the form of a genuine proof for God's existence by Aquinas himself as one of the Five Ways. But as it stands in the *Summa Contra Gentiles* it is not a proof of God's existence, but rather of something else concerning God.[20]

Thomas, on ne trouve de demonstration proprement <lite de cette verite, que Dieu existe." Gilson, art. cit., *Divinitas,* p. 29.

[20] - Cette demonstration n'a pas trouve place dans la *Somme contte les Gentils."* Gilson, *Le Thomisme* (6th ed.), p. 80. "Cette troisieme voie ne figurait pas dans le *Contra Gentiles."* Art. cit., *Divinitas,* p. 33. Yet "on en trouve un exact equivalent dans la premiere des deux Sommes, seulement, au lieu de s'y trouver au livre I, ch.13, avec !es autres preuves de !'existence de Dieu, il se trouve au livre· II, ch. 15, par. 6, 0U saint Thomas etablit que Dieu est pour tons les etres la cause de leur existence .... C'etait une preuve de Dieu tout faite; rien n'empechait saint Thomas de l'ajouter aux autres; il s'est contente plus tard de l'inserer dans la *Summa Theologiae,* comme l'une des cinq voies." Ibid. Meeting a situation created by Geny, Gilson allows that "saint Thomas !'a serieusement retouche pour en faire une preuve de !'existence de Dien." But the retouching seems to consist iii making explicit the starting point in sensible things, serious enough from the perspective in which Gilson was writing. In any case it remained an "exact equivalent."

The 'version in *CG,* I, 15, Amplius, in going on to prove that God is eternal, formulates the intermediate conclusion "Et hoc Deus est" quite as CG, II, 15, Praeterea, formulates it " Et hoc est Deus." Similarly the proofs given in *In I Sent.,* d. 3, div. Jae partis textus, (I, 88 and 89), have "et hoc est Deus," and in d. 8, q. 3, a.l, Praeterea (I, 211), "et hie est Deus," .fully in accord with the wording of the *De Ente* (p. 377.146) passage "hoc est causa prima quae Deus est." This

Gilson's meaning here is quite obviously that the reasonings he rejects as proofs for God's existence do not occur under St Thomas's listing in the Five Ways of the *Summa Theologiae.* That is undoubtedly a fact, and the consequences drawn are those of an historian of philosophy in his role as such. But there is no questioning whatever of the demonstrative character of the reasoning to the intermediate conclusion that God exists. As is evident from the handling of the argument in *Contra Gentiles* II, *15,* the reasoning can readily be given independent status and listed under the proofs of God's existence. Aquinas himself did this in case of the *Contra Gentiles* argument. Why could it not have been done just as easily in all the other cases? We can do it today, and even extend considerably the number of headings for the demonstration that God exists.[21] But we do that on our own responsibility. We must scrupulously avoid attributing it to Aquinas. We have no right to classify the reasonings in those cases as Thomistic proofs that God exists. That is the rationale of the case.

One may or may not agree with this meticulous precision in dealing historically with the thought of Aquinas. Undoubtedly

way of concluding the proof is that of Maimonides, *The Guide of the Perplexed,* II, l; trans. Shlomo Pines (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 248. It is a rational conclusion that follows cogently from the reasoning. For a different view see: " The decisive words ' Et hoc est Deus ' are those of a Christian theologian, and they contrast with the ' quod omnes dicunt Deum esse' of article 3 which are those of various philosophers committed to nothing but reason." Edward Sillem, *Ways of Thinking about God* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961), p. 102. Sillem (p. 76) is defending the stand that the Five Ways do not conclude immediately to the existence of God. The case that their reasoning is metaphysically that of the *De Ente* passage is presented in my article " Aquinas and the Five Ways," *The Monist,* 58 (1974), 16-35. In point of fact, the cogency of the reasoning in the *De Ente* is unhesitatingly acknowledged by Gilson: " Cet argument est d'une force saisissante." Art. cit., *Doctor Communis,* p. 257. The point is just that the argument does not meet Gilson's conditions for classification as a formal proof for God's existence.

[21] They are grouped under eleven headings, with the instances or varieties of each, by Jules A. Baisnee, "St. Thomas Aquinas's Proofs of the Existence of God Presented in their Chronological Order," in *Philosophical Studies in Honor of the Very Reverend Ignatius Smith, O.P.,* ed. John K. Ryan (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1952), pp. 63-64.

fact should be kept care£ully distinguished from interpretation. Bllt for many, history of philosophy will be much more than recording historical facts. Understanding them is part of the process, and here the facts have to be understood philosophically. Understanding the demonstrative force of these reasonings in themselves as proofs of God's existence will in this perspective come under the work of the historian of philosophy. While today one cannot list them under Aquinas's own headings for the demonstration that God exists, one can understand their cogency and validity for attaining that conclusion even within the particular contexts in which they are historically found. This first ground does not militate at all against their demonstrative character, but only against placing them formally under the lists drawn up by Aquinas himself.

The second ground is more complicated and significant. There is no difficulty in taking its premises at their full force. They are that a Thomistic demonstration of God's existence starts from sensible things actually being encountered in the real external world, and that the distinction between a thing and its being is not something sensible.[22] But the application of these two considerations is not as simple as may appear at first sight. Sensible things are immediately perceived to exist. Aquinas has no hesitation in recognizing the judgment of the senses.[23] Judgment is for him the awareness of existence, on the sensible as well as the intellectual level. Through sensation, accordingly, one is immediately aware that things do exist. Senses, of course, do not distinguish between things and their being. Nevertheless they give immediate cognition of both. In that perspective existence is immediately sensed and known, and then inferred to come from something else and ultimately from subsistent existence. Only then is its nature reached, in contrast to quiddita-

•• " Saint Thomas part d'une evidence physique et sensible . . . La distinction d'essence et d'existence, au contrairie, n'est *pas* une constatation sensible .... Cette distinction ne pouvait done etre au point de depart des preuves thomistes de l'existence de Dieu." Gilson, art. cit., *Doctor Communw,* p. 258.

·[3] Texts on this point may be found gather.ed in my article "Judgment and Truth in Aquinas," *Mediaeval, Studies,* 32 (1970), pp. 138-147.

tive natures that are grasped imm.ediately through conceptualization.

It is in this context that one should understand Gilson's statement about the most highly abstract character of the metaphysical knowledge by which existential actuality taken in itself is grasped, and its equivalence with the answer to the question "What is God?" [24] This is what has been referred to in the above discussion as " the nature of existence," identified with God. There is explicit ground in Aquinas for calling God "abstract existence" (esse abstractum) .[25] Understood as a nature in this way, existence is of course not immediately perceived by the senses nor immediately known by the intellect. But that sense of " abstract existence " is not what is found at the beginning of the *Ente* passage. Rather, the existence meant there is not something that comes by way of formal sequence or quidditative origin. It is existence that has been caused efficiently (causatum ... sicut a causa efficiente--.p. 377.132-133). That assertion is emphatic in the text, and makes explicit what was understood at the start. The existence distinguished from man or phoenix was the real existence of the man caused in the sensible world, or, to add for the sake of completion, the cognitional existence of the man or phoenix caused efficiently by the knower. In neither case was there question of anything that could be grasped originally by way of a concept and distinguished as thing from thing as with Giles of Rome. It was existence originally known through judgment, existence really and actually present in the sensible world, in the man and in the one who was imagining the phoenix.

One need merely make explicit what is implicit in the starting point of all these reasonings to God's existence, in order to have

""Pris en Iui-meme, cet aete n'est accessible qu'a !'abstraction metaphysique la plus haute. II est Ia reponse ultime a la question: qu'est-ce que Dieu?" Gilson, art. cit., *Divinitas,* p. 28.

[25] " Sola Dei substantia est ipsum esse abstractum." *De Subst. Sep.,* c. 14; ed. Leonine, XL, D65.44-45. Cf. "in divinis idem est abstractum et concretum," *ST,* I, 40, 1, ad lm, and the use of "res abstractas" for separate substances at *In II Metaph.,* Iect. 1, Cathala no. 286.

the Thomistic form of argument required by Gilson. They are all based on existence known through judgment, existence found in sensible things. An argument like that of Anselm, based on the concept of real existence contained in the greatest of all perfections, would never be acceptable to Aquinas. Something has to be found existing before the reasoning can start. To express this formally, one would have to commence the *De Ente* reasoning with " Men are found existing in the sensible world, phoenixes in the imagination," and then go on to show that in neither case is the existence contained in what the thing itself is. The formal requirement for a proof that God exists is then satisfied. Again, the explicit addition is ours, and is not to be attributed to the text of Aquinas. But the cogency of the demonstration was there from the beginning.

This is hardly a *nego majorem* in regard to the second ground urged by Gilson. It is rather a difference in ground rules. In a particular baseball park there may be a rule that a fair hit bouncing over a close outfield fence is a double. Normally any fair hit on which the batter can reach home plate without being halted or tagged is a home run. But special circumstances may demand special ground rules. Gilson was understandably alarmed at the prospect of Thomistic proofs for God's existence, in the wake of Del Prado's widely read book, finding their basis in a real distinction between essence and existence.[26] Hence the insistence on explicit inclusion of a starting point in sensible things. Even the *Contra Gentiles* (II, 15) passage had

[26] "Unde quinque viae, quibus Deum esse evidenter probari potest, videntur esse sicut quinque scalae fixae in creaturis et stantes super realem compositionem actus et potentiae in linea entis ..." Norbert del Prado, *De Veritate Fundamentuli Philosophiae Christianae* (Fribourg: Consoc. Sancti Pauli,1911), pp. XLU-XLIII. This attitude still continues: "in the *Scripta* we encounter a proof of God's existence, different from the Five Ways, based exclusively on Aquinas's new understanding of being *(esse)* and on the real distinction between essence and *esse* in creatures." B. Mondin, *St. Thomas Aquinas' Philosophy in the Commentary to the Sentences* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), p. 56. Gilson's (art. cit., *Doctor Communis,* p. 257) immediate target was "En verite, ii n'y a pas de preuve plus directe ni plus profonde de !'existence de Dieu que la distinction reelle entre !'essence des choses et leur existence." Martin Stanislaus Gillet, *Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: Dunod, 1949), p. 67.

to be made over for listing under the Five Ways. Any such reasoning, no matter how valid in itself, was under the circumstances barred from home run status, even though without the ground rule it would allow the runner to reach home plate safely.

For purposes of the present discussion, then, the doubt raised by Wippel on Gilson's authority may be disregarded. In point of fact, Wippel himself (p. 292, n. 31) accepts the reasoning in the *De Ente* passage as a proof for God's existence. The doubt seems raised only for polemic reasons against the opposed stand that makes acceptance of real distinction in *De Ente* depend upon prior demonstration that God exists. Demonstration of real distinction without demonstration of God's existence would avoid the possible hurdle that could arise from insistence on Gilson's authority in this area. Yet once it has been shown that Gilson brings no objections against the cogency of the demonstrative force in the *De Ente* passage, the hurdle disappears of itself. Hence this explanation has been necessary for the case that inference of real distinction here depends on the demonstration that existence is a nature, even though the point is not crucial in Wippel's own stand.

IV

The third seemingly latent tenet listed above (Section I) concerns reasoning to the real world from the content of a concept. From the concept of real existence can you immediately infer real distinction of the existence from the subject in which it inheres? In the *De Ente* reasoning the initial existence is undoubtedly envisaged as real (an esse habeat in rerum natura- p. 376.101). It has already been shown to be conceptually distinct from the real thing. On those two points there is no dispute. But what remains open to question is whether the distinction between the real existence and the real thing is itself also real or only conceptual.

In the first two examples given in the text (p. 376.105-110) the relevant distinctions would lie between generic nature and

specific nature, and between specific nature and the individual. These are clearly conceptual distinctions. The third **(.110-111),** that of heat from its subject, would be real in real things since heat is a predicamental accident. But for the moment the text is concerned only with the distinction ;between separate heat and participated heat, and not with the distinction between participated heat and its subject. Unquestionably anyone who acknowledges either positively or hypothetically that God is the sole being whose essence and existence coincide will concede distinction between the two in all other beings. But what kind of distinction? The distinction may be real as *res* from *res* (Giles of Rome), or intentional (Henry of Ghent), or conceptual (Suarez). For all these thinkers the existence of creatures is real and is distinct from its subject. Yet the tenet of identity in God, held by them all, does not universally guarantee real distinction between the two in creatures. Something else appears required for that conclusion.

What is the something else? If the conclusion is to be drawn prior to the demonstration that existence is a real nature, will not the ground have to be a requirement in the very concept of real existence? But does the concept of real existence show immediately any real distinction from thing? In the present reasoning process would not an opponent of real distinction see a *petitio principii* in the inference of real distinction from the identity of the two in God? Only if the distinction had already been accepted as real in creatures would the identity of the two in God mean real difference elsewhere.

This seems to parallel Aquinas's rejection of the Anselmian argument. The procedure, nevertheless, is not so obvious. Here, different from the ontological interpretation given the Anselmian argument by Aquinas, the existence from the start is real and is known as real. Yet the reality of the distinction is not apparent in the premises. It is not known as a distinction between two realities *(res* and *res)* . One of the terms, existence, is not known originally as a *res.* It is not an immediate object of conceptualization, though this would seem to be implied in the emphasis deliberately given by Giles of Rome to the

sity of distinguishing existence from essence as one reality from another.[27] For Aquinas, on the contrary, existence in a creature can hardly be considered as a further reality.[28] That reality

[01] Edgar Hocedez notes that except for a passing expression in which *esse* is referred to as an essence added to the essence of a creature, there is no reason to believe that Giles conceived existence as an essence: " Sauf une expression fugitive, rien ne fait croire que Gilles corn;oive formellement *l'esse* comme une essence." *Aegidii Romani Theoremata de Esse et Essentia* (Louvain: Museum Lessianum, 1980), p. *55.* Naturally it had to be conceived as other than existence in order to make the contrast. But the question here is whether it is immediately attained by a concept, or whether it has to be referred to by concepts taken from essence. It has to be conceived as a thing, and on one occasion Aquinas does refer to it as a thing: "... esse rei quaedam res cr.eata est." *De Ver.,* I, 4, ad 4m; ed. Leonine. Yet to conclude from concept to reality would require an immediate concept of existence. For the case that one may so reason see: "The argument appears to show a conclusion about the real world from something that occurs in knowledge. . . . Thus, in this context *for something to be understood to be so* is also *foir it to be so."* Joseph Bobik, *Aquinas on Being and Essence* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965), pp. 167-168.

[28] *Res* is used by Aquinas at times for the term that is distinguished from being. See "Res ergo composita non est suum esse *"-In Roeth. Hebd.,* leet. 2, no. 82; "Nulla res est suum esse *"-De Ver.,* I, 4, ad 4m; "... cum non sit res aliqua praeter Deum suum esse *"-CG,* III, *65,* Adhuc, licet; "... in quibuscumque r.es non est suum esse *"-Quodl.,* II, 4, ad 2m. This may be compared with the more explicit designation "creature," in "Nulla enim creatura e.st suum esse, sed est habens esse . . . in qualibet creatura est aliud ipsa creatura quae habet esse, et ipsum esse eius *"-Quodl.,* II, 8, c, and then with the specific " man " or "phoenix." In every case the term distinguished from being is what receives the being. But what receives real being is the individual supposit. To it the being pertains: "... licet ipsum esse non sit de mtione suppositi, quia tamen pertinet ad suppositum, et non est de ratione naturae .. ."-*Quodl.,* II, 4, ad 2m. In this way the thing is viewed as having its nature and as having its being: "... ipsum suppositum sive individuum habet naturam speciei, sicut homo humanitatem, et habet ulterius esse: homo enim nee est humanita.s nee est esse suum *"-De Pot.,* VII, 4, c. In this perspective Aquinas's preferred way of speaking is to say that the thing's essence (or nature or quiddity) is not its being, e.g. "omnis res in qua est aliud essentia et aliud esse *"-CG,* I, 22, Amplius, omnis. But in the real world, where alone there is question ,of real distinction, the natur.e or quiddity or essence is really identical with the *thing* that receives the real being. The distinction may therefore be worded as between being and nature (essence, quiddity) or as between being and thing. Just as "distinction" is not Aquinas's regular word here but is now found more convenient, so "thing" rather than essence or nature or quiddity is preferable today in the interests of clarity.

On the other hand, since being pertains to it, a thing has to be regarded as composed of itself and what is other than itself: "componitur ex seipso et alio "–

again would require actuation distinct from itself, and would set up an infinite The existence, rather, is the actuation of *all* the reality in the thing, actuation grasped through the synthetic cognition of judgment and not through the static representation of a concept. In a subsequent concept, as discussed above, the existence can be contrasted with the essence and seen to be conceptually distinct from it. But there is no justification so far in the premises for projecting this contrast as a real distinction present outside the mind. Even though the reasoning has been carried to the point where it has shown that the distinction does not hold in God, there is as yet no ground for projecting it as real. It would be reasoning from the presence of a distinction in the mind to a corresponding distinction in reality. In that perspective the reasoning would seem to have an ontological cast.

In point of fact, Wippel (pp. 282; 286; 287, n. 18) notes that the reasoning in the *De Ente* passage is directed towards real distinction. He presents this issue lucidly, and then goes on to show that in the " second phase " (p. 287) of the reasoning Aquinas "can conclude to factual otherness of essence and existence in all other entities " (p. 289). In the body of this interpretation of " phase two " as well as in its conclusion, there is no mention of " real." Yet when applied soon after to bearing on the main contention, namely that demonstration of God's existence is not a prerequisite for showing the real distinction, the conclusion is summed up as " essence and existence are really not identical" and as "the real distinction between essence and existence " (p. 291). " Real " seems to slip in unobtrusively as though an alternative for the "factual otherness"

Quodl., II, 3, ad Im. As a composite in that way the transcendental *res* is distinguished only conceptually from a being *(ens)* and from a unit *(unum).* At the same time, within the real composite, it is really distinct from its own being *(esse).* Acoordingly in the text "res, ens, unum, significant omnino idem, sed secundum rationes *"-In IV Metaph.,* lect. 2, no. 553, the oonceptual distinction is meant between *res* and *ens,* and not between *res* and *esse.*

[29] Cf. infinite regress argument at *In I Sent.,* d. 8, q. 1, a. 2, arg. 2 (I, 197), and the r.eply " ipso formaliter est creatura " at ad 2m (p. 198).

that had been inferred, as just mentioned, on p. 289. "Real" then continues to be used on pages 292-295 in applying that conclusion to the main theme, in the way the problem had been set up with the distinction envisaged as real.

There need be no objection to the term" factual distinction," if it is understood in the sense that the distinction is a fact regardless of whether any human mind is conceiving it. The extent to which " factual " in this sense is synonymous with "real" may be left for the next section of this paper. For the present the point is that the "fact" demonstrated in the "second stage" is that only God can be understood as identical with his nature. No other entity can. No ground is offered for projecting the distinction into the real world, and thinkers in other metaphysical frameworks have expressly refused to do so. Hence the appearance of ontological trend in this interpretation. The conclusion, as Wippel (pp. 289-291) correctly points out, is not hypothetical but positive. The crucial problem, however, is whether the inference is ontological in character.

V

Finally, the notion of" factual otherness" (Wippel, pp. 289, 290, 295), seems to indicate another latent assumption. It would imply that " real otherness " and " factual otherness " are synonymous. Yet the Avicennian background against which thirteenth century thinkers wrote made existence in the mind *(esse in anima)* a genuine kind of existence, though secondary to real existence *(esse in re, in se, extra animam).* In neither way could a creature be its own existence. This should mean the factual otherness of the thing in regard to its cognitional as well as its real being. A thing is surely other than its existence in the human mind, factually, even though its existence in reality is not involved.

For the purposes of the traditional controversy there may seem little point in raising this issue. Obviously the existence of a phoenix in one's imagination is not the phoenix itself. It is not even entailed by the nature of the phoenix, let alone identi-

cal with it. The tree outside my window would be other than its existence in my perception, even though no human mind were conceptually distinguishing the one from the other. They would be distinct in fact, regardless of distinct concepts about them. Yet the factual distinction here could hardly be called "real," since it is not concerned with distinction in the real world.

The Thomistic distinction between a thing and its being is accordingly wider in range than real distinction. "Factual distinction" is an apt term to designate it, as long as the phrase means distinction in fact regardless of human consideration of its terms. It is a fact that the tree exists outside my window and a fact that it exists in my mind while I am thinking about it. Each of these facts involves a "factual" distinction in the sense just mentioned. The range of "factual" is thereby restricted conventionally to what is there independently of further construction in human conceptualization. The fact that the terms have been conceptually distinguished will be subsequent to the meaning agreed upon for "factual" in this context. But whatever term is used to designate the Thomistic distinction between a thing and its being, it has to be wide enough to include distinction from cognitional existence. The distinction between a thing and its cognitional existence antecedes human conceptualization of its terms. But it can hardly be called a "real" distinction.

VI

If one has no qualms in accepting the four latent tenets just examined, real distinction between being and thing in Aquinas before demonstration of God's existence may not seem incongruous. In that case the procedure in the *De Ente* may be regarded (Wippel, pp. 294-295) as a highly significant exception to the order of treatment in the other works, and Aquinas may he faulted with a "failure to identify explicitly as real the kind of distinction for which he was ultimately arguing" (p. 294, n. 35) in it. Rejection of the first and fourth implicit tenets, however, makes the omission of "real" an attitude that

could be expected. Rejection of the third tenet excludes argument from the content of the two concepts to corresponding distinction in the real world. Finally, and crucially, rejection of the second tenet will imply that contrary to Wippel's (p. 295) view Aquinas rather needs to and does " presuppose the existence of God in order to conclude to real otherness of essence and existence in other entities" (p. 295). Existence as a nature or part of a nature in the thing would in Parmenidean fashion absorb everything else. Where found really in a finite thing existence has accordingly to remain really other than what it actuates. No lesser argument can establish real distinction. But to show that existence is a nature is to demonstrate that God exists.

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ASSIMILATING KOHLBERG TO AQUINAS

THE RESEARCH FINDINGS of Lawrence Kohlberg obviously invite attempts to assimilate them to philosophical theories of natural law. Here I propose to assimilate them, if only in rough outline form, to one such theory, that of Thomas Aquinas. Both parties, I think, can profit from such an integration.

Two preliminary remarks, however, need to be made. First, I shall not be concerned with Aquinas's theory of natural law as a whole. My attention will be focused instead on one famous text: *Summa Theologica*, I-II, 94, art. 2. Whether this is reconcilable with other statements Aquinas makes on natural law, though an important and interesting question, is not strictly relevant to my present concerns. Second, I shall be liberal in my construction of that text. What I am interested in is not so much the letter of Aquinas's text as the spirit which, I believe, informs it; and when that spirit requires supplementing or correcting the *ipsum verbum* of the text, I shall not hesitate to do so.

The findings of Kohlberg which are pertinent to our present purposes are these: (1) that the development of moral thinking in the individual is a process which passes through definite stages; (2) that this cognitive development has to do with the form of morality rather than the matter, the "why" of conduct rather than the "what;" (3) that the developmental process has three main stages or levels, called the *pre-conventional,* the *conventional,* and the *post-conventional* (or *autonomous* or *principled)* levels; (4) that the pre-conventional level is characterized by egocentric thinking, i.e., thinking which takes the actor's own pleasures and pains, desires and aversions, as the measure of what should or should not be done; (5) that the conventional level is characterized by ethnocentric or sociocentric thinking, i.e., thinking which takes the values of the

actor's own group or society as the measure; (6) that the post-conventional level is characterized by anthropocentric or universalistic thinking, i.e., thinking which takes as the measure standards having validity apart from the preferences of any individual or any group; (7) that the individual passes through these stages in a step-by-step way, not skipping any steps along the way; (8) that for the most part the steps are irreversible; (9) that a person who is at any one stage, though he does most of his thinking at that stage, does not necessarily do all of **it** at that stage; (10) that individuals move through the developmental process at different rates of speed; (11) that individuals often fail to complete the whole developmental process; (12) that certain cultures and societies have a greater propensity than others to retard and even to arrest, or conversely to promote and to accelerate, the developmental process in their members. [1]

Aquinas makes a distinction among fundamental precepts of morality between what may be called formal and material precepts. There is only one basic formal precept:

> Hence this is the first precept of law, that" good is to be done and promoted, and evil is to be avoided." All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this; so that all the things which the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good belong to the precepts of the natural law under the form of things to be done or avoided. [2]

By itself, of course, this formal precept tells us nothing about the content of morality. That is provided by certain natural inclinations, which, when viewed, so to speak, through the lens of the do-good-avoid-evil precept, become the fundamental material precepts:

> Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil the nature of the contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a natural inclination are naturally apprehended by reason as being

[1] Kohlberg, Lawrence, "The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Eduaction," *Phi Delta Kappan,* June, *1975* (reprinted in *Annual Editions: Readings in Human Development 78/79.* Guilford, Ct., Dushkin Publishing Group, 156-163).

[2] *S. Theol.,* I-II, 94, art. 2.

good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance.'

Corresponding to three levels of fundamental inclinations in man, there are three categories of basic precepts on the side of matter or content. Moreover, there is an order among these categories, beginning with the most primitive and to the highest.

Therefore the order of the precepts of the natural law is according to the order of natural inclinations. For there is in man, first of all, an inclination to good in accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances, inasmuch, namely, as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to its nature; and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of preserving human life and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more specially, according to that nature which he has in common with other animals; and in virtue of this inclination, those things are said to belong to the natural law "which nature has taught to all animals," such as sexual intercourse, the education of offspring, and so forth. Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to good according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him. Thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society; and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law: e.g., to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination. [4]

At this point I want to supplement Aquinas's account in three respects, in all cases remaining, I think, faithful at least to the spirit, perhaps even to the letter, of his natural law theory.

First, when speaking of the " order " of natural inclinations and the corresponding "order" of material precepts, Aquinas does not expressly say that this order is a temporal one, as though the first category of precepts emerged in the consciousness of the individual at an earlier date than the second and the

[3] *Ibid.*
[4] *Ibid.*

second in turn at an earlier date than the third. But neither does he rule out its being a temporal order. In fact, it would be more consistent with the Aristotelian spirit of developmentalism which pervades his natural philosophy and anthropology to say that higher capacities and accomplishments based on higher capacities come later in time. Let us assume, then, that the order he refers to is a temporal as well as an ontological one, and that the higher the category of basic material precept the later it comes to be recognized by the individual.

Second, though Aquinas may refer to a developing order of awareness of the fundamental *material* precepts of morality, he clearly makes no reference to a developing awareness of the fundamental *formal* precept. Yet here again it would be quite inconsistent with the overall spirit of Aquinas's anthropology and natural philosophy to interpret this omission as an assertion on his part that there is no development here, as though awareness of the do-good-avoid-evil precept dawns upon the individual one fine day instantaneously and in the plenitude of its significance. Let us say, then, that he intended-or at all events that he would have intended had he been consistent with himself-to say that there is a process of developing awareness not just of the basic material precepts but of the basic formal precept as well.

Third, granted there is this process of developing knowledge of the basic formal precept of morality, the question arises: what are the stages of this process? On the Aristotelian principle, which Aquinas of course would acknowledge, that form and matter are proportionate to one another, we may answer by saying that there are three stages and that these three correspond to the three stages, mentioned above, of developing awareness of the basic material precepts of morality. In other words, the meaning of the rule" do good and avoid evil" varies for the individual depending on which level of inclination, hence which level of material precept, has emerged as dominant in him.

Given these three amendments, we have a Thomistic natural

law theory in which knowledge of the basic precepts of the law, both formal and material, goes through a three-stage process of development, stages in which dominance belongs first to inclinations of self-preservation, then to animal inclination, and finally to properly rational inclinations. Superficially at least, this bears a resemblance to Kohlberg's findings, which also reveal a three-stage process of development. But does the resemblance go deeper than that? Are Kohlberg's three stages similar to the Thomistic three?

The resemblance between them is, I submit, striking. Kohlberg's pre-conventional level of egocentric moral thinking is plainly similar to Aquinas's first stage in which self-preserving inclinations are dominant. Kohlberg's second level, the conventional, in which ethnocentric or sociocentric thinking rules, is similar to Aquinas's second level, in which animal inclinations are dominant. At least it is so if we refrain, as Aquinas apparently intended to, from the defamation of animality so often implied when people speak of animal inclinations; for Aquinas, to judge from the examples he offers (" those things are said to belong to the natural law' which nature has taught to all animals,' such as sexual intercourse, the education of offspring, and so forth ") , seems to believe that the distinctive feature of animal, as opposed to sub-animal, "morality" is the readiness of the individual animal to live for the group to which it belongs. In other words, animals, though of course not political, are at least social or gregarious beings.

The resemblance between Kohlberg and Aquinas is somewhat less obvious at the third and highest stage. For the former, this is the post-conventional level, the level at which moral thinking becomes universalistic and recognizes the value of man as man. For the latter it is the stage of properly rational inclinations. Now having heard him say this, one expects Aquinas to describe these inclinations as being ordered to universalistic objects; for rationality and universality normally belong together. Nor is this expectation disappointed when he gives his first example of such an inclination (" Thus man has

a natural inclination to know the truth about God ..."). Certainly this is ordered to a universal object, the most universal of all objects of knowledge. But when he comes to his second example of a rational inclination (" to live in society ") and to the precept based on that inclination ("to avoid offending those among whom one has to live ") , universalism is dropped in favor of particularism. No advance has been made beyond the social or gregarious inclinations of the second stage. Why Aquinas slipped into this inconsistency is a question that need not be answered here; but there can be no doubt that it is an inconsistency. Had he been consistent, had he assigned nothing but universal objects to rational inclinations, he would have offered as examples something more along these lines: an inclination to membership in a moral community which includes all men, a precept requiring us to live in peace with everyone. And this, of course, would bring his third stage into accord with Kohlberg's.

Thus, as the result of some stretching and pulling of Aquinas to make him congruent with Kohlberg (but always, as I have said, remaining faithful to the spirit of the Thomistic theory), we find that both theorists hold a three-stage theory of the development of moral knowledge, beginning with a stage that is egocentric, passing through an intermediate stage of limited sociability, and culminating in a stage of universalism.

This reconciliation between Kohlberg and Aquinas, if valid, possesses, as I said earlier, advantages for both sides. Let me itemize them here, both some which have been touched on already and others.

For the Thomist there are these advantages:

1. He gains a clear notion of the three stages of the development of moral knowledge.

2. He also gains an understanding that this three-stage development applies to the basic formal precept as well as to the basic material precepts.

3. He clarifies the meaning of third stage (rational) inclina-

tions, making it plain that they have universalistic, not particularistic, objects.

4. His notion that there is a process of developing awareness of the formal precept of morality gets empirical corroboration from Kohlberg's findings.

5. Since his theory closely links the formal and material aspects of moral knowledge, this empirical corroboration of the developmentalism of the former is also an indirect corroboration of the developmentalism of the latter.

6. His theory is rescued from a theoretical embarrassment faced by it and nearly every other account of natural law, viz., the fact of moral diversity in the world. If there is a natural knowledge of basic moral rules, it is objected, why do so many individuals and cultures appear to be ignorant of at least some of these rules? The Thomist can now answer that these are instances of incomplete or arrested development.

For Kohlberg the advantages are:

1. His empirical findings are given a philosophical grounding (though no doubt not exactly the kind he is looking for, since his philosophical affinity seems to lie with a naturalism of the John Dewey type).

2. He is alerted to further research possibilities. Just as he has uncovered empirical evidence that there is a developmental process of awareness of the form of morality, so he may be able to turn up empirical evidence of a parallel process relative to the matter of morality.

What I have offered here is obviously only a rough sketch. Much further work needs to be done before a theory of natural law along Thomistic lines can fully assimilate the results of research of the Kohlberg type. In three areas especially is this further work needed. (1) On the Thomistic side, a theory of the development of moral cognition will have to be elaborated in such a way as to link up on the one hand with a general philosophical theory of cognitive development, on the other with

empirical discoveries. (2) On the side of empirical research, inquiries will have to be made into the development of knowledge of the basic material precepts of morality. (3) An adequate vocabulary will have to be worked out for translating the findings of empirical research into philosophical language and, contrariwise, for translating philosophical statements into empirically testable propositions.

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THE ETHICAL THEORIES OF AUREL KOLNAI

APART FROM THOSE who knew him personally, it is doubtful that many attribute to Aurel Kolnai the importance that the penetration and fineness of his thought merited. To a degree this may have been the case because he lacked, by choice and by chance, an enduring group identity-doctrinal, ideological, cultural, and national. Born in Budapest of Jewish parents in 1900, he was throughout the first great war strongly pro-Ally. Following the war he went to the University of Vienna, where he earned a D.Phil. from both the philosophy and history faculties (Schlick, Gomperz, and von Mises were among his teachers). Later, he studied under Edmund Husserl and Martin Honecker in Freiburg. In the mid-twenties, influenced by G. K. Chesterton (whom he saw as a phenomenologist) and the German Phenomenological School of Philosophy, he was converted to Catholicism. Despite numerous philosophical publications, both books and articles, until 1945 he chose to be a writer and journalist rather than an academic. His writings dealt with many matters, ranging from political events in Germany and Austria, the thoughts of Belloc and Chesterton, and the "rule of money" in democracy, to the relationship between Fascism and Bolshevism, the ideology of progress, and the meaning of racial obsession. His approach was frequently polemical. After years of effort (one locale of which was a Vienna coffeehouse frequented by Austrian Nazis), he completed and saw published *The War Against the West*, a brilliant study of Nazi doctrines and policies. Up to the end of the 'thirties, he was, politically, sympathetic toward democratic socialism, but, among other things, the proclamation by a " progressive " association of French *lycee* teachers that the West did not have the moral right to defend itself against Hitler's Germany caused a change of view, and he became what today would be called a neo-conservative, that is, a supporter

of a liberal, capitalist, and, institutionally at any rate, democratic society. During the war, after internment in France and escape through Spain and Portugal, he and his wife, Elizabeth, found refuge in America, where he worked in journalism and for the Office of War Information. From 1945 to *1955* he taught in the Faculty of Philosophy, Laval University, after a short time as *professeur agreg.e.* At Laval, reasonably enough, his thought took on a Thomistic cast, although he was critical of the approach toward St. Thomas prevailing there. A resident of London from *1955* until his death in 1973, he was Visiting Lecturer in Ethics and Political Philosophy at Bedford College. During this period his philosophical endeavors acquired an " analytic " style, this being facilitated by a perceived agreement in theme between phenomenology and the British analytic school. From 1945 on he contributed an abundance of articles in philosophy to various journals in America, Canada, and England, and on the continent, in English, French, German, and Spanish, all of which, in addition to Hungarian, he spoke and wrote with distinction and native adeptness. He frequently read papers in England and abroad, and was Visiting Professor of Philosophy at Marquette University in 1968.

In 1978 there appeared a volume of his papers, most previously published, edited by two former students of his at Bedford College, Mr. Brian Klug and Dr. Francis Dunlop, with a preface by Bernard Williams of Cambridge and David Wiggins of Bedford.[1] Its purpose is to achieve a better balance between his accomplishments and public appreciation of them. The selections cover only his London period, but they are representative works of someone who was, above all and at all times, a unyielding foe of those who would debase the central features of human existence. The themes of the collection are many. A pervasive one is the perversity in assigning a near-divine status to human appetite. Another, closely related, is the wrongheadedness of egalitarianism, though he acknowledged its underlying moral urges. A third, also related to absolute human-

[1] *Ethics, Value and Reality,* Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1978. Originally published by The Athlone Press, University of London, London, 1977.

ism, is the threat posed by utopian dogmas. Yet another is the error of a wholly rationalistic conception of ethics, the belief that one can and ought to demonstrate the basic tenets of a consciously moral life. Each of these points is found, openly or implicitly, in the conclusion of Part I of the volume's most important work," Morality and Practice", here published for the first time. Speaking of the inevitable failure "to cope conclusively with the question 'why should I be moral'," he holds that such a failure

> may make the philosopher sensitive to a rationalistic-naturalistic misdirection always latent in ethical speculation: the mirage, that is, of a necessary goodness of Man-or of every will-and of evil as a mere appearance. Behind the claim of 'proving ' to me that I 'should' be moral there is at work the fond hope, self-contradictory and Utopian, imbued with an atmosphere of all-goodness and all evil in its implications, of demonstrating that I *cannot but be* moral .even though some of my operations are ill-conceived and harmful owing to error, inadvertence or technical disability. The practical conclusion to which this speculative schema would point is excessive mildness in dealing with immoral conduct and boundless tyranny in dealing with people, i.e. the policy of cleansing the world from evil and fashioning it in a moral code once for all, by a comprehensive plan of coercion, need-gratification, indoctrination, training and selective elimination. [2]

Clearly, Kolnai did not see as a product of chance the co-presence within today's dominant totalitarian systems of a rationalism run amuck in the structuring of society, the toleration, indeed state-sponsorship, of life-destroying personal behavior, the coercion operating at the social level, the purges of those who resist, and the offering of a future in which the gratification of spontaneous human desires is the culminating condition of the cosmos.

Kolnai also sets himself the task of probing and judging existentialist conceptions of ethical being, principally those of Sartre and Heidegger. One target is what he terms The Idol of Authenticity, the insistence that a person must unqualifiedly shape himself, never submitting to " objective " values, even

[2] *Op. cit.,* p. 94.

those of his own making. The difficulties that he finds within the Sartrean formulation of this scheme are several:

If I am free, my craving to evade freedom and sell myself into the bondage of ' thingness ', to forge myself a mystifying network of objective goods, values, rules, standards and determinants of all kinds also springs from my freedom. And if, apparently, freedom does not take kindly to itself, why not allow it the freedom to undergo limitations and indulge its thirst for solidification and reification? ... Further, what is wrong with shams, dodges, ungeniuneness and artificiality? Why not choose these freely, rather than seek with desperate monotony to display my untainted freedom by an endless string of ' gratuitous ' choices, i.e. by trying always to obey one vacuous principle instead of actually choosing *x* for being a greater good than *y,* and then *z* because it is an obligation or *non-q* because *q* is evil? And if insincerity is wrong, is it wrong because my freedom has so decreed? Hardly. But why then assent just to this one moral intuition or Divine commandment or socially established standard or deduction from the utility principle, and not to others as well? Should it be simply because Sartre has so chosen *pour les autres,* including me? But are not all general and imnmtable principles a fake, and might he not (perhaps, ought he not to) choose anew and differently at any moment? [3]

However, the basic objection that Kolnai has to these thinkers' doctrines is found here:

Sartre's exposure of the modes of 'bad faith' and Heidegger's analogous critique of *das* i.e. of man's ordinary consciousness thriving in the medium of civil society, while rich in pertinent insights and beyond psychology relevant also to ethics, breathe the sterile spirit of nihilism in that they ultimately attack, not so much an erroneous doctrine or a specified kind of morally inferior conduct as human existence itself-which in its main body is first and foremost, unalterably, everyday existence-and aim at invalidating the moral demands which arise *in the context* of that existence. [4]

A related flaw is also to be discerned. While they would claim " that the whole treasure of decencies and loyalties " that often guide men is " no better than a homogeneous fabric of sham," the " authentic " act can, at the best, but embody the standard principles of moral action:

• " Existence and Ethics." p. 124.
• *Ibid.,* p. US.

the extraordinary, 'marginal', heroic and 'gratuitous' feats of authenticity, apart from being in strictness impossible-for man is doomed to be empty unsubstantial ' freedom ', he can neither attain to divinity nor be sanctified by a non-Bxistent God-themselves depend, for such meaning as they may be credited with, on traditionally approved principles and concerns, like sincerity, benevolence, courage and the welfare of mankind.[5]

Kolnai has no more favorable a view of conventional relativism. In the paper "Erroneous Conscience" he calls attention to the fact that advocacy of relativism precludes devotion to any one set of values. In his words, "the philosophical relativism of ' several moralities equally justified ' is incompatible with actual adherence to one of these *alleged* moralities." [6] One reviewer has questioned Kolnai's claim here, but its soundness is not difficult to grasp. Relativism asserts that no moral doctrine or judgment is simply valid, i.e., that none expresses an intrinsic value that is objectively given. On the other hand, adherence to a particular ethic is to declare that a value is so given. The inconsistency of the two positions is thus evident. The attempt to dissolve the inconsistency through recourse to a qualifying " it is so given *to me* " would amount to the admission that *it is not so given,* that you now realize the subjective or culture-bound status of the moral datum that in a less controlled spirit you overlooked, and so abandon the ethic to which you had carelessly subscribed.

In another paper Kolnai argues at greater length against the creed of relativism. Its title is "Moral Consensus", and its major points are that, one, there is substantial agreement among men on moral questions, and, two, without such agreement we would very likely succumb to a radical disorientation. The first point naturally calls for a consideration of its doctrinal denial. This denial, he insists, is at its

crudest ... prone to confuse the prevailing *practice* of men with their prevailing moral *appreciations* ... and would only accept the fact of moral consensus if it saw the terrestrial world superseded by

"*Ibid.,* p. 129.

[8] " Erroneous Conscience," p.

a uniform heaven of saints (or perhaps a uniform abode of the damned, under the sign of either Lasciate ogni speranza or Evil, be thou my Good) . It tends to identify moral decay with a ' new morality ' and *mores* with morality.7

He also observes that the corollary of the position, cultural determinism (like relativism, it stems directly from the understanding of an ethic as an expression of a given culture's genius), precludes understanding of a common and highly relevant state of affairs, namely the existence within a society of those who, on moral grounds, condemn its practices.

Its favourite belief in homogeneous (and mutually alien) 'epochs', ' cultures ' or ' societies ' makes it overlook the potent presence of the Jeremiahs, Juvenals, Bossuets, Burckhardts and similar critics of their own societies.[8]

Another error of relativism is the claimed identity between a society's moral code and its selective emphasis upon this or that specific value .

. . . relativism is guilty of confusing morality with ' ethos ', i.e. the variable and particular vividness of moral emphasis as displayed in locally and chronologically differentiated ideals, idols, and ideologies, traditional code-phrasings and fashionable slogans, whose moral tenor is intimately amalgamated with the indefinite multeity of non-moral concerns, particular interests and aspirations, self-loves and selective sympathies. [9]

It would be rather unreasonable to claim that the Latin stress upon warmth, or the Germanic devotion to thoroughness, or the Jewish emphasis upon intellectuality, constitutes a moral value unique to that culture.

Finally, relativism overlooks the fact that disagreements in non-moral matters far surpass those in the moral sphere:

... how much more striking is the discordance between the factual beliefs of men, their religions, their para- or non-religious outlooks, not to speak of their dominant individual and collective interests,

[7] " Moral Consensus," p. 156.
[8] *Ibid.*
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 157.

than between their moral beliefs all over the world and along its history. To become aware of this contrast in its full proportions should suffice to establish the fact of moral consensus.[10]

While granting that they will involve "modulations and differentiations," and that they will be codified " with simplifications and irksome omissions," he insists on a " consensual perspective of feelings, insights, views " that

> benevolence is good and malice, bad; that veracity is right and mendacity, wrong; and similarly with the contrast-pairs of courage and cowardice, self-control and intemperance, respect for others and arrogant self-assertion, yet on the other hand self-respect and servile self-surrender, adulation or pliancy, dignity and meretricious cynicism, magnanimity and cruelty, chastity and lust, honesty and dishonesty, fidelity and treachery, loyalty and treason.11

The list is an impressive one; indeed, a convincing one. It has, hovvever, a dominant feature that is, in the context, somewhat puzzling. An account of transcultural moral concordance ought, it would seem, to focus on the matter, the content, the specific values, of human life-on such things as the various forms of friendship, the activities of the mind, and self-determination or autonomy. Instead, in the above, we are offered the human responses, virtuous or vicious, to the elements of life, without explicit reference to the values upon which these responses bear. This emphasis on the state of the will faced with its objects is, we shall see, a major element in the paper " Morality and Practice", which contains Kolnai's most developed original contribution to ethical theory. There, however, we find a balance between the will and its object, one which, without diminishing the decisive role of the will and its responses, does assign a definite priority to the object.

In " Morality and Practice " Kolnai seeks to develop an adequate account of human goodness. He begins the project proper by noting and distinguishing two ways in which we use the word " good ".

[10] *Ibid.,* p. 158.
[11] *Ibid.,* p. 154.

When we speak of the good the agent is pursuing (perhaps efficaciously, with the appropriate means, and successfully) or of the ' good of man ', and when we speak of the goodness of conduct or of a ' good man ', we mean by ' good ' sharply different things whatever relations we may on closer inquiry discover between them.[12]

The first, the" good of man", embraces "the desirable, satisfying and valuable ... what I hold in high esteem ... what is known to be desired by or useful for people in general or a category of people."[13] Among such goods in this sense, then, would be the possession of wealth, or status, or power, and, more important by far, the *perfections* of man's specific being, those forms of existence toward which he is inclined by his nature, those stressed in the Aristotelian natural law ethic.

Man's *goodness,* on the other hand, is found in his self-directing but self-detached devotion to value, a devotion, that is, involving" a relinquishment of the' John's good' point of view, a decisive step beyond the John-centric system of coordinates, a radical change of perspective."[14] Such a change of perspective will be signaled by a desire to be a good person:

At a certain level of moral virtue, i.e. if he is really 'good', John will be *concerned* about being virtuous, develop a sensitive conscience, and suffer whenever he has failed to follow its suasion.[15]

In such a case, for John "the goodness of his will has indeed become a precious part of ' his good '," though of course it is "his good" in a sense quite different from that in which, say, power is his good. Concern for his own virtue

means a *reception* into the st,ructure of his wanting of a *claim on him* as contrasted to the autonomous unfolding and pursuing of *his desires* as such and a readiness to renounce frequently, at the cost of pain and effort if necessary, 'his good' in the direct, perhaps fully experienced and often very comprehensive sense of the word, and to check his pursuit of it.[16]

What is the target of these characterizations and distinctions? Quite simply, the view that through the fulfillment of

[12] *Op. cit.,* p. 66.
[13] *Ibid.,* p. 65.
[14] *Ibid.,* p. 68.
[15] *Ibid.,* pp. 68-9.
[16] *Ibid.,* p. 69.

his root urges, inclinations, desires, through the acquisition of further actuality, the acquisition of ontologically richer modes of being, man, by that fact alone, takes on a kind of grace, i.e. moral goodness in its proper nature. Concerning what he calls Aristotle's Metaphysics of Good, he states:

His point of departure lies in the conception of good as 'perfective' of the thing whose good and, basically, the object of whose desire it is. Good is inconceivable without a reference to its power of attraction; but that attraction is thought of as consequent upon the objective need on the part of the attracted thing for having its being 'perfected'-sustained, accomplished, enhanced-by 'its good' .... Good thus becomes a concept subordinate to that kind of being.17

In a clear reference to G. E. Moore's Naturalistic Fallacy, Kolnai terms the above Aristotle's "metaphysical naturalism", and he will have none of it:

It may well be morally good to promote the 'perfection' of self and of others in any meaningful sense of personal perfections, but neither does this in any way define or comprise morality nor is it true that a man is morally better for being more perfect in any, however basic and desirable, non-moral sense.18

He then adds, in a definite paradox that we shall specify later:

Man's being distinctively human or fully developed *qua* man cannot be the criterion of his morality, for what distinguishes man from the 'brutes' is his being morally accountable.19

What is the proper response to all this? That, largely, it is both valid and adequate. Let it be granted that we naturally seek to be knowing, free, and loving, and that these states are in some deep and experienced way perfective of our being, our existence as human. This does not mean that our possession of them is one with our virtue, our moral goodness. A person is not moral because he is knowledgeable and wise, self-determining, and, to cite the most evident instance, 'in love'. He is, however, morally good in *seeking* these states-in seeking them

[11] *Ibid.,* p. 74. [1]. *Ibid.,* p. 77. [1]. *Ibid.*

as cognizant of their worth, thus seeking them for himself and for others.

At this point we come to something not found in Kolnai's accounts of the good offered above. Clearly it is not in the deliberate seeking of just any desired object that we take on the quality of moral goodness. This means that we have need of what, in another passage, Kolnai calls an " intermediary " concept of good,

> the further concept of an *intrinsic* but not in itself moral good which is not, then, a quality or characteristic but (along with 'goods') an *object* of the agent's pursuit yet at the same time endowed with autonomous validity and a standard or measure of the quality of that pursuit rather than a function or consequence of it.20

Accordingly, man's pursuits and man himself will acquire moral goodness if it is to objects that have intrinsic worth that he deliberately directs himself. And what are these? Interestingly, they are for Kolnai, as, presumably, they are for the rest of us, those mentioned more than once, those that Aristotle would see as naturally sought by man, those that he would see as perfective of man as such-namely, the forms of true friendship, intellectual operations, and autonomous behavior. A reading of certain passages given above and of many others scattered through the papers of this collection would reveal that. True, it is not because they are naturally sought, not because they are perfective of our nature, that the pursuit and the pursuer take on the quality of goodness, but because of their *specific* characters and because we see that such modes of being are what we ought to acquire. Our view of them thus should be akin to the view that we have of our own virtue: something that we seek for ourselves, indeed, but in a spirit of subordination to what has worth quite apart from its possession by us. The upshot of this is that the good intermediary between the good of man and man's goodness tends toward man's goodness, without, of course, directly having that quality, which by its

•• *Ibid.,* p. 71.

nature is a *response* to the moral imperium. The quasi-union between the goodness of man and, for want of a better word, the goodness found in nature has an important function. Human virtue is more readily acknowledged if we grant the existence in nature of that which, having intrinsic worth, compels and measures our choices:

> Moral self-detachment may itself become more understandable, more credible as it were, if seen in the context of somehow analogous objectifications than if regarded as an isolated miracle.[21]

This means, as Kolnai sees it, that there is "some sort of congruity between the natural and the moral good," and that " being in its manifoldness and coherence and the functioning of nature *must* be good."[22]

The claimed harmony takes another form. We saw that in the passage where he rejects the view that" being distinctively human or fully developed *qua man* " is the standard of morality, he adds that" what distinguishes man from the' brutes' is his being morally accountable." Paradoxically, this is to say that man's distinctive being is at its core *moral;* that, further, to be developed qua *man* is to be virtuous, for to that state is moral accountability ordered. We might also note that both accountability and the ability to have a detached yet feeling response to value are rooted in man's intelligence, will, and freedom. In rejoinder, though, Kolnai could stress that whatever its ground, virtue is a *non-natural* quality, and that nothing he holds commits him to what he rejects in others, i.e, the identification of an acquired natural mode of being with moral goodness.

And here we are brought back to Kolnai's underlying concern: the defense of the characteristically human; above all, the defense of that uniquely human mode of existence, the moral, against all forms of reductionism, all confusions between it and the non-moral. He would hardly be bothered by the claim that the moral is *human* in origin. To the contrary, he would insist

[01] *Ibid.,* p. 7!i!.
[••] *Ibid.,* p. 83.

that, in our experience, it is with man that the moral is inserted into existence. But this is far from justifying the inference that the moral is illusory or subjective in its status. Speaking of moral opinions, as he might also have of moral feelings, habits, or actions, he observes:

> The point is that there are *moral* opinions, that *all* moral opinions are facts, and these facts are the only data on which any analysis and interpretation of morality, and not of something else arbitrarily substituted for morality, can be based.[28]

It could of course be brought out in seeming or partial rebuttal that the above does not wholly answer the question which has always followed any formulation of the Naturalistic :Fallacy: since the Good is not a natural mode of being, what precisely is it? Insofar as Kolnai answers by designating that manifestly non-natural state of the human psyche that we term the moral, fine. But what of its claimed analogue in nature, that which he sees as congruous with the moral, indeed as the measure and standard of moral goodness? There, what does " the good " signify?

The question is surely both fair and difficult. Still, reversing the order established by Kolnai, we might say that the *goodness* of a natural mode of being becomes more understandable and credible if seen in relation to its somehow analogous objectifications in the human spirit that we call moral goodness. Further probing of moral goodness might thus enrich our understanding of the good in nature. Probing the undeniable instances of the natural good-knowledge, love, and freedom-might also help. Not only are they intimately related to moral goodness, but they, too, have fallen outside the notion of Being favored by the radical monist; they, too, have been the objects of an attempted reduction to Being, that thick and throbbing but essentially homogeneous and indifferent stuff with the concept of which, in the manner of the ancients, contemporary thought is comfortable.

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»a " Moral Consensus," p. *151.*

BOOK REVIEWS

Jesus: An Experiment in Christology. By EDWARD ScHILLEBEECKX. Translated by Hubert Hoskins. New York: The Seabury Press, 1979. Pp. 767.

The original (1974) title of this first volume of E. Schillebeeckx's trilogy on Christology was "Jesus of Nazareth: The Narrative of One Who Lives (or The Living One)," and the author's article in *Lumiere et Vie* (Sp-Oc, 1977) retained that designation, *Jesus de Nazareth, le recit d'un vivant.* An alternate title Schillebeeckx had in mind for the book was " Salvation in Jesus Coming From God." With translations of volume one already available in many languages (four editions in German alone), with the second volume now out in English translation and with the name of Schillebeeckx so much before the public in recent months because of his conversations with Roman authorities, a ' review of reviews ' might be now attempted. The aim of this report, however, is more modest: how Schillebeeckx's foray into the world of exegesis about Jesus who was the Christ strikes another systematic theologian.

When the Scriptures proclaim the resurrection of Jesus they are always conscious of his early life. Yet there is a tension today, liberation theology is an example, between those who adore the heavenly Jesus and those who are interested in the earthly Jesus; a healthy balance is sought. On the basis of a painstaking study of New Testament exegesis-more than 80% of the book is the author's summary of current biblical research, he argues that the Old Testament and inter-testamental figure of the eschatological prophet is the key to understanding Jesus of Nazareth. From this strongly Jewish background the first disciples faced the scandal of the cross; so the Christian scriptures show, reflecting earlier sources. The kingdom of God was inaugurated in Jesus whose life was delivered over to God's demanding love. Victory over death is achieved in death and by death.

Traditional Christologies have collapsed in false dilemmas, e.g., Jesus of Nazareth as model of Christian life in the world contrasted to a Christology with roots in the Easter kerygma and its expression in the Church's worship. Or the dilemma is posed: either Christians struggling for justice, or a Christology interior to the Church, theoretically liberating but practically conservative on sociopolitical involvement. Still again: accent on the man Jesus even to the exclusion of his eschatological union with God, or stress on Jesus Christ at the right hand of the Father, far removed from the grubby world. Schillebeeckx's 'experiment' has been to investigate the earthly life of Jesus, using historico-critical studies, looking for

clues in that life which lead to the Christian message as the answer to the human quest for salvation. Now, however, the dialogue partner to Christtianity is no longer the humanist but the poor looking for liberation. The author would have his reader join the first disciples on their *itinerarium mentis,* as they follow their fellow Jew and after his terrible death proclaim him Christ, Son of man, Son of God.

The first "Jesus" volume "Experiment in Christology," might also have been called "Experience of Christology" (volume two is called *Christ the Experience of Jesus as Lord),* so strong is the place given to experience whether of the first disciples or later Christians. Experience takes precedence over the cognitive aspects on the part of both the first followers of Jesus and all subsequent believers. The content aspect or message dimension of the revelation of God in Christ receives little attention from Schillebeeckx. Is he reacting over-strongly to a two-story universe, with a God out there breaking through to send saving informa.tion to human beings down here? Is there no proper space for divine action and divine communication *propter nos homines et propter nostram .rnlutem,* yet with full respect for the independence and integrity of creation and the creatures who are human beings, recipients of the Father's favor in Christ and the Spirit?

Anticipating (and in subsequent editions answering) criticism, Schillebeeckx protests fidelity to the creeds of the Church, especially Nicea and Chalcedon, though he insists these too must be taken historically. He wants his readers to grasp the dogmas of the Church, not abandon them, quite the contrary of liberal theology. After stating he starts "from the impression the earthly Jesus made on his loyal followers" in order "to understand better the theological drift of the Church's *kerygma* and of the first credal formulations," he continues, "Jesus of Nazareth is ... the norm and criterion of Christian belief. So too, for me as a Christian, is Chalcedon: but under the compelling norm of the same Jesus Christ, whom this council-within a framework of specific and specifically Greek philosophical inquiry, proper to its time though strange to us-likewise took to be the norm and criterion of its dogmatic definitions . . ." For him 'narrative' has priority over apologetic or abstract arguments.

Christianity is more than a 'religion of the book'; it has reference to historical events and persons, yet, useful though such research may be, the image of Jesus thereby reconstructed is not the norm of our faith, for there is a fundamental difference between the 'historical Jesus,' that is, the distillate of historical-critical research and the Jesus of history living in the company of his contemporaries in Palestine.

Historical investigation can help us follow Jesus with the disciples from his baptism to his death, to discover how their hearts were burning in his company. We have here not only a *fides quaerens intellectum* but also an *intellectus historicus quaerens fidem.* "Leaving aside the dogma of the

Church," writes Schillebeeckx, adding at once, "though I am convinced that it is that very dogma which impelled me to these studies, I wish to follow without knowing where they may lead me, not even knowing if this way might not lead to an impasse. " He stands in a good theological tradition; recall how Anselm (Schillebeeckx has warm words for Anselm's soteriology of satisfaction) put aside the redemption when he set out on the journey of his *Cur Deus Homo.* Historical investigation is one line of approach, but another extremely important, indeed central, approach is what the author calls ' disclosure experience,' which can be conclusive for some, not for others. It is to such an experience that Schillebeeckx attributes the Easter faith of the disciples, which was finally expressed in terms of appearances of the Risen Lord and the empty tomb. The Easter experience is never far from the author's thought throughout this lengthy book.

The *itinerarium* of the disciples began with a meeting which led them to follow Jesus, their lives changed in the process (I Cor. 15: 17 is Paul's reminder of it) . The basic gospel category is ' meeting, ' meaning both experience and interpretation, which stand in reciprocal relationship, which are the hinge of both volumes, says the author. Revelation and experience are not opposed, for God's revelation includes, though it transcends, the course of human experiences. Jesus is not just the cipher for our own human experiences, as Hans Kling seems to be saying (so said Schillebeeckx in his keynote address to the convention of the Catholic Theological Society of America, San Francisco, June, 1980). First order or *'what* Christology' led to *'who* Christology.' What was once experienced can only be handed down in renewed experiences.

Each New Testament book records the experience of grace differently. Jesus opens a new way of life, not as a mere symbol but as the Living One. How docs that offer of salvation translate to our contemporaries? Jesus is accessible to us through the believing interpreters of the New Testament. Jesus of Nazareth lived out his message, in his attitude towards God and in service of others, especially the poor and despised. At his death the disciples fled; the poignant *sperabamus* of the pair bound for Emmaus shows his followers held Jesus to be the eschatological prophet. Schillebeeckx distinguishes between the various messianic concepts of Jesus' day. Along with the familiar Davidic-dynastic model, a messianic eschatological prophet was also expected, greater even than Moses, many of whose qualities he would have.

For a century, from the Wisdom books of 50 B.C. to the first Christian scriptures (I Thess.), approximately A.D. 50, there was an inter-testamental concept of the eschatological prophet, with remote roots in Deuteronomy. Jewish tradition came to see Moses not only as intermediary but as suffering intermediary, bearing the sins of the people. By the time of Deutero-Isaiah the royal prophet Moses who bears the sins of the people was identified with the suffering servant, and there developed

the concept of an eschatological prophet greater than Moses, the servant who would be a light to the nations *(lumen gentium* was used for the Law, eventually for Christ). Christians borrowed from Judaism the concept of the prophet to express Jesus' own sense of himself and his mission.

Schillebeeckx sees the eschatologi.cal prophet as the basic matrix of New Testament professions of faith, the proto-creeds. There are four kinds of such confessions, traceable to pre-New Testament sources, and synthesized in the Easter Christology. The first kind was the parousia category, Jesus is master of the future, the judge to come and eschatological Savior of the world. Implicitly, this was already a Christology. The second primitive confession was that Jesus is a doer of great signs, a wonder-worker, the ' divine man ' in the Solomon line of a royal benefactor full of goodness and wisdom who must undergo contumely but who will be vindicated by God. The third proto-credal category is found in the sapiential Christologies: Jesus comes forth from God, he is sent by divine Wisdom, even identified with Wisdom. The fourth is paschal Christology, centered on the death and resurrection of Jesus; this developed last, even though it came to dominate. All four approaches express dimensions of the life of Jesus: announcing the kingdom of God, doing good, revealing the mystery of God by revealing man to himself, and, though executed, yet vindicated by God.

How move from the death of Jesus to Christian proclamation of his resurrection? For Jesus death is already victory. Jesus has met his fate and mastered it; he has conquered finitude by service to his fellowmen. To attempt a theology without the message and mission that led to the death of Jesus misses the saving significance of the cross. A classic modern example of such missing the point was R. Bultmann's explanation of the execution of Jesus as simply a 'tragic error.'

The death of Jesus was not an historical accident; it was the consequence of his radical life-style and uncompromising message. Jesus did not court suffering, he did not seek death, but he was so committed that the deadly consequences of his activities did not deter him. As Schilleheeckx puts it, " Although Jesus likely never preached his death as an event of salvation, his death on the cross, given the pattern of suffering and injustice, was the consequence of his words and deeds to which he was more committed than to his own life. "

This resurrection is the divine ratification of the life of Jesus; God redressed the injustice of his execution. The resurrection confirms what was already present in the life and death of Jesus. Resurrection means victory over death, the last enemy. It took a long time for the Judaism of the Hebrew Bible to reach the conviction that death could not break the true life of union with the living God. The belief that Jesus was the eschatological prophet who spoke with God face to face led the first Christians to say that in his case the power of death had been broken.

Jesus cannot be separated from God; there is a new presence of Jesus among us in the power of the Spirit.

What is involved here, the author insists, is not simply a human experience in the face of a theory of survival, without foundation and incapable of verification (desperation?), but a real human experience face to face with a real religious experience, i.e., the Christian attitude towards death.

The oldest pre-New Testament confession of faith in the resurrection was in the form of the parousia of this prophet as being the coming of the parousia credo, for if Jesus is the one to come, then he must be living. The experience of salvation *as* forgiveness given in the Risen Jesus antedated reflection on his personality. Soteriology came before Christology. Developing his particular theory about the resurrection, Schillebeeckx holds that whatever the function of the empty tomb and whatever the historical significance of visual elements in the appearance accounts, faith in the resurrection of Jesus cannot have its foundation in either the empty tomb (though historically probable) or in the visual elements of the New Testament accounts (we have *seen* ...). Even Paul, he holds, did not claim to have *seen* Jesus. For Paul the 'seeing of Jesus' was a Christological seeing, an understanding of Jesus as the Christ made possible by grace alone.

What is sure about the resurrection? Here is Schillebeeckx's answer on this central point, never out of mind throughout the entire book. First, faith in the resurrection is not man's invention but God's free gift in and by Jesus. Second, a human psychological experience was involved. These were new experiences, not simply reflections on what Jesus had been before his death. A conversion experience, forgiveness, came first, and with it the awareness that Jesus must still be alive even after death, for only the living Jesus can forgive. Peter was the first to have this forgiveness experience, and once confirmed (or converted) he gathered around himself the other disciples who had dispersed after the shameful death of their Master. The author is at pains to dissociate himself from the position of W. Marxsen, who limits the background of the resurrection to experiences the disciples had of the earthly Jesus. The New Testament makes it clear the initiative comes from Christ; it does so by means of the vertical images of the heavenly Jesus. Yet Schillebeeckx leaves hanging the question, "Did they see Jesus? " by asking rhetorically, "... did they see Jesus, as Paul saw Peter?"

Faith in the resurrection has its foundation in the pentecostal experience, that is, the experience of the Church that Jesus is living with the Father and in the community of his followers. Easter and Pentecost go together: Christ with the Father (Easter and Ascension) is among his own who are in the world (Pentecost). " I would say that it is only through Pentecost, that is, by the experience in faith of the presence

of the living Christ, that the disciples know that Jesus is risen (Easter and Ascension)."

Even non-believing historians must admit the change the disciples underwent after the death of Jesus, proven by their preaching so short a time afterwards. The New Testament speaks of their initial doubts; could it be that the death of Jesus brought home to them that he was the eschatological prophet, that the kingdom had come? Does St. Mark in referring to Peter's tears at cockcrow allude to a *metanoia* already in effect, to an awareness of Jesus as Savior? Schillebeeckx replies that the resurrection cannot be thus reduced. The resurrection must not be simply identified with faith in the resurrection, even though the New Testament says Jesus appeared to believers (John 14, 19). All the same, the objective and the subjective must not be separated in the integral concept of the resurrection: the objective is the real resurrection of Jesus, his elevation with the Father; the subjective is the experience of faith expressed in the appearance accounts. The total paschal event is the Easter experience of the disciples with its source in the Risen One. Resurrection means Jesus was raised from the dead, but it means also the Father has given the Risen One to a community, the Church. In "the stories about Jesus ' making himself seen ' after his death ... there is enunciated the Christological identification of Jesus of Nazareth, experienced as a sheer act of grace on God's part and as ground and source of the Church's mission. " The resurrection means also the heavenly presence of Jesus among us. " His resurrection is at the same time the sending of the Spirit and the gathering of the dispersed disciples. " Schillebeeckx is not out to demythologize the appearances of the Risen Jesus (p. 710, note 119, for his statement on this). No doubt about the strength with which Schillebeeckx proposes his reading of the meaning of resurrection, yet this reviewer is doubtful about the clarity of his position. 'Easter experience' is an ambiguous expression, notes the author; has he resolved the ambiguity?

Schillebeeckx eschews both empiricism and fideism. The resurrection of Jesus and his heavenly presence among his own are aspects of one and the same reality in such a way that it is in the renewed presence of Jesus and by that presence that the disciples know what has happened to him- " He is risen." The appearance narratives speak consistently of the mission of the disciples. As for the appearances, Schillebeeckx insists he is not eliminating them, but holds the heart of the matter is the experience the followers of Jesus had of his presence in their midst after his death, however their emotions worked on them, visually, by hearing, or in whatever way.

In the *Lumiere et Vie* article, Schillebeeckx puts as a final question: "Is belief in survival after death an evasion? " He answers with another question: " Without attaching value to present life as a union with God already begun, what value would a future life hold?" Union with God

now involves service to neighbor in love. Faith in the resurrection gives the Christian limitless, undaunted, unquenchable freedom and an openness able to confront the powers of this world (Ephesians 6:12-13).

There are many particular points of interest in this book: a glossary of technical terms, flashes of wit, e.g., poking fun at the Cafe called The Whale, frequented by Jonas; defense of accurate use of historical terms, for example, the expressions of early Councils which have a fixed meaning, *pace* Schoonenberg; sensitive reflection on the mystery of suffering. Questions might be put about the one-sided approach to the Virgin Birth (virginal conception of Jesus) where Schillebeeckx accepts without question a prevailing exegetical opinion that is not the only possible one, and the second century apocryphal midwife does not advance the argument.

I have sought to do this review without depending on the many others currently appearing, I would call attention to only one review which appeared of late: a major review titled *The Pre-EMter Jesus and Christology,* by Reginald H. Fuller, in *Interpretation* 34 (July, 1980) 293-296. Fuller finds without warrant the peculiar stand Schillebeeckx takes on the earliest appearance references. So much of the Schillebeeckx argument on the resurrection of Jesus rests on this factor, that I believe Fuller's exegetical dissent should be carefully noted.

From the viewpoint of a friendly critic who finds much to praise, Fuller faults Schillebeeckx for his assessment of the earliest Easter traditions, in the pre-Pauline list of appearances of I Cor. 15:3 ff. Schillebeeckx gives his own interpretation to the chain of *ophthe's* in I Cor. 15. In Fuller's judgment these are primary reports, not secondary reflections on conversion experiences. Fuller wonders too if the difference from Marxsen is as great as Schillebeeckx would like it to be, for if the ' resurrection idea ' is only one of several possible interpretations for the conversion experience of the disciples, how much does this differ from Marxsen's ' the cause of Jesus continues '? In his book Schillebeeckx seems to infer that something happened to Jesus himself, not simply to his converted followers. Fuller asks if Schillebeeckx is willing to say right out that God brought the Crucified One to life again. In my judgment the Christological case of Schillebeeckx stands or falls with the answer to that question. It should be noted finally that along with occasional pleas for understanding the author asks readers at the start to read and weigh the entire book, and at the very end repeats the hope that his book assist " a kind of believing that really tells." His final fear about the book's being marked down for sale in a curio shop is not likely to occur soon.

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Catholic Theology in the Nineteenth Century: The Quest for a Unitary Method. By GERALD A. McCooL. New York: The Seabury Press, 1977. Pp. 300. $14.95.

The centennial of the encyclical *Aeterni Patris* provides the occasion to rethink the significance of this important document in light of present-day challenges, questions, and crises facing Catholic theology and philosophy. Fr. McCool's book is an appropriate starting-point since it retraces the developments, achievements, and painful conflicts of Catholic theology during the years between *Aeterni Patris* and the Second Vatican Council. Such an historical exercise is necessary in order for the modern theologian to place himself in the continuing debate which constitutes the evolution of Catholic theology in its response to the challenge of post-Enlightenment thought. As a major part of this evolution McCool suggests, early in the book, that the result of the current historical interest may be an authentic pluralism, the possibility of a genuine option between a developed Thomism and a restored pre-Thomistic nineteenth century system.

McCool's study necessarily begins with the drafting of *Dei Filius* and *Aeterni Patris.* Among the important matters in *Dei Filius* (April !i!!i!, 1870) were the Council's affirmation of the existence of an eternal, free, omnipotent, and personal God and the affirmation that God's existence and a number of divine attributes could be known with certainty by natural reason. Against the "blind leap" approach to faith favored by the Protestant pietist tradition, *Dei Filius* defended the reasonableness of the assent of faith, a reasonableness that would be challenged by many philosophers, most notably the ontologists and the Kantians. Moreover, *Aeterni Patris* (August 4, 1879) mapped the three functions philosophy must serve in the Church. First, as an apologetic, philosophy could establish important truths and arguments by natural reason. Second, it could invest sacred theology with the nature, habit, and character of a genuine science. Finally, it could provide sound arguments which the Church would employ in its controversies with opponents. The encyclical asserts: "Those therefore are the *best* philosophers who combine the pursuit of philosophy with dutiful obedience to the Catholic faith, for the splendor of the divine truths irradiating the soul is a help to the intelligence; it does not deprive it of the least degree of its dignity, but even brings it an increase of nobility, acuteness and strength" (italics added) . The " best " philosophers, then, join their mature scholarly work with the possession of truth founded on faith.

Nevertheless, the encyclical includes an important qualification to its advocacy of the wisdom of St. Thomas. " If there is any proposition too subtly investigated or too inconsiderately taught by the Doctors of the School, any tenet of theirs not strictly in conformity with subsequent dis-

coveries or in any way improbable in itself, it is no part of our intention to propose that for the imitation of our time. "

Joseph Kleutgen, who was the most original, profound, and influential of the Jesuit neo-Thomists, was instrumental in the formulation of a putative perennial Thomism. McCool recounts the Thomistic revival through Liberatore and Kleutgen, marking the key points in the debate. The debate within Catholic theology was threefold, among Georg Hermes's semirationalism, Tubingen traditionalism, and the scholasticism of the Roman College. Along with the ontologism of Rosmini and Gioberti, the dualism of Gunther served to upset the promoters of the neo-Thomist movement. Matteo Liberatore attacked the ontologists and Kleutgen took up arms against Gunther as well as the Tubingen theologians and Hermes's semirationalism.

McCool records the fact that the problem with many of the contending theological schools of thought was their inability to meet the demands of Catholic theology. One of the more important demands is that the assent of faith must be supernatural, and the act of faith must transcend the limits of natural knowledge and the philosophical order. Subsequently, the major issue in the debate between the neo-Thomists and the post-Kantians was the ability of their respective methods to handle adequately the Catholic teaching on faith and reason, on grace and nature. Leo XIII's support of neo-Thomism in priestly formation, writes McCool, rested on the conviction that the Thomistic metaphysics of substance and accident could preserve the necessary distinction between grace and nature which post-Kantian metaphysics could not seem to preserve. In addition, Thomas's theory of knowledge avoided the confusion between natural and supernatural knowledge of God which post-Kantian intuitive epistemology could not avoid because Kant's necessary and universal intellectual world left no room for revealed religion.

These historical considerations bring Fr. McCool to make two of the most important points found in the book. First of all, Fr. McCool forcefully recounts the emerging pluralism which resulted from the debates between neo-Thomistic and non-scholastic theologians as well as the debates within neo-Thomistic theology itself. Secondly, he compares the modern theological methods and the scholastic theological method in order to measure fairly the complaints of modern theologians against the effectiveness of the scholastic method.

To illustrate the first point, McCool shows how Liberatore's philosophical synthesis resulted in two contending Thomistic groups. As far as Liberatore was concerned, the epistemology and metaphysics of abstraction in St. Thomas resolved the problem of objectification without resorting to Kantian apriorism or to an ontologism. Yet Liberatore's metaphysics did not include the act of existence; hence his notion of being differs from St. Thomas's. When this issue of objectification again arose,

the Thomists divided into rival groups. One group, which included Etienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain, sought the solution in the intelligibility of the contingent act of existence of sensible singulars. The second group, those in the rival camp of Joseph looked for the solution to the infinite act of existence which is the final cause of the active intellect.

Fr. McCool argues that even in the unitary system of the neo-Thomists the seeds of a future Thomistic pluralism could be found. The differences between the new and old theology are clear enough. Thomistic theology is presently characterized by historical openness, the evolutionary character of its thought, and its sensitivity to the plurality of cultural and conceptual frameworks. As Lonergan and Rahner have shown, the Aristotelian scientific method, which buttressed scholasticism, could cope neither with history nor with the spiritual life of the human subject. Kleutgen's uncritical adherence to this method blinded him to the metaphysical resources within Thomas's work which could almost satisfy the demands of the Tlibingen theologians. Emphasized in the Tiibingen theology and ignored by Kleutgen were the organic nature of the Kingdom of God, its historical realization in time, the place of living tradition within the Church, and the role of the Holy Spirit as the Church's vital source of unity.

Kleutgen gave impetus to neo-Thomism and its development, but that development might appear strange to Kleutgen. This unfamiliarity would result from the openness of much modern Thomism to post-Cartesian philosophy, its subjective starting-point, its denial that the contingent forms of sensible singulars can ground the necessity of " abstract " essences and metaphysical first principles, and its stress on the divine existence, grasped within the mind, as the necessary condition for the objectivity of human knowledge.

Fr. McCool then addresses the second point-modern theology's criticism of scholasticism. Scholasticism was taken to task because its alleged deficiencies could not pl'otect the Catholic faith against the inroads of skepticism and pantheism. Modern theology claimed it could defend Catholic truth and meet the demand for certainty, necessity, completeness, coherence, and scientific rigor. Kleutgen's work necessarily fell prey to this critique. Kleutgen's weakness was his oversight regarding the role of cultural development or of different conceptual frameworks in the history of thought. Despite his careful and fair reading of historical sources, Kleutgen interpreted them in terms of his own conceptual framework of post-Reformation scholasticism. Fr. McCool asserts that this weakness became, in fact, the source of a widespread malaise in Catholic theology in the first half of the twentieth century.

In light of the pluralism and the multiple critiques of modern theology, modern philosophers and theologians might ask what, if any, is the connection between the Thomism of the New Theologians, Rahner and

Lonergan, and the Thomism of their neo-Thomistic ancestor, Kleutgen? Fr. McCool is clear in his answer. The connection is found in the Thomistic theory of knowledge and the anthropology Kleutgen employed to support his Aristotelian metaphysics of nature and supernature. This theory of knowledge demands a substantial union between soul and body. This epistemology also sees intellect as abstractive, where abstraction and analogy rather than direct and intuitive knowledge of God singles out the scholastic approach to God.

Just as *Catholic Theology in the Nineteenth Century* is about the emerging pluralism in theology and its openness to new developments, it is also an attempt to reopen avenues blocked by philosophical and theological polemics which sometimes led to condemnation. McCool's historical examination is an effort to continue unlocking doors to a dialogue regarding viable alternatives for Catholic philosophy and theology to explore in their attempt to speak persuasively to the challenges of the contemporary intellectual community.

One would hope that McCool's approach toward pluralism within Catholic theology will be adopted toward the pluralism of faiths. Alongside the plurality of reasons for different positions regarding the Catholic faith, there is the plurality of faiths which must be addressed reasonably. This must be achieved in such a way as to preserve what is distinctive of the Catholic faith and its truths without closing off arbitrarily and uncritically the different avenues and ways to truths and to the Truth. As McCool himself proclaims, one of the great teachings of *Aeterni Patris* is the importance of tradition and the necessity of contact with revelation in a Christian philosophy.

The task of the modern theologian, says McCool, clearly demands that theological thought be historical. Both historical thought and being are intelligible but that intelligibility McCool believes cannot be captured in a definitive metaphysical system. Consequently, McCool suggests, " All . . . the contemporary theologian can hope to do is to point to that intelligibility as it reveals itself through its historical expressions. The theologian can do no more than show how historical thought can mediate a living tradition and the institutions which carry that tradition and its spirit without ceasing to be historical." Unfortunately, McCool seems to retreat from the more forceful thrust he gives theology in the earlier sections of his book. But this guarded optimism should be interpreted in light of the intellectual thrust of the work. His vision is one of prudence reflecting the wisdom gained through past mistakes. Fr. McCool urges upon us a demanding and continuing task, but one which must be performed with humility.

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Death, Dying, and the Biological Revolution: Our Last Quest For Responsibility. By ROBERT M. VEATCH. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976. Pp. 323 including index and bibliography.

This book's three major themes are: (I) establishing the category difference between technical questions of medical feasibility and ethical questions of moral legitimacy; (2) defining ' death ' and ' dying ' so as to elucidate the difference between medical treatments which support life and those which "prolong dying "; and (3) showing the difficulty of articulating a public policy-not to mention an established medical ethic-about the dying and the recently dead in a society so pluralistic as almost to be antinomian. Veatch knows that these are questions of the first complexity, and avoids stating his views as dogma, occasionally leaving his own opinion on the issues unclear. Properly, he also avoids mechanically spinning out theorems based on axioms of ethics. The book's greatest value is the critical sensitivity with which it exposes and dissects the levels of these problems. Relations between ethics, policy, and medical feasibility are often uneasy, and Veatch appreciates this fact. He is also well-informed concerning both recent law on the topics and the current state of the medical art.

The most philosophically interesting section is Veatch's analysis of four competing definitions of ' death '. His novel position is that it is as morally offensive to treat dead individuals as living as it traditionally has been to treat the living as though they were dead. His choice of definition is the " irreversible loss of capacity for social interaction "; his justification for this choice, in contrast to the " capacity for bodily integration ", is the neurologic fact that the autonomic, medullary controls for fluid circulation and for some reflexes (e.g. yawning) can persist in a person whose EEG is irreversibly isoelectric for what Veatch calls the higher functions, such as thought, reason, and emotion. (His note on " permanent back ward psychotics or senile individuals " needs amplification, though, since they aren't brain stem cases and equally clearly have no capacity for social interaction.) His meticulous analysis of the medical and legal options in defining death supports his thesis, put rhetorically: "How could medical research possibly discover that death *should* be pronounced when brain function rather than heart function has stopped irreversibly? " (Italics added).

The book's focus-especially seen in chapters 3, 4, and 5-is on the results of this definition of death in the realm of public policy. He begins with an exploration of some of the concurrent problems: active vs. passive euthanasia, " slippery slope " consequences, and " extraordinary " medical intervention.

His decisive move is to recast all these arguments from the perspective of the patient who acts as agent in his own behalf. "... To view the moral

issue from the standpoint of rights and obligations of the patients rather than from the moral alternatives of physicians ... changes the character of the discussion. The consequences are predictable. The patient (or his agent) should decide what interventions are acceptable, whether extended respiratory support for a cerebrally dead patient is "extraordinary", and so on. Veatch is in the " reasonable man " camp with this sort of guideline, and as many reasonable man theorists are, he is compelled quickly to admit legal recourse in deciding" reasonableness " (and, similarly, " grave burdensomeness" of treatments). Given the spectrum of judicial good sense and lack of it which Veatch recounts, one wonders how the practical consequences of his principle will improve on current policy. He reviews the refusal-of-treatment cases, including the Jehovah's Witness blood transfusion cases and the Down's syndrome infants with intestinal blockages, and discusses the Quinlan matter most astutely, concluding, in parallel with the New Jersey Supreme Court, that "refusal of death-prolonging treatments should be seen as radically different from and normally more reasonable than refusal of lifesaving treatments." (As noted above, Veatch appreciates that " gravely burdensome treatment " has almost as much of a subjective element as does the "reasonableness " of a refusal.) While Veatch's section on definitions of death suggests that patients choose between cardiopulmonary, bodily-integrative, and social-competence definitions, but not outside these, no such guide for " reasonableness " or " burdensomeness " seems forthcoming-a difficulty probably inherent in the subject-matter. Veatch finally considers policy options to empower persons more explicitly to control their own final care. The salient feature of his proposal is that refusal of death-prolonging interventions shall not be construed as prima facie evidence of diminished competency, as is not infrequently seen in current legal battles.

One senses Veatch foundering on two terribly difficult problems in this section. He seems compelled to admit that there is no morally safe way to legalize active killing of patients even when they have good reason, and full competence, to request it. Yet the moral necessity of having such an option available seems to follow inescapably from the reasoning of the section, even with the self-conscious reminder that the control of one's final care " represents the development of modern Western philosophical individualistic voluntarism." Second, his having to turn to the courts for adjudication of" reasonableness" seems almost to presuppose an adversary relationship between patient and physician, which situation in fact is quite rare. Such problems are examined in detail in his discussion of policy guidelines. He concludes that an individual's own perceptions of what is needful for his " dignity and humanness " should control decisions on treatment, and goes so far as bluntly to state that " the physician should never be placed in the position of deciding to stop or omit treatment", turning rather to the courts for guardianship when the patient (or his agent) has not ex-

pressed an opinion while competent to do so. The position follows straightforwardly from the two preceding chapters.

In his last and least perspicuous chapter Veatch undertakes " a case for the goodness of life, even for the ideal of immortality," in the face of a "possibly romantically elitist" concept of natural death. (The problem, of course, arises from the presence of the most troublesome word in the philosophical lexicon, "natural".) His intention seems to be to reaffirm death as an evil, in contrast to the more recent acceptance of it, but also to argue the relative acceptability of certain deaths-presumably those following termination of extreme technological intervention.

The book's excellent sensitivity to different levels of individual dilemmas is praiseworthy. But from its decisive move-restating moral problems from the patient's perspective-a difficulty emerges. There is an extensive tradition running counter to "individualistic voluntarism," implicitly invoked whenever a physician does something uncomfortable to his patient. The tradition has it that the physician is trying to get the upper hand, not of the patient or of his voluntarism, but of his illness. Since he is a professional, the physician's medical judgment is, at least in life-saving rather than in death-prolonging treatments, normally more reasonable than the layman's. Voluntarism sometimes obscures the difference between layman and professional, to the detriment of the one and the frustration of the other. Met with intransigent refusal of, say, a minor and routine intravenous line, a physician would probably say words to the effect of " Don't practice medicine for me," not " Don't make ethical judgments for me." The decision for the IV is medical, not ethical. It seems that somewhere a line should exist between the practices of medicine and of individualistic voluntarism. Though it surely is one of this book's virtues to articulate the limitations of expertise, the prevailing wind of mistrust of experts and of expertise sometimes obscures that line. Lacking a criterion of " reasonableness " (or " grave burdensomeness ") it is easy to see the resort to the courts to adjudicate such problems.

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The Heretical Imperative: Contemporary Possibilities of Religious Affirmation. By PETER L. BERGER. Garden City: Anchor Press, Doubleday, 1979. Pp. xv + 207. $9.95.

Few writers had as much influence on religious and theological thought in the 1960's as did the sociologist Peter L. Berger. His *The Sacred Canopy* (1967) delineated convincingly the ways in which religions (including Christianity) arise as social constructs and themselves engage in the social construction of reality (both this-worldly and other-worldly). One effect of such a sociology of knowledge has always been to suggest that all these social constructions are, at best, so many subjective approaches to an unknowable realm and that they are perhaps all equally illusory. Berger's *A Rumor of Angels* (1970) was his effort to show why and how one might engage, formally and informally, in the theological enterprise even after subscribing to the analyses of *The Sacred Canopy.* Now after ten years, he has returned to the same task in *The Heretical Imperative.*

Berger entitles this new study of the " contemporary possibilities of religious affirmation " *The Heretical Imperative* because he wishes to stress the necessity of choosing (playing on the Greek verb *hairein,* to choose) in which the modern situation places human beings. The main feature of this situation, as it bears on religion, is not so much secularization as it is pluralism. Modernity brings with it a multiplication of possibilities and an acute consciousness that the possibilities are available. At other times and in other cultures, people may have been, in principle, able to choose between life-styles and world-views; but in modern societies picking and choosing become an inescapable and often unhappy necessity for nearly everyone. And, once a person has elected to follow one path rather than another, he remains aware that he does so out of choice. This awareness has profound consequences for religious authority and religious community, but what Berger wishes to stress here, as in *A Rumor of Angels,* is not so much the sociological situation as the strategies for choosing.

The basic argument should be a familiar one for readers of the earlier books. The author notes two procedures which he regards as fundamentally inadequate. First of all, there is the deductive strategy in which one reaffirms the tradition. The person confronted with the unsettling dissonance introduced by modernity can put the challenge aside and say once more, "It is so, and it can be no other." Although he sees it worked out in a variety of forms in different cultures, Berger takes Karl Barth and neo-orthodoxy as the paradigm. The strength of this response is that it highlights the authoritative element in religious life; its weakness is that it denies the human conditions and connections of Christian faith. The polar extreme of neo-orthodoxy is reductionism, and here Rudolf Bultmann's demythologization project serves as paradigmatic for all those theological

maneuvers which allow the wisdom of the age to control the interpretation of religion. The two fatal weaknesses of such maneuvers are that they tend to liquidate themselves in favor of purely secular readings of the world and that they normally involve too simplistic a view of modernity itself.

Berger's own way through the Scylla of deductionism and the Charybdis of reductionism still bears the name *inductionism.* Lying behind it are the convictions that locating religion as a human project says nothing about the truth-value of religious experience and religious belief and that the import of the project must be determined by calling forth all the resources available to people today. By *induction,* he means" taking human experience as the starting-point of religious reflection and using the methods of the historian to uncover those human experiences that have become embodied in the various religious traditions." The representative figure here is Friedrich Schleiermacher, and Berger makes it clear (no doubt to the surprise of some who have been reading his writings over the past few years) that he shares the theological liberalism of Schleiermacher and Ernst Troeltsch. It is a liberalism which allows one to stand firm as a Christian while acknowledging his fallibility and while looking for the truth in other people's experience. *A Rumor of Angels* was no less a liberal enterprise, but what makes *The Heretical Imperative* different is its accent not on the rumor present in everyday existence, but rather on the thunderous break-throughs at the origin of all religious traditions. Indeed Berger would now have Christian theologians attend considerably less to the confrontation with secular systems of thought and more to the encounter with non-Western religions. Thus his last chapter negotiates the territory between Jerusalem and Benares.

The Heretical Imperative is a delight to read. As always, Berger writes with grace and clarity; and he has an extraordinary knack for evoking an image which fixes a difficult concept or a complex situation in the reader's mind. And, in the end, there are few books which lay out the options facing religious thought as well as does this one. Finally, it is hard for the reviewer to see what alternative there is but the middle strategy proposed in its pages. If facing up to the whole range of human experience without a priori limits concerning possible interpretations and decisions is the essence of theological liberalism, then we must all be liberals. What is missing, though, in *The Hemtical Imperative* is a serious treatment of the ways in which people can sort out the evidence before them. It is one thing to be committed to an open examination of experience in all its varieties and dimensions, but it is another to suggest a method for determining its meaning and truth-value. Sankara and Thomas Aquinas and Ludwig Feuerbach all adopted an inductive approach and reached radically different conclusions because of diverse epistemologies, metaphysics, prejudices, faiths and so on. In fact, in the case of Aquinas, induction led to deduction; and, in that of Feuerbach, it led to reduction. Perhaps their enterprises would have been

enriched by traversing the terrain between Jerusalem and Benares, but it is hard to see how they would have been changed fundamentally. The most valuable thing Berger could do for us now would be to go beyond delineating our religious situation and sketching the broad options and to take up in print and in detail the task of responding to the heretical imperative. In a sense, *A Rurrwr of Angels* was a superior book inasmuch as it involved a rudimentary effort of this type in its final chapters. With *The Heretical Imperative,* the scope of theology has been clarified and broadened, but the real philosophical and theological labor remains to be accomplished.

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A General Theory of Secularization. By DAVID MARTIN. New York: Harper and Row, 1978. Pp. 841.

The author's contribution to understanding the process of secularization is very significant. One of the essential points of his analysis is expressed by him in the following words: " I want to suggest under what conditions religious institutions, like churches and sects, become less powerful and how it comes about that religious beliefs are less easily accepted " (p. H) . He stresses also the important difference between religious beliefs and religious institutions.

For him religion is " a creature of the realm of symbol, feeling and meaning " (p. 13) . He has constructed an empirical theory of secularization. Through the whole book, we see sacred and secular in constant dialectical and dynamic interaction. Revolution is one of the outcomes of this dialectical process. Whether this revolution is an act which divides internally or unites society against something external is crucial to the process of secularization. In his words, " almost every revolution tends to move to extremes, and extremes directed outwards draw off extremism directed inwards. The frame acquired by America revolting against England, Holland, against Spain is one of unity against oppression, whereas the frame acquired by France is one of disunity between one Frenchman and another " (p. 16) . Religion has a tendency to be identified with a particular political position. When religion and political institutions are " independent " or in a state of equilibrium, and conflicts are not superimposed one on the other, secularization is in a state of" sleep". It is quite like Vulcan Vesuvius for the time being. But Vulcan may be reactivated anytime, showing his power. So can secularization.

The author analyzes different models which reflect the relationship be-

tween political and religious institutions. *Monopoly* is one of them. Where there exists one religion possessed of a monopoly, society necessarily splits into two warring roles, one of which, obviously, is dedicated to religion (for example: Spain, Portugal, Italy, Belgium, France). All Orthodox societies have also approximated the Monopoly Model. Similarly where there are two or more religions, or distinct forms of the same religion, monopoly is not established. The second model is called *"Duopoly,"* in which the Protestant Church is the major partner (England, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, etc.). The third model may be called *The Mixed Model* (Holland, Germany and Switzerland) . The fourth model the author called *The Pluralistic Model.* The United States is a good example of the last. In this last model society does not split into warring groups but into competing although mutually tolerant parties each supported by the various denominations.

In the Orthodox monopolistic countries there usually is visible an instance of extreme collision between Church and State. In Russia, for instance, this is visible where society is secularized; the Church is not. Based on degrees of pluralism, maximal in America and minimal in Russia, the author suggested that religious pluralism is strongly associated with the stability of pluralistic democratic regimes and religious monopoly with the incidence of militant secular religions. Religion in the United States is formally excluded from school and state because its pattern is federalist both in politics and religion. Social order is legitimated by a civil religion. The universalization of dissent permits religion to take on as many images as there are social faces.

In the society with the right-wing pattern the Church usually initiates the movement towards differentiation from the presence of political authority. In the left-wing pattern the Church partly resists that differentiation which the State demands. The right-wing state is using religion as a means to a political end. The left-wing state is trying to replace religion by politics. Needless to say, religion has to disagree with both approaches. In the left-wing state, the Church is at the mercy of secularist elites, which want to control Church activities and provide a functional alternative to religion by politics. According to Martin, communism became in Sweden an accepted political religion in the areas which were isolated and devaluated, for instance economically. " Communism acts as the available valve of discontent and normative exclusion" (p. 69). At the same time, religion defends the integrity of culture. This is particularly strong when the national myth and religion overlap. In fact, this positive overlap is necessary because the majority of people cannot accept too sharp a contradiction between religious faith and their group or motivational identity. Needless to say, when national myth and religion are contradictory the social power of religion has to be restricted.

Only a small group or groups (sects) can survive such a contradiction

when they are looking to create an alternative society. In essence, Europe has a record of the overlap of national myth and religion where the national identity is either rooted directly in religion or possibly related to it. A typical example is the role the church plays in Scottish identity. Similarly, the Church in Russia was the soul of nationhood in the past. To this day, being Russian and being Orthodox amount to the same thing. In addition, where the church has been the sole available vehicle of nationality against foreign denomination, as in Greece, Cyprus, Poland, Belgium, Ireland, and Croatia, an indivisible union of church and nation arises which acquires the " sacramental " power combined with overtones of a suffering Messianic role. One finds this in Poland. The similar function of identity is performed by religion for migrants. In the case of England and the United States, religion has been the *sole* source of migrant identity.

In the discussion of the pattern of secular monopoly, Martin suggested that the churches are the only exceptions to the ideological monopoly attempted by the government. Paradoxically, liberalism and nationalism, which the church fought in the nineteenth century, became its allies in the twentieth. In the case of Christianity, Martin points out, there was always the social differentiation between an earthly kingdom and a heavenly kingdom, likewise between Church and State at the symbolic level, and usually at the organizational level. However, " Christianity encounters a vigorous Durkheimian pull towards a total unity of Church and State, and even when that unity has been broken, there remains a pull towards collusion between fundamental social and religious values " (p. !?!78).

Next Martin analyzes more in detail the relationship between Christianity and society. He distinguishes phase one, consisting in the collusion of Church and State (for instance, respecting fundamental values) , which still persists today. The integration of religion and society characteristic of phase one is based on an acceptance of Church and clergyman as ontologically part of the social order, and not so much on regular attendance at church, or on strict adherence to Christian precept. The second phase is characterized by increasing differentiation of the sectors which are removed, then become secularized; as a consequence, the Church and its clergy become more religious. Multiple secular roles of clergy and the pragmatic secularity under phase one disappear with an emphasis on the specifically religious aspects of the clerical role, which is expressed in a form such as a sanctification of the Church, of clerical orders, of rituals, or a sanctification of individual persons.

In phase three appears the translation of Christian concepts into secular equivalents, for instance: communion-community, sin-alienation, or holiness-wholeness. These processes bring us to the power of a secular ideology in general. If people are simply creatures of environment, it is difficult to see the relationship between individual morality and social justice. It seems that collective ills are susceptible to individual initiative. At the same time,

the clergy feels able to locate and stigmatize an evil without adopting a party political system.

In conclusion, Dr. Martin presents his very sound theory of secularization intuitively and rigorously. He is careful to point out that this theory is rooted empirically in the religious-political reality of the societies taken under consideration.

He stresses polarity as a natural process; every system has a counter-system; the periodicity process whereby any system undergoes a process of organization results in emergent properties of a supersystem which are not visible in its subsystems. He also reveals the formation preference-the formation of a system implies a selection among alternatives with a very clear information system, i.e., the norms incorporated in a system become normally a fixed source of information for this system. The author has demonstrated that secularization is a dynamic process particularly, but not exclusively, visible in industrial societies. There are the crucial events in each society, such as war or revolution, which may increase or decrease the secularization process. Here the history of Church-State relations within the large context is admirably presented, analyzed, and documented. The methodological solution promoted by Martin for the study of secularization is a multidimensional, polymethodic, pluralistic approach. Secularization is ultimately dependent upon the sort of social, political, and economic order that prevails.

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Systematic Philosophy. By JOHN E. VAN HooK. Hicksville: Exposition Press, 1979. Pp. 147. $7.50.

Early (p. SO) in the course of this synoptic work there is some reference to what might be called the principle of congruity between language and the existent. Here accommodated so as to have some bearing on the matter at hand, that principle could be said to require that a review of a book entitled *Systematic Philosophy* be itself systematic. In keeping with that dictate this review will consist (1) of a general overall response to the book, a resume of the thematic of the book, {S) a limited critique which will serve in the customary way as a setting for pointing out positive and problematic features of the book, {4) a brief notice concerning editorial format of the book, and (5) a final word about the utilization potential of the book.

1. While it is no easy matter to check initial impressions, the fair thing to do would be to permit the author of this rather small book to indicate what he intends his book to be. The subtitle informs the reader that this is

to be " An Overview of Metaphysics Showing the Development from the Greeks to the Contemporaries with Specified Directions, Objections, and Projections." Thus the perspective is to be that of overview, the focus that of metaphysics, the theme that of development, the compass that of beginning to the present, and the methodology that of directions, objections, and projections. Given this design of the book, the author is faced with the task of selecting the genre or vehicle for presenting his case for such development. Should this be in terms of notional unfolding ideologies or should this be in terms of historic individuals and their philosophies? This author chooses the latter alternative. Hence the resultant work is a combination of Thought History (Development of Ideas) and Person History (History of Philosophers). The outcome of this, in turn, is a tension. It is to be an overview, but it is to include some limited details. There are to be some details, but these must be limited because it is to be an overview. Thus the overall impression created by the book for this reviewer is that the professional would appreciate more development, that the student would appreciate more explanation, and that in the right classroom it could perhaps serve as a catalyst for both.

9l. Described in the most general of ways, the central theme of the book is that of the advancement of that human hermeneutic of reality which has come to be identified as philosophy. The initial refinement of this takes place through the mediation and subsequent linking of two terms, viz., " systematic " and "metaphysics." Because its primary vocation is to address the real coherently (systematically) and fundamentally (metaphysically) , philosophy is at its base metaphysics. This initial refinement is extended by the explicitation of such notes proper to metaphysics as unity, comprehensiveness, objectivity, reflexivity, "linguistics," open-endedness, and pluralism.

Described, however, in a less encyclopedic and more precise way, the thematic of the book is that the formal notes just mentioned, i.e., systematic and comprehensive, etc., become determinative for the detection of genuine philosophies as these emerge in history as proposed hermeneutics. Not only do these formal notes aid in such detection, but they also help to account for the divergencies and variables between and in different philosophies or metaphysical systems. From Plato to Quine these constitute the criteria for excluding or including and for distinguishing the systems of thinkers.

Described, finally, in a still more precise way, Van Hook's theme is that it is the presence of these formal notes that establishes a theory as a metaphysical system and that it is the variation in these notes that accounts for the proliferation of such systems. With this emphasis on the formal notes as contrasted with contents one is reminded of the content-form distinction and of the debate over the interpretation of divine illumination theories.

3. It is with these things in mind that evaluation must be undertaken.

Intimations were present in the concluding observations of sections 1 and 2. But these must be extended. On the side of the positive, the author demonstrates a first-hand grasp of the philosophers on his philosophic roster which could only come from a personal and direct study of their writings. If these are components, he sees also that they are inter-related not merely as" before and after" but in a way that makes for some sort of continuity, unity amid variety. His special contribution is to argue that what accounts for this continuity, this unity amid variety, is that metaphysics is the constant. There has been no constant metaphysics, but metaphysics has been the constant. There has been no metaphyics which cannot be shown to be in some ways lacking, but there has never been, since its beginning, any lack of metaphysics. There has been no metaphysic which completely rules out another, but never too was there a time when metaphysics was ruled out. Not only can any metaphysics not rule out another completely, but any metaphysic can be made more complete by another. Van Hook sees philosophy as non-adversarial. Metaphysical systems are to be allies not foes.

On the side of the problematic, there are those who would challenge this interpretation. Those so prompted might come from the schools concerned primarily with content as distinguished from form. Although this review cannot do the matter justice, surely it can be argued that there are times when there is that fundamental and substantive communality present that allows systems to differ from one another without being incompatible. Between such systems there would be divergencies, but they would not be alien to one another. It is something else, however, to hold that one metaphysic can always be aligned in a significant manner with another. What may well be critical is open-endedness. One can hardly quarrel with the dismissal of any claim of finality (as meaning concluded or consummated) for any system of philosophy or metaphysics. Thus open-endedness, as contrasted with the concluded or the consummated, is surely a note proper to a philosophy or metaphysic. But this need not be understood to preclude significant incompatibility between systems. Every system may be enriched, but every system need not be substantially enriching for another.

Further, with the admission on the part of the reviewer that he may be overly susceptible to reading Wolterstorffian overtones into the text prefacing what follows, attention might be directed to a particular problematic text. On page 108 there appears the following sentence: "In these chapters we have seen that a deductive system has never been successfully constructed." Bearing this in mind, we quite possibly catch here an echo of the position which Nicholas Wolterstorff takes in his book *Reason Within the Bounds of' Religion* (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1979) on the subject of Foundationalism. Understanding foundationalism to entail justification through a non-inferential and certain ultimate (p. *25),* Wolterstorff, while not maintaining that there has been

an irreversible refutation of foundationalism (p. 86), writes that "it seems to me that there is nothing to do but give it up for mortally ill and learn to live in its absence (p. 5%!)." Van Hook appears to be sympathetic with this sentiment. But again, while surely no *finalized* deductive system of metaphysics has ever been successfully constructed, this is not to say that no deductive (foundationalistic) system of metaphysics has ever been soundly and therefore successfully constructed.

The final reference in this critique section might be a kind of synthesis of the positive and the problematic. This reference is to the ingredient of language in the metaphysical enterprise (pp. 134-141). The linguistic factor is understood by Van Hook as intrinsic to a metaphysic. "The elaboration of what is presupposed by the way we talk about the world is simultaneously the elaboration of a metaphysical scheme and the development of a level of self-awareness (p. 140)." This understanding advisedly directs our attention to the mounting philosophic appreciation of language as central to all human intellectual activity. As given in the abbreviated fashion necessitated by the boundaries of the book, however, not to speak of the metaphysical maze to be traversed, all this will be problematical for many a reader.

4. In a brief reference to the editorial format of the book one finds oneself thinking alternately of blueprint and construction. As blueprint the major sections of the book clearly illuminate steps to be taken, and the two final chapters entitled "Objections" and "Projections" are helpful summarizations. One wonders, though, if so terse a resume of Berkeley (p. 71) can be of much service and if, although it is subsequently clarified, the unwary reader might be misled by the kind of rapport initially described as existent between Kant and metaphysics (pp. 78-81). Under the aspect of construction the book has an index but no footnotes. The presence of the former is something always most welcome (the reviewer belongs to the society whose members share the conviction that with rare exception it would be better for a book without an index not to have been born). The absence of footnotes, however, is a mixed blessing. It makes for brisk and uninterrupted reading, but from time to time at least one feels a need for primary source citation and deliberate examination.

5. For the reviewer who is a teacher, the question of usefulness inevitably arises. This reviewer sees the book as a resource for either initial preview or concluding digest. In the former case, it would be followed by the process of uncrating and unpacking. In the latter case, it would be the tight assembly of all the previously provided parts. So used, it could well be a companion volume to works that offer similar assistance, e.g., William A. Wallace, *The Elements of Philosophy* (New York: Alba House, 1977).

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The Letters Of Saint Oliver Plunkett. Edited and Translated and with an Introduction by John Hanly. Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1979. Pp. 599. $82.50.

One of the most tragic occurrences of the Reformation was that of a priest or religious informing, sometimes even falsely, on another priest or religious. One of the most startling things about the Reformation in Ireland is that this was still happening as late as 1681. When Oliver Plunkett, Archbishop of Armagh and Primate of Ireland from 1669 to 1681, went to the scaffold, the chief witness against him was a Franciscan friar. Three other Franciscans testified against him as well. Further comment on the state of Church disunity is not necessary.

One of the constant themes of the letters of Archbishop Plunkett is the dissolute state of religious life in his native Ireland. Cromwell has come and gone. The Irish Catholic gentry have been impoverished and largely displaced. The Dominicans have fled and returned, only to find their old territories and parishes taken over by the Franciscans. And the religious orders, except for the Capuchins and Jesuits, have generally resumed their old quarrels and practices.

Archbishop Plunkett arrives in the middle of all this and seeks to remedy whatever he can. He complains to Rome that the orders are sending only their most troublesome brethren to Ireland and that they serve only to drain the already meager resources of the island. Furthermore, he complains of the multiplication of religious houses which brings about no corresponding increase in labor:

> The Franciscans have up to ten convents in the province and the Dominicans about seven, and altogether they live in community; they do not catechize, they do not preach and, to tell the truth, it seems that their whole purpose and aim is to quest (beg) around about [and although there might be ten or twelve in one convent, you would with difficulty find two or three at home: they go about questing at the parochial altars] . . . . What they collect they later eat in laziness without choir, without discipline. (Letter 89, p. !216)

Plunkett also seeks to limit the number of religious in the episcopacy because of the rivalry between the secular clergy and religious. Even though he speaks highly of individual members of religious orders, and praises some of them who have been bishops, he deems it essential to the peace of his clergy to keep the religious from gaining jurisdiction over a diocese.

The picture painted by Plunkett is not altogether black, for he states in one place that the Dominicans and Franciscans " are doing great good in the province . . . and I abundantly find that the rivalry and emulation between the two to acquire credit and admiration among the people rouses them to preach well and to do good and to live good lives (Letter 115, p.

30Q)." But the general tenor is that of determined bickering in the face of imminent persecution.

Monsignor Hanly has provided a valuable service in editing these letters. He presents them in chronological order and in the original languages (Italian, Latin, and English) with a translation when necessary. The heading of each letter includes mention of the addressee, the date, the place from which it is written, and the archive or archives in which it is found.

Hanly does not annotate these letters, but chooses instead to prefix each letter with a commentary which supplies information about the persons mentioned in the letter, the occasion for the letter, and the historical setting. These commentaries are sometimes longer and more significant than the letters they comment on. In Letter 19, for example, Plunkett's letter informs Propaganda in two lines that Msgr. Talbot has left Brussels for England. Hanly's commentary on this letter, explaining the importance of both Peter and Richard Talbot, runs to one and one-half pages of close print.

The choice of this method of commentary is a wise one, and enables the editor to write more comprehensive and inclusive introductions to the letters and to achieve a flowing narrative instead of the usual brief identifications. Hanly is not merely annotating letters; he is writing history. He points out the relation of one person to another, of one incident to another, and his biographical notes are extensive. He has the advantage of being familiar with the letters as a whole and draws on this familiarity to acquaint the reader with general trends and interesting details found in the letters.

The translations are, by and large, superb and have been done with great attention to idiomatic English. There are occasional lapses, as in Letter 38 where *triginta quinque annis* is translated " for thirty years", but these are so scattered as to be insignificant. Footnotes are reserved for classical and biblical allusions and seem superfluous in light of Plunkett's frequent citing of the same texts. Plunkett is relentlessly Pauline, and the reader wonders whether the repetition is necessary. A helpful index is included, along with Plunkett's last speech at Tyburn.

Hanly was the Postulator of Plunkett's Cause from 1968 to the Canonization in 1975; so it is understandable that the introduction to the book is a bit hagiographical. There is also the implied suggestion that, just as Archbishop Plunkett obeyed " even the merest hints of the Holy See," the reader would do well to follow suit. But this is not to undervalue the book. It is well done and is of value as much for the informative commentaries and introduction as for the letters themselves. It is a work worthy of the saint himself, if not of the astonishing price.

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Per lo Studio di Fra Remigio dei Girolami (+1319). *Contra falsos ecclesie professores cc. 5-37.* By EMILIO PANELLA, O.P., Pistoia, Italy: Memorie Domenicane, new series, no. 10, 1979. Pp. 313 plus nine of illustrations (manuscripts: 8). Lire 15,000.

Memorie Domenicane has projected two volumes to celebrate the seventh centenary of the foundation of the Convent of Santa Maria Novella in Florence. The first to appear is this important and erudite work honoring one of the convent's most illustrious sons. Fra Remigio is best known as a Parisian student of St. Thomas Aquinas and as the supposed teacher of Dante Alighieri at Santa Maria Novella-topics studied but not overemphasized in the present work. However, Fra Remigio as preacher, lector, prior, provincial, and eminent civic figure was prominent both in the life of the Dominican Order (and Church) and in the life of his native city of Florence in one of the periods of her most explosive growth. A great number of his writings have been preserved; in this he is more fortunate than many of his contemporaries.

Fr. Panella has elected to present a critical edition of a part of the interesting work on ecclesiology, *Contra falsos ecclesie prof'essores,* chapters 5-37, which deal with the spiritual and temporal authority of the Church. The entire treatise comprises 99 chapters, and in Appendix I Fr. Panella also publishes chapters 1, Q, 3, 4, 46, and 68, and parts of 76, 80, 81, SQ, 97, and 99, with a new and complete index, to illustrate the general inspiration of the book and point out its originality. But besides the section with the text there are three introductory articles and three appendices, all of great interest, along with a list of pertinent manuscripts, an excellent bibliography, and index.

Fr. Panella's historical contribution is noteworthy. He has done important work on the manuscripts of Fra Remigio, identifying much of his autograph work. He has studied the chronology of the manuscripts and of the entire literary output of Fra Remigio, identified salient dates in his life for a more accurate biography, and with meticulous care has prepared the best documented catalogue of his works, including some that have been lost. His textual criticism is important, seemingly sound and intuitive. He proposes solutions to some difficult problems arising from the style of Fra Remigio, which is sometimes allegorical and occasionally borders on the enigmatic. The author acknowledges his debt to previous scholars who have devoted attention to Fra Remigio (the most prominent of whom is perhaps Martin Grabmann), but he has surely probed deeper than his predecessors into the spirit of this vivacious Florentine, and his additions and corrections to their studies are praiseworthy. The present work with its many original contributions should stimulate Remigian studies in all sectors, and indeed this is one of the principal purposes of the author and

the editors. Even those whose primary interest is in the remarkable history of the city of Florence, many of whose medieval institutions continue to this day, will find profit in the study of the life and works of Fra Remigio, who helped in the process of moulding the future of the city.

A small but interesting contribution of Fr. Panella is the identification of the Distinctiones written by Fra Remigio, not previously documented. He has edited the fragment discovered which is in the calligraphy of Fra Remigio himself (App. III, in fine). Other interesting and rather lengthy texts are also included from time to time, as the study progresses.

Among the works of Fra Remigio there are tracts and quodlibeta which remind us that he is a first-generation Thomist, always a cause of interest. At the same time there are collections of sermons and various works that provide other precious insights into the medieval mentality and *modus operandi*. He will be found quite original in many points; but, as Fr. Verdi remarks in his presentation of this volume, further critical editions of his works are needed before a synthesis of his personality is attempted. In recommending this excellent and rather complete introductory study, we would like to express encouragement to the author and the sincere hope that his work will be emulated by other capable scholars who will faithfully present all the works of Fra Remigio to modern students.

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Plecu;ures and Pains: A Theory of Qualitative Hedonism. By REM **B.** EDWARDS. Cornell University Press, 1979.

In *Plew;ures and Pains: A Theory of Qualitative Hedonism,* Rem Edwards presents but does not argue for the hedonistic view that pleasure and only pleasure is intrinsically good. Moreover, he argues that qualitative as opposed to quantitative hedonism provides the best answer to the question of what makes life worth living. Quantitative hedonism is understood as the theory that pleasures qua pleasures and pains qua pains differ only in respect of their (i) temporal proximity or remoteness, (ii) duration, (iii) intensity, and (iv) causal connections. The linguistic and normative correlates to this thesis are: (LCI) The referent of the word 'pleasure ' is a single quality of feeling; and (NCI) Some pleasures are better than, and ought to be chosen in preference to, other pleasures, but only when the former pleasures provide a greater balance of intensity and duration over the latter.

Qualitative hedonism is understood as the theory that pleasures qua pleasures and pains qua pains differ not only quantitatively but also qualitatively. The correlates to this thesis are: (LC2) The word ' pleasure'

refers to many different inner qualities of feeling which we find interesting and desire to sustain, cultivate and repeat; and (NC2) Some pleasures are intrinsically better than, and ought to be chosen in preference to, other such feelings, even where the duration and intensity of the former pleasures is less than or equal to that of the latter.

The book consists of six chapters. Chapter I lays out several preliminary distinctions between hedonism, antihedonism, pluralism, egoism and universalism. Chapters II to IV provide the heart of Edwards's account. In chapter II he begins a critique of quantitative hedonism by showing that this view is strained by the apparent phenomenological fact that some pleasures are localized whereas others are not. A pleasure is localized when it is meaningful to ask where it is. If this question is meaningless, then that pleasure is nonlocalized. In chapter III it is argued that the theory of quantitative hedonism is false because it entails the (seemingly) false 'Replaceability Thesis', viz. that since all pluralistic goods are merely instrumental goods each pluralistic good is replaceable by an equally efficient or more efficient cause of pleasure without loss of intrinsic worth. Chapter IV addresses several pertinent issues, but perhaps its most interesting claim is that most, if not all, pleasures involve intentionality. The intentionality of pleasure provides a second reason for rejecting the Replaceability Thesis. In Chapter V, Edwards addresses the questions: Is qualitative hedonism really a disguised form of pluralism? By what criterion can we tell which pleasures are intrinsically better or worse than others? What is the qualitative hedonist's conception of happiness and the good life, and can a theory of action and obligation be derived from qualitative hedonism? Chapter VI provides a rather cursory answer to the question of whether there are rational methods available for resolving disagreements on matters of value and practice.

As noted above, Edwards does not argue that pleasure and only pleasure is intrinsically good; rather he argues that qualitative and not quantitative hedonism is the most defensible version of hedonism. There are two arguments for this conclusion. The first is a heuristically clever appeal to the undesirability of a ' brave new world ' where traditional pluralistic goods are replaced by others, such as well-placed electrodes and the drug soma. When combined with the Replaceability Thesis, this appeal is taken to entail the falsity of quantitative hedonism, although Edwards hedges on this conclusion by sometimes stating it conditionally (p. 61) and other times absolutely (p. 72). The second argument is that the Replaceability Thesis is false because most pleasures have intentional objects from which they are " logically " as well as " conceptually " inseparable. For example, " the pleasures of contemplation are not replaceable by equally prolonged and intense pleasures of copulation. The two kinds of pleasure are not even adequately identifiable if their objects are eliminated from thought and experience" (p. 89).

For qualitative hedonism to be consistent, there must be some difference of pleasure aside from quantitative differences that would account for the differences of value between higher and lower pleasures. Edwards seems to point to two such differences. The first is that some pleasures (and pains) seem localized and others do not. Nonlocalized feelings are not the same as universally localized feelings, since the former have no definite bodily locus, whereas the latter seem to be" all over". The second answer rests upon an important distinction between the cause and the intentional object of a pleasure. Cause and object may coincide, though they need not. The second answer, I suspect, also lies behind the plausibility of the " brave new world " objection to the Replaceability Thesis, since a tendency to confuse cause and object may lead one to attribute a greater or lesser value to a pleasure when in reality the change in value is due to a change in the intentional object.

Unfortunately Edwards has little to add to either of these answers, leaving untouched such questions as: Even if pleasures can be exclusively classed as either localized or nonlocalized, how are difference of value between pleasures of the same class to be accounted for? Is it true that some pleasures (and pains) have no bodily locus whatever? Are all pleasures (and pains) intentional? If not, then how are non-intentional pleasures classified? What exactly is the relation between a pleasure and its intentional object?

Two further shortcomings of Edwards's account are that he does not reply to the often stated, though I believe mistaken, charge that qualitative hedonism is inconsistent because, if something is (in the long run) less pleasurable and yet better, then one has already deserted pleasure as the sole criterion of desirability. The second shortcoming is that, in reply to the questions of how can we tell which pleasures are intrinsically better or worse than others and what rational methods are available for resolving disagreements on matters of value, Edwards turns to Mill's majority of competent, rational judges. This is a turn from the task of attaining certainty about matters of value and practice to the attaining of the best possible information about such matters. Perhaps this turn is justified by the seeming urgency of human things, though it leaves us empty-handed when we ask, for example, why a majority and not a unanimity of competent, rational judges. How are (strong) disagreements amongst these judges to be understood?

Pleasures and Pains is easy to read and provocative. Its arguments are clearly formulated and devoid of technical logic and terminology. It is forthright in answering the philosophic questions at hand, involves a minimum of scholarly and textual discussion. Hence it is well suited to undergraduate as well as graduate use.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

Akademischer Verlag Stuttgart: *The Question of Belief' in Literary Criticism: An Introduction to the Hermeneutical Theory of Paul Ricoeur* by Mary Gerhart-Weber. Pp. 408; no price given.

American Catholic Philosophical Association: *The Human Person* edited by George F. McLean. (Proceedings, volume 53). Pp. 211; no price given.

University of Alabama Press: *Heraclitean Fragments: A Companion Volume to the Heidegger-Fink Seminar on Heraclitus* edited by John Sallis and Kenneth Maly. Pp. 173; $18.50.

Basic Books: *The Limits of Analysis* by Stanley Rosen. Pp. 279; $17.95.

Beauchesne: *Le Sens et le mal: theodicee du swmedi saint* by Yves Labbe. Pp. *500. La Naissance de la metaphysique chez Kant* by Fran1<ois Marty. Pp. *592.* (Bibliotheque des Archives de Philosophie, N.S. volumes 30 & 31). *No* prices given.

University of California Press: *Papal Power: A Study of Vatican Control over Lay Elites* by Jean-Guy Vaillancourt. Pp. 375; *$16.95.*

Catholic University of America Press: *Experience, Reason and God* by Eugene T. Long. Pp. 180; $17.9.5. *The Philosophy of Baruch Spinoza* edited by Richard Kennington.

University of Chicago Press: *Justice and the Human Good* by William A. Galston. Pp. 324; *$25. ChrU!tianity, Social Tolerance and Homosexuality* by John Boswell. Pp. 424; $27.50. *The Cult of the Saints* by Peter Brown. Pp. 187; no price given. *Everything that Linguists Have Always Wanted to Know about Logic* but were Ashamed to Ask* by James D. McCawley. Pp. *508; $35* cloth, $12.50 paper.

Cornell University Press: *Reference and Generality* by Peter T. Geach. 3rd edition. Pp. 231; $19.50. *The Political Philosophy of the Frankfurt School* by George Friedman. Pp. 312; no price given.

Doubleday: *Does God Exist?* by Hans Kung. Pp. 839; $17.50. *How Brave a Brave New World?* by Richard A. McCormick. Pp. 440; *$15.95. Lost Christianity* by Jacob Needleman. Pp. 240; $9.85.

Editions Albert-le-Grand: *Les Conferences sur la doctrine de la Justification* by John Henry Newman. Translated by E. Robillard and M. Labelle. Pp. 492; no price given.

Editions Universitaires Fribourg Suisse: *Contemplation et vie contemplative en Christianisme* by Jean-Herve Nicolas. Pp. 429; no price given.

Eerdmans: *Commentary on Romans* by Ernst Kasemann. $22.50. *The Two Horizons* by Anthony C. Thiselton. Pp. 384; $22.50.

Universita Gregoriana Editrice: *Citoyen de deux mondes* by Joseph De Finance. Pp. 318; L.14.000.

Greenwood Press: *Tlwmistic Bibliography 1940-1978* edited by Terry L. Miethe and Vernon J. Bourke. Pp. 318; $39.95.

Harper & Row: *Mother Teresa: Her People and Her Work* by Desmond Doig. Pp. 175; $9.95. *Companion to Narnia* by Paul Ford. $12.95. *Nietzsche: Volume I The Will's Power to Act* by Martin Heidegger. $12.95. *The Epistle of James* by Sophie Laws. (Harper's New Testament Commentaries). Pp. 273; $14.95.

Harvard University Press: *The Philosophy of Teaching* by John Passmore. Pp. 259; $27.50.

Humanities: *Art and Philosophy* by Joseph Margolis. Pp. 350; $25.

Indiana University Press: *Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science* by Mary Hesse. Pp. 271; $22.50.

Magi Books: *Commentary on John, Part I* by St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by J. A. Weisheipl and F. R. Larcher. Pp. 505; $35.

Marquette University Press: *Does God have a Nature?* by Alvin Plantinga. (Aquinas Lecture 1980) Pp. 146; no price given.

Notre Dame University Press: *Beyond the New Morality* by Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw. 2nd edition. Pp. 232; $10.95 cloth, $4.95 paper. *Paradigms and Revolutions* edited by Gary Gutting. Pp. 340; $18.95 cloth, $7.95 paper. *Theory of Propositions: Part II of Summa Logicae* by William of Ockham. Pp. 224; $20. *Myth, Symbol and Reality* edited by Alan M. Olson. Pp. 189; $14.95.

University of Oklahoma Press: *Albert the Great: Commemorative Essays* edited by Francis J. Kovach and Robert W. Shahan. Pp. 297; $12.95.

Oxford University Press: *The Existence of God* by Richard Swinburne. Pp. 306; $37.50. *Philosophies and Cidtures* by F. C. Copleston. Pp. 198; $16.95. *Natural Law and Natural Right* by John M. Finnis. Pp. 425; $39.50.

Princeton University Press: *Identity and Essence* by Baruch Brody. Pp. 164; $16.95 cloth, *$5.95* paper. *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* by Richard Rorty. Pp. 401; $20 cloth, $6.95 paper.

Routledge & Kegan Paul: *Friendship, Altruism and Morality* by Lawrence A. Blum. Pp. 234; $20. *Violence and Responsibility* by John Harris. Pp. 177; $20.

Rowman & Littlefield: *Valiie and Existence* by John J,eslie. Pp. 223; $18.

Seabury Press: *Christ: The Experience of Jesus Lord* by Edward Schillebeeckx. Pp. 925; $29.50. *A New Christology* by Karl Rahner and Wilhelm Thiising. Pp. 239; $12.95.

University Press of America: *Universal Mathematics in Aristotelian-Thomistic Philosophy* by Charles B. Crowky, O.P. Pp. 221; $17 cloth. $9.50 paper.

Yale University Press: *Social Justice in the Liberal State* by Bruce A. Ackerman. Pp. 392; $17.50. *The Moral Meaning of Revolution* by Jon P. Gunneman. Pp. 277; $15. *The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine* by Oliver O'Donovan. Pp. 221; $14.