TWO EARLY ENGLISH THOMISTS: THOMAS SUTTON AND ROBERT ORFORD VS. HENRY OF GHENT

IN THE CLOSING decades of the thirteenth century there took place in Oxford what I have elsewhere called the 'early Oxford Thomist movement '.[1] Its literary remains are ample enough to enable the historian to form a picture of the principal persons of this school along with the ideas they advanced. Much work has already been done, both the edition of texts and scholarly articles written by men such as Ehrle, Callus and Pelster, to mention only a few. But as F. Van Steenberghen said recently of late thirteenth century Oxford theology in general: "il serait premature de vouloir en preciser la physionomie doctrinale ".[2] In this article we propose to examine some of the criticisms levelled against Henry of Ghent by two of the leading representatives of the early Oxford Thomist school, viz., Thomas Sutton [3] and Robert Orford.[4]

Henry of Ghent has been described as "the most illustrious teacher in the last quarter of the thirteenth century ".[5] If not

[1] F. Kelley, *The Thomists and their opponents at Oxford in the last part of the thirteenth century* (unpublished D. Phil. thesis-Oxford Univ., 1977) MS. Bodleian D. Phil. d. 6258, introduction, p. I.

[2] *La Philos.ophie au xiiie Siecle* (Philosophes Medievaux, Tome ix, Louvain-Paris, 1966), p. 499.

[3] For recent discussions of Sutton's life and writings see *Thomas von Sutton Quodlibeta,* ed. Schmaus-Gonzalez Haba (Bayerische Akad. d. Wissensch., Band !!, Munich, 1969), Introduction *passim; Expositionis D. Thomae Aquinatis in Libroa Aristotelis De Generatione et Corruptione Continuatio per Thomam de Sutona,* ed. F. Kelley (Bayerische Akad. d. Wissensch., Band 6, Munich, 1976), Introduction *passim; Thomas von Sutton Quaestiones Ordinariae,* ed. J. Schneider (Bayerische Akad. d. Wissensch., Band 3, Munich, 1977), Introduction *passim.*

[4] For Orford's life and writings see *Les Premieres Polemiques Thomis.tes: Robert d'Orford Reprobationes Dictorum a Fratre Egidio in Primum Sententiarum,* ed. A. Vella, O.P. (Bibliotheque Thomiste, xxxviii, Paris, 1968), Introduction *passim.*

[5] J. Paulus, "Henry of Ghent", *New Oath. Encycl.* (Vol. 6, 1967), p. 1035.

the most illustrious teacher of this period, Henry was certainly

the most indefatigable His fifteen *Quo<llibets*reflect the work he did as a master at Paris in the years 1276-1291. Ehrle's study, which has stood the test of time, gives the basis for these dates. In addition to some exact datings taken from the *explicits* of certain manuscripts, he provides further evidence of chronology from internal considerations. [6] Besides settling the dates for the *Quo<llibets,*Ehrle also clears away some confusions caused by earlier biographers regarding Henry's life, especially the mistaken notion that Henry had studied under Albert the Great, had taught as master at Cologne and Ghent as well as at Paris, and had been a master of the Order of Servites. [7]

Although he came in for much criticism from the Thomists, Thomas Sutton and Robert Orford, Henry of Ghent was not in the strictest sense an adversary of St. Thomas. But while he ought not to be taken as an adversary, Henry's overall system of thought marked a significant departure from that of St. Thomas as well as from all other preceding scholastics. J. Paulus sees a connection between Henry's having been a secular master and the freedom he enjoyed, unfettered as it were through loyalty to a religious Order.

Ainsi voit-on s'opposer a la Faculte de Theologie de Paris dans la seconde moitie du XIIIe siecle, deux partis principaux: celui des Dominicains rallie a l'aristotelisme thomiste, celui des Franciscains inebranlablement fideles a l'augustinisme tel que l'avait defendu saint Bonaventure. Ni dominicain, ni franciscain, mais penseur seculier, Henri a beneficie d'une independance de fait, qui a sans doute assure dans une large mesure l'originalite de sa pensee. [8]

There is truth in this observation, but one feels that the genius and originality of Henry would have come through had he been secular or religious.

• "Beitrlige zu den Biographen heriihmter Scholastiker-I-Henrich von Gent", *Archiv fur Lit. u. Kirchenges.ch.d. MittelaU.*, I, ed. Denifle-Ehrle (Berlin, 1885), pp. 385-395.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 366-383. See also in this same volume, Ehrle's "Nachtrag zur Biog· raphie Heinrichs von Gent", pp. 507-508.

[8] J. Paulus, *Henri de Gand, Essai sur les Tendances de sa Metaphysique* (Etudes de Philosophie Medievale, Paris, 1938), pp.

Unlike St. Thomas who adopted the basic approach of Aristotle, Henry of Ghent attempted to work out a synthesis which was Platonist in spirit. But he was unique and even original in the way he refused, despite his Platonist idealism, to allow the concrete to become " absorbed in the abstract ". [9] He accorded complete independence and autonomy to the singular existent. In his noetic, however, Henry drew a curtain around the singular existent as far as metaphysical knowledge was concerned. The concrete in his view, could be grasped only by physical knowledge, i.e , through sensation. Thus, for instance, what appears to the senses as distinct from another thing is in fact truly and objectively so distinct. But it is a mistake to speak of any real distinctions inside the concrete by the employment of metaphysical considerations. Paulus calls this side of the Henrician system" nominalisme integral":

> Mais le concrete ne se caracterise pas seulement par l'existence actuelle; il presente en outre les proprietes fondamentales de subsistance et d'individuation, et c'est en vain, nous l'avons vu, que la metaphysique cherche a assimiler ces dernieres. Force sera done de ne les considerer que sur le plan ou elles s'imposent, c'est-a-dire sur le plan physique et empirique, en adoptant pour cet examen les methodes et les postulats essentiels de l'empirisme: tout ce qui parait a nos sens subsister, separe OU separable du reste, nous declarons *res*, chose distincte. A l'interieur de telles *res*, uniformement singulieres et consistantes (qu'elles soient matiere, forme, accidents), nulle division d'aucune sorte. Au total-sur le plan precise ou nous sommes, nous le repetons-nominalisme integral. [10]

In this respect, there is a striking similarity between Henry of Ghent and William of Ockham. Unlike Ockham, however, Henry maintained an independent and legitimate standing for metaphysics, even if it had nothing to do with the world of singular existents. Perhaps we should not say 'had *nothing* to do ', for the concrete singular in Henry's view served as the ' occasion ' for metaphysical thought. But metaphysics does not ' derive from' the singular grasped by the senses. Rather,

[9] J. Paulus, *Henri de Gand*, p. 387.
[10] *Ibid.*

metaphysical knowing springs from the mind, stirred as it were to do so by sense knowledge. This aspect of Henry's noetic stems from Plato, or more exactly, from St. Augustine. [11] Ockham later found fault with this noetic-grounded metaphysics. [12]

There was, therefore, more than out and out empiricism in Henry of Ghent's system. One did not have only two kinds of knowing, viz., logic and the empirical knowledge gained through sensation. Metaphysics was there as well, yielding a third type of knowing. Henry's famous three-fold distinction: *secundum rationem* (logic), *secundum intentionem* (metaphysics) and *secundum rem* (physics), was his simplest formulation of the range and types of human knowledge. But if the formulation can be said to have been simple, the full meaning behind the formulation is not simple. [18] Henry's metaphysics, unlike the realist metaphysics of St Thomas which was based on Aristotle, was heavily influenced by the illumination theory of St. Augustine:

"L'intention est, en un sens, l'oeuvre de l'esprit. Il s'ensuit que la composition intentionnelle n'existe *qu'en puissance* dans les choses prises en soi et absolument; qu'elle est amenee a l'acte par !'intervention de !'intellect, et qu'esse n'est attribuee en *acte* qu'aux choses conc;ues actuellement par !'intellect. Une telle differenciation, operee par la raison, n'est-elle point vaine? Ellene l'est pas, repond Henri, parce que la nature meme de la chose physique est fondement et racine de conceptions diverses extraits par l'intellect, comme les branches de l'arbre sont racines de feuilles et de fruits extraits par la nature." [14]

Thus, in Henry of Ghent there is found an extraordinary blend of Platonism and nominalism or empiricism. Whether or not he managed to avoid a deep inconsistency in his overall

[11] Paulus, *Henri de Gand,* pp. 10-18.

[10] Henry of Ghent is one of Ockham's ' more famous ' targets; see *Guillelmi de Oclcham, Opera Theologica I* (St. Bonavent., New York, 1967), ed. G. Ga.I- S. Brown, Introd., p. 87*.

[13] See Paulus' explanation, *Henri de Gand,* pp. 199-!M7.

[14] *Ibid.,* p. 258. See also R. Macken, "La Theorie de l'illumination divine dans la philosophie d'Henri de Gand ", *RTAM,* 89 (1972), pp. 82-112.

outlook, it can be said that he marked a mid-way point between Plato and Ockham. [15]

From the foregoing it is clear that Henry's philosophy and especially his metaphysics differed greatly from that of Thomas Aquinas. Despite this deep difference it would, however, be inaccurate to describe Henry as an adversary of Aquinas.

" L'adversaire auquel il s'adresse et s'oppose le plus souvent n'est pas saint Thomas, mais, comme nous l'avons vu, Gilles de Rome, assez eloigne du thomisme par l'esprit." [16]

This being the case, the Thomists Sutton and Orford faced a difficult task in attempting to deal with Henry. Had they been Egideans, the going would have been easier. As we shall see, Robert Orford not unwittingly found himself adopting an Egidean stance in order the better to argue against Henry. [17] This manoeuver is most understandable in light of the polarization between Henry and Giles. The departure of Henry's system from St. Thomas's lacked that sharpness of focus which had been present in William de la Mare's critique. Accordingly, when earlier, Sutton and Orford had defended Aquinas against William's attack, the path to travel had been comparatively simple and straightforward. Making the enterprise more challenging still when dealing with Henry was the added fact that he was constructing a novel system, and that system was in the process of its evolution at the very time these Englishmen took him on. William de la Mare had taken pot shots at Aquinas; Henry of Ghent was erecting an alternative philosophic synthesis. It is remarkable how quickly these two English Thomists recognized what Henry was attempting. For that fact alone they earn a respectable place in this period of scholastic thought. It is possible with the benefit of much later study to spot weaknesses along with the strengths in some parts of their reaction to Henry. But overshadowing such shortcomings is the fact of their prompt and significant contribution to the most

[15] Paulus, *Henri de Gand,* p. 389.
[10] *Ibid.,* p. 382.
[17] See *infra,* pp. *355* sqq.

important developments in scholasticism taking place at that time.

Essence and Existence

The question concerning whether or not there is a real distinction in creatures between essence and existence, and, if the distinction be admitted, the explanation of how it is to be understood, brings out, as well as the discussion of any topic could, the metaphysics of the medieval philosopher. Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and, in sharp opposition to the latter, Giles of Rome all took up this question and each gave to it a decidedly different answer. Robert Orford and Thomas Sutton carefully examined these answers and it is illuminating to read their opinions of them. Before taking up what these English Thomists had to say, however, it is necessary to review briefly the opinions of the three Paris Masters.

St. Thomas held the view that in every creature there is a real composition of essence and existence. His teaching in this matter is scattered throughout many of his writings. Roland-Gosselin provides a list of references sufficient to establish at least the fact that Aquinas upheld what later came to be called the " real distinction ".[18] Hocedez on the other hand expresses his doubts as to whether or not Aquinas had ever, in fact, upheld the "real distinction ".[19] His hesitancy is based on the remarkable split found in the writings of the early disciples of St. Thomas as to how the master ought to be understood in this question, with some insisting that he had upheld the real distinction and others denying that he had done so. Hocedez also points out, rightly, that this question was in all likelihood not nearly as important in the eyes of St. Thomas as it later became, especially after the controversy between Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent concerning how one ought to understand the

[18] M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, *Le 'De Ente et Essentia' de S. Thomas. d'Aquin,* (Paris, 1948-this work was actually written prior to 19!1!6), p. 189.

[19] *Aegidii Romani Theoremata,* ed. E. Hocedez, pp. (100)- (116). This section of Hocedez's historical introduction to the edition bears the title: 'L'enigme du Thomisme '.

distinction. In any case, the reading of Aquinas's own words leaves no room for doubt. No matter what his followers may have thought about what he intended, the advocacy of the real distinction is clearly and consistently there for the reading, as Roland-Gosselin points out. And despite his hesitancy caused by the subsequent history of the discussion by Aquinas's disciples, even Hocedez agrees that if one reads what Aquinas himself said," le doute n'est guere possible ".[20]

We shall continue to use the expression " distinction between essence and existence " as it has 1becomethe customary one, but it should be remembered that St. Thomas himself never used it. He spoke always of the "composition" in creatures of essence and existence. If we permit ourselves to use the word " distinction", for St. Thomas it meant no more than a metaphysical one. That is to say, when the mind thinks of the nature or essence, for example, "humanity", and of its existence, for instance, in the case of this individual "Socrates "-since the thinking of the one does not include or require the thinking of the other-then do we say that *a parte rei* these two components or aspects of the single existent are really distinct from each other. This kind of knowing, according to Aquinas, is called metaphysical knowing, and its existent counterpart is called a real metaphysical distinction. By an assumption which some later philosophers, including Henry of Ghent, refused to grant, St. Thomas subscribed to a correspondence standing between metaphysical knowing and an objective counterpart outside the mind. Metaphysical complexity of this sort is very different, however, from the grosser and more palpable complexity found in a grouping of concrete singulars. Thus, for example, when one says that the group in the room " is composed of" Socrates and his listeners, the elements or component parts here are more than metaphysically distinct. Aquinas's term for this kind of distinction was ' *material distinction* ' or ' *numerical distinction* '.[21] And when one says that the concrete

[20] *Aegidii Romani Theorema.ta,* p. (100).

[21] See, e.g., *Summa Theol.,* I, 47, *corp.*

singular, for example, Socrates, ' is composed of ' matter and form, these elements or more properly *principia* are more than metaphysically distinct. In Aquinas's brand of realist philosophy, there are shadings to be recognized amongst real distinctions: thing from thing; physical component principles from one another; metaphysical components from each other. We might choose as a label for Aquinas's account 'moderate realism'. If we do, then Giles of Rome advanced what could be called an 'exaggerated realism'.

Giles blurred the shading which for Aquinas had differentiated metaphysical from physical complexity. He insisted that there corresponds to the mind's thinking of' essence' and' existence ', not merely two metaphysically distinct components in the one thing as Aquinas had it, but rather there are two 'things', viz., the 'essence-thing' and the 'existence-thing':

> . . . in propositions five and twelve it was proved and it will be shown here as well that essence and existence are two things, such that existence is nothing other than a kind of actuality added on to the essence in a real way.[22]

In putting it this way, Giles altered the meaning of the so-called ' real distinction ', and it is this which doubtless caused so much of the confusion amongst Aquinas's followers to which Hocedez refers. As we shall see, Robert Orford was one of the first to get snared.

In favor of this new understanding Giles advanced several proofs, this having been necessary since he considered Aquinas's argument, viz., that the thinking of the one (essence) did not include the thinking of the other (existence) to have been inadequate. Perhaps the most important of his newly developed arguments was the separability of essence from existence.[23] That is to say, the essence of the creature must be in a real manner distinct from its existence, for one can plainly see that this existing essence, i.e., the humanity of Socrates, could ' lose ' its existence.

•.s *Aegidii Romani Theoremata,* p. See also Hocedez's discussion of this difference between Giles and St. Thomas in his Introduction, pp. •

•• *Aegidii Romani Theoremata,* pp. 67-68.

Henry of Ghent took issue with Giles's formulation which we have labelled ' exaggerated realism ', and the latter in turn argued against Henry. According to Paulus, the ' documents essentiels du debat ' were arranged in the following order:

1276	: Gilles, bachelier	: *Primus Sententiwrum,* premieres distinctions. *Theoremata de Corpore Christi*
1276, Noel	: Henri (Gilles objectant)	: *Quodlibet* I, 9
1278-86	: Gilles (en exil)	: *Theoremata de esse et essentia*
1286, Paques	: Gilles (maitre)	: *Qiwdlibet* I, 7 qui resume les *Theoremata*
1286	: Gilles	: *Quaestiones disputatae de esse et essentia,* q. I-IL Les q. 9 et 11 refutent le *quodl.* I, 9 d'Henri.
1286, Noel	: Henri	: *Quodlibet* X, 7 qui repond aux *quaest. disp.* 9 et 11.
1287	: Gilles	: *Quaest. disp. de esse et essentia,* q. 12 et 18 qui refutent Henri, *Quodl.* X, 7.
1287, Paques	: Gilles	: *Quodlibet* II,. 6 (negligeable).
1287, NoeI	: Henri	: *Quodlibet* XI, S qui repond aux *quaest. disp.* 12 et 18 de Gilles.[24]

Mandonnet maintained that Henry of Ghent in his 1276 *Quodlibet* had directed his attack against St. Thomas and not against Giles.[25] Roland-Gosselin supported Mandonnet's judgment.26 However, Hocedez [21] and Paulus have made it necessary to revise Mandonnet's opinion. Indeed, far from having

[24] Paulus, *Henri de Gand,* p. 281.

[25] Mandonnet, "Les premieres disputes sur la distinction reelle entre !'essence et l'existence ", *Revue Thomiste,* 18 (1910), pp. 741-755.

[26] Roland-Gosselin, *Le 'De Ente et Essentia* ', p. 200.

[21] Hocedez, " Gilles de Rome et Henri de Gand sur la distinction reelle, 1276-1287 ", *Gregorianum,* 8 (1927), pp. 358-384; "Le premier Quodlibet d'Henri de Gand, 1276 ", *Gregorianum,* 9 (1928), pp. 92-117; "Deux questions touchant la distinction reelle de l'essence et de l'existence ", *Gregorianum,* 10 (1929), pp. 365-386; *Aegidii Romani Theoremata,* pp. (82) sqq.

attacked Aquinas, according to Paulus, Henry of Ghent came close to supporting the same view as that held by the Angelic Doctor. [28]

Henry maintained that essence and existence are distinguished in the creature not " according to a real distinction, nor according to a rational distinction, but according to an intentional distinction ". This was his explanation in *Quo&ibet* I, the very first time he took up the question (1276):

> for the present let this suffice: as far as creatures are concerned, one cannot say that the essence is existence, because these two are distinct according to intention, despite the fact they are in reality the same. [29]

Later, in his tenth *Quodlibet* his doctrine remained unchanged:

> [existence] does not differ in reality from [essence]: nor do they differ from one another only by virtue of a rational distinction, for in cases where two things are distinct only by a rational distinction, one of them cannot be grasped by the mind without at the same time comprehending the other. They differ from one another according to a manner midway between real and rational distinction, that is to say, according to intention. In cases where things differ according to intention but are in reality the same, one of the two things can be grasped by the mind without at the same time comprehending the other. [30]

This is close, at least in the wording, to what St. Thomas said when he explained how essence and existence are distinct. Henry then went on with what is a clear reference to Giles of Rome:

••Paulus, *Henri de Gand,* p. Paulus's thought here should be read in the context of the entire work, which shows the profound differences between St. Thomas and Henry of Ghent.

[29] " Sufficit autem ad praesens quod non possit dici in creaturis quia essentia earum sit earum esse: quia sunt diversa intentione licet sint idem re", *Quodlibeta Magistri, Henrici Goethals a Gandavo,* I (Paris, 1518)., *fol.* 7v.

[30] " non differat re ab ipsa: nee etiam differat sola ratione: quia in eis quae sola ratione differunt, unum eorum non potest intelligi sub contrario alterius: difl'erunt tamen medio modo, scilicet, intentione; et in his quae sunt eadem re, et quae sic differunt, unum eorum bene potest intelligi sub contrario alterius ", *ibid,* II, *fol.* 417v.

But he says: I do not see how 'differ by intention' is anything other than ' to differ according to a rational distinction '. Let me explain.

His explanation, for Giles's benefit, was by way of examples illustrating what he meant by the threefold distinction. Of the distinction according to reason he says: " rational animal and man differ only according to a rational distinction", and of the real distinction: " the rational and the white difier in reality ". It is according to the intentional distinction that 'the rational' differs from ' animal ' and that essence differs from existence. Henry then got sarcastic with Giles:

> Let this third type of distinction be baptised and give it a name! And if 'difference according to intention' is not the right term to show how a confusion with 'rational distinction' might be avoided, then give this third type of distinction another name. It is silly to quibble over a name when we are sure of the reality at issue.[82]

In all of this Henry was insisting on a metaphysical distinction, that is to say, a distinction midway between a physical one and a purely logical one. Giles of Rome, not finding enough realism or objectivity in Henry's formulation, argued that one could speak only of a physical distinction in the sense of ' thing ' from ' thing ', or of a merely logical distinction to which there corresponded nothing in the real world outside the mind. It was a difficult thing for any Thomist to work out a critique of Henry's metaphysics which constituted the underpinning of the distinction according to intention, and to avoid at the same time the exaggerated realist position advocated by Giles.

Orford

Robert Orford appealed to the authority of Giles of Rome in order to defend St. Thomas against Henry's understanding. In

[31] " Sed <licit ille, non intelligo quod sit differre intentione aliud quam differre ratione. Declaro ut intelligas ", *ibid.*

[32] " Baptizetur ergo ille modus medius, et detur ei nomen; et si non competenter possit appellari differentia secundum intentionem, ut omnino idem sit differre intentione et ratione; detur ei aliud nomen. Fatuum enim est disputare de nomine quando notum est de re", *ibid.*

his *Contra Dicta Henrici (contra Quodl.* 10, 7) where Orford attacks Henry's distinction according to intention, a point so fundamental in metaphysics as well as in the special question relating to essence and existence, he has two arguments which are from *fratre Egidio.* The importance of Orford's citation here is very great, for it enables us to say with assurance that Orford approved the Egidean sense of the expression ' to differ in reality'. In the first argument [33] he begins by stating the conclusion: there is no intermediate between a real and a rational distinction. The rationale in support of this consists in listing the various way in which words signify. The list can be put schematically:



The implication here is that, from what is taken to be an exhaustive listing of the modes of word signification, there is no room for Henry's 'distinction according to intention'.

[38] " Item, non videtur quod sit medium inter differre re et differre ratione: quia vel uno nomine significamus plures, et tune est aequivocatio ubi est diversitas secundum rem; vel unum pluribus nomiuibus, et tune non est nisi differentia seeundum rationem; vel plura pluribus, et tune, ut prius, est differentia rei. Essentia ergo et esse actualis existentiwe, cum siut plura nomina, vel significant eamdem rem, vel non; quia non est dare medium: si eamdem rem, vel eodem modo, et sic sunt synonyma, quae nee re nee ratione differunt: si non eodem modo, ergo differunt ratione ", *Contra Henricum, MS. Peterhouse 129, fol.* 65va; *MS. Vat. lat. 987, fol.* 94rb.

The second 'argument' [34] like the first, is not so much an argument as a straightforward denial of the validity of Henry's 'distinction according to intention'. Quite simply, this distinction has to be in the last analysis either real or rational; there is no middle ground.

For our purposes, the significance of all this is not so much the relative merit of Henry's view as compared with Giles's. The important point is the fact that Orford is pleased to endorse Giles's understanding of how we ought to understand the distinction when we say 'essence is distinct in reality from existence'.

E. Hocedez has some reservations in listing Orford among those Thomists who betrayed an Egidean influence regarding the way they explained the distinction between essence and existence. Of Orford he says:

> Les extraits publies par Mgr Grabmann ne trahissent pas par eux-memes au moins avec certitude une influence egidienne ... Je n'ai releve qu'un passage qui pourrait faire croire a une connaissance plus personelle de Gilles, encore n'est-il pas peremptoire. [35]

The passage Hocedez quotes from Grabmann reads:

> Let us suppose for the present, in agreement with him, that" to be" is twofold, viz., " essence, or actual existence "..... This is the way of thinking about the question, common amongst the doctors, and when viewed this way it is necessary to say that essence is a kind of substratum and existence something received in the substratum, although this way of thinking about it does not suit him. [36]

[34] Item, intendere est proprie ipsius animae. Ad animam enim spectat formare de rebus diversas intentiones. Istae ergo diversae intentiones vel dicunt diversas res, vel eamdem rem, aliud et aliud sumptum. Si primo modo, tune differre intentione est differre I'e; secundo modo differre non est nisi ratione. Unde Commentator super 8 *Metaphysicae* vult quod difierre intentione sit commune ad differre re vel ratione, et non differens ab utroque. Dicit enim quod ens et unum non significant intentiones eodem modo. Sed constat quod ens et unum difierunt ratione solum. Dicit etiam quod accidens significat intentionem additam rei. Sed constat quod accidens re differt a snbstantia. Patet ergo quod differre intentione non est aliud quam re differre vel ratione. Istas duas rationes accepi a fratre Egidio", *ibid.*

[35] *Aegidii Romani Theoremata de esse et essentia*, Introd., section 10 entitled "Influence de Gilles", pp. (90)-(91).

[36] " Suppono ad presens cum eo quod est duplex esse, scilicet esse essentie et

If we read Orford's fuller explanation given in *Contra Quodl.* I, 9 in the light of what he ' accepted from Giles' in *Contra Quodl.* X, 7, it becomes clear that Orford belongs in Hocedez's list.

In his main response, for example, when Orford says:

It must be said therefore, that in every creature, "essence" and " actual existence" differ from each other in a real way,[37]

there can be no doubt that he is taking the real distinction in the Egidean sense. His first argument in support of this Egidean sense of the real distinction closely resembles what Giles himself had said on the subject in his *Theoremata de esse et essentia:*

It is clear that the essence of the form of the part remains in the whole, but without its own existence; rather, it shares in the existence of the whole; this is made plain in the seventh book of *Metaphysics.* Therefore, they [i.e., essence and existence] are not one and the same in reality, since one may be separated from the other. [38]

This argument, which appeals to a separation of existence from essence, is a hallmark of Giles's thought. In the twelfth theorem of the *Theoremata,* Giles repeats Aquinas's argument in order to show the validity of the real distinction:

For these " sensibles " can be grasped by the mind independently of their existence; [indeed, they can be thought of] even if in fact they had no existence. But the mind could not do this unless they [i.e., the essences of these " sensibles "] were in potency to the act of existence. For I can understand a rose even were there no existent rose.[39]

actualis existentie ... Sic enim *communiter a doctoribus.* in hac quaestione accipitur et per hoc oportet dicere quod *essentia intelligatur ut quid substractum* [this should read *substratum] et esse quid receptum in ea,* quamvis non placeat ei talis modus intelligendi ", *MS. Peterhouse 129, fol.* 5rb; *MS. Vat. lat. 987, fol.* 6rb. The underlining indicates Hocedez's italics.

[37] - Dicendum est ergo quod in onmi creatura differunt re essentia et esse actualis existentiae ", *MS. Peterhouse, fol.* 5vb; *MS. Vat. lat., fol.* 7ra.

[••] *Ibid.*

[••] *Theoremata de esse et essentia,* p. 67.

He follows this reference to Aquinas's argument immediately with the warning that it is not, in and of itself, sufficient; some doubt remains. To remove the doubt, Giles adds the argument from ' separability ', or rather ' real separation':

But it must be remembered that some things are separated from one another in a real way, whereas some things are separated only in the mind. And when we find things separated from each other, they are mutually distinct. If they are separated only in the mind, then they differ from each other at least by a rational distinction; but if they are separated in a real way then it is necessary that they are distinct in a real way. And if there might be a doubt as to whether really distinct things can be really separated from each other, there can be no doubt whatever that those things which are really separated from each other are really distinct. For if the essence were in reality always united with its existence, it would always have existence and could never be without it. Therefore, by the very fact that ' sensibles ' are able not-to-be, or have not always been united to their existence-for at some point in time they began to be-we can argue that they are in potency to existence and that they have their essences really distinct from existence.40

In addition to the argument from separability, Orford, like Giles, employs the analogy of form and matter in the generation process in order to show how essence differs from existence:

For just as matter is without limit in the way it relates to the forms, but when it receives one of them it is bound and limited by it, so also the form considered in itself is common to many, but when received in matter becomes the form of" this thing" in a determinate way-[by analogy] if existence itself, being the supremely formal aspect of all things, were not received in something, then it would be infinite and it would be existence pure and simple since it would not be mixed with any other nature; in addition, there would be but one existence. For any form considered abstractly by the mind can be only ' one '.[41]

40 *Ibid.*, pp. 67-68.

41 " Sicut enim materia de se infinite quasi se habet ad formas, sed cum recipit unam, terminatur et finitur per illam-sic forma in se considerata communis est ad multa, sed per hoc quod recipitur in materia fit determinate huius rei-sic, si ipsum esse quod est maxime formale omnium non esset receptum in aliquo, esset infinitum, et esset esse purum cum non haberet admixtionem alicuius alterius naturae; non

Finally, Orford endorses Giles's recommendation that we ought to think of essence as the ' substratum ' and existence as ' what is received' in the 'substratum':

> and when viewed this way it is necessary to say that essence is a kind of substratum and existence something received in the substratum, although this way of thinking about it does not suit him [i.e., Henry of Ghent). [42]

Orford's account and explanation of the real distinction between essence and existence, which is virtually the same as that of Giles of Rome, is far removed from the thought of Thomas Aquinas, and disregards entirely the latter's subtle differentiation between metaphysical and physical modes of thinking.

It should be pointed out in fairness to Orford, however, that he had good company in experiencing difficulty when he tried to give a Thomist rejoinder to Henry of Ghent. [43] It was very difficult to resist standing on what appeared to be the solid ground for counter argument developed by Giles. It should also be noted that Orford's work here is vastly superior to what he wrote in his *Reprobationes contra Egidium.* There, when the difficult question of essence and existence arose, he merely noted the fact that there was a difference in the doctrine of Giles and Aquinas, and moved on without any discussion. [44] Here, Orford addresses the question with vigor.

Sutton

What appears to be Sutton's first treatment of the question concerning the real distinction is in *Quodlibet* I, 7. Perhaps

etiam esset nisi unum. Forma enim secundum intellectum abstracta non potest esse nisi una ", *MS. Peterhouse, fol.* 5rb; *MS. Vat. lat., fol.* 6rb.

[42] "Et secundum hoc, oportet dicere quod essentia intelligatur ut quid substratum et esse quid receptum in ea, quamvis non placeat ei talis modus intelligendi ", *ibid.* See footnote 36.

[43] In Hocedez's list of those who fell under Giles's influence are such men as Bernard of Trilia, Richard of Middleton and Durandus of Saint Pourgain, *Theoremata,* pp. (84) - (98) .

[44] See *Robert d'Orford Reprobationes Dictorum a Fratre Egidio in Primum Sententiarum,* ed. Vella, pp. 96-97. See also my discussion of this in *MS. Bodleian D. Phil.* d. 6258, pp. 194-197.

'treatment' is not the right word, because in this place he mentions the subject only obliquely. The main point of his inquiry has to do with the act of knowledge:

Whether the mental word is the very act of understanding, or something produced by the act of understanding. [45]

In his response Sutton observes that in questions like this, where at best the finest of distinctions are being drawn, it is understandable that one might pass up the distinction as otiose:

so small is the difference that [the things being considered] are taken to be the same by the authors, who do not search out such differences between things which are so close to one another. For tiny differences are not weighed by the authors, but rather are counted as nothing; for example, according to the masters there is a real difference between form and existence. But because the difference is small it is disregarded, so that by the Philosopher, existence can be taken to mean form or essence, and vice versa; and sometimes he says generation terminates in the form, sometimes in existence.[46]

From the way Sutton speaks here, we know that as yet he had not come to appreciate the true significance of what Henry of Ghent and Giles of Rome were arguing about. He had knowledge of the exchange, for he says further on in the question:

For this reason there are found different opinions concerning essence and existence among the masters ... as to how they are distinguished, with some saying they differ only according to a rational distinction, others saying they differ in reality, and others saying they differ according to an intentional distinction which is somewhere midway between a real and rational distinction. [47]

All this discussion, Sutton says, amounted to little more than quibbling over word usage; nothing of any account is at stake no matter how one looks at it. And indeed, if there be in £act such a distinction apart from and independent of the mind's activity, surely it is so small as to warrant being overlooked rather than made much of:

••*Thomas von Sutton Quodlibeta,* ed. Schmaus-Gonzalez Baba, p. 115.
••*Ibid.,* 115-116.
·[1] *Ibid.,* p. 119.

and the dispute between them is more one of words than of opinion. For if there be some sort of real difference between essence and existence, it is so small as not to be regarded by many, and these say it is not a real difference at all because the difference in question appears to be the result of our looking at one and the same thing in different ways, viz., according as it is actual or as it is potential. [48]

From his first mention of the dispute going on in Paris over this question, one gathers that Sutton did not yet realize that behind it metaphysical principles of far reaching importance were being debated. His judgment about the significance of the controversy changed drastically by the time he wrote *Quaiestio disputata* '26. This question opens with:

Whether in the angel there is a real composition of essence and existence such that the existence lies outside the realm of the essence as something absolute and added on to the essence.[49]

He starts his response with a reference to Henry of Ghent's opinion: [50]

There are some who say there is not found a real composition of essence and existence in angels. But although they deny any such real distinction, they deny also that essence and existence differ only according to a rational distinction. Essence and existence differ from one another according to a distinction midway [between real and rational], viz., according to an intentional distinction, and they [i.e., essence and existence] bring about an intentional composition, as do the genus and difference in the case of " animal " and " rational ".[51]

In reply to Henry of Ghent Sutton argues there can be no such middle ground, as it were, between being outside the mind and being in the mind. When one speaks about a distinction or indeed about anything whatever, if it lies outside the mind, one calls it 'real'; if it is in the mind and not outside it, one calls it' rational'. Sutton's complaint against Henry here is the same as Orford's, viz., it is impossible to imagine anything midway between the real and rational orders of things:

[48] *Ibid.*

[49] *Thomas von Sutton Quaestiones Ordinariae,* ed. J. Schneider, p. 715.

[50] For Henry's opinion see *Quodlibeta Magistri Henrici,* I, 9 and X, 7.

[51] *von Sutton Quaestiones Ordinariae,* ed. J. Schneider, p.

But there cannot be such a difference ... either the difference is in reality and outside the mind, or it lies only in the mind ... If ... it lies outside the mind, then we describe such things as different in reality ... if the difference is only in the mind ... then we describe them as different according to a rational distinction.[52]

Sutton then says Henry's so-called intentional distinction is nothing more than a 'figment'. The example Henry had used in explaining the intentional distinction, i.e., of animality thus being distinct from rationality, Sutton says, is a bad one indeed, for there is no objective and extra mental disparateness whatever found in Socrates, for example, between his being an animal and being rational. We do say that in the human the animality is 'rationalized', i.e., the genus is specifically differentiated, but this is thought and word play only; very useful indeed for purposes of discourse, but we ought not to forget that the genus-specific difference couplet pertains only to the logical order:

genus and difference do not differ from one another, insofar as they exist in the same thing, except according to a rational distinction.[53]

Godfrey of Fontaines's view[54] that essence and existence are distinct only according to a rational distinction has the merit of having avoided Henry's lapse of entertaining an impossible category of being, but it gives rise to the theological and philosophical anomaly of ruling out all contingency in creatures. If existence were buried in the center of each nature so that the very meaning of the thing carried inside itself the requirement of its existence, then it could not not-be:

What is part and parcel of the very meaning of something must always pertain to it, and the opposite of such an attribute can never pertain to that thing.[55]

No, Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines are wrong;

[52] *Ibid.,* pp. 724-725.

[53] *Ibid.,* p. 726.

[54] *Les quatre premiers Quodlibets de Godefroid de Fontaines,* ed. DeWulf-Pelzer (Les Philosophes Belges, ii, 2, Louvain, 1904), *Quodl.* 3, q. 1, pp. 164-166.

[55] *Thomas von Sutton Quaestiones Ordinariae,* p. 727.

essence and existence in the angel, for this was the context of the discussion, are distinct in a real way, as 'certain doctors' have shown by good and necessary reasoning. Angels participate or have a share in existence. Sutton then summarizes the 'good reasoning' of these 'doctors' as to how we ought to understand participation in this context.

First he rules out what would have been a mistaken understanding of participation. We ought not to think that the essence is 'existenced' in the way the genus is 'differenced'. It is true, we do use the word 'participation' when speaking of the relationship of the species to the genus. It is perfectly correct to say that the species 'shares in' the genus in the way, for example, that human nature can be said to share in or have a part of animalness. This, however, is not the correct way to understand essence sharing in existence. For, as he said earlier, this manner of participation carries with it or bespeaks an identity in the thing outside the mind. When we say *a* has a part of *b,* intending this sense of participation, the division into words and concepts is purely of the rational order; in reality there is no such division:

> It is clear from what has been said, that essence does not share in existence in such wise that it has a kind of limited existence shrunken as it were by virtue of a 'difference', so that it constitutes the essence itself-which essence has as a part of its very meaning this existence, so that as a result [essence] is said to share in existence, meaning by this that it 'captures a part of it', because what is limited [i.e.,, the existence] is 'of the essence', as the species shares in the genus.[56]

When it is said that essence participates in existence, the word 'participate' is equivalent in meaning to 'has a part of, but not all':

> But it is necessary that what has the essence thus shares in existence, because it captures not the total perfectionem of existence, but only a part ...[57]

[56] *Ibid.,* p. 730.
[57] *Ibid.*

Existence is narrowed down, so to speak, so as to be suited for reception in this particular essence:
insofar as existence is limited by the essence in which it is received.[58]

Just as the form of equinity in itself undifferentiated comes to be the form of this particular horse and not that particular horse by virtue of its reception in the individuating matter, so is existence limited when received in the essence. By the force of the analogy, just as form differs from matter in reality, so also must we say essence differs in this way from existence.

The ' certain doctor ' from whom Sutton is borrowing this ' necessary argument ' consisting in the assigned meaning of participation is none other than Giles of Rome. The Egidean *participatum* is found in his *Quaestiones de esse et essentia*, q. 11:

' to participate in' means something like 'to capture a part of'; for whatever has anything within itself whole and entire does not 'participate in' that thing, but it possesses its fulness; therefore, the potency which receives act is said to participate in it.[59]

Giles used the example of fire, where Sutton substituted the horse, but the doctrine expressed is exactly the same. The main point for Giles, of course, as the title of the *Quaestio* indicates, was to apply this concept of participation to show how essence and existence are distinct in reality:

therefore, in this way, essence shares in existence, just as potency shares in act; because it cannot receive it in the measure of its fulness; and existence is shared by the essence in the same way that act is shared by the potency, because it is not received in all its fulness.[60]

[58] *Ibid.*

[59] " dicitur enim participare quasi partem capere: quod enim totum in seipso primo habet non participat illud, sed habet plenitudinem eius; potentia ergo recipiens actum dicitur participare ipsum ", *Quaestiones de esse et essentia* (ed. Venice, 1504), p. 11, *fol.* 24vb.

[60] " hoc ergo modo essentia participat esse, sicut potentia participat actum; quia non potest ipsum recipere secundum suam totalitatem; et esse participatur ab essentia sicut actus participatur a potentia, quia non recipitur ibi secundum suam plenitudinem ", *ibid.*, *fol.* 24vb-25ra.

And it is by virtue of this understanding of participation that the real distinction between essence and existence is argued:

> the creature would not share in existence,. nor would the existence of the creature be described as that which is shared in, unless there were here a real difference [i.e., between essence and existence].[61]

When Sutton realized the controversy over the real distinction was more than a matter of words, he like Orford, turned to Giles of Rome for what he took to be sound argument.

Sutton's final posi,tion

Later, in Quodlibet III, q. 8, Sutton saw that the Egidean view had fatal flaws. Elsewhere I have described how he developed his doctrine regarding the hylomorphic theory in three successive stages.[62] Here again in the question concerning the real distinction, his thought reveals a remarkable evolution and clarification. His final treatment of the question is a masterpiece of scholastic exposition and argument. It is no surprise to read Pelster's reason for editing Sutton's work on the debate concerning the real distinction:

> The principal reason why I have selected texts from the disputed questions and quodlibets of Thomas [Sutton] rather than from Henry of Ghent or Giles of Rome, who were the leading figures [in the dispute], was that Thomas set forth the state of the question and nearly all of the arguments advanced by either side more briefly and at times more clearly than the disputants themselves.[63]

In his final treatment Sutton asks the question:

> Whether in creatures there is a real composition of essence **and** existence by reason of creation.[64]

[61] " creatura non participaret esse, nee esse creaturae diceretur quod participatur nisi esEet ibi differentia realis ", *ibid.*

[62] *Expositionis D. Thomae Aquinatis in Libras. Aristotelis De Generatione et Oorruptione Continuatio per Thomam de Sutona* (Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Band 6, Munich, 1976) ed. Kelley, pp. 13-29.

[63] *Thomae de Sutton, O.P.: Quaestiones de reali distinctione inter essentiam et esse,* ed. Feister (Opuscula et Textus, Series Scholastica, Aschendorff, 1929), p. 6.

[64] *Thomas von Sutton Quodlibeta,* ed. Ifa"Q!l., p. 390.

The doctrine of a real composition of essence and existence in creatures, he says, " is true and necessary for the following special reason ", viz., " the thinking of the one does not include the thinking of the other ". This, it will be remembered, is the reason St. Thomas had advanced; [65]

existence, since it is not of the very meaning of essence, differs in a real way from essence and brings about a real composition with it.[66]

Pelster's notation [67] in his transcription of this text, viz., that Sutton is once more subscribing to Giles's authority, is not accurate. True, Giles like Sutton had referred to Aquinas's argument in the places Pelster notes, but as we have seen he regarded this line of reasoning as having been insufficient to establish the real distinction. [68]

Sutton then summarizes Henry of Ghent's position, but this time he shows quite precisely how Henry is in fact opposi:q.gSt. Thomas. He manages to cut through the confused polemic between Henry and Giles, confused that is to say from a Thomist's standpoint, and he succeeds in isolating what for the Thomist had been Henry's mistake:

The argument, viz. St. Thomas's, is disputed by some [i.e., Henry] who say that it would follow well enough only on the supposition that what is "added" to the essence were absolute; then and only then would St. Thomas's reasoning conclude effectively to a real distinction between essence and the *additum absolutum*, viz. existence. If on the other hand what is " added" is not absolute but

[65] " Whatever is not contained in the very meaning of the essence or quiddity must accrue to it as something external, making a composition with the essence; for no essence can be understood without its parts. But any essence or quiddity can be understood without thinking about its existence; for I can understand what a man is or what a fern is without knowing whether either of them exists. Therefore, it is clear that existence is something other than .essence or quiddity ", *Le 'De Ente et Essentia' de S. Thomas d'Aquin,* ed. M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, 0.P. (Bibliotheque Thomiste, Paris, 1948), ch. 4, p. 34.

[66] *Thomas von Sutton Quodlibeta,* p. 391.

[67] *Thomae de Sutton, O.P.: Quoostiones,* p. 50, note *fl.*

[68] See *supra,* pp. 8-9.

is a relationship, then there is not a real distinction. In this case there is an intentional

And this, Henry had said all along, is how existence is added to essence. In concluding his critique of Aquinas's argument, Henry had one further observation:

Existence does not denote or signify in strict parlance this relationship; existence means the essence along with the relationship.[70]

The relationship about which Henry spoke, of course, was that which the essence bore to its extrinsic efficient principle, viz., God.

Henry's explanation, says Sutton, will not do. On the supposition that St. Thomas's argument, which had assumed a realist metaphysics, was valid, Henry's interpretation of it added nothing. His attempt to avoid saying that essence and existence were distinct only according to a rational distinction failed, and his use of the new word' intentionally' was of no avail. What Henry wound up saying in a roundabout way was that ' existence' means 'essence':

For if existence is not a relationship, nor bespeaks a relationship on the strength of the term 'existence', nor [is] something absolute added on to the essence, then it is necessary that the term [i.e., existence] bespeak the essence itself, at least in some sense.[71]

Sutton's observations here probably would not have left Henry persuaded; medieval controversy had a way of going on. But there can be no doubt that Sutton had sorted out very well those elements of Henry's view which bore directly on what St. Thomas had said. He no longer had recourse to Giles of Rome in order to form the base of his critique. In fact, in the second part of this same question Sutton shows how much confusion Giles had caused. Having established in the first part of the question that there is a real composition in creatures, and that Henry of Ghent's criticism of the supporting argument has

•• *Thomas. von Sutton Quodlibeta,* p. 892. (Sutton is quoting from Henry in *Quodlibeta Magistri Henrici,* Quodl. 10, q. 7, *fol.* 154v.)

[70] *Quodlibeta Magistri Henrici, fol.* 154v.

[71] *Thomas von Sutton Quodlibeta,* p. 892.

been ineffective, in the second part Sutton asks whether the real composition of essence and existence can be proved by the fact of creation. What might have seemed the oddity of asking this question turns out to be appropriate upon our reading Sutton's discussion, for it is in this precise context that he can most effectively and separately deal with Giles of Rome:

> Having dealt with the first, viz., that it is necessary to admit a real composition of essence and existence in creatures, we must consider the second, viz., whether it is necessary to admit this real composition in order to maintain the fact of creation. [72]

Sutton begins his response by writing down the opinion of some who argue to the real distinction from the fact of creation. According to this opinion, since by virtue of creation what had formerly been only possible now existed in fact, it is perfectly plain that there must be a real distinction between the former state of possibility (essence) and the state of actual existence brought about by the act of creation. Through creation the **essence 'acquires' existence. Sutton is here repeating the** thought of Giles:

> Some say that since essence is 'possible existence', which acquires actual existence through creation,. it is necessary that existence which is acquired through creation is distinct in reality from that 'possible' [or essence] which acquires it. Otherwise, nothing would be acquired through creation. And he gives the example of generation through which the form is acquired by matter which is in potency to it; unless the form were really different from matter, nothing would be acquired through generation. [73]

> **If** therefore essence is a kind of 'possible existence', by virtue of the essence nothing actual could ever come about unless some kind of actuality were added on to the essence . . . and this actuality which must be added on to the essence in order for it to be, is called existence . . ,[74] therefore the essence of anything is that through which the thing is able to exist; existence, however, is that through which it actually exists; therefore, we say that just as generation makes it certain that matter is different from form, so also creation makes us know that essence 1s different from existence. [75]

[72] *Ibid.*, p. 393.

Sutton rejects Giles's statement that" the ·essence of the creature is ' possible existence ' ". This is quite wrong to say because prior to creation there are no grounds for our speaking of essence as 'possible ' or ' impossible '; prior to creation there is only nothingness, pure and simple. Sutton is not speaking here about pure logical possibility or impossibility. Obviously, before creation took place it had been logically possible for it to come about. In scholastic logic one would have always insisted that prior to something's having taken place it had been logically possible for it to occur (from existence to possibility is a valid inference). What Sutton here finds fault with is Giles's shift from logical possibility to an ontologically grounded possibility. Giles 'reifies,' as it were, the logically possible, and this one cannot do, at least in the theological context of creation. Sutton is here putting in clear relief the exaggerated realist tendency in the Egidean metaphysics. Hence, Sutton says:

> It is a false imagination on the part of those who imagine that through creation existence is impressed on the essence in the same way that form is impressed on the matter through generation. [76]

This was exactly how Giles had in fact expressed himself:

> Therefore, we must imagine that ... existence is nothing other than a certain actuality impressed on all things by God Himself. [77]

Sutton has in this question seen and pointed out what he took to be Giles's faulty conception when he discussed essence and existence. Despite the fact that a Thomist might have been

[78] *Ibid.,* p. 395.

[74] " Si ergo essentia est quoddam possibile esse, numquam ergo per essentiam poterit aliquid actu esse nisi illi essentiae superaddatur actualitas aliqua . . . et ilia actualitas quam oportet superaddi essentiae ad hoc quod actu sit, vocatur esse ... ", *Aegidii Romani Quaestiones de esse et ess,entia,* q. 12, *fol.* 27rb.

[75] "essentia igitur cuiuslibet rei est id per quod res est possibilis esse; esse autem est id per quod actu existit; dicemus ergo sicut generatio facit scire materiam aliud ·esse a forma, sic creatio facit nos scire essentiam esse aliud ab esse ", *ibid., fol.* 20vb-2lra.

[7·] *Thomas von Sutton Quodlibeta,* p. 396.

[77] " Sic igitur imaginari debemus . . . esse . . . nihil est aliud quam quaedam actualitas impressa omnibus ab ipso Deo ", *Aegidii Romani Quodlibeta,* (ed. Venice, 1504), Quodl. I, q. 7, *fol.* 5vb.

inclined to side with Giles in his attempt to emphasize against Henry of Ghent the realness of the distinction, Sutton recognized that Giles's view was not right. His conclusion was correct, but his reasoning was not:

Though the conclusion is correct, his manner of proof is not correct. [78]

B. Soul and its Faculties

In *Quodlibet* III, 14 Henry of Ghent ruled that the faculties of the soul ought not to be considered as distinct from its substance. He concluded his somewhat lengthy discussion of this determination with the words:

It must be said that the will is a natural faculty in the soul, and it is nothing other than the substance of the soul ... similarly,. the agent intellect is a natural faculty in the soul, and is nothing other than the substance of the soul.[79]

He had harsh words for those who had maintained that the faculties of the soul were accidents inhering in it as in a subject.

It is a great mistake to say that the passive potency proportioned to substantial act falls in the category of substance, and the one proportioned to accidental act [falls] in the category of accident or quality. [80]

Such a doubling of potential principles in order to explain the activity of the soul he deemed to be quite silly:

It is quite silly to say that the substantial form ... cannot be the principle of any operation. [81]

[78] *Thomas von Sutton Quodlibeta,* p. 396.

[79] " in proposito dicendum quod voluntas est potentia naturalis in anima, et non est nisi substantia animae ... similiter, intellectus agens, potentia naturalis est in anima, et non est nisi substantia animae ", *Quodlibeta Magistri Henrici, fol.* 71r.

[80] " Et magnus error est dicere quod potentia passiva quae est ad actum substantialem est in genere substantiae, et quae est ad actum accidentalem est in genere accidentis, ut qualitatis ", *ibid., fol.* 67r.

[81] " multum frivolum est dicere quod forma substantialis . . . non potest esse principium alicuius operationis ", *ibid.*

Henry complained about the way certain persons misconstrued what he meant when he taught the identity of soul and faculty. He did not at all mean that the soul burst into its activity with no outside stimulus:

> It must be understood that the substance of the soul is not said to be one and the same with its faculty, as if we meant by so saying that the substance and essence reached its activity without the benefit of any external assistance whatsoever....
>
> And this is obviously what these persons insist I must mean when they argue against me in the following manner: Just as existence is to essence, so is exercise to the faculty. Therefore, in accord with this balanced proportion, just as existence is to exercise, so is essence to the faculty. But in God alone is existence and activity [or exercise] one and the same. Therefore, in God alone are the essence and the faculty one and the same.[82]

Henry of Ghent did not identify who these persons might have been who so argued against him, but whoever they were, we know from Thomas Sutton that they were borrowing the argument from St. Thomas, for Sutton quotes Henry's version of the argument *verbatim* and tells us it is the *ratio magni <loctoris*, one of his labels for Aquinas [83] In fact St. Thomas had given his view on the subject in several places.[84] In his disputed question *De spiritualibus creaturis* [85] we find the formulation of the argument most closely resembling the words of Henry of Ghent quoted by Sutton.

In any case, Henry observed, the attempt these individuals have made to confute him with their recourse to Aquinas misses

[82] " lntelligendum quod substantia animae non dicitur esse re ipsa eius potentia, tanquam ex eo solo, quod est substantia et essentia quaedam, procedat in actum sine omni adminiculo exteriori . . . Sed sic credunt nos ponere substantiam animae esse ipsam potentiam eius illi qui ponunt quod potentiae sint accidentia animae, quando arguunt contra nos sic: Sicut se habet esse ad essentiam, ita et operari ad potJentiam. Ergo permutata proportione, sicut se habet esse ad operari, et essentia ad potentiam. Sed in solo Deo, esse suum est eius operari. Ergo in solo Deo essentia est ipsa eius potentia ", *ibid., fol.* 67v.

[88] *Thomas von Sutton Quodlibeta*, ID, q. 7, p. 885.

[84] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 77, a. I; I *Sent.*, d. 8, q. 4, a. !!; *Quaest. disp. de anima*, a. !!!, *sed contra* I; *Quodl.* X, q. 5.

[85] See q. 11 (ed. Marietti), pp. 412-418.

the point altogether, for they are taking the word' potency' to mean one thing, and he means something other. It can mean on the one hand:

A certain faculty [or ' potency'] which in and of itself sufficiently and perfectly without any external assistance achieves its activity. [86]

Now if one claimed that' potency' taken in this sense were the very substance of the soul, then of course St. Thomas's reasoning would apply and would successfully show the futility of such an idea:

If we take potency in the first sense, then the comparison holds, and if we rearrange the proportion we get the same result, and the conclusion drawn in this case is valid. [87]

Only in God is ' potency ' or ' power ', understood in this sense, one and the same with His substance.

But there is another meaning of 'potency', viz.,

which does not proceed to activity in and of itself without any external assistance, [88]

and taken in this sense, the argument of proportion does not hold, viz.:

that in the soul ' essence is not one with the faculty ', but only in God; indeed the only inference here is that in the soul the essence is not the faculty itself in the way this is true of God. [89]

Orford

Henry of Ghent's critique of St. Thomas here was based on his introduction of a refinement in terminology and concept. He had proposed a new way of thinking about the question, which in his mind at least, made Aquinas's analysis still effective in one sense but no longer pertinent in another. One might have elected to dismiss Henry's distinction of 'potency' as having

[86] " quaedam potentia, quae ex se sufficienter et perfecte sine omni exteriori adminiculo procedit in actum suum ", *Quodlibeta Magis:tri Henrici, fol.* 68r.

[87] " de potentia primo modo tenet ilia comparatio, et similiter illa commutata proportio et de ilia vera est conclusio ", *ibid.*

[88] "quae non procedit ad actum ex se sine alio adminiculo ", *ibid.*

[89] " quod in anima essentia non sit potentia, sed in solo Deo, immo sequitur solummodo quod in anima essentia non est ipsa potentia sicut est in Deo ", *ibid.*

no advantage or even legitimacy, but it would have been no response to him to have quoted Aquinas once again on the subject. This had been done before and Henry had given his reply. When Robert Orford wrote his answer to Henry's teaching in this place, he took no account 0£ the new context 0£ the question. He chose simply to record once again what Aquinas had said on the subject, and ignored Henry's observation against this procedure.

In preparing his reply to Henry, i£ reply is the right word, Orford did little more than consult and repeat what he had written against William de la Mare in his work entitled *Sciendum.* In his main response to the question in *Contra Henricum,* after having referred to question 11 0£ Aquinas's disputed question *De spiritualibus cmeaturis* where, Orford said, one can find many arguments settling the matter, he went on to select some of those arguments. But despite the reference given, Orford's principal source here, as in *Sciendum,* was St. Thomas's disputed question *De anima.*[90] He chided Henry for having written off Aquinas's reasoning as having been erroneous and frivolous without having offered any reasons of his own to back up the charge:

> Therefore, what he said in the beginning, viz., that it was erroneous and silly to say that the potency to an accidental act was an accident, and the potency to a substantial act was a substance-his own judgment here [is] neither more nor less [erroneous and silly] except he had brought forward some reasons-since [the point under judgment here] does not appear to be erroneous nor silly at all, but quite reasonably presented, as is clear.[91]

Orford immediately answered with two counterarguments 0£ his own, and then added:

[90] Limitations of space preclude a comparison of Orford's critiques of Henry *(Contra Henricum)* and William de la Mare *(Sciendum).*

[91] " Quod ergo in principio dicit error.em esse et frivolum dicere quod potentia ad actum accidentalem est accidens, et potentia ad actum substantialem substantia-ipsum suum dicere, neque magis neque minus, nisi rationem adduxisset. Cum tamen non videtur erroneum neque frivolum sed multum rationabiliter dictum, quod sic patet ", *MS. Peterhouse, fol.* 16vb; *MS. Vat. lat., fol.* Urb.

I should have preferred that he might have answered this argument and not [merely] reported that it was erroneous or silly to speak thus.[92]

One might not have subscribed to Henry's doctrine when he said the powers or faculties of the soul are not distinct from its substance, but one could not have said that he had failed to make argument against the reasoning to which Orford referred. In order to show the inanity of positing a 'potency' separate from the substance Henry used the example of fire.

Fire produces heat in another thing by virtue of its own heat and we call, if we like, the heat in the heat producer the 'power' to produce heat. Heat and the 'power' to produce it in something other are one and the same thing. There is no reason whatever for our having to say that something must have been added to heat which only then gave to it the 'power' to produce it. Indeed, were one to insist on such a separation between the essence of heat and the 'power' to produce heat, the same 'reason' would reassert itself after the first separation and call for another, and on to infinity.[93]

Henry then applied this line of thinking to the substantial form. Just as there is nothing wrong in saying the essence of the accidental form is one and the same with its powers, so too:

In substantial forms which are 'act' only, and not capable of existence all by themselves nor of purely independent activity, there is nothing standing in the way of the essence itself [i.e., of the form] being the 'power' by which the composite [substance] performs its proper activity [which activity] is called for precisely in virtue of that substantial form.[94]

[92] " Istam rationem vellem quod solvisset et non dixisset quod erroneum vel frivolum est sic dicere ", *MS. PetMhouse, fol.* 17ra; *MS. Vat. lat., fol.* 2lrb.

[93] " Cum ignis calefacit calore, ut potentia calefaciendi, ibi non est aliud essentia ipsius caloris quae est passibi!is qualitas, et aliud ipsa potentia: immo ipsa essentia caloris est ipsa potentia calefaciendi in igne, non aliquid additum ei naturaliter; a!iter enim esset abire in infinitum, nisi esset stare in aliquo quo aliud agit quod in essentia sua est ipsa potentia. Quia si potentia non esset re essentia ipsa, esset re aliquid additum ei. Et de illa re esset quaestio eadem: utrum esset pobentia qua aliud ageret, quod si negaretur, quaestio illa procederet in infinitum, ut patet ", *Quodlibeta Magistri Henrici, fol.* 66v.

[94] " Etiam in formis substantialibus quae sunt actus tantum, non nati per se existere nee agere separatim, nullum est inconveniens quod ipsa essentia earum

Robert Orford took no notice of all this. His defense of St. Thomas against Henry of Ghent was almost identical with what he had written against William de la Mare. But while this resemblance between *Contra Henricum* and *Sciendum* proves rewarding in that it offers further evidence to the historian of single authorship for the two works, it is unsatisfying because Henry and William required different sorts of responses. The reason for saying they needed different responses from a Thomist defender is that their opposition to Aquinas was so different.

William had said that he saw no error in what Aquinas taught here: "I see here no error." [95] He did add, however, that St. Thomas's view was plainly in opposition to what St. Augustine and Avicenna had said.[96] All any defender of Aquinas had to do, therefore, was to take up William's two problems of authority, especially of course St. Augustine. In *Sciendum* Orford did this well enough, but in addition to what would have easily sufficed, he took the opportunity to restate St. Thomas's reasoning rather elaborately and in a context where it hardly belonged. All of Orford's arguments from Aquinas concerning the distinction of the soul from its faculties appear in connection with article 38, which bears the title: "Whether distance is an obstacle to the 'separated soul's' knowing an object." [97] The appropriate place, if needed at all, would have been article 110 where William de la Mare critized St. Thomas's explanation as to how the

> powers or faculties are accidental modifications which spring from the soul, and are determined to be what they are by the nature of the soul.[98]

Henry of Ghent, unlike William, charged that St. Thomas's reasoning was erroneous and frivolous and proceeded to argue

est ipsa potentia qua compositum agit suam propriam et per se actionem debitam ei ratione formae substantialis ", *ibid.*

[95] *Le Correctorium Corruptorii ' Quare'*, ed. Glorieux (Kain, p. 412.

[96] *Ibid.*, pp. 412-413.

[97] *Ibid.*, p. 174.

[98] *Ibid.*, p. 412.

against it extensively. In response to this, all Orford did was to give us a part of what he had already done in *Sciendum* some years earlier, accompanied with the denial that Henry had so much as given any reasons for his rejection of St. Thomas's theory.

Orford's carelessness or perhaps haste in dealing with these two critics of Aquinas is revealed in the way he mixed them up regarding their citations of the *Liber de spiritu et anima.* William de la Mare attributed this work to St. Augustine in article llO, where after citing the authority of St. Augustine in IX *De Trinitate* ... "Again, in the same book " he says: "And [St. Augustine] speaks the same way in many places, as well in the *libro de SJJ'irituet anima* ".[99] Orford failed to correct William on his mistaken attribution, but he went out of his way to correct Henry, who needed no correction. For the latter, after having quoted from this work: "And this is what we read in the *libro de spiritu et ani1na*", said that in addition to this we have the word of Augustine: "This is clearly the opinion of St. Augustine " and went on to quote him from several of his writings.100 Although Henry had clearly distinguished Augustine from the author of *De spiritu et anima,* Orford observed:

> In reply to the fifth [argument] it must be said that the book in question is not Augustine's, but is said to be the work of a certain Cistercian; accordingly the words noted here are of no particular interest to us.1°1

Although this reminder was out of place in the *Contra Henricum,* he put it in anyway, borrowed once again from St. Thomas who had written:

> This book *De spiritu et anima* is not Augustine's but is said to have been the work of a certain Cistercian; nor should we bother much with what is found in it.[102]

•• *Ibid.,* pp. 412-413.

[100] *Quodlibeta Magistri Henrici, fol.* 21va.

[101] Ad quintum dicendum quod ille liber ut dicitur, non est Augustini, sed dicitur cuiusdam Cisterciensis, et ideo non est curandum de dictis ibi ", *MS. Peterhouse, fol.* l 7ra; *MS. Vat. lat., fol. nvva.*

[102] *Quaest. disp. de anima,* a. 12, ad lum, pp. 826-827.

In this question, which was considered quite important at the time, Orford was not thorough in attending to what the opposition had said. His loyalty to Aquinas is evident, but his method of defense was confined to assembling the *verba Thoniae* without much concern to get inside the counterarguments with critical and independent judgment. It shows the mark of a man in a hurry.

Sutton

In his discussion of how the soul is related to its faculties, Thomas Sutton turned his attention first to Henry of Ghent's opm1on:

> But it should be observed that some people say that the substance ' in act ' is the immediate passive principle of some of its own perfection, viz., of its inseparable property .[103]

Sutton then summarized briefly Henry's argument against Aquinas, the argument, that is to say, which had appealed to the infinite regress. He allowed that Henry's argument had some merit:

> And without a doubt this argument concludes with necessity that the substance is the immediate subject of a certain kind of accident in such a way that [the inherence of the accident in the subject] is not brought about through the mediacy of another accident. And this point must be granted. [104]

But, Sutton continued, there is a weakness running all through Henry's reasoning. He is guilty of equivocation in his use of the term ' power '. In one sense the term can be understood as that which makes possible a transformation by an external agent *(principium transmutationis ab alio).* In another sense it can mean the proper accident *(passio propria).* If all Henry meant when he identified the created essence with ' its power' was that the particular essence was in reality nothing other than the sheer capacity to be stirred to activity by the First Agent, i.e., God, there would have been no objec-

[103] *Thomas von Sutton Quodlibeta,* III, q. 7, p. 886.
[10]. *Ibid.*

tion. But he shifted his meaning of the term 'power' so that in his conclusion he had taken the term to mean ' proper accident'. Sutton deftly ran the two meanings of the term together in order to bring out the sense of equivocation. Speaking of ' power ' in the first sense he said:

The immediate passive principle is nothing other than the passive ' power ' which is the principle of its being transformed by some other thing precisely as it is some other thing; that is to say [' immediate passive principle' in this sense] is the immediate subject [or 'receiver'] of any transformation whatever [and not just some particular one]; and this sort of 'power' is a capacity to contradictories,. as is said in IX Metaphysics. But one cannot take the term ' power ' in this sense when one speaks of the proper accident. [105]

The reason for our saying this is that no substance is in potency to its proper accident:

The substance is not brought, by way of a transformation through an external agent, to the achievement of its inseparable and proper accident. [106]

One could never, for example, say that a human being has the capacity (passive power) of being capable (proper accident) of laughter. Sutton's point here has the economy of sarcasm. He then went on:

While one does not say that the created substance is in potency to its proper accident, it is quite correct to say that the substance is the immediate subject of this proper accident. [107]

And this is all Henry's argument concluded to, the argument namely which brought in the regress to infinity. Sutton then ended by saying:

and anyway, all this has nothing to do with the main point, viz., the contention that the substance is not the immediate principle of its operation, or to say the same thing, the powers of the substance are not one and the same with the substance. [108]

[105] *Ibid.,* pp. 386-387.
[100] *Ibid.,* p. 387.
[107] *Ibid.*
[10s] *Ibid.*

Again, one is safe in thinking Henry of Ghent would hardly have been silenced by the way Sutton analyzed his reasoning, but it must be admitted that this Englishman went straight to the heart of Henry's argument with his charge of equivocation.

C. Creation of matter without form

In *Quodlibet* I, q. 10 Henry of Ghent asked: "Is it possible for matter to exist without form? "[109] Henry's purpose in debating this question was not so much to deepen the understanding of Aristotle's principles of matter and form as to investigate the durability of philosophy in the context of Christian faith. Although the precise terms in which the question was framed were strictly philosophical, the more important point at issue was theological.

St. Thomas had raised this question on a number of occasions,[110] and the answer he gave reflected his profound conviction of the solidity and autonomy of Aristotle's philosophy. On the assumption that the hylomorphic theory enjoyed philosophic validity, then we can say with absolute certainty that matter cannot exist without substantial form. The reason for our having absolute certainty about this is that the statement ' matter exists without form ' entails a contradiction:

> By ' actual ' I can mean either the act itself or the potency now participating the act; [of these two senses of ' actual '] matter cannot be taken in sense one, for [matter] according to its very meaning is being-in-potency. Therefore, when one says 'matter is actual ' it can only mean ' matter participates act '. But act participated by matter is nothing other than form. Whence, it is the same thing to say 'matter is in act', and' matter has form'. Accordingly, to say 'matter is in act without form' is to utter a contradiction.[111]

In saying this, Aquinas held by implication that God Himself could not have brought matter into existence without form. We

[109] *Quodlibeta Magistri Henrici, fol.* Sr.

[110] E.g., *Summa Theol.,* I, 66., I; 1, 69, l; 1, 74, 2; II *Sent.,* d. 12', a. 4; *Quaest. disp. de potentia,* q. 4, a. 1.

[111] *Quodl.* III, q. 1, a. 1.

say this was the implication, for St. Thomas himself did not have anything more to say about this philosophical point in relation to the theological doctrine of God's power.

The theological context of this question was, however, Henry of Ghent's main concern. After having described what primary matter is, in terms any Thomist would have been pleased to accept, Henry said that although in the normal course of things matter could never stand without form, it must be allowed that God by His supernatural intervention could indeed bring this about:

> And although according to the normal course of nature, matter is produced in such a way that by any natural action it cannot stand without a form, because in any strictly natural action there is never corruption of one thing without at the same time a generation of something else, through divine action [matter] can be found without any form ...
>
> Therefore we must admit that supernatural and divine action can bring it about that matter can stand by itself without any form.[112]

To those, viz., Thomas Aquinas, who would bring to bear philosophic arguments against this possibility, Henry replied that such arguments do no more than reveal the shortcoming of philosophy itself. Nor is it the case that philosophy stands here in opposition to theology. It is rather the case that the former is deficient when compared with the latter:

> To the philosophic argument which would have us believe that matter in and of itself is in potency and is in no sense ' actual ' without the form, and the existent is actual in some sense because existence itself is the' act' of the being, etc.: in order that one might see how this argument results from the shortcoming of philosophy which does not deal with all levels of being, and does not [result] from any conflict between philosophic and theological truth, one should attend to the words of the Commentator on book two of Boethius's

[112] "Et licet secundum communem cursum institutionis naturae sic sit facta materia ut aliqua actione naturae non possit omnino spoliari forma; quia actione pura naturae non est unius corruptio sine alterius generatione; tamen actione creatoris spoliari potest ab omni forma. . . Simpliciter •ergo dicendum quod actione divina supernaturali materia potest per se subsistere nuda ab omni forma ", *Quodlibeta Magistri llenrici, fol.* Sv.

De hebdomadibus, where he says that the disciplines of philosophy and theology deal in different ways with existence pure and simple, and with the existence of this thing or that thing. For in theology, when a thing is said to exist,. the theologian takes ' existence' to mean the existence of the primal source [or first Being] by a kind of extrinsic denomination, that is to say, insofar as the existent singular participates in divine existence as its likeness . . . The philosopher on the other hand does not draw this kind of distinction.113

The important point for our purposes is that Henry of Ghent had no objection to make to Aquinas's philosophic reasoning as such. If one remained within the confines of Aristotle's philosophy, it would have been perfectly correct to argue as St. Thomas had done, that matter could not exist (or be ' in act ') without form. If on the other hand, the question be viewed from the perspective of theology, then, said Henry, the answer must be different. The theological understanding of existence as a participation in divine existence goes beyond the Aristotelian-philosophic understanding, i.e., 'to have act or form'. In other words, Henry of Ghent insisted here that the theologian uses categories of thought not available to the philosopher.

Orford

One might have elected not to accept Henry's method in all of this, but it would not have been the appropriate thing to have simply repeated Aquinas's argument in order to show where he had gone wrong. He knew quite well what St. Thomas had said, and he found no fault with the teaching as far as it

113 "Ad argumentum philosophicum quo vane sustentati sunt quod materia de se est in potentia nullum habens actum sine forma, et esse subsistens est in aliquo actu, quia esse est actus, etc.: ut argumentum istud intelligatur procedere ex defectu philosophiae, non determinantis omnem modum essendi, non autem ex contrarietate eius ad theologicam veritatem; sciendum secundum quod dicit Commentator super secundam Hebdomadam Boetii, quod in philosophia et in theologia esse simpliciter et esse aliquod circa quamcumque rem multipliciter dicuntur. Nam in theologia quod aliquod dicitur e.sse, hoc intelligunt theologi quadam extrinseca denominatione ab esse primi principii, qua scilicet, participant divino esse inquantum sunt similitudo quaedam divini esse... Philosophi vero, eodem modo dicunt rem quamlibet esse et aliquod esse ", *ibid., fol.* 8v-9r.

went. Rightly or wrongly Henry sought to broaden the context of the question and it was here that any objector ought to have worked his criticism. Robert Orford, however, did not take the time to do this. Once again his response to Henry was very close to what he had written in *Sciendum* against William de la Mare, which in tum was nothing more than an elaboration of Aquinas. In *Sciendum,* after the statement:

Therefore, God can produce anything which does not violate the meaning of being *qua* produced, but He cannot produce something which would lack every sense of entity.114

Orford provided some examples to illustrate what this means. He then completed the argument:

But the prospect of matter perduring [for any length of time] without a form implies a contradiction. Therefore, God cannot make this happen, not because of some deficiency in His power, but rather because of the inherent impossibility of the event itself.115

In his conclusion he spelled out why there is a contradiction:

Therefore, to say ' matter is measured by time ' amounts to saying ' matter has form '. Accordingly, to say ' matter precedes the form in time ' is the same thing as saying ' matter has form ' and 'matter does not have form', which is a contradiction. 116

All of this is basically the same as what Aquinas had said:

For if matter precedes the form in time, it [matter] would already be' in act': time or duration necessarily implies this ... But' act' is ' form '. Therefore,, to say ' matter preceded the form in time ', is the same as saying ' being is actual and not actual ', which is a contradiction. 117

In *Contra Henricum* Orford stayed inside the lines of the foregoing reasoning, thereby missing the new direction Henry had taken. 118 In his major premiss Orford laid down three ways

114 *Le Correctorium Corruptorii 'Sciendum* ', ed. Glorieux, p. 116.

115 *Ibid.*

116 *Ibid.,* p. 117.

117 *Summa Theol.,* I, 66, I.

118 " Solutio. Sicut dictum est in prima quaestione, Deus facere potest omne illud quod [non] repugnat enti inquantum ens, neque facto enti inquantum factum,

in which one might have said 'God cannot do *x* '. First, because the doing of it was impossible from the standpoint of being as such; second, because it was impossible by reason of its being a produced thing (the only point in adding this was to explain why God could not ' make ' another God) ; third, because it was impossible by reason of its being this particular sort of produced thing.

Now if we ask: is there any inherent impossibility in God's creating matter to exist by itself, i.e., without form, the reply would be negative in the first and second senses listed. That is to say, independent existence is not incompatible with being as such, nor with ' being-as-produced '. The impossibility arises in the third sense, i.e., independent existence is incompatible with primary matter not because of its entity as such, nor because it is an effect, but because of the particular kind of effect that it is.

His proof for this comes next. To exist independently is the same thing as to' perdure '. But' to perdure' is the measure of the act of existing. Therefore, were matter to subsist and have duration by itself, it would perforce have had some kind of act

neque huic facto inquantum hoc factum. Quod si alicui eorum repugnet, non potest illud facere. Materiam autem primam per se subsistere non repugnat enti inquantum ens, quoniam ipsum primum quod maxime est ens, maxime per se subsistit. Nee repugnat enti facto inquantum factum, quoniam multa entia facta per se subsistunt. Sed repugnat huic enti inquantum hoc ens, quod sic patet. Per se subsistere est durare; duratio autem mensurat actum existendi, quia res non dicitur durare dum est in potentia, alioquin aer duraret in igne cum sit in potentia in materia ignis, et antiChristus nunc duraret cum sit in potentia, quorum utrumque est manifeste falsum; si ergo materia per se subsisteret et duraret, oporteret quod haberet actum aliquem. Sed actum non habet nisi a forma, quia de se solum est in potentia, quia secundum Commentatorem: materia subintelligitur per posse. Materia enim, id quod est, potentia est, sicut forma id quod est, actus est. Dicere ergo sive facere quod materia prima per se subsisteret, est facere quod materia prima per se habeat actum sive formam. Sed per se nullam formam habet nee actum. Ergo hoc facere est facere quod materia simul habeat formam sive actum et non habeat, et ita implicat contradictionem. Quod Deus non potest facere, non propter impotentiam Dei, sed propter impotentiam facti, quia non habet rationem factibilis, quia non habet rationem possibilis. Huie ergo facto inquantum hoc factum, id est, materiae primae secundum quod huiusmodi, repugnat per se subsistere, et ideo dicendum quod Deus non potest hoc facere." *MS. Peterkouse* U9, *fol.* 4ra"4rb; *MS. Vat. lat.* 897, *fol.* 5ra.

as well. But it cannot have any act except through form. Therefore, the proposal that matter might have existed by itself is tantamount to saying that it might have act independently. But the very meaning assigned to matter is that it does not have act independently. Thus the contradiction is apparent, and we can say with every assurance that even God could not cause matter to exist without form.

Orford is wordier here than Aquinas and he adds an explicit account of the various modes of impossibility, but at no point does he entertain Henry of Ghent's introduction of existence as participation of the divine Being. Orford's difficulty here is an early testimony of the problem any scholastic now faced after Henry of Ghent altered the context of theological and philosophical debate. Criticism, if it be made, ought to be softened because of that fact.

Sutton

In *Quodlibet* IV, question 7, Thomas Sutton considered whether or not it was possible for matter to exist without form. Unlike Orford, who passed over the distinction made so much of by Henry, viz.:

existence pure and simple (participation of first Being) THEOLOGICAL
existence (as' act' or' form') PHILOSOPHICAL

Sutton focused his attention on it.

> For existence is a kind of ' act ', and it is an ' act ' other than the 'form', as these people say [i.e., Henry], who so argue.[119]

Sutton went on in this place to explain carefully Henry's position and then he developed two arguments designed to show that this view could not hold up. He had no objection to make against Henry's concept of existence as a participation of divine Being, but he argued that no matter what idea of existence one might have chosen to use, be it Aristotelian or not, there were contradictions unavoidably associated with the statement, viz., 'matter exists without form'. His first argument pointed to the

[119] *Thomas von Sutton Quodlibeta,* p. 544.

fact that before we can possibly think about something having existence we must in the first instance be thinking about some kind of thing. That is to say, it is not possible to talk seriously about existence having been accorded to what lacks all ontological specificity. And this is exactly what Henry meant by primary matter, i.e., the totally unspecified or purely potential principle of the composed material substance. It is an absurdity grounded in contradiction to have imagined that what is undifferentiated in every possible meaning, and which has no positive or actual content, could be found somewhere in actual fact, no matter what be our description of its state of existence. Whatever exists needs to be a defined something. But all specificity and determination down to the smallest shred flows from the form. Existence for Henry as well as for anyone else at that time was not considered as the principle of specification; it was rather a state of the already specified. Therefore, one must conclude:

matter cannot exist except it participate form which makes for the species.[120]

Sutton's second argument centered on the pre-requisite of individuation for existence. One could not have imagined that something which was nothing in particular existed, and precisely as it was nothing in particular. Sutton realized only too well that Henry had enough realism in his overall outlook to have resisted the prospect of a non-singular existent. While this point would not have disturbed an unqualified idealist, it did score with Henry. But individuation is not possible without that form which is quantity. Primary matter in and of itself is unsingularized because unquantified. Therefore, primary matter could not receive the act of existence without any form whatever. Sutton spelled out what would have been the resultant contradiction:

Otherwise the result is that matter is individual and not individual, because on the one hand, as the term of creation it is individual, and

[20] *Ibid.*

on the other hand, not possessing the requirement of individuation [i.e., quantity], it is not individual. Thus the position results in a contradiction. [121]

Here again Sutton has Henry of Ghent's basic point, and if he has not settled matters, at the very least he would need answermg.

Conclusion

Thomas Sutton and Robert Orford were alike in many respects. Both were Oxford scholastics, first generation Thomists and members of the Dominican Order. The advocacy of St. Thomas's thought, and when necessary its defense, is a characteristic of each man's work. But alongside these resemblances there are striking differences between Sutton and Orford. The study of the ways they criticized Henry of Ghent's doctrine regarding the soul and its faculties, the possibility of matter existing without form and especially the real distinction, show Sutton to have been a careful worker whose thought was capable of evolution in successive expositions of a question. By contrast, Orford's criticisms of Henry were wide of the mark and might even be described as superficial. In taking on Henry of Ghent-one of the truly great scholastic thinkers of the high Middle Ages, and one whose work needs much more attention by scholars than it has until now received-any Thomist or non-Thomist had all he could handle. The difficulty Orford experienced in trying to cope with the *Doctor Solemnis* is an indication of the latter's greatness; Sutton's measure of success in dealing with Henry earns for him a special place in the early Oxford Thomist school.

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[121] *Ibid.,* p. 545.

THE PROBLEM OF BEING IN THE EARLY HEIDEGGER*

SINCE THE PUBLICATION 0£ volumes 21, 24, *25* and 26 of Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe,* a more exact insight into the thought 0£ the early Heidegger has become possible. In this paper, our aim is to examine the concept 0£ Being in the early Heidegger with respect to these hitherto inaccessible lectures. We shall first discuss three key characteristics 0£ Heidegger's concept 0£ Being. We do not claim that these three characteristics exhaustively circumscribe the concept 0£ Being in Heidegger, but only that these three are all essential characteristics of this concept (Part I). We shall then point out a problem in Heidegger's concept (Part II). It will be argued that the early concept 0£ Being, according to which Being " is " only in Dasein's understanding 0£ Being, involves a serious difficulty, since if Being "is" only in the understanding 0£ Being, then Being cannot be the Being of beings, which Heidegger claims it is, but only the transcendental condition of their revelation.

I. *Three Characteristics of the Concept of Being in the Earl,Y Heidegger*

1. Being is not distinct, in any absolute sense, from the meaning of Being.

It is essential to note that Being for Heidegger cannot be distinguished, in any absolute sense, from the meaning 0£ Being. "And if we are inquiring about the meaning 0£ Being, our investigation does not then become a ' deep ' one, nor does it puzzle out what stands behind Being. It asks about Being itself insofar as Being enters into the understandability of Dasein.

*I am indebted to Quentin Smith (University of Kentucky, Lexington) for several penetrating criticisms.

The meaning of Being can never be contrasted with beings, or with Being as the ' ground ' which gives beings support; for a ' ground ' becomes accessible only as a meaning ...[1] Thus it is not as if there is Being and in addition the meaning *(Sinn)* that Being has for Dasein; rather, for Heidegger, Being is, or resides in, the meaning of Being. This does not simply mean that Being is accessible to Dasein only as a meaning, but that Being " in itself " " is " only as understood, whether this understanding be ontological or pre-ontological. Indeed, this conclusion follows immediately from Heidegger's claim that "... only as long as Dasein *is* ... 'is there' Being."[2] For, if Being were absolutely independent of the meaning of Being, then Heidegger could not say that Being " is " only as long as Dasein is.

In order to bring the point to foll clarity, it is necessary to examine Heidegger's concept of meaning. First of all, meaning *(Sinn)* for Heidegger has little or nothing to do with the atemporal and non-spatial validity *(Geltung)* of propositions, or of any other kind of ideal object.[3] If we were to say that the

[1] Und wenn wir nach dem Sinn von Sein fragen, dann wird die Untersuchung nicht tiefsinnig und ergriibelt nichts, was hinter dem Sein steht, sondern fragt nach ihm selbst, sofern es in die Verstandlichkeit des Daseins hereinsteht. Der Sinn von Sein kann nie in Gegensatz gebracht werden zum Seienden oder zum Sein als tragenden ' Grund ' des Seienden, weil ' Grund ' nur als Sinn zuganglich wird ..." *Sein and Zeit* (hereafter, SZ) (Tiibingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1967), p. 152. The German pagination is given in the margin of the Macquarrie and Robinson translation as well as in the margin of the *Gesamtausgabe* edition (vol. 2). All translations of passages from SZ are taken from the Macquarrie and Robinson translation with minor modifications supplied by us.

[2] " Allerdings nur solange Dasein *ist* ... ' gibt es ' Sein." SZ 212.

[3] At the time of SZ, Heidegger had not quite decided what to do with *irrealia* (meanings, propositions, etc.) and their ideal Being. On the one hand, he polemicizes vigorously against the theory of judgment of Lotze with its postulation of atemporal contents of judgment (SZ 155-6)-which polemic is also directed, though less obviously, against the theories of judgment of Bolzano, Rickert, the early Husserl and others insofar as these theories involve some version of Platonism-but, on the other hand, there is something half-hearted about Heidegger's critique inasmuch as he doesn't flatly exclude something like an atemporal *Urteusgehalt.* " Den Begrifl' des Sinnes restringiel'.en wir nicht zuvor auf die Bedeutung von 'Urteilsgehalt ', sondern verstehen ihn als das gekennzeichnete, existenziale Phiinomen . . ." (SZ 156). In several places throughout SZ Heidegger speaks of ideal beings and their Being as subsistence *(Bestehen).* Cf. e.g. SZ 420, **11.8-10.**

meaning of a declarative sentence in a given language is the proposition expressed by it, this usage of " meaning " would have nothing in common with that of Heidegger. Nor does " meaning " for Heidegger connote " reference." The referent of the term "Being" is not some "metaphysical " entity lurking behind the scenes, as our first quotation shows. Meaning, for Heidegger, is "... that wherein the understandability of something maintains itself." [4] This is not very helpful but it at least provides us with a clue. Heidegger's formal definition runs as follows: " Meaning is the ' upon which ' of a projection in terms of which something becomes understandable as something; it gets its structure from a fore-having, a fore-sight, and a fore-conception." [5] This definition is typically Heideggerian in its obscurity, but not, for all that, meaningless. Heidegger's theory is roughly as follows. Beings, whether ready-to-hand, present-at-hand or of the type of Dasein, can be understood only if there is something like an *a priori* understanding of the Being of these beings. Thus an *a priori* understanding of actuality, for example, precedes and makes possible the encountering of something actuaL [6] Now this understanding has the character of a projection or "sketch" *(Entwurf)* (SZ 145). That which is projected *(das Entworfene)* is the particular being in question whether it he of the type of Dasein or not. That upon which the being is projected is the Being of that particular being. This Being resides *a priori* in Dasein's understanding and thereby makes possible the encountering of the particular being. In the *Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie* Heidegger puts it this way: "We understand a being only insofar as we project it upon Being .... " [7] Now if meaning is the" up-

[4] " Sinn ist das, worin sich Verstandlichkeit von etwas halt." SZ 151.

[5] "Sinn ist das durch Vorhabe, Vorsich und Vorgriff strukturierte Woraufhin des Entwurfs, ans dem her etwas verstandlich wird." SZ 151. Heidegger's italics have been suppressed.

[6] Cf. *Heidegger Gesamtausgabe* Band 9?4, *Die Grundprobleme der Pkanomenologie* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann Verlag, 1975), p. 14. *Die Grundprobleme* will hereafter be referred to as GP.

[7] " Wir verstehen Seiendes nur, sofern wir es auf Sein entwerfen ... " GP *396.* All translations of passages from Heidegger's recently released lectures are our own.

on which" *(Woraufhin)* of a projection in terms of which something becomes understandable *as* something, it follows from the passage just cited that the Being of a being is the meaning of that being. Consequently, "Being" and "meaning" would seem to be synonymous.

However, there is a further nuance which must not be ignored. The complete sentence from which we quoted reads: "We understand a being only insofar as we project it upon Being; Being itself must thereby be understood in a certain manner, that is, Being in turn must be projected upon something." [8] Thus there are two projections: the first makes possible the encounter of a particular being; the second makes possible the understanding of the Being of this being. But what is the second "upon which"? What is the Being of beings projected upon so that an understanding of Being can take place and thereby make possible the antic experience of beings? The answer to this question would be the answer to the central question of *Being and Time* (What is the meaning of Being?) inasmuch as meaning, as has been seen, is the ". . . ' upon which ' of a projection in terms of which something becomes understandable as something . . . . " The answer, hinted at in *Being and Time,* [9] is given in the *Grundprobleme der Phiinomenologie* which is the hitherto unpublished Third Division of Part One of *Being and Time* as originally planned. [10] Baldly expressed, the meaning of Being is time. [11]

[8] " Wir v.erstehen Seiendes nur, sofem wir es auf Sein entwerfen; <las Sein selbst muss dabei in gewisser Weise verstanden werden, d.h. Sein seinerseits muss auf etwas hin entworfen sein." GP 396.

[9] Cf. e.g. SZ 17, 437.

[10] Cf. *Heidegger Gesamtausgahe* Band £, *Sein und Zeit* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann Verlag, 1977), p. 581 ff. "Nachwort des Herausgebers ".

[11] An adequate analysis of the different senses of " time " in Heidegger would require a separate article. Heidegger speaks of *Zeit, Zeitlichkeit, Zeitigung, Temporalitiit* and *Praesenz. Zeitlichkeit* is sometimes defined as the Being of Dasein (SZ 17) and other times as the *meaning* of the Being of Dasein (e.g. SZ 486). This is not sloppiness on Heidegger's part since, as we have been arguing, Being and the meaning of Being are not absolutely distinct for Heidegger. It would he fair to say that while *Zeitlichkeit* is the meaning of the Being of Dasein, *Tem-*

We have argued that for Heidegger there is no absolute distinction between Being and the meaning of Being in the case of the understanding of beings. Moreover, it seems as if Being and meaning are strictly synonymous. But does this also hold in the case of the understanding of Being as such which makes possible the ontic experience of beings? Is time, as the meaning of Being, indistinguishable in an absolute sense from the meaning of time? It would certainly seem so if time is indeed a meaning, and if meanings " exist " only as understood by Dasein (SZ 151). Moreover, authentic time for Heidegger is finite and is only so long as Dasein is.[12] Time, like Being, is only as understood by the contingent being, Dasein. But it does not follow that Being and meaning are strict synonyms since time is not simply Being, but the condition which makes possible the understanding of Being. To sum up then, (1) Being is not absolutely distinct from the meaning of Being; (2) Being is strictly synonymous with the meaning of Being in the case of the ontic experience of beings; but (3) Being is not synonymous with the meaning of Being when we consider that Being, to be understood, and thereby to make possible the encounter of beings, must in turn be projected upon its " upon which ", namely time.

But it does not follow from what has been said that a distinction is not required between Being and any given ontological understanding of Being. Certainly one can distinguish, as Heidegger does, between Being and a given thematic, i.e. ontological understanding of Being. But this distinction is only relative, namely, relative to the level of adequacy of any given ontological understanding of Being and to the task of working out as adequate an understanding of Being as possible. At the

poralitiit is the meaning of Being as such (cf. SZ 19). "Temporalitat ist die ursprtinglichste Zeitigung der Zeitlichkeit als solcher." GP Heidegger also describes *Temporalitiit* as *Praesemz.* "... wir das Sein auf die Praesenz, d.h. die Temporalitiit entwerfen." GP 459. From this quotation one can gather that meaning of Being is *Praesenz (Temporalitiit).*

[12] This seems to follow from Heidegger's discussion in § 81 of SZ. Cf. in particular SZ

time of *Being and Time* Heidegger was of the opinion that an adequate *conceptual* grasp of the meaning of Being was possible.[13] Such a grasp would have amounted to a closing of the gap between Being as the goal of the investigation and the given ontological (i.e. philosophical) understanding of Being. Indeed, a renewal of the question of Being makes sense only if it is possible to approach an adequate understanding of the meaning of Being. And this in turn is possible only if Dasein has a pre-thematic, i.e. pre-ontological, understanding of Being. The distinction between Being as goal and theme of the investigation and Being as conceptually and pre-conceptually understood falls *within* the understanding of Being. It is only because Being is always already understood pre-thematically, i.e. pre-ontologically, that an explicit conceptual grasp of Being is possible. Thus Dasein always already has access to Being; Heidegger's Being is not set over against Dasein in the way Sartre's *en-soi* is set over against and "outside of" the *pour-soi.* Since the distinction between Being as the theme of ontology and any given ontological understanding of Being is immanent to the understanding of Being possessed by Dasein, the terms of this distinction are not Being and the meaning of Being, but pre-ontological meaning of Being and ontological meaning of Being. Thus for Heidegger there is no absolute distinction between Being and the meaning of Being. In this respect, Heidegger's Being differs from Sartre's Being-in-itself.

It might be noted in passing that the view that Being "is" only as a meaning correlates with Heidegger's conception of ontology. "Ontology is possible only as phenomenology."[14] The theme of ontology, the Being of beings, is the phenomenon

[13] Cf. SZ 8. Heidegger later gives up the view that Being qua Truth of Being can be conceptually grasped, maintaining that there is a thinking which is more rigorous *(strenger)* than conceptual thinking. For the later Heidegger, ontology thinks the Being of beings, but not the Truth of Being, thereby overlooking the possibility of a thinking which is more rigorous than conceptual thinking. "Brief iiber den Humanismus" in *Heidegger Gesamtausgahe* Band 9, *Wegmarken* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann Verlag, 1976), p. 357.

[14] "Ontologie ist nur als Phanomenologie moglich." SZ 35. Heidegger's italics have been suppressed.

in the phenomenological sense.[15] Determined in this way, Being is necessarily referred to a being to which Being appears. Or in other words, Being is only as understood (whether prethematically or thematically) by Dasein. Being "is" only as a meaning. Of course, " meaning " here does not refer to an ideal object subsisting atemporally and non-spatially, but to the execution of Dasein's understanding of self and world (SZ 151).

The view that Being " is " only as a meaning implies that Being" is" only so long as Dasein is. And Heidegger explicitly states this. Without beings capable of an understanding of Being, i.e. without Dasein, Being would not" be." [16] Now Dasein is merely the *ontic* condition of Being. Heidegger speaks of Dasein as the ontic possibility of the understanding of Being on p. 2rn of *Sein und Zeit.* Since Being, as we have seen," is" only in the understanding of Being, the ontic possibility of the understanding of Being is coevally the ontic possibility of Being itself. And interpreting possibility as condition, we see that the ontic possibility of Being itself is the ontic condition of Being itself. Thus Being, as the ontological condition of the revelation of beings,[17] is itself ontically conditioned by a being, namely Dasein.

One must remember that Dasein is not a "phantastically idealized subject" (SZ 229) free of the vicissitudes of space and time, but a contingent being which happens to occur in nature. [18] Dasein need not occur, although, if it occurs, then it

[10] " Der phanomenologische Begriff von Phanomen meint als <las Sichzeigende <las Sein des Seienden ... " SZ 35.

[16] " Allerdings nur solange Dasein *ist,* <las heisst die ontische Moglichkeit von Seinsverstiindnis, ' gibt es ' Sein." SZ 212. Cf. SZ 183, 230; GP 24f., 241, 422; " Vom Wesen des Grundes " in *Wegmarken,* p. 172.

[17] For Heidegger, beings can be grasped as beings only on condition of an *a priori* understanding of Being. In this sense, Being is the ontological (as opposed to ontic) condition of the revelation or manifestation of beings to Dasein.

[18] " Denn es ist nicht wesensnotwendig, <lass dergleichen Seiendes wie menschliches Dasein faktisch existiert. Es kann ja auch *nicht* sein." "Vom Wesen des Grundes" in *Wegmarken,* p. 140. "Because it is not essentially necessary that a being like human Dasein factically exists. It can indeed also *not* be," our trans.

necessarily "exists." That is, Dasein contingently occurs, but necessarily exists. vVe are using "occurrence" to refer to the fact *that* Dasein is, whereas " existence " in expressions like "Dasein existiert" (Dasein exists) refers to the way Dasein is, to Dasein's mode of Being *(Seinsweise).* Thus to say that Dasein exists says nothing about whether or not there occur in nature any instantiations of the regional concept Dasein, but merely specifies the mode of Being of the type of being designated by the ontic term" Dasein." The term" existence" *(Existenz),* referring as it does to the Being of Dasein (SZ IQ), has nothing to do with the contingent thatness of instances of the concept Dasein. [19]

Thus if Being is ontically conditioned by Dasein, a contingent being, Being is itself contingent. In Part II of this paper it will be seen what problems this involves.

2. Being is the transcendental-a *priori* condition of the revelation of beings.

It has been seen that Heidegger's Being is (1) a meaning *(Sinn),* (2) a phenomenon in the precise phenomenological sense, and (3) ontically conditioned by Dasein. But what is the relation of Being to beings? As will be shown in this section and the next, Being for Heidegger is both the transcendental-*a priori* condition of the revelation of beings and the Being of these beings. In this section, the first half of this assertion will be explicated.

Being is the transcendental-a *priori* condition of the revelation of beings. Being is *transoendental* insofar as it (1) transcends all definition in terms of genus and species, and (2) is that whose understanding first makes possible the givenness of beings. The first sense of " transcendental," according to which Being is transcendental inasmuch as it is not a highest genus, will be discussed in the following section. We are presently concerned with the second, specifically modern, sense of " transcendental."

[19] *1Vegmarken* (Gesamtausgabe), p. 374f.

For the sake of orientation, let us recall what " transcendental " chiefly meant for Kant. At B of the *Critique of Pure Reason,* Kant states, **"I** entitle *transcendental* all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects insofar as this mode of knowledge is to be possible *a p1iori."* This definition clearly gives the term " transcendental " a subjective connotation. Transcendental knowledge is not concerned with objects but with the knowledge which human subjects have of objects. Transcendental philosophy is thereby a second-order, reflexive knowing of the subjective conditions of first-order knowing insofar as this first-order knowing lays claim to *a priori* validity. Although, according to this definition, " transcendental " strictly qualifies only the knowing (or investigating) of subjective conditions of first-order knowing rather than these conditions themselves, the term is usually, and quite naturally, extended to embrace what is known in a transcendental investigation.

Thus to say that Heidegger's Being is transcendental means in part, i.e. according to the specifically modern sense of the term, that Being is, in some sense, subjective. As has been seen, Being is indeed subjective to the extent that it " is" only so long as Dasein is. Being for the early Heidegger is ontically conditioned by Dasein. This does not mean that Being is a product of man or a human idea or representation. Being is obviously not a product, since it is not an innerworldly entity at Dasein's disposal. Nor is it a representation qua object represented, since it is not an object but the ultimate condition of a11 "objectivity." [20] The extent to which Being is a kind of *a priori* representing similar to Kant's pure or Husserl's categorial intuition cannot be discussed here. Nevertheless, without Dasein's factual occurrence, Being would not "be." The type of conditioning involved here is not causal, since Dasein does

[20] " Obj,ectivity " is here used in a loose sense to embrace both presence-at-hand *(Vorhandenheit)* and readiness-to-hand *(Zuhandenheit).* A tool in use, though not an object of theoretical contemplation, is certainly an object of practical manipulation, and to this extent must appear as an object to Dasein's circumspective concern.

not cause or create Being, but it is not logical either insofar as Dasein is not a logical but an ontic condition of Being. The nature of this conditioning seems analogous to that which obtains between color and extension. Extension conditions the existence of perceived color, without being the cause of it; so too, Dasein conditions the "existence " of Being without causing or producing it. Without extension, a color cannot be *(esse* here = *percipi)* ; without Dasein, Being cannot " be." And yet neither extension nor Dasein is a merely logical condition.

But this analogy is inadequate insofar as the relation between Dasein and Being is not external as is the relation between extension and color. For Dasein has an understanding of Being. Being is not only ontically conditioned by Dasein; Being is ontologically and pre-ontologically understood by Dasein. This understanding of Being (= Being itself) is described by Heidegger as *a priori.* This term has a two-fold sense: it can be used in a straightforwardly ontological manner to refer to that which precedes or is prior to something else as its logical or ontological condition. Accordingly, Being is *a priori* insofar as it is not a being or a real (in the sense of *realitas)* property of beings, but the condition of beings and their real properties. But the term can also be employed in the wider Kantian sense according to which it does not simply refer to what is logically or ontologically prior, but also and at the same time situates the *a priori* in the (transcendental) subject. Being for Heidegger is *a priori* in this second sense (which does not exclude but includes the first sense) insofar as Being is equivalent to the thematic or pre-thematic understanding of Being, and insofar as the understanding of Being is found in only one type of being, namely Dasein. Heidegger, like Kant, situates the *a priori* in the subject. [21]

[21] It would be incorrect to view Dasein as but another name for the transcendental sub;.ect, but it would be equally erroneous to think that it has nothing to do with the transcendental subject of Kant, neo-Kantianism and Husserlian phenomenology. The concept of Dasein is the ontological extension of the concept of the subject in post-Cartesian philosophy. If this is not clear from *Being and Time,* it becomes quite clear if we consider the lectures from that period. "Aber das

One can readily see that the two-fold sense of *"a priori"* parallels the two-fold sense of "transcendental." In the pre-Kantian sense of the term, Being is transcendental in that it is not a highest genus. But to the same extent, it is *a priori* in the second sense. .11 *priori* in this sense carries more of an epistemological than an ontological connotation. Accordingly, Being for Heidegger is *a priori* not merely as a principle which precedes and conditions beings, but also as a condition of the " knowledge " of beings. Beings are understood as beings and as the kind of beings that they are only in virtue of a prior understanding of Being. This is expressed in particularly clear fashion in the *Grundprobleme der Phiinomenologie,* delivered as lectures in Marburg in the Summer semester of 1927, the year in which *Being and Time* first appeared. "We must be able to understand actuality before every experience of things actual. This understanding of actuality or else Being in the widest sense over against the experience of beings is in a certain sense *earlier* than the latter." [22] **"If** we did not understand, even in a rough and non-conceptual manner, what is meant by actuality, then things actual would remain hidden to us." [23] Thus an *a priori* understanding of actuality, the Being of things actual, is a condition of the givenness of something actual. The same holds in

leitende Problem, <lessen Erorterung uns auf das Phiinomen der Welt fiihrte, ist doch gerade, zu bestimmen, was und wte das Subjekt sei,-was zur Subjektivitiit des Subjekts gehore." GP "But the leading problem, whose discussion leads us to the phenomenon of the world, is just this, to determine what and how the subject is-what belongs to the subjectivity of the subject." The ontological determination of the subjectivity of the subject, if not the main task of SZ--which is the renewal of the Being-question-is second only to this main task. It could be said that Dasein is the subject ontologically viewed. " Die Richtung auf das Subj·ekt bzw. auf das, was im Grunde damit gemeint ist, unser Dasein . . . " GP 103. " The direction to the subject, or else to that which is fundamentally thereby meant by it, our Dasein . . . "

[22] " Wir miissen Wirklichkeit vel'.stehen konnen *vor* aller Erfahrung von Wirklichem. Dies•es Verstehen von Wirklichkeit bzw. Sein im weitesten Sinne gegeniiber der Erfahrung von Seinendem ist in einem bestimmten Sinne *friiher* als das letztgenannte." GP 14.

[23] "Verstiinden wir nicht, wenngleich zuniichst roh und unbegrifliich, was Wir·klichkeit besagt, dann bliebe uns Wirkliches verborgen." GP 14.

the case of other categories and/or existentialia like reality, vitality, *Existenz* and subsistence.[24] One should note here the distinction between Being as such and Being as divided by the categories and/or existentialia. Heidegger is claiming that we have an *a priori* understanding not only of Being as such, but also of the Being of particular regions of beings.

3. Being is not only the transcendental-a *priori* condition of the revelation of beings, but also the Being of these beings.

It has been seen thus far that Being for Heidegger is (1) a meaning, (2) a possible phenomenon in the phenomenological sense, (3) ontically conditioned by Dasein, (4) transcendental in both senses of the term, (5) *a priori* in both senses of the term, and (6) as all of the above, the condition of the revelation of beings.

Nevertheless, for the early Heidegger at least, Being is always the Being of beings.[25] Being is that which determines beings as beings (SZ 6). Thus despite the "ontological difference" of Being from beings, beings *are* only in virtue of their "participation" in Being.[26] Therefore Being is not merely the transcendental condition of the revelation or disclosure of beings, but also precisely the Being of these beings. If Being were only a condition of revelation, Being would function as little more than another name for (transcendental) consciousness. But it

[24] GP 14.

[25] "Sein ist jeweils das Sein eines Seienden." SZ 9. "... Sein aber je Sein von Seiendem ist ..." SZ 37. "Sein ist überhaupt und in jeder Bedeutung Sein von Seiendem." *Heidegger Gesamtausgabe* Band 26, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann Verlag, 1978) p. 193. "... <das Sein immer Sein eines Seienden ist ..." GP 456.

[26] "Participation" may appear a dangerous and misleading expression. Talk of the participation of beings in Being does however seem to be justified on Heideggerian grounds since "the being" *(das Seiende)* is, grammatically considered, the substantive form of the participle "being" *(seiend)*, which in turn refers back to the infinitive "to be" *(sein)*, the noun form of which is Being *(Sein)*. *Das Seiende* "participates" in *Sein* insofar as the former is derived from a *participial* modification of the latter. Cf. "Der Spruch des Anaximander" in *Heidegger Gesamtausgabe* Band 5, *Holzwege* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977)' p. 344.

is clear that the tendency of Heidegger's problematic, despite the transcendental idealism of *Being and Time,* is straightforwardly ontological. The nominal theme of the investigation is indeed the Being of beings, not the consciousness (however concretely determined) of beings. The analytic of Dasein, though it is at the center of *Being and Time,* merely prepares the way for the renewal of the Being-question. This is quite clear from § I of the treatise. The question of Being as unfolded in this section is the question of the unity of Being over against the manifold of special categories (SZ 3). But the unity of Being, as Aristotle already was aware, is not the unity of a highest genus (M*etaph.* . It follows that Being, or else the meaning of Being (which amounts to the same for Heidegger), cannot be defined in terms of a genus-species scheme. Such a scheme is appropriate only for beings. Although Being is not susceptible of genus-species definition, it nonetheless would appear to have a unified sense which can and must be investigated if ontology is to progress (SZ 11). Heidegger's point is simply that the problem of the transcendental (i.e. non-generic) unity of Being, although seen by Aristotle and treated in the Scholastic doctrines of analogy, has been since that time forgotten (SZ 3). It should be clear, then, that the Being-question as fommlated at the beginning of *Being and Time* is a technical ontological question which, in itself and apart from the theory that Being resides *a priori* in Dasein's understanding, has nothing at all to do with the question of the revelation of beings. In other words, the Being-question, as the sober and apparently justified question as to the transcendental unity of Being, can be *detached* from the further question as to how we have access to Being.[21] Heidegger of course does not

[27] To a certain extent, this is the tack that Heidegger takes in his *1935* lecture, *Introduction to Metaphysics.* Here the Being-question is approached more straightforwardly, so that the role of Dasein, as the bearer of the understanding of Being, becomes almost peripheral. "Wenn wir daher die Frage 'Warum ist iiberhaupt Seiendes und nicht vielmehr Nichts? ' in ihrem Fragesinn recht vollziehen, miissen wir die Hervorhebung von jeglichem besonderen, einzelnen Seienden unterlassen, auch den Hinweis auf den Menschen." *Einfuhrung in die Metaphysik*

separate the two questions in *Being and Time:* Being can be investigated only in relation to Dasein's understanding of Being. But this does not mean that the two questions are not distinct.

As a straightforwardly ontological question, the Being-question cannot be reduced to the " epistemological " question of how beings are disclosed or "known." This does not mean that the Being-question is not also an '" epistemological " question, but only that the narrowly ontological thrust of the question is not to be lost sight of. Thus the Being-question has as it were two sides, both of which are constitutive of it, and neither of which can be eliminated without distorting the sense of the question.

This state of affairs can be elucidated from another angle. As has been seen, Being for Heidegger is transcendental in two distinct but interwoven senses. Being is transcendental in the traditional sense insofar as it is not a highest genus, i.e. not a highest what-determination of beings. But Being is also transcendental in the modern, i.e. Kantian, sense insofar as it is the ultimate *a priori* condition of the revelation (knowledge in a very broad sense) of beings. In the first sense of "transcendental," Being is a straightforwardly ontological theme, whereas in the second sense, Being is the theme of a regressive transcendental *reflection* which aims to exhibit the *a priori* conditions of the revelation of beings. The difficulty and questionableness of Heidegger's position in *Being and Time* is in large part due to the interweaving of these two senses of "transcendental." As transcendental in the second sense, Being is arguably subjective, although transcendental-subjective and not psychological-subjective. Being "is" only so long as there is a being (Dasein) which has an understanding of Being.[28] As transcendental in the first sense, however, Being is no more subjective than non-subjective. After all, it is certainly not

(Tlibingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1966) p. 3. "Innerhalb des Seienden im Ganzen ist kein Rechtsgrund zu finden flir die Hervorhebung gerade *des* Seienden, das man Mensch nennt und zu dem wir selbst zufiillig gehiiren." *Ibid.* p. 3.

[28] SZ 212. Cf. note 16 above.

Heidegger's intention to equate Being as such with the Being of Dasein *(Existenz),* even though there are passages in which he seems to conflate Being with *Existenz.*[29] *Existenz* is only one mode of Being, along with presence-at-hand *(Vorhandenheit)* , readiness-to-hand *(Zuhandenheit),* life, subsistence, nature and space.[30] Clearly then, the Being of Dasein (i.e. *Existenz)* is distinct from Being as such insofar as Being as such comprises, in addition to the Being of Dasein, the Being of beings other than Dasein. Nor is it Heidegger's intention to equate *Sein* with *Bewusstsein,.* Being with consciousness. Thus Heidegger's conception of Being exhi:bits a certain tension inasmuch as the two senses of " transcendental," both of which qualify Being for Heidegger, would seem to be incompatible.

II. *The Inconsistency in the Concept of Being in the Early Heidegger*

Having sketched some of the characteristics of the concept of Being in the early Heidegger, we are in a position to point to a serious difficulty involved in this concept. If Being " is " only in Dasein's understanding of Being, and if Dasein is a contingent being, then Being itself is contingent. This paradoxical conclusion would not be objectionable if " Being" were only a differ·ent name for "consciousness." On this assumption, the non-existence of Dasein would entail the non-existence of human consciousness, but would not touch the " existence " of beings other than Dasein. What makes the conclusion objectionable is the fact that for the ·early Heidegger Being is not only a condition of the revelation of beings, but also the Being

[29] Cf. SZ 38. In the first full paragraph on this page, in which Heidegger speaks of Being as such and of the knowledge of Being as such, we find a sentence in·congruously intercalated which refers to the transcendence of the Being of Dasein. The context strongly suggests that Being as such and the Being of Dasein are identical. The same identification is suggested, though not as strongly, on p. 20, 11.35-86 of SZ.

[30] Heidegger distinguishes at least seven different modes of Being *(Seinsweisen),* namely, *Existenz, Vorhandenheit, Zuhandenheit, Leben* (SZ 50), *Bestehen* (SZ Ql6f., 4!20), *Natur* (SZ !211) and *Raum* (SZ lU).

oi these beings (see characteristic three above). Thus if Dasein were not to exist, no other beings would "exist" either. But this explicitly contradicts Heidegger's often repeated claim that beings are independent of the understanding of Being (cf. SZ 212). A clear statement from the *Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie:* " World is only if and so long as a Dasein exists. Nature can also be if no Dasein exists." [31] That is, Dasein is a condition of the revelation of nature, but not of the Being of nature. Heidegger makes the same point in the *Metaphysische AnfangsgriindJe der Logik* (1928) : " The cosmos can be without humans inhabiting the earth, and presumably the cosmos was long before humans ever existed." [32] But what sense is there in saying that the cosmos can be without humans if Being "is " only in Dasein's understanding of Being? Being, we will remember, is the Being of beings; it is that which makes beings be. It is not just the condition of their revelation. Heidegger's Being is something like the *actus essendi* of Aquinas, though Heidegger refuses to conceptualize Being as a highest being, namely God, and moreover, seeks to get back behind the essence/existence distinction presupposed by Aquinas. [33] Being cannot therefore be merely a condition of the revelation of being. If it were, it would be indistinguishable from consciousness. Now if Being is at once both the Being of beings and contingent upon the existence of Dasein, it necessarily follows that no beings can be without the existence of Dasein. But Heidegger refuses to draw this conclusion, and in fact asserts its opposite. Thus Heidegger's early "system" contains a manifest contradiction.

How does this contradiction arise? We would like to suggest that it is the result of two conflicting tendencies in Heidegger's thought. The one tendency is decidedly "idealistic" while the other is more " realistic."

[31] " Welt ist nur, wenn und solange ein Dasein existiert. Natur kann auch sein, wenn kein Dasein existiert." GP 241. Cf. GP 422.

[32] " Der Kosmos kann sein, ohne dass Menschen eine Ertle bewohnen, und vermutlich war der kosmos liingst bevor je Menschen existierten." *Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Logik,* p. 216.

[33] Cf. GP 108-149, in particular, 128-131.

Heidegger's idealism can be seen in his early conception of Being: Being" is" only in Dasein's understanding of Being. In *Being and Time* and works of that period, Heidegger definitely favors idealism over realism. "As compared with realism, *idealism,* no matter how contrary and untenable it may be in its results, has an advantage in principle, provided that it does not misunderstand itself as 'psychological' idealism. If idealism emphasizes that Being and reality are only 'in consciousness,' this expresses an understanding of the fact that Being cannot be explained through beings." [34] From this passage and the next, one can gather that Heidegger's idealism is a transcendental rather than a psychological idealism. "If what the term ' idealism ' says, amounts to the understanding that Being can never be explained by beings, but is already that which is ' transcendental ' for every being, then idealism affords the only correct possibility for a philosophical problematic." [35] Being is transcendental-but the term " transcendental," as we have argued above, has two distinct senses. Being is transcendental as the non-generic unity of beings, as that which is non-generically common to beings; and Being is transcendental insofar as it is " subjective," residing as it does in Dasein's understanding of Being. Heidegger combines these two senses of "transcendental " with consequences that are dubious indeed. For if Dasein is neither an ideal subject nor a metaphysical self, but a contingent being delivered over to the vicissitudes of the "real world," then Being is just as contingent as Dasein is. And if Being is not just a "subjective" condition of the disclosedness of beings, but also the Being of these beings, then beings are only so long as Dasein is.

[34] " Gegeniiber dem Realismus hat der *ldealismu11,* mag er im Resultat noch se entgegengesetzt und unhaltbar sein, einen grundsiitzlichen Vorrang, falls er nicht als 'psychologischer' IdealismUB sich selbst missversteht. Wenn der Idealismus betont, Sein und Realitiit sei nur 'im Bewusstsein ', so kommt hier <las Verstandnis davon zum Ausdruck, <lass Sein nicht <lurch Seiendes erkliirt werden kann." SZ !207.

[35] " Besagt der Titel Idealismus soviel wie Verstiindnis <lessen, <lass Sein nie <lurch Seiendes erkliirbar, sondern fiir i·edes Seiende je schon <las 'Transzendentale' ist, dann Iiegt im Idealismus die einzige und rechte Moglichkeit philosophischer Problematik." SZ !208.

Heidegger's realism consists in the refusal to admit this last inference. Heidegger asserts quite definitely that beings, e.g. nature, are whether or not Dasein is. Thus the early Heidegger seems to maintain a doctrine of things in themselves which "exist" apart from Dasein's understanding of them.

A brief comparison with Kant should illuminate Heidegger's position. Kant took great pains to distinguish his transcendental or formal idealism from what he calls " material idealism " whether this be the "problematical" idealism of Descartes or the" dogmatic and enthusiastic" idealism of Berkeley.[36] In the *Proleg<Yrnenato Any Future Metaphys-ics,* Kant claims that his formal idealism does not affect the *existence* of objects, but only the manner of their appearance to us.[37] According to this passage from the *Prolegomena,* objects exist in themselves apart from the subject's knowledge of them. In other words, thinking beings are not all there is for Kant-the opposite of which is the thesis of idealism according to Kant [38]-'-there are also things in themselves.[39]

Now just as Kant went to great lengths to distinguish his formal idealism from material idealism by arguing that the *existence* of objects is not dependent upon the subject, so too Heidegger tries to avoid a full-blown idealist position by claiming that beings would be without Dasein. But whereas Kant's position is that the being-known of beings is dependent upon the subject, Heidegger's stance is that the very Being of beings is dependent upon the" subject." Thus Kant's formal idealism seems to represent a possible position whereas Heidegger's position seems clearly untenable.

Heidegger is faced with a dilemma: If Being is the Being of beings, and if beings "exist" independently of Dasein's ex-

[36] Cf. the "Refutation of Idealism" inse;-ted in the 11econd edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason,* B274 ff.

[37] *Prolegomena* § 13, Remarks II and III.

•• " Der Idealismus besteht in der Behauptung, dass es keine anderen als denkende Wesen gebe.. ."*Prolegomena* § 18, Remark II. Felix Meiner Ausgabe, p. 41.

•• In the *Opus Postumum,* Kant seems to abandon his belief in things in themselves. Cf. *Akademie-Ausgabe* XXII 26, 27, SI, S2, SS, 84, 42, 44, 45.

istence, then Being cannot he identical with Dasein's understanding of Being. But if Being ·is identical with Dasein's understanding of Being, then no beings can be without Dasein. Heidegger refuses to take hold of either horn and attempts- unsuccessfully, we think-to have it both ways at once.

One could interpret Heidegger's difficulty as arising from the attempt at renewing the Being-question within the framework of transcendental idealism. The straightforwardly ontological problem of Being is approached in *Being and Time* via the analysis of that being which alone has an understanding of Being. From the outset, Being is viewed as relative to Dasein; and yet Being is always more than a subjective condition of the understanding of beings since it is precisely the Being of beings whether these be of the type of Dasein or not. It is as if the Being-question-a thoroughly legitimate question, by the way [40] -will not let itself be restricted to the narrow confines of transcendental idealism. Could it be that the inner tension in the early concept of Being helped motivate the " turn " in the later Heidegger?

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••For a spirited attack on the meaningfulness of the Being-question, see Sydney Hook *The Quest for Being* (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1968) p. 147.

THE PLACE OF THE STATE IN SOCIETY ACCORDING TO THOMAS AQUINAS

IN RENDERING THE Aristotelian formula, "Man is by nature a *political* animal," [1] Aquinas generally prefers to say" Man is by nature a *social* animal." [2] The texts containing this rendition of the formula, taken collectively, reveal that he considers the social realm to be grounded in man's physical, intellectual and moral need for assistance from his fellow man and in a basic love that one man has for another. In addition, they reveal that he regards the social realm, in its concrete expression, as ranging from the family up to, and including, its natural culmination in the political realm of the State *(cimtas)* as a civically governed society. Accordingly, though society cannot be identified exclusively with the State, it ultimately takes the form of the State, wherein the social concern for the welfare of the whole man is most fully satisfied.[8] St. Thomas, therefore, has reason to say, as he does on one occasion, "Man is by nature a political *or* social animal," [4] since 'the social ' assumes the form of ' the political ' in the realm of the State. [5] Speaking in this vein, St. Thomas is assigning a positive, natural value to the State, hitherto generally unrecognized by writers in the Middle Ages, for whom the divinely appointed lay ruler had merely the negative function of restraining the waywardness of man.[6]

[1] Aristotle, *Politics,* I, 2; 125Sa2: "Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal " (Jowett transl.) .

• This mode of expressing the Aristotelian formula is found in the following: *Summa Theologiae,* I, 96, 4; I-III, 95, 4. 11-11, 109, S *ad* 1. *Su11/1T114 Contra Gentilu,* Ill, 117, 128, 129, 147. *In Eth.,* I, 1.

• *In Eth.,* I, 1.

•*Summa Contra Gentiles,* III, 85.

[5] These are the conclusions I reach upon a review of these texts in another article, entitled "Aquinas' Political Philosophy: A Political Economy?".

[6] Cf. Walter IDlman, *Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages* (London: Methuen, 1961). pp. *255-66.*

But in adopting this basically Aristotelian position, he would seem to favor the notion of a State so exalted and all-encompassing that it would deny any autonomy to its component communities and its individual citizens.[7] When this is combined with the fact that there were in his own day the beginnings of a separation of the political and the social, in which the political tended to become identified with the legislative and juridical, we have the makings of a State that rules society from above and without.[8] In other words, we have the makings of a totalitarian, absolute State, caring paternalistically for society and its members.

There are, however, other texts in Aquinas, containing further renditions of the Aristotelian formula, which must be considered before establishing whether or not his position ulti-

[7] This Aristotelian position, in the hands of the Medieval Schoolmen, was interpreted by Gierke as an organic theory of the State (Otto Gierke, *Political Theories of the Middle Ages*, transl. with an introd. by F. W. Maitland, Cambridge University Press, 1900).

For a re-examination of Gierke's interpretation, see Ewart Lewis, "Organic Tendencies in Medieval Political Thought," *American Political Science Review*, XXXII (Oct. 1938), pp. 849-76.

In addition, it might be noted that St. Thomas's successors were inclined to strengthen the community at the expense of the individual. For example, Peter of Auvergne, the continuator of St. Thomas's *Commentary on Politics*, writes: *cum vivit secundum rempublicam operatur secundum rationem (In Pol.*, V, 7). Cf. Thomas Gilby, O.P., *The Political Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (London: Longmans, Green, 1958), p.

[8] Along with a pervasive legal positivism, this tendency was, in fact, subsequently fed by strains of Latin Averroism, which precluded the higher inspiration of religio-spiritual values in civil affairs; and by notions of sov.ereignty and compact in Roman Law, interpreted along the lines of political voluntarism, according to which the will of the ruler was supreme. The tendency, under these influences, ultimately culminated in Jean Rodin's doctrine of sovereignty in the sixteenth century.

Singling out legal positivism, Gilby writes that the jurists " treated laws and institutions as existing social artefacts " and " defined the political or civil in terms of the constitution actually in force" *(op.* cit., p. "Twenty years after his (St. Thomas's) death," Gilby adds, "legality was seen to menace the *lex perfecta juxta vias philosophiae*, as Roger Bacon put it; he burst out with the reflection that there was more worth in a few chapters of Aristotle than in the entire *Corpus Juris.* So also Giles of Rome, though a Canonist hims.elf, called the legists *ydiote politice"* (op. *cit.*, p. 191).

mately leads to this kind of State. First, there are those in which he uses 'political' alone in the formula, rather than 'social,' thereby reproducing exactly the words of Aristotle, "Man is by nature a *political* animal." Secondly, there are some in which he uses 'political' conjunctively with 'social,' saying "Man is by nature a political *and* social animal." Finally, reversing the order of the two terms in the conjunction, he writes: "Man is by nature a *social* and political animal."

Through a review of these texts, the present article seeks to clarify St. Thomas's position on the matter. Taking them in the above order, this review will introduce and cite the texts, expose their thought-content, and offer an explanation of the formula-variations found therein. After considering the texts individually, the article concludes with a summary of the views expressed, taking the texts collectively.

To commence:

Man is by nature a political animal

A text containing this exact duplication of the formula, basic to the whole of St. Thomas's social and political philosophy, is found in his *Commentary on the Politics,* I, 1. Here, adopting Aristotle's thought as his own, he offers two arguments to substantiate the statement that "Man is by nature a political *(civilR)* animal": The first is based on the natural character of the State; the second, on speech as an operation proper to man.[9]

In the first, he holds that the State is natural insofar as it is the end of a natural, generative process. This process, he explains, commences with the union of man and woman, giving rise to the domestic society of the family and household, which provides for daily needs. It continues through the wider and more complex society of small communities, which can provide more completely for the needs of its members. And it cul-

•*In Libros Politicorum Aristotelis Expo'Sitio, Lib.* I, lect. 1, nn. 84 and 86. I am using the Spiazzi edition (Rome: Marietti, 1951), but with emendations taken from the Leonine (Rome, 1971).

minates in the still wider and more complex political society of the State, which, as a *perfect* or complete society, provides most fully for individual needs. These needs include not only the needs of life itself, but the needs of the good life-the life of virtue, to which the laws of the State are ordered.[10] Given, therefore, the natural character of the State, man must be considered a naturally political animal:

> He (Aristotle) concludes then, first of all, from what has preceded that a State is made up of things that are according to nature. And since a State is nothing other than a congegation of men, it follows that *man is by nature a political* (*civile) animal.*[11]

It is true, St. Thomas continues, that people are sometimes deprived of citizenship through exile or lack of property requirements, but this does not vitiate the position that man is naturally a political animal. It does not do so, any more than the loss of a hand, or being deprived of food, would allow for the conclusion that this was the natural state of man. If, in fact, a man were found who was not political by nature, he would either be depraved, his human nature having been corrupted, or he would be better than man, insofar as he would have a more perfect nature than that commonly found in men, and could do without the company of his fellows, as was the case with John the Baptist and Blessed Anthony the hermit. Apart, therefore, from exceptional cases of this kind, who are either below or above the nature of man, men are, or are meant to be, by nature members of a State or political society. Hence, the argument from the natural character of the State in support

[10] *lbi<l•* nn. 17-33, *passim.*

[11] *Ibid.,* n. 34: *Concludit ergo primo ex praemissis quod civitas est eorum quae sunt secundum naturam. Et cum civitas non sit nisi congregatio hominum, s:equitur quod homo sit animal naturaliter civile (cf.* Aristotle, *Politics,* I,

Cf. Ernest L. Fortin's and Peter D. O'Neill's English translation of portions of the *Commentary on the Politics (Proemium;* I, l; ID, 1-6) in *Medieval, Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook,* edited by Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi (New York: Macmillan, Free Press, 1963), pp. I have retained Fortin's and O'Neill's translation of 'political ' for *civilis,* in keeping with *civitas* as the Latin equivalent for the Greek, *polis,* though ' civic ' would be likewise acceptable.

of the statement that " man is by nature a political animal " retains its cogency.[12]

In the second argument, based on the presence of speech in man, he points out that man alone among the animals has the power of speech *(locutio).* Other animals, he says, have at best mere sound of voice (*vox)* , though some reproduce human speech without knowing what they are saying. But the language of human speech *(sermo)* and the sound of an animal's voice (*vox)* are two different things. The voice of the animal signifies merely pain or pleasure and consequently passions, such as anger and fear, which the animal makes known to other animals through voice-sounds, as the lion by his roar and the dog by his bark.[13] Human speech, however, signifies something over and above this: it signifies what is useful and harmful. From this it follows that speech signifies the just and unjust, for justice consists in the fact that some people are treated equitably or inequitably with respect to useful and harmful things. Given, therefore, that man alone among the animals has a knowledge of the good and bad, the just and the unjust, and other things of this kind, the language of speech, through which this knowledge is conveyed, must likewise be seen as belonging to man alone, or as proper to man.[14]

On the basis of this premise, he observes, we can say that speech is given to man by nature, and since nature does nothing in vain, always working toward a determined end, the final end of speech must be given to man by nature as well. What is that end? It is social intercourse concerning properly human affairs, which assumes the dual form of the household, or family, and the State. Consequently, insofar as the household and the State are, themselves, the final ends of speech, they are, along with speech, natural to man. From this, follows the conclusion that "Man is by nature a domestic and political animal ".[15]

[10] *Ibid.,* n. 85.
[13] *Ibid.,* nn. 86 and 87.
"Ibid., n. 87.
[10] *.Ibid.*

Since, therefore, language is given to man by nature, and since language is ordered to this, that men communicate with one another regarding the useful and harmful, the just and the unjust, and other things of this kind, it follows from the fact that nature does nothing in vain, that men communicate with one another regarding these things. But communication in these matters is what makes a household and a State. Therefore, *man is by nature a domestic and politic<il* (*civile) animal.*[16]

In the light of these .arguments, he adds, one man could not live self-sufficiently by himself apart from the State, unless he were either a beast or a god, just as a hand or a foot could not exist apart from a man.[17] This is to say, first of all, that there exists in every man a certain natural inclination toward the community of the State, just as there exists in every man a certain natural inclination toward virtue. This does not mean, of course, that man is born with the State any more than a man is born with virtue, for States are founded through human industry and virtues are acquired through human experience.[18] The State, however, aids man in his acquisition of virtue, through which man achieves his human perfection, since the laws of the State restrain him from wickedness, savagery and corruption.[19] Indeed, ' because man is made to abide by justice . through the political order, the Greeks used the same term for the order of the political community and the judgment of justice, namely, *dike.* The institution of the State kept men from

[16] *Ibid.,* n. 87: *Oum e:rgo homini datus sit sermo a natura, et se:rmo ordinetur ad hoc quod homines Bibi invicem communicent in utili et nocivo, iusto et iniusto et alia huiusmodi: sequitur, ex quo natura nihu facit frustra, quod naiiuralite:rhomines in his Bibi communicent. Sed communicatio in istis facit domum et civitatem; ergo homo est naturalite:r animal domesticum et civile (cf.* Aristotle, *Politics,* I, 2; U58al7).

Speaking of man as being " by nature a domestic and political animal " is in keeping with his *Commentary on the Ethics,* I, 1 (n. 4, Spiazzi ed.), in which he views man's social nature (" Man is by nature a social animal") as concretized in the basic, human communities of the family and the State.

[17] *Ibid.,* n. 89.

[1·] *Ibid.,* n. 40.

[1·] *Ibid.,* n. 41.

being most evil and brought them to a condition of excellence in accordance with justice and the virtues.' [20]

Throughout, therefore, the whole of this argumentation in the *Commentary on the Politics,* St. Thomas views the political as an extension of the social, bringing to the social on the level of the family and local community its greater resources and its legislative power, and pursuing the same aim as the social in promoting the well-being of man, materially and spiritually. Consequently, St. Thomas, in reproducing the Aristotelian formula at the beginning, might have said, as he has on many other occasions: "Man is by nature a *social* animal." Instead, he says: "Man is by nature a *politiaal* animal." Why? Apart from any literal faithfulness to the terminology of Aristotle, the answer is to be found in the fact that he is writing a political commentary, in which he is emphasizing the primacy of the political within the social realm. [21] In this regard, he reminds his readers that among the Greeks the order of the political community coincided with justice, in the eyes of its citizens.

At the same time, however, in his reference to the Greeks, he is removing himself from their position on the complete supremacy of the State, or the political community, in its juridical function. Among them, any recognition of a higher end than the State was reserved for the few; accordingly, it was left to the State to be the final judge, for the common man, of right-

[20] *Ibid.: Sed homo reducitur ad iustitiam per ordinem civilem: quod patet ex hoc quod eodem nomine apud Graecoo nominatur ordo civilis communitatis. et iudicium iustitae, scilicef ' diki '. Unde manifestum est quod ille qui civitatem insllituitj, abstulit hominibus quod essent pessimi, et reduxit eos ad hoc quod essent optimi secundum iustitiam et virtutes.*

In the passage upon which St. Thomas is commenting *(Politics,* I, 2; 1253a31-38), Aristotle concludes as follows: " But justice is the bond of men in states, for the administration of justice, which is the determination of what is just, is the principle of order in political society."

[21] As distinct from the traditional, medieval conception of man as a social animal, Walter Ullmann notes: "The concept of man as a political animal signified the entry of the 'political' into contemporary vocabulary and thought-processes. Thinking in 'political' terms became a new mental category" (Walter Ullman, *A History of Political Thought: The Middle Ages* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1965)' p. 175).

ness and wrongness in human aff.airs.[22] But from the viewpoint of the reasoning of those belonging to the Christian faith, this could not be true, for Christians maintain that there is a higher arbiter of justice and virtue than the State, namely, God. This tenet of Christian faith and reason, which permeates the thought of St. Thomas,[23] plays a significant role in his political philosophy, allowing, as it does, for elements of a spiritual and moral character within society and the individual person that transcend the power and authority of the State.[24]

[22] As E.B.F. Midgley says in his recent article, "Concerning the Modernist Subversion of Political Philosophy," *New Scholasticism,* **Liil,** No. 2 (Spring, 1979), pp. 168-90: "although Aristotle rightly distinguishes between the different levels of the political life and the contemplative life, he does not properly show, in a sufficiently thoroughgoing way, how the political life is ordered to the life of contemplation. . . . The synthesis, absent in Aristotle, is to be found in Aquinas " (p. 181).

Hence, as R. W. and A. J. Carlyle have written in *A His.tory of Mediaeval Political Theory in the Westi,* 6 vols. (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1903-36) Y, pp. 6-7: "Aristotle's conceptions of political society as the necessary condition of human life and progress, and of the political order as founded upon the conception of a moral justice, were profound and permanent. But he failed to understand the complementary truth of the equal and free personality of men; . . . in his profound apprehension of the meaning of the social and political order of human life, he failed to take sufficient account of the fact that though, in his own phrase, the State is prior to the individual, the State exists for the individual, and not the individual for the State."

Finally, as A. P. D'Entreves observes, in *Aquinas: Selected Political Writings,* ed. with introd. by A. P. D'Entreves and trans. by **J.** G. Dawson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1959), pp. xiv-xv: "the Aristotelian conception, with its insistence on the ' natural ' character of the State and the exaltation of the State itself as the fulfilment and end of human nature, contained at bottom a challenge to the Christian idea of the existence of higher and ultimate values, and of the inadequacy of merely human means for their attainment."

[23] For example, *Summa Theologiae,* I-II, 21, 4, *ad* 3; *ibid.,* 91, 4.

[24] This readily evokes the question of Church-State relations. For present purposes, let us merely note that St. Thomas " never treated Church and State as though either could appeal to exclusive loyalties" (Thomas Gilby, *op. cit.,* p. 313). As he said, ' the temporal power is subject to the spiritual as the body to the soul. There is no usurpation of power if a spiritual Prelate should enter into temporal affairs with respect to those things in which the temporal power is subject to him or in matters which have been left to him by the secular power' *(S.T.,* II-II, 60, 6, *ad* 3).

For analyses of Church-State relations in Aquinas, see the article of I. **T.** Eschmann, 0.P., "St. Thomas Aquinas on the Two Powers," *Mediaeval Studies,* XX

Within this framework, provided by St. Thomas at the beginning of his *Commentary on the Politics*, we can now consider other texts, commencing with the *Commentary on the Ethics*, I, 9. Here, after having shown that happiness, as the ultimate end of man, must be the perfeot good, and that the perfect good must be self-sufficient,[25] he goes on to explain that a self-sufficient good can only be self-sufficient if it satisfies more than one person:

> It is called a self-sufficient good not because it suffices merely for one man alone living a solitary life, but for his parents, children, wife, friends and fellow citizens as well, so that it will adequately provide the necessary assistance both in temporal matters by service and in spiritual matters by instruction and counsel. Such extension is required because *man is by nature a political (civile) animal*, and therefore his desire is not satisfied in providing for himself alone, but in being able to provide for others. This, however, must be understood within limits.[26]

Following this, St. Thomas explains that the self-sufficient good of which Aristotle is speaking is not the absolute or unlimited self-sufficient good, which is God, but a self-sufficient good of a limited character within the natural order, which cannot care

(1958), pp. 107-fW5, and the responding article by Leonard E. Boyle, 0.P., "The *De Regno* and the Two Powers," in *Essays in Honour of Anton Charles* ed. J. Reginald O'Donnell, C.S.B. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), pp. 237-47.

[25] *In Decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis. Ad Nicomachum Expositio, Lib.* I, *lect.* 9, nn. 107-112. I am using the Spiazzi edition (Rome: Marietti, 1949), but with emendations taken from the Leonine (Rome, 1969).

[26] *Ibid.*, n. 112: *Dicitur autem esse per 11e sufjiciens bonum, non quia sit sufjiciens so!i uni homini viventi vitam solitariam, sed parentibus et filiis et uxori et amicis et civilnis, ut scilicet sufjiciat eis et in temporalibus. providere necessaria auxilia ministrando,, et etiam in spiritualibus instruendo vel consiliando. Et hoc ideo quia homo naturaliter est animal civile. Et ideo non sufjicit suo desiderio quod sibi provideat, sed etiam quad possit aliis. providere. Sed hoc oportet intelligere usque ad aliquem terminem (cf.* Aristotle, *Nie. Ethics*, I, 7; 1097b8-12).

Cf. the English translation of C. I. Litzinger, O.P., *St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics* (Chicago; Henry Regnery, 1964), 2 vols. According to the Spiazzi and Leonine editions, *civile* is the term used in the formula, and hence ' social ' in the Litzinger translation should be replaced by ' political' or 'civic'.

for the need of an indefinite number of people, however much we might like to extend the number.[27] It is this limited self-sufficient good belonging to man's present life that is meant to satisfy not merely the solitary man, but 'his parents, children, wife, friends,' and, topping the list, 'his fellow citizens.' As suggested by the latter, the self-sufficient good under consideration is the political society of the State, which, in accordance with its social function, provides the necessary assistance 'in both temporal and spiritual matters.' Because, therefore, the self-sufficient good being considered is specifically the State, St. Thomas again chooses the word' political' over' social' in saying "Man is by nature a *political* animal," without suggesting that the political is to be detached from the social, for both are joined in their common concern for the whole man.

In keeping with the mention of 'friend,' along with 'parents, children, wife and fellow citizens,' as among those that the individual's happiness, or self-sufficient good, must satisfy, St. Thomas later in the same work, namely, in the *Commentary on the Ethics*, IX, 10, speaks of the need of friendship for human happiness:

> And he [Aristotle] says that it seems strange for the happy man to be a solitary; for this is contrary to everyone's choice. No one would choose to live alone all the time, even though he had all other goods, because *man is by nature a political (politicum) animal* and fitted naturally to live with others. Since, therefore, the happy person has what is naturally good for man, it is reasonable that he should have people with whom to live. But obviously it is better for him to live with friends and virtuous people than strangers and anyone whatsoever. Accordingly, it is clear that the happy man needs friends.[28]

[27] *Ibid.*, nn. 113-16.

[28] *Ibid.*, n. 1891: *Et dicit quod hoc videtur esse inconveniems quod beatus sitl solitaritis. Hoc enim es.t contra communem omnium electionem: nullus enim eligeret ut semper viveret secundum se ipsum, scilicet solus, etsi omnia alia bona haberet, quia homo naturaJiter est animal politicum et aptus natus convivere aliis. Quiai igitur felix habet ea quae sunt naturaliter bona homini, conveniens est quod habeat cum quibus convivat. Manifestum est autem quod melius est ipsum convivere amicis et virtuosis quam extraneis et quibuscumque. Sic ergo manifestum est quod felix indiget amicis* (cy. Aristotle, *Nie. Ethics*, IX, 9; 1169bl6-U).

Though the term 'social' in the formula would have sufficed to support the conclusion that the happy man needs friends, St. Thomas uses the term ' political ' for the simple reason that he is commenting on the topic of friendship within Aristotle's context of justice and the community, especially the community of the State. Viewed in this light, St. Thomas is implicitly saying that man's political nature, and hence the State, is grounded in something more than man's social need to live with others for the sake of his physical, moral and intellectual development; it is grounded as well in man's social need for companionship or friendship. Conversely, it is the need for friendly relatedness in man, and not merely the pragmatic need for survival, nor the need for intellectual and moral well-being, that lies at the root of man's political nature. [29] The State, therefore, which emerges in part from this basic need, must concern itself with establishing a social atmosphere, wherein friendship is possible. Again, the State joins with society in promoting this common aim.

The use of the single term, ' political,' by St. Thomas in the Aristotelian formula is found not only in both Commentaries, but also in his *Summa Theologiae.* Here, however, it is found merely on occasion, when it occurs for special reasons, in preference to' social' which is more generally used. [30] A case in point is found in the 'Treatise on the Virtues,' *Summa Theologiae,* I-II, 61, *5,* where St. Thomas divides the cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance, taken collectively, into: 'exemplar virtues,' 'political virtues' 'cleansing virtues,' and ' virtues of the cleansed soul.' As existing in God with re-

[29] Similarly in *Summa Contra Gentiles.,* III, 117, which contains the Aristotelian formula as "Man is by nature a *social* animal," St. Thomas views the social nature of man as grounded in a basic, natural love that one human being has for another. On friendship and love as an ultimate foundation for society and the State, see *L'Humanisme politique de Saint Thomas d'Aquin, individu et etat,* by Louis Lachance, 0.P. (Montreal: Uvrier [1964]), pp. 214-18.

[30] For examples of where ' social ' is used, see above, note 2. That " ' political ' is found merely on occasion, where it occurs for special reasons," is in keeping with I.Th. Eschmann, O.P., *St. Thomas Aquinas, On Kingship to the King of Cyprus* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949), p. 4, fn. 2.

spect to Himself' where they exist in an exemplary manner, they are called' exemplar virtues'; as existing in man according to the condition of his nature, they are called' political virtues'; as existing in man's striving for God, they are oalled 'cleansing virtues'; and finally, as existing in man's possession of God, they are called ' virtues of the cleansed soul.' Concerning the latter two, St. Thomas says that they are to be considered as mediating between the ' political virtues,' which are human and the 'exemplar virtues,' which are divine. [31]

Elaborating upon the 'political virtues ' as human virtues, he writes:

> Now because *man is by nature a political (politicum)* animal, virtues of this kind, insofar as they exist in man according to the condition of his nature, are called political *(politicae)* virtues, since it is by reason of these virtues that man conducts himself rightly in human affairs.[32]

Taking this passage in isolation from the rest of the article, one might think that the term ' social,' instead of ' political,' would have been more appropriate. For the cardinal virtues, considered as naturally human, govern the actions in general of one man in relation to another, or the broad spectrum of human affairs, which extends to the affairs of State, and as in texts containing the Aristotelian formula, wherein the term ' social ' is used, the social would be seen as including the political.

The reason for the choice of 'political,' however, is manifest

[31] *Loe. cit., corpus.* I am using the Marietti manual edition of the Leonine text (Rome, 1950).

[32] *Ibid.: Et quia homo secundum suam naturam est animal politicum, virtutes huiusmodi, prout in homine existunt secundum conditionem suae naturae, politicae vocantur: prout scilicet homo secundum has virtutes recte se habet in rebus humanis gerendis. Secundum quem modus hacteinus de his virtutibus locuti sumus.*

The concluding statement, " **It** is in this sense that we have been speaking of these virtues up to now," refers to the treatment of the cardinal virtues as natural, moral virtues, distinct from the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity, which St. Thomas considers in the next Question, viz Q. 62.

Cf. the English translation by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (London: 1912-25). *Cf.* also John A. Oesterle's translation of *Summa Theologiae,* I-II, 49-67 in Treatise on the Virtues. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966.

from the' Reply to the Fourth Objection'. Here, in responding to the position that only legal justice is ordered to the common good of the State, and hence that it alone among the virtues should be called 'political,' St. Thomas says:

> Legal justice alone relates to the common good, but by commanding it draws all the other virtues to the common good, as is said in *Ethics, V.* For we must take note that it belongs to the political virtues, as we are speaking of them here, to perform well in regard to the community, but also in regard to the parts of the community, namely to the household or to an individual person.[33]

Accordingly, St. Thomas, in elaborating upon the cardinal virtues as human, speaks of them primarily in relation to the common good of the State through the intermediary of legal justice. Viewing them in this light, he calls them *political* virtues, and sees them to be in keeping with the nature of man as political. At the same time, in accordance with his basic position that the political, naturally considered, encompasses the social, he notes that ' the political virtues ' govern the actions of men not only on the level of the State, but on the domestic and personal levels as well. In other words, to the extent that the moral virtues can be commanded by the legal justice of the State, they are called *political* virtues.[34] In bringing to society, there-

[83] *Loe. cit: Sola iustitia legalis directe res-picit bonum commune: sed per imperium omnes alias virtutes ad bonum commune trahit, ut in V Ethic dicit Philosophus. Est enim considerandum quod ad politicas virtutes., secundum quod hie dicuntur, pertinet non solum bene operari ad commune, sed etiam bene operari ad part.es communis, scilicet ad dowum, vel ali,quam singularem personam* (cf. Aristotle, *Nie. Ethics,* V, 1; ll'Z9b81-30a8).

••On the innovative character of St. Thomas's doctrine, Walter Ullmann writes as follows: " The ordinary cardinal virtues which were applicable to any man and were conditioned by his human nature were, according to the current medieval doctrine, not true virtues at all and were designed consequently as "acquired virtues" *(virtutes acquisitae),* whereas the "true virtues" consisted exclusively of the three theological ones, because they were " infused" by divinity (hence, *virtutes infusae)* . . . . Nothing reveals the consistency and integrity of Thomist thought better than the quite revolutionary thesis that these four ordinary, human, cardinal virtues perfectly sufficient for assigning virtuous character to an action based upon them . . . . Transferred to the science of government, Thomas's doctrine entailed that the four ancient, cardinal virtues, having assumed autonomous character, were capable of serving as the basis of the natural product, the

fore, the rule of justice and law, the State is seen to hold a distinctive place within society, but its role remains integral to society and its concerns, specifically in this instance, concern for the moral welfare of society, ranging from the State to the individual. [35]

This, however, is only one side of the picture. For the degree to which the State can govern the moral life of society is implicitly modified by St. Thomas's further consideration that the cardinal virtues, which are seen ultimately as' political virtues' on a naturally human level, take on a higher dimension as 'cleansing virtues' when they are ordered to God as man's supernatural end, in Whom they become' virtues of the cleansed soul ',[36] This leaves room once more for factors common to society and the individual person that are above and beyond the competence and jurisdiction of the State. [37]

State" *(The Individual, and Society in the Middle Ages)* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966) pp. 124-5.

Regarding the expression, *virtus politica,* Ullmann notes that it originated with Plotinus and was transmitted to the Middle Ages by Macrobius in his *Commentary on the Dream of Scipio* where he enumerates and discusses the four 'political virtues' (op. *cit.,* p. 125, ftn. 49; *Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages,* p. 247, ftn. 2).

[35] However, St. Thomas maintains that only those acts of virtue that are directed to the common welfare can be prescribed by State laws. Even then, he adds, only the exterior, virtuous act comes under the law, not the interior, virtuous disposition, though the law has this for its aim as well *(S.T.,* I-II, 96, 3; II-II, 58, 9, 10). Cf. Thomas Gilby, *op. cit.,* p. 183; *Between Community and Society, A Philos.ophyand Theology of the State* (London: Longmans, Green, 1953) p. 237.

••This further consideration is found in the *Corpus* of the same article (I-II, 61, 5).

[87] Viewing the political thought of St. Thomas in terms of an Aristotelian-,Augustinian synthesis, Bernard Roland-Gosselin, in his *La Doctrine Politique de Saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: Marcel Riviere, 1928), p. 99, writes: "La genie de St. Thomas a ete moins d'innover que d'incorporer a l'idealisme augustinien l'empiricisme aristotelicien, en fixant comme fin prochaine a l'Etat la felicire temporelle, a peu pres au sens OU l'entendait Aristote, pour l'ordonner ensuite a la felicite eternelle, a cette *Cite de Dieu* chantee par St. Augustin, fin de toutes les fins sociales et personnelles."

This concludes our review of texts in which St. Thomas chooses for specific reasons to use the term ' political ' rather than ' social ' in expressing the formula. It should be noted, however, that he likewise chooses ' political ' on occasion, when

Man is by nature a political and soc.ial animal

An example of a text containing this re-expression of the formula, using ' political and social ' to replace ' political,' is found immediately after the ' Treatise on the Virtues ' in his 'Treatise on the Vices,' *Summa Theologiae,* I-II, 72, 4. In this text, St. Thomas speaks of sin as being divided into sin against God, against oneself, and against one's neighbor, in keeping with a threefold order in man: man in relation to God; man in relation to his own reason; and man in relation to his fellow man:

There should be a threefold order in man. One is in relation to the rule of reason, insofar as all our actions and passions should be commensurate with the rule of reason. Another order is in relation to the rule of Divine law, by which man should be directed in all things. And if, certainly, man were by nature a solitary animal, this twofold order would be sufficient. But because *man is by nature r0 political and social animal,* as is proved in *Politics,* I, it is necessary that there be a third order by which man is directed in relation to other men with whom he has to live.[38]

The third order, to which St. Thomas refers as that' by which man is directed in relation to other men with whom he has to live,' is the social realm as governed by justice and law, *i.e.,* the political order. Accordingly, the implicit presence of the social

he is merely referring to the formula in Aristotle, even though the sense of the passage containing the reference would call for 'social'. A case in point is found in a text from the *Commentary on the Sentences* (4 *Sent.,* 26, I, 1), where he is speaking of the natural character of marriage. The text reads as follows:
Sicut enim naturalis ratio dictat ut homines simul cohabitent, quia unus homo non sufficit sibi in omnibus quae ad vitam pe;rtinent, ratione cujus dicitur homo naturaliter politicus; ita etiam eorum quibus indigetur ad humanam vitam, quaedam rYpera sunt competentia viris, quaedam mulieribus; unde natura movet ut sit quaedam aswciatio viri ad mulierem, in qua est matrimonium (loc. cit., Vives edition, 1874).

[33] *Loe. cit.: Triplex autem ordo in homine debet esse. Unus quidem secundum comparationem ad regulam rationis: prout scilicet omnes actiones et passiones nostrae debe-nt secundum regulam rationis commensurari. Alius autem ordo est per comparationem ad regulam divinae legis, per quam homo in omnibus dirigi debe1J. Et si quidem homo naturaliter esset animal solitarium, hie duplex ordo suffice;ret: sed quia homo est naturaliter animal politicum et sociafo, ut probatur in I Polit., ideo necesse est quod sit tertius ordo, quo homo ordinetur ad alios homines, quibus convivere debet (<Jj.* Aristotle, *Politics,* I, 2; U54a2).

in the political would have permitted him to use the word' political ' alone in the Aristotelian formula. What, then, prompted him to use 'political and social'? For a response, we have to take into account the developing complexity of society, consequent upon the breakdown of the Empire, the beginnings of the modern nation-State and the growth of urban and commercial life. This developing complexity required the expansion of administrative offices and an increase in governmental control, exercised through positive law-legislation, with the result that ' the political ' tended to become identified with ' government ' alone.

In choosing to use ' political and social,' St. Thomas shows that he is aware of this tendency, and recognizes that the more complex a society becomes, the greater the *existential* separation of government in ordering the affairs of that society. But, at the same time, by conjoining ' social ' with ' political,' he wishes to ensure that there is no misunderstanding about the necessity for ' the political,' construed as ' government,' to join *essentially* with ' the social ' in their common concern for the whole man.[39] In keeping with his Aristotelian notion of the State as a political community, he is saying implicitly that the governmental dimension of society in the political community should not be divorced from the interests of society itself.

From the subsequent paragraph in the article, however, it can he inferred that in some respects society and the individual person remain outside the authority of the State. For he points out that' there is a hierarchy among the three orders, according to which, some matters belong to the first, the Divine order, but not to the second, the order of human reason; and some to the second, but not to the third, the political order.' 'Sins against faith, such as heresy, sacrilege and blasphemy,' he tells us, 'would be examples of the former, while personal sins, such as gluttony, lust and wastefulness would be examples of the latter.40 Thus, he is saying, in so many words, that the religious

••I have borrowed the *existential-essential* distinction from Jacques Maritain, *Man and the State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951) pp. 34-5.

•• *Ibid.,* following the above text.

and private life of the people is not part of the political order, thereby re-asserting his qualification with regard to the supremacy of the State over society and the individual person.[41]

Another text containing the same re-expression of the formula occurs in his *Cmnmentary on the Perihermeneias,* I, 2. In this instance, as in the text from the *Cmnmentary on the Politics,* cited earlier, where he uses 'political' alone in the formula, he views the prerogative of speech as essentially relevant to the political and social nature of man. Unlike the *Commentary on the Politics,* however, which regards speech as a basis for demonstrating the political nature of man and implicitly his social nature, the *Commentary on the Perihermeneias* conversely regards man's political and social nature as a basis for requiring the existence of human speech. In this vein, he writes as follows:

Now if man were by nature a solitary animal the passions of the soul by which he would be conformed to things so as to have a knowledge of them would be sufficient for him. But since *man is by nature a political and social animal,* it was necessary that the conceptions of one man be made known to others. This he does through vocal sound. Therefore, it was necessary that there be significant vocal sounds in order that men might live together. Whence those who speak different languages are not able to live well together.[42]

"As Maritain explains in *The Person and the Common Good,* trans. by John J. Fitzgerald (New York: Scribner's, 1947), p. 70: "although man in his entirety is engaged as a part of political society (since he may have to give his life for it), he is not part of political society *by reason of his entire s.elf* and all that is in him."

The relevant references cited by Maritain (op. *cit.,* pp. 70-1) are, on the one hand: *S.T.,* II-II, 64, 2; I-II, 96, 4; II-II, 61, l; II-II, *65,* 1. On the other: *S.T.,* I-II 21, 4, *ad* 3.

••*Jn Libras Peri Hermeneias Expositio,* I, 2, n. 12: *Et si quidem homo esset natural,iter animal solitarium, suffecerent sibi animae passiones, quibus ipsis rebus conformaretur, ut earum notitiam in se haberet; sed quia homo est animal natu'l'-aliter politicum et sociale, necesse fuit quod conceptiones unius hominis innotescerent aliis, quod fit per vocem; et ideo necesse fuit esse voces significativas, ad hoc quod homines ad invicem conviverent. Unde qui sunt diversarum linguarum, non possunt bene convivere ad invicem* (cf. Aristotle, *On Interpretation,* I, I; 16a4-8).

I am using the Spiazzi edition *(cum textu ex recensione leonina), In Aristotelis Libras Peri Hermeneias et Posteriorum Analyticorum Expositio* (Turin: Marietti, 1955)' pp. 3-144.

By using 'social' here in conjunction with 'political' St. Thomas is displaying a position consistent with that indicated in the *Commentary on the Politics*, namely, that the social is essentially present on both political and domestic levels. He is saying that without speech and a common language, or common languages, life in society, whether on the level of simply *living* together in the family and local community or on the level of *living well*, or' living fully,' together in the State, would be impossible. Hence, the conclusion follows that insofar as this would vitiate the basic nature of man as a 'political *and* social' animal, speech and lnguage must be recognized as a necessity of man's nature. [43]

Man is by nature a social and political animal

Concluding the series of variations of the formula, this variation, in which St. Thomas again uses 'political' and 'social' conjunctively, but with the latter preceding the former, is found at the beginning of the *De Regno ad Regem Cypri*, more commonly known as the *De Regimine Principum.* In an introduction resembling the thought of the above text from *S.T.*, I-II, 72, 4, he supports his position that' man needs some directive principle to guide him towards his end,[44] writing as follows:

> To be sure, the light of reason is implanted by nature in every man, to guide him in his acts towards his end. And if indeed it were suitable for man to live alone, as many animals do, he would require no other guide to his end. Each man would be a king unto himself, under God, the highest King, inasmuch as he would direct himself in his acts by the light of reason divinely given to him. Yet *it is natural for man, more than for any other animal, to be a social and political animal, to live in a group.* This is clearly a necessity of man's nature. [45]

Cf. Jean T. Oesterle's English translation, *Ari.ste>tleon Interpretation: Commentary by St. Thomas and Cajetan* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Pr.ess, 1962).

[43] In addition, on the role of words, along with action or custom, in the formation of, and change in, human laws, see *S.T.*, I-II, 97, 3.

[44] *De Regno Sive De Regimine Principum ad Regem Cypri, Lib.* I, *cap.* 2, n. 2. I am using the Perrier edition of the *Opuscula Omnia,* I (Paris: Lethielleux, 1949), pp. 220 ff.

[45] *Ibid.: Est autem unicuique homini naturaliter insitum rationis lumen, quo in*

It is, therefore, because man can only live in a group as a social animal that some directive principle, besides the individual reason of the solitary man under God, is required to guide him towards his end. Why is this further directive principle needed? St. Thomas's answer is only forthcoming after he first demonstrates that man is by nature more of a social animal than any other animal.

Accordingly, he points out that man, unlike other animals which are physically well-equipped to care for themselves in regard to food, clothing and defence, has been given reason and hands with which to work for a living. But, he continues, the solitary man cannot succeed in this basic task by his own unaided efforts; he needs the help of his fellows. Likewise, man, unlike other animals which instinctively know what particular thing is useful or harmful, as in their use of a particular, medicinal herb to cure or heal themselves, has been given the power of reason to acquire similar knowledge. As in the foregoing, however, one man alone cannot acquire all the knowledge needed in this regard; the co-operation of many is necessary. Finally, though other animals can express their feelings in a general way, *e.g.*, the dog by barking, man, through his power of speech, can express universal concepts acquired by his understanding and thereby communicate with his kind more perfectly than other animals. For this further reason, it is natural for man, more than for any other animal, to live in a group as a social animal; otherwise his power of speech would be nugatory .[46]

Having established this basic premise, St. Thomas is now prepared to support his contention that' man, as a member of

actibus dirigatur ad finem. Et si quidem homini conveniret singulariter vivere sicut multis animalibus, nullo alio dirigente indigeret ad finem, sed ipse sibi unusquisque esset rex sub Deo summo inquantum per lumen rationis divinitus sibi datum in actibus se ipsum dirigeret. Naturale autem est hommi ut B'iti animal sociale * *et politicum, in multitudine vivens, magis etiam quam 01111nia alia animalia, quod quidem naturalis necessitas declarat.*

* I have chosen *sociale,* as a variant noted by Perrier, over *sociabile* in the text. *Cf.* the English translation by Gerald B. Phelan in Eschmann's *St. Thomas Aquinas, On Kingship to the King of Cyprus,* I, 1, n. 4.

a group, must be ruled by a directive principle over and above the individual reason of the solitary man.' Accordingly, he argues that if a group were ruled by its many individual members, each pursuing his own interest, without some governing agency to care for the common good, the group would disintegrate. This is only logical, he tells us, since *the proper* is distinct from *the common;* things differ by what is proper to each, whereas they are united by what they have in common. And since different effects require different causes, there must be an agency moving the many in a group toward their common good over and above the agencies of the individual members as directed to their particular goods or interests. [47]

In addition to this logical argument, St. Thomas observes that in all things directed towards an end, one thing is found to rule the rest: Within the universe, for example, one heavenly body moves the other heavenly bodies. Within man himself, the soul rules the body; reason rules the irascible and concupiscible appetites; and the heart or the head moves the members of the body as their one principal mover. Likewise, he concludes, we can see that in a group, composed of many members, there must be some ruling or governing power. [48]

What St. Thomas is saying concerning this need of a governing or ruling power within a group applies to any group or community. In this treatise, however, addressed as it is to a king, it is meant to apply more specifically to the community represented by a State or a Kingdom. Speaking in this respect, he is demonstrating that man is by nature not only a social animal, but a political animal as well. He is saying that no large and diverse society can exist except as a governed society, or in other words, that social man must also ultimately be a political man. In keeping with the order of the terms, first ' social ' and then ' political ' in his re-expression of the Aristotelian formula, and in accord with the corresponding line of argumentation, he is showing that the political emerges from the social and is for

[46] *Ibid.,* nn. 2 and 3. *Cf.* Eschmann, *op. cit.,* I, 1, nn. 5-7, incl.
[47] *Ibid.,* n. 4. *Cf.* Eschmann, *ibid.,* n. 8.
[48] *Ibid.*. *Cf.* Eschmann, *ibid.* 11.n. 8 and 9.

the sake of the social. Insofar as the political community of the State contains the element of governmental rule in addition to the social element, it is distinct from the social or from society, but it is by no means separate from, or alien to, society; the political incorporates, and remains bound to, the social, with the social ultimately holding priority.' [0]

Summary and Conclusitm

In a manner, therefore, that undercuts any suggestion of a paternalistic, absolute State, these texts, taken collectively, elaborate and clarify the position advanced by those in Aquinas expressing the Aristotelian formula as " Man is by nature a *Bocial* animal." They, first of all, explain in greater detail than the latter that the political community of the State brings the human, social community to completion and fulfillment. They maintain that the State, like society on the levels of the family and local community, comes naturally into existence for the sake of satisfying man's essential needs as a human being, but that it is on the level of the State where these needs are most fully satisfied. Insofar as these human needs include the necessities of *life itself,* the State must, of course, have a basic concern for the economic, material welfare of man. But insofar as these human needs likewise include what is required for *the vood life,* that is, the life of virtue or excellence on an intellectual and moral plane, the State must also have for its concern the intellectual and moral welfare of man. Moreover, insofar as man's need of friendship, which is grounded in the natural, human relatedness between man and man, forms a further, and most fundamental, basis for social and political life, the State, by implication must foster an atmosphere in which friendship is possible.

But secondly, these texts intimate the manner in which the interests of the people are to be served by the State. They must

•• Indeed, later in the *De Regno* he refers to the present argumentation in support of " Man is by nature a social *and* political animal " as being in support of " Man is by nature a *social* animal," simply (De *Regfl(},* I, 18, n. 40; Eschmann, *op. cit.*, II, I, n. 94)

not be served through a tyrannical rule on the part of a State resorting to unilateral formulation and imposition of its laws, which does violence to human relations. Instead, as indicated by the repeated emphasis on the social and political function of speech, they are to be served by way of a medium that is in keeping with the very nature of man's fundamental relatedness of man to man in society on every level, namely, dialogue. Insofar as dialogue requires a common understanding of language or languages spoken, and insofar as without this common understanding no society or State can function, the State, as one of its prime concerns, must, by implication, make this possible through its educational facilities, and abide by it in judicial and public affairs generally.

Hence, any divorce of the governmental, legislative wing of the State from the State itself as the highest form of human society, and any consequent absolute imposition of governmental authority, would rupture the unity of the State and society. With this in mind, it is specifically this governmental, legislative wing of the State to which St. Thomas is drawing attention, when, in citing the Aristotelian formula, he introduces the term ' political ' in place of ' social ' or in conjunction with 'social.' The governmental, legislative wing of society at society's highest point of development makes society a political society or a State. Though, within a large and complex society, this governmental, legislative wing must be somewhat removed in the actual exercise of governing, it remains, nevertheless, essentially tied to the society from which it arises. Its function is to serve that society and its members by promoting an environment in which local communities, families and individuals may subsist and develop as human, rational, moral beings. Consequently, the authority of State-government, however much an authority, cannot be regarded as absolute, for it remains subject to the common interests of the members of society, who ultimately have the last word.

Beyond this natural order of things, there is a further reason why State-governmental authority is not supreme, for it must be borne in mind that man, in turn, is made for God as his

supernatural end. Hence State-government, as a human institution serving man's needs, is subject to the still higher authority of God. From this, it follows that, however enlightened and praiseworthy its motives may be from a naturally social viewpoint, it cannot conduct its affairs in a this-worldly manner, exclusively. It must remain cognizant of the fact that the members of society whom it serves have a supernatural destiny and that its conduct is subject to their judgment from this vantage point as well. The State, therefore, in its governmental rule, is not only subject to society as its origin and end on the natural level, but it is likewise subject to society as ordered in its individual members to a supernatural end. As Thomas Gilby observes, " St. Thomas pictured the political order as a community within the larger communities of the race and the City of God; it rose from the first, aspired to the second, and was responsive to the conditions of both. Hence he had to call on two adjectives, animal *sociak et politicum*[1] in order to translate Aristotle's one, *zoon politikon."* [50] Allowing for the fact that governmental rule, in directing its actions immediately through legal justice toward the common good of a political society as a whole, stands at the peak of that society, it does not, however, rise above the peak, *ab-solved* or ' loosened from ' its bond to society, directing the totality from without, as in absolute, totalitarian rule.[51] In the words of Maritain: "When we say that the State is the superior part in the body politic, this means that it is superior to the other organs or collective parts of this body, but it does not mean that it is superior to the body politic itself. The part as such is inferior to the whole. The State is inferior to the body politic as a whole, and is at the service of the body politic as a whole." [52]

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•• *The Political Thought of Thomas Aquinas,* p. 188.
[51] *Cf.* Jacques Maritain, *Man and the State,* p. 84.
•• *Op. cit.,* p. 13.

THE DOCTRINE OF SYNERGISM IN GREGORY OF NYSSA'S *DE INSTITUTO CHRISTIANO*

AN IMPORTANT BUT widely neglected topic in contemporary moral theology is the relationship between grace and works in the Christian moral life. To develop a cogent and generally acceptable theory about grace and works has never been an easy task, as we plainly see from the Pelagian controversy of the fifth century and the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth. Yet despite the difficulties involved, moral theologians must address this issue if they are to present a comprehensive theory of Christian ethics. And as they take up this task, they might find an unexpectedly fruitful resource in an ascetical treatise of Gregory of Nyssa, *Ilepl rov κara' ()€0V <J"K01TOV Kat' 'TYJ'> κara' a11.Y()€taV aO"KTJO"EW<;* ("On the Goal [of Life] According to God and the Mode of Life According to Truth"), better known by the Latin title *De instituto christiano* ("On the Christian Mode of Life").[1]

While it may seem somewhat inappropriate to direct the attention of present-day theologians to a fourth century document, the fact is that in a certain sense the document is new. Scholars have long been familiar with a work by Gregory entitled *De instituto christiano,*[2] but when Werner Jaeger was preparing his critical edition of Gregory's works he discovered that what had passed for a complete treatise was actually a mere excerpt-and a highly defective one at that-of a larger work by Gregory bearing the same title.[3] Jaeger's research re-

[1] Gregory of Nyssa, *Gregorii Nysseni Opera,* ed. Werner Jaeger and Hermann Langerbeck; vol. 8, pt. 1, *Gregorii Nysseni Opera Ascetica,* ed. Werner Jaeger, John P. Cavemos, and Virginia Woods Callahan; *De instituto christiano,* ed. Werner Jaeger (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 195£), pp. 40-89. References to the Greek text (page and line) are given in the body of the paper. Translations are my own.

[2] This version appears in Migne, *Patrologia Graeca* 46, cols. £87-306.

[3] Werner Jaeger, *Two Rediscovered Works of Ancient Christian Literature: Grego'l'!J of Nyssa and Macarius* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1954), p. 3.

vealed that the full version was the only one to appear in manuscripts dated prior to the thirteenth century.[4] Jaeger's edition of the complete Greek text was published in 1952.

Forty years before Jaeger's rediscovery of the original version of *De instituto christiano,* J. Stiglmayr called attention to the close parallels between Gregory's treatise (i.e., the excerpt known at that time) and "The Great Letter" traditionally (but erroneously) attributed to the hermit Macarius of Egypt. He found almost literal agreement between large parts of the two works.[5] Subsequent textual studies led scholars to conclude that *De instituto christiano* was an abridgment of " The Great Letter."[6] After Jaeger's publication of the complete version of Gregory's work, the problem of priority was raised anew.

In 1954 Jaeger himself argued that" The Great Letter" was dependent upon *De instituto christiano,* and not vice versa.[7] Nine years later Reinhart Staats took issue with Jaeger, maintaining that Gregory's treatise was a reworking and expansion of" The Great Letter."[8]

Although the question of temporal priority is important historically, we need not decide the issue for the purposes of this paper. For, as Staats himself admits, even if Gregory did borrow heavily from" The Great Letter," in *De instituto christiano* he " made the matter his own."[9]

Gregory tells us at the beginning of his treatise that he will be " selecting from the fruits[10] given [him] previously by the Spirit" (42.17-48.1). Those prior fruits were expressed in such ascetical writings as *De professione christiana, De virginitate, De perfectione, Quid nomen professiove christiwnorum sibi velit, De perfectione et qualem oporteat esse christianum,*

•*Ibid .•* p. 7.

•*Ibid.,* p. 87.

•*Ibid.,* pp. 41-42.

[7] *Ibid .,* pp. 87-47.

[8] Reinhart Staats, " Der Traktat Gregors von Nyssa ' De lnstituto Christiano ' und der Grosse Brief Symeons," *Studia Tkeologica* 17 (1968), pp. 120-28.

• *Ibid.,* p. 128.

[10] The reading " fruits " follows Jaeger's suggestion that *"'fpa.cp•'av* be changed to *Ka.ptrtiJv.* See his note for 42.18.

In psal,morum inscriptionem, Vita MOJJsis, and his biography of his sister, *Vita sanctae Macrinae.* In the last years of his life, sometime after 390,[11] Gregory composed *De instituto christiarwi* a treatise which " represents, in every sense of the term, Gregory's last word on the problem of the true ascetic life and its importance for the realization of the supreme goal of the Christian religion." [12]

In *De instituto christiarw* Gregory presents us with a sophisticated theory of the relationship between divine grace and human works. Since he at times calls the relationship *<TVvepyia* ("a working together"; 72.1; 87.4), it is fitting to name his doctrine " synergism " (despite the fact that the term is customarily associated with the theory of grace and works proposed by Melanchthon in the sixteenth century). My purpose in this paper is to examine critically the doctrine of synergism in *De instituto christiano.* Such a study is warranted both by the intrinsic interest of Gregory's theory and by the contribution the theory can make to present-day attempts to explain the relation of grace and works. Gregory's treatise has special value because it was written shortly before the outbreak of the Pelagian controversy and the subsequent widespread acceptance of Augustine's heavy emphasis on the utter gratuity and efficacy of grace. Moreover, Gregory's theory should prove to be of particular interest to those contemporary moral theologians who are trying to develop an ethic which stresses the dispositions of the agent more than the nature of acts, for Gregory understands Christian perfection as a cultivation of virtuous dispositions, and describes how grace and works operate together to establish these dispositions. A final justification for a study of Gregory's doctrine of synergism is the occasional but serious mistranslation in the only published English translation of *De instituto christiano.* For example, in five different places *xapa* (joy) is translated "grace," being apparently mistaken for *xapic;* (grace) .[13]

[11] Jaeger, *Rediscovered Works,* p. 119.

[12] *Ibid.,* p. 8.

[13] Gregory of Nyssa, " On the Christian Mode of Life," in *Saint Gregory of*

The first section of the paper is a somewhat detailed exposition of the theory of synergism developed in *De instituto christiano.* The second part is an analysis of the argumentation used by Gregory to support his theory. In the final section I venture a brief evaluation of Gregory's doctrine about grace and works.

I. EXPOSITION

De instituto christiano is Gregory's extended response (fifty pages) to a request he had received from a group of monks for instruction on the goal (*CTKo7T6i;;,* more literally " the mark on which one fixes the eye ") of life and the means necessary to attain that goal (. Gregory begins his reply by identifying the goal of life as " the good and acceptable and perfect will of God" (41.17-18; see Rom He then explains that "the perfect will of God is the purification of the soul from every defilement" (. Later on Gregory states that the goal of life is the "new creation" spoken of by Paul (61.3-17; see Gal 6: 15; Cor 5: 17). The new creation is the dwelling of the Holy Spirit in the human soul (69.19). Purification and the Spirit's indwelling are closely connected, as we see from Gregory's statement that life's goal is "the dwelling of the Holy Spirit in a pure and blameless soul which has distanced itself from all evil and wickedness and shame. For when a soul hates sin, it makes itself suitable [*olKeiWCT7J iavT-ryv]* for God " Gregory also speaks of the goal as perfection (TeA.ei6T'YJ'>) or virtue (apeT-ry). The attainment of perfection or virtue demands both the purification of vices from the soul (see 54.11-19) and the cultivation of specific virtues (see 74.15-18; 77.15-78.4).

Expanding upon his goal imagery, Gregory likens life to a journey (7rope£a) (41.14; 64.15). One must travel (7ropeveCT0at) down the right path (086.;;) (41.18-19). Sometimes Gregory

Nyssa: Ascetical Works, trans. Virginia Woods Callahan (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press), pp. 127-58. The five passages where *xa.p6.* is mistranslated are: 78.3,4 (p. 151, l. 38 of the translation); 79.4 83.17 (155.7); SU (155.9).

speaks of walking toward the goal (48.13-14; 63.13); at other times he speaks of running toward it (48.9-10; 66.17-18). In two final metaphors, he exhorts the monks to arrive at the harbor which is the will of God (76.7; and to make the "ascent *[avoOVi]* to the summit of the virtues" (84.19).

At first sight, Gregory's words about attaining the goal of life seem to imply that there is some final and unchanging state which constitutes the object of Christian asceticism. Such is not Gregory's position, however. For Gregory holds that since man came into being through change, change must be an essential feature of human nature, both in this life and the next.[14] According to Gregory, man has " a natural impulse toward the beautiful and the best" (40.7-8), i.e., toward the Good, toward God. Since the Good is infinite, there is no limit to the distance man can travel in that direction. So even after death man will be making perpetual progress in his journey toward God. As the soul grows in goodness, its capacity for goodness increases. " Such are the wonders that participation in the Divine blessings works; it makes him in whom they come larger and more capacious."[15] Evil, on the other hand, is finite, and hence there is a limit as to how far one can go in that direction.[16]

The perfection or virtue which constitutes the goal of life, consequently, is not something static. As Jean Danielou explains in an essay on Gregory, **"It** is **...** a mistake to imagine perfection as a state of complete immobility **...** Perfection is progress itself: the perfect man is the one who continually makes progress. And this cannot have a limit."[17]

The basic reason why men go astray on their journey to God lies in their subjection to their passions, especially pleasure

[14] Jean Danielou, S.J. "Introduction" to *From Glory to Glory: Texts from Gregory of Nyssa's Mystical Writings,* trans. and ed. Herbert Musurillo, S.J. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1961), p. 48.

[15] Everett Ferguson, "God's Infinity and Man's Mutability: Perpetual Progress According to Gregory of Nyssa," *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review* IS (Spring-Fall 1973), p. 71.

[16]. *Ibid.,* pp. 66-67.

[17] Dani<llou, "Introduction," p. *52.*

(40.U-12) .[18] The passions hinder the soul's power of calculation *(A.oyurµ6<>)* (see 55.13-15; 75.6-8), and the soul is deceived into thinking that an apparent good is a genuine good.[19] Gregory likens the passions to waves which beset the soul as it tries to make its way to the heavenly harbor (82.1-5).

Since man is blinded by his passions, he needs a guide to direct him toward his goal. The basic guide which has been given to man is the truth revealed by Jesus Christ. This truth leads him on the way *(oo'T/ye'i<rOm)* to salvation (41.7-8). The truth which Jesus brought and which is recorded in the Scriptures is not, however, always correctly understood and applied. And so the monks request an explanation from Gregory of the Christian way of life to guide them toward their goal, although they have already eagerly embraced the Gospel (41.10-15).

Having explained that the goal of life is perfection or virtue, Gregory proceeds to give the monks advice on how to attain that goal. His advice is clear and straightforward: they are zealously and perseveringly to perform the *7r6vot* (efforts, toils, hard work) and *aywve<>* (struggles) of virtue and perfection.[20] " To the degree that you extend your *aywvE<>* for piety, to that degree is the greatness of your soul extended" (46.13-15). The worst enemy of virtue is careless indifference *(pq,Ovµia)* (40.13; 87.8). Hence "it is necessary never to relax the exertion of *7T6vo<>* or to stand aside from the *aywvE<>* which lie ahead " (65.8-9). The ascetic should love *7T6vot* (66.17), perform them with pleasure (84.17-18), and even "wear out [his] heart with thoughts of *7r6voi"* (65.12-13) .

Just what are the *aywve<>* and *7T6voi* to which Gregory refers? Specific activities given as examples include prayer (81.11-14; 82.22-83.2; 84.7), fasting (65.18-23; 84.7), keeping watch (65.18-23), and observing the commandments (75.21) .

l£ one undertakes the works of perfection, he will rid his soul

[18] See Walther Volker, *Gregor von Nyssa al,s Mystiker* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, *1955),* p. 88.

[19] *Ibid.,* pp. 87-88.

[20] Gregory uses the terms *d:ywv* and *7r6vos* interchangeably, as is evident from 46.13-16; 75.20-22; 84.9-18.

of sin (50.11), fortify its power of calculation against the influence of evil (55.13-15), and provide it with nourishment and refreshment (45.2-3; 71.22). *IT6voi* and *&:ywves-* make a person resemble the beauty of Christ (50.4) .

Unremitting effort, then, is absolutely essential if one is to eradicate his vices and acquire the virtues. But human effort is not by itself sufficient for accomplishing either of these aims. Evils are rooted so deeply in the soul that " it is not possible through human zeal and virtue alone to wipe out and destroy them" (54.13-14) . Neither is human effort "sufficient to raise souls to the beauty of life" (47.9-10). The attainment of perfection requires not only *7rovoi* but grace.

Gregory makes it clear that grace is a gift *(8wpea, DWpTJp,a)* (41.4-5; 44.17; 46.25; 60.18-20). He uses the term "grace" *(xapis-)* in a broad sense; it seems to embrace every kind of favor bestowed by God. Examples of grace include the divine assistance Gregory himself received in composing *De instituto ohnstiano* (42.4-5), the gift which enabled the apostles to conduct a fruitful ministry (44.16-19) , and the blessing of eternal life (46.26-41.7). In *De instituto ohnstwno,* however, Gregory is principally concerned with the type of grace which helps a person attain perfection.

Perfection is a process involving both purification from sinfulness (see 54.11-19) and the cultivation of virtues (see 74.15-18; 77.15-78.4). It is "the redemption of the soul from its passions and the ascent to the summit o:f the virtues" (84.17-19). Grace assists man in both dimensions of the perfection process; on the one hand " the grace of the Spirit destroys the seeds of evil" (57.14-15), and on the other hand grace helps one in" accomplish[ing] easily his own works of virtue" (85.20-22).

A close look at Gregory's notion of perfection reveals that what he is basically talking about is the inner dispositions of a person. A disposition is a lasting tendency to act in a certain way; it is what Aristotle calls a *l(is-* [21] and Aquinas a *habitus.*[22]

[21] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics,* 1103121-22.

[22] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 49, aa. 1-3.

Purification for Gregory means the elimination of dispositions to evil, i.e., the elimination of vices. Cultivation of virtues means the establishment of dispositions to good.

When Gregory in *De instifJuto christiano* discusses the relationship of works and grace, the type of grace he has in mind is that which assists a person in eradicating vices and cultivating virtues. This kind of grace might appropriately be termed" disposition grace." Henceforth in this paper, the term " grace " will be used as a shorthand expression for disposition grace, unless a broader meaning of grace is clear from the context.

Although grace is given freely by God, it is not given arbitrarily. God bestows his grace only on those who have already undertaken the *1T6voi* of virtue. According to Gregory, the effort which a person expends for the attainment of perfection makes him worthy (agtoi;) of grace. "The ardent desire ... for *1T6voi* supplies the worthiness [*dgia]* for receiving the gifts *[Swpa]* [of the Spirit] and the enjoyment of grace" (47.2-4). To the monks who had asked him how to " make their souls worthy of the reception of the Spirit" (41.21-24), Gregory counsels, " Conduct yourselves in such a way that you can take upon yourselves every *1T6voi;* and *aywv* with joy in order to appear worthy of the indwelling of the Spirit and the inheritance of Christ" (87.4-7).

Gregory explains that grace" quickly follows those persevering in the *1T6voi* of virtue" (57.13-14), and that *1T6voi* attract the grace of the Spirit (84.1-3). If someone makes an effort to attain perfection, but nonetheless finds wicked reasoning springing up in his soul, "the One who sees all, having seen [his] *1T6voi* will quickly and by his own power excise that deceitful and festering root of reasoning before it sprouts" (57.10-12). On the other hand, "the grace of God by its nature does not [*ovK* exei *cpvaw]* visit souls fleeing salvation" (47.7-9).

There is one crucial passage in *De instituto christiano* where Gregory seems to contradict his frequent assertion that efforts make one worthy (*agioi;)* of grace: " He [the ascetic] strives

eagerly until the end of his life, adding *TT6voi* to *TT6voi* and virtues to virtues, until he makes himself esteemed [*Tiμ,ioc;]* by God through his works, not having the thought in his mind that he has made himself worthy *[atwc;]* of God" (65.23-66.4). Gregory seems to hold that the ascetic's efforts both do and do not make him worthy to receive God's grace.

The inconsistency is, I believe, more verbal than substantive. The passages can be reconciled if we distinguish two meanings of the term *atwc;* (worthy). In one sense to say a person is worthy of something means that he *has a strict right* to it; in another sense a person is worthy of something if *it is fitting* that he receive it. Gregory would reject the claim that man is worthy of grace in the first sense; grace is always viewed as a gift, and hence as something to which man has no strict claim. But Gregory does maintain that a man can be worthy in the second sense; the ascetic, through his *TT6voi* and *&:ywvec;,* shows himself desirous of perfection, and thereby makes himself a fitting candidate for the reception of grace.

Gregory himself does not draw an explicit distinction between these two senses of *atioc;,* but he strongly hints at it in the passage cited above (65.23-66.4): the ascetic is not *atioc;,* i.e., he does not have a strict right to grace; but the ascetic is *Ti1uoc;,* i.e., he is esteemed by God and therefore a fitting recipient of grace. If my interpretation is correct, this passage does not contradict Gregory's other statements about worthiness, but rather clarifies the nature of this worthiness.

Gregory's thesis that human effort is a necessary precondition for the reception of divine grace, i.e., that God bestows grace only on those who make themselves fitting recipients through their prior *1T6voi,* is reflected in his use of words compounded with the prefix *a-vv-* (with). After the ascetic shows himself a fighter *(μ,aXYJTfic;)* for virtue, the grace of the Spirit comes to assist him as an ally *(<rvμ,μ,axoc;,* "co-fighter") (54.15-16). The Lord makes an alliance *(a-vμ,μ,axia,* "co-fighting") with those who undertake the struggle for perfection (47.19-20). The best term describing the relation of man's efforts and God's

grace is synergism *(crvvepyia,* "co-working") . If a person shows himself a worker (€pyaT'f/<>) for virtue, the Spirit joins him as a co-worker *(crvvepy6<>)* (see 44.20-22). Gregory writes that it is "through the synergism of the Spirit" that one attains the goal of life (87.3-4). And since grace can be viewed as the grace of Christ, Gregory can state that perfection is attained " through many *'7T6voi* ••• and the synergism of Christ " (71.24-72.2) .

Although many human works must precede divine grace, works and grace are always found in close conjunction in the life of one traveling the path of perfection. Hence Gregory usually speaks of the two elements in the same breath, as the following series of texts indicates. The soul is " irrigated by the sweat of virtue and the abundance of grace" (45.2-4). "By the power of the Spirit and through [the soul's] own virtue" the soul is strengthened against the evil one (45**.14-17)** . " When the works of justice and the grace of the Spirit occur together, they join and fill the soul . . . with a blessed life " (47.4-6) . " The guard of the soul is reverent reasoning fortified by ... the grace of the Spirit and the works of virtue" (55.13-15). "Grace cultivates [a harvest] in the soul's ... diligence in works " (84.5-6) . In a final and striking passage Gregory calls virtuous activities " flowers of *'7T6voi* and fruits of the Spirit" (84.9-10) .

Gregory's thesis that human effort is a necessary precondition for grace has an important corollary: the amount of grace which one receives is directly proportionate to the amount of effort which one exerts for perfection. The more *aywve<;* and *1T6voi* one accomplishes, the more esteemed he becomes in God's eyes, and the more grace he receives. In short, " the gift of grace is measured by the *'7T6voi* of the one receiving it " (46.25-26) .

Gregory's theory of synergism can be summed up in three propositions: both human effort and divine grace are necessary for attaining the goal of perfection; human effort is a necessary precondition for the reception of grace; the amount of grace

which one receives is directly proportionate to the effort which one expends. These three themes are closely intertwined in *De instituto christiano;* Gregory himself does not separate or even clearly distinguish them. Yet such a summary seems fair enough for the analytic purposes of this paper.

II. ARGUMENTATION

At the beginning of his treatise Gregory announces to the monks, " [We will be] everywhere quoting the very words of Scripture in the measure needed to give confidence to what we are saying and to show our understanding of Scripture, lest being puffed up with empty pride we seem to neglect grace from above and give birth to illegitimate ideas in our poor and lowly mind, forming notions of piety from external reasonings and ignorantly introducing these notions into our writing" (43.1-7). Gregory makes a sustained effort to ground his ascetical doctrine in the Bible, " at times cumulating biblical evidence almost triumphantly ... " [23] He cites some ninety texts, and alludes to many others. Indeed, the only form of argument he explicitly uses in his treatise is the appeal to Scripture.

The first tenet of Gregory's theory of synergism is that both works and grace are necessary for attaining the goal of perfection. To prove that the goal of life is in fact perfection (re/...ei6r71<>), Gregory quotes Christ's words, " Be perfect [re/...ei-0<>] as your heavenly Father is perfect [re/...eio<>]" (Mt 5: 48, cited at 48.7-9) .[24] Gregory also employs the Pauline texts about the "perfect [r€/...ew<>] man" (Col 1: Q8, cited at 48.10-11 and again at 50.10-11; Eph 4: 13-15, cited at 45.19-Q5).

Scripture supports Gregory's claim that purification is an essential part of perfection. In the Psalms we read, "Create a clean heart in me, 0 God" (Ps 50: 12 in LXX, 51: 10 in RSV; cited at 49.1), and "Who will ascend to the mountain of the Lord? ... The one with harmless hands and a clean heart (Ps

[23] Jaeger, *Rediscovered Works,* p. l!l2.

[2]. Translations from Scripture are my own. Old Testament translations are made from the Septuagint version quoted by Gregory.

23: 3-4 in LXX, 24: 3-4 in RSV; cited at 49.4-5). The sixth Matthean beatitude is "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God" (Mt 5: 8; cited at 48.6-7). Paul exhorts the Corinthians to "clean out the old leaven in order that you become a new lump [of dough] " (1 Cor 5: 7; cited at 62.1-2). Gregory identifies the" fiery arrows of the evil one" (Eph 6: 16; cited at 62.12-14) with the passions from which the ascetic must be purified.

To attain perfection both human works and divine grace are necessary. To prove the necessity of perseveringly devoting oneself to the *1T6voi* and of virtue, Gregory assembles in one place (46.16-23) a number of New Testament texts. " Struggle [*aywvi,ecrBai]* to enter by the narrow door " (Lk 13: 24). "The violent take it [the kingdom of heaven] by force" (Mt 11: 12). "The one who perseveres to the end will be saved" (Mt 10: 22). "In perseverance will you gain your souls" (Lk 21: 19). "We run with perseverance to the *aywv* that is set before us" (Heb 12: 1).[25] "Run in order to obtain" (1 Cor 9: 24). "As God's ministers, in much patience ... " (2 Cor 6:4).

The necessity of grace is evidenced in both the Old and New Testaments. "It was not by their sword that they inherited the land, and it was not their right hand that saved them; it was your right hand and your arm and the light of your countenance" (Ps 43: 4 in LXX, 44: 3 in RSV; cited at 47.14-17). "If the Lord does not build the house and guard the city, in vain does the guard keep watch and the builder labor " (Gregory's abridgment at 47.11-13 of Ps 126: 1 in LXX, 127: 1 in RSV). We see the necessity of grace in overcoming those vices of which we are not even aware: " Cleanse me from those things that are hidden " (Ps 18: 13 in LXX, 19: 13 in RSV; cited at 54: 18). From the New Testament Gregory selects the passage from Ephesians which speaks of the need for heavenly armor to withstand the attacks of the evil one (Eph 6: 13-17, discussed at 62.9-18).

[25] " We run" translates the indicative verb form accepted by Gregory *(Tpexwµev).* Modern critical editions prefer the subjunctive *(Tpexwµev).*

While Gregory adduces ample biblical evidence for the first thesis of his doctrine of synergism, he does not present any direct biblical support for either his second claim (that effort is a prerequisite for grace) or for his third (that the amount of grace is proportionate to the amount of effort). What is remarkable is that Gregory did not seem to think that the latter two propositions required any proof. He saw them as obvious corollaries of his first thesis. Or to be more precise, he viewed them as simply two different ways of stating his (first) proposition about the necessity of both grace and works. This is why Gregory in *De instituto chnstiano* neither separates nor distinguishes his three theses.

But what led Gregory to view the second two propositions as mere reformulations of the first, and hence as requiring no independent proof? The answer seems to lie in his philosophical presuppositions. So let us briefly examine these.

Gregory's ascetical doctrine is heavily influenced by the Greek notion of virtue (apeTr/). In its broadest sense, virtue meant the excellence of a thing in the performance of its function. Human virtue was seen as excellence in performing human functions, however those might be understood. Gregory adopted the view that human virtue consisted of the purification of dispositions to evil and the cultivation of dispositions to good. When he encountered the term" perfection" (TeX.ei6T'lJS') in the New Testament, he understood it in terms of his Greek philosophical view of vitrue. In so doing, comments Jaeger, he" built up a new Christian ideal of the philosophic life ... corresponding to the Greek philosophical ideal of life and [built up] a new pattern of ascetic virtue (*apmj)* corresponding to that of the man of perfect virtue in Greek philosophy." [26]

Strong influence from Neoplatonic philosophy accounts for Gregory's stress on purification. According to Plotinus, the first step which the soul must take in its ascent to the divine is purification. [27] From Neoplatonism or perhaps Platonism

[26] Ja:eger, *Rediscovered Works,* p. SS.

[27] See Mariette Canevet, "Gregoire de Nyssa (saint)," *Dictionnaire de Spirituolite* 6 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1967), col. 980.

Gregory adopted the idea of the composite soul in which the passions adversely affect the reasoning part of the soul.[28]

Gregory's stress on the overcoming of one's passions stems more from Stoicism than from Neoplatonism. Gregory accepted the Stoic doctrine that man's primary enemy in his attempt to live according to his nature is his passions *(7ralJ7J)* (see 40.6-41.2), and he endorsed the Stoic ideal of *amfOeia* (passionlessness, " apathy ").[29] Like the Stoics, he propounded " a morality of effort which demands a tension in the soul." [30]

Perhaps the most general doctrine which Gregory absorbed from his philosophical milieu was that man has a natural orientation toward a final goal, and that one should live one's life in such a way as to make progress toward that goal. From philosophy Gregory got his conviction that to attain the goal of having virtuous dispositions, one must perseveringly undertake the *7r6voi* of virtue.

Gregory saw Christianity as supplementing philosophy. Through revelation man gains a knowledge about the goal of life and the means to attain it-a knowledge which could never be attained by unaided philosophical reasoning. Moreover, through the Christian religion one receives the special help from God (disposition grace) which is necessary if one is to attain the noble goals posited by philosophy.

Christianity not only supplements philosophy; it is itself the one true philosophy. Hence the monks to whom Gregory writes are a" chorus of philosophy" (41.20-21) ; the goal of the Christian life is identical with the goal of philosophy (64.4); the road of Christian asceticism is " the path of true philosophy " (48.13) . In short, to live the Christian life is to "philosophize rightly" (48.12) .

•• See *ibid.,* cols. 979-80.

•• It should be noted that, strictly speaking, *cl:iraOeia* did not mean either for the Stoics or for Gregory the eradication of all emotion. Gregory, for example, exhorts the monks to have zeal in their quest for perfection (41.23-25). For a discussion of the kind of emotion advocated by the Stoics, see J. M. Rist, *Stoic Phuosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 22-36.

[3°] Canevet, " Gregoire," col. 982.

It was his philosophical assumptions that man by nature is oriented toward his goal, and that man by nature must perform certain *1T6voi* and if he is to achieve his goal, which led Gregory to assert without argumentation his (second) thesis that human effort is prerequisite for the reception of grace. God respects the natural order of things and does not violate that order by eradicating vices from men or instilling virtues in them apart from their human efforts. More precisely, God does not give his disposition grace to men unless they have previously shown their willingness to undertake the natural means of eliminating vices and cultivating virtues.

The third proposition of Gregory's doctrine of synergism says that the amount of grace one receives is directly proportionate to the amount of effort which one expends for perfection. The same types of philosophical reasons which lie behind the second proposition lie behind the third, for the third is largely a corollary of the second. If we grant that grace is given in response to man's efforts for perfection, we should have no difficulty in admitting that the more effort a person exerts, the more grace he will receive. Using the terminology of worthiness, we can say that since *1T6voi* make one worthy of grace, more *1T6voi* make one worthy of more grace.

III. EVALUATION

Christians whose viewpoint on grace and works has been shaped by the Western theological tradition would probably be quick to obj-ect to Gregory's theory of synergism on the ground that its emphasis on human effort compromises the utter gratuity of salvation (justification); for there is no doubt that according to Gregory the performance of ascetical works is necessary for attaining perfection. But such a criticism of Gregory assumes that salvation is synonymous with perfection. In Gregory's theology, however, these two notions are not the same: perfection is the eradication of vices and the cultivation of virtues in this life, whereas salvation is the infinite progression toward the infinite Good in the next life.

Gregory, like the theologians of the West, holds that salvation is a pure gift (46.26-47.1), but he differs in maintaining that in the next life *all* men will receive this gift. According to Gregory, even the worst sinners will eventually end up on the path of never-ending progress toward God. It is not the case, however, that everyone will immediately start out on that path after death. A person who has led a sinful life will have to undergo a painful purification in the next life before he begins his journey toward God. But if a person purifies himself and develops the virtues before he dies, he will receive the gift of salvation immediately upon entering the afterlife. So the ascetic is the wise and prudent man.[31]

Gregory's purpose in writing *De instituto christiano,* then, is not to show the monks how to assure their salvation; they, like all men, will be saved no matter how they live their lives. Gregory's aim, rather, is to explain how to attain perfection in this life and thereby begin the journey toward God while still in this world. Gregory's theory of grace and works, therefore, applies only to the attainment of perfection in the present life. It is important to keep this in mind as we evaluate each of the three theses of Gregory's theory of synergism.

Is Gregory correct in his first claim, that both grace and works are required if one is to eliminate his vices and develop the virtues? We need not hesitate to affirm the necessity of grace, for such has been the nearly unanimous teaching of Christianity throughout the ages (the Pelagians being the one major exception) . But what about works? It is well-established fact about human nature that the normal way to rid oneself of some inner disposition or to acquire another is frequently to perform external acts which reflect and foster the desired change.[32] And both the Old and New Testaments frequently exhort us to do works which lead to virtue and to avoid those leading to vice. So we can safely assert that ordinarily

[81] See J. Patout Burns, S.J., "The Economy of Salvation: Two Patristic Traditions," *Theological Studies* 87 (December 1976), pp. 106-107.

[82] See Aristotle, *Nicormachean Ethics,* 1008a81-82; Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 51, aa. 2-8.

the achievement of perfection requires human effort. But if we believe in the omnipotence of God, we must allow for the possibility that God could, in any given case, remove a vice or implant a virtue apart from any effort by the person. Gregory makes no allowance for such extraordinary cases in his treatise, however. But it may be that he simply intended his thesis to apply to ordinary situations. If such was his intent, we can readily accept his first proposition.

The second thesis asserts that effort is a necessary precondition for the reception of grace, i.e., that disposition grace is given only to those who have already initiated a of perfection. Although Gregory does not limit grace to what I have named disposition grace, he nonetheless seems to deny that any grace is involved in the ascetic's initial actions. I find this claim unacceptable, for it goes against the basic biblical teaching that we are dependent upon God in *aU* that we do. "In him we live and move and have our being" (Acts 17: . " Apart from me you can do nothing" (Jn 15: 10) .

The reasons underlying Gregory's denial that grace is operative from the first moment a person undertakes a or *d:ywv* of virtue are to be found in his philosophical view of what is natural. Gregory believed that man has a natural orientation toward the Good. In the natural order of things, a person must perform certain works if he is to attain perfection. But Gregory knew from his faith that grace is a real factor in the world. Gregory was thus led to posit two spheres of reality, the natural and the supernatural. (He does not employ the latter term in his treatise, but the idea is clearly present.) Disposition grace is something which enters the natural order from the supernatural realm in order to help man achieve perfection; once the ascetic has taken the natural means to virtue, God intervenes from on high.

The splitting of reality into the natural and the supernatural is not, of course, unique to Gregory. Indeed, it has become a commonplace of Christian theology. The postulation of the supernatural as a separate realm has the advantage of securing the gratuity of grace; since grace is supernatural no one can

claim it as his natural right. But it has the serious disadvantage of restricting God's direct action and providence to the upper portion of a bifurcated reality. It seems much more plausible-and biblical-to posit just one world order, and to say that this one order is permeated with God's grace. God creates all things, sustains them, and gives them (especially man) various kinds of assistance. This latter view does not require one to deny the gratuity of grace; on the contrary, it enables one to view everything as constantly graced.

If we accept the pervasiveness of grace in a single world order, we will have to reject Gregory's second thesis. For the performance of any or *ayw* of virtue will be possible only with God's assistance. Effort will not be a prerequisite for receiving grace, but will itself be a graced event. The ascetic can thus assert with Paul that when he labors " it is not I but the grace of God that is with me" (1 Cor *15:* 10; see Gal 2: 20) .

We may now tum to the third and final proposition of Gregory's theory, the thesis that the amount of disposition grace which one receives is directly proportionate to the amount of effort exerted for perfection. Taken strictly, this thesis is obj-ectionable because it restricts the freedom of God. Since the Spirit bestows his gifts " to each one individually as he wills " (1 Cor 12: 11) , we can never be certain how much disposition grace is bestowed on a given individual in a given situation. Yet Gregory's second proposition does point to an important truth. Virtues are ordinarily acquired through the performance of many acts, and these acts involve a certain amount of human effort. It is reasonable to assume that when someone undertakes an *ayw* of virtue, God will subsequently assist him with the gift of disposition grace. (The initial *ayw* is, as I have argued, itself aided by grace-but this is not disposition grace.) So it is reasonable to claim that, in general, the more effort one expends, the more disposition grace one will receive. But surely there are exceptions, made for reasons known only to God.

The doctrine of synergism which Gregory presents in *De instituto christiano* is an important and penetrating examination of the relationship between grace and works. Jaeger holds

that in Gregory's treatise" the theology of the Eastern Church reached the culminating point of its tendency to bring the two basic elements of the Christian religion, divine grace and human effort, into perfect balance." [33] While Gregory may not have struck a perfect and wholly acceptable balance, his attempt to do so constitutes a significant achievement in Christian theology.

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•' Jf<eger, *Works*, p. 88,

THE SYMBOLIC ELEMENT IN BELIEF: AN ALTERNATIVE TO TILLICH

PAUL TILLICH believed that revelation, because it is consistent, could he interpreted in a systematic form. Indeed Tillich's own theological system is so consistent that he could successfully claim that " each part contains the whole from a different perspective." (168)[1] Any criticism, therefore, of one part of this system implicitly contains a criticism of the entire system. The present critique will focus precisely on the question of what type of relationship is established when one thing is contained in another thing. The particular point of entry will be the ontological status of beliefs as symbolic expressions of the ultimate. No attempt will be made to show that Tillich's position on belief is either inconsistent or mistaken within his own system. Instead, his position will be criticized insofar as it is a consistent and correct embodiment of a system that is itself questionable.

Although Tillich saw each part of his system as containing the whole, he insisted on an opposite relationship between the mediums of revelation and that which is revealed. Not merely is revelation never to be confused with its historically and culturally conditioned expression, but such confusion of the two things would be idolatrous. (1110) This principle Tillich applied consistently and thoroughly: he distinguished God from anything that is said about God; he separated Jesus as Jesus from Jesus as the Christ. In the end Tillich drew a line between any belief and that which is believed.

Tillich's system is of immense value in itself. The critical problems that it raises, however, need to be addressed.

[1] Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology,* 3 vols. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951, 1957, 1963). References will appear in parentheses, Roman volume number followed by Arabic page nnmber.

According to Tillich's system, the ontological status of anything that exists is ambiguous. All that participates in being is finite; at the same time, however, that which is finite is both potentially infinite and threatened with nonbeing. All that exists is engaged in the quest for the New Being in which essential being conquers existential being under the conditions of existence. (IIllS-19) Life is the actualization of potential being. (III130) . Anything that exists participates in being to the extent that it strives toward its essence which simultaneously affirms its infinite potential and negates its finitude. And so, for Tillich, the self-affirmation of finite existence is a choice against being, while the self-negation of finite existence is the choice of being and the embracing of infinite potential. Thus that which exists both is and is not: in the affirmation of finite existence, it is not; in the negation of finite existence, it is.

Tillich's conception of creation and fall corresponds with his ontology. These doctrines do not describe temporal events. Rather, they describe the relation between God and the world. (!2$!t) Two opposite positions that have emerged historically concerning this relation are, on the one hand, the doctrine of total depravity and complete separation from God, and, on the other hand, the belief that the world is basically good but partially turned away from God. Tillich attempts to transcend this dichotomy. For him life is neither basically evil nor basically good; it is ambiguous. Symbols, according to Tillich's system, are ontologically ambiguous. This is especially true of religious symbols. Religious symbols are "double-edged." (1240) Like everything else in Tillich's ontology, they are composed of both finite and infinite elements. The essential being of a symbol acts as a gateway to the infinite. The existential selfhood of a symbol is structurally separate from its essential being, and only in the negation of its existential selfhood does a symbol achieve its essential function.

Symbols live existentially as the expression of a relation between the finite and the ultimate. Because of its finite elements, a symbol can also die. No symbol is in itself ultimate. But this

is not, Tillich claims, to say that symbols are not true. They have a two-fold participation in truth: they have truth to the extent that they are adequate expressions of revelation; they are true to the extent that the revelation that they express is true.

Tillich's concept of symbol is thoroughly consistent with his ontology and with his entire theological system. It is also consistent with certain elements of the Christian tradition in regard to representation. A statue, for example, is not a saint; a priest is not God. Tillich's position takes into consideration that blind acceptance is not faith; faith always includes doubt and risk. Also, his position deals effectively with the issue that beliefs are not things known in the same way that empirical facts are known. Tillich's concept of symbol is, on the whole, extremely valuable.

Tillich's position on symbol, however, is not the only conceivable one that can deal effectively with the traditional problems that he encounters; his position goes further than is necessary. For when the implications of this position are drawn out, an untenable relationship between God and the created world is established. This relationship, which will have profound psychological effects upon any believer who adopts Tillich's system, will become more apparent after a specific investigation of the ontological status of beliefs within the system.

Dogma

As with everything else in Tillich's ontology, the manner in which dogma participates in being is ambiguous. Dogmas are symbolic expressions that point beyond their finite elements to the ultimate and that participate in the power of the ultimate. The correlation of revelation, which is the expression of a particular correspondence between a culture and the Christian tradition, is transformed by every new group in history, even to a small degree by any individual who enters the group. (H28) As Tillich pointed out, several times in history an original revelation has been exhausted or superseded. Such, for

example, is the relationship between Apollo and Christians and between the Virgin Mother and Protestants. In these cases what had once legitimately and effectively pointed beyond itself to the ultimate has now died insofar as its power of revelation is concerned.

Tillich's concept of dogma is valuable; as with his concept of symbol, however, he went too far. It is true that all dogmas have elements that are historically conditioned and subject to change. Hence, it is always necessary to be aware that there is a distinction to be made between the particular expression of a dogma and the truth that a dogma contains. There is yet a further distinction to be made, however, between saying that a dogma is true in itself and demonically elevating the finite elements of a dogma to the level of the infinite. It is neither necessary nor possible to construct an absolute barrier between the truth and that in which the truth is contained.

Mary's virginity may have ceased to be existentially meaningful to some Protestants and to some Catholics; however, this has nothing to do with the truth contained in the dogma. This dogma may be reinterpreted. Our understanding of its significance and of its existential applications may change radically. Our particular reformulations of it may someday even make it appear at first glance to be something completely different. But Mary's virginity will never cease to be a part of the Christian tradition. This dogma not only says something about Mary; it also tells us something about Christ and discloses to us truth about God. Moreover, it discloses something about the relation of God and the world.

Tillich has set up a false dichotomy by claiming that a dogma can only be said to be true insofar as it reflects the divine but not at all in itself, so that for Tillich whatever is finite is disposable. A middle position, however, is possible. For a dogma can be both true in itself and a reflection of the ultimate. [2] This

"Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972). Lonergan favors the "permanence" of dogma over "immutability," and distinguishes between the meaning and the formulation.

is not inherently a contradiction, as Tillich would have it, nor is it the demonic elevation of the finite to the level of the infinite. It is possible to believe that a dogma is true in itself and at the same time be fully aware of its historical and cultural conditioning. It is further possible, in this world in which salvation both is and is yet to come, that God has elevated certain finite elements to the level of the infinite; this could hardly be called demonic.

One who integrates Tillich's position on dogma into one's functional being ultimately believes in nothing but the ultimate; it is not more than a belief in believing.[3] Beliefs are like laser beams that get bounced off the moon. Yes, they truly strike the moon, but, no indeed, there is not anything special about the particular beam. In dealing quite effectively with the problem of the historical relativity of dogma, Tillich has undermined dogma itself.

God-Talk

According to Tillich, there is only one statement that refers directly to God, the assertion that God is being-itself, and all other talk of God is symbolic. (Ifl38)[4] Any symbolic statement about God uses a segment of finite experience which is both affirmed and negated at the same time. Its proper, finite meaning is negated by that to which it points; it is affirmed to the extent that it points beyond itself. (1239) The ontological status of all God-talk, therefore, is ambiguous.

In response to Gustave Weigel's charge that he had reduced Aquinas's *analogia entis* to a concept of symbol, Tillich replied

•George H. Tavard, *Paul Tillich and, the Christian Message* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1962). Tavard takes the position that Tillich overemphasizes the *fides qua creditur* to the neglect of the *fides quae creditur.*

•John Herman Randall, Jr., "The Ontology of Paul Tillich," pp. 182-61 in *The Theology of Paul Tillich,* edited by Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952). Randall charged that "being-itself" is also symbolic. Tillich agreed, but he went on to distinguish primary from secondary symbols. See also Paul Tillich, " The Meaning and Justification of Religious Symbols," in *Religious Experience and Truth,* edited by Sydney Hook (New York: New York University Press, 1961).

that when he talks or symbolic knowledge he means the same thing that Aquinas meant by analogy, and that the difference was purely methodological. [5] Later, again in response to Weigel, Tillich claimed that symbols do say something positive about God, but that he emphasized the negative because or his concern about idolatry. [6] By elevating the negative to the same structural level as the positive, however, Tillich did indeed reduce Aquinas's concept. [7]

It is true that Tillich's concept or symbol effects an important methodological distinction from the *analogia entis,* but this does not rule out the fact that it is also ontologically distinct. For Aquinas, talk referred to God analogously; for Tillich, talk referred to God ambiguously. Tillich may say in response to criticism that symbolic statements say things that are positively true about God, and that the negative is merely being emphasized. Making the negative a structural element, however, goes beyond "emphasis." Tillich's concept or symbol does not allow for symbolic assertions to be positive statements in the sense that Aquinas's analogical statements are. The Thomistic believer speaks directly about God; one must simply remember that one's language refers to God in an analogous manner. The Tillichian believer who makes assertions about God, on the other hand, must always keep in mind that one is not speaking directly about a being called God; instead, one is using statements that tap into the power or the ultimate about which nothing can be said other than that it is being-itseli. Such assertions are useful for mediating the power or the divine; they do not say anything about God.

[6] Gustave Weigel, "Contemporaneous Protestantism and Paul Tillich," *Theological Studies* 11 (June 1950): 177-202. Weigel claims that Tillich can be considered an ontologist only according to his own existentialist definition of ontology, but not by the traditional definition.

•Gustave Weigel, "The Theological Significance of Paul Tillich," *GregoTianum* 87 (1956): 34-53. Weigel argues that, whereas universal concepts are useful in communicating the transcendent, they are useless in achieving the transcendent.

•Gustave Weigel, "Recent Protestant Theology," *Theological Studies* 14 (Dec. 1953): 568-94. Weigel charges that Tillich's position that the finite cannot become infinite goes back to the challenge met by the Church in Antiochean theology.

Jesus as the Christ

The answer to the question implied in finitude is the New Being in which essential being conquers existential being under the conditions of existence. (II118-19) Faith cannot tell us particular historical facts about the person who brought the New Being, not even for certain that his name was Jesus. There is but one fact guaranteed by faith: reality has been transformed in that personal life that the New Testament expresses in its picture of Jesus as the Christ. (II107)

Tillich was right to emphasize the historical minimum, particularly in regard to the theological situation that he was addressing. The problem with his Christology, however, has nothing to do with history; it has instead to do with the specific manner in which he claimed that Jesus is the Christ. Traditional Christology has it that Jesus, the finite man, was the Christ. For Tillich, on the contrary, Jesus is not in himself the Christ. He is the Christ only to the extent that he denies his finite, existential being. Such existential self-negation is necessary to the Christ, for " without the continuous sacrifice of himself as a particular individual under the conditions of existence to himself as bearer of the New Being, he could not have been the Christ. He proves and confirms his character as the Christ in the sacrifice of himself as Jesus to himself as the Christ." (II123) Like a symbol, then, Jesus participates in the power of that which he bears to the extent that he negates his finite elements. Thus his ontological status as the Christ is ambiguous.

The Protestant Principle

The Protestant principle is the protest against the identification of our ultimate concern with any creation of the Church (137); it expresses the fact that the distance between human beings and God is never bridged (Ill239); it protests against the tragic-demonic self-elevation of religion. (III245) Due to this principle, any affirmation of a tradition involves both a " No " and a "Yes." (125) The ontological status of beliefs is thereby ambiguous.

Ironically, the Protestant principle arises out of the necessity for the theologian who participates in the tradition to view it simultaneously with an attitude of detachment from one's existential situation. (125) Now one might think that this would have prompted Tillich to ask the question of truth in a philosophical manner. Instead it led him simply to the existential position that whatever is asserted might not be true, and that if it is true then it is only true relativdy. Of course it is *true* that whatever is asserted might possibly not be true, and it is also true that whatever is asserted has by nature relative elements. Tillich, however, elevates these negative truths to the level of the positive, so that the theologian's "No" is put on a level with the theologian's "Yes." Assertions are thus rendered ambiguous. And beliefs are judged by their efficacy: they become " true " for Tillich only to the extent that they are useful.

The connection between the Protestant principle and Tillich's concept of symbol should be evident. There is a further correspondence between that principle and the doctrine of the fall. Ontologically, the 1.'elationship between the world and God is ambiguous; psychologically, the world is completely separated from God. As a consequence Tillich's position is functionally one of total depravity.

For one who existentially incorporates Tillich's system into one's being, the world is seen not to be good in itself. Rather, it is only good to the extent that it reflects its ground, which is God. Psychologically, likewise, this finite world in which we live is not real in itself. Beliefs cannot be true in any humanly comprehensible fashion, but only as efficaciously pointing to the incomprehensible beyond themselves.

The believer cannot, then, believe in any content whatsoever. Content can only be used to bounce meanings off the transcendent. God can be spoken about meaningfully and effectively, but it must always be remembered that what is being said is true only in a highly conditional fashion. Similarly, Jesus can only be a vehicle of worship if we constantly keep in mind that he is pointing beyond himself. And for us authentic life becomes a denial of existential being: that is, it becomes self-

denial. People are not good in themselves; they are only good to the extent that they point away from their finite selfhood.

There is much truth in Tillich's position: the kingdom of God is not of this world, and self-denial is a constitutive part of conversion and of all Christian life. Tillich, however, has set up a false dichotomy between self-affirmation and self-negation. For there is surely a distinction to be made between self-affirmation and demonically setting oneself up against God. Only during a moment of original conversion, does self-negation function as an absolute principle and even then it is paradoxical. In truth *metanoia,* or on-going conversion, consists in an inseparable intertwining of self-affirmation and self-negation. Tillich spoke from the purely abstract position of one who has affirmed nothing and who is wrapped up in the ambiguity of life. From such a position, self-negation as an absolute appears to be the best course of action. Can a theologian, however, speak from an abstract position that does not take into consideration the reality of initiated salvation?

Tillich's system is, as we have already said, of immense value. It provides a theological framework from which Christianity can successfully deal with Kantian and Hegelian philosophy, with historical and cultural relativity, and with supernaturalistic dualism. In fact, the trouble is that the system is too effective. The problems are obliterated, but in the process the validity of all beliefs is undermined: the wheat has been burned with the chaff. In putting Christianity beyond the reach of all possible criticism, Tillich has put it beyond the reach of believers.

The New Symbol

The constitutive ambiguity of Tillich's concept of symbol embodies the problem of all beliefs within his system. Beliefs are existentially separated from that which is believed. Symbols in the same way are existentially separated from that which is symbolized.[8] And, as the answer to the self-estrangement of

[8] Michael Simpson, "Paul Tillich's Symbolism and Objectivity," *Heythrop* 8 (July 1967): 293-309. Simpson compares Tillich's concept of symbol with that of

existential being from essential being is the New Being in which essential being conquers existential being under the conditions of existence, so the answer to Tillich's separation of symbol from that which is symbolized is what we may call the *New Symbol.* The New Symbol does not simply point away from itself; it does not only present that which it represents. The New Symbol contains within itself that which it represents; it is in itself a particular manifestation of that which is being presented. [9]

All revelation, including the revelation of the New Being, is dependent upon its reception. (ll 11) In the same manner, the New Symbol depends upon the attitude of its receiver. A symbol presents nothing if there is no one who believes that there is something being presented. However, once a symbol establishes a true relationship between a believer and that which is symbolized, something becomes true about that symbol that can never be taken away from it. For not only do symbols present that which they symbolize; they create between that which is symbolized and a believer a living bond that is potentially common to all believers.

The particular relationship between a believer and that which is symbolized is always subject to alteration and reformation, since any formulation of such a relationship is historically and culturally conditioned. For Tillich, moreover, symbols not only can change; they also can die. With the New Symbol, however, the only symbols that can die are those that symbolize finite things. Symbols that truly symbolize the infinite can change, but they can never die.

Christian symbols are not simply symbols of God; they ex-

Ernst Cassirer. Cassirer's symbols are inseparable from that which they represent; however, his position seems to necessitate an absolute relativity of symbol systems.

•David Power," Symbolism in Worship: A Survey," *The Way* 13 (1973): 310-24; 14 (1974): 57-66; 15 (1975): 56-64; 15 (1975): 137-46. I am not by any means presenting the New Symbol as a totally new concept. Power presents a good survey of contemporary work in symbolism as it relates to a faith community. See also Karl Rahner, "The Theology of the Symbol," *Theological Investigations,* vol. 4, for an ontological justification of what I am calling the New Symbol.

press a relationship between God, the world, and humankind. Though Tillich is right in asserting that the ultimate does not change, he forgets that there are also certain anthropological facts that will be true as long as there are human beings. Our understandings of these facts may change, and our formulations of them may also change. But just as there are truths about God that do not change even though our formulations may change, so there are facts about humankind that do not change. Now this does not mean that humankind does not change at all; it simply means that there are certain things that categorically define human beings that cannot change as long as human beings exist. Furthermore, though particular aspects of the relationship between humankind and God can change, there has been established a fundamental relationship that remains the same. Christian beliefs are expressive of this fundamental relationship.

Christian beliefs, then, are symbolic expressions of the relationship between humankind, the world, and God. They disclose to us the very nature of reality. Because the believer interacts with and participates in the symbol, presentation of this reality occurs simultaneously with disclosure. Christian symbols do not simply disclose an adequate peek at the ultimate; they radically effect the believer's experience. They effectively mediate the believer's reality. And yet it must be said that Tillich would agree with all of this. What distinguishes the New Symbol from Tillich's concept of symbol is that the former is true in itself, whereas the latter is true only to the extent that it negates itself. The believer in the former believes in and through the symbol as it presents that which it represents, whereas the user of the latter uses the symbol to mediate temporarily the power of that to which it points.

Tillich's concept of symbol nonetheless presents much that is positive and deals effectively with many difficult issues. It must therefore be shown that the New Symbol can deal as effectively with the same issues while overcoming the structural negativity of Tillich's concept.

The New Symbol and the Issues

Though Tillich's system met the challenge of, Hegelian thought head on, some believe that Tillich's Christianity ended in defeat. It has been claimed that Tillich made Christianity conform to a philosophical system rather than assimilating the philosophical system into Christianity. [10] And in a limited sense this is true. Tillich's system, however, at lea.st lays the groundwork for the reconciliation of Hegelian thought with Christian faith, and his concept of symbol is a major part of the groundwork. The New Symbol goes on to attempt to put Hegelian thought in the proper Christian perspective.

With its concept of emerging being Hegelian thought offered a dynamic as opposed to a static ontology, a persona.list rather than an objectivist view of the world, and a concept of finitude negating itself in its quest for the infinite. In accordance with this threefold characterization Hegelian ontology raised the problem of supernaturalistic dualism, a personalist outlook brought with it a criticism of the notion of truth as objective correspondence, and finitude negating itself posed questions about idolatry and the relativity of dogma.

When we are dealing with Hegelian thought symbol has many advantages over analogy as a medium of faith. It can manifest and disclose the ultimate rather than simply refer to it; it is psychological as well as logical; by definition it establishes a relationship between the knower and the known; and it is dynamic and organic. Tillich's concept of symbol, however, like Hegelian thought in general, sets up a false dichotomy between the dynamic and the static. Relationality is mistakenly seen *as opposed to* objectivity; the psychological is seen *as opposed* to the logical; manifestation and disclosure are seen *as opposed to* reference and correspondence. [11] The New Symbol,

[10] Av.ery Dulles, "Paul Tillich and the Bible," *Theological Studies* 17 (Sept. 1956): 845-67. Dulles claims that Tillich has reduced the biblical message to the dimensions of a human philosophy.

[11] William L. Rowe, *Religious Symbols and God: A Philosophical Survey Of Tillich's. Theology* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968). Rowe de-

on the contrary, both reveals and refers; it is both psychological and logical; it is both relational and objective; it is both static and dynamic. [12]

The New Symbol deals effectively with the problem of supernaturalistic dualism. On the one hand Neo-scholastic interpretation of the analogy of being tended to posit a static supernatural realm over and above the natural realm. Tillich's concept of symbol on the other hand refers to an emerging transcendent that is manifesting itself in a limited but adequate manner. Retaining this advantage, the New Symbol brings the added advantage of asking the question of truth, for symbols are seen as disclosing truth that *corresponds* to a real established relationship between humankind, the world, and God. Correspondence thus carries over to the realm of relationality, and symbols refer to this relationship rather than to a static supernatural realm. Hence the problem of supematuralistic dualism is conquered without passing over the truth question.

Moreover, the New Symbol takes into account the problem of idolatry and the relativity of dogma. Supematuralistic dualism had forced some theologians to treat dogma as the timeless expression of supernatural facts. Whereas Tillich's concept of symbol denies all timeless truth whatsoever in dogma, the New Symbol, though taking into account the historical and cultural conditioning of all dogma, yet at the same time recognizes that there is truth in dogma that corresponds with the very nature of reality in a virtually timeless way. Thus the problem of relativity is dealt with, again without by-passing the question of truth.

The New Symbol is still not to be confused with the ultimate itself, for it is limited in two ways. First, no expression of a relationship with the ultimate exhausts the ultimate itself; any such disclosure is limited by its particularity. Second, though

scribes an unresolved tension in Tillich's system between the historical demands of faith and the scientific concept of factual truth.

[12] James Anderson, "Language, Thought, and History," *The New Scholasticism 50* (Summer 1976): 323-32. Anderson has an interesting discussion of the relation the statil: !;lng the dynamic on page 827.

the ultimate is made available in symbol, it is only available to the extent the believer participates in the symbol.

In addition, it must be remembered that there are in any symbol some finite elements that can be subject to negation. A statue, for example, is not a saint. When dealing with language, however, a more inseparable relationship is established. The particular sounds of words can be negated, though even here it is conceivable that in some cases sound could be an integral part of meaning. Particular words themselves too can be negated insofar as they are historically and culturally conditioned. All this being granted, still something about the meaning of symbolic assertions and what they refer to that must be affirmed. For it is the nature of language that, when referring to things not of a concrete nature, it presents that which it represents to those who participate in the language. When referring to concrete objects language presents the *idea* of the objects to its participants. When referring to ideas, however, language fully presents those ideas to those who participate. Of course, one could speak simply of the idea of a relation between humankind and God without actually presenting the relationship. Believers, however, interact with God and experience a relationship with God through participation in the Christian symbols. If you break a statue you do not do anything to a saint. But if you change the essential meaning of a dogma you can rupture a belief.

The New Symbol deals effectively with the problems raised by Hegelian thought without the structural negativity of **Til**lich's concept of symbol. In preserving the transcendence and ineffability of God, Tillich made God absolutely unspeakable and unknowable. While the New Symbol by no means pigeonholes God or puts any restrictions on God but on the contrary maintains transcendence and ineffability, it sanctions true statements about the relationship between humankind, the world, and God. Such statements do not interfere with God's transcendence and ineffability because they do not pretend to be empirical statements about a supernatural r<:alm spoken

from a position of factual certainty; rather, they are statements expressing natural/supernatural relationships that are spoken from a position of faith and trust.

Symbol and the Position from Which One Speaks

Tillich's concept of symbol and the New Symbol are similar in structure: both contain finite and infinite elements. Their differences, then, are not structural; they lie rather in the way that the same structure relates to reality. Both symbols are, in a sense, the same structure looked upon from a different point of view, which then results in different things being said about them. Tillich's concept of symbol is symbol seen from the point of view of one who lives in a purely theoretical world of existential self-estrangement that has been abstracted from the real world. The New Symbol, on the other hand, is symbol seen from the point of view of one who is experiencing salvation through the affirmation and internalization of the Christian symbols of belief.

Tillich described the theologian as being simultaneously committed and alienated, as being in faith and in doubt, as being inside and outside the theological circle. Sometimes one side prevails, and sometimes the other side prevails. What makes the theologian a theologian is the acknowledgement of the theological circle as one's ultimate concern. (IIO) This is yet another example of Tillich raising the negative to a level with the positive. There is again much truth in what he says, but he goes again too far. The theologian of the New Symbol experiences alienation and doubt; the kingdom of God is not yet here, but it has been initiated. The theologian of the New Symbol speaks basically from a faith stance. This by no means rules out doubt, for faith is compatible with unrestricted questioning .[13]

For the theologian of the New Symbol, faith takes primacy

[13] Karl Rahner, *Foundations of the Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity*, translated by William V. Dych (New York: The Seabury Press, 1978). Rahner consistently questions and explores from a faith stance.

over doubt. The theologian can be said to participate in faith-itself, in which is contained a dialectical relationship between faith and doubt. For Tillich, faith and doubt, though they occur simultaneously within the theologian, are to be treated as mutually exclusive operations. And so the Tillichian theologian affirms only the act of believing and ends up completely doubting all beliefs without affirming any.

The status of beliefs in Tillich's system is thereby ontologically ambiguous and psychologically negative-this is the result of his theoretical point of view. On the contrary, for the theologian who speaks from a concrete faith stance beliefs are ontologically and psychologically positive. They are to be doubted and to be revised, for faith is by no means necessarily uncritical. It is through faith that symbols achieve their efficacy.

Tillich arrived at the position from which he spoke by abstracting a theoretical world of an ambiguous mixture of essential elements and existential elements from the real world in which grace is universally available. Such an abstract description of fallen human nature certainly has its value; it provides one way of examining the relationship between the world and the Christian message. Such an abstraction, however, hardly provides a position from which a Christian theologian can speak systematically. Yet this is just what Tillich did. He spoke from the position of one who is caught up in the ambiguities of life and who believes that Christian symbols will point beyond themselves to answer his ultimate concern. Though Tillich claimed that the theologian is both one who participates and one who doubts, he constructed his systematic theology from a stance of doubt. His self-proclaimed "existential" position of alienation and doubt surely does not do justice to the real existential position of Christians. He spoke as one who may be about to believe, not as one who believes.

Tillich's theologian operationally separates faith and doubt. Ultimately this is negative, because the theologian may be separated from faith but is not allowed to be without doubt.

On the other hand the theologian who adopts a faith stance can encompass a faith-doubt dialogue within a basic faith. Such a theologian speaks not simply as one who is posing questions and pointing to answers, but rather as one who is posing questions and participating in the answers.

By accepting the ambiguity of existence Tillich tried to transcend the old problem of whether the fallen world was basically still good or was totally depraved. Psychologically, however, this stance functions as a belief in total depravity. The theologian who adopts a faith stance, however, is able to transcend this old question by accepting the answer to the question implied in the ambiguity of existence. For there is no such thing as an abstract fallen world. The world, which, to borrow from Tillich, is participating in the New Being, is basically good both ontologically and psychologically.

From Tillich's stance, symbols are useful for pointing beyond themselves to disclose the ultimate in a limited way, but they are not true in the sense that they themselves correspond to any reality. From a faith stance, symbols by contrast not only disclose the ultimate in a limited way but are also true in the sense that they represent reality. Obviously the effect of this on belief is important. For Tillich, beliefs are not true; they are useful but ambiguous. Seen from a faith stance, however, beliefs are true though open to doubt and revision. In other words, whereas one who integrates Tillich's system into one's being believes not in the symbols but beyond the symbols, one who adopts a faith stance believes in and through the symbols.

The theologian of the faith stance is not without a Protestant principle; it is, however, different from Tillich's principle. Tillich arrived at his Protestant principle from the necessity for the theologian sometimes to act with a detached rather than a participatory attitude. Because of his presupposition that the world is basically ambiguous, Tillich arrived at the position that no belief could ever in any way be true in itself. Now the theologian of the faith stance will also sometimes act in a detached manner. It is done, however, through a temporary sus-

pension of belief from within the basic faith stance, for, as stated previously, faith is not incompatible with unrestricted questioning. Unlike Tillich, the theologian of the faith stance asks the question of truth without the presupposition that a belief is absolutely false in itself. Such a theologian tries to understand what truth a belief does express, while still remaining completely open to revising and even discarding the belief should that become necessary. The world is seen to be basically good, and beliefs are basically true.

The New Symbol and Dogma

Within the framework of the New Symbol, the ontological status of dogma is positive. Dogmas are presumably true. At the same time, they are historically and culturally conditioned, and our understandings of them are also historically and culturally conditioned. Dogmas can change and grow. They are subject to revision. To the extent that they express a relationship between humankind, the world, and God, however, they contain a virtually timeless truth, that is, a truth that is true and that will be true until the end of the world as we know it.

The believer who adopts a faith stance does not disregard the virginity of Mary. One does not necessarily believe that this is literally true in the sense that it corresponds to a biological fact. One believes, however, that it is literally true in the sense that it discloses something about the nature of reality that corresponds with the actual relationship between humankind and the transcendent. That is, it is both literally and mythically true. Mythical truth is manifested and disclosed; literal truth corresponds with an actual reality.

The believer recognizes the reality of original sin. One does not necessarily believe that Adam ate an apple. But original sin does describe a truth about the human situation as it relates to God. Sin is a reality, and we are born into it. Our sinfulness is our responsibility so long as we have the opportunity to grow. In this sense, our "fall" is our "fault." Our understanding of original sin may change. We may even express it

as the self-estrangement of existential being from essential being. Nonetheless there is a truth expressed by the concept that is virtually timeless. It will be true as long as human beings exist categorically as human beings.

The New Symbol and God-Talk

In relation to the New Symbol, the ontological status of God-talk is positive. God-talk refers directly and truly to a supreme being whom we call God. God is not a woman or a man. God is God. God is Father, but the symbol "father" by no means exhausts God. God is truly and directly referred to, but God is always infinitely more than we can say about God. God is all-good, but none of us can imagine what all-goodness is. We may indeed experience intimations of all-goodness in our hearts, but we can never talk about God in a way that fully captures God. And, even if we say things about God that are completely false, it is still God to whom we are referring in a false way. But the believer has faith that one can make some positive statements about God and about the operation of God in one's life that are true in the sense that they correspond with reality.

God, who is the supreme being, is being-itself, the ground of all being. And this is not, as Tillich would have it, a contradiction. Rather it is a mystery. As each person exists both completely as a part of the world and simultaneously completely transcends it, so God exists as the ground of all being and fully transcends it to exist as the supreme being.

The New Symbol and Jesus as the Christ

From a faith stance, the ontological status of Jesus as the Christ is positive. Jesus is the Son of God. He is one in being with the Father who made all things. He came down from heaven for us human beings and for our salvation. Now the believer does not pretend to comprehend fully what this means. The believer does not necessarily imagine an eternally pre-existent Logos who came down from heaven by dropping out of the sky. And yet, without fully understanding what it means

to say that Jesus is God, the believer has *an* understanding of it and this understanding is positive. The believer can have intimations of what this means and can thematize these intimations in a positive fashion. To say that Jesus is God is mythically true in the sense that it opens up and discloses something of the nature of reality, and it is literally true in the sense that it corresponds with an actual reality. The transcendent has fully entered into history as a human being. A new relationship has been created between humankind, the world, and God. Accordingly one can affirm the Christ-event as literally and objectively true without taking a literalistic and objectivistic viewpoint toward it.

The believer who adopts the stance of the New Symbol believes that Jesus is in himself God. It is true that Jesus as expressed in the New Testament at times pointed away from himself. And yet it is equally true that he pointed to himself and through himself. It is true that the Jesus of the New Testament fully emptied himself as a total sacrifice. And yet it is equally true that what he emptied himself of was not the negative and the worthless, but the positive and the infinitely valuable. It was indeed a sacrifice. Tillich's kenotic Christology accounts for only half of this paradox. For the Jesus of the New Testament did not simply negate his finite being; he sacrificed his positive self as an act of total love. The believer believes in and through Jesus, not simply beyond him. Such a believer views Jesus from a post-Resurrection stance of faith.

Tillich in Perspective

Tillich has been called an atheist. This charge has been made on the ground that he presented Hegelian philosophy in the guise of Christian language,[14] and on the ground that being-

"Leonard F. Wheat, *Paul Tillich's Dialectical Humanism: Unmasking the God Above God* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970). Wheat's book is devastating yet fair. It well points up the inadequacies of Tillich's system. It fails, however, to recognize the tremendous value that the system has as a transitional tool for laying the groundwork for a more " theistic " theology that can deal with modernity.

itself is not the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.[15] However, Tillich's status as an atheist is ambiguous. From the point of view of a person who prays to God as a supreme being, Tillich might appear to be an atheist. From the point of view of a naturalist who argues a.gainst praying to God as a supreme being, Tillich might also appear to be an atheist. But this is much too simple. Tillich must be viewed in a larger perspective.

Tillich's systematic theology is basically apologetic. He was addressing a situation where traditional Christianity was under severe criticism from history, science, and philosophy. The very foundations of Christianity were being shaken. Tillich found the defensive approach of the traditionalists unacceptable. Instead of taking modern criticism seriously, many Christians had retreated into intellectual ghettoes that made an idol out of religion. Nea-orthodoxy had arisen in part to counteract this idolization of religion, yet it itself became idolatrous through its uncritical acceptance of its own sources and by its refusal to take the contemporary situation into consideration. (15) Neo-orthodoxy tried to put Christianity beyond the attacks of history, science, and philosophy, but by doing so it raised faith, the gospels, and its own concept of God to the level of the infinite. Tillich was heavily influenced by neo-orthodoxy, yet at the same time stood in reaction to it.

Like the neo-orthodox theologians, Tillich was dissatisfied with liberal Christianity. Even though Tillich is labeled by some as a Protestant Hegelian, he explicitly polemicized against Protestant Hegelianism and Catholic modernism. (1241) He saw them as watering down the Christian language into" mere" symbols that dissolved its real meaning and power. Also, he disagreed with their seemingly uncritical acceptance of culture. At the same time, however, Tillich was heavily influenced by Hegelianism and modernism.

On the one hand, then, Tillich was arguing against the mod-

[15] Sidney Hook, " The Atheism of Paul Tillich," pp. 190-94 in *Pragmatism and the Tra.gic Sense of Life* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1974). Hook calls Tillich a " beneficent trojan horse in the citadel of the idol-worshippers."

ernists who would interpret Christianity as "mere" symbols; on the other hand, Tillich was arguing against those who would make an idol out of their own understanding of the Christian message. Against the liberals, Tillich argued the neo-orthodox position that culture must submit itself to the judgment of the ultimate. Against the neo-orthodox, Tillich argued for the liberal position that all ontological " content " is dynamic and organic and therefore relative. After using the arguments of each side against the other, Tillich then turned their arguments back upon themselves. Tillich brought neo-orthodoxy under the judgment of not respecting the absolute transcendence of God. He took liberalism to task for not realizing that the efficacy of symbols extended to the mediation of a reality beyond themselves.

Tillich's solution was to establish a genuine dialogue between Christianity and culture. Culture poses questions; Christianity answers them. But the answers are correlative between the tradition and the culture; they are to a great extent dependent upon the questions that are asked. Tillich's Hegelian notions of the evolution of ideas enabled him in a sense to bring Christianity down to the level of the culture so that the dialogue could be genuine. He did this by claiming that any specific content of Christianity is efficacious only to the extent that it negates its finite elements, all finite elements being seen to be part of the culture. What happens, however, is that Christianity in its complete relativity becomes absolutely sensitive to the culture. Yet Tillich did not put Christianity on a level with the culture in order to reduce the message. I believe that he did it because he had the faith that Christianity and the ultimate would prevail whenever they were given a fair chance.

When seen in a broad perspective, Tillich is not an atheist. He defended the reality of Christianity against its attackers. He defended the otherness and the transcendence of Christianity against those who thought they had it packaged. And he defended the vitality and infinite possibility of Christianity against those who had a literalistic and objectivistic understanding of it. He presented a coherent system that dealt effec-

tively with the issues that he addressed. The problem with Tillich is the position from which he himself spoke. He stood apart from the tradition and claimed that it had the answers for anyone who would look past it. The difficulty that arises is that the content of Christianity is seen in no way to be true in itself. It is only seen to be powerful. And this is simply not what believers who stand inside the tradition believe. For a believer, a belief is basically true, and Christianity is thus basically true. And the world is basically good.

If the world could be easily divided into believers and non-believers, and if these corresponded exactly with Christians and non-Christians, then Tillich's systematic theology would be an enticing presentation of the message to non-Christians. It is written from the position of one who has detached himself from the tradition in order to address people who are caught up in the ambiguity of life. The world, however, cannot be so easily divided. Tillich, from his stance of an about-to-be-a-believer, presented Christianity itself as being ambiguous. Certainly it must be granted that Christianity is historically and culturally conditioned. It must also be granted that from the position whence Tillich spoke Christianity *is* ambiguous. What must not be granted is Tillich's position itself. As one who forged ahead alone during a time of much turmoil and confusion within Christianity, Tillich lacked the positive concept of ecclesiology that might have improved his stance. Tillich's system has laid the groundwork for contemporary theology. In itself, however, Tillich's system leads to conclusions that are ultimately intolerable.[16] The answer to the self-estrangement of Christianity from its essential being is thus the New Symbol, which is symbol viewed from a stance of faith.

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[16] Ved Mehta, *The New Theologian* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965). In an interview near the end of his lifo, Tillich intimated that all symbol systems are absolutely equal; all that matters in the end is the experience of the holy.

BOOK REVIEWS

Theological Investigations: Volume XVI. By KARL RABNER, S. J. New York: The Seabury Press, 1979. Pp. xii + Q75, with index. $14.95.

The Acting Person. By KAROL WoJTYLA. Boston: D. Reidel, 1979. Pp. xxiii + 367, with index.

By reviewing these two books together we should be able to compare the anthropologies of Karol Wojtyla and Karl Rahner. Clearly, *The Acting Person* is an essay in philosophical anthropology. While the most recent volume of Rahner's *Theological Investigations* is more diversified in scope, the human person remains sufficiently in the forefront to found a comparative essay. Given the probably greater familiarity of the reader with the thought of Rahner, I shall use Wojtyla's book as the point of departure and give it a lengthier treatment. Discussing each author in turn will help to provide a brief overview of their works as a basis for a presentation of their views on human transcendence and freedom. In this way we can achieve a sharper focus.

The simple devout soul who stumbles into a religious book store and, moved by the impressive cover picture of His Holiness in full regalia, purchases *The Acting Person* for devotional reading will find his or her perseverance sorely tried. This is a difficult volume. The prose as translated from Polish is turgid and makes for laborious reading. To read this book once is to read it twice; one must continually reread what one has just read. But such writing is not peculiar to philosophers. And the depth of analysis is remarkable. Wojtyla's understanding of man is comprehensive and detailed. At times repetitious, he seldom veers from his chosen theme.

Wojtyla begins with methodology. The focus is upon experience, and the approach is in the line of phenomenological realism. The author claims that his work is consistent with traditional philosophy, which he identifies as Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy (p. xiii). Yet his presentation is a rethinking and recasting of the tradition, not denying it, " but supplementing it in an attempt to rethink it to the end " (p. Q66). In this rethinking he especially acknowledges the influence of Max Scheler's *Wertethik.* Wojtyla seeks by his phenomenological approach to explain what experience and intuition provide.

Part One is entitled " Consciousness and Efficacy ". The focus is on the person as revealed through conscious action. The various dynamisms are considered along with the proper efficacy of the human person. In Part Two we find " The Transcendence of the Person in the Action ". Here the structure of freedom is considered in relationship to the problem of the will and the cognition of truth and value as it leads to choice and decision.

Throughout, the complexity is underlined. The study turns to freedom as manifested in self-determination, then to the possibility of fulfillment, and the role of conscience and responsibility. Part Three moves to the complement of transcendence, namely " The Integration of the Person in the Action ". Here, the person's subjectivity as manifested through the body is considered, with an extensive treatment of the emotions. Part Four is entitled "Participation", and turns to the problem of Intersubjectivity and social being.

But what is the purpose of this book? It is of course to " exfoliate the complexity of man". Yet the aim seems to be more than analytical. Granted that throughout the volume the author concentrates upon the dynamic interaction and unity of the person and action, these are seen as leading to the true and authentic attainment of freedom and fulfillment. The becoming of the person through genuine freedom and the fulfillment gained through action appear as a guiding thread through this discourse on man. To grasp Wojtyla's idea of freedom and how is it related to transcendence and action much groundwork is needed.

Wojtyla thoroughly analyzes action. Action discloses the person; better, the person is manifested through action. The author firmly renounces a static human nature as grounding human acts. The dynamic nature of man is thoroughly accepted. Contrasting this contemporary approach with a more traditional philosophy of man, the Polish philosopher notes that for the latter man's nature is rational, he is a person in virtue of reason, and his rationality grounds his social nature. Wojtyla claims that the evolution of thought is not towards rejecting these principles but towards a " better understanding and more comprehensive interpretation" (p. 268). No one doubts that man is rational and social. But the question remains: What does this mean? " Our questions thus refer to the meaning of these assertions from the point of view of acting, that is, of the dynamic correlation of the action with the person." We encounter no arid intellectualism here but rather a sustained adherence to the original phenomenological slogan, *Zuriick zu den Sachen selbst.* There is no quick establishment of certain inviolable principles of reality from which rationalistically to draw conclusions. Experience and intuition remain the norm in this text, and the insights are profound.

Action is conscious acting. As "conscious acting" it is characteristic of and related to the will. Wojtyla cites the tradition as having assumed the person as the source of action. But he moves in the opposite direction: action is the source for knowledge of the person. It is in action that the dynamism proper to man is manifested.

This leads to a consideration of consciousness. Consciousness is more than action, although action never occurs without it. It accompanies action, yet it also precedes and succeeds it. Consciousness mirrors the action during its performance. Through its presence one is able to act as a person

and to experience his acting as action. In its mirroring function consciousness reflects what goes on in action and is able to interiorize what it mirrors. Two important functions of consciousness emerge: the reflective and reflexive functions. In the function of reflection consciousness is able to mirror the results of cognition. This is the process of objectivation. It is this function that has led phenomenologists to speak of the intentionality of consciousness. The author carefully avoids a strict identity between intentionality and consciousness. More important for the shaping of the personal subject, of the ego, is the reflexive function of consciousness. Here lies the ability to experience my actions as my own and to let them shape and mould myself. The reflective function " denotes that consciousness, so to speak, turns back naturally upon the subject ..." (p. 43). It is this turning back that allows the experience of one's own subjectiveness. Both of these functions are vital in achieving self-knowledge. And self-knowledge is crucial to freedom and fulfillment.

In self-knowledge I can objectivize the ego, consciousness-the ground of the ego, and the actions that flow from the ego. The ego itself is an inexhaustible source of rich material for self-knowledge, confirming that man is mystery-" *individuum est ineffabile* ", the author writes. (Here is a lir..k with Rathner's anthropology, which stresses the presence of mystery in man, acting as the lure of transcendence, inviting man towards self-enactment. In Wojtyla, beyond the recognition of man as mystery, the point is made, yet undeveloped.)

The process of subjectivation through consciousness allows man the unique privilege of experiencing himself as the subject of his actions. Man is the subject who can know himself as object and, through the reflexive function of consciousness, return to himself through self-experience. Wojtyla does not approach man as simply a type of being. True, man is a determinate being, yet he possesses himself, governs himself, and is a real subject whose personal ego designates a unique person. The ego, the author writes, " is the real subject having the experience of its subjectiveness or, in other words, constituting itself in consciousness " (p. 45). Without consciousness we would never constitute ourselves as the ego. No taint of idealism accompanies this focus on consciousness, which is intimately united with the ontological being which is the concrete man-person.

The person disclosed through consciousness and experience is a unity. There is no overemphasis on man's rationality nor separation of reason and emotion. Nonetheless, human existence contains a tension: between bodily potentiality, with emotiveness and the various impulses, and the will as the power of self-determination. For both Wojtyla and Rahner, one may signify this tension in the couplet of "nature-person". This tension is the heart of the human existential drama. Wojtyla writes: "Experience tells us that it is in this tension rather than the simple and pure self-determination that consists the lot of man" (pp. 123-124). Herein lies the possibility

of authentic freedom and self-fulfillment. For this tension calls upon the person's active nature purposefully to transcend and integrate his passivity.

How are we better to grasp this inner tension? Wojtyla again returns to the experiential ground. The varied human dynamisms are best divided into "man-acts" and "something-happens-in-man". The tradition said: act and potency. Experientially we can say: acting and happening. At this point the author further clarifies the meaning of action in comparison with ., act ". " Act " designates the dynamism of all being, including the human dynamism both as" man-acts" or" acting"," something-happens-in-man", or "happening". "Human acting," of course, is the action proper to man corresponding to the structural dynamism of "man-acts". Strictly, "man-acts " is the form of the dynamism with man himself as conscious agent. Wojtyla has carefully prepared us for the unique and creative moment of freedom. Through consciousness I am not only aware of my acting, but also experience myself as the agent responsible for my acting. Concerning the other dynamic structure, that of " something-happening-in-man ", much on the vegetative level escapes my awareness. Even on the level of emotions, I can be unaware of emotional stirrings. It is the experience of "being the actor" that tells of personal freedom. Wojtyla calls it the "moment of efficacy ". Thus "subjectiveness" is related structurally to "something-happening-in-man" and efficacy to man's acting. Through efficacy man enacts his being and becomes the person he was potentially.

What are the dimensions of action? Action does not simply externalize itself in the object intended; it has an immanent aspect. There is a reflexive quality of both consciousness and action. In fact, man the subject is the ultimate object of his own acting. Wojtyla claims that "it is man's actions, his conscious acting, that make of him *what* and *who* he actually is " (p. 98). Such action presupposes the efficacy proper to man, and morality is the fruit, not abstractly, but as an existential reality of the person. Therefore, it is our actions, having the personal ego as their ultimate object, that render us good or bad. Man *is* in becoming through his actions, and it is here that freedom is manifested.

Freedom has its foundation in the experience "I may but I need not." In this experience, which best visualizes freedom, we see manifested and actualized the dynamism most proper to man. As every dynamism implies a potentiality as the source of this dynamism, then the correlate of this dynamism is the will. Between the experience of " I may " and that of " I may not " resides the dynamism proper to the will, viz., "I want." For Wojtyla, "The will is what in man allows him to want" (p. 100). In willing I manifest my freedom and the dynamic transcendence belonging to the person but lacking in the deterministic fabric of nature.

For the understanding of freedom and transcendence the reader must concentrate on chapter three, "The Personal Structure of Self-Determination ". Here we find some of Wojtyla's most illuminating analyses, espe-

cially of the will and self-determination. The essence of willing is "to strive". Implied is an outgoing towards an object, suggesting value. The will expresses a dynamism, and as dynamic it of itself possesses an orientation to truth. The will, with its relation to the truth, influences cognition through the will's demand and need to have revealed the truth concerning the objects of its tending. " It is only by its objectifying function," the author writes, " that cognition guides the will: nothing may be the object of will unless it is known " (p. 114). At bottom both thinking and willing emerge from a common source, man's spiritual nature, the evidence of which "stems in the first place," Wojtyla notes, "from the experience of the person's transcendence in the action ..." (p. 181). What distinguishes thinking and willing is the different directions they take. Retreating from the complex issue of intellect and will, we can better pursue our purposes by turning to the notion of self-determination, for in this notion lies the constitution of the ego.

The will is reflexive as well as intentional and in its former capacity it exists as self-determination. " The turning to any external object that is seen as an end or value," Wojtyla claims, " implies a simultaneous fundamental turn toward the ego as the object" (p. 111). The dynamic core of efficacy itself consists in self-determination identifiable with the experience of " I will." Thus, freedom itself is identified with self-determination as discovered in the will as an element of man's personal structure.

Transcendence, like the will, is an essential of the human person. Transcendence means a going beyond a boundary or certain limits. Like Marcel, Wojtyla distinguishes between horizontal and vertical transcendence. The former expresses intentionality, being directed towards an external object, as in perception or volition. The latter is a fruit of self-determination. One transcends one's structural boundaries through the capacity to exercise freedom. Transcendence, therefore, is owed to free will as " the person ' transcends 'his actions because he is free and only so far as he is free " (p. 138). It is in transcendence that the spirituality and ultimate fulfillment of man are realized. Transcendence shapes human existence. The author states, " Man as the person both lives and fulfills himself within the perspective of his transcendence" (p. 181). But is this transcendence as embodying freedom a blind thrust into nothingness? Not at all. Transcendence is related to truth. Truth is not only essential for the possibility of human knowledge but also " the basis for the person's transcendence in the action " (p. 146). What is demanded is a " surrender to truth ".

Wojtyla unfolds the notion of "surrender" in relationship to freedom, fulfillment, conscience, obligation, and responsibility. There is an experiential " moment of truth " grounded in an intuitive experience of objects. This intuitive experience, being of values, is accompanied by a judgment of values. The judgment is not discursive in nature; for values are found " ready-made " in knowledge, not invented by reason. It is this " moment

of truth " intuitively realized, judged and assessed, that leads the will, through a surrender to truth, to enter into decision, choice, action. So in truth we find the ultimate point of reference for the transcendence of the person. It is at this point that we find the strongest critique of the " rational nature of man " notion in traditional philosophy. The tradition is right in emphasizing that the source of transcendence is the mind. Yet the definition of man through his rational nature introduces a metaphysical reductionism which overemphasizes man's intellectual nature " rather than transcendence of the person through the relation to the value of moral truth. It is this transcendence as the constitutive feature of the person that we are trying to disclose in this study " (p. 166). This critique of the tradition is ratified in reference to norms. The objective truthfulness is not so much the issue as is the experience of their truthfulness leading to a subjective certitude and a sense of obligation. The sense of obligation is in fact united with the experience of truthfulness. Obligation entails an imperative best expressed as a positive value in the statement: " Thou shalt. love." And love brings fulfillment to man in freedom.

From Wojtyla's *The Acting Person* we tum to Karl Rahner's *Theological Investigations: Volume XVI,* titled *The Experience of the Spirit: Source of Theology.* (This volume is dedicated to his mother, who celebrated her hundredth birthday in 1975.) The essays of this volume are divided into four parts. Part One is titled " Faith and Spirit " and is the most helpful for its insights into the philosophy of man. Part Two is a most important section dealing with " Spiritual Theology in Christian Tradition ". The initial essay in this part was Rahner's first major theological study to be published (1932): " The 'Spiritual Senses ' According to Origen ". Both it and the succeeding essay, "The Doctrine of the 'Spiritual Senses' in The Middle Ages", are important for tracing the early direction of Rahner's thought. Anticipations of the *Vorgriff* are easily discernible in these articles concerning Christian mysticism. Part Three, " Listening to Scripture ", deals with a variety of more professional theological topics, including dogmatic theology, the history of revelation, and the universality of salvation. Finally, Part Four, in three essays, turns to" Questions about God", and includes a remarkable chapter on" The Hiddenness of God".

The main theme of this volume is indeed that of " spiritual experience " (p. 25G). The beginning point for Rahner is experience, especially that of man as a questioner. His ability to question, and question further, makes of man an absolute question open to the infinity of God. This questioning capacity drives man right past the objective and categorical and into the boundless expanse of mystery. Man experiences his transcendence through his experience of the spirit. This experience is one of going beyond the limits of one's finitude towards God himself. As Rahner relates, "Man is the being who possesses unlimited transcendence of knowledge and freedom. The inner dynamism of his spirit is directed to absolute being, to absolute

hope, to the absolute future, to good in itself ... and thus to God . " (p. *55).*

Immediately we can establish some thematic similarities between our two authors. The dynamic nature of man is affirmed as well as man's transcendence. Yet the revelation and meaning of transcendence differ. Wojtyla's work affirms this essential of man only after considerable effort to demonstrate the complex dynamisms of man, his free will and its relationship to consciousness, efficacy, and man's subjectiveness as known in action. M_an's transcendence is treated only after action has been scrutinized and seen to reveal the person's free and spiritual nature and natural reference to truth. For Rahner, the approach is bold and direct, and the results are of infinite proportions. Despite the more abrupt approach the object of transcendent experience seems to be the same. For Rahner, it is the will of God. For Wojtyla, it is the surrender to truth. But the element of mystery is more heightened and affirmed in Rahner's approach, who, in claiming an experience of truth, finds it occurring in " the basic experience of the mystery itself " (p. 236) . This mystery is at the origin of all knowledge and freedom. Mystery pervades Rahner's anthropology. It is the pre-condition of both knowledge and freedom, and it is revealed to man in the experience of mystery. "For the essence of knowledge lies in the mystery which is the object of primary experience and is alone self-evident" (loc. *cit.).* It is not man who is the shepherd of being-Rahner is not Heidegger -but the mystery that is the shepherd of man. The experience of mystery is not one in which man is the dominant subject but one in which he experiences himself as the recipient of being. In conceptualizing his relationship to the mystery he understands himself as reaching beyond all abstractions into the incomprehensibility of infinite being.

Rabner continues to emphasize knowledge as the main approach to understanding the human person. He renews his invective against a false ideal of knowledge aiming at mastery over the object. This ideal has permeated the western tradition of philosophy, with its goal of seeing through things rather than openness to mystery. Rahner's philosophy now meets his theology, moving him to conclude, " The most radical and ultimate statement of this anthropology is that man is a being who is endowed through the free self-communication of God in grace with the infinite incomprehensibility and incomprehensible infinity of God, and so shapes his own being in divine incomprehensibility " (p. *253)* . Knowledge in its most radical sense is the presence of the mystery which is God.

Turning to freedom, we learn that transcendence, grasped in its unlimited breadth as the pre-condition for all categorical knowledge, " is also the pre-condition for the freedom which is historically expressed and objectified " (p. 237) . Transcendence is not confined to the realm of knowledge. In the free human act also I accept myself as I am and trust myself to God's incomprehensibility. This demands an unconditional surrender to God as

the true source of our fulfillment. Surrender, as in Wojtyla, is crucial to freedom and its realization. Surrender does not bind one or limit one's options; rather, it opens one to the infinite breadth of authentic freedom and fulfillment.

Freedom entails transcendence and surrender. Here both authors are in agreement. Wojtyla likewise confirms the dynamic activity of the mind towards truth. Our ability to grasp truth " is combined with the urge to search and inquire." This striving indicates a need for truth. Wojtyla concludes that "It is the surrendering of the mind with regard to truth that conditions the transcendence of the person " (p. 159). Comparison at this point can mislead. Recall that Wojtyla's work is an exercise in phenomenology, while Rahner holds fast to his transcendental Thomism, the linchpin of his thought being Aquinas's *"excessus"* as he has developed it. Would Wojtyla approve?? One can only conjecture. Discussing Stoicism's depreciation of the emotions Wojtyla condemns its "apriorism ", the essence of which, he maintains, " is to disregard the evidence of experience " (p. 244). Rahner purports to attend to experience, while at the same time claiming that all concrete experiences are grounded in a transcendental experience. "Transcendental experience", Rahner states in *Foundations of Christian Faith,* "is the experience of transcendence, in which experience the structure of the subject and therefore also the ultimate structure of every conceivable object of knowledge are present together in identity " (p. 20). This structure is an a priori of the subject, but does not prevent reality from manifesting itself as it is; it is revealed in every act of knowledge as co-present with the object known. Would such an experience satisfy Wojtyla? It seems doubtful. With Rahner, though, we would ask of Wojtyla an account of the dynamism of the mind and the " urge " towards truth. The cognitive experience of truth is granted, but beyond the descriptive enterprise looms the need for metaphysical explanation.

Both knowledge and freedom possess reflexive qualities in Rahner's anthropology. Despite the immediacy of the infinite breadth of transcendence in both knowing and willing, a mediation is required through categorical reality placed within historical horizons. Self-presence demands the mediation of the other. Man's transcendent nature do.es not annul society but requires it. Without the mediation of a categorical realm one's transcendent thrust is without an echo. Both in knowing and willing expressed historically and categorically the subject is mediated to himself. Freedom enacted through choice constitutes a synthesis of a transcendent experience of the spirit and the categorical object of choice before us. Not to choose, for example, to love someone, but to withhold all choice, is to exist in the realm of possibility, which is not to exist. Further, in withholding love in the concrete, one loses the experience of the spirit in its transcendence. Like Wojtyla, Rahner holds to the reflexive nature of freedom. And as Wojtyla maintains that the object of the will ultimately is the ego, Rabner claims the object of freedom to be the person himself.

Rahner is the philosopher of the transcendent; Wojtyla is the philosopher of action. Both affirm the mysterious and spiritual element of man, and the unified dynamic whole which is man. Yet in this unity lies a complexity rife with tension, distortion, and unwholeness. Still, synthesis is possible, and each, in his anthropology, aims to chart the path of authenticity and self-realization achieved thorugh transcendence. They are equally critical of an overly intellectualistic view of human nature, or even of one that too narrowly compartmentalizes man's reason and emotions and thus distorts the vital relationship between them. For both, nature is realized in the person, and the person is realized through transcendence.

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The Two Horizons. New Testament Hermeneutics and Philosophical Description with Special Reference to Heidegger, Bultmann, Gadamer, and Wittgenstein. By ANTHONY C. TmsELTON. Grand Rapids: Eerdemans, and Exeter: Paternoster, 1980. Pp. xx + 384.

Thiselton's work seems to point implicitly to a crisis in biblical studies. On the one hand he has written a fine book which both surveys and develops the field of New Testament hermeneutics, a valuable aid for any student of scripture or theology. On the other hand his remarkable study leaves one strangely unsatisfied. If he had bungled his task we could blame it on the bungling. But it is his very success which suggests that the problem lies elsewhere-in the discipline itself. I propose therefore: (I) to review Thiselton's work, and (II) to suggest that Thiselton's failure to satisfy is part of a larger failure on the part of biblical studies as a whole to come to grips with the complexity of the text, with the psychodynamics that went into its composition.

I

The book is in three parts. Part One begins by explaining why a student of the New Testament should bother with philosophy. The point is crucial; for, while theologians generally are aware of the need to read philosophy and poetry, biblical scholars in their anxiety over many things sometimes do not get a chance to sit and think. In their neglect of philosophy they may forget that they are working on unexamined philosophical presuppositions. It is the business of hermeneutics to help one to cope both with the ancient text and with one's own presuppositions, to establish an open and

fruitful dialogue between the different mental horizons of past and present. Particularly relevant for this quest are Heidegger, Bultmann, Gadamer and Wittgenstein. For in these four thinkers, indicates Thiselton , we find a major effort to see things afresh, to view them (partly under the inspiration of Husserl's phenomenological tradition) as phenomena to be described, not as pieces in an abstract theory. Of course all four realize that the viewpoint of the observer or interpreter is inevitably predetermined to some extent-one must have one's own world (Heidegger), pre-understanding (Bultmann), tradition (Gadamer), training or " scaffolding" (Wittgenstein)-but they are convinced that much can still be gained from calm, detached, philosophical description. And it is precisely this attitude of philosophical description which Thiselton believes can benefit the study of the New Testament.

Before analysing in detail the contributions of the four thinkers Thiselton pauses (Part Two) to describe in greater depth the difficulties involved in understanding and interpreting.

First of all (51-84) there is what might be called the massive generation gap. If there can be such incomprehension between those who live in the same house and who are separated by no more than thirty or so years, what are the chances of bridging a gap of twenty centuries? Nineham is sceptical about its feasibility, and seems resigned to leave the people of the New Testament in peace within their own horizon. Troeltsch, though in some ways sharing Nineham's views, took an opposite tack, a daddy-knows-best approach: he sought to impose a modern horizon, in fact to impose his own personal horizon, on the past. This attitude is not that of philosophical description, and Pannenberg criticises it as dogmatic, positivistic, anthropocentric, stereotyped, and unrealistically clinical. Pannenberg does not solve the problem of reading the past, but at least he counters Troeltsch's effort to read it narrowly, and he helps to reestablish the need to keep an open mind, to be ready for the new and the extraordinary. Thiselton's treatment of Nineham, Troeltsch, Pannenberg, and the rise of historical consciousness illustrates one of the strengths of his book-comprehensiveness in dealing with a wide range of modern authors. His chapter on the generation gap (" historical distance ") does not completely bridge the divide, but it leaves us more sensitive to the problems and possibilities of those on the other side.

Secondly (85-114), there are the various factors which, without quite washing one's brain, leave it, so to speak, somewhat damp and clouded. There can be a well-meant but ultimately lazy reliance on the Holy Spirit-as though God, while insisting that we use our muscles, should dispense us from using our intelligence. There can also be an unreflective reliance on ancient formulae of faith. And there can be an uncritical acceptance of one's own consciousness or of the viewpoints of one's society. Here too Thiselton covers a wide range of authors, from Barth to Schleiermacher,

and from liberation theology's complaints about bourgeois presuppositions to Freud's critique of superficial motivation.

Thirdly (115-139), there are such problems as reading into a word an etymological meaning which does not apply, or mistakenly reading an attitude into a language structure. The virtual absence of gender distinction in English, for instance, does not mean that English-speakers have lost interest in sex. Similarly it is very debatable whether or to what extent the structure of Hebrew may be used as a guide to the ancient Hebrew mentality. And even when one does establish reasonably well what language meant in the past, it still remains, in the opinion of Thiselton and Ricoeur, to establish its meaning now.

The question of present meaning reappears when Thiselton (Part Three) introduces the first of his four major thinkers: *Heidegger* (143-9W4). Like a poet who would study people by looking into their eyes, Heidegger, particularly in his early writing, decided to study Being afresh by looking into its human eyes, by examining the human understanding which encounters and reflects Being. In other words, for him human life is a window on the soul of Being. Thus Being is known, not as an objective reality, but primarily through subjective experience. Similarly, things have meaning insofar as they relate to human experience. A piece of gold, for instance, has meaning and value not primarily through its external reality as a piece of metal, buried perhaps in the earth, but through its relationship to subjective experience, as when it gleams in the light or recalls memories. Likewise signs and texts have meaning not as external objects but insofar as they relate to present experience or meaning **(157).**

Thiselton's exposition of Heidegger is carefully balanced. He underlines also the contrast between Heidegger's emphasis on personal meaning, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the emphasis, resulting from Cartesian philosophy and Newtonian physics, on reality as composed of solid measurable objects. This latter view of the world, as made up of measurable objects, is in fact an extremely limited one, but its status as " scientific " gives it immense prestige. The same is true in dealing with texts. To treat them as detached objects subject to clear hermeneutical rules appears scientific and therefore unquestionable. But such a treatment neglects the crucial element of personal meaning, the element that Heidegger would regard as most important (157-160).

Of *Bultmann* (205-292) it can hardly be said that he approached the New Testament with philosophical detachment. His Lutheranism gave him not only a desire to communicate the evangelical word but also an emphasis on subjective faith which helped him to see that word as related primarily to a subjective response rather than to external events. Hence faith in the resurrection is not concerned with an external event on a distant Sunday morning but with personal renewal, the achievement of a new self-understanding (!i71-272). The colorful images of the New Testament concerning

bodily resurrection are part of an outdated mythology which obscures the evangelical word.

Of course it was not just his peculiar interpretation of Lutheranism which led Bultmann to his radical stance. He was influenced by Heidegger as well as by Dilthey, Collingwood, the History of Religions School, and form criticism. But it is Bultmann's near-forgotten debt to Neo-Kantian philosophy which Thiselton highlights. "Bultmann's Lutheranism," he writes (211), "is inseparably bound up with the presuppositions of Neo-Kantian philosophy." Briefly stated, such philosophy involves a dualism between the inner and outer worlds, between inner value and outer fact (208-212). When combined with the Lutheran dualism between the inner and outer worlds, between word and work/ external event, this neo-Kantian dualism contributed, decisively Thiselton would say, to cutting Bultmann off from certain aspects of reality. He developed an almost unique sensitivity to the interpreter's situation and to his need for personal meaning, but, in Thiselton's view, he does not seem to have done justice to all the dimensions of the text, especially its relationship to external events (245-251).

When *Gadamer* (292-826) speaks of understanding texts, he does so in the context of understanding in general, especially as the process of understanding is illustrated through the experience of art. The experience of art involves more than consciousness or abstract understanding. One goes beyond consciousness and loses oneself in the music, the dance, the story, thus achieving a unique contact with Being, a vital moment of understanding. For this reason the meaning of the work of art is not to be found in the consciousness or intention of the author. For while it may be possible, and quite important, to reconstruct the text or score, it is not possible to recover the unique experience of the author, nor can the reader's experience on the other hand be limited to that of the author. Perhaps the author who described David's grief over Absalom shuddered while writing, but not as much as a reader who has lost a child. "Rumor of war" can have for us a particular horror it could never have had for an earlier age.

If life is a factor which gives meaning to the text, then the mixture of life and experience which we call tradition has an important place in interpretation. One cannot read or question without bringing to the task the sensitivities of one's own tradition. There is no presuppositionless reading. One's tradition can involve a richness which expands the texts. The text in turn can expand the vision of the reader. It is this contact which Gadamer describes as a fusion of two horizons.

In practice this contact of horizons means that the text be applied, that it really enter one's horizon, one's world. To say one understands a law, argues Gadamer, but does not know how to apply it, means that one does not really understand. One simply has an abstraction in the head. Genuine understanding involves knowing how it applies. Similarly with texts.

Of course application is not a mechanical process. It is precisely because the text has to be fused with a completely different horizon that the process of interpretation, while faithful, must also be creative. Gadamer's contention therefore is that interpretative understanding is to be achieved, not as the historical method would have it, by recovering the author's intention, but by entering into the text and applying it creatively to the present situation.

The *later Heidegger's* (327-56) emphasis on language helps to account for the emphasis on language in the " new hermeneutic " of Fuchs and Ebeling. Language expresses what is, expresses Being, brings Being to a new stage. Hence language is an event. The New Testament, as distinctive language, constitutes a distinctive event. This event is interpreted by the event of my own life. One might say the events of text and life are like interacting chemicals. Interpretation therefore is very much related to the present: it is a dialogue between the text and my life. Thus, as in Gadamer, the interpretation involves application and creativity. In Thiselton's view, however, the new hermeneutic, and with it the work of Funk, Via, and Crossan, is rather one-sided and subjective: it tends to be selective in its choice of texts, and its emphasis on the present is not balanced by an adequate emphasis on the past.

In Thiselton's analysis *Wittgenstein* (357-438) serves first of all to reject the most decisive element of Bultmann's intellectual apparatus, his neo-Kantianism-precisely the near-forgotten element which Thiselton had highlighted earlier. For while Bultmann and Wittgenstein both came from a background of Neo-Kantian dualism (causing Bultmann to separate word a:1d value from fact, and causing Wittgenstein at first to separate language from life), Wittgenstein later realized that such dualism is not true to life, to the reality of spoken language. Aspects of Wittgenstein's analysis serve also to temper the claims of Nineham and Funk. Furthermore Wittgenstein's later writings dealing with the complexity and particularity of language help to cast light on such complex New Testament words as " faith," " flesh," " truth," and " justification by faith."

By and large Thiselton's treatment of the material is comprehensive, balanced, and clear. I found the section on Wittgenstein quite difficult and had to resort to the library in an attempt to cope with it. The effort was well worthwhile, and I felt grateful for being forced to look more closely at that fascinating thinker.

What has Thiselton achieved?

Negatively, he points to the limitations of several writers on the New Testament-not only of Nineham and Bultmann, whom he critiques severely, but also, to a significant extent, of Fuchs, Ebeling, Funk, Via, and Crossan.

Positively, his work is enigmatic. On the one hand he not only provides a useful survey of several issues and authors, but also, by relating Wittgen-

stein to New Testament hermeneutics, breaks valuable new ground. On the other hand, his impressive array of analytical and interpretative instruments, instead of coming together in some kind of climactic resolution, seems, rather, simply to lie there and peter out.

II

To a considerable extent what Thiselton has done is to state a problem rather than solve it. In this he is at one with a good deal of modern biblical hermeneutics: it points to the problem of historical distance, analyzes some of its aspects, criticizes inadequate solutions, and suggests some approacheey. This is invaluable: it awakens the mind, sharpens it, gives it space. But it does not solve the problem. To a large extent one is left to choose between a historical method which has failed repeatedly to solve the central historical and literary issues, particularly with regard to the Pentateuch and the Gospels, and a more recent hermeneutic which moves the emphasis from the writer to the finished (canonical) text and the reader, but which tends to avoid or shelve problems of history. And history is important, for it is linked to questions about the very nature of the biblical documents. What seems necessary therefore is not to abandon the historical method but to improve it, to focus it towards unraveling the forces at work in the text.

The point is illustrated by Childs's *Introduction.* In his leap from the historical debate to the discussion of the final text he realises that certain crucial historical and literary factors, precisely the factors closest to the composition of the text, have been passed over. Thus with regard to the oral-literary tension in Second Isaiah he writes: "The exact nature of the forces within Israel which led to this type of composition has not as yet been adequately understood " (1979: 321-22).

Even so massive and microscopic a work as Brown's *The Birth of the Messiah* seems to pass over the central compositional knot, so that James Sanders, who succeeded Brown as president of the SBL and who greatly praises his work, feels compelled nonetheless to chide him gently for shying away from the central dynamics: "Brown does not deal ... with biblical hermeneutics in the sense of the way the NT thinkers . . . contemporized traditions they received ... Whatever one calls the method, it is important to discern the hermeneutics " (1978: 196) .

Walter Ong, in his study of the evolution of consciousness and culture (1977: 231) believes that an analysis of compositional psychodynamics-i.e. of the mental processes, simple or subtle, involved in composition-would be decisive: " Scriptural scholarship as a whole, so far as I can see, still shows little awareness in depth of the psychodynamics of an oral culture ... so that the definitive breakthrough in scriptural studies, I believe, is yet to come ".

Ong of course is working on the presupposition that the Bible comes out

of oral tradition, a point that would be questioned in various ways by the observations, say, of Van Seters (1976), Warner (1979) and Neusner (1971). What seems certain is that a study of the psychodynamics of composition, whether oral or literary, could constitute a considerable advance and help to establish a bridge between the historical method and the methods which put more emphasis on the finished text and the reader.

Work has been done and is being done in both areas, oral and literary. Ong (1967: 22-35; 1977: 250-53) indicates work on oral composition. Koestler (1966), for instance, analyzes both the conscious and unconscious processes of art. Steiner (1975) analyses, both in theory and in practice, the processes of translation, interpretation, and composition. Thiselton's failure even to mention Steiner is rather surprising-a symptom perhaps of a larger failure on the part of scriptural studies to learn from the processes of literary composition in general-but his analysis of Wittgenstein makes up, so to speak, for that omission. For it is in Wittgenstein in particular that we find analytical observations about the subtle processes of perception and language.

Of course it is a long way from the broad sweep of Ong, Koestler, Steiner, and Wittgenstein to the precise processes behind each biblical book, but unless such analytic instruments are brought to the help of traditional historical and literary criticism it is unlikely that such criticism can continue to thrive. Lately there have been some specialized and highly interesting analyses of complex literary processes of adaptation and composition: Horgan's study (1979) of interpretative techniques at Qumran, Bryce's study (1979) of Proverbs's reworking of Egyptian literature, and Carmichael's examination (1979) of the fascinating and subtle process by which Deuteronomy seems to have reworked parts of Genesis. Nor can it now be said, as it was in the Fifties by Renee Bloch shortly before her death, that the study of midrashic processes in the New Testament is an area which remains more or less" *completement inexplore"* (1957: 1279). Yet scriptue scholarship is still in the early stages of pinning down the detailed compositional process, the practical hermeneutics, behind each book. Until such detailed hermeneutics are clarified the broader science of biblical hermeneutics is likely to consist of a mixture of conflicting theories, each in search of a practical base.

One of Thiselton's contributions is to have helped, unwittingly perhaps, to awaken us to this crisis.

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The New Image of the Person: The Theory and Practice of Clinical Philosophy. By PETER KOESTENBAUM. Westport, Conn. Greenwood Press: 1978. Pp. xi + 570.

In thirty-nine chapters and eight appendices, the author renders us the whole of a phenomenological philosophy of person and its consequent therapeutic, upon which he has worked since the late sixties. His is a humanistic realist viewpoint, yet quite impressive to the theistic realist, who finds much to ponder in this effort, and then to challenge in a stimulating exchange of visions. Certainly, the very idea of a " clinical philosophy " is intriguing; it is refreshing to find a thinker offering a therapy rooted formally in a philosophical persuasion. Many therapists insist they harbor no underlying philosophy of human nature, much less the metaphysics for a whole worldview. The philosopher quite often sees the contrary situation, and wonders how those who indeed have no coherent theory of what they are doing in fact help anyone. Koestenbaum's approach is vigorous, orderly, and free from the obfuscation often afflicting those who work within the ambit of Continental categories.

The text comprises three approaches to the topic. A theory of what it is to be human, existential and phenomenological in its metaphysics and bipolar in personality assessment, forms the first book. Then a discourse on anxiety relating to birth, freedom, and death follows in Book Two. Finally, a somewhat disjointed presentation of pathology, focusing on the "deconstituted consciousness," techniques for pain and need management, and his notion of participatory healing, is offered in the last book.

Koestenbaum delivers exactly what he promises, and then some. The study could well serve in several contexts, especially in personality and counseling courses where a personalist viewpoint is formally espoused, with options left for theistic interpretation of basic thematics. This task will not prove difficult since most humanist thinking, and Koestenbaum's is no exception, borrows from religious themes and traditions. The volume is superbly presented, with the best current bibliography of existential phenomenology the reviewer has seen and a full index of themes. The text also abounds in those kinds of charts and graphs of complex notions one seldom finds in philosophy works (generally composed on the supposition that script alone suffices to convey meaning) . His effort to lay out the structure of human consciousness is one of the most noteworthy to date. There will be exception taken to his model, no doubt, but Koestenbaum comes to his project with solid work on Husserl's *Paris Lectures* already published.

" A person is secure, grounded and at home by virtue of his nature, because of his relationship to his consciousness and to the universe," he states at the outset (p. 11). This new discipline, clinical philosophy, will enable

individual therapist-self-counseling is also envisioned-to claim this truth " which is always there but not always perceived." On this account, self-esteem is not to be considered a psychological feeling but rather a philosophical fact. Self-esteem, in short, is to be learned as a truth, not created as a feeling. It is a "metaphysical reality related to the structure of our consciousness and of the external world, which is always the object of that consciousness." This foundation of mutuality will be emotionally experienced when, and only when, it is intellectually clarified. For Koestenbaum's client, it is what one does not know because one has not discovered it, or been taught it by another, that leads to maladjustment. The other option is that the client has chosen one way or another to escape from self-valuation into illusion. The forms illusion takes are of course multiple, but the ultimate illusion is infinitude. Koestenbaum's root cause of human frustration and illness is the rejection of human finiteness. This desire to be infinite, to transcend especially the fact of death, leads into illusion. His move is now apparent: educate the individual in total acceptance of the real world and the real world's termination in death. This then is not to be a therapy of emotional adjustment by a technique of denial or any nominalistic re-categorizing of the unpleasant. Rather, acceptance of human finiteness is acceptance of "an ontological fact which can be illuminated and brought to life through a loving and supportive environment."

Koestenbaum's philosophy of person requires the intellectual acceptance of the human being as a finite freedom and full acknowledgement beginning in the intellect of what this must imply. Thus, responsibility, choice and commitment are key steps in achieving or reconstituting authentic personhood. This project begins in the uncovering of five modes of human awareness. Of these, individual, intersubjective, and communal are fairly evident dimensions while the final two are not. Cosmic stream consciousness is awareness of being a portion of all the consciousness that exists in the universe; the deepest level, what the author titles " eternal now " consciousness, is called forth by the present demands of relativity physics, eliminating space/time absolutes.

It must be admitted that, while this last level seems esoteric, it does take into account the nature of the universe in which human consciousness exists; no previous work on consciousness has done this. For the humanist thinker, "eternal now" awareness will not endure forever but instead characterizes consciousness outside of the finite universe which is its home. At such points, the theistic realist is bound to make the sort of extrapolation suggested above. This level of consciousness reflects the notion (which some impute to St. Thomas) of a self-aware consciousness with only itself as content, lacking orientation or intentionality to anything other than itself. We recall that self-awareness is evidence for Aquinas of the psyche's immortality-the proof from proper reflection: consciousness aware of itself must be immaterial and thus in some sense supratemporal. It would seem

that Koestenbaum's decision for finitude verges on the reverse decision. In essence, the decision implied by realism is not necessarily to acknowledge finitude, but to acknowledge the horizon between two sides of possible existence.

A similar re-casting of the author's basic category for negativity in human life can be suggested. He understands anxiety in the face of limits, especially death, as the highest "illumination that invades us " when ordinary designs on the world or coping mechanisms fail. For him this is an experience to be accepted instead of fled from, faced rather than framed for containment. This moment of truth, to employ a trite phrase in an exact sense, resembles the knowledge of utter contingency or absolute dependency that Aquinas utilizes in his metaphysics. There also the insight does not lead directly to an emotional or religious sentiment but to intellectual awareness of the frailty of things.

One wonders, indeed, if the client in acute anxiety is capable of rendering a positive meaning for anxiety. Koestenbaum has clearly been chastized on the issue of whether his intellectualist therapy will effect results with seriously disturbed, yet non-psychotic, personalities. His response is expectedly realistic: " All of us have only limited access to our freedom and some, due to circumstances, ... have barely any contact at all with human freedom " (p. 523). It seems this clinical philosophy is applicable mainly to the life of the healthy, those in a position to be educated, who can listen and share at either casual or fundamental levels. To state this might mean to diminish Koestenbaum's entire project, were it not for increasing evidence that the current medical model of emotional and mental illness is inadequate. Such theories of psychotherapy cannot claim to be analogous to surgical interventions. Perhaps it is time to address the intellect in times of distress rather than assume that the emotional/voluntary dimension of personality can be ventilated noncognitively.

The suggested technique borders on that of tutor, in line with the educational emphasis. The client is immediately referred to all details as these surface, following his own case history like an intern, if we may revert to the rejected medical model. The pathology is examined in " a thoroughly academic, scholarly and research sense." The point seems to be that as this life-scanning continues, the client becomes more conscious that it is his life at this moment which is being examined and affected, not some abstract entity brought along to the session. The approach is no doubt based on the assumption of a direct efficacy of mind over matter and the " hypothesis is that such a procedure . . . has curative consequences " (p. 463). In this mind-oriented therapy, intellectual fantasy, formally entered and sustained, will have a major role; formal fantasizing replaces destructive illusions, a difference the intellect realizes and enjoys. Here the client deliberately gives up a self-conception of victimhood or oppression before

unknown forces, moving to achieve first indirect contact as a mind/body continuum and finally full recognition of negative life factors.

At a time when the four major schools of psychotherapy (analytic, behavioral, humanist, and personalist) divide, according to some accounts, into more than one hundred sub-schools, there iii seldom full disclosure of the philosophical underpinning of a preferred therapy. Not so with Koestenbaum's clinical philosophy: he avows his chosen ontology. The reader may take this option or not. But most realists surely will choose to modify the image of person presented rather than scuttle it.

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Homosexuality and Ethics. Edited by EDWARD BATCHELOR, JR. New York: The Pilgrim Press, 1980. Pp. 261.

This book is a collection of essays and excerpts from essays by twenty-one authors, critiques of these essays, and then some statements from various churches and professional bodies concerning the ethical character of homosexual actions. There are many common themes in these essays and critiques, and it can be assumed that most readers are already familiar with them.

Most of the essays argue in favor of at least the toleration of homosexual actions, if not their approval, even though some of the essays totally or conditionally condemn them. Arguments totally opposing the morality of homosexual acts usually are grounded on either the natural law or a divine command which limits permissible sexual acts to those of heterosexual marriage. The case for homosexual acts, based on the natural law, usually employs a post-Reformation manualist conception of the natural law, which is inherently rigid, static, and legalistic. This deficiency could be more readily overcome by returning to the more dynamic Thomistic predecessor, but few have chosen to do this.

J\lfost arguments tolerating or approving homosexual acts are established by the intuition that more desirable psychological and relational states of affairs are brought about by these acts than by the repression of homosexual drives and inclinations. This notion creates serious problems for the moralist in that it reduces the moral good of reason to the psychological good by trying to account for the rational good as a set of psychological or relational states of affairs. If the rational good can be explained as a set of psychological states of affairs, then why cannot it be explained as a set of sociological, cultural, political, or racial states of affairs? Another serious problem with this mode of arguing is that psychological and relational states of affairs such as fulfillment, trust, self-acceptance, or creativity

are all future contingent singulars in relation to the homosexual act, and their actualization is by no means necessarily entailed by the homosexual act. This being the case, the grounds of justification of these acts can be eliminated if these states of affairs are not realized. This problem has been ignored, in large part, by those advocating approval of homosexual acts.

Some writers contend that homosexual acts are permissible because of the impossibility of homosexuals living the celibate or married life. What is obscure here is the meaning and content of this mode of impossibility. Is it a logical, psychological, rational, volitional, or practical impossibility? These distinctions must be made, for they bear heavily on the moral judgments that are to be made. Related to this is the lack of discussion, by those contending that homosexuals cannot adapt to other life styles, of the role of grace in the life of the homosexual. One gains the distinct impression from reading many of the authors in this work that the lot of many homosexuals is so desperate and hopeless that it is totally immune to the movements of grace and the Holy Spirit.

Some of the moralists in this volume argue that homosexual acts are imperfect and not to be morally approved, but only tolerated and not condemned. Based on a notion that some sinful acts and states must be tolerated because of the sinfulness of the world, this " compromise " theory urges the promotion of tolerance and the withholding of judgment. The theory of compromise is notoriously elastic, however, and it is not at all clear under what conditions it can be validly or invalidly invoked. The conclusions of the compromise theory are also unsatisfactory to most homosexuals, for they seek not just to be tolerated, but to be approved and esteemed as moral paradigms, and it certainly is not satisfactory to those who regard seriously the severe judgments on homosexual acts rendered by the natural law or other like theories and find homosexual acts intolerable.

It is not uncommon to find rather tortured renderings of Scriptural data by those who argue for the approval for homosexual acts. It is frequently argued in this book that the Genesis account does not pertain to homosexual acts, but to violations of ancient hospitality customs and laws. It is claimed that the men of Sodom did not wish to have homosexual relations with the angels who assumed the character of men and stayed in Lot's house, but that they only wished to " know " these men in the sense of learning their names and becoming acquainted with them (p. 189). The difficulty with this interpretation is that it makes the reasons for God's punishment of the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah rather irrational and unjust. For, if this theory is true, then Lot would have been the one guilty of inhospitality by not introducing his visitors to his friendly town's folk. If this interpretation is correct, then Lot should have been punished, and the men of Sodom should have been delivered. According to this theory, it is quite possible that God has badly misdirected his lightning,

fire, and brimstone. This is not a :fatal point against the theory that homosexual acts should be approved, but it is one to which attention should be given. Another difficulty related to the use of Scripture to gain approval of homosexual acts is the absence of any passages in Scripture which condemn those who do not tolerate or approve of homosexual acts, even though there are many passages which appear incontrovertibly to reject the morality of these acts. Since virginity and chaste marriage are constantly approved and counseled in Scripture, it would appear that homosexual acts would also be worthy of outright approval in Scripture if they were instances of Christian virtue and love. In contrast to this, most Scriptural writers appear to consider homosexual acts to be against chastity and Christian love.

Theorists demanding the moral approval of homosexual acts appear to believe that these acts can be approved while maintaining that other types of genital sexual expression can be prohibited. While homosexual acts do not separate the marital ends in the same manner that contraception does, these acts do entail a bifurcation of these ends, and the pursuit of one end independently of the others. Approving homosexual acts entails approving sexual acts or procreative acts that pursue the marital goods in independence of each other. Approving homosexual acts thus entails approving contraceptive acts that do not act in behalf of the procreative good, just as homosexual acts do not allow the procreative good to be realized. Allowing the independent pursuit of the marital goods would allow masturbation, and, even further, *in vitro* fertilization in which the procreative good is pursued independently of the unitive good. Advocates of the moral permissibility do not appear to wish to admit it, but sexual morality is inextricably united. One cannot grant moral approval to one species of action that separates the goods of procreation, love, and fidelity without being logically compelled to grant approval to acts that pursue these goods in independence of each other. Given the fact that gay rights activists wish to have homosexual acts not merely tolerated but approved, serious attention must be given to the implications this approval would have for the whole structure of Roman Catholic moral theology. In summary, granting an approval of this type would radically revise, if not wholly destroy, the structure of Roman Catholic moral theology, sexual morality, and theology of marriage.

Some authors in this volume urge that exclusive homosexual unions be sacramentally ratified for the reason that these unions have a sacramental dimension, aspect, or quality. But the form, manner, and the type of this sacramental reality is never clearly specified. One must explain how the grace of the sacrament of matrimony would be communicated in these types of relationships, given the fact that any procreative capabilities of these relationships are extrinsic to them. How does the fidelity of these exclusive gay unions signify and effect the fidelity of Christ for His Church and for married couples, given their infertility? And if marriage is not a relationship

based on nature, but only on consent (p. 19), then why is it that the human animal is freed from the natural constraints to reproduce? What is so unique about the human animal that his or her generative drive is Lot from nature but only from consent? It appears that the moral legitimation of homosexual marriages must torture the institution of marriage just as the moral approval of homosexual acts must torture Scripture.

In the last analysis, the granting of moral approval to homosexual acts and the holding up of the homosexual life style as a moral model and paradigm cannot be done because of the relationship of homosexual acts to chastity. Because homosexual acts cannot promote the procreative good, they can only promote the affective good, and the entailed end of the homosexual act will be pleasure. This however is a violation of the virtue of chastity, which must remain as a preeminent and controlling value in Christian life. It is this virtue which orders and controls the human drive for pleasure. It is a crucial virtue for all today on account of the dangerous world in which we live. For the drive for pleasure, which is ordered and controlled by the virtue of chastity, is inextricably linked to the drive to violence. It was the philosopher Schopenhauer who pointed out this relationship most clearly. Violence cannot be controlled unless the drive to pleasure is also controlled, even though many today do not believe this. In heterosexual acts which promote the good of procreation, love, aud fidelity, the drive to pleasure is ordered to these goods, and these goods are sufficient to restrain this drive. But in homosexual acts, which pursue the goods of love and fidelity independently of the good of procreation, the goods pursued are insufficient to order and restrain the drives to pleasure and violence.

The plight of the homosexual today is certainly one of great suffering and trial. But Christian faith must confess that Christ's passion was not in vain, and that the grace He won for us is sufficient for all our needs. If homosexuals are ostracized from society, blame must be shared by both society and the homosexual, for it is the immoral character of these acts which initiates their separation from the community. Their integration into full communion can come about only with their obedience to the command of chastity and by a radical devotion by the Christian community to witnessing to the mercy, forgiveness, and healing love of the Holy Spirit.

This book is a worthwhile introduction to current debates concerning the moral status of homosexual acts. However, it is somewhat slanted, and it does not pay sufficient attention to numerous serious criticisms of arguments for the approval of homosexual acts. A larger number of historically complete, philosophically nuanced, and theologically sophisticated studies would have made this work a more significant contribution to the ongoing controversies.

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Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. By RICHARD RORTY: Princeton University Press, 1979. xv + 401 pp. cloth, *$6.95* paper.

The philosophical tradition is surely unique in the place its adherents have given to thinkers who reject not just reigning schools of thought but even the very enterprise commonly called *philosophy.* W0 have only to think of the influence of David Hume, Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Martin Heidegger. Richard Ro1ty calls these thinkers " edifying philosophers "; and, although he asks no special status for his own work, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* qualifies as a major contribution to the literature of edification.

Rorty sees philosophy as having been governed, particularly since Descartes, by a pre-occupation with discovering the foundations of knowledge and bewitched by the metaphor of mind as a mirror reflecting an autonomous nature. Insofar as philosophers have believed themselves to have a special mission to analyze, purify, and preserve the mirror, they have assumed for philosophy the position of a critic establishing principles for and setting limits to the sciences and other cultural enterprises. The position of this book is that the foundations cannot be found, that the mirror does not exist, and that philosophy has no rights to establish principles and set limits for human thought and activity.

The great edifiers made it into the anthologies not by merely mocking the tradition, but by doing battle with the arguments of their more ambitious peers; and Rorty takes little time entering the fray with his predecessors and contemporaries. First he deals with the classical writers from Plato and Aristotle through Augustine and Aquinas to Locke and Kant and then moves on to the efforts of present-day analytic philosophers to put empirical psychology or language theory in the place of representational epistemology. There are no quick dismissals of any of these thinkers and movements. Rather they are handled carefully, respectfully and indeed laboriously with the result that the therapy for misgnided philosophy requires a great deal of intellectual effort on well-known philosophical puzzles. The attack on the mirror bewitchment leans heavily on the efforts of W.V.0. Quine against the language-fact distinction and of Wilfred Sellars against the myth of the given. With these important notions undermined, Rorty is ready to dismiss any correspondence theory of truth and any realist claims about objective readings of a world out-there-even if these come with Kantian provisos. When these old projects go, so does the pursuit of unified science. Rorty can, as a result, adopt a deterministic physicalism without a reductionism challenging treasured beliefs and practices in art, morality, or religion. Each can have its own historically conditioned, diverse, and changing method and structure.

What is left for philosophers if they, like everyone else, must give up the old hope for unadulterated truth and objectivity and if they can no longer play midwife to narrower enterprises? They can, in Michael Oakshott's expression, be simply but importantly " a voice in the conversation of mankind " without trying to stake out a secure *fach* for themselves. The principal models cited for this shift are Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and John Dewey, all of whom renounced knowledge as their aim for the sake of edification, "the project of finding new, better, more interesting, more fruitful ways of speaking." What these ways were for them Rorty does not really say. The models he presents in detail are rather Hans-Georg Gadamer with his subtle negotiation of the hermeneutic circle and Jean-Paul Sartre with his insistence on being-for-itself as defining the world and its own place in it.

Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature is one of the most interesting and challenging books which I have read in recent years. If for nothing else, it would be notable for combining a careful argument with an appreciative consideration of thinkers as diverse as Sellars and Quine on the one hand and Gadamer and Sartre on the other. No one who has witnessed the parochial quarrels among professional philosophers in the United States can fail to welcome this accomplishment. On the substantive level, Rorty disposes effectively of the imperial pretense of traditional philosophy, and he points up the illusion of making epistemology the basis of science and culture. But, ready as I am to give up such pretense and illusion, I find that his argument exacts sacrifices which are both disturbing and unwarranted. Does one have to give up all notion of a language-fact distinction or of a cognitive given to accept perception as theory-laden? Does foresaking reductivist unity mean leaving intellectual disciplines perfectly discrete? Are epistemological realism and the correspondence notion of truth done in with the recognition that there is no autonomous, uninterpreted object of knowledge? If I go too far in Rorty's direction, I encounter difficulty talking even to myself no less than to others. Rorty escapes the difficulty by allowing for everyday use of some notions denied to philosophy. What happens to me is that, in trying to justify the allowances as well as to get a handle on the process of edification, I end up returning to fairly old-fashioned philosophical questions and re-evaluating the likes of Descartes and Locke, Sellars and Quine, and, in the end, Richard Rorty. Perhaps this return must be my modest contribution to the on-going conversation, but I know that it will be a contribution enlightened by *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.*

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Person and Object. By RODERICK M. CHISHOLM. LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1976. Pp. 230. $10.95.

This book, the Carus lectures of R. M. Chisholm, is divided among four chapters and five appendices. The first three chapters set out the author's philosophical positions on personal identity and selfhood, metaphysical agency, puzzles involving persistence through time and change. The final chapter explains and defends the author's ontological basis: states of affairs. The appendices are related to each of the chapters. The first four offer the author's theoretical foundations for his philosophical positions. The fifth summarizes and sets out the definition used earlier. The whole treatment in chapters and appendices is clear, patient, and ingenious. Many areas developed represent perfected theories stated earlier in the author's writings. The book, then, is in a sense a summary of views already stated and, in some instances, corrections of earlier formulations. There is, however, a single chapter, the first, which sets forth a fascinating argument for which both validity and soundness are claimed. This argument deals with individuation and awareness of the self. It represents a significant departure from contemporary analytic tradition and is so important as regards the scope of the book that the remainder of this review will deal with this argument, carefully examining the claims made by the author for validity and soundness.

The author's principal claim in regard to self-awareness, against both the analytic and phenomenological positions on self-awareness, is that persons, or rational subjects, have a direct acquaintance with themselves by virtue of an awareness, clear or obscure, of an individual concept or an individual essence. An individual concept is a property which can be possessed by only one entity at a time, such as " husband of X " or " wife of X " in a monogamous society. An individual essence or haecceity is a property necessarily possessed at all times by one entity alone. Thus two things may have the same individual concept successively, but only one individual thing ever has a given haecceity and has this omnitemporally and necessarily. The means by which these individual concepts and essences ground self-awareness is by their involvement in the individual's awareness of certain self-presenting states, states whose very occurrence implies that their subject is aware of them and whose presence makes of them the most reasonable objects of his belief or acceptance at that time. One thinks automatically of the self-presentations of Brentano or of the perceptual judgments attendant on protocol statements. But these are not the only examples of self-presenting states; and it is wise to bear this in mind lest it seem that the author is offering a phenomenalist position in regard to self-awareness: that the self is known as a peculiar kind of phenomenon,

albeit different from something like a sense datum. This is contrary to the nature of both the self and the self-awareness which the author discovers in his analysis.

Arguing against a background of Humean and Kantian denial that the self is a datum in perception or even discoverable by reference to it, the author sets out his own doctrine of self-apprehension by means of an Aristotelian reductive argument. To the inspection of this argument we now turn. A resume of it (p. 82) is as follows. (1) We individuate or pick out certain individual things. (2) Our individuation of any entity is either by relation to something else *(per aliud)* or is individuation *per se.* (8) A wholly relational view of individuation is either viciously regressive or viciously circular and thus gives no account of the fact stated in (1). Therefore, (4) something is individuated as such, or *per se.* This argument appears to be valid. Is it also sound? Since (4) follows from (1)-(8) it is to these that we must look. (2) merely spells out individuation options: either *per se* or not *per se (per aliud).* The circle and the regress leave us with the alternatives when it is not. This leaves us with (1) and (8). Let us see what happens when we deny either, beginning with the denial of (8). It may be objected that, if we deny (3), all our individuating judgments are relational. And we might offer in support of the plausibility of this denial that we often do mistake one entity for another, for by the author's admission (D. I. 4, p. 28) more than one thing may have a given individual concept, though not simultaneously. Here the reply, of course, is that we have proved no more than what ordinary experience teaches: relational individuation occurs in regard to those entities about which we might make identificational mistakes, but there remain entities about which no similar mistake can occur. These are individuated *per se.* We will attend to this reply in a moment because it is important and constitutes, in the reviewer's opinion, the kernel of the author's defense of self-awareness. But for the moment let us consider the possibility of individuation ad infinitum. We individuate A with repect to B, B with respect to C, C with respect to D, and so on. Our judgments in each case are about the relative individual diversity of the entities in question. Ignoring the problem which might arise from the repeatability of individual concepts (when we got to Q we found that it had the individual concept formerly had by A), if such individuation *successive* did presuppose acquaintance with the totality of entities as an explicitly diversified totality, then the author would seem to be correct in his claim (p. 82) that in that case "we individuate by having individuated an infinite number of things." But is such individuative acquaintance actually presupposed, even on the author's terms? It is not so much a question of whether individuation could be ad infinitum as whether, if ad infinitum, it is viciously regressive. And it does not appear to the reviewer that such individuation, even if regressive and involving an infinity in some way, is vicious. By the author's definition D. I. 9 (p. 31) S individ-

uates X when he knows some state of affairs p whose occurrence implies X to have some property. Now a state of affairs implies an entity to have a given property when it entails (in the author's sense given in D. I. 3) that the entity have the conjunction of an individual concept G plus that aforesaid property. On the author's view, such implication and entailment requires that the subject S be aware of the state of affairs p, of the individual concept, and of the property ascribed in connection with that concept. But-and this is what seems most significant to the reviewer-it would not appear that the subject S need have a clear and explicit knoweldge of that individual concept G *as an individual concept.* He need not have such acquaintance with the concept that it is clear or manifest to him that the concept is an individuating one. All that is required by the definitions D. I. 3-D. I. 10 is that, in being able to ascribe the property in question to the entity in virtue of acquaintance with and awareness of that entity, he also have an awareness and acceptance of the individual concept. Thus while his property ascription is dependent on his knowing an individual concept, it is not dependent on his knowing it *qua* individual concept. Hence it would be possible for him as subject to have performed successive judgments which would involve an infinite number of objects and concepts *virtually* or obscurely present to him. For example, if we hold that a line continuum contains an infinite number of point-objects, each with an individual concept in relation to the other point-objects, then in a sense one may have been aware of the relative diversity of an infinity of objects without a corresponding awareness of an articulated infinity of individual concepts, when one looks at the line and can later, when it is absent, make discriminations about rightness and leftness in regard to positions. In such a case, the nature of such judgments-if S did decide to individuate positions explicitly, beginning at time t_0 would be 'extensive' rather than viciously regressive. For no one of these judgments would presuppose an explicit knowledge of individual concepts qua individuating concepts dependent on an infinite articulated totality. In order to make the regress vicious, as the author wishes, it would seem to the reviewer that we need another kind of individuative judgment, call it individuation *simpliciter* to distinguish it from individuation *per se.* We might define it as follows. 'S individuates X *simpliciter* = Df. There is a q such that (i) q implies X to have a certain individual concept G; (ii) S knows that q; (iii) whatever other properties q implies X to have and S to know of, S accepts that G is an individuating (individual) concept.' This would require that the individuation *simpliciter* of anything presupposed the Subject's awareness of an individual concept as such. And it would then indeed appear to follow from this that individuation *simpliciter* and ad infinitum would imply vicious regress-the individuation *simpliciter* of an infinite totality of things in order for even one of them to be individuated. Similar considerations, in the reviewer's opinion, appear to attend the implementation of definition

D. I. 10.-individuation *per se*. The question of circular individuation is similar. Basically the difference between circular and regressive individuation is the difference obtained alternatively by postulating acquaintance with a finite or infinite totality of entities. In both instances, genuine individuation under the author's definitions would seem to the reviewer to be possible without the conclusion of vicious circularity. There would be a kind of circularity here just as there was a kind of regress before. But neither seems prima facie vicious.

And if we do not wish to deny premiss (8), we have, the reviewer thinks, the option of denying (I) without, it seems, falling victim to the charge of scepticism (p. paragraph . It may simply be that our picking out of things is a relative objective diversification of our *objects* of acquaintance, qua *objects*. The reviewer personally agrees with premiss (I) and with the author's view that there is an important sense in which we do individuate ourselves, a sense we shall consider in a moment. But the reviewer is not persuaded that the abandonment of (1) is tantamount to scepticism. For, indeed, the root strength of the argument, it would appear to the reviewer, lies in the notion that we are aware of ourselves in such a manner that we cannot make certain erroneous identity claims about ourselves as *subjects* even if we can make similar mistaken claims about ourselves as *objects* of self-acquaintance. We may be wrong in our beliefs of what our friends think of us, but we cannot be wrong in believing ourselves to be the selves we now find thinking. We may be wrong in identifying ourselves with Smith or Jones or Napoleon, but I cannot be wrong in identifying myself with *me*. We might mistake ourselves for this or that object of acquaintance. But it seems wholly implausible to suppose that any one of us could think sanely "I am other than this subject" or that I could confuse my very subjectivity with the subjectivity of another. It seems to the reviewer that this is the real kernel of the argument in favor of self-awareness, that it is a sufficiently powerful argument, and that the obscure awareness of an haecceity which the author posits on p. 86 is reflected by the indubitable property of subjective experience *qua* subjective experience: that though one might mistake himself for an object which he is not, no one would mistake himself for a subject which he is not; and were he to seem to do so, close inspection would reveal that he had in fact mistaken himself for an object which he was not. The reviewer would maintain that the impossibility of such intersubjective error or confusion rests on the unique possession by whatever is identical with a given subject of the property of being unmistakably apprehensible by that subject as "myself."

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BOOKS RECEIVED

Basic Books: *The Art of Biblical Narrative* by Robert Alter. Pp. *195;* $13.95.

Ilellarmin: *Cosmic Presence* by Roger Lebeuf. Pp. *557;* $19.95. *La theorie platonicienne de la Doxa* by Yvon Lafranc. Collection noesis. Pp. 475; $30.

Cambridge University Press: *Aristotle and Logical Theory* by Jonathan Lear. Pp. 123; $17.50. *Conscience in Medieval Philosophy* by Timothy C. Potts. Pp. 153; $24.50. *Emotions* by William Lyons. Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. Pp. 230; $29.50. *The Idea of the Symbol by M. Jadwiga Swiatecka.* Pp. 213; no price given. *The Problems of Theology* by Brian Hebblethwaite. Pp. 164; $21.50 cloth, *$6.95* paper. *The Will: A Dual Aspect Theory* by Brian O'Shaugnessy. 2 volumes. Pp. 259, 386; *$57.50,* $62.50.

Catholic University Press: *God and Atheism* by Bernardino M. Bonansea. Pp. 378; *$15. The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines* by John F. Wippel. Pp. 413; no price given.

The Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press: *Doubt and Religious Commitment: The Role of Will in Newman's Thought* by M. Jamie Ferreira. Pp. 156; $28.50. *Works and Worlds of Art* by Nicholas Wolterstorff. Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy. Pp. 392, fgs. 15; *$55* cloth; $23.50 paper. *The Diversity of Moral Thinking* by Neil Cooper. Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy. Pp. 303; $45.

Crossroad Publishing Company: *The Emergent Church* by Johann Baptist Metz. Pp. 127; $10.95. *Interim Report on the Books Jesus and Christ* by Edward Schillebeeckx. Pp. 151; $9.95. *Minister? Pastor? Prophet?: Grassroots Leadership in the Churches* by Lucas Grollenberg, Edward Schillebeeckx, et al. Pp. 102; $8.95. *Ministry: Leadership in the Community of Jesus* by Edward Schillebeeckx. Pp. 176; $12.95. *A Passion for Truth: Hans Kung and His Theology* by Robert Nowell. Pp. 377; $14.95. *Toward a Philosophy of Praxis* by Karol Wojtyla (Pope John Paul II); edited by Alfred Bloch and George T. Czuczka. Pp. 152; $10.95.

Harper & Row: *Making All Things New* by Henri J. M. Nouwen. Pp. 96. *$6.95.*

Marquette University Press: *Karl Rahner, S.J.: Discoverer in Theology* edited by William J. Kelly, S.J. Pp. 320; $24.95.

New American Library: *Kierkegaard's Philosophy* by John Douglas Mullen. Pp. 176; $2.95 paper.

Pontificia Accademia di S. Tommaso: *L'Enciclica Aeterni Patris: Significato e preparazione.* Atti dell'VIII Congresso Tomistico Internazionale, vol. II. Studi Tomistici, 11. Pp. 484; no price given.

Princeton University Press: *Kierkegaard and Christendom* by John W. Elrod. Pp. 320; *$22.50.*

Reidel: *Prelude to Galileo* by William A. Wallace. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 62. Pp. 369; $49.95 cloth, *$23.50* paper.

Routledge & Kegan Paul: *Marx and Wittgenstein: Social Praxis and Social Explanation* by David Rubinstein. Pp. 231; *$25.*

St. Martin's Press: *Understanding Persons: Personal and Impersonal Relationships* by Frances M. Berenson. Pp. 198; $19.95.

Scholars Press: *Lonergan Workshop, vol. 2* edited by Fred Lawrence. Pp. 403; no price given.

Seabury Press: *The Being of God* by Robert P. Scharlemann. Pp. 204; $14.95. *Toward a Reformulation of Natural Law* by Anthony Battaglia. Pp. 150; $14.95.

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