

REVOLUTIONARY THEOLOGY AND POLITICAL THOUGHT

THE EXTENSIVE literature on alienation and liberation has been characteristically and intentionally centered on man. Ernst Cassirer some time ago captured this essential ingredient when he spoke of the "new anthropology" whose "first postulate ... was the removal of all the artificial barriers that had hitherto separated the human world from the rest of nature." What is removed, according to Cassirer, is the notion that "there is a general providence ruling over the world and the destiny of man."¹ Certainly Marx and Feuerbach are part of this tradition and twentieth century expressions of their thought do not alter this fundamental character. So too, most of the recent literature related to liberation and alienation, as in Marcuse or Fromm or others, maintains the same point, namely, that the described character of the human problem of alienation and its solution is to be examined in human terms alone.² It is as if, to borrow a phrase from Cassirer, "neither classical metaphysics nor medieval religion and theology were prepared for this task,"³ the task of resolving the problem of man.

There is little doubt then that the emancipation of the social world from the thought and need of God characterized the new anthropology's approach to the problem of man. Cassirer as well as Sabine credit Grotius's celebrated hypothesis, that

¹ Ernst Cassirer, *An Essay on Man* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944), p. 13.

² Herbert Marcuse, cf. especially *Reason and Revolution* (New York: Beacon Press, 1941), *An Essay on Liberation* (Boston, 1969), "Repressive Tolerance" (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970); Erich Fromm, cf. especially *Marx's Concept of Man* (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing, 1961), *Man for Himself* (New York, 1947), *Beyond the Chains of Illusion* (New York: Pocket Books, Inc.,

a Cassirer, *op. cit.*

natural law would be the same even if there were no God, as an historical turning point marking the beginning of this liberated tradition.⁴ At other times Machiavelli is cited as the principal instrument beginning the empirical trend.⁵ The precise time or person marking the turning point is less important than the fact of the acceptance of the thesis that the examination of man could, and should, proceed strictly in human terms, based on "empirical observations and on general logical principles," as Cassirer phrased it.⁶ Later, indeed, Feuerbach and Marx were to argue that the very ideas of God, religion and theology, are themselves alienations from which man is to be liberated. While most recent theorists, save perhaps for Cassirer, do not address themselves to either the thesis of Grotius or of Marx they all nonetheless operate within this "liberated" tradition by either accepting it, as does Cassirer, or by not addressing themselves to it. The point of operating within the tradition by not addressing it will be examined later, but at the present suffice it to say that the arrival on the scene of a genre of liberation literature arguing a solution to the problem of man in terms of religion and God appears to be an altogether new dimension which should be examined. In other words the liberation tradition up to now has regarded theology as a source of alienation, for others at least theology has been understood to be a concern of which political theory had no need, and consequently such considerations were never a part of any political solution.

Such a contrapuntal dimension in liberation thought is offered in the recent discussions on a "theology of liberation." To this time the great hulk of discussion of this topic has been confined to religious studies circles even though its intentions and consequences are quite political. The question arises as to

⁴ Cassirer, *The Myth of the State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946), p. 172. George H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1950), p.

⁵ Cassirer, *op. cit.*, p. 140. Cf. John J. Schrems, "Ernst Cassirer and Political Thought," *Review of Politics* Vol. 29 (1967), pp. 180-208.

⁶ Cassirer, *An Essay on Man, op. cit.*, p. 15.

whether the new religious-politics efforts should be judged in religious terms alone and thus ignored by the social sciences or whether the religious terms should be judged on political grounds. The liberationist themselves invoke the social sciences as having a "central place" ⁷ or a mediative role ⁸ in the new theology. Accordingly liberation theology should be examined by the social sciences and specifically, in this case, by studying it in the light of political thought.

As Berger in his *Pyramids of Sacrifice*,⁹ although not examining specifically liberation theology, examines the spirit of sacrifice-for-a-cause from the perspective of the social sciences and particularly in terms of human costs, what is proposed here is to examine liberation theology from the perspective of the history, classical and modern, of political theory. From this perspective it may be hypothesized that this development in religion would: one, constitute a genuine and new reconciliation of essential ingredients of both traditional religion and liberated thought, or two, return the problem of man to the previously rejected "artificial" way camouflaged in the language of liberation, or three, continue essentially within the liberated tradition while appearing to make a reconciliation with theology.

Gustavo Gutierrez,¹⁰ one of the most prominent of Latin

⁷ Francois Houtart and Andre Rousseau, *The Church and Revolution* (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1971), p. 345: "Political theology ... must give a central place to sociopolitical analysis, and this casts an entirely new light on the relation between theology and the human sciences."

⁸ Raul Vidales, "Methodological Issues in Liberation Theology," in Rosino Bibellini, *Frontiers of Theology in Latin America* (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1979), p. 39: "To begin with, liberation theology must accept the mediation of a new type of scientific rationality to which it has not been accustomed. This new line of scientific reasoning is a contribution of the human sciences, of the social sciences specifically."

⁹ Peter L. Berger, *Pyramids of Sacrifice* (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1974). Berger clearly points out the human limitation of sacrifice for a cause. However, Berger himself unwittingly becomes a participant in the sacrifice dilemma when he endorses Max Weber's approval and citing of "Machiavelli praising the man who esteems the welfare of his city higher than the salvation of his own soul." *Ibid.*, p. 225.

¹⁰ Gustavo Gutierrez, *A Theology of Liberation* (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1973).

American ¹¹ liberation theologians, appears to answer the first query and speaks of Liberation Theology as intending a genuine reconciliation not a return to rejected ways. Gutierrez ¹² states his purpose as to "reconsider the great themes of the Christian life within this radically changed perspective" of liberation. ¹³ Reconciling opposites is indicated in his very understanding and explanation of what is called, "orthopraxis." **It** is to balance orthodoxy and praxis:

Faith in a God who loves and calls to the gift of full communion with him and brotherhood among men not only is not foreign to the transformation of the world; it is necessary to the building up of that brotherhood and communion in history. Moreover, only by doing this truth will our faith be "verified," in the etymological sense of the word. From this notion has recently been derived the term *orthopraxis*. . . . ¹⁴

¹¹ Liberation theology appears concentrated in Latin America where it is said to have "originated" (1979 *Catholic Almanac*, Huntington, Indiana: Our Sunday Visitor, Inc., 1978; p. 76), but it is in reality by no means limited to that region. John C. Bennett, (*The Radical Imperative: From Theology to Social Ethics*, Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1975; pp. 105ff.) points out that the same themes are also present in Europe, in "black theology" in the United States, and in a "theology of women's liberation." Bennett sees theologies of liberation as a response to the "global threats to humanity" (*ibid.*, pp. 190-191). Andre Dumas (*Political Theology and the Life of the Church*, Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1978; p. 90), reports that "political theologies have in fact arisen in two very different areas: in those countries which have a high level of economic dependence and a developed critical conscience (especially in Latin America), and in countries with considerable economic capacity but little social cohesion (especially in West Germany)." Houtart and Rousseau (in their *The Church and Revolution*, *op. cit.*) trace political theology to the French Revolution, the 19th century French workers movement, the Cuban Revolution, the Vietnam War, and revolutionary movements in Southern Africa.

¹² Gutierrez is regarded as the outstanding liberation theologian. His *Theology of Liberation* is viewed as "the best and most complete introduction to the subject yet available in English." (J. A. Komonchak, *America* MS, March 81, 1978; p.

Rosio Gibellini (*op. cit.*, p. ix) refers to Gutierrez's work as a "classic" in articulating much more fully this new approach to theology. Juan Luis Segundo, himself a noted Latin American liberation theologian, regards liberation theology as "theology as a whole" (Segundo, "Capitalism Versus Socialism: Crux Theologica," in Gibellini, *op. cit.*, p. 11) and he endorses Gutierrez (along with Hugo Assmann) as the "only . . . scholarly" reply to European theology's regard of liberation as a passing fad not to be taken seriously.

¹³ Gutierrez, *op. cit.*, p. ix.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

Let it be clear, Gutierrez intends no return to orthodoxy. This refusal is evidenced in his emphasis on praxis and his intention "to reject the primacy and almost exclusiveness which doctrine has enjoyed in Christian life and above all to modify the emphasis often obsessive, upon the attainment of an orthodoxy which is often nothing more than fidelity to an obsolete tradition or a debatable interpretation." He holds that "the intention . . . is not to deny the meaning of *orthodoxy*, understood as a proclamation of and reflection on statements considered to be true." His intention is not to deny its "meaning" but to reject the primacy of its practice. To reject fidelity to an *obsolete* tradition or a *debatable* interpretation in favor of brotherhood is understandable and not unacceptable. However, to suggest a conflict of orthodoxy and orthopraxis, between which there should be no conflict, and to take one's cue from, recognize the work and importance of, concrete behavior, of deeds, of action, of praxis is suggestive of the secular liberation traditions. It is more than suggestive if other ingredients are present.

One important element is the definition of theology since as Cassirer said a key ingredient of modern thought was its focus on man rather than "artificial barriers" to man.¹⁶ Gutierrez understands theology to be "reflection, a critical attitude." It must be "man's critical reflection on *himself*, on *his* own basic principles."¹⁷ Liberation theology changes the direction of theology. Its attention is not on God but on man. This character of the theology of liberation is seen in the fact that it is a reflection which starts with the historical praxis of man.

It seeks to rethink the faith from the perspective of that historical praxis, and it is based on the experience of the faith derived from

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Cassirer, *Essay*, p. 13. Gutierrez cites, although he does not evaluate, Cassirer's interpretation of modern thought and its critical view of religion in his "Freedom and Salvation: A Political Problem." (*Liberation and Change*, Gustavo Gutierrez and Richard Shaull, Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1971, p. 33.)

¹⁷ Gutierrez, *A Theology of Liberation*, p. 11.

the liberating commitment. For this reason, this theology comes only after that involvement....¹⁸

Furthermore, this origin which flows from the historical praxis of man is not peculiar to the theology of liberation, for it, " as all theology, ... is nothing more than the taking on of consciousness in ecclesial communion which a Christian generation makes of its faith in a given moment of history."¹⁹ According to Raul Vidales²⁰ liberation theology approaches theology from particular historical perspectives; "what initiates our theological thinking is scripture insofar as it is accepted and fleshed out by believers in a concrete historical experience."²¹ Robert McAfee Brown reports that liberation theology begins with a new " starting point " and indicates that rather than the old start of God and the order of creation, or revelation, or even rationality as a product of the Supreme Mind, the new theology starts with " the poor, the 'marginalized,' those about whom the rest of society could not care less."²² Alfredo Fierro traces this emphasis on man in theology to a slightly earlier period, starting in the 1930s, and refers to the more contemporary development as more of an emphasis on the political.²³ In any case the shift of primary focus is away from the traditional. And Joseph Comblim reiterates this new perspective most forcefully when he describes theology as " human utterance " and goes on to say " theology belongs to this world. **It** is wholly conditioned by the portion of the world in which it itself is immersed."²⁴

¹³ Gustavo Gutierrez, "Faith as Freedom," *Living With Change: Experience and Faith* (Villanova, Pennsylvania: The Villanova University Press, 1976, Vol. VII, p. 4!1). Gutierrez says that theology is a " second act " and "this manner of perceiving theology is one of the first *intuitions* (emphasis added) of the theology of liberation."

m *Ibid.*, p. 45.

²⁰ Vidales, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

²² Robert McAfee Brown, *Theology In a New Key* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1978), p. 60.

²³ Alfredo Fierro, *The Militant Gospel* (London: SCM Press, 1977), p. 4.

²⁴ Joseph Comblim, "What Sort of Service Might Theology Render?" found in Gibellini, *op. cit.*, p. 60. Comblim says that "if we try to turn theology into the

Thus not only is theology a function of man's critical reflection on " himself " but its peculiar expressions are a function of differing historical settings. Theology in this new perspective has acquired an essential Marxian character, it stands parallel to what Marx said of economics and philosophy, a function of the peculiar historical circumstances. Most certainly the basic character of theology has changed from where Aquinas said " it is called theology as treating of God. Therefore God is the subject of this science." ²⁵ In liberation theology as in liberation thought the concern is man. From these observations it is possible to see how theology of liberation is within the liberation tradition. As mentioned earlier, Cassirer credits the beginning of liberation thought with the removal of " artificial " ways of viewing man: the new anthropology begins with Grotius's hypothesis and does not consider " presuppositions " such as the hierarchic order in the universe and the belief that there is a general providence ruling over the world and the destiny of man. ²⁶ Both liberation thought and liberation theology *start with man*. Then, what is interesting and indeed of profound consequence is that from this base liberation theology can talk about theology because it is among the artificial matters outside of man which modern thought has rejected and which, according to Marx, have always been but projections of man. Theology viewed as man's theology is precisely human. It is consistent with but goes beyond Grotius, Marx, and Cassirer by now making practical use of this human tool.

Liberation thought desires to be judged in terms of praxis. Liberation theology seeks the elimination of poverty, injustice, oppression, domination, dependencies, misery, deprivation, unjust order, alienation, persecution, torture, exploitation, unjust socioeconomic structures, dehumanizing ignorance, institution-

very language of divine revelation, then we are simply establishing and justifying the privileges of an elite class of clerical mandarins and scribes. We are trying to imprison God in a realm of technicalities so the technicians who know the jargon become indispensable intermediaries." *Ibid.*, p. 63.

²⁵ Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I,Q.1, a.7.

²⁶ Cassirer, *Essay, op. cit.*

alized violence, trampled human rights.²⁷ It desires human awareness, participation, political awareness, humanism, for men to enjoy unfettered the fruits of their labor, for deprivatization of religion, and the call for the church to undertake a "prophetic task of justice" lest it be an "accomplice to injustice."²⁸ In all, what is called for is "liberation," as God liberates slaves.²⁹ In part, it ought to be acknowledged that there is a certain peculiarity that liberation is needed at all when, after centuries of Catholicism in Latin America, religion is called upon to save once again the saved. Beyond this initial peculiarity, however, is the greater feature of how the need for liberation is resolved this time. It is resolved in a new "unity,"³⁰ "class struggle," and "social revolution."³¹ The basis of the new order is said to be a certain gratuitousness of God's love³² for the poor and a certain commitment of solidarity out of love with the poor:

"[O]ur love is not authentic if it does not take the path of class solidarity and social struggle. To participate in class struggle not only is not opposed to universal love; this commitment is today the necessary and inexcusable means of making this love concrete. For this participation is what leads to a classless society without owners and dispossessed, without oppressors and oppressed."³³

A new awareness of Latin American reality comes about by "paying special attention to the root causes,"³⁴ one starts with a rejection of the existing situation, considered as fundamentally unjust and dehumanizing."³⁵

This basic impulse of rejection is then carried over to the

²⁷ The purpose of this and the following litany is to suggest the flavor of Gutierrez's work. As one reviewer said, "This work is theological, sociological, and at the same time political and devotional." (*Choice*, Vol. 10, May 1973, p. 438.)

²⁸ Gutierrez, *Theology*, pp. 114-119.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 277 and p. 278.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

³² Gutierrez, "Faith," p. 31.

³³ Gutierrez, *Theology*, p. 276, and cf. p. 300.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 71 and cf. p.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 174.

"developmentalist" model of capitalism's attitude toward poor nations. The model is rejected because of "grave problems of perspective." Meanwhile the "dependence theory" of the poor favoring revolution is found acceptable without question: "only a class analysis will enable us to see what is really involved in the opposition between oppressed countries and dominant peoples."⁸⁶ And, we are told, "the theory of dependence will take the wrong path and lead to deception if the analysis is not put within the framework of the worldwide class struggle."⁸⁷ Socialism apparently flows from God's love for the poor who is to be the "new man."⁸⁸ Recounting the gospel story of the good Samaritan it is pointed out that "the poor person for the gospel is the neighbor par excellence."³⁹ For the liberationist the God who is love loves the capitalist old man less. Accordingly, there is a call for "a radical change in the foundation of society, that is, the private ownership of the means of production" in order truly to be a neighbor and to avoid the pitfalls of an "individualist charity."⁴⁰ Gutierrez is not alone in taking on the language and means of revolutionary socialism through the theology. Bonino, a Protestant Latin American liberation theologian, quotes Hugo Assmann endorsing Che Guevara's statements: Christians must definitely decide for revolution particularly in our continent, where the Christian faith is so important among the masses of the people.⁴¹ Johannes Metz, a German theologian, sees love as a "revolutionary force."⁴² And Paulo Freire points to the obligations in love to liberate the oppressed,⁴⁸ Girardi, the Italian

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 88, p. 85, p. 87.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 87,

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 91 and p. 146, p. 189.

see Gutierrez, "Faith," p. 24.

⁴⁰ Gutierrez, *Theology*, p. 202.

⁴¹ Jose Miguez Bonino, *Christians and Marxists* (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1976), p. 27.

⁴² Johannes Metz, *Faith and the World of Politics* (New York: Paulist Press, 1968), p. 14.

⁴⁸ Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), p. 78.

theoretician of *Christians For Socialism*, argues as summarized by Hebblethwaite, that "faith can only hope to survive if it can make a positive contribution to the 'revolution'." ⁴⁴

Founded on God's love for the poor, the problem of perspective of capitalism, and the intention of the new man, liberation theology calls for "revolution," "radical change," "effective combat." ⁴⁵ "A call is made for the revolutionary transformation of the very basis of a dehumanizing society." ⁴⁶ Gutierrez elaborates:

To support the social revolution means to abolish the present status quo and to attempt to replace it with a qualitatively different one; it means to build a just society based on new relationships of production; it means to attempt to put an end to the domination of some countries by others, of some social classes by others. The liberation of these countries, social classes and people undermines the very foundation of the present order; it is the greatest challenge of our time.⁴⁷

And this social revolution does mean violence, for, in order to overcome root causes, this great challenge must be met in the terms of our time: "politics today involves ... violence." ⁴⁸ There is no question for the liberationists that the transformation will involve violence, "combat," "struggle." ⁴⁹ There is only the effort to identify the "true" men of violence:

The figures of Camilo Torres and "Che" Guevara have put an irrevocable seal on the Latin American process and decisively influenced certain Christian sectors.... What is happening in Chile since the fascist coup of General Pinochet is a typical example of ... who are truly the men of violence in Latin America.⁵⁰

⁴⁴ Peter Hebblethwaite, *The Christian-Marxist Dialogue* (New York: The Paulist Press, 1977), pp. 69-70. Hebblethwaite likewise pointedly cites Gutierrez's conclusion that the task of the Church is to "politicize by evangelizing" and that in Latin American this means subversion. (*Ibid.*, p. 54.)

⁴⁵ Gutierrez, *Theology*, p. 88, p. p.

⁴⁶ Gutierrez, "Faith," p. 37.

⁴⁷ Gutierrez, *Theology*, p. 18.

⁴⁸ Gutierrez, "Faith," p. 28.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 18, 51, and cf. *Theology*, p. 275, and p. 276.

⁵⁰ "Faith," p.

Violence is assumed. **It** is, however, according to the liberationist the responsibility of the established order, it is the other side's fault. Unfortunately, it may be so, in part but it is also the liberator's in part. Santayana and others have observed that in order to survive revolutions must restore the tyranny they destroyed.⁵¹ That observation is true of twentieth century revolutions and it applies on the practical level to "good " and "bad," "true " and "false" revolutions today. Each must impose order at least temporarily to avoid chaos. They must solidify their position. The problem arises, however, as to the length of the " temporary " period of adjustment. Time is always shorter in the promise than in the performance. One must, therefore, consider the extent or intensity of the violence reasonably anticipated. The suffering is more extensive and long as the revolution is deep and protracted. Revolutions are protracted as the conflict involves global dimensions. Vietnam is a recent example as Brown, Bennett, and others relate to this context.⁵² For Gutierrez, as for Marx, Lenin, Marcuse and other students of revolution,⁵³ the break with the oppressing social order and the lead to a society without classes takes place in the context of " the globalness and complexity of the political process." ⁵⁴ The global environment requires global

⁵¹ George Santayana, *The Life of Reason, Reason in Religion*, Vol. 3 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), p. 83 and *The Life of Reason, Reason in Society*, Vol. 2 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), pp. 111-112. In a similar fashion Paul Lehmann (*The Transfiguration of Politics*, New York: Harper and Row, 1975; p. 261) draws attention to the "apocalyptic character of violence that shatters its vicious circle of necessity ... and disallows its justification " Lehmann looks to " preserve revolution from its own undoing " whereby all revolutions " end by devouring their own children."

⁵² *Supra*, footnote # 11.

⁵³ For Marx " the conflict " is not limited to a few states, it is worldwide. Only when changes are accomplished on a global basis can one reasonably expect the state to begin the final "withering away." Marcuse points out the " global " character of the struggle in a number of his works. (Cf. Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance," *op. cit.*, p. 82.) Robert C. Tucker (*The Marxian Revolutionary Idea*, New York: Norton Company, 1969; pp. 222-225) admires Marx's "futurology" for pointing out the worldwide character of human problems.

⁵⁴ Gutierrez, "Faith," pp. 47-48.

liberation. For Gutierrez unity "is not truly achieved without the unity of the world."⁵⁵

The call for revolutionary violence in a global context should add a dimension of heavy responsibility for the liberator. This responsibility follows from the context of their very liberation practical morality. The revolutionist cannot be absolved from this responsibility on the theoretical convictions that the liberator did not create the "unjust" order. Most individuals who live in capitalist societies are unaware of the violence for which they are said to be responsible. Even Lenin's concept of false consciousness acknowledges this lack of culpability. To initiate violence against one who is unconsciously violent is to contradict the liberationist's canon of love with the expediency of reason. This expediency of reason is the evil of the oppressive old order. In the liberationist's effort to protect the individual, the individual becomes a victim once again, now, it is said, out of "love."

It is instructive to note that liberation theology parallels the revolutionary theory of Marcuse.⁵⁶ Marcuse earlier sought genuinely to advance the borders of liberation against its unconscious opponents. He proposed to sort out pure tolerance which is a disguised form of repressive tolerance from discriminating tolerance which is truly liberating. Pure tolerance, according to Marcuse, purports to allow all sides to speak, but the left cannot influence the formation of majority opinion effectively. "The chance of influencing, in any effective way, this majority is at a price, in dollars, totally out of reach of the radical opposition."

Here too, free competition and exchange of ideas have become a farce. The Left has no equal voice, no equal access to the mass media and their public facilities-not because a conspiracy excludes

⁵⁵ Gutierrez, *Theology*, p. 278.

⁵⁶ Gutierrez finds Marcuse's work to be "important." (*Theology*, p. 81.) Marcuse is an authoritative reference in liberation theology as well as in political literature. Cf. J. G. Davis, *Christian Politics and Violent Revolutions* (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1976).

it, but because, in good old capitalist fashion, it does not have the required purchasing power.⁵⁷

For Marcuse, as Lenin before him had reasoned,⁵⁸ the solution to this situation is liberating tolerance whereby through a discriminating tolerance the Right is restrained: "Liberating tolerance, then, would mean intolerance against movements from the Right, and toleration of movements from the Left."⁵⁹ By this discrimination the Left would *liberate* the Right from their unconscious intolerance and establish "real democracy."⁶⁰ Marcuse is consistent in holding that liberating tolerance does not establish a new repression or a new claim of violence because liberating tolerance would be the last liberation. With complete liberation there will be no new side to repress; all other sides will have been "liberated."

The same consistency is attained by a theology of liberation. It "loves" its enemies with "effective combat" in order to liberate them. Orthopraxis is properly, according to its own norm, intolerant of unconsciously blind orthodoxy. It is intolerant to the effect of becoming the last orthodoxy in the practical order. Like Marcuse's liberating tolerance, it succeeds only when it contradicts itself. The crucial point about the new theology is that it becomes like the earlier alleged intolerant theology.

Underlying the contradiction for Marcuse and in liberation theology is a fundamental problem of political theory concerning the role and place of so-called ultimate truth and of the perceivers of such. Gutierrez has at least a partial appreciation of the problem when he rejects the expectedness of slavish fidelity to an orthodoxy which is obsolete or debatable. But liberation theology becomes part of the problem when it would have the new norm of orthopraxis established by class struggle

⁵⁷ Herbert Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance," in *A Critique of Pure Tolerance* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. 119.

⁵⁸ Cf. V. I. Lenin, *Theses and Report on Bourgeois Democracy and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat*.

⁵⁹ Marcuse, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

and combat. This problem, of the role and place of truth and its perceivers, extends in political theory from Plato to such experiences as the Inquisition, to Marx, and to the present. Plato, benign though he might be in many respects, imposes the philosopher-king's truth on the republic so that the individuals and even rulers become mere functioning parts as Sabine correctly describes it.⁶¹ The Inquisition supposedly practiced salvation without due process and Marx, despite his intended radical individualism, produces conformity to the new order. Contemporary prescriptions for the good community by B. F. Skinner are said to parallel others in the conformity requirement. In each of these efforts to implement truth, "the good" is sought. In each, however, there is the problem of how the perceived good was to affect those who do not perceive it. In those doctrines which proclaim one truth (orthodoxy) the individual who is in opposition must be liberated for his own sake and for the good of all. Each system of "truth" becomes in its own way intolerant if not totalitarian.

Skinner, while generally viewed as within the above paradigm, has the advantage of contemporary perspective whereby he can evaluate the totalitarian program as a "lethal mutation."⁶² Nowhere does he urge the *imposition* of his truth on those who do not perceive it. He remains close to the core of the fundamental problem, however, in that his advocacy of a culture "inducing" the means for its survival appears as a benign form of Plato's restrictive educational system. The final test is in terms of the exclusiveness of system and Skinner's system is exclusive. Skinner would not have one way imposed even though he might conclude that survival-his norm-renders one practice best. However, the fundamental character of Skinner's position is revealed in this very liberal tolerance. Skinner's non-totalitarian liberalism is for the sake of the sys-

⁶¹ George H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory* (4th ed.; Hinsdale, Illinois: Dryden Press, 1973), p. 65.

⁶² B. F. Skinner, "Comment on Watt's 'B. F. Skinner and the Technological Control of Social Behavior,'" *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LXIX, No. 1, (March 1975), p. 229.

tern, the culture, and *not* for the sake of the individual as such. Even though in its benign respect the tolerance comes by way of the individual and his uniqueness, the principle of operation is for sake of the culture. In any contest between the individual and the culture the ultimate value for Skinner is the culture and its survival. This is so even though in a very thorough sense the uniqueness of the individual is considered.⁶³ In final analysis, therefore, respect for the integrity of the individual takes second place as it does in Plato, in the Inquisition, in Marx, and in liberation theology.

The survival of a culture, the truth, the good, are all quite legitimate concerns. It is a matter of where each theoretical system or rationale place man that has consequences for men. The critical test is whether specifications are made with or without provisions for being wrong, the fundamental test of tolerance. Executions, purges, banishment, ostracism, exclusion, forced recantation are all tools of intolerant successful revolutions. Such practices flow from, and at the same reveal, the regard with which the individual is held by the revolutionary leader. The contradiction of calling for man's emancipation and subjugating men is not unusual in modern political thought. Charles N. R. McCoy's analysis of the structure of political thought reveals this as a common phenomenon of modern thought precisely as a result of the option for man as primordial rather than things higher than man.⁶⁴ In Marx especially the contrast is clear where without question he is sympathetic to the plight of mankind and calls for the revolutionary establishment of the new man. Many contemporary theoretical marxists are allegedly critical of the violence and suppression in the Soviet Union under Stalin but they fail to see or they ignore the very logic of violence which Lenin saw in Marx⁶⁵ and which

⁶³ B. F. Skinner, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* (New York: Bantam Books, 1971) p.

⁶⁴ Charles N. R. McCoy, *The Structure of Political Thought* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1963). Also directly to this point is the same author's "The Dilemma of Liberalism," *Laval TMologique et Philosophique*, Vol. 16 (1960), pp. 9-19.

⁶⁵ V. I. Lenin, *op. cit.* and V. I. Lenin, *State and Revolution*.

Marx himself understood as "suffering ... for man." The "realization of philosophy" and the destruction of all enslavement for Marx has "suffering" as a necessary ingredient.⁶⁶ In this way the very concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat, a uniquely Marxian leadership principle,⁶⁷ necessarily involves violence. Marx speaks at length, as does liberation theology, about love and about the realization of "man for himself, as a social being."⁶⁸ (For Marx this is to be a non-political social life since the state is ultimately to be abolished.) Marx opposes the selfish individual "separated from the community, folded back on himself, uniquely occupied with his own private interests."⁶⁹ This is why Mao's theoretical *and* practical conception of leadership fits so well as an expression of Marxian thought. Mao is described as wanting "leaders who will be servants rather than masters, who will sacrifice themselves for the community ... , live austerely, be humble, constantly scrutinize their own behavior, be open to criticism, etc."¹⁰ In practice however Mao strove to achieve the new man at the expense of millions of "old" men, just as the new liberation theology would necessitate.

What is striking is that the Marxian notions of leadership, man, and society are similar in part to an earlier "political theology." Augustine, in elucidating what has been called a "revolutionary"¹¹ Christian philosophy of society, likewise opposed the private, non-social individual and sought leaders who were indeed, "servants of those they seem to command; ruling

⁶⁶ Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, found in Erich Fromm, *Marx's Concept of Man*, p. 132. And, Marx, *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, found in Robert C. Tucker, *The Marx-Engel11Reader* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1978), pp. 53-65.

⁶⁷ Marx, "Letter of Joseph Weydemeyer," found in Robert C. Tucker, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

⁶⁸ Marx, "Private Property and Communism," *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, in Fromm, *op. cit.*, p. 127, and Tucker, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

⁶⁹ Marx, "On the Jewish Question," cf. *Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society*, edited and translated by Lloyd D. Easton and Kurt H. Guddat (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1967), p. 216.

¹⁰ B. Schwartz, "Mao," *New York Review of Books*, Feb. 2, 1973, p. 3L

¹¹ Sabine, *op. cit.*, p. 176. And cf., McCoy, *Structure*, pp. 99-118.

not in ambition, but being bound by careful duty; not in proud sovereignty, but in nourishing pity." ⁷² There is a crucial difference however in that while Augustine viewed man as "sociable in his life and actions" he distinctly said that man and the citizen "must not be all for himself ... " ⁷³ The difference of "man for himself, as a social being" and man "not all for himself, but sociable in his life and actions" is reflective of that fundamental point of modern thought as to whether man is the highest object or whether as in classical thought there is something better than man. For Marx man is the highest object and for Augustine there is something higher than man. Accordingly, as Aristotle, interestingly a "non-Christian," phrased it, "politics becomes the highest science" for Marx but not for Augustine. ⁷⁴ Politics as the highest science is precisely totalitarian for Aristotle because there is nothing to limit or measure it outside of human will, whether singular or plural. It is this limit or measure that is the functional value of "something better than man" which both modern thought and liberation theology do not realize. In this way the consequent illiberalism of liberation thought is inevitable because it cannot tolerate anything which would challenge its own infinity. Erich Fromm's humanistic ethics holds that "there is nothing higher and nothing more dignified than human existence." ⁷⁵ It is small wonder then that Fromm later points to his work, not surprisingly entitled, *Man For Himself*, as an expression of the productive character of man envisioned by Marx and modern

¹² Augustine, *The City of God* (Healey edition), XIX, ch. 14; Vol. II, pp. 115-118.

⁷³ Augustine, *op. cit.*, p. 117. Joseph Petulla (*Christian Political Theology, A Marxian Guide*, Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1972; p. 129), who explicitly accepts a Marxian guide for political theology, sees man's notion of God during much of Western history as contributing to the passive relationship to the social processes. In particular he sees the Augustinian model as not promoting "political, much less revolutionary, activity in Christian societies." Petulla seems quite unaware of the profoundly revolutionary character of Augustine's analysis which has been described as the foundation of the Christian concept of social justice. Cf. McCoy, *Structure*, p. 114.

⁷⁴ Cf. McCoy, *Structure*, p. 48, and p. 116.

⁷⁵ Erich Fromm, *Man For Himself* (New York: Fawcett Premier Book, 1967), p. 118.

thought. It logically follows that the institutions and traditions of classical thought are to undergo revolutionary change. It is in this manner that the family, the concept of obedience, religion, and other vehicles of traditional ethics come under attack in Fromm's system.⁷⁶ What has occurred is that modern thought has come to the stage in Marx of accomplishing the "substitute infinity" that Augustine spoke of as resulting from the rejection of the infinity of eternal beatitude.⁷⁷ Having accomplished in marxian thought the infinity of materialism the human mind is now in the process, in liberation theology, of deifying it much as in ancient times deified kingship came to be a convenient device for justifying allegiance among diverse peoples. A Christian Marxism has all the endowments of the concept of deified kingship. The principal disadvantage of both is the lack of freedom and integrity of the individual.

Both the question of violence and the role of a leader are parallel functions of the same attitude of the place of man relative to higher things from the Aristotelian perspective. Politics, even the totalitarian "non-politics" of Marx and other modern thinkers, becomes the highest science when man is regarded as the best thing in the universe. The new man and *his* creations are the new "substitute infinity." The new man as the new god would remake the world by liberating violence if necessary. Conversely, that there are things better than man in the universe preserves politics from becoming the highest science, that is, from being totalitarian. As a consequence of the existence of these higher things man would be, in Augustine's word, "god-like" in his actions but not God. In turn, respect for the integrity of each individual as god-like would be insisted upon but one would not impose upon another.

Especially troubling then from the point of political theory

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 20-23. And cf. Fromm, *Beyond the Chains of Illusion*, p. 180 where he speaks of the "fight against the authority of Church, State and family" and states that "one must remember that the capacity for disobedience is as great a virtue as the capacity for obedience.... Disobedience was the first act of freedom, the beginning of human history."

⁷⁷ Cf. McCoy, *Structure*, p. 116.

is a theology of liberation which defines theology as man's reflection on himself, which "takes off" from a fundamental "intuition,"⁷⁸ which assumes the posture of "Christian anthropocentrism" where "man is the measure of all things, since God became man."⁷⁹ The logical term and practical consequences of the new liberation continues within the liberation tradition of modern thought with its characteristic dilemma of self-denial or intolerance.⁸⁰

Aside from the logical conclusions of political theory a further practical aspect of the impulse for a new wave of liberation ought to be considered: Impatience is quite understandable in the light of the injustices in the underdeveloped but also the developed world today. However the processes of social change are slow, exceedingly slow. A major contribution of the twentieth century social sciences is the overwhelming evidence that change occurs much more slowly than ideas. History shows that despite momentary appearance to the contrary institutions undergo change that is evolutionary and not revolutionary as even the Russian and Chinese revolutions show. Learning theory or socialization as a major concept in all of the social sciences points to the multiple and long term factors which influence behavior. Even personality theory assumes "deep-seated traits"⁸¹ which are not subject to immediate control. It is as if the burden of the social sciences is to have demonstrated empirically Burke's theoretical description of society: "a continuous stream of generation cooperating with generation."⁸² Institutions or structures may occasionally change by fiat but the society or culture will adjust only at its own pace.

An example of the pace and extent of change, counterposed

⁷⁸ Gutierrez, "Faith," pp. 44-45.

⁷⁹ Gutierrez, *Theology*, p. 7.

⁸⁰ Charles N. R. McCoy, "The Dilemma of Liberalism."

⁸¹ Alan C. Isaacs, *Scope and Methods of Political Science* (Revised edition; Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1975), p. 174.

⁸² The quote is a summary statement by Ebenstein of Burke's description of society. Cf. William Ebenstein, *Great Political Thinkers* (4th ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), p. 478.

to liberation literature, is reflected in a description of change in Philippine anthropology. Such a social science reference point is especially appropriate because the Philippines have many historical and cultural similarities to the Latin American and other developing countries where liberation theology is most prominent. The Philippines was subject to a massive "christianizing" effort by Spain for three-hundred and fifty years followed by an extensive educational and secularization effort by the United States. Vast amounts of material are available describing and cataloging the Spanish efforts and a greater amount of social science data is on hand recording and analyzing, if not applauding, the efforts since 1898. In the light of all of this it is instructive to note the resistance and exceedingly slow adaptations to change reflected in a report on a typical barrio where "in spite of outward manifestation of adherence to Christianity, traditional religion still plays a significant role in the lives of the people." Christianity is blended with traditional beliefs and practices to the point where Roman Catholic saints and traditional environmental spirits (*ingkantu*) appear similar. Thus after a period of four centuries of what can, not inappropriately, be called a revolutionary change, it nonetheless can be stated that "the introduction of Christianity appears *not to have led to any significant shift in the emphasis placed on folk belief, attitudes, and practices.*" [Emphases added.]⁸³ After all those efforts the change is not significant, the Philippines are not noticeably different today from Latin America, and the cry of liberation theologians is heard in those islands as in the Latin continent.

There is an irony that the liberationists invoke the social sciences for revealing the corruptions of the established order while social science studies, whether the logic of revolution cited earlier or anthropological tracts cited above, reveal the limitations of what they seek. The scientific study of society has been held out since early times as a hope for the more efficient

⁸³ F. Landa Jocano, *Grm.oing Up In a Philippi,neBarrio* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), p. 18.

and effective management of human affairs. Skinner as a pre-eminent social scientist challenges the relevance of the pre-scientific studies of society and seeks instead "a technology of behavior," "a science of human behavior."⁸⁴ If the liberationists desire to invoke the social sciences it is important to point out that the social sciences themselves have become increasingly cautious about their claims of utility. Even Skinner's euphoria about the "fact" of "an effective science of behavior"⁸⁵ has given way to the acknowledgment of "not the science of human behavior" but the "philosophy of that science."⁸⁶ This recent acknowledgement is not on Skinner's part a denial of his faith, he still seeks a technology of behavior; it is however an admission that it is a faith as opposed to a "fact."

The caution that Skinner's acknowledgement constitutes is a contraindication which is being more widely, and independently, shared by social scientists. In this regard Gabriel Almond, whose eminence as a social scientist is without question, recently argued that "politics is more cloud-like than clock-like in nature."⁸⁷ Margaret Conway, who cites Almond approvingly, elucidates the point by observing that no explanation will ever "model human behavior 'perfectly' "since "shifting viewpoints about determinancy and indeterminancy in the *natural sciences* suggest that total determinism may be an unrealistic goal for *any science*."⁸⁸ [Emphases added.] The same advice to give less emphasis to the promise of social science is reiterated by Charles E. Lindblom, who in his *Usable Knowledge* questions the assumptions on which the social sciences claim new and deeper insight into humanity and society. Lindblom, like

⁸⁴ B. F. Skinner, *Beyond Freedom of Dignity* (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), Chapter 1.

⁸⁵ B. F. Skinner, *Walden Two* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), p. 755. It is true that this is a novel, but Skinner in the 1976 edition (New York: The Macmillan Co.; p. viii) acknowledges that Frazier, who is quoted above, speaks for him.

⁸⁶ B. F. Skinner, *About Behaviorism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1976), p. 8.

⁸⁷ Gabriel Almond and Stephen J. Genco, "Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of Politics," *World Politics*, July 1977, p. 505.

⁸⁸ M. Margaret Conway, "Can Political Science Be a Science?," paper delivered at 1978 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, p. 80.

Almond, a prominent social scientist, observes that "social science and social research are only weakly understood by their own practitioners" and, he points out, it is possible that social scientists "hold a fundamentally wrong conception of social science."⁸⁹ Certainly not all social scientists agree with these observations, and Lindblom acknowledges this, but at least such caveats from major social scientists should make it clear that there is no univocal view about the meaning and utility of the social sciences. Consequently the social sciences cannot be cited as authoritative source for insight into the existing order.

Lindblom, like the others, does not totally reject a contribution by social science; instead he sees it, more realistically and more effectively he believes, in a less forceful and more supplementary role to alternatives which are more readily available and which are less pretentious. The alternatives he mentions are "ordinary knowledge," "social learning," and a variety of "interactive" and "analytic" practices.⁹⁰ Ordinary knowledge is defined as "knowledge that does not owe its origin, testing, degree of verification, truth status, or currency to distinctive ... professional techniques but rather to common sense, casual empiricism, or thoughtful speculation and analysis."⁹¹ The content of these alternatives, especially ordinary knowledge, may be debated in their detail but at least their outline as counterposition to scientific rigidity is clear. These discussions show that responsible and practicing social scientists can suggest ordinary alternatives to the limits of their discipline. Consequently it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the liberationists ought to reconsider their own existing stock of alternatives before getting caught up in conclusions which lead to revolutionary violence. Perhaps for religionists the ordinary alternatives of traditional teachings,⁹² of social justice and the

⁸⁹ Charles E. Lindblom, *Usable Knowledge* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979) p. 6.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, Chapter

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁹² Some liberation writers touch on the papal encyclicals, for example, but their consideration is not sympathetic. Segundo, *The Liblml.tim Of Theology*;

opportunity to implement them, have not been entirely exhausted. Rather than jumping from theology into praxis what the liberationists might do more effectively is pay a bit *more* attention to the social sciences especially as seen in broader range, and to the traditions of political thought.

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Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1976, p. 91) refers to *Rerum Novarum* but he dismisses it very quickly as "either deduced from divine revelation or else grounded on some alleged natural right. . . . In reality the 'social doctrine of the Church' started out by trying to guide Christians to lead a societal life more in conformity with the gospel *within the existing capitalist structures.*" (Emphasis added.) Houtart ("Socio-Political Implications of Vatican Council II," *Faith and the World of Politics*, ed. by Johannes B. Metz, criticizes the Pastoral Constitution of Vatican II and the encyclicals in their lack of consideration of means to agreed upon ends. When the church does address itself to specific means, then, as Metz points out (*ibid.*, p. 15), it is subject to the criticism of mishandling and **Jr** inadequately receiving non-theological information.

THE PLACE OF THE PROOF FOR GOD'S EXISTENCE
IN THE *SUMMA THEOLOGIAE* OF THOMAS AQUINAS

THE PRESENT ARCHBISHOP of Canterbury, the Most Reverend Robert Runcie, in an interview at the time of his election, said: "Someone once preached a sermon in which he tackled the question 'How do you know there is a God?' In essence his answer was, as it was certainly the answer for me: we know there is a God because we've been told-that is the traditional element in religion ... a distilling of people's experience which has been passed on" (*The Observer*, Sunday January, 1980, section 3, p. 33).

Thomas Aquinas, writing between 1266 and 1268,¹ in the initial questions of his *Summa Theologiae*, asks whether God exists. He raises two objections to God's existence; first, the presence of evil in the world, and second, that nature, together with human will and reason, is sufficient to explain what we experience, but then, on the other side, he cites God himself. "But, on the contrary, there is what is said in Exodus 3 by the person of God 'I am who I am' ".² Thus, if we pass over the not unimportant difference that Robert Runcie speaks of a tradition distilling "people's experience", while Aquinas starts from what God in his own person says, both begin treating God's existence from what we have been told. Faith seeks understanding but certainly need not commence with philosophi-

¹ J. A. Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas d'Aquino: His Life, Thought and Works* (Oxford, 1975) p. 361.

² *Summa Theologiae*, ed. altera emendata, ed. Commissio Piana (Ottawa, 1958), hereafter abbreviated *ST*. For the *Summa contra Gentiles* I have used the the Leonine *Opera Omnia* Vol. XIII-XV (Romae, 1918-1980) abbreviated *ScG*. For the theological significance of Thomas's beginning with Exodus 3.14 see E. zum BI"Unn, "La 'metaphysique de l'Exode' selon Thomas d'Aquin", *Dieu et l'Etre: Exegeses d'Exode 3,14 et de Coran 20,11-24*, ed. Centre d'Etudes des religions du livre, CNRS, Etudes augustinienes (Paris, 1978), pp. esp. p.

cal reason.³ So Aquinas teaches that theology or sacred doctrine is a knowledge which begins from principles made evident to a higher form of cognition, namely, that possessed by God and the blessed.⁴

The knowledge from which theology starts is God's own simple knowledge of himself, and all else in himself,⁵ communicated to the Prophets and Apostles who wrote the canonical books,⁶ handed on to us through that Scripture, and summed up in the articles of the faith.⁷ It is because sacred theology begins with God's own self-revelation grasped by faith that it has a shape and order distinct from natural theology, the theology which is a part of philosophy.⁸

Sacred doctrine is able to start with God. After considering God in himself, it shows how creatures come out from him and how he then brings them back into union with himself.⁹ Philosophical reason starts rather with creatures and climbs by a long and difficult ladder to knowledge of God.¹⁰ The order of sacred doctrine determines the order of matters in the tripartite structure of the *Summa Theologiae*. It begins with God and treats him and his creative work in the First Part. The

³ *ST* 1,1,8 *ad* 2; 1,2,2 *ad* 1. Theology begins with the unity of God, not because this is comprehensible, see *In librum Beati Dionysii de Divinis Nominibus Expositio*, ed. C. Pera (Taurini-Romae, 1950), *proemium* and II,ii,143, but because the one is by nature principle (*ibid.*, II,ii,135 and 148; XIII,ii,981) and my article "The *De Trinitate* of St. Boethius and the Structure of the *Summa Theologiae* of St. Thomas Aquinas", *Atti del Congresso Internazionale di Studi Boeziani*, Pavia, 5-8 ottobre, 1980, ed. L. Obertello (Romae, 1981), pp. 367-375.

⁴ *ST* 1,1,2.

⁵ *In de div. nom.*, 1,1,13; *ST* 1,1,2 *ad* 2, *ST* 1,1,4.

⁶ *ST* 1,1,8 *ad* 2; *ST* I,12,11 *ad* 2. Vision of God "*in sua essentia*" is the ground of this revelation and is given to Moses and Paul *ST* II-II,175,3 *ad* 1.

⁷ *ST* 1,1,8.

⁸ *ScG* 11,4; IV,1; *Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi*, ed. nova, R. P. Mandonnet et M. F. Moos, 4 vol. (Paris, 1929-1947), I, [YT]VI, p. 2ff and *epilog.*, p. 1082; *Expositio super librum Boethii de Trinitate*, ed. B. Decker, *Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters* 4 (Leiden, 1959), *prol.*, p. 46, 4-8; V, 4, p. 194, 29-30.

⁹ *ST* 1,2, *prol.*

¹⁰ *ST* 1,1,1; *ScG* 1,4; VI,1, *Super de Trin.*, [YT]ol.; *Compendium Theologiae, Opera Omnia* (Leonine), XLII (Romae, 1979), 1,1.

movement in this part is from God's simplicity towards otherness and diversity. There is first God's unity, treated initially as substance, and then, as operations.¹¹ The consideration of the divine substance begins in simplicity and ends in unity,¹² but the self-conscious relation of knowledge dominates the operations. The real relation of God to himself in three persons comes next,¹³ and then the work of his power in creation. Creation is treated in three sections. First, by privilege of the likeness of their knowledge and spiritual existence to God's, come the angels; then, there is the material creation, and finally, because he unites spiritual and material in himself, there is man.¹⁴ Man concludes God's creative work just as he also concludes the last section of this part, the section on God's governance of the world, which has a similar tripartite structure.¹⁵

The Second Part is the biggest of the three. It considers man, the image of God. Man drew together and completed God's work of creation and governance in the First Part; now, man's work is considered. Thomas says in the Prologue what he means by treating man as the image of God: "that is to say, man as the source of his own works because he is free and has power over his own deeds."¹⁶ This part is organized around the virtues and vices and begins, as one would expect from the Prologue, with man acting for the sake of an end. Freedom consists in man's capacity to shape his actions in accord with what he regards as his perfect fulfillment or happiness.¹⁷

Man's freedom cannot, however, complete the *Summa Theologiae*. The first article of the first question of the First Part said that sacred doctrine is required just because the ultimate end of man is God, the comprehension of whom exceeds human reason. Consequently the *Summa* requires a Third Part beyond

¹¹ *ST* I,Q, 'Y'ol. and I,14, 'Yrol.

¹² Q.Q. 8 and 11.

^{1a} *ST* I,Q7, vrol. and I,Q, prol.

¹⁴ *ST* I,50, 'Y'ol. and I,75 'Yrol.

¹⁵ *ST* I,106, prol.

^m *ST* I-II, prol.

¹¹ This is the sum of the first question: "*de ultimo fine hominis*".

that treating man's freedom, power and works. This concerns Christ, who, uniting God and man, is our way of actually arriving at God our end. The Third Part thus considers Christ, his sacraments through which we are united to him and attain salvation, and the eternal life at which we arrive through Christ by resurrection.¹⁸

This is the course then which theology runs, a course determined by its origin in God's revelation of himself from beyond the comprehension of human reason and seeking a union past his natural rational capacity. Thomas refined and clarified this theological structure in important ways but fundamentally its logic derived from the later Neoplatonists and had been set out in systematic form in the Christian West as early as the ninth century by John Scotus Eriugena.¹⁹ The rough use of the pattern by the twelfth century theologian Peter Lombard in his *Sentences*, the theological text book of the High Middle Ages, assured its influence into modern times. Thomas was content with this basic structure combining the step by step derivation of multiplicity from the divine unity and the gathering in and return of this to God again. Indeed his alterations of the system as he received it often have the effect of making this Neoplatonic structure more clearly and completely present.²⁰ But then, the need for a proof of God's existence becomes a problem.

is *ST* I,2, *prol.* and III, *prol.*

¹⁹ In his *De divisione naturae* (PL 122,441-1022). There is a critical edition of the first two books, Iohannis Scotti Eriugena, *Periphyseon, de divisione naturae*, ed. I. P. Sheldon-Williams with the collaboration of L. Bieler, *Script. lat. Hiberniae* 7,9,2 vol. (Dublin, 1968-72).

²⁰ Among the most important changes made by Thomas are the removing of what he calls the divine operations from their place in Lombard, after the Trinity and before creation, to their place in the *Summa Theologiae* and the *Compendium Theologiae*, between the substance and the persons of God, and the collecting and centering of the moral aspect of theology around man. On the former see my article, "The Place of the Psychological Image of the Trinity in the Arguments of Augustine's *de Trinitate*, Anselm's *Monologion* and Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae*", *Dionysius* 3 (1979), 99-110. On the relation between the structure of the *Summa Theologiae* and the *Sentences* and especially on the influence of Dionysius involved, see my "Aquinas's First Principle: Being or Unity?", *Dionysius* 4 (1980), p. 155 and n. 111.

If we begin from what we have been told about God and from his inner unity, why does theology need, and how can it have a proof which rises to God from sensible effects? How can it have a philosophical demonstration of God's existence?

It is at this point that a radical difference appears between our contemporary Archbishop and St. Thomas. Doctor Runcie's approach to theology occurs in the context of his discovery that metaphysical reason cannot convince us of religious truths. Reading philosophy at Oxford after the last World War, during the "heyday of logical positivism", he "was much influenced by the anti-metaphysical bent". (*The Observer* *Zoe*. cit.) Thus, theology must presumably run its course without the help of philosophical reason. For Thomas, on the contrary, this would mistake theology's strength and weakness. On the one hand, it would violate theology's sovereignty which uses what is subordinate to it. On the other it would ignore the necessities of human theological thinking. For, although its beginning is established through God's revelation to faith, yet, because of the weakness of human reason, theology cannot proceed one step on its immense course without assistance from philosophical reason.²¹ St. Thomas says:

Among the inquiries that we must undertake concerning God in himself, we must set down in the beginning that whereby his existence is demonstrated, as the necessary foundation for the whole work. For if we do not demonstrate that God exists, all consideration of divine things is necessarily destroyed.²²

The demonstration of God's existence is the necessary foundation of the whole of theology. This is a surprising statement given the descending logic of theological system for Aquinas. What can it mean? Minimally the proof provides evidence that the subject of theological science exists in contradistinction to knowledge of the nature of its subject. The words of Thomas have been taken in this sense and not without some foundation; for, following Boethius, he does distinguish sharply between the knowledge that a thing exists and the knowledge

²¹ *ST* 1,1,5 *ad*

²²scG 1,9.

of what it is and says that we know properly only that God is.²⁸ Our human faculties are suited only for the direct knowledge of sensible individuals and even these we know from the outside, through their sensible accidents, and imperfectly, despite their mode of being corresponding to ours.²⁴ In them and in us, there is a division between the sensible and the intellectual aspects of existence. Yet this agnosticism about the nature of things cannot be pushed too far. Our knowledge from sense means that we have no direct knowledge, vision, of the intellectual but it does not mean that we have no knowledge at all and this applies also to God. For the very simplicity of God, the fact that in him existence, that he is, and essence, what he is, are identical, means that our proof must yield knowledge of his nature.²⁵ It is then primarily for the sake of making God's revelation thinkable, of making it a science, of allowing a consideration of divine things, that the proof is required.²⁶ When

2a *ST* I, rn, rn *obj.* 1 and *ad* 1. For Boethius as a medium of Neoplatonic thought for Thomas see my "Aquinas's First Principle", pp. 142, 143 and 1112 n. 96. P. Faucon, *Aspects neoplatoniciens de la doctrine de Saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Lille/Paris, 1975), p. 431 concludes:

la tradition neoplatonicienne illustree notamment par Boece fournit A saint Thomas le couple du Quod est et l'esse sur lequel va s'eriger au xiiiie siecle la distinction reelle de l'essence et de l'etre.

24 There is much of this agnosticism in Thomas even in respect to our knowledge of the physical world. For a general treatment of it and why it has been played down by contemporary Thomists see J. Pieper, "The Negative Element in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas", Chapter II in his *The Silence Of St. Thomas: Three Essays*, trans. D. O'Connor (London, 1957). For a list of texts confer A. Maurer trans. *The Divisions and Methods of the Sciences: Questions V and VI Of (Aquinas's) Commentary on the de Trinitate* (Toronto, 1963), p. xxxv, n. 50 to which one might add as typical *ScG* IV,1.

25 *ST* 1,2,2, *ad* 2. M. Grabmann, *Thomas von Aquin* (München, 1912), p. 88 speaks of the proof as a "Briicke ". E. zum Brunn's exposure of the inadequacies of E. Gilson's existentialist representation of Thomas has also the effect of bringing together the knowledge of God's existence and essence in Thomas (op. cit., esp. pp. 26ff.) .

26 One way of putting this is to say that by the ways, God is named. F. van Steenberghen has brought this out in his numerous writings on the proof: e.g. *Dieu cache: Comment savons-nous que Dieu existe?* Essais philosophiques 8 (Louvain/Paris, 1961). Two studies in English also elucidate this well: "So St. Thomas ... speaks of the proof that 'God is' *as* among the *praeambula* which are necessary to the *scientia fidei*-i.e. knowledge of the faith, not faith itself". "... There is no

the five ways in the proof are taken together, they can be immediately seen to produce a considerable knowledge of God. He is the unmoved source of motion, existence, goodness, and perfection of all else, which is ordered into unity, because the God who does all this knows.²⁷

The proof of God's existence in the *Summa* is primarily a summary of the ways, corresponding to Aristotle's four causes, by which thought moves from the world of sensible creatures to God.²⁸ So the movement of knowledge coming down from God's self-disclosure mediated to us through Scripture must meet the movement of thought rising from the scientific understanding of natural phenomena and reaching up towards God.²⁹

Theology as sacred doctrine begins in the meeting of these two: For our deficient understanding is more easily guided into those things which pass reason and are treated by divine science by passing through the world known by natural reason from which the other sciences proceed.³⁰

In commencing with God, sacred doctrine progresses in the same order as God's own self-knowledge.³¹ As sacred theology

contradiction at all in saying that our means of proof are effects and the *quid significet nomen* of God, for they are one and the same." Victor White, *God the Unknown* (London, 1956), pp. 52 and 60. "There is no separate theological question about God's existence: the question about God's existence is only raised at all in connection with the study of what God is." Edward Sillem, *Ways of Thinking about God* (London, 1961), p. 48; Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are all relevant.

²⁷ We arrive at "*aliquid primum movens, . . . aliquam causam efficientem primam, . . . aliquid quod sit per se necessarium . . . causa necessitatis alii, . . . causa esse et bonitatis et cuiuslibet perfectionis, . . . aliquid intelligens*", *ST* 1,2,S.

²⁸ On the relation of the ways and the causes see A. Kenny, *The Five Ways: St. Thomas Aquinas's Proof of God's Existence* (London, 1969), p. 86; H. J. Johnson, "Why Five Ways? A Thesis and Some Alternatives", *Arts liberaux et philosophiques au moyen âge*, Actes du quatrieme Congres international de philosophie medievale, Montreal, 1967 (Montreal/Paris, 1969), pp. 1148-1154; Sillem, *op. cit.*, Chapter 5.

²⁹ *Super de Trinitate* V,4 makes clear that philosophical theology arrives at the separate substances from whose self-revelation sacred doctrine sets out. The essential connection is shown in the ordering of the parts of the last book of the *Summa contra Gentiles* relative to the first three books because "*est autem eadem via ascensus et descensus*" (IV,1).

so *ST* 1,1,5 ad 2.

³¹ *ScG* 11,4; *ST* 1,1,7; *ST* 1,2, *prol.*; *In de div. nom.*, VII,iv,729; for secondary materials see my article in *Dionysius S* (1979), pp. 100, n. S.

begins with God and knows all else coming from him and returning to him, so God knows all things in knowing himself, though, unlike our theology, his is a direct and immediate seeing of everything in his own being. But this does not mean that the laborious climb to philosophical or natural theology is solely a human work. Thomas agrees with Aristotle that we can have knowledge of God only because God is not jealous; rather he wishes us to share in his own knowledge.³² Both theologies, theology as philosophy and theology as sacred doctrine, are "divinely given modes of sharing in the one divine science".³³ In this sharing, philosophical knowledge is subordinate to the knowledge based on Scripture, as nature is subordinate to grace but always, indeed eternally, presupposed by it, and present with it.³⁴ We have come some way in understanding what the proof does, but do we understand sufficiently its necessity?

³² Commenting on *Metaphysica* 1,2,983a,5-10, Thomas writes: "*Solus (Deus) quidem habet (hanc scientiam) secundum perfectam comprehensionem. M=ime vero habet, in quantum suo modo etiam ab hominibus habetur licet ab eis non ut possessio habetur sed sicut aliquid ab eo mutuatum.*" In *duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristoteles Expositio*, ed. M. R. Cathala et R. M. Spiazzi (Turin/Rome, 1964), 1,3,64. Confer R. D. Crouse, "*Philosophia Ancilla Theologiae*, some texts from Aristotle's *Metaphysica* in the interpretation of Albertus Magnus", *Actas del V Congreso Internacional de Filosofia Medieval*, 2 vol., i (Madrid, 1979), pp. 657-661; *idem.*, "St. Thomas, St. Albert, Aristotle: *Philosophia Ancilla Theologiae*", *Atti del Congresso Internazionale Tommaso d'Aquino nel suo settimo centenario*, 8 vol. (Napoli, 1975), i, pp. 181-185. The basis of the argument is that God alone possesses the proper knowledge of himself, consequently all true knowledge of him comes from his willingness to share it. This can also be given a more evidently Neoplatonic form as in Dionysius. In his comment on the *Divine Names* Thomas states: "*Ei (Deo) enim soli competit de se cognoscere quod quid est.*" I,32. "*Esset enim contra rationem bonitatis divinae, si cognitionem suam sibi retineret quod nulli alteri penitus communicaret, cum de ratione boni sit quod se aliis communicet.*" 1,36. God communicates in different forms but all are revelation: "*studium philosophiae secundum se est licitum et laudabile, propter veritatem quam philosophi perceperunt, Deo illis revelante, ut dicitur. Ad Rom.. 1,19*" *ST* II-II, 167, *ad* 3. Cf. J. H. Walgrave, "The Use of Philosophy in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas", *Aquinas and the Problems of His Time*, Mediaevalia Lovaniensis 5 (Leuven/The Hague, 1976), pp. 161-193.

³³ R. D. Crouse, "St. Thomas, St. Albert, Aristotle", p. 183.

³⁴ *ST* I,1,8 *ad* 2 and thus the doctrine of created grace *ST* 1,12,5 *ad* I.

To get hold of the place of this climb from nature to God in Thomas's theology and indeed partially the place of nature, human freedom, power and work in his system, it is necessary to digress a little into the historical background of its inclusion in his system. If the proof is dependent upon Aristotle's enumeration of the causes and is in theology only because of an Aristotelian conception of science which allows God both to be the subject of the investigation and to be established as an object in its course,³⁵ it follows that it is possible for Thomas to use the ways only because of the third wave, which occurred in his time, of the gradual rediscovery of Aristotle.³⁶ The third wave was the transmission to the medieval west of the sciences of Aristotle: physics, metaphysics or theology, psychology, politics, ethics as opposed to the earlier waves of logical works. This is not, however, a sufficient explanation. Just because means are present we are not thereby actually enabled or compelled to use them. Theology is not a salad into which anything edible can be thrown. Because it is the most fundamental science endeavoring to draw reality together under one principle, the knowledge of how its elements are united is essential to it. With what kind of theological structure will Thomas's proof cohere?

³⁵ On this much disputed question Thomas is clear in the *proemium* of his *In Metaphysicorum*; for Thomas see the articles of R. D. Crouse referred to inn. 82 above and L. Ducharme "L'idée de la métaphysique dans les écrits du premier enseignement parisien de Saint Thomas d'Aquin", *Colloque commémoratif Saint Thomas d'Aquin, Eglise et théologie* 5, No. 2 (1974), 155-169 together with the *commentaire* by C. Stroick in the same volume. On Aristotle J. Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics* (Toronto, 1951), pp. 152ff. should be taken with the critique by J. D. Beach, "Separate Entity as the Subject of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*", *The Thomist*, 20 (1957), 75-95. Avicenna and Averroes take opposite positions which break up the unity of ontology and theology in both Aristotle and Aquinas; see the first two sections of Chapter One of Avicenna Latinus, *Liber de Philosophia Prima sive Scientia Divina*, I-IV; ed. crit. par S. van Riet (Louvain/Leiden, 1977), esp. pp. 4-16 and Averroes *Oommentaria in I Phyaicorum*, in Aristotelis, *Opera*, IV (Venetiis apud Juntas, 1574), 47rF8-47vH and E. Gilson's remarks and further references in *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (London, 1955), n. 21, p. 644.

³⁶ M. J. Congar "Theologie", *Dictiownare de theologie catholique* XV (1), (Paris, 1946) p. 859.

Prior to St. Thomas, Christian theology had often thought that it was unnecessary, inappropriate or impossible to prove God's existence, or if it was in fact necessary or useful that a much more direct method than that employed by him was preferable. In the tradition of the Greek theologian pseudo-Dionysius, represented in the west most strongly by John Scotus Eriugena, and known to Thomas both directly, through the translations of Eriugena and others, and indirectly, through John of Damascus and Maximus the Confessor, God is known first of all as non-being.³⁷ Because all determinate and finite beings come out of his fathomless depths and presuppose them as their horizon, it does not seem necessary, appropriate or possible to prove his existence. On the other hand, a proof seems appropriate in an Augustinian perspective where God is thought of more positively as being, but for the Augustinian spirituality the most natural motion to him is inward.³⁹ Within

³⁷ This tradition has its origins in the interpretation of Plotinus by Iamblichus and his followers Syrianus and Proclus, who is its greatest exponent and diffuser, in opposition to that of Porphyry, who identified being and the One. These two contrary influences and their meeting in Thomas are treated in my article "Aquinas's First Principle: Being or Unity?", pp. 189 ff. The opposing theological tendencies condition each other; for example Thomas interprets "*Sed Deus non est eadentens, sed 'mpra existentia' ut diei, Dionysius. Ergo non est intelligibilis, sed est supra omnem inteUectum*" ST I,U,1 *obj.* ¶ as follows: "*Deus non sic dicitur non existens quasi wul,lo modo sit existens, sed quia est mpra omne existens, inquantum est mum esse*" and thus he is known but not comprehended ST I,12,1 *ad.* ¶. On Thomas's alteration of Dionysius in his reading of him cf. J. D. Jones "The Ontological Difference for St. Thomas and Pseudo-Dionysius", *Dionysius* 4 (1980), pp. 119-182.

³⁸ Thomas holds to be correct John Damascene's statement that God's name is "*Qui eat*" because "*totum . . . in se ipso comprehendens habet ipmm esse velut quoddam pelagus mbstantiae infinitum et indeterminatum*"; because the less determinate a name and the more common and simple it is, the more appropriately it names God (ST I,18,11). He places Damascene's notion that the "*cognitio existendi Doom naturaliter eat imserta*" at the top of the objections showing that no proof for God's existence is necessary; for, it is "*per ae notum*" ST I,2,1.

³⁹ Augustine stands within Porphyry's tradition of Neoplatonism. Its movement through Victorinus, Augustine, Boethius, Avicenna and others to Aquinas has been shown by historians of Neoplatonism; the relevant materials are indicated in my article in *Dionysius* 4. The inward movement of Augustine's Plotinian spirituality is treated in my "The Place of the Psychological Image of the Trinity" and in his chapter on Augustine in A. Louth, *The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradi-*

that perspective, Anselm begins by urging us to turn within ourselves toward God.⁴⁰ There our thinking must make contact with the only and divine truth by which all truth is known and touches God.⁴¹ Anselm's ontological argument has such a beginning in coming immediately upon an idea of God which directly leads us to the knowledge of the existence corresponding to this idea.

For Thomas neither of these approaches was satisfactory.⁴² A proof was necessary and possible just because the sensible stands between us and God. Because our minds are not immediately with God, proof is necessary, and because the sensible provides the mediation, it is possible.⁴³ Without this middle, there is no proof and Thomas does not call Anselm's argument a proof.⁴⁴ For him the fact that the fool can say in his heart there is no God compels a proof,⁴⁵ and that St. Paul tells us that the invisible things of God are known through created things enables a proof from sensible effects.⁴⁶ Thomas's understanding and use of this famous text from the Epistle to the

tion: From Plato to Denys (Oxford, 1981). M.-D. Chenu, *Nature, Man and Society in the Twelfth Century: Essays on New Theological Perspectives in the Latin West*, ed. and trans. J. Taylor and L. K. Little (Chicago and London, 1968) tells us that in contrast to pseudo-Dionysius, Augustine found God "in the intimate depths of his own mind" (p. 63); his orientation was "toward an interior life that took external objects as mere occasions for its enrichment" (p. 64). To Augustine's use of "'signs' corresponded a mysticism of the interior life" (p. 125) as opposed to Dionysius's symbolic theology.

⁴⁰ Anselmi, *Proslogion, Opera Omnia*, ed. F. S. Schmitt, 6 vol. (Edinburgh, 1946-1961) i,1, p.97,4-8.

⁴¹ Augustine, *De Magistro*, XI,38 (PL 32,U16). For a grouping of similar texts and an example of the Augustinian spirituality in which they were understood see Bonaventurae, *Quaestiones Disputatae de Scientia Christi, Opera Omnia*, 10 vol., v (Ad Claras Aquas, Quaracchi, 1891), q. V, pp. 17 ff.

⁴² They are rejected in question 2, articles 1 and 2: "*utrum Duum esse sit per se notum*" and "*utrum Deum esse sit demonstrabile*".

⁴³ "*Sed quia nos non scimus de Deo quid est, non est nobis per se nota, sed indiget demonstrari per ea quae sunt magis nota quoad nos et minus nota quoad naturam, scilicet per effectus*" ST I,2,1 and "*Deum esse ... demonstrabile est per effectus nobis notos*" ST I,2,2.

⁴⁴ It is treated under "*utrum Deum esse sit per se notum*", ST I,2,1.

⁴⁵ This text is in the *sed contra* of question 2, article 1.

⁴⁶ This text is in the *sed contra* of question 2, article 2.

Romans to justify the use of Aristotelian arguments from what is evident to sense indicates his turning from the Augustinian perspective.⁴⁷ What is the standpoint from which such an enterprise takes place?

To understand this as a theological perspective we need to turn again to the intellectual principles of the tradition of pseudo-Dionysius. Dionysius appears to have been an eastern contemporary of Boethius, the great sixth century Roman theologian, poet, statesman and martyr. These two Christians were influenced by the late Neoplatonic thought best formulated by Proclus.⁴⁸ In the Middle Ages, Dionysius especially had great theological authority as he was thought to be the Athenian disciple of St. Paul.⁴⁹ On a number of important points Proclan Neoplatonism differed from that of Plotinus. On some of these the other great medieval theological authority, Augustine, who predates Proclus's flourishing, follows Plotinus. The influence of Augustine on St. Thomas is strong; his first system of theology was a commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, whose text book was very largely excerpted from the works of Augustine. But our first autograph from St. Thomas is his notes of Albert the Great's lectures on the *Divine*

47" Ce qui l'oppose aux partisans de la preuve ontologique, telle que l'a exposée saint Anselme, et en fin de compte à Augustine lui même, c'est l'epistemologie qu'il choisit pour approfondir la signification du qui est. On le voit clairement dans l'interprétation non traditionnelle que des le Commentaire (sur les Sentences) saint Thomas donne au fameux verset de Romains 1/30, complémentaire d'Exode 3,14, qui pour les Peres grecs et latins signifiait le retour ou la remontée du monde sensible au monde intelligible. Pour Thomas cette remontée a un tout autre sens: il insiste sur l'impossibilité d'arriver à la connaissance naturelle de Dieu autrement qu'en raisonnant à partir de l'expérience sensible." E. zum Brunn, "La 'métaphysique d'Exode' ", p. 133.

48 On this relation see my "The *De Trinitate* of St. Boethius" and my articles in *Dionysius* 3 and 4 and among the most recent literature H. D. Saffrey, "Nouveaux liens objectifs entre le pseudo-Denis et Proclus ", *Revue de philosophie* 63 (1979), 3-16; H. Chadwick, "The Authenticity of Boethius's Fourth Tractate ", *The Journal of Theological Studies* 31 (1980), 551-556; R. D. Crouse, "Semina Rationum, St. Augustine and Boethius ", *Dionysius* 4 (1980), 75-86, and the treatment of Dionysius in A. Louth, *The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition*.

49 "Dans toute son oeuvre ... il (Thomas) reconnaît l'auteur des Noms Divins pour l'Al-eopagite" J. Durante!, *Saint Thomas et Pseudo-Denis* (Paris, 1919), p. 30.

Names of pseudo-Dionysius.⁵⁰ St. Thomas commented on this work, two treatises of Boethius, and the *Liber de Causis*. The last was an Arabic work mainly derived from Proclus's *Elements of Theology* together with a commentary, at crucial points representing the same philosophical-theological position as Dionysius; for most of his life Thomas attributed the whole work to Aristotle.⁵¹ The movement of St. Thomas's thought is indicated by the fact that this is his last and most personally revealing commentary. In it he only tells us a good deal about his own thought, as well as explaining the text of the *Liber de Causis*, but he also reveals that he has read the *Elements of Theology* itself, to which he continues to refer in his *De Substantiis Separatis* dating from the same period.⁵² Moreover, Thomas is not likely to have felt the differences between these two Platonisms as much as we do. Boethius credited his trinitarian thought to Augustine when in fact he ordered it within a Prodan schema.⁵³ Even when medieval thinkers saw the difference, there was a tendency to reconcile or blend the opposed views, as in Eriugena's conflation of Augustine and Dionysius.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ See P. Simon in his *Prolegomena* to Alberti Magni, *Super Dionysius de Divinis Nominibus*, ed. P. Simon, *Opera Omnia* 37(1), (Coloniae, 1972), p. viii and my "Aquinas's First Principle", 146, n. 67.

⁵¹ The first indication of Thomas's knowledge of the Proclan basis of the *Liber de Causis* is found in his commentary, *Super Librum de Causis Expositi*<>, ed. H. D. Saffrey, *Textus Philosophici Friburgen*&es 4:5, (Fribourg/Louvain, 1954), *pro'emium*, p. 3, 5-8, which cannot predate 1268. On the common doctrine of Dionysius and the author of the *Liber* see H. D. Saffrey's introduction to his edition of Thomas's exposition, his "L'etat actuel des recherches sur le *Liber de Causis*", *Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter, Miscellanea Mediaevalia*, ed. P. Wilpert, ii (Berlin, 1963), pp. 267-281; L. Sweeney, "Doctrine of Creation in *Liber de Causis*", *An Etienne Gilson Tribute*, ed. C. J. O'Neil, (Milwaukee, 1959), pp. 274-289; and A. Pattin, "Le *Liber de Causis*: edition etablie a l'aide de 90 manuscrits avec introduction et notes", *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* 28 (1966), 90-203, esp. 93-94.

⁵² "En effet, le chapitre 20 cite deux propositions de Proclus, les propositions 169 and 196" *De Substantiis Separatis, Opera, Omnia* (Leonine) XL (Pars D-E), (Romae, 1968), p. D6.

⁵³ See my "The *De Trinitate* of St. Boethius", pp. 368ff. and R. D. Crouse, "*Semina Rationum*: St. Augustine and Boethius", *passim*.

⁵⁴ There is now a large literature on this subject to which one of the latest contributions is B. Stock "In Search of Eriugena's Augustine" a paper for the Third

Nonetheless, there are important differences between these two Neoplatonisms which are of consequence for our endeavor to understand the theological context which permits and requires Thomas's proof. First, in Proclus, theology is systemized so as actually to begin from God's inner unity. In Proclus's *Elements*, Dionysius's *Divine Names*, Eriugena's *De Divisione Naturae*, and works structured in this tradition, or coming under its influence, but *not* in Augustine's *De Trinitate*, or works faithful to it, theology begins from the divine unity. Second, the multiplicity within the divine, whether the Trinity in Eriugena and Dionysius, or the henads and triads in Proclus, is distinguished from the divine unity.⁵⁵

The motion and multiplicity within the divine spiritual life is the intelligible pattern and basis of the motion and multiplicity of the sensible world further down. What is distinctive about the Prodan Neoplatonism here is that the going out from the divine unity, the proceeding, *ἔξοδος* or *exitus*, is given equal weight with the return, *ἐπιστροφή* or *conversio*. This is not true in Augustine. He is primarily interested in how, addressed by the divine Word in the world in which he finds himself, man can be saved out of it forever.⁵⁶

International Eriugena Colloquium, 1979, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität, Freiburg i. Br. For further items confer notes 14, 15 and 16 in R. D. Crouse "Intentio Moysi: Bede, Augustine, Eriugena and Plato in the *Hexameron* of Honorius Augustodunensis", *Dionysius* 2 (1978), 185-157. Dr. Crouse concludes that Eriugena's system is "By no means a rejection, or a tendentious misinterpretation of Augustine (but) a modification by selection and emphasis" (144). This accords with J. J. O'Meara "Eriugena's Use of Augustine in his Teaching on the Return of the Soul and the Vision of God", *Jean Scot Erigene et l'histoire de la philosophie*, Colloques Internationaux du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Laon, 1975, (Paris, 1977), pp. 191-200 and "'Magnorum Virorum Quendam Consensum Velimus Machinari' (804D): Eriugena's Use of Augustine's *de Genesi ad litteram* in the *de divisione naturae*", also for the Third Eriugena Colloquium, and certainly is close to Eriugena's own consciousness.

⁵⁵ See my article "The *De Trinitate* of St. Boethius" for the result in Christian theology of the differences between the pagan Neoplatonic schools; the pagans are more fully treated in "Aquinas's First Principle", 189 ff.

⁵⁶ See my "The Place of the Psychological Image of the Trinity" and R. D. Crouse "Semina Rationum".

The third difference between Proclan and Plotinian Neoplatonism, and crucial for us, is the place of the human soul in this structure. Plotinus, looking at the human soul in its causes, sees it partly in the world of sense and body, which soul animates, and partly above in the higher realm of pure intellectual life. This higher soul never loses its contemplation of higher things and its direct access to the intellectual world. Consequently, for Plotinus, as for Augustine and his followers, the movement to God is inward.⁵⁷ Proclus, on the other hand, following his predecessor Iamblichus, in accord with their mutual tendency to formalize and to differentiate entities, with his sense of the weight of the downward movement in reality and the weakness and evil of our human situation, sees our soul as altogether fallen into the sensible world. The very last proposition of his *Elements of Theology* is as follows:

Every particular soul, when it descends into temporal process, descends entire; there is not a part of it which remains above and a part which descends.⁵⁸

Both the content and the position of this statement are important.

The content requires a relation between man and the sensible world. For Proclus, man in his weakened and humbled position requires help from outside. This help takes the form of theurgy, the place of which in pagan Neoplatonism roughly

⁵⁷ On the division of the soul see Plotinus *Enneades, Opera*, ed. P. Henry et H. R. Schwyzer, Museum Lessianum, Series Philosophia 88, 8 vol. (Paris/Brussels, 1951-1978), IV 8,8,2-8; V 1,10 and C. G. Steel *The Changing Self; A Study of the Soul in Later Neoplatonism: Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus*, (Brussels, 1978), p. 81 and elsewhere. On the movement inward see *Enneades* I 6,8,4; I 6,9,1; III 8,6,40; IV 8,1,2; V 8,2,82; V 8,11,11; VI 9,7,17; VI 9,11,88 and A. H. Armstrong, "Salvation: Plotinian and Christian", *The Downside Review* 75 (1957), 126-139, reprinted in *Plotinian and Christian Studies*, Variorum Reprints (London, 1979).

⁵⁸ Proclus, *The Elements of Theology*, A Revised Text with translation, introduction and commentary by E. R. Dodds, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1968), Prop. 211, p. 185. On the positive character of the downward movement for Proclus see "Aquinas's First Principle", 148-151; for its effect on Dionysius see P. Rorem, "The Place of *The Mystical Theology* in the Pseudo-Dionysian Corpus", *Dionysius* 4 (1980), 88-89.

corresponds to the place of the sacraments in Christian religion.⁵⁹

Theurgic union is attained only by the perfective operation of unspeakable acts correctly performed, acts which are beyond all understanding, and by the power of unutterable symbols which are intelligible only to the gods.⁶⁰

Thus, although Proclus, in contrast to St. Thomas, still holds that the soul knows itself through knowing its higher spiritual causes, an essential move towards exterior sensible reality has been made, both in respect to the soul's return to God, and in its location in the cosmos.⁶¹

A Christian spirituality moving forward from this position is to be found in pseudo-Dionysius's symbolic theology, which advances to God beginning from symbols "natural, historical, scriptural or sacramental."⁶² This theology, worked out in Eriugena, forms a foundation for medieval aesthetics so that Abbot Suger at St. Denis structures and adorns his gothic abbey around the principle that the material light gleaming on silver and gold or in jewel and glass leads the spirit to the immaterial God.⁶³ The twelfth century revival of this Dionysian spirituality develops a previously absent sense of the reality of the natural world, a universe functioning by its own

⁵⁹ C. Steel, *The Changing Self*, pp. 156-157.

⁶⁰ Iamblichus *De Mysteriis* II, 11 trans. by E. R. Dodds, *Elements*, p. xx.

⁶¹ *Elements*, Prop. 167; for the contrasting doctrine of St. Thomas see *ST I*, qq. 85-87. For a different view of St. Thomas see B. de Margerie, S.P., "A quelles conditions d'après Lumen Ecclesiae (para. 15-16) une philosophie peut-elle servir d'instrument à l'élaboration d'une christologie catholique;" to appear in *Atti del VIII Congresso Tomistico Internazionale suU'Enciclica "Aeterni Patris"*, ed. A. Piolanti, (Roma, 1981), pp. 191-206, esp. p. 195.

⁶² M. D. Chenu, *Nature, Man and Society*, p. 125; additional materials on Dionysius and theurgy are given in my "Aquinas's First Principle", 147. Since its appearance there is A. Louth's *The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition*, pp. 162-164 which is also the best treatment of the matter I have found.

⁶³ See Sugerii Abbatis Sancti Dionysii, *Liber de Rebus in Administratione Sua Gestis*, in E. Panovsky, *Abbot Suger*, 2nd ed. (Princeton, 1979), XXVII and XXXIII, pp. 46-48 and 62-64 and W. Beierwaltes "*Negati Affirmatio*; On the World as Metaphor. A Foundation for Mediaeval Aesthetics from the Writings of John Scotus Eriugena", *Dionysius* 1 (1977), 127-159.

second causes through which man comes to God.⁶⁴ This movement towards secularization and feeling for the natural world is crucial to Thomas's use of the Aristotelian proofs and in fact Thomas refers to Dionysius when he wishes to justify the knowledge of God through sensible effects.⁶⁵

One of the characteristics of the later Neoplatonism identified by modern scholarship is its greater acceptance of Aristotle. This also characterizes the Christian thinkers.⁶⁶ Whereas Augustine has little use for Aristotle, Boethius thinks that he and Plato have the same teaching and Boethius is responsible for the first of the three Aristotelian waves to wash the west.⁶⁷ Thomas says early in his career that Dionysius follows Aristotle⁶⁸ and, while he comes later to understand the Platonic character of Dionysius's thought,⁶⁹ he continues to see what is usually regarded as the Aristotelian ascent to God through knowledge of the sensible world in Dionysian terms. To Dionysius he credits the following:

"Men reach the knowledge of intelligible truth by proceeding from one thing to another." "The intellectual soul then . . . holds the last place among intellectual substances . . . it must gather its

⁶⁴ M. D. Chenu, *Nature, Man and Society*. Most of the essays in this volume touch on this question; most important perhaps is "The Platonisms of the Twelfth Century", pp. 49-98; on the idea that the world constituted a whole see p. 67. Confer also R. D. Crouse, "*Intentio Moysi*", 158-5 on Honorius and the Platonists of Chartres, their sense of cosmos, and openness to the world.

⁶⁵ See *ST* I,1,9 and texts cited below. This is not his unique procedure: "pseudo-Dionysius himself, thanks to his religious sense, so deflected Platonic idealism toward a keener subjection to sensible realities that later, he was occasionally bracketed with Aristotle in concordances or "harmonies" of "the authorities" (*concordia auctoritatum*). Chenu, *Nature, Man and Society*, p. 185.

See my "Aquinas's First Principle" 148 and S. Gersh, *From Iamblichus to Eriugena: An Investigation of the Prehistory and Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition, Studien zur Problemgeschichte der Antiken und Mittelalterlichen Philosophie* 8, (Leiden, 1978), pp. fl85-6.

⁶⁷ See *De interpretatione*, ed. C. Meiser, ed. secunda, (Leipzig, 1880), p. 79, and R. D. Crouse, "*Semina Rationum*", 76-77.

⁶⁸ "*Dionysius autem Jere ubique sequitur Aristotelem, ut patet diligenter inspecienti libros ejus*": *In II Sent.* d.14,q.1.a.2 (Mandonnet, p. 850).

⁶⁹ " --- plerumque utitur stilo et modo loquendi quo utebantur platonici . . ." *fa de div. nQm, proem*,

knowledge from divisible things by way of sense." "The human mind cannot rise to the immaterial contemplation of the celestial hierarchies unless it uses the guidance of material things." "Divine things cannot be manifested to men except under sensible likenesses." "Men receive the divine illumination under the likeness of sensible things." ⁷⁰

It is worth noting the necessity of the turn to the sensible expressed here and that it is precisely this that divides Thomas and Bonaventure, who is also less Aristotelian than Thomas. Bonaventure certainly uses the sensible way in his theology but he regards it as only one way. The soul may also take the Augustinian more directly inward route.⁷¹ Thus, the context of this turning to the sensible in which the Aristotelian proof eventually becomes necessary and intelligible is originally religious in the most cultic and mystical signification of that term. It is the subsequent development of what has been called a more secular feeling for the natural world and the discovery of the sciences of such a world which actually bring us to the proof itself.¹²

The place of man and the position of the statement about his place in the *Elements of Theology* is really part of the content. The human soul descends into the temporal process and all of it is there. In Proclus, this is the final statement in his systemized theology. Although St. Thomas's view of man is exactly of this kind, for him and for the first western Christian systematic theologian, Eriugena, this descent is not the end of theology but man is rather the pivot point, the hinge, or crux, on which the cosmos turns. For these thinkers, man's reason is distinguished from intuition or *intellectus* by reason's divided or discursive nature. In Eriugena, Genesis associating

¹⁰ *ST* I,79,8; I,76,5; I,88,2 *obj.* 1; I-II,99,8 *ad* 8; I,108,1. The list is from A. C. Pegis, Index of Authors, *Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 2 vols.,ii, (New York, 1945), p. 1168.

¹¹ Ewert Cousins, *Bonaventure, The Soul's Journey into God, The Tree of Life, The Life of Saint Francis, The Classics of Western Spirituality*, (London, 1978), p. 28.

¹² Chenu, *Nature, Man and Society*, pp. 45 ff.

man with the naming of the beasts, means that the sensible world comes into particularized sensible being through man and his form of divided knowing and is restored to its heavenly and intellectual unity in the redemption of man in Christ.⁷³ We have seen how man, uniting the material and spiritual creation through his unity of body and soul and, as free agent in the world, forms the structural center of the *Sunima Theologiae*. Thomas transforms a statement from Proclus about the soul as the "horizon and mutual limit of the corporal and spiritual", mediated to him through the *Liber de Causis*, into a teaching about man joining the two worlds.⁷⁴

Neoplatonic theology, Christian or pagan, by no means universally applauds this anthropocentrism, which is not to be identified with the very general conception that man is a microcosm or little world uniting in himself the elements of spiritual and material reality.⁷⁵ One of Plotinus's complaints about the gnostics and, by implication, the Christians, who share their perspective, is the vanity of their anthropocentric pride:

But really! For these people who have a body like men have, and desire and griefs and passions, by no means to despise their own power but to say that they can grasp the intelligible but that there is no power in the sun which is freer than this power of ours from affections and more ordered and more unchangeable, and that the

⁷³ *De Divisione Naturae* IV,8 (PL 122,744A); II,6 (PL 122, 582A); cf. B. Stock, "The Philosophical Anthropology of Johannes Scotus Eriugena", *Studia Medievalia*, 8 (1967), 1-57, R. D. Crouse, "Intentio Moysi", 142-144. D. F. Duclow, "Dialectic and Christology in Eriugena's *Periphyseon*", *Dionysius* 4 (1980), 99-118; the nicest summary is perhaps I. P. Sheldon-Williams, "Eriugena's Greek Sources", *The Mind of Eriugena*, ed. J. O'Meara and L. Bieler, (Dublin, 1978), pp. 11-12.

⁷⁴ See *Liber de Causis*, Prop. 2 and F. Ruello, "Saint Thomas and Pierre Lombard", *San Tommaso, Fonti e riflessi del suo pensiero*, ed. A. Piolanti, Studi Tomistici I, (Roma, n.d.), p. 202.

⁷⁵ Because of Gregory of Nyssa's objection to the term-it seemed to make man an image of the world rather than of God-it is not used in Eriugena except in one unfavorable context. Cf. Lars Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator, The Theological Anthropology of Marimus the Confessor*, Acta Seminarii Neotestamentici Upsaliensis, (Lund, 1965), p. 142; on Gregory and Eriugena cf. E. Jeauneau, *Jean Scot, Homelie sur le prologue de Jean*, Sources chretiennes, 151, (Paris, 1969), p. 887.

sun has not a better understanding than we have, who have only just come to birth and are hindered by so many things that cheat us from coming to the truth! And to say that their soul, and the soul of the meanest of men, is immortal and divine but that the whole of heaven and the stars there have no share given them in the immortal soul.¹⁶

'Augustine,⁷⁷ Gregory the Great,⁷⁸ Boethius,⁷⁹ Anselm⁸⁰ and Peter Lombard⁸¹ all hold a view which seems incompatible with the anthropocentrism of Eriugena and Aquinas,⁸² namely

⁷⁶ *Enneades* II 9,5,1-11 translation by A. H. Armstrong in the second volume of the Loeb *Plotinus* (Cambridge, 1966), p. 289. See also *Enn.* II 9,9,45-56 and A. H. Armstrong "Man in the Cosmos: A Study of Some Differences between Pagan Neoplatonism and Christianity", *Romanitas et Christianitas*, ed. W. den Boer et al. (Amsterdam/London, 1978), 5-14, reprinted in *Plotinian and Christian Studies*.

⁷⁷ *Enchiridion*, LXI (PL 40,261): "... ex ipsa hominum redemptione ruinae illius angelicae detrimenta reparantur", also XXIX (PL 40,246); *De Civ. Dei*, XIV,26 (PL 41,485) and XXII,1 (PL 41,752).

⁷⁸ *Hom. in Evang.* II,84 (PL 76,1249 and 1252) "*Decem vero drachmas habuit mulier, quia novem sunt ordines angelorum. Sed ut completeretur electorum numerus, homo decimus est creatus . . . Quia enim superna illa civitas ex angelis et hominibus constat, ad quam tantum credimus humanum genus ascendere, quantos illic contigit electos angelos remansisse, sicut scriptum est: Statuit terminos gentium secundum numerum angelorum Dei.*" This occurs then in the context of the parable of the ten coins and includes Gregory's listing of the nine orders of angels so like that of ps.-Dionysius. Miss Jean Petersen informs me that "the exegesis of this parable and that of the lost sheep by Gregory, Cyril of Alexandria, Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa and Origen (scraps only) is extraordinarily similar." This would indicate that in Gregory the Great, at least, the Augustinian and Greek traditions meet here. Anselm, Gregory and Peter Lombard are considered in M. Chenu's treatment of this question "*Cur Homo? Le sous-sol d'une controverse*" *La théologie au douzième siècle*, (Paris, 1966), pp. 52-61. Fr. Chenu thinks that Honorius changed his mind on this matter from the *Elucidarium* to the *Libellus VIII Quaestionum* (p. 55). But M. O. Garrigues has shown that Honorius never held that man was "*pro angelo sed non pro ipso creatus*". He never belonged to the more pessimistic Augustinian tradition on this point; cf. her *L'oeuvre d'Honorius Augustodunensis: Inventaire critique*, unpublished Ph. D. diss., Univ. de Montreal, 1979, pp. 280-299. This is of some importance as Honorius is a main source for the Eriugenan tradition in the twelfth century.

⁷⁹ *De fide Catholica* (PL *Brevis Fidei Christianae Complexio*), last sentence (PL 64,1828).

⁸⁰ *Cur Deus Homo*, 1,16-18 (PL 158,881-889).

⁸¹ *Sent. lib.* II,d.1 c.9 (PL 192,654).

⁸² *In II Sententiarum*, d.1,q.2,a.8 (Mandonnet, pp. 49 ff.). *ST* II, *prol.* cites John of Damascus as the source of his view of man. See also *ST* 1,98,5 *obj.* 2 and 1,98,9 and R. Southern, *Medieval Humanism and Other Studies* (Oxford, 1970), p. 50.

that man makes up the number of the angels who fell with Satan. In Anselm and Gregory tijis is indeed said to be the reason for his creation.

The much more positive view of man in Eriugena, his twelfth century followers, like Honorius Augustodunensis, and in St. Thomas emphasizes rather the human affirmative relation to the sensible creation and man's freedom.⁸³ In this the dominant influence comes from the Greek fathers.⁸⁴ Man's place at the bottom of the ladder of spiritual creatures is seen positively because, as in Eriugena, his knowing is the source of their being, and his redemption the basis of their return to God. In Thomas, man's knowing is also suited to the sensible world so that his body becomes essential, not only to his communication with all other reality, but even for his knowledge of himself.⁸⁵ We have seen how the Proclan-Dionysian Neoplatonism is at work in this development. Further, the sensible world provides the sphere in which man shows his freedom. As its governor, he stands to it as God stands to the whole of creation and so he is seen as the image of God.⁸⁶ It is for him. On this account, the eternal raising up of the sensible world is also related to man. " Because the bodily creation is finally ordered to be in accord with the state of man ... it will be necessary for it to have a participation in the light of his glory." ⁸⁷ The sensible

⁸³ Confer note 73 above and M. Chenu "Nature and Man-the Renaissance of the Twelfth Century", *NatU?e, Man and Society*, pp. 1-48 and R. D. Crouse, "*Intentio Moysi*", 146 ff.

⁸⁴ G. Lafont, *Structures et methode dans la somme theologique de saint Thomas, Textes et etude theol.*, (Bruges/Paris, 1961), pp. 192 ff. J. Pelikan, "*Imago Dei*, An Explication of *Summa Theologiae* 1,93", *Calgary Aquinas Studies*, ed. A. Parel (Toronto, 1978), pp. 27-48; P. Faucon, *Aspects neoplatoniciens*.

⁸⁵ *ST* I,87,1.

⁸⁶ Confer note 20 above and *ScG* III,!: "*Quaedam namque sic a Deo producta sunt ut, intellectum habentia, ejus similitudinem gerant et imaginem repraesentent; unde et ipsa non solum aunt directa, sed et seipsa dirigentia secundum proprias actiones in debitum finem. . .*" The difference between the freedom and ruling of God and of man is indicated structurally in the *Summa Theologiae* by placing the treatment of man's nature in the *de Deo* under creation while his operations go into the Second Part. God's nature and operation are treated together.

⁸⁷ *ScG* IV, 97 and *Compendium Theologiae* I. 169-170.

world has become something separate from man but their interrelation requires its resurrection with him.

The proof of God's existence is necessitated by the position of man descended into the temporal, sensible world and turning toward it in order to rise out of it. Theology evidently needs this rise in order to make its beginning intelligible to man, for it starts with God, and is addressed to this humble creature separated from the intelligible world. But it is not because theology is human science that man has a crucial place in it. Man's place and role are objectively given. Because theology is primarily the knowledge of God and those who have the vision of him, man's crucial role is determined by the structure of reality. The movement from both God and man which creates the rhythm and structure of the *Summa Theologiae* is a reflection of the inner rhythm and structure of reality. Not only is the whole a movement from God to material creation and back through man, but this pulse of going out and return runs through the individual parts of the work.

The Neoplatonists gave this form to the Aristotelian notion of activity or pure act⁸⁸ by which Thomas understands God, and he and they both regard this activity as a kind of motion.⁸⁹ This motion structures the five ways of the proof, which allows us some understanding of God's being, just as it orders the proof that he is the first cause in each of the four senses of cause, with which the treatment of creatures begins.⁹⁰ In both cases the causes are arranged in a way never used by Aristotle.⁹¹ Thomas begins with the source of motion and concludes

⁸⁸ S. E. Gersh, *A Study of Spiritual Motion in the Philosophy of Proclus*, (Leiden, 1975), pp. 4 and 181.

⁸⁹ *ST* 1,9,1 *ad* 1 and *ad* 2, *ST* 1,18,3 *ad* 1; *ST* 1,19,1 *ad* 3; *ScG* 1,13. Confer. M. Jordan, "The Grammar of Ease", *The Thomist* 44 (1980), 1-26 and my "Aquinas's First Principle", 169-170.

⁹⁰ *ST* 1,44.

⁹¹ Compare *Physica* II,3,194b-195a3: *In Octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis Expositio*, ed. P. M. Maggiolo (Turin/Rome, 1965), II,v,178-181; *Physica* II,7,198a 1-14; *In Physicorum* II,xi,241; *Metaphysica* 1,3,983a 24-32: *In Metaphysicorum* I,iv,70; *Metaphysica* II,2,994a 19-994b 27: *In Meta.* 11,ii, 300-301; *Metaphysica*, V,2,1013a 24-1018b3: *In Meta.* V,ii,763,764,765 and 771.

with final cause, so that there is a return to the motionless beginning.⁹² Between these two opposed causes are placed, first, the material cause, and then, the formal. The reduction of the material cause to God shows that there is no barrier to his efficacy. The formal is linked to the final, as the moving end is the good as known and perfected in form, here the divine essence itself.⁹³

Thus, the being which God is, is said to return to itself.⁹⁴ The treatment of the divine substance, questions two to eleven, passes out from the consideration of his simplicity, to his infinity and being in all things, and back again to his unity.⁹⁵ The treatment of his operations moves from intellect, the most undivided spiritual relation, to truth, which requires a reflection on intellection, in that to be truth knowing must know that it knows its object, to will, which is differentiated from knowledge just because the possession of the object known is also desired, to power, by which things outside the self are made, back again to happiness, which belongs to self-conscious beings when knowing and its object are fully in accord. Happiness is primarily an attribute of the self-knowing knower. Similarly, the Trinity involves a real relation, distinction, procession and movement by which the Father generates the Son and both are united in the Spirit.⁹⁶ Bernard Lonergan has shown how the questions on the Trinity as a whole describe

⁹² The doctrine that God remains in himself when he moves upon himself in love and knowledge is found in Dionysius; cf. *In de div. nom.* IV,vii,369; IV,viii,390; IV,x,439; IV,xi,444. It is worked out systematically in Eriugena. Thomas probably has the doctrine from Dionysius but I try to show in "Aquinas's First Principle" 170, n. 197 that he might also know a portion of *De Divisione Naturae* containing the notion.

⁹³ *ST* 1,19,1 *ad* 2.

⁹⁴ *ST* 1,14,3 *ad* 1.

⁹⁵ This is the argument of my "The Structure of Aristotle's Logic and the Knowledge of God in the *Pars Prima* of the *Summa Theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas", *Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter, Miscellanea Medievalia*, ed. A. Zimmerman, 13/2, (Berlin/New York, 1981), pp. 961-968.

⁹⁶ See my "The Place of the Psychological Image", 107 and "Aquinas's First Principle", 165-166.

a circle beginning in the processions, which come out of the internal operations, and passing on to the plurality of the distinct persons, returning to the original unity in the notional acts, which are the same as the processions.⁹⁷

Beyond the divine comes creation, which moves from the spiritual to material creatures and their unity in man. A similar structure is found within the elements of these parts as well.⁹⁸ The very being of God, arrived at by the proofs as the motion from below meets that from above, is manifested as being which returns to itself. God's being is self-relation and consequently knowledge, love, creative power and Trinitarian procession.

The proof of God's existence is crucial in Thomas because it begins that movement from below, from man to God, which is essential to theology. The proof stands at the beginning but it is not a ladder which is then pushed away; it remains present in the content and structure of what follows. And does it not remain necessary for theology? For it follows first from the religious need of man altogether descended into the world of time and place, and then, from the freedom which belongs to man's growing secularity and scientific progress. Proclus and Iamblichus held the former because any other view is "inconsistent with the facts of human sin and misery."⁹⁹ A view we can have no less grounds to adopt. The movement of human freedom towards a secular natural science, which Thomas urged forward with his acceptance of Aristotle, has hardly diminished. **It** may be that theologians no longer think we can move through nature to God by means of Aristotle. But if this be so, some new means for the same journey must be provided.

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⁹⁷ *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*, ed. D. B. Burrell, (Notre Dame, 1969), pp. 206-207.

⁹⁸ See my "The Structure of Aristotle's Logic".

⁹⁹ E. R. Dodds, *Elements*, p. 809 summarizing Iamblichus according to Proclus *In Tim.* I c.

KNOWING PERSONS AND KNOWING GOD

AM GOING TO propose an account of affirming God's existence which runs counter to a prominent trend in recent philosophy of religion, a trend which defends the meaningfulness of theism by either giving up the concept of God's existence as a category mistake or defining it in terms of the practical value the idea has for religious life. Such defenses are reductionist. They reduce the meaning of 'God exists' to its functions *within* what they variously call 'religious language,' the 'religious language game,' or the 'religious form of life.'¹

I, too, want to defend theistic thought and life, but I do not believe that the reductionist defenses work.² In another paper,³

¹ I have in mind especially the following:

R. B. Braithwaite, "An Empiricist's View of the Nature of Religious Belief," *The Philosophy of Religion*, ed. Basil Mitchell (Oxford, 1971), 72-91.

Paul Holmer, "Language and Theology: Some Critical Notes," *Harvard Theological Review*, LVIII, 5 (July, 1965), 242-261; "The Nature of Religious Propositions," *Religious Language and the Problem of Religious Knowledge*, ed. Ronald E. Santoni (Bloomington, 1968); "Wittgenstein and Theology," *Reflection*, Vol. 65, 4 (1968).

Gordon Kaufman, *God the Problem* (Cambridge, Mass., 1972). See especially chapter 5.

D. Z. Phillips, *The Concept of Prayer* (London, 1965); *Faith and Philosophical Enquiry* (New York, 1971).

P. F. Schmidt, *Religious Knowledge* (New York, 1961).

Elmer Sprague, *Metaphysical Thinking* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978).

Paul van Buren, *The Edges of Language: An Essay in the Logic of Religion* (New York, 1972); "Anselm's Formula and the Logic of God," *Religious Studies*, vol. 9 (1973), 279-288.

² Many have said as much, but few have argued the case. Kai Nielsen is a notable exception. See his "Wittgensteinian Fideism," *Philosophy*, Vol. 42 (1967). More frequently one encounters an off-handed rejection of reductionism, as in Patrick Sherry's *Religion, Truth, and Language Games* (London, 1977) where he notes that "... it often seems as if Phillips is *reducing* God to a concept or to some

I argued that while claiming to leave the practice of theistic religion as it is, reductionist views would, when integrated into believers' lives, lead to so fundamental a change in religious life that instead of defending they would undermine or, as Ninian Smart put it, cause a "colossal revolution" in faith.⁴ Be that as it may, I also believe that the reductionist defenses of the uses and meaning of religious language do not take their analytic and phenomenological task sufficiently seriously when it comes to the meaning of affirming God's existence. They attend to other functions of religious language without examining the sense affirming God's existence actually has in the practice of theistic faith. They view religions as complex forms of life organized by peculiar language systems, conceptual schemes, or models which perform practical functions for believers. We have learned much from the concern with the uses of religious language, but the question about God's existence persists.

In this paper I shall argue that affirming God's existence is a necessary part of theistic religion and that the affirmation follows the logic of the most certain affirmation of existence we make, viz. affirmations of the existence of human individuals or persons. That being so, if it is rational to affirm the existence of persons, it is rational to affirm the existence of God. In order thus to support the rationality of affirming God's existence, I will develop four main theses: (1) that practicing theistic religion presupposes the idea of God as a personal or suprapersonal individual; (2) that the actual practice of theism involves affirming the existence of God in a sense of existence appropriate to such finite individuals as human persons; (3) that affirming the existence of human persons takes place through an act which attributes intentions and values to something encountered in action; (4) that affirming God's existence follows the same logic as affirming the existence of persons.

aspect of the world. . . ." (p. 53). See also Ninian Smart in *The Concept of Worship* (New York, 1971).

³ "Theistic Reductionism and the Practice of Worship," *The International Journal for Philosophy of Religion*, Vol. X, No. 1 (Jan., 1979).

⁴ Ninian Smart, *The Concept of Worship*, p. 74.

The third thesis is absolutely fundamental to my project and will occupy the greatest share of the space. Since theism conceives God in personal or suprapersonal terms, affirming God's existence should be judged by comparing it with affirming the existence of persons. When we do so in the development of the fourth thesis, we find, not that the affirmation of God's existence is as certain as that of persons, but that when we judge the believer's affirmation of God's existence by the best knowledge we have of the existence of individuals, we see that it uses and extends rather than abuses and destroys the logic involved in our most certain affirmations of existence.

I

God as Suprapersonal Individual

The conception of God as a suprapersonal individual defines the form through which theistic faith exists. If this claim needs defense at all, we can provide it by considering the place of worship in theism. Ninian Smart has effectively argued in *The Concept of Worship* "that the substantive concept of God is indissolubly linked to the practice of worship." Worship is the comprehensive activity of faith. Most if not all religious activities are activities of worship. The special objects, clothing, paraphernalia, buildings, etc., all have their religious use in relation to worship. Smart gives a lengthy list:

... prayer, worship, the sacraments, sacramental preaching, altars, communion tables, church buildings, blessings, halleluiahs, hymns, ministrations to the sick and dying, funeral services, sacred weddings, baptisms, anathemas, intercessions, masses, crucifixes, pulpits, chasubles, bands, clerical collars, prostrations, readings from the Bible, the Bible, the prayer-book, creeds, dogmas, descriptions of God, sacred narratives, Good Fridays, Christmases, saints days, places of pilgrimages-and so on. (p. 68)

But at the heart of all these is worship. Even though some believers and some groups may eschew many of these elements, worship in some form remains.

Now, the essence of worship is personal interaction, communicative interaction with God. According to Smart's phenomenological description, worship is a "relational activity" in which the worshiper relates himself in a special way to the "Focus of Worship" (p. 44), which in the case of theistic religions is the one God. Furthermore, as a relational activity it is an activity of *addressing* God: "In worshipping God one addresses him" (p. 50) So theistic worship exists (in part) through a language of personal interaction in which one acknowledges and defers to God's unconditional superiority, recognizes his perfect knowledge, love, and will, pledges devotion and submission to him, and asks for his help in bringing such faith to fruition. The worshiper speaks to God and waits for God to speak to and to help him or her as one person helps another. That the core of theistic life treats God as personal, then, is scarcely debatable. There are, of course, special theologies and mystical views originating from theism which view God in non-personal or transpersonal terms. My point, however, is that regardless of theories about God, theistic worship exists through or by means of an interpersonal form.

I hasten to add that the term 'person' must be taken metaphorically or analogically. Because God is not personal in the very same way that human individuals are, we shall say that God is suprapersonal rather than personal. So doing will make it clear that while God includes, he also transcends the personal. The important point is that the metaphor of God as personal is not one among a variety of metaphors which can be used or **not** used as one sees fit—not, at least, if one is to practice faith in God. *It is the very form through which the theistic life is lived, a lived analogy.*⁵

⁵ Austin Farrer stresses this point in *Faith and Speculation* (New York, 1967): "It (enjoyment of 'life in God') is a reality not to be objectively observed (how could it be?) but performed or lived; and so the believer escapes from dependence on mere analogical inference . . . for he lives the belief, a belief which admittedly has an analogical shape" (pp. .

II

Theistic Practice Affirms the Existence of God

The interpersonal form of faith in God involves affirming God's existence or reality in a sense disallowed by reductionist views. Reductionists identify the reality of God with the practical effectiveness the belief in God has for those who entertain it. The question whether God exists and, hence, the affirmation that God exists, are category mistakes, says D. Z. Phillips, "imposing an alien grammar on religious discourse," viz. the grammar of distinguishable physical objects.⁶ And Elmer Sprague asserts the reductionist view even more boldly, saying on the one hand that 'God' names an entity and on the other that it names the distinctive kind of entity that is "brought into being by someone wielding the notion in discourse." (*Metaphysical Thinking*, p. 4) I can only agree, of course, that God is not to be confused with finite objects or made into a thing among things—that would be reductionism of a different kind. But to avoid confusing God with finite objects is one thing, to say that the being of God is a function of theistic discourse and that therefore believers must speak of the existence of God in an *entirely* different way than of the existence of finite individuals, is another.

For there is an important part of the meaning of 'exists' shared by affirmations of God and affirmations of some finite things. When we say of a physical object, for example, that it really exists and is not imaginary or illusory, we mean that it

⁶ Phillips, *Faith and Philosophical Enquiry*, p. 148. See also Kaufman, *God the Problem*, chapter 5. Kaufman defines faith in and commitment to God as "practical postures of a self striving to represent to itself with the only kind of imagery or symbolism available, a world in which moral action and seriousness about life make ultimate sense." (p. 109) Thus the life of faith, he says, is a life in which devotion to God is a necessary practical presupposition. But, he also argues, the question of whether God exists apart from the life in which the faith mode of entertaining the idea of God plays the founding role, is inappropriate. That implies that God's reality is exhaustively understood in terms of the role of the idea of God in the lives of believers. Kaufman tries in other passages, however, to avoid this reductionism.

has some independence from the subjects who know it, such that it makes or can make differences in the world beyond an object of the thought or discourse of subjects. So also when believers speak of God's existence it is part of what they mean that God is not, as Sprague would have it, the kind of entity that could be brought into being by our discourse about him, but that, on the contrary, God is the kind of being who has a life of his own independently of the subjects who believe in him.

When we consider the interpersonal form of the life of faith we can see that believing in God means affirming God's existence in the sense of 'existence' just explained. For this is the nature of the interpersonal or communicative form of life: that it exists through recognizing and responding to another center of action which in turn enacts its own life in pursuit of its own values in such a way that that life is not wholly reducible to anything outside itself. The belief that God exists may not often be expressed in the form of the statement, 'God exists'; and the believer's faith may be focused upon God's actions of creation, redemption, and salvation and on the response to God's will, rather than upon God's existence simply. But in submitting to God's will and drawing upon God's grace, the believer tacitly affirms God's existence. The affirmation resides primarily in the practical action of the believer, not in the mouthing of the words, 'God exists'.

It is the same with affirming the existence of human individuals. We do not usually go around saying 'Ruth and Tom exist,' but by entering into a life with them we affirm their existence. Life with others is a continuous activity of attending to the values, intentions, desires, and wills of others, of trying to know what they want, what they will do, and how they will do it, and of deciding when and how to oppose, question, cooperate, avoid, adjust, or simply go along with them. **It** is because practical life with persons thus involves the continuous modification of one's own will and action by intentional reference to their wills and actions that it involves the recognition of the independent of others. The ontological status of other persons does

not consist in the shape the idea of them gives to one's life; it consists in the will and action of the persons themselves. The idea of other persons certainly plays an important role in the life which recognizes them, but that role is to direct a life which refers beyond itself to the independent lives of others.

So it is with God. The lived belief in God certainly involves an idea of God, and the idea helps to shape the life of faith and so has practical consequences in the lives of believers. But the idea directs a life which in order to be a life of faith in God refers beyond itself to the independent life and will of God. So it is that faith affirms the existence of God in a sense of 'existence' also affirmed of human individuals.

III

Knowing the Existence of Human Individuals

The knowledge we have of the existence of human individuals is the most certain knowledge of existence we have, more certain than our knowledge of mathematical entities, electrons, genes, or other such objects of specialized modes of knowing. We have already seen that the very form of interpersonal life involves the-at least tacit affirmation of the existence of the people with whom we interact. And now we go further and say that inasmuch as human life is interpersonal, one cannot live as a human individual and at the same time deny the existence of other persons. Even if one were to say, in a momentary fit of solipsistic scepticism, that all the world is his or her dream or that there is no satisfactory account of how one knows the existence of other persons, still one would affirm their existence by using language, by addressing intentions and ideas to them, by watching out for their ideas and intentions in turn. One could only refrain altogether from such affirmation by sinking into mere physiological functioning, without speaking or engaging in any communicative action.

Couple the inevitability of affirming persons with the fact that affirming God also belongs to an interpersonal form of life and we have good reason to make affirming the existence of

persons the paradigm and standard for judging the rationality of the believer's affirmation of God's existence. Consequently, in this section, I shall examine the structure or logic of the thought which affirms the existence of human persons so as later to discover the extent to which affirming God's existence follows the same logic.

I believe and shall argue that the knowledge of personal individuals begins with, depends upon, and necessarily involves an evaluative attitude and act in which a knowing subject regards some things it encounters as though they also live, value, and pursue goals of their own. If this is true, then our best and most certain knowledge of what exists involves evaluation and is not simply objective or value-neutral. It means that receptivity to possible intentions and values other than one's own and to their possible relevance to one's own life is at the heart of knowing the world. And it means that affirming God's existence may be reasonable even though it is not simply a matter of drawing a conclusion from premises but is an evaluative action.

In order to develop the claim that knowing persons involves valuing, it is not necessary to give a complete account of the meaning of 'person'. It is sufficient to say that when we affirm the existence of a person we affirm the existence of some entity which lives its life as a pursuit of values and intentions, and which, with the help of language and linguistic communication, lives with other similar individuals (or in a healthy case is able so to live). Such entities have values which they sometimes consciously entertain and evaluate; and through a conscious and conceptual interpretation of reality they form and reform intentions, consider means, make plans and choose actions in order to realize the values. And they do these things with other people and with the help of language.⁷

⁷ To define the concept of 'person' more precisely, we would need to locate persons in relation to other kinds of individuals, where 'individual' means an entity which has a degree of self-being in that it makes or can make some difference in the world which cannot be explained without reference to the presumed individual itself and to its own operation as an individual, something which operates or enacts

The question about the logic of affirming the existence of persons is the question about the structure of thought involved in the recognition that something one encounters is personal. For we do not know reality as it is in itself apart from its effects upon us. We know it by interpreting it. What is necessary for us to be able to interpret it as including particular persons? I believe that the needs, goals, intentions, values of the interpreter provide the initial principles of interpretation and that consequently the logic of interpreting reality is a logic of *evaluative discrimination*.

All knowing, whether human or sub-human, begins in practical life. Consider the most primitive animal organism. As a living organism it maintains its form through a continuous exchange of matter.^s It is, therefore, continuously operating or functioning, i.e. metabolizing. In its life process it is in constant interaction with an environment. For it must secure from outside itself the nutritive matter without which it will die; and besides food it must have fitting environmental conditions: the proper temperature range, suitable air and water, and some means of protection against predators, for example. But since not anything and everything will do for food, since the food does not come by itself into the organism's belly, and since surrounding circumstances are changeable, the organism must take action to move to and appropriate its food and to insure suitability and safe conditions. That is, the life of the organism depends upon some ability to delineate the world, to distinguish food from non-food, good food from bad food, friend from foe. There need be no conceptual knowledge of the needs, no knowledge of the organism that such and such is its need. But there

itself and has some unity of operation by which it is itself and not another. Given such an idea, individuality admits of different levels and forms. Persons are those individuals whose operation in part proceeds consciously and through language and linguistic communication. The notion of individual thus defines a scale which runs from the less than personal to the personal and, if we are theists, to the supra-personal. The notion of such a scale has a long history in philosophy. I believe that its best expression in recent years is in Austin Farrer's *Finite and Infinite* edition; London, 1947), now reissued by the Seabury Press (New York, 1979).

^s Hans Jonas, *The Phenomenon of Life* (New York, 1966), 64-98.

must be some operation by which the organism discriminates, selects, and rejects.

If knowing the world follows such form as I have sketched, the description ' *evaluative* discrimination ' is apt. It is evaluative because its principle of delineation is the recognition of disturbances to its own life activity. The original or most primitive knowledge of the world and its constituents is not a detached and disinterested observation, but an evaluation of the ways regular and repeated disturbances in the knower's field of activity variously qualify, limit, support, promote and hinder its life activities. The organism knows or interprets the world in relation to its own needs and desires, in relation, that is, to the values which direct its own life.

The simpler the organism and its activities, the simpler the delineation of the world; the more different operations performed, the more ways in which the environment can be interpreted. An amoeba will know the world quite simply as what directly feeds or harms its metabolic processes (though even amoebas send out pseudopodia which diversify to some extent the feeling of the environment) . A cat, on the other hand, has a complex nervous system with many specialized operations which go with it (e.g. the various senses), and that nervous system goes with a more complex way of moving around in the world (cats run, jump, climb, switch their tails, turn their heads, and so on) . Consequently, the cat can experiment in many more ways than the amoeba; and the differences the environment makes to the cat's activity are far more than it makes to the amoeba's. The increased specialization of discriminatory operations goes with and is necessary for an increased range of other activities that can be performed by means of them, for example for running, jumping, and climbing and for diverse forms of social interaction. The special operations of the special senses can be performed just for themselves, as in play and the sheer enjoyment of sights and sounds. But the primary function of these operations is to delineate the bearings of reality on the life projects of the organism-and

that means to delineate reality in relation to the *values* of the organisms.

Moving from amoebas to cats to people, we can say that human beings are able through language and its complex thought constructions to extend and diversify their interaction with the environment, to complicate their ways of affecting and being affected by it far beyond what is possible for amoebas and cats. The more diverse the operations an organism performs, the greater the discrimination of differences and recognition of relations and repeated patterns in the qualification or disturbance of its activity. But however complex the organism, knowledge of the world and its constituents begins with the diverse qualifications and disturbances of the activities of the organism as it seeks to satisfy its needs and desires. Consequently, we must say that the organism knows the world not as the world is in itself, but as it relates to the organism's needs, purposes, values, and activities.

What we have proposed so far, however, does not explain how it is possible for us to have the idea and recognize the existence of persons. For by a person, remember, we mean something which at least has a life or being of its own directed by its own values. But so long as the knower recognizes only its own needs, purposes, and values, that knower can regard nothing else as an individual in its own right with its own life. Relative to the knower's values alone, there could at best be a discrimination of regularly recurring units of interference and support. But that is not the same as regarding some such units as existing persons. All the physical movement and all the gesturing and speaking in the world would not lead a knower to regard something as a person unless that knower regarded them as directed from within themselves by intentions and values of their own.

There is, of course, no question that we do take some regularly recurring units as persons. The question is not about whether we do, but about what is involved in our doing so. And if, *ex hypothesi*, knowing were limited to evaluating every-

thing in relation only to one's own values, then there would be, could be, no knowledge of persons.

Clearly, knowing persons requires that the knowing subject go beyond the values and intentions which direct its own life to posit intentions and values other than its own which direct actions other than its own. I say 'posit' intentions and values advisedly. For they are not data lying around the world waiting to be observed by the senses or by some special organ of perception. Nor are they to be analogically inferred by comparing one's own value-directed activity with the observable behavior of others. There must, instead, be an interpretative act in which the knower so responds to the disturbances in its field of operation as to attribute to systematically recurrent and identifiable portions of it, intentions, values, or purposes which constitute and direct it, making it the kind of disturbance it is. Let us see how such interpretation can in principle be performed.

Hall knowing does in truth begin in relation to the knower's intentions and values as it tries to realize them in its life, the same must be true with the knowledge of intentions and values which belong to other persons. The knower must find that the pursuit of its own intentions requires it to treat other parts of the world as having their own values and goals. The knower must think that it makes a difference to the pursuit of its own goods whether some other part of the world involves intentional action or is instead only blind and unintentional process. For supposing that there are multiple individuals, each will have values and intentions which have consequences for the other individuals. This being so, it will be important to one person's life that there are particular intentions and values other than his or her own. Successful life will depend not only upon knowing that there are such intentions but upon ascertaining what they are and what differences they are apt to make. Only then will one be able to direct one's own actions successfully.

We must, however, not suppose that there is first knowledge of oneself as an agent acquired through prior experience of one-

self by oneself and then knowledge of values and intentions which constitute personal lives other than one's own. We do not come to know ourselves by ourselves, but are from the beginning in a world with other persons. We come to know ourselves as we come to know others.

The question of the knowledge of other persons, when it used to be asked from the standpoint of Cartesian solipsism, was the question of how it is possible for a self which already knows itself as a self to know that there also are other selves. But refusing to isolate ourselves in the Cartesian context, we find that there is nothing of which we are more certain than that we belong to a world of multiple agents, each having its own values and each directing life by them. To be a human knower is to discriminate occurrences in the world by their relevance to our values and intentions. And so we find ourselves becoming explicitly aware both of our own and of others' values and intentions. It is part of the discrimination to distinguish one's own aims from those of others. Making the discrimination in practical interpersonal life is also practically affirming the existence of oneself and of others.

It is possible to note three essential elements in the evaluative discrimination of persons. First is an attitude of receptivity as the knowing-doing subject goes about its life. Second is the valuing response or action which treats parts of the world as persons. Third is the modification of the knowing subject's experience as a result of its valuing action. Consider these in order.

First the attitude of receptivity. In order to know persons a subject must be, so to speak, "on the lookout" for whatever may be relevant to the achievement of its goals. And if the subject is to interpret some of what it finds as being, expressing, or in some way including intentions that are not its own, its attitude must be one of respectful receptivity. That is, it must be open, expectant, willing to wait for the other, to suspend and redirect its further action in view of what it finds. I do not mean to suggest that the necessary attitude is one of

moral respect, a Kantian sense that some things belong to a kingdom of ends. On the contrary, a subject may first have the attitude in a wholly utilitarian and selfish form, looking out for what is there in order to pursue its own goals more successfully.⁹ But it is passive, receptive, and respectful in the minimal sense that it refrains enough from pressing its own intentions to let them be modified by what is there.

Such an attitude requires that the knower's intentions not be completely specific and determined. There must be some degree of indeterminacy in its operations, so that its precise intention, if not its general values and goals, can be variously modified in relation to the world.

The second element is the evaluative response. Beyond the attitude of respectful receptivity there must also be a valuing action in which the knowing subject treats another as something which has its own aims. To treat something thus is certainly different from treating it otherwise. We watch out for trees, walls, curbs, holes in the ground, and so on, by noting their location and properties. But for spouses, colleagues, children, and students, we must consider the values they hold and the intentions they pursue. To act, then, towards another as to something which has its own values and meanings is to move from attitude to action. In the action which attributes values and intentions to the other, the subject affirms the existence of an individual. The attribution and affirmation are not necessarily conceptual; the knowing subject does not first think 'aha, there is an intention that is not my own,' and then act accordingly. Rather, acting toward the other in a certain way is an evaluation in practice of the other, either as a person or as some other kind and level of reality, depending upon the form of the action.

The third element is the modification of the subject's experi-

⁹ Moral respect may well have its beginning here, however; for, once a subject regards something as another individual pursuing values and goals, it may be possible for the knower to see those values and goals as taking precedence over its own.

ence of the world as a result of its having in action valued something as personal. The action is, of course, also an interaction with the world; it changes the ways in which the subject's activity is limited, supported, or otherwise affected by the world. The subject may recognize that such modifications are consequences of its having valued the world as it did and consequently as confirming or disconfirming the original valuation. **It** is such experience that makes possible the emendation of a subject's interpretation of the world.

The instance of the practical evaluative discrimination of self and others which is most accessible to philosophical analysis and description is the instance of life lived and shared by language. We can see that such life involves the three elements we have described. First, one must be respectfully receptive to others, open to *their* intended meaning. Second, one must respond to others' actions by actions expressing one's own meaning, intentions, and values. Third, one must note whether a response works to carry communication forward, noticing the effect of the response on ongoing experience. Thus, life with other persons is a life of attending to others' values, intentions, desires, and wills, of trying to know what they want, what they will do, and how they will do it, and of deciding when and how to oppose, cooperate, adjust, or simply go along with them. In communicating with others we evaluate them as making claims upon us to recognize their own intentions and values in appropriate ways. And responding to the claims of their intentions, we affirm their existence. A schematic description of how we learn to share the interpersonal life of language will clarify further this view of how we know that persons exist.

A child is born into a community. As an animal organism it has certain specialized organs for performing the same kind of discriminatory evaluations which other animals perform. But as a human it enters a world where there already are people living as people. The child encounters, then, other persons (it doesn't yet *know what* a person is, nor that it itself is one) affecting its life, persons who already value the child as having

a life of its own with needs and as yet unspecified goals and projects to develop. This valuation they express in actions which relate directly to the child and its needs. They feed or withhold food; they comfort or withhold comfort, change or do not change, praise or scold, play with or tend to. In doing all these things they also *talk* to the child. The talking usually begins almost immediately after birth. In talking they tell the child things about itself, its physical surroundings, their feelings about it, etc. Mostly they talk nonsense. But there is a purpose behind the nonsense. Knowing that the child will not understand determinate meanings, the talkers say anything just to make it aware that they are there and to get it to talk back—even if only in a gurgle. **I**t is an effort to break into the child's consciousness and be recognized as a person who values the child, has hopes and expectations for it, places demands upon it, is there to help and enjoy life with it. When the child begins to talk back, it is already beginning to know itself as a valuing knowing doer whose life is a sharing with other valuing knowing doers. This process of learning to talk is the process of being made a participant in a community of persons. We might say that we are talked into our personal individuality. And what is most important is that it is in this context that the child values parts of the world as having intentional, communicable expectations of him and as placing demands upon him to respond in kind. To have this experience is not to be a passive observer of external pressures. It is to regard them as expressing intentions and values other than one's own, such intentions and values as to make one kind of response appropriate rather than another. **I**t is to regard them as making a certain kind of claim upon one's responsive action, a claim to respond not just by avoiding or lying on or picking up, but rather by listening and talking back to, i.e. by being receptive to the other's intentions. **I**n listening and talking back the child is valuing the other differently than, say, its blanket, bottle, toys, and crib. **I**n the valuing lies the child's recognition that the other is a source of intentional actions which seek and merit some re-

sponse. To start to talk back, even in gurgles and cries, is to recognize the claims. And to recognize the claims is to recognize some real individual acting from within itself and having a life of its own whose actions are aimed at results which are goods for the acting individual. But not only does the child come through learning to talk to recognize other persons as other persons; it also comes to know that it itself is a person, the source, like the other, of its own action. So it is that in recognizing persons as existing in its world, the child is at the same time learning to know itself as a person and taking its place within a community of persons.

It is important to emphasize that the development of the idea goes with the development of the behavior. There is not first the idea of a person, then the interpersonal behavior. Rather, there is first the behavior in which our elders treat us already with respect, seeking to communicate with us, imputing to us values, intentions, goals-an inchoate, incipient personhood. Thus we are talked into listening to them and talking back. And with that behavior comes the idea; it grows up with the action. To have the idea is already to be practically involved in the action of interpersonal communication and understanding, to judge that here are real persons. With the development of language and the powers of memory and reflection, the idea can be separated from the action and so can acquire a sense of theoretical separation from practice. Indeed, when we begin to reflect upon our experience with people, then it is that the idea stands out from the action in which it has been involved. But in day to day doing, we are scarcely aware of having a concept of something; we are just aware of that with which we have to do and aware of it as involving certain kinds of problems and possibilities.

The question may well be asked., 'Why do some recurrent qualifications of our field of action get valued as persons while others do not?' There must be something in experience which, so to speak, encourages and sustains the attitude of respectful receptivity toward the world in general and perhaps especially

toward certain kinds of disturbances within it. And some experiences must by their very character provoke the response which values something as having its own intentions and values. The valuing cannot capriciously choose to posit value and accept claims just anywhere; there must be some reasons for the response. On the other hand, the reasons cannot amount to direct experiences of the other's values and intentions. Were that the case, knowing persons would be a matter of passive occurrence rather than evaluative response. The only answer must be that while agnosticism about personal being is always theoretically possible, there are some kinds of experience which lead toward the valuation, others which do not. We do not value in a vacuum, but in response to different kinds of qualifications of our field of action. There is no experience at all except in relation to an ongoing, valuing life. But, then, that doesn't mean that the knower manufactures experiences to go with its desires or imposes any value it chooses independently of the way its activities are qualified. Rather, the kind of external pressure the knower feels makes a certain range of valuational responses possible. Some modes of experience lead us to think that one response is appropriate, another response inappropriate.

Further, mistakes can be made-and discovered and corrected. The affirmation of a person is a practical matter; it involves entering into a certain form of action with the world. If the form of action is not sustained, if the other does not reciprocate with talk and action which conform in some way to the expectations which go with the valuation and affirmation, then the knower may well decide he was wrong. There is no person there after all.

IV

Affirming God's Existence

It is easy to see how affirming God's existence can be described in the same terms as the affirmation in practice of persons. We know persons through the evaluative discrimination

of values and intentions which are not our own. Through an attitude of respectful receptivity and practical actions exercised within an interpersonal setting, we interpret recurrent qualifications of our fields of operation as bearing values and intentions that are not ours. Thus we recognize the presence or affirm the existence of persons.

So also with God. God also must be known in relation to intentional activity and by the bearing his values and will have upon it. If we are to affirm God's existence, certain 'interferences' or 'qualifications' of our action must be interpreted as expressions of intentions and actions other than one's own. But in the case of God, the intentions and actions must be of a peculiar kind if they are to be interpreted as significant of a divine or suprapersonal agent. They must be seen as unconditional, that is, as involving values which we are not at liberty to deny or reject and such that the failure to give them absolute precedence is to jeopardize our own being and value. The recognition in action of such unconditional values is at least the beginning of the affirmation of God's existence. I say 'the beginning' because the interpretation may not take a fully theistic form. The affirmation of God's existence will be explicit when the unconditional values are interpreted as belonging to the will of a perfect or divine suprapersonal being. When so interpreted, the affirmation of God will consist in some degree of intentional participation in the practical life of faithful worship. The specific practices may vary widely, but will generally involve some form of interpersonal life with God.

Merely to assert an analogy between knowing persons and knowing God, however, leaves an important question unanswered. What recurrent qualifications of our human modes of operation do we interpret as expressing and bringing to bear upon us the unconditional values and intentions we take to be significant of God? In the case of affirming human individuals it is not too difficult to indicate specific ways in which the intentions and values of others are brought to bear upon us. We can mention, for example, care by parents or other adults. This

is a good example because it is, as we have seen, the experience in which we come to know that there are persons. We also could mention the way persons encounter each other in adult life, describing many different ways they make their claims upon each other felt. Unless we can do the same for God we cannot claim to show that the affirmation of God's existence conforms to the paradigm of affirming the existence of persons.

I think that the affirmation of God is indeed a response to experienced qualifications of human operation and shall now try to explain how.

I have proposed that cognition is an activity of evaluative discrimination. All experience is relative to an organism's active life of getting on in the world. This means that all encounters with reality will be in relation to the life activities of the knowing organism. Experience, therefore, is not simply sensory experience; it is evaluative discrimination. Organisms know the world primarily as limits and supports to their practical actions, not in relation to their sensory organs. The operation of the senses is mostly instrumental to the practical activities which aim at satisfying needs and desires. Thus, for example, a hungry animal will know the world in relation to its activity in search of food and therefore as edibles and inedibles. Colors, shapes, feels, smells, and tastes will not be the primary objects or contents of its experience but will instead be instrumental to its discrimination of food and non-food. The relevance of experience to practical action is important here because it allows us to understand how the experience of God occurs not in relation to sensory operations but in relation to certain very specialized operations that only human beings can perform.

As we have said, organisms of different kinds have different abilities to know reality because they have different ways of interacting with and so of exploring it and different aims in relation to which they experience its limits and supports. An amoeba's knowledge is limited by the relatively simple form of its interaction with the world; a cat will know more than an amoeba because it can act in more complicated ways and there-

fore experience the world's supports and limits more variously. And a human being will know more than a cat because it can operate still more variously, adding the specialized form of operation that is language. Insofar as all three of these kinds of life must eat, they will know the world in relation to the fixed bodily need for food. But the more complex the organism, the more different ways it can act; and the more different ways it can act, the more room there is for the development of aims which go beyond the satisfaction of fixed bodily needs. And the more different aims activity can have, the more different kinds of limits and supports to action a knowing subject can experience. The human interaction with the world through language involves us inevitably in activities which aim at something far beyond the satisfaction of fixed bodily needs. It is in relation to the peculiarly human way of living through language, and in relation to the peculiarly human aims that go with it, that we sense divine value and intentions and affirm the existence of God.¹⁰

I have discussed at length in other places¹¹ the ways language introduces certain problems into human life. Because these problems exist only because of language, and because language is the defining activity of human existence, we can say that the problems in question are the human problems. Suffice it here to explain some of these briefly.

Language enables us to think comprehensively. We can think

¹⁰ Elmer Sprague is right in *Metaphysical Thinking* to say that language is essential for such entities as persons, the world, and God. But instead of saying that "they are brought into being by someone's wielding these notions in discourse" (p. 4), I have given a view of the place of language in knowing according to which we can say that language makes it possible for us to become aware of or to experience entities that without language would go unknown. Jerry Gill, in his paper titled "Religious Experience as Mediated," read to the Society for Philosophy of Religion in March 1981, has made some interesting suggestions about how "intangible reality is experienced as *mediated in and through* tangible reality" His suggestions, based on the later writings of Wittgenstein, are another way of getting at the point I am trying to make.

¹¹ "Homo Symbolicus," *Man and World*, Vol. 4, (1971), No. 2, 131-150 and "The Problem of World," *Eros and Nihilism*, edited by Charles Bigger and David Cornay (Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt, 1976), 2-8.

the world as an embracing context for life, distinguishing the fundamental powers, entities, constituents, and events by reference to which we try to understand all sides of experience. And among the constituents of the world we recognize especially ourselves and other persons. We form ideas of the possibilities and limits that exist for us. Our own existence and non-existence becomes a problem for us. Our existence is not simply given and assured but is known to us as something to be sustained. When we eat, drink, sleep, and move in the world, it may not be simply to satisfy an organic need, but to satisfy the general aim to be, perhaps even to be unconditionally. Thus, because of human language we have being as an intention. The dark side of this is that language also gives us the knowledge that our being is limited, that at some time we will cease to live as we know living to be, that our being is not unconditionally secure.

Language also enables us to think of ourselves as enduring and whole individuals with our own peculiar identities. This being so, we conceive a value or worth which might belong to ourselves as selves and not just to one of the many particular functions of the body or to separate projects and activities. Consequently, we not only act in order to secure being but also to attain a value of the whole, a value or worth of oneself by reference to which one can say, 'My life is worthwhile' or 'My existence means something.' The action which aims at attaining a secure value and meaning, in fact, is most of the time a preoccupation of human beings. It pervades all our everyday activities, even though we may not always be aware that it does. Only when life seems clearly threatened does the aim simply to be become more our concern-and even then the concern for life's worth can outweigh the concern for its mere continuation.

Concern for moral rectitude is often a large part of the human action which seeks to acquire personal worth. For if we recognize others as, like ourselves, having intrinsic worth, then we shall also recognize their claims to be treated by us so as at

least not to make that worth less likely to be realized. In the context of the felt claims of others upon us, therefore, we experience our failures toward them as a participation in destruction and know our own value as thereby diminished. And so our activity of living aims at making us morally good against the fear of moral condemnation. So strong a part of our activity is this that we invent elaborate ways of convincing ourselves that we are good and of hiding from ourselves the ways we are not.

It would no doubt be possible to distinguish other characteristically human problems, actions, and aims made possible by our specialized linguistic mode of operation in the world, but the ones already mentioned are most important for our present purposes. These themes have been made so familiar by such thinkers as Tillich, Ricoeur, Gilkey, and Berger that no further discussion should be necessary.

My thesis is that it is in relation to the pursuit of the ultimate human values of being, worth, and goodness that we feel the bearing upon us of the unconditional will and values of a perfect God, making an unconditional claim upon us to respond in worship and faithful obedience. How does this come about?

In the first place, the human values of being, worth, and goodness are exceedingly indeterminate. They do not by themselves specify the precise modes of action which will realize them. The more the person desires their fulfillment, the more he or she must be on the lookout for whatever might by being recognized allow a response that would lead to their fulfillment. Thus, the human mode of being involves a special kind of lookout activity and respectful receptivity: a lookout for and receptivity toward just those modes of life and being through which being, worth, and goodness may be possible.

In the second place, the human experience of limitations, confusion, and impotence, especially in relation to the aspiration for human values, leads to the sense of God as a being whose values and will pertain precisely to our concern for being, worth, and goodness. We are not sure what will secure life and are

repeatedly reminded by death and sickness that we lack control over it. Nor do we know what person to be, or whether the one we become will in truth have value. We try; we falter; we fail; we try again. And the others around us do the same. Almost from the beginning of life we know that our being, worth, and goodness are tenuous and beyond our control. With increasing age comes the clearer recognition that these limits are inescapable. We may learn to live with them more or less well; they will not go away. But since our basic knowledge of the world involves the recognition and idea of persons, the experience of the limitations from the beginning carries as a corollary the sense of a personal individual (or individuals) *not* subject to the limitations which beset human life and make it so problematical.¹² The idea of such a person is the idea of God. So it is that the idea of God exists only as an evaluative interpretation of the experience of the inescapably finite pursuit of human being, worth, and goodness.

Monotheism conceives the divine person as transcending the limits of human existence in an absolute way. The divine supra-personal individual is God, the perfect individual. In having the sense of finitude in relation to the ultimate human values, human individuals have the sense of God as the individual whose being, worth, and goodness transcend the limits of human life and exist in perfect power, effectiveness, and security. The being of God depends upon nothing but God himself; it cannot fail. And the worth and goodness of God are absolute.

To have the idea of God, then, is to have the idea of intentions and values which take absolute precedence over all other intentions and values. For this reason, to have the idea of God is to feel an unconditional claim upon one's life. **It** is to sense that subordination of one's own values and actions to God's would be to have one's life formed by those very values which can confer the being, worth, and goodness for which one longs.

¹²Descartes's *Third Meditation* already stated this view. In having the idea of ourselves as imperfect, we already have thereby the idea of God as perfect. The ideas are corollaries; we cannot have one without having the other.

It is also to sense that rejecting God's values and intentions would be to put oneself at odds with the only thing that could fulfill one's own most fundamental aims and would therefore be to risk complete loss.

It is reasonable to say that such an evaluative interpretation of human experience involves an ongoing experience of an independently existing God, just as it is reasonable to say that the recognition of other persons in the daily activities of life is experiencing independently existing persons. We feel God's active suprapersonal presence as a pressure qualifying the activities of being human. We feel his presence in relation to the lookout activity of persons seeking ultimate being, worth, and goodness and who are, therefore, on the lookout for that which is relevant to just such desires. We articulate that presence as the divine will imposing an unconditional demand upon human action, such that it is only in relation to such a will that being, worth, and goodness can be realized.

To enter into a life of worship and obedience is to move beyond the valuing attitude of respectful receptivity into the valuing act of worshipful obedience. Because the same elements of evaluative interpretation are involved in recognizing God as in recognizing persons, we may say that the affirmation of God's existence is not a leap beyond reason but a special expression of the very kind of evaluative discrimination that is the necessary heart of our most rational and inescapable affirmations of existence.

But we must be careful here, as in the case of understanding our recognition of human persons, not to suppose that first we have an idea of God, then of his unconditional claims, and then the decision to affirm his existence by taking up the life of faith. As we are engaged in interpersonal life with persons before we explicitly know them as persons, so with God. For if theism is true, then God's action and will are everywhere present. They go before us and are there before we know them. Our action in pursuit of the ultimate human goals, then, will already be an interaction with God before it becomes explicitly so.

And just as with knowing persons we have other persons already there leading, instructing, and giving specific shape to our interpersonal life and our concept of persons, so with the knowledge of God. We find ourselves already in a community of people who live, more or less well, within the faithful form of life. They teach and tell and cultivate in us the sense of the suprapersonal God whose values and intentions must be accepted as unconditional claims on life. And even before the conceptual grasp of the theistic idea takes shape, they lead us in the practices of the life of faith. They take us to church, teach us to pray, tell us of the high will of God for his creatures, and encourage us to respond actively in faith and obedience. In short, they incorporate us into the behavior of life lived in relation to God. As with persons, there is first the behavior, first the personal form of interaction with God, then the *explicit* idea and affirmation in consciously directed practice of God's existence.

Verifiability and Falsifiability

The account we have given of knowing persons raises the questions of verifiability and falsifiability. For we said that the experience which results from the act of valuing another as a person will confirm or negate or in some way modify the judgment and action. In a particular case of affirming a person, the affirmation will be verified if the experience which results is a proceeding forward of interpersonal life, falsified if not. If the logic of affirming God is an extension of the logic of affirming persons, then it should be possible to say what experience would confirm and what negate the affirmation of God. Or do the criteria of verifiability and falsifiability show that the logic of affirming persons breaks when stretched to cover the divine person?

The most common defense of theism against the criteria of verifiability cum falsifiability has been to take up a form of conceptualism or contextualism according to which 'God' is not an object of experience or a thing in the world but rather a

fundamental idea in a form of life or language game. That being so, the criteria of verifiability and falsifiability do not apply to God. But because I have argued that the affirmation of God's existence follows the same logic as the affirmation of people, I have accepted the applicability of the criteria and must now show how and to what extent the affirmation of God satisfies them.

In the case of God, the confirming or denying experience cannot consist in the occurrence of precisely predelineated events. For God is unique; he makes an *unconditional* claim upon our devotion. To ask him to prove his existence through the production of happy effects would be to subvert the affirmation; it would be a subordination of God's will to ours rather than of ours to God's. In religious terms it would be to put God to the test. This does not mean, however, that there is no experience which counts toward confirming the affirmation of God's existence. The affirmation of God, if genuine, is a practical affirmation which runs out into the activity of integrating one's own will, values, and actions with God's. Though we cannot say that certain specific events will follow if God exists or not follow if God does not exist, we can still speak intelligibly of the experience or "enjoyment of life-in-God."¹³ The valuing act of affirming people makes us more or less effective participants in a peculiarly human form of life, ongoing life with people as friends, enemies, family, co-workers, etc. The experience of involvement in interpersonal life verifies the affirmations. But those affirmations which do not sustain interpersonal life are falsified. Similarly, the valuing act of affirming God is an effort to enter into the special form of life that is union with God.¹⁴ The experience of belonging to such a life and of finding that the experience blesses, verifies the affirmation of God. On the other hand, to find that the affirmation followed out in ac-

¹³ Austin Farrer, *Faith and Speculation*, p. 129.

¹⁴ There are, of course, many different forms of life-in-God, provided through different stories, traditions, and institutions. But, as we noted earlier, all have in common the form of interpersonal relation.

tion did not sustain the life-in-God and did not bless would be to falsify the affirmation of God. Thus, it is possible in principle to say what counts for and against the affirmation of God.

However, the criterion of falsifiability, applied to the affirmation of God's existence, stretches the logic of knowing persons to its thinnest point. Believers in God do not ordinarily and should not ever admit that anyone could accumulate enough experience in this life to justify the final conclusion that God's existence has been falsified. Not even an unanswered Job could rightly have cursed God and died, rationally secure in thinking that his prolonged affirmation of God had at last been shown false.

The theist's refusal to recognize any conclusive falsification of God is not necessarily an a priori denial of the relevance of experience or a decision in advance to affirm God in spite of evidence to the contrary. It is rather due to the meaning of 'God' and the kind of pressure felt in the human pursuit of being, worth, and goodness. The individual, God, is unique; consequently, the kind of being he is calls for a unique commitment in the valuing act that affirms his existence. God makes so absolute a demand upon our action that the proper response is unconditionally to unite one's will with his. Not that believers have succeeded in doing so but that one cannot rightly claim to have found the evidence falsifying until he has made an unconditional response-and that requires one's whole life. If someone claims to have affirmed God and yet not to have become thereby a participant in an enhanced life-in-God, then the theist is justified in saying that the affirmation has been conditional or half-hearted. For the affirmation of God admits of degrees. The better one understands that God's demand is absolute, the more one's affirmation will take the shape of a struggle against weakness of will and understanding and a seeking of divine help. The absence of ecstatic experience, of happy turns of events, and of the fulfillment of one's specific hopes will not be decisive. The believer will not, if he is strong, conclude against God because life is hard. Austin Farrer says it well:

For sometimes the will of God which his servants must embrace is not aimed at their present or personal advantage; it pursues a more distant creative purpose. The individual's service may be a martyrdom, with no fruits in this world but agony and personal destruction. So Christ was crucified.¹⁵

Yet Christ also found his life-in-God to be one of joy and peace. Therefore, if one does not find that in spite of difficulties life-in-God blesses, the logic of affirming God throws him back upon himself to see where he has withheld himself from absolute commitment.

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¹⁵ Austin Farrer, *A Science of God?* (London, 1966), p. 111.

NECESSARY TRUTH, THE GAME ANALOGY,
AND THE MEANING-IS-USE THESIS

JOHN PETERSON HAS recently suggested ¹ that necessary truths might after all pertain to the ways things really are.

Henry Veatch has argued ² most persuasively for this same thesis, and there have recently been philosophers ³ within the analytic tradition who have maintained this thesis too. There have been signs that analytic philosophy might be awakening from its Kantian slumber. Yet, there are many issues ⁴ to be considered if this realist thesis is to have a chance for acceptance. By way of advancing this view I would like to consider one of the primary theories of necessary truth that has been held in recent times by analytic philosophers. This theory does not attempt to explain the nature of necessary truth by reference to some internal feature of the sentence, viz., the meaning of words, the syntactical structure, or self-contradictory denials. Rather, this theory appeals to rules regarding the use of whole sentences. Rules of language dictate what we must and must not say, and these rules constitute the ground or explanation of necessary truth. For example, the principle of non-contradic-

¹ "Analytic Philosophy Reexamined," *The Thomist* 44 (April, 1980).

² *Two Logics* (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1969).

³ Panayot Butchvarov, *The Concept of Knowledge* (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1970) and *Being Qua Being* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1979); Milton Fisk, *Nature and Necessity* (Bloomington, Indiana: University Press, 1978) and Saul Kripke, "Naming and Necessity," in *Semantics of Natural Languages*, eds. Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1972).

⁴ Not the least of which is the question of whether logical relations are different from so-called real relations. See Veatch, *Intentional Logic* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952); also, Robert W. Schmidt, S.J., *The Domain of Logic According to Saint Thomas Aquinas* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966).

tion is accounted for by saying that it is a rule of language that one does not contradict oneself. This rule is neither justified by reference to some feature of the sentence nor by an appeal to the way things are. Rather, it is just a rule of language.

It might be objected that this approach accomplishes nothing because it can still be asked why these rules are adopted. The mere fact that there is a linguistic rule "Don't contradict yourself" does not in and of itself show that such a rule is ultimately linguistic in character with no concern for the way things are. (In other words, it does not show that the source of the necessity exhibited in the principle of non-contradiction, to continue the example, is a result of linguistic convention.) Further, it does not illuminate the nature of necessary truth very much if every time one confronts a necessary truth, one postulates a rule of language as the explanation. If this were really to constitute an explanation, it would seem that these rules should be verifiable independently of the necessary truths they purport to explain, but what would it be like to discover the adoption of such a rule? Are they found in grammar books or dictionaries?

These objections to the appeal to linguistic rules as the source of necessary truth may seem quite effective. They are so, however, only within the confines of a certain view of language—a view challenged by Wittgenstein. Is it the case that words ultimately obtain their meaning through their reference to something, some extra-linguistic object? Or, is it the case that the meanings of words is their use? Putting it more directly for our concern, is it the case that the rules of language require some explanation, some appeal to "objective fact," or is it the case that language is more like a game than anything else and thus its rules do not require further grounding? If the latter is true, then the objections raised against the appeal to linguistic rules as the source of necessary truth are without foundation. In this essay I will consider the claim that language is more like a game than anything else, and after suggesting why this account fails, I will consider a view of meaning which helps make

the game analogy plausible—namely, the meaning-is-use thesis⁵—and show it to be an inadequate account of meaning.

The Game Analogy

To begin, it is important that we grasp the methodology that Wittgenstein employs when considering the nature of language. The point Wittgenstein seems to have been making is that there is a powerful and illuminating analogy between language and games like poker and chess. There are such important similarities between language and games that our understanding is greatly advanced by our thinking of language in such terms. Wittgenstein states that

our ordinary language, which of all possible notations is the one which pervades all our life, holds our mind rigidly in one position, as it were, and in this position sometimes it feels cramped having a desire for other positions as well. Thus, we sometimes wish for a notation which stresses a difference more strongly, or one in which in a particular case uses more closely similar forms of expression than our ordinary language.⁶

Thinking of language in terms of games like poker and chess is a particular case where more closely similar forms of expression are used than would have ordinarily been used. Thinking of language in this way helps us better to understand what language is. This method of noting similarities and differences provides such insight. Questions like this seem to require clarification and understanding more than the discovery of new information for their solution, and this is why such a method is invoked, for it searches for significant similarities between the subject matter in question and something we already under-

⁵ I make no claim to be presenting the actual views of Wittgenstein, for interpreting him is a most difficult matter, but certainly the views presented here have their inspiration from his work and are plausible interpretations of his position. Also, it should be clear that I am not in any way presenting a complete account of the nature of language or meaning. See Mortimer Adler's *Some Questions About Language* (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1976) for an overall approach to these issues. Also, see John A. Oesterle's "Another Approach to the Problem of Meaning," *The Thomist* 7 (April, 1944).

⁶ *The Blue and Brown Books* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960), p. 59.

stand. Indeed, Gilson states that "to understand something is for us to conceive it as identical in nature with something else we already know."⁷ So there is nothing unusual about this approach, and it is quite legitimate, for it attempts to relate through similarities something we do not fully understand (language) to something we have a greater understanding of (games like poker and chess). Thus, this is a procedure that cannot be dismissed as *only* analogy, as if it were second best.⁸

According to this approach, language is more like a game than anything else. It is a self-sufficient human activity whose specific features need have no connection to the world. Language is neither a preformulated picture of the world nor just a tool for the expression of thought. **It** is like a game in being purely conventional—its fundamental rules require no justification. These rules, however, do give us instructions on how we are to proceed linguistically. Just as certain moves in a game are required, forbidden or left open, so too in language. We have necessary truth, necessary falsehood, or contingent truth or falsehood. There is an analogy between these truths and the moves in a game that are required, forbidden, and allowed but not required. For example, just as in poker one may not raise one's own bet, so in language one may not contradict oneself. **If** one is to play poker, one must abide by this rule, and if one is to use language, one must abide by this no self-contradiction rule. No explanation of the latter is required than is of the former. Thus, to ask what grounds or justifies the rules of language is an improper question, for such a question supposes that language is *not* more like a game than anything else.

It must be realized that if this analogy is upheld, then a successful linguistic theory of necessary truth has been found, or, at least, one for which I have no objection. But is this

⁷ *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952), p. 6.

⁸ See Panayot Butchvarov's most persuasive defense of the method of analogy, "The Limits of Ontological Analysis," in *The Ontological Turn: Studies in the Philosophy of Gustav Bergmann*, eds. M. S. Gram and E. D. Klemke (Iowa City, Iowa: University of Iowa Press, 1974), pp. 8-87.

analogy successful? Is it true that language is more like a game than anything else? Granting the arguments advanced for considering language to be like a game, let us consider if it is *more like* a game than anything else. In other words, we must grant that there is indeed an analogy between language and games such as poker or chess, but are there other analogies that are even closer but which do not support the account of necessary truth proposed by the game analogy? This is the crucial question, for if there are other rule-determined activities which language is more like than games such as poker or chess, and if these rules are subject to appraisal, then the game analogy is defeated by its own method. There would be a rule-determined activity which language is more like than anything else, but whose rules require evaluation.

There are many rule-determined activities whose rules are subject to appraisal as legitimate or illegitimate by appeal to facts external to the activity.

For instance, there are rules of fire-fighting, drilling for oil, constitutional reform, artificial respiration, successful teaching, and open-heart surgery. There are moves in these activities that are forbidden by the rules, moves that are required, and moves that are neither forbidden nor required. But the crucial fact about the rules of such activities is that, typically, they are not arbitrary conventions. Their legitimacy is subject to appraisal, and we appraise it by appeal to objective facts about fires, political institutions, respiration, education, and hearts.⁹

Could language be more like these rule-determined activities than the games of poker or chess? The activities of chess, language, and firefighting are quite similar in many respects. Not only is the correctness or incorrectness of an action in these activities a function of an appropriate rule; it is also a function of the circumstances or context in which the action takes place. For a certain move by a chess piece to occur not only must there be a rule allowing the move, but the other pieces must be in certain positions, e.g., a pawn can move forward one space

⁹ Butchvarov, *The Concept of Knowledge*, pp. 133-134.

(a rule), but it can only do so if the space is unoccupied (a context). For the statement 'Socrates is sitting' to be correctly made not only must there be a *rule* regarding the applicability of the word 'sitting' to an entity such as Socrates, but also Socrates must exist and must indeed be sitting-the *context*. Finally, for the use of a certain chemical on a fire, there must not only be a rule which calls for that particular chemical to be used on that sort of fire, but also the fire in question must be of that certain sort and what one uses must indeed be that very chemical, etc.¹⁰ As said, all three of these rule-determined activities are similar.

Yet, there is an important difference between chess and both language and fire-fighting. The context in which the moves take place in chess is itself determined by the rules of chess.

The chessboard, the number and kinds of pieces, their arrangement, and the stage at which the game is at any given moment, are determined by the other conventional rules of chess. This is the point of saying that chess is a self-sufficient, autonomous, purely conventional activity.¹¹

This, however, is not the case in language. The context in which a typical statement is made is not determined by the rules of language; it is not itself a result of linguistic convention. The context of 'Socrates is sitting' is not a result of linguistic convention-that Socrates exists and that he is sitting are in no sense determined by the rules of language. (It might be asked if Socrates's sitting does not depend on his decision to sit, and, of course, this is true, for some *facts* do depend on human decision. Yet, this admission does not change the basic point-namely, the context for linguistic moves (statements) is not itself the result of the rules of language. Also, consider the context for the statement 'That book is blue'. Is it a convention or the result of one? Definitely not.) This is so just as fires, chemicals, and their whole host of properties are in no sense conventions or the results of conventions.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 134.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

And this is the point of saying that language is about the world, in a sense that chess is not about the world, and that the correctness of a statement is in part a function of the nature of the world, in a sense which no move in chess is so.¹²

Indeed, the fundamental difference between the purposes for which we play chess and the purposes for which we talk is that we take the context for granted in chess and are not concerned about it, while in language we are generally concerned with the context and do not take it for granted.

In the case of language, it is the context, the situation in the world, in which we make the statement that we are usually interested in. It is simply false that language has the autonomy, self-sufficiency, and complete conventionality of a game such as chess. Language is far more like fire-fighting, whose rules generally are required by facts about the world, than it is like chess, whose rules are mere conventions.¹³

Though language is a rule-governed activity and does share similarities with games such as chess, the context or circumstances in which its "moves" take place are not a result of the linguistic rules themselves. Thus, language seems to bear a closer analogy to the activity of fire-fighting than the activity of playing chess. And since the rules of fire-fighting are dictated in part by the facts of the world and thus subject to assessment by reference to them, so is it the case in regard to language's rules. The linguistic rule "Don't contradict yourself" can be asked to establish its legitimacy, can be asked to establish the basis for its force, and thus such a rule cannot be the explanation or ground for the necessary truth of the principle of non-contradiction.

The claim that language is *more* like a game than anything else does not stand the test of its own method of analogy and for this reason does not provide a basis for the proposal that linguistic rules are the source of the necessity in logical principles such as the principle of non-contradiction. It does, how-

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Tbid.*

ever, behoove us to consider how it ever came to be considered plausible to explain language's functions in terms of a game analogy. We cannot, of course, consider all that is involved in this conception of language or much less even begin fully to explain what we take the nature of language to be, but some comments on this topic seem required, for the belief that language can be understood in terms of games and games' rules is a very powerful model.

Meaning-is-use Thesis

We take Wittgenstein's discussion of "What is the meaning of a word?" in *The Blue Book* to be a pivotal starting point, for this discussion is a rejection of the legitimacy of this question. The basic message is that linguistic object X does not obtain a meaning by its reference to extra-linguistic object Y, for all such accounts of meaning already presuppose what they purport to explain. They already presuppose that we understand what X, be it a word, picture, or diagram, means or signifies. Thus, all such explanations fail, and we should cease proposing theories of meaning as to how words become meaningful. We should instead look to how the terms are used. When we do this we learn, as William P. Alston has stated, that "there is nothing apart from the rules of language that brings it about that, [for example], 'oculist' denotes eye doctors."¹⁴ Abstract questions such as "What is the meaning of a word?" only cause a mental cramp and suppose that we can step outside the rules of language in order to explain it. Yet we cannot and unless we realize that language's rules are self-sufficient (i.e., language is more like a game than anything else) we can never find an end to these questions. But explanations come to an end somewhere, and the "somewhere" is language itself. Thus, the meaning of a word is its use, not some extra-linguistic object—be it material or mental—but the entire system of signs (words, pictures, diagrams) to which the sign belongs. Indeed, Wittgenstein contends that

¹⁴ *The Philosophy of Language* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964). p. 54.

studying the grammar of the expression " explanation of meaning" will teach you something about the word" meaning", and will *cure* you of the temptation to look about you for *some object* which you might call "the meaning"¹⁵

We must, however, examine this more closely: Why is it that all attempts to explain the meaning of linguistic object X in terms of extra-linguistic object Y already presuppose that X has its meaning? First of all, consider the case of ostensive definition. Wittgenstein uses the example of someone pointing at a pencil and saying this is called a 'tove'. What does this ostensive definition mean? "The definition can be interpreted to mean:

" This is a pencil ",
 " This is round",
 " This is wood ",
 " This is one ",
 "This is hard", etc. etc."¹⁶

The possible interpretations of the pointing are too numerous to mention further, and unless we already know what the ostensive definition means, we would have no idea of how to interpret the pointing and the statement" this is called a tove." Second of all, consider the case where some thought, idea, or mental image is supposed to be what a statement means. Wittgenstein states:

If I give someone the order " fetch me a red flower from the meadow ", how is he to know what sort of flower to bring, as I have only given him a *word*?

Now the answer one might suggest first is that he went to look for a red flower carrying a red image in his mind, and comparing it with the flowers to see which of them had the colour of the image. Now there is such a way of searching, and it is not at all essential that the image we should use be a mental one. In fact the process may be this: I carry a chart co-ordinating names and coloured squares. When I hear " fetch me etc." I draw my finger across the chart from the word "red" to a certain square, and I go and look

¹⁵ *The Blue and Brown Books*, p. 1.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, P.

for a flower which has the same colour as the square. But this is not the only way of searching and it isn't the usual way. We go, look about us, walk up to a flower and pick it, *without comparing it to anything* . . .

If the meaning of the sign (roughly, that which is of importance about the sign) is an image built up in our minds when we see or hear the sign, then first let us adopt the method we just described of replacing this mental image by some outward object seen, e.g., a painted or modelled image. Then why should the written sign plus this painted image be alive [meaningful] if the written sign alone was dead?-In fact, as soon as you think of replacing the mental image by say, a painted one, and as soon as the image loses its occult character, it ceases to seem to impart any life to the sentences at all. (It was in fact just the occult character of the mental process which you needed for your purposes.)¹⁷

Nothing is explained regarding X's meaning by the appeal to mental images. In fact, talk of thought as the factor that endows mere notation with significance (makes marks or sounds words) is sheer mentalese. The illusion of explanation is given, but nothing more. The problems of correlating linguistic object X with mental objects are no different than the problems of associating it with material objects. In both cases X's ability to refer to some extra-linguistic object is already assumed, but this ability was supposed to be the very thing explained.

More generally, the complaint Wittgenstein seems to be offering against all theories of meaning that attempt to explain linguistic object X's meaning in terms of some extra-linguistic object Y is that of circularity-that is, they cannot explain the correlation or association X has with whatever it is that enables X to refer to Y. Whatever it is that relates X to Y is an extra-linguistic object too, that is, a 'Y', but this is the relation that must be explained! Thus such "explanations" cannot get off the ground.

Wittgenstein's solution to the difficulty is to "dissolve" it-show that the attempt to explain how mere notation gains sig-

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 8, 5.

nificance is an error. X's ability to have significance, be alive, is not accomplished through its reference to some extra-linguistic object. It is alive because it is part of a language game. Strictly speaking, it is wrong to consider X as mere notation and then ask how did it become a word. This supposes that learning the meaning of a word is like learning a foreign language—that is, one is faced with mere marks or sounds that have to be given meaning. This cannot be true in all cases, or otherwise language could never get off the ground. As already said, explanations come to an end somewhere, and the "somewhere" is language itself.

The trouble, however, with leaving the question "What is the meaning of a word?" "dissolved," i.e., understood only in terms of linguistic rules, is that this too fails to provide insight into what we are looking for when we ask such a question.

If we ask, "what does sentence 'S' mean?" we are told, in effect: "The question is inappropriate; the proper question is, rather, 'How does the sentence 'S' mean?' And the answer is that it means by virtue of certain 'linguistic conventions governing its correct use.'" This response seems to have somehow missed the point of our question. It is, as it were, on a different level of our question. The difficulty, clearly, is that whereas we are asking, or trying to ask, "What fact or state of affairs does the sentence 'S' assert?" we were interpreted as asking, "What is it in virtue of which the sentence can be employed to make assertions of a certain type?" How, then, can we ask what we are trying to ask, namely, to what state of affairs does this set of words (whether it be called "sentence," "statement," "proposition," or whatever) refer? When I ask, for example, "What is meant by the sentence, 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon'?" I normally wish to know the precise state of affairs, if any, the group of words asserts. And if it is answered that meaning *must* be given in terms of linguistic rules and conventions and not in terms of extra-linguistic fact, then I can only attempt to rephrase my question until I have a hit a locution that will satisfactorily convey what I wish to ask;

What this shows, I think, is that the use-theory does not satisfactorily accommodate the semantical use of "mean." ¹⁸

¹⁸ R. J. Clack, *Bertrand Russell's Philosophy of Language* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), pp. 86-87.

Of course, it can still be replied that this complaint assumes that X is meaningful only because of some extra-linguistic object Y, and this very assumption is not granted. This time, however, a problem appears that was not evident before—namely, that the denial of any reference to Y by X is tantamount to the denial of meaning to X.

What is essential to realize, however, is that in order to have any linguistic function at all, expressions and sentences must have a *referential* use, i.e., it must be possible to state *what* it is that they refer to. *Whatever* the purpose of our language may be, whether it be to inform, command, amuse, or anything else, we are unable to accomplish this purpose unless the expression in our statements, commands, jokes, etc. have a referring use which the other uses presuppose. No matter how many different uses a given locution may have, it says nothing unless the ... expressions which go to make it up have a referring use. This, I take it, becomes evident once it is pointed out; and it shows, I think, that we cannot treat language as though it were *simply* a tool, *simply* an instrument for accomplishing certain linguistic tasks.¹⁹

In other words, X must be a sign if it is to be a word. It must, so to speak, point to something. If there is not, at least, this minimal signifiatory function, then we do not have a *linguistic* object.²⁰ Certainly, we cannot accept the position that X is not a sign. Surely, we must grant that this means there is a sign and its significant and, hence, the relation between them. Once this is granted, however, a very interesting difficulty appears for the claim that it is *only* linguistic rules that are responsible for the fact that, for example, 'oculist' denotes eye doctors.

To say that it is a convention of language that whenever one wants to refer to Y, one uses X or some synonym thereof is to say what is the most efficient, commonly accepted, way to direct the attention of the users of the language to Y. The conventions

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

²⁰ If it is still demanded that X need not signify, refer, mean, intend, or direct our attention toward something other than itself, then it can be replied that the meaning-is-use approach has not "dissolved" the question of a word's meaning but rather destroyed it! In fact, there could literally be no such things as words if they were not considered signs in this minimal sense.

or rules of the language tell one *when or under what circumstances* X can be used to refer to Y. This does not, however, tell one *why* it is possible for X to be used to refer to Y. This question is not answered by appealing to the language's rules. In fact, such rules already presuppose that this possibility has been realized, for they appeal to the tradition and history of the language community's use of X to refer to Y. Thus,

to assert that X can refer to Y because the rules of the language of which X is a part enable (i.e., direct or 'require') a speaker to use X to mention Y is a disguised tautology.... Far from answering our question, it merely restates in another form the very fact we want explained.²¹

In other words, the appeal to language's rules fails to answer the basic question of any philosophy of language—namely, how it is that words can direct our attention to things besides themselves, or, even more basically stated, how is it that there are words? (How is it that a mark or sound is transformed from a natural to a linguistic event?)

Again it must be said that this is a philosophical, not an historical or a psychological, problem; it is not concerned with what is meant by a particular word in a particular language at a particular time, or as used by this individual or that one at one time or another.²²

This, of course, is just the type of question that Wittgenstein sought to dismiss or "dissolve," but if it is granted that X is a sign, then it is quite legitimate to ask how it became a sign. Not every natural event is a sign, so how is it that some become signs? Not every mark or sound signifies something; how is it that some do? To say that they just do (i.e., *we* use X to refer to Y) does not answer the question. This question asks: What are the conditions for the possibility of their being words? **It** is the kind of basic question philosophy can and should ask.

To deny the legitimacy of this question is to suppose that meaning occurs by spontaneous generation: that without the operation of

²¹ John N. Deely, "The Use of Words to Mention," *The New Scholasticism* 51 (Autumn, 1977): 548.

²² Adler, *Some Questions About Language*, p. 14.

any assignable causes or without the intervention of any extrinsic factors, the physical sound or mark suddenly becomes a word. What at one moment is a meaningless notation becomes at the next a meaningful notation—a word or part of speech—without sufficient reason for the change. If this occurred, the genesis of meaning would be as mysterious and inexplicable as the genesis of life according to the theories that affirm the spontaneous generation of living from nonliving matter.²³

The appeal to linguistic rules to explain how it is that X can refer to Y just does not achieve the fundamentality required by the question. This is a most serious flaw in this approach to the philosophy of language.

Yet, if such an approach to the philosophy of language is so seriously flawed, why was the game analogy so powerful? There are no doubt many reasons, but I believe I know a central one. This can be best answered if we will but consider a little further the question: Why can X refer to Y? One way of characterizing the position faced by a philosophy of language in answering this most fundamental question is as follows:

When X is used to mention Y, it acquires a property that it does not have when it is used otherwise, namely the property of referring or directing our attention to Y. This is clear from the fact that by various means or under other circumstances we could use X to mention things other than Y—if need be, by stipulating changes in the rules of language.

Let us call this property that X acquires, R. When X is used by me to refer to Y, it acquires the property R relating it to Y, a property X can lose or change.

Since X does not have this property R stably and on its own, it must get it—whenever and to what extent it exhibits it—from something else, say T. The same reasoning applies now in turn to T: either T generates the property R stably and on its own, or it acquires R from something else, say U. But U either generates the property R on its own, or . . . , and so on, in an infinite regress.

Hence we must either at some point stop and admit that there is an entity (or some aspect of an entity) that cannot be without giving rise to R, or we must deny that the exhibition of R by X is any way explicable.²⁴

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

²⁴ Deely, "The Use of Words to Mention," p. 549.

It was the latter alternative that the game analogy adopted, because it was supposed that the necessity of answering why X can refer to Y could be avoided. A central reason for that tactic was the belief that thought (T) could not offer an explanation as to how words referred, meant, signified, or mentioned extra-linguistic objects. The supposition that a word would acquire the property R through its association with T failed to suffice, for as Wittgenstein asked: How is the relation between the word and the thought to be established? This relation needs to be explained as much as any other. So, if thought failed to explain X's significance, then indeed maybe the question was illegitimate and language itself was self-sufficient. Yet there was a crucial assumption in the argument Wittgenstein used. He assumed that to know thought (T) was no different than knowing any other extra-linguistic object; but need this be the case? Need it be the case that my thought of a red flower is known just the same way as I know the picture of a red flower on some chart?

There is, of course, an entire tradition in philosophy that opposes the belief that thought is known in the same way as, for example, items of the external world. The Aristotelian/Thomistic tradition considers thought to be intentional in nature and thus not something directly knowable. One does not know one's thought and then (somehow) infer the world (à la Descartes or Locke), but rather one knows the items of the world and from this awareness infers the existence of thought, not as something that can be known for itself but as something which can be known only through its reference to something else. As John N. Deely states:

The original and classical argument for intentionality as an ontological property distinctive of the mental . . . was that there are things in the world, notably (but not exclusively) words and sentences, which can be made and used to refer to things (be they physical or not is irrelevant to the argument) other than themselves. But things which acquire the property R of referring are inexplicable unless there are beings which have this property R by nature, in association with which linguistic or other signs take on

or borrow the property R. This is clear from a *reductio ad absurdum*: failure to postulate beings (not necessarily substances, of course) which do not acquire the property R but have it by nature leads to an infinite regress. Given therefore that there must be such beings whose very nature and function it is to refer, it is clear that none of the physical things we encounter perceptually exhibit such a property. Hence these peculiar entities must be located within the living thing; and within the living thing, only the instruments of cognition produced by the mind itself . . . fit the experiential requirements of the postulated entity.²⁵

Indeed, if we will but reflect on our own cognition of things, we will find that our thoughts or ideas are always *Of* something.^c If someone asks you to describe your idea of a triangle, and you reply "a three-sided, enclosed, plane figure," and the person responds "No, tell me about your *idea* of a triangle!", then you should not know what to say nor could you, for the very being of the idea is what it is *Of*.

Yet, if T is not something that can be known without generating a reference to, let us say, Y (viz., T has R in virtue of its own nature), then the questions regarding X's relation to Y cannot be extended to T, for T is not known in the same manner as Y. Y is something in itself and can be known without any reference to anything else, while T is essentially nothing in itself *save* its reference to Y, and so cannot be known otherwise than as presenting something beside itself, something which it itself is not. Strictly speaking, then, there can be no such thing as a relationship between X and T, because T, *just as such* (just as it is a relational being), is nothing but the relation between X and Y, and as such cannot be something which stands in relation to something else.²⁶ In other words, T is a relational

²⁵ Deely, "The Ontological Status of Intentionality," *The New Scholasticism* 46 (Spring, 1972): 229-230.

²⁶ This is not to say, however, that we cannot upon reflection speak of T as an entity and how it operates. This is presumably-just what happens in logic. Rather, it is only to underscore that T is a relational being and as such is not something which needs to be related, but is rather something which relates. This is what I also take to be the central point of Veatch's contention that logic's tools--concepts, propositions and arguments-are intentional in character.

being, a *relativum secundum esse*-that is to say, not merely a being whose nature is explained by reference to something else, but a being whose nature *is* a reference, a respect, an ordination to something else. T has a nature, but its nature is unique in being relational. This is why it is impossible for T to be known without knowing what it is of. Unless we want to make a relation something capable of independent existence and thus no longer an ordination to something else (and then covertly create some other existent which performs the same function as such a relational being), all questions regarding how something is related to T are pointless. They can exist only by ignoring its relational nature.

From these considerations we see how Wittgenstein is both right and wrong. He is right in believing that if knowing T is no different than knowing Y, then it is a worthless exercise to explain how X becomes meaningful in terms of its association with T, for the process of associating X with T is fundamentally no different than the process of using X to refer to Y. Simply put, the *explanans* is nothing other than a special case of the *explanandum*. He is wrong, however, in believing that thought is not necessary for X to be meaningful (viz., to have acquired the property R). The marks on this page do not in and of themselves refer to anything, and it is perfectly intelligible and indeed necessary to ask how these marks obtain the property of referring. The necessity of positing something which in virtue of its very nature has the ability to generate a reference comes from the very fact that these marks are meaningful! This is why people naturally suppose the existence of T. Yet, since T is not directly knowable but is known only by inference from X's ability to refer to Y, and since T is inherently relational and hence not anything adventitiously capable of being related to, there can really be no such question as "How is X related to (associated with) T?". Such a question assumes that the nature of T is other than has been characterized. It assumes that T, an entity whose very being is relational, is something which needs to be related, but this is contrary to the very pur-

pose *of* positing T. Thus, the question is illegitimate, for it is based on a misunderstanding of the nature *of* T. The very nature *of* T makes T necessary for X to be able to refer to Y and by the same token invulnerable to Wittgenstein's objections. It is not necessary to suppose that language is more like a game than anything else without extra-linguistic concerns or to despair *of* philosophers' endless questions regarding X's meaning, for explanations do come to an end somewhere and, in this case, it is with T and its inherently relational character.²⁷

Conclusion

There is certainly much more required by any complete discussion *of* the topic *of* linguistic meaning, but this foray into the philosophy *of* language does seem to indicate a very important point—namely, the intentionality *of* thought is necessary for the existence *of* language.²⁸ This in turn shows that the attempt to explain necessary truth by reference to linguistic rules cannot succeed. The meaning-is-use thesis does not provide an adequate account *of* linguistic meaning, and so language cannot be considered a self-sufficient activity whose rules require no objective assessment. The tendency to consider language more like a game than anything else resulted from the *failure* to see that if thought were viewed as intentional in nature, then Wittgenstein's rejection *of* it as necessary to explain the acquisition *of* meaning by marks or sounds would not have force. This failure has now been remedied.

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²⁷ The last two paragraphs are, with certain additions and modifications, taken from my article, "Deely, Wittgenstein, and Mental Events," *The New Scholasticism* 54 (Winter, 1980).

²⁸ See John N. Deely's "The Nonverbal Inlay in Linguistic Communications," in *The Signifying Animal*, eds. Irmengard Rauch and Gerald F. Carr (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1980); also see Jacques Maritain, "Language and the Theory of Sign," in *Language: An Enquiry Into its Meaning and Functions*, ed. Ruth N. Anshen (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957).

MORAL AUTONOMY, DIVINE TRANSCENDENCE
AND HUMAN DESTINY: KANT'S DOCTRINE OF HOPE
AS A PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION FOR CHRISTIAN
ETHICS

WE ARE ALL familiar with a rendition of Kant's moral philosophy in which the features of moral autonomy, and the implications they have for the character of human existence, offer a picture of Kant's philosophical enterprise in which there is little, if any, room for those doctrines of Christian faith which have their basis in a worshipful acknowledgement of a living and transcendent God. In this rendition, Kant is the herald of a turn to a "this-worldly" account of the significance of Christian religious doctrines and moral beliefs: creation, sin, redemption and eternal life have meaning just and only insofar as they can give concrete shape to the present and future in the only world we have—the one which we see, hear, touch, and in which we live the brief, determinate span of our lives. This interpretation of Kant has the ironically comforting advantage of making him one of us; his account of human moral existence has provided a guiding thread by which we can follow and unify the intricate turnings of modern Western history and our contemporary civilization: human destiny under human control; we bear the ultimate responsibility for what we become and for what we make of our world.¹ This "Kantian" picture of human autonomy has proved

¹ This, of course, is hardly a unanimous judgment of Kant scholarship. One of its most recent espousals can be found in Carl Raschke, *Moral Action, God, and History in the Thought of Immanuel Kant*, American Academy of Religion and Scholars Press, Dissertation Series 5 (Missoula: Scholars Press, 1975), e.g., p.

"For man, if we stretch the inner logic of Kant's thought to its outer limit, is now bidden to grasp the reins of history, to struggle for his own kingdom with every ounce of commitment. The result is that the erstwhile God of history is now transformed into the developing powers of that pre-eminent historical being—**man.**"

more durable than his critical metaphysics and epistemology; the basic shape it has given to European and American self-understanding still apparently survives even in the face of the accumulated stress of this century's major wars, economic cycles, revolutions, ideologies of terrorism and genocide, and the encroachment of manipulative technique into all areas of human life.

I have no doubt that the picture of moral autonomy as human control of moral destiny represents a concise and accurate summary of beliefs which have been a deeply embedded part of Western civilization for at least two centuries; yet I have doubts, which this paper will set forth, that this picture provides an accurate portrayal of Kant's philosophical beliefs. Setting forth these doubts will provide an appropriate context for advancing two theses which I think may be of some interest for others who work, as I do, in the territory-some might say "no man's land"-which forms the boundary between philosophy and theology. The first thesis is about Kant's philosophical doctrine: Kant's account of human moral autonomy allows history, community, and a worshipful acknowledgment of a transcendent God to function as features essential for the foundation and significance of moral agency in human life. The second thesis is "methodological" in that it allows us to locate, within Kant's account of human moral autonomy, at least one feature of human moral life which can function as an element

For expositions of Kant which sort out some of the ambiguities which lead to this interpretation see, for instance, Frederick Ferre, *Basic Modern Philosophy of Religion*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), pp. flfl7-fl30; Richard Kroner, *Between Faith and Thought*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 76-87; *Kant's Weltanschauung*, translated by John E. Smith, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 30-60.

For readings of Kant which attempt a sympathetic reconstruction of the place of "moral theism" within Kant's critical project see James Collins, *The Emergence of Philosophy of Religion*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1967); Michel Despland, *Kant on History and Religion*, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1973); Allen W. Wood, *Kant's Moral Religion*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970); *Kant's Rational Theology*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978).

of a philosophical foundation for the work of Christian ethics. The feature which Kant's account allows us to locate is the finitude of human moral endeavor: we are not in control of the abiding outcome of our moral conduct. My second thesis is that the recognition of this feature of our human moral life makes it possible to give at least one definite focus to efforts to provide a philosophical foundation for Christian ethics: that focus is upon the way philosophical concepts and procedures, on the one hand, and Christian beliefs and practices, on the other, give form to our expectations of human destiny.

I shall make my case for these two theses by placing Kant's account of moral autonomy within the context of his doctrine of hope. I propose to interpret that doctrine in terms of Kant's concept of reason's "interest": hope is the form in which, for us as finite moral beings, reason's interest in human moral destiny is exhibited. In accord with that interest, we can then acknowledge that such destiny—the attainment of the highest good—awaits upon a God who has appointed it. The conclusion I propose to draw from this interpretation is one that runs counter to some of the standard themes of Kant interpretation which I have previously noted. It will be my contention that, in the context of the doctrine of hope, Kant's doctrine of moral autonomy need not yield up the picture of human destiny under human control; rather, it enables us to render human moral experience into philosophical terms congruent with, and illuminating of, a picture which is discerned through a central affirmation of Christian faith: the picture is of human moral life as an anticipation of God's grace; it is a picture which can be discerned through an acknowledgment which Kant affirms to take place in consequence of our efforts to live a moral life: human finitude before a just, transcendent God.

My initial doubt about the standard rendition arises inasmuch as that picture seems to make Kant's account of moral autonomy—and particularly its *foci* upon universality and obligation—identical with the total picture his critical philosophy offers of what I shall term "human moral personhood." In

accord with this identification, the standard rendition would surely judge Kant's account of moral autonomy as just about the last place to find a philosophical rendering of the Christian doctrines of human finitude and divine transcendence. In fact, because Christian convictions about human moral existence and agency involve notions such as creaturely dependence, sin, and redemption, it would seem especially forced to claim to discern the lineaments of sinful Adam—even sinful Adam who has been redeemed—upon the face of a self-legislating Kantian moral agent. The power of the idea of autonomy, so the standard rendition *goes*, is precisely that it has enabled us to free our understanding of moral conduct from the encrustations of such doctrines, all of which inhibit, in one form or another, the possibility of taking full responsibility for our lives.² Such quick dismissal of my proposal is justified as long as one maintains—as the standard rendition seems to do—that autonomy is the sum and substance of the story of moral personhood as told by Kant's philosophy.³

There are, however, good reasons for thinking that autonomy is not the whole story of moral personhood for Kant. These reasons will then help explain why Kant, to what should be the embarrassment of the usual rendition of his position, employs three basic Christian "symbols" or doctrines: the Kingdom of God; God as Ruler, Lawgiver, and Judge; and eternal life—philosophically sanitized, to be sure, into the concepts of the highest good, God as the guarantor of the proper apportionment of happiness to virtue, and immortality—in order to complete his account of human moral existence.

² Raschke, p. 170: "Kant is concerned to deny God absolute power in man's moral life." Iris Murdoch, "The Idea of Perfection," in *The Sovereignty of Good*, (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), pp. 50-81, sums up well the view frequently attributed to Kant: "Here I stand alone, in total responsibility and freedom, and can only properly and responsibly do what is intelligible to me, what I can do with a clear intention."

³ See, for instance, Warner Wick, "Kant's Moral Philosophy," in I. Kant, *The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue*. trans. by James Ellington (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964), pp. xv-xvii.

The grounds for my doubt about the accuracy of the standard rendition of moral autonomy as the whole story of moral personhood arise principally from the fact that Kant found it necessary to say more about the foundations of human moral existence than what is furnished by an answer, framed in terms of autonomy, to the second of his famous triad of questions: What ought I to do? Raising and answering the third question—What may I hope?—was, for Kant, essential to the full intelligibility and critical grounding of the answers given to the prior two.⁴ It is of particular relevance, both to my doubts and to my two theses, that the terms in which Kant frames an answer to the third question, and, thereby, completes the critical phase of his philosophical enterprise, are philosophical counterparts to the three Christian symbols: We are legitimately allowed to hope for the attainment of the highest good (the coming of the Kingdom of God), which is the proper apportionment of happiness to good conduct for a universe of persons;⁵ since the legitimation of our hope, moreover, is based upon an employment of reason which is critically grounded, we have assurance that our hope is not to be disappointed; we are thereby justified in having full confidence that the conditions which make possible the attainment of the highest good—God (as just Ruler and Judge) and immortality (eternal life)—are, in fact, fulfilled.⁶

There is a simple enough reason both for Kant's raising of the question of hope and for answering it the way he does; simple as the reason is, it is one that may strike us as odd in view of the usual identification of moral personhood with au-

⁴ *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1929), A 805-806/B 833-834. Hereafter cited as *CPR*; page citations are to the marginal indices of the pagination of the 1st and 2nd editions.

⁵ *CPR*, A 814/B 842; see *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. by Lewis White Beck (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), p. 142, for an explicit identification of the "intelligible world" with the Kingdom of God. Hereafter, the *Critique of Practical Reason* will be cited as *C Pract R*, with pages references to Beck's translation in the Bobbs-Merrill edition. See *C Pract R*, p. 133, for an identification of the highest good with the Kingdom of God; *CPR*, A 812/B 840 for an identification of the intelligible world with a "kingdom of grace."

⁶ *CPR*, A 810-811/B 838-839; *C Pract R*, pp. 147-151.

tonomy. The reason is this: Although the attainment of happiness is an essential part of moral personhood, such attainment is not ours to control. Kant makes it clear in a number of places that the attainment of happiness is a limiting condition to the moral significance of autonomy and to what we are critically justified in expecting of it.⁷ As such a limit, attainment of happiness becomes an essential component of moral personhood. Autonomy, if it is properly exercised, does not bring about that attainment; it simply secures a condition for such attainment: worthiness for it.⁸ In and of itself, autonomy does not secure happiness for us. A moral personhood which consisted only in the exercise of autonomy would be for Kant an admirable one, according to the measure with which he admires the Stoics; it would, nonetheless, be a truncated one, for it would lack its proper completion: the attainment of happiness.⁹ By holding that the attainment of happiness is not within human power to effect, Kant has placed a limit upon autonomy's role in determining the essential character of human moral personhood. This limit, moreover, is not an accidental one; it has its ground in the character of autonomy as an exercise of reason in its proper human modality: finite reason.

The finitude of reason is made manifest for its theoretical and practical uses in the guise of "givenness." For the theoretical use of reason, there is the givenness of sense;¹⁰ for the

⁷ E.g., *C Pract R*, p. 133: "But the moral law does not of itself promise happiness, for the latter is not, according to the concepts of any order of nature, necessarily connected with obedience to the law"; cf. also *C Pract R*, p. 117; *CPR*, A 810/B 838.

⁸ *C Pract R*, p. 134: "Therefore morals is not really the doctrine of how to make ourselves happy, but of how we are to be worthy of happiness"; cf. *CPR*, A 808-809/B 837-838.

⁹ For Kant's discussion of virtue and happiness as the completion of moral personhood, cf. *C Pract R*, pp. 114-115. For his attitude toward the Stoics, cf. *C Pract R*, pp. 131-134; e.g., "Thus they really lift out of the highest good the second element [personal happiness] since they placed the highest good only in acting and contentment with one's own moral worth including it in the consciousness of moral character."

¹⁰ "Givenness" in the mode of sensibility is suggested as a mark of finite reason by the remarks Kant makes about the character of intellectual intuition as original, *CPR*, B

practical use of reason, there is the givenness of freedom as a "fact" and of the structure of desire as it is ordered to the attainment of happiness.¹¹ Kant's insistence upon the finite character of human reason, even in what for us is its sole constitutive use, the practical, is at least a faint philosophical echo of the Christian doctrine of creaturely dependence. It becomes a deafening roar, however, in contrast to the views of Hegel, for whom givenness is a scandal.¹² It is Hegel, much more than Kant, who should be considered herald and prophet of the rendition of moral autonomy which beguiles us: human destiny under human control.

If it is correct to characterize human moral autonomy as finite, i.e., as subject to givenness both in its form, as freedom, and in being ordered, as will, toward completion in the attainment of the highest good, then we have located one of the fundamental grounds in support of my first thesis. History, community, and the worship of God can all be understood as features essential for the foundation and the significance of moral agency in human life inasmuch as they are each forms under which the finitude of reason in its practical use is concretely acknowledged. In human history, we find the concrete accrual of an abiding moral identity, whose completion in the moral future is represented under the form of hope in immortality.¹³ In human moral community, the mutual recognition of the moral agency of each and all constitutes the shared world

¹¹ Cf. *O Pract R*, pp. 81, 48; *Critique of Judgment*, trans. by J. H. Bernard (New York: Hafner, 1951), pp. 81-82, for the givenness of freedom as a "fact" of reason. The givenness of the structure of desire as it is ordered to the attainment of happiness provides one of the grounds on which the antinomy of practical reason is generated; cf. *O Pract R*, pp. 114-115; ¶ 7-114.

¹² This is the interpretation I make of Hegel's project of overcoming immediacy in all its forms, starting with the immediacy of sense-certainty.

¹³ *C Pract R*, pp. 111-112; cf. *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, trans. by Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson, 3rd ed. revised and with an essay by John R. Silber (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), pp. 60-61, in which Kant ties moral identity more concretely to the life history of the person. Hereafter this work will be cited as *Rdigion*, with page references to the Greene and Hudson translation.

of mutual respect and moral interdependence which alone makes concrete moral judgment and action possible.¹⁴ In the steadfastness of hope in the attainment of the highest good as the summation of human moral community and history, there is the proper worshipful acknowledgment of a God who is transcendent, at least in terms of the final moral ordering and completion of the universe of human persons.¹⁵

The placement of Kant's notion of autonomy into its essential relations to history, community and the acknowledgment of God enables us to see more clearly his intent in devising a doctrine of hope: it ensures that he has given an account of the foundation for the full range of human moral existence. As the usual rendition gets played, all that he seems seriously interested in accounting for is the foundation for the moment of decision which stands at the center point of human moral existence.¹⁶

The details of Kant's doctrine of hope indicate that his account of moral decision, which puts it on a footing justified in terms of reason's critically founded use, is part of a larger concern about human moral conduct: its efficacy in terms of human moral destiny. Kant speaks of such concern, in connection with the question about hope, in terms of reason's "interest." The focus of reason's interest upon the efficacy of moral conduct comes about because, in Kant's view, surety about our capacity for responding to reason's moral demand-i.e., surety about our freedom-which his critical account has shown we are justified in having, brings us no corresponding surety about what will come about morally from conduct governed by this

¹⁴ I take this to be the point of Kant's talk of a "kingdom of ends" and of our elevation, through the acknowledgment of the moral law, to an intelligible "world."

¹⁵ *C Pract R*, pp. 135-136.

¹⁶ Iris Murdoch has summed up well the picture of decision as the center of moral existence: "Stripped of the exiguous metaphysical background which Kant was prepared to allow him, this man is with us still, free, independent, lonely, powerful, rational, responsible, brave, the hero of so many novels and books of moral philosophy." "On 'God' and 'Good'" in *The Sovereignty of Good*, p. 50.

response.¹¹ Kant does not doubt that the latter surety is required by reason in its practical use: it is required in virtue of the ordering of desire to the attainment of happiness. Since, on Kant's view, reason functions to represent totality, the surety which is required to satisfy reason's interest in the moral efficacy of human conduct and, thereby, to ground hope, concerns the good outcome of the totality of human moral conduct.¹⁸ Kant's concern for the autonomy of an agent's moral decision is at least equally a concern for the moral destiny of all humanity, if not, in fact, a function of it.

There are two aspects of this concern for the moral destiny of all humanity which deserve attention in the context of this paper's theses. The first is that this concern can be understood to arise from a feature of Kant's account of the exercise of human freedom which the standard picture of his moral philosophy often ignores or misinterprets: freedom's essential ordering to the service of human mutuality. The second is that Kant's presentation of this concern provides the basis for the proposal made by my second thesis; it does so inasmuch as this presentation functions as an acknowledgment of the finitude of human moral endeavor and, consequently, as an element which has the power to shape our expectations about the fulfillment of human destiny. As I have already noted, and shall note again at the conclusion of this paper, the expectations shaped by Kant's concern for human destiny have a fundamental congruence with expectations shaped by those Christian convictions and practices which acknowledge that human moral existence takes form in the presence of a God who is transcendent.

I shall bring to completion this paper's case for my two theses by explicating in more detail what I take to be the import of

¹¹ This is put succinctly as a question in *Religion*, p. 4: "What is to result from this right conduct of ours?"

¹⁸ Kant gives one expression to this concern by noting, in *Religion*, p. 54, that "Mankind (rational earthly existence in general) in its complete moral perfection is that alone which can render a world the object of a divine decree and the end of creation."

these two aspects of Kant's concern for human moral destiny. The first aspect is that Kant's concern for human moral destiny, which is presented in his doctrine of hope, arises from human freedom's essential ordering to the service of human mutuality, i.e., to the fashioning of a shared world, and of practices by which we share of ourselves, for the attainment of good for one another. I do not propose to defend in detail here the claim that Kant's account of freedom can be understood to involve, as an essential element, such ordering to mutuality. I merely wish to show that the concern which his doctrine of hope shows for the totality of human moral destiny suggests the possibility of this interpretation; it suggests the possibility of this interpretation inasmuch as the origin of this concern can be traced back to reason's fundamental "interest" in the construction of a "world": in the field of human action, reason's world-constructing interest is manifest in the exercise of human freedom, and the "world" which reason seeks to construct can be understood to be constituted by the conditions which make for an enduring community of human moral agents.

In Kant's view, therefore, a concern for human destiny in its totality does not arise from mere chance or curiosity; it arises, rather, because the exercise of freedom in human conduct makes us pose the question of hope in terms which can be satisfied only by the accomplishment of a shared and common human destiny. Thus, the connection Kant makes between the exercise of freedom in human conduct and the origin of hope provides a basis for understanding freedom as essentially ordered to the service of mutuality. This connection is made most clearly in Kant's discussions of the object of the hope to which freedom gives rise; Kant designates this object as "the highest good." The specification he gives to the highest good indicates freedom's ordering to mutuality: the hope to which the exercise of my freedom gives rise is that my conduct will effect the attainment of abiding good, not for myself alone, but for each and all who exercise freedom.

Kant's discussion of the highest good makes it clear that

even though the question of hope is formulated as singular and personal, it is, nonetheless, more fundamentally about a common and shared human destiny. Kant does not doubt that the -singular and personal good which freedom gives me hope of attaining can be conceived only as the satisfaction of my human cravings; yet his account of hope clearly places the attainment of my singular and personal good in the context of a moral future constituted by the title we each and all can claim to membership in an abiding moral community. This context indicates that, as Kant conceives of hope, its origin can be only in the exercise of freedom as it is ordered to the service of mutuality.

Although Kant makes it quite clear that hope has its origin in freedom, commentators have only recently started to note that the freedom which gives rise to this hope is ordered to mutuality.¹⁹ The picture which Kant provides of the moral future through his concept of the highest good and his doctrine of hope is that of the full attainment of human community. He speaks of this community in images which make clear its public and shared character: a "kingdom of ends," an "ethical commonwealth," even a "kingdom of grace."²⁰ Kant's account of the highest good indicates that he sees this future as possible only insofar as our conduct is shaped through the exercise of freedom which keeps the attainment of mutuality constantly in view.

There are a number of ways in which Kant's analysis of human conduct takes note of freedom's ordering to the service of human mutuality. A presentation of some of these ways will

¹⁹ See, for instance Yirmiahu Yovel, *Kant and the Philosophy of History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 53-54; 64-66; Wood, *Kant's Mora/, Religion*, pp. 57-60; 74-78. Yovel, it should be noted, would not find this ordering to mutuality a basis for an affirmation of God.

²⁰ The most familiar of these terms is "kingdom of ends" found, for example in *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, trans. by H. J. Paton (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 100-101. The expression "ethical commonwealth" appears in *Religion*, pp. 88-91; "kingdom of grace" appears in *CPR*, A 811/B 840 (*das Reich der Gnades*); A 815/B 843 (*regImm gratiae*).

indicate how a concern for a shared and common human destiny arises from the exercise of freedom as it is ordered to mutuality. Kant indicates, for instance, that the exercise of freedom places us into an intelligible "world"-into a connected and ordered totality of relations to the moral agency of each and all who constitute human moral community. Kant provides a description, in *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, of the process of making moral judgments; this description suggests one way in which he takes this process to be a function of our capability for representing an interconnected world of human agents shaping their conduct through the exercise of freedom:

Take a man who, honoring the moral law, allows the thought to occur to him (he can scarcely avoid doing so) of what sort of a world he would create, under the guidance of practical reason, were such a thing in his power, a world into which, moreover, he would place himself as a member. He would not merely make the very choice which is determined by the moral idea of the highest good, were he vouchsafed solely the right to choose; he would also will that [such] a world should by all means come into existence (because the moral law demands that the highest good possible by our agency should be realized) and he would will so even though, in accordance with this idea, he saw himself in danger of paying in his own person a heavy price in happiness-it being possible that he might not be adequate to the [moral] demands of the idea, demands which reason lays down as conditioning happiness. Accordingly he would feel compelled by reason to avow this judgment with complete impartiality, as though it were rendered by another and yet, at the same time, as his own; whereby man gives evidence of the need, morally effected in him, of also conceiving a final end for his duties, as their consequence.²¹

Our freedom, as Kant here describes its exercise in moral decisions, functions to place us in a world constituted in its moral character by relations of mutuality; these relations are of a particular kind: they are the ones which make it possible for persons to render impartial judgment upon one another's con-

²¹ *Religion*, p. 5.

duct. It is particularly important to note that these relations of mutuality do not have as a prior condition an acknowledgment by an individual moral agent just of one's own freedom, as if it were grounded independently of the mutual acknowledgment of human freedom which is effectively rendered by submitting to such impartial judgment. Such a prior condition would seriously misconstrue the character of freedom; it would keep us from seeing that the acknowledgment which I make of my own freedom can take place only in the context of the mutual acknowledgment of freedom which is a constitutive element of moral community.

There is a picture of human freedom which denies it this character of mutual acknowledgment—the human agent in lofty and lonely moral solitude at the moment of decision—and, as I have pointed out above, this picture has been mistakenly attributed to Kant. If attention is paid to the connection Kant makes between human freedom and the hope such freedom engenders in human destiny, then the correct picture emerges: the exercise of human freedom in a moral decision to shape conduct is our precise point of contact with one another in mutuality, and it promises us full participation in human community.

This description of moral decision is not the only place in which Kant suggests that freedom is ordered to mutuality. There are other discussions in which Kant uses terms which presuppose that there is a shared and interconnected character to the prospect which is opened up to us by the exercise of freedom—a "world" or a "kingdom" of which we find ourselves members.²² It is in virtue of this participation in a shared world, which is constituted in and by human freedom in human action, that the "interest" of reason manifest in that exercise of freedom gains its focus upon human destiny. This prospect and this focus do not seem to open up for the agent

²² See, for instance, *O Pract R*, pp. 85; 89-90; 109-110; *Religion*, p. 86; *Critique Of Judgment* # 86, pp. 292-298.

whose moral autonomy is pictured as the loneliness of the moment of moral choice.

If, therefore, we render moral personhood solely in terms of autonomy as it is pictured in the standard rendition of Kant, there can be no adequate basis for satisfying this interest of reason. Awareness of our autonomy as it is exercised in the making of decisions does not provide surety about the outcome of our personal moral history, and even less about the outcome of the moral history of the human race. What does provide this surety proves ironic in view of the implications frequently drawn from the Kantian doctrine of autonomy: surety is here provided by an acknowledgment of a fundamental sense in which human destiny is not under human control. Human reason, when it confronts itself with the question of human destiny, can have surety about the good outcome of right conduct only if it represents that outcome under the form of hope: the outcome waits upon, and we must await it from, a God who has appointed that destiny and who is to be trusted to bring it to completion.²³

Now that I have proposed grounds which I hope are sufficient to raise doubt about the usual rendition of Kant's account of human moral personhood, and which I think open the way for interpreting Kant along the lines proposed in my first thesis, let me now turn to a consideration of the second aspect of Kant's concern for human moral destiny which I noted earlier: its function as an acknowledgment of the finitude of human moral endeavor and, thereby, its power to shape our expectations of human destiny. This consideration will also explicate the basis on which I offer my second thesis that the efforts to provide a philosophical foundation for the enterprise of Christian ethics can take focus upon our expectations of human destiny. Kant's doctrine of hope, which is the formal philosophical rendering of his concern for human destiny, provides the basis for this thesis, inasmuch as this doctrine makes the critical

²³ *CPR*, A 810-811/B 838-839.

measure of our expectations for the accomplishment of our human destiny to be our acknowledgment of human finitude; expectations shaped in accord with this critical measure are thereby able to stand in congruence with expectations about human moral destiny which are shaped by those Christian convictions and practices by which we acknowledge that our human existence takes form before the face of a just, transcendent God.

To see how this is so, we need to recall that Kant's doctrine of hope is of a piece with his overall critical enterprise of marking out the limits of the exercise of human reason. Kant's doctrine of hope, moreover, is a capstone for this enterprise: at the limits of the exercise of our reason, hope enables us to comport ourselves properly in the face of a fundamental truth of human existence; we would not be able to justify such comportment were the limits to reason's exercise not acknowledged. This truth is about our mortality and our finitude: left to our own devices, our deepest human cravings go unsatisfied, as they have done for the numberless generations before us. In the face of this truth, freedom nonetheless gives rise to hope as the proper mode of human comportment before it: we are allowed to expect the abiding satisfaction of our deepest cravings, provided we shape our existence with one another to the full achievement of an abiding moral community.²⁴ Freedom gives rise to this hope on the basis of its-i.e., freedom's-ordering to mutuality. This hope is the most radical expression of reason's world constructing interest; in accord with it, we are required to shape our conduct in congruence with the conditions which have the power to constitute the moral world in its full reality and accomplishment. Kant denotes this world and its conditions as the "things of faith": the highest good, the Being of God, and the immortality of the soul.

Kant's doctrine of hope, therefore, proposes that we give proper shape to our expectations of human moral destiny in

²⁴ *C Pract R*, pp. 128-124; *IS!!-184*; *Religion*, pp. 89; 91-91!.

consequence of the limits which his critical enterprise requires us to place upon the exercise of human reason. These expectations take their definite form in accord with the possibility which the critical enterprise has delimited in regard to our conduct's *power* to effect an abiding moral community. The critical enterprise delimits this possibility in terms of an assent to the "things of faith": as long as we persist in expecting our conduct to effect an abiding moral world-and we do so persist by fashioning our conduct in accord with freedom's ordering to mutuality as it is manifest in the demands of the categorical imperative-we thereby also give assent, in our conduct, to the "things of faith," which stand as conditions for our conduct's effecting that world.²⁵

Kant thus depicts assent to the "things of faith" as inseparable from our human fidelity and persistence in moral endeavor. This fidelity to moral endeavor has usually been rendered in terms of the conscientiousness of the individual moral agent; in its most common philosophical rendering, moreover, such conscientiousness has been depicted in terms of a formal account of the structure of human moral decision. Such a formal account of the structure of human moral decision-particularly when it is taken as a part of a picture of human destiny under human control-is not an especially apt locus on which to attempt to set a philosophical foundation for Christian ethics. It is correct, therefore, for the standard versions of Kant's moral philosophy to take his doctrine of moral autonomy to be at odds with certain fundamental Christian convictions about human moral existence in the face of God's transcendence-correct, that is, if moral autonomy is rendered as a formal account of the structure of human decision in a world in which human destiny is under human control.

The placement of moral autonomy within the context of

²⁵ *Critique of Judgment*, # 87, pp. 801-304; # 91, pp. 313-315; *Lectures on Philosophical Theology*, trans. by Allen W. Wood and Gertrude M. Clark (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), p. U1. See Wood, *Kant's Moral Religion*, pp. 31-31.

Kant's account of hope, however, suggests otherwise: fidelity to, and persistence in, moral endeavor, which Kant makes the requisite context for sustaining hope and for assenting to the "things of faith," offer the possibility for a quite different interpretation of human moral autonomy. Kant's stress upon persistence in moral endeavor as the context for sustaining hope allows us to read his account of moral autonomy in terms of freedom's ordering to mutuality: what enables each of us to persist in moral endeavor is not-as much contemporary wisdom, relying upon accounts of the formal structure of moral decision, would have it-principally the conviction of the (rational) unassailability of my decision; what enables each of us to persist in moral endeavor is, rather, the conviction that the abiding success of even my own individual moral endeavor is entrusted not to my hands alone, but to the hands of others as well, and that this success is not to be measured solely in terms of the outcomes I can come to know in the span of my days.

In simplest terms, Kant's doctrine of hope enables us to interpret his account of moral autonomy along these lines and thereby to render it congruent with a Christian picture of human moral existence as an anticipation of God's grace, insofar as the doctrine of hope requires that we interpret moral autonomy from the perspective of a shared moral future. Hope in the accomplishment of a shared moral future gives present moral endeavor the shape of mutuality: we are to comport ourselves to one another in trust that we each and all exercise our freedom for the accomplishment of that future.²⁶ Kant did not himself clearly mark out the full significance of comporting ourselves with such trust: in that trust, we find that fundamental exercise of human freedom which makes moral endeavor possible; such trust shows freedom to have its ground in our human mutuality and interdependence.

Kant's doctrine of hope thus enables us to gain sight of our

²⁶ See *CPR*, A 808-811/B 886-889.

freedom's grounding in mutuality by reminding us that our expectations for the accomplishment of our human destiny have their proper focus upon the shared character of the moral future. In bringing our attention to bear upon this feature of human moral existence, Kant's doctrine of hope offers a promising ground on which to set a philosophical foundation for the work of Christian ethics. This is so because this feature renders us open to a perspective on human moral existence which has its most fundamental ground in Christian belief and practice. In accord with those beliefs and practices, human freedom's ordering to, and grounding in, mutuality and interdependence serves as a sign of and pointer to the most fundamental ground constituting human moral existence: God's own mutuality of shared life, expressed in the Christian symbol of Trinity. God's own mutuality serves as foundation for Christian ethics in that it is the enabling power for human freedom and, as freely bestowed gift, it accomplishes for us in full the abiding achievement of that mutuality which is our human destiny.

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IS NOMINALISM COMPATIBLE WITH TRUTH?

A NOTE

IF "TRUE" applies as straightforwardly to things like diamonds and friends as it does to statements, the answer to the above question is "no". But as against the received view and for the reasons which follow, I here argue that "true" *does* apply to the former in an as underived sense as it applies to the latter. How this falsifies nominalism becomes clear as soon as it is shown how the underived truth of things, "ontological truth" as it is sometimes called, implies that universals exist. Supporting the view of those medieval realists who denied that expressions of the sort "true gold" are derivative from the sense of "true" in "true statement",¹ I contend, first, that the standard argument for the view that "true" applies primarily to statements alone (call this the reductionist view) is unsound. Then, in two separate arguments I argue that that same reductionist view is in fact false. Finally, I show how the underived concept of ontological truth implies that universals exist and hence that nominalism is false.

To begin, then, what I take to be the standard argument for the reductionist view runs like this: Since, say "Y is a true diamond" implies but is not implied by "It is true that Y is a diamond", it follows that "true" in the latter sense of the term (i.e. in the sense of what is said), must be the logically primary sense of "true", in which case "true" as ascribed to diamonds as well as to other things constitutes a secondary,

¹ According to St. Augustine, St. Anselm and St. Thomas Aquinas, the truth-relation would exist even if human beings were eliminated. They believed that things could be said to be straightforwardly true in the sense of conforming to eternal ideas in the divine intellect.

derived sense of "true". But in that case there is really no such thing to begin with as an irreducible "truth of things". Alan White has succinctly put the argument as follows:

When an X, e.g., a statement or a story, is characterized as true in virtue of what is said in it rather than for itself, such an X is a true X and only if what is said in it is true. When, on the other hand, an X, e.g., a Corgi or courage, is characterized as true other than because of what is said in it, an X is a true X if and only if according to some restrictive standards of X it is true to say that it is an X. The former use of "true" is primary. "This is a true Corgi" implies, but is not implied by, "It is true to say that this is a Corgi." To suppose that it were implied by it would commit one wrongly to holding that "This is a Corgi, but not a true Corgi" is contradictory, and also that when it is true that X is a thief, a professor or a pianist, then he is a true thief, a true professor or a true pianist. But the whole point of characterizing some X other than what is said as true is to suggest that "X" is here being used according to some restrictive standards by which not everything called by that word is, in the user's opinion, truly so called. What commonly passes for a Corgi may not be at Crufts a true Corgi; what is commonly called a rose or mahogany may not, botanically speaking, be a true rose or true mahogany. The higher our standards the more reluctant we are to allow that a certain degree of love, courage, or freedom should truly be called love, courage or freedom; it is not true love, true courage or true freedom.²

And yet, to reflect a moment on this argument is to realize at once that what gives White free passage to deny "It is true to say that X is a Corgi" implies "X is a true Corgi" is the rather dubious assumption that we always use "true" in expressions like "true Corgi" or "true diamond" to mean that the Corgi or diamond in question is, comparatively speaking, a Corgi or a diamond of a higher quality or a Corgi or diamond to a greater degree than are other Corgis or diamonds with which we are or have been acquainted. But surely the more common case is when we use such expressions not to indicate a difference of quality or degree between Corgis, diamonds, or what have you, but rather to mark off a difference in *kind*.

² Alan White, *Truth* (Garden City, N.Y., 1970), pp. 5-6.

When, picking out a diamond from a group of imitations, a gemologist says, "This is a true diamond", he means to indicate a difference in kind between the gem he is holding and the other stones in the group. But it is just this sense of "true" with which we are here concerned, i.e. "true" in the sense of "genuine". And when "true" is used in *this* sense then "**It** is true that X is a Corgi" does indeed imply "X is a true Corgi". Accordingly, it cannot be argued that, as applied to, say, a diamond as opposed to a statement, "true" has a non-primary sense and has that derivative sense just because "This is a true diamond" implies but is not implied by "**It** is true that this is a diamond." For this is simply not the case when "true" means "genuine" as opposed to "spurious". But in that case "the truth of things" has not been eliminated after all, and hence supporters of the reductionist thesis have not made their case.

But not only does the reductionist view go unsupported by the foregoing argument for the reasons which have just been given, but in addition it is in fact simply fallacious. To see this, consider the following arguments:

Argument I

Assume that the reductionist view is true. Then:

- (1) The concept of a statement or proposition would necessarily be included in the definition of every secondary sense of "true".
- (2) But the concept of a statement or proposition is not necessarily included in the sense which "true" has when "true" is attributed to things.
- (3) Hence, the assumption in question is false.

In this argument the crucial step is (1). (1) is simply an exemplification of the rule, based on the definition of referential equivocity, that a secondary or derived sense of a term always includes the primary referent of that term. Take, for example, the secondary senses which "sad" and "healthy"

have respectively in the phrases "sad event" and "healthy blood". Here, an event is called sad only because it is conducive to sadness in a *person*, while blood is called healthy only 'because it is a sign of health in an *organism*. It is to be noted that the secondary senses which "sad" and "healthy" have in these phrases necessarily include or have reference to (hence the term, referential equivocacy) the primary or proper referent of "sad" and "healthy" respectively, namely, a person and an organism.

That the primary referent of a term is necessarily included in any secondary sense of that term was pointed out by Aquinas in the context of his discussion of whether names predicated of God are predicated primarily of creatures. St. Thomas says:

I answer that, in names predicated of many in an analogical sense, all are predicated through a relation to some one thing; *and this one thing must be placed in the definition of them all. And since the essence expressed by the name is the definition as the Philosopher says, such a name must be applied primarily to that which is put in the definition of the other things, and secondarily to these others according as they approach more or less to the first.* Thus, for instance, healthy applied to animals comes into the definition of healthy applied to medicine, which is called healthy as being the cause of health in the animal; and also into the definition of healthy which is applied to urine, which is called healthy in so far as it is the sign of the animal's health.³

Step (2) is just the factual premise of the argument; it states, undeniably that the supposed primary referent of "true", a statement or proposition is not necessarily included in the supposed secondary senses which "true" has when "true" is attributed to things. The truth of (2) is easily shown by citing examples. When a person calls something false gold or calls something else a true diamond, he means by this and is understood to mean that the first object falls short of the standard of goldness whereas the second object conforms to the standard of diamondhood. In these supposed secondary senses of "false"

³ St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I. Q 18. Art. 6. (Italics are mine.)

and " true " there is no reference whatsoever to anything like a proposition or a statement. But the joint truth of (1) and (2) imply (3), namely, that the reductionist thesis is false.

A_rgument II

Assume that the reductionist view is true. Then, consider the following:

- (1) If there are pseudo-propositions, then there are genuine propositions.
- (2) But "true" is a synonym for "genuine" (as "genuine diamond " = " true diamond ").
- (3) Hence, genuine propositions may be called true propositions.
- (4) But, as attributed to propositions in (3) "true" must be used in a secondary sense. Otherwise, " true " would not mean " conforms to a fact ", which under the reductionist view it does.
- (4) But then, by the logic of referential equivocity, "true" in (3) must include in its definition the supposed primary referent of "true", namely, a proposition.
- (6) But no term the use of which in a given context *includes* its primary referent in its sense is in that context being *attributed* to its primary referent.
- (7) Hence, propositions cannot be the primary referents of "true" in (3).
- (8) But (7) contradicts the assumption of the reductionist that when attributed to a proposition " true " is necessarily attributed to its primary referent.
- (9) Hence, if (a) there are pseudo propositions and if (h), synonyms can in all contexts be substituted the one for the other, then the reductionist thesis is inconsistent.

Just because it turns on assumptions -(a) and (b) above Argument II is less elegant than is Argument I. Nonetheless, it is worth considering. The crucial step in Argument II is (6). (6), like (I) in I, goes to the heart of referential equivocity.

If something is called O in a secondary sense of O , then that same something cannot in that same context be the primary referent of O . When, say, you call a certain event sad in, of course, a secondary sense of "sad", that same thing, the event, cannot be the primary referent of "sad". Or again, when you call walking healthy only because it is conducive to health in an organism, you must then hold that it is an organism and not walking which is the primary referent of "healthy". If, therefore, on the assumption of the reductionist thesis, steps (I) through (6) be true, in Argument II, then (7) would follow, namely that propositions are not the primary referents of "true" in (3). But (7) is plainly inconsistent with the nerve of the reductionist thesis that propositions or statements⁴ are always and everywhere the primary referents or bearers of "true" (or "false"). Consequently, if there are such things as pseudo-propositions and if synonyms can generally be substituted the one for the other (as "true" is substituted for "genuine" in step (8) above), then the reductionist thesis is self-contradictory.

But now, if the foregoing arguments (I and II) are cogent, must it not follow that nominalism is false? For from the fact that the truth of things is underivable from the truth of statements it appears to follow that universals exist. This can be shown in two steps. First, if things such as nuggets of gold and diamonds are called "true" or "false" in as straightforward a sense as are statements, and if in calling such things "true" or "false" we mean that they either do or do not exemplify a certain standard, then, as terms of the relation of exemplification, these same standards must have some kind of ontological status. Second, that the ontological status of these same standards is that of real as opposed to conceptual existence is shown by the fact that a conceptualistic account of standards is possible only if none of our ideas are derived from experience. To see this, suppose it be granted that our ideas of goldness

⁴ The difference between propositions and statements makes no difference here.

and of diamondhood are derived from sense experience of individual diamonds and gold pieces (call this (D)). Suppose too that the standards of gold and diamond which are implied in the straightforward use of "true" in phrases such as "true gold" and "true diamond" are man-made and not objective standards, so that a conceptualistic rather than a realistic account of standards is true (call this (C)). In that case, it would be impossible for those supposed standards of gold and diamonds really to be standards after all. For quite generally, that which is the *standard* of x cannot be *deriV'ed from* or be consequent upon x. Otherwise, nonsensically, exemplifications would be prior to or would be the measure of their exemplars and not *vice-versa*. In other words, (C) is incompatible with (D). Hence, unless our ideas of gold or diamonds are innate, i.e. not derived from sense experience, a conceptualistic analysis of standards is untenable. But not even the most unbridled rationalist would deny that our ideas of gold and diamonds, at least, are derived from sense experience of individual diamonds and gold pieces. Therefore, unless it be denied outright that "true" in phrases such as "true gold" l're used in a straightforward, underived sense (and Arguments I and II undermine 'any such denial), it must at once be conceded that the standards which are implied by the straightforward use of "true" in such contexts exist independently of minds.

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WILLIAM WALLACE'S PRELUDES AND ETUDES:
VARIATIONS ON THE CONTINUITY THEME

A REVIEW DISCUSSION *

TO THOSE OF US familiar with the thorough, solid, and trailblazing work of Father Wallace, the first impression in perusing this volume is one of *deja vu*. This is a correct impression. Indeed, as Father Wallace himself points out, the contents reproduce substantially studies and essays published during the past fifteen years. The exceptions to this statement are few: a couple of appendices providing further clarification of the author's positions about reasoning *ex suppositione* and additional examples of Galileo's knowledge of the fourteenth-century Parisian nominalist school; also, a brief article (based on a 1976 conference paper) discussing Galileo's views on causality. The rest is essentially old hat (i.e., classical), even though it contains sometimes minor re-writing, small modifications, as well as attempts at supplying transitions between the various chapters and parts to make the volume unified and homogeneous.

All this does NOT mean that the publication of this volume is unwelcome. Quite the contrary. As Father Wallace indicates, there are some good reasons for collecting the previously widely scattered papers in one readily available tome. Among these reasons, one can mention the following: As an aggregate, these papers "present a unified thesis about the medieval and sixteenth-century sources of early modern science" (p. ix); the volume represents a true ingathering of the author's pertinent historical diaspora, serving to set his interpretation apart from

**Prelude to Galileo: Essays on Medieval and Sixteenth-Century Sources of Galileo's Thought.* By WILLIAM A. WALLACE. (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 62.) Dordrecht, Boston, and London: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1981. Pp. xvi + 869. Cloth \$49.95, paper \$28.50.

those of his illustrious predecessors, Duhem, Maier, Koyre, Moody, and Drake; and, as a whole, the various essays fill in an important lacuna, dealing systematically with Galileo's *early* works, some of which are seminal for a proper understanding of Galileo's mature contribution to the modern science of motion.

The sixteen chapters of greatly unequal length and substance are distributed among the four major subdivisions of the volume. These four parts deal respectively with (1) the medieval roots of sixteenth-century developments in mechanics, (2) the sixteenth-century achievement in the study of motion, (3) Galileo's crucial contributions to mechanics seen as growing out of both medieval and sixteenth-century preoccupations with the logic and physics of motion, and finally (4) an analysis and critical assessment of the historiographic contributions of Duhem, Anneliese Maier, and Ernest Moody in light of the author's own findings in his own "Etudes Galileennes."

Father Wallace's fundamental thesis is *prima facie* both obvious and welcome to the historically minded reader; indeed it is a historical truism: Galileo Galilei did not spring fully formed out of the ahistorical head of a transcendent Zeus. Though a great genius, he was a man of his times who absorbed the kindred ideas of his predecessors and contemporaries, and it is upon these ideas that his creative spirit exerted itself. In Wallace's own words: "Galileo will never be understood either historically or philosophically, when viewed in isolation from the intellectual background out of which his scientific work emerged" (ibid.). Of course. For the historian this is almost axiomatic. It is the historian's job, however, to flesh out, to substantiate this quasi-axiom. This Wallace does admirably. Dropping Drake's approach to Galileo Studies, an approach which Wallace calls *a parte post*, and adopting the *a parte ante* perspective of Duhem, Maier, and Moody, Wallace shows convincingly, by focusing on newly available manuscript sources of Galileo's sixteenth-century notebooks which he has unearthed and dissected (cf. also *Galileo's Early Notebooks: The*

Physical Questions), that Galileo's early views on motion owe their ultimate inspiration to thirteenth-century scholastics, that the views of these commentators on Aristotle were known to Galileo primarily through the intermediary of *reportationes* of lectures of professors at the Collegio Romano, and that realist currents of thought (primarily Thomism, Averroism, Scotism, and, in general, Renaissance Aristotelianism) played a more central role in the genesis of Galileo's *nu.ova scienza* than heretofore granted by those who (with Duhem, Maier, and Moody) identified nominalism as the demiurge of modern science.

These conclusions represent significant enough departures from the previously inherited Galilean scholarship to make Father Wallace's contributions to *Galileana* essential for all serious future workers in the field. And these conclusions are presented with modesty and humility, thoughtfulness and remarkable balance in tone, features which are indeed characteristic of the man and his style. There is an aura of understatement and lack of fanfare surrounding extremely important claims, which are typically backed up with a plethora of specific textual examples, making the modesty and restraint of the claims all the more impressive.

A couple of examples should make this clear. Having established that the kinematics and dynamics of seventeenth century Europe, the *terminus ad quem* of the medieval science of motion, are made up of two components, one mathematical, and the other physico-experimental (towards both of which the Middle Ages made essential contributions), Father Wallace analyzes the development of mechanics to the sixteenth century, starting with the crucial contributions of Bradwardine and the Mertonians to the mathematical component mentioned above (i.e., to kinematics). The other high points of medieval developments in mechanics take place on the Continent, chronologically first at Paris in the fourteenth century (Buridan, Albert of Saxony, Marsilius of Inghen) where Mertonian calculatory techniques are applied for the first time to real physical

motions (falling bodies and celestial motions); next at Padua in the mid-fifteenth century (Paul of Venice and Gaetano da Thiene) where the emphasis on dynamics is further increased by dropping the purely abstract, mathematical, kinematical concerns of a Heytesbury in favor of their application to quasi-real physical, practical situations; the next steps in what may be called the increased physicalization of discussions of motion by the adoption of a progressively stronger realistic approach, at the expense of an exclusively nominalistic tendency, are again Paris, in the early sixteenth century (John Major, Jean Dullaert of Ghent, Alvaro Thomaz, and Juan de Celaja), Spain in the mid-sixteenth century (the important figure of Domingo de Soto) where the examples of natural motions offered in support of theoretical classifications cease to be imaginary and become realistic, leading to the identification of uniformly difform motion with freely falling bodies, and, finally, again Padua during the late sixteenth- and early seventeenth century (Tartaglia, Benedetti, and Francesco Buonamici), leading directly to Galileo in whom all of these developments and traditions coalesced to bring about his unique achievement. And this is how William Wallace ends his essay describing the historical development of mechanics:

In this analysis, the least that can be claimed for the movement we have been tracing throughout this essay is that it provided the point of origin, the springboard, for Galileo's distinctive, but later, contributions. . . . [T]he line of argument pursued in this study suggests a modest conclusion. Bradwardine's *Tractatus de proportionibus* and its successors laid the mathematical foundations that made the seventeenth-century accomplishment in Northern Italy a possibility. Less noticeably, perhaps, they introduced the problematic of how motions can be conceived and analyzed mathematically, and at the same time studied in nature or in artificially contrived situations. Scholasticism may have been in its death throes by the time the full solution to this problematic could be worked out, but withal the schoolmen were not completely sterile in the influences they brought to bear on its statement and eventual resolution (p. 59).

Another example displaying the same distinctive lineaments comes from the essay "The Enigma of Domingo de Soto." In

this essay, Wallace looks at the historical background leading to Soto's seemingly original conception of *uniformiter difformis* -motion with free fall-and at Soto's statement that the distance covered in such a motion is calculable from the elapsed time by means of the Mertonian mean-speed theorem. Wallace establishes that Soto's significant achievement was an outgrowth of " a progression of schemata and exemplifications used in the teaching of physics from the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries Soto's uniqueness ... consists in having introduced as an intuitive example the simplification that Galileo and his successors were later to formulate as the law of falling bodies. How Soto came to his result is a good illustration of the devious route that scientific creativity frequently follows before it terminates in a new formulation that is capable of experimental test" (p. 91). And here is Wallace's summation:

The contribution of the Spanish Dominican was not epoch-making, but it was significant nonetheless All of Soto's examples, of course, like those of his predecessors, were proposed as intuitive, without empirical proof of any kind. Moreover, he and Diest ... were the most venturesome in attempting to assign a precise quantitative modality to falling motion. Of the two, Soto was ... the better simplifier. He seems also to have been the better teacher, and ... he was philosophically more interested in unifying the abstract formulations of the nominalists with the physical concerns of the realists of his day. Again, he had the advantage of time and of being able to consider more proposals. The strange alchemy of the mind that produces scientific discoveries requires such materials on which to work. It goes without saying that Soto could not know all that was implied in the simplification he had the fortune to make. But then, neither could Galileo, in his more refined simplification, as the subsequent development of the science of mechanics has so abundantly proved " (p. 107).

One encounters the same careful, judicious approach and pregnant characteristics in Wallace's discussion of " Causes and Forces at the Collegio Romano " for which Wallace establishes the fundamental role of Mutius Vitelleschi's ideas in Galileo's early treatises:

It could well be, therefore, that what has been sketched is the type of material Galileo studied after leaving the University of Pisa in

1585, and even planned to teach in the late 1580's or early 1590's. This is not to say that the more mature development[s] of the concept of force in Galileo's writings ... or the more explicit development of Johannes Kepler . . . are the same as the ideas here presented. What these researches suggest, however, is that there are subtle connections between concepts of cause and concepts of force, and that the late sixteenth century was the period during which these sets of concepts, which had been used more or less interchangeably for centuries within the Aristotelian tradition, began to get sorted out and assume the form they now have in scientific discourse (p. rn2).

Finally, our last illustration of what is best in Wallace's historical writing comes from the essay "Galileo and the *Doctores Parisienses*." In this essay, Wallace assesses critically Duhem's continuity thesis and Favaro's criticism thereof in light of Wallace's own unsurpassed knowledge of the manuscript sources of Galileo's early notebooks. The result of this thorough analysis is a significant modification and historical fleshing out of the "Duhem-Favaro theses" into what may rightly be called now the Duhem-Favaro-Wallace thesis of the continuity of development between medieval and modern science.

While Duhem identified Galileo's direct precursors as Jean Buridan, Albert of Saxony, and Themo Judei (the so-called *Doctores Parisienses*), Favaro, unconvinced of the value of historical continuity, dismissed Galileo's reference to the *Parisienses* in his Pisan notebooks as just youthful scholastic exercises (*juvenilia*) of an uncommitted, indifferent student who was merely copying indiscriminately from secondary sources, namely his professors' course notes. According to Favaro, then, the value of these youthful, unoriginal jottings for an understanding of Galileo's own original views on motion is naught.

Recognizing the problems inherent in both Duhem's original thesis and in Favaro's criticism of it, Father Wallace plunges into an extraordinarily learned discussion of the contents and sources of MS Gal 46 (containing the so-called *Juvenilia* in which the two references to the *Parisienses* appear) and establishes beyond any reasonable doubt that the writings it contains (questions on Aristotle's *De caelo et mundo* and *De generatione*)

et corruptione) are "the work of Galileo's head as well as his hand" and that they were probably composed from 1589 to 1591 on the basis of ideas extracted from the printed writings of Christophorus Clavius and Benedictus Pererius as well as from manuscript writings of professors at the Collegio Romano, chief of whom are Paulus Valla and Mutius Vitelleschi. Moreover, what is significant is that the *reportationes* of both Valla and Vitelleschi refer to the *Parisienses* in completely similar contexts to those of Galileo.

This leads Wallace to his important modification of Duhem's continuity thesis in which he takes into account the valuable elements of Favaro's criticism. He thus comes up with what he calls a *qualified* continuity thesis which he expounds in the following terms:

Viewed from the perspective of this study, ... nominalism and the *Doctores Parisienses* had little to do proximately with Galileo's natural philosophy or with his methodology. This is not to say that either the movement or the men were unimportant, or that they had nothing to contribute to the rise of modern science. Indeed, they turn out to be an important initial component in the qualified continuity thesis here proposed, chiefly for their development of calculation techniques that permitted the importation of mathematical analyses into studies of local motion, and for their promoting a "critical temper" that made these and other innovations possible within an otherwise conservative Aristotelianism. But Galileo was not the immediate beneficiary of such innovations; they reached him through other hands, and [were] incorporated into a different philosophy. What in fact probably happened is that the young Galileo made his own the basic philosophical stance of Clavius and his Jesuit colleagues at the Collegio Romano, who had imported nominalist and calculatory techniques into a scholastic Aristotelian synthesis based somewhat eclectically on Thomism, Scotism, and Averroism. To these . . . Galileo himself added Archimedean and Platonic elements, but in doing so he remained committed to Clavius's realist ideal of a mathematical physics that demonstrates truth about the physical universe....

What then is to be said of Favaro's critique of the Duhem thesis? An impressive piece of work, marred only by the fact that Favaro did not go far enough in his historical research, and thus lacked the materials on which a nuanced account of continuity

could be based. As for Duhem's 'precursors,' they surely were there, yet not the precise ones Duhem had in mind, nor did they think in the context of a philosophy he personally would have endorsed. But these defects notwithstanding, Favaro and Duhem were still giants in the history of science. Without their efforts we would have little precise knowledge of either Galileo or the *Doctores Parisienses*, let alone the quite complex relationships that probably existed between them (pp. 233-234).

Magisterial. Whatever else one can say about this essay, it is clearly a real scholarly *tour à force*, appealing as it does to paleographic considerations, calendarical and chronological computations, as well as the history of chronology, and displaying, among other things, a deep knowledge of the history of printed editions of scholarly works, the history and output of the *Collegio Romano*, etc., etc., all brought to bear on the Duhem-Favaro clash. It is a fascinating piece of scholarly detective work, limpid, convincing, and important. It gives Wallace's predecessors what they deserve, while modifying significantly their claims and establishing the new claims on solid foundations. It is a truly remarkable study, perhaps the *piece de resistance* of the entire volume, that only William Wallace could have written.

Enough praises. The remainder of this essay review will deal with some of my criticisms of various aspects of Wallace's book. First is Father Wallace's pronounced tendency to use the timeless categories of the philosopher ("realist," "nominalist," "positivist," "instrumentalist," etc., etc.) when discussing historical figures to whom these stark and limpid categories do not starkly and limpidly apply. Instances of this tendency are extremely numerous. And, although these philosophical categorizations have the advantage of making things clear, pregnant, and convincing (they may also explain the inclusion of the book in a series on the philosophy of science), their disadvantage is their very tightness, neatness, and exclusiveness. Even though there is not the slightest doubt about Wallace's impressive historical credentials, one cannot help getting very often the impression that it is Wallace's philosophical hypostasis that has

the upper hand in his historical assessments and that, this being so, history serves as the illustration of basic philosophical distinctions.

This, unavoidably, leads to anachronism. A case in point is supplied by Wallace's discussion of Galileo's use of reasoning *ex suppositione* in which some of the former's explanation is utterly anachronistic, couched as it is in terms of the differential and integral calculus (cf. p. 158, no. 7), which Galileo clearly could not "see." So, saying that Galileo "did not see this immediately" (ibid.) is less a reflection on Galileo's inability and ignorance than it is on Wallace's use of hindsight (cf. also pp. 154-155). There are also other instances in which a purist may discern a historically objectionable way of speaking (for example, on p. 103; cf. also the statement on p. 52: "... a mathematical basis for seventeenth-century mechanics was apparent to the Mertonians [!] whereas an experimental basis was not....").

Coupled with this is Wallace's penchant for the language of anticipation in all its rich and variegated synonymy. Thus we read on p. 5 that Augustine anticipated Descartes's *Cogito* and on p. 6 that Peter Abelard anticipated nominalism. In these cases, the "offenses" seem merely linguistic, i.e., infelicitous ways of saying things rather than assertions involving genuine historical distortions. Still, as one goes on reading the book, one encounters again and again and at an alarmingly increasing rate of repetition the language of "adumbration," or "foreshadowing," or "preparation," or "heralding," or "anticipation," etc., etc. of later views by earlier thinkers (cf. pp. 13, 24, 25, 29, 31, 33, 37, 38, 41, 42, 44, 47, 58, 73, 90 (n. 44), 92, 104, 124 (n. 12), 135, 185 (n. 11), 231, 305—a particularly hackneyed and rebarbative example, in which the 1277 bishops of Paris and Oxford are made into the anticipators of Immanuel Kant—306, 314, etc.), in which one can clearly see a less offensive but nevertheless not innocuous form of "precursoritis." What comes to mind in all these instances is Canguilhem's statement (which I have heard from Gerard Lemaine at the I.A.S.

in 1977) that "Le précurseur c'est celui dont on sait après qu'il est venu avant."

An obvious consequence of the book's nature is the fact that there is quite a bit of overlap between the various essays, which often leads to repetitiousness and, sometimes, to unneeded duplications and redundancies both in the text and in the bibliographic information contained in the notes. Essay #5 ("The *Calculatores* in the Sixteenth Century") is to a large degree an enumeration of a lengthy string of names and works, burdensomely descriptive involving little, if any, analysis of contents and ideas. (But this is, after all, what Wallace set out to do in the original article.) Essay #9 ("Galileo and the Thomists ") is again excruciatingly and wearisomely descriptive and enumerative; it is also tedious and in the nature of "overkill." The point could have been made more economically, I think. (Still, one cannot help being impressed by the great learning and thorough scholarship it displays and by its reliance on previously unresearched primary sources.) The essay seems also to be heavily repetitive. I somehow get the feeling that the table given at the end supplemented by some explanatory comments would suffice to make Wallace's point abundantly clear. It is clear from the above, then, that the quality of the essays included in the book varies; some are impressive, others merely solid.

A few more critical remarks, some on rather minor points. Wallace's stated understanding of Averroes's position on the process of abstraction involved in intellection, on the relationships between the various parts of the intellect, and on the bearing these relationships have on personal immortality (pp. 15-16) seems to me to be faulty, involving, at best, a serious oversimplification of a very difficult issue in both the *Philosopher* and the *Commentator* (cf. the article in the *D.S.B.*, to which Wallace himself refers). In discussing the dilemmas arising from the traditional understanding of Aristotle's statements on motion in Books 4 and 7 of the *Physics* (p. 37), which led to Bradwardine's contributions, Wallace makes an inaccurate as-

sersion about the conditions under which the velocity of a moving body would be finite. In Essay #3 ("The Development of Mechanics to the Sixteenth Century") there seems to me to be an underrating of those elements in Aristotle's theory of motion (like the use of ratios, for example) that were themselves contributory to what will become the *via moderna* in discussions of motion in the fourteenth century.

Essay #8, "Galileo and Reasoning *Ex Suppositione*," is a most enlightening piece of historico-philosophical research in which Wallace takes issue with both the Platonic and the experimentalist (hypothetico-deductivist) interpretation of Galileo's scientific methodology, advancing instead his own view that "the method utilized by Galileo ... was basically Aristotelian and Archimedean in character" (p. 129) rather than *ex hypothesi*, which has its modern equivalent in the hypothetico-deductive method. In spite of some minor reservations, I find Wallace's interpretation insightful and convincing; it should put to rest once and for all the one-sided, distorting approaches to Galileo, some of which, however, stubbornly refuse to die. Still, there are a number of assertions in the essay with which I cannot agree. Thus, it is not clear to me that the experiment described by Galileo in *Opere* 17, pp. 91-92 (see p. 157, n. 4), is one in which "sense observation" plays a decisive role (cf. p. 144). Furthermore, some cases identified by Wallace as illustrative of reasoning *ex suppositione* could, with equal ease and justification, be taken to be representative of reasoning *ex hypothesi* (cf. pp. 144-145, 154). In conclusion (and this is not a disparaging observation), the most that one can say about Wallace's own interpretation of Galileo's methodology is that it is itself a piece of historical reasoning *ex suppositione*: "If this be admitted, then other aspects of Galileo's contribution follow" (p. 148). Indeed. And this is, after all, all one can say about good, sound, convincing historical scholarship.

A few more observations are needed to wrap up these critical comments. There are instances in which items are referred to in the body of the text without their inclusion in the Bibli-

ography (or, sometimes, in any other place). Cases in point are McVaugh, 1967 (p. 32) and Weisheipl, 1963 (p. 40). The book has its share of more or less annoying typographical errors. "Themo Judaeus" (pp. 192-193, 238 n. 32) is an improper appellation, in spite of its currency, as established peremptorily by Henry Hugonnard-Iloche in his *L'Oeuvre Astronomique de Themon Juif Maître Parisien du XIV^e Siècle* (1973). Cf. *ibid.*, p. 13, where the correct name is secured, according to manuscript sources, as Themo Judei in agreement with the medieval spelling. (The second part of the name is either a patronymic or a surname.) It does not necessarily follow that Galileo wrote, or intended to write (p. 195), on "all the books of Aristotle's *Physics*" (*ibid.*); the supportive quotation given in n. III (p. 236) need not be "an indication of a commentary on the eight books of the *Physics*" (*ibid.*), but only on book six: "[ea] quae dicta sunt a nobis 6^o Physicorum ..." (*ibid.*). Finally, the implication that the only kind of impetus fourteenth-century thinkers considered was of the self-exhausting type (p. 322) is inaccurate.

In summation, *Prelude to Galileo* is a masterful work that documents fully the historical transition from medieval science to the science of Galileo, emphasizing the elements of continuity, consistency, and coherence between the Middle Ages and the early modern era in the natural philosophical domain. It is a work of painstaking and illuminating scholarship that clearly advances to a considerable extent, and significantly modifies, the rich field of Galilean scholarship. All workers in the field must come to grips with its important conclusions.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Existence of God. By RICHARD SWINBURNE. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979. Pp. \$37.50.

With this book Swinburne has made an excellent and important contribution to the philosophy of religion. It is much more controversial than his recent book, *The Coherence of Theism*, to which this is the sequel, at least in part insofar as its main issue, the existence of God, is the subject of more debate than the logical coherence of theism. Many readers will undoubtedly consider one or another part of this book mistaken, but no one interested in the philosophy of religion can afford to ignore it.

Swinburne's basic idea is that, since no one has succeeded in producing an argument for or against the existence of God whose inferences are clearly valid and whose premisses are generally accepted as true by those whom the argument is intended to convince, it is reasonable to turn to weaker, inductive arguments to see whether there is sufficient evidence to render God's existence more (or less) probable than his non-existence. To this end Swinburne first devotes considerable attention (almost a third of the book) to the nature of explanation and the logic of inductive argument. In the rest of the book he examines in detail various sorts of inductive arguments for God's existence—cosmological and teleological arguments, arguments from consciousness and moral awareness, from providence, from miracles, and from religious experience—as well as the argument from evil for God's non-existence. He concludes: "On our total evidence theism is more probable than not. An argument from all the evidence in this book to the existence of God is a good P-inductive argument [an argument in which the premisses make the conclusion probable]. The experience of so many men in their moments of religious vision corroborates what nature and history shows to be quite likely—that there is a God who made and sustains man and the universe" (p.

Swinburne's conclusion and the line of investigation leading to it rest heavily on a fundamental principle: "For large-scale theories [such as theism] the crucial determinant of prior probability is simplicity" (p. 53); "*simplex sigillum veri* ('The simple is the sign of the true') is a dominant theme of this book" (p. 56). This principle has been challenged in recent literature. For example, Nancy Cartwright in "The Truth Doesn't Explain Much" (*American Philosophical Quarterly* 17 (1981)) says "Covering law theorists [of whom Swinburne is one] tend to think that nature is well-regulated . . . I do not. . . . God may have written just a few laws and grown tired. Determinists, or whomever, may contend that nature must be simple, tidy, an object of beauty and admiration. But there is one outstanding empirical dictum in favor of untidiness: if we must make metaphysical models of reality, we had best make the model as much like our

experience as possible. So I would model the Book of Nature on the best current Encyclopedia of Science; and current encyclopedias of science are a piecemeal hodgepodge of different theories for different kinds of phenomena, with only here and there the odd connecting law for overlapping domains. The best policy is to remain agnostic, or at least not to let other important philosophical issues depend on the outcome. We don't know whether we are in a tidy universe or an untidy one" (p. 161). For those who share this view, the force of Swinburne's book will be significantly undercut from the outset.

But disbelief in or even agnosticism about the simplicity of the universe is clearly at variance with the ordinary, common-sense assumption on which most men, including scientists, base their work and daily lives. And on practical grounds alone such disbelief or agnosticism seems to me a mistake. For example, some of the exciting recent research in elementary particle physics, attempting to unify theories of the electromagnetic, strong, and weak forces into a single theory and to find a single family to which quarks and leptons can both belong, is plainly driven by belief in the simplicity of nature, as physicists themselves acknowledge. (See, for example, Steven Weinberg, "Is Nature Simple?" in *The Nature of the Physical Universe*, ed. D. Huff and D. Prewett, N.Y., 1979; and Howard Georgi, "A Unified Theory of Elementary Particles and Forces", *Scientific American* M4 (1981) 48-63.)

Those who readily accept Swinburne's fundamental principle of simplicity may nonetheless feel some qualms about the way he applies it. Swinburne occasionally bases a crucial premiss in his argument solely on our intuitions about what is simple, or good, or even probable. For an example involving probability, here is part of his consideration of the argument from providence:

"There are however many other worlds, which if there were no God, would be *as likely* to come into existence as this one. . . . To take crucial examples, the world might have been one in which the laws of nature were such that there evolved rational agents . . . with the power to hurt each other for endless time or to an infinite intensity It follows that the existence of our world rather than of these other worlds, the existence of which is incompatible with the existence of God, which would be *equally likely* with ours to occur if there is no God, is evidence that God made our world" (pp. 198-199; italics added).

In view of the great importance Swinburne attaches to simplicity, such a dependence on unsupported intuition is most striking and most worrisome when it involves judgments about what is simple. -For example, in connection with his discussion of the cosmological argument, Swinburne says what could almost serve as an aphorism for the whole book: "The choice is between the universe as stopping-point and God as stopping-point [of explanation]" (p. 127). Swinburne argues that it is more rational to accept God as the stopping-point: "There is a complexity, particularity, and fini-

tude about the universe which cries out for explanation, which God does not have ... the existence of the universe has a vast complexity, compared with the existence of God. ... the supposition that there is a God is an extremely simple supposition; the postulation of a God of infinite power, knowledge, and freedom is the postulation of the simplest kind of person which there could be.... If something has to occur unexplained, a complex physical universe is less to be expected than other things (e.g., God)." (p. 130) For this argument, which is central to his book, Swinburne depends in the first place on our sharing his intuition that a person whose attributes are infinite is simpler than a person whose attributes are finite. Some of his readers will no doubt agree with him, feeling as Swinburne does that postulating a person with less than perfect freedom or power, for example, raises a difficulty that does not arise in connection with a person with the perfection of the same attribute: namely, why *this* degree of freedom, or power, rather than any other? But for other readers, it may seem that postulating a person who is disembodied, everlasting, uncaused, possessed of infinite power and knowledge, and creator of the physical universe raises a whole host of difficulties not raised by the existence of human persons, some of which Swinburne himself addresses in this book, such as 'Why did God make this universe rather than any other?'

But, even if we agree with Swinburne that God is the simplest kind of person there could be, and even if we accept his judgment that the simplest kind of person is a simpler object than the physical universe, we still do not have the conclusion Swinburne wants and needs, which is a claim about the simplicity of a *hypothesis*. Swinburne slides from the claim that God is a simpler object than the universe to the claim that the supposition of God's existence is a simpler supposition than the supposition of the universe's existence. This seems to me a fallacious move. The history of philosophy and of science abounds with ideas of simple objects the postulation of whose existence was anything but simple. For example, atoms of time, postulated by various thinkers such as the fourteenth-century philosopher Walter Chatton, are extremely simple objects. But the postulation of their existence requires such Byzantine complexity in the attempt to devise consistent explanations of other physical phenomena such as motion that the postulation of their existence has been dropped in favor of the simpler postulation of a spatial continuum, an "object" a great deal less simple than a temporal atom. Hence Swinburne has not, I think, made out his claim that as a stopping-point for explanation the postulation of God's existence is more probable than the postulation of the universe because it is a simpler supposition.

But I think that Swinburne would not incur these difficulties if he added simplicity to his list of God's attributes, a characteristic regularly attributed to God by orthodox theologians of the major monotheisms. Thomas Aquinas, for example, takes God to be simple in a technical sense of 'sim-

plicity ' which implies, among other things, that God is identical with his existence (as well as with all his other characteristics), so that God's existence is logically necessary. (For good defense of the coherence of this notion of simplicity, see William Mann, "Divine Simplicity," forthcoming.) And the postulation of God's existence *is* clearly a simpler supposition and a better final stopping-point of explanation than is the postulation of the universe if God is understood as a logically necessary being. The postulation of the universe as the stopping-point for explanation leaves unanswered the question ' Why does the universe exist? ' or ' Why is there something rather than nothing? '. If God is a logically necessary being, the analogous question in his case has an obvious answer.

Swinburne, however, rejects the notion of a logically necessary being for two reasons. In the first place, he claims that "it seems coherent to suppose that there exist a complex physical universe but no God, from which it follows that it is coherent to suppose that there exist no God, from which in turn it follows that God is not a logically necessary being" (p. ms). Swinburne's argument is this:

- (1) It is coherent to suppose that the universe exists and God does not exist.
- It is coherent to suppose that God does not exist.
- (3) God is not a logically necessary being.

Since Swinburne obviously intends the inference from (1) to (3) to be valid, he is apparently taking ' it is coherent to suppose that ' as logically equivalent to ' it is logically possible that '. Otherwise, the coherence of our supposition that God does not exist could in no way warrant the denial of God's logically necessary being. On this reading, (1) is of the form $\Diamond (pA, \neg; q)$ where q is ' God exists '. Since $\Diamond (pA, \neg; q)$ entails $\Diamond \dots q$, which is logically equivalent to Swinburne's conclusion, his argument is obviously valid; but no one who understands God to be a logically necessary being would agree that it is coherent to suppose that the universe exists and God does not. And so those whom Swinburne is out to convince with this argument would reject its first premiss.

Swinburne's second reason for rejecting the notion of God as logically necessary is his principle that " the logically necessary cannot explain the logically contingent " (p. ms); that is, if God is to be the stopping-point of explanation for the contingent physical universe, he cannot be a logically necessary being because " you cannot deduce anything logically contingent from anything logically necessary " (p. 76). This may be a telling criticism for Neo-Platonists who see the universe as flowing ineluctably from God's being. But it has no force against theists who take the universe to be created by an act of God's free will. Orthodox Christians, that is, can take God as logically necessary and also as the stopping-point of explanation

for the contingent physical universe without violating Swinburne's principle because they consider the existence of the universe to be dependent not just on God's logically necessary being but also on acts of his free-that is, logically contingent-will.

So neither of the arguments Swinburne gives for rejecting the notion of God as a logically necessary being seems to me a good one, and I think that the central argument of the book would have been considerably strengthened if Swinburne had extended his adherence to simplicity to include acceptance of simplicity in its technical sense as a divine attribute implying God's necessary existence.

There are many other issues in Swinburne's book this review might have concentrated on. For example, if we accept the "big bang" theory of the origin of the universe, which appears to be the current view of most scientists, then it seems to me that Swinburne's own version of the teleological argument (which he summarizes and accepts on pp. 140-141) is vitiated by the same sort of objection he himself raises (p. 135) against the simple "spatial order" version of the argument. The "vast uniformity in the powers and liabilities of bodies throughout endless time and space" (p. 140) can be explained naturally by the fact that the entire universe has evolved from the by-products of a single explosion. And although his solution to the problem of evil, based on the value and importance of man's freedom, is ingenious and promising, it seems to me open to some of the well-known objections so eloquently expressed by Ivan Karamazov.

Though there is much to disagree with in the book, it is, I think, the best and the most philosophically interesting among recent defenses of theism. It must be taken seriously, and it is well worth studying.

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Catholicism: Study Edition. By RICHARD P. MCBRIEN. Minneapolis: Winston Press, 1981. Pp. U!90. Paperback \$24.50.

Richard McBrien is a paragon communicator of contemporary theological ideas. He writes in a style that is simple, direct, clear, appealing, and persuasive. He comes from a theologically progressive, renewal-minded position and presents himself as a bridge between the Church of yesterday and the Church of today (p. xxviii). His is a work of systematic or "constructive theology" (p. xxx). The two-volume trade edition of *Catholicism* has received a Christopher Award and the Annual Book Award of the College Theology Society. It has been acclaimed by most reviewers as a beau-

tiful summary and a remarkable success. **It** is a serious attempt at a synthesis of all that is important to the Catholic believer today. **It** starts from Christian Tradition and displays a basic openness to all truth and every positive value. **It** acknowledges the real problems of interpretation involved in bringing Catholic doctrine to bear on contemporary problems. **It** is hope-filled, optimistic; in the best sense it is human in approach. Thus, it uplifts us and challenges us to investigate our faith.

The new *Study Edition* contains an unusual two-page statement from the Bishop of Fort Wayne-South Bend. Father McBrien requested formal ecclesiastical approval for the one volume edition. He made the corrections requested by the censor and was granted a *nihil obstat*. Nevertheless, Bishop William E. McManus declined to grant the *imprimatur*. His reasons were that *Catholicism* is not a "basic text of instruction" and therefore does not require canonical approval according to the latest norms. Secondly, the book attempts a synthesis of traditional and contemporary theological speculation, some of which is only tentative and probable even in the minds of the authors. Thirdly, the bishop anticipates that extensive review of the book may result in further perfecting changes in future editions (p. vi). **It** is difficult to see how the bishop could miss the point that *Catholicism* is intended as a textbook, for McBrien states this clearly (p. 19) and even gives instructions on how the book could be used as a text in a one- or two-semester course (pp. 1195-1196). Whatever one might judge about the appropriateness of giving ecclesiastical approval to this type of book, the bishop's point is well taken, namely that some critical review of *Catholicism* is called for and may help to improve a future edition of this book or similar ones which may be written. It is with this hope in mind that the remainder of this review proceeds.

The *Study Edition* is not a full scale revision, but it does contain some important changes. The most significant modification is in the section entitled "Recognizing a Dogma; Dissent" (trade edition, pp. 71-7Q) which becomes in the *Study Edition* "Dogma and Its Development" (pp. 71-74). The new material is characterized by a rejection of the so-called "double magisterium" theory, namely that theologians are presenting themselves as "a co-equal teaching body with the hierarchy". McBrien underlines: "This is not being proposed here" (p. 7Q). In the new material he is at pains to give examples of "some of the Church's major theologians [who] found themselves in disagreement with official positions at one time or another" (Zoe.cit.). His first example is that of Thomas Aquinas, some of whose theological opinions were condemned by the bishop of Paris in 1277 and later by two successive archbishops of Canterbury. Curiously, he fails to note that Aquinas died in 1274, three years before the first condemnations, and that during his life he was always most respectful of official Church positions. Other noteworthy changes occur on page 513, where a paragraph is added clearly affirming as official teaching that "Jesus was

born of the Virgin Mary " and distinguishing this dogma from contemporary studies which address the meaning of the teaching and the ways to express it today. McBrien deletes a paragraph and adds new material (pp. 517-518) to explain the reconciliation of new scholarship and official teaching on the virgin birth. He substitutes new material (pp. 829, 831, 834, 837) and makes minor corrections in other places concerning the office of the papacy which modify the more restrictive view taken in the trade edition of this work. The author deletes two sentences (pp. 846-847) which stated that in principle every baptized Christian is empowered to administer every sacrament. Finally, McBrien modifies his statements in the moral section on the reaction of bishops' conferences around the world to *Humanae Vitae* to affirm that these conferences " accepted the encyclical as authoritative teaching" (p. 1024) and clarifies official teaching on homosexuals with new material from the Vatican *Declaration on Sexual Ethics* (1975) (p. 1029).

Catholicism is organized around an introduction and five main parts. The introductory chapters situate Catholicism at the point of crisis-i.e., a turning point-and lay the ground rules, i.e., McBrien's understanding of faith, theology and belief. The five parts treat of human existence, God, Jesus Christ, the Church, ethical and spiritual questions. McBrien is faithful to a method which he describes as "traditional ", in that it considers every major point of Catholic faith from the sources of revelation, and " contemporary", in that it proceeds inductively rather than deductively.

In Chapter II of the introduction McBrien makes his key distinctions between faith, theology, and belief. Faith is "personal knowledge of God " (p. 25); theology is that "process by which we bring our knowledge and understanding of God to the level of expression" (p. 26). "Faith exists always and only in some theological form " (*Zoe. cit.*). Throughout the chapter McBrien accents the " personal " side of faith as an experience of God as God, as though there were no content or propositional aspect of faith. Nowhere does he indicate that faith views the content of revelation as " credible", i.e., as the object of faithful assent to God's witness, whereas theology considers the reality of revelation as "intelligible", having an understandable inner meaning and value. Belief is described as " a formulation of the knowledge we have through faith " (p. 27). Throughout Chapter II McBrien uses the term belief as an " expression " of faith, e.g., doctrines and dogmas; but in Chapter VI "Belief and Unbelief Today " he seems to be using it more in the sense of the immanent act of belief which Augustine calls " to think with assent", The *Study Edition* would be improved if these distinctions were made explicit.

In Part One McBrien attempts a coherent statement about human existence. He surveys the contemporary world of change in which we live (Chapter III), the range of anthropological answers which thinkers have provided (Chapter IV), and the theology of human existence (Chapter V).

Because "No aspect of theology is untouched by our anthropology" (p. 82), this section bears careful reading. McBrien is relentless in his application of the position on grace which he develops in Chapter V; he interprets all other Catholic doctrines throughout the book in the light of these principles. McBrien proposes to use transcendental Thomism as the integrating principle of his theology of human existence (p. 134). In the grace-nature question this means acceptance of Karl Rahner's theory of the "supernatural existential", which McBrien describes as "a permanent modification of the human spirit which transforms it from within and orients it toward the God of grace and glory (p. 160). The "supernatural existential" is not grace itself but only God's offer of grace, which, by so modifying the human spirit, enables it freely to accept or reject grace. Although this position is not unchallenged by contemporary theologians, nevertheless, it does have the weight of authority of a leading theologian, who claims to have found its roots in St. Thomas. It is not the acceptance of the supernatural existential by McBrien which is questionable, but rather his development, application, and extension of the theory. In McBrien's treatment God's offer of the supernatural existential is equivalent to grace itself. "Human existence is already graced existence" (p. 162).

As one reads this key Chapter V more carefully, it appears that the three themes of human person, grace-nature, and original sin are very loosely connected. Within each of the themes the biblical, historical, and systematic sections, too, are somewhat disconnected. What McBrien says of the field of anthropology is evidenced by this chapter of his book: "Because of the scientific, philosophical, and theological developments outlined in the preceding chapter, the time for an anthropological recasting of all the traditional doctrines is at hand. But the task is as yet uncompleted" (p. 149). One has the distinct impression that McBrien has relied too heavily on source material, which he does not always acknowledge, and has not given sufficient time for the question to unify itself in his own mind. Compare, for example, *Catholicism on "Grace"* in the Old and New Testaments (pp. 153-155) with John L. McKenzie, *Dictionary of the Bible* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1965, "Grace", pp. 324-326); "The Problem of Nature and Grace" (pp. 158-161) with "Nature and Grace" by Juan Alfaro in *Sacramentum Mundi* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969, vol. 4, especially points 2 and 3, pp. 177-178); "Original Sin", a positive statement of contemporary theology (pp. 165-167) with "Original Sin" by Karl Rahner in *Sacramentum Mundi* (vol. 4, especially "d. Synthesis of the doctrine of original sin", pp. 331-333). A re-working of this chapter will give it unity and remove the appearance of being a kind of dictionary of theological terms.

Part Two: "God" is a long section in which McBrien takes up a number of fundamental questions: belief and unbelief (Chapter VI), revelation (Chapter VII), religion and its varieties (Chapter VIII), God (Chapter

IX), the Trinity (Chapter X). On the question of belief and unbelief McBrien follows Hans Kung: "His approach is consistent with the one adopted in this book ... *That* God is cannot be proved or demonstrated or otherwise established beyond all reasonable doubt. **It** can ultimately be accepted only in a confidence founded on reality itself" (pp. 187, 188). He asserts that this apologetical approach "does not seem to be inconsistent with the official teachings of the First Vatican Council and is certainly not inconsistent with those of the Second Vatican Council" (p. 194). **It** would have been helpful if McBrien had explained how or why the position is not inconsistent with Vatican I: "God, the beginning and end of all things, can be known with certainty from the things that were created through the natural light of human reason, for 'ever since the creation of the world His invisible nature has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made' (Rom. 1:20)" (Denz. 3004). Revelation is the "self-communication of God" (p. 234). **It** is the process by which God communicates and the product of this communication. McBrien's explanation of revelation is controlled by his thesis that every human being is elevated by grace in the depth of his heart: "Even when grace is not adverted to, it is present and operative as a fundamental orientation to God. Thus, every human person is already the recipient of divine revelation in the very core of his or her being in that God is present to every person in grace" (p. 236). In what might be an attempt to remove "sexist language" from God McBrien plays down the importance of the "Fatherhood" of God: "Even if Jesus had spoken of God as our Mother, he would still have had the same essential message to communicate about God.... Furthermore, Jesus's references to his own relationship with his Father in heaven simply underscore the intimacy of Jesus with his Father (whether God is spoken of as Father or as Mother, as Husband or Wife, as Son or as Daughter) ... it is not the Fatherhood of God that is important to Jesus but the Godhood of the Father" (p. 334). **If** Jesus had spoken of God as his mother, husband, wife, son, or daughter, this would seem to have serious consequences for our understanding of the procession by way of generation in God.

Part Three, "Jesus Christ," examines the Christ of contemporary culture (Chapter XI), of the New Testament (Chapter XII), of the Fathers, the Councils, medieval theology (Chapter XIII), of twentieth-century theology (Chapter XIV), and concludes with special questions (Chapter XV) and the Christ of the liturgy (Chapter XVI). This section is marked by its multiplicity of models and opinions: five Jesuses of contemporary popular models (pp. 375-382); the five relationships of Jesus to culture of H. Richard Niebuhr (pp. 382-388); the five clusters of Christological views of the New Testament according to Raymond Brown (pp. 398-403). But it is the chapter on twentieth-century Christology which is most heavily crammed with opinions: a study of ten Catholic theologians, eight Protes-

tant theologians, and one Orthodox theologian in the space of forty pages. McBrien's own comment is apropos: "So broad and diverse a sampling of recent and current Christologies is not easily synthesized" (p. 503). After reading Chapters XI-XIV, one does not have a clear vision of McBrien's Jesus Christ. But Chapter XV treats of four special questions (the virginal conception of Jesus, his sinlessness, his knowledge, and his sexuality) and gives five criteria for judging Christologies according to the Catholic tradition. In this chapter, especially in the section on criteria for judging, we find that the Jesus Christ according to McBrien is quite orthodox and catholic. The chapter on "The Christ of the Liturgy" seems to be included just to show that there is a mutual influence of contemporary Christological opinion on the liturgy and of liturgy upon current Christology.

Part Four, "The Church," is a long section which includes: the Church of the New Testament (Chapter XVII), in history (Chapter XVIII), of Vatican Council II (Chapter XIX), of today; its nature and mission (Chapter XX); the Sacraments of Initiation (Chapter XXI); of healing, vocation, and commitment (Chapter XXII); special questions in ecclesiology (Chapter XXIII); Mary and the Church (Chapter XXIV). Ecclesiology is the field in which McBrien has acquired his well-deserved reputation, and, as one might expect, this section flows very smoothly. He is at home with contemporary views of the Church in the New Testament and moves easily through the history of the Church following an outline division of Hubert Jedin and August Franzen. Some might question if it is not too early to judge the Second Vatican in such superlatives: "a moment comparable in historical significance to the early Church's abandonment of circumcision as a condition for membership (p. 648) ... a council unique in the history of the Church because it was the first really *ecumenical* council" (p. 659). One might question, too, the judgment that "The single most influential personality associated with the event of Vatican II was *Pope John XXIII*" (p. 687). By contrast, a careful reading of McBrien's chapter on the Church of the Second Vatican Council reveals only one place where Pope Paul VI is mentioned (p. 684). Yet the last two Popes have taken the names of John Paul to honor the memories of the unique inheritance left to the Church by Popes John XXIII and Paul VI.

Chapter XX, "The Church Today: Its Nature and Mission," summarizes the opinions of seven Roman Catholic and four Protestant theologians, the bilateral dialogues, official Catholic documents since Vatican II. Everyone would agree with his description of the Church as "an institutionalized servant-community" (p. 714). But all could not agree with McBrien's definition of the Church: "the whole body, or congregation, of persons who are called by God the Father to acknowledge the Lordship of Jesus, the Son, in word, in sacrament, in witness, and in service, and, through the power of the Holy Spirit, to collaborate with Jesus's historic mission for the sake of the Kingdom of God. The definition embraces all Christians:

Catholics, Orthodox, Anglicans, and Protestants " (*loc. cit.*). While it is true that Vatican II used the word " Church " to describe the ecclesial reality of certain Christian communities besides the Roman Catholic Church, it is premature and unrealistic to define the Church as embracing Catholic, Orthodox, Anglican, and Protestant without distinction.

The effect of treating the sacraments as an adjunct to the Church is to emphasize their relation to the Church and in consequence to minimize their relationship to Christ. " They are acts of Christ, to be sure. But they are immediately *acts of the Church*. They are expressions of the nature and the mission of the Church " (p. 733). McBrien easily shows that the sacraments are signs of faith, signs of the Church, but it is more difficult to discover in what sense they are causes of grace. "The sacraments signify, celebrate, and effect what God is, in a sense, doing everywhere and for all " (p. 738). Grace and revelation are universally available. " Accordingly, the doctrine that Baptism is necessary for salvation can mean that for those called explicitly to the Church, Baptism is necessary for salvation " (p. 752). The urgency for Baptism and for missionary activity is somewhat modified. McBrien is sanguine, perhaps overly optimistic, about the success of the various bilaterals, especially those on the Eucharist: " What also emerges is a general readiness (except among the Orthodox) to call for some eucharistic sharing, or intercommunion, on the basis of these remarkable convergences on eucharistic doctrine " (p. 767). In " special questions " (Chapter XXIII) McBrien treats authority, papacy, ministry, women in the Church, intercommunion. Although each is given only a brief study, the solutions proposed are usually balanced and useful.

By placing Marian doctrine in relation to the Church rather than more directly in relation to Christ (Chapter XXIV) McBrien gives more emphasis to Mary's role as preeminent member of the redeemed community and less to her role as mediatrix. His position on original sin and the supernatural existential leads him to a re-interpretation of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception: "If, on the other hand, one understands Original Sin as the *sinful condition* in which every human being is born, then we have to propose a different explanation for the Immaculate Conception. It is not that Mary alone was conceived and born in grace, but, that, in view of her role in the redemption, God bestowed upon her an unsurpassable degree of grace from the beginning " (p. 885). In line with his definition of the Church as embracing Catholics, Orthodox, Anglican, and Protestant Churches, McBrien holds " These two dogmas [Immaculate Conception and Assumption] are not so central or essential to the integrity of Christian faith that one cannot be in the Body of Christ without accepting them " (p. 899).

Part Five, " Christian Existence: Ethical and Spiritual Dimensions," may not be entirely adequate by the standards of a professional moralist, but McBrien does pull together a number of useful elements which are not

available elsewhere in so up-to-date a manner. He gives a concise biblical and historical review of Christian moral demands of the individual and of society and states the post-Vatican II Catholic situation in terms of a shift in methodology from classicism to historical consciousness (Chapter XXV). This is followed by a study of principles and process, which features a distinction of sins into the categories of venial, serious, and mortal; a description of the virtues which blends classicism and historical consciousness; a study of values, norms, and conscience (Chapter XXVI). He considers four special questions, two which have to do with interpersonal ethics: birth control and homosexuality; and two which have to do with social ethics: warfare and the intervention of the state in the economic order (Chapter XXVII). In handling all four questions McBrien gives the official position of the Church and then contemporary views of theologians. When he states the values underlying each position McBrien appears to invite the reader to form his own conscience. On the interpersonal issues, however, McBrien seems to tilt in the direction of theological viewpoints rather than the official teaching, whereas on the issues of social ethics, especially of warfare, he acknowledges the lead which has been taken by the official magisterium and favors magisterium over scholars. McBrien completes his study of morality with a helpful history of Christian spirituality (Chapter XXVIII) and an eschatological study of the Kingdom of God and the four last things (Chapter XXIX).

The Conclusion, "Catholicism: a Synthesis" (Chapter XXX), is a beautiful statement of the distinctiveness of Catholicism, its focus on philosophical realism and its theological foci of sacramentality, mediation, and communion.

The warm reception which Richard McBrien's *Catholicism* has already received is indicative of the need which Catholics feel for a systematic text which will provide a review and updating of theological positions. But McBrien's book is not the final and complete text; it has weaknesses and limitations which will be pointed out by competent teachers. Both the success and the deficiency of *Catholicism* will inspire other theologians and writers to produce competing texts. The result will be the building of many safe bridges between the Church of yesterday and the Church of today.

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Creativity and God: A Challenge to Process Theology. By ROBERT C. NEVILLE. New York: The Seabury Press, 1980. Pp. xi+ 163. \$rn.95.

Robert Neville's *Creativity and God* is a compact, sympathetic, yet critical series of proposals concerning Whitehead, the process theology tradition, and God. It is an intriguing text for anyone interested in one or more of these areas. Within Neville's own textual corpus, *Creativity and God* seems to function as in part a summary and in part a controversialist respite from a massive endeavor to develop a speculative theory of religion—a theory focused on God as Being-itself (*God the Creator*, Chicago, 1968) and human beings as free personally, socially (*The Cosmology of Freedom*, New Haven, 1974), and spiritually (*Soldier Sage Saint*, New York, 1978). The book is also an important one for those who are—or who would like to see if they are—interested in this impressive project.

The central aim is "to provide a sustained critique of process theism, in its roots and at least some branches, from a standpoint at one with Whitehead in appreciation of speculative philosophy, neighboring in general cosmology and opposed regarding the conception of God" (x). Neville frames his discussion by taking the process tradition as an endeavor to work out perceived difficulties in the way Whitehead related God and Creativity. The first seven chapters presume process theism's claim that Whitehead's uniqueness lies in separating or distinguishing God and Creativity. Neville takes the reader through competing strands of "the conceptual structure of process theism" (Chapters I through VI) before a climactic chapter on process theism's endeavors to come to terms with "the structure of experience itself" (116) (Chapter VII). The argument is clear if compact, and its progression is as follows.

First, if God is an individual actual entity (Lewis S. Ford, Whitehead), God will transcend the world too much; indeed, the result is "Whiteheadian deism" (119) (C. II). Further, Creativity on this view remains an irrational, a surd (C. III). On the other hand, if God is a society of actual entities (Charles Hartshorne), then God is "subject to the strictures of necessity" (33, C. IV). Further, there are links between the social view of God and inadequacies in Hartshorne's handling of personal identity, universals, ambiguity and suffering, and a priori knowledge (C. IV).

But, if God is neither individual nor society, ought we to jettison the God of Western religions? Neville argues that both Shubert Ogden's critique of the classical tradition and his neo-classical alternative are inadequate (C. V). Further, process philosophy is "fundamentally alien to the transcendental turn" in theology (C. VI). The latter presumes the givenness of a particular theological content, of secular experience, and/or of transcendental projects in themselves. The most one can do (and Neville claims Charles Winquist has done it) is give a Whiteheadian interpretation to the transcendental imagination (113).

Chapter VII is the climactic chapter, for here Neville moves to "the structure of experience itself" as this is articulated in John Cobb's endeavor to come to terms with world religions. The problem here is that Cobb talks as though a choice must be made between, say, Buddhism and Christianity. But Neville thinks that new structures of existence woven from the various unintegrated resources at our disposal are needed (119-120). Using Plato's theory of the educable "parts of the soul," he proposes that the quest for new structures of existence is a quest for new forms of the spirited part of the soul (the saint), the rational part of the soul (the sage), and the appetitive part of the soul (the soldier).

On the basis of this cumulative critique of the distinction between God and Creativity, the final chapter recommends that the distinction be abandoned. On the process view, the category of the Ultimate (including Creativity, one, and many) remains a kind of irrational given (138-39, 43-47); Neville, on the other hand, wants to distinguish creaturely "cosmological creativity" (the self-constitution of one out of many) from "ontological creativity" ("a transcendent creator that makes itself creator in the act of creating") (8, 139-40, 144-45). Again, the distinction between God and Creativity limits God's presence in the world in the name of human freedom; Neville, on the other hand, prefers to conceive God's presence as "coincident with people's freedom" (141). In this way, unlike the God of process theism, God can indeed know us in "the subjective immediacy of our hearts" (17). Further, this distinction between God and Creativity limits our presence to God. Neville, on the other hand, claims that our spontaneous immediacy is "the divine character" (10); God (as in "most religions") is "closer to us than we are to ourselves" (18, 34). Finally, the distinction is inadequate as a reading of the theistic tradition, whereas Neville suggests that his notion of ontological creativity may (or may not) be more adequate.

Quarrels with Neville will naturally have at least three objects: his exegesis of Whitehead, his critique of one or more of the strands of process theism, and his own proposal. For example, does the exegesis devote adequate attention to the fact that the category of the Ultimate (including Creativity) is "presupposed in" the other categories and that Whitehead's "God" is a "derivative notion"? Is it plausible to imply that process theism has a more "identifiable nature" than all the major religions (133)? And is a "philosophical trinitarianism" (8) which synthesizes theism, quasi-pantheism, and Buddhism a coherent reading of the goods and evils of our individual and collective lives? Evaluation on these or other scores would have to address itself to Neville's other writings. But *Creativity and God* is valuable as a unique challenge not only to the process tradition but also to classic Christian concepts of divine and human life.

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Total Presence is Thomas Altizer's seventh book. He is one of the few
 THOMAS J. J. ALTIZER. New York: Seabury Press, 1980. Pp. 108.

Total Presence is Thomas Altizer's seventh book. He is one of the few well-known contemporary American theologians who have produced a sizable body of work devoted to the elaboration of a single theological vision. Unfortunately, Altizer in his latest book comes no closer than before to giving us a convincing or even fully intelligible presentation of his vision.

Altizer is continuing to elaborate the eschatological understanding of the Christian message and of Western history developed ten years ago in his *The Descent into Hell*. New in this book is his focus on the parables of Jesus. Altizer finds in these parables 'antistories' which negate everything previously recognizable as meaning or identity. They actualize a presence that is total and that negates all horizons beyond the pure immediacy of its speech. In these parables, the Kingdom of God is immediately at hand.

The eschatological message of Jesus is lost in the Church's pyrrhic victory over the Hellenistic vision. It is recaptured only in the modern revolution that has its roots in medieval apocalypticism, reaches its fullest philosophical expression in Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche, and is embodied in contemporary avant-garde poetry, painting, and music. The central targets of this revolution are, on the one hand, a transcendent God who can be spoken of as something other than totally and immediately present and, on the other, an interior, self-conscious center of individual identity. These interrelated concepts had an important part to play in the dialectical history of consciousness, but they are now dissolving and must dissolve before the advent of a new, total, and immediate identity in which God and humanity are anonymous, not because they are so distant from each other that naming is impossible, but rather because their presence to each other is so total and immediate that the distance involved in naming has been dissolved. In the new world of mass revolution and of an art in which the individual voice ceases to speak, the alienated, autonomous self-consciousness and the transcendent God which mirrored it both find realization only in their dialectical negation, universal presence.

No one can deny the breadth of Altizer's religious vision or of his acquaintance with the Western avant-garde tradition. He writes well, almost too well. The rhythm of his rhetoric can tempt one to turn the page before one has grasped what has been said. Nevertheless, this book is unconvincing at a variety of levels. The presentation takes a form closer to a virtuoso soliloquy than to a contribution to public discussion. Contemporary theologians and philosophers are never mentioned, nor is their impact evident. Various major figures of the past are mentioned over and over again, but their ideas are never analyzed or discussed in detail. The book is—naturally—without footnotes.

The inadequacies of this mode of presentation are most obvious in the discussion of Jesus's parables. Here is one of the few places that Altizer's discussion becomes specific enough for critical evaluation. One presumes Altizer's interpretation grows out of the intense discussion, over the last decade, of the ways in which the parables mean. Altizer does not, however, explicitly draw on this discussion nor give us any idea of where he stands in relation to it. This omission would not be serious if Altizer's reading of the parables could stand on its own, but it cannot. Why should one think that ". . . the intention of parable is to realize an enactment of speech wherein a totality of speakable or realizable identity is wholly present and immediately at hand" (pp. 3f)? What does it mean to say that parable shatters every speakable distinction (p. 12)? Altizer's interpretation would be easier to come to terms with if he analyzed even one specific parable instead of merely making generalizations about parabolic speech.

Altizer's downfall in discussing the parables is the downfall of the entire book: sweeping statements with little evident supporting analysis. Sometimes his generalizations seem illuminating (e.g., that Greek philosophy was the consequence of a vision that received its first expression in art, p. 38). Sometimes they are beyond taking seriously (e.g., that Paul was "... obsessed by chaos, guilt, and self-judgment," p. . . . They are never backed up with detailed analysis.

Altizer's problems, however, run deeper. The foundation of his theological vision is a picture of the history of consciousness that is both descriptive and normative. To be right is to be in step with the history of consciousness. That history is the only possible norm, since consciousness is the ultimate medium in which reality must be real. Reality is real only as it is a moment within consciousness. If truth is a correspondence to reality, then it also must be a correspondence to consciousness and its history. This relation explains Altizer's assumption that the avant-garde is always right. They are right because they express the flow of history. Altizer's parochialism of the avant-garde is an in principle parochialism.

Fundamental questions need to be asked about Altizer's assumptions and procedures. First, should consciousness be made that in which all reality must appear in order to be real? What does "consciousness" then refer to? How does Altizer's thorough-going idealism relate to the empiricism and nominalism that are far more typical of modern America?

Second, can we so easily construct pictures of the universal history of consciousness, especially on the basis of unsupported generalizations? Despite Altizer's avowed modernity, he seems unbothered by one of the prime specters of modernity, historical relativism.

Third, can we rely so exclusively on dialectic to understand history, particularly on a dialectic as inflexible as Altizer's? For a Kierkegaard, dialectic is a tool that exposes nuance and subtlety. For Altizer, it is a Procrustean bed into which everything must be made to fit. Nothing is ever partial for Altizer. Everything is absolute and total. (Some variant of

" total " is used at least 158 times.) In Altizer's world there are no shades of grey, blue, or green. There is only black and white, and even they are only the dialectical reversals of each other.

What is odd, however, is that, while Altizer's dialectical categories become quickly predictable, their application remains almost arbitrary. He neither explicitly nor implicitly explains how we are to differentiate dialectical opposition from mere difference. He seems to admit (p. 40) that cultural realities can be in opposition without being dialectically opposite, but gives little hint about how to go about telling one from the other.

Altizer remains one of the few American theologians willing to risk elaborating a comprehensive theology through a number of books. Nevertheless, his methods, his conclusions, and perhaps even his fundamental vision of the nature of Jesus's message are inadequate for the development of a theology for contemporary Christian existence.

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The Problem of Self in Buddhism and Christianity. By LYNN A. DE SILVA.

New York: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., Barnes & Noble Import Division, 1979. Pp. 185.

This book falls into the growing tradition of Buddhist-Christian dialogue. Rather than pursuing historical scholarship, however, de Silva tries to understand, and resolve in his own terms, one of the most significant Buddhist-Christian contrasts: diverging views on the nature of the soul or self. Detailing the teachings of each tradition—the Buddhist refusal to take a final stand on the question of the soul (saying it is ultimately unimportant for salvation) and the Christian (=Biblical) affirmation of the resurrection of the body and eternal life for the individual soul—de Silva then proposes a meeting point which, he hopes, will open the door for a the concept of *anatta-pneuma*. *Anatta-pneuma*, or, as John Hick says in his foreword, "nonegocentric mutuality" (p. ix), is based on the notion that individuals are not isolated entities, but participants in a dynamic system of interpersonal relationships whereby the boundaries of their own egoity are ultimately transcended in and for the community. It is in light of this "communal selflessness" that de Silva then recasts the original inspirations of the Buddhist and Christian traditions. While his efforts are commendable, and certainly worth working through for anyone with background in either field, the problems of method and context are almost insurmountable.

It is important to remember at the outset that de Silva's method is not that of a scholar but that of a theologian, who builds his own philosophical system by taking from each tradition those elements which are most useful

in the construction of a common Buddhist-Christian eschaton. By drawing his own conclusions about the intersection of the two traditions on the self/soul, de Silva denies himself the scholarly status he might have had if he had been more faithful to the historical and philosophical contexts from which the two teachings came. And, in fact, had he been more contextually oriented, the affinities and complementarities which he finds would have been seen to be strained, if not groundless.

De Silva's book is an attempt at dialogue, and indeed he does move back and forth with ease between the two traditions. But this ease is deceptive, and in the end proves inappropriate to each tradition. By using Christian terms to clarify Buddhism, for instance, de Silva adds something to the early Buddhist discovery that was not necessarily there before. He selectively chooses concepts, matching them to get a doctrine that is satisfactory to him, but not necessarily appropriate to each tradition. And what appears to be satisfactory to him is whatever will somehow vindicate the Christian message. The hidden agenda of his book, it seems, is to affirm the validity of the Christian Kingdom of God in Buddhist terms: "In the idea of the Kingdom of God, I suggest, we have an answer to the Buddhist quest for self-negation as well as for a form of self-fulfillment . . ." (p. 130). It is the Kingdom of God, then, which for de Silva provides the symbol for the Buddhist-Christian eschaton whereby there will be the progressive realization of egolessness (the doctrine of *011ULtiii*) and the progressive actualisation of the participatory individual (the doctrine of *pneuma*) (p. 123) in a spiritual community. In defense of his methodology de Silva says:

The question may be asked: what right have I to use terms and ideas that belong to Buddhism to express Christian truths? The answer is simple: I am doing what is inevitable in a multi-religious context and what most religious teachers have done (p. xiii).

In other words, de Silva is undertaking to do, by himself, what he sees to be the inevitable outcome of any pluralistic historical process: to graft concepts and beliefs from other (and alien) systems on to his own where they seem most appropriate.

His collaboration with Christianity provides the structure whereby de Silva miscasts two very important elements in early Buddhism: the nature of Buddhism as a revolutionary ideology and the intent of the Buddhist doctrine of *anattii*. First, it has been argued in the past, and it is argued again by de Silva, that the thrust of the revolution within the Hindu context was ethical. His position is that the elaborate and meticulous analysis of the nature of conditioned existence is undertaken in Buddhism not for its own sake but rather to give rise to a certain social and ethical attitude that will lead to "release" from the human predicament. De Silva is quite right in focusing on the soteriological nature of the Buddhist movement, but this soteriology is not ethically founded, as he argues, but based

instead upon a new metaphysical perception of the world, a discovery of the causal, and therefore transitory and foundationless, qualities of a world permeated by sorrow. *Dulckha* is not, as de Silva claims, a word for "disharmony, conflict, unsatisfactoriness, anxiety, etc., a word which describes the predicament in which man is, in his state of alienation" (p. 151), that is, a word which describes the pain of man's autonomy and isolation from others. Rather, *dukkha* is irrevocably bound to the other two Buddhist marks of existence, *anicca* and *anattii*: man feels suffering (*dukkha*) because he is attached to (has *tanha*, desire, for) elements in his experience which are by nature impermanent (*anicca*) and without an ultimate ground of being (*anattii*). In other words, man suffers because he cannot have, on a permanent basis, whatever he desires most. Harmony and the rest are therefore not appropriate in a discussion of the Buddhism of South Asia; causality is. It is only as a consequence of our non-attachment to causal existence that concern for others, at least in the Theravada tradition, arises. Ethics is, therefore, a secondary issue in the soteriology of early Buddhism.

We move now to the Buddhist notion of the self and, for de Silva, to the necessary implications of *anattii* for the Christian God. By and large, de Silva's explications of the Buddhist teachings on the soul are standard. That he does not give the reader anything new in his analysis is due, perhaps, to his apparent reading of the texts from others' translations, rather than in the original. But be that as it may, it is de Silva's interpretation of *anattii* which proves most troublesome, for in laying out the doctrine's implications he seems most motivated by a desire to ease the radical threat of early Buddhism, rather than to face the doctrine head on. His approach to the "soul question" diverges dramatically from that of the Buddha. In taking up the question of whether or not man has a soul, the Buddha outlines three arguments (Personal Continuity, the Parts and the Whole, and Causality) by which one might argue for a soul. By carefully analyzing these arguments, the Buddha concludes that we simply cannot know whether or not there is a soul. Moreover, we should not even bother to ask the question, for belief in a soul or in no-soul is ultimately unhelpful, that is, is ineffective in the salvific process. He classes it, therefore, amongst those questions he traditionally answers in silence.

In contrast to the Buddha's metaphysical position on the question of the soul (*attii*) is his teaching about individual notions of self, and here de Silva's discussion is appropriate, at least in the beginning. We individuals are nothing more than a complex of matter, feelings, perceptions, compounded mental states, and consciousness. But because of our attachment to existence, we project a transcendent essence on to this complex and call it "I," and it is this attachment to an ultimate personal identity, false and illusory as it is, that is the major cause of suffering. The Buddha's call to non-attachment is the call to render unfounded all perceptions of the significance of the self, to give up all grasping for personal ultimacy, and to

free oneself of the confines of a falsely constructed ego. What de Silva does not explain is that the result of the Buddhist's non-attachment, according to the orthodox tradition, will be the undermining of the karmic power of our actions. And it is only when the fruit of all our actions has been played out that the "self," this complex of causal elements that is tied to existence only by its karma, will no longer have its basis in rebirth (*samsiira*), and will experience *nirvana*: the "extinguishing" not only of karmic power but of desire, sorrow, and the illusion of the self as well.

The all-important question of karma and rebirth, so essential to Buddhism and especially to the Indian context in which Buddhism arose, is rarely, if ever, addressed by de Silva. Instead, he focuses upon the entirely unfounded notion that *nirvaana* is the extinction of the ego (p. 144)-not, as tradition says, the extinction of our false idea that there is an ego or the extinction of the karmic power of our actions. Having defined *nirvaana* as the extinction of the ego, however, de Silva cannot rest in the face of such a threat without bringing in the Christian God. "It is my contention that, if *anattii* is real, God is necessary; it is in relation to the Reality of God that the reality of *anattii* can be meaningful. . . . If man is really *anattii*, God is indispensable for his salvation. If God is not, then *anattii* necessarily implies final extinction" (pp. 138, 145), a horror, apparently, that is entirely unacceptable to him. For de Silva, the experience of *nirvaana* is necessarily accompanied by an experience of a reality which goes beyond all rational thinking to some deeper depth of ultimacy. He refuses to leave man's solution to himself, as Buddhism so clearly demands, or to find the key to existence within existence itself, the only way as far as early Buddhism is concerned. Rather, he posits as basic to human nature man's need to transcend himself, to go beyond himself when the boundaries of the ego have broken down. The inevitable transcendence of the individual occurs, in de Silva's Buddhist-Christian system, when man finally affirms the relational nature of his existence in a community of people whose identities are based in the transcendence of the Christian God.

De Silva's distortion of early Buddhist thought is compounded when he applies Buddhist terms to the recasting of the Biblical material. He begins by stating that the Genesis account of a *creatio ex nihilo* implies the impermanence (= *anicca*) of all elements of our experience-that is, of course, the impermanence of all things as they appear apart from God (p. 78). His application of *anicca* here, however, does not take into account the necessary causal underpinnings of *anicca*: all things are impermanent precisely because they are causally conditioned, and that includes, for the Theravada Buddhist, all notions of a soul and all beliefs in a God, as well as the gods themselves (n.b. the Pali Canon's constant railing against the *devas*, and its clear bias). De Silva then proceeds to argue that because the (Hebrew material in the) Bible leaves no room for the notion of an immortal soul, and because the Hebrew *nepesh* and Greek

psyche both refer to the same unitary concept of man (marked, that is, by the absence of a mind/body dualism), there is *anattii* in the Bible—an *anattii*, or as de Silva says, a creatureliness, that exists for man when he is apart from the spirit of God (p. 84).

De Silva then argues that Christianity takes the doctrine of *anattii* far beyond that which is found in Buddhism. First, while Buddhism denies an ultimate self, it also argues that man has an intrinsic capacity to work out his own salvation; Christianity, on the other hand, states that man cannot save himself—he can be saved only by the grace of God. Second, the Buddhist theory of karma and rebirth implies that there is a "something" in man which has the power to cause or perpetuate life in other persons after his own death (that something being, though de Silva never really discusses it, man's karmic qualities); the Christian doctrine, on the other hand, says that it is only by the power of God that man inherits eternal life. By trying to show that the Bible has a more thoroughgoing doctrine of *anattii* (based, for de Silva, on the much more desirable Christian doctrine whereby man is relieved of all soteriological responsibility), he is arguing not only that the Christian doctrine is far more radical than the Buddhist, but that Christianity somehow "out-Buddhizes" Buddhism. For de Silva, the problem is this: if *anattii*, i.e., no ultimate self, is real, then there must be some other transcendent element which fills in the vacuum. His fear is quite real as he stands before the radical implications of what is in fact the Buddhist doctrine, i.e., that the existence of anything transcendent simply cannot be argued for, and therefore should not be a consideration in the soteriological process. **It** is at this point that de Silva must, it seems, bring in God and the community.

De Silva is quite right in arguing for the transcendental nature of the Christian self. His discussion of man as *imago Dei* is appropriate as far as it goes, particularly in his assertion that man is not made immortal, but made to be immortal. He overemphasizes, however, the communal nature of this image, saying that what is most important is the direct and positive relation of community between man and God—clearly an argument that would support his own thesis, at the expense, however, of an authentic reading of the Biblical material. Moreover, de Silva's discussion contains little if any Christology. How, we ask, can one understand the transcendence of the Christian self, and particularly man as *imago Dei*, without an analysis of the Incarnation? His overemphasis on the Holy Spirit and his neglect of Christ must be counted as obvious weaknesses in the Christian side of his argument.

It is the issue of transcendence, however, which continues to be his kingpin and, ironically, the main obstacle to the success of his argument. For de Silva, and for Christian doctrine, the existence of a transcendental quality in man which enables him to rise above his finite existence is crucial. But for Buddhism, transcendence is precisely that about which we can say nothing and which must therefore be excluded from the soteriological

process. It was, in fact, the belief in God and the soul which Buddhism so vehemently argued against in its early days. The attribution of a transcendent dimension to Buddhism is not the only thing which proves so fatal to de Silva's argument, however, but the overvalued ethico-social dimension as well. To be sure, the communal element is there in both traditions, but to argue that *anattii*, for instance, is an ethical concept or that the goal of early Buddhism was a communal eschaton with primarily social implications is to recast the original material into unrecognizable form. While de Silva's book is a thought-provoking introduction to Buddhist-Christian conversation, its reworking of the original material is on most accounts inauthentic.

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God Beyond Knowledge. By ARTHUR HERBERT HODGES. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1979. Pp. xii + 181. \$22.50.

In his posthumously published *God Beyond Knowledge*, Herbert Arthur Hodges (1905-1976), late Professor of Philosophy at the University of Reading, undertakes to examine the origin of the 'God' concept, to explore the standard several dimensions of man's reputed knowledge of God, and, perhaps most importantly, to answer the question of our ability to know Him metaphysically. Although this position is not always argued consistently, the author's conclusion about natural theology is basically negative. Given Hodges's presumably early exposure to the British Empirical tradition and his ready acceptance (albeit a pragmatic one) of the scientific model of knowledge, this conclusion would not be surprising except for the fact that Hodges himself was a devout Anglo-Catholic, a lay theologian, and the author of several apologetic works on the Christian religion. Consequently, while he will employ the traditional philosophical concept of God throughout much of the discussion in this book and even make use at times of the *Thomistic* doctrine of analogy, ostensibly to counter religious anthropomorphism and agnosticism, his true philosophical position finally unmasked is a form of Pyrrhonian scepticism. Consistent with this scepticism, he will embrace Hume's analysis of cause and thus deny the possibility of any *a posteriori* proof of God's existence. For Hodges, then, one's acceptance of God's existence and of a particular religious creed are both equally choices of the will—the standard Protestant view—not intellectual assents with a foundation in reason. In reviewing this book I will focus upon those chapters in which philosophical material particularly is dominant.

In describing the origin of the 'God' concept (Chapter 5, "The Genesis

of 'God') Hodges seems primarily concerned with the one prevalent in Western philosophy and theology and in the Judaeo-Christian tradition, although he sees his remarks as applying, *mutatis mutandis*, to Hinduism as well. This concept, according to Hodges, is that of an "All-Agent" and arises because we tend to view *being* as essentially connected with *activity* or *agency* and to think that the mind-unified reality we call "the world" depends upon a superior being. Why we think it is (1) caused by a single (2) Personal Agent (3) Who transcends finitude Hodges explains respectively through our desire for a unity of pattern or design, our recognition of the perfection of person, and our impatience with limitations and consequent need to find the absolute realized. Thus, "We form the concept of God as being which is wholly self-sufficient and whose activities amount to nothing less than creating and sustaining all that is. God, so conceived, is being in an unqualified sense. He is not something as distinct from something else—that would be limitation—he is without qualification, he is That Which Is, *ipsum esse subsistens*" (p. 54). Yet Hodges recognizes that such a concept must also be supported by proof of God's existence if it is not to be only a fantasy, "valuable perhaps as poetry or drama but still not a cognition of reality." Consequently, he finds it necessary to re-examine, "but in the light of the present situation," the traditional natural theology's arguments for God's existence.

In Chapter 6 ("Metaphysical Arguments for God's Existence") Hodges considers four traditional arguments for God's existence (to the three Kant recognized he adds a fourth, one based upon the need for satisfying the mind's desire for complete intelligibility). Noting that there are various forms of the *cosmological* argument (the argument from "contingency" as he prefers to call it), Hodges states it in what he considers the broadest terms possible, namely, in terms of the dependency of one being upon another for the realization of its potential to be or to be made actual. Since not all beings can be dependent, Hodges argues (following the traditional line), we must therefore arrive at a first cause, one, however, which need not be "first" in a temporal series. In this last connection he writes, "in the heyday of natural theology causality was not necessarily a time-relation. In particular the causal relation between God and the universe was not so. God, being Himself timeless, was the cause of all that is in time by virtue of a timeless act. If the world existed through an infinite past, it was nevertheless dependent, throughout the infinite past time, on the action of the timelessly existing God for its existence and duration" (p. 68). Hodges then explains how we are led to characterize the first cause as infinite, completely immaterial, and always possessed of a perfect act of understanding and concludes this discussion on a partly Aristotelian note by remarking "Here is a first cause which can hold our interest, and the belief which can give a sense of meaning to our lives" (pp. 65-66).

The argument from *design* is the next to be considered, and in its summary Hodges comments that "in all these phenomena (of nature) we are

invited to see evidences of purpose at work and since the animals involved cannot themselves be supposed to have the power either to conceive these purposes or to execute them the facts point directly to God " (p. 65). However, concerning the value of this argument, Hodges points out that it cannot be expected to sustain the whole weight of religious theism, for, at best, it only proves a purposeful controller of the world, not a creator. Regarding the *ontological* argument, Hodges believes that Kant's refutation remains valid so long as one reads the argument at its surface level, but that there is also its deeper level which accounts for its continued fascination. According to Hodges, this deeper level involves a flash of insight that what is highest in thought must *be*, or, and here he cites another contemporary writer on the subject, that thought *is* the criterion of reality and that there is also its deeper level which accounts for its continued fascination. The ontological argument would seem to resemble closely the argument from *intelligibility*. In explaining this latter argument Hodges uses language reminiscent of certain recent Thomist philosophers as he argues that the mind, unsatisfied with mere partial explanation of the real, seeks an explanatory principle which leaves no question unanswered and which makes the whole intelligible, namely, a supreme intelligence and creator whom men call God.

At this point in his reading, one could infer that Hodges is prepared to give some credence to the traditional arguments for God's existence. Not so, however, as the reader soon discovers when he arrives at Chapter 8 ("Not Proven"). Here Hodges questions metaphysical *realism* by arguing that, since our knowledge is restricted to the phenomenal aspects of material reality (which we "objectify" or scientifically describe in quantitative or mathematical terms), "we can form no certain and definitive doctrine concerning the most general structure of being " (p. 93). Thus, regarding the notion of *cause* Hodges now claims that it is impossible to know what it is for a cause to act or even to apprehend a necessary relation between cause and effect. All that we know about this latter relationship, he asserts, is that one thing regularly follows another in our experience and thus may be said to "depend " upon it. Consequently, he concludes, as well he may, the arguments from contingency and design fail to prove God's existence. As for the principle that the real is what realizes the demands of the intellect, i.e., the principle of intelligibility, Hodges dismisses it here as a " piece of unsupported dogmatism " which we do not know to be true.

In some of the later chapters (9, 10), Hodges -discusses the nature of religious-mystical experience as a possible mode of experiential knowledge of God and also the nature of religious faith. While emphasizing in this context God's incomprehensibility, he will still continue to speak of God in *analogical* terms, making use of concepts he consistently employs throughout the book, such as agency and person. But it is in his chapter "*Credo ut Fiam*" (13) that he fully reveals the extent of his scepticism.

As a sample he claims that, although we may rightly accept them on pragmatic grounds, we can never be certain that the guiding principles of our knowledge of reality (e.g., the assumptions that our memories are valid, that the future will resemble the past) are true. It is within this context that he asserts that science and religion are equally based on faith, the principle of which, according to him, is the will to live. In his final chapter (16) he sums up the results of his discussion. Generally stated they are: (1) The foundation of theism is an imaginative vision of existence which can be of deep significance for life but which cannot be verified by reason; what determines belief, therefore, is an existential acceptance, so that, actually, there are no more rational grounds for believing theism to be true rather than its opposite; and (3) one chooses the belief which allows expression to one's authentic self.

In concluding, this reviewer feels obligated to offer some remarks about the merits of this book (a "much revised" version, he neglected to mention, of Hodges's Gifford lectures delivered at Aberdeen in 1956-57). Aside from its lack of internal unity of thought development (a reflection, perhaps, of its original lecture form), what is most disturbing about the book is its obvious violation of the rule of internal consistency. While the author often offers instructive statements concerning our natural knowledge of God and its limits-and argues them as though he thought them of value-their value is ultimately negated by his deeper scepticism. What is also confusing philosophically is that, despite his uncritical acceptance of the Humean concept of cause, Hodges will continue to refer to God as "All-Agent" and Personal Creator even when describing the *mystic's* awareness of God. It might be said in his defense, perhaps, that these references are based upon the author's religious faith; even so, this does not prevent them from being quite unintelligible from the standpoint of what Hodges has claimed reason can know. Finally, one might also wish to express his dismay that a Christian *and* a philosopher would have so completely succumbed to this radical form of skepticism without apparently having given too much thought to its logical epistemic consequences.

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Divine Commands and Moral Requirements. By PHILIP L. QUINN. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978. Pp. viii + 166. \$19.50.

In this study, which defends the status of divine command theories of ethics without positively advocating such theories, the author is concerned to set forth a view according to which propositions expressing moral requirements may be coherently and illuminatingly regarded as necessarily

equivalent to propositions expressing the content of those same requirements as divine commands. Divine command theories have fallen on hard times. Thus the author, in defending such theories against objections, has in a sense offered a conceptual account of moral requirements modeled on decrees of God in much the same way that recent philosophy has used alternative worlds and states of worlds to explicate propositional modalities.

He begins with a simple theory stating the terms of equivalence and proceeds to amplify the simple theory according to the views of God presupposed by various forms of theism. In the simple theory, it is necessary that for any proposition p it is required that p if and only if God so commands; it is permitted that p if and only if God does not command the denial of p ; and it is forbidden that p if and only if God commands that not- p , where the name "God" designates a singular across the class of worlds in which that singular exists and nothing in worlds in which that singular fails to exist,

He then takes up ten objections to divine command theories, disposing of them clearly and cogently, in the reviewer's opinion; he urges at length that the most serious objections can be treated so as to show that it is at least more reasonable to suspend judgment on the truth of divine command theories than to reject them. We shall return to this later; for in the reviewer's opinion the author has himself given covert reasons for rejecting such theories in some of his declarations of neutrality.

The author, with the same firm competence evident in his defense, works divine command into theory of value and obligation, a theory which deals with conflicting *prima facie* moral responsibilities and recent deontic logics. His strategy resembles one of giving a kind of moral semantics in terms of divine commands.

It is his final chapter, however, which the reviewer finds most interesting and which raises the question of how well the divine command theory has been defended. Throughout, the author has been at pains to precise his theory without reference to classical theism in any of its special doctrines, doctrines logically independent of the concept of the authority of divine commands as such. The difficulty is whether such independence does not ultimately tip the balance toward a rejection of divine command theories. On p. 140, he states the argument of Minas to the effect that, according to orthodox theism, God cannot legitimately be said to forgive or refrain from punishing to the extent that this involves a prohibited change in attitude on God's part. He counters with the reply that, of course, God can do all this; and proceeds to vindicate "the doctrine that God's activity of forgiving sins consists either in a change of attitude on his part or an act of refraining from adopting a negative attitude" (p. 145). To this, two comments seem in order. First, Minas's characterisation of the *aseity* of God is questionable in the opinion of the reviewer, who is a classical theist. Quinn is quite correct to regard it as inadequate. Second, his proposed alternative-which does allow changes of attitude and disposition

in God-seems less effective than the position of careful classical theists. Classical theism requires that God be immutable. Hence it must explain apparent "changes of attitude" in God as, say, toward the repentant. While holding to divine immutability, the classical theist must explain the perfectly acceptable intuition that God does resent or view with displeasure certain actions, that he punishes, and that he has compassion on the repentant. The author's own treatment, indeed, permits a defense of the classical view. In its defense, the reviewer would suggest the following account.

God is displeased with or resentful of or in a state of personal umbrage at (henceforth we shall say merely "is displeased") action y just exactly in case He has commanded the avoidance of y . This would apply to the action y simply and without qualification. We would say, then, that God is displeased with the agent X *on account of* y just exactly when (i) X brings y about (does y , etc.) and (ii) X believes or accepts that God is displeased with y . This makes God's displeasure rest on an agent in terms of the agent's belief about what he does in relation to God. We could then easily say that God is displeased with agent X during the temporal interval ' $t-t$ ' just exactly when there is an action y such that (i) God is displeased with X on account of y (ii) X brought about y at t ; and (iii) X repented of y at ' t .' This rests the limits of God's displeasure less within the Divine will than within the limits of the unrepented deed.

Further we could with equal ease say that God forgives X (the sin) y just exactly when (i) God is displeased with X on account of y ; and (ii) there is a time t -future to the time of y -in which X repents of y . Finally, we could say that God is displeased with X *simpliciter* just exactly when (i) God is displeased with X on account of some y ; (ii) X never repents of y .

Clearly this transfers the burden of attitude on to the agent who offends and does or does not repent. Changes in divine attitude are explained with reference to the disposition of the offender. But this does not imply the indifference assumed by Minas for God. It is in fact simply an attempt to deal consistently with the consequences of Divine immutability together with our conviction that God should be a forgiving God, indeed, a God of unaltering benevolence, even though circumstances make this attitude now the benevolence of displeasure, now the benevolence of forgiveness, now the benevolence of approbation.

The view of the author, however, that God could change his attitudes as he chooses-since no divine command can apply to God himself-in fact runs the risk of making God capricious. Why, for instance, may he not refuse forgiveness or recant on an earlier forgiveness? Neither justice nor benevolence requires it without some special axiom to the effect. The same problem arises when the punishment of sin is considered. Why might God not punish sins forgiven, save for a special prohibitive axiom? This is a nominalist's God whose will is absolute and who may freely bind and un-

bind himself, regardless of what we might think of his *noblesse oblige*.

And, if God has such power to bind and loose in this fashion, then surely a divine command theory of ethics is to be rejected to the extent that it enshrines the possibility of such a God. It would be better to live in a world without God than in a world where God may change his attitude--and not necessarily for the better. The defensibility of divine command theories surely requires support from some form of classical theism with its special and logically independent doctrine of immutability and eternity. And, if this is so, then it jeopardizes the author's conclusion that suspending judgment on divine command theories is preferable to rejecting them.

All this should not reflect unfavorably on a work so well written, so clear in its program, and so successful in its defense against the weightiest of the traditional objections. Perhaps reading this book will lead others to share the author's stated position on the feasibility of divine command theories: "For my part I once believed that, no matter what the fate of other theological doctrines, divine command theories must be false. . . . Perhaps divine command theories can be refuted, but at present I do not see just how this remarkable feat is to be accomplished." (p. 65)

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Ethical Issues of Death and Dying. Edited by JOHN LADD. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980. Pp. x + 214. Cl. \$rn.95; ppr. \$6.95.

This book is a collection of essays written by noted American and English philosophers and physicians dealing with the ethical aspects of euthanasia, treatment prolongation, and life saving therapies. John Ladd's introductory essay focuses on the moral problem of converting "cacothanasia," or ugly and deformed dying, into "euthanasia," or happy and good death. The fundamental problem for the moralist, in his opinion, is that of clarifying the concepts surrounding the various types of euthanasia, and, after that, distinguishing the various modes of dying, killing, and euthanasia. Whether the method of clarification and analysis is adequate to the problem of resolving the complex questions of euthanasia is open to debate.

Philippa Foot's important article "Euthanasia" is reprinted here. It contends that saving life is not always and everywhere a good, for it is conceivable that a prisoner's life could be saved so that he could have more torture inflicted on him. The distinction between active and passive euthanasia is relevant, but the distinction is to be grounded on justice and charity. Charity is regarded as "the virtue that gives attachment to the good of others" (p. 34), and the adequacy of this notion of charity is subject to dispute. Killing someone who asked to be killed could not be regarded as a violation of justice for the reason that no injury can be done

to a person who consents. Failing to aid another in danger may be against charity, but it is not against justice in each and every case. The physician's ordinary duty is to preserve life within the confines of justice and according to the ordinary standards of medical practice. Active euthanasia against the will of the patient is thus against justice and is prohibited. But Foot contends that voluntary passive and active euthanasia are not morally objectionable. These two forms of euthanasia, along with non-voluntary passive euthanasia, are permissible because neither justice nor charity is violated in any case, no rights are infringed, and no harm is done. Foot confuses the moral good with bringing harm and violating rights here, and her analysis is weak. Acts are not wrong because they bring harm, for, if that were so, then no one could sin against God in that no one could inflict harm on God. The conclusion that voluntary active euthanasia is a good because it gives relief from harm is questionable, for the relief from harm is not a necessary aspect of one's death. She supports the use of living wills, but objects to the legitimization of active euthanasia on practical grounds. The fundamental difficulty with her essay is the inadequate treatment of the nature of the human good. A fuller discussion of this might have led her to very different conclusions.

Peter Singer, writing from a utilitarian hedonistic background, attacks the notion of the sanctity of human life as "specist" and discriminating against living members of other species. Contending that certain types of human life are no more worthy of sanctity than other forms, he argues that active nonvoluntary euthanasia could be performed on certain human persons if suffering were minimized by so doing. And he argues, on the other hand, that certain forms of animal life should be granted greater protection because of the close proximity of these forms to human life. Singer, unfortunately, does not understand the ultimate grounds for the ascription of sanctity of life to human beings, as is seen in his brief history of the concept. Human life possesses sanctity because it possesses intelligence and freedom which give the human being mastery over action when the use of reason and freedom is attained. The possession of freedom and intelligence gives the human being an active participation in the divine nature. The human species does not possess sanctity by reason of chance or happenstance but because of a unique mode of participation in divine life which human intelligence and freedom permits. Singer's attempt to unsanctify human life fails because of his failure to understand this theological relationship.

Michael Tooley suggests that the only issue involved in euthanasia is that of personhood. Where personhood, defined as a set of psychological states, does not exist, but where only biological life exists, then active termination of life can be undertaken. Potential persons, members of the human species who lack a self-concept, a concept of themselves as continuing, and a concept of themselves with a future, can be actively killed because they fail to meet the necessary requirements for membership in

the class of human persons. Infants lacking relational capabilities and brain dead but breathing corpses can be killed because they are only biologically, but not personally, alive. Tooley's concept of the person is quite superficial, and he virtually regards the person as being identical with the psychological states of the individual. A more adequate anthropology would reject this bifurcation of the psychological and biological, and see the person as the causal agent and referential subject of both of these states, yet not identified strictly with either of them. Tooley also fails to see that the person, or soul, exists in all parts of the whole, as it gives existence to the whole. This being the case, the person exists when the parts of the whole, here meaning the major organ systems, retain the capability for integrated and spontaneous, if sometimes assisted, functioning.

In dealing with the issue of the rights of the patient and euthanasia, Dan W. Brock stresses the importance of considerations of distributive justice. Models that exclude these considerations, such as strictly patient-centered models of analysis, are inadequate and cannot deal with the demands of justice.

John Ladd argues that the rights model of dealing with problems of death and euthanasia is too narrow and rigid. The complexity of these issues requires that such aspects of dying as compassion and kindness to the dying be considered. He opts for what he calls an "ideal rights" model, which is more open ended and positive and which ascribes to society obligations to provide citizens with the good life. As part of this good life, Ladd includes a good death, meaning the ability to choose one's own time and manner of dying. These ideal rights are more dependent on the kindness and generosity of members of society than are the traditional forms of rights.

James Rachels contends that there is no rational basis for the active-passive distinction in euthanasia for the reason that there is no distinction of any value between killing and letting die. This criticism of the traditional active-passive distinction is not valid, however, for it fails to see that in morally valid occasions of letting die, there is no means available to the person who permits death significantly to forestall or prohibit death. In killing, there is an option available, and this is what makes it worse than permissible modes of letting die. Rachels also ignores the fact that in legitimate cases of letting die there is no consent or approval of the death of the person as a human good that is to be pursued. In these cases, the will of the person who permits death does not attach to the death of the victim as a good which enhances the character of the agent who permits death. Rachels also fails to see that in valid situations of letting die the omission of the agent is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the death of the person, for the underlying disease or condition is the necessary and sufficient condition of death. The omission of the agent who lets die does not initiate the deadly occasion, whereas the act of killing does initiate this occasion. In acts of killing, the object of the act is to realize the

death as the end of the act and as a good to be pursued, but in the act of letting die the object of the *will* is not the death of the patient even though the end of the *performance* of letting die is the death caused by factors independent of the omission.

John Ladd's article on passive and active euthanasia calls into question the classical distinction between these two forms of euthanasia. The logical distinction between these two is not clear, in his opinion, and acts of omission often have the same effects as acts of commission. As is the case with other authors, Ladd seems to pay insufficient attention to the posture of the will in these acts, and the relation of this posture to the character of the moral agent.

Raymond S. Duff and A.G. M. Campbell argue that the family, physician, and patient should decide issues dealing with life-prolonging treatments and that, in instances of conflict, a physician should be assigned who would consider only the interests of the patient. It is strange that it should be necessary to appoint an individual to protect the interests of the patient, but it should be the case that no one should be allowed to enter into decisions who does not have the interests of the patient sincerely at heart. The rights of the patient are to be considered, in Duff's and Campbell's opinion, but it is not clear why these rights are not given priority or made absolute, but just made the object of consideration. Because many doctors are actually practicing active euthanasia today, the authors suggest that hypocrisy be avoided, and that approval be given to it as a policy. Why policy should be determined by practice is not even considered by the authors. Society should intervene in the treatment of the patient and in the family-patient-physician relationship only when harm is being done to the patient, and only when society is willing to support those who suffer from unwanted decisions. The concept of harm is not specified in any manner here, which makes unconditional acceptance of this theory impossible, and the reason why society is obliged to support those who suffer from unwanted decisions is not established. Must society out of justice support those who suffer because of unwanted laws against rape or incest? This crucial question remains unanswered.

The value of this book could have been enhanced if articles from authors who defend the traditional prohibitions against various types of euthanasia had been included. Also, a couple of the articles repeat the same themes, and other articles fail to advance any new theories or concepts. But this book remains valuable as an introduction to the debates and controversies surrounding the moral permissibility of various types of killing, letting die, and euthanasia. Unfortunately, no major new theoretical developments are to be found in this work that have not appeared elsewhere; what this book has done is simply to gather past theories under one cover.

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