begins with a reexamination of the attempt to reconcile God's existence with the phenomenon of evil and suffering that is all pervasive in the world. Is such evil inevitable in the light of finite freedom (as Alan Plantinga argues)? Or could God preclude all evil without doing violence to created freedom? Theodore Kondoleon argues, against Plantinga, for the latter, insisting that to admit the principle as a logical possibility not in fact actually realized, need not be interpreted as telling against the existence of **God.**

Following this is a somewhat original reflection on the focal Thomistic notion of analogy which, when seen as a phenomenon of language rather than as *anal,ogia entis,* more closely approximates the preference for dialectical speech about God operative in Reformed Theology. Colman O'Neill draws out the ecumenical implications of this by suggesting a development of analogical method into a general hermeneutic for all interpretations of the Judaeo-Christian tradition, one wherein analogy is concerned with knowledge already acquired rather than with knowing the unknown.

Next is a stimulating essay by George A. Kendall suggesting that mankind's contemporary sense of alienation is rooted in a refusal of creaturehood. This amounts in fact to an ideology, in sharp contrast to the biblical view of the struggle for existence as due to the creature's living in a wrong relationship to their Creator.

Subsequent to this is a piece of historical scholarship from Francis E. Kelley on an early (late thirteenth century) Thomistic thinker, Robert Orford, discerning in his writings influences from Giles of Rome, an Augustinian against whom Orford ordinarily reacted in polemical fashion.

Kees de Kuyer then offers a reflecton on Heidegger's search for the meaning of ground, by way of Leibniz's principle: *Nihil est sine ratione.* The implications of this enable Heidegger to maintain that every being has its source in Being, shedding some light on his constant contention that " the thoughtworthy is the unthought discovered as the depth dimension of the already thought".

Lastly is a'' Review Discussion" of Alan Donagan's *Theory of Moral,-ity* in which Stephen Theron expresses strong reservations on Donagan's contention that law in morals does not require a divine lawgiver.

Rounding out the issue are reviews of nine recent books of significance, featuring a lengthy reflection on Jurgen Moltmann's innovative reconcep. tualization of the doctrine of the Trinity, and reactions to Edward Schillebeeckx's two provocative studies of Christian ministry.

W.J.H.

THE FREE WILL DEFENSE: NEW AND OLD

ORIGINATING WITH Augustine (See *On the Free Chmce of the Will,* particularly Book III) , the Free Will Defense (hereafter *FWD)* is the strategy most Christian apologists have relied upon to meet the atheologian's challenge that the existence of evil, *acy* evil, but particularly the amount and quality of actual evil, is incompatible with the existence of God.[1] In its most general or widely accepted form this defense amounts to the following argument: (1) A universe containing moral free agents who can choose or reject God as their ultimate good (and i.n which there is also, presumably, a greater balance of moral good over moral evil [2]) is a universe that surpasses in value any universe lacking such creatures; While God, in creating free agents, makes moral evil *possible,* the free agent is itself, by its own act of choice, directly responsible for this evil of action which He, God, nonetheless permits for the sake of certain goods to which it is logically presupposed; and, finally, (3) Aside from moral evil,

[1] For some recent discuussions of this subject see Alvin Plantinga, *The Nature of Necessity* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1974), Chapter 9 and *God, Freedom and Evil* (New York): Harper Torchbooks, 1974). For the atheologian's side see II. J. McCloskey, *God and Evil* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974). Also see J. L. Mackie, "Evil and Omnipotence," *Mind,* LXIV (1955), pp. 200-!?12 and "Theism and Utopia," *Philosophy,* XXXVII (1962), pp. 153-158; and Antony Flew, "Divine Omnipotence and Human Freedom," *New Essays in Philosophical Theology,* ed. A. Flew and A. Macintyre (Nfilw York: The Macmillan Company, 1964).

[2] In his *FWD,* at least as he presents it in *On the Free Choice of the Will,* Augustine neglects to include this proviso as an essential part of such a defense. Aquinas, 011 the other hand, seems to have been a little more sensitive to this point since he, at least, contends that given the existence of *angela* and their existence in great multitude the amount of moral good in the universe resulting from the exercise of free will exceeds the amount of moral evil. On this point see *Summa Theologiae,* I. Q. 63, a. 9, *c.* and *ad* I.

other evils befalling man in this life (as well as in the next) come under the heading of evil of punishment. [3]

At first glance the *FWD* would appear to reconcile God's existence with what, from the human standpoint, are the major forms of evil in the world, and even one contemporary atheologian has felt compelled to remark how "it is a powerful defense, which has satisfied many believers and routed or at least rattled many sceptics." [4] Nonetheless, the more undaunted of their number (Flew included), rather than withdraw from the attack, have scanned it for possible weaknesses and claim to have found it vulnerable, even fatally so, in the following two areas. (I) Granted a universe containing moral free agents (and in which moral good outweighs moral evil) is superior in goodness to any universe which would lack such creatures, still God could have created a universe which would include free agents but one in which *all* these agents would *always* choose rightly. God could have done this because it is evidently something *logically* possible and, therefore, God as all-powerful could have brought it about. [5] Clearly, or so it would seem,

[3] According to traditional Christian teaching *evil of punishment* includes not only the punishment inflicted because of one's own personal sins but also the punishment inflicted on all men because of original sin. However, in Plantinga's *FWD* (as we shall see) one possible explanation of natural evil, considered evil because it causes human suffering, is that it is due to the evil actions of Satan and his cohorts. Plantinga claims to find this explanation of natural evil in Augustine (I do not, but more on this later). Yet to be consistent with Augustine if not nlso with traditional Christian belief, he would have to allow that such evils that "natural evil" c>auses would not have befallen man if Adam had not sinned.

[4] A. Flew, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

[5] As Mackie puts this point: "If God has made men such that in their free choice they sometimes prefer what is good and sometime' what is evil, why could he not have made men such that they always freely cho:Joe the good? If there is no logical impossibility in a man's freely choosing the good on one, or on several occasions, there cannot be a logical impossibility of his freely choosing the good on every occasion. God was not, then, faced with a choice between making innocent automata and making beings who,- in acting freely, would sometimes go wrong; there was open to him the obviously better possibility of making beings who would act freely but always go right. Clearly, his failure to avail himself of this possibility is inconsistent with his being both omnipotent and wholly good." "Evil and Omnipotence," p. 209. The two versons of the *FWD* that I will ex-

such a universe would give greater testimony to His wisdom and goodness than a universe in which some (even one) are permitted to sin and to remain attached to an undue end thereby forfeiting happiness. Therefore, as infinitely good and wise, God would be expected to do what is better here and create a sinless world. Since, obviously, He has not done so, He must not exist. (Q) The *amoun.t* of moral evil in the actual world, to say nothing of the great pain and suffering consequent upon such evil, some of which is visited upon the innocent but which has also to include the stern punishment a divine justice would be expected to mete out to the wicked, precludes any possible justification for its divine permission. Therefore, even if this world *were* the best God could create (as some have argued, in one form or other, it is), He should still have refrained from creating it.[6] However, *prim.a facie,* it would certainly appear that God *could,* and therefore *should,* have done better. Evidently, then, He must not exist.

A relatively recent and somewhat ingenious version of the *FWD,* that proposed by Alvin Plantinga, has been designed to meet this renewed attack by contemporary atheologians. It consists chiefly of arguing

(1) *possibly* God could *not* have created a world containing moral agents without also permitting sm

and

amine above have two quite different replies to Mackie's objection. One, Plantinga's, will contend that possibly it was not within God's power to create beings who would act freely but *always* go right; the other, Saint Thomas's, will concede that God could have done this but that it would not necessarily have been the better thing to do.

[6] On this point see McCloskey, *op. cit.,* p. 80. To quote him in part on this matter: " A wholly good, omnipotent God would refrain from creating a world in which evil predominated even were this the best possible world he could create. I suggest therefore that the underlying suggestion that evil is justified if this is the best of all possible worlds is mistaken." Here McCloskey is obviously addressing himself to the problem of *actual* evil and it is his considered view that, in light of the enormity of human suffering and the amount and kinds of moral evil, this world is not a world that an all-perfect being would have created. But more on this later.

(Q) *possibly* God could *not* have created a world containing ,a greater balance of moral good over " broadly " moral evil than the actual world contains.[7]

Since (1) contradicts

(3) (necessarily) God *could* have created a universe containing moral agents none of whom would ever sin

and (Q) contradicts

(4) (necessarily) God *could* have created a universe containing a greater balance of moral good over broadly moral evil than the actual world contains,

if both are demonstrably true, then the whole of the atheologian's renewed attack would have been met and soundly defeated. Moreover, since the traditional version of the *FWD* (e.g. that to be found in Augustine and Aquinas) would allow that God could have created a universe containing free agents and willed (or caused it to be) that none of them would ever sin, Plantinga's version seems less vulnerable to attack and thus, if true, would seem to provide a stronger defense if not also a definitive solution to the problem of evil.[8]

In what follows I propose to examine Plantinga's *FWD* primarily from the standpoint of its philosophical acceptability. In this connection I shall argue that, aside from certain theological objections to which, perhaps, it lies even more exposed, it involves a philosophical mistake with respect to God's knowledge, one that adversely affects its understanding of His power, and must, therefore, be rejected as false. I will then co)lsider the case made against God's existence, based upon evil, by one contemporary atheologian, namely, McCloskey, and attempt a solution along traditional, principally Thomistic, lines.

I. Plantinga's *FWD*

1. *A note on free will.* Basic to Piantinga's *FWD,* as well as to its other versions, are the following two assumptions. (1)

[7] Plantinga includes under " broadly " moral evil any evil resulting from the morally evil acts of free agents. See *The Nature of Necessity,* pp. 192-193.

[8] See, for example, Saint Augustine, *The City of God,* Book XIV, ch. 27.

Certain created beings are *free* agents, i.e. they are not necessitated (or determined) to *this* or *that* particular good (real or apparent) but have it within their power to determine *for themselves,* a;t the very moment of choice, which of two opposing goods they will have to use or enjoy. (2) The most significant choice a created free agent can make (one which, generally speaking, they all must make) is the choice between a·real and an *apparent* good, or the choice between moral good and evil. While neither of these two assumptions entails the inevitability of moral evil in a God-created universe containing free agents, they do imply the genuine possibility of such evil in such a universe. However, some contemporary atheologians, in attacking the *FWD,* have argued that God could have created man (or any other free agent) so, or of such a nature, that he would always choose rightly and therefore need not have risked even so much as the possibility of moral evil in His universe.[9] One, Flew, actually argues this position from the standpoint of compatibilism (something which McCloskey apparently rejects).[10] However, his argument to support this theory is a curious one and completely fails to prove its point.[11]

[9] See Mackie, "Theism and Utopia," p. 155. Also see Flew, *op. cit.,* pp. 149-157 and McCloskey, *op. cit.,* 118-119. In these references Mackie contends that "it was logically possible for God to make men such that they would always freely choose to do good," and McCloskey inquires "Why, then, given the love a man may have for God and his fellow man, could not men be so made as never to incline to evil but to incline to acts of love which are good?" However, Flew argues his position from the standpoint of compatibilism.

[10] See *ibid.,* p. 117. To quote him on this point: "It is not possible here to enter into a discussion of whether we do or do not possess free will. Instead I simply note what follows if we lack freedom, namely that there would be no problem of moral evil but a more perplexing problem of physical evil. I shall assume that free will is incompatible with complete determinism."

[11] To give Flew's argument here: "to say that a person could have helped doing something is not to say what he did was in principle unpredictable nor that there were no causes anywhere which determined that he would as a matter of fact act in this way. It is to say that *if* he had chosen to do otherwise he would have been able to do so, that there were alternatives within the capacities of one of his physical strength, of his I. Q., with his knowledge and open to a person in his situation." P. 150. In other words, according to Flew an action can be said to be free, even though antecedently determined by causes over which the

Moreover, if Flew is right about compatibilism, then one may well wonder how men can be morally faulted for acting the way they do *and God* for creating man the way he is. I would think, then, that the problem of moral evil depends upon a non-deterministic conception of free will and, therefore, that an attempt at its solution can equally proceed on the same premise. However, I am quite willing to concede to the atheologian that freedom of choice need not entail the possibility of moral evil. One has only to mention in this connection God and the angels in heaven.[12] Moreover, unlike Plantinga, I am also willing to allow that God could have created free agents yet so ordered things that no one would ever sin. But I will return to this point later in the discussion. Let me for the moment proceed on the assumption (I believe a correct one) that, given the actual order of things, for those of us who do not possess the absolute good or a special privilege of grace, the possibility of making a morally wrong choice (i.e. a choice opposed to the divine rule) can always arise.[13] However, the atheologian could still pursue the present line of attack by asking, Could not God have created a universe containing moral free agents each one of whom *always,* and this purely *contingently,* chooses rightly? Since there would appear to be nothing logically contradictory in this latter state of affairs, it can be argued that God should have created such a universe. It is this particular challenge that Plantinga's *FWD* principally intends to meet.

2. *Plantinga's FWD and Universal Transworld Depravity.* As I have already noted, Plantinga's version of the FWD argues that it may *not* be within God's power to create a world containing free agents no one of whom would ever make a morally wrong choice. If this is true, then possibly God should

agent had no control, if the agent, *it* to- decide to do the opposite, would be able to do so. But this is like arguing that a perfectly normal and healthy person even though bound hands and feet is free to walk because if he were unbound he could do just that!

12 See *Summa Theoi.,* I, Q. 19, a. 9, *ad* 2, and Q. 62, a. 8, c. and *ad* 2 and *ad* S. 1a See *ibid.,* Q. 62, a. 8 and Q. 100, a. 2.

not be faulted for not having done so, or for creating the world He (supposedly) did create, since, possibly, this was the only option open to Him consistent with His goodness *and* His decision to create. We have now to determine how correct Plantinga is in arguing this defense.

To begin with, Plantinga willingly allows that a world containing free agents in which no one ever sins *is* a possible one for, evidently, there is nothing contradictory in the notion of a multitude of free agents all of whom always choose rightly. What is more, he also upholds the view of God's power which asserts that it can effect, or bring about, any possible state of affairs so long as its being brought about does not involve a contradiction. How then, one might ask, can Plantinga possibly oppose the view that God *could* have created a world containing free agents but one without moral evil ? But this would be to overlook the most important weapon in his whole *FWD,* namely, *free will.* For, according to Plantinga, what free choices free creatures will make in any universe God should decide to create containing them is something determined by *them,* not by God.[14] Moreover, and this is his major point, it is entirely possible that each and every possible free creature would, if created and allowed to act freely, at least once choose to do something morally wrong. In Plantinga's somewhat quaint terminology, they would all suffer from " Transworld Depravity." Finally, and this point is also important, God, as omniscient, would presumably know this.[15] Consequently, it is demonstrably possible that God, even though omnipotent, cannot create a world which contains free agents but no moral evil. It would be well to note here how Plantinga's hypothesis of universal "Transworld Depravity" disposes of the objection, sometimes heard, that God, if He willed to create a universe containing free agents (as His wisdom and goodness would (seemingly) require Him to do *if* He willed to create at

[14] See *The Nature of Necessity,* pp. 184, 190. See also *God, Freedom and Evil,* pp. 42-44.

[15] See *ibid.,* pp. 42-43 and also *The Nature of Necessity,* p. 180.

all) could at least have willed to create only those free agents who He foreknew would never sin; for, according to Plantinga, *th'ere may be no such agents.* Let us now see how Plantinga works out his defense in terms of " possible worlds." [16]

Among possible worlds Plantinga invites us to consider a possible world, *W,* in which a particular free agent, *P,* in a given situation, *S,* is free with respect to a certain action, *A.* Now assume that in *WP* does *A.* Consider also another possible world, W_1, which in its time segment up to *S* is alike in every respect to *W* (in other words, let *S* entail everything that has occurred in *W* and W_1 up to and including S) ; however, in W_1 *P* does not do *A* but the opposite. Which of these two possible worlds, Plantinga might now ask us, do you think God can actualize? Our initial impulse would be to answer," Either one, since God is omnipotent and therefore can actualize just any possible world." Not so, says Plantinga, and here is why. Suppose that if *S* were *actual P* would do *A* (and God, as omniscient, knows this); then, clearly, God cannot actualize *W1.* Suppose, on the other hand, that if *S* were actual, *P* would not do *A* but the opposite (and God knows this); then, clearly again, God cannot actualize *W.* In either case there is a possible world that God cannot actualize. Since examples here are easy to multiply, one would have to conclude that there are many possible worlds God, despite His omnipotence, simply cannot actualize, namely, those worlds which contain free agents but whose actualizations would entail a contradiction. Thus, according to Plantinga, God, in deciding to create a world containing free agents, must be guided by HiEI knowledge *of* what choices each and every po8sible free creature would make i1' created and plar·e<lin any and an circumstances involving an exercise of its free wiU.[11] If, on the other hand, God

[16] My summary of Plantinga's *FWD* omits some of its details and presents it in a less rigorous and elegant manner than the author does. However, I believe my sketch of it captures all its essential features. For the *FWD* as Plantinga argues it see *ibid.,* pp. 169-195 and *God, Freedom and Evil,* pp. 29-64.

[11] To quote Plantinga on this very important point: "The essential point of the Free Will Defense is that the creation of a world containing moral good is a co-

Himself were in any way to determine which choice (of the two possible choices open to a certain possible free creature in a particular set of circumstances) would take place in a universe He should decide to create containing that creature (and in *this* way have foreknowledge of it, as some have held), then He would not be creating an agent which is truly free.

Extending this idea to the *moral* choices of created free agents, Plantinga can now argue, concerning a certain possible free creature, how it is entirely possible that if God were to create it it would choose, at least once, to do something morally wrong. In other words, *possibly* God cannot actualize *any* possible world containing that possible free creature in which it does not make a morally wrong choice. Such an agent, again using Plantinga's words, would be infected with "Transworld Depravity." Plantinga is now in a position to establish the main point of his *FWD.* For assuming what is possible, namely, that *each* and *every* possible free creature is so infected, then in any world God should create containing free agents each one of these agents would, at least once, go morally wrong. Hence, Plantinga concludes, *possibly* God could not have created a world containing free agents but one without moral evil. So much for the first part of his *FWD.*

8. *Plantinga's FWD and the actual world as possibly the best, morally, God could create.* However, what the atheologian may still want to argue, and what appears more than likely, is that God could have created a world containing a better mixture of moral good and evil than the actual world contains. Plantinga is able to meet this objection by employing the key notion of his *FWD,* namely, that God cannot ac-

operative venture; it requires the uncoerced concurrence of significantly free creatures. But then the actualization of a world *W* containing moral good is not up to God alone; it also depends upon what the significantly free creatures of *W* would do if God created them and placed them in the situations *W* contains. Of course it is up to God whether to create free creatures at all; but if he aims to produce moral good, then he must create significantly free creatures upon whose co-operation he must depend. Thus is the power of an omnipotent God limited by the freedom he confers upon his creatures." *The Nature of Necessity,* p. 190.

tualize just any possible world that includes free agents since which of these worlds God can actualize depends upon what choices these possible free creatures would make in an actual world, something God, as omniscient, presumably knows.[18] Thus he concedes there are many possible worlds containing a greater balance of moral good over moral evil than the actual world contains but perhaps God cannot actualize them. To illustrate this point let us take, for example, a possible world, W^2, which contains a greater balance of moral good over moral evil than Kronos (the actual world). Let us also assume that up to a certain point in time, T, W^2 is in every respect just like Kronos except that at T a certain agent, P, chooses rightly with respect to moral good and evil whereas in Kronos P chooses wrongly at T (and this is one of the reasons why W^2 is morally superior to Kronos). Since it should now be clear, in light of what has previously been said, that God could not have actualized W^2, we can conclude that there is at least one possible world morally superior to Kronos that God cannot actualize. Perhaps the same is true of all other possible worlds containing a greater balance of moral good over moral evil than Kronos contains; perhaps God cannot actualize any one of them! Hence, Plantinga concludes, *possibly* God could not have created a morally better world than the one in fact He did create.

But, it may be objected, moral evil is not the only evil that we find in the universe. There is, after all, a great deal of *natural* evil. In this category are to be placed earthquakes, floods, droughts, monstrosities and other natural disorders, some of which exact a great toll in human suffering. Surely, it can be argued, God could have created a world containing less *natural* evil than the actual world contains and, since (presumably) such a world would be a better world, He should have done so. Plantinga's response to this objection is simply to say that, indeed, God could have created such a world but perhaps not at the cost of some moral goodness to be found in

[18] See *ibid.*, p. 180 and also *God, Freedom and Evil*, pp. 42-43.

the actual world.[19] Here he argues that the balance of moral good over moral evil in the actual world may entail the amount of physical evil the latter contains by suggesting that the world's natural evils and its human persons may be so related that a greater amount of moral good results from those evils than would otherwise obtain (i.e. perhaps people *can* and *do* respond to these evils in morally heroic and exemplary ways) However, he also proposes, as an hypothesis, that natural evils may be caused by certain malevolent non-human persons (Satan and his cohorts). While this idea may strike many today, even Christians familiar with their tradition, as strange, Plantinga claims that it was actually held by Augustine; moreover, it serves the purpose of reducing natural evil to moral evil, thereby strengthening his *F'WD* by extending its explanatory power to *all* evil.[20] Consistent with this hypothesis, Plantinga maintains, are the following two positions: 1) *possibly* there is a balance of good over evil with respect to the actions of these non-human persons; and 2) possibly it was not within God's power to create a world that contains a more favorable balance of good over evil with respect to the actions of its non-human persons than the actual world contains. To sum up Plantinga's response concerning the amount of *actua.l* evil: *Possibly* all the evil in the world is broadly moral evil and it was not within God's power to create a world containing a better mixture of broadly moral good and evil than the actual world contains.[21]

19 See *ibid.,* pp. *57-58.*

20 In both *The Nature of Necessity* (see p. 192) and *God, Freedom and Evil* (see p. 58) Plantinga refers to certain works of Augustine in which Augustine supposedly teaches that natural evil is caused by Satan and his cohorts. One may check these references in vain to find Augustine expressly or explicitly teaching such a thing and nowhere else, to my knowledge, does he maintain this view.

21 See *ibid.,* pp. *57-59* and *The Nature of Necessity,* pp. 192-193. Plantinga defines " broadly moral evil " as the evil resulting from the free actions of moral free agents and " broadly moral good " as its correlative notion. Thus broadly moral evil could include not only natural evil but also evil of punishment ! On the other hand, broadly moral good would include not simply good and meritorious acts but also the happiness and well-being effected by such acts.

II. Some Cracks in Plantinga's *FWD*

1. *Some theological difficulties.* There are, I believe, several serious theological objections to be raised against Plantinga's *FWD* which we might do well to consider here before proceeding to appraise it philosophically. Since Plantinga is, I presume, a believing Christian, these objections will have at least the force of an *ad hominem* argument against his position and should surely dissuade from it those who believe that, in such matters, faith is the final arbiter of truth. The most obvious one concerns his hypothesis of universal "Transworld Depravity." This hypothesis is readily seen to be in open conflict with what both Scripture and tradition teach about the moral actions of Christ and the good angels.[22] Thus, contrary to Plantinga's *FWD,* God *could* have created a world containing free agents but no moral evil: He could have done this simply by creating, from among possible free creatures, only the good angels. There is also the assumption, one basic to Plantinga's *FWD,* that God cannot be the cause, not even the first cause, of the acts of choice of finite free agents. Not only does this position contradict numerous Scriptural passages which indicate God's control over the choices of His free creatures but it also denies the Christian doctrine of grace, a doctrine which teaches, among other things, God's movement of the will away from evil and to the good (the grace of conversion).[23]

22 For a somewhat similar criticism of Plantinga's *FWD* see Robert Merrihew Adams, "Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil," *American Philosophical Quarterly,* 14 (1977), pp. 116-117. However, Adam's "Theological" criticism is done from the standpoint of the teachings of certain Jesuit theologians who subscribed to the theory of "middle knowledge," a theory which Adams and I see to be implied in Plantinga's *FWD.* Adams wants to suggest by his criticism that one can hold, as these Jesuits did, for a theory of "middle knowledge" without at the same time admitting the possibility of universal "Transworld Depravity." However, I think Plantinga is right on this point and Adams wrong. Nevertheless, Adams has correctly identified in this article what I believe to be the error in Plantinga's *FWD* by noting that such propositions as refer to the "conditional future" free choice acts of possible or actual free creatures are neither determinately true nor false.

za Some of the more significant Scriptural passages acknowledging God's power over man's will are Prov. ii: I and Phil. i: IS.

Once again, contrary to Plantinga.'s *FWD,* God could have created a world containing less moral evil or more moral good than the actual world contains; He could have done so simply by working greater miracles of grace. Whether such a world would be a *better* world than the actual world is an entirely different question. From what we have said, any orthodox Christian, it would seem, would have to regard Plantinga's *FWD,* despite its laudable purpose, as one does the proverbial "gifts borne by Greeks."

A philosophical fault in Plantinga's FWD. Plantinga's *FWD* also suffers from what I (and others) have perceived to be a philosophical mistake relating to God's knowledge, one which, incidentally, is not without an important precedent in the history of Roman Catholic theology.[24] As we have seen, one of the key ideas in this defense is that prior in the order of explanation to any decision on His part to create-and to create *this* world (the actual one) as opposed to some other possible order of things-God a1ready knows what each and every possible free creature would choose to do in any conceivable set of circumstances were it actually to exist along with those circumstances. But here an objection can be raised, one that strikes at the very heart of Plantinga's *FWD.* How, it may be asked, can God possibly know what choice a certain possible free creature would, in fact, make in a given set of circumstances were it actually to exist and be placed in those circumstances? For inasmuch as free will is open to opposites, it is not in itself determined to either one or the other of the two opposing choices it can make in any particular situation involving its act of choice. Consequently, some have argued that apart from a " virtually practical " type knowledge that these are the choices He would will to exist in this or that particular

[24] As I mentioned in a preceding footnote Adams also identifies this mistake in Plantinga's *FWD* and is, I believe, the first to do so. However, my way of " attacking " it is, in some respects, different from his and capitalizes on the Dominican view that the conditional future free choice acts of actual or possible free creatures are intrinsically unknowable (and that; therefore, propositions about them are neither determinately true nor false).

world He could create for the reflection of His goodness (a type of knowledge included in His wisdom), God cannot possibly know the "conditional future" free choice acts of His possible free creatures since they are *intrinsically unknowable.* They have also maintained, as regards the absolute (as opposed to the merely conditional) future free choice acts of those possible free creatures God has actually willed to exist, that God knows them because He has *decreed* their existence and is their First Cause, i.e. He knows, in His eternal lmowledge of vision, which one of two choices a certain free creature will actually make in a particular set of circumstances because He has eternally willed its existence in keeping with His plan for the universe (He also could have willed the existence of its opposite if He had willed to create a different order of things) and at the same time has also willed to concur with the creature (who is not always in act) in bringing this choice about.

As those familiar with the history of theological controversy within the Catholic Church must by now be aware, it was precisely this question, namely, whether the conditional future free choice acts of possible (or actual) free creatures belong to the category of things intrinsically knowable (and thus knowable to God), which sparked a prolonged and heated controversy between the leading Jesuit and Dominican theologians of the 16th century.[25] Briefly, the issue concerned God's so-called "middle knowledge" *(scientia media),* a type of knowledge the Jesuit theologian Molina (d. 1600) thought it both convenient and appropriate to attribute to God. According to Molina and his Jesuit followers, God's "middle knowledge" mediates between God's knowledge of *simple intelligence,* wherein He knows all things possible to His power but which He has not willed to exist, and His knowledge of *vision,* in which He sees, in a single glance as it were, the whole actual order of things (from beginning to end) He has wifled to exist, *and consists in*

[25] For a good discussion of the nature of this controversy see Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., *The One God,* trans. Dom. Bede Rose, 0. S. B. (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1944), pp. 449-473; also pp. 637-713.

the knowledge of what each and every possible free creature would do if created and placed in any particular set of circumstances.[26] As might be expected from theologians in those days, the Jesuits were prepared to support their position with Scripture and eagerly pointed to such a text as I Kings 28, wherein we read that God revealed to David what Saul and the people of Keilah would do should David decide to remain in that city. This text, the Jesuits argued, clearly demonstrates that God knows what choices His free creatures would make even in counter-factual situations and thus that He possesses "middle knowledge." He possesses such knowledge because He eternally knows what Saul and the people of Keilah *would* have chosen to do if David had remained in that city, even though, as things turned out, David did *not* remain in that city.

Before proceeding any further with this discussion perhaps it would be well to indicate why Molina proposed this theory of "middle knowledge " in the first place. He did so, apparently, to safeguard human free choice from any prior and determining movement of the will by God *(concursus praevius)* and also to soften the traditional doctrine of *Predestination.* On the assumption of " middle knowledge " this latter doctrine could now be explained in such a way as to make the *creature,* not God, ultimately responsible for its election to eternal life, since God would then foreknow, thanks to His *scientia media;* those free creatures who *would* and those who would *not* merit salvation by the use they would make of His grace and could thus plan and act accordingly. It would certainly not be the case of His freely choosing some but not others for eternal life, in accord with His plan for the reflection of His goodness, and then giving grace, ultimately the grace of final perserverance, as a result of His election. According to Molina and his Jesuit followers, then, the amount of good God could accomplish in a world containing free agents would necessarily depend upon the extent of the cooperation these creatures would give to His

[26] For this distinction between God's knowledge of simple intelligence and His knowledge of vision in Saint Thomas see *Summa Theol.,* I, Q. 14, a. 9.

grace-something which God would presumably foreknow in His " middle knowledge "-so that it would also be true for *them* that God cannot create just any possible world. However, it never occurred to these good Jesuits to propose Plantinga's more radical hypothesis ("Universal Transworld Depravity") and likely because of the obvious theological difficulties I have already mentioned.

For their part the Dominicans vigorously opposed the theory of " middle knowledge," regarding it as a dangerously novel doctrine, one which entailed a denial of God's ultimate and complete control over His creatures' actions, specifically those of His free ones, and, on its theological side, a renewed form of Pelagianism.[27] They argued that God's knowledge of the absolute or conditional future free choice acts of His actual or possible free creatures can only be explained in terms of what He has actually willed (or would will) to exist in the universe He has willed (or would will) to create for the reflection of His goodness, Otherwise explained, i.e. on the Jesuit theory, God would be knowing something intrinsically unknowable- either that or else, according to what this theory could also imply, the creature's free choice act would actually be *determined* (and thereby foreknown) by the *circumstandes* God would have prearranged for it. Thus, to return to the Scriptural passage cited above in support of "middle knowledge," the Dominicans maintained that the following proposition

(I) If David were to stay in Keilah, Saul would lay siege to that city and the people of Keilah would deliver David up to Saul

can be accepted as true without conceding " middle knowledge " by interpreting it to mean that what is stated in the consequent is what God would have actually willed to occur if, contrary to fact, David had chosen to-remain in Keilah.

Moreover, in acknowledging a" physical premotion" *(concursus pra'evius)* even in the case of an act of free choice, the

21 See Garrigou-Lagrange, *op. cit.*, pp. 46Q-470.

Dominicans were careful to explain how such a movement, or prior concurrence, does not destroy the will's freedom. Insisting that every finite agent, even the free one, must be moved to act by God (since the finite agent is first in *potency* to operation), they also maintained, following Saint Thomas, that God works in each creature in accord with its nature.[28] As they would exp}ain it, God, the Self-Existing Being, is the first cause of the *existence* of the creature's act of choice, the creature its proximate (or secondary) cause. Now, to continue this explanation, in this conference of existing God uses the will of the free agent as an instrumental cause which *freely* determines the particular act of choice to be given existence (absolutely considered the agent could have chosen otherwise). In other words, God moves it (the created will) on the level of universal being and goodness while the creature gives determination to this movement by freely choosing *this* particular good or its opposite. Thus, He moves the will so that it freely determines itself to *this* act of choice as opposed to *that.* Since it is this particular act of choice that God has willed to exist in His universe (but willed to exist in accord with the creature's free determination) it is therefore, the Dominicans maintained, "foreknown " by Him. Considered solely in its contingent cause, the future free choice act of any particular free creature is something undetermined and therefore unknowable.[29] However, considered

[28] To quote Saint Thomas on this important point: " Free will is the cause of its own movement because by his free will man moves himself to act. But it dms not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be the cause of another need it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause Who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He dms not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in each thing according to its own nature." *Summa Theol.,* I, Q. 83, a. 1, *ad* 3. (English quotations from the *Summa Theologiae* appearing in this paper are from the English Dominican translation by Lawrence Shapcote.)

[29] Once again to quote Saint Thomas: " In another way a contingent thing be considered as it is in its cause; and in this way it is considered as future, and as a contingent thing not yet determined to one; forasmuch as a contingent cause has relation to opposite things: and in this sense it is not subject to any certain knowledge." *Summa Theol.,* I, Q. 14, a. 13.

in its First Cause, Who in His eternal knowledge 0£ v1s10n knows all the things He has willed to exist, *in their very presentiality,* it is something already determined and thus infallibly known to Him.[30] So much here for this controversy between the Jesuits and the Dominicans.

As we have seen, Plantinga also accepts the theory 0£ "middle knowledge," although he never uses that expression and arrives at his position independently. His sole argument in favor 0£ "middle knowledge" (an argument which the Jesuit philosopher-theologian Suarez also employed [31]) would appear to be the following. Every conditional proposition, for example,

(2) **If** Borg had not injured himself before his U. S. Opens match with Connors, he would have defeated him instead of losing the match,

has a contradictory, which in (2)'s case would be

(3) **If** Borg had not injured himself before his U. S. Opens match with Connors, he would not have defeated him but would have lost the match (as he actually did).

Now where contradictory propositions are concerned, one is true and the other false and God, as omniscient, presumably knows which one is which.[32] With this in mind, consider the following proposition:

(4) **If** God were to create Peter and place him in the same historical circumstances in which in actual fact He did place him, Peter would deny Christ.

(4)'s contradictory is therefore

(5) **If** God were to create Peter and place him in the same historical circumstances in which in actual fact He did place him, Peter would not deny Christ.

Since one of these two propositions is true and the other false and since God knows which one is which, He must therefore possess" middle knowledge."

so See *ibid.*

31 See Garrigou-Lagrange, *op. cit.,* p. 470.

82 See Plantinga, *God, Freedom and Evil,* pp. 4fl-43; also see *The Nature of Necessity,* pp. 180-184.

What should be said about this argument for " middle knowledge " ? I think it is unsound and for the following reasons. (1) It is not at all clear that (2) and (3) *and* (4) and (5) are pairs of contradictorily opposed propositions. As a matter of fact the contradictory of any proposition of the form p::Jq is a proposition of the form ,....,(p::Jq) , not a proposition of the form p::J,.._,q as the argument assumes. That is why propositions of the forms p::Jq and p::J,_,q can both be true, at least according to Material Implication (M. I.) . For M. I. claims that if the antecedent of a conditional proposition is false, then the consequent can be either true or false and the conditional proposition true (since anything can follow from a false antecedent) .[33] Thus, if the common antecedents of (2) and (3) *and* (4) and (5) are both false, then (2) and (3) *and* (4) and (5) are all true. If one were to assume, then, that God had not decided to create Peter, or had decided to create him but not to place him in the actual circumstances in which He did place him when he denied Christ, what could be said about (4) and (5)? According to M. I., they would both be true! But this contradicts the theory of " middle knowledge," according to which one of these two propositions is true and the other false regardless of God's decision with respect to Peter. True, (2) and (3) *a.nd* (4) and (5) *are* contradictorily opposed when their common antecedents are each assumed to be true. However, all that means, say in the case of (4) and (5), is that the following proposition

[33] Wher•e *strict* as opposed to *material* implication is concerned, however, it is not true that any consequent can follow from a false antecedent. For in the proposition " If I were not alive at this moment, I could not be writing this paper" the antecedent (as contrary to fact) is false but the consequent necessarily true. Presumably, however, propositions supposedly the objects of God's "middle knowledge " would not be propositions involving a relationship of strict implication between the antecedent and the consequent, unless, of course, one were to acknowledge a determination of circumstances. In the latter case such a proposition as " If God creates *x* and places him in circumstances *y*, then *x* will do *A* " would be true if *x* were determined to do *A* because of *y*. While such an explanation would give an adequate account of how such propositions could be true, it would be fatal to free will.

(6) If God were to create Peter and place him in the same historical circumstances in which He actually did place him, then either Peter would deny Christ or he would not deny Him.

is necessarily true; it does not mean that (4) and (5) are contradictorily opposed. In other words, to think that because the law of excluded middle applies to the disjunctive proposition which is the consequent of (6) when that proposition is taken in conjunction with its antecedent, it also applies to (4) and (5) is surely a mistake.

(2) Even where contradictory propositions are concerned, while it is true that one or the other must be true (or false), it may not always be the case that either one is *determinately* true (or false)–at least so Aristotle thought regarding contradictory propositions about future contingent occurrences.[34] In other words (and this was *his* view, not ours), in the case of any two such propositions it is true to say, in accord with the Law of Excluded Middle, that one must be true and the other false. However, neither one is determinately-or actually-true (or false) since *that* has yet to be determined in the order of reality (as well as in the order of human knowledge). Assuming a *divine foreknowledge,* though, then, *pace* Aristotle, one of two such propositions *is* determinately true and the other false as what is future is already present (and thus certain) to God's knowledge. In the case of God's supposed middle knowledge, on the other hand, we are not dealing with something in the absolute (or actual) future which is already included (as present) in God's knowledge of vision, but with what *would* take place as regards a particular act of choice supposing God were to create a certain possible free creature and place it in particular circumstances. Now, to return to the case of propositions (4) and (5) above and other propositions like them, which Plantinga supposes to have determinate truth value and thus to be an object of God's knowledge I would contend that, unlike Aristotle's propositions concerning future con-

[84] See *On Interpretation,* ch. 9 19a6-19b4.

tingent occurrences, not only do such propositions lack determinate truth value (so that neither one is determinately true or false) but also they are not even contradictorily opposed.

Plantinga attempts to support the view that such propositions *are* contradictorily opposed (and *God* knows which one is true and which one false) by arguing that counter-factual conditionals can be shown to have determinate truth value and that, therefore, for example, in the case of (2) and (3) above, one is determinately true and the other determinately false (even though *we* may not know which one is which).[35] Now if this is true, God *could* be said to have" middle knowledge" since the class of counter-factual conditionals would include propositions relating to the free choice acts of possible or actual free creatures. However, I would argue, against this view, that counter-factual conditionals concerning *contingent* matters, such as (2) and (3) above, belong to a category of propositions whose truth values are forever undetermined (and that, therefore, (2) and (3) are not contradictorily opposed). While some recent work in logic claims to have discovered a procedure by which counter-factual conditions may be determined to be true or false, I do not believe that this procedure is plicable to the case in question nor to every case of counter-factual conditionals.[86] According to this procedure

(7) A counter-factual conditional *A-?B* is true if either *A* is impossible of in that possible_world closest to the actual *A* and *B* hold and not *A* and *B.*

(7) seems correctly to describe why it is that we are inclined to accept such a proposition as

(8) If the pilot's parachute had failed to open after he ejected from his cockpit 3,000 feet above the hard and rocky ground below, he would not have survived the fall

as true and

ss See Plantinga, *The Nature of Necessity,* pp. 174-180.

36 See David Lewis, *Oounterfactuals* (London: Blackwell, 1978), Ch. I.

(9) If the pilot's parachute had failed to open after he ejected from his cockpit 3,000 feet above the hard and rocky ground below, he would have survived the fall

as false. In other words, we think that (8) is true and (9) false because in the possible world closest to ours (the real world), but in which the antecedent of (8) and (9) is true, the laws of nature which govern our world hold and thus (8)'s consequent is also true (and (9)'s false).

While I would hardly deny that *some* counter-factual conditionals are true, even obviously true (and others obviously false), I do not believe that they are always true (or false) because of (7) above. Take, for example,

(10) If I were not alive at this moment, I could not be writing this paper.

(10) is true and its opposite number false but surely not because (10) could only be false in a possible world that is unlike ours in a certain important or relevant respect. Indeed, there is no possible world-or at least no possible world in which *I* exist and in which I can write papers-in which (10) would not be true. Furthermore, the possible world analysis of how such counter-factual conditionals as and (3) *and* also (8) above can have determinate truth value does not allow for the possibility of either miracles *or* free will. Yet, if one *does* allow for possible departures from natural laws or from habits acquired by the exercise of free will, then these propositions are at best only *probably* true (or false). But God's" middle knowledge " is not about what is only probably true.

Now regarding (4) and (5) above (and other propositions supposedly the object of God's "middle knowledge"), while they need not turn out to be counterfactual conditionals, they are, nonetheless, at least logically prior to any determination on God's part with respect to creation, without any determinate truth value (and therefore cannot restrict God with respect to the universe He can create). The reason why they lack determinate truth value has already been indicated: since free will

is open to opposites, what choice a cert!lin possible free creature would make in a given set of circumstances were it to exist along with those circumstances is something intrinsically indeterminate and, therefore, unknowable. In a word, there can be no determinate truth about something indeterminate in being. Plantinga, in arguing his *FWD,* has argued on the premise that such propositions are determinately true (or false). Consequently, since his *FWD* rests upon that false assumption, it necessarily collapses.

If, then, God knows the future free choice acts of His free creatures (as He most assuredly does), this can only be because they are already seen by Him, in their very presentiality, in His eternal knowledge of vision, a knowledge which presupposes His will as causing the existence of all His creatures- and also their actions, as First Cause-in accord with His plan for the universe. Plantinga would presumably reject this explanation of a divine *causal* knowledge of the creature's free choice act since he would see it to conflict with free will. Indeed, his *FWD* rests on the view that such knowledge on God's part cannot be causal knowledge since God supposedly has no control over the free choice acts of His free creatures. In other words, Plantinga's argument is that if God were in any way the cause of the creature's free choice act, then the latter would not be something truly self-determined and therefore free. However, I do not see why God cannot move the creature's will, as the first and universal cause, without prejudice to its freedom. The will, after all, is free to choose or not to choose (to act or not act). However, when it chooses, it chooses something reason judges, rightly or wrongly, to be good (e.g. either the sense pleasure in an act of adultery or the good of justice in choosing not to commit adultery) . But this movement of the will towards the good, the universal object of the will, is from God, the First Mover and the Universal Good. As Saint Thomas explains this point: " God moves man's will, as the Universal Mover, .to the universal object of the will, which is good. And without this universal motion, man cannot will

anything. But man determines himself by his reason to will this or that, which is true or apparent good. Nevertheless, sometimes God moves some specially to the willing of something determinate which is good; as in the case of those whom He moves by grace." [87] Moreover, even in God's movement of the will, by grace, to some determinate good (so that what the will chooses is what God's movement determines it to), the will is not *forced* in any way but consents to the movement. Indeed, it could be noted in this connection that grace is not an *impediment* but an *aid* to free will (particularly in man's fallen state).

As regards the sinful act of choice, it may be noted here that God is also *its* first cause.[38] In concurring with the creature in giving existence to this act, He permits the defect in the act (a defect caused by the creature's failure to submit itself to its proper rule or measure) and permits it for a good purpose. Thus, He wills the existence of the act, indeed is its first cause, while permitting its defect. Moreover, since in planning His universe He has willed to include defective or sinful acts of choice therein and, to speak even more specifically, to include certain particular ones, He thereby foreknows them as their First Cause.

I think I have now made clear why I find Plantinga's *FWD,* despite its laudable aim, philosophically unacceptable. For one, it implies the theory of "middle knowledge," a theory which holds something to be knowable which is intrinsically unknowable. For another, it opposes our normal philosophical inclination to think that God, as Infinite, *does* have complete control or power over what kind of universe He would want to exist should He decide to create one to reflect His goodness

[37] *Summa Theol.,* I-II, Q. 9, a. 6, *ad* S.

[38] As Saint Thomas explains it: "The act. of sin is both a being and an act: and in both respects it is from God. Because every being, whatever the mode of its being, must be derived from the First Being . . . Again every action is caused by something existing in act, since nothing produces an action save in so far as it is in act and every being in act is reduced to the First Act, viz., God, as to its cause, Who is act by His essence." *Summa The&.,* I-II, Q. 79, a. !i!.

and that He therefore *can* determine what actions of His creatures, particularly His free ones, shall exist in such a universe. Not so on the theory of " middle knowledge," which would preclude God from creating any number of possible worlds.

III. The Traditional *FWD*

Since the view of God's power and knowledge which I have defended in the preceding discussion allows that it is within God's power to create a world containing free agents acting for an end freely chosen but a world without moral evil, we have now to face the question posed by the atheologian, Why, then, did He not do so instead of creating a world containing, particularly on the human level, such a great amount of moral and consequent evil? Should He not be faulted for creating *this* world when there was available to Him the apparently much better alternative of creating a world containing moral free agents yet one free of moral evil (and the consequent evil of punishment)? Indeed, could He not be faulted for creating a world containing *any* evil? As one recent writer has put this objection, "an all-perfect God as such must prefer the better to the good, and the best if there is such a thing to the better." [39] While the writer, McCloskey, finally concedes that the concept of " the best of all possible worlds " is most likely an incoherent one, he will insist, nevertheless, that for any universe, no matter how good, containing evil there is always a better one wholly good, one which an all-perfect being would necessarily create if He were to create at all (since "an all-powerful being would always create the better rather than the less good world " [40]) . Many of McCloskey's arguments throughout this book from which I have just quoted, his most recent and extensive discussion of the problem of evil, aim either at demonstrating the inefficacy of certain traditional solutions to the problem of evil or, more positively, at establishing that while the existence of evil, any evil, is, if not logi-

[89] McCloskey, *op. cit.*, p. 81.
[40] *Ibid.*, p. 76.

cally, at least *ethically* incompatible with the existence of God, the various forms of *actual* evil and, in his opinion, its excessive amount make it even more certain that God does not exist.

In responding to McCloskey's arguments, particularly those directed against the Thomistic solution to the problem as well as those advanced to show the ethical incompatibility between God's existence and evil's, I will follow closely Saint Thomas's teaching. Necessarily, then, a certain amount of" theological" material will again enter my discussion since his solution is partly along theological lines. Fundamental in this connection, I should mention here, is his position on the question of the origin of moral evil in our universe. For, according to it, moral evil would not have arisen in this universe, a universe containing moral free agents all of whom were created good and naturally incapable of choosing anything contrary to the good proportionate to their natures, were it not for the fact that man and the angels were created for a higher, supernatural end, to wit, a very sharing of the life or beatitude of God Himself.[41] On this point, then, Thomas would seem to be in complete accord with those atheologians who argue that God *could* have created a universe containing moral free agents and seen to it that none of them would ever choose wrongly; He could have done so simply by creating man and the angels for a purely natural end (i.e. for a state of natnral happiness) .[42] It should also be noted that some of the objections atheologians sometimes bring against the existence of God, based upon evil, presuppose certain Christian beliefs, e.g. original sin, the eternal punishment of the wicked in Hell. Since this last-mentioned doctrine presents the most serious difficulty, or, at any rate, the one most keenly felt by most believers concerning the divine permission of moral evil, it seemingly ought not to be ignored in any full discussion of this problem. Finally in this regard-and this point has been an extremely important one

41 See *Summa contra Gentiles,* Book Ill-2, Ch. 109. See also *Summa Theol.,* I, Q. 68, a. I, *ad* 8.

42 See *ibid.;* see also *Summa Theol.,* 11-11, Q. 164, aa. I and

in Christian theodicy-part of the traditional Christian answer to the question of the divine permission of moral evil involves the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Redemption.

L *The existence of God is not incompatible with the existence of some evil.* In his own discussion of the problem of evil Aquinas makes what I consider a very convincing case for the view that the existence of *some* evil is actually necessary in a God-created universe complete in every way, and in my reply to McCloskey's objection that an all-perfect creator, if He is to create at all, is morally bound to create a wholly good world I will, for the most part, simply be restating it.[43] The solution he proposes for the problem of evil, generally, can be summarized along the following lines:

(1) The perfection of the universe requires that there be an inequality among its parts and, therefore, less perfection in some of them; however, to be included among less perfect beings are beings which *can* fail in goodness and, therefore, at some time (or sometimes [44]) *do* fail, God not preventing

[43] For the relevant texts see *Sumnia Theol.,* I, Q. 22, a. 2, *ad* 2; Q. 48, a. 2, c. and *ad* 3 and Q. 49, a. 2. See also *Sumnia contra Gent.,* III-I, Ch. 71.

[44] "Ipsa autem natura rerum hoc habet ut quae deficere possunt quandoque deficiant." *Summa Theol.* I, Q. 48, a. 2, *ad* 3. In this passage Aquinas asserts that it is of very nature of things which can fail that at some time (or other) they do fail. Some have objected that this assertion is contradicted by a sound principle of modal logic, viz., " a posse ad esse non valet illatio." A further objection would be that it hardly applies to moral agents, i.e. fallible moral agents, since not all of them *do* fail with respect to choosing the good they ought. In reply to the first objection it can be said that the principle in question is not meant to apply to the case of corruptible substances; in other words, it seems perfectly obvious that what can die *will* die (nothing to prevent it). As regards the second objection, it can be noted that the term "quandoque," meaning "at some time (or other)," is not the operative word in this context but rather the term "interdum " (" sometimes") which Aquinas often employs in the same context. See, for example, the body of the article of the text cited above. See also *Summa Theologiae,* Q. 49, a. 2, *c.* Is it true, however, that in the case of agents in whom there *can* be moral failure, there necessarily (or in some instances) *is?* One may be willing to grant that instances of moral failure are *likel,y* to occur but how maintain, as Saint Thomas's *FWD* seems to, that such is necessary (God not preventing it)? No answer other than that already indicated, namely, that it belongs to the class of things fallible that what can fail sometimes does fail (nothing preventing it), is provided by Aquinas. But more on this point later.

this lest other good things be hindered thereby

and

(2) While moral evil, unlike evil of nature, is in no way intended by God, not even indirectly, its occurrence (in some cases) accords with the nature of fallible freedom; and God permits such failure in some *but nonetheless* draws good from it.

As we can see, (1) applies more generally to evil of nature and specifically to evil of fault. It will be a sufficient response to McCloskey's objection to argue the necessity of natural evil insofar as that evil contributes indirectly to the perfection of the universe.

As Aquinas points out, it belongs to God's goodness that He communicate it, by way of a participated likeness, to every possible grade of being so that it be manifested completely or perfectly.[45] Thus it is required that the universe God creates be a *complex* whole consisting of *material* as well as of spiritual beings. Such a universe is clearly superior in goodness to a universe consisting solely of the more perfect (viz., spiritual) grades of being.[46] (McCloskey takes issue with this statement, seeing it as by no means evident, and I will return to consider his argument shortly.) Now in a world that includes material beings *and* the inequality among such beings required for their diversity, some evil is bound to occur (nothing preventing it). To begin with, material beings are by nature *corruptible.* Containing matter (a potency for form) as an essential part of their substance, they are naturally subject to substantial change. Indeed, leaving aside their origin by way of creation, however that may have occurred, they come into existence by way of generation and all, individually, eventually corrupt. (In losing their existence, however, they also lose their goodness and this, for *them,* is evil.) Moreover, due to the contrariety to be found in things, some are naturally injurious and destructive of others.[47] Also to be considered in this connection is the

[45] See *Summa Theol.,* I. Q. 22, a. 4; also see *Summa contra Gent.,* 111-1, Ch. 72 (3).

[46] See *ibid.,* III-II, Ch. 94 (10).

[41] See *ibid.,* ID-I, Ch. 71 (4).

natural subordination of the lower orders to the higher whereby the former serve as means to the latter's end and are generally unable to resist their powers.[48]

At this point it could be objected, with McCloskey, that God could have seen to it that corruptible beings did not actually corrupt and arranged things so that the good of individuals belonging to the lower orders would not have to be sacrificed to the needs of the higher.[49] One part of Aquinas's reply to this objection is to observe how it does not pertain to Providence to destroy nature but to preserve it, the other, to point out that the good of the whole takes precedence over the good of the part.[50] Thus, it would be contrary to God's wisdom and goodness to prevent corruption entirely and, particularly, the corruption of plants and animals. Such action on God's part would render the powers of natural substances ineffectual and prevent the generation of new things (" water lives in the death of air") .[51] It could also be observed that if material things *did not* corrupt, then no new individuals (except, perhaps, by way of creation) would come to partake of the perfection of the species (or of *being)* and thus that perfection would not be as widely or diversely shared as it could be. Finally, for God to arrange things in such a way that material beings of the lower orders did not serve as means to the end of those belonging to the higher orders would be for Him to remove, not only the order involved in the subordination of the lower to the higher, but also the entire biological world as we know it. Thus, as Aquinas aptly observes, it does not belong to Providence to prevent corruption in the universe lest many good things be removed thereby .[52]

48 See *ibid.*, Ch. 69 (17) .

49 See McCloskey, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-14; also pp. 98-99.

50 *Summa Theol.*, I, Q. 22, a. 2, *ad* 2, also Q. 48, a. 2, *ad* 8.

51 See *Summa contra Gent.*, Ill-I, Ch. 71 (5).

52 See *Summa Theol.*, I, Q. 22, a. 2, *ad* 8. It may be objected that our discussion above has ignored what is ordinarily thought of as evil of nature, viz., natural disorders, and focused instead upon the evil of corruption, something which, it could be argued, is not actually an evil since incorruptible being is not naturally due material substances. However, regarding natural disorders (e.g. monstrosities,

We have argued that corruption contributes indirectly to the good of the order of the universe. We accept it,as true, therefore, that a universe complete· with respect to all possible grades of being but containing *some* evil is superior in goodness to a universe containing only one grade of being, no matter how superior that grade, but without evil. McCloskey questions this value judgment, arguing that it would also imply that a world containing God alone is *inferior* to a world containing God and all the grades of finite being.[53] McCloskey's argument here clearly involves a false comparison. Contrary to what he argues, the comparison at issue is not between a world containing God alone, if God can properly be thought of as being *contained* in a world without also reducing Him to the finite level (which, perhaps, McCloskey wants to do to suit the purpose of his argument) , and a world containing God and all possible grades of finite being, but rather one between a (created) world composed solely of finite spiritual beings and a (created) world containing all possible grades of being. Obviously, an infinite being is *not* inferior to that same being plus any multitude of finite beings since the addition of the latter does not increase or amplify the perfection of being already found in reality (in God) ; these beings simply share by way of likeness and in varying degrees the being or perfection of God Himself.[54] However, once again, the point at issue is not whether a superior being, *an#* superior being, is necessarily in-

earthquakes, floods, and famines) it could be pointed out that they are more the exception than the rule, that *they* also happen in a<'cord with natural laws, that they may have some beneficial side-'!lffectsor occasion good, and that they serve to emphasize by way of contrast what is normal and good. In any event, they hardly provide what could be regarded as a strong argument against God's existence.

53 To quote McCloskey on this point: " The value judgment is not intuitively evident to me, and indeed, seems intuitively false. I cannot see that a world of purely spiritual beings is evidently inferior to one of corporeal beings and spiritual being, nor that one containing parasites and carnivores is superior to one without such beings. Implicit in the first claim is the contention that a world containing God alone is inferior to that containing God and all the beings that now exist." *Op. cit.*, p. 98.

54 On this doctrine of participation by similitude see, for example, *Summa Theol.*, I, Q. 6, a. 4 and Q. 44, a. S.

ferior in goodness to that same being plus any number of inferior beings, but whether a created world composed solely of finite incorruptible beings is inferior in goodness to a world composed of all possible grades of finite being but also containing corruption. We have argued that it *is* since in that world-our world-the divine goodness is more extensively communicated and, moreover, in such a world the higher (spiritual) beings participate in the administration of divine providence by helping to direct lower creatures to their ends, thereby sharing in the divine wisdom and goodness to a greater degree than they otherwise would.

The existence of moral evil and the traditional FWD. Assuming that we have satisfactorily established that the completion of the universe requires the existence of *some* evil, viz., evil of nature, we can now proceed to the more serious question, Why moral evil? Here we seem to be faced with an evil that in no way conduces to the perfection of the universe, let alone one which could be viewed as *naturaUy* necessary even given the existence of every possible grade or order of finite (and thus *fallible)* free agent. One would think, therefore, that Saint Thomas's solution to this particular problem would have to be worked out along basically different lines of thought from those followed in his solution to the problem of evil of nature. However, such is not the case and, except for a few differences relating to the special nature of moral evil, the divine permission of this kind of evil will be explained in much the same manner as the divine permission of evil of nature (something indirectly intended by God). To begin with, Saint Thomas would argue that the perfection of the universe requires the existence of intellectual creatures and thus the existence of creatures with free will.[55] Yet, as already noted, the free will of any finite agent (with the exception of those who already possess the perfect good (God) or who in this life have been afforded a very special privilege of grace) is capable of sin.[56]

[55] See *ibid.,* Q. 50, a. 1.

[56] See *ibid.,* Q. a. 8; Q. *63,* a. l; and Q. 100, a.

This is so, according to Saint Thomas, because the creature's will must, for the rectitude of its act, be subject to a higher rule or measure, namely, the divine will ("which itself is not directed to a higher end and to which the last end of every creature is to be referred " [57]) from which it is truly free to deviate. Moreover, as I have already pointed out, Saint Thomas, in explaining the origin of moral evil, teaches that the higher end to which the intellectual creature's will should be directed is a *supernatural* end-a sharing in the very Life and Beatitude of God Himself-and one to which it must direct itself by an act of charity (elevated to a supernatural level by grace) and from which it can freely turn away.[58] Only within this context, Aquinas believes, can the possibility of moral failure on the part of finite free agents, all of whom were created good and naturally disposed to choose the good due their natures, be adequately explained. Nor can it be reasonably objected here that, if this is indeed the case, God should *not* have created man and the angels for ,a supernatural end but for a purely natural one instead, since thereby He would have avoided the possibility of moral failure on the part of His free creatures. Such an objection implies a value judgment which would have the greater manifestation of the divine goodness subordinated to the good of each single individual creature; for, so far as the end to which a mere creature can attain, the divine goodness is maximally manifested in a universe in which intellectual creatures, though not necessarily *all,* come to enjoy the perfect good itself.

However, given the possibility of moral evil in a universe created by God and containing a multitude of fallible free agents, must such evil actually take place? To this question Saint Thomas would seem to have a twofold reply. Considering what pertains to the divine *power* such evil need *not* occur since God could have willed it so that no one of these creatures would ever fail. Thus, God *could* have created a universe con-

57 See *ibid.,* Q. 6S, a. 1.
58 See *ibid.,* Q. 63, a. 3.

taining the same free agents the actual world contains (i.e. the various grades of angels *and* man) but willed that each and every one of them, in all their choices, be directed to Him as their supernatural end. (Indeed, I have insisted on this point almost from the outset.) However, given the fact that every possible grade or order of finite free agent is represented in the universe *and also* the nature of what is fallible, according to which what can fait in some cases does fail (nothing to prevent it) , then it would seem inevitable that some moral evil actually take place.[59] :Moreover, Saint Thomas has also observed that liberty of choice with respect to choosing God as one's supernatural end is better established in the universe when some from every order of creature with free will ("which in every degree of creature can be turned to evil ") do choose contrary to the good which is God Himself.[60] Thus, in a universe complete in every way, the existence of moral evil would, not unfittingly, be included, not, it is true, as either directly or indirectly contributing to its order or perfection, but rather as something consequent upon that order (an order in which the spiritual creature has been summoned to a supernatural end) and as serving to confirm liberty of choice in finite free agents. In creating or planning His universe God naturally takes all this into account. Yet so great is the divine goodness that God would not permit moral evil to occur in His universe unless from it He would also draw good and good such as more than compensates for the evil permitted.[61]

Regarding this last-mentioned but most important aspect of Saint Thomas's solution to the problem of moral evil, namely, the good which God draws from this evil so as to justify completely its divine permission, Christian apologists (and this

59 See *ibid.*, Q. 48, a. 2, *ad* 3; also Q. 49, a. 2.

60 See *ibid.*, Q. 63, a. 9, *ad* 3.

61 See *ibid.*, Q. 48, a. 2, *ad* 3; also see *ibid.*, III, Q. 1, a. 3, *ad* 3. To quote just a passage from this last cited text: " For God allows evils to happen in order to bring a grea,ter good therefrom; hence it is written (Rom. v. 20): "Where sin abounded, grace did more abound." Hence, too, in the blessing of the Paschal candle, we say: " 0 happy fault, that merited such and so great a Redeemer."

would include Aquinas) have stressed the following: (1) The greater manifestation of the divine love in God's redemption of man, a redemption which brought God to the human level and encompasses the forgiveness of numerous contrite sinners (who have been moved by God's grace to repent) and their ultimate justification by grace; (2) The greater manifestation of the divine justice in the punishment of the wicked; and (3) The good accruing to those who love God and who suffer, for His sake, from the injustice or wrong-doing of others.[62] Since (3) already presupposes the existence of some moral evil I will focus my discussion of this part of the solution on (1) and (2).

In (1) 's behalf it can be, indeed has been, argued how much greater a degree of divine love towards His creatures is manifested in a universe in which God shows His mercy in forgiving sinners (not all it is true) than in a universe in which no sin occurs. Certain familiar gospel parables make this very point and in a very simple yet moving manner.[68] Moreover, when one considers man's Redemption, particularly the way in which it was wrought, then the argument becomes even stronger. Thus Christians throughout the ages have called attention to the fact, perhaps the most decisive point to be made in the whole of Christian theodicy, that if it were not for Adam's sin God would not have sent His Son to redeem us.[64] Now while Leibniz may have been wrong (and we shall argue that he was) in his view that this world is the best possible, he makes a powerful case for it in his claim that a universe with the Christ (and in which He, Our Redeemer, triumphant over the power of Satan and death, is exalted above all creatures) is immeasurably superior in goodness to a universe

62 See *ibid.*, I, Q. 48, a. *ad* 3; also see *Summa contra Gent.*, 111-1, Ch. 71 (6).

63 See Luke 15: 4-10.

64 See *Summa Theol.*, III, Q. 1, a. 3. Aquinas is willing to concede, however, that the Incarnation might have taken place-even if Adam had not sinned. Indeed, in the first article of this Question he even seems to argue this position (one held by certain Franciscans and suggested, nowadays, in the "Incarnational physics" of Teilhard de Chardin). Nonetheless, it would appear to be Thomas's position that the Incarnation is more fit.ting and necessary because of Adam's fnll.

without the Incarnation.[65] It may be objected here that our reply to the question, Why moral evil?, has now become much too theological to convince the atheologian or the sceptic. My answer would be that our main concern in this discussion is not to convince the unbeliever but to satisfy *ourselves* that God's existence *is* compatible with the existence of moral evil, even with the amount of it we find in the actual world.

With regard to (2) Aquinas argues that God's "avenging" justice, an aspect of His justice (and goodness), would not be made manifest in His universe were there not sinners to be punished for their disobedience to His will[66] Thus, God, in planning His universe, decides to include in it some individual free agents who, in the exercise of their freedom, will choose contrary to His rule. But He makes this decision based upon His goodness since from this evil of action (which He wills to permit) He will draw good, in some cases the ultimate good of others as well as the good of showing His justice in punishing those who have freely rejected Him. Nor does God do the creature any injustice if He creates it and does not will it to merit and attain glory, since God is free to give glory to whomsoever He wills in accord with His plan for the reflection of His goodness in the universe. Nor does He do it any injustice in punishing it since the creature turns away from God's goodness of its own free will. Thus God receives glory from His creatures, not only in the manifestation of His mercy in forgiving and justifying many who have sinned, but also in the manifestation of His justice in punishing those who willfully refuse to love His goodness and follow His ways.

65 See *Theodicy,* trans. E. M. Huggard (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), pp. 129-180. See also *Monadology and Other Philosophical; Essays,* trans. Paul Schrecker and Anne Martin Schrecker (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1965), p. 124. Here, in a passage from an essay entitled "A Vindication of God's Justice," is what Leibniz has to say on this matter: "The strongest reason for the choice of the best series of events (namely, our world) was Jesus Christ, God become Man, who as a creature represents the highest degree of perfection."

66 See *Summa Theol.,* I. Q. 48, a. 2, *ad* S, and *Summa Contra Gent.,* ID-I, Ch. 71 (6).

At this point the atheologian, in this case McCloskey, would be ready to object that for God to permit His creatures to sin when He could have seen to it that their choices would always be good and no one would come to unhappiness, and this in order to show His mercy in forgiving some and His justice in punishing others, is unethical by any non-utilitarian (or Kantian) standard inasmuch as it reduces the finite person to a *mere* means to an end, something presumably beneath his natural worth and dignity.[67] In reply to this objection, one that understandably finds much support nowadays, it should be stressed that the rational or free creature is nonetheless a *creature*, a finite being, while God, on the other hand, is Infinite, and that *He* does not exist for our sake (or convenience) but rather *we* for His. Obviously, this does not mean that God can treat His free creatures capriciously (e.g. by rewarding the wicked and punishing the virtuous) since that would be to act contrary to His wisdom and goodness. What it does mean, however, is that He can (indeed His goodness requires Him to do so) use His creatures to reflect His goodness and thereby give Him glory. I think we have now shown how, other things being equal, God's external glory can be greater in a universe in which there are free agents but also moral evil than in a universe in which free agents exist and always choose rightly. Indeed, I have attempted to indicate how, from the Christian standpoint, this is in fact the case with respect to the actual world.

All well and good, the atheologian might remark at this point, but now explain the traditional Christian doctrine of eternal punishment, or Hell! Is not this doctrine inconsistent with the concept of a God supposedly infinite in goodness, love and mercy? Could not God's justice be adequately manifested in the universe simply by meting out to sinners, regardless of the gravity of their sins, only some form of temporal punishment? And would not His infinite mercy require that He ultimately save all? As those conversant with Church history may

[67] See McC!oskey, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-76.

know, one prominent early Church theologian, Origen, influenced by Platonism, subscribed to this view-nowdays called "universalism "-and even some contemporary Christian apologists have accepted it.[68] Aquinas, however, and I think we must agree with him here, rejects such a position as clearly contrary to Scripture. Moreover, he attempts to show in his theology that the doctrine of Hell is not contrary to reason '(however strange *that* may strike us today). In this connection he would first point out that Hell's punishment consists chiefly in the pain of loss, the loss of the highest and perfect good (God) .[69] He would also argue that the angels cannot possibly be pardoned, or forgiven, even granted God's infinite mercy.[70] Because of their high degree of intelligence, their clear and certain knowledge from the outset of the good they wanted for their end, and, after their choice, their firm attachment to that undue end, they cannot possibly be withdrawn from it to repent and forgiven. With man, however, it is entirely different. Since man's knowledge is much less perfect than the angel's, his choice much less certain, and his attachment to the good he has chosen not fixed with much firmness, he can, at least in this life, be turned away from sin. He is therefore capable of repenting and, if he does, thereby worthy to be forgiven or pardoned.[71] However, there *are* men who, in this life, choose to turn away from God (or from the things of God) and towards evil ways. Since they have repeatedly declared themselves for an undue end and have failed to become God-like through grace, it would seem most unfitting that they should, at any time, come to the vision of God.

8. *A word on actual evil.* At this point I believe it has been satisfactorily established that neither evil of nature nor moral evil is incompatible with the existence of God. If this is true,

[68] See John Rick, *Evil and the God of Love* (London: Macmillan *Co.,* 1966) pp. 345-369.

[69] See *Summa Theol.,* I. Q. 64, aa. I and £.

[10] See *ibid.,* a. £, *ad* £.

[71] See *ibid.,* a. £.

then McCloskey's position that the existence of evil, *any* evil, is incompatible with the existence of an all-perfect creator is obviously false. However, most of McCloskey's arguments are concerned with *actu.a],* evil, its varieties and amounts, and it is regarding this evil that McCloskey makes, and evidently intends to make, his strongest case. To this end he attempts to demonstrate what he sees, or claims to see, as the enormity or immensity of .actual evil, citing to support his view 1) the various kinds of natural disorders and the toll they exact in human life and suffering, the various kinds of diseases affiicting man, from which not even innocent children are spared, and the variety of harms they cause, 8) the privations or defects of mind .and body to which all humans are, at one time or another, prone but which, apparently for no good reason, affiict some more than they do others, 4) the pain and suffering caused by mishaps other than natural disasters, 5) the pain of animals (who could hardly be said to be under the penalty of sin), and, finally, 6) the quantity and quality of moral evil.[12] In one sense it is difficult to argue with McCloskey on this point since the issue involves what one perceives, or at least *says* he perceives, reality to be. McCloskey apparently sees it to· contain much more evil than good or, at any rate, to contain amounts and kinds of evil that exceed what one would expect to find in a universe created by God. Moreover, concerning moral evil, McCloskey contends that there is no way of knowing whether, in the final reckoning, the kinds and amount of good which result from the exercise of free will will outweigh i.e. morally, the evil.[73] This objection is directed against the *FWD* but also seems aimed at any attempt to demonstrate philosophically God's existence.

In response to McCloskey's argument here, I would say that it tends to exaggerate the extent and, in some cases (e.g. the pain of animals), the intensity of actual evil. Indeed, if one were to weigh collectively all that McCloskey has to say

[12] See McCloskey, *op. cit.,* pp. 13-19 for his litany of *actual evil.*
[73] See *ibid.,* p. 124.

on this subject, he would have to conclude that man's life on this earth is a pretty grim and horrible lot indeed and that, in the final analysis, it would have been better if he had never been born. But surely this is not the case and, given what is the normal situation, all of us would proclaim that life, on the whole, is *good.* To this observation the Christian theologian might perhaps want to add that, aside from moral evil, the actual evils befalling man in this life are all ultimately the penalty of sin (i.e. original sin, a doctrine which McCloskey dismisses as " crude ") and thus come under the heading of evil of punishment. [74] Again, considered in their proximate causes and manifestations, many of these evils are often the result of man's actual sins. As for this latter evil and its vast extent, this too is not without a theological explanation: it too is due to original sin, or at least to a penalty for that sin, viz., the disorder in man's nature whereby the inclination of the sense appetite resists reason's rule or control.[75]

Concerning McCloskey's point that it is impossible for anyone to say whether, in the final reckoning, the good wrought by the exercise of free will will outweigh the evil (which means, presumably, that there can be no solution to the problem of moral evil and that, therefore, the jury must remain forever out on the question of God's existence) , several things may be said in response. For one, McCloskey assumes throughout his discussion that any attempt at solving the problem of evil cannot *presuppose* God's existence without begging the question since the existence of evil calls into question His existence. To quote him on this point: " To postulate an all-perfect sufficient reason in the light of the fact of evil is to beg the question." [76] What McCloskey is actually saying here is that before one can prove God's existence one must first solve the problem of evil. But some theists, in attempting to solve that problem, or certain

14 For a less *ad hominem* approach to the question of original sin see *Summa contra Gent.,* IV, Ch.

75 See *Summa Theol.,* TI-II, Q. 164, a. 2.

1a See McCloskey, *op.* .• p. IL

aspects of it, *assume* God's existence and therefore (according to McCioskey) beg the question. However, I think McCloskey is wrong on this point. What one has to show to solve the problem of evil is that the existence of evil *(any* or *actual* evil) is not incompatible with the existence of an all-perfect being. Now if one can do this by supposing the existence of such a being, I do not see why this would be a begging of the question. Admittedly, when it comes to *actual* evil, particularly actual moral evil, my point is valid only if one has, already, a sound argument for God's existence (something McCloskey is obviously unwilling to allow). Thus, assuming one is already convinced by reason that God exists, then McCloskey's argument about our inability to determine whether, in the final accounting, the amount of good resulting from the exercise of free will will outweigh the evil is completely ineffectual. The philosophically convinced theist can reply that it will (since God is infinitely good and wise). Actually, McCloskey's point here about the balance of moral good over evil in the final reckoning is irrelevant to the question whether it can be demonstrated that God exists. Indeed, it may even be argued (as Aquinas himself did) that the existence of moral evil *paints* to the existence of God rather than disproves it; it points to His existence since it presupposes a rule which ought to be followed by man if he is: to attain his end (or true good), a rule for which man himself cannot be responsible any more than he can be responsible for his own nature or end.[77]

4. *Some final 'l'emarks.* We have attempted to show in this discussion of the traditional *FWD* that the existence of evil-any evil or actual evil, moral evil or physical evil-is not incompatible with the existence of God. With regard to actual evil, we argued, against McCloskey, that its amount and kinds cannot be used to disprove God's existence and that the universe, on the whole, contains more -good, indeed much more good, than evil. Here a final question may be raised concerning our position on actual evil: Are we in effect maintaining

[17] See *Summa contra Gent.,* III-I, Ch. 7l (10).

that this universe, with its amount and kinds of evil, is superior in goodness to the same universe without even *some* actual evil? If we *are*, then, according to our adversary, we are subscribing to the view that this world is the best of all possible worlds, since what we are saying in effect is that God could not have made the world better than He did.[78] If we are not, then McCloskey would ask us, Why, then, did God not create the better world, viz., the one with less evil in it than the actual world? In reply I would first want it noted that I agree with McCloskey that the concept of " the best possible world " is an incoherent one. It is an incoherent one, one to be placed in the same category as " the largest possible number," because for any universe that God creates He could always create a better one simply by adding more creatures or by increasing the perfection of one, or some, of those in actual existence. However McCloskey is mistaken in his view that those who hold that the removal of any or some of the world's evils would result in an inferior universe are necessarily subscribing to the view that this world is the best possible absolutely. For what they need simply be holding is *not* that the world which God created could not be better *absolutely* but only that it could not be better by the removal of any or some of the world's actual evil (McCloskey's position). As Saint Thomas observes in this connection: "The universe, this present creation supposed, cannot be better, on account of the most beautiful order given to things by God; in which the good of the universe consists; for if any one thing were better, the proportion of order would be destroyed ... Yet God could make other things, or add something to the present creation; and then there would be another and better universe." [79] Finally, McCloskey has contended that an all-perfect creator is required to create the better world and that a world containing less evil than the actual world is, necessarily, the better world. We have argued, on the contrary, that the latter part of this statement is false

[78] See McCloskey, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

[79] *Summa Theol.*, I, Q. U, a. 6, *ad* S.

since God would not permit evil in His universe unless He *could* and also *would* draw good from it. As for his premise that God must (or is morally obliged to) create the better world, if true that would make it morally impossible for God lo create (as McCloskey himself recognizes) because, as we have said, for any world He creates God could always create a better one.[80] What should be said in this connection is that God is free with respect to the degree of His goodness He wishes to have reflected in His universe and that there are many possible worlds containing a greater degree of goodness than the actual world contains but that God was not morally obliged to create any one of them in preference to the world He did create.

THEODORE J. KONDOLEON

Villanova University
Villanova, Pennsylvania

so See McCloskey, *op. cit.,* p.

ANALOGY, DIALECTIC AND INTER-CONFESSIONAL THEOLOGY *

STRICTLY SPEAKING, analogy is a common phenomenon of language, occurring whenever a predicate is transferred from a proposition where it is obviously at home to another where, because of the subject of the sentence, it seems oddly placed. As such, it hardly merits, the dramatic roles that have sometimes been assigned it in theology, either by those who mistakenly call it the analogy of being and somehow think they endorse that, or 'by those who see in it a barely camouflaged claim to Roman supremacy in the church of Christ.

In inter-confessional discussion it soon becomes clear, however, that wherever the influence of Karl Barth still makes itself felt, even if only as a memory of a starting-point, there is a deeply experienced feeling that analogy is bound up with natural theology, with rationalism and with all that is wrong with Catholic theology. Even if explanations about the true nature of analogy are received sympathetically and when it is agreed that the early Barth's Catholic sources were misleading, there still remains a conviction that analogy, if no longer to be personified as the anti-Christ, is at least the apple that gives the barrel of Catholic theology its special and rather disagreeable flavor. This seems to be due in part to the fact that the metaphysics implied in theological analogy appears to some as no longer presenting a valid intellectual option; in part also,

* The reflections presented here are developed from a paper read by the author at a seminar of the " troisieme cycle " held by the theological faculties of the Universities of Fribourg, Lausanne, Geneva, and Neuchatel during the year 1980-81. The Faculty of Fribourg is Catholic, the other three Reformed. The papers read are collected in P. Gisel, ed., *Analogie. et dialectique,* Geneva, Labor et Fides, 198(t.

and perhaps at a more instinctive level, to a deep distrust of anything that appears to promote that unwarranted serenity of spirit which takes refuge in a so-called theology of glory.

A theology of the cross, on the contrary, welcomes the intellectual tool of the dialectic which seems to reflect much more faithfully the dramatic contrasts of the New Testament as well as the struggle of Christian existence and the plight of the world we live in. The very fact that the differences, in terms of methodology, between Catholic and Reformed theology could be formulated as a clash between analogy and dialectic indicates the need for further clarification on both sides. It will be suggested here that it seems to be the case that a theology using analogy can, and ought to, take up the insights of dialectic thinking, though it is clearly not possible that it should accept its intuition of reality as the most basic in Christianity. The clarification that this claim calls for should also be of service in determining one of the relationships which obtain between systematic and biblical theology, since this is quite possibly what the discussion is all about. The key to both these questions will be said to lie in the proposition that the analogical method can be developed into a general hermeneutic that has to be called into play in all interpretations of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. This may seem a far call from our opening remark that analogy is a common and simple linguistic phenomenon. There must be more to it than that, so let us define terms.

Analogy and theological method

Analogy is a particular form of predication, that is, of attributing a predicate to the subject of a sentence. It occurs only when we have to do with at least two propositions. This is because it makes sense to speak otanalogical predication only in the case where the proposition we are concerned with uses a predicate which, if defined strictly, belongs to a proposition with a different kind of subject. Evidently, once the subject of the proposition we are concerned with refers to something,

real or imagined, lying outside the realm of ordinary observation, we are going to find analogical predication. This is simply because the only predicates which come to hand are those which refer to ordinary observation. Once we apply them to a non-empirical subject we are using them analogically, whether we care to use this term or not, and we need to explain what we are trying to say. Now, the believer, when he is speaking of God, is talking in this way all the time because he attributes to God all sorts of predicates which, if they mean anything at all, derive their meaning from their normal usage when they are attributed to beings who are not God.

Quite often nowadays it is said that this way of talking about God in terms of what we know of created things is comparable to the method of using models, as practised in the theoretical moments of the empirical sciences. It may, in fact, well be that theology does sometimes use this method-as, for example, in ways of envisioning the function of Christ or of the Church-but this is not what is meant by analogy. The use of models considered to be pertinent to the subject under study corresponds to argument from analogy, which is a means of formulating hypotheses about the unknown in terms of its supposed correspondence with the known; this is probably what most people think of when the method of analogy is mentioned. The classical theory of analogical predication is something entirely different. It has to do with the linguistic expression of a knowledge about God that is held, whether rightly or wrongly, to be *already acquired* and to be *true*, even though necessarily imperfect. Those who speak in this way of analogical predication take it as given that there are judgments about God, whether of faith or of reason, in which, by means of concepts drawn from the created world, the human person attains the reality of God himself. All that the theory of analogy is meant to do is to account for the oddities of linguistic expression which result from this conviction. As a result it is, on the one hand, less complex than current theories about theological

which appear to be grappling with the problem of

mediating the faith to others; on the other hand it assumes a claim about our cognitive possibilities which appears relevant at a time when those who confine themselves to the model theory seem to be ready to accept that theological statements are, without exception, to be considered hypotheses which, by their nature, are reformable.

The basic claim

The theory of analogy is concerned, not so much (if at all) with the construction of a theological language as with a correct reading of a language which is already to hand; so it is principally concerned with the primary discourse of faith, as found in the Scriptures and the creeds of the church; but it also deals with theological language. The medieval analysis of these languages, based as it is on the literary rhetoric of the time, stands in need of further development; but, simple though it is, it still succeeds in high-lighting a basic principle of a general hermeneutic.

Shorn of all non-formal elements (in particular of the whole affair of proper and improper proportionality, which is not without interest but is extraneous to analogy as such), the medieval analysis may be reduced to two distinctions. The first concerns the ways in which a predicate may be related to the subject, God, and this gives the distinction between negative, relative and substantial predication. That is: the predicate is denied, explicitly or implicitly, of God (he is not finite, is immutable); the predicate expresses a relation of the creature to God (he is creator, is savior); or it is the speaker's intention to affirm the predicate of the divine reality itself (God is good, is a trinity of persons) *(Summa theol.,* I, q.18,a.2). The third type of predication claimed as possible is of historic significance, for it distinguishes this approach from any form of purely negative theology, even though it respects the intuition which inspires the negative approach to God. It is in order to amplify what is implied in this claim that the second distinction is introduced. This is based on the referent of the

cate, on what it signifies. It gives two forms of predication: The first is termed "proper"; here what is signified by the predicate is to be found within our normal experience but is realized fully only in God. The second is termed " metaphorical " predication: it is not " proper ", though it can sometimes be substantial; what is signified by the predicate is to be found properly only in a creature but, for one reason or another (it is largely a matter of the speaker's religious sensibility), it is attributed to God *(ibid.,* aa. 6 and 8) .

Modern linguistic analysis quite clearly permits theologians to distinguish many other types of theological statements, but, by the nature of the case, this will always be in terms of their anthropological significance. The medieval analysis is exclusively theological in character since it is concerned with the fundamental possibilities of making statements about God. Its principal weakness, even on its own terms, lies in its too summary treatment of metaphorical predication, a way of talking about God which did not greatly interest theologians whose preoccupation lay with extending the Aristotelian notion of science into religious discourse. Their treatment of the sacraments shows that they were aware of religious symbolism, but this had no effect on their discussion of language. We should probably be inclined today to find at least a certain symbolism attached to any predicate taken up into religious discourse. What is essential, if we are to understand the medieval tradition on its own terms, is that room be left, at the heart of the symbolism, for " proper " predication.

The claim to objectivity: analogy and dialectic

Even though no attempt has yet been made to justify the claim that proper predication is possible in the language of faith, it may already be possible to suggest a certain clarification of the relationship between the analogical and the dialectical methods simply in terms of the claims that are being made for the former. It seems evident that the " dialectic of the cross " calls up for theologians of the Reformed tradition a vast

network of symbolism which is of vital significance not only for matters of personal conviction but also for questions of church order. At the extreme, for those influenced by the German idealist tradition, the symbol appears to shape the very way in which they approach the mystery of God himself. So we find the drama of Christian existence, torn as it between sin and grace, oppression and justice, being projected through the agony of the human spirit onto the divine source of existence. The existential problem of evil seems then to demand an ontological negativity within God himself and the dialectical method appears to have no resources, beyond those of Christian instinct, to combat this tendency. Now, here the system seems patently to have soared in speculation far beyond and away from the dialectical gospel of Paul. I suggest that, in order to allow faith to control the otherwise unmanageable forces of an unleashed symbolism, it is essential for theology, in certain of its judgments, to transcend the symbolism, not in a misguided effort to eliminate it, but so as to place it in its legitimate theological context. It does not seem possible to do this if we do not return to the simple distinction between proper and metaphorical predication. If we did we could attribute to the dialectic of symbolism its true theological value in the light of certain positive affirmations about the God who conceived the economy of Israel and of the cross. We would be led, I think, to shift the emphasis in Christology to the manifestation of love, both human and divine, in the cross of Jesus and to attach the negativity of suffering to the mystery of iniquity which it is only too easy to explain in terms of man in his opposition to God. There is a whole style of theology already implicit in this suggestion for the love of God is taken to be the resolution of the human dialectic and is held to be already fully achieved and active in the cross and, by implication, in the church on earth. (See below, section 4.)

So far from being a curious relic of medieval theology, the theory of analogy, with its confidence in the possibility of proper predication, appears to promise the only sure guide

through contemporary theology's daunting project of opening itself to the new human sciences, for the latter may be admitted to theology only if they are scrutinized according to a strictly theological criterion. The fact that so many present-day philosophers and theologians do not even seem to be aware of, much less consider, the possibility of proper predication must be set off against the theological fact that the Christian community takes it for gTanted that the gospel, while it certainly calls for the commitment of faith, also speaks in a very direct fashion about God and about his action in the world. The example that must be central to any Christian community's belief is formulated by Peter: " You are the Christ, the son of the living God " or, in another form, " The Word was made flesh ". The full significance of these confessions must escape us (we shall return to this below), but it is the task of the Christian theologian to defend the legitimacy of faith's attaching to them a literal, non-dialectical and non-symbolic meaning as a necessary implication of whatever existential demands they may contain.

The reading suggested of these texts is an example of the application of the general hermeneutic formulated by the theory of analogy. It will be seen that it has been placed in the context of the community in which the theologian works and so it is not a purely philosophical hermeneutic. It certainly can be elaborated in philosophical terms and a theologian is obliged to see that it is; and nevertheless it shares in a non-philosophical certitude deriving from the existential situation of the theologian within the community of the Spirit. This influence of the Christological faith of the community is made even more precise by the fact that the community is one that celebrates the Eucharist and believes that, at the heart of all its symbolism, there is some new form of literal interpretation to be given the words: "This is my body". The God this community is talking about is the God who makes this statement true. In a community which underlines the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist there is found, as common currency, a certain

perception of reality which inevitably influences the theologian and his philosophical intuitions. The ontology which is here at stake will attempt to formulate the relations which obtain between the creature and the Creator in such wise that a real presence of Christ in the Eucharist and a real incarnation of the divine Word are not excluded by the individual's philosophical options. A false question is posed if it is asked whether this is not an illegitimate intrusion of faith into the realm of reason. Meaningful questions of this kind can be formulated only in terms of persons; and as far as persons go, believer and sceptic, theologian and philosopher, are on equal footing for both start with some kind of intuition about the nature of reality. For the believer who philosophizes reality must have a deeper meaning than it does for the sceptic.

The presuppositions of ana/,ogy: a general hermeneutic

Simple explanations of analogy can easily leave the impression that the method is inspired by an uncritical optimism about the capacities of the human mind for grasping the mystery of God. This might be the result of the kind of examples chosen to illustrate the theory; as when we say that there is analogical predication in the second of the :following statements: " Several people whom I know are good" and " God is good". Such examples are accurate in formal terms but they distract from the way that analogy actually works in theology. They give the impression that the theory is hopelessly compromised by an alliance with "natural theology" whereas, in fact, it is meant to provide a way of reading the Scriptures and of constructing a Christian theology. They also conceal the very real dialectic which enters into theological thinking based on analogy. In particular, the claim that proper, analogical predication about God is legitimate -can be justified only if we analyze the presuppositions of this claim in the realm of ontology and of a theory of religious knowledge. A classical exposition of the presuppositions is found in the *Prima Pars* of St. Thomas.

The question dealing with analogical predication (I, q.13) is concerned with a formal linguistic analysis but, contrary to the avowed practice of modern linguistic scholars, this is considered to be feasible only as an application of a preconceived theory of knowledge which itself is considered as an off-shoot of an ontology. This is thought of today as putting the cart before the horse; but the best thing is to see whether the vehicle will move and only after that look for picturesque metaphors. In order to grasp the possibilities and the limitations of analogy, it is necessary to trace backwards two steps in St. Thomas's argument.

In I, q.4, a.3, he asks: Whether a creature can be like God? The theological character of the question is at once established by two scriptural quotations: *Gen.* 1.26: " God said, ' Let us make man in our own image, in the likeness of ourselves'"; and *I Jn.,* 3.2: "We shall be like him because we shall see him as he really is ". The reply to the question appeals to the fact that the creature, as such, participates in the reality of God; and here is to be found the immediate ontological justification for analogical statements about God. But the theological context should not be forgotten; if it is, we are left with a purely philosophical principle which might be exploited in the construction of just another rationalism. The participation principally referred to is that of a creature, man, whose salvation and likeness to God are eschatological. The abstract terms we habitually use to illustrate likeness with God, such as " truth" and " goodness " should not be allowed to conceal the fact that our authentic experience of these values is derived from human contacts; and it is in these terms that we think of God. Both likeness and participation are dynamic qualities and they will not be fully achieved until salvation is achieved. Nevertheless, it is this participation, imperfectly achieved in itself and fleetingly grasped by the theologian, which constitutes the only justification there is for positive statements about God, whether in Scripture, in creeds or in theology. This is the only way there is to break out of a purely negative theology and to transcend

the anthropological coils of symbolism. Yet it is a very modest way and two moments of negativity are implicit in it.

(i) First, the likeness discovered between the creature and God is situated within that dissimilarity which is at the source of the whole tradition of negative theology (a.8, replies to difficulties). It is not necessary, nor indeed is it legitimate, to appeal at once to the existential dialectic introduced by sin in order to account for the dissimilarity; this is rather something that results immediately from the radical distinction which exists between creature and Creator. It is this dissimilarity which imposes that genuine dialectic of thought which was recognized by the tradition when it spoke, however summarily, of the moment of negation which enters into our thinking about God: we must deny the limitations of created perfections when we apply their concepts to God. It would, of course, be false to imagine that this dialectic results in some form of higher concept of God that would be purified of creaturely imperfections. The dialectic persists in the form of two judgments, one positive, the other negative. It is further heightened with the introduction of the classical moment of" eminence". This does indeed intend to make a positive statement about the infinity of God's perfection; nevertheless all that it can do is to deny the limitations of finitude so that it remains negative. The whole process involves a dialectic which cannot be eliminated from analogical thinking.

(ii) There is a second moment of negativity contained in analogy; it has to do with the very nature of the theological project, placed as it is under the sign of a salvation which is eschatological. History shows that theologians who make use of analogy run the risk of ignoring this limitation whenever they lay a premium on an intellectualism which has little to do with the existential condition of the community of believers and of the theologian himself. The medieval theologians who elaborated the theory of analogy, for all their confidence in the intellect, were sufficiently men of faith to understand that the believer must love God if he is to overcome the deficiencies of his present knowledge (so, St. Thomas: I, q.l, a.I; q.U, with

its stress on the eschatological dimension of knowledge; q.48, a.5 ad 2; II-II, q.27, a.4 ad 2). Since that time this appeal to love has generally been siphoned off into what is known as mystical theology. It does not dispense from intellectual rigor, but it has significance for the whole theological project, for it not only serves to emphasize the fact that unadorned thinking about God misses the point, but also indicates a valid theological function for the so-called " moral " or existential way to the affirmation of God and to the doing of theology.

The theme of participation which justifies analogical predication is, in its turn, justified when we take a further backward step, to I, q.2, a.3: *Utrum Deus sit.* It is to this article that reference is usually made for the five classical " proofs " for the existence of God; and it may well be that philosophers are justified in making such use of the text-it is up to them to convince us, should they so care. But the text itself is a theological one and should be interpreted as such. In the context of medieval theological method, the question asked means: What is the significance of the affirmation of *faith* that God exists? There was no question of even a methodological doubt concerning the existence of God; medieval theology, at its best, was far too hard-headed for that. The real intention was to establish certain theological affirmations concerning the fundamental relations which exist between the creature and the God who reveals himself in Jesus Christ. Once established, these affirmations dominate and orientate the entire effort of giving systematic expression to the truths of faith-they provide, in fact, the general hermeneutic characteristic of the theory of analogy.

Since this is a matter of using the resources of human reason, certain philosophical traditions of quite diverse origins are brought into play; but they all undergo a radical transformation dictated by the doctrine of creation from nothing; and this belief of faith imparts to them a unity which was not attributed to them in the philosophies from which they come. What emerges from all this is that certain forms of causality are attributed to God with respect to his creatures-final, effi.-

cient and exemplar causality-and these are affirmed to connote the fundamental relations between the two. There is, however, no claim made to be able thereby to grasp fully the ineffable mystery of what creation, as an act of God, really is; this is demonstrated unequivocally when St. Thomas speaks later on of that same mystery in terms of divine providence and human liberty.[1] At that point it becomes clear that, even if we find ourselves obliged to attribute causality to God, it has to be a totally transcendent causality which requires that we eliminate from our thinking that kind of quantitative distinction which we normally associate with " cause " and " effect " and which implies determinism. The transcendent cause we are talking about is, as Creator, immanent in human liberty; and this is very hard to think about since it threatens the consistency of our basic concept " cause ". When later Thomists insisted on what they could grasp of the mystery of liberty, they hardened the basic concept and spoke of "physical predetermination"; this is how theology becomes decadent.

It is in tenns of the three causalities mentioned that participation and then analogy, in its turn, are justified; there does not seem to be available any other way of breaking out of the bonds of negative theology or of a purely existential theology. The error would be if we were to assume that these categories of causality express adequately our belief in the creator. We are obliged to attribute causality to God because that is what is demanded if we are to account for his creatures; but it would be wrong to think that the precision of these categories which is carried over to the conceptualization of participation and finally to the theory of analogy permits us to grasp all that we mean when we say that God is Creator. The mystery of God remains intact; all that the theologian does is to put in order, as well as he may, those resources of human reason which permit him to look towards the Father of Jesus Christ.

[1] *S. Theol.*, l,q.19,a.8 and a.5:q.22, a.4,esp. ad S; *In Peri Hc1.*, lib. 14, nn. 16 ft$_{11}$ esp. n.22.

The role of judgment in faith: Existence, concepts and judgments.

Current debate about ways of knowing God takes it largely for granted that what theology must do, if it is to measure up to modern man, is to elaborate existential ways of approaching God. Here is a salutary corrective to exaggerated forms of intellectualism that are little more than disguised rationalism, even though one suspects that what many authors are reacting against is their own imperfect grasp of what an objective approach to God really is. What arouses suspicion is the fact that, if a discussion of the question is even considered necessary, the whole argument turns on concepts, on their inadequacy when it comes to speaking about God, and on their historical conditioning. Here there is a fundamental misunderstanding of what is at stake. To pose the problem in terms of whether or not our concepts are adequate for expressing the mystery of God is already to have answered it, because they are not; and anyone who has ever considered the question admits this; so this is not the point that needs to be argued about.

This means that there is something wrong with the way the question is being posed when a contrast is set up between the analogical and the dialectical methods because the problem then being set has to do with the concepts used by theologians. It certainly seems, at any rate, that the dialectical method is concerned with a. dialectic of concepts or of symbols, even though the claim would probably be made that this corresponds to a dialectic in the process of reality. It would also appear to be true-and this may be the source of the confusion-that anyone who claims to defend "analogical concepts" is placing himself on the same terrain and is, presumably, ready to do battle with the dialecticians on the terms chosen by them. Both sides would then miss the point because of a failure to grasp the fundamental intuition of the theory of analogy.

Analogy, we have insisted, is a form of predication. This means that the basic unit that it considers is a complete state-

ment which expresses a judgment. Statements certainly incorporate references to those concepts which the theologian attributes to *God,* but they do so only in so far as the concepts are taken up into what we may call the dynamism of a judgment, that is, into a living movement of the human spirit towards the reality of God. The concepts used are always drawn exclusively from experience of this world but they acquire a new relevance when they are given that explicit reference to existence-in this case the divine existence itself-which a judgment, as distinct from a concept, always achieves. Created reality's participation in God, on which the analogical method relies, is not the result of our projecting onto reality the logical structure of our conceptualization. If that were the case, it would be high time the proponents of analogy adopted one or other of the much more sophisticated forms of idealism now at hand. But in fact participation is realized in the innumerable individual acts of existing which impose themselves on our consciousness; the way we conceptualize the inner richness of those acts of existing is secondary from this point of view and it may be more or less successful. The theory of analogy claims that it is possible, whether by reason or by the power of the Spirit, to prolong the movement of our judgment beyond created acts of existing to the existence of God himself. Unhappily, this is something that the professional thinker's training causes him to miss, perhaps because it is so simple. People can be trained to manipulate concepts; existence they have already found for themselves.

The act of existing, the obviously real, as soon as it is conceptualized (as we are doing now), is falsified or, at best, only faintly shadowed. We can certainly grasp it, as we do a butterfly in flight, and hold it living in our own existential act of judgment; but once we begin to t_alk about it we have transformed it into a pathetic object of study, subject to whatever measurements our ingenuity can devise. It is attained, that is to say, not in a concept but in an intellectual act of judgment rooted in an immediate sense experience; when we put it into

words we use some part of the verb" to be". Obviously, every existential judgment we make also uses universal concepts which serve, more or less adequately, to thematize for ourselves what we perceive to be the concrete content of an individual act of existing. But such concepts are always abstract, an idealizing of what exists; in this lies their power of generalization but also their weakness in the face of reality. The judgment, on the contrary, because it affirms the act of existing of the individual, constitutes the knowing subject's acknowledgment of the inexhaustible richness of the other. It is the other who leads the way, who imposes itself on our knowing; and it always transcends, simply because it exists, whatever conceptualization we may form of it. The created act of existing, in particular the individual personal existence, is for us a mystery. It is the irony of the human condition that, when we undertake the highest task of reflective reason, the elaboration of an ontology, we necessarily conceptualize and render abstract that very reality which, because of its utter originality, will not permit itself to be grasped in such a fashion. The theologian (or, for that matter, the philosopher) who claims to speak of the divine mystery should not be unaware of this mystery of created existence which eludes his grasp even before he attempts to raise his thoughts to God.

The theological theory of proper analogical predication deals with the very complex phenomenon of complete statements which express judgments inspired by faith about the reality of God. It naturally offers an evaluation of the concepts used in such judgments; but it is principally concerned with the believer's claim that he is really talking about God, which is to say that his judgment of faith attains God's own act of existing. This is why it is false to place this theory on the same footing as those which deal only with concepts.

From created existence to the divine act of existing

The fundamental relation between the creature and God is affirmed when we say that the Creator is the principle of all

created acts of existing. What we are in fact affirming of God is a two-fold transcendence: we say that he transcends, as principle, that which, even in the created order transcends our concepts; and this we must maintain even as we confess that he gives himself in his own reality to our act of knowing.

All this is expressed in the apparently simple affirmation of faith that God exists. However natural it may be for the believer, its epistemological status is extraordinarily complex. First of all, it is an *analogical* judgment, for we have transferred the word " exists " from its natural context where it signifies an act of existence seized in our inner-worldly experience, with its reference to sense data, and have placed it in a proposition whose subject does not belong to that experience. The procedure is a daring one and all the more pregnant with mystery when we advert to the fact that the normal signification of the word escapes our conceptual grasp. If we were considering only concepts we would have to admit that our grasp of God would be precarious in the extreme. But this is not the case because, secondly, "God exists" is a *judgment* and, as such, it would be meaningless unless in it we are able to open ourselves to the reality of God of whom we are speaking. Now, it is quite evident that we cannot open ourselves to the reality of God in the same way that we attain the acts of existence encountered in daily experience. But there are other ways. The philosopher who is convinced that he has proved the existence of God will affirm his conclusion in virtue of the rational force of the argument he has constructed; the judgment affirmed in the conclusion acquires its realism, its openness to the reality of God, from the conviction which the argument carries. The believer, on the contrary, makes his affirmation in the power of the Holy Spirit; the judgment that he forms as he opens himself to the reality of God is borne up in its realism by the intervention of the Spirit. The inner mystery of God and his plan of salvation are simply not realities for us unless in this way God himself imparts to our subjective judgments that dynamism towards his own reality which is characteristic of any existential judgment.

It is now possible to formulate more precisely the general hermeneutic implicit in the theory of analogy. It is expressed in the judgment, " God exists ", understood, not as a simple preliminary axiom of theology, but as a fundamental judgment which situates the transcendent existence of God with respect to created existence. As such it exercises a constant dialectical function with respect to every statement of faith, for no interpretation of such a statement will do justice to the transcendence of God if it is not consciously related to the two-fold transcendence affirmed in the fundamental judgment. The theologian must remind himself constantly that the concepts which are applied to God are realized in him, not simply at the level of existence (which is why any real thing transcends our concepts) , but at that summit of reality which is the act of existing without restriction. The point has been made most tellingly in the field of philosophy by Etienne Gilson [2]; it remains valid in theology, where the realism of faith depends on the Spirit.

The moments of negation and eminence invoked by the theory of analogy are intended to draw attention back to the act of divine existing in all its transcendence. A whole series of judgments is called for, each one correcting the imprecision of the others, without the possibility of arriving at a definitive statement. Here there is an evident dialectic but it is not confined to one that is set up between concepts thought of as mutually contrary or complementary; it is not, in its most crucial stage, a dialectic of ideas at all. It is the dialectic which affects the human person when faced with the mystery of the divine reality, a dialectic between all conceptualization as such and the irreducible reality of God, to which the Spirit opens the believer and which the theologian can only hold in awe. Once this dialectic is recognized as the fundamental intuition of the analogical method, it becomes possible to give a theological

[2] E. Gilson, *L'etre et l'essence,* Paris, Vrin, 1948; a summary reference in *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (=Le Thommne,* 5° ed., 1948), New York, Random House, *1956,* pp. 108-110.

evaluation of another form of dialectic, that which is found particularly in symbols and in the concepts derived from them.

It still remains true that analogy implies a more positive evaluation of the capacity of certain concepts to direct our thematized judgments towards the being of God than seems to be recognized in systems which appeal exclusively or primarily to a dialectic of concepts. It implies also a more confident acceptance of the truth-value that is given through the complex mediation not only of concepts but also of metaphors and symbols, functioning within the judgment of faith. This is because the idea of participation takes into account both the transcendence of God and his immanence in creation, in the Incarnation and in the sending of the Spirit. Creation, reaffirmed in the Incarnation, can supply concepts which direct towards God the mind of the person who is brought to God by the Spirit.

Faith judgments of identity

The dynamism of the judgment as it opens the knowing subject to reality is expressed in language by the copula, some form of the verb " to be"; in the judgment of faith this word can be pronounced only as a gift of the Spirit. Here there is something that merits the special attention of the theologian. Whether he is involved in textual and historical research or in a project of systematization, the theologian is concerned almost exclusively with the meaning of concepts, images and metaphors; and this preoccupation becomes particularly evident at a time when the community is asking for new ways of expressing the faith. It is for this reason that so much is heard today of " models," which are conceptual constructs put forward as possible thematizations of the mysteries. The creative thought that goes into all of this can only too easily overlook the fact that the verb " to be " constitutes a special case when statements of the tradition are being examined. It can be treated as though it expressed just another concept, just another perspective on reality which could quite easily be put in another way. The

analytic method largely used by the theologian, which works reasonably well for concepts, has a way of asserting itself like this even when the statements being considered move out of the irealm of conceptualization into that of the unique relationship with reality given in the judgment.

In its strongly existential sense (it may have other senses but these need not detain us) the verb "to be" indicates that the speaker is affirming that the referents of both subject and predicate of his statement are united, not simply by logical juxtaposition, but also, and primarily, in one reality which exercises its own unique act of existing. The speaker, if he is being serious, has some reason for making such an affirmation even though he may be quite unable to say how it is that what he is talking about is the way he affirms it to be. Now, it is clear that the Christian tradition makes statements having this strong existential character. In such cases the theologian is guilty of an elementary fault of logic, but one with devastating consequences, if he fails to advert to the unique significance of the verb " to be " as understood by the tradition he claims to be speaking for. It might be difficult to draw up a full list of such " limit propositions " where " to be " has this sense and where the Christian faith is immediately engaged. Evidently the Scriptures cannot supply an answer since they themselves pose part of the problem. The believer will be led to assume that the Holy Spirit makes other provision at the appropriate times for indicating which propositions are of this kind; the Christian communities do in fact make such an assumption in more or less explicit fashion.

The central example for all traditions could hardly be other than: "You *m·e* the Christ, the son of the living God". As far as concepts and images go, it is evidently true that both subject and predicates provide an inexhaustible field of enquiry and meditation. Equally, the fact that they are brought together has a limitless existential significance in terms of Christian life. But the broad signification of the terms, as understood in the Christian tradition, can be made clear to anyone and so can the claim being made by means of the " are ". We can

make the confession our own only in the power of the Spirit. If we do, we know that we are talking about one and the same person possessing both kinds of characteristics; and arguments that profess to demonstrate that this is not the case or even that it is the case will not make any essential difference to our confession because they will be conceptual while it is more. As far as the assent of faith is concerned we can only surrender ourselves to the mystery of the divine reality showing itself in Jesus Christ. Within the Catholic tradition a similar mysterious simplicity attaches to the words" This *is* my body". Conceptual analysis, if left to itself, is going to miss the point of statements of this kind. The tradition-or the teaching office of the church-fulfils its function if it simply reiterates the judgment of faith.

Analogy, dialectic and theological style

It is not analogy as such which is characteristic of a certain theological tradition, for it is difficult to envisage any theology conscious of its epistemological status which could ignore the need to justify the believer's unusual use of ordinary language; and to pose this problem is to recognize that the believer uses language analogically, even if this term is not adopted.

Where the real difficulty lies is revealed in the expression *analogia entis,* the analogy of *being,* a misnomer usually employed unreflectively by those who do not accept the method or, if they do, have not quite grasped it. This shows that what is at stake is a particular justification for analogical predication in statements of faith, namely, the metaphysical doctrine of participation. It is in virtue of the participation of created beings in the creative act of divine existing that a theology may lay claim, with all due reserves, to justify proper predication of God.

The participation on which analogy rests is a two-way street. It can permit the formulation of a general hermeneutic for interpreting statements of faith in such wise that the divine

transcendence is not compromised; but it also points the way to a reaffirmation of the values of creation and so to an authentic humanism. The immanence of the divine Son is seen to imply a restoration by the Spirit of what was given by God in his act of creation but was refused by sin. The whole mystery is precisely that of the immanence of God in mankind.

A theology that acknowledges participation will therefore present its own special way of looking at the Christian life for it will be a theology whose principal thrust is concerned with the Spirit who can progressively transform the sinner in the measure that one who is justified by grace acknowledges the divine goodness, with all that that implies, as the dominant inspiration of his life. It is within these perspectives that a St. Thomas could build his anthropology round the doctrine of the image of God which finds its future fulfilment in the vision and love of God. This is the context too of his moral theology which is structured by the articulation of the theological and moral virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Here, vocation to the beatific vision is seen as taking on its present ethical obligations according to the terms of the gospel beatitudes; sin and the negative commandments appear only as the negative side of grace.

A theology of this kind is, in principle, capable of opening itself to any genuine insights of Christian experience. This is because its fundamental intuition points to the most universal and the most concrete phenomenon of reality-the act of existing itself. It is totally subordinated to the mystery and the revelation in Christ, for this is the way in which God has chosen to exist in the world. For this reason, too, it is open to the intuitions of a theology of the cross with the dialectic that that implies. For St. Thomas, the cross of Christ, though he speaks of it with all the pathos of medieval spirituality, finds theological significance only when interpreted in the light of the goodness of God who chooses this way of communicating himself historically to sinful man. Still, the place for a dialectic remains; but it is significant that St. Thomas finds it in the

treatise on the sacraments in which those who believe the word of the gospel are united with Christ precisely in their existential condition where sin and suffering still exercise their power. The dialectic is an only too real fact of the Christian community's existence; but when it is projected onto the incarnate Son it can no longer retain the same significance, for he was without sin. Indeed, so far as his loving commitment to the Father and to us is concerned, all is positive. The negativity of his sufferings cannot be accounted for in terms of his individual person unless perhaps we were prepared to say that he was, like so many other human beings, a victim of historical circumstances.

It is only when those who believe in him are brought into actual union with him that a true element of negativity makes itself felt, for then the influence of sin becomes an active agent in a dialectic which is the developing mystery of Christ among us. His sufferings are drawn into the dialectic only when we, who are both justified and sinners, add our own sufferings to them, making up what is wanting to them in our own persons. If he is artificially seen as an isolated individual, then it will be said that he suffered simply because that was the way his message was received by the political and religious interests of his time. But if he is seen, as he ought to be, as one whose significance depends on his being actually received and acknowledged in faith, then his sufferings will not be isolated from those of believers or, indeed, from those of the world; and then the suffering can become an integral part of the development of the image of God in mankind as it seeks to overcome sin and its consequences, for this cannot be done without suffering. The true dimensions of the kenosis of the Son are to be discovered only when he, the original image of the Father, is seen as here and now drawing all men to himself, within the complexities of our human existence, marked as it is by the reality of sin, This very summary interpretation of the scholastic teaching on Christ's "satisfaction" is intended to indicate how an approach based on analogy, which stresses love as the key to Christ's saving activity, can be opened out to a dialectical ap-

proach.[8] But this is possible only if the dialectic is confined to the existence of believers and is not permitted to touch the person of Christ himself. The interpretation is evidently based on a development of *Col.,* UM. It could be further developed in terms of the Eucharist where Christ's saving activity is at work and where his members unite their sacrifice with his; in the Eucharist the dialectic is more real than it could have been on Calvary since grace is here found in direct confrontation with sin and its consequences.

No theology conscious of its pastoral function can ignore the dialectic of the Christian life. But it should turn to it only because it has already received a message which speaks positively of the grace of God and one which, if words mean anything, presents an objective statement about the divine plan of salvation. A purely existential message would not be existential since, lacking all objectivity, it would not present a valid possibility of life. A purely dialectic approach to the message, though it claims to be existential, appears to be obliged to place in brackets, as unattainable, the whole ontology which is implicit in the claim to objective knowledge about God. It seems that it does this because its proponents are concerned to maintain a dialogue with European agnostic philosophy. The Reformed tradition, it would appear, has resources which cannot be confined in so narrow a compass; the New Testament certainly has. Its totally uninhibited openness to God can be maintained in theology only if the theologian is prepared to open himself again to being, to the living butterfly, full of existence but so easy to crush. The alternative is to think about thinking about God and that discovers reality only when the one who is doing the thinking is God himself.

COLMAN E. O'NEILL, O.P.

University of Fribourg
Fribourg, Switzerland

s The theme is developed by R. Cessario, O.P., *Christian Satisfaction* in *Aquinas. Towards a Personalist Understanding,* Washington, D.C., University Press of America, 1982 (a doctoral dissertation presented at the University of Fribourg).

ALIENATION AND THE STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE: BIBLICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL VIEWS IN CONTRAST

EVERY SERIOUS effort to understand the human condition has led to the formation of a myth of the Fall, a myth which expresses the understanding that the actual condition we find ourselves in is not that of our genuine, normative human reality but is rather a condition of separation or *alienation* from that reality, a flawed mode of existence in which existence is a struggle, in which existents are set in conflict with one another in consequence of their separation from true being. Thus emerge two concepts which play key roles in our understanding of ourselves: 1) *the struggle for existence.* The reflection on the human condition will therefore attempt to ask and to answer three questions:

1) What is the nature of alienation ? That is, from what are we alienated ? What is the nature of the genuine reality of our existence and how does our actual existence differ from it ?
2) Concretely, how does our actual existence as struggling existents derive from this primary alienation ?
3) Given the etiology of the struggle, how can we hope to overcome or transcend it ?

The present discussion will attempt to contrast two radically divergent answers to these questions: 1) that found in the Jewish and Christian scriptures and in the view of the world grounded in these scriptures and the revelation they attest; 2) that provided by characteristically modern ideologies, such as Marxism, contemporary radical libertarianism, etc.[1] The

[1] For a more complete exposition of the concept of ideology presupposed here, see my article "Ideology: An Essay in Definition" in *Philosophy Today*, Vol. XXV, Number S/4, Fall, 1981, pp.

fundamental inadequacy of these ideologies for dealing with the problem will be a central theme of the present essay.

I

The Bible is quite clear both on the source of alienation and on the primary human reality preceding alienation. The account of creation given in Genesis tells us that God created the world in six days and that at the end of each day he looked upon his work and saw that it was good. When he had reached the end of the six days, culminating in the creation of man, he looked at all his creatures and saw that they were very good. Thus it is overwhelmingly clear from the account that the fault does not lie in man's creaturely state as such, that is, in his condition as a distinct and separate existent who is in no way identical with God, the absolute, the Ground, or whatever, but who receives his distinct individual existence as a gift from the Creator. This status of creatureliness is in fact his true and genuine reality, a reality which the Creator can pronounce to be very good. It is in fact the effort of the creature to abolish his creatureliness which the Bible sees as the source of the Fall. In the Genesis account, man is persuaded to eat the forbidden fruit by the argument that in so doing he will become as God, i.e., as the Creator, that he will no longer be in the position of receiving his existence as a free gift from God but will acquire the ability to confer existence on himself. Thus, in his genuine, creaturely human existence, in his primary right relationship to God, man receives his existence from God as a wholly free gift, a gift in which he takes joy, enabling him to live eucharistically, in thanksgiving. When this right relationship is lost, when man seeks to transcend his creaturehood, existence becomes, no longer a gift to rejoice in, but rather something which one must try to bestow on oneself, and thus something we must struggle for in competition with other creatures. Hence man must earn his bread by the sweat of his brow, woman must bring forth in sorrow, etc., all existence becomes something one must fight for, even against other crea-

tures who become one's enemies because they too are struggling for existence. One notes the change immediately in the passage *(Genesis* 8: 12-18) in which Adam and Eve present their excuses for their sin. Adam blames it on the woman, the woman in turn blames it on the serpent. We see already the breakdown of solidarity among creatures, the end of mutual support, etc. It is every creature for himself. Thus man's attempt to abolish his creaturehood leads directly to the struggle for existence.

Because it is not creaturehood but man's negation of his creaturehood which eventuates in his alienation and in the conversion of his life into a struggle for existence, the Biblical images of the overcoming of the struggle (classically found in the Sermon on the Mount) involve a reaffirmation of creaturehood, not its negation. For example, the following passage is central:

> Therefore I tell you, do not be anxious about your life, what you shall eat or what you shall drink, nor about your body, what you shall put on. Is not life more than food, and the body more than clothing? Look at the birds of the air: they neither sow nor reap nor gather into barns, and yet your heavenly Father feeds them. Are you not of more value than they? And which of you by being anxious can add one cubit to his span of lifer And why are you anxious about clothing? Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow; they neither toil nor spin; yet I tell you, even Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these. But if God so clothes the grass of the fields, which today is alive and tomorrow is thrown into the oven, will he not much more clothe you, 0 men of little faith? Therefore, do not be anxious, saying, "What shall we eat?" or "What shall we drink?" or "What shall we wear?" For the Gentiles seek all these things; and your heavenly Father knows that you need them all. But seek first his Kingdom and his righteousness, and all these things shall be yours as well.
>
> Therefore, do not be anxious about tomorrow, for tomorrow will be anxious for itself. Let the day's own trouble be sufficient for the day. *(Matthew* 6: 25-34, RSV)

Here we are told, not that the needs which we struggle to satisfy are wrong or illusory, but that, in a right relationship to God, these needs will be satisfied by the Creator's free gift.

Anxiety is to be overcome by accepting existence as a gift, i.e., by returning to full creaturely status. Similarly, in the passages exhorting us not to resist evil, we are told, in effect, that if we exist in a right relation to God, our existence can no longer be something we struggle to defend against the various forces which would seek to take it away from us, but is rather something to be accepted from the Creator without anxiety or defensiveness.

For the Christian, therefore, overcoming his alienation and terminating the struggle for existence is a matter of the slow progress in the life of grace by which he becomes increasingly able to die to himself (i.e., to his pretensions to be more than a creature) and thus to give up the struggle for existence so that he can receive his existence as a gift from God. " For whoever would save his life will lose it, and whoever loses his life for my sake and the gospel's will save it *(Mark* 8: 35) ." For the Christian, therefore, the end of the struggle for existence comes when he can give up the *struggle,* not when he can can give up existence understood as a gift from the Creator. (It must be understood, however, that for the Christian this giving up is the work of grace and cannot be realized as a social and political project to be somehow forced on the earthly city, as, e.g., pacifists try to do, thus engaging in their own kind of struggle for existence.)

In summary, for the Biblical perspective, alienation and the struggle for existence emerge from the negation of creaturehood and are to be overcome, through grace, by the reaffirmation of creaturehood.

II

The ideological understanding of alienation, in contrast, can best be understood in terms of the idea of a kind of fall from potentiality into actuality. To exist as an actual, particular creature, embedded in a network of relations, commitments, responsibilities, etc., is seen as alienation from one's true being, which is universal and unlimited (e.g., for Marx, man's

" species-being") . To be an actual existent distinct from some sort of "All" or "One" is to be alienated, cut off from one's true being. A couple of representative passages from the writings of ideologues may help to illustrate this. Marcuse, commenting on Freud, makes the following remarks:

.... Phantasy (imagination) retains the structure and the tendency of the psyche prior to its organization by the reality, prior to its becoming an " individual " set off against other individuals. And by the same token, like the id to which it remains committed, imagination preserves the memory of the subhistorical past when the life of the individual was the life of the genus, the image of the immediate unity between the universal and the particular under the rule of the pleasure principle. In contrast, the entire subsequent history of man is characterized by the destruction of this original unity: the position of the ego " in its capacity of independent individual organism " comes into conflict with " itself in its other capacity as a member of a series of generations." The genus now lives in the conscious and ever renewed conflict among the individuals and between them and their world. Progress under the performance principle proceeds through these conflicts.[2]

Similar passages can be cited from the young Marx:

In estranging from man (I) nature, and (fl) himself, his own active functions, his life-activity, estranged labour estranges the *species* from man. It turns for him the *Zife of the species* into a means of individual life. First it estranges the life of the species and individual life, and secondly it makes individual life in its abstract form the purpose of the life of the species, likewise in its abstract and estranged form.[3] Estranged labour turns thus: (3) *Man's species being*, both nature and his spiritual species property, into a being alien to him, into a means to his *individual existence:'* ... The proposition that man's species nature is estranged from him means that one man is estranged from the other, as each of them is from man's essential nature. [5]

Now it is obvious that such passages offer monumental difficulties to interpretation, but what -one clearly senses, with the

2 Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization* (New York, 1962), p. 129.

a Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (Moscow, 1961), pp. 74-75.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 76.

s *Ibid*.. p. 77.

aid of a little spiritual discernment, as underlying them is an animus against individual existence as such insofar as the latter is seen as implying, in some sense, a loss of universal substance. What such writers struggle against is the simple, obvious reality of common sense that to be a particular existent is not to be any other existent. Ohe detects, in these writings, not merely a reaction against the extremes of atomistic individualism in advanced industrial society, but a generalized opposition to particularity as such, to the fact that, e.g., to be a particular human being precludes being universal humanity.

Now what needs to be clarified here is precisely what it means to be a particular, individual human being. First of all, to be a particular human being means to be an *actual* human being, i.e., to have given up being merely a *potential* human being. But one becomes an actual human being in the encounter with others in the course of which one makes commitments, takes on responsibilities, becomes embedded in a network of relations which define, that is, *delimit,* what one is. Thus to be an actual, particular being is to be defined and limited, to have given up the unlimited realm of the potential for the limited realm of the actual.

But selfhood in this sense, as a limited structure emerging out of the limiting encounter with others and with an order of existence of which one is a part and no more, is an object of bitter hatred for characteristically modern ideologies. Nowhere is this more clear than in the rash of " liberationist" ideologies which have grown up like weeds in the past generation, of which feminism is a typical example. Such ideologies again and again repudiate actual selfhood in favor of a potential selfhood which they see as true selfhood. Ideologues committed to such views spend their lives fantasizing about the infinite potentialities which would be open to them if only a repressive society had not forced them into this or that role, e.g., forced them to be women, or to be men, etc. Now actual selfhood is the selfhood acquired when one is actualized by the encounter with objects, and its opposite is a kind of potential " selfhood" which is in reality pure subjectivity. A pure subject is open

to infinite possibilities-an actual self is not, it is limited by the possibilities it has actualized in the process of becoming a self. The essential subjectivism implicit in the " liberationist" movements is well illustrated by the insistence, on their part, that everyone be referred to and treated solely as a " person," that is, that all charaderistics which differentiate people (cultural, sexual, ethnic, etc.) be simply ignored (in other wnrds, that "humanity" or" personhood" be made a univocal term, an issue to be discussed later) . But since it is precisely by virtue of such attributes that one is an actual human being rather than merely a potential one, what the liberationists are really insisting on is that everyone be thought of purely as a potential, not an actual, human being. But a purely potential human being is a pure subject, so that what we are really being asked to do is to see and treat everyone solely as a pure subject. But the pure subject is a negation of selfhood, since to be a self is to be an "impure" subject, a subject actualized in various ways, e.g., by culture, by social roles which culture assigns in various ways to various individuals, in general, by commitment and responsible action emerging from the actualizing encounter with others. Where for the Christian freedom or wholeness implies the ability to act and exist as a particular, actual creature limited and bound by a network of relations rooted in the created order of being, for the " liberationist " freedom or wholeness means openness to infinite possibilities, it means the total absence of any closure or limitation of the personality, it means spending one's life confronting limitless possibilities without ever acting so as to limit them. For the Christian this is not freedom but paralysis of the will and hence slavery.

It is clear, then, that for ideologues creaturely existence as such is the root of alienation and consequently the struggle for existence occurs solely because there are existents, because there are creatures, not because creatures live in a wrong relation to their Creator. The distinction between the two understandings becomes clear enough when we compare their respective visions of how the struggle for existence is to come to an end. For the

Christian, it is the *struggle,* not existence, which is to end, when creatures learn to accept their existence as a gift and, in this joyful acceptance, affirm, not negate, their existence. In contrast, for the ideologue, the struggle for existence will end with the abolition of creaturely *existence,* with the swallowing up of the particular, individual self in the infinite sea of pure potentiality, pure subjectivity, which, in the last analysis, is a form of nothingness.

III

But the contrast presented above in outline is in need of more technical clarification. At the center of the ideologue's rejection of particular, creaturely existence is the belief that such a creaturely existence involves the loss of universal existence. Hence at the center of the problem of alienation is the ancient problem of universals, and just how one understands universals and their meaning will be determinative of how one understands the relation between universal and particular existence so central to the problem of alienation.

Now it is clear that universals can be looked at in three ways:

I) As univocal, i.e., as applying in an identical way to a multitude of particulars;
2) As equivocal, i.e., as merely homonymous;
3) As analogous.

The equivocal or homonymous notion of the universal term need not concern us here. What is crucial is the contrast between the univocal and analogous understanding of the universal.

Clearly, for ideological thought, the universal is always univocal and thus it can only be imperialistic in its pretensions, tolerating nothing which would limit it. The univocal universal must subsume all particulars under some-common something which is identical for all. But the only thing we can find which is truly identical for all members of a class is some potentiality shared by all. As soon as we introduce actuality, we introduce diversity, because actuality comes into being when universal

potentiality is actualized and limited. Thus to get at what all existents in a species share identically we must remove all actuality and hence reduce all the particulars to pure potentiality in which there can be no particular. Thus universal humanity must assume the form of a kind of universal human potentiality because it can only be found when we remove from it everything which is particular and hence actual. Thus particular existents within the species must be abolished, e.g., there can be no men and women but only " persons." If humanity is to be univocal, it must swallow up all diversity, since the latter can be understood only as the loss of universality and hence as alienation, as illusion.

In contrast, for the analogous concept of the universal which is always central to the Christian vision of the creation whether or not it is theoretically articulated, this type of conflict between universal and particular is not inherent in the very structure of things. The concept of the *analogia entis* [6] does not require the presence of any one something which all particulars share in common in an identical way. Rather, what holds particulars together, what makes them part of a class of some kind, whether that class is the human species or the creation as a whole, is the diversity of relations which all have to a common term, i.e., to God, who is the prime analogate. Ultimately, a particular creature has its particular form by virtue of a relation it has to its Creator which we may call *imaging.* Each particular creature images the Creator in a unique way built up out of the network of relations, limits, etc., in which that creature has its roots and out of the tension to image the Creator which is in a sense the creature's essence *qua* creature. An example may help to illustrate this. If we were to take the

[6] The problem of the *analogia entis* cannot, of course, be treated in any depth in the present context. Of particular value as a source for this issue is James F. Anderson's work, *The Bond of Being: An Essay on Analogy and Existence* (New York, 1949). Etienne Gilson's *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy* is also an invaluable source on this problem. The present discussion attempts to point only to certain elemental concepts which the author sees as central to the present issue, and should not be read as if it were an attempt to deal adequately or completely with the problem of the analogy of being.

variety of images of Christ which we find in churches, we would find almost no limit to their diversity and we would be hard put to find any one something which all had in common. But the relation which each has to the one term, Christ, draws them into the same class, however diverse the relations are. Thus the creation could be thought of as the universal community of images of the Creator. Universality is not, in this context, some univocal something which swallows up all particulars in identity, but is rather understood as *community*, which draws together all the particulars by virtue of their shared but diversified relation to the Creator. Universality, understood as community, in no way militates against particularity but rather requires it. In the community, each particular has its own unique and distinct existence but belongs to all the others by virtue of its imaging the same Creator. Thus, for Christians, universal humanity can be understood as the community of human icons of Christ. In a right creaturely relationship to God, individuation implies no loss of universal existence but rather is a condition for it.

IV

Ideology thus emerges, in the context of this problem, as a hatred of creaturely existence as such. In summing up this theme, it seems somehow appropriate to follow Plato's practice of presenting a myth. It has been suggested by theologians that Satan's sin was not a rejection of God as such, but an insistence on having God on his own terms, not on God's. One suspects that the key to Satan's rebellion, thus understood, may lie in his attitude to the creation. One might speculate that Satan's zeal for God was such that he willed that God should be God wholly in and for Himself, without creatures who are other than God and who, in Satan's view, in some way lessen or limit God's glory. But in fact, God freely chose, not to be God in and for himself only, but to be God with and for the creation. This understanding of the matter is summed up with particular clarity by Karl Barth:

God's deity is thus no prison in which He can exist only in and for Himself. It is rather His freedom to be in and for Himself but also with and for us, to assert but also to sacrifice Himself, to be wholly exalted but also completely humble, not only almighty but also almighty mercy, not only Lord but also servant, not only Judge but also Himself the judged, not only man's eternal king but also his brother in time. All that, rather, is the highest proof and proclamation of His deity. He who *does* and manifestly *can* do all that, He and no other is the living God.[7]

To will that God be God wholly in and for himself is to will that God be God otherwise than as he has freely chosen to be God, and is thus to rebel against God in the name of God. And with this rebellion goes a hatred of the creation, a hatred of the splendid multiplicity of creatures each imaging God in its own unique way and deriving its form from this imaging. Since the imaging is the source of all form, the rebellion involves a hatred of all form, a desire to unform all creatures and thus to reduce them to the closest possible approximation to nothingness. And thus ideologues, in their endless efforts to abolish all form, to abolish all creaturely existence, to draw all things back into pure potentiality, manifest only too clearly whose servants they are. And there is no inconsistency in the fact that they are themselves creatures, because their efforts to abolish form extend even, perhaps especially, to themselves; they ceaselessly work, and with considerable success, to unform and deform themselves, seeking the nothingness before all creation as their *telos.* Indeed, it seems to be precisely with themselves that they are most successful, reducing themselves to distorted shadows of the God-imaging creatures they were meant to be.

The ideological understanding of alienation and its transcendence is thus fundamentally destructive. It negates existence, warring against the joy in existence which holds the creation together.

GEORGE A. KENDALL

Lansing, Michigan

[7] Karl Barth, *The Humanity of God* (Atlanta, 1978), p. 49.

THE EGIDEAN INFLUENCE IN ROBERT ORFORD'S DOCTRINE ON FORM

SOMETIME BETWEEN the years 1277 and 1279, the English Franciscan William de la Mare wrote a polemical work entitled: *Correctivwni fratris Thomae.*[1] The purpose of this treatise was to safeguard the orthodoxy of those young Franciscans who might have been reading the writings of Thomas Aquinas. The Franciscan Chapter of Strasbourg held in 1282 ordered that the friars have this book before them while reading Aquinas. We know of three Dominican responses to William's *Correctivum* which were written at Oxford, each being identified by its opening word, viz., *Quare, Sciendum* and *Quaestione.*[2] The second of these, whose full title is: *Correctorium Corruptorii Sciendum* is ascribed in *MS. Madrid Bibl. Real. VII, H. 5* (now *University Salamanca* 1887) to a certain *Guillelmus Torto Callo Anglici.* On *fol.* 89v is the explicit statement:

> Here ends the correction of the corruptor by brother William of Torto Collo, an Englishman, Master of Theology, of the Order of Friars, Preachers.

This same man, Torto Collo, also wrote a work against Henry of Ghent which is found in *MS. Vat. lat.* 987, *fol.* lr-128v, but in this work against Henry his name is written Colletorto. On *fol.* 128 in a contemporary hand are the words:

1 For a discussion of this work, its dates and the events surrounding its appearance, see my *The Quaestio Disputata de Unitate Frirmae by Richard Knapwell,* (Paris, 1982), pp. 165.

2 All these works are available in editions. *Le Oorrectorium Corruptorii ' Qucire',* ed. Palemon Glorieux (Kain, 1927); *Le Correctorium Oorruptorii 'Sciendum ',* ed. Palemon Glorieux (Paris, 1956); *Le Correctorium Oorruptorii ' Quaestione',* ed. Jean-Pierre Muller (Rome, 1954).

and here are notations in the margins of these titles or articles by Master Robert of Colletorto, so that one might see how he (i.e., Henry) contradicts himself.

Despite the difference in the way the name appears, i.e., Torto Collo and Colletorto, internal evidence makes it clear that one and the same man wrote both works. We might note also that the author of *contra dicta Henrici,* viz., Robert Colletorto, made several references to a *responsorium ad corruptorium,* and in one of these references he said it was his own *responsorium:*

> but because Henry does not oppose what I have written concerning this matter in my response to the corruptor, I do not care to deal with what he says here.[3]

Colletorto or Torto Collo also wrote another treatise, against Giles of Rome, entitled *Reprobationes dictorum a fratre Egidio in primum Sententiarum* which is extant in one manuscript, viz., *MS. Merton* Q76.[4] Although the latter work is anonymous in the Merton manuscript, a comparative examination of *Reprobationes fratris Egidii, contra dicta Henrici* and *Sciendum* shows that one man wrote the three works.

A comparison of what we read in the three treatises in connection with the relationship of the intellect to the will makes it clear that Torto Collo is the author. Is the intellect the su., perior faculty in man; or is the will? If the question be set in these precise terms, it might have seemed an odd or perhaps trivial thing to he asking. But the implications of the question for the scholastic were far-reaching. The way he discussed the point depended largely on how he stood regarding the broader question of that time concerning the role of philosophy in the Christian scheme. The excessive rationalism of the so-called

a " Sed quia Henricus non opponit se ad ea quae ego scripsi circa materiam istam in responsorio ad corruptorium, ideo non _curavi tractare quae sic recitat ", *MS. Vat. lat.* 987, *fol.* 122rb. P. Bayerschmidt shows that the *respomcmum* in question is *Sciendum,* Robert von Colletorto, Verfasser des Correctoriums •*Bci*endum' ", *Divus Thomas* (Freiburg im Breis.) 17 (1939), pp. Sll-S!!6.

4 *RobeTt d'Orford Reprobationes dictorum a fratre Egidio in Primum Sententiarum,* ed. A. Vella (Paris, 1968).

radical Aristotelians brought on the strong counter-measures of the Church and University authorities. The debate over the. relative superiority of intellect and will did not reflect this conflict in its entirety, but it formed an important element in the dispute. The opposition to those who stressed unduly the excellence of the rational element in man is reflected in some of the propositions condemned at Paris in 1277:

40. That there exists no higher calling than to give oneself to philosophy.
121. That the intellect, man's highest perfection, is entirely abstract.
144. That every good possible to man consists in the intellectual virtues.
145. That there is no question subject to rational inquiry which the philosopher should refrain from disputing and deciding, for arguments are derived from external reality. But Philosophy in its several areas deals with all external reality.[5]

Aquinas, in his efforts to remain consistent with Aristotelian principles as he understood them, insisted that the rational and true and therefore the intellect enjoyed an ontological priority over the good and the will.[6] Of St. Thomas's view William de la Mare said:

To us this seems to be false and to pave the way for many other false things even if it does not appear to be directly contrary to the Faith or to upright living.[7]

For support William relied heavily on the authority of St. Augustine and St. Anselm, without however neglecting to cite and interpret Aristotle and the Commentator in accord with what he took as the Augustinian position. In *Sciendum,* Torto Collo arranged his main response under three headings. In

5 *Chart. Univ. Paris,* I, pp. *545-552.*

6 For St. Thomas's position see *Summa Theol.,* I, 82, 8; 11-11, 28, 6, ad lum; *Contra Gent.,* III, c. 26; *Quaest. Disp. de Veritate,* q. !!!!, a. 11. R. Macken discusses the ' intellectualism ' of St. Thomas in relation to the ' voluntarism ' of Henry of Ghent in " La volonte humaine, faculte plus elevee que l'intelligence selon Henri de Gant", *Recherches de TMologie ancienne et medievale,* 4!! (1975), pp. 5-51; see especially pp. 41-51.

1 In *Quare,* p. 161.

fact he started out as if we were going to hear two lines of argument:

but a faculty can be considered in two ways: either as a kind of power, and this would be in comparison to its activity, for a power is what it is from its relation to activity; or, these faculties can be considered in relation to their terminating objects.[8]

In following out his scheme, however, which is taken from Aquinas, he added a third argument:

Again, the same thing is clear if [the faculty] be compared with the essence of the soul.

The first and third arguments follow closely what St. Thomas had written in the *Summa Theologiae*[0]; the second argument, which appears to be original, is verbally identical with what is found in the *oontra Egidium:*

For since the essence of the soul is one and the faculties are several, and there is progress from one to many according to a certain order, of necessity there exists an order among the faculties of the soul. According to the order of nature perfect things are prior to the imperfect, but according to the order of generation it is the other way round. But by the order of nature the intellect comes before the will . . . Therefore, simply speaking, in this way the intellect is the higher faculty .[10]

In the later *oontra Egidium* Torto Collo referred to this place in *Soiendum* and quoted from it *verbatim.*[11]

In *Quodlibet* 1, 14, Henry of Ghent said that if we had to compare the two faculties then we ought to say that the will enjoys a pre-eminence over the intellect. His conclusion was:

Therefore it must be said without qualification that in the entire kingdom of the soul the will is the superior power; and thus [it is superior] to the intellect.[12]

s *Sciendum,* p. 148.

0 *Summa Them.,* I, 8!e, S.

10 *Sciendum,* pp. 148-149.

11 *Reprobationes contra Egidium,* p. 51.

12 "Absolute ergo dicendum quod voluntas superior vis est in toto regno animae; et ita ipso intellectu ", *Quodlibeta Magistri Goethals a Gandavo,* I (Paris, 1518, vol. 1), *fol.* 1Ir.

In the main response to Henry found in *contra Henricum* Torto Callo directed the reader to what he had already written m *Sciendum:*

The solution as to how the intellect is a higher faculty than the will is sufficiently set forth in *Responsorio contra Corruptorem,* question 34, and it is found in *super II Sent.,* distinction 33. There also are found the solutions to all the arguments repeated here. Therefore I shall pass over them briefly. For in that place it was shown how the intellect is a higher and nobler faculty than the will be comparing them to the activity, habit and object.[13]

As we have seen, in *Sciendum* Torto Callo compared the faculties "to the act, to the essence and to the object". The slight discrepancy between " to the essence " and " to the habit " does not disturb the parallel. The next words in *contra Henricum,* viz., " in that place also is the answer to the authority of Anselm when he calls the will ' mistress ' "[14] is a reference to the first objection in *Sciendum:* " To the first opposing argument, it must be said that when Anselm says ... "[15] And his following words against Henry, viz., **"It** is also clear there how the intellect moves the will and vice versa [how] the will [moves] the intellect "[16] are again a reference to what he had already said in *Sciendum.* The four remaining points in *contra Henricum* have their counterparts in *Sciendum* as well:

There also is the answer to the argument concerning Charity.[17] There also is answered the last argument placed here.[18] To the

13 " Solutio qualiter intellectus sit altior potentia quam voluntas satis declaratum est *responsorio contra corruptorem,* quaestione 34, et ponitur *super 2 Sent.,* distinctione 33. Ibi etiam ostensum est solutiones ad omnia argumenta quae hie replicantur. Ideo brevius est pertranseundum. Ibi enim ostensum est quomodo intellectus est altior et nobilior potentia quam voluntas comparando eas ad actum et ad habitum et ad obiectum ", *MS. Peterhouse* 129, *fol.* 6va; *MS. Vat. lat.* 987, *fol.* 7vb.

14 "Ibi etiam responsum est ad auctoritatem Anselmi cum vocat voluntatem dominam ", *ibid.*

15 *Sciendum,* p. 149.

16 " Patet etiam ibidem quomodo intellectus movet voluntatem, et econverso voluntaa intellectum ", *MS. Peterhouse* 129, *fol.* 6va; *MS. Vat. lat.* 987, *fol.* 7vb.

17 In *Sciendum* the reply to the fourth objection dealt with the question of charity: "To the argument relating to charity ... ", p. 150.

18 The reference here is to Henry's argument that the will's object *(bonum)* is

argument: it is more noble to love God than to know Him, the response is found in article 89.[19] How reason commands the will is explained in *Responsorio ad Corruptorem,* question *55,2°* and it is found in *super II Sent.,* distinction 88.[21]

After this reference he elaborated on what appeared in *contra Egidium:*

Therefore I say it is true, the will moves the intellect to its activity. But it should be recognized when we say this that we do not mean the will moves the intellect to its act of understanding pure and simple, for were we to take the latter meaning then the act of will would come before the very first act of understanding, and this is not true, for we will only what we know, as the blessed Augustine says: nothing is loved unless it is known. [When we say the will moves the intellect] this must be taken as referring to a special act of understanding. Taken in this special sense, there are two aspects requiring our consideration, namely, the activity itself and the determination of the activity, or to say it another way, 'to understand ' and ' to understand this particular thing '. In a similar way, in the special act of willing [there are two aspects], viz., ' to will ' and ' to will this particular thing '. Therefore, in the special act of understanding the activity itself is the result of willing, for the activity comes about by virtue of a mediating habit, and a habit is something we put to use when we will to do so. However the determination of this activity does not come from the will, but from the species [or idea] which is the form in the intellect of the thing being understood. For through the mediation of the idea of man I understand what a man is, and through the idea of

better or 'higher' than the intellect's object *(verum).* The point here is that *verum* is not *bonUJn.* In *Sciendum* the reply to the last argument took this point under consideration: " it must be recognized that since the true is a kind of good ...", p. 150.

19 In *Sciendum* see article 50: "To the other argument, when it is said ... to love God is more noble than to know Him, it must be said ...", pp.

20 See *Sciendum,* article 55: " Whether to command is an activity of the reason ", pp.

21 " Ibi etiam responsum est ad argumentum de Caritate. !bi etiam soluta est ultima ratio quae hie ponitur. Ad illud: diligere Deum est nobilius quam cognoscere, responsum est articulo 89. Quomodo autem ratio imperat voluntatem, patet in *resp0118orio ad corruptorem,* quaestione *55,* et habetur *super II Sententiarum,* distinctione SS.", *MS. Peterhouse.* 129, *fol.* 6va; *MS. Vat. lat.* 987, *fol.* 7vb.

horse, what a horse is. With the will the reverse is true. For since the will is the seat of liberty, though not its cause-as will be made clear in the next question-and since action flows from this seat, therefore the will acts freely. But even though it can only will after what is known determines it to will this or that, in the sense that reason proposes this or that to the will, the will itself is not however forced to will this or that-this will become clear.[22]

The cross references and parallels here are sufficient for us to say that one man, Torto Collo, wrote the three works.

Although the different spellings of the second name is of no significance, the author's first name is William in one manuscript ascription and Robert in the other, and this is most significant. Palemon Glorieux, in the introduction to his edition of *Sciendum* prefers William as the correct given name and dismisses the 'Robert' found in the Vatican manuscript as an error.[23] His reasoning for this choice places great emphasis on the fact that the *Stam.-; Catalogue* has a *correctorium* under William Macclesfield's name and not under Robert Orford's.

22 " Dico igitur quod 'voluntas movet intellectum' verum est quantum ad exercitium actus. Hie tamen sciendum est quod cum dicitur voluntas movet intellectum quantum ad exercitium actus, hoc non dicitur intelligere quantum ad exercitium intelligendi simpliciter, quia secundum hoc, primum intelligere praecederet actus voluntatis, quod falsum est; cum nihil volumus nisi quod cognoscimus, secundum beatum Augustinum: nihil amatur nisi cognitum. Sed hoc debet intelligi de actu intelligendi speciali. In hoc enim speciali actu intelligendi vel intelligere sunt duo considerare, scilicet exercitum actus et determinationem actus, ut in intelligere et intelligere hoc. Similiter, in speciali actu voluntatis sunt velle et velle hoc. In hoc ergo speciali intelligere, exercitium actus est a voluntate, quia actus elicitur mediante habitu. Habitus autem est quo utimur cum volumus; determinatio autem actus non est a voluntate, sed a specie quae est forma rei intellectae in intellectu. Mediante enim specie hominis intelligo hominem, et mediante specie equi, equum. Econverso est de voluntate. Cum enim voluntas sit subiectum libertatis, quamvis non sit causa, ut patebit in quaestione sequenti, et subiecti est agere, voluntatis est libere agere. Sed quia nihil potest velle nisi per cognitum determinetur ad volendum hoc vel illud, ex hoc quod hoc vel illud a ratione sibi proponitur, non tamen necessitatur ad volendum hoc vel illud, ut ibi patebit ", *MS. Peterhouse* IQ9, *fol.* 6va; *MS. Vat. lat.* 987, *fol.* Sra.

23 " Tout inviterait ainsi a abandonner la candidature de Robert d'Erfort et, dans ces conditions a considerer cornrne errone sans doute le prenorn que la notice du Vatican a attribue au Tortocollo, auteur du traite contre Henri de Gand ", p. 17.

Two observations are in order here. First, we must remember that the absence of a certain work under one's name in an early catalogue might mean nothing more than that it is incomplete in the given instance. There s reason to think this is the case with Robert Orford and a *correctorium*, for the later chronicler John Bale assigns to him a *Protectorium Thomae Aquinatis.* [24] Second, one must bear in mind also that all we are sure of from *Stams* is that William Macclesfield wrote one of the *correctoria;* which particular one he wrote is in no way hinted.

The same *Stams Catalogue* which Glorieux cites as an argument against Robert Orford having done *Sciendum* attributes to him the other two works:

contra dicta HIN [RICI] de Gaude [GANDAVO], quibus impugnat Thomam, contra primum Egidii, ubi impugnat Thomam.[25]

But what of the ' William ' written in the Madrid manuscript? D.A. Callus gives an interesting explanation for this.[26] The name William might not in fact designate the author but rather the author's adversary, viz., William de la Mare. The three line colophon in *MS. Madrid, fol.* 89va is:

Explicit [in mag. correctorium] corruptorii fratris Guillermi de Torto Collo anglici magistri in theologia ordinis fratrum predicatorum,

According to Callus, this might very well have been a four-line colophon in the copy the scribe used, so that reconstructed it would read:

Explicit [correctorium] corruptorii fratris Guillermi [de Mara anglici magistri in theologia, Robertil de Torto Collo anglici magistri in theologia ordinis fratrum predicatorum,

The scribe's significant mistake in omitting and then correcting later his omission by including the important word *correctorium*

24 *Scriptorum lllustrium Maiori.s Brythannie Catalogus* (Basel, 1557), p. 824.

25 *Catalogus Stamsensis*, ed. Denifle (Archiv fiir Literatur-und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters, 2, 1886), p. 60.

26 *Bulletin Thomiste*, 9 (1954-1956), p. 658.

in conjunction with the easily possible homography suggested by Callus, is an inviting supposition. While an element of doubt remains, we are safe in saying that these three works, one of them being the *correctorium corruptorii Sciendum,* very probably belong to Robert Orford.

Emden puts Orford down as a Franciscan.[27] This is a slip,[28] for there can be no doubt he was a Dominican. His name is in the *Stams Catalogue* which lists only Dominicans and he is identified as a Preacher in *MS. New Coll.* 92 and *MS. Worcester* 46.[29] From *.MS. Assissi* we know he acted as respondens in two disputations: one, with a certain ' Clif ', and on another occasion with Alan Waker:field who was the 17th Franciscan regent Master at Oxford.[80] He also preached a sermon there on February 22, 1293, whether as a Master or not we do not know.[81] From *Stams* we know he became a Master at some point, but the date of his inception is not known.

In vi·ew of his writings against Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent, Vella suggests Orford may have spent some time studying at Paris.[32] The *Dictionary of National Biography* states it as a fact:

> Afterwards he was at Paris where he wrote in support of Thomas Aquinas against Henry of Ghent and Giles of Rome.[33]

If he did so, then his departure from Oxford and later return would have paralleled the moves of his confrere, William Mac-

127 *A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500,* ii (Oxford, 1958), p. 1401; *Biographical Register of the University of Cambridge to 1500* (Cambridge, 1963), p. 435.

2s The source of the slip could be the ambiguous sentence in *Oxford Theology and Theologians ca. A.D. 1282-1302,* Little-Pelster (Oxford, 1934), p. 12, where, in speaking of Orford a reference is made to the Franciscans lists.

29 *Oxford Theology and Theologians,* p. 163.

so *Ibid.,* pp. *105;* 112. See also Thomas Eccleston, *Fratris Thomae vulgo dicto de Eccleston Tractatus de Adventu Fratrum Minomm in Angliam* ed. Little (Manchester 1951), p. *53.*

31 *Oxford Theology and Theologians,* pp. 168; 181.

32 *Reprobationes contra Egidium,* pp. 12-18.

as *DNB,* 42, p. 252.

clesfield.[84] It is easy to understand a decision of the Dominican superiors to have arranged such a trip for these two enthusiasts in the interest of peace as well as for their own welfare. Orford's concern with these two Paris masters, however, in and of itself is not enough to suggest a sojourn in Paris. There was plenty of interest in Giles and Henry at Oxford, at least among these early Thomists, making the Paris trip for Orford a superfluous conjecture.[35] Indeed, in the earliest work we have from him, viz., *Sciendum,* Orford reveals his familiarity with Giles.[86] While the Paris sojourn lacks sufficient evidence, there is a clue that Orford might have spent some time at Cambridge. If, as Pelster says, the first 15 quires (with the exception of 11 and rn) of *MS. Assissi* 158 originated in Cambridge, since in the fifth quire Orford's name appears as *reS'pondens,*[81] it follows that he was there at that time. At any rate, he is back at Oxford, if he ever left, by *ca.* 1285 responding under Alan Wakerfield.

In article 31 of *Sciendum* entitled: "Whether in man there exists only one substantial form", Robert Orford presents his basic argument in defense of the unity thesis.[38] The core of his argument appeals to a distinction drawn between the ' form of the part ' and the ' form of the whole ' in the way they give ' substantial existence ' to a substance. It is possible, he says, to view substantial existence in two ways: in part, or in its entirety. For example, we can speak of ' man ' as a single complete entity, and corresponding to this is substantial existence in its entirety. Or we can speak of the' arm' or' toe', each of which is a part of the composed substance 'man', enjoying an existence in a sense its own. It is perfectly acceptable to say there are several substantial forms in the one composed sub-

84 See F. Kelley, *The Thomists and their opponents at Oxford in the last part of the thirteenth century* (unpublished D.Phil.- thesis Oxford Univ., 1977), *MS. Bodleian* D.Phil. d. 6!!58, p. 58.

85 *Ibid.,* p. 168.

36 See *infra,* pp. 88sqq.

37 *Oxford Theology and Theologians,* p. l!l.

sap, 187.

stance, if by so saying we refer to the ' forms of the parts ' which give partial substantial existence.[39] But if one were to hold that there is more than one form of the whole substance giving total substantial existence to the composite, then he would be wrong. Indeed, to say such a thing implies a contradiction, for it amounts to saying that one thing is many things.4°

Orford's argument here is most unusual, at least for a Thomist. Throughout the discussion he is referring to existence, and emphasizing the way form gives existence. The most remarkable thing of all is the way he draws the distinction between total substantial existence and partial substantial existence which, he says, corresponds to and is ' given by ' the form of the part and the form of the whole. One looks in vain for anything resembling this in the writings of St. Thomas. F. Roensch says that Orford here " bases his rebuttal of the pluralist view on St. Thomas' *Commentary on the Metaphysics",4* [1] but what Orford says in the argument just considered is not at all what St. Thomas has in the place Roensch cites. **It** is true, Aquinas uses the terms ' form of the whole ' and ' form of the part ', but he uses them in an entirely different meaning from Orford's. By ' form of the whole ' St. Thomas means the nature taken in abstraction from the individual, as for instance when one speaks of ' man ' in general. This usage corresponds exactly to what he elsewhere calls total abstraction. [42] By ' form of the

89" Dare autem esse simpliciter, scilicet esse substantiale, contingit dupliciter, vel partiale vel totale. Esse autem plures formas in re aliqua quae dant esse substantiale partiale non est inconveniens, immo necessarium est; cum enim ex non substantiis non fiat substantia, partes substantiae sunt substantiae; unde Philosophus in *Pra.edicamentis* vult quod manus et pes quae sunt primae substantiae non sunt accidentia, quia non sunt sicut accidens in subiecto, sed sunt substantiae quae sunt sicut partes in toto ", *Sciendum,* p. 138.

40 " Si loquamur de esse substantiali totali et de forma quae <lat esse substantiale totale, sic impossibile est esse plures formas in una re; quia cum a forma sit denominatio, illa substantia esset non unum totum sed plura tota, quod est implicatio contradictionis, nam una res esset plures res ", *ibid.*

41 *Early Thomistic School,* (Dubuque, 1964), p. 29?3.

42 See for example, *Expositio 8'!iper librum Boethii de Trinitate,* ed. Decker (Leiden, 1955), q. *5,* art. 3; *Summa Theol.,* I, 85, 1. See also J. Weisheipl, *Friar Thomaa d'Aquino,* p. 185.

part ' he means simply any individual instance of the nature, e.g., Socrates or Callias. He does not at all mean, as Orford does, the form of the entire individual composed substance, e.g. Socrates on the one hand, and the form of the 'part', say Socrates' arm on the other:

> Whence there exists another opinion which Avicenna follows; and according to this [opinion J the form of the whole, which is the very nature of the species, differs from the form of the part, as a whole from its part: for the nature of the species is composed of matter and form, but not from this form and from this individual matter. From these latter the individual, say Socrates and Callias, is composed.[48]

Orford's entire procedure here does, however, resemble closely what Giles of Rome has in his *Theoremata de esse et essentia.*[44] Indeed, the distinction between ' form of the part' and ' form of the whole ' as giving partial existence and total existence is one of the central concepts running throughout the entire treatise. He introduces the distinction in theorem VIII and resorts to it repeatedly in IX, XII and XVI. Hocedez says that the way Giles returns to this point in the treatise might make us think that he was afraid the reader was not understanding it.[45] Theorem VIII is entitled:

> All material things have in them a form of the part and a form of the whole, and since form causes existence we can see that in material things a twofold existence is found. One of them is existence pure and simple, the other however is not existence pure and simple, but can be called a mode of existence.[46]

The point Giles stresses here is that although we can and do speak of the ' existence of the form of the whole ' and the ' existence of the form of the part ', we should not imagine that there are two 'existences', simply speaking. In strict parlance there

43 St. Thomas, *In Metaph., lib.* VII, *lect.* 9, n. 1469, p. 358-359.
44 *Aegidii Romani Theoremata de esse et essentia,* ed. Hocedez (Louvain, 1930).
45 *Ibid.,* Introduction, p. (24) •
46 *Ibid.,* p. 39.

is one existence, viz., the ' existence of the form of the whole '. The ' existence of the form of the part ' is correctly understood as ' mode ' of existence. His doctrine is summed up in the conclusion of theorem VIII:

But were existence to be caused by and made to flow from each and every form, as we said in our proposal, it might seem to follow from this that in material things a double existence would be found; one which flows from the form of the part, and another from the form of the whole. But as will appear from what follows, the existence flowing from the form of the part is not a thing really differing from matter and form; thus such an existence is a kind of mode of existence rather than existence pure and simple. The existence flowing from the form of the whole is really different from the essence or nature. Therefore, when in speaking about existence we say that material things are composed not only of matter and form but also of essence and existence, existence is not taken here as something caused by the form of the part but as it flows from the form of the whole. Thus what we said in the theorem is correct, viz., that if one posits a double existence in material things because of the double form, then one of these is existence pure and simple, as that flowing from the form of the whole; the other however is not existence in a proper sense, but could be called a mode of existence as flowing from the form of the part. [47]

Orford has taken the conceptual arrangement as well as the terminology from Giles and turned it to his purpose in arguing for the unity of form. Just as the existence of the form of the part is not an existence in and of itself distinct from the existence of the form of the whole, but is rather a mode of that existence-this had been Giles's basic position-by an extension, Orford argues: the form of the part (giving partial existence, as Giles had said) is not something in and of itself distinct from the form of the whole (giving total existence); rather it participates in the form of the whole:

Therefore there exist several partial substantial forms of this kind in the total composite, and insofar as the form of the whole is nobler, a greater plurality of partial forms is required ... But they

[47] *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46.

do not give any kind of existence-the form of the whole prevents this-rather they participate in the form of the whole.[48]

The Egidean influence is unmistakable. Though Orford would later attack Giles on matters ranging from the serious to the trivial,[49] here we find in his early work, *Sciendum,* clear indications that he favors the Augustinian's understanding of existence. And he applies Giles's concepts, most interestingly, in order to defend the Thomistic position regarding the hylomorphic theory.

Like Sutton and Knapwell, Orford saw the importance of the non-terminated dimensions for the proper understanding of the unity thesis. It is no surprise, therefore, to find in *Sciendum* a lengthy discussion of the dimensions.[50] Most of what we read here is verbally identical with portions of the opuscule *De natura materiae et dimensionibus interminatis* ascribed by some scholars to Thomas Aquinas.[51] This is one of a list of seven opuscules whose authorship has been debated. The titles are:

De instantibus
De natura verbi intellectus
De principio individuationis
De genere
De natura accidentium
De natura materiae et dimensionibus interminatis
De quatuor oppositionibus

Mandonnet accepts as authentic opuscules of Aquinas only those contained in the official catalogue which, he says, is the work of Reginald of Piperno, composed not long after the saint's death in 1274.[52] The *intrusion massive* of apocrypha

48 *Sciendum,* p. 188.

49 I hope to deal with this extensively in a later article.

50 The discussion occurs in article 29: " Whether in spiritual substances there can be a numerical difference without a specific difference", pp. 126-138.

51 *De natura materiae et dimensionibus inferminatis,* (Divi Thomae Aquinatis Opuscula Philosophica), ed. Marietti (Rome, 1954), pp. 131-145.

52 *Des Ecrits Authentiques de S. Thomas d'Aquin,* (Fribourg, 1910), pp. 40sqq. The list of St. Thomas's writings as given by this catalogue is on pp. 20-Sl. See also Mandonnet's article, "Les 'opuscules' de saint Thomas d'Aquin ", *Revue Thomiste,* 10 (1927), pp. 122-151.

took place, according to Mandonnet, shortly thereafter and received sanction in the catalogues of *Starns* (13a), Ptolemy of Lucca (UH7) and Bernard Gui (1319). These seven opuscules represent the original intrusion of apocrypha and they appear in a late thirteenth-century manuscript described as 'edited by brother Thomas of the Order of Preachers '.M The authors of these catalogues, says Mandonnet, took ' brother Thomas ' to be Aquinas, but this was a mistake since the opuscules are wanting in the official catalogues, and in any case they contain doctrines alien to the thought of Aquinas.[54]

A note in a fourteenth-century hand alongside one of the opuscules, viz., *De instantibus,* in *MS. Vat. lat.* 806, *fol.* fl5: "I believe this treatise *De instantibus* was edited by brother Thomas Sutton the Englishman " led Mandonnet to believe all seven might be Sutton's. This, he thinks, is confirmed by the character of the works. The author is interested in defending Aquinas's doctrine as Sutton often did, and the emphasis on logic points to Sutton as well, who was ' un tres fort logicien '.

Grabmann disagrees with Mandonnet, insisting that these seven opuscules certainly belong to Aquinas.[55] Their absence from what Mandonnet calls the official catalogue does not prove them to be apocryphal, but merely shows that the catalogue is incomplete. The addition of the later catalogues which Mandonnet claims were erroneous should be presumed as having been well founded and a supplement to the original attempt to compile a complete list of St. Thomas's writings.[56] The note in the Vatican manuscript is not a good hypothesis, for three of the other opuscules in the same manuscript, viz., *De natura generis (fol.* 3r-llr), *De natura accidentis (fol.* 15v) and *De principio individuationis (fol.* 16v) are ascribed to Aquinas.[51]

53 *MS. Avignon* 251, *fol.* lr-SOv.

54 " Enfin, la doctrine de plusieurs de ces opuscules, sinon de tous, est inassimilable a celle de saint Thomas.", "Les' opuscules' ", p. 151.

55 *Die Werke des Hl. Thomas von Aquin,* (BGPM, 22, Heft 1-2, 1949), pp. 246-247.

56 Regarding Mandonnet's ' exclusiveness-theory ', see *ibid.,* pp. 58-91.

51 For the debate on the authorship of these opuscules see also J. Weisheipl, *F'l'i!P Thomas cl'Aquino,* pp. 408-404.

Glorieux, the editor of *Sciendum,* suggests in the introduction to his edition that if the *De natura materiae* does not belong to Aquinas, it might well be Orford's. [58]

From internal evidence we can say with a high degree of probability that of the seven opuscules at least the *De natura materiae* does not belong to Aquinas but to Robert Orford. The main thrust of the opuscule, and the central part of it found in *Sciendum,* is an attack against Averroes's view concerning the non-terminated dimensions. Chapter four opens with the words:

> Therefore it is clear from what has been said that Averroes was mistaken in his book *De substantia orbis* when he said the non-terminated dimensions pre-existed in matter. [59]

After a number of arguments designed to show why Averroes was wrong, the author introduces a 'more reasonable opinion' which someone has advanced. [60] This more reasonable view has it that the non-terminated dimensions do not have primary matter as the subject. It was in saying this that Averroes made his mistake. Rather, the non-terminated dimensions have as the subject the composite made up of matter and form. In order to understand this properly, we must distinguish between 'form' considered as the genus (i.e. 'body') and 'form' taken as 'specific' or 'more complete.' To form in sense one correspond the non-terminated dimensions; to form in sense two follow the dimensions as terminated:

> Thus others say, more reasonably, that the form of the second genus, that is to say 'body', when it joins with matter gives to it a kind of incomplete existence which is a preparation for actual and complete existence resulting from another more complete form. Therefore these people say that the three non-terminated

ss *Sciendum,* introduction, p. rn. J. Wyss, in the introduction to his edition *De Natura Materiae* (Textus Philosophici Friburgensis, Fribourg, Suisse, 1953) says we cannot say who in fact wrote the work, but it was certainly not St. Thomas.

59 *De nat'l!ra materiae,* ed. Marietti, p. 134; *Sciendum,* p. rn7.

so " Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est quad quidam alio modo et rationabilius eas posuerunt quam Averroes", *De natura materia.e,* p. 138; *Sciendum,* p. 129.

dimensions exist in matter through the incomplete form; afterwards they receive their termination by reason of another more complete form. Accordingly, these people do not say that primary matter is the subject of these dimensions, as the Commentator had said; rather, it is the composite made up of matter and subform.61

This 'more reasonable opinion' which Orford refers to here is none other than Thomas Sutton's in *Quodlibet* I, 10:

it does not follow that primary matter is the subject of accidents, but the composite made up of matter and form, so that matter along with the generic form constituting ' body ' is the subject of non-terminated quantity, and matter along with the inferior generic form is the subject of the other less common accidents, and so on, always descending until we reach the specific form. And the specific form with matter is the subject of all the terminated accidents, precisely as they are terminated. 62

Since the author of *De natura materiae* refers to Sutton's *Quodlibet* I, 10 it follows that Aquinas could not have written the opuscule, for Sutton's work was written after the saint had died.

The following considerations favor Orford as the one responsible for *De natura materiae.* After having presented Sutton's opinion, the author found fault with it, and the delicacy in the way he disagrees, i.e., Sutton's view is 'more reasonable' even if mistaken, sounds very much like the rebuke by an admirer. More importantly, the very inclusion of the central portion of the opuscule in *Sciendum* with no hint that it is borrowed from another is strong evidence that this dissentient admirer of Sutton is none other than Robert Orford. The account taken of Sutton's opinion regarding the important problem concerning the unity of form is almost what one might have expected

a1 *Sciendum,* p. rn9; cf. *De natura rnateriae,* pp. 138-139.

62 *Thomas von Sutton Quodlibeta,* ed. Schmaus-Gonzalez Haba (Munich, 1969), p. 75. For a full discussion of Sutton's doctrine regarding the dimensions see my *Expositionis D. Thomae Aquinatis in Lib1'0s Aristotelis De Generatione et Corruptione continuatio per Thomam de Sutona* (Munich, 1976), introduction, pp.

from the youthful Oxford Dominican. Like Knapwell in *Quare,*[63] Robert Orford in his opuscule and in the section of it borrowed for *Sciendum* was most attentive to what Sutton had said about the dimensions. But between Knapwell and Orford there is a difference in the way they regarded Sutton's opinion. Knapwell quoted from Sutton at great length without any word of criticism. Indeed he confessed that he personally found difficulty in following Sutton's method of arguing. Orford on the other hand, after having summed up Sutton's doctrine in *Quodlibet* 1, 10, went on to object against it:

> But these people are mistaken, for it is impossible to have several substantial forms mutually related to one another in matter.[64]

Orford's main critique of Sutton is, interestingly, much like Sutton's later critique of himself. That is to say, Sutton's earlier two treatments of the Averroist 'dimensions,' and especially the one in *Quodlibet* 1, 10, reflected more logic than natural philosophy, and hylomorphism is a thesis pertaining to the latter. The explanation in *Quodlibet* 1, 10 is similar to what Roger Marston has in his second *Quodlibet*, q. 22. Etzkorn, not surprisingly, finds it convenient to describe Marston's position in terms of logic:

> The above may be expressed in the language of the logician as follows; the subject of generation, it will be remembered, is the generic individual, e.g., the grade of life-matter couplet.
> As long as the process of generation is in progress, this generic individual remains incomplete. Once the process of generation is terminated, viz., when the *terminus ad quem* is reached, the generic individual is completed by the *terminus ad quem,* viz., the specific individual.[65]

In his opuscule *Contra pluralitatem formarum* Sutton replaced the earlier emphasis on logic with one following the principles of natural philosophy.[66] Orford's critique in *De*

sa See my *Expositionis D. Thomae Aquinatis,* pp. 1-18.

64 *De natura materiae,* p. 139; *Sciendum,* p. 129.

65 "The Grades of the Form according to Roger Marston OFM ", *Franziskanische Studien,* 44 p. 447.

66 See my *E:t7potitioni8D. Thoma1 Aquinati1,* pp.

natura materiae and *Sciendum* resembles Sutton's own progression from *Quodlibet* 1, 10 to the later *Contra pluralitatem formarum* in that it warns against the danger oi confusing rational with real distinctions:

Therefore from what has been said it is clear that to place non-terminated dimensions in matter in a way that they come before substantial form, is impossible, unless we are dealing only with our understanding of things-the way mathematicians proceed. But we shall speak about this later.[67]

After having rejected Sutton's explanation of the dimensions as it appeared in *Quodlibet* 1, 10, Orford presents his own position. The key to the proper understanding of the dimensions is found in the way we understand existence. Prior to actual existence, the dimensions are non-terminated; with the reception of actual existence they are terminated. In order to illustrate this, Orford draws a parallel; just as the essence of the substance gets its termination through existence, so the essence of the accident which is 'dimension' receives its termination through existence:

From what has been said it is easy to see how the dimensions are said to be non-terminated. Just as the essences of things are terminated by their existences which are 'formal' in the highest degree; but before they are called ' essences ' they are not thought of as actual, nor terminated-so also, the aforementioned dimensions are non-terminated before they actually exist. And alt.hough [the dimensions] actually exist in man as in a subject, their proper characteristic being to ' measure ' when they actually exist, nevertheless they enjoy only potential existence and they do not actually exist in the thing on which they depend as their originating source, i.e., the subject.[68]

Like Sutton in his final discussion of the question, Orford objected to the use of pure logic as a way to explain the dimensions. Unlike Sutton, however, who worked out his final solution using principles of natural philosophy, Orford resorted

67 *De natura materiae,* p. 186.
as *Jbid.,* p. 140; *Sciendum,* p. 182.

to metaphysics. In this place Orford is givmg us his own thoughts, and in so doing he is departing somewhat from his avowed purpose, for *Sciendum* like the other *correctoria* had for its objective the defense of Thomas *per Thomam.* In this most important question, however, the English Dominican took the liberty of a personal digression, borrowing from his fuller treatment found in the *De natura materiae.* We can say fur. ther, his development of the way existence is to be understood in *Sciendum* and the opuscule is consistent with what he later wrote in his treatise against the *Quodlibet* questions of Henry of Ghent.[69] In these early works as in the later one against Henry, his understanding of existence is Egidean in tone. It is this fact which causes certain scholars to find it difficult to include the *De natura materiae* among the works of St. Thomas. M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, for example, says:

> Cette breve analyse suffit a montrer que le *De natura materiae* propose une theorie parfaitement originale et dont les oeuvres authentiques de saint Thomas ne portent pas la moindre trace. Sur un point tres important-Ia relation de Ia forme a l'*esse-elle* contredit les fondements memes de la metaphysique thomiste.[70]

He suggests that the *De natura materiae* is very likely the work of an early disciple of St. Thomas. He does not, however, mention Orford as a possibility, nor does he make note of the dependency on Giles of Rome.

Orford believed that the reason for all the trouble over the unity thesis was due to the fact that most people attributed to St. Thomas a theory which in fact he never upheld. In his *Contra Henricum* he said the entire debate over the question was rooted in a complete misunderstanding of what Aquinas intended when he advanced this doctrine. The latter's main concern had been nothing more than to correct the error of Avicebron who taught that the forms in any existing thing took their number from the predicates attributed to it:

69 See my " Two early Thomists: Thomas Sutton and Robe.rt Orford vs.. Henry of Ghent", *Thomist:* vol. 45, 1981, pp. 855-860.

70 *Le 'de ente et essentia' de S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris, 1948), p. 182.

Therefore it should be recognized that everything said on this matter concerning the unity of form in man results from an ignorance of brother Thomas's own opinion. As I have often said in other *quodlibet* questions, brother Thomas everywhere tried to refute the opinion of Avicebron about the plurality of forms. Avicebron established the number of forms in accord with the number of predicates. [71]

John Pecham, says Orford, had it all wrong; St. Thomas never denied there was a plurality of forms in the way the archbishop thought he had done. Pecham thought Aquinas had insisted there could be no other form in man except the rational soul, whether we take such other forms 'according to existence' or 'according to essence.' It is a mistake to take St. Thomas this way:

From the foregoing it is clear that the unity of form condemned in England is not the kind of unity brother Thomas taught. But these people, noticing only a few points and making pronouncement with ease, falsely attributed an opinion to him. According to them, there exists in man no substantial form other than the rational soul, neither according to existence nor according to essence, but [there exists] only the rational soul and primary matter-and this is not true. From this misconception follow the condemned articles and not from the unity of form as taught by brother Thomas, as we have said. Therefore, since the diffuse criticism against this erroneous sort of unity has nothing to do with the opinion of brother Thomas, I do not care to deal with it; for I do not wish to uphold anyone's fiction. [72]

71 " Sciendum est igitur quod quidquid loquitur in ista quaestione de unitate formae in homine totum est ex ignorantia opinionis fratris Thomae. Sicut enim saepe dictum est in aliis quolibet[is], frater Thomas ubique nititur destruere opinionem Avicebron de pluralitate formarum. Posuit enim Avicebron numerum formarum secundum numerum praedicatorum ", *MS. Peterhouse,* 129, *fol.* 63ra; *MS. Vat. lat.* 987, *fol.* 9lva.

12 " Ex his patet quod unitas formae condempnata in Anglici non est ilia unitas quam frater Thomas tradit, sed ad pauca respicientes et de facili pronuntiantes falso ei imposuerunt, quia secundum eos omnino nulla forma est in homine nisi anima rationalis, neque secundum esse neque secundum essentiam, sed sola anima rationalis et materia omnino prima, quod est erroneum. Et ex hac opinione sequuntur articuli condempnati, non ex unitate formae quam tradit frater Thomas, ut dictum est. Quia igitur ea quae diffuse contra tenentes istam unitatem erroneam

The last few lines of this text imply that Orford regarded Knapwell's explanation of the unity thesis as having been unrepresentative of what St. Thomas taught. Pecham's 'diffuse' criticism of what Knapwell had said did not touch Aquinas, and for this reason Orford says he will not bother to go into the matter. He has no intention of trying to support an imaginary position.

The only way Orford could say this interpretation of Aquinas was the wrong one, was that he was convinced St. Thomas's understanding of the unity theory could be fully and properly grasped only by employing the Egidean doctrine of essence and existence. That is to say, 'according to existence' there could be but one form; ' according to essence ' there could be several. What is merely implied here became explicit in the *De natura materiae:*

> Therefore we are guilty of no contradiction if we say there are several forms in a thing, provided [we say] existence pure and simple does not flow from them. A plurality of substantial forms in a single thing is ruled out only because of the substance's existence pure and simple. Thus it is clear, and the Philosopher shows it to be so, that to imagine several substantial existences in one thing is impossible; the only form posited in the thing is that which existence follows. The other [forms] are not like this.[73]

But Giles himself did not have the unity of form right. His doctrine on the real distinction between essence and existence was correct, but he failed to apply it, as he might have done, to explain hylomorphism. Instead of doing this, Giles fell into the same error as Knapwell and Sutton (i.e., in *Quodlibet* 1, 10); that is, the three men tried to respond to the theological objections advanced by the pluralists with a recourse to the Averroist non-terminated dimensions.

in nullo tangit opinionem fratris Thomae, ideo non curavi ea ponere; nolo enim fictionem cuiusque sustinere ", *MS. Peterhouse* 129, *fol.* 6Sra; *MS. Vat. lat.* 987, *fol.* 91 vb. P. Bayerschmidt in *Die Seins-Und-Formmetaphysik des Heinrich von Gent in ihrer Anwendung auf die Ohristologie* (BGPM, 36 Heft 8/4, 1941) reads the last five words as follows: "nolo utrisque factionem sustinere ", which is erroneous and obscures the meaning. (p. 296)

[73] *DtJ natura* 1714tMia,e, p. 142.

Again [Henry] says that some, when they posit one form in each thing, extend the identity of ' body-as-substance ', calling it ' body-as-substance' because matter in company with the non-terminated dimensions remains one and the same in the living and dead substance having its substantial parts with the parts of the dimensions ... it is in this way that they explain how there is one and the same 'body-substance ' in the living and dead thing-and he [i.e., Henry] rejects this opinion. I agree with his rejection. This was the opinion of brother Giles.[74]

Robert Orford, who so often appears hurried in his exposition of theological and philosophical points,[75] in this particular discussion took more care. Although, as a Thomist, he shared the general viewpoint of his confreres Thomas Sutton and Richard Knapwell, he criticized what they had said regarding the unity of form. His preference for the direction Giles of Rome had taken in metaphysics did not prevent him from registering his objection to the way the Augustinian had explained the hylomorphic theory. One may or may not see merit in Robert Orford's philosophic analysis of this controverted question, but there can be little doubt that, when he took the time to do it, this English Thomist added new elements to the development of scholastic thinking at Oxford.

"FRANCIS E. KELLEY

Franciscan Institute
St. Bonaventure University
St. Bonaventure, New York

74 " Item quod dicit quod aliqui ponentes unam formam in unoquoque extendunt identitatem corporeitatis substantialis ut dicatur corporeitas substantialis, quia materia sub dimensionibus interminatis manet eadem in vivo et mortuo, habens partes suas substantiales sub partibus dimensionum ... et sic est idem corpus substantia in vivo et mortuo, et illam opinionem reprobat. Concedo illam reprobationem. Haec enim est opinio fratris Egidii heremite ", *MS. Peterhouse* 129, *fol.* 63ra; *MS. Vat. lat.* 987, *fol.* 9lvb.

75 Glorieux notes this characteristic in his introduction to *Sciendum,* p. 9, and A. Vella says the same trait runs through his work against Giles of Rome, see *Reprobationes contra Egidium,* p. 28.

THE PROBLEM OF GROUND IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER

LIKE EVERY philosopher Heidegger wants to get to the bottom of things, indeed not merely to the roots but to the ground in whch these roots are located, out of which they arise. He describes this fundamental realm in many different ways, yet the actual term *ground* is clearly one of his favorites.[1] The term is inherited from tradition and speaks loudly in Leibniz's principle: *nihil est sine ratione (Nichts ist ohne Grund)* .

It comes then as no surprise when in *Vom Wesen des Grundes* (1928) Heidegger turns to this principle in his search for the essence of ground. What does come as a surprise is that the principle does not seem to be very helpful. One could say that the principle is a statement about a being in reference to something called ground (*omne ens habet rationem)* . Yet the question-what is this ground-receives no answer. Hence the content of the principle is almost totally irrelevant to the study in hand.

Nevertheless the principle is of some help. It points us in the direction of further investigations. It would seem from Leibniz's own words that the principle arises out of the very nature of truth and this allows Heidegger to conclude:

> The more originally we seize upon the problem of the essence of truth ... the more persistent must the problem of ground become.[2]

1 Heidegger published two works containing the term *ground* in their title. This study is primarily based on these works. *Vom Wesen des Grundes,* (19£8). (Bilingual edition, *The Essence of Reasons,* tr. T. Malick, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969). Quotations will be taken from this bilingual edition and hereafter the work will be refeITed to as WG.
Der Satz vom Grund (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), Dritte unveriinderte Auflage, *1965.* Hereafter as SG.

2 WG. p. 18 "Je urspriinglicher wir uns daher des Wesens der Wahrheit bemiich-

:More originally? Yes, for the notion of truth of Leibniz is the truth of assertion, the truth of a predicate belonging to a subject. In *Being and Time* of the previous year Heidegger had already shown at length that truth understood in this way is based on more original truth. [8] The treatment here is basically a repetition. With it we land in the domain of truth and the problem of ground. The principle of Leibniz hardly features any more. What then is truth for Heidegger and how is it related to the problem of ground?

The truth of assertion, of agreement between subject and predicate, demands a pre-predicative knowledge of being. **It** is only when there is a manifestation of being that there is a basis for the truth of assertion. This pre-predicative manifestness of being, called ontical truth,4 is not the result of a judgment or assertion but comes about

> in our situating ourselves in the midst of being, through our moods and drives, as well as in conative and volitional kinds of behavior toward being that are grounded in the way we find ourselves situated. [5]

It is immediately evident that the beings we thus encounter are not all of the same kind: a stone is not a man. The particular manifestness of any being is therefore guided by the more basic Being of a being. This disclosedness of Being Heidegger calls ontological truth. [6]

The ability to recognise this distinction between being and Being (Ontological Difference) is only found in *Dasein.* Indeed it defines *Dasein.* **It** constitutes the very essence of *Dasein* and receives the name transcendence. [7] Thus via truth the quest for the essence of ground becomes the problem of transcendence.

tigen, um so aufdringlicher muss <las Problem des Grundes werden." I prefer the term *ground* to the translator's *reasons.*

a M. Heidegger, *Being and Time,* trs. J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967) pp. 256-278. Hereafter SZ *(Sein und Zeit).*

4WG. p. 20.

5 WG. p. 21.

ewG. p. 22.

1 WG. p. 28.

The transcendence referred to is nothing else than the Being-in-the-world of *Being and Time.* It is called transcendence because it involves a surpassing *(Uberstieg)* of being towards Being. This needs some explanation.

It is clear from what has been said so far that transcendence concerns the manifestness of being prior to any assertion or judgment. It is a pre-predicative awareness. Here *Dasein* is aware of itself precisely as self and other beings as not-self. Yet the not-self is not considered in its individuality, this rock, this tree, but precisely in its totality, all the non-self. What we have here therefore is *Dasein's* relationship to everything which is not itself. If then both *Dasein* as self and everything else is surpassed in transcendence, where then does this surpassing land, what is the "toward which" of this surpassing? The *world,* says Heidegger.[8] The world not as a totality of things but as the *llow* of being in its totality. In other words the world as it appears to us. Heidegger demonstrates how this may differ from age to age and from person to person.[9] He sums up by saying:

> As a totality, world "is" no particular being but rather that by means of and in terms of which *Dasein* gives itself to understand what beings it can behave toward and how it can behave toward them.
> . . . If the world is that, in surpassing to which, selfhood first arises, it is also that for the sake of which *Dasein* exists.... But that for the sake of which *Dasein* exists is itself. World belongs to selfhood; it is essentially related to *Dasein.*[10]

Hence *Dasein's* transcendence, its Being-in-the-world, is a forming of the world in which *Dasein* and everything else can become manifest. And inasmuch as *Dasein* is essentially possibility,[11] freedom lies at the basis of any projected world.

8 SWG. p. 40.
9 WG. pp. 48-84.
10 WG. p. 85.
11 SZ. p. 69 and throu!:hout.

Freedom alone can let a world govern and " world " *Dasein.*[12] As transcendence freedom is the origin of ground in general. Freedom is freedom for ground.[13]

Ground therefore comes about in transcendence. It is not so much· a thing as a process: the threefold strewing of ground by laying-claim, taking-possession and founding.[14] lf transcendence is the Being-in-the-world of *Being and Time,* then it is easy to see that the three ways of grounding correspond to the *existentialia* understanding *(Verstehen),* state-of-mind *(Befindlichkeit)* and discourse The new names are due to the fact that here they are specifically related to the problem of ground and indeed a relationship to ground is heard in each one of them.

The laying-claim is nothing else than the projection of a world as spoken of above. Yet *Dasein* cannot project any old world, as it is equiprimordially limited by the beings in the midst of which it finds itself (taking-possession) . One could say that *Dasein* grounds by projecting a world, but that this simultaneously demands that it has " a foothold in being, or has gained 'ground'." [15] In other words, *Dasein's* facticity limits its possibilities. Put in other terms, *Dasein* is not a creator; its freedom is finite.

Heidegger warns against an ontical interpretation at this stage and his own words express this best:

the *project of world* makes a preliminary understanding of the Being of being possible and yet is not itself a relationship of *Dasein* to *being. Dasein,* because of its *preoccupation* with being, can find itself disposed by and in the midst of being, though indeed never without a disclosure of world. But its preoccupation

12 WG. p. 108.

13 WG. p. 104. "Die Freiheit als Transzendenz ist ... der Ursprung von Grund ilberhaupt. Freiheit ist Freiheit zum Grunde."

14 WG. p. 104. "Griinden als Stiften ... als Boden-nehmen ... als Begriinden." The English terms in the text are not those of the translator but are taken from W. J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968) pp. 164-165.

15 WG. p. 109.

is not a way of *behaving* toward being. On the contrary, both *Dasein's* understanding of and its preoccupation with being-in their unity ... -make intentionality transcendentally possible![16]

Laying claim and taking-possession do not exhaust the nature of transcendence as Being-in-the-world. The third way of grounding, entitled founding, is equiprimordial. In *Being and Time* the third *existentiale* was called discourse and was described as "the articulation of intelligibility "[11] underlying all interpretation and assertion. Similarly we read in connection with founding:

In founding, the transcendence of *Dasein* takes charge of making the manifestation of being possible, i.e., it takes charge of the possibility of ontical truth.[18]

Just as discourse underlies all interpretation and assertion, so founding underlies all ontical truth, all " proving" of ontical propositions. It precisely makes the question "Why?" possible, says Heidegger.[19] In other words, in its factical behavior *DaS'ein* is often asking "why?", and it is precisely founding which makes this transcendentally possible.

It is obvious that founding must be seen in relation to laying-claim and taking-possession and that the "why" must arise out of that. We have seen that in laying-claim *Dasein* projects a possible world. *Dasein* does this as situated in the midst of being. The "why" arises precisely in *this* world reigning as the way of existence for *Dasein.* This " why " implicitly contains " a preconceptual understanding of what something is, of how it is, and even of Being ".[20] As containing this understanding of Being the " why " has the ultimate answer and lays the foundation for all questioning. It is in this way that we find founding in transcendence.

Inasmuch as the manifestness of being depends on the understanding of Being founding lies- at the basis of all ontical

1a WG. p. ns.
11 SZ. pp. 9l08-9l04.
18 WG. p. llS.
19 *Ibid.*
2o WG. p. 116.

truth and every kind of behavior toward being. Yet not founding alone but as related to laying-claim and taking-possession in the unity of transcendence.

Heidegger is now confident that he can spell out what is meant by the title of his essay:

> The essence of ground *(Wesen des Grundes)* is the threefold transcendental dispersion of grounding in the project of world, preoccupation with being, and the ontological founding of being.[21]

It is clear therefore that the whole question of ground is linked with Being and truth for Heidegger. Yet, as we saw before, truth as disclosedness is due to *Dasein* being essentially transcendence and in this transcendence Being rules. The actual rule of Being depends on what possibility is projected, hence on *Dasein's* freedom. This causes Heidegger to make such statements as:

> Freedom is the origin of the principle of ground. . . . Freedom is the ground of ground.[22]

Naturally freedom is not ground in any of the three ways mentioned above but the source of the grounding of transcendence. Of itself, however, it is groundless. *Dasein* has no control over the £act that it is in the midst of being as "free" and that transcendence " as a primordial happening "[23] is its very essence. ';Ve have here the overtones of Sartre's famous" doomed to be free ".

Hence we finish up with a groundless freedom which in transcendence lets ground reign due to the ontological difference between Being and being. This latter is then expressed at the ontical level in the principle of ground of Leibniz.

Though fascinating and full of insights this presentation of the essence of ground does not satisfy me totally. Even though *Dasein* is freedom and projects its possibility, it is simultaneously limited by the beings in the midst of which it finds itself. It would seem therefore that ground is to be thought more

[21] WG. p. 121.
[22] WG. p. 123 and p. 127.
[23] WG. p. liD.

originally still. Moreover, why "is *Dasein* thrown among beings as free ' potentiality for being ' " ?[24] If *Dasein* finds itself precisely as thrown one could very well ask in Heideggerian terminology-whence was it thrown? [25]

* * *

Heidegger himself became dissatisfied with this early work and said so explicitly when he tackled the problem again in *Der Satz vom Grund* (1957).u It could be said that in this work we possess the final thought of Heidegger. All the dominant themes of his later years are to be found in this work, and at the end of it one is practically reduced to silence. Whether the latter is true in fact I leave to the reader to decide.

Relying on his later insights that "language is the house of Being" [21] and that the thoughtworthy is the unthought in the already-thought, [28] Heidegger once again uses Leibniz's principle: *Nihil est sine 1·ationе (Nichts ist ohne Grund)* as the approach into this whole area of ground. The evaluation of the principle here differs considerably from that of 1928, as we shall see.

Any attempt to query the principle, to test its validity soon proves futile. The principle asserts its authority continually. It is a fundamental principle of all human thought, and Heidegger even suggests that it is the basic principle of all principles.[29] Be that as it may, it would seem that no further progress is possible. And yet it is by no means evident why this principle has such a hold over us. We just take it for granted and give no further thought to it. Why not?

24 *Ibid.*

25 See also James Buchanan, "Heidegger and the Problem of Ground", *Philosophy Today*, Vol. XVII, 1973, pp. 232-245. This is an evaluation of the early Heidegger, though no reference is made to WG.

2s SG. pp. 48; 84.

21 M. Heidegger, "Brief iiber den 'Humanismus'" in *Wegmarken*, (Frankfurt: Klosterman, 1967) p. 145.

2s SG. pp. 158-159.

29 SG. p. 21.

Because our relationship to what is closest to us is dull and stupid. For the road to that which is closest to us is for us humans always the longest and hence the most difficult.[30]

That in itself is not enough to daunt Heidegger. Even if the principle is totally clear in all its applications, what is not clear is where the principle comes from, whence it speaks to us. That is worthy of investigation. In other words, the principle does not tell us much about the nature of ground, and maybe we will discover more when we examine the principle's source and origin. The principle states something about every being, namely that it has a ground. Typically Heidegger hopes to get beyond that to the source of every being-Being itself. With a play on words which is so much his own, Heidegger reminds us that the German *Satz* does not only mean principle but also leap [31] and that it is this leap which will turn the principle from a principle of being into a principle of Being. Such a change, given the dominance of this principle in our thinking, will naturally affect the nature of our thinking as well.

Heidegger makes much of his way *(Weg)* into the problem and stresses its importance. [32] Yet the way as such makes little sense unless you already have some idea as to where you will finish up. For example, you have to be familiar with what the later Heidegger understands by Being and the *Being-Dasein* relationship before you can have any insight into what he terms some of the major steps along the way. In this regard Heidegger's imagery of ways and paths is not always consistent.

It is proposed that there are five major steps along the way leading us into the realm of ground, though it is only with hindsight that these steps become intelligible. This is due to the fact that the way is not a passage away from one area to

so SG. p. 16. "... weil unser Verhiiltnis zum Naheliegenden seit je stumpf ist und dumpf. Denn der Weg zum Nahen ist fiir uns Menschen jederzeit der weiteste und darum der schwerste."

si SG. p. 96.

s2 Explicit references to this point are made in 8 of the 18 lectures. It nevertheless continues to sound somewhat forced and in part at least reflects the Jiattll'e of the work: class lectures rather than a composition for publication:

another area but rather a depthing of something. Nothing is left behind, but the unthought is discovered as the depth dimension of the already-thought. Heidegger's own approach is the best illustration.

The first three steps along the way concern the principle of ground as it appears in the writings of Leibniz.

1) Why is it that a principle which is so all-pervasive in human life has taken two thousand three hundred years to be formulated? [33] When considered as a principle of being there is no answer to this question. But if we are speaking about a principle of Being then it is subject to the dispensation *(Geschick)* of Being: in this long 'incubation period ' Being shows itself as hiding its essence.
2) On that premise the actual formulation of the principle by Leibniz and the role attributed to it (highest first principle) would seem to shatter the hiddenness of Being. On the contrary, says Heidegger, it is precisely the liberated power of the principle as a principle of being *(every being must have a reason or ground)* that hinders the appearance of the principle as a principle of Being.
3) Leibniz's description of his principle as' *grande, magnum et nobillisimum* ' is regarded as stressing that the principle is not an abstract law of thought but a reality ruling every aspect of human life-this incessant demand to furnish a reason. Heidegger suggests that insight into this fact may be gleaned when as a principle of Being the principle will announce that Being and ground belong together, speak the same language as it were.

The last two steps along the way apparently abandon the principle as understood by Leibniz. Here we find a typical example of Heidegger's 'retrieve' *(Wiederholung)* or thinking the unthought in the already-thought. The way into this is a statement which seems to oppose the principle of ground.

aa The stress is here on the actual formulation of the principle; not on its *de facto* employment.

4) If one formulation of Leibniz's principle can be-' nothing is without why' *(Nichts ist ohne Warum),* then the poet Scheffler gives us something else to think about:

The rose is without why; it blossoms because it blossoms; It thinks not upon itself, nor does it ask if anyone sees it.[34]

What we have here is not a lack of ground (it is present in the *because)* but a lack of the demand to furnish the reason or ground. The ground itself appears here in a rather startling manner. It is not beyond the blossoming but the blossoming itself. Here then we have an inkling of Being and ground being the same. Yet the insight is difficult to maintain at this level inasmuch as the statement concerns a being (the rose) and the language of Being is scarcely audible.

5) The final step on the way is the so-called leap by which we leave the realm of beings and land in the realm of Being. This comes about by a new accentuation of Leibniz's principle.35 Heidegger would have us hear more than 'every being has a ground'. In the statement 'nothing IS without GROUND ' we hear a certain harmony of IS and GROUND. 'Is' naturally indicates in some way the Being of that which is *(Sein des Seiendes)* . This shows that the principle is not merely a principle of being but also a principle of Being. That is the point of the new or second accentuation of Leibniz's principle.

What does this principle say? It says:

To Being pertains such a thing as ground. Being is of the nature of ground ... Being is in itself as grounding.[36]

With this we land in the realm of Being. Being as Being grounds and hence every being has a ground. Yet how does ground pertain to the essence of Being? Heidegger goes on to show that Being and ground pertain essentially to each other and

USG. p. "68.

n SG. pp. 89-98.

89 SG: p. 90. "Zurn Sein gehort dergleichen wie·Grund. Das Sein ist grundartig, grundhaft . . . Sein west in sich als griindendes."

concludes " Being and ground: the same." And if this is the case then Being itself can have no ground, hence: " Being: Abyss (groundless)."

All of this is due to the leap accompanying the second accentuation of Leibniz's principle. Moreover it is when we make this leap that we meet for the first time the real region of freedom.[37] Naturally we find here a treatment of the *Dasein*-Being relationship as understood by the later Heidegger.[88] It brings out the belonging together of man and Being in a relationship in which the initiative lies with Being as dispensing itself *(Geschwk).* This is something which cannot be understood in categories of representational thinking or in the realm where Leibniz's principle rules as a principle of being. It also means that the leap does not take us to a new place but to the region where we already are. This is another way of saying that it lands us in the to-be-thought as the deeper dimension of the already-thought. It will demand a new way of thinking, indeed a new language.[39]

What exactly is this to-be-thought and how does it shed light on the problem of ground? It is the saying of the principle: 'Being and Ground: the same'. As outlined in *ldentitiit und Differenz,* Heidegger always regards identity as a co-belonging not as a uniformity. Identity must be regarded as a co-belonging which simultaneously holds two things together and apart. This is now to be applied to Being and ground.

An examination of what we mean by the terms ' Being ' and 'ground ' does not lead anywhere. It says no more than what we already know and thus gives no insight into this question of identity. The way out of the impasse is a consideration of the Latin rather than the German form of the principle-*principium reddendae rationis sufficientis-in* which *ground (Grund)* is seen to be the translation of *ratio.* In an almost

s1 SG. p. 157.

as This is brought out very well by John D. Caputo in "The Rose is without Why", *Philosophy Today,* Vol. XV, 1971, pp. S-16.

a0 Heidegger wonders at times whether this will be possible. M. Heidegger, *ldentitiit und Differems,* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), p. 66. Hereafter ID.

incredible analysis of the word *ratw* Heidegger comes up with the following conclusions.[40] As derivative from the verb *reor*, *ratio* carries two meanings, namely ground and reason as faculty of understanding. He illustrates this by moving from *reor* as meaning ' to consider as ' to *rechnen* as ' to calculate '. In the process *ratio* becomes ' calculation '. Yet ' calculation ' has a double meaning: calculation as activity and calculation as the calculated. How this double meaning can manifest itself as referring to both ground and faculty of understanding is shown in the following:

> In calculation something is presupposed ... that which determines that a thing is the way it is. This presupposed ... determines ... the calculated of the calculation; thus *ratio* is the basis ... i.e. the ground. In presupposing calculation presents something as something. This presentation of something as something is a bringing before oneself ... in which one perceives what lies before ... and according to which one calculates. Calculation, *ratio* as such a perceiving is understanding *(Vernunft*, Reason) .[41]

This in turn is linked with the philosophy of Kant. Kant, according to Heidegger, is precisely the one who answers the demand of the principle of ground most rigorously, i.e. the furnishing of a sufficient reason. Returning to our starting-point, Being and ground: the same, we now have Being and ratio: the same. That it should be like that Heidegger attributes to the dispensation of Being in this particular.· period of Western thought, the period of representational thinking.[42]

It would seem that we have reached an impasse here. How

[40] SG. pp. 165-175. Heidegger has often been criticized for the violence he does to language. Such violence would seem inevitable if one is to lay bare the unthought in the thought. After all, taking language at face-value is precisely to remain in the realm of the already-thought.

[41] SG. p. 174. "In der Rechnung wird etwas unterstellt, ... das, woran es gerade schon Iiegt, dass es mit einer Sache so steht, wie es steht. Das so Unterstellte, ... ist <las, woran es Iiegt, ... das Gerechnete der Rechnung; die ratio ist somit die Basis ..., d.h. der Grund. Das Rechnen stellt im Unterstellen etwas als etwas vor. Dieses Vorstellen von etwas als etwas ist ein Vor-sich-bringen ... und in 8o1Chem Vor-nehmen veminimt; ... worauf und womit gerechnet wird . Dai Rechnen, die ratio ist als.solches V:ernehmen,die Vemunft."

[42] SG. p. 176.

can one get beyond representational thinking if this is precisely due to the dispensation of Being? To my mind Heidegger never explains this satisfactorily. His own 'solution' seems to lie in a return to earlier thought as the realm whence present thought has come. The implication is that we can find there a greater wealth than in our de facto present thought. It does not seem a solution, however, if the development, poor though it may be, is precisely due to the initiative of Being.

To put this present impasse in different words: we have here Being and *ratio:* the same, the height of representational thinking, be it as a principle of Being. In an attempt to bring this back to more original thought, Heidegger regards *ratio* as a translation of the Greek *logos* and concludes to-Being and *logos:* the same.[43] The search for ground, therefore, has come via ground *(Grund)* and *ratio* back to *logos.* The new problem is the co-belonging of Being and *logos.*

A translation is never a simple matter, it never quite captures the original. Just as ground does not capture the full extent of *ratio,* so *ratio* may not fully capture *logos.* So what does *logos* mean and how does it pertain to Being?

Logos can be regarded as indicating the same kind of thing as *rat£o,* thus justifying the translation.[44] Yet *logos* says more than the Latin *ratio* and this is only apparent when we think *logos* in the way the Greeks thought it. Heidegger's analysis of *logos* and *legein* as 'gathering together' and ' letting-lie-in-front-of' *(Vorliegenlassen)* and its connection with language is a familiar theme.[45] In its particular application here we read:

> *legein* and *logos* are the letting-lie-in-front-of what is present in its presence. *Logos* also means the said i.e. what lies-in-front-of such, what is present in its presence. We say: the being in its Being. *Logos* names Being. But *logos* as that which lies-in-front-

[43] Heidegger admits that his conclusion is not -found as such in any Greek literature but maintains that it captures Greek thought and foreshadows its further development as found in Latin *(ratio)* and German *(Grund).* SG. p. 177.

[44] SG. pp. 178-179.

[45] Its most detailed exposition is to be found in the essay entitled "Logos ". M. Heidegger *Vortriige und Aufsiitze* (Pfullingen: Neske, Dritte Auflage, 1967) Teil Ill, pp. Hereafter VA.

of is at the same time the basis on which other things lie and rest. We say: the bottom, the ground. *Logos* names the ground.[46]

Here too then we discover the co-belonging of Being and ground. Indeed *"Logos* names Being and ground simultaneously ".[47]

How far has this helped us in relation to the problem of ground? The co-belonging which sounds in Leibniz's principle is now brought back to the dawn of Western thought. One would have thought that this co-belonging of Being and ground as present in Greek thought would have become clarified in later developments. Not so, says Heidegger. He explains this by means of the dispensation *(Geschick)* of Being in terms of *alethe£a.*[48] In its self-revelation Being also remains hidden. **It** is suggested that what remains hidden is precisely this mutual belonging of Being and ground.[49] This retreat or concealment of Being consists precisely in the appearance of ground in its many forms *(arche, ratio, causa,* principle, etc.). Being therefore dispenses itself to man in such a way that it hides its essence behind the thick veil of rationally understood ground and of causes in its various forms. Heidegger pointed out early in the piece that at this level where ground reigns supreme (the realm of Leibniz's principle as a principle of being) there is no insight into the nature of ground. The only insight possible then would have to be in the realm of Being where the leap landed us. In this realm we find that Being and ground are the same *(logos)* but in a mutual belonging which historically appears as a difference.

While Being " is " dispensationally identical with ground, in

46 SG. p. 179 " *legein* und der *logos* sind das Vorliegenlassen des Answese,nden in seinem Anwesen. *Logos* ... meint zugleich das Gesagte, ... , d.h. Vorliegende als solches, <las Anwesende in seinem Anwesen. 1Vir sagen: <las Seiende in seinem Sein. *Logos* nennt das Sein. Aber *logos* ist als <las Vorliegende, als die Vorlage zugleich das, worauf anderes liegt und beruht. Wir sagen: der Boden, der Grund. *Logos* nennt den Grund."

47 SG. p. 180. "Der *logos* nennt zumal in Einem Sein und Grund."

48 Again a constant theme of Heidegger and the topic of an essay: "Aletheia ", VA, Teil III, pp. 58-78.

Mi SG. p. 188.

itself it is groundless. After all the second part of Leibniz's principle of Being says: 'Being: abyss.' But why is Being groundless? Because every form of grounding, even self-grounding would reduce Being to some kind of being.[50]

Surely *we* go against all logic here. How can one possibly reconcile 'Being and ground: the same' and 'Being: abyss.'? Quite simply Heidegger tells us that logical thinking has been left behind. With the leap comes a new way of thinking-a thinking in which for the first time the to-be-thought is Being as such.[51]

Is there any more that can be said? What is the thought of this new thinking? Heidegger takes up a saying of Heraclitus and compares Being to child's play:

> The child plays because he plays. The 'because' sinks into play; there is no 'why' ... There is only the game itself ... but this "only" is everything, the One, the Unique.[52]

Hence the conclusion of the later Heidegger to the problem of ground reads as follows:

> Being as grounding has no ground; it plays as non-ground of every game which dispenses Being and ground to us.[53]

* * *

One is tempted to say that the conclusion of both *Vom Wesen des Grundes* and *Der Satz vom Grund,* though almost thirty years apart in publication, is identical-a groundless ground. Yet there is an enormous difference. In the first instance this groundless ground is affirmed of a being, *Dasein,* whereas in the second instance it is affirmed of Being as such.

It was inevitable that *Dasein* could not be the ultimate solution. It is *Dasein* which in its threefold grounding lets Being

50 SG. p. 185.

51 *Ibid.*

52 SG. p. 188. "Es spielet, weil es spielet. Das "Weil " versinkt im Spiel. Das Spiel ist ohne "Warum "---- Es bleibt nur Spiel ... Aber dieses "nur" ist Alles, das Eine, Einzige."

53 SG. p. 188. "Sein als griindendes hat keinen Grund, spielt als der Ab-Grund jenes Spiel, das als Geschick uns Sein und Grund zuspielt."

and beings reign. Yet the very structure of *Dasein's* transcendence imposes limits on what can actually reign as Being, as world. Hence there would seem to be something which restricts *Dasein* as "freedom for ground." Precisely because *Dasein* is finite it encounters reality with which it has to reckon. One could say *Dasein* does not create in its transcendence, it interprets, it gives meaning. All its grounding is, therefore, subject to what it encounters, despite the fact that it projects its own' for the sake of '.[54] There is something more primordial than the transcendence or freedom of *Dasein,* even though it only appears in transcendence. Or, looking at it from a slightly different angle, *Dasein* is unique in its relationship to Being, yet is not the source and origin of its own Being.

[54] WG. p. 107.

It is not surprising therefore that in his later years Heidegger regards Being as such as ultimate foundation: Being and ground: the Same. We have seen that this is not regarded as a uniformity. If you like, the terms Being and ground may not be interchanged at will. Rather, as abyss Being dispenses itself as ground. A note of warning should be sounded here. A mere reading of *Der Satz vom Grund* could lead to an hypostasized notion of Being. That is definitely not Heidegger's intention. Being is always the Being of beings. More precisely, as spelled out in the essay *Das Ding,* it is the Event of Appropriation *(Ereignis)* in which earth and heaven, mortals and gods mutually define each other *(das Geviert)* .[55] The grounding here is due to Being itself as Event of Appropriation. The "why" or "wherefore" receives no answer, however, it is the secret of Being. It plays because it plays.

The last lecture of *Der Satz vom Grund* finishes with a sentence which is practically an invitation:

> The question remains, whether and how, hearing the moves of this g!lme, we play along and enter into that game.[56]

[55] VA. Tei! II, pp. 37-55.

[56] SG. p. 188. "Die Frage bleibt, ob wir und wie wir, die Satze dieses Spiels horend, mitspielen und uns in das Spiel fiigen."

I admit a great reluctance to play along. It seems tantamount to rejecting the drive to intelligibility which accompanies all my searchings. I am reluctant to throw that overboard. In that case I am forced to review once again why Heidegger arrives at his conclusion.

There is a great appeal in Heidegger's invitation to break out of representational and rationalistic thinking. He equates this with thinking Being as such (not as a being) which leaves behind the rules of logic. Yet to what extent is this possible without denying the quest for intelligibility? Can one really speak about Being as such without speaking of the Being of beings? Obviously not, as Heidegger himself admits. Yet he seems to want to give certain characteristics to Being which are not shared with any being. While every being is grounded, Being is groundless. And if Being always dispenses itself as ground in some way or other (Being and ground: the Same) then one gets the impression that this groundlessness of Being functions in some way as basis or ground for the various dispensations.

In the earlier works Being can only appear within the possibilities of *Dasein* for Heidegger. That state of affairs is naturally totally acceptable. There is no other way. When in the later works the initiative is granted to Being rather than to *Dasein,* it is still true that it can only appear within *Dasein's* possibilities. Is it perhaps this relationship of *Dasein* to Being which casts a special light on Heidegger's position?

Dasein not being the creator of Being, but only its interpreter, lets Being emerge in a certain way. In that sense the notion of *aletheia* as explained by Heidegger seems to fit very well. *Dasein* never grasps reality totally. Yet that does not mean that reality itself "is" in that way. True, one can say that a being does not exhaust Being and hence there is a certain concealment. But the later Heidegger claims to have reached the realm of Being as such and this is explained in terms of *aletheia:* groundless ground in which Being appears as ground (Being and ground: the same) and hides its groundlessness (Being:

abyss). Is this not a transference of the limitations of *Dasein* upon Being? And how can this be valid when it is acknowledged that *Dasein* is not self-explanatory and must have its origin elsewhere?

Put differently, can *Dasein* in its finitude ever understand Being as infinite? Heidegger does not speak this language. It reminds him of the onto-theological thinking of metaphysics in which he sees Being as ultimately identified with the highest being.[57] Yet unless one arrives at Being as plenitude, as ground in its own right, we are left with groundlessness. But *Dasein* could not project such a notion of Being. Indeed, but in the later Heidegger *Dasein* is asked to be attentive to Being so that beings may become manifest. We are invited to think Being itself. Why should this be limited to beings as they appear to us? Why should we stop here? Why not follow the drive of our intellect and ask why things are as they are till we reach the ultimate ground of all that is? I might never know the full implications of Being as plenitude, understand its nature fully, but I can conclude that it is the ground of all that is. A ground which is not subject to further groundlessness, but grounded in itself i.e. so fundamental that it itself suffices, needing no further foundation.

As J. Buchanan pointed out so well:

> An ontological analysis presumes-indeed must so presume-that Being itself is grounded and that moreover there is a belonging together established between Being and the entity under analysis.[58]

If *Dasein* as groundless ground did not suffice, then Being as abyss will not suffice either. It merely reiterates the same problem and gives no answer to the problem of ground.

KEES DE KUYER, C.Ss.R.

Yarra Theological Union
Box Ilill, Australia.

s1 ID. pp. Sl-67.

58 James Buchanan, "Heidegger and the Problem of Ground", *Philosophy Today*, Vol, XVII, l973, p. !!44.

THE MORAL LAW AND THEISM

*A Review Discussion**

IN *THE THEORY OF MORALITY* Professor Donagan rejects Professor Anscombe's contention that law in morals requires a divine lawgiver.[1] His chosen aim and method both require him to rebut this contention in his first pages at the same time as he tries to ground " common " morality upon the Judaeo-Christian tradition. I do not think he succeeds, as I hope to show by detailed consideration of his argument.

He begins by quoting the Stoic theory in words of Diogenes Laertius. To be morally good is

> to be in accordance with Nature, that is, in accordance with the nature of man and that of the universe, doing nothing which the universal law is wont to forbid, that is, the right reason which pervades all things and is coextensive with Zeus.

He adds a piece of Cicero:

> (Before there was a written law) reason *(ratio)* existed, having sprung from the nature of things, impelling (men) to right action, and summoning (them) from wrongdoing. This reason began to be law, not when it was written down, but when it originated; and it originated simultaneously with the divine mind. Hence the true and supreme law having to do with commanding and forbidding is the right reason of Jupiter the highest (De *legibus,* II 4, 10, quoted as in Donagan *op. cit.* p. fl).

In Stoic theory, Donagan then says, "the relation between Nature and reason is hard to disentangle ... Nature, as a principle distinct from reason, became 1ess and less important to

*Alan Donagan: *The Theory of Moral,ity* (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1977).

1 G. E. M. Anscombe, "Modern Moral Theology", *Philoaophy* XXXlll, UMS.

the later Stoics . . . What mattered was that the 'true and supreme law' was held to be both willed by the highest of the gods and enjoined by reason."

Now this development, insofar as Donagan appears to endorse it by saying " Nature is extraordinarily elusive," is disquieting. For in the Cicero passage reason appears to be justified through "having sprung from the *nature* of things," a predicate which seems at the least to be closely related to his other predication, that reason "originated simultaneously with the divine mind." As Donagan says, " the divine law expresses the divine mind, which is necessarily rational."

But having all but jettisoned Nature, Donagan now, and with greater ease than would otherwise have been possible, relegates the divine mind to second place, in preparation for jettisoning it too in favor of reason. For he says of the two characteristics of the supreme law, viz. being willed by the highest of the gods and being enjoined by reason, that "although inseparable, they are distinct; and from the point of view of moral philosophy, the one that is fundamental is rationality" (p. Q) • This, it seems to me, is Donagan's crucial move, whereby he turns on to a Kantian or rationalist path, parting company with Professor Anscombe and, I shall argue, with much that he assumes supports him in his venture.

We may note first that Donagan speaks of the law as *enjoined* by reason, thus making reason a dual authority with the highest of the gods, before going on to state that this characteristic, of having the authority of reason, is the one fundamental" from the point of view of moral philosophy." Clearly he means that reason is the *authority for* the law, for if this were not so why should it be of note that it is enjoined by reason? The true and supreme law is enjoined also by most people's grandmothers, but the testimony of these ladies is sadly despised.

He makes reason, then, into a supreme authority. But in Cicero's text reason is not an authority for the law. It simply *is* the law, and the authority *for reason as law* is its originating

with the divine mind. It seems to me that Cicero is more sound here. For what is practical reason apart from the principles and laws which express it and constitute it in action, which actualize the capacity which it is? For Donagan can't here mean by reason exclusively the capacity to reason, since a capacity can't enjoin anything.

One may note that Donagan says the divine law " expresses the divine mind," not that it is merely enjoined by it. For that would make it less clear that this law is "necessarily rational," like that mind. But the " true and supreme law" of human life is no less necessarily rational, while to say that this law is "enjoined by" reason, rather than that it "expresses" it, suggests that this law is then guaranteed by something else, viz. reason.

But if the law *is* reason, then such law, such reason, either justifies itself or requires further justification. Cicero justifies reason as springing from "the nature of things " or, apparently equivalently, if we deny that it could have two origins or springs, " originating simultaneously with the divine mind." Cicero, that is, did not think reason justified itself. But Donagan thinks "rationality" is fundamental.

But what does he mean by saying it is fundamental from a certain point of view? If we are dealing with rationality *in re,* as the context suggests, and not just with a leading concept or explanatory model, then, it seems to me, such a real element is either fundamental or it is not (to the moral law). It can't merely be fundamental " from the point of view of moral philosophy."

That is, either rationality is self-guaranteeing or it requires to be shown that it needs a certain relation to the divine mind if it is to serve as a guide to truth. Otherwise Donagan seems to be saying that even if rationality is not self-justifying it is in any event our ultimate criterion in moral philosophy.

In fact Cicero did not say, as Donagan seems to suggest, that the divine mind is necessarily rational, but that reason is divine, and *therefore* law. This is the crux. If he, and the

Judaeo-Christian tradition, were saying the former, then Donagan might plausibly suggest that we can just lop off the religious bits of the tradition for secular purposes. He and they would be committed to the same ultimate reliance on human reason, or on the law as we have it. But since they are saying the latter he cannot do this.

Furthermore, moral philosophy would be a pretty poor affair if it were merely a matter of working out what it is to act rationally, while imposing what amounts to a taboo on the question why one should be rational. If, for example, reason were a product of blind forces the question of whether it is good to follow rationality arises, even although it be granted that such a question only arises itself within that rationality. Reason might be the ladder one kicks away. (In Graham Greene's *Brighton Rock* Ida Arnold knows right from wrong, but is ignorant of "good and evil", of what is at stake. Her ignorance of the divine sanction condemns her to pharisaism. She pursues the ethical so long as it is "fun".)

Cicero, in saying that reason is divine, is in line here with a part of the tradition Donagan is expounding but which he seems to ignore. It is a theory about the nature of moral agents which he does not mention in his section " Human Beings and their World" (pp. 32-36) where he simply says that one of the two fundamental presuppositions of the Hebrew-Christian tradition is that " Man, considered as a moral agent, is a rational animal."

Here he stresses, rightly, man's essential animality, according to this tradition. But its more central claim, as Hebrew-Christian, is that man is made in the "image and likeness" of God (Genesis 1, v.Q6). This likeness, it being agreed that God is not animal or embodied like us, is hence spoken of as " in the soul", a phrase understood as including reference to rationality. The reason generally given why this soul, and hence reason or mind, is like to God is that, like Hirn, it is a spirit, though with a difference (The English Jerusalem Bible has a note that"' likeness', by excluding the idea of equality, weakens the force of ' image ' " . . .) .

By a spirit, I would wish to argue, is understood a being open to reality as it is, not shut up in a limited cognitional environment, but having a capacity for truth. This is essentially Cicero's claim. How it sees things, if functioning as properly as its nature enables it, is how things are. This is the foundation of the possibility of philosophy and science as understood by Western man and perhaps by any man. But this only comes about if reason is spiritual and thus like to God, supreme Spirit, so that it can truly be measured by things (see them as they are) as God measures them (makes them as they are) . Here the effect is like its cause but differs infinitely from it just as effect, which God in no sense is. Hence there is no implication that God is just one of a class of spirits, any more than divine existence can be placed beside created existence. But though all spirits (save God) are caused, this is not part of the definition of spirit, and so their divine cause can be called a spirit too.[2]

This is the positive tradition of spirit of which immateriality is merely the negative condition. Aristotle argued that if there were a material organ of cognition it would " get in the way " of this openness to union with its object in knowledge which is mind, spirit. And so there comes about the opposition of spirit and matter, which however is softened if we note that in the same system matter is *only* differentiated from spirit by its being potential to it.

There is a real problem concerning how someone who rejects accounts like this can claim authority for reason in, say, ethics. Dogs, after all, are as confident in their barking. I cannot tell whether Professor Donagan would reject an account of the spirituality of the reason, though parts of his last chapter suggest a different account, whereby human reason becomes an end for itself simply because it is not by nature held to any other end. But I can see nothing there implying reason's spirituality or openness to knowledge.

[2] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theol.*, I q.44, a.1, ad lum.

My point here is that the ignoring of spirituality in the sense described is not methodologically justified, since in the tradition Donagan claims to expound it is not taught that law expresses the divine mind which is necessarily rational and therefore law. If reason were not in the divine image its practical operations might still be in legislative form, but these dicta would no more be law than are New Year resolutions.

Perhaps Donagan omitted the spirituality of reason from his list of presuppositions, its being in the divine image and likeness, because he did not feel it would command such wide assent as the other two presuppositions. Yet recognition of it would have prevented enlistment of this tradition in support of a non-theistic neo-Kantian theory of moral law such as he offers. Even if he thinks Miss Anscombe is wrong (sc. about Kant and about the " religious" nature of moral law) he should, I think, have seen that she rather than Kant continues the tradition he cites. Here I am arguing both that this is so and that the tradition on this point is right.

The spirituality of reason is argued for in a compelling way by Professor Josef Pieper.[8] Pieper first discovers a contrast between the " world of work", of means and ends, and the " beyond " this to which philosophizing, *theoria,* carries us. He then asks " what sort of a world lies beyond" and how the two " worlds " are related. He says that, however they are related, "both belong to the world of man" (p.83). Next then," What kind of a world is man's world? "

Pieper's questioning revolves round the sense of "in" in which one might say that all that lives, all that exists even, is "in" the world. He introduces a perhaps unusual concept of a relationship, arguing that it is " a link established from inside to something external; relations can only exist where there is an ' inside ', where there is that dynamic centre from which all activity springs," for " one cannot . . . speak of the

s Josef Pieper: *Leisure the Basis of Culture,* Chap. 2, " The Philosophical Act " (New York: Mentor-Omega Books, 19.52); German original: *Was heisst Philosophieren.*

' inside ' of a stone with reference to the disposal of its parts." " The ' inside ' is the power by virtue of which a relation to something external is possible; inwardness is the capacity to establish relations and to communicate." He then relates this concept to that of a world: " world means the same thing as a range of relations. Only a being capable of having relations ... -and this in its turn means a living being-has a world."

Thus, he wants to say, although a stone is in *the* world, it does not have *a* world in the sense we meant when asking about "man's world", or even a plant's world.

For, argues Pieper, "there is a fundamental difference between relations thus conceived and the relation which results from the proximity of stones in a heap by the roadside . . . That form of relation is ... different from the relation between a plant and the nutriment it draws through its roots out of the ground, for then the relation is not solely spatial ... it is a real relation ... in the active reflexive sense of relating itself: the nourishment in the ground and in the air is absorbed and assimilated into the sphere of the plant's life by the dynamic centre of the plant, and its power of establishing relations. All that constitutes the plant's range of relations makes its world. A plant, in fact, has a world, and a stone has not" (p.84) .

We might assume that the idea of a particular creature's world was the same idea as that of an *environment,* in which the creature is confined but to which it is perfectly adapted. To have *a* world seems to exclude establishing relations with *the* world. But it is not impossible for a being to have a world coextensive with the world.

Pieper points out that some creatures have a wider power of establishing relations in this sense than others. Thus a plant " does not extend its spatial world beyond the sphere of touch ... The animal's capacity to establish relations is greater in so far as it is capable of being sen-sibly and sensually aware; " in fact, "'to be aware' of a thing is an entirely new mode of relating itself to a thing, unknown in the plant world, a new manner of relating itself to the 'outside'." Nevertheless, ani-

mals are as securely imprisoned inside their respective environments as are plants. They all live in a " selected, partial world " or" environment', which may well be more limited even than the animal's" surroundings"; thus jackdaws are unable to perceive motionless grasshoppers.

Now there is no denying that man too has his environment, that sphere in the world which is specifically human. But is he imprisoned within it? Is he even perfectly adapted to it? This, in connection with Pieper's question "What is philosophizing?", is where we see the point of Plato's example of the Thracian maid laughing at Thales when he fell down a well *(Theatetus* 147). Thales was at that moment star-gazing and not adapted to his environment. But by the same token he was not imprisoned within it. For he was a philosopher. But to be a philosopher or scientist is also proper to man.

H we ask what is the field or world which corresponds to " the form of knowing peculiar to man " Pieper answers that " the capacity for spiritual knowledge has always been understood to mean the power of establishing relations with the whole of reality, with all things existing." This is what is meant by the proposition *omne ens est verum.* " ' A thing is true ' means: it is known and knowable, known to the absolute spirit, knowable to the spirit that is not absolute."

Is then man's world the whole of reality coordinated to intellect? Only in so far as he is spirit, says Pieper. "But not only is he not pure spirit, he is finite spirit; ... the essence of things and their totality is not given to him fully ... but ' in hope ' .... The really human thing is ... to preserve our apprehension of the universality of things in the midst of the habits of daily life."

Nature seems in a sense to be not so much disposable as the central pin in the Stoic conception as represented by Donagan's two citations.

To have sprung from the nature of things or to be in accordance with Nature might indeed seem to apply as much again to the barking of dogs as to reason. But then these predicates

would not signify, for what is meant rather seems to be nature considered as a unified whole and even as the unifying principle of that whole. In this way right reason " pervades all things and is coextensive with Zeus." In calling this reason merely right, and not specifying it as divine, Diogenes Laertius implicitly claims reflected divinity for human reason, which is as such, when it is right, " in accordance with Nature," " Nature " signifying how things are, a condition determined in turn by the divine reason.

So if Nature is dropped from this triad we are left with the "true and supreme law," Donagan's "Stoic ideal," being both willed by the gods and enjoined by reason, these predicates no longer in any kind of ordered relation, but clashing like alternative authorities, so that he goes on to say that "the content of the divine law can be ascertained by natural reason, *and its force appreciated,* without any direct reference to the gods at all " (p. 3, my underlining) .

He seems to miss Cicero's point from the outset, viz. that reason is law because its source is divine; that is, the divine law or mind and not *de facto* rationality is " fundamental". Donagan says that the contrary of this, for which he argues, is less evident to " strict monotheists ... who take all divine commands, whether or not they form part of the supreme divine law, to express divine providence and wisdom."

This is very odd, perhaps confused. There seems no call to introduce here the distinction between what Aquinas called *lex aeterna* (Donagan's "the supreme divine law") and what he called *lex divina* (including "divine commands" such as the Old Testament ceremonial precepts, not part of *lex aeterna).* If reason is justified by originating from the divine mind, i.e. if *lex naturalis* participates in *lex aeterna,* then *lex divina* scarcely need come into it. In any case the suggestion that " a god's arbitrary pleasure " need not "express divine providence and wisdom " is quite unacceptable.

Of course that rationality *rather than* divine law is fundamental is less evident to theists. It is not evident at all, since

their position is that it is only in virtue of rationalitis *imaging* divine reason that it can be a foundation at all. Donagan is not in a position to claim that divine law is rational if he means by that that it is according to *human* reason and not just that law and intellect coincide in God. For he can't *know* the former, though the latter may appear deducible from the concept of God. A theist however *can* claim to know, by argument, that human reason mirrors divine, rather than vice versa. Donagan does not seem to be taking the idea of God functionally at all in his argument. But then he cannot claim it is a *divine* law of which reason ascertains the content and appreciates the force.

Thus it is certainly true, as we saw, that it does not follow from the " genuine divine law that all men should obey the gods" that "everything the gods command is divine law" if by "divine law" is meant eternal and natural law or the law of right reason. But this proves nothing, for Donagan does not make human reason self-guaranteeing or even show that it was so for the Stoics.

We may further agree with his principle that " A divine command expresses divine law (.<tc. *lex aeterna)* if and only if it expresses divine reason" (my parenthesis). We may also agree that " human reason is in principle adequate for the direction of human life " (p. 8) , depending on how we interpret this unclear sentence.

We may also agree that "so far as it has to do with the regulation of human life, the content of the divine law can be ascertained by human reason," for Cicero's argument was precisely that what reason ascertains *is* the divine law. But Donaagan adds as part of his conclusion that the " force " of this divine law can be "appreciated, without any direct reference to the gods at all."

One is puzzled as to what an indirect reference to the gods would be. In any case Donagan needed his first premise:.__"A divine command expresses divine law if and only if it expresses divip.e "-irt order to conclude that what it is that human reason can ascertain the content of is *the divine law,* but

if it ascertains it *as such* then here we have a direct reference to the gods. If on the other hand the content is ascertained without knowledge as to what it is the content of, then what is being said apart from that reason ascertains what it ascertains, which is to say nothing and leaves us simply with the assertion of the second premise (on p. 8), that reason is adequate for the regulation of human life?

In this case the first premise too must be taken as preliminary to that and really meaning that a divine command expresses divine law if and only if it expresses *reason,* i.e. if it tallies with the conceptions of that reason *of ours* which is adequate for living. For otherwise it would be, we saw, merely a theological premise about the priority of intellect to will in God with no connection with Donagan's second premise, or at best yielding the conclusion that the content of the divine law is ascertained *as divine* and hence as having the force of "divine" by natural human reason, and this is the conclusion Donagan does not want. He wants to say it has the force of divine law without reference being made to its divinity.

It is in any case hard to see that Donagan's conclusion ("the content of the divine law can be ascertained by natural human reason, and its force appreciated") "follows" from his premises, since they have no middle term in common unless by divine reason he means the same as human reason, but then, we have seen, he has no warrant for asserting that reason can ascertain the content of the divine law. But then how can one claim that what reason ascertains can be appreciated as having the force of divine law ("and *its* force appreciated")? How, from what Donagan tells us, can one claim that it has the force of law at all?

So Donagan has not shown, as he claims, that "it was a mistake for Professor Anscombe to contend that morality can intelligibly be treated as a system of law only by pre-supposing a divine lawgiver."

STEPHEN THERON

Universi,ty of the Witwater8rand
Johannesburg, South Africa.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Trinity and the Kingdom. By JURGEN MoLTMANN. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981. pp. xvi + *256.* $15.00.

Jlirgen Moltmann's *The Trinity and the Kingdom* is a provocative, challenging and highly idiosyncratic piece of work. The book is provocative and challenging, because it boldly sets out to abolish some of the most fundamental assumptions of Christian doctrine as we have known it historically in the West. Such elemental topics as monotheism, creation *ex nihilo,* and the divine lordship over history are radically transformed as the author fixes single-mindedly and intently on the one theological idea which apparently matters to him more than anything else: the suffering of God. God's suffering becomes the master concept before which everything else must yield; and the excessive fashion in which this project is carried out leads to some extraordinary results. The real strengths of this book, in my opinion, center around themes (such as Christ's resurrection) we have heard Moltmann sound before. The book's new material, which might be described as a systematic enlargement upon the deviations of Moltmann's theology, unfortunately leaves much to be desired, although it does raise some extremely important questions.

I will summarize my reservations about this work under three heads: method, tritheism and panentheism.

Method. It is dismaying to watch Moltmann pursue his theology without any serious methodological reflection. He seems to proceed by sheer intuition, and in this book more than ever before the result is a kind of methodological mishmash. When Moltmann wants to appeal to experience to validate a theological claim, he appeals to experience. When he wants to invoke the testimony of Scripture, he does so. When a general philosophical definition makes sense to him, he brings it in. When he needs a more specifically theological argument, he does not hesitate to construct one. In short, the procedure is rather arbitrary.

Let me give some examples. The problem with Schleiermacher, Moltmann argues at one point, is not that he appealed to religious experience to validate his theological claims, but that he didn't do it well enough. Moltmann, too, wants to appeal to religious experience, not only claiming that the Trinity is "revealed " to faith by the experience of suffering, but but also that from suffering faith can even know how we ourselves are " experienced " by God (pp. 8-5). Moltmann simply states these bewildering ideas and moves on. Unlike Schleiermacher he has no carefully considered

method which might perhaps provide them with some backing. Such claims are apparently meant to be self-evident.

Or again, take Moltmann's use of Hegel's definition of what constitutes a person. Moltmann is particularly impressed by Hegel's idea that to be a person means to give oneself entirely to a counterpart different from oneself and then to find oneself through participating in the life of this other. (Never mind that elsewhere Moltmann sharply criticizes the logically connected Hegelian idea of 'the self-identical subject " as an instance of bourgeois individualism.) The idea of coming to oneself by expressing and expending oneself in others is continually commended as the real meaning of human love and subjectivity (pp. 5, 9, 57 and 174). Now the remarkable thing about this idea is the way Moltmann goes on to use it theologically. Applying it directly to the Trinity, he ends up making the doctrine of the *perichoresis* sound merely like the instance of a class (pp. 173ff.). Thus is one of the most mysterious of all Christian doctrines levelled down to a more or less intelligible psychological experience. Such unfortunate movements from the general to the particular are commonplace in Moltmann's book, but their rationale is never discussed.

More positively, on the other hand, one is almost as likely to find the argument moving in the opposite direction, from the particular to the general, if that should happen to suit the author's purpose. Thus, at least from time to time, we find Moltmann making good on his assertion that " ultimately we must always see to it that the liberating force of the biblical witness is preserved and not obscured " (p. 65). He does not, for example, allow any general philosophical or psychological considerations to obscure the biblical witness to Christ's resurrection and its consequences. On this point Moltmann remains uncompromising: "Anyone who sees the risen Christ is looking in advance into the coming glory of God. He perceives something which is not otherwise perceptible, but which will one day be perceived by everyone " (p. 85). " The Old Testament idea of the ressurrection of the dead already resists every form of spiritualizing interpretation " (p. 128). Here it is the particularity of the biblical witness, however difficult or contrary to our experience it may be, which Moltmann takes as the basis for constructing his general understanding of Christian hope.

How rarely Moltmann still continues to think in this way may be gauged from the second chapter of his book, which represents, if anything does, the methodological core of his discussion. Here we are given a theological tour of those writers, ranging from the relatively famous to the wholly obscure, whom Moltmann regards as his true predecessors in discovering the significance of the suffering God. The section is mainly descriptive, and, while the tone seems largely favorable, it is difficult along the way tQ out just how Moltma.nn wantS to evaluate the concepts he finds in

these writers. This difficulty is no small matter, considering the fact that many of them, though philosophically familiar, are quite bizarre (e.g., creation as. God's " self-humiliation," incarnation as necessary to God's being, God as the object of redemption and compassion, etc.}. Moltmann's fateful attraction to such ideas soon emerges, however; for while he first introduces them descriptively, before long he is using them normatively. One notes that this transition to norm from description receives no conceptual justification-a detail which symptomizes the more general problem that, methodologically, Moltmann's discussion almost invariably ends where it ought to begin.

Tritheism. " As the history of theology shows," we are told, " there has never been a Christian tritheist" {p. 243). If this is true then one can only conclude that Moltmann is vying to be the first. Despite the evident scorn with which he anticipates such a charge, *The Trinity and the Kingdom* is about the closest thing to tritheism that any of us are ever likely to see. That Moltmann has finally succumbed to the tritheistic temptation long latent in his theology can be seen not only from his constructive proposals, but also from the drift of his polemics.

The polemics are a rec:l key; for when it comes to the doctrine of the Trinity, where one stands-the extremity of one's position-can often be ascertained not only by what one criticizes, but also by what one fails to criticize. Moltmann adamantly and explicitly rejects in principle every important trinitarian position found in the history of Western theology. One finds nothing comparable-indeed one finds nothing at all-from him about any potential dangers in the alternative positions of the theological East. Is it not already rather revealing that, according to Moltmann, the danger of tritheism has really never existed (cf. p. 144}?

It is not necessary, however, to rest our case on general suspicions. Whereas a more careful doctrine of the Trinity would attempt to do equal justice to both God's oneness and God's threeness, Moltmann consistently pits them against one another, as if the doctrine of the Trinity were intrinsically opposed to monotheism. Thus he warns us against the " danger of monotheism " (p. 164), portraying a monotheistic understanding of God as the antithesis of any trinitarian one (cf. pp. 18, 69 & 74), and not failing to throw in the aside that monotheism is " always patriarchal " (p. 165). The Thomistic idea of God as " supreme substance " is dismissed as cosmologically outmoded (p. rn), while the more Augustinian idea of God as a single and singular subject is linked up with Cartesian and then with German idealism so that the idea of an " absolute subject " can be discarded as nothing more than the " archetype " of bourgeois existence (p. 14f.). Barth's doctrine of the Trinity is described as " a late triumph for the Sabellian modalism which the early church condemned" (p. 139), and Rahner's reinterpretation of the Trinity is said to end "in the mystic

solitariness of God" (p. 148). The point here is not only that such judgments as these amount to little more than dubious caricatures. The point is that this is exactly how we would expect the world of Western theology to look to a fairly extreme, if sophisticated, tritheist.

One's misgivings along these lines are only confirmed when one turns to what Moltmann calls " the trinitarian concept of person " (p. 18). It seems that such a " person " must be an independent subject capable of separate actions and relationships. Thus Moltmann is prepared seriously to ask of Rahner why it should be open to misunderstanding and wrong to think of the trinitarian persons " as three different ' personalities with different centers of activity' " (p. 145). For, as Moltmann would have it, the Son (like the Father) " is a subject of his own" (p. 86); and the Spirit, too, must be regarded as an " independent subject of his own acts " (p. ms). On this view one must never speak of " one, identical divine subject " (p. 18), but instead of " the co-workings of the three divine subjects: Father, Son and creative Spirit" (p. 94). Nor is one permitted to " degrade " the trinitarian persons into mere " modes of being " (p. 139), but must rather regard them as " individual, unique, non-interchangeable subjects . . . with consciousness and will " (p. 171). They can be said to share a " common divine substance " *(ibid.)*, but cannot in any sense be said to constitute a single, self-identical subject. One can only wonder why Moltmann, having gone this far, should still want to eschew the proper label for his position.

The clincher that we are dealing with an actual case of tritheism may be found in Moltmann's conception of the divine unity. God's oneness, as presented by Moltmann, is strictly a function of God's threeness: " ... we must dispense with both the concept of the one substance and the concept of the identical subject. All that remains is: the unitedness, the at-oneness of the three Persons with one another ... " (p. 150). In other words, God's unity is no longer numerical, and all that Moltmann has left is a harmonious set of relationships among the three trinitarian persons. Their unity, he says, " lies in their *fellowship*, not in the identity of a single subject " (p. 95, italics original). Or to put it another way, their unity is merely historical. Together they constitute a common history in which they " combine or work together according to a single pattern " (p. 94). Or finally, what amounts to the same thing, the divine unity is found in nothing but the *periclwresis* of the three persons. As Moltmann says in a tritheistic turn of thought which as such leaves nothing to be desired, if the unity of the three persons is seen as anything other than *perichoretic*, " then Arianism and Sabellianism remain inescapable threats to Christian theology" (p. 150).

Two observations may be offered in conclusion. First, Moltmann claims that his concept of trinitarian unity is " a concept ... capable of

being thought " (p. 19). That is, he has devised a doctrine of the Trinity which, as he says, is free from " impenetrable obscurity or insoluble riddle " (p. 161). The only remaining question is whether this intelligible and extremely rationalized version of the doctrine can any longer be said to correspond to the church's historic affirmation that God is not only three, but also one. In other words, hasn't Moltmann effectively and forcibly eliminated the true mystery of the Trinity?

A second and closely related question concerns the sense in which it still remains meaningful for Moltmann to speak of" God" in the singular. Having rejected the ideas of " one substance in three persons " of " one subject in three modes of being," Moltmann's alternative proposal is apparently " three persons in one process." In that case it would seem to follow that " God " in the singular could only properly be used to designate the process, not a person-at least not an active, self-identical person whose being as such somehow encompasses the three members of the Trinity. Yet, as if by some sort of atavistic hangover from rejected modes of thought, Moltmann persists in using the term " God " in precisely such an active, self-identical sense. What are we to make for example of a statement like this: " The Son is not identical with God's self " (p. 86). What, for Moltmann, could possibly be identical with " God's self" ? If " God " is properly a process not a person, can God even be said to have a " self " ? Or what about this: " In the incarnation of the Son the triune God communicates himself wholly and utterly " (p. ml) . What can the word " God " possibly mean in this sentence? How can a process engage in an activity like communication, and how can it have a " self " to communicate? Won't l\foltmann for the sake of consistency simply have to stop using the term " God " in the active voice, or else rethink his hasty dismissal of the single, self-identical divine subject?

Panentheism. Whereas "pantheism " usually designates the idea that God's being and the world's being completely coincide, the less familiar " panentheism " implies a more differentiated position whereby the world's being is somehow included in the being of God, but God's being is not exhausted by that of the world. The great problem with panentheism, from the standpoint of Christian theology, has always been either that it seems to make God ultimately responsible for whatever evil there is in the world, or else that it seems to regard God and the world as somehow inherently conditioned by one another, thereby obliterating the divine freedom implicit in the biblical witness to God as_Creator and Lord. In working out his new position, which he openly acknowledges as " panentheism," l\foltmann unfortunately manages to escape neither of these liabilities.

The question would be straightforward if one were justified in extracting a coherent picture from the jumble of different things which Moltmann

happens to say in this regard. As it is, the picture is partially confused and confusing with lots of loose ends and rough edges. Nonetheless, the general drift of discussion is clear, despite the fact that Moltmann seems from time to time to shrink back from the full consequences of the panentheism he claims to espouse.

Let us begin with Moltmann's discussion of God as Creator, turning later to his treatment of God as Lord. The first thing to notice is Moltmann's peculiar sympathy for the traditionally suspect doctrine of emanation: "It is ... wrong to polemicize continually against the neo-Platonic doctrine of emanation in considering the Christian doctrine of creation " (p. 113; cf. p. 54). Although he never explains why not, Moltmann seems to hold that there is nothing incompatible between the traditional idea of creation *ex nihilo* and the emanationist idea of creation " in God." But when the latter is supposed to mean that the " difference" (not distance) between Creator and creature is somehow "bridged" by the Spirit *(ibid.),* one cannot help suspecting that perhaps the Creator/creature difference is going to get rather blurred.

The next thing to notice is a whole cluster of statements implying that God is inherently conditioned by the world. In marked contrast to the idea of creation *ex nihilo,* the idea of creation *in deo* seems to entail the notion of a closed system in which God cannot create the world without ·at the same time severely diminishing his own being. The Creator, we are told, "has to concede to his creation the space in which it can exist" (p. 59), and this concession involves "a limitation on God's part, not a de-limitation" (p. 110). Just how drastic this limitation really is becomes clear with the statement that the act of creation is something God " suffers and endures " (p. 59), that it is " a self-humiliation on God's part, a lowering of himself into his own impotence " (p. 110; cf. p. 27). One can only say that a greater distance than this from the grandeur of the Genesis creation account would be hard to imagine. Moltmann's proposal of a cosmically impoverished Creator is as unabashed as it is biblically remote.

By a related train of thought Moltmann maintains that God created the world to satisfy an inner personal need. It must be noted, however, that Moltmann's defense of this idea approaches incoherence by requiring the conjunction of apparently incompatible ingredients. Thus, to speak abstractly for a moment, we are asked to accept the implausible constructions that necessity is freedom, that deficiency is superabundance, and that love motivated compulsively is love given freely. The ideas of necessity, deficiency and compulsion in God are clearly panentheistic. Yet unless they can somehow be redefined to mean freedom, superabundance and uncompelled love, Moltmann cannot possibly hope to keep his theology Christian. However, since the argument does not rise above the level of merely asserting that the incompatible is coinpatible, one. is left

with the impression that Moltmann's " Christian panentheism " is a contradiction in terms.

Let us be more specific. Stripped of apologetic wording, the claim is simply that the world was created to satisfy God's needs. The argument goes something like this: God is love. God's love requires an object. Without an object to love, God would enter into self-contradiction and would therefore cease to be God. God, who is not self-sufficient in love, therefore creates the world out of "longing" for a personal counterpart (see pp. 53f., 57ff., 99, 105ff.; cf. pp. 33 & 45f.). The fatal move here, of course, is the idea that God's love requires something external, that it is not self-sufficient, and that it compels God to choose between creation and self-contradiction. How, then, can we follow Moltmann when he says that it is " axiomatic " for God to love the world freely (p. 107), that this love flows not from deficiency but from " superabundance " (pp. 23 & 45), and that the creation arises from divine freedom, " not out of compulsion " ? (p. 58). Having espoused the panentheistic notion that God inherently needs the world, Moltmann's ambivalent attempt to Christianize it is simply not convincing.

Finally, and most disappointing of all, one finds more than once a dark suggestion in Moltmann that God as Creator is responsible for the existence of evil. For what, after all, does Moltmann really mean when he describes creation as" the tragedy of divine love " ? (p. *59,* italics dropped). Is the creation "tragic" for God, because (as suggested at one point) God needs " to clear his conscience" of the guilt incurred by creating evil and suffering along with the world? (cf. p. 40). Or is it" tragic," because God is actually to be described as " a process which contains the whole pain of the negative in itself" (p. 57), so that " evil must already have come into existence with God ..., not merely with creation, let alone with the Fall ..."? (p. 34; cf. p. 51). Or is it perhaps " tragic," because God cannot create the radically imperfect world without also becoming its victim and thereby requiring " deliverance " ? (pp. 28, *56* & 60). With this book one never knows. Suffice it to say that there are enough such ominous, if undeveloped, hints to give one serious pause.

Given this kind of outcome in his view of God as Creator, Moltmann's treatment of God as Lord should come as no surprise. It must be remembered that, despite a certain amount of vague and elusive language, the basic thrust of Moltmann's thought is toward an ontically closed system in which two counterparts, God and the world, mutually limit, assist and suffer with one another (cf. p. 56). However, this closed system is conceived of as dynamic rather than static. Though ontically closed it remains eschatologically open, God and the world being caught up in the same complex process of suffering and deliverance. In this context two points about.God as Lord are especially salient.

First, as part of the one dynamic process, God's being and therefore God's lordship are radically eschatologized. "Eschatology," we are told, "... is what takes place in God's essential nature" (p. 92). Even the doctrine of the immanent Trinity is said to be " part of eschatology " (p. 161). While Moltmann is never terribly clear about just what all this might mean, his language obviously implies that God will not fully be God until the eschaton. Until then it would seem that God's essential being as God-God's lordship-is subjected to a two-fold historical process, consisting not only of suffering but also of self-realization. Even though Moltmann wants to deny the latter (p. 166), it is hard to see why divine self-realization is not actually required by the logic of his eschatological utterances. Moreover, God may perhaps be "the Lord of the coming liberty of the universe" (p. 71), but it is difficult to see how a God whose being is so completely implicated and submerged in the eschatology of present earthly suffering can in the meanwhile be affirmed as the active though hidden Lord of history.

God's lordship begins increasingly to look as if it has been evacuated of content, for on these terms it does not seem possible unequivocally to affirm God's present lordship over evil at all. Indeed, if God will not fully be God and Lord until the eschaton, then the eschaton itself would seem to be cast increasingly in doubt. Can we really believe that this essentially impoverished, tragic and self-humiliated deity is finally going to sway the future after all? From this angle even the great strength of Moltmann's theology of hope begins to look more and more tenuous.

Secondly, in Moltmann's hands God's lordship is not only eschatologized; it is also sentimentalized. Within the mutual conditioning of the closed, panentheistic system, God and humanity begin increasingly to take on each other's characteristics as the majesty of God's lordship is allowed to dwindle down to the dimensions of mere friendship. God is our cosmic friend, and in the name of freedom it is better to talk about friendship than lordship, because, we are told, " freedom does not mean lordship; it means friendship " (p. 56). " Lordship " increasingly becomes a pejorative term, with all sorts of unhappy associations like "servitude," "domination," even "possessive individualism" (pp. *56,* 88 & 231). "Lordship" is also defined in sharp contrast to God's "fatherhood," for in God's kingdom, we learn, God is " not the Lord " but " the merciful Father" whose kingdom involves " no servants and no obedience," only " free children," and " free participation " in love (p. 70). Once again it is hard to avoid the conclusion that God's lordship is being evacuated of real content, this time at the eschatological goal rather than along the way. The problem of course is not that Moltmann speaks of God's " fatherhood " and " friendship," but that he insists on doing so by giving God's lordship short shrift. Yet the one set of concepts without the other can only lead to mere seutimentality.

When Moltmann's doctrine of the Trinity is mixed together with his eschatology and with his panentheism, then one may note the further result that it is not only God who inevitably dwindles, but humanity which also inflates. The inflation of humanity may be seen as the peculiar consequence of Moltmann's doctrine of the " open Trinity." It seems that ultimately the unity enjoyed by the three trinitarian persons is not to be restricted to them alone, for the unity of the triune God is " open," "inviting," and even "communicable " (p. 149)-the latter adjective in this case being the most crucial. In the great consummation " the new, free and united human race " will not only enter into a new relationship *with* God, but will actually, we are told, "enter into the trinitarian relations *of* the Son, the Father and the Spirit " (p. 122, italics added) . " All people and things then partake of the ' inner-trinitarian life ' of God " (p. 127) . The creation which at first brought so much divine humiliation, impoverishment and suffering will at last become the vehicle of " God's eschatological selfcdeliverance " (p. 60) and of " the feast of the divine joy" (p. 59) as God's " creative love" finally " communicates itself by overcoming its opposite" (p. 106). God finally makes "human nature in its entirety ... part of his eternal life" (p. 121) as the divine Son " throws open " to all humanity "his relationship of sonship to the Father " (ibid.). Given the essentially communicable nature of the trinitarian unity, it is perhaps not surprising to find Moltmann at last writing explicitly about "the birth of God in the soul " (p. 211) and about the idea of salvation as "deification" *(theosis),* in which humanity will find itself gathered "finally, wholly and completely" into the open Trinity's eternal life (p. 213). It is surprising, however, to find Moltmann criticizing Hegel for making the " deification of world and humanity " into a "necessary conclusion " (p. 107); for it is not at all easy to see how Moltmann has avoided this conclusion himself.

One closes this book as if awakening from a bad dream. Why should Jiirgen Moltmann, in my opinion perhaps the most promising of all contemporary theologians, have allowed his theology to wander down such tangled and impossible paths? Before attempting to answer this question, let me make a few quick observations about my own critique. In spite of everything I cannot quite bring myself to believe, at least not yet, that Moltmann really wants to adopt the positions which appear in this book. For one thing he keeps shrinking back from them, and for another there are too many conflicting cross currents-more than I have been able to do justice to here-which somewhat scramble the picture I have presented. I have simply tried to clarify the dominant trends in order that some of their shortcomings and dangers might he writ large. Yet I cannot help hoping that the book reads too much like someone thinking out loud in public to be taken as Moltmann's last word.

Furthermore, anyone who reads the book will realize that my review sidesteps much of Moltmann's argumentation against positions which conflict with his .own. This omission has been deliberate. Although I do not usually find the polemical sections convincing (and it would take a much longer essay to explain why not) , the point I want to emphasize is that the.se sections generally function in lieu of any direct defense of the position Moltmann finally ends up with himself. But it would be fallacious to suppose that even a successful critique of competing positions would count as an adequate argument for one's own alternative viewpoint. That is why I have attempted to ask about the viability of Moltmann's constructive proposals apart from any extensive consideration of his corresponding polemics, even if that meant (as it did) that I had to draw upon theological concepts (such as "God's self-sufficiency ") which Moltmann thinks he has done away with.

Finally, despite the welter of confusion, there are a number of interesting ventures and conceptions in this book which at least deserve to be mentioned. Although the results are uneven, Moltmann does make some useful suggestions about how to think of the divine act of creation from a trinitarian standpoint (pp. lllff.). He introduces a much needed corrective to Western theology when he emphasizes the personal rather than merely relational character of the Holy Spirit (pp. 168ff.), and one might add that perhaps even his most "tritheistic " formulations ought to be regarded as being more nearly corrective than constitutive. Above all, Moltmann provides a very thoughtful and provocative discussion of the *Filioque,* which is promising in the avenues it seeks to open up for reconciling the traditional trinitarian differences whch still sadly separate the churches, East and West (pp. 178ff.). One could perhaps be more enthusiastic about such hopeful sections were they not themselves so thoroughly overshadowed by the problems already discussed.

Let us return, then, to the question as to why Moltmann should have ended up on the paths where we have found him. Two reasons can perhaps be suggested, the one material and the other more formal. The material reason, if one may put it this way, is rooted in Moltmann's deep, impassioned sense of personal anguish in response to the atrocities of innocent suffering, atrocities which have become all too commonplace in our century and our contemporary world. One of the great strengths of Moltmann's theology has always been the profundity and honesty by which it confronts the difficulties which gratuitous suffering poses for our understanding of God. At the heart of Moltmann's meditation on these difficulties has been the insight that the victims of atrocity are not aloof from God, for God in Jesus Christ has made the sufferings of the world his own, and that therein lies the great if mysterious hope that somehow those whom Jesus Christ has incorporated into his wounded body will

one day be given a share in his risen body as well. By this time, however, Moltmann's theology has taken such a drastic twist that even God seems primarily to be regarded as a victim, and the cross of Christ to be more important as a symbol of human victimization than as the real accomplishment :of our forgiveness (p. . In short, the deficiencies of Moltmann's newer theology seem to stem, at least in part, from an inordinate preoccupation with the mystery of innocent suffering.

The more formal reason is closely related to the first. Moltmann's earlier theology used to speak very powerfully about " the pain of the open theodicy question." This meant that the question of innocent suffering was eschatologically open, and that it could only be answered by God. It meant that evil was regarded as an "impossible possibility," and that both God's power and God's love as testified by Scripture were affirmed. It also meant, however, that a great deal had to remain incomprehensible and shrouded in irresolvable mystery. By contrast, Moltmann's more recent theology must be interpreted as a press away from mystery toward a greater degree of rational intelligibility. l\foltmann now suggests that he wants " to offer a universal explanation of suffering in the world " (p. *50).* His newfound panentheism, which is essentially an exercise in rationalism, serves this very purpose. It severely restricts God's lordship arid power so that the existence of evil can be made to seem more intelligible. Regardless of how one evaluates this enterprise, the point to see is that Moltmann is moving toward a more rationalist theological picture. If he does not change this course, it will be interesting to note if he can still manage to avoid the traditional bane of rationalism, which almost always ·seems to know what evil is good for, and therefore why evil is not evil. In any case, it was another real strength of Moltmann's earlier theology that it not only let evil be evil, but also let God be God.

GEORGE HUNSINGER

New Brunswick Theological Seminary
New Brunswick, New Jersey

Ministry: Leadership in the Community of Jesus Christ. By EDWARD SCHILLEBEECKX. Translated by John Bowden. New York: Crossroad, 1981. Pp. 165. *$12.95.*

Minister? Pastor? Prophet?: Grass-roots Leadership in the Churches. By LUCAS GROLLENBERG, EDWARD SCHILLEBEECKX, *et. al.* Translated by John Bowden. New York: Crossroad, 1981. Pp. 102. $8.95.

In introducing the book *Minister? Pastor? Prophet?* Lucas Grollenberg states that the essays presented reflect "the particular situation of the Roman Catholic church in Holland, but [they discuss] a problem which concerns the whole of the Roman Catholic church" (p. 1). Therefore he is pleased to offer these essays for the reflection of English-speaking readers, and also to make Roman authorities more aware of the need to reconsider ministry on the basis of what is actually happening in "grass-roots" communities. He summarizes the questions raised by asking why only celibate men may be ordained, why men and also women from local communities may not be ordained, especially those who already exercise leadership responsibilities, and why each local community does not have "the right to an ordained minister" (p. 1). These questions also preoccupy Edward Schillebeeckx in his work *Ministry.* In fact, this work is an expansion of his essay contained in *Minister? Pastor? Prophet?* which also appears in a somewhat different version in *Right of the Community to a Priest, Concilium,* Vol. 133 (New York: Seabury, 1980). The four papers which comprise the collection *Minister? Pastor? Prophet?* were first published in *Tijdschrift voor Theologie* (no. 3, 1979), having been presented at a conference on ministry held at Nijmegen earlier that year.

This background information is important to bear in mind, especially because it is not so clearly stated in the Schillebeeckx volume and many statements found there are made clearer by recalling the origin of the work. However, this particular religious and cultural context does not so dominate or determine the argumentation offered that the books offer little insight for the wider church. In fact, the situation of other local churches is kept in mind throughout. This is seen most clearly in the first essay in the *Minister? Pastor? Prophet?* volume by Jan Kerkhofs, containing a statistical review of the shortage of priests throughout the world. This essay also contains some reflections on the situation of those who wish to continue to function as married priests or as women priests. The first part of this article (also found in *Concilium,* no. 133 in an abridged form) is more helpful than the second, which contains some oversimplifications and unexplained judgments. The author concludes by stating that any ministry in the future must require ministers to bear personalized responsibility for the ministry, that ministers serve as members of a pastoral

team, and that the " criterion is always that of functioning within and from a community in the light of the gospel " (p. 20).

The second essay by Anton Houtepen reflects on present-day problems in ministry from a theological perspective. Many of the author's observations are insightful, making this essay worth serious consideration. Houtepen argues forcefully that the tradition of the church on ministry shows that service to the *paradosis* is the specific feature of the pluriform "ministry " in the church. As such, there should be a reintegration or reemphasis given to the unity of catechesis, liturgy, and *diakonia* as essential aspects of the one ministry. Too much differentiation causes splintering of those elements which together comprise service to the handing-on of the gospel. " Gospel-community and life-style, worship and service form one event of *paradosis* in the New Testament .... " (p. 24). "Ministerial service is there to provide appropriate help in the direction of God's kingdom. This includes message and life-style, preaching, worship, and help in all kinds of distress " (p. .

In offering insights from other disciplines on " religious leadership " J. J. A. Vollenbergh maintains that a new paradigm, that of the self-governing group, offers real possibilities for developing the ministries of helper, prophet, and witness in the church. He calls for an "integrated leadership," and a collegial approach to ministry. In commenting on the virtues of "restrained leadership" the author remarks parenthetically: " It is therefore somewhat paradoxical that progressive groups hope to get Rome's power behind them" (p. *53).* "Neither the simplicity of the concept of hierarchy nor an· insufficiently thought out adoption of democratic forms of leadership will help us out of the [present] impasse" (p. *55)* • In this present situation collegiality is a desired model for exercising leadership and responsibility.

While each of these three essays may be considered sketchy, sometimes offering ideas that are more provocative than cogently argued, nevertheless, they do contain helpful ideas about ministry and the context within which to consider ministry in the church today. In fact, the insights noted here are so important for developing the notion of ministry that one wonders why they are not found in Schillebeeckx's *Ministry.* While one can understand their absence in Schillebeeckx's essay in the collection of articles (since these papers were first presented together at the ministry congress), the fact that they are not emphasized (or are even ignored) in the book is among the work's major flaws.

In the Foreword to *Ministry,* Schillebeeckx notes that from among the seventeen articles on ministry he had written over a twenty-five year period, four articles (from formed the starting point for this book. " It was not niy purpose to work up all this material into what then . . • would have been called ' a complete theology of ministry ' ••

(p. v). What he does provide is a book of fil.ix chapters (of unequal length) in which he gives great emphasis to the New Testament data on ministry and the church's first thousand years of experience with ministry. The second millenium is sketched very briefly (pp. 5!?l-65), the account ending with the teaching of Trent on ministry. The third chapter discusses continuity and divergence between the first and second millenia (pp. 66-74). In comparison with what follows in the next chapters, these comprise the more helpful part of the book. The second part deals with the tension between actual church order and alternative practices in ministry (chapter four), a hermeneutical clarification (chapter five), and some perspectives on the future with detailed description of and reference to the 1971 Synod of Bishops (chapter six). This second part of the book deserved more careful composition and editing, especially since the hermeneutical clarification (chapter five) could have been presented earlier in the book and .in that position have been freed from its defensive tone. It appears to have been added to justify the proposals offered in the book's final chapter. It would have been more helpful if incorporated into the Introduction as part of the explanation of how the author used arguments from the tradition to deal with the present state of ministry in the church. In addition, the book's structure is flawed by the absence of sections on the Second Vatican Council's treatment of ministry and post-conciliar statements on ministry (e.g., the revised rite for the institution of readers and acolytes in *Ministeria quaedam,* or the restored .diaconate in *Ad pascendum.)* To give an extended treatment to the 1971 Synod (pp. 105-130) and to deal with these very significant documents only in passing is curious.

The subtitle of the American edition " Leadership in the Community of Jesus Christ" reflects indirectly the main concern of the book, the person of the ordained minister in the church today. "Ministry" here is about the ordained ministry. The subtitle of the English edition of the book: " A Case For Change " (London: SCM Press) reflects a main argument throughout: that married men and women should be allowed to be ordained so that grass-roots communities enjoy their " right " to celebrate eucharist regularly. There are times when this latter concern is so dominant that it tends to obscure the clarity and precision seen in the scriptural and historical sections of the book. In fact, this single issue recurs so frequently that one wonders whether the English subtitle is not a more accurate description of the work.

In spite of these structural flaws, this book makes an important contribution to the ongoing consideration of the ordained ministry in the contemporary church. Since this is a book by Schillebeeckx, we should highlight the contributions made in the sections on theological method and exegesis. !le states: " without critical recollection of the

whole of the church's past, our modern questions are not in themselves normative either, although they are part of the picture. Only in a ally critical pastoral, practical and theological confrontation between the preselilt and the past is a truly Christian answer possible" (p. 2). The issue he raises concerns whether the practice of ministry " is shaped primarily by theological criteria, or on the basis of non-theological factors. Or more precisely, whether it is formed from theological reflection on new human and cultural situations" *(ibid.).* He implies that it is because of largely non-theological (or at least not theologically normative) criteria that the ordained ministry is reserved to celibate males.

Because. of the complexity of the New Testament data on ministers and ministry, some conventional treatments often give more weight to the former and delineate the pluriformity of those involved in ministering. Schillebeeckx tries to avoid this pitfall in concluding his important treatment of these data by recalling the church's *apostolic* mission, and that apostolicity requires that the community be aware that it is carrying on the cause of Jesus, that the gospel is its foundation document and norm, that this community stands under the norm of being disciples of Jesus, that proclamation, liturgy, and *diakonia* are characteristics of the church, that local communities are bound to other communities in love, and that ministry is service rather than a status or state (pp. 34-7). What tends to be obscured even here is the mission of the church as witness in the world. That the ministry is in service to communities under the Word of God is clear, but that this implies witness in the marketplace is not· so clear. Without this broader context ministry itself could be understood on its own and in a self-contained fashion. This would destroy another aspect of the apostolicity of the church and of ministry within the community. It is for this reason that the inclusion in chapter six of a letter of Latin American priests to Pope John Paul II (of July, 1980) is helpful. It was written prior to the Holy Father's journey to Brazil and it called for the church to recommit itself to the poor of Latin America. This is a helpful reminder of the church's prophetic and apostolic nature. This apostolic and prophetic stance should be recalled as the church considers its structures of ministry. The Pauline exhortation to build up the Body of Christ here receives its appropriate and necessary context.

While it is later in the book that Schillebeeckx will argue for the ordination of married and celibate men and women, this point could have been made in this earlier section by the use of sociological criteria and evaluation of the situation of New Testament communities. Determining why men, both married and unmarried, were chosen for the ministry at this time, and why women were not, does seem to depend on the kind of "non-theological " factors noted above. A sociological review of these data would have been helpful:

In concluding this section Schillebeeckx states that " this survey shows that as far as the New Testament is concerned the community has a right to a minister or ministers and to the celebration of the eucharist. This apostolic right has priority over the criteria for admission which the church can and may impose on its ministers. . . . This apostolic right has priority over the church order which has in fact grown up and which in other circumstances may have been useful and healthy . . . . " (p. 37). What is curious here is the limited conclusion drawn on the basis of this body of evidence about New Testament ministry. In addition, there is nothing said about the criteria for presidency at eucharist. Even if we grant the truth of Schillebeeckx's statement as it stands, there are other issues that are not dealt with which are important for clarity of argument and expression. In fact, in another section the author seems to caricature one obvious criterion: education. " In that case the vitality of the community in terms of the gospel is the deciding factor, not the availability of a body of priestly manpower, crammed full of education in one place or another" (p. 41). One should recall that one of the advances made at Trent was the requirement of seminary education; the state of clergy education/ formation at the time was chaotic. Another criterion for liturgical presideRcy would appear to be connected with holiness and spirituality, factors also underscored in seminary formation.

In sketching the context for liturgical celebration, Schillebeeckx emphasizes the intrinsic connection between liturgical presidency and leadership in the life of the community. On the basis of the early church's experience he argues for a more obvious and essential link between the community leader and the community celebrating. This is because " the active agent of the eucharist was the community " (p. *50).* This is an important statement, not only to help Schillebeeckx's argument that the local community has a right to its minister, but also for a proper theology of eucharist; the locus of celebration is the community with a variety of roles functioning within it.

The treatment of the second millenium of the church's life is the briefest and the least comprehensive. This is unfortunate since it is here that a certain " privatization " and individualism of the ministry takes place. Helpful here, in addition to the importance of law and the influence of feudalism as noted, would have been a more detailed description of the changed context for doing theology, including the important role philosophy played in this period. What also mars the author's argument about the requirement of celibacy is the fact that it is mentioned in this section for the first time and then only in an incomplete way. The historical evolution of this requirement is only dealt with here by way of flashback.

In offering an alternative practice for the ordained ministry Schillebeeckx notes that today " laity are allowed to engage in pastoral work aa

much as possible but are refused the sacramental institution to the ministry which goes with this " (p. 85). He questions whether this is sound theological development, for he sees that " it maintains the exaggerated sacral view of the priesthood ...." It can be argued on the basis of sacramental theology that what one could call a "refusal of ordination" is, in fact, a way to emphasize the theology and reality of baptism where a complementarity of community members together take joint responsibility for building up the body of Christ. Not all have to be ordained, just as not all have the same function, gift, or charism. In fact, an exaggerated view of the priesthood in certain circumstances may well be a reason for limiting the number of ordinations. Ordination should never replace the primary locus of communal identity, ministry, and responsibility-baptism.

Despite the critical comments we have made, this book is a helpful contribution to the expanding literature on the church's tradition of ministry. Because it concerns the ordained ministry it would be especially helpful for those ordained, for candidates for ordination, and for use in courses on the theology of ministry. It does raise many important questions about ordination today, and it challenges assumptions about its present shape based on the church's past. In this way it also offers a challenge for its shape in the future. It is an appropriate contribution from the pen of one who intended to challenge and evaluate, rather than offer " a complete theology of the ministry."

KEVIN W. IRWIN

Fordham University
Bronx, New York

A Century of Moral Philosophy. By W. D. HUDSON. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980. Pp. 198. $18.95.

Hudson, a Reader in Moral Philosophy at the University of Exeter, offers us a concise, clear, and readable account of the course of British moral philosophy over the last hundred years. His work is not encyclopedic but seeks rather "to trace what seems to me to be the most important thread of argument and counter-argument in this branch of philosophy" (p. ii). In eight chapters,, Hudson traces the development of metaethical argument with major stress on two schools of thought, intuitionism and utilitarianism. He presents the basic arguments made by the various philosophers, details the objections offered by their critics, and often gives his own opinion as to the strengths and weaknesses of the different positions.

The first chapter presents the intuitionism and utilitarianism of one

hundred years ago. Intuitionism emphasizes that "moral properties are objectively *real* and *intrinsic* to the actions or states of affairs which they characterise." (p. Human beings have a faculty, referred to as conscience, which enables them directly to discern what is right and what is wrong. A very important exponent of the intuitionist position was William Whewell of Cambridge, who argued that this moral faculty was reason and who offered significant criticisms of utilitarianism. On the other hand, utilitarians such as Jeremy Bentham and J. S. Mill sought to establish an objective and external standard of morality with their principle of utility. "Their utility principle laid it down that, if an action brings about in sum more pleasure than pain, its moral value is positive; if more pain than pleasure, negative; and if an equal quantity of both, neutral" (p. 10). Their principles contrast significantly with those of Whewell and the other intuitionists.

The following chapter exposes and analyzes Henry Sidgwick's attempt to forge a union between these two disparate positions. On the basis of both logical and psychological arguments, Sidgwick seeks to show that utilitarianism answers the intuitionists' question of what is good while intuitionism can justify the utilitarians' principle that we ought to aim at general happiness. Sidgwick's method, however, was not without its problems and led him into a quandary regarding practical reason. Yet "he raised many of the questions which were to preoccupy moral philosophers during the next hundred years" (p. . Two other lines of thought of the period are represented by Sidgwick's contemporaries T. H. Green and Herbert Spencer. Green presented a Hegelian point of view and thought that to understand morality a person must see its basis in metaphysics. Spencer believed that " the study of evolution provides the appropriate basis for ethics " (p. 57) . Hudson is quite critical of both and believes their contribution to the ongoing discussion was in pointing to areas in need of further analysis and understanding.

The fourth chapter deals with G. E. Moore's teleological intuitionism. Moore gave direction to modern moral philosophy in winning " general assent for the proposition that ethics stands alone" (p. 74). It was Moore who gave the name " the naturalistic fallacy " to all attempts to define the good. Moore is normally regarded as Mill's most incisive critic, though recently that criticism has been called into question. In general, Moore and other intuitionists of his time believed that certain truths were self-evident although they didn't agree on what these truths were. The main objection raised to their " view that ethical intuition gives us immediate of moral truths . . . is the lack of any independent check upon it " (p. 10£) .

Hudson proceeds from discussing Moore to an analysis of the emotive theory of moral meaning proposed by A. J. Ayer, C. L. Stevenson, and

others. This theory holds: "If we say, 'This is good,' that 'serves only as an emotive sign expressing our attitude to *this*, and perhaps evoking similar attitudes in other persons, or inciting them to actions of one kind or another '" (p. 108). While this theory dealt with the mysteriousness and failure to direct action of previous intuitionist theories, it also proved inadequate on a number of counts, especially the fact that discourse which influences another person is not necessarily moral discourse.

The central place in modern moral philosophy is occupied by R. M. Hare's prescriptivism, a theory which contrasts in many ways with emotivism. In Hudson's opinion " it is the most clearly stated and comprehensively argued of contemporary ethical theories " (p. 126). For Hare, moral judgments are distinctive in that they possess the two logical features of prescriptivity and universalisability. This analysis of moral judgment leads Hare to conclude that a judgment is not moral unless it is in accord with the principle of utility. A major defect in his prescriptivism seems to be " that it allows *a:ny content at all* to go through as a moral judgment provided it fulfills the formal conditions, which Hare calls 'necessary ingredients' " (p. 150).

The seventh chapter considers two versions of the view that there is a restricted content to morality. "By saying that its content is restricted I mean that, in our moral judgments, it makes good sense to express approval (or disapproval) of certain things but not of others " (p. 153). Here Hudson discusses the morality grounded in human wants proposed by Mrs. Philippa Foot and that grounded in tradition proposed by R. W. Beardsmore and others.

The final chapter concludes that, just as they were one hundred years ago, intuitionists and utilitarians are still at odds. Hudson believes that the contemporary neo-intuitionism really began with a paper presented by Miss G. E. M. Anscombe in 1958. lntuitionism has revived in a renewed form and holds that not all moral convictions are logically reducible to the principle of utility. To ignore intuitions is to "misrepresent the nature of morality " (p. 171). On the utilitarian side, Hare has recently offered a model which speaks of intuitive or level-I thinking and critical or level-2 thinking. He believes that his prescriptivism encompasses both levels and thus provides a theory which includes all the essential elements of moral thinking.

Hudson's interesting and detailed presentation provides a stimulating view of the last century of moral philosophy. It perhaps could be improved by giving a little more attention than it does (2 pages) to Rawl's theory of justice, especially since this theory converges in some ways with the data on psychological development presented by Lawrence Kohlberg and his colleagues. More importantly, while Hudson seems to be sympathetic to Hare's most recent theory, it would have been helpful if Hudson had

stated his own position toward the end of the book, if for no other reason than to stimulate the reader to a personal critique and synthesis.

Hudson's work also might prove helpful in stimulating thought on the state of Catholic moral theology. Currently there is a widespread move to embrace a theory of proportionate reason which is consequentialistic in nature and seems to be akin to utilitarianism. While the debate over this proposed move is intense and complex and thus cannot be related in a simplistic way to Hudson's work, yet the century of debate in philosophical ethics offers insights into the contemporary debate in Catholic circles. Certainly, there is a need for a clarification of the philosophical presuppositions of the move to proportionate reason. Likewise might not the difficulty of measuring consequences which Whewell raised long ago be raised against any new consequentialistic theory? Furthermore, won't the problem of content raised above against Hare also have to be dealt with in any new system? Will the departures from moral rules for proportionate reasons not lead to the vitiation of such rules (see p. 174)? These and other serious questions arise as one seeks to relate the century of debate in philosophical ethics to the current controversy in Catholic moral theology. If Hudson's work is any indication, this complex debate will be long lasting, if not everlasting.

JOHN W. CROSSIN, O.S.F.S.

DeSales School of Theology
Washington, D.C.

Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science. By MARY HESSE. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980. Pp. xxvi + 271. $22.50.

This volume can be looked at in two ways. It might be seen as simply a collection of reprinted essays by a philosopher of science widely respected in English and American academic circles. Or it might be seen as more, as a relatively coherent compendium of the most important pieces in the developing corpus of one of the first and most influential female philosophers of science in our day. Two things favor the more pretentious claim. Appended to the collection of essays is a complete bibliography of work by Hesse-the sort of bibliography most- often found in collections of authors whose published works the editors think important enough to list in full. And, the feminist aspect aside, the works chosen from that bibliography do represent a judicious selection of essays calculated to display the current state of thinking in the intellectual development of an independent· thinker in philosophy of science with a distinct enough perspec-

tive to warrant the attention of historians of twentieth-century philosophy of science. In any case, the volume will here be treated as such a major statement rather than as a mere collection of essays.

The distinctiveness of Hesse's approach and of the volume shows up best not only in the inclusion of Part IV," Science and Religion" (which includes just the final chapter), but in the central role that chapter plays in the unfolding synthesis sketched out in the volume.

Parts I and II, " The Historiography of Science," and " Objectivity and Truth," represent what, in recent years, Mary Hesse has come to be known for in philosophy of science circles. The final chapter in the second part, for instance, was presented at the 1976 Philosophy of Science Association meeting and is readily available in *PSA 1976,* volume The presentation is clear and precise-and dry. The viewpoint expressed is sympathetic toward the newer movements in philosophy of science. As Hesse herself sums up the situation: "The papers ... in this collection all address themselves in one way or other to a critique of . . . empiricist presuppositions, and try more positively to steer a course between the extremes of metaphysical realism and relativism" (p. xiv}. In Hesse's view, recent developments in philosophy of science-she associates them principally with Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, and Stephen Toulmin, as well as W. V. Quine-only serve to reinforce the untenability of scientific realism.

One chapter in this earlier part of the volume stands out as demonstrating Hesse's openmindedness. In " The Strong Thesis of Sociology of Science," Hesse shows herself to be remarkably open to the theory referred to in the title of the chapter. And that thesis-in Hesse's reconstruction of it: " the view that true belief and rationality are just as much explananda of the sociology of knowledge as error and noncrationality " (p. 81)-is indeed a strong one for advocates of logical empiricism in its traditional form to swallow. Larry Laudan in *Progress and Its Problems* (1977}, for instance, even while pushing empiricism about as far as it can go, concludes with a chapter on rationality and the sociology of knowledge which resolutely and with some harshness restricts sociology of knowledge to what Landan calls the " arational." Hesse subjects the strong thesis to extremely probing criticism, but in the end she finds that it " survives " (p. 45)-and in any case she shows *much* more openness to it than Laudan (and, all the more, still narrower traditional empiricists).

Another indication of Hesse's to flirt with radical anti-empiricism is to be found in chapter 9, "Habermas's Consensus Theory of Truth." There, in considering empiricist objections to Jiirgen Habermas's version of Frankfurt School neo-Marxism, Hesse admits: " If the consequences of the consensus theory of truth for theoretical science are properly understood, it must be concluded that the ' objectivity ' of *theories* is a.a bitdly off the claimed objectivity of value judgments "-the hams

of the empiricist objection (p. 224). While this chapter again displays Hesse's openness (plus rigorous criticism), in the end she does not agree with Habermas's version of a consensus theory of truth. In passing it is worth noting that this is not the most lucid chapter in the book-several better interpretations of Habermas are now available-and Hesse seems to find it difficult to translate Habermas's ideas into the uncongenial standard language of Anglo-American philosophy of science.

Returning to "Science and Religion" and the distinctiveness of Hesse's approach, we might do well to quote portions of her own summary as given in the introduction: "In 'Criteria of Truth in Science and Theology,' I consider some . . . consequences of [earlier chapters] . . . for the perennial science/religion debate. Like most philosophical debates that have presupposed empiricist analyses of science, this one takes on a different complexion when empiricist presuppositions are rejected" (p. xxii). To set the problem, Hesse asks herself the question, "What *is* the status of theological claims to 'knowledge' of the world in, for example, doctrines of creation ...?" And she answers: "I conclude that these claims are *ideological* in the same sense that comprehensive theories in the human sciences are ideological, that is that they incorporate evaluations of their subject matter" (p. xxiii). Then, with implicit reference back to her earlier claims about the status of scientific theories, Hesse concludes: "In this sense theological claims . . . rejoin the same category as scientific cosmologies, when these are themselves understood as the framework of social communications. . . . Thus science/religion debates can be re-engaged at a different level" (p. xxiii). Finally, this is Hesse on science: "I have argued that there are no defences except [a] pragmatic criterion against the relativity of scientific theories, and . . . the pragmatic criterion permits a permanent plurality of conceptual frameworks" (p. xxiv); and on religion: "In the case of postulated moral or ideological absolutes there is no empirical test procedure with which to contrast the appropriate mode of knowledge.... But it does not follow, any more than it does from the pluralism of scientific theory, that there is no non-relative truth in these domains" (p. xxv).

Where does this leave Hesse? In the actual chapter devoted to science and religion (as opposed to the introductory summary relied on here}, she makes these points much clearer. One example, related to the cultural relativism of her view: "Should the theologian be alarmed at the apparent rejection of the notion of perennial truths of which he has often been regarded as guardian? ... It does not at all follow that perennial insights of the proper theological kind cannot be captured, however fleetingly and obscurely, in the appropriate expressions of each culture, any more than it follows that the linguistic variance of physical theories prevents the fo.cts that underlie experimental control of nature lµi.ving and

perennial character" (p. 252}. Again: "What I have said about the nature of theological assertion is ... perhaps the most important intellectual task facing the Church. I believe that the . . . criteria for ' goodness ' of theological assertion lie primarily in the areas of meaning and value judgment, and not in the area of empirical fact " (p. 253)-especially if " fact " is understood in an outdated empiricist fashion. Finally, Hesse concludes the chapter and the book on this note: " Fundamental theological disputes may well break out again [in the current intellectual climate], but this will be a sign of health, because it will show theology being again incarnated in its own time, and even perhaps differently in each of the many and deeply distinct social systems of our time. We shall not create the successors of Augustine and Aquinas overnight, but if we are faithful to our own concerns, in his own good time God may " (p. 254).

In short, we have here a first-rate thinker carrying as far as she can the insights of the new philosophy of science of Kuhn and Quine (and others}, who is willing even to face the consequences of these views for religious belief. (Hesse goes further than others in being open even to Continental influences, such as that of Habermas or the social thinker Emile Durkheim.} Many theologians and religious philosophers will be uncomfortable with the cultural relativism she sees implicit in these views. But she has issued her challenge forthrightly, and they would be well advised to take it up with the same openness, honesty, and rigor she has displayed.

PAUL T. DURBIN

University of Delaware
Newark, Delaware

Commentary on the Gospel of John, Part I. By SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS. Translated by J. A. WEISHEIPL, 0.P., and F. R. LARCHER, O.P. Albany, N.Y.: Magi Books, 1980. Pp. 505. $35.00.

Fr. Weisheipl is responsible for the Introduction and Notes of this volume and, seemingly, for most of the translation-at least that is what the explanatory statement, "translation of J. A. Weisheipl with F. R. Larcher" implies. At any rate, the work comes with the authority of the author of *Friar Thomas d'Aquino: His Life, Thought and W9rk-and* that is approbation indeed. This, the first of two volumes, covers Jn 1-7.

In his masterly introduction, Fr. Weisheipl explains that the commentary is a *reportatio,* that is to say, the gist of a professor's lectures. In our case the reporter is Reginald of Piperno, Thomas's faithful *socius;* Moreover, there is evidence that this *reportatio* was revised by Aquinas

himself. There may be even more to it than that. There are indications that the commentary on the first five chapters of the gospel is not a *reportatio* at all but an *expositio:* the *text* of the lectures. All in all, this commentary is an impressive witness to Aquinas's exegetical skill and theological acumen.

Weisheipl carefully points out that the commentary is typically medieval, lacking the unction, colloquialism, and informality of patristic commentaries, and suggests that it is easier to read Augustine's commentary on John than that of Thomas. An apt observation. But as one whose formal theological formation was in the scholastic tradition, I find it easy to read Thomas. What Weisheipl implies, and correctly, is that fewer and fewer find it so.

There is no doubt that, for a man of his time, Thomas's exegetical competence is remarkable. He sought out the literal sense of the text. And though, of course, he commented on the Vulgate text, he knew some Greek; he knew of variant Greek readings and the precise meaning of certain words. His text of Jn 1:3-4 read: "All things were made through him, and without him nothing was made. What was made in him was life". He was aware that the punctuation in the Greek was different and cites Chrysostom as an authority. " Chrysostom is held in such esteem by the Greeks in his explanations that they admit no other where he expounded anything in Holy Scripture. For this reason, this passage in all the Greek works is found punctuated exactly as Chrysostom did, namely, ' And without him was nothing made that was made ' " (p. 58). Or, again, on Jn 3:3 (" Unless one is born again, one cannot see the kingdom of God "). Note that the Greek reading is not ' again ' but *anothen* i.e. 'from above', which Jerome translated as 'again' in order to suggest addition. And this is the way Jerome understood the saying 'unless one is born again'. It is as if he were saying: Unless one is reborn once more through a paternal generation " (p. 185). In fact *anothen* is one of the consciously ambiguous Johannine double expressions, meaning " again " *and* "from above". But Aquinas was on to something.

As a medieval exegete, Thomas made much of the " spiritual " sense. This spiritual sense-as the *sensus plenior* or "fuller sense "-found a new lease of life some decades back; for a while I viewed it with some favor. It is no longer in vogue-and rightly so. God has spoken in *human* words and we must respect the human conditioning of Scripture. Recourse, in our day, to " spiritual " exegesis would be a betrayal of our hard-won understanding of the *message* of the biblical writers. An example here of the " spiritual" sense (on Jn 2:1): "The place too is appropriate. For ' Cana ' means ' zeal ' and ' Galilee ' means ' passage '. So this marriage was celebrated in the zeal of a passage, to suggest that those persons are most worthy of union with Christ who, burni1,1g with the zeal of a con$Ci-

entious devotion, pass over from the state of guilt to the grace of the Church ". A nice thought-but hardly that of Jn 2:1.

I have given an example of " spiritual " exegesis. In fairness-and, more importantly, to give an indication of the calibre of the commentary-I include some details of the comment on Jn 3:16-18 (pp. 199-202). Aquinas asserts that the greatness of God's love is shown from four standpoints: 1. from the person of the one loving: *God;* 2. from the condition of the one who is loved: *the world* (man, a bodily creature of the world); 3. from the greatness of the gift: *his only begotten Son;* 4. from the greatness of its fruit: *eternal life.* And we find a shrewd answer to the question: Did God give his Son with the intention that he should die on the cross? " He did indeed give him for the death of the cross inasmuch as he gave him the will to suffer on it" (p. 201).

Aquinas notes that the statement: " God did not send his Son into the world to judge the world " (v. 17) seems to conflict with 9:39-" I came into this world to judge ", and answers: " There are two kinds of judgment. One is the judgment of distinction, and the Son has come for this in his first coming; because with his coming men are distinguished, some by blindness and some by the light of grace. The other is the judgment of condemnation; he did not come for this as such " (p. 202). And he goes on, commenting on v. 18: "Now he proves what he had said, as though by a process of elimination, in the following way: ' Whoever will be judged will be either a believer or an unbeliever. But I have not come to judge unbelievers, because they are already judged. Therefore, from the outset God did not send his Son to judge the world. So first he shows that believers are not judged. Secondly that unbelievers are not judged ' " (p. 202). This sober exegesis displays a shrewd touch which is maintained as long as the commentator sticks to the literal sense.

All the same, one has to be aware that theological presuppositions can cloud exegesis. Take the comment on 5:5 ("Unless one is born of water and the Holy Spirit, one cannot enter the kingdom of God "). Thomas begins well. "It is necessary that the one generated be generated in the likeness of the one generating; but we are regenerated as sons of God, in the likeness of his true Son. Therefore it is necessary that our spiritual regeneration come about through that by which we are made like to the Son; and this comes about by our having his Spirit " (p. 187). But when he goes on to the necessity of water for this regeneration, he makes heavy weather. "Water, too, is necessary for this regeneration, and for three reasons". First, because of the condition of huiiian nature. Man is of soul and body-·therefore in order that the flesh be regenerated, it is necessary that something bodily be involved. " Secondly, water is necessary for the sake of human knowledge": man knows spiritual things by means of 11ensible things: water, the mr,ans of external cleansing, suggests an

interior and spiritual cleansing. " Thirdly, water was necessary so there might be a correspondence of causes". In the sacraments there should be something corresponding to the Word and something corresponding to the body. "Spiritually speaking, this is water when the sacrament is baptism, so that through it we may be conformed to the death of Christ, since we are submerged in it during baptism as Christ was in the womb of the earth for three days: ' We are buried with him by baptism ' (Rom 6: 4) ". Thomas, in fact, holds for an *absolute* need of baptism for salvation, though he distinguishes three forms of baptism: by water, by blood, and by desire. And he accepts, too, that unbaptized children do not enter the kingdom of God (p. 189). Our better understanding of the gospels saves us from such a constrained interpretation of God's saving grace. We are reminded that even the most genial theologian is subject to the world-view of his time.

Weisheipl adds to Thomas's purpose of determining the literal sense and explaining the spiritual sense of the gospel the refutation of error and the confirmation of the Catholic faith. In these concerns, too, he was a man of his time. What does emerge is Aquinas's impressive knowledge of the Latin and Greek Fathers. And, all the while, his distinctive scholastic theology is in evidence. Thus, his comment on 6: 55 (" Whoever eats my flesh and drinks my blood has eternal life ") is an instance of the scholastic method at its most typical. "Now our Lord proves that this spiritual food has power to give eternal life. And he reasons this way: Whoever eats my flesh and drinks my blood has eternal life. Here he does three things: first he gives his major premise; secondly the minor premise, which he proves (v. 58); and, thirdly, he draws his own conclusion:- *This is the bread which came down from heaven* " (pp. 887f) . Thomas then continues, over three pages, to expound each of the members of the syllogism.

Fr. Weisheipl finds it necessary not only to explain the scholastic method but to provide, in an Appendix, lengthy notes on the scholastic notions of "Nature" and "Person", on the scholastic doctrine of Trinity and Incarnation, and on Thomas's doctrine of the Hypostatic Union. Today such notes are wholly necessary: scholastic theological language is no longer current. The great scholastics, however, and supremely Aquinas, have enduring value. That is why this translation of Thomas's *Commentary* on John is important. It is essential, though, that it be kept in perspective. Frankly, as a twentieth-century exegete, I find it of no more than marginal interest in my striving to understand the -Fourth Gospel.

I recall how, repeatedly, throughout my theological studies, especially in Rome, I had been assured that in Aquinas's writings we find the answers to the problems of all time. Even. then I could see that there was something odd in the assumption that a thirt(;!enth-century theologian was

adequate for the twentieth century. Had theology stopped short in the Middle Ages? I regret, then, the final sentence of Fr. Weisheipl's Introduction: "For our guide [in the study of John] we can have none better than the Angelic Doctor, whom Jesus loved". The *pietas* is, perhaps, understandable. But I, also a brother of Friar Thomas, find many more penetrating insights in the classic commentary of Rudolf Bultmann.

A sour note. It is a great pity that Weisheipl has gone out of his way to drag in Hans Kling-whom he evidently misunderstands (p. 482). It is distasteful (to put it very, *very* mildly) to find Kling branded a heretic (p. 479). A medieval theologian may be excused his lavish bestowal of the epithet "heretic ". A modern writer ought to be more circumspect.

That said, I warmly commend the industry of Frs. Weisheipl and Larcher. They have given us a splendid translation of a major exegetical work of the thirteenth century. It is right that we should be reminded of our heritage. But we must keep our balance.

While preparing this review I happened to be reading Edward Schillebeeckx's *Christ.* His lengthy (pp. 305-432) exposition of Johannine thought is truly impressive. Indeed, the exegetical expertise of this systematic theologian throughout his two Jesus-books is awe-inspiring. For me, it is most encouraging that, in our day, a brother of Friar Thomas d'Aquino, a preeminent theologian, has given us a major exegetical study. This is the Thomistic tradition that appeals to me.

WILFRID HARRINGTON, O.P.

St. Mary's, Tallaght County
Dublin, Ireland

Les perfections du Dieu de Jesus-Christ. By BERTRAND DE MARGERIE, S.J. Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1981. Pp. 489. NF 114, Cent. 30.

" Every scribe that is trained for the kingdom of heaven is like a householder who brings out of his treasure what is new and what is old " (Mt. 18:52). This logion could be an apt motto for this remarkable book. Seminary professors, their students, and scholars in general are often reluctant today to present or to read a tract *De Deo uno* in traditional form; yet the feeling is growing that more substantial fare is needed than has been given in many places. While Fr. de Margerie did not write this as a textbook, we can best describe it as providing a comparably solid yet new treatment of that basic topic.

The author describes his work thus: " A volume that does not pretend to be .... philosophical, but theological. It is not a manual of theodicy.

Our intention is not to reply to questions which reason . . . could pose about the origin and goal of the world; the God of whom the philosopher speaks is not yet the God who speaks of Himself to the believer. . . . " For the approach is to be basically Scriptural. 'Nor is this book "apologetics . . . but it is, and means to be, an apology within the fold of the faith." Again, it is " not a book of fundamental theology; it does not pretend to treat the rational preliminaries of faith, but rather that which the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob, the God of Jesus Christ, has revealed about His ways of acting and about His Being."

As a result, the table of contents is far from reproducing the old line of theses. Instead we find these chief topics: the incomprehensible God makes Himself known; the theology of Atheism; the evolution of the biblical notion of God; the revealing and revealed God is Being and Love; in respect to the idolatry of polytheism and pantheism, the revealing God is simple, one, unique, and jealous; the omniscient and prescient knowledge of God, the illuminator of man.

The second group of chapters, on the action of God, considers: God the Creator, origin and end of the universe; the God who reveals is immanent, present everywhere; the revealed God is the eternal, the faithful, the absolute future of man; He is mercy and patience; He is the all-powerful will to save us; Redemptive Providence, Wisdom, and the sanctifying sanctity of the living God; God who predestines the just, reprobates obstinate sinners without ever predestining them to sin.

In the final chapters we meet with some very different topics, not often explored: the beauty of God, the interconnection of the divine perfections, in which human virtues share; God without limits: neither finite, nor indefinite, but infinite; the joy of God within Himself, in man, and in the world.

It is within each chapter that we find the *nova et vetera.* The treatment is basically Scriptural, but not in the old mode of just citing proof texts: passages of various lengths are adduced as parts of biblical themes, and are treated in accord with the findings of modern exegesis. Where appropriate, we find also ancient pagan philosophers along with modern speculators. Then there are the Fathers, but again it is not just a matter of quoting proof passages without analysis here either. Rather, there is a careful discussion of each passage. The case is similar with documents of Councils and Popes. At the end of each section come the thoughts of leading recent writers on the topics involved. Here too we do not find snippets, or the kind of footnote so common in scholarly works which accumulate a large bibliography without citing anything, still less discussing it. Rather, everythng is carefully examined, and integrated into the entire treatment.

The list of authors in the inc:lices rl)veals unusual breadth. Sts. Augus-

tine and Thomas are used often enough to call for separate indices for each. But other authors of every stamp appear frequently, especially K. Barth, who comes in seventy times. Others of various persuasions are found several times, such as Y. Congar, A. Feuillet, Garcia Cordero, R. Garrigou-Lagrange, G. M. Garrone, E. Gilson, P. Van Imschoot, M. J. LaGrange, X. Le Bachelet, J. Maritain, K. Rahner, M. Scheeben, F. Schleiermacher, A. Sertillanges, F. Thonnard, P. Tillich, H. Urs von Baltassar.

The breadth of erudition is matched by similar broadmindedness. When Fr. De Margerie cites Catholics like Suarez, Scotus, and St. Bonaventure, it is not, as so often happened in the past, just as examples of rejected opinions. Rather, positive contributions are drawn from them. The same is true of many Protestant authors as well. Without accepting everything in them, of course, Fr. De Margerie often draws on the very real insights they show. For example, on pp. 327-39 he finds special help in the works of E. Brunner, K. Barth, and F. Schleiermacher. Brunner relates the wisdom of God to the order of the universe; Schleiermacher defines divine Wisdom as, " the principle that orders and determines the world in view of the self-communication of God shown in the redemption." Barth prefers to say that Wisdom is the divine self-communication that orders and determines the world in relation to itself.

Some of the remarks on atheism are striking. Thus on p. 86: "It is true ... that it is difficult to know if a human person is really an atheist: how can we know, in many a case, which God they are denying? Christians have always denied false gods. If today, because of a deformed presentation of God offered by [some] Christians, men reject a God that does not exist such as He is presented: who can blame them for it? ... Since the testimony of the Gospel is addressed always to a man who already knows the living God implicitly, and in so many ways, a man who has been solicited by so many actual graces, the word will have always the sense of a recollection. It will be, in fact, ... a tender cry addressed to the memory . . . inviting him not so much to discover God as to remember Him." In this vein, note 115 at the end of that chapter urges us: "Let us notice that St. Alphonse de Ligouri, a doctor of the Church, promised to criminals condemned to death that if they would accept and unite their death to that of Christ in expiation of their sins, they would have salvation, together with a great reward for their great merit. . . . They would become, in other words, workers of the eleventh hour .... [Similarly] atheists could be innocent, and dispose themselves, under the action of grace, to a hopeful faith, and to justification, and they too could, in receiving it at the last hour, deserve an abundant eternal reward: Hebrews 11:6 is illuminated by Heb. 10:85."

Striking too in the last sentence of chapter 6, in which, after a new

.and stimulating discussion of Augustinian illumination, the author adds: " I am corruptible, changeable, material; but in the bosom of the omniscient Consciousness of God, I have, mysteriously, an uncreated being, immaterial, eternal, towards which I tend." He means, of course, the Divine Idea of me to which I should conform.

This is one of the passages in which the author tries to carry out the wish expressed by Paul VI (cited in note 4 on p. 9) when the Pope said that the *pastoral* aspect of the work of theologians is more urgent today than ever; or the author's promise in the introduction: " Our book conveys then to the reader an experience, indirect, but savory, of the living God, so as to let himself be transformed by the perfection that God reveals to him, and in which he believes. The theology that we propose .is, in a Bonaventurian way, an anticipation of the vision, and a traveling towards it." The opening chapter, "The incomprehensible God makes Himself known", is an instance. That chapter draws much, *inter alia,* on the path shown by the Pseudo-Dionysius: God is best known by unknowing-or on the paradoxical utterance the author cites from St. Augustine: "We must not even call God ineffable, for when we say this, we say something "-whereas He is best known by the way of unknowing.

Again, on pp. 806-07, the author draws on Pius XII and Emile Brunner, " ' By the Omnipotence of God, even the very obstacles that spirits and free wills oppose to Him are so many means to lead them to cooperate tawards higher ends', wrote Pius XII in 1989. Emile Brunner, in his turn, says very well: ' In the person of His Son, God abandoned Himself to the opposition of men, and in that abandon revealed justly the unique character of the Almighty, which no human thought could discover. God is to such an extent sovereign over the course of the world that He makes use of the maximum resistance to His will to accomplish His revelation, and to unfold His power.'"

Finally, the last two chapters open up new ground in exploring two themes that have been largely ignored by others: the Beauty of God and the Joy of God.

In the introduction, the author tells us this book developed from giving several courses at universities and seminaries in the United States and Portugal. So a seminary professor could well draw on it for a rich, fresh, new presentation of what used to be *De Deo uno.* At the same time it is to be warmly recommended to the general reader, who can use it to enlarge his knowledge by the rich multiplicity of sources that are laid under contribution, and even, in many passages-,as a book to spark contemplation.

WILLIAM G. MOST

Loras College
Dubuque, Iowa

Being Qua Being: A Theory of Identity, Existence, and Predication. By PANAYOT BuTCHVARov. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979. Pp. 274, with index.

The author conceives this work as an essay in proto-metaphysics, that discipline which inquires what it means to be a world or to be in a world. He argues that the concepts of existence, identity, essential predication, and accidental predication are fundamental notions which we employ in understanding any world as such. These are, as it were, the transcendental characteristics of any world *qua* world, applying to any entity in a world as such. He begins his treatment of proto-metaphysical problems with the historically familiar puzzle of the apparent distinctness of identicals--for example, the identity in distinctness of the Morning Star and the Evening Star. He holds that one of two possible approaches to solving this problem is inevitable: either the appearance of distinctness is a mere appearance and must be explained without misrepresenting what is asserted in the identity claim; or there is somehow a real distinction which must be explained without denying true identity statements. The author opts for the latter alternative. And his theories of existence and predication follow upon this option.

He distinguishes between formal identities, those of the form A=A, and material identities, those of the form A=B, urging that the latter are paradigmatic and the former degenerate expressions. In order to sustain his option and the division of identities into formal and material he adopts an ontology of entities and objects. According to the author, a thing is an entity, a *reale,* in terms of the limits of its identifiability. All real things can be indefinitely identified by means of true material identity claims. (The converse, that all indefinitely identifiable things are real, is more difficult to establish inasmuch as fictitious entities also seem indefinitely identifiable.)

By contrast an object, which is logically prior to an entity, is anything that may be referred to, singled out for attention, classified, or subsumed under a concept. Thus while many objects are also entities, many are not. Although the author refrains from a Meinongian adoption of *impossibilia,* many merely intentional objects are permitted ontological status of a sort. The explanation of the puzzle about the Morning Star's being identical with the Evening Star despite the apparent difference is found by interpreting material identity statements as being about one entity and at the same time about two objects both of which are that entity. Thus the apparent distinctness in a true material identity claim is founded in a real distinctness in the objects which serve as its terms, while the identity truly affirmed is founded on the fact that the two really distinct objects

are but a single entity; in the case of the Morning and Evening Stars, the two objects are the one planet Venus.

The distinction made by the author between object and entity, however, is one which the reviewer questions. Two theses of the author give rise to this query. (1) "The apparent distinctness of material identicals is simply their real distinction as objects" (p. 44). (2) "The distinction between objects and entities is not a real distinction, a distinction between classes of things, but a distinction of reason, a distinction due solely to the application of concepts" (p. 45). Now, if both (1) and (2) obtain, we would be saying that, while object A differs only in reason from entity **B** and entity **B** differs only in reason from object C in a true material identity statement of the form A=C, the difference between A and C themselves is not rational but real. Whence arises this real distinction? If A and C differ from B only in reason, how do they differ from each other except in reason? And if A and C are identical with **B** in fact, how are they not identical with each other in fact?

The difficulty would appear to be that a real difference, a difference of the type usually invoked in the case of real entities, is what is claimed oii behalf of objects which are logically prior to real entities and which do not differ really from the entities to which they point as objects. Would this not be, however, to enshrine these supposed objects as entities, terms of real identity and diversity? And would we not also be obliged to conclude from such enshrinement that, contrary to (2), the distinction between objects and entities was a distinction between two sorts of entities, that is, a real distinction? If so, then the author's proto-metaphysics and the theory of redication resting upon it would be altered in their most fundamental aspects.

On the other hand, would not an effort on the author's part to maintain that the distinction between objects and entities is merely rational imply that a merely rational distinction existed between two appropriate objects? If so, then the author would be driven back to the first of the two alternative approaches to solving the problem, the one he has eschewed: that the appearance of distinctness is a mere appearance to be explained away, And this would be sufficient to render much of the rest of the proto-metaphysics unsound.

NICHOLAS INGHAM, **O.P.**

Providence College
Providence, R.I.

The Will. By BRIAN O'SHAUGHNESSY. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980. Vol. I: pp. lxvi + 259; $57.50. Vol. 2: pp. xxiii + 368; $6!2.50.

Recent analytical philosophers have been reluctant to talk about the will as such. Nor have they favored philosophy of mind which begins from the consciousness of subjects. Their questions have been largely about behavior and the grounds which it provides for the ascription of psychological states. Brian O'Shaughnessy's book is therefore refreshingly unusual. It is certainly analytical, but it moves 'from-within-to-without ' and is much concerned to insist on the reality of the will as " a force-laden psychological item that is altogether different from a mode of consciousness: a *sui generis* irreducible psychological phenomenon that is literally as old as the hills" (Vol. I, p. !xiii). William, says O'Shaughnessy, " is spirit in motion " (Vol. I, p. Ii).

Now all that may sound like Cartesian Dualism; but O'Shaughnessy is certainly not defending any general and sharp dichotomy between mind and body. He is actually offering ' a dual-aspect theory' of bodily actions, according to which voluntary actions can be viewed as both physical and psychological. In O'Shaughnessy's view, all physical actions are identical with some striving or other; but this does not mean either that tryings are purely mental or that physical actions are nothing but biological events. We have, says O'Shaughnessy, " absolutely no choice but to opt for this thesis: that in some *sui generis* and non-stipulative sense of ' psychological ', physical actions rate as psychological " (Vol. 2, p. 137). He therefore distinguishes between " the *merely* psychological and the *properly mental sub-sector* of the psychological "-i.e., "between the non-mental psychological and the mental psychological " (Vol. 2, p. 138). And this distinction entails a denial of the view according to which we move voluntarily by virtue of psychological events set in an ' inner world ' which cause physical activity. According to O'Shaughnessy, neither dualistic nor materialistic theories do justice to the nature of voluntary action. We need an account which can somehow allow for both the mental and the physical elements which together constitute an action as voluntary.

O'Shaughnessy's book is a long and complex thing with which it is impossible to deal adequately in the space of a book review. One can, however, stress that the quality of its argument is extremely high and that the book as a whole is very impressive. Its chief value lies, I should say, in its detailed treatment of a large range of issues relevant to its subject matter, and in its sophisticated efforts to handle these in a way that strikes a credible balance between competing views which fail to recognize both the mental and the physical nature of bodily action. Deep reflection on voluntary action calls for rigorous discussion of numerous problems, and

O'Shaughnessy shows himself keenly aware of the fact. He also shows why one should deny that voluntary actions are either wholly incorporeal or irreducibly physical.

In short, then, *The Will* is a text to be warmly recommended. In its current form it is wildly expensive; so we must hope for a cheaper edition as soon as possible.

BRIAN DAVIES, O.P.

Blackfriars
Oxford, England

BOOKS RECEIVED

L'Age d'homme: *Meditations Kantiennes* by Philibert Secretan. Pp. 204; no price given.

Alba House: *Reincarnation: Illusion or Reality?* by Edmond Robillard, O.P., translated by K. D. Whitehead. Pp. 190; *$5.95.*

Catholic University of America Press: *Ethica Thomistica: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas* by Ralph Mclnerny. Pp. 129; $8.95. *The Three-Personed God* by William J. Hill, O.P. Pp. 354; $37.95.

Delacroix: *Womanhood* by Raoul Mortley. Pp. 119; $14.50 (Australia).

Desclee-Bellarmin: *Problemes et perspectives de theologie fondamentale* edited by Rene Latourelle and Gerald O'Collins. Recherches theologie 28. Pp. 482; $20.

Fortress Press: *Beyond Dialogue: Toward a Mutual Transformation of Christianity and Buddhism* by John B. Cobb, Jr. Pp. 176; $8.95. *Christian Theology: An Introduction to its Traditions and Tasks* edited by Peter C. Hodgson and Robert H. King. Pp. 368; $15.95. *Faith and the Mystery of God* by Maurice Wiles. Pp. 160; *$6.95. Metaphorical Theology* by Sallie McFague. Pp. 240; $11.95.

University of Fribourg: *La Fondazione Teologica della Legge Naturale nello Scriptum super Sententias di San Tormnaso d'Aquino* by Angelo Scola. Studia Friburgensia, N.S. 60. Pp. 298; Fr. *55.*

Matthias Grunewald-Verlag: *Unfehlbarkeit und Geschichte* by Ulrich Horst, O.P. Walberberger Studien 12, Pp. 262; DM 44.

Hackett Publishing Company: *Hippias Major* by Plato, translated with commentary and essay by Paul Woodruff. Pp. 232; $19.50. *A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* by George Berkeley, edited by Kenneth P. Winkler. Pp. 152; $13.50 cloth, $3.45 paper.

Harper and Row: *In Season and Out of Season: An Introduction to the Thought of Jacqites Ellul* by Jacques Ellul, based on interviews with Madeleine Garrigou-Lagrange, translated by Lani K. Nile. Pp. 206; $7.95. *A Man For Others: Maximilian Kolbe* by Patricia Treece. Pp. 208; $12.95. *Nietzsche: Vol. IV, Nihilism* by Martin Heidegger, edited by David Farrell Krell and translated by Frank A. Capuzzi. Pp. 301; $17.95. *The Things of the Spirit* by Pope John Paul II, edited by Kathryn Spink. Pp. 89; $7.95.

Harvard University Press: *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private La:nguage* by Saul A. Kripke. Pp. 150; $H!.50.

Holmes & Meier: *The Secular Mind: Transformation of Faith in Modern*

Europe. Essays Presented to Franklin L. Baumer. Edited by W. Warren Wagar. Pp. 272; $85.

University of Iowa: *Interpreting Kant* edited with an Introduction by Moltke S. Gram. Pp. 149; $15.

Maggioli: *La Scienza degli Occamisti* by Francesco Bottin. Studi di filosofia e di storia della filosofia 4. Pp. 362; no price given.

University of Minnesota: *Consequences of Pragmatism* by Richard Rorty. Pp. 237; $29.50 cloth, $11.95 paper. *The Foundations of Knowing* by Roderick M. Chisholm. Pp. 2rn; $29.50 cloth, $10.95 paper.

Universidad de Navarra: *Los Lugares Teologicos de Melchior Cano en los Commentarios a la Suma* by Juan Belda Plans. Pp. 897; no price given.

Paulist Press: *Problems and l'm·spectives of Fundamental Theology* edited by Rene Latourelle an<il Gerald O'Collins. Pp. 412; $12.95.

Pilgrim Press: *Rational Theology and the Creativity of God* by Keith Ward. Pp. 240; $17.95.

Prentice-Hall: *Political Philosophy: A History of the Search for Order* by James L. Wiser. Pp. 419; $22.95.

Sheed & Ward: *Introductory Theology* by Zoltan Alszeghy and Maurizio Flick. Pp. 178; £6.50.

Scholars Press: *Lonergan Worlcshop Vol. III* edited by Fred Lawrence. Pp. 199; no price given.

St. Benno-Verlag: *Glaube, Werke und Sakramente in Dienste de Rechtfertigung in den Schriften von Berthold Pilrstinger* by Gerhard Marx. Erfurter Theologische Studien 45. Pp. 570; no price given.

State University of New York: *The Spirit of American Philosophy* by John E. Smith. Revised edition. Pp. 253; *$9W.50* cloth; $7.95 paper. *Taking Laughter Seriously* by John Morreall. Pp. 144; $89 cloth, $12.95 paper.

University Press of America: *On to the World of Freedom* by Francisco L. Peccorini. Pp. 870; $23.50 cloth, $13.50 paper. *Affectivity: Its Language and Meaning* by James F. Brown. Pp. 280; $24 cloth, $11.75 paper.

Westminster Press: *God Has llfony Names* by John Hick. Pp. 144; $7.95. *Reality and Evangelical Theology* by T. F. Torrance. Pp. 168; $8.95. *Theological and Philosophical Inquiry: An Introduction* by Vincent Brummer. Pp. 320; $16.95.