AN EPISODE IN MEDIEVAL ARISTOTELIANISM: MAIMONIDES AND ST. THOMAS ON THE ACTIVE INTELLECT

I N A PREVIOUS STUDY, I touched indirectly on the influence of Aristotle on the thought of Maimonides and St. Thomas while investigating their speculations on the sacred name YHVH.[1] It was suggested that the tetragrammaton can be viewed as marking the boundary between philosophical speculation and belief, reason and revelation. This investigation led to another theme, left unexplored at the time, which has generated a great deal of scholarly concern as well as critical mischief during its lengthy career, that of the Active Intellect. It presents a major difficulty to Aristotle interpretation, a state of affairs passed on with interest to medieval scholarship. The variations on the theme by Maimonides and St. Thomas are valuable not only in themselves but may possibly act as an index reflecting the extent to which Aristotelian elements penetrated into Christian and Jewish thought. I propose to begin with a summary discussion of the *De Anima* text and pass on to the interpretations of Maimonides and St. Thomas, attempt to draw out pertinent implications, and, if possible, draw out the conclusions which present themselves.

Aristotle's De Anima

The text of *De Anima* is manifestly deficient, riddled with corrupt readings, written perhaps in two versions.[2] Moreover, the oldest authority for any part of the work consists in references by Alexander, who was followed by the other 'ancient'

[1] " Maimonides and St. Thomas on the Tetragrammaton: The Exodus of Philosophy", *Modern Schoolman,* March, 1982, Vol. LIX.

[2] Refer to W. David Ross, "The Text of *De Anima* ", *Autour d'Aristote* (Louvain: Pub. Univ. de Louvain, 1955), pp. 213-214.

commentators and paraphrasts, Themistius, Philoponus, Sim-
plicius, and Sophronius, the latter writing some sixteen hundred
years after Aristotle. [3]

Given the corruption of the text, the complexity of the sub-
ject matter, and the dearth of complementary explicative texts,
it is hardly surprising that vastly different versions of the Ac-
tive Intellect were elaborated.   (Hirschberger cites a codex in
the Basle University library that lists no less than 17 different
interpretations   of the *Nous poietikos.)* [4] Scholars are still at a
loss how to characterize Aristotle's speculations on the Ac-
tive Intellect.   While A. E. Taylor indicates that the presenta-
tion of *De An.ima.* II, *5,* is "the most startling of all the incon-
sistencies between the naturalistic and the spiritualistic strains
in Aristotle's philosophy" [5] and Randall considers it a Platonic
wild oat come home to roost [6], Sir David Ross can suggest that
it is the 'culminating   point' of Aristotle's psychology. [7] And
this is only a representative example of the wide discrepancy
which exists between scholars.

A close view of the text itself will evidence the difficulties of
interpretation.   Aristotle initiates *De Anima* II, *5* by stating
that two factors are involved in the whole of nature, in every
class of things. He is referring to matter-potentially   all the
particulars included in the class-and a productive cause. The
soul also possesses both a potential element and an actualizing
element, the latter being the *poietikon* (activity) [8]. Surprising-
ly, the *Nous poietikos* or Active Intellect is not found in the
text, but was introduced at a later date by Themistius. [9] At any
rate, these ' elements ', both the actualizing and the potential,

a *Ibid.,* pp. 207-215.

4 Johannes Hirschberger, *Historia de la Filosoffa,* trans. by L. Martinez Gomez
(Barcelona: Herder, 1968), Vol. I, p. 868.

s A. E. Taylor, *Aristotle* (New York: Dover, 1955), p. 86.

6 John Herman Randall, Jr., *Aristotle* (New- York: Columbia University Press,
1960), p. 102.

1 W. David Ross, *Aristotle* (New York: Meridian, 1960), pp. 146-149.

s *De Anima,* 430al 7.

9 Edmond Barbotin, *La Theorie Aristotelicienne de L'lntellect D'A'[n'es Theo-
phraste* (Louvain: Pub. Univ. de Louvain, 1954), p. 154, note 8. He cites Themi-
stius, *In de Anima,* 2, 108; 19-22.

are to be found *in* the soul *(en te psyche).* Theophrastus, Aris-
totle's disciple and successor, understood this as indicating
the co-existence of the two elements in the individual soul, a
position which will later serve as point of departure for St.
Thomas's interpretation.

Intellect is then of two kinds, that which " becomes all
things", and that which "makes all things", the first com-
pared to the senses, it being a receptive faculty. The second,
the *Poietikon,* is compared to light, as it transforms potential
colors into actual colors.[10] This passage was used by Themistius
to establish the identity of the Active Intellect in all men, it
being distributed as is light into various rays.[11] Although this
may be chancy, it is clear that the epistemological function of
the *Poietikon* is to actualize the intelligible forms by abstract-
ing them from matter. After the manner of light, it exercises
its activity on the *noeta* in potency, bringing them to actual
intelligibility.

Aristotle indicates that the *Poietikon* has four attributes; it
is separable, impassible, unmixed, and, in its essential nature,
is activity.[12] The term *choristos* signifies to exist in itself-in an
independent manner-and was used previously in *De Anima.*[13]
Both *apathes* and *amiges* present little difficulty as they also
refer to the Passive Intellect and *a fortiori* to the Activity. The
fourth attribute is reserved by Aristotle to the *Poietikon* . The
words *"te ousia on energeia"* expresses its unique status.[14]
The essence of the Activity is the actuality of thought. Still,
the *Poietikon* does not seem to be identified with God. **It** is
hardly possible after the *Metaphysics* description of God as
Unmoved Mover whose causal activity is one of attraction as
end, ensconced within its hedonistic circle of contemplation,[15]

[10] *De Anima,* 480al5-17.

[11] Refer to E. E. Spicer, *Aristotle's Conception of the Soul* (London: University
of London Press, 1984), p. 104.

[12] *De Anima,* 480al8-19.

[13] *Jbid.,* 408b19.

[14] Frarn;ois Nuyens, *L'Evolution de la Psychologie d'Aristote* (Paris: Vrin,
1948)' p. 303.

[15] *Metaphysics,* Book XII, esp. chapters 7 and 9.

that Aristotle would have the deity spoonfeeding individual men with intelligibles.

The unceasing activity of the *Poietikon* seems to demand that it not be limited to the role of a mere epistemological principle. Aristotle suggests this when he indicates that the Activity appears *as it is* only when liberated from its present condition. This alone is immortal, eternal, and impassible. Without it, no one thinks![1]a The terms *athanaton* and *aydion* are the only predicates aside from unceasing activity which are expressly attributed to the *Poietikon* alone. According to Bonitz, Aristotle uses the first term only five times-mainly in the *Politics-while* *aydion* is a much used expression meaning to possess without interruption. [11] In the *Metaphysics,* Aristotle speaks of "eternal things", indicating that those things which are capable of not existing are *not* eternal. [18] It follows that " eternal " has a specific meaning for Aristotle, signifying that which has always existed and will always exist, which is to say, that which is necessary.

Additional texts are not really helpful in solving the problem at hand. In the *Metaphysics,* Aristotle speaks of *nous* as a form which survives death. [19] But is he referring to the *Poietikon?* Perhaps so, but the point can hardly be demonstrated. Perhaps the most relevant text found outside the *De Anima* is from *De Generatione Animalium.* After a discussion of the development of the human foetus, Aristotle goes on to make the point that ' principles ' the activity of which is physical cannot be present without a physical body: there can be no walking without feet, and so on. The only exception is *nous* which enters as an additional factor from the *outside.* It alone is divine because physical activity has nothing whatever to do with its activity. [20] Here the *Poietikon* is probably meant as the

[1]a *De Anima,* 430a22-25.

[11] Bonitz *Index,* 14bll-15, cited in Nuyens, *op. cit.,* p. 307.

[18] *Metaphysics,* 1088123-24.

[19] *Ibid.,* 1070a26ff.

[20] *De Generatione Animalium,* 7S6b27-28.

Passive Intellect could not be considered by Aristotle as an additional factor from the outside. The preceding is, in brief, the ground of the convoluted speculations which generated the different versions of the Active Intellect which reached Maimonides and St. Thomas. At least in Maimonides's case, it is a fairly safe generalization to note that, at a relatively early date, Aristotle's notion of the *Poietikon* was conflated with Neo-Platonic theories of emanation. His 47 or *55* separate intelligences were, in the majority of cases, whittled down to 10, with the   separate intelligence identified with the Active Intellect. As Isaac Husik indicated some years ago, in this way the "Active Intellect was thus placed among the ... intelligences whose function it is to control the motions of the sublunar world and in particular to develop the human faculty of reason ".[21]

Maimonides

Maimonides's thought as presented in the *Guide of the Perplexed* has its own peculiar difficulties. As Leo Strauss suggests, the *Guide* is not merely a key to the forest-as Maimonides himself indicates-but is itself an enchanted and hence enchanting forest (the work itself is at best elusive, at worst schizoid, containing both a public and a secret teaching) . As it is not primarily a philosophical book but a Jewish book,[22] one can reasonably ask: what kind of Jew wrote this Jewish book? This leads us to the theme under consideration as the question as to whom the secret teaching is addressed will be seen to be closely linked to the question of the Active Intellect.

The contrast between the Aristotelian source of Maimonides's speculation and Jewish belief has been noted repeatedly. Husik suggests that he is apparently unaware of the ' yawning gulf '

[21] Isaac Husik, *A History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy* (New York: Atheneum, 1973), pp. xlvii ff.

[22] "How to Study the *Guide of the Perplexed"* in Moses Maimonides, *The Guide of the Perplexed,* trans. and notes by Shlomo Pines (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. xiii-xiv; xv fl'.

between Aristotelianism and Judaism. [28] Guttmann, more eirenic in approach, indicates that Maimonides throws the opposition between the two into bold relief in order to overcome it by means of a 'genuine synthesis '. [24] Because of this, Maimonides's main concern was to demonstrate the *identity* between philosophy and religion, that is to say, that philosophy is the sole means for the appropriation of the content of revelation. [25]

There is obviously more than a whiff of the suspect in this formulation when viewed from the perspective of the observant Jew. This is compounded by a system of thought in which degrees of philosophic knowledge are equated with those of religious certitude while religious inwardness is made to depend on the deepening of understanding. [26] One fears that the suggested ' genuine synthesis ' may prove to be merely a facade for a drastic turnabout in which religion is reduced to the role of prat-boy to philosophical speculation. The point could be made that this was reflected in the violent reaction against Maimonides within Judaism, including accusations of abandoning belief in Messianic redemption and corporeal resurrection while replacing them with the pagan notion of individual immortality.[21] In addition, the Rabbis of northern France condemned him unanimously at an early date although it was left to Hasdai Crescas, some time later, to launch a fullscale attack against Maimonides's Aristotelianism. But, in this respect, we should recall the suspicions which gathered around St. Thomas and which reached their apogee, after his death, in the Paris and Oxford condemnations.

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[23] Husik, *op. cit.,* p. 800. He indicates that " the very passage from Jeremiah which he quotes as summing up his idea of the *summum bonum* speaks out against him and he only succeeds in manipulating it in his favor by misinterpreting the word 'wise'".

[24] Julius Guttmann, *Philosophies of Judaism* (New York: Schocken Books, 1976)' p. 172.

[25] *Ibid.,* p. 175.

[20] *Guide,* III, 51.

[21] Guttmann, *op. cit.,* pp. 208-210.

Maimonides was certainly an Aristotelian, of that somewhat bizarre genre, hybrid of Aristotle and Neo-Platonism, which was current in Islamic Spain at the time. This is not to say that he did not part company with Aristotle. He certainly did on the important issues of creation, providence, miracles, and the unique status of Moses and Torah. Nevertheless, Maimonides belonged to those who in Islam were called philosophers, in opposition to the *mutikallimun,* those exponents of *Ka.lam* described by Wolfson as " a particular system of thought which arose in Islam prior to philosophy ".[28] Moreover, he made a valiant attempt to prove that the equivalent of Greek philosophy once existed in Judaism.[29] In addition, he restricts full participation in religious matters to a small elite: the deepest meaning of Scripture should never be revealed to the masses.[30] Perhaps even more weighty is his apportionment of immortality-itself primarily a Greek notion-to philosophers. The Jewish masses can only qualify by means of professing the thirteen articles given in his *Commentary on the Mishna.*

It is important to realize that this amalgam of the religious and the philosophical was scarcely novel in medieval Jewish thought. Prior to Maimonides, Pseudo-Bahya identified the Active Intellect with the *Shekinah-the* presence of God-and with *Kabod,* wisdom.[31] More to the point, the 'philosopher ' in Halevi's *Kuzari,* representing a viewpoint at variance with that of the author, considers that union with the Active Intellect to be man's highest goal. Through it, he becomes like one of the angels.[32] Ibn Daud and Ibn Ezra also reflect, to varying <legrees, the philosophical view of the matter which will be taken up, with some modifications, by Maimonides.

[28] Harry Austryn Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 2 ff.

[29] *Guirle,* I, 71, 121; II, 9, 28.

[30] *Ibid.,* Intro., I, 2b-12a.

[31] Husik, *op. cit.,* pp. 109 ff.

[a2] *Kuzari,* I, 1.

Fackenheim has praised Maimonides's philosophical investigation of prophecy in the *Guide* as a noteworthy attempt at mediating " the sharp dualism between the ' natural ' endowments of reason and the supernatural gift of revelation ".[33] Maimonides presents three views on prophecy; that of the multitude, the philosophers, and the Law. The first believe that divine initiative is paramount, that God "chooses whom he wishes among men, turns him into a prophet, and sends him with a mission ".[34] The philosophers, for their part, consider prophecy is a ' certain perfection ' in the nature of man. Therefore, it is not possible for an' ignoramus' to become a prophet.[35] Quite the contrary. It is that individual, superior in moral and rational qualities, who will become one. The view of the Law is the same as the preceding except for one point-God is able to exercise a sort of veto. But this veto, of which Baruch is an example, does not in any way dispense from the requisite speculative preparation. Maimonides cites the *Talmud* in favor of this opinion: " Prophecy only rests upon a wise, strong, and rich man ".[36]

It is clearly a fundamental belief of Maimonides that education generates " the possibility to which the power of God becomes attached ".[37] The ignorant lack this possibility. As well turn a frog into a prophet! In a decidedly Neo-Platonic maDiner, prophecy is viewed as the result of an' overflow' emanating from God through the mediation of the Active Intellect. It first affects the intellect and then passes on to the imagination. Once the requisite intellectual and moral disposition is attained then " all his desire will be directed to acquiring the science of the secrets of what exists and knowledge of its causes", finally ar-

[33] Emil L. Fackenheim, *Encounters Between Judaism and Modern Phuoso'PhY* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 81.

[34] *Guide,* II, 32, 73a-73b.

[35] *Ibid.,* 73b ff.

[36] *Ibid.,* 74a. Maimonides cites B. T. Shabbath, 92a; B. T. Nedarim, 38a, and refers to his arguments presented in the *Mishneh Torah,* 'Yesodei ha-Torah, vii *et al.*

[37] *Ibid.,* 74b.

riving at "the knowledge of the deity and in reflection on his works ".[38] This is obviously very much in line with the program of First Philosophy as presented by Aristotle in the *Me-taphysics.*[39] But it is not the philosopher but rather the prophet who represents the highest degree of man, the ultimate term of human perfection. [40]

The ' divine overflow' is received in different degrees. It is precisely these degrees which constitute the hierarchy of human excellence.[41] The prophet is superior to the 'scientist' and the legislator, because in the first the' overflow' extends to both intellect and imagination, while in the latter it is restricted to either the intellect or the imagination. The analogy of the Palace in the *Guide* illustrates these distinctions superbly. The observant masses are admitted to the Throne Room reluctantly, "ignoramuses who observe the commandments ".[42] Not surprisingly, Moses is accorded a truly unique status [43] in spite of the fact that salvation (under the guise of immortality) is obtained by intellectual merits. The exception made for believers with regard to the thirteen articles is not really in tandem with the sense of his argument. Maimonides's intellectualistic slant is further evidenced by his transmogrification of Abraham into a philosopher-teacher who teaches by means of "speculative proofs ... that the world has but one deity ".[44]

The Active Intellect is then the direct source of prophecy and intellectual perfection and is-following Aristotle-in constant activity. It flows from level to level, individual to individual, until it can go no further, reaching an individual beyond whom it cannot go, 'merely' rendering him perfect. [45] Strictly speaking, the ' overflow ' is directed primarily to the rational faculty,

[38] *Ibid.,* SOa.
[39] *Metaphysics,* Bk. I, chap. 2, 982a4--98Sa22.
[40] *Guide,* II, 36, 78a-78b.
[41] *Ibid.,* II, 37, Sla ff.
[42] *Ibid.,* III, *51,* 124a.
[43] *Ibid.,* II, SS, 76a. Cf. II, *35,* 77a; 77b; 78a; II, 36, sob; II, 38, 84a *et al.*
[44] *Ibid.,* II, 39, 84b ff.
[45] *Ibid.,* II, 37, 82a.

causing it to pass from potentiality to actuality. Although it then may pass on to the imagination, only a man who has first achieved intellectual perfection can be a prophet. [46]

The primacy of the intellect is related to the principal task of man, to separate the noble form he possesses (as image of God) from 'earthly', 'turbid', and 'dark' matter. [47] Maimonides indicates that the very commandments of Torah are intended to ' silence ' the disordered and anarchical impulses of matter. This leads to a somewhat novel asceticism, Neo-Platonic in texture, which is grounded on the *Nichomachean Ethics,* [48] and goes hand in hand with an intellectualism which proposes that the end of man *qua* man is the contemplation of the intelligibles, the apprehension, so far as is possible, of God, the angels, and His other works. [49] Although this turn to God is of greatest importance, it nevertheless takes place in an eminently intellectualistic manner. The contemplation of the prophet is primarily speculative. [50]

Aristotle cannot be faulted with the posthumous accretions to his theory of the *Poietikon.* The theory which reached Maimonides was the end result of a lengthy process of sedimentation which begins before Alexander, passes through Themistius, and, as previously indicated, is then subject to the modifications if not depredations of the early medieval Islamic and Jewish philosophers. He appears to have combined the Active Intellect thesis with other texts from Aristotle, notably from the *Nichomachaean Ethics,* those which stress the paramount importance of the life of mind. [51] Small wonder that although Aristotle was, in the eyes of Maimonides, outshone by Moses, he is described superlatively as "the root and foundation of all works on the

[46] *Ibid.,* II, 38, 88b-84a.

[47] *Ibid.,* III, 8, rnb.

[48] *Ibid,* II, 40, 87a-87b. Cf. II, 86; III, 8, 49. Aristotle's text is *Nick. Ethics,* Il18bQ ff. It provides Maimonides with the point of departure for a rational justification for his contempt of the sense of touch and all which is deriv.ed from it.

[49] *Ibid.,* III, 8, 18a.

[50] *Ibid.,* III, *51,* 1Q4b.

[51] Refer to *Nick. Ethics,* 1177b80ff; Il 79a9.!8 ff.

sciences ".[52] A good case can be made, in line with our prior observations, that it was in great part through the theory of the Active Intellect that Aristotelian naturalism and rationalism gained a privileged status within certain enclaves of medieval Jewish thought.

This trend was continued by a younger contemporary of Maimonides, Ibn Aknin, who taught that metaphysics provides. the key to the understanding of the Torah, which is itself considered as comprising the whole of philosophic truth. [53] Perhaps it is anticlimactic to note that R. Abraham, Maimonides's only son, describes prophecy in terms of a divine illumination which bestows the gift of divine wisdom.[54] He fails to mention the Active Intellect or the necessity of an intellectual propaedeutic the prophetic life. Is it permissible to suggest that in R. Abraham we encounter a belated effort to return to tradition and confront the inteJlectualistic secularization of Judaism which had found a champion in Maimonides and its speculative point of departure in the theory of the Active Intellect?

In spite of the influence which Aristotle's *De Anima* exercised on Maimonides, both direct and indirect, in the Middle Ages the commentaries of Averroes and St. Thomas are considered to be the most influential if not the most perspicacious. They stand at the head of commentators and paraphrasts which include Albert as well as lesser lights such as John of Jandun and Francis of Mayronne. [55] Later, the Renaissance, hardly Aristotelian in temper, brought about a revival of studies in the ' School ' of Padua, in the works of Zarabella and Pacius. The interest in *De Anima* increased in the Nineteenth Century with Trendelenberg, Brandis, and Franz Brentano addressing themselves to the text. This work was taken up with renewed enthusiasm in the past half-century or so, the best work probably

[52] Cited by S. Pines in his introduction to the *Guide,* P. lvx.

[5a] Refer to Guttm&nn, *op. cit.,* pp. 214fl'.

[54] *Ibid.,* p. 220 ff.

[55] Refer to *Aristotle Texts and Commentaries to 1700,* ed. by Lymon W. Riley (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1961).

done at Louvain under the influence of Msgr. Auguste Man-
sion.56 As was to be expected, many of these studies were writ-
ten under Thomistic auspices and provide us with welcome
material in the task of evaluating St. Thomas's interpretation
of the Active Intellect.

St. Thomas

St. Thomas' version has become so familiar to the student of
philosophy that other interpretations tend to jar the ear, not
to say the mind. Perhaps its very familiarity has tended to ob-
scure important nuances and implications. Briefly put, there
are two elements within the individual soul, Passive Intel-
lect and the Active Intellect. 57 Later, Brentano will follow St.
Thomas in his endeavour to refute the error of those who con-
sider the *Nous Poietikos* to be a foreign intelligence *(fremden
Geist)*, detached from the operations of the individual mind. 58
Insofar as the light-metaphor of *De Anima* 430al 7 is concerned,
St. Thomas compares the function of the Active Intellect to
that of light which, in good Aristotelian fashion, is to actualize
a transparent medium so that color may be seen.59 This is to
say, it brings color from potency to act. The Active Intellect
actualizes the intelligible notions, abstracting them from mat-
ter, thus bringing them from potential to actual intelligibility.

As three of the four ' qualities ' of the Active Intellect also
belong to the Passive Intellect, they do not present any notable
difficulty. But the fourth-being essentially in act-is con-
sidered to be proper to the Active Intellect and assuredly pre-
sents a definite challenge. l£ this actuality is that of thought,
which it definitely appears to be, and, in addition, it is accepted

56 Some of the most interesting of these works have been cited previously;
Barbotin, *op. cit.;* Nuyens, *op. cit.;* To these the following should be added: Mar-
cel de Corte, *Le Commentaire de Juan Philipon sur le Troisieme Livre du Traiti de
l'ame d'Aristote* (Paris: Droz, 1984) and Joseph Moreau, *Aristate et scxii Ecole*
(Paris: P.U.F., 1962).

57 *Quaestiones Disputatae De Anima,* Q. V.

58 Cited by Nuyens, *op. cit.,* p. 299, note 118.

59 *In de Anima,* No. 780.

that human beings do not think at all times, is it possible to view the Active Intellect as no more than a mere faculty of the human soul? St. Thomas certainly believed this was the case. Human nature would be deficient if it lacked any function required for the natural activity of understanding.[60] In his commentary on the *Metaphysics,* he inveighs strongly against those who would 'degrade' the intellective soul in this way, arguing that Aristotle himself had rejected the view that either Passive or Active Intellect is imperishable and a separate substance.[61] If the Active Intellect included the forms of intelligible objects, knowledge would not take place as it in fact does, with the Passive Intellect depending upon phantasms. It would be actualized by the Active Intellect alone and the relation of the latter to intelligibles would not be, as Aristotle indicated, of the maker to something made, but actually would be identical to them.[62]

Insofar as Aristotle's statement that the *Poietikon,* when ' freed ' from its present conditions, presents itself *as it is* and this alone is immortal and eternal, St. Thomas interprets the passage as referring to the soul after death.[aa] Instead of entertaining the possibility of the existence of a common intellect for all men, St. Thomas ingeniously transforms it into a possible point of departure for the demonstration of the immortality of the soul. Although it does not seem very likely that Aristotle himself had such a solution in mind-the soul, after all, is a natural form-it could be argued that this interpretation can be buttressed by texts such as *De Anima* 480a20 in which the term intellect-in-act appears, designating the combined activities of both intellects, with regard to the act of knowing.[64] Nonetheless, as the text stands, it seems to imply that the action which the *Poietikon* exercises on human thought

60 *Ibid.,* No. 784.
61 *In Met.,* No. 2458.
62 *In de Anima,* No. 789.
aa *Ibid.,* Nos. 742; 745.
64 *Q.D. de Anima, lac. cit.*

is not essential to it, that only considered in itself and in isolation from its function in human cognition is it immortal.

But St. Thomas had other, weightier reasons to combat interpretations of the latter sort, of which the Averroistic was most current. As a Christian theologian he was aware of the pernicious influence which these theories were having, and could have, in the future within Christendom. He states this quite clearly in his *Quaestiones Disputatae De Anima:*

We must also consider that, if the Active Intellect is held to exist as a separate substance along with God, a consequence repugnant to our faith will follow: namely, that our ultimate perfection and happiness consists not in a certain union of our soul with God ... but with some other separate substance.[65]

He violently attacked incipient Christian Averroism in his *De unitate intellectus contra averroistas,* written in 1270. As Father Maurer indicates:

St. Thomas abandons his customary impersonal tone and shows his irritation at those who claim that reason necessarily arrives at the oneness of intellect of all men, yet who hold the opposite by faith. To him, this is an evident contradiction because the necessary conclusions of reason must be true, and they cannot oppose the truths of faith.[66]

Prior speculation on the theme must have influenced St. Thomas's approach and fueled his sense of urgency. Roger Bacon had identified the Active Intellect of the Islamic philosophers with the *Verbum,* and Albert, St. Thomas's own master, seems to have espoused the notion of illumination-that old Augustinian standby-by means of the Universal Active Intellect. St. Bonaventure reacted to the danger at hand by setting Christ Himself up as the" *medium omnium scientiarum* ", in effect, putting the Active Intellect in checlanate. [67] Varia-

[65] *Idem.*

[66] Armand A. Maurer, *Medievril Philosophy* (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 204.

[67] Refer to Paul Vignaux, *Philosophy in the MUlille Ages: An Introduction* trans. E. C. Hall (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1962), pp. 99-104.

tions on the theme were plentiful. As Vignaux has noted, " in the thirteenth century, the active intellect and the possible intellect were the symbols of common data, but each thinker elaborated his concepts in his own way ",[68]

St. Thomas, in transforming the Active Intellect into an internal epistemological principle, incorporates it as a function of the soul, a far cry from the *da.tor formarum* of the Islamic philosophers, establishing a barrier against the bizarre marriage between Aristotelianism (larded as it was with Neo-Platonism) and the Gospel of St. John which was gaining currency within Christian thought. [69] But this did not suffice. His world of natures which seem to operate autonomously, will eventually lead to the accusation that Aristotle had been allowed entry, so to speak, through the back door. If the temptation of Christian Platonism has been to reduce the world into a tenuous veil between God and man, that of Christian Aristotelianism has been to center attention on the world for its own sake, downplaying if not ignoring its rootedness in God. Though St. Thomas could not be accused of holding this view-a good reading of the theory of *esse* [10] would disabuse anyone of this misconception-he seemed to be perilously close to it (when viewed from the perspective of traditional theology) .

We must insist that St. Thomas's rejection of the Islamic reading of the Active Intellect was definitive. In the *Summa Theologiae,* a late work, he refers once again to the Aristotelian metaphor of light, stressing that light is *not* the same in the different objects which are illuminated. Likewise, the Active Intellect is different for different men," *non est idem intellectus agens in diversis hominibus* ".[71] It is no more than the act of the intelligibles abstracted from the phantasms, and is a func-

[6s] *Ibid.,* p. 104.

[69] *Ibid.,* pp. 11H19.

[10] Refer to F. D. Wilhelmsen, " Existence and *Esse* ", *The New ScholastWism,* Vol. L, 1, Winter, 1976. Additional bibliography in my "Maimonides and St. Thomas " foe. *cit.*

[71] *Summa Theol.* I, 79, *5.* Cf. *Sent.* 2dl 7 q. 2 ad 1; *De Spirit. creat.* q. 10; *Q.D. de Anima,* Art *5; Oompend. Theol,* c. 86.

tion of the soul, as is the Passive Intellect. [12] It is noteworthy that St. Thomas was very much aware of the Aristotelian source of the error which he combats, citing books translated from the Arabic which equate angels and intelligences. [73] Still, his own argument is buttressed by a principle taken from Aristotle's *Physics* (195b26) : it is impossible for the souls of animals of one species to be in animals of a different species. It is equally impossible for the *anima intellectiva* to be the same in beings which are numerically distinct. And, in any event, the argument would hold whether the point of departure be Platonic or Aristotelian. From the first perspective, if the intellect were one for all men, the difference between two men, say Socrates and Plato, would be no different than a change of clothes. From the second, as form is the principle of *being-forma est essendi prinoipium--it* is as impossible for different things to have the same form, as to have the same being. [74]

This interpretation of the Active Intellect will lead *to* a view of prophecy substantially different from that of Maimonides. Although for St. Thomas, prophecy " *primo et prinoipaliter consistit in cognitione ",* this 'knowledge' transcends the purely natural order. [75] It is not a *habit,* a permanent disposition, hut something like a ' transient impression ' which requires a light superior to that of natural reason. While in the natural order it is by means of the Active Intellect that the first principles of reason are known, in prophetic knowledge the human intellect receives illumination from the Divine Light. In fact, a thing more properly belongs to prophecy-which includes the revelation of future contingents-the more it transcends the domain of natural knowledge. [76] This proposition is repeated several times in the course of the three dense questions covering prophecy in the *Summa.* [11]

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[12] *Ibid.* I, 79, 4 ad5; 87, 4 ad 1; 88, 1 *et al.*
[13] *Ibid.,* I, 79, 10.
[14] *Ibid.,* I, 76, 2.
[15] *Ibid.,* 2-2, 171, l.
[16] *Ibid.,* 2-2, 171, 2:8.
[11] *Ibid.,* 2-2, 171, 4; 178, 4, *et al.*

As prophecy is not included within natural phenomena, it can be experienced only through divine revelation. Although it is a perfection of the intellect, it does *not* require an intellectual propaedeutic. As God is universal cause in act, He does not require a material disposition but can produce together with prophecy the disposition adequate to it in the natural order. [78] The *virtus divina* is the sole cause of prophecy. The Holy Spirit in this way takes over the function enjoyed by the Active Intellect in Maimonides's interpretation. Nevertheless, prophets are only ' imperfect instruments ' in spite of the superiority of their mode of cognition over natural philosophical knowledge.

There are obvious resemblances between Maimonides and St. Thomas. In both, the intellectual prophetic 'vision' is superior to imaginary vision. In both, prophecy is related to politics, although this is given far less importance in St. Thomas. Both uphold the unique prophetic status of Moses. [79] But the emphasis is manifestly different. In St. Thomas's view, intellectual and imaginary vision together are superior to the intellectual taken alone only in the case of a supernatural truth revealed by means of corporeal images. I would take this to mean only in those cases when prophecy exercises a pragmatic, most probably a legislative, function. [80] Moreover, St. Thomas hardly views prophecy as the principal source of civil legislation. It is ordered to the utility of the Church with regard to religious praxis. [81] Again, although *"Moyses fuit omnibus maior ",* his prophecy is still subordinate to that of the New Testament. [82]

It would seem that in safeguarding the privileged status of the supernatural through his domestication of the Active Intellect, St. Thomas would have been exempted from accusations similar to those which plagued Maimonides. But we have

[18] *Ibid.,* 2-!i!, 17!i!, 8.
[10] *Ibid.,* 2-!i!, 174, 2; 171, 4; 174, 4; 174, 6, 175, S *et al.*
[80] *Ibid.,* 2-2, 174, !i!.
[81] *Ibid.,* 2-2, 172, 4; !i!-!i! 172, 1.
[s2] *Ibid.,*   174, 4; 174, 6.

noted that this was hardly the case. The traditional theologians
reacted energetically against Aristotelian naturalism and ra-
tionalism and though the brunt of the onslaught was directed
against Siger of Brabant and Latin Averroism, moderate
Aristotelians such as St. Thomas were not spared. The con..:
demnations of 1277 led to the composition of *Correc:toria*modi-
fying the works of St. Thomas. And though the rehabilitation
of his thought began as early as   when the Bishop of Paris
lifted the censure against those propositions of his which had
been condemned, the harm was already done, and from this
point on, we encounter the progressive separation of faith and
reason which characterizes modernity.

1£ St. Thomas did in fact achieve the " finest balance " be-
tween Christian faith and Aristotelianism as Thomists such as
:Father Maurer indicate, 83 this would have been difficult to ap-
preciate from the other side of the theological fence. l£ we
take St. Bonaventure as an example, we find that the major
errors of the day are viewed as proceeding from the denial of
the Augustinian theory of Ideas. This denial leads to ignoring
three truths: the eternal art *(veritas artis aeternae),* divine
providence, and the fall of the angels *(ruinae angelicae).* Worse
still, this triple ignorance leads to a triple blindness manifested
in the affirmation of the eternity of the world, the unity of the
intellect, and the denial of personal immortality. 84 **It** is note-
worthy that while Bonaventure faults Aristotle directly for the
first and third, the unity of the intellect is characterized as the
' sense 'of Aristotle as conveyed by Averroes. 85 One can surmise
that from this perspective St. Thomas's position could easily be
misinterpreted as an unsatisfactory halfway house with the
primary defensive position-the theory of Ideas-already sur-
rendered to the enemy.

However, it was not the *De Anima-nor* even the *Physics*
and *Metaphysics-which* first inspired suspicion, but rather

83 Maurer, *op. cit.,* p.
84 *Collationes in Hexaemeron,* VII, 1.
85 *Ibid.,* VII,

versions of the *Ethics* in which the pagan and Christian con-
ceptions of happiness are placed in clear opposition. Van Steen-
berghen indicates that it acts as " the starting point of those
naturalistic and rationalistic tendencies which will be con-
demned in 1277 ".[86] Nonetheless, the *De Anima* exercised a
notable influence of its own. Peter Of Spain, who as Pope John
XXI initiated the inquiry which resulted in the 1277 condemna-
tions, was the author of a *De Anima,* considered to be the
earliest systematic exposition of Aristotle's psychology.[87] More
to the point is Albert's composition of his *De unitate intellectus
contra Averroem,* by the express command of Pope Alexander
V. From this point there is only a step to the extravagances of
Siger of Brabant, whose only known work prior to 1270 is his
Quaestiones in Tertium de Anima, to which St. Thomas may
have dedicated his strong riposte. In any event, the 1277 con-
demnations proved to be ineffective. By 1866, the legates of
Pope Urban V make the knowledge of the complete works of
Aristotle compulsory for candidates for the licentiate in Arts.[88]

Conclusion

Maimonides and St. Thomas both made a courageous at-
tempt to assimilate Aristotle's thought within the boundaries
of their respective religions, curbed by the exigencies of Torah
and Christian belief. It was assuredly a monumental task, as
well as one demanded by the age. Yet there is little doubt that
their efforts were not completely successful, that in spite of
them alien beliefs and attitudes of thought became incorporated
into medieval Jewish and Christian speculation. More import-
ant still, their own thought was hardly immune to the attrac-
tions of Aristotelianism and carried it, perhaps unwillingly and
certainly in differing degrees, into the consciousness of later
generations who were less able to cope with the difficulties en-
tailed. In Maimonides's and St. Thomas's treatment of the Ac-

[86] Fernand Van Steenberghen, *Aristotfo in the West: The Origin of Latin Aris-
totdianism* (Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts, 1955), p. 99.

[87] *Ibid.* p. 107.

[88] *Ibid.,* p. 111; *165.*

tive Intellect we have encountered and discussed one of the principal themes involved in Aristotle's contact with the religions of the Book.

1£ Maimonides seems to have subordinated religious practice to philosophy, we should recall that his chief adversaries were those who advocated an anthropomorphic, indeed physical, conception of God, and against these Aristotle-even the Active Intellect theory as elaborated by the Islamic philosophers-would be welcomed as an ally. Rabbi Abraham hen David of Posquieres, who violently attacked the *Mishneh Torah* because Maimonides considered heretical those who affirm that although God is one He is a *body* and possesses a *figure,* [89] was not an isolated case. The hostility which Maimonides provoked from other quarters has previously been mentioned. Nevertheless, the rationalistic strain was very much in evidence in Spanish Jewish speculation until the expulsion made the question moot.

The tragic history of the Jewish people in the succeeding centuries effectively isolated speculative enthusiasm, at least insofar as philosophy was concerned. In most cases, the ghetto served as the harsh disciplinarian of incipient intellectualism. Yet once conditions changed and Emancipation was viewed as a real possibility, Moses Mendelssohn and other *maskilim* appropriated the values of the Enlightenment enthusiastically. An illuminating contrast is found in the antithetical pronouncements given by the Israelite Temple Association of Hamburg (founded 1817) and the city's Rabbinical Court. The first categorically declares that "science has decided that the Talmud has no authority dogmatically or practically", while the Rabbinical Court inveighs against those who are " instituting practices which are not in keeping with the Law of Moses and Israel ".[90] And this is no more than an illustration of a fundamental cleavage in Judaism, today reflected in many permutations.

[89] Wolfson, *op. cit.* p. 108.

[90] Refer to texts in Section IV of *The Jews in the Modern World,* ed. by Mendes-Flohr and Reinberg (New York: O.U.P., 1980), pp. 140-181.

With regard to medieval Christendom, the rationalism and naturalism engendered by Aristotelianism continued until well after the Renaissance and the mathematization of nature had in fact reduced it to the status of an academic fossil. It played no small part in the collapse of the medieval Christian order. However, Aristotle and the Latin Averroists were scarcely the *bete noir* of Christianity. There were other, more pernicious influences at work, those stemming from Neo-Platonism and Gnosticism among the first. But these usually floated to the surface as spiritual perversions, part of a domain in which the Church was amply capable of defending itself. The pretensions of the ' purist ' Aristotelians were more humble, their mode of attack more circuitous, that of establishing an enclave of thought which was theology-free. In the strengthening and extending of this enclave we find the adumbration of the Modern World.

If the history of ideas and beliefs (as Wolfson believed) is often a history of imitation by contagion, both Maimonides and St. Thomas appear to have succumbed to the Aristotelian virus. But, as has been established, this belief must be substantially modified. Both men attempted to incorporate Aristotle's thought as far as possible, while combating those elements which they considered pernicious to religious belief. This is nowhere more evident in the case of St. Thomas than in his treatment of the Active Intellect. If his Aristotle interpretation is at times puzzling, his commitment to truth and the Christian faith is not. The Islamic theories of the Active Intellect presented a direct threat to Christian belief and St. Thomas's exertions helped to prevent the mischief which further dissemination could have caused. It is somehow ironic that his *quondam* disciple, Meister Eckhart, seems to have projected St. Thomas's theory of *esse* within the domain of Aristotle's Mind-thinking-Itself, coming up with a theory remarkably like the suspect versions of the Active Intellect. [91]

[91] Although the author would hardly agree with this assessment, refer to C. F. Kelley, *Meister Eckhart on Divine Knowledge* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

Maimonides certainly seems to have weakened at this point but, as has been indicated, this was not the Achilles heel of Judaism at the time. Nevertheless, the theory of the Active Intellect remained an ever present reminder of the presence of Aristotelianism in Jewish thought. Indeed, the rationalistic strain within Judaism has, perhaps all too often, been considered as consubstantial to it. One may wonder if it comprises part of Maimonides's legacy.

Maimonides's and St. Thomas's thought are still operative in Judaism and Christianity in spite of the passage of time and the depredations of friend and foe alike. While attaining the status of classics they have not lost the power of inspiration. Today, reason and revealed religion continue their ambivalent flirtation, albeit in a lesser sphere. That this flirtation is still a moderately important though perhaps tangential cultural phenomenon within a progressively secularized contemporary world provides sufficient justification for the present study.

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MUTUAL NEED AND FRUSTRATION:
HEGEL'S CONCEPTION OF RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY IN THE MODERN ERA

HEGEL'S CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY is often looked upon as an important, if not always welcome, catalyst of philosophy's modern development. Depending upon one's own philosophical predilections, Hegel's philosophy retarded or advanced philosophical reflection but always in the course of being rejected itself.[1] For some the pretentious compass and rigidity of an encyclopedic system present the greatest difficulties. For others the arguments for the integrity of a spirituality over nature, history, and/or society are particularly unconvincing, resembling thinly-veiled apologetics if they deserve to be called arguments at all.

Whatever their particular misgivings with Hegel's philosophy, however, a majority of modern thinkers uniformly repudiate one thesis of Hegel's philosophy in particular, viz., the thesis that religious faith and the metaphysics of a philosophical system are mutually accountable. According to this thesis, philosophy and religion in their own respective ways need and explain one another. Rejecting this view, positivists place religious faith outside the domain of meaningful discourse while some language analysts, eschewing positivist systems, locate

[1] Thus in Habermas's attempt to chart the development of the modern positivist mentality, rejection of Hegel's philosophy forms the starting point of that movement. See J. Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests,* translated by J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), Chapter One. For a similar claim see R. Bubner, *Modern German Philosophy,* translated by Eric Matthews (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 8. Despite their great diversity the modern traditions spawned by Russell and Moore, Reichenbach and Dewey, and Kierkegaard and Marx share a common repugnance for the speculative sweep of Hegel's philosophical sciences.

religious faith in the indeterminate gamut of language-games.
Marxists (and Freudians) consider religious faith an ideologi-
cal sedative and even religious existentialists insist that reli-
gious faith is a matter of choice, a leap that is only hindered
by the weight of a metaphysical system.

In the following paper it is not my purpose to explain why
these various strands of the modern mentality reject Hegel's
view of the relation of philosophy and religion. However, an
insight into the character of modern philosophical culture can
perhaps be gleaned from a clear perception of what it universal-
ly rejects. Indeed, Hegel argues his thesis systematically and
historically and both focuses provide important clues, not only
to the contemporary rejection of that mutual accountability,
but also to the contemporary state of philosophy itself.

Feuerbach and Marx are often credited with fashioning a
religious model of ideology and then applying that model to
philosophies (including Hegel's) . Yet it is Hegel who puts such
a model to devastating use in his assessment of philosophies
which do not fulfill religion's need for philosophy but simply
replicate religion in secular fashion. Hegel's historical argu-
ment for the mutual accountability of religion and philosophy
is based on a critical account of a religious model of cognition
within modern philosophy from the time of Descartes. ²

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² Curiously this theme, which is interwoven in Hegel's views on religion, philos-
ophy, and history, is largely overlooked by scholars. Some have duly recognized
the role of the Lutheran Reformation in Hegel's own thinking. See Karl LOwith,
From Hegel to Nietzsche, translated by David E. Green (Garden City, New York:
Anchor, 1967), pp. 32-33. Identifying the spirit of Hegel and Kierkegaard,
Stephen Crites rightly emphasizes the self-conscious dependence of Hegel's own
philosophical perspective on his "Lutheranism," viewed as "the modern Protes-
tant culture in which as he [Hegel] sees it, the Christian religion and the secular
order have so permeated one another as to be indistinguishable." See Stephen
Crites, *In the Twilight of Christendom: Hegel v. Kierkegaard on Faith and His-
tory* (Chalmersburg, Pennsylvania: American Academy of Religion, 1972), p. *51.*
In this regard Crites echoes a theme, not only of LOwith, but also tof Fackenheim:
"For if for Hegel the truth of Spirit is already disclosed in life the disclosure is
found-or found decisively-in *religious* life, reaching its fullness in modern
Protestant Christianity." See Emil Fackenheim, *The Religious Dimension in*

The first part of this paper presents Hegel's systematic account of the different ways in which philosophy and religion respectively need each other. In the second part of the paper the focus shifts to Hegel's account of modern philosophy's religious presupposition, the Reformation, and its reverberations in the Cartesian legacy of modern philosophy. At this stage a central thesis begins to take place. Modern philosophy progresses by giving distinctively philosophic expression to its religious presuppositions in the age of Reformation. Yet modern philosophy stumbles precisely by not maintaining its integrity as against religion. This collapse of modern philosophy into its religious foundation occurs on an epistemological level where philosophy reverts to the immediacy of belief and intuition and to the formal authority of a traditional understanding.

I. *Philosophy and Religion: A Systematic Presentation*

In the abstract terms of Hegel's system, religion and philosophy have a common content, viz. an absolute and a human relation to what is absolute. In philosophy the content is in the form of thinking, while religion displays its content in the form of symbolic understanding and in the form of devotion. [3]

Hegel's Thought (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1967), p. 22. See also *ibid.,* p. 212. Yet none of these scholars attempt to explain how, in Hegel's view, the Lutheran Reformation set the stage for modern philosophy, beginning with the Catholic Descartes, in its epistemological model. In fact, another approach suggests that implicit atheism and " revolution against Christianity " characterize the tradition initiated by Descartes, in stark contrast to Hegel's attempt to preserve the wisdom of the ancients. But these concerns are not directly relevant to the theme of this paper. See Stanley Rosen, *G. W. F. Hegel: An Introduction to the Science of Wisdom* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), pp. 7Jll.

[3] G. W. F. Hegel, *Einleitung in die Geschichte der Philosophie,* herausgegeben von Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Meiner, 1966), S. 42, 46-47, 167, 288. Hereafter this text is referred to as 'Einleitung.' G. W. F. Hegel, *Enzyklopiidie der philosophischen Wissenschaften i,m Grundrisse,* herausgegeben von Friedrich Nicolin und Otto Poggeler (Hamburg: Meiner, 1969), § 573, Zusatz, S. 451-461. Hereafter this text is referred to as ' Enzyklopiidie.' For the English, see *Heleg's Philosophy of Mind,* translated by Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 302-313 (hereafter referred to as " HPM ".

A. *Religion:s Need of Philosophy*

The mutual accountability holding between religion and
philosophy is grounded in the fact that they are alike forms of
the human spirit and thus exist within a history of a human
community. In order to grasp first how religion both needs and
is a prerequisite for philosophy, religion's dual form of sym-
bolic understanding and devotion must be conceived as a form
of spirituality.

I. *Religious understanding and religious devotion.*

For the genuine believer and practitioner of a faith, the in-
dividual's religion in some way expresses the profoundest sense
of himself or herself. This sense of oneself is so fused with one's
sense of God or what is absolute that the very feeling seems to
have an absolute character as though it be itself a unique, trans-
cendent, and divine creation. This fusion of self-awareness and
awareness of God within a religious feeling is the hallmark of
what Hegel has in mind when he speaks of the religious form
of spirituality. The simplest forms of this religious self-aware-
ness and spiritual feeling are devotion and prayer.

Even in this most elementary form, however, the self-aware-
ness in religion displays both a communal character and a reli-
ance on the memory and the past, essential ingredients to what
Hegel calls " understanding." 4 Religion, with the help of art,
gives and develops communal expression for the absolute, an
expression (like the absolute itself) formative of that initial,
interior, and quite individual feeling of who we are. Thus an
individual's religious experience and knowledge of God involve
private feelings having public expression. This expression is in
the form of *representation.*

A representation is both a symbol and a re-presentation,
exhibiting some content anew within an individual conscious-
ness. For example, a representation may signify the content of

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4 *EVnleitung,* S. 46-47 Fackenheim, *op. cit.,*   " Just as feeling must be in-
wardly bound up with representation to be religious, so representation must be
bound up with feeling to be religious."

a sensation by relating that sensation to another re-called sensation. This relating of two different intuitions is possible because they are in some sort of order ("after-one-another " or "next-to-one-another")   for some individual.

The German word for representation is *Vorstellung* (literally, " before-placing ") , and expresses perhaps better than the English word the family of meanings Hegel brings to bear on his account of the role of representations in religious self-awareness. The representation need not represent the content of a sensation. But a *Vorstellung* always involves a consciousness of some content on the model of something sensible, the ordering of which, viz., " after or next-to," is reducible to a private subject, i.e., a subject itself represented as "next-to or after-one-another." Thus the religious *Vorstellung* places something in front of (*vor)* us in terms of what has been placed there before (vor) .[5]

Thus, on the one hand, self-awareness through religious symbol expresses a community's self-awareness at a definite stage in its history and in an understandable form. That is, religion makes itself understood in artistic symbols or parables which signify or picture the spirit by re-presenting what has already been felt in the community. When someone says **"I** understand," it usually means that a speaker or writer places before him what he can immediately find re-presented in his experiences. The speaker represents what is customary, what the hearer is well-acquainted with in his daily perceptions and activity. To fail to understand is simply to fail to find, in one's memory, the proper match in the past for something currently placed before us.[6]

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[5] *Enzyklopadie,* § !W, S. *55.* For the English, see *Hegel:s Logic,* translated by William Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 80. Hereafter this text is referred to as 'HL '. See also M. Clark, *Logic and System: A Study of the Transition from ' Vorstellung' to Thought in the Philosophy of Hegel* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971).

[6] *Einleitung,* S. 48-51; *Enzyklopiidie,* § 9, S. 4rt (HL, 18) and § 80, S.   (HL, 118).

On the other hand, representations display their symbolic power by virtue of an individual subject as an ordering unity. This same characteristic carries over into the understanding which accepts or rejects what is placed before it on the grounds of its ordering of representations. Accepting Kant's characterization of understanding as the power of representation, Hegel specifically distinguishes *Varstellung* from *Verstand* by attributing to the latter the reflection of relations such as universality and particularity, cause and effect, and the like among representations. [7] Nevertheless, while these reflections are in a sense a negation of representations' direct and reflex-like, communally determined replication of the past, these determinations remain bound to or retain their validity in a private subject with private interests and private acts. [8] Moreover, though this individual certification is itself a communal heritage, the subject too is re-presented and, no less than the content of other representations, separate and outside-another.

In other words, in the religious expression of the spirit in the form of understanding, both the absolute and the conscious subject are conceived on the model of a representation, i.e. treated as objects after or next to one another. A metaphysics of custom or "positivity," as the young Hegel termed it, dominates the scene as something is understood only when it represents what is over-or dead. [9] In this manner, the very power constitutive of religious self-consciousness, the absolute is nonetheless represented as something alien-in a temporal or spatial sense-to living human beings, yet commanding their unqualified submission. Thus, this side of religion ultimately betrays the intimate feeling of the spirit, the unity of the religious experience in devotion (including the unity among the individuals themselves) , which led to its expression. Hegel has

[7] *Enzyklopiidie,* §   S. *55* (LH, 30); *Einleitung,* S.

[8] *Einleitung,* S. 48.

[9] *Einleitung,* S. 50: " Ob etwas verstanden werde oder nicht . . . hangt davon ab, ob es in der Gestalt seiner angewohnten Metaphysik an dasselbe kommt."

in mind explicitly those creeds which locate human beings' in-
herent sinfulness and salvation in past events and establish
these claims in a dogmatic theology.

Religious devotion *(Andaoht)* and the cult, on the other
hand, express a sense of the inadequacy of dogmatic under-
standing. "Devotion" signifies the initial religious feeling of
oneness with God, while " cult " stands for communal *practice*
of preserving and recovering that unity. Thus this side of
religion often finds itself at odds with a religious understand-
ing. Devotion and cult overcome the human alienation from
the absolute precisely by denying religious understanding's ex-
clusive location of salvation in a past and in the positive au-
thority of a church. [10]

2. *Religious inner contradiction and reconciliation in philos-
ophy.* Many a devoutly religious soul sees philosophy as an ex-
tension of a religious understanding lost in representations,
gradually forgetting the absolute, and preparing for a sceptical
atheism. Religious understanding, viewing the freedom of
inner conviction in thought or devotion as potentially arbitrary,
argues for the acceptance of positive church authority. These
conflicting sides of religion constitute a kind of religious model
of cognition. For reasons similar to those underlying their mu-
tual opposition, each side of this religious model considers
philosophy inimical to religion.

In Hegel's view, this connection of philosophy with each side
of religion is no accident. Like the devotional side of religion,
philosophy is opposed to a solely symbolic understanding which

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[10] *Enzyklopiidie,* § *565,* S. 447 (HPM, !'l99): "Der absolute Geist in der aufge-
hobenen Unmittelbarkeit und Sinnlichkeit der Gestalt und des Wissens ist dem
lnhalte nach der an fiir sich seiende Geist der Natur und des Geistes, der
Form nach ist er zunachst fiir das subjektive Wissen der *Vorstellung.* Diese gibt
den Momenten seines lnhalts einerseits Selbstandigkeit und macht sie gegeneinander
zu Voraussetzungen und *aufeinander folgenden* Erscheinungen und zu einem
Zusammenhang des *Geschehens* nach *endlichen Reflexions bestimmungen;* anderer-
seits wird solche Form endlicher Vorstellungsweis.e in dem Glauben an den einen
Geist und in der Andacht des Kultus auch aufgehoben." See also *Enzyklopiidie,*
Vorrede zur zweiten Ausgab.e, S. 12-18; *Einleitumg,* S. 4!'l-48, 167. Fackenheim, *op.
cit,* pp. 120-124.

transforms the truth into an unreachable goal and demands a meek submission to positive authority. [11] Yet philosophy is just as opposed to any attempt by a devout spirit to fashion a mythical unity with God, i.e. a unity in something other than its distinctively human form-the form of thinking. [12] The truth that is philosophy's object must contain the self-discipline and communicability of thought aspired to by religious understanding but also the oneness and completeness experienced in religious devotion.

Howeversomuch they be directed at philosophy as a one-sided development of one aspect of religion, the valid criticisms made by each side of religion against the other are in fact *philosophic* insights. Far from being opposed to religion, philosophy in the Hegelian scheme is needed to complete both sides of the religious act by developing the self-criticism inherent in their mutual antagonism. Philosophy, as Hegel puts it, is " the rebirth of the spirit" emergent from the vain one-sidedness of either a purely symbolic understanding or a thought-less piety. [13]

Philosophy for Hegel accomplishes what religion can only point to and make barely conscious in the human being, viz. a human reconciliation with the infinite. Philosophy accomplishes the reconciliation of finite and infinite precisely by overcoming religion's contradictions. Philosophy alone construes the spirit in its proper form, the form of thinking, which is at the same time the mark of humanity. Philosophy expresses in human form the unity of devotion and the cult without submitting the freedom of thought to the positivity of religion.

[11] *Einleitung,* S. 57.

[12] *Einleitung,* S. 57: "In dem Unterschiede, der zwischen dem Mythus und zwischen seiner Bedeutung gemacht wird, und darin, <lass die mythische Darstellung, die Darstellung der ldee fiir die natiirliche Vorstellung, als eine Verhiillung dieser ldee betrachtet wird, liegt das Eingestiindnis, <lass die Bedeutung der eigentliche Gehalt, und dieser Gehalt nur in seiner wahrhaften Weise ist, insofern er der sinnlichen Gestaltung und endlichen Verhiiltnisse entkleidet und in der Weise des *Gedankens* herausgehoben wird."

[13] *Enzyklopiidie,* Vorrede zur zeiten Ausgabe, S. 18, See Rosen, *op. cit.,* p. 22, 45-46.

Hegel accordingly refers to philosophy as both " an ever-endur-ing divine service (*Gottesdienst)* " and " the worldly wisdom " that, without suppressing subjective freedom, finds in thought the content of religion and worldly reality alike.[14]

Hegel's firm conviction about the primacy of human freedom involved in the integrity of thinking underlies this assessment of religion's need of philosophy. Insofar as a symbolic under-standing via the mechanism of re-presentations finds intelligi-bility solely in what can be construed as sensible, past, and con-forming to church authority, and insofar as the religious experi-ence of unity in devotion is devoid of rational reflection, the factors that determine the truth in either perspective remain solely matters of belief. As such they have immediate certain-ty but lie beyond and overdetermine the compass of human thought and freedom.

From this vantage point, religion's need of philosophy can be described as a humanizing and liberating need. Philosophy's emphatic effort to think the absolute provides a check on those dogmatic and sentimental tendencies in religion which may un-dermine human rationality and human freedom. Philosophy thereby confirms the solid foundation of the religious enter-prise, that the human being's relation to God is most assured in the human being's full independence of thought and free-dom of action.

B. *Philosophy's Need of R!eligion*

Yet while both the negation and completion of religion, philosophy also stands in need of religion. The need here is an existential need in the sense that, as Hegel puts it, " philos-ophy cannot even exist without religion." On the other hand, although it requires philosophy if it is to avoid self-defeating

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[14] *Einleitung,* S 169: "Die Philosophie beschiiftigt sich mit dem Wahrhaften, bestimmter ausgedruckt mit Gott; sie ist ein immerwahrender Gottesdienst." *Einleitung,* S.   " Das Gottliche muss in Weltlichen dargestellt sein, doch so, dass die subjektive Freiheit nicht unterdruckt ist. Insofem muss die Philosophie Weltweisheit genannt werden."

internal   contradiction,   religion   can   indeed   exist   without
philosophy .15

Philosophy presupposes religion in both its forms. The unity
of religious experience and its communal character are require-
ments for a philosophical reflection that would hope to get be-
yond the self-defeating formalism engendered by an exclusively
symbolic understanding. 56 At the same time, Hegel describes
representations, the essential ingredients to this sort of under-
standing, as " metaphors of thought." 17 Philosophy may be
described as the task of substituting thoughts for representa-
tions or metaphors of religion. Adding one more wrinkle to the
Vor-stellung word play, representations are placed in front of
us *before (vor)* thoughts are worked out.   Philosophy has no
pre-supposition-less beginning insofar as it is an act of spirit,
a spirit existing in human time and manifesting a variety of
self-expressons in addition to philosophy.   In other words,
philosophy has an epistemic need of the religious object.   The
philosophic mind which comes to think the spirit presupposes
temporally and logically some acquaintance with the absolute
as represented by religion.18

Among all the forms of the spirit's self-expression, religion's
special significance for philosophy is that of self-consciously pro-
viding a representation of the absolute in terms of the ordinary
perceptions and interests of the human community at a definite
stage in its history. As Hegel puts it, religion is the sort of
consciousness of the truth " for human beings of every cul-
ture." 19 Before mid-twentieth century squabbles over ordinary
and formal languages, Hegel recognizes the narrow sphere of
discourse in scientific knowing and how much discourse has its
base of translatability and intelligibility in the language and

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15 *Enzyklopiidie,* Vorrede zur zweiten Ausgabe, S. rn..

16 Devotion, Hegel notes, is a " thinking towards " *(Hin-denken)* and even con-
tains in German the word for thought, i.e. *"An-dacht."*

11 *Enzyklopiidie,* §8, S. 85-86 (HL, 6-7).

1s *Enzyklopiidie,* §1, S. 88 (HL, 8).

19 *Enzyklopiidie,* Vorr.ede zur zweiten Ausgabe, S. 12; *Eimleitung,* S. 102.

content of an entire culture. Accordingly, the first condition
for properly grasping an age of philosophy is " the cultivated
knowledge of the thought-relations," i.e. a recognition of " the
culture or formation of the subjective thinking." [20] In this re-
spect just as religious representation precedes philosophical
thought in general, so a particular expression of the spirit at a
certain stage of human culture is the key to that culture and
to the intelligibility of philosophy born of that culture. [21]

II. *Modern, Philosophy and Its Religious Presupposition*

From a systematic perspective philosophy has an existential
and epistemic need of religion, while religion has a human and
liberating need of philosophy. However, Hegel argues for this
mutual accountability from an historical perspective as well.
Indeed, he attempts to articulate the religious perspective pre-
supposed by philosophies in the modern age, and to evaluate
those philosophies' degrees of success at humanizing and lib-
erating religion.

A. *The Equivalence of Truth and Freedom:*

"The   content of the Reformation"

The religious culture serving as the presupposition of modern
philosophy is what Hegel designates the " protestant principle,
that in Christianity the interiority in general comes to con-
sciousness as thinking, as something to which everyone has a
claim; indeed thinking is everyone's duty, that on which every-

20 *Enzyklopiidie,* Vorrede zur zweiten Ausgabe, S. 11-U.

21 *Einleitung,* S. 296: " Das Ziel der Philosophie ist selbst dann dieses, in sich
den Geist, sein Wesen in seiner Tiefe zu £assen und in Harmonie sich zu finden mit
der Tiefe, die die Religion in sich enthalt. Die Geschichte, die die Entzweiung,
vorstellt, muss fiir uns, die wir den Begriff haben, das zeigen, was die Geschichte
noch nicht ist, niimlich erstens, dass beide Prinzipien; Eines sind, zweitens, dass
selbst in der Entzweiung beider nur ein Prinzip zu Grunde liegt da der Begrifl' in
Einem wurzelt. Drittens muss die philosophische Geschichte den Gang der Ver-
sohnung zeigen das Hinfi.ihren zu dem Bewusstsein ihrer Einheit,-dass beide sich
erkennen als dasselbe enthaltend."

thing is based." 22 Protestantism, for Hegel, thus brings the de-
votional side of religion from a state of dumb feelings to a per-
sonal, self-determining thinking opposed to positivity of any
kind. The split between Catholicism and Protestantism does
not merely echo the conflict in religion in general but, with the
Reformation, produces a new *religious* attempt to overcome the
split between religious mind and body.

   The Reformation emerged from the medieval church's own
corruption but, Hegel insists, this was no accident. Usually
corruption is understood as a human failing, a contingent " mis-
use " of power and position by runaway passions. Hegel does
not deny that certain evils of the medieval church were con-
tingent, due to individuals' misuse of power and position. How-
ever, the corruption Hegel has in mind, the corruption which
produced the Reformation, is endemic to the medieval church
as a whole.

The corruption of the church has developed out of itself; it has its
principle precisely in this, that the *this* [the individual] is felt as
a sensible [something] within it [the church]; [that] the external
as such is encountered within [the church] itself .28

While I cannot be sure what Hegel intends by the term " this "
in the preceding passage, probably he is referring to God's
presence for the Catholic faith in the individual, sensible host
and more generally to the way of becoming conscious of an
individual in the intellectual culture dominated by that faith.
Hegel seems to be implying that the credo of the medieval

22 G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen uber die Gesehichte der Philosophie, Ill* in
Werke in zwanzig Banden, 20 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1971), S. 120:
" In dieser neuen Periode ist das Prinzip das Denken, das von sich ausgehende
Denken-diese lnnerlichkeit, die iiberhaupt in Rucksicht auf das Christentum
aufgezeigt und die das protestantische Prinzip ist. Das allgemeine Prinzip ist
jetzt, die Innerlichkeit als solche festzuhalten, die tote Aeusserlichkeit, Autoritiit
zuriickzusetzen, fiir ungeh0rig anzusehen . . . und dies Prinzip fangt mit Descartes
an." Hereafter this text is referred to as 'VGP '.

23 G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen iiber die Philosophie der Geschichte* (Stuttgart:
Frommann, 1961), S. 5!i?0: "Das Verderben Kirche hat sich aus ihr selbst
entwickelt; es hat eben sein Prinzip darin, dass das *Dieses* als ein Sinnliches in ihr,
<lass das Aeusserliche, als ein solches, innerhalb ihrer selbst sich befindet." Here-
after this text is referred to as " Philosophie der Geschichte ".

church reflects an epistemology in which the individual can be sensed but not thought.

Negating the power of the mind and spirit, this principle that what is individual can only be sensed is the principle of negation, or the evil, inherent in the medieval church. The vices of the church are just so many manifestations of this principle. For to place reality in the sensible as such and ultimately outside thought is to place it outside one's self in some sensible thing. This denial of thought and this indebtedness to the sensible and the past serve as a classic instance of the *positivity* that accompanies religion's purely symbolic understanding. A superstitious faith and a blind obedience to church authority alone supply moral and scientific criteria in this religious formalism. [24] At the same time the virtue of the church is no less affected by the same principle. Virtue is directed against sensibility, but only abstractly, since it is unknown-and unknowable-how to be moral in terms of sensibility. After all, what is is not what ought to be, and what is is sensible. The effect is a virtue that flees and denies sensations.

Under this corruptive principle, the vice and virtue of the medieval church bear witness to the inner conflict Hegel considers intrinsic to religion. The development of these two sides of the medieval church and of their opposition produces the Reformation. On the one hand, through the devotional practice of virtue, human beings recognize their subjective power, their ability to oppose themselves to an external sensibility, their freedom as self-determining. On the other hand,

The *delivery from sins,* the highest liberation which the soul seeks, to be certain of its oneness with God, this deepest, innermost thing is offered to human beings in the most external, most frivolous manner-namely *to be purchased* with *mere money,* and at the same time this occurs for the most external purposes-luxury. [25]

[24] *Philosophie der Geschichte,* S. 520-521; 531.

[25] *Philosophie der Geschichte,* S. 521: "Der *Ablass der Siinden,* die hochste Befriedigung, welche die Seele sucht, ihrer Einigkeit mit Gott gewiss zu sein, das Tiefste, Innerste wird dem Menschen auf die ausserlichste, leichtsinnigste Weise geboten,-niimlich mit *blossem Gdde zu kaufen,* und zugleich geschieht dieses fiir die iiusserlichsten Zwecke-der Schwelgerei."

According to Hegel, the change that this contradiction within the church brings about is most effectively articulated by a Catholic monk, Martin Luther. Luther opposes himself to the medieval church by denying its basic principle or, in other words, by affirming that the individual is spiritual and intellectual and that the spirit subsumes all that is sensible and external.

Luther's simple teaching is that the *this,* the infinite subjectivity, i.e. the effectively true spirituality, Christ, is in no way present and actual in an external fashion, but as the spiritual in general is reached only in reconciliation with *God-in belief and in enjoyment.* These two words say everything. It is not the consciousness of a sensible thing as of God, nor even of something represented merely, which is not actual and present, but on the contrary of something actual, which is not sensible.[26]

No sensible thing, be it the host or the historic fact of a crucifixion or resurrection, is the basis of belief. When Hegel remarks " we Lutherans believe better," he is comparing Lutheran belief to one dependent on a present sense experience or on an event in the past, dependencies which deny the individual a free and active role in his reconciliation with the divine.[21]

Among the wide and abiding influences worked by Luther's reformation the increasing dissolution of the class distinction between priests and laity signals in an external way the central significance of the Reformation for modern philosophizing. Just as no class is to be above another by virtue of its celibacy or to be in possession of the church's temporal possessions, so no particular class has an exclusive claim to the truth. Rather truth belongs to

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[26] *Philosophie der Geschichte,* S. 522: " Luthers einfache Lehre ist, <lass <las *Dieses,* die unendliche Subjektivitlit, d.i. die wahrhafte Geistigkeit, Christus, auf keine Art in ausserlicher Weise gegenwartig und wirklich ist, sondem als Geistiges iiberhaupt nur in der Vers0hnung mit Gott e'rlangt wird-im *Glauben und im Genusse.* Diese zwei Worte sagen Alles. Es ist nicht <las Bewusstsein eines sinnlichen Dinges als des Gottes, noch auch eines bloss Vorgestellten, das nicht wirklich und gegenwartig ist, sonderu von einem Wirklichen, das nicht sinnlich ist."

[21] *Einleitung,* S. 177-178.

the sensitive spirituality of human beings, which can and should come into possession of the truth, and this subjectivity is that of *all human beings.* Each person has to complete the work of reconciliation in himself.[28]

The chief means by which Luther effected this result, which made the whole authority of the church problematic, was his translation of the Bible into German. As the foundation of the Lutheran church, the Bible was opposed to previous church authority and, with its availability to all, it became clear that " everyone should be able now to teach himself from it, to determine his conscience from it." [29]

   The ability and responsibility of each human being to determine the truth for himself is the Reformation's legacy, the legacy of the "free spirit," to modern philosophy. Drawing religion and philosophy closer together, the cultural heritage of the Lutheran Reformation is the triumph of the subjectivity of devotion over the religious understanding.

The subjectivity now makes the objective content its own, i.e. makes the teaching of the church its own. In the Lutheran church the subjectivity and certainty of the individual is just as necessary as the objectivity of the truth. The truth is for the Lutheran not an object already made, but on the contrary the subject itself should become something effectively true in that it gives up its particular content in the face of the substantial truth and itself makes this truth its own. Thus the subjective spirit becomes free in the truth, denies its particularity, and comes to itself in its truth ... This is the essential content of the Reformation. The human being has determined through himself to be free.[30]

[28] *Phuosophie der Geschichte,* S. 523: " lndem <las lndividuum nun weiss, <lass es mit dem gottlichen Geist erfiillt ist, so fallen damit alle Verhaltnisse der Aeusserlichkeit weg: es gibt jetzt keinen Unterschied mehr zwischen Priester und Laien, es ist nicht eine Klasse ausschliesslich im Besitz des lnhalts der Wahrheit, wie aller geistigen und zeitlichen Schatze der Kirche; scmdern es ist <las Herz, die empfindende Geistigkeit des Menschen, die in den Besitz der Wahrheit kommen kann und kommen soll, und diese Subjektivitat ist die *aller Menschen.* Jeder hat an sich selbst das ·werk der Versiihnung zu vollbringen."

[29] *Philosophie der Geschichte,* S. *525.*

[30] *Philosophic der Geschichte,* S. 523-524: "Die Subjektivitat macht sjch nun den objektiven lnhalt, d.h. die Lehre der Kirche zu eigen. In der lutherischen

If Hegel views philosophy as the completion of religion in gen-
eral, he views modern philosophy as the completion of religion
in the age of Reformation.   The conflict inherent in religion in
general carries over into the new religious age and develops
anew the antagonism between philosophy and a particular side
of the religious form. Nevertheless, the presupposition for re-
conciliation, reconciliation of the conflict within religion and
thus reconcilation of philosophy and religion, is given in this
"essential content of the Reformation."

B. The self-sufficiency of reflection:

Protestantism in Cartesian Guise

In the introduction to the *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sci-
ences* the principle of modern philosophy is described as the
principle of the self-sufficiency of reflection, thus echoing what
in his lectures on the philosophy of history Hegel calls the
" essential content of the Reformation."   Yet other factors,
notably art and empirical sciences, contribute as much to the
burgeoning philosophic sense of the " free spirit." [31] For ex-
ample, natural science found its validity in experience rather
than in the metaphysics of custom upheld by church authority.
"A human being learned now to observe, to think for itself,
and to construct for itself representations opposed to the firmly
posited truths, the dogmas of the church, and even opposed to
prevailing state law." [32] **In** effect, the principle of experience in

Kirchen ist die Subjektivitiit und Gewissheit des lndividuum ebenso notwendig
als die Objektivitiit der Wahrheit.   Die Wahrheit ist den Lutheranern nicht ein
gemachter Gegenstand, sondern das Subjekt selbst soil ein wahrhaftes werden,
indem es seinen particularen lnhalt gegen die substantielle Wahrheit aufgiebt und
sich diese Wahrheit frei, negirt seine Particularitiit und kommt zu sich selbst in
seiner Wahrheit ... Diess ist der wesentliche lnhalt der Reformation; der Mensch
ist durch sich selbst bestimmt frei zu sein." See also *Enzyklopiidie,* § 7, S. 39-40
 (HL, 10-11).

[31] *Philosophie der Geschichte,* S. 524.

[32] *Einleitung,* S. 160: " Der Mensch lernte nun selbst beobachten, denken und
sich Vorstellungen machen gegen die festgesetzten Wahrheiten, die Dogmen der
Kirche, und ebenso gegen das geltende Staatsrecht;   oder hat wenigstens neue
Prinzipien flir das alte Staatsrecht gesuuht, um es nach diesen Prinzipien zu
berichtigen."

the emerging natural sciences and the " essential content " of the Reformation alike form the philosophic principle of the modern tradition, the principle of the self-sufficiency of reflection.

The principle of experience contains the endlessly important determination, that for assuming and holding some content as true, the human being itself must be there, more precisely, that it find such content in unity and united with *the certainty of its very self.33*

Thus, modern reflection takes its content from its own intuitions and perceptions. What is reflected (isolated or abstracted) is that of which the individual is as certain as he (or she) is certain of himself (or herself) .

1. *First reflection and philosophical inquiry.* However, Hegel is quick to add that this realization is only in embryonic form at the outset of the modern age-reflection is an unenfolded principle. 34 Hegel employs the word *"Nachdenken"* (literally, "after-thinking") to depict this principle of reflection whose self-sufficiency is just coming of age. In the modern tradition, the *initial or first reflection* follows after determinations have somehow come to be present in consciousness. The determinations which present themselves, constituting and directing thought, are those determinations which the individual *finds* to be as certain as he (or she) is of himself (or herself) . Be it religious or scientific, this thinking belongs to a symbolic or re-presentational understanding of the sort which religion employs to express the absolute. The authority may no longer be that of the church, but there is still a submission to untested limits, limits defined by the scope of an individual's security. 35 Hegel distinguishes this understanding or first reflection from

33 *Enzyklopiidie,* § 7, S. 40 (HL, 10-11): "Das P_rinzip der *Erfahrung* enthalt die unendlich wichtige Bestimmung, <lass fiir <las Annehmen uncl; Fiirwahrhalten eines Inhalts der Mensch selbst *dabei sein* musse, bestimmter, <lass er solchen Inhalt mit *der Gewissheit seiner selbst* in Einigkeit und vereinigt finde."

34 VGP, S. 121.

35 *Einleitung,* S. 5-6: *"Der Mut der Wahrheit, der Glaube an die Macht des Geistes ist die erste Bedingung der Philosophie."*

a second reflection. The latter would be directed philosophical-
ly at the general determinations in the tradition underlying
the presumed (or found) determinations of first reflection.[36]

The situation Hegel envisions may be described as follows.
At the outset of the modern age the individual, buoyed up by
the self-sufficiency of reflection in art, science, and religious in-
wardness, rejects authority and affirms the content of his or
her own reflections. Yet perhaps swept up by the liberating
emotion of the initial act of reflection, or perhaps fearful of
the uncharted waters of ongoing inquiry, individuals are slow
to perform a second act of reflection, namely questioning and
offering solutions why a particular content was reflected. They
fail to ask why an individual comes to regard some determina-
tions as having the very certainty the individual has of itself.
Modern philosophy's degree of success can be measured by its
ability to inquire into the first reflections of art and politics,
science and *religion.* Such a philosophical inquiry is an attempt
to account for the religious experience, and this very attempt
makes philosophy in turn accountable to religion.

2. *The Cartesian Legacy.* Descartes is "the effectively true
beginner of modern philosophy.[37] At the outset of what Hegel
calls "the period of thinking understanding," he is Hegel's
prime example of a philosopher affirming the self-sufficiency of
reflection yet restricting the same to the level of first reflection
and thereby undermining the mutual integrity of philosophy
and religion. On the one hand, Descartes formulated the prob-

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[86] *Enzyklopadie,* § 9, S. 42 (HL, 13).

[sl] VGP, S. 123: *"Rene Descartes ist* in der Tat der Tat der wahrhafte Aenfanger
der modernen Philosophie." The following account is intended not so much as a
set of accurate claims about Descartes's and his successors' philosophies but as an
attempt to portray accurately Hegel's assessment of these philosophies in view of
his thesis about the mutual accountability of religion and philosophy. Also all
quotations in this section are taken from the two main sources of Hegel's analysis
of Cartesian philosophy: his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* and his
discussion of "The Immediate Knowing," the third posture of thinking towards
objectivity, in the Prelimin317 Concept *(Vorbeqriff)* tQ the *Encyclopedia of
Philosophical*

lem of truth for the modern age as well as the essentials of its solution precisely by giving *philosophic* expression to Luther's concept of the free spirit. On the other hand, Descartes's is a philosophy characteristic of a tradition in which philosophy and exact sciences are not distinguished. At the level of first reflection or symbolic understanding at which these sciences take place, the revolutionary nature of reflection's self-sufficiency becomes solely an abstract principle or moment of the truth. [38] At this point philosophy alternates between private intuitions and the symbols of scientific or religious authority. Thus the internal contradiction between understanding and devotion in a religious model of cognition is not resolved but simply duplicated in Descartes's philosophy and its modern legacy.

Descartes, whose influence in Hegel's opinion cannot be overestimated, establishes " the protestant principle " as the first principle of his philosophy. This principle, viz. *de omnibus dubitandum est,* signifies a doubting, not in the sense of scepticism, " but much more the sense that one has to deny every prejudice-i.e. all presuppositions which are assumed to be as true as they are immediate-and begin from thinking, in order lo come initially from thinking to something stable, to reach a pure beginning." [39]

Obviously, Descartes's expressed intent was to arrive at objective truth, not to give philosophic expression to some protestant ideal. Nevertheless Hegel perceives the Lutheran notion of the free spirit at the root of Descartes's philosophizing, since objectivity is to be achieved solely through" my thinking."

It is the interest of freedom which lies at the bottom; what is recognized as true should possess that rank in that our freedom is contained in it, in that we think. [40]

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[38] *Enzyklopiidie,* § 114, Zusatz, S. 134-135 (HL, 165-166).

[39] VGP, S. 127.

[40] VGP, S. 129: *"Es* ist das Interesse der Freiheit, was zugrunde liegt; was als wahr anerkannt wird, soil die Stellung haben, dass unsere Freiheit darin erhalten ist, dass wir denken."

Hegel finds this underlying notion of the free spirit further evidenced in what he considers the second principle of Descartes's philosophy, viz." the immediate certainty of thinking," Descartes's rule of accepting nothing as true that is not recognized clearly and distinctly. [41]

Yet this second principle also clearly exemplifies the relative self-sufficiency of a *first* reflection, duplicating the positivity of religious understanding in two ways. First, the self-certainty of the thinking in the cogito or " I " arrived at through doubt is supposed to be an isolated individual, e.g., before-or-next-to-another in the manner of representations. Yet, Hegel insists, the certainty refers only to thinking in its immediacy or the thinking of self-consciousness in general. **"'I'** has the significance as thinking, not as the individuality of self-consciousness." [42] As yet there can be no certainty of an individual, let alone determined in spatial or temporal or sensible terms. Secondly, since this is thinking in its immediacy, the unity of thinking and being in the cogito is not an inference. In this unmediated fashion, the thinking and the being of the cogito do not have concrete content. Thus, while the identity of thinking and being in the cogito is, according to Hegel, " the most interesting idea of the modem period [and Descartes] was the first to put it forth," being and thinking nevertheless remain different and Descartes does not *prove* their identity. [43]

Because of its immediacy and because it serves as the beginning of his philosophy, the self-reference of thinking, even in the cogito, functions as a strictly formal principle. Hence Descartes requires a third principle, that of " the transition of this certainty to the *truth."* [44] According to this principle truth involves something other than thinking and the basis of the

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[41] VGP, S. 130.

[42] VGP, S. 130: "Ich hat die Bedeutung als Denken, nicht Einzelheit des Selbst bewusstseins."

[43] VGP, S. 131-132; 134, 136.

[44] VGP, S. 136: "Das Dritte ist der Uebergang dieser Gewissheit zur *Wahrheit,* zu Bestimmtem."

transition to that other is God. In his principle of clarity and distinctness, and in the self-sufficiency of thinking achieved by rigorous doubt, Descartes finds no basis for distinguishing among representations vis-a-vis external objects. As soon as I maintain or deny that an external object corresponds to a representation, I find that I can be deceived, or better, I find that there are representations involving an other which I do not think as surely as myself. Hence the question emerges for Descartes: how do I know, even in a clear and distinct representation of something other than myself, that I am not deceiving myself? The remedy is a representation of something other than myself which involves the existence of that other just as surely as that representation is thought.

The quasi-divine character of the unity of thinking and being is similar to Hegel's own concept of absolute spirit. However, the nature of Descartes's proof of God's existence relies on the same sort of immediate knowing which characterizes Descartes's account of the cogito. As the identity of thinking and being in the cogito is abstract and not proven but simply affirmed, so are the existence of God and its role in overcoming doubt not adequately established.

What betrays Descartes, Hegel claims, is that same symbolic understanding functioning within religion, only now in the guise of the method of the exact sciences. The proof of God's existence is supposed to substantiate determinations about degrees of reality of metaphysical distinctions, in terms of which truth and error might be confidently determined. Yet these very determinations are presupposed in the proof and considered " immediately certain," thus replaying the opposition in religion between the intuitive unity achieved by devotion and the symbolic gap of the understanding.

That Descartes was himself aware of this is evidenced by what Hegel considers the fourth principle of Descartes's philosophy: " What is revealed to us by God, we must believe although we do not grasp it." [45] The individuality of the self,

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[45] VGP, S.　　"Das Vierte ist nun, <lass Cartesius sagt: 'Was uns von Gott geoffenbart ist, mussen wir glauben, ob wir es gleich nicht begreifen.' "

the existence of God, the various metaphysical distinctions and principles are all ideas Descartes finds to be as certain as himself and, at the stage of first reflection, he gives assent to his clear understanding of these ideas. There can be no second reflection, no inquiry as to why the cogito is conceived as an individual, why certain metaphysical determinations are accepted and so on, since such inquiries simply extend beyond the intelligibility provided by a clear and distinct, but nonetheless symbolic understanding.

The ambivalence and ambiguity in Descartes's philosophy, Hegel argues, is due to his persistent recognition that "self-consciousness is an essential moment of the true," while still holding that the nature of truths or essences and God's existence are distinct from his own self-certainty. [46] The truths perceived clearly and distinctly have their validity in the external, unchanging thinking of the same by a veracious God.

Putting the results of Hegel's analysis of Descartes's philosophy into the perspective of his thesis of religion's and philosophy's mutual accountability, it is evident that Descartes is not able to account for religion because his philosophy merely apes the cognitive model in religion. Not sufficiently distinct from religion, Descartes's philosophy resurrects its internal contradiction. This lapse of philosophy into religion is, moreover, a Cartesian legacy.

An adequate demonstration of the persistence of this particular Cartesian legacy among modern European philosophers is a monumental task, one I am not convinced even Hegel, its proponent, successfully executed. Nonetheless, a profile of that demonstration can be readily indicated. The continued emphasis on clarity and distinctiveness by Descartes's rationalist successors and their attempt to cast philosophy in the mold of a formal system are unmistakable remnants of the religious

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[46] VGP, S. 120: "Wir kommen eigentlich jetzt erst zur Philosophie der neuen Welt und fangen diese mit Cartesius an. Mit ihm treten wir eigentlich in eine selbstandige Philosophie ein, welche weiss, dass sie selbstitndig aus des Vernunft kommt und dass das Selbstbewusstsein wesentliches Moment des Wahren ist."

dichotomy between intuition and understanding. When Locke, reacting to the collapse of individual consciousness within these formal systems, questions the origins of clear and distinct ideas within experience, empiricist formulation is given to the protestant principle of the self-sufficiency of reflection. Viewed in relation to one another, moreover, rationalists and empiricists respectively give secular expression and emphasis to one of the mutually exclusive modes of religious knowing. Thus, the rationalist-empiricist debate may be construed as a replica, within modern philosophy, of the struggle between dogmatic and mystically-minded theologians. [47]

There was obviously a great effort expended by modern philosophers to give an account of religion and even, in some cases, to make philosophy accountable to religion. Hume's investigations of religion's natural history provide a prime instance of the former. For instances of making philosophy accountable to religion, one need only consider Descartes's continual efforts to have his philosophy accepted by Arnauld and other theologians or Leibniz's ingenious reformulation of transubstantiation, aimed at reconciling Catholicism and Protestantism. These efforts are all laudatory, from Hegel's viewpoint, and signify moments of real progress in the philosophic enterprise. For in these efforts philosophy maintains a distance from religion, respecting religion's integrity while giving independent expression to the self-sufficiency of personal reflection and experience. Hegel's difficulty is not with such efforts but rather with modern philosophy's inability to free itself from the epistemic quandary inherent in the religious experience.

[47] It should be remembered that the two sides of religion emerge from a single unified religious consciousness or spirituality, as noted at the outset of the systematic account of religion. This unity is logically re-covered through a demonstration of the logical equivalence (valid biconditionality) of the categories of rationalism and empiricism. The recovery is accomplished in Hegel's doctrine of essence in the *Science of Logic,*

Concluding Remarks

Hegel's account of Descartes's and other modern philoso-
phies, if we can rely on his lecture notes, is sketchy, free-wheel-
ing, and often simply unfair, as he hammers out his own philo-
sophical theories. [48] Yet, despite its shortcomings, this approach
makes significant strides towards clarifying and even evidenc-
ing his thesis about the mutual accountability of religion and
a systematic and metaphysical philosophy. What this thesis
means is that religion and philosophy must recognize the in-
tegrity of one another. Religion's need and explanation of
philosophy is quite distinct from philosophy's manner of need-
ing and explaining religion. This integrity is not maintained
merely when philosophy makes religious experience or religious
dogma a topic of investigation nor when a philosophy attempts
to accommodate a religious doctrine. Rather, if Hegel is correct,
a central feature of philosophy's autonomy from religion lies
in its ability to free itself from the religious model of cognition
which bifurcates knowing into mutually exclusive realms of
private intuitions and public understanding or of feelings and
symbols. Only by fashioning its own model of cognition can
philosophy satisfy religion's need of philosophy while acknowl-
edging its own need of religion.

However, the preceding account of the mutual accountability
thesis is misleading if somehow it gives the impression that
philosophy exists because religion-which is no ex professo
epistemology-proves to be an epistemological nightmare.
Philosophy exists not because religion is contradictory but be-
cause that contradiction which may surface in a philosophic re-
flection upon religion is simply not *true.* Dominating the his-
tory of religion and re-surfacing in the history of philosophy,
distinctions between private feelings and public expression, be-
tween intuition and its symbolic mediation, or between the
spontaneity of the present and the ponderous weight of past

[48] See Karl Marx, *Karl Marx: Selected Writings,* translated and edited by David
McLellan (Oxford, 1977), p. rn.

authority are real distinctions. Yet this truth is not articulated by collapsing either component of such a distinction into its counterpart. What is required is a conceptual framework powerful enough to accommodate these real distinctions and the real relations they logically entail.

The articulation of such a framework is precisely the task of a systematic and speculative philosophy. For philosophy to attempt anything less, e.g. to be moved by political winds or to relinquish the articulation of truth to natural science or poetry, is to weaken in a fundamental way human beings' power of understanding themselves and their world and thus of determining their own fate. Indeed, such a strategy would not only deny modern philosophy's own religious presupposition but also frustrate modem religion's need for an intellectually responsible expression of its principle of the equivalence of truth and freedom.

What does all this have to do with modern crisis of confidence in philosophy? Perhaps that crisis of confidence is due to a loss of identity on the part of philosophy. Symptoms of this loss are dramatically evidenced by the rejection of Hegel's thesis of a mutual accountability between religion and philosophy. For precisely in its relation to religion, as Hegel conceives it, philosophy faces a telling challenge in maintaining its epistemic integrity and its identity. What the preceding paper implies is that the modern crisis of confidence in philosophy exists because philosophy has attempted to replace religion, because philosophy no longer acknowledges its need of religion or religion's need of it, and because finally philosophy cannot account for religion and fulfill religion's need of philosophy. Yet, if Hegel's analysis is correct, to maintain its accountability to religion and to itself, philosophy must be systematic metaphysics.

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KARL RAHNER AS A DOGMATIC THEOLOGIAN [1]

A MOST THIRTY YEARS AGO Karl Rahner proposed " a single requirement " for the improvement of theological literature:

More dogmatic theology in the handbooks, more dogmatic theology in the historical studies, more dogmatic theology in the special studies over the whole range of dogmatic theology and not just in limited fields.[2]

What does Rahner mean by this? More importantly, what would it be like for us to take up or turn down Rahner's recommendation?

[1] I will use the following abbreviations for the texts by Rahner cited:

D.T. =*Dictionary of Theology.* With Herbert Vorgrimler. Second Edition. Trans. Richard Strachan, et al. (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1981).

F.C.F. =*Foundations of Christian Faith. An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity.* Translated by William V. Dych. (New York: The Seabury Press, 1978).

S.M. = *Sacramentum Mundi. An Encyclopedia of Theology.* Edited with Cornelius Ernst and Kevin Smyth. (6 volumes. New York: Herder and Herder, 1968-1970).

S.z.T. = *Schriften zur Theologie.* (14 volumes. Ziirich: Benzinger, 1959-1980).

T.C.C. = *The Teaching of the Catholic Church as Contained in Her Documents.* Originally Prepared by Josef Neuner, S.J., and Heinrich Roos, S.J. Edited by Karl Rahner. Trans. Geoffrey Stevens (Staten Island, New York: Alba House, 1967).

T.I. = *Theological Investigations.* Various translators. (17 vols. London: Darton, Longman, and Todd, 1961-1982; New York: Seabury, 1974-1982).

[2] T.I. I: 14 (The Prospects for Dogmatic Theology); cp. S.M. 2:95-111 (Dogma). A scrupulously documented treatment of Rahner would yield lengthy footnotes referring to early and late books and articles, encyclopedic and dictionary preaching and " spiritual writings," and massive secondary literature. I have preferred to simply give what I take to be " representative texts " at key points. I hope that the claims I make are modest yet distinct enough to justify this procedure.

My aim is to propose an interpretation of Karl Rahner as a "dogmatic theologian," with particular attention to the way he might be a model of that odd creature. I will not argue that this is the only or even the central clue to Rahner's diverse writings. He has, for example, rightly been taken as a philosopher, apologist, spiritual guide, historian, preacher, and in other ways. But I do think that new light can be shed on Rahner's other activities (particularly his preaching and philosophy) by studying their relationship to his dogmatic theology. Rahner's supporters and critics have sometimes made things too easy and sometimes too difficult for themselves by neglecting the important role dogmatics play in Rahner. Most importantly, taking Rahner as a dogmatic theologian can help us understand both the potential and the limits of engaging in dogmatic theology in the last decades of the twentieth century. I will propose that, for Rahner, dogmatic theology is limited because it functions by way of contrast to the "kerygma" as well as philosophical and scientific truth-claims. This will require some explaining. I will then offer some examples of Rahner's dogmatic practice, focusing on a largely unstudied text: Rahner's edition of Denzinger's *Enchiridion Symbolorum.* The first part will emphasize what Rahner says dogmatic theology is, while the second part highlights Rahner's practice of dogmatic theology; but, because of the connection between Rahner's theory and practice of dogmatic theology, each section has influenced the other. Finally, I will summarize the way a focus on Rahner's dogmatic theology can show some of the fairest ways to dispute Rahner's proposals as well as diagnose the claims of other dogmatic theologians.

I. *Dogma, Kerygma, and Philo:wphy: The Limits of Dogmatic Theology*

In one sense it is easy to say what the " dogma " is with which dogmatic theology deals. Dogmas are the kinds of things gathered together in Rahner's edition of Denzinger's *Enchiridion Symbolorum,* translated into English as *The Teaching of*

the Catholic Church (hereafter TCC) .[3] The main body of this
lext is eleven chapters on topics ranging from Revelation and
Tradition to Grace and Last Things. It includes fallible and in-
fallible teachings from individuals and groups, regional and
more universal Councils past and present. If we want concrete
examples of dogmas, we need merely open this text at almost
any page. However, since Rahner has changed his mind about
the importance of some dogmas in this volume, we could also
find examples of dogmas in his encyclopedia, dictionary, and
other articles when he summarizes " the teachings of the
Church" on one or more topics. In short, it is easy to :find ex-
amples of what Rahner means by dogmas. Dogmas are teach-
ings of the Church.

   Before raising some questions about such teachings, it is im-
portant to note their two related characteristics. In sum, the
paradigmatic utterance of dogmatic theology is " We teach,"
not " I teach " or " They teach." It is not primarily " I teach "
because these are teachings *of the Church,* teachings of the
whole community and not only the teachings of one person.
Teachings are, we might say, communal and social (though, as
we shall see, not always " officially " so) . And the paradigmatic
utterance is not primarily " They teach this or that " because
these are *teachings* of the Church, not teachings about the
teachings of the Church; thus, for example, the standard dog-
matic utterance is "[We teach that] God is abidingly mysteri-
ous," not "[Catholics/Christians   teach that] God is abidingly
mysterious." Teachings, we might say, are not only communal
but also self-involving (where the "self" is communally cir-
cumstanced) . Dogmas are, Rahner says, " ' committed '
knowledge." [4]

   But what is the point of such teachings? In a lengthy article
on dogmas, the first proposal Rahner makes is that a dogmatic

   [3] For the biographical context of Rahner's original edition, see Herbert Vor-
grimler, *Karl Rahner. His Life, Thought and Works,* Tr. Edward Quinn (Glen
Rock, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1966), pp. 46-47.
   [4] S.M. 2: 108   (Dogmatics).

statement is (among other things) "a statement which claims to be true even in that formal sense which we are familiar with from ordinary language." [5] A dogmatic statement is, we might say, a truth-claim. Good examples of dogmas or teachings are good examples of truth-claims.

This, I would say, is a small but important advance. Dogmas are teachings or truth-claims. In view of the associations of " dogma " with " dogmatism," we may even want to use "truth-claims" or "teachings" instead of "dogma." But, no matter what our preferences are on this score, we might still ask: what are truth-claims? And it is crucial for Rahner's understanding of truth-claims to begin by noting what truth-claims are not.

Kerygma, Poetry, and Truth-Claims. First, a truth claim is not primarily what Rahner calls a" kerygmatic statement" or an " exhibitive word event." The kerygma is a particular kind of speech-act-or, better, a particular kind of utterance by certain people in certain circumstances. In short, it is the proclamation of the Word of God in human words which " efficaciously makes present" what it proclaims. [6] Given the scope of the examples Rahner uses, it is important to take " proclamation " in a very broad sense. Thus, to speak kerygmatically is "to speak prophetically, to persuade, to announce, to transmit, to recall, to utter the (sacramental) word of life, to judge, to give testimony." [7] All of these are examples of the kerygma. To generalize in more Romantic language, the kerygma is a word from the very heart of the speaker which penetrates the heart of the listener because this word is summoned by and summons up the very heart of God. [8]

Note that distinctions which are often important for Rahner

[5] T.I. V: 43-44 (What is a Dogmatic Statement?r. T.I. XIII: 13-31 (Thomas Aquinas on Truth) .

[6] D.T. 249 (Kerygma). For examples of Rahner's preaching, see T.I. VII and VIII.

[7] T.I. IV:265 (The Word and the Eucharist).

[8] T.I. IV: 357-67 (Poetry and the Christian) .

(e.g., distinctions between "experience" and its verbal "objectification ") are not mentioned in connection with the kerygma. The kerygma is " efficacious "; it is prior (or posterior?) to any distinction between experience and verbalization, forms of life and language, infra- and suprastructures. **It** is full of images and symbols, but the crucial thing is not the images and symbols in themselves but the use to which they are put. Indeed, we might call the kerygma Rahner's selection of *ordinary, common-sensical, and idiomatic examples of Christian discourse-Christian* discourse used as only native speakers can use a language. This is, I think, largely correct-if we add one qualification. Rahner has no more trust in ordinary Christian language in general than he has in the "fabricated, technical, utility words " of ordinary human discourse.[9] In both cases Rahner has principles of selection at work. Just as poetry or symbolic discourse is ordinary language put to non-idle tasks, so the words uttered in the context of sacramental activity are the best examples of the kerygma. More concretely, if we want to find examples of the kerygma, we can go to a Christianly apt celebration of the Lord's Supper; in the prayers of praise and thanks, the preachings, the words uttered by ministers and assembly (from "The Lord be with you" to " Thanks be to God ") we will find Christian discourse working" efficaciously," i.e., being the very Word of God in ordinary and idiomatic ways.

If dogmatic statements are not kerygmatic statements, then we cannot expect to find dogmas in isolation in the native language of sacramental practice. A dogma is a teaching. " Dogmatic questions " might arise if someone asked the worshipping assembly "Is what we pray and preach consistent with what we teach? " But, even when this question is asked, it must be remembered that " the kerygma is the primary source and norm

9 T.I. III: 296 (Priest and Poet) . See also the recent call for a " ' poetic theology"" in "Theology and the Arts," *Thought* 57 (# 224, March, 1982), p. 25.

of dogma and theology." Teachings serve the ordinary language of worship and not vice versa. [10]

Thus Rahner as a dogmatic theologian assumes that there are good examples of Christian discourse doing the work it should do. And he assumes that the best though not the only examples of such an effective use of language are found in sacramental practice. If asked to back up the latter assumption, Rahner could appeal to what he takes to be the kerygmatic portions of Scripture and Tradition, as well as his sacramentology and related loci.[11] I will discuss the point of such appeals a little later. But, no matter how much such appeals can and must influence sacramental practice, they can never replace it. Such appeals amount to a set of teachings about rituals; and the kerygma is not primarily a set of teachings.

Thus, the key lesson is this: The kerygma is the ordinary and idiomatic language we hear and utter in common worship. We may want to select different or other cases of Christian discourse working efficaciously than Rahner selects. But Rahner's dogmatic practice suggests we must pick some samples-and then neither separate them from nor confuse them with the truth-claims with which dogmatic theology deals.

Dogma,, Philosophy, and Science. Second, a dogmatic statement is not (usually) a philosophical or scientific statement. What does this mean? First, we should not confuse philosophical or scientific discourse with language performing the function it most efficaciously performs. A certain kind of poetry, Rahner thinks, is ordinary language doing its real work. Philosophy and science, one might say, are to poetry as dogma is to kerygma. What, then, are philosophy and science?

One way to answer this question is to explicate a key Rahnerian concept: self-transcendence. This is not a concept most people-Christian or non-Christian-ordinarily use. It is a technical concept useful for some particular purposes. What

10 D.T. 250 (Kerygma); S.M. 2:108 (Dogmatics). For a cautionary note on this score, see D.T. 275 (Lex Orandi Lex Credendi)

:p   the references in note 29 below.

might these be? **If** we try to use the word" self-transcendence"
in some way, Rahner points out that self-transcendence nec-
essarily suggests something that " goes on " over the course
of time-a process, a becoming, a history, a development of
some sort. And this means that self-transcendence i) must have
a *beginning* and a *middle* and an *end* (or, a past and ,a present
and a future) and ii) the transitions between these three must
combine *continuity* and *novelty.* [12] **It** is important to grasp the
necessary character of these features of self-transcendence.
Rahner is making a conceptual-or, others might say, a gram-
matical-point.   A priori, if [13] we use the notion of self-tran-
scendence, it will imply a process that has a beginning and a
middle and an end which are related in ways that combine
continuity and novelty.

Further, self-transcendence is "transcendence   of self." **If**
transcendence of self has the force of a subjective genitive, it
necessarily implies that I go beyond (or transcend) myself
toward other people and things and even (Rahner argues) God.
I am not solipsistically isolated; and self-transcendence is not a
series of absolute novelties with no continuity. I necessarily go
beyond myself to others; and these others make for a kind of
continuity in self-transcendence. The technical term Rahner
often uses for these " others " which provide continuity for
self-transcendence is *"matter";*   matter includes my body, na-
ture, the world, and the whole of my " situation."   Further,

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[12] The clearest explications of "self-transcendence"   are perhaps T.I. V: 157-192
(Christology within an Evolutionary View of the World); T.I. VI: 153-77 (The
Unity of Spirit and Matter in the Christian Understanding of Faith) .

[13] The if-clause here is added so that I do not seem gratuitously to gloss over
some crucial questions about transcendental deductions. Some admit such tran-
scendental reasoning: 1others say it only makes sense if we presume that some one
categorical scheme is built into human nature. It is possible-at least when the
focus is on dogmatics-to   understand Ralmer;s conceptual scheme whether we
think it is transcendentally necessary to think and experience this way or not.
For a good bibliography of recent literature on transcendental deductions, see
Robert B. Pippin, *Kant's Theory of Form. An Essay on the Critique of Pure
Reason* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982), Chapter 6 (The
Transcendental Deduction).

the primary task of various *sciences* (historical, natural, and social) is to study the" functional connections between different factors" which make up the continuities of self-transcendence. [14] Again, Rahner is making a conceptual point here. If we speak of transcendence of self, this transcendence implies that we move toward others; these others can be called " matter " and studying their connections is the main job of the various sciences.

Finally, if self-transcendence only implied a going beyond oneself to others, we would have ,a real problem. Do I so "go beyond " myself to others that my own identity is lost in the process? Does self-transcendence avoid solipsism by subordinating my uniqueness to the broad continuities of matter? No. "Transcendence of self" not only has the force of a subjective genitive but also of an objective genitive. In this sense, self-transcendence is a process in which I am different from (or transcend) others. The technical term Rahner often uses for this " I " who is irreducibly different from all others is " spirit " (or, sometimes," person" or" soul"). In non-technical terms, this is "the innermost 'kernel' of one's person." [15] This is each person's "original and never quite attained self-understanding" which is the subject matter of *philosophy.* [16]

Spirit is the unique experience of self prior to any verbal or other objectification in matter. Again, Rahner is making a conceptual point here. If I elect to speak of self-transcendence, I necessary imply that there is an " I " to do the transcending;

14 T.I. VI: 168 (The Unity of Spirit and Matter).

15 T.I. XI: 151 (A Brief Theological Study on Indulgence).

16 T.I. VI: 74 (Philosophy and Theology). I would emphasize that the concept of self-transcendence is only *one* way to get at Rahner's "philosophy." I do think that "self-transcendence" nicely condenses Rahner's peculiar contribution to philosophy, but it does not exhaust that contribution._ For example, it does not directly take account of Rahner's use of many categories of classical metaphysics (e.g., efficient, material, formal, and final causes). And I have elsewhere argued that his " theological ontology of the symbol " is developed at the expense of a less than adequate reading of what I here call the "kerygma "; see " On Being a Symbol: An Appraisal of Karl Rahner," *Theological Studies* 40 (# 8, September, 1979), pp. 458-478.

this " I " can be called " spirit " and reflecting on its uniqueness and novelty is the main job of philosophy.

Rahner's point could be pressed further. If self-transcendence implies this kind of unique, experiential " kernel " to my identity, am I absolutely unique and perhaps solipsistically isolated? Has Rahner saved " spirit " from " matter " only at the price of a solipsism which renders self-transcendence a process of constant novelties and no continuities? To use the notions of self-transcendence and spirit in these ways neglects the fact that "transcendence of self" not only has the force of an objective but also of a subjective genitive. Transcendence of self used with the force of a subjective genitive (" I transcend myself toward others ") requires that we take account of " matter" and the continuities of the process of self-transcendence; transcendence of self used with the force of an objective genitive (" I transcend others in being who I uniquely am.") requires that we take account of " spirit " and the novelties of each person's experience of himself or herself. The concepts of self-transcendence, spirit, and matter require each other. There is no way we can use one of these concepts-or equivalent concepts which make a similar range of judgments-without the others. To emphasize the importance of the range of judgments rather than the concepts, we might put the same point this way. Rahner's world is a world in which the extreme positions are held by Historicists (novelty without continuity in transcendence) and Traditionalists (continuity without novelty in transcendence), Existentialists or Solipsists (unique spirit without matter) and Behaviorists or Materialists (matter without spirit), and Idealists and Empiricists. The function of "self-transcendence" is, on a very high level of abstraction, to hold together this world.

What, then, is a truth-claim? Given this conceptual scheme (and without pretending to do full justice to the immense technicalities of Rahner's epistemological tradition), this much can be said. Truth-claiming is a kind of self-transcendence. As self-transcendence necessarily implies an other toward which I

transcend, so epistemic self-transcendence implies a judgment that a particular subject and predicate are " related to ... reality itself." [17] As self-transcendence necessarily implies a self to do the transcending, so epistemic self-transcendence implies that "the discovery of truth is always the discovery of the self as well. . . ." [18] In terms of classic theories of truth, we might say Rahner is attempting to hold together correspondence and pragmatic theories of truth (where what counts as "practical" is determined by Rahner's understanding of self-transcendence).

A number of questions might be asked about this view of things. [19] But our interest is elsewhere. A dogmatic statement,

[17] T.I. XIII: 17 (Thomas Aquinas on Truth). See also Rahner's *Spirit in the World,* trans. William Dych, S.J. (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), especially c. 3; *Harer des Wortes. Zur Grundlegung einer Religiomsphilosophie.* Neubearbeitet von J. B. Metz (Miinchen: Kosel Verlag, 1963), especially c. 3.

[18] T.I. XIII: 28 (Thomas Aquinas on Truth).

[19] For example, on Rahner's own terms, does " spirit " (if used as a systematically central category) leave too much room for an apolitical, ahistorical, alinguistic, or at least consistently elusive " self "--or do philosophies which cannot be gro\unded in a transcendental understanding of self avoid the problems of individualism and even solipsism in modernity? Does "matter" (again, if used as a systematically central category) leave too much room for (in Whitehead's phrase) "vacuous actuality "--or do philosophies which ignore "matter" avoid the problems of metaphysical materialism? Does the notion of " transcendence," particularly when it is followed by the felicitous ambiguity of objective and subjective genitives, downplay the concrete complexities of the narrative shape of life--or is narrative a kind of nostalgia for a world in which divine and human character, plot, and circumstances are held together? But the most interesting challenges probably come from two other sources: 1) those who challenge the meaning (in contrast to the truth) of trying to understand " every entity . . . in the light of being as a whole .... " (D.T. 349 [Ontology]), and 2) those who grant the possibility of such a quest but dispute Rahner's understanding of "being as a whole " and/or "every entity." Among the former, see, for example, Richard Rorty's analysis of ontologies which trade on distinctions between " spirit " and " nature " in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). In the latter category, among English-speaking theists, I think of process theology, those who read Thomas out of the analytical tradition, and Austin Farrer in particular; but the use of ontological terms in the doctrinal schemes of other religions would also be pertinent (e.g., Ninian Smart, *Reasons and Faith* [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958], pp. 138-147).

we began by saying, is not usually a philosophical or scientific statement. Why not? Philosophy and Science make truth-claims. But Philosophy and Science, taken together, make truth-claims about *all* of life or about *everything* there is; dogmas or Church teachings, on the other hand, are truth-claims which are important to Catholic or at least Christian identity. As dogma only arises out of the kerygma when we ask " Is this prayer or preaching consistent with what we teach?," so dogma distinguishes itself from philosophy and science when we ask "Is this truth-claim essential to Catholic or Christian identity?" or "How closely related to crucial Christian teaching is this philosophical or scientific claim? " or " How is this. Christian teaching related to this philosophical or scientific claim? "

This is, Rahner knows, a rough distinction. It is not always possible or necessary to make it. When Rabner makes the distinction, he clearly wants to avoid claiming that the teachings or truth-claims of various areas can be isolated from or reduced to each other. On the other hand, crucial Christian teachings and philosophical/scientific truth-claims obviously overlap; the product of such overlap Rahner calls a " theologoumenon." [20] But, particularly in the cases of such overlap, Rabner will try to maintain some kind of distinction between use of *an* individual philosophical or scientific teaching in proposing Christian teachings and philosophical/scientific truth-claims *as a whole.* For example, in the context of treating the doctrine of transubstantiation,   Rahner generalizes:

It is a priori improbable-more   we may not say-that a dogma can only be formulated and understood in dependence on a well-defined philosophical system. [21]

One reason Rahner is not willing to say more than this may be that he does not want to rule out cases when a well-defined philosophical system is the only way Christians can say what they want to say. But the main point is that it is" a priori im-

20 S.M. 6: £3£-38 (Theologoumenon).

21 T.I. IV: 290 (The Presence of Christ in the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper).

probable "-more Rahner would not be willing to say-that any Church teaching can only be formulated in dependence on the view of things packed into" self-transcendence." To claim more than this would be to claim that the essentials of Christian identity require a well-defined system; and, while Rahner is sometimes optimistic and more recently pessimistic about such systems in our pluralistic world, he clearly does not want to make such systems a part of the essentials of Christian teaching, much less make them substitute for the kerygma or poetry.

In sum, Rahner assumes, besides good standard examples of the Christian idiom at work in the kerygma, good examples of non-dogmatic truth-claims at work in philosophy and science. If asked to back up this supposition, Rahner could appeal to distinctions between derived revel,ation and philosophy in Scripture and Tradition as well as Catholic teachings about " revealed " and "natural " knowledge (including his own recasting of that distinction in his dogmatic theology) .[22] Again, I will discuss the role of such appeals later. But, just as dogmatic truth-daims cannot substitute for the kerygma, so they cannot substitute for philosophy and the sciences doing their own jobs with their own interests and canons of knowledge.

The key lesson is this. Philosophy and Science are truth-claims about everything that is-for Rahner, spirit and matter in   Dogmatic statements are truth-claims about what is essential to Christian identity. We may want to select other or different cases of philosophical or scientific truth-claims than Rahner does. But Rahner's dogmatic practice suggests that we must pick some such cases-and then neither separate them from nor identify them with dogmatically central teachings.

Some Limits of Dogmatic Theology. Why spend time explicating Rahner's view of the kerygma arid philosophy/science if the goal is to understand Rahner as a dogmatic theologian?

[22] See the references in note 31 below.

The reasons are crucial, for they suggest some of the limits of dogmatic theology. Dogmatic theology is distinct yet insepar- able from the language of ordinary prayer and worship as well as from philosophy and science. A dogma is a truth-claim es- sential to Christian/Catholic identity. The kerygma implies such truth-claims (and thus is open to the question "Is what you preach and pray related to sound teaching?"), but the kerygma is its own irreducible form of life and language. The "We *teach* ... " which is paradigmatic for dogmatic theology cannot ignore the fact that we say and do many other-usually more important-things besides teach or make truth-claims. The first way dogmatic theology can go wrong is to ignore this.

   Again, dogmatic truth-claims are related to the truth-claims of various philosophies and sciences, but dogmas have to do with christianly essential teachings and not with the whole range of truth-claims in our collective experience. The " *We* teach ... " which is the standard utterance of the dogmatic theologian cannot ignore the fact that others also make truth- claims. Individuals' and groups within and outside the Chris- tian community know things about themselves, the cosmos, God, and other things. A second way dogmatic theology can go wrong is to ignore the similarities and differences between crucial Christian teachings and the key truth-claims of other religious and non-religious ways of living-or to try to replace philosophical or scientific claims with dogmatic ones.

   We could, of course, pursue any number of these matters further. But we now have in hand enough tools to move to Rahner's actual practice of dogmatic theology. Before doing this, some summary consolations. Sandwiching dogmatic theology between the kerygma and philosophy **/**science will hopefully impress some-at least those who share in Rahner's or a similar community-as   an exercise in common sense. Dog- mas are quite simply teachings or truth-claims. They are dis- tinct from and related to the kerygmatic Christian idiom and the various teachings of philosophy and the sciences. When Rahner calls for " more dogmatic theology " he is not pleading

for more dogmatism or more dogmas. He is rather proposing that the circumstances are right to ask whether and how the Christian idiom as well as philosophical and scientific teachings are related to what we wish to hold true as community.

II. *Doing Dogmatic Theology*

What, then, does a theologian do with these dogmas, teachings, or truth-claims? George Lindbeck has proposed a classic description of Rahner's "method of practicing Catholic theology."

This method consists of assuming the truth of what the magisterium teaches, and then subjecting these teachings to a rigorous and often tediously technical historical and logical examination in order to distinguish the propositionally specifiable affirmations which they contain from the symbolic and conceptual frameworks in which they are inevitably imbedded in order to determine the range of possible interpretations, including many new ones, to which they are susceptible in new intellectual situations and historical contexts. The procedure is often reminiscent of the lawyer's search for loop-holes in the laws of the land; and in both cases the search always succeeds.[23]

Rahner assumes " the truth of what the magisterium teaches " in the sense that he takes central Catholic truth-claims to be true. What he does here is no more or no less a feat than a Buddhist taking key Buddhist teachings to be true, a Jew taking crucial Jewish teachings to be true, a scientist taking certain examples of scientific activity to be paradigmatic, a lawyer taking certain laws to be normative, etc. **It** may be illusory for one or more of these groups to think that there are such teachings or that any of them are held widely enough to label them Catholic, Jewish, Buddhist, scientific, legal, etc. But once we admit such communities exist, Rahner puts the burden of proof

[23] *Infallibility.* The 197!¡! Pere Marquette Theology Lecture (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1972), pp. 51-52.

on those who wish to deny that such communities have crucial
teachings. [24]

 This assumption, we have seen, is linked with two others.
First, there are good examples of ordinary Christian discourse
at work which set the context for teachings.   The ultimate
point of the procedure Lindbeck describes is to serve " the
kerygma."   Second, there are good examples of other kinds of
truth-claims, particularly in philosophy and the sciences. In-

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[24] I am not trying to gloss over the fact that, when Rahner speaks of the
magisterium (or, for that matter, the kerygma) he is frequently referring to a
"juridically embodied" entity (D.T. 285-287 [Magisterium]).   To explain what is
at stake dogmatically in such claims, Rahner would have to explain I) how
essential Catholic teachings on law or ' juridical embodiment ' are related to and
differ from the range of possible teachings on law in the contemporary world and
2) how something of a juridically determined nature can be or aid the kerygma
 (in contrast to legalistically obstructing the work of the Spirit in prayer and
worship).   Rahner has much more to say about the second point than the first
 (e.g., T.I. IV:240-241 [The Theology of the Symbol]), but it is clear how he
would go about answering the first (e.g., distinguish and relate concepts like *Amt,
munus,* and *officium* to the various categories of current social theories).   In any
case, Rahner would claim that teachings like those selected in this section are
more crucial to Christian identity than teachings about the role of jurisprudence
in Christian life; to this extent it seems fair not to discuss Rahner's vew of the
relationship between "Lehramt und Theologie " in detail here.   But the point
is important enough to make one further comment. It is tempting for practi-
tioners of both the *Lehramt* and *Theologie* to assume that their relationship is
paradigmatically conflictual; on this view to claim that the standard utterance of
dogmatic theology is " We teach " is precarious, for it looks as if it sidesteps the
much publicized conflicts between "the teaching office" and "theology."   But
Rahner does not (for better or worse) assume that the *paradigmatic* relationship
between " the teaching office/theology " or " teaching officials/theologians " (and
claims about these alternatives are quite distinct) is conflictual-any   more than
the paradigmatic relationship between God and creation or Christ and the Church
is *normally* conflictual. On the contrary, Rahner assumes that, in the everyday
life of the Christian community, the tasks and functions of various officials and
non-officials are sufficiently related and distinct to work moderately well; given
this (ideal, some would say) situation, Rahner then develops various principles
for when theology must follow and when it must lead the teaching office. Among
many other texts, see S.z.T. XIII: 69-92 (Lehramt und Theologie); T.I. XIV: 86-97
 (The Dispute Concerning the Church's Teaching Office); T.I. XII: 3-30 (The
Teaching Office of the Church in the Present Day Crisis of Authority);   and
Vorfragen zu einem Okumenischen   (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder,
1974).

deed, it is the latter assumption which enables Rahner to " distinguish the propositionally specifiable affirmation " of doctrines from the " conceptual frameworks in which they are inevitably imbedded." It is a priori improbable (to repeat Rahner's doctrine about conceptual schemes) that" the conceptual frameworks" are essential to dogma; on the other hand, it is only by knowing philosophy and the sciences that Christian teachings can be both distinguished from and related to the truth-claims of these fields. Equipped with these three suppositions, Rahner does dogmatic theology. But how?

Presume, for the sake of exhibiting Rahner's dogmatic craft, that central Catholic truth-claims are like those in the eleven chapters of T.C.C.: I. Revelation, !!. Tradition and Scripture, *3.* God One and Triune, 4. Creation, *5.* Original Sin, 6. The Redeemer, 7. The Mother of the Redeemer, 8. The Church, 9. The Sacraments, 10. Grace, and 11. Last Things. Why these teachings and not others? And why in this order? And what do we do with them?

The answer to these questions is not easy to summarize. The reasons for these topics in this order are related to the long term practices of a ritually focused community living in a world that is philosophically, scientifically, and even poetically complex. We ought not rule out in advance the possibility that the teachings of the Church preserve inconsistencies essential to such a communal life. A strong doctrine of sin and evil (i.e., granting c. *5* a dominant role in relationship to the other chapters) might even require us to look for, find, and remain satisfied with such inconsistencies.

Even if (as Rahner seems to think) this is sometimes the case,[25] we still need to determine which inconsistencies are more and less fruitful. A complete account, if we used Rahner's large scale theory of truth, would have to include clarifying the subjects and predicates of each and every teaching and relating

[25] E.g., D.T. fl06 (Hell); *The Trinity,* Tr. J. Donceel (New York: The Seabury Press, 1974), p. 81.

such teachings to "reality" and "discovery of self." This would be no simple chore. Even further, it would suggest that the pattern of Church teachings is required (in contrast to permitted) by the theory of truth that is part of Rahner's notion of self-transcendence. But there is no single way to order and relate Church teachings for Rahner. The best we can do in a short space is propose one pattern that seems implicit in Rahner's practice of dogmatic theology. Thus, if asked" What do we teach? " in the context of life that moves between the kerygma and philosophy /science, the answer will include teachings about many related things. We need, therefore, teachings about the principles used to select and order such teachings; teachings about the "things"; and teachings about the" relations." Such are precisely what are offered in T.C.C.-in the following way.

The first two chapters deal with what Rahner metaphorically calls the "basis" or" sources" of Christianity. ·we might also say that these chapters have to do with the kinds of reasons dogmatic theologians can appeal to in the course of proposing teachings about other matters. In still other words, c. 1 and c. 2 have to do with teachings about how to discover, create, and rank Catholic teachings; they are, in this sense, doctrines about doctrines. 26

The remaining chapters have to do with teachings themselves (in contrast to teachings about how to discover what the teachings are). God is "the mystery of mysteries of our faith" (T.C.C. 85). Hence, c. 8 is about God. Rahner also considers teachings about God when considering the sources of theology (c.l). But there God has to do with the sources of our knowledge about God's being and other things, i.e., God is discussed

26 For the notion of "doctrines about doctrines," see William A. Christian " Bochenski on the Structure of Schemes of Doctrines," *Rdigious Studies* 13 (1977), 203-219. Note the parallel Christian draws between religious doctrines/ doctrines about doctrines and H. L. A. Hart's distinction between primary/secondary rules in philosophy of law (pp. 213-14). For a more expansive view of Rahner's dogmatic theology, I think it would be useful to distinguish (as Christian does) teachings which have the force of action-guides, valuations and beliefs.

as Revealer. In c. 3, on the other hand, God is considered
            the range of God's being and relationships. In this
sense, the doctrine of God has a kind of precedence over other
teachings. Because teachings about God have to do with God
in se as well as God in relationship to others, the teachings of
this third chapter are the most complex teachings with which
dogmatic theology deals.

   The remaining chapters have to do with the other teachings
to which teachings about God are related. Chapters 4, *5,* 6, and
11 are (at least on the surface) ordered chronologically. Here
we have the classic "Christian story," from creation through
sin and redemption to the future consummation of all things.
Put grammatically, these teachings deal with "tensed predi-
cates"; creates, sins, became flesh, redeems, moves toward, etc.
Chapters 8, 9, and 10 deal with the kinds of things that are
temporally related (rather than the temporal relations between
these kinds of things.) , loci (rather than tempora) . This in-
cludes the community (including communal rituals) (c. 8 and
c. 9) and individuals (c. 10) as they move from creation to
the eschaton.

   Chapter 7 is, compared to· the other chapters,. anomalous.
Because Mary is redeemed in Christ, the chapter is located
after christology-although its chronological_location is before
that chapter. Because Mary is "perfectly redeemed" [27] the
chapter goes before c. 8 to c. IO-although it could be in prin-
ciple be located with c. 10.

   Thus, one way of reading the logic of the chapters in T.C.C. is
relatively clear. For Rahner, central Catholic teachings have
to do with

     I. Teachings about Teachings (c. 1-c.

    II. Teachings about other Things and Relations (c. 3-c.
       11)

       A. Teaching about God's being and relations (c. 3)

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[21] T.I. I: (The Immaculate Conception).

B. Other Teachings
1. Teachings about History (or Temporal relations) (cc. 4, *5,* 6, and 11)
2. Teachings about the community, its rituals and the individuals involved in all phases of redemptive history (cc. 8, 9, 10)
3. Teachings about Mary (c. 7)

This pattern is not useful in the abstract but only because it suggests three of the main ways any single proposed teaching can be challenged. We might argue that a teaching inc. 3 to c. 11 has not been based on appropriate sources (c. 1-c.2); that teachings about God (c. 3) are either too isolated from or identified with other teachings (c. 4 to c. 11) –or vice versa; that the teachings about temporal relations (cc. 4, *5,* 6, and 11) are isolated from or collapsed into teachings about individuals and groups (c. 8 to c. 10)-or vice versa. In other words, presuming that the answer to the question " What do we teach? " includes many related persons and things, we might dispute their many-ness, their relationships, and/ or their existence. We may not agree with Rahner's selection or ordering of such teachings, but if we challenge them in one or more of these ways we are at least challenging them on Rahner's terms.

The best way to back up this claim would be through a series of examples from each of these areas. For example, when Rahner claims that Mary is she who is: perfectly redeemed, what aspects of this claim are essential for Christian teachings about redemption (II. B. 1.) ? about the groups and individuals of redemptive history (II. B. 2.) ? What aspects are theologoumenal? When Rahner claims that God is holy mystery who imparts self in Word and Spirit as the gracious fulfillment of self-transcendence, what aspects of this proposal are crucial to Christian identity? What aspects are of secondary importance? If, in the case of such teachings, Rahner's interest was not in the question "What do we teach?", we would have to con-

elude that Rahner was not operating as a dogmatic theologian. If Rahner had inadequately identified a teaching or inadequately shown its relationship to other teachings, we would have a way to criticize Rahner's dogmatic theology on his own terms.

But space permits only a single example-taken from Rahner's "teachings about teachings" because it re-enforces the main point I am trying to make. In T.C.C. Rahner claims that we believe Christian teachings on the basis of " revealed " and "natural" sources (c. 1); the revealed sources include Scripture and Tradition (c. fl). Thus, backing up central Christian teachings (cc. 3-11) involves weaving together these sources in complex ways (e.g., Revealed Sources have priority over Natural Sources; Scripture, taken in the context of Tradition, has priority over Scripture alone or Tradition alone). But this selection and ordering can be challenged. Are these sources really the bases of Catholic teaching? For example, does the priority of revealed over natural sources contradict the Catholic teaching that "grace perfects nature"? Or, are these really the bases of *Christian* teaching? Do they, for example, contradict a Barthian emphasis on Revelation, an Eastern Orthodox emphasis on Tradition, a Reformation emphasis on *sola Scriptura?* Or are these sources really the bases of more broadly *human* teachings? Do they, for example, square with the a priori and a posteriori knowledge available to anyone who cares to know any and every entity in the light of being itself?

In the face of these kinds of challenges, Rahner recasts the relationship between these bases, grounds, or sources of Catholic teachings. How does he do this? The surprisingly simple answer has an unavoidably complex warrant. In discussing the relationship between these different candidates for teachings about teachings, Rahner makes the following distinctions. First, there is in Scripture " the immediate and original event of revelation (*unmittelbarer Offenbarungsvorgang ursprilnglicher Art).* This is the consciousness, self-expression, life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ *as* experienced (but not preached

or reflected upon) by the early Christian community. [28] Second,
the kerygma of Scripture is the proclamation of this " original
event." [29] Third, one can" reflect on" (in contrast to "experi-
ence " or " proclaim ") this original event; in Scripture this re-
flection is called " New Testament theology " or " derived reve-
lation." [30] Fourth, this reflection is only undertaken by one
" who already knows other things besides revelation." This
collection of "other things" Rahner calls "philosophy and sci-
ence." [31] Finally, there is a continuous " self-traditioning" of
Jesus which "has a history" or" develops"; this self-tradition-
ing is (like the " original event ") experienced, proclaimed in
the kerygma, authoritatively reflected upon in dogma, con-
fronted by developments in modern philosophy and the rise of
the " historical, natural, and social sciences." [32]

    The logic in these technical distinctions becomes clear if we
recall Rahner's presumptions.

RAHNER'S PRESUMPTIONS	parallel	SCRIPTURES	parallel	TRADITIONS
The Word of God		Original Event of Revelation		Jesus' Self-Traditioning
Ordinary liturgical language		New Testament Kerygma		Proclamation throughout the Tradition
Essential Christian Teachings		Derived Revelation or New Testament Theology		Dogmas in Tradition
" Other things " we know and experience besides the above (Philosophy and the Sciences)		"Other things" the New Testament authors know and experience besides the above		" Other things " known and experienced in the Tradi-tion

    2sTJ. V:23, 31, 34, 36 (Theology in the New Testament); T.I. V:60 (What is
a Dogmatic Statement?); T.I. V: 107 (History of the World and Salvation His-
tory); T.I. IV:3-4, 7 (Considerations on the Development of Dogma); T.I. IX:50
 (Philosophy and Philosophizing in Theology); S.z.T. XIII: 26-33 (Dogmen- und
Theologiegeschichte von gestern fiir morgen); F.C.F. 239, *265,* 279, 285.

    29 T.I. V: 36, 23 (Theology in the New Testament).

    80 T.I. V:23, 26 (Theology in the New Testament).

    81 T.I. V: 71-74 (Philosophy and Theology).

    32 T.I. VI: 101 (Scripture and Tradition); T.1. IV: 3-35 (Considerations on the
Development of Dogma); T.I. V: 60-66 (What is a Dogmatic Statement?); T.I.
IX: 60 (Philosophy and Philosophizing in Theology); T.I. XIII: 73-102 (Theology
as Engaged in Interdisciplinary Dialogue with the Sciences).

What Rahner has done here is claim I) his presumptions (i.e., the distinctions between poetry and Christianly efficacious language, essential Christian teachings, and other truth-claims) are analogous to distinctions in Scripture and Tradition; 2) the importance of Tradition is based on analogous distinctions in Scripture-in this sense Scripture is indeed *rwrma non normata* "as a whole" [33]; 3) the original event, the kerygma and derived revelation are inseparably linked with our common human experience and knowledge-in this sense, theology is indeed related to our common human experience; 4) the original event of revelation in Scripture, the self-traditioning of Jesus in Tradition, and God's self-impartation in grace and glory are central to the community's epistemic resources-in this sense, "Christianity has its ultimate objective basis in God's speaking to mankind and mankind's acceptance of God's word" (T.C.C. p. 17).

Two lessons emerge. First, Rahner will sometimes speak variously of Revelation, Scripture, the kerygma, the magisterium, experience, and other things as *the* foundation and starting point of theology. In other words, he sometimes seems to be what is called a " foundationalist " in his teachings about teachings-but a foundationalist of a rather inconsistent sort. I do not want to deny that there are texts in Rahner to support a foundationalist reading, nor that he has changed his mind on some of these issues over the last few decades. But I think there is another way to account for his various stands-a way that does justice to a broader range of his texts, accounts for his persisting interest in dogmatics, and is more instructive for his theological strategy. In sum, the closest Rahner comes to a dogmatic resolution for this issue (i.e., a resolution which pro-

83 T.I. VI: 89 (Scripture and Theology) . Scripture is *norma non normata* when it functions kerygmatically and as source of dogmatic statements and concepts. If taken " philosophically " (as a source of the *fotal* self-understanding of the authors) or "scientifically" (as a source of a *well-developed* cosmology, sociology, or set of historical claims) , it is " a priori improbable " that Scripture yields Christianly crucial teachings.

poses what we as a Christian community ought to hold as true about the principles for holding anything as true) is the espousal of an " indirect method " for sorting out teachings about teachings. The point of an " indirect method " is to offer reasons which make for a "convergence of probabilities" in favor of the truth-claim we wish to make. [34] An "indirect method" rules out two possibilities: a) There are no principles for proposing what we ought to teach; b) There is one solitary principle. Within this range, an essential teaching will be one which I) is communally preachable and prayable, can be put in the form of a truth-claim by appropriate individuals and groups (e.g., Saints, the teaching office, theologians, etc.), 3) is related in positive ways to the various truth-claims of philosophy and science, and 4) coheres with God's gracious presence for humanity. We might also say that a crucial teaching ought to cohere with Scripture, Tradition, Culture, and Revelation-or, since each of these breaks down in an analogous ways, communal worship, other community teachings, and the truth-claims of our culture. But the "method" is "indirect " because there is no communal consensus on any one of these taken alone, i.e., " directly."

This means that, when Rahner does propose a single source for theology, he is best read as proposing that this "foundation " *can* be taken as *the* source for theology for certain purposes. For example, Rahner usually defines all of these sources-God, Philosophy and the Sciences, Scripture, Kerygma, Tradition-in terms of each other so that it takes peculiar circumstances to have to pick among them. But, if the point is to speak to our common worship, we can take the kerygma as "the norm" of theology. If the point is to speak to what

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[34] T.I. VI: 28-30 (A Small Question Regarding the Contemporary Pluralism in the Intellectual Situation of Catholics and the Church); T.I. XI: 75-79 (Reflections on Methodology in Theology); F.C.F. 10, 346fl'. "Indirect Method" is not solely or even primarily "transcendental method." For the former, the latter is an "umbrella concept" embracing the intricacies of self-transcendence as no " more than one part or aspect " of theology (T.I. XI: 84,86).

we hold as officially (socially and even juridically) true, we can take " official dogmas " as our starting point. If the point is to speak to what we hold as true in relationship to Scripture, Scripture becomes *norma non normata.* If we wish to speak to the relationship between what we hold as true and what is held as true by other communities, we can take philosophy or one of the sciences (natural, social, or historical) as our starting point. But none of these strategies override the overall goal of an "indirect method"; an accumulation of mutually rein- forcing principles which converge on the teaching we propose.

Is Rahner correct in proposing that the Church maintain an "indirect method" in its teachings about teachings? Does he provide adequate principles for adjudicating conflicts between the different individuals and groups who propose teachings, for example? If his account is inadequate, is it because of some- thing internal or external to his dogmatics? These are impor- tant but secondary questions for my purposes. The key lesson is this: one task of dogmatic theology is to propose teachings about how to identify its teachings-if not Rahner's "indirect method " then some other one. The point is that, if we put the question "What is Rahner proposing we (the Church) teach about this or that? " to Rahner's writings, we can learn some- thing different than if we put other questions-even if these other questions are also necessary in other contexts.

We have here, I believe, a kind of repeatable experiment which suggests some hermeneutical rules for reading Rahner. First, for any article or text, ask whether Rahner is modeling the kerygma, elaborating a vision of every entity irr the light of being itself, or proposing what we (the Church) ought to teach. Only in the last case is Rahner doing dogmatic theology. We can find the dogmatic proposals implicit in Rahner's keryg- matic and philosophical/ scientific utterances by asking: is Rahner's kerygma consistent with what Rahner thinks we ought to teach? What in Rahner's philosophical remarks is essential to Christian communal identity? Second, if we deter- mine that Rahner is indeed making a dogmatic proposal, one

might ask whether his proposal is adequate to i) teachings
about teachings, ii) God's being and relations, iii) individuals
and groups in redemptive history, and/ or the relations between
i) , ii) , and iii) .

For those who do not have such an esoteric interest in read-
ing Rahner, the experiment might be generalized on the basis
of Rahner's example to yield some procedural rules for doing
dogmatic theology. First, select some samples of Christian dis-
course working "efficaciously"   (using Rahner's or one's own
standards for what counts as " efficacious ") . Ask: what are ·
the teachings implicit or explicit in this Christian idiom? ·Sec-
ond, develop i) teachings about the teachings we select so
that we can cogently propose teachings to others, ii) teachings
about God and God's relations, iii) teachings about individuals
and groups in redemptive history (or about whatever you take
Christian life to be " as a whole ") . Third, select samples of
philosophical and scientific truth-claims.   Ask whether such
truth-claims are the same, similar, or opposed to the truth-
claims of the Christian community-but   try to make it " a
priori improbable " that essential Christian teachings can only
be formulated and understood in dependence on a systematic
view of things. Such is the way we can add " more dogmatic
theology " to theological literature.

Some Ways to Dispute Rahner's Dogmatics

I have proposed that, for Ralmer, dogmatic theology is the
communal and self-involving activity of proposing what we
 (the Church) teach. It is distinct from but related to the di-
verse language of worship as well as the truth-claims of philos:-
ophy and science. I have also given some examples of how
Rahner weaves such teachings with each other, the kerygma,
and other kinds of truth-claims.   But there is at least one dis-
advantage to taking Rahner this way, viz., it becomes less ob-
vious what counts against his proposals. Objections to their
relevance to ordinary life and language can be met by showing
that a dogmatfo or philosophical/ scientific truth-claim does or

should relate to the (for Rahner) more ordinary language of the kerygma and poetry. Objections to his reading of certain teachings can be countered by the claim that, on his own terms, he has overlooked the subjects, tensed or non-tensed predicates, or importance of certain loci or tempora. Objections to his view of philosophy and the sciences can be countered n two ways: by showing that he has not adequately taken account of spirit, matter, or self-transcendence or by showing that the crucial claim Rahner wants to make does not depend on this well-developed philosophical scheme. If, as Lindbeck puts it (note , " the search always succeeds," we might wonder what kind of success it is which can never fail.

Rahner himself often reinforces-or seems to reinforce-the impression that nothing can ultimately count against his proposals. First, in the most widely ignored line in *Hearers of the Word,* Rahner claims that the kerygmatic Word of God" cannot be given a foundation by man, neither in its: actuality or necessity nor in its inner essence." [35] But, if the kerygma cannot be grounded or founded, does this mean we cannot disagree with it in significant ways? Second, Rahner presumes that some essential teachings are infallible. Does "infallible" here mean that nothing can count against such teachings? Third, Rahner grounds philosophy and the sciences on experiences which (he says) are self-contradictory to deny. But, if the denial of such a truth-claim is self-contradictory, does this mean nothing can count against it? In each of these cases, then,-i.e., at every crucial point in Rahner's theology-there seems to be no significant way to disagree with him.

If nothing can count against Rahner's proposals, the consequences would be serious. 1£ nothing can count against his claims, it is difficult to see what might count on their behalf. If it is difficult to disagree with Rahner's claims, it is: hard to know how one might significantly agree with them. [36] If Rah-

[35] *Borers des Wortes,* pp. 22, 208, 2l!'l-218.

[36] See William A. Christian, *Meaning and Truth in Religion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 24-26.

ner's proposals are not "falsifiable," we may want to join the ranks of those who claim that this is the price of any fully "committed" knowledge (see p. *3* above)-or we may join the ranks of those who see this as cause to avoid such self-involving knowledge (at least in public.) In either case, Rahner's dogmatic theology would then have become a kind of dogmatism.

But I do not think we need track the consequences further, for there are a number of ways Rahner's theology can be disputed on Rahner's own terms. Summarizing these ways will barely suggest the issues raised (e.g., the relationship between a priori and a posteriori knowledge, the various kinds of infallibilities). But it will provide a kind of summary to enable us to diagnose Rahner's other dogmatic claims-as well as the truth-claims other dogmatic theologians make. I have tried to state the possible objections within each category (kerygma, dogma, philosophy/science) in an order of plausibility. But a full discussion of whether these possible objections are real ones must be reserved for another time.

First, we can dispute the existence, features, or importance Rahner gives the kerygma. Thus, we might deny that there are good examples of efficacious Christian (kerygma) or human (poetry) discourse. We might agree that there are good examples, but dispute the features Rahner attributes to them. Perhaps the kerygma does not have any single isolable feature. Finally, we might grant the kerygma's existence and its features but propose that it is either less or more important than Rahner grants. It would be " less important " if we were skeptical that good examples of efficacious Christian discourse existed. Perhaps, as has been said, Christianity has never been really tried. The kerygma would be_" more important " than Rahner suggests if we doubt that Rahner's view of dogma or philosophy is really " normed by " ordinary efficacious discourse. In sum, the kerygma is liable to significant disagreement. When Rahner says that the kerygma cannot be grounded or founded, he may be suggesting that it is as difficult to get

a theological discussion off the ground with someone who does not admit some samples of ordinary Christian discourse as it is to get a philosophical discussion off the ground with someone who admits no standard cases of non-philosophical discussions. In any case, the kerygma is liable to significant disagreement.

Further, we might dispute the existence, features, or importance of Rahner's essential teachings themselves. Thus, we might deny that there are any Christian truth-claims. Perhaps Christians ought be satisfied with one or other variety of" noncognitivist" theories of religion. Again, we might claim that the teachings Rahner selects are indeed truth-claims, but deny that they are Christianly crucial or essential truth-claims. Finally, we might grant that Rahner has captured the crucial teachings but argue that he has not adequately supported them or related them to each other. In sum, Rahner's view of Church teachings is liable to significant disagreement.

What, then, about Rahner's claim that some teachings are infallible? George Lindbeck is right, I believe, in proposing that Rahner's "a priori infalliblism" is a) analogous to presumptions of lawyers and scientists and b) minimalistic (i.e., only claims that some teachings do not " place the universal church as a whole in unambiguous contradiction to Christ. . . .") .[37] Stated in this way, it is easy to see how one might disagree with Rahner: find a crucial Christian teaching which places the Church in unambiguous contradiction to Christ.

How might Rahner's construal of philosophy, science, and their movement in transcendence be disputed? We might teach that theology has no business with philosophy or science. Further, we might argue that theological truth-claims can be reduced to (in contrast to " related to ") philosophical or scientific truth-claims. Perhaps Christian teachings are primitive philosophical and/ or scientific truth-claims. Still further, we

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[37] T.I. VI: SOS (The Church and the Parousia of Christ) . See also note above.

might argue that philosophy and/or the sciences are not what Rahner takes them to be (see note 19). Finally, we might argue that one or more of Rahner's doctrinal claims requires (against Rahner's own principles) that we agree with his philosophy taken as a well-defined scheme of things. In sum, Rahner's philosophical theology is liable to significant disagreement.

In sum, Rahner's theology is liable to significant disagreement in a number of ways. It is probably impossible and not very useful to say at what point such criticisms would have to accumulate before we significantly disagree with Rahner. It is important to remember that there are, for Rahner, two kinds of theology.

(T) here is a theology of the commonplace in the supernatural by which one tries to find God in a constant multiplication of newer and more distinct particulars. But there is also a theology of the ' mystical ' or the silent mystery, in which as in mysticism proper, the particulars are lost to sight as though at night, so that one totality may become more powerful.[38]

On my reading, the sundry teachings of the Church, the varieties of the kerygmatic Christian idiom, and the various experiences and objectifications of philosophy and science are these " distinct particulars." A theology of the mystical is a theology which tries to hold all of these together " so that their totality may become more powerful." The theology of the mystical is the one Rahner thinks is " too little practiced today." [39] But we cannot have access to this theology without going through the arduous theology of the commonplace. It is as spirits in the world made up of distinct particulars that we are hearers of God's Word.

A final comment which suggests some further areas of exploration. A complete treatment of Rahner would do well, I think, to take Rahner's *Schriften zur Theologie* as his central text. The " zur Theologie " highlights the fact that Rahner intends to do "systematic theology"; the apt characterization

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[38] T.I.   (Considerations on the Development of Dogma).
[39] T.I. IV: *(ibid.)*

" Schriften " suggests or reflects the fact that Rahner does such systematic theology by treating" individual schemes in an unsystematic manner and as dictated by the needs of the moment." [40] Systematic theology is more than dogmatic theology, just as dogmatic theology is more than proclaiming and otherwise uttering the kerygma. Investigating Rahner's systematic theology would require analyzing his use of philosophy as well as the natural, social, and historical sciences. And we would want to study not only what Rabner says systematic theology is but also how he actually executes it. As dogmas are of various kinds and variously related, so we might expect Rahner's theory and use of philosophy and the sciences to be various. Each of Rahner's systematic claims would have to be considered one by one if we would have access tG both his theory and practice of systematic theology.

I have not tried to do this here because, although systematic theology is more than dogmatic theology, it is also no less than dogmatic theology (just as dogmatic theology, although more than the kerygma, is no less than the kerygma) . Studies of Rahner's systematic or philosophical theology which ignore the background of his accumulated web of communally circumstanced teachings will lessen the chances of coming to grips with criticisms Rahner might regard as pertinent. To miss this point is to guarantee that (as Rahner says in a treatment of Ori.gen) the necessary and inevitable enterprise of systematizing " may dominate and violate the transmitted doctrine to be believed." [41] In any case, we may not agree with Rahner's

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[40] T.I. XI: 69 (Reflections on Methodology in Theology). For other emphases on the dialectic between " systematic " and "unsystematic " in Rabner, see Leo J. O'Donovan, ed., *A World of Grace: An Introduction to the Themes and Foundations of Karl Rahner'a Theology* (New York: The Seabury Press, 1980), pp. vii-x; Karl Lehmann and Albert Raffelt, eds., *Rechenachaft des Glaubena: Karl Rahner Lesebuch* (Zurich: Benziger, 1979; Freiburg: Herder, 1979).

[41] T.I. XI: 246-247 (The Penitential Teaching of Origen). This might be compared to Rahner's comment on Thomas Aquinas: "though a point may be critical from a philosophical point of view in Thomas's work, it does not always follow that it is also the main point at issue" (T.I. XIII:lS-14 [Thomas Aquinas on Truth]). See also T.I. XVII:243-48 (Some Clarifying Remarks about My Own Work).

vision of the totality or with his selection and ordering of the distinct particulars in kerygma, dogma, philosophy, and sciences. But, if so, it is at least clear how Rahner would challenge us: is our theology related to and normed by efficacious Christian language? Is this ordinary language consistent with the various things we teach? Are these teachings related to the truth-claims of our individual and common human experience? No one of these questions provides *the* clue to Rahner's diverse writings-or to the many tasks of theology, much less to the mystery of God. But focusing on Rahner's dogmatic theology is one way of making sure we take them all into account. [42]

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MARY AS CREATED WISDOM, THE SPLENDOR OF THE NEW CREATION

HERE IS GROWING EVIDENCE that an impasse as been reached in Catholic Christology, whether this e regarded from a systematic or from a historical viewpoint. The former, typified by the several versions of transcendental Thomism, appears unable to avoid subordination to an anthropological a priori; the latter, insofar as it imports a theology of history, is placed in the dilemma of either submitting to the secular stringencies of a critical method which balks at the Resurrection as an historical event, or of accepting that event in its historical concreteness as an explicit theological a priori without any clear appreciation of its impact on the meaning of historicity. [1] For both approaches to Christology

[1] For example, one may contrast the opposing theologies of history operative in the interpretation of the Resurrection offered on the one hand by Schillebeeckx, who characterizes any insistence upon the public or event-character of the disciples' encounters with the Risen Lord *as* " ignorant," and on the other hand by Beda Rigaux, whose *Dieu l'a ressucite* (Gembloux, Duclot, Paris, 1978) rests entirely upon the premise of a concretely historical Risen Jesus *as* the insistent and unifying proclamation of the entire New Testament. In sharp contradiction, Schillebeeckx in his *Interim Report on the Books* Jesus *and* Christ (Crossroad Press, New York, 1981) terms such a point of view "virulently" ignorant: pp. 75 ff., 147 n. 8, 148 n. 4. What is at issue is the academic legitimacy of asserting that the Risen Lord is a real event in the temporal dimension of our fallen world. Decisions upon this question are finally confessional and doctrinal rather than academic-theological, but the confessional decision is always operative in theological method. Given the fact of a legitimate pluralism in theological method, it is all too easy to conclude to the legitimacy of a doctrinal pluralism, or what is the same thing, to the subordination of the confessional to the academic commitment. Newman noted a comparable confusion in the- fifth century School of Antioch; see *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine,* new edition, edited with a preface and introduction by Charles Frederick Harrold, Longmans, Green and Co., New York, London, Toronto, 1949,   Such confusion, then and now, masks the continuing need for an explicitly theological understanding of

(their convergence would seem inevitable) there is a clear danger of identifying an orthodox adherence to the ecclesial tradition with a nominalistic *sacrifioium intellectus.* In brief, the properly academic insistence upon methodological rigor tends toward a doctrinally unacceptable monism, whether anthropological or historicist, whose immanent " necessary reasons " would eliminate the radical freedom and novelty of the Word made flesh, while the orthodox affirmation of the historical, public, and event-character of the Resurrection, although continuing to reject any methodological suppression of that *articulum stantis et cadentis ecclesiae,* has discovered no satisfactory resolution of the methodological dilemma posed by the Catholic faith in the radical intelligibility of the Resurrection as the central event of history, and the central reality of the universe. Now as always, the demands of methodological rationality seem to eliminate the historicity of truth. Conscious as we are that the truth is in fact historical, every methodological entry into that truth, whether by way of history or of metaphysics-or in fact, by way of any humanism whatever-lends to the construction of yet another identity system,[2] in which the structures of logical thought once more impose a timeless unity upon the truth of the Catholic faith.

The present paper will propose that this dilemma is resolved only by taking seriously the historicity of the subject matter of

history, or what is the same, for a recognition that any understanding of history incorporates a confessional decision. Unfortunately, many who write in this field suppose such matters to be of only philosophical interest and so cannot but miss the specifically theological dimensions of the problem of historicity, in a manner reminiscent of the metaphysicians before and after Vatican II.

[2] H. U. vou Balthasar's prolonged and profound criticism of all theological systematizing as inescapably the construction of monist identity systems through which the freedom of the revelation is systematically annulled is expressed most incisively in his *Cordula oder der Ernst/all, mit einem Nachwort zur zweiten Auf!.,* Einsiedeln, Johannes Verlag, 1967. It is not clear that his indictment would bear upon a theologcal system which methodologically refuses to legislate upon what the revelation may be, intending only to frame the questions indissociable from the obscurity of faith; see my "Methodological Critique of von Balthasar's Theological Aesthetics," *Communio,* vol. *5,* no. I (Spring, 1978), fl3-43.

Catholic theology, upon which the historicity of the theological
project must itself depend. For example, if, as is a common-
place today, it be maintained that all such theology must be
Christocentric, it must be insisted that this "center" is not a
static hypostatic union, to be plumbed as an abstract intelli-
gible structure, but rather is an event, a dynamic event, his-
torical and free, the Augustinian *Christus integer,* the sover-
eignly free Trinitarian Mission of the Son by the Father to give
the Spirit and, inseparably, the created freedom, Marian and
ecclesial, in which the Mission and the Gift are received and
actual. The center of Catholic theology is then the New Cove-
nant, the center at once of being and of history in which the
faith terminates and upon which Catholic theology must bear.
It is this unit, at once Trinitarian, Christological, Marian and
ecclesial, historical and ontological, which is the *prius,* the sub-
ject matter, of theology: there is no other.

Only when the work of theology is thus envisioned does theo-
logical method cease to articulate the immanent dynamic of
autonomous rationality, and begin to respect rather than to
foreclose the mystery it should serve. So to regard theology,
however, is to place it in the context of worship; only as cor-
relative to worship, as *fides quaeren.sintellectum,* can theology
exist, for only there is the mystery given to the mind in a pos-
ture of questioning inseparable from faith.

This worship is not to be understood as some least-common-
denominator " worship in general;" we are concerned with wor-
ship in its concrete Catholic historicity, the worship whose
center is the Eucharistic presence, sacrificial and creative, of
the Lord of history in His Church, and whose circumference is
that of the Good Creation, the history of salvation, the Chris-
tocentric universe: there is no other. [3]

a The center-circumference language employed here goes back to Alain de Lille
by way of Bonaventure and, much later, Pascal, who applied it not to God, as
his predecessors in this usage had done, but, in a manner suggestive of modern
physics, to the created universe, conceived as " the greatest sensible mark of the
almighty power of God." For the references to Alain de Lille *(Regulae theologicae,*

To live in this universe is to live by faith, in a continuing or viatory conversion to the mystery of the New Covenant, the mystery of our total dependence upon the Christ in whom we are created. By this conversion we enter into the freedom and the truth of the Good Creation; we become ourselves in the appropriation of our creation. The Gift of the *Creator Spiritus* by which we enter into the freedom of the children of God is thus the gift of our history; that history is integral with the Good Creation-it is the temporality, fallen and redeemed, of our existence in Christ, in the Church. Its sustenance is Eucharistic; its meaning is sacramental, open only to the Catholic faith, available only to a questioning which feeds upon the faith.

The systematically coherent articulation of this questioning is the task of theology, whatever may be the humane discipline which supplies the interest and vocabulary of the particular inquiry. Such disciplines become theological by the submission of their methodological a priori to the revelation given in the worship of the Church. This theological articulation is existentially dependent upon the Faith of the Church, and so upon the Church's worship; as dependent, it cannot be identified with that faith or that worship. Further, such articulation, although invariably a unified and personal construct, cannot be identified with the faith-commitment of the theologian, although theology lives upon that commitment as the immediate font of the *quaerens* which theology seeks to articulate. Finally, theology cannot be identified even with the personal *quaerens* or inquiry of the theologian: this inquiry, this dynamic questioning or seeking out of the mystery given in the Church, is

reg. 7) and to Bonaventure *(ltinerarium mentis in deum,* v, 8) I am indebted to Ewart Cousins *(Bonaventure: The Soul's Journey into God; The Tree of Life; The Life of St. Francis,* Translation and Introduction by Ewart Cousins; Preface by Ignatius Brady, O.F.M., *The Classics of Modem Spirituality,* ed. Ignatius Brady, O.F.M., Paulist Press, New York, Ramsey, Toronto, 1978, 82, 100. The application of this phraseology to the *Christus integer,* the center and sustenance of Catholic worship, is no distortion of the Augustinian insight.

not other than the theologian's covenantal historicity, his graced participation in the whole Christ, which, as *gratia Christi,* can never be identified with a rational construct. This much is evident: the truth 0£ one's personal existence *in Christo,.* is totally dependent upon the concrete unity 0£ the mystery in which it is radicated, while the truth 0£ the theological construct has only the unity 0£ an intelligible form, caused by the formality 0£ its method. This formal unity is always inadequate; whether taught by Godel's theorem or by the classical notion 0£ the potentiality 0£ all discursive reason, we recognize generally the continuing need for yet more inclusive syntheses. [4] All intellectual dynamism, including the dynamism 0£ faith, transcends our ability to articulate it: our question is more vast than any answer to it which our minds might frame, although this fact is known only in the continual proposal of such answers-answers whose validity is tested finally by their compatibility with the dynamism 0£ the faith which fosters them; their validity is not other than their ability to generate yet further questioning.

When this questioning inadvertently becomes self-regarding, autonomous, as has been the situation, increasingly explicit, since Augustinian illumination and its Thomist version, the *trahi a Deo,* were definitively dispensed with by the Scotist and Occamist critique 0£ the high medieval syntheses, the articulation of its answer comes to be regarded as governed by the same *n0lJ1.,os,* the same intrinsic formal necessity, as the question itself: the unity 0£ a supposedly autonomous consciousness. This particular quest £or intellectual autonomy became self-conscious with Descartes; it has since governed modern philosophy,

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4 For "An excellent nontechnical account of the substance of GOdel's celebrated paper" see *Godel's Proof,* by Ernest Nagel and James R. Newman, New York University Press, New York, 1958; the phrase quoted is taken from the *Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society,* and appears on the back cover of the paperback edition cited above. A still more accessible explanation may be found in Stanley Jaki, *The Relevance of Physics,* The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1966, rn7-180.

and the theological enterprise also, to the extent that it has been placed under the obligation of answering the same auto-nomous question. So to obligate theology is to denature it: it becomes a sub-department of some other humanistic inquiry, an implication or a consequence of knowledge already possessed in principle: philosophy, history, sociology nowadays, as earlier the Aristotelian cosmology, or the Newtonian physics. [5] Theol-ogy cannot be captive to the self-regarding mind, as a matter of definition: it is a project possible only to a mind extroverted by the worship of God, by the faith which looks to a truth which is God's free and historical gift of Himself. Only this radical historical contingency and particularity of the Chris-tian revelation can free the human inquiry from its immanent and universal necessities, for it is impossible to draw an equal sign, as nineteenth century idealism wished to do, between the freedom of the Christ and the immanent necessity of discursive thought: the " scandal of Christian particularity " stands in the way, the historical Rock upon which founder the projects of autonomous reason.

   The truth, once revealed to be transcendent to the intrinsic necessities of thought, becomes mystery, not a block to the in-telligence, but an invitation, the *trahi a Deo* of St. Thomas, the illumination of St. Augustine: the invitation is to the appro-priation of the gift, to worship. This is historical worship, a worship not submitted to the criteria of autonomous reason, but to those of the historical revelation: it is the worship of the Church, in which that revelation, the Christ, is immanent.

   [5] This is the flaw, for example, in Lonergan's theological method; its cognitional analysis intends to establish the inevitable and therefore transcendent structure of knowledge, and therefore becomes subject to all the criticism long directed at the classical notion of nature: it reduces the transcendence of the revelation to its own immanence. See *Method in Theology,* Darton, Longman and Todd, London, 1971, 17-25, 107-111, 282-283. A comparable preoccupation with a philosophy of history embedded in the notion of praxis proceeds to a reduction of Catholic worship to the immanent necessities imposed by that criterion: I have discussed this more at length in "Liberation and the Catholic Church: The Illusion and the Reality," *Center Journal,* vol. 1, no. 1 (Winter, 1981) 45-65.

There is no other access to the Truth: it is available only through a conversion, an act of historical freedom by which the freedom and historicity of the New Covenant are appropriated, to become one's own, *in Christo;* thus a new *quaerens* begins which seeks henceforth an ever deeper radication in the only reality and truth, concrete actuality rather than abstract possibility, the pleroma, the fullness given us in Christ, mediated by his Church. What is sought in this *quaerens* is clearly not a system or a construct, but reality: existence *in Christo, in ecclesia.* It is this Covenantal existence, which theology tries to articulate, whether as a metaphysics of creation in Christ, as a theology of the history of salvation, as a sociology of the people of God, a hermeneutic of the Scripture read in the Church, or as whatever other converted humanism. Such efforts remain always provisional, hypothetical, the possibility rather than the actuality of truth. The *actual* articulation of the *fides quaerens intellectum* is always finally liturgical; it is this alone which escapes the radical inadequacies of the autonomous mind, and the insoluble dilemmas of its immanent logic. In this liturgy the actuality of the true and the real is at once given and appropriated in the community which is the worshiping Church. To this dynamic actuality which is the faith of the Church all theological hypotheses are correlative; they live by this correlation, which is their subordination to the faith of the Church. Outside this correlation, such hypotheses are no longer theological, for they then bear upon another truth and serve a different interest from that of a faith seeking understanding.

A Catholic Christocentricism must resist those temptations which tum theological reason in upon itself in such wise that it looks no longer to the faith which it would understand, but to a set of immanent laws of thought, of abstract consciousness, out of which it would forge a world God never made, centered not on God but upon man. The cure for such errors is not provided by yet another theological method; it is provided by the worship of the Church, the New Covenant, and not otherwise.

When this is not the center, when some other "Christ" is postulated by the logic of whatever theological method-'-metaphysical, historical-critical, sociological, political, etc.-the eccentricity is immediately evident: such a theology loses at once its correlation to the revelation mediated in the Church and its own hypothetical character, to become an affirmation competitive with rather than a question in complementarity with the teaching of the Church. Such failures are implicit failures of historical worship, in that the theologian has permitted his method a non-theological and extra-ecclesial autonomy; his scholarship and his faith are then no longer held in correlation. Persisted in, such deviations must reach a level of self-awareness; at this point the personal correlation of the theologian's consciousness, his historicity, to the worship of the Church, to the New Covenant, is placed in issue, and the issue is existentially resolved.

Such resolutions are always conversions, whether to faith or to its monist analogue. It is idle to deny that the constructive work of theology always threatens, in a fallen world, to become destructive; like all other ecclesial activities, theology also is in continual need of reformation, a reformation which is always a return to the fundamental worship of the Church. For the reformation of Catholic theology, this return must be ever more explicit: it is no longer, as once it was, to construct a theology which would prescind from the   a metaphysics *de Dea uno,. de Deo trino,* in the manner of the First Part of Thomas's *Summa Theologica,* or a hermeneutic in the manner of the fifth century Antiochene exegesis which Newman criticized for its sterile literalism and consequent scepticism; neither is it any longer possible to construct a theology of the Incarnation which would consist in a metaphysics of the hypostatic union understood only in its static facticity, prescinding from its historicity, and methodologically unconcerned with the implications of the event-character of the Incarnation, i.e., with its freedom. It is becoming increasingly difficult for the exegetical counterpart of such a metaphysics to con-

tinue to neglect the event-character of the Christ-for taken
simply as brute fact, the concrete presence of the God-Man
makes no sense, whether as metaphysics or as narrative. It is
only when the Emmanuel is understood as constituted by a
divine freedom which creates the free human response by
which God is humanly present among us-in brief, as Coven-
nant-that the Good News of the *logos sarx egeneto* is capable
today of being accepted in a moment in which all the categories
of our understanding lose their immanence by conversion to
this transcendent truth. This is today the work of theology, as
it has been from the beginning: the continual conversion of the
categories of our understanding. Of themselves, they possess
no potentiality for this transvaluation; only the worship of the
Church can open them, not in some mystical experience, but in
the theologian's taking with a radical seriousness the fact that
the Church's worship is a worship in truth. When, as always,
our constructs fail, they fail by having become self-regarding,
seeking to solve an immanent problematic, rather than to in-
quire more deeply into the mystery mediated by the Church;
thus the failures of the theologies of *de Deo uiuj, de Deo trino,
de Christo, de gratia, de ecclesia* and all the rest, which sought
in *ratio* rather than in the multifaceted unity of the Church's
worship the sustenance of all theology. Thus also fail the theo-
logies of our own time, but more disastrously. A Thomas
Aquinas might arrange his treatises in a way now open to mis-
understanding, and perhaps even conducive to it, but his own
theology is not one upon which it is legitimate to foist our pre-
occupations, still less our temptations. In the thirteenth cen-
tury it was not possible for a Christian to think of history ex-
cept in terms of liturgy; even the flight from history essayed by
the Spiritual Franciscans and by Joachim's speculations in the
preceeding century was conceived liturgically; liturgy was the
factual framework of human life, by which it had meaning-a
sacramental meaning insofar as mainline orthodox Christianity
was concerned. Thomas regards history in the context of the
Old and the New Covenants, and of their fruition; no other pos-

sibility existed for a theologian. The actuality may have been insufficiently reflected upon, but it was not less a historical actuality for that. Our own situation is different. From the time of the death of St. Thomas, the victory of a merely rational Aristotelianism began to disrupt the liturgically-grounded syntheses of the great medieval theologians; the dissolution of the sacramental unity of the medieval world was its consequence. This dissolution is now normative; to contest it upon liturgical grounds is to be accounted anti-intellectual, while to assert the sacramental structure of reality is to become incomprehensible, even in theological discourse. There is no agreement whatever upon any alternative principle of truth and unity, other than that the sacramental-liturgical principle is unacceptable. We continue to struggle for a *ratio* or a *praxis* which will provide a place to stand: we demand autonomy. But it remains true that we shall not stand unless we understand, and the price of our autonomy is as it has been, the dissipation of the tradition of the Church.

If there is to be a return from this dissipation of the Catholic tradition, if there is to be a restoration of the specifically Catholic interest in the systematic expression of the *fides quaeren.s intellectum,* it can only begin by again taking seriously the Catholic tradition, and this at the point at which its authenticity is assured, in the sacramental worship of the Church. It is here, at the Eucharistic center, that any future systematic theology must find its ground and sustenance, for it is here that the primacy of Christ is actual by his immanence in the Church. [6]

The Eucharistic immanence of the Christ is the single, the unique moment and event by which the Triune God is present to creation, and creation present to God. The Eucharist is thus the recapitulation of salvation history, the New Covenant in which the Old is included and concluded. The narrative of its

[6] E.g., Avery Dulles, *The Resilient Church,* Doubleday, Garden City, N.Y., 1977, 54.

institution is that by which every element of the New Testament is integrated, at once referred to the past and opened to the future apart from whose reality its own would have failed with the failure of the imminent eschatological hope. But we find among the earliest expressions of this eager expectation of the definitive presence of the Lord among his people the Eucharistic *Maranatha,* in which expectation and celebration are conjoined.[7] If the Parousia for which the Old Testament longed were not now a historical reality the New Covenant would not be new; if it were not also in the future, it would not be a matter of covenant and promise.

To this immanence of God in man, the *Logos sarx egeneto* Who is the Christ, the " firstborn of all creation," there is a necessary correlative: the free consent of creation, of humanity, to that immanence. It is never to be forgotten that this Covenant of God with man is a gift, not an imposition of the divine will upon a passive inconscient material. To understand that such a gift is possible, it is at once necessary to recast the conventional image of the relation between divine and humalli freedom; four centuries of *De auxiliis* disputation have left Catholic theologians with the nearly ineradicable impression that these freedoms are competitive, whether the contest be resolved according to Bannezian or Molinist lines. While those scholastic analyses are doubtless little regarded today, their influence continues to suppress the quite obvious truth that God's freedom is exercised precisely in the creation of human freedom. That this creation is definitive in the New Covenant is central to the biblical message. The several theologians of liberation have begun to make this fact familiar, but in a context which re-establishes the ancient dichotomies and their pervading historical pessimism; nor is it merely incidental that these theologies find nothing in Mariology to interest them, for

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[7] Oscar Cullmann, *Early Christian Worship,* tr. by A. Stewart Dodd and James B. Torrance, London, S.C.M. Press, 1963, 13-14; *The Christology of the New Testament,* tr. by Shirley C. Guthrie and Charles A. M. Hall, Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1963, !'tlO ff.

if the initial exercise of integral freedom by an immaculate *Theotokos* is not understood to be paradigmatic for the structure of the Good Creation, we shall have thereafter no recourse but to those secular utopian constructs which are now proposed as limits upon what the New Covenant may be. This mistake is an ancient one: the search for extrinsic criteria for the *sancta societas qua inhaereamus Deo* is as old as the Ebionites, as new as Moltmann and his followers. Whether it be specified by poverty, equality, fraternity,. justice or whatever other substitute for righteousness, there is no lack of secular criteria by which the Catholic and Christian reality may be judged and found wanting, lacking that abstract conceptual purity so essential to the demythologizing mind. The New Covenant, the Good Creation, in despite of such criticism, submits to one norm only, the Triune God in whose image it is made. To this imaging, Mary is essential: it is not too much to say that the entirety of that branch of theology which concerns her is directed to her imaging of God. The remainder of this paper will sketch some elements of that imaging in a very cursory fashion, which may nonetheless serve to point to a more functional notion of Mary than is now current.

The first postulate of this discussion is that the Priestly account (Gen. 1:26-28) of the creation of mankind to the image and likeness of God is to be understood, as Karl Barth has insisted, in terms of the masculine-feminine polarity. [8] The postulate is obviously disputable. I have defended it elsewhere and shall not repeat what was said there, other than to observe that the integrative power of this interpretation is perhaps the last and best argument for its validity. [9]

This view of the Good Creation as marital, taken up by the Pauline adaptation of the Yahwist "one flesh" of Gen. 2:24 in Eph 5:81, is inseparable from the notion of covenant itself,

[8] Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics* III/I, tr. by G. Bromley and T. Torrance, Edinburgh, University of Edinburgh Press, 1961,

[9] D. Keefe, "Authority in the Church," *Communio,* vol. 7, no. 4, (Winter, 1980), 848-868.

whether in the Old Testament or the New. It is also insepar-
able from the reality of created freedom. As the Old Testament
is the record of the summons to freedom, of the liberation, of
the People of God, that freedom is more and more clearly pre-
sented, from Hoseah to the final chapters of Isaiah and in the
later Wisdom literature, as the response to a love which is
marital. God's love for his people is the continual offer, by the
Lord of the living, of the gift of life: He evokes the bridal re-
turn, the mediation, of that love, and condemns its betrayal as
a prostitution, i.e., as betraying not only God, but the splendor
and beauty of the Good Creation, whose reality is foresworn
when its one purpose and truth, the mediation and imaging of
God, is refused. Any interpretation of the relation of God to
Israel which does not take very seriously, and not as mere
metaphor, the bridal symbolism by which that relation is in-
creasingly stated in the later levels of the Old Testament can-
not avoid an impoverished and finally inadequate view of the
New Covenant as well. If the idea of freedom is taken out of
this biblical context, it is immediately deformed by subordina-
tion to some alien frame of reference, in terms of which any
discussion of its value-as for instance that in which the en-
cyclical *Mirari vos* engaged the rationalist and Romantic cor-
ruption of its meaning-becomes less and less concerned with
the reality, until finally acquaintance with it is in danger of
being lost outright. [10] The consequence is familiar; the dicho-
tomies of rationalism are rediscovered, and become the preoc-
cupation of theology to the neglect of its proper object, the
neglected mystery.

   If it be kept in mind that the covenanted freedom of the
people of God is a marital freedom, and that this freedom is no
other than the imaging of God which is inseparable from their

   [10] For a balanced treatment of this remarkable document, see A. Simon's article,
"Gregory XVI, Pope," *New Catholic Encyclopedia,* vol. 6, 788 fl'.; for a discus-
sion of its aftermath, see Roger Aubert's discussion of Catholic liberalism during
the pontificate of Pius IX in *The Christian Centuries,* vol. *5, The Church in a
Secularized Society,* ed. by Rober Aubert et al., London and New York, Darton,
Longman & Todd, and the Paulist Press, 1978, 84 ff.

creation as a people, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that
the marital relation which Paul saw to be grounded in the rela-
tion of Christ to the Church is given its primary expression in
the " *Fiat mihi* " by which Mary uttered forth the beauty and
splendor of the New Creation in the free affirmation of that
Creation's mediatorial   destiny. As the Second Eve, by her free
appropriation of her own created reality, that of the *Theotokos,*
Mary reverses the refusal of her antetype, and does so in a
correspondence to the Second Adam which is the inception of a
radically new relation of the Lord of history to the world of
men and of Uncreated to Created Wisdom. In this New Crea-"
tion, this New Covenant, the immaculate Woman of this New
Genesis utters and makes concrete the plenitude which is hers
as the Daughter of Zion, the final bearer of the hope of Israel.
As unfallen, immaculate, integral, she fulfills totally the media-
torial role of her people: a role at once virginal and maternal,
Daughter of Zion, Mother of God, Bride of Yahweh. What
would for fallen femininity be an impossible splintering of exist-
ence is found integrated in her integrity; she is at once the little
child of Proverbs 8: 80, joyful in the creative presence of her
Lord, and the *Mater Dolorosa* at the foot of the Cross, whose
soul a sword has pierced. [11] The fragmented elements of fallen
femininity, mutually exclusive in their disintegration, find in
her their unfallen and eschatological unity, the unity which is
the splendor of the Good Creation, once refused by Eve, now
realized in the New Covenant of God's definitive presence to
His people, the One Flesh of Mary's conception of Our Lord.
This relation, the created bi-polarity of the New Adam and
the New Eve, constitutes the New Covenant by which God is
mediated to and present in our humanity; it is at the same
time and under the same aspect the single, the unique relation

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[11] A. Feuillet, *Jesus et Ba Mere, d'a'[YT'es lea recites Lucaniens de l'enfance et d'a'[Yl'es St. Jean: Le role de la vierge Marie dans l'histoire du salut et la place de la femme dans l'eglwe.* Paris, Gabalda, 1974, part 3, 199 ff.; see especially note *25, p. 256.* See also G. von Rad, *Old Testament Theology,* vol. 1, Harper and Row, New York, 1962, 447.

of God to that creation which, through the New Covenant, is now redeemed.

This relation is of course Trinitarian: the Father's sending of the Son to give the Spirit, and its sole mediation, the *sine qua non* of the mission of the Son and the outpouring of the Spirit, is the Incarnation of the SOn through the motherhood of her by whose" *Fiat"* the Uncreated and the Created Wisdom are united in a society which is at once the definitive (and because integral, also primordial and eschatological) presence of God in the world, and the equally definitive imaging of God. This imaging is bi-polar; its dialectic is that of Mary's consent, *plena gratia,* to the plenitude offered her by God, a plenitude which is at once her own creation as the immaculate Woman, and the created immanence within her of the Man, the Son whose mission is also the Gift of the *Creator Spiritus* in whose outpouring creation is at once given and renewed.

The integrally free society of Mary and her Son, the New Adam and the New Eve, the New Covenant and the New Creation, is then that by which the Trinity has signed creation with God's own unity, truth and goodness: qualities of being which can be appropriated only in worship, for they are not concepts but mysteries, to be received as gifts rather than grasped as properties of nature. This New Creation knows no "nature," no latent infra-structure which would not be gift, would not be signed with the Trinitarian image. If one wishes to make rational distinctions between nature and grace, it is then necessary to assign the totality of concrete finitude to grace, upon which postulate, itself no more than a corollary of the Christocentric and Trinitarian faith of the Church, the reality of nature becomes entirely abstract, unreal because uncreated-for only that is created which is created in Christ and sealed with the image of the Trinity. [12]

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[12] For a Thomistic ontology of creation, so viewed, see my *Thomism and the Ontological, Theology of Paul Tillich: A Comparison of Systems,* Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1971, 1-188, in which the Christocentric method and system of Tillich is contrasted with an equally rigorously Christocentric Thomist metaphysics.

To appreciate the Trinitarian imaging proper to the marital society which is the New Covenant, whether this be viewed most inclusively as the New Adam-New Eve polarity, or as the Christ-Church correlation, or that of the Incarnate Logos and Mary, it must be understood in all these instances that we have to do with the " one flesh " whose eschatological perfection is symbolized uniquely by marriage, rather than by one of the other polarities (father-daughter, mother-son, brother-sister, etc.) found in human sexuality, for of these sexual polarities, only marriage is a sacramental sign and a Trinitarian symbol. Therefore our avenue to any understanding of the *Imago Dei* is a sacramental one: this should not be astonishing, for sign, sacrament, symbol and *imago* have a single ground, the actual presence of the eschatological Good Creation within the worship of the Church. This ground is Eucharistic, and as Ephesians assures us, it is also marital.

The Trinitarian structure of the marital symbol is evident enough: the total self-donation of two persons to each other is constitutive of each, as husband, as wife, and is productive of a third reality, the marriage bond itself, the marital society, the substantive love of each for each which cannot be undone, and whose self-subsistent character is evidenced by its irrevocability. This love, or covenant, cannot be identified with either of the covenanting parties; this, and its radical permanence as a relation, makes the marital covenant of husband and wife the Trinitarian image and sacrament par excellence. It is only within this context that the Trinity is in fact "imaged" even by the Incarnate Son, for He is Image as sent, as obedient to the Father in a sacrifice which has no other :finality than that *sancta societas* which is fallen humanity's sole means of union with God.[13] The Christ cannot be approached except by the

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[13] St. Augustine, *De civitate dei,* bk. X, ch. 6, defines the relation between sacrifice and the beatitude mediated solely by the *sancta societas* as follows:

Proinde verum sacrijicium est omne opus, quo agitur, ut sancta societate in haereamus deo, relatum scilicet ad illum finem boni quo veraciter beati esse possimus.

Adam and the New Eve. It is in this Covenant that she is created; her whole reality is Covenantal, as is her Son's. As Paul Tillich might have said, they both manifest this reality under conditions of existence; as Rahner has said, with reference to the hypostatic union, the intuitive vision of God which is proper to Christ's integral humanity does not place him at some beatified remove from our fallen history, for He, like us, is *ensarkikos,* bound to the suffering and death of fallen humanity.14 So also for his mother, whose integrity and unfallenness and utter freedom only radicated her more deeply in the redemptive suffering of her Son. Her imaging of God, her worship of the Father through her Son in the Spirit which He gave her fully from the first moment of her existence, is the utterance of the splendor and beauty of the New Creation, but in the idiom of a fallen people, for it is addressed to them. In fact, it is by this covenantal presence of the eschatological Good Creation in fallen space and time that this fallenness is valorized and given sacramental (eschatological) significance, for it is of this Good Creation that the sacraments speak; it is this that they signify, and for this reason, the Eucharist, as the sacramental continuation of the New Covenant, underlies the other sacraments, as the New Covenant underlies the Eucharist.

Mary's Assumption is similarly to be understood with reference to her eschatological creation. The Assumption into the heavenly Kingdom of the Queen of Heaven is no mere sign of divine favor, no inference from a more or less sentimental love of the Son for his mother; it is the strict counterpart of her Immaculate Conception, of her substantial integrity. As in the Resurrection which is the ontologically first moment of the fulfilled creation, Jesus is lifted up from the subjection to fallen space and time in such wise as to be present in that realm henceforth only in sign and sacrament, so Mary, the immaculate recipient of the fullness of His grace, was also removed,

14 K. Rahner, " Dogmatic Reflections upon the Knowledge and Self-consciousness of Christ," *Theological Investigations* VI,

as integral with that fulfilled creation, from the corruption of
the earth at her death. The Created Wisdom by which she is
Theotokos and *Mater dowrosa* is that by which she is also
Regina coeli, still the first beneficiary of her Son's mission from
the Father, his obedience unto death. It is only when systematic
theology begins to understand the necessity linking Mary's in-
tegrity with her Assumption that the latter can itself be used
as a *point d'appui* for a further inquiry into a point of some
difficulty, the meaning of the distance between our own death
and our resurrection in Christ. Fallen human beings are not
assumed into heaven upon their deaths so as to leave no body
after them on this earth. Until the history of its salvation is
complete, the earth shall bear some temporal and spatial re-
lation to those whose mortal remains are mingled with its ele-
ments-a relation entirely lacking in the Risen Christ and in
his mother. Given that upon their death (mox, as wrote Bene-
dict XII) the fallen dead are judged and enter upon their final
destiny, nonetheless they do not rise until the last day.[15] The
meaning of this truth is not an easy thing to grasp: given the
discontinuity between this world's history and whatever man-
ner of duration is appropriate to the fallen dead, the continuity
implicit in the postponement of their resurrection to the last
day places a real link between even the justified dead and the
dust to which they returned upon their deaths, and so to the
time and space of the fallen world in which they no longer live,
but to whose final redemption and recreation their own is in-
dissolubly connected.

The kind of criticism of this Catholic doctrine which rests
upon the physical sciences is obviously beside the point, but it
is perhaps necessary to remark that the philosophically
grounded objection, which would insist that a separated soul
has lost the materiality which any waiting or duration after
death would imply, also lacks an assured place upon which to

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[15] Benedict XII, *Constitutw "Benedictus Deus,"* cited in Denzinger-Schoenmetzer
(23rd ed.) *1000.

stand. It is all too easy to read into the doctrine which de-
scribes death as the separation of soul and body some Aristo-
telian or quasi-Thomist metaphysic, a procedure no more justi-
fied here than in the case of the Tridentine doctrine on tran-
substantiation.16 A " separated soul" is a doctrinal, not a
philosophical concept, despite the metaphysicians' struggles
over it. If the doctrine is to be clarified, as distinct from the
resolution of some metaphysical difficulty, the appropriate
starting point is doctrinal: one proceeds from the " limit case "
of an unassailable truth whose meaning is pertinent to the
question at issue, and here Mary's Assumption is precisely in
point, for it sets off, as Jesus's Resurrection does not (if only
because He is divine as well as human) a concrete distinction
between integral and fallen humanity, in the unique instance of
Mary's death. [1] It is quite clear that the matter is too difficult
to be dealt with in this place; nonetheless, it is well to point out
the advantages of Mariology for Catholic theology, in a time
when, for perhaps the majority of contemporary Catholic
thinkers, the doctrines concerning her are felt as a burden and
an embarrassment rather than as the enormous resource which
they actually are for systematic theology. Even those of us
who do not share that embarrassment are too passive in our
appropriation of the Marian dogmas, to the point that even for
us they do amount to a burden-outposts to be defended, but
from which no sorties need be feared. This is a garrison soldier's
mentality, inappropriate to a theologian whose legitimate de-
fensive function can be met only by an entire confidence in the
truth of the mystery to whose intelligibility without limit he is
committed.

[16] E. Schillebeeckx, *The Eucharist,* tr. by N. D. Smith, Sheed and Ward, New
York, 1968, is insistent upon the Aristotelian context of the Tridentine definition
of the Eucharistic transubstantiation.

[17] See the Vatican Doctrinal Congregation letter to the Bishops, "Letter on
Certain Questions Concerning Eschatology," dated 17 May, 1979, released 14 July,
1979, published in *Origins, N. C. Documentary Service,* vol. 0, no. 9 (August
1979) 131-133, esp. 133.

A further illustration 0£ the same point may be ventured: would not much 0£ our confusion over the meaning of Mary's virginity" *ante, in et post pa,rtum"* be removed by the postulate that integral human sexuality is virginal as such? From this standpoint, physiological integrity need no more be associated with her childbearing than is freedom from the common cold associated with her Immaculate Conception, £or integrity under conditions of a fallen world carries with it no immunity from physical trauma, and it is integrity which controls the meaning of her virginity. Thus viewed, virginity is simply an aspect of Mary's *Fiat,* of her total self-donation to God in the New Covenant. It is then the physical actuality of the exclusivity of her relation to her Son; by this, her femininity is fulfilled integrally, completely, beyond any possibility of increase or altereity. I£ one must speak 0£ her marriage to Joseph, it should be made clear that this relation is marriage only by an extrinsic denomination, £or it lacks the intrinsic symbolism or sacramental quality which the term marriage demands in its ordinary acceptation. As unfallen, integral, Mary is beyond any sacramental expression of her relation to God, for such an expression looks to and causes a personal completion or integration which was Mary's from her conception.

In fact, many 0£ the difficulties which Catholic theologians encounter in meeting the questions posed to them by contemporary dissent from Catholic practice and doctrine may well be met by a firm reliance upon and confidence in the profound truth of those doctrines as the firm ground 0£ much of what has gone unexamined in the traditional practices of Catholic life. A vigorous inquiry into the contemporary implication of such doctrines will find much more meaning in them than the contemporary diffidence has come to expect. How often, for instance, does one hear it argued that priestly celibacy is the strict implication of the priest's sacramental offering of Christ's marital sacrifice £or his bridal Church, and that the abandonment 0£ celibacy by those ordained to offer this sacrifice is also the abandonment of the *alter Christus* function

by which it is offered? On the other hand, how often is the ir-
revocable union of Christ with his Church put in issue by talk
of a" sinful Church," as if the alternative were a triumphalism
contemptuous of history, and as though the Eucharistic Lord
could be irrevocably related to the Church through a freedom
less integral and a worship less adequate than that of the
Woman who is the Church's antetype? Such talk, common
enough since the Council, concedes more to the *Zeitgeist* than
a careful examination of central Catholic doctrines can admit.
Only a confident rejection of that dispirited mentality, and a
Spirit-led return to the doctrinal, moral and liturgical tradi-
tion will permit Catholic theologians to perform their task. The
Marian component of that task is indispensable.

Catholic theology may then be said to have paid too little
attention to Mary's integral and eschatological stature; while
the Fathers have recognized it since Justin Martyr, while the
doctrinal tradition since Ephesus has made it increasingly ex-
plicit, and while the liturgical tradition has spoken of it un-
hesitatingly, Marian theology finds little interest outside of
conferences and journals expressly devoted to that now esoteric
topic. Particularly, the Vatican II reference to a " hierarchy of
truths" is often taken to have a typical if not general refer-
ence to the Marian doctrines; these, it is frequently asserted,
have less relevance to contemporary catechetical needs than
do the central Trinitarian and Christological doctrines.ls Par-
ticularly, this is thought to be the case with respect to the rela-
tively recent definitions of the Immaculate Conception and the
Assumption. Doubtless there is little point in pursuing an in-
quiry into the precise sense in which this " hierarchy " is to be
understood, since it is quite clear that the Conciliar fathers
themselves did not attain to any precision in this matter. The
existence of very brief kerygmatic and baptismal formulae of

is Avery Dulles, *The Resilient Church: The Necessity and Limits of Adapta-
tion,* Garden City, N. Y. Doubleday, 1977, ch. 3, "Doctrinal Renewal: A Situa-
tionist View," sp.eaks of the "burden of dogma" on p. *51,* and discusses the ap-
propriate interpretation of the " hi.erarchy of truths " on pp. *57* ff.

the faith in the earliest layers of the New Testament tradition is itself testimony to an ecclesial recognition that certain truths are of primary concern for the primitive Church, and that the list of these can be quite compact. It is much less clear that the making of such a list is any longer a possibility; the post-Conciliar attempts to discover a credal formula satisfactory to the contemporary Church are of a dwindling interest today; such projects as that which would re-institute the earlier Apostles' Creed in place of the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed at the Mass are rather the products of liturgical conferences and commissions than the expression of any need felt in the pews. Academic fashion has little to do with the *lex orandi;* it owes much more as a rule to the charms of some such anachronism as Schoonenberg's Christology than it does to a valid insight into the *sensus fidelium.*[19] The fear, not infrequently voiced, that the centuries have piled up far too great a burden of doctrine and dogma to be borne-as though every baptizand, every practicing Catholic, must have to hand a ready recollection of Denzinger's latest edition-has its origin in a profound distrust of history as the medium of the Christian revelation, and in a consequent desire to be rid of its harvest, root and branch. [20] However, it is not necessary to share a

[rn] Piet Schoonenberg, *The Christ. A Study of the God-Man Relationship in the Whole of Creation a,nd in Jesus Christ,* tr. by Della Couling, Herder and Herder, 1971. In this 1965 book. the author develops a Christology "from below" anticipating much of the later work of such revisionists as Kueng and Schillebeeckx, by which the doctrinal themes characteristic of the " high Christology " of the early Councils are relativired by their historical situation. The result is a return to the Monarchian viewpoints patent in such works as Moltmann's *The Crucified God.* In his latest work, *Trimitaet und Reich Gottes,* Kaiser, Munich, 1980, Moltmann attempts to discover this fault in the more traditional Trinitarian theology of Karl Rahner. In the end, the dispute is over the meaning of history, and cannot be pursued here.

[20] John O'Malley, "Reform, Historical Consciousne8s and Vatican H's Aggiomamento," *Theologiool Studies* vol. 32, no. 4 (December, 1971) 573-601, argues for the reversibility of Catholic doctrine, resting his case upon modern theories of history. The article is descrbed as a "breakthrough;" what would seem to have been broken through is the Church's claim to an authentic historical continuity. I have replied to this sort of theology of history in the article cited in note 9, *supra.*

Veuillot's ultramontanism to recognize with Newman that to
be Catholic is to be deep in history, a history which is not dis-
pensable. The centuries of the Church's worship are normative
for what worship is. Manifestly, one does not require of the
ordinary Catholic an articulate familiarity with all of the doc-
trinal achievements of two thousand years, but one does re-
quire-the Church requires-that such a Catholic accept that
tradition for the seamless web it is, that he commit himself to
that historical reality which is the teaching Church, with its
past and its future. The essential simultaneity of the Marian
and the ecclesiological doctrines is evidenced by their treatment
in a single dogmatic constitution at Vatican II: ecclesiology
and Mariology are indissociable, and any attempt to relegate
the Marian doctrines to some peripheral Catholic interest im-
mediately runs into major ecclesiological obstacles, obstacles
which are not other than the sacramental presence in our fallen
world of the eschatological perfection of the New Covenant.
This sacramental worship is specific and essential to Catholic-
ism and any dilution of the eschatological stature of our Lady
immediately and necessarily puts in issue the ground of the
Church's faith: the actual presence in space and time of the
Eucharistic Lord in the worship of the Church. It is in Mary's
act of eschatological and integral freedom, her consent to be the
Mother of God, that this Covenant is given: here and here
alone the eternal and the created Wisdom meet; here the free-
dom of the Creaitor and of the Good Creation are agreed; here
the most High is pleased to take to Himself our fallen flesh.
It is by Mary's *Fiat,* where alone the created beauty and wis-
dom and freedom of our redeemed humanity find adequate and
full expression, that He became "one flesh" with us forever,
and the promises of the Old Testament are fulfilled, in the
Covenant by which He has fixed his tabernacle in his chosen
people, irrevocably. But if any of the Marian doctrines are
doubted or denied, then the Church is not the Church; if any
of them are neglected or disdained, so also is the splendor of
the Church.

The Marian doctrines are therefore not only not negotiable, not dispensable to the Christian faith: their exploration is an essential task of theology, and any systematic theology which would ignore these doctrines, or fail to integrate them, particularly those most recent promulgations of Mary's eschatological perfection, is doomed to lapse into that kind of " identity system " which von Balthasar properly condemned in Barth's dogmatics, which is latent in Tillich's systematic theology, and which is all too easy to extrapolate from any theology which would prefer, for its principle of explanation, some immanent dynamism, human or cosmic, whose relation to the grace of the New Creation is at best and finally uninteresting.[21] The Marian doctrines enter theology at the level of method, for the conversion process which the Christian faith demands of any prior anthropology, cosmology, sociology, politics or other humane discipline in order that it become a theology is that by which such a discipline loses its immanent necessity, to become Christocentric. Christ, the new center of existence by which autonomous rationality is freed from its immanence to become a quest for wisdom, is the mediation of the truth of God, but He is this mediation as the *Christus integer,* the New Covenant, the concrete event of the unity, *una*

[21] For a discussion of this difficulty in Rahner's Christology, see Kasp.er, *op. cit., 50-52,* 57-58; for a Marian resolution of the analogous problem in Tillich's ontology of Essential God-Manhood (integral creation), see my *Thomism and the Ontological Theology of Paul Tillich,* 316-328. It is curious that although Tillich appears to have been able to accept the Marian definitions, he found no application of them in his system. Karl Barth on the other hand has recognized the marital character of the Covenantal creation *(Church Dogmatics* 3/1, 183-206) before any of his contemporaries-and is reproached therefore by feminist theologians such as Paul Jewett *(Man as Male and Female: A study in sexual rdationships from a theological point of view,* Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, Mich., 1975)-but was unable to accept the dogmas of Mary's Immaculate Conception and Assumption: see the letter appended to Hans Kueng's study of Barth, cited in note *5.* Consequently, for Barth as for Rahner and Tillich, Chrisbology tends to a monism: in this H. U. von Balthasar's criticism of systematic theology is correct, for none of the systematists, Catholic or Protestant, have taken seriously the Augustinian and Scotist insight into the bi-polarity of the Whole Christ. However, this is hardly a reason for abandoning systematic theology.

caro, of created and Uncreated Wisdom. It is this New Being, to use Tillich's phrase, which is the concern of theology; if it is simply identified with the Son of Man, his presence among us must be understood to be unmediated, unreal, inhuman and unintelligible, except insofar as He is reduced by a" Christology from below" to merely human and non-redemptive dimensions. It is only by Mary's perfect freedom that one may understand that God's presence among men is not inhuman and despotic, an arbitrary exercise of *potentia absoluta.* It is one of the tragedies of Catholic theology that Scotus's Augustinian insight into the Christ-Mary correlation should have so little interested his contemporaries and followers, so that the Scotism of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries should now provide such a paradigm for the poverty of the theological minimalism which governed the decline of medieval theology and the emergence of the anti-sacramentalism of the Reform, as it now governs the regnant American Catholic theological scholarship. [22]

That much deplored axiom of Marian piety, *numquam satis de Maria,* therefore has sounder foundations than much of what passes for theological sophistication in our schools today. In the six centuries of theological doldrums in which the spirit of Ockham has dominated theological speculation by conforming its subject matter to the immanent structures of autonomous reason, Marian piety, nearly bereft of scholarly sustenance, has fed on another food, the One Flesh of the Eucharist, the New Covenant which cannot be undone, even by our neglect. It is faith in this Whole Christ which is Catholic, and the *quae,rens* which ever seeks the *altitudo* of that mystery cannot see it by any other light than that which Mary bore for the world's salvation. [23]

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[22] Duns Scotus, *In Ill Sent.,* 8.1: *"Per illud patet ..•. "*

[23] An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the Institute for Theological Encounter with Science and Tei::luwlogy (!TEST)   held in Columbus, Ohio in January

AUTHORITY AND THEOLOGICAL METHOD

A Review Discussion [*]

I N *ECCLESIAL REFLECTION* and in its predecessor
Ecclesial Man (Fortress Press, 1975) Edward Farley,
professor of theology at the Divinity School of Vanderbilt
University, intends to offer a prolegomenon to theology. In
Ecclesial Man the author addressed what he called " the prob-
lem beneath the problem of theological method," that is, the
question whether faith in Jesus Christ involves reality-refer-
ences and reality-apprehensions. Using social phenomenology
to probe the linguistic, social, and psychological strata of the
faith-world, he showed how faith apprehends directly or indi-
rectly realities of this intersubjective faith-world, the *ecclesia,*
the disrupted but redeemed existence.

Ecclesial Reflection, building upon this foundation, dis-
cusses the problem of theological method or criteriology proper.
It is written with elegance and great didactic skill. The ideas
are carefully argued, often clearly enumerated; the main theses
are highlighted by italics; each chapter or sub-division recapitu-
lates the previous one and concludes with helpful summaries.
It does not, however, mean that the book makes for easy read-
ing, and this partly because it presupposes acquaintance with
Husserlian philosophy and social phenomenology with their
attendant unfamiliar concepts and vocabularies (e.g. lived-
space, social self, cointentions, depth sociality, etc.), partly be-
cause Farley is forced at times by his-perspective to use old
words with new connotations (e.g. *ecclesia, Kerygma,* ecclesial

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*Edward Farley: *Ecclesial Reflection: An Anatomy of Theological Method*
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982).

universal, generic universal, etc.) , and partly because any discussion of methodology cannot help but be abstract.

Apart from its appendix on the general structure of social duration (its conditions, its elements, its process), the book is divided into two almost equal parts, the one critical, the other constructive. Convinced that most contemporary theological work, both Catholic and Protestant, is methodologically incoherent, Farley devotes the first part (pp. 3-168) to a radical critique of the classical criteriology which he calls the " House of Authority." His method is to unearth the various strata from the lowest to the highest that have been inserted into the structure of this House of Authority. He starts out therefore in chapter one with an analysis of the religious matrix that originates the methodology of classical Christian theology: the faith of Israel (Yahwism, covenanted people, land, Torah, tradition); Judaism (synagogue, sacred scriptures, apocalypticism, universalization); and early Christianity which retained and modified these elements of the faith of Israel and of Judaism. Of the faith of Israel, early Christianity preserved the Adamic myth, the *heilsgeschichtlich* framework, but rejected the motif of the land in the sense of a definitive territory given to the elect people as a nationally defined entity. Of Judaism, it took over the apocalyptic worldview, the Scripture principle, the missionary enterprise, and the synagogal organization, but modified them substantially. Instead of synagogue, we find local congregation; instead of rabbis, missionary preachers, and instead of the Torah piety, the Jesus kerygma and Jesus piety.

In the next three chapters Farley traces the route that leads from this religious matrix to the three loci of the classical methodology, namely, Scripture, dogma, and Church. Obviously these three loci are not strictly speaking criteria but norms within the framework of authority. Supporting them are two foundational principles and their middle axioms. The first principle is the interpretative scheme of salvation history with its three elements: the people, their history teleologically interpreted, and the kingly deity who governs through causal

interventions (the " royal metaphor"). This salvation history scheme entails that history can be periodized (e.g. in apocalyptic literature); that the time of revelation can be fixed (e.g. the view that Christian revelation ended with the death of the last apostles); and that in the eschatological age the Church is the definitive institution of doctrinalization and locus of truth. The second principle, that of identity, affirms an identity between what God wills to communicate and what is brought to language in the interpretative act of a human individual or community. Thus the creaturely entity is the *ersatz* presence of the divine, the divine intention is identified with the human interpretation, divine qualities (e.g. infallibility and inerrancy) are predicated of the human agent. This principle comprises three other middle axioms which Farley calls the axiom of secondary representation, the axiom of leveling, and the axiom of immutability. The first axiom extends this identity from the original authoritative figure (e.g. Paul) to his successors (e.g. Titus), from the oral tradition (e.g. the kerygma) to its written deposit (e.g. the New Testament), from this written deposit to its definitive commentary (e.g. the Fathers), from the primitive group (e.g. the apostles) to an institution whose role is to maintain, protect, explicate the tradition and its ongoing interpretation (e.g. the Magisterium). These organs of secondary representation are, sociologically speaking, vehicles of duration whose purpose is to provide social perpetuity to the original identity between God's intention and the human agent. The axiom of leveling presupposes the identity between God's intention and the vehicles of duration operated by the axiom of secondary representation and extends this identity equally to all the several parts of the vehicles and grants them the same divine status (e.g. the theory of inspiration). The axiom of immutability, a corollary of the other two axioms, adds the note of universal applicability to the bearers of the divinely communicated contents.

These founding principles and their middle axioms, which originate from the religion of Israel and Judaism and which

are appropriated by the Christian Church, form the strata upon
which other strata are erected as the locations of divine-
human identity.   The first location is the Sacred Scripture.
Farley's thesis is that the Scripture principle is maintained by
religions that are somehow dependent on synagogal Judaism
 (Islam, Christianity, Mormonism) and that it is Judaism
which gave birth to that principle.   The diaspora Jews, lack-
ing the land, the temple, and the priesthood as institutions
of social duration, created a new institution of social persist-
ence, the synagogue.   To secure their survival they felt the
need of something more identifiable than oral tradition, the
written Torah.   The synagogue was a place of their gathering
under authoritative   teachers for the hearing and interpretation
of the written Torah which now is meant as Yahweh's exhaus-
tive word, equally valid throughout the variety of its texts, as
the law for his dispersed but ethically self-interpreted people.
Christianity, in Farley's account, appropriated but modified
this Scripture principle by means of a new periodization (the
prophecy and fulfillment scheme with Jesus as the dividing
center), a new collection of writings (the New Testament), a
new function of gospel and doctrine, and a new corporate re-
ferent namely the world, and not an ethnic nation.   Attempt-
ing to preserve the Scripture principle while radically modify-
ing it at the same time, Christianity employs a theological
method which is, Farley claims, essentially ambivalent and ulti-
mately incoherent.

   The second and third locations of identity are dogma and
Church. The principle of dogma is rooted in the Scripture prin-
ciple, since Scripture needs a definitive key to render itself
perpetually and universally applicable and resolve its ambi-
guities. Dogma, granted the divine status by the principle of
identity and its middle axioms, became criteria for theology.
With Scripture and dogma the Church too is an authority since
the first two locations require a social institution to perdure.
The Church's specific function (especially the Magisterium) as
the teleological community of salvation is to preside over the

process of salvation and therefore must have the authority both to define and guard the saving Scripture and dogmas.

In chapter five, having uncovered the layers of religious matrix, founding principles, and the three locations of identity of the House of Authority, Farley describes its theological method itself. Basically for him " theological thinking in the classical criteriology is a method of authority and is not a ' science ' in either the ancient or contemporary sense of the word " (p. 108) . It is a way of authority because it locates evidence for judgments in vehicles of social persistence (authorities) rather than in the immediate manifestation of reality; it is in style and genre citation rather than inquiry, interpretation rather than assessment; it restricts the question of truth to the formal question of internal coherence and co-herence with universal rationality. The Church then legiti-mates this criteriology by making it into an article of belief (the myth of apostolicity). Farley points out that this method is employed not only by the Catholic Church but also by the Protestant churches.

Farley concludes the *pars destruens* with a three-levelled thoroughgoing critique of the classical criteriology. On the first level, historical analysis, particularly modern biblical scholar-ship, has revealed unacceptable factual claims; moreover, his-torical consciousness militates against the mode of thought presupposed by the House of Authority. On the second level, social phenomenology shows that the " Scripture principle does not offer a vehicle of duration that corresponds ideally to ecclesial existence" (p. 140) . In fact, for Farley, the Scripture principle is not only unnecessary for the survival of Christianity as a nonethnic and nonhalakic community whose emphasis is not on law but on proclamation, but also incompatible with it as a corporate, universalized, redemptive-existence. Finally on the level of founding principles, Farley argues that the salva-tion history scheme with its royal metaphor must be rejected because it violates creaturely freedom and autonomy and sacri-fices divine goodness and love, and that the principle of iden-

tity with its logic of triumph must also be dismissed " partly
because it partakes of the same problems as the first founda-
tion stone ... and partly because identity between the divine
will and creation is either a synthesis of *meaning* which is in-
accessible or an identity between detailed states of affairs which
violates the autonomy of creatures " (p. 165) . Farley ends
his description of the collapse of the House of Authority with
a warning, in an uncharacteristic flourish of rhetoric, about the
dire consequences of the classical methodology: " That vehicle,
honored as divine, continues to be the occasion and framework
for human pathology, sin, and grief. The way of authority
hardened into the Protestant religion of the book and the
Catholic religion of the institution. It continues to foster ob-
scurantism, dualisms in the human self, superstition, sexism,
reality denial, legalism as a unifying piety and mindset " (p.
168) .

   With the House of Authority in ruins Farley in the second
part (pp. 171-344) sets out to propose a new theological meth-
od in which authority will not be allowed to function as a
criterion of truth. Three problems immediately present them-
selves to Farley's enterprise: Which are the criteria of truth in
this post-authority theology? How do judgments of truth
 (understanding as opposed to precriteriological insights of
faith) occur? What is the content of faith if the precriteriologi-
cal insights of faith are not viewed as determinate dogmas and
if the kernel and husk metaphor adopted by neo-orthodox
Catholic theology to explain the historicity of dogmas is re-
jected? The success of Farley's proposal depends on whether
it can satisfactorily answer these three questions. In the in-
troductory chapter (chapter 8) Farley attends to the first
question by explaining what he understands by criteria. Ob-
viously they cannot be " authorities/' nor are they experience
itself. Experience mediates the faith-world, Farley points out,
but is not the criterion of evidence. Nor can the central and
primary" paramount reality" of the faith-world, namely, God,
be a criterion of evidence since as absolute mystery he is not

accessible. For Farley, " in post-authority theology criteria are themselves fields of evidence. For theology to subject itself to criteria, to consult criteria to support judgments, means simply that it consults appropriate fields of evidence .... Theological criteriology means, then, the description of these fields and how they operate " (p. 178). What those fields are and how they operate Farley will describe in chapters 9-U.

Before doing so, however, Farley explains how the collapse of the House of Authority alters not only the meaning of criteria but the nature of theology itself. Rather than citation or exrlication, theology is reflective inquiry. It is "the attempt to bring pretheological, apprehended realities to formulations intended as true by interrogating the fields of evidence pertinent to those realities" (p. 183). This ecclesial reflection is performed, according to Farley, in three moments or dimensions. The first moment, corresponding to historical and biblical studies, seeks to answer the question: What is ecclesiality? Or, Is that which is under investigation (a doctrine, practice, claim) ecclesial? In other words, one is attempting to depict the fields of evidence as theological criteria. The second moment, corresponding to systematic theologies, introduces other fields of evidence that are   than the ecclesial symbolic universe (the Adam-Gospel story) and the depth social structure of ecclesiality. Here one subjects without reductionism the portraiture of ecclesial existence of the first moment to rational criteria of internal consistency, to external consistency with other realms of factuality, to different ontological philosophies of being and knowledge. This second moment is necessitated by the fact that the Adam-Gospel story claims to be true and valid not only provincially but universally. The outcome of this investigation is the discovery of " determinate universals " as fields of evidence and the truth status of-theological judgments. The third dimension, corresponding to practical theology, moves theological reflection back to the determinacy and concreteness of individual and social situations of the present time. Thus, without the first dimension theology will not be

able to describe the truth-intending ecclesial realities; without
the second dimension theology will discover only provincially,
not universally valid truths; without the third dimension, uni-
versally valid truths will remain powerless, irrelevant, incapable
of transforming the present moment. Farley acknowledges that
his book deals only with the first two dimensions, portraiture
of ecclesial existence and the truth status of theological judg-
ments.

Farley begins his task of uncovering the fields of evidence
with the question whether tradition in the sense of contents
(tradita) can function as a criterion for post-authority
theology. His answer is a qualified yes. " ... Tradition, the
material, historical reference of theology, does occur as a valid
criterion (field of evidence) for theological reflection but is in-
sufficient in itself as a sole criterion " (p. 195). What Farley
wants to eschew is both the purely historical method of the
liberal " Essence of Christianity " theology and the residual
way of authority in neo-orthodox theologies. But how can
tradition be criterion and field of evidence? On the one hand
against the liberal theology Farley argues that the given and
material references which ground theological reflection are not
neutral data but pre-reflective faith-informed "picture" of
ecclesial existence which will be turned into a " portrait " by
a secondary act of theological representation (" portraiture ").
Hence portraiture is a theological activity partly because it is
an essential dimension of theological reflection, partly because
its object is corporate ecclesial existence both as actual and as
ideal, and partly because its results are normative. On the
other hand against neo-orthodox theologies he maintains that
tradition depicted by portraiture is not found in the relative-
historical institutions and their products granted necessary
status by the House of Authority (the *tradita)* but in the depth
sociality, the determinate intersubjectivity of the community.
Hence portraiture is an historical activity because it is itself a
constantly changing enterprise focusing not on some supposed
immutable kernel covered by a changeable husk but on the

unity, the interrelation of features of ecclesiality which is understood not as the essence of Christianity but Christianity as a *type* of historical existence both as partially actualized in historical Christianity and as a telos, ideal, or entelechy. In Farley's view, there are three regions where ecclesiality emerges: the original transition from older types of corporate existence to the new type; ecclesiality's overall mythos and primary symbols; its depth sociality. These three clues to ecclesial existence involve the study of the origins of ecclesiality, depth linguistics, and depth social structures respectively. Only a combination of these three disciplines can produce a portrait of ecclesiality that will serve as a normative and indispensable source for the second and third dimensions of theological reflection.

Farley pursues his task of delineating tradition and traditioning by describing the social duration of ecclesial existence in chapters ten and eleven. The problem is to discern how ecclesiality as a social corporate existence offers itself to theological portraiture, how it rises into fields of evidence which can be drawn on in theological reflection's first dimension. This Farley does by examining the elements of space and time in ecclesial existence with the help of the general phenomenology of social duration (see Appendix for an exposition of this phenomenology). It is important to note that he does not translate the general structure of social duration into the history of Christianity; this is forbidden by the very nature of ecclesiality which is universal, redemptive existence actualized and ideal. Ecclesial time and space presupposes, according to Farley, an originating, normative event which is now remembered, celebrated, and perpetuated down the generations since ecclesiality as a determinate, historical movement must have a beginning, and above all since it is a corporate, universalized redemptive existence. The originating- event, therefore, must be one whose outcome was a corporate existence, a community, and the nature of the event as any historical transition has to be one of universalization. This event is normative in the sense that " it is definitive for the self-interpretation of subsequent

historical expressions of the same type of corporate existence "
 (p. 225). This event for the Christian is of course Jesus of
Nazareth proclaimed as the ideal telos (the "Kingdom of
God ") in a linguistic context (the kerygma or gospel) . This
normative event gave rise to a redeemed space and time, a
new mode of being-in-the-world, both for the individual and
for the community (the "social self") . If sin consists accord-
ing to Farley in absolutizing a particular space and time, then
redemption means deabsolutizing provincial space (and there-
fore there is no provincial space which can be called ecclesial)
and universalizing time. " The ecclesial community is marked
by a time which rises from the cointentions of redeemed indi-
vidual existence into corporate memory. Its £unction, however,
is to disestablish any provincial ecclesial space as the absolute
condition of redemptive being-in-the-world"   (p. 239). In
ecclesial time, therefore, the normative event re-occurs re-
demptively in ever-new situations, deabsolutizing and validat-
ing ever new provincial spaces.

   But how does this redemption occur? In other words, what
is the structure of the ecclesial process? Farley suggests that
there are two poles in this process: transformation and tradi-
tion. Transformation because ecclesiality is redemption of
provincial space; tradition (in the sense of *tradita,* and not
traditio) because redemptive existence also refers to a con-
tinuity which bridges time. The function of retained tradition
is the deabsolutizing and validating of provincial spaces. Tra-
dition is retained not for its own sake as immutable norm but
as the lens through which contemporaneity is experienced; one
does not believe in tradition, rather *through* it one experiences
the ever-changing situations of the world. But how is the past
tradition made available today? First by linguistic sedimenta-
tion so that it can be remembered, celebrated, and taught in
the communities shaped by it; and second, by institutions as
vehicles of social persistence so that it may continue across the
generations.

   Ecclesiality, Farley reminds us, is a social process and there-

fore necessarily involves institutionality. Institutions of ecclesial existence, however, are of a special kind; they must correspond to the nature and structure of ecclesial process and consequently cannot have an absolute, non-historical status . Farley classifies them according to the activities of ecclesial community: proclamatory (preaching, teaching, writing) , sacramental (communion, baptism, marriage, confirmation) and caring (political liberation, individual welfare). These three types of activities have their common matrix in ecclesial process, supplement each other, and pervade each other. They require ecclesial structures that are by nature "paradoxical" (p. 259) insofar as these structures are both separate from and entangled in the contemporary environment; insofar as those who perform these three types of activities are both independent from and dependent on the community; and insofar as the community is both unified and pluralistic. This ecclesial community with distinctive structures, in order to survive, must have, according to Farley, at least the following three features: distinctive leadership in all the three fields of activity; face-to-face relationships; some unity at the level of institutional structure among the various congregations.

Chapter twelve completes the description of ecclesial duration by examining linguistic sedimentation and subsequent interpretation of ecclesiality. In Farley's view, the normative event, in order to persist in the community as normative, must (1) find linguistic expression. (2) That language must be further located in a vehicle that will enable it to persist from generation to generation. (8) That language and vehicle must be granted some sort of normative character (p. 268) . The story of how the event of Jesus found a language, first oral, then written, in which he was to be remembered, celebrated, and testified is well known. Having rejected the Scripture principle Farley is concerned to explain how this language, especially in its written form, is normative. Indeed, it is his conviction that " much of the confusion that attends modern theology is a result of ambiguity and vacillation on this point, symptomatized

in antinomies that attend the commitment to historical-critical methods *and* the Scripture principle" (p. 273). He refuses to locate the normativity of the Scripture in some residual part of it such as salvation history, revelatory events, a canon within a canon, etc. He also refuses to locate it in the early church's criteria for determining canonicity such as apostolic faith or apostolic origin. Finally he also refuses to locate it in a historically constructed Jesus supposedly more reliable than the Christ of piety. Farley recalls that by normative is meant "definitive for the self-interpretation of subsequent expressions of the same type of historical existence" (p. 274). Now if the Scripture is the linguistic, written sedimentation of the normative event, then the normativity of the event somehow must pass over into the Scripture. But what kind of normativity? Of course, not that propounded by the Scripture principle rejected by Farley. The normativity of the Scripture is determined by its literary genre. Now, Farley observes, the genre of the literature of ecclesial origins is neither Torah nor revealed truths but *kerygma.* These writings should not be called 'New Testament' since the term is burdened with the Scripture principle and the salvation history framework. Farley proposes to call them ' Kerygma ', with the upper case, as distinguished from ' kerygma ', with the lower case, the oral preaching. How does the Kerygma exercise its normative function then? According to Farley, in two ways: "as a definitive reference to ecclesiality's subsequent self-interpretation " and "as a lens which, when 'seen through', opens up and judges provincial spaces" (p. 278). How can the writings that attest the originating events of ecclesiality be identified (the problem of the canon) ? Farley proposes three criteria. The work identified as embodying the Kerygma should be one from within some part or movement of the community, thus having the characteristic of a witness; it should with some integrity function as a historical account of the forming of ecclesial existence; it should have to do with the originating event, the event and period of origins.

If the ecclesial writings cannot be called New Testament, then the writings of Israel cannot be called Old Testament either. Farley proposes to call them "the writings of Israel's faith" (p. 283). Rejecting the salvation history scheme Farley maintains that " the faith of Israel is immanent in and consti- tutive of ecclesiality " (p. 285). Ecclesiality does not therefore replace, fulfill, or destroy the faith of Israel. What is celebrated in ecclesiality is *both* the event of Jesus Christ and the story of God, human being, and evil and hope which is the faith of Israel. Consequently the writings of Israel are not abolished in theological reflection but continue to function as bearers of corporate memory *through* which as a lens redemptive reality is seen.

Moreover ecclesial writings, whether writings of Israel's faith or Kerygma, are not self-explanatory but need interpretation. Interpretation, however, is for Farley not so much exegesis of texts but *looking through them* at the provincial spaces and discerning in them both their structure of evil and their pos- sibilities of redemption. This view of interpretation is con- sistent with the way Farley regards the ecclesial writings, not as deposit of immutable laws or truths, but as hermeneutical horizon of experience through which one interprets contem- poraneity. In interpretation a double disclosure occurs: first, the " seeing through " may turn up situational realities of evil and redemption; second, wider and even universal aspects of those realities may contribute to the lens itself, to the insight into the very structure of ecclesiality. Further this living in- terpretation as discernment tends to become sedimented into tradition: oral, written, and institutional. This tradition-inter- pretation (e.g. liturgical practices, hymnodies, creeds, classical works, conciliar declarations, confession, etc.) is a vehicle of duration and self-identity of ecclesial existence. It is also a major source of theological portraiture, not as " authorities " with a priori truth status of course, but as partial, relative his- torical realizations of the ideal, " entelechaic " ecclesiality.

The last two chapters of *Ecclemal Reflection* take up the sec-

ond dimension of theology, namely the judgment about the
truth and universality of ecclesiality. Of course the truth ques-
tion, Farley points out, is already present in the prereflective
stage of faith and in the first dimension, theological portraiture.
Nevertheless it is only in the second dimension, namely theo-
logical understanding and judgment, that the question of truth
is explicitly raised since here a distinction emerges between
the total mythos or tradition of the ecclesial community with
all its elements and judgments about these things.   The ques-
tion of truth concerns two things: reality *(what* grounds theo-
logical claims as true?) and criteria *(how* is the ground present
in fields of evidence which function in the making of theologi-
cal judgments?) *Ecclesial Man* has already dealt with the first
issue; *Ecclesial Reflection* will examine the second. According
to Farley, judgments have four features: they refer to how
reality is, in fact or in structure; they have a universal, "as
such" character and are therefore universally available; they
make a claim, thus implying the appropriate evidence; they
represent the subject's transition from mere insight to self-con-
scious understanding   (the process of doctrinalization).   The
question now is: Can judgments of such features be made of
the faith-world? Can corporate, universal, redemptive exist-
ence be translated into a general ontology so that the realities
of the faith-world, which are the referents of theological judg-
ments, are comparable to Whitehead's *res verae,* Heidegger's
existentials, or Thomas's transcendentals?   Farley's answer to
these questions is no. His reason for this is that the realities of
faith, which are the referents of theological judgments, are uni-
versal in a *unique* way. They are *universal* and *determinate* at
the same time, or "determinate   universals" (p. 310). Their
uniqueness and strangeness results from the fact that in Far-
ley's view they refer only to the totality of the faith-
world but also to the world, being, as such (since sin and re-
demption affect the world as such) ; that sin and redemption to
which they refer are not experienced as something ontologically
a priori and constitutive of human existence, though universally

present; that all ecclesial universals, and hence all theological judgments, refer to the transcendent, the mystery.

If ecclesial universals are not identical with the empirical and generic universals of both the sciences and ontology, how can they be discerned and then formulated in a theological judgment? Farley deals with these two problems in the last chapter of his book. The ecclesial universals are discerned in a process of theological hermeneutics. Farley points out that ecclesial universals are not the result of reflection but are already given there and in some sense precede theological judgment as something to be discerned in two different modes, prereflective and reflective. They are present *prerefiectively* in the faith-world as the bearers of faith's apprehensions in the form of primary symbols. In the *reflective* level, that of portraiture, these primary symbols are grasped not only in their overall symbolic setting and their interrelation to each other, but in their universal references as well, although, at this level, the formulation of these references still remains determinate and provincial. The portrait resulting from this first dimension of theological reflection (portraiture) shows forth primary symbols as candidates for ecclesial universals and thus prepares the way for the discernment of the theological judgment which occurs in the second dimension of ecclesial reflection.

How then does one go about locating candidates for ecclesial universals according to Farley? By interpreting the three types. of ecclesial literature, the Kerygma, the writings of the faith of Israel, and Interpretation, not as discrete texts (" authorities") but as embodiment of fundamental imagery: the Christ, hope, sin, God. In this interpretation, the Kerygma has a certain primacy in relation to the other two literatures because " it contains in an explicit way the primary paradigm of ecclesiality, the paradigm of a strange, new universal availability of salvation " (p.   .

Discerning ecclesial universals by means of portraiture alone is not sufficient; Farley strongly insists against historicism and pietism that theological reflection must end with judgments.

The move from portraiture to judgment, however, is not a move from hypothesis to verification in the model of scientific explanation, even though elements of causal efficacy are present in the Christian myths. Nevertheless such a move, in Farley's view, retains formal features of judgments as such insofar as it means both a new level of cognition, a seeing into the reference, and a formulation of such in evidential mode. Therefore in its judgments " theology reviews the truth-intentions which attend faith as to their claims about how the world is and as to the evidence for those claims" (pp. 333-334). In judgments, then, theological reflection issues forth in "understanding." Farley summarises neatly the move to theological judgment as " a move from identifying potential candidates for ecclesial universals in their setting in ecclesial existence to a formulation (or abandonment) of these candidates as universals by uncovering their world structural (as suchness) elements" (p. 335) .

Implied in this statement is a particular view of the relationship between the symbols and the realities of faith-world on the one hand and the structure of being on the other. Farley suggests that there is on the one hand a distinctive ontological reality content in the faith-world and its symbols different from the generic universals of ontology. On the other hand the world structures are immanent in the experience and the language of the faith-world so that faith realities and world structures are distinguishable yet inseparable. Because there is a distinctive as-suchness and universality immanent in the ecclesial universal itself, the task of theological judgment is to discern and formulate that immanent universality. How can this task be done? Not, of course, by translating ecclesial universals into generic universals of ontology (" generic hermeneutics ") nor by translating them into particulars (" relevance hermeneutics ") . The method suggested by Farley is using generic universals of ontology as" devices, even lenses, through which one can view the figure, the ecclesial universal, by means of which one can uncover the way that the generic universal has undergone modification in the ecclesial universal " (p. 338) . When

that modification is discovered, Farley is confident, a world structural element of the ecclesial universal has appeared, something which gives the reference of the figure its universal character and which is identical neither with the generic universals of ontology nor empirical science. The move, therefore, is from the symbol through the generic universal to the ecclesial universal.

Farley's heuristic use of generic universals in order to discover the ecclesial universals implies not only that there is an analogy between them but also that these two groups of universals do not constitute two separable realms side by side to each other. Indeed the generic universals are immanent in the ecclesial universals. The question now is: how do the world structures immanent in ecclesial universals reflect reality as it is discerned by ontology? Farley must answer this question in order to show how theological judgments can be said to be true or false. According to him, theological judgments are true only if their claims can be grounded in as-such and world structural references. He proposes three ways in which these references occur in the faith-world according to the myth of creation and redemption: "(1) as the created reality presupposed by the theodicy myth itself and present in every faith-world reality both as the possibility of redemption and the reality behind the distortion; (2) as the distorted modifications of generic universals in sin; and (3) as a field open to redemption and divine presence" (p. 344).

This rather detailed analysis of *Ecclesial Reflection* reflects the reviewer's conviction that it is an important work with radical consequences for theological method. In the remaining pages I will attempt to indicate the main virtues of this book and raise some questions for further considerations. One of the most useful contributions Farley has render_edto theology is his consistent appropriation of phenomenology and sociology in working out a prolegomenon to theology and in conceiving the nature of theology and its tasks. *Eccle.nal Man* contains an excellent introduction to (Husserlian) phenomenology (pp. 3-

82) and its impact on theology (pp. 235-272) and *Ecclesial Reflection* offers an informative summary of the sociology of social duration (pp. 345-373). While avoiding sociologism, Farley's analysis provides an illuminating account of how Christianity as a social movement originated and survived by means of vehicles of social duration throughout the centuries and still retained its distinctive essence. Whether Farley's attempt to utilize phenomenology and sociology as a comprehensive framework for theology is successful or not remains yet to be determined.

As a result of his skillful use of phenomenology and sociology Farley has been able to offer a coherent study of tradition both as *traditio* and *tradita* and its positive role for theological reflection. He has also restored a structural unity to the various theological disciplines (biblical-historical studies, systematic theology, and practical theology) by insisting on their necessary ecclesial character. Lastly, important too is his retention of truth (its formulation in judgments) as the goal of theological hermeneutics (portraiture).

While acknowledging Farley's valuable contributions to theology, especially to theological method, I would like to point out some issues which in my estimation need further clarification and perhaps also correction. First, his description of the classical method, which he calls the House of Authority. Even allowing for the unavoidable oversimplification attendant to such a description, one must say that it is a portrait of extreme fu:ndamentalistic theology and its method, and not of the mainline, " average " theological tradition, both Catholic and Protestant, not even of the neo-orthodox theologies (Rahner, in particular) . It may be true that the principle of identity and its middle axioms are operative in authoritarian, dogmatist, fundamentalist theologies; but then these theologies are ideologies rather than theologies. It is quite untrue to say they are applied in contemporary Catholic theology, even that of the Magisterium. Farley's statement that in classical theology "the locus of divine-human identity, the authority, is itself the

evidence or the location of evidence for religious belief and theological judgment" (p. 110) is an accurate description of demagogic, Bible-thumbing or Denzinger-leafing preachers but is a caricature of serious past and contemporary theological reflection. The same thing should be said of his characterization of classical theology as citation and exposition, concerned only with the formal question of truth. Finally, his critique of the salvation history scheme and the principle of identity on the ground that both ultimately fail to provide a satisfactory answer to the problem of God's goodness and the presence of evil (pp. 153-165) is understandable enough but quite off the target since the theodicy question is the outcome of our assertions about God's omnipotence and goodness and man's freedom as such, whether the salvation history framework and the principle of identity are adopted or not. The most that can be said is that these two principles make the problem more acute, but it is wrong to think that it will not exist or is resolved if they are not used as methodological principles. Indeed, it is quite doubtful whether any theology, even the one built outside the House of Authority, on Farley's own foundation, is able to provide a satisfactory answer to this problem.

Does it follow then that the mainline Christian theology, and for that matter, Farley's theology, can be done without at some point using" authority" (e.g. a text) as evidence? Farley notes in several places (pp. 206-210; 221-225; 248-249) the historical origin of ecclesial existence and points to Jesus of Nazareth as this origin. In *Ecclesial Man* he described the religious a priori grounding the historical language and intersubjectivity of the corporate, universal, redemptive community (ecclesiality) as the refusal to accept chaos, death, and evil as final (pp. 127-149). Following Husserl's distinction between (direct) presentation and (indirect) appresentation he claims that these direct presentations of religious language, a priori references to redemption, and ecclesial intersubjectivity are accompanied by appresentations of the historical redeemer and transcendent creator (pp. 206-234). Apart from the question-

able assumption that appresentations, which in Husserl are re-
stricted to spatio-temporal objects, can reach the transcendent,
it is difficult to see how Farley can identify the Jesus of history
as the redeemer (even granting that present appresentations
can reach a historical redeemer) without attributing at some
point to the texts that proclaim him to be such an " authorita-
tive" status, notwithstanding what he claims in *Ecclesial Man,*
pp. U7-220.

   This brings up the issue of how Farley proposes to use the
writings of Israel, the Kerygma, and Interpretation in theo-
logizing. For him, we may recall, they are to be used as lenses
through which one can discern ecclesiality (pp. 277-278, 289,
292-293, 333, 338) . Despite his protest against the charge of
perspectivism (p. 278), it is hard to see how he can success-
fully escape it. Lenses *per se* are devoid of content; they limit
one's vision to a certain *mode* of perception. **If** the ecclesial
writings in their threefold form are simply " lenses " through
which one sees reality, then their material contents should not
be given normative status. But if they are to be considered as
norm, then the writings themselves should be seen as more
than lenses, especially if certain of these contents cannot be
reached either through presentation or appresentation but only
as asserted by them. An example would clarify this point. Sup-
pose I were to reflect on the origins of Christian existence; ob-
viously I need to look into the "New Testament," especially
the gospels. Should I use them merely as lenses to look into
reality and hopefully discern evil and redemption in it, or
should I also pay serious attention to their claim that Jesus
rose from the dead? I presume that Jesus's resurrection, how-
ever we understand it, is *now* available neither to presentation
nor to appresentation. How then can Jesus's resurrection, which
is the center of the New Testament proclamation, function as a
lens, as a hermeneutical horizon, unless I have already accepted
it as a fact on the basis (and authority) of the witness? Given
the central position of this visual metaphor in Farley's her-

meneutics it is regrettable that he has not elaborated more clearly and precisely on how it actually functions in practice.

Another matter that needs clarification is Farley's posture towards the writings of Israel and its relationship to the litera- ture of the initial transition to ecclesiality, the "New Testa- ment," which he calls *Kerygma.* While strongly rejecting the salvation history scheme and consequently insisting that the writings of Israel (the "Old Testament") must be read on their own terms, and not as " a subordinate or inferior source of theological portraiture of ecclesiality" (p. 291), Farley also maintains that in interpreting these writings and their sedi- mented interpretations a "certain primacy" must be given to the Kerygma in relation to the other two literatures. The rea- son for this is that the Kerygma testifies to salvation in its uni- versalized mode whereas the writings of Israel testify to it in its territorial and ethnic framework. There is, therefore, in them, to use Farley's words, an "entelechy" (p. 286), a" teleology" (p. 328) towards the Kerygma. One wonders then whether there is anything more than a semantic difference between the classical view (not the extreme allegory exegesis or the funda- mentalist prophecy-fulfillment proof-text reading) and Farley's. Indeed, one wonders why he should bother himself with pre- serving the normativity of the Kerygma collection at all since his three conditions for canonicity (pp. 278-280) would easily be fulfilled by any book at any time. Finally,. one also wonders whether he is fully consistent when on the one hand he blasts against the salvation history framework and its axiom of periodization (pp. 28-32; 155-157) and on the other continues to maintain the three chronologcially successive literatures, the writings of Israel, the Kerygma, and the Interpretation, with the first "entelechizing" towards the second, and the third sub- jected to both the second and the first.

Both *Ecclesial Man* and *Ecclesial Reflection* constitute an ambitious enterprise to re-think theology and its method out- side the House of Authority. If the "House of Authority" is understood as the fundamentalistic, literalistic, and authori-

tarian way of doing theology, then Farley has delivered a powerful *coup de grace* to it, and three cheers for him. But if a new method is proposed for theology in which no " authority " of any kind is allowed to function as methodological criterion, then some of the issues cited above need further clarification before" a virtual Newtonian revolution of piety and tradition" (p. 277, n. 6) can occur so that his proposal may be acceptable.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Problems of Theology. By BRIAN HEBBLETHWAITE. Cambridge University Press: 1980. Pp. 164. $21.50.

The main content of this book is a wide ranging study of theology as an academic discipline among other academic disciplines. This includes much discussion of the object and methods of theology compared and contrasted with those of the history or phenomenology of religions, psychology and the social sciences, philosophy and history, both church history and secular history. Particular attention is given to the problem of revelation as a claim to data not generally available or not subject to regular scrutiny, to the relation between ethics and theology and to the problem of the relationship of theology to official church doctrine. All this is done with astonishing competence, considering the range of content and the brevity of the text. It must be said that the writing is very dense and at times extremely hard to follow.

Such is the content. The purpose of the book is to demonstrate and defend the place of theology in the (secular) university by explaining its method, content and scope. In the feisty opening chapter, Hebblethwaite lays out all the cards he means to play, but by this time the reader is caught. The harmless looking little book in the bland blue dustjacket turns out to be first cousin to the Trojan horse and fraternal twin to the letter bomb. It unmasks a pervasive hidden assumption, an unacknowledged bias in the main stream of contemporary religious studies with a powerful if idiosyncratic logic. The setting and the manner of the argument are British. American readers may have some difficulty following the thread of the argument at first but the book rewards persevering readers generously.

The thesis of the book is this : to include theology within the category of " religious studies " implies an underlying assumption that God does not exist, for if God exists then " religious studies " must necessarily be included in theology (p. 3). The author's definition of theology is "rational talk about God" (pp. 1, 6, and throughout). His implied definition of " religious studies" appears to be " rational talk about religious behavior and beliefs ", such as would be meaningful whether or not the beliefs are well-founded or the behavior justified. His concern, though never explicitly stated in quite this way, appears to be that there is an alliance at work among three very unlikely partners and that two of them are probably unaware of what is going on. These partners are atheist

scholars and academic administrators. whether these be theoretical or merely practical atheists, rigorist or fundamentalist theologians, of whatever faith or denomination they may be, and those extremely liberal (not radical) theologians to whom the particularity of their tradition and its claims is no longer important because they are willing to follow the Hegelian notion that religion attains maturity by resolving itself into philosophy.

Hebblethwaite's understanding appears to be that the consensus over establishment of religious studies in universities and colleges (rather than theology, though this might be included as a small area of descriptive study within the " academically respectable " field of religious studies) is totally coherent from the point of view of the atheists, but a trap for the other two parties. The doctrinaire theologian is the one who will not bring his discussion into the public forum of the academic world because he claims privileged data, methods and conclusions. If the establishment of religious studies keeps him out of the academic limelight but guarantees him a corner which he is sure he could not otherwise occupy, he is cautiously satisfied. **If** religious studies exclude him, he is probably relieved in any case, because he is convinced that he has nothing to discuss with his unbelieving colleagues in the secular university and had better pursue his theological activities in an isolated world of believers. As this world shrinks and many traditions are closely intertwined in society, such theologians have less and less to say even to believers. They can be progressively discounted, which is of course a desirable development from the atheists' point of view. The extremely liberal theologians are happy to be invited into the liberal arena because they judge the validity of the theological enterprise by the atheists' standards. They respond to those standards by readily eliminating the particularity of the tradition and its claims. They are not interested in what is characteristic of their traditions but only in what is common to all traditions. They are chary of claims of revelation and of specific acts of God in history. They are apparently doing this as a way of saving faith and theology in a secular and pluralistic society. They do not see that instead of saving them they are losing them to the atheists' game plan.

It should be stated here that nowhere in the book does the author set this out explicitly. However, the embroiled and entangled reviewer, tenaciously following the line of argumentation of the book and trying to discover to whom it was really addressed and why, came to the conclusion .that this is the situation the author sees, and found herself not unsympathetic to the interpretation of the situatiou and to the solution offered when the author sets out " to suggest a particular hypothesis about the proper nature and scope of theology today" (p. viii). That particular hypothesis is not succinctly stated in a way that could be quoted here. Its characteristic elements seem to be : theology has a right to claim its

own particular sources in revelation (almost exactly the position of Aquinas with whom Hebblethwaite remains on very amiable terms throughout) ; theology is obliged to establish the credibility of the revelation in which it is grounded as well as the internal and contextual coherence of the worldview founded upon it (a thoroughly Catholic position from the Anglican Fellow and Dean of Chapel of Queen's College, Cambridge, who is also University Lecturer in Divinity); in our times this must be done in the public forum of honest intellectual exchange with scholars in the human and social sciences, as well as those in the natural sciences, history and philosophy, and that in spite of what the author sees as the fractured condition of philosophy in our times and the limited scope of other disciplines which regard religion often from one aspect which distorts it; in our times it must also be done within a particular tradition but in continuing conversation with the other great religious traditions of the world in sensitive and well-informed awareness of the claims that they are making and the grounds on which they substantiate them; finally it niust genuinely be done in the open forum of the intellectual exchange of the university so that the unbeliever may participate in it as a respected and welcome partner who may both challenge and be challenged on the assumptions made, the coherence of the arguments put forward, and the conclusions drawn.

Hebblethwaite assumes that in the contemporary world most educated people do not believe in God (p. 1), an assumption Americans may wish to question. In the name of tolerance and objectivity, therefore, it is usually claimed that the proper object of study is people's religious behavior and belief, a claim with which the author takes issue because it begs the question. If God exists, then theology as he defines it can only be the most comprehensive study which situates all other concerns within the relationship of human persons and the world to God. This will influence the questions asked and the expectations of all other academic disciplines (" subjects" in Hebblethwaite's British vocabulary). Therefore the question of God's existence must at least be seriously pursued. Moreover, because that question cannot be resolved to the point of general consensus, theology has at least the right to exist on its own terms in the secular university side by side with an (explicitly or implicitly) atheist construction of the pursuit of learning.

Hebblethwaite goes so far as to give the intellectually honest atheist a role in theology. He bases this on the understanding that such a person can entertain hypotheses by which one may enter sympathetically into the possibility that God exists and construct an interpretation of reality viable within those hypotheses. He envisages a fruitful exchange between believer and unbeliever not only on the grounds for belief but also on the coherence of the interpretations of reality given from the believer's posi-

tion (pp. 4, 32-34). But the point at issue is that this can only be done with intellectual integrity on the believer's ground, that is from within, and not on the unbeliever's ground from without, because it is clear that the coherence of the position cannot be seen from without. Thus he takes issue with the not uncommon assumption that religious questions can be studied with intellectual honesty from a stance of " methodological atheism " and that this gives objectivity to the endeavor. This objection is supported in an interesting way from the structuralist approach of cultural anthropologist Levi-Strauss and the field-work of E. Evans-Pritchard and Godfrey Lienhardt (pp. 49-51). It is his conviction about the subtle but inherent bias of the more usual approach to religious questions by the various academic disciplines that is at stake for Hebblethwaite in the structuring of programs where the choice lies between theology standing in its own right (and including within its horizons various aspects of religious studies) and religious studies as a composite or interdisciplinary field concerning itself with religious behavior, including religious beliefs.

In spite of certain disavowals (e.g. pp. 72-73) the author in fact tries to bring theology back almost full circle to the standing among other disciplines and the basic assumptions and starting points that it had for Anselm and Aquinas (pp. 70-73), whom he lauds explicitly (p. 10) along with Athanasius and Augustine. He takes into account the Kantian, Hegelian and (by implication) Comtian revolutions in thinking about God, not to mention the Freudian and Jungian questions thrown into the process, but then discovers a solidity in the traditional authors which survives through these revolutions albeit in further refinement that is not to be understood as excluding other traditions or taking them less than seriously. It is rather a question of bringing Christian tradition into fully serious conversation with other secular and religious traditions, and in this Hebblethwaite does expect the uncovering and testing of truth, even the truth of propositions about God and about the action of God in history and the relationship of human persons and the world to God. What he sees as a positive legacy of the Enlightenment consists of *new questions* on the appropriate understanding " of the relation between God and the world and of the way God acts in the world" (p. 13).

In addressing such new questions, the author rejects the stance taken by Karl Barth, which he characterizes as a retreat into a private certainty not subject to critical study in the open forum and therefore not allowing for theology as an intellectual discipline with its place in the university (p. 15-16). But he also rejects the stance popularized by John A. T. Robinson (of *Honest to God* fame) because the latter seems to claim too much for common experience. thereby apparently disallowing or devaluing the particular self-revelation of God in Christian history (p. 17). He

rather consistently aligns himself with the basic stance taken by Wolfhart Pannenberg (e.g. pp. 115, 120).

Hebblethwaite envisages proper method in theology as that which is critical and self-critical in all aspects and therefore also willing to engage in public scrutiny of faith itself and "its rational basis in conviction ", and which is therefore really a plurality of methods akin to the critical methods used in philosophy, history and the study of ancient texts (p. 18). Taking this view, he also takes issue with Bernard Lonergan *(Method in Theology)* because of his apparent claim to reduce all theological method to one program and because of his insistence on the specific role of religious conversion at one particular point in the program (p. 19). Hebblethwaite's keen sensitivity to the contemporary need to do theology in the wider ecumenical context prompts him to look back to the classics of Catholic theology for an approach that seeks to wed reason with revelation and to enter into public discussion of the rational grounds of credibility.

Most of this is really set out in the opening chapter and substantiated in the remainder of the book. In pursuit of his defense of theology the author makes a comparison of its stance and methods with those of comparative religion or phenomenology of religion (Ch. 2), those of psychology and the social sciences (Ch. 3), of philosophy (Ch. 4) and of history (Ch. 6). He exhibits and assumes in the reader a rather wide acquaintance with these fields. He also interpolates a significant reflection on the "problem of revelation" (Ch. 5) and concludes with considerations of the position of ethical problems among these disciplines (Ch. 7) and of the problem of doctrine and doctrinal theology today (Ch. 8).

As the author himself readily admits, he is attempting too much in this one brief volume to do justice to these fields. Occasionally one is left gasping over a conspicuous omission, such as that of Karl Rahner on the question of revelation, where Hebblethwaite seems to be groping for just the sort of approach that Rahner provides, and the omission of the political theory of J. B. Metz and the liberation theology of Latin America and other Third World countries in Chapter 7 where these seem to be what he is looking for. The present reviewer, who came to systematic theology by way of the social sciences, found Chapters 2 and 3 insightful but very thin and Chapter 8 only tantalizing for its further possibilities. However, the challenge and usefulness of the book is not in the way the author works out his thesis in detail but rather in the central thesis itself which ought to be studied and discussed widely among American theologians and academic administrators. This is not a book for students but for those who are already professionals.

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Skeptical Essays. By BENSON MA.TES. Chicago: University of Chicago
  Press, 1981. Pp. xi **+** 176. $17.00.

" The principal traditional problems of Philosophy are genuine intel-
lectual knots; they are intelligible enough, but at the same time they are
absolutely insoluble." So runs the pessimistic thesis of Benson Mates's
Skeptical Essays. The outline of his argument is to identify the essential
features of " genuine intellectual knots " or paradoxes, select paradigm
paradoxes, and demonstrate tha;t they have these features, and then to
identify two principal problems of philosophy which share these essential
features.

A paradox is a seemingly valid argument that has apparently true
premises yet an implausible or self-contradictory conclusion. A paradigm
paradox is reasonably short, has logical transitions which satisfy standards
as high as are imposed on reasoning anywhere else, and it should appear
that there are no slippery logical transitions or ' fuzzy ' terms. In short,
there must appear to be no way to avoid the conclusion.

Mates selects the Liar's and Russell's Paradoxes as paradigms. After
clearly stating each, he rehearses their major purported solutions and
carefully indicates the inadequacy of each solution. The intention is to
demonstrate not only that these paradoxes have the aforementioned char-
acteristics, but also that, although there is unanimous agreement among
philosophers that something is wrong, no proffered solution has ever
gained more than a minority as adherents.

The two problems of philosophy, identified by Mates as intelligible yet
insoluble, concern the freedom of the will and our knowledge of the ex-
ternal world. The former is a metaphysical problem of practical signifi-
cance, the latter is epistemological with questionable practical implica-
tions. Mates, following his program, clearly states each problem, presents
significant purported solutions, then points out the shortcomings of each
solution. He thereby re-establishes the initial problem and demonstrates
the existence of the relevant paradoxical characteristics.

The second chapter contains, among other more concise theoretical solu-
tions, an extended discussion of Austin's attempt as presented in his
"A Plea For Excuses" to solve the Free Will problem. It is his conten-
tion that the very statement of the Free Will problem is unintelligible
because of the misuse of the critical qualifiers" freely" and "voluntarily"·
In a lucid rebuttal, Mates argues that not only are Austin's criteria for
the applicability of these qualifiers mistaken, but also that the Free Will
problem can be stated without their use.

The third chapter moves briskly through the history of philosophy and
the various prominent attempts by notable philosophers to solve the prob-
lem of Our Knowledge of the External World. By design, though, no

attempt is made to present either a comprehensive or a meticulous set of
solutions or rejections of these solutions. The aim is always to establish
and perpetuate a sense of philosophic wonder and paradox. In this re-
spect Mates is successful. But granted that Mates establishes his skeptical
thesis, there is little suggestion as to what is to be made of the resulting
intellectual paralysis.   What is the purpose and value of philosophy in
the event that the principal philosophic problems are insoluble'   Addi-
tionally, what other traditional   principal   problems does Mates have in
mind' *No* answers are given or suggested.

   Mates is at his best when stating the relevant philosophic problems and
providing a 'map' of the historical attempts to solve them. The prose
and logic are straightforward,   crisp, and lively. One only wishes he had
said a little more about what, if anything, comes next.

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Emotion.   By WILLIAM LYONS. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
      1980. Pp. xi + 230. $29.50.

   Dr. Lyons concentrates -0n emotional states rather than on emotions
considered dispositionally.   His argument is that they can be accounted
for by ' the causal-evaluative theory ' in terms of which ' X is deemed an
emotional state if and only if X is a physiologically abnormal state caused
by the subject of that state's evaluation of his or her situation' (pp. 57 f).
According to Lyons, the physiological changes which go with emotional
states can be evidence of an emotion's presence, but they are not neces-
sarily evidence of some particular emotion and " there is no one special
feeling that we can invariably connect with any particular emotion and
with that emotion alone " (p. 133). Nor is there any particular form of
purposive behavior characteristic of any particular emoti-0n, as, say,
eating is characteristic of hunger.

   Lyons also thinks that emotions have formal and particular objects.
An emotion's formal object is a general evaluative category (e.g. 'the
dangerous '), which is not a cause. A particular object of an emotion is
something like a person, an event, or the content of a belief. But it is
not necessarily an item " capable of being described in any definite way "
(p. 105), and it can be illusory or non-illusory. In Lyons's view emotions
can also be motives. Although one can do something from a motive without
wanting to do what one actually does, a motive, so Lyons argues, is often

a cause. And when a motive is a cause the action to which it is attributed
can be explained by a desire, though desires or wants are not intentions
and one can have a motive for doing something without wanting to do it.
An emotion can thus be a motive by including a want (either conscious
or unconscious) which could have been, or is, or could become a deliberate
cause of an action.

   Lyons also holds that emotions can give rise to purposive behavior,
though emotions are not activities and, therefore, they are not things
which can be done for a purpose. " Emotions include beliefs, evaluations
and wants which cannot be induced at will, as they are not like actions or
performances which one can do on demand, but are more like reactions
or responses engendered or stirred up in us by conditions which we usually
cannot control " (p. 196). But emotions can be useful to those who have
them, and, in this sense, can be purposive, though also disruptive.

   Turning finally to the topic of emotions and blame, Lyons argues that
"there are a number of ways in which we can control our emotions and
so a number of ways in which we can be blamed in respect of our emo-
tions" (p. 193). We can put ourselves into, and also avoid, situations
where a certain emotional state is likely to arise. We can extricate our-
selves from situations which bring about emotional states. We can get
ourselves out of an emotional state by listening to argument. We can get
ourselves into an emotional state by putting ourselves in the way of be-
lieving certain things. We can " protect and promote an emotion by
fostering the conditions in which it is likely to prosper" (p. 199). We
can also control or hide or wallow in the non-purposive expressions of
emotion (e.g. weeping). The conclusion to be drawn is that **"if** each of
the ways we can be said to exercise control over our emotions can give
rise to some undesirable upshot so that the person having the emotion can
be held responsible for the undesirable upshot, and if it is presumed that,
in the cases exemplifying these ways, there are no mitigating circum-
stances, then all the conditions for blame have been fulfilled in respect
of a person's emotions " (p. 202).

   Lyons has taken on a difficult and complex subject, and much of what
he says invites questions to which he might profitably have addressed
himself. Animals, for example, seem able to undergo fear and pleasure,
yet in what sense do they evaluate with reference to beliefs¥ According
to Lyons "**it** would seem odd to blame harmless malice" (p. 195); but
why can we not blame someone for harboring malicious thoughts' Even
if someone always acts well, is it odd to say to him " I know what you're
thinking, and you ought to be ashamed of   And why should
we agree that, as Lyons maintains, for Aquinas " emotion is firstly a felt
tendency, that is a desire which is, in the first instance, physiological and
set into motion by perception alone, unmediated by beliefs and evalua-

tions" (p. 36) Aquinas holds that the *passiones animae* depend on their subject's recognition of things as good or bad (S.T. 1a, 2ae, 22, 2), which means that he does not sharply distinguish between feeling and believing in the way implied by Lyons.

These criticisms aside, however, I think it must be said that Lyons has done his job very well indeed. Extraordinarily well, in fact. His book is a model of clarity and it abounds in careful and balanced reasoning. And, as far as I can see, it advances a first-rate defence of the theory for which it argues. Though its tone is constru0tive rather than polemical, it also manages some very effective swipes at a number of dubious pronouncements, notably ones by Descartes, Skinner, Freud, and Sartre. At several points in his text Lyons also offers some useful correctives to Anthony Kenny's *.Action, Emotion and Will* (1963), with which it must now be included in any serious bibliography on the question of emotion.

It might be worth adding that anyone unconvinced by Lyons on emotion and feelings could fruitfully ponder on the following quotation from *Pepys's Diary,* which is missed by Lyons but cited to good effect in C. S. Lewis's *Screwtape Proposes a Toast* (1965) :

> With my wife to the King's House to see *The Virgin Martwr,* and it was mighty pleasant ... But that which did please me beyond anything in the whole world was the wind musick when the angel comes down, which is so sweet that it ravished me and, indeed, in a word, did wrap up my soul so that it made me really sick, just as I have formerly been when in love with my wife ... and it makes me resolve to practise wind musick and to make my wife do the like. (27th February, 1688.)

According to Lyons, " it seems impossible to assert that one is in the grip of such and such an emotion just by introspecting the quality or type of one's present feeling" (p. 133). Pepys would presumably have agreed.

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The Political Philosophy of the Frankfurt School. By GEORGE FRIEDMAN. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1981. Pp. 312. $17.50.

Like a guest at a disappointing dinner party, a reader sometimes finishes a book thinking it a splendid failure. Such is my reaction to George Friedman's *The Political Philosophy of the Frankfurt School.* Since Friedman views the work of the Frankfurt School as itself a failure, there is

more than a little irony in this. By assuming that the Frankfurt School
intended to produce a recipe for overcoming " the bankruptcy of mod-
ernity," Friedman manages to turn what could have been food for thought
into a dining disaster.

There is much that is inviting in Friedman's bill of fare. The book is
well-written, lucidly presented, and vigorously argued, qualities which
rarely come to mind when considering the merits of other discussions of
the Frankfurt School. Even more appetizing is the promise of a fresh
perspective. First, Friedman advertises his thesis as something other than
intellectual history, which Martin Jay, of course, has already done. In-
stead, his recipe calls for " a systematic treatment of the thought of the
Frankfurt School " (p. 21), a reconstruction of their fundamental doc-
trine about politics. Second, he does not present this on an *hors d'oeuvres*
tray, as if the Frankfurt School were significant merely in preparing an
agenda for the critical theory of Jiirgen Habermas. Wellmer, Schroyer,
Bernstein, McCarthy, and Held, all have taken a turn at that arrangement.
By contrast, Friedman focuses exclusively on the first generation, Max
Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and Herbert Marcuse.
Third, his menu is less restricted than most. There is more here than just
one more footnote to the increasingly ponderous tradition of neo-Marxism.
\Vhile Friedman does not deny Marxism's formative influence in defining
the " problematic" of the Frankfurt School, he insists that " what makes
... [it] ... interesting is the non-Marxist origins of its thought" (p. 49).

Having whetted the reader's appetite with such promises, Friedman
serves up his thesis as a three-course meal. The first course, " Philosophic
Roots of the Frankfurt School," makes vegetable soup of what's usually
treated as their neo-Marxist Hegelian foundations. Once these roots are
washed, sorted, and diced for cooking, it is clear that they have been
gathered from the gardens of the Right as well as the Left. Ingredients
identified as Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Spengler are used in equal pro-
portion with those labelled Hegel and Marx. For good measure, the tra-
ditions of Judaism and the criticisms of Freud are thrown in for season-
ing. Upon sampling this mixture, Friedman observes that "although they
appropriated Marxism as the most explicit critique of bourgeois life,
almost any anti-bourgeois aspect of twentieth century intellectual thought
was apt to be pressed into service" (p. 19). Once the soup is served, the
chef invites our response, asking whether such an attempt " to go far
outside Marxism in order to search out in its enemies the potential for
preserving it . . ." marks " the theoretical *coup de grace* " not only for
Marxism but also for the Enlightenment itself. We are given just enough,
in other words, to make us hungry for more.

So skillfully, then, have our appetites been prepared for the second
course, " Posing the Problem of Enlightenment."   But here the reader

finds few surprises, as the Frankfurt School's bread and butter issue, "the dialectic of Enlightenment," is served up in four slightly different entvees. In short, modernity's attempt to rationalize the world at the expense of myth and for the benefit of science-along with the paradoxical consequences which have ensued from it-is outlined schematically as four interrelated crises of reason, of art and culture, of the human psyche, and of history. Each of these comes flavored with the sweet and sour sauce of "negative dialectics." Thus each confirms the fact that "the Enlightenment-progressive as long as it was conquering nature, as long as it was negative-became repressive at the moment of its realization" (p. 202). Since this sauce tends to make each entree taste the same, what saves this course from becoming a bore is Friedman's attempt to show how each crisis also undermines the Frankfurt School's own perspective of criticism. The self-destruction of the Enlightenment cannot fail to threaten the principle of critical negativity itself. Since modernity has embraced the positivity of a technocratic society, and since negativity cannot long survive as an abstract theoretical principle, "effective criticism" can only be sustained by reinstitutionalizing the opposition to modernity. Nevertheless, since the crisis also includes the failure of the Marxist proletariat to take up its role as the agent of "transcendence" in history, the Frankfurt School is left with the desperate search for a new solution to the problem it has analyzed so well. Some sauces, in other words, just can't be left to simmer alone, or they'll evaporate.

The heat generated by boiling away the principle of critical negativity fuels Friedman's attempt at a third course, a souffle, entitled "The Search for a Solution." As every experienced chef knows, souffles are risky business. But Friedman's menu calls for one, and so he struggles to deliver one. Here his need to find something more substantive in the Frankfurt School leads him to rely heavily on the ingredients provided by Benjamin and Marcuse. More defiant of the law of gravity than most souffles, Friedman's emphasizes the discontinuities between the crisis of modernity and its solution. If the proletariat has failed, some new messiah from the margins of modernity may appear. Thus he uses Benjamin's mystical hermeneutic of history to support Marcuse's view of the revolutionary significance of the Student Revolts of the 60's and the subsequent upheavals in the Third World. Such messianism is the active ingredient which makes the souffle rise; it provides, in other words, the agent of historical "transcendence." Its content, the divine promise messianically fulfilled, is "the transfiguration of being" resulting from the liberation of Eros, once "conditions of scarcity "-economic and otherwise-have been eliminated by revolutionized technology. Thus Marcuse's "eroticization of the body and . . . sensualization of the environment " is to rise to the top of the baking mold, thus giving ultimate expression to the Frankfurt School's vision of society.

Given Friedman's thesis concerning the Frankfurt School's failure, it comes as no surprise that at the moment when this souffle is to be pulled from the oven, we see our chef announce dramatically that it has collapsed. Instead of savoring the liberation of Eros, we are forced to inspect the burnt remains of a recipe for moral and political disaster. Marcuse's speculations, now deflated and "wallowing " in the mire of their own excesses, are condemned as infantile, indeed as " bestial" in that, when judged by the perennial standards of Mosaic faith and Aristotelian civic virtue, they are exposed as a subhuman form of self-gratification. Under such circumstances, there is little that a chef can do but send his guests home empty with the promise of another invitation, once the kitchen is thoroughly cleaned. Yet, as they slip into their overcoats, the guests can't help but wonder, "How strange! What went wrong?!"

Friedman's basic error, in my opinion, is to read the Frankfurt School as if it were a recipe for cooking up one more metaphysical world-view. Although the metaphor isn't his, I've used it here to dramatize what I think he's up to. Let me restate the point in methodological terms. It may be subdivided into two parts.

The first concerns the appropriateness *in principle* of giving " systematic treatment" to the thought of the Frankfurt School. As Friedman himself emphasizes, critical theory constitutes something like an "antisystematics " (p. 220), insofar as it defines itself against " the System," i.e., the theory and practice of modern industrial societies. Since the inhumanity of " the System" is revealed in paradigmatic events like Auschwitz and Viet Nam, " :fighting the System" means overcoming dehumanization wherever possible by " negating the negation." Critical theory, which tries to put this protest into theoretical focus, thus proceeds as an "antisystematics."   If Friedman is right about the dynamics of critical theory-and I'm quite sure that he is-isn't there something counter-productive about his basic   Specifically, can a method of anti-systematic thinking be reduced to a system of doctrines about society and   Can it, in other words, be used as a recipe for a post-modern or anti-modern world-view without contradicting its essentially negative character.

Second, it seems that *in fact* Friedman's "systematic treatment" is seriously inadequate. The problem here is the selection of the authors representing the Frankfurt School, and the manner in which their thoughts are harmonized. It is customary to identify Horkheimer and Adorno as central to the school and the others as peripheral. By contrast, Friedman gives Benjamin and Marcuse equal billing with Horkheimer and Adorno, despite the fact that there were deep disagreements between the latter pair and the former. Nevertheless, Friedman's recipe requires a metaphysical sensibility from Benjamin and an ethic and eschatology

from Marcuse. In any case, it remains an interesting thought experiment to try to reconstruct whatever hidden affinities may link Marcuse's *Eros and Civilization* and Benjamin's " Theses on the Philosophy of History" with Horkheimer's *Eclipse of Reason* and Adorno's *Negative Dialectics.* But when Friedman conflates these so that the latter are rounded out doctrinally by appeal to the former, only to condemn the resulting "system " as subhuman, the reader is entitled to suspect that the experiment was rigged from the beginning. The difficulty, in short, is not that Friedman has failed to persuade me to give up my sympathy for the Frankfurt School; rather, it is that a " systematic treatment " pursued in this way makes it impossible to see what critical theory is really all about.

Let me try to define the area of disagreement more precisely. Once critical theory is read as another metaphysical world-view, many of Friedman's criticisms make sense. Of course, it fails to provide a satisfactory answer to the ontological question raised by death; of course, it fails to develop a transcendental grounding for a retrieval of Aristotelian civic virtue. Of course, it fails " to get Marx off the hook by partial purchases of a non-Marxist ontology" (p. 299). In short, of course it fails to overcome "the bankruptcy of modernity "; for the questions that modernity poses for Friedman are ultimately metaphysical questions, and he refuses to be satisfied with anything less than a metaphysical answer. Friedman's refusal, no doubt, must be taken seriously; but it is simply a mistake to assume his perspective as the basis for evaluating the work of the Frankfurt School. They are after two different things.

Any effective criticism of the Frankfurt School must begin by respecting the metaphysically agnostic character of negative dialectics. There are serious difficulties for both theory and practice entailed by this method, and Friedman has succeeded in identifying many of these. Where he fails is in assuming that these difficulties forced the Frankfurt School quietly to abandon the negative dialectic in favor of a positive and therefore essentially static world-view. Ironically, what gives the lie to Friedman's assumption is the criticisms usually-and more insightfully-directed against Horkheimer and Adorno, namely, that their refusal to be anything but negative leaves them the unwitting representatives of " stoic resignation" in the face of the crisis of modernity. Such may be the case; but even **if** their silence before the metaphysician's perennial questions amounts to " stoic resignation," it must still be accepted as the point of departure for any insight into the " problematic " of the Frankfurt School. An interpretation of the Frankfurt School's failure would have been welcome; but given Friedman's assumption, what should have been recognized as splendid gets treated as merely contemptible.

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How Bra;ve a New World?   By RrcmARD A. McCoRMIOK. Garden City:
     Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1981. Pp. 440. $15.95.

This is a collection of previously published essays, all of which relate
to the ethical issues generated by contemporary biological and medical
developments. The volume is divided into seven major sections: (a) gen-
eral methodological reflections, (b) experimentation and the incompetent,
(c) abortion, morality, and public policy, (d) contraceptive interventions,
(e) reproductive technological genetics, (f) the preservation of life (es-
pecially those cases wherein technology promises seemingly open-ended
extension of some degree of life), and (g) the quality of life.

There is also an appendix, " The Principle of Double Effect," a concise
summary of McCormick's research and refleetions on this topic as of 1976.
Those who wrestle with this topic will want to consult this particular
statement by McCormick; its brevity and simplicity may help some to
understand his *Doing Evil to .Achieve Good.* Except for the fact that
McCormick's name is now inextricably linked with research on double
effect, one is surprised to find this appendix in this volume. Indeed, one
could read the rest of the volume without becoming aware of McCormick's
interest in this issue.

Four lengthy essays reprinted here (i.e., an abortion "dossier,"
Humanae Vitae in 1968 and then ten years later, and the piece on genetic
medicine) first appeared in the " Moral Theology Notes " of *Theological
Studies.* They are also only recently published as an integral part of *Notes
on Moral Theology, 1965 through 1980* (University Press of America,
1981). Hence, readers with limited financial resources will perhaps think
twice before purchasing both of the new collections of McCormick's work.

McCormick's style in the " Notes" is evident in much of the present
volume. He is masterly in reporting accurately and comprehensively
what others have said about a particular topic; there is no better way to
begin studying the literature on moral topics than by reading along in
McCormick's "notes." Over the course of an entire book, however, that
style can become burdensome. In this respeet, *How Brave a New World'.I'*
suffers from not being more explicitly integrated around an identifiable
theme and/or a set of fundamental principles consistently applied to each
new topic. Still, those looking for a Roman Catholic theologian's reflec-
tions on bioethics will wisely turn to this volume.

It is, in my judgment, possible to begin generalizing about McCormick's
method and content when he is doing bioethics. Perhaps this is best done
by playing off McCormick against James Gustafson, the other great
master in summarizing ethical literature. Indeed, these two are notably
similar in their talent faithfully to   the core arguments and insights
of other moralists. In other ways, however, they are notably dissimilar. I

shall here describe two such instances, the second of which is identified by McCormick himself.

First of all, one must ask how important is McCormick's faith as he addresses these biological and medical issues. Explicitly in his preface he identifies himself as a Catholic moral theologian and defends the appearance of still " another book in bioethics" precisely in terms of his conviction that his own "religious faith stamps (him) at a profound and not totally recoverable depth"; that is to say, his Catholic faith makes a difference in what gets said. But, true to his words about its being not totally recoverable, nowhere does McCormick plumb his own depths in an effort to articulate the effects of such a faith-stamping (or is it a faithing stamp').

Of course, that is all right. That is the stuff of another book, or at least of an article that Gustafson might write about McCormick. When one recalls the former's Marquette lecture, *The Contribution of Theology to Medical Ethics,* one knows that Gustafson could surely trace at least some of the lines left on McCormick by the stamp of faith. Indeed, they are rather obvious. What is ironic, and important to say, is that this McCormick (who is so often branded by his Roman Catholic critics as too contemporary) carries the stamp of Catholic tradition much more obviously than the stamp of moral modernity. While so many others spend themselves to develop moral theories which are explicitly Christian, theories which are emphatically grounded in a personal faith-commitment to Jesus, here is McCormick scarcely mentioning Jesus. In fact, the single principle mentioned (and it infrequently) by McCormick is the identity of love of God and neighbor as recently spelled out by Karl Rahner. That is, I believe, a controlling theme for McCormick's moral theory. But I do not recall any other controlling theme or principle which so clearly relates to the Incarnation.

But that is not to deny any faith-stamping whatsoever of McCormick. It is, rather, to set the stage for saying that McCormick grounds his work much more in creation than in Incarnation. Human beings as images of God, always to be respected and cherished-this is the appropriate theological model here. And it is a model of great consequence in McCormick's deft hands.

My first point has been, then, that McCormick's faith-stamping does make a difference, even though the difference it makes is expressed in accents of creation more than of Incarnation. Of course, the fact that the Incarnation is only sketchily visible here could lead some to question what difference Christian faith makes to McCormick. One does not easily pin down a Gustafson, but I would want to argue that at this point he and McCormick are dissimilar (if not "notably" so). Gustafson would surely

recognize the stamp left by McCormick's faith, but his own stamp would be of rather different contours.

Which leads me to a second instance of dissimilarity, or perhaps it is only an expansion of the first, because here I hope to show that McCormick is utterly serious in his conviction that the created human mind is able to find in created reality the stuff for some very explicit norms for bioethics.

In the essay on genetic medicine McCormick summarizes and critieizes Gustafson (pp. 298-301). The latter is typically able to identify two clear alternatives for ethical decision-makers, but he predietably earves out some middle ground whieh allows one to hold on to the attractive elements of the two extreme alternatives. He is inevitably sensitive to the eomplexities of reality and so also inevitably unwilling (beeause theoretieally unable) to give guidanee whieh is too speeifie. The present review is not meant to be a study of Gustafson; so we need not push all this too far. The point, rather, is that MeCormick is quite willing to work at being speeifie, and here he is notably dissimilar to Gustafson. On p. 300 we read:

> What Gustafson wants (and rightly) to say is that rational moral discourse is limited, and that there comes a point when the complexity of reality leads us beyond the formulations of traditional wisdom. That, I think, is true. And I believe we have always known it, even though we have not always admitted it. But where that point is located is very important. Failure to specify at least some of the values that can override a primary value or right all too easily suggests that there is no point to which rational deliberation can lead us, that we cannot specify these values, and that this can only be done in individual decisions. Does this not remove moral discourse in principle from objective and rational scrutiny?

One can safely characterize MeCormiek's work as the subjeetion of moral diseourse to objective and rational scrutiny. He is almost cemented into the Roman Catholic tradition.

If McCormick is the grand reporter on moral theorists, the grand notetaker on what is unfolding in literature on ethics, he is just as surely the grand Roman Catholic casuist of our day. He is determined to be specific about eases, to draw lines, to identify finely-drawn norms which will serve doctors and patients, nurses and parents, judges and legislators.

Examples are easy to come by. Of interest to this reviewer is McCormick's consideration of how to decide in the case of severely-disadvantaged newborns. First he reminds us that Roman Catholics have a long tradition of not holding human life as absolutely sacred, necessarily to be protected and safeguarded with every possible resource. Then there is the much shorter, albeit better-known, tradition (stretching to Pius XII) which teaches that humans are not morally bound to employ extraordinary

means to continue human life. McCormick is impatient with those who would stop at the ordinary/ extraordinary distinction. It is possible to go further, he claims. It is not necessary to leave hospital personnel and families of patients with these general principles alone. The moralist can be even more precise in the thoughtful and objective determination of norms; his claim is that we can (and ought to) spell out what human conditions can truly be called extraordinary. In this case, he is led to develop a quality-of-life argument, identifying certain human physical (i.e., observable, measurable) conditions, the presence of which would justify a decision not to continue artificially to prolong that life. (Of course, this is altogether different from arguing that we can justly attack such a life in order to accelerate its anticipated ending; McCormick never espouses such direct and deliberate intervention.)

Many object to such a position. They claim that McCormick is opening the gates to all sorts of perverse applications of the quality-of-life argument. They fear what the future might bring if such norms receive theological justification.

Very simply, McCormick is aware that the feared future is already here. The decisions are already being made-very often, daily. Human beings *are* deciding. McCormick's claim is that moralists should be in the middle of these cases, working to express objective norms (which are already implicitly being invoked in some cases by non-professional ethical persons), so that doctors and families need not treat every new case as unique and mysterious. McCormick is a competent contemporary practitioner of Roman Catholic casuistry.

Why, then, do today's traditional Catholics get upset with Perhaps because he understands too well what casuistry is. By definition, it is about *cases,* and so by definition it does not look for timeless eternally-applicable conclusions. McCormick is impatient with those who would simply leave individual decisions to personal conscience; the casuist can provide (he claims) objective norms to facilitate the process of conscience. On the other hand, he is impatient with those who reject efforts to be specific, lest today's " adaptations" become tomorrow's soft morality (or immorality). Surely he would leave tomorrow's cases to tomorrow's casuists; sufficient for today are the cases thereof. But neither will he concede the field to utilitarians, the secular casuists of America today. He finds in the Catholic tradition transcendent human values which too easily escape utilitarian calculations, but which ought to be major factors in human discerning. He truly does believe that his faith-stamping makes a difference, even to the point of developing general norms for our contemporary cases.

McCormick takes a further step, addressing how these specific moral conclusions might be expressed in civil law. First he identifies his theology of law (p. 72).

Morality concerns itself with the rightness or wrongness of our con-
duct. Law or public policy, on the other hand, is concerned with the
common good. Clearly, then, morality and public policy are both re·
lated and distinct. They are related because law or public policy has
an inherently moral character due to its rootage in existential human
ends (goods). The common good of all persons cannot be unrelated to
what is judged to be promotive or destructive of the individual-in
other words, judged to be moral or immoral. Morality and public policy
are distinct because it is only when individual acts have ascertainable
public consequences on the maintenance and stability of society that
they are the proper concerns of society, fit subjects for public policy.

Two major considerations influence the formulation of public policy. (1)
The law must always be feasible. One must anticipate that, in general,
it will be enforceable in the public realm. One can expect that some con-
clusions of the moralists are not truly apt to be obeyed if embodied into
law. (2) The law might be more strict than is the moral position. Moralists
can envision exceptions as truly exceptional to the general norm; the truly
exceptional does not threaten the moral norm. It is difficult, however, to
legislate the exceptions; once allowance is made for this or that isolated
possibility, the legal door is opened to more wide-ranging deviations from
the norm.

Again, McCormick is to be commended for specifying his moral theology
of civil law. Indeed, this is a traditional concern of the Christian moralist;
McCormick helpfully articulates, from his stance as moralist, what might
be good law.

But McCormick does far more. He moves into the legal realm and at-
tempts to identify what the civil law should say about fetal research, about
abortion, about living wills, about *in vitro* fertilization. There is some-
thing very Catholic about this move, but it is also open to misunderstand-
ing. It is surely consistent with the natural law tradition, and with the
earlier-noted casuistry, to work at particularizing one's moral principles
into quite specific circumstantial considerations. The more specific one
becomes, however, the more likely one will need to readjust his judgments
as times and cultures shift.

This openness to change is not attractive to some recent Catholics,
taught to expect only timeless formulations of truth by theologians. Of
course, such an insistence forces one out of the realities of the political
and legal arenas where the common good is debated. Not infrequently
those holding this conviction insist on a moral position which could never
realistically be legislated; those who adjust to the real are then accused
of moral compromise. Such a charge has been directed at McCormick.
However, it is he who is more traditionally Catholic, well aware that his

efforts at particularization must face public debate and probably subsequent revision; in the meantime he will have labored hard to translate into realistic civil law the moral principles which are more nearly unchanging. Those who read McCormick will wisely begin at the beginning, allowing him to spin out his general moral principles, and only subsequently move with him into the more conditioned considerations of what constitutes wise public policy and law in our day.

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Toward A Reformulation of Natural Law. By ANTHONY BATTAGLIA. New York: The Seabury Press, 1981. Pp. ix + 150. $14.95.

Anthony Battaglia has written an attractive, erudite essay which basically proposes the natural law doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas and finds it valid for guiding us in the field of morality today. He does have his reservations about an all-out endorsement of Aquinas, but in the end he comes rather close to one. In his introduction, the author sets forth his purpose " to rescue the chief insights of the natural law tradition from this limbo to which it has recently been relegated" (p. 1). After giving three reasons for the reexamination of the natural law theory, Battaglia describes himself as· presenting " a revisionist understanding of Thomas Aquinas" (p. 4).

Four chapters constitute the bulk of the book with a brief concluding chapter. The first chapter is mainly concerned with defending the very treating of natural law in an age inclined to dismiss it, and probably morality itself, as old hat and not relevant to our times. The writer succeeds in capturing the good will of the reader by his engaging presentation and arouses one's interest by hinting at the exploration to come.

The second chapter is explicitly on St. Thomas and his teaching on the natural law. Actually the whole book is on Aquinas, as anyone just glancing at the footnotes could discover. Of the 160 notes almost half refer to St. Thomas's writings. However, the second chapter is the *ex professo* treatment of natural law as found in Thomas's *Commentary on the Sentences* and the *Summa.* Also, since the author relates the analogy of law to that found in truth, he has occasion to draw from *De Veritate.* All of this is done clearly and with considerable creative and original insights.

Chapters three and four develop an essential claim the author makes throughout the work for establishing the validity of natural law, namely,

that "moral reason is trustworthy because it is in touch with reality" (p. 5). In these chapters Battaglia brings in other authors than St. Thomas. He wants to gain support from some recent writers for his thesis that natural law still has a role to play for guiding us in moral decisions. He successfully integrates these modern comments into the ever-present doctrine of St. Thomas. As a result he is able to achieve what he set out to do. Early in the book he had written: "Reformulating means, in its common-sense usage, to say the same thing in a different way " (p. 29).

Hence, we conclude with the natural law theory of St. Thomas Aquinas said in a different way, more congenial perhaps to our contemporaries, although a bit watered down by the author's concern for the role of historicity (cf. pp. 13 sq.) as a determining factor for change in morals, especially in the area of sexual morality. But then the human family is always looking for something like that.

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The Being of God: Theology and the Experience of Truth. By ROBERT ScHARLEMANN. New York: The Seabury Press, 1981.

Robert Scharlemann has contributed a significant and provocative addition to the debate on the nature of truth and the way in which truth is experienced. His work will undoubtedly arouse discussion and interest among theologians for some time to come. The author's intention is not to engage in a debate about the theoretical nature of truth but rather to focus discussion on how truth is experienced. This distinction allows the author to contend that the theme will " unfold on its own terms for any-one who may care to follow it "; but, as we shall later note, the seeming neglect of the nature of truth itself gives rise to particular problems with the book itself.

There are, however, clear indications of the nature and scope of the author's philosophical sources. Anglo-American analytical thought and continental phenomenological and speculative traditions play a major role in Scharlemann's thinking. There are _Kantian overtones to his use of the term ' experience '; something is given to thought itself, and one suspects that Kantian assumptions (including his use of Karl Daub's work) play a significant role in the major thesis of the book that it is as reflectivity upon ' identity in difference ' that truth is experienced.

Consideration of the theoretical nature of truth cannot, however, be far

away from the author's perception of how truth is experienced, for the ground which he establishes for his argument precludes any discussion of the object of traditional metaphysics (prior to Kant). For Scharlemann, as indeed for so many proponents of current liberal theology, the death of traditional metaphysics is considered a *fait accompli,* and therefore the experience of God as the Supreme Being, the Creator of this world, must be given an altogether different interpretation. Correspondence between human thought and transcendent truth must be re-interpreted. Defining religion as " the consciousness in any person for which ' God' and related words name a realm which is as real as the physical world because the images created by those words are as much given as are the data of sense perception", Scharlemann finds in Heidegger's analytic the beginning of a postmetaphysical thinking of truth. The idea of a Supreme Being is a delusion, but by recoguizing this fact, he claims, the way is made clear for a re-thinking of the experience of truth which takes into full consideration the atheistic experience. In this manner, the author argues, one's conception of truth is freed from ' enslavement' to just one among many variations of truth.

It is in turning to the structure of reflection, the focus of which is the **'I'** (Heidegger's Dasein-which the author claims is substantially the same as Aristotle's *anima* and Thomas's *ens quad natum est convenire cum omni ente),* that the process of understanding the experience of truth begins. Through projection and disclosure the reflective act brings meaning and being together in time. Language is the medium in which the experience of truth takes place, but language is limited by perspectivity of the self, for many points of view accompany historical reflection. A view of a tree from the north can be quite different from the view from the south. Reflection therefore demands openness to several points of view. Likewise, one's standpoint, distinguished from point of view, in which subjective value-judgments are made, and among which there is the likelihood of direct incompatibility, must be characterized by openness.

In the second chapter of the book on the meaning and verification of 'God Is', the author attempts to overcome contradictions among standpoints. Interpretation makes clear what is said, while verification determines that what is said is true. The criterion for interpretation is the extent to which the truth expressed by a text is brought to light either by explanation or by putting the same truth into new words that speak it effectively. Such words can then be verified -when the hearer sees that what is said corresponds to who he really is, when the self is illumined. The words are true when they accord with the reality in which we live, with the way things are.

The question then is what is the meaning of ' God Is ', given the rejection of traditional metaphysics and of the central doctrine of a Su-

preme Being. A re-working of both Anselm and Aquinas enables the
author to assert that ' God Is ' has the same validity as ' light shines ' and
secondly that ' God is ' can be understood as an incomplete assertion such
as 'God is G '. This interpretation allows one to break from the frame-
work of traditional metaphysics. ' God Is ' designates the agent of an
action such as 'the walker walks '. One becomes conscious of God as one's
true and essential self. ' God Is ' becomes the language of the unity of
events which constitute the self. " To determine whether ' God Is ' we
watch or play the game of language and thought that is specified by the
rules of theontic thinking".   ' God Is' designates what is happening every-
where, and is distinguished from the question of whether there exists
something godly. A phenomenology of mind thus becomes the 'revela-
tion ' of the being of God.

   One suspects that the idea of universal subjectivity underpins this
thesis, but a major question remaining concerns the little or no attention
which is given to the theoretical philosophical position which underpins
Heidegger's concept of the self (Dasein). This self is historical, and is
therefore subject to continuous change. Existing in time, nothing can be
' given ' to Dasein's nature. A second problem follows from this consid-
eration. How can a language about ' God Is' be sustained when one
has first of all denied the objective reality of a Supreme Being and when
one is compelled to recognize the historical and changing character of
language itself? It would seem that when these conditions of human
existence are recognized verification of ' God Is ' is rendered impossible,
for reality itself is in constant flux. On these important questions, the
book offers little help. Perhaps the skepticism concerning the world of
traditional metaphysics which one finds in this book ought to be extended
with equal readiness to the presuppositions and ground of modern thought
also.

   To give focus to this criticism in the little space available, the author's
discussion of the ' death of God ' in chapter three is carried out with no
recoguition of the philosophical revolution which is associated with that
term and is to be found in the work of F. Nietzsche. When subjectivity
becomes the criterion of verification, opinions concerning the death and
resurrection of Jesus can take diametrically opposing positions (stand-
points). Scharlemann prefers to say that " the atheism of reflection is
simultaneously the gospel in religion and the beginning of the experience
of the truth of God as such"· In other words, atheism and faith are but
two perspectives of the same event. Either Jesus is God or he is a dis-
illusioned preacher.

   However, it is doubtful that the author can succeed in incorporating
these two opposing standpoints, for the philosophical goal of the ' death
of God ' theme in Nietzsche's work is the destruction of belief in a trans-

cendent Being and other forms of objective truth (science, reason). In which case, we do not have two perspectives of a tree, one from the north, the other from the south. Rather, one conclusion is that there is a tree, the other that there is no tree at all. The radical nature of this philosophy is neglected by Scharlemann together with the implication that all language about ' God ' is henceforth made redundant when the self is proclaimed in its supremacy, free from transcendent authority of any kind.

In *The Being of God,* the author would like to maintain language of ' God Is ' in the sense that this reality exists in the naming of the human situation and "verifies itself by verifying man". The autonomy of the self is proclaimed clearly ("creator of a world"), and this process is the self-embodying of God. The project is ambitious, but when one moves from experience to consider the theoretical positions associated with Nietzsche's atheism and his attack on Christianity, one is compelled to ask: Is this project successful *1* Can one indeed be faithful to both the Christian experience and the experience of the atheist? In *The Being of God,* the word ' God' is retained because no other term can fully express what transpires in the be-ing of man. When the sovereignty of the self is proclaimed, how long before even this reduced meaning of the term ' God ' is made redundant?

Several other questions arise from these reflections about the book. An autonomous self is one which transcends ethical distinctions too. The author would like to think, quite admirably, that the self is still conscious of 'goodness ', but from whence does 'goodness' originate f If the Kantian understanding of what is ' given ' to human nature is destroyed, not even the sense of ' goodness ' remains. One final consideration. It is unfortunate that the experience of truth is not discussed at some point within the context of the symbolic and the sacramental. Experience of truth is reduced to the thinking of the "mononymous subject", but is not this assertion somewhat selective of human experience itself which remains highly symbolic and thoroughly institutional? If one takes the author at his word, and we free ourselves from preferred theoretical positions, perhaps it will become possible to re-think the experience of truth in the light of the whole metaphysical tradition and not simply from what has transpired philosophically in the past two hundred years. This book helps us to clarify the issues and thereby moves the debate forward.

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Theological Investigations XVIII.   By KARL RAHNER. New York: Cross-
     road, 1981. Pp. 260. $14.95.

Concern for the Ohiirch (Theological Investigations XX).   By KARL
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   Transcendence is the condition of the possibility of history; history is
the mediation of transcendence.   This dialectic has grounded Rahner's
theological retrieval of the Christian tradition throughout the many vol-
umes of his *Theological Investigations.*   It is again the basic key to Volume
XVII wherein he addresses current questions in Christology, Anthropology,
and Ecclesiology.   As we have come to expect, the characteristically Rahne-
rian focus is on the transcendental moment in these various issues. How-
ever, his insistence on the historical as the concrete mediation of the reality
of faith is loud and clear.

   The genius of Rahner's dialectic of history and transcendence is illus-
trated in this volume in the relationship between the specificity of Christ-
mas and transcendental freedom, between Christ's resurrection and trans-
cendental hope, between the life and death of Jesus and the Risen Lord,
between classical ontic Christology and modern ontological Christology.
In his chapter on " Jesus Christ in the non-Christian Religions " Rahner
imaginatively recalls the ancient Platonic theme of *anamnesis (memoria)*
to assert the anticipatory thrust of human consciousness toward a histori-
cal "' recognition " of its salvation.   No one finds what he or she is not
" constitutionally " looking for.

   The "always already there" presence of the Holy Spirit in the human
spirit constitutes the basis for Rahner's anthropological essays.   Accord-
ingly, the Christian message "means awakening and interpreting the in-
nermost thing in man."   The same dialectic is in evidence in Rahner's
essay on the human body, the " self-consummation of the spirit in space
and time."   The Incarnation of the Logos is the necessary historical media-
tion of grace and glory in accord with the same taxonomy.   Indeed, the en-
fleshment of the Word is "the only reason" that we have anything to
do with the Trinity.

   The key to the essay on mysticism remains the same-now rendered:
mysticism is the condition of the possibility of prophecy; prophecy is the
mediation of mysticism.   The prevenience of the grace of the Spirit con-
stitutes all as mystics in principle.   The so-called extraordinary mystics
are those whose psychology is pervaded by the elevation of grace, those
in whom the experience of grace takes " deeper root existentially."   In his
essay on the " liberty of the sick " Rahner reflects further on his theology
of death as the active self-consummation from within as transcendental
freedom achieves itself in concrete, total self-surrender.   In his discussion

0£ the " intermediate state" Rabner completes his thesis by placing the " moment " 0£ resurrection in coincidence with, the " moment " 0£ death as self-consummation.

Self-critical appropriation 0£ the graced fullness 0£ the self requires criticism in the Church. Total rapport between the inner exigencies of lived faith and the outer structures of the Church constitutes the ideal towards which criticism (direct and indirect) in the Church moves. Rahner's criticism of *Mysterium Ecclesiae* (the 1973 Declaration 0£ the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith) again illustrates another form of his dialectic-in this instance the mutually conditioning relationship between the official teaching of the Church and the ecclesial life of the whole People of God. Rahner clearly indicts the tendencies of the " Roman authorities " to invoke their merely formal authority as the legitimation of doctrine. As he continues his discussion of authority in relation to ministry in the Church, Rahner again indicts "formalism" in his contention that only the content of the actually envisioned ministry legitimizes its sacramental transmission. In relation to the critical issues of authority and power in secular societies today Rahner detects a *kairos* for the institutional Church-the possibility of setting a social example of what might be called "institutionalized freedom." " See how those Christians love one another " *can* be translated into " See how they really live together, in liberty and without coercion."

In relation to " the one Church and the many Churches " Rahner envisions a *communio* of the Churches around the " basic Christian substance of faith "-when the "the immobility of the Churches' leaders" is overcome. Again, the official teaching authority in the Church enjoys normative power only when (like a "snapshot") it is the successful reflection of actual lived faith in the Church. This actual faith is the existential correlate of the objective " hierarchy 0£ truths," endorsed officially by Vatican II; this *de facto* faith is no obstacle to institutional unity. Indeed, contemporary ecumenical initiatives have constituted a "third Church" which, despite its sectarian dangers, can serve as a salutary stimulus toward future unity. Rabner completes his ecclesiological meditations with a reminder that religion (or church) is not the only (or necessarily the better) mediation of true "piety," which finds its "material" everywhere in space and in time.

Finally, Rahner offers some clarifications about his own work. The limitations engendered by the contemporary "'knowledge explosion" lead to what Rahner calls the need for a *haute vulgarisation* in the field of theology where " the difference between what is said and what is meant is greater than ever before."

The twentieth and last volume of the *Theological Investigations* series is appropriately titled " Concern for the Church." As he addresses vari-

ous issues in ecclesiology Rahner writes with "holy impatience" with the present state of the institutional Church in light of a vision of hope for the Church of the future.

In his essay on " courage for an ecclesial Christianity " Rahner correlates the perennial "unchanging essence" of the Church-human immediacy to God in the Spirit-with the historical, changing structures of the Church-which exists to mediate that immediacy. As the historically visible victory of grace the Church must constantly seek to become what she is. As a theologian Rahner is concerned particularly with the doctrinal dimension of ecclesial visibility, and here he boldly criticizes the narrow-minded one-sidedness of many of the procedures of the Roman magisterium. In speaking to the " situation of faith today" Rahner refers to the Church as a "burden " because its authoritarian *modus operandi* clouds the distinction between the "fundamental dogmas " and secondary issues. He decries magisterial insensitivity to the existential rapport between these "fundamental dogmas" (the *fides quae)* and the inner sense of faith in the People of God (the *fides qua).* Indeed, as Rahner always insists, these " fundamental dogmas " become existentially credible only as they bring people home to their true depths.

Rahner addresses the issue of the ordination of women through a critical reflection on the 1976 Roman declaration. His conclusion is: the discussion must continue.

The primary service of the Church to the freedom of the individual is the " gospel of Christian realism." This gospel service demands extensive changes in church structures to promote freedom within and to witness to freedom without. The political task of the Church today flows from historically conscious faith-it is " institutional redemption."

In his theological interpretation of Vatican II Rahner sees the beginning of Christianity as *world-Church.* He gives us his own rendition of the "three ages" in church history: 1) the short period of Judaeo-Christianity; 2) the period of Hellenistic-European Christianity; 3) the period now beginning of the truly world-Church. A new "Pauline boldness " is necessary and in principle it is affirmed at Vatican II; but, officially, massive structural reform remains a " possibility in principle." Rahner refers to the period from the restoration following the French Revolution up to Vatican II as the " Pian epoch " in Church history. Everything was immutably constituted "from above." Now comes the realization that the Church is "changeable in all its structures to a far greater extent than people thought." All these structures are relative and historically conditioned; the immutable essence of the Church remains the Spirit of Christ as the ground of faith, hope and love.

The ever hopeful Rahner relates a dream about a future Pope who ful-

fills the Petrine function of uniting Christians without uniformity-a bold critique of the *status quo* in the poetic mode of anticipatory memory.

The spirituality of the Church of the future will focus on essentials; it will be a communal experience of the Spirit of God that patiently bears the inadequacies of the Church.

As the Church becomes world-Church it will become a more tangible manifestation of the eschatological unity of the human race. Ecclesial service to this urgent task of achieving greater unity among peoples will require the unification of the Christian Churches.

However, the Church may never understand itself merely in function of a better future for humanity. While love of God and love of neighbor are one, Christianity demands a love of God in and for Himself-a "blessed uselessness" of love for God beyond human interests.

In the end Rabner remains the mystic living from and for the Mystery of God through Christ in the Spirit {the" substance of faith"). In everything he writes he is the mystagogue-leading us further into the Incomprehensible Ineffability.

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Catholic League: *Constitutional Rights ʃP: Religious Prejudice: Catholic Education as the Battleground* by Peter M. J. Stravinskas. Pp. 221; $14.95.

Crossroad: *In Memory of Her: A Feminist Theological Reconstruction of Christian Origins* by Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza. Pp. 351; $19.50. *In Search of Humanity* by John Macquarrie. Pp. 280; $16.95.

Hackett: *Handbook of Epictetus* by Epictetus, translated by Nicholas White. Pp. 36; $2.25. *Two Comic Dialogues: Ionr-Hippias Major* by Plato, translated by Paul Woodruff. Pp. 96; $12.50 cloth, $3.45 paper.

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Kendall & Hunt: *Philosophy ʃP: Ideology: An Adventure* by Larry Azar. **Pp.** 164; $12.95.

Marquette University Press: *How Philosophy Begins* by Beatrice H. Zedler. The Aquinas Lecture, 1983. Pp. 52.

Massimo: *Existential Judgment cf; Transcendental Reduction* by Michael M. Tavuzzi, 0.P. Studia Universitatis S. Thomae in Urbe 18. Pp. 270.

Universidad de Navarra: *El Catecismo Romano : Fuentes E Historia del Texto y de la Redaccion* by Pedro Rodriguez and Raul Lanzetti. Pp. 498. *Mons. Josemaria Escriva de Balaguer y El Opus Dei* edited by Pedro Rodriguez, Pio G. Alves de Sousa y Jose Manuel Zumaquero. Pp. 497.

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Oxford University Press: *Principles of Biomedical Ethics* by Tom **L.** Beauchamp and James F. Childress. Second edition. Pp. 364; .$24.95 cloth, $14.95 paper.

Paulist Press: *An American Strategic Theology* by John A. Coleman. Pp. 296; $9.95.

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Reidel Publishing Co.: *Principles of Philosophy* by Rene Descartes, translated by Valentine Rodger Miller and Reese **P.** Miller. Pp. 325; $59.00.