THE THEOLOGICAL RELEVANCE OF THE HISTORICAL JESUS: A DEBATE AND A THESIS

Introduction: The Recent Past as Historical Context for the Question

IN AN EARLY STAGE of his theological investigating, Karl Rahner surveyed the state of the then current christology and found cause to bemoan its lack of vitality, using a most interesting standard: " How few really living and passionate controversies there are in Catholic christology today which engage the existential concern of the faithful (is there a single one ?) ." [1] In his judgment, one of the primary reasons for christology's stagnation was the lack of noteworthy influence exercised by modern biblical theology upon the farmer's traditional neo-scholastic structure and content. According to the teaching of the Church, the Scriptures are the inexhaustible source of truth about Christ, but " is this conviction noticeable as an active force and holy disquiet in the ordinary practice of christology today ?" [2] Rather than incorporate the new knowledge surfacing in the biblical :field, dogmatic christology seemed content simply to go on as before, quoting certain Scripture texts which were necessary to prove theses already laid down in advance. Nor was dogmatic christology doing justice to the best of its own tradition as embodied in Aquinas, Suarez, and others, for it showed little interest in Christ's life-his baptism, his prayer, his concrete passion and abandonment by God on the cross, leaving these Scriptural "mysteries" to the considerations of piety. What remained of christology was a pallid version of its former self.

1 " Current Problems in Christology," *Theological Investigations* I, tr. C. Ernst (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1961), 152.

2 *Ibid.,* 155.

Rather than yield to discouragement in the face of such inertia, Rahner committed himself to the hope that Scripture studies could and would contribute renewing power to the prevalent neo-scholastic christology. In an eerily prescient remark he prophesied:

> Let no one say that nothing more is really possible in this field any longer. Something is possible, because something *must* be possible, if it is a matter of the inexhaustible riches of God's presence with us ... [3]

It was not until over a decade later, when Roman Catholic biblical scholarship was firmly validated by the Second Vatican Council (and when among Protestant exegetes the 'new quest' for the historical Jesus was already well launched), that insights and questions from the biblical perspective began to penetrate this quiescent christology.[4] The first wave of discussion, generated by recognition of the genuine differences between biblical and prevailing Catholic christology, treated the issue under the rubric of the tension between exegesis and dogmatic theology, the latter understood as the christology of the

s *Op. cit.*

4 For a sketch of the history and for summaries of the major documents of the Roman Catholic Church on biblical study during the last century, see T. A. Collins and R. Brown," Church Pronouncements," *Jerome Biblical Commentary* II (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1968), 624-632.

The classic survey and assessment of the 'old quest' is Albert Schweitzer, *The Quest of the Historical Jesus: A Critical Study of its Progress from Reimarus to Wrede,* tr. W. Montgomery (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1961). The 'new quest ' was intiated by Ernst Kasemann's lecture, "The Problem of the Historical Jesus," *Essays on New Testament Themes,* tr. W. Montague (Naperville, Ill.: Alec. R. Allenson, Inc., 1964), 15-47, and its principles delineated clearly by James Robinson, *A New Quest for the Historical Jesiis* (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1959). For an eminently readable summary and evaluation of the 'old quest', see James Mackey, *Jesus-the Man and the Myth* (N.Y.: Paulist Press, 1979), 10-51. For one synopsis of the life of Jesus research, cf. Gustaf Aulen, *Jesus in Contemporary Historical Research,* tr. I. Hjelm (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976). For an excellent discussion of the whole issue from Reimarus to the new questers (including annotated bibliography), see Norman Perrin, *Rediscovering the '.l'eaching of Jesus* (NY.: Harper and Row, 1967), 207-48, 262-66.

manuals." Indeed there was tension, for biblical scholarship, in spite of its variety of approaches and plethora of disputed issues, had enough of an operational consensus to challenge the proof-tcxting, literalist mode of interpretation, and almost exclusive preoccupation with the Johannine image of Jesus Christ which characterized manualist christology. For a time the theory of the *sen.m,s plenior* or fuller sense of the Scriptures was advocated as a possible bridge between the two fields: the biblical text is capable of an increment in meaning, an increment which could transcend the conscious intent of the biblical author and could be grasped only in the course of the later experience and dogmatic teaching of the church.[6] Such a theory, if accepted, would obviate the conflict at its root.

But while this attempt at reconciliation was being developed, largely from the side of the exegetes, a second, more potentially far-reaching development began on the part of different dogmatic theologians in the Roman Catholic communion. It was nothing less than the incorporation of the results of critical biblical scholarship into the very re-thinking of manualist

5 The dissertation written by Henrico Petri, *Exegese und Dogmatik in der Sicht der katholischen 'I'heologie (Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana,* Rome, 1965) laid out the issue in detail and with extensive bibliography. Particular clarifying essays were written by many others; cf. Edward Schillebeeckx, "Exegesis, Dogmatics, and the Development of Dogma," *Dogmatic vs. Biblical Theology,* H. Vorgrimler, ed. (London: Burns and Oates, 1964), 115-45; Karl Rahner, "Exegesis and Dogmatic Theology," *Theological Investir1ations* 5, tr. K. Kruger (N.Y.: Seabury, 1975), 67-93, as well as "The Position of Christology in the Church between Exegesis and Dogmatics," *T.I.* 11, tr. D. Bourke (N.Y.: Seabury, 1975), 185-214; G. Thils and R. Brown, eds. *Exegese et Theologie, Les Saintes Ecritures et leur interpretation theologique* (Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1968).

a Raymond Brown, who gave this theory new currency through his dissertation *The Sensus Plenior of Sacred Scripture* (St. Mary's University, Baltimore, 1955), and who reviewed its progress in "The 'Sensus Plenior' in the Last Ten Years," *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 25 (1963), 262-85, has come to the position that "because of the scholastic and peculiarly Catholic origins and formulation of this theory, I think that it cannot in its present form meet the problems that confront it;" rather it must be reformulated and become part of a wider hermeneutical movement; in "The Problems of the "Sensus Plenior," Thils and Brown (n. 5), 81.

christology itself. Throughout the decade of the 1970's a continuous stream of works by theologians such as Kasper, Kiing, Sobrino, Bofl', Mackey, Lane, Schillebeeckx, and the later Rahner (to mention some of the more widely-read in the English-speaking world) suggested new and varied theological interpretations of Jesus Christ with obvious reliance on the results of critical exegesis.1 Not that these "experiments" in christology were shaped by biblical scholarship alone; they also drew heavily and variously from renewed scholarship of the early Christian centuries, from analysis of the cultural situation of the contemporary world and from the pluralism of contemporary philosophies. [8] But that the results of biblical research have played an intrinsic role in the formation, content, and conclusions of these and other recent Roman Catholic christologies is virtually beyond dispute. As one sympathetic observer of the Roman Catholic scene characterized the fundamental shift taking place, " the traditional procedure of interpreting the Bible in the light of dogma is reversed; instead, dogma is interpreted in terms of Scripture." [9]

The Historical Jesus

One particular result of biblical research which has emerged with an influential role in recent systematic Roman Catholic

7 Walter Kasper, *Jesus the Ghrist,* tr. V. Green (N.Y.: Paulist Press, 1976); Hans Kung, *On Being a Christian,* tr. E. Quinn (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1976) ; Jon Sobrino, *Ohristology at the Crossroads,* tr. J. Drury (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1978); Leonardo Boff, *Jesus Ghrist Liberator,* tr. P. Hughes (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1978); James Mackey, *Jesus-The Man and The Myth* (n. 4); Dermot Lane, *The Reality of Jesus* (N.Y.: Paulist Press, 1975); Edward Schillebeeckx, *Jesus-An Experiment in Ohristology,* tr. H. Hoskins (N.Y.: Seabury Press, 1979), and *Christ-The Experienoe of Jesus as Lord,* tr. J. Bowden (N.Y.: Seabury, 1980); Karl Rahner, *]l'oundations of Christian Faith,* tr. W. Dych (N.Y.: Seabury Press, 1978).

s *Oommunio-International Oatholio Review* 6 (1979) presents seven different methodological options operative today in its issue entitled "Approaches to the Study of Theology."

9 George Lindbeck, *The Future of Roman Catholic Theology* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970), 111.

christologies and which is the focus of this essay is the image of what is called the "historical Jesus." This image is arrived at through the use of historical-critical methods operating on the limited sources of our information about Jesus of Nazareth: a few extra-biblical writings, the apocryphal gospels, the New Testament outside of the gospels, and primarily the canonical gospels themselves perceived as embodying some authentic historical traditions. Operating on the assumption that Jesus of Nazareth can be recognized from his historical influence on the circle of disciples, exegetes work methodologically backwards from the written text, shaped according to the theology of the writer, through the mainly oral preaching tradition about Jesus which existed in the post-resurrection communities and on which the writers drew, to (with great caution) the death and characteristic teaching and behavior of the originator of that tradition. The ' historical Jesus ', as operative in recent christologies and as used here, refers to that image of Jesus of Nazareth reconstructed by way of inference from our present sources with the tools of historical criticism. [10]

This image needs to be distinguished in principle from three other possible referents of the term 'historical Jesus '.[11] It is not, first of all, to be identified with Jesus "as he really was", the actual man who lived years ago and had quite definite patterns of behavior and relationship. That actual Jesus who lived is not fully recoverable by historical methods not only because of the selective character of early Christian memories which omitted much biographical and psychological information, and not only because of the confessional nature of the gospels as sources, but more profoundly (as Schillebeeckx has recently argued [12]) because the " secret " of a concrete individual is in principle inaccessible to a purely scientific approach and consequently eludes detection. The image of the historical

[10] For synopsis of these tools, see Perrin (n. 4), 15-53.

[11] Van A. Harvey has described these referents in a clarifying way; cf. *The Historian and the Believer* (N.Y.: Macmillan Co., 1966), 266-68.

[12] *Jesus* (n. 7), 68-69.

Jesus, then, is not equatable with and does not exhaust the total reality of the actual Jesus who lived. This is not to say that the reconstructed image of the historical Jesus has no relation to that Jesus. It is produced by historical critical researching into the sources, the aim of which is to identify, in Lonergan's formulation,

> where (places and territories) and when (dates, periods) who (persons, peoples) did what (public life, external acts) to enjoy what successes, suffer what reverses, exert what influence ... [13]

Given the near unanimity among biblical scholars on the point that some historical tradition lies behind the gospels, the image, when carefully reconstructed after redaction, form, and source criticism have done their work, approximates, however asymptotically, the actual Jesus who lived. There is a true although incomplete coherence between the two.

A second differentiation exists between the historical Jesus and the memory impressions of Jesus held by the earliest Christian communities. The two images are arrived at in vastly different ways, the latter being due to the testimony of original disciples and those near to them, the former the result of historical reconstruction. The memories of Jesus held by the earliest Christian communities, furthermore, were highly selective ones which preserved what was vital to the ongoing experience of particular groups and deleted what was judged from their perspective to be unimportant. Highly dependent on these disparate memory impressions, the reconstructed ima.ge of the historical Jesus takes into account the total New Testament tradition and thus presents a more comprehensive picture than any individual tradition taken alone.

A third distinction should be made between the historical Jesus and the biblical picture of Christ brought about by the transformation of the early communities' memories through continued theological reflection. This later picture, while in

[13] Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (N.Y.: Herder & Herder, 1972), 128.

continuity with the earlier memories, contains ever deeper insights into and more refined interpretations of Jesus of Nazareth confessed as the Christ.[14] Neither Jesus as he actually lived, nor as remembered by the early Christian communities, nor as transformed by theological interpretation, the historical Jesus is the fruit of contemporary biblical scholarship which has reconstructed through historical critical methods a picture of the one who stands at the origin of the Christian tradition. While arrived at largely through inference, and in that sense an abstraction, it carries the connotation that by critical appropriation of the witness of the early communities, we today can have some assured knowledge of the concrete contours of the human historical life of Jesus of Nazareth.

What elements properly belong to this image of the historical Jesus ? After more than a century of intense disputes there are still many basic unsolved questions, some of which may remain forever unresolved. There is, however, a growing consensus among interpreters of the New Testament, both Roman Catholic and those of the Reformation tradition, about what can be known in an historically tmstworthy fashion of ,Tesus of Nazareth. This minimum of knowledge, while allowing no even nearly complete biography, does yield the typical basic features and outlines of Jesus's teaching, behavior, and eventual death. In bare outline, it includes knowledge that Jesus was a member of the Jewish race, hailing from the town of Nazareth, who in his adult life started a ministry of preaching and healing centered in Galilee. He proclaimed the nearness of the reign of God and called for conversion of heart in the light of the coming of that reign. He taught in parables; addressed God as " Abba"; gathered a group of disciples; chose the marginalized people of society as the particular recipients of his minis-

14 Several studies which meticulously but differently trace this development are Reginald Fuller, *The Foundations of New Testament Ohristology* (N.Y.: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1965); Edward Schweizer, *Jesus,* tr. D. Green (Richmond, Va: John Knox Press, 1971) ; James Dunn, *Ohristolog'!J in the MakinlJ* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1980),

tering activity. The freedom of his behavior and the authority with which he taught raised at least implicitly a claim as to his own agency in the coming of the reign of God. Although his own perceptions were shaped by contemporary Jewish ethical and religious thought, he came into conflict with other Jewish teachers particularly with regard to interpretations of the Law and its traditions. Going to Jerusalem at the time of Passover he was arrested, tried, crucified and buried. Some time later, his followers began to proclaim that he had been raised from the dead.

This core of information about Jesus of Nazareth, along with the concomitant awareness that it is critically probable and that therefore it closely approximates in however minimal a fashion Jesus as he actually lived, has only recently gained entrance to Roman Catholic consciousness. That it has become a significant factor to be grappled with is reflected in the fact that the International Theological Commission treated the complex of questions surrounding it as the first of its selected questions in christology:

> Jesus Christ, the object-referent of the Church's faith, is neither a myth nor any sort of abstract notion. He is a man who lived in a concrete milieu, and who dies after having lived his own life within the unfolding of a historical process. It follows that historical research concerning Jesus Christ is demanded by the Christian faith itself ..." [15]

Noting the difficulties that such research entails, the Commission nevertheless affirms the legitimacy of the task of bringing to light and testing the historicity of certain facts relative to the historical existence of Jesus. Furthermore, the results of this research should not be confined to the field of Scripture studies alone, for within the broad framework of the living

15 International Theological Commission, *Select Questions on Christology* (Washington, DC: USCC, 1980), 1. See also Brian McDermott, "Roman Catholic Christology: Two Recurring Themes," *Theological Studies* 41 (1980), 339-67, where one of the is th() theological significance of the earthly

faith of the Christian community, "a return to the earthly Jesus is beneficial and indispensable today in the field of dogmatic theology." [16]

The Commission in these statements was affirming the direction already taken by various constructive christologies of the past decade which had begun to incorporate the historical Jesus of biblical research into their systematic reflection on Jesus Christ's saving significance and ultimate identity. The eschatological prophet announcing God's nearness in the midst of suffering and embodying the joy of this in his liberating lifestyle (Schillebeeckx); the critical reformer proclaiming God's will to be human well-being in the face of institution, hierarchy and law (Kling) ; the Spirit-filled man of faith and obedience mediating the Spirit of freedom to others (Kasper); the opposer of injustice in the name of God whose call to discipleship involves the faithful follower in the same suffering fate (Sobrino) ;-these and other designations cast the critically assured minimum into particular interpretative frameworks which serve each christology's larger intentions. But each theologian is in fact utilizjng basically the same elements which comprise the image of the historical Jesus reconstructed from Christian texts. The historical Jesus is never the sole content of these systematic christologies. There is much of essential importance which cannot be got at through historical research, in particular the understanding of the presence and initiative of God in the whole Christ event. Even to do justice to the biblical texts themselves, the historical critical method by which the historical Jesus is arrived at needs to be complemented by other approaches (language analysis, social analysis, etc.) , interpreted through hermeneutical moves, and continually refined and corrected. Yet, however much this method needs to be contextualized, it remains the most fruitful way in which

16 I.T.C., *ibid.,* 4. One of the most compact synopses of knowledge of the earthly Jesus is given in question-and-answer format by Joseph Fitzmyer, *A Ohristological Oateohi.qm: New Testament Answers* (N.Y.: Paulist Press, 1982).

the historical content of the word "Jesus" can be got at, and by commonly accepted criteria.[17] Although admittedly an extrapolation and never totally adequate, the image of Jesus which it produces inevitably brings in its wake some renewed appreciation of the concrete contours of the human historical life of Jesus of Nazareth. However variously related to the Christ of the Church's confession, and whether functioning as norm and criterion, starting point, critical standard, or one validating ground of christology itself and of Christian discipleship,[18] the historica] Jesus has become a new factor in Roman Catholic christology, one of the clearest results of the interfacing of systematic thought with biblical exegesis.

Critique from One Hermeneutical Perspective

In the face of the emergence of wide-spread incorporation of the historical Jesus into contemporary Roman Catholic christology, a massive caution has recently been uttered by David Tracy against the theological pre-eminence accorded to this image. Since his argument is explicitly and cogently presented, it provides an occasion for dialogue over a matter of critical importance.[19]

Although Tracy agrees that it is possible through the use of historical critical methods to gain some historically probable knowledge of Jesus of Nazareth, and although his own synopsis of the critically assured minimum is in broad agreement with the consensus of exegetes outlined above, he maintains that the acquiring of such knowledge is neither necessary nor im-

11 Leander Keck, *A Future for the Historical Jesus* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1981), 270; the whole work is a coherent and vigorous argument for this position.

18 E.g., respectively, Kasper (35) and Kung (540-53); Sobrino (1-16); Schillebeeckx *Jesus,* (41-76); Rahner (228-64); seen. 7.

19 David Tracy, *:J'he Analogical Imagination-Christian Theology and the Culture of PluraliBm* (N.Y.: Crossroad, 1981), hereafter cited as *A.I.* The immediate context for Tracy's critique is provided in "A Methodological Preface," 233-47; the argument itself is mounted in a running series of footnotes extending through the second section of the book, making the argument a bit disjointed but nonetheless vigorous.

portant, for "it is not the 'historical Jesus' but the confessed, witnessed Jesus that is theologically relevant." [20] Who is this confessed, witnessed Jesus? It is the Jesus remembered by the original apostles and attested to in the proclamation, narrative, symbol and reflective thought of the New Testament texts; it is "the Jesus remembered by the tradition which mediates the event in the present through word, sacrament, and action; the .Jesus remembered as the Christ, the presence among us of God's own self." [21] Consciously aligning himself with the Kahler-Bultmannian position on this question, [22] Tracy argues that it is this confessed Jesus Christ in the New Testament which is important for christology and not the historical Jesus reconstructed from New Testament texts and given ·such prominence in the recent christologies of Schillebeeckx, Kling, Boff, Sobrino, et al. Particularly inappropriate, in Tracy's view, is the recent theological *use* of the historical quest for Jesus, namely the use of historically assured knowledge of Jesus to ground, validate, adjudicate the Christian faith claim. Such attempts to ground christology on the historical Jesus, along with the usual concomitant claim that the historical Jesus is the standard or norm for the christological tradition, are nothing less than an "obsession" [23] of present christologies, an obsession not in keeping with the internal norm of the living tradition which has mediated the event of Jesus Christ to the present day. Christian faith is faith *in* Jesus *with* the apostolic witnesses. Its ground, therefore, is not the historical Jesus but the tradition from the earliest apostolic witness to Jesus to the present community's memory of Jesus. According to that tradition's own inner criterion, the norm for fidelity to the event of Jesus Christ is the later tradition's fidelity to the original apostolic witness to that event.u What is immediately assured

[20] *A.I.,* 301, n. 97.
[21] *A.I.,* 234.
[22] *A.I.,* 245, n. 23; and 301, n. 97.
2aA.I., 335, n. 17.
[24] As far as I can determine, Tracy equates the original apostolic witness with the Jesus-kerygma of the earliest apostolic witnesses, reconstructed by

if the original apostolic witness is given priority is a christology ' from above ', however low, for the earliest apostles witnessed to the event of Jesus Christ as an event from God and by God's power, an event happening now. More to the point here, recognition of the authoritative role of the original apostolic witness for the whole tradition has the effect of shifting the christological center of gravity to the actual Jesus remembered by the community and confessed in the narratives, leaving the historical Jesus *"at best* a relatively external and secondary criterion of appropriateness for certain necessary assumptions or presuppositions of that witness to Jesus." [25]

Tracy assumes, as he is sure the original apostolic witnesses did, that their understanding is faithful to the actual Jesus who lived. If one should wish to test their memory against the image of Jesus reconstructed through historical critical methods, then a legitimate historical enterprise is going forward. It can even yield results in terms of an image of the historical Jesus that could actually function theologically as a continuation of the original apostolic witness, keeping alive in the community today the dangerous memory of Jesus and thereby being appropriate to the tradition's own internal criterion. But in no way can the historical Jesus be claimed as the norm of the tradition itself. Rather, the tradition's own norm of apostolicity renders the quest and its resultant reconstructed historical Jesus "not *theologically* necessary to the Christian affirmation of Jesus Christ," indeed, even " theologically inappropriate." [26] The quest may he of historical interest but it can never be constitutive for Christian theology as such. Neither can the historical Jesus which is its fruit, for "it is not the 'historical Jesus' but the confessed witnessed Jesus that is theologically relevant." [21]

form critics like Marxsen from Q and early Markan narratives. Cf. *A.I.,* 246, n. 25, and 269-75, especially 273.

[25] *A.I.,* 238.

[2s] *A.I.,* 245, n. 23; 295, n. 68.

[21] *A.I.,* 301, n. 97.

Admittedly a minority viewpoint, Tracy's position is all too easily misunderstood, and it is important to be clear about what he is not saying. In no way is he calling into question the actual existence of Jesus of Nazareth, or the intrinsic relevance of Jesus for the Christian faith. Quite the contrary: Christianity without Jesus is no longer Christianity; the Christ-principle without Jesus is always in danger of falling captive to a personal or cultural mood. Every christology must affirm the actual Jesus who lived and admit the intrinsic connection of every present experience of the Christ event to the person Jesus of Nazareth. In no way, either, is Tracy denigrating historical critical methodology; rather, he assigns this method at least three distinct and contributing tasks. By historically reconstructing the central texts of Christian self-understanding, it provides the raw material upon which the methods of literary criticism can play to elucidate and explain the sense, the religious-existential meanings expressed therein. It can also show continuity between various stages of the kerygma from the original witnesses through the Synoptics to John, Paul, and early Catholicism and beyond, thus providing warrants for the interpreter's trust of the tradition, (although it is interesting to note that the task of showing continuity between the actual Jesus who lived and the original apostolic witnesses as a basis for trust in the tradition is not considered important) . In the context of the major constitutive realities for theology of tradition, community and the personal venture of faith, these methods can furthermore contribute to both the development of the tradition and the exposure and correction of distortions in the tradition. [28]

What then is at the heart of Tracy's critique of the utilization of the historical Jesus in contemporary christology? It

2s *A.I.,* 237-38; 246, n. 25; 262. See also Tracy's *Blessed Rage for Order-The New Pluralism in Theology* (N.Y.: Seabury Press, 1975), 50-51 (hereafter cited as *B.R.O.)* ; and " Particular Questions Within General Consensus," *Consensus in Theology?* ed. Leonard Swidler (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1980), 36-39.

is the practice of adjudicating the Christian faith claim by historical critical inquiry into what lies behind the texts; it is the claim of Kling, Sobrino, Schillebeeckx and others that they are "grounding" christology in the historical Jesus; it is the theological importance ;assigned to this Jesus reconstructed by empirical methods in lieu of the Jesus confessed by the original apostolic witness (also reconstructed) .[29] In Tracy's judgment, such practice or claim or assignation comes close to being disastrous, for it reduces the classic Christian texts and symbols to a tenuous reconstruction, and in the end is " nothing less than a choice of the wrong religious classic to interpret when interpreting Christianity as a religion." [30] The historical Jesus is too fragile a base from which to make the Christian interpretation; rather, the personal faith response to the event Jesus Christ along with and within the mediating realities of tradition and community (themselves normed by the original apostolic witness to that event) alone provide the firm and constitutive foundation.

Underlying this difference in judgment are obviously deep differences over questions of fundamental theology, questions which concern the nature of revelation and faith, the nature of history and its significance for faith, the relation of a tradition to its originating events, the assessment of the contemporary situation in which the Christian message needs to be set forth, the nature of systematic theology itself. Since Tracy's position on the particular question of the theological relevance of the historical Jesus is shaped by his foundational understanding of the hermeneutical nature of the task of systematic theology, a delineation of that understanding will serve to highlight what is at stake in the debate. For such a hermeneutical approach, tradition is the all-encompassing horizon and, along with the mediating reality of community and the personal venture of faith in Jesus Christ, the chief constitutive element of Christian theology:

[29] David Tracy, "Author's Response," in review symposium on *A.I.* in *Horizons* S (1981), 329-39; *A.I.* 301; 334, n. 15.

[30] "Author's Response," 338.

If we are to know Jesus as he was and is, we must know him through the mediation of the whole tradition as witness to him and immediately as we have ourselves experienced him either individually or communally in our experience of the Christ event as from God and happening now.[31]

Given the centrality of tradition as the major constitutive mediating reality of the event of Jesus Christ, the central theological task is that of interpretation, or "translation carried on within the effective history of a tradition to retrieve its sometimes strange, sometimes familiar meanings." [32] Those meanings are more often than not present in the classic texts of a tradition. In authentic conversation with any classic text, a realized experience of understanding " happens ", in which the interpreter's present understanding is provoked, challenged, transformed by the meaning mediated through the text. As with artistic and literary classics, so too with the Christian classic (the event and person of Jesus Christ expressed in the New Testament texts): theology's authentic conversation with it can disclose a new and transformative understanding of a unique way of being-in-the-world, in this case, since Jesus is the presence among us of God's own self, the particular human possibility of being-in-the-world, in the presence of a gracious God. In this perspective, christological statements have primarily a religious-existential character; they are affirmations which bear the character of a response. Consistent with this, Jesus Christ is seen not primarily as the actualization of the possibility of authentic human existence but as the great representative sign, symbolizing with powerful existential import the real human possibility for genuine relation to God.[33]

31 *A.I.,* 236.

32 *A.I.,* 99. Tracy's own creative use of contemporary interpretation theory, especially that of Gadamer and Ricoeur, can be seen as one of the most valuable aspects of his project.

33 *B.R.O.,* Ch.. 9. In response to reviewers, Tracy maintains that a continuity between this earlier work on fundamental theology and the later *A.I.* does exist: "Author's Response," 335-39. However, in *A.I.* he does conItect the religious mode of being-in-the-world disclosed by the text more explicitly with the memory of Jesus, e.g. 275-81; 298, n, 85.

This approach clearly favors a'' reversal of priority from the 'historicity' of religious texts to their 'logicity' ",[34] not to the exclusion of concern for historicity but to its completion in more religiously meaningful interpretation. To cite one example of its actual application: the meaning of a parable of Jesus is not yet rightly understood when one has understood the situation in Jesus's ministry in which it was originally spoken, nor the situation of the early community in which it was remembered and interpreted, nor the theology of the authors who wove it into their gospels (the three levels retrieved through historical critical methods). Only when the hermeneutical move has been made, aided by the employment of literary critical methods, is an adequate interpretation given as the contemporary religious-existential meaning of the parable is disclosed in all of its disorienting claim and transformative power. It is with this understanding of the hermeneutical task of systematic theology that Tracy himself engages in the interpretation of the proclamation, narrative, symbol, and reflective thought of New Testament texts, with beautiful, at times almost homiletic, results.[35] It is also from this perspective that he mounts his consistent critique of the theological preeminence recently given to the historical Jesus in contemporary christology.

Tracy's total project is making undoubtedly valuable contributions to significant areas of the discipline of theology; one could cite his concern for the public character of theological speech, his analysis of the classic and the application of that category to theological method, and his championing of literary critical methods in the interpretation of the Scriptures. On this particular question, however, as his fundamental position leads him to critique the theological relevance of the historical

[34] *B.R.O.,* 78.

[35] *A.I.,* 248-304; 329-32. It is, I think, one of the ironies of Tracy's work that in spite of the density of his own prose, his stress on and demonstration ot the hermeneutical task has such potential for application to the ministry of preaching, so sorely in need of attention in the Church today.

Jesus, one can raise the question of whether there is not more to be said in order to do justice to all aspects of the issue. Diverse arguments could be brought to bear against his critique from different systemic approaches, but, since the fundamental issues are so disputed, more fruitful perhaps will be the posing of counter-questions regarding the very values of tradition and its hermeneutic to which Tracy assigns pre-eminence.

Question: The Nature of the Gospel Tradition Itself

The Bultmannian position on this question, with which Tracy explicitly aligns himself (although for vastly differing reasons [36]), perceives the gospel tradition from the form critical perspective, i.e., as a tradition primarily confessional in nature and primarily reflective of the situation-in-life of the early Christian communities. While that insight has remained virtually unassailable in subsequent scholarship, the conclusions which Bultmann drew from it have not. He maintained that although the actual Jesus who lived was a necessary pre-condition for the k:erygma, and indeed could even be partially portrayed, [37] his figure remained a piece of pre-history continuous

36 Bultmann was strongly influenced by the Lutheran understanding of faith, an event of believing response evoked by the proclamation of the Word of God. The present happening of the Word of God has priority; investigation into its historically past origins is a misguided attempt to validate the kerygma by human means. What was called for was faith in the Word of God proclaimed in the present apart from any buttressing by reason or history. This is in effect "a radical application of the doctrine of justification by faith to the sphere of knowledge and thought," Bultmann, *Jesus Christ and Mythology* (N.Y.: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), 84. Tracy's stance, on the other hand, proceeds not from the Lutheran understanding of faith but from his overarching purpose of delineating and advocating the hermeneutical nature of the theological task.

37 "Hence with a bit of caution we can say the following concerning Jesus's activity: Characteristic for him are exorcisms, the breach of the Sabbath commandment, the abandonment of ritual purifications, polemic against Jewish legalism, fellowship with outcasts such as publicans and harlots, sympathy for women and children; it can also be seen that Jesus was not an ascetic Eke the John the Baptist, but gladly ate and drank a glass of wine. Perhaps we may add that he called disciples and assembled a.bout himself a small com·

with the kerygma in a 'historical' but not a 'material' way. The kerygma itself was not interested in the knowledge of the Jesus of history who remains in the past, but in the proclamation of the crucified and risen Lord as the genesis of faith here and now.

Reaction to this radical separation between the actual Jesus who lived and the confessed, witnessed Christ, between history and the kerygma, has led after three decades of post-Bultmannian scholarship to a substantially new perception of the nature of the gospel tradition's relation to the actual Jesus who lived, one more positive in its correlation of the two.[38] It is seen in the new suggestion that although Easter faith is foundational to the Christian kerygma, it is not the only source of its content. The apostolic witnesses realized that God had acted in a revelatory way in Jesus of Nazareth, and testified to this by incapsulating the earthly history of Jesus, however minimally, into their proclamation. As the witnessing, proclaiming gospel tradition developed, it stayed in close relationship with authentic historical tradition about Jesus, preserving some characteristic features of Jesus's message and ministry and perforce even assimilating its proclamation to them. The very

pany of followers, men and women." Bultmann, "The Primitive Christian Kerygma and the Historical Jesus," *The Historical Jesus and the J(erygmatic Ghrist,* eds. C. Braaten and R. Harrisville (N.Y.: Abingdon Press, 1964), 22·23.

as As indicated in n. 4, the shift to the 'new quest' was triggered by Ernst Kiisemann's lecture on the problem of the historical Jesus, called by Stephen Neill "one of the turning points in theological thinking in this century," *[Jesus Through Many Eyes* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), 167]. Peter Stuhlmacher provides an overview of the rise and fall of the Bultman·nian program in *Historical Criticism and Theological Interpretation,* tr. R. Harrisville (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977), 51-91. Roman Catholic in·terpretation joined the discussion at the time of the new quest; while differing from the new questers in significant fundamental ways, it has largely been in accord with the search for continuity between history and the faith confession. Cf. Raymond Brown, "After Bultmann, What? An Introduction to the Post-Bultmannians," *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 26 (1964), 1-30; ,Josep11 Cahill, "Rudolf Bultmann and Post-Bultmannian Tendencies," *ibid.,* 153-78; Heinrich Fries, *Bultmann-Barth and Catholic Theology,* tr. L. Swidler (Pittsburgh: Duquesne Unive.rsity Press, 1967).

existence of the gospel genre, coming chronologically as it did *after* kerygmatizing and mythologizing tendencies had taken root in Christian consciousness, points to the Christian communities' concern not only for the presence of the glorified Lord but also with the actual history of Jesus of Nazareth, in whom God was believed to have acted, and acted *before* there ever were believers. In the gospel genre, an historical account of a past event is precisely the form that the Church's word takes. The very existence of the gospels shows the abiding interest of the Christian community in what happened "once upon a time", interest which perdured because of the identification made in their experience and insight between the Jesus who actually lived and the Christ of faith. So mutually correlative are the historical actual Jesus who lived and the Christian kerygma that the question as to whether the New Testament includes the actual Jesus who lived among the criteria of its own validity can be answered in the affirmative.[39] Precisely as thoroughly imbued with faith conviction, the gospel tradition is interested in the history of Jesus and points back behind itself to that history. Fidelity to that tradition, then, requires theological inquiry to do likewise. Theology is interested in historical information about Jesus of Nazareth because the gospel tradition itself considers this important.

That these post-Bultmannian insights can be made fruitful for christology in a way that does not necessarily result in a simplistic "grounding" of christology in the Jesus of history has been recently demonstrated by (among others) Edward Schillebeeckx, who among Roman Catholic systematicians has given most careful attention to the relation between the history of Jesus and the gospel tradition.[40] In his judgment there is an aspect of the truth in Bultmann's refusal to attach any theological significance to the historical Jesus, for no reconstruction can show that he is the Christ. But the difficulty lies in Bult-

[39] Ernst Kasemann, "Blind Alleys in the 'Jesus of History' Controversy," *New Testament Questions of Today* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1969), 48.

[40] *Jesus*, Part One, 41-104; see also his *Interim Report on the Books' Jesus' and 'Christ'*, tr. J. Bowden (N.Y.: Crossroad, 1981).

mann's equating a theological interest in the historical Jesus with the attempt to validate or prove the truth of the kerygma, and his consequent option for the centrality of the Christian witness alone. Such an option ignores the fact that Jesus and his first believing disciples were a single phenomenon: " Neither Jesus nor the earliest' church community' constitutes the font and origin of Christianity, but both together as offer and response." [41] Jesus of Nazareth in his whole historical reality-his actual person, message, way of life-was experienced as constituting an 'offer' to which Christian faith and its expression in titles and other categories taken from the socio-cultural context were a 'response'. 'l'he response is not purely projective on the part of the Christian witnesses, but is evoked and partly determined by the reality that was offered in Jesus. However varied the credal trends, they are related to particular aspects of the actual Jesus who lived (as teacher, wonder-worker, crucified and risen one, etc.) ; however culturally conditioned the titles, their meaning is modified by the history of Jesus to whom they are attributed; however creative the responses, they are intrinsically limited by the historical offer itself. Thus the ' objective ', evocative element and the 'subjective ', projective element, while not totally distinguishable, exist as intrinsically related correlatives at the origin of the tradition. The original apostolic witness does not exclude historical concern for Jesus, but rather includes it as part of the matrix out of which Christian faith is born. Consequently, the Bultmannian position which negates the idea that the primitive Christian tradition enshrined an interest in the history of Jesus has been widely abandoned by modern exegesis. Rather, the " confession of the crucified-and-risen One manifestly embraces the recollected substance of his earthly life: the kerygma is itself meant, on the ground of its own self-understanding, to refer back to the past events involving Jesus." [42]

[41] *Jesus,* 58. Hence, SchiUebeeckx is more nuanced on the question of the historical Jesus as ground of faith than Tracy would allow (cf. *A.I.,* 334, n. 15).

•2 *J efJU6 1* 72.

The post-Bultmannian understanding of the nature of the gospel tradition seems to have in principle undercut the Bultmannian division between the history of Jesus and Christian faith at its root. It furthermore makes an option for one to the exclusion of the other appear inadequate to the sources themselves. Certainly, as Tracy mentions, the original apostolic witness is normative for the faith tradition. Yet this original apostolic witness, far from making inquiry into the history of Jesus "inappropriate", has as part of its own content specific and concrete references to the actual historical life and death of Jesus of Nazareth, distinct from although mediated through this witness, a reference furthermore which entails not only historical continuity but also material continuity between them both.

This then remains a question to the position which would undervalue the importance of interest in the history of Jesus and the reconstruction of that history in lieu of the normativity of the original apostolic witness: whether the valuable move into hermeneutical concerns does not lead to less than justice being done to the full nature of the classic Christian texts and the tradition which produced them, and this according to the totality of their own inner criteria.

Question: The Referent of New Testament Texts

A second area of concern regarding a completely hermeneutical approach has to do with the adequacy of an exclusively existential hermeneutic of New Testament texts carried out on the supposition that all of those texts, even explicitly christological utterances, refer primarily to Christian self-understanding. Again, Bultmann's perception of the hermeneutical circle required this supposition in order_that the result of theological interpretation of the texts be the disclosing of possibilities of authentic existence for human beings in the present. Tracy too hews closely, though with significant nuancing, to this line of thought, invoking Bultmann's understanding at several key

points.[43] The christological sections of both his major worirn focus on the existential religious significance of christological utterances; in the first, the fact of Jesus Christ is envisioned not as the actualization of a possibility but as the re-presentative Christian fact re-presenting the possibility of human existence in genuine relation to God; in the second, literary critical analysis of the proclamation, narrative, symbol, and reflective thought of the New Testament serves primarily to disclose the existential meaning carried in these texts. What is of first importance is to know the " existential meaning and truths represented for our present human experience by the christological affirmations."[44] It is logically coherent, if theology's primary task is seen as the hermeneutical one of explicating the religious mode of being-in-the-world which the New Testament , texts express, to maintain that questions about the internal relation of that understanding of human existence to the concrete history of the actual Jesus who lived insofar as we can reconstruct it are relatively unimportant.

Although the value and importance of the concern for the existential meaningfulness of the Christian witness can in no way be denied, an existential hermeneutic taken alone is open to the critique that it cannot adequately encompass the entire theological task, and that judgment is made on the basis of the classic Christian texts themselves. Those texts do indeed make explicit statements about self-understanding, especially in the Pauline and in a more limited way in the Johannine writings, but such statements do not appear in every New Testament author's work. More to the point, the diverse self-understandings which are implicit in various texts (the early apocalyptic, Hellenistic enthusiastic, community of the Epistle of James, etc.) can hardly be synthesized to *one* understanding of human existence. To Braun's classic formulation, endorsed by Tracy, that "the constant is the self-understanding of the believer;

[43] *A.I.,* 256, 260-61, 269-70,
[44] *B.R.O.,* 218.

christology is the variable," [45] Kasemann has responded, " I hold this judgment to be, quite simply, false ... the range of variations (in Christian self-understanding) could hardly be wider." [46]

Not only is there no unified implicit or explicit understanding of human existence expressed in the texts, but these texts on the face of it deal with many matters other than the understanding of human existence, although all things dealt with do indeed reflect the author's self-understanding. Statements are made which refer directly to God and God's work in the events of the ·world, to Jesus and the events of his life, statements whose obvious intention is to refer to realities not reducible to though not unrelated to the possibilities of human existence. In debate with the Bultmannian position, a substantial body of thought now argues that theological interpretation cannot focus exclusively on a text's existential meaning and ignore other aspects of its reality. Insistence on the understanding of existence as the ultimate hermeneutical principle unduly restricts actual New Testament speech; by means of it, speech about the history of Jesus Christ" is changed into a network of significant ideas; it is dissolved into a mere 'signi:ficat' and has lost the force of the' est'." [47] In the face of such existentialist constriction, it is no longer apparent why any reference to the person of Jesus is essentially necessary, although Bultmann is convinced that it is. A more adequate position would be to maintain that if the Christian texts are a response to the fullness of the event of the man Jesus Christ in his living, dying and rising, then along with existential concerns (and not without them) interpretation of christological texts has to maintain emphasis on Jesus Christ's person and the history narrated in connection with him.

[45] Herbert Braun, "The Meaning of New Testament Christology," *God and Ghrist: Existence and Providence,* Ro·bert Funk ed. (N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1968), 115.

•a " Blind Alleys," 37-38.

[47] Gunther Bornkamm, " Myth and Gospel: A Discussion of the Problem of Demythologizing the New Testament Message," *Kerygma and History,* eds. C. Braaten and R. Harrisville (N.Y.: Abingdon Press, 1962), 187.

Tracy's widening the horizon of human existence to include the social dimensions of the individual, the reality of community experience, and the need for orthopraxis immeasurably enriches this position, but does not in the end counter the basic critique of the Bultmannian way of proceeding.[48] Valuable as it is as a hermeneutic for the gospel, the possibility of human existence disclosed in the Christian texts does not exhaust the totality of the referent of these texts. This then remains a second question to the position which would focus on the existential significance of the Christian texts to the diminishment of the importance of other referents of the texts: whether the valuable and much-needed concentration on the existential religious significance of christological texts does not lead to less than justice being done to the full nature of the classic Christian texts and the hermeneutical methods needed to mediate their meaning, and this according to the totality of their own referent.

The Historical Jesus or the Memory of the Tradition: A False Dilemma

The problem of the historical Jesus is a genuinely disputed issue in contemporary theology, one which is far from being resolved. Surfacing some arguable insufficiencies of any particular approach still leaves the positive theological relevance of this image unexplored. To that end, the following thesis regarding the nature of the reconstructed image of the historical Jesus in the faith of the Church today is proposed:

[48] Langdon Gilkey brings the same critique to bear against Tracy on this point as Bornkamm et al. bring against Bultmann; *Reaping the Whirlwind* (N.Y.: Seabury Press, 1976), 377, n. 23. With regard to both this question and the previous one it can be pointed out that Tracy, in his alliance with Bultmann, does not deal with serious readjustments which have been made in the Bultmaunian position by subsequent thought. There is nothing wrong in itself, of course, with disagreeing with a solidifying and substantiated body of opinion, this being the way scholarship moves forward; but if one does so, the option should be backed by warrants which are clear or convincing enough to engage and overcome the developing position. Tracy leaves many questions unanswered in this respect.

Thesis: The reconstructed image of the historical Jesus not only functions today as the equivalent of the memory impression of Jesus in the early Church, but actually is the equivalent of it, i.e. is the means by which significant segments of the present generation of believers remember Jesus who is confessed as the Christ. As such, it is an element of the living tradition of the present Church.

The community of believers has always, from the beginning until now, had its memory image of Jesus.[49] As a memory image of a concrete historical person held by a community of faith, it has carried that community's consciousness of the brandnewness which came into the world with Jesus, the drawing near of the transcendent in him, and the specialness attaching to his person as a result. Although the contours of that memory image have changed over the centuries, the image itself has continuously served as a symbol mediating the reality and mystery of what is at the heart of Christian belief, namely, (in broad terms) that at a certain point in time God's graciousness was shown in the coming to be of this member of our race, whose life, death and resurrection redound to our benefit, and in whom we have to do with the one God who is really and truly God.[50] In so doing, the memory image has been essential to the identity of the community, for it has always referred the living reality of the community and its tradition beyond itself to the one who lived and operated before there ever was a Christian tradition, the one without whom there would be no tradition (which is not to say that this one would be known today without the Christian tradition) . The memory image of Jesus in the community has contributed to the formation and content of the Church's confession, liturgi-

[49] Cf. Harvey, 246-91, for discussion of the memory image in a faith context; also David Schindler, "Theology and the historical-critical claims of modernity: on the need for metaphysics," *Oommunio* 6 (1979), 73-94, for critique of Harvey's own proposal in this regard.

\Ve are prescinding here from the recent debates about the meaning of Incarnation (Hick et al.) and the uniqueness of Christ (Knitter et al.), focusing for the moment on what can be identified as mainline Catholic position.

cal practice, preaching, ethical stance, and choice of life values and, as symbol, gives rise to thought, to teaching and doctrine. In a circle of mutual influence, it has also been shaped by the confession and practice of the Church as well as the culture in which the Church exists. As the Church "hands on to all generations all that she herself is, all that she believes " [51] the memory image of Jesus is also handed on, an irreplaceable element in the living tradition.

For the earliest communities, the memory of Jesus was shaped by the original disciples' first-hand experience of the actual Jesus who lived. These women and men had followed Jesus during his ministry, listened to his preaching, observed his behavior, been attracted to his manner of life. Their witness to his resurrection after the desolation of his crucifixion was informed by their personal memories communally shared. [52] Whether one follows the Pesch/Schillebeeckx understanding of original multiple communities with various and distinct memories issuing in confessions coherent with those memories, or sees the tradition originating solely with witness to the resurrection, the same phenomenon is at hand: the calling upon the disciples' memories of Jesus's ministry and death in the fashioning of the Christian proclamation.

Even before the end of the first century, the earliest images of Jesus had changed under the impact of the community's ongoing experience of the gifts of the Spirit and confrontation with new cultural settings. Newer images, including the theological idea of pre-existence, transformed and altered the earlier memories into what we call now the biblical picture of Christ.

51 *Dei Verbum* #8, *Documents of Vatican II,* W. Abbott, ed. (N.Y.: America Press, 1966) .

52 For recent argumentation that women functioned as original disciples, cf. Roeemary R. Ruether and Eleanor McLaughlin, eds., *Women of Spirit:]l'emale Leadership in the .Jewish and Christian 'l'raditions* (N.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 1979); and Elisabeth Schlissler, Fiorenza," Women in the Early Christian Movement," *Womanspirit Rising,* C. Christ and J. Plaskow eds. (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979), 84-92, as well as *In Memory of Her* (N.Y.: Crossroad, 1983), by the same author.

Through the long march of centuries the memory image of Jesus, now developed with reference to the total picture of Christ in the New Testament, continued to be intrinsic to the Church's consciousness, interacting with the whole of the Church's life. Contrasting memory images lay behind the clash between the Alexandrian and Antiochene schools, one focusing on Christ's identity as Logos, the other remembering his fully functioning humanity, while both were influenced by the ascendency of the Church under Christian civil power. The medieval image was shaped by insight into Jesus Christ's personal identity in dialogue with the newly re-discovered ideal of Greek anthropology; elements of superior knowledge and power were incorporated into the image and held in tension with the memory of his suffering. Post-Reformation and post-Enlightenment efforts to defend the faith resulted in a restriction of the rich memory image of Jesus in official theory, a restriction which was compensated for in the flourishing of certain types of spirituality (School of Berulle, Exercises of Ignatius, devotion to the Sacred Heart, etc.). The complex memory image which resulted in this later period continued to mediate to those generations under the suppositions of their cultural contexts the reality at the center of the Christian tradition: God's gracious presence in Jesus Christ calling forth human response. That this particular image has become less and less successful in doing so for believers who inhabit and are inhabited by a world ever more historically conscious, scientifically oriented, and aware of the magnitude of evil is one of the major concerns of contemporary christology.

The Church is never without its memory image of Jesus; this is an essential element passed on in the living tradition. In the present situation, the memory image of Jesus passed on by our immediate forebears in the faith is once again being transformed, this time under the impact of biblical scholarship's historical critical investigation into the Christian texts. The image of the historical Jesus reconstructed from those texts, whether directly for those who study and ponder it, or indirectly for

those who absorb it through catechesis, preaching, liturgical practice, experiences of ministry, etc., is the way Jesus is being remembered by significant numbers of the present generation of believers. As was pointed out above, it is as an image not exhaustive of the actual Jesus who lived, nor exactly the same as that held by the original apostolic witnesses. But given the critical tools by which it was arrived at, it arguably approaches however asymptotically the historical actuality of the earthly Jesus, and approximates more closely the original disciples' memory of Jesus than the memory of the Church has done for many generations.

Reception of *this* particular memory image, precisely because of the significant role which the memory of Jesus has played all through the tradition, has significant implications for all of the Church's life. If Jesus lived a life passionately devoted to God his 'Abba'; if he made a preferential option for the poor and marginalized of his society in the name of this God; if his preaching of the coming reign of this God limned a new vision of reality in which the old classifications made on the basis of race, sex, and class lost their meaning; if he himself was no stranger to the passions of red-blooded humanity but had to discern his life decisions, learning obedience through what he suffered; if his rejection and death came about as a consequence of fidelity to his mission (which mission can be said after Easter to cohere in the very depths of his being with what he is), then the call to follow as a disciple, both individually and collectively, takes on certain characteristics and understandings different in significant ways from that of the recent past. Roman Catholics now have a sufficient share of "passionate and living controversies in Christology which engage the existential concern of the faithful," whether the faithful be theologically educated or not, and this fact can be directly linked to the work of historical biblical criticism, so potent in its consequences because it is resulting in nothing less than the reshaping of the memory image of Jesus held by the Church.

As David Tracy has rightly insisted, it is imperative that the

actual Jesus who lived be affirmed in every christology. He much prefers that this be done through the memory of the tradition rather than through the reconstruction of the historical Jesus.[53] Perhaps a benevolent interpretation of his insistence on this distinction would view it as analogous to the distinction made by Karl Rahner between na.ture and grace: hypothetically necessary for the preservation of certain values, but not functionally operative in the concrete historical order of things.[54] It seems to me, however, that the stringent posing of such a definitive contrast between the tradition and the historical Jesus sets up a choice which is basically a false dilemma. In the present cultural context, when the historical Jesus is quested for and received within the faith consciousness of the Church (and never without reference to the original memory impressions), the reconstructed image of the historical Jesus is not separate from, opposed to, or a potential replacement for the memory of Jesus in the tradition. Rather, it is the form that memory is taking in the present moment of the living tradition.

This is not to say that the quest for the historical Jesus is in principle theologically necessary for christology; christology has existed for centuries without it. But the Church's memory image of Jesus is theologically necessary for christology and, as the quest has concretely affected the way Jesus is remembered in the Church, the quest and its results have assumed theological pertinence not only for the correction of the distortions of the tradition (although certainly for that), but also for the constitution of the tradition insofar as it includes remembering.55 Wha.t is constitutive is what is essential to a reality's constitution or make-up, missing which that reality

53 *A.I.,* 245, n. 20.

54 "Concerning the Relationship between Nature and Grace," *Theological Investigations* I, 297-317.

55 In distinction to D. Tracy, "Particular Questions within General Consensus," n. 39. Tracy, however, does recognize the possibility of the positive function of the image in the present community-A.I., 239.

would not be what it is. The memory of Jesus has always been constitutive for the Church's confession (without it, the content of *Jesus* in the event of Jesus Christ would be reduced to a cipher or a projection). As informing the present memory of Jesus in the community, therefore, the historical Jesus has constitutive value for christology. The image of the historical Jesus mediates to present believers the reality and mystery at the heart of the Christian tradition, and refers that tradition beyond itself to what is strange, challenging, even" dangerous" at its core, one Jesus of Nazareth. Because this image self-consciously contains what is historically reliable, it brings to consciousness in a striking way after centuries of forgetting the genuine humanity in the concrete historical contours of the Jew from Nazareth confessed as Lord and Christ-the paradox of Incarnation. Insofar as this image of the historical Jesus is relatively recently discovered, insofar as its manner of discovery and its content are congruent with the historical consciousness of contemporary believers, and insofar as it has had and is having widespread influence on systematic thought done in faith, what is most likely taking place in contemporary christology, however lurchingly, is a genuine development in the living tradition of the Church, a theological development which could well issue in a development of doctrine.[56] Most fundamentally, therefore, the theological importance of the image of the historical Jesus devolves from its constituting in part the Church's memory of Jesus in this new moment of the living tradition.

What effective application might this thesis have when brought to bear on the understanding of Christian faith itself and on theological reflection done within a faith context? In other words, in what ways is the historical Jesus in the memory of the present Church affecting Christian faith and its seeking

[56] Cf. Karl Rahner, "Considerations on the Development of Dogma," *Theological Investigations* IV, tr. K. Smyth (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1966), 3-35, for relation between theological activity and the development of doctrine.

of understanding ? Delineating the relation of the historical Jesus to Christian faith and, by way of example, the effect of this image in two key areas of systematic theology (christology and soteriology) can serve to highlight the power of this image.

Theological Relevance of the Historical Jesus for Christian Faith

In spite of deep differences over this genuinely disputed issue in contemporary theology, there is fundamental agreement among most theologians and exegetes on the basic point that the early Church made an identification, even an absolute identification, between the ministering and crucified Jesus who actually lived and died and the Christ experienced in the Spirit: one *is* the other.[57] The identification is rooted in the early communities' experience of past and present, of anamnesis and pneuma, as a single reality, and is articulated in their preservation of both stories remembered about and hymns and creeds witnessing to Jesus Christ. On the basis of this identification, the Christian affirmation **"I** believe in Jesus Christ" contains an internal reference to history, to a real historical man of the past, as well as to the present experience of him as the Christ of God through the Holy Spirit in the Church, both of which ground hope for the coming of the reign of God.

Christian faith affirms the saving activity of God in the person of Jesus Christ; it is (and this is not exhaustive) responsive trust in God who self-manifested in the person Jesus Christ. The center of faith is not a message, law, or set of principles, but the person of Jesus of Nazareth confessed as the Christ, the self-revelation of God. Christian faith in God, then, precisely as Christian, retains an essential link with the man from Nazareth; the link with his history forms an inner dimension of Christian faith.[58] This is not to say that history constitutes the

57 This is true of theologians as diverse as Tracy (A.I., 272) and Schille·beeckx *(Jesus,* 81); the latter considers the identification to be the hermeneu·tical key to the gospels.

ss This understanding, while divergent from the classic position of Bult-mann, is in accord with the consensus emanating from the new questers,

whole of what is essential for faith, nor that faith depends upon history alone. Faith is a response to the total revelatory event which occurs not only in the earthly history of Jesus but in the continuing life of the Church. But it is to say that knowledge of Jesus in his past actuality materially informs faith: *Jesus* is the Christ. As the present form of the Church's knowledge of Jesus in his past actuality, the historical Jesus is intrinsically related to Christian faith and functions in that relationship in several ways.

First of all, knowledge of Jesus reconstructed from Christian texts contributes to the faith image of Jesus which believers have, and to this extent can be a source of the necessary content of faith.[59] It is not the only source, for the proclamation of the Church arising out of the experience of the risen Lord is the ultimate origin of faith. But who is Jesus who is the Christ? Historical knowledge contributes concrete content to the name" Jesus," gives a particular cast to the memory image of this person, and is thereby a "subordinate but necessary medium to image forth this Jesus to whom we respond in faith."[60] The historical Jesus functions positively by providing the Christian faith image with important content.

In a second, more critical function, the historical Jesus can be used to test competing representations of Jesus and to judge the validity of claims made in his name. Was Jesus a humanist, as 19th century liberals held, or an all-knowing being as presented in the manualist tradition, or a revolutionary as might be claimed today ? Most likely not. Legitimate appeal can be made to the limited but assured historical knowledge of Jesus

Protestant systematicians such as Pannenberg, and most Roman Catholic christologians. Cf. Gerald O'Collins, *Foimdations of Theology* (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1970), 66.

59 Norman Perrin conducts a seminal discussion of the positive and negative functions of the historical Jesus-n. 4, "'The Significance of Knowledge of the Historical Jesus and His Teaching," 207-48.

ao Michael Cook, *The Jesus of Faith* (N.Y.: Paulist Press, 1981), 27. See also by the same author, " The Call to Faith of the Historical Jesus," *Theological Studies* 39 (1978), 679-700.

in order to test any faith image for consistency with that knowledge. In this way the faith image can be kept free from manipulation or simple projection, and allowed to embody the powerful figure of the gospels. To this limited extent, as Norman Perrin articulates it, " the historical Jesus validates the kerygma: not as kerygma, but as Christian." [61]

In addition to the positive and negative function of the historical Jesus with regard to the Christian faith image, there is an even more properly theological function which it exercises for Christian faith in the light of the above thesis: it connotes, in and through its specific denotation set within a dynamic of faith, the actuality of God's saving gift to humanity in our history, the reality of Incarnation. In an era of heightened historical consciousness amounting almost to a revolution in the way human beings perceive reality, strong emphasis on the kerygma in the case of the Protestant tradition, or on dogma in the case of the Roman Catholic, has had the unwanted effect of at least leaving Christian faith open to the charge that it springs from mythological, ideological, or self-delusionary tendencies. [62] With historical understanding a given in the western world, most contemporary believers cannot avoid the historical question of whether something happened and, in fact, of *what* happened, cannot schizophrenically divide the logical from the existential in their awareness. Prescinding here from the range of specific questions germane to fundamental theology in this regard, reclamation of the historical appears as a basic element affecting the faith of contemporary believers. Far from being an inert and powerless figment of historical reconstruction (as it appears in Tracy's work), the historical Jesus when received within the dynamic of faith becomes a powerful warrant for the connection of faith with reality in all of its dimensions.

01 Perrin, n. 4, 244. There is agreement about the positive and negative functions of the historical Jesus within faith from the most divergent quarters; cf. Tracy, "Particular Questions," 36-39; and Schillebeeckx, *Jesus* 62-71.

62 Whole systems of theology have been developed with this critique in mind, e.g. those of Rabner and Pannenberg.

Faith thrives on this historically reconstructed image precisely out of the conviction that in Jesus, his words and deeds and destiny, the decisive act of God for our salvation was being accomplished in our world and at the same time *extra nos,* freely,' objectively', evocatively. The historical Jesus connotes the reality of God's initiative and self-gift; while, as Ferdinand Hahn has argued, " renunciation of the theological relevance of the factual signifies something like a loss or privation of reality ..." [63]

Christian faith is concerned with a symbol system, a message, a possibility of self-understanding, but neither solely nor even primarily so. Each of these aspects of the faith experience has a primary reference to the person Jesus Christ in whom God is believed to have approached the world in a definite time and place, in a definite life. The centrality of this historical person evokes particular responses and checks the tendency to symbolize him in such a way that he presents particular possibilities of human life regardless of his own historical characteristics, as is sometimes done with other historical figures. If God has actually self-manifested in history in the person of Jesus, then this human life is not just a re-presentative symbol which opens people up to their own deepest existential possibilities. Rather, it is the locus of God's address. Therefore, it is theologically important to know who this man really was in history. [64] Chris-

63 "Probleme historischer Kritik," *Zeitschrift fur die neutestamentlich Wissenschaft* 63 (1972), 1-17. See also K. Rahner, "Intellectual Honesty and the Christian Faith," *Theological Investigations* VII, tr. D. Bourke (N.Y.: Seabury Press, 1977), 52; and John Collins, "Biblical Scholarship and the Church," *Chicago Studies* 20 (1981), 121-35.

64 As Schillebeeckx argues, " God does not sanction a cultural or anthropological model or process, but this man Jesus," *Interim Report,* 28. In the *Report* S. explicitly critiques the position which Tracy espoused in *B.R.O.,* holding that it cast Jesus in too completely and representatively symbolic a role divorced from his history, Likewise, he questions the sole use of purely literary critical exegesis which is interested only in texts. The specific datum of Christianity is the Jew Jesus Christ, and so literary criticism is untenable religiously if it is meant to be definitive (28-9; 144, n. 6). In *A.I.,* Tracy has concentrated more attention on the 'dangerous memory' of

tian faith has (though not exhaustively so) an historical content; that content is the factuality of the history of Jesus as the history of God's self-manifestation. Because the event of salvation is intrinsically related to the irreducible concreteness of Jesus, for Christian faith "at this point what is most historical is what is most essential." [65]

The image of the historical Jesus, formed by the coalescence of historical knowledge about him, is not properly utilized if it becomes a verification or proof of faith. It is, however, theologically relevant for faith in that it gives concrete content to the faith confession, corrects faith images of Jesus, and, most crucially, carries the element of the free, divine ' given' in the Christ event, the actuality of God's self-gift in history to which Christian faith is a response.

Theological Relevance of the Historical Jesus for Christological Doctrine

The christological doctrine of the Church, crystalized in the formulation of the Council of Chalcedon, stressed the centrality of the insight that Jesus Christ's identity involved a double relationality: with God (" one in being with the Father ") and with the whole human race (" one in being with us ") . In the context of the Eutychean effort once again to transform Jesus into a divine man, the import of Chalcedon's incorporation of the " two natures " terminology was to secure a nonnegotiable place in the Church's doctrine for the full humanity of the incarnate Word. The very reality of the Incarnation demanded the full participation of the " Christ, Son, Lord " in human nature and the structures of human existence. So too did the effecting of salvation since, in the judgment of those championing the two natures doctrine, " what was not assumed

Jesus than was evident in *B.R.O.,* and to powerful effect. Still, insofar as he claims fundamental continuity between the two works, uses literary critical methods alone in the christological chapters, and explicitly warns against attempts to incorporate the historical in a constitutive way, the questions from S. would still be pertinent.

65 Rahner, *Foundations,* 176.

was not redeemed ". In the words of Leo, which the Council in substance affirmed, " it is as dangerous an evil to deny the truth of the human nature of Christ as to refuse to believe that his glory is equal to the Father " (Sermon 27).

Chalcedon notwithstanding, the humanity of Christ has consistently proved difficult for the Church to come to terms with and has often in oblique ways been suppressed or lost from view. This can be the case, as Rahner has pointed out, in a particularly ironic way in so-called orthodox christology; such christology has a " mysterious monophysite undercurrent " running through it, a secretly docetic tendency which pervades it despite protestations to the contrary. This comes to expression in the ordinary understanding that a mark of the true believer is the confession of Jesus as God, while at the same time equal importance is not attached to the fact that "Jesus is a real, genuine, and finite human being with his experience, in obedient human being, like us in all things." [66] The historical Jesus, this image which emphasizes the actual and the concrete, gives the Church a rather reliable picture of Jesus the man. To this extent it helps to break through the docetism which tends again and again to assume dominance in the Church and leads to a fuller appropriation of the full humanity of Jesus Christ. A plausible case can in fact be made that the controversy over the historical Jesus is but the modern form of the old christological dispute of docetism, the ancient and apparently ingrained tendency to absorb the humanity of Jesus into the current perception of the divine in such a way that Jesus becomes a mere construct. [67]

[66] K. Rahner, "I believe in Jesus Christ: Interpreting an Article of Faith," *Theological Investigations* IX, tr. G. Harrison (London: Darton, Longmans and Todd, 1972), 166. See also n. 1.

[67] The case is made by Keck, 127-28 and Reinhard Slenczka, *Geschichtlichkeit und Personsein Jesu Christi* (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1967), 19, among others. It is important to note that the charge is not being made here that anyone who does not stress the importance of the historical Jesus is tending toward docetism, since such a one may either be assuming

The humanity of a historical figure is recognized when that figure is seen in concrete relationship to real, particular situations and people. By situating Jesus of Nazareth against the background of his political, cultural and religious milieu and by delineating his characteristically personal stances, teaching, and manner of behaving, the image of the historical Jesus insures that the human nature of Jesus (Chalcedon's 'vere homo ') is understood not as an abstract notion but as involving a concrete history, one not subsumed by the 'vere Deus' which is an equally essential element of the Church's confession. Just as important, the exegetical methods which produce the historical Jesus preclude certain systematic conclusions which may weaken the full humanity, e.g. regarding Jesus's knowledge, and so insure that the humanity of the Son of God remains recognizable in the context of contemporary anthropological presuppositions. In the present climate of questioning and criticism, as Donald Baillie described it for the Protestant tradition, " the redicovery of the human historical personality of Jesus came as a new realization of the historical content of the dogmas;" [68] for those in the Catholic communion, such a recognition is in fact still coming.

The historical Jesus is constitutively bound up with christology, insofar as christology aims to make intelligible the Christian confession that *Jesus* is the Christ. Its presence in the Church's memory enables the working out of a christology which corrects the monophysite distortion characteristic of ordinary christology of the recent past, and advances the understanding of the radical assertion that the one Christ, Son, Lord, is "one in being with us as to his humanity" by giving to that humanity concrete historical content. Its theological importance lies precisely in this-that it delineates the history

the humanity of Jesus or attempting to insure its place by other means. But it is being said here that there is a relationship between the historical Jesus and the correction of docetism.

ss Donald Baillie, *God Was in Christ* (N.Y.: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948), 52.

of God with us, and leads to the rejection of docetism in any form.

Theological Relevance of the Historical Jesus for Understanding Salvation and the Christian Way of Life

What God has done for our benefit in Jesus has from the beginning been at the heart of the Christian proclamation of the good news as well as at the heart of the way of response in prayer and praise, in moral choices, in the whole Christian life of faith. In recent centuries soteriology tended to narrow the focus of Jesus's salvific activity to his death on the cross. The redemption effected there was a freeing from sin, understood primarily as a grace-less condition of the individual's soul, and ·a freeing from death, in such a way that the fruits of salvation were to be experienced for the most part in the world to come. The gap between that traditional soteriology and the quest for meaning and wholeness in the contemporary era has led theology to the discovery that the salvific dimensions of the life of Jesus Christ for believers and indeed for the whole world are richer than the Church has remembered for a long time. The initial move in this direction came in the early 1960's with biblical scholars reappropriating the unmitigated importance of the resurrection of the crucified one in the New Testament witness. Continued historical critical investigating has uncovered another intrinsic link vital for understanding salvation: the relation between the ministry and death of Jesus. Jesus's death was the historical consequence of his fidelity to his ministry of preaching and healing; it is just this Jesus who did and said these things and not some crucified man who is the Redeemer. If we ask what is meant by the salvation given to us in him, " to give substance and content to this we have to point to Jesus of Nazareth himself, his person and his whole career and course of action up to and including his death." [69]

As the Church's present memory of the actual Jesus who

[69] Schillebeeckx, *Jesus,* 52.

lived, the historical Jesus is theologically relevant for the understanding of salvation. Informed by some historically assured knowledge of the ministry of Jesus, including in particular his preaching the coming reign of God with all the richness that symbol carried in the Jewish tradition, his association with the tax collectors and sinners, and his liberal attitude toward the legal tradition within his basically law-abiding life, newer theological approaches to the meaning of salvation have introduced the ancient category of "liberation " to signify the height and breadth and depth of human salvation effected in him.[70] Against the tendency to overspiritualize and to privatize, these approaches claim earthly salvation in both personal and corporate dimensions to be inner components of Christian redemption. It is seen, for example, that it was precisely Jesus's desire for human wholeness which led him to heal on the sabbath rather than wait for the first day of the week. Opposition to this choice and others similar to it created the conflict which ultimately led to his death. If then the cross was a consequence of Jesus's pattern of ministry, it cannot be used (as sometimes happens) to legitimate passivity and toleration of the suffering which is rooted in human injustice. It is, rather, "the abiding sign of the determination of God and of Jesus to free us as individuals and the human race as a whole."[71] Incorporating the memory of the prophetic life and healing work of Jesus into the interpretation of his death is resulting in an understanding of salvation critical of ideology and oriented toward the promotion of human well-being.

Interpretation of soteriology as full human liberation (integrity, wholeness in all dimensions) is closely woven with growing appreciation of Christian life as a way of discipleship, of following the one who is the Way. Following consists in

10 See survey by Francis Schussler Fiorenza, " Critical Social Theory and Christology: Toward an Understanding of Atonement and Redemption as Emancipatory Solidarity," *OTSA Proceedings* 30 (1975), 63-110.

71 Dietrich Wiederkehr, *Belief in Redemption,* tr. J. Moiser (Atlanta: .Johll Knox Press, 1979) , 32.

hearing the word of God and acting upon it (Lk 8: 21), which translates concretely into a life of faith and suffering love based on the adoption of the values of Jesus, not in slavish imitation but by the power of his Spirit in one's own circumstances. In ways newly appreciated, discipleship may well mandate one to question critically the given order of things, to oppose what is oppressive to human well-being, to reconstruct creatively systems in keeping with the vision of the reign of God, and to do so in the name of the crucified Jesus who is proclaimed as Lord and Christ.[72] In the life of discipleship, mystical activity (i.e. prayerful experience of God's immediacy in absence) and political activity (i.e. action on behalf of justice) belong together. It is not by accident, then, that liberation theologies are virtually unanimous in some sort of appeal to the historical Jesus and his prophetic ministry as one keystone of their critical reworking of the Christian tradition. Jesus's teaching and liberating praxis, known through historical reconstruction, is at the heart of the transforming vision of a redeemed humanity from which these theologies proceed and toward which they struggle in hope to move the Church and the world. Two brief examples: Latin American theologians find in the historical Jesus's option for the poor and marginalized of his society the warrant for the critical, liberating way of discipleship in socially oppressive situations. The concreteness of his life guarantees the truth of their perceptions:

> No authority can decree that everything is permitted, for justice and exploitation are not so indistinguishable. And Christ died so that we might know that not everything is permitted. But not any Christ. The Christ that cannot be co-opted by accommodationists and opportunists is the historical Jesus.[73]

12 Cf. Johannes Metz, *Followers of Christ,* tr. T. Linton (N.Y.: Paulist Press, 978); Thomas Clarke, ed., *A.bove Every Name: The Lordship of Christ and Social Systems* (N.Y.: Paulist Press, 1980).

1aJ. Miranda, *Being and the Messiah* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1977), 9. In Sobrino (n. 7), 15-16, n. 25 there is a partial listing of leading Latin American theologianlil who appeal to the historical Jesus in their critical approac!l, · ·

Reformist feminist theologians likewise appeal to the historical Jesus who discloses transforming patterns of relationship between people through his own personal style of relating. During his ministry he associated with women as friends and disciples; women were witnesses of his death and burial, and commissioned witnesses of the resurrection. This reality is so deeply rooted that it survived the androcentric tendencies of the tradition and is still perceptible in the texts.[74] Beside Jesus's personal attitude and behavior toward women, feminist theology also finds valuable Jesus's stance toward the poor and oppressed, among whom outcast women are at the bottom of the list (recall the Samaritan and Syro-Phoenician women, the widows, the prostitutes) . Jesus's rejection, implicit and explicit, of relationships patterned on domination-subjection, and his vision of a new humanity of service and mutual empowerment give the lie to those who would perpetuate sexist structures and modes of relationship in his name.

The historical Jesus, remembered-with assurance-as actually being one kind of man and not another, teaching particular things about God and humanity and not something else, living this kind of life and being put to this kind of death and not another, calling human beings to this kind of response and not another, this historical Jesus is contributing to the reshaping of the understanding of salvation effected in him and the way of discipleship which is the Christian response.

Conclusi,on

The importance of the image of the historical Jesus pertains to many more areas of study than have been discussed here; it has relevance for Christian anthropology, ecclesiology, escha-

74 Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza, "Interpreting Patriarchal Traditions," *The Liberating Word,* Letty Russell, ed. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976). For an overview of this perspective, see Anne Carr, "Is a Christian Feminist Theology Possible ?" *Theological Studies* 43 (1982), 279-97. For particular example, see Rosemary R. Ruether, *To Change the World: Ohristology and Cultural Oritiosm* (N.Y.: Crossroad, 1981), especially Ch. IV, "Christology and Feminism: Can a Male Savior Save Women?", 45-56.

tology and theology of God, as well as for fundamental, moral, and spiritual theologies as they are related to systematic theological thought. The areas described here were set out briefly to illustrate the impact which the historical Jesus, informing the memory of the Church, is having on theological renewal. Indeed, if one could imagine the removal of this image from the present consciousness of the Church, the theology of the last two decades would look significantly different. Shifting the basic image of Jesus cannot but have vast implications for all areas of the Church's life and thought. Hence, the living and passionate controversies swirling around Roman Catholic christologies today.

A popular axiom used in ecumenical discussion holds that people are more usually right in what they affirm than in what they deny. Tracy's hermeneutical project, which seeks to make manifest the existential religious meanings inherent in the classic Christian texts while at the same time critiquing those christologies which incorporate the historical Jesus in theologically relevant ways, would seem to be a good case in point. His own positive insights and in particular his own interpretative moves are penetrating and pertinent; yet what he negates is counted by the majority of contemporary christologies to be among what is essential. It would seem that the totality of the theological task encompasses more than the hermeneutical approach focused primarily on texts would allow, valuable as that approach is in itself. Even if one would agree that it is a misuse of the historical Jesus to employ it to ground or validate in whole or in part the kerygma, there still remains the further question of whether the rejection of that function should diminish the importance of other functions of the historical Jesus in present christology. Tracy allows subsidiary corrective and developmental roles; the argument here has been that there is an even more primary, constitutive ro]e, insofar as the historical Jesus informs the present memory of the Church. Even if one would agree that the mediation of tradition and community ground faith, there still remains the further question of what

grounds the tradition. Apostolicity is certainly a normative element, but what is the relation of the original apostolic witness to that to which it witnesses *?* Stopping the theologically relevant line of inquiry at the witnesses and their memory has the effect of leaving one in the minds and experiences of those people and not leading *ad rem,* to Jesus Christ in his own reality which, however, is never known apart from the witnesses. Even if one would agree that criteria of appropriateness are of great importance, are not criteria of intelligibility at least equally crucial in this age of historical consciousness, when faith must render an account of its hope to a reason gone historical? Even if one would agree that it is the actual Jesus remembered and confessed by the community which must bear the theological weight, can that Jesus be so radically distinguished from the historical Jesus known by empirical methods in the present community? The thesis put forward here is that such a divorce is not legitimate.

The suggestion has been made that moments of renewed care in scholarly study of the Bible are correlated with and may even be responsible for sparking moments of great power and originality in the history of theology.[75] To judge from the evidence of the last two decades, such a moment is once again present. Biblical criticism is a work of the Church; historical biblical criticism in particular is renewing the memory of Jesus Chrst in the Church. If present-day Roman Catholic christologies are "obsessed" with the historical Jesus, it is with good reason. After so long a season of forgetting, the Church is once again perceiving the actual historical contours of the one confessed as its Lord and Christ, is once again glimpsing the ' human face of God'. It is a picture too valuable to be eclipsed by its undoubted existential import.

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1n Krister Stendahl, "Biblical Theology, Contemporary," *The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible* (N.Y.: Abingdon Preas, 1962), 418-32.

GOD'S OMNIPOTENCE AND IMMUTABILITY

HERE ARE SEVERAL WAYS of attacking theological beliefs. One is to show that there are mistakes in he rational arguments used to support them; another is to show that they do not fit the facts; yet another is to claim that since they cannot be falsified they are vacuous; and, fourthly, one can attempt to show that they are mutually inconsistent.

Attacks oi the fourth type will be discussed here, attacks which pertain primarily to God's omnipotence and immutability. It will be argued that there are ways that the theist can meet these attacks without abandoning any essential beliefs. Thus, in what follows, my sole purpose is to establish the mutual consistency of certain theological beliefs and I shall not try to prove that they can meet criticisms of types 1, 2 and *3.*

Th·e Paradox of Omnipotence

In "Evil and Omnipotence", J. L. Mackie presents the "paradox of omnipotence": "can an omnipotent being make rules which then bind himself?" [1] Mackie's argument for the paradox, in essence, is this: if a being cannot make rules which are binding on himself, then, in this respect, he is not omnipotent; if he can, and does, then he is no longer omnipotent. [2] Thus, if God, say, creates beings with free will (i.e., whom he can no longer completely control) He loses His omnipotence, yet, if He cannot, He is not omnipotent. The analysis of " omnipotent", therefore, appears to disclose that this concept is self-contradictory or paradoxical.

[1] J. L. Mackie," Evil and Omnipotence", in *God and Evil: Readings on the Theological Problem of Evil,* edited by Nelson Pike, Prentice-Hall (Englewood Cliffs: 1964), p. 57.

[2] Mackie, " Evil and Omnipotence ", pp. 57-58.

The Paradox of Immutability

The traditional conception of a perfect being, a conception which has its roots in classical Greek philosophy, is that a perfect being is eternal and unchanging. It is thought that a perfect being is immutable because any change would have to be for the better or for the worse. If for the better, then the being in question was not, prior to the change, perfect; if for the worse, then, upon changing, it would no longer be perfect.

In itself the claim that God is immutable does not appear to pose any problems, but when God's specific attributes are considered problems do arise. Here I shall confine my attention to the attempt to reconcile immutability with omniscience.

Let it be supposed that there is a sequence of events, A, B, C, D ... and that corresponding to this sequence of events there is a sequence of mental ' bits ' of information, a, b, c, d . . . One need not think of these ' bits ' as ' mirroring ' or ' picturing ' their corresponding events; rather one is committed only to the claim that, if X knows, say, A, then X has a as a mental content. Let us imagine further that the kind of knowledge involved is direct as opposed to inferred knowledge. E.g., I know *directly* that my glasses are on the table before me and *directly* (through memory) that they were there a moment ago, but I only know through inference or indirectly events of which I have knowledge but which I have not witnessed and am not witnessing. One might argue against this distinction (which bears some resemblance to Russell's distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description) that even knowledge that my glasses are before me requires inferences since I must ' infer ', on the basis of sight, touch, and so on, that my glasses are, in fact, before me. However, problems of this sort need not detain us, for even if we must make such inferences, God, given His omniscience, does not. Given God's omniscience, *all* events, even future events, are directly known by Him. Also, given His omniscience, His direct knowledge of these events is generally, if not always, fuller than ours; it is complete. We can say, then, that, corresponding to events, A, B, C, D ... God has ' bits ' of knowledge or mental contents

a, b, c, d ... Let us now suppose further that A, B, C, D ... occur sequentially over time, such that A occurs at t_1, B at t2, and so on. Let us suppose it is now t_3. A human being who had knowledge of all the events in the sequence which had occurred or were occurring, therefore, would have knowledge a, b and c (and would know all three at ta). He would know about C through apprehension or present experience and A and B would be remembered.

God, on the other hand, from all eternity would know the entire sequence, A, B, C, D ... , that is, He would not be limited to a knowledge of present and past events.

But let it be supposed further that at t_3 there are two people, X and Y, both of whom know A, B, C (have knowledge a, b, c) except that X knows that a and b are *memories* (i.e., that A and B are past events) and that C is a present event, whereas Y, while knowing that A, B, C occurred sequentially and while knowing that A preceded B and B preceded A, does not know *when* A, B and C occurred in relation to his own temporal position. In this case, all other things being equal, we would say that X knows more than Y.

But time advances. Say it is now t,. If X is to continue to know when each event occurred, not only in relation to the sequence of events in question, but also in relation to the present, c must change to a memory. Thus, as time passes, X changes, that is, his memories increase.

If we now turn to God, we can see that His position differs somewhat from X's, for although X at any time only knows all the events which have occurred in the sequence up to and including that time, God, at any time, knows the entire sequence. But does God know *when* each member of the sequence occurs, not only in relation to the other members of the sequence, but in relation to the present? If so, then, as time passes, His memories must increase, that is, He is not immutable. But if He cannot know when A, B, C, D ... occur in relation to the present then, in this respect, His position is analogous to Y's, who, obviously, knows less than X. Therefore, if God's memories do not increase, He is not omniscient.

Incidentally, claiming that God is eternal and hence 'outside' time will not help solve this problem; it will, rather, reduce one to claiming that God's knowledge of temporal events is a ' mystery '. The ' mystery ' claim should only be made when all else fails.

Resolving the Paradoxes

The problems at issue here are problems of consistency and I intend to resolve them by rendering the claims that God is omnipotent and immutable consistent with certain other central theistic beliefs; the principal one being the belief that it is possible that God exists.

In *New Essays on Human Understanding* Leibniz suggests that the ontological argument will go through only if it can be shown that God's attributes are not contradictory. [3] In stating this Leibniz may simply be making the point that from p and not-p *any* conclusion follows. However, there is another, more interesting, way of construing his remark.

The ontological argument assumes that God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived, or, to use Descartes's version, that God has every perfection. I do not wish to defend the ontological argument, but its fault, if it has one, surely lies in the premise that a perfect being must exist (i.e., that it is greater to exist than not to exist) and not in the premise that God is the greatest conceivable being.

But what *is* such a being? Even if it is not the case that X, to be perfect, *must* exist, surely, as ' perfection ' is being used here, such a being must *possibly* exist. It is true, of course, that a perfect round square cannot possibly exist, but its non-existence does not follow *simply* from its perfection. That is, there is nothing intrinsic to the nature of perfection such that, if X is perfect, X, solely by virtue of being perfect, cannot exist. In reply to this one might attempt to define ' perfect ' in such a way that no perfect X could .exist, but my point is not that

a G. W. Leibniz, *New Essays on Human Understanding*, translated and edited by Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett, Cambridge University Press. (Cambridge: 1981), pp. 437-438.

' perfect ' cannot (even stipulatively) be defined in such a manner; my point, rather, is that when (most) theists claim that God is perfect, however it is they define ' perfect ', they do not define it in such a way that God, by virtue of being perfect, cannot exist. At the very least, His being perfect must be compatible with the *possibility* of his existence. Thus, it can be said that an essential theistic belief is the minimal belief that God's existence must be possible. All other claims concerning God, including claims concerning his various perfections, must be rendered consistent with this claim.

Let us return now to the specific perfection, omnipotence. Clearly, here, too, the theist is committed to a definition of 'omnipotence' which, minimally, does not entail the impossibility of God's existence. Thus, he is committed to a definition of ' omnipotence ', if one can be found, which is not self-contradictory or paradoxical. Consequently, if conceptual analysis of ' omnipotence ' leads to the paradox Mackie describes, the term' omnipotence' (as applied to God) must be amended in such a way that the paradox disappears. Mackie himself suggests that the paradox could be resolved by distinguishing:

> between first order omnipotence (omnipotence (1)), that is unlimited power to act, and second order omnipotence (omnipotence (2)), that is unlimited power to determine what powers to act things shall have. Then we could consistently say that God all the time has omnipotence (1), but if so no beings at any time have powers to act independently of God. Or we could say that God at one time had omnipotence (2), and used it to assign independent powers to act to certain things, so that God thereafter did not have omnipotence (1) .[4]

What the theist can say then is that since omnipotence (0), (that is, a conception of omnipotence which includes omnipotences (1) and (2)) is self-contradictory, neither God (nor any being) could possibly exist and yet have omnipotence (0).

[4] Mackie also proposes an alternative solution to the paradox, *viz.*, ' deny that God is a continuing being .. .' But this solution would be unacceptable to the theist, and Mackie himself points out that 'on this assumption ... no meaning can be given to the assertion that God made men with . . . [free will]. Mackie, "Evil and Omnipotence", p. 59.

Since it is an essential theistic belief that God at least possibly exist, His omnipotence, therefore, is *not* omnipotence (0). Further, since an omnipotence which renders one's existence impossible is a queer sort of omnipotence, the theist can further claim that God's lack of omnipotence (0) does not in itself render Him less than omnipotent (in some non-queer sense of the term). The non-queer senses appear to be omnipotence (1) and omnipotence (2). Therefore, God's omnipotence is either omnipotence (1) or omnipotence (2).

But which form of omnipotence does God have, (1) or (2)? Here, there are two possible solutions. Since God is *(ex hypothesi)* 'truly' omnipotent, an attempt might be made to compare omnipotence (1) and omnipotence (2) to determine which is greater. That is, we could suppose that there are two beings, equal in all other respects, except that one had omnipotence (1) and the other omnipotence (2). Which is the greater? If these two forms of omnipotence are amenable to such comparison we can know which form of omnipotence God has.[5] However, let us suppose that there are no conclusive grounds for choosing, on the basis of direct comparison, between omnipotence (1) and omnipotence (2). In that case we can still decide which form of omnipotence God has on other grounds. The free will issue provides one such ground, and, indeed, Mackie raises the paradox of omnipotence while discussing the issue of man's free will.

Let us imagine that the theist who is trying to determine which type of omnipotence God has also holds as an essential tenet of his beliefs that God gave man free will. Such a theist, knowing that omnipotence (2) is compatible with free will and knowing that omnipotence (1) is not, will declare then that omnipotence (2) must be the kind of omnipotence God possesses and that, since God is the greatest possible being, omnipotence (2) must be a 'greater' form of potency than omnipotence (1). Similarly, a theist who holds that man does not have free will would opt for omnipotence (1).

[5] For more on this way of resolving the paradoxes, see my treatment below of omniscience.

Thus (to confine our attention to the free will theist) it appears that he can consistently hold that: a) it is possible that God exists; b) no being can exist and have attribute omnipotence (0); c) therefore God does not have omnipotence (0); d) however, it is possible for a being to exist and have omnipotence (1) or omnipotence (2); e) omnipotence (1) is incompatible with man's free will; omnipotence (2) compatible; f) man has free will; g) therefore, God has omnipotence (2); h) God is the greatest conceivable being; i) consequently, omnipotence (2) must be ' true ' omnipotence.

The determinist theist would hold a to e and h and $f_{1)}$ man does not have free will; $g_{1)}$ therefore God has omnipotence (1); and ii) consequently, omnipotence (1) must be 'true' omnipotence.

Immutability and Omniscience

With respect to immutability and ommsc1ence it appears that one can decide, without considering other beliefs, which form of omniscience is ' true ' omniscience and, therefore, attributable to God. One's problem, then, is to reconcile God's omniscience with his immutability. This, I think, can be done.

Let us call omniscience without memories omniscience (1) and omniscience with memories omniscience (2). Let us imagine that there are two computers, X and Y, which contain identical knowledge of events A, B, C, D ... except that X does not know when A, B, C, D ... occur in relation to the present while Y does. Let us imagine further that this is all the knowledge that they have. In such a case I think it is clear that Y knows more than X because Y knows everything that X does and, in addition, it knows something more. Thus, if Y knows everything, Y is omniscient, but X *cannot* know everything because it knows less than Y. Consequently, omniscience (1) cannot be 'true' omniscience and if God is truly omniscient, God has omniscience (2).

But this entails that God has memories and how is *this* claim be reconciled with God's immutability?

Let us reexamine the reasons for claiming that God is immutable:

1) Change must be for the better or worse:
2) If God changes for the worse, He will no longer be perfect;
3) If God changes for the better, He was not perfect;
4) But God is always perfect;
5) Therefore, God does not change.

But must change necessarily be for the better or worse (1)? In the case of our computer which gains memories as time progresses this clearly is not the case. At ti it knows everything and at t2 it still knows everything. The content of its knowledge has changed, but this *must* change if it is to continue to know everything. In this case *failure* to change would be for the worse since it would know *less* than it had· known previously. The same reasoning can be applied to God.

However, even if we must allow that God changes, there remains an important sense in which God is immutable; i.e., at ti God is omniscient and at t2 He is still omniscient. Hence, a precondition of His immutability in this *sense* (call it immutability (2)) is that He undergo change in another sense. And yet it seems to me that immutability (2) gets at the essential sense in which we want to claim that God is unchanging; i.e., we want to claim that a) He does not go from' better to worse' or 'worse to better'. Since this sense of immutability is consistent with a) , nothing essential is given up if it is admitted that there is a sense (call it immutability (1)) in which God is *not* unchanging.

Conclusion

Throughout I have attempted to argue not for the truth or falsity of certain theistic beliefs, but for their consistency. Rendering theistic beliefs consistent, quite obviously, makes them immune to charges of inconsistency, but, additionally, this project aids in the clarification of the theists' position.

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ATTRIBUTE AND ACT

WE SHALL PROPOSE AN ONTOLOGY based on wo primitive notions expressed in two primitive lo-utions: "A is an (actuated) attribute," and "A is identical with (some) B," together with the customary logical operations of negation, conjunction, disjunction, implication, and quantification. We shall also make use of the primitive logical concept of necessity as an alethic propositional modality and construct an ontological cognate by means of it.

It is our opinion that with these primitives we can deal with certain other entities such as events, states of affairs, propositions, and intentional objects-many of which are primitive to other ontologies-by means of attribution, actuation, and identity. Let us begin with the concept of an attribute.

By an attribute we shall understand whatever can be said of anything as a property of that thing. Thus the properties of being green, of being actually existing, of being such that George III was a Hanoverian, and of being such that two and two are not five, are all attributes in our inclusive sense.

Some attributes appear to be primitive and irreducible-such as the attribute of being one or singular-while others would appear to be composites of attributes themselves more simple-such as the attribute of being either red or blue or the attribute of being if a violinist then a musician. Whether there exist perfectly atomic attributes and whether attributes may form a calculus subject to combination and reduction to attributive simples are questions beyond the scope of the present essay. The crucial essential characteristic of an attribute is its capacity for being predicated of, asserted in connexion with, ascribed positively or negatively to some entity.

The crucial existential characteristic of an attribute is its actuation. By actuation we understand the making real or actual of an attribute. We might describe actuation as analogous to instantiation or exemplification. The preference for a special term is at length arbitrary but it does express something of importance. Exemplification, instantiation, and inherence all characterize an attribute in relation to another-some subject of attribution. While it is undoubtedly the case that most actuations are exemplifications-perhaps only a philosopher could think of one which is not-it is better, for our purposes, to deal with the realization of attributes as such. Thus many attributes will always be actuated, many will be actuated variably, and many will never be and can never be actuated at all.

Accordingly, actuation is distinct from existence or self-identity insofar as there may be existent but unactua.ted attributes. We shall hold, in fact, that all attributes exist simply by virtue of their being attributes-even those which are neither actuated nor actuable. It should therefore be clear that we embrace an extreme form of Platonic Realism. Whitehead, for example, said much the same of propositions-whether true or false they exist etemally.[1] Husserl has said of states of affairs *(Sachverhalten.)* that, whether possible or not, they all maintain ideal unities.[2] Even St. Thomas Aquinas, for all his Aristotelianism, seems to allow a kind of qualified existence to unexempli:f:ied ideas and unrealized forms as types in God's speculative knowledge.[3]

1 A. N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York: Macmillan: 1937)' pp. 227-8.

2 E. Husserl, *Logical Investigations, Vol. I* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), pp. 284-5. Also *Cartesian Meditations* (Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1960), Meditation II, pp. 50-53.

3 St. Thomas Aquinas. *Truth* (translated from the Leonine edition of *Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate,* by J. McGlynn, S.J. Chicago: Regnery, 953), Q. III, I. Compare the more concise account in *Summa Theologiae* I, 15, 3 (Rome: Marietti, 1950). This is not to suggest that St. Thomas would accept the *in se* or *per se* existence of such eternal objects as attributes. But it is noteworthy that the Platonic tradition is not so foreign to this great Ari§totelian as some wight urge.

We shall say, further, that an entity has an attribute or is qualified by an attribute only in terms of a coincidence of that entity's identity and the actuation of the attribute. These ways of speaking, aside from primitive locutions, are descriptive and are not intended to carry any ontological implications which we shall not explicate in other ways.

We may now consider the first or primitive state of any attribute, its existence, from whose explication we may derive the concept of a state (of affairs).

D.1 P is the existence (act of existing) of the attribute Q = (df) i) P and Q are attributes; ii) necessarily P is actuated if and only if there is something identical with Q.[4]

Two matters are to be initially noted. First, since P is actuated with the existence of anything identical with Q, it is legitimate to say that, although existence and actuation are distinct, every existing is expressed by an act; second, since the actuation of P is equivalent to Q's self-identity, P may be regarded the ' act ' of Q. Thus the term " act of existence " is neither vague nor metaphorical. From D.1 we may characterize the more generic notion of a state of affairs.

D.2 **P**is a state (of a:ffairs)=(df) **P**is the existing of some attribute.

Although some philosophers have drawn a close connexion between an attribute and a state of affairs, no one-to our lmowledge-has gone so far as to identify a state of affairs as the very existence of an attribute and to characterize states of affairs not merely as possible objects or contents of thought, acceptance, or consideration, but as existences.[5] For this rea-

[4] Thus if every attribute must have a positive identity, we have the right to enquire whether such dubious ' attributes ' as "being not an attribute of itself" exist at all except in terms of some specification of " itself."

[5] For views which effectively regard states of affairs or their equivalents as primarily objects of thought see A. Marty, *Untersuchung zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie* (Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1908), pp. 288-362; *N.* Hartmann. *Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie,* 3rd ed. (Meisenheim am Glan: A. Hain, 1948), pp. 88-126. R. M. *Per· son and Object* (La Salle: Open Court, 1976), pp. 114-137,

son to say of a state of affairs that it may be the object or content of an intentional attitude is in effect to maintain the intelligibility of acts of existence; hence the following axiom:

A.1 Every state of affairs is such that it may be considered, entertained, accepted, or not accepted.

We may consider the relation between attributes and states of affairs more concretely by a few examples. Take a relatively simple attribute, that of being red. The state of affairs which is the existence of this attribute would be one we might express in words by the phrase 'there being red' or by the dependent clause 'that there is red.' To the attribute of being round squareness or of being golden mountainousness would correspond the states of affairs of there being round squareness and golden mountainousness. By contrast to the attributes of being round and square or golden and mountainous would correspond the respective states of affairs of there being round squares and there being golden mountains. [6]

Clearly, then, some states of affairs-those which are the existences of actuated attributes-not only exist [1] but occur or obtain as well.

D.3 P is an obtaining state of affairs= (df) i) P is the existing of some attribute Q; ii) Q is actuated.

D.4 P is a non-obtaining state of affairs= (df) i) P is the existing of some attribute Q; ii) Q is not actuated.

[6] We might say, in general, that the attribute of being A-and-actual (real, existent, identical-with-something) was the same as the attribute of being-an-A. We would then be justified in saying *(pace* Meinong) that the golden mountain might be golden without having to conclude that the existent golden mountain existed. Being golden, mountainous, and existent (i.e., being a golden mountain) would ahvays 'include' being golden. But being golden, mountainous, and existent (i.e., being a golden mountain) would not 'include' existing. Thus there is a sense in which existence is a real predicate and adds to an attribute and there is an equally important sense in which it does not add.

[1] Lest it seem odd that a state of affairs "exist," we should recall that by D.l states "f affairs, too, are attributes-attributes whose being implies the actuation of an identity.

And from the above we may characterise the parasitic notion of a negative state of affairs. For we might say that to the attribute of being such that 'there being F's' is a non-obtaining state of affairs would correspond the state of affairs of there being no F's. Clearly, too, states of affairs are of three basic types. Any state of affairs whose corresponding attribute belongs to an attribute obtains ipso facto. Any state of affairs whose corresponding attribute is impossible fails to obtain; and any state of affairs which is the existing of an attribute whose actuation is variable obtains variably.

D.6 P is a necessary state of affairs= (df) i) P is a state of affairs; ii) necessarily P is a state of affairs if and only if P obtains.

D.7 P is an impossible state of affairs= (df) i) P is a state of affairs; ii) necessarily P is a state of affairs if and only if P does not obtain.

D.8 P is a contingent state of affairs= (df) i) P is a state of affairs; ii) P is neither necessary nor impossible.

Finally let us address the fundamental philosophical problem of identity and individuation in regard to attributes and states of affairs. Since we have maintained the very strongest connexion between the two, we may distinguish attributes and states of affairs among themselves in one of two ways. We may take identity and diversity among attributes as primitive and define the identity and diversity of states of affairs accordingly. Two states of affairs are identical when existences of a single attribute. Or we may go the other way. We may take states of affairs as primitively identical and distinct and define identity and diversity among attributes by reference to them. Two attributes are two when their acts of existence are two; one when their acts are one. There are two advantages to the second alternative. First, since by D.I states are themselves attributes, a preference for individuation by states would allow us to individuate all attributes by reference to a subclass of them. This economy is not possible on the first alternative nor even plausible if states of affairs, as attributes, are already identical and distinct. Second, since we have already assumed

m A.I the intelligibility of existences, we can give an intentional (epistemological) criterion of identity and diversity among attrbutes if we individuate in the second way. Let us state such a criterion:

> For any two states of affairs P and Q, they are identical if and only if whoever considers the one considers the other.

Thus if anyone might consider P without considering Q or Q without considering P, P and Q are distinct acts of existence. We may turn now to the analysis of propositions and events.

In dealing with propositions-and a fortiori in dealing with events-we should note that there is no uniform doctrine of either which has won unanimous acceptance. To some extent, then, our analysis of the two in terms of attributes and acts must balance philosophic considerations against those of common sense.

Propositions are not uncommonly held to have the following properties: a) they are either true or false but not both. Some have urged that their truth and falsity are eternal; but this view is sufficiently idiosyncratic that we may limit our consideration to truth and falsity alone, leaving open the question of eternity. [8] b) They are the objects of attitudes or the contents of beliefs, expressing states of affairs; perhaps they are actually identical with states of affairs as thought or considered. Since we have taken states of affairs as existences, we shall prefer the weaker position which holds that propositions are intentional entities which express or assert states of affairs. [9] So if we hold that propositions represent or are products of acts of judgment, we will be accepting that a judgment-in terms of

s For views of propositions which stress respectively their truth and falsity and their eternity see A. N. Whitehead and B. Russell, *Principia Mathematica to *56* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 4-12; Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, p. 227.

9 For a view which identifies propositions as a subspecies of states of affairs, see R. M. Chisholm, *Person and Object*, p. 123; for a contrasting view which seems to make of them intentional constructs, see St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I, 14, 15.

the proposition produced by it-is an assertion or a denial of existence, the existence which is the state expressed in the proposition. Indeed, there is some plausibility in favor of the position that propositions express judgments of existence, since they usually say that things are or are not in a certain way.[10] c) Some appear to regard propositions, like attributes, as eternal not only in their truth and falsity but in their existence, too. However, two considerations seem to be appropriate here. First, propositions appear to depend on states of affairs in a way which does not suggest reciprocal dependence. It is entirely conceivable that there might be a world without propositions replete with states of affairs, unless we beg the question and assimilate the two. Second, there is some case for arguing that propositions only come to be when thought and pass away when not thought or come to be when first thought and remain testaments of thought ever thereafter. The difficulty with the latter view is that it is manifestly arbitrary. The difficulty with the former is that if we allow a single proposition to come to be when thought and then to pass away when not thought, we run the risk of encouraging the existence of entities with multiple comings to be and passings away. We may, however, still express the dependency of propositions on states of affairs without deciding whether their existences are eternal or not.

D.9 P is a proposition= (df) i) There is a state of affairs Q such that a) it is for Q to be and for P not to be; b) necessarily P is true if and only if P exists and Q obtains and false if and only if P exists and Q does not obtain; ii) it is possible that someone asserts or denies P.

The above definition, though complex, satisfies our three important criteria. Propositions are either true or false; they are possible contents or products of judgment; they assert or express or name states of affairs in such wise that their truth and falsity depends on a connexion with the obtaining and non-ob-

[10] For a view that propositions are essentially possible objects or contents of thought see W. E. Johnson, *Logic, Part I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 921), pp. 3 and ff.

taining of states of affairs.[11.12] Thus it seems possible, in principle, to analyse propositions in terms of states of affairs while maintaining our earlier contention that states of affairs are the existences of attributes. So let us turn to events and conclude this section with a treatment of the kinds of entities our ontology enables us to deal with, in terms merely of attribution and actuation.

Of the three basic intentional concepts: state of affairs, proposition, event, the third is by far the most diffuse in focus; the term itself has grown loose. For this reason, rather than attempt define an event, we shall find it more worth our while to set out a scheme for considering how statements appearing to employ such entities as events may be paraphrased in favor of statements which require only attributes and their existences. Our treatment of events will differ in its strategy from our treatment of propositions. Where we have assumed propositions and explained their truth and falsity in terms of attributes and their acts of existence, we shall proceed to eliminate the distinct notion of an event altogether, treating it as no more than a *facon de penser.*

In order to do this simply, though, we must introduce the concept of attribute coactuation.

D.10 A and Bare coactuated in P=(df) i) A and Bare attributes; ii) P is a state of affairs: iii) Necessarilv P obtains if and onlv if A and B are both actuated: (iv) P obtains.

D.11 A and B are coactuated bv the same Q = (df) i) A anil B are coactuated in some P; ii) Necessarilv P obtains if and only if there is something identical with Q; iii) P obtains.

11 If we did wish to accept propositions as states of affairs insofar as they were considered, we might substitute the following for D.9.

D.!l' P is a proposition /df /i) P is a state of affairs which iR entertainf'd: ii) it is nossible that P is a Rfate of affairR without bf'ing entPrtained · iii\ P is true if and onlv if P iR entertained and P obtains, and false if and only if P is entertained and does not obtain.

12 For views which purport to dispense completely with -propositions as entities see A. N. Prior. *Objeefa of Thonght* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. ll-13; 28-30: W. V. Quine. *Word and Objeet* (Cambridge: MIT Press. 1960) , pp. 216 and ff; *Theories and Things* (Cambridge: Harvard, Belknap Press, 1981), µp. 43-54.

We could, of course, make coactuation even more specific by appending temporal indices. But we shall save the treatment of times until the second part.

We may apply this now to what all would consider an event-an important historical event: Brutus's stabbing Caesar. It is something which came to be, which lasted for a certain time, and then ceased. It involved persons, actions by those persons, and observable locations. It was witnessed, and its being witnessed might also count as an important historical event.

Can we re-express the content of this putative event in terms of attributes and their acts ? It should be quite clear that we can, given all that has been said above. We have only to list the important attributes involved and state the conditions of their actuation and coactuation. To illustrate, we would say that the attributes of being Julius Caesar and of being Marcus Brutus were coactuated in some state of affairs but not by the same entity. The attributes of being Caesar and of being stabbed were coactuated by the same entity. The attribute of stabbing and the attribute of being Brutus were also coactuated by the same entity. If we wished to restrict the description entirely to the wounds dealt by Brutus, to the exclusion of the actions of other co-conspirators, we might add also that no other entities coactuated stabbing or being stabbed.[18] Further qualifiers might include spatiotemporal indices; and a minute account might be obtainable. But whether or not it is, we seem to have no difficulty accounting in principle for an event in terms of a set of actuated attributes. Accordingly, we may

1a It might be objected that in addition to Caesar's being stabbed, his chest was also stabbed and that something else besides Caesar coactuated being stabbed. Three replies subvert this difficulty. First, we might urge that the only things which coactuated being stabbed were Caesar or parts of Caesar. Second, we might urge that it would be more correct to say not that his chest was stabbed but that he was stabbed in the chest. Chests do not die of wounds; persons do. Third, we might avoid the problem entirely by saying that what was properly coactuated was being Caesar and being a stabbed person. There seems no reason why any two attributes might not coexist as a third or why two compossible attributes might not be coactuated as a third.

adopt the following axiom which allows us to dispense with events as such.

A.3 For every putative event E there is a class of attributes (possibly infinite) actuated when and only when E is correctly considered to have occurred.

This permits us to eliminate events without having to take a positive position on the question whether they could be defined to accommodate the intuitions of everyone precisely.

We may illustrate the application of our axiom in a case where one putative event might be thought to have caused or contributed to the occurrence of another. Let us say that Brutus's stabbing Caesar was the very event which brought about Caesar's death, notwithstanding the aggressive endeavors of others. We might speak of the coactuation by a single entity of the attribute of being Caesar and of the attribute of losing life as Caesar's dying. To say, then, that Brutus's stabbing caused Caesar's dying would be to say that given appropriate standing conditions, necessarily if being Caesar and being stabbed were coactuated by the same entity and being Brutus and stabbing were coactuated by the same entity, then at an appropriate later time being Caesar and losing life were coactuated by the same entity. More fastidious accounts of the same cause/effect sequence could be had as we brought in more and more refined conditions of actuation and coactuation.

We may turn now to a general classification of entities and conclude this section with the consideration of intentional objects and a stricter concept of ontological necessity than proposed in D.6. Our previous definition of a state of affairs, *D.9l,* permits the natural extention of the principle embodied in D.1 to non-attributes. We can develop a concept of concrete existence.

D.12 P is the existence of X *in concreto* = (df) i) P is a contingent state of affairs; ii) P obtains if and only if something is identical with X-and necessarily so; iii) P obtains.

And, by contrast, we have abstract existence.

D.13 P is the existence of X *in abstracto* = (df) i) There is an attribute A necessary such that X is identical with something if and only if A is actuated, ii) P is the existing of A.

Thus the. abstract existence of anything consists in the existence of an attribute whose actuation would coincide with the existence of the thing. Thus all attributes exist *in abstracto,* none *in con.creto,* and entities existing concretely exist abstractly in terms of the attributes actuated by their concrete existences. If we wished to permit a kind of concretion to attributes, we might do so in the following way:

D.12' P is an attribute concretized by a Q = (df) i) P and Q are attributes; ii) There is an R such that R is a contingent state of affairs and necessarily R obtains if and only if P and Q are coactuated by the same entity.

We have spoken of attributes as entities existing by necessity-their existences are necessary states of affairs as defined in D.6. If there are necessary entities, then there are surely possible, contingent, and impossible entities.

D.14 X is possible/impossible/ contingent= (df) There is a P such that i) P is a state of affairs which is the existence of X *in abstracto;* ii) P is not impossible/P is impossible/P is contingent, as a state of affairs.

From the above a number of noteworthy consequences follow. First all attributes exist *in abstracto;* although they may be concretized it does not follow that they themselves exist *in concreto.* All attributes are necessary entities.

Entities which are not attributes exist *in. concreto* depending on whether the states of affairs which are their concrete existences obtain or not. Such entities, by virtue of the variable obtaining of their states of affairs, are contingent. They also exist *in abstracto* in virtue of the attributes whose actuation would accord them concrete existence. It may seem implausible to say that attributes, when actuated by contingent entities, are concretized but not existent *in concreto.* Recalling that existence *in concreto* is a property of something simply by virtue of its existence, we may observe simply that many attrib-

utes are not actuated simply by virtue of their existence and that those which are are because they are attributes proper to other attributes. The concretization or concretion of an attribute might be regarded more correctly as the mode of being-actuation-acquired by an attribute from the existence of an entity whose proper mode is existence *in concreto.*

Without attempting to give a comprehensive treatment to the problem of intentionality, we may apply our results to the analysis of three representative intentional relations, each of which seems, *prima facie,* to commit us to the existence of unreal entities as objects of intention.

For present purposes we may take as primitive the relations of considering and of acting to bring some state of affairs about. By A.I both these intentional attitudes may take states of affairs as their second terms.

In order for something to be taken or considered explicitly as an intentional object, we must have a way of fixing it for our intention so as to distinguish it effectively from what we do not hold clearly in our intensive gaze. The individuation criterion in A.2, in enabling us to do this for states of affairs, allows us to do the same for other objects of consideration.

A. S considers Y as an intentional object = (df) There is some state of affairs P necessarily such that P obtains if and only if Y exists; S considers P.

Thus we may say that the primary objects of consideration are states of affairs and that the consideration of a state of affairs implies the secondary consideration of whatever would exist by virtue of its obtaining. An act requiring endeavor has conditions of its own.

In order for someone to act with the intent to bring about a change in a certain entity-to make some entity Y have a property Z-it would seem, first, that a subject must be able to fix his attention on both the entity Y and the attribute to be acquired, Z. Second, the subject must act to the end that Y acquires this property. That this may be impossible is of no consequence, although the subject must clearly refrain from be-

lieving that it is impossible. No mathematician sets out to prove a theorem he believes to be false. In terms of what we have said of attributes above, a subject would act to such an end by acting with the intent to bring it about that the attribute Z and the attribute of being (identical with) Y are coactuated by the same entity.

B. S acts to make Y (to be) Z = (df) i) S considers both Y and Z as intentional objects; ii) S does not accept that the state of affairs which is Y's being Z is impossible; iii) S acts with the intention of bringing it about that Z and being Y are coactuated by the same entity.

Lastly, we may consider the intentional relation of seeking. Again in order for a search to take place-even in theory-certain special conditions appear to be required. First, as before, the subject must be able to fix the sought object in intention, at least by some partial conception of what he expects to find. The search for anything in general perishes either of the abundance of satisfactory objects or of the dearth of satisfactory concepts. Conditions binding on practical reason, similar to those of intentional endeavor, must apply. Thus although the subject need not positively believe in the existence of the object sought-like Schliemann he might proceed amid existential ignorance and probable groping-he cannot positively disbelieve in the existence of what he seeks without reducing his search to a sham. Third, he must have some motive or reason to seek. No one seeks an object whose access may be had for the asking; no one enquires the whereabouts of a being whose whereabouts he believes he knows. Thus it cannot be a sufficient reason to search merely for a subject to intend that a certain object be discovered. He must also intend that *he* discover it either directly or through the agency of another and without regard to whether anyone else has succeeded in :finding the object. These considerations might lead us to the following:

C. S seeks Y = (df) i) S considers Y as an intentional object; ii) S acts to make Y (to be) discovered by himself.

We may conclude this section by developing an additional concept of ontological necessity, stronger than that advanced in D.6, where a state of affairs was deemed necessary when strictly equivalent to its own obtaining. Such necessity, however, is not complete. D.6 permits necessary states of affairs to be non-existent and non-obtaining. Although we have assumed that all attributes exist as such we have not granted them absolute necessity, one equivalent to inalienability of existence. And this makes the very necessity of attributes subject to a certain contingency. [14] But it may be possible that there are attributes, perhaps divine attributes, whose existence is not merely equivalent to their actuation but absolute; such attributes would be not merely eternal but incapable of nonexistence. Such an absolute attribute, if any there are, would depend on an absolute state of affairs:

D.14 P is an absolute state of affairs= (df) i) P is a necessary state of affairs; ii) Necessarily something is identical with p.[15]

D.15 A is an absolute attribute= (df) i) A is an attribute; ii) there is some P which is the existing of A; iii) P is an an absolute state of affairs.[16]

II

If we now augment our ontology with times, considered as the limits of temporal intervals, we may propose two concepts of change, a loose and a strict concept. Loose change, change in the very widest sense, is mere state succession. It is the kind of change which even a classical theist would allow God to undergo. Anything whatever is such that today is Tuesday

[14] For a somewhat similar view of "contingent" necessity see "The Fall of Satan," in *Truth, Freedom, and Evil: Three Philosophical Dialogues by Anselm of Ganterb'ury.* J. Hopkins and H. Richardson, eds. (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 168-172.

[15] It should be noted that the occurrences of "necessity" in clauses i) and ii) are neither univocal nor equivocal; "necessarily" in clause ii) is alethic logical necessity; "necessary" in clause i) is defined in D.6.

[16] Compare the somewhat different notion of an absolute attribute in A. Bressan. *A General Interpreted Modal Calculus* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).

(whenever it is Tuesday) and tomorrow will be such that' today' is Wednesday. Some have called mere state succession a " Cambridge change." [11] State change includes all change, both Cambridge changes and changes so intimate that we might have difficulty recognizing the entity after them. Leibniz appears to have favored the view that all change is best regarded under the umbrella of loose change-state alteration with or without true passive affection by an external ca.use.[18]

Intimate change-change in the stricter sense-involves, by contrast, some alteration in a subject specifically by passive affection externally caused. Aristotle seems to have thought the most important changes to be of this kind.[19] Neither concept is wholly unproblematic. The difficulty with loose change is its intuitive implausibility. Surely it is very odd to think that something changes merely because today is today and tomorrow tomorrow. The equally great difficulty with strict or intimate change is that it presupposes a clear boundary between which state successions involve passive affection and which do not; accordingly, a theory of strict change also seems to presuppose a very clear understanding of just which entities are subjects and just wherein their subjectivity lies. Not only is the line between loose and strict change a thin one, it is hard to know where to begin drawing it. When is state succession passive affection and when is it not ?

Without attempting to settle this important critericilogical question or decide whether a more rigorous or a more latitudinarian position on change is preferable, we shall try to give an account applicable in either case so as to distinguish the two without legislating in favor of one rather than the other. We may begin by characterizing assertions in which change or state alteration is ascribed to something, directing our atten-

11Cf. P. T. Geach. *Logic Matters* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972).

is G. W. Leibniz. *JJfonadolo,gy,* G. Montgomery, trans. (New York: Doubleday, 1960), paragraphs 7, 11.

19 Aristotle. *Physics,* H. Apostle, trans. (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1969), Bk E; 224al-225b9, especially 224a35-224b5.

tion to those forms of ascription which connect an attribute with an entity indicated by a definite description.

D.16 The A is B = (df) i) A and B are attributes coactuated by some X; ii) whatever A and B are coactuated by is identical with X.

"\Ve now introduce the notion of a temporal interval-which may but need not be treated as an attribute.

D.17 The A is B during the interval t-t' = (df) i) A and B are attributes coactuated by the same X; ii) there is an attribute T actuated by the existence of t-t'; iii) A, B, and T are coactuated in some P. iv) whatever A and B are coactuated by is identical with X.

We may assume, too, the existence of individual times as the extremities of continuous temporal intervals. Aristotle has said that

"... there is an extremity of time past with no part of the future lying this side of it, and there is also an extremity of the future time with no part of the past lying on the other side of it; and this is, as we said, a limit of both." [20]

[20] Aristotle, *Physics,* Z, 233b35-234a5. Unfortunately Aristotle goes on to say in conclusion from the above: " That no thing is in motion in a moment is evident from what follows. For if something fa, the faster and the slower may be in motion in the same moment .... let the faster traverse the length AO in the moment M. Then ... the slower will traverse a length less than AO, say AB. Now ... the faster will move (over AB) in less than that moment. Hence that movement will have been divided. But it is indivisible, as was shown. No thing, then, can be in motion in a moment." 234a 25-33.

Clearly Aristotle's hypothetical experiment presupposes that motion at a moment must be finite. For if a faster body, moving at velocity R, and a slower body, moving at velocity R-N, both exist at an indivisible or unextended instant M, it is enough that at M their velocities are different not that they cover any distinct distances at all. These respective velocities will be assigned them not in terms of some distance covered at M but in terms of their position changes over finite temporal intervals. All Aristotle has the right to conclude is that a) bodies which cover distinct distances in the same finite temporal intervals move at distinct velocities; b) the velocity of a body may be determined by its changes of position over finite time intervals; c) bodies at unextended times maintain distinct velocities if and only if during finite temporal intervals containing those unextended times they maintain distinct velocities; d) if motion over a finite distance during an in-

Immanuel Kant has observed, "Points and instants are only limits, that is, mere positions which limit space and time." [21] Accordingly, we may treat these limiting times as selfsame boundaries between a past and a future interval-the antecedent limit of the future and the subsequent limit of the past.

D.18 t is an earlier limit of a B state of the A = (df) i) A and B are attributes; ii) there is an interval t-t' such that t' is earlier than t and such that for any interval between t' and t, the A is B during that interval.

D.19 tis a later limit of a B state of the A = (df) i) A and Bare attributes; ii) there is an interval t-t' such that t is earlier than t' and such that for any interval between t and t', the A is B during that interval.

And from these two we may derive the notion of an entity's having an attribute at a given temporal instant.

D.QO The A is B at t = (df) t is either an earlier or a later limit of a B state of the A.

Now it is easy to characterize gain and loss of attributes, whence we may derive a generalized conception of change. [22]

D.21 The A begins to be B at t = (df) t is a later but not an earlier limit of a B state of the A.

divisible moment implies the divisibility of the moment, then either the moment is always divisible or no motion over a finite distance occurs at an indivisible moment. To say, however, that a body at an instant is not in motion because it does not move over a finite distance is, in effect, to beg the question.

21 Immanuel Kant. *Critique of P1ire Reason,* N. Kemp Smith trans. (London: Macmillan, 953), p. 204. Unfortunately Kant goes on to say (p. 231) ".All transition from one state to another occurs in a time which is contained between two instants ... Both instants are, then, limits of the time of a change." .All that follows is, of course, that state succession occurs *either* in a time belonging to neither a preceding nor a following interval (both instants are limits) *or* in a time belonging to both. To say, however, that a single time cannot belong to both-as, say, a limit of both-is to beg the question.

2!\ .Alternative formulations of what is essential in D. 18-20, specified only for local motion, however, appear in R. M. Chisholm, " Some Problems Concerning Time and Change," in *Time and Gause: Essays Preseuted to Richard Tavlor* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1980).

D.22 The A ceases to be B at t = (df) t is an earlier but not a later limit of a B state of the A.

D.23 The Changes from being B to being C at t = (df). The A begins to be C at t and ceases to be B at t.[20]

D.23, we note, permits instantaneous change. So if Zeno's arrow is in flight and flight is a kind of change, then at any moment during its flight it is ceasing to be at one position and beginning to be at another. Thus: we may say, by the above, that the flying arrow changes at every moment of its flight. By contrast, if the arrow is not in flight but at rest and rest denotes absence of change, then at any moment during its rest it is at rest. Consequently, it is possible for the A to be both B and C at an instant t, even if A, B, and C cannot be coactuated over any finite temporal interval. What keeps this paradoxical appearance from becoming a contradictory reality is the respectively different senses in which the A is B at t and C at t. The A is B at t only in the sense that it has been B for some finite interval up to t as a limit; the A is C at t only in the sense that it will be C for some finite interval proceeding from t. This is simply to say that the possession by an entity of an attribute at an instant always derives from its possession of an attribute during a finite interval. Instantaneous qualification, on our view, is a logical construction upon enduring qualification. Coming to be and passing away can also occur in an instant.

D.24 The A comes to be at t = (df) t is the later limit of some B state of the A but not the earlier limit of any B state of the A.

D.25 The A passes away at t = (df) t is the earlier limit of some B state of the A but not the later limit of any B state of the A.

Can we now distinguish strict from loose change? It should be clear from the above that we can. We have only to develop the notion of intimate change by narrowing the scope of concepts applying to change in general. In order to do this let us consider one initial difficulty connected with D.24-25 and then

summarize the logical interrelations among the concepts pertinent to change we have just set out.

Our initial difficulty is this: are coming to be and passing away changes? Since D.23 introduces change only in terms of state succession, it is unclear whether coming into a first state or passing from a last should count as a change. Again, without wishing to adjudicate the question, let us show how we may define generic change so as to include coming to be and passing away if we wish and to exclude them if we do not. What we have said already allows this to be done with the greatest simplicity. [23]

D.26 The A changes (by alteration) at t = (df) The A begins to be some Batt and ceases to be some Catt.

Change by alteration, presupposing the existence of its subject, is equivalent to losing and gaining of attributes conjointly.

D.27 The A changes (simply) at t = (df) The A begins to be some B at t or ceases to be some C at t.

Simple change, not presupposing the existence of a subject of change, is equivalent to losing or gaining attributes disjointly.

Like other properties, change itself may begin and end. Let us specify this for simple change. The extension to change by alteration is left to the reader.

D.28 The A begins to change at t = (df) i) The A changes simply at t; ii) there is a t' earlier than t such that during no interval between the two did the A change.

D.29 The A ceases to change at t = (df) i) The A changes simply at t; ii) there is a t' later than t and such that at no interval between the two does the A change.

That there is change implies, of course, that there may be i·est.

D.30 The A rests in being at t = (df) i) The A is some B at t; ii) The A neither comes to be nor passes away at t.

za For a view which argues that coming to be and passing away are not changes, see St. Thomas Aquinas. *On the Truth of the Catholic Faith Bk. II: Creation,* translated by J. F. Anderson from *Summa Contra Gentiles, II* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1900), Ch. 17, pp. 54-5.

D.31 The A rests simply at t = (df) i) The A is some Batt.

Thus simple rest is equivalent to existence, while rest in being pre-supposes existence. Beginning and ceasing to rest are virtual duals of beginning and ceasing to change.

D.32 The A begins to rest at t = (df) i) The A rest simply at t; ii) there is a t' earlier than t such that at no interval between the two did the A rest.

D.33 The A ceases to rest at t = (df) i) The A rests simply at t; ii) there is a t' later than t and such that at no interval between the two does the A rest.

Thus to begin to rest is to begin to be and to cease to rest is to pass away.

We may note in summary all the logical relations holding among the concepts defined in D.24-25; 27-29; 31-33.

a) X comes to be at t; b) X passes away at t; c) X changes simply at t; d) X rests simply at t; e) X begins to change at t; f) X ceases to change at t; g) X begins to rest at t; h) X ceases to rest at t.

All and only the following relations of logical entailment hold between any two of a) -h) .

a) entails c), d), and e); and is equivalent to g).
b) entails c), d), and f); and is equivalent to h).
c) entails d).
e) entails c) and d).
f) entails d) and e).

We may now propose a view of change in the strict or intimate sense. Like opinions concerning propositions and events, those regarding subjective change are so many that it would be impossible-or at least very unlikely-to find a single comprehensive expression adequate to them all or capable of assuaging the misgivings of every thinker who has written on change. If, however, we were to attempt to draw a distinction between the strict and the loose, a natural place to begin would be to regard those changes as strict which somehow involve a certain 'passing away' of a subject and a certain 'coming to be' of the same subject. St. Augustine once said

that " every change is a kind of death." [24] It may be, too, that every intimate change is a kind of birth.

Three important criteria we should bear in mind in any attempt to find an adequate definition for intimate change would, then, be, first, that intimate change, is, at least, state alteration; second, that this alteration must somehow be appropriately restricted or localized in a primary subject; and third, that this change must reflect a certain coming to be and passing away in relation to its subject. Bearing these in mind, we might propose the following as a definition of strict or intimate change.

D.34 The A changes strictly or intimately in respect of B at t = (df) i) A and B are attributes; ii) The A begins or ceases to be B at t; iii) for any non-attribute X and for any time t' at which the A neither comes to be nor passes away, if, when A begins or ceases to be B at t', X exists, then necessarily if the A exists at t, X exists at t.

This definition appears to satisfy our three criteria. Clause i) specifies strict or intimate change as change in attributes and, by implication, in states. Clause ii) limits intimate change to coming to acquire or lose a given attribute. Clause iii) guarantees that the only non-attributes whose existences are implied by strict change are those entities whose existences are implied simply by the existence of the A over a finite interval. These would include the A itself, (essential) parts of the A, if A's actuation results in the existence of an entity with parts, and other non-attributes dependent on the existence of A for their own existing. These three conditions limit the attributes acquired and lost during strict change to those intimately connected with the subject itself. For example, unless you yourself are the A the property of being thought about by you/or not thought about by you is not an attribute in respect of which the A could change strictly. For the actuation of A at the time of your beginning or ceasing to think of the A does not imply your existence, while the attribute of being thought of by you

[24] St. Augustine, "Contr(t Max:iminum," in Migne, *P L Vol. XLII.* Bk. II, 12.

does imply your existence, as does a change from being thought of to not being thought of by you. On the other hand, if the A were to become blue at t, it would change strictly in respect of being blue provided that the coactuation of A and being blue does not imply the existence of anything but other attributes and entities whose existence is implied by the existence of the A.

In an ambiguous case, such as that of local motion, we would have to say that change of position involved strict change only insofar as it involved intimate change per D.34. So if it were possible for an omnipotent agent to alter every spatial relation 'vithout acting to induce intimate change in a located body, then the body's change of place-as defined by spatial relations-would not be intimate. From D.34 we may generalize:

D.35 The A changes intimately at t = (df) The A changes strictly or intimately at tin respect of some attribute B.

Whether a theory of strict change is actually to be preferred is not a question on which we wish to pass judgment. It is enough to indicate how, given our general theory of change, a strict theory may be sub-theoretically defined.

It is suggested that, in evaluating present views, the reader do so in part by comparing this theory of attributes and their acts, in comprehensiveness and theoretical economy, with the available alternatives.

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BEYOND THE SELF-REFERENTIAL CRITIQUE OF DETERMINISM

Introduction

DURING THE PAST FIFTY YEARS or so, determinism has been frequently under critical fire from what today is typically styled the "self-referential

The argument is so styled because it purports to show that determinism must be rejected, not because it fails to meet the challenge of. an opposing theory, but rather and more trenchantly because it is intrinsically self-refuting by dint of self-contradiction: to wit, any attempt to vindicate determinism is *eo ipso* a vindication of indeterminism.

A salient feature of the self-referential argument is that it deviates from the normal critical procedure whereby one questions the legitimacy of the evidence adduced in support of a theory. In fact, the argument alerts us to the fundamental assumption of this procedure, namely, that the proponent of a given theory *can* appeal to supporting evidence, even if it turns out that the proponent's appeal, at least insofar as the critic is concerned, is unconvincing. It is this fundamental assumption that the argument contests. For implicit in the argument is the radical contention that the determinist hypothesis *cannot* invoke evidence in its own behalf.

Shortly, I shall endeavor to show that this radical contention of the self-referential argument-that determinism cannot cite supporting evidence-harbors a hitherto undisclosed and even more devastating critique of determinism than that of the self-referential argument itself: nothing less than that determinism is a meaningless theory, and hence actually no theory at all. However, since the claim as to determinism's ultimate mean-

inglessness is legitimized in consequence of the self-referential argument, the justification of such a claim evidently presupposes the justification of this argument. For this reason, it will be necessary to defend the argument's radical contention, that determinism cannot cite supporting evidence, before proceeding to argue that determinism's theoretic meaninglessness is implicit in and thus inferable from this very contention.

"The Self-Referential Argument"

Determinism, we know, amounts essentially to the theory that one's actions cannot issue from choices based on a deliberative weighing of the options. Choices, determinists insist, are all of them conditioned and motivated by antecedent hereditary and/or environmental factors, factors which causally necessitate our every thought, word and deed.[1]

Now the determinist cannot but regard the determinist theory as true. If so, we are naturally driven to inquire into the probative basis of this theory. What might this be? It will hardly do merely to assert or stipulate the truth of determinism, since, of course, what is merely asserted is arbitrarily asserted, and what is arbitrarily asserted may be merely arbitrarily denied. Presumably then the determinist, if he wishes to convince, must cite evidence, e.g., the scientific principle that all events are necessarily caused, in behalf of his determinist theory. That is, the determinist must needs contend that the

[1] This description of determinism is equally applicable to both the "hard determinist" camp-the view that determinism precludes moral freedom and therefore moral responsibility-and the "soft determinist" camp-the view that determinism is compatible with moral freedom and therefore with moral responsibility. For a brief discussion of these two positions, see Arthur J. Minton, "Theories About Human Freedom," in *Philosophy & Science*, ed. Frederick E. Mosedale (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1979), pp. 119-123. For a somewhat more developed discussion of these views, see W. T. Stace's defense of soft determinism, "The Problem of Free Will," in *Philosophy & Contemporary Issues*, eds. John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (New York: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 19-26, and Robert Blatchford's defense of hard determinism, "The Delusion of Free Will," *ibid.*, pp. 27-34.

evidence supportive of determinism is rationally more compelling than the evidence critical of determinism.

Clearly, though, such a contention, whereby the determinist essays to convince, makes sense only on the supposition that one can deliberate on the evidence, and so find the evidence for determinism more compelling than the evidence against determinism. In short, such a contention makes sense only on the supposition that one is free, since free will theory or indeterminism, in contradistinction to determinism, is essentially the view that actions can issue from choices based on a deliberative weighing of the alternatives. But if so the determinist intent on championing the determinist cause is embroiled in a terrible dilemma: to argue the truth of determinism is implicitly to admit the truth of indeterminism.

What recourse does the determinst have if he would avert this Scylla-Charybdis-like dilemma? Only one, it would seem: he must abandon the hope of demonstrating determinism on evidential grounds, and grant that his own conviction as to the truth of determinism is itself determined.

But does even this resigned admission redeem the determinist from the aforesaid dilemma ? In truth, it does not. For we may assume that the determinist is convinced that his deterministic conviction is necessarily determined. (Otherwise, at the very least, he entertains the veracity of indeterminism) . As such, the question then shifts to the basis on which the determinist is convinced of his own determinist conviction. And once again, there seem only two possible responses: mere assertion or the evidence. Mere assertion, we noticed, relegates determinism to the philosophic netherworld of arbitrariness, so that the determinist has no alternative but to invoke evidence of some sort in behalf of his de'.:ermined determinist conviction. But, as we have also had occasion to notice, any such invocation perforce presupposes the ability to evaluate the merits of the case, and then to decide on the basis of the merits-again, a perfectly apposite characterization of indeterminism. And so, notwithstanding the shifting of the issue from the veracity of

determinism per se to the veracity of one's determined deterministic conviction, the aforementioned dilemma reasserts itself: to argue determinism is obliquely to argue indeterminism.

Before concluding this section, it is important that we specify the precise sense in which the self-referential argument proves determinism self-contradictory. This specification is necessary in view of an incisive critique to the effect that the argument begs the question by claiming to prove that one *does* freely choose. In fact, the critique continues, such a claim is unwarranted on the basis of the self-referential argument alone. For this reason, concludes the critique, the self-referential argument cannot be brought to bear against the determinist hypothesis.

But this critique, it has been shown, does not nullify the cogency of the self-referential argument; rather, it necessitates a. semantic qualification thereto. The precise nature of this qualification has been perceptively disclosed by the authors of the 1972 *Review of Metaphysics* -article, " Determinism, Freedom, and Self-Referential Arguments." [2] As the authors point out, what the self-referential argument actually proves is not that " anyone does free acts," but " only that someone *can* choose freely." [3] This is the specific sense in which determinism is self-contradictory and as such an implicit vindication of indeterminism. For to contend that determinism is evidentially supportable is to own by implication that one *can* weigh alternatives, and therefore that one *can* freely choose. In this way, one averts the charge of question-begging, since one asserts no more and no less than an analysis of determinism itself will brook-no more, in that one does not purpose to show that someone actually does choose; no less, in that one does yet show determinism a self-contradictory vindication of the proposition that one *can* freely choose.

This specification duly recorded, the self-referential inconsistency of the determinist hypothesis is established: any at-

[2] See Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez and Olaf Tollefsen, 26 (September) , 30-32.

[3] *Ibid.,* 32.

tempt to vindicate determinism evidentially necessarily implies the vindication of indeterminism. But if this is true, then the argument's radical contention-that determinism cannot supply self-supporting evidence-is likewise established, and the way is now clear for the presentation of the even more fundamental critique of determinism as theoretically meaningless.

Beyond The Self-Referential Argument

As the task of this section is to show determinism a meaningless theory, it should be initially noted that opponents of determinism generally eschew any such critical claim. They do so principally because they regard a critique in this vein as restricted to establishing determinism's *definitional* meaninglessness. A noteworthy case in point are the authors of the above mentioned article. Despite their thoroughgoing efforts to prove determinism self-referentially inconsistent, the authors are just as dedicated to dissociating formally the question of determinism's meaninglessness from that of its self-referential inconsistency. This they set out to do relatively early in their paper, through examining various charges that determinism is meaningless by reason of definition. After evaluating these charges,[4] the authors see fit to dismiss them, stating that their "clarifications show that determinism is not meaningless; it is coherently defined."[5]

Let me hasten to say that I could not agree more with the authors' conclusion that attempts to reveal determinism's meaninglessness on definitional grounds will inevitably fail of fulfillment. At the same time, however, I must take exception to their and others' assumption that such attempts exhaust the available means of so critiquing determinism. That such attempts are in fact not exhaustive will, I submit, be shown in the subsequent analysis.

4 *Ibid.:* 8-15.
5 *Ibid.:* 15.

Thus far, the self-referential argument has revealed (1) that any movement on determinism's part to defend itself evidentially necessarily involves the self-contradictory vindication of indeterminism, and that this is effectively to say that determinism cannot furnish supporting evidence in its own behalf (the radical contention).

Now if the radical contention is correct, if determinism is inherently unable to adduce self-supporting evidence, then it follows that determinism is *ipso facto* beyond the pale of human experience. And why? Precisely because if, as must be granted, evidence is perforce a function of experience, so that we can only submit as evidential what is in some sense experiential, then to demonstrate that determinism cannot appeal to evidence is in principle to remove determinism utterly from the experiential, and so effectively to demonstrate that determinism cannot invoke experience.[6]

But this inference entails two further inferences. The first is that determinism is effectively an unknowable hypothesis. This follows from the patent epistemic fact that we cannot know what we cannot experience, or, positively put, that we can only know what we can experience.

The second inference follows immediately from the latter. And this is that determinism is ultimately meaningless. For meaning presupposes knowability, and since, as we have seen, determinism is unknowable, we cannot but infer that determinism is meaningless. Whereupon, to argue that determinism is congenitally unable to furnish self-supporting evidence is implicitly and at bottom to argue that determinism is meaningless and a fortiori not a veritable theory. Such is the ultimate implication of the self-referential argument's radical contention.

6 In formally syllogistic dress, this argument expresses the following *modus tollens:*

> If the determinist theory is experientially verifiable, then one can appeal to evidence in support of the determinist theory.
>
> But one cannot appeal to evidence in support of the determinist theory.
>
> Therefore, the determinist theory is not experientially verifiable.

Concluding Recommendation

If the foregoing analysis rings true, the determinist, it seems, has nothing further to say as regards determinism. But if the determinist can say no more, neither shall it be necessary for us to say more, save perhaps to suggest that the would-be determinist take to heart Wittgenstein's sage advice in the final sentence of his *Tractatus:* "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence." [7] Silence, in the last analysis, is the determinist's sole recourse.

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1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuiness, third ed. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), p. 151.

POLITICAL LIBERALISM AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS: A REVIEW DISCUSSION*

WHAT IS A LIBERAL THEORY of social justice, and what does it have to do with Christian ethics? For a helpful preliminary answer to the first question, we can turn to Amy Gutmann's excellent study, *Liberal Equality.* Gutmann describes such a theory as being founded on a view of what makes up an individual's interests, which include an interest in doing what one chooses without interference from others. A liberal state is justified if and only if it satisfies these interests, as it also serves to regulate the pursuit of them, given the realities of social conflict. " Conflict " follows from conditions of economic scarcity, since under such conditions all interests cannot be simultaneously satisfied, and from the presence of divergent conceptions of the good pursued by individuals. Thus arises the need for principles of justice which determine the appropriate division of the benefits of social cooperation, upon which citizens make competing claims.[1]

While I am interested in developing this answer in this essay, I am more concerned to propose an answer to the second question, regarding the relation between liberal theory and Christian ethical reflection. In doing so I will consider some important current philosophical writings attentive to justice and liberal thought.

*Bruce A. Ackerman, *Social Justice in the Liberal State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980); Amy Gutmann, *Liberal Equality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980) ; Michael J. Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality* (New York: Basic Books, 1983).

1 Gutmann, pp. 1-7.

My position concerning the second question is to be distinguished from two recent theological appraisals of liberal justice. The first, powerfully argued by Stanley Hauerwas, views many contemporary Christian calls for justice as implicitly reinforcing liberal assumptions that undermine the character-constituting commitments of the Christian life. Liberalism is not a social strategy appropriate to the Christian call to conform one's personal story to the particular story of God's dealing with humanity in Jesus Christ. The liberal presupposition that persons have no shared conception of the good yields only " individual interest " and " liberty " as bases for political life. Such a life, founded on self-interest and conditions of distrust, stands in fact at odds with a community that trusts in God's promises of redemption and that accordingly offers hospitality to the stranger. What is more, liberalism's effort to organize society apart from a particular vision of the good tempts us to believe that "we are free to make up our own story." This belief violates the truth that our story is one of response and conformation to God, and deceives us into uncritically accepting liberal social arrangements in the name of our "consent" to them. For Hauerwas, the Christian community must resist these tendencies by preserving its internal distinctiveness in faithfulness to God's promises; it thus stands as a "contrast model " to all politics that know not God [2] Yet Hauerwas never clarifies, it seems to me, what Christian warrant there is, if there is any, for working directly toward a national society in which persons' welfare and freedom are supported justly. Does the Church's "being itself" internally exhaust its social ethic? Is there a secondary if still essential task of securing justice in the secular political community *?* How would this task be related to the primary task in terms of values supported by each ? Is there any relation between these values and the values of liberalism ? I want to focus on these

[2] Stanley Hauerwas, *A. Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Ethio* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), pp. 1·2, 11·12, 12-86.

questions, questions which Hauerwas clearly cares about but seldom addresses in detail.

Gilbert Meilaender's recent work on friendship sensitively addresses the Christian stance toward political liberalism through a critique of the ideal of " civic friendship." [3] This ideal would be realized in a "participatory-communal polity," wherein citizens are actively aware of themselves as participants in a free state for the common good. Meilaender proposes, however, that the example of Athens, so heralded by proponents of the ideal, points to the instability of a political community framed along these lines. The conditions under which such an ideal may be realized, in addition, are rare; there can be no such polity without intimate and voluntary relations among persons in a small commonwealth. Most important, the ideal of civic friendship is incoherent, for the political order is essentially concerned with the good of justice which is realized through an *impersonal* bond among citizens; a bond such as this *contradicts* the *personal* character of friendship. Impersonality is necessary to overcome sinful tendencies generated by our narrower loves as we seek to insure fairness for all. So politics is best understood by Christians as the realm which provides a measure of freedom and justice enabling persons to seek friendship (and other genuinely relational goods) in their private lives. Politics provides the opportunity to enjoy personal ties outside of political life, and these ties are intimations of the family of God; such a "chastened political ideal," according to Meilaender, is a *liberal* ideal " in the best sense." [4]

This position is deep and important. But the following concerns drive me to propose an alternative. First, Meilaender oflers little theological warrant for so sharply distinguishing friendship as a created good intimating a greater good from the bond of citizenship. The personal-impersonal distinction which he employs tends to mask the possibility that a *shared* com-

[3] Gilbert C. Meilaender, *Jt'riendship: A Study in Theological Ethics* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), pp. 68-85.

[4] *Ibid.,* p. 85.

mitment to justice and the common good might involve a quality of relation different from friendship but still expressive of genuine value. Secondly, I am not sure how Meilaender's theological case accounts concretely for the sovereignty of the one gracious God who creates, preserves, and redeems in Jesus Christ. He conceives of the liberal state as an order of preservation, an ordinance of God existing for the purpose of preserving fallen creation from sin and for other goods which reflect God's creative and redemptive work. But if it is the one God in Christ who rules over all creation in its activity as such, then some " intimation" of that God must be present *within* the normative ordering activity of political life. The " opportunity " provided for citizens must in some way include the opportunity to realize a created good, itself an anticipation of redemption, in and through political activity itself. Otherwise, one is at a loss to know how the preserving God is concretely at one with the God who creates and redeems. My suspicion is that Meilaender's defense of liberalism cannot meet this requirement. So some theological reassessment seems to be in order.

My position justifies the Christian effort to secure justice in the political community in terms of the covenantal character of political life. God's unity is established in theological talk about the political order once it is recognized that the political bond, while not perhaps " friendship " in any straightforward sense, is distinctively anticipatory of friendship; as such, that bond is more than merely instrumental to the realization of genuine creaturely value. Having given some advance notice of an answer to our second question, I need to consider in some detail the complexities associated with the first.

Liberal Refinements

The four works considered here can be viewed as attempts to advance upon or to refine insights about liberal justice most commonly associated with John Rawls and his magisterial work, *A Theory of Justice.* An especially important develop-

ment, I hope to show, is an increasing emphasis upon the way liberal justice is to preserve a citizen's sense of his or her equal worth. The individual's crucial interest in doing what one chooses without the interference of others, central to liberal theory according to Gutmann, gives way to an individual's interest in being recognized as a being of equal worth, and in being spared unjust assaults on one's sense of oneself as such a being. Arguably, one source of this shift in emphasis is Rawl's stress on self-respect as the most important primary good for free and equal moral persons.[5] Yet this emphasis fails to occupy all liberal theorists post-Rawls. Bruce Ackerman, author of *Social Justice in the Liberal State,* is a case in point.

According to Ackerman, the essence of liberal thought is political neutrality over conceptions of the good. The fundamental problem of politics is regulation of the competition for power in society, and liberalism is the form of political culture that constrains assertions of power by 1) the requirement that all such assertions be accompanied by a justifying reason that does not include reference to one's intrinsic superiority or to the greater value of one's conception of the good. Ackerman's ideal of "undominated equality," extending across matters of genetic make-up, education, wealth, free exchange, and intergenerational justice, is built upon the high valuation of conversation about power; in fact, it is this celebration of dialogue that, he thinks, distinguishes his version of liberalism from contractarian and utilitarian approaches. Hence the one basic justifying reason for any distribution of resources that would seem to pass the neutrality requirement is the "' conversational move " of the form **"I** am at least as good as you are." This " liberal assertion of equality " in effect grounds equal concern and respect for persons upon their status as choosers and valuers of a life plan.[6]

It is difficult to grasp how Ackerman's approach improves

5 John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University l'ress, 1971), p. 440.

6 Ackerman, pp. 53-59.

upon the central features 0£ current liberal thought. On the contrary, his vision tends to ignore or obscure such features. For example, the equality claim is presented as passing a test 0£ "neutrality," when in fact it represents a shared belie£ among citizens that there exists *some* partial overlap among conceptions of the good, i.e., in the fact that persons value their self-determining valuings. This fact would seem to require a precise analysis 0£ what self-determination means and how it may be best realized in terms 0£ specific social goods. These are the matters, the *shared* matters, from which and about which people in a liberal state are going to talk. Ackerman refuses this route, perhaps because of his conception 0£ conversation as regulating the contest for *poiver.* But legitimate exercises 0£ power in accord with the neutrality and equality claims may be affirmed only in terms of background beliefs about self-determination and its social realization. Otherwise, it is but wishful thinking for Ackerman to believe that practices of justifying power relations to one another establish a basis for citizen self-respect;[7] for Ackerman's citizen is never given enough conversational equipment to know in what value exactly self-respect, a sense of one's worth, consists. He does propose four bases of justification for neutrality itself. These include respect for self-determination, the necessity of transcending rather than suppressing doubts in the pursuit of truth, the fear of authoritarian government, and moral skepticism. But the first three positions basically collapse into a commendation of an undefined notion of self-determination, and the fourth conflicts with the commendation, inasmuch as it would impugn the valuing 0£ self-determination in the first place.[8]

Another problem is Ackerman's approach to a number of different realms of human activity solely in terms of a contest for power. A liberal is one willing always and everywhere to

[1] *Ibid.,* p. 93.

[8] Cf. Ronald Dworkin's similar critique of Ackerma.n in *The New York Review of Books* 29 (January 20, 1983), 47-50.

inquire after and defend all aspects of his or her power position in terms of neutrality so as to defend his or her freedom. Thus childbearing has value in a liberal state only as an instance of the free choices of citizens. Infanticide is a problem because it may violate the rights of would-be adoptive parents (infants lack the conversational competence to qualify as liable to protection). Children wrestle for power with parents, who stand as potential oppressors, and parental nurturance is justified just because liberal citizenship calls for some quality of "cultural coherence" (whatever that is).[9]

Something is wrong here. Must the liberal "ideal " of power legitimation extend so erosively into other areas of human activity? Is it conceivable that in a liberal state these areas may not be comprehended primarily in terms of the struggle for power among suspicious if vigilant power seekers? Michael Walzer's *Spheres of Justice* above all poses a challenge to any tendency to collapse the variety of human activities and social goods into a uniform distributive process or standard. His basic assertion is " that principles of justice are pluralistic in form; that different social goods ought to be distributed for different reasons, in accordance with different procedures, by different agents; and that all these differences derive from different understandings of the social goods themselves-the inevitable product of historical and cultural particularism."[10] So Walzer appeals at every turn to our " shared cultural understandings " of different goods realized in different, relatively autonomous spheres of activity. The distribution of goods associated with security and welfare is one thing, the distribution of goods linked to money and commodities is quite another. Distributive criteria vary with the meaning of these goods, and so also with the meaning of the goods of office, leisure, education, kinship and love, recognition, divine grace, and political power. Walzer's ideal is a society of " complex equality," wherein the criteria for distribution of goods within any one

9 Ackerman, pp. 128-129, 139-143.
io Walzer, p. 8.

sphere never dominate the distribution of goods within any other. Tyranny exists when, for example, money can buy political power or office or a good education, or when the status of office can bring recognition without proof of worth, or when market forces dominate family ties. Thus room is made for understanding justice and social goods in a manner resistant in principle to the kind of conflation found in Ackerman's study; and Walzer's attentiveness in describing the diversity of distributive spheres assists us in envisioning a just society far more than his counterpart's unhelpful reminders of how each one of us is " at least as good " as anyone else.

Walzer despairs of the "regime of simple equality," in which justice is gauged in terms of an overall equal distribution of dominant goods. Efforts to instantiate or to maintain such a regime will require the concentration of state power, which then needs to be balanced by the protection of countervailing private privilege among emerging monopolists of other dominant goods. The ideal of complex equality overcomes the instability of pitting statism against privilege by viewing political power as underwriting boundaries between spheres of justice, rather than as attaining a general equal distribution of undifferentiated social goods. For a society such as ours, Walzer argues, complex equality leads in the direction of a decentralized democratic socialism. The components include:

> a strong welfare state run, in part at least, by local and amateur officials; a constrained market; an open and demystified civil service; independent public schools; the sharing of hard work and free time; the protection of religious and familial life; a system of public honoring and dishonoring free from all considerations of rank or class; workers' control of companies and factories; a politics of parties, movements, meetings, and public debate.[11]

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 318. In *Radical Principles* (New York: Basic Books, 1980), pp. 37-42, Walzer distinguishes his socialist program from that of "liberal utilitarianism," which correlates human welfare with the satisfaction of the interests of an individual " absolutely free to make his own choices and measure his own happiness." Gutmann, however, persuasively shows how democratic socialism can be viewed as the direction of the liberal tradition since

Now what makes Walzer a liberal is a commitment to a pluralism of freely chosen lifestyles and loyalties, and a suspicion of moralistic accounts of politics which would jeopardize freedom; but what makes him an interesting liberal is the conviction that a just society can be realized only through the vigilance of self-respecting citizens who view themselves and one another as empowered and participating members of a common enterprise. In short, Walzer is a liberal committed to something like a "participatory-communal polity."

The " ideal subject of the theory of justice " is, therefore, the self-respecting citizen, who takes responsibility for oneself and one's actions, and who is recognized by one's fellows as measuring up to the standards of democratic citizenship. Recognition of this sort contributes importantly to a secure sense of one's equal worth *qua* citizen. Social arrangements supporting this ideal include a system of communal provision of security and welfare attentive and in proportion to needs collectively understood, and sensitive to the idea of equality of membership. Also required is some public acceptance of communal standards of citizenship, indicating " a way of being in the community," and serving as the basis of persons' " recognizing themselves as mutually recognizing each other." Finally, every citizen must be ready and empowered to participate in political life when appropriate or necessary. Deprived at local and national levels of power necessary to take part in the determination of common goals and the maintenance of distributive boundaries, the citizen is also deprived of self-respect. Powerlessness makes a parody of claims to equal membership, and renders impossible mutual recognition. [12]

Walzer's proposal is weakened by the absence of a determi-

Locke. See in particular her location of Walzer in that tradition, pp. 105-107, 111-118. The features of "liberalism" which Walzer criticizes become according to this interpretation nagging corruptions of the tradition properly understood. Hence Gutmann can consider C. B. Macpherson's attack on the variants of liberal " possessive individualism" as *immanent* critique; see her discussion, pp. 145-156.

12 Walzer, *Spheres of Justice,* pp. 272-280, 303-311.

nate conception of the shared understanding of membership appropriate for our society. We lack a precise description of his theory's "ideal subject," or, better, we need a surer sense of the point of view of this subject in terms of his or her loyalty to principles expressive of his or her nature and supportive of the common life. Without the commended point of view, the character of distributive decisions concerning welfare, recognition, and power remains elusive. The problem is especially acute given the presence in our society of disagreement about justice and the meaning of membership, Walzer's hints to the contrary notwithstanding.

What Walzer requires, it seems to me, is something like John Rawls's effort to establish a conception of membership in terms of commitment to principles of justice expressive of free and equal moral personality. Walzer is critical of Rawls's work, since he views it, somewhat inaccurately, as a representative defense of simple equality. But he fails to consider whether a view like his own can accommodate Rawls's constructivist approach to our shared cultural and historical understandings for the purpose of acquiring a grasp of the meaning of membership. Rawls does, at least, offer a method of resolving disagreements concerning justice, and Walzer needs to move in the same direction if his emphasis on our " shared understandings " of social goods is not to appear sanguine. The social role of a conception of justice regulative of the major institutions of society is to enable members of a society to justify the arrangement of those institutions to one another, given their understanding of who they are and of what social cooperation means. Members of a society become members of a common political life when they have publicly acknowledged reasons to share. The practical task of political philosophy is to contribute toward the *achievement* of public agreement on a conception of justice for the major social institutions, and Rawls takes that task seriously while Walzer may fail to indicate as much.[18]

[18] See John Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," *Journal of Philosophy,* 77 (1980), 515-572. I rely *on* this recent general statement of Rawls's project in this and the next paragraph.

Rawls's method involves organizing our fundamental ideas of freedom and equality, of ideal social cooperation, and of a moral person into "model-conceptions," which serve as premisses for reaching an acceptable public understanding of justice. The " original position " is that model-conception which displays the connection between the conception of a moral person and the principles of justice that regulate relations between free and equal citizens in society. The connection is displayed by modeling the way in which these citizens, viewed as moral persons (i.e., capable of a sense of justice, and of forming and revising a determinate plan of life according to some conception of the good) , would select normative principles. The outcome represents a specific shared point of view, framed in terms of a commitment to social justice. Of course, one may call Rawls's preferred principles of justice into question; but his method enables one to show how more acceptable views of personhood and social cooperation would yield different and preferable principles.

Walzer stresses that just institutions can be realized and sustained only if they are " inhabited by men and women who feel at home within them and are prepared to defend them." Complex equality requires " strenuous defense " and " eternal vigilance " on the part of members. Without a principled and publicly available sense of membership as found, perhaps, in Rawls, there can be none of the strenuous commitment which Walzer requires. But Michael Sandel argues in *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* that Rawls's theory of justice must interpret the human person as one who can have no" constitutive attachments," and who therefore cannot be strenuously committed to anything at all. Sandel's fascinating argument goes as follows. Rawls stands with Kant in advocacy of a form of " deontological liberalism," the basic tenet of which is that principles of justice are derived independently of any particular conception of the good. Principles of this sort are correlated with a philosophical anthropology that characterizes the human subject as prior to the relations within which it stands and to

the ends which it seeks. The values and relations of the self of the original position do not and cannot define its identity, for otherwise the self could not escape the web of contingency \vhich independent derivation transcends. The Rawlsian person is " individuated antecedently," i.e., is a distinct entity whose boundaries are assumed to be fixed prior to communal relations with others and to all other experience. As a "subject of possession," the liberal self is also distanced from the interests it has, and the distance is overcome only by the scope and reach of naked will. No commitment, according to this vision, can grip me so fully that I could not comprehend myself without it; and no account of community which takes it to be constitutive of human identity can be acceptable.[14] If all of this is true, Sandel asserts in triumph, liberal talk about protecting the sovereignty of self-creating individuals dissolves into nonsense; for the " essentially unencumbered " self of liberalism cannot participate in the *constitution* of its own identity. One can only report and reflect on one's pre-existing desires in terms of their intensity. But since one just *has* rather than *is* this range of desires, arbitrariness and not self-constitution is the consequence. There can be no depth or character to a being with no deep attachments, who stands beyond history and social influence, and for whom fellows can offer no insight concerning who one is. One can only correct this vision by importing features alien to deontological liberalism itself.

Walzer wants nothing to do with this kind of being. Hauerwas no doubt would find in Sandel's well-wrought critique much to confirm his suspicions. And Rawls does invite Sandel's interpretation in significant sections of *A Theory of Justice.* For example, he compares persons in the original position to Kantian noumenal selves, and he uses the image of " Archimedean point " to characterize principles of justice. Unfortunately, however, Sandel's critique is distressingly misleading. His major error is to think that Rawls wants to assert the

[14] Sandel, pp. 47-65, and *passim.*

priority of justice in terms of an epistemologically independent derivation. Rawls's patterns of justification of moral principles precludes this interpretation in principle; he is commited to a form of holism in which rational principles arise from inference to the most coherent explanatory account of our model sensibility, following critical testing and revision of the beliefs about persons, just institutions, etc., comprising that sensibility.[15] The independence of the point of view of justice stands decidedly *within* our history and traditions, and it is devised primarily for the purpose of overcoming problems about dis-

[15] I discuss Rawls's justificatory procedure of "reflective equilibrium" in "Social Justice, Social Selves: John Rawls's *A Theory of Justice* and Christian Ethics" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1981). A recent dispute between Walzer and Ronald Dworkin on the adequacy for a theory of justice of appeals to our shared understandings is resolved if one properly attends to this procedure. Dworkin argues against Walzer that "the principles of justice we use to decide which features of a community are relevant to a just distribution of its goods and opportunities . . . must be principles we accept because they seem right rather than because they have been captured in some conventional practice. Otherwise political theory will be only a mirror, uselessly reflecting a community's consensus and division back upon itself." Dworkin fails to reali;i:e that explication of " shared understandings" may have a thoroughly critical quality. It involves a process of relating anthropological and other beliefs to distributive principles, and relating both of these to our more specific intuitions about how things ought to go in a particular distributive sphere. Some of these beliefs and judgments are more deeply entrenched in our belief system than others, but none are immune to revision in light of the rest. Testing our beliefs against one another in this way may lead us to revise some of them, perhaps drastically, as we come upon incoherences in the overall account. Principles of justice are *justified* when they best cohere with the other features of our critically tested explanatory view. Walzer's project of sorting out the meanings of social goods for our culture, then, ought not to be a matter of useless reflection on things we already and unthinkingly know and do, because the account of these meanings must be critically situated in a context inclusive of other beliefs which would warrant and be warranted by that account. Unfortunately, Walzer contributes to Dworkin's faulty analysis by failing to emphasize that a particular version of our shared understandings of social goods is an achievement of rational interpretation, and that that version must be argued for in the midst of disagreement, not merely " read off" our common life. But the argument still must *start* from something shared in a particular culture and tradition, and Walzer sees this far more clearly than Dworkin. The exchange between the two is in *The New York Review of Books* 30 (July 21, 1983), 43-46.

agreement on justice which a society like our own must confront.

Justice according to Rawls, moreover, does not annul but rather clarifies the constitutive character of and the partial similarity among persons' conceptions of the good. Sandel virtually ignores Rawls's refined theory of primary goods, and the omission severely impairs his analysis, for it is through this account that Rawls puts a number of Sandel's worries to rest. The primary goods include rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect. They are taken to correspond to the higher and highest order interests of moral personality. These include an interest in planning and revising a conception of the good, and an interest in acting from principles of justice. The connections between interests and goods sought reflect a conception of the *needs* of moral personality, and these needs both constitute and are shared by persons as they consider various institutional arrangements in terms of justice. [16]

Rawls's anthropology is sensitive as well to the complex relation between agency and social shaping. He is concerned to show how the influences stemming from a realized public conception of justice may nurture or educate persons to take on a point of view which preserves critical independence from social influence. Using the terminology of James and Mead, we can say that Rawls is after making the "I," the point of view of free and equal moral persons, independent of and yet supported by the "me " of social influence. Sandel overlooks Rawls's strong belief that

> given our dependence on society, we could not be this sort of person unless institutions developed and encouraged our capacity to act and others publicly to acknowledge its realization. Peoples' attaining this conception of the person would be the achievement of social cooperation; for success depends on social forms and mutual recognition.[17]

[16] Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," pp. 525-527.

[17] John Rawls, "The Independence of Moral Theory," *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 48 (1974-75), 13.

The last point is reminiscent of Walzer, and further undermines Sandel's interpretation; for Rawls's conviction that a sense of one's own worth as free and equal requires the fair recognitions of others contradicts a claim that he conceives of persons as individuated antecedently to relationships with others. A successful scheme of recognition, in addition, requires persons' constitutive commitment to an ideal of self-determination, of good use of one's capacity to choose for oneself according to one's own lights and apart from coercion or the pressures of need.

Rawls explicitly denies that human agency involves gauging the intensities of our pre-existing desires, precisely because agents are responsible for their ends. Our wants do not assail us because we are capable of " standing back " from our commitments in order to discover and determine what we are to become in terms of our grasp of who we are. Our public identity remains stable over time not because we are above contingency, but because, according to Rawls, our interests in preserving free conditions within which to form our loyalties cut across our other interests. Finally, Rawls not only provides for constitutive attachments, but also builds in a constitutive attachment to community through the requirement that agreement to principles of justice within the original position be unanimous. " Since the self is realized in the activities of many selves, relations of justice that conform to principles that would be assented to by all are best fitted to express the nature of each." [18] To be sure, Rawls does equivocate in his account of community, and Sandel is at his best in exposing these confusions. But the latter is arguing for a deeper confusion than equivocation in Rawls's view of the person, and his argument on that score fails.

To raise questions about Sandel's version of Rawls is not yet to vindicate the Rawlsian project as an adequate complement to Walzer's vision of membership. Devotion to principles must

is Rawls, *A Theory of Justioe,* p. 565.

carry with it vigilance and effective participation, and Amy Gutmann is right to challenge Rawls for his tendency to underemphasize or to misunderstand the participatory implications of his liberal ideal. She worries in particular about Rawls's obscure attempts to relate egalitarian arguments for the redistribution of material goods to the matter of equalizing opportunities for participation in the public business. Rawls's weakness is but a moment in a tradition of liberal egalitarian thought directed toward the specification and integration of distributive and participatory dimensions of social justice. In *Liberal Equality,* Gutmann astutely tells the story of that tradition, and shows well the way in which that tradition may both indude and surpass Rawls's basic insights.

A liberal egalitarian, generally speaking, would prescribe more equal societal distribution of goods, services, and opportunities among persons, given some descriptive claims about how persons are equal and criteria of relevance appropriate to the distributed goods in question. The act of choosing a plan of life according to one's own self-understanding is taken to be a necessary but not a sufficient condition of individual freedom; for the alternatives from which to choose must be expansive and reasonable, and the situation of choice must facilitate the ability and desire to choose. Attention to the arrangement of situations and possibilities of choice must encompass relevant ways in which choosers are taken to be equal, e.g., in the need for goods supportive of psycho-physical welfare, or in the basic capacity to take responsibility for one's life and to abide by canons of mora]ity. [19] In her treatment of Bentham, Mill, the early and later Fabians, Tawney, Rawls, and others, Gutmann points out how in each case the execution of these egalitarian moves fails to integrate distributive or material and participatory equality. So Mill devised an anthropology of self-development congenial to normative stress on participatory opportunities, but maintained a "principled indeterminacy " on questions of economic distribution. The Fabians compensate

[19] Gutmann, pp. 8-20.

for Mill's inconclusiveness with their emphasis on the satisfaction of basic material needs; yet their policy proposals called for a centralization of state power that R. H. Tawney and G. D. H. Cole resisted in their plea for institutional arrangements supportive of fraternity and self-command. And so forth.

Rawls's attempt to establish priorities for material and participatory values provides the point of departure for Gutmann's own contribution toward integration. Her just society provides for distribution of medical and legal services according to need, and citizens' "welfare rights" to such distribution are to have maximum stringency, equivalent to that of rights to civic and political liberties. Here she joins Walzer in the recognition that certain failures in communal provision of welfare can threaten persons' sense of equal worth; Rawls perhaps too blithely links equal worth to equal liberty alone. She follows Rawls in his requirement of fair equality of opportunity, and offers a helpful interpretation of his " difference principle," according to which inequalities in income and wealth are justified only if they maximally benefit the least advantaged representative person in society. Her point is that the wealthy at any time may justify their greater advantage in terms of the difference principle only if no other possible alternative arrangement of inequality can improve the situation of the worst off. Finally, she argues concretely for equalization of participatory opportunities in the areas of local and national politics, the workplace, education, and bureaucratic administration. These proposals would correct Rawls's failure to offer clear criteria for distinguishing between fair and and unfair participatory chances. Thus she holds that equalized material distribution appropriately constrains egalitarian participatory opportunity, and that the latter protects against assaults upon equal worth and allows for activities where one may have a more vital sense of one's equal worth. [20]

Gutmann's primary rationale for equalizing participatory opportunities is to establish a social basis for equal dignity and

[20] *Ibid.,* pp. 119-140, 173-217.

mutual respect among citizens. Without the empowering opportunities, one cannot take the assertion of responsible membership in a democratic political order seriously; with them and accompanying minimal standards of citizenship, persons may in their public engagements recognize one another as meeting those standards, thereby supporting self-respect and respect for others. This rationale is prominent for Walzer and Rawls as well. All three have an abiding interest in the social conditions for and the positive meaning of Ackerman's "liberal assertion of equality": "I'm at least as good as you are." The new focus challenges Isaiah Berlin's distinction between negative and positive liberty, on the one hand, and recognition, on the other.[21] Freedom from the interference of unfair or derisive recognition takes on genuine importance, since " unless our endeavors are appreciated by our associates it is impossible to maintain the conviction that they are worthwhile."[22] Equalizing communal provision of welfare and participatory opportunity makes possible a fair system of recognition in which persons preserve a sense of their value as they realize an ideal of free and equal moral personality, i.e., positive liberty. In proposing this set of connections, contemporary liberals are attempting to describe and to locate socially some archetypal and institutionally established pattern of behavior, some "role," that aptly bears freedom and individuality. Disagreements on conceptions of the good are still assumed to be present. Freedom from interference and for private lives and loyalties retain a deep importance. And members of a liberal commonwealth who choose to devote most or all of their time to non-political matters are countenanced, not condemned.[23] But with all of this said, the refined liberal plea remains. Without a principled and shared sense of political membership, with-

[21] In Isaiah Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 158.

[22] Rawls, *A Theor:y of Justice,* p. 441.

[23] For a splendid statement, see Walzer's "A Day in the Life of a Socialist Citizen," in *Radical Principles,* pp. 128-138.

out genuine empowerment for and within the conversation of politics, without equal access to self-respect-without these, the liberal vision of justice is defective, precisely because these conditions are necessary for the establishment and maintenance of a free and equal society.

Christian Ethics and the Problem with Rights

How does liberal justice of the sort represented by Walzer, Gutmann, and Rawls stand vis-a-vis Christian ethical reflection ? I want to begin an argument for my answer by suggesting a way in which Christian ethics may embrace a category often taken to be central to liberal thought, that of "rights."

The language of rights is employed extensively in contemporary Christian ethical writings, and especially in Roman Catholic treatments of justice. Recently, John Paul II devoted an entire chapter of his encyclical *Laborem Exercens* to the rights of workers. Less recently, John XXIII argued in *Pacem in Terris* that respect for the entirety of rights owed to persons in virtue of their humanity (" human rights ") is the fundamental condition for attaining peace in the modern world.[24] There is, however, a certain theological problem which accompanies these and other similar claims. It has to do with the relation between the logic of rights and a particular view of human persons which is supposed to support the defense of a person's rights. The relevant view of persons includes the claim that human dignity, respect for which is implicit in respect for human rights, always exists within various concrete relationships. An implication is that a life of mutual interdependence significantly contributes to human flourishing. The Roman Catholic tradition thus holds that the point of just social arrangements is to promote genuine mutuality, a sense of fellowship and community, among the citizens of a commonwealth. Protestant theologians such as Karl Barth make

[24] In David J. O'Brien and Thomas A. Shannon, eds., *Renewing the Earth* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1977), pp. 124-170.

similar moves.[25] Now while it may be assumed that there is compatibility between claims commending community and an emphasis on the connection between human dignity and human rights, the compatibility is hardly obvious and needs to be argued. Consider that " rights " are valid claims to some good to which the holder is entitled. Persons " stand up " for their rights. They may indeed "fight" for their rights, and the consequence of the fighting may well be disruption and conflict, not fellowship and mutuality. Persons express indignation and resentment when their rights are denied, and the link between such moral emotions and community is not perspicuous. And even " if there are conceivable circumstances in which one would admit rights diffidently, there is no doubt that their characteristic use and that for which they are distinctively well suited, is to be claimed, demanded, affirmed, insisted upon." [26] Why, then, are rights stressed by a tradition which also stresses community and cooperation ? Why work with these potential creators of conflict, and not, for example, with reciprocal duties or needs? The problem with rights in this context concerns how practices of claiming, demanding, etc., are both compatible with and, seemingly, required by community.

One might try to overcome the problem by understanding rights as claims to the conditions of existence requisite for the fulfillment of one's social obligations.[27] One problem with this solution is its indeterminacy; one may not be sure how obligations to society translate into the presence of community. On its face, the position captures all sorts of very different visions of life in society, libertarian as well as organicist. Another problem concerns whether or not rights may be relativized unacceptably given prospects of differential societal contributions.

25Karl Barth, *Against the Stream,* ed. Ronald Gregor Smith (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954), p. 188. Cf. relevant sections of *Gaudium et Spes,* in O'Brien and Shannon, pp. 252-258.

2s Joel Feinberg, *Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty: Essays in Social Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 151.

21 See, e.g., Lisa Sowle Cahill, "Toward a Christian Theory of Human Rights," *The Journal of Religious Ethics* 8 (Fall 1980), 277-301.

Perhaps the free speech of some should be protected more than that of others because the former have more that is important to say. Or maybe the elderly and the sick just do in fact have fewer rights, since their obligations to society have diminished. One can avoid this interpretation by allowing that the individual's obligation to serve the common good must be modified in view of the individual's ordination to fellowship with God; one cannot subordinate such a creature to the social whole of which it is a part.[28] But to make this last point is in a way to state the problem with rights all over again. *How* does the irreducible and divinely bestowed dignity of the individual mesh with that *same* dignity understood in terms of service to the common good in the spirit of fellowship ?

What is missing, and what I would like to begin here to provide, is a general theological description of what fellowship amounts to in political and other contexts. With that in hand, we will be less perplexed about how " rights " language conforms to it.

Let me begin by noting three different ways in which human persons may be understood to be *social* beings.[29] First, there is a sociality which refers to the ways in which social influences leave their mark upon persons in matters of language, value, action, and belief. Call this foundational sociality. Secondly, recognition sociality is a mode of human interaction which, through patterns of demonstrated competence, support, and interpersonal acknowledgment, enables the effective pursuit of jndividual projects through the generation of self-respect. Finally, normative sociality is a mode of human relationship, constitutive of human flourishing, which coordinates goods of community and individual self-expression.

Normative sociality has a certain prominence theologically. I would argue, following Karl Barth, that human creatures exist in the image of God as they are with others in fellow-

28 *Ibid.,* p. 282.

29 For detailed analysis of these forms of sociality, see Werpehowski, "Social Justice, Social Selves," Chapter Three.

ship.[30] This "cohumanity" contributes most significantly to creaturely flourishing. Applicable to every facet of human existence, be it work, play, culture, or politics, and having a radical isolation as its antithesis, cohumanity is the image and parable of the free differentiation in relation that constitutes God's intratrinitarian life, and hence His free action *ad extra.* It stands also as both likeness and promise within the work of creation of the redeeming relation between Christ and his community. The human creature, then, conforms in its being to the convenanting God, and anticipates its ultimate fulfillment as God's covenant-partner, by being a covenant-partner in its own sphere of human creaturely activity.[31]

What are the basic features of this creaturely covenant?[32] In the first place, cohumanity requires a two-sided openness, one to another, with a view to the benefit of the other. Each must focus upon the other as much as possible in terms of his or her particular point of view, and not merely as" the surface to which a certain label can be applied."[33] A related implication is that creaturely fellowship in any area of human activity is realized among concrete individuals. as such, and not among mere representatives or embodiments of this or that cause or gTOup. Beyond the necessary condition of mutual openness, cohumanity requires a mutuality of speech and hearing. Each party must try to interpret oneself to the other and must do so with a view toward the specification of a relevant and pre-

[30] Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics,* Volume III/2 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1960), pp. 316-324. My indebtedness to Barth's idea of cohumanity in what follows should be evident. For his full analysis, see *ibid.,* pp. 222-285.

[31] Both Barth and Dietrich Bonhoeffer argue from the narrative in Genesis 1: 26f. of the creation of humanity as male and female to establish the relational character of the *imago dei.* For the latter's study, see Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Creation and Fall/Temptation* (New York: Macmillan, 1959), pp. 35-40.

[32] The following description applies to self-conscious adults. Obviously, important modifications can and must be made in the case of infants, the severely mentally handicapped, etc.

[33] Bernard Williams, *Problems of the Self* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 236.

supposed common sphere of life and interest. This intersubjective space is to be defined not only through active disclosure but also through willing acceptance on the part of each party. These conditions are completed by the existence of mutual assistance, in which each party helps and is helped by the other from within the shared sphere. One thinks and chooses not from one's isolated point of view, nor from one's associate's point of view, but from a "third point of view," a perspective from which one's own good and the other's good are equally in play.[34] As those created and summoned by God for fellowship with Him, human creatures are to bear responsibility for their own lives; but they are also in essence dependent. In the variety of forms of human life, the facts of self-responsibility and dependence are witnessed and coordinated through patterns of mutual help. What is called for is a differentiated freedom on both sides realized in fellowship. Since all act within the grace of creation, cohumanity is a possibility for all human persons, a possibility which norms the full sweep of human activities in a manner appropriate to different relational contexts.

So cohumanity is constituted by two components: " free differentiation" and "relation " or " fellowship." The definition of each component is *internally qualified* by the other, just as in the divine-human covenant concrete identity and otherness is established in and through fellowship. The " free differentiation " of the parties who pursue their own individual life-acts is in principle congruent with and realized in the fellowship of mutual openness, speech, hearing, and assistance; and the " relation " or " fellowship " is not realized apart from the preservation of "two-sided freedom." Creaturely self-fulfillment is jeopardized when the two components are split apart. An individual who pursues his or her personal life-act outside of patterns of mutual assistance is in misery. A "fellowship" which denies free differentiation for the slightest suggestion of slavery or tyranny cannot make for human fulfillment. The

34John Finnis, *Natural Law an!), Natural Riphts* (Oxford: Oxforcl. sity Press, 1980), p. 143,

claim about internal qualification must be distinguished from any proposal to the effect that either component is *merely a means* to the other. By the same token, one cannot separate the components so completely to allow the judgment that " individuality " *apart from* fellowship and '" fellowship " *apart from* individuality are in themselves " good-making." The individuality which welcomes fellowship and the fellowship which preserves free differentiation are what is "good-making," properly speaking. " Individual " and " community " are therefore not separate and potentially antagonistic; to commend the one includes the commendation of the other.

Now this last point suggests an important correlation between the normative sociality that is cohumanity and what I have called "recognition sociality." In its existence with its fellows, the human creature is recognized by others as being valuable. That recognition, which takes place within a context of fellowship, is itself a condition for the preservation of individuality and distinctness. The absence of recognition implies an absence of a sense of self-worth; but the absence of a sense of self-worth may lead to the abandonment of distinct individuality in favor of submission to the other. Or it may lead to a kind of self-doubt which destructively expresses itself in a need to dominate the other, just because the other is seen to be so threatening in its own separateness. In either case, cohumanity is denied. These consequences suggest that creaturely individuality, a component of cohumanity, must be *maintained* in and through the relation and fellowship of cohumanity. There is nothing circular about this proposal. It is in fact only a confirmation and extension of my earlier analysis in which I argued that free differentiation and relation internally qualify one another. Introduction of the category of recognition permits a concrete demonstration of the " fit " between the two components. So thoroughly intertwined are these components that the sense of one's value in separateness is forged in and through fellowship. Conversely, persons assured of the value of their self-constituting activities and proj-

ects will not have disdain for fellowship, but will find themselves more able to pursue relationships with greater zest and commitment, and in deeper and more varied ways. Thus would patterns of recognition promote and elicit deeper and surer expressions of cohumanity. So while cohumanity has a certain primacy in being the context within which recognition sociality is effectively realized, there is also a sense in which the two overlapping patterns of relationship reciprocally support one another.

At this point, we are in a position to address the problem with "rights" considered earlier. The enhancement of cohumanity must involve not only generation of ever greater prospects for sharing among persons, but also the maintenance of a two-sided differentiation and freedom. What the language of rights preserves, with its associated practices of claiming and asserting, is the *otherness*, the valued *separateness* of the other. This is true insofar as acknowledgment of fundamental political and economic rights, for example, entails recognition of a person like oneself who would insist that these rights be recognized. To yield to the claim of the other is ipso facto to deny that the other is an extension of oneself, as it is to deny that the good bestowed is but a gift, an expression of mere magnanimity. This recognition in part enables the right-claimer to develop a sense of self-respect; but since recognition sociality presupposes as well as enhances a measure of cohumanity, the claiming and acknowledging of rights by citizens of a political commonwealth ideally stands as an invitation to establish more perfect cohuman relations among the members. In brief, rights have as their proper province and presupposition at least some measure of cohumanity, and the recognition of a person's rights ideally would make for cohumanity's deeper realization. Merely to assert that one is *in need* will not necessarily elicit a response which accords recognition and enhances self-respect: To claim one's *rights* to goods which one needs does more nearly draw forth that response, and accordingly yields the possibility for greater partnership. So if all are to be viewed

as equal members of a commonwealth, the ascription and acknowledgment of fundamental rights to goods necessary and appropriate for effectively carrying out a plan of life confirm and condition fuller realization of membership in line with a sense of human dignity that embraces free otherness and sharing alike.[35]

These reflections suggest how and why the nature of rights may be viewed as compatible *in principle* with community, understood as partnership between irreducibly distinct parties. *In fact* recognition of rights may not, in a sinful world, engender a quality of recognition supportive of community. But the theological appropriateness of rights-language, as I have presented it, is not jeopardized by the non-ideal case; for rights as stringent claims express both judgment and promise. A begrudging recognition of rights, one grounded in hostility and a desire for isolation, yields some benefit to the recipient nonetheless. Moreover, that the stringency of the right-claim may serve as a restraint on sinful self-seeking points to the attribute of divine patience. God gives His creatures time to come to Him, even as He judges those to whom He gives the time. Yet the feature of judgment is in service of promise, as God's patience is in service of His wisdom. Practices of claiming and asserting rights stand not only as sources of restraint and outlets for attaining some well-being even in the midst of inhumanity; they also present the opportunity for a genuine recognition of otherness as it arises from and sustains those creaturely covenants which reflect and witness to the divine nature in God's relations *ad intra* and *ad extra.* So even in the case of this problem with rights, God may be known as the One whose judgment remains itself while being surpassed by mercy and grace.

My resolution of the problem with rights necessarily includes the view that cohumanity may be realized within political life. In their active commitment to principles of justice regulative of major political and economic institutions, and in their com-

[35] Cf. Feinberg, pp. 148-155.

patible lower-level political activities, citizens of a political community may assist one another in the advancement of their life plans under conditions of freedom and equality. They also may help one another, through their common deliberations about justice, to attain an ideal expressive of their nature as free and equal. These kinds of mutual help require the presence of various effective opportunities for citizens' participation in the public business; provision of these opportunities would in turn require the democratization of corporate government (since " the public business " includes decisions about the state of the economy) , and the decentralization of governmental activity and political movements generally. This arrangement of political life may yield a value which genuinely witnesses to the sovereign God who creates and redeems, and who as such sustains human creatures even as they would seek to stray from Him.

I said earlier that the political bond can be viewed as an anticipation of friendship, and perhaps now the meaning of that formulation comes clear. Friends, according to C. S. Lewis, deeply care about the same truth, and friendship is a sharing of that concern.[36] Citizens of a cohuman political order do indeed share and pursue some truth in mutual openness, speech, hearing, and assistance, and the sharing thus realizes a good of relation deepened in friendship. In the context of divergent plans of life and particular final ends, such citizens are bound to one another in their commitment to principles and social conditions supportive of freedom, equality, and, integrating these, cohumanity itself. It is against the background of this vision of political life that I wish to evaluate political liberalism.

Analysis and Assessment

By contemporary accounts, political liberals have always been anxious people. They are uneasy about the presence of

sa C. S. Lewis, *The Four Loves* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 11160), pp. 97·98.

human desires which need to be restrained or even frustrated for the sake of social harmony. They worry about how scarce natural resources are to be distributed. [37] Perhaps most of all, they worry about how a peaceful distribution of goods may take place given the fact that persons simply do not agree about what manner of life constitutes human fulfillment. These problems of restraint and frustration, scarcity, and disagreement show up in the studies I have been considering. **But** within an appropriately restricted frame of reference, they might also fittingly appear in Christian political writings. The problems reflect the facts of human finitude; limitations constraining human discernment, knowledge, and satisfaction all may attest to the truth that the creature is not the Creator. [38]

An important feature of the liberal solution to the facts of human finitude, however, may not fit theological concerns nearly so well. In order to respond to the dangers of severe social conflict occasioned by religious and other disagreements, liberal political theory has tended to defend the " autonomy " of morality, which "consists largely in abstraction from one's own conception of the good and one's own (nonliberal) political and religious commitments." [39] Sandel levels his sights on this feature, and Christian ethicists must heed his general critique, mistaken interpretations of Rawls aside; for it is obvious that any positive Christian appreciation of political liberalism cannot be *based* upon an abstraction from peculiarly Christian points of view. In such a circumstance, there could be nothing " Christian" about the appreciation at all. To embrace complete abstraction in the name of reasons derived from Christian ethics, moreover, would be self-defeating, since the maneuver would suggest that there are good reasons based

[37] Sheldon S. Wolin, *Politics and Vision* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1960), pp. 314-325.

[38] The work of Reinhold Niebuhr offers deep insight into the implications of a Christian notion of human finitude for political ethics.

[39] Jeffrey Stout, *The Flight from Authority: Reli,qion, Morality, and the Quest for Autonomy* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 233.

upon a Christian understanding of the sphere of politics for dispensing entirely with a Christian understanding of the sphere of politics. A positive relation between Christian ethics and liberal justice can be established only by showing how some features of the latter roughly overlap with a theological apprehension of what political life is, what it is for, and of how God's work may be known in it. For example, something about politics theologically conceived would have to justify something like Rawl's "veil of ignorance," which constrains persons' deliberations in the original position by denying them knowledge of their particular final ends. But that constraint could only be part of an account in which the theological perspective remains decisive. Abstraction from particular theological beliefs, then, would be necessary in order better to focus on a; theological value from which the Christian political thinker does not distance oneself, and which the partial abstraction supports. The consequence, according to the view of anthropology and politics sketched earlier, is that the support of a material ideal of cohumanity in political life includes and is not undermined by a qualified self-distancing. The latter is part and parcel of cohumanity's political realization among citizens who, *apart* from their disagreements, view themselves as free, equal, and with one another in mutual assistance. Abstraction displays the possibilities and the boundaries of common ground politically conceived.

If the troublesome feature of abstraction can be handled in this way, a substantive theological account of liberalism's strength, weakness, and promise becomes possible. Liberalism's special strength is its elevation and egalitarian defense of the irreducible otherness of the free individual; Paramount value belongs to the individual's " autonomy," to his or her ability "to take ultimate, self-critical responsibility for one's ends and the way they cohere in a life." [40] Christianity cannot simply dispense with this emphasis. The Word of God addresses the

[40] David .A. J. Richards, "Rights and Autonomy," *Ethics* 92 (October 1981)' 9.

individual in his or her separate and responsible life-act, and summons the individual to respond in freedom to the gracious offer of mercy and fellowship. While one's separate point of view and responsible initiative is confronted and challenged by the Word, neither as such is in any way imperiled. Similarly, interhuman relationships are defective if free differentiation on either side is compromised in favor of slavish deference or domination. Respect for individual development of a self-responsible point of view characterizes Christian commendations in the political sphere accordingly.

Free differentiation, however, is to be forged in and through relation or fellowship. That liberals more often than not fail to acknowledge this reflects liberalism's weakness, and justifies Christian critique of the liberal ideal as incomplete and misleading. Rawls and Walzer seek with little success to remedy this defect. We have already considered the latter's failure to develop a concrete idea of membership to buttress his participatory ideal; and while Rawls may offer some help here, his own material vision of community is deeply ambiguous, as Sandel notes. Ackerman in effect neglects the subject of community. Gutmann thoughtfully distinguishes liberal egalitarianism from Rousseauan "communal egalitarianism," but never comes up with a clear and positive statement concerning the possibilities for a theory of community within liberalism itself.[41] In light of these failures, one has good reason to fear that liberal political theory will continue to be plagued by a vision of politics that accredits factional interest to the exclusion of common commitment. This "interest politics," made credible by an unqualified view of individual separateness and self-responsibility, is aptly described by Sheldon Wolin:

> Interest politics dissolves the idea of the citizen as one for whom it is natural to join together with other citizens to act for purposes related to a general community and substitutes the idea of individuals who are grouped according to conflicting interests. The individual is not first and foremost a civic creature bound by pre-

41 Gutmann, pp. 218-230.

existing ties to those who share the same history, the same general association, and the same fate. He or she is instead a business executive, a teamster, a feminist, an office worker, farmer, or homosexual whose immediate identity naturally divides him or her from others. As a member of an interest group, the individual is given an essentially anticivic education. He is taught that the first duty is to support the self-interest of the group because politics is nothing but a struggle for advantage.[42]

There can be no base for mutual assistance where isolation in the name of" individual interest" holds sway. This is because the conception of " interest" precludes realization of the conditions of mutual assistance, i.e., mutual openness, speech, and hearing.

It is clear that Walzer and Gutmann wish to criticize and advance beyond " interest politics," and there is a felicitous incoherence in their work that signals the promise of contemporary liberal thought for movement in this direction. Both theorists focus on the connection between individual self-respect and the recognition of fellow-citizens. Yet the analysis of cohumanity pointed out that the kind of interpersonal recognition generative of self-respect is available only against a background of some mutual openness, speech, hearing, and assistance. Their lapses notwithstanding, Walzer's and Gutmann's best insights implicitly presuppose and require a definite view of community which their own general account fails explicitly to provide. The possibility remains, however, that these thinkers and others like them will come to organize their reflections more and more in terms of the norm which the reflections themselves imply. Christian political ethics may contribute significantly to the realization of this possibility, not only by working directly for political arrangements supportive of cohumanity, but also by proposing in concrete and timely ways how talk about self-respect goes hand-in-hand with talk about mutual respect, sharing, and assistance.

42 Sheldon S. Wolin, "What Revolutionary Action Means Today," *Demoo·raoy* 2 (Fall 1982): 20-21.

Consider archliberal Ronald Dworkin's critique of current national policies curtailing redistributive welfare programs.[43] He sounds a familiar note with the claim that a liberal policy "must impose no sacrifice or constraint on any citizen in virtue of an argument that the citizen could not accept without abandoning his sense of his equal worth." He allows that people with a lively sense of their own worth can accept grounds for bearing burdens for the sake of the community as a whole. But what grounds are consistent with maintaining self-respect? Surely one cannot accept reasons that permit irreversible losses to a minority merely in order to achieve gains for the large majority. Perhaps, however, it is claimed that the inflationary and growth-impeding effects of egalitarian welfare programs will severely damage a public environment which all citizens cherish and want to uphold. Society gets poorer, and consequently culture declines, order is lost, hopeful expectations across the board give way to despair. If this forecast is acceptable, then one can say that sacrifice is asked of the poor who would benefit from these programs not for the sake of benefiting individuals privately, but rather for the sake of preserving a set of public institutions to which they and all others are commited. Now this argument depends, according to Dworkin, on a conception of " active membership " in a community. If people can accept burdens with pride in this case, it is because they have an operative sense of the community to be benefited as *their community.* Such a sense can exist only in circumstances where their lives *draw on and contribute* to the social values sought to be preserved, and where they are empowered to take part in the maintenance of those values now and in the future. The very plea to someone to bear burdens is fitting only when the community offers to that person " the opportunity to develop and lead a life he can regard as valuable both to himself and to it." But these conditions demand that cutbacks in welfare provision have as

[48] Ronald Dworkin, "Why Liberals Should BPlieve in Equality," *The New York Review of Books* 30 (February 3, 1983), 32·34.

an accompaniment efforts on other fronts to improve the social integration and political participation of the ones who suffer. The present administration fails exactly at this point, since its policies, taken together, deprive the sacrificers of the very goods possession of which might allow for justification of the sacrifice in the first place.

Dworkin's remarkable critique implicitly affirms that political life should be understood as a " conversation." That conversation is not merely about power as it accrues or is denied to individuals pursuing isolated interests given isolated preferences; it is also and especially about how members of a community will to live together. The category of "interest" undergoes a transformation insofar as some shared commitment to " our life together " is presupposed as the background to disputes based upon different conceptions of the good. "Individual interests " *include* a shared desire for patterns of relationship conducive to self-respect among citizens. The patterns are characterized by a sense of membership established through common commitment to principles of justice and a conception of public virtue, and effective empowerment. But Dworkin's argument goes beyond all of this (and, I suspect, goes beyond Walzer and Gutmann) with the suggestion that what may well *constitute* the desired relationships is the characteristic of mutual assistance, the mutual willingness to help and be helped within political life. This is but a suggestion, and a qualified one at that; perhaps the most that Dworkin would say is that the presence or absence of a quality of mutual assistance in this particular case supports or impedes self-respect. Nevertheless, the argument, which Dworkin hopes will contribute to an "overdue development in liberal theory," commands extensive elaboration by proponents of cohumanity. They will say that cohumanity integrates and makes intelligible the liberal plea for a sense of membership, empowerment, and fair access to self-respect; and they will try to show that in the absence of this relational norm and its implications for citizen participation, liberal arguments and policies offered in defense of individual " autonomy" or free differentiation will not succeed.

Conclusions

1. I agree with Hauerwas that the Christian community must maintain its integrity, and I also agree that a political life based on distrust or isolation or complete abstraction from particular Christian commitments jeopardizes that integrity. Still, the Church may " be itself " in its pursuit of social justice in the political sphere, if " justice " is taken to coincide with cohuman political arrangements.

2. While Meilaender is correct to distinguish friendship from citizenship, I fear that he argues for too much, because the concrete relation of the one gracious God to the political order remains obscure in his theological analysis. If cohumanity, a creaturely relation which in its structure reflects the being and work of the covenanting God, norms the political life, the obscurity is removed, and greater clarity is given to the political implications of Christian respect for the irreducible dignity of human creatures beloved of God. Respect of this sort would display itself in efforts to provide persons with the conditions through which they may be with one another as citizens in fellowship.

3. A cohuman political ethic may embrace a liberal ideal of free differentiation inasmuch as the ideal. stresses interpersonal recognition and self-respect. Without the relevant political ethic, the ideal is incomplete and misleading. In any case, responsible theological defense and criticism of contemporary liberalism must address its treatment of recognition sociality.

4. Walzer is correct in his claim that justice requires defense of the plurality of social goods in accordance with their relatively autonomous meanings. The proponent of cohumanity may be better able to protect the meaning of some of these goods from '"liberal collapse" into categories of isolated choice and interest by showing in argument and practice how they retain a covenantal dimension. Family relations cannot be reduced to a power struggle, and education cannot be reduced to a way for individuals to "get ahead," leaving the

rest behind. Walzer's analyses of family as a sphere of guaranteed love and of education as nurturance toward democratic citizenship are extremely instructive in this connection. Still, an anthropology of covenant is a crucial complement to 'Valzer's vaguer reliance on " our shared understandings," lest the defect to which liberalism is especially disposed be insufficiently resisted.H

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BOOK REVIEWS

Faith and the Mystery of God. By MAURICE WILES. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982. Pp. 160. $6.95 (paperback).

The Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford University in this slim volume sets forth a personal account of his central beliefs as a reflective, critical theologian. He begins by calling attention to the problems caused for Christians by contemporary awareness of the multiplicity of differing faiths, all of which merit consideration and respect. In his modest style Wiles is prepared to claim, as a Christian, that we do have glimpses of something beyond relativity and that personal language about the divine is "not wholly inappropriate." Many disagreements, he contends, are occasioned by a false understanding of religious language, which is intended to be disclosive of the transcendent and, even more importantly, to stimulate creative responses. Language about God acting in history, accordingly, cannot be taken as literally describing God's active intervention, but it can significantly shape our ideals and patterns of behavior. The divine causality is more felicitously understood in terms of final rather than efficient causality-a proposal which Wiles, with his distrust of metaphysics, leaves rather undeveloped.

This imaginative view of religious language is for Wiles the key to many crucial theological problems. The "real presence" of Jesus in the Eucharist can now be understood as symbolic rather than literal and thus (against Paul VI) as a matter of trans-signification rather than transubstantiation. The church can be understood as the Body of Christ not in a literal, biological sense (the view here attributed to E. Mascall and J. A. T. Robinson), but in a metaphorical sense, pointing the way to a new intimacy with God built upon personal relations to other Christians and to Jesus himself. Still more centrally, Jesus may be understood as one with God not in a metaphysical sense (J. N. D. Kelly) but in a figurative and inspirational sense. The gospels, according to Wiles, are intended to communicate a way of looking at Jesus in the light of the divine glory rather than to provide factual information about him. The important thing about Jesus, it would appear, is not what he actually was but what he means for faith.

Having established these principles, Wiles attempts to summarize the new possibilities opened up by the gospel story. Exemplary in his own personal life of faith *(pace* Aquinas), Jesus arouses in his followers a confident reliance on God's graciousness so that they are, in a sense, "jus-

tified by faith." The cross should not be taken as vicarious suffering (W. Sunday) or even as a vicarious penitential act (R. C. Moberly) but as a parable of God's engagement in the costly struggle against evil. The resurrection accounts, correspondingly, need not be taken as affirming a real change in the dead body of Jesus, but as a confident affirmation of God's eventual victory over evil. As parables, the stories about Jesus create new possibilities in our own lives.

From Christology Wiles passes on to ecclesiology. He depicts the church as a community called to foster freedom and universal openness. While institutional structures are indispensable, no specific church order can be imposed as mandatory without detriment to freedom within the church and to ecumenical harmony among churches. For the church to define itself against any other group is for Wiles a serious deviation, at variance with the goal of universal human fellowship-the aspect of the church's task which Wiles, following Charles Davis, most strongly emphasizes. The quest for specific identity on the part of the church is a delusion. " To put it very sharply," writes Wiles, "it is only the church which does not much care whether it is one which is one. By that standard churches are hard to come by" (p. 89).

In his reflections on worship Wiles returns to his themes of symbol and evocative language. The language of worship, he insists, is radically different from the language of belief. The same is true of prayer. We do not pray beause we believe that God acts in answer to our petitions but because we find ourselves impelled to pray and because, in praying, we experience a transformation of our own wills.

In the field of ethics, Wiles espouses similar principles. Morality is not a matter of obedience to revealed precepts or of conformity with the natural law. Rather, it is action that creatively responds to the possibilities inherent in the Christian vision of life. These possibilities, however, must be continually tested by critical reason.

In a concluding chapter Wiles assesses the doctrine of the Trinity at its current value. Classical theology, in his opinion, effectively undermined the relevance of the Trinity by admitting that specific events could never be properly attributed to any one of the three divine persons, but always to all conjointly. Wiles proposes to revise trinitarianism in terms of a fundamental doctrine of God as Spirit. As one advantage, he finds that this enables us to avoid calling God " Father," a title he regards as ambiguous and confusing. Further, it permits us to formulate a Spirit-Christology, portraying Jesus as divinely inspired, in place of a crude doctrine of Incarnation. Finally, it leads to an ecclesiology in which the church is viewed as a spiritual community, " the place where creative love is recogni,zed as love" (p. 124).

From this summary it should be evident that Wiles has composed a very dense and comprehensive work, displaying an impressive command of

many specializations, including comparative religion, linguistic theory, dogmatics, liturgiology, and Christian ethics. Never ponderous, he sustains throughout a highly personal and almost colloquial tone. He avoids theological jargon, but can, as occasion requires, adduce theological opinions as agreeing or differing from his own. Among modern authors, he utilizes the ideas of Philip Wheelwright, F. W. Dillistone, I. T. Ramsey, John Macquarrie, G. W. H. Lampe, Paul Tillich, Charles Davis, Karl Rabner, and Edward Schillebeeckx. While taking clear positions of his own, he is consistently courteous and modest. With disarming simplicity, he presents the mature fruits of many years of sincere inquiry. He is honest, reasonable, and well informed.

Wiles's synthesis is, in my judgment, typical of a large stream of current liberal theology in the "revisionist" school. This theology intends and claims to defend Christian faith, and even to commend it to nonbelievers. But in the quest for defensibility the authors so whittle down the contents of faith that the surviving remnant, even if it still merits the name of faith, has minimal substance. Wiles's positions on many central points would not be recognized as authentically Christian by Athanasius or Augustine, Anselm or Aquinas, Luther or Calvin, Newman or Barth. Gone are the traditional doctrines of Trinity and Incarnation. In Wiles's reconstruction Jesus was not personally divine, nor did Jesus really atone for the sins of the world, nor did he objectively rise from the dead. In place of these traditional doctrines we are invited to hold that the biblical story, though not literally true, stimulates the reader to a loving and hope-filled commitment. This interpretation, it is true, diminishes the conflict between rival religions, but it does so at the price of making the Christian say no more than many non-Christians could agree to. How much of Wiles's profession of faith would be beyond the reach of a pious Hindu?

Crucial for Wiles's entire enterprise is his doctrine of religious language. Many of the points he takes over from Wheelwright and Ricoeur, Ian Ramsey and Ian Barbour are valid and important. One may agree that religious language gathers its images from experience in the world and symbolically extends their meaning so that they point to various aspects of the divine mystery. But it is important that the religious imagination should not present us with the merely imaginary; that it should lead us into deeper realms of reality and thus offer us more, not less, than descriptive or scientific truth. Wiles, I take it, would concur with these principles, but when he goes about interpreting the language of Scripture and the creeds he assigns meanings that are, in my judgment, reductionist. He would reject the charge of reductionism on the ground that he has made faith functional for life, While I appreciate this, efforts at theological reconstruction

cern, I would submit that a faith with richer doctrinal content could be still more fruitful for Christian existence, and actually has been in the lives of many saints.

Wiles's conclusions cannot be effectively challenged on his own methodology. Although he wishes to stand " recognizably within historical Christian tradition," he considers it appropriate " to test, to review and where necessary to revise both the traditional affirmations of faith and its contemporary insights" (p. 128). Accordingly he takes Scripture and traditicn as providing something less than authoritative witness to divine revelation. He treats them as offering materials to be interpreted ar,-cording to the norms of contemporary experience and common sense. This method guarantees in advance that the novelty of the gospel will be blunted. An alternative approach would have to reckon with the possibility that God might do and reveal things beyond all that the human imagination might be inclined to conceive. The idea of Christianity as a radical reversal of all human expectations is almost totally absent from the present volume. Yet if this idea is correct, Christianity cannot help but be far more distinctive than Wiles would have it.

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Hume and the Problem of Causation. By ToM L. BEAUCHAMP and ALEXANDER ROSENBERG. New York: Oxford University Press, 1981. Pp. xxv + 340. $23.50.

Although of interest primarily to philosophers of an empiricist persuasion, familiar with the recent literature on causality, this clear, careful, and precise volume can be easily summarized. Beauchamp and Rosenberg do very careful textual analysis of David Hume's works, but they are just as interested in constructing "a unified and *defensible* Humean theory of causation" (p. 32; italics added). Their principal target throughout is J. L. Mackie's *The Cement of the Universe* (1974), and they accuse Mackie of "offer[ing] epistemological answers for metaphysical problems" (p. xxiii, in a very handy analytical table of contents, referring to chapter 7, which ends with the claim that Mackie " seems to confuse ontological and epistemological accounts of causation " (p. 282]).

The account of (metaphysical) causality Beauchamp and Rosenberg offer is a modification-involving a criterion they call "Nominal Extensionality " (p. 269)-of a proposal due to Jaegwon Kim (1973), inter-

preting Hume's account as requiring "the time-like, the space-like, and ... abstract items" to be brought "together under the category of a structured *event"* (p. Z51). (This will be referred to again later.)

Beauchamp and Rosenberg provide their own summary: "[J. A.] Robinson and most all recent writers on causation believe that Hume holds a pure regularity theory of causation .... J. L. Mackie, who allies himself with Robinson, ... [says Hume means] that statements of causal connection are nothing but statements of *de facto* constant conjunction" (pp. 31-32). This view, Beauchamp and Rosenberg then say, is indefensible because it fails to "distinguish causal laws from statements of *de facto* regularity" (p. 32). This they counter, saying, "After all, there is the second definition of 'cause' . . . [plus] Hume's repeated assertion that, 'According to my definitions, necessity makes an essential part of causation' *(Treatise,* 407)" *(ibid.).* And what they then propose is to provide their defensible reconstruction of Hume's theory of causal *events.*

Aside from Mackie, Beauchamp and Rosenberg take on G. E. M. Anscombe (chapter 3), William Kneale (chapter 4), and Bertrand Russell and Richard Taylor (chapter 5)-among others. In chapter 8, Beauchamp and Rosenberg take up Hume's views on causal explanation, where their opponents are C. J. Ducasse *(Causation and the Types of Necessity,* 1924), R. G. Collingwood *(An Essay on Metaphysics,* 1940), H. L. A. Hart and A. M. Honore *(Causation in the Law,* 1959), in addition to Mackie. Throughout, they maintain they are not talking (at least primarily) about epistemological skepticism-except with respect to the claims of rationalism. According to the authors, Hume is not at all skeptical about scientific rationality; indeed, that is what (they say) he is appealing to against the rationalists !

Undoubtedly, Beauchamp and Rosenberg will encounter opposition from within the empiricist camp-especially from people like Mackie who favor an epistemological (and skeptical) interpretation of Hume. It is equally obvious that they will be opposed by adherents of views such as those of Collingwood-not to mention philosophers such as Errol Harris (e.g., in *Hypothesis and Perception,* 1970), who will argue that once one goes along with Jaegwon Kim's "structured events," nothing is left of Humean empiricism to contrast with idealist, or neo-idealist, or Whiteheadian events.

Aristotelians (along with Kantians and neo-Kantians, though obviously £or different reasons) will wonder why causal explanation has been relegated to such a minor role. In Aristotle's four-causal scheme, after all, (efficient) causality is primarily a matter of explanation; "agency" in the metaphysical sense is simply the commonsense reality a (realist) theory of efficient causality sets out to explain. (Aristotelians will, as a matter

of course, object to the implicit nominalism, to the anti-realism of the entire Beauchamp/Rosenberg/Hume venture; if they have a cavil about the book, it will be that they are never given so much as a mention, much less a hearing.)

Granted all these objections from people who would have wanted Beauchamp and Rosenberg to have written something different, their book is an impressive accomplishment. They would seem to have successfully extricated Hume from the entanglements of those, friends and foes alike, who would make him out to be a *me;e* regularity theorist and skeptic. They seem clearly to be right in claiming that Hume was skeptical primarily about rationalist claims with respect to causality. Whether Beauchamp and Rosenberg are as successful in defending their " event" view of causality (derived from Jaegwon Kim) is a matter likely to be debated for some time in empiricist circles-while process philosophers grumble from the sidelines that they come perilously close to giving up the rational empiricism they work so mightily to defend.

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Understanding Human Action: Social Explanation of the Vision of Social Science. By MICHAEL A. SIMON. State University of New York Press, 1981. Pp. 226. Cloth, $29.50; paper, $9.95.

" This book," the author writes, " is an attempt to see what it is about human social life that makes a social science based on the model of natural science impossible" (p. viii). The "principal argument of the book " is outlined in the introduction as follows :

> The social studies have essentially to do with human actions; actions are free in the sense that they are not subject to explanation and prediction on the basis of strict causal laws; what empirical science is capable of investigating successfully cannot be free in that sense; hence the social studies cannot be empirical sciences (p. 2).

Simon's first three chapters are devoted to establishing the first premise of this argument. In Chapter 1, he attempts to show that action "must be conceived as a logical primitive," in the sense that it is "irreducible to any concepts that do not themselves presuppose the notion of action or agency" (p. 7). The thesis of his second chapter is that "social relations as we know them are not possible without a concept of action which

they presuppose, and that this concept has no essential role in language other than to serve this mediating function" (p. 27). And in Chapter 3, he locates the subject matter of social science in human action and its products (p. 41).

In his first two chapters, and again in Chapters 4 and 7, Simon makes use of the work of some prominent philosophers of action. These chapters exhibit a less than adequate familiarity with the literature in the field. In Chapter 1, for example, Simon employs an objection of Ryle's to volitional theories of action (p. 18) and Melden's version of the argument that there can be no causal connection where there is a logical connection (p. 19), without considering recent, and even not-so-recent, meritorious replies, e.g., by D. M. Armstrong, A. C. Danto, Donald Davidson, and Alvin Goldman. And in Chapter 4 he advances a version of contextualism-" Reasons explain ... by representing the action as appropriate under the circumstances" (p. 62)-without even mentioning the weighty objections raised by such influential figures in the field as Davidson, Shaffer, and Davis.

Simon's discussions of action are sometimes imprecise or seriously incomplete at important junctures. The following are representative instances of this problem. (1) Simon reports that "What is essential" to his " understanding of human actions is that they be conceived neither as random nor as determined in accordance with causal laws" (p. 131). Thus it is crucial for him to get clear on what determinism is. Yet he elaims-what is demonstrably false-that "If human beings are a proper subject matter for deterministic science, their behavior must in principle be totally predictable" (p. 170). Simon also contends, in apparent ignorance of Goldman's well-known attack on the position, that a person cannot predict his own actions (pp. 171-2). Even if he is right about this, the arguments which he employs have been forcefully criticized and one would like to see a reply. (2) Simon makes some interesting claims about reasons for action which are difficult to assess in the absence of an account of what reasons for action are. He contends, e.g., that what can count as a reason for action is constrained by social norms (p. 68), and that " The only role that causation plays in the explanation of actions in terms of reasons is as a relation between the occurrences that give people reasons for acting and the actions that they do for those reasons " (p. 121). But he leaves the notion of a "reason for action " unanalyzed. We are told that " The hearing of the sound of bombers overhead" is "a reason for someone to run for cover" (p. 117) and that some wants are reasons for action (p. 62). But how are these two types of reason If I hear the sound of bombers overhead and want to avoid being blown to bits, do I have *two* reasons to run for coverf If I hear the bombers but want to be killed in ground-to-air com-

bat do I still have a reason to run for cover1 (3) The stated thesis (reproduced above) of Chapter 2 involves the claim that " social relations as we know them are not possible without a concept of action *which they presuppose"* (p. 27, my emphasis). But Simon says only two paragraphs later that " What we need to do, if we are to prove that human action is a social concept, is to specify a sense in which *actions do presuppose a system of social interactions"* (p. 28, my emphasis). And, without explaining the shift, Simon addresses the remainder of the chapter to the latter thesis, in which what was originally said to presuppose a concept of action is now being held to be *presupposed by* actions. The second thesis is not quite the converse of the first; but in the absence of explanation the shift is puzzling indeed.

The middle chapters of the book (Chapters 4-7) "consider the topic of social explanation and examine a number of approaches to understanding why people behave as they do" (p. 2). Chapters 4 and 7 are concerned respectively with the roles of reasons in social investigation and with causation. In the former, Simon argues that "reasons depend on norms " and that there can therefore "be no science of action that regards actions as separable from the culture in which they are performed" (p. 76). The stated purpose of the latter is "to consider whether human actions and other social phenomena have causal explanations" (p. 111).

In Chapters 5 and 6 Simon deals with explanations of irrational and non-rational behavior and with non-rational explanation of human behavior. The latter chapter is a rejection of a biological approach to explaining human action. The former defends the thesis that " All social explanation is ultimately rational explanation," since all " explanations of what rational agents do . . . rest on the paradigm of a person doing something for a reason," and all explanations of social phenomena " presuppose the existence of rational agents " (p. 90).

In the last four chapters (Chapters 8-11), Simon is "concerned with the nature of social science's output" (p. 3). His book, he says, "can be seen as a philosophical response to the failure of social science to contribute much understanding of the universe of human affairs" (p. viii), and Chapters 8-11 focus on this failure. Simon's target in Chapter 8 is the *theoretical* inadequacy of social science. " The failure of the subject matter of social science to lend itself to rigorous theoretical comprehension shows," he argues, " that either the subject matter is 'deficient' in the sense that it refuses to behave in ways that can give rise to theoretical ordering, or else social scientists have not been patient or clever enough to discover what the proper ordering should be." That he affirms the first disjunct is made clear in Chapter 10, the thesis of which is that "the subject matter of the human sciences is such that a properly

explanatory science of that domain is impossible in principle " (p. 170). Chapter 9 argues that " objectivity is not a possible goal for social inquiry in general" (p. 166). And Chapter 11 concludes with an assessment of social science according to which what it contributes is, for the most part, " a compendium of facts, stories, insights, and world views " (p. 205). " Once its scientific aspirations are set aside and its pretensions stripped away," social science is, Simon argues, "at best, a set of humanistic disciplines" *(ibid).*

Of this final group of chapters, 9 is the least convincing and 10 is the most important for the purposes of the book. In the penultimate paragraph of the former, Simon writes: "If the pursuit of objectivity in social science requires withholding evaluative characterization, and a refusal to apply evaluative categories implies an evaluational stance" (both of which antecedents he affirms), "then the notion of objectivity with respect to social inquiry must be self-contradictory and incoherent" (p. 166). But given that what Simon means by an objective social discipline is one which is "capable of providing accounts of human affairs that are as free of bias and independent of the values *held by the investigators* as the natural sciences are" (p. 150, my emphasis), it is natural to reply both that an objective social discipline *may* make value judgments, provided that the values appealed to are those of the person, group, or institution being studied, and that the refusal to apply one's *own* " evaluative categories" implies only a meta-evaluational stance which in fact promotes the objectivity of the accounts given of human affairs. One might even take a stronger line and argue that there are *objective* values which may be objectively applied in making comparative evaluative judgments across cultures. To these replies Simon has no convincing answer.

The thesis of Chapter 10 is the dominant thesis of the book, viz., that because human action, the fundamental subject matter of the "human sciences," is free, it is not subject to fruitful "scientific" investigation. " Something whose behavior is neither random nor causally necessitated," Simon says in his " Afterword," " is nothing for science to get mixed up with" (p. 207). What is missing here, and in the rest of the book, is careful argumentation designed to show that human beings exhibit a kind of freedom that is incompatible with their actions' being determined. We are given, as I have mentioned, familiar arguments from the impossibility of prediction; but these arguments have been intelligently disputed, and Simon does not reply to the objections. That human actions are free in Simon's sense is an important premise in what Simon describes asl " the principal argument of the book," and it merits much more attention than he gives it.

My reservations notwithstanding, *Understanding Human Action* is of interest to practitioners and philosophers of social science and to action

theorists. Simon's attempt to make human action the fundamental subject matter of social science is worthy of investigation, even if his discussions of action are not always as carefully conducted as one might wish. About his treatment of the other main premises in the central argument of the book, claims about free action and its relations to causality and empirical science, I can only say that it contributes little to the current study of these issues.

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The Human Center: Moral .Agency in the Social World. By HOWARD L. HARROD. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1981. Pp. x + 150. Cloth, $14.95.

Reading a book on the Dutch painter Jan Vermeer during the income tax season suggests two different aspects of ordinary experience. Vermeer renders ordinary people, usually women, in everyday situations, such as reading a letter or pouring milk. His renderings are clear and distinct, as thougli he was trying to do in painting what his contemporary Descartes wanted to do in philosophy. But there is also a sense in Vermeer of something deeper and more mysterious. There is a luminosity not only of the colors but of ordinary human experience. Nothing could be further from this aspect of ordinary experience than filling out the income tax form, which is, whether we like it or not, a part of our common, ordinary experience. The income tax form itself, as well as instruction booklet, render ordinary experience opaque; worse yet, they render ordinary experience prosaic. All this is by way of introducing Howard L. Harrod's *The Human Center: Moral .Agency in the Social World.*

Like Vermeer, Harrod offers to illuminate ordinary experience. The opening sentences of his book are: " Ordinary moral experience often goes unnoticed and unanalyzed, and yet it exhibits some of the most marvelous instances of human transcendence. One fascination motivating this work is precisely the luminosity of the small, the common, and the mundane." Perhaps my expectations were too high, but as I read further I got the feeling I was reading a philosopher's version of an income tax booklet. In a way, one might not unreasonably expect stylistic problems in a work that is a phenomenological description of moral agency in the social world. Let's face it, phenomenologists not infrequently write in an expressive style dubbed by Thomas Hanna the "Teutonic plague". Harrod's book does not suffer in this way, though. He does not overwhelm

the reader with terminology (jargon). His vocabulary is not the problem; he'd never make it writing sociology. His problem is that he writes like a bureaucrat: He says the most banal things in tortuous circumlocutions. Let me illustrate. I take the following to mean that in the process of socialization a male learns his roles as father and husband, and these roles are seen as ' right '.

> By the time a male child has become an adult, for example, the typical and symbolic meanings surrounding the social roles of father may be sedimented as part of personal history and identity. At the point in personal life when the social project of constituting a family and becoming a father comes into view, the foundations for the personal project of getting married and having children has become a taken-for-granted meaning structure orienting the agent's action. The typical sequences of action which are necessary to realize the project are fantasized in the future perfect tense; and when the act is completed in the social world, it is retained in memorial experience as a significant personal event which becomes the subject of various acts of recollection and interpretation and may, under certain circumstances, become a symbolic vehicle in experience. The context within which interpretation and reinterpretation proceed includes not only typical understandings at the level of law and the broader social system; there are also important normative elements that derive from the symbolic mediation of value meanings in experience.

Unfortunately, this is not atypical. Consider this key passage. As I read this passage, Harrod is ' describing ' how human freedom arises because we can reflect upon and learn from our past.

> This last point opens toward a fundamental dimension of the freedom of human agents. This is a freedom which is inherent in both biographical horizons of experience and the horizons that constitute the social world. There is an ongoing sedimentation of experience which proceeds routinely, but dialectically related to this is the capacity to transcend experience by turning back upon it. Each act of recollection is both an elongation of the aperture of awareness toward horizons of sedimented experience and fundamentally a new act, an act which may give rise to reinterpretation of the past as it has been grasped previously by the self. This means that the past has both the character of recognizable identity in the experience of agents and potentially open horizons. The open horizons are made possible by the capacity to turn back upon experience in acts of recollection and through these acts to reconstitute its meaning in various ways.

But a philosopher may have the expressive style of a bureaucrat and still have exciting ideas, as is evidenced by Kant and Hegel. So let us turn to the substance. Again, great promise followed by disappointment.

The stimuli for Harrod's work, he tells us, are pluralism and scientific

reductivism: pluralism because it is conducive to subjectivism in ethics ·and therefore undermines any public ethics; and reductivism because it relegates values to the epiphenomena! and therefore bowdlerizes moral experiences. His analysis of moral agency, then, offers promise, for he wishes to show how human beings constitute a world of values and moral actions, a world which is inherently intersubjective and relatively autonomous. The promise, however, is not redeemed, at least in an important or novel way.

Harrod's counter to scientific reductivism is a phenomenological description of the moral agent in the social world. But his description is by now 'routinized', to use one of his favorite terms. The central notion in his description of moral agency is the intentionality of consciousness. The conscious agent constitutes meaning, but since he is an embodied, linguistic being and not a disembodied Cartesian *cogito,* meaning constituted by the moral agent is inherently intersubjective. Thus, in response to scientific reductivism, Harrod writes that " the reality sense of the experience of value . . . arises as a consequence of features that are essential and not accidental to the human being· and the human social world." I happen to share Harrod's sentiments here, but since he never goes beyond the level of phenomenological description, I do not see that he has adequately met the challenge of scientific reductivism. For a reductivist (such as Mario Bunge in his recent *Scientific Materialism)* could also agree with the above quotation. For reductivism is not a claim about the experience of value but about the ontological status of values, which of course depends upon an ontology of the person. I certainly do not wish to claim that a phenomenological description of the experience of values may not be useful in developing a response to reductivism; it is simply not enough.

More disappointing than his failure really to engage the problem of the ontological status of values is Harrod's failure to come to grips with pluralism. I say this because I believe pluralism not only conducive to social divisiveness and sheer power politics, but because pluralism must try to show how we can come to a reasonable consensus on issues; it must provide some way of overcoming relativism and dogmatism. Harrod believes that an affirmation of the reality of moral experience and the disclosure of universal, formal features in the moral experience are enough. Yet he himself concludes that he has failed.

> This conclusion brings us back to the concern with which we began, namely, the pluralism of the modern world and of contemporary experience. If anything, the analysis in these pages has deepened this problem by affirming it and by showing the grounds in human agency upon which it rests. Does this mean that no paradigms of value meaning are better

than any others? Or is moral experience and the values that evoke it hopelessly bound up with the relativities of space, time, and individual idiosyncracy? An answer to this question would, of course, require another type of analysis.

The last sentence says it all.

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The Autonomy of Religious Belief. Edited by FREDERICK CROSSON. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981. Pp. 162. $14.95.

Many philosophers of religion have found in Wittgenstein's language-game analogy and in his concept of a form of life the rudiments of a new apology for religious belief. Both of these terms call attention to the fact that our language is imbedded in the praetices which surround it-so imbedded, in fact, that the meaningfulness of our words and the rationality of our judgments depend on an underlying agreement in our behavior. In relation to religion, this suggests that religious language, insofar as it is tied to its own distinctive form of life, might have its own peculiar standards of intelligibility and rationality. Religious belief, in other words, might be logically autonomous. Each of the contributors to this collection of essays-J. M. Cameron, Louis Mackey, D. Z. Phillips, Kai Nielsen, Kenneth Sayre, and William P. Alston-has something to say about this idea.

According to the editor, Frederick Crosson, the central question in the book is whether religion can be adequately understood as a form of life. But the contributors are far more concerned with the concept of logical autonomy than they are with the concept of a form of life. None of them makes any serious attempt to explicate Wittgenstein's use of the term "form of life"; most simply adopt the popular view that "language-game " and " form of life " are more or less interchangeable terms for separate domains of linguistic practice. This then enables them to raise the question of autonomy in terms of religion's relation to external influences and independent reasons for religious doubt.

This, of course, is not. a new issue, even in its quasi-Wittgensteinian formulation. Indeed, two of the authors represented here, Phillips and Nielsen, have been central figures in a long-standing discussion. The two extreme positions which have emerged from this discussion are described by Phillips as " internalism " and " externalism." According to the former view, all external criteria of meaning and rationality are irrelevant to

religious systems of thought, or to any other self-contained conceptual systems. According to the latter view, religious claims are subject to universal criteria of reason and sense. Given this distinction, Nielsen's contribution to the present discussion, like his previous contributions, can be described as a merciless attack on internalism. If religious belief *were* immune to external criteria of meaning and truth, then the most searching and fundamental questions about it would be out of place. But such questions are not out of place. Ordinary people as well as philosophers want to know what exactly the believers affirm when they believe in God. What, if anything, does the word "God" refer to How can the referent of this word be known or identified or distinguished from other
Nielsen insists that there is nothing deviant or senseless about these questions, nor is there anything logically absurd about the possibility that "God" refers to no more than a figment of human imagination. It may not make sense to ask questions such as "Is time real", but it surely makes sense to ask if God is real. Such questions arise for believers as well as non-believers, and they require a response.

In Nielsen's eyes the undeniable seriousness of such questions means that religious claims need to be defended in ways which do not depend on the prior acceptance of a religious outlook. Independent reasons for belief, drawn on external criteria of judgment, are needed to justify religious language-games as a whole. Yet as Phillips points out, the inadequacy of the internalist's account of belief does not prove the adequacy of the externalist's account. Serious doubts may surround religious belief, but this does not mean that these doubts can only be met by grounding religious claims in independently gathered, logically prior, evidence of their truth. Depending on the nature of the doubts themselves, there may be appropriate responses which do not involve the appeal to external evidence. Phillips does not pursue this point, but it is so important that I would like to add some thoughts of my own. Religious doubts do not all have their source in a lack of evidence. Some doubts arise because religious claims seem conceptually peculiar or inconsistent, and these might be answered by *explanation* or *instruction.* Others may arise because certain claims seem pointless, and these might be answered by leading one to see what it would mean, practically speaking, to take the beliefs in question to heart. Still other doubts arise because religious ways of life seem inhibiting or psychologically harmful, and these might be answered in kind with pragmatic appeals. Depending on the situation, any of these responses might be appropriate; yet none involves the attempt to found religious claims on prior rational grounds. And this in turn suggests that there is a middle ground between the false isolation claims from reasonable doubt and the rigid demand that religious claims be justified as inferences from non-religious premises.

I think that Phillips would agree with these remarks about doubt, but it is only in an appendix to his essay that he defends himself against his critics. The body of his essay is designed to show that religious belief is *not* autonomous, that the culture which surrounds a religion affects its credibility, and that the resultant dangers cannot be escaped. Neither a private relationship with God, nor the vain hope of rational proofs, nor the will to accommodate cultural changes can protect the believer. For private relationships to God depend on publicly available ways of understanding those relationships, " proofs " for the existence of God live from the faith that precedes them, and the possibility of renewing an old faith in the midst of a current crisis depends on a kind of authoritative speech which cannot be manipulated. Owing to the weight of crushing experiences, such as the Jewish holocaust, people may lose their sense of life's divine meaning; and there is no way to change this fact. Churches can issue assurances, but, if these are not being heard, concerned believers cannot simply *decide* to speak more authoritatively. That sort of thing cannot be engineered.

Cameron makes a similar point in his essay. He cites the character of Dorothea in George Eliot's *Middlemarch* to show how a wider view of the world can give a particular religious outlook-in this case Roman Catholicism-an almost bewitching appeal. Yet he might just as well have chosen a character like Hester Prynne to show how changed events and circumstances can drive a person away from the larger society's religious views. For his point is that religious forms of life are not immune to outside influences and threats. They are not even immune from inside threats, as Kierkegaard's relation to the Danish Church shows. This leads Cameron to question the usefulness of the term " form of life," but the real object of his criticism (like that of Nielsen) is not the term but the compartmentalized conception of language which it supposedly enshrines.

The one issue that remains in tension among these three writers concerns the appropriateness of maintaining and defending such claims as " God is real," or " God exists," in the face of culturally generated criticism. Nielsen and Cameron plainly believe that such claims are in order; but Phillips, who doesn't discuss the point in this volume, thinks that such cnssertions invite a confused assimilation of the affirmation of faith claims to the affirmation of testable hypotheses about objects of one kind or another. Again, however, a more careful analysis of the nature and variety of religious doubts might show that there is a third alternative in which the importance of maintaining the reality of God can be acknowledged without thereby confusing this issue with other questions about the existence of objects.

In effect, Alston tries to develop an intermediate· position between the " externalist " who wants an argument for the existence of God and the "internalist" who thinks such demands are too confused to be legitimate.

Before accepting the Wittgensteinian terminology in which this issue is cast, however, he introduces some refinements of his own. He, for example, is the only contributor who stops to consider the problems involved in identifying different language-games, or in distinguishing one form of li:2e from another. He realizes that Wittgenstein himself may have had no " single consistent criterion " of individuation here; yet instead of pondering the implications of this critical insight (which in itself is enough to undermine the internalist's position), Alston offers his own way of defining language-games. (The reviewer's own views on this subject are presented in "Language-games and Forms of Life Unconfused," *Philosophical Investigations,* Vol. I, No. 4, Fall 1978). According to his stipulated definition, each language-game (he does not discuss forms of life) defines its own entities and ontological categories; each defines the range of concepts which can be applied to these entities; and each defines its own irreducible or immediate judgments.

All this is done so that one can say more clearly whether Christianity qualifies as a separate language-game. And here Alston's answer is " yes." Christian discourse has its own ontological referent, God; it has its own set of concepts (attributes) which must be learned in connection with this object; and it has its own primary judgments which provide the basis (data) for further reflection. These judgments include such things as a felt sense of God's presence, a sense of being comforted or guided by God, an appreciaticn for divine glory in nature, etc.-all of which depend on more mu'ldane perceptions of physical objects but which are no less immediate for that reaso'l than similar judgments about people and their personal qualities. In both cases, Alston argues, we experience certain qualities through physical objects, but our judgments are not inferences from phenomenal impressions. Even so, he does not conclude that the Christian language-game can be justified simply by noting that it is played. Like Nielsen, he insists that it makes sense to ask whether the epistemic machinery of such a language-game promotes true understanding, or puts us "in touch with reality." We can ask these questions partly because rational standards of consistency and parsimony cut across language-games, and partly because the Christian language-game is peculiar in various respects. Not everyone plays, the players themselves see alternatives, they encounter doubt and uncertainty, they differ in their mastery of its coneepts, and they gain no predictive power by virtue. of their unC\ers•anding. None of th1s conclusively counts against Christianity, though; for in a lengthy and theologically rich discussion Alston shows that each of these erstwhile objections depends on dubious assumptions about what a reliable language-game should be. He concludes by saying that Christian belief might be self-justifying, in that a greater participation might produce a greater awareness of God, often in unanticipated ways.

The remammg two essays are somewhat eccentric in relation to the others. Louis Mackey discusses the theology of St. Bonaventure with the expertise of a medievalist, but his overall purpose is to illustrate the way in which the language of revealed religion " undermines the languages by which men define themselves." He uses the term *"Lebensf orm"* to describe ways of life conducted in worldly categories, defined by natural needs and inspired by rationally or imaginatively created ideals. Such forms of life and language are thrown into upheaval by the " absolute alterity" of revealed categories of thought. Yet this may be exactly what a redeemed life requires. Perhaps the believer must accept thoughts which he cannot humanly think. Readers familiar with Mackey's work on Kierkegaard will find suggestive allusions here, but the connection with Wittgenstein is minimal. Nothing would be lost in this arresting essay if Mackey had avoided the term " form of life " and used another word, such as "culture" or "natural life," to describe that which revelation subverts.

Sayre's essay revolves around the question, "How does one know that he believes in " A person cannot know that he believes in *God*- i.e., the true God-unless the descriptions through which he understands God are accurate. And that is something that most people cannot claim, at least without being presumptuous. Nor can one know that he believes in God simply because he participates in religious practices, which Sayre alternatively describes as religious forms of life. Some participants in religious practices do not really believe, while others who *do* believe do not participate (go to church, etc.). Thus, we need another account in order to save the commonsense claim that we *can* know whether we believe in God. His solution : religious belief is a perceptual disposition. " To believe in God is to be disposed to certain forms of behavior, under the perception that the world is a certain type of place." This sort of perception is neither intentional in the sense of being directed at a theoretically defined object, nor intentional in the sense of being dircted at a proposition. Rather, it is a way of " taking" the facts which propositions describe. That is a very promising idea, but one would like to hear more about it than one does at the end of Sayre's essay.

In this essay, also, the concept of a form of life plays an incidental role. Yet none of the essays should be judged as contributions to scholarship on Wittgenstein. The purpose of the book is to advance old controversies about faith and reason in new ways, and this it does. In more instances than a mere review could ever display, it does it with the sensitivity of people who know about Christian faith, the ways of the world, and the philosopher caught in between.

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Religion as Art: An Interpretation. By THOMAS R. MARTLAND. State University of New York Press, 1981. Pp. 221. $14.95.

Among the more extraordinary of William Blake's many extraordinary claims is the assertion, in his engraving of Laocoon, that " Christianity is Art." ("Jesus & his Apostles & Disciples," he tells us, "were all Artists.") That something of the Romantic apotheosis of art and the artist survives today is evident in the religious aura that attends much of the language we use to talk about art. We like to think of the artist as an " inspired being," a " priest of the imagination " who has his "vocation" and produces "transcendent " works of art that furnish us with equally "transcendent" aesthetic experiences or "epiphanies."

This attitude is perhaps most strikingly embodied in that characteristic modern phenomenon, the art museum. " Once a mere collection," notes Andre Malraux, " the art museum ... is becoming a sort of shrine .... From the Romantic period onward art became more and more the object of a cult."

Not surprisingly, the exaltation of art goes hand in hand with an aestheticizing of religion. As art basks in the decaying afterglow of religious belief, so religion forfeits its claim to truth and becomes little more than another expression of man's "creative potential." Again, the museum-in Holderlin's phrase, an " aesthetic church "-aptly illustrates this. "Regarded as a temple," writes Hans Sedlmayr:

> the museum is not the temple of any particular God but a Pantheon of Art in which the creations of the most varied epochs and peoples are ranged next to one another with equal claims to our attention. For this to be possible, however, it was first necessary that the divinities for whom the works were created in the first place should themselves be undeified.

Distinctions vanish as Christ and Hercules join hands and become brothers, their divinity accommodated to aesthetic criteria. " The museum," Sedlmayr continues, " resolves all religions into things of the past, absorbing them into a new pan-religion of art."

Champions of this development will find eager support in Thomas Martland's *Religion as Art.* His thesis is nothing if not straightforward: "what art does, religion does." Both "present collectively created frames of perception or meaning by which men interpret their experiences and order their lives " (p. 1). No doubt there is something right in what Mr. Martland says. Art and religion can help us interpret our experiences, and religion, at least, has helped many order their lives.

The problem is that the thesis as it stands is uncomfortably general.

It doesn't seem to have isolated the *distinctive* features of art and religion. Our fund of practical knowledge, for example, is not noticeably artistic or religious, and yet it is " collectively created " and undeniably helps us interpret our experiences and order our lives. And wou.d we want to agree with Mr. Martland about Art may be important to us for a number of reasons, but does it provide us with a means of ordering our . Should

Mr. Martland is obviously after big game here, but I'm afraid that his exposition is not entirely convincing. In arguing for the connection-indeed, for the virtual identity-of art and religion he develops a stable of concepts that, taken together, are designed to allow lJ;S to appreciate what is valuable about art and religion and at the same time, to enable us to distinguish them from their less worthy counterparts, " craft and magic." His central idea is that art and religion liberate us from " old understandings, old ways of seeing things" (p. 18) and create new ones, while " craft and magic" are content to rest with the already known (cf. p. 73). Art and religion serve the future, craft and magic the past; art and religion seek new understanding (a good thing), craft and magic want power and control (bad things).

Unfortunately, the loose generality that undermines the book's overa11 thesis also undermines its supporting arguments. Consider, for example, Mr. Martland's discussion of the notion of " truth-to," introduced in an attempt to arrive at criteria for deciding whether something really is " art or religion." " Those activities which function as art or religion," he explains, "are those activities which are ' true-to ' the open-ended context in which they operate. This context is yesterday's, today's, tomorrow's. To be true in this way means to coalesce continually with constantly new discoveries" (p. 115). There fo]ows a reference, apparently obligatory in books of this ilk, to quantum mechanics and Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. This leads to the facile observation that since "physical theory serves to bring order into the world of experience, ... science ... and its concepts are akin to artistic or religious acts in that they too create what men experience so that men can understand" (p. 116).

His recapitulation near the end of the text is similarly uninformative: "An object or activity is art or religion insofar as it is in part responsible for the massed impact of that common ground that leads into the future. To recognize that something is art or religion is to recognize a particular future which, in turn, illuminates a particular present and a particular past" (p. 155). After one has unraveled such a pronouncement, I should think that the diffieult task would be to specify activities that could not, on the basis of this characterization. be construed as " art or religion."

Mr. Martland's treatment of citations poses related problems. In elaborating his position, he enlists what we might call the collage method of scholarship. The object is to propose a simple and well-known idea ip an oblique and mystifying manner and then to embellish it with surprising examples from radically different sources and traditions. Instead of arguing, one merely juxtaposes statements, relying on verbal similarities to suggest conceptual continuities.

For example, both art and religion are said to exhibit a "distance " from taken-for-granted or habitual ways of looking at things: " so far as a work does function as art or religion it must evince some distancing from old understandings" (p. 59). Mr. Martland associates distance with creativity and observes that the idea "emphasizes that a necessary and permanent withdrawing accompanies art's and religion's openness to creating or finding the yet-to-be" (p. 43). He then marshals supporting quotations from an astonishing variety of sources, including, to take one representative passage, Van Gogh, Paul Klee, Kierkegaard, Hesiod, T. S. Eliot, F. Scott Fitzgerald, Clement of Alexandria, the gospel of St. John, Foucher's *The Life of the Buddha,* an Islamic text, the *Mundaka Upanishad,* and the *Vakyapadiya.* It's a bit like Hesse's glass bead game.

Mr. Martland's creative interpretation of sources contributes to the effect. Consider his reading of Rudolph Otto's idea of God as *mysterium tremendum et fascinans.* For Otto, the focus was clearly on the dual character of man's encounter with the "wholly other." As absolutely transcendent, God is experienced as a terrifying yet irresistably fascinating mystery; one is simultaneously repelled and drawn in. In Mr. Martland's hands, however, the idea gets a new twist. Otto, he tells, us,

> calls man's religious interest in affirming his inherited structures the element of *fascinosum,* and his interest in transcending them the element of *tremendum.* The former stems from man's consciousness of the given as already created, whereas the latter stems from man's consciousness of the given as something to be created. (p. 34)

Equally novel is his interpretation of Aristotle's view of art. Conspicuous in the Aristotelian teaching is the contention that in art the idea or conception of what is to be made precedes and guides the execution. In the *Ethics,* Aristotle defines art as the "capacity to make, involving a true course of reasoning" and insists, in *Parts of .Animals,* that "art indeed consists in the conception of the result to be produced before its realization in the material." True, this does not jibe well with a view of art that extolls spontaneity, inspiration, and creative abandon. But as it is nice to seem to have Aristotle on one's side, one may have to emend Aristotle. This Mr. Martland does handsomely: " Aristotle postulates that art . . . imitates a nature which is activity," he writes, "which creates or produces that has no place a:part

from the activity itself." And, by way of clarification, he quotes Robert Frost: "a poem particularly must not begin with the thought first" (pp. 17-18).

Or consider his treatment of Schopenhauer's interpretation of the Lord's Prayer. For Schopenhauer, man is first of all a desiring, not a rational, being. What we *want* tells us more about who we are than what we *think.* Yet we often deceive ourselves about what we want. Thus, when Schopenhauer suggests that the phrase " Lead us not into temptation" means "Let me not see who I am," he means that temptation, confronting us with a desire that we have to acknowledge but wish to suppress, reveals us to ourselves. The burden of temptation is the burden of self-knowledge. But for Mr. Martland, the matter is considerably more exotic:

> The "who I am" to which Schopenhauer refers is the knowledge of the self which the soothsayer holds, the knowledge of "who I am" here and now. Thus Schopenhauer's analysis of the prayer is that it is telling men that they must not be tempted into being content with these structures which they already know; rather, they must press on to relate with the not-yet, with the appearing with God. (p. 56)

But to appreciate the truly vertiginous quality of Mr. Martland's book, ponder his frequent use of the locution " artists and religious people ":

> So far as artists and religious people are concerned it is the awareness that the world in which they function is an accommodation, perhaps by God whom they really do not know, or perhaps by them to a previous moment, and that writing and listening to poetry, like attaining nirvana, is equally a falling forward out of that accommodation into what is now not yet, but nevertheless will be the new world. (p. 51)
>
> Artists and religious people must do their activity in that special way free from prior understandings, as ends and not means. (p. 89)
>
> Artists and religious people have no fixed or predetermined essence. (p. 91)
>
> The artist and religious person must be true to themselves [sic] in the universal applicability of their activities. (p. 112)

In part, the many confusions of this book result from itsi impossible thesis. For, though each may assimilate itself to the other, art and i·eligion are plainly not the same thing. The protean complexity of the subject cautions reticence-there are exceptions to almost any generalization-yet certain basic distinctions are still illuminating. Thus, following Aristotle, we might hazard the suggestion that art is first and foremost a kind of *making.* Religion, however we decide to define it (or avoid defining it), is surely not that. To this extent at least we should M be !Pliqed b;r stiind!lrd linguistic and common sense,

both of which Mr. Martland is perhaps too quick to snub. In fact, the real clue to this book may lie in the epigraph to the penultimate chapter, "Verification," where Mr. Martland cites an oft-quoted passage from Carroll's *Through the Looking Glass:*

"But 'glory' doesn't mean a nice knock-down argument," Alice objected.

"'When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less."

Mr. Martland, alas, sides with the egg.

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New Studies in Theology, Vol. 1. Edited by STEPHEN SYKES and DEREK HOLMES. Duckworth, 1980. Pp. 192.

Here is a book to be applauded for both its intention and its execution. It is the first in a projected annual series that seeks to develop an English language forum for the discussion of fundamental, doctrinal, and systematic theology and related disciplines. The editors state that this forum will be open both to established scholars in the field and to their junior colleagues who wish to share the conclusions of important dissertation work. There is certainly a need for such a forum. The number of publications interested in constructive, technical theological articles is not large, especially if one looks beyond the Catholic-oriented journals.

No particular theme ties together the articles in this volume. Two are straightforwardly constructive pieces: Nicholas Lash on the from-above/from-below distinction in Christology and I. U. Dalferth on the relation between the experience of Jesus as Word of God and the truth-claim that Jesus *is* the Word of God. Three make constructive points through discussions of other theologians. Robert Morgan discusses the connection between historical-critical studies and the doctrine of incarnation through an analysis of the unsuccessful attempt by Anglican scholars to base the latter upon the former. James Bradley argues that process metaphysics might be a truer heir than any naturalistic philosophy to the most important aspects of Feuerbach's critique of theology. Richard Roberts contends that Barth's attempt to derive the nature of reality exclusively from revelation ends up denying the reality of everyday historical succession. Three of the pieces are more exclusively historical: P. G. Wignall on the pre-World War II theological writings of D. M. MacKinnon, R. E. Williams on Vladimir Lossky's understanding of

apophasis as a key to theological and Ann Loades on the evolution of Kant's views on theodicy. The book closes with a survey by G. M. Newlands of the literature produced in the debate surrounding *The Myth of God Incarnate.*

The quality of the articles is consistently high. All are typified by level-headed, precise thinking of the sort one associates with English scholarship, though the prose is often rather dense. This density may be due to the apparent origin of many of the articles in recent dissertations. The articles also share the atmosphere of England. The editors and all but two of the contributors are connected with Oxford, Cambridge, or Durham Universities. Corresponding editors are listed, however, from other parts of the world; so perhaps future volumes will be more geographically diverse.

A few of the articles may have wider appeal than others. The article with the broadest significance is probab,y Lash's "Up and Down in Christology." He argues that the much-used distinction between Christology from above and from below has become more confusing than helpful. The terms are used both to distinguish differing methods in Christology and to distinguish differing descriptive Christological models. While these distinctions are interrelated, they are not identical. Clarity is not furthered by referring to both distinctions with the same set of terms. Lash directly addresses the reasons Pannenberg advances for pursuing Christology from below. The above/below metaphor turns out to be used in sometimes inappropriate or misleading ways. In addition, some of the concerns that allegedly demand a Christology from below can be better met in other ways. Most importantly, Lash contends that "the beguiling simplicity of the metaphor" obscures the dependence of any coherent Christology on decisions about the nature of God and about our knowledge of God. Lash's points are well taken. Anyone who wants to continue to use the from-above/from-below distinction shoU:.d attend to Lash's questions.

Those interested **in** Christology might also look at Morgan's article. He recounts the attempt by Anglican moderates to ground a traditional or liberal doctrine of incarnation on historical-critical biblical studies. His conclusion strikes me as essentially correct: incarnational doctrine must make contact with the historical data if it is plausibly to claim that it is talking about a real man, but such data cannot become significant evidence for an incarnational interpretation of Jesus. This essay raises the question whether some Germanic Catholic theologians are headed down dead-end roads others have traveled before.

A third article of some interest is Bradley's discussion of Feuerbach's relevance to modern thought. Bradley suggests that not only Marx, Engels, and contemporary scholars such as Wartofsky, **but** even Feuer-

bach himself may have misjudged both the most important aspect in Feuerbach's critique of theology and the connection between that critique and philosophical naturalism. Bradley's thesis is that the true importance of Feuerbach's critique lies not in his anthropological reductionism but in his exposure of the core of living religion of the 'dramatic', genuinely historical interrelation of God, nature, and humanity. Theology and metaphysics are to be condemned for misrepresenting this dynamism through static and abstract categories. On this reading, F. H. Bradley and Whitehead, not Marx and Freud, are the continuers of the most important aspect of the Feuerbachian critique. I leave a final judgment on the adequacy of Bradley's interpretation to the Feuerbach specialists. Nevertheless, it seems to me *prima facie* implausible that the anthropological reduction of religion is not decisive to Feuerbach's argument and to his importance for contemporary discussion. One can say, however, that Bradley has pointed to an aspect of Feuerbach's arguments that is often not given prominence.

Comments can be made and questions raised about the other contributions. For example, Williams does an excellent job of showing how Lossky's initially forbidding Orthodox Mysticism connects with an anthropology of self-transcendence that many modern Catholics and Protestants find appealing. And I wonder how Newlands would fill out his eminently reasonable statements about the need for something at least akin to a concept of incarnation. In trying to reflect on the fundamental principles of Barth's theology, does Roberts take with sufficient seriousness Barth's claim that his theologizing was not guided by fundamental principles? That these and other comments could be expanded at some length shows that the series is off to a worthwhile start in this volume.

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The Jesus of Faith: A Study in Ohristology. By MICHAEL L. CooK, S.J. New York: The Paulist Press, 1981. Pp. 208. $6.95.

The inclusion of both 'Jesus' and 'faith' in the title indicates Cook's desire to distance himself from those who would argue that the starting point for christology is one of the by-now familiar alternatives: either from below or from above. For Cook neither alternative is adequate.

The construction of an adequate christology (the purpose of the book) begins from the concrete, personal existence of Jesus of Nazareth because "it is Jesus in the concrete particularity of his own personal existence who reveals to us and so 'defines' the divine, the human, and the future"

(191). Cook's point is that one does not begin with some formal definition of humanity and then impose that definition on Jesus (the from below approach) and any other category suggested by contemporary christology. Indeed, only the concrete historical Jesus himself reveals and thus defines humanity and divinity. This not only explains the primacy of Jesus, historical and particular, in this study; it also explains the prominent place Cook gives to history: it is necessary, legitimate, even indispensable but always subordinate to faith in any study of christology. Thus, the lion's share of Chapter I is concerned with the correct understanding of the relationship between history and faith. To gain this understanding, Cook follows Norman Perrin's use of three distinct kinds of knowledge: historical knowledge, historic knowledge and faith knowledge. Faith knowledge is particular, concrete, and essentially interpersonal (I-Thou). It is also transhistorical " insofar as it introduces the idea of God's activity and it may or may not be related to historical/historic knowledge." (23) A faith knowledge of Jesus, as Cook nuances it, allows one's faith to be related to the historical and historic Jesus (to the Jesus of history and to the Jesus of the early Church's proclamation) and yet to be able to transcend the inevitable limitations of such knowledge, yielding to the grace, risk, and peculiar certainty of an I-Thou relationship. Thus, both faith and history are ways of knowing within historical consciousness, but faith knowledge is not reducible to a dimension of historical/historic knowledge. Towards the end of his work Cook restates this: " The Word-faith correlation, while internally related to history, is primarily revelatory in character, something that simply transcends the inevitable limitations of scientific historical knowledge while remaining intrahistorical" (190-91). For Cook, then, the category of faith knowledge is elastic enough to handle what is available to us from both historical/historic data (what a historical-critical investigation of scripture and tradition yields) and what is available to us from transhistorical or meta-historical data (the resurrection as the primary example of such data).

In brief, Cook states a very positive, though nuanced and ultimately subordinate view of historical and historic knowledge of Jesus vis-a-vis one's faith in him as Lord. Given this, it is not surprising to find him employing a thoroughly historical approach as he moves from the origins of Christian faith in the Jesus of history (his ministry and fate, Chapters II and III) to the early Church's resurrection proclamation of him as Lord (Chapter IV). Once these data are studied, Cook is in a position to suggest the necessary elements in any adequate contemporary christology (Chapter V).

Once again, the option of starting point is not between the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith but rather Jesus in the concrete particu-111.rity of his own personal existence and the continuity (including both

identity and difference) between this Jesus of history and the community's faith in him as Lord. Thus Chapter II investigates this concrete Jesus in terms of his ministry in the context of eschatological prophet. This is done precisely " in order to show how his ministry could raise questions intelligible to his contemporaries . . . while he continually transcended their expectations ..." (35) Cook's analysis of Jesus's prophetic existence involves the three dimensions of word, deed, and fate. Word embraces Jesus's understanding and proclamation of the Kingdom of God through an analysis of his language (parables, *abba, amen)* and his deed (healing ministry, table-fellowship with sinners, prayer). Included in his discussion here is the nature of one's response to Jesus in terms of acceptance (faith) or rejection (fate). In this chapter, as throughout the book, Cook follows and nuances authors with whom he is in basic agreement on this or that aspect under discussion. His originality is not so much in presenting new material as in suggesting the elements necessary for an adequate christology (historical Jesus, cross, resurrection, incarnation, and Jesus's identity-in-being with God.)

"Jesus is known to us not simply in his earthly ministry, his words and deeds, but primarily in his fate " (73). Thus, Chapter III deals with Jesus's death and resurrection, with each interpreting the other. Acknowledging but nuancing Moltmann's contribution on the subject, Cook understands the death of Jesus as speaking not of a division within God but of God taking human divisiveness into his own life. At issue, then, in the crucifixion of Jesus is not the death *of* God but death *in* God and its saving significance for us. But faithful to his approach, this is understood concretely in "that it was *this man* Jesus who was condemned as a blasphemer, crucified as a rebel, and died as one forsaken by God whom God has raised from the dead. The scandal is in the concrete particularity of Jesus." (83-84) " It is in this way that the cross interprets the resurrection, for God ' became the kind of man we do not want to be: an outcast, accursed, crucified' " (77, quoting Moltmann).

The bulk of this chapter deals with a generally favorable exposition of Fuller's treatment of the resurrection in the New Testament and needs little comment. However, one point is of particular interest. In interpreting Mk. 16:7, " Go now and tell his disciples and Peter, 'He is going ahead of you to Galilee .. .'" (NAB), Cook suggests that Mark's point is to insist that the ambiguity with which the ministry of Jesus was met "can only be properly understood in the light of the cross" (92). This is Mark's way of moving his community beyond an assessment of Jesus, in his ministry, as a mere wonder-worker *(theios-aner)* and so to understand their Christian discipleship as more profoundly rooted in his experience of death.

Again, largely following Fuller, Cook in Chapter IV discusses the movement from implicit christology, via the resurrection faith, to explicit

christology and, this, through the three strata of New Testament communities (Palestinian Judaism, Hellenistic-Jewish mission, Gentile mission). This movement develops from a more eschatological to a more experiential· focus, as well as from a merely functional view of Jesus as God's agent to ontic affirmations about his relationship to the divine to, finally, ontological questions about his identity-in-being with the divine. The final section of this fourth chapter looks briefly to the emergence of the Chnlcedonian faith precisely in J esus's identity-in-being with the divine. .Like Rahner, Cook regards Chalcedon as both end and beginning of faith reflection on the person and work of Jesus.

In the first four chapters of his book, Cook articulates, through an hist.orical-analytical approach, the development of christology from the proclamation of Jesus to the dogmatic statement of Chalcedon. Chapter V seeks a r:iore synthetic approach as he attempts an adequate christology for toda:r. This synthetic approach is realized in an analysis of the thought ·)f four contemporary theologians : Schoonenberg, Pannenberg, Moltman:1, and Hodgson. These theologians are chosen for several reasons: (l 1 they all take as their starting point the concrete particularity of Jesus in his own personal existence; (2) each engages the understand- of rrnlity from the vantage point of the concerns of the contemporary wc.rld, a procedure which is " indispensable for anyone who is seriously concerned about doing theology today" (134); (3) each emphasizes one or more of the aspects which Cook considers essential for an adequate christofogy today: the concrete historical Jesus, cross, resurrection, incarnation. The order, with incarnation last and following upon a consideration of pre-existence, is important to Cook. What Cook brings to the discussion, in addition to arguing for the inclusion of all these elements in an adequate contemporary christology, is his further insistence that an assessment of these elements must be " grounded in a metaphysics of ontic identity " of Jesus with the divine (191) .

Chapter V is the most important part of the book. Especially helpful perhaps is Cook's discussion of the relationship between soteriology and christology, with christology rooted in soteriology so that " Jesus' salvific significance is pre<'isely his personal relation to the Father as the perfectly obedient Son " (164, f.n. 45). Cook is using the concerns of Antioch as a corrective to what might be considered the one-sided victory of Alexandria at Chalcedon.

Helpful, certainly, is Cook's presentation, nuanced from his Roman Catholic perspective, of the views of these important major theologians and their significant contributions to christology. But one wonders why more Roman Catholic thinkers are not included. One suspects it is because too few *begin* their christologies with the concrete particularity of the historical Jesus.

Cook's insistence on the identity-in-being of Jesus with the Father underscores the fact that it is God himself who is given to us and for us in the incarnation. This concern preserves the important patristic soteriological principle that only God saves us and is a needed perspective if one is to remain true to the New Testament conviction that in Jesus and his ministry God himself is among us and for us.

Given Cook's emphasis on the concrete particularity of the historical Jesus, one would perhaps expect some consideration of praxis as the transforming effect of faith in Jesus upon society. Theologians as different as Sobrino and Nolan, who, incidently, begin their christologies with the concrete Jesus, might suggest praxis as an additional ingredient to ihe elements considered necessary in an adequate christology for today. One might add the ingredients of worship and witness too, as in van Beeck's christology.

Many will find this work very significant as a review of much contemporary christology and as an aid in introducing graduate level students to a study of Jesus Christ.

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Luther and the Papacy: Stages in a Reformation Conflict. By SCOTT H. HENDRIX. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1981. Pp. xii + 211. $14.95.

Martin Luther's well-known polemics against the papacy, especially during the last years of his life, have been the subject of a variety of studies. Most recently, Remigius Baumer, a Roman Catholic scholar at the University of Freiburg, Germany, presented the view that the young Luther radically changed his mind in 1518-19 from a tolerant, if not pro-papal, stance to a deep personal hatred of the papacy as the embodiment of the anti-Christ in his time *(Martfo und der Papst,* 1970). In contrast to Baumer, Hendrix, who is Associate Professor of Church History at Lutheran Theological Southern Seminarv in Columbia, N.C., concentrates on the question of Luther's motive. *Why* did Luther attack the The answer to this question evolves in the carefully argued thesis of the book that Luther's opposition to the papacy is dee-ply grounded in the conviction that the p0pes and other ecclesiastical office-holders did not exercise their legitimate pastoral function, namely, to nurture the people by communicating the word of G0d to them. Hendrix shows how Luther developed this conviction in finely differentiated stages between 1517 and 1522, concluding that all hopes for a rapprochement

between Rome and Wittenberg were lost since Rome refused to heed the call to return to a proper exercise of pastoral authority.

Hendrix presents his thesis in seven chapters, each headed by a well-selected Luther quotation and a detailed chronology of events. Starting with a brief analysis of Luther's own recollections about his early years (1505-17), Hendrix sums up Luther's early views of the papacy with the term "ambivalence" (ch. 1). A basic shift in Luther's attitude occurred in 1517 when Luther encountered the very unpastoral trafficking in indulgences, promoted by Bishop Albrecht of Mainz with the support of Rome. This shift is linked to Luther's breakthrough to a Reformation theology which rediscovered the powerful message of Paul's gospel of justification by faith apart from the works of law. Aware of the jungle of contradictory interpretations with reference to the precise date of Luther's breakthrough, which he called his " tower experience " (*Turmerlebnis),* Hendrix refuses to make a calculated guess, but tends to lean towards 1517 as a *terminus ad quem.* Whereas Luther ignored rather than intentionally excluded the papacy in his new, budding ecclesiology before 1517, his famed Ninety-Five Thesis of 1517 intended to establish the limits of ecclesiastical authority. Luther tested papal authority in the context of canon law when he attacked the indulgences, calling for a return to the .word of God as the highest authority in the church. Hendrix describes this period from October 1517 to June 1518 under the heading "protest" (ch. 2). Luther's first personal encounter with Roman authority, his meeting with Cajetan in Augsburg, led Luther to open " resistance " (ch. 3, sketching the period from June to December 1518). When Cajetan demanded recantation without dialogue, Luther countered with a confession of faith in God who justifies sinners through Christ without any human disposition, merit, or good work. By 1518 Luther had decided that loyalty to the Roman church no longer included loyalty to the pope. Contrary to popular opinion, Luther, however, did not set up a strict authority of Scripture against papal authority. He appealed to the authority of a General Council, thus avoiding the label "scripturalist "· Hendrix rightly stresses this evidence in the face of Luther interpretations which view Luther as the staunch defender of the prineiple " Scripture alone" *(sola scriptura).* When Luther discovered that there was little hope for a General Council, he challenged Rome to prove from earliest conciliar tradition, not just Scripture, that the papacy was instituted by Christ as the highest authority in the church. The challenge was taken up by John Eck at the Leipzig debate in 1519, focusing on what Hendrix calls Luther's "proposition thirteen". This proposition argued that the historical tradition of fifteen hundred years, Scripture itself, and the decrees of the Council of Nicaea (325 A.D.) stood against the Roman contention that the papacy was a divine institution. Such a " challenge " (the

title of ch. 4) quickly led Luther to open "opposition" (the heading of ch. 5). Thus Luther was convinced by 1520 that the pope was the anti-Christ, a label which had been applied to various popes since the eleventh century when Pope John XXII condemned radical Franciscans who refused to believe that Christ and the apostles possessed property (Edict *Cum inter nonnullos,* 1323). Hendrix does not see in Luther's increasing polemics a total opposition to the papacy. Rather, he shows that Luther only wanted to make it clear that the pope had no exclusive right to interpret Scripture and that being a Christian does not depend on membership in the church of Rome. According to Luther, the church can exist without the papacy. But if the papacy claims authority over consciences, without exercising proper pastoral care, it is anti-Christian, and resistance against the pope becomes a holy duty. Hendrix sums up Luther's anti-papal stance in 1521 under the heading " conviction " (ch. 6). The term takes on a double meaning since Luther's conviction, expressed at the Diet of Worms, that consciences are "captive to the word of God" led to his conviction as a heretic and outlaw. After Worms Luther remained convinced that the papacy had violated its holy obligation to care for the consciences of the faithful. Hendrix describes this unchanging stance in a final chapter, entitled "Persistence, 1522-1546 " (ch. 7). Colorful Luther quotations demonstrate that the papacy was somehow always on Luther's mind until he died. He wanted his epitaph to read as an address to the pope, " Alive, your plague, dead your death"; he used pornographic language to describe his anti-papal stance; and he included a rejection of the papacy in his last prayer at the hour of his death.

Hendrix raises the question at the end of his detailed study whether Luther fulfilled the "duty of a good pastor", as he had put it in the Ninety-Five Theses of 1517. Did Luther console terrified consciences more effectively than anyone else in the sixteenth century' Or was Luther too radical, too zealous, too polemical ' On balance, Hendrix concludes that Luther was justified in his persistence since Rome refused to engage in reforms, be it in the matter of indulgences or in other matters. Even the Council of Trent, whose first sessions took place during Luther's last days, did not appear to address the grievances in the church, although it ended up doing so by 1563. Thus Luther seemed justified, according to Hendrix, to start and to nurture a reformation which would offer pastoral care to people in the face of the papacy's neglect to exercise the duty of its assigned pastoral office.

While this book does not make a pioneering contribution to Luther research, it puts together both primary and secondary evidence in such a way as to help readers, especially those who are not seasoned Luther scholars, to appreciate Luther's primary concern for the neglected consciences of the faithful in the church of his time. Thirty-seven pages of

footnotes, an extensive bibliography, and indexes of persons, places, and subjects disclose solid, careful work. The book offers further, conclusive evidence against a Luther image which projects a hot-headed reformer, driven by a hatred of Rome, perhaps on the basis of bad parenting as Erik Erikson *(Young Man Luther)* and other psychohistorians have argued with insufficient evidence from Luther's works. To this extent, the book offers necessary revisionist historiography. For Luther was, after all, a priest-professor deeply concerned with the proper care and nurture of God's people, never really eager to break away from the Roman church for the sake of creating a " sect ". Hendrix's book once again provides evidence for the thesis that Luther was the leader of a reform movement within the church catholic, driven out of his church by a careless exercise of authority unfortunately associated with the papacy. When Lutheran church historians can, together with Roman Catholic scholars, such as Joseph Lcrtz and his students, deal with historical evidence without prejudices, Luther will finally get his due as a father of the church who became embroiled in a schism which none really desired. This book, therefore, is one historian's contribution to an ecumenical climate of opinion which still needs a fresh wind blowing in clean air to overcome persistent pollution generated by ecclesiastical pride and prejudice. Hendrix himself notes in the Introduction that the official, bilateral Lutheran-Catholic dialogue in North America relied more on the irenical attitudes of sixteenth-century Lutherans and Catholics than on the polemics of the old Luther.

This is a commendable book. It is sensitive to issues and answers concerning a neuralgic theme, and it assembles the evidence for a balanced hindsight and for reasonable judgment on what was, and still is, a thorny question for ecumenists, namely, the origins and nature of teaching authority in the church. This reviewer would have liked to see more of a treatment of the relationship between pastoral office and papal teaching authority than Hendrix provides. For magisterial and pastoral authority are intimately linked in the exercise of the papal office; and Luther himself seemed quite aware of this link. This observation, however, is not meant to be a substantial critique of the book. Rather, it is meant to point up a holistic understanding of ecclesiastical authority which, according to Luther, combines being a good pastor and a good theologian.

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C. S. Lewis's Case for the Christ-ian Faith. By RICHARD L. PURTILL. New York: Harper and Row, 1981. Pp. 146. $10.95.

Richard L. Purtill's study of C. S. Lewis presents a concise summary of key themes in the thought of that still-popular apostle to skeptics who died in 1962. It also helps focus two questions of major importance in contemporary apologetic theology: Hew is one properly to deal with biblical scholarship in addressing a And, more important, how is one to wed imagination to reason in an *apologia* for the faith 7

BBC broadcast talks by the Oxford don, which were first published in this country in 1942 as *The Case for Christianity,* inspired Purtill's title. He shows an impressive command of the Lewis literature. Although he tried to ke2p qurtation to a minimum, most of Lewis's forty-some books, as well as unpublished letters and manuscripts, find their way into the notes. Nevertheless Purtill expresses the opinion that *Till We IIave Faces* is perhaps Lewis's best novel, *Letters to Malcolm* one of his best non-ficticn books, and *The Last Battle,* the final chronicle in the Namia series, " one of Lewis's greatest books." He is equally aware of the many secondary studies, from which he quotes judiciously, with commendable restraint.

Professor of philosophy at Western Washington University, Purtill is an admitted and unabashed Lewis fan. It is therefore to his enormous credit that he gives us Lewis without honey. One good example of his honest criticism comes in disrussion of the argument for the so-called "mental proof" for belief in God. Fellowing a quotation from *M;racles,* he writes, " Here, I think, Lewis makes one of his rare missteps in argument." Lewis has lost pnints to evolutionists. Purtill puts great stress on the cogency of Lewis's arguments. In this respect he is loyal to his professi0nal interest in logic.

A Christian logic shapes the book. In ten brief chapters we are taken from belief in God to death and beyond. En route we are introduced to Lewis's ideas about Christ, miracles, other religions, ethics, prayer, and related themes. Clean prose and clear thinking are evident throughout, and Purtill has frequently transposed Lewis's arguments into an American key. Thus, for example, Gerald Ford's pardon of Richard Nixon successfully illustrates the discussion of miracles, and the *"Playboy* (or *Playgirl)* philosophy" the discussion of Christian living. In this respect Purtill makes a significant contribution as an apologist in his own right, as well as a sensitive interpreter of his British predecessor.

Both Lewis and Purtill, therefore, contribute to the maior questions about the apologetic task raised above. Lewis's attitude toward biblical criticism, apparently shared by Purtill, is perhaps one of the reasons for

Lewis's current popularity. In my opinion, however, it is an attitude which oversimplifies the nature of the New Testament and misunderstands the intention of biblical scholars.

The issue is clearest in the short chapter headed "Who is There Purtill begins with an accurate paraphrase of Lewis: " Christ claimed to be God. He was either telling the truth, or he was insane, or he was a liar." Indeed the whole of Jesus's behavior as recounted in all four gospels is said to be " inexplicable " if Jesus did not claim to be God. A similar attitude pervades the chapter on miracles and history. There Purtill explains Lewis's position with equal simplicity: "In other words, proponents of the view that Christ's cures were psychosomatic ... must decide whether they accept the written records as factual or fictional, or believe them to be a mixture of both."

Purtill allows himself to quote at length from a paper on "Modern Theology and Biblical Criticism" which Lewis originally delivered in 1959. Those chiefly responsible for "undermining the old orthodoxy" are "divines engaged in New Testament criticism." Himself a literary critic, Lewis eharges these scholars with reading rationalistic presuppositions into the text. He and his interpreter prefer the plain words of the Gospel story to demythologizing. They both reject any theory of interpolation *[sic]* by the early Church. Again it is an either/ or decision: " either the early Christian writers were liars, or they were deluded, or they recorded accurately what Jesus did and said."

Rather than inveigh against so-called " modernistic " views of Scripture, it would seem more useful for the apologist today to help a skeptic understand the kerygmatic nature of the gospel genre. Lewis and Purtill seem to share their own modernistic presuppositions-those of historicism.

The issue of the i·elation between imagination and reason raised by this book is more complex. One of the secrets of Lewis's success, Purtill rightly argues, is his imaginative power in the service of reason. Throughout the book Lewis's use of vivid metaphor, concrete imagery, apt analogy is amply illustrated. Yet the person whom Lewis was primarily addressing, as Purtill understands his work, was one who has an *"appetite* for argument" about the truth of the faith. The case for a reasonable faith which they both make often seems to be addressed to a kind of scientific rationalism which may no longer dominate our intellectual climate.

It seems highly likely that it is Lewis's imagination more than his reason which accounts for his popularity today, and which thereby conveys a message to apologists today. He speaks to people who sense what Rahner and his students recognize as an " eclipse of mvstery" in our culture. He awakens depths of being inaccessible to logical argument. It may be that the Narnia tales are far more effective Christian apolo-

getic today than any effort to explain the mystery of the Gospel. Purtill's keen appreciation of Aslan's country suggests Lewis's appeal far more powerfully than his appreciation for Lewis's logic.

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A Passion for Truth: Hans Kung and His Theology. By ROBERT NOWELL. New York: Crossroad, 1981. Pp. 377. $14.95.

Kiing in Conflict. Edited with a Translation and Commentary by LEONARD SwrnLER. New York: Doubleday, 1981. Pp. 627. $17.95.

In reviewing these two works I first will deal briefly with each separately, noting their contents and making some comments. Then I will make three comments pertinent to both. Finally I will raise six questions which the two evoke. I am not primarily concerned with Kiing's theology as such, though of necessity some of my comments pertain to it.

Nowell's book is a "theological" biography of Kiing. The introductory chapter, "Loyalty Disavowed," provides the context for the book. The Kling case raises two questions: whether the Church is committed to the truth or its own past; whether the Church is truly universal or limited'! Kling is presented as *the* contemporary Catholic theologian who is (alone'!) passionately committed to both the Church and (especially) the truth, who tries to make sense out of Christianity for our world today, who assumes that Christian faith is reasonable and must be something vital. Above all, Kling is a preacher, who wishes to proclaim the message of God not of men. Whether he has been successful is now, from the standpoint of Roman authorities, disputable. Whether or not Rome's evaluation of Kiing is correct the reader will be better able to judge by the end of the book. For the purpose of this book is to enable the reader to judge (I presume with some objectivity) the relative merits of Kiing and the magisterial (especially Roman) authorities.

Chapter two, "The Making of a Theologian," and chapter three, "Rome and Paris," depict Kiing's milieu (secular and ecclesial) and its influence upon him, his seminary and educational experiences up to his doctoral work. Central here is that Kiing's theological development paralleled the developments within the Church from a pre-Vatican II (closed and repressive) Church to a Vatican II (open and liberating) Church. Chapter three likewise indicates the theological issues which first caused concern

for the pre-doctoral Kiing and which will be important for his later theological development (the meaning of tradition and the natural-supernatural question). Also mentioned here is Kiing's early contact with the theology of Barth and its abiding influence upon him. From chapter four to chapter eighteen, Nowell presents in chronological fashion the key writings and main theological positions of Kiing, while at the same time noting Church events during these years which in some way influenced Kiing's writings (e.g. the calling of Vatican II by John XXIII and *Humanae vitae).* Likewise throughout these chapters he deals with Kiing's conflict with the Roman Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith and the Doctrinal Commission of the German Bishop's Conference.

Regarding Kiing and his theology Nowell makes several points worth noting. (1) Kiing has developed an ecumenical rather than a polemical theology. He does not try to prove Protestants wrong and Catholics right but rather is concerned to listen to what Protestants are saying and to use this as an occasion and basis for a Catholic examination of conscience (p. 68). (2) Nowell accurately notes the pastoral concern of Kiing's theology. Kiing generally is not addressing a professional, theological audience but rather the educated lay person. Hence his writings tend to be "more popular" in language style. 'rhat Kiing writes for the lay person itself has ecclesiological ramifications; it shows that he acknowledges the emergence of the laity from its subservient position in which the laity was strictly the " *ecclesia discens."* In addressing the laity, Kiing, as Newman earlier, is relativizing somewhat the *ecclesia docens-discens* distinction (p. 96). (3) Nowell often shows how later works of Kilng build upon earlier ones. For example, Kilng's positions on infallibility (1970) are found in seminal form in *Structures of the Chui·ch* (1962). (4) Nowell rightly underscores the of Kiing's historical method of doing theology, forcing theology to face up to "the awkward facts of history" and nnt explain them away with theological theories. "When this historical realism is roupled with a similar willingness to let the biblical data speak for itself *[sic],* as it is in Kilng's case, the result can best be described as empirical theology" (p.115). (5) Nowell correctly points out on several occasions that for Kilng the " Gospel" is the criterion of all later developments in theology and Church (e.g. p. 139). (6) Throughout Nowell gives good insights into the man, the reformer, and the theologian, Hans Kilng.

Now comments. (1) Nnwell's presentation of Kiing's thoui;ht is accurate. This book can serve as a one-rlume compend;um of Kil'lg's theology. The only chapter which I found wqnting is chanter fourteen, "Hegel as a Theologian," which deals with quite diffirnlt work *Menschwerdung Gett es.* However, (2) Nowell's of :Kii.nff

utterly uncritical and bordering on *doulia.* The author seemingly agrees with every point of Kilng's theology. He never challenges Kiing or adverts to ambiguit:es or limitations in his thought. I make only two (insignificant) critical remarks. The first pertains to Kling's position on the necessity (or lack thereof) of ordination for the validity of certain ministries. Why did not Kling mention the Korean Church of the late 18th century (pp. 105-05, 148)? Second, Nowell offers a mild criticism regarding Kling's position in *On Being A Christian* concerning the involvement of the Church in social-political questions (p. 273). He likewise notes the absence in Kling's last two works of a treatment of prayer. (3) Nowell, himself not a theologian to the best of my knowledge, makes blase comments which may indicate that Nowell is in water over his head, comments which indicate an attitude ranging from sarcastic to paranoic. Examples: (a) Nowell (in line with Kling) seems to think that the cfficial teaching on infallibility is too riddled with absurdities to be upheld (201). This is a bit of a revelation to me. That the official position on infallibility may cr-ntain certain d"fficulties, that it is capable of further development and clarification, I concede. That it is absurd is certainly not *per se evidens.* (b) Nowell's remarks concerning theologians (a pack of "angry theologians" at that), who hate to see their "sacred cows" led away to the slaughterhouse, who as "members of a football team," "gang up against" Kling (pp. 212, 284) are not only puerile but intimidat;ng. Both N°well and his hero (Kiing) decry the lack of freedom and openness in the Church, especially regarding theologians. Yet both are capable of drawing from a well-stocked linguistic arsenal words which seem to have as their only purpose to mock and intimidate the opposition. If you disagree with Kiing, then you are one of the football players " ganging up on " him. Dees that type of language advance free and open discuss;on among theologians? Does it exhibit "a passion for truth "¥ (c) In line with Kiing, Nowell believes that infallibility results in the Church's being " bound by the chains of its past mistakes as it fumbles its way towards the truth." (p. 213). I am not aware that Kiing or anyone else has given one unambiguous example of an " infallible past mistake." The examples provided are the old ones which no informed theologian considers infallible. So what are these infallible past mistakes? "Bound by chains "? I believe that hermeneutical theory (especially after Gadamer) would see the past in quite a different light. Far from binding, the past just might be both liberating and instructive for the present and the future. "Fumbles its way towards the truth." Again an example of language which advances theological discussion and development! If the Church has been doing nothing but " fumbling towards truth," then I would have to say that it has been and will continue to be a "fumbling 11 that has involved much effort and not little intellectual acumen. Of course

fumbling towards the truth may be very much indigenous to the human situation. But that in itself should make one pause and inquire whether this human fumbling might itself be a reason to ask whether indeed, if the Church is to be the sacrament of God's eschatological and definitive promise and Self-gift, then that same Church might be much in need of God's eschatological Spirit, which Spirit might itself account for this fumbling Church's ability to teach in an infallible way. (d) And, finally, Nowell seems astonished that *"On Being A Christian* sparked off a dispute that outdid in fierceness and bitterness that sparked off by *Infallible,"* for "in the present case Kling was not challenging or criticizing anything" (p. 276). Even Kling's most benign reviewers have noted with praise that this book was indeed quite challenging and critical. *No* problem with that. But Nowell gives the impression that this book from a doctrinal point of view is harmless. Now that is certainly not obvious. Apart from the fact that the magisterium had several difficulties with this book, the fact is that many prominent scholars also registered doctrinal difficulties with the book, especially regarding Kling's explanation of *"vere Deus."* One would have thought that the reactions of so many prominent theologians would have caused Nowell to pause and at least entertain a few critical questions. Many other statements of Nowell are equally vulnerable. But I think that I have made my point.

If the purpose of the book is to aid the reader to make an objective and critical appraisal of Kling, then the book has failed. In this regard, I have several critical reactions: (a) The "Gospel" is for Kling the criterion of all later development. True, but simplistic! Why' Does not Kling also seem to indicate that Jesus himself is the What does Kling mean by "Gospel"? With such a criterion stated so simply, is there not a tendency to go "backwards," as if what is first is either best or complete? More importantly, when one speaks of the Gospel (or Jesus) as criterion (and who would deny are we not immediately thrown into the very thorny area of hermeneutics? (b) Kling's method is basically historical. But (see pp. 149-51) in dealing with the question of the Petrine Office, Kiing is willing to bypass the question of whether a Petrine Office going back to Peter can be *historically* established. What is important is "succession in the Spirit." One can also ask whether in his *historical* theology Kling always does justice to all pertinent data of the past or is highly selective? (c) Nowell uncritically accepts Kling's position that the teaching of the Church on birth control is, according to Roman theology, an instance of ordinary but *infallible* magisterium (pp. 188-89). Not even Paul VI made that claim! Likewise (p. 208) Pius XI in *Casti connubii* was fulfilling the conditions of Vatican I for the exercise of the infallible Petrine teaching office! (d) Few would say today that the last word has been said on infallibility, but to say that "the doctrine of infallibility

comes to look more and more like a Cheshire Cat" (e.g. p. 208) exhibits a simplistic understanding of the complexity of the philosophical, historical, theological, and ecumenical issues involved, despite Nowell's reference on p. 209 to "the complexity of the doctrine." That so many prominent theologians have taken issue with Kiing on this question should make Nowell more circumspect and critical. My concluding comments: if one is interested in a quick and accurate review of Kiing's theology, read it. If one rejoices in an attempt to make the magisterium appear intolerant and silly, read it. If one is interested in a critical treatment of Kiing's theology, there is nothing to be learned from it.

Swidler's book, apart from a preliminary and informative biographical chapter and a final chapter of evaluation, is a documentation consisting of statements and correspondence from, to, or about Kiing during the years 1968-1980. The bulk of the correspondence consists of that between Kiing and the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith and between Kling and the German bishops. The book also contains a " spare narrative" to "provide both the context for the texts and a continuity between the important documents. . . . With the original sources in a contextual setting, the reader is enabled to understand just what was going on and why, and also to decide which claim or counterclaim is warranted" (p. xiv). Swidler points out that his book also provides important material lacking in *The Kung Dialogue*, published by the U.S. Catholic Conference in 1980. This documentation will provide not only a valuable insight into the train of events but also expound important elements of Kiing's thought (p. xiv).

In his last chapter Swidler makes it clear that he has attempted " for the most part to play the role of the 'objective' historian ... so that the reader could ... judge the developments accordingly " (p. 609). He then steps beyond the objective role of the historian and presents his own evaluation. Kiing's difficulties with the Church are due to the fact that: (a) he takes the historical-critical method seriously and hence is unafraid of change; (b) he is totally honest; (c) he writes in an understandable manner about contemporary problems. Swidler also challenges the *modus operandi* of the Doctrinal Congregation. " It falls short of the minimally accepted canons of justice and legal procedure in contemporary Western civilization" (p. 611). His conclusion: the documentation shows that the measures taken against Kiing parallel the repressive measures of the 19th century Church.

This work, therefore, like Nowell's, has as its purpose to help the reader make an objective judgment regarding Kiing, though the reader at times (in the intervening narrative sections) will have to close his objective eyes to interpretative comments of the author in favor of Kiing lest he or she not be able objectively "to decide which claim or counterclaim is warranted."

It is impossible to summarize the content of this documentation. But several points merit mention. (1) Kling's seeming willingness to collaborate with Church authorities; (2) his persistent objection that the procedures of the Doctrinal Congregation are unjust; (3) his demand to be presented with counter-arguments and not gratuitous assertions; (4) his avowals of (a) loyalty to the Church; (b) the legitimate role of the magisterium; (c) the truth, value, and necessity of binding, doctrinal statements; (d) his openness to correction; (e) his orthodoxy, and acceptance of the ancient Christological councils; (5) his pastoral concern and ability to theologize meaningfully in and for today's situation; (6) his later clarifications regarding the divinity of Christ which represent an advance beyond statements in *On Being A Christian.*

However, for this reviewer several questions also emerge. (1) Are not many of Kling's demands questionable and perhaps unreasonable, e.g. to be allowed to inquire and teach without suspicion, to leave the judgment to history, to have discussions on his terms? Does Kling in effect consider himself exempt from magisterial oversight? (2) Does Kling clearly address the *s'ibstance* of questions put to him or does he continually "dodge" the substantive issues by, for example, raising questions regardbg procedures. Is he truly willing to dialogue7 (3) Did some of the very simple questions put to Kling by the German bishops and theologians regarding the divinity of Christ really require further time for reflection berause of the complexity of the issues involved? Was not Kling simply being asked whether or not the S('n is as divine as the Father, and cannot that question be answered with a simple "yes " or "no "? *(*4) Is the meaning of Kling's statements always so obvious? Why must Kling constantly defend himself by saying that interpretations of his writings do not represent his own intentions? (5) Cannot Kling (and also Swidler) see that merely affirming the orthodoxy of one's statements does not necessarily make them orthodox? Despite the many questions raised to him, Kling (and Swidler) cannot see that his Christol('gical statements regarding the divinity of Chist are not *obviously* adequate. (6) Were the German bishops unable to view Christological doctrine in categories other than Greek metaphysical? Greeks can be Christians, but must *all* Christians be Greeks? Dees metaphysics equal *Greek* metaphysics 7 (7) Why is Kling unable to relate in a positive way his (and the New Testament's) *functional* categories with the metaphysical categories of the councils, so as to show clearly that he has retrieved in an orth0dox fashion the binding truths of these coun°ils (and the New Testament)? Why does he insist on pitting Greek metaphysical against functional categories7 Christians need not be Greeks, but Greeks also can be Christians. (8) Did not the statements from both sides, especially towards the end, become highly polemical, filled with half-truths and false accusations, and hence serve no constructive purpose T

Now for comments upon Swidler's book. (1) Given the documentation, I question Swidler's one-sided evaluation of the Kiing case. Could he not raise even one critical question regarding either Kling's theology or his way of relating to both the magisterium and other theologians? Does the documentation unambiguously show, as he seems to think, that Kling is right, the magisterium wrong? (2) The documentation in this book is valuable for those who wish to evaluate the Kling case as well as for those who are interested in Kiing's theology or the questions he raises. To both groups I recommend the book, but I urge the reader to form his or her own judgment on the basis of the documents and issues themselves.

I end this lengthy review with three comments and six questions which these two books (and the Kling affair) raise. Comments: (1) Unlike Nowell and Swidler I cannot give Kiing's theology a blanket exoneration. Kling has asked challenging questions and provided provocative answers. That his own positions (especially regarding infallibility and the divinity of Christ) are as orthodox as he claims is certainly not evident, not even to many of his peers. (2) I am not convinced that Kling or his followers have sufficiently attended to the *substantive* reactions to his thought, and I fear that now the "blinders are on." (3) Unlike Nowell and Swidler I do not believe that the evidence clearly indicates that Kling was truly willing to collaborate and that the Church authorities and their procedures were intolerant and unjust. I do not think the case is so cut and dried. I am not saying that the Church authorities in their statements and their procedures left nothing to be desired. I am merely saying that perhaps, if Kiing had been more cooperative, the results may have been quite different. Collaboration and dialogue had always to be on his terms. Is not that a bit unrealistic and possibly self-serving? The documentation indicates to me that the German bishops especially were most considerate of and compromising towards Kling. In turn, he seemed to frustrate them at every turn.

And now some questions. (1) Has the magisterium taken seriously the consequences of historical consciousness and the historical circumscription of doctrinal formulas, as is noted in *Mysterium ecclesiae* itself? Historical consciousness and circumscription are not the death of infallible dogmas (as Kling seems to hold). On the contrary, with a sophisticated historical hermeneutics, theology, preaching, and the magisterium will not only be able to retrieve the binding truth of past doctrinal assertions but will be able to enrich and rearticulate this truth in such a way that doctrine can speak meaningfully to *our* times. Again, Greeks can be Christians, but not all Christians must be or can be Greeks. Merely citing a Denzinger passage does not end a theological discussion. Those who think it does are guilty of a *magisterial* fundamentalism as naive and dangerous as biblical fundamentalism. The world really was not created in six days.

But neither is Genesis 1 wrong! (2) Must not the theologian and the magisterium today make Herculean efforts to understand and respect each other, to dialogue and work constructively with each other, realizing that each is in service not of itself but of the Gospel and the Church? (3) Has the last word been said on the relative roles and competencies of the theologian and the magisterium? Since the last word has not yet been said on God, I doubt whether it has been said on this topic either. Is there not a tendency for the magisterium to dismiss the theologian or too quickly make him or her subservient? Was this not perhaps a justifiable fear of Kling? On the other hand, does the theologian truly recognize the role of the magisterium? If so, what is it? (4) Does not the Kling case raise questions as to: (a) the adequacy of curial procedures; {b) the representation of various theologies on the Roman Doctrinal Congregation and local episcopal doctrinal committees; (c) the relation of the local episcopal conference to the Roman Congregations and of the local bishop to the national conference and Roman Congregations? (5) Regarding Kling, would he not do well to write, a *clear and detailed* account of his understanding of the relation between theology, scripture, tradition, and magisterium? (6) Regarding the Kiing affair, was not the ending a tragedy which perhaps could have been avoided? Is this the best the Christian community can do? Does not the ending challenge the consciences of both the theologian and the magisterium? With Kling somewhat "on the shelf," is the Church as a whole now better off? Has a challenging, provocative, and perhaps even necessary voice been dismissed?

My hope is that the Kiing case will in the long run benefit the whole Church, perhaps by forcing it to deal constructively with many of the questions raised above. Finally, I hope that, because I have myself found it necessary to be critical of these works as well as of Kling, I have not thereby become a member of the "football team." I really have no desire to join in "ganging up on" Kling or anyone else!

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American Catholics: A History of the Roman Catholic Community in the United States. By James Hennesey, S.J. New York: Oxford University Pxess, 1982. Pp. 397. $19.95.

The preparation of a comprehensive history indicates a new self-consciousness on the part of the community it is written within and about and suggests that one era of that community's history is at an end and another beginning. John Gilmary Shea's *History of the Catholic Church in the United States* (1886-92) came at the time when it seemed that the great dream of a church that could be both Catholic and American was nearing fulfillment. John Tracy Ellis's *.American Catholicism* (1956) and Thomas McAvoy's *A Histo1·y of the Catholic in the United States* came when it seemed that the failure of American Catholics to be both Catholic and American might be ending. Father Hennesey's study suggests a whole new consciousness among American Catholics, a new maturity, a new sense of place in American culture and history.

American Catholics is quite different from its predecessors in its historical methods and assumptions. Earlier historians emphasized the unity of the American church : American Catholics presented a solid front to the challenge of American Protestant anti-Catholicism; they were united by shared devotions and a common loyalty to the pope; and they participated in the shared task of creating and sustaining a church in the complicated world of the United States. The first noteworthy assumption of this new history is that the American church has always been a complex community in which diversity has frequently erupted into bitter conflict. Diversity has been rich indeed: *American Catholics* includes helpful sketches of the history of Afro-American Catholicism, of the values and practices of the Hispanic church of the west and southwest, and of the deep piety of Native American Catholics.

But the tensions have been sharp as well. The many ethnic groups which contributed rich and ancient traditions to the shaping of American Catholicism usually resented and mistrusted each other; in some cases, long and debilitating rivalries developed. Clergy and laity have often competed for authority and power and have diverged in their understandings of what is best for a particular community. The trustee controversies of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries are the best known examples of this tension, but there have been many others. Hispanic Catholics of the southwest suspected that the missionaries sent to them by the American hierarchy were there to impose a foreign culture on them. Catholics found themselves on both sides of the Civil War, when regional loyalties eclipsed their shared faith. White Catholics, as Hennesey unflinchingly shows, have not welcomed Black Catholics into their

churches. Nor has the intellectual life of American Catholics been homogeneous: Hennesey's complex picture of American Catholicism inc:udes the avant garde clergy who constituted a modernist school in New York City in the latter half of the nineteenth century. This complexity reveals the confidence of Hennesey's history : twenty years ago, these conflicts would not have been mentioned, let alone treated so seriously and calmly.

This church took shape in an equally complicated society. Competition, hostility, and, much more rarely, cooperation characterized the relations between Catholics and Protestants in a nation which had established a Protestant social consensus in place of an established church. The United States is anti-Catholic in its deepest roots and American Catholic historians before Hennesey tended to construct their histories around this reality. Marked as foreign by the styles of its devotion and the national origins of its congTegations, American Catholicism struggled along as a minority faith in a Protestant land.

Hennesey's second major historiographical assumption is his departure from this perspective. Hennesey's Catholics have a claim on the United States. *American Catholics* is not a statement from the ghetto, but a reflection of the central economic and social place that Catholics now occupy in the United States. This centrality is taken for granted. The consciousness that Hennesey describes as nascent in the church of the 1920s has come to fruition today: "The American Catholic community throughout its many layered being grew in self-assurance and acquired a sense of chosenness theretofore reserved in America for those with better Puritan credentials."

Although he discusses anti-Catholicism throughout and emphasizes its persistent importance, extending well into this century, Hennesey locates the shaping dynamic of the American church in its endeavor to create a community that would be both Catholic and American. The history of the American church has been determined by its own needs and goals, not by a hostile environment. In his discussion of Catholic history in the ante bellum period, a heyday of xenophobic anti-Catholicism, Hennesey observes, "But American Catholicism's more pressing problems were internal." His focus is kept on this internal dynamic and development, beginning with John Carroll's great dream of a truly American church in the colonial period right through to the triumph of John Courtney Murray at the Second Vatican Council.

Rome has not always agreed with American Catholicism's positive self-assessment, however. For much of its modern history, American Catholicism has smarted from the rebukes delivered by the pope during the Americanist controversy. Roman officials, who felt that the United States had reaped the whirlwind of religious anarchy that they at least had known was lurking in the Reformation, did not share the American

church's enthusiasm for the United States or for the Catholicism that took shape here. Romans had difficulty understanding the special needs and requirements of the American church. As Hennesey notes of American-Roman relations in the nineteenth century, "American ideas and concerns did not always translate easily into European idiom and were frequently misunderstood by those whose horizons were bounded by the Adriatic and Tyrhennian seas."

This incongruence between Rome's understandings and American Catholic realities and self-perceptions is the third assumption governing Hennesey's study. Rome occupies an interesting place in this history. It is there, on the other side of a large ocean, firm in its misperceptions of American Catholics and their country. Rome intervenes early in the history of the Catholic community in the United States to undermine Carroll's plans for a genuinely American church and to secure the dependence of American Catholics on *Propaganda Fide.* But Roman officials never fully appreciated the precariousness of Protestant-Catholic relations here and so they fumbled badly at times. They publicly reminded American Catholics that the separation of church and state was tolerable, but that the establishment of the church was still the best way to order society; they almost outlawed the Knights of Labor, misunderstanding the nature of the organization. These off-stage authorities could also be manipulated by clever and well-connected American Catholics engaged in controversies the Romans often could not understand but chose to participate in for their own reasons. On their part, American prelates have often jealously guarded the power they did have and struggled to keep Rome an ocean away. It was this characteristic combination of cultural misunderstanding and power struggle that drove the Americans' protracted campaign to prevent the arrival of an apostolic delegate in Washington at the end of the nineteenth century, a campaign so resolute that Leo XIII asked an American priest in Rome, " Why don't they want the Pope there *'/* "

In its broadest strokes, then, *.American Catholics* tells the story of a complex church taking shape in accordance with its own inner goals and needs and in response to a changing nation. This is not, however, to say that Hennesey has written a celebration or an apologetic. His history, rooted as it is in the confidence and security of contemporary American Catholics, adopts an open and critical attitude towards the history of the American church. This is seen most clearly in Hennesey's presentation of Catholic participation in the American labor movement. Catholic labor activism was one of the glories of the earlier histories: the church of working class immigrants had supported its people in their struggle for decent wages and working conditions. IIennesey tells this in the nice harmony between the firm anti-socialist bias of late 19th ·

story too, but he is careful to qualify it: "The real Catholic impact was century Catholic teaching . . . and the upwardly mobile aspirations of Catholic immigrants, who saw themselves as incipient capitalists, not as members· of a proletariat." Catholics exerted a powerfully conservative influence on the development of American labor unions. This is an area of American Catholic history that demands the attention of social historians; Hennesey's balanced assessments are useful places to begin.

On some questions, however, Hennesey shares the assumptions of his predecessors. Surprisingly, despite his attention to the many conflicts that troubled the American community, Hennesey makes no mention of class conflict. His picture of a complex community includes economic diversity, but rich and poor seem at peace in the same church, where, it has long been assumed, a common faith obliterated class rivalries and struggles. Rich Catholics, always deemed a sign of Catholicism's success on the American scene, willingly share the burdens of a poor church in the traditional view.

One of the most intense periods of class conflict in the American church was the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Hennesey sees this conflict as ethnic, the reaction of new immigrant Catholics to the "hibernarchy" of the American church. But class conflict underlay and fired the ethnic hostilities. Italian and Polish immigrants competed with Irish and German Catholics for jobs. The new immigrants were sometimes used as strike-breakers; they often came to resent the authority of Irish and German supervisors. Many Irish Americans had moved solidly into the middle and upper classes by this time (although Catholic historians have long overlooked the fact that Irish immigrants remained an important element of the American poor into the twentieth century), and they viewed the arrival of this European proletariat with the same apprehension and dread as non-Catholic Americans did. As a result, one· of the functions of the newly forming Catholic social work organizations of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was to make the immigrant laboring Catholics safe for American society, to secure their conformity to American social and economic values and to eliminate the threat of radicalism in the immigrant colonies. One participant in the first conference of Catholic Charities warned that "of its very nature, poverty, notably acute poverty, easily rouses passions and suggests vices, which are the next step to discarding the faith; such as discontent, seditiousness, theft, gambling, intemperance, uncleanliness and immorality." Many of the participants at this conference echoed these themes of distaste for and fear of the immigrant poor. The conservative influence. of Catholics on the American labor movement might have its roots in the ideology revealed in this ·conflict between a middle class church and the working class immigrants. .·

Hennesey also shares the assumptions of his predecessors in the matter of Italian American Catholicism. Since the publication in 1946 of Henry Browne's important essay, " The ' Italian Problem' in the Catholic Church of the United States, 1880-1900," American Catholic scholars have never known quite what to do with Italian American Catholics. For many years, a debate raged in the church over whether or not these immigrants could even be considered Catholics. In part, a methodological assumption is at the heart of this failure of understanding. American Catholic scholars have assumed that what is " religious " or " Catholic " is what takes place inside a church and so they have tried to study Italian Americans with church-oriented criteria. The result is that Italians appear to be very bad Catholics in the early twentieth century. Their faith or spirituality simply cannot be measured with reference to church attendance or support for Catholic education. But the assumption, repeated by Hennesey, that Italians were therefore ignorant of religion until the American church launched an " evangelization effort"· is to misunderstand quite profoundly the nature of Italian American history and religion.

These same Italians gathered in huge public devotions, to the Madonna or to various popular saints; these *feste* combined solemn religious devotion with the atmosphere of a party, a combination Italians would not separate even at the insistence of the American church. Other Amerfoan Catholics thought the Italians were pagans, and this judgment has not been altered by historians. But it was in such " non-liturgical" (an unhelpful and misleading term for historians) celebrations that Italians revealed their faith and passed it on to their children. While Italians filled the streets of New York, New Haven, Waterbury, Philadelphia, Youngstown, and other northern industrial cities displaying the most fervent spirituality, American Catholic scholars have been walking through empty churches and assuming that, because the churches were not full, Italians were not religious.

Hennesey's massively comprehensive history does include references to popular spirituality, but these are necessarily brief. Popular history often seems overwhelmed by the history of the institution. Hennesey has told the latter story with as much detail and specificity as possible and has prepared the way for a more intimate popular history of American Catholics by his careful attention to the full variety of the American community. Subsequent studies will be made much easier by Father Hennesey's book. *.American Catholics* is rich in suggestions for further research: it will inspire and excite future American Catholic historians. Father Hennesey has written a magnificent survey of the history of American Catholics, an essential work, a vital contribution to the historiography of American Catholics.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

Center for Thomistic Studies: *About Beauty; A Thomistic Interpretation* by Armand A. Maurer, C.S.B. Pp. 135; $6.00 + $1.00 postage.

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Crossroad: *The Glory of the Lord: A Theological .Aesthetics; Volume I: Seeing the Form* by Hans Urs von Balthasar, edited by Joseph Fessio, S.J. and John Riches, translated by Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis. Pp. 700; $35.00. *Martin Luther: An Illustrated Biography* by Peter Manns. New Popular Edition. Pp. 120; $14.95.

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