"HOW DOES GOD enter into philosophy?" To respond to this Heideggerian question is the purpose of this communication. [1] Heidegger's O'Wn response is that God enters into philosophy as *causa sui,* but that " man can neither pray nor sacrifice " to this God, nor "make music nor dance " nor fall on his knees before him. [2] There is no doubt that such a ' God ' is inadequate to religion, but there is likewise no doubt that this is not how God has in fact entered into philosophy. This paper will offer an account of that entrance; it will be an historical and thematic study at once, and will present only the argument of a work in progress QO times its length. In order to specify how God does enter into philosophy, we must first explicate the matter at issue in philosophical reflection and then clarify in a minimal way the God of religion. This done, we will be able to pose the question in a rigorous way: How do the Being that philosophy brings to discourse and the salvational Power that appears in religion relate to each other? It is their identity or coincidence that will answer the question. However, since there is always more to Being than is proper to the salvational Power, and reversely, this identity will at once be a difference or divergence. Accordingly, the argument will fall into three parts: the matter at issue in philosophy (Being) , the correlate of the religious project (the salvational Power), and their identity and difference.

[1] Martin Heidegger, "Die onto-theo-logische Verfassung der Metaphysik," in *Identitat und Differenz* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), p. 70. Hereinafter quotation marks ("like this") will mark only quotations, and inverted commas ('like this') will indicate metaphor, irony, and so on.

[2] *Ibid.*

I. THE BEING OF PHILOSOPHY

This part will have two main sections: the circumscription of the philosophical object, and then the articulation of this object as far as our question demands it. A summary will serve as the transition to the next part.

A. The Circurnscription. of the Philosophical Object

The first task is to specify what is always at issue for philosophy, that in terms of which the philosopher tries "to save the phenomena," that horizon within which philosophic discourse interrogates anything at all. The history of philosophy is the display of this proper object: the philosophic tradition takes its coherence from a discernible matter peculiar to it.

In a formal and neutral way, the matter at issue may be circumscribed as the *Arche.* It is the 'origin' in the sense of that by reason of which things *are* and not not, that in virtue of which there is anything at all rather than nothing, that in everything on account of which anything at all is. It is not one origin among others, but is the originary origin: the origin at work in all possible origins. Other neutral names for the *Arohe* are: the Foundational, the Apriori, the Radical.

No matter what' content' be ascribed to it, no matter what ' identity ' be discovered in it, no matter how explicitly it be discussed, no matter through what approach it be first and subsequently defined, this *Arche* is what remains at issue in the tradition of philosophy.

The matter at issue in philosophy is: the ultimate condition for the possibility of any phenomenon whatsoever, that which renders possible the appearance of anything at all, that because of which everything becomes possible.

This matter may be delimited in a formal way through various questions which, in the end, are only variations on one question. How does it happen that things *are* in the first place? Why, ultimately, should anything *be?* What accounts for the

fact that anything at all *is-not'* is in this way or that way,' *not* 'is *of* a certain type,' *not* 'is this particular one instead of that one,' but simply *is?* How do things emerge as *be-ing* (in the participial sense [3] ⊃— *not* 'be-ing this, that, or the other,' *not* 'be-ing in one way instead of another,' but simply *be-ing?* Why is there something rather than nothing? What is the condition for the possibility that anything at all *be?* The formal answer to this one question is: the *Arche.* The whole task of philosophy is to give 'content' to this answer. The philosopher articulates the 'content' of the *Arche* and 'saves the phenomena' in these terms. There are ostensibly many questions in philosophy-questions, for example, *of* truth, love, beauty, good, time, and God. But what makes these many questions philosophical-when they are philosophical-is the one question: the question of the *Arche.* The one question diffuses itself into many, and the many concretize the one. Whatever the concrete phenomenon interrogated (e.g. time), what the philosophical question aims to reach is the *Arche.* Whatever the point of departure for philosophical interrogation, the one aim in all of it is the *Arche.* Whatever the philosopher asks, the one question in all of his concrete questions is the question of the *Arche.*

The *Arche* has received many names in the history of philosophy. However, the most revelatory and the most common is the one given to it from the beginning and implicit in the questions that serve to delimit it as an issue. This primary name of the *Arche* is *Be-ing.* [4] The task now is to exhibit this.

Let us take the questions already formulated. How does it happen that anything at all *is?* Why should anything *be?* What is the condition for the possibility that anything whatsoever *be?* Philosophy puts at issue, interrogates in terms of, or is the discourse upon the fact *of Be-ing.*

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a The orthography *be-ing* will hereinafter connote the participial sense.

4 'The capitalization of the term *be-ing* will serve to call attention to its unique status, to emphasize it, and to avoid confusion.

Or, let us take another approach; let us consider the ' content' of any experience whatsoever. This 'content' is 'that-which-is,' taken in the most comprehensive sense. Whatever the concretion of this content, however that-which-is congeals itself into definiteness, for whatever reason the content comes to pass, experience always remains the experience of that-which-is. The mode of that-which-is, however universal or particular, remains irrelevant to a comprehensive reflection upon the content of experience. Any distinction comes too late for such a reflection. In other words, we may allow the ' that-which-' or the definiteness of that-which-is to remain unspecified, and at the same time bring to explicit affirmation the '-is' in that-which-is. Again: we may ignore the particularity of the phenomenon and reflect upon the fact of its simply be-ing, i.e. the fact of Be-ing. Since that-which-is would not be any 'that-which-' were it not in some sense be-ing, the activity of be-ing is the condition for the possibility of, the immanent origin of, the *Arche* of any that-which-is. Philosophy is the attempt to explicitate the Foundational in experience, what is always already experienced in the experience of anything whatsoever, to wit, be-ing. Philosophy, at its core, is the discourse on *Be-ing*.

Philosophy has displayed itself as the quest to lmow the Be-ing in, of, and as anything whatsoever. This Be-ing is not-to put it in a preliminary way-the Other of beings. At the threshold of philosophical reflection, we must not conceive of the activity of Be-ing as 'existence' in contradistinction to 'essence' or, in another perspective, in contradistinction to be-ings. Everything expressed in the ideas of 'essence' and 'beings' already belongs to the process of Be-ing. It is not as if there were a 'gap' between Be-ing and something else <,whatever the latter be called); distinctions must be made inside this process, as it were, and not between it and something else. In other words, the Be-ing happening as or in phenomena does not, so to speak, constitute an Other with respect to them, nor are the phenomena other than the process of Be-ing occur-

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ring as or in them. A particular being is an 'instantiation'   of
the process of Be-ing, and it takes on 'determinateness'   as
particular   beings.   What   philosophy   tries   to   articulate   is
phenomena-in-their-Arnhe   or,   reversely,   the   *Arche-ofi..phe*-
nomena. It is the Whole to which philosophy attends.

A terminological adjustment   is now in order. Having em-
phasized the participial   sense of the term, we may revert to
the orthography   *Being.*   Beyond this, however, we may now
take the following as equivalents: the Being-process, To-be, Be,
Is, and others as they develop. 5

At issue, then, is the process of To-be: the Being in, of, and
as beings. The fact-of-Be is to be examined. What must be
admitted   about the fact-of-Be?

B. The Immediate Articulation of Being

The question of the *Arche* has become the question of Being.
Why is there anything at all rather than nothing? The answer
is: the *Arche.* The primary name of the *Arche* is To-be. Hence
this answer has become the question: what about Being? How
to understand it? What ' content' may we find in it? Upon
articulation,   how does it look to us? What   must we admit
about it?

The task now is to elaborate   what we may admit about it
immediately-but   only insofar as (retrospectively)   *the ques-
tion of how God enters into philosophy demands it.* Here we

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5 The ,primary name of the *Arohe* has been Being. But the great philoso-
phers have offered a number of different names (some of which we shall de-
rive as we proceed).   Plato, for example, called it the *idea* of the Good, the
Beautiful, that which purely and simply is, and so on; Aristotle, *on* (be-ing)
as *on,* separate form, *enteleoheia* (to-be-completely),   and so on; Plotinus, the
One; Thomas Aquinas, *ipsum esse subsistens* (subsistent To-be itself); John
Duns Scotus, the first principle,. infinite *enS'* (be-ing),   and so on; Spinoza,
substantia and *natura naturans* (naturing Nature); Leibniz, the infinite
prime monad; Hegel, absolute Spirit, the absolute Idea, Reason, and so on;
Jaspers, Transcendence,   Truth,   and so on; and Marcel, the Transcendent,
Being as plenitude, the Pleroma, and so on.

will look to Parmenides-the   first explicit philosopher-for guidance. What we must admit about Being is at least that it is necessary, absolute, one, and ungenerable and imperishable.

The articulation of these four ways in which the process-of-Be itself is and is itself will provide four new ways in which to pose the question that defines philosophy. In other words, the answers to the question of Being that this section elaborates will be further specifications of the very question. But that is all that we need in order to determine how God enters into philosophy.

What must we admit about the process-of-Being? First of all, this: "it is not possible that it should not be " (Parmenides, B2.3) . That Being is-not is impossible. In other words, the Being-process in beings is necessary: it cannot not-be.

The decisive demonstration of the necessity of Being is a negative one, to wit, that non-Being is impossible. That is why, after only stating the positive thesis of the necessity of Is, Parmenides immediately turns to the negative thesis: "Not-is [is-not], and it is appropriate that it should not be" (B2.4).

The Being in, of, and as beings cannot not-be; reversely, Not-be cannot be. Here all of the following are equivalent: non-Being, Not-be, Non-is, Nothing, Nothingness, and the obvious others. It seems that if there were no Be, there would ' be ' only non-Be. But non-·Being 'is' (so to speak) the total absence of Being; it ' is ' not ' there ' to precisely ' be.' Or: that non-Being would *be* imports that non-Being would 'be' being, would ' be' exercising Be. But then it would not-be non-Being. In order to be itself, it would have to be not itself. And further, it itself ' is ' not anything to 'be ' or not-be ' itself.' Again: total Nothingness would not *be* that which is if there were (as one may wish to affirm) no beings. If we imagine away every being, it is not the case that then Nothing or non-Being would be left; for Nothing is not ' something ' that *is* so that it could *be* left. Nothingness does not 'do' anything: it does not exercise ' be.' Or again: for Not-be to ' be ' it would

have to 'be' Be. But there is nothing in Nothingness to' be.' It can 'be' only Not-be; it can only not-be; it cannot be.

Reversely to the positive thesis: Ising is, Be must be, Being is necessary, the Being-process cannot not-be. If we do not suppose the derivative distinction between essence and existence, we may say: Existence exists, Existence must exist, Existence cannot not-exist. The process-of-Being does itself, the process-of-Existence exists, and does not in any condition do otherwise. Just as 'to be a table' is what a table properly does, so 'to be' is what To-be properly does. That To-be should be To-not-be is impossible.

However, a problem arises. While the Being-process of beings is necessary, beings themselves are not necessary. They are contingent. The Being in, of, and as beings cannot not-be; but it is not impossible that beings should not-be. Any one being and the totality of beings do not have to exist. How to understand *this?* The necessity of Being together with the contingency of beings generates a problem. How to ' reconcile' them? How to think both sides together? We may not deny the necessity of Being in order to save the contingency of beings, nor the contingency of beings in order to save the necessity of Being. The question of Being, therefore, receives a new precision: How to think together Being and beings, the Necessary and the contingent? The great philosophers'-who *begin* with this question in one or another of its forms-are those who have given an original response to it.. To have arrived at it is enough for our purpose.

What must we further admit about Being? This: that it is "·absolute" *(pampan,* BS.11) ·. For, what may the Being-process lack? Or what may it gain? ' Other than ' To-be, 'outside of' Being, would' be' only non-Being or Nothingness. Hence Being lacks only Nothing and may gain only Nothing. But Nothingness is not anything to lack or to gain. In other words, Being does not lack; it is absolved from any lack or possible gain; it is absolute. " So, necessarily is: either absolute-

ly To-be or else Not-at-all"   (BS. 11). If we be not willing to admit that Being is absolute, then we must admit that Not-at-all or Nothingness is. To deny the absoluteness of Being is to affirm the be-ing of non-Being. But such a claim would be ab-surd. The Being-process is absolute; it is the Absolute.

Since beyond Being there 'is' only non-Being, since there ' is ' nothing more than Is, anything that is must *be* Being; whatever is must be identical to Being, be reducible to it, ' participate in ' it. If there were a being that is not identical to the Being-process, then that process would lack something; but Being lacks only Nothing. There can *be* no being that would not be *Be.* That which is not Being is-not. However, a problem arises. For, while beings must be identical to ab-solute Being, they themselves are *not* absolute. They are not absolved from lack or gain. They are each limited or restricted in that they are not one another; each being lacks the others. (Indeed, beings lack even themselves to the extent that they are not totally self-identical; this will be taken up below, with the self-identity of Be.) The Being-process in, of, and as beings is not restricted over against something else, yet beings are restricted to be-ing themselves and not others. It would seem that if Being is absolute, then the beings of which it is the Being would likewise be so; or, reversely, it would seem that if beings are finite, then their Being would likewise be finite or non-absolute; but neither may be admitted.   How to under-stand *this?* How can beings *be* and not be *absolute?* How does absolute Being manifest itself in and as beings that are *not* absolute? We may pose the Being-question with a new preci-sjon: How to think together the Absolute and the finite? The great philosophers are those who have given an original re-sponse to this question. But for our problematic here we need only have come to it.

What more must we admit about Being? This: that it is " one ,. (BS.6) . Opposite oneness stands multiplicity, which may- import either ' wan;v ' or ' division.' Hence oneness means,

respectively, uniqueness and self-identity. Let us take each of these in turn.

The Being-process is one in the sense of unique. Briefly, if there were two or more Being-processes, then each would lack the others. But 'other than' Being 'is' only non-Being, and there is nothing in Nothingness to lack; in other words, Being does not lack. Hence it is unique: it is the Unique.

Any being, insofar as it is, must be identical to unique Being; each being 'participates in' uniqueness; each, in other words, is unique. But there are many of them that are unique. Hence they are each only co-unique. In these terms, the process-of-Being is unique in its uniqueness: it is uniquely unique. But still a problem arises. It would seem that beings are all one, since they are nothing other than the Unique. Or, reversely, it would seem that To-be is multiple in that it is the To-be of many. How to reconcile the unique uniqueness of Being and the multiplicity of beings? How to think together the Unique and the many? To have arrived at this new precision of the Being-question is enough for our purpose.

The process-of-Being is one in the sense of self-identical. It is not itself in such a way as to lack any of itself. It is not such that any of itself would differ from any of itself; for any phenomena that differ must differ by something (certainly not by nothing) ; hence one of them has what the other one lacks, namely, that by which they differ; but Being does not lack. It is not ' divided ' in itself. It is indivisibly one, equal to itself, wholly itself. " It is not divisible, since it is all alike .... It is all cohesive " (BS.22, 25) . In other words, Being is self-identical.

Opposite self-identity is multiplicity in the sense of division. Each being is divided in itself; it is internally differentiated or, in other words, has 'parts outside of parts'; each is self-exterior. Even so, to the extent that beings are, they are self-identical; for they are nothing other than the Self-identical. Each being is itself or is self-identical but incompletely so.

(This incomplete self-identity, this self-exteriority, takes on two forms: space and time.)

The problem again arises. Each being is identical to the totally Self-identical; it seems, therefore, that each should be totally identical to itself; but this is not so. Reversely, it seems that, as the Being of internally multiple beings, Being itself cannot be totally self-identical; but it is. How to understand this paradox? Neither side may be denied in order to save the other one. How to think together Being and beings, the Self-identical and the self-different? For our purpose, it is enough to have come to this new precision of the Being-question.

What must we further admit about Being? This: that it is "ungenerable and imperishable" (BS.8).

The term *genesis* (generation) has two meanings: beginning and becoming. The process-of-Being is ungenerable in both senses. It does not begin. If it were to have begun, then before it would have been (so to speak) only non-Being. But it is not possible that non-Be should be; besides, since out of Nothing can come only nothing, there would not be anything now. Therefore Being does not begin. It is ungenerable also in the sense that it does not become. Whatever becomes has a past and a future; and becoming is the transformation of future into past and *vwe versa.* But past and future differ; they each lack the other. Hence whatever becomes must lack. But Being lacks only Nothing. In it past and future (and therefore present) must be one. It does not become. Being is ungenerable in both senses. It is likewise imperishable. Hence the process of To-be has no beginning and no ending, no different past or future; it is, as it were, totally *now.* "It was not ever, nor shall it be, it now *is* all at once, one, cohesive " (BS.5-6) .

A problem arises here. Since beings are nothing other than Being, it would seem that they are ungenerable and imperishable, or that Being is not so. However, beings do have a past and a future and do in some sense begin and end, while Being remains the Ungenerahle and the Imperishable. How to think

the two together?   Again, it is enough for us to have arrived at this question.

C. Summary arul Transition

Philosophy at its core is the discourse on the Being in, of, and as beings. What must be admitted about it is at least that it is necessary, absolute, one, and ungenerable and imperishable. If a discourse develops within the horizon of the *Arche,* if thought does not abstract its matter from the Whole, if a mode of questioning aims at Being, then it is philosophy. The discourse on Being takes on concreteness *as* the philosophy of knowledge, the philosophy of politics, the philosophy of art, and so on. Our concern here is the philosophy of religion.

II. THE SALVATIONAL POWER OF RELIGION

This part will have two main sections: a preliminary purification of the phenomenon of religion, and then a specification of what is proper to religion. A short conclusion will serve as the transition to the next part.

A. Tlve Preliminary Purification

Philosophy may say no more-and should say no less- about religion than what religion presents of itself to be articulated in terms of Being. It is the embarrassment of philosophy as an academic discipline that philosophers have so often spoken about religion with so little knowledge of it. No one would attempt a philosophy of the formal sciences with only an elementary knowledge of arithmetic; anyone who would offer political philosophy with no more background than what he remembers from secondary school about the phenomenon of politics, what strikes him from journalism, and what rumors he hears about it would hardly merit respect. Yet this is precisely what many academic philosophers do; they speak as if there were no science of religion from which they may learn the

phenomenon of religion. Even to learn it from science, how-
ever, is not enough. The philosopher must further purify
the phenomenon before he can treat it in an explicitly onto-
logical way.

This purification has two moments: differentiation and
eidetics.

The differentiation of the religious phenomenon from all
other psychological, sociological, and historical phenomena-
each in the broadest sense-is the work of the science of reli-
gion. However, the deliverances of science to philosophy in
this regard have not been altogether satisfactory; science has
not quite differentiated the religious phenomenon from myth
(especially in 'primitive' religions) and from philosophy
(especially in Oriental religions). The responsibility has so
far devolved upon the philosopher to do this.

Although religious proclamation, tradition, and self-critical
reflection are at their center irreducibly mythical (i.e. are
symbolic narratives about origins), mythic existence (i.e. the
experiential compactness of all the dimensions of human
existence) is irreducible to religion and religion to it.[6] Myth
as the discourse proper to compact existence must be distin-
guished from myth as the symbolic narrative regarding
(exemplary) origins. In the *first* case, myth is at once all
those discourses that *we* in our era experience as differentiated,
including science, both natural and human, medical and psy-
chological art, literature and entertainment, philosophy and
religion. It is the discourse proper to archaic or compact man.
In the *second,* case, myth is discourse through symbols; a sym-
bol is, phenomenologically, a double-sense the first of which
both reveals and conceals the second which is available only
in this way; or, ontologically, it is a single phenomenon in its
ambivalent presence. Evidently symbols and thus myths may

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s For a brief discussion, see Daniel Guerriere, " The Structure of Mythic
Existence," *The Personalist,* 55 (1974), 261-272.

be separately scientific, philosophic, or religious.[7] It is not specific to religion that it incorporates myth in the *second* sense; and it is not distinctively religious to be mythic in the *first* sense.

Although religious proclamation, tradition, and self-critical reflection may appropriate philosophy and may even in practice be undifferentiated from it, the two are not the same. It is doubtless true that the great religious and philosophical traditions of Oriental experience have been compact; indeed Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism and Shintoism have quite aptly been called " philosophical religions " and " religious philosophies." Furthermore, in Western philosophy the difference between religion and philosophy has often been obscured, usually through the obscurity of the word ' God,' which may import either the Other of religious experience or the *Arche* of philosophic interrogation. This compactness in the East and obscurity in the West constitute a methodological problem here; for if we have to differentiate philosophy and religion, i.e. to purify the phenomenon of religion in order then to interrogate it philosophically, we shall have to enter the circle of arbitrariness. We may solve this problem in the usual way: the fact that one can practice religion without philosophy, and institute philosophizing without religion, is enough to allow us to take their difference as a hypothesis for now. In other words, the purification here takes the form of a hypothesis. The justification for it will be what it makes possible: an exact ontological delimitation of the two realms and thus an answer to the question how God enters into philosophy.

[1] Philosophic myths include those invented by Plato (e.g. the Socratic account of the genesis of the bad *politeia.i)* . Scientific myths are cultural or natural. An example of the former would be the legends of the foundation of a nation and, of the latter, the 'theory' of the genesis of the cosmos in a primeval explosion (for there is no science of the unique, i.e. of *what* exploded, although cosmology can trace back the evolution of the cosmos to one-hundredth of a second after the beginning; see Steven Weinberg, *The First Three Minutes* [New York: Basic Books, 1976]).

The eidetics of religious objectivity and subjectivity was first the work of the science of religion (under the title of ' phenomenology ') and has been sporadically translated into philosophical phenomenology. [8] On its first level, as the exhibition of the correlative structures of objectivity and subjectivity, phenomenology may say that the religious object is the ultimate, ambiguous, and invocative other, while the religious subject is the prefocal, interpretative, and unique self. On its second level, as the evincement of fundamental objectivity and fundamental subjectivity, phenomenology may say that the religious self is the quest-to-be-let-to-be, while the religious other is the salvational Power. [9] The next section will be a summary statement of the second level of the phenomenology of religion.

B. The Specificity of Religion

Philosophy, having learned from the science of religion, may prepare access to the phenomenon in many ways. Religion does not need philosophy in order to be itself, and philosophy need never take up the problematic of religion. But philosophy, forging an access in its phenomenological mode, may explicate that condition of man in response to which religion arises. It may define the existential problem to which religion is the response. This explication need not be immediately ontological; here we shall only refer unsystematically. to Being (in order, at least, to show how the discussion may open quickly into ontology) . Why, then, should religion ever arise?

Man, for phenomenology, is the quest-to-be, the quest to

[8] For a comprehensive but condensed essay, see Daniel Guerriere, "Outline of a Phenomenology of the Religious," *Research in Phenomenology,* 4 (1974), 99-127.

[9] There is a third level in phenomenological philosophy: the circumscription of the primordial Unity out of which objectivity and subjectivity arise. For our purpose, this is not immediately relevant. For a phenomenological interpretation of religion on this level, see *ibid.,* pp. 102, 123-127.

be the one whom he has been given to be, the one who he already is but not yet. The self who he is to be may be called his *daimon,.* his truth, or ultimately his Being. And the fundamental existential question is: Will I achieve my *daimon?* Is fulfillment or consummation possible? Or is my quest to *be* necessarily a failure? Will I end in frustration or will I reach my Being? This is the question that man *exists.* It is but the interrogative form of the fact of evil-the double evil that man experiences: that which he undergoes and that which he undertakes, vital failure and moral failure, death and fault.

The evil that man suffers-which is ultimately death-does not constitute the specific existential problem to which religion is the response. Religions indeed interpret this evil, recommend ways to confront it, and even offer beliefs and rituals that allow man to tolerate or transform it. But the very fact that these responses may all be given outside of religion imports that religion does not constitute itself specifically *as* them. (Anti-theists no less than preachers are often confused in this regard.)

The evil that man does, however, is a different matter. The condition into which man puts himself by bringing evil into the world is the problem in response to which religion arises as the *therapeia* (in Plato's term). Religion arises beyond questions of morality. (Preachers often preach their confusion apropos this.) Moral codes are the guidelines that human freedom gives itself in its quest for consummation, while religion is the response of freedom to evil vvhose invincibility seems to preclude this consummation. The task now is to explain how the evil that man does becomes invincible-and thus why religion arises. This may of course be done in many ways; but here we will do it in terms of freedom and of completeness.

Both ways require a prefatory remark. It is not the essence of evil or, more precisely, the origin of evil that philosophy would explicate in this task. Rather, the myths of the origin of evil remain myths: but philosophy can articulate the condi-

tion of iniquity.   In ontological terms, this condition is the
failure to *be.* To be morally evil is to not do who I am, to
not actualize (my) Being, to not be, to not be To-be. *How*
and *why* man fails to be is beyond the resources of philosophy
to decipher. Furthermore,   philosophy knows only the before
and the after, not the exact *irruption* of evil. It is the condi-
tion afterwards-the   condition of iniquity-that   we must
delineate here.

In general: if the destiny (*daimon)* of freedom is freedom it-
self as destiny, then moral evil is to have rendered oneself un-
free; if man is to complete the self who is his destiny, then
moral evil is to have rendered oneself incomplete.   Let us de-
tail each of these.

In terms of freedom: since the way-to-be of human existence
is freedom, the failure to be myself amounts to self-enslave-
ment. If my To-be is a to-be-free, then to *not-be* (myself, my
Self, my Being) is precisely to be a slave, i.e. the *not-free.* But
if freedom enslaves itself, then it, precisely as the slave, i.e.
as not itself, cannot liberate itself, i.e. change its own condi-
tion. The condition into which freedom puts itself is beyond
freedom to change. The not-free is not free to free himself. To
not be free is to not be free to *be.*

In terms of completeness: insofar as I have not constituted
myself as myself (my Self, my Being), insofar as I have not
done myself, I can no longer do myself. I have constituted my-
self as failed or incomplete and remain so: for my past is now
beyond my power. The fault is permanent.   I may indeed
modify the effects of it in the future, but I cannot change it.
The past is precisely beyond my power to constitute; I cannot
undo what I have done. For anything temporal, once to be
not complete is never to be complete.

This, then, is the fundamental existential problem: the in-
vincibility of human evil for human freedom or power. The
not-free cannot liberate himself; the not-complete lacks the
complete power to complete himself. Philosophy can project.

the only possible remedy for this condition, but cannot judge whether what it projects ever becomes actual. What would be the *therapeia?*

Since man himself cannot actualize his consummation, i.e. freedom as destiny and complete self-constitution, he can only *hope* for it through the work of *an other.* Self-enslaved freedom can only hope for liberation, incomplete power can only hope for completion-by an other. Man is a quest-to-be who makes himself, through evil, a quest-to-be-let-to-be by an other. Correlative to this fundamental structure of subjectivity, the other (objectivity) is the power that would free man unto his complete destiny. The therapy for the human condition of iniquity would be the work of an other. This work may be given a specific name: salvation, for example, or redemption. The other may be called the salvational Power.

What is specific to religion-what constitutes religion, religious experience, or the religious dimension of human experience-is (1) to acknowledge the need for an other to liberate or complete oneself, to abide in one's own exigency for a salvational Power, to wait for it, to hope that it will appear; and (2) if it does appear, if it does advent in one's experience, to accept it, to acknowledge it as what it is, to let it do its proper work. There is no other experience like this; unlike the human response to the evil that man suffers, this double acknowledgement as the response to the evil that he does and (this means) to the condition into which he thereby puts himself has no other sense than what man calls religion. The consummation of the human quest to *be* in the face of the condition of iniquity is the proper concern of religion.

The genesis of religion, then, 1s the ' impossible ' condition of man: the impossibility of self-liberation and self-completion once he fails, no matter how slightly. What is *not* specific to religion is the response to suffering-to despair or disappointment, frustration, and perplexity in the face of the evil that man suffers. The remedy for *that* is not the work of an other-

a salvational Power-and *a fortiori* not the provision by this other of compensatory gratification. The remedy for evil suffered is to fight it with all the energy that we have and, at the same time, to give its past a fruitful sense for the future. To be sure, we will not conquer it, if for no other reason than that some of the evil that we suffer is evil that we do to each other. But there is nothing specifically religious about the fight against and the transformation of evil.

The salvational Power that philosophy can project as the *therapeia* for the human condition of iniquity is the religious ' God.' Any other 'god ' is irrelevant: an omnipotent creator, for example, or an omniscient power beyond the world, or an omnibeneficent protector somehow compatible or incompatible with the evil that we suffer. It may be that a particular culture or person understands a salvational Power in one of these ways: but such understanding is at best an extrapolation from and at worst an arbitrary addition to an experience of it. For example, creation may be understood as the first act of salvation;. and the possible compatibility /incompatibility of ' God ' and evil is a speculative issue arbitrarily injected into concrete religious experience.

Whether or not a salvational Power advents in human experience, the philosopher as such is incompetent to decide. Indeed, philosophy does not determine whether *anything* is or, fundamentally, whether there be Being. It can only *subsequently* articulate Being and then everything else in terms of it.

C. Concluswn and Transition

But if this be so, then how exactly does the (possible) salvational Power enter into philosophy? What *is* it in terms of Being? How does it appear within the horizon of Being? The answer shall be that it both coincides with and diverges from .Being. The 'God' of religion and the To-be of philosophy are both identical and different.

III. IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE

The task now is to explicate the process-of-Being and the salvational Power to the point at which their ' relationship ' becomes manifest. It was the Christian theologians of Western civilization and the Islamic theologians who first did this; but they did not make clear the *precise* point(s) at which they coincide and diverge.

It, takes-retrospectively-only   one further explication to discover their identity.

Let us begin with Being. The To-be in, of, and as beings is ungenerable and imperishable. It has no beginning and no ending, no past and no future: it is all of itself all at once. It is, so to speak, total Nowness. But 'to be all of oneself all at once ' is precisely the definition of ' eternal.' [10] Opposite eternal is temporal. To be temporal means to be oneself but *not* all at once, to be oneself in a less than total manner, to be such that one also lacks oneself. Whatever is temporal lacks the fullness of itself. But Being lacks only non-Being; it does not lack. It is non-temporal. We may not allege that Being 'always was and always will be.' *That* is merely temporal-an *indefinite* temporal extension, to be sure, but nonetheless temporal. (In terms of 'infinity': it is merely, as Hegel called it, " the bad infinite.") The image of Being as " everlasting " (*aei*) , which we find in Plato and Aristotle, is inadequate to the idea of eternal; the image *aei* is what happens when the activity-of-Eternality be thought as a temporal process. It expresses the experiential compactness of time and eternity or, in other words, the Cycle typical of mythic existence-which the Greeks did not completely break. Only with the decisive differentiation of compact experience did it become possible to distinguish time and eternity; this was the achievement of Hebrew and then of Christian existence. The Being-process

io First in Boethius, *Philos. Cons.* V 6 (*CC-L* 49, V 6, 4 and 8 =*PL* 63, 858 .rnd 859).

does itself completely, as never less than itself; it is all of it-
self all at once; it is the Eternal.

But while Being is eternal, beings are temporal. They have
a past and a future and in some way begin and end. They are
each of them themselves but not all at once; they also lack
themselves; they are such that their past lacks their future
and *vice versa.* The problem arises: Every being is nothing
else than the Being-process (for they are certainly not other
than it), but none of them are eternal. The To-be in, of, and
as beings is eternal, but they themselves are temporal. How
could that be? Here is another precision for the Being-ques-
tion: How to think together the Eternal and the temporal?
We need only come this far to determine how 'God' enters
into philosophy.

Let us turn to the salvational Power. The condition of
iniquity into which man puts himself is the condition of self-
enslavement and permanent incompleteness. The only possible
therapeia for it is that an other should liberate and complete
man. But if it should do this, then it must be such that the
past of man-which is beyond his free power to alter-is *pres-
ent for it.* It must be such that every human past-and that
includes every *future* past-must be available to its power.
For it, every past of man and thus every human future must
be present. In other words, it must be such that past, present,
and future are *one* for it; that it has no past, present, and fu-
ture separate from each other and thus no beginning and no
ending; that it is itself *as* all-at-once. To be in this way for
every human past and future is to be so for *any* past and fu-
ture; for their oneness as the present is itself one. Hence if
there is to be a salvational Power, it must be eternal.

It is precisely here that the salvational Power and To-be
coincide. The matter at issue in philosophy and the (possible)
other in religious experience are identical in that they both
must be *eternal.* The objection may arise immediately: Could
there not be two activities-of-Eternality?   The answer is that

the Eternal is *one,* i.e. the *Ono;* for it is Being and Being is
one. The identity of eternal Being and the eternal salvational
Power was the discovery of Christian and Islamic theologians,
first of all St. Augustine. If, as Heidegger says, each thinker
has but a single thought, the one thought of Augustine was
'the Eternal.' After him, philosopher-theologians think the
identity with inexhaustible energy, as befits one of the great
discoveries of humankind. The core of the *philosophical* re-
flection on the *religious* Other is the so-called proofs for the
existence of God. These are nothing more than the affirmation
of the coincidence of Being and the (mostly) Christian salva-
tional Power. Because this affirmation was not always precise,
we must emphasize that the coincidence lies in their *eternality.*
In St. Thomas, for instance, the ' argument ' for ' the existence
of God ' runs as follows. There is a first unchanged changer,
a first cause *(not* a *causa* sui), something necessarily necessary,
something perfect, a goal of all; all of these are (rather awk-
ward) names for Being, *ipsum esse per se subsistens;* and *this*
is eternal. But this To-be is 'God' or, reversely, ' God' is
this. Therefore' God' exists. 11 What such an' argument' lacks
is an exact statement that the salvational Power of Christian
existence, like any salvational Power, advents in human experi-
ence outside of philosophy; that it, still without reference to
philosophy, must be eternal; and that the identity of it and the
Being of philosophical reflection lies in their eternality.

Once this be admitted, however, we cannot avoid the
counter-affirmation: The salvational Power and Being are not,
for human experience, *completely* coincident; they also diverge
or differ. There is more to Being than what belongs to the sal-
vational Power, and reversely. This is evident from each side
in turn.

The To-be that philosophy articulates is the Being-process in,
of, and as beings. They are nothing other than it (while it is
more than they) ; they ' participate in ' it (while it is not mere-

11 *ST* I, q. 2, a. 3; q. 3, aa. 3-4; q. 7, a. I; q. IO, aa. 1-3; and so on.

ly they); they are reducible upward to it (while it is irreducible
downward to them) . In contrast, the salvational Power of
religion is not such that beings, in particular man, are reducible
to it. It remains the *Other.* Religion does not affirm that the
salvational Power whose presence and work it proclaims is the
ultimate Identity of man, the Unique with which and in which
unique beings are one. It is not *specific* to the salvational
Power that it be the Being of the beings whom it saves and
thus that they be nothing other than it. Hence Being and the
salvational Power diverge.

While Being is necessary, the work of the salvational Power
remains gratuitous. It is specific to the Other of religious ex-
perience that it be that for which man hopes, that it be non-
necessary, that its presence and work be always a gift. The
gratuitous character of the salvational Power is more precisely
its *"love.* Its proper work is to let man *be* who he is beyond the
condition of iniquity into which man puts himself; to let the
quest-to-be, which has made itself the quest-to-be-let-to-be,
finally *be;* to let human consummation *be.* But ' to let be ' is
the very definition of 'love! To love is to accept, foster, and
promote the person (and derivatively the thing); it is the evo-
cation, the active affirmation, the effective willing of the Pos-
sibility (Being) of the person. Love makes or lets him be the
one whom he has been given to be; it gives him to himself.
Precisely as gift, it is not necessary. (The opposite of the
necessary is only minimally the contingent; it is properly the
gift.) Furthermore, to love is proper to persons. Hence the
salvational Power must be personal. But it is not immediately
evident that Being is personal. What is clear, however, is that
necessary Being and the gratuitous salvational Power do not
completely coincide in human experience.

The coincidence and divergence, the identity and difference,
of Being and the salvational Power has become evident. They
must be one yet also two.   They are one with respect to
eternality. They are two in that there is more to the Being-
process than is proper to the salvational Power, and reversely.

<Pedagogically, they may be represented as two circles that only partially overlap.) Unfortunately, the term 'God' in Western civilization obscures the difference and misnames the identity. Religious existence need never say anything about Being inasmuch as it differs from the Other; and philosophical reflection need never recognize any salvational Power inasmuch as it differs from Being. But each may affirm the identity under the title of the Eternal.

How does God-i.e. the salvational Power of religion-enter into philosophy? As *the Eternal.* But philosophy, upon recognizing this, must immediately pose the opposite question: How does God remain outside of philosophy? As the gratuitous and personal Other.

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" THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE EFFECT"

I

INTEREST IN THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE EFFECT: WHY BOTHER?

RCENT INTEREST AMONGST philosophers in the Doctrine of Double Effect [1] seems extraordinary, given that the Doctrine would appear merely to be an esoteric and derivative aspect of Catholic-and more narrowly, Thomistic-moral theology, embedded in a morality based upon general, exceptionless moral rules. It is not simply that some prominent moral philosophers have chosen to widen the range of discussion of possible views on basic moral issues, and in particular that of the morality of killing, by including for interest's sake a discussion of the Doctrine. Rather, an examination of the viability and importance of the Doctrine's central distinction between what a person ' foresees as a result of his voluntary action and what, in the strict sense, he intends' [2], now appears to be regarded as essential to any satisfactory discussion of the general issue of killing, and of its particular aspects (abortion, euthanasia, warfare, and so on) .[3]

This development is surprising because within its Thomistic context the Doctrine is made necessary by the acceptance of

[1] Sometimes called the Principle of Double Effect, or the Doctrine or Principle of Twofold Effect.

[2] Philippa Foot, 'Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect' (in James Rachels (Ed.), *Moral Problems,* New York: Harper and Row, 1975, 2nd edition 59-70), p. 60.

[a] See, e.g. James Rachels (Ed.), *op. oit.;* Jonathan Glover, *Causing Death and Saving Lives* (Penguin, 1977) ; Richard Wasserstrom (Ed.), *War and Morality,* (Wadsworth, 1970).

two tenets, the range and combination of which not many moral philosophers now would regard as tenable. These tenets are: (1) Some intentional actions are intrinsically morally wrong, and (2) It is never morally permissible to use an intrinsically bad means to a good end.[4]

G. E. M. Anscombe lists those actions which Catholic moral theory forbids, 'whatever consequences threaten', as 'choosing to kill the innocent for any purpose, however good; vicarious punishment; treachery . . .; idolatry; sodomy; adultery; [and] making a false profession of faith '.[5] Further, although treachery and making a false profession of faith may be seen as species of lying, both Augustine and Aquinas regarded all lies, however harmless or well-motivated, as sins. Needless to say, various methods were devised to dull the sting of this general prohibition in obvious problem cases.[6] Nevertheless, lying could never be morally justified on this view.

Undoubtedly,   of the interest in this strict stance is motivated by concern for what many would regard as its morally abhorrent conclusions. Interestingly, such criticisms cast the rulings of Catholic moral theory as either far too restrictive, or far too permissive. Where restrictive, that Catholic moral teaching disallows the intentional killing of one innocent person-even in extreme cases where this is the sole means of saving thousands of lives-is regarded as almost sufficient illustration of its unacceptability.[7] On the other hand, it is held that far too much foreseen, unintended killing could be

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[4] Given that this second tenet is often explicitly stated, the acceptance of these exceptionless moral rules is not, as H. J. McCloskey suggests, the result of confusing the intrinsically wrong with the absolutely wrong. (H. ,T. McCloskey, *Meta-Ethics and Normatives Ethics,* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1969), p. 213.)

[5] G. E. M. Anscombe, 'Modern Moral Philosophy' (in Thomson and Dworkin (Ed.), *Ethics,* New York: Harper and Row, 1968, 186-210), p. 198.

[a] For a discussion of the history of the prohibition against lying in Catholic moral theology, see Sissela Bok, *Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Priv'Jte Life* (The Harvester Press, 1978), Ch. III.

[7] See, e.g., H. J. McCloskey, *op. cit.,* pp. 215-216.

justified on the Catholic view-that it would allow, for ex-
ample, obliteration bombing.

These criticisms are not incompatible. To believe that there
may be circumstances in which it would be right directly to
intend the death of an innocent person is not thereby to be
committed to the view that foreseen extensive killing is moral-
ly permissible. But whilst Catholic moral theory is committed
to (what many regard as) the morally abhorrent conclusions
of the first type, its criticism in this respect is misdirected at
the Doctrine of Double Effect. Any more than perfunctory
examination of the Doctrine and its place in Catholic moral
teaching illustrates this, and also that there is no basis for
concluding that practices like obliteration bombing are more
easily justified on this view than on other, currently more
popular, approaches to the moral evaluation of actions. In-
deed, the requirements for justification of obliteration bombing
appear stricter on Catholic moral theory than on either a con-
sequentialist, utilitarian calculation, or an approach via the
consideration of *prima facie* moral duties.

I argue in this paper that much concern with the Doctrine
of Double Effect is due to confusion and mistake. But there is
another source of interest amongst philosophers which, unlike
concern with morally abhorrent conclusions, is properly focused
on the Doctrine itself. The reaction of philosophers to the Doc-
trine has not universally been one of interest.   Some have im-
mediately dismissed it as merely a piece of sophistry [8]-unlike
St. Anselm's Ontological Argument, obviously not so charming
a joke. In contrast, the detailed attention which the Doctrine
has received from others has sometimes been due to the recog-
nition that, whilst not morally decisive, the central distinction
of the Doctrine appears to be morally important.

Consequently, in the third section of the paper, I discuss
two ways in which the Doctrine might be thought to contribute

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[8] See, e.g. H. L. A. Hart, 'Intention and Punishment' in his *Punishment
and Responsibiiity* (Oxford University Press, 1968)

to determining the relevance of direct intention in the appraisal of an agent's action. My first point is negative: that in the absence of a satisfactory characterization of the distinction between the directly intended and the merely foreseen, the most plausible interpretation seems inconsistent with actual rulings given under the Doctrine's conditions. The second claim is that, despite its difficulties, the Doctrine goes in the right direction in an important, unrecognized respect. The purpose of the Doctrine in Catholic moral theory is to give a ruling on the moral permissibility of certain actions with bad effects. Here an agent's lack of desire for a foreseen bad effect of his voluntary action is taken as relevant to his moral blameworthiness on its account. Lack of desire is not, as a recent philosophical trend would have it, a condition which relieves a person of moral responsibility for what he does or brings about.

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THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE EFFECT, AND MORALLY ABHORRENT CONCLUSIONS

(1) *The nafore of the Doctrine, and its place in Catholio moral theory*

It may be that a person can bring about a significant good (or, negatively, avoid a great evil) , only by performing an action from which a foreseen bad effect will almost certainly follow. Aristotle's example of the ship's captain who jettisons his cargo during a violent storm in order to save his ship and crew is one in this range [9], and other examples of necessary choice between evils are reasonably familiar.

In appraising most actions of this type, Catholic moral theory shares the common, reasonable view that the overall moral evaluation of one course of action, and its preference over

[9] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics,* Book III, lllOa, 8-20, *(The Works of Aristotle, Vol. IX, trans. (Ed.) Sir David Ross,* (Oxford University Press, 1975)).

another, involve careful consideration of the foreseeable con-
sequences. But whilst Aristotle's ship's captain clearly does
what any sensible man would do,1° many necessary choices
between undesired, undesirable alternatives are morally diffi-
cult for anyone who believes that actions of certain types are
intrinsically wrong, and practically difficult for those who must
consider that particular types of actions tend generally to have
adverse consequences.

The problems confronting those who attempt to adhere to
the absolute prohibitions of Catholic moral theory are more
complex still. In the most difficult cases the lesser physical
evil amongst the probable consequences of alternative courses
of action (for example, the death of one innocent person, as
compared with the deaths of five hundred) , is never permissib-
ly intended. The questions are obvious. Is it morally permis-
sible on this view for Aristotle's ship's captain to cut loose a
broken and trailing mast to which three men are clinging, in
order to save the ship and the remainder of the crew? Is it
permissible to kill the three men by using explosives, where
this is the sole means of removing the mast successfully? The
purpose of the Doctrine of Double Effect is a guide to action
in such situations of moral dilemma. The Doctrine outlines
four strict conditions under which it is said to be morally per-
missible for a person voluntarily to bring about a foreseen bad
effect of a type which is never permissibly intended. These
conditions are:

'(I) The act itself must be morally good or at least indifferent.
(2) The agent may not positively will the bad effert but may per-
mit it. If he could attain the good effect without the bad effect he
should do so. The bad effect is sometimes said to be indirectly
voluntary.
(3) The good effect must flow from the action at least as imme-
diately (in the order of causality, though not necessarily in the
order of time) as the bad effect. In other words the good effect must

10 *Ibid.,* Book III, lllOa, 10-11.

he produced directly by the action, not by the bad effect. Other-
wise the agent would be using a bad means to a good end, which is
never allowed.

(4) The good effect must be sufficiently desirable to compensate
for the allowing of the bad effect. In forming this decision many
factors must be weighed and compared, with care and prudence
proportionate to the importance of the case. Thus, an effect that
benefits or harms society generally has more weight than one that
affects only the individual, and an effect sure to occur deserves
greater consideration than one that is only probable; an effect of
a moral nature has greater importance than one that deals only
with material things ... '11

   Although strict, these four conditions are not intended to
give a precise ruling in all cases, and whilst some actions are
clearly impermissible under them, others require careful con-
sideration.

   The cutting loose of the ship's mast would not be morally
impermissible, but would require prudent weighing and com-
paring under condition (4). The permissibility of the resort to
explosives, however, is far more difficult to establish under
this condition, as the deaths of the three men would be cer-
tain. To shoot the three men would seem impermissible, where
the danger to the ship is due to their vigorous efforts to remain
afloat, and not to the trailing mast.

(2) *Morally abhorrent conclusions of the first type*

   Analyses of actions like the above commonly prompt the re-
sponse that the rulings given under the Doctrine are merely
instances of hairsplitting. Joseph Rickaby has replied that,
" *Hairsplitting,* so far as it is a term of real reproach, means
splitting the wrong hairs ",12 but one might offer a more sub-
stantial defence by pointing out that precision is important to
any moral theory which holds that an agent's intention is rele-

   nNew Oatholio Enoyolopaedia, Vol. 4. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967),
pp. 1020-1022.
   12 Rickaby, Joseph, *Moral Philo8ophy,* (London: Longman's Green & Co.
Ltd., 1929), p. 202 (emphasis original).

vant to establishing the morality of his action; and crucial where under some conditions intention determines permissibility. Indeed, given the central importance of intention, the opposite type of criticism may seem more appropriate: that the Doctrine's conditions, in so far as they require interpretation, are not precise enough. Undoubtedly the permissibility of some actions will be uncertain.

The charge of hairsplitting is most often a response to the fact that the Doctrine's conditions do not permit certain actions which many regard as right, if not obligatory. In some circumstances, to let a person die, or not to prevent his suffering, seems to many to be no morally worse-and indeed sometimes morally better-than intentional killing.13 Many who reject the rulings of the Doctrine do so on these grounds. Nevertheless, whilst objections such as these are not inappropriately levelled at Catholic moral teaching, they are misdirected at the Doctrine of Double Effect. To mention one clear example of this confusion:

In *CauS'ing D;eath and Saving Lives,* ¹⁴ Jonathan Glover characterizes the Doctrine as follows,

This doctrine can be summarized crudely as saying that it is always wrong intentionally to do a bad act for the sake of good consequences that will ensue, but that it may be permissible to do a good act in the knowledge that bad consequences will ensue ... ¹⁵

It is important, however, to recognize that whilst Glover's statement may be acceptable as a crude summary of one aspect of Catholic moral teaching, the source of this teaching is not the Doctrine of Double Effect. The Doctrine outlines those

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1a In cases of double effect the bad effect is sometimes said to be allowed or permitted, rather than intended, but the distinction drawn by the Doctrine between intended and merely foreseen killing is not, of course, the distinc·tion sometimes drawn in other contexts, between killing and letting die. On Thomistic moral theory, a person may kill another and yet not intend his death, and conversely, intend the death of someone whom he lets die.

14 Glover, *op. cit.,* Ch. 6.

1s *Ibid.* p. 87.

conditions under which it is ' permissible to do a good act in the knowledge that bad consequences will ensue.' The Catholic teachings that such acts may be permissible under some conditions, whereas ' it is always wrong intentionally to do a bad act for the sake of good consequences that will ensue ' are quite another matter.

The Doctrine is made necessary in Catholic moral theory by ihe acceptance of particular exceptionless moral rules, together with the need for guidance in problem cases. But the Doctrine i8 not identical with the view that certain actions are intrinsically wrong, nor with the' Pauline teaching that we may never do evil that good may come '.[16]

Confusion of the Doctrine with these two tenets of Catholic moral theory is further illustrated in Glover's subsequent discussion of what are probably the two most common objections (ostensibly) to the Doctrine: that it relies on a ' distinction without a difference ', and that it entails morally repugnant conclusions. In the first instance, the Doctrine distinguishes between cases of abortion, ruling that an abortion to save a woman's life is impermisible where the death of the foetus is an intended means. One example of such a case would be that of a pregnant woman with a weak heart, who will not survive until the foetus is viable outside the womb.[11] However, abortion is allowable under the conditions of the Doctrine where the death of the foetus is merely a foreseen consequence of an objectively good action-where, for example, the cancerous womb of a pregnant woman is removed.

Many would deny the moral importance of this distinction between these cases of abortion, and the reasons are obvious enough. As Glover notes, both acts have the same outcome: 'the death of the foetus and the saving of the mother'.

[16] G. E. M. Anscombe, 'War and Murder' (in Richard Wasserstrom (Ed.), *War and Morality, op. cit.),* p. 51.

[11] This example fits Foot's description of a 'situation in which nothing that can be done will save the life of the child and mother, but where the life of the mother can be saved by killing the child'. Foot, *op. cit.,* p. 69.

Glover's further point is that many would also regard one rul-
ing given under the Doctrine as immoral, on the grounds that
' the death of the mother is a worse outcome than the death of
the foetus'.   Glover again raises this second type of objection
in discussing H. L. A. Hart's example of an action which
'would have been condemned by the double effect doctrine '.[18]
In the example, a bystander responds to a request made by a
man trapped in a fire, with no hope of being freed, by shoot-
ing him in order to save him from further agony.

   The point is, however, that forceful as the objection might be
that Catholic moral theory is wrong in condemning the action
of the bystander, and that of the doctor who aborts a foetus in
order to save a woman's life, these actions are not condemned
by the Doctrine of Double Effect. They are condemned by the
Catholic teaching that it is never permissible intentionally. to
take innocent human life, and consequently not permitted un-
der the Doctrine's conditions.

   The consequences of this confusion of the Doctrine of Double
Effect with the tenets which make appeal to it necessary in
problem cases are not insignificant. Recognition of the nature
and place of the Doctrine greatly affects what can be regarded
as an acceptable response to what are considered its morally
abhorrent conclusions. The upshot of the confusion is that the
most con;imonly recognized problems for Catholic moral theory
in this area are rarely either thoroughly *or* effectively tackled
head-on.

   It is important that objections to what are regarded as the
morally abhorrent rulings (of this first type) be recognized for
what they are: the rejection of particular exceptionless moral
rules. (In the case of abortion, there is most often also the ob-
jection to the application of the rule forbidding the taking of
human life to all stages of foetal life.) The Doctrine is not it-
self an attempt to establish such rules, but a guiding principle
in cases in which application is difficult. The justification for

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1s Glover, *op. cit.,* p. 88.

such rules, where it is made explicit, is to be found in Thomistic Natural Law ethics, and not in an examination of the adequacy of the conditions of the Doctrine of Double Effect. [19] To attempt to show that the Doctrine cannot give a precise enough ruling on permissibility in certain problem cases goes no way towards the necessary critical examination of these rules. Further, it is the *clear* rulings of impermissibility under the conditions of the Doctrine which are most often rejected as morally abhorrent.

It might be replied that, without critical examination of their supposed justification, the conclusions required under the tenets of Catholic moral theory are sufficient to establish its unacceptability. Philippa Foot, who does not confuse the source of such rules, comments that it ' is a great objection to those who argue that the direct intention, of the death of an innocent person, is never justifiable that the edict will apply even' [20] in cases where nothing can be done to save a foetus, but the mother can be saved by aborting the foetus. But if the conclusions entailed by such maxims are alone sufficient to illustrate their unacceptability, one can only again wonder why those who find them patently false should bother to discuss the Doctrine of Double Effect.

(3) *Morally abhorrent conclusions of the second type*

To identify the Doctrine of Double Effect as the source of morally abhorrent conclusions of the first type is to misunderstand the nature and place of the Doctrine in Catholic moral theory. Nevertheless, these conclusions are justifiably attributed to this view. But the charge of moral unacceptability has also extended to the claim that appeal to the Doctrine

[19] Glover discusses some of the relevant arguments in Chapter 3 of *Oa,using Death and Saving Lives,* but does not identify any of these as possible sources of the Doctrine. Nor does he explicitly discuss Thomistic arguments for exceptionless moral rules. These latter arguments are discussed, however, by H. J. McCloskey, *op. cit.,* pp. 211-219.

[20] Foot, *op. cit.,* p. 69.

would justify far too much unintended, foreseen killing. Even
the practice of obliteration bombing has been thought permis-
sible, so long as a bomber's intention is primarily the destruc-
tion of some military target.

This particular criticism assumes, of course, that there can
be genuinely innocent non-combatants in a country at war,
and that to engage in obliteration bombing is immoral. I do
not question either of these assumptions, although debate on
these issues has been an important aspect of discussions of the
Catholic response to obliteration bombing. [21] Nor is it neces-
sary to tackle these issues in evaluating the extent to which
obliteration bombing would be permissible under the conditions
of the Doctrine of Double Effect. If it can be assumed that all
members of a population who are likely to be killed by bomb-
ing can legitimately be classified as combatants or unjust ag-
gressors, the Catholic need not consult the Doctrine as a guide.
 (Although the issue of the permissibility of bombing would
not thereby be straightforward.)   If there is no presumption
that the practice of obliteration bombing is immoral, the point
of the criticism of the Doctrine's supposed ruling collapses.

At least Oile Catholic philosopher has argued that the Doc-
trine's conditions would never permit obliteration bombing. [22]
Whilst this extreme claim does not hold, obliteration bombing
is no more easily justified on Catholic moral theory than on
any other which requires a prudent weighing-up of conse-
quences where actions involve serious, certain harm. Culpable
ignorance of both the purpose and the conditions of the Doc-
trine appears a generous explanation of the ready inclusion of
obliteration bombing amongst its positive rulings. The primary
consideration which contributes to the impermissibility of ob-
literation bombing is that it is strategic bombing, the stated

[21] See John C. Ford, S.J., 'The Morality of Obliteration Bombing', and
G. E. M. Anscombe, '·war and Murder' (both in Richard \Vasserstrom (Ed.),
War and Moraiity, op. cit.)
[22] John C. Ford, S.J. *Ibid.*

end of which is almost always wholesale destruction as a means to dispersing civilian populatinos, destroying economy, lowering civilian morale, etc. Thus, such bombing immediately violates the third condition of the Doctrine, which requires that ' the good effect must be produced directly by the action, not by the bad effect'. As Anscombe states, in defending the Doctrine in precisely this respect,

'It is nonsense to pretend that you do not intend to do what is the means you take to your chosen end.' [28]

Given also the condition that ' the act itself must be morally good or at least indifferent ', it is implausible to suggest that in this type of obliteration bombing the deaths of the innocent are simply unavoidable, unintended consequences of an otherwise morally good action.

Catholic moralists seem not entirely blameless on account of the frequent misinterpretation of the sense of ' intention ' in which it is held never to be permissible to intend the death of an innocent person. John C. Ford, S.J., who is aware of the strict use of ' intention ' in Catholic moral theory, includes the psychological impossibility of the bomber ' withholding his intention ' as he drops the bombs, as one reason why obliteration bombing could never be condoned. [24] But on this use of ' intention', critics would be right to claim that obliteration bombing, and much else besides, could be justified providing one could manage to summon only thoughts of possible good effects. However, the direction of one's attention away from the bad effect of one's action fails to meet the requirements of the strict sense of ' intention' of Catholic moral theory. [25] One important place in which this sense is outlined is in the second and third conditions of the Doctrine, where an agent is said to intend that which he positively wills as his chosen end, or as a means to

[2s] Anscombe, 'War and Murder', *op. cit.,* p. 51.

[24] Ford, *op. cit.,* p. 31.

[25] Anscombe discusses this ' perverse ' direction of intention doctrine in '\Var and Murder', *op. cit.,* p. 51.

his end. In stating that the use of ' double effect ' refers to the
two effects an action may produce, ' the one aimed at, and the
other foreseen but in no way desired ',[26] Foot isolates the sense
of intention which some exponents of the theory fail to ap-
preciate. In the next section, I argue that there is a serious
difficulty in determining an agent's intention consistently with
actual decisions given under the Doctrine's guidelines. Never-
theless, it is clearly not held that a person's intention is de-
termined by the direction of his thoughts in a way which makes
it possible, for example, for him not to intend the death of his
enemy as long as he concentrates on testing the accelerator
whilst aiming the car at him.

   Anscombe argues that it is abuse of the relevant concept of
intention which has led some into the error of believing that the
Doctrine would permit obliteration bombing. Undoubtedly this
is so, and, as Anscombe states, it is nonsense to pretend that the
deaths of the innocent are not intended where they are a means
to the desired end. But the deaths of innocent people do not
appear necessarily to be intended in all cases of obliteration
bombing. For example, it may be the case that a crucial mili-
tary target is either dispersed amongst a civilian population, or
impossible precisely to locate within a radius of ten miles. Ir-
respective of whether obliteration bombing in these cases could
be permitted under the other conditions of the Doctrine, ap-
peal to the Doctrine here need not involve the perverse ' direc-
tion of intention ' argument. Within the guidelines of the third
condition, it may be argued that the target is genuinely a mili-
tary one. As the evacuation of civilians prior to the bombing
would not thwart its purpose, wholesale slaughter is not a
means to the desired end.

   In examining the claim that the Doctrine would permit this
latter type of bombing, consideration of the fourth condition
assumes primary importance. This condition requires difficult,

   26 Foot, *op. cnt.*, p. 60.

sensitive nioral appraisal, but it cannot simply be ignored. Clearly, the Doctrine would not permit the dumping of industrial wastes into a river in order to cut costs, with the foreseen unintended consequence that those who drink the water or eat the fish will be poisoned. Foot's reminder that 'no one is suggesting that it does not matter what you bring about so long as you merely foresee and do not strictly intend the evil that follows ',[21] should be µnnecessary. Unfortunately, many quick-fire objections to the Doctrine make its reiteration not out of place.

The fourth condition does not give a precise ruling, but it offers specific guidelines which do count against the permissibility of obliteration bombing. The .most important consideration in determining whether the good effect is sufficiently desirable to compensate for the bad, is that the deaths of innocent people are certain. Further, the desired outcome of the bombing-which is not simply the destruction of the military target, but the estimated consequences of so doing-may be nebulous, or where not, only probable. As the deaths of innocent people are effects of a serious moral nature, the type of good effect necessary to compensate would be far more weighty than in a case where bombing involved solely the destruction of property. The Doctrine's second condition becomes relevant here, because, where hitting a military target unavoidably involves the destruction of the property of civilians, but could be secured without loss of life, the Doctrine requires the adoption of alternative means. Sometimes sabotage may be possible in preference to bombing, or the civilian population may be warned beforehand. In other cases, these measures may simply be tactically impossible or unrealistic. What the second condition clearly forbids is a situation of over-kill, where obliteration bombing is preferred when genuine military targets could effectively be hit by accurate pinpoint bombing, or where an

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[21] *Ibid.* p. 62.

atomic bomb is used in order to force the capitulation 0£ a
country already on the brink of surrender.

Ford interprets the second condition as requiring that the
good effect be strictly unattainable without the bad.[28] Al-
though the condition thus interpreted could be met in some
cases (for example, the removal of a cancerous womb), its ap-
plication would be impossible in most war situations, where
judgment as to whether the good effect could be achieved with-
out the bad would almost always involve considerations of
cost and probability. To wipe out a specific military target
might be a certain and effective way of ending a war, but it
need not be that the war could not have been won by five years
of prolonged struggle. To be realistic, the second condition
would have to refer to the immediate effects of the action,
whilst the purpose of the fourth condition would be to evaluate
their moral acceptability. Even so, considerations of cost and
probability would be relevant in the specific case. The resort
to sabotage might be a possible alternative to bombing a mili-
tary target, but the effectiveness of the former might be less
certain and its success far slower in achievement. **If** the second
condition of the Doctrine is interpreted as strictly as Ford sug-
gests, so that the course of action under consideration is the
sole means to achieving a highly desirable result, then the
range of actions for which the Doctrine could be a guide is
extremely limited. Whilst Thomistic exponents do state ex-
plicitly that the Doctrine is a guide in particularly difficult
cases, Ford's interpretation would confine its use to those cases
in the range of necessary choices between evils which are at
least morally perplexing.

Consideration of the permissibility of some actions under the
second and fourth conditions of the Doctrine is extremely dif-
ficult, but this difficulty is one which the Catholic shares with
others who consider themselves bound to evaluate the conse-
quences 0£ their actions in determining whether bringing about

28 Ford, *op. cit.,* p. 35-39.

serious harm is justifiable. The claim that obliteration
ing would always contravene the Doctrine's guidelines is far
too extreme, but the conditions in which it might be permis-
sible would be those in which most other moral theories short
of pacifism would cast the bombing as morally a serious option.
The further, perhaps more important point, is that in the ab-
sence of an absolute prohibition against intentionally killing
the innocent, others would seem also to be committed to ob-
literation bombing in an extreme case in which deaths are
clearly means to the desired end. There may rarely be cases
in which a utilitarian calculation, or the resolution of what are
seen as the *prima facie* duties to, say, prevent suffering on the
one hand and not to kill innocent persons on the other, could
acceptably be concluded in favor of obliteration bombing.
Perhaps these moral theories are only committed ' in principle '
to the permissibility of obliteration bombing in the manner in
which J. J. C. Smart hopes that the utilitarian is committed to
the rightness of punishing an innocent person.[29] Nevertheless,
one of the major criticisms of Catholic moral theory by those
who believe that letting innocent people die can be morally
worse than intentional killing is that the theory forbids the di-
rect intention of the death of an innocent person, even in a
case where this is a necessary means to saving thousands of
lives. That is a morally abhorrent conclusion of the first type.

III

THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE EFFECT, INTENTION AND RESPONSIBILITY

Whilst many would regard an agent's intention as clearly
not always decisive in determining the moral permissibility of
causing death, the contrast between some cases appears to

[29] J. J. C. Smart, 'An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics' (in
Smart and Williams, *Utilitarianism, For and Against,* (Cambridge University
Press, 1973)) pp. 69-72.

establish the central distinction of the Doctrine of Double
Effect as morally important.   Foot compares the much-dis-
cussed example of a judge who by framing an innocent man
can prevent a mob taking out revenge on a particular section
of the community, with the case of the driver of a runaway
tram who can only steer from one narrow track to another. In
the former case, the mob has five hostages who will be killed
if the culprit is not hanged, and in the latter case there are
five men working on one track and one man on the other. As
Foot states, in ' insisting that it is one thing to steer towards
someone foreseeing that you will kill him and another to aim
at his death as part of your plan ', the Doctrine appears to
offer an explanation as to ' why we should say, without hesita-
tion, that the driver should steer for the less occupied track,
while most of us would be appalled at the idea that the in-
nocent man could be framed '.[30]

Although Foot argues that the conflict between these judg-
ments can be resolved otherwise than by appeal to the Doctrine,
a large part of the interest in its central distinction has been
generated by this concern with the question of the relevance
of an agent's intention to moral decision. In this section I
examine two aspects of the Doctrine-the   pitfalls of its char-
acterization of intention, and the nature of its rulings-which
make it both unhelpful in one respect, and important in an-
other, as a basis for the discussion of this issue.

(1) *Intention*

The second and third conditions of the Doctrine outline the
notion of intention to which the tenets of Catholic moral
theology appeal. It is a mistake to identify intention as what
.Anscombe calls 'an interior act of mind which could be pro-
duced at will ',[31] but its characterization as that which the
agent wills either as his chosen end, or as a means to his end,

ao Foot, *op. ait.,* p. 63.

a1 Anscombe, 'War and Murder', *op. cit.,* p. 51.

simply postpones the problem of interpretation. For while.it will often be obvious when an agent can be said to have intended a bad effect of his action, in some difficult cases the question of how an agent's intention is to be determined in these terms will neither be mischievous nor naive. Here, the official rulings given under the Doctrine would seem the obvious source of a fuller explanation of what is thought necessary for an agent properly to be judged to have chosen, or willed, a bad effect either as his end or as a means to it. Unfortunately, the most plausible interpretation of the second and third conditions of the Doctrine appears inconsistent with actual rulings purportedly given under them.

To begin with two previously mentioned examples, where the Doctrine is said to give a ruling of permissibility in the first case and impermissibility in the second. In the first case, a pregnant woman has a cancerous uterus. Not to remove the cancer will result in the deaths of both woman and foetus, but removing the cancer will save the woman. The only way to ensure that all cancer is removed is to perform a hysterectomy-with the foetus's death a certain result. In the second case, a woman with a weak heart becomes pregnant, and will not survive unless the foetus is aborted at an early stage. Here the early removal of the foetus will give the woman a good chance of survival. The death of the foetus is inevitable.

The hysterectomy in the first case, and the abortion in the second, are actions of double effect: both result in the death of the foetus and the saving of the woman's life. But whilst the hysterectomy in the first case has been deemed permissible under the conditions of the Doctrine, the abortion in the second case has not. Given that in both cases the death of the foetus is inevitable whatever action is performed, it can reasonabiy be assumed that the fourth commensurabi.lity conditibn of the Doctrine is irrelevant to the distinction between them. That the issue of intention appears alone relevant to the distinction between these cases makes their examination illu-

minating, despite what would otherwise be the complicating
feature of the controversial status of the foetus.

   Removal of a cancerous womb in order to save a woman's
life would more than qualify as an action which is ' itself . . .
morally good '. But when such an action also has a foreseen
bad effect-the death of the foetus-its moral character is said
to be not precisely determined when evaluated in the abstract,
and directed one way or the other by the agent's intention. [32]
In the first case, the hysterectomy is said to be permissible be-
cause its immediate aim is the removal of the cancer. The
death of the foetus is not a means to this nor to the long-term
end of saving the woman's life. Here the inevitability of the
death of the foetus is thought irrelevant to the issue of whether,
in the very strictest sense, the death is intended. Nevertheless,
the second condition has an important role to play in this con-
text, and it is here that the plausibility of this strict inter-
pretation of intention crumbles, and becomes inconsistent with
the actual rulings given under the conditions of the Doctrine.

   The second condition of the Doctrine requires an agent to
bring about the good effect without the bad effect where this
is possible. Initially, the fulfillment of this condition appears
lo have great bearing on the issue of intention. For example,
if it had been possible to save the life of the foetus after the
surgery (say, by placing it in an artificial womb) and this op-
tion was deliberately not chosen, it would be implausible to
maintain that the foetus's death was not intended. In making
a similar point about the driver's intention in her example of
the runaway tram, Foot notes that if by some remote chance
the man on the narrow track manages to escape death as the
vehicle hurtles by him, the ' driver ... does *not* then leap off
and brain him with a crowbar '.[33] In contrast, the death of the

[32] Thomistic accounts of the moral evaluation of actions are extremely
similar, but for a philosophically sophisticated account see Joseph Rickaby,
Moral Philosoph'JJ, op. cit.

[33] Foot, *op. cit.,* p. 63 (emphasis original).

innocent man is an important, necessary part of the judge's plan.

Foot's is an important point about the strict interpretation of intention, and one which enhances the plausibility of a distinction which may otherwise seem incredible. But the unavoidable reliance on this interpretation of intention allows far more than the Doctrine of Double Effect has been said to permit. This can now be illustrated by examining the reasons for the ruling against the abortion in the case of the woman with the weak heart. Abortion in this case is deemed impermissible under the third condition of the Doctrine. Here the good effect-the saving of the woman's life-is produced by the bad effect-the removal of the foetus. On any reasonable interpretation of the conditions under which an effect is brought about as a means to an end, the second case clearly contravenes the third condition; and most would agree that there is a distinction between the cases in terms of this condition, even though many would deny its moral importance here. The difficulty, however, is that the removal of a foetus from a woman is not absolutely prohibited in Catholic moral teaching, even in a case (for example, the first) in which the death of the foetus is a certain result. What is forbidden is the *intention of the c/;eath* of the foetus-either asthe desired end, or as a means to it. But how is this to be determined?

Some have attempted to discredit the Doctrine on precisely this point by arguing that whilst in the second case the removal of the foetus is clearly a means to saving the woman's life, strictly its death is not. After all, the surgeon's aim would equally well be achieved if the foetus could successfully be placed into an artificial womb. Once this point is made, it is apparent that whilst the answer to the question, 'Would the agent's end be thwarted if the death did not occur?', marks an important difference between the intentions of Foot's tram driver and judge, it cannot be relied upon as a satisfactory criterion for determining intention. On this interpretation, the

Doctrine could be used to justify almost any case of killing in
which the death is not strictly required for the achievement of
the agent's aim. [34] If, for example, a doctor gives a terminally
ill suffering patient what is normally a lethal dose of some
drug, and in some inexplicable way the dose cures the patient
instead of killing him, the doctor does not then ensure that the
patient dies some other way. [35] Here, not only is it implausible
to suggest that in giving the patient the drug the doctor did
not intend his death, but euthanasia in such cases is impermis-
sible on Catholic moral teaching precisely because it is held
that the patient's death is intended.

  Catholic moralists have rightly objected to the sophistical
manoeuvre whereby the action is said to be intended under one
of its descriptions-the   removal of the foetus from the womb-
and not under another-the   killing of the foetus. One cannot
maintain that one did not intend the death of an innocent man,
but rather just to blow him to pieces. [36] But in order to resist
this particular distortion of the notion of intention, they must
appeal either to something like Foot's suggestion of a' criterion
of " closeness " ... [whereby] anything very close to what we
are literally aiming at counts as if part of our aim ',[37] or alter-
natively, to Philip Devine's requirement that we be able to
refer to a 'non-fantastic scenario' in which the good effect is
achieved without the bad. [38] But these suggestions cannot as-
sist those who wish to maintain the account of intention out-

[34] H. L. A. Hart has suggested this. See Foot, *op. cit.,* p. 61.

[35] I owe this example to Peter Singer.

[36] Foot, *op. cit.,* p. 61.

[37] *Ibid.,* p. 62.

[38] Philip E. Devine, 'The Principle of Double Effect', *Amerioan Journal
of Jurisprudence,* Vol. 19, 1975. Devine also argues in this paper that an
exceptionless moral rule with respect to killing the innocent ought to be
accepted on utilitarian grounds, as a practical absolute. However, this view
would appear to be open to the types of objections which led Ross to develop
his theory of *prima facie duties.* (W. D. Ross, *The Right and the Good,* (Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, 1930) and which J. J. C. Smart has successfully
levelled against Rule Utilitarianism   (J. J. C. Smart, *op. cit.,* pp. 42-57).

lined by the rulings of the Doctrine. On this view, not only may an agent be said not strictly to intend an effect of his action which is certain to occur, but as Devine notes, reference to non-fantastic scenarios would mean that what an agent intends depends to a large extent on external factors (for example, the state of medical technology) .

The plausibility of the distinction between the hysterectomy in the :first case and the abortion in the case of the woman with the weak heart, depends upon the removal of the foetus (which ensures its death) being a means to saving the woman's life in the second case. But then it seems impossible to reconcile this interpretation of the distinction between the intended and the merely foreseen, with the claimed permissibility of abortion in cases of ectopic pregnancy where rupture of the Fallopian tube due to the developing foetus will cause the woman's death. Although abortion in ectopic pregnancy has not always been accepted as permissible in Catholic moral teaching, it appears now commonly to be accepted on the grounds that a pregnant Fallopian tube will be in a pathological condition before it ruptures. [39] But in terms of the Doctrine's second condition, this is insufficient justification for removing the Fallopian tube. The Doctrine would not permit surgery which would kill the foetus if, although necessary for some good end, it could safely be postponed until the foetus became

A hysterectomy for the purpose of removing a :fibroid uterine tumor would be impermissibly performed on a pregnant woman if there was no danger to her life.

What is distinctive about ectopic pregnancy is the inevitable death of the foetus, and the fact that the woman can be saved by removing the Fallopian tube before it ruptures. But these grounds for the abortion seem indistinguishable from those in

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[39] This point, and the following, are discussed by Susan Teft Nicholson, in *Abortion and the Roman Catholic Church* (J. R. E. Studies in Religious Ethics), Knoxville: Religious Ethics, 1978), p. 110. Unfortunately I have not yet been able to obtain this book, but see J. Teichman's detailed review of its contents in *Philosophical Quarterly,* 1979, p. 376.

the case of woman with the weak heart.   Still, it is argued that
there remains an important   difference between the *way* in
which the death of the foetus is brought   about in the two
cases. With ectopic pregnancy, emphasis is usually placed on
the fact that a diseased Fallopian tube is removed-not   simply
the foetus-the   removal of the Fallopian tube being aligned
with the hysterectomy   in the case of the pregnant   woman with
a cancerous uterus.   (Presumably this is an oblique reference
to the first condition, whereby, the action must be good in it-
self, or at least indifferent.)   But the similarity between these
two cases in this respect is hardly even illusory. Whilst it is
possible to argue with some point that the surgeon's intention
in removing the diseased womb in the latter case is not (strict-
ly) the removal of the foetus, this claim is incredible where
the presence of the foetus either constitutes, or significantly
contributes to, the pathological condition. Further, despite the
strict interpretation   of intention as a means suggested by the
traditional   distinction between the initial two cases, the judg-
ment of permissibility has also extended to the performance of
a hysterectomy   in a case in which a growing foetus caused
varicose veins in the womb to rupture and the woman to
hemorrhage dangerously. [40] It is difficult to find the relevant
respect in which these two cases differ from that of the preg-
nant woman with the weak heart.

The difficulty of reconciling actual rulings given under the
Doctrine with any reasonable interpretation   of intention is
broadened by the fact that the Doctrine has also been used to
justify killing in self-defense.[41] But in some cases, there are no
grounds for not attributing   the innocence of the foetus which
endangers the woman's life to aggressors. If a madman wields
an axe at me, it is said to be permissible for me to do whatever
is necessary to save my life. Where I am able to disable the
man by shooting him in the leg, the second condition of the

[40] *Ibid.*
[41] See, e.g., Anscombe, 'War and Murder',   *op. cit.*

Doctrine requires that I do not aim at his heart. But if my only weapon ·is a stick of dynamite, presumably I am permitted to throw it. Here I may kill the man, even though (unlike some foetus) he may live and become sane if I do not. **If** it is possible for me to kill someone in taking necessary steps to protect my life, without thereby intending his death, why not the pregnant woman with the weak heart?

(2) *Responsibility.*

Despite the difficulty of extracting an acceptable account of intention from the rulings given under the Doctrine, I now wish to emphasize that an agent's not having intended a bad effect of his action which he foresaw as certain or highly probable, is not held to eliminate or lessen his responsibility for it. [42] Many would disagree with the Thomistic view that an agent's intention is crucial in determining the permissibility of some actions of double effect. Nevertheless, in casting an agent's lack of desire for a bad effect as relevant to his moral blameworthiness on its account, and not to the issue of his moral responsibility, the Doctrine draws attention to an important and often seriously neglected distinction. Within the scope of this paper, I cannot establish in detail either the necessity for the distinction between moral blameworthiness and moral responsibility, or the full implications of its neglect in some recent philosophical accounts of responsibility. [43] However, in the concluding part of this section, I indicate the importance of recognising this distinction in the evaluation of actions which involve necessary choice between evils-irrespective of whether

[42] H. J. McCloskey notes that 'At least one ingenious exponent of the theory tried to deal with the embarassing problem of abortion to save a mother's life, by suggesting that the foetus which endangers the mother is an unjust aggressor, but his suggestion has been rejected by most exponents of this theory.' H,, J. McCloskey, *op. cit.,* p. 216.

[43] Although I have done so elsewhere, in *Responsibility* (M. A. Thesis, La Trobe University, 1980).

such actions meet the conditions of the Doctrine of Double effect.

Contrary to popular belief, the purpose of the Doctrine of Double Effect is not to give a ruling on responsibility. **If** it were, we would be justified in levelling a criticism against it along the lines of Henry Sidgwick's claim that, 'we cannot evade responsibility for any foreseen bad consequences of our acts by the plea that we felt no desire for them, either for their own sake or as a means to ulterior ends '.[44] As it stands Sidgwick's claim is too extreme. We are responsible for our voluntary actions and for some of their consequences; and although the relationship between the probability which can reasonably be attached to a consequence, and the agent's responsibility for it, is complex, we cannot justifiably be held responsible for all foreseen consequences of our actions. But these points are not issues here, as the Doctrine is intended as a guide in cases where voluntary actions have certain or highly' probable bad effects. The force of Sidgwick's claim about such cases would be that an agent's lack of desire for the bad effect, either for its own sake or as a means to ulterior ends, is insufficient to negate his responsibility for it.

Sidgwick's view of the relationship between an agent's responsibility for the foreseen bad consequences of his actions, and his desire for them either as means or ends, is not inconsistent with the ruling given by the Doctrine. The Doctrine is intended as a guide to the moral permissibility of actions with serious bad effects. Thomistic exponents never claim that an agent is not responsible for the bad effects of morally permissible actions. The bad effect is always said to be at least indirectly voluntary; and although Henry Keane is rare among Thomists in his explicit formulation of the question in terms of responsibility and not in terms of voluntary action, his answer to the question, ' Am I responsible for the evil effect? ',

44 Henry Sidgwick, *The Methods of J!Jthios* (6th edition)   (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1901), Book 1, Ch. V, Note 1.

is that to which the account is committed. [45] Keane separates
the issue of the moral permissibility of the action from the ques-
tion of the agent's responsibility for the evil consequence:

'In this type of action (i.e. inevitable evil consequence) a two-
fold question arises: (1) Am I responsible for an evil consequence
which I foresee is bound to, or probably will, result from a good act
of mine?   Am I bound in view of such evil effect, to refrain
from the act in question?
The answer to (I) is sufficiently obvious. I am responsible. There
is a causal relationship between my act and its consequence. As I
am responsible for the act I am also for that which directly follows
from it.' [46]

Thomists regard an agent as responsibile for the foreseen,
willed consequences of his voluntary action, irrespective of
whether he felt a desire for them either as ends or as means
to ends. The purpose of the Doctrine of Double Effect, and
the significance of establishing intention in the strict sense,
is in determining the answer to (2).

To stress this explicit separation of the responsibility and
moral permissibility is to expose both a serious misinterpreta-
tion of Thomistic moral theory, and some very confused think-
ing about responsibility in cases of necessary choice between
evils. In establishing the first of these claims, it should be
noted that misinterpretation of the Doctrine as giving a rul-
ing on responsibility is not confined to the ranks of the unini-
tiated. In so far as she claims to adhere to orthodox Catholic
moral theology, Anscombe misunderstands it when she criti-
cises Sidgwick's 'thesis that it does not make any difference
to a man's responsibility for something that he foresaw, that he

[45] Characteristically, Thomistic accounts are of the conditions of voluntary
action, and use of ' responsible ' is not common. But ' responsible ' is used
in the context of voluntary action, particularly in the works of recent
Thomistic writers who discuss responsibility in terms of the conditions of
voluntary action. See, for example, Austin Fagothey, S.J., *Right and Rea-
son,* (5th edition), (St. Louis: the C. V. :Mosby Company, 1972), Ch. 2.

[46] Henry Keane, *A Primer of Moral Philosophy,* Catholic Social Guild, Ox-
ford, (New York: P. J. l{enedy & Sons).

felt no desire for it, either as an end or as a means to an end.' [47] Anscombe identifies Sidgwick as the source of the now commonly accepted view of responsibility which she rejects. However, intention in the strict sense is not included in traditional Thomistic moral theory as relevant to determining responsibility. In claiming otherwise, Anscombe's divergence with Thomists on the issue of responsibility is substantial. (Ironically, Sidgwick's difference with the Thomistic conditions of responsibility is a verbal disagreement over the use of 'intention '.[48] In stating, ' whereas I should contend that a man is responsible for the bad consequences of his bad actions, but gets no credit for the good ones; and contrariwise is not responsible for the bad consequences of good actions ... ',[49] Anscombe casts being responsible for something as the opposite of getting credit for it. But whilst it is reasonable to hold that there are asymmetrical conditions for attaining moral credit in the case of good actions, and its opposite in the case of bad,[50] it is unacceptable to view responsibility and moral blameworthiness as indistinguishable. A person may be responsible for a good action, and for the good consequences of his actions. Further, to establish that it was morally acceptable for a person to bring about an evil is not thereby to relieve him from responsibility for what he has brought about, unless one holds the implausible view that a person's responsibility is determined by the moral permissibility of his action. But this latter view appears to be one which Anscombe holds, and in doing so she confuses the concept of responsibility with

[47] Anscombe, 'Modern Moral Philosophy', *op. cit.,* p. 199.

[48] Sidgwick includes 'under the term 'intention' all the consequences of an act that are seen as certain or probable', his reason being 'that we cannot evade responsibility for any foreseen bad consequences of our acts by the plea that we felt no desire for them .. .' Sidgwick, *op. cit.,* p. 202. Sidgwick's account of the moral appraisal of actions is, of course, quite different from the Thomistic one.

[49] Anscombe, *op. cit.,* p. 200.

[50] See Eric D'Arcy, *Human Acts,* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963) for a discussion of this issue.

that of moral blameworthiness or fault. Whether or not Anscombe is the source of this view of responsibility, it has plagued recent influential discussions of cases which involve necessary choice between evils.

Obviously, in the evaluation of many cases of this type a person's responsibility for the bad effect of his action is denied on the grounds that the action, or omission, was not fully voluntary. A person's being in a situation of moral dilemma, duress, or threat may affect his capacities adversely, so that he is rendered incapable of voluntary action or choice. Responsibility may appropriately be denied on these grounds, although decision here is often difficult (for example, we need also to establish in such a case that a person was not responsible for the incapacity). But 3:ppeal to these relieving conditions *is* distinct from the claim that an agent's lack of desire for a had consequence of his action (as a means or end) is itself sufficient to relieve him from responsibility for it. When baldly stated, this latter claim seems incredible-and indeed one reason why it often goes unnoticed is that in many cases of necessary choice between evils there is at least some suggestion of compulsion. Nevertheless, the concepts of responsibility to which Anscombe, and more recently, Jonathan Glover,[51] and Robert Young,[52] appeal, appear to allow that without any suggestion of diminished capacity, an agent may be relieved from responsibility simply by virtue of (1) his choice being restricted to a range of undesirable, undesired alternatives, and (2) his being (to use F. H. Bradley's phrase [53]) ' compelled to an alternative ' by such considerations as his set of priorities, the cost of alternatives, the existence of valuable opportunities, and so on.

[51] Jonathan Glover, *Responsibility,* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), pp. 15-19.

[52] Robert Young, *Freedom, Responsibility and God* (New York: Macmillan Press, 1975), pp. 6-17.

[53] F. H. Bradley, Notes to Essay 1, in his *Ethical Studies* (2nd edition) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 44.

An agent's choices having been restricted by circumstances
outside his control, to a range of undesired, undesirable alter-
natives, is often justifiably taken as constituting mitigating
circumstances in relation to the harm caused. But a distinc-
tion between responsibility and moral blameworthiness is nec-
essary here if we are to be consistent in our judgments about
responsibility. The view that an agent, e.g. a speeding driver,
must desire a consequence of his action in order to be respon-
sible for it is unacceptable; and unless he is mentally incapaci-
tated, a captain who reluctantly abandons members of his
crew is responsible and blameworthy for his action and its
consequences, even though being in the situation of having to
choose something adverse may not have been due to any prior
fault or lack of due care on his part.

Most of us consider ourselves obliged to avoid bringing about
pain and other evils. But often when we set out to achieve
what we value and consider right, there are no means avail-
able but ones with untoward results for which we have_no de-
sire. **It** is implausible, though, to claim that where this is so
we are not responsible for the evil deliberately brought about,
or that our responsibility for it is lessened, by virtue of either
the fact that we felt no desire for it, or the fact that it was an
unavoidable consequence of what we considered right or more
important.   Both these things may truthfully be claimed of
the action of the ship's captain who reluctantly abandons his
crew in order to save a valuable cargo of tea. Most would
judge such an action to be morally reprehensible, and the re-
verse action to be morally justified. But to judge that this
ship's captain is responsible, whereas the captain who jettisons
the cargo is not, is to base judgments about an agent's respon-
sibility not upon whether or not his action fulfilled certain
conditions, but (it would seem solely in this case) upon one's
moral evaluation of it. The ship's captain who chooses to lose
his cargo rather than his ship and crew has, in most circum-
stances, made the right choice. Here, the reasonable judgment
that the captain is not morally blameworthy for the resulting

harm is based on a particular moral evaluation of his action-
namely, that it was morally justified. In Aristotle's words, this
action and similar actions are ' worthy of choice at the time
when they are done ',' for in the abstract no one throws goods
away voluntarily, but on condition of its securing the safety
of himself and his crew any sensible man does so '.[54] When re-
sponsibility is denied in many cases of choice between evils,
often it can justifiably be claimed that such actions are morally
justified-that particular acts which cause harm, which would
otherwise be morally wrong, are right-given the circumstances
in which they are performed, or the good (s) which they
achieve. [55] But a judgment that an agent was not morally
blameworthy in bringing about harm in order to achieve a
desired result is not exclusively a consequence of the view that
his action was morally justified. A person's choice and action
may be wrong, yet morally excusable because the result of
morally genuine or defensible choices. Where someone acts in
accordance with a set of priorities which I consider mistaken,
I may regard his action as wrong, and yet find it understand-
able given the circumstances. Where an agent acts from con-
scientious or reasonable values-albeit ones which I do not
share-again the judgment that he is morally to blame may
not appropriately accompany the view that his action was
wrong.

Considerations justifiably regarded as excusing in this latter
context excuse from moral blameworthiness. Whether or not
such considerations are regarded as excuses of this type, or as
justifications, depends upon our moral evaluation of the
agent's action, and not upon the agent's degree of responsibil-
ity for what he did. Sometimes we may be uncertain, or dis-
agree, about an action's being justified, or alternatively, moral-
ly excusable on the above grounds. The storm may abate a

[54] Aristotle, *op. cit.,* 1 llOa, 10.

[55] E,ric D'Arcy makes this point about the nature of moral justification.
P'Arcy, *op. cit.,* pp. 77-BO.

few minutes after the captain throws the cargo overboard.
Those who regard his action as right, as justified, given the
desperate nature of the circumstances, and those who believe
that the circumstances excuse, whilst believing that, neverthe-
less, the captain ought to have held out for a longer period of
time, differ in evaluation of the agent's action. In neither case
need the agent be deemed morally blameworthy for what he
did, but he is nevertheless responsible, and a fit subject of moral
appraisal on its account. Further, that this is so makes it ap-
propriate to isolate this type of responsibility as *moral,* and
not simply personal, agent responsibility.

IV

CONCLUSION

The reaction of moral philosophers to the Doctrine of Double
Effect has been mixed, and on a number of levels. The Doc-
trine has been dismissed by some as merely a piece of sophistry;
and carefully considered by others because its emphasis on the
distinction between the intended and the foreseen effects of a
voluntary action appears to be morally important in some
cases, and obviously irrelevant in others. At the same time,
the Doctrine is generally regarded as entailing morally shock-
ing conclusions-both in respect of permitting too little in-
tentional killing on the one hand, and too much foreseen killing
on the other.

Whilst the Doctrine does not deserve much of the attention
which it has attracted for the above reasons, philosophers would
do well to interest themselves in its distinction between respon-
sibility and moral permissibility m the appraisal of actions
with foreseen bad effects.

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A PHILOSOPHICAL PRECURSOR TO THE THEORY
OF ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE IN
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

N THIS PAPER I wish to present an important precursor, hitherto unnoticed, to the theory of essence and existence in the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. It comes from an ancient pagan context and throws considerable light upon the whole problem of whether the distinction between essence and existence is real or not. I have in mind a series of passages from the *Enneads* of Plotinus; their principal motifs are significantly repeated in the anonymous commentary on the *Parmenides* attributed to Porphyry,[1] and they are further systematized in the work of Proclus. Indeed too, I think, the whole context of Boethius's *De Hebdomadibus* in a more limited fashion owes much to Plotinus here.[2] What I wish to show, however, is not simple textual correspondence, but a similar philosophical approach to a similar problem. Before coming to Plotinus, I shall first present the principal points of the Thomistic distinction and then attempt to relate this to the wider problems of nature and grace, natural capacity and the vision of God's essence. For the sake of simplicity and brevity I shall confine myself almost exclusively to the question of composition in either immaterial substances or created substances in general.

Unlike the Spanish philosopher Avicebron and all the Neoplatonists, St. Thomas held that spiritual substances (human souls and angels) do not include matter. Instead, following

[1] By P. Hadot, *Porphyre et Victorinus,* Volumes I and II, Etudes Augustiniennes, Paris, 1968.
[2] On this see below.

Avicenna and St. Aihert, they are compounded. of essence, or form, and being *(esse),* and these elements are related to each other as potency to act.

In an early work, *De Ente et Essentia,* Thomas argues for the distinction as follows: every essence can be understood without knowing anything about its existence. One can know, for example, what a man or a phoenix is without knowing whether or not it actually exists. Therefore existence is different from essence, unless there is something whose essence is existence, in which case this Being is one and primary. In all created things, however, existence is not contained in the notion of essence and must, therefore, come from outside the essence and enter into composition with it. Only in God are existence and essence identical *(De Ente,* C. VI, pp. 34, 6-35, 2; Roland-Gosselin).

Is this distinction real or conceptual? In the *De Veritate* [3] and the *Commentary on the Sentences* [4] these two intrinsic principles of the creature are said to be really distinct. But in the *De Ente* this is not specified.

What does the distinction mean? Essence refers to what is expressed by the definition of a thing; existence, or Being, indicates that the individual is and that it depends upon a prime cause. In every created spiritual substance we find a quality, the substance itself and its existence which is not the substance (quod non est substantia ejus; *Contra Gent.* II, 53) . Intelligence receives its existence from God, but its essence is identical with that which it is *(De Ente,* C. IV, p. *35,* 4-6, R-G). Every creature possesses existence, therefore, by participation; [5] and the substance that participates in existence is something other than the participated existence. Hence, the essence stands as potency to the act of existence which it receives from God. The existence is " that by which it is ", the essence " what

sne Veritate 27, 1 ad 8; 1, 1 ad 3 (sed contra).
„ *In I Sent.:* d. 13, q. 1, a. 3.
s *ST,* I, 61, 2, *resp.: De Spir. Oreaturis,* 1, 1, 14.

it is". By essence Thomas means not the abstract universal essence, even though it can be grasped abstractly, but the actual essence as found in things. Created substances, then, are composed of " quod est " and something added to them, *esse,* or " quo est ". Boethius [6] had ·used these terms (*quod est* and *esse)* to distinguish the concrete subject and nature in finite things (cf. *De Hebdomad., PL.* 64, 1311C). For him all things are good in their own substantial existence only because their ' ipsum esse' derives from the First Good, whereas the First Good is good simply and solely in the fact that it exists. [7]

Siger of Brabant, who found the distinction between essence and existence difficult to understand, argued that if existence is not the thing itself, nor its parts (matter and form in material substances) , nor an accident superadded to the created thing (as in the case of Avicenna), it must be a fourth nature. [8] In this case existence will be something over and above the essence. St. Thomas, however, holds not only that existence is constituted by the principles of essence (" sed quasi constituitur per principia essentiae ", *In IV JYJetaph. lect.* 2; ed. Cathala, no. *558)* and that in the thing it is "actus entis *resultans* ex principiis rei" *(ln III Sent.* d. 6, q. 2, a. 2, Resp.; ed. Moos, III, 238) , but that whatever is in something and distinct from its essence, belongs to the thing only accidentally (quidquid est in aliquo praeter essentiam ejus, inest ei acci-

[6] On this see generally P. Hadot, " La distinction de l'()tre et de l'etant dans le *De Hebdomadibus* de Boece ", *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* (ed. P. Wilpert, Berlin, 1963), II, pp. 147-153. The wider scope of my present subject prevents any discussion here of Hadot's position as regards Boethius, or Porphyry and Marius Victorinus (see note 1 above). Nonetheless, I hope to demonstrate that the general character of the distinction between *id quod est* and *esse* is already developed in some passages in the *Enneads.*

[7] Later, in thinkers like St. Albert, for instance, these terms are brought to refer specifically to essence and existence in immaterial substance: "Ex intellectu enim possibili . . . est natura intellectualis id quod est, sed ex agente est perfectio ipsius secundum esse intellectuale in actu" (cited in Le *"De JJJnte et JJJssentia*", Roland-Gosselin, p. 177, note 6).

[8] *Quaestiones in Metaph., Introd.,* p. 16, 29-32 (Graiff).

dentaliter. *Comp. Theol.* C. LXVI) . How can Being be both essential and accidental? How can it be both prior and posterior?

Fr. Owens [9] has applied the distinction of two lines of causality, formal and efficient, to this problem (according to the principle: esse per se consequitur formam creaturae, supposito tamen influxu Dei: sicut lumen sequitur diaphanum aeris supposito tamen influxu solis. *ST.* I, 104, 1 ad 1) . He has shown that in the line of formal causality created essence holds Being as something essential to it, so that the form, as subject to Being, determines that being (. . . " Quia tamen quaelibet forma est determinativa ipsius esse, nulla earum est ipsum esse, sed est habens esse" *De Hebdomad. lectio* 2, n. 34) [10] and exercises a formal causality upon an act which is added to it and is other than it (. . . esse enim quod huiusmodi est, est aliud secundum essentiam ab eo cui additur determinandum, *De Pot.;* VII, 2, ad 9) ; whereas in the line of efficient causality, since it has to be produced by something other than itself, its being is accidental to essence. Being, therefore, is essential and accidental from different viewpoints: " **It** is the same *being* that is caused formally by the essence and efficiently by the external cause." [11]

But how can we grasp essence and existence as intrinsic principles, if existence " advenit ab aliquo principio extrinseco sicut lumen in aere ex influentia solis" *(De Ente.* C. IV, p. *35,* 4-6) ? The two positions, extrinsic and intrinsic, seem to go together: "whatever does not belong to the notion of essence", Thomas states, " hoc est adveniens extra et faciens compositionem cum essentia" (ibid., p. 34) . Three notions are of importance here: *esse* is (1) an extrinsic principle (extra) , (2) a secondary

[9] J. Owens, " The .Accidental and Essential Character of Being in the Doctrine of St. Thomas .Aquinas", *Mediaeval Studies* 20, 1958, 1-40. See also "Quiddity and Real Distinction in St. Thomas .Aquinas", *Mediaeval Studies,* 27' 1965, pp. 1-22.

[10] R. Spiazzi, *Opuscula Theologica* 2 (Rome, 1954), p. 398.

[11] Owens, *op. ait.,* p. 40.

principle of movement and also constitutive of the whole
created thing, that is, " adveniens"   and "faciens compo-
sitionem" connote agency or efficiency movement, and (8) an
intrinsic principle. From the point of view of ' movement ',
therefore, it appears that *esse* is added from above, not in the
sense that essence is independent, but rather because existence
is prior and more fundamental to the nature of the whole ob-
ject. The distinction between essence and existence is not one
between a more or less abstract concept, essence, and an intui-
tion, *esse,* but between an intrinsic nature and the objective
meaning it possesses: this latter is in some sense both intrinsic
and extrinsic, and from it the essence is not in fact abstractly
separate.   Existence, therefore, is creative. **It** expresses the
pure value of activity. [12] Secondly, existence includes, and cor-
relates, the activity of God and creature (it is a ' line ' between
cause and effect, immediately in the case of the efficient cause,
mediately in that of the formal) .[13] Thirdly, the motive activity
of God and creature is distinguished: when viewed in terms of
the effect, existence is internal to the creature, yet it possesses
 (implicitly in the *language* of St. Thomas) a movement, a sort
of agency in that it " comes from " God and is ' added to ' the
essence.

  This dynamic notion of being as a simple perfection which is
prior to essence, which enters into composition with it and
which also points beyond itself, qua created *esse,* to *lpsum esse,*
is very much connected with the problems of nature and grace,
natural capacity and the vision of God's essence, the goodness

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[12] The idea is perhaps akin to the sense in which Aristotle states that
waking, perception and thinking, as it were the existential acts of the essence,
are pleasant because of God's perfect actuality *(Metaph.* XII, 7, 1072 B 13-
18). However this depends upon the implications of *lhii.*   and perhaps
the statement should be taken to be a general remark on the link between
pleasure and activity rather than a statement that our pleasure in waking or
thinking depends upon God's actuality.

  [13] *De Ver.* 27 1 ad 3; ed. Mandonnet I 693 A.

of created being and divine goodness. St. Thomas speaks in similar terms of grace:

Since grace is above human nature, it cannot be a substance or a substantial form, but only the accidental form of the soul. That which is substantial in God becomes accidental in the soul that participates in divine goodness.

And he continues:

Accordingly, therefore, because soul participates imperfectly in divine goodness, which is grace, it has existence in the soul in a more imperfect manner than the soul subsists in herself; it is, however, more noble than the soul, inasmuch as it is an expression or participation of divine goodness, though not in its mode of being (. . . inquantum est expressio vel participatio divinae bonitatis: non autem quantum ad modum essendi) .[14]

Participation involves a reference to unrestricted goodness beyond both the essential nature and the restricted, participated existence.[15] Grace, like existence, enters from outside; it perfects and completes nature, just as existence perfects and completes essence. On the other hand, nature, like essence, without a supernatural end is only an abstraction. Nature cannot be seen in isolation from that which moves it. Man, for instance, is the instrument of God: he participates in divine governance by *gubernari* and *gubernare.* Thomas states with regard to both habitual and actual grace that the operation of any effect is attributed to God alone insofar as our mind is only moved, and this is *gratia operan::;.* But insofar as our mind both moves and is moved, it is attributed both to God and to our soul. This is *gratia cooperans.* I suggest, then, that existence stands in a similar concrete relationship to essence: " quod *venit* in compositionem alicuius, non est primo et *per se age'l'e,* sed magis compositum"   *(ST.* I. 3, 8, *resp.).*

[14] *ST.* I-II, llO, 2, ad 2.

[15] Generally on the question of 'participation'   see L. Sweeney, "Existence/ Essence in Thomas Aquinas' Early Writings",   in *Proc. of the American Oatholic Philosophical Association,* 1963 (pp. 97-131), espec. p. 131.

A similar function is involved in the problem of how imma-
terial substances, like our own intellects, can actually see God's
essence. On the one hand, grace in the highest sense exceeds
every faculty of created nature *(ST.* I-II, 112, 1). Human in-
tellect in its present state can understand neither the substance
of uncreated essence nor even pure, immaterial, created sub-
stances *(ST.* I, 88, 3, *resp.)* . On the other hand, since the ulti-
mate perfection of man consists in coming to God, and since
he possesses a ' natural desire ' of knowing the cause, when he
sees the effect, Thomas concludes that the ' *beati* ' must see
the essence of God (ibid.). But since the intellectual virtue of
the creature is not the essence of God, " relinquitur quod sit
aliqua participata similitudo ipsius, qui est *primus in.tellectus* "
(ST. I, rn, 2) . This *'participata si,militudo'* bears an affinity
to the dynamic function of *esse:* as received in the effect, it is
'likeness to God ';[16] but as an expression of God's essence and
goodness, it is no longer simply a likeness, but "perfectio
quaedam intellectus, conforta.ns ipsum ad videndum Deum "
(ST. I, rn, *5, resp.).* In the composition of the intellect itself,
therefore, must lie a natural ' movement ' between the sphere
of its own essence and the real vision of God's essence upon
which intellect's own existence follows. The notion of " what
is participated" is a fulcrum point of this' movement', for, by
its reference, it links the unbounded life and goodness of God
by means of the instrumentality of created light/ existence/
gTace to the natural powers of the complete, immaterial sub-
stance. Nature, therefore, in its act of existence takes some-
thing to itself over and above itself and, in the creativity of
this participation, a creativity which comes alone from God,
already possesses a natural efficacy to a supernatural end.
Hence, created light is necessary to the vision of God's essence:
it is a perfection of the intellect, giving it extra strength to
see God. By means of this light intellect is made ' deiform '

[16] De *Spir. Oreaturis,* 1, 1, 14 anything participates in the first act "per
assimilationem ... in quantum habet esse ...

(ST. I, 12, *5, resp.)* . It is a light which "continues to grow from above" from divine grace and which gives a'' virtus intelligendi" to intellect. So too existence is "like light": it is an "influxus Dei" *(ST.* I, 104, 1, ad 1), that is, at once a power *of* God and a power *from* God present to the created substance, and granting illumination and meaning to both the whole object (viz. existence and essence considered as composite) and the essence.

It is evident that many of the expressions we have encountered, such as participation, reception, are, generally speaking, "Platonic". For example, the notions of 'participation' and ' the participated ' are characteristic of Iamblichus, Proclus and Pseudo-Dionysius; the distinction between nature and grace, of course, is integral to the Christian Platonism of St. Augustine and the long tradition founded upon this; the ' light ' motif, based chiefly upon Plato's *Repiiblic* and Aristotle's *De Anima* III, *5,* and much developed in Neoplatonic thought, is also familiar in earlier Mediaeval Philosophy; the notion of the "primus intellectus ", cited above, occurs frequently in Plotinus and is also reminiscent of the *Chaldean Oracles,*[17] much quoted by Neoplatonic writers. More importantly, in the thesis that created being is prior to every other effect (" Primus autem effectus est ipsum esse, quod omnibus aliis effectibus praesupponitur et ipsum non praesupponit aliquem alium effectum ".*De Pot.,* III, 4c; ed. Mandonnet, II, 52a) Thomas has in mind the *Lib'er de Causis* and the saying "prima rerum creatarum est esse" *(In Lib. de Causis, Lec,t.* IV, init.; ed. H. D. Saffrey, p. 27 ff.). Being in the thing is that upon which all other effects are grounded (cf. *Comp. Theol.* C. LXVIII) . A. Maurer [18] thinks that the composition of form and being

[17] In the *Chaldean Oracles* the famous phrase is *"lf.v9os vov* ", frs. 49, 2 and 1, 1. *Oracles Ohaldaiques* Aed. E. des Places), Paris, 1971. cf. also *Flnnead* VI, 7, 32, 31: *t:..vva,µis o6v* .,,.a,nos (i.e., *T0 lv) Ka,Mv lf.v9os lurTl,* Kcl.XXos *KaAA07roiov.*

[18] On Being and Essence, *Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies,* Toronto, 1968, p. 53, note 8.

found in the *De Causis* is not one between essence and being in
the Thomistic sense, but between being, understood as the
primary substratum of things, and their essential determina-
tions or forms. This is too narrow a view of the function of
Being in Proclus. **H. D.** Saffrey [19] holds that in Neoplatonism
what passes from the One to inferior hypostases is not exist-
ence, but a content of Being opposed to existence by its formal
determination; the Plotinian "system of causality", he con-
tends, has a certain role to play, but the notion of existence is
developed principally through and from Boethius. Although
there is some truth in this view, it is-as we shall see-mis-
taken. Roland-Gosselin [20] believes that in Proclus and in the *De
Causi,s* there is an equivalent to the distinction between essence
and existence. In Proclus (as also in Plotinus) Being
ofJu[a, T6 0V etc.)-in whatever sense-is prior to life and
thought. There is no fixed terminology, however, in Proclus
and the distinction has none of the importance it will assume in
Thomas. Later in the *De Ente* (cap. V, p. 39, **10-14)** it is
rather the distinction ibetween Limit and Unlimit which in-
terests St. Thomas (cf. *Elements of Theology,* props. 89, 84-
86; *De Causis,* St. Thomas *lect.* 4). Every real being is com-
posed of limit and unlimit; from above it is limited, from below
unlimited (cf. espec. *Elements,* prop. 89). Of course, the whole
question of the nature of Being in Later Neoplatonism and its
relation to Mediaeval Thought is beyond the scope of this
paper. However, I wish to point out, alongside the comments
of M:aurer, Saffrey and Roland-Gosselin, that Thomas himself
finds both distinctions, ' forma ' and ' esse ', ' infinite inferius '
and ' finite superius ', well suited to his own theory; and I
think that, given the differences between the Thomist and
Neoplatonist views, and given the full richness of the concep-
tion which lies behind the two distinctions of Proclus, St.

[19] *In Lib. de Oausis,* Introd. p. XXL
[20] *Le "De Flnte et Flssentia" de S. Thomas D'Aquin,* Vrin, Paris, 1948, p.
147.

Thomas is correct to view Proclus in this manner. However,
the first object 0£ our study is to see how we can gain greater
insight into a philosophical spirit which integrates and unites
these general correspondences. To that end, and with our
position clear so far, we can now turn to Plotinus.

  With regard to created immaterial substances there are im-
mediate and important differences in composition and creation
 (apart from the obvious differences 0£ *creatio ex nihilo* in
Thomas and God as transcendent 0£ 'Being' (ousia) in Plo-
tinus). For Plotinus an effect proceeds from its cause as an
unformed potentiality (c£. the indefinite dyad) ; only in turn-
ing back to its cause does it actually and properly become it-
self. Whereas in Aquinas all creation belongs solely to God,
for Plotinus not only does the Second Hypostasis (Intellect)
produce the Third (Soul) , but each hypostasis after the First
is both created and self-created. Secondly, as to composition,
each intelligible object is composed 0£ intelligible matter and
form. Prima £acie, therefore, one is confronted with a com-
pletely different world view in Plotinus. 1£ one adds to this
the £act that a distinction between essence and existence in the
manner 0£ St. Thomas is nowhere immediately apparent in
Plotinus, the difference is even more accentuated.

  However, in one 0£ Plotinus's greatest works, VI, 7 (38), *On
How the Multitude of Forms Came to Be and On the* Good,[21]
Plotinus does make a distinction (consciously following and
developing Aristotle) between the being 0£ the thing (i.e., the
causal essence, *Tl ..jv flvai,* the *8i6n)* and the thing itself (the
8n). In looking at material objects, he argues, we set the £act
0£ existence and the cause as separate (VI, 7, 2, 3 ff.), whereas
in the intelligible world this can not be so. Indeed not even in
the sensible world is it always the case that we should perceive
the object and the cause to be separate: in understanding what
an eclipse is we find them to be identical *(ibid.,* 11-12; cf.

  21cf. also VI, 8 (39), 12-14). In referring to the *Enneads,* numbers in
brackets refer to chronological order.

Aristotle, *Metaph.* H4; *Po. An.* II, 89B ff.) . Each object, there-
fore, must be a cause *("Bia rt")* ; for "what each thing is, it is
because of this " (ibid., 16) . In other words, in coming to grasp
what the reality of Nous or Intellect is, we must proceed more
concretely into the nature of the object before us in order to
avoid seeing the cause as an abstraction. So far, the argument
distinguishes a formal cause of being, essence, and the material
object-but not abstractly. However, what Plotinus is most
interested to explore is the meaning of the living existence of
the sensible object before us, whatever it be, in relation to the
cause of being which is not abstractly separate from it. Thus,
he explicitly states that in arguing that the substance of each
thing is its essence he does *not* refer to the form as cause of
being (in the Aristotelian sense that being is derived from the
form), but rather that "if you also unfold the form itself-
that is, each form to itself, you will find the cause" (d *Kat avr6 r6*
E:WO> E:KaUTOV 7rp0> aVTO   aVa7rTVUUOi>, €VpYJUH> E:V aVT<p T0 oia τr> . Where
a thing is idle *(dpy6v)* and has no life, then it cannot altogether
possess the cause, but where it is a form and dependent upon
intellect, it must take its cause from Nous, which is also a
form and is not separate (19-22) . Hence, even the fact of a
living thing's *existence* is seen to be neither accidental nor sim-
ply identical with either its matter or form, but rather to be
included in its intellectual nature, where "that it is" and
" why it is " are one (ibid., 45-6) .

  In later chapters (notably 9-12) this comprehensiveness of
the intellectual nature is extended not only to all creatures,
rational and irrational, but even to the elements-fire, earth,
air, water (C. 11). The intelligible contains them all. And in
VI, 7, 13 it is argued finally that the infinite diversity in unity
of essential existence is necessary to the very meaning of in-
dividual intelligible activity and indeed of activity itself (48-
51: *cnJVE:UTt TlTT> aA>..oi> r6 wuaVTW> Kal Kara ravra €av yap   7r€pt ra* ttAAa
r6 WUUVTW'> Kal Kara ra avr6, dpyt:Z *7rUVTYJ Kal r6 f:vt:pyda Kal Τι £.vf.pyna*
ov8ap.0v) • To remove even one individual existent from the life
of Intellect is to diminish its total substance *(ibid.,* 55-7) .

It seems therefore, that here we already have a philosophical prolegomenon to the Thomistic theory, even though in VI, 7, 2 Plotinus's approach is very different and his argument is worked out in a rather experimental manner.

However, it is in the study of intelligible substance that Plotinus makes the clearest distinction between a thing's nature and that by which it is. The whole argument takes place in the context of the Good, but it seems incorrect not to interpret it as referring ultimately to the pure value of existence, as activity, by contrast to intelligible essence.

According to what criteria is the intelligible form good [22] (VI, 7, 18-20) ? The form is good in its nature; for it derives from the Good. Like St. Thomas's essence, it too is created: ipsa quidditas creari dicitur *(De Pot.* III, *5* ad 2m) . But if we ask what it is *in* all these intelligible forms that makes each of them good (cf. VI, 7, 21, 1 ff.), then we are speaking of something which is at once above the object itself and yet present in it. This Plotinus says, is a 'love' (ibid., 11-12), given to the intelligibles by God (cf. 22, 18-19), "not when they are what they are " (*olix ifrav* ἧ *lJ:rr<p llJ'r[v)* hut "when, already being what they are, they take something else in addition from There" *(orav EK<iOw   OVTa aµ.op ElJ'atv /J,>..Ao 7rpOU'Ad,f311)* 21, 11-12) .[213] What is this */J,AA.o* which is added to their nature? How can it be an element in their composition?

It is light, and all light's content, by which the forms are visible to themselves and to the soul (21, 13-17) . This light 'runs upon' them (22, 1-3) and makes them *capable of efficient causality,* that is, it makes them able to move us *(ibid., OTaV ovv T0 cf>w> r6Vr6 Ti>* lJiy *r6ro   Kal KWUTal* E7r' *al!ra Kal T0V cf>wr0<; T0V £m0€ovro<;* E7r' *al!rOis yA.ix6µ.wo> <lJcf>palv<Tat* K.r.A..)' just as in the

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In much of this passage Plotinus has *Republic* 508-9 C at the back of his mind. The coloring, therefore, is highly Platonic, as also in chapter 22 where passages from the *Phaedrus* come to the forefront.

23 cf. also VI 8 13, 12-14: *row   EKaO'!Jov e<fneµevov rov a'Yet!Jov {JoVAETCtl e1<eLv0 µ,o."!lXov* 7j 8 *l<YOiv el.vcu, Ket< r6re µaXi<Yrci oterci1elvci1, llrciv rov a'Yet0ov µerciXafJ'f/ "·r.X.*

case of material bodies we love not their *substrata,* but the beauty which is manifested to us in them. This light, therefore, is not only "upon" the Form (or material body), but also manifested in the Form; and it is even dynamically present in color (cf. 22, 6), although color strictly speaking is a different light actually *in* the substrate (cf. 21, 14-15). Here again we encounter the duality of form and matter in Intellect, but we should remember, firstly, that this duality is dynamic, which is to say it leads by the path of analysis either to gTeater unity or greater multiplicity (cf. II, 4, 4-5) and, secondly, that in Nous the substrate is substance or" rather it is thought with that upon it and is a whole illuminated substance " (μE,Mov Be μ,era Tov <?r a▸ry voovμ,cvri Kal ὅτι.ιγ o▸cra ?rf꜑wncrp.€1'a OVCTlⱴ • What is 'that upon it'? It is not simply color, or symmetry, as residing in the object, but the light which gives the object its meaning. Therefore, since Intellectual substance can not be seen in abstraction from the cause which makes it what it is, and since the presence of the cause is from the point of view of the effect efficient productive activity realized in the effect, "light", or that which gives the essence its true value, is prior (and added) to the effect's essential nature and yet also an element in the composition of the whole illuminated Form.

The following will act as a summary and development of the most important ideas:

Firstly, each thing is good not in itself simply, but because the Good makes it so, which is to say that it takes (or, in the language of Iamblichus and Proclus, " participates in ") something over and above its own nature. This is almost certainly the origin of Boethius's argument in the *De Hebdomadibus,* but it goes beyond the position of Boethius, as we shall see below.

Secondly, Light is a ' love ' given by God, an effluence from God (22,8: €Ka0<v &:rropporiv, cf. *Phaedrus* 251B) , an "infl.uxus Dei" (21, 4: Tdya06V €v{pyeiav. μE,Mov €K Tdya8ov) • It corresponds, therefore, not only to the action of grace in St. Augustine and St. Thomas, but especially to that of existence

in the latter. Moreover, in VI, 7, ££ the phrases "radiant grace which is the bloom of beauty " (£4; trans. McKenna: *xapi<; f.m(Novua r<iJ KaAAq)* and "the Good who gives grace and loves to those who desire them" (6-7: *τον O.yaOov 6Jrnr€p xapira'i 86vro<; ailrol<; a, rct f.cpilμ.r::va lpwra<;)* are, I think, enormously significant for the history of thought, despite the fact that a pagan *x&pi•* in the sphere *of* aesthetics inhabits an entirely different universe of discourse from the Christian "Grace". This theory of light-grace, which unites sensible and intelligible reality in us by integrating the language of perception and intellection, had a very great effect not only upon later Neoplatonists and Pseudo-Dionysius, in particular, but especially upon St. Augustine and even the Cappadocians. This is all the more so because of Plotinus's remarkable statement that even Intellect's own beauty is boring without the light of the Good (cf. £2, 11-12).

Thirdly, in what sense might we understand Plotinus to be referring ultimately to existence?

(a) Plotinus recognises that the beauty of intellect without the light of the good (i.e., existence of an essence, or essence possessing determinate existence) is an abstraction, but one which is an unfortunate part of our psychological experience (as, for example, in the dilemma to know the good, but to be unable to do it) . It is, therefore, an abstraction, or declination, from the fuller meaning of what each intelligible object is in the light of its source.

(b) The value of the intelligible object (i.e., every 'intelligible' object above the substratum and the irrational conditions which are to be ascribed to matter in the sense-world) is at once prior to the essence, in the object and above the object; for what makes a form valuable and meaningful, what makes it actually existent as a real thing for us, is its ability to *move* us, to excite us; this is its life, which involves a real reference to the cause; and this is to say its life is well-founded in the cause.

We may conclude, therefore, that Plotinus is primarily in-terested (both here and in other similar passages) in the mean-ing and value of existence at each level of life; this, he main-tains, can only be fully grasped in relation to the meaning of pure goodness which, as the creative power of the One, actually causes the pure value of existence in the whole hierarchy of formally determined existence.

Hence at VI, 7, 23, 22-24 Plotinus asks what does the Good make now, and he answers that now it has all things in its keeping   *£Kava);* it makes intelligences think living things live and "if something can not live, it makes it be". The Good, therefore, is the efficient cause of existence to all deter-minate existences. It is 'above Being'; yet, as Plotinus will say at the conclusion of the following treatise, VI, 8 (39), it is "itself alone and really itself" *(μ.6vov aVTO Kal 0VTW'>* a'ljro), whereas everything else is both itself and another (El "/€8wv a>..Awv *tKaurov avro Kal* a>..Ao) •.Life, eternal Being and Act, therefore, are desirable not qua nous (*ovx Ti v6Vs)* but qua good (ii *O.ya8oii Kal a7r0 aya06V Kal* ds *aya86v,* VI, 7, 20, 22-23).

At first glance the position of Proclus (for instance in *The Elernents of Theology* prop. 101) seems to be different. For him all " existence " depends on Being just as all life depends on Life; and Being is the more generic because it gives rise to more effects, that is, Being includes all things, whereas Life in-cludes only all living things. [24] The difference, however, is only apparent; for the well-foundedness of all determinate existences upon the Good *is* in fact Being when one thinks in terms of effect.[25] Hence, the notion of value-existence is equally im-portant for Proclus's thought, even if some of its meaning seems to be lost in the vast hierarchical structure erected.

Finally, in this context, it should be made clear that for Plotinus determinate intelligible existence (like determinate

[24] cf. *In Lib. de Gausis,* prop. I: omnis causa primaria plus est influens super suum causatum quam causa secunda uniYersalis.

[25] See St. Thomas, *De Gausis, lect.* IV (Saffrey), p. 28, 4-9.

sensible existence) is constituted by the formal principles of
the thing, as it is :for St. Thomas; for in the constitution of
Intellect, Intellect is shaped both by the One and by itself
 (cf. V, 1, *5,* 17-18); but this self-shaping also has a doubleness
to it : on the one hand, nous generates itself only as an ex-
pression of the One's power. In other words, its creativity is
an ability to move, to shape its own nature by virtue of the
power invested in it. This power, therefore, even though it
belongs in the effect, is not something which can be reduced to
the substratum   *sim,pliciter.* We shall provide an illuminating
example of this presently. On the other hand, Intellect's shap-
ing of itself as a formal subject has to be seen in the light of
the substrate; and this line of determination is formally caused
by that substrate, since in intelligible substances (despite the
composition of intelligible matter and form) the substrate is
form.2a

We have shown, therefore, that a real distinction between
essence and existence, as pure value, is an important feature
of Plotinus's thought, in which he comes very close to the in-
ternal dynamic of the Thomistic theory. We have also shown
that this value, as light, is prior to essence and added to
essence entering into composition with it and that it is related
to the whole notion of nature and grace (i.e. *gift* from/of God).
Finally it appears that the distinction between two different
lines of causality, efficient and formal, is as important for
Plotinus as it is for St. Thomas.

It remains to examine the function of this prior element for
Plotinus not only in the composition of immaterial substance,
but also in relation to the vision of God. What for instance is
its function in thought? In what sense might we term it the
actus essendi? Can Form be related to it as potency to act?

In a later chapter of the same work, VI, 7, 40, Plotinus
argues that both personal experience and the logic of the situa-
tion demand that the One transcend 'thought'   Im-

2GFor the general principle see I, 1 (53), 12, 24 ff.; IV, 3 (27), 9, 20-22.

plicitly his argument is directed against the possibility of a "thinking of thinking" *(v6'1)cm* which we find in Aristotle's Theology; indeed, his first statement that "all thought is from something and belongs to something" (40 6; *'7r'aCTa v6'1)CTl<> IK Tiv6<> Kat Tiv6<>*) is to my mind a covert ' citation ' of some such passage as *Physics* 224 **B 1:** *7raCTa KlV'l)CTl<> IK nvo<> Kat <l<> n*, and indicates (the Aristotelian principle) that there can not be 'movement of a movement' or ' a thought of a thought ', but that the sense of such terms as *kinesis* and *noems* must bear a definite relation to a substrate.

Plotinus goes on to distinguish two sorts, or aspects, of thought, one of which expresses the notion of " belonging to something" (nvoo;;), the other that of "coming from something " *(eK nvo>)* • The first has no generative function: it is an activity of the substrate and belongs to it simply (6-10: *Kai. piv ITVVOvCTa rt)i* oil *ECTTIV V7rOKELp.€vov p,ev Ixn* Τ0 oil fon *v6'1)CTl'>, oiov Be EfJ,tKELfL€VOV ylv<Tal aVTOV OVCTa Kat 7rA'l)pO'uCTa T6 3vv&p,EI EKEtVO ov3lv YEVVWCTa EKElvov yap fonv,* oil fon, *p,6vov, oiov T<A<lWCTl'>)•* The second is the creative act which makes the thing what it is. One knows that this is not the activity of the First only because of the fact that it is not *in* the First (10-13). This aspect of thought is (a) a self-dependent generative power **(13-14:** *3vvap,i<>* Ταυ *ywvav €¢'* *IylVV'f* K.r.A.), (b) it accompanies the SUbstance and gives it being **(10-11;** *V6'1)0'l'> fL<T' OVCT[a<; Kat koCTrryCTaaa of,CT[av),* (c) its *act* is substance and (d) it is **in** the substance (15). And therefore, Plotinus concludes, thought, substance, and *that* by virtue of which [27] (ii *voa)* nous thinks itself, are not different, except conceptually (*aAA' A6ycp*)• This activity can not reside in the Good because it belongs in the composition of Nous.

What relation does this passage bear to the Thomistic distinction between essence and existence? At first glance there appears to be little relation, for Plotinus is not speaking overtly

27 cp. also VI, 7, 40, 55-56: Ae'YW */Je,el* *μev :fl /Jvvaμts avrov,i]v eμavOavov, /Je,fl eμavOavev.*

about existence. Rather, this passage illustrates a similar approach to a similar problem, the meaning of composition in immaterial substance. For Plotinus, the intellectual object already possesses.the duality of form-act and substrate (8-10); and this is also a function of the fact that for him the intellectual " essentia " is created by a sort of emergence from the One, in which form and matter emerge together (6-7):   *uvv6Vaa rc;i .ζℓ 0V £anv)* and constitute one perfect object (7-10), whose substrate must nonetheless 'stand under' its form. This is a significant difference between Plotinus and St. Thomas, but it should also be remembered that the form *is* the substrate. To all intents and purposes, therefore, the first *noesis* constitutes the bare object or essence of Nous.[28]

The second act is that which actually gives it *substantial existence* (10 ff.): It is prior (cf. 48); it does not belong to the substrate in the same way as the essential " shape " does; it is self-dependent and dependent on the Good; and yet it also enters into composition with the "essence" of the object, where the substance and the " quo est " are different both conceptually and really. The correspondence with the Thomistic theory seems complete: the pure act of Being and Thought is prior, and indispensable, to the ' quod est'. It can not be reduced to the substratum and yet it has an intimate connection with it. The distinction between the two is, therefore, real; but it is not a distinction between two things; and since the ' quod est ' is only an abstraction without the ' quo est ', the distinction is also conceptual.

In Plotinus this act, which is a self-dependent power, is related to the vision of God. It is an image of God (VI, 7, 40, 19: *'tvBaA.p.a)* the *exact* equivalent of a" *similitudo participata* ". The power in virtue of which it generates substance is both the

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²s It is worth remarking that Plotinus does not use the word *ovuln* in lines 6-10. It is only in the light of the second act that the whole object can be seen to be one substance by the timl;1 the   ri;iaches that :position itt lines 15-16,

power by which " it will think " and that by which it sees God (cf. VI, 35, 20-33). This letter, Plotinus says, is the" loving" nous *(ibid.,* 23-26) . Intellect's vision of the Good, therefore, is non-intellectual (" it no longer thinks ") , pre-intellectual and yet clearly it is also " quaedam perfectio " which gives rise to the act of thought in Intelligence. [29]

Furthermore, the theory that essence stands to existence as potency to act, developed by St. Thomas with Aristotle, Pro-clus *(Elements,* props. 77-9), Avicenna and St. Albert in mind, is very much connected with the idea that the higher act of Intellect belongs to the Intellectual subject only accidentally. The most famous, if indirect, example of this way of thinking is Aristotle's *nous thurathen* and the long tradition based upon it. And just as pertinent perhaps as Avicenna's "naturae hominis ex hoc quod est homo accidit ut habeat esse " [30] are two examples from Alexander of Aphrodisias and Plotinus. For Alexander when act and object are one, man knows primarily the immaterial intelligibles; he perceives only accidentally that he himself is this object *(De An.* 86, 14-23, Bruns) .[31] For Plotinus, in *thinking* the Good, Intellect thinks itself per ac-cidens (V, 6, *5,* 16-17). Hence, Nous, as determinate Intelli-gence, is the recipient of a potency for the pure act, noesis, which has come to it from the Good.

Hence, in the thought of Plotinus one finds for the first time a natural, organic structure of the immaterial substance in virtue of which it both sees God and is. The correspondences with St. Thomas are exact; but, more importantly, the different

[29] It is important to point out two things here: Firstly, I do not mean to imply that what Intellect takes from the vision is any sort of content of the vision. The One remains transcendent of *ovulu.* (cf. VI, 7, 40, 49-56). Secondly, it may be objected that it is not the non-intellectual vision of the One which gives rise to the act of thought in Intellect, but Intellect's subsequent self-reflection. In my view it is both (cf. VI, 7, 35, 30-33) ; or one might also say that the subsequent self-reflection arises directly out of the non-intellectual vision (cf. VI, 7, 16, 13-16). A full discussion of this subject, however, would require a separate treatment.

[30] *Metaphysica,*   tr. V, c. 2, f. 87.

[31] cp. Aristotle, *Metaphysies* XII, 9, 1074 B 35-36.

focus of attention in Plotinus illuminates the nature and func-
tion of the distinction between essence and existence in
Aquinas, just as the study of Thomistic texts on this question.
certainly helps to illuminate Plotinus.

How is this double-noesis related to later Neoplatonism? Its
exact status in Plotinus with relation to the triad Being-Life-
Intelligence would require a separate treatment. ³² However, we
can say that pure noesis corresponds to Life, which is cause of
existence in Intellect, and that, as something created, this de-
pends upon Intellect's vision of the One, the object of which
in relation to itself, as a subject, is Being.

The position is much simpler with regard to the anonymous
commentary on the *Parmenides* attributed   to Porphyry. ³³
Here Porphyry distinguishes two states of Intelligence in a dis-
cussion of the *Parmenides'* second hypothesis. ³⁴ The lower
power is that which deals directly with the Intelligibles, the
higher is comprehensive and judgmental of them all. The two
powers are analogous to perception of the special sensibles and
the sensus communis. According to the lower power Intellect
is multiple, according to the higher *(8.0vaμi<; l7rava/3Ef3'11wia,*p. 108,
28-29) it is simple, transcendent and in contact with its prior,
the One. The lower power is noesis in the more usual sense,
i.e., self-intellection (cf. pp. 110-112); the higher has two mo-
ments: as Being   it is immobile (p. 110, 22-23), as
Life   it is an activity inclining from Being, p. 112, 25-26:
lK rij<>   *lKv£i5aaaalv/.pycia).* This Life although indefinite in
itself by contrast with the substratum, *Nous-noesis,* is clearly
a prior, comprehensive, self-dependent and generating activity
of thought; and as Being it coincides with The One. The motif
of double-noesis, therefore, is significantly repeated/ developed

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³² On this see P. Hadot, " Etre, Vie, Pensee Chez Plotin et Avant Plotin ",
Les So1wr:es de Plotin, Fundation Hardt, Vandoeuvres-Geneve, 1957, pp. 107-
157.

³³ cf. P. Hadot, *Porphyre et Victorinus,* volumes I and II (cited above in
note 1).

s4 Op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 106 ff.

in Porphyry. I would argue here that from the point of view of the second hypothesis, Being is the object of *Intellect's* vision of the One (which is different from saying that The One is *simply* an intelligible object); in this sense pure existence is derived from the transcendent One and is for Intellect *wu7r€p lBia Tov 5vTo<;* (p. 106, 29-33) .[35] Similarly, for Plotinus the Idea in immobility (*i8ta €v* unfun) is the Limit of Intellect (*7rtpa<; •.. vov,* VI, 2, 8, 23-24), that is, its" boundary stone ".[36] This same notion, ultimately stemming from the *Philebus,* passes into Proclus within the framework of the internal triadic structure of nous (mone, prohodos, epistrophe) and is at the root of the distinction between ' finite superius ' and ' infinite inferius ', which in Proclus is *7rav T6 5vrn<; 5v* i!.κ *7rtpaT6<; i!.un t<.al d.7rdpii'v (Elements,* prop. 89), *precwely* the equivalent of Plotinus's *7raua v6'Y}ut<; lK nv6<;* i!.un *Kat nv6<;.* **It** expresses a dynamic, creative movement (which is thought) from the pure identity of God to the distinction between dependence and self-dependence in the creature. This movement is the life of Intellect and the source of its existence, transcending its intellectual essence.

The position of Pseudo-Dionysius is different, but similar in important details. From the distinct perfections in the divine procession (Being, Life, Wisdom) ·there come the participated perfections in created things, of which Being is the first; and by Being God is cause of existence to all that is *(De Div. Nom.* **V,** *5; P.G.* 3, 820 A-C). In this passage *T6 dvat avT6,* or *ipsum esse,* is used instrumentally as a channel to link God and creature. As St. Thomas recognises *(In Lib. de causis* IV, p. 29, 8-**rn,** Saffrey), when' Proclus' speaks of' esse' he means neither separated Being, nor Being participated communally by all existents, but Being participated' in primo gradu entis creati'

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[35] See 106, 29-35: "Oun *0£TTOV TO .Zvat,TO μεv 7rp0V7rapxei TOV* llnos,TO *0ℓ* Ⅱ *e7ra'Y€Ta£ EK TOV* 6nos **m** *e7reKeiva tvos ToV elva.L llvros TO a7r6hVTOP Ka! tfJ0'7rep .;, lofo TOv /Snos,ov μeTaO'XOV   TL   'Yf''Yovev,<jJ 0'VKV'YOV ro a7r' avTOv e7rt<f>ep6μevov elvai.*

[36] .A full discussion of the differences between Plotinus and Porphyry is to be found in volume 1 of *Porphyre et Viotorinti8.* Unfortunately, it is not possible to comment further on this topie here.

(ibid., line rn) . How is this to be related to 'existence'? Surely Being in this sense already possesses a definite formal content, as Saffrey claims? The " formal content" which Being possesses at this level, however, is *not* the essential, intellectual nature, but, firstly, the value and meaning of existence grounded in what is beyond substance, and, secondly, a productive power whose efficacy is realized in the essence: Being and Life give existence to the essence and make it what it is, but the essence or ' quod est ' is necessarily distinct, since neither Being nor Life can be simply reduced to it; instead, Being is" received", not" absolute"   (cf. *De Ente* V, 39, 6-10).

In conclusion, therefore, I propose three things: firstly, that there is an immediate affinity between the language and thought of Plotinus and St. Thomas on the subjects of light, nature, grace and the finite being's capacity to see God, and that this is directly relevant to the question of essence and existence; secondly, that the distinction between *esse* and *id quod est,* first explicitly stated by Boethius, has its roots demonstrably in the general framework I have outlined from Plotinus's thought; and finally that this theory of composition, worked out by Plotinus and developed by Porphyry and later Neoplatonists   (especially Proclus and Pseudo-Dionysius)   is the real source of the whole character of the Thomistic theory of essence and existence in created immaterial substances, and that, together with the question of individual existence in Aristotle's logic, it prefigures in an important way the more scholastic distinction between essence and existence among the Arab philosophers. Certainly, the question of whether or not the distinction is real receives a definite, affirmative answer when the problem is looked at in this way .[37]

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KANT'S DILEMMA OF KNOWLEDGE AND TRUTH

O NE OF MANY HARD AND FAST distinctions in
Kant is that between *a priori* knowledge and *a pos-
teriori* knowledge. The former may be either pure or
mixed, Kant tells us, but in neither case is it ever reducible to
a posteriori knowledge. So central is this distinction to what
he is about that what Kant calls his " Copernican Revolution ,;
in philosophy consists in showing how one of the species of
these two types of knowledge, namely, *a priori* synthetic knowl-
edge, is possible. *A priori* judgments which are not merely
analytic are possible for Kant only on the assumption that ob-
jects conform to mind rather than the other way around. This
is the message of the first Critique.

But no sooner does Kant forge this distinction between *a
priori* and *a posteriori* knowledge than he is on the horns of a
dilemma. Either he holds that knowledge applies as straight-
forwardly to *a posteriori* knowledge as it does to *a priori* knowl-
edge or else he confines knowledge proper to *a priori* knowl-
edge, *a posteriori* knowledge being for Kant no more than true
opinion or true belief. But if he takes the first alternative,
Kant's definition of knowledge ends up being self-contradictory,
whereas if he opts for the second possibility Kant is saddled
with a contradictory view of truth.

To spell out the dilemma, suppose that knowledge for Kant
applies in the strict sense to both *a priori* knowledge and *a
posteriori* knowledge. In that case, knowledge for Kant would
consist in both the conformity of object to mind and in the
conformity of mind to object. For Kant's view is that while
all synthetic judgments taken from the point of view of their
form are possible only if the understanding imposes its cate-
gories on the raw material of sensibility, still, considered from

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the viewpoint of their matter or content, not all true synthetic judgments consist in this same conformity of object to mind according to him. Rather, only that knowledge which is exemplified in synthetic *a priori* judgments consists, from the standpoint of its matter and form both, in the conformity of object to mind. For example, the source of the knowledge I have that all events are caused is not experience but human understanding, while the source of the knowledge I have, if it *is* knowledge, that all cats have fur is sense experience, even though, from the viewpoint of their form, both judgments according to Kant require the imposition of categories. It is neither logic nor the nature of the understanding but rather sense experience which justifies the ascription of the predicate "having fur" to the subject " cats " in the foregoing example. For that reason Kant would say that from the standpoint of its content the knowledge I have that all cats have fur consists in the conformity of mind to object and not, as with *a priori* synthetic knowledge, the other way around. Therefore, if he predicates " knowledge " univocally of both *a priori* and *a posteriori* knowledge, Kant is saddled with the contradiction that knowledge is both the conformity of object to mind and the conformity of mind to object.

Nor is the other horn of the dilemma any more palatable or more negotiable for Kant. For suppose Kant predicates "knowledge " of *a priori* knowledge only, *a posteriori* knowledge being for him something of the order of true opinion or true belief. In that case, since they are known by us, synthetic *a priori* judgments would be true for Kant, and true not in the ordinary sense of conforming to objects (for then they would not be *necessarily* true for Kant), but rather true in the sense that objects conform to them as a rule.[1] What it would

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[1] Kant characterizes this difference in the sense of "true" as predicated of a *priori* synthetic judgments and as predicated of *a posteriori* judgments as the difference between transcendental truth and empirical truth respectively (N. Kemp Smith, trans. *Kant's Uritique of Pure Reason,* B 185, B 82-84, B 87).

then mean to say that one of these same judgments is true is exactly what would be meant by human knowledge, the distinction between truth and knowledge having altogether collapsed in the case of synthetic *a priori* judgments. For Kant's repeated view is that *a priori* synthetic knowledge consists in the conformity of object to mind. But now, since Kant also admits that empirical judgments are true and true in the opposite sense of conforming to objects, Kant would then end up saying that truth both is knowledge and is not knowledge, that it is both the conformity of object to mind and the conformity of mind to object. The only way out of this is to say that for Kant " true ", like " knowledge " is strictly speaking predicable of *a priori* judgments only, so that all empirical judgments are true for him only in a derived sense of the term. But in that case all instances of truth would *ipso facto* be instances of knowledge, in which case Kant could not consistently believe, as he does, that some unknown propositions are nonetheless true. That God exists, that man is free, that man is morally responsible for his actions are propositions which Kant believed to be true even though they are not known. The dilemma, then, is inescapable. Either Kant must swallow the contradiction that knowledge is both the conformity of object to mind and of mind to object just in case he predicates "knowledge" univocally of *a priori* and *a posteriori* knowledge, or else, if he confines knowledge to *a priori* knowledge, Kant invites the contradiction that truth both is and is not knowledge.

In answer to this dilemma, a defender of Kant may retort that the first horn of the alleged dilemma is really not contradictory after all but rather quite harmless. For predicating knowledge univocally of both *a priori* knowledge and *a posteriori* knowledge is contradictory only if it is assumed from the start that knowledge must be either the conformity of object to mind or the conformity of mind to object and not both. But this in turn assumes that being either the conformity of object to mind or the conformity of mind to object expresses

the *definition* of knowledge. If, though, this conformity of ob-
ject to mind or of mind to object is accidental to what knowl-
edge is then it would be possible for knowledge to be both the
conformity of object to mind and the conformity of mind to
object. But then there would be nothing contradictory after
all in Kant's predicating knowledge univocally of both *a
priori* knowledge and *a posteriori* knowledge.

   But the clear reply to this objection is twofold: first, if either
the conforming of object to mind or the conforming of mind
to object is not at least part of the definition of knowledge then
it is difficult to conceive what *would* enter into the definition
of knowledge. Besides, if this same conformity were accidental
to what knowledge is then a person could be said to know
something even though there is absolutely no conformity at all
between his mind and some object or between some object and
his mind. But this is simply unbelievable. But second and
more decisive, the denial that knowledge requires one of these
two conformities is inconsistent with Kant's own celebrated an-
nouncement in the Preface of the *Critique of Pure Reason* that
he is charting a new course in epistemology, the purpose of
which is to show that knowledge consists in the conformity of
object to mind rather than the other way around. But in that
case no defender of Kant can answer the first horn of our
proposed dilemma by denying from the start that conformity
enters into the definition of knowledge-at   least no defender
of Kant could do this and be consistent with the philosophy of
Kant himself.

   Granted, then, that the dilemma in question seems to be
unavoidable, just how in the first place did Kant ever manage
to get caught between its two horns? What presupposition or
assumption in the Kantian philosophy spawns and feeds this
dilemma? For it may be the case that the dilemma in ques-
tion is propagated by a tenet which is not at all central to
Kant's programme and which can be deleted without damage
to the whole. Unhappily, though, there can be no easy patch-

up answer to this conundrum which will save the heart of Kant's message. For the source of Kant's dilemma on this score is nothing less than his transcendental turn in philosophy together with its consequent dualism of things as known and things in themselves. For what this " Copernican Revolution " forced Kant to do was to live in a half-way house between realism and idealism. To the extent that Kant held that much of our knowledge is derived from sensations which are "caused" by things-in-themselves, Kant felt constrained to define empirical knowledge at least as the conformity of mind to object, while, to the extent that he locates the source of the most important *a priori* knowledge in the nature of the understanding itself, Kant is led to define knowledge as the conformity of object to mind. But then there is no way in which Kant can give us a definition of knowledge itself without conflating knowledge with truth, unless, of course, he opts to restrict knowledge to those cases in which objects conform to mind. But that, as was shown, puts Kant in a compromising position as regards truth. For then empirical truths for him are true because they conform to objects while synthetic *a priori* judgments are true because objects conform to them. On the matter of truth, then, Kant ends up having one foot in realism and the other foot in idealism if he takes the second alternative.

Unable to bear Kant's fence-straddling on truth but agreeing with Kant that there can be no object without a subject, the idealists after Kant did the only thing they could do to make both truth and knowledge whole again, and that was to l"!bandon the troublesome thing-in-itself. [2] Without the thing-

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[2] Needless to say, the post-Kantians had other reasons for eliminating the thing-in-itself too, not the least of which was its status as being unknowable and yet as being at the same time the cause of our sensations. Nor does it help to say that the thing-in-itself for Kant is a cause in a different sense from that by which the *a priori* category of causality is a cause. **If** the thing-in-itself is really unknowable, one could not know either that it was unknowable or that it is a cause of sensations.

in-itself, knowledge or truth could no longer be said in any
sense to be a conformity of mind to object since it is now mind
which makes objects in their entirety as regards both their
forrn and their matter. But this does not mean that the post-
Kantian idealists either did nor could occupy the idealist side
of the Kantian halfway house and define knowledge or truth
as the conformity of objects to mind. For to the extent that
even this idealist-oriented definition presupposes a given to be
structured, it presupposes representations which are not due
to mind but to the *Ding an sich.* So the Idealists could do
nothing else but abandon the conformity or correspondence
view of truth or knowledge altogether, adopting instead a kind
of holistic or coherence theory of knowledge and truth.   To
demolish the half-way house of Kant and thus make knowl-
edge and truth well and whole again, the old conformity or
correspondence relation had to give way to holism. **It** is far
from being clear, though, that this substitute of holism for con-
formity succeeded any better for the Idealists than the con-
formity relation succeeded for Kant in preserving in their sys-
tems any distinction between knowledge and truth.   For at
least in Hegel, " True " with a capital ' T' would seem to be
just another name for Absolute Spirit, that state of the Ab-
solute in which it enjoys perfect self-knowledge, or knowledge
with a capital ' K '. The highest degree of truth is then one
with the highest degree of knowledge. Along the way to this
goal, of course, there are lesser degrees of truth as, for example,
when the Absolute manifests itself in Christian art. But even
here states of truth are no different from states of knowledge.
Man's limited knowledge of the Absolute in Christian art is at
once the Absolute's limited knowledge of itself. The deepen-
ing of the Absolute's self-awareness through history is no dif-
ferent from the deepening of truth itself, so that, with the per-
fect self-awareness which the Absolute finally enjoys in and
through the philosophy of Hegel, we achieve, of course, truth
for all time. Be that as it may, though, and assuming that one
can swallow, as Kant never could, the extravagant identifica-

tion of Being with Mind, Hegel was in a much less compromis-
ing position on knowledge and truth than was Kant, who al-
ways insisting on the necessity of the given in human knowl-
edge, paid the price, as we saw, of bifurcating the definitions of
knowledge and truth.

But can Kant's compromising position on knowledge and
truth as well as the dubious cure of the Idealists which followed
be avoided? To see how they can, look more closely at the
reasons which prompted Kant to initiate his celebrated
" Copernican Revolution " in the first place. Those reasons are
rooted in Kant's belief that if in knowledge our concepts must
always conform to objects, we should never have the necessary
and universal knowledge of the world which we do in fact
have. We would at best achieve only an inductive rather than
a strict universality. But since Kant thought that the latter is
indeed achieved in geometry and physics, not to mention ethics,
he felt constrainted to chart a new course in epistemology ac-
cording to which objects conform to our concepts.

But right here, lurking behind his claim that *a priori* knowl-
edge of the world is impossible if knowledge is always a con-
formity of concept to object, there is a *non sequitur* which, due
to his identification of empiricism with Hume's empiricism,
Kant seems to have missed entirely. And that is the fallacy of
assuming that just because everything sensed is given it fol-
lows that everything given is sensed. That Hume swallowed
this *non sequitur* is clear from his definition of an idea as noth-
ing but the faint copy of an impression. For Hume, as there is
nothing in or about an impression which is not particular so
there is nothing in or about an idea which is not particular.
But then there is nothing in the given which has not been
sensed. But from this it follows as a matter of course that if
knowledge is always a case of our ideas conforming to objects
nothing strictly necessary and universal can be known about
the world. Kant, then, is quite correct in noting that empiri-
cism (or better still, Humean empiricism) leads straightway to
skepticism. Operating under this definition of empiricism and

intent on eradicating skepticism, poor Kant could do nothing else than start a revolution in epistemology and suggest that, despite appearances to the contrary, knowledge must sometimes be not an affair of discovering but an affair of making, that is an affair of objects conforming to concepts. But why should Kant or for that matter anyone else assume that just because what is sensed is given it follows that what is given is sensed? Why not instead assume the opposite and say with Aristotle, Aquinas, C. S. Peirce and a host of other philosophers that there is more in the given than is dreamt of in the philosophy of Hume, and in particular that there are universal structures and relations in sense perception which are not recognized by sense perception, and that, accordingly, what Kant called the given is something far richer and deeper than what the narrow confines of Humean phenomenalism allowed it to be? But if it is, then there would seem to have been no basis at all for Kant's celebrated transcendental turn in philosophy in the first place, or, if there was a basis for it, that basis would seem to have been nothing more than an uncritical and undefended nominalism. Once this is recognized, might it not then be asked whether Kant's transcendental turn in philosophy was not, despite its enormous historical influence on the subsequent course of thought, a wrong turn in philosophy, one which can only be characterized as a tragic, if ingenious, mistake?

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"MEANING" AND "MENTAL PROCESS": SOME DEMURRALS TO WITTGENSTEIN

WITTGENSTEIN'S UNUSUAL STYLE of presentation in the *Philosophical In.vestigations* is one of he chief charms of his work, but also one of the main sources of the uncertainty about his line of argument and its cogency. His interpreters seem often enough to be put in the position of having to supply the joints and articulations of the very structure whose firmness they are supposedly testing. Under these circumstances, many sympathetic expositors have a tendency to be very generous indeed in their estimate of the soundness of his reasoning, while adverse critics may experience an impatience at the size of the job that faces them. The latter are easily accused of missing the point of his thought, and may be so lacking in assurance about their own perceptiveness in this novel case that they are half-tempted to concur in the accusation.

Nevertheless, it is by no means clear that adverse criticism of Wittgenstein constitutes *prima facie* evidence of misunderstanding. On the contrary, because he was incapable by temperament of providing the kind of sustained exposition that would have rendered his thought prosaically accessible, the prudent suspicion would be that there might well be errors and false starts lurking in the inspired utterances which comprise his work. To increase the difficulty, his friendly commentators, who could have been of most help here, have not by and large subjected him to the severe scrutiny his thought calls for; in spite of the wealth of secondary literature, too much has been allowed to pass relatively uncontested. This has had the effect of allowing his followers to retain some of the air of a coterie while they have been in the process of be-

coming an army. The net result is that one of the most power-
ful thinkers of the century has not yet been sufficiently con-
fronted by, nor forced to maintain his theses in the face of, a
wider and more traditional philosophical audience. Deter-
mined criticism from this quarter cannot fail to be useful, and
should figure significantly in the next phase of Wittgensteinian
reflections.

    A critic bent on finding bones to pick with Wittgenstein
would find them generously strewn in his path throughout the
Investigations.   These could be picked up at random, but it
would very likely be more profitable to try to locate them in
respect to some unitary movement of thought contained in the
work. Let us single out the process by which Wittgenstein
moves from his initial rejection of the " naming" theory of
language (ostensibly found in St. Augustine) to his rejection
of any proper role for a " mental act " of " meaning " in the
elucidation of thought.

    The crucial notion tha.t facilitates this process seems to be
the conviction, arrived at swiftly, that the " meaning" of a
word can be equated with "'its use in the language." (43)
The first purpose which the " meaning-is-use " theme serves
is to rule out the simple, punctilinear meaning which he takes
the " naming" theory of meaning to assume, and to see mean-
ings as contextual. An ostensive theory of how words get their
meaning inclines us to believe that ultimately there must be
words which point to simple unities of meaning (as Wittgen-
stein himself had concluded in the *Traotatus);* language is
then seen as a mosaic of such words. Once we are disabused of
the belief that this is how words acquire their meanings, many
things become clear. We no longer feel the need to see each
word as pointing to some rigidly bounded " essence," but can
see that a " family resemblance " sufficiently grounds what-
ever definiteness a concept requires. Usage assigns meaning,
and linguistic usage is as varied as the employment of tools.
It is ultimately grounded in the form of life which sustains it,
and so has a factual basis beyond which there is no appeal.

(Philosophy, of course, goes wrong precisely by falsely presuming that it has a ground whereon to stand that is somehow outside the language-games which alone can confer their meanings upon words.) One of the upshots of this view is Wittgenstein's prolonged campaign against the possibility of private languages and the pseudo-problem of "other minds," but this does not form part of the present concern. This is focused in another direction: because the meaning of a term is derived from its use in a language, which in turn is explicated from the "natural history" (25) of a being with a certain form of life, Wittgenstein also finds it impossible to assign any place to a " mental act " in the conferring of meaning and the running-on of the life of thought. " Thinking " is not an additional and separate process alongside of our use of words. Such a process is undiscoverable and would be completely dispensable in any case. " Mental insight," acts of " understanding," or the like, are no guarantee that we know how to use words correctly: it is not our private insight, but the public sanction of our fellow-users of the language that assures us that we are proceeding correctly. Since meaning is use, the criterion of correct meaning is successful use. Wittgenstein spends large portions of the *Investigations* exorcising the mentalist bogey and rebutting objections he thinks of as arising to his view. (816-427, 491-658) He remains firm that "When I think in language, there aren't 'meanings' going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought." (829) If you disagree, " then just think the thought without the words." (880)

Such, in broad outline, is the manner in which he moves from employing the formula " meaning is use " to combat the ostensive theory of meaning to employing it to combat the significance of " mental acts." It is quite an extensive move, and the differences between the first and final stages should not be missed. In the first case, " meaning " signifies the content of a term, its ideal freight or signification, and Wittgenstein is contending that this comes from the way in which it

is used. In the second case, it signifies the *act* of a subject, an inner, non-linguistic process, and Wittgenstein is contending either that such do not occur or that they are entirely negligible. The second contention is not automatically supported by evidence adduced in support of the first, since they are obviously distinct claims. Meaning as act and meaning as content are clearly different. It seems quite possible logically to assent to either of Wittgenstein's contentions without being thereby committed to the other. 'This an important, if elementary, observation, and should alert us to the requisite care in observing how he proceeds from one usage to the other.

In the context of this over-all argument, let us now examine a few of the theses he defends along the way:

1. The formula " meaning is use " is not itself free from possible ambiguities. It has not been sufficiently remarked that Wittgenstein himself qualifies it mildly when first introducing it. He says that " For a *large* class of cases-though not for all ... the meaning of a word is its use in the language." (43) This is admirably un-dogmatic, but he does not go into the exceptions, and so leaves most readers with the impression that they can be ignored. Furthermore, regarded in itself, the expression might easily be taken to signify that the meaning of a word could only be gathered from its use; this would not reduce meaning to use, but only signalize that the rich variety of the former could only be learned by attention to the latter. Such a construction would attract many adherents from a far wider area than he is usually considered to reach, but it would in no way underwrite the conclusions he then goes on to draw. These conclusions demand that the passage be interpreted reductively: meaning is nothing but use. It is not that we see what a word means by learning to use it in appropriate situations-rather, "knowing what it means" is just using it in these situations.

Further, an oddity begins to take shape around the **full** phrase that he has actually employed. The meaning of a word

is given not just by "use," but by "use in the language." It is only use in a *language* which can account for the meaning of a word. Not just any kind of use gives meaning or gives a word. A tool is used, too, but a tool is not a word. Other uses of men are involved in the behavior of eating, drinking, fighting, or gathering food. What kind of use makes an instrument a word? Its use in language, we are told. But this suggestion clearly gives language a more primary status than words or their use. What makes a language? What constitutes a linguistic use? Here it seems impossible that we can answer without resorting to a notion of " meaning " which Wittgenstein will later attempt to rule out: meaning as act, meaning as intentional reference. What he later does is to try to base language itself upon a further notion of use, that use which is reciprocal to and expressive of a form of life. The meaning of a word is its use in language, and the meaning of language is conferred by the form of life. Yet the form of life founds sundry usages, so that saying just this much does not explain why one of these usages should be characterized as linguistic.

Finally, even if we credit the persuasiveness of Wittgenstein's thesis that a word's meaning can only be garnered in the full context of its use, this would not necessarily rule out the ostensive theory of meaning, although it would moderate its exclusiveness. For one of the uses of a word in language can obviously be to point or to name. Wittgenstein realizes this, of course, and only wants to warn against taking this as the source for language rather than one of its functions. Yet admitting so much will also set limits to his ability to dispense with such mental acts as "imaging" in the constitution of meaning in later discussion.

2. Wittgenstein's devising of the "family resemblance" as a way of conceiving similarities is surely provocative, but by no means so rewarding as some have imagined. It will be remembered that he suggests it in response to the objection that he has slighted the need to find something in common for the various " language-games " he has been inventing: you may

have a variety of such games, the objection runs, but what is common to all these which makes them into examples of a language-what, in other words, is " the essence of a language-game?" (65) To which he replies that the phenomena" have no one thing in common," (65) but should rather be considered by analogy with the "family resemblance" which members of the same family often exhibit: " build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc." (67) These criss-cross and overlap, although no one member of a family may have anything identically in common with any other. So, perhaps, language-games form a family, in the manner that other games do: what, after all, is common to board-games, card-games, ball-games, and the multifarious other activities we group under this name? Wittgenstein invokes his salutary "Don't think, but look! " (66) Don't say there *rnust* be something in common, but look, and you will see an intertwining set of relationships, not a univocal identity.

Clearly this is an instance where Wittgenstein's flair for analogy has produced a rich philosophical observation. Yet it cannot be used too confidently without further ado to solve problems, since it raises many of its own. Some have taken it as a sort of rousing rejection of "essentialism," as jf the ghost of Plato had been finally laid. But this is not apparent upon inspection. For, while it may be enlightening to see that in a family resemblance, such items as build, color of eyes, and gait may criss-cross, still in order to make this statement we have to have some unitary meaning for " build," " color," " eyes," and " gait." There must be some common signification here, or we will not be able to state what we mean by family resemblance. Could one claim that each one of these elements is itself an example of a family resemblance? One might try, but the spectre of an infinite regress seems to haunt the whole idea of family resemblance once it is extended in this manner. Not only that, but Wittgenstein chose an example, "games", where his analogy   at least an initial ring of plausibility. If, instead, one thinks of such concepts as "odd," "even,"

"triangle," or even "man," "chair," or "red" (as Wittgen-
stein himself proceeds to do) , the plausibility of seeing these as
exhibiting only a family resemblance becomes much less, since
it seems relatively easy to discern an identical meaning.

By no means should the analogy be taken as supporting a
denial of universals, since it is quite evident that each one of
the examples that Wittgenstein cites for "game" is a com-
mon meaning which is applied univocally to each one of its
instances. That is, while " game " may be perplexing as tak-
ing in sundry types of games, still " chess-game " applies uni-
vocally to the individual instances as they are played, and so
does "gin-rummy," "baseball-game," or "tic-tac-toe." These
are species applied to individuals, and as such are straightfor-
ward examples of what traditional philosophy has meant by a
universal (and perhaps even an "essence"). Wittgenstein is
looking at the relationship between genus and species (" game "
and "card-game," e.g.), so that his remarks do not affect the
species/individual relation, and that is where the problem of
universals can best be located.

A further ground for misgiving about the import of this
notion is that there is an unmistakeable difference between a
literal family resemblance and the sort of thing Wittgenstein
is pointing out. In taking note of an unfamiliar passer-by as
resembling other members of a local clan, we may say " He
looks like a Barrett," but in doing so, we do not mean that he
is an instance of a certain *kind*. A family is not a type, and
we don't mean that it is. So in ordinary speech there is a
difference between the use of family-names and the use of
class names. This remains true even though we may recognize
families and settle upon classes by means of noticing criss-
crossing resemblances. The name " Barrett " is the name of a
certain family, but it is not a meaning which can be exemplified
by particulars. Contrariwise, the word " man" is not the name
for a family or a set of individuals. The name "Jones " is a
denomination after the fact: I don't first have the meaning
"Jones" and then observe an instance to see whether it ful-

fills this meaning. I don't abstract the meaning" Jones," since it is the name of a singular case. There is no discernible property called " being a Jones," as there is a property " being a man." All Joneses are alike in being men; it is in another sense that they are alike in being Joneses. Nominalism may hold otherwise, but the error is patent. Therefore, it is likely that trying to understand common nouns by analogy with proper nouns will generate confusion along with enlightenment.

It is also clear that there is something peculiar about appealing to family resemblance to ground common names, since there is no limit to family resemblances once under way. That is, from some point of view everything is similar to everything else, and depending on what sort of criss-crossing resemblances we wanted to mark, we could generate an endless number of names for them. This would not disconcert Wittgenstein, of course, since one of his points is that it is only a factual basis that accounts for our concepts: interest determines the way we catalogue and name things, and there is no appeal from **that**– we " just do " it this way. That seems fair enough, over a wide area and understood properly, but it does permit entry to the thought that something else is involved in our formation of concepts than just noticing resemblances. **It** suggests that in each case resemblances are taken as the clue to the presence of a unity which is worth naming. They help us to identify or demarcate a type, but we apply our word to the type, and not to the resemblances. We note the resemblances, but we mean the type.

Finally, a brief but important consideration. Even if Wittgenstein could rightly rely on the feasibility of using " family resemblance" to explicate certain features of word usages, it would still be an unsettled question whether " language " is something that can be usefully viewed like this. We cannot just assume that there is nothing common to the various language-games because we feel that other usages lend themselves to this treatment. **If** some words, to take the minimum assumption, display a common intelligible core, may this not

also be the case with "language"? Wittgenstein might have the right to proceed provisionally, seeing where his analogy leads him, but the ultimate verdict must be reached on the basis of whether so proceeding really does justice to the full meaning of language. Every analogy must prove itself, and most turn out to have mixed cases; this seems no exception.

3. Another analogy of Wittgenstein's carries both interest and risk: the comparison of a word with a tool. This is developed in the course of his quarrel with the ostensive theory of meaning. The latter might seem to require that all words be regarded as" signifying something," and getting their status as words by doing so-and then we might look around for what it is they signify. Yet the search for "the " source for meaning is misguided, if the meaning of a word is to be sought in its use. Uses are diverse, and" ostending" is only one of them. Perhaps we ought to say that words signify not something, but some-how. "Think of the tools in a tool-box," he suggests (11): "there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screwdriver, a rule, a glue-pot, nails and screws. The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects."

The analogy seems suggestive and unexceptionable insofar as it merely stresses the need for flexibility in conceiving how language works (and it bears against nothing so strongly as against Wittgenstein's own *Tractatus* view of the matter). Yet he employs it as well to support the claim that there is no common definition that could be framed to apply to these diversely functioning words and tools. And the analogy does not show that. Any neophyte lexicographer might come up with a formula that applied to all tools (and one superior to the weak entry he disposes of in #14, that tools "serve to modify something "). To recognize a common meaning is not to require anything in common among the entities that fulfil it beyond the fact of their fulfilling it. That is surely obvious once we reach the appropriate level of generality. The difficulty in arriving at a proper appreciation of language arises from the temptation to remain at a lower level of generality

and to equate the role of words detected at that level with
language as such; Wittgenstein rightly warns us off this pit-
fall, but there is nothing to prevent our ascending to a height
that commands a better view of things.

The tool analogy is one more step by which Wittgenstein's
reflections become irreversibly committed to the explication
of meaning exclusively through use. It is therefore worth
pointing out that, like all analogies, it has a strictly limited
validity. Is a word really like a tool? Well, in some ways yes,
in some ways, no. Is the yes or no more important? Only a
consideration of the ways in which they agree and differ could
help to answer that. Words and tools are both referential to
things other than themselves, that is true. Yet the whole
being of the word is to be understood from the aspect of its
role in the intentional grasp of experience, and that cannot be
said of tools. A tool is part of a *causal* process, and is referred
in its functioning to later events in that process. A word is not,
as such, part of a causal process; it is a sign, not a cause. It
is not temporally related to the object to which it refers. A
tool is a means by which we do something; a word is a medium
by which we mean something. Granted that this sort of ob-
servation would have to be followed up at length in order to
perceive its significance, the mere noticing of such differences
must give us pause in any tendency to be too precipitate in
putting too much weight on the similarities. A word is like a
tool? Yes, indeed. But it is also very much unlike a tool, and
perhaps it is just this unlikeness that would be most revealing
about the nature of language.

4. Nowhere is the ambivalent effect of Wittgenstein's fond-
ness for analogy more in evidence than in the root-metaphor
that dominates the *Investigations,* the likening of language to
a game. This is a brilliant, stimulating, lively metaphor which
keeps his thought moving in an unfailingly interesting way,
and has become part of the *lingua franca* of contemporary
philosophy. He introduces it abruptly in *117* and reverts to it
in all sorts of ingenious ways. It is gratefully perceived by **him**

as the instrument of his liberation from the unwarranted de-
mand for the rigid boundary and "crystalline purity" (108)
of concepts which the earlier "picture-theory" of language
of the *Tractatus* had seemingly enforced. " A *picture* held us
captive," he declares (115) , and we feel a sort of exultation or
relief that his new view of language frees him from that bond-
age. Yet, what an odd sort of deliverance! For, he has freed
himself from one image (the likening of a proposition to a
picture) precisely through recourse to another (the likening
of a proposition to a move in a game). Images apparently had
the same mesmerizing effect on Wittgenstein as etymology had
on that other oracular philosopher of our century, Heidegger.
Just as the notion that a proposition is a picture had flashed
across his mind in reading an account of how a model had been
used in court to depict a traffic accident, so the notion that
speaking a language is like playing a game came to him while
watching a football game.[1] Both metaphors are provocative,
but ought not to be treated as unchallenged poles of reference.

   The principal reason for questioning the ultimate utility of
likening language to a game is that language is intentional, and
games are not. The difference seems crucial, and it sets in-
superable barriers to the granting of any decisive character to
the analogy. Whatever theory we construct for the nature
of language, or however conscientiously we   from con-
structing a theory, it seems indisputable that language as a
whole is oriented upon the extra-linguistic. Language refers
to what is not language. One might like to protest that this
"other-than-language" only presents itself for language, but
that does not alter the point. Words, assertions, questions,
commands, linguistic expressions of any sort, bear upon what

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[1] Wittgenstein himself tells us how the " picture theory " of propositions
occurred to him in *Notebooks, 1914-1915* (edit. by G. H. von Wright and
G. E. M. Anscombe, with an English translation by G. E. M. Anscombe,
Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1961), p. 7. The inspiration for the game metaphor
is recounted by Norman Malcolm, *Ludwig Wittgenstein:* A Memoir (London,
Oxford Univ. Press, 1958), p. 65.

is other than themselves. Let us remain entirely neutral as to how this "other-than-language" is to be conceived-the fact remains that the linguistic instruments themselves are unintelligible except as referring to what is not a linguistic instrument. No questioning of the adequacy of an ostensive theory of definition could justify a denial of the need for the presence of some ostensive dimension in language as a whole. That way would lie incoherence. For, unless the speaker recognized that in speaking, he was speaking *about* something other than his words, he could not even speak about language.

Language, in short, is not self-contained; games are. A game is not the medium for the presencing of what is other than itself. It is not an intentional process. The elements which are part of the game are assigned their status and their role, as well as whatever" meaning" they have, in a manner completely immanent to the game itself. The game answers to nothing outside the game. This is because it does not refer to anything outside the game. The Queen of Spades receives its role in the game of " Hearts " by an assignment made by the rules of the game; it just is what the rules say it is. The fact of its being this cannot be measured by anything beyond it. Neither the elements of the game nor the game in its entirety bear upon anything beyond it.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of this difference, and it puts unmistakeable limits to the value of the "game " analogy. Wittgenstein says (108): "The question 'what is a word really?' is analogous to 'What is a piece in chess?' " But this won't do, as it stands. For the piece in chess derives its entire status through the rules of chess. Its " being " is conferred upon it by the rules of the game. It is not an intentional sign of anything other than itself. In this sense, it is not significantly different from a wheel in a machine, the appearance to the contrary being caused by the fact of its being employed in a species of communication between men, which occurs in an intentional setting. The fact remains that the piece is not an intentional symbol, and the word is.

Failure to take this into consideration permits the quite extraordinarily misleading remarks which Wittgenstein makes in #136-137. He has arrived at the point of feeling it necessary to extricate himself from the obligation to treat even a proposition as something which has clear boundaries and a " general form." One might be inclined to say that a proposition could be at least defined as " whatever can be true or false." Wittgenstein retorts that this has only a specious value, since it is like saying that " ' The king in chess is *the* piece that one can check.'" Such a statement would not confer some special understanding of what a king is. Rather, "This can mean no more than that in our game of chess we can only check the king." Likewise, "That only a *proposi,tion* can be true or false can say no more than that we predicate ' true ' and ' false ' of what we call a proposition." Here Wittgenstein is proposing that the meanings of " true " and " proposition " are assigned in the language-game, as the meaning " king " is assigned in the game of chess.

This quite remarkable proposal only gains the appearance of credibility because insufficient attention has been paid to the radical difference between the intentional character of language and the non-intentional character of ordinary games. The elements in an ordinary game can be arbitrarily assigned their roles, since a game is a self-enclosed process answerable to nothing outside itself. The whole purpose of language, on the other· hand, is to make possible an intentional reference to what is other than itself. It therefore must conta.in the elements which make such intentional reference possible. The nature of these elements is not conferred upon them by the game, since they are required if there is to be a " game." Language must have a structure which makes its purpose fulfillable. Then in it there must be some act in respect to which it makes sense to ask whether it is true. This act we call a " proposition"; the name is arbitrary, but not the relationship. That there be intentional processes in which the reference to the extra-linguistic is accomplished is part of the nature of lan-

guage. The " king" is not something we find, but something we make; under one indispensable aspect, the proposition is not something we make, but something we find. If anything whatsoever is prior to language, then the need for some element in language serving the role of propositions is inevit-.able-otherwise this priority of the extra-linguistic could not be recognized, and the whole business of language is to recognize it. Much in language is conventional, but if the meaning of "truth" were conventional, there would be no meaning to calling anything else conventional. Language, which founds the possibility of game-playing, cannot itself be ultimately comprehended as a game.

None of this would matter too much if the limits of the analogy were kept continually in mind. But in the present case Wittgenstein is so impressed by the fecundity of the image and the welcome power it confers to break the molds of his previous thinking that he keeps little track of its limitations. Instead, we get a progressively more unqualified readiness to understand language from the vantage-point of the game metaphor, to elide the meaning of words with their use, and finally to conflate thought and language, thus effectively sealing off any relief from that side.

5. A couple of relatively minor moves facilitate Wittgenstein's eventual claim that thinking may be conflated with speaking, and that "mental acts" either play no part or at best play a negligible part in the language-game.

The first is his suggestion that naming an object is something like sticking a label on it. (15) He says this in the course of loosening up the fixation many have to see language exclusively as a mosaic of naming words, but he says that it will often prove useful in philosophy to treat a name in this way. One such case is in his builders' game at the beginning of the *Investigations:* an assistant in the work of building might go and fetch an article when the master shows him a certain mark; the required tools all have the mark in question. Now this surely seems open to the objection that it does not get

anywhere near the philosophical significance of naming words.
For, whatever else naming is like, it is not like sticking a label
on an object. Every label is stuck on a *singular;* but no name
(no common name) is the name of a singular. The name is a
universal which is applied precisely to what is not peculiar to
some singular. Even in Wittgenstein's example, the puzzle is
to see exactly why the same label may be stuck on different
singulars. One who does this is applying a name or making
use of a universal, but he can only be moved to do this be-
cause of some recognition that makes the application pos-
sible-a recognition of a resemblance which it would be ex-
ceedingly hard to see as occurring at the level of language-
use. Affixing a tag to a thing is a corporeal move in a lan-
guage-game, but the motivation to make it is due to an act of
recognition; affixing the same tag to different individuals mani-
fests something of the nature of this recognition, but it does
not substitute for it. Perhaps Wittgenstein's earlier *Tractatzts*
belief, that names derive their meaning from the bearer, in-
clines him to his present course, as it had inclined him and
Russell -to think that ultimately names had to name simples
(and Russell to the belief that therefore " this " was the only
proper name). These problems, however, are not inherent in
every conception of universals, but only in a certain way of
approaching them. His later characterization of the name as
a " baptism of an object " (38) likewise would seem difficult to
apply to most philosophers who have held the objectivity of
universals: since what is baptized is always a singular, the
metaphor does not seem apt to convey the thought of those
who hold that a concept grasps a universal. **It** might be more
plausible to think of it as suggesting that a noun must refer
to something, and therefore as conjuring up a "universal " as
the target of a noun; even so, precisely because it is a universal
which is conjured up, no proponent of the theory could treat
the cases as equivalent.

The second set of remarks also arises out of Wittgenstein's
attempt to dissipate the need to admit that a concept refers

to a " common," although his intent here is somewhat harder
to fathom. He is considering a suggestion (72) that, for ex-
ample, when I teach someone the name of a color, I may show
him several samples of it, and then say: " The colour that is
common to all these I call 'blue'."   One might now like to
enlarge on this and say that to have understood a definition
"means to have in one's mind an idea of the thing defined,"
adding, significantly, " and that is a sample or picture." (73)
This notion that having an idea of a common element is hav-
ing a sample in one's mind which serves as a paradigm is fre-
quently resorted to by Wittgenstein in explicating the issue of
how the common might be apprehended (cf. 50, 53, 56). In
no case does he accept the explication, but rather combats it,
showing that it will not work and is moreover irrelevant to our
use of words; for, we may have a picture without knowing
thereby what to understand by means of it, and conversely we
may understand a word without any corresponding picture.
So it is not any acceptance of this way of explaining the ap-
prehension of universals that concerns us now, but rather that
it is the only alternative that he offers to his identification of
meaning with use. In #74, he utilizes the example of a leaf:
do I possibly learn what "leaf" means by getting" an idea of
the shape of a leaf, a picture of it in my mind? " He has no
trouble showing that there is no picture of a leaf which is com-
mon to all leaves. This could be taken as a laudable dismissal
of an empiricist approach to universals, like that of Locke or,
even more, Berkeley. But it is the only alternative to his own
view which he examines, as if he felt that once we can get
over the habit of seeing the universal as a kind of " paradig-
matic particular," we are left with nothing more to be said in
behalf of a mental act of ideation, but are thereby persuaded
that all we need to understand ideation is sense experience
plus words in their linguistic context. The same viewpoint
seems to surface later on when he considers the role that
images play in understanding. He says very rightly that mean-
ing cannot be equated with the having of images or even un-

derstood from this side, since it is what I do with the image, how I use it, which gives it whatever relevance it has to the life of meaning. To understand the word " cube" is not to have a mental picture, since that picture could be variously used: the picture does not force some specific use on me. (139) He is entirely right here, but the force of the point seems directed simply against an empiricist view of ideas: no conceptualist or moderate realist from Aristotle to Husserl would have conceived the apprehension of universals in this way.

Wittgenstein is rebutting the views of someone who says, " What really comes before our mind when we *understand* a word?-Isn't it something like a picture? " (139) but the real question still remains, once jejune thoughts like this are disposed 0£. Given that thinking and meaning are not equivalent to having images, how shall they be understood? Unless we conceive of imagery as the " sample " for mental life in general, we cannot impugn the mental reality of thought by showing that thought is something other than imaging. Yet this seems what Wittgenstein is usually about; on pp. 175/176, he studiously tries to show that the grasp of meaning cannot be spoken of in the same manner as the having of images, but seems to take that as evidence that therefore the apprehension of meaning cannot be spoken of as a " mental act " at all. 'lrVe can be grateful for his analyses without accepting his inferences.

6. Following out what seem to him to be the full consequences of his reduction of meaning to use, Wittgenstein is eventually drawn into an emphatic rejection of any role for such a "mentalist " function as " insight " in the process of understanding. Setting out from his own suggestion that the meaning of a word might be equated with its use in a language, he has produced gradually an atmosphere in which whole sentences can be similarly viewed, and in which language itself is comprehended under the canon of use, to the exclusion of any mentalist predicates. Clearly, he has moved a long way from the initial *eureka,* which only released him from the confinement to an ostensive theory of meaning.

In a famous set of passages, Wittgenstein contests the need to regard even such a mathematical   bit of reasoning as the power to see how to continue a series as the product of an "insight."   He had been entertaining the objection: since the meaning 0£ a word is or can be understood in a flash, while the use of a word is mastered gradually over time, it is not possible to equate the two. This objection seems to have a lot to be said £or it, and he grapples with the difficulty at length.   Consider the case 0£ a child learning the number series: isn't there a point at which he understands in a mental sense how to produce it upon request? No, Wittgenstein holds; rather it is his disposition to continue as we wish him to do which is the criterion £or whether he has truly understood. (149/150) No inner mental vision will serve; what a man does, not what he says he " sees," determines i£ he understands.   **It** is possible to imagine cases where a person says," Now I can go on," and then can't go on, or goes on incorrectly. Wittgenstein offers the example 0£ a child being taught the series, 2, 4, 6, 8, ... who gets along fine until he reaches 1,000, and then continues: 1,004, 1,008, 1,01£ ... When reprimanded by his instructor, he says, but that is what I took the directions to mean: add 2 up to 1,000, add 4 up to 2,000, add 6 up to 8,000, and so forth.   Could we charge him with having failed to see what we mean? Well, says ·Wittgenstein, the correct understanding 0£ the original instructions is decided by the accepted practice. Your claim to know the correct interpretation 0£ the instruc- tions is just a statement as to how you would go on. Nor would an advertence to the algebraic formula of the series help, since the formula has to be interpreted, and the correct interpretation   is a decision reinforced by other practitioners. So even i£ I have the formula, the question can still be raised how I apply it correctly, that is, in the manner which custom requires.   Then, " In the sense in which there are processes (including mental processes) which are characteristic 0£ under- standing, understanding is not a mental process." (154)

Wittgenstein   certainly comes very close here not simply to

denying that a mental process called " insight " is decisive in confirming that understanding has occurred, but to denying that there is any process that could be characterized as insight. It is simply a name for a disposition to behave in a certain manner, and has no standing in the knowledge process. Yet surely he has over-reached himself, as his own examples can testify. The child who is learning the series certainly has an insight into *some* possible series-it is just not the one intended by the teacher. Each series has its formula. If the child has misinterpreted the instructions, he has wrested the words away from the intention of the instructor towards some intention of his own. Or, if the instructor has been very obscure, he has said, in effect, " guess which series I am thinking of." As long as the matter is left at the level of words, these being regarded as symbols open to variant or arbitrary interpretation, anything might be read into them. As uninterpreted symbols, words could lead anywhere. Wittgenstein is advancing the claim that the interpretation can only derive from the practice of the linguistic community. But actually he has showed at best that the *selection* of possible interpretations is made by the linguistic community. However, once some meaning has been given to the symbols, the possibilities of further interpretation are narrowed. Once 2, 4, 6, 8 are designated as the numerals in the natural number series, then any instructions that utilize them can be interpreted far less arbitrarily. Both series which Wittgenstein cites make sense, both have their rules, and we can see what the rules for each are. Each series is an ideal possibility made possible through the series of natural numbers. Our insight is into the ideal series. It is a bit wrong-headed on Wittgenstein's part to treat the fact that there is no insight into the words as such as substantiating that there is no such thing as insight at all.

Actually, even for him and the reader to recognize that there are two disparate series involved, and to see on what basis they have been formed, he and they must have an insight into what has occurred in each case. *We* must see that the child

and the instructor have seen things differently. At least our
seeing is a matter of insight. Really, the chuckle of amuse-
ment that Wittgenstein's example arouses in us upon first
meeting it is itself a testimony that we have had a flash of
realization. Laughter is not aroused by use or disposition over
a period of time. We chuckle because we see-at an instant.
We do not wait for confirmation, we just" get it."

Still, even here one is reluctant simply to reject Wittgen-
stein's guidance, and just a bit uncertain how his ultimate
point is to be best appreciated. On the one hand, as indicated
above, he is clearly extending and expanding his earlier pro-
posal that the meaning of a word is its use in language; here
strings of words, sentences, even inferences, are said to derive
their standing from usage. On the other hand, his way of con-
tradistinguishing understanding from " mental process " is also
directed against the granting of any privilege to private ex-
perience, and could be viewed as a tactic in the fight against
psychologism. Notice that in #154 where he contrasts the un-
derstanding with mental processes, he cites as a typical ex-
ample of a mental process "A pain's growing more or less; the
hearing of a tune or sentence." From this remark, one might
be tempted to enlist him as a possible ally in the Husserlian war
against reducing meaning to psychic occurrences; on this basis,
he could be welcomed as a champion of the objective status of
meaning. The trouble is that he does not make the Husserlian
or Fregean distinction between understanding as an act and
understanding as content. He is fighting against psychologism
armed purely with the weapon of linguistic use and its public
status, and is thereby led to defend badly placed positions.

For instance, having defined "understanding" against
"mental processes," he is drawn further and further into an
outright denial that there is anything called a mental process
of thinking at all. Talk about thinking turns out invariably
to be talk about behavior, specifically, linguistic behavior.
There is no way in which I can be said to " observe " thought;
introspection will not do the job. Thinking doesn't strike us

as " queer " when we are doing it, he says (, but when we begin looking for it, we can't find it: I always come upon verbal expressions, but not, in addition, " 'meanings ' going through my mind."   Thinking is not some "incorporeal process" behind the words. (339) In the end he runs through an inventory of processes akin to thought, which might seem to have "mental" credentials-such as, believing, deciding, recognizing, willing, and intending-and finds them unsatisfactory: the criteria for the use of such words are not inner, but language and behavior patterns. (571-653) Wittgenstein has little hesitation in running together the two questions: are there mental processes of thought, and what is the criterion for saying that there are? Yet if there really are mental processes, the only " criterion " needed for saying that there are would seem to he the consciousness of them.

It will be seen that Wittgenstein has been led to his strenuous efforts to understand language without reference to mental processes by a determined adherence to the formula enunciated at the start, that the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And yet it is not at all clear that the formula itself dictates this direction. For there seems to be nothing in the notion of "use " which excludes its application to the mental as well as the behavioral. The only way the term " use " can be the instrument for the exclusion of meaning and mental process is by conceiving it behavioristically to begin with. In itself it appears to be quite a neutral term. Why shouldn't there be mental uses? Or, why shouldn't mental processes be involved in the integral use of words? It is in many ways a happy thought on the part of Wittgenstein to loosen up our thinking about " meaning," to reject any premature or doctrinaire equation of it with pure ostension; yet it would be small gain if we were to conclude in a doctrinaire equation of meaning with "use" conceived behavioristically. Perhaps he does not have enough uses for the word "use." Would it not be better to take his initial formula to imply that the meaning of words is conferred on them by the role

they play in the entire life of consciousness? The content of
words is generated and sustained by their reflection and trans-
formation of experience. But to try to see this process without
advertence to the fact that experience is conscious experience,
and that an appreciation of the full range of language requires
continual reference to consciousness, is futile.

Clearly, we don't explain something by calling it incorporeal,
nor by ascribing it to " incorporeal" processes. Explaining
language in terms of thought, if by thought we just mean a
mysterious " incorporeal process " parallelling the act of speech
does not help much to understand what thought is. But we
don't explain something by calling it " corporeal " either-so
that explaining the life of language by saying that it is part of
a linguistic behavior which we "just do" engage in is not
much help either. It may be that, in the long run, language is
in some sense inexplicable, but that alone will not automatical-
ly certify the Wittgensteinian emphasis upon use. Explanation
in terms of pure verbal sounds and their use will not convey
how meaning differs from other uses. Unless the speaker un-
derstands the appropriateness of his uses, we are left with the
correlation of two outwardly observed events, and this is no
more an explanation of the life of meaning than would be any
other such correlation. Wittgenstein may intend something
quite different from this, but it is not clear that he can achieve
it with the explanatory instruments he allows himself. If we
must come to a point where the " spade turns," why is it more
satisfactory to do that with linguistic use than with mental
insight? For unless we smuggle in meaning at some point, even
our appeal to use will be useless. It is only some irreducibly
mental sense of meaning that will allow us to identify what we
mean by linguistic use, as opposed to some other sense of use.

Wittgenstein supports his denial of the reality of a mental
process of thinking by the challenge mentioned above: " Try
thinking the thoughts without the words." Not only is this a
bit unfair, since it relies on the Humean empiricist bias that
only what is separable can be distinct, but it is in no way

decisive, since the challenge could easily be reversed: " Try saying the words without thinking them."   Without the animation of the mental intention, the words would only be a string of sounds; in effect, they would not *be* words, and we would not really have " said " them. Wittgenstein, of course, would claim that what makes the difference is that the sounds as " really said " are simply uttered in conformity with a usage sanctioned by a community.   Yet this leaves out quite a bit. Among other things: 1) both individual users and community must be using intentional symbols, so that the intentionality explicates the specific kind of use, and not the other way around; 2) the very existence of the language is the reflection and expression of the multifaceted life of the speaking com-. munity, a life which includes above all the conscious dimension of its existence and the conscious apprehension of it. Above all, it is *reflection* which makes language possible, so that to try to appreciate language without allusion to it is an unprofitable *tour de force.*

These criticisms do not detract from what is deservedly seen as the genuine contribution of Wittgenstein: his stress on the rich variety of the sources for the meaning of our words, the marvelous philosophical vitality with which he himself reflects upon language, and his insistence on the public character of language, along with the ensuing polemic against psychologism. His purposes, however, cannot be achieved merely by dwelling upon the fact that words are uttered in given circumstances. Words, after all, occur-they are generated. It is legitimate to ask for the ground of their coming-to-be, and no answer couched in terms of a re-iteration that they just do come to be is going to be very satisfying. "Use" only contributes to the explanation if it is seen by the speaker to be the appropriate use; thus, even acknowledging a role for use entails acknowledging a role for insight.

Undoubtedly, the whole subject of language remains exasperatingly elusive but that should not prompt us to stop with the acknowledgement of it as some kind of gigantic fact.

Since it is a fact that is continually coming into being, its existence requires some explanation. Wittgensteinians might object that grounding that existence on "thought" simply has the effect of displacing the " mere fact " to the realm of thought. Granted that they have a point, the issue is in part whether even this displacement is an improvement or not. Admittedly, it brings its own difficulties. Yet if explanation must come to an end somewhere, many would feel that it is more intelligible that it end with " seeing," even " mental seeing," rather than with the utterance of sounds. At the very least they would feel that language is inexplicable without the admission of this or an analogous " mental factor " somewhere along the way. Insight is, as Wittgenstein points out, not a mental process of the same sort as feeling pain or having a sensation. But does that mean that it is not a mental process at all? That seems a premature conclusion. An Husserlian (or even a Popperian) would say that it is distinguished from the aforementioned mental processes by a) being intentional b) being related to the ideal. That means that it is not adequately comprehensible simply under the generic classification of "psychic" or" mental," and Wittgenstein has done noble service along with others in bringing this out. Discerning so much, however, sets the problem; it does not solve it or banish it. The problem becomes something like: how shall we discriminate that portion of mental life which is axised upon the ideal from that which is merely " psychic," and how shall we appreciate its special features?

In this effort at appreciation, an openness to the myriad features of language is certainly called for-not only to signification, but to feelings, images, sound, associations, memory, action, and an entire gamut of factors not specifiable in advance. Everything from basic physiology to quasi-Kantian *a priori* categories may have something to reveal to us about language. Since language is an ontological phenomenon, even a contribution from the side of metaphysics is to be rather expected than dreaded. By any yardstick, many of these sources

of illumination will turn out to be " mental," since the whole concrete life of the human subject flows into language. As one of the ultimate expressions of the life of consciousness, it would be odd indeed if language could be viewed without reference to it.

Actually, could we not even invoke Wittgenstein himself as an ally in this view? His whole purpose, he tells us, is to battle against the " bewitchment of our intelligence by language," (109) and that surely means that he is making some kind of distinction between thinking and speaking. If the two were identical, would we not be in a position similar to the one he defends in the *Tractatus,* when he holds that it is impossible to think illogically, since logic defines what can be thought? For, if language as behavior defines thinking, would it really be possible for the intelligence to be bewitched by language? Words without use would have no meaning-but then how could t.hey even appear to have one? How could they errone-ously have come to be, except in terms of an erroneous mental attitude? Even the " idling engine" metaphor doesn't seem to evade the difficulty, since we must always wonder whose foot is on the accelerator. If language is identified with use, it seems to be identified with the working of the engine, so that even on Wittgenstein's own terms something else must explain its idling.

At the last, let us appeal to that excellent motto of his, which, strangely, could be transferred verbally intact to Hus-serl: "Don't think, but look!" (66). Let us, then, look. And don't we *see* anything? It is quite odd for someone like Witt-genstein, who uses this motto, to deny the role of mental in-sight. For the assumed power of insight seems to underlie his own language-game of classification that he is: playing in the *Investigations.* There was no need for him to have denied this, and indeed his method might well gain new dimensions by admitting it.

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RE-TRIEVING TRINITARIAN TEACHING:

A Review Discussion *

'T'HE DOCTRINE OF **THE** TRINITY embraces the ntral teachings of what we might call classic Chrisanity. Its point is, quite simply, truthfully to teach who God is-and to teach this with and for both church and world in such a way as to correspond to what God intends be taught about who God is. "God is one *ousia/natura,* three *hypostases/persoru:i"* came to be the climactic trinitarian formula and " revealed " the honorific title attached to teachings of such import. But the set of diverse and conflicting intellectual, religious, and social shifts some call modernity has had a strange love-hate relationship with this doctrine. For the last 200 years in particular, the doctrine of the Trinity has been variously abandoned, re-affirmed, recovered, reformulated, relocated, or ignored in the face of the diverse stands on God in novel christianities and other religious and non-religious ways of life. A teaching which functioned as a sacred canopy for God, world, and church seemingly collapsed under the strain of a culture which forces us to believe we had to choose among such things.

The challenges themselves are not surprising-Judaism, classical culture, and Islam all heretofore raised hard-nosed questions about the Trinity. And it is not even surprising that Christians disagree on such things-the classic doctrine of the Trinity was honed against debates within the Christian community which only gradually yielded distinctions between

ortho-, hetero-, and non-orthodox. What is surprising is that
even Christians do not seem agreed on what it is they disagree
about on this score. Shall we speak of a doctrine, idea, symbol,
myth, contemplative or liturgical prayer, experience, praxis, or
in some other way? Shall we give the topic its own time and
space-not only in our reading and thinking but also in our
individual and communal prayer? Or shall we make the Trin-
ity a function of some other teaching-christology, anthro-
pology, ecclesiology, etc.-or some other liturgical feast? Or
perhaps it should simply be turned into an appendix to the-
ology or abandoned? And how might we intelligently decide
about such issues?

William J. Hill's *The Three-Personed God: The Trinity as
a Mystery of Salvation* is a massive contribution to this theo-
logical conversation on the Trinity. [1] Hill "re-trieves" trini-
tarian options past and present in order to propose that the
being as well as the salvific activity of God is three-personed.
Those seeking an original overview of trinitarian thinking
throughout the ages (including potent challenges to current al-
ternatives) can do no better than to study this text.· Even
more importantly, Hill's constructive proposal (sympathetic
to an existential and moderately realistic reading of Thomas
Aquinas, but identifiable with no single-ism) is probably the
most challenging recommendation to focus trinitarian theology
on the classic categories of" nature/persons" to come along in
many decades.

After a summary of the text, I will analyze and evaluate
the major ways I think Hill advances the discussion of the
Trinity. The summary is brief, just long enough to give the
reader a taste of the breadth of the book and suggest the con-
text of Hill's remarks so that my analysis and evaluation will

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[1] The text has a select bibliography as well as indices of names and topics.
All numbers in the following essay refer to pages or chapters ("c. ") of
this text. .A related book is William J. Hill, *Knowing the Unkno'W1b God*
(New York Philosophical Library, 1971), including a section on "God as
Tripersonal" (201-17).

not seem unfair. My primary goal is not to repeat the details
of Hill's position but to set it in a context which highlights its
key distinctive contribution to the conversation-without,   I
hope, distorting its internal shape.

I. A Re-Trieve of the Trinity

The Three-Personed God is fittingly divided into three dis-
tinct but mutually dependent parts. The first two parts are an
overview of trinitarian options in the tradition and in modern-
ity. Part I (Background: Theology Listening to the Past)
moves from Scripture (c. I) through the Greek Fathers (c. 2)
to Western Medieval theology (c. 3) . The Old Testament is
construed as the" ambiance" of the New. Yahweh as Father
of the Elect, with Word and Spirit, is " suggestive of " a trinary
structure in God's relation to people-but only suggestive of
the Christian Trinity by a kind of (Christianly legitimate)
dogmatic eisegesis (4-5) . In the New Testament Hill identifies
the implicit trinitarianism in the various " symbols " of a
" second " and " third " in God, but proposes that the primary
concern of the New Testament" is soteriological, only second-
arily Christological, and even more remotely trinitarian"   (27,
29). The "doctrine" of the Trinity does not emerge until the
Greek Fathers. In the second chapter Hill tracks this shift
through Justin, Irenaeus, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria,
Origen, Athanasius, the Cappadocians, and others. He reads
the transition much like Lonergan-as a move from " sym-
bolic " to " conceptual " expression-while   affirming that the
process involved a great many a-rational factors (50-52).
Medieval theology in the West-Augustine, Thomas Aquinas,
and Richard of St. Victor-is read as the climax of classical
trinitarianism. Augustine, says Hill, proceeds from trinitarian
reflections in finite being and human being before reaching an
analysis of the Trinity *in se* focused on the concept of " rela-
tion" (53-62). Aquinas picks up on the Augustinian clue, in-
serting " relation " into the context of a " metaphysics of no-
tional act " which moves from the divine essence to the proces-

sions, relations, and persons of God's interpersonal being (62-78). Richard of St. Victor's influence on Aquinas is summarized (78-79), but a full discussion of Richard is reserved for a later chapter (225-32). The impact of 16th and 17th century reformation on trinitarian teaching is read as a function of contemporary Protestant positions (e.g., 111-13); and contemporary Eastern Orthodox positions would apparently be read as variations on the Greek Fathers discussed in chapter 2.

"Modernity" is clearly Hill's central dialogue partner. Thus, Part II (Foreground: Theology Speaking in the Present) organizes the various strategies for dealing with the de-centralization of the Trinity after the Enlightenment. At 150 pages, Part II is twice as long as either of the others. It is also probably the strongest of the three Parts. While one might quibble with Hill's reading of one or more figures, Part II . does succeed in bringing an immense number of Trinity-like proposals under the control of five chapters. I will touch on some of the ways Hill agrees and disagrees with these alternatives below. In general, chapters four through seven deal with proposals which stress divine unity un7) and chapter 8 summarizes those which stress the divine plurality by conceiving the Trinity as interpersonal koinonia (Hasker, Bracken, Richard of St. Victor, Muehlen, et al.). If I might label the alternatives which stress divine unity more simplistically than Hill does, I would call them Liberalism (c. 4, Schleiermacher, Tillich, Richardson, Lehman, Wiles, et al.), Neo-Orthodoxy (c. 5, Barth, Jenson, Welch, Rahner, Macquarrie, et al.), Hegelianism (c. 6, Pannenberg, Moltmann, Kaufman, Schoonenberg, Kiing, Kasper, et al.), and Process Theology (c. 7, Whitehead, Hartshorne, Ogden, Cobb, Ford, Stokes, Kelly, et al.).

Part Three (Focus: Theology as Re-Trieve *[Wiederholung]*) fuses the horizons of tradition and contemporary thought, the better " to clarify ancient truths " and initiate "new understanding and new truths" (241). This is the shortest (75 pages) as well as the richest of the three Parts. Although it

could be read on its own as a summary of Hill's constructive position, the method of *Wiederhofong* means Part III largely presumes the reader has worked his or her way through the background and foreground.

Hill begins with ten densely packed pages on prolegomena (241-51) and a summary of Parts I and II (251-55) before turning to the Trinity *in se* (255-72) and *ad extra* (c. 10). He develops God's immanent identity in three interrelated phases. First, the Ground of the Trinity is " Being as Act." God, not limited by the structure of worldly beings, is *"Be-in.g* Itself" whose " intentionality " is articulated as knowing and loving *(255-56,* 259-62). Second, plurality in God is metaphysically real. The fecundity of Be-ing issues in immanent terms which "posit *relationality* at the core of existence" not simply *esse ad* or *esse in* but hypostasis and subsisting relation (256-57, 262-68). Or, third, we may also make the same point in less " metaphysical " or " western " fashion and in a more " psy- chological " or "Eastern " manner (258, 267). Thus, we can shift to " the subjects exercising the act of ' to he,' ' to know,' and 'to love.' " (268). This yields "notional" (in contrast to " essential") consciousness, knowledge, and love (268-72). Thus, " Father, Son and Spirit are three centers of conscious- ness in community, in mutual communication " (272). In all this, "it is the formal distinction between nature and per- son . . . that remains irreducible and the key to theological discourse" (271; cp. 282, 27).

The treatment of the Trinity *ad extra* (c. 10) is not as tight- ly organized, for here Hill deals with a range of issues-from the Trinity in creation and salvation to the Trinity in non- Christian religious experience. For example, "religious con- sciousness " moves " from the Trinity encountered in the events of saving history to the inner divine Trinity and thence to an awareness of the Trinity operative in creation" (274). Here the Trinity in the order of salvation is prior to the Trinity in the order of creation. For " theological consciousness " (which seeks to approximate " something of the standpoint of

God himself ") the immanent Trinity   " ' explains ' the trini-
tarian characteristics first of creation and then of salvation "
 (274). There is a "presence of the Trinity" in creation by
appropriation   (282-84) and "a specifically trinitarian pres-
ence " in salvation (284ff). Working this out leads Hill to
suggest an ecclesiology which subordinates Church as sacra-
ment to Church as communion (291), a doctrine of the gifts
of the Spirit as ecclesially contexted (303-307), and an anal-
ysis of the non-trinitarian dimensions of non-Christian religious
phenomena (307-314).

II. Two Theses

This impressive text obviously deserves scrutiny by exegetes,
historians, and metaphysicians as well as systematic theo-
logians like myself. The limits of my perspective will be ob-
vious as I proceed. But the issue is complicated by the fact
that, despite some disagreements, I am sympathetic to large
segments of Hill's position-frequently   because I agree, but
sometimes because my intuitions incline me in Hill's direction
even when I do not fully understand it. Such sympathies can
no longer be gainsaid, even in Catholic theology. Roman
Catholics like myself could be placed in all Hill's background
and foreground chapters. Those who (unlike myself) identify
themselves substantively with any of these existing positions
would write a considerably different response from the one that
follows.

The best I can do in these circumstances is put the discus-
sion in my own terms in order to highlight my agreements, dis-
agreements, and lack of understanding. Whether in doing this
I distort or shed light from another direction on *The Three-
Personed God* must be left to Hill and the reader to decide. At
the risk of underemphasizing all that Hill has to say about
salvation and evil, our societies and selves and histories as well
as the cosmos, I would say Hill advances the discussion of the
Trinity in two major ways. First, he proposes that God's be-
ing *in se* (God's "being and identity")   and *ad extra* (God's

"saving activity in history")   is three-personed in one nature-
with the result that we live in "a universe of natures" and
"a universe of finite persons"   (277).   Second, he recommends
we come to this conclusion about God on the basis of a de-
scription of theology as "re-trieve   *(Wiederholung)* ," remain-
ing faithful to what we have been and taking up everything
all over again from the beginning (xi, 241).   The first is a
teaching about God; the second is a teaching about teachings
 (about God).   I will begin with the second-not   because it is
more important   (which it is not)   but solely because it will
generate some useful distinctions for analyzing Hill's central
proposal.

III. Hill's Methodological Observations

   ·what Hill sometimes calls "re-trieve,"   he elsewhere breaks
down into " five general characteristics " of his methodology
 (241).   Theology is situated within faith, seeks rational un-
derstanding, has its origins in experience, interprets the trans-
mitted texts and symbols of christianity,   and uses speculative
reason in its constructive task (241-51).   In more detail, faith
is " an encounter with the living God," ultimately   " an adher-
ing primarily to the person of Jesus"   (241, 243); theology
seeks to understand the intelligibility of this in various ways
 (243).   Because the encounter is an experience, we need *(inter
alia)* a "theory of experience" to "mediate the submission of
such experience to the interpreting Word of God" (244).   Be-
cause the experience occurs in an historical world, we need to
interpret " the transmitted texts and symbols of christianity "
 (245).   Because the intelligibility we seek must be as extensive
as possible, we need some " theory of being" (247) . Put with
a pragmatism that might make Hill cringe, what we do (or do
not) teach about the Trinity makes a difference to the way we
encounter God, adhere to Jesus Christ, experience the world
around us, interpret and otherwise use texts and symbols, and
speculate on the complexities of everything there is. And vice
versa.

It is somewhat unfair to dwell on these methodological ob-
servations: Hill-fortunately-provides   us with a substantive
exercise in theology rather than methodological comment on
theology. But his observations nicely condense some of the
main advantages of the text and suggest some useful distinc-
tions for analyzing Hill's more substantive non-methodological
claims. First, Hill's treatment of the Trinity is an excellent
example of how we do not have to be fooled in *choosing among*
such things as " faith," " understanding," " experience," " her-
meneutics," and " speculative reason " in explicating the three·
personed God. In my own terms, throughout the text Hill at-
tends to the variety of practical contexts in which trinitarian
issues arise. For example, in praying " to the Father, through
the Son, in the Spirit" (282) we trust *coram Deo* that our
praise and thanks and petition will be cleansed and accepted
by God. In offering *narratives-* whether the mythological
portrayals of heavenly councils, brief trinitarian scenes in the
Gospels, or a reading of the whole of Scripture as a story mov-
ing from Father through the Son to the Spirit-we hope that
what we say will·be evaluated by how well it depicts the inter-
action of characters, plot, and circumstances. When we use
trinitarian *images,* symbols, or metaphors of God-geometrical,
cosmological, or otherwise,-we might expect what we say to
be evaluated by how well it condenses the narratives or in some
other way. When we *teach* that God is three-personed-from
the pulpit or *ex aliqua cathedra,* in a classroom or home, in
inner-Christian controversy or extra-Christian apologetic-we
hope our judgments are true to what we are talking about; thus,
we hope our teachings about all kinds of things, God, and even
teachings about teachings themselves speak the truth. 2 While

2 For Hill's views on these issues, see his index under the concepts of
analogy, dogma, myth, prayer, and symbol. One might ask: could not re-
marks about the Trinity be ideological disguises for remarks about the self,
society, history, or the cosmos? This would seem to be the claim of Feuer-
bach and similar hermeneuticians of suspicion (152£) ., Remarks about the
Trinity do indeed not only have the force of prayers, stories, symbols, and
teachings but also ideological disguises. But the notion that the Trinity is

it would be a mistake to saddle Hill with this or any other rigorous way of ordering these contexts, it is clear that Hill would rightly have us take them all into account.

Still further, I believe Hill is also correct to imply that the crucial issues in trinitarian theology-at least once we presume the set of practices which nurture prayer, narratives, images, etc.-have to do with what we shall *teach* or believe in this regard. This is not to say that " trinitarian language cannot be *employed* in a symbolic way" (109. Hill's emphasis); nor is this to deny " how tenuous a cognitive hold we have upon the mystery who is God" (311). It is to suggest that taking the Trinity to be a teaching or truth-claim is the most diffi-cult case, for we can then insist that, while there are a number of purposes and contexts for dealing with this topic, one of these purposes and contexts is truthfully teaching who God is. And if we aim to teach truthfully, the doctrine of the Trinity is subject to (if not exhausted in) the kind of reason-giving involved in any proposed teaching. Hill clearly disagrees with "the Trinity of Religious Symbolism" (c. 4), all the while insisting that symbolic discourse has an indispensable role to play.

Indeed, I think it is fair to go one step further. Hill's main interest is in the relationship between what we teach as Chris-tians and the broad range of things there are; his proposal is not only " dogmatic " but also and primarily " systematic" (xiv). Hill is attuned to the differences between these two enterprises. His speculative reason, for example, distinguishes the " judgment " that something is the case from the " con-ceptual grasp of what sort of thing it is" (259-65)-clearly

an ideological disguise seems to me to be not so much a way of *making* re-marks about the Trinity *oneself* as a way of taking account of the fact that *othm·s* confess that God is three-personed. The latter is a noble enterprise and has parallels in the ways Christians take the doctrines of other religions. But only linguistic terrorists would *intend* their remarks on the Trinity to be an ideological disguise. I will not take such such instances into account here since they seem to trade on more positive ways of taking the
even though I am sure we terrorize the divine more than we care to admit.

suggesting that Hill is more interested in the judgment that
God is three-personed   than the concept "three-personed."
Again, Hill knows that other' theories of being'" are available
and no exclusive claims to truth can be made" (247); meta-
physical schemes in the wrong hands can and have become
" quickly   divorced   from   concrete   Christian   living "   and
" religiously sterile " (253) . We can fairly presume that analo-
gous remarks could be ma.de about various theories of experi-
ence and hermeneutics. Christian claims about God have been
compatible   with a va.riety of speculative, experiential, and
hermeneutical theories. On the other hand, Hill takes serious-
ly the way our notion of God as mystery of salvation is related
to *all* the things and kinds of things we are saved for and from
by this God. If so, why not give full rein to what might be
said on this score?

   I, for one, find this project extraordinarily interesting. But
not all will share Hill's interest and a variety of questions
might be asked about how his five methodological character-
istics are woven together. For example, if we take "to the
Father, through the Son, in the Spirit " to be the paradigmatic
prayer (282) , are we not giving priority to " subordinative
doxology " rather than " coordinative doxology " (e.g., *Gloria
Patri et Filia et Spirititi Sancto)?* [3] If experience is always" in-
terpreted experience"   (244), what is the point of distinguish-
ing a" theory of experience" from "hermeneutics"? Why do
" symbols " seem to be more hermeneutically crucial than nar-
ratives?   Could it not be just as true that symbols are con-
densed narratives as that narratives are "extended" (107)
symbols? [4] How differently would Hill's background and fore-
ground read if attention were focused on prayer, symbols, or

   [3] See Bertrand de Margerie, S.J., *The Oh?-istian Trinity in History,* Tran!<.
Edmund J. Fortmann, S.J. (Still River, Massachusetts: St. Bede's Publica-
tions, 1982), pp. 103-4, 339-46.
   [4] A good treatment of the relation between "stories" and "symbols" is
David Baily Harned, *Images for Self-Reeo,gnition: The Christian as Player,
Sufferer and Vandal* (New York: The Seabury Press 1977), Chapter 5
 (Imagery and Stories).

exegesis rather than ancient and modern theologians and philosophers? Once the classic categories " nature/persons " are used in the context of a speculative scheme, how will we distinguish what is communally crucial about such concepts from the speculative scheme?

Despite the force of these and similar questions, there is a sense in which they are not fair. Hill's central enterprise focuses on what we shall teach about who God is in relationship to everything there is, all the while insisting on a whole range of appropriate contexts for God's dealings with us and our dealings with God (e.g., prayer, narrative, symbol). It is unfair, it seems to me, to focus on questions about these other contexts and avoid the key issues Hill raises. In what follows, I will suggest some links between Hill's speculative enterprise and prayer, narrative, and symbols; and I will periodically raise some questions about how to distinguish communally essential from more speculative teachings. Nonetheless, my focus (like Hill's) will be on what we (the Christian community) ought to teach about God in relationship to everything there is.

A final question about Hill's methodological observations will make for a transition to these substantive issues. It is interesting that Hill's three-personed God plays no explicit role in his methodological observations. There are surely a number of reasons for this. If " methodology " has to do with the truth-claims we make about how to discover what truth-claims we want to make, it might seem self-defeating to build claims about God as triune into such teachings about teachings when the point is to make a case for the three-personed God. Further, Hill clearly worries that building the Trinity into methodology will restrict the doctrine of the three-personed God to a prolegomenal clue by which to structure our theologies. On this reading, the doctrine of the Trinity functions solely in relationship to how we know God (in contrast to who God is) and the immanent Trinity is collapsed into an epistemologically focused economic Trinity. Such is the re-reading of the Trinity proposed by those like Schleiermacher and Tillich who take the

Trinity to be merely "a second level concept" (84, 87, 91, 106); and Hill even finds this move in Barth's revolutionary decision to structure his prolegomena around the Trinity (111, 115, 125) . However, it is unclear to me whether Hill accepts a view of the Trinity as not *only* a teaching about God but *also* a teaching about other teachings. Clearly he rejects-rightly, I would say-the view that " the Trinity is not *a* doctrine but the prolegomena of all other doctrines" (125). And his own teachings about teachings focus on "re-trieval" rather than the Trinity. But what if we claimed that the Trinity was not *only* a "doctrine" (a teaching or truth-claim about God) but *also* prolegomena! (i.e., a teaching about teachings)? What if the Trinity was not only a teaching about God but also (say) a model for theological *Wiederholung* (i.e., the way God remains faithful to what God has been and simultaneously takes up everything all over again from the beginning)? Hill does not make this move. He does not deny that it is possible either. And it seems to me that the Trinity is also such a doctrine about doctrines, even if it is not *primarily* such. My reason for thinking it is not primarily such that " teachings about teachings" normally presume teachings about other things. [5] My reason for thinking it is (or, at least theologoumenally, can be) a doctrine about doctrines is-why not? If the Trinity is as important as Hill claims, why not use the doctrine of the Trinity as the clue for identifying the whole range of Christian

5 I realize that this distinction between "teachings " and "teachings about teachings " could be challenged by those who view language as a kind of a priori that structures what we even count as "reality" and/or "experience." On this view the distinction between " teachings " and " teachings about teachings " would have to be replaced by something like a distinction between ordinary use of teachings and the theological quest for the "grammar " of such use; for one approach see David Burrell, *Aquinas. God and Action* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979). This might eventually lead one to ask for the rules that govern the use of trinitarian nouns (Father, Word, Image, Holy Spirit, Love, Gift), verbs (proceed, spirate, etc.), and prepositions. I am very sympathetic to the quest for such rules, but to pursue the issues this way would take me too far from the center of gravity of Hill's proposals.

teaching? This, it seems to me, is what Barth does when he not *only* structures his prolegomena around the Trinity but *also* orders the other volumes of the *Church Dogrnatics* around creation, reconciliation, and salvation. One advantage of allowing for this is that Hill could extend his proposal throughout the whole range of trinitarian discourse-from prayers and stories and images through teachings to teachings about teachings.

In any case, on this Hill and I agree: the Trinity is not primarily a teaching about teachings. Even if one is willing to admit that the doctrine of the Trinity can operate as a second-level or meta-dogmatic rule, the only way such a prolegomena! guide could be defended if challenged would be to explicate the meaning and truth of the Trinity as a doctrine about God. How so?

IV. What shall we teach about God?

A. God *in se* and *a.d extra*

Perhaps the basic axiom of Hill's text is condensed in the subtitle: God is a mystery of salvation. To speak of the three-personed God is not *only* to teach about God's relationship to us or our relationship to God; the doctrine of the Trinity is also and primarily a way of identifying God *in se*. Here Hill stands with almost all pre-modern theologians (except economic trinitarians [30:fl']) and twentieth-century theologians like Barth (116; but cp. 121, 127) for what Austin Farrer calls " the prior actuality of God." [6] He stands against Schleiermacher (c. 4) and those process theologians (c. 7) for whom God is *only* as related to the world and its creatures. Traditions which do not focus on God's prior actuality find it difficult to explain why we not only thank and petition God for various benefits but also praise God simply for the one God is (e.g.,

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[6] " The Prior Actuality of God" in *Reflective Faith: Essays in Philosophical Theology, ed.* Charles C. Conti (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company 1972), pp. 178-91.

the one who blesses and so praises us). Still further, for such
traditions, narratives of God can be tales of God's relations
(e.g., " acts of God ") but not of God *in $e* (e.g., the one who
acts) . And images of God, for those unwilling to speak of
God's prior actuality, tend to be evaluated simply by their
power to express and occasion our relationship to God and not
also for their power to symbolize who God is. Finally, more
philosophically, to claim that God's relations are purely ex-
ternal or economic may make God's *ad extra* relations a mat-
ter of arbitrary fiat.

On the other hand, Hill also stands against large segments
of pre-modern theology and with theologians like Barth in re-
fusing to separate God *in se* and *ad extra,* the immanent and
economic Trinity.   We not only praise but also thank and pe-
tition God. Narratives of God are not tales of God's hidden
being but also stories of God's people and cosmos. Images of
God trade on our feeble attempts to see God in the world in
which we live. Finally, and again more philosophically, to
claim that God's relations are purely internal or immanent
may make God's *ad extra* relations necessary to God's identity.
Here is the truth in Liberal and Process theologies: "relation-
ality" is essential to God's identity.   God is in relation, even if
God is not identifiable with God's *ad extra* relations, much less
turned into a relation. The immanent Trinity is not identified
with the economic Trinity   (as Hill worries it is in Rahner's
famous axiom [140f,   but is and is only known in God's
economic activity.

Hill's decision on this score is a large and important one. I
will not dwell on it because I am in substantive agreement-at
least systematically.   (It is unclear to me where Hill would
draw the line dogmatically. Is it essential to Christian identity
to affirm the priority of God *in se-or* might it suffice to affirm
both God *in se* and *ad extra,* leaving a great deal of room for
working out the priority and relationship between the two?
Further, if the fact that the Trinity is a mystery of salvation
means *(inter alia)* that relations are internal   (not only ex-

ternal) to God, (how) is it possible to distinguish what we wish to teach on the Trinity from competing theories of internal and external relations? 7) At any rate, it is one of the major ironies of modern trinitarian theology that a teaching frequently criticized for bearing no relation to life has become the means for affirming such relations-precisely by building "relationality" into God's prior actuality. How so?

B. Being and Acting

Hill's focal identification of God is "Be-ing Itself (the hyphen serving to convey the participial form of the term) " (260, 248, 256). God's "Pure Act of Being" (260) reveals itself, Hill proposes, as an "intentionality" which achieves "explicit articulation in the concepts of knowing and loving" so that the " divine ' to be ' is thus identified simultaneously as' to know' and' to love'" (260-61). This notion of God as Be-ing trades on a contrast between our limited be-ing (our "exercise of the act of 'to be'") and God's unlimited Be-ing (260); I will return to the way our identifications of God (as unlimited and necessary Be-ing) are inseparable from our identifications of ourselves (e.g., as limited or contingent be-ing) in a few paragraphs. For now it is important to note that Hill's identification of God as Be-ing is a powerful alternative to a number of other ways of specifying the referent of " God." Hill himself notes that his claim that God is Be-ing contrasts with referring to God as Becoming (who, metaphorically at best, acts [185, 254]) or Being (who, perhaps, acts [260]). But the contrasts could be expanded, particularly if (like Hill) we wish to relate our teachings to the whole range of " religious experience" (807-14). William A. Christian, for example, suggests that the following have been the grammatical subjects

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1 I am thinking here of the issues discussed in standard theological and philosophical encyclopedias. For example, B. Mattingly, "Relation," *New Catholic Enoyclopedia,* 1967, XII, pp. 216-9. Richard Rorty "Relation, Internal and External" *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* 1967, VII, pp. 125-33.

of some different kinds of "basic religious proposals": quali-
ties, relations, particular natural entities, particular human in-
dividuals and groups, Nature, Mankind, Pure Forms, Pure Be-
ing, and a transcendent active being.[8] To take God as Be-ing
is to rule out an identification of God not only with particular
or more universal natural or human entities but also with ab-
stract qualities, relations, and pure forms. Thus, Hill worries
that the key referent for Tillich (and, sometimes, for Rahner
[136] and others) is an "ideal and purely possible realm"
 (97)-William Christian's "Pure Forms." And Hill suggests
that those for whom God is " the eternal God of History " (c.
6) sometimes seem to transform History into God. " The God
of Panentheism " (c. 7) frequently turns Creativity into God.
"The God of interpersonal koinonia" (c. 8) seems to have
three referents and thus cannot account for the unity of God's
" act of ' to be.' "

   On the other hand, Hill's Be-ing is a novel referent relative
to William Christian's list-or, perhaps, a compromise between
the referents Christian characterizes as " Being" and " Agent."
A major problem (Hill suggests) identifying God as "Being"
is that it seems to separate divine *ousia* and *energeiar*-
and can yield a hierarchical and therefore subordinationist
trinitarian theology (77, 226, 252). The problem with identify-
ing God as Agent *(ens in actu* in contrast to *ens ut actus* [248])
is that it seems to suggest a kind of divine embodiment and
change which Scripture and particularly tradition have wanted

   B*Meaning and Truth in Religion* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1964), especially c. IX. A "basic religious proposal" proposes
one of these or some other logical subject as "more important than anything
else in the universe " (c. IV) . Such unrestricted primacy valuations function
remarkably like Thomas's discussions of divine perfections (e.g., *Summa
Theologiae* Ia, 13, 7) and suggest interesting links between Aquinas's natural
theology and contemporary theories of religion-links that I will not pursue
here. I will also not pursue the different views of " reference " in Hill's claim
that Be-ing is that which is most perfect (*Three-Personed* p. 248) and Wil-
liam Christian's claim that " 'exist ' and ' good' are colorless like water"
 (Meaning p. 226).

to avoid-and, I would add, may be unable to avoid what Hill calls " neo-modalism " (c. 5) !' In claiming God is "Be-ing," Hill aims to avoid these alternatives.

" Be-ing " here is clearly a construct of " speculative reason." I think it is fair to say that Hill does not view Creativity, History, or Pure Forms as apt identifications of God either dogmatically or systematically. He seems to think that identifications of God as agent (" a living God intervening in the concrete history of man"), triunity of persons, and Be-ing (and Being?) are all apt dogmatically (e.g., –but that Be-ing is the way of identifying God that best meets the demands of speculative reason. To test this identification, it might be helpful to dispel some of the prima facie objections to identifying God as Be-ing. In prayer, it might be said, we call upon God by name (e.g., "Lord God, ... ") not by a description like "Be-ing." But, Hill might say, does not our prayer also describe God in various ways (e.g.," ... King of the Universe")? And how is one to articulate the pattern in the various; ways God is called upon in (say) Eucharistic Prayers (e.g., Father, Lord God, Lord Jesus, etc.)? Further, a major function of stories is to render the unique identity of God (in the Tanak) and Jesus Christ (in the New Testament) ;[10] stories of "Be-ing " are non-existent. But, Hill might retort, New Testament narratives depict trinitarian figures interacting in various ways'"-ways that give rise to a number of questions about the coherence of these narratives. Finally, those interested in more philosophical objections might wonder if an identification of God as Be-ing does not tilt us so much in the direction of" de-

[9] For God as transcendent agent see Robert H. King, *The Meaning of God* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1973). For explicit attention to the problems of embodiment and agency see Thomas Tracy, *God, Action, and Embodiment* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, forthcoming).

[10] See Dale Patrick, *The Rendering of God in the Old Testament* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1981); Hans Frei, *The Identity of Jesus Ghrist.* The *Hermene1ttioal Bases of Dogmatic Theology* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975).

scriptions " that we cannot take account of " proper names." [11] But, if we take "Father," "Son," and "Spirit" to be proper names, we may have the tritheism Christians have been concerned to avoid; still further, Hill claims that we must begin with descriptions of God because we more readily understand kinds of things than unique things (63) and (more generally still) " the concept of unity enjoys a logical priority over multiplicity" .

Indeed, Hill might even claim that such activities as praying and narrating God count in favor rather than against God as "Be-ing." For example, prayer does seem to presume One who preeminently *is* rather than an unactualized possibility. Further, God engaged in praise and thanks and petition, while surely the eternal God *of* history and creativity, is clearly other than natural and historical process. While we may not want to go so far as to say that a correct understanding of biblical narrative cannot be had unless one sees that this God cannot not be,[12] it is the case that our judgments of the aptness of these narratives of God are inseparable from our apprehension of the existence (Be-ing) of this God. Such stories of God depict a concrete character with nature and history and evoking cosmic and human unrealized possibilities but not identifiable with any of these actualities or possibilities.

The point is that these distinct referents for "God" (and " Trinity") are embedded in distinct policies toward prayer, narrative, symbols, and more abstract issues like the relationship between proper names 'and descriptions. God as Be-ing has the advantages for prayer, narrative, symbol, and speculative reason suggested above, even if one is skeptical of some of Hill's speculative reasons for claiming God is Be-ing (e.g., that we more readily understand kinds of things than unique

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[1.1] See John Searle, "Proper Names and Descriptions," *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* 1967, VI, pp. 487-91. For a discussion of the theological issue in Thomas, see .Armand Maurer, "St. Thomas on the Sacred Name 'Tetragrammaton,'" *Medieval Studies* 34 (1972), pp. 275-86.

[12] See Patrick's and Frei's texts in note 10 above.

things). The issue at this point is: what is the benefit of the insistence on "Be-ing" for Trinity and salvation? [13]

C. Theology and Anthropology

One way to address this issue is to move from the referent to the referees, from God's nature and persons to the creaturely world of natures and persons, from " theology " to " anthropology." Hill's identification of God does not simply trade on a contrast between limited contingent and unlimited/necessary be-ing and God. The innerworldly paradigm of *ess<e* is human be-ing as intentional act focused on knowing and loving.

To appreciate Hill's move at this point it will be useful to contrast it with another possibility. As Hill notes, at least since Schleiermacher it has been common to conceive a " human being " or " person " as " a center of consciousness, radicated in an autonomous exercise of freedom" (254). Any further account of things is (primarily but not only in German idealism) " modeled on the structure of human consciousness " and corporeality becomes "a precipitate of spirit" (114). Human " nature " then becomes " the historical product of the person subject to ongoing transformation and bespeaking the open realm of what is possible for persons in society" (254; cp. 234). Hill's point might be expanded, for this" turn to the subject" also has an impact on our linguistic skills. When " selves " are so conceived, we are compelled to look at the individual or social consciousness symbolized within or behind various narratives instead of at the cumulative interaction of characters and circumstances. Prayer becomes less praise and thanks and petition than a complex co-presence of self- and God-consciousness. More generally, if the self is conceived as consciousness, there is no single modern notion of " person," no single " anthropology." Modern anthropology becomes the minimal collection (held together by the market's invisible hand) of

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[1s] For a clear discussion of different uses of "being," see Christopher Stead, *Divine Substanoe* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), Chapter I.

answers to the question "Who are we? " needed to deter those who think otherwise. [14] The relationship between individuals and communities becomes fundamentally conflictual; and, in matters trinitarian, we are asked to choose between " psychological " and " social " analogies.

Hill's alternative to this is a universe of finitude and contingency generating a " twofold wonderment: that something is at all and the distinct question of what sort of thing it is "; existence is distinct from essence as " the *act* of the essence " (259). In more perfect beings, this act is intentional act-particularly knowing and loving. Such intentional acts have a " source " and " term " (e.g., successful knowmg imp1les a knower and a known) so that we speak of" rela.tionality at the core of existence" (263)-either as " the accidental qualification of an existent" (in our case [71, 264]) or" subsisting relation," " hypostasis," and " person" (in God's case [257, 266, 267]). Finally, such descriptions can be reversed and we can begin with "the subjects exercising the act of 'to be,' 'to know,' and ' to love.' " (268), describing "the characteristic ways in which a given person appropriates a common nature, unveiling himself in the externality of that nature" (269). When person is used of the Trinity at this third stage, it " marks an approximation to what the term person means in contemporary usage-an approximation, nevertheless, that can never be more than analogous." (272)

In this last paragraph we find the major benefits and burden of Hill's proposal. The benefits are the ways the anthropology illuminates Hill's claim that God is Be-ing. First, the anthropology enables Hill to locate salvation firmly in the context of creation without sacrificing the priority of soteric issues for "religious consciousness" (274). That is, what we are saved from and for depends in part on what goods there are and can

[14] For further background on these competing " anthropologies," see David Kelsey's "Human Being" in Peter Hodgson and ·Robert King, (eds.), *Ohristian Theology: An Introduction to Its Traditions and Tasks* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982), pp. 141-167.

be-e.g., for Hill, existence as the intentional and so relational
act of essence. Second, for Trinitarian purposes, the move
from " be-ing" and " intentional act" to "relationality " and
the "subjects exercising the act of to-be'" assures a focus on
divine activity *(Be-ing)* without collapsing the immanent into
the economic Trinity   (Be-ing) .

   I am enormously sympathetic to both points, including the
effort to develop an alternative to "the turn to the subject."
But it is precisely HHl's effort to weave the notion of" subject"
into his speculative scheme that raises problems. In sum, I
am not persuaded that Hill can make his move to "the sub-
jects exercising the act of 'to be,' 'to know,' and 'to love'"
without separating subjectivity and agency. The very concept
of" subject" suggests a distance between who I am and what
I do, a distance that seems to be overcome only by an ongoing
"unveiling"   (cp. xii, 269) . This distance emerges clearly if
one asks: how can we overcome the gap between the " pure re-
Ia,ting" (e.g., 271, 281) of trinitarian persons and the relations
that characterize human persons? For Hill it is clear that the
gap cannot be overcome conceptually. Thus, "the names used
to designate the members of the Trinity . . . function not as
concepts (to define essences) but as symbols (to name the per-
sonal)" (277-78, 283, 296) . This surely provides a foothold for
addressing various distortions of trinitarian teaching (e.g.,
sexist notions of God) . And it is a welcome reminder of how
impractical it is to study trinitarian teaching independently of
prayer, stories, symbols, etc. But, if we contend this-if we
contend that the way God is three-personed is ultimately
symbolic-have   we not given up on teaching the three-personed
God (in contrast to praying to, narrating, or symbolizing God
as three-personed)?

   But it seems to me that the whole of Hill's enterprise sug-
gests how we might go further in this regard-though   I fear
my suggestions at this point must remain cryptic. If the
grammatical clue to God is verbal (be-ing), the alternatives
to construing the Trinitarian " names " are not " concepts "

and " symbols." Rather, the question is how our community's
teachings and our speculative judgments about God relate to
those kinds of symbols Hill calls narratives-narratives   of a
God who freely creates a world destined for God's love (273) ,
a world in which" the *Logos* works through the unique freedom
of Jesus and so through his individual history; the *Pneuma*
through the communal freedom of all believers and so through
continuing history that cannot yet be finally thematized "
 (290) . The narrative exegesis of a Moltmann or a Balthasar
seems very promising for analyzing the actors and acts of the
drama, even if one agrees with Hill's criticisms of their sys-
tematic positions. [15] If we ask for referential specificity for this
God, we might say we have a transcendent active be-ing who
has particular attributes, including internal and external rela-
tions of various sorts (e.g., to possibilities as well as actualities
like particular individuals and more universal natural and
human groups). All this can be said without implying any
speculative view of the relationships between actuality and
possibility, being and act, internal and external relations-
though I am sure it implies many non-speculative (e.g., gram-
matical) claims about the roles of nouns, verbs, and preposi-
tions in God-talk. Here we find the truth in Lonergan's sug-
gestion that the concepts "person/nature" ought to be
handled by " Hellenistic technique " rather than speculative
reason-at least on the level of " doctrines " in contrast to
"systematics." [16] In any case, when rightly pressed for our
speculative judgments on this score (e.g., how can this God be
a God of our cosmic and social and personal and historical lives

[15] "Jiirgen Moltmann, *The Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God.*
trans. Margaret Kohl (San Francisco: Harper and Row Publishers, 1981),
Chapter III; Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Theodramatik,* 2 volumes (Einsiedeln:
Johannes-Verlag, 1973-1978). For a devastating critique of Moltmann's book,
see also George Hunsinger's review in *The Thomist* 47 (#I, January, 1983),
pp. 129-39.

[16] But Hill's questions to Lonergan (pp. 224-25) might still remain. See
Bernard Lonergan, "Dehellenization of Dogma," *Theological Studies* 28
(1967)' pp. 336-351.

in Jesus's unique and our communal freedom?), we can then show how it is that this is the kind of God (" one nature ") who *is, in se* and *ad extra,* in these relationships to world, Christ, and church ("three persons ")-and so we are the kind of be-ings whose existence is constituted by our " relationality " to Jesus Christ and each other in ways " that cannot yet be finally thematized."

I am, quite frankly, unsure where this would lead in relationship to soteriology: recall that Hill's three-personed God is a mystery *of salvation* and that my comments have been narrowly honed relative to the range of issues Hill discusses. The suggestion that equal time be given to narratives and symbols, divine and human agency as   as divine and human be-ing, surely raises as many soteric problems as it solves-perhaps, Hill might argue, too many. It would be downright foolish to suggest that a text as thorough as *The Three-Personed God* would not have potent responses to my suggestions. Hill has done an excellent job of including the variety of practical contexts in which we deal with the trinitarian God, outlining the past and present alternatives we have, and proposing a way to incorporate the classic categories of "nature/persons " into a speculative scheme. No one interested in Trinitarian issues dare fail to come to terms with this text.

JAMES J. BUCKLEY

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The Christian Trinity in History. (Studies in Historical Theology, Vol. I.) By BERTRAND DE MARGERIE, S.J. Translated by Edmund J. Fortman, S.J. Still River, Massachusetts: St. Bede's Publications, 1982. Pp. xxii + 387 including indexes and bibliography. $29.95.

After centuries of neglect, Christian theologians have begun to re-address the doctrine of the Trinity relegated for so long to the realm of " mystery " suggestive of higher mathematics and deemed of little concern to the believer. Now the challenge first thrown down by Karl Barth, who inaugurates his massive *Ohitrch Dogmatics* with an in-depth exploration of the Trinity (Vol. I/1), has been taken up by others. Notable among the products of this new concern are Karl Rahner's *Mysterium Salutis* article, translated into English as *The Trinity,* Eberhard Jungel's *Doctrine of the Trinity,* Jurgen Moltmann's *The Trinity and the Kingdom,* Heribert Muhlen's *Der Heilige Geist als Person,* and George Tavard's *The Vision of the Trinity.* To these efforts must now happily be added this English translation of the 1975 work of the Jesuit theologian Bertrand de Margerie. All of these studies differ in radical ways from one another and de Margerie's contribution does not follow the lead of any one of them but offers a distinct approach of its own. Its strong suit is history-as the title leads us to expect, and as we would anticipate from an author whose more recent work is concerned with exegesis: *Introduction a l'histoire de l'exegese,* Vol. I, *Les Peres grecs et orientaux* (1980). The history in question is mined extensively, with scrupulous attention to the texts, making use of interpretative norms that are clear, consistent and controlled. The net result of this procedure is a strong sense of living tradition, one in which the continuities are rather more pronounced than the discontinuities-though de Margerie does observe that Gregory of Nazianzus is "generally regarded as the only Father who put forth no heresy" (p. 275). It is herein that lies the preeminent trait of de Margerie's work: he knows with crystal clarity "who it is in whom he has believed". This is to say that the theological methodology at work throughout is one that starts in the very midst of, and within the fullness of, an avowed faith commitment. The *Oatholica,* the "Catholic thing", comes forth impressively because the point of departure is always the historical revelation made in Jesus of Nazareth, articulated normatively in the New Testament, and mediated in living tradition. In this sense, the work is pre-critical. It is not an employment of theology as hermeneutics in the sense of a reinterpretation

of sources. This does not preclude an interpretative element on de Mar-
gerie's part in his role as one who is reflecting theologically on what is
given in tradition.   But it does emphasize that ultimately it is the Word
of God that interprets us rather than the other way around. He prefers
to preserve the *lectio difficilior* against any facile rationalizing of the
text on the basis of present experiences as having a revelatory power on
their own. Occasionally this gives a conservative tone to the resultant
theology, but it would be a mistake to dismiss de Margerie's study as
deteriorating into a sterile traditionalism.   His reverence for tradition does
not belie the fact that he is familiar with, and able to cope with, the views
of others. This is true at least to a degree. The positions of Hegel, Feuer-
bach, Luther, and Karl Barth are extensively presented if usually reacted
to negatively; Karl Rahner provokes a generally favorable but reserved
response; Bernard Lonergan fares somewhat better; Heribert Muhlen's
I-Thou-We analogy is adopted and richly used, even as objections to it
are taken note of. Entirely lacking, however, are any dealings with Process
Theology, with Paul Tillich, whose name does not even appear in the index,
with the eschatological hermeneutics of vVolfhart Pannenberg and Jurgen
Moltmann, or with Eberhard Jungel's elaboration upon Barthian trini-
tarianism.

There is, of course, an alternative methodology available for dealing
with the mystery of the God's triunity.   This alternative method is mark-
edly critical in its procedures. It keeps the content of faith at a minimum,
at least initially, out of a fear of religious apriori-ism or ideology. Thus,
it views the doctrine of the Trinity, less as a teaching about God-even
a saving God-than as a teaching in function of a Christology. Jesus is
acknowledged as the Son of God, and in an ontic sense, after the Easter
event. But what is seemingly meant is that God somehow or other " pos-
sesses " as his own the human consciousness of Jesus. Father (the *Abba*
of Jesus) is a name designating in itself the fullness of the Godhead.
Holy Spirit is then the spirit of the risen Jesus poured out upon believers,
or differently put, the immanence of God within his holy people. Without
repudiating tradition, indeed in seeking it out, the intention is not only
to retrieve and reactivate it as a deposit of truth but also to excise those
elements within it that are aberrant or irrelevant.   Obviously, the theo-
logical yield is going to differ vastly depending upon which of these
methodologies is deployed. This revisionist method is precisely one that
de Margeric chooses not to pursue; it is mentioned here as a contrasting
procedure to put into perspective the method that he does employ.

The structure of the work as a whole is a twofold one: an historical
and analytic study followed by a systematic section. Part One begins with
a scriptural investigation but is more markedly a searching of tradition
where the author is very much at home. Where else today can one read

through the development which moves from the Biblical record through the early Fathers, from First Constantinople (381) to Second Constantinople (554), into Medieval theology culminating in the Latin Councils of the Middle Ages: IV Lateran (1215), Lyons (1274), and Florence (1441), all the way down to the trinitarian ecclesiology and pneumatology of the Second Vatican Council (1961-65)

In a somewhat briefer Part Two the author attempts a systematic theology of the Trinity. Thus, he does not succumb to a failure of nerve in the face of the difficulties confronting one who would seek to synthesize, not the divine reality itself, of course, but our tentative efforts at coming to grips with it cognitively; his efforts represent a confidence in what human understanding is capable of under the light of faith. Basically, de Margerie offers three analogies which he views as illuminating the tri-unity of God: family, Church, and the human soul. The first two are expressive of intersubjectivity; the third of intrasubjectivity. These are complementary one to another, and all three of them are revealed-though the third of them is only implicitly so. To begin with, then, he harkens back to Gregory of Nazianzus to resurrect the familial image of Adam, Eve, and Seth (that is to say of the human father, mother, and child) as representing respectively, in a vastly inadequate way, the divine Father, Son and *Pneuma.* In doing so, he chides Augustine and Aquinas for re-jecting the analogy, though he does note that they understand the analogy as one in which the child images the Second Divine Person and the mother images the Third Divine Person. Still and all, de Margerie argues that the prior version (Gregory's) has rich implications that have only been discovered in the light of modern personalist thought. Succinctly put, this derives from the insight, so opposed to the spirit of Neo-Platonism, that human love remains spiritual even as it is embodied. Thus, the very conjugal act itself as the mutual love of man and woman issues in the fruit of that love which is the child, something which is analogous to the procession of the Holy Spirit as the personal term of the mutual love between the divine Father and his Son. Similarly, Eve (symbol of woman-kind) proceeds from the very substance of Adam and is not an instrument in the production of Seth but a true co-principle, which is analogous to the position of the Second Person of the Trinity vis-a-vis the First and the Third. Undergirding this sort of thinking is the understanding that mankind images the divine, not according to the soul alone (the explicit teaching of Aquinas in *Summa Theologiae,* I, 93, 6, ad 2um & ad 3um) but according to its full humanity.

The second analogy de Margerie offers is likewise scripturally based (e.g., " Father, may they be one in us, a.<; you are in me and I am in you "; John 17 :21), and was given theological elaboration by Richard of St. Vietor. It turns on the eeelesial intersubjectivity of the community of

believers. This reciprocal immanence of Christians to one another in their equality images but only analogically once again, the circuminsession of the divine Persons. The procession of the eternal Son is mirrored in that " The Church, like the Father, begets only Christ, the total Christ" (p. 295) and the procession of the Holy Spirit is reflected in the mutual love ("spirit") of the ecclesial community.

For his third analogy, de Margerie rehabilitates the psychological model which, through the efforts of Augustine and then Aquinas, came to dominate theological reflection. He views this as the culmination of the other two analogies and one which seeks to overcome the obvious shortcomings of the two intersubjective models by recourse to what is basically an intra-subjective one-thereby safeguarding the consubstantiality of the divine Three. This leads him to conclude that the emanation of the *Logos* by divine intellection and of the *Pneuma* by way of divine love are "more than a mere hypothesis as Rahner seems to think" (p. 313). What motivates de Margerie in giving greater status than this to the analogy and in characterizing it as implicitly a matter of faith is its quality of belonging to the universal and ordinary magisterium of the Church; he views it in short as a non-defined dogma (p. 313). De Margerie pursues this analogy beyond the deepening of Augustine's original suggestions by Aquinas into the psycho-social development of Aquinas by Bernard Lonergan.

This latter development of the psychological analogy-implicit in Aquinas's analysis of love as regarding the " other" in its very otherness, and worked out explicitly by Lonergan-actually endows this intrasub-jective model with a dimension of intersubjectivity; thus is it complementary to the first two analogies. This brings into the open what is perhaps the most creative suggestion in de Margerie's vision of the Trinity. It consists in the recognition that the Persons in God can actually be conceived of as really distinct centers of consciousness. This is not equivalent to three distinct consciousnesses, nor three distinct liberties-language which can hardly be absolved from tritheism. But the theological development at work here does seem to allow for speaking of three distinct subjectivities, of three centers of one consciousness that are really if only relatively distinct. The more common theological position today is one that aligns itself with Karl Bath's "three modes of being" or Karl Rahner's "three distinct modes of subsisting" *(drei Subsistenz-weisen)-* positions which eschew using the term "persons " of God in the plural, due to the connotations that the word has taken upon itself in modern usage. Their expressions can be understood in an orthodox manner and were so employed by some of the early Fathers; its equivalence is to be found in Aquinas when he appropriates Richard of St. Victor's definition of a divine person as " an incommunicable existence of the divine nature" *(Summa Tlieql()[Jiae,* I, 29_1 3_1 ad 4μm), :But unless carefully nuanced,

such language does tend to suggest accidental modalities within a uni-personal God, something subsequent without which the divine substance might well still subsist; so understood this is modalism in its heterodox sense. What de Margerie's trinitarianism argues for here is an understanding wherein "person" predicated of divinity conveys not only a metaphysical reality (the Greek *hypostasis),* but a personalist or phe-nomenological one as well. The argument quite simply is that "relation" as intradivine is in fact notional act conceived of as true activity; notional act rather than essential act, but genuine act nonetheless. The Father truly generates his Son (or "utters" his eternal Word), which cannot be said of the Second or Third Person; likewise the Father and the Son spirate forth together as one, the Spirit, a true action that cannot be attributed to the Spirit. The intelligibility which this affords should not be overstated: the attribution of such categories to divinity is always an analogical act wherein the differences ever surpass whatever likeness is evoked.

De Margerie completes this integral and valuable study of the Trinity with reflections on the redemptive Trinity, i.e. with the role of the Trinity in the economy of salvation. Attention here centers on the temporal mis-sions of the Son and the Spirit, who are first sent to the Church by the Father, whence They themselves then send the Church into the world. In an epoch when the visible missions have come to an end, it is the Church that gives visibility to the invisible missions. Thus is the Church the saerament of the Trinity. The apex of this sacramental activity is the Eucharist. Here communion with the sacramental body of the incarnate and now glorified Son is at the same time a "drinking of the Spirit" (I Co. 12 :13), and a return to the Father. The Church constitutes her-self in the very celebration of the Eucharist; here is revealed her character as a trinitarian mystery in that " The Eucharistic Christ is totally *ad Patrem, in nexu Spiritus Sancti"* (p. 349).

St. Bede's Publications is to be commended for such scholarly proce-dures as putting the footnotes at the bottom of the pages, and supplying six indexes (though the analytic index is too brief to be of much help), Edmund Fortman's translation from the French is both accurate and readable. All in all, this book is an invaluable contribution to a major theological discussion that is just now getting under way.

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Theories and Things.   By WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE. Cambridge:
        Harvard-Belknap   Press, 1981. Pp. 219 with table of contents,
        index, and table of references. $12.50.

   This collection of concise and well-written essays-many of which have
not appeared in print before-summarizes   the philosophical program of
America's foremost exponent of ontological nominalism. Although occa-
sional pieces on geography   (" The Times Atlas "), lexicography (" Menc-
ken's *.American Language")*   and biography ("Kurt Godel") are included,
most deal with issues familiar to readers of Quine's previously published
writings : the pragmatic   conception of existence as theoretical status and
its criterion of logistical commitment ("Factuality,   like gravitation   and
electric charge, is internal to our theory of nature," p. 23; " To assume
objects of some sort is to reckon objects of that sort among the values
of our variables," p. 8) ; the call for a naturalistic abandonment of the
aims of a first philosophy ("... it sees natural science as an enquiry
into reality, fallible and corrigible, but not answerable to any supra-
scientific tribunal and not in need of any justification beyond observation
and the hypothetico-deductive method," p. 72) ; the repudiation of a uni-
verse of intensions, meanings, unexemplified attributes,   and *irrealia* ("I
have felt that if I   come to terms with Platonism, the least I can do
is to keep it extensional," p. 101) ; and a consequent behavioral approach
to the uses of language and thought ("... a legitimate theory of meaning
must be a theory of the use of language," p. 192).
   Several of the pieces are of technical interest.   " On the Individuation
of Attributes"   suggests that attributes   might be admitted as ultimate
classes (classes which are not themselves members of anything else).
" Intensions Revisited " proposes to deal adequately with the alethic modal
operator of necessity by means of a necessity predicate taking sequences
as its arguments.   "Predicates, Terms, and Classes" sets forth a calculus
of five (ultimately four) functors which, iteratively applied, suffice to
express adequately the whole of the predicate calculus.
   In the reviewer's opinion the central issue, here as elsewhere, is Quine's
nominalism. Virtually all his views can be looked on as the ingenious
and frequently illuminating deployment of an ontology minimal in its
coIDIDitmentto the non-concrete. Thus a fair evaluation of Quine's achieve-
ment cannot be made without examining this nominalism and its relative
merits-which   are not inconsiderable. But what *does* a contemporary
pragmatic nominalist actually hold as a general principle which might
lead to pragmatic criteria of existence as theoretical status or to a repudi-
ation of intensions T

It has been the reviewer's opinion for some time that the contemporary nominalist/realist   dispute comes down to the acceptance or rejection of a single ontological maxim: to every discrete actuality a distinct entity. Thus in the simplest case, the resemblance of two particulars, the realist will maintain (at least) that over a:μd above the two particulars, there exists a universal relation of resemblance irreducible to particulars and needed to explain the fact of similarity. The nominalist, on the other hand, will maintain that such resemblance is a primitive fact which does not require the existence of a further entity, the resemblance relation, and which could not really be explained by the invocation of such a relational universal without giving an account *per obscurius.*

The second point is well taken. That able thinkers of the nominalist position find in universals only occult entities suffices to show that the notion of a universal is a problematic one. If it were not, there would be no dispute. As regards the first point, though, it is simply not clear that similarity needs no account. And the realist may reply that to hold sim- ilarity primitive without further ado is to make such similarity obscure. If the realists are right, then universals exist even at the price of obscurity, while if the nominalists are right then they seem committed to rejecting a maxim which is at least as reasonable as their criticism of the obscurity of universals. And the debate goes on. Intensions fare similarly.

It would be impossible to praise too highly the care, precision, and dis- crimination which Quine has always brought to his work; and this book is no exception. Even those who lack sympathy with his fundamental views must acknowledge their importance and the philosophic zeal they embody. *Theories and Thin'gs* is a tribute to the philosophical penetration and eirenic spirit with which its author has approached not only the prob- lems of philosophy but the problems of life.

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Faith and Reason. By ANTHONY KENNY. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983. Pp. viii ✚ 94.

In the first two of the four lectures which make up this book, the most popular philosophical account of rationality is described and rejected, and another one is put in its place. In the last two, the question is raised whether belief in the existence of God is rational in this sense, and whether faith in a divine revelation is so. The four lectures together make up a wonderfully clear, unpretentious, profound, and well-written little book,

from which anyone interested in the philosophy of religion, or indeed in the proper grounds of belief in general, will find a great deal to learn.

Rationality, Kenny maintains, is best considered as a virtue on the Aristotelian model (for all that it was not so considered by Aristotle himself) ; a mean between the vice of credulity or gullibility, where one believes too much, and the contrary vice of scepticism or incredulity, where one believes too little. Many philosophers, from Locke to Quine, have maintained that a belief is rational so far as it is proportioned to evidence. But Kenny complains that this will not quite do for many of the beliefs which we all hold, and rightly hold, as a matter of course. Thus we believe in the existence of Australia more firmly than in any of the reasons we could give for the belief to anyone ignorant of the fact. To meet this difficulty Kenny suggests a more complicated criterion for rational belief, which he admits lacks the charm of simplicity but which he hopes will neither be so strict as to be self-refuting nor so lax as to be hospitable to lunacy. What his suggestion amounts to is roughly this. Rational beliefs must be either properly basic or properly derivable from properly basic beliefs. Properly basic beliefs include not only those evident to the senses (as on the usual ' foundationalist ' account) but also many confirmable by memory; in addition, there are those which could not be given up without causing havoc in the whole structure of our belief about things-a type of belief to which Wittgenstein drew attention in *On Certainty.* A third group of properly basic beliefs consists of those which one does not oneself hold on the basis of reasons but which one can defend to other persons by the giving of reasons. Non-basic beliefs, to be rational, are to be derived from basic beliefs in two principal ways, those of inference and testimony.

How is the rationality of religious faith to be assessed according to such criteria ꜰ The empiricist criteria of meaningfulness which have caused such an uproar when applied to theology are hardly, according to Kenny, to be taken seriously. "Not since the time of Voltaire have the godly been set on a stir with so little outlay." On the other hand, Alvin Plantinga's suggestion that belief in God is itself a properly basic belief, though worthy of greater respect, must also be rejected (here I agree with Kenny; it is by no means clear why, if that belief is to be admitted as properly basic, others of a patently bizarre nature should not be so). Kenny's own conclusion about the existence of God is resolutely agnostic. **"I** do not know whether there is a God, but perhaps it can be known; I have no proof that it cannot be known." This he calls "contingent agnosticism", as opposed to the "necessary agnosticism" exemplified by Kant's view that theoretical knowledge of whether God exists or not is impossible because of the limits of the human mind. Flew's "presumption of atheism " is adroitly argued to be no better grounded than a presump-

tion of theism. On the rationality of belief in revelation, Kenny is more
negative. What, he asks, would rationally justify the unshakeable com-
mitment demanded by faith 7 Belief in a divine revelation has two elements
-that there is a God who might reveal himself; and that certain historical
events constitute an actual revelation. Now I know some historical facts-
for example, the existence of Hitler-with the same kind of certainty as
I know of the existence of Australia. But can the belief that Moses or
Jesus said and did what it is essential for the Jewish or Christian faith
that they did do and say really be rationally affirmed with the requisite
degree of conviction?

   I strongly agree with Kenny that a good case for the existence of God
-not necessarily known, of course, to every simple believer-is a neces-
sary condition for the rationality of any theistic faith. I have argued
elsewhere that it is available, on the basis of a conception of rationality
which has something in common with Kenny's, something in common with
the 'foundationalist' one which he rejects. But I wonder whether, granted
the reasonableness of belief in God, the requirements for rationality in a
faith with historical truth-conditions might not be a little less stringent
than Kenny proposes. (I believe that they ought to be considerably *more*
stringent than is presupposed by much modern Protestant and some very
recent Roman Catholic theology; but this is not the place to argue the
point.) If there were a putative revelation which could be shown to be
uniquely appropriate to the plight of man, and for the historical truth-
conditions of which at least as good a case could be made for as against--
might not this be enough for faith? However, it is an indication of the
excellence of this book that it forces the mind to exercise itself on such
fundamental and frequently-evaded problems.

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Faith and Reason. By RICHARD SWINBURNE. Oxford: The Clarendon
     Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1981. Pp. 206. $23.00.

   Complementing Swinburne's earlier works, *The Coherence of Theism* and
The Existence of God, this volume rounds out a very significant achieve-
ment in philosophical theology/philosophy of religion. In *Faith and
Reason* Swinburne attempts to put into perspective the judgment of prob-
ability which was the conclusion of *The Existence of God;* he thereby
addresses the question at the heart of a very important (and sometimes

divisive) intramural debate between believers-namely, the question of
the relevance (possibility, appropriateness, necessity) of rational justifi-
cation to religious belief. The book is an impressively detailed defense of
the relevance of such rational inquiry and justification; its contribution,
in great part, lies in its extreme starkness, providing a paradigm example
of one end of the spectrum on the question of the cognitivity of religious
belief.

The assumption which informs the entire book is stated quite straight-
forwardly at the outset: "well-justified conclusions about religious faith
can only be reached through a thorough understanding of the nature of
belief" in general (2). Beginning what he admits is a "dry and secular
road" (readers will probably find even the religious road "dry" in this
presentation), Swinburne highlights several aspects of belief which have
implications for religious discussions: (1) beliefs, as probability judg-
ments, need to be specified with respect to alternatives; (2) beliefs are
not directly voluntary, though they can be voluntarily cultivated through
an indirect process; (3) beliefs have consequences for action, though they
do not consist simply in dispositions to act; (4) a belief-that-p (that is,
"that p is more probable than any alternative" [6]) is to be distinguished
from 'acting on the assumption-that-p' (which implies only belief that
there is a " small probability that p " [31]).

Continuing along the road, we are provided in the following chapter
with a very detailed consideration of five kinds of rational (irrational)
belief. The first two kinds are judged in terms either of coherence with
the agent's own standards or conformity with the "correct" standards-
at the time of the agent's assessment. The other three are judged with
respect to conformity witli. (a) the agent's own " view " of his standards,
(b) the actual standards the agent ordinarily uses, (c) the " correct "
standards-all at an earlier stage of investigation leading to the evidence
and standards at issue.

Though my own sympathies lie in the direction of Swinburne's em-
phasis on the cognitivity of religious belief, I nevertheless find his confi-
dent assumption of the universality of rational norms and our ability to
discover and "completely" codify "the true" inductive standards (47,
64-5) a somewhat facile dismissal of a large body of literature which finds
the question more troubling than Swinburne does. He does, however, pro-
vide important reminders by way of a corrective to an all-too-common
attempt to endow religious belief with entirely *sui generis* standards. He
cautions against "jumping too quickly to the judgment that a man is
using different inductive standards in his judgments about religion from
those he uses elsewhere " (61) ; we must avoid building "into our account
of [a] man's inductive standards features peculiar to the areas in which
we studied his inductive behavior, which [do] not allow it to have appli-

cation to wider fields" (62). Moreover, shared inductive standards are implied in the overlap between religious and nonreligious language: if our words are to be applicable to God, even analogically, "one would expect *somewhat* the same inductive standards for judging ... in the two fields" (64).

Since the only culpable irrationality Swinburne finds is that which arises when the investigation issuing in the relevant evidence and standards is not adequate even in the agent's own view, Swinburne turns to an examination of the criteria of adequacy of investigation. In the process of raising fundamental questions about rights and duties to believe (either particular propositions or in particular ways), and about non-rational grounds for belief, Swinburne provides a number of important contributions to a growing "ethics of belief" literature. In the context of this discussion, however, Swinburne draws a conclusion with which I must take issue. He refers to Basil Mitchell's claim that "A man who is prepared to change his mind about any of his beliefs whenever it appears to him that the evidence tells against them will not be able to hold on to them long enough to work them out and test them properly", arguing that theoretical belief in the face of negative evidence is ruled out both descriptively and prescriptively (97).

Swinburne's views on the topic began to emerge earlier in the book, in the examination of the relation of belief to evidence. He suggested that if a woman continues to believe her son is alive in the face of evidence which "seems to indicate that her son is dead .... she must believe either that the public evidence does not show what others think that it shows (e.g. because there are hidden discrepancies in it) or that she has private evidence which counts the other way" (23). It cannot be, he continues, "that a man could believe a proposition while admitting that the public evidence rendered it improbable and denying that he had any other evidence" {23-4}. In his discussion of Mitchell's claim, Swinburne extends the conclusion: since belief is passive, "the only way in which you can save your belief in the face of negative evidence is by disguising from yourself the negative force of the evidence" (97). The alternatives set forth by Swinburne are (1) ceasing to believe or (2) disguising the negative force of the evidence (and thus rendering the belief ultimately unfalsifiable) . On the basis of this dichotomy, Mitchell's claim, and any claim defending such theoretical belief or tenacity, is reduced to a claim about acting-as-if. What Mitchell must be recommending, says Swinburne, is "that people who are most of the time believers should hang on to the practice of religion, should act as if it was true (not, should *believe* it), on their off-days (when on balance the evidence seems to be against it) (97).

There are a number of ambiguities in Swinburne's formulations. It is

not clear to me, for example, that the admission that one does not *have* evidence to offset the counter-evidence is equal to an admission that one could not (reasonably) obtain other evidence. Moreover, often what is being admitted to be rendered improbable by the counter-evidence is not '*p* ', as such, but rather one's particular configuration of justifying reasons for *p.* More importantly, however, I have argued elsewhere ("Newman and the Ethics of Belief," *Religious Studies,* forthcoming) that although there is something obviously correct in the view that one cannot choose to create a belief directly by intellectual *fiat,* the dichotomy proposed by Swinburne is not necessarily exhaustive. If I am correct, then the reduction of Mitchell's claim (and others like it) to a defense of acting-as-if is not necessary.

In Chapter Four, "The Nature of Faith", Swinburne's earlier distinction between belief-that-p and acting on the assumption that-p comes into play. In both "Thomist" and "Lutheran" types of faith, belief that God exists (and is of a particular sort) is a necessary but not sufficient condition of faith; in addition one needs "trust". To trust is "to act on the assumption that [God] will do for us what he knows we 'want or need, when the evidence gives some reason for supposing that he may not and where there will be bad consequences if the assumption is false " (112), rather than to believe that this is more probably true than its alternatives. Such trust implies then only that one believe there is a "small probability" that God will so act. "Pragmatic" faith, however, dispenses entirely with belief that God exists and finds it sufficient to act on the assumption that He exists and to 'trust' Him in the appropriate ways. A second distinction is developed in this chapter-namely, "strong" *vs.* " weak " belief in the Creed. A " strong " belief is constituted by believing "each item of the Creed to be more probable than its negation", while " weak " belief is a " a matter of believing each item of the Creed to be more probable than each of a number of specific heretical or non-Christian alternatives" (119). Though the former seems to have been required by the early Church, Swinburne sees the latter as a sufficient normative requirement (164).

While I agree that both distinctions are important, and that the distinction between " strong/ weak " belief in a Creed has not been adequately appreciated before, I think two comments need to be made concerning them. First, Swinburne seems to vacillate on the nature of the normative requirement. On page 163 he writes that " to pursue the Christian way " one needs " only to believe that this proposition [that there is a God] together with the other credal propositions of Christianity is more probable than the total creed of any other religion." In the following paragraph, however, he writes: " The sort of weak belief that a creed is true which is required for the practice of religion is ... the belief that

if one acts on the assumption that it is true, one is more likely to achieve the goals of religion than if one acts on any contrary assumption." Given the distinction between belief-that-p and acting on the assumption-that-p, it is not clear that the two statements of the requirement are equivalent.

Secondly, Swinburne sees acting on the assumption-that-p as equal to "do[ing] those actions which you would do if you believed p" (31) and claims that such action implies the belief in the " small probability " that p. Rationally to do those actions, however (to act rationally on the assumption-that-p), it is necessary only that one believe that p is *possi"i)le*. For those who might require some added psychological impulse, it would be sufficient to couple the belief in the possibility that p with hope that p. My question then is whether Swinburne sees the belief in the " small probability " of p as something stronger than belief that p is possible.

My reservations about this volume are, in general, minor ones; it is a classic statement of one side of the current debate concerning the autonomy of religious belief and should be read by anyone interested in philosophical theology and philosophy of religion.

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Doubt And Religious Commitment: The Role of The Will In Newman's Thought. By M. JAMIE FERREIRA. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980. Pp. ix + 156. $9.50.

After John Henry Newman's *Grammar of Assent* appeared in the Spring of 1870, it received a number of critical reviews, but only one which Newman himself thought "understood me," Mozley's analysis in the *Quarterly Review,* July, 1870. Jamie Ferreira has given us a recent exegesis of the *Grammar* along lines with which I believe Newman, for the most part, would concur. For years Newman had been struggling with the relationship between belief (as unconditional assent) and evidences, seen in his notebooks, his correspondences (especially with Wm. Froude), and his sermons. In 1866, while vacationing in Switzerland, "the ' Open Sesame' of the whole subject" (Letters, 25 :199) came into view: that certitude following upon logical demonstration was but one type of assent, yet it was still possible for the human mind to assent absolutely on reasons which taken separately are but probabilities. Now does this mean that one *wills* to assent, as if the evidences are not up to the markT Does it mean that belief, a type of assent for Newman, is an effect of will power alone and that rational justification is ultimately nugatoryT Newman

elaborated his Swiss insight in terms of a duty to assent, but what is the role of the will in this process? Ferreira's book wishes to defend Newman against charges that his insight is an intellectual cop-out.

The *Grammar* can be read from different angles, and, while Ferreira's angle differs from my own, I would agree that her defense of Newman is consonant with his basic principles and the subtle logic he employed. She does find certain inconsistencies in Newman's expression which ultimately are not injurious to his position, in her opinion, although I would caution about placing too much exegetical weight on pre-1866 texts. It is on two usages of *will,* however, not appreciated by most critics of Newman, that Ferreira makes her case. I will first elaborate her argument and then conclude with some of my own readings.

Ferreira presents a logical reading of the *Grammar,* and a reader must be ready for some passages of heightened subtlety. Her dialogue partners are contemporary philosophers of religion, concerned with issues of rational justification, epistemology, and canons of logic. Her strong suit is an awareness of recent literature in the field, and she is able to translate Newman's Victorian parlance into the contemporary discussion. This is the angle from which she works, which I find so laudable. She finds that Newman has anticipated so many of their "findings" in non-analytic ratiocination, i.e., non-logically demonstrable arguments.

In terms of content, rather than method, the discussion shapes up as follows: Newman maintains that doubt is incompatible with assent (faith) and with certitude. Others maintain that doubting is ingredient to religious commitment. Is Newman open to a criticizable assent, indeed, a reversal of assent? Does he secure certitude by isolating it from questioning? On the other hand, is Newman simply one of those who maintain that faith is incompatible with doubt, because faith transcends categories of rational justification ⁊ If rationality has no part in why one comes to believe, then obvious rational considerations to the contrary are just written off. Newman does maintain a necessary role for rational justification, he does admit the criticizability of assent and certitude, and he does maintain that doubt is incompatible with faith, *if all the terms* are properly understood. To exegete Newman, Ferreira will consider in detail the role of the will.

The first hurdle to leap, however, is the question whether certitude can follow upon non-analytic reasoning without resorting to a transcendental "gap-bridger." In Newman's terminology a conclusion from an inference is *conditional;* it depends on the strength of the inference. In the concrete matters of life, a reasoning process can never capture with demonstrative force the conclusion to be drawn. Yet we do give assents to life matters, assents which of their nature are unconditional. Is one just bridging this logical gulf by a deliberative volition ⁊ The fallacy committed by

those who say " yes " is the paradigm of the analytical model alone, the clearest examples of which come, of course, from mathematics. Rather, says Ferreira, Newman's illative sense does lead to conclusions based on evidence but not compelled by it. It is not a logically blind jump but rather like the "change in posture" of which S. Toulmin speaks. The personal character of reasoning is sufficient to account for a change in the order of viewing (Toulmin, K. Lehrer), and assents are justified when they fit into the web of other things we believe (G. Harmon). Such certainty does flow from a natural reasoning process, and is not simply willed.

One can sense how Ferreira relates Newman to contemporary retrieval of the non-analytic reasoning process, and it is a fine marriage indeed. It could have been strengthened by a treatment of converging probabilities, and how the cumulus of them provides a certain " upshot " of it all. It is precisely here that Newman speaks of a duty to conclude, not because the evidences in themselves carry the case, but because the mind through a certain elastic power Newman likens to Aristotle's *phronesis* can bring together an orientation of the probabilities, can see that something cannot be otherwise, can see that further evidence adds nothing. Ferreira's treatment could have been appreciably strengthened by relating Newman to Lonergan's virtually unconditioned. Ferreira does present Newman's case accurately, but this feature of "deciding to conclude" within a clearly rational process is crucial. Cf. Lonergan's acknowledgement of Newman in *A Second Collection* (Philadelphia, 1974), pp. 38, 263.

In Chapter Three, Ferreira moves to her main contention. Willing has two roles in relation to certitude. (1) The will is involved in the process of reaching certitude. Certitude is not a passive recognition from without, as in the analytic paradigm, but an *active* recognition of something as true; it is a Wittgensteinian "taking hold." Concluding to a certitude is a free act, in the sense a person would be irrational to continue doubting. Such non-entailment means only that a conclusion is non-coerced, not that it is non-constraining. Active recognition is a *decision* because it is non-entailed. (2) The will is involved after certitude is reached. Since we can stifle certitude, or give it up, from moral weakness, Newman maintains the need for a commitment to the certainty we experience. Ferreira claims that this opens up two senses of religious commitment-deliberative and non-deliberative-and shows a greater complexity in Newman's mind relating doubt to religious commitment. This is important for a contemporary philosophy of religion.

If certitude is not only assurance but *persistence,* given the second usage of will, does this mean a willful suppression of doubt Ferreira says that one cannot render oneself immune to criticism, to possible change, by a simple *fiat* once for all, and that Newman does not claim this either.

We must assess the grounds for believing, as a Christian apologist in-
deed does; but if they are held out there for assessment, they can be
criticized, and it is possible that the criticism can become so telling that
someone will cease to assent. All of this must be related to Newman in
a psychological sense. Certitude is a kind of persistence which rejects
idle objections; it is a spontaneous resistance to changing assent. Ferreira
calls this a non-deliberative commitment. Over and above, we can make
a deliberate commitment to maintain certitude. Newman recognizes here
the function of moral weakness, or the proclivity of certain temperaments
to be ever second-guessing their decision. Ferreira might have developed
more extensively Newman's doctrine of *mrundum in maligno positum* to
bring greater clarity to the deliberate commitment, but I shall return later
to a more " religious reading " of the *Grammar.* Instead, the logical issue
which concerns Ferreira is criticizability. Does Newman preclude doubt,
self-critique, in the deliberate commitment to remain certain (Newman's
indefectible certitude) Y With the help of Wittgenstein Ferreira argues
that certitude merely requires the absence of reasonable doubt, not of all
doubt. We can admit we could be wrong, although this is somewhat
theoretical.

   According to Ferreira, Newman was resisting the claim that a residue
of doubt attached to all assents, because the evidence is not compelling.
On the contrary, Newman argued, logical incompleteness does not neces-
sitate such a residue nor must the scientific mentality be ever checking up,
using a falsification principle. In this contention Newman was anticipating
recent positions in the philosophy of science. A promise to adhere is not
necessarily an intention to resist change, come what may. It is only a
promise to be true to the truth.

   The book's final chapter asks whether faith, as a gift of God involving
a graced act of the will, overthrows the above exegesis of Newman Y
Ferreira concludes that there is a parallel in the kind of adherence in-
volved in certainty described above, e.g., its criticizability, and that in the
consummate certainty of faith.

   I began this review by mentioning the logical reading Ferreira brought
to the *Grammar,* and given the nature of her dialogue partners this is very
understandable. I applaud the effort. It brings Newman into a section
of the *academy* into which others have not brought him. My own reading
of the *Grammar* comes from a more explicitly religious angle, although
I think this is what Newman had in mind too. I mention a few issues
which were not hig·hlighted in Ferreira's book. Newman locates belief as
a *real* assent. Such assent is an unconditional acceptance of a reality as
true because of the "vivid presence" a concrete reality can have to our
five senses, or, more importantly, because of the presence which an absent
reality or an immaterial reality can have in our imagination. Newman's

question, "Can I believe as if I see?", reflects his aim to bring the reality
of God to such vivid presence in the imagination that one assents to
God as readily as one assents to the flowers in one's yard.   This he elabo-
rates through his argument from conscience. But closely connected with
that is Newman's contention that right moral principles generate right
thinking, which he once described as the crucial principle all through
the *Grammar.* By being faithful to one's conscience, a person comes to
"see " the salient evidences, and comes to " see " the upshot of converging
probabilities.   Rational   justification   and obedience to conscience go hand
in hand in the *Grammar.* The Newman phrase, " concrete matter," ties
together the assent portion of the *Grammar* with its inference portions.
Newman concludes Part One with a basis for assenting to the invisible
God, as *if* one "saw."   Part Two is concerned with inferences leading to
an assent in the concrete.   To believe in the Roman Catholic Church for
Newman is to believe in a " concrete fact."   *Not* only does the *Grammar*
describe the elastic quality of someone's mind to conclude to a certainty,
but it also uses phrases, illustration, details, all of which are calculated to
bring this whole process of thinking into its culmination in the imagina-
tion.   As Newman says, people, events, examples of heroism, etc., move
one; syllogisms do not.

Secondly, the personal character of thinking enters into the ability to
conclude, with certitude, from apposite premises. Ferreira's book takes
due note of this important feature, and indeed relates it to some contem-
porary discussion. A full appreciation of the sinews of such personal
thinking, in Newman's full doctrine, is rooted in his description of first
principles.   The functioning of first principles, given some play in the
Grammar and operating at a depth in its movement, come under full
scrutiny in *Present Position of Catholics.* And, he says in the *Grammar,*
premises condition reasoning processes, and what is to verify those prem-
ises but other more antecedent reasonings, themselves in need of verifica-
tion? " The long retrospection lodges us at length at what are called first
principles, the recondite sources of all knowledge, as to which logic pro-
vides no common measure of minds" (p. 269). It is in first principles
that person differs from person, and it is because of them that an argu-
ment which tells for one does not tell for another.

My final remark is meant to remove any unclarity about my reason for
stressing the angles from which one reads the *Grammar.* For the type of
contemporary issues in philosophy of religion which occasioned Ferreira's
book, I do not think other approaches would have served her case as
well as the one she in fact took. Certain emphases in the *Grammar,* how-
ever, fall out of focus or at least are not given sufficient play, when
J9oked at from a particular angle. And this, of course, is Newman's own

principle elaborated in the *Development of Doctrine.* But the conclusions Ferreira draws in defense of Newman do sure justice to Newman's own aim. "Can you believe something you cannot absolutely prove?"   You can, and it is not intellectual dishonesty.

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What Is and What Ought to Be Done: .An Essay on Ethics and Epistem-
ology. By MORTON WHITE. New York; Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1981. Pp. 131.

White's theory of ethics consists in the application of " epistemological corporatism"   to moral beliefs. Like some other contemporary philos-
ophers, he wants to avoid the semantic approach characteristic *of* earlier analytic philosophy.   The proper questions are epistemological (5, 6) and the proper epistemology is corporatism, the view that in the face of challenging evidence we do not affirm or deny one particular belief, but we are at liberty to revise other assumptions (17, 18, 27). So far White is with Quine, but White insists against Quine that we do not always make all of our convictions liable to revision, only more limited " bodies of belief" (19). Thus White argues for limited instead of total or holistic corporatism   (20).

Corporatism in morality means that we do not test normative beliefs in isolation but we test them in conjunction with descriptive beliefs. We test batches of beliefs and in principle any of them can be rejected (15). Our beliefs, expressed in premises and arranged syllogistically, may some-
times lead to conclusions we reject, and the rejection may lead us to deny or amend a descriptive or a moral belief which was part of the argument (29).   For example,

(1) Whoever takes the life of a human being does something that ought not to be done.
(2) The mother took the life of a fetus in her womb.
(3) Every living fetus in the womb of a human being is a human being.
Therefore,
(4) The mother took the life of a human being.
Therefore,
(5) The mother did something that ought not to be done (30).

Now suppose, says White, that one was inclined heretofore to accept the premises of this argument, but one finds one cannot accept the

sion. One might be led to revise the major normative premise (1), but one is just as free to change the descriptive premises, including the claim that a fetus is a human being (30-31). We are free to deny or alter a descriptive premise in order to believe that the mother did not do anything she ought not to have done.

White does not deny that one may extract the descriptive premises of a mixed normative-descriptive argument and test *them* corporatistically. One may also isolate the moral premise and test it in some other mixed normative-descriptive argument. What one may not do is to test the normative premise, parallel to the way in which the extracted descriptive premises can be tested, apart from some mixed argument. Descriptive premises can be tested on their own (albeit corporatistically), but normative ones cannot. The reason for this asymmetry is that normative beliefs presuppose descriptive ones (33). Thus there is no way, parallel to the extraction and independent testing of descriptive premises, that one can isolate and test the major moral premise.

How do we test mixed   White's claim is that we would reject or affirm a conclusion insofar as it accorded with our moral feelings, just as ::<ensory experience may disconfirm or confirm a prediction. A body of descriptive premises, for example, might lead to the conclusion that a powder will be white, but on inspection it does not seem to be white. Just so a moral argument may lead to a conclusion which our feelings reject. Where there are recalcitrant sensory experiences, we can revise the premises and the same goes for the premises of moral arguments (38, 39, 40, 44).

What sort of feeling is it which legitimates the rejection of premises in a mixed   The feeling is that of a normal person under normal circumstances (39, 40). The feeling is not a belief or conviction; it is a feeling of obligation, not a feeling that one is obligated (42, 45, 46). It is a feeling of requiredness, a feeling that something ought or ought not to be done. Thus White says he is not presenting a coherence theory of belief; there is something beyond belief, namely, feeling (46). But the point of revising our premises is to organize our descriptive and moral beliefs and our moral feelings more successfully (57). In addition simply to denying or altering a descriptive premise, we could make an exception to the major moral premise (and alter descriptive beliefs accordingly) or vre could formulate another argument which bypassed the obstructive fact entirely (55, 56, 58). The function of all these moves is to harmonize our beliefs and our feelings.

Thus White has tried to avoid a dualism of normative and descriptive beliefs without falling into reductive naturalism. That is, one cannot test normative moral beliefs in isolation, in a way that is epistemologically separate from descriptive beliefs; to avoid dualism, however, it is not

necessary to say that x ought to be done *means* x is in accord with the
feelings and beliefs of a normal person. White does not offer a semantic
theory of ought or right; there just are normative moral beliefs and we
test them corporatistically-on   the basis of feeling.

   My objection is to White's version of corporatism. We may admit,
since moral beliefs presuppose descriptive ones, that both normative and
descriptive beliefs are open to revision; in this sense we do not test moral
beliefs in isolation. But the sticking point in White's corporatism is the
.role of feeling. **If** a conclusion goes against the grain of feeling, we are
free to alter or deny either the descriptive or the normative premises.
White often speaks as if we can just change a descriptive premise di-
rectly, e.g., the fetus is a human being (assuming this is a descriptive
belief), or the mother killed a fetus (60, 61). But he also says, as I
noted, that one can isolate the descriptive premises and test them in
appropriate ways. The only way, however, one can test the major moral
premise is by the touchstone of feeling; one rejects the major premise
insofar as the conclusions to which it leads, either in the original mixed
argument, or in some other, accord with feeling. What seems to jar is
this claim about feeling. While I could accept (for the sake of argu-
ment at least) a corporatism which insisted that descriptive as well as
normative premises are open to revision, it seems another thing entirely
to suggest that the arbiter of normative change is my feeling about par-
ticular conclusions (61, 63, 64). **It** does not accord with my view of
moral experience to say, for instance, in the context of the abortion
argument, that I have the right to alter the major moral premise *simply*
because the conclusion to which it leads does not jibe with feeling. I
would have thought, admitting to be sure the interdependence of norma-
tive and descriptive beliefs, that there might be a way, parallel to the
extraction and corporatistic testing of descriptive premises, in which we
could extract and test our general moral beliefs independent of our feel-
ings about particular moral conclusions; we might have a direct way of
examining the meaning and grounds of our prohibition against killing.
For example, we might think that the premise prohibiting killing is de-
rived from mixed arguments about the relation of a deity and human
beings; one would attend to a complex set of descriptive and moral argu-
ments in order to revise the prohibition against killing. To be sure, just
how one would test the moral and descriptive beliefs which yield the
prohibition is another issue; but on this view one would not revise major
principles such as the prohibition of killing simply on the basis of feel-
ings about particular conclusions.

   White might explain my objection as due to a prejudice against the
notion that all the premises of a moral argument are subject to revision
if the conclusion seems unacceptable (47). This prejudice derives from

a " legalistic " view of moral argument which assumes that the major moral premise, parallel to a statute, is established in one way, that the descriptive premises about the commission of an offense are established in another, and that the normative conclusion which calls for punishment is inescapable once the premises are established. White would argue that I have misinterpreted my experience; I have not understood how moral beliefs are tested because I am under the influence of a misleading analogy (indeed a misleading view of legal reasoning itself) (48 ff.).

But what supports White's interpretation of experience? Why should feeling have the role he gives it (39)? Why after all, **if** our beliefs stand up, shouldn't our feelings be altered? The answer is that White assumes a close analogy between immediate sensory experience and moral feelings. The powder is supposed to be white, but it isn't; there must be something wrong with our assumptions. Says White, " I believe in the existence of moral feelings ... with as much confidence as I believe there is a sensory experience to which we appeal when we attribute a color to a physical object" (40). Whatever the correct understanding of sensory experience, I submit that we should revise White's view of moral feeling. We do react to particular actions or qualities of persons and on that basis we are inclined to accept or reject judgments about them. But our reactions, however much they involve feeling or emotion (and I grant they do) do not arise in isolation from beliefs which constitute the framework of our experience (I am indebted to Paul Lauritzen for conversations about the relation of feeling and belief.) I wonder if any feeling is as separate from belief as White suggests, but it certainly seems the case that moral feelings, moral reactions, which crystalize into judgments, are formed by belief. A negative response to the abortion argument above, for example, could well rest on a body of complex descriptive and moral beliefs involving the circumstances of the pregnancy and the rights of the mother. The mother did not do something which ought not to be done because unless the mother consents to bear the fetus, it does not have a rightful claim on the mother's support and the mother is within her rights in killing it. The response, in other words, rests on a set of beliefs about the pregnancy, and the right not to bear certain burdens; it is these beliefs about just and unjust killing which conflict with the original argument.

It seems to me, then, that one must elucidate a recalcitrant reaction by examining the premises on which it depends and by so doing one can determine whether to revise or retain the premises of the original argument. White does not see the necessity for elucidating the reaction because he takes it as a *sui generis* feeling independent of belief. The fact that a feeling is not a report of belief, of course, does not mean that feeling is not structured by belief.

White has attempted, therefore, to avoid the semantics and the sub-
jectivity of emotivism while retaining its emphasis on feeling; he wants
the certainty of Moore's analogy to the perception of yellow without his
theory of meaning (40). But if the analogy obscures the relation of
feeling and belief, then it offers an illusory security. We are not so in-
clined, once we reject the analogy, to accept White's assurance that al-
though it is harder to get agreement about normality in moral feeling
than in sensory experience, the difference is one of degree (66). If feel-
ings and beliefs (moral and descriptive) are linked, then we do not have
the analogy's protection against the taint of subjectivity.

In conclusion, if one may not revise moral judgments directly on the
basis of feeling, then the   between descriptive and normative
beliefs is not as "pointless" as White claims (33). And if the analogy
to sensory experience is mistaken, then we do not yet have an account
of the normative component of moral feeling; we do not understand how
moral beliefs shape feeling. By his analogy to perception, White wanted
both to separate feeling from belief and to make it the secure pivot on
which all else turns. But if beliefs enter into feeling, then we not only
do not have this security but must look elsewhere to test moral belief.
Thus there is much in White's clear and well-expressed account one can
accept: the fact that moral premises assume descriptive categories, that
both descriptive and moral premises can be revised, that we test beliefs
in bodies, the importance of feeling. But the question of the status of
moral belief cannot be settled through his problematic analogy.

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Studies in .Aristotle. Edited by DOMINIC J. O'MEARA. (Studies in Philos-
        ophy and the History of Philosophy, Vol. 9.) Washington, D.C.:
        The Catholic University of America Press, 1981. Pp. 313. $26.95.

Studies in .Aristotle is a collection of twelve articles on Aristotle's phil-
osophy. Most of the papers were "delivered in the fall of 1978 at The
Catholic University of America as part of the Machette series of lectures
on Aristotle." All are of high quality. They are : M. Frede, " Categories
in Aristotle"; A. Gomez-Lobo, " Definitions in Aristotle's *Posterior
.Analytics";* W. Wallace, "Aristotle and Galileo: The Uses of
(*suppositio)* in Scientific Reasoning "; A. Long, " Aristotle and the His-
tory of Greek Skepticism "; G. Verbeke, "Aristotle's Metaphysics
Viewed by Ancient Greek Commentators "; J. Driscoll, "EillH in Aris-

totle's Earlier and Later Theories of Substance"; A. Hyman, "Averroes as Commentator on Aristotle's Theory of the Intellect"; T. Irwin, "Aristotle's Method of Ethics"; N. White, "Goodness and Human Aims in Aristotle's Ethics"; D. Devereux, "Aristotle on the Essence of Happiness"; J. Owens, " The KAAON in Aristotelian *Ethics";* H. Veatch, " Telos and Teleology in Aristotle's Ethics."

Needless to say, it is impossible to deal with all of these essays in a short book review. This is my excuse for concentrating on the two papers which excited me most, the articles by Devereux and White, even at the expense of ignoring essays which people whose interests are primarily metaphysical or epistemological will find more valuable.

Devereux's paper addresses an issue which has received a great deal of attention in recent years. Is Aristotle's conception of the final good " inclusive " or " dominant "-i.e., does he believe that the final good is composed of the various goods which are desirable for their own sake or rather that it is identical with the most desirable member of this set of goods? Is the first book of the *Nicomachewn Ethics* (NE) internally consistent on this matter? If it is consistent, which position does it take7 And, finally, how does Book I compare with Book X on this issue? Devereux concisely describes the leading interpretations (those of Hardie, Ackrill, and Kenny) and the considerations which motivate them. But he does not take sides in the debate, since he believes that:

> ... the question at issue is ill conceived. Asking whether Aristotle's conception of the good is inclusive or dominant presents us with two models, neither of which really fits his view. If there are inconsistencies in the discussion of happiness in the NE, they do not have to do with the contrast between dominant and inclusive conceptions of the end. (248)

Devereux's own position is that " Aristotle's definition of happiness [the final good], as he understands it, is *implicitly* inclusive" (256). "An explicitly inclusive definition would treat happiness as simply a collection of goods" (257); but, Devereux argues, Aristotle, in accordance with his views on definition, is concerned to locate a formula which " singles out the essence " of happiness, thereby pointing to " a unity and structure among the goods which are necessary features of the happy life " (*loc. cit.).* Thus, if a particular type of good is not mentioned in an Aristotelian definition of happiness, the definition may still entail that that type of good is an ingredient in a happy life.

How, then, should we understand Aristotle's assertion in X.8 that "Happiness ... must be some form of contemplation" (1178b32)? Devereux has a plausible answer. First, Aristotle's "general position" in X.7-8 is not that "an individual human being is ... simply identical

with his theoretical intellect " (259). Second, for Aristotle in these chapters, contemplation is the *essence* of happiness, or, rather, of "perfect happiness " (*u"/l.ela eV!Jaiµovla;* there is also the secondary form of happiness discussed in X.8). Contemplation *itself* does not presuppose a variety of other goods, as is evident in the case of Aristotle's god, who is not handicapped by his lack of such goods as friends and moral virtue. " But a human being who pursues a contemplative life *will* be handicapped if he lacks friends and moral virtue "; and contemplation " as engaged in by human beings" does presuppose other goods (260). To say that perfect happiness is contemplation is not to embrace a dominant conception of *u"/l.ela eV!Jaiµovla;* for the essence of perfect happiness, in the case of human beings, depends upon a variety of goods, which goods are parts of that happiness.

Devereux has advanced a viable alternative to the interpretations of Hardie, Ackrill and Kenny. I believe that it will receive its share of attention in future investigations of the issue.

White's essay, to which I now turn, is helpfully introduced by way of a question posed by Veatch in his contribution to the volume :

> [A]re sueh ends or goals, as we human beings happen to have, to be pronounced good because we go for them or desire them, or is it rather the case that they are ends that we should desire or seek simply beeause in themselves, and independently of what our own interests and desires may happen to be, they really are good and hence are just such things as ought to be   (281)

Plato affirms the second disjunct (as does Veatch); and White observes that Aristotle " is often regarded as reaeting against Plato " on this point (266). As some have it, "Aristotle stood in naturalistic reaction to Plato's views on the good much as Anglo-American ethics after [G. E. Moore's] *Principia Ethica* stood in reaction to *Principia Ethica* itself" *(loc. cit.).*

According to White, Aristotle does react against Plato, but only in part, and he (Aristotle) affirms neither of the disjuncts in Veatch's question. Rather, for Aristotle, the good has both "formal" (and thus desire-independent) and non-formal features; and its goodness is due to both.

By a "formal " feature of the good White means a charaeteristic of the good " that it can be determined to have without antecedent specification of the good man and his aims " (231), or, more generally, without antecedent specification of the aims of any particular being or group of beings (234). The "most notable" such characteristic is that the good-i.e., the chief good-is the " most final " of ends, "that which is always desirable in itself, and never for the sake of something else" (1097a33-34). (If there is a chief good, it must be" most final," or" final without qualification," quite independently of what the good man, or anyone else for that matter, aims at or desires.) Other formal features of the

good are " un1queness ,;:_there is "precisely one thing for the sake of which everything else is sought and which is not itself sought for the sake of anything else "-and " self-sufficiency" (232).

On the other hand, " [o]ther parts of Aristotle's description of the good ... seem to require for their full elaboration an ability antecedently to specify and recognize the good man ... " (233). E.g., the human good is " activity of the soul in aecordance with *aperr,* (excellence or virtue)" (1098a16-17) ; but in order to explain what *aperr,* is, Aristotle expounds his doctrine of the mean, and here he relies on the " right rule " deployed by the practically wise agent (*ep6vtµos),* "without describing any independent criterion that such a person would use in determining the mean " (233).

White's final judgment is that what Aristotle gives to naturalism "is certainly more than he takes away," since " he *does* tie the notion of being good firmly to the notion of being aimed at " and " the formal features of the good leave considerable room . . . for further determination of the human good on the basis of specifically human characteristics" (246). But I am not convinced. It is true that the good is an end; but I think that, for all that White has said, it may be an " obligatory end " in Veatch's sense (281), i.e., an end "which we should desire or seek" because, in itself, and independently of what we want, it is good. It is true that what is good *simpliciter* would not be good for human beings **if** they were not the sort of being that they are; but this is not yet to say that what is good *simpliciter* would not be good for human beings if they did not have certain *desires* or *aims.* Notice also that, although the discussion of the *gp"fov* or function of a human being in NE I.7, as White rightly observes (237), "carries Aristotle's argument beyond the range of formal features of the good," it appeals, in arriving at the non-formal characteristics of the human good specified there, not to what human beings want or aim at, nor even to what we *would* want or aim at **if** certain conditions were satisfied, but rather to what a human being *is.* Of course, to decide whether what Aristotle gives to naturalism is more than he "takes away," one must decide just what the important issues are on which naturalists disagree with, say, Plato. One, surely, is the matter of the considerations to which one should appeal in characterizing the good. But another is the issue which Veatch raises. Once the good is *defined* in terms of (actual or possible) human desires or interests-and naturalism is one kind of definition-the anti-Platonic answer must be given to Veatch's question. And here, I think, Aristotle and Plato are on the same side.

This reservation notwithstanding, White's article makes an important contribution to the study of Aristotle's ethical thought. Aristotle's conception of the good does involve both formal and non-formal characteristics;

and this, as White suggests (241-3), may help to expiain some of the tension in the NE which have received so much attention in recent years. Whereas formal considerations such as unqualified :finality and self-sufficiency may incline one to identify happiness (or its essence) with contemplation, considerations of characteristically human activities seem to count in favor of making morally excellent activity central to human happiness (after all, Aristotle's god contemplates, but the only morally active beings are human beings). And, as White observes, both types of consideration come into play as early as Book I : "What Aristotle says in Book I about the good already involves a kind of conflict and the ideas in X, 7-8, are in large part simply a result of it" (243).

I shall add a word about Veatch's essay, which certainly deserves better than to be treated only as an introduction to the paper of another contributor. It revolves around two major ideas. First, "Aristotle's teleology is of a radically different character from most, if not all, of the g·oing varieties of teleology that are fashionable in present-day ethical theories ... " (280); for the latter reject "the metaphysics of :finality," and "once final causes [are] removed ... , then any and all natural obligations or duties or 'oughts'," including, most importantly, the obligation to pursue one's own good, disappear as well (284). Second, a " prohibitively high cost " must be paid " if one chooses, in the manner of modern teleologists, to repudiate anything like a natural telos or a naturally obligatory end" (289). On the first score, I think that Veatch is quite correct. And I am sure that many will want to investigate his provocative argument for the second thesis.

Studies in .Aristotle-to turn back to the book as a whole-is an excellent collection of articles. The papers by Wallace, Long, Verbeke, and Hyman make significant contributions to our knowledge of Aristotle's influence and of various historical perspectives on his work; and each of the twelve essays increases our understanding of his philosophy. There is something in this volume for every student of Aristotle, and for a great many others as well.

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Albert the Great: Commemorative Essays. Edited with an Introduction
    by FRANCIS J. KOVACH and ROBERT W. SHAHAN. Norman: Uni-
    versity of Oklahoma Press, 1980.

The seventh centenary of the death of Albert the Great has been the
occasion for renewed interest in this great scientist, philosopher, and
theologian of the thirteenth century. Several *Festschriften* have ap-
peared, among which is this fine collection of essays. Clearly Albert has
been overshadowed by his most illustrious disciple, Thomas Aquinas, who
preceded his master in death by more than six years. Yet the older
Dominican came to several important positions in his philosophy that
were both original with him and passed on to Thomas. For example,
Albert was the first to connect the principle of proportionate distance
between two light sources with the problem of action at a distance, to
mention only one such principle brought out in Kovach's essay contained
here. This principle was taken up by Thomas also, and may well be
considered the remote origin of the inverse square principle of con-
temporary field theory.

Collections of essays are notorious for lacking unity, a difficulty all
the more accentuated by multiplicity of authorship. Yet there is a sur-
prising degree of cohesiveness to these nine contributions   touch on
every aspect of Albert's influence except the theological.

Ralph McInerny provides the initial chapter, "Albert on Universals."
McInerny's fine choice and analysis of texts surfaces two important as-
pects of Albert's thought. Albert groped and struggled with Neoplatonic .
influences and interpretations of Aristotle; he also eventually arrived at
many positions which strongly influenced Thomas. These facts of Albert's
writings are true of much more than his treatment of universals, though
not as well handled by some of the other contributors.

The present work complements another commemorative volume,
.Albertus Magnus and the Sciences: Commemorative Essays, ed. James A.
Weisheipl (Toronto : Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1980),
previously reviewed in this journal *(Thomist,* vol. 44), by including a
treatment of the doctrine of time in Albert's commentary on *IV Physics.*
Owing to his earlier treatments of this same topic in Aquinas and Augus-
tine, John M. Quinn, O.S.A., is the logical choice to write "The Concept
of Time in Albert the Great." The Platonic influences on Albert become
more apparent in this second essay. Quinn moves from the dialectical
development of the definition of time to the importance of the ' now' in
Albert's treatment, concluding with the properties of time and its relation-
ship to the soul. Fuller references to contemporary theories of time would

have been helpful. Yet Quinn's development of Albert's doctrine that time requires numerable matter, a numbering soul, and formal number does serve nicely to illumine the author's point that formal number applied to motion leads to a quasi-mathematical concept of time in Albert.

" The Priority of Soul as Form and Its Proximity to the :first Mover: Some Aspects of Albert's Psychology in the First Two Books of His Commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima"* is the long title of the next essay by Ingrid Craemer-Ruegenberg, the only European contributor to this volume. In this short chapter the author outlines Albert's doctrine on the procession _of forms from the First Cause, then uses this as an instrument to interpret the Aristotelian passage at *II De anima 9* on the necessity of a living body being organized. The third section of this chapter is an all-too-brief sketch of Albert's position on the unity and immortality of the human soul. That the author confined herself to the :first two books of the *De anima* is understandable, but lamentable. A fuller analysis of Albert's development of the active and passive intellect passages of *III De anima* would be welcome as a subsequent essay.

What treatment of a medieval philosopher would be complete without some mention of *esse?* Leo Sweeney, S.J., has provided "The Meaning of *Esse* in Albert the Great's Texts on Creation in *Summa de Greaturis* and *Scripta Super Sententias"* to fill this need. His careful analysis of these texts, taken chronologically, is handled well. Once again Albert appears as groping with Neoplatonic influences, yet emerging with positions that have clearly influenced Thomas. Aquinas, however, consistently maintains a position which Etienne Gilson has shown to be slightly different from Albert's. Sweeney is careful to observe this and give deference to Gilson and other scholars in their efforts to understand the medieval labyrinth of *'esse.'* Sweeney's writing is quite readable and flows easily, though he begins with a rather lengthy justification for writing the article.

Another voice from Loyola University of Chicago is heard in Francis J. Catania's essay " 'Knowable ' and 'Namable ' in Albert the Great's Commentary on the *Divine Names!'* The text on God as knowable occurs in book seven of the *Divine Names,* that on God as namable in the first book. These texts are treated in the reverse order as flowing more logically thus, a decision easily accepted. The analogy involved in the relationship between God and his creation is no simple matter. Catania does an excellent job of explicating Albert's treatment of it in this particular text. Yet the author's claim on p. 126 that a properly philosophical analogy between two things necessitates some third, not the same as either, is a claim that seems to exceed the text under consideration, however cautiously Albert may be said to have used the word ' analogy.'

Leonard Ducharme, O.M.I., from the University of Ottawa, vrovided "The Individual. Human Being in Saint Albert's Earlier \Vritings." He

offers this as a follow-up to his 1957 article *"Esse* chez saint Albert le Grand: Introduction à la meta physique de ses premiers ecrits," in *Revue de l'Universite a/Ottawa.* The present study is quite capable of standing alone, however; dialogue with the earlier article is confined to footnotes. The author draws from the same two Albertine texts as does Sweeney. This study is clearly developed and illumines many thorny difficulties in Albert's concepts, of *ratio, forma partis* and *forma totius,* and matter as the principle of individuation. The quality of Ducharme's scholarship is quite evident in this, the sixth essay.

The next chapter, " The Enduring Question of Action at a Distance in Saint Albert the Great," is offered by one of the editors, Francis J. Kovach. Like all Gaul, this article is divided into three parts. The first part is a logical division of possible stances on the question. Kovach may be thanked for his effort to provide a comprehensive historical survey of treatments of this problem, which could serve as a useful directory for other researchers. In the second part Kovach comments on several texts showing Albert's contiguist position that, in the motion of bodies, mover and moved must be in contact. Next treated are a number of texts which might be interpreted as anticontiguist; yet the author handles them very well, making Albert's stance on this question plain, despite the complexity of the problem. Lastly, Kovach does an excellent job of outlining the sources of Albert's position and its novelty, pointing out several influences Albert had on his famous pupil.

Ducharme, in treating Albert's position on individual humans, pointed out that Albert rejected universal hylomorphism. James A. Weisheipl, O.P., outlines the sources of universal hylomorphism in medieval thought in "Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism: Avicebron: A Note on Thirteenth-Century Augustinianism." The influence of D. A. Callus, O.P., Weisheipl's teacher at Oxford, is quite apparent in his approach. Weisheipl states and defends the thesis that the real doctrinal novelty of the thirteenth century was not the teaching of Albert, Aquinas, and their fellow Dominicans. Rather, the brand of Augustinianism taught by Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure, and defended by John Pecham in 1285, for example, was so influenced by the Arab and Jewish commentators as to be incompatible with the truly Christian heritage of the Fathers. The main focus for this study is Avicebron's *Liber fontis vitae,* also known as the *Fons vitae.* Weisheipl does an excellent job of showing how the two main points of Avicebron-that God creates at will, not from necessity, and that the infinite a.nd transcendent simplicity of God makes him essentially different from the corporal nature of every creature--are welcomed by Christian faith. However, the elaboration Avicebron makes of these points leads to the voluntarism, universal hylomor-

phism, and plurality of substantial forms theses combatted by Albert, Thomas, and others.

   The careful scholarship of William A. Wallace, 0.P., is evident in this book's concluding essay, " Galileo's Citations of Albert the Great." Continuing to build on the basis of his breakthrough in *Galileo's Early Notebooks: The Physical Questions: A Translation from the Latin, with Historical and Paleographical Commentary* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), Wallace shows, by comparison of manuscripts, that these physical notebooks of Galileo's were written around 1590. The evidence is indisputable that Galileo copied or paraphrased extensively from the lecture notes of Menu (1577-78), Valla (1588-89), Vitelleschi (1589-90) and Rugerius (1590-91), all professors at the Collegio Romano. Such a practice was not at all uncommon at the time, and indicates several important points. First of all, these notebooks were not the juvenile writings of a student, as Antonio Favaro had classified them in the National Edition of Galileo's works. Also, Galileo probably did not have access to original sources. In addition, the image of Galileo as " the father of modern science " cannot be sustained as picturing a Renaissance scientist with no familiarity with his medieval predecessors. Rather, as much of Wallace's scholarly efforts have shown, there was great familiarity with the medieval " Peripatetics," especially Albert and Thomas, on the part of Galileo; the Pisan scientist was a realist, not a nominalist. Efforts such as Wallace's confirm this by showing that his citations of Albert and Thomas vastly outnumber references to such nominalists as Bradwardine and Buridan. Although we learn more about Galileo than about Albert from this, Wallace has ably shown the continuity between medieval and modern science.

   The attempt in the Introduction to convey the flavor of the thirteenth century by focusing on Albert's life as it correlates with events in the lives of his contemporaries might have been more successful if the debate surrounding the date of his birth had simply been noted and the usual 1200 compromise then settled on. Such sentences as " Moreover, when Roger Bacon was born (1212), Albert was at least five if not as much as nineteen years old" give one the dizzying impression of being a spectator at the net in a tennis match. A certain number of typographical errors seem to have escaped the proof readers, especially in the Introduction.   The claim that Ulrich of Strasbourg died on March 7, 1277, is curiously precise; that this is the same date as the death of Thomas Aquinas "two years before" (p. xiv) seems like more than a typographical error.

   Kovach and Shahan present a good, well-researched picture of Albert's philosophical thought. The contributors are expert, and well chosen.

Their contributions are valuable additions to Albertine scholarship and complement other recent collections of like nature. Any scholar of Albert or of medieval thought would be well rewarded by having this volume.

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Thoughts on Death and Immortality. By LUDWIG FEUERBACH. Translated with Introduction by James A. Massey. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980. Pp. xliii + 261. $6.95.

The first English translation of the complete text of Feuerbach's first publication is a welcome event. Feuerbach continues to be of some interest, if not in this country, certainly in Europe. With Massey's strong translation, English-speaking readers can experience at first hand the recent discovery of the early Feuerbach. If they do, they may be surprised.

I. Problems in Interpretation

Until recently Feuerbach's *Gedanken uber Tod und Unsterblichkeit* (GTU) attracted little attention. Scholars formed views about Feuerbach's thought without consulting this seminal piece, published eleven years before *The Essence of Christianity* (1841). Why was it ignored? Perhaps because it is not a great work. The GTU, Feuerbach's first publication, is hardly clean. It explodes in youthful poetic exuberance and prophetic indignation. Even Feuerbach seems eager to pass beyond it. He publishes it anonymously in 1830, perhaps to avoid censorship or to preserve his academic reputation, and does not reprint it until he severely edits the text for Vol. III of his *Samtliche Werke* (1847). Then, rearranging the sections dramatically and condensing the manuscript by a third, he does his best to purge his *Todesgedanken* of the Hegelianism of his youth. Only in the last few years does the full 1830 text reappear to prompt a reappraisal of his early development.

Apparently the GTU has been ignored for other reasons. It clearly embarrasses disciples, who do not want their materialist hero to be such a speculative idealist. Bolin and Jodl, for instance, reprint the 1847 purged version in their standard 1903 *Siimtliche Werke* even though they realize how much Feuerbach revises the text. Marxist interpreters also shy away from the Feuerbach of the GTU. Typically, Marxists view this Feuerbach still as a student of his idealist teachers, one who has not yet

developed the inversion of Hegel which liberates Marx and Engels. The Marxist is not much interested in Feuerbach until the explicit break with Hegel (" Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Philosophie," 1839), or if Marxists do consider the early Feuerbach, they usually notice only the germs of his later materialism. Philosophers and psychologists of religion, too, ignore the early Feuerbach. The Feuerbach they favor is one gathered from a few snips of *The Essence of Christianity,* in whom they :find an incipient Freud and the parent of the projection theory. But since in the GTU he has not crystallized a theory of the illusory character of religion, he is of little interest. Theological critics, :finally, are hardly more attentive. Of course, modern theology and *Religionsphilosophie* quickly pass Feuerbach by, and not until Barth do these disciplines return to Feuerbach's critique of theology and religion. But the attention Barth gives is of a peculiar kind: Feuerbach, along with Schleiermacher, becomes :the convenient neo-orthodox " whipping boy," blamed for the theological sins of an entire century. The Feuerbach who sticks in Barth's craw is the Feuerbach of the productive 1840's, the one whom Barth styles as the great anthropologizer of theology. It is not the Feuerbach of the GTU who proclaims that God is the end of the :finite human and the worldly.

The Barthian :fixation on the Feuerbach of the 1840's reminds us of a further quirk in the history of Feuerbach research. *The Essence of Christianity* (EC) so dominates the discussion that it becomes the official lens through which all things Feuerbachian are judged. A classic does this, after all, and EC is Feuerbach's classic text. The unfortunate consequence is that the power of a classic can prevent us from uncovering its own foundations. In the present case one text interprets all texts; in fact, one family of interpretations of the one text interprets all texts. Let me characterize this family as a hermeneutic which reads Feuerbach backwards. The naturalism or materialism toward which Feuerbach's :fifty-year evolution tends provides the vantage from which all of his thought can be assessed. According to this nearly canonical frame of interpretation, the EC holds the germ of the later materialism. Such a format, of course, only obscures the early Feuerbach, as solid studies now show.

So far as researchers do notice the GTU, the book becomes the battleground of competing interpretations of Feuerbach's whole production. The battlelines are fairly clear: (1) What is his relationship to Hegel? Typically, how scholars reconstruct the comprehensive picture of the Hegel-Feuerbach relationship shapes their reading of the Hegel question in the GTU. (2) What are the signs, if any, of a shift away from Hegel toward an anthropological, empirical, naturalist or materialist orientation f Often scholars find hints already in the GTU of their own theory of

where Feuerbach "comes out." (3) What is his relation to other German idealists, the romantics, and the mystics? The ghosts of Schelling, Spinoza, B-Ohme, Tauler and others haunt the research. (4) What is the nature of his early criticism of religion and theology and the relation of this criticism to his later criticism of both'f The important question is: to what extent does the speculative-mystical pantheism of love set in motion a critique of religion and theology which anticipates the famous critique of the 1840's'f

Most critics of the GTU, consciously or not, strike a position concerning these four great issues. They bring to the GTU the strengths and weaknesses, and the presuppositions of their reading of (1) Feuerbach's relation to Hegel; (2) the significance of his break with Hegel and the quality of his new program; (3) his relation to philosophical and religious traditions other than the Hegelian one; and (4) the essence of his *Religionskritik.* Consequently, nearly all the battles in Feuerbach research can be waged on the turf of his first monograph. In fact, the history of the interpretation of the GTU becomes a miniature of the entire Feuerbach story. Perhaps there is good reason for this. The text itself is loose enough and murky enough to permit such a war.

Once interpreters find their way through the dominant issues of Feuerbach research, they face further troubles. The text defies an e.asy reading. (1) First of all, it is still difficult to find the 1830 edition, as the 1903 version of the 1847 edited text is the one most widely available. Even today after the republication by Frommann Verlag (H.-M. Sass., ed.) of the 1830 text, some scholars continue to project the 1840's Feuerbach onto the early Feuerbach. (2) The form and style of the original text is demanding, for it is a work of mixed genre : it is at once a prose hymn of " genuine pantheism " and an intricate Hegelian phenomenology of being-toward-death to which Feuerbach adds a twenty-one page poem and a prose summary. The book concludes with nearly eighty pages of Epigrams. Feuerbach compounds the difficulty of the mixed genre by shifting from primary to secondary speech (from kerygmatic outburst to philosophical reflection) and from one *persona* to another. In addition, his style is often effusive. As yet, most interpreters are not very sophisticated about the interactions among the genres of the piece and find Feuerbach the poet irritating. (3) The Epigrams present special difficulties. Not only does the printer misplace them in the 1830 edition, but, in fact, as many as two-thirds of them may well originate with the editor and not with Feuerbach. To this day, no one has applied the tricks of historical criticism to discern the message of the historical Feuerbach. One thing is clear. The poetic epigrams do not match in content the prose sections of the text. While the prose sections sing a pantheistic-mystical paean to the infinite which Feuerbach develops via a phenomen-

ology of being-toward-death, the epigrams bitterly satirize pietistic and rationalistic theology. Their tone is more strident, in addition, and nature grows in importance. Are the epigrams inconsistent with the prose argument' If so, to what do we attribute the inconsistency¥ Change of genre¥ Change of mood' Different authors¥ Interpreters have hardly begun to sort out the stylistic and substantive tensions within this text. If anything, the tensions simply permit scholars to import into the text their pet theory about Feuerbach's development.

II. Epitome of the History of the Research

(1) In the first generations of Feuerbach research, scholars usually view the earliest works (the dissertation, the famous letter to Hegel, and GTU) as portents of the later radicalism. Under the influence of atheistic and naturalistic disciples, this research seeks to show that Feuerbach was never a genuine Hegelian. Rawidowicz in the 1920's brings a reaction which appreciates what an orthodox Hegelian is the earliest Feuerbach. The last two decades of work seek to balance these two orientations. Something of a current consensus suggests that scholars can neither retreat from appreciating the Hegelianism nor ignore that Feuerbach shapes problems in ways that are novel. From his dissertation on, he exhibits an un-Hegelian separation of theology from philosophy. There is a growing hostility to theology (at least some kinds) even as he extends the Hegelian critique of modern subjectivism in order to recover a genuine religion centered about a communitarian acceptance of finitude. (2) The growing balanced view, then, sees the Feuerbach of the GTU fully within the frame of Hegelian phi¹osophy. Feuerbach is indeed an idealist, he works with a speculative concept of God, his method is formally dependent on Hegel's dialectical panlogicism. It is, after all, the Hegelian criticism of modern subjectivism and dualism which Feuerbach extends to a critique of the doctrine of personal immortality; in this respect Niidling can call him more of a Hegelian than Hegel. .

(3) Yet scholars are not content to note the closeness to Hegel. They want to enter the troublesome matter of determining to what extent and in what ways Feuerbach breaks with Hegel's camp. There is little agreement in the literature. Some scholars argue that the emergence of the language of love signals a disenchantment with speculation. Some emphasize that Fauerbach allows nature to flourish in an independence uncharacteristic of Hegel. These scholars notice that he lingers a bit too long over the finite, the particular, the this-worldly. *Sinnlichkeit,* for instance, no longer simply distracts from the essentializing task of philosophy; in fact, they find already a hint of nominalism in his *Gattung.* The center of the unresolved debate in current scholarship is whether the new signals imply that Feuerbach inverts speculation's relation of *Geist*

to nature. Several newer critics (especially Cornehl, Braun, and Hommes) argue that nature already grounds *Geist* in the GTU (although a counter-reaction is brewing). Still other scholars point to the rising value of the human in the GTU. Could this shift intimate the coming displacement of God by   Whether the natural and the human gain in status is difficult to ascertain; for, as Ascheri reminds us, any gains of this sort occur within a frame of thought suspicious of the empirical, the individual, and the finite. Again, the tricky relationship between old and new in the GTU too often simply prompts scholars to project onto the text their favorite reading of Feuerbach's development.

Finally, most scholars find the germ of the critique of religion already in the GTU. The critique of modern subjectivism becomes the critique of dualism, which in turn becomes the critique. of the *Jenseits.* Religious preoccupation with the hereafter is illusory in some sense, and with that Feuerbach has the focus of a life-time. To be sure, we find little agreement how extensive is his critique in the GTU itself (all religion or only modern Christianity; theology in general or only pietistic and rationalistic   Earlier interpreters find hostility to religion and theology, period. Subtler recent positions see the critique as a speculative attack against pietistic and rationalistic theologies in the name of a genuine religion. In this discussion the watershed, achieved by Jaeschke and others, is the recognition that Feuerbach never accepts the Hegelian identity of religious and philosophical truth. From the dissertations on, he favors philosophy, and, while this favoring need not be hostile to all religion, it does turn a suspicious eye toward religion. We have to note that in the GTU he departs from Hegel even as we admit that he continues Hegel's own critique of modern religion. He carries forth the Hegelian suspicion of subjectivistic, dualistic religion onto the turf of the modern Christian doctrine of immortality, yet in so doing he hints that he intends to decode *Vorstellungen* in novel ways.

(4) The enduring contribution of the GTU grows out of the critique of modern subjecti¢ism. Feuerbach makes a plea for human community (the *Gattung)* which reminds us that there is no isolated individual. The sheer ego is not the person, as the ego must be embodied. The single person is not the human, as the individual must be found within the community. Anyone who isolates the ego from the body, the world, the cominunity is predisposed to a " false consciousness," as we call it. Such a person is not likely to see death as a serious matter; such a person is not likely to take love seriously either, for without death love is riskless. God, in this view, does not require the loving death of the individual but serves to insure the continuation of the deathless soul. God is the jumbo ego hired to preserve all the separate sheer egos. Such a false consciousness, typical among modern religious people, requires the therapeutic

work of philosophy. True philosophy directs our attention back to the ego's embodiment in a body and in a community, even as it seeks to abstract an essence from such in-corporation. Feuerbach can get his reader to look *at once* to the concrete and the sensual of this world and through them to the essence behind them, a double orientation made possible because he begins to treat universals almost as a nominalist (as Starcke sees in 1845). Any true philosopher who seeks the essential has only the concrete and the sensual and their negation with which to work. The work of abstraction, in fact, proceeds by way of negation, just as the body is the negation of the soul and the community is the negation of the individual. Naturally, then, all things essentially human arise out of genuine mortality; the true pantheist and the mystic already know this, and for this reason they are uninterested in personal immortality. Feuerbach, following their lead, shows that consciousness of mortality grounds reason and spirit.

III. *Massey's Translation*

I applaud James A. Massey for bringing the *Todesgedanken* into English and for the way in which he has accomplished the task. Massey finds that extraordinary balance between the painfully literal but dead and the fanciful recreation of a text. His Introduction serves well to place the GTU within Feuerbach's life and world. It speculates about his purpose in writing, pulls off a crisp summary of the argument, and reflects briefly on the significance of the work. Massey directs that significance, perhaps sensibly, in a particular way: GTU is an antecedent of and an important contribution to the recent scholarly discussion of death. What is lacking in the Introduction is a sense of the history of the reception of the work.

Massey rightly translates the 1830 version and rearranges the text according to the author's original plan. For some reason there are very few footnotes to this often difficult and obscure text. Massey's Introduction and the translation of the Epigrams receive the most annotation while the prose argument is virtually without clarification. (Massey explains only Latin phrases, names, and certain German puns.) Moreover, Massey inserts none of the key German words in the English text. The reader does not know when Feuerbach uses *Aufhebung, Einbildung, Phantasie, Vorstellung,* or when some synonym will do. That we cannot see any of the technical vocabulary is doubly unfortunate, since Massey does not always (and indeed could not) use the same English word for the same German one or translates two German words as one English one: e.g., p. 70,. where *Einbildung* and *Phantasie* are both "imagination", or p. 70., where *Aufhebung* is both " cancel" and " negate." Of course, anyone who has the 1830 German text next to Massey's translation will have no dif-

ficulty, hut the version is still rare in American libraries. One wonders what audience Massey has in mind. On the one hand, he gives no footnotes for certain technical idealist moves and words, his Introduction does not exposit the GTU within the Hegelian philosophy of religion, and he does not designate sensitive German words in the text. These signals presuppose that Massey writes for insiders who can spot an *Aufhebung* on the street. On the other hand, Massey casts his Introduction for public academic audiences. He does not enter the battles of Feuerbach research nor even trouble the reader with Feuerbach's relation to Hegel. Here he would let the early work contribute to the public literature on death. I am left with the impression that Massey addresses the wrong things for experts and says too little for the academic public.

   The actual translation is by and large sound. Occasionally, an important word disappears for no apparent reason (i.e., *allgemeinen,* p. 75), or a word with a technical, Hegelian sense appears in ordinary dress (i.e., a dialectical *Mittelpunlct* becomes an ordinary "focal point," pp. 92, 125). There are some grey areas, certain calls of judgment which may or may not he significant (i.e., "Wesen" translated as "nature" and not "essence" because, apparently, the passage is about the natural world, p. 148) and Massey does not always know what to do with *Geist* (e.g., *Geist* becomes "contemplation" on p. 33).

   While not significant in itself, each of the above examples points to a larger pattern in the translation. There is a tendency to orient the GTU away from its Hegelian character. I do not think that Massey does this deliberately, hut that he simply does not hear clearly enough the Hegelian tone to the text. The *Universal* determines itself as actual life (example 1) and without *allgemeinen* the passage is limp. Without a *Mittelpunlct* a reader may miss a fine dialectic (example 2). So too, when Massey translates: "Es macht das Ich sich das zum *Objet/* Das hast Du nun das ganze *Sujet"* as: "It turns the I into its own object-Now you understand my whole subject," the reader could miss both the nature of the criticism of a pietistic God and the objectification structure already in place for the criticism of religion. In example 3 Massey takes a word proper to the first moment of a dialectic *(Wesen)* and translates it in the language appropriate to the second ("nature"). When Massey translates *Geist* as contemplation (example 4), he risks that we will not see that spiritual activity on the side of the finite self is also Spirit. In one paragraph Massey will translate *Bestimmung* as "destiny" and as "determination" without alerting us that he departs from the common pattern of translating a crucial Hegelian term (p. 132).

   These oddities in the translation suggest that Massey does not hear how Hegelian is the text. Not surprisingly, Hegel plays no major role in Massey's Introduction. In fact, he sets the context for the 1830 GTU

with quotes from an 1839 essay in which Feuerbach bemoans how abstract are the systems of metaphysical idealism (p. ix). The Feuerbach we hear about from Massey is the one who criticizes professional philosophy. The task of this Feuerbach is to find a concrete expression which trans-forms consciousness. This Feuerbach responds to " challenges of his day," but Massey draws them entirely from the socio-political realm. There is no hint that Feuerbach struggles with an unfinished task within Hegel's system. Massey can call Feuerbach a "brilliant follower of Hegel " in reference to the dissertation but sees little Hegel, apparently, in the GTU. In fact, in the biographical notes Feuerbach moves imme-diately to the break with Hegel. When Massey turns to the text of the GTU itself, he does not analyze the world which the text creates for the reader; rather, he enters the text by way of Feuerbach's famous letter to Hegel accompanying the earlier dissertation. The letter is the key to the GTU, apparently, and within the letter, only one theme is helpful: (Hegel's) philosophy must take a new direction. Massey subtly finds in the GTU a kind of commentary on the earliest hints of a break with Hegel. The effect is stunning: the entire critique of modern Christian immortality in the name of God as *Geist* actually works against Hegel! A careful reader of Massey's Introduction is unprepared for the Hegel in the text and is already looking for discontinuities and novelties. To be sure, there are some new things in GTU but the overwhelming stamp of the piece, in style, theme, and frame of critique, bears the mark of Hegel.

When Massey concludes his Introduction with some Reflections (which do not mention Hegel), he finds Feuerbach's chief weakness to be his "idealist presuppositions" (p. xxxviii); we are told that his idealist philosophy "gets in the way" of what he really wants to say. Were it not for his idealism, he would really like to make philosophy concrete. Of course, it is Marx and Engels who view Feuerbach as the one who directs philosophy toward the concrete, but who, finally, fails to achieve any genuine concretion. Massey, it is evident, accepts this judgment. Feuerbach is the one " in-between " abstract philosophy and genuine praxis. For whatever reason, Massey employs this view to set the con-text for the English reading of the GTU. It determines the shape of his Introduction and, I suspect, how he reads certain parts of the text. Massey's is a crypto-Marxist reading, and it spills over into choices of English words. The most striking example to add to the above is the fact that *.Aufhebung* always means "negation" or "cancellation" for Massey. The sustaining, preserving, and uplifting power-true subla-tion-is lost in this translation. What is the effect of this loss? Feuer-bach's critique, I believe, is subtly converted into a simpler skepticism about religion and theology, when, in fact, his is a very complicated

suspicion which he learns from Hegel and others. If .*Aufhebung* is sheer negation, then imaginative symbol use in religion is sheer illusion and all religion is foolishness. But Feuerbach's position is much more nuanced and positive toward the productive possibilities of the imagination, as Wartofsky recently shows *[Feuerbach* (Cambridge University Press, 1979)].

Only this insensitivity to things Hegelian mars a distinguished translation. The volume is an attractive paperback and ably printed (I caught only two " typos " : pp. 82, 160). On only one occasion do I find a passage which I think is simply mistranslated (again, it is a passage which spells out the Hegelian character of the argument): In the Editor's Foreword we find: " so erscheint dagegen in dieser Schrift die Realitat, Objektivitat und Substanzialitat des Geistes als das Unsterbliche und Ewige, aus dem der Verfasser hinwiederum den Tod selbst ableitet. Er setzt somit den Tod, und hebt ihn wieder auf; vermittelt daher dialektisch die Gegensatze, und das Resultat, in dem bei ihm Tod und Unsterblichkeit aufgehen, ist die wirkliche Welt, das inhaltsvolle Leben.. das wahrhaft Unendliche, ist Gott und Geist selbst." Massey reads this passage as if the *author* posits death and " cancels " it; he then converts " *vermittelt"* into a passive verb and takes " die Gegensatze " as the subject of the sentence. Once he has so reshaped the sentence, "bei ihm" must refer to the author, and not to *Geist,* the focus of all this activity for a Hegelian.

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