AFTER RAHNER WHAT? A TRIBUTE TO HIS MEMORY AND ACHIEVEMENT

I

SUPPOSE FOR A MOMENT that Karl Rahner had never lived and that his works and all traces of his influence have been removed completely from the surface of the earth. All his books with the numerous translations disappear and long shelves in libraries become empty. Citations, references, ideas and inspirations of his are deleted from all printed materials and many books and articles are reduced therefore to almost nothing. The absence of any books written about him lea.ves further room for other books on library shelves. Teachers and professors of theology who because of Rahner's theological vision could teach or chose theology as their profession disappear from theological schools and theological associations together with their disciples. Like the theological libraries, theological schools and academies are contracted and many book publishers go out of business. Priests and faithful who made Rahner's retreats and heard or read his spiritual exhortations and, as a result, remained faithful in the priesthood, kept their faith, or became converted to the Catholic Church are not so. Their places in the Church are empty. The name Rahner is erased from millions and millions of human brains. Vatican II is not Vatican II as we know it now. And many who knew Rahner as a friend are lonely trying to be satisfied with the less challenging friendship of others.

We could go on like this to dramatize the great influence Karl Rahner has had on the world during the last *50* years. One wonders whether there is a professor or teacher of religion anywhere in the world who could say that he or she had never heard that name.

Indeed, Karl R.ahner could write and say something interesting about the most various issues of human life. His theology was encyclopedic. He could discover and dismantle the theological implications or significance of any topic he put through his scrutinizing theological mind. He was above all an apologete who defended the doctrine of Christian faith as well as the wisdom of school theology. The general schema of the R.ahnerian articles illustrates this. The author first stated the tenets of school theology and challenged them as insufficient. Then he went into a penetrating analysis of human existence in the light of existential philosophy. And finally he showed that the old scholastic teaching had more to say than we had originally thought. Because of this dialectic method he could be and was accused of both rigid orthodoxy and extreme modernism.

One would venture to say that R.ahner has influenced the theology of his time as no other theologian has. Even more, he did not just influence his time, he created the time in which he lived, ahead of time. After the Second Vatican Council in 1965 in the preface to the English edition of his *Kleines Theologisches Worterbuch* first published before Vatican II in 1961, he wrote: "... we note with some satisfaction tha.t nothing whatever needs to be changed because of the Council: our approach seems to be a sound one after all". One wonders whether there is any other Catholic theologian who could say that he had a theology of Vatican II before Vatican II, who knew post-Vatican II theology before 1961. In contrast, think only of the *New Catholic Encyclopedia* conceived about the same time as the *Kleines Theologisches Worterbuch* and which appeared as contemporary with R.ahner's *Theological Dictionary,* and of the long laborious effort of trying to update it in the spirit of Vatican II. I refer to the updating volumes published in 1974 and 1979.

Yet R.ahner, as I knew him, never thought too much of his great achievement. Incarnationalist in his writing, he was eschatologist in his living. In 1952 when he gave an informal talk during recreation-time to a small group of Jesuit scholastics

in Belgium, Rahner presented a very dim view of theology as a discipline at that time. He remarked that there is no one outstanding promising theologian or theological school on the horizon. "The time of the *Nouvelle Theologie* is over and the Church needs a *Neue Theologie,"* he concluded his talk with a smile. One of the audience, Anton Renyes, who had read all that Rahner had written up to that time, saw the theological scene more cheerfully than Rahner and said to him: " But Pater Rahner, you do not seem to realize that we have a Rahner." Rahner replied: "Ah, Rahner, who?" And he kept this critical scepticism about his achievement in later years as well. He was unlike H. G. Gadamer, who told the present writer in Toronto that whenever he feels depressed he goes back to read his *Wahrlieit und lJ1ethode,* which makes him cheerful by his seeing again how good that book is.

Rahner was restless in his thinking all the time. This restlessness became stronger towards the end of his life, when we heard him making statements about certain issues which he had never made before. He was always very scholarly minded and this made him consider most of his work as just *haute vulgarisation,* high class popularization. The dissatisfaction with himself and with his work took him from Munich in the Fall of 1981 back to Innsbruck, the place of his early teaching. Like most of us he thought that the setting of his early life would give him back his time which he could not find at Kaulbachstrasse. Less than three years later he died in Innsbruck and his time was finally once and for all sublated by the time of Christ.

The fact that Rahner was never satisfied with himself and with his achievement made him an outstanding Jesuit and a selfless supporter of young scholars even though they were not in the Rahnerian line. He was not interested in forming a school of his own. He did not despise, but rather liked, those who thought differently, because he trusted in Christ who was the center of his spiritual life as well as the center of his theology. The meditation on the Incarnation in his *Spiritual Exercises* is an excellent instance of how well he could inte-

grate his theological knowledge with his spiritual life and vice versa. For him spiritual theology did not exist outside his dogmatic theology, a heritage which we will need a long, long time to appreciate. Rahner was a Jesuit, a devoted admirer of St. Ignatius and he loved everything which belonged to that word. But this, instead of preventing him from respecting and serving others, rather inspired him to do so. It was in 1969 that I visited him in Munster where he had a private apartment. When I arrived he opened the door for me. He greeted me, led me to one of the rooms and asked me to excuse him for a while since he was still engaged with an earlier visitor. He gave me some books to entertain myself, then he went back to give all his attention to one of his undergraduate students, who had a few more questions to ask. While I was waiting other undergraduate students came to see him and he offered the same treatment with apologies for being a little la.te. I talked to him about my project and the future journal *Ultimate Reality and Meaning.* He supported me and the project from that time onward, even though his lack of knowledge of languages and of the natural sciences made him uneasy in interdisciplinary circles . For him theology had two sources to live and grow on: scholastic philosophy and existential analysis. Therein lay his strength. Other sciences and disciplines did not become *loci theologici* for him. In his essay entitled "Theology as Engaged in an Interdisciplinary Dialogue with Sciences" in 1971, he expressed concern about the contribution scientists could make to theology. Having established a transcendental method for theology he was suspicious of the scientists, with their tendency to monopolize, doing the same. He noticed that, concealed by a mask of conventional politeness, there is an attitude of aggression in every scientist which manifests itself particularly in interdisciplinary dialogue. Rahner rightly saw that there is a fear in every scientist but he did not seem to take into account that there is a fear in every theologian as well. It is possible, as Paul VI acutely remarked concerning the dialogue with non-believers, that Rahner reflected the feeling of the theologians of the "past-present",

who felt in the presence of the scientists like " wretched victims." And fear, indeed, makes any kind of worthwhile dialogue impossible.

Now it is my hope that the theologians of the "future-present" will not have this fear, since they will come from the sciences rather than from the Greek-La.tin gymnasium, where the knowledge of and the familiarity with mathematics and the sciences were not as much promoted as they will be in the future. An interesting confirmation of this assumption comes from another great theologian in Rahner's time, Karl Barth. Thomas F. Torrance visited Regis College last April and I asked him how he, an outstanding Barthian student, became interested in the science-theology interaction recently. In reply he told me that as a young man he learned to love science and applying that now to his theological knowledge is a. sort of Barthian dream come true. During one of his last visits Barth encouraged him to do research on the science-theology relationship, because he himself always wished to do this, though he was unable because he had never learned the sciences well. This, in my view, explains quite well the Barthian method. The question of science and theology was for both Rahner and Barth, as for most of the theologians and believers of today, first of all an apologetical question and not a. question of method or a source for theological thinking challenging the validity of the one and unique transcendental method.

Indeed, I know very few who mastered school theology as well as Rahner. He made excellent use of this knowledge together with his familiarity with Heideggerian existential analysis. This is why all those who were familiar with school theology and had some understanding of existential philosophy read Rabner with great pleasure, enthusiasm, profit and admiration. It was in 1977 that Rabner wrote first about the *pluralistische Verstehenshorizonte:* " Dogma und Theologiege-·schichte" *Zeitschrift f:iir Katholische Theologie,* 99 (1977) 101-102. In 1969 this was not yet on his mind. Nevertheless, he supported the project. After 11 years when I met him again,

this time in Munich, he was very much interested in the project and the progress it was making. This interest in a project different from his own and in people different from himself is characteristic of a great genius. Though Rahner could not explain further in writing what he meant by the pluralistic understanding-horizons, I believe it was part of his life though not that of his theology.

II

Karl Rahner is gone now. No doubt theologians will be inspired by his system for a long time. But the context of understanding for the theologians of the "present-future" will be different from the one Rahner created. Cougar, Schillebeeckx, Lonergan, Bultmann, Barth, like Rahner, had learned traditional school theology, a theology which is not taught in academic centers any longer. It is interesting that the theology we have now was made possible by those who were formed by another theological system and, if our new updated system has any merit, the old school theology must be credited. It was the old school system which brought about theologians like Rahner. The students of the old school were creative enough to produce what we now have to chew on for a while. But what about the disciples of the disciples of the old school? Will they be like Rahner, innovative and creative, pouring out influential works, demanding room on the shelves of scholarly libraries and not just on the shelves of pious religious bookstores? In other words, will Rahner and his contemporary great theologians be as successful in educating a new generation of theologians as the educational system which made Rahner, Schillebeeckx, Bultmann, Barth possible? What is the future of theology after the death of Rahner? If we look around do we not find the theological scene as dim and hopeless as Rahner did in 1952? Rahner noticed some time ago that today, unlike the way it was in previous times, talented young people with brains do not enter theological schools; rather they study science, mathematics and computer technology. Is not the pessim-

ism of Rahner of *195£* the most remarkable heritage he left for us looking forward to the next millennium? In the vein of his thought do we not feel that after *nouvelle* and *n.eue* theology we need a *new* theology?

But the incentives for hope are fewer now than they were in Rahner's time. In 1966 Fr. Earl A. Weis had a great vision of laying a foundation of *Corpus Instrumentorum,* a new conception which was expected to do for theology in the United States what the *Dietionnaire de theologie ca.tholique* had done for a generation of French theologians. " The great French encyclopedia", said Fr. Weis, "actually helped to develop a whole generation of notable theologians, including Y. M. J. Congar, A. Michael, and E. Dublanchy. In the same way the *Catholic Theological Encyclopedia* (readers should not confuse it with the *New Catholic Encyclopedia)* could be the occasion and stimulus of theological development in the United States, a. country that has not yet exploited its full potential in this area of scholarship" *(America,* 115 (1966), 586-587). But the project never got off the ground. The World Publishing Company backed off, and the U.S. Catholic world would not support scholarships which would not sell in the immediate future, and which is more than *haute vulgarisation.* The *new theology* died before it was born. Some angry potential authors accused Fr. Weis and his collaborators of" clerical unrealism" since they could not pocket the unusually high honorarium offered for research. Fr. Henri Rondet hoped, but in vain, that the immediate future of theology would be in America.

Sixteen years have passed since then, and the *new theology* has no more future than the *neue Theologie* had in 1959. The difference is, though, that the *neue Theologie* followed *nouvelle theologie,* because there was a Rahner. Now there is no Rahner and we do not know what will happen to his vision of pluralistic understanding-horizons and to his outgoing love for the whole world, A. Tallou's third stage of the Rahnerian "becoming a person", surfacing in Rahner's latest writings as the forerunners of the time after Rahner's time. Evidently theology will not come to an end with Rahner's deil.th or with the fail-

ure of certain projects. Theology is part of the life of the Church which with God's special grace will keep its faith alive on its way to the final glorification of the last day, when not just the cosmos but human understanding of any kind will be redeemed. God " who loves all that exists and loathes none of the things he has made" (Wisdom 11,24) will disclose himself in each individual (universal judgment). By his incarnation " Christ in a certain way united himself with each man " (*Gaudium et spes, no. 22)* and as a result there is the reality of salvation as dialogue (Paul VI, *Ecclesiam suam).* Faith must encounter man in his global humanity as John Paul II proclaimed in his first encyclical: "Man in the full truth of his existence, of his personal being and also of his community and social being-in the sphere of his own family, in the sphere of society and very diverse contexts, in the sphere 0£ his own nation or people ... and in the sphere 0£ the whole mankind-*this* man is the primary route that the Church must travel in fulfilling her mission: *he is the primary and fundamental way for the Church,* the way traced out by Christ himself . . ." *(Redemptor hominis,* no. 14) .

It would appear that this is the first time that we have been told that together with Christ who is " the chief way " *(Redemptor hominis,* no. 31) man in his human historical and universal entirety is the way for the Church, the way traced out by Christ himself. Thus, not only does Christ reveal man (no. 8) but man also reveals Christ ... "by means of the continually and rapidly increasing experience of the human family we penetrate" into the mystery of .Jesus Christ" (no. 13). To put this more clearly we knew previously that the Church is the mediator between Christ and man but now John Paul II teaches us that the human family is the " mediator " between Christ and his Church. And man understood here is not just the existential man as Heidegger understood him after the second world war, but the whole human family including every individual as he lived or lives in Asia, Africa, America or in Europe. All together are the way for the Church, the sacramental-bringer of salvation.

Therefore theology must consider man in his global and manifold reality. Theology is not just the theology of man but the theology of the human race which consists of the Akan people in Africa, of Mul;tammad, Bruegel, Hua Miao of China, Plato, Kalpa Sutras, Kahbalah, Beth-shan, S. Alexander, V. Frankl, Berdjaev, Biochemical system, Navajo Indians, al-Razi, Soka Gakkai,];lgveda, E. Wiesel, Ramk6kamekra-Canela Indians of South America, etc., etc. This is the implication of the fact that Soteriology is Christology which is the center of theology, and Christology, the center of theology, is Soteriology. It was John Paul II again who emphasized that we will not develop a better and deeper understanding of Jesus Christ until we come closer to the magnificent heritage of the human spirit and approach all cultures, all ideological concepts of all people (no. rn) .

Unless one assumes that redemption means the annihilation of everything that is human, Christology, and with Christology theology, must be an answer to the totality of the problems people and individuals experience. Christ must enter into that complex human activity by which each of us creates his own idea of ultimate reality and meaning. The uniqueness of each of us comes from the creation of one's own world view dependent on different problems faced in one's life-time. The different concepts of ultimate reality and meaning make the differences among ourselves. Without that we would be no more than a series of computers made in the global village called the earth. Now the activity of affirming the ultimate reality and meaning of our life is not a form of deduction or induction but rather is similar to the inference of discovery. It is the most personal and the most universal reality in our life. All people have something to which they reduce and relate everything and which they do not reduce and relate to anything; and for which they would sacrifice everything and which they would not lose for anything and in the light of which they understand whatever they understand. Inasmuch as this ultimate reality and meaning is interpreted as personal or non-personal we have the difference between believer and non-

believer. Inasmuch as this ultimate reality and meaning is understood and believed as Jesus Christ or not we have the difference between Christian and non-Christian.

As we can gather, the concept of ultimate reality and meaning is not necessarily a static, permanent principle. It is possible that concrete experiences which are usually interpreted by it, will condition it, since the old concept of ultimate rea.lity and meaning could not solve the emerging new problems in confrontation with other concepts of ultimate reality and meaning created by others. In the case of Christians, if Jesus Christ is not the problem-solving paradigm any longer, i.e., if he cannot solve the emerging new problems in confrontation with the pluralistic society of a technological scientific age, the Christian may repeat his creed, but Christ is not the ultimate reality and meaning for him. He has lost his faith, has he not?

The task of the theology of the future is to analyze the manifold problems of different peoples and individuals in each particular case and explain faith which affirms that Christ as Savior has the power of raising questions and of solving problems as well as of creating contexts in which the insufficiency of other problem-solving paradigms becomes manifest. As the Savior of the whole world Christ enters into dialogue with the different ideologies and human problems without any fear. He can confront any problem-solving paradigm and emerge as the Savior, i.e. the most powerful problem-solving ultimate reality and meaning. This is the meaning of our faith that he has already conquered the world.

The new theologian who believes that Christ is the Savior of the world and the final Word of God, will follow Christ not just in existential philosophy, but in the most different dialogues since he wants to see how Christ will emerge as redeemer again and again, i.e. as the standard of exactness and adequateness of any human language expressing the meaning of human life-who translates mankind's word of God (words about God, understood as ultimate reality and meaning of human existence) into the words of God (words spoken by

God) as God's revelation to each one in the eschatological time of the world.

Theology is part of the salvation process, and as such it is in progress. Thus, there is no doubt that God will provide the Church with great theologians again but they will be different from the great theologians of the past. And if one tries to read the signs of the times, one would venture to say that the future great theologians will probably not come from the gymnasiums where Karl studied, but from the departments of Physics, Mathematics, Anthropology, Biology, Chemistry, Arabic and Islamic Studies, Chinese Studies, Judaic Studies, South and North American Indian Studies, Psychological and Sociological Studies, etc., etc. They will be scientists first who become theologians afterwards, trying out the new wine they have discovered in the "old" faith of Jesus Christ as it appears in the 21 ecumenical councils of the Church.

In short, theology after Karl Rahner will be 1) science-oriented, 2) globally universal and 3) intersubjective in the community of cooperative theologians. There will be no "master " followed and copied by fascinated students. Instead there will be a Christ-research oriented group of specialists dispersed by the different scientific methods which each must use in his own field yet united by faith in Christ as the real ultimate reality and meaning whatever concept of reality and meaning they discover. There will no longer be one transcendental method since each will have his own horizon of understanding with different sets of hermeneutics. The only transcendental method will be the one which God gave us and which is not man-made, i.e. the faith in Jesus Christ, God and man, the Savior of everyone and of the whole world as well, indeed. God knows well that theology after Rahner cannot be satisfied with one Rahner at a time.

TIBOR HORVATH, S.J.

Regis College
Toronto, Canada

PART AND WHOLE IN ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPT OF INFINITY

IN *PHYSICS* I, 2, while discussing whether one or more than one principle is required for knowledge of nature, Aristotle begins to reflect on unity itself. He notes that if unity, or the one, is used as " one in the sense of continuous, it is many, for the continuous is divisible *ad infinitum."* [1] Aristotle then proceeds to sketch a difficulty " about part and whole " in the context of the infinite which, although " perhaps not relevant to the present argument," is still " deserving consideration on its own account." The difficulty concerns " whether the part and the whole are one or more than one, in what sense they can be one or many, and, if they are more than one, in what sense they are more than one" (185bl0-15). This difficulty certainly seems fundamental. But it is apparently not to Aristotle's purpose to address the problem here or elsewhere in the *Physfos,* even when the continuum and infinite divisibility are the explicit objects of analysis. As we shall see, however, the problem of describing the relation between part and whole, if pursued in the context of the infinite, leads directly into a series of difficult and in some ways paradoxical implications.

Although the Aristotelian notion of infinity has elicited its due share of commentary, the reigning tendency in these studies has been to contrast Aristotle's approach to infinity with that of modern physics or mathematics. There are, of course, important points of opposition to be discerned from such interpretation. However, it should be noted that Aristotle's own formulation and development of infinity is predominantly metaphysical. As is evident from the *Physics*

[1] All quotations are from the Oxford translation of the *Physics* by Hardie and Gaye.

passages cited above, infinity is bounded by concepts such as continuity, part and whole, one and many. Now the strictly metaphysical ramifications of these concepts are of some complexity, both in their own right and from the standpoint of certain other notions of commensurate generality in the Aristotelian scheme of things, e.g., potency. Furthermore, many of these metaphysical considerations tend to be concealed by the alignment of Aristotelian infinity with later physical and mathematical analogues. The purpose of this paper is therefore to indicate (by critically examining several such studies) how this concealment comes about and to outline some of the more important consequences arising from the immediate metaphysical context surrounding the notion of infinity. We shall focus attention on the infinite with respect to magnitude, since the decisive problems emerge here even without introducing the distinct complexities of the continua proper to motion and time.

I

The *Phymcs* maintains, as an axiom, that a whole is that from which nothing is absent (207a10) and, as an implicit corollary, that a part is always part of a whole. Although the precise nature of the part/whole relation in the infinite remains in question, let us agree to allow these definitions to stand as a point of depa.rture for determining (if possible) the sense of this relation.

The initial relevance of part and whole quickly becomes evident. Consider the well-known characterization of the infinite announced in Book III: " The infinite is such that we can always take a part outside what has been already ta.ken" (207as) . Later, In Book **VI,** we *8.re* also told that the infinite, as continuous, is " divisible into divisibles that are infinitely divisible" (2Slbl5). However, for Aristotle, there is not and never can be an actual infinite. The infinite exists only potentially (206al8) , but its mode of potency is unique. While other potencies can become actualized (e.g., the potency of

bronze to become a sta.tue), the realization 0£ the potential infinite must always remain potential even as the infinite is actually being divided. Thus, the infinite with respect to a given whole magnitude exists only in the sense that it is always possible to keep dividing that magnitude into parts 0£ ever-decreasing magnitude.

David Bostock has taken Aristotle's position concerning the unactualizability 0£ the potential infinite to be a "claim that an infinite process is a process that cannot be finished-for, one might ask, how could one come to the end 0£ that which has no end? " [2] But later in his discussion, Bostock contends that this formulation 0£ Aristotle's position" rests on an equivocation on the phrase ' come to the end 0£'." Bostock argues as follows:

> Certainly an infinite series has no last member, and therefore it is indeed impossible to *come to the last member* of the series. But it by no means follows that it is impossible to *finish* the series, i.e., to come to a state in which no member remains outstanding. From the fact that there is no *last* member it does not follow that we cannot perform *every* member.[3]

It seems, however, that Bostock himself is making an important metaphysical assumption, i.e., that the contemporary mathematical notion of an infinite series can serve as an accurate representation of Aristotle's notion 0£ infinity. In particular, he has assumed that in an infinite series-or in something resembling an infinite series-there must be a distinction between the absence of a last member and the totality comprising every member. For Bostock, when every member 0£ a series derived from a given magnitude is taken collectively, the result can be understood to be a kind 0£ whole. But it is not clear what " every " could refer to, at least in a. strictly Aristotelian context; for from Aristotle's standpoint, every member of a magnitude as a totality comprising all members could always be increased by an additional division. Thus, not only

[2] David Bostock, ".Aristotle, Zeno, and the Potential Infinite," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 73 (1972/73) : 39.

[3] Bostock, p. 46. Italics in text.

is there no last member of an infinite division, but there does not seem to be a legitimate sense in which " every " member of a magnitude could ever be isolated in such a way as to allow the constitution of a whole set, even if we grant the operational stance Bostock builds into his counterargument. Bostock has posited a whole, implicit in his notion of " every " member of a series, in metaphysical circumstances where for Aristotle it would be difficult if not impossible to articulate a sense of whole.

In fact, the problematic status of such a whole is one reason why Aristotle speaks of the lack of intelligibility peculiar to the potential infinite (207a24ff). As a result of this lack, Bostock's criticism of Aristotle retains a degree of relevance, since it compels us to reexamine the sense in which the notion of a whole can be understood with respect to the infinite. From the standpoint of the problematic dimension of part and whole introduced above, the following question might be asked: If the product of infinite divisibility understood as a whole is unintelligible and the process of infinite divisibility must be taken as part of that whole, then can the part be asserted as intelligible even though the whole is, admittedly, unintelligible?

In fact, the peculiar complexity of the whole-phase of the infinite shades into paradox once we reflect on the status of the correlate part-phase. Now a part of the continuum-however part may eventually be defined-must be in some sense less than the whole. But since the part is in this instance part of *a continuum,* the part is itself infinitely divisible. Thus, it follows that both part ap.d whole of a given magnitude are infinitely divisible. Now will the infinite generated by continuously dividing the part admit determination as "more " or " less " or in any sense other than the infinite generated by continuously dividing the whole? Surely not, for how can any one instance of infinite divisibility be more or less infinitely divisible than any other instance? Therefore, if the infinite generated by dividing a. part of a magnitude is identical to the infinite generated from the magnitude as a whole, then how can

any one part of the magnitude *qua* infinity be distinguished from the whole magnitude *qua* infinity? [4]

Furthermore, once a continuum is divided into parts, each part is itself a whole. And as a whole of infinite divisibility, each part becomes indistinguishable from that whole of infinite divisibility from which the part has been divided. Thus, each part of the whole is no less a whole than the whole which contains each part. And it also follows that any one part of a whole magnitude is identical in this respect to any other part of that magnitude. In terms of unity, the unity of a part with respect to infinity becomes identical both to the unity of the whole as the locus of potential infinity from which that part was divided and to any other part divided from that whole. And with this paradoxical implication, the part/whole distinction threatens to collapse, at least in the context of the potential infinite.

Of course, Aristotle could have forestalled the production of such paradoxes by refusing to construe the infinite according to part/whole characteristics. But this he does not do. We have already seen Aristotle pose a hypothetical problem in which both part and whole are questioned with regard to their place in the continuum. And at the conclusion of Chapter 6 of Book III, Aristotle affirms that "it is plain that the infinite stands in the relation of part rather than of whole," just as bronze is part of that whole which is the bronze statue (207"26) . Thus, when analyzing the metaphysical structure of the infinite, we must preserve at least the part-phase of the part/whole relation, as well as the potency/ act distinction. But how can a part be a part unless it is part of a whole? And how can a part be part of a whole when the process of realizing that part exists only potentially and can never be wholly actualized?

[4] The infinite of "endless addition that can be identified by reciprocity with endless division" (206b3ff) is also subject to the same critique. As the added parts move closer and closer to the limit of the given magnitude, the difference between the last part added and the limit of the magnitude itself becomes less and less. At some point, that difference becomes infinitesimal- but however minute the remaining segment of magnitude becomes, it still can generate infinite divisibility.

It has been suggested that the threatened collapse of the part/whole distinction can be avoided by taking a certain mathematical detour. Seamus Hegarty contends that " the mind quickly boggles when-naively-one tries to imagine an infinite division of a straight line and fails to see what escapes the division." [5] Hegarty then asserts that Aristotle's "criterion for continuity is essentially incomplete," and that the inadequacy of the divisibility criterion is best appreciated by " considering the rational numbers (i.e. the fractions including integers)." [6] Hegarty's development of this alternative approach is worth careful study. However, it is important to keep in mind that Hegarty's interpretative shift does not take into account a significant difference between the rational numbers and magnitude-i.e., the perceptibility of magnitude vs. the imperceptibility of rational numbers.

The implications of this difference emerge most clearly when we consider what Hegarty says a few pages later. Speaking of a set theoretical analogue to the infinite by addition, he asserts that a one-to-one mapping can be achieved between the members of the set of positive integers and the members of the set of even integers. Hegarty then adds the following commentary:

> Another-psychological-difficulty here is that we seem to be equating the part with the whole, some of the integers with all of them, and so making use of an invalid definition. We do no such thing, of course, as a careful scrutiny of the definition shows. We merely state the possibility of a one-one mapping between sets; any member of either set has a unique member in the other set corresponding to it. The condition is verified as shown, and that is all.[7]

Hegarty has discerned the potential paradox of part being equated with whole. But for Hegarty, replacing the division of a magnitude with properties pertaining to the rational numbers reduces the implicit equation of part with whole to a

[5] Seamus Hegarty, "Aristotle's Notion of Quantity and Modern Mathematics," *Philosophical Studies* 18 (1969) : 30.

[6] Hegarty, p. 30.

[7] Hegarty, p. 34.

purely "psychological" and therefore insubstantial difficulty.

But this reduction is misleading, if not mistaken. For the difference that remains irreducible concerns the fact that the initial division in the process of infinite divisibility is directed at a magnitude, i.e., something measurable-not at something such as an integer which need not be presumed to possess any spatio-temporal properties whatsoever. The relevant property of magnitude with respect to the infinite may be discerned from the following considerations. That part of a magnitude AB which is AC, one-half of AB, is a part measurably less than that whole which is AC. Now the doctrine of infinity implies that AC, AD, etc., are identical to AB in the sense that ea.ch is infinitely divisible. And, as we have noted, not only is each divided part of a magnitude indistinguishable from the whole magnitude in this regard, but each part of the whole magnitude becomes indistinguishable from every other part of the whole magnitude. However, we can see, literally, that AB, AC, and AD are not identical to one another with respect to measurability. Thus, the reduction of infinite divisibility from specific context of magnitude to the modern context of integers eliminates the possible relevance of the measurability of magnitude with regard to the paradoxical implications which beset the part/whole distinction in the context of infinity.

A real difficulty emerges here, one which cannot be avoided by the claim that Aristotle's exposition has not been approached from a properly sophisticated mathematical point of view. This difficulty takes shape as follows. Hegarty's suggested reformulation of continuity includes the supposition that "the rational numbers (i.e. the fractions including integers) " can " be divided into two or more pa.rts having the required properties (of being a unity and an individual) ." [8] Consider AB, a one-inch magnitude, AC as one-half of AB and AD as one-half of AC (or one-fourth of AB). The fractions one-half and one-fourth are infinitely divisible, just as AC and AD are infinitely divisible. However, the fractions

s Hegarty, p. 30.

understood as wholes are relations between integers, i.e., they are internally complex. But the successive partitions of a magnitude are not complex in this way. Each partition of a magnitude becomes an undifferentiated whole capable of producing its own infinity. Now it is true that there is no distinction *qua* unity between one-half and one-fourth, or between AC and AD; similarly, there is no distinction *qua* unity between the fraction one-half and the fraction $\frac{1}{2^n}$, where n is an indefinitely large number. There is, however, a distinction between $\frac{1}{2^n}$ and the corresponding segment of the magnitude. For in those instances where n has become very large, the corresponding magnitude will doubtless be invisible to the naked eye, perhaps invisible even to the most powerful magnification device. And yet that segment of magnitude, we are told, is itself infinitely divisible. The relational characteristic of a fraction permits the production of an infinitesimally small fraction no different *qua* unity from a very large fraction. But the counterpart dimension of a magnitude divided infinitesimally may not remain subject to empirical scrutiny even while retaining its own unity as a whole theoretically capable of such division.

The divided part can thus move from the realm of visibility into the realm of invisibility. Can this significant shift of the part as potency be accommodated metaphysically? Upon reflection, we see that there are two distinct senses of part in Aristotle's analysis of the infinite divisibility of magnitude: (1) as measurable members of a limited whole; and (2) as members of the potential infinite. These senses are distinct. All parts in the first sense can also become parts in the second sense, but it is empirically possible that not all parts in the second sense can be parts in the first sense. Consider AB, the magnitude of one inch. Halve the magnitude at C. AC and BC are then measurable at half an inch. Once combined, they constitute the whole magnitude AB. But AC can also be the first partition in the infinite divisibility of AB. And, as noted, the continuation of the process of division may result in parts so infinitesimal that they are beyond all forms of empirical de-

tection. Is the actuality of the part as a measurable member of the whole magnitude identical to the potentiality of that same part as a member of an infinitely divisible magnitude? There might be an important metaphysical sense in which AC as measurable is not identical in all respects to AC as the first member of the infinite generated from AB. If so, then the question becomes whether that whole which contains the parts in the first sense can cohere with whatever sense of whole contains the parts in the second sense.

II

We have wondered whether infinity as a process of potential partitioning can be asserted as intelligible if it is correlated with a whole which is, at its core, unintelligible. Can this problematic sense of whole be given an articulated structure of sorts? In *Physics,* I, 2, Aristotle reminds us that unity, no less than being, "is used in many senses" (185h5). Perhaps it is possible to isolate a sense of unity which could be applied to determine that sense of whole which limits the process of infinite divisibility.

A suitable candidate appears to be available in V, 4. The general context here concerns the ways in which unity is predicated of motion, and Aristotle observes that" sometimes a motion even if incomplete is said to be one, provided only that it is continuous " (228hl5) . This claim can be adapted to our purpose by fitting the factor of incompleteness into the process of the continuous divisibility of a given magnitude. One might object that such adaptation is inapposite because incomplete motion can be completed whereas the infinite can never be completely actualized. But Aristotle's point in predicating unity of incomplete motion seems to be that, as long as the motion is of a certain type (i.e, continuous), it can be characterized as one even *while that motion remains incomplete.* But if this condition admits of unity, then the incompleteness of the potential infinite should also be capable of an analogous kind of unity. In this case, unity can be predicated of the process of

infinite divisibility *while that process is being actualized.* The fact that the process cannot be *finally* actualized or completed does not preclude describing a given moment or phase of that divisibility as one.

The pivotal element in this interpretation of the part/whole distinction is its characterization as a process actually occurring. But the fact that this aspect is necessarily paramount suggests several intriguing and perhaps troublesome consequences for understanding how part and whole function within the infinite. In discussing these consequences, we shall follow Aristotle's own formulation of the part/whole problematic as given at the start of the paper.

A. Aristotle has asked *whether* the part and the whole are one or more than one. This hypothetical may be understood as suggesting the possibility that a part may not be characterized by unity. But, at least at first glance, it seems impossible for a part not to have some kind of unity. Consider again that part of AB which is AC. Surely AC is *one* part of a whole. But keep in mind that Aristotle has broached this possibility when the part is not of a static magnitude as such but of the magnitude as the locus of the potential infinite. And here we can appreciate more readily the force of the possibility he has envisioned. For if the predication of unity to AC would somehow arrest AC so that it became static in the process of division, then AC would no longer be the type of part which it must be in order to instantiate the potential infinite. Thus, AC is *one* part of a continuum if and only if it generates more than its unity by necessarily leading to the next part in the process of infinite partition.

B. If therefore we want to preserve some sense of unity for AC, we must pay heed to the next phase in Aristotle's posing of the problem, i.e., *how* the part can be one or many. Now the unity of the process of division has generated a series of parts of continually decreasing dimension while the whole from which those parts are being produced remains unified as one static magnitude. As already noted, some parts of this magnitude can be measured. But the fact that some parts are measurable

is not essential to the partitioning of the potential infinite. During the process of division, the parts divided will become infinitesimally small. And, as noted, these parts will eventually be reduced to a dimension beyond measurability. There will nonetheless continue to be a magnitude of some minute dimension capable of being infinitely divided. And these imperceptible parts are no less parts of the potential infinite than are any and all measurable parts.

At this point, however, one might contend that the infinite divisibility of a magnitude entails that the process of division shifts from producing empirically measurable parts to generating those parts which (due to sensory finitude and finite technology) are capable of such measurement only conceptually, only in the mind of an observer following the potential infinite actually being divided. And it is essential to note the structure of this shift. It represents, in effect, a qualitatively complex state of affairs-from a state of process during which parts are measurable with or without an observer to a phase of that same process in which parts become measurable only in virtue of an observer's conceptual capability. Thus, the notion of whole as applied to the infinite divisibility of a magnitude seems to require both the dimensional character of the magnitude itself as well as the presence of an observer thinking about that magnitude in a certain way.

But it appears that Aristotle would deny this kind of complexity. For him, thinking about the infinite has no constitutive role in the infinite as such-" the thought is an accident "

In a similar vein, Joseph Catalano has remarked that

> in the *Physics,* "potency" refers to a real capacity in matter, a principle of being, and is never used in the sense of a logical possibility, the mere absence of contradiction in meaning. Indeed, it is probable that Aristotle never used the term "potency " in this latter sense.[9]

[9] Joseph Catalano, "Aristotle and Cantor: On the Mathe:inatical Infinite/' *Modern Schoolman* 46 (1968/69): 265,

Catalano may well be correct in asserting that Aristotle never used the term "potency" in the sense of logical possibility. But the question now is whether the implications of Aristotle's explicit position on the infinite are such that he perhaps should have allowed potency to be used in either this or an analogous sense.

It will be instructive to recall that in the discussion of time in Book IV of the *Physics*, Aristotle cautions that "whether if soul did not exist time would exist or not, is a question that may fairly be asked" (223a22). Contemporary scholarship differs on the issue of how (if at all) an observer figures into the nature of time for Aristotle. In any event, Aristotle at least envisions the possibility that the observer may have some essential role to play in the determination of time. But he has denied that the observer, in particular the thinking of an observer, plays any role in the determination of the infinity of magnitude. If, however, a soul is necessary in order to impose number on motion as an element in the production of time, then why should a soul not also be necessary to make the initial cut of a magnitude for purposes of realizing the infinite? After all, there is no more intrinsic physical reason why a magnitude should begin to be divided in a set way than there is for a mobile to be correlated according to a unit measure by an observer.

It seems plausible to maintain therefore that if Aristotle intends to preserve the measurability of parts within the process of infinite division, then he must at least countenance the notion of the whole containing those parts in such a way that it can incorporate an observer conceiving of measurable parts beyond the point where such measurement can be actually accomplished. And this is, I suggest, a type of logical possibility. Although it is always the magnitude *qua* matter which is divisible, beyond a certain point such divisibility can occur only when an observer conceives of the possibility of matter undergoing such divisibility. The potency factor of the infinite must therefore include not only the capacity for infinitely dividing a measurable magnitude but also for continuing this di-

vision up to and beyond the point at which the magnitude ceases to be empirically measurable. A complex sense of potency is at work here, not in the sense that a given magnitude ever shifts from quantity to something other than quantity, but in the sense that the divisibility of the quantity is necessarily measurable both empirically and, so to speak, logically.[10]

C. Even if this formulation of whole should be rejected, the process factor which defines both part and whole must still be addressed. For even without the presence of an observer, the part can be said to be one only on condition that its unity includes the element of process. Without such process, the unity of AC as part of a continuum would be indistinguishable from the unity of AC as a purely static part of a limited magnitude. In the latter instance, AC need not be anything other than its own magnitude in order to be one part of a whole. But in the case of unity predicated of a part controlled by the process of infinite divisibility, AC must include more than just the bare magnitude of AC as a static part of a static whole. It must include a process element whereby AC achieves a place as a distinctive moment-but of course only a moment-in an infinite process.

The final phase of Aristotle's part/whole problematic provides another useful guideline for the attempted stipulation of this distinction. He has asked, if part and whole are more than one, in what sense they are more than one. As part of a continuum, AC is one on condition that infinitely many parts can be generated from that unity. But each subsequent part of AC is also one, and in precisely the same way, i.e., as the locus for the generation of yet another infinity. Now as a distinguishable element in the process of division, each part retains its status as one whole. And as the process continues, there will be infinitely many wholes. Therefore, there are in-

[10] Friedrich Solmsen has also hinted at a different but related shift from a quantitative to a qualitative approach toward the metaphysics of infinity. See his *Aristotle's System of the Physical World* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), pp. 162ff.

finitely many unities as parts (during the process of infinite divisibility of the given magnitude) and infinitely many unities as wholes (as distinguishable moments in that process, each itself capable of infinite division).[11]

Concluding Remark. If these descriptions of part and whole as derived from Aristotle's teaching on the infinite are approximately accurate, then Aristotle was prudent indeed to pose the part/whole distinction as problematic in this regard. For if in the continuum of a given magnitude an infinity of parts joins an infinity of wholes, then this crowded confluence seems to compel additional investigation, not just for understanding the coherence of the part/whole relation as such, but perhaps for preserving the very intelligibility of the doctrine of the infinite, at least to the extent that this doctrine depends on the part/whole distinction. The process of dividing a whole into parts in a certain way provides the fundamental structure of Aristotle's notion of infinity. And if, with respect to the element of process in that concept, the interplay of part and whole is such that they become indistinguishable from one another, then perhaps we should wonder whether the concept of the infinite itself must be reexamined.

The source of wonder may, however, lie in the simple fact that we, with Aristotle, are trying to think ahout (one kind of) motion. As Aristotle. himself notes, the actuality of motion as such is " hard to grasp, but not incapable of existing " (202a2). Nevertheless, the attempt to grasp the part/whole structure of that particular kind of motion proper to the infinite raises such

11 Fr. Leo Sweeney has maintained that "le devenir est ce proces en tant qu'actuel, !'infinite est le proces en tant que potentiel." Now the product of process as becoming differs from the product of process as the infinite in that the former product can be realized while the latter product cannot. In view of this fact, would it nevertheless follow that the two processes can be said to be the same? If the sense of unity introduced in the body of my discussion above can be properly predicated of the process of motion without taking into account its product, then, presumably, Fr. Sweeney's identification could be maintained; if not, however, then there is reason to suspect that the process of becoming must be distinguished from the process of infinity. See Leo Sweeney, "L'infini quantitatif chez Aristote," *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* 58 (1960) : 528 n.

problems that one may be permitted to speculate about the very existence of infinity in this sense. In fact, the paradoxes encountered in this attempt might call to mind the Platonic principle that intelligibility cannot be secured in a realm of reality dominated by motion. But of course the implications of this principle for Aristotle's position can only be explored in an arena of much vaster scope than that defined by the present study. [12]

DAVIDA. WHITE

DePaul Unwersity
Ohicago, Illinois

12 An earlier version of this paper was read at the 1981 meetings of the .American Catholic Philosophical .Association and the Illinois Philosophical .Association, The present version of the paper has benefited considerably from the critical remarks suggested during these two meetings.

THE PROBLEM OF DIVINE EXEMPLARITY IN ST. THOMAS

ST. THOMAS'S DISCUSSION of God's knowledge involves a sustained attempt to safeguard the high view of divine transcendence which is central to his philosophical-theological project as a whole. Human knowledge invariably implies a change in its subject, a transition from ignorance to understanding; one comes to know a thing when it acts upon him in certain ways. Therefore the kind of knowledge which is predicable of God cannot be the same as that which is predicable of creatures, inasmuch as God is immutable and in no respect passive with respect to anything external to Himself. Yet an insistence on the absolute perfection of God requires Thomas to predicate knowledge of God analogously, since knowledge is a perfection in creatures. The infinite intellect does not exclude but rather raises to an infinite degree the perfection which we know in finite beings as knowledge. For this reason Thomas is forced to confront the problem of God's knowledge of things other than Himself.

Some of his predecessors had "solved" the problem simply by denying that God has such knowledge. Aristotle's God, for instance, is conscious only of Himself; such a God will not interrupt the contemplation of His own perfection and condescend to know that which is less perfect, *i.e.*, less real; to do so would be demeaning to the dignity of the divine intellect.[1] Similarly, Plotinus emphasized God's transcendence in such a radical way as to argue that God is not conscious but is rather beyond consciousness ("... though whether by that he meant to say that God is simply not conscious may be doubted,"[2]

[1] Thomas Gornall, *A Philosophy of God* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1962), p. 79.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 78.

as Gornall observes.) But this route is not open to St. Thomas, for he senses that it is to deny God a perfection possessed by some creatures. The divine perfection must be more, not less, than the creaturely; indeed, Thomas holds such an exalted view of the transcendent perfection of God that he cannot long entertain any doctrine which has the effect of placing God in a position of inferiority *vis-a-vis* creatures in any respect whatever. As the cause of all that exists (including all creaturely perfections), God possesses all perfections "in a more excellent manner" *(eminenter).* Therefore His knoweldge cannot be restricted to mere self-knowledge. From the eighth and eleventh articles of the *Siimma Theologiae* Ia, q. 14, it is clear that in St. Thomas's view" God's knowledge must be exactly coterminous with His creative activity and power." [3] Since God's act of understanding is identical with the divine substance (a. 4), by which all things are caused to be (a. 8), it follows that there is nothing which falls outside the scope of divine (hence causal) knowledge. Furthermore, God's knowledge of Himself would be less than perfect if it did not extend to the full range of His creative power (a. 5). Thus to affirm the infinite perfection of the divine being is to affirm the infinite perfection of divine knowledge. In order for God to be all that Thomas believes Him to be, He must know all things that are real (and therefore knowable) in every way in which they are real (and knowable). Otherwise some degree of imperfection will be introduced into the divine essence-which on Thomas's principles (given his definition of God as both pure act and absolute ontological perfection) is absurd. Thomas's God must be nothing less than the ultimate Knower.

In knowing things perfectly, God knows them to the full extent of their reality .and knowability. One of the modes in which things exist and are knowable is as imperfect imitations of the divine essence. It is at this point that St. Thomas turns to a consideration of the divine ideas. In Thomas, as in scho-

[3] R. J. Henle, *Saint Thomas and Platonism* (The Hague: Martin us Nijhoff, 1956)' p. 359.

la.sticism generally, the doctrine of divine ideas is examined in close conjunction with the doctrine of God's knowledge of His creatures.[4] If God as Creator has knowledge of His creatures, there are two especially urgent issues which Thomas must address. (a) How can God know a creature without being in some sense passive in relation to it? (b) If it is true that God's knowledge is the cause of things, and not the reverse, how is the doctrine of God's knowledge related to the doctrine of creation? It is here that the doctrine of divine ideas is to be located in the Thomistic synthesis. The doctrine of divine ideas functions both epistemologically (as a device for explaining God's knowledge of beings other than Himself) and metaphysically (as a way of accounting for the rationality and orderliness of creation) . The latter function is probably the more important of the two, since in the *Contra Gentiles* Thomas successfully elaborates the doctrine of God's knowledge without a major emphasis on the divine ideas.[5]

This essay will examine Thomas's treatment of divine ideas in four of his major works in which the doctrine is presented most fully. The limited scope of the present essay will not permit us to trace the pedigree of the doctrine in an exhaustive way. An attempt will be made, however, to locate Thomas's comments with reference to several key figures in the discussion of ideas which had developed from the time of Plato onward. Such an overview can hardly do more than to indicate the general thrust of a tradition of exemplarism to which St. Thomas was an heir and with which he was in constant dialogue. Against this background, we shall turn to an exegetical study of some of the relevant passa.ges in four works: the *Commentum in primum librum sententiarum* (d. 36, q. aa. 1-3), the *De veritate* (q. 3, aa. 1-8), the *Summa contra, gentiles* (I, 51-54), and the *Summa theologiae* (Ia, q. 15, aa.

[4] As H. Pinard puts it, " Les docteurs voient dans cette doctrine avec saint Augustin, une pure consequence de ce fait que Dieu est intelligence." H. Pinard, "Creation" in *Diotionnaire de Theologie OathoUque,* Tome Trosieme, deuxieme partie (Paris: Librairie Letourzey et Ane, 1938), p. 2155.

[5] See below, p. 214.

1-3 and 44, a. 3). (The materials from the *De veritate* and the *Summa theologiae* will be analyzed with special care, since these are the texts in which St. Thomas addresses the question of divine ideas most thoroughly.) Then two much-disputed questions will be addressed: (a) What does Thomas mean by affirming a plurality of ideas in a God who is nonetheless absolutely simple? (b) Wha.t is the function of the doctrine of divine ideas in Thomas's system as a whole?

In spite of the close connection between the doctrines of divine knowledge and divine ideas, our concern here is more with the latter than with the former; the problem of God's knowledge of creatures will not be treated separa.tely but only insofar as it bears directly on the question of divine ideas. In addition, while divine ideas are important to Thomas's account of how God knows, they are far more central to his account of God's mode of creating. The focus of our concern, therefore, will be not the epistemology but rather the metaphysics of exemplarity in Thomas's system.

For the sake of clarity it may be worthwhile at the outset to specify the sense in which the terms " exemplar" and " exemplarity" are intended in this context. In ordinary usage, the word " exemplar " can be used to denote a member of a series of objects which " exemplify " some pattern or model. In this sense " exemplar " is a synonym for " example." For purposes of philosophical discussion, however, the term is generally used in precisely the opposite sense, as Fr. Perret observes: " ' Exemplar takes on a different meaning in philosophical discourse. When philosophers speak of a thing's exemplar, it is not a question of a certain member in a series; it is not merely the first such member, the' first edition,' the prototype of which the other items are repetitions. For them it is a question of the original, the model itself and not the reproduction." [6] Whenever the word " exemplar " occurs in the course

[6] Marie-Charles Perret, "La Notion d'Exemplarite," in *Revue Thomiste,* Annee 41, Nouvelle Serie XIX (1936), p. 450. Perret notes that this philosophical use of the term involves a curious inversion of that which is customary in, say, industrial or commercial contexts: "... le langage courant a garde

of the subsequent discussion, it is to be understood in the active sense, *i.e.*, as that model in imitation of which something else comes to be (or is made to be) what it is. Hence the notion of exemplary causality may be defined as follows: " The exemplary cause of a thing is the extrinsic form of that thing, such that it preexists eminently in the practical intelligence of the informing a.gent." [7] By " exemplarism " I will mean the thesis that phenomenal realities are patterned after ideas, whether subsistent or in a transcendent intellect, which serve as their exemplars in this sense.

I

As a theologian-philosopher, St. Thomas takes with great seriousness both the Scriptural revelation and the philosophical tradition. As. a result he finds himself forced to confront the doctrine of exemplarism which is at least implicit at several points in Scripture and which is quite explicit in certain strands of philosophy tracing their inspiration back to Plato.

Among the Biblical materials which are especially congenial to the doctrine of exemplarism must be included (a) those which speak of God as the Maker of the heavens and of the earth; such language offers an immediate point of contact with the artisan-analogy which plays such a critical role in several varieties of exemplarism, including that of St. Thomas. [8] The Biblical view of the relation between God and the existence of the created world emphasizes the distinction between

le sens de modele au sens passif, de chose fabriquee, de la chose sortie du moule ou elle a ete coulee: le langage philosophique, en emprutant la metaphore, l'a modifiee dans le sens actif: suivant une metonymie qui se verifie dans l'histoire du langage, 'l'exemplaire' signifie des lors non la chose coulee dans le moule, mais le moule dans lequel a ,ete coulee la chose." *Ibid.*, p. 451. This inversion is not merely an idiosyncrasy of the French language. *Webster's New World Dictionary* defines the word in both the active and the passive senses. "Exemplar: (a) a person or thing regarded as worthy of imitation; model; pattern; archetype. (b) a sample; specimen; example."

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 465. The phrasing of this definition reflects its author's Thomist orientation, but the definition itself is relevant to the thought of a number of philosophers other than St. Thomas.

[8] See below, pp. 195 *sq.*

Creator and creation in a way which provides an analogue to the relation between an artisan and his work.[9] (b) The doctrine of creation adumbrated in both the Old and New Testaments underscores the creative role of the divine Verbum, spoken (Gen. 1.3, 6, 9) and incarnate (John 1.3). The Verbum who serves as the exemplar of all creation is identified in the Logos-theology of the Apologists (e.g., Justin Martyr) as the preexistent second Person of the Trinity. By the time of the Council of Nicea (325 A.D.), the creative Logos comes to be identified as *homoousios* with the Father; hence the prime Exemplar of the created order is precisely God Himself.[10] (c) The conception of God as Exemplar is reenforced by the clear teaching of Gen. 1.26-27 that man is created in the image of God. If God is Himself the model or pattern after which one of His creatures (man) is made, there arises the possibility of coming to understand Him as the Exemplar in an even wider sense.[11] (d) An allegorical interpretation of the Levitical polity offered several points at which the early Christian commentators could claim to discern traces of a Biblical exemplarism. The earliest instance of this sort of enterprise is found in the pseudo-Pauline *Epistle to the Hebrews* (8.5; 9.23-24). Certain of the Fathers sought to ground this interpretation in Yahweh's instructions to Moses concerning the construction of the sanctuary.[12]

> Make me a sanctuary, and I will dwell among them. Make it exactly according to *the design I show you,* the design for the Tabernacle and all its furniture. . . . See that you work to the design which you were shown on the mountain.
>
> (Exodus: 25.9, 40-NEB)

The artificiality of patristic exegesis at this point should not obscure the influence of such texts upon those in the early Church who sought to establish some point of contact between

[9] Pinard, "Creation," *op. cit.,* p. 2150.

[10] *Of.* C. J. Chereso, "Exemplarism," in *The New Catholic Encyclopedia,* Vol. *V* (New York: McGraw Hill Company, 1967), p. 715.

[11] Pinard, "Creation," *op. cit.,* p. 2150.

[12] *Ibid.,* p. 2153.

Biblical faith and the Greco-Roman culture. The legacy of this exegetical tradition formed part of the context of St. Thomas's work, and he could hardly have failed to take it with great seriousness.

On the other hand, Aquinas could hardly ignore the important role of ideas in the Platonic and Neo-Platonic traditions with which his own thought was in such lively dialogue. In refuting the materialistic metaphyics of Thales, Anaximander, et al., Plato developed a doctrine of Ideas in which, as Pinard summarizes it, "... things are what they are not only because they are composed of given elements, but because they correspond to a type, the idea, and to an end." [13] This doctrine is outlined at several points in the dialogues, especially in the *Phaedo,* 100 *sq.,* Pinard observes that Plato can be cited as the fountainhead of both idealism and exemplarism.[14] The cosmogony expressed in the *Timaeus* (30 *sq.)* involves the notion of a demiurge who creates according to "the original of the universe" which "contains in itself all intelligible beings." [15] There is some ambiguity concerning Plato's view of the ontological status of the "original" from which the world was created. Aristotle interpreted Plato as having affirmed that the "intelligible beings" subsist apart from the Creator, whereas patristic theology and Neoplatonism tended to locate the Ideas in the mind of God and to interpret Plato as holding the same position.[16]

Philo of Alexandria assimilated the Platonic Ideas into a

13 *Ibid.,* p. 2151.

14 Les etres existent-ils par *participation,* de ces realites superieures, OU sont-ils seulement crees a leur *imitation, μ{μ;11uis?* Dans le premier cas, Platon nous mettrait sur le chemin de l'idealisme alexandrin; dans le second, nous aurions reellement, avec un dieu transcendant, la theorie de l'exemplarisme. L'hypothese la plus probable est peut-etre la suivante: Platon a partage successivement les deux mani·eres de voir." *Ibid.*

15 Plato, *Timaeus* (30) in *The Dialogues of PZato,* Vol. II, trans. B. Jowett (New York: Random House, 1892, 1920), p. 14.

1s Pinard, "Creation," *op. oit.,* p. 2151. Pinard argues that "... !'interpretation qui presente Ies idees comme les idees de Dieu n'est pas anterieure a l'ere chretienne." *Ibid.*

Jewish apologetic in which the notion of a transcendent Creator-God is central. Philo's contribution to the history of exemplarism is important to a study of St. Thomas because of Philo's influence upon Neoplatonism, which in turn exerted such an important influence on Aquinas and on both St. Augustine and the Jewish and Arabic philosophers with whom Aquinas is in almost constant dialogue.[11] In his attempt to render the Mosaic creation-myth plausible to the Greco-Roman mentality, Philo seeks to draw a connection between Gen. and Plato's doctrine of "intelligible beings" as the models or archetypes of phenomenal realities. In the treatise *On the Creation of the World* (IV), Philo speaks of "that beautiful world which is perceptible only by the intellect" as the pattern according to which God created the world that is perceptible by the senses, and he explicitly identifies it as "a world which consists of ideas."[18]

> . . . God, as apprehending beforehand, as a God must do, that there could not exist a good imitation without a good model, and that of the things perceptible to the external senses nothing could be faultless which was not fashioned with reference to some archetypal idea conceived by the intellect, when he had determined to create this visible world, previously created that one which is perceptible only to the intellect, in order that, so using an incorporeal model framed as far as possible on the image of God, he might then create the corporeal world, a younger likeness of the elder creation, which should embrace as many different genera perceptible to the external senses, as the other world contains of those which are visible only to the intellect.[19]

Here the world of ideas is presented as one of God's creatures, external to Himself; almost immediately, however, Philo compares the Creator to an architect or statesman who "first of all

[11] In his "Preface" to *The Essential Philo,* N. N. Glatzer cites the work of H. Guyot, F. Heinemann, and A. Altmann in support of his claim that Philo "prepares the way for Neoplatonism." N. N. Glatzer, ed., *The Essential Philo* (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), pp. xi-xii.

[18] Philo Judaeus, *On the Creation of the World* (IV) in *The Essential Philo, op. cit.,* p. 4.

[19] *[bid.*

sketches out *in his own mind* "[20] the plan or design of what he intends to construct:

> Now we must form a somewhat similar opinion of God, who, having determined to found a mighty state, first of all conceived its form in his mind, according to which form he made a world perceptible only by the intellect, and then completed one visible to the external senses, using the first one as a model.[21]

The world of ideas is itself " the archetypal model, the idea of ideas, the Reason of God."[22] Thus in Philo the world of ideas is described both as God's creature and as something existing in God Himself. The tension is left unresolved.

Among the early proponents of a Christianized exemplarism,[23] none was more influential for the development of medieval philosophy than St. Augustine. Now the ambiguity which we have noted in Plato and in Philo is resolved in favor of the view that the exemplars of the created world exist in God and not in some autonomous realm external to the divine intelligence.

> . . . Ideas are the primary forms, or the permanent and immutable reasons of real things; so they are, as a consequence, eternal and ever the same in themselves; and they are contained in the divine intelligence. And since they can never come into being or go out of it, everything that can come into being and go out of it, and everything that does come into being and goes out of it, may be said to be framed in accord with them.[24]

It is the orderliness of a universe, Augustine argues, that requires the hypothesis of exemplarism: "... the whole of things is preserved, and the very order in which they change, as they manifest their temporal courses according to a definite pattern,

[20] *Ibid.,* emphasis mine.

[21] *Ibid.* p. 5.

[22] *Ibid.,* (VI), p. 6.

[23] Pinard finds the doctrine in the theologies of Irenaeus, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, Pseudo-Dionysius and St. Ambrose. "Creation," *op. cit.* pp. 2153-54.

[24] Aurelius Augustinus, *Eighty-three Different Questions,* question 46, 2, trans. Vernon J. Bourke in *The Essential Augustine,* ed. Vernon J. Bourke (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1964-1974), p. 62.

is maintained and governed" by a divine law. "When this is established and admitted, who will dare to say that God established all things in an irrational manner? Now if this cannot be said or accepted in any proper sense, the conclusion remains that all things were founded by means of reason." [25] But the " reason " of a created being Augustine has already defined as nothing other than its Idea. [26] And the Ideas are in no sense alien to God. Augustine describes them in terms which could hardly be applied to any creature without sacrilege: if the exemplars are eternal and immutable, they must exist in God and nowhere else. For God needs nothing external to Himself in order to accomplish the work of creation; otherwise He would be a demiurge rather than the transcendent Creator. "Now, where would we think that these reasons are, if not in the mind of the Creator? For He did not look to anything placed outside Himself as a model for the construction of what He created; to think that He did would be irreligious," [21] since it would be to suggest that God does not create absolutely *ex nihilo* but is to some extent dependent on that which is external to Himself.

Although it would be an exaggeration to say that the notion of exemplarity is central to Augustine's metaphysics, it is nonetheless possible to discover traces of the doctrine a.t a number of points in his total system. In *The City of God* (XI, 29), Augustine asserts that angels are given the privilege of" knowing a thing in the design in conformity to which it was made." [28] Then (in XII, 26) Augustine explicitly makes common cause with Plato's theory of an intelligible world as the prototype of creation: "And if God, as Plato continually maintains, embraced in His eternal intelligence the ideas both of the universe and of all the animals, how, then, should He not with His own hand make them all? Could He be unwilling to be the con-

[25] *Ibid.,* p. 63

[26] *Ibid.*

[21] Augustinus, *Eighty-three Questions,* 46, 2, *op. cit.,* p. 63.

[2s] Aurelius Augustinus, *The City of God* (XI, 29), trans. Marcus Dods (New York: The Modern Library, 1950), p. 374.

structor of works, the idea and plan of which called for His ineffable and ineffably to be praised intelligence? " [29] In the *De ordine* (I, 11, 32), Augustine interprets Christ's language in John 18. 36 as an allusion to the world of exemplars in God's mind: " the Savior is careful to specify that his Kingdom is not of *this* world, thus implying that there is another world, i.e., the world of ideas." [30] It is true that Augustine repudiates this exegesis in his *Retractations* (I, 11, 2) : "But I regret ... that I proposed two worlds, the one sensible, the other intelligible ... in such a way as though the Lord also meant to indicate this, on the ground that He does not say, "My kingdom is not of *the* world' but ' My kingdom is not of *this* world.' " [31] Yet it is clear that what Augustine means to retract is not his commitment to the doctrine of divine exemplars but rather the tortured exegesis by which he had concluded that such a doctrine is taught in John 18.36. For at once he goes on to applaud what he takes to be the essential thrust of Platonic exemplarism: " Plato, indeed, did not err in saying that there is an intelligible world, if we are willing to consider not the word . . . but the thing itself. For he called the intelligible world that eternal and unchangeable plan according to which God made the world." [32]

The story of the development of Platonic-Augustinian exemplarism in the centuries between Augustine and Aquinas is far too complex to be recounted here. Among the more important items to be noted in a general overview, however, are (a) the contributions of Boethius, whose *De consolatione philosophiae* (III, ix) thematizes the role of God's ideas in the

29/bid., (XII, 26).

20 Aurelius Augustinus, *Contra Academicos, De Beata Vita, necnon De Ordine,* ed. William M. Green (Antwerp: In Aedibus Spectrum, 1956), p. 116. "Esse autem alium mundum ab istis oculis remotissimum, quem pau· corum sanorum intellectus intuetur, satis ipse Christus significat, qui non dicit: 'regnum meum non est de mundo' sed: *'regnum meum non de hoo mundo.'"*

81 Aurelius Augustinus, *The Retractations,* trans. Mary Inez Bogan (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1968), p. 14.

32 *Ibid.,* pp. 14-15.

creative process.[33] (b) The *De divinis nominibus* of Pseudo-Dionysius (chapter 5) includes a doctrine of paradigms which is elaborated in terms of the thesis that being is itself inferior to the high God, who is beyond being. The paradigms are both intelligible and immutable; hence they possess being in a pre-eminent way. But for this very reason they are distinct from God.[34] St. Thomas frequently appeals to Pseudo-Dionysius as a resource for his own reflections, but he is not slavish in his use of Pseudo-Dionysius;[35] at a number of points the materials borrowed from the *De divinis nominibus* are radically transformed. Among the points of divergence between Thomas and Pseudo-Dionysius, one that is striking involves precisely the question of the relation between the exemplars and the high God, since Thomas follows Augustine in locating them in the divine intelligence.[36] (c) Finally, it is plausible to suppose that the importance of the intermediaries between God and creation in Neoplatonism and its Arabic-Jewish heirs may have conditioned Thomas's understanding of the role of the divine ideas as exemplars; since he denies them any existence apart from God, however, Thomas does not regard the ideas as true intermediators, except in the same sense in which the New Testament *(e.g.,.* I Tim. Q.5) and early Trinitarian theology speak of the Verbum as the intermediary between God and man, who nonetheless participates fully in the Father's divinity.[37]

33 Cited in Pinard, "Creation," *op. cit.,* p. 2155. "Tu cuncta superno, Ducis ab exemplo, pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse Mundum mente gerens, simulque in imagine formans."

34 Etienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas,* trans. L. K. Shook (New York: Random House, 1956), p. 139.

35 *Of. ibid.,* p. 140.

36 See below pp. 199-202. It is interesting to note that St. Thomas does use materials from the *De divinis nominibus* in his treatment of the divine ideas; *cf. I. Sent.,* d. 36, q. 2, a. 1.

37 This brief sketch hardly does justice to the rich variety of materials which would have to be addressed in any thorough history of exemplarism among St. Thomas's medieval predecessors. For a fuller analysis, *cf.* Pinard, "Creation," *op. cit.,* pp. 2155 *sq.*

II

As R. J. Henle observes,[38] Thomas's doctrine of ideas is explicitly related to his doctrine of God's knowledge, and both doctrines are decisively informed by a number of interconnected theses, including the following: (a) The absolute ontological perfection of God *(S.T.* I a, q. 14, aa. 1-3; *I Sent.,* d. 35, q. 1, aa. 1, *5; Dever.* q. 2, aa. 1, 2); (b) hence, the absolute perfection of divine knowledge *(S.T.* I a, q. 14, aa. 7, 9, 10; *I Sent.,* d. 35, q. 1, aa. 1, *5,* d. 36, q. 2, a. 2; *Dever.* q. 2, aa. 7, 9, 12, 13); (c) the exemplarity of the divine essence (I *Sent.* d. 36 q. 1, a. 1, ad 3; *Dever.* q. 2, a. l; *C.G.,* I, 54; *S.T.* I, a, q. 14, aa. 6, 8, 9 (ad 2), 12); (d) the universal causality of the divine intelligence (I *Sent.* d. 36, q. 1, aa. 1-3 and d. 36, q. 2, a. 3; *C.G.* I, 50; *Dever.* q. 2, aa. 3-5, 8, 14; *S.T.* I a, q. 14, aa. 8, 11); and (e) the absolute simplicity of the divine essence (I *Sent.,* d. 35, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2 and q. 2, ad 4; *C.G.,* I, 53-54; *S.T.* I a, q. 14, a. 1, ad 2) . These principles regulate Thomas's reflections on the ways in which both knowledge and ideas may be predicated of God. Within the boundaries defined by this set of criteria Thomas develops his own contribution to the exemplarist tradition.

A. *Commentum in primum librum Senten.tia.rum* (1254-56)

Thomas discusses the doctrine of divine ideas in distinction 36, question 2, after a rather lengthy treatment of the scope of God's knowledge. Here both the epistemological and metaphysical aspects of the question are examined. In contrast with some of his later discussions, however, Thomas seems almost to take the metaphysical role of the divine ideas (as exemplars) for granted, and it is clear that what really arouses his concern is their role in God's act of knowing. He acknowledges the metaphysical function of divine ideas when he defines them as *formae operativae* in the mind of the divine Arti-

ss R. J. Henle, *Saint ThomM and Platonism,* op. cit., p. 358.

ficer, serving collectively as the pattern by which He creates the universe.[39] Similarly, Thomas observes that the term " idea " refers to the divine essence itself considered under the aspect of its imitability by creatures: " Therefore, since this term, ' idea,' denotes the divine essence insofar as it is an exemplar imitated by a creature, the divine essence will be the very idea of that thing according to a determinate manner of imitation." [40] It is clear, however, that the real burden of the argument centers on the question of the function of the ideas in God's knowledge of realities other than Himself. L. B. Geiger notes that in this relatively early work Thomas seems to regard the ideas both as the objects and as the media of divine knowledge.[41] In fact, the dominant tendency is to speak of ideas as that through which *(per quas)* God knows His creatures. In d. 36, q. 1, Thomas begins by positing a logical distinction between *that which* God knows and *that by which* he knows. Elsewhere he affirms that "it is through ideas *(per ideas)* that God has not only practical but also speculative knowledge of things. . . ." [42] Against the background of the Aristotelian theory of the role of the intelligible species in human cognition, however, such language arouses in Thomas a certain degree of anxiety when predicated of God. For to speak of divine ideas as the means by which God knows things is to open the way to certain interpretations which in effect pose a

39 Thomas Aquinas, *I Sent.,* d. 36, q. 2, a. 1. This and all subsequent quotations from the commentary on the first book of the *Sentenaes* will be from Vol. I of the edition of 1856 (Parmae: Typis Petri Fiaccadori).

40 *Ibid.,* d. 36, q. 2, a. 2. *Of. ibid.,* d. 36, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3: "Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis in Deo non sit aliquid materiale, sed essentia ejus sit actus tantum, tamen ille actus est causa omnium quae sunt in re et materialium et formalius; quern actum imitatur quantum potest omnis res et quidquid in re est; et ideo essentia divina est similitudo non tantum formalium, sed etiam materialium rei. • • ." "Unde cum hoc nomen *idea* nominet essentiam divinam secundum quod est exemplar imitatum a creatura, divina essentia erit propria idea istius rei secundum determinatum imitationis modum."

41 L. B. Geiger, " Les ldees Divines Dans !'Oeuvre de S. Thomas " in *St. Thomas Aquinas, 1274-1974: Commemorative Studies,* eds. Armand A. Maurer, et al. (Toronto, Canada: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1974), Vol. I, p. 189.

42 *I Sent.,* d. 36, p. 2, a. 1.

real challenge to Thomas's understanding of God as pure act.[48] To avoid such a result, Thomas must be able to affirm that the means by which God knows is itself both the " object formed by the (Divine) knower" [44] and, as such, identical with the divine essence. For otherwise God would be to some degree passive with respect to that which is external to Himself; in which case He would be less than pure act, hence (for Thomas) less than God.

On the other hand, Thomas already senses the danger implicit in the affirmation that there is a plurality of ideas in God, since such language can easily be interpreted as a way of compromising the divine simplicity. To avoid such a result (which clearly would be fatal to his entire project), Thomas relies upon the distinction between the divine essence as such and the divine essence as imitable by creatures. The plurality of divine ideas results from God's knowledge of the innumerable modes in which the divine essence is imitable.[45] The plurality of divine ideas is a plurality of objects known by God in the simple act of understanding Himself (and, in so doing, understanding all beings other than Himself.) If God knows Himself perfectly, it follows that he knows Himself in all the modes in which He is knowable; among these are the diverse ways in which the divine essence can be imitated by creatures. But ideas are precisely the ways in which the divine essence is imitable; hence the plurality of ideas is a plurality of the objects of divine knowledge, and St. Thomas believes it has already been established (in d. *35,* q. 1, a.. !2) that the multiplicity of things known by God is in no way repugnant to His simplicity.

B. *De veritate* (1256-59)

St. Thomas's most extensive treatment of divine ideas is to be found in the *De veritate,* q. 3, aa. 1-8. He begins by dis-

43 Geiger, "Les Idees Divines, - *op. cit.,* p. 180. Geiger's question underlines the dilemma: "Ceux-ci *(i.e.,* Jes idees), en effet, ne doivent-ls pas aussi actuer en quelque sorte l'intellect divin pour etre connus, comme l'exige, en principe, l'espece intelligible selon Aristote?"

44 *Ibid.*

45 *I Sent.,* d. 36, q. 2, a. 1.

tinguishing among several senses of the Greek term which he translates into Latin as *formae.*[46] An idea or form can mean (a) that *from which* a thing receives the form by virtue of which it is what it is (as when the form of the agent informs the effect). But since an effect may embody its cause's form only imperfectly, it follows that its form is not identical to the form of that from which its own form is derived. Or (b) the term may denote that *by which* a thing is informed; *e.g.,* the soul is the form of the body. But in this case we seem to be dealing with form as a part of a compound, whereas ". . . the word *idea.* signifies a form separate from that whose form it is." [47] But (c) there is a third sense of the word "form" which, according to Thomas, coincides with the strict sense of i8€a: this is the "exemplary form" *according to which* a thing is made to be what it is. "Hence, the idea of a thing is the form which it imitates." [48] The imitation involved at this point is an expression of the agent's intention, since "... what imitates a form by chance is not said to be formed according to that form, because *according to* seems to imply direction to an end." [49] It is proper to speak of ideas only in the case of an agent who directs things to some particular end, since his intention is part of what constitutes the proper meaning of the term "idea." Thus an idea may be defined as "a form which something imitates because of the intention of an agent who antecedently determines the end himself." [50] To posit the existence of ideas in this sense *(i.e.,* as exemplars) is to exclude the view that the universe and the things in it have come to be by chance. Equally excluded is the doctrine that the world exists as a necessary emanation from the divine essence: for emanationism leaves no room for the free exercise of God's will (intention) in causing things to exist as they do. Thomas believes that the fatal defect in such a metaphysics is already

46 *Dever.* q. 2, a. I.
47 *Ibid.*
48 *Ibid.*
49 *Ibid.*
50 *Ibid.*

clea.rfrom the definition of the term" God." The transcendent Creator determines the end for whose sake He directs His creative act; otherwise the end would have to be determined by some agent external to Himself-in which case God would be to some extent passive. But such a result is absurd if the God of whom we speak is by definition pure act.

Between the two excluded extremes lies what Thomas believes to be the truth of the matter. Things come into existence neither fortuitously nor by a natural necessity but rather intentionally, in accordance with the plan of the prime Agent.[51] But to speak of the Creator's plan is to raise the question of divine ideas in their function as exemplars. Thus Thomas employs the doctrine of exemplarism in order to account for the orderliness of the cosmos without infringing upon the absolutely free character of God's crea.tive act. Against those (such as the Epicureans) who deny the doctrine of providence, and equally against those (such as Empedocles) who envision a necessitated universe, Thomas commends Plato and Pseudo-Dionysius for recognizing that a doctrine of ideas is required in order to account for the rationality and orderliness evident in creation. But because the ideas function as ends, they must be posited as existing in the mind of God and nowhere else. Otherwise God would be to some extent passive. The ideas "... can be only within the divine mind, for it is unreasonable to say that God acts on account of an end other than Himself or that He receives that which enables Him to act from a source other than Himself."[52] Since things happen intentionally, it is clear that there are exemplars. But since God is pure act, the exemplars must exist only in God, for otherwise God would be to some degree passive inasmuch as His act of knowing/ creating would then be conditioned by something external to Himself.

51 Geiger, "Les Idees Divines," *op. cit.,* p. 190. Geiger's summary of the argument up to this point expresses it well: "L'idee est le modele d'apres lequel Dieu cree, puisque la creation n'est ni l'oeuvre du hasard, ni l'effet d'une necessite naturelle."

52 *De ver.,* q. 3, a. 1.

At once Thomas senses that such a thesis must be defended against the charge that it introduces some sort of imperfection into the act of God's intellect, hence into the divine essence itself. So he argues that to know things by means of ideas is a less perfect mode of knowledge only when wha.t is thus known is also knowable in itself. But no creature is knowable in itself; it is knowable " only insofar as it is in a knower by means of its likeness." [53] In fact, to know a thing by its essence is less perfect than to know it by an idea, since the idea is more immaterial-hence more knowable-than the essence.[54]

Thomas is eager to show that his doctrine of ideas is not liable to the same criticisms which Aristotle leveled against the Platonic theory of immaterial forms. In themselves, he admits, the ideas are not absolutely immaterial, but he insists that ". . . it is not inconsistent for them to acquire immateriality from the one in whom they exist." [55] When art idea exists in an intellect (either human or divine) as the intelligible species of what is known, it is immaterial; since it exists according to the mode of that in which it is, the form (idea) is immaterial to the highest conceivable degree in God. Yet this conclusion is immune to the sorts of criticisms by which Aristotle refutes Plato, since Thomas explicitly disavows the view that "... the ideas of natural things have a separate substance ...." [56] It is not in things nor even in themselves but strictly in the divine intelligence that ideas exist immaterially. (After all, Thomas has already made it perfectly clear tha.t by idea he does *not* mean that by which a thing is informed, and it is against the notion of the immateriality of forms in this sense that Aristotle's critique has force.) Likewise, Thomas reasons, the objection that ideas are metaphysically superfluous, since they neither generate nor are generated, applies only to Plato's own theory. For Thomas sharply distinguishes generation from creation: the Creator is not a set of ideas sub-

53 *Ibid.,* ad 1.
54 *Ibid.,* ad 2.
55 *Ibid.,* ad 4.
56 *Ibid.,* ad 5.

sisting apart from God but is precisely God Himself who acts freely but in accordance with the ideas existing within the divine intellect. Loosely speaking, the ideas can be said to produce or create things (as their exemplary causes), but precisely on the premise that they exist only in the mind of God; strictly speaking, it is God alone who creates in accordance with nothing external to Himself.[57] Nor does the fact that composite things are "caused" by their exemplars in God's mind introduce composition into Him. Thomas does not deny the principle that effects resemble their causes, but he qualifies this generalization with respect to the first cause in a series: "Nor is it necessary, when composite things are made, for the first efficient cause to resemble what is generated: this is true only of the proximate efficient cause."[58] The doctrine of divine ideas, then, does not imply that God is in any way passive or conditioned, since God's ideas (unlike man's) are in no sense caused by the things known. On the contrary, divine ideas are both logically and ontologically prior to that which is known and made according to them.[59]

Objections 7-11 of a. I deal with the suggestion that in one way or another the doctrine of ideas in the divine mind implies a denial of God's absolute transcendence. Thomas concedes that whatever is made according to an archetype is somehow proportionate to it. But while there is no direct proportion between the infinite Creator and His finite creature, still there can be a proportionality between two things that are finite and two others that are infinite.[60] Likewise, since the divine ideas are affirmed to exist in the mind of God, and nowhere else, their existence does not suggest that in His knowing and creating God is subject to a norm other than Himself. Since the ideas are essential to Him, God is precisely His own norm; hence His self-sufficiency as Knower and Creator is not

[57] *Ibid.,* ad 5.
[58] *Ibid.*
[59] *Ibid.,* ad 6.
[60] *Ibid.,* ad 7. *Of. ibid.,* q. 2, a. 3, ad 4.

called into question.[61] It is crucial to Thomas's whole argument that he be able to show that God is not the passive recipient of ideas from the things which He knows. God's ideas are not caused by things; precisely the reverse is true. Things exist in imitation of their archetypes in the mind of God. Thus God remains pure act.[62] Indeed, Thomas argues, the existence of ideas in God must be postulated if we are to affirm that God knows things other than Himself without being in any respect passive in relation to them. For otherwise His knowledge (hence the divine essence) would be conditioned by the objects of His knowledge. But if it is precisely in knowing Himself as imitable that God knows both the ideas as modes of His own imitability and things as more or less defective imitations of Himself, it follows that in knowing creatures God remains absolutely unconditioned by them. Thus the ontological similarity between God and creature posited in the doctrine of exemplarism does not compromise the infinite contrast between the two. To say that there is in the Creator a likeness or exemplar of the creature is not to elevate the creature to equality with the Creator, since whatever perfection is common to God and creatures exists in an infinitely more perfect way in God. For ". . . although that which is divine may in some way be passed on to creatures, we ca.n never grant that a creature possesses it in the same way in which God possesses it. Hence, although we grant that there exists a likeness between a creature and God in some way, we do not grant that they are equal in any way whatsoever."[63] Ideas, after all, are exemplary forms. As such they properly can be said to exist only in the intellect which acts in accordance with them. Creatures could claim equality with God only if they possessed their forms not only as that *by which* but also as that *according to which* they are what they are; which is to say that creatures could rightfully claim equality with God only on the condition that they should cease to be creatures at all. (And

61 *Ibid.,* ad 8.
62 *Ibid.,* ad 10.
63 *Ibid.,* ad 9.

this in turn is an impossible condition for any contingent being to fulfill. For the fundamental distinction between God and creature lies precisely in the fact that anything other than God is incapable of being the cause of its own existence.) Nor is there multiplicity in God on account of the difference between the way in which He knows creatures (i.e., by their exemplars) and the way in which He knows Himself (i.e., by His own essence). For the exemplars are essential to God in such a way that in knowing Himself God knows the exemplars as well. It is only from a creaturely point of view that the problem of the multiple modes of God's knowledge even arises; it seems to be a problem only because of an inappropriate interpretation of the analogy between divine and human knowledge. In a human knower it is not possible for an object and its intelligible species to be one and the same, whereas-since God *is* all that He *has-His* intelligible species is identical with the divine essence which He knows. From the standpoint of the Knower, it remains true that God knows creatures in the same way in which He knows Himself: for He knows Himself in Himself, and He knows creatures in the same way, *i.e.*,. in Himself, by means of their exemplars which are essential to Himself.[64]

In a. 2, Thomas establishes the plurality of divine ideas. To say that there is only one exemplar in the divine intellect is to imply that God's creative intention extends only to being in general and not to beings as distinct from one another. Such a result would either require us to posit the existence of a creative intermediary (such as the Platonic demiurge) or else to infer that everything in addition to the object of God's primary or immediate intention-i.e., everything other than being *per se-is* relegated to the realm of mere chance. The first of these options is an insult to divine omnipotence, while the second is excluded by the evidence of order and regularity in the universe. Furthermore, if what God intends is only the creature as such and not the individuations by which creatures exist distinctly, it follows that to the extent that the general is

64 *Ibid.,* ad 11.

determined by the special it happens unintentionally, hence accidentally, with reference to its first cause, but essentially with reference to its immediate cause. But this is impossible since "... what is essential is previous to what is accidental, and the relation of a thing to its first cause is previous to its relation to a second cause...." [65] Hence it is not only being as such whose exemplar exists in the mind of God, but also beings in their distinction from one another. Consequently, just as there are many creatures, so are there many exemplars.

How do ideas function in God's knowledge? On the one hand, ideas exist in the intellect as likenesses of the things understood; in this way they serve as principles of the act of understanding. On the other hand, ideas exist in the intellect not as the cause or medium but rather as the effect of the act of understanding: for it is precisely the idea which is understood. Even in this case, however, ideas function as " the second means " by which the act of understanding occurs, since it is by means of the exemplary idea produced in the initial act of understanding that one understands both what is to be made and how it is to be made. Ideas are products of the intellect in which they exist, but even so they function as that through which the intellect understands things other than itself.66 Here lie the roots of a possible solution to the problem of the multiplicity of ideas within the divine simplicity: because ideas are not primarily the *quo* but the *quod* of God's knowing, their plurality does not disturb the divine simplicity. The ideas that are produced in God's act of understanding can then be understood as encompassed in the divine Verbum who is of one substance with God-as-Knower. Departing from the basic thrust of his treatment of the issue in *I Sent.,* d. 36, q. 2, Thomas now suggests that *idea* refers to the content of the act of understanding: " An idea does not have the character of *that by which* a thing is first understood but, rather, of *that which* is understood and is existing in the intellect." [67] But in

[65] *Ibid.* q. 3, a. 2.
66Ibid.
[61] *Ibid.,* ad 9.

fact the distinction between the idea as principle of the act of understanding and the ideas as the product of that act is toyed with for just a tantalizing moment before Thomas proceeds to pursue the argument a.long quite different lines.[68]

In the case of an intellect which produces something resembling itself, the operative intellect itself becomes the exemplar or model of what it produces. If the imitation is perfect, the operative intellect may be said to possess the idea as the exact form of what is imitated. If, however, the imitation is less than perfect, the exemplar in the operative intellect is distorted in inverse proportion to the degree of similarity attained in the imitation.[69] The varying degrees of defectiveness with which things imitate the divine essence accounts for the plurality of exemplars, since exemplars must be referred to the divine essence not *per se* but under the rubric of its imitability by crea.tures.[70] Since it is by knowing Himself that God knows and produces all things external to Himself, it follows that He is the idea of all that He knows and produces. The divine essence, as the primary object of God's act of understanding, is itself the idea of the entire creation. But since no creature imitates the divine essence perfectly, the idea is not the divine essence in its fullness as essence but is rather understood (by God) according to the varying degrees of perfection with which different creatures imitate it. The divine essence is understood by God in the full range of its imitability by creatures, and it is this act of understanding whose product is the multiplicity of ideas. This does not destroy the divine simplicity, however. Multiple exemplars as the causes of things do not stand in opposition to God Himself as the sole cause of things. For, as Thomas seems keenly aware, such language is to some extent anthropomorphic and must not be pressed too literally. In reflecting upon itself, "... the divine essence devises-if I may use such an expression-different ways in which it can be imitated."[71] Such language is clearly metaphorical, as Thomas

68 Geiger, "Les Idees Divines," *op. cit.,* p. 197.
69 *De ver.,* q. 3, a. 2.
70 *Ibid.*
u *Ibid.,* ad 6.

himself seems to acknowledge. After all, God's "devising" of the ideas takes place not in time but in eternity. The ideas exist in God as different modes of understanding the one uncomposed truth which He is.[72] Thus the inequality among things whose exemplars exist in God does not introduce composition into the divine essence, since exemplars exist in God according to the mode of Him in whom they are: " Hence, from the fact that some of the things of which ideas are had imitate the divine essence more perfectly than others, it does not follow that the ideas are unequal but that the ideas are of unequal things." [73] Similarly, the temporality of a thing does not detract from the eternal character of its exemplar, since the temporality of *things* does not imply the temporality of *relations.* A thing can come into and then pass out of existence in time without affecting the ability of even a finite intellect to know it; this is true in our knowledge of whatever is past to us. It must be eminently true in the case of an intellect to which absolutely nothing is past.[74] The divine intellect is eternal and God's knowledge is not discursive but simultaneous. But since ideas exist primarily as the *quod* rather than as the *quo* of God's knowledge, His simplicity is left unimpaired. Even in the secondary sense in which ideas can be said to function as that by which God understands things other than Himself, the simultaneity of God's knowledge excludes any degree of composition in Him. *What* God understands is multiple: He knows a plurality of actual and possible relations of things to Himself. But He does so precisely *by means of* His own simple and indivisible essence.

Since exemplary ideas have been defined in terms which refer to operation, Thomas turns in a. 3 to the charge that such ideas pertain to an inferior kind of knowledge *(i.e.,* practical as opposed to speculative) which cannot be attributed to God without detriment to the absolute perfection of His act of understanding. Thomas begins his argument by distinguishing

[72] *Ibid.,* ad 3.
[73] *Ibid.,* ad 4.
[74] *Ibid.,* ad 7.

among four modes of knowledge. Actual practical knowledge is the knowledge of what can be done by an agent who intends to do it, whereas habitual or virtual practical knowledge is the knowledge of what can be done on the part of an agent who lacks such an intention. On the other hand, it is possible to know something in such a manner that the sole end toward which such knowledge is directed is simply truth for its own sake. This occurs when one knows something which is of such a nature that its production is utterly beyond one's competence. Yet a. thing which is itself producible through knowledge is capable of being known speculatively when the knower considers it strictly in itself and without reference to any productive operation. Such knowledge is to be distinguished from either sort of practical knowledge, in which the object known is considered precisely as producible. God knows things in each of the four modes of knowledge. Of things which He knows and wills to create, He has actual practical knowledge. Of things which He knows as producible but does not will to create, He has virtual practical knowledge. In knowing things analytically (by distinguishing from each other the notes which can have no actual existence apart from their conjunction in a particular subject), God knows things speculatively, *i.e.*, in such a way that they are incapable of being produced. In addition, God knows evil, which is itself producible, but not in such a way that His knowledge is its cause: of evil God has speculative knowledge in a secondary sense. Now it is simply a matter of ascertaining to which of these four modes of divine knowledge the ideas pertain. In the strict sense an idea is defined as an exemplar, *i.e.*, it is defined with reference to its role in the work of creation. In this narrow sense ideas pertain only to practical knowledge. But in a broader sense the term "idea" may be used as referring to the principle of a thing's intelligibility rather than of its production. In this sense ideas pertain also to speculative knowledge. Indeed, any practical lmowledge which is only virtual is in some sense speculative " in so far as it falls short of actual execution." [75] Thus

[75] *Ibid.*, ad 2.

"... an exemplar is not necessarily restricted to that which is actually practical, because a thing may be called an exemplar merely if something else can be made in imitation of it-even though this other thing is never made." [76] Yet here again Thomas senses that such language is too anthropomorphic to be predicable of God according to its literal sense. It must always be kept in mind that to speak of God in this way is to speak of Him " according to our way of understanding." [77] In fact, the distinction between the practical and the speculative has more to do with the limitations of any human conceptuality than with God as He is in Himself. A practical idea in God is not distinct from His speculative idea as a different kind of idea. It is rather a matter of our viewing the divine idea in terms of the categories and definitions arising from our ordinary experience of what it means to know a thing.

If Thomas's task is to show that the existence of divine ideas is in no way repugnant to the character of God, the problem takes on a special urgency when the question of evil is raised. Having defined ideas as exemplary causes, Thomas is forced to argue that there is in God no idea of evil. Such a posture is necessary on several grounds. (a.) The cause of evil (if there were one) would itself be evil: hence to say that God has an idea. of evil would be say that there is evil in God. (b) Furthermore, if an exemplary cause of evil exists in God, God is Himself the cause of evil (since everything that is in God is essential to Him) . This is an inference which Thomas cannot embrace without jeopardizing his own claim to orthodoxy. (c) In addition, adhering to the Augustinian definition of evil as privation, Thomas holds that in the strict sense evil has no being; in that case, it follows that evil is neither caused nor created, hence that there can be no idea (exemplar) of evil. Even in the broader sense in which " idea " is taken not as exemplar but as intelligible species, there can still be no idea of evil since in becoming evil a. thing is deprived of being, hence

[75] *Ibid.,* ad 3.
[77] *Ibid.,* ad 6.

of intelligibility, precisely to the degree to which it becomes evil. For evil is by definition the absence of being, hence the absence of the intelligible character by which existent things are knowable: in falling short of being, evil falls short of intelligibility as well. There is no idea of evil in God because "... evil has no nature through which it could participate in something that is in God...." [78] This is not to say that God has no knowledge whatever of evil. It is only to say that He does not know evil as a separate thing, created in accordance with an idea proper to it alone. God knows evil in knowing the good. "He knows both good and evil by means of the idea of the good." [79] Since God's knowledge by exemplars is creative, God could have a separate idea of evil only by transforming it from the status of nonbeing to the status of some kind of being-so that immediately His idea would correspond to something other than evil. For a thing is knowable only to the extent that it exists, and precisely to the extent that it has being a thing is not evil but good. *Idea* as form or as cause implies *being* (either actual or virtual); as soon as a form is conceived it is clear that there is something whose being (either actual or virtual) is informed by it. Since, then, evil is not some-thing, there can be no idea of evil in the intellect, whether human or divine: thus there is in God no idea of evil.[80]

Prime matter, like evil, is characterized by the absence of form: [81] it is by definition that in which no form inheres. As soon as it receives a form it is no longer prime matter but is rather one part of a composite. On the other hand, however, unlike evil prime matter is more than mere privation; it is not defined *solely,* as the absence of form, any more than form is defined as merely the absence of matter. Explicitly rejecting Plato's theory of an uncaused prime matter, Thomas insists that all matter is a creature of God. On the premise that God does not act irrationally, then, it is necessary to postulate that

78 *Ibid.,* a. 4.
79 *Ibid.,* ad 7.
so *Ibid.* a. 4.
s1 *Ibid.,* a. 5.

there is in God an idea of this creature as well as of others. For there must be in any cause some likeness of its effect. Yet the case of prime matter poses a special problem for tht! doctrine of exemplarism, inasmuch as matter (like form) cannot come to exist in any other way than as a composite with something other than itself. Strictly speaking there are exemplars only of those things which either are or can come to be in act. From the fact that by itself matter cannot be in act at all it follows that there can be no exemplar of matter as such. But if matter exists at all there must be in God some sort of likeness corresponding to it. Thomas concludes that this likeness is such that "... one idea corresponds to the entire composite. . . ." [82] There is an exemplar for every composite of matter and form, since it is by being so composed (either virtually or actually) that things are made both to be and to be intelligible. Strictly speaking, then, it is only of composites that exemplars can be said to exist. Yet in the sense of intelligible species (or *ratio)* there can be an idea of even prime matter. It is possible to know matter and form analytically (by definition) and in this way to know them distinctly, even though they cannot exist distinctly: "Even though matter cannot exist by itself, it can be considered by itself." [83] In this broad sense-as likeness rather than as exemplar-there is in God an idea of prime matter. This is but to say that the idea of prime matter does not pertain to knowledge that is either virtually or actually practical. Yet this is not to exclude the presence in God of an idea of prime matter; it is only to specify that this idea pertains strictly to God's speculative knowledge.

Since God knows by means of ideas (which, however, are identical with His own essence), there is in God an idea of each thing which He knows. Among these are things which exist in potency but not in act, *vfa.,* the "possibles." Hence God knows some things which have no actual existence at any time. [84] A cause, insofar as it is a cause, is in no way passive

[82] *Ibid.*
[83] *Ibid.,* ad 3.
[84] *Ibid.,* aa. 6, 11,

with respect to its effect. Since an idea is the exemplary cause of some creature, the existence or nonexistence of its object is irrelevant to the existence or nonexistence of the idea. It is not the existence of the object which causes the existence of the idea; hence the nonexistence of the object does not imply the nonexistence of the idea. Otherwise that which is in potency but not in act would be the cause of that which is in act but not in potency. Thomas believes he has already established (in a. 4) that ideas pertain not only to God's actually practical knowledge but also to His virtually practical knowledge. Of those things which exist in potency only but never in act God has a virtually practical knowledge. Now "God knows things by ideas;" [85] hence there are ideas of these things in Hirn. But there is a crucial difference between such ideas and those which are properly called exemplars. There are determinate exemplars of those things which exist, have existed, or will exist in act. But of those which exist in potency only there are indeterminate ideas, inasmuch as the determination of the divine will to bring them into actual existence is lacking. But an indeterminate idea is an idea of something existing determinately in God's knowledge; [86] for to be in potency is still one mode of being, and to whatever exists-in whatever way-there corresponds a divine idea. Hence there are ideas not only of those things which he actually produces, but also of those which He does not produce although He could, if His will should so determine. For if God did not have ideas of things other than those actually produced by Hirn, it would be false to say that He *could* P:roduce them, since He would lack the requisite knowledge. [87]

Unlike the teaching of Plato, Thornas's doctrine of creation posits a single transcendent Creator-God as the universal cause of that which is, in whatever mode. For this reason it is of critical importance for Thomas to argue that the ideas exist only in the divine intellect, as we have already seen. [88] For the

85 *Ibid.*
86 *Ibid.* ad 1.
87 *Ibid.* ad 3.
88 See above, pp. 199-202.

same reason Thomas must insist that God is directly involved in every case of secondary causation. This position is in contrast to that of Plato who held (in the *Parmenides* rn9 A. *sq.*, 131 C. *sq.)* that ideas are only the remote causes of things: ideas cause substances, in other words, but accidents are caused in turn not by ideas but by the substances themselves. For Thomas, however, it is not only the first creature (i.e., substance) but also the subsequent being (i.e., accident) that is caused by God according to a specific exemplar. Thus there a.re ideas of accidents as well as of substa.nces.[89] Otherwise there would be something (i.e., accidents) which exists but of which God is not the cause. Such an inference is excluded by the claim that God is the uncaused Cause of all that is. But there are differences among the ways in which the ideas of different kinds of accidents exist in God. "Proper accidents" are those which cannot be conceived as existing apart from their subjects. Since by definition an exemplar is the pattern of something which can be brought into existence, such an accident can have no separate exemplar. "There will be only one idea, that of the subject with all its accidents . . . . " [90] To call an accident proper, however, is to posit a relation between the accident and a particular kind of informed substance, but not between the accident and substance as such. On the other hand, there are accidents which are not proper in this sense; such accidents are separable from their subjects and in no way included in their subjects' definition. Improper accidents are caused by an operation distinct from that by which their subjects are brought into existence. Rationality is a proper accident of every man as man: that a certain man happens to be a grammarian is an improper accident. Since improper accidents are brought into existence by a separate creative act, it follows that there is separate exemplar corresponding to each of them. But as a likeness, though not as an exemplar, there is an idea corresponding even to proper accidents. In respect

89 *Dever.* q. 3, a. 7.
90 *Ibid.*

to their intelligibility, all accidents no less than substances have distinct ideas; in respect to their creation, however, substances have distinct ideas while proper accidents are included in the exemplars of particular subjects.

In the final article of *De veritate,* q. 3, St. Thomas argues that just as God creates accidents as well as substances, so does He create individuals as well as their species. Here again Thomas's insistence on the doctrine of God's universal causality forces him to diverge from Plato's doctrine of ideas *(cf.* the *Parmenides* 13lb *sq.,* 134 d.). Thomas observes that Plato viewed the ideas as co-creators (with prime matter) of all elements; *i.e.,* individuation is accomplished in matter whereas the form (idea) of anything so individuated pertains to its species. " Consequently his ideas did not correspond to a singular insofar as it is singular but only by reason of its species." [91] Such a position is unacceptable to Thomas because it has the effect of constricting the scope of God's direct causality. In Thomas's view God is the cause of every existent. It follows that there are in God ideas (exemplars) of singulars. As *exemplar* there is only one idea for the singular and its species: "... Socrates the man and Socrates the animal do not have separate acts of existence;" [92] there are therefore not two separate exemplars in this case. But as the principle of intelligibility ("likeness", "intelligible species"), there can be many ideas of the same thing, since it can be considered under a number of different aspects. [93] It is crucial to Thomas's argument, however, that at least one exemplar be posited for each singular, for only in this way can he defend the claim that there is nothing whose existence falls beyond the scope of God's creative intention and causality. [94]

91 *lbid.,* a. 8.

92[bid.

93 *Jbid.,* ad 2.

94 *lbid.,* a. 8. We ... assert that God is the cause of singulars, both of their form and of their matter. We also assert that all individuals are determined by His divine providence."

C. *The Sum1na Contra Gentiles* (rn61-64)

It is in the *Summa Contra Gentiles* (I, 53-54) that one comes to sense most clearly that the doctrine of divine ideas is logically peripheral to Thomas's treatment of the question of God's knowledge. In the *I Sent.* (dd. 35-36.), the *De veritatJe* (qq. Q-3) and the *Summa theologiae* (Ia, qq. 14-15), the treatment of divine ideas follows the discussion of God's knowledge. But in the first book of the *Summa Contra Gentiles,* as Geiger observes, the materials in chapters 44-77 (with the exception of chapters 60-62) form a unity in which divine ideas are treated in the context of a larger discussion of God's knowledge.[95] The function of the doctrine of divine ideas, then, is clearly not primarily epistemological.[96]

The task that Thomas sets for himself in the *Summa Contra Gentiles* (I, 51-52) is to explain the multiplicity of the objects of God's knowledge without compromising His simplicity. Among several options which Thomas is at pains to exclude is the Platonic doctrine of subsistent ideas apart from the Creator's intellect. Such a position, Thomas senses, has the effect of introducing some degree of imperfection and passivity into the act of God's intellect, hence into the divine essence itself. In the case of human knowledge, the "understood intention" is "the term, so to speak, of the intellectual operation: "[97] the *intentio* is not just the *quo* but also in some sense the *quod* of the act. In the analogy between divine and human knowledge at this point, Thomas sees a possible solution to the problem.

> On the other hand the divine intellect understands by no species other than His essence.... And yet His essence is the likeness of all things. Therefore it follows f.rom this that the concept of the divine intellect, according as He understands Himself, which con-

[95] Geiger, "Les Idees Divines," *op. cit.*, p. 198. "Aucun chapitre, traitant des idees divines ne vient le completer. Cependant il n'est pas difficile de voir que les chapitres 51-54 forment un bloc qui interrompt l'expose."

[96] See below, p. 218-19 *sq.*

[97] *O. G.* I, pp. 37 ff.

cept is His Word, is the likeness not only of God Himself understood, but also of all things of which the divine essence is the likeness. Accordingly many things can be understood by God, by one intelligible species, which is the divine essence, and by one intention, which is the divine Word.[98]

The divine act of understanding takes place by means of the *Verbum* produced by the Knower and identical with Him. In this way Thomas believes it is possible to affirm that, as Geiger puts it, "... if we distinguish between the intelligible species and the produced word, a multiplicity of objects known does not logically entail a composition in the divine intellect." [99]

D. *Summa theologiae, Prima Pars* (1266-68)

As befits a " summary ", Thomas treats divine ideas far less extensively in the *Summa theologiae* than in the *De veritate.* It would be rash to say that Thomas breaks new ground here, but a number of themes adumbrated in his earlier works receive special emphasis in the *Summa theologiae.* (a) The ideas of things are immanent in their Creator.[100] It is only in an intellect that an idea can exist and be known at all. Thus ideas, which exist only to the extent that they are known, exist only in the intellect. Hence, while transcending the phenomenal world, the divine ideas do not transcend God or have any existence apart from the divine intellect. (b) God knows the ideas of things precisely in knowing Himself. Thus the ideas are identical with the divine essence. (Thomas prefaces q. 15, a. 2 with a citation from Augustine's *Eighty-three Questions* in which divine ideas are described in terms which are normally reserved for God Himself.) For Thomas is aware that to posit ideas subsisting apart from God would be, in effect, to imply a second Creator-God. (c) Here as elsewhere, Thomas is concerned to show that the multiplicity of ideas in God does not disturb the divine simplicity. To this end he argues that there

98 *[bid.*
99 Geiger, "Les Idees Divines," *op. cit.,* p. 201.
100 *S.T.* Ia, q. 15, a. 1, ad 3.

is a single intelligible species *(i.e.,* His own essence) by which God understands a.II things; therefore the act of the divine intellect, which is identical with the divine essence,[101] is not conditioned or determined by any plurality of intelligible species. (d) On the other hand, to affirm that God has perfect knowledge of His own essence implies a multiplicity of ideas. For to know a thing perfectly is to know it in the full range of its modes of intelligibility. Hence God knows His own essence "... not only as it is in itself, but as it can be participated in by creatures ..." [102] But the way in which a creature participates in the divine essence is precisely its proper form or idea. Thus in knowing Himself as infinitely imitable, God knows His essence as the prime Exemplar of all actual or possible existents.

Aside from these emphases, the argument in the *Summa theologia·e* generally follows the contours of the arguments sketched in greater detail in the *De veritate.*

III

The notion of multiple ideas in an absolutely simple God posed a logical problem which Thomas (and especially his scholastic successors) had to address. If, as Thomas affirms, the one divine essence is itself the Idea of all created things, why is it necessary to speak of *ideas?* Thomas himself seems uneasy at this point. Much of Thomas's discussion of exemplarism centers in an attempt to avoid the anthropomorphism implicit in the "artisan" analogy. To this end he repeatedly underlines the contrast between the ways in which such language is predicable of divine and human subjects.[103] We have already noted a number of points at which Thomas seems clearly aware of the metaphorical character of language which posits a plurality of ideas in God.[104] The plurality of

[101] *Ibid.,* q. 14, a. 4.

[102] *Ibid.,* q. 15, a. 2.

[103] As Pinard puts it, "Pour eviter de tomber dans l'anthropomorphisme, il convient de se rappeller sans cesse les corrections que reclame la simplicite parfaite de l'etre infini." "Creation," *op. cit.,* p. 2155.

[104] *Fl.g.,* see above, pp. 205-206, 208.

divine ideas is not a plurality within the divine essence as such; it is rather a function of the divine essence considered in a certain way, *viz.*, as imitable by creatures. Thus, as D'Arey puts it, " If the argument sounds anthropomorphic, it should be remembered that the description is only analogic, and that St. Thomas corrects the conclusion. For the moment he is pressing the Platonic tradition as far as he can. When he deals expressly with God's essence, he argues that this idea in God is his essence in act." [105] F. C. Copleston is undoubtedly correct in arguing that" ... Aquinas was well aware that to speak of 'ideas ' in God is to speak anthropomorphically and that there is no objective distinction between the divine ideas and the divine being." [106] Yet, as we have seen, Aquinas goes to great lengths to establish the claim that it is proper to speak of more ideas than one. In doing so he is forced to confront two problems which arise with special urgency. First, how can God be held to know many objects without positing in God multiple principles of intellection? Thomas's vehicle for addressing this question is the notion 0£ God's self-knowledge (in His Verbum) as infinitely imitable by creatures. Secondly, how can there be a multiplicity of the objects of God's creative act of understanding without multiple principles of actualization? Thomas deals with this difficulty by distinguishing between the divine essence as an object of God's knowledge and the divine essence as the " actualizing form " of all things external to Himself.[107]

The same thing is not true of ideas and essential attributes. In their principal meaning, the essential attributes do not signify anything more than the essence of the Creator. Hence, strictly speaking, they are not plural. ... An idea, however, in its principal meaning signifies something other than God's essence, namely, the proportion a creature has to His essence.... Because of this there are

105 M. C. D'Arcy, *Saint Thomas Aquinas* (London: Clonmore and Reynolds, Ltd., 1953), p. 103.

106 F. C. Copleston, *Aquinas* (Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books 1955), p. 98.

101 Geiger, "Les Id·ees Divines," *op. cit.*, pp. 202-203.

said to be many ideas. Nevertheless, the ideas may be called essential attributes inasmuch as they are related to the essence.[108]

The multiplicity of ideas, then, is logical rather than ontological. Thomas explicitly acknowledges that objectively there is but a single idea-the divine essence itself (*S.T.* I, q. 44, a. 3). But, as A. Krempel observes, Thomas insists that it is still appropriate to speak of divine *ideas* because "... logically we may ascribe to God innumerable ideas insofar as there are created entities imitating his essence in such or such a manner, relating to it as to their model." [109] Thus the multiplicity of divine ideas is a function of the aspect under which the absolutely simple divine essence is considered.[110] As early as the composition of *I Sent.,* Thomas sought to establish the multiplicity of ideas in the distinction between the divine essence as essence and the divine essence known as imitable. But by the time of the composition of the *De veritate,* Thomas was beginning to see that it was necessary to speak of ideas as " actualizing forms" (i.e., exemplars of things.) [111] Thus the distinction between the ideas as the principle and as the object of the act of understanding, which is adumbrated in the *De veritate,* becomes crucial to the whole discussion in the *Contra gentiles* and thereafter. It is, in fact, the basis of Thomas's ultimate solution to the problem of reconciling the plurality of ideas with the doctrine of divine simplicity.[112] Lonergan's comment

1osDe Ver., q. 3, a. 2, ad 2.

109 A. Krempel, *La Doctrine de la Relation chez Saint Thomas* (Paris: Librairie Philosophique, 1952), p. 419.

110 *Ibid.,* p. 420. "Comme le dit assez l'adverbe: logiquement, ces idees innombrables ne sont rien d'autre que des relations logiques (necessaires), attribuees a Dieu en echo aux innombrables relations reelles d'imitation qui vont de nous a lui."

111 Geiger," Les Idees Divines," *op. cit.,* p. 207.

112 Pinard, "Creation,' *op. cit.,* p. 2160. *Of.* Gianni Baget-Bozzo, "La Teologia Delle Idee Divine in San Tommaso " in *Revista di Filosofia Neo-Scholastica,* Anno LXVI, Fascicolo II-IV (Aprile-Decembre, 1974), p. 307: "L'essenza divina e in se infinitamente imitabile: tuttavia l'atto dell' intelletto divino specifica 1) infinita "possibilita" dell' imitazione. E per l'atto dell' intelletto divino che nella semplicita della divina essenza, si produce una pluralita in atto." Cf. Pinard, *op. cit.,* p. 2160: "Le terme de l'acte est multiple, l'acte lui-meme est simple .... "

is worth quoting: " The plurality of divine ideas within divine simplicity is accounted for by an infinite act of understanding grasping as secondary objects the perfections eminently contained in the divine essence and virtually in divine omnipotence. As we can understand *multa per unum,* all the more so can God." [113]

After indicating the way in which the doctrine holds together internally, one must still confront the larger question of its function in Thoma.s's system. Undeniably there is a certain awkwardness about the place of the doctrine of divine ideas in the Thomistic synthesis. Thomas rejects the Platonic and Augustinian theories of the role of ideas in human cognition but insists on retaining the term " ideas " while remolding its content to meet the specifications of his own system.[114] Henle is perhaps only noting the obvious when he states that the doctrine of divine ideas is the point at which a. Platonic influence is most apparent in the thought of Aquinas.[115] On the other hand, however, Henle is himself perfectly aware of the contrast between Plato's doctrine of ideas and that of Aquinas.[116] For Plato, the ideas are subsistent and distinct from one another as separate entities, whereas for Thomas they exist only in the divine intellect and are not entities at all but are rather the different ways in which God knows His own essence as imitable. Plato envisions ideas of universals, whereas Thomas claims that there are ideas of both universals and individuals. Furthermore, the divine ideas do not function in Thomas's system as the objects or norms of human knowledge, whereas the transcendent ideas are crucial to Plato's epistemology as a whole.[117] Yet Thomas is unwilling simply to discard the philosophical idiom which comes to him largely from a tradition which, on this point, at lea.st, inclines in directions

11s Bernard J. Lonergan, *Verbum* (South Bend, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), p. 196.

114 Geiger, " Les Idees Divines," *op. cit.,* p. 176.

115 Henle, *Saint Thomas and Platonism, op. cit.,* p. 358.

11a *fbid.,* p. 361.

111 Geiger," Les Idees Divines," *op. cit.,* p. 179.

that are inconsistent with the general thrust of his own thought. The question, then, is why Thomas considers the doctrine important. Why can he not simply pass it by in silence?

The fact that Thomas is able to delineate a doctrine of divine knowledge in which the ideas play only a peripheral role (in the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, I, 44-71) suggests the basis on which a number of scholars have come to regard the doctrine of divine ideas as a mere appendage which serves no real purpose in Thomas's system. Thus A. Krempel implies that Thomas felt constrained to treat the divine ideas mainly because Plato and Augustine took them so seriously.[118] Gilson argues that Thomas's doctrine of divine ideas is largely a concession to the authority of the theological tradition.[119] Noting the awkwardness of the doctrine in the treatment of the total problem of God's knowledge, Henle draws much the same conclusion:

> *No new development in the substance of the doctrine* appears within these questions dealing with divine ideas. The substantial doctrine has already been established and everything proceeds as if Saint Thomas were occupied in finding, within his own doctrine, analogues for the Ideas as presented to him by the Christian as well as the philosophical tradition. This is confirmed by the fact that in the *Contra Gentiles* (where the discussion-significantly- is not developed in function of *auctoritates)* the entire doctrine is worked out with hardly a mention of the word ' idea.' The question deals, therefore, not so much with the development of a theory or the incorporation of a doctrine as with the incorporation and determination of a tradition of *auctoritates.*[120]

Perhaps, then, it was because of his respect for the tradition that Thomas felt obliged to take up the topic in the first place.

[118] Krempel, *La Doctrine ae la Relation, op. cit.,* p. 419.

[119] Etienne Gilson, *Introduction a la philosophie clwetienne,* pp. 173-174, cited in Geiger, " Les Idees Divines," *op. cit.,* p. 178. "... il est a peine exagere de dire qu'au fond, tout ce que S. Thomas a dit des Idees etait dans son esprit une concession de plus faites au langage d'une philosophie qui n'etait pas vraiment la sienne. C'etait aussi, n'en doutons pas, la reconnaissance de l'autorite theologique de Saint Augustin."

[120] Henle, *Saint Thomas and Platonism, op. cit.,* p. 359.

Having done so, however, he used the material as a way of dealing with several concerns integral to his own theological-philosophical enterprise. Corresponding to the distinction between idea as *exemplar* and as *ratio-the* principle of production or of intelligibility, respectively-is the twofold function of the doctrine of divine ideas in T:Q.omas's system. (a) Epistemologically, the doctrine helps to explain how God can have knowledge of beings other than Himself.[121] Lonergan puts the matter quite precisely: "If divine self-knowledge has no need of an inner word, as far as natural theology goes, because the knowing is pure understanding and the known is simply intelligible and knowledge is by identity, still divine knowledge of the other seems to require an inner word. For the other is not simply intelligible, nor always in act, nor identical with the knower." [122] (The association of divine ideas with the notion of " an inner word " is suggestive. The relation of the ideas to the Verbum bridges the gap between the epistemological and metaphysical functions of the doctrine.) [123]

(b) But if God's ideas cause their objects, and not *vice versa*, then the objects and principles of God's knowledge are crucial to any thorough metaphysics. Lonergan summarizes the ontological import of the doctrine as follows: "... the intelligibility of natural process is imposed from without; natures act intelligibly, not because they are intelligent, for they are not, but because they are concretions of divine ideas and a divine plan." [124] Equally important, as a kind of prolegomenon to any natural theology, the doctrine that the world is somehow a copy-however faint or defective-of its Exemplar, the divine essence, authenticates a theological method which

121 Geiger, "Les Idees Divines," *op. cit.*, p. 183. In sharp contrast to Aristotle's God, as Geiger notes, "Un Dieu createur ... qui produit l'univers en fonction d'une conception qu'il s'en fait, dans son ensemble comme dans le detail, et qui le produit librement, doit posseder en lui-meme les formes des etres qu'il cree, s'il est vrai que l'intellect ne connait que les objets dont il possMe la similitude."

122 Lonergan, *Verbum, op. cit.*, p. 194.

123 See below, p. 221-222.

124 Lonergan, *Verbum, op. cit.*, p. 7.

begins with nature rather than with special revelation. As Klubertanz has shown,[125] the notion of the exemplarity of the divine essence provides one of the principal rubrics under which Thomas develops his doctrine of the analogy between God and the world.

(c) Finally, one can hardly overlook the connection between the doctrine of divine exemplarism and Thomas's Trinitarian theology. In the early commentary on the first book of the *Sentences,* Thomas associates himself with Augustine's dictum: "He who denies that there are ideas denies the Son."[126] Thus the doctrine of divine ideas is grounded in Christ's role as the Word of the Father. In q. 4, a. 4 of the *De ventate,* Thomas implies that the divine ideas are in the Word who is the second Person of the Trinity .[121] For the Word is related to creatures as well as to the Father:[128] the Word who expresses the character of divinity is equally the exemplar of all creation. The importance of such a doctrine as a ha.sis for natural theology can hardly be exaggerated. The Word is related both to the natural and to the supernatural in such a way that He becomes the hermeneutic by which the world can be read as a witness to God.

JOHN L. FARTHING

Hendrix OoUege
Conway, Arkansas

125 George P. Klubertanz, *St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy* (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1960) pp. 26-27, 48-55, 64, 127-128.

12s Augustine, *Eighty-Three Different Questions,* q. 46, as cited by Thomas in *I Sent.,* d. 36, q. 2, a. 1. "Qui negat ideas esse, negat Filium."

121 "However, for the divine Word to be perfect, it must express whatever is contained in that from which it had its origin. . . . Consequently whatever is contained in the Father's knowledge is necessarily and entirely expressed by His only Word . . . . " *De Ver.,* q. 4, a 4; " . . . if likeness is taken in its broader meaning, then we can say that the Word is a likeness of creatures, but in the sense that it is their archetype." *Ibid.,* ad 2.

128 *Of. S.T.* I a, q. 34, a. 3.

THE MEANING OF PROPORTIONATE REASON IN CONTEMPORARY MORAL THEOLOGY

IN CURRENT DEBATES in Roman Catholic moral theology much attention has been given to certain teleological theories commonly called "proportionalism." The topic has been the subject of an already extensive literature and scarcely needs further introduction. [1] In a recent overview of the controversy, Philip S. Keane indicates that a key issue in these debates is the exact meaning of " proportionate reason." [2] The aim of this essay is to seek to clarify that notion. Such an undertaking presents difficulties as the notion can be discussed adequately only within the context of a wider theory of morality. Some indication of the wider context will have to be given if the function of the concept is to be explained. But the principal focus will be on this specific point. Since the debate is extremely complex and is still in progress, this effort at clarification can be only tentative and provisional. [3]

1 Some more recent accounts of the contemporary debate are: Lisa Sowle Cahill, " Teleology, Utilitarianism, and Christian Ethics," *Theological Studies* 42 (1981) :601-629; Philip S. Keane S.S., "The Objective Moral Order: Reflections on Recent Research," *Theological Studies* 43 (1982) :260-278. Both articles provide extensive bibliography.

A further bibliography, including European contributions, is given in Peter Knauer, S.J., "Fundamentalethik: Teleologische als deontologische Normenbegruendung," *Theologie und Philosophie* 55 (1980) :321-360. Two further critiques not mentioned here are: Servais Pinkaers, O.P., "La question des actes intrinsequement mauvais et le ' proportionalisme '," *Revue Thomiste* 82 (1982) :181-212; Theo G. Belmans, 0. Praem., "Saint Thomas et la notion de 'moindre mal moral '," *Revue Thomiste* 83 (1983) :40-57..

2 Keane, "The Objective Moral Order," p. 271.

·writing in 1977, Richard A. McCormick, S.J., noted that there were "serious and unresolved theoretical problems involved in the use of such terms as " the lesser evil" and " proportionate reason." See *Nates on Moral Theology: 1965 through 1980* (Washington, D.C., University Press of America, 1981), p. 647. These problems have not yet been solved.

s It would be most fruitful to explore the relationships between the debates within Roman Catholic moral theology and other ethical theories. See *Doing*

Proportion of Act to End and Proportionate Reason

The notion of proportionate reason has been linked with St. Thomas Aquinas's discussion of the morality of self-defense and with the modern formulation of the principle of the double effect, especially the fourth requirement. [4]

Evil to Achieve Good: Moral Ghoioe in Oonfiiot Situations, ed. by Richard A. McCormick, S.J. and Paul Ramsey (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1978), especially the articles by Paul Ramsey and William Frankena, pp. 69-144; 145-165. However, the issues within the Roman Catholic context are so complex that they need to be clarified before this further task can be undertaken.

[4] See S.Th., II-II, Q. 64, a.7 in corp.

The structure of St. Thomas's argument is as follows:

"It must be said that nothing prevents that from one act there be two effects, only one of which is in the intention, and the other outside *(praeter)* the intention.

"But moral acts receive their species from what is intended, not from what is outside the intention, since the latter is accidental as is clear from what has been said above.

"Therefore from the act of someone's defending himself a double effect can follow: One is the preservation of his own life; the other is the killing of the attacker.

"An act of this kind, by reason of the fact that what is intended is the conservation of one's own life, does not have the character of the unlawful, since it is natural for everyone to conserve himself in being so far as he can.

"But some act which proceeds from a good intention can be rendered illicit if it is not proportioned to the end.

"Therefore, if some one in defending his own life uses greater violence than is necessary, it will be unlawful. But if he repels the violence with moderation it will be a licit defense ....

"Nor is it necessary to salvation that he omit this act of moderate self-protection in order to avoid the killing of the other, since man is more bound to provide for his own life than for the life of the other."

This last point is omitted by some who have analyzed this text. Peter Knauer, S.J., "The Hermeneutic Function of the Principle of Double Effect." in *Readings in Moral Theology No. 1. Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition,* ed. by Charles E. Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1979) : 1-39, 3, omits it altogether. Belmans, "Saint Thomas et la notion de 'moindre mal moral'," gives it a brief mention without attaching any special significance to it.

Cf. John R. Connery, S.J., "The Teleology of Proportionate Reason," *Theological Studies* 44 (1983) :489-496, 489. The author states: "St. Thomas argued that the intention of self-defense would justify killing." This is not

In the text of St. Thomas we find the statement that " Some act which proceeds from a good intention can be rendered illicit if it is not proportioned to the end." The modern formula is usually expressed in such terms as: "That there be a proportionately grave reason for permitting the evil effect." Peter Knauer notes that the modern formulation of the PDE differs in more than one respect from that of St. Thomas. St. Thomas required that the act be proportioned to the end. The modern formula requires a " commensurate reason" or " proportionate reason." He argues, however, that if properly understood, the formula " commensurate reason " means the same as the earlier formula. [5]

It is not immediately evident that the two formulas mean the same thing. One is concerned with the relation of the act to the end; the other with a proportionate (commensurate)

quite correct. St. Thomas does not reach a final judgment on the justification of the killing solely on the grounds of this intention, but only after he has applied the principle of preference relating providing for one's life and for the other's.

According to William Daniel, S.J., "Double Effect and Resisting Evil," *Australasian Oatholio Reaord* 56 (1979) :377-387, 380, this point plays a significant part in the structure of the argument. It functions as a limit 011 what could be construed as a potentially anarchical element in the doctrine of intention.

There are variations among the wa.ys in which different authors express the requirements of the principle of the double effect. A common formulation would be the following:

(1) that the action in itself from its very object be good or at least indifferent;

(2) that the good effect and not the evil effect be i11tended;

(3) that the good effect be not produced by means of the evil effect;

(4) that there be a proportionately grave reason for permitting the evil effect.

See Joseph T. Mangan, S.J., "An Historical Analysis of the Principle of Double Effect," *Theologiaal Studies* 10 (1949) :41-61, 43. The principle will be referred to henceforth as PDE.

5 Peter Knauer, "The Hermeneutical Function," p. 6. In abandoning (1) he disagrees with Louis Janssens, "Ontic Evil and Moral Evil," *Louvain Studies* 4 (1972) :115-65, 142 (also in *Readings* No. 1). This English translation first appeared in *Natural Law Forum* 12 (1967). The German version is "Das rechtverstandene Prinzip von der Doppelwirkung als Grundnorm jeder Gewissensentscheidung," *Theologie und Glaube* 57 (1967) : 107-133.

reason, i.e., commensurate to the evil effect. However, there is one point on which the formula of St. Thomas and the modern formula agree; both require that a number of criteria. be satisfied before a final judgment can be made concerning the moral licitness of placing the act. For St. Thomas, questions concerning the end, the structure of the act, the relation of the intention to the evil effect, the order of preference between providing for the one's own life and for the life of the other, have to be answered.[6] In the modern formula the first three requirements have to be satisfied in addition to the fourth. For both, the earlier steps in the argument are necessary, but not sufficient to answer the question: may the act be done?

Nor is it evident that Knauer's "rightly understood" revision means the same as either of the earlier versions. Knauer's interpretation seems to be that the first three conditions are not normative and that the fourth " correctly understood" is *alone* decisive.[7]

Three Meanings and Functions of Proportion

There appear to be at least three different meanings of proportion represented in these accounts. They can be distinguished by asking what are the terms compared (i.e., what is proportional to what?) and what is the function of proportion in the argument?

In the modern version of the **PDE** the terms compared are

[6] A complete account would call for an investigation of the complex question of " direct" and " indirect" intention. Cf. Franz Scholz, *Wege, Umwege und Auswege der Moraltheologie: Ein Plaedoyer fuer begruendete Ausnahmen* (Munich: Don Bosco Verlag, 1976), p. ll8. To keep to the specific subject of "proportion" this issue will not be discussed at any length.

[7] This is the way in which he has been interpreted by Franz Scholz. See Scholz, *Wege,* p. 123. In his recent writing on the subject Knauer explicitly states that he intends to reduce the two criteria, (1) the value pursued must itself be correct (*riohtig)* and (2) the means must be proportioned to the end, to one criterion, namely a particular interpretation of proportion. See Knauer," Fundamentalethik," p. 329, note 10.

effect and effect.[8] The good effect is compared with the bad effect in order to establish the presence or absence of proportion. The presence or absence of proportion then provides an answer to the question: is there a proportionate reason for permitting the evil effect? In this version the act is defined in terms of its object and thus is considered as distinct from the effects. Thus, in this way of structuring the argument, it is necessary to prove in the first place that the act, by reason of its object, is morally good or at least indifferent, i.e., not bad " in itself."

In St. Thomas's argument it is the *act* which is compared to the *end.* In this version the act is also defined as distinct from the effects. However, the first question asked by St. Thomas is not precisely whether the act, by reason of its object, is evil in itself. Rather he asks what is the end of the act, i.e., what is the end which gives the species or morally relevant meaning to the act? He then asks whether acts which have this particular meaning (self-conserving acts) are illicit. To answer this question he refers to the natural tendency to conserve oneself in existence and on that basis gives his answer: acts which have this meaning are not illicit on this score.[9] If the act is not proportioned to this end, it *can* (pos-

s Cf. N. Hendricks, O.S.B., "La contraception artificielle: Conflit de devoirs ou acte a double effet?" *Nouvelle Revue TMologique* 104 (1982) :396-413, 401.

The author notes that the manualist tradition solved such conflicts by means of a comparison of values in conflict, i.e., in terms of the effects that the act or omission would produce. But this teleological solution was limited by the principle that the end does not justify the means, i.e., it was necessary to determine whether the means were morally right or wrong "in themselves."

9 Is this a reference to the "natural law?" Knauer states that St. Thomas here does not use the criterion of " correspon(lence to nature." See " The Hermeneutic Function," p. 4. Others, however, would not agree. See Charles Robert, "La situation de 'conflit ', un theme dangereux de Ia theologie morale d'aujourdhui," *Revue des Sciences Religieuses* 44 (1970) :190-213, 196. This author interprets St. Thomas as arguing "since anything at all in virtue of a fundamental natural law ought to conserve itself in existence." This seems more in keeping with the obvious sense of the text. Knauer's elimination of the criterion of the natural law would be consistent with

sit) be illicit. It is not illicit precisely because it is disproportionate. That is, disproportionality as such is not the criterion of moral wrongness. Why is it illicit? It would seem that the reason is this: because of the excessive violence used it is not proportioned to the end, therefore, it cannot be subsumed under the moral meaning of the end (self-conservation). It then takes on a distinct meaning of its own. This meaning is taken from that to which the act is directed, namely harm (lethal harm) to the other. The act is, in its inherent meaning, an attack on the other. The lethal harming (the killing) is now the meaning-giving, willed object. Thus, here, proportion is construed in terms of the moral meaning of the acts involved.

In the modern version of the PDE the presence of proportion between the effects is required as providing a reason for permitting the evil effect. In this argument it is assumed that, even though the evil effect is not directly intended, the causing of that effect is not thereby justified. To permit has the meaning: not to choose to avoid or prevent something when one can. The question then is: is the agent (defender) obliged to prevent this effect? The answer is provided by the presence or absence of a proportionately grave reason. If there is such a reason, the permitting can be justified.

In St. Thomas's account the lack of proportion relates to the meaning of the act. Then he asks the further question: Granted that act is not illicit on any of the grounds so far discussed, is it nevertheless illicit on the grounds that it causes the death of the other? The precise question he poses is: is it morally obligatory (necessary to salvation) to omit the act in order to avoid the killing of the other? He does not formulate his answer in terms of proportion, but rather in terms of a

tion of all the traditional criteria to one, namely proportionality. St. Thomas admittedly does not invoke "conformity to nature" as the immediate moral criterion by which the act is judged morally licit or not. Nevertheless the criterion of "nature " or "natural law" in some form has a necessary role in the argument. It is because the end (self-conservation) when referred to the rule of reason as grasped in the "natural law" is a valid human end that acts deriving their meaning from this end are not illicit, by reason of this meaning:·

principle of preference. Thus he answers: no, one is not obliged to prefer the life of the other to one's own.

The concept of proportion has a different function in St. Thomas's argument from that which it has in the modern version of the PDE. Is this merely a verbal difference in the sense that, while St. Thomas does not use the word " proportion " to articulate his principle of preference, he might well have done so without any essential change in the structure of the argument? Could we say then that" saving one's own life" is a proportionate reason for not avoiding the killing of the other? This question raises another issue which may constitute a significant difference between the various accounts of proportion. So far I have followed through two questions: (a) what is compared with what in the assessment of proportion? (b) what is the function of proportion in the respective arguments? The question which must be asked now is, how, or within what context is the comparison made?

If the comparison is made in terms of some kind of measuring of good and/or evil, or measuring of values, then the comparison in this case would presumably take the form: preserving my life is a " greater good " than preserving the life of •the other, or the death of the other is a " lesser evil " than the loss of my own life, or my life is more valuable than the life of the other.[10] It is hard to see what precisely would be the grounds for such assertions. St. Thomas's principle of preference is not based on such considerations. Presumably, his statement that one is more bound to provide for one's own life than for the life of another would be defended in terms of his explanation of the" order of charity." [11] He explains that there is an order or priority among those things or persons to be loved. This is founded not on a purely subjective preference, but on an objective reality, namely the participation of these things or per-

[10] Knauer specifically and correctly rejects any such quantitative comparison. "Such a quantitative comparison is not possible as it is a matter of qualitatively different values which cannot be compared with one another." See " The Hermeneutic Function," p. 11.

[11] S. Th. II-II, Q. 26, a. 4.

sons in the divine goodness that is the foundation of the love of charity. A man loves himself in charity accordingly as he participates in this goodness; the neighbor is loved by reason of association in this goodness. This difference grounds a legitimate preference for the self. One may want to disagree with this argument. But the nature of the argument is clear; it is a moral argument constructed in terms of the requirements of the virtue of charity. It is not based on a simple measuring of goods and evils against each other, but on the relationship of acts and ends to the moral rule of charity. If St. Thomas had used the word "proportion" here, he might have said that the act is duly proportioned to the virtue of charity.

In some of the more recent formulations, the act is defined so as to include all its effects (or aspects). Thus, the clear distinction between object and effect is lost.[12] Then this total act, or the act in its totality, is compared to the end. This is conceptualized in terms of the proportion of act to end. But these terms have a different meaning. The notion has also a different function in the argument. If there is a proportionate reason in this sense, then the act which causes the evil is morally right.[13] The other questions, either those asked by St. Thomas, or those posed by the modern formula, no longer have a necessary role in the argument.

In a recent commentary on the controversies which these developments have occasioned, Richard A. McCormick, S.J.,

12 This obscuring or neglect of the distinction between object and effect is one of the points of criticism brought against proportionalists by Belmans, " Saint Thomas," p. 44. There are grounds for this. The distinction is at least obscured in the thesis which Knauer sets out to prove, namely that the relationship of the act to its consequences is an inner determination of the act itself. See " Fundamentalethik," p. 321.

Cf. Albert Di Ianni, S.M., "The Direct/Indirect Distinction in Morals," in *Readings,* p. 216. The author explains the reasons for this move. The authors prefer to treat the act or means as a constitutive part or stage of a larger whole. This whole is the primary object of one's intention and thus is the only true unit of moral significance. The *em objecto* evil of an act prior to consideration of any circumstance or intention has led, they claim, to conclusions which are too literal or artificial and in some cases erroneous.

13 Knauer, "The Hermeneutical Function," p. 35.

has proposed some further clarifications.[14] He points out that those who espouse teleological tendencies most often interpret the term " consequence " as applying to " the immediate intersubjective implications " of an action. " Thus, by ' consequence ' they mean that the physical reality of killing (death-consequence) can be, as intersubjective reality, murder, waging war, self-defense, the death penalty .... " This does not appear to be quite clear. Is the " consequence " itself the death, the killing or the different meanings which the intersubjective reality assumes? Does consequence mean the same as " effect?" McCormick goes on to say that where " the immediate implications of the action (consequences)-the reason the act was performed-are different ... this difference makes a different action, a different object." [15]

The concept " the reason the act was performed " would seem to ·mean what used to be called the " end." This is identified with the "immediate implications " which were previously equated with the " consequence." Consequence includes both the event (the death), the act which brings about this event (the killing) and the "reason," and all together constitute the new object. What happens here is that "object" is redefined so as to include the act, the end and the consequences. The point being made, if I understand it correctly, is that all these factors are constitutive of the moral meaning of the act.

How, in this framework, would one determine that the reason is proportionate? Presumably one would compare the reason with the death, or the killing, and determine whether good was in preponderance over evil. Suppose we have formed a judgment on this balance. We then have a complex of factors in which good preponderates over evil and this complex is that upon which the will focuses. In this sense then the proportionate reason is part of the object of the act. There are problems

[14] Richard A. McCormick, S.J., "Notes on Moral Theology: 1982," *Theological Studies* 44 (1983) :84.

[15] *Ibid.,* p. 85.

with these changes of terminology .[16] But for our present purpose it is sufficient to establish what proportion means here and how it is assessed.

" Proportion " in most, if not all, versions of the modern formula of the PDE means effect/effect proportion. The proportion between the effects was often interpreted in quantitative terms, such tha.t some kind of mensuration was carried out and a "balance" assessed between the two effects.[17] This quantitative interpretation can be found in the works of Gury who is usually credited with the systematic formulation of the modern theory. [18]

It is this kind of effect/effect proportion, determined by a mensurative comparison between effects which has opened up the possibility of a utilitarian interpretation of the fourth requirement.19

These two features of the fourth requirement: (1) the in-

16 See John R. Connery, S.J., "The Teleology of Proportionate Reason," *Theological Studies* 44 (1983) :489-496.

11 Cf. G. Kelly, S.J., *Medico-Moral Problerns* (St. Louis: Catholic Hospital Association, 1955), p. 14.

18 See Joannes Gury, S.J., *Oornpendiurn Theologiae Moralis,* 4th German edition (Ratisbon: Georg Joseph Manz, 1868), p. 5. On the key role played by Gury, see Mangan, "The Principle," p. 61.

19 Cf. Germain Grisez, *Abortion: The Myths, the Realities, and the Argurnents* (Washington: Corpus Books, 1970), p. 329. In discussing the four conditions for the use of the PDE he says of the last (proportionally grave reason), "The last condition can easily become a field for a covert, although limited utilitarianism." **If** I understand his point correctly, the limit would be set by the first three requirements. Thus, even where the fourth requirement is explained in terms of measuring effect against effect in terms of the greater good and/or lesser evil, the fourth requirement alone did not decide the rightness of wrongness of the act. The first requirement, that the act be not morally wrong in itself, would clearly limit the utilitarian tendency of the requirement. But then, if the first three points are elided, we are left with what seems to be a utilitarian criterion of some kind. This has, of course, been a charge brought against at least some forms of "proportionalism."

Similarly, Albert Di Ianni, S.M., "The Direct/Indirect Distinction," p. 216, writes: "This last condition has little bearing upon ensuring the indirect voluntariety of the act and can be viewed as a teleological or quasi-utilitarian consideration about consequences. **It** concerns more directly the production of the good than the deontological rightness or fittingness of the act."

terpretation of proportion as a comparison between effect (s) and effect (s) and (2) the interpretation of the comparison in terms of some kind of measuring, have been carried over into the contemporary formulations of " proportionalism." However, a further point has been added. In many, if not all, contemporary " proportionalist " theories the terms to be compared are taken to be " premoral" values and disvalues. [20]

Thus, for proportionalists the comparison between the terms is considered as some kind of measuring of premoral factors (e.g., harms-evils, and Some of the most consistent critics of these contemporary theories see two things wrong with this: (I) the measuring of goods (and evils) against (goods and evil), (2) the nonmoral character of the measuring. They would, however, be prepared to accept " proportion" in some sense. [21] In pursuing this investigation into the meaning and function of proportion it will be necessary to discuss the notion of the comparison of effects by measurement.

Proportion as Established by Measurement

There are again at least two problems with this form of comparison; how does one "measure" goods (evils) against goods (evils)? It is not at all clear how this can be done as

20 This would seem to be a generally accepted notion among those who have proposed one or other form of proportionalism. Some use the term "ontic evil." For an account of these notions see Keane, "Objective Moral Order," p. 265.

21 Germain Grisez, for example, while he would accept the fourth requirement of the PDE as valid, rejects any form of mensuration of goodness against goodness. He argues that a comparison between good and evil can be made only if one has a moral standard. He understands the fourth requirement to be "a mere reminder that even if the evil effect is not our direct responsibility, we still have an obligation to avoid it under the general principle that we should avoid evil and prevent it." See "Towards a Consistent Natural-Law Ethics of Kiiling," *American Journal of Jurisprudence* 15 (1970) :64-96, 79. He would prefer "morally acceptable reason" to the term "proportionate reason." See Germain Grisez, ".Against Consequentialism," *American Journal of Jurisprudence* 23 (1978) :27-72, 54. He admits that if an act has two "aspects," one needs a proportionate reason for choosing it.

the debates about utilitarianism have shown. What is the scale by which the measuring is to be done? Secondly, even if goods and evils can be measured against one another, so that we could determine that there is an excess of good over evil, why precisely is this morally relevant? One solution to this problem was proposed by Gury. The explanation he gave was if the good does not cover or elide the evil, there remains an excess of evil. When the will focuses on this, it must then will the evil *per se.*[22]

Gury himself seems to have sensed the inadequacy of this kind of quantification and nuanced his explanation in a later edition. He wrote: " There must be a proportionately serious reason for actuating the cause so that the author of the action would not be obliged by any virtue to omit the action. For natural equity obliges us to avoid evil and prevent harm from coming to our neighbor when we can do so without proportionately serious loss to ourselves." [23] Here he invokes a general moral principle (we are obliged to avoid harm and prevent evil coming to our neighbor) and a principle of preference- when we can do so without serious loss to ourselves. Proportion would then have to be assessed not simply in terms of "' quantities" of good and evil, 'but in relation to the requirements of virtue and in relation to a principle of preference.

In a later edition of Gury's work with corrections and addition by Joannes Ferres, the explanation is modified further. [24] **It** is explained that the harm to be considered is not only that to the agent, but also the common harm of all. But since the obligation to abstain from acting in order to avoid harm to the

22 Joannes Gury S.J., *Compendium Theologiae Moralis,* 4th German edition (Ratisbon: Georg Joseph Manz 1868), p. 5.

He adds a further qualification. "Furthermore, in these cases a more serious reason for acting is necessary the closer the cause is to the evil effect, the more probable it is that the evil effect will follow from the cause, and the less right the author has to perform the action looked at in itself .... "

23 5th German edition (Ratisbon: Georg Joseph Manz, 1874), p. 6.

24 Third Spanish edition (Barcelona: Subirana Brothers, 1906), p. 8, note 4. These changes suggest a certain dissatisfaction with the fourth requirement.

common good would be most onerous, it is sufficient that the avoidance of common harm, which is itself a good, equal the evil which is permitted. Considerations of proximity and probability of the causing must be considered a.s well as rights. Such calculations of proportion remain within the schema of effect-effect proportion but include multiple terms.

If we refer back to the earlier discussions of cases it is evident that the authors were concerned with those kinds of problems where the " effects " were quite specifically identifiable, e.g., "motions of the sensitive appetite," "pollution," "death of a non-ensouled fetus," death of an attacker. [25] ·with such

[25] Connery claims that, in the tradition, *ratio proportionata* was used only for exceptions to affirmative obligations or positive legislation. See Connery, " The Teleology," p. 494.

According to Mangan, a most important link in the historical development leading to a recognition of the PDE as a general principle applicable to the whole field of moral theology was in the treatise "De Peccatis " in the *Oursus Theologious* of the Salmanticenses. Cf. "An Historical Analysis," p. 56. There is indeed a very lengthy discussion, but of a particular subject, namely whether and how the movement of the sensitive appetite and other effects (illicit in themselves) are to be imputed as blameworthy in the application of a free cause, or whether they are excused from malice by reason of the necessity or utility of such a cause. The text available to me was the 9th corrected edition (Paris: Victor Palme; Brussels: G. Lebrocquy 1877), t. 7, Tractatus XIII, Disp. X, Dub. VI, nn. 211-277, pp. 384-420.

However, the nature of the discussion makes it clear that the author considered that the criteria proposed had a wider application.

It is of interest that when the author comes to the issue with which we are concerned here, he discusses it in terms of the obligation to avoid the evil. The obligation ceases when there is "serious necessity" to place the cause on account of the good effect. He confesses, 110wever, that no general rule can be given since in diverse matters we must reason differently, n. 244, p. 401.

In his historical account of the PDE, Ghoos examines the writings of a number of authors up to John of St. Thomas (d. 1644). The issues they addressed were likewise of a very particularized scope. The question of "pollution" is frequently mentioned, but also abortion.

See J. Ghoos, "L'acte a double effet: etude de theologie positive," *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovaniensis* 27 (1951) :30-52. Ghoos himself argues that no general rule for establishing proportion can be given. It can be judged only with reference to particular concrete acts. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

For these authors, the judgment of proportion is a particularized, prudential judgment.

effects as the subject of discussion some kind of argument could be brought forward to establish the presence or absence of proportion. But when the circle of moral relevance is extended to include a much wider range of very different kinds of effects, it seems to be extremely difficult to determine precisely what effects are to be counted in, why they are to be counted in, and how they are to be judged proportionate or not. A similar problem arises in some versions of contemporary theory.

The problem of how to determine proportionality between the effects compared is the most obvious difficulty. This calls for closer analysis. I will single out one problem, namely, the ways in which the comparison between the terms is construed and the notions employed to express the comparison.

Proportion as Established by " Weighing "

One way of explaining the comparison is to designate the terms to be compared as " values " and to express the comparison in terms of weighing. This has been criticized by both supporters and opponents of the method of proportionalism. Among the opponents Germain Grisez has been a consistently forceful critic.[26] His basic criticism is that if goods can be measured (or weighed) in such a way that one could work out which alternative promised the *greater* good, there would be no rational ground for choosing the lesser good. "How could anyone knowingly choose the lesser good? " This would also lead to a denial of freedom " since no one can deliberately prefer the lesser good."

Knauer in his first article on the subject argued against the position that from among several goods one must choose the highest. Against this he maintained that, in the first place, values are often almost incommensurable, and that furthermore this would bring in a danger of rigorism. It would not

[26] See Grisez, "Against Consequentialism," p. 43.
Cf. also John Finnis, *Fundamentals of Ethios* (Georgetown: Georgetown University Press, 1983), p. 89.

admit the distinction between the good and the best. The morality of charity aspires to the perfect by counsel and not by obligation. In the realm of the good it assures full liberty. [27] In his more recent articles he holds to this position and protests strongly that he has held to the principle of the incommensurability of goods and never invoked the theory of the weighing of goods (Gueterabwaegung) .[28] Other authors who support one or other form of " proportionalism " have also expressed criticism. Philip Keane, for example, considers that such " weighing " may be helpful in opening up the question of proportionate reason, but it is not an adequate account of proportion. [29]

" Weighing " then would seem to be an unsatisfactory term for a meaningful comparison. To " weigh" may serve as a metaphor expressing some kind of adjudication, but it is far too imprecise to function adequately in a meaningful ethical analysis.

Proport£on in Terms of a" Hierarchy of Values"

This notion also has its critics. Some challenge the adequacy of the explanations so far proposed by supporters of proportionalism. Lisa Sowle Cahill, for example, is critical of the lack of a sound basis for the hierarchy of values upon which some versions of proportionalism depend. However, she would not reject completely the possibility of establishing such a hierarchy .[30] An example from a more recent article illustrates some of the difficulties. In his in many ways excellent article "Norms and Priorities in a Love Ethics," Louis Janssens dis-

[21] Peter Knauer, S.J., "La determination du bien et du mal moral par le principe du double effet, *Nouvelle Revue Theologique* 87 (1965) :357-376, 367.

[2s] See Knauer, "Fundamentalethik," p. 328, note 9.

[29] Keane, "The Objective Moral Order," p. 267.

[so] Cf. Cahill, " Theology," p. 617. "One pertinent and undeniable shortcoming in McCormick's sort of innovative teleology is that, in the absence of a classical metaphysics and anthropology, it is no mean task to discern and agree upon the precise relations of values in the hierarchy upon which the theory depends."

cusses the case of prisoners of war who took their lives rather than allow themselves to be forced, by the use of truth serum, to reveal secrets to the enemy. He argues, " Their action was (also) morally right because they preferred lesser premoral disvalue (their own death) in order to save higher premoral values (many lives, important military interests) ." [81] Are many lives a higher value simply because they are many? Why are "military interests" a higher value than an individual life? Why is this so? As far as I can see no adequate explanation is given for placing some values " higher " than others. Others question whether a. guiding hierarchy of values can be estab-
at all.[82]

One of the most well-developed critiques of attempts to establish an objective hierarchy of values is that by John Finnis. [33] An objective hierarchy among the "basic" human values is ruled out for a number of reasons: (1) each is equally self-evidently a form of good; none can analytically be reduced to an aspect of the others or to being merely instrumental in the pursuit of others; (3) each one when focused on can be reasonably regarded as the most important. [34]

The first reason does not seem conclusive. Let us suppose that a value were not equally self-evidently a form of good when compared with another value. (Can something be more or less self-evident?) Would that necessarily mean that the first value was somehow lower or less fundamental than the second? Or would it simply mean that the recognition of the first calls for a more complex process of analysis and comparison with other values? What of the second reason: that none can be analytically reduced to an aspect of the others? This would seem to mean that none of the basic values can be de-

81 See Louis Janssens, "Norms and Priorities in a Love Ethics," *Louvain Btu.dies* 6 (1977) :207-238, 215.

32 Garth L. Hallett, *Christian Moral Reasoning: An Analytic Guide* (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), p. 137. However, Hallett himself still bases his theory on a "balancing" of values.

as John Finnis, *Natural Law and Natural Rights* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980)' p. 92.

84 *[bid.*

rived from others of the basic goods. Thus the quality of being 'underived ' applies to each of the basic goods. Other values can be shown to represent or be constituted of some aspects (s) of some or all of them.[35] Thus the concepts which stand for each good or value could be arranged, as it were, in sets or groups beneath the basic values. The basic value which is foundational in each set cannot be derived from any other basic good. The sets could thus not be ordered hierarchically on one sea.le where the principle of order is constituted by derivation. But there would seem to be no reason why one set, with its basic value, might not be " higher " or " lower" than another set with its basic value, if some other scale with a different principle of order could be discovered. It would seem that an adequate principle of order has not yet been discovered. But to demonstrate that the basic values are equally *underived* does not seem to prove that the basic values are equally *valuable.*

The next reason given is that none can be reduced to merely instrumental values in the pursuit of others. Thus the goodness of any particular basic value cannot be defined exclusively as good *for* some other value to be realized. This does not exclude the possibility that the realization of one value may be a necessary condition for the realization of another. What is excluded is that one basic value be *merely* instrumental for the realization of another. This would exclude a hierarchy where the principle of ordering was (mere) instrumentality of some goods in relation to others.

The third reason would seem to have an affinity with the objections to "weighing" raised by Grisez and Knauer. If there were an objective hierarchy of values such that certain values were " higher " than others, then a rational choice would seem to have to be for the higher and not the lower. Finnis argues that one *can reasonably* choose any of the basic goods as most important, i.e., one is not constrained on rational grounds to choose any *one* as the highest. However, Finnis

35 *[bid.*

would grant that there is, and must be, a *subjective* ordering of *priorities* amongst the basic values. By reasonable choice a person makes one or more values more important for him/her.[36] But this does not mean that these values are more important than others in themselves.

There are at least two distinct issues here. The first is whether or not an objective hierarchy of values can be established. Finnis has argued that such a hierarchy cannot be established on the basis of (1) self-evidence, (2) derivation, (3) instrumentality, (4) availability for rational choice. Are there other conceivable bases for a hierarchical order?

The second issue is this: Even if such a hierarchy could be established, how would it function in ethical argument? In the context of the analysis of proportion it would appear that the function would be as follows. We examine the values entailed in the " effects " or consequences of an action. The positive effect is X; the negative (harmful) effect is on Y. If it can be shown that X is a "higher" value than Y, then there is a proportionate reason for sacrificing Y for the sake of attaining X.

In view of the difficulties discussed so far with regard to the lack of a secure foundation for a hierarchy and in relation to the move from a hierarchy to a reasonable, free moral choice, this procedure is open to serious objection. Thus, in the present state of the controversy, proportion has not been adequately explained in terms of a hierarchy of values.

Proportion. Established by " Urgency"

Another proposal takes up the notion of priorities and seeks to establish an order of values on this basis. The key concept here is "urgency." This is linked with a further factor, namely, that the realization of one value may be a necessary condition for the attainment of another value. The term "urgency" occurs frequently in the literature, but is not always explained

[36] *fbid.,* p. 93.

clearly. Some authors, however, have provided a more detailed account. Knauer, for example, states that the " urgency " of a. value means that it comes before other alternatives as the necessary condition for the realization of other values.[37] A similar account of urgency as a basis for value preference has been given by Jean-Marie Aubert.[38]

The examples where this notion is applied are usually "policy " decisions where a planner must give priority or recognize the urgency of, for example, economic sta.bility before cultural development, or a restrained economic growth with attendant restrictions and pain, over quick but ephemeral " boom." Such urgency is meaningful when we are dealing with priorities, i.e., deciding which values to promote first. But it fails to account for obligations which may arise as negative duties from other values. For example, granted that economic stability ought to be given priority over other considerations, it does not thereby justify the denial of freedom or justice for the sake of prosperity. This category may well apply to " policy " decisions establishing priorities, but it does not seem that it can serve as a general theory of value preference.

In the structure of reasoning proper to a policy choice in a situation of limited resources, it would be irrational for example to invest in cultural development before ensuring economic stability. It would be similarly irrational to plan for a rapid, but passing boom rather than for a gradual, painful but enduring program of economic development. But is such a choice *morally wrong* precisely on the grounds of this irrationality? If we adopted a moral theory in which moral right and wrong were determined in terms of the maximum possible net welfare (in the long term) we might attribute moral wrongness to an action on the above grounds. But then those who propose such a theory would have either to explain how their position differs from utilitarianism or else to defend their version

37 Knauer, "La determination," p. 369.

38 Jean Marie Aubert, "Hierarchie de valeurs et histoire," *Revue des Sci-ReZigieuses* 44 (1970) : 5-22.

of utilitarianism. [89] I would suggest that such irrationality is one morally relevant feature of a particular kind of choice. It is not the only morally relevant feature; we would need to include other features such as the apportionment of harms, the range of responsibilities of the policy makers, in other words, considerations of justice.

The Negation of Proportion by" Counterproductivity"

One of the besetting difficulties with an ethical theory based on an assessment of effects of consequences is establishing some kind of reasonable perimeter of relevance. Must we take into account *all* effects? This would make a secure judgment extremely difficult if not impossible. Some principle of selection must operate, some way of picking out what effects are relevant and which are not. But what is this?

One move which might seem to overcome this difficulty is to make the particular value pursued the basis of judgments or relevance. Thus the framework of inquiry is: (I) determine the value pursued, i.e., the end; investigate whether the *way in which* the value is pursued will undermine it in the long run. Knauer frames the question this way: does the damage caused or permitted in pursuing this good in the long run and on the whole destroy that good which the agent seeks in this particular act? [40] This undermining in the long run is considered as a quality of the act and called "counterproductivity." An act is proportioned to this end when it is rightly ordered to this end, not only in a particular way and in the short term, but in the long run and on the whole.[41]

A major difficulty in this approach is evident in a further elaboration of this concept of counterproductivity by Richard McCormick. He explains in an example that robbery is counter-productive because it undermines private property; private

[39] Cf. Charles E. Curran, "Utilitarianism and Contemporary Moral Theology," in *Readings,* pp. 341-362. Cf. also John Finnis, *Fundamentals,* pp. 80-108.

[40] Knauer, "Fundamentalethik," p. 328,

[41] *Ibid.* p. 330.

property is essential for the "overall well-being" of persons; and well-being is, after all, that at which robbery aims.[42] Cahill argues that this translates "the value sought in the act " into so global a notion that it could include any value sacrificed. It amounts to a formal definition of morality .[43]

It is worth examining this latest move by Knauer more closely. First, he identifies the meaning of proportion in St. Thomas as act/end proportion. This is correct. But it is another question as to whether he understands the notion in the same way as does St. Thomas. He argues further that the proper ethical criterion for the moral qualification of the act (in the text of St. Thomas) consists in the act being proportioned to the end.

It is important to establish the context of this argument. Although Knauer uses the terms "act " and " end " he modifies the meaning of the terms. We could say, for example, that a bank robber takes money belonging to others (the object of his act) to enrich himself (end). Or we could say that he seeks " riches " as his end. Knauer insists that the end be taken not as a particular good, these riches for this man, but riches in the universal sense. How does Knauer arrive at this apparently implausible suggestion? It seems that he does so by playing on the words *ratio bani.* We say that an end, as a willable good, has a *ratio bani.* This I take to mean that it has an intelligible ground for its desirability. So we could say that the end sought by the bank robber has as the intelligible ground of its desirability its capacity to enrich. Knauer expresses this abstract notion as " riches." He then turns the abstract concept into a universal, so that it comes to mean riches in general, and then gives it concrete content so that it finally comes to mean riches for " on the whole " and in the long

42 Richard A. McMormick, S.J., "Notes on Moral Theology: 1980,' *Theological Studies* 42 (1981) :89. McCormick thinks that the judgment of counterproductivity is probably made in different ways depending on the issues at stake. This, I think, is correct. But what is the basic common structure of the judgment which justifies the use of the common name?

48 Cahill, "Teleology," p. 621.

run (" auf die Dauer und im Ganzen ") . What is constitutive of moral wrong in the act of bank robbery is that it is " counter-productive," it undermines riches as such.[44]

This interpretation avoids some of the difficulties so far encountered: it does not attempt to weigh values against each other; it does not invoke a hierarchy of values. By focusing on one value it avoids the further problem of lack of a perimeter of relevance limiting the consequences to be assessed. However, Knauer's reasoning seems to lead him back into the same difficulty in another form. If we are required to consider the consequences for riches or welfare in the long term and on the whole, we would be called upon to undertake an extremely complex projection with no clear limits.

There is still the question as to what is being compared here and how the comparison is being made. It seems to me that the terms of the comparison are the long-term consequences of the act and the end sought in the act. The long-term consequences which are taken to be relevant are those only which concern the realization of this particular value, i.e., not all thinkable consequences. What is the primary focus is the *way in which* this value is sought.[45] The precise *ratio maJ,i* (if we may use that expression) is that characteristic of the a.ct by reason of which it threatens the long-term realization of the end sought in the act.[46] An act is to be judged bad, when and only when, it can be shown that it is counterproductive in the long run and on the whole.[47]

What the a.ct ought to aim at as end (in Knauer's rather unusual conceptualization of end) is the long-term total realization of this particular value, i.e., what it ought to produce as long-term consequences. What it does produce as its immediate effect is such as to lead rather to the long-term consequence of the " undermining " of this value. Thus, we are still dealing with a mode of effect/effect proportion. The par-

44 Knauer, "Fundamentalethik," p. 335.

45 *Ibid.,* p. 328.

46 This characteristic Knauer designates as "counterproductivity." *Ibid.,* p. 331.

47 *Ibid.*

ticular characteristic which Knauer attributes to the act itself can only be defined as wrong making on the basis of the comparison between effects which ought to be realized and effects which are (likely to be?) realized.

There is at least one major difficulty which remains. It is this: why precisely is counterproductivity a moral criterion? Knauer insists that it is such; indeed he asserts that it is the *only* criterion.[48] He explains that such counterproductive acts are in themselves "contradictory."[49] This may be the case, but why does that make such acts ethically bad? Indeed it would seem that it is not precisely this feature which is the wrong making characteristic. Knauer falls back on a "total balance," a kind of economic calculation in which, however, one does not seek to maximize the gain under a particular aspect, by achieving the greatest difference between gain and loss at a particular point in time. Rather one seeks to optimize the gain in the long run and on the whole. And it is the introduction of this latter feature that constitutes, according to the author, the calculation an *ethical* calculation.[50]

What does maximizing the gain mean? Knauer appears to mean promoting that state of affairs where all persons in an unlimited range of time will be able to enjoy those values. An act which undermines a value in the long run and on the whole is an act which produces a state of affairs where many (or all?) will be deprived of the possibility of enjoying that value.

But if acting in such a way that many or all will be deprived of the enjoyment of the value is ethically wrong, why is it not also wrong to deprive one person of the enjoyment of the value? How is it that the universal extension of the deprivation establishes moral wrong?[51] What seems to have

48 " Eine Handlung ist nur dann als ethisch schlecht anzusehen wenn sich aufweisen laesst, dass sie 'auf die Dauer und im ganzen kontraproduktiv' ist." *Ibid.,* p. 331.

49 *Ibid.,* p. 333.

50 *Ibid.*

51 To use an example given by Knauer, it seems to me that to rob a bank is morally wrong because it deprives these particular persons of a "value," the good of possessing that money to which they have a claim in justice.

happened here is that Knauer has replaced the reference of the end pursued to the universal law of reason, " the moral law," with a. reference of end or object to the universal realization of this particular value. So the modification ends up being a " balancing " after all, but a balancing on a universal scope. It is not at all clear to me why this constitutes the balancing a moral calculation.

Could we call Knauer's concept a variant of act-end proportion? In a sense this would be possible. However, he defines the inherent meaning of an act in terms of its long-term productivity, i.e., in terms of its consequences. A balancing of consequences or effects remains the central and crucial feature of the assessment of proportion.

If I have understood his position correctly, Knauer is still holding to the effect/effect proportion of the modern version of the PDE, in spite of his subtle modifications. I would propose as a hypothesis that· proportion understood in this way may answer some questions, but tha.t it cannot provide an answer to the question being asked, namely, what is the criterion of ethical wrongness? To try to build a whole moral theory on this notion of proportion seems to me misplaced.

In a similar vein Richard McCormick has proposed an interpretation of proportion in which the manner of protecting the good (e.g. human life) undermines this value by serious injury to associated goods (e.g. liberty). Since liberty is an associated good upon which the good of life itself depends, to undermine the associated value is to undermine life itself. Thus, an act which undermines the value in life by reason of the way in which it seeks to protect life, is disproportionate. [52] In this interpretation there is no attempt to establish an abstract hierarchy of values; one value is ordered to the other as a necessary condition for its realization. This provides a foundation for a meaningful comparison.

However, to determine whether the act does in fact have such an undermining effect on the value of life would require

52Richard A. McCormick, S.J., *Notes on Moral Theology: 1965 through 1980,* p. 721.

some kind of long term calculation of effects such as proposed by Knauer. [53] Such a calculation would call for such a complex and hypothetical calculation of probabilities involving contingent events, including further free human choices, that it is difficult to see how it could yield a secure basis for the constitution of a moral norm. There remains also the same problem mentioned above: why is it that undermining the value in a generalized sense is disproportionate and so constitutive of moral wrongness while a particular negation of the value (e.g. by direct killing of an innocent) is not? Why does the generalization of the assault on the value constitute the decisive factor? This does not seem to be clearly explained.

In conclusion, it seems that proportion has several different meanings and different functions in the argument and is used in different contexts. For example, the act-end concept of proportion used by St. Thomas corresponds to a context where the focus is on the subject-agent, [54] the effect-effect concept belongs in a context where the focus is that of the external (juridic) observer. What is called for is an integrated moral theory including both perspectives.

The problem cannot be solved by taking notions such as act, end, and consequence from one context and redefining them so as to fit them into another quite different context. Such frequent redefinition of terms has been a characteristic of the debate so far and would seem to lead to confusion rather than to advancing the discussion. In short, the meaning of proportion has not yet been sufficiently clarified. It has not yet received that degree of refinement which would make it an appropriate tool for moral analysis.

BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE, C.SS.R.

The Catholic University of America
Washington, D.O.

53 For McCormick's analysis of Knauer's concept of counterproductivity see his "Notes on Moral Theology: 1980," *Theological Studies* 42 (1981): 95-90.

54 This is explained in the recent article by Louis Janssens, "Saint Thomas Aquinas and the Question of Proportionality," *Louvain Studies* 9 (1982) : 26-46. This article is an important step towards clarifying the notion of proportion. It establishes the meaning of act-end proportion and the proper context of that term.

INFALLIBILITY AND SPECIFIC MORAL NORMS: A REVIEW DISCUSSION [1]

FRANCIS A. SULLIVAN, S.J., who for many years has been professor of ecclesiology at the Gregorian University in Rome, has written an important book on the magisterium. In it he explains and defends the teaching of Vatican I and Vatican II on apostolicity, infallibility, and unalterable dogmatic truths. Because Sullivan engages in authentic Catholic theological reflection, his work must be taken seriously. I wish to make it clear that I agree with much of Sullivan's theology of magisterium and admire his fidelity to the Catholic theologian's vocation. Here, however, I must take issue with certain aspects of his argument in chapter six: "The Infallibility of the Ordinary Universal Magisterium and the Limits of the Object of Infallibility."

Sullivan criticizes a position John C. Ford, S.J., and I defended: that the received Catholic teaching on contraception (and, by implication, on many other questions about sex, marriage, and innocent life) has been taught infallibly by the ordinary magisterium. Sullivan maintains that no specific moral norm can be taught infallibly. In what follows, I try to show that he has neither refuted our position nor established his.

I

During the controversy following *Humanae vitae,* it was widely assumed that since the encyclical contains no solemn definition, the teaching it reaffirms is not proposed infallibly and could be mistaken. That assumption simply ignored the entire category of teachings infallibly proposed by the ordi-

1. Francis A. Sullivan, S.J., *Magisterium: Teaching Authority in the Catholic Church* (New York: Paulist Press, 1983).

nary magisterium.[2] However, in *Dei filius,* Vatican I definitively teaches that there is such a category: "Further, all those things are to be believed with divine and Catholic faith which are contained in the word of God, written or handed down, and which the Church either by a solemn judgment or by her ordinary and universal magisterium proposes for belief as divinely revealed."[3] Because *Dei filius* concerns revelation, its teaching is limited to revealed truths. Still, it shows the unsoundness of the assumption that only what is defined is infallibly taught.

Vatican II articulates criteria for the infallibility of the ordinary magisterium: "Although the bishops individually do not enjoy the prerogative of infallibility, they nevertheless proclaim the teaching of Christ infallibly, even when they are dispersed throughout the world, provided that they remain in communion with each other and with the successor of Peter and that in authoritatively teaching on a matter of faith and morals they agree in one judgment as that to be held definitively."[4] Vatican II's formulation is not limited to revealed truths. It allows for a secondary object of infallibility: truths required for revelation's safeguarding and development.[5]

Reflecting on Vatican H's formulation, Ford and I became convinced that the received teaching on contraception meets the criteria. In an article, we clarified the conditions for the infallible exercise of the ordinary magisterium by tracing the development of Vatican H's text in the conciliar proceedings. We then argued that the facts show that the received Catholic teaching on contraception has met these conditions.[6]

In making our case, we did not try to show that the norm concerning contraception pertains to revelation, because Vati-

2 See John C. Ford, S.J., and Germain Grisez, "Contraception and the Infallibility of the Ordinary Magisterium," *Theological Studies,* 39 (1978), 259-61.

3 DS 3011/1792; my translation.

4 *Lumen gentium,* 25; my translation.

5 See Ford-Grisez, 265-69; Sullivan, 131-36.

6 Ford-Grisez, 263-86.

can II does not include that among the criteria by which infallible teachings of the ordinary magisterium are to be recognized. However, in specifying the limits of infallibility in defining, the Council states: "Now this infallibility, with which the divine Redeemer willed his Church to be endowed in defining a doctrine of faith or morals, extends as far as extends the deposit of divine revelation, which must be guarded as inviolable and expounded with fidelity." [7] This statement of the limits of infallibility makes it clear that if anything is taught infallibly, it must pertain to revelation, at least by being a truth required to safeguard and develop revelation itself.

The connection is essential. But it does not follow that no teaching can be recognized as infallible without first being recognized as pertaining to revelation. Essential conditions for a reality need not be conditions for recognizing instances of that kind of reality. For instance, water is H20, but one can recognize instances of water without first knowing them to be H20. Similarly, the fact that a moral teaching within the infallible competence of the magisterium must either be revealed or closely connected with revelation need not prevent one from first recognizing instances of such points of morals and only thereby coming to know that they *somehow* pertain to revelation.

Therefore, Ford and I proceeded on the assumption that if a teaching meets the conditions articulated by Vatican II, it can be recognized as infallibly proposed, and from the fact that it has been infallibly proposed, it can be known to pertain to revelation. The question how it pertains is secondary. Still, since the connection between infallibility and revelation is essential, if the norm concerning contraception has been proposed infallibly, this secondary question is important. Thus we treated it first in a series of subordinate questions and objections.

In beginning our account of the way in which the norm concerning contraception pertains to revelation, we expected the

[7] *Lumen gentium,* 25; my translation.

objection: Your argument is going in the wrong direction; you ought first to have shown how this teaching pertains to revelation, and then how the Church has taught it. That objection would have been based on the supposition: Nothing can be recognized as pertaining to revelation from the manner in which the Church holds and hands it on. A single counter-example falsifies a general thesis, so we offered one counter-example: the dogma of the Assumption and the argument Pius XII offered for its being revealed when he defined it.[8]

II

Instead of beginning his criticism of Ford's and my position by examining our basic argument, Sullivan starts with our treatment of the subordinate question: How does the teaching pertain to revelation? Omitting our introduction to the question, which makes clear the status we allow it, Sullivan says: "Let us look first at the premises on which they base their contention that the morality of contraception falls within at least the secondary object of infallible teaching."[9] He then quotes the first paragraph of our three and one-half page answer to the question, and in doing so omits a sentence which calls attention to the fact that this paragraph is not a complete argument:

> We do not assert that the norm is divinely revealed. This question is one from which we have prescinded. Our position rather is this: if the norm is not contained in revelation, it is at least connected with it as a truth required to guard the deposit as inviolable and to expound it with fidelity. [The following sentence is omitted by Sullivan.] In support of this position, we first point out that no one has seriously tried to show that anything in revelation is *incompatible* with the Church's teaching on the morality of contraception. Admittedly, it does not seem there is any way to establish *conclusively* that this teaching either pertains to revelation or is connected with it apart from the fact that the ordinary magisterium has proposed the teaching in the manner in which it has, and the faithful as a whole until recently have accepted the

[8] Ford-Grisez, 287.
[9] Sullivan, 143.

norm as binding. But a similar state of affairs has been used as a basis for solemnly defining at least one dogma: that of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary. [10]

A careless reader might be misled into thinking that Sullivan is about to criticize the premises of Ford's and my main argument.[11]

Sullivan says that when Ford and I refer to the doctrine of the Assumption, we are trying to prove by analogy that the morality of contraception is a proper object for the infallible magisterium. [12] Therefore, he begins his criticism by pointing out disanalogies. The Assumption had for centuries " been a matter of universal Christian *faith."* But the fact that the faithful accepted the "teaching on contraception as binding does not prove that they accepted it as revealed or even as necessarily connected with revealed truth. Indeed, it seems likely that many of them accepted it simply as a binding law of the Church, which they had to observe whether they were convinced of its truth or not." [13]

Even if Ford and I were arguing by analogy, Sullivan's criticism would not be decisive. Of course, the norm concerning contraception was not accepted as a matter of faith, for it is a matter of morals. Sullivan may well be right in doubting that the faithful accepted the teaching on contraception as revealed or even as closely connected with revelation. But he offers no evidence that the faithful assented to the Assumption under such theological formalities. Moreover, it is mere speculation to say that it seems likely the teaching on contraception was accepted only as a binding law of the Church. Admittedly, widespread legalism led people to confuse moral norms with laws. But instructed Catholics always knew the difference between laws of the Church and laws of God, between eating meat on Friday and contraception.

10 *Ibid.;* Ford-Grisez, 286-87.

11 Richard A. McCormick, S.J., "Notes on Moral Theology: 1983," *Theological Studies,* 45 (1984), 95, seems to have been misled.

12 Sullivan, 144.

13 */bid.*

Actually, however, a counterexample is not an argument by analogy, so the disanalogies, even if they were as great as Sullivan thinks, would not tell against Ford's and my point: One can legitimately argue from the way the Church holds and teaches something to its pertaining to revelation; one need not show that something pertains to revelation, or how it pertains, to recognize it as an integral part of the Church's teaching.

Sullivan reformulates what he takes to be the supposition of our argument: "If the magisterium speaks in a definitive way about something, it must necessarily be the case that what they speak about is a proper object of infallible teaching." [14] He says this supposition "would eliminate the possibility of challenging any magisterial act that was claimed to be infallible by questioning whether the subject-matter of that act fell within the limits of the proper object of infallibility." [15] Sullivan then states his major difficulty with what he thinks is Ford's and my view:

> Against such a view I would argue that if it were true, there would be no point at all in the insistence of Vatican I and Vatican II that the magisterium can speak infallibly only on matters of faith and morals. It would have been necessary to say only this: whenever the magisterium speaks in a definitive way it must be speaking infallibly, because the very fact that it speaks in a definitive way would guarantee that what it speaks about would be a proper matter for infallible teaching. What then would have been the point of mentioning the limits of the matter about which the Church can teach infallibly? [16]

And Sullivan concludes that our view would open the door to "absolutism" in the exercise of the magisterium.

Sullivan claims that Ford and I are arguing that we can only know for certain that the morality of contraception is a *proper object* for infallible teaching from the fact that the magisterium has taught it infallibly. I distinguish: We do say that the only way to prove conclusively that this teaching

14 *Ibid.*
15 *Ibid.*
16 *Ibid.*, 144-45.

either pertains to revelation or is closely connected with **it**– and in *this* sense is a proper object of infallible teaching-is the fact that the magisterium has proposed it infallibly. But we do not say that the only way to recognize the teaching as a matter of " faith or morals "-and in *this* sense as falling within the magisterium's competence as a *potential* object of an infallible teaching-is the fact that the magisterium has proposed it infallibly.

Sullivan equivocates; his argument succeeds only on the assumption that "faith and morals" in *Lumen gentium, 9l5,* really means " a point of faith or morals *known* to pertain to revelation." This assumption of Sullivan's is the general thesis Ford and I showed to be false by the example of the doctrine of the Assumption. And there are other ways of seeing that Sullivan's assumption is mistaken.

If Sullivan were right in assuming that " faith and morals " can refer only to those matters already *known* to pertain to revelation, Vatican H's articulation of conditions for the infallibility of the ordinary magisterium would be useless. Christians who ponder revelation can come to see truths not yet widely grasped in the Church; when they do so, they can believe such truths, although the magisterium never has proposed them for belief. **If** Sullivan were right, nothing could ever be found to meet the conditions for infallible teaching by the ordinary magisterium without first being grasped by such independent Christian insight as divinely revealed or closely connected with revelation. But whatever was so recognized independently of the magisterium's proposal of it would not require the seal of magisterial authority.

Moreover, Christians always have believed that the apostles and their successors bonded together in communion enjoy an unfailing charism of truth. That is why, when disputes arose concerning what really is revealed truth, appeals were made to what had been held and handed down in all the churches. The force of that appeal never depended on an independent showing that the truth in question was revealed. That condition, which Sullivan wishes to impose, would have blocked the

attempt to proceed from the way truths are held and handed on to their status as pertaining to revelation.

As for the " absolutism in the exercise of the ma.gisterium " which Sullivan fears, that seems a threat only because of his oversimplification of our position when he says: **"It** would have been necessary to say only this: whenever the magisterium speaks in a definitive way it must he speaking infallibly." [11] This reformulation might lead one to imagine that Ford and I suppose that if one's bishop were to tell one definitively what cold remedy to use, his judgment would be infallible. For Sullivan omits the other conditions for infallible teaching: that the bishops agree in one judgment on a matter within the magisterium's competence-faith and morals. But Ford and I include these conditions. We simply do not grant Sullivan's assumption that one cannot recognize what falls under " faith and morals " without knowing beforehand that and how it pertains to revelation.

III

Having disposed of what he mistakes for Ford's and my " principal argument," Sullivan devotes one more paragraph to the three pages in which we articulate the explanation on whose introductory paragraph he focuses his attack. These pages contain our reasons for thinking that the norm excluding contraception either is included in revelation or was a legitimate development of revelation's shaping of Christian life.[18] In line with his misreading of the introductory para.graph of our argument, Sullivan considers these pages not as an explanation of *how* but as " other arguments " *that* the question of the morality of contraception is at lea.st within the secondary object of infallibility. Without summarizing our explanation and without offering grounds for his verdict, Sullivan says these " other arguments " would at most " suffice to show that this moral teaching is connected with revelation; however, I

17 *Ibid.,* 145.
18 Ford-Grisez, 287-90.

do not think they show that it is so necessarily connected with revelation that the magisterium could not safeguard and expound revelation if it could not teach this particular norm with infallibility." [19]

The key to Sullivan's summary judgment is his phrase, "so necessarily connected." To understand the issue here, one must bear in mind that according to Vatican II infallibility extends not only to revelation itself but also to truths closely connected with revelation. Sullivan commendably defends this " secondary object of infallible magisterium," signified by Vatican II's phrase, " which must be religiously guarded and faithfully expounded." [20] He also rightly rejects the view which would include in this secondary object everything connected with revelation, no matter how loosely. For Vatican H's formula limits the magisterium to truths it is required to teach if it is to fulfill its ministry.

However, Sullivan needs more than "required "; his criticism turns on " so necessarily connected." Moreover, as we shall see, one of Sullivan's key arguments to exclude specific moral norms from the object of the infallible magisterium is that they cannot be derived with logical *necessity* from revealed principles.

Where does Sullivan get " necessarily " as a qualification of the connection? Not from Vatican II, for the Council does not use the word and the official clarification of the phrase, " divine revelation, which must be guarded as inviolable and expounded with fidelity," simply is: "all those things and only those things which either directly belong to the very revealed deposit, or which are required to guard as inviolable and expound with fidelity this same deposit." [21]

To obtain "necessarily," Sullivan invokes a never completed project of Vatican I, which is not mentioned in this context by Vatican II, and so has little or no theological weight:

1.9 Sullivan, 145.
20 *Ibid.,* 131.
21 Ford-Grisez, 268-69.

" The commission which drew up the draft of the Constitution on the Church at Vatican I chose a much more restrictive term to describe the secondary object: ' veritates quae necessario requiruntur, ut revelationis depositum integrum custodiatur' (truths which are necessarily required, in order that the deposit of revelation may be preserved intact)." [22] Having thus introduced "necessarily," Sullivan reads it into *MysteriU'ni ecclesiae,* a 1973 declaration of the Doctrinal Congregation, which says that the competence of the magisterium extends " to those things, without which this deposit cannot be properly safeguarded and explained." [23]

There are two reasons for rejecting Sullivan's reading of " without which cannot properly " as " necessarily required." First, it is reasonable to understand Church teaching since Vatican II in accord with that Council's completed work, not in accord with an unfinished project of Vatican I. Second, Vatican I's schema was concerned only with truths necessarily required in order that the deposit of revelation may be *preserved inta,ct,* while Vatican H's teaching refers not only to truths required in order that the deposit may be religiously safeguarded (preserved intact) but also to those required for it to be *faithfully expounded.* This last phrase points to a different requirement-the need for development not only of theology but of doctrine. [24]

The distinction is important, because what is required to unfold revelation as the basis of God's ongoing relationship with his people might not be *necessarily* required to preserve intact the already given deposit of revelation. Furthermore, as soon as one attends to the fact that Vatican II's formula leaves room for authentic doctrinal development, one sees the untenability of any attempt to restrict the secondary object of infallibility to what can be derived with formal, logical necessity-that is, to what can be deduced.

22 Sullivan, 133.

23 *Ibid.,* 134.

24 See Karl Rahner, S.J., in Herbert Vorgrimler, ed., *Commentary on the Documents of Vatican* II (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), 1:212.

For although many theologians once defended a deductivist model of doctrinal development, since Newman it has become recognized that such a model cannot accommodate the facts.[20] Indeed, Sullivan himself, explaining the development of Marian doctrine earlier in his book, says: "Admittedly, these conclusions do not follow with metaphysical necessity from what Scripture tells us about Mary. They are seen to be contained in the total mystery of Christ, by a kind of intuition, rather than by a process of logical deduction." [26]

In sum, if the development of the Church's teaching on contraception involved a dialectic which cannot be reduced to deductive form, that does not put the teaching outside the scope of the infallible magisterium. If the norm is not revealed-and it might be-it can be required to guard the deposit as inviolable or *expound it with fidelity,* as Ford and I show, without meeting Sullivan's demand that it be logically deducible from explicitly revealed truths or " so necessarily connected with revelation that the magisterium could not safeguard and expound revelation if it could not teach this norm with infallibility."

IV

Ford and I offered an argument that the norm concerning contraception is a matter of morals: " Vatican II itself, in *Gaudium et spes, 51,* at least affirmed the competency of the magisterium in this very matter when it stated: ' Relying on these principles, it is not allowed that children of the Church in regulating procreation should use methods which a.re disapproved of by the magisterium in its explaining of the divine law.'" [21] We thought that" in its explaining of the divine law" shows that the morality of contraception falls under "faith or morals."

[25] See J. H. Walgrave, "Doctrine, Development of," *New Oatholio Encyclopedia,* 4:940-44.

[26] Sullivan, 18.

[21] Ford-Grisez, 272-73.

Sullivan himself grants that the magisterium can speak authoritatively on particular moral issues. To show this, he quotes a few texts, including Vatican II's sta.tement that in the matter of birth regulation parents "must always be governed according to a conscience dutifully conformed to the divine law itself, and should be submissive toward the Church's teaching office, which authentically interprets that law in the light of the gospel." [28] Sullivan asserts that " there is every reason to believe that, when the Council speaks of the ' divine law' in this context, it means the natural law, which of course is divine in its origin." [29] Thus, Sullivan admits that the Church can teach authoritatively-although he denies she can teach infallibly-specific norms of natural law, including that concerning contraception.

Before examining Sullivan's position on this issue, it is worth noticing that there are good reasons to think he moves too quickly when he reads " divine law " as meaning no more than "natural law, which of course is divine in its origin." "Divine law " and " natural law " often refer to the same reality, but do not have exactly the same sense, as can be seen in other statements of Vatican II, such as: " In pursuit of her divine mission, the Church preaches the gospel to all men and dispenses the treasures of grace. Thus, by imparting knowledge of the divine and natural law .... " [30] The Church is concerned with the natural law of the handing on of life insofar as it is divine law to be interpreted " in the light of the gospel " and belongs to the plan of " God, the Lord of life." [31] Moreover, the footnote, immediately after "in its explaining of the divine law," first refers to *Casti connubii*, where contraception is condemned as against the "law of God and of nature," after nature and the revealed vvi.11 of God have been treated separately and *seriatim* as sources of the condemnation. [32] Thus, in

28 Sullivan, 138, quoting *Gaudium et spes,* 50.
29 *Ibid.*
so *Gaudium et spes,* 89.
s1 *Ibid.,* 50-51.
a2Ibid., 51, n. 14; DS 3716-18/2239-41.

speaking of " divine law " in reference to contraception, Vatican II means more than natural law, divine in its origin.

No one doubts that the magisterium sometimes teaches authoritatively without teaching infallibly. That clearly is so where new and complex issues must be faced, and a pope or other bishop-or a group of bishops-finds it necessary to provide guidance, yet cannot at once tell whether the judgment proposed will be accepted eventually by the entire magisterium or precisely how it is related to revealed truth.

But it is a different matter to suppose that the magisterium cannot teach infallibly on a specific moral question even when all the bishops in communion with the pope hold the same position and propose it to the faithful throughout the world as an obligatory norm to be held definitively. Sullivan's position is that even if (as he admits) the morality of contraception is within the magisterium's competence, and if (which he does not deny) the magisterium has agreed in the same judgment about it, and if (which he denies) the judgment has been proposed to be held definitively, still the teaching *could 1wt possibly be infallible.* For he thinks that no specific moral norm can be taught infallibly.[33]

That opinion emerged only since Vatican II. Sullivan himself implies as much, for when he first raises the question, "How much of the natural law is also revealed?" he proposes the view which excludes specific moral norms as " the strong trend in current moral thinking."[34] He concludes the chapter by treating with approval the opinion, which he thinks is that of the majority of Catholic moral theologians today, that "particular norms of natural law are not objects of infallible teaching."[35] At the end he summarizes the point he wishes to make:

> It is the consideration of such factors as these in the process by which we come to know the particular norms of the natural law,

[33] Sullivan, 152.
[34] *Jbid.,* 137.
[35] */bid. 1* 148, in the subheading.

which has led most of the Catholic theologians who have written on this question in recent years, to the conclusion that such norms are not proper matter for irreformable teaching. [Note omitted.] This judgment rules out not only the possibility of the infallible definition of such a norm, but also the claim that such a norm has ever been, or could be, infallibly taught by the ordinary universal magisterium. [36]

Both Sullivan's own formulation of this opinion and the stated positions of some of the authors he cites in his note to support it make it clear that by" particular norms of the natural law" he means all specific moral norms.

In section VII, I will examine Sullivan's use of current theological opinion and criticize the arguments he draws from it. Here I wish to stress the position's novelty.

The view common among Catholic theologians before Vatican II was articulated forcefully by Karl Rahner, S.J., in an essay on conscience, which he published in the late 1950s. Rahner says that Christians must accept binding norms:

> Furthermore, the Church teaches these commandments with divine authority exactly as she teaches the other "truths of the Faith," either through her " ordinary " magisterium or through an act of her " extraordinary " magisterium in *ex cathedra* definitions of the Pope or a general council. But also through her *ordinary* magisterium, that is in the normal teaching of the Faith to the faithful in schools, sermons and all the other kinds of instruction. In the nature of the case this will be the normal way in which moral norms are taught, and definitions by Pope or general council the exception; but it is binding on the faithful in conscience just as the teaching through the extraordinary magisterium is.
>
> It is therefore quite untrue that only those moral norms for which there is a solemn definition (and these are criticized from all sides in the " world ") are binding in faith on the Christian as revealed by God, and must be accepted by him as the rule for his own behaviour; and of course it is equally untrue-and this is often unadmittedly expected-that the moral law preached by the Church must necessarily receive the assent (even if it is only theoretical) of the non-Christian world. When the whole Church in her everyday teaching does in fact teach a moral rule everywhere in the

as/bid., 152, 227-28 (n. 46).

world *as* a commandment of God, she is preserved from error by the assistance of the Holy Ghost, and this rule is therefore really the will of God and is binding on the faithful in conscience, even before it has been expressly confirmed by a solemn definition. [37]

One can see why Catholics at that time believed that the Church's teaching on contraception could never change.

But the current opinion Sullivan embraces denies the possibility of moral absolutes as such, not merely the moral norm concerning contraception. The challenge extends to other questions about sex, marriage, and innocent life.[38] On the new theory, "Thou shalt not commit adultery," is always a correct norm of Christian life only if " adultery " is understood to mean *wrongful* extramarital intercourse. The theory is that no "material " norm-that is, no norm without a built-in moral characterization of the act it concerns-can possibly hold always and everywhere. [39] From this it would follow, of course, that no such norm can be an unchanging truth, and so no such norm can be proposed infallibly.

It is significant that many apologists for contraception in the mid-1960s said it was an isolated issue, but today almost all who approve contraception defend exceptions to other received moral absolutes. This development is evidence that one cannot abandon the Church's teaching on contraception without threatening her entire view of sex, marriage, and innocent life. It seems to me that this close connection provides further evidence that the norm concerning contraception pertains at least to the secondary object of the infallible magisterium. Of course, this argument will not impress those who hold that revelation includes no specific moral norms at all.

a1 Karl Rahner, *Nature and Grace: Dilemmas in the Modern Church* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1963), 51-52. Rahner later joined in ignoring the existence of the ordinary magisterium: *Theological Investigations,* vol. 11, *Confrontations I,* trans. David Bourke (New York: Seabury Press, 1974), 270.

38 See Germain Grisez, *The Way of the Lord Jesus,* vol. 1, *Christian Mor.al Principles* (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1983), 873.

39 Richard A. McCormick, S.J., *Notes on Moral Theology: 1965 through 1980* (Washington, D.C.; University Press of America, 1981), 700; cf. 528-44, 684-97' 748-57.

V

Since it was commonly supposed until after Vatican II that revelation does include specific moral norms, it is reasonable to take" faith and morals" in the Council's documents as including reference to such norms. To take the conditions which Vatican II articulated for the infallible exercise of the ordinary magisterium as if they included the restriction Sullivan tries to impose is to replace the view the Council Fathers took for granted with a different view which they had never thought of. I do not say that such a replacement would *contradict* the Council's formal teaching. But one cannot simply read it into the Council's formulation. Sullivan needs some cogent theological grounds for setting this limit to "morals." He tries to find such support in certain documents of Trent, Vatican I, and Vatican II.

Sullivan points out that Trent is a primary source for the specification of the magisterium's field of competence by the phrase *res fidei et morum.* He says that in Trent's language, *mores* includes more than what we would call "morals " and suggests the translation: " matters pertaining to Christian faith and practice." Trent also teaches that the gospel-that is, Christian revelation-is the source of everything essential to Christian life. Sullivan concludes, "the bishops and the pope cannot claim to speak authoritatively, much less infallibly, unless the matter about which they speak pertains to Christian belief or the practice of the Christian way of life. In some real way, the *doctrina de fide vel moribus* has to *go* back to the Gospel as its source." [40]

I agree with that conclusion. The question is whether specific moral norms, such as that concerning contraception, can go back to the gospel as their source. Nothing Sullivan finds in Trent shows that they cannot, and he himself agrees that the Church can speak *authoritatively* on such matters. Some claim that "morals" in Trent does not refer to specific moral norms; perhaps Sullivan accepts that view. However, substan-

[40] Sullivan, 128-29.

tial studies of Trent's documents in their historical context show that " morals " in Trent should be taken to refer to specific moral norms along with much else.[41] In any case, Vatican I and Vatican II could add to Trent's teaching without contradicting it. So what the later councils mean by " morals " is more relevant than what Trent meant.

As an argument for the view that the Church can infallibly propose specific moral norms, Sullivan rejects (as question begging) a statement in the first schema of Vatican H's Constitution on the Church: " Since this same magisterium is the ministry of salvation by which men are taught the way they must follow in order to be able *to* attain to eternal life, it therefore has the office and the right of interpreting and of infallibly declaring not only the revealed law but also the natural law, and of making judgments a.bout the objective conformity of all human actions with the teaching of the Gospel and the divine law." [42] Sullivan thinks it significant tha.t this claim did not appear in later drafts which led to *Lumen gentium* or any other Vatican II document.

If the omission of this argument from the mature work of Vatican II is to be taken as significant, however, the significance might well be that the phrasing " not only the revealed law but also the natural law " makes a false contrast between revelation and the norms of natural law.[43] Moreover, the development of *Lumen gentium* between the first and second sessions left behind all sorts of things which were in the initial, rejected schema..[44] Hence, in the absence of evidence, such as

41 See T. L6pez Rodriguez, " 'Fides et mores' en Trento," *Soripta Theologica,* 5 (1973), 175-221; Marcelino Zalba, S.J., "' Omnis et salutaris veritas et morum disciplina ': Sentido de la expresi6n 'mores ' en el Concilio de Trento," *Gregorianum,* 54 (1973), 679-715.

42 Sullivan, 140-41.

43 *Dignitatis humanae,* 14, does not make this contrast. The Council's n. 36 (Abbott n. 57) refers to an address of Piux XII on the formation of the Christian conscience; he makes it clear that natural law also pertains to revelation.

44 The original schema used "head of the college of bishops " to specify the authority of the pope in ex cathedra teaching-see Rahner, in Vorgrimler, ed., *Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II,* 1:212. Did Vatican II's change mean it teaches the opposite?

interventions criticizing certain points, that particular changes implied the Council's rejection of a position, such omissions should not be considered significant.

Sullivan also claims that there is " evidence that the term *res fidei et morum* was not understood at Vatican I to embrace all possible questions of natural morality." [45] He adduces this evidence when he considers and rejects another argument for the view that the magisterium can teach specific moral norms infallibly. Sullivan formulates this argument: "The magisterium is infallible in matters of faith and morals: but particular norms of the natural law are matters of morals; therefore the magisterium can speak infallibly about them." Sullivan rejects this as " rather simplistic," because " it ignores the difference between what is revealed and what is not revealed with regard to morals."

By itself, this statement of Sullivan's would merely repeat what he needs to prove. So he seeks to establish the point by appealing to Bishop Gasser's response to a proposal to substitute " principles of morals" for *res morum* in the definition of papal infallibility. Sullivan cites the second of two reasons why the *Deputatio de fide* rejected this proposal: "Moreover, principles of morals can be other merely philosophical principles of natural morality [*alia mere philosophica naturalis honestatis],* which do not in every respect pertain to the deposit of faith." [46] Sullivan thinks this portion of Gasser's comment an "illuminating proof " of his thesis.

However, the first reason Gasser gives for rejecting the proposed amendment is an even more illuminating disproof of Sullivan's thesis:

Sed etiam hanc emendationem non potest admittere Deputatio de fide et quidem partim quia vox ista esset omnino nova, cum vox *res fidei et morwrn,* doctrina fidei et morum sit notissima, et unusquisque theologus scit quid sub his verbis sit intelligendum. (But the *Deputatio de fide* cannot accept this amendment either, partly because that expression would be wholly new, while the ex-

45 Sullivan, 140.
46]bid.

pression *res fidei et morum,* for doctrine of faith and morals is very well known, and every theologian knows what ought to be understood by these words.) [47]

The theological periti of Vatican I plainly knew what every theologian knew. J. Kleutgen and J. B. Franzelin were leading *periti* of Vatican I; both participated in the session of the *Deputatio de fide* where Gasser's responses to the proposed amendment were determined. [48] But Sullivan himself says that these two theologians were among those who " asserted that the whole of the natural law is revealed, without making any distinction between the basic principles and more particular norms." [49] Thus, theologians Gasser knew well included specific moral norms under " faith and morals."

Had Vatican I accepted the amendment which was thus rejected, Sullivan would have had some real support. For the amendment, proposed by Archbishop Yusto of Burgos, was intended to restrict the scope of the infallible teaching authority to principles, in order to exclude moral determinations which depend on matters of fact that are not revealed. [50] But this argument, which is close to Sullivan's, must not have seemed cogent to the *Deputatio de fide,* for they rejected Yusto's proposed amendment.

But if Gasser's remarks cannot be read as excluding specific moral norms from the object of the infallible magisterium marked out by the phrase " faith and morals," what could the *Deputatio de fide* have meant by "merely philosophical principles of natural morality, which do not in every respect pertain to the deposit of faith"? I think a clue to the answer is in the phrase *natnralis honestatis,* which Sullivan translates "natural morality." The translation is not bad, but it facilitates Sullivan's argument in a way that the Latin does not.

47 J. D. Mansi et al., ed., *Saororum oonoiliorum nova et amplissima coUectio,* 52:1224.

48 Kleutgen ("Peters") was *relator* for that *Deputatio* session: Mansi, 53:270-72.

49 Sullivan, 137, 226 (n. 23).

50 Mansi, 52:854; also 986, 1130, 1132, 1228.

For *naturalis honestatis* does not mean the same thing as *naturalis legis,* and the two expressions have different connotations.

Honestas does refer to morality, but it means moral uprightness (not moral goodness *or* badness) and it connotes the social value of upright character, which merits honor. There is a body of philosophical moral literature concerned with *honestas.* It includes, for instance, Castiglione's *Courtier* and Chesterfield's *Letters to His Son.* This genre mixes morals in the strict sense with social conventions, etiquette, and practical techniques for getting ahead. The philosophical principles *naturalis honestatis* found in works of this genre might be included in the reference of "principles of morals." But for the most part such " principles of morals " ha.ve little to do with the deposit of faith. They pertain to it only to the extent that they touch on matters of faith and morals. For example, when Chesterfield explains how to conduct extramarital affairs discreetly, the immorality of fornication and adultery pertains to the deposit of faith, but the honorable way of engaging in that immorality does not.

When Gasser spoke of " alia mere philosophica naturalis honestatis, quae non sub omni respectu pertinent ad depositum fidei," he may well have meant principles of morals of that sort. In any case, the first reply to the proposed amendment, which Sullivan ignores, makes it clear that " faith and morals " in Vatican I means what every theologian at the time meant by it-what Kleutgen meant by it.

VI

What Vatican I meant by "' morals " is extremely important because that Council used " faith and morals " in specifying the authority of the pope teaching *ex cathedra,* and in its definition Vatican I identified the object of papal infallibility with that of the Church. Thus, Vatican I implicitly defined the infallibility of the Church as extending to matters of "morals." And this implicit definition should be taken to mean what Vati-

can I in fact meant by it. But Vatican I included in the reference of " morals " what theologians of that time included-specific moral norms. It follows that the reference of " faith and morals" in Vatican I's implicit definition of the infallibility of the Church ought to be taken to include specific moral norms.

But even if they bow to the evidence that Vatican I included specific moral norms in the reference of " faith and morals," those who wish to exclude such specific norms from the object of infallibility will argue that Vatican I has not definitively rejected their position. Since all theologians at the time thought the Church could teach infallibly on such questions, this was not then at issue. Hence, the Council did not consider this issue, and so the common theological view of the time cannot have settled it.

I grant (not concede) that Vatican I did not definitively teach that the Church's competence to teach infallibly extends to specific moral norms. Still, Ford's and my view that contraception falls under " faith and morals " as the phrase is used by Vatican I and Vatican II in their statements of conditions for infallible teaching finds support in the documents, while Sullivan's contrary view finds none.

Furthermore, by citing passages in four previous documents as comparable to its own teaching, Vatican II itself provides guidance on the correct interpretation of the conditions for infallible teaching by the ordinary magisterium. One of the documents cited is Vatican I's revised schema for the second constitution *De ecclesia Christi,* together with Kleutgen's commentary.51 The schema would have defined the infallibility of the Church as extending to " all those points which in matters of faith or morals a.re everywhere held or handed down as undoubted under bishops in communion with the Apostolic See, as well as all those points which are defined, either by those same bishops together with the Roman pontiff or by the Roman pontiff speaking *ex cathedra."* Kleutgen's

51 Ford-Grisez, 271.

tary makes it clear that" morals" here refers to specific moral norms. Indeed, he argues at length that the Church can teach infallibly on new moral questions, with respect to which lation says nothing implicitly or explicitly, because the answers to such questions are closely connected with revela.tion.

Ford and I, not wishing to press Vatican II's reference to Kleutgen, said that although the note might refer to his whole commentary, it does not seem this reference" ought to be read as an endorsement of Kleutgen's entire commenta.ry, yet the commentary remains a very authoritative guide to what the proposed text of Vatican I meant." My view remains the same: Vatican II perhaps meant its teaching to be read in the light of Kleutgen's whole commentary; but even if it did not, that commentary specifies the meaning of Vatican I's schema, to which Vatican II refers.

One of the arguments Kleutgen uses for the extension of infallibility to the Church's whole moral teaching is that it would be utterly at odds with her divinely constituted role of mother and teacher if with utmost gravity and severity she misled the faithful as to what is right and wrong.[52] This argument is like one Sullivan criticizes, drawn from the so-called minority report of Paul VI's commission on birth regulation:

> ... there is no possibility that the teaching itself is other than substantially true. It is true because the Catholic Church, instituted by Christ to show men the sure road to eternal life, could not err so atrociously through all the centuries of its history. The Church cannot substantially err in teaching a very serious doctrine of faith or morals through all the centuries-even through one century-a doctrine constantly and insistently proposed as one necessarily to be followed in order to attain eternal salvation. The Church could not substantially err through so many centuries-even through one century-in imposing very heavy burdens under grave obligation in the name of Jesus Christ as it would have erred if Jesus Christ does not in fact impose these burdens. The Catholic Church could not in the name of Jesus Christ offer to the vast multitude of the faithful, everywhere in the world, for so many centuries an occasion of formal sin and spiritual ruin on ac-

[52] Mansi, 53: 327.

count of a false doctrine promulgated in the name of Jesus Christ. [53]

It was this argument that Ford and I meant to improve upon by our study. Hence, I do not claim it was perfect. However, Sullivan's criticisms scarcely do it justice.

Sullivan thinks this argument "is based on the grave consequences of erroneous moral teaching by the Church." [54] Having thus oversimplified it, Sullivan offers two answers.

First, if the argument were sound, " it would also have to be true that the Church has never erred when it has taught something to be gravely sinful." [55] Sullivan insinuates that this test of history could not be passed, but leaves the issue to historians.

But the argument sets a higher standard, "a doctrine constantly and insistently proposed as one necessarily to be followed in order to attain eternal salvation." This standard is more precisely expressed in Vatican H's formula: " agree in one judgment as that to be held definitively." While the test of history set by Sullivan's reformulation of the standard might not be passed, the test set by the more adequate formulation can be. Ford and I showed that neither of the two main counterexamples suggested by John T. Noonan, Jr.-the supposed requirement of procreative purpose to justify marital intercourse and the condemnation of usury-tells against Vatican H's conditions for the infallibility of the ordinary magisterium.56

Second, Sullivan argues that scandalous conduct by leaders of the Church certainly has caused great spiritual harm, which God has permitted. It cannot be shown that erroneous moral teaching would cause greater spiritual harm. Hence, we cannot know that God has not permitted the spiritual harm arising from erroneous moral teaching. [57]

sa Sullivan, 141-42; Ford-Grisez, 302.
54 Sullivan, 141.
ss *Ibid.*, 142.
se Ford-Grisez, 294-98.
67 Sullivan, 142.

Here Sullivan confuses infallibility with impeccability. The argument he criticizes does not assume that we can know how much harm God will permit sinful leaders of the Church to do. Hence, the harm caused by scandalous conduct is irrelevant. The argument is that the Church herself, divinely estahlished and assisted to teach the truth humankind needs for salvation, could not act in her universal magisterium so defectively as to accomplish precisely the opposite of her mission. If the Catholic Church is what she claims to be, she cannot have been misleading the faithful through the centuries by erroneously telling them that certain kinds of acts are absolutely and gravely wrong.

VII

Having dealt with the position he rejects, Sullivan devotes the last section of his chapter on the infallibility of the ordinary magisterium to the opinion that no specific moral norm can be infallibly taught. He claims this is the view of " the majority of Catholic moral theologians today " [58] and that " most of the Catholic theologians who have written on this question in recent years " subscribe to it.[59] Thus, although he also summarizes some of the arguments offered for this view, Sullivan primarily relies on the authority of other theologians who hold it.

This appeal to the authority of other theologians is unsound in three ways. First, within theology, opinions no more weigh in an argument than do scholarly opinions in any other field of scholarship. As in any intellectual discipline, the weight of theological opinions is no greater than the evidence and arguments offered for them. Second, Sullivan begs the question by appealing to these opinions to complete his argument against us, for we have made our case against these same opinions.

Third, the appearance of theological consensus in favor of the opinion Sullivan adopts is only that. There are two substantial bodies of theological opinion. Which is the majority,

58 *Ibid.,* 149.
59 *Ibid.,* 152.

which the minority? Who knows? Richard A. McCormick, S.J., writing in 1984 of those who support the Holy See's defense of Catholic teaching, says: " There are growing numbers of reactionary theologians who support this type of thing with insistence on a verbal conformity that is utterly incredible to the modern-and, I would add, open-mind." [60] I dislike McCormick's adjectives, but am glad he sees the tide is turning.

According to Sullivan's summary, the "majority" view admits the possibility of infallible teaching concerning basic principles of natural law and of authoritative pastoral guidance on concrete problems. But it holds that specific norms of natural law" are neither formally nor virtually revealed" and that they cannot be deduced from revealed truths. The argument is that we arrive at concrete norms by shared reflection on experience; the process is inductive rather than deductive.

Sullivan adds that specific norms cannot be shown to be necessarily .connected with revelation. Here the argument is based on the rule of Canon Law that nothing is to be considered infallibly defined or declared unless this is manifestly the case. Sullivan thinks this puts an impossible burden of proof on anyone who would try to show that a particular moral norm falls within the secondary object of infallihility. [61]

In these arguments, Sullivan uses language which seems to narrow the class of moral norms which he claims cannot he infallibly taught. For instance, he says: " The concrete determinations of the natural law with regard to the complex problems facing people today are neither formally nor virtually revealed." Again, he refers to the " concrete and complex problems of modern man." [62] Such language might lead one to think of problems such as the morality of nuclear deterrence or in vitro fertilization.

However, granted (not conceded) that the solutions to such

60 Richard A. McCormick, S.J., "Notes on Moral Theology, 1983," 84.
61 Sullivan, 150.
62 *[bid.*

problems do not pertain to revelation, that does not entail that revelation neither contains nor requires any specific moral norm. Yet that is Sullivan's thesis. If it were not, one could grant his thesis but point out that contraception, adultery, abortion, and so on are not "complex problems of modern man," but fairly straightforward and perennial problems.

Sullivan's argument that specific moral norms cannot pertain to revelation if they depend upon shared reflection on experience not only assumes that all specific norms must be reached in this way, but that divine revelation can only be unfolded deductively. As I explained in section three, that assumption would preclude the development of doctrine.

When Sullivan invokes the rule of Canon Law that nothing is to be considered infallibly defined or declared unless that is manifestly the case, he evidences a confusion, widespread among the theologians who share his view, between teaching infallibly proposed in solemn definitions and teaching infallibly proposed by the ordinary magisterium. For that rule of Canon Law refers to the former, not to the latter. [63]

Sullivan ends the chapter by summarizing arguments for the thesis "that the concrete norms of the natural law simply do not admit of such irreversible determination "-that is, truth which would permanently preclude any need for substantial revision.[64] The basic argument is one already used: that specific moral norms are reached by shared reflection upon experience. Sullivan thinks that passages in *Gaudium et S])es,* 16, 33, and 46, which speak of searching for solutions to problems, support this thesis. He also sa\}'s that the open-ended character of experience is such that moral absolutes are impossible: "We can never exclude the possibility that future experience, hitherto unimagined, might put a moral problem into a new frame of reference which would call for a revision of a norni

63 This is clear enough even in the 1917 Code Sullivan quotes (150, 227 n. 44), but even clearer in the 1983 Code, where "or declared" is omitted (Can. 749.3).

H Sullivan, 151.

that, when formulated, could not have taken such new experience into account." [65] Finally, he invokes the opinion of Karl Rahner that the dynamism of human nature precludes specific moral norms with permanent validity. [66]

The passages in *Gaudium et spes* which Sullivan cites clearly support the view that *some* moral questions call for shared reflection on experience, admit of no ready answers, and baffie everyone, including popes and other bishops. There are complex, fresh problems, such as how to order modern technology and industry to the common good, how to avoid the holocaust without surrendering to tyranny, and so forth. But *Gaudium et spes* makes it clear that there are at least some specific moral norms whose truth permanently precludes the possibility of substantial revision:

> Contemplating this melancholy state of humanity, the Council wishes to recall first of all the permanent binding force of universal natural law and its all-embracing principles. Man's conscience itself gives ever more emphatic voice to these principles. Therefore, actions which deliberately conflict with these same principles, as well as orders commanding such actions, are criminal. Blind obedience cannot excuse those who yield to them. Among such must first be counted those actions designed for the methodical extermination of an entire people, nation, or ethnic minority. [67]

Obviously, genocide is a much greater immorality than contraception or adultery. However, the norm forbidding genocide is a specific moral norm. Indeed, this norm would not have been articulated without reflection upon some recent experience.

Again, the argument that the ongoing, open-ended character of experience precludes permanently true specific moral norms might be true with respect to *some* norms. But the argument only succeeds if someone establishes a theory of moral norms which shows the impossibility of moral absolutes. Many who deny moral absolutes think proportionalism is such a

65 *Ibid.,* 152.
66 *Ibid.*
67 *Gaiudium et spes,* 79.

theory. However, there are strong reasons for considering proportionalism indefensible. In a recently published volume, I state these reasons. In the same work I criticize Rahner's claim that the dynamism of human nature precludes specific moral norms with permanent validity. [68]

VIII

Vatican II's conditions for infallible teaching by the ordinary magisterium include that the teaching be proposed *tamquam definitive tenendmn-as* to be held definitively. Sullivan criticizes two of the four considerations Ford and I offer to show that this condition has been met in the case of the received teaching on contraception. To follow this argument, one must bear in mind a basic point: This requirement cannot mean that the infallible teaching of the ordinary magisterium must be expressed in the language of solemn definition. For the bishops dispersed throughout the world cannot define anything and do not use the language of solemn definition in their day-to-day teaching.

In his basic treatment of the infallibility of the ordinary ma.gisterium, Sullivan refers to Salaverri's preconciliar treatise on ecclesiology for the meaning of " as to be held definitively." According to Salaverri, bishops propose something to be held definitively only " when, with the highest level of their authority, they oblige the faithful to give irrevocable assent to it." [69]

Ford and I say that what is to be held definitively is to be accepted with an assent of certitude, as undoubted. [70] Is not such an assent "irrevocable?" It might seem so, for one who assents to something as certain does not consider that assent recallable or reversible. However, "irrevocable" is often used in legal contexts, and so it can mislead by connoting a formal-

[68] *Ohristian Moral Principles,* 141-71 (critique of proportionalism) ; 859-60 and 869 n. 62 (critique of Rahner's claim about the dynamism of human nature).

ea Sullivan, 125-26.

10 Ford-Grisez, 275.

ity not characteristic of submission to the ordinary magisterium-a formality usually not present in a Christian's assent of faith, although it can be, as when an adult convert professes the faith. Thus, " irrevocable " suggests, misleadingly, that bishops never propose anything to be held definitively without consciously acting *as* authorities and formally demanding that the faithful obey *as* subjects.

Is there any reason to think that Vatican II intended to refer only to instances of teaching involving such formality when it said that the position must be proposed as to be held definitively? Sullivan supplies none. Against it is that holding something definitively either is or is like assenting to it with faith. (The motive will not be that of divine faith if the point pertains only to the secondary object of infallibility.) But without formalities, bishops in their ordinary teaching frequently propose revealed truths to be held with faith. Hence, they can propose without formalities other truths to be held definitively.

Logically, this can happen because the certitude of one's assent is neither identical with nor necessarily related to the level of authority at which a teaching is proposed or the severity of the obligation to assent. A bishop can limit himself to gentle persuasion in communicating a truth he considers to pertain to faith. For instance, a bishop might not invoke his authority or demand " irrevocable assent" if he is trying to reconcile opposing groups who think that only the Latin Mass is valid and only Mass in the vernacular is valid. Even if he believed the validity of both a truth to be held definitively and wished people to accept it as such, the bishop might not say so.

Sullivan also quotes comments of Karl Rahner, S.J., on *Lumen g·entium, 25.* Rahner makes three points bearing on the meaning of" as to be held definitively." First, he says that the draft of 10 November 1962 did not include the clause *"tamquam definitive tenenda.m,* which is very important in judging the intention of the final text." Second, Rahner says that " an absolutely strict and irreformable assent must be explicitly called for." Third, he argues: **"It** has often been assumed in

the past, with practical effects, that a doctrine is irreformable in the Church simply because it has been generally taught without clearly notable contradiction over a considerable period of time. This view runs counter to the facts, because many doctrines which were once universally held have proved to be problematic or erroneous, and is fundamentally unsound." [71]

The fact that the November 1962 draft did not include *tamquam definitive tenendam* is significant, but not in the way Rahner's comment suggests. For this qualification was introduced when " in handing on the revealed faith" was replaced with " teaching on matters of faith and morals " to avoid *restricting* the infallibility of the episcopal body to points proposed to be believed as divinely revealed. [72] The phrase was not chosen to tighten what would otherwise have been a looser requirement.

Rahner gives no argument and offers no basis in the Council's documents for his requirement that "an absolutely strict and irreforma.ble assent must be explicitly called for." The reasons for questioning Sullivan's introduction of "irrevocable" from Sa.laverri apply here too. Of course, there are times when assent is called for explicitly, namely, when the extraordinary magisterium solemnly defines a proposition. The word " irreformable " also appears in this context, for it properly qualifies a definition rather than an act of assenting. Vatican I, for example, speaks of the "irreformable " definitions of popes teaching ex cathedra. [73] Rahner tends here to reduce the requirements for infallibile teaching by the ordinary magisterium to those for solemn definitions, and thus to leave no room for the infallibility of the ordinary magisterium.

As to the third point, I agree with Rahner in rejecting the view that " a doctrine is irreformable in the Church simply because it has been generally taught without clearly notable con-

n Sullivan, 126.
12 Ford-Grisez, 267.
1s DS 3074/1839.

tradiction over a considerable period of time." This formulation is too loose; it omits the requirement that the teaching be proposed as certain. Moreover, as already explained, it is not exact to say that a doctrine infallibly taught by the ordinary magisterium is " irreformable."

IX

Ford and I stated as follows what we think is meant by " as to be held definitively ":

> The genesis of the text makes clear that what is demanded if the exercise of the ordinary magisterium is to be infallible is that a judgment be proposed for acceptance with an assent of certitude, similar to the assent of divine faith, but not necessarily having the same motive as has the latter assent. The formula in the second schema *De ecclesia Christi* of Vatican I, which Vatican II cites as comparable with its own teaching, refers to points held or handed down *as undoubted.* Thus, " to be held definitively " clearly excludes cases in which a bishop proposes a view as a safe and probable opinion, but only as such.
>
> A point of teaching surely is proposed as one to be held definitively if a bishop proposes it in the following way: not at his option but as part of his duty to hand on the teaching he has received; not as doubtful or even as very probable but as certainly true; and not as one which the faithful are free to accept or to reject but as one which every Catholic must accept. [74]

When Sullivan specifically criticizes our arguments that the teaching on contraception has been proposed " as to be held definitively," he recalls his account of this requirement based on Salaverri and Rahner, quotes the second paragraph of Ford's and my explanation without the first, and then says: " Now it seems to me that there is a very real difference between authoritative teaching which calls upon the faithful to give their assent to it as certainly true, and the kind of teaching which proposes a doctrine as irreformably true and calls for an irrevocable assent." [75]

By " irreformably true " and " irrevocable assent," Sullivan

[74] Ford-Grisez, 275-76.
[75] Sullivan, 146.

again tends to set a standard met only in the case of solemn definitions. But he realizes he needs some argument to show that " as to be held definitively " means more than " as certainly true." So he quotes a passage from John Reed, S.J., who recognizes not only infallible teaching both in solemn definitions and by the ordinary magisterium, but authoritative teaching which falls short of infallibility. Reed points out the distinction between infallibility and certainty:

> In matters of conduct, a doctrine which is not taught with the plenitude of infallibility may still be taught with certainty, in the sense of moral, practical, certitude, so as to exclude any solidly probable opinion to the contrary here and now, i.e. with the effect that at a given time a particular mode of conduct is certainly licit or certainly illicit, without the abstract question of its relation to right order being definitively closed. Infallibility excludes the absolute possibility of error. Certitude, in the sense of moral, or practical, certitude, excludes the prudent, proximate fear of error.[76]

The point Reed makes here is sound. However, the way he puts it is confusing.

Reed's point is that popes and other bishops can provide authoritative moral guidance, even when they are not absolutely certain that the guidance they give is true. In such cases, they obviously should be morally certain-sure beyond areasonable doubt. Given such guidance, the faithful have the duty of religious assent and obedience. (Notice, however, when such guidance is that a particular kind of action is licit, it frees rather than burdens consciences.)

But Reed's way of putting his point can mislead. By contrasting what is taught with "the plenitude of infallibility" with what is taught with " moral certitude," Reed both suggests that these are direct opposites and that there is nothing between them. However, there is another category.

In their day-to-day teaching, bishops do not individually teach "with the plenitude of infallibility," even when they hand on revealed truths which call for the assent of faith.

[76] Quoted, *ibid.*

Rather, they simply teach truths-those which are revealed as such, those closely connected with revelation as certain, and those they consider sufficiently probable and important as safe judgments to accept and follow. Infallibility supervenes on acts of day-to-day teaching if all the conditions are met. But the bishops in teaching and the faithful in accepting their teaching usually do not reflect upon the supervening infallibility. Thus, doctrines taught infallibly by the ordinary magisterium are not "taught with the plenitude of infallibility." Only solemn definitions are proposed in that way.

Hence, *what is taught with the plenitude of infallibility* and *what is taught as only morally certain* are not the only categories. A bishop might propose an implicitly revealed truth to be held with faith, yet his teaching would not be infallible if the truth had not been defined and had not yet been proposed by many other bishops. Again, a bishop can propose moral teachings already infallibly taught as if they were only morally certain, because he happens to be unclear about their status.

In any case, bishops can propose teachings as more or less certain. To propose something as " morally certain " is one way of proposing it as probable enough to follow in practice. That would not meet the requirement set in *Lumen gentium, 25,* as Ford and I explain it: The teaching must be held and handed down "as undoubted," proposed " not as doubtful or even as very probable but as certainly true," not as a "safe and probable opinion " but as a "judgment to be held definitively."

X

Ford and I offer four considerations to show that the teaching on contraception was proposed as a norm to be held definitively.

The first of these we called a " negative " point: " We know of no evidence-and Noonan points to anyone handed on the received teaching as if it were a private opinion, a merely probable judgment, or a commendable ideal which

the faithful might nevertheless blamelessly choose to leave unrealized. The teaching always was proposed as a received and certain part of the obligatory moral teaching of the Church." [77] Obviously this point is not entirely negative. Sullivan ignores it; Ford and I considered it basic.

The next consideration we advance pivots on the fact that the teaching on contraception concerns grave matter:

> Second, the teaching is that acts intended to impede procreation are in species gravely evil-that is, are the matter of mortal sin. This fact ... makes clear the unqualified character of the intellectual assent demanded for the teaching. When the Church proposes a moral teaching as one which Christians must try to follow if they are to be saved, she a fortiori presents the teaching as one which must be accepted as certain. The magisterium permitted no differing opinions about the morality of contraception, and so probabilism was inapplicable. Thus the conditions under which the teaching was proposed left no room for doubt in the matter. [78]

Sullivan calls this our" principal argument" to show that the sinfulness of contraception was taught as a moral norm to be held definitively: " They base this claim primarily on the fact that the magisterium condemned contraceptive behaviour as gravely sinful." [79]

But Sullivan does not deal with the statement of the argument quoted above, where we actua.Ily make our case. Instead, he selects a one-sentence summary from an answer to an objection much later in the article: " To propose a norm excluding some kind of act as mortally sinful is to propose a, teaching to be held definitively." [80] This summary is overly compact; I admit that, considered by itself, it is not sound.

The first point Sullivan makes is that a teaching could be proposed that something is morally certainly gravely illicit without that meaning (in Reed's language) that" the speculative question is definitively closed." [81] I concede this point and

[77] Ford-Grisez, 281-82.
[18] *Ibid.,* 282.
[w] Sullivan, 147.
[80] *Ibid.;* Ford-Grisez, 295.
[81] Sullivan, 147.

now say (contrary to Ford's and my summary of the argument): To propose a norm excluding some kind of act as mortally sinful need not be to propose a teaching to be held definitively. The content of the teaching and the kind of assent called for are at least logically distinct. A bishop could propose a norm excluding some kind of a.ct (for example, working in an H-bomb factory) as mortally sinful but expressly propose that norm as probable rather than as certain. (But a conscientious bishop would not say *without qualification* that something is morta.lly sinful if he had the least doubt a.bout it.)

Sullivan sums up his case on this point: "It is one thing to teach that something involves a serious moral obligation; it is quite another to claim that this teaching is now absolutely definitive, and demands an irrevocable assent." He thinks our argument "would practically rule out any ordinary, noninfallible exercise of the Church's teaching authority on moral issues." [82] Here Sullivan restates the point I concede-that teaching about grave matter is not necessarily proposed as certain-within the framework of his interpretation, which tends to reduce the conditions for infallibile teaching by the ordinary magisterium to those for a solemn definition.

Although I concede that teaching about grave matter need not be proposed as to be held definitively, still I can complete the consideration Ford and I advanced by supplying a missing premise. We should have pointed out a norm for Catholic teachers on which St. Alphonsus and several other doctors of the Church insist: Catholic teachers never should unqualifiedly assert anything to be gra.ve matter unless they are certain it is.[88] This norm for pastors and teachers is almost always observed, because most try hard to avoid putting unnecessary

82 *[bid.*

83 S. Alphonsus Maria de Ligorio, *Theologia Momlis,* ed. L. Gaude (Rome: Typographia Vaticana, 1905-9), 1:456: "Ad hoc igitur ut actio aliqua sit graviter illicita requiritur certitudo prout docet omnes "; and he goes on to cite St. Raymond, St. Antoninus, and Benedict XIV. He often repeats this point and provides additional citations: 1:51, 70, 445; 2:53, 747-48; 3:627.

burdens on the faithful. Hence, where grave matter is involved, the whole body of bishops in communion with the pope never will agree in unqualifiedly proposing a norm unless they consider it certain-to be held definitively.

Thus, I admit that there is no necessary logical relationship between the grave matter contained in a norm and the certain assent called for by those who teach it. But I deny that any sin was included all over the world in Christian lists of mortal sins unless the norm excluding that kind of act was received, held, and handed on as an inescaphle requirement of God's plan for Christian life-not merely as "morally certain" but as undoubted-to be held definitively.

XI

The third consideration Ford and I advanced to show that the norm concerning contraception was proposed to be held definitively points to another set of facts: " Third, the insistent repetition of the received teaching in recent times when it was called into question outside the Catholic Church often included and always implied the proposition that this is an obligatory teaching, one which every Catholic must hold even though it is denied by other Christians." [84] Sullivan ignores this consideration, as he does the first.

He goes on at once to the fourth consideration we advanced: " The other argument Ford and Grisez use to show that the doctrine on contraception was being taught as to be held definitively is that it was often proposed as a divinely revealed moral norm." [85] He then quotes the first and last paragraphs of this consideration:

> The teaching on the morality of contraception often was proposed as a moral norm divinely revealed. Since it was proposed as revealed, a fortiori it was proposed as a teaching *to be held definitively*. We prescind from the question whether the evidence alleged to show that the condemnation of contraception is divinely re-

[84] Ford-Grisez, 282.
[85] Sullivan, 147.

vealed does or does not show this. The point we wish to make is simply this: when one who is proposing a teaching appeals to divine revelation to confirm the truth of what he proposes, he implicitly calls for an assent of divine faith, and thus proposes the teaching as one to be held definitively.[86]

If one considers the explicit appeals made to Gen 38:9-10 together with the implicit appeals made to the same passage, to Rom I: 26-27, and to the Ten Commandments, one realizes that most who handed on the Catholic teaching on contraception claimed the authority of Scripture, which they believed to be the authority of divine revelation, in support of this teaching. Whether one thinks this claim was valid or not-a question we are not considering here-no one can deny that those who made it proposed the teaching on behalf of which they made it as a moral norm *to be held definitively.*[87]

Sullivan's criticism of this argument is brief:

Now it seems to me that if this argument were valid, it would eliminate practically all ordinary, non-definitive teaching by the magisterium. For, whenever any appeal was made to Scripture in support of what was being taught, this would automatically become definitive teaching. Are we to conclude that the popes, who regularly appeal to Scripture in their ·encyclicals, have in all such cases been proposing their doctrine as definitively to be held?[88]

It seems to me this criticism involves two confusions.

First, Sullivan here introduces the phrases "non-definitive teaching" and "definitive teaching." This language shifts the focus from the kind of assent called for to the teaching which ca.lls for assent, and again suggests that the subject of discussion is teaching by solemn definitions. Actually, acceptance of Ford's and my argument would not " eliminate practically all ordinary, non-definitive teaching by the magisterium." It would merely mean that the part of this ordinary moral teaching which all the bishops in communion with the pope agree in proposing as certain has been taught infallibly-although lacking solemn definitions it is not " definitive teaching."

86 Ford-Grisez, 282; Sullivan, 147-48; he deletes "Fourth" from the beginning.

87 Ford-Grisez, 284-85; Sullivan, 148.

88 Sullivan, 148.

Second, the argument Ford and I make does not entail that whenever the popes appeal to Scripture in their encyclicals they are proposing their doctrine as to be held definitively. For instance, in *Humanae vitae* there are sixteen references to New Testament texts, but none of them is employed to found or support the central argument and conclusion.[89] The same thing is true of most uses of Scripture in encyclicals.

But in the detailed argument between the two paragraphs Sullivan quotes, Ford and I show that Scripture texts usually have been used precisely to found or support arguments for the conclusion that contraception is morally wrong. Today everyone is much more cautious than people once were about using proof texts, and Ford and I prescind from the question whether the use of Scripture texts to certify the teaching concerning contraception was sound. But we say that when Catholic teachers claimed that God himself tells us that contraception is wrong, they proposed that norm as something divinely revealed, and thus called for an assent of faith. And that is the clearest way of proposing something *tamquam definitive tenendam.*

This consideration, it seems to me, is the decisive one. It explains why Christian teachers held not only this norm but other specific norms bearing on sex and innocent life, and proposed them to the faithful as obligatory standards for Christian living. They agreed in one judgment and proposed it so firmly because they held the common body of moral teaching, centering on and elaborating the Ten Commandments, with divine faith.

XII

In a general audience on Wednesday, 18 July 1984, John Paul II reflected on the status and ground of the norm excluding contraception:

The Church teaches this norm, although it is not formally (that is, literally) expressed in Sacred Scripture, and it does this in the con-

[89] See Joseph A. Komonchak, "*Humanae Vitae* and Its Reception: Ecclesiological Reflections," *Theological Studies,* 39 (1978), 251.

viction that the interpretation of the precepts of natural law belongs to the competence of the Magisterium.

However, we can say more. Even if the moral law, formulated in this way in the Encyclical *Humanae Vitae,* is not found literally in Sacred Scripture, nonetheless, from the fact that it is contained in Tradition and as Pope Paul VI writes has been "very often expounded by the Magisterium" *(HV,* n. 4) to the faithful, it follows that this norm *is in accordance with the sum total of revealed doctrine contained in biblical sources* (cf. *HV,* n. 4).

4. It is a question here not only of the sum total of the moral doctrine contained in Sacred Scripture, of its essential premises and general character of its content, but of that fuller context to which we have previously dedicated numerous analyses when speaking about the "theology of the body".

Precisely against the background of this full context it becomes evident that the above-mentioned moral norm belongs not only to the natural moral law, but also to the *moral order revealed by God:* also from this point of view, it could not be different, but solely what is handed down by Tradition and the Magisterium and, in our days, the Encyclical *Humanae Vitae* as a modern document of this Magisterium. [90]

Here the Pope makes at least three points: The fact that the norm excluding contraception is in accord with the sum total of revelation *follows from* its being contained in tradition and its often being expounded by the magisterium; the norm belongs to the moral order *revealed by· God;* and it *could* not be different.

These three points clearly imply that the norm concerning contraception has been infallibly taught by the ordinary magisterium, that at lea.st some specific moral norms do fall under "faith and morals," and that one can argue from the way a norm is held and handed on to its pertaining to revelation. Ford's and my view and that taken by the Pope come to the same thing. John Paul II has made a significant personal contribution: a scripturally based "theology of the body" which provides fresh evidence that Catholic teaching not only on contraception but on other questions concerning sex, marriage, and innocent life is rooted in divine revelation.

[90] John Paul II, "General Audience of 18 July," *L'Osservatore Romano* (Eng. ed.), 23 July 1984, 1.

The view that revelation includes no specific moral norms goes against the convictions of Christians down through the centuries. If one sets aside the twentieth century and considers the entire previous Jewish and Christian tradition, its massiveness and unity are overwhelmingly impressive. For example, not only no Catholic but no other Christian and no Jew ever would have dared to say of adultery and killing the innocent anything but: These are wicked things, and they who do them, unless they repent, can have no part in God's kingdom. Contrary contemporary theological speculation has the burden of showing that even until yesterday the whole People of God grossly misunderstood his wise and loving commands.

GERMAIN GRISEZ

Mount Saint Mary's College
Emmitsburg, Maryland

BOOK REVIEWS

Foundational Theology: Jesus and the Church. By FRANO'IS SCHUSSLER FIORENZA. New York: Crossroad, 1984. Pp. 326 + xviii. $22.50.

Professor Fiorenza's *Foundational Theology* is, I believe, essential reading for anyone interested in the sets of issues raised by what is variously called "apologetics, fundamental theology, foundational theology, formal-fundamental theology, basic science of faith, prolegomena to dogmatics, philosophical theology, and philosophy of religion " (249). The first three parts of this work practice foundational theology on the issues of the resurrection of Jesus (c. 1-c. 2) as well as the foundation (c. 3-c. 6) and mission of the Church (c. 7-c. 8) ; a fourth part (c. 9-c. 11) treats the nature and goals of the foundational theology Fiorenza has practiced in the first three parts (xiv). The goal of foundational theology is to establish a "reflective equilibrium " (in a sense I shall elaborate shortly). In each part Fiorenza criticizes the " foundationalism "-i.e., "the conviction that knowledge as a true and justified belief is based on foundations" (285)-of all the major alternatives. His chapters on the history of these alternatives (c. 9-c. 11) are the best I have seen. Still further, Fiorenza's introduction and use of these notions in relation to issues like the resurrection as well as the foundation and mission of the Church is powerful and novel.

However, permit me, in the interests of time and space, to skip over the many ways Fiorenza could be praised and turn to a single question-first in general form, then in three specific forms. Thus, first, although I am delighted Fiorenza has brought current criticisms of foundationalism into Catholic foundational theology, I am not convinced that all foundational theologies commit the same mistake (i.e. foundationalism), even if Fiorenza is correct that most of them do. My impression is that a Schleiermacher or a Rahner, for example, practices a method of correlation that is distinctly non-foundational. That is, both propose-in their different traditions and historical contexts-a correlation between Christian faith and common human experience while insisting that there is no foundation to mediate these two prior to the practice of the method itself. What Fiorenza calls the " circularity" of methods of correlation (e.g., 284) is not (in these cases) a vicious circle but essential to a world in which Christian faith and human experience are thought to be *constituted* by their *relation* to the other.

It would take a book to turn this impression into a reasoned case-a book whose central issues Fiorenza would know quite well (see, e.g., the

issues raised in Friedrich D.C. Schleiermacher, *On the Glwubenslehre. Two Letters to Dr. Lucke.* Trans. J ame:s Duke and Francis Fiorenza [Ann Arbor, Michigan : Edwards Brothers, Inc./Scholars Press, 1981]). I mention this impression not because I disagree with Fiorenza's critique of foundationalism and methods of correlation but because it relates to the question I have about Fiorenza's constructive strategy. Put simply, is not "reflective equilibrium " a politically focused version of the more subtle method of correlation we find in a Schleiermacher or a I am not sure whether this is a critical question or a question of clarification, for there is some ambiguity in Fiorenza on this score. Thus, Fiorenza offers a powerful critique of methods of correlation (e.g., 276-284); yet, when discussing the mission of the Church) Fiorenza seems to favor a method of correlation-as long as the two correlated poles are "historical" rather than "fixed" (228). Thus, the "Church's mission has, as its first task, in its political and social ministry the development of a political theology. Such theology would have as its primary function to uncover the latent symbols, values, and belief systems that undergird the particular society in which the Church exists " (227-228). Do we have here anything methodologically different from a politically focused, mobile and self-correcting method of

Even **if** some of Fiorenza's general remarks sometimes suggest that the answer to this question is " yes," his use of " reflective equilibrium " makes the question much more difficult to answer-at least at first. Consider examples from each of the three tasks of a foundational theology. The first task is "hermeneutical reconstruction," i.e., " an interpretation of Christian identity" (304) proposing "the paradigmatic ideals in theory and in practice, of the tradition " (304, 306). One discovers such paradigms, Fiorenza implies, largely by using Scripture in particular ways. For example, Fiorenza's reconstruction of Jesus's resurrection superbly emphasizes that this One's resurrection is only adequately dealt with in the context of doxological praise and narratives depicting the identity of the risen One with the One who lived and died (33-38, 42-43). Again, the Church is founded insofar as the " Gospels are narratives about Jesus *and* stories of Christian identity " (133. Fiorenza's emphasis). The mission of the Church depends upon Scripture's and Tradition's identification of Jesus with Wisdom, Logos, and Power (221f). Relative to the usual foundational theologies of Jesus and Church, I find these rich proposals. But here is a question. Where is the "home " of these doxologies, these narratives, these wisdom motifs? Fiorenza explicitly denies that the task of hermeneutical reconstruction is either historical or experiential (e.g., 305). But when and where do doxology, narrative, and wisdom depict a Lord risen, founding a community, and commissioning that community for universal mission? Where do we find the people who have the

historical and social ability, skill, and talent (297-98) to praise this God, tell these stories, and teach true wisdom? Can hermeneutical reconstruction yield anything but a correlational " crisscrossing" between our " considered judgments" and "reconstruction" of those judgments (305)-a crisscrossing which leaves us permanently "on the boundary" on the issue of the paradigmatically Christian?

But, the argument might go, when these sorts of questions are asked, we need to move from the first to the second task of foundational theology. We need to provide retroductive warrants, i.e., make a case that a belief can, quite pragmatically, "illumine experience and guide praxis " (308). We need to look, in particular, at the consequences of resurrection, church, and mission. Once again, the theological pragmatism that seems to be in the background of Fiorenza's notion of retroductive warrants sets his foundational theology apart from existing methods of correlation. The genius of such theological pragmatism, I believe, is to argue that how and what we know, meaning and truth, depend on what we are *doing* in addressing such issues. One weakness of theological pragmatism is that, thus far, it has had more to say about the " doing," the praxis, than that about the "we " who are doing it. For example, is it possible to distinguish retroductive warrants essential to Christian identity and those which are not? Sometimes Fiorenza's retroductive warrants seem to do this extraordinarily well; I think in particular of his " basic rule" about the Church's mission which nicely slices through the theological options on this issue (223) and also his rule for determining w:hat is divinely instituted (168). Yet, I am not sure whether such retroductive warrants on particular issues like resurrection, Church, and mission are distinguishable from the theological pragmatism that defines the notion of " retroductive warrant." And surely we do not want to say that theological pragmatism is essential to Christian identity any more than theological foundationalism is-even **if** one is (as I am) more sympathetic to the former than the latter. What then? Do we have here, once again, a mobile method of correlation that cannot cut such a distinction 7

But, the argument might go, when these sorts of questions are asked, we need to move from the second to the third task of foundational theology. That is, we must make a case for our background theories, i.e., make a case for those notions of nature, society, history, self and evil used in retroductive warrants. Thus, for example, Fiorenza's thinking on the resurrection presumes a view of historical testimony as confessional narrative (30-32, cp. 311, xiv, 46, 39, 45); his view of church founding depends on theories of intention, action, and reception (311, 111-121, 172, 237); his view of church mission depends upon a theory of politics and social evolution (311). Once again, Fiorenza has extraordinarily interesting things to say about each of these background theories. Certainly his

focus on agency, narrative, and language rather than subjectivity, transcendence, and experience sets his proposal apart from other methods of correlation. Yet, according to Fiorenza's theory of reception, " it is only through a series of diachronic receptions that one can grasp what is paradigmatic about Jesus " (121). This theory of reception, I suggest, is the core of any method of correlation. As in Schleiermacher's faith-consciousness of Christ, Tillich's interaction between expressive and occasioning revelatory events, Rahner's original event of revelation, the Christ who Fiorenza insists is unique Lord of Church and world is a "received Christ." But, then, where is the free grace which constitutes God's political odyssey in Word and Spirit? Do not Fiorenza's background theories imply a correlation between God and world which balances them ("equilibrium") at the expense of divine prevenience?

Once again, I am still not sure whether this is a question of clarification or criticism. This issue can only be addressed by a theory of divine and human agency-and Fiorenza himself notes that developing such a background theory would go beyond his analysis (46). But I cannot resist suggesting that the resources he mentions for handling the issue of God's prevenient activity (Rahner, Pannenberg, and Whitehead) may not be promising for those who think that the first (though perhaps not the last) metaphor for theology is "pilgrimage" rather than "equilibrium "-God's pilgrimage in Word and Spirit, and therefore ours.

I had the unusual opportunity of presenting a slightly abbreviated version of the above questions at a recent meeting of the Baltimore-Washington Region of the College Theology Society. Professor Fiorenza, while not totally eschewing the comparison to Schleiermacher and perhaps Rahner mentioned above, pointed out that his criticisms of Rahner and Schleiermacher have less to do with foundationalism than with their notions of experience, language, etc. He also suggested that his treatment of " testimony " might be a start at developing the view of divine agency I seek-and that " reflective equilibrium," rightly understood, does imply " pilgrimage." Others at the meeting proposed that my cryptic remarks about divine prevenience may imply an unsatisfactory way of relating grace and freedom. The context-a comparative discussion of Fiorenza's book and George Lindbeck's *The Nature of Doctrine-did* not permit all these issues to be pursued. The discussion also demonstrated that people of very different viewpoints will be challenged by Fiorenza's book.

JAMES J. BUCKLEY

Loyola College
Baltimore, Maryland

L'Homme et Ses Problemes dans la Lumiere du Ghl'ist. By RENE LATOURELLE. Montreal: Bellarmine, 1981. Pp. 386. $12.00.

In reviewing Latourelle's book, I first will briefly summarize its contents; then I will offer several positive and negative reactions. I realize that in my brief summary I cannot do justice to all that Latourelle has written.

This work could be characterized as a Christian (more precisely a Christo-centric) anthropology with an apologetic intent and is meant to complement the 1978 work, *a Jesus par leis Evangiles,* which in dealing with the origins of Christianity is a first apologetic step in establishing the credibility of Christianity. However, this latter work, says the author, "... must be completed by a hermeneutic of man himself. For Jesus is not only an irruption of God into the history of man; he is an irruption which reveals man to himself, deciphers, interprets and transfigures him. Man finds meaning only in Christ. Only Christ can accoJTuplish the exegesis of man and his problems. . . . The present work attempts to enlighten this *second* aspect of the credibility of Christianity " (p. 7). It deals with the question of whether or not Jesus and his message respond to the radical question of the meaning of human existence.

Latourelle wishes, therefore, to ground this second apologetic step solidly in man himself, for man is first of all a question about himself and the ultimate meaning of his life. He can no more escape this question than he can escape himself. He cannot escape the questions of who he is, where he is going, why he exists. As Vatican II indicated, people today are looking for a response to the enigmas which deeply trouble them such as: what is man, the meaning and purpose of life, sin, the origin and purpose of suffering, the way to true happiness, death, judgment and retribution after death' Finally, what is the ultimate and ineffable mystery which surrounds us, from which we draw our origin and to which we are drawn? Only Christ can answer these questions. Only he can provide meaning by revealing to man his vocation as son called by grace to the life and glory of God and by shedding light on the concrete problems of human existence. In him who is pure light man discovers his ultimate truth (pp. 7-9).

Having established his purpose and his correlative anthropocentric-Christocentric methodology or approach. Latourelle moves on in his first chapter to depict the situation of contemporary man as one which constitutes an unexpected opportunity for an encounter and dialogue with Christ. He classifies contemporary man according to eleven types, e.g. a religious or indifferent man, the man of leisure, technological man, the organization man, unidimensional man, consumer man. And he concludes that man today more than ever before is fixated upon himself, experi-

ences hi.Inself as being out of order, is a slave of his own creations and lacks meaning in the midst of a broken world for which he himself is responsible (p. 16). But this situation does not make man a poor candidate for the Gospel. On the contrary, the crises of today which produce protest, revoltl frustration, unrest and anxiety can become " the points of insertion . . . for the Gospel and can constitute the unexpected opportunity for an encounter and dialogue with Christ. . . . Man's awareness of his deformed image can be the occasion for him to :find again his authentic and true image in Jesus Christ" (p. 17). In a world which lacks meaning, Christ appears as the mediator of meaning, as the exegesis of man and his problems, as so many Christian thinkers have shown (Pascal, Blonde!, Guardini, Teilhard de Chardin, Rahner, Marcel, Von Balthasar, Legaut, Zundel, Solzhenitsyn). Each of these (discussed briefly) shows that man can be neither understood nor fully realized outside of Christ and the Gospel. He is an enigma to himself which only Christ can decipher (p. 26). Latourelle then points out that this sensitivity to man, his problems, and his condition is as old as Christianity itself, which is a religion concerned with the salvation of man. But never before has this sensitivity been so manifest as in the teachings of *Gaudium et Spes* and certain encyclicals of Paul VI and John Paul II (which are then briefly summarized : 26-33).

Latourelle then proceeds to the first major section of his book (" Trois Approches de la Condition Humaine "), which consists of four chapters dealing with Pascal, Teilhard de Chardin, Blonde!, and a comparative study of the three (pp. 37-218). In these chapters he very clearly summarizes the thought of Pascal, Teilhard de Chardin, and Blonde! and presents them as Christian apologists who were significant for their times and can be for ours. Each in his own way manifests Christ as the exegesis and fulness of man. " For Pascal, Christ is the mystery which enlightens the mystery of man, the abyss of misery and grandeur. Christ at the same time illumines and heals everything by means of an even greater Mystery (God). For Teilhard, the universal Christ as point Omega, as the risen one and pantocrator, reconciles all things, makes all things cohere and converge, faith and science, the cosmic and the christic spheres. For Blondel, the 'necessarily Unique' (Christ) is the way of light which clarifies human action" (p. 217). Although the perspectives and approaches of the three are different, they are in accord in trying to present Christian truth by accepting human existence as the guiding key.

Latourelle considers his study of Pascal, Teilhard de Chardin, and Blonde! apologetically significant for today because it can render more acceptable the historical encounter with Jesus of Nazareth, who is not simply a myth or a " gnosis," but the reality of God in our midst. However, this encounter is only possible to one who is open, disposed, and sincerely searching for the truth (217-18).

At this point, the author begin; the second major l!!ection of his work ("Le Christ et Nos Problemes d'Hommes"), which consists of eight chapters (pp. 219-372) dealing with the following themes: solitude and loneliness; relations with others; work-research-progress; the power of evil; autonomy-liberation-freedom; suffering; death; the God of Jesus Christ. In each of these chapters, Latourelle provides a concrete, experiential description of the problem and then indicates how Christ is the response to it. In the final (" Le Dieu de Jesus-Christ "), he notes the many false images of God (e.g. despot, avenger, legislator, the God involved in emergency cases, etc.) and claims that only Christ gives us a true understanding of God (transcendent-immanent, in search of man, patient and merciful, love). In a short conclusion (373-76), Latourelle restates the thesis running throughout the book: without discounting the insights of philosophy and the great religions, only Christ, the God-man, is the definitive mediator of meaning for and the sole exegesis of man and his problems.

I would now like to offer several positive and negative reactions to this book as well as raise several questions. Before doing so, however, I must confess that my familiarity with Latourelle's writings is quite limited. This limitation obviously may affect my evaluation of this particular work.

Five positive reactions: (1) The book is clearly written with no obfuscating language. (2) The expositions of Pascal, Teilhard de Chardin, and Blondel, as well as the chapter relating the three to each other, are excellent, though at times a bit repetitious. The treatment of the three could serve well as both an overview and introduction to their thought. (3) Likewise Latourelle has provided a valuable and concise summary of Magisterial teaching (Vatican II, Paul VI, John Paul II) .which pertains to the theme of his book. (4) The book exhibits extensive research, as is obvious from the authors cited. In his treatment of Pascal, Teilhard de Chardin, and Blonde!, both primary and key secondary sources are utilized. At the end of each chapter significant bibliography is provided. (5) The greatest strength of this book is that in it Latourelle employs a method or approach which has come to be called variously "from below," empirical, *a posteriori,* phenomenological. He himself calls this approach a "hermeneutic of man himself" (p. 7). In discussing man and the human situation, he does not present an. atemporal, static, essentialistic, *a priori* account. Rather he deals with man, human experience, and the human situation *in the concrete.* In so doing, he has presented an excellent descriptive account of contemporary *Western* man (presumably European and North American man) who experiences human existence as harsh, aimless, and meaningless without God and Christ. Any reader will profit from these sections of the book.

Three negative reactions and accompanying questions. (1) On the first

pages of the book Latourelle states that man is an inescapable question about himself and the ultimate meaning of his life. Hence the *wnavoidable* questions: who are we, where are we going, why do we exist, what is the goal of life, what is goodness and sin, the origin and purpose of suffering, the way to true happiness, death, judgment, retribution after death; finally what is the ultimate mystery which surrounds our existence, from which we come and to which we are drawn (pp. 7-8) '/ These questions constitute the framework within which Latourelle writes this book. Two comments:

A) To what extent are these today's questions'/ Do they not all *presuppose* that there is *pre-established* meaning to human existence (something Latourelle clearly affirms regarding the world and work on p. 265) '/ But with the increasing rise of religious indifference and atheism, can the Christian apologist work with such a presupposition '/ If contemporary man is as withdrawn from God as the author indicates, then there would seem to follow a collapse of pre-established meaning, if not meaning itself, as Nietzsche and Sartre have shown, and as Latourelle also seems to indicate (e.g. p. 16). But if there is no meaning apart from that which is constituted by the subject (which is tantamount to no meaning), and if "no meaning" is becoming more and more the *Zeitgeist,* then I am not too sure that one can presume that all people, even Western people, are asking these questions.

B) The questions as well as the problems of contemporary man considered by Latourelle and his response to these questions and problems (hence the whole book) are very Western indeed, and in fact very European and North American. They are not the questions, for example, of Latin American peoples or Third World peoples in general, at least not according to liberation theologians. The whole book pivots around the question of " meaning." In fairness to him, it must be said that he often states that he has in view especially Western man. Nonetheless, I still must question the lack of any attempt to integrate neo-critical perspectives into his anthropology, for example by drawing upon political and liberation theologies. Latourelle's anthropology is highly "privatized" and to a great extent "spiritualized." For example, in pp. 314-18, where he explicitly deals with the question of salvation and social liberation, he fails to do justice precisely to the relation between the two with the result that one has the impression that salvation is utterly " individual " and has little or nothing to do with social, political, and economic oppression. Hence he says that we accord less importance to the oppression of religious freedom than to forms of social oppression; we are not concerned about personal faults; we forget that salvation is personal; that Christ loved *me* and gave himself up for *me;* that salvation is for *me,* just as sin is *mine* (p. 315). For Latourelle social-political-economic

liberation is at ·best an *external condition* for real salvation but in no way is an essential moment of it. "In other words, we forget that the salvation promised by Christ is not earthly, but is to be found only beyond" (p. 315), words which lend great credibility to Marx's "opium of the people-pie in the sky" critique of Christianity. While Latourelle tries to relate Christian salvation (which seems to be restricted) to liberation in a positive way (pp. 316-17), he still in no way clearly shows (much less stresses) that the salvation of Christ *essentially* is not just a private affair or an "otherworldly" matter, but that it (salvation, the Kingdom of God) essentially (not just externally, secondarily, accidentally) has *also* to do with *this* world, its history and its structures, with me and also with *us*, since "I" cannot be concei,ved apart from my material-historical-economic-political-social reality.

Likewise on p. 222 Latourelle enumerates problems about which man today is quite concerned, e.g. salary, budget, taxes, inflation, unions, contracts, social security, ecology, the state of the economy. But these, according to him, are superficial problems to which Christ promises no answers. Christ's message goes beyond these peripheral, external concerns and touches man in his most intimate depths. I agree that Christ and his salvation have also and ultimately to do with the most intimate depths of man. But I question whether the issues which Latourelle considers superficial or external can be neatly marked off from some "inner core of man" (shades of a Platonic anthropology) or that Christ and his salvation do not relate also to these "superficial" aspects of man's life, precisely because of the Christian understanding of salvation which affects the *whole* man (and therefore also the whole human social-political-economic situation) and which even now is being made tangible and effective in history, a point upon which Catholics especially should insist if they are to take seriously Tridentine *intrinsic* justification. God's grace is truly to make a difference *now* in *this history.* In short Latourelle has failed to take seriously significant concerns and insights of political-liberation theology, and to this extent his anthropology remains quite traditional and incomplete.

(2) Second negative reaction. One of my major questions regarding this book is: for whom is it written' The answer to this question obviously is very important for evaluating the book as a whole. I take it that Latourelle has written the book primarily for Western man (presumably meaning European and North American man) who finds himself devoid of meaning and purpose. To this man Latourelle offers Christ (Christianity) as the resolution to his questions, aspirations, problems. Two comments :

First, Latourelle often indicates that contemporary man has already written Christianity off. It has become a stranger to him (e.g. pp. 221,

373). Now if this is the case (and to a great extent it is), then how can Latourelle expect his Christian solution to be a response to those who have already dismissed Christianity¥ It could of course be answered that a newly articulated vision or understanding of Christ and Christianity such as one can find in many contemporary theologians could perhaps resonate meaningfully for and with contemporary man. True enough. But that leads to my second comment.

Latourelle has not provided a vision or articulation of Christ and Christianity which in any way is new, challenging, or exciting. His responses to contemporary man with his many probelms are totally "kerygmatic," i.e. he responds for the most part by merely citing verses from the New Testament. This is sheer kerygmatic theology (verging on fundamentalism) which appears to be utterly innocent of biblical scholarship and the hermeneutical attempts at retrieval, rearticulation, and construction of contemporary systematic theology. As just one example of this kerygmatic response, I choose a statement from p. 317. "The radical newness of Christianity is found in the fact that in Jesus Christ we are given the pqssibility of leading a new existence because we have been delivered from sin and death by participating in the very life of God himself. In bringing man deliverance, Christ has revealed to every man that his freedom is captive and that he must be reborn from above in order to have access to eternal life (Jn. 3:3)." As a Christian I do not deny the truth of this statement. But I do not know what such language could possibly mean to the Western man whom Latourelle addresses. Do not such sheer kerygmatic (or biblical, if you wish) statements presume faith, Christian faith, acceptance of the New Testament as an inspired and normative text¥ But these are the very presuppositions which are lacking today. What sense does it make to cite random verses from the New Testament to non-Christians, former Christians, sceptical Christians, even many practicing Christians, to say nothing of the religiously indifferent and atheists? In short, the author has given us nothing but "undigested kerygma," which he himself seemingly has already granted is irrelevant for the times. Hence my third major reaction, which is consequent upon the second.

(3) Third negative reaction. Once a given articulation (understanding, vision) of God, Christ, Christianity ceases to speak meaningfully and creatively to people of a specific time, Christian theology is confronted with the task of transposing its discourse to a neutral and more universal arena acceptable to believer and non-believer alike, as was done for example by the second century Apologists in their Logos theologies. More specifically, Christian theology must show how and why God and Christ constitute at least a possible answer to the question which man is (his specific questions, aspirations and problems). This is exactly what

Latourelle intends (rightly) to do. But to do this requires more than biblical responses (positive theology) already dismissed as inadequate. It requires that one show that and how the question which man is is in some way a question concerning the Whole and necessitating the Whole, a Whole to which (whom) Christ is uniquely related.

To the extent that I understand Pascal, Teilhard de Chardin, and Blonde!, each did precisely this in his own way and hence could provide an apologetic which worked from and within a universe of discourse broader than and anterior to any expressly articulated Christian formulas, biblical or otherwise, and in terms of which universe of discourse the " ancient formulas" could be retrieved and appropriated anew. Latourelle himself seems to indicate that this is precisely the accomplishment of Pascal, Teilhard de Chardin, and Blonde! (see e.g. p. 203). In more recent times, Rahner and Tracy in their own ways have attempted the same thing. But it is this attempt to transpose the apologetic-theological discussion to a common and more universal ground, to which *subsequently* the expressly Christian response can be "correlated", which is lacking. Thus also the reader finds himself asking: why the lengthy (183 pp.) treatment of Pascal, Teilhard de Chardin, and Blonde!, since for the most part neither their thought nor their apologetic method appears in Latourelle's own subsequent proposals (219-376).

In short, Pascal, Teilharl de Chardin, and Blonde! attempted to show some type of *intrinsic* relation between the human situation (the paradoxical human condition of misery and grandeur; the upwards movement of evolution towards the noosphere; the exigencies of human willing and action) and Christ as a response to that situation. I do not see how Latourelle has done this, although to do so is his intention. At best, the only ones who could profit from his apologetic are those who need no apologetic.

There are other issues which concern me in this book, but they are somewhat secondary, not in themselves but in the context of the book. I merely note two. First, what does it mean to say " God dies for us" (see pp. 292-95) I find such theopaschitic statements, quite fashionable today, to be very confusing. How can *God* To point to the cross of Christ does not answer the question. At best it forces one at least to be more precise concerning the meaning and employment of the *communicatio idiomatiim,* and perhaps even to rethink the basis of the *communicatio idiomatum.* To the best of my knowledge orthodoxy has never said nor could say that the Son, precisely as *God* the Son (i.e. in his divine nature) died. I am not saying that Latourelle says God literally died. But the statement "God dies for us" in my opinion raises more dust than it settles.

Second, Latourelle makes several Christological statements which make

the ears of at least this theologian perk up. To say that "in the incarnation God created for himself a *body* (underlining mine) of expression through which he can reveal himself" (p. 361) sounds dangerously Apollinarian. One hopes that the humanity of Christ consists of more than a body. And to say that "the love of Christ is the love of God made visible; the acts of Christ are the acts of God in human form; the words of Christ are the human words of God" (pp. 361-62) again sounds dangerously Apollinarian, as if the humanity of Christ were merely a passive puppet or instrument of the divine.

My final evaluation of the work is that as a descriptive account of Western man and his problems it is successful. As an apologetic or response to these problems, I believe it fails.

DONALD BUGGERT, O. CARM.

Washington Theological Union
Washington, D.C.

Divine Revelation and the Limits of Historical Criticism. By WILLIAM J. ABRAHAM. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982. Pp. 222.

It has become commonplace for theologians to contend that certain traditional doctrinal claims must be radically modified or given up altogether in the face of modern developments in science and history. This is said not only of doctrinally marginal miracle stories, but also of affirmations whieh have been undeniably central to the tradition in the past, e.g., the claims that Jesus Christ was the incarnate son of God and that he rose from the dead. The whole vision of history as the scene of direct divine action has purportedly been swept away by the modern disciplines of inquiry which demystify our world and eliminate appeal to the supernatural.

In *Divine Revelation and Limits of Historical Criticism,* William Abraham makes this common wisdom the target of his critical scrutiny. His approach, as he says, is philosophical in the sense that it involves careful attention to connections of concepts and to the structure and cogency of arguments. His concerns, however, are clearly theological; he wants to defend the possibility of continuing to make certain classical Christian claims (e.g., about incarnation and resurrection) while fully affirming the intellectual authority and explanatory power of modern modes of critical inquiry. The discussion in this book takes place against the background of his first volume, *The Divine Inspiration of Holy Scripture* (Oxford, 1981). In this earlier work Abraham argued (contra "fundamentalist evangelicalism") that the doctrines of revelation and in-

spiration must be separated and that the latter can be given a form which is fully compatible with critical historical examination of the context and content of Scripture. The present volume focuses upon the concept of revelation and its connection to self-declaring divine actions in the. world. Abraham's project is twofold. First, he argues that Christian theology, in its claims about revelation, has a great deal at stake in continuing to speak of divine intervention in our world, albeit in a way that is chastened by critical historical scrutiny. Second, he argues that the common wisdom about the demise of the idea of divine intervention is more common than wise; crucial links are missing in even the best arguments on its behalf.

In the first half of this enterprise, Abraham's task is essentially one of clarifying concepts and displaying connections of ideas. " Revelation," he points out, is a polymorphous concept; the act of revelation can be accomplished in a wide variety of different particular ways. We must be careful, therefore, not to identify any particular means by which God reveals himself with revelation *per se.*

> One generation focuses on divine creation as the bearer of revelation; another in reaction focuses on divine speaking to prophets and apostles; another focuses on Jesus Christ as the bearer of revelation; another highlights the supreme significance of the inner illumination of the Holy Spirit; yet another argues that revelation comes only at the end of history. . . . In the classical Christian tradition all have a place. What unites each element to the other is a narrative of God's action that stretches from the creation to the end (p. 13).

Abraham's initial concern is to make clear the importance of talk of divine intervention within this narrative of revelation. In particular, Abraham argues that " divine speaking" plays a key role in the logic of revelation. The initial puzzle, of course, is to figure out what is meant by an act of divine speaking. Abraham does not go very far here, and indeed it is hard to see how anyone could. He denies that divine speech must involve a public audible divine voice. " Certainly I see no reason to conclude that God must use any particular vehicle to communicate a mes:;-age or word to people. If people can send messages without using voices, clearly God will have no trouble with this" (p. 17). The gist of Abraham's remarks on divine speaking seems to be that the doctrine of revelation needs to appeal to "some form of direct communication," (p. 19) some "direct access to the mind of God as he has revealed it" (p. 23).

There are two reasons why the Christian needs to make this appeal. The first is that overt actions alone remain an ambiguous indicator of an agent's purposes. This is a special problem with an agent who is not embodied. " Incorporeal agents who do not speak are like invisible men who are dumb. We are rightly very suspicious of those who profess to know what they are doing" (p. 15). The second reason is that we need

to distinguish between a "word from God" and a "human insight" (p. 19). The fact that the communication is from God is a sufficient condition of its truth (given God's trustworthiness) and a warrant for its special authority. Human insights, of course, do not carry this same reliability and weight.

Some questions arise here, however. It is important to note, with regard to the problem of ambiguity of action, that utterances are as often clarified by overt actions as vice versa. Abraham could grant the dialectical relation of speech and overt action in clarifying the intentions of an agent, and still make the point that divine speaking plays an important part in the doctrine of revelation. But this will make it much more difficult to sustain the stronger claims he makes about the peculiarly foundational role of divine speaking: e.g., that it is " *only* because God has *spoken* His word that we can have any assurance about what He has done in creation and history and about His intentions and purposes in acting in creation and history" (p. 21, emphasis added). A related point emerges when we look at the role that appeal to divine speech might actually play in supporting Christian claims about God's intentions. Abraham does not indicate any way to distinguish between a direct communication from God and a human insight in terms of the character of the event itself. An episode which gives rise to a new claim about God's will could be understood either way. 'The question about whether a religious claim is a " word from God " apparently will be settled by determining its truth and its authority for the religious community, and that will be determined in part by its relation to what the community already claims to know about God's purposes. Appeal to divine speaking, then, functions *not* as a *warrant* for the truth of the religious claim but as a *conclusion* drawn from the judgment that this claim is true and authoritative. In talking about direct divine communication the Christian asserts that certain religious ideas are anchored in God himself. But this does not provide an independent starting point for the justification of claims about God. Rather this assertion must itself be justified by its fit with other beliefs in an overall network of Christian discourse.

Abraham in fact acknowledges the need to provide backing for the claim to have received a direct word from God. If divine speaking cannot be identified by any overt mark of the communicative event itself, then perhaps it can be attested by some accompanying sign. Harking back to John Locke and J. B. Mozley, Abraham embraces a classical definition of miracle as a divine intervention which violates a law of nature, and he argues that miracles can serve as " signs whereby the credentials of an agent of God are to be secured" (p. 28). Miracles in no way constitute decisive proof of a claim to revelation, but they help support it in roughly the way the possession of a password or of special inside informa-

tion helps certify the authority of an intermediary in ordinary situations (p. 36). Abraham is careful to note the limitations of this analogy, not the least of which is. that in putative cases of revelation we cannot check on the messenger by going directly to the sender of the message. Most importantly, miracle claims from the distant past are quite properly suspect for all of us who live in a world where miracles seem not to occur. In the face of these and other well-known difficulties, why stress the role of miracle in certifying claims to revelation, particularly since Abraham acknowledges (p. 38) that a number of more subtle considerations are relevant The answer is that in Abraham's view Christians have a great deal at stake in at least one miracle, viz. the resurrection, since this event provides primary support for the claim that Jesus Christ plays a unique revelatory role as the incarnate Word of God.

At this point Abraham turns his attention to the idea of divine incarnation. His aim, he explains, is not to develop a doctrine of the incarnation or even to establish the coherence of the concept, but rather " to determine as clearly as possible what is at stake if it is abandoned" (p. 47). It is necessary to have some idea of what is meant by incarnation, however, and to this end Abraham comments on the considerations which would help justify such a claim. These include God speaking to the Apostles, the resurrection appearances and utterances, and the testimony of the Holy Spirit. Note, however, that none of this tells us much about what " incarnation " means; the link between justification and meaning does not work here in the way Abraham suggests. More helpful is Abraham's observation that there are certain aspects of Jesus's career which " transcend the human " and " match the acts that are used to identify God" (p. 53). Abraham refers here to J esus's control over nature, his power to heal, his freedom from any " sense of sin," his authority in forgiving the sins of others, and so on (p. 55). These aspects of the Gospel narratives do help specify the special relation of Jesus to God which was later developed into doctrines of incarnation and the Trinity. But Abraham's unclarity about meaning and justification creates difficulty for him here. The claim about J esus's special relation to God may be presented in the Gospel narratives without the narrative details being used as historical *evidence* for this claim. In saying the latter as well as the former, Abraham locks himself into precisely the kind of historicist reading of the New Testament that has fragmented under the impact of modern sch-0larship. Abraham, for example, acknowledges the limited availability of the historical Jesus but then suggests, without actually making the case, that enough can be known about him to construct a plausible argument that he was (and therefore is) who Christians claim him to be. This may be a bad strategy of argument not only because it is unlikely to succeed, but also because its emphasis on g-0ing "behind " the text to

its historical subject matter can obscure the point of the Gospel narratives (as Hans Frei shows so elegantly in *The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative).*

In any case, Abraham's primary concern at this stage of his discussion is to argue the theological centrality of the incarnation. This part of his argument is relatively independent of his understanding of the role of history in justifying Christian claims about incarnation. Abraham takes as his opponents John Hick and Maurice Wiles, both of whom treat incarnation as a mythological notion whose function is to express religious experiences and evoke religious attitudes but not to make a factual or explanatory claim about Jesus. Abraham objects to this on a number of counts. He doubts that a compelling explication can given of the experiential base for these claims and he argues that " it is surely much more plausible to see discourse about divine incarnation as a justification for taking up certain attitudes to Jesus rather than as a way of evoking such attitudes" (p. 74). He later makes the more problematic assertion that belief in divine action in history (e.g. incarnation) is "logically before" the experience of new religious life through Jesus (p. 82). But it is not at all clear that the experience Hick and Wiles describe presupposes the belief claims about divine action which they reject; a fuller argument would be needed for this dramatic reversal. Abraham is on stronger ground in pointing out that for Hick and Wiles there is no reason in principle why Jesus should continue to be of unique importance in Christianity. And he argues carefully and convincingly that Christian talk of redeeming divine love loses its primary ground and exemplication **if** we deny that God has acted on our behalf within human history and has quite concretely entered our condition to overcome the destructiveness of human rebellion.

Abraham now moves to the second stage of his project, namely, the task of showing that there is nothing in the presuppositions of modern critical inquiry which rules out in principle all talk of divine action in history. Abraham is not trying to make the case that historical study supports the Christian claims. Nor is he contending that historical research could not in principle overturn them. Rather he is arguing that the canons of historical and scientific inquiry do not require an *a priori* rejection of such claims. Abraham briefly discusses Ernst Troeltsch in order to set the terms of his discussion and raise basic issues. The historian's work, Troeltsch says, is guided by principles of criticism, analogy, and correlation. Simply put, the historian weighs evidence about past events (criticism) in light of the conviction that the present is like the past (analogy) and that events are connected in interdependent networks (correlation). The sticking point for the theologian is that Troeltsch subscribed to a "material conception of correlation" (p. 108) which restricted the range of historically relevant interactions (and so the terms

of historical explanations) to natural causes and human agents. Appeal to God's activity is ruled out of historical explanation. Abraham quite correctly points out, however, that this simply "makes clear what kind of explanation a person, *qua* historian, can allow" (p. 112). The historian need not insist that his naturalistic explanations are exclusive and complete in a way which would rule out all theological discussion of these same events. Nor do the historian's rules of explanation represent necessary limits for all critical reflection and intelligible explanation. A formal principle of correlation may be neeessary, i.e., that events occur within an interactive network. But to eonclude that "events can *only* be explained naturalistically is to embrace a disputed metaphysical doetrine" whieh does not follow from this general principle (p. 161).

If Troeltsch points to diffieulties for theology eontained in the prineiple of eorrelation, Van Harvey does so in terms of the principle of analogy. At the heart of Harvey's well known position is a broadly Humean argument. Any claim about an extraordinary act of God like the resurrection flies in the face of overwhelmingly well-established experiential warrants against it (e.g., that dead men stay dead). Very powerful rebutting considerations would be neeessary to justify overturning such expectations, and that evidence is almost certain to be unavailable. Even if some such evidence were in hand, it would not be likely to justify the degree of convietion which ordinarily characterizes religious faith. It does not follow from this that a miraeulous divine intervention could not occur. But it does follow that anyone who is committed to certain basic standards of rationality will find it very difficult, if not impossible, to affirm that such a thing has happened.

Abraham's fundamental line of response to Harvey is that he "has failed to do justice to the internal and contextual character of the believer's position on the resurrection" (p. 126). Abraham argues that Harvey has not observed closely enough the logic of the position taken by the believer. Claims about the empty tomb, post-resurrection appearances, and so on function as the believer's data. Arrayed against this is the warrant of ordinary experience for the belief that dead men stay dead. The rebutting considerations needed to overcome this are found in the wider Christian belief structure which understands ·our world to be the scene of an ongoing history of divine action. The coherence of the resurrection with the other events in this history gives us reason to suspend our natural skeptic.ism about such an occurrence. If, that is, one is prepared to affirm certain things about God's activity and purposes, these conditions may provide grounds for concluding that in this case a dead man did not stay dead. "What is in mind here is the theological elaim that God was doing something quite particular and special in Jesus: He was there incarnate, He was there redeeming and saving us from our sins,

He was there revealing Himself in a dramatic and unique fashion" (p. 135).

There are some important problems with this procedure. First, Abraham has told us that the resurrection provides the primary warrant for the belief that Jesus possesses a unique revelatory significance as the incarnate son of God. We now discover, however, that belief in the incarnation plays a key role in securing the claim that Jesus Christ rose from the dead. This, of course, is circular. It may be true that these two claims will stand or fall together, but they cannot each provide supporting evidence for the other. Second, even if appeal is not made to the incarnation, but only to other features of the Christian story, the problem of backing for these other Christian claims remains. We cannot justify our conclusion about the resurrection unless we can justify these other claims about God's actions and purposes. But in justifying any one of these claims, the same problems of circularity are likely to arise. Sensing this, Abraham again emphasizes the key role of God's speech aets. " It is of some importance that adequate *independent* access to God's mind be available as expressed in His speech-acts ... Without this it will be difficult to . . . give reasons why the warrants normally relied on should be challenged" (p. 135, emphasis added). But we have already seen that divine speech acts fail to provide an independent epistemological foundation for Christian claims. Indeed, the claim that God has spoken will be warranted in part by noting the miracles which accompany the divine message. But now we find that miracle claims require appeal to claims about God's purposes which, in turn, are rooted in God's speech acts- and so we take another turn around the circle. Third, the data which Abraham cites for his argument about resurrection (e.g., the empty tomb, appearances of the risen Christ) are themselves in question. Abraham acknowledges this (p. 136) and indicates that careful critical judgment is needed. Once again, however, the justifying argument here is likely to require, at some crucial point, appeal to other elements of the Christian belief structure.

If there is a way out of these repeated justificatory circles, Abraham does not locate it. Neither does he clearly enough acknowledge this cularity and reflect in a sustained way on its implications. One could argue that justification, if pursued far enough, is almost always circular and that if the circle of argument is large enough it ceases to be vicious. The notion that our beliefs are built up in a cumulative way out of a foundation in simple certainties has come in for a great deal of criticism lately. Justification may be a matter of assessing the coherence of a claim within a complex and widely extended network of claims none of which can finally be justified without reference to some of the others. All this, of course, is a matter of energetic philosophical discussion, and its

application to the justification of particular Christian claims requires some painstaking work. Abraham's discussion moves in this direction, but at crucial points his arguments thin out and leave us with assertions that are troublesomely *ad hoc.* Abraham points in the direction of a response to Harvey which would argue that in assessing certain Christian claims (e.g., about the resurrection) the theologian can legitimately appeal to considerations not available to the secular historian, considerations rooted in the wider vision of history which characterizes Christianity and for which (presumably) a complex, cumulative case can be made. But lacking an account of this wider case, and given only arguments which draw too tight a circle of justification, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Abraham's proposed defense of these claims begs the question.

There are aspects of Abraham's argument that I have not discussed here, e.g., his comments on natural science in the last chapter. But enough has been said to illustrate both the importance and the difficulty of Abraham's project. Whether or not his arguments are entirely successful, he makes it clear that the limits often placed upon what is thinkable in contemporary theology are not obvious conceptual or methodological necessities. Without denying the profound impact of modern critical scholarship, Abraham suggests some ways in which classical Christian ideas can be thought under these new conditions. One of the virtues of this project is its tenaciousness in laying bare the grounds for decisions to retain, revise, or reject these classical claims.

THOMAS F. TRACY

Bates College
Lewiston, Maine

Reality and Evangelical Theology. By T. F. TORRANOE. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1982. Pp. 168. $8.95 {paper back).

The contents of this book formed the 1981 Payton lectures at Fuller Theological Seminary. Ostensibly this seems to have dictated the second half of the title. It may also have prompted the publishers to offer this book as a major effort to transcend the fundamentalist-liberal dichotomy. In reality what we have is a summary of Torrance's solution to the ills of modern theology, together with the implications of that solution for our understanding of scripture, divine revelation, and truth.

The central thesis is relatively clear, for Torrance returns to it again and again. Christian theology must get its house in order by allowing the object of theological discourse to control the content of its thought. This is the point of the reference to realism in the title, and for the most

part we are on familiar Barthian territory mapped out in Torrance's inimitable style. At the outset we are told that theology must be bounded by the actual way in which God has chosen to relate himself to us in the world. Torrance knows for sure what God has chosen and how this is to be understood. For him everything hinges on a real incarnation of the eternal Son of God and a real indwelling of God's Spirit in the hearts of human beings. Without these we simply cannot know God.

Moreover, it is within the created order that God makes himself known to us and in which we human beings may express knowledge of God. We cannot speak of God except *within* the world in which God has placed us. For Torrance this is a pivotal issue. It means that human beings are priests of creation, appointed by God to bring to expression the inherent intelligibility of the universe. Indeed through human beings the universe is destined to know itself and to express its intrinsic rationality. We are nature's midwife, enabling it to give birth to structured realities outside of itself. Secondly, because we know God within the universe, then there is a necessary relation between theological concepts and physical concepts, between theology and natural science. For example, just as science must operate under the compelling claims of its object, the created universe, so theology must operate under the compelling claims of its object, God the Creator. Each science operates in accordance with the nature of the realities it is investigating. If we do not adhere to this proposal, the alternative is really subjectivism in both science and theology.

Torrance pursues the immediate implications of this realism in various directions. He holds that it creates a genuine space for natural theology. Indeed the traditional distinction between natural and revealed theology has to be rethought. Just as Einstein integrated geometry into physics and thereby transformed it as a four-dimensional geometry into a natural science, so natural theology must be integrated into what we know about God on the ground of actual empirical knowledge of God and thereby become the epistemological infrastructure of our knowledge of God. Moreover, says Torrance, this realism highlights the crucial role of empirical correlates in theological science, although the relation between experience and theory is a stratified one where theological statements and the empirical world are correlated not at every point but at essential points. One such essential correlation is between the empty tomb and the resurree>-tion. Torrance also argues that realism truly integrates empirical and theoretical ingredients in knowledge, for it grounds the inherence of theoretical and empirical factors in one another in reality itself. Furthermore, realism suggests that theological science is concerned with the distinctive kind of order that obtains in what he calls onto-relations, thus capturing the importance of those relations which are essential to the

object or being under investigation. Onto-relations, says Torrance, have their own distinctive kind of order in which form, motion, and being are inextricably joined. This order cannot be grasped through abstracting its form but it may be cognized through nonanalytical, empirico-theoretical penetration into its dynamic structure guided by basic clues which we intuitively apprehend as we allow our minds to fall under the power of its distinctive intelligibility.

In chapters two and three, Torrance explores what this means for biblical scholarship and divine revelation. In chapter two he poses a series of questions to biblical scholars, beginning with questions about the function of language and moving through questions about the relation of language to things and to connection *[sic]* to questions about the phonetic character of language. He ends by calling for a reorientation of historical research in a realist direction. Chapter three begins by looking at the relation between the divine revelation to Israel and the incarnation. The former prepares the way for the latter by developing appropriate forms of thought for it, but the witness of Israel is transcended and. relativized by the final and permanent forms which the Word of God has taken in the life and work of Christ. Both preparatory and final revelation are now mediated to us through the scriptures. Ontological priority still resides, of course, in the realities which brought the scriptures into existence, but the latter function as a crucial guide to those realities. A realist interpretation of the scriptures will take self-revelation of God with radical seriousness, for it must operate within the boundaries of the ways and acts of God out of which the scriptures arose. This means it must attend to the scope of divine revelation, respect the actual grounding of the biblical material, be guided by a framework of thought derived from the biblical subject-matter and clarify and check interpretations in accordance with the canon of ultimate truth. Torrance explores these four guidelines in detail.

Chapter four takes us back again to the heart of Torrance's realism, only this time we leave behind the analogy between natural science and theology explored in chapter one and are introduced to realism via an exposition of Anselm's doctrine of truth. Here Torrance expounds the stratified nature of truth, calling for three levels of truth: the truth of signification, the truth of things and the supreme truth of God. He then argues that the truth of God retains its own essential mystery even in the midst of his self-revelation, that the truth of theological statements is to be found not in themselves but in the truthfulness of their relation to the realities they signify and that theological statements and formulations have their freedom in the service of the truth over which they have no control.

This "book clearly deals with pivotal issues in theology. Torrance raises

fundamental questions about the foundations of theology as a cognitive discipline, about the nature of divine revelation, about the interpretation of scripture and about the character of theological truth-claims. The author has a very definite message for the world and once again he has proclaimed it with great enthusiasm. The message itself is not a new one, but it has been decked out with a great range of scientific and theological learning. Yet, even though I share some of the theological convictions of Torrance, I do not find this a refreshing or rigorous expression of those convictions. This may reflect a very basic difference of orientation, but in the last analysis I find this book long on rhetoric and assertion and short on clarity of expression and rigor of argument. Here is why.

First, Torrance simply takes it for granted as a *fait accompli* that God has made himself known in Israel :md in Jesus Christ. I share this thesis, but this is something that the theologian must establish in some way or another rather than just present it in a take it or leave it fashion. Torrance, of course, believes that his realist epistemology secures his starting point. It does nothing of the kind. Formally we can agree that our thought about God must be controlled by the object of theology but this says nothing as to how materially God has actually made himself known. Torrance simply assumes that he has privileged access to God's self-revelation and then insists that this must control everything. It would be a godsend to theology if we could make such an assumption. However, the radical diversity and disagreement that there is about conflicting claims to revelation explodes such a possibility. We can readily agree that the task of justifying any claim to revelation is bewilderingly difficult, but it is not solved by talking dogmatically in a loud voice about the internal complexity of the Christian claim as expounded by Barth and his followers.

Secondly, Torrance's appeal to realism in natural science is not nearly so secure as he thinks it is. First, it is an act of heroic faith to take natural science as a model for a universal epistemology. Secondly, Torrance offers no compelling warrant for taking science as the appropriate model for theology. To arg11e to this from the fact that we know God within the universe is just nonsense. We could just as easily argue for history as the model discipline, for surely we equally know God only within history. Thirdly, even were we to grant that science is a model for theology, Torrance's realist interpretation of science is open to serious doubt. I am very sympathetic to realism in science, but any such thesis must acknowledge the genuine force of non-realist alternatives developed by philosophers like Mary Hesse. Torrance is aware of the alternatives but does not take them at all seriously. He does expound a realist version of theology on independent grounds in chapter four, but all that is offered there is a modern exposition of Anselm's theory of

truth. We need more than exposition at this point; we need rigorous argument to show that Anselm has got it right. So we remain disappointed about the security of his realism in theology.

Unfortunately all this vitiates the rest of the argument. If Torrance had established his central thesis, then we might be able to agree to the application of this to various topics. These stand or fall together. Thus, even though I am fascinated by Torrance's suggestions about natural theology and even though I share some of Torrance's concerns about biblical revelation and divine revelation, I remain unconvinced by his exposition. For example, Torrance claims that modern analysis has made clear that there can be no logical bridge between the world and God. If we include Richard Swinburne's recent work in modern analysis, and surely we must, then Torrance is just wrong on this. Moreover so much is obscure if not confusing in his claims that one suspects that only converts initiated into Torrance's system of thought will find the application very stimulating.

One last word is in order. This book claims to offer a viable alternative to fundamentalism and liberalism. Some within evangelicalism have already been attracted to Torrance's alternative and more will probably go in this direction. Given my misgivings about this book, it will be obvious that I do not consider this a very wise choice. There is another reason for caution. Nowhere in this book does Torrance enter into sympathetic and critical dialogue with the rich and tangled history of evangelical theology. He writes from afar off without any deep appreciation of evangelical theologians like Wesley, Warfield, or Henry. Calvin and Luther get a mention, but these and their offspring are not the only representatives of evangelical theology. Serious interaction with liberal theologians is even less visible. Hence I judge this work to be a profound failure which neither satisfies intrinsically nor really offers a genuine alternative to fundamentalist or liberal interpretations of the bible.

WILLIAM J. ABRAHAM

Toward the Soul: An Inquiry into the Meaning of before Plato. By DAVID B. CLAUS. Yale Classical Monographs, 2. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 1981. Pp. xii + 200. $17.50.

The meaning of changes and expands dramatically from Homer to Plato and the course of its semantical development has never been satisfactorily understood or definitively treated. David Claus's *Toward the Soul* makes an impressive contribution to our understanding of this difficult problem. Taking Burnet's 1916 classic " The Socratic Doctrine of Soul " as a model, though later repudiating its conclusion, Claus attempts what he calls an empirical study of the important occurrences of before middle Plato. No presumptions about archaic logic, no anthropological, sociological, or philological theories, including etymological ones, no narrowly epistemological considerations or speculations about religious life are to intrude. The categorization of indifferently seleeted instances of or other relevant " soul" words on contextual grounds is his chief methodie strategy, and much of the book consists of eontextual descriptions of word usage. Claus displays great sensitivity to idiosyncratic patterns of meaning in the documentary record, whose causes are often deemed beyond recovery. The result is a cautious study, frequently negative in impact, whose main positive eontention is that the notion of a life-force is central to the meaning of throughout its history to Plato.

The book's first of three parts prepares for the discussion of by studying the pattern of meaning exhibited by other Homeric words used for phychic phenomena : WO>, *cpplv£>, Ovμ,6>,* and *μho>·* The semantics of these so-called " soul " words provides the key for understanding the meaning of in post-Homeric popular usage according to Claus. He argues that *v6o>* and *cpplv£>* share the root meaning of an immediate, concrete, contextually determined thought, and that the other words all refer most basically to the non-psychological physical force or energy responsible for a person's life. Other uses of these " soul " words, including the more distinct uses designating intellectual or emotional agents, are personifications or extensions of the contextual thought or life-foree senses. According to Claus these findings confute the usual view that these words in Homer refer to specific bodily organs, and that more abstract senses are developed from these concrete ones. On the basis of his contextual descriptions Claus sees no reason to read these words organically in Homer nor to accept either the etymological arguments often offered to link them to specific body parts or the notion that Homeric man's emotional and intellectual life is the domain of a range of discrete agents. That the archaic mind would move from concrete particular meanings to abstract ones cannot be proved, and idiomatic

patterns of meaning may well be in place by Homer, even if one presumes primitive organic readings for these words. With regard to this issue Claus contrasts *KpaSl'Y/,* which in Homer indisputably means the physical heart, with *8vμ6>,* and *μf.vo>. KpaSfij* never shares with the latter physical contexts involving strength, syncope, wasting and waning, and it is not " lost," " destroyed " or readily said to " waste away " as they are. The restricted context of the organ *KpaU'Y/* would not differ so markedly from the broader common life-force contexts of these other words were they actually signifying specific organs.

Part II, *"tftvx0* and Its Evolution in Popular Usage," studies the development of *tftvx0* against the background of the life-force words. In Homer *tftvx0* means either the life lost at death or the shade which persists in Hades. But the instances of *tftvx0* which Claus examines in lyric poetry, tragedy, old comedy, and in Herodotus and Thucydides, once idiomatic cases such as periphrastic constructions are discounted, show usage which matches the models of physical and derived psychological usage devised in Part I for the life-force words. Claus concludes that by the time of Homer *tftvx0* belongs to the life-force pattern of meaning and " it therefore shares with the other words a natural ability to act as a psychological agent of the ' life-force' type" (p. 97). In Homer himself a particular interest in *tftvx0* as shade inhibits this natural ability, which finds documentation in the extant record once Homeric preoccupation with the shade disappears. Indeed, during the fifth century *tftvx0* preempts the life-force pattern from the other words, whose use diminishes or ends, as it takes on a more positive biological sense of the life-force. Thus it succeeds precisely as a life-force word, not by taking on new psychological or occult religious senses denied the others.

Part III, which discusses the philosophical use of *tftvx0,* argues that *tftvx0* assumes two important and gradually merging philosophical contexts during the fifth century: *tftvx0* as impersonal animator .of the body and a personal *tftvx0* in a non-dualistic psychophysical union with the body. A short chapter discounts direct Pythagorean and Orphic influence on the meaning of *tftvx0,* and Anaximenes, Heraclitus (whose unique and extensive use of *tftvx0* is thoughtfully discussed), and Diogenes are seen to conform to the traditional life-force pattern. Claus does find significant change with Democritus, Gorgias, and the medical writers. A dichotomy of soul and body is applied to the living person for the first time, in conjunction with programs of physical and moral therapy. The *tftvx0* is seen to be a naturalistic life-force whose psychological properties can be grasped and managed for the well-being of the body, on analogy with medical knowledge and treatment. Claus writes (p. 154):

> In brief, if a concept of psychological soul gradually emerged in response to the medical character of the claims for soul therapy, it

> is likely to have implied that the soul is something internal, a single unified center of the man responsive to persuasion (rational or otherwise) and an entity around whose welfare the subject must somehow regulate his life.

This psychological soul is not yet the ontologically separate soul of Plato's Socrates, but important elements for the Socratic doctrine of soul are here. Sidestepping the " problem of Socrates " Claus uses early dialogues of Plato, especially the *Gorgias,* to show how Plato decisively " revaluates" (a favorite term) and transforms the psychophysical life-force soul of medical and sophistic therapy into the ontologically distinct soul which comprises the self.

Though this is an interesting and instructive book, not least of all concerning the relevant secondary literature, one may question such key features of its argument as the " natural ability " of life-force words to take on psychological connotations, the sometimes quick recourse to idiosyncrasy to refute opposing theories or to downplay the importance of recalcitrant textual evidence, and the relatively weak explanatory power of Claus's empirical method, which can describe but which limits its theorizing about the documentary record. The claims summarized in the two-page conclusion of the book are by no means negligible, but almost every one provokes an interest in further explication. The book has a bibliography, an index to citations of and a general index, but at least fourteen cases can be found where an author or an author plus date of publication absent from the index is mentioned in a footnote without bibliographical information. Other lapses-typographical errors; consistent misspelling of the name of the Heraclitus editor Marcovich-mar a book which as a physical product is exceptionally well designed and produced.

KURT PRITZL

The Catholic University of .America
Washington, D.C.

Selective Treatment of Handicapped Newborns: Moral Dilemmas in Neonatal Medicine. By ROBERT F. WEIR. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984. Pp. xii + 292. $27.95.

For the past fifteen years, Western society has witnessed the progressive devaluation of innocent, troublesome human life. *Roe v. Wade* gave women the legal right to devalue and destroy innocent unborn human life. But this right could not long be restricted to pregnant women alone, for the Baby Doe cases extended this right to others and gave them the legal right to devalue and terminate innocent, troublesome newborn human

lives. The Clarence Herbert case proyi.ded physicians with the legal right prematurely to shorten the lives of difficult adult unconscious patients, and in the summer of 1984 we await the outcome of the *Matter of Olaire Oonroy* to see if American courts will give physicians, family members, and institutions the legal right to shorten the lives of the chronically ill, bedridden, and handicapped. Robert Weir's book marks the epitome of the current secular craze to devalue and eliminate innocent human life. This book is not remarkable for its scholarly contribution, but for its audacity in arguing for the direct intentional killing of seriously ill newborns.

This is not an ill-informed book. Weir demonstrates that he knows a great deal about newborn intensive care units and congenital diseases. He studies the history of the practice of infanticide and notes that infanticide has been regularly practiced by society throughout history to solve its social problems. He wrongly implies that the Catholic Church has looked benignly on infanticide, for in fact the Church regularly condemned it as an exceedingly grave action. He implies that medieval law did not consider the killing of infants to be as grave as the killing of adults. In fact, medieval law did regard infanticide as very grave even though it did not involve disturbing the king's peace or the social order as the killing of adults Cl.id. Nonetheless, infanticide was a very grave crime and was anything but a small misdemeanor.

Weir notes that in recent years there has been a great deal of pressure exerted by physicians, attorneys, and various interest groups to change the laws prohibiting the killing of infants and regulating the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatments. Various physicians have expressed worry over the fact that numerous handicapped unborn children are escaping abortion and are being allowed to live. Weir discusses the views of leading pediatricians, pediatric surgeons, and neonatalogists on the withdrawal of medical treatments from infants with congenital illnesses. In general, he presents their views very accurately and precisely. In his discussion of the views of various legal scholars, he notes that some attorneys are suggesting that handicapped newborns should be legally classified as potential persons and not have a legal right to life ascribed to them immediately after birth. And these attorneys suggest that not all acts of involuntary euthanasia should be considered as either acts of malice or of negligence.

Even though Weir has a rather clear understanding of the legal and historical issues and current views, he adopts some of the most extreme ethical principles of the past decade to judge the morality of infanticide and neonatal euthanasia. He asserts that all newborns should be regarded only as potential persons because they are indistinguishable from late term unborn children. They should also be regarded as only potential per-

sons because they do not meet all of Joseph Fletcher's "indicators of humanhood" when they are first born. Only when it is clear that newborns can meet these criteria should they be considered as possessing all of the rights of a person. Second, he holds that the right to life should only be considered as a *prima facie* right that can be nullified when other rights or duties are judged to be more weighty. Weir claims that human life is not always a good and should not always and everywhere be seen as a benefit to newborns. Congenital illness can create such burdens that life can be a harm and death can be a benefit for some children. Weir argues correctly that medical treatments should be administered according to the "best interests" standard, so that treatments are only administered when they are judged to be of benefit to the child. If treatments cannot lilleviate the suffering caused by congenital illnesses and give only an existence marked by continuous suffering, then, according to Weir, they do harm rather than good and should be withdrawn. He uses the principle of nonmalfeasance to support his claim that medical treatments which cannot cure but only palliate congenital illnesses and only continue a painful existence should be withdrawn because they are doing harm rather than good. Since he denies that there is any significance to the killing/letting die distinction, he concludes that deliberate, positive acts of intentional killing are justifiable in some circumstances. When continued existence is determined no longer to be of benefit to a congenitally ill newborn because that existence is marked by intractable suffering, Weir holds that positive acts of direct killing should be undertaken because they will bring death swiftly and painlessly. This direct killing should be a group project which would include the death-dispensing physician, the Newborn Intensive Care Unit, and the ethics committee of the hospital. Weir's principle implies that newborns diagnosed as having Lesch-Nyhan or Tay Sachs disease should be intentionally killed by positive measures because the administration of medical treatments only causes them "harm" by continuing their painful existence.

Weir asserts that he wants all clinical categories to be treated equally. But he backs away from that position and later holds that treatments should be optional for various categories of patients for whom treatments should be obligatory. This exception would seem to destroy his claim that he is concerned with assuring equal treatment for newborns with the same clinical picture.

The author is eager to keep the courts as far away as possible from decisions to withdraw treatments from seriously ill newborns. Only if the physicians and family and institutional review board cannot come to an agreement on the treatment of a seriously ill newborn should the courts be allowed to intervene. His preference, however, is for physicians to have the liberty to treat handicapped newborns as they please in consultation with the parents.

Weir never seems to give serious consideration to the rights of newborns in his discussions. Even though he is a professor of religious studies, he completely fails to understand the nature of the sacredness of human life, for he sees human life as a value existing on the same scale as other values, even though higher up on the scale. He assumes that death can be of benefit to some infants, and ignores the words of Chief Justice Weintraub : " Man, who knows nothing of death or nothingness, cannot possibly know whether that is so ". Weir fails to see that the human being is a spiritual creature and is set apart from all other material creatures, which means that certain actions cannot be taken against the human being. Had Weir understood the nature of the sanctity of human life better, he probably never would have said that human life itself could become impossibly burdensome. Diseases and ailments from which persons can suffer can create severe burdens, but life itself cannot become a burden as it is a gift and treasure from God.

Weir shows a complete ignorance of the traditional role of the physician as a healer/counsellor, not executioner. He invokes a complete paradox, that "the principle of nonmalfeasance ... call(s) for the intentional killing of an untreated, suffering infant." But how can a principle of not harming require killing-the ultimate harm one human being can do to another'? He overlooks completely the advances in pain control. Practically every newborn can be kept comfortable and relatively pain-free. It seems that Weir's real concern is for the suffering family and the frustrated medical staff.

It has been stated that, while there are " untreatable' diseases, there are no untreatable patients." Merely because our technological armamentarium has failed us, we still have the resources that physicians have relied on for thousands of years . . . empathy, support, and compassion. Physicians are to enter into a healing covenant with their patients, not only for the welfare of the patient, but also for the benefit of the physician. In this covenant, the physician is to accompany the patient either to his or her healing or to death and not abandon the patient along the way. It is necessary for the physician to do this so that the physician can declare in truth at the end of the relationship that he or she has acted responsibility toward the patient and did not abandon the patient in frustration. Weir's proposals ultimately not only make the physician a technologist who abandons the patient when technological "fixes " are insufficient but enable the physician to become a killer when technology fails.

We should not be surprised that Weir's defense of nonvoluntary euthanasia for handicapped newborns has been put forth so boldly, for this form of euthanasia has been practiced for years against the unborn. For more than a decade, the unborn have had to pay the highest price in

order to allow our permissive, self-oriented society to continue. 'l'he appearance of this book causes us to believe that handicapped newborns will soon have to begin paying that price as well.

Pope John Center
St. Louis, Missouri
St. Louis University Medical School
St. Louis, Missouri

ROBERT L. BARRY, O.P.
AND
KATHRYN L. MOSELEY, M.D.

The Challenge of Liberation Theology: A First World Response. Edited By BRIAN MAHAN and L. DALE RICHESIN. Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1981. Pp. viii + 147. $7.95.

The Challenge of Liberation Theology is a collection of papers written for a conference at the Divinity School of the University of Chicago in 1979. It can be sub-titled *A First Response* not just because it responds to the critique of institutions and actions proclaimed by third.-world and especially Latin American theologians as implicated in a pattern of oppression, but, even more because it is a re-appropriation of many of the preoccupations and commitments marking liberation theology in its original Latin American form. Since we North Americans can evade these concerns only at our peril, we do well to give this book serious attention. Like any collection of work by people with diverse perspectives, it is difficult to summarize for a review. Some of the essays deal with problems of first world societies themselves. Thus Dorothee Soelle writes eloquently about the grotesque idolatry of a consumerist society in which Levi-Strauss can proclaim: "Thou shalt have no other jeans before me." whereas Lee Cormie attacks the fundamental economic structures of capitalism. The global attack becomes particular and more strictly theological in the essays of James H. Cone and Elizabeth Schussler Fiorenza on black and female liberation respectively. James Fowler highlights the varying directions of black liberation theology from the angle of his well-known developmental theory of faith. The papers of Langdon Gilkey and Schubert M. Ogden address the broader theoretical issues raised by political and liberation theology.

The two most provocative contributions, from my point of view, are those of Soelle and Schussler Fiorenza. On the one side, they are provocative quite simply because they are passionate denunciations of existing first world societies. In the case of Soelle, the focus is on the hedonist fascism which she sees reducing people to mindless pursuers of commercialized pleasure, and in Schussler Fiorenza's it is on the male domina-

tion of women through myths and institutions. Although their rhetorical edge is at times too mean to be liberating, I found myself, as a white, middle-class male reviewer, squirming as some probes came duly home. But, passion apart, these essays are provocative because they raise serious epistemological questions. For Soelle, theory and practice flow together so closely that she would have her "theology become a prayer." That seems to me a proper, even traditional, desire; but theoretical arguments do arise out of the most prayerful practice, and she gives little help in handling them. Schussler Fiorenza handles the epistemological questions directly in discussing liberation theology and biblical hermeneutics. She will accept neither the doctrinal paradigm of Jon Sobrino nor the objectivism of Juan Miranda nor the contextualism of Juan Segundo. Her way out of the hermeneutic circle is an " option for the oppressed " which allows her to fight all forms of male domination including the God presented in many parts of the biblical and theological tradition.

One problem which Soelle and Schussler Fiorenza raise is that the " option for the oppressed " seems itself to stand almost beyond discussion, indeed beyond reflective discourse. How does one reflect on options and oppressions unless there is some purchase outside the option itself? How does Soelle read or converse with white males whose normal sentence comes to her as unintelligible? How does Schussler Fiorenza avoid the balkanization of theology and of religious life? Why should their options be mine? Or should they? As David Tracy points out in his valuable introduction, we are brought back to " the crisis of cognitive claims." It is a matter which Fowler approaches in his distinction between different types of black liberation theology, some of which, including Cone's, he regards as functioning at an ideological level and others as transcending this level. But Cone himself allows the biblical material to have a distinct weight that Schussler Fiorenza does not. The concluding parts of the collection are Gilkey's and Ogden's more prosaic, but nonetheless penetrating, explorations of the biblical roots and the conceptual framework for a theology of liberation. Gilkey attends to the demands of the Gospel for political action with a fine sense of responsibility and of limitations while Ogden asks whether a Christian theology must be conceived as a liberation theology with his answer being, " Formally, no; but as a matter of historical fact, yes."

A side of the book which is underdeveloped and perhaps wrongly developed is social theory and analysis, and yet one of the claims of political and liberation theologians has been that they join theology with such theory and analysis. Two of the essays, those by Soelle and Cormie, move in this direction. But Soelle's critique of consumerism is too global to be fully enlightening. Every modern society including the socialist ones is consumerist under her description; and, revolting though the extremes of

a hedonist culture may be, some elements of advertising, commercialism, and consumerism appear essential to liberation at a certain level of social and technical development. Cormie provides a good synopsis of the common socialist critique of capitalist oppression of first world as well as third world people. No one can deny the broad validity of the critique, and still the situation is more complicated since capitalism continues to be liberating and oppressive at the same time and since alternative arrangements (real or imaginary) offer little promise of greater liberation. On a more basic level, the most serious problems of wealth and poverty, war and peace, cannot really be understood, never mind resolved, simply in terms of the oppressed and the oppressors, .oppression and liberation. One of the tasks of liberation theology, then, must be to evidence an awareness of this complexity without losing the single-mindedness whieh has allowed it to make so great an impact.

MICHAEL J. KERLIN

La Salle College
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania