THE BROTHER I HAVE KNOWN*

WHOEVER CAME TO **THE** SAULCHOIR would ncounter Father Chenu first in his courses. In philosophy he translated and commented on Aristotle's *Peri psyches.* In theology, in his courses on the history of doctrines (a term that he used instead of " the history of dogmas"), he treated the subject matter in relation to the doctrinal courses, while also .adding a few classes " extra formam." Of these latter I particularly recall one on the Fa.ith and Constitution Movement (the Conference of Lausanne had just taken place in 1927) and several on Mohler and the Catholic school of Tiibingen, which opened up one of the sources from which I subsequently drew much that inspired my own work. To this may be added the optional courses given in the afternoon, which were the most interesting.

The course on the history of doctrines was marked by the strong conviction of a man who believed in ideas with his whole being. One of the people who was responsible for his having come under suspicion told me one day that Father Chenu did not hold for metaphysics and affected an all-embracing relativism. I have encountered few people, however, who believed as he did in intelligence, in its act and in intellectuality. The history of doctrines, as he taught it to us, was the history of the search for truth; it was a drama in which one discovered how the great minds had stumbled in their quest for the knowledge of the truth, or had added to it-and what problems were their point of departure and how they

*Editor's note: When invited to contribute to this issue of *'.l'he '.l'homist* celebrating the 90th birthday of Father Chenu, Congar sent us this essay, written to honor Chenu in 1964 and never before published. It dates from the period of the Second Vatican Council when these two great Dominicans were colleagues in Rome. Translated from the French with minor revisions by Boniface Ramsey, O.P.

construed them, and with what presuppositions, misunderstandings and perceptions they had approached their task. One lived the problems in their contexts, as great questions of truth that had in fact anguished the spirit. Nothing was more doctrinal than these purely historical courses.

Father Chenu wrote that he had entered the Order of Saint Dominic for the sake of the contemplative life. Thus, totally open to his fellow human beings in the world, he was intensely a man of meditation. It is in this context and with this magnificent resource that he was present to men and women and to their problems. Reflection of a philosophic kind assures theology and every response that may be proposed of a depth that, without it, cannot be attained. This is a reflection on the *givens* of problems and on the concepts that are at issue therein. It permits responses to be renewed by taking the question further. It presupposes a profound intellectual life that is not at the mercy of the superficial flow of the sensations and of information.

I can picture Father Chenu now, at the Saulchoir in Kain (Belgium), coming downstairs every day at about 4:30 in the afternoon to take a meditative and reflective walk in the park. I can see him now, always alert and reflective, scribbling in a little notebook or on the back of an envelope a few words suggested by what he was listening to. A constant nourishment from within permitted him to make a constant gift of his heart and mind. It was a kind of intellectual generosity on the same plane as his extraordinary openness to others, to every question and to every project upon which he entered, in a spirit both fraternal and collaborative, as if he had nothing to do but that. Etienne Gilson once said of him: "Father Chenu pours himself out in participation." He often sacrificed what could have been his own work for the sake of pouring his wealth into the poverty of others. How many texts that appeared under another name were really by him!

During the very difficult time when the worker priests had been condemned and Father Chenu himself was the object of discriminatory measures, two young clerics of the Mission de

France asked him if he would give them their retreat preparatory to ordination. Shortly after, full of enthusiasm, they told me: They can't chop Father Chenu up into little pieces; the sap flows as full and fresh as it ever did!

In fact, after the condemnation of 1942-which was all the more painful for him because through him it touched the Saulchoir that he had wished to serve, and at the precise moment of the little book program to which he had given himself completely-Father Chenu began a new life: after twenty years of teaching young men at the house of studies, a direct apostolic service to men and women in the very midst of their problems. Never was he more himself. His reasons for serving the faith were stronger than the circumstances in which he was placed. His interior wealth always went beyond what he communicated of it. He continued a life of teaching and research. Far from a decent library, which he had helped to enrich, dividing his time between Saint-Jacques (Paris), where he had his books, and Rouen, where two shelves were more than enough for his papers and a few volumes, he produced the splendid fruits of his study: *Introduction a l'etude de sain.t Thomas* in *1950* and *Theologie ait XIle siecle* in 1957. But, enjoying an exceptionally broad range of possibilities for making contact with others and for work, he was in particular a man with a remarkable ministry among small gatherings of friends and study groups. Priests, teachers, engineers, sociologists, economists, worker priests and the Mission de France, groups from the thirteenth arrondissement, families, workers making the pilgrima.ge to Chartres, and how many more! Others have also been able to glimpse behind the veil of this life that is so authentically one of a friar preacher, a. life hidden with Christ in God. And in all of this, what constant resourcefulness, what freedom in the faith!

I have just used, perhaps, the word that is most exact and most significant. How often we have experienced in ourselves and in the persons of so many of our brethren the formal exactness of the Savior's phrase: "The truth will set you free"! I shall only evoke some of the dead from among our brethren,

who are now gathered around Him whom we celebrate as living. There are the names, the faces, the work of a Father Bernardot, a Father Couturier, a Father Maydieu, a Father Chiffiot, a Father Boisselot, a Father Gourbillon. . . . All of these, friends of Father Chenu and following in his wake, were, in a magnificent way, *free men* and men of faith-rocks of faith and models of freedom, authentic friars preachers. I remember how Antoine Martel formulated the impression that had been left with him after a stay at the Saulchoir: a vibrant faith. It is true. The Saulchoir at Kain radiated this in the life of study and the intense liturgical life that were equally and conjointly cultivated there. But, at the Saulchoir and later at some distance from it, in every sort of apostolate, Father Chenu radiated this in a manner entirely his own. Yes, a man truly free, in faith.

Father Chenu spoke much of the faith and often wrote about it. He said that he owed to Father Garrigou-Lagrange his vital perception of the supernatural quality of the faith, just as he owed to Father Schultes his sense of the development of dogma. His conception of the faith was that of Saint Thomas, as was his conception of theology: he saw this latter as the promotion of the faith in and by the cultivation of a historical and rational understanding. Who has spoken better than he of theology as a branch of knowledge subordinated, by faith, to the knowledge of God and the blessed? He experienced profoundly the movement by which the First Truth communicates to us His certitude which, by way of the believer's reflection and the rational process of a mind seeking to
stand what it believes, communicates itself with a reflection of its supernaturality to theology itself. As a result, with his irascible and fighting nature, remarkably gifted as Father Chenu was with that " humble virtue of indignation " spoken of by Pastor Andre Dumas, he joined battle against a certain " spirit of faith," which is experienced as something that needs to be added on in an extrinsic manner, if one conceives of the faith solely either as an adherence to a list of propositions of a metaphysical sort or as an obedience to an authority that is

completely external and more or less arbitrary. For him the supernatural knowledge of God that the faith gives was intrinsically and ontologically religious, alive and fervent. There was no need at all of a " spirit of faith," where one would meet with a rather pale and somewhat moralizing piety, inasmuch as the faith was radica.ted in its living supernaturality, indissolubly intellectual and motivating Christian behavior. His reaction in this regard went further still and was as much linked to his understanding of the history of doctrines as to his vision of the whole of theology.

These were the things that, as time went on, we used to speak of. Projects came into being. I had taken on the publication of the collection *Unam Sanctam.* Along with Father Feret we had, the three of us, started on the project, which circumstances would transform for us from then on into something almost fantastical, of editing a history of theology. Not of dogmas but of *theology.* One da.y, chatting at the entrance of the old Saulchoir, we found ourselves in profound accord-at once intellectual, vital and apostolic-on the idea of undertaking a " liquidation of baroque theology." This was a moment of intense and total spiritual union. We elaborated a plan and distributed the tasks among ourselves. I still have the dossier that was begun then. The project will never be realized as such, but it still has at least, in fact, been partially realized by each one of us according to his own interests and according to his capabilities, which have largely been conditioned by events and opportunities. It was not a question of producing something negative: the rejections were only the reverse of aspects that were more positive. One day the balance will be drawn up, but already the positive quality can be sensed. What would a little later be called "ressourcement" was then at the heart of our efforts. It was not a matter either of mechanically replacing some theses by other theses or of creating a " revolution " but of appealing, as Peguy says, from one tradition less profound to another more profound. When, in 1938, Father Gillet (the Master of the Order) summoned me to pass on to me the criticisms that had been made of me,

he told me: "You are being reproached for recommending a return to the sources." Of course that is what I was advocating and what I was trying to practice. At that time Father Chenu was greatly esteemed by Father Gillet, who often consulted him. From that time on, however, it was to Father Chenu as much as to me, and before me, that the reproach ought to have been addressed. But would it be a reproach today? *Ubi sun.t quite accusahant?*

I began these reminiscences by recalling the teaching of Father Chenu, and I let myself be drawn into speaking of the interior of his mind as a theologian and as a friar preacher. I should return to that teaching in order to say better what it brought to me, but I cannot do this without first speaking a little about myself. I believe, however, that I ha.ve understood that other lesson that Father Chenu gave us by his living example, and I employ his very formulation of it: Objects precede persons and, in particular, they precede every utility or tactic, even those that are ordered to the good.

I have always loved history. As a child I used to enjoy reading Plutarch's *Lives,* and I was much taken up with Napoleonic history. From the moment when, with the instigation and the guidance of the Abbe D. Lallement, I started on Saint Thomas (in 1921), I was drawn to a *historical* study of his thought. There was a danger there of sacrificing an understanding of the essentials to a taste for diffusiveness in citations and references. At the Saulchoir, while a. student, I made an effort to resist this strong tendency, and in this respect I was almost scrupulous. When Father Gillet wanted to found the Institute of History at Santa Sabina (the Dominican motherhouse in Rome), I was nearly designated shortly after, along with Father Raymond Jordan, to be assigned there. I wept over my laxity, over my infidelity, perhaps, to my vocation as a friar preacher and theologian, a. doctrinal servant of the People of God-an infidelity which, in letting me flutter around the edges of history, had left me open to be designated for something in which I feared a certain betrayal of my voca-

tion. This stayed with me. But the teaching and fraternal friendship of Father Chenu formed in me, little by little and in depth, the tissue of a theological life where history had its place, great and beautiful, at the service of doctrine.

Father Chenu taught history with a remarkable mastery of that discipline, in a way that was completely penetrated by reflection on and the search for the truth. With Father Mandonnet, he disclosed to us the historical conditioning, integrally historic, of that very research itself, pursued with a great consecration of the mind to the true and to the spread of the truth, which was a task eminently Dominican. He initiated us into the perception of the concrete and material character of the most sublime realities that we are called to live in time. Gradually, with the course of years, he himself came to see and to speak more and more of the economic and social conditioning of the historical process. It was not *despite* that, but rather *in* that and *by* that, that the mind would come to a fuller perception of reality, and thus to the truth. }'or myself, I confess it, historical knowledge and, if possible, a knowledge of history integrally understood (in the sense of Lucien Febvre and the school of the *Annales),* has increasingly been a means of intellectual and theological life, a dimension of the thought that seeks to seize upon that which is, the path of a perception of the true in which what is relative, when given its place, permits the absolute to be honored there where it is truly found. It was there that we encountered one another and were joined to one another, that we communed intensely in the same service to the truth, as if it were to a woman to whom we had consecrated our love and our life.

To this search Father Chenu brought a resource that we too rarely have at our disposal and that I myself would like to make better use of-a certain knowledge of, and in any event an instinct for and a concern about, philology. He has recently written a few enlightening pages (an article on the *Consecratio Mundi* in *Nouvelle revue theologique,*. July 1964). There he shows that, beyond the generic and in some wa.y material sense, a verbal expression has a meaning that comes to

it from the use that people make of it in a particular milieu of thought and in the context of a particular problematic. One uses words to say something, the real content of which depends on a certain social and historical milieu, and which seeks to express certain historically conditioned perceptions that cannot be imposed on or interchanged with perceptions that, in another era and another milieu, one would have been able to use the same word for. All of this, of course, without prejudice to the creative power of great minds. Relativism? No: realism. With the school of Christine Mohrmann we have come to know better the value of semeiology. Father Chenu was teaching this to us in the late '20s.

Father Chenu's recent apostolic intuitions, his activity with the Abbe Godin and in the mission apostolate (he was the first to propose the idea of the Church in a state of mission) , flow from his methodological positions first taken in other domains. Everything is consistent. He recognized the reality of " milieux " and of the historical-sociological conditioning of the apostolate before it was being spoken of everywhere. Perhaps he has sometimes over-used his discovery. I am not sure that that is true, however.

We were priests together from '83 to '89 at the old Saul-: choir, with the seminarians and priests of the north, with the jocistes and the Missionnaires du Travail. But I will not bring up these memories, as dear and comforting as they may be.

I write these few lines at Rome, in the midst of the Council, where the work that I am involved in forces me to put down my thoughts hastily. Father Chenu is here as well. We see one another infrequently because Rome is big and we are very busy. But we have had occasion to say to one another: When one sees where one is and one realizes how long the road has been, one can't tum back! Father Chenu is one of those who, with much labor, have broken ground for that road. How many things are ours thanks to him! One day Etienne Gilson, whom I have already cited, said, alluding to the difficulty of finding a replacement for Father Chenu at the head of the

studium that he had loved over the course of twenty years, including ten years as regent: " A Father Chenu-there is only one such every hundred years!" That was the expression of a friend, but also of a historian who knows human beings and who understands how and through whom the fruitful ideas of the future come into existence.

YVES M.-J. CONGAR, O.P.

Rome, October 29, 1964

TWO TRADITIONS ON LYING AND DECEPTION IN THE ANCIENT CHURCH

THE TEACHING ON LYING and deception that the Western Church has received comes to it from Augusme, who was himself formed by the Scriptures. Augustine's position, which is delineated at length in the treatises *De mendacio* and *Contra mendacium,* is relatively well known and has been analyzed by several writers,[1] but it bears repeating here.

The *De mendacio,* written in 395, is the more generic of the two treatises. Although the author was not perfectly satisfied with this work on account of its obscurity, and was minded to remove it from circulation,[2] he nonetheless did not do so, nor did he in fact ever retract any of it. Augustine begins by acknowledging the complexity of the topic that he is about to address, and he immediately removes from the discussion the joke whose obvious untruth is understood and accepted by all.[3] He defines the person who lies as one" who has one thing

[1] Cf., e.g., Louis Thomassin, *Traite de la verite .et du mensonge* (Paris 1691) pp. 1-74; Franz Schindler, "Die Liige in der patristischen Literatur," in Albert Michael Koeniger, ed., *Beitroge zur Gesohiohte des ohristliohen Altertums und der Byzantinisohen Literatur: Festgabe Albert Ehrhard zum 60. Geburtstag* (Bonn/Leipzig 1!122; repr. Amsterdam 1969) pp. 426-433; Bernard Roland-Gosselin, *La morale de Saint Augiistin* (Paris 1925) pp. 127-141; L. Godefroy, in *Dictionnaire de Tneologie Oatholique* 10.1 (1928) 558-560; Thomas Deman, *Le traitement soientifiqiie de la morale ohretienne selon Saint Augustin* (Montreal/Paris 1957) pp. 39-40; Anne Marie la Bonnardiere, "Le dol et le jeu d'apres Saint Augustin," in *Forma Futuri: Studi in onore del Cardinale Michele Pellegrino* (Turin 1975) pp. 868-883; Sissela Bok, *Lying: Moral Choice in Public anJ, Private Life* (New York 1978) pp. 32-46.

[2] Cf. *Retract.* 1.27 (CCSL 57.87-88) .,

[3] Cf. *De men<lacio* 2 (CSEL 41.414). On jokes and artistic deceptions, such as in literature, painting and sculpture, cf. *Soliloquia* 2.16ff (PL 32.892ff). Here Augustine distinguishes between the *mendam* and the *fallam;* the joke and the artistic deception fall under the *mendam,* whieh does not really have the intention of deceiving, whereas the *fallam* does have that intention.

in his mind and expresses something else in words or in any other way whatever." [4] Holding tenaciously to this definition, Augustine not only says the obvious, namely that one who mistakenly believes and utters an untruth is not lying (although he may be blameworthy for his ignorance), [5] but he also finds himself obliged to pass a more difficult judgment, the first of several. This latter concerns the case of two persons, neither of whom has a reputation for trustworthiness. One of them tells an untruth in order to save the life of someone who would not believe him if he told the truth, while the other tells the truth with the realization that he will not be believed, so that his hearer may act in such a way as to place his life in jeopardy. Augustine concludes by posing the numerous questions that would naturally be asked in this situation; but his definition, as he himself almost reluctantly admits, obliges him to say that the former has lied, whereas the latter, who told the truth with the intention of doing harm thereby, has not, whatever his culpability may have been otherwise. [6]

Following this, Augustine treats the matter of those sections of the Old Testament that appear to condone lying and that undoubtedly scandalized many of his contemporaries, besides giving a handle to the Manicheans, who rejected the Old Testament. After first citing five passages from both Testaments that speak against falsehood, he remarks that in the Old Testament "any event can be accepted in a figurative sense, even though it really occurred, and whatever is brought about or said figuratively is not a lie." [7] If perhaps a lie is really such in the Scriptures and not meant to be taken figuratively, it is

[4] *De mendacio* 3 (CSEL 41.415).

[5] Cf. *ibid.* (*ibid.* 414-415).

[6] Cf. *ibid.* 4 (*ibid.* 416-419).

[7] *Ibid.* 7 (*ibid.* 421). The principle is elaborated in *Quaest. evang.* 2.51 (PL 35.1362) : "Not everything that we feign is a lie. But when we feign something that has no meaning, then it is a lie. When, however, our feigning has some meaning, it is not a lie but a figure of the truth. Otherwise all those things that have been said in figurative fashion by wise and holy men and even by the Lord himself are to be considered lies, because according to the common understanding there is no truth in such a way of speaking."

either mentioned in light of what could have been worse (as Sodom is said to be justified in comparison with Israel in Ezek. 16.48), which is the case with the midwives' deception of Pharaoh in Ex. 1.19 (it is hinted that the midwives could have been worse liars than they were in fact!); or it is simply reproved, as is the case with Peter's dissimulation in Gal.

Having defined lying and having demonstrated that Scripture considers it iniquitous,[9] Augustine then raises the issue of whether a lie may not in some circumstances be excusable. May a person lie, for example, to save someone else's life? To this he replies that to place one's own eternal life in danger for someone else's temporal life represents an incorrect understanding of the evangelical precept of love of neighbor.[10] Or may a person lie to preserve his own purity from a ravisher? To this the answer is that purity is more especially in the soul than in the body, and that the ravishing of the body does not necessarily imply the violation of the soul.[11] Or may a person lie to bring others to the faith? But this would undermine that very faith, which must in all instances be credible.[12] Or may a person lie to prevent a greater evil, particularly when it would seem that by not doing so he becomes responsible for that greater evil himself? But one is always in a position to condemn both the greater and the lesser evil, and thus be responsible for neither; moreover, the possibly greater evil that befalls one is not a sin, whereas the lesser evil that one consents to and does is a sin.[13]

scf. *De mendaoio* 7-8 (GSEL 41.421-424). In *0. mendaoium* 32 *(ibid.* 512-514) Augustine writes that the midwives, like Rahab in Josh. 2.1-21 and 6.25, are commended "because they were merciful to the people o:f God. It was therefore not for their deception that they were rewarded but for their benevolence, not for the evil o:f lying but for graciousness of spirit." On the midwives cf. also *Enarr. in Ps.* 5.7 (CCSL 38.22).

9 Cf. *De mendaoio* 9 (CSEL 41.425-427) .

10 Cf. *ibid.* *(ibid.).*

n Cf. *ibid.* 10 *(ibid.* 427-429).

12 Cf. *ibid.* 11 *(ibid.* 429-430) .

ts Cf. *ibid.* 12-14 *(ibid.* 430-433).

It is here that Augustine agonizingly poses the question as to whether a man may lie in order to prevent himself from being defiled in the most horrible way-'by having excrement poured over him or forced into his mouth, or by being sexually violated as if he were a woman. Not even this, however, can defile a person within, despite the universal loathing that is felt at such deeds.[14] Augustine gives such weight to the opposing point of view, which would permit lying here, that it is sometimes difficult to follow him, but it becomes clearer from further reading that even this lie is prohibited, although it is most excusable.[15]

Some chapters later in the *De mendacio* Augustine presents the most famous part of his treatise, namely the eight degrees of lying, which are on a descending scale of gravity. They are: 1) the lie that is introduced into religious teaching, which under no circumstances must be told; the lie that harms another person and is of no profit to anyone; 3) the lie that is useful to one person but harmful to another, although it does not subject the one harmed to bodily uncleanness; 4) the lie that is told merely for the pleasure of lying and deceiving; and 5) the lie that is told for the sake of being pleasing in speech. These first five categories are to be utterly rejected. There follow: 6) the lie that is useful to someone from a material point of view and harmful to no one (as when a person misleads a thief as to where someone else's treasure is hidden); 7) the lie that is useful to someone from a spiritual point of view and harmful to no one (as when a person saves someone even from a merited death in order to give him a chance to repent); and 8) the lie that is not harmful to anyone and that preserves someone from the bodily defilement spoken of in the previous paragraph.[16]

In succeeding chapters Augustine investigates the New Testament, demonstrating that although the actions of the saints occasionally modify the strictures of Jesus himself, there

14 Cf. *ibid.* 15 (*ibid.* 434-435).
15 Cf. *ibid.* 41-42 (*ibid.* 461-465).
16 Cf. *ibid.* 25 (*ibid.* 444-446).

is no mitigation at all of the prohibition of lying.[11] The last great question is, again, whether one may not tell a lie in order to avoid a greater evil. To suggest this possibility, however, is to judge reality by human :;-ather than by divine standards, that is, to judge by custom and by what passes for good in a temporal existence.[18] In this light Augustine returns to the eighth category of lie, which exercises him through much of the treatise, and reiterates that purity of soul is to be preferred to bodily purity.[19] He concludes by mentioning the impermissibility of all eight types of lie and by expressing his anger toward those who suggest that Paul himself, in Gal. 2.14, might have been guilty of the first and most reprehensible kind.[20]

In his second treatise on lying, the *Contra mendacium,* written twenty five years later in 420, Augustine deals with a specific question raised by the Spanish bishop Consentius. The question is in fact related to the first category of lie, for Consentius had a.sked whether it would not be justifiable for a Ca,tholic Christian to undermine the Priscillianist heresy, which the Priscillianists concealed by lies and deception, by himself pretending to be a Priscillianist. Augustine responds to Consentius by elaborating some of the principles already set down in the *De mendacio.* Worthy of note is the idea of *causa, finis* and *i'ntentio,* which Augustine adduces midway through the treatise; all of these must be good for an act to be good, and a seemingly good cause, end or intention cannot make a lie not a lie.[21] Eleswhere he remarks that it is not a lie when something is held back that is better not spoken of, as when Abraham said of Sarah that she was his sister, which was true on account of their kinship, but passed over in silence the fact that she was his wife as well (cf. Gen. 20.2, 12).[22] It

[11] Cf. *ibid.* 26ff *(ibid.* 446ff).
[18] Cf. *ibid.* 38 *(ibid.* 458-459).
[19] Cf. n. 15 *supra.*
[20] Cf. *De mendaoio* 42-43 (CSEL 41.463-466).
[21] Cf. *O. mendaoium* 18 *(ibid.* 489).
[22] *Of. ibid.* 23 *(ibid.* 498-499).

is while treating of the New Testament that he distinguishes between metaphor and typology on the one hand and lying and deception on the other and makes the famous remark with respect to Jacob's dissimulation in Gen. 27.1-29, which was the act of deception *par excellence* in the Bible: "Non est menda.cium, sed mysterium." [28] In substance the *Contra mendacium* adds little to the teaching of its predecessor.

To these two treatises may be added two other *loci classici* in Augustine-chapters 18 and 22 of the *Enchiridion,* written in the year 421, and *Letter* 82, composed in *405* and addressed to Jerome. The chapters from the *Enchiridion,* which it suffices merely to mention, take up, once again, the question of whether a lie is ever permissible and give the expeoted answer in the negative. [24]

Letter 82 represents the last volley of a famous exchange of letters between Jerome and Augustine that took place over a *decade-Letters* 28 (written c. 395), 40 (written 397) and 71 (written 403) from the pen of Augustine; a letter numbered 75 in the Augustinian corpus and written by Jerome in 404; and finally the letter under. discussion. The burden of this correspondence concerns Jerome's interpretation of Gal. 2.14, where he says that Paul did not really rebuke Peter for acting as a Jew because: 1) it would have been improper for an inferior to rebuke a superior; 2) Paul had himself dissembled in similar wise, as recorded in Acts 16.3, 18.18 and 21.17-26, excusing himself by saying that he had become "like a Jew to the Jews in order to win the Jews" (1 Cor. 9.20); and 3) Peter was only pretending to observe Jewish customs anyway.25 Jerome's opinion in this matter is founded on that of seven other interpreters of the passage, among them Origen and John Chrysostom. [26] Augustine's view, first expressed in *Letter* 28 and finally pursued at length in *Letter* 82, is that the

23 *Ibid.* 24 *(ibid.* 499).

24 Cf. CCSL 46.58-59, 62.

25 Cf. Jerome, *Oomm. in Gal.* 2.14 (PL 26.342); *l!lp.* 75, *passim* (CSEL 34.280-324) .

26 Cf. 75.4, 6 *(ibid.* 286, 289-290). For Chrysostom's exegesis cf. *Serm. in l!lp. ad Gal.* 2.4-6 (PG 61.640-644); Origen's has been lost.

credibility of the Scriptures depends upon both the reality of Peter's dissimulation and the reality of Paul's rebuke, inasmuch as Paul swears tha.t he is telling the truth in Gal. As difficult as it ma.y be to believe that Peter should have acted in such a compromising :fashion, it is unthinkable that Paul's words, which carry all the authority of Scripture, should be false.[21] Some lines later Augustine takes up the supposed dissimulation o:f Paul, which is a secondary affair in any event, and demonstrates at least to his own satisfaction that Paul did not pretend to be what he was not.[28] The substance o:f this letter is thus perhaps less about deception as such (although Augustine reiterates in it his conviction that no lie is acceptable20) than it is about the credibility o:f the Scriptures, which is thrown into doubt by a possible untruth.

By way o:f epitomizing Augustine's teaching in this area, the :following points may be stated with certainty. In the first place, lying or deceit is defined as the lack o:f correspondence between the thing contained in the mind and the thing expressed in whatever way. Secondly, lying or deception of any kind is sinful, based upon scriptural authority as an ultimate :foundation, and must absolutely be avoided. Thirdly, there are nonetheless degrees of sinfulness in lying, as illustrated in the eight categories of lying enumerated in the *De mendacio.* With regard to this third point, however, it should be noted that Augustine does not always seem to give sufficient weight to the moral differences among the categories, as when he says in *De mendacio* 9 that the person who lies to save someone else's life (which according to him would be one of the least culpable forms of lying) is in danger of damnation.[30] At other times, though, he shows himself very sympathetic to the person who resorts to lying or deception in order to extricate himself or someone else from what seems to be an otherwise impossible situation. Fourthly and finally, the lies and decep-

21 Cf. *JiJp.* 82, esp. 4, 7 (CSEL 34.355, 356-357).
2S Cf. *ibid.* Sff *(ibid.* 357ff).
29Cf. *ibid.* 21 *(ibid.* 373-374).
so Cf. CSEL 41.426-427.

tions that the Old Testament appears to commend are in many cases to be explained as types and figures, while in other cases a distinction may be made between the lie itself, which is reprehensible, and the praiseworthy intention of the one lying-a distinction that is not usually made in the biblical narratives.

Whence comes this teaching? Augustine has obviously been profoundly influenced by scriptural prohibitions of lying and deceit, and in particular by Ps. 5.6-7 ("You hate all evildoers; you destroy all who speak falsehood") and Mt. 5.87 ("Say, 'Yes' when you mean 'Yes' and 'No' when you mean 'No'"), both of which he cites several times when treating of the subject.

Also at play here, however, is the particularly Augustinian mystique of truth. This truth is first of all the divine person, as expressed, for example, in a section from the *De mendacio:*

> The truth of doctrine, religion and piety cannot be violated except by a lie. But the highest and most intimate Truth itself, whose doctrine this is, cannot be violated at all. To arrive at this, to remain in it completely and to adhere to it thoroughly shall not be permitted until the corruptible has put on incorruptibility and the mortal immortality (cf. I Cor. 15.53).[31]

The Truth in its fullness is, therefore, like God himself, because identical with God himself, beyond our grasp in the here and now, although Augustine goes on to say that the practice of virtue in this life is an exercise for the attainment of that Truth, and that holy words and deeds *(humanis verbis et corporeorum sacramentorum signaculis)* hint at it.[32] The identifica.tion of Truth and God, and the consequent apostrophizing of that Truth, is an Augustinian characteristic that appears in the *Contra mendacium,* for instance ("... where shall I take refuge except in you, O Truth? "[33]), but perhaps most frequently and familiarly in *The Confessions.* There we may read the anguished cry: "O Truth, Truth, how deeply then

[31] *De mendacio* 40 *(ibid.* 461).
[32] Cf. *ibid. (ibid.)* •
[33] *C. mendacium* 40 *(ibid.* 524).

did even the marrow of my mind sigh after you!"[34] Or in other places: "O eternal Truth and true Charity and beloved Eternity!"[35] "When have you not walked with me, O Truth ...?"[36] These are but a random sampling.

Another aspect of this mystique is the identification of truth with chastity, which occurs in *De mendacio* 40, where truth is spoken of as "the chastity of the soul *(animi)*," which cannot be injured even when the body is itself ravished.[37] Of at least equal significance is the clear subordination in the *Contra mendacium* of bodily chastity to the truth, "because all chastity comes from truth, but truth is the chastity of the soul *(mentis)* and not of the body, and even the chastity of the body resides in the soul (in *mente)*."[38] The importance of such statements, particularly the latter, can only be appreciated when one realizes the extreme reverence in which the Fathers of the Church held precisely bodily chastity. It was an age in which Augustine's contemporary and master, Ambrose, would suggest that suicide was allowable for a virgin who could find no other way to escape from the hands of a ravisher.[39] Augustine's measured refusal to accept this position, in the first book of *The City of God*,[40] is of a piece with his refusal to let truth be undercut for the sake of this same bodily chastity.

This opens up on to a further source for Augustine's teaching

34 *Conf.* 3.6.10 (CCSL 27.31).

35 *Ibid.* 7.10.16 *(ibid.* 103).

36 *Ibid.* 10.40.65 *(ibid.* 190).

37 Cf. CSEL 41.460-461.

38 Cf. *C. mendacium* 38 *(ibid.* 522).

39 Cf. *De virginibus* 3.7.32-37 (PL 16.229-232). For a virgin's use of deception that leads to suicide, which is intended to protect her from being ravished, cf. *History of the Patriarchs of the Coptic Church of Alexandria* 1.18 (Patr. Orient. 5.163-164). The event in question supposedly occurred during the patriarchy of Michael I (744-768) and is recounted by the Monophysite editor of the *History* with obvious admiration. The story demonstrates the durability of the idea that chastity is a greater good than veracity or self-preservation.

40 Cf. *De civ. Dei* 1.17ff (CCSL 47.18ff).

on lying and deception, namely the complete relativity which he imputes to any temporal reality whatsoever, be it the most exalted, such as chastity or virginity. Augustine's unwillingness to accept a lie under any circumstances at all—even to protect someone from rape, death or the most loathsome uncleanness—is consistent with his belief in the absolute precedence of eternal with respect to temporal goods. This belief is conveniently illustrated in the first pages of *The City of God,* where Augustine can discuss the mayhem that occurred in Alaric's sack of Rome in the year 410, an event whose effect on the psyche of the contemporary Mediteranean world can hardly be overestimated, with something akin to serenity: "They [some of the survivors] lost all that they had. Did they lose their faith, their piety or the possessions of the interior person, who is rich before God? This is the wealth of Christians. . . ."[41] And a little later: "But many Christians were also slain, many were carried off in a horrible variety of deaths. Yet if this is difficult to bear, still it is common to all who have been born into this life. This I know, that no one ever died who was not going to die at some time or other."[42] Life, wealth and even bodily chastity are temporal realities that can sometimes be dispensed with; but truth partakes of the eternal.

This conviction is in turn founded, finally, upon the idea of a hierarchy of love, which is clearly outlined in the treatise *On Christian Doctrine.* The first thing to be loved is that which is above us, namely God; the second is ourselves, meaning our souls; the third is that which is on a level with us, namely our neighbors; and the fourth is that which is beneath us, namely our own and our neighbors' bodies.[43] This hierarchy, based upon the two great commandments of love in Mt. 22.37-39,[44] then demands that some goods be preferred to others.[45] For

[41] *Ibid.* 1.10 *(ibid.* 10).
[42] *Ibid.* 1.11 *(ibid.* 12-13).
[43] Cf. *De doct. christ.* 1.23.22 (CCSL 32.18).
[44] Cf. *ibid.* 1.26.27 *(ibid.* 21-22).
[45] Cf. *ibid.* 1.27.28 *(ibid.* 22).

this reason Augustine can say that lying to save another's body from death is a perversion of the commandment of love of neighbor because it mistakenly subordinates the soul of one person to the body of another.[46]

These things then-the authority of Scripture, the mystique of truth, the relativity of temporal goods and the hierarchy of love-are variously responsible for the absolute prohibition of lying and deception in Augustine's writings.

It was this absolute prohibition, stamped with all the weight of Augustine's considerable authority, that formed the tradition on lying that was embraced by the Western Church, however that tradition might have been modified later by such theories as "mental reservation." This was the tradition passed on by Augustine's most influential student, Gregory the Great (d. 604), as we may see in his *Moralia in lob,* which served into the Middle Ages as the great Western Christian textbook on morality.

Commenting on Job 27.3-4 ("So long as I still have life in me and the Spirit of God is in my nostrils, my lips shall not speak iniquity nor my tongue meditate a lie"), Gregory affirms the Augustinian doctrine that all lying is evil: "All lying is most greatly to be avoided, although sometimes there is a kind of lying that is less culpable, as when a person lies in order to be of assistance." While it is true that this kind of sin is the most forgivable, it is wrong to assert that it is not a sin at all. Those who are of this opinion use the story of the Hebrew midwives' dissembling in Ex. 1 to defend their position, since it is written that "the Lord built up families for them" by way of reward (Ex. 1.21). Gregory uses this verse to show, however, that what they received as an earthly reward for their well-intentioned lying was in place of the eternal reward that they would have received had they not lied at all. "And if the matter is carefully investigated," Gregory remarks, displaying an acute knowledge of human motivation, "it was for love of the present life that they lied, not with the

[46] Cf. n. 10 *supra.*

hope of a reward [in the life to come]; for while it is true tha.t by sparing them they sought to save the lives of the infants, by lying they sought to save their own."

Gregory concludes by saying that while lying may have occurred in the Old Testament, it is almost never admitted by the perfect. Moreover, lying was less culpable under the Old Covenant in any event, inasmuch as the people of that Covenant lived not in the truth but in the shadow of the truth. And if a person living in the time since the Truth appeared in the flesh wishes to justify a lie by having recourse to the Old Testament, he will be obliged as well to justify the seizing of others' property and the retribution of injuries, which were conceded to that people in their weakness.[47] Thus Gregory seems less willing to accept the theory that the Old Testament lies were really figures than does Augustine; more the moralist, perhaps, he sees them simply as lies, albeit of diminished culpability.

Finally we can call attention briefly to Thomas Aquinas, who in the *Summa theologiae* repeats Augustine's strictures against lying. In Question 110 of the *Secunda secunda.e* he cites Augustine nearly twenty times in the course of four articles. Notably, he accepts Augustine's eightfold division of lying[48] and deals with both the midwives of Ex. 1[49] and the lies and deceptions of the Old Testament in general[50] as his master does. It is also interesting to see that he quotes Gregory the Great's opinion on the midwives at one point.[51] Although Thomas is beyond the period of time envisioned by this essay, it is useful to notice how much he depends on Augustine and how he passes on his teaching to succeeding generations.

* *

In a sermon falsely attributed to Maximus, bishop of Turin (d. between 408 and 423), we may read an interesting story

47 Cf. *Moralia in lob* 18.3.5-7 (CCSL 143A.888-889).
48 Cf. 2a-2ae, q. 110, a. 2, c.
49 Cf. *ibid.* a. 3, ad 2.
50 Cf. *ibid.* a. 3, ad 2.
51 Cf. *ibid.* a. 4, 4° and ad 4.

about Eusebius, bishop of Vercelli (d. 371), and his confrere in the episcopate, Dionysius of Milan (d. after 362).

> When the hateful perfidy of the Arians had thrown all of Italy into tumult, along with the rest of the world, and the priests of this plague had taken captive the martyr Saint Dionysius in his simplicity, having enchained him by his signature, in his cleverness Eusebius freed him from their hands. For as the holy Apostle says: "I became like a Jew to the Jews in order to win the Jews" (I Cor. 9. so also Saint Eusebius feigned that he was a heretic in order to snatch his son from heresy. For he said that he agreed to their perfidy and that it pleased him that they had placed Dionysius before themselves in the signing, but that he was greatly disturbed that they had put his son before him. "You," he told them, " who say that the Son of God cannot be equal to God the Father, why have you placed my son before me?" Swayed by this reasoning, they immediately erased Saint Dionysius's signature and offered the first place for signing to the blessed Eusebius. Upbraiding them and laughing at them he said: " I will not pollute mys·elf with your crimes nor permit my son to participate with you." Therefore, when the Gospel says that in this generation the children of darkness are more astute than the children of light (cf. Lk. 16.8), behold: here a son of light has been found who is more astute than the darkness itself.[52]

With this sermon, probably preached in northern Italy shortly after Eusehius's death, i.e. some twenty years before the *De mendacio* was written, we are in what appears to he a world fa.r removed from that of Augustine's moral austerity. The anonymous preacher has used the passage from Paul to justify Eusebius's deception that Augustine would, several decades fater, spend time meticulously explaining in *Letter* 82 as words of compassion rather than deceit. And the lie that the preacher praises is precisely of the kind that Augustine condemns as worst, namely that which touches upon religious doctrine and which he forbade to Consentius. Whether Eusehius ever really did what the preacher says he did is nearly irrelevant; the point is, of course, that the action-imaginary or real-is presented to a congregation in a homily, the traditional vehicle

[52] Ps.-Maximus, *Serm.* 7.3 (CCSL 23.25-26).

for imparting moral values to a Christian community, as laudable.

That there could have been another way of looking at the truth in the early Church might perhaps have been evident from Jerome's remarks on Gal. 2 (he is otherwise guiltless of defending deception), but that would hardly have prepared us for Pseudo-Maximus and his blatant narrative. This other tradition has in fact already been analyzed to some degree;[53] it will be the goal of the remainder of this essay to offer examples of the second tradition, to submit them to further analysis and to draw what conclusions are possible. First we sha.ll draw attention to some texts that in some way justify the use of lying and deception.

As early as the end of the second century Clement of Alexandria (d. after 202) could write in praise of truth, saying that the perfect (or " gnostic ") Christian would not lie even if he were to die under torture for his refusal to do so.[54] A few lines later, however, he makes an exception for an occasional " therapeutic" deception of the type practiced by physicians toward their patients, alluding to Paul's supposed dissimulations in Acts 16.3 and 1 Cor. 9.20 as his justification. The perfect Christian deceives in this way " for the salvation of those for whose sake he practices accommodation, not dissembling under stress of the danger which threatens the righteous from those who are jealous of them." [55] But Clement does not oblige us by offering an example of this acceptable kind of deception.

Origen (d. c. 254) mentions a rather less exalted and more common form of permissible deception in his now lost *Stro-*

53 Cf. Thomassin, pp. 129-1!JO (where this second tradition is explained away to the extent possible); Schindler, pp. 421-425; Godefroy, 560-561.

54 Cf. *Strom.* 7.8.50-51 (GCS Clem. Al. 3.37-38). It is interesting that this and the following passage do not seem to have received the attention from Clement's commentators that they merit.

55 *Ibid.* 7.9.53 *(ibid.* 39), trans. by J. B. Mayor, in J. E. L. Oulton and Henry Chadwick, eds., *Library of Christian Classics 2: Alemandrian Christianity* (London 1954) p. 127. Cf. also *ibid.* 6.15.123-124 (GCS Clem. Al. 2.494).

mata, of which a passage from the sixth book has been preserved in Jerome's *Apology aga.instRufinus.* First Origen cites some lines from Plato's *Republic* that advocate just such a restricted use of deception as he is going to speak of.[56] He remarks that there are times when the truth may be presented in an ambiguous or veiled manner, but other times when an outright lie should be employed.

The person on whom the necessity of lying occasionally falls must be very careful to use a lie in the manner of a seasoning or a medicine, so as not to exceed the proper measure or go beyond the limits observed by Judith with respect to Holofernes. [There follow other examples from the Old Testament.] . . . Hence it is clear that, unless we have lied in such a way as to seek some great good, we shall be judged as the enemies of the one who said: " I am the truth" (cf. Jn. 14.6).

It is worthy of note that Jerome quotes Origen in order to repudiate what he says.[57]

Another kind of deception-this time one with a divine provenance-appears in Origen's *Contra Celsum,* an immense apology written in response to the pagan Celsus's objections to Christianity. Here Origen is discussing a theme dear to him, namely that the Word of God adapts himself to the capacities of those who are to receive him, and in so doing " he does not deceive or lie." [58] Inasmuch as Celsus, however, had held this to be deceptive,[59] Origen retorts that Celsus himself had made an exception for a physician's lie. Even supposing that it were a deception, " what is the matter with this means if it was useful for salvation? " For the human race was sick, and the

[56] Cf. *Repub.* 389 B.

[57] O. *Rufinum* 1.18 (CCSL 79.17-18). Thomassin, p. 157, remarks: "Jene voy pas qu'il soit fort necessaire de nous mettre en peine de justifier Origene sur le mensonge, non plus que Platon, qu'il a quelquefois suivy trop inconsiderement, en je ne combien d'autres points .que l'Eglise a desapprouvez."

[58] Cf. *O. Oelsum* 4.18 (SC 136.226-228).

[50] Cf. *ibid.* *(ibid.* 224).

Word would have done certain things not by choice but because constrained to do them by circumstances.[60] The Word, like Clement's perfect Christian, adapts or accommodates himself to others for the sake of their salvation.

Similar to the passage in the *Contra Celsum* is one in Origen's twentieth homily on Jeremiah-on Jer. 20 7ff ("You duped me, 0 Lord, and I let myself be duped ... "). Here as well it is a question of a deception practiced by God for the sake of accomplishing a good, in the manner of a physician who hides a bitter medicine under something sweet-tasting or the father of a family who, on the other hand, conceals a loving heart under threatening gestures.[61] An example. of a useful deception of this sort (although here Origen is really speaking of ignorance tha.t is permitted by God) would be the case of a widow who had the mistaken idea that remarriage brings with it eternal damnation. Is it not better for her to remain pure by reason of her fallacious belief than to know the truth and remarry, thus placing herself in an inferior station?[62] Origen concludes by averring that even if the devil should tell the truth it would be harmful, whereas if God seeks to dupe someone it is for his or her bene:fit.[63]

Turning to the West and Hilary of Poi tiers (d. c. 867), we can read in a commentary on Ps. 15.S ("who has not lied with his tongue nor done evil to his neighbor ") that, first of all,

60 Cf. *ibid.* 4.19 *(ibid.* 228-230) .

61 Cf. *Hom. in Ieremiam* 20.3 (SC 238.260-266).

02 Cf. *ibid.* 20.4 *(ibid.* 268) .

63 Cf. *ibid.* *(ibid.* 270-272) ; cf. ·also *ibid.* 19.15 *(ibid.* 238-248). On this interpretation cf. Henri de Lubac, *"Tu m'as trompe, Seigneur,* Le commentaire d'Origene sur Jeremie 20,7," in *Memorial J. Ohaine* (Lyon 1950) pp. 255-280. Although de Lubac rightly points out, pp. 265 and 270ff, that this is not a real lie (any more, undoubtedly, than that spoken of in *O. Oelsum* 4.19), but rather an attempt to express the divinely ineffable, nonetheless Origen carries it quite far. That he should have chosen to emphasize the scriptural verse at all, as he in fact does, seems to indicate a certain openness to the notion of deception. For another and more famous instance of divine deception in patristic literature, which, however, has a different end in view than Origen envisages, cf. Gregory of Nyssa, *Orat. cat.* 26 (ed. Srawley 96-101).

falsehood should not be spoken.[64] But immediately thereafter Hilary remarks that

> there is a lie that is most necessary, and sometimes falsehood is useful, when we lie to a murderer about someone's hiding place or falsify testimony for a person in danger or deceive a sick person with respect to his chances for recovery. According to the teaching of the Apostle, our speech should be seasoned (cf. Col. 4.6) . For this reason the Holy Spirit tempered what is meant by falsehood by imposing conditions on lying when he said: "Who has not lied with his tongue nor done evil to his neighbor," so that a criminal act of lying would be committed when another person was adversely affected.[65]

Suffice to mention briefly John Chrysostom's (d. 407) story of his deception of the otherwise unknown Basil in the farmer's treatise *On the Priesthood,* written in the 880's. Chrysostom acts in such a way as to lead Basil, his friend, to believe that he will accept being ordained to the priesthood with him, although neither is willing to undertake this responsibility. When the time for the ordination actually comes, however, Chrysostom disappears, leaving Basil to be ordained alone.[66] Some time later, when the consternated Basil finds Chrysostom and demands from him an explanation of his behavior, the latter replies with a lengthy argument supporting the occasional use of deception. The prohibition against lying is not absolute, he says, but depends upon the intention and the good that may result. Military strategists, families among themselves, physicians and, of course, the Apostle Paul are among the examples that Chrysostom adduces in the course of his long self-justification.[67]

Certainly the lengthiest argument in favor of deception in either East or West is to be found in Cassian's seventeenth *Conference.* Cassian (d. c. and his fellow monk Germanus had gone to the Egyptian desert with the intention of growing

64 Cf. *Traat. in Ps.* 14.9 (CSEL 22.90-91).
65 *Ibid.* 10 *(ibid.* 91).
66 Cf. *De saaerd.* L3 (SC 272.72-76).
al Cf. *ibid.* 1.6 *(ibid.* 88-89) .

in a more perfect life through meeting and speaking with the great Egyptian ascetics, but they had promised to return to their own monastery in Palestine at a given time. When the time came, however, they were torn on the one hand by the promise that they had made (in the cave at Bethlehem where Christ was born and which "he himself witnessed"[68]) and on the other by the strong conviction that their growth in spiritual perfection would be hindered by an immediate return to the more mediocre life of the Palestinian monastery whence they had come. Thus they agree to place their dilemma before the abba Joseph. He tells them that they should not have made a promise in the first place but, having done so, they should consider whether or not to keep it by judging what would do them less harm or be more easily expiated by making amends.[69] Germanus quotes Christ's words in Mt. 5.37 ("Say 'Yes' when you mean 'Yes' ...") by way of objection,[70] to which Joseph replies that the intention of the agent is determinative of the value of the act. "He shall suffer no harm who has started out in a reprehensible manner, not out of contempt for God or with the intention of sinning, but who, with an eye on a necessary and holy end, has borne the necessity of a blameworthy beginning."[71] He then gives scriptural examples of a good end being accomplished with a bad intention (Judas betraying the Lord for the salvation of the world), which is still inexcusable, and of a deceitful act being done with a good intention (Jacob's deception of Isaac).[72]

A few lines later the specific subject of lying is introduced by Germanus. Would breaking the promise not offer an opportunity for lying to certain weaker souls, and is not lying forbidden by express scriptural prohibition?[73] Joseph replies by saying that those who are ill-disposed will always find

68 Cf. *Conlat.* 17.5 (CSEL 13.468).
69 Cf. *ibid.* 17.8 (*ibid.* 469).
70 Cf. *ibid.* 17.10 (*ibid.* 471).
71 *Ibid.* 17.11 (*ibid.*).
72 Cf. *ibid.* 17.12 (*ibid.* 471-473).
73 Cf. *ibid.* 17.15 (*ibid.* 474).

harmful things in the Scriptures, even when they are allegorically interpreted; the *oikonomia* of the Old Testament cannot be ignored, however, which presents numerous examples of lying used to accomplish a good end. Lying should be regarded as a medicine of last resort, like hellebore, which if taken in danger of dea.th is beneficial, but if taken otherwise can cause death. When grave need arises, "then the refuge of lying is to be sought, but in such a fashion that we are bitten by the guilt of a humbled conscience in a salutary way." [74] When Germanus responds to this by saying that the Old Testament permitted many things that the New forbids,[75] Joseph concedes that even lying itself was prohibited in the Old Testament except when it was decreed by the will of God or was employed for the prefiguration of spiritual mysteries or for the saving of some holy persons. To lie in such cases is to seek the good of the other, in the words of Paul (cf. I Cor. 10.£4, 33; 13.5), rather than one's own good, i.e. the spiritual perfection that one might attain by not lying. This is borne out by examples from Paul's life.[76]

Finally the question arises as to whether one should, by telling a lie, conceal one's virtuousness or, by telling the truth, . reveal it. This is an issue specifically with regard to fasting, concerning which Christ had said that it should be done in secret (cf. Mt. 6.18), but it also bespeaks the profound monastic love of humility. Even Germanus admits unhesitatingly that a lie is called for here.[77] The discussion on lying con-

74Cf. *ibid.* 17.16-17 *(ibid.* 474-477).

1s Cf. *ibid.* 17.18 *(ibid.* 477-478).

1a Cf. *ibid.* 17.19-20 *(ibid.* 478-486).

77Cf. *ibid.* 17.21-22 *(ibid.* 486-487). For examples of dissimulation at the service of humility cf., e.g., John of Ephesus, *Lives of the Easti;rn Saints* 29 (Patr. Orient. 18.565-566) ; some pages later *(ibid.* 573) the ascetic in question confesses firmly on his deathbed that he has never lied; John Moschus, *Pratum spirituale* 116 (PG 87.2980-2981) : a monk who confesses to a theft that he did not commit; *ibid.* 179 *(ibid.* 3049) : a female ascetic who lies in order to hide her virtue and, interestingly, is reproached for her deception; *The Life of Saint Pisentius* 5 (Patr. *Orient.* 22.338-339) ; Ferrandus, *V. Beati Fulgentii* 8 (ed. Lapeyre 49).

eludes with a catalogue of lies from both Testaments, some of them falling under the rubric of broken promises.[78]

Following Cassian, there are two other significant witnesses to the tradition that permits occasional lying and deception, both ascetical writers from the East and both probably influenced by Cassian. The first of these is Dorotheus of Gaza (d. 560-580), who devotes one of his *Didaska,liai* or *Instructions* to the problem of lying.[79] In the instruction in question he speaks of three forms of lie-that of thought, that of word and that of life itself. After describing the sort of person who lies in word, however, he digresses slightly and explains that there are times when one must nevertheless dissimulate in order to prevent a greater evil from happening. In support of his position Dorotheus cites an apophthegm from the Egyptian desert, a classic remark made by the abba Alonius to the abba Agathon:

> Imagine that two men have committed a murder in your presence and that one of them has fled to your cell. The magistrate is looking for him and asks you: "Did you see the murder?" If you do not employ a ruse, you are delivering the man up to death.[80]

A lie such as this is rare and can only be told with regret and, indeed, with tears. If one does not lie with fear and sorrow, then one does wrong even when one lies for a good and necessary cause.[81]

John Climacus (d. c. 650), the second of these writers, discusses lying in a chapter of his renowned *Ladder of Paradise.* He condemns the practice, but two passages are of particular interest inasmuch as they qualify the condemnation somewhat. In the first he writes that " the person who has recourse to lying uses the *oikonomia* as a. pretext, and he often takes for good actions those that ruin the soul. The liar gives the impression

78 Cf. *Oonlat.* 17.25 (CSEL 13.488-496). On Cassian's teaching I have been unable to consult Z. Golinski, " Doctrina Cassiani de mendacio officioso," in *Oollectanea Theologica* (Lw6w) 17 (1936) 491-503.

79 *Instruct.* 9.96-103 (SC 92.320-334).

80 Cf. *Apophthegmata patrum,* de abbate Alonio 4 (PG 65.133) .

81 Cf. *Instruct.* 9.102 (SC 92.330-332).

of imitating Rahab, and while he is destroying himself he insists that he is saving others." [82] The mention of the *oikonomia,* the divine governance of human affairs which frequently appears ambiguous and even deceitful (and of which Rahab is an example), recalls a theme of Origen cited earlier.[83]

The next passage has it: "It is only after we have been entirely purified of lying that we can have recourse to it, but still with fear and if it is imposed by circumstances." [84] This resembles very closely the attitude taken by both Cassian and Dorotheus, who see deceit as a sad necessity that may infrequently be practiced by someone who, it is understood, is advanced in holiness.

With this we pass to a second set of texts, namely one in which a deceptive deed is recounted in an approving way without any significant attempt at justification. Thus, at the very end of the fourth century, Paulinus of Nola (d. 431), in a poem in honor of his patron Felix of Nola, cites how Felix supposedly eluded some men who were going to kill him. As they approached him something happened either to them or to him which made it impossible for them to recognize him. Realizing that this had occurred with Christ's help, Felix said smilingly to his persecutors: " I do not know the Felix whom you seek." The scene closes with Felix's departure "while the Lord laughed at the hounds baying in vain" [85]-which is something rather astonishing to contemplate.

The desert, whence came Cassian's, Dorotheus's and John Climacus's teaching on lying, is the source of numerous ex-

[82] *Scala paradisi* 12 (PG 88.856) .

[83] Cf. Jean Climaque, *L'echelle sainte,* trans. by Placide Deseille (Spiritualite Orientale 24, Begrolles-en-Mauges 1978), p. 339, n. 12.10.

[84] *Scala paradisi* 12 (PG 88.856) .

[85] Cf. *Oarm.* 16.52-74 (CSEL 30.70-71). For examples of deception employed to escape from persecution cf. also, e.g., *Martyrium Pidnii* 9 (ed. Musurillo, *The Acts of the Christian Martyrs,* p. 146) : the use of a false name, which may nonetheless have symbolic value, to prevent a Christian on trial from suffering further torment; John of Ephesus, *Lives of the Eastern* Saints 10 (Patr. Orient. 17.145); *ibid.* 49 *(ibid.* 18.695-696). John (d. c. 586) was a Monophysite, and these two cases concern Monophysite bishops escaping either from Nestorians or from Chalcedonian Christians.

amples cast in anecdotal or apophthegmatic form.. One of these is a typical act of charity.

One of the brothers in the monastery was dejected on account of being reprimanded by Pachomius [d. 346] for the sake of his salvation. Theodore [Pachomius's great disciple and successor], being prudent and wise, realized that the man was disaffected in his heart to the point of leaving the brothers for that reason, and he said to him: "You know that the old man's speech is abrupt beyond measure. I, too, do not know whether I can stay here." The brother was relieved and replied: " So has the same thing happened to you?" And Theodore said: "Even more so to me. But let us console each other until we test him once again. If he is good to us, let us stay. If not, let us go and make our own quiet life as anchorites." The weak man was strengthened when he heard this. Then Theodore went secretly to our father Pachomius and gave him an account of the matter. Pachomius replied: " Very well. Bring him here in order that you may both blame me for this, and as God grants I will persuade him." They did go, and Theodore pretended to reprimand Pachomius, who replied: "Forgive me. I have sinned. Should you not bear up with your father as children? " And when Theodore started pretending to reprimand Pachomius again, the brother signaled to him and said: "Stop. This is enough. I have been comforted greatly." Thus Theodore benefited the brother with his good-natured cunning.[86]

A second example, also typical, is recounted in Palladius's *Lausiac History* (written c. 420) and concerns a nun who pretended to be a fool and to be possessed by a demon. In so doing, we are told, she lived out the words of 1 Cor. 3.18 ("If anyone of you thinks he is wise in a worldly way, he had better become a fool") . Thus she attained to a high degree of

[86] *V. prima gr. S. Pachomii* 66 (ed. Balkin 43-44), trans. by A. N. Athanassakis (Missoula, Mont. 1975) pp. 95-97 (translation slightly altered). For charitable lies cf. also, e.g., *Apophthegmata patrum,* de abbate Joanne Colobo 17 (PG 65.209) ; "Histoire des solitaires egyptiens" 44 (ed. Nau, in *Revue de l'orient chrotien* 12, 1907, 175); *ibid.* 346 *(ibid.* 17, 1912, 297-298) : a lie to test someone else's charity; *ibid.* 451 (trans. in L. Regnault, ed., *Les Sentences des Peres du D.6sert,* Sable-sur-Sarthe 1970, pp. 68-69); Paul Evergetinos/PE II 45,10 (trans. *ibid.,* pp. 179-180); John Moschus, *Pratum spirituale* 193 (PG 87.3072-3076).

sanctity. **But** her fellow nuns eventually discovered her ploy, much to her chagrin.[87]

A third and concluding example is more unusual. It is reminiscent of the passage from Pseudo-Maximus's sermon in that it touches upon a religious teaching, which Augustine said was the most reprehensible form of untruth. A certain old man in Egypt, the story goes, in his innocence and lack of theological knowledge, believed that Melchisedech was the Son of God.

And when this was told to blessed Cyril, the archbishop of Alexandria [d. 444], he sent someone to him. Knowing that the old man was a worker of miracles and that there was revealed to him whatever he asked of God, and that he had said this out of simplicity, he spoke cleverly, saying: "Abba, I beseech you: sometimes one thought says to me that Melchisedech is the Son of God, and another thought says that this is not so and that he is a man and a priest of God. Since therefore I am disturbed by this, I have sent to you that you may pray God to make a revelation to .you in this regard. And the old man, confident of his powers, said without hesitation: "Give me three days and I shall ask God about this and I shall tell you who he is." Retiring, then, he prayed to God about this matter. And returning after three days, he said to blessed Cyril that Melchisedech was a man. And the archbishop said to him: "How do you know this, abba?" He replied: " God revealed to me all the patriarchs, so that each of them passed before me, from Adam up to Melchisedech; be assured, then, that it is so." He withdrew, then, having preached to himself that Melchisedech was a man. And blessed Cyril rejoiced greatly.[88]

A perhaps obvious caution should be given before proceeding: it must be admitted that in some cases typical of desert or ascetical literature we are faced with actions that may be characterized as charismatic or in some wa.y "inspired." To

[87] Cf. Palladius, *Hist. laus,* 34 (ed. Butler 98-100). On pretending to be what one is not for the sake of humility cf. also, e.g., *Apophthegmata patrum,* de abbate Ammona 9 (PG 65.121); *ibid.,* de abbate Mose 8 *(ibid.* 285); John Rufus, in *Patr. Orient.* 8.178; "Histoire des solitaires egyptiens" 61 (ed. Nau, in *Revue de l'orient chretien* 12, 1907, 181) ; John of Ephesus, *Lives of the Eastern Saints* 52 (Patr. Orient. 19.164-179).

[88] *Apophthegmata patrum,* de abbate Daniele 8 (PG 65.160).

that extent they are not normative. It is, after all, ancient ascetical literature that recounts approvingly the story of a virgin who pulled out her eyes upon learning that they were a. temptation to a young man [89] and that tells us of a monk who cut off his ear in order to avoid ordination, [90] to say nothing of innumerable extraordinary penances. Such actions too are charismatic (one might say) and utterly non-normative. In this category presumably falls the story just told of Cyril of Alexandria, as well as several others that involve deception. Nonetheless, many ascetical narratives simply bear out in an unselfconscious way the common practice for which Origen, Cassian and others had already established the theory.

While the examples cited here are not exhaustive, they well bear witness to the second tradition. What can we say about them? Common to all the authors in question, in the first place, is the idea that a lie may be told only with the intention of accomplishing some good. This good could be saving a person from death (whether warranted or unwarranted) or, as in the case of Pachomius and Theodore, saving someone from discouragement. Again, it could be a person's own growth in humility, as when a monk dissembles his virtue or even his sanity. Apart from this last instance, we never hear of anyone lying on his or her own behalf. There is disagreement, though, as to whether deceit should be practiced only as a last resort-as the abba Joseph says at one point, for instance, in Cassian's recounting of his words-or whether it may not be used as one of several options, as we can infer from other ascetical literature.

Although it is not always expressly stated, a second common aspect of such texts (common, in any event, to the texts that discuss these matters in a somewhat theoretical way, if not necessarily to the anecdotal narratives) is the willingness to speak of deception or lying precisely in those terms. That is to say, deceit has not become something else when it is placed

[89] Cf. John Moschus, *Pratum spirituale* 60 (PG 87.2912-2913).
[90] Cf. Palladius, *Hist. laus.* 11 (ed. Butler 32-33).

at the service of what appears to be a greater good; it continues to be deceit, but it is licit. That this should be so helps to explain the moral ambiguity that, in the texts cited, Cassian, Dorotheus and John Climacus seem to be aware of-Cassian when he says that some kind of guilt *(reatu humilis conscientiae)* and lack of personal perfection attach to this licit deceit, and the other two when they speak of having recourse to such deceit in fear and sorrow.

Apart from this it is difficult to find common points. Although the texts are overwhelmingly Eastern (and even Hilary produced his *Commentary on the Psalms* after he had been exiled in Phrygia, while Jerome based his interpretation of Gal. 2 solely on the exegesis of Eastern writers), they are not exclusively so. Likewise, the' justifying precedents differ, when they are employed, a.I.thoughthey are almost invariably at least one of three-namely Old Testament deceptions, the supposed dissimulation of Paul and the customary treatment of the sick by their physicians, which last can be traced to the time of Plato.[91] Of the authors whom we have studied, Dorotheus is alone in not supporting his argument with one of these justifications. Fina.lly, when actual deeds of deception of whatever sort are narrated, they are told only of people who exercise ecclesiastical authority (e.g., Eusebius of Vercelli, Cyril of Alexandria) and/or have some reputation for sanctity (e.g., Felix of Nola, the Egyptian ascetics). Presumably such persons, to revert to a. thought of John Climacus, have purified themselves of the spirit of lying and hence are permitted the occasional lie for a greater good.

* * *

An important question that arises at the conclusion of this account is whether we are in fact dealing with two traditions with respect to lying and deception in the ancient Church.

91 Cf. n. 56 *supra;* cf. also Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4.2.17 (LCL Xenophon 4.280); Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* 7.38 (ed. von .Arnim, .*Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* 2.132); Philo, *Quaest. in Gen.* 4.204 (trans. in LCL Philo Suppl. 1.499-500); Celsus, ap. Origen, *O. Oelsum* 4.18 (SC 136.224); Maximus of Tyre, *Philosophumena* 19.3 (ed. Hobein, Teubner, 238-239.)

This may be subdivided into two questions: I) Does the position which accepts deception in certain circumstances have sufficient backing to constitute a real tradition, in the sense of being a current to be reckoned with in the life of the ancient Church, or may it be dismissed either because of insufficient witness or because it represents a patently unacceptable teaching, a bizarre aberrancy? 2) Can this position in some way be made to identify with or be reconciled with the tradition that steadfa.stly rejects all deception as evil and sinful, unless that deception be a "mystery," as Augustine calls Jacob's ruse at Esau's expense? Be it noted that neither of these questions touches upon the issue of the intrinsic morality of lying and deception.

As far as the first of these two questions is concerned, the support of such distinguished Fathers as Hilary, Chrysostom, Dorotheus of Gaza and John Climacus (not to mention Clement of Alexandria, Origen and Cassian, whose influence was considerable even if occasionally suspect) suggests that this position has a. real witness. If we were dealing only with things of the ilk of Pseudo-Maximus of Turin's sermon and Paulinus of Nola's story of Felix of Nola we could in clear conscience dismiss them as amusing aberrations. Perhaps we could even dismiss the numerous apophthegms from ascetical literature in a similar vein. The reputation of most of the Fathers involved, however, the seriousness with which they treat the problem that seems to be able to be solved exclusively by the use of deception and, finally, the precedents in antiquity for solving the problem in like fa.shion[92] all imply that the solution offered, namely the occasional use of deception, is not patently bizarre or prima facie unacceptable.

It may even be suggested that the more ancient tradition is that of Clement, Origen and the others, granted that the use of justification seems to imply at least some opposition to the point being justified, and hence the existence of another point of view. But, until the time of Cassian, the few such

[92] Cf. the references inn. 91 *supra.*

justifications that we possess are almost casual and certainly not argumentative, apart from the case of Origen in the *Contra Celsum,* where the author is in any event expanding on a principle already conceded by the pagan Celsus. Only Cassian's abba Joseph, at the dawn of the fifth century, actually defends the use of deception against an opposing view, which is articulated by Germanus. And in the treatise *On the Priesthood,* Basil challenges Chrysostom not because of his friend's deception as such but because it appeared to be an act unfriendly to him. As far as the ascetics of Egypt, Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East are concerned, they seem to know nothing at all of an opposing opinion and practice deceit with, as I have suggested earlier, an unconscious calm; it is what comes naturally to them in the situations that they face.[93] More-

93 .An interesting insight can be gained by reflecting on an early Egyptian text such as the following, which dates from the final third of the fifth century: "But you who make these disturbances and who lie one to another, woe to you, for you have not remembered the word which our father [Shenute, the founder of the monastery] said sorrowfully: '.Again you lie to one another in hatred after hearing the curse that he who lies to his neighbor in wickedness and hatred is cursed.' Or will you be able to vindicate the words that you utter slanderously? If the things you say are true, woe to you because you did not say them at the time or the occasion when it was suitable to say them. For to speak a word in its season is altogether good. But if the things you say are lies, woe to you. You shall be greatly cursed because you have lied to your brethren and have thought out schemes which you will not be able to vinicadte, drawing down upon yourselves wrath in the day of wrath and the revelation of the just judgment of God, who will render to every man according to his works (cf. Rom. 2. 5-6). For on this it has been said: 'The lover of sin rejoices in contentions' (Prov. 17.19) . .And: 'The hard of heart will meet with no good' (Prov. 17.20)." Besa, *Frag.* 8.2 (CSCO 158.18-19). It is obvious that Besa (d. after 474), an abbot and monastic legislator, considers the lie here exclusively in terms of malicious intent and not as something that may be intrinsically wrong. The condemnation of lying is frequent in monastic literature: cf., e.g., the numerous references in L. Regnault, *Les Sentences des Peres du Desert* (Solesmes 1976) p. 358, s.v. "mensonge." But it is invariably the lie that does harm to another that is condemned. The lie that helps another or that preserves one's own humility is not really a lie at all, or at least is not treated as such.

Nonetheless we occasionally find a case of deception in such literature that seems inexcusable except when judged by the most farfetched criteria. In this regard cf., e.g. the approving narrative of the theft of the body of

over, we would be hard put to find in Christian antiquity an example of someone who, recommended to the Christian faithful, practiced truth-telling with all the rigor that Augustine demanded and with any of the tragic consequences that he indicated might befall one for so doing. Augustine himself can only think of a certain bishop Firmus of Thagaste, who refused under torture either to lie or to betray someone's hiding place in time of persecution.[94]

We may risk saying, in any case, that the more widespread view in both East and West, until the time of Augustine, was the one that permitted occasional deception. After him, indeed, the West embraces his teaching, but it appears to have had little if any impact at all in the East. It is Augustine, then, who must introduce his position into already occupied territory. And Augustine's position is really a new one, for the prohibition of lying and deception pronounced b;Y the Scriptures and the Fathers previous to him,[95] including even the Fathers who accept deception, required him to elaborate and absolutize it.

May these two traditions be reconciled? Does the position which justifies deception represent merely a. " legere divergence dans la ligne de la tradition," as Godefroy says in his article in the *Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique*[96]-the "tradition " being presumably the Augustinian doctrine? Despite the fact that the cases in which one may employ deception are carefully restricted by the Fathers who discuss the matter, despite the fact that the persons who tell the charitable lie or practice the gracious deception are saints or hierarchs, i.e., despite the very tempered quality of the deception at issue, there is no reconciling an absolutist position, however sympathetic it may be to the dilemmas of life (for Augustine was

James of Edessa, engineered by Bishop Zakkhai of Thella, in Ps.-John of Ephesus (Patr. Orient. 19.268-273).

94 Cf. *De mendaoio* 23 (CSEL 41.442).

95 The references are virtually numberless; they begin with *Didache* 3.5 (SC 248.154); *Ep. Barn.* 19.7 (SC 172.204); etc.

96 Godefroy, 561.

not unsympathetic to those dilemmas), with one that is not. Augustine, to be sure, would not have accepted a reconciliation. Indeed, he did not, since his writings show that he was familiar with virtually all the arguments used by those who supported occasional deception. Moreover, if the less rigorous tradition is the more ancient of the two, then we may say that the real "divergence" is Augustine's.

If we were to seek the essence of the difference between these two traditions, we could say that it lies in two variant approaches to moral judgment. The Augustinian tradition is remarkable for its absolute consistency: given the principle of the supremacy a.nd inviolability of the truth, it abides by this unconditionally. It also foresees the sometimes distant consequences of acting according to this principle and judges that these consequences are more desirable than the immediate benefits that might flow from what is conceived as a well-meaning but intrinsically at least partiaUy disordered act. The other tradition is marked by an obvious inconsistency: while recognizing the supremacy of truth, it admits (sometimes regretfully, sometimes not) of exceptions. Its concern, in addition, is with the more immediate consequences of an act-the apparently urgent good that justifies the violation of truth-rather than with the long term.

* * *

There are, then, two traditions on lying and deception in the ancient Church, of which the less rigorous one has a good chance of being the older. This certainly would not, in and of itself, make it right; the expression of heretical views, for example, very frequently takes chronological precedence over the expression of their orthodox counterparts. It would count for even less if the less rigorous were only the more popular position until the time of Augustine in the West; Gnosticism was perhaps more popular in its day than was Catholic Christianity. Nor, finally, are the Fathers-even some very great Fathers, and even a number of them together-incapable of saying things that have been construed by later generations as

regrettable. Perhaps the tradition that allows occasional lying and deception takes its force, rather, from an intrinsic "human" and merciful quality, for want of a better way of putting it, and from the fact that the "generous" lie is the utterly natural response to an otherwise apparently impossible situation; it is what men and women have always done and undoubtedly always will do. And if this is not unknown to the Old Testament, and perhaps not to the New either (despite Augustine's distinctions and protestations), nor to a goodly number of Fathers of the Church, perhaps it is not morally implausible after all.[97]

BoNIFACERAMSEY, O.P.

Dominican House of Studies
Washitngton, D. O.

[97] Subsequent to my completing this essay, my attention was kindly drawn by Fr. G. Anawati, O.P., of the Institut Dominicain d'Etudes Orientales (Cairo), to some complementary information in the realm of Islamic moral teaching. The work of the twelfth-century author Ghazali entitled *lh'ya ' Ouloum lild-din,* which was a kind of *Summa* for the Islamic world, explains that lying is not illicit in itself but could be harmful both for the liar and for others. This statement is qualified by an earlier one that says that lying is the most serious of sins, and by a later one that says that it is wrong to lie when one can accomplish the desired good end by telling the truth. A lie is permitted in three instances-for the sake of reconciling two opposing parties, during a war, and between spouses. In a fourth instance it is not only permitted but obligatory, namely in order to keep a person in ignorance of something disagreeable that is about to befall him (the example given is of a man who will be put to death but is unaware of it). Finally, Ghazll.li teaches that an exaggeration is not a lie, although it is better not to get into the habit of exaggerating. Cf. Ghazali, *Th!ya ' Ouloam lild-din, ou Vwification des sciences de la fo,i,* analyse et index par G.-H. Bousquet (Paris 1955), pp. 242-243. Certainly Ghazalt is presenting a doctrine that is more ancient than the twelfth century. It is suggestive to realize that Islam developed in roughly .the same geographical area as Eastern Christianity, which seems to have been more tolerant of lying and deception in specific cases than its Western counterpart.

GUIBERT OF NOGENT AND GREGORY THE GREAT ON PREACHING AND EXEGESIS

0 MANY MEDIAEVAL SCHOLARS Gregory the he Great was *Gregorius ntJster,* rather as Virgil among he Roman poets was the familiar *Virgilius noster.*[1] He became perhaps the most significant single influence upon the detailed working out in the West of the system of interpretation adumbrated in the writings of Origen and Augustine and involving literal, allegorical and moral senses and the ana.gogical sense. Gregory also supplied a vast stock of material for interpreting specific texts, from which scholars borrowed freely for a millenium.[2]

Gregory became something of a patron for Guibert of Nogent towards the end of the eleventh century, when his mother sent him to school with his harsh and insistent tutor on the feast day of Gregory himself.[3] Guibert speaks of other Fathers, too: Jerome, Gregory Nazianzus, Origen, Eusebius of Caesarea.[4] But Gregory the Great remained a special influence upon him, not least because, as he explains, Gregory was instrumental in helping him make the change of habit in his reading which turned him from a secular to a Christian scholar.[5] He says that Gregory holds the keys of the 'art' of exegesis; all its traditional rules are set out in its commentaries

1 H. de Lubac, *EmegeseMedievale* (Paris, 1959), II, 537-8.

2 R. Wasselynck, 'L'influence de l'exegese de S. le Grand sur les commentaires bibliques medievaux ', *Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale,* 32 (1965), 157-204, lists mediaeval authors who make use of Gregory.

a *De Vita Sua* I.4, PL 156.844A, and cf. *Gesta Dei per Francos,* Preface, PL 156.681-2 for more of Guibert's comments on his early education and the excessive love of poetry he had when he was young.

4 PL 156.339A, PL 156.489A *(De Incarnatione)* where Guibert couples Gregory and Jerome.

s PL l56.29D 339.A.

(veterum auctorum regulae).[6] Guibert was moved by this example to attempt a commentary of his own on Genesis, in which he tried to bring out the moral sense; and then he went on to comment on other books, he tells us, always laying the chief emphasis upon one of the higher senses.[7]

Guibert was an author of some stature, as he himself was well aware. He had a natural fluency and elegance which led him into early excesses as a poet,[8] and sufficient conceit to think himself able to imitate the models the Fathers had left behind them. His Scriptural commentaries concentrate principally upon the Old Testament, because that was where he found a lack of patristic material: on Hosea, Amos and Jeremiah, for example, and even on Genesis, viewed from the point of view of the higher senses to complement Augustine's work on the literal sense of Genesis.[9] Guibert's *De Vita Sua* has some claims to be an autobiography after the model of Augustine's *Confessions,* although it is also a history book.[10] His *De Pignoribus Sanctorum* is, as we shall see, consciously modelled in part upon Gregory's *Dialogues.*[11] As for his monographs, the *De lncarn.atione,* the *De Bucella Judae data et de veritate Dominici corporis,* the *De Laude Sanctae Mariae,* the *De Virginitate,*[12] topical though they are in their subject-matter (compare Gilbert Crispin's *Dialogue between a Jew and a Christian* with the *De lncarnatione)*,[13] they belong loosely to the genre of Augustinian monographs and dialogues in their attempt to treat single issues. Guibert's large history, the

a *De Vita Sua* I.17, PL 156.874B.

7 *De Vita Sua* I.17 PL 156.875-6.

s *Gesta Dei per Franoos,* PL 156.681-2 and *De Vita Sua* I.17.

9 The entry for Guibert in F. Stegmliller, *Repertorium Biblioum Medii Aevi* (Madrid, 1950), II, gives an indication of surviving manuscripts. *The Liber Quo Ordine Sermo F.ieri Debeat,* the *Moralia in Genesim,* the *Tropologiae in Osee, Amos and Jeremiam* are printed in PL 156.

10 One comparison in particular is irresistible: Guibert places great emphasis upon the help his mother gave him in becoming a Christian.

11 See p. 538.

12 All printed in PL 156.

1a Gilbert Crispin, *Disputatio Judei et Ohristiani,* ed. B. Blumenkranz (Antwerp, 1956).

Gesta. Dei per Francos, is an ambitious attempt which perhaps owes something to Eusebius, to extend exegetical principles from Scripture to the analysis of historical events in recent times, so as to show God's teaching in the world through history.

Guibert's sense of his own capacities as a scholar and author set him apart a little from the work of contemporary exegetes and threw him back upon the great examples of the past in a rather unusual way. He seems at some time to have heard Anselm of Laon lecture,[14] but he was not drawn into the corporate endeavour of Anselm and his pupils which helped to frame the *Glossa Ordinaria.*[15] He remained an individual as a writer, seeing himself rather grandly in the tradition of the Fathers. He undertook his ambitious projects not without due protestations of modesty. But the spirit in which he did so is clear from his Proemium to his *Moralia in Genesim.* In the introductory letter to Bartholomew, bishop of Laon, he draws a picture of the two brothers, Anselm and Ralph, who ran the cathedral school at Laon in his day, as two 'eyes' brighter than the stars. Their work has recently been remarkable both in their interpretation of the Bible so as to bring out its teaching on the faith, and for their rebuttal of heretics. Guibert concedes that it is bold of him to put himself forward as a commentator in such company, and above all to write on a book of the Bible on which Augustine has had so much to say. But he has, he says, something new to offer. Something is missing from the existing literature, and this that he has tried to supply.[16] Where other scholars compile quotations from the Fathers to illustrate and illuminate their exegetical discussions, Guibert tries to write in the manner of the Fathers, adding to their work in the same spirit and on the same principles, but with his own hand. And here his debt to Gregory is apparent at a. number of points.

14 O. Lottin, *Psyohologie et morale au!JJ !JJiie et !JJiii sieoles* (Gembloux, 1959), p. 9.

15 B. Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1952), pp. 285-6.

1s PL 156.19-22.

Gregory found the tension between the demands of public life and the pull of the inner life a constant source of strain. He writes about many sides of his life and work in terms of this necessary balancing of *interior* and *exterior.*[17] Guibert did not share his practical preoccupations because he lived the monastic life from which Gregory regretted daily that he had been torn away.[18] But in one respect he understood the principle very well. He was of one mind with Gregory in believing that it was of the first importance to look for the inward and spiritual truth which underlies all exterior things, and which God intends those things to teach.

The first necessity, as Gregory understood it, was to look to the *interior home,* to know one's own soul. Here Guibert owed a debt to Anselm of Canterbury he says, helped him at the time when he was first seriously turning his thoughts to holy reading and learning the principles of exegesis from Gregory; Anselm taught him how to read the Bible and how to 'manage the inner man '.[19] The two tasks, of exegesis and self-knowledge, remained intimately interconnected for Guibert, as they had been for Gregory. He speaks, in a commonplace also used by Gregory, of the 'book of conscience': 'Let the book from which our prayer text comes be a pure conscience, lest while the tongue says good things to other.s, the memory of sin gna.ws us inwardly '.[20] The preacher, as he expounds Scripture, should burn inwardly, so that what he says outwardly may fire the hearts of his listeners.[21] Guibert does not mention Gregory at this point-in fact, he refers to a text of Ambrose the underlying principle is Gregorian never-

[17] On 'consideration' see my *The Mind of St. Bernard of Olairvaum* (Oxford, 1983), pp. 191-217.

[18] Guibert does borrow Gregory's term *consideratio,* but he does not put it to use in the same way. See, for example, PL 156.417B (on Amos), PL 156.426 (on Amos), PL 156.612B (Preface to the *De Pignoribus Sanctorum).*

[19] *De Vita Sua* I.17, PL 156.874 C-D, *qualiter interiorem hominem agerem.*

[20] *Liber Quo Ordine Sermo Fieri Debeat,* PL 56.24.

[21] *Liber Quo Ordine,* PL 156.24.

[22] Ombrose *De Officiis* I.22, ed. R. O. Gilbert (Leipzig, 1839) ; PL 156.24D. Gregory himself owed a large debt to Ambrose.

theless. In his exegesis 'inward ' and 'outward ' are an insistent theme.[23]

If we are to understand the implications of this talk of ' inward ' and 'outward ' in exegesis as Gregory intended it, we must look at the *Dialogues,* and at Guibert's *De Pignoribus Sanctorum.*

Gregory's *Dialogues* are a series of miracle-stories strung together in a conversational sequence as Peter the Deacon raises questions and Gregory answers them with explanations and illustrations. The work is divided into four books, the first three principally containing examples of marvellous events in good men's lives, with the second book given up wholly to the life of St. Benedict. The last book differs in giving a connected treatment of problems of the nature of the soul, death, resurrection, heaven and hell. The whole is based on the assumption that the events and things described in Scripture have a teaching function no different in kind-although perhaps higher in degree-from events of the present day and things now to be seen in the world with our own eyes. All these' things' are signs.[24]

There is little here which adds to Augustine's discussion of signs in the *De Doctrina Christiana,* but there is a difference of emphasis. Gregory explicitly links teaching and preaching and exegesis in a way which makes these latter-day ' signs ' of central importance.[25]

In the *De Pignoribus Sanctorum* Guibert attacks the question of relics with a view to setting aside the nonsense current in his own day and explaining the true function of things as 'signs' of holiness. He begins by asking how we are to know a man to be holy: an underlying preoccupation of the Gregorian *Dialogues,* too. Outward signs are not, he argues, always an indication of sanctity. He points to examples from

2a E.g. PL 156.457C.

24 Gregory's *Dialogues* are in PL 77 and edited by A. de Vogue, *Sources Ohretiennes,* 251 (1979), 260 (1980).

25 On Augustine's theory of signs, see M. Colish, *The Mirror of Language* (Yale, 1967).

history, Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, and 'in our own time ' comets which mark the deaths and accession of kings in Lotharingia and England. These show that the gift of signs is distributed *plurifa,riam,* and may have other meanings than that a, man is holy. There is no necessary connection between the person ' about ' whom a miraculous event happens and the sanctity of the person in question. Recently, last Easter, he ·recounts, a small child which had been brought into church by its mother and which knew nothing of what had been enacted before its eyes, cried aloud 'Mother, don't you see what a beautiful boy the priest is holding on the altar! ' [26] This vision edified, not the child, but those who heard him. Guibert is anxious to emphasize this point, so as to discourage reverence for those who do not deserve it. He cites Gregory twice in this connection. [27] His treatment of the theory of signs gives way in Books II and III to a discussion first of the wholeness of the Body of Christ at Mass, and then of the claim of the monks of St. Medard to have a. tooth of Christ himself. Guibert wants them to understand the a,bsurdity of such a notion, because it makes nonsense of the idea of Christ's resurrection, and shows them to have misunderstood what is done in the consecration at the Eucharist when the whole Body of Christ is present in the consecrated bread. Book IV contains Guibert's thoughts on the inward and outward aspects of signs- his development of Gregory's principles into a full sign-theory of his own.

The *interior mundus,* the spiritual world is, he says, not seen by the outward eyes; nor can the *imaginatio* conceive because the imagination, by definition, is the faculty which makes images of corporeal things for the mind to observe when there are no direct sense-impressions. Only *contemplatio* attains this vision *(attingit)* .[28]

The images to be found in Scripture are, Gregory believes, necessarily of the kind visible to the bodily eye or the eye of

2e PL 156.615.

21 PL 156.627B-628.

2s PL 156.665B (IV.i.l).

the imagination: *aut corpora aut similitudinibus corporum.* The visions of the prophets contain *signa* and *figura* only. The prophets describe God by comparing him to these things, but they cannot speak in this way of the *vera simplicitas* of the divine omnipotence. The only exception is the 'I am that I am' and ' He who is sent me to you.' of Exodus 3.14. Everything else the Old Testament authors say is in terms of the *dicta* and *faeta* of the human condition; Old Testament descriptions of the divine are in a *humanus modus,* a human form of speech, and thus figurative in their reference to God himself.[29] Guibert cites Gregory here on the experience of those who have had visions and who have passed in their perception from the outward to the inward and returned to speak of it,[30] but only in human language. Similarly, the signs of the present day, relics, events, are all images outwardly apparent to our senses, of an inward reality which we cannot see but only guess at by analogy. The prophets gained an idea of God but were not able to express what they learned in language appropriate to its reality.[31] They could not do so because it would not have been proper for them to do so *(Non itaque potuerunt, quia n.on debuerunt)*,[32] that is, because it lay beyond their human capacities.

Guibert completes his book by considering questions close to those in Book IV of the *Dialogues,* with references to the *Dia,logues.*[33] Miracles in our own time *(diebus vest'lis)* are a.cts of divine mercy in teaching us.[34] The *Gesta Dei per Francos* is based on this concept of modern history as an extension of Biblical history. Guibert sees the historian as equally in his element when he is giving an account of exemplary lives or miracles (a.s he himself does at the end of Book IV, for ex-

20 PL 156.667A (IV.i.2).

3o PL 156.6670-D (IV.i.2).

31 PL 56.669D (IV.ii.I).

32 PL 156.669D. Cf. Anselm, *Our Deus Homo* and *De Oasu Dia.boli* on *posse* and *debere,* ed. F. S. Schmitt (Rome/Edinburgh, 1938-46), vols. I-II.

33 *De Pignoribus* IV.iv.3, cf. *Dialogues* IV.29, on the way in which souls perceive.

34 PL 156.962.

ample), and when he is speaking of recent events.[35] He explicitly links his own work with that of the Old Testament, comparing his purposes with the *auth:enticis historiis sanctorum patrum,* whose author is God himself.[36]

This association of events and signs and things in the Bible with things and events in the world at large, as God's various ways of speaking about inward truths through outward things, was not new even in Augustine, as Guibert knew. He refers to the teaching of Gregory Nazianzen on the comparisons, *satis idoneas ... et significantias,* between the things we read about in Scripture and see now with our own eyes and those higher things we cannot see directly for what they are.[37] But there is something which bears the marks of the influence of Gregory the Great specifically, in Guibert's emphasis on the power of these things to 'preach '.[38] Guibert was unusual in his day in placing an emphasis on preaching in this way. There was very little preaching of fresh sermons. It was more usual to read from a homily of Augustine or Gregory. When Anselm of Canterbury gave his talks to his own community and to the communities he visited (as he did at Fly when Gilbert was there) , his discourses struck everyone as something not only uncommonly fresh and lively, but also as something new. A generation after Anselm, in Bernard of Clairvaux's day, monastic sermons[39] were beginning to come into their own. But Guibert was writing along pioneering lines when he prefaced the *Moralia in Genesim* with his own little handbook on preaching.

Guibert writes with a practical slant, but his underlying principles owe a good deal to Gregory. Like Gregory, he emphasizes the need to adapt what is said to the needs of the simple;[40] Gregory himself does so with most dramatic effect in

35 PL 156.749B.
36 PL 156.7670.
37 *Liber Quo Ordine,* PL 156.29D.
38 *Gesta Dei per Francos,* PL 56.683D.
39 See my *The Mind of St. Bernard of Olairvaum,* pp. 52-72.
40 Gregory, *Moralia in Job, passim.*

the *Dialogues,* whose style is so plain as to seem crude in comparison with the eloquence with which Gregory writes elsewhere when he is trying to lift men's hearts and aspirations. Guibert, who certainly had at least a comparable literary skill, often writes with deliberate stylistic contrivance:

Interea cum versificandi studio ultra omnem modum meum animum immersissem, ita ut universae divinae paginae seria pro tam ridicula vanitate seponerem, ad hoc ipsum duce mea levitate jam veneram ut Ovidiana et Bucolicorum dicta praesumerem, et lepores amatorios in specierum distributionibus, epistolisque nexilibus affectarem.[41]

Here the patterning of *immersissem, sepon.erem, praesumerem, afjectarem* has not been difficult to arrange, but it clearly *has* been arranged, to give balance to the account. Fancier contrivances are to be found:

hoc quotidie intra cordis mei penetralia experior et contemplor impleri.[42]

Here *-or-* and-er- sounds and patterning of grammatical structures work together.[42] By contrast, in the *De Pignoribus Sanctorum,* where Guibert comes closest to the *DialogU'es,* the stories are told, not without style, but simply and straightforwardly:

Cumque ab utroque interrogaretur quid fleret, se a catulis comedi respondebat. Tum mater, quae matris meae ancilla et aliquando pedissequa exstiterat, ad ipsam dominam suam, matrem videlicet meam, concurrit.[48]

Here perhaps Guibert is doing no more than adjusting his style to his subject-matter in the ancient rhetorical tradition- as his contemporaries did with an equal self-consciousness; it would be stretching the evidence to suggest that this was peculiarly a debt to Gregory.[44] The important point is that

[41] *De Vita Sua* I.17, PL 156.873A.

[42] *De Vita Sua* I.16, PL 156.870B.

[43] *De Pignoribus* I.21, PL 156.883D.

[44] On the three styles, see the opening of Book IV of the *Rhetorioo ad Herennium.*

Guibert, like Gregory, is applying the technique to preaching, deliberately creating variety and considering the different needs of educated and less well educated audiences. He points out in the *Liber Quo Ordine* that the *litterati* will benefit even by hearing what they know already, if it is said to them *eloquenter.* They must be prevented from becoming bored by offering them something well-put and novel, so as to make the old material seem fresh. The various *modi locutionum* of Scripture give each word a diversity of meanings; stylistic excellence on the part of the preacher can convey the same richness and variety. [45]

In the *Regula Pastoralis,* where he places great emphasis upon the *pastor's* duty to teach, Gregory says a good deal about the kind of man a preacher should be, and the spirit in which he should go about his task. Guibert clearly depends on his teaching-among other sources-in the *Liber Quo Ordine.* Where Gregory speaks of the reasons which may encourage a. man to seek or refuse the *pastoralis cura* (and by implication to become a preacher) ,[46] Guibert tackes directly the question of the *intentiones* which lead a man to preach or to refuse to preach. For example, some will not preach because they are proud. Others are overcome by distaste for the task. Others are put off by envy of the good lives other men lead, or their superior learning. There are others still who do live good lives and would make excellent preachers, but who are put off by the fact that they hold no pastoral office *(pastoralis locus)* in the Church, and so think they have no right to preach.[47] Like Gregory, Guibert thinks both good learning and the setting of a good example vital to effective preaching. The association of intellect and behaviour in this way is a commonplace, but it is in some degree a Gregorian commonplace. 'It is,' says Guibert, 'very dangerous for him whose duty *(officium)* it is to preach to stop learning, just as it is damnable for him to set an example of wickedness '.[48]

45 *Liber Quo Ordine,* PL 156.2SD-29A.
46 Gregory, *Regula Pastoralis.*
47 *Liber Quo Ordine,* PL 56.21B.
48 *Ibid.*

Preaching in this grand Gregorian sense of making men see into the inner truth behind outward things makes life itself an ·exegesis. The preacher in his own person acts as one of the ' things ' or examples through whose outward appearance to the senses God teaches men about inward and spiritual realities. The tea.ching is everywhere. Guibert points to ' the nature of the lion '[49] in one connection, and elsewhere, where the lion has a diffevent meaning, he points to another aspect of its behavior.[50] In the first case the lion's eating habits are relevant, in the second its custom of sleeping with its eyes open so that it is always alert. God has given it these characteristics so that it can teach several things. When the ' seed ' of the Word of God sprouts in men's hearts, that is the earth sprouting grass.[51] There is no 'like' in Guibert's description. The grass on the earth enacts the springing of the Word of God in a way which is almost more than an analogy.

When we look at this Gregorian account of the inwardness and outwardness of things in the context of Biblical exegesis, its immediate implication is clear. The literal sense is different from the figurative senses. It means what it seems to mean. It does not speak of something else within. The 'higher', figurative senses all deal with outward things in terms of an inner reality. The Lion of Judah is not a lion but Christ. The teaching power of these higher senses is thus much greater.

Gregory the Great was instrumental in drawing the fourfold method of interpretation from its preliminary formulations in Origen and Augustine and elsewhere, and making it the standard pattern in the mediaeval Latin West. He envisaged an ascending scale running from the allegorical sense to those moral and anagogical interpretations which especially appealed to Guibert as requiring the application of fresh effort by the exegete of his own time.[52] It is because he sees the matter as integral to this division of the senses that Guibert treats

49 PL 156.469A (Jeremiah).
50 PL 156.324B (Genesis) .
51 PL 156.45B (Genesis).
52 Lubac, *op. cit.,* I.187 -8.

Augustine's discussion of the reason why the Bible speaks in so many wa.ys and uses ' bodily images ' for spiritual truths in the section of the *Liber Quo Ordine* which he devotes to the four senses of Scripture:

' There are four *Regulae Scripturarum* on which the whole Bible runs as on wheels: they are history, which speaks of events, allegory, in which one thing is understood by another, tropology, that is, moral speech, which deals with behavior . . . . anagogy, that is the 'spiritual understanding', by which we are led to higher things in dealing with the heights and the heavens. For example, Jerusalem is historically speaking a city; by allegory it signifies the holy Church: by tropology, that is, morally, the faithful soul of the man who sighs for the vision of eternal peace; by anagogy it signifies *(mgnat)* the life of the heavenly citizens, who see the God of Gods face to face '. Guibert points out the respective usefulness of these senses. to the *interior* homo.[53]

He himself greatly preferred tropology and anagogical explanations. He suggests that allegory has served its purpose and has now been almost superseded by the higher senses.[54] He himself attempted whole commentaries devoted to a single level of meaning (with some diversions). Jerome, he says, has done enough to clarify the literal sense of Jeremiah; he himself has thought it superfluous to attempt to do the same, and so he has written a tropology of Jeremiah instead.[55] Guibert speaks with awe of the difficulty of tropological explanation, and describes the efforts of Origen ' supreme in learning after the apostles ', Apollinaris of Laodicea, Eusebius of Caesarea ' than whom no one was more famous in his time among divine preachers '.[56]

Gregory was especially interested in the Bible's prophetical utterances, where human beings were visibly striving to express divine truth and clearly handicapped by their ultimate

53 PL 156.25D-26A.
54 PL 156.26, cf. Smalley, pp. 243-5.
55 PL 156.488C, Lubac Iii, p. 450.
se PL 156.339A.

inability to talk in any terms but those of 'bodily images'. Here, too, Guibert can be seen to follow him, not only in his own choice of prophets for commentary, but also in the details of his discussions. 'Note the prophetical way' *(Nota propheticum morem)*, how they frequently repeat 'in that day', showing by the demonstrative pronoun how insistent the presence of the inward light *(internae lucis)* must be in their minds'.[57] 'Note the prophetical way, how easily the shift il> made from singular to plural, from plural to singular, from person to person'.[58] Language is being stretched to its limits in these attempts to express what is beyond language.

Like Gregory, Guibert constantly points to double and multiple meanings.[59] Water, for example, sometimes means the pleasures of the fiesh,[60] often the knowledge of the Bible (compare Gregory, *Moralia,,* on water as knowledge for preaching and in this passage: 'Waters in Holy Scripture are wont sometimes to denote the Holy Spirit, sometimes sacred knowledge, sometimes wrong knowledge, sometimes calamity, sometimes drifting peoples, sometimes the minds of those following the faith').[61] Guibert gives us wisdom in two modes, too.[62]

So dominant is this search for the interior sense that Guibert finds himself in no discomfort when he encounters a note of a variant reading. All is equally adaptable to the divine teaching purpose. The Old Translation does not give *inanis et vacua* at the beginning of Genesis but *invisibilis et composita. Quod optime moraliter consonat!* 'That fits perfectly with the moral interpretation!' exclaims Guibert.[63] The earth is 'invisible' in those who do not know themselves.

Guibert sees no more forcing of the issue here than Gregory had done in his characteristic exclamations at various points in the text: 'What is this but... .' Guibert catches the habit

57 PL 156.3140 (Hosea).
58 PL 156.3490 (Hosea).
59 PL 156.314A.
60 PL 156.37A, on Genesis 1,2.
01PL156.41B, on Genesis 1.6; cf. *Moralia in Job* XI.x.14 and XIX.vi.9.
62 PL 156.41D.
68 PL 156.35.

from him: ' What then ought we to say is to be understood by "light" but that first good ',[64] 'What is "God saw" but" God caused to be seen"'? [65] What is "He divided" but "He taught them to distinguish between vices and virtues"? [66] The same *quid est nisi* formula recurs again and again in both Gregory and Guibert, as though to point out the very obviousness of the comparisons and usages to those who have eyes to see the inner meaning, and to take away any sense that there is contrivance here on the part of the interpreter. Guibert's point, like Gregory's, is precisely that there is no exegetical contrivance, merely an unfolding of meanings already put into the text by its Divine Author.

The Gregorian tone of Guibert's inward-looking exegesis is perhaps clearest in his *Moralia in Genesim,* where he evidently found his model closest to his own purposes. Like Gregory, he allows the text to suggest a train of thought, and makes the practical application to the living of a good Christian life his guide. 'In the beginning God created heaven and earth'; 'In the beginning of our conversion we are divided within ourselves into two entirely opposite parts .... flesh and spirit '.[67] This was not how God created man, but a result of the Fall, which made the urges of the flesh powerful and dominant. So the first verse of Genesis describes how, at the beginning of the process of conversion, God makes 'heaven' and 'earth' in man. The spirit, which is reason, is divided from the 'earth ' of carnal affection, with which it was mixed before, and put in its place in a proper *ordo,* in such a way that the 'heaven' is above and in control of the ' earth'. And just as the light pours down from the sky and it rains and the winds blow across the earth, so the *claritas* of *recta inten.tio* shines down, the clouds of the Fathers gather and rain down *sententiae* and make the earth fruitful, and the four winds of the virtues blow, and dry out the earth's desires. When Genesis says that 'the

[64] PL 156.37D.
[65] PL 156.39.4.
[66] PL 156.39D.
[67] PI.,. 156,31-2, cf. *MoraHa in Job* IX.xxviii.44.

earth was without form and void ' we must understand that our bodies are *inanis et vacua* because there is nothing *solidum, stabile* or *constans* about the body, or about the *interior homo* while it remains mingled with the body, far from God. Guibert rounds off his account with Scriptural parallels to bear out what he says.[68]

There is, both Gregory and Guibert insist, a right and a wrong way to use the inward and outward duality of Scripture. Where the good preacher reveals the inner meaning by his analysis of the outward and necessarily ' corporeal ' images, the heretic perverts the outward meaning so as to make it not less but more 'corporeal'. *Per falsas Scripturarum interpretationes . . . quasi ca.rnaliter dicta Scripturarum exempla exponunt.* [69]

The preacher may draw ' out' what is ' in ' Scripture in the right manner in two ways, by going behind its outward face in search of truths of faith or in search of guidance on good behavior, in the dual tradition of Christian mediaeval teaching. Gregory does both even in the *Mora:lia,* where ostensibly his primary purpose is to teach about the living of a. good Christian life. Taio of Saragossa perceived, not long after Gregory's lifetime, that the *Moralia* was full of teaching on doctrine as well as on behavior, and he rearranged the material in an order which would make it more readily accessible to the reader who wanted help on a particular point. In a letter to Eugenius bishop of Toledo he describes his feelings on reading Gregory. He crept up to the door step by step irresistibly drawn *(inaestimabili accen.sus desiderio)* and, like a bold *explorator* he went in; he was struck by wonder at the sight of the profusion of beauty before him; he rushed about plucking the flowers in handfuls like a little child at play. Then he decided that it would be better to make them into an orderly arrangement rather than a. bundle. Gregory himself prompted him to do so, he says.[70] He explains the order he has chosen:

68 PL 156.33, cf. *Moralia in Job* XXVII.xxxix.65; XXIX.xxviii.55.

au Lubac, Hi, p. 112-8. PL 156.4430-D.

10 PL 80.723-5.

he begins with God himself, the Trinity, the origin of the world, man and his story, to the end of the world. He has put in some portions of Augustine, too, as a sauce and a flavoring and a scattering of flowers at the feast.[71]

But to Guibert the moral teaching of Gregory afforded a more attractive example. Only in the sense that the anagogical sense can be said to deal with speculative theology was Guibert drawn to it. He concedes that the preacher should say something, *aliquoties,* to build up men's faith.[72] The *Moralia* lent itself equa.Ily readily to the plucking of flowers for *florilegia* of moral teaching.[73] Ta.io's enthusiastic garnering was not restricted to doctrinal matter.[74] He held Gregory in respect not only for his *sapientia* but also for his *prudentia.* He claims that Socrates, Plato, Cicero and Varro, philosophers and moralists alike, ' if they were living in our day ' would stand no higher than Gregory. When Taio was in Rome he sought out a copy of the *Moralia in Job* (he had not been able to find the one Gregory had sent to Leander of Seville); he made a copy of it with his own hand, and another of Gregory on Ezekiel, where Gregory had, as everywhere in his writing on the Old Testament, made clear everything which was obscure.[75] Looking at Gregory in search of material for his own purposes, Guibert was struck most forcibly by the moral teaching. In his preface to his own *Moralia,* the *Liber Quo Ordine,* he discusses virtues and vices with all Gregory's keen interest. He recommends Gregory, together with Cassian (but not as an exegete, rather for his *Institutes* and *Conlationes),* as the supreme authorities on virtues and vices.

Guibert's work owes a gTea.t deal to numerous other Fathers besides Gregory. But his overall perception of his task as an interpreter of the Bible is, like Gregory's, first of all that of a

n PL 80.729A-B.

72 PL 156.26.A.

nR. Wasselynck, 'Les *Moralia in Job* dans les ouvrages de morale du haut moyen age latin ', *Recherches de theologie ancienne et mediifoale* 31 (1964), 5-32.

74 PL 80.724B.

75 PL 80.725-6.

preacher.[76] All his effort *(tota verbi nostri vigilantia)* is directed towards the *11Wtus interioris hominis.* Everyone, he says, can benefit from this because everyone shares the experience of sin and has to fight against vice.[77] 'I do not think,' he says, 'that any preaching is *salubrior* than that which shows a man himself and those things which are outside him spread within, that is, in the mind.' 'If anyone wants to know how he ought to treat his inner man ', he continues, ' he can offer no better recommendation than the study of Gregory or Cassian.' [78]

G.R.EVANS

Fitzwilliam College
Cambridge University
England

76 PL 156.27.
77 PL 156.26A.
78 PL 156.27B.

EULOGIUM SPONSI DE SPONSA: CANONS, MONKS, AND THE SONG OF SONGS*

THE SONG OF SONGS, eight short chapters of love lyrics found in the collection of wisdom literature attributed to Solomon, is the most enigmatic and problematic book of the Bible. It is also one of the most frequently commented upon books of the canon. Whether this is because of or in spite of its enigmatic nature depends on one's perspective: the Song of Songs tells no sacred history, gives no clear prophetic or theological revelation, and does not mention God. Yet for thousands of years, Jews and Christians alike have preserved it in the canon of scripture, and used it in liturgy. Exegetes saw it as an admirable vehicle for allegory, and so the Song of Songs exerted an enormous influence on Jewish and Christian spirituality and mysticism.

Perhaps enthusiasm for the book was at its peak in the Christian Middle Ages: at least seventy Latin commentaries on the text survive from the seventh to the fourteenth centuries.[1] These are allegorical expositions in the tradition of the first great Christian exegete, Origen of Alexandria.[2]

*A version of this paper was presented at Yale University in April, 1983. My revisions have been guided by the discussion which followed. A grant from the American Philosophical Society allowed me to examine important manuscripts in Paris.

[1] F. Ohly, *Hoheliedsstudien* (Wiesbaden, 1958) and H. Riedlinger, *Dill Makellosigkeit der Kirche in den Lateinischen Hoheliedkommentaren des Mittelalters* are two comprehensive studies of Christian Song of Songs interpretation. Riedlinger's is a more specialized account of the ecclesiological interpretations.

[2] Origen's commentary on the Song of Songs, extant only to 2: 15, and his two homilies on the Song of Songs 1: 1 to 2: 14, survive in the Latin translations of Jerome and Rufinus. See the text in CGS 33, *Origenes Werke,* 8, ed. W. Baehrens (Leipzig, 1925), and R. P. Lawson, trans., *Origen: The Song of Songs Commentary and Homilies,* Ancient Christian Writers 26 (New York, 1956).

Origen understood the love songs to be between Christ and the church or between God and the individual soul. Later exegetes elaborated on both the ecclesiological and the mystical readings of the Song of Songs, and less frequently interpreted it as the love between God and the Virgin Mary. Medieval Christian commentary on the Song of Songs was dominated by authors in some form of religious life, with monks of the Benedictine and Cistercian orders predominating, and members of various orders of canons close behind.

It is hardly surprising that such a tradition flourished in the spiritual and intellectual climate of twelfth-century Europe. The evangelical fervor of this century was characteristically expressed in symbolic language; the Song of Songs provided a familiar and emotionally powerful vocabulary for these expressions.[3] It was in the twelfth century that Bernard of Clairvaux wrote the famous series of 86 homilies on the Song of Songs 1:I to 3:3 for the spiritual edification of his monastery.[4] The Song of Songs was also extremely influential in the flowering twelfth-century cult of the Virgin Mary.[5] But most twelfth-century treatments of the text, like the *Eulogiurn sponsi de sponsa,* the subject of this essay, take as their subject the drama of love between a demanding but forgiving deity and the errant human soul.

The *Eulogium sponsi de sponsa* is associated with the

[3] M. D. Chenu, *La theologie aux douzieme sieole* (Paris, 1976) pays special attention to the mentality of twelfth-century symbolism, and to the evangelical fervor of the period, pp. 223-398.

[4] J. Leclercq, H. Rochais, C. Talbot, ed., *Sanoti Bernardi Opera,* I, II, (Rome, 1957, 1958). See also Leclercq's introductory essay "Were the Sermons on the Song of Songs Delivered in Chapter?" in *Bernard of Olairvaum, On the Song of Songs* II, Cistercian Fathers Series (Kalamazoo, Michigan, 1976) pp. vii-xxx.

[5] The ancient mariological tradition of Song of Songs interpretation was primarily liturgical, centering on a few verses used for the Feasts of the Nativity and Assumption of the Virgin Mary, cf. J. A. Aldama, *Maria en la Patristioa de ios Sigios Iv II* (Madrid, 1970). Important commentaries with a mariological focus are by Rupert of Deutz, + 1129 (PL 168), Philip of Harveng, +1183 (PL 203), William of Newburgh, +1198 (ed. J.C. Gorman, *Spioilegium Friburgense* 6, Fribourg, 1960), and Alan of Lille, +1202 (PL 210). A separate study of this tradition would be very welcome.

twelfth-century school of Saint Victor in Paris, a community of canons regular with a strong intellectual bent. Saint Victor was home to the famous teacher and theologian Hugh, the mystic Richard, and a number of skilled exegetes.[6] The house also had connections with the nascent University of Paris, and with the school of canons at the cathedral of Troyes. Peter Comestor was associated with both Troyes and the University before entering Saint Victor in 1169.[7] The link to Troyes brought a Cistercian influence to Saint Victor, emanating from Clairvaux, a major Cistercian house in the vicinity of Troyes, home of Saint Bernard. Although Hugh has been called a " second Augustine," his dependence on Bernard was also great: the Victorine excerpted from the Cistercian a.bbot in many places, as for example in the *Miscellanea,* made up in part of short selections from Bernard's writings.[8]

The *Eulogium spon.si de sponsa* appears in PL 176, among the " opera systica " of Hugh, as edited by the canons of Saint Victor in 1648.[9] It also appears in PL 198 as one of a cycle of sermons attributed to Peter Comestor; there it is sermon for the Feast of the Assumption of the Virgin Mary.[10] However, the text is not found in the earliest Comestor manuscripts, a fact which will be discussed below.

6 B. Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1951, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1964) is an outstanding intellectual history of the house. See also F. Bonnard, *Histoire de l'abbaye royale et de l'ordre des chanoines reguliers de St.-Victor de Paris,* 2 vol. (Paris, n.d.).

7 For Peter Comestor, see R. *M.* Martin, "Notes sur l'oeuvre LitMraire de Pierre le Mangeur," *Recherches de tMologie ancienne et medievale 3* (1931) 54-66, and A. Landgraf, "Recherches sur Pierre le Mangeur," *RTAM* 3 (1931) 292-306, 341-373.

a For the influence of Augustine on Hugh of Saint Victor, see J. Taylor's introduction to *The Didasaalion of Hugh of Saint Viator,* Columbia Records of Civilization LXIV (New York, 1961). An excellent example of Hugh's use of Bernard is *Miscellanea* IV, cvii, "De tribus osculis," (PL 177:712C) adapted from Bernard's sermon 3 on the Song of Songs (ed. Leclercq, Rochais, Talbot, I, pp. 14-17). A detailed study of Hugh's use of Bernard and other contemporaries has yet to be done.

9PL 176:987-994. The title here is *De amore sponsi ad sponsam.* Many manuscripts are untitled; the most common title is *lilulogium sponsi de sponsa,* used in this study.

10 PL 198: 1784-1788.

The intention of this paper is to put the *Eulogium* in a twelfth-century context with the dual goal of illuminating the question of authorship and providing a basis for the interpretation of the text. This will involve a summary of the tradition of Song of Songs commentary in relation to the *Eulogium;* description of the treatise; analysis of the manuscript tradition; study of the known sources; consideration of the didactic message of the work; and discussion of the appearance of the *Eulogium* in other twelfth-century authors.

The *Eulogium* and Exegesis of the Song of Songs

The *Eulogium sponsi de sponsa* is a short treatise, barely six columns in the *Patrologia,* treating chapter 4, verses 6b to 8 of the Song of Songs. These verses show an idiosyncratic Bible text, with some notable variants from the Vulgate, as demonstrated hy the following comparison:

Eulogium sponsi de sponsa [11]		Vulgate
Ibo mihi ad montem myrrhae Et ad colles Libani Et loquar sponsae meae.	4:6b	Vadam ad montem myrrhae Et ad collem thurris
Tota speciosa es proxima mea Et macula non est in te	4:7	Tota pulchra es, amica mea Et macula non est in te
Veni a Libano sponsa, veni, Ad Libanum venies Et transibis ad montem Seir, Et Hermon A cubilibus leonum, A montibus leopardorum. Allelulia.	4:8	Veni de Libano sponsa mea, Veni de Libano, Veni, coronaberis, De capite Amana, De vertice Sanir et Hermon, De cubilibus leonum, De montibus pardorum

From the little we know about the Old Latin versions of the Song of Songs, it is evident that the verses commented on by the *Eulogium* are adapted from a pre-Vulgate Bible text close to the Septuagint.[12] Some Old Latin versions begin, as does

[11] Most copies of the *Eulogium* begin without quoting the verses from the Song of Songs on which it is based. The version given here is taken from Paris, B. *N.* latin 2479 (c.12, from the collection of the Count of Thou), f. 74v. This is a rubricated extraction from the text. Note the liturgical ending.

[12] A composite text of the pre-Vulgate Song of Songs is *Bibliorum Sacrorum. Latinae versiones antiquae, seu vetus Italica, et caeterae quaecunque*

the *Eulogium,* "Ibo," rather than "Vadam." Similarly, and in contrast to the Vulgate, both Old Latin versions and the *Eulogium* use the words "transibis" and "Seir (Sanir) et Hermon" in verse 8. But the progression of prepositions in verse 8 is peculiar to the *Eulogium.* The bride is urged here to come *from* Libanus, *to* Libanus, *to* Mount Seir and Mount Hermon, *from* the lions' den, *from* the leopards' mountains." In contrast, all other versions use various forms of "from" *(a, de,* apo) throughout verse 8.[13] This is strong evidence that the author of the *Eulogium* either used an unknown version of Song of Songs 4 (perhaps liturgical) or adapted his own version for didactic purposes.

Song of Songs 4: 6-8 did not, in fact, play an important role in the liturgy, and was not an obvious choice for such a selection. La.tin exegetes were notably laconic about this passage. We have no evidence that either Origen or Bernard commented on it directly; and the little others did say is echoed in the *Eulogium.* Key words of the text: myrrh, the mountains of Libanus, are given set allegorical meanings, based on etymologies. The Venerable Bede, for example, links myrrh with mortification of the flesh.[14] Alcuin, Angelomus of Luxeuil, and the influential Raimo of Auxerre all agree that Libanus is associated with color white.[15] But most commentators do not read these lines as a unit; some are primarily interested in the

in codibus mss. & *antiquorum libris reperii paruerunt,* 3 vols. Florentain, 1743). It is a collection of non-Vulgate readings from old Bible manuscripts, but also (and mostly) from citations in patristic authors and the liturgy. In the absence of a critical Song of Songs text from the Vetus Latina Institute in Beuron, Germany, the uncritical edition of Sabatier can be consulted with caution.

13 Other variants between the *Eulogium* and the Septuagint-based Old Latin: no mention is made of the beginning of faith, " principio fidei" in verse 8, the *Eulogium* renders "montem" for "capite" and "cubilibus" for "latibus" in the same verse. The Vulgate also reads "cubilibus," which suggests some influence.

14 PL 91: 1136A "In myrrha mortificatio carnis."

15 Alcuin PL 100: 652B, "Libanus candor interpretatus," Angelomus PL 115: 609, "Libanus candor interpretatur," Haimo PL 117: 319 " Libanus [. _.] dealbatio vel candidatio."

words " tota pulchra es," singling them out for independent treatment.[16] This makes the *Eulogium sponsi de spoosa* all the more interesting.

Description of the Treatise

The *Eulogium* begins on a relatively simple note with the words " A bridegroom is speaking here, one who has a bride, and promises to visit her."[17] Notice is taken that the bridegroom is away froin the bride, but is planning a reunion.

After the first paragraph, the mode of interpretation shifts from the historical to the tropological. The text continues:

"But, you ask, who is this bridegroom, who is his bride? The bridegroom is God, the bride is the soul. The bridegroom is at home when he fills the mind with internal joy, he goes away when he takes away the sweetness of contemplation. But, by what similitude is the soul said to be the bride of God? She is the bride because she is joined to him by a chaste love. She is the bride, since by the breath of the Holy Spirit she is made fertile with the offspring of the virtues.[18]

The nuptial gift of the bridegroom (the word is *arrha,* a contract gift)-the gifts of grace-are of common and a special kind. The common gift is human existance, feeling, knowing, and discernment; the special gift is rebirth and remission of sins. Each soul is given a pledge gift by the bridegroom in accordance with its nature:

1s For example, Haimo does not treat this passage as a unit, but explicates "tota pulchra est" at some length, PL 117:319.AB. Most exegetes reflect some knowledge of the etymologies. "Veni de Libano" is often the beginning of a section of interpretation, "Vadam ad montem myrrhae" is seldom associated with verse 4:8.

11 PL 176:987B "Sponsus quidam hie loquitur, qui sponsam habet, et spondet se visitaturum eam."

1s PL 176: 987C "Sed quaeris quisnam sit iste talis sponsus, et quae sponsa eius? Sponsus est Deus; sponsa est anima. Tune autem sponsus domi est, quando per internum gaudium mentem replet; tune recedit, quando dulcedinem contemplationis subtrahit. Sed qua similitudine anima sponsa Dei dicitur? Ideo sponsa, quia donis gratiarum subarrhata. Ideo sponsa, quia casto amore illi sociata. Ideo sponsa, quia per aspirationem Spiritus sancti prole virtutum fecundanda."

For the strong soul, the gift is strength, which invigorates her, so that she becomes strong for good works. For the weak soul, the gift is weakness, which breaks her, so that she does no evil. For the foolish soul, the gift is simplicity, which humbles her, lest she be proud.[19]

It is in the acceptance of the gifts intended especially for it that each soul is able to make progress towards God's love.

The text continues the drama of the reunion of the bride and the bridegroom described in Song of Songs 4: 6-8. The allegorical interpretations of key words are extensive and more elaborately developed than in most commentaries. Myrrh signifies mortification of the flesh. Libanus, which means " whitening " in Hebrew, signifies fleshly purification. Therefore, the journey to the mountains of myrrh and the hills of Lebanon takes the soul through penance to purification of the heart. That the first task is difficult is evident from the fact that it is a *mountain* rather than a *hill* of myrrh. The hills of Libanus, conversely, are plural rather than singular because " the illumination of the inner mind is manifold."[20] From this follows a discursive meditation on the relationship of the Trinity to human sin: sins of weakness are sins against the Father, to whom is imputed strength; sins of ignorance are against the Son, who is wisdom; sin of malevolence are sins against charity, and therefore against the Holy Spirit. This category of sin alone has no remission " because to full sin is owed full retribution."[21]

In similar fashion, the allegorical understanding of Libanus as " whitening" opens an extensive discussion of the invitation to progressive stages of purification: the soul is invited first *to* Libanus, then *from* this Libanus to another, " from the Libanus made white to the Libanus not made white, yet which

[19] PL 176:988B "Arrha est forti fortitudo sua, qua roboratur, ut ad bonum opus convalescat. Arrha est debili debilitas sua, qua frangitur, ne malum perficiat. Arrha est insipienti simplicitas sua, qua humiliatur, ne superbiat."

[20] PL 176:988D "in illuminatione mentis intrinsecus multiplex est bonum, quod invenimus."

[21] PL 176:989B "quia pleno peccato plena retributio debeatur."

is white [...] from the heart made clean to the cleanser of hearts, not made clean, but clean,"[22] A mystical union seems to be implied here, but is not elaborated upon; this section ends with the observation (to be understood in the mouth of the bridegroom) "You will not come all the way to me if you remain in yourself; ascend above yourself and you will find me."[23]

This pattern, verses from the Song of Songs providing key words whose allegorical meanings provide key insights, is repeated with every remaining place-name. The word Seir means shaggy or hairy; Sanir, the alternative reading, means a nocturnal bird or a stench. Seir is explicated first, and related to Edom, or Esau. In other words, the bridegroom's invitation to pass over to Mount Seir is meant to evoke the story of Jacob and Esau in Genesis Esau, the flesh, is the first-born, but is meant by God to be supplanted by the latter-born Jacob, the desire of the spirit. The Song of Songs speaks of *Mount* Seir; this commentary goes further, postulating a mountain, a field, and a valley of Seir. Each is associated with the flesh in a different state: "when the flesh takes food only to keep itself alive, it is Seir on the mountain. When it seeks food to keep strong, it is Seir on the field. When it begs for the delights of luxury, it is Seir in the valley."[24] Therefore, "one who cuts off the superfluous tramples Seir in the valley; one who minimizes necessities conquers Seir on the field. The soul, however, that yields to nature only those things necessary to stay alive renders a more demanding obedience to Seir on the mountain."[25] And this is the peak toward which the bridegroom invites the soul.

22 PL 176:990B "Veni de Libano decandidato ad Libanum non decandidatum, sed candidum. Veni de corde mundato ad mundatorem cordium, non mundatum, sed mundum."

23 PL 176:990B "Non pervenis ad me si remanes in te, ascende supra te et invenies me."

24 PL 176:991A "Quando ad vivendum tantum caro sustentamentum accipit, Seir in monte est. Quando vero ad robur nutrimentum quaerit, Seir in campo est. Quando autem ad lasciviendum delicias poscit, Seir in valle est."

25 PL 176:991B "Qui superflua resecat, Seir in valle conculcat. Qui vero de necessariis aliquid minuit, Seir in campo vincit. Qui autem ad susten-

The alternative reading, Sanir, meaning a nocturnal bird or a stench, refers to the enticements of lust, which come in secret, but "as for why the concupiscence of the flesh is called a stench, this does not pertain to our exposition." [26]

Hermon, the next place-name in the text, means "his anathema." "His" is understood as refering to anathema itself; therefore, Hermon signifies anathema of anathema, or separation of separation. Since the original anathema or separation was that of the devil and his minions, the call to Hermon is an invitation to separate oneself from the one who is already anathema., to be "separated from the body of the devil, and made members of Christ." [27] Like Seir, Hermon has a mountain, a field, and a valley; in the same pattern of exposition, those who are most steadfast in carnal renunciation, those who stand up against the devil, are on the mountain of Hermon. [28]

This brings the author almost to the end of the allegories, and thus of the commentary. The explanations of the lions' dens and the leopards' mountains are brief, and seem almost inevitable. The lions' dens signify sleeping cruelty, the lust of the flesh with which the devil tempts the soul and against which one must always be on guard. The leopards are a cross between cruel lions and spotted panthers (the heretics, infecting the body of the church with spots) ; so, "who are the leopards then, but the proud lovers of this world, whom the devil first turns into heretics by false doctrine, then enflames to vice through the love of this world? The mountains of those leopards are the riches and pomp of this world, in which these depraved ones take pride, and rail bitterly against the life of the elect, when they see them [the saints] abject in this world and themselves exalted." [29]

tamentum tantum naturae necessaria tribuit, quasi Seir in monte exactiori obsequium reddit."

26PL 176:9910 "Quare vero concuspiscentia carnis fetor dicatur, hoc iam exposi ti one non indiget."

21 PL 176: 991D "qui separati a corpore diaboli facti sunt membra Christi."

28 PL 176:992B.

29 PL 176: 992D-993A.

The conclusion summarizes the collective meaning of these individual allegories:

Well, therefore, does the bridegroom say to the bride: "Come and you shall pass over to Mount Seir and Hermon, from the lions' lairs, from the leopards' mountains." For what is "from the lions' lairs to Mount Seir" but from incontinence to chastity, from lust to austerity? And what is "from the leopards' mountains to Mount Hermon " unless from pride to humility, from cruelty to patience? And note that it says "from dens" and not "den," and " from mountains " and not " mountain," and from mountains to mountain. That is, we progress from the many to the one, for the more we draw near to God in fleeing the world, that much more are we gathered into the one. May he so grant us to be. Amen.[30]

The Manuscripts

There are a great many manuscripts of the *Eulogium sponsi de S[JOnsa.* Because of the brevity of the text, it easily slips unnoticed into larger collections; this, of course, raises the possibility that many more copies remain undetected. A complete manuscript list may be impossible to assemble; and it is worth noting that the *Eulogium* is cited by Stegmiiller's *Repertorium biblicum medii aevi* only in the lists of anonymous texts, once from a manuscript from Troyes, and once from a manuscript from Mons.[31] But the text was widespread; at least eighteen twelfth- and thirteenth-century manuscripts of the *Eulogiurn* are extant in the Bibliotheque Nationale in Paris. Three of these,. one from Notre Dame of Paris, and one from the abbey Foucarmont, bear ascriptions to Hugh.[32]

SOPL 176:993.A.-994.A..

a1 F. Stegmiiller, *Repertorium biblicum medii aevi* (Madrid, 1940-1961); see the entries for Hugh of Saint Victor (v. 3, #3786-3854, pp. 173-191); Richard of Saint Victor (v.5, #7316-7345, pp. 103-115); Peter Comestor (v.4, #6543-6592, pp. 280-300). The entries under Anonymous are found in vol. 6 #9820 (Mons 9 [1661]), and vol. 7 #11307 (Troyes 1562 c.12). The *Jilulogium* is listed by J. B. Schneyer in his *Repertorium der Lateinischen Sermones des Mittelalters* (Munster, Westf., 1970) IV, #165, under Hugh of Saint Victor.

a2 Paris, B. N. latin 17251 (c.13, Notre Dame, Paris) "magister hugo sic ait" f. 130; Paris, B. N. Iatin 2945 (c.13, Foucarmont) "Incipit tractatus

Another assigns the text to Bernard of Clairvaux.[88] The remaining fourteen manuscripts say nothing about the authorship of the *Eulogium.* In six manuscripts, however, the text appears among a collection of the writings of Hugh of Saint Victor, including selections from the *Didasealion,* the *Miscellanea, De arrha animae, De area Noe mystiea,* and *De area Noe morali.*[34] The *Eulogium* is also found in a collection of Song of Songs glosses and cornrnentaries,[35] as part of a homily in a group of sermons attributed to Hugh and Bernard,[86] and as a space filler.[87]

magistri hugonis parisiensis" f. 109; Paris, B. N. latin 3007(1) (c.12/13, France, part of a composite manuscript) "Tractatus magistri hugonis" f.19.

83 Paris, B. N. latin 576 (c.12/13, France f. 130v bears the fifteenth century ex libris of "frater Jaqnobus Mercier religiosus de premonstram.") f. 130: "Domnus Bernardus Clarevallensis." It should be noted that the *Eulogium* is also found in a collection of the works of Hugh copied at Clairvaux in the twelfth century. This is Troyes 301, cf. *Oatalogue general des manuscrits des bibliotheques publiques des departments* v. 2 *(Paris, 1855) p. 143.*

34 Some works of Hugh are published in PL 175-177. See also B. Hareau, *Les oeuvres de Hugues de Saint-Victor* (Paris, 1886/Frankfurt, 1963), R. Baron, *Etudes sur Hugues de Saint-Victor* (Bruges, 1963), and D. Van Den Eynde, *Essai sur la succession et la date des ecrits de Hugues de Saint-Victor* (Rome, 1960).

The manuscripts are: Paris, B. N. latin 2531 (c.12, France) ff.22v-27; 2479 (c.12, France) ff. 2566 (c.12, France, later of the Celestin house at Marcoussis, near Paris) ff. 100-103; 15315 (c.13, Sorbonne) ff. 278-282; 14506 (c.13, Saint Victor) ff. 184v-186v. Another manuscript in which the *Eulogium* appears in a Hugonian collection is Paris, B. N. latin 2532, ff. 129-132 (a deluxe edition in the hand of the fifteenth-century Count of Angouleme, Jean, brother of Charles of Orleans.)

as Paris, B. N. latin 2647, ff. 113v-117. This collection begins on f.3lv, includes excerpts from Ambrose by William of Saint Thierry (ff. 37v-lllv, PL 15: 1851-1962), and parallel columns of the Vulgate and Septuagint texts of the Song of Songs (ff. 31v-37v). This Septuagint text does not include the idiosyncracies of the *Eulogium.*

sa Paris, B. N. latin 6674 (c.13, Limoges?) ff. 3lv-34v, continued from 34v-38v with additional material. No author is noted. It is interesting that the only copy clearly used for preaching makes the *Eulogium* part of a much longer sermon. Was the text as it appears in PL 176 suitable for homiletical purposes?

87 Paris, B. N. latin 12029 (c.12/13, Saint-Maur-des Fosses, Paris). Here the *Eulogium* follows an unattributed commentary on the Pauline Epistles, and fills all but one remaining folio of the final quire.

Manuscript evidence thus associates the *Eulogium* with Hugh of Saint Victor primarily, and, far less frequently, with Bernard of Clairvaux. No other author is suggested by this evidence. The *Eulogium* does not appear in Victorine manuscripts other than those containing collections of the writings of Hugh.[38] What is more, and in spite of its printing in PL 198, the *Eulogium* is absent from the early manuscripts of the sermons of Peter Comestor. Over thirty twelfth and thirteenth-century manuscripts now in Paris bear witness to the earliest transmission of this homiletical cycle.[39] Half have the same sermon, "Pulvis sum ego et cinis," for the Feast of the Assumption [40], the rest a variety of other sermons, but not one contains the *Eulogium.* Its presence in the " edition " of Comestor sermons in PL 198 is thus hard to explain, and may derive from much later manuscripts. At any rate, it is unlikely that the *Eulogium* was included in the Comestor collection before the fourteenth century. It is just as clear that the sermons

[38] My search through the Victorine manuscripts of Paris was greatly aided by the recent critical edition of the catalogue of Claudius of Grandrue, compiled in 1514, ed. G. Ouy, *La catalogue de la bibliotheque de la abbaye de St. Victor en Paris: 1514* (Paris, 1983). In my Yale lecture, I suggested Richard of Saint Victor as a possible author; but it must be noted that no material evidence links him to the *Eulogium.*

[39] I have examined the following twelfth- and thirteenth-century manuscripts from Saint Denis, Saint Germain-des-Pres, Saint Victor, the Sorbonne, and other houses: Paris, B. N. latin 2602, 2603, 2950, 2951, 2952, 3301, 3537, 3549, 3813, 3824, 6674, 12415, 13432, 13576, 13582, 13774, 14589, 14590, 14873, 14932, 14933, 14934, 14948, 14954, 16331, 16506, 16699, 16709, 18171; Paris, .Arsenal 272; Paris, Mazarine 1000 (962), 1001 (952), 1005 (941). This list is culled from Schneyer, IV (1972) pp. 636-651, and M. M. Lebreton, "Recherches sur les manuscrits contenant des sermons de Pierre le Mangeur," *Bulletin d'information de l'inst-itut de recherche et d'histoire des textes* 2 (1953) 25-44, and " Recherches [...] Pierre le Mangeur. Additions et corrections," *Bulletin d'information* . . . 4 (1955) 35-36. I would also like to thank Mlle. Tesniere, of the Salle des manuscrits, Bibliotheque Nationale, for her generous assistance with these manuscripts.

[40] This appears in the *Patrologia* as homily LIX of Hildebert of Cremona, PL 171: 627-31, but Schneyer lists it as Comestor, v. 4, #126, p. 638. The manuscripts are: Paris, B. N. latin 2602, 2603, 2950, 12415, 13432, 14589, 14590, 14932, 14933, 14948, 16505, 18171. Six are from Saint Victor.

0£ Peter Comestor are in need 0£ further critical study.[41] But the manuscripts associate the *Eulogium* with the Victorines in general, and with Hugh 0£ Saint Victor in particular.

The Case £or Hugh 0£ Saint Victor

Hugh was a theologian and spiritual writer who served as the head of the School of Saint Victor from lHW to his death in 1141. He was the most revered of the Victorine scholars. Legend claims that he was a count of the Blankenburg line of Saxony, and that he founded Saint Victor in 1115 by translating the relics of the martyr Victor from Marseilles to Paris. Modern scholars are of different minds about this legend;[42] but, certainly, it tells us something about the level of *auctoritas* granted Hugh by later medieval tradition.

Hugh tends to be described as a " modern " figure, interested in how to teach and study, the nature of philosophy, and such theological and spiritual questions as the distinction between natural reason and divine faith, and where the line should be drawn between mystical contemplation and the Beatific Vision. He was systematic, practical, and interested in theory. His exegesis, which emphasized the literal sense, has been described by Smalley as the beginning of modern, scientific biblical scholarship.[43]

[41] The *Patrologia* edition is drawn from M. La Bigne, ed. *Mamima bibliotheca veterum patrum et antiquorum scriptorum ecclesiasticorum . . .* (Lyons, 1677) v. xxiv, pp. 1386ff. This edition claims to be based on a Parisian manuscript contemporary with Peter Comestor, one manuscript each from Saint Martin of Tours and Corbie, and a Carthusian copy. It also cites three manuscripts from Saint Victor. All of these descriptions have possible correlations with the extant manuscripts in Paris, but none of these manuscripts includes the *Eulogium.*

[42] See J. Taylor, *The Origin and Early Life of Hugh of Saint Victor: An Evaluation of the Tradition* (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1957) ; J. Ehlers, *Hugo von St. Viktor: Studien sur Geschichtsdenken und zur Geschichts-schreibung des 12. Jahrhunderts* (Wiesbaden, 1973) pp. 27-50; J. Miethke, "Zur Herkunft Hugos von St. Viktor," *Archiv fur KuUurgeschiohte* 54 (1972) 241-65; and Baron, pp. 9-30. Favorite alternative birthplaces for Hugh are Thuringia and Flanders.

[43] Smalley, pp. 93-106.

And yet most scholars defend Hugh's authorship of the highly allegorical *Eulogium sponsi de sponsa.* This is due in large part to the mention of the *Eulogium* in a list of the works of Hugh known as the *Indiculum omnium scriptomm Magistri Hugonis de Sancto Victore que scripsit,* extant in one manuscript, Oxford, Merton College 49. This *Indiculum* lists the works contained in four volumes of Hugh's writings compiled by Gilduin of Saint Victor sometime after 1141, the year of Hugh's death.[44] The *Indiculum* has the power of a canon list for many scholars of Saint Victor. A number of twelfth- and thirteenth-century manuscripts of the works of Hugh follow the order of the *Indiculum,* often with attribution to Hugh; these are from Dijon, Troyes, Cambrai, Tours, and Paris.[45]

While these reasons make scholars hesistant to eject the *Eulogium* from the corpus of Hugh's writings, the obvious textual problems make them equally hesistant to accept it. Van Den Eynde calls the *Eulogium* " one of the most curious works which Hugh has left to us."[46] The primary curiosity is the non-Vulgate Bible text on which it is based; Van Den Eynde claims that this is the only non-Vulgate citation in Hugh's writings. Certainly, Hugh's sermon on the Assumption of the Virgin Mary, printed in PL 177, is based on a Vulgate version of Song of Songs 4, and quotes extensively from chapters 2 and *5,* from the Vulgate.[47] Van Den Eynde also points out that the discussion of the sin against the Holy Spirit, which the *Eulogium* describes as the one unforgivable sin, appears nowhere else in Hugh's writings, not even in the treatment of sin and penance in *De sacramentis.* The singularities of the *Eulogium,* Van Den Eynde believes, will be explained with the eventual recovery of the source of the biblical version cited.

44 The *Indiaulum* is described by Van Den Eynde, pp. 1-29; Bacon, pp. 31-67; and J. de Ghellinck, "La table des matieres de la premiere edition des oeuvres de Hughes de Saint-Victor," *Reoherohes de Soienoe Religieuse* 1 (1910) 270-289.

45 Haureau, p. 134, n. 2.

46 "Cet ouvrage est un des plus curieux que Hugues nous ait laisses," Van Den Eynde, p. 103; complete discussion, pp. 103-105.

47 PL 177: 1209-1222.

The Sources of the *Euwgium*

The sources employed in the *Eulogium,* and the manner in which they are used, also help to build the context of the author. It is clear, first of all, that the allegorical meanings of the Hebrew place-names are not original to this text. There was an accepted medieval tradition of lists of names and difficult words of the Bible and their allegorical meanings; these were widely circulated. Such short list texts were used as aids to Bible study in the Carolingian schools, where exegesis was the supreme field of study. They are attributed to venerable Bible scholars and exegetes: the *Liber interpretationis Hebraicorum nominum* to Jerome; an *Interpretatio nominum Hebraicorum* to Bede; the *Interpretationes nominum Hebraicorum progenitorum Domini nostri Iesu Christi* to Alcuin; and *Allegoriae in sar;ram scripturam* to Hrabanus l\faurus.[48] This last text bears the closest resemblance to the a.llegories of the *Eulogium sponsi de sponsa.*

According to the *Allegoriae in sacram scripturam,* myrrh is mortification; the *Eulogium* says that myrrh signifies mortification of the flesh. Libanus, which in the *Eulogium* signifies whitening or purification, is Christ £or Hrabanus; his discussion speaks of conversion and purification through baptism. Neither Seir nor Sanir appears on Hrabanus's list, but his interpretation of Edom refers to carnality, with a specific mention of the Jacob and Esau story of Genesis Finally, the *Allegoriae* interprets Hermon as anathema or alienation, although not as " his anathema," the reading in the *Eulogium.* It should be noted, though, that "Ermon-anathema eius" does appear in the *Interpretatio nominum Hebraicorum* attributed to Bede, the only allegory it shares with the *Euwgium.*

These parallels hardly constitute a solid source £or the allegories of the *Eulogium,* but they do suggest that interpretations of Hebrew words and names were a common and somewhat fluid literary tradition in which the treatise participates.

48 Texts attributed to Jerome, CCL 72; to Bede, PL 93: 1098; to Alcuin PL 100:723; to Hrabanus Maurus PL 112:849.

A more exact source or sources might be found, but it is also possible that the *Eulogium* shows these allegories adapted to fit the nuances of an argument.

One outstanding feature of the use of sources in the *Eulogium* is the relative scarcity of quotations from the Bible. Besides the verses from the Song of Songs upon which the *Eulogium* is based, only seven biblical texts are used: the Gospels of Matthew and Mark are each cited once,[49] Genesis is evoked once,[50] I Corinthians and Job are quoted directly one time each,[51] and Proverbs is quoted twice.[52] This averages out to approximately one biblical quotation for each column of the *Patrologia* printing of the text, a strong contrast to the use of the Bible in the writings of most monastic authors. One need only think of Bernard's homilies on the Song of Songs, where each biblical citation resonates into another for a profusion, a blossoming, of biblical allusions. The Psalms, the daily liturgical song of the monastic life, are found on every page of Bernard's homilies on the Song of Songs; they are not cited at all in the *Eulogium.*

The sources accentuate the difficulty of interpreting this text. Its meaning is tied up in a rather peculiar use of place-name allegories, and the strange, even contradictory, text of Song of Songs 4: 6-8. A large leap of understanding is thus called for on the part of a modem reader. And several questions remain unanswered: What was the intended purpose of this concatenation of allegories? Is this text meant to instruct a congregation? For study in a school? For devotional guidance in the novitiate? How did the author arrive at such a strange text of the Song of Songs? Was there no hesitation about the textual variants from the Vulgate?

The Message of the *Eulogium*

And so we come to a consideration of the didactic message and the important themes of the *Eulogium.* The treatise is

49 Mark 3:28-30, PL 176:989A; Matthew 12:32, PL 176:989B.

50 Genesis 25: 19-34, PL 176: 9900.

51 I Corinthians 15:46, PL 176:9900; Job 40:21, PL 176:9920.

5;3-4, Proverbs 9:16-18, both PL 176:9920.

clearly a call to a life of chastity and purity, away from sin, especially carnal sin. The soul is given the dowry *(arrha)* of grace: all share in the *arrha communis* of being alive, feeling, knowing, discerning; some have the *specialis arrha* of being reborn, shorn of sin, accepting the charism of the virtues.[53] To this Augustinian notion of grace is added a yet more particular understanding of God's action in the bestowing of grace. All things one has: wealth, poverty, strength, weakness, foolishness, "are disposed by the pious creator, in goodness, either for the correction of vice, or for the advancement of virtue."[54] With these tools, bestowed by God's grace and wisdom, the soul progresses from the valleys to the plains to the peaks of self-denial and spiritual awakening, from the leopards' dens of carnal sin to the shining peak of Libanus, to the union of the bride and the bridegroom.

In many ways, of course, this exhortation is a.t the heart of Christian monasticism, especially for orders of such strict observance as the Cistercians. Yet the *Eulogium* seems more interested in the journey than the goal, and says very little about the spiritual union itself. In other respects as well the text seems to be very aware of the *saeculum,* and to be concerned with the balancing of the spiritual yearning for God with the variety of both grace and temptation a soul meets in the world. The Augustinian canons, including those of Saint Victor, were explicitly attempting to maintain a life of religious zeal *in the world* rather than, as the monks, in the wilderness. The *Eulogium* is a tropological, or moral, interpretation, rather than a mystical one. It has a rather pragmatic focus on sin and repentance, paralleling what has been described as the canons' interest in behavior as edification, and the importance

53 "Communis arrha est quod nati sumus, quod sentimus, quod sapimus, quod discernimus. Specialis arrha est quod regenerati sumus, quod remissionem peccatorum consecuti sumus, quod charismata virtutum accipimus." PL 176:9870.

54 "Et omnino quidquid in hac vita humana fragilitas tolerat, hoc pius conditor quantum in sua bonitate est, vel ad correctionem pravitatis, vel ad profectum virtutis dispensat." PL 176:988B.

of taking responsibility for moral education.[55] Its close grounding in the etymologies of particular words is a method of exegesis in which allegory functions as an outgrowth of the historical sense of the text. This was the style of Saint Victor, particularly of Hugh.[56]

The *Eulogium* in Twelfth-Century Latin Literature: Gebuinus of Troyes and Thomas the Cistercian

Yet it is also characteristic of Hugh of Saint Victor to weave a text out of passages from admired authors, especially Augustine and Bernard of Clairvaux. If such a source was employed in the writing of the *Eulogium,* it has yet to be identified. But it should be noted that the *Eulogium* appears, almost verbatim, in writings of two little known authors of the twelfth century, Gebuinus of Troyes and Thomas the Cistercian. This opens the possibility that all three texts may be based on a single, unidentified, exposition of Song of Songs 4: 6-8.

Gebuinus of Troyes is known from references of contemporaries, Bernard of Clairvaux, John of Salisbury, Hildebert of Mans, and Nicholas of Clairvaux.[51] All of these witnesses praise Gebuinus, cantor, and later chancellor of the Cathedral of Troyes, for his skill in preaching and redacting sermons from the works of other authors, especially Bernard of Clairvaux. The sermons of Gebuinus remain unpublished, but they are extant, in part or in full, in a number of manuscripts in Paris.[58] Three of these manuscripts include a homily (# *5* in

[55] C. W. Bynum, *Jesus as Mother: Studies in the Spirituality of the High Middle Ages* (Berkeley, 1982), " The Spirituality of the Regular Canons in the Twelfth Century," pp. 22-58.

[56] Chenu, "La theologie symbolique," pp. 191-209, especially pp. 200-202, "La decision d'Hugues de Saint-Victor."

[51] J. Leclercq, "Gebouin de Troyes et S. Bernard," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et tMologiques* 41 (1957) 632, n.40, citing Bernard, Ep. 17 (ed. Leclercq, Rochais, Talbot, v.7, p. 65); John, Ep. 31 (ed. C. N. L. Brooke, *The Letters of John of Salisbul·y* (London, 1955) p. 31); Hildebert, Ep. 3,18 (PL 171:294); Nicholas, Ep. 5 (PL 196:1598-1600).

[58] Leclercq, "ebouin de Troyes," and Schneyer II, pp. 165-171, for a rough list of manuscripts. The search for the homilies of Gebuinus is com· plicated by the composite and idiosyncratic nature of all of these sermon collections.

Schneyer's *Repertorium)* whose *incipit* seems an adaptation of the opening lines of the *Eulogium sponsi de sponsa:*

Ibo mihi et loquar sponsae meae. Sponsus quod est eximiae pietatis hie loquitur, qui sponsam quam habet se visurum pollicetur.[59]

This close resonance to the opening of the *Eulogium,* including, of course, the non-Vulgate Bible text, continues for the first quarter of the homily. Gebuinus shares with the *Eulogium* the statement that the soul in love goes alone on its journey, the analogy of the bride with the soul and the bridegroom with God, and the discussion of the common and special dowry gifts of grace. In many places, the correspondence is word for word. After the list of the *arrhae,* however, the texts are extremely different. Gebuinus's homily continues through a number of lists of four: the four chains of the devil, the four garments of the women of Egypt, the four spiritual paths; each list related to the one next to it by the method of *singula singulis.*[60] This homily only takes Song of Songs 4: 6-8 as the starting point for a spiritual exhortation on purity of life, which differs markedly from the lush place-name allegory of the *Eulogium.* The Gebuinus homily bears no title in the manuscripts,[61] nor is there any rubrication assigning it to a specific feast-day.

The relationship between the *Eulogium* and Gebuinus homily # *5* is difficult to ascertain. Gebuinus is first mentioned in 1126, and died before 1162.[62] There was clear contact between the Cathedral of Troyes and Saint Victor later in the seventh decade of the twelfth century: Peter Comestor, dean of the Cathedral of Troyes from 1145 to the early 1160's, became a

59 Paris, B. N. latin 14937 (c.12/13, Saint Victor) f.108; 14925 (c.13 Saint Victor) f. 177; 3563 (c.13, France) f.97.

60 For an example of the *singula singulis* method in the homilies of Gebuinus, see Leclercq, "Gebouin de Troyes," p. 634, on the fight between the patriarch Jacob and the angel.

61 Only Paris, B. N. latin 14937, reads "Gebuini" at the head of the sermon, f.108.

62 Leclercq, " Gebouin de Troyes," pp. 632-633.

canon of Saint Victor in 1169.[63] It is perhaps significant that two of the three manuscripts containing sermon # *5* of Gebuinus were written a.t Saint Victor in the late twelfth or early thirteenth century.[64] It is possible that Peter Comestor brought the homilies of Gebuinus to Saint Victor.

On the other hand, the great number of twelfth-century copies of the *Eulogium* from monastic centers a.s far from Paris as Compiegne, Tours, Limoges, and Lombardy makes it unlikely that the text was based on homily # *5* of Gebuinus.[65] Unlikely is not, of course, impossible. If the *Eulogium* was indeed written by Hugh of Saint Victor, it is worth noting that Hugh and Gebuinus were exact contemporaries. Both men were extremely active in their respective communities from UQO until Hugh's death in 1141. It is possible, then, that one of these texts is dependent on the other. But since Gebuinus and Hugh alike were known for their skillful adaptations of previous authors, and since the nearly identical passages appear in rather different contexts, a. shared source, perhaps from the school of Bernard of Clairvaux, is a less problematic and equally likely solution.

Such a solution would also serve to explain close similarities and significant differences between the *Eulogium,* homily # *5* of Gebuinus, and the passage on Song of Songs 4: 6-8 in the commentary of Thomas the Cistercian, printed in PL Q06.[66] It has been suggested that Thomas lived at Vaucelles (near Cambrai), Perseigne, Clairvaux, and Citeaux, the evidence for each being equally scanty.[67] What seems clear is that Thomas

[63] Dates suggested by Martin, p. 54.

[64] The earliest, Paris, B. N. latin 14937, is thought by Leclercq to be "une collection authentique," "Gebouin de Troyes," p. 633; but see n. 7 on the composite nature of this collection.

[65] See notes 33-35 above. Other manuscripts from the late twelfth or early thirteenth centuries are: Paris, B. N. latin 18096 (Saint Corneille de Compiegne), 3833 (South France, perhaps Saint Martial of Limoges), 627 (Cerredo, Lombardy), 18219 ("Saint Quintin us de Monte," perhaps the Cluniac monastery of Montaubon), Troyes, B. M. 301 (Clairvaux), and Dijon 60 (41) (Saint Benigne).

[66] PL 206: 17-862.

[67] B. Griesser, "Thomas Cisterciensis als Verfasser eines Kommentars zum

was a. monk of the order of Saint Bernard, and that he wrote his long commentary on the Song of Songs between 1170 and 1189, dedicating it to Pontius, Bishop of Clermont-Ferrand, formerly abbot of Clairvaux.[68] The commentary had a confused early printing history, first appearing appended to the commentary of John Halgrinus of Abbeville (+rn37) , and subsequently attributed to two rather later :figures: Duns Scotus, and Thomas Gallus, abbot of Vercelli, and author of several distinct Song of Songs expositions.[69] The commentary of Thomas the Cistercian is extant in three twelfth-century copies and in a. number of manuscripts from the thirteenth century, several from Cistercian monasteries.[70]

Whoever Thomas the Cistercian may have been, he was extremely well-trained in secular Latin literature: his commentary quotes from Ovid, Horace, Vergil, Juvenal, Boethius, the *Distichia Catonis,* Lucan, Persius, Statius, as well as the Christian authors Prudentius and Sedulius, and several unknown poets.[11] However, the purpose of Thomas's text, in marked contrast to both the *Eulogium* and homily # *5* of Gebuinus, is a sustained, verse-by-verse exposition of the entire text of the Song of Songs. Again, the correspondence with the *Eulogium* is extremely close, but not exact. The close re-

Hohenlied," *Oistercienser-Ohronik* 51 (1939) 168-74, article continued 219-224, and 263-269.

68 "Reverendo Patri domino Pontio, Dei gratia Claromontensi episcopo, F. Thomas quantuluscunque Cisterciensis monachus, se totum in exsequendis mandatis eius impendere." PL 206: 17. See G. Thery, "Thomas le Cistercien: Le Commentaire du Cantique des Cantiques," *The New Bcholasticism* 11 (1937) 101-127.

69 Thery, pp. 117-127; Griesser, pp. 169-174.

10 Griesser, pp. 220-224 for manuscript list, including Du Mans, B. M. 1 (c.12, Perseigne); Oxford, Laud. misc. 150 (c. 12 end, Eberbach); Tours, B. M. 78 (c.12 end, Saint Gratian, the Cathedral of Tours) ; Dijon, B. M. 63, 64 (c.13, Citeaux); Troyes B. M. 2000 (c.13, Clairvaux). Of these, only the Dijon and Tours manuscripts include the prologue to Pontius.

71 B. Grisser, "Dichterzitate in des Thomas Cisterciensis Kommentar zum Hohenlied," *Oistercienser-Ohronik* 50 (1938) 11-14, 118-122; 51 (1939) 73-80.

lationship of the *Eulogium,* Gebuinus of Troyes, and Thomas the Cistercian is illustrated by the following comparison:

Flulogium
PL 176:987CD

Ibo, inquit, *mihi.* sibi vadit, quia singularis amor participem secreti non recipit. Sibi vadit, quia non vult sodalem itineris, qui non patitur consortem amoris. Sed quaeris quisnam sit iste talis sponsus, et quae sponsa eius? Sponsus est Deus, sponsa est anima. Tune autem sponsus domi est, quando per internum gaudium mentem replet; tune reeedit, quando dul-eedinem eontemplationis subtrahit. Sed qua simi-litudine anima sponsa Dei dicitur? Ideo sponsa, quia donis gra-tiarum subarrhata. Ideo sponsa, quia casto amore illi socia ta. Ideo sponsa quia per aspirationem Spiritus saneti prole virtutum fecundanda. Nulla est anima, quae huius sponsi arrham non aceeperit. Sed est quaedam arrha commu-nis, quaedam speeialis. Communis arrha est quod nati sumus, quod sentimus, quod sapimus, quod discernimus. Spe-cialis arrha est, quod regenerati sumus, quod remissionem peccatorum consecuti sumus, quod charismata virtutum aecepimus. Et quod quisque habet, hoc enique arrha est.

Gebuinis of Troyes
Paris, BN latin 14937
f. 108

Ibo, igitur, *et loquar sponsae meae.* Sibi vadit quia singularis amor partieipem seereti non recipit. Sibi quia non vult sodalem itin-eris. qui non patitur eonsortem amoris. Si vero quaeritis quis sit iste sponsus. qua sponsa est. Deus (f.lOSv) est sponsus. anima sponsa est. Non autem hie vel illa. Sed indefinite anima ad imaginem Dei glo-riose formata. quam per translationem divina scriptura nunc vocat sponsam Christi nunc amicam Dei. Nunc uni-cam unici. Vnde. *Surge propera sponsa mea. amica mea. columba mea. formosa mea.* Anima vero per quatuor sponsa dicitur. quia donis gratiarum sub-arrhata. qua casto amore illi sociata. quia prole virtutum fecun-data. quia in eternum ei socianda. In Iordanis baptismate. in unctionis crismate. divini verbi dogmate. Omni procul enigmate. Singula sin-gulis. Donis gratiarum subarrhatam. in Ior-danis baptismate. casto amore illi sociata. in unctionis crismate. prole virtutum fecundata. divini verbi dogmate. In eternum ei socianda. Omni procul enigmate. Sed est quaedam arrha communis. quaedam spiritualis. Communis autem quadrifaria est. quia nati sumus. quia sentimus. quia sapimus.

Thomas the Cistercian
PL 206:423AB

Item, *ibo mihi* ait. Sibi vadit quia singularis amor participem secreti non recipit. Sponsus est Deus, sponsa est anima; ideo sponsa, quia donis gratiarum subarrhata; ideo sponsa, quia casto amore ei sociata; ideo sponsa, quia prole virtutum fe-cundata. Omnis anima huius sponsi arrham suscepit. Sed est arrha eommunis et est arrha specialis. Communis est, quia nati sumus, quia sentimus, quia sapimus, quia discernimus. Spe-cialis est arrha, quia regenerati sumus, quia remissionem peccatorum accepimus, quia charis·mata virtutum aecepi·mus, et quod quisque habet boni unicuique arrha est.

]J)ulogium PL 176:987CD-Cont.	Gebuinis of Troyes Paris, BN Iatin 14937 f. 108-Cont.	Thomas the Cistercian PL 206:423AB-Cont.
	quod discernimus. ex materia. experientia. intelligentia. ex industria. Singula singulis. nati sumus ex materia. sentimus experientia. sapimus intelligentia. discernimus ex industria. Spiritualis arrha similiter quadrifaria est quod sumus regenerati. quod remissionem consecuti. quod virtutibus exornati. quod spe certa beati. perveniente misericordia subsequente indulgentia super habundante gratia perseverante constancia.	

The differences are as striking as the similarities. The passage in Thomas the Cistercian is shorter than the other two, and contains only material found in the *Eulogium.* Gebuinus, in contrast, is the most expansive, and adds "quia in eternum ei socianda " to the list of attributes by which the soul is ca.Ued the bride of Christ, this for the sake of the pattern of lists of fours linked by *singula singulis.* And, where the *Eulogium* and Thomas the Cistercian distinguish between the *arrha communis* and the *arrha specialis,* the manuscripts of Gebuinus clearly read *arrha communis* and *arrha spiritualis.*[12] The relationship between the three texts remains unresolved, but the possibility of a shared, and lost, common source, also remains. Perhaps a part of this text is extant in Troyes a twelfth-century composite of excerpts from various authors (among them Bernard of Clairvaux) which includes at least the beginning of the *Eulogium.*[13] The twelfth-century region of Clair-

[12] The abbreviation in Paris, B. N. latin 14937 is "spual," f. 108v. Paris, B. N. latin 14925 corrects the sign to "spal," more easily read "specialis," by placing dots under the u, f. 177. It would be interesting to know what text this was corrected against.

[13] This text seems to be excerpted, in random order, from a commentary or commentaries on the Song of Songs. Its *inaipit* is "Capite nobis vulpes parvulas (Cant. 2: 15) -Moraliter: Vinea sponsi anima iusti ... " The next

vaux is strongly suggested as the birthplace of the allegories which were redacted into the text attributed to Hugh of Saint Victor.

Conclusions

Whether or not the *Eulogium sponsi de sponsa,* Gebuinus of Troyes, and Thomas the Cistercian are borrowing directly from one another, it is clear that they are sharing a common understanding, in almost identical language, of the soul as the bride of Christ, alone on the spiritual journey. This expression received by far the greatest exposure in the *Eulogium,* which was a popular text in both monastic and canonical schools of the twelfth century. The *Eulogium* seems to emanate from the canons rather than the monks. The evidence suggests that, in the version circulated as a short devotional text, it was associated with Hugh of Saint Victor. As part of a longer exegetical work, it may have had a Cistercian origin.

This is the immediate context of the *Eulogium sponsi de sponsa.* It is important to remember, however, that the treatise also has a wider context, embracing the evangelical spirituality of both monks and canons of the twelfth century. The Song of Songs, in allegorical interpretation, was an inspiration to this spirituality. The *Eulogium,* homily # *5* of Gebuinus, and the Song of Songs commentary of Thomas the Cistercian are all evidence of an innovative interpretation of Song of Songs 4: 6-8, unknown before the twelfth century. This is in itself eloquent testimony to the impact of twelfth-century spiritu:ility on the tradition of biblical commentary.

E. ANN MATTER

University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

section beings "Ibo ad montem myrrhae ••. Sponsus hi quidam loquitur, qui sponsam habet et spondet se visitaturum illam. Nota ergo, quod non semper domi est sponsus iste." Then follow two different comments on Song of Songs 1:13. This text is found on ff. 56v-65v. My description is taken from Stegmiiller, vol. 7 #11307, p. 351, and the Troyes catalogue, *Oatalogue generale des manuscrits des bibliotheques publiques de departements* vol. 2 (Paris, 1885), pp. 82-83. I have not seen the manuscript.

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE BIBLICAL WISDOM TRADITION

I.

St. Thomas, the Bible, and the Quest for Wisdom

THE WISDOM BOOKS of the Old Testament have never received much attention among exegetes. The major reason for their neglect undoubtedly has been the conviction that they do not represent the major strands of biblical revelation that became normative for Judaism or Christianity. They were understood more as a secularizing and universalizing tendency in later Old Testament faith in reaction to a narrow nationalism built upon the covenant doctrine of Israel's special election by God. Wisdom was thought to distrust doctrines and dogmas of all kinds, and to put aside all divinely-revealed knowledge in favor of trust in human experience. Given this view, it is not surprising that one would rarely associate the biblical quest for wisdom with the same avowed quest in the major writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, namely, his *Commentary on the Metaphysics,* the *Summa Contra Gentiles* and the *Summa Theologiae.* After all, Thomas makes it clear that for him wisdom and the study of revealed truths, i.e. *sacra doctrina,* are closely united as one discipline;[1] and that discipline is approached by the rigorous philosophical and logical methods of Aristotle and Scholastic theology. But, taking a lead suggested by Father M. D. Chenu in whose honor this article is written, I would argue that both the Old Testament sages and Thomas were on the same quest and grasped the essential nature of wisdom in much the same way.

[1] See *S.T.* I, q. 1, art. 1, corp.

Among the many outstanding contributions of Father Chenu to the understanding of St. Thomas, one stands out as a remarkable challenge to the prevailing picture that the angelic doctor clung primarily to the feet of Aristotle. Chenu emphasizes that Thomas relied fundamentally on the Scriptures as the basis for his theological endeavors.[2] Even the great *Summa Theologiae* itself claims to be an exposition of Scripture when it equates *sacra doctrina* with the Holy Scriptures in Q. 1, art. 1. Thomas asks whether any *sacred doctrine* is needed beyond philosophy, and answers with the quotation of 2 Tim 3: 16, "All *Scripture* inspired by God is profitable." Again, in art. 3, he demonstrates that *sacra doctrina* must be one science by arguing that the *Scriptures* consider everything that is divinely revealed, and this material is what constitutes the formal object of *sacra doctrina.* In short the formal object of theology is what has been revealed in the Scriptures. And although Thomas does occasionally refer to Tradition beyond the Scriptures, he does not consider it as a source of revelation on a level with the From the start, Thomas considers the theological enterprise as an exposition and further penetration of the biblical message. Thus, St. Thomas insisted that the real subject of theology was not the spiritual sense of Scripture but the literal, and that any further allegorical or spiritual interpretation must be based on the literal sense of the text (S.T. I, Q. 1, art. 10, corp.) .

St. Thomas was, as a result, generally much more sober in his exegesis of biblical passages than most of his contemporaries, and refrained from forcing meanings on to the text. He showed his rich knowledge of the Bible by the liberal use of quotations throughout his writings. He particularly loved the wisdom books of the Old Testament-the index to the *Summa Theologiaie* lists 44 columns of quotations from the prophets, but *52* from the wisdom literature.

2 *M.* D. Chenu, *Toward Understanding St. Thomas* (Henry Regnery Company, 1964) ; and *Faith and Theology* (Dublin: Gill, 1968) 36-49.

a G. Geenen, "The Place of Tradition in the Theology of St. Thomas," *Thomist* 15(1952) 110-135.

Despite this congenial insight, St. Thomas was not a modern critical exegete but a medieval, and his approach shared much more of the medieval approach than would be accepted today in critical circles. For example, his quotations of Scripture in the *sed contra.* sections of each question in the *Summa* are used as authorities for the argument to follow, much on a par with citing Aristotle or Augustine or Pseudo-Dionysius, who are also quoted regularly. This is a form of proof-texting that treats the biblical passage as a doctrinal statement or rational argument that can be read and used outside of its context in the Bible. A slightly different example of this same approach can be seen in Thomas's treatment of an entire biblical book in his *Exposi,tio in Job ad litteram* (Commentary on the Book of Job). The impassioned dialogues between Job and his friends are treated as philosophical discourses or scholastic debates of the genre *quaestiones disputatae.* [4] No doubt, Thomas was trying to protect Job from a blasphemous attack on God himself, but in order to treat the text literally (ad *litteram),* he is forced to rob the original Hebrew work of its literary genius and treat it as a philosophically rigorous debate. Still a third example would be a work such as his *Catena Aurea,* in which he has strung together chains of patristic comments on the Gospels. Although Thomas could be quite critical of the excesses of allegorical interpretation elsewhere,[5] here he cites many of the same type of spiritual insights in a casual manner without reference to any literal sense of the original passages in the Bible.[6]

All of these examples show that St. Thomas still maintained strong ties to the earlier traditions of biblical interpretation

[4] See Vernon Bourke, *Aquinas' Search for Wisdom* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1965) 126-127.

[5] See Chenu's sensitive treatment of this balance between literal and allegorical interpretation in Thomas in his *Toward Understanding St. Thomas,* 253-259.

[6] Although, in Thomas's favor, it should be admitted that he was seeking to widen the base of interpretation by adding quotations from many newly available works of the Greek fathers to the standard repertory of western Latin fathers.

that showed up often in his writings. On the other hand, his conscious effort to read biblical texts more soberly and more literally where possible did overcome the worst fantasies of the allegorical tradition. The shift had another effect as well. A more literal reading of texts broke down the close relationship of the Bible to personal piety that had developed over the centuries as a result of the spiritualizing allegories that transferred difficult passages of the Bible, especially those dealing with war and conquest, into moral lessons for the Christian. This freed the texts of the Bible from their pious role and allowed them to be examined as the subject of speculative theology.[7] Thomas especially searched through the Scriptures to understand their overall claims of revelation in a comprehensive theological schema. To a modern biblical critic, this move overcame the worst shortcomings of the allegorical method, but created a second weakness of its own. It took the biblical passages as nearly absolute proclamations of divine truth so that they could be used out of their original literary context. This resulted in only the barest acknowledgment of the relative nature of the biblical language and no awareness of the historical contingency in which biblical statements were formed. This weakness was intrinsic to all pre-critical approaches to the Bible as a sacred book: because it was a book of divine revelation, it *could not* be confusing or time-bound.

Current exegesis stresses precisely the opposite about ancient texts. The hermeneutical challenge to the modern reader of Scripture is the conviction that our contemporary understanding of the nature of the world and of the nature of "knowing" itself is substantially different from that of the ancient world.[8] But for Thomas, the opposite would have been true. He would have been convinced that the basic understanding of what is

7 See Chenu, *Toward Understanding St. Thomas,* 258-259.

8 There are many available discussions of modern hermeneutical concerns. See, e.g., Van A. Harvey, *The Historian and the Believer* (New York: Macmillan, 1966); Stephen Neill, *The Interpretation of the New Testament, 1861-1961* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966); and Paul Ricoeur, *Essays on Biblical Interpretation* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980).

would remain largely the same for all peoples and all periods, i.e., truth would be timelessly expressed. He did make it his task to translate the common people's language of the Bible into the deeper and more adequate language of philosophy and theology, but this was translation and not transmutation.

He used a whole panoply of scholastic methods to draw distinctions and make grammatical points a source of interpretation, as well as applying Aristotelian categories in his theological exegesis of individual passages.[9] In general, he gave theological explanations of the biblical texts according to the developed state of theology in his day as though the ancients must have intended the same meanings with the same distinctions and categories. He probably never considered that the original purpose or meaning of an Old Testament text might be far different from his own understanding.

Despite these shortcomings in his direct exegetical understanding, Thomas can be considered an outstanding figure in the history of biblical exegesis. Pope Leo XIII declared him to be the most illustrious of biblical interpreters in paragraph 7 of his encyclical *Providentissi,mus Deus* (1893). Moreover, Thomas commented on more biblical books than any other medieval commentator. Although very few of these have ever been translated into modern languages because of the limitations in his verse-by-verse exegesis, his true achievement in Scripture is tied to his theological system. Thomas sought boldly to systematize all of Scriptural revelation into a. unified theological exposition. Aspects of his system are built on Augustine and traditional medieval methods of exegesis, as well as on Aristotle; it is most clearly seen in the great *Summa Theologiae.* This work turns awa.y from the older, pietistic use of the Bible and towards a philosophical theology of revelation, but it does so by respecting the two basic aspects of

9 For a detailed treatment of Thomas's approach to Scripture, see J. van der Ploeg, " The Place of Holy Scripture in the Theology of St. Thomas," *Thomist* 10 (1947) 398-422 and Ceslaus Spicq, "Thomas d'.Aquin," sections III to VIII on Thomas as an exegete, in *Diotionnaire de Theologie Oatholique* (Le Touzey et .Ane, 1946) Tome 15, part 1, cols, 701-738.

the biblical expression of revelation: the initiative of God in revealing himself and his intention, and the human response in discovering the way to that God. The famous *exitus-reditus* schema of the *Summa* mirrors this dynamically.[10] For Thomas, the undertaking of such an enormous *summa* of theology was nothing less than the recovery of the meaning of Scripture for his own age through the insights offered by the classical philosophy of Aristotle. But he did this primarily in works of theology and not as successfully in his biblical commentaries where he was tied to traditional concerns. In grasping revelation as a whole, he achieved an excellent understanding of the purposes intended by biblical authors without always consciously recognizing it. This is excellently illustrated by comparing Thomas to the wisdom tradition. Both represent wide-ranging attempts to explore what we can know about God. Do they achieve the same ends? Let us look first at modern critical approaches to the Wisdom literature; then at Thomas's statements on wisdom in his *Metaphysfos, Summa Contra Gentiles* and *Summa Theologiae;* then make some comparisons; and finally evaluate the results.

II.

Development in Understanding the Wisdom Books

The Wisdom books of the Old Testament have been largely ignored in the systematic treatments of Israel's faith by exegetes using the historical-critical method. Julius Wellhausen, for instance, in his monumental synthesis of the source-critical theory of how the Old Testament was written, *Prolegomena to the History of Ancient Israel,* never discusses a role for wisdom at all.[11] Most scholars in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries understood the wisdom movement to be a post-exilic development.[12] It was seen to have developed as an heir to prophetic preaching which had fallen silent after

10 See *B.T.* I, q. 2, prologue.

11 First printed in 1878; English edition, Meridian Books, 1957.

12 See O. S. Rankin, *Israel's Wisdom Literature: Its Bearf;ng on Theology and tke History of Religion* (T & T Clark, Edinburgh, 1936)

the Exile. The two older supports of faith, namely a living voice of prophecy and a trust that God would always intervene to save Israel, were gone. For these older scholars, Wisdom reflected a double response to this breakdown of the old faith structures.

First, there developed, along with the writing down and codification of the Law, a practical piety of reflection upon the certainty of divine retribution for evildoing, as well as serious words of moral advice to guide the believer in daily obedience to the way of the Law.[13] This is reflected in the proverbial wisdom in the Book of Proverbs and in a still later book, the Wisdom of Jesus hen Sira. (Ecclesiasticus). Second, a new questioning spirit began to take shape, found primarily in the Book of Job and Qoheleth (Ecclesiastes), which explored the problems of theodicy, divine governance of the world, the limits to human knowledge of the transcendent, and the meaning of death. In many ways, authors such as Qoheleth or the writer of the Wisdom of Solomon were understood to be influenced by the questions posed by Greek skeptical thought. The great age of the Wisdom teacher was, according to this view, the last two centuries before Christ.

Over the last fifty years, the interpretation of wisdom has changed radically, if only gradually.[14] The primary reason for abandoning the older outlook has been the discovery of so many wisdom para.llels in other Ancient Near Eastern documents, most of which can be safely dated far earlier, to the second millenium B.C., or at the latest, to the same period as the Israelite monarchy (1000 to 586 B.C.).[15] Collections of

[13] R. E. Clements, *One Hundred Years of Old Testament Interpretatfyn* (Westminster Press, 1976) 99-101.

[14] See J. .A. Emerton, "Wisdom," in *Tradition and Interpretation,* edited by G. W. .Anderson (Oxford University Press, 1979) 214-237.

[15] Many are collected in Walter Beyerlin, *Near Eastern Religious Temts Relating to the Old Testament* (Westminster Press, 1978) 133-145, and in James Pritchard, *Ancient Near Eastern Temts Relating to the Old Testament* (Princton University; 3rd edition, 1969) 412-440. .A brief survey of ancient wisdom genres is provided by Roland Murphy, in *The Forms of the Old Testament Literatures vol. XIII, Wisdom Literature* (Eerdmans Press, 1981) 9-12.

wisdom maxims are known from Egypt ranging from Ptahhotep, close to 2000 B.C., down to the writings of Amenemope (about 700-600, B.C.) and Onchsheshonqy (600-400 B.C.).[16] These show a decided development in spirit from a more self-assured and confident optimism that humans can prosper and succeed in life by being prudent, careful and learning wise ways, found in Ptahhotep, down to a more "religious" attitude that acknowledges the mysteries of God's ways and the uncertainty of human achievement that necessitates prayer, humility and acceptance in order to receive divine favor, common in Amenemope and Onchsheshonqy.[17] The same combination of an "older" practical wisdom with its rules for success, with "later" observations on the "Fear of the Lord," obedience and submission to Yahweh's will, is found in the Book of Proverbs. Thus its spirit is closer to Egyptian materials of an earlier age than it is to any post-exilic theology. Even more striking, Proverbs 22:17 to 24:22 borrows directly from passages in Amenemope.[18]

If we turn to Babylonian wisdom materials from the second millenium, a different but just as remarka.ble series of parallels can be noted.[19] The *Ludlul bel nemeqi* ("I will praise the Lord of Wisdom") is often referred to casuaily as the "Babylonian Job," because it treats the questions of a God who seems to be angry at the author for some reason that cannot be discovered. The author proclaims his innocence and explores the V'arious attitudes he as a sufferer should take towards the divinity. In all, this work is quite similar to Job in its concern for understanding why God's ways cannot be fathomed, why

16 See *ANET* 421-424, and Beyerlin, 49-61, both cited in foonote 5.

17 Thorough treatments can be found in Ernst Wurthwein, "Egyptian Wisdom and the Old Testament," in *Studies in Ancient Israelite Wisdom,* edited by James Crenshaw (New York, Ktav, 1976) 113-133, and Berend Gemser, "The Instructions of 'Onchsheshonqy and Biblical Wisdom Literature," in the same volume, pp. 134-160.

18 The parallels are listed fully in L. Boadt, *Introduction to The Wisdom Literature and the Book of Proverbs,* (Collegeville Bible Commentary Old Testament Series; Liturgical Press, to appear in Fall, 1985).

19 See especially W. G. Lambert, *Babylonian Wisdom Literature* (Oxford University, 1960).

some people suffer, what avenues of healing or knowing the divine will may be found, and how salvation can be experienced. A similar work, often referred to as the " Sumerian Job" has been dated as early as B.C. Still another Babylonian wisdom text, usually titled the "Babylonian Theodicy" and sometimes referred to as the "Babylonian Qoheleth," is written as a dialogue between a sufferer and his friend in which the possibilities of rejecting God and the uselessness of devotion to the divine are proposed by the victim and refuted by the friend.[20]

From this wealth of wisdom traditions discovered among Israel's neighbors, we can conclude not only that Israel was part of a larger wisdom movement in the ancient world and shared common questions and concerns that were not unique to its own sense of revelation from Yahweh, but also that the tradition of exploring such questions and framing them in the literary forms found in Proverbs, Job, Qoheleth and other books, far antecedes the Exile. Since the wisdom books do not deal with historical events, it is always dangerous to try to date them precisely. Quite possibly, the final forms of the books of Proverbs and Job were written down after the Exile, but both books clearly belong to the preexilic period in their major content. Qoheleth more obviously seems to be from about 400 to 800 B.C., partly because of its later vocabulary, and partly because of its more "rational" approach that does not use the imagery of the old myths and traditions to illustrate its points. But it too builds on a shptical tradition of pessimism that is much earlier.

A Contemporary Biblical Understanding of Wisdom

One of the tendencies in the older approach to wisdom as a late movement was to identify it with Greek concepts of the wise person as the prudent person, whose practical judgment ordered all knowledge to achieve understanding and successful

[20] William McKane, *Proverbs* (Old Testament Library; Westminster Press, 1970) 151-182, treats this in some detail.

harmony in life.[21] Socrates's advice to know oneself and one's ignorance summed up the ideal for much of the Greek world. Reason was a. human effort to bring order and understanding to the world we perceive. It recognized limits to that understanding, and, through Aristotle, proposed contemplation of the highest cause and first principle as a step beyond our controlled ordering of things.[22] But it certainly stopped short of a personal relationship with the gods and avoided any moral demands based on a wise understanding of divine revelation. When biblical interpreters applied this comparison with the Greeks to Israel's sages, they tended to view the Wisdom Books as speculative in nature and opposed to the salvation history traditions and kerygma of divine revelation typical of the Pentateuch and Prophets.

If, instead, we examine the wisdom traditions against their more natural background of the Ancient Near Eastern thought world, a different picture will emerge. Wisdom will not be a rigorous and logical philosophy as such, but more of a prephilosophical reasoning built up of a combination of searching questions, traditional insights proved by experience, and religious affirmations grounded in the particular revelation about God that Israel proclaimed.[23] Despite the difficulties that many biblical commentators have in reconciling the piety of some proverbs with the secularism of others, or of the devout atttitude of a Sirach with the apparently "faith-less" conclusion of a Qoheleth, careful reading of the wisdom corpus as a whole reveals a remarkably coherent picture. Seen and understood from within the perspective of Israel's faith, wisdom belongs properly only to Yahweh as the single source of all creation, as the only power to control and order all events, and as personally involved in every aspect of the world.

[21] See the survey of this in Mortimer Adler, *The Great Ideas-A Syntopicon of the Great Books of the Western World* (London: Encyclopdia Brittanica Corp., 1952) II: 1105-1110, and Jacques Maritain, *Soience and Wisdom* (New York: Scribner's, 1940) 10-14.

[22] A. J. Festugiere, *Contemplation et vie contemplative selon Platon* (Paris: Vrin, 1936) 5-8.

[23] Gerhard von Rad, *Wisdom in Israel* (Abingdon Press, 1972) 61, on gnomic apperception.

The Characteristics of Biblical Wisdom

What, then, are the chief characteristics of this Yahwistic view of Israel's wisdom tradition? And what sets it off from the other major religious traditions of the Bible: the Law and the Prophets?

(1) We must first recognize that "wisdom" *(hokmah)* in ancient Israelite thought was not a. carefully limited technical term. Wisdom covered everything from skill in manual craftmanship to prudent behavior to speculative thinking about the meaning of creation and existence. It even covered an almost mystical personification of the divine attribute of wisdom as an individual person.[24] Despite this range, we can, for our purposes, limit the use of wisdom in what follows to a " professional" wisdom that is closely linked with the major intellectual and religious institutions of Israel: in particular, the royal administration and the temple schools. This has been treated at length in studies of wisdom and needs no defense here.[25] Jeremiah implies that the wise counsellor stands beside priest and prophet as a source of knowing divine intention,[26] and so we can most clearly tie the origins of professional wisdom to the task of giving political and moral advice in difficult situations facing the state. By its nature, then, wisdom will develop interests broader than the special religious traditions of the Israelites alone since it must confront crises and decisions involving Israel's relations to other nations.

(2) Where the legal and prophetic traditions had relied on wha.t God had specifically revealed or done in Israel, the wisdom writers sought to understand and relate faith in God to

24 .A survey is provided in R. B. Y. Scott, *The Way of Wisdom in the Old Testament* (Macmillan Press, 1971) 1-22.

25 For more detailed treatment of the origins of formal wisdom schools in the royal administrations of David and Solomon, see .Albrecht .Alt, "Solomonic Wisdom," printed in *Studies in Ancient Israelite Wisdom,* edited by James Crenshaw (Ktav, 1976) 102-112, and R. B. Y. Scott, " Solomon and the Beginnings of Wisdom in Israel," *Ibid.,* 84-101.

20 Jer 18: 18: "Come, let us make plots against Jeremiah, for the Law will not cease from the :priest, nor counsel from the wise, nor the word from the prophet."

everyday experiences common to all people, whether Israelite or pagan. Thus they do not rely on divine commands, but on the persuasive power of insights gained from experience. They are thus best characterized as keen observers of life in all of its different manifestations. This accounts for wisdom's willingness to borrow so much from neighboring peoples. It also la.ys the foundation for understanding their reluctance to base arguments on any revelation particular to Israel alone.

(3) This wisdom tradition must be understood further as a completely intellectual tradition, with rigorous study of past learning expected of all who would enter its ranks.[21] While not governed by the procedures of strict logic as modern philosophical traditions generally are, it had its distinct rules which were taught. One of these was reasoning by analogy. Lessons learned by observation of nature, or more importantly, of human behavior, could be applied in new situations. Especially was this true of speculation on the divine. Observation on creation, as we shall see, can reveal some hint of the divine intentionality which in turn can be sought in proper human forms of behavior. In this way, Israelite wisdom was always both practical and speculative.[28] But the moral dimension of the practical was more often uppermost in their concerns.

(4) The concern with results forced them to examine the *causes* of things. Some things were easy to understand because they were necessarily so, "A lazy hand causes poverty, while an industrious hand grows rich" (Prov. 10:4). But others were what Gerhard von Rad calls " contingent," i.e., they cannot be understood immediately as to why they are the way they are: " The mouth of the just person is a fountain of life, but the mouth of the wicked conceals violence " (Prov

21 R. N. Whybray, *The Intellectual Tradition in the Old Testament (BZAW* 135; New York: De Gruyter, 1974) 70-73.

2s Gerhard von Rad, *Old Testament Theology I* (Harper and Row, 1965) 418; James Crenshaw, *Old Testament Wisdom: An Introduction* (Atlanta: John Knox, 1981) 24; Dianne Bergant, *What Are They Baying about Wisdom Literature?* (New York: Paulist Press, 1984) 1-10.

10:11).[29] To master the reasons *why* reality works the way it does is to discover the proper ordering of reality.[30]

(5) The passion for seeing order in the experience of the world's operations led the wisdom writers to extol the beauty and perfection in the divine order of creation itself. All of reality is planned by God and operates according to the divine plan. The search for wisdom is a search to see and know the divine intention behind the ordered universe. At the same time, the order and harmony of nature reveals the power, intelligence and love of the planner.[31]

(6) Order is not to be understood as a set of intrinsic "natural" laws that govern a system by secondary causality. Rather, for Israel, God is personally the cause of all that happens, at least by means of his governance. Human freedom also brings about results, but never, for good or for evil, without the simultaneous action of the divine will. Thus causality is ultimately personal, and understanding the sequence of cause and effect, or of order in general, requires knowledge of the personal God.[32]

(7) Such knowledge of God did not mean necessarily understanding the divine intention. God's answer to Job in the whirlwind of the Book of Job makes that absolutely clear (Job 38:4-40:2). Human beings are unable to penetrate the hidden quality of God's plan for creation, or comprehend its scope, or control its direction. Instead, they are led to wonder and adoration, a, response mentioned often in the Psalms (see Pss 8, 19, 67, and 93 as examples). Wisdom is personified as the divine assistant, or even the spirit of playfulness, at the moment of God's act of creation, in Proverbs 8:22-31. This wisdom is revealed in every aspect of the created universe, and links human contemplation of God's greatness with the

29 Von Rad, *Wisdom in Israel,* chapter 7.

30 Roland Murphy, "Wisdom-Thesis and Hypothesis," *Israelite Wisdom: Theologiaal and Literary Essays in Honor of Samuel Terrien* (Scholar's Press, 1978) 35; see also James Chenshaw, *Old Testament Wisdom,* p. 19.

31 Psalm 104 is a good example; see von Rad, *Wisdom in Israel,* p. 67 as well.

32 Von Rad, *Wisdom in Israel,* 66-67.

divine pleasure in his creatures: "I was daily his delight, rejoicing before him always, rejoicing in his inhabited world and delighting the sons of men" (Prov 8:30-31).[33]

(8) Above all, creation was good in the eyes of wisdom. Genesis 1, a hymn to creation, repeatedly affirms that God saw in what he created, "that it was good" (Gen 1:4, 10, rn, 18, 21, 25). The hymn reaches a climax in 1:31, when" God saw *everything* that he had made, and truly, it was *very* good." For Israel, the good was primarily a quality of doing good, a force that promotes the welfare of community and individual. It is above all a human quality defined by a person's ordering himself or herself to the divine plan of good order. The" good" person is one who does what is right, a " righteous " person *(saddiq)*.[34] This is a public stance, not a private one, and the Book of Proverbs in particular addresses the vast majority of its lessons to the pupil who seeks to do what is right or good. " Goodness " is never an abstract noun, it must be concrete. If used of the results of good acting, it is expressed as prosperity or blessing. Thus the wise contemplation of the divine goodness in creation leads the believer to a moral stance of doing good.

(9) Wisdom was built upon trust in Yahweh. The wise were never neutral observers of the universe, but searchers after its secret and hidden mystery beyond what they could discover by their own powers. Not one single book in the Old Testament can be read apart from the committed stance of trust in Yahweh, and this holds as much for the wisdom literature as for the prophetic. " Trust in Yahweh with all your heart and do not rely on your own insight " (Prov 8:5); " Commit your work to the Lord and your plans will be established" (Prov 16:8). And the reverse also holds-those who are arrogant or fools, who refuse to act in reference to the divine will, come to grief: "A scoffer seeks wisdom in vain, but

[33] See James Efird, *BibUcai Books of Wisdom: A Study of Proverbs, Job, Ecdesiastes and Other Wisdom Literature in the Bibfo* (Valley Forge: Judson Press, 1983) 14.

[34] See von Rad, *Wisdom in lsraei,* 77-72.

knowledge is easy for a person of understanding" (Prov 14:6); "Wisdom is not known in the heart of fools" (Prov 14:33); "A fool's mouth is his ruin, and his lips are a snare to himself" (Prov 18.7). Since the fool does not know or trust Yahweh, he cannot be " Crush a. fool in a mortar with a pestle along with the crushed grain, and still his folly will not depart from him!" (Prov 27:22). Complete trust in the Lord is supported by the wisdom of experience which has been reflected upon and refined in long-standing lessons or maxims (see Prov 22:17-19). Trust also prepares us for the uncertainty of sufiering, injustice and seeming indifference on God's part.[35] Job ends in a hymn of trust declaring that Job is better off for having experienced God than understanding his situation (Joh 42:1-6).

(10) Wisdom built on these foundations must find further expression in concrete worship. The concept of "Fear of the Lord" is much closer to religious observance and reverent worship than to anything else (Prov 8:13; 9:10; 10:27; 14:27; 15:16, 33; 16:6; 19:23 22:4; 23:17; Job 4:6). It is the concrete human response to the experience of the awesomeness of God, and ultimately suggests that Israel acknowledged the limits of what human searching can know by freely confessing that faith must come before understanding whenever the divine is involved.[36] Prov 1:7 sets the theme of the whole book: "Fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, but fools despise wisdom and instruction." So, too, Job 28 describes the human search for wisdom throughout all of created things. Yet it remains hidden from us (28:20-21) and known only by God (28:23).[37] God announces it, establishes it and declares to

[35] Von Rad, *Wisdom in Israel,* 195-204.

[86] Crenshaw, *Old Testament Wisdom: An Introduction,* p. 190; see also von Rad, *Wisdom in Israel,* pp. 97-112.

[37] The acknowledgment of human limitation in understanding the divine also restricts attempts to calculate the proper times. God determines what will be in his own time (Qoh 3:1-9, 17; 9:12). Qoheleth is particularly insistent on this. Other peoples had elaborate soothsaying and divining arts, but Israel ruled it out (Lev 19:31, 20:6; Deut 18:10-11) because it conflicted seriously with the attitude of obedience and trust to Yahweh who

humans: "Behold, fear of the Lord-that is wisdom" (28:28). Wisdom is a divine gift, not a human achievement, in the ultimate sense.[38] And when the texts speak of the wisdom found in the original creation, they speak of how God sent wisdom to seek out humans, and not vice versa (Prov 8:22-31, Sir 24:1-24). The Wisdom of Solomon declares the surpassing worth of wisdom above all else in chaps. 7-9, but begins, "Therefore I *prayed,* and understanding was given me; I called upon God and the spirit of wisdom came to me" (Wis. 7:7).

(11) If wisdom is understood in connection with Israel's relationship to God, then the intellectual searching of the sages must have a fundamentally personal dimension: they sought the understanding of life and how to gain the blessings of the good life: "(Wisdom) is more precious than jewels and nothing you desire can compare with her; long life is in her right hand, riches and honor in the left. Her ways are full of joy, and all her paths are peace. She is a tree of life to those who lay hold of her" (Prov 3:15-18). Their search had many important aspects in view, and different books reflect different priorities.[39] James Crenshaw sums these up for the major wisdom books as: Proverbs searched for knowledge; Job for the divine presence; Qoheleth for the meaning of life; and Sirach for the continuity in life.[40] Each of these books in its complexity carries out its search in the realization of an ongoing tension between the object of its seeking and the gulf that separates its seeker from the transcendent God who can bestow it. Wisdom above all prepares the wise person to cope with real

acts in his freedom. At the same time, however, one can learn the proper moments to act in ordinary circumstances (Prov 15:23, 25:11; Sir 4:20). This is part of the teaching of the wise, but it exists always in the larger context of recognizing the limits to imposing human order on events. Wisdom recognizes that the divine will in a given situation may be quite different from what prudence ordinarily demands. As Prov 16:9 says, "In his mind, one plans his way, but the Lord directs his steps."

[38] Donn Morgan, *Wisdom in the Old Testament Traditions* (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1981) 151.

[39] Roland E. Murphy, *Wisdom Literature and Psalms* (Interpreting Bible Texts; Abingdon Press 1983) 29-31.

[40] James Crenshaw, *Old Testament Wisdom: An Introduction,* pp. 62-63.

life in all of its inconsistencies and frustrations without losing sight of the God that stands behind that life.[41] This holds true for the corollary concerning how to live that life: ethics. The prophets and law are concerned with morality as much as wisdom, but wisdom seeks for first principles and the application of those principles to the problems of human living.[42]

(rn) Finally, it can be deduced from the above-named qualities of Israelite wisdom that it simply cannot be understood apart from Israel's faith in Yahweh. If there. ever was a "secular" wisdom made up of practical observations on the best ways to get ahead in life, it certainly does not stand on its own any longer.[43] Whatever wisdom training came from parental instructions to youth or from court schools for the education of professional diplomats and scribes, it has been preserved and interpreted only in the larger context of Yahweh's own wisdom linked to Israel's proper intellectual and moral response to the divine action as the source for understanding the universe and our place within it.[44]

III.

What does Thomas say about wisdom in his programmatic statements at the head of his major commentaries? These will provide a broad definition of the role of wisdom in the philosophical and theological enterprise of the Christian and establish a background to the next step, the comparison of Israel's sages to Thomas.

Wisdom in Thomas's Commentary on the MetaphysiGS

St. Thomas, in commenting on Aristotle's *MetaphysiGS,* emphasizes the importance of the Philosopher's arguments that

41 See L. Boadt, *Reading the Old Testament: An Introduction* (Paulist Press, 1984) 489-491, for other life-values sought by the sages.

42 See O. S. Rankin, *Israel's Wisdom Literature: Its Bearing on Theology and the History of Religion* (Schocken Books, 1936) ix.

43 Donn Morgan, *Wisdom in the Old Testament Traditions,* 137-146.

44 In this claim, I side with van Rad's consistent arguments for the enduring Yahwistic context of all biblical wisdom books as we see them, and against Crenshaw and McKane, who would view explicit Yahwistic influence as part of an ongoing (and later) development.

wisdom is a science, i.e., it is a virtue of the intellect.[45] It is not to be associated with wide experience and skill, but with reasoning to truth through causes. Moreover, humans desire to know, and their happiness is tied to the knowledge and understanding of the causes of things. Human wonder is not satisfied with knowing many individual objects or facts, but with understanding universals; thus, " it is more according to wisdom to know as one pursuing all things " *(Metaphysics,* Lesson 1, C23). Thomas also comments that some people are wiser insofar as they have a plan for things to be done and know their causes which are the basis of such a plan *(ibid.* C 28)[46] Wisdom deals with causes, and thus there is a hierarchy of the sciences, depending on how noble and outstanding are the causes with which they deal; and at the top is the study of the First Cause of a.ll things, and this study alone truly deserves to be called wisdom *(Metaphysics,* Lesson 1, C 34-35; Lesson 2, C 36-51) .[47] Thomas approves of Aristotle's stress on the dignity of wisdom because its object is difficult for human understanding *(ibid.* Lesson 2, C 45-46); and also because it gives a greater certainty since it knows the highest universals, thereby rendering the wise person the most fitted to teach (C 47-48). Wisdom is necessarily concerned with the end of things in knowing their causes so that it is also focussed on the *good* of things (C 50-51): "Hence the science which considers first and universal causes must also be the one which considers the universal end of all things, which is the greatest good in the whole of nature" (C 51).

In his third lesson, Thomas points to Aristotle's claims that wisdom (or philosophy) exists for the sake of knowledge itself, and not for any practical benefit or gain. Philosophy was born in wonder, and in an attempt to escape from ignorance, by discovering the causes of things (M*etarphysics,* Lesson 3, C 53-54). Aristotle claims that wisdom is free, in that the wise

[45] See also *In VI Ethics,* lecture 5, #1183; and *In I Sent.* Prol., q. I, qla. I, sol.

[46] *In VI Ethics,* lecture 5, # 1177.

[47] *S.T.* I-II, q. 66, art. 5. See also Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VI: 7.

person does not pursue wisdom for some other purpose or gain, but only for its own sake. *(ibid.,* C 58). This then leads to a final observation about wisdom which is Thomas's main point, that wisdom belongs properly to God as First Cause, and he possesses it preeminently *(ibid.,.* C 64).[48] But it also belongs to us humans in our own way, as though borrowed from God (ibid.): indeed, in short, wisdom "is speculative and free, not a human possession but a divine one" *(ibid.,* C 68). Not only does the human use of wisdom investigate and establish the truth of the universal causes of things, but the knowledge gives the goal, a state of no longer wondering because we do know (ibid.).

In these first three lessons on the *.Metaphysic.s,* Thomas brings out the major characteristics of wisdom that he as a Christian disciple of Augustine shares with Aristotle, the Greek philosopher. But Thomas goes further by adding a. prologue to his commentary, in which he discusses what he considers Metaphysics to really be about. He employs the phrase from Aristotle's Politics (I, 5), "it is the office of the wise to direct others" *(nam sapientis est alias ordinare),* to establish that metaphysics directs all other sciences, and that it alone should be called "wisdom."[49] This ability to order all other human knowledge derives from wisdom's knowledge of its own object: the certitude of knowing first causes, the study of being in itself and not in particulars *(ens commune),* and its focus on intellectual substances rather than material being. All science and art is directed to human happiness through the deepening of what we know, but only wisdom perfects that natural desire by transcending the particulars and the limits to seek out the ultimate causes and meaning of all reality (Being).[50] It is significant that Thomas does not go beyond the limits of purely natural philosophical inquiry here. Wisdom is by and large seen as the master intellectual virtue that governs all others. Surprisingly, there is no indication here that Thomas

[48] *S.T.* I-II, q. 57, art. 2, corp.
[49] *Metaphysics,* lesson 3, C 59; also lesson 2, C 50.
[50] *In X Ethics,* lectures 10-13; also *S.T.* I-II, q. 57, art. 1, ad 2.

understands Aristotle to see the primary end 0£ natural philosophical wisdom to be *contemplation* 0£ the First Cause and Being itself-a point developed elsewhere at some length in his *Commentaries on the Sentences,*[51] as well as in the *Summa.*[52]

The Summa Contra Gentiles

In the first two chapters 0£ the *Summa Contra Gentiles,* Thomas sets out the vision 0£ the wise person once again. He cites the statement 0£ Aristotle a second time, " it is the office 0£ the wise to direct others" *(SCG I,* 1). Wisdom considers the highest causes, it pursues the highest intellectual good, and these both are truth, the ultimate end 0£ the whole universe *(Ibid.)* . But Thomas goes on to add to the duties 0£ the wise the task 0£ refuting untruth, citing Prov 8: 7, "My lips shall hate wickedness (or impiety) ." He then proceeds to illustrate this moral task 0£ wisdom by pointing out the noble nature 0£ the pursuit 0£ wisdom: sharing true happiness, joining the wise person to God in friendship and embodying the whole 0£ Christian faith *(SCG* I, 2) . 0£ particular significance £or our comparison to Old Testament wisdom, however, is Thomas's citation 0£ Ps 104: 24, "O Lord, how rich are all your works; you have made them all in wisdom." He comments on this that the pursuit 0£ wisdom thereby leads a person closer to the likeness 0£ God *(SCG I,* 2), an insight that comes very close to contemporary biblical scholarship's insistence that the theology 0£ creation in Genesis 1 which climaxes in the human being made in the "image and likeness 0£ God (Gen 1: 26) is permeated by wisdom thinking.

Wisdom in the Summa Theologiae

In the *Summa Theologiae,* Thomas explicitly sets out to treat *sacra. doctrina,* which he understands to be a body 0£

[51] *In II Sent.* D 41, q. 1, art. 1, sol.; and *In III Sent.,* D 34, q. 1, art. 2, sol.; *In IV Sent.,* D 15, q. 4, art. 1, qla. 2, 1 M; *In III Sent,* D 35; q. 2, art. 1, sol. 3.

[52] *S.T.* II-II, q. 180, art. 3, ad 1; art. 4, corp.; art. 6, ad 2; art. 7, corp.

truth beyond the grasp of human reason alone (I, q. 1, art. 1, corp.) directed to knowledge of God as our human end (ibid.) and which is studied as a science (I, q. 1, art. 2, corp.), and can be identified with the Sacred Scriptures (I, q. 1, art. *3,* corp.) . *Sacra doctrina* is identified with wisdom above human wisdom; since wisdom orders all things and *sacra doctrina* orders all knowledge by divine principles above all other principles (I, q. 1, art. 6, corp.). Thomas goes on to distinguish two types of theological wisdom that flow from this. One is *sacra doctrina* as science, human study by means of principles established by revelation; the second is a divine gift of the Spirit given to those who have faith inclining them to judge divine things wisely (I, q. 1, art. 6, a.d 3). Wisdom derived from the science of theology is acquired learning; its contemplation of first causes has implications derived from the human search for happiness and purpose in life.[53] It differs from contemplation achieved by metaphysics in that its first principles are given by revelation and not arrived at by reasoning to them.

There is thus an important hierarchy within the three levels of human wisdom. All three touch the divine mystery for Thomas,[54] but metaphysics contemplates only the necessary and ultimate end of things; it cannot touch the inner life of God nor the supernatural relationship to human salvation. The wisdom of theology contemplates the intimate life of God as revealed for our salvation; we can know about the Trinity from revelation and contemplate and reason about it as our source of truth and goodness. Humans with the knowledge of the first principles given by faith are able to *videre omnia in conspectu Dei.* It thus brings together the true relationship of God and reality and leads to affective love on our part for the loving plan he has for our salvation. The wisdom of grace

53 See also *In I Bent.,* Prol., q. 1, art. 3, sol. 1.

54 *BOG-* II, 24, "Ordinare sapientis est: ordinatio enim aliquorum fieri non potest nisi per cognitionem habitudinis et proportionis ordinatorum ad invicem et ad aliquid altius ejus, quod est finis eorum; ordo enim aliquorum ad invicem est propter ordinem eorum ad finem."

from God goes beyond theological reasoning to know God as an object, God as a person in a loving relationship, and not just as a concept. Thus it directs all human activity towards its true end, loving communion with God.

Thus wisdom is both practical and speculative, but as Thomas points out, it is more speculative than practical since its primary aim is the contemplation of God itself.[55] This then directs all other ends and represents the highest realization of the principle, *sapientis est ordinate.*

A Positive Comparison of Thomas and Old Testa.ment Wisdom

IV

There are many important points of similarity between Old Testament wisdom and the vision of wisdom put forth by Thomas in his prologues to the *Metaphysics,* the *Summa Contra Gentiles* and the *Summa. Theologiae,.* and which is further developed in some detail throughout the latter work. The following are a few of the most suggestive for a short article.

(1) Both the Israelite wisdom tradition and Thomas share a conviction that the pursuit of wisdom is a consciously intellectual task. Throughout the biblical wisdom texts, the stress falls on instruction and discipline to learn. Proverbs are passed on so that " the wise person may hear and increase in learning, and the understanding person acquire skill to comprehend a proverb, a simile, wise sayings and riddles " (Prov 1:5-6) . Sirach uses the image of the hunt, "Pursue wisdom like a hunter, and lie in wait along her paths " (Sir 14:22) ; for " Blessed is the one who meditates on wisdom and who reasons intelligently, who reflects in his mind on her ways and ponders her secrets" (Sir 14:20). Later, the sage adds, "An educated man knows many things, and one with much experience will speak with understanding:" (Sir 34:9) .

Articles 8 and 9 of the first question of the *Summa* emphasize that wisdom is a search for truth by reasoning as well as by knowledge of first principles. Theology as wisdom natural-

[55] See Francisco Muniz, *The Work of Theology* (Thomist Press: Washington, D.C., 1958) 29.

ly employs philosophy as its handmaid (*S.T.* I, q. 1, art. 8, ad 2). Thomas further interrelates the intellectual virtues of *scientia, intelleotus,* and *sapientia* in I-II, q. 57, art. 2. For Thomas, the wise understand difficult things beyond the ordinary understanding, and are more liberally educated, prizing knowledge as a goal in its own right.[56]

(2) Wisdom is learned by hard study and discipline at the feet of teachers who are already wise. This hardly needs much evidence. Proverbs 1-9 is framed in a special "Instruction Genre " that calls on a young man to listen to the words of the wise as a son hears his father's advice, or a student studies in school. This same genre was well-known in Egyptian literature,[57] which frequently uses the imagery of an aged vizier passing on his knowledge to a young successor. Many biblical proverbs also reflect this approach to wisdom. " A person who ignores instruction despises himself, but he who heeds admonition gains understanding" (Prov *15:* 82). "Whoever loves discipline loves knowledge, but he who hates reproof is stupid (Prov 12:1).[58]

Thomas holds that wisdom is normally acquired through the instrumentality of a teacher who challenges and stimulates the student. Wisdom and understanding require rigorous study (*In VI Ethics,* lecture 7; and in *XII Libros Metaphysicorum Expositio* I, lecture 2). Moreover, Thomas has written a charming letter to Brother John on good study habits that outlines a very straightforward philosophy: commit to your mind everything good that you hear taught, no matter who says it.[59] Of course, Thomas did not receive this insight from

56 See Herman Reith, *The Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1958) 8-9; also Aquinas in *I Niaomaahean Ethics,* I, 1: The task of the wise is to order all things because wisdom is the most powerful perfection of reason, whose proper characteristic is to know order.

57 See R. *N.* Whybray, *Wisdom in Proverbs (Studies in Biblical Theology* I: 45; SOM Press, 1965).

5BSee also Prov 11:14; 12:15; 13:1, 14, 20, 24; 15:20, 22; 18:15; 23:26; Sir 6:18, 36. Other good texts are the Prologue to Sirach and the small treatise on the teacher found in Sir 34:9-12.

59 *Opusaula Theologica,* vol. 1 (Torino: Marietti, 1954) 451. An English extract is provided by Vernon Bourke, *Aquinas' Searah for Wisdom,* pp. 17-18.

Aristotle. He was steeped in the importance of the human teacher for penetrating the knowledge that God provides from his familiarity with Augustine's *On Christian Doctrine,* especial the Prologue. This is not to deny that theological wisdom begins with revelation as a given. Still, it is the main burden of the *Summa Contra Gentiles* opening chapters 1-8 as well as the first question of the *Summa Theologiae* to show that this wisdom needs to be studied by reason.

(8) Wisdom as a human endeavor has its limits, however. While it seems that many of the oldest proverbs show a confidence in our ability to find the right ways of doing things by prudent observation of experience, this applies primarily to concrete moral advice. Gerhard von Rad is surely right in his insistence that, as far back as we can now trace the wisdom traditions of Israel, they are saturated with a "Yahwistic" viewpoint.[60] Chapter 16 of Proverbs centers the entire message of the book around a series of important sayings that relate human limits to God's control over events:[61]

> The plans of the human mind belong to us, but the tongue's reply comes from the Lord. All the ways of a person are right in his own eyes, but the Lord tests the spirit. Commit your endeavors to the Lord and your plans will be established. (Proverbs 16:1-8)

The Book of Job contains the wonderful poem on the search for wisdom in chapter 28. No one can find it; only God knows where wisdom is to be found, and he reveals it himself.

It was a major concern of the medieval theologian to maintain the ineffable mystery of the divine being. Thomas himself favors the *via negativa* which respects the limits of knowing God best by knowing what we don't know about Him. See *I Sent. D.* 8, q. 1, art. 1, 4m; *De Veritate,* q. 2, art. 1, 9m; SCG I, 80 and III, 89. Thomas calls wisdom a "humble search after truth (*SCG* I, 4, cf. also SCG III, 48). Once again, St.

[60] This is the main burden of the argument in von Rad's *Wisdom in Israel* (Abingdon, 1972).

[61] The center of Proverbs' arguments are found in chapters 15-16, where an enormous number of Yahweh-sayings are gathered.

Augustine had already insisted on this point in his *De Trinitate,* IX, 1.

Certainly, St. Thomas in his treatment of the Book of Job addresses the problem of innocent suffering from a conviction that all things are under God's providence (see *S.T.,* I, q. 22) despite appearances to the contrary; so that we must affirm a God who knows more than we can understand, yet has loving care for us (see the treatment of chs. 38-42 of Job).[62] This certainly comports well with a modern interpretation of the original Hebrew author's intention. Job expected God to operate according to a human order of reasoning, but God insists that Job will never understand the reasons why God does what he does; instead he should seek a relationship with God "face to face."[63] This is very close to a Thomistic understanding of the role of contemplation in wisdom.

(4) Wisdom is a search of discovery.[64] "Search out and seek, and (wisdom) will become known to you; and when you get get hold of her, do not let her go" (Sir 6:27); "for wisdom is like her name, she is not known to many" (Sir 6:22). Although much of the divine nature and plan is hidden from us, we hunger and yearn for more knowledge of them (Sir 24:19-21; Job 28:12-22; Prov 8:10-11). There is a paradox in biblical wisdom. It is achievable by human searching but only up to a point. Beyond that, wisdom touches the mysterious hiddenness of God himself and his purposes. Yet, what do the sages say? "The beginning of wisdom is this: Get wisdom." (Prov 4:7). "Happy is the man who finds wisdom and gets understanding, for the gain is greater than the profit from silver, or the value of gold" (Prov 3:13-14). Thus, although there is a limit beyond which the sage cannot go on human wisdom alone, only the sage is qualified to approach the limits. On one hand, the purpose of the search is to know-to know the reasons and causes of things, to explore the edges of the mystery of God, to test human capacity to understand. But

62 *Expositio in Job ad Litteram (Opera omnia,* vol. xviii; Paris, 1876).

63 See James Efird, *Biblical Books of Wisdom,* 46-49.

64 Crenshaw, *Old Testament Wisdom: An Introduction,* pp. 58-65.

on the practical level, wisdom is a search for life. "Wisdom is a. tree of life to those who lay hold of her; those who hold her fast are called happy" (Prov 8: 18). Proverbs supplies reflections on the ways to live successfully; Job argues that such human rules are inadequate and only contact with the divine presence will satisfy our hopes; Qoheleth challenges the traditional ideas on the meaning of human existence and proposes a trusting faith in darkness. All are fundamentally interested not in a.bstract knowledge of God, but in knowing the quality of life with God.[65]

Thomas, in setting out the purpose for writing his *Summa Contra Gentiles,* in I, 2, holds that wisdom is the most excellent of all human pursuits because it brings us happiness, joy, understanding of the divine image in ourselves, and eventually to immortal life. Because, for Thomas, both metaphysical wisdom, and theological wisdom, end in desire not to understand the concept of Being and the First Cause but in the reality, i.e. God himself, the element of search, attraction towards, quest and desire are all prominent.[66] No wonder that modern authors title their treatment of his thought under titles such as *Aquinas' Search for Wisdom* (Vernon Bourke),[67] or *The Lure of Wisdom* (Collins).[68]

(5) From the last two points, it can be affirmed strongly that both biblical wisdom and Aquinas understood wisdom to unite both the speculative and practical intellect in one. The very terminology of wisdom mixes the two: beyond the intellectual categories of understanding, knowledge, learning, insight, found scattered throughout the wisdom tradition,[69] there is a corresponding concern with moral categories such as the

65 See G. von Rad, *Wisdom Mi Israel,* pp. 97-110.

66 *S.T.* II-II, q. 1, art. 2, ad 2; Chenu, *Faith and Theology,* 18-19, says: "It is in this insatiable appetite that theology is born. A.nd anyone who fails to grasp this source of its birth cannot appreciate its vitality, its dignity or its structure."

67 Bruce Publishing Co., 1965.

68 Marquette University Press, 1962.

69 Prov 1: 1-6 sets out in a prologue the purpose of the search for wisdom in exactly these terms.

good and the wicked in contrast, or the fool, the scoffer, the simple, the prudent, the diligent. Some concentrated examples can be found in Proverbs 10, 26, 28; Qoheleth 10 and Job 36. Sirach 39: 1-5 combines praise for those who study and seek out the hidden meaning of the law of God through ancient authorities and prophecy and notable scholars with a call to rise early to pray and worship God.[70]

Aquinas explicitly affirms that wisdom is both speculative and practical in several texts, but most notably in *S.T.,* II-II, Q. 45, art. 3, V ad 3. Theological wisdom, in particular, examines both principles for ordering of knowledge and principles for human conduct, and draws conclusions from both. God himself, the supreme truth and formal object of such theological wisdom, is both the Truth that is to be contemplated, and the Good that is to be loved and obeyed.[71] In the same way, the divine gift of knowledge is both speculative and practical-the first because it helps us know what to believe, and the second because it directs our works in faith (*S.T.* II-II, Q. 9, art. 3 corpus. ad 3) .

(6) Both see wisdom as the understanding of the right order of all things. Specifically, as a search, it seeks the highest order. Order has many dimensions. The Biblical wisdom first of all is concerned with the place of parents and children, commoners and kings, rich and poor, good and evil. " When you sit down with a ruler to eat, carefully observe what is before you, and if you have a large appetite, control it with a knife at your throat!" (Prov 23: 1). "The poor is disliked even by his neighbor, while the rich has many friends" (Prov 14: 20). " A wise son is the joy of his father, while a foolish son is the

10 The " fool " is the opposite of the wise person. The fool fails to understand the proper order of reality, or violates it for the sake of some shallow good that is immediate. The fool cannot bring together the speculative nature of wisdom with practical action.

71 See further, the reflections of Francisco Muniz, *The Work of Theology,* p. 29, Kieran Conley, *A Theology of Wisdom: A Study in Ht. Thomas* (Dubuque: Priory Press, 1963) 128, and Otto Gardeil, *Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas: IV. Metaphysics* (St. Louis: Herder, 1967) 12.

grief of his mother" (Prov 10:1). All of this is Israel's inheritance from its Near Eastern neighbors and their wisdom traditions.[72] Human social orders are based on the order of creation itself. Genesis 1 is a hymn declaring the ordered plan of Yahweh for all aspects of the created universe. There is a hierarchy, of course, at the top of which stands the human being. Genesis 2 carries on this wisdom reflection on the mystery of creation by exploring in depth the inscrutable intention of God for human life in mythical language. The wisdom teachers are convinced moreover that God has so governed the world as to reward virtue and punish evildoing. This underlies the optimism of the Book of Proverbs, and the pessimistic questioning of Job, who doubts if experience backs up this claim. The interest in the proper time for everything (known best in the poem of Qoheleth 3, "There is a time to born and a time to die ... a time for everything under heaven") represents another aspect of this concern for order. In the same way, the wisdom tradition reflected outside of the wisdom books themselves, such as the story of Ahitophel and Hushai in 2 Samuel 16-17, or the emphasis of Isaiah on the plan of Yahweh that will thwart human plans (Isa 5:12-13, 29:9-16, 30:1-2), show a marked concern for conforming human decisions to the divine intention. The wisdom teachers thus understand order as a basis for all wisdom efforts. They both seek to comprehend natural order and they try to organize experience to make order in it.[73]

Benedikt Otzen notes that the wisdom love for dualism of virtue and vice, good and evil, wise and fool, reflect "a craving for order that is the motive power of all wisdom thinking. The immense spiritual strength that is hidden in the wisdom tradition emanates from a need to understand the surrounding world and to arrange it according to its immanent laws."[74]

12 Thus James Crenshaw, *OLd Testament Wisdom: An Introduction,* pp. 212-235.

73 See Dianne Bergant, *What Are They Saying about Wisdom Literature?* pp. 13-15.

74 Benedikt Otzen, "Old Testament Wisdom Literature and Dualistic Thinking in Late Judaism," *VTS* XXVIII (1975) 146-157; esp. pp. 155-156.

Thomas certainly considered this the key characteristic of wisdom. It is the task of the wise to order *(nam sapientis est ordinare)* and thus Thomas prefaces his major works with the quotation taken from Aristotle. It appears in the *Nicomaohean Ethios* I, 1, l; the *Metaphysios* in the Prologue; in the *Summa Con.tra Gentiles* I, l; and in Bk 1, q. 1, art. 6 of the *Summa. Theologiae* (and frequently see, e.g., I-II, q. 57, art, 2, corp.; II-II, q. 45, art. 1, corp.) The responsibility for ordering all other sciences is intrinsic to theology as wisdom since its principles are the highest.[75] The principle of ordering itself is architectonic for a.ll other sciences.[76] The wise man orders because he knows the end (SCG II, 24). Aquinas can therefore define wisdom as both the contemplation or vision of the First Principle and as the direction of human acts according to the divine rule (S.T. II-II, q. 45, art 8, ad 8).[77] The notion of ordering is therefore fundamental to both philosophy and theology in light of their ends to know all things and their mutual relations *(S.T.* I-II, q. 57, art 2).

(7) Another way to speak of wisdom's search for order is to describe wisdom's preoccupation with *cause and effect.* Biblical wisdom expended much of its energy on why things were the way they were. This could take the form of proverbial wisdom with its experiential answers to the questions about life, or the form of speculative dialogue (as in Job) or the diatribe (as in Qoheleth). The one aspect that stands out in all of Israel's wisdom reflections on cause and effect, however, is the lack of philosophical rigor that seeks to define areas of knowledge and establish the chain of causality within it "scientificaUy" as Thomas defines *scientia (S.T.* I-II, q. 57). Since the concern of the wise centered on explaining human behavior, most of the examples are gathered from the

75 See also *In III Sent.,* D 34, q. I, art. 2; *In III Sent.,* D 35, q. 2, art. 1; *I Ethics,* lecture 1, 1.

76Also *In I Meta.* lesson 2, # 50; *SOG* III:25, *S.T.* I-II, q. 66, art. 5, corp.

11 " Ad sapientiam per prius pertinent contemplatio divinorum, quae est visio principii; et posterius dirigere actus humanos secundum rationes divinas."

realm of psychological experience: " Without counsel, plans go wrong, but with many advisors they succeed" (Prov 15:22), or " A rebuke goes deeper into a person of understanding than a hundred blows on a fool" (Prov 17:10).

At times, the sage moves beyond these kinds of experience to speculate on the lessons from nature. Qoh 1:3-11 observes that nature remains stable and never seems to advance much; Job refl!O)cts on the power of God manifest in the wonders of the created universe in Job 9:1-12. Frequently, the wise would turn to analogy to discover truth. A typical example is found in Prov 27:17: "Iron is sharpened by iron; one man sharpens another." Zophar the friend uses the analogy of the enormous extent of the cosmos to challenge Job's human desire to understand God: "Higher than heaven-what can you do?; Deeper than Sheol-what can you know?" (Job 11:8).[78] The wisdom teacher sought to explain the relationship of human acts to their consequences as another form of causality: "Jealousy shortens life, and worry ages someone prematurely" (Sir 30-24); "Stolen bread tastes sweet, but later turns to gravel in the mouth" (Prov 20:17). Gerhard von Rad rightly insists that Israel did not multiply these merely to provide a body of moral advice. The analogies show a distinct interest in the wonder of nature itself, and a concern for ordering the contingent in life into an intelligible whole. A distinct element of praise lies behind the composition of the wisdom books.[79]

Thomas's affirmation that the task of metaphysics is the study of the Highest Cause is made so often tha.t it does not need to be argued *(In 1 Post. Anal.* lect. 44. *In I Meta.* lect. 1, # 34), and even more that this is the task of theology *(S.T.* I, q. 1, art. 7). Above all, it is wisdom's task to contemplate and study the first Cause *(S.T. I,* q. 57, art. 2; *Nico. Eth.* VI, *3,* 6; see also *S.T., I,* q. 66, art. *5;* II-II, q. 45, art. 1). It is summed up completely in the first question of the *Summa Theologiae* (I, q. 1, art. 6), where wisdom is equated with theology which is equated with the study of the First Cause by

[78] Also Job 35:1-7; 38:4-18; 40:10-24; Psalm 8.

[79] Von Rad, *Wisdom in Israel,* pp. 115-137.

which to judge all other sciences and their study of lesser causes.[80] The study of causality from the First to all lesser causes is nothing else than *sapientis est ordinare* ("*finis est causa causarum," In V Meta*.. lect. 8.[81]

(8) Wisdom is therefore contemplation of the First Cause and Highest Being both as metaphysics *(In II Sent* D41, q. 1, art. 1; *In IV Sent,* D *15,* q. 4, art. 1; *In Ill Sent* D *35,* q. 1, art 2), and as theology *(S.T. II-II,* q. *45,* art. 3, ad 3; *In I Sent Proi.* q. 1, art 3). This comports well with one side of ancient biblical wisdom which moved beyond the practical and speculative interest to a. higher contemplation of wisdom as a divine attribute. Proverbs 8:22-31, Sirach 24:1-34 and Wisdom 7 to 9, all personify wisdom as a being at the side of God who comes forth to teach and bring human beings a "reflection of the divine light and a spotless mirror of the working of God, an image of his goodness" (Wis 7:26). In Sir 24:23, Wisdom who has come forth from the mouth of God and dwelt on earth is identified with the Law of the covenant. In these passages, wisdom is given characteristics in the "image and likeness of God" (Gen 1:26-27). It is a means to bridge the distance between our creaturely understanding and the transcendence of the divine. While such personified wisdom calls pupils as a teacher (Prov 1:20, 8:2), she is also contemplated, "Wisdom is radiant and unfading, and easily understood by those who love her, and found by those who seek her" (Wis 6:12), "she is a breath of the power of God and an emanation of the glory of the Almighty" (Wis 7:25), and an "image of the goodness of God" (Wis 7:26). True, this is only a small part of the wisdom tradition of Israel, and it is not completely understood even now how much "existence" apart from God the sages attributed to this figure of wisdom personified.[82] But

[80] Also, *In Ill Sent.,* D 34, q. 1, art. 2, "In alia autem via contemplationis modus humanus est ut ex simplici inspectione primorum principiorum et altissimarum causarum homo de inferioribus judicet et ordinet. Et hoc fit per sapientiam quam ponit Philosophus intellectualem virtutem quia sapientis est ordinare."

[81] See also *S.T.* I, q. 105, art. 5; II-II, q. 180, art. 4.

[82] See von Rad, *Wisdom in Israel,* pp. 144-176, and other studies cited there.

the most likely answer is that it was an analogical description of the contemplation of the wisdom of God and acknowledgment that the same wisdom operates in the human sphere as a human achievement and as divine gift.

Wisdom in all its forms strives for contemplation of the highest cause and is architectonic for all other sciences. In this insight of Thomas, we can see a close parallel to the thought of Prov 8:30, which describes wisdom as the architect of the world, and of Augustine, who saw wisdom as the archetype of the world *(De Doct. Christ. I, 11)*,[83]

(9) Biblical wisdom believed that the human mind can learn much about the order and meaning of existence, but beyond the limits it also understood that God gave wisdom as a gift to enable humans to know more. " Many are the plans of a man, but it is the purpose of the Lord that will be established" (Prov 19:21). "The Lord gives wisdom; from his mouth came knowledge and understanding" (Prov 2:6).[84] Beyond these general recognitions of God's determination of the final outcome of events beyond our control, there is a conviction that God has given a way to live that can be known. It is found first of all in the concept of " Fear of the Lord " (Prov 1:7, 29; 8:13; 10:27; 14:27; etc.), which is wisdom vocabulary for obedience to the divine will, and is equivalent to the covenantal obligations found in the Elohist narratives of the Pentateuch where the same expression is used (Gen 20:11; 22:12; 42:51; Exod 1:17, 21). It is also found in the message of the Book of Job that the final answer to human questioning is found in humble awareness of the divine presence (Job 42:4-6). And it is found above all in trust in Yahweh (Prov 20:22; 16:20; Pss I: 1, 37-3-4, 7, 9; 112:1). From all dangers He will deliver the person who relies on Him: Job 5:7-19; 5:23-24; Sir 4:17--18; Psalm 49. Utimately, in the human search for wisdom, only God can give true wisdom: Job 28:28; Wis 8:18, 22.[85]

sa See also .Augustine, *Oonfessions,* Book 7. This is also well-treated by Eugen Biser, "Wisdom," in *Sacramentum Mundi,* vol. 6.

s4 .Also Prov 16:1, 3, 4, 9; 20-24.

85 Von Rad, *Wisdom in Israel,* pp. 190-205.

Thomas cites the teaching of Augustine (De Trinitate, Bk 12) that wisdom directs human life not just by human reasoning but by divine reasons (*S.T.* II-II, q. 19, art. 7). Moreover, he goes on to insist on the divine gift of Wisdom which is both speculative and practical (*S.T.,* II-II, q. 45, art. 3). St. Augustine had also bequeathed the insight that wisdom is an attribute of God revealed only gradually and in the shadows to humans (*Confessions,* Bk. 7).[86] The work of the gift of Wisdom is "to contemplate divine things and by them read the meaning of the divine and human order."[87] Metaphysics is wisdom, theology is wisdom, but above all the gift of the Spirit is the wisdom that must be sought. As Gilson says of Thomas, "Wisdom to him was not philosophy, it was not even theology; in its only perfect form, wisdom was Christ."[88] Father Chenu himself explains this characteristic of wisdom in St. Thomas as "the happy result of a daring trust" engendered by the gift of faith that allows us to recognize the purpose of life and our ultimate happiness. Theology is born of this insatiable appetite that faith stirs up in us, an unquenchable desire of the believer, a painful dissatisfaction that can only be satisfied by the divine gift itself.[89]

(10) St. Thomas' treatment of eternal law illustrates a close connection to biblical wisdom ideas as well. In the Summa, he identifies law with the direction given by reason (*S.T.* I-II, 90, art. 1, corp.), and more specifically *eternal* law with the intention of the divine lawgiver (91, art. 1, corp.). Thus eternal law is never just blind order for the universe, but rather the loving directive of the creator so that all creation will act for the purposes which he intended. Indeed Thomas explicitly identifies this eternal law as divine wisdom: *ratio divinae sapi-*

sa Further treatment of Augustine can be found in Maritain, *Science and Wisdom* (New York: Scribner's, 1940) 22-35, and in Eugene Rice, *The RenaiBsanoe Idea of Wisdom* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1958) 8-13.

87 Walter Farrell, O.P., *A Companion to the Summa,* vol. III (New York, 1941) 135.

88 Etienne Gilson, *Wisdom and Love in St. Thomas Aquinas* (Marquette University Press, 1951) 25-26, fn. 12.

89 See Chenu's reflection on this in fn. 66 above.

entiae secundum quam est directiva omnium rerum ad *ultimam finem eorum* (q. *93,* art 1, corp.). God governs the actions and movements of every single creature by means of the *ratio* (or "type") of order he intended in creation *(ibid.).* The law is intensely personal for Thomas and far from the idea of Aristotle that God does not care about the creatures that he directs to their end blindly since God only contemplates God personally.[90]

Thomas comes much closer to the biblical tradition in this. Neither he nor the wisdom writers of the Old Testament can divorce the order and intelligibility that they discern in the universe from the intention of the creator. When Israel extols the Torah (" Law") as its most perfect means of covenant union with God (Pss 1, 19, 119), or Job humbly withdraws his challenge to God before the revelation of God's intention (Job 38-42), or Thomas speaks of eternal law, it comes from a. shared conviction in divine providence founded in divine revelation, whether the God who reveals be called Yahweh or The Father. The search for wisdom is rooted in the knowledge of the Wise Lawgiver.

(11) Finally, a short word can be said about the *exitus-reditus* schema in Thomas's *Summa Theologiae* and its relation to the basic stance of the wise in Israel. The schema is set forth by Thomas in the prologue to Question 2 of the *Summa.* His work will involve three parts: (1) God; (2) the rational creature's advance towards God; (3) Christ as the way to God. This marks a departure from the traditional approach of Christian theology in the early Scholastic period which had centered on the events narrated in Scripture and thus was basically historical in character. Thomas organized all theological knowledge according to the role of the First Principle *(exitus)* and Final End *(reditus).* All being is treated from its source and the end towards which it tends. It may be true that the idea was given to Thomas through the Christian Neo-Plato-

[90] This point was made to me orally by Fr. Benjamin Hunt, C.S.P., my :first philosophy professor and present colleague, who argues forcefully that Thomas and his medieval confreres were engaged in a retrieval, or even a continuation, of the great biblical wisdom tradition.

nists, but it fitted the vast scope of Scripture as Sacred Doctrine which went far beyond Salvation History alone. Scripture included the Wisdom literature which Thomas loved, but which could not easily be considered prophetic or covenantal revelation. Indeed, the canon of Scripture contains the fundamental self-revelation of God in three major expressions: (a) through the covenant in the Pentateuch; (b) through moral practice in the prophets; and (c) through intellectual inquiry in the wisdom books. Wisdom gives us the power to know and discover reality through our minds, and thereby discloses important truths about the divine mystery which can give direction to our wisdom search for meaning. It hardly needs to be argued that the *exitus-reditus* approach is profoundly biblical not only in fitting a Salvation History schema of God's saving intention as proposed by the Pentateuch and the Prophets and the New Testament proclamation of Jesus, but also in fitting wisdom's teachings about God's gift of wisdom that leads our human wisdom to understand experience more profoundly.

Conclusions

There are also many differences between the approaches of the sages in Israel and St. Thomas. Most notable, of course, is the Christian context from which Thomas works, in which Jesus is seen as the incarnate wisdom of God. For the Old Testament, God's transcendence was a formidable barrier to human questioning, but the New Testament led Christian theologians to a much deeper appreciation of God's self-revealing personal concern. Another difference would be St. Thomas's use of the Greek philosophical tradition with its careful use of formal logic. To a certain extent this reverses the first situation. Now the Old Testament language of personal relationship permits a richer and more intense expression of the personal aspects of divine causality, while the philosophical categories inevitably sacrifice the specificity and mystery for the cold categories of cause and effect.[91]

91 Chenu, *Faith and Theology,* pp. 44-46.

A corollary to this is that the Bible's presentation of wisdom is disorderly in that many different approaches and books can be laid side by side, often with contradictory or at least antithetic contrasts, and be allowed to stand. Thomas must order material logically. Moreover, ancient wisdom really did see a value in an ascending sea.rch from human experience towards the divine mystery alongside what was known by Yahweh's self-revelation. Thomas is constrained by his theological task to work from a descending approach rooted in the corpus of divine revelation. However, this is more a matter of emphasis, since theology is also a science which addresses the conclusions drawn from secondary causes and thus includes experience in its study.

Naturally, too, there were the differences of culture and language, the fact that Thomas could work from fixed texts that claimed to be inspired while the ancient sage knew a looser body of national religious traditions and so never attempted to make arguments based on an exact phrase or dogma.

But when all of this is admitted, the question still remains open whether or not a fair assessment of the whole work of Israel's wisdom writers and the whole work of Thomas does not admit of a convergence in intention. I believe the answer to this is "yes." Father Chenu has pioneered the insight that Thomas was profoundly biblical in his theology, and even this short comparison supports such a conclusion fully. It can be seen clearly that the desire of both Thomas and Old Testament wisdom was to root wisdom firmly in the personal God's relation to creation. But it can also be seen in their intellectual approaches to wisdom. One of the most important characteristics of St. Thomas's thought is the immense respect he has for all the individual areas of human thought and knowledge. We can know affectively, scientifically, philosophically, by revelation and by infused grace. Each can operate and interact with one another without any loss of its own integrity or by being subsumed by the higher. Thus the whole theological pursuit, the highest of human searches for knowledge, can be fittingly called wisdom. In doing so, the wisdom that is the-

ology is strictly in line with the multiple approaches to wisdom that were propounded by the ancient sages of Israel. Experience, questioning, speculation and revelation could all be incorporated into a. deeper discovery of the divine mystery.[92] For both Israel and Thomas, contemplation and praise are the ultimate end of wisdom, the search for order is its structure and shape, and the human desire to know its seedbed.

LAWRENCE BOADT, C.S.P.

Washington Theological Union
Washington, D.O.

02 See Vernon Bourke, *Aquinas' Search for Wisdom,* 205-207, for a fine summary of this ·interplay: "If the wisdom of the theologian, then, is higher than that of the philosopher, it is, like all human knowledges, infinitely below the wisdom of God."

NATURE AS ANIMATING: THE SOUL IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES

HIS ESSAY ADDRESSES the problem of the fragmentation of knowledge on the contemporary scene, nd proposes that the rediscovery of the Aristotelian concept of nature can go far toward providing a solution.[1] Well known is the situation in academe, where specialization is the price of advancement and tenure, and where few professors are capable of ranging outside their fields to assess truth claims or attain a comprehensive overview. No less serious is the compartmentalization of knowledge at research institutes and "think-tanks," where competent scholars are engaged in detailed analyses of problems in economics, political science, and international security, but where it has proven difficult to generate studies that direct prudent action by government leaders. Here the basic problem is the perennial gap that intrudes itself between knowledge and action, between what Aristotle identified centuries ago as *theoria* and *praxis,* which we may label, following him, as that between the theoretical and practical disciplines. The direction of sensible action in the sphere of human affairs, in Aristotle's view, pertained to ethics and politics, which he regarded as practical sciences-concerned not merely with knowing but with knowing as ordered to doing. The practical orientation of scholar-

[1] The article is an expanded version of a colloquium paper read at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., on November 8, 1984, with the title "The Idea of Nature: Its Contemporary Relevance for Ethics and Politics." .An earlier draft was read in the Seminar on Problems of .Authority and Participation at the same Center on .August 13, 1984, with the title "The Modeling of Nature: Can the Soul Be Put Back Into the Human Sciences? " The author wishes to thank Edmund Pellegrino and Otto Bird for their helpful commentaries on the colloquium paper, and James Billington, Prosser Gifford, and .Ann Sheffield for providing the stimulating ambience in which it could be written and presented.

ship-the ideal embodied in " knowing as ordered to doing "-is a concern that goes far beyond the needs of academe and research institutes. Its neglect on the contemporary scene is but an instance of the more pervasive fragmentation of knowledge that characterizes our culture.

The theme of this essay is that the concept of nature, particularly as animating and instantiated in the human soul, can be fruitful in overcoming such fragmentation in a basic way: by reuniting the physical and the human sciences and showing how action or doing can be related to both.[2] By the physical sciences we mean the speculative or theoretical sciences concerned with nature, the *phusis* of the Greeks, whence the term "nature " in our title. Among such sciences one might include physics, astronomy, chemistry, biology, psychology in its more theoretical aspects, and so on. The human sciences we take to embrace those concerned with man's affairs: the social and political sciences, ethics and politics, economics, the behavioral sciences in their more clinical aspects, etc. They less obviously are concerned with nature, and yet they are but manifestations of human nature in action, as will be shown in the sequel. Thus nature as seen in the world of nature and as embodied in human nature as part of that world is the concept around which we propose our integration.

The regulative idea is simple: nature is an intrinsic principle of perfective activity, and the better we understand a nature or a natural kind the more we can appreciate how it should act. Thus we would bridge the " is " and the " ought " by rooting the norm for action in an objective standard: a nature that is not completely refractory to understanding. Here it is important to observe that there is a vast difference between knowing all there is to know about a nature and having no knowledge of it at all. By the somewhat elliptical expression, " a nature that is not completely refractory to understanding,"

[2] For an exposition of the concept of nature and the intellectual context in which the following development should be situated, see W. A. Wallace, "The Intelligibility of Nature: A Neo-Aristotelian View," *Review of Metaphysics* 38 (1984), 33-56.

we mean one of which humans can have a progressively better and deeper comprehension with each advance of science. A method well suited to illustrating such progressive understanding is the modeling technique, and throughout this essay we will refer to models, or schematic diagrams, to bring home the point. To be able to model something implies at least a partial grasp of what it is.[3] The modeling of nature is the theme that underlies the speculative part of this presentation, on which the practical part is later based.

Nature in the Natural Sciences

When we speak of nature we generally mean what we experience when we go into a primeval forest or gaze on a starry night into the depths of space. Nature for us is what is free from human intervention and artifice, what comes into being and runs its course without benefit of man's assistance, to say nothing of his contaminating influence. In this sense we differentiate the world of nature (Nature, say, with a capital " N ") from the world of art and of artifact. The latter is ma.n's creation, whereas the former exists independently of man, although it is available for his observation and, in some cases, for his manipulation and use.

Aristotle's definition of nature is somewhat more refined than this.[4] While differentiating the natural from the artificial, as we do, he also took pains to distinguish it from the forced or violent, from what is done by coercion instead of coming from within the thing being studied. In this way of speaking a nature (let us call this nature with a small "n ") is a source of the activities it originates and so are peculiarly its own.

[3] This theme is developed in W. A. Wallace, *Oausality and Scientific Explanation,* 2 vols., Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1972-1974, 2 :257-264, and in idem, "Causality, Analogy, and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge," *Tommaso d'Aquino nel suo settimo centenario,* 9 vols., Naples: Edizioni Domenicane Italiane, 1978, 9 :26-40. The latter essay has been reprinted in W. A. Wallace, *From a Realist Point of View: Essays on the Philosophy of Science,* 2d ed., Lanham-New York-London: University Press of America, 1983, 212-227.

[4] *Physics,* B.l, 19lb21-23.

Such natures, which go to make up the world of Nature, are found in plants and animals, in chemical elements and compounds, in s't:a::-s and planets, in human beings, all of which come into being and pass away, and yet enjoy periods of relatively stable endurance during which they respond to, and interact with, things around them. Some natures obviously are animate whereas others are inanimate, yet both types are knowable through observable properties and behavioral characteristics. To say of something that it is sulphur, or a gera.-nium, or a horse, is to specify its nature; this we learn not merely from its appearance but from the way it acts and reacts in a variety of circumstances.

To be more specific, the nature of a thing is manifested by the way it exercises its natural powers, either spontaneously or in reaction to external influences. Such powers constitute its "inner dimension," one might say, and they can be grasped by us to the extent that we are successful in modeling the ways in which they act. We may illustrate this by taking a few examples from the inorganic, plant, and animal worlds, to show how the advances of modern science have yielded progressively fuller knowledge of natures and of the powers through which they can be known in these respective domains.

Powers of the Inorganic

The inorganic or inanimate world is that of the non-living-a terminology that differentiates it from the living and presumes that the difference is easily recognized. Admittedly in Nature there are entities whose kind is difficult to establish and so might leave one in doubt as to whether life can be predicated of them. But most of the objects we encounter in our surroundings do not present this difficulty. We classify them as some type of plant or animal if they manifest vital activities at one level or another, and if not, we regard them as inanimate. Planets and stars, on the other hand, present more of a puzzle for not being close at hand. But with a few exceptions civilized people have tended to include them among the non-living, since they give no indication of undergoing the

changes one usually associates with life processes. Thus the inorganic world is commonly thought to be made up of chemical elements and compounds, of crystals and minerals of various types, of heavenly bodies, and then of the various particles of which all of these might be composed, such as molecules, atoms, electrons, etc.

For over two thousand years inorganic natures resisted attempts at understanding, and it was only with the Scientific Revolution that real progress was made. The first step came with the recognition that the matter of the heavens is basically no different from terrestrial matter and so does not require a special element or quintessence to supplement the four "earthly" elements: fire, air, water, and earth. The second came with the breakdown of such elements as water and air into more fundamental constituents: hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen, carbon, and their associated compounds such as carbon dioxide. From this it was a straightforward matter to develop the Periodic Table of the elements wherein they are grouped into kinds, and then to explain their chemical properties in terms of their atomic structures. In the present day, with the rapid growth of physics and chemistry and affiliated branches such as astrophysics, geology, meteorology, and oceanography, we can boast a fairly exhaustive knowledge of inorganic natures-possibly superior to that we have of the organic.

How do we come to know an inorganic nature such as that of a chemical element? Our thesis is that we know a nature to the extent that we can model it in terms of its components and the ways in which they function. There are many models we might use to illustrate this, but for purposes here the one developed by the Danish physicist Niels Bohr to explain the Periodic Table of the elements is most instructive.[5] In it the atom for each element has a central nucleus in which most of its mass resides, surrounded by one or more orbital electrons

5. An elementary explanation of this model, as well as of others used in recent physics, will be found in Michael Chester, *Particles: An Introduction to Particle Physics,* New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1978, 31-36, 68-79.

arranged in concentric circles or shells. Those acquainted with modern chemistry know how these electron configurations can serve to explain the affinities and other properties of the respective elements. The one valence electron in hydrogen, for example, lets us understand why two hydrogen atoms are necessary to complete the outer shell of oxygen and thus form the H_2O molecule; the two valence electrons in helium complete its shell and make it an inert gas; the valence electron in sodium explains the affinity of that metal for chlorine to form salt, and so on.

One can introduce further complication into the Bohr atom by introducing the Bohr-Sommerfeld model, wherein circular electron orbits are replaced by elliptical orbits that assume various orientations in space.[6] This more complex model can be used to illustrate the Pauli exclusion principle, which states that no two electrons in any atom may occupy the same energy state; in it each electron in a given orbit must be shown with a different spin or orbital position. Usually orbits are pictured for the normal or unexcited states of the atom. If one wishes to explain the ways in which an atom absorbs and emits electromagnetic energy, still more complicated configurations are required. For example, when electrically energized the sodium atom emits a bright yellow light, familiar to many of us from the sodium vapor lamp. The emission of that light is caused by one of its electrons falling from an excited state (i.e., one of higher energy) back to its normal or ground state. Quantitative calculations aside, one can visualize such activities and reactivities of sodium in terms of this model, and so gain an understanding of its chemical and spectroscopic properties in almost unlimited detail.

Other types of models may also be mentioned as furnishing additional insight into inorganic natures. The lattice-structure model of the crystal, showing for example how sodium and chlorine atoms form the cubical crystal of salt, or how the electron transitions in an emerald bring about its characteristic

[6] *Ibid.,* 37-43.

green color, or how semiconductors such as a silicon chip operate, is equally illuminating. Also of help are models of the atomic nucleus, such as the liquid drop model, which shows how protons and neutrons are arranged and interact in fusion and fission and in various kinds of radioactivity. Then there are models of stars in the stages of their development, of pulsars and how they emit radiation, and of quasars, black holes, and other cosmic phenomena.[7]

What is amazing about these recent developments in physics and chemistry is the extent to which they have unveiled the energies or powers latent in the inorganic world. Such powers are commonly regarded as potentials that give rise to various forces, now classified into four basic types. First is the gravitational force, which accounts for the weight or gravity we experience in heavy bodies. Then there is the electromagnetic force, which serves to explain chemical reactions as well as electrical and magnetic phenomena. Third is the weak force, believed to be associated with radioactive emissions from atomic nuclei. And finally comes the strong force, that exerted between particles within the nucleus, which provides an understanding of the nuclear reactions studied by the high-energy physicist. These four forces are the scientist's ways of speaking about natural powers in the domain of the inorganic. Much effort is now being expended to tie them together in a unified mathematical theory. The important thing to observe is that, mathematics aside, they are already unified in the nature of which they are the power manifestation.

Let us explain the last statement. It seems clear from recent science that hydrogen and helium and sodium, and silicon and salt and emerald, are natural kinds, that is, they are substances with natures, not artifacts, that have their own characteristic

[7] Most physics and chemistry textbooks are replete with illustrations of such models; see, for example, Henry Semat and J. R. Albright, *Introduction to Atomic and Nuclear Physics,* 5th ed., New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1972; also Remo Ruffini and J. A. Wheeler, "Introducing the Black Hole," *Physics Today* 24.1 (January 1971), 30-36, 39-41, and A. Hewish, "Pulsars," *Annual Review of Astronomy and Astrophysics* 8 (1970), 265-296.

activities and reactivities. The four natural powers diagrammed in the upper portion of Figure I indicate these activities and reactivities in a generic way. In any one element, say in sodium or radium, the Bohr-Sommerfeld atomic model and its associated nuclear model show precisely how these powers are present and balanced in the particular nature they represent. In radium, for example, all four powers find their manifestation, whereas in sodium radioactive emission is muted because of the stable structure of its nucleus. The reductivist mentality seems satisfied with cataloguing the components of such natures-electrons, protons, neutrons, mesons, neutrinos-without reference to the formal and material elements that unify them into functioning units.

It is difficult to diagram such formal and material elements precisely because they effect unities in being and in operation. An attempt to do so, however, is schematized in the lower portion of Figure I. This is labeled simply "A Nature in the Inorganic Realm," meaning by this a particular nature understood indeterminately, and so applicable to each and every nature in the realm of the non-living. What differentiates the lower from the upper portion of Figure I is that the former has a point identified in its center, from which radiate a series of concentric circles that overlay the four natural powers. The point is a schematic way of representing a concept found in Aristotle's *Physics* that of *hule prote, materia prima,* or protomatter, to use the English equivalent.[8] Protomatter, for Aristotle, is the basic material constituent of the universe. The circular lines that radiate from it are meant to convey the impression of a field that " expands " protomatter, as it were, and forms it into a substance of a particular nature. In so doing it unifies the four powers and makes of them a functioning whole. The field itself stands for the nature or the defining form of the particular substance, say, the element sodium. At once it is a unifying form, conferring a. unity on the components of that element; a specifying form, making those com-

[8] *Physics* B.I, 193a29.

FIGURE 1

Electromagnetic Forces

Weak Forces

Gravitational Forces

Strong Forces

NATURAL POWERS OF THE INORGANIC

Chemical Reactions

Radicactive Emission

Gravitational Interactions

Nuclear Interactions

A NATURE IN THE INORGANIC REALM

ponents be and react in a way characteristic of sodium; and a stabilizing form, preserving the identity of the element and maintaining the unity of its components under external influences to the extent that this is possible. It is called form from the Greek term Aristotle used to describe it, *morphe*[9]; the scholastics designa.ted it, perhaps more accurately, as the *fomia substantialis,* since it is the factor tha.t determines the substance to be what it is. One can thus understand any particular substance in light of a potential principle, a basic protomatter (however one wishes to understand this-perhaps as a pure conservation principle bereft of all specific determination) , plus an energizing or actualizing principle, a unifying, specifying, stabilizing natural form that makes that substance be what it is.[10]

The schematic diagrams of Figure 1, it should be emphasized, are generic in character. They should be viewed only in conjunction with a model for a specific substance, say, the Bohr-Sommerfeld model of the sodium atom or the radium atom. The nature of each of these substances is manifested by the specific or distinctive way in which its powers operate. Their various components are constituted and energized, as it were, by the form that underlies such powers and causes them to be and to act in the way they do. This natural form, modeled in Figure 1 as a field, *is* the nature of sodium or radium, which we grasp as soon as we come to know these particular chemical elements with their distinctive powers and characteristics.

Powers of Plants and Animals

Unlike the inanimate world, the world of plants and animals offers a rich abundance of natural kinds that have been recognized as such for millenia. Students of na.ture have not been

[9] *Ibid.,* 193b5.

[10] For an explanation of how the .Aristotelian concepts of *hule* and *morphe* have application in recent high-energy physics, see W. .A. Wallace, "Elementarity and Reality in Particle Physics," *Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science* 3 (1968), 236-271, reprinted in *F1·om a Realist Point of View,* 2d ed., 185-212.

content to distinguish the living from the non-living, but have worked seriously at differentiating each kind from every other. In this project a " natural kind " designates a class of things alike in all their essential characteristics, sharing a common nature though differing in individual traits. One of the earliest recognized tests is the ahility of organisms to reproduce, i.e., to produce another individual of their species. Thus specimens that can interbreed and produce normal offspring are regarded as having the same nature even though they differ widely in individual characteristics.

The unity in being and operation found in plants and animals is easily recognized: that is why we call them " organisms," for their many organs act for the good of the whole. Aristotle was aware that such organs exercise the basic powers required for life processes, which he identified as those of nutrition, growth, and reproduction. [11] Modern biologists, studying in detail the mechanisms whereby chemicals serve the needs of organisms, have a more nuanced understanding of the ways in which these powers function. Like physicists and chemists, they employ models to gain an insight into such processes as homeostasis, metabolism, and the control of genetic factors in development and reproduction. For purposes here it may suffice to note models for the first two, homeostasis and metaholism, as complementing the Bohr atom by furnishing an insight that is more distinctive of the life sciences.

Homeostasis is a self-regulating process whereby a living thing maintains its stability while adjusting to conditions that are optimal for its survival. It is usually modeled by some sort of device that is capable of modifying itself, through a negative feed-back mechanism, so as to maintain dynamic equilibrium with its environment. [12] As a minimum this involves a

[11] Aristotle's thought was, of course, taken over and systematized by St. Thomas Aquinas in his *Summa theologiae;* on the vegetative powers, see Prima Pars, q. 78, a. 2. Much of the remainder of our exposition follows the development of Aquinas in qq. 75-83 of the Treatise on Man, and the use he makes of it in his Pars Prima Secundae when developing his moral doctrine.

[12] The homeostatic process is well described by L. L. Langley, *Homeostasis,* London: Chapman and Hall, Ltd., 1965, 12-14.

register of some type that responds to changes within the organism. Somewhat like a home thermostat the register activates a modulator that works to achieve the desired adjustment; when this is effected the result is fed back and the register deactivates the process. In plants such control is effected chemically by concentrations of various substances in different parts of the organism; in animals chemical action is supplemented by that of the autonomic nervous system. But whereas mechanical and elootrical regulating devices are rigid and determined in their operation, biological regulators are flexible and adaptable. The plant hormone, auxin, for example, works homeostatically to regulate growth by controlling water intake and so stimulate or inhibit the rate at which the plant develops-variable over a range, yet optimal considering the environment in which the plant is placed.

Metabolism is the term reserved for chemical changes whereby energy is provided to maintain life functions. All organisms derive their energy from sunlight; most plants do so directly through photosynthesis, whereas animals and some plant forms use the products of photosynthesis as food and thus as their indirect energy source. Chemically the processes are extremely complex, and yet they are so finely controlled that, from the foods available, precisely the required amounts of energy are produced when and where they are needed within the organism. Elaborate models can be constructed, for example, to illustrate the metabolic process (also homeostatic, by the way) whereby the amount of sugar is controlled in the blood of an animal organism. Sugar or glucose builds up from the liver and directly from food; it is lowered by excretion, conversion to fat, and the use of energy. An effective model provides an understanding of the metabolic process by showing how these and other factors serve as controls to maintain the blood glucose at a desirable level.[13]

Homeostasis and metabolism are pervasive in the plant and animal worlds, their links, so to speak, with the physico-chemi-

[13] *Ibid.,* 40, 64-65.

FIGURE 2

RP: REPRODUCTIVE POWER
DP: DEVELOPMENTAL POWER
MC: METABOLISM CONTROL
HC: HOMEOSTASIS CONTROL

SR: STRONG FORCE
EF: ELECTROMAGNETIC FORCE
WF: WEAK FORCE
GF: GRAVITATIONAL FORCE

NATURAL POWERS OF PLANT LIFE

cal realm of the inanimate. Other powers may be built upon these to take care of the complex functions found in the different kingdoms, phyla, classes, and so on. For vegetative life the basic natural powers are shown in Figure 2. Directly above the four inorganic potentials are drawn the control powers for homeostasis and metabolism, the first controlling the organism's links with the environment and the second the internal processes of food and energy conversion. The two additional powers on the top line are the developmental power, whose function throughout the organism has been likened to that of a " morphogenetic field " as it effects cell differentiation and growth, and the reproductive power, which brings about the production of new individuals within the species.[14]

As in the previous diagram of the powers of the inorganic, Figure 2 is a generic model applicable throughout the plant kingdom. For any one type of organism, as the botanist well knows, these powers and the natural form that underlies them develop the organ systems necessary for the life activities of the particular species. Figure 3 models that form, or the nature of a specific plant organism, as an energizing field.[15] Stated otherwise, although a generic model, it is meant to represent the nature of an organism of a species or type, such as that of a live geranium or live oak. Only when the " live " is added, we should note, do we have a true geranium or a true oak. When the plant or tree dies the nature is no longer there, the powers cease to activate the organ systems, and the substance decomposes and reverts quickly to the level of the inorganic.

The animal kingdom is usually differentiated from that of plants by its possession of sentience and mobility, and for these

[14] More complicated models are at hand for the various phases of cell division and the DNA molecule, showing how it functions in the transmission of genetic codes, but discussion of these need not be entered upon at this point.

[15] Here the boxes representing the various natural powers are designated by the same capital letters as shown in Figures 1 and 2, but the distinctive activities that emanate from the powers are indicated to the left and right of the powers, thus emphasizing the point that the nature itself is the root source of the activities that take place within, or emanate from, the organism.

FIGURE 3



A NATURE IN THE PLANT KINGDOM

characteristics additional powers and organ systems are required. Although one may speak of a plant's behavior, the term "behavior" is usually reserved for distinctively animal activities. Touching an oak tree reveals little about life functions that may be going on within it, but touching a frog gives a quick indication of whether the frog is alive or dead. The well known stimulus-response model makes use of this fact to lay out the behaviorist program for animal experimentation. Early behaviorists concentrated exclusively on externally observable, and usually measurable, features which they identified as stimulus and response; the interior of the organism they regarded as a " black box " that must forever remain opaque to scientific investigation. But with the development of computers, more complicated models have been developed by researchers in cognitive science that give a deeper understanding of sensation and the ways in which it may be linked to motor activity. [16]

A computer-driven robot, for example, might be diagrammed schematically as composed of four interacting units, two to account for stimulus functions and two to handle response. In the case of stimuli, a sensor unit would normally be required for their reception, to which a memory unit could be added for retention and later reference; to effect appropriate response, a selector would then be desirable to activate alternate drives depending on signal reception, and finally a motor unit would be needed to carry out the elicited commands. Four capabilities or powers-sensor, memory, activator, and motor-would then suffice for the simulation of activities usually associated with the animal kingdom. [17]

Just as the Bohr atom and the homeostat can be used to model natures in the inorganic and vegetative realms respec• tively, so a robot of this kind may be used to model natures at the level of the sensitive. The natural powers that explain

1s For an elementary description of such devices, see the author's essay, "Computers and the Modeling of Man," *From a Realist Point of View,* 2d ed., 245-271.

11 *Ibid.,* 259-261.

animal life, to be sure, build on the powers already investigated for the realms of the inorganic and the vegetative. But not much ingenuity is required to generalize the four capabilities just sketched for the robot to obtain the corresponding natural powers that can complement the eight powers required for plant life. The sensor would be replaced by the external senses-sight, hearing, taste, touch, and smell; memory would be expanded to include all of the internal senses associated with the brain and central nervous system-perception, imagination, memory, and instinct; the activator would become behavioral response-various emotional reactions as sources of impulsive and aggressive behavior; and the motor would be replaced by the range of motive powers associated with the animal's organs of movement.[18] Thus twelve natural powers in all should be sufficient to account for the activities that characterize the animal kingdom. These function as a type of hierarchical structure wherein the four powers of the inorganic subserve the four plant and wherein all eight in turn subserve the distinctive powers required in an animal organism.[19] The ensemble of these powers operating within the animal is what constitutes is nature. By analogy with the natures already diagrammed for the inorganic (Figure 1) and for the plamt world (Figure 3), a nature in the animal kingdom will then be modeled by the radiating circles or field that energizes all of the powers and enables them to function as a specific unit.[20] This model, as heretofore, is itself generic in kind; to be appreciated it must be associated with an organism

18 *Ibid.,* 261-263.

19 See the schematic diagram represented below in Figure 4. This shows the fourteen natural powers characteristic of the human organism. Two of these should be deleted to have the diagram applicable throughout the entire animal kingdom rather than restricting it to *homo sapiens* alone. These are the boxes in the top right portion of the figure-those for the powers of intellect (I) and will CW), which are found only in humans.

20 The field shown in Figure 5 below approximates that of an animal nature. To be more precise its center should lie exactly in the middle of the four boxes designating the powers of the plant kingdom, and the radiating circles should not extend so far as to overlap the powers of intellect and will, since an animal nature as such is incapable of thought and volition.

of a particular species, say, a squirrel. A live adult squirrel is able to exercise all of these natural powers, and it does so in ways that contribute to the unity and well-being of the entire organism. Its life has an inorganic base in the sense tha.t its bodily components obey all the laws of physics and chemistry; it assimilates its food and grows and develops, even procreates; and all of these functions undergird its sensitive and mobile capabilities. But the squirrel differs from the robot in an important respect: it is self-developing and self-activating-another way of saying that it is alive. The robot works only when energized; the squirrel is by nature energized. And yet the concept of being " energized " casts light on the function of the natural form in the realm of the living. Just as a robot is inert or dead when it lacks a source of energy, so the squirrel is dead when it no longer is animated, when it no longer has its nature, when the powers deriving from that nature become inoperative, and when its structure disintegrates and the organism itself decomposes into inert chemical substances.

Powers of Man

With this we have all the materials necessary to discuss man's nature and the powers associated with it. A human being is an *animal rationale,* which is to say that his rationality is what distinguishes him from brute animals. To explain this two additional powers have traditionally been invoked, namely, the intellect and the will. The first-alternately referred to as reason, understanding, insight, etc.-supplies man with a type of knowledge superior to that of the lower animals, called intellectual knowledge to differentiate it from that of the senses. The second is an a.ffective power that can rise above the level of emotional response; it takes its intimations from the intellect and is the root source of the personal decisions a human being makes precisely as human.[21]

[21] For a fuller elaboration, see *From a Realist Point of View,* 2d ed., 263-269, and also the material referred to there in an earlier essay in the same volume, "Basic Concepts: Natural and Scientific," 45-49.

FIGURE 4

S ES IS

R MP·

I: INTELLECT
W: WILL

ES: EXTERNAL SENSES
IS: INTERNAL SENSES
BR: BEHAVIORAL RESPONSE
MP: MOTOR POWERS

RP: REPRODUCTIVE POWER
DP: DEVELOPMENTAL POWER
MC: METABOLISM CONTROL
HC: HOMEOSTASIS CONTROL

SF: STRONG FORCE
EF: ELECTROMAGNET'C FORCE
HF: WEAK FORCE
GF: GRAVITATIONAL FORCE

NATURAL POWERS OF THE HUMAN ORGANISM

Figure 4 shows all of the natural powers of the human organism, basically those of the higher animals but adding to them the distinctive powers of intellect and will. The powers are arranged hierarchically in the diagram, which should be read from bottom to top to retrace the sequence followed thus far in developing our conception of nature as animating. At the lowest position are the four basic forces of the physicist from Figure 1, only now shown in interaction with, and so subserving, the natural powers of plant life. In the middle position are the properly vegetative powers of Figure 2, here shown connected with, and in symbiosis with, the physico-chemical powers beneath them and the animal powers above them. And finally, at the top position, are the natural powers required to support animal life with its distinctive properties of sentience and mobility. The topmost grids are shown as a type of stimulus-response mechanism (represented by the Sand R symbols to the left of the diagram) and are labeled ES for external senses and IS for internal senses along the stimulus line, and BR for behavioral response and MP for motor powers along the response line. To accomodate the additional powers found in human beings, the diagram has then been extended to the right to include intellect (I) at the termination of the stimulus (or knowledge) line and will (W) at the beginning of the response (or action) line. Fourteen powers in all are thus required to signal the capabilities of the human organism and their various modes of support and interaction within its life processes.

Human nature itself, following the convention already explained, may now be modeled by an energizing field laid over all of these powers, as illustrated in Figure 5. As with previous models of natures, this is not a model of an individual person. Rather, it applies to the species as a whole and so should be thought of as instantiated in each and every adult human organism. Human nature, in this understanding, is a unifying and stabilizing principle to which all of man's life activities can be traced. In virtue of that principle a person thinks, wills, perceives, reacts emotionally, senses, and moves his

FIGURE 5



HUMAN NATURE: SOUL AS AN ANIMATING PRINCIPLE

limbs; it also lies behind the homeostatic equilibrium he maintains with his environment, the metabolism whereby he assimilates food, the processes through which his body grows and develops and ultimately reproduces. It even explains the ways in which ion concentrations are maintained in his body fluids, how radioactive tracers are carried to one or other of his organs, and ultimately why he floats in water and falls in accordance with the la.ws of gravity. In a word this natural form is what makes him one organism, with a diversity of parts, all capable of being coordinated in unified activity, which reaches its perfection in his rationality and exercise of free will.

Thus far we have been using the terminology of nature and form in analyzing the powers and activities of inorganic, plant, animal, and human substances but have made no reference to soul-a key concept in this essay, which, as intimated in its title, assumes considerable importance in the human sciences. Nature, following Aristotle, is an internal substantial principle of characteristic activity; it may refer to the basic protomatter explained above, or it ma.y refer to the distinctive form that makes the substance be what it is.[22] We have been modeling the latter referent as an energy field, and in this way have been able to account for the unity and stability of inorganic substances as well as those of the organic realm. When we move from the non-living to the living, however, we note a difference in the activities that emanate from the specifying form: these are now *life* activities, those, namely, that characterize living organisms. Energy serves as a useful analogue to describe all activating principles behind the operations of nature, but it is especially apt for shedding light on the animating principle that makes organisms operate the way they do. Just as a robot will function only so long as it has within it a source of electrical energy, so a plant or an animal will exercise its life functions only so long as it is energized properly. This energizing or animating principle in living things has traditionally been

22 *Physics,* B.1, especially 192b33, 193a29, 193b5.

known as the *anima* or soul. An organism is alive and functioning only to the degree that it is animated or besouled, or, in other words, to the extent that it has a soul. Nature as animating is therefore nature in its "ensouling" function: it is this function that enables us to speak of a plant soul, an animal soul, and a human soul. Such souls are nothing more than the correlates of the *forma substantialis* that effects specific unity and stability at the level of the non-living. Each is successively capable of supporting the increasingly sophisticated activities to be found in the plant, animal, and human spheres. The human soul is the apex of this formal hierarchy. All the powers we associate with humans are basically *its* powers, for only when the body is energized by the human soul can these powers be activated to have the body function m truly human fashion.

Entitative Perfection

Before proceeding to an analysis of human nature in action, which should follow at this point, we will address briefly the problem of the entitative perfection of natures, that is, their perfection in being, for the light this may shed on their operational perfection, their perfection in operation. It seems more or less evident that there are degrees of perfection in natures according as they manifest more and better powers or capabilities. In this sense plants are superior to minerals, animals to plants, and humans to animals. Even within a kingdom or species, or within an individual over time, however, it is possible to speak of one state being better than another. This is difficult to see in the inorganic realm, though perhaps one would be prepared to admit that a diamond is better than a piece of charcoal, although the chemical nature is the same in both-pure carbon. Crystals and precious gems, in a way, manifest the perfection of an inorganic nature for they show it in its most stable and unified state, able to conserve its being against deleterious environmental influences.

In the realm of the living, some individuals are better adapted than others, stronger or more agile, for example, and

thus, as Darwin pointed out, more fit for survival. But individuals themselves vary in their capacity for exercising life functions from time to time. At one period their organ systems might be working well, at another not. There is a general name for this well-working of an organism as a whole, and that is "health." Plants and animals are said to be healthy when their natural powers activate their organs properly and all their systems function well. Then they are said to be "well" themselves-our common way of indicating that we are healthy. There is such a, thing as a healthy geranium and a healthy squirrel, and, of course, our preeminent concern is with the healthy human being. This is the sense of entitative perfection on which we would focus.

What is health, and how does it related to a nature that is said to be healthy? The traditional reply is that health is a ha.bit or disposition that characterizes the organism as a whole, but is especially manifest in the way a natural power energizes or activates its respective organ system.[23] In this sense one can have a healthy liver, healthy circulation, and healthy limbs; the aggregate of all these healthy systems constitutes the health of the organism. With a little ingenuity a symbolism can be devised to show how a habit or disposition of this type can modify its relevant life powers, both in themselves and in their relationships to other powers, so as to render an organism "healthy" in the various ways it functions. With such a symbolism the schematic diagram of Figure 4 can be augmented to model how the natural powers of the human organism may be disposed operationally, and so register, in a general way, that organism's state of health.[24]

[23] This is the way in which the concept is generally viewed within the Aristotelian tradition; for its application to the contemporary situation in medicine, see L. R. Kass, "Regarding the End of Medicine and the Pursuit of Health," *The Great Ideas Today 19'"18,* Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1978, 72-103.

[24] In the schematic diagrams employed thus far, powers have been represented by boxes; to represent a habit or disposition that modifies these power, small hexagons may now be added to the boxes. Such hexagons, with the small letter "h" inserted within them to designate "health" or "healthy

The sense of entitative perfection just described may now be extended somewhat to include more than bodily health (tha.t associated with organs and organ systems), to include the type of health that is peculiarly human, the health of the mind. The mind is healthy when it thinks properly, and this requires more than a sound body, more than a healthy brain and nervous system. It requires also that the intellect be habituated to correct ways of thinking about various subject matters. Such haibits are sometimes called intellectual virtues. An alternate term is sciences, understanding science in the broad sense of systematic knowledge about any subject.. In this meaning a science may be regarded a.s an entitative perfection of the intellect, much in the wa.y that health may be regarded as a similar perfection of other life powers.[25] We shall have occasion to return to this comparison as we move now to an examination of human nature in action and the remaining ways in which it may be perfected in the order of operation.

Na.ture in Action

Earlier the claim was made that the better we understand a nature the more we can appreciate how it should act, that we can bridge the " is " and the " ought " by rooting the norm for action in an objective standard, a nature that is not completely refractory to our understanding. Now it is time to justify that claim in the context of the human nature we have just examined to show how it can be a norm for action and in this

operation," are shown in Figure 6 below. There they are appended to the sentient and behavioral powers of the animal organism; they could likewise be added to the vegetative powers on Figure 2 and 4, if one wished to indicate the state of health of such powers in relation to the organ systems they activate. They would not be added, on the other hand, to the inorganic powers or forces of Figure 1, since the qualification "healthy" is usually reserved only for powers in the realm of the living.

[25] In the schematic diagrams of Figure 6 below, one may again note the hexagons marked with the letter "s" appended to the intellect box; the term "science" for which the " s " stands is to be understood generically, since there are many sciences with which a particular intellect may be endowed, and to possess one is not necessarily to possess them all.

way have contemporary relevance for human sciences such as ethics and politics. Recall that at the outset we characterized ethics and politics as practical sciences, sciences concerned with " knowing as ordered to doing," and thus our concern now is not with the entitative perfection just discussed but rather with an operative perfection, a perfection in *praxis,* that must be the goal of every practical discipline. This goal is sometimes referred to as " practical truth," which perhaps can be illustrated with simple examples drawn from engineering and the health sciences.[26]

Perfection in *Praxis*

The engineer works mainly with the inorganic natures discussed in the first part of this essay. He must investigate the forces and potentials found in such natures, but not merely to understand them, rather to harness them, channel them in the right direction, so to speak, to produce artifacts that serve the needs of man and society. His knowledge is not measured by how good a theory he can formulate about electron flow in semiconductors, but by how well he can design and produce a reliable computer, to give a current example. The practical truth of the engineer is seen in his products: the skyscraper, the video recorder, the space shuttle, all of which must not only come to be but must also function properly. The engineer's knowledge consists in knowing the right thing to do, in construction and in operation or maintenance, to assure the attainment of the goal embodied in the material artifact he aims to create or produce.

What the engineer attempts to do with inorganic natures has obvious parallels with the work of the practitioner in the health disciplines. Health is a concept we normally associate only with organic natures. So a.s to make full use of the mate-

2s For an explanation of the notion of practical truth, see W. A. Wallace, *The Role of Demonstration in Moral Theology,* Washington, D.C.: The Thomist Press, 1962, 117-140; some of this material is summarized in the essay, " Being Scientific in a Practice Discipline," *From a Realist Point of View,* 2d ed., 273-293.

rial developed above about plants and animals, let us include under health practitioners horticulturists and veterinarians as well as physicians and surgeons. All must possess detailed knowledge of the organ systems and powers that activate them in the organisms with which they work. No truth available to the botanist or zoologist falls outside their ken, and yet they cannot rest satisfied with such speculative knowledge a.Ione. They must grasp the natures of the plants and animals (including human animals) in their care, and then give whatever assistance they can devise to bring such natures to proper, healthy functioning. They spend much of their time with malfunctions or dysfunctions, for these must be understood if correct functioning is to be restored. But the measure of their truth or knowledge is not what they *know* about functions or dysfunctions, but rather what they are able to *do* with them to restore an ailing organism to health and in this sense attain practical truth.

To show this concern of doctors and engineers with proper doing or acting as opposed to mere knowing, the upper portion of Figure 6 redra.ws the topmost section of Figure 4, only labeled slightly differently to indicate the main human powers and how these function in the " knowledge line " and the " action line" respectively. Man's knowledge line is perfected to the degree that his organs and powers of sense and perception are healthy (indicated by the small hex•agons with the letter "h ") and to the degree that his intellect, at which the knowledge line terminates, is perfected in the order of science (shown by the hexagon marked with the letter " s ") . In many areas, to be sure, his sensations and perceptions a;re inferior to those of the lower animals, but provided his sense organs and nervous system, brain, etc., function properly, his intellect is able to make up for their limitations. Yet his knowledge reaches its full perfection as human only to the degree that it is perfected along the lines of the intellectual disciplines-the pure sciences and the humanities-which enable him to grasp in a more or less systematic way all that is humanly knowable.

FIGURE 6

Knowledge Line

S SENSATION INTELLECT S

R MOTOR POWERS EMOTION WILL

Action Line

POWERS IN OPERATION

S SENSATION PERCEPTION INTELLECT S

R MOTOR POWERS Impulse EMOTION Contending

THE ROLE OF THE MORAL VIRTUES IN HUMAN PERFECTIBILITY

The action line is more complex, if only for the fact that it is dependent on the knowledge line and is influenced by it in various ways. The first influence is shown by the path connecting perception and emotion to illustrate the case where something perceived elicits an emotional response that prompts the knower to action. This is the way in which brute animals respond to their environment; provided their instincts are good and their reactions healthy it is sufficient for the activities they require for survival. With humans the case is different, for knowledge responses can come from the intellect rather than from perception alone. If they come from the intellect they are mediated to the emotions through the will, man's power of choice and personal decision. An emotivist theory of behavior might urge, "If it feels good, do it," but experience quickly shows that such is not always the best course of action. Man is a rational animal and he can perfect his nature only to the extent that he acts reasonably, that his emotions are under the control of his reason and his will. Voluntary activity is the distinctive mark of the human being. Just as the intellect terminates the knowledge line and brings it to perfection, so the will begins the action line and initiates responses that can lead to human perfection in practice.

In the bridge between intellect and will at the top of Figure 6 an operative habit labeled "a" has been added to the entita.tive habit "s." The latter, as already noted, stands for science or the sciences, the health of the intellect, one might say, in its ability to reason correctly and come to the truth in a systematic way. The "a," on the other hand, stands for art or the arts (*techne*), the "know how" that applies knowledge to practice and points out the right thing to be done, here and now, to achieve an intended result. The difference between this operative kind of knowing and the speculative understanding of the pure sciences can be illustrated in the differences between the engineer and the physicist and between the biologist and the medical doctor. Engineers and internists are good engineers and good internists only to the extent that they choose the right means to achieve a desired result, whether

this be designing a computer tha.t works properly or restoring health to a dysfunctioning organ. In both cases, it should be stressed, to refer to their operating knowledge as art is not to remove it completely from the sphere of scientific knowing. Both engineering and medicine are also commonly referred to as sciences, but the sense then is that they are *practical* sciences-practice disciplines concerned with knowing in order to do and, in the final analysis, with doing more than with knowing. And this same practical component is found in all the arts and crafts, from the art of politics and the art of rhetoric to architecture and the fine arts that make our world a more beautiful place in which to live.

Human Perfectibility

One may now ask the question, and it has been asked for centuries, whether there is any kind of knowledge that enables one to become, not a good artist or a good engineer or a good doctor, but simply a good person, a good human being precisely as human? Attempts to answer that question give birth to the special discipline known as ethics or moral philosophy. The art of living well, that is, of living reasonably and bringing all of one's natural powers to their proper fulfillment, is the basic concern of ethics. Like engineering and medicine, this is a practical science. As Aristotle conceived it, it examines the ways in which one's operative powers can be habituated to act rightly, that is, reasonably, in the difficult situations with which one is daily confronted. For Aristotle this practice discipline has three components: ethics itself, which regulates how the individual should act to achieve personal perfection; economics, which addresses itself mainly to problems of the family and how its members can attain their proper well-being; and politics, which has a similar concern for problems of the state.

The basic insight is that man's natural powers can be perfected by operative habits in the action line just as they can by entita.tive habits in the knowledge line. Operative habits are acquired through repeated activity: if they advance a per-

son's good and make him good they are called virtues; if they do the opposite, they are called vices. The ensemble of virtues and vices one has acquired is usually referred to as character. Through daily living not only do we develop skills and personality traits but we also develop character, and do so whether we consciously intend it or not. Virtues, or good habits of acting, are acquired simply enough-through repeated actions moderated by right reason. A person develops a good character by cultivating the cardinal virtues: prudence, justice, moderation, and courage. These become for him "second natures," as it were, habituating him to act reasonably, i.e., to control his natural passions and to give to others their due. In this way he himself becomes good, and so more fully human. The individual who fails to acquire virtue, on the other hand, and for example is repeatedly unjust in his dealings with others, inculcates a character defect and to this extent is stunted precisely as human.

The schematic diagram in the lower portion of Figure 6 repeats that in the upper portion, excepting that it now indicates the operative habits that bring man to his personal perfection through rational and voluntary activity. Notice here that prudence (p) has taken the place of art (a) in the diagram above. It is analogous to the "know-how" of the doctor or the engineer, and yet it is much wider in scope. Prudence is a habit of the practical intellect that enables one to choose wisely and well, that is, to determine the correct course of action to pursue in the widest variety of circumstances encountered in day-to-day living. It is concerned with subject matter that can pertain also to the other virtues, judging the mean between excess and defect, for example, in matters of eating and drinking. Justice (j) is a habit of the will that inclines its possessor to render to others their due. Moderation (m), sometimes called temperance, controls the impulse emotions, as seen in a temperate attitude toward food and sex. Courage (c) or fortitude, on the other hand, controls the contending or aggressive emotions, guarding against excessive anger, fear, or despair. The individual whose intellect is perfected for pru-

dent decisions, whose will is disposed to be just, whose passions or emotions are under the control 0£ intellect and will through courage and moderation, is said to have a good character. The problem 0£ character formation, on this accounting, is essentially the problem 0£ acquiring moral virtues such as these, and then 0£ habituating oneself to the type 0£ action that is conformable to their possession and continued retention. [27]

Remember that we are discussing the idea 0£ nature, now instantiated in that 0£ human nature, showing how it is intelligible through the powers 0£ the human soul (clearly the key to man's perfectibility), and so providing a norm-a natural and objective norm-for virtuous human action. Does the idea of nature, in this context, have contemporary relevance for ethics and politics? From the viewpoint of ethics itself the answer would seem to be obvious: good people, happy people, are those who have endowed their human natures with second natures, with intellectual and moral virtues, that can bring them to their fulfillment precisely as human. So let us now extend our inquiry further into the domains of economics and politics. This will enable us to inquire about the role of society in promoting virtue in its members and so bringing them to their natural perfection.

The Body Politic

A human being is never completely self-sufficient: he comes into the world dependent on parents, grows up within a family context, and requires the additional resources of city or state to reach intellectual and moral maturity. Family and state,

21 For a summary account of these moral virtues, and how each contributes to human perfection and happiness, see Josef Pieper, *The Four Cardinal Virtues,* Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976. A fuller analysis will be found in Jody Palmour, *The Ancient Virtues and Vices: Philosophical Foundations for the Psychology, Ethics, and Politics of Human Development,* University Microfilms, .Ann Arbor, Michigan (Ph.D. Dissertation, Georgetown University, 1984) ; also, by the same author, *A Differential Diagnosis of Aristotle's Virtues and Vices, Based on a Psychoanalytic Perspective and the Theory of the Four Causes* (Cross-referenced to both the *Nicomachean Ethics* and *The Art of Politics),* Washington, D.C.: Archou Institute, 1985.

in some form or other, thus seem practically necessary for the development of a rational being: an *animal rationale* is by nature and instinct an *animal sociale,* and *homo sapiens* cannot help but also be *horno politicus.*

The family is obviously the first support system for human development. Mother and father are necessary to bring offspring into the world, and they are the normal requirement for providing nurture and sustenance during its early years of growth. Food and shelter are required for the proper development of organs and limbs, and parents normally provide these and the care their provision entails. Even more important, however, is growth in character, in learning not only to speak but to tell the truth, in practicing how to moderate one's appetites, in coming to recognize the rights of others and giving them their due. The community, and particularly the school, can provide assistance in such character formation, but the primary responsibility resides with the parents, with mother and father, who must give long and devoted attention to the task if they would achieve its goal. This requirement alerts us to one of the gravest social disorders of our times: the breakdown of family life owing to separation or divorce, the growth of families, the increasing number of " latch-key " children who are alone much of the day and lack reliable guides to the development of virtue. Small wonder that juvenile delinquency is on the increase and that alcohol and drug addiction have reached alarming proportions in our otherwise affluent communities.

Does the body politic, over and above the family, have any essential role to play in the development of virtue? Such a question is difficult to answer, but a reasonable response can perhaps be gleaned from Aristotle's teaching in the *Politics,* particularly in how he saw this work related to his *Nicomachean Ethics* and its preparatory treatises.[28] For Aristotle, the *Politics* is the second half of a subject whose first half is

[28] A summary reply to this question is contained in Charles N. R. McCoy's article on" Political Philosophy" in the *New Catholic Encyclopedia,* 15 vols., New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967, 11:510-516, on which much of the following exposition is based.

the *Ethics:* both constitute the science of human affairs, of man's good or happiness. This happiness consists in a certain manner of life, a life of virtuous activity, which inevitably is shaped by one's social environment-the laws, customs, and institutions of the community to which one belongs. The sense of Aristotle's statement that man is "by nature a political animal " is tha.t he only develops his full capabilities in society when this is rightly organized for his welfare. Once one knows in what manner of life human fulfillment is to be found, then and only then can one inquire into the form of government and the various social institutions that will enable it to be secured. It is this latter inquiry that raises questions about the constitution of the state, with which the *Politics* is principally concerned.

Politics, like ethics, is a practical science. Indeed it is the supreme practical science, because it has for its aim human welfare and happiness as a whole. It is based on the premise that man is free and is capable of governing himself, but it also recognizes that man is limited in this self-government because he is produced by nature and can perfect only the nature he has. The self that is involved in self-government is really the second nature or character man has developed, and this is determined by the virtues he has inculcated in his soul-let us now call them the political virtues: prudence, justice, courage, and moderation. If all people possessed these virtues, to be sure, government would be a simple matter. The fact is that they do not. And so politics cannot deal with the idea.I, utopion sta.te; it must address itself to very refractory material, to the common condition of men. In its practicality it must almost be pragmatic in adapting practical reason, and the law tha.t attempts to embody it, to meeting the conditions in which ordinary human beings customarily find themselves.

Since such conditions make full attainment of virtue extremely difficult, human law cannot forbid all vices, from which good people abstain, but only the more grievous ones, from which most people should be able to abstain.[29] Chief

[29] *Summa theologiae,* Pars Prima Secundae, q. 96, a. 2.

among these are the vices that prove injurious to others, those involving injustice that make life in society difficult if not impossible. Here note an important difference between the political order and the moral order. The purpose of law is surely to make men virtuous, but the good that the law attempts to achieve is the human good of a multitude of persons, most of whom are clearly deficient in virtue. For the common good of the state, then, it suffices that citizens be only virtuous enough to obey its laws. And yet, as Thomas Aquinas clearly saw, the virtuous performances of virtuous deeds is the end at which every lawgiver aims.[30] The political order directs itself to a common good predicated not on force or fear of the law, but on a free advance of its citizenry to the possession of virtue. Law can provide an extrinsic help, but the common goal is attained only when a whole people develop a sense of justice, moderation, and responsibility as they attempt to bring their individual souls to proper fulfillment as human.

* * *

Let us return now to the theme with which this essay began. The concept of nature is a key concept for forging a unity between the natural sciences and the human sciences, for providing a link between knowing and doing. We ha.ve ranged over the entire world of nature, from elementary particles to the highest forms of animal life, to make essentially two points: (1) it is possible to know the natures of things, for these manifest themselves through their powers, their activities and reactivities; and (2) such natures can provide a norm against which the propriety of action is judged and so enable one to dispel the so-called naturalistic fallacy by bridging the " is " and the "ought." The idea of nature reaches its culmination in that of human nature, for man, as has been seen, is a microcosm who incorporates every element of nature in his being and whose mind can reach out and grasp the rest of Nature in its most intricate detail. But human nature is a free nature. Man's activity is not as determined from within as is that of

30 *Ibid.,* a. 3, ad 2.

other species; he molds his own nature, as it were, by endowing his soul with second natures that register the degree of humanity he has attained and his resulting capacity for further fulfillment and happiness.[31]

It is in such a context that we must see our political order and those who aspire to be its leaders. One who wishes to govern others should have risen above the common condition of men, above the herd, we say, not merely in the possession of fame or wealth but especially in the possession of virtue. He or she should be prudent, just, courageous, and moderate in matters of personal life, and the electorate rightly insists on that. But over and above personal prudence the political leader must have political prudence, the art of governing that sees to it that right decisions are made here and now so as to foster the common good. The most powerful adjunct to this art, as Aristotle saw it, was the art of rhetoric, with whose possession the head of the *polis* could persuasively urge courses of action that cultivate virtue, peace, and material well-being in its members.[32] Rhetoric has fallen into disrepute in our times. The communications media unfortunately have had a deleterious effect on this art of arts: technique has supplanted substance, and no longer are *logos, ethos,* and *pathos* evident as norms by which respectable presentations can be judged. We seem above all to have lost the concern for character and value that was crucial for political action in the Greek city state. Yet, at a time when drugs and alcoholism are on the

[31] As the reader will have noticed by now, the scope of this essay has been restricted to man's natural perfectibility, i.e., his perfectibility in the order of nature and abstracting from his *de facto* elevation to the supernatural order through grace. Applying the Thomistic adage, however, that grace perfects nature, one could easily extend the treatment herein to include Thomas's analysis in the Pars Secunda of the *Summa Theologiae,* so as to attain his ultimate goal in glory, the beatific vision.

[32] Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is sometimes treated by scholastic authors as a part of his *Organon,* but it can with equal justice be regarded as a special *techne* that complements the political teaching contained in his *Politics.* For an explanation and justification of the latter way of regarding the *Rhetoric,* see Larry Arnhart, *Aristotle on Political Reasoning: A Commentary on the "Rhetoric,"* De Kalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois University Press, 1981.

rise, when the arms race threatens the destruction of the species, when pollution of the natural environment and depletion of its resources are a continuing problem, it would seem that such a normative concern, based on nature and what it means to be truly human, has become a major desideratum.

If virtuous living within the *polis* is a legitimate goal of the head of state and its legislators, much of the recent worry about politics and religion can be seen to be baseless. From the very foundation of our republic religion has been a most powerful force for the cultivation of morality and virtue, more effective by far than law and its enforcement. It is not religion that is to be feared; much more dangerous, it would *seem,* is a secular mentality that magnifies material needs, emphasizes creature comforts, distorts sex, sees " quality of life " as more important than family and children, and might even sacrifice human life if it proves too bothersome or inconvenient.

Nature is the norm. Obviously we do not possess such an exhaustive knowledge of human nature that we can prescribe every detail conducive to virtuous living. Our knowledge of reproductive biology is a good case in point. Our speculative and practical sciences in that field are especially deficient, and clearly in bioethics much work remains to be done. But, as has been said, nature is not completely refractory to our understanding, and that applies to human nature too. Perhaps the modeling techniques here proposed give some insight into the riches of that nature, and how they can and should be used to promote the common good.

WILLIAM A. WALLACE, O.P.

The Oatholic University of America
Washington, D.O. 20064

BOOK REVIEWS

Reformation of Church and Dogma (1300-1700). (The Christian Tradition, Vol. IV.) By JAROSLAV PELIKAN. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984. Pp. 424. $27.50.

With this volume Jaroslav Pelikan's history of Christian doctrine continues its magisterial course "from the deaths of Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure in 1274 to the births of Johann Sebastian Bach and George Frederick Handel in 1685" (p. 1). Many questions commonly addressed in book reviews do not even arise in this case; anyone interested in the history of doctrine knows that Pelikan is writing the definitive work of its kind for our time. This volume has the virtues of its predecessors-and raises many of the same questions. Pelikan continues to write the history of what the church believed, taught, and confessed-not social or institutional history, not the lives or speculations of individual theologians. If the book contains no big surprises, however, it offers a wealth of new interpretations and insights.

From a wealth of material, I can only single out some of the innovations, then note some of Pelikan's obvious virtues, and finally touch on some critical questions.

The book has a straightforward organization. After discussing the doctrinal pluralism of the late Middle Ages and the crises in ecclesiology from the great schism to the Hussites and conciliarists, Pelikan focuses in turn on the Lutheran, Reformed, Catholic, and Radical reformations. Yet he is explicitly not writing denominational history. Each chapter draws material from all four traditions as he attempts to trace the "development of doctrine within the Christian tradition as a whole" (p. 2). The book concludes with a chapter on confessional dogmatics in the seventeenth century.

Accounts of late medieval theology have often been almost indistinguishable from histories of the period's philosophy. Pelikan usefully turns our attention from metaphysics and logic to issues of predestination, soteriology, Mariology, and the sacraments that more directly affected the faith and life of the church. Indeed, he arguably overreacts against philosophy: nominalism, for instance, may have had more impact on doctrine than this account suggests.

Pelikan draws heavily on Hussite writers in discussing late medieval ecclesiology, and I suspect reviewers will be debating whether this adds

to the richness of a pluralistic account or represents an overemphasis. I'm not sure. I am sure that he shows that this period's conflicts were not simply a fight between the church's opponents and defenders but a genuine debate over the nature of the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic church-not least over which of those adjectives was most important.

His chapter on Lutheran theology focuses on the *publica doctrina* of Luther's Reformation, " as expressed not only by Luther and Melanchthon but also by the confessional generation of Lutherans who followed them in the second half of the sixteenth century" (pp. 127-128). Thus the discussion of justification by faith leads to the debate between Flacius and Strigel on free will and Osiander's theory of infused righteousness, Luther's views on the atonement to those of Chemnitz, and Luther's appeal to the Gospel to the views of Scriptural authority in the Augsburg Confession and the Formula of Concord. This is different from-and better than-the usual pattern of presenting Lutheran theology as the intellectual biography of Luther.

Similarly, Pelikan's treatment of "Reformed theology" is not a summary of Calvin but draws on many voices. A single page on the Eucharist (p. 197) cites Oecolampadius, Zwingli, Calvin, Bullinger, Ursinus, Beza, and Edwin Sandys, the archbishop of York. For all its admirable richness, such an account of " Reformed " doctrine may occasionally blur important distinctions; one might infer, for instance, that Calvin did not significantly differ from Zwingli regarding the Eucharist.

The chapter on the Catholic Reformation emphasizes creativity and innovation. This is not the story of a "counter-Reformation" but of a reformation of a different kind. Of course Trent provides the centerpiece of the story, but Pelikan describes the humanists and theologians who went before it and the debates which followed it. Even the account of Trent itself draws heavily on working drafts and the accounts of individual participants as well as the final declarations.

If Pelikan recovers the individuals in Catholic theology, he puts clearer emphasis on the communities of the Radical Reformation. Other accounts focus on fascinating individuals like Miintzer and Hubmeier wandering around Germany. Pelikan emphasizes theologians who spoke on behalf of small but disciplined communities. Because those communities *were* small, Pelikan's account of them is proportionately brief, and those who see the Anabaptists and others as important precursors of things to come will feel they have been neglected here.

The final chapter shows how, in the seventeenth century, the question of authority made prolegomena an increasingly important of all doctrinal systems, how the need to defend Luther's doctrine of the Eucharist drove Lutheran theologians to more specific definitions of the rela-

tion between humanity and divinity in Christ (and concern for Christ's humanity led toward Lutheran pietism), how Reformed debates about predestination led to new interpretations of "covenant," and how Jansenism challenged the Catholic interpretation of grace.

In the last generation of Reformation studies, scholars like Reiko Oberman have taught us to see the Reformation in its medieval context. Pelikan builds on that work, but he also reminds us that the Reformation no more disappeared into a vacuum than it arose from one. The history of doctrine does not end with the death of Calvin and then resume a century later. The concluding chapter points toward Pietism, Puritanism, and Jansenism, the starting points of Pelikan's next volume, and the greatest impact of this volume may be to force a reevaluation of those too often dismissed as the epigones of the Reformation.

Pelikan's most obvious virtue is his massive erudition. He can quote not only the minor work of a major theologian but the illustrative passage from a minor writer. The list of works cited includes not only seventy-six from Luther but twelve from Josse von Clichtove. The range of Pelikan's reading enables new voices to make themselves heard in the history of doctrine-a range of Hussite theologians, a variety of humanists, the different Catholic points of view in the period before Trent, and so on.

Pelikan also writes ecumenically with such natural ease that one forgets how few such accounts have been unmarred by confessional bias. Lutheran, Reformed, Catholic, and Radical perspectives all receive balanced accounts, and we see the interactions across confessional lines. Contemporary historiographers tell us there is no such thing as "objective history." Fair enough. But one can write a history that treats all parties with respect and sympathetic understanding; Pelikan has done it.

His virtues as a stylist have been less remarked. But his sentences are never awkward, always clear, sometimes epigrammatic. This clarity of style would suit this work to a wide readership, and any serious student of Western intellectual history ought to be reading Pelikan's work. I thus regret that Pelikan provides so little context for the student or general reader. Major figures appear without our knowing who they are, and often without a signal of their importance. Events rarely get set, even briefly, in their political or social context. The recent editor of Yeats's poems who helpfully footnotes a reference to Christ as, "Jesus Christ, son of God in the Christian religion," may have been excessively pessimistic, but in a secular age one cannot presuppose the general knowledge of Christian history Pelikan seems to take for granted.

Perhaps political issues should have been discussed for reasons other than simply setting a helpful context. Every great medieval synthesis from Aquinas to Gabriel Biel addressed the relation of church and state,

which became a crucial issue between the magisterial and radical reformers, one which appears in confessions and certainly affected the life of the church. Yet Pelikan rarely mentions it. He admit$ that applications to the political and social order constitute one of the principal differences between Lutherans and Calvinists, but he does not discuss them. For that matter, Pelikan's readers will not learn that Luther got married, or that he said some vicious things about the Jews, yet both those facts touch on issues that have shaped what the church has believed, taught, and confessed.

Pelikan has repeatedly emphasized that he is not presenting the story of the speculations of individual theologians but of the intellectual life of the community-the chorus rather than the soloists. Yet he is not writing a sociological study of what the average Christian in 1450 or 1650 believed. Research like Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie's on the beliefs of peasants in a late Medieval French village has no place in Pelikan's investigations. But, if this is the history neither of the scholars in their studies nor of the peasants in the fields, then of what is it the
When the church speaks officially-at Trent or Augsburg or Dort or Schleitheim-that obviously belongs to Pelikan's story. But the richness of his account goes far beyond such official pronouncements.

Sometimes it all makes good sense. In describing the Anabaptists, he begins with the Schleitheim Confession and then turns to elaborations of its themes by Menno Simons, Dirk Philipsz, and Peter Walpot. To be sure, the average Anabaptist had not thought through all the issues these theologians discuss, but they were the intellectual leaders of a community, speaking to and for that community.

On the other hand, when Pelikan discusses the conciliarists, or pre-Tridentine Catholic writers like Gropper, Sadoleto, and Witzel, why are these not merely the voices of soloists 1 He would answer that his concern is with what shapes the life of the church. *Lex orandi, lex credendi.* But might that need to be more of an exercise in social history than he undertakes?

Perhaps part of the problem is not with Pelikan's method so much as with the self-understanding of Christian theologians. His Yale colleague George Lindbeck proposes in his recent book *The Nature of Doctrine* that doctrines function to define the rules of belief and action in a Christian community, not to express the religious experience of some individual. Pelikan is writing the history of doctrine in that spirit. But Lindbeck worries that few Christian intellectuals any longer belong to a religious community sufficiently structured to constitute the kind of ordered consensus his theory demands. Reflection on this volume of Pelikan's work suggests that that was sometimes true even in the Reformation period, and, when it is true, Pelikan's definition of doctrine be-

gins to slip out of focus. The gap between theologians and the life of the church seems, if anything, to be widening. For that reason, as for many others, one eagerly awaits his volume on the modern age.

WILLIAM: C. PLACHER

Wabash College
Crawfordsville, Indiana

Biblical Ethics and Social Change. By STEPHEN CHARLES MOTT. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1982. Pp. xvii, 254. $17.95 cloth; $6.95 paper.

John H. Yoder speaks of modern Christian ethicists who have assumed that the only way to get from the Gospel Story to ethics, from Bethlehem to Rome, or to Washington or Saigon, is to leave the story behind. On the other hand ethicists have frequently complained that Scripture scholars, even when they do not confine themselves to exegesis, remain securely within the biblical world. We have never quite faced the problems created by the division of theological labor. Once a state of apartheid exists between Scripture and Ethics, the source of Christian vision and inspiration ceases to guide reflection and ' false gods ' under the title of reason or experience or the Marxist analysis of social reality are pressed into service in its place. Now clearly both reason and experience have roles in any moral decision-making that deserves to be called human, and at this stage scarcely anybody would hold that Marx had nothing to teach us. But 'reason' and 'experience' are two of the most slippery and ambiguous concepts in theological and philosophical discourse. They bear man's smudge and can finally be purified only by hearing the word of God. Likewise we can hardly deal intelligently with any social (or even private) question without a reading of social reality, and the more explicit and critical this is the better. But it seems to me that if the Gospel is to be taken seriously the Marxist account will have to be significantly recast.

The umbilical link between the revelation in Jesus Christ and the ethical reflection and praxis of the Church must therefore be maintained and fostered at all costs. Otherwise the Gospel is not effectively preached and the people perish.

Mott joins the restricted number of those who have endeavored to establish and preserve the living link. He is a bridge-builder who moves with ease in the two territories he sets out to relate together. It is the combination of informed attentiveness to Scripture and a deep aware-

ness of and good judgment on current moral issues that makes this book valuable.

It is particularly appropriate that the present volume should be devoted to the social dimension. Several factors have forced us to attend to this dimension and to discover its depths and demands.

Perceptive minds have set out to 'psychoanalyze ' society, to lay bare its inner workings. As with the Freudian effort we have perforce learned much that is unpalatable and that we preferred to leave out of sight. We have grown in the awareness that we are all involved and implicated together in the functioning of society and that we are all responsible together. No longer can we satisfy ourselves with laying the blame at the doors of those in authority. We know too that there is something seriously askew with our world socio-economic system. Combine all this with the fact that major decisions about the future on issues of vital concern for the whole human race are being made in our time and will not be postponed. The result is that we find ourselves in a novel and very critical situation for which we are ill-prepared on the scriptural and theological fronts. The social issue has become a rock of division. There is confusion, frustration, intense disagreement alongside social apathy and regression. We sometimes seem to lack at the corporate level the light and the hope necessary to cope with such a situation.

The situation is reasonably well illustrated by the gap that separates a J. Luis Segundo from a James V. Schall. For Segundo the task of the Church is eminently political. He considers that it should throw its weight behind the socialist struggle for political and social reform, even if this means adopting a socialist. ideology. He assures us that Jesus had his own ideology adapted to his own situation. Schall on the other hand tells us:

" The meaning of Christianity in politics then came to be that it enabled politics to disassociate itself from man's quest for ultimate happiness, while at the same time giving him something valid to do during his life. Politics was only politics. Salvation-was to be found elsewhere". *(Christ and Politics,* p. 32).

Now Segundo and Schall concern us primarily as representatives of sizeable groups within the Church. If they are to reestablish dialogue across the gulf that divides them they must return to the source and judge of all theological reflection-Sacred Scripture. This does not exclude the use of ' right reason; but the deliverances of right reason must harmonize with the message of Scripture.

It is against such a background that we can appreciate the volume under review. The author develops some key biblical themes in an illuminating and convincing way, conveying the reality and nature of the Christian's concern for the society to which he or she belongs. He *pro-*

vides us with a balanced vision of the Church and its m1ss10n to the world in a chapter significantly titled, "The Church as Counter-Culture." One spontaneously compares this with the vision presented in the Preface to *Gaudium et Spes.* It does not measure up to that of the pastoral constitution, and yet it has its own value, if only because at the moment the synthetic vision is all-important. The chapter on "The Reign of God" deserves special mention too. Violence and civil disobedience are among the specific issues to which he devotes space.

Mott's book inevitably raises the issue of an appropriate method for an enterprise such as his. To adopt a phrase from James M. Gustafson, we need the methodical self-consciousness to press the vital questions. Only when we press these questions do the full riches of Scripture come to light. At the same time, it is in the encounter with God's word that our self-awareness grows and the questions emerge. So it is necessary to explicitate as fully as possible the self-awareness that God's word aims at forming within us. We are in search of a Christian anthropology that is not simply developed in the light of the questions that concern the systematic theologian. Further it must go beyond the overt commands and guidance of Scripture to the underlying spirit and style of Christian life in community.

The author has given us a worthwhile book that covers much important ground in a balanced way. The book is well-written, the matter well-divided and lucidly presented.

I have some reservations, however, about the use of consequentialist terminology and arguments. Mott quotes with approval from Paul Ramsey to the effect that, whereas love creates community, enlightened self-interest can do no more than preserve it. Can it do so much'

VINCENT HUNT

Holy Cross College
Mosgiel, New Zealand

Love and Understanding. By JOHN M. McDERMOTT, S.J. Analecta Gregoriana, Vol. 229; Series Facultatis Theologiae: Sectio B, n. 77. Rome: Universita Gregoriana Editrice, 1983.

This work, a revision of the author's doctoral dissertation, presents a detailed and even convoluted study of the intellectual pilgrimage of Pierre Rousselot, a French Jesuit whose half-dozen years on the theological faculty of the Institut Catholique in Paris were decisive for the transformation of Catholic systematic theology. With the possible exception

of his Jesuit contemporary, Joseph Marechal, Rousselot was more than any other thinker of his time responsible for the ultimate abandonment of the static and nominalist version of Thomism in which the resolutely unimaginative manualists of the nineteenth century had cabined and confined the speculative genius of St. Thomas. Out of the astonishingly venturesome speculation of Rousselot emerged the *nouvelle theologie* best exemplified by de Lubac, the theological aesthetics of which von Balthasar is the eloquent spokesman, and much of the impetus toward the transcendental theology exemplified by the early Karl Rahner. But Rousselot cannot be identified with any of these movements; his death in one of the unnumbered hecatombs of the Great War left his work unfinished, but it was already marked by a quest for systematic rigor which even then had left Marechal behind and which the transcendental Thomists have been unable to accommodate. Perhaps closest and most responsive to Rousselot's Christocentric insight is that of de Lubac who, schooled in the Augustinian spirituality of the early middle ages, could not accept its ' Thomist ' rationalization, whereby grace became an accident and Christ a *propter peccatum* coda to creation. With Rousselot's untimely death and, a generation later, the disavowal of the *nouvelle theologie* by *Humani generis,* the Thomist enterprise in theology would henceforth be dominated by Marechal, whom Rousselot saw to have missed the Thomist theological problem, that of accounting for the radical *immanent* unity of the created order. This problem, unresolved also within the essentialist universe of Aristotle and unrecognized by the bulk of Thomist scholarship even today, Rousselot first approached by way of the postulate of a "primordial Adam;" by 1914, the year before he died, this original insight had deepened, to become a theology of creation in Christ. With the passing of Rousselot, however, this theology was abandoned because of its apparently intractable nature-grace dilemma: if the whole of created reality is *gratia Christi,* is not grace naturalized, reduced to a mere implication of man and the Henri de Lubac found himself impaled on these horns forty years ago; in consequence his *Surnaturel* lay under a cloud for two decades, for in it he had concluded that the creation of an intellectual nature implied its ordination to beatitude. Since the publication of *Humani generis* in 1950, Catholic systematic theology has insisted upon the nominalist distinction between the gratuity of creation and the gratuity of grace-a position which is for the Thomist a systematic impossibility, because the same esse-essence analysis accounts for creation and for the Incarnation, the source of *gratia Christi.* This impasse has endured, reducing Thomist theology to impotence during those years, ironically enough, in which the endorsement of historical criticism by *Divino afflante Spiritu,* promulgated a year before the publication of *Siirnaturel,* let loose upon the Catholic

academy a swarm of methodological reductions of grace to necessity in the name of biblical scholarship. This systematic challenge to the Church's historicity has found little response from the ranks of the systematists, apart from the outworn charge of gnosticism-an indictment which, while true enough, is all too easily met with a *tu quoque.* There are more ways than one of ignoring Christ's lordship of history.

The Christocentrism which Rousselot pioneered is nowadays generally accepted, but without the systematic integrity upon which he was intent; it is his rigorous intellectualism which contemporary systematic theology chiefly lacks, as it was lacking also in the schools of Thomist theology in which Rousselot was taught. It is this nominalist heritage, this rooted distrust of the *quaerens intellectum,* which he labored, with genius, to overcome, without, as Teilhard did, rejecting Thomism out of hand, and without despairing, as von Balthasar has done, of systematic theology across the board.

Fr. McDermott has done the theological academy the favor of recalling to its attention the brilliant brief passage of a phenomenal intelligence whose dedication to theological speculation was at one with his dedication to his faith, to his Church. To have accompanied Rousselot in his hurried journey through the life of the mind is to have shared his fascination with the truth of the revelation which is the Christ, and perhaps to have glimpsed from afar some scintilla of that Ancient Beauty whose truth possessed his mind throughout his brief career, driving him headlong to the Vision in which he now knows as he is known.

D. J. KEEFE, S.J.

Marquette University
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

William of .Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste: New Ideas of Truth in the Early Thirteenth Century. By STEVEN P. MARRONE. Princeton University Press, 1983. Pp. xi + 319. $32.50.

During the course of the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries the Latin West strove to assimilate the world view of the Greeks, mainly through the study of Aristotle in translation. Prior to this renaissance, as Haskins called it, speculation-what there was of it-nurtured itself on Christian sources, and of these, outside of Holy Writ itself, the voluminous work of St. Augustine was far and away the most influential.

The confluence of these two traditions-the one, religious, unsystematic and unscientific, the other, secular, relatively lacking in assumptions and

pagan-caused the leading figures of this renaissance to exercise their minds and religious commitment in an attempt to build an enlarged and different world view.

Relatively recent historical research has considerably improved our understanding of this important and fascinating human endeavor. The present book is but one more contribution to this process of clarification, and historians along with theologians and philosophers interested in the later medieval period owe Steven Marrone a debt of gratitude for his study. As his title indicates, he selects two prominent men of the early thirteenth century, William of Auvergne, a Parisian, and Robert Grosseteste, an Englishman, in order to examine one of the more fundamental issues which underwent transformation, viz. the idea of truth.

Put simply, his general thesis is that these two scholars deserve credit for the way they utilized the newly discovered Greek learning (Aristotle) in the areas of metaphysics, epistemology, and logic, thereby undermining (perhaps 'replacing' is the kinder word) the Augustinian theory of knowledge which held sway for most early medieval thinkers when they discussed the problem of knowledge and truth.

One major fault this reviewer finds with the thesis running through the book, however, is that both William of Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste are presented as agents laboring to move away from a fundamentally religious orientation to a more philosophical one. As Marrone sees it, the transition is basically away from Augustine and towards Aristotle as far as the theory of truth and knowledge is concerned. I say 'basically', for he acknowledges more than once the persistence of what might be described as a religious habit of mind, taken in the moral sense. To be sure, both William and Robert were men of their time; they retained a strong Christian commitment regarding man's destiny and his relation to the Judeo-Christian God as they understood it through Revelation. And to some extent, as the author indicates, overtones of this commitment can be found here and there even in the philosophic discussion of concern, i.e. the theory of truth. But for all that, his claim, repeated frequently, is that the growing understanding of Aristotle evident in their writings, testifies to a new and improved speculative orientation regarding truth and knowledge, amounting to a sl!ift from the religious approach of Augustine to one more scientific and philosophic.

Later centuries, as we all know, were to witness just such a shift, but, on the basis of what we know so far, the early thirteenth century was still foursquare 'The Age of Faith'. It is always interesting, of course, for historians to probe into the past in search of the first stirrings of later profound intellectual and cultural development. And on occasion genuine roots are uncovered. In the present book however, a careful reading of Marrone's fine analysis of these two men indicates not so much

a shift from a religious orientation to a more philosophic one as an attempt to incorporate divergent elements from both into a new synthesis. There can be no question that Aristotle was arriving, and these two thinkers are among the earliest and most important witnesses to this arrival. But at the same time, Augustine loomed large in their thought, even in matters we should now call philosophic.

The bulk of Marrone's book has value in that it spells out in considerable detail the careful analysis of the meaning of truth, simple and complex, these men presented, and he gives due credit for the occasional ingenuity and originality they brought to bear on the issue at hand while not neglecting some obscurities inherent in their work. There can be no doubt that Aristotle provided, and these men knew it, a way of thinking about truth and knowledge not at all available previously. Heretofore unrecognized problems were now on the table; problems which Augustine's so-called 'illumination theory' was not equipped to investigate, much less resolve. But it is not at all clearly established that once William of Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste set out in this new direction charted by Aristotle, they at the same time took leave of Augustine's illumination theory. Maybe they should have done so; or maybe they should not have done so. The plain fact appears to be, however, on the reading itself, that they did not do so.

The author himself on more than one occasion is on the verge of saying as much. For example, towards the end of his section dealing with William of Auvergne, he says: "Admittedly, he did keep some place for the traditional view that God was the origin of human knowledge of the truth, for he held that the formation of the first category, the first principles of science, was the result of God's active intervention in the workings of the mind" [p. 125] His immediate subsequent qualifier- "What is important to recognize, however, is that he totally eliminated this divine influence for the two remaining categories of scientific principles, whose origin he placed securely in the created world. It was there, and not in some transcendent world, that the mind had to look for the evidence of their truth"-while true, tends to conceal the mix (awkward though it may seem to some) William is in fact attempting. Far simpler, one would have thought, to say that here we see clearly enough how William of Auvergne tries to weave together the new and the old. Synthesis, not replacement, is what this scholastic seeks.

More difficult still is it to take all of Grosseteste, even in his later work, i.e. his *Commentary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics,* and to disallow the overall attempt at synthesis. Marrone is not unaware of this. He says, for example: "In fact, there are places in the *Commentary* (i.e., on the *Posterior Analytics)* where Grosseteste spoke of a light in which truth must be seen, and the language he used on such occasions some-

times recalls that of *De veritate.* (As Marrone points out, this work is representative of Grosseteste's earlier and more 'Augustinian' period.) These passages have suggested to most scholars that even in his efforts to come to grips with Aristotle, Grosseteste continued to hold to his early views on the place of divine illumination in man's knowledge of simple truth" (p. 195). He then goes on to explain why it is we ought not to take Grosseteste to mean what he appears to mean, even if, as he admits: "Every historian who has written about Grosseteste's thought" has tended to do so. His recommendation is that we consider such passages in the text as attempts at imagery or metaphor, to be read in the corrective light of what Robert says elsewhere-or rather, fails to say elsewhere about divine illumination in explaining how man knows truth. Here again, the simpler lesson would seem to be that Grosseteste, like William of Auvergne, remained committed to St. Augustine's illumination theory, despite the newly discovered insights from Aristotle.

The foregoing critical remarks, it must be emphasized, reflect this reviewer's opinion only as to Marrone's general thesis, i.e., his contention that William of Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste are in the business of replacement rather than synthesis. The running comment he provides on how the two men handled the exposition of truth is very well done, and will be of help to anyone who seeks to learn what they thought about the subject.

As a final note, I might refer the reader to another recent study, viz., *The Philosophy of Robert Grosseteste* by James McEvoy (Oxford, 1982), who, it seems to me, strikes a better balance in the way he presents one of Marrone's two scholars in this complex period of transition.

FRANCIS E. KELLEY

St. Bonaventure University
St. Bonaventure, New York

The Marxist Philosophy of Ernst Bloch. By WAYNE HUDSON. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982. $27.50.

This is an impressive book whatever one thinks of Bloch's philosophy. Ernst Bloch was one of the most elusive thinkers in twentieth century Marxism; at times he seemed studiously vague not only in his prose but in thought as well. All the more reason then to be grateful to Hudson for his systematic, clear presentation and analysis of Bloch's philosophy.

The origin of this work was Hudson's doctoral dissertation on Bloch written under Leszek Kolakowski at Oxford in 1975. Thus, one needs to

qualify the author's claim that this book is an introduction of Bloch to the English-speaking world since it is anything but an introduction for the general reader. Rather, the detail of argument and the frequent allusions to and comparisons with other philosophers and philosophical schools make the book most attractive to teachers and serious graduate students in philosophy.

Hudson displays a scholar's attention to fine points of nuance besides commendable mastery of material on classical German philosophy, Marxism, and Bloch himself. One senses Hudson has fairly and carefully set forth Bloch within a context of Marxist revisionism even when the author disagrees with his subject. The research is indeed thorough, perhaps even a bit excessive-941 footnotes for 218 pages of text!

To use Isaiah Berlin's parable, Bloch is best understood as a hedgehog rather than a fox-a man with a single great insight which he uses to retrieve and re-cast other ideas that became conventional. That single insight was the importance of utopian thinking.

In six chapters Hudson unfolds Bloch's approach, not so much chronologically as thematically, helping the reader to see the basic insight, explaining how Bloch developed this insight into a metaphysical system, and showing where Bloch has enriched, challenged, confused, and strayed from the Marxist tradition. The opening chapter is a brief outline of Bloch's biography and a short note on the ambiguity of his use of the term "not yet." Chapter two covers the major themes in Bloch's project for a utopian philosophy while the two middle chapters expand this effort to illustrate how Bloch conceived of a "Marxist metaphysic." The last major chapter discusses Bloch's viewpoint on four central areas: ethics, aesthetics, religion, and materialism. The volume concludes with a short evaluative commentary by the author.

It is in the fifth chapter that one sees how the hedgehog works, applying the basic insight to various aspects of a philosophical system and refashioning old views. Starting with the utopian hermeneutic Bloch appealed to Marxists to understand their "inheritance," that is, to return to ideas like natural law and give them a "transformed functionality."

Perhaps nowhere has that strategy of Bloch been more celebrated than in his writing on religion. He believed that, even though illusory, religion was also healthy and enduring. Why? Because what all great religions embody is hope, total, absolute hope. It is this that lies at the heart of utopian thinking and that allows humanity to be future-oriented. In his longest work *Das Prinzip Hoffnung,* Bloch had argued that it is hope which is constitutive of the *humanum.* Hope is not merely affective but cognitive; it is revelatory, for we possess an anticipatory consciousness that permits a not-yet conscious awareness of future possibilities. It is precisely because of this that theory-praxis must be future-minded.

> Future contingents, as Aristotle taught, are undetermined events which have not happened yet; but for Bloch there is an already dispositionality to what is unreached: developing partially conditionally ability-to-be, which requires further conditions before it can be realized. Moreover, even though the form the future will take is undetermined, the future is not merely mystical haze, but something which can be brought within the ambit of planning and goal-setting through a Marxist analysis of (1) tendencies; and (2) the pre-appearance (*Vor-schein)* or utopian anticipation which the world already contains. (161)

The contribution which Bloch made to Christian thought was, of course, to spur a retrieval of eschatology in contemporary theory. I am inclined to agree with John Macquarrie, however, that the philosophical background for the writings of Jurgen Moltmann, J. B. Metz, and others is wider than one figure. It is possible to trace a Hegel-Marx-Bloch line that is quite as influential now as a Kierkegaard-Heidegger-Bultmann line was for an earlier generation of scholars. As to his influence on theology I would question whether Bloch even merits pre-eminence among revisionist Marxists since compared to figures in the Frankfurt School his impact is on the wane. That is not because theologians seek novelty in conversation partners but because Bloch is more of a suggestive catalyst than a thinker of sustained critical theory. Having helped to open up a new area for investigation Bloch becomes less useful as a guide into the new terrain. And yet, if we deny special status to Bloch, his contribution should not be slighted. It is difficult to read Bloch without mentally noting how his ideas have turned up in present-day theological literature. His concern for re-stating Messianic hopefulness has shown the way to fruitful dialogue for Christians and Marxists.

Throughout his book Hudson never loses his focus, which is on Bloch's Marxism. In pursuing that topic Hudson treats some interesting subtopics such as Bloch's relationship with G. Lukacs (34-31). But, as Hudson states, the real question is not whether Bloch is a true Marxist but how he could have thought himself one despite his obvious differences from orthodox Marxism. To explain that requires the author to help the reader enter into Bloch's not always coherent system. Hudson succeeds in this task admirably. One concludes that Bloch's philosophy may not be precise or systematic but surely was an articulation of a seminal idea. It merits this fine study.

KENNETH R. HIMES, O.F.M.

Washington Theological Union
Washington, D.G.

Nature Mathematicized: Historical and Philosophical Case Studies in Classical Modern Natural Philosophy; Papers Deriving fram the Third International Conference on the History and Philosophy of Science, Montreal, Canada, 1980, Volume I. Edited by WILLIAM R. SHEA, The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, Volume 20. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983. Pp. xiii + 325. [N.P.]

The long and cumbersome set of titles and subtitles tells precisely what is in this first volume of a two-volume set. (The second, edited by Michael Ruse, covers Greek medicine, nineteenth- and twentieth-century biology, and psychiatry.) This volume includes the program for the entire 1980 conference and a long and well argued introduction by the editor: "Do Historians and Philosophers of Science Share the Same " The answer is that they do-meaning mainly a focus on the mathematical features of (in this case early modern) science-and thus that they have a great deal to learn from one another.

There are five parts in this volume; four are made up of a major paper and responses, while the fifth is more eclectic. The historical figures focused on are Galileo, Newton and Descartes, Descartes and Leibniz, Kant on the foundations of natural science, a Russian scientist, V. V. Petrov, who did early work (published 1803) on electricity, Bernard Bolzano, and nineteenth-century predecessors of Albert Einstein's tensor calculus. The major contributors are Maurice Clavelin (University of Paris), J. E. McGuire (University of Pittsburgh), Paul Weingartner (University of Salzburg), Peter M. Harman (University of Lancaster), two professors from the Institute for History of Science in Moscow, V. P. Kartser and V. Vizgin, and Karel Berka of the Czechoslovakian Academy. Respondents include people of the stature of John D. North (University of Groningen)-whose paper is almost as long as the one he is responding to-and Kathleen Okruhlik (University of Western Ontario).

Throughout, the emphasis is on a rigorous reading of classical texts and especiaJ.ly on their mathematical formulations. It is a discussion by specialists intended for other specialists. Indeed, this is the case to such an extent that it may be years before it is known whether any of the results reported in this proceedings volume have any lasting value. Some contributions, such as Harmon's on Kant or North's on the persistence of Aristotelian ideas well into the seventeenth century, seem destined to have an impact on scholarship in the field. Others, such as Clavelin's reconstruction of Galileo's geometrical formalisms in *Two New Sciences,* are more tendentious and pedantic-unlikely, surely, to influence many

philosophers of science (however much Clavelin may influence Galileo studies).

In general the volume is not as likely as Shea thinks to influence the relations between historians and philosophers of science. Indeed, as things stand in the current state of ferment in p,h.ilosophy of science, it is safe to say that these case studies will appeal *much* more to internalist historians of science than to most philosophers of science.

One final note. Almost no effort was made in the editing of the volume to translate contributions by non-English speakers into readable English.

PAUL T. DURBIN

Philosophy Department and Genter for Science and Culture University of Delaware

THE GENERAL INDEX TO *THE THOMIST*

VOLUME 49 (1985)

INDEX OF AUTHORS

PAGE

Allik, Tiina, Karl Rahner on Materiality and Human Knowledge 367
Boadt, Lawrence, C.S.P., St. Thomas Aquinas and the Biblical Wisdom Tradition 575
Buckley, James J., Doctrine in the Diaspora 443
Cascardi, A. J., On Heidegger and the Recourse to Poetical Language 99
Cougar, Yves M.-J., The Brother I Have Known 495
Duffy, Michael K., The Moral-Nonmoral Distinction in Catholic Ethics 343
Evans, G. R., Guibert of Nogent and Gregory the Great on Preaching and Exegesis 534
Farthing, John L., The Problem of Divine Exemplarity in St. Thomas 183
Geach, Peter T., Dummett on Frege: A Review Article 116
Grisez, Germain, Infallibility and Specific Moral Norms: A Review Discussion 248
Horvath, Tibor, S.J. After Rahner A Tribute to His Memory and Achievement 157
Johnstone, Brian V., The Meaning of Proportionate Reason in Contemporary Moral Theology 223
Lee, Patrick, The Relationship Between Intellect and Will in Free Choice According to Aquinas and Scotus 321
Machan, Tibor, Harman's " Refutation " of the Flourishing Ethics 387
Matter, E. Ann, *Eulogium Sponsi de Sponsa:* Canons, Monks, and the Song of Songs . 551
O'Neill, Colman, O.P., The Rule Theory of Doctrine and Propositional Truth 417
Plasher, William C., Revisionist and Postliberal Theologies and the Public Character of Theology 392
Price, James Robertson, the Objectivity of Mystical Truth Claims 81
Ramsey, Boniface, 0.P., Two Traditions on Lying and Deception in the Ancient Church 504
Schultes, Janice L., Is-Ought: Prescribing and a Present Contro- . 1
Shewmon, D. Alan, M.D., The Metaphysics of Brain Death, Persistent Vegetative State and Dementia 24

INDEX OF AUTHORS *Continued*

PAGE

Tracy, David, Lindbeck's New Program for Theology 460
Wallace, William A., O.P., Nature as Animating: the Soul in the Human Sciences 612
White, David A., Part and Whole in Aristotle's Concept of Infinity 168

INDEX OF BOOKS REVIEWED

PAGE

Abraham, William J.: *Divine Revelation and the Limits of Historical Criticism* (Thomas F. Tracy) 299
Caputo, John D.: *Heidegger and Aquinas* (Joseph S. O'Leary) 477
Carroll, Robert B.: *From Chaos to Covenant* (Howard N. Bream) 154
Chisholm, Roderick M.: *The Foundations of Knowing* (Nicholas Ingham, O.P.) 131
Claus, David B.: *Toward the Soul* (Kurt Pritzl) 131
Cooper, Neil: *The Diversity of Moral Thinking* (Edward Langerack) 146
Davies, Brian: *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion* (Eleonore Stump) . 128
Dietrich, Donald J.: *The Goethezeit and the Metamorphosis of Theology in the Age of Id.ealism* (Thomas F. O'Meara) 134
Fiorenza, Francis S.: *Foundational Theology* (James J. Buckley) 288
Heyd, David: *Si'tpererogation* (Daniel Dombrowski) 485
Hudson, Wayne: *The Marxist Philosophy of Ernst Bloch* (Kenneth R. Himes, O.F.M.) 660
Klassen, A. J., ed.: *A Bonhoffer Legacy* (John S. Mogabgab) 142
Kripke, Saul: *Wittgenstein on Riiles and Private Language* (John Churchill) 481
Latourelle, Rene: *L'Homme et ses Problemes* (Donald Buggert, O. Carm.) 292
Linacre Center: *Euthanasia and Clinical Practice* (Robert Barry, O.P.) . 487
Marrone, Steven P.: *William of Auvet·gne and Robert Grosseteste: New Ideas of Truth in the Early Thirteenth Century* (Francis E. Kelley) 657
Macquarrie, John: *Twentieth Century Religfous Thought* (James J. Buckley) . 122
Mahan, Brian & Dale Richesin, eds.: *The Challenge of Liberation Theology* (Michael J. Kerlin) 317
May, William E.: *Sex, Marriage and ChastUy* (Hugh D. Bmns, O.P.) 151
McDermott, John M., S.J.: *Love and Understanding* (Donald J. Keefe, S.J.) ' 655

INDEX OF BOOKS REVIEWED

PAGE

Meissner, W. W.: *Psychoanalysis and Religious Experience* (Michael Stock, O.P.) . 490

Miller, John W.: *The Philosophy of History with Reflections and .Aphorisms* (Michael J. Klein) 132

Mott, Stephen Charles: *Biblical Ethics and Social Change* (Vincent Hunt) 653

O'Flaherty, James C.: *Johann Georg Hamann* (Robert M. Browning) 136

Pelikan, J aroslav: *Reformation of Church and Dogma 1300-.1700* (William C. Placher) . 649

Schall, James V., S.J.: *Liberation Theology in Latin .America* (Donald J. Keefe, S.J.) 125

Shea, William R., ed.: *Nature Mathematicized: Historical and Philosophical Case Studies in Classical Modei·n Natural Philosophy* (Paul T. Durbin) 663

Torrance, T. F.: *Reality and Evangelical Theology* (William J. Abraham) 000

Wagner, Harald: *Ein fuhrung in die Fundamentaltheologie* (Randy L. Maddox) . 124

Ward, Keith: *Rational Theology and the Creativity of God* (W. McF. Wilson) 473

Weir, Robert F.: *Selective Treatment of Handicapped Newborns* (Robert Barry, O.P. & Kathryn Moseley) 313