GREGORY OF NYSSA AND THE
SOCIAL ANALOGY OF THE TRINITY

I N 1948 DONALD BAILLIE described the contemporary social analogy of the Trinity as "hltra-Cappadocian," suggesting that such Anglican versions of it as Leonard Hodgson's constitute "one-sided" developments of the Cappadocian three-man analogy. [1] Baillie does acknowledge, of course, that the Cappadocian fathers compared the Trinity to a human trio. He is further aware that twentieth century Anglican trinitarians have often pointed to the Cappadocians, particularly to Gregory of Nyssa, as precedent. But Baillie judges these contemporary theories to err in drawing a central conclusion from such a comparison, namely, that three "persons" in God mean-either for the Cappadocians or for us— three personalities, three centers of consciousness.

The Cappadocians themselves, on Baillie's reading, are more circumspect. By their doctrines of intratrinitarian *perichoresis* (mutual enveloping, or interpenetration) , identity of trinitarian works *ad extra,* identity of essence, and divine simplicity,

---

[1] Donald M. Baillie, *God Was in Christ: An Essay on Incarnation and Atonement* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948), pp. 137, 140, 144. By "social analogy," or, alternatively, " strong trinitarianism," I mean any theory in which (1) Father, Son, and Spirit are conceived as persons in a full sense of "person" i.e., as distinct centen of love, will, knowledge, and purposeful action (all of which require consciousness) and (2) who are conceived as related to each other in some central ways analogous to, even if sublimely surpassing, relations among the members of a society of three human persons. Ironically, though his concept of God broadly meets these criteria, Hodgson himself rejected " social analogy" as a description of his own view, preferring an oddly inappropriate analogy of a single person as the organic union of three activities. Leonard Hodgson " The Doctrine of the Trinity," *Journal of Theological Studies* n.s. 5 (1954): 49-55; *The Doctrine of the Trinity,* Croall Lectures, 1942-1943 (London: James Nisbet and Co., 1943), pp. 85-87.

they carefully qualify their trinitarian theory and skirt the dangers of tritheism latent in it. Their use of "modes of existence " as one expression for the three in God further shows their caution and balance. They never go so far as to suggest " that the Persons are three distinct personalities in a ' social ' unity of even the highest kind." [2]

   In weighing contemporary Anglican theories Baillie thus finds them Cappadocian in only a lopsided and imbalanced way. They must in fa.ct be assessed as ultra-Cappa.docian: they fail to qualify the statement that God is three persons with the equally important statement that he is the one modally existing " infinite and universal Person." The result in Baillie's judgment is a distortion, a onesidedness, "an over-simplification of a mystery, or an overrationalization of a paradox." [8]

   Baillie's question of historical precedent for strong trinitarianism has lately become acute. Recently a number of books and articles have appeared in which the social analogy is stated with the help of concepts and methods from analytic philosophy,[4] or from phenomenology and sociology of knowledge,[5] or, especially, from socio-political theory. [6] The latter of

   [2] Baillie, *God Was in Christ,* pp. 141-42.

   a Ibid., p. 144.

   [4] William Hasker," Tri-Unity," *Journal of Religion* 50 (1970): 1-32.

   [5] Joseph A. Bracken, "The Holy Trinity as a Community of Divine Persons," *Heythrop Journal* 15 (1974): 166-82, 257-70; *What Are They Baying About the Trinity?* (New York: Paulist Press, 1979).

   [6] Juan Luis Segundo, *Our Idea of God,* trans. John Drury, A Theology for Artisans of a New Humanity, vol. 3 (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1974); Jan M. Lochman, "The Trinity and Human Life," *Theology* 78 (1975) ; 173-83; Geevarghese Mar Osthatios, *Theology of a Classless Society* (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1980); Jiirgen Moltmann, *The Triinity and the Kiingdom: The Doctrine of God,* trans. Margaret Kohl (San Francisco: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1980). See also Daniel L. Migliore, *Called to Freedom: Liberation Theology and the Future of Christian Doc·trine* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1980), pp. 72-79; Thomas D. Parker, "The Political Meaning of the Doctrine of the Trinity: Some Theses," *The Joumal of Religion* 60 (1980) : 165-84; Kenneth Leech, *The Social God* (London: Sheldon Press, 1981).

these typically combine strong trinitarianism with a dehellen-
ized doctrine of God's pathos, particularly his compassionate
or " compathetic " identification with oppressed societies.

What one misses, however, in both the older Anglican
theories and in the more recent wave of " Trinity and suffer-
ing " theologies is a patristic background discussion that is full
enough to estimate the degree of continuity between them and
the Cappadocian tradition. Early twentieth century social
analogies look like trinitarian apologies for the sort of philo-
sophical personalism (Charles Renouvier, Mary Whiton
Calkins, Borden Parker Bowne) then in vogue.[7] Their histori-
cal investigations, even into Greek theories claimed as prece-
dents, are typically and disappointingly shallow. Some of the
more recent work on the social analogy shows a bit more his-
torical interest, but is never focussed particularly on the Cap-
padocians.[8]

Yet the attempt to find a Cappadocian link between, say,
the fourth gospel and Hodgson or Moltmann is fruitful along
both historical and theological lines of inquiry. Of course one
cannot sensibly argue to a systematic theological conclusion
from the mere citation of ancient precedent. Supposing that a
social theory of the Trinity was indeed embryonically alive in
fourth century Asia Minor, it scarcely follows that it is true
(or fitting, or valid, or sugges1tive). After raising the inevitable
question of the historical *Sitz im Leben* and how it may qual-
ify an ancient view, the modern trinitarian obviously has other
criteria for assessing a trinity statement besides sheerly histori-
cal ones. He wants to know, for example, how coherent a
theory is, how complete, how theologically, ethically, and de-
votionally redolent. He wants to know how continuous this

[7] See, for instance, Wilfred Richmond, *Essay on Personality as a Philo-
sophical Principle* (London: Edwin Arnold, 1900); J. R. Illingworth, *The
Doctrine of the Trinity* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1907); Francis J. Hall,
The Trinitv (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1910); Clement C. J. Webb,
God and Personality (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1918).

[8] For example, Moltmann, *Trinity and Kingdom,* does a fascinating study
of Joachim of Fiore, but only mentions the Cappadocians.

theory may be with the best developed New Testament
witness.

All this conceded, it is still edifying to know whether the
social analogy is merely an interesting· historical aberration to
be associated with such oblique figures as John Philoponus and
Joachim of Fiore, or whether, on the other hand, it is respec-
tably, even if distantly, of the house and lineage of Gregory of
Nyssa (the fullest and most technical of the Cappadocian
trinitarians).   Further, it would be helpful to gather and shed
on the current discussion what theological light Gregory may
have kindled.

Accordingly, in what follows I want to state Gregory's
theory, offer an interpretation of it that diverges from a stand-
ard one (that of Baillie, G. L. Prestige, an.d J. N. D. Kelly),
and make a concluding judgment about the measure of con-
tinuity between Gregory's trinitarianism and a full, contem-
porary social analogy.

Throughout, discussion will center on Gregory's answer to
the big fourth century questions *quid tres* (three what?) and
quis unus (one who?) and especially on his approach to the
threeness/oneness coherence problem these questions generate.

General Statement of Gregory's Theory

It was usual as late as the third quarter of the fourth cen-
tury for Greek trinitarians to use *ousia* and *hypostasis* almost
interchangeably for the divine unity, as, for example, in the
anathemas of the Nicene Creed and in some works of Athana-
sius.9 But the Cappadocians fixed *ousia* as the main oneness
term, reserving *hypostasis* for what Father, Son, and Spirit are
individually.

Basil (or Gregory of Nyssa) shows this move in the opening
of *Epistle 38.10* He complains that those who think it "makes

---

9 J. N. D. Kelly, *Early Christian Doctrines,* rev. ed. (San Francisco: Harper
and Row, Publishers,   1978), pp. 242, 247.

10 Refs. to Eng. text of B3sil will be Saint Basil, *Letters* (1-185), trans.
Agnes Clare Way, notes by Roy J. Deferrari, The Fathers of The Church,

no difference " whether they use *ousia* or *hypostasis* in discussing the Trinity fall into error and confusion. The fact is, he says, that faith teaches " both that which is separated in *hypostasis* and that which is united in *ousia."* In the Trinity, therefore, we should say that *ousia* is the common word for the three (ο *Tfi*<> *KoivoTrJro*<>,\oyo<>) but that *hypostasis* is the sign for the specific characteristic or peculiar quality of each (*8£ ῖ!7rὸCTTUO'L'> TὸȈOLá'ι'>ov ἐKaCTTOV <rYJ/J,ȉιOV ἑO'TIV*⟩ .[11]

In works that are indisputably Gregory's the same usage prevails. Oneness terms are *ovCTla* (substance or essence or being), *⟨фvCTi⟩* (nature), and *fh6TrJ"* (Godhead). Threeness terms are *vll"0CTraCTi'>* or *7rpoCTwll"ov* (both usually translated " person ") , though occasionally, for the sake of routing Sabellius, Gregory uses *ousia* as a threeness term, in the sense of an individua:I *7rpayμ,a* or *aroμ,ov* (thing or particular) .[12] Gregory is not afraid of using the anarthrous *(1£6,* predicably or sortally after the fashion of John I: le. Thus, just as Peter, Paul, and Barnabas

vol. 12 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1955). Refs. to Greek text will be to Saint Basile, *Lettres,* ed. and trans. Yves Courtonne, 3 vols. (Paris: Societe d' Edition "Les Belles Lettres," 1957), vol. I. Refs. to Eng. text of Gregory will be to Gregory of Nyssa, *Select Writings and Letters,* trans. and with an introd. by William Moore and Henry Austin Williams, A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, vol. 5 (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1954); Eng. refs. to *Ad Graecos* are to a working trans. by Robert Bernard, Princeton, 1979 (handwritten). Greek refs. to *The Great Catechism* will be to James Herbert Srawley, ed., *The Oatechetical Oration of Gregory of Nyssa,* Cambridge Patristic Texts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956). Other Greek refs. to Gregory will be to *Gregorii Nysseni Opera,* ed. Werner Jaeger, Institutum pro Studiis Classicis Harvardianum, 9 vols. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1957-72). Besides section refs., page refs. to Greg. will also be supplied for convenience.

11 *Epist.* 38.5 (p. 89).

120. *Eun.* I. 19 (Jaeg. 1, pp. 92-93). G. Christopher Stead, "Ontology and Terminology in Gregory of Nyssa," in *Gregor von Nyssa und die Philosophie: Zweites Internationales Kolloquium uber Gregory von Nyssa,* eds. Heinrich Dorrie, Margarete Altenburger, and Uta Schramm (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1976), pp. 112-13, 117-19, charges Gregory with a vast and confusing usage of key trinitarian terms. But R. Hubner, "Diskussion," p. 120, rightly observes that Stead makes no use in his article of the central trinitarian writings!

are each man,[13] so the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God;[14] indeed, Gregory sometimes just uses the adjective *Bcio>* for wha.t a divine person is; viz., divine.[15] But typically he uses " the God " (*b 8<6>*) or even " the only God " (*0 μ.6vo> 8<6>)* for the Father [16] or for the whole Trinity. [17] It is further characteristic of Gregory to use the expression "the only-begotten God" for the Son (*b μ.ovoy<vi/> 8£6>,* from some manuscripts of John 1:18) in contexts in which he is distinguished from the unbegotten God, the Father. [18]

Gregory's theory is formally straightforward. The Father is God (i.e., on the sorta! use, a divine being) , the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God. Yet there are not three Gods. Rather, God is one. For the three al'e " divided without separation and united without confusion." [19]

All three persons are uncreated. But Gregory stresses that the Father is the fount, source, or cause of the deity (*alrla rij<; BdTIJTO>)* and hence is " properly God " (*Bc6<; Kvplw>)* while Son and Spirit a.re " of " or " from " him as his "effects" *(alTLara)*•[20] Thus the Father is "the cause," the Son is " of the cause " (*lK roii a.lrwv)*, indeed directly so (*7rpouexw•)*, while the Spirit is " through the one who is directly from the first " (*8Ji. roii 7rpornxw> €7r roii 7rpwrov)*•[21] These causal distinctions

[13] "Man" used predicably: *l1.v0pw7ros 'Yap rovrwv*   *0.* Eun. 1.19 (Jaeg. 1, p. 93). The same use is found in Basil, *Epist.* 38. 2 (Court., p. 81).

[14]*Ad Graec.* (Jaeg. 3. 1, p. 20). In *Tres Dei* (Jaeg. 3. 2, p. 25) Gregory uses 0£os both for what each person is and also as a modifier of the Godhead, just as "good," "holy," etc. See also Werner Jaeger, *Gregor von Nyssas Lehre vom Heiligen Geist* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1966), p. 15.

[15] *De Spir. Banet.* (J aeg. 3. 1, p. 90).

[16]*0. Eun.* 2. 5 (Jaeg. 2, 327).

[17] *Ad Graec.* (Jaeg. 3. 1, p. 25).

[18] *0. Eun.* 5. 4 (Jaeg. 2, pp. 125, 127).

[19]*Ad Graec.* (Jaeg. 3. 1, p. 20); *Tres Dei* (Jaeg. 3. 1, p. 55); *Against Eunomius* 2. 2 (p. 102) .

[20]*Ad Graec.* (Jaeg. 3. 1, p. 25); cf. *Tres Dei* (Jaeg. 3. 1, p. 56), where the distinction is *Kara ro af-r<v Ka! afr<arov* ("cause and that which is caused"). Adolf Harnack, *History of Dogma,* trans. E. B. Speirs and James Millar, 7 vols. (London: William & Norgate, 1898), 4: 87; Kelly, *Early Doctrines,* p. 262.

[21] *Tres Dei* (Jaeg. 3. 1, p. 56); Kelly, ibid.

give Father, Son, and Spirit distinct " modes of existence " (7l'tiis €un)[22] according to their "identifying properties" or "characteristic idioms" *(18ti,μara, Wi6T'YJT€S xapaKT'YJpl,ovom)*[23] For the Father this is unbegottenness *(ay£WYJsta);* for the Son, begottenness *(y£vvaula);* for the Spirit, mission or procession (*EK1l'Ep.iflis,*EK *1l'6p£vsis)•*[24]

This theory is for Gregory the mean between " Jewish dogma" and that pagan polytheism which splits up the first cause "into different Godheads."

The truth passes in the mean between these two conceptions, destroying each heresy, and yet accepting what is useful to it from each. The Jewish dogma is destroyed by the acceptance of the Word and by the belief in the Spirit; while the polytheistic error of the Greek school is made to vanish by the unity of the nature abrogating this imagination of plurality. [26]

Transposed to Christian heretical categories, Gregory's enemy list is predictable. Sabellius must be rejected on the oneness side for appiying three titles to one " subject " *(mroKdp.£vov)•*[26] But Eunomius and the other Arians are the pluralist heretics. For they make the Son a " bastard," and their Trinity " a plurality of beings " or a " plurality of gods." [27] Arians posit not merely three *ousiai* in the primary

---

[22] *Tres Dei* (ibid.).

[23] *0. Eun.* 2. 2 (Jaeg. 2, pp. 315, 317); *Ad Graec.* (Jaeg. 3. 1, pp. 21-22). Harnack, *Hist. Dogma,* 4 :86.

[24] *Ad Graec.* (Jaeg. 3.1, p. 25); *Tres Dei* (Jaeg. 3. 1, p. 56).

[25] *The Great Oatechism* 3 (p. 477). Cf. *Against Eunomius* 10. 2 (p. 223), where the error of the Jews is "admitting ne.ither the Only-begotten God nor the Holy Spirit to share the Deity of the God whom they call ' Great,' and ' First.' "

[26] *0. Eun.* I. 19 (Jaeg. 1, p. 93). Cf. in 10. 2 the Sabellian error of applying " three names " to one God (Moore and Wilson, p. 223) and in 10. 4 the wry complaint that for Sabellius the Son does not exist in himself, but is " painted on" to the hypostasis of the Father (p. 229) .

[27] *Against Eunomius* I. 18 (p. 55); I. 19 (p. 56); 2. 6 (p. 107). Ekkehard Miihlenberg, *Die Unendlichkeit Gottes bei Gregor von Nyssa: Gregors Kritik am Gottesbegriff der Klassischen Metaphysik,* Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte, vol. 16 (GOttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966), pp. 95-122, isolates the Arian-posed problem Gregory had to

sense of *ousia;* that is in Gregory's view an acceptable, **if** somewhat irregular, thing to do against Sabellius.[28] What is rather the Arian mistake is to conceive of three beings of *alien* substance, three beings of different *generic* natures: [29]

[According to Eunomius] there is no connexion between the Father and the Son, or between the Son and the Holy Ghost, but that these beings (ovcnm) are sundered from each other, and possess natures (cpvu£t>) foreign and unfamiliar to each other, and differ . . . also in magnitude and in subordination of their dignities. [30]

Though, as always, it is instructive for grasping a historical figure's position to see what he was afraid of, and though Gregory seems solidly in the middle between the conventional trinitarian heresies of his period, the fact is (and this is also instructive), he kept on being attacked, then as now, for believing in three Gods.[31] Especially in *Tres Dei* and *Ad Graecos* Gregory attempts to refute his critics and simultaneously to offer what he regards as a proper logical solution to one main version of the threeness/oneness problem of trinity doctrine. It will pay us, then, to lay out Gregory's scheme, following the argument in *Tres Dei* and adding corroborative and explanatory material from several of his other pieces.

solve, namely, how a begotten God can nonetheless be God. Gregory's answer is that the unbegotten and begotten God possess exactly the same infinite divine nature. Unbegottenness and begottenness are distinguishing personal idioms, but irrelevant to the sameness of nature of Father and Son just as, in the case of Adam and Abel, they would be irrelevant to the joint possession of an identical human nature.

28 *O. Eun.* I. 19 (p. 93). "Primary" here means "individual" or "particular." Gregory has already de-materialized the Aristotelian primary substance *(Categories,* 5) in a way that was to become standard in trinitarian theology (cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* q. 29, arts. 1, 2).

29 As is rightly noted by Harry Austryn Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Ohurch Fathers,* vol. 1: *Faith, Trinity, Incarnation* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 334.

so *Against Eunomius* 1. 19 (p. 56) .

s1 See, e.g., Bernard *M.* G. Reardon, "A comment [on 'Two Questions Concerning the Holy Spirit,' by Hubert Cunliffe-Jones]," *Theology* 75 (1972) : 299, on "the great defect of Eastern trinitarianism" in general; viz., its "latent tritheism." Cf. G. L. Prestige, *God in Patristic Thought* (London: S.P.C.K., 1952), p. xi.

Gregory on Threeness/Oneness

In the opening of *Tres Dei* Gregory considers a dilemma posed to him by the "noble Ablabius." Either we have to deny the Godhead to Son and Spirit, or else, if we admit it to them, we have to say there are three Gods. The latter is unlawful: Scripture gives us the Deuteronomic *Shema* as our *homologia.*[32] But the former is " impious and absurd."

Ablabius's presentation is straightforward: take the obviously parallel case of Peter, James, and John. These exist "in a common humanity" (lv *µ,iij, 5vw; rii av6pW7r6r11rw.),* but though thus united according to nature, " there is no absurdity in describing ... [them] by the plural number of the name derived from their nature." In short, we call them" three men." Why then can we not do a similar thing with respect to the dogmatic mystery of the Trinity? There we readily confess three *hypostaseis,* yet " we are in some sense at variance with our confession " if we say " there a.re three Gods."

Gregory courteously admits the difficulty of this " monstrous dilemma," but then proposes a threefold solution that takes up the rest of the tract. The first suggestion is only half-serious: to ".straight-forward" or "guileless" people, he says, we might offer for their edification the observation that though it seems perfectly proper to add up those who display or exhibit one nature, and thus to speak of a number of Gods, in fact our dogmatic rule or definition ("-6yo◇) refuses this option simply "to avoid any resemblance to the polytheism of the heathen," lest it appear that we have with them some " community of doctrine." [33]

Gregory admits this answer will not satisfy anyone who is really interested in the alternatives that have been posed: it actually offers no solution to the dilemma at all.

Hence Gregory's second main observation follows-an offered solution that is absolutely typical of his thought, repeated

[32] Jaeg. 3. I, p. 42.
[33] *Three Gods* (p. 331).

in various treatises, and interestingly at variance with that of Augustine, who was confronted with exactly the same dilemma. [34]

The solution, says Gregory, is to consider properly the nature of man. The fact is, it is not only dogmatically illegitimate to say "three Gods"; it is also an abuse of language to talk of *men* in the plural. (You might as well, in that case, talk about "many human natures.") For man is actually not " divided in na:ture." " Man " refers, after all, not to what is individual; proper names do that. It refers rather to what is common. [35] Thus, though we consider individual idioms when referring to, say, Luke or Stephen, m fact their *physis* is absolutely simple and the same:

Their nature is one, at union in itself, and an absolutely indivisible unit, not capable of increase by addition or of diminution by subtraction, but in its ·essence being and continually remaining one, inseparable even though it appear in plurality, continuous, complete, and not divided with the individuals who participate in it. [36]

Thus there is actually only one *man-no* matter how many individual hypostases or exhibitions [37] of it there may be.

[34] Gregory, as we shall see, adjusts the oneness term in the human analogue: Peter, James, and John turn out, contrary to appearances, to be (three instances of) "one man." But Augustine's resolution in Books 5 through 7 of *De Trin.* is simply to deny that (according to simplicity doctrine) there can be more than one instance or example of *deitas.* The " persons " are only relations of the one divine essence to itself. Accordingly, where Gregory releases tension by saying "(•Ile man" in the human analogue (willing to be implausible on oneness to protect threeness) Augustine does so by only reluctantly granting the threeness term in the divine analogue (willing to be vague on threeness to protect oneness) . In God, says Augustine, there must be " three somethings" or "three persons . . . in order that we may not have to remain wholly silent," or "three substances or persons, if they are to be so called." *De Trin.* 7, 4. 9; 7. 6. 11.

[35] Jaeg. 3. 1, p. 40. See also Basil, *Epist.* 38. 2: *li.vOponros* refers to .:, *Ko<v:/i rp{Hm* or to.:, *Kotv6r71s* (Court, pp. 81-82).

[36] *Three Gods* (p. 332) .

[37] Jaeg. 3. 1, p. 54: 0Γ *KaO'   EV rii rp[HTe< rov avOpcfnrov ifoKvoμ,evo<.* Cf. p. 53: only those things can be enumerated that are considered in their " individual conscription" *(Kar' tolav μ,ept"fparpfiv),* and *Ad Graec.* (J aeg. 3. 1, p. 19) where Gregory asserts that we cannot count natures, but only *prosopa.*

Gregory acknowledges that we do actually speak of " three men " in the plural, but claims this is only a had habit. In *Ad Graecos* he admits that even Scripture has this habit-but, he adds, only "catachrestically," only as an accommodaiting abuse of language, never literally *(Kvplw<;)*. Using a f:amilia:r image, Gregory suggests that the Scriptural use of " man " in the plural is only a " condescension " (*<FVyKaraf3&aw)* for the benefit of the immature. like a nurse stammering to children. [38]

Indeed, several considerations make speaking of " three men" more justifiable than speaking of "three Gods." The analogy of Peter, James, and John being to the one man as Father, Son, and Spirit are to the one God is not exact. First, hypostases of men variable and transitory distinguishing features-of time, place, will, passion, etc. But the persons of the Godhead are never divided from each other in these re-spects. They are distinguished only by cause. [39] Again, though all human beings have the whole human essence, not all of them are of, or from, the same person; they do not all have the same cause. But Son and Spirit are both from the Father: " therefore, indeed, literally we say boldly that the causer with his effects is one God, E>ince they also exist with him." [40] Yet again, while there is an ever changing number of human hypo-stases, there are always exactly three of God.

These considerations, says Gregory, allow us to keep on with our had habit. **But** we must always bear in mind that we are really still talking of only one human nature. For literally, ac-cording to "manness" or "the man," *(Kara r6 av0pw7ro<;),* there is only one-no ma:tter what we say. [41]

---

as *Ad Graea.* (J aeg. 3. I, pp. 23, 25, 27-28).

39 Ibid. (pp. 24-25).

40 Ibid. (p. 25). Cf. *Against Eunomius* I. 34 and 3. 3 for Gregory's argu-ment that Adam and Abel furnish an excellent example of a whole nature being passed on from an ungenerate one to a generate one. The ungenerate Adam generates "another himself " (Cf.XXov *f.a.vro•).*

41 *Ad Graea.* (Jaeg. 3. I, pp. 25·26). *ro* Cf.v0pw7ros is here neuter indeclin-able. Gregory's main and much-discussed analogy is therefore literally a three (of one) *man* analogy, not an analogy of three *men.* And its force,

Gregory's third main observation has to do not with nature, but with works or "operations" *(f.vlpyeia)* •42 Most people, he says, think " Godhead " just names the divine nature. But actually that naiture is entirely unspeakable. The best we can do is to say what God is not (not corruptible, etc.), and to explain our *conception* of the divine nature 43 according to those things found " around " it *'''iv fletav f/>v0'LV/*44-a conception formed by observing " the varied operation of the power above us." (Gregory means such operations as showing power, discerning the heart, providentially overseeing, giving life, and the like.) And here too we properly speak of only one power and one God.

But, he adds, a critic could raise an obvious objection. A critic could observe that we ordinarily speak in the plural of those who are engaged in the same pursuit. Do we not speak of many farmers? Many shoemakers and philosophers?

Indeed. But the crucial difference is that in God, as opposed to humanity, there is complete unity of work. Men work separately, sometimes even at cross-purposes. Each has his own concern, his own bailiwick: " Each of them is separated from the others within his own environment, according to the special character of his operation." 45 Not so with God. In a srtvong statement of the *opera ad extra indivisa.* principle, Gregory simultaneously links divine missions with persons and unifies his Trinity theory:

ironically, is to shore up Gregory's right to claim he believes in only one God.

42 *Tres Dei* (Jaeg. 3. 1, pp. 42-16).

43 One sees here the fascinating coincidence of ancient Neoplatonic and modern Kantian pious agnosticism about the divine nature. See, e.g., Plotinus, *Enneads* 2. 9. 1; 5. 5. 1, 6; and 6. 8. 11 for the view that we cannot literally apply any predicates to the One at all-not even "is one." For to predicate properties of the One compromises its simplicity. It is just "the indefinable," known in devout vision by its "effects."

44*Tres Dei* (Jaeg. 3. 1, p. 43). See additional references in *0. Eun.* presented and discussed by Basil Krivocheine, "Simplicity of the Divine Nature and Distinctions in God, According to St. Gregory of Nyssa," *St. Vladimir's Quarterly* 21 (1977): 77-78.

45*ThreeGods* (p. 334).

Every operation which extends from God to the creation, and is named according to our variable conceptions of it, has its origin from the Father, and proceeds through the Son, and is perfected in the Holy Spirit. . . . The action of each concerning anything is not separate and peculiar, but whatever comes to pass ... [does so] by the action of the Three, yet what does come to pass is not three things.[46]

Thus, though we receive, for instance, both life and power from God, we never receive "lives" or "powers "-i.e., different gifts from each of the three persons. Accordingly, given this joint action we cannot rightly speak of " three Givers of life " or " three Good beings," for " the unity existing in the operation prevents plural enumeration." [47] Hence, once more, there is only one God.

And, Gregory adds, if a critic still thinks Godhead refers to nature rather than to operation, recourse may be had once more to the second argument: even with respect to nature we should rather speak of three men/one man than of three who are God/three Gods.[48] The conclusion in any case is clear:

[46] Ibid. The quoted passage, distinguishing naturally enough between God *iiberhaupt* and the works of God, and between each person in God and that person's (shared) work, renders implausible the astonishing thesis of Robert Jenson that for Gregory "God" just names the divine work! Jenson supposes that when Gregory speaks of " the name of the action" not being different for the various actors he means by " action " God. But in the quoted passage Gregory clearly means by " action " such things as giving life. These are Godly acts, but never (till Hegel and Barth, perhaps) God. Robert W. Jenson, *The Triune Identity God: According to the Gospel* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982), pp. 113-114.

[47] Ibid. (p. 335). Here one sees that Donald Baillie is right in supposing that identity of work *ad extra* is a unifying factor for Gregory's trinitarianism. But as Gregory conceives it, this unity is still a joint or shared unity of three persons-not that of Baillie's one " infinite and universal Person."

[48] This time Gregory's example is one gold/several gold this-or-thats, .a unity of substratum. This sort of unity, as Wolfson points out, is listed third in Aristotle's five types of unity in the *Metaphysics* 5. 6 (accident, collateral, substratum, genus, species). Gregory's gold example fits a typical pattern in the fathers: unity of the divine persons is of two types: substratum, genus, or species, on the one hand, and operation, on the other. Wolfson, *Faith, Trinity,* pp. 314-49. Gregory typically regards the *ousia* as the genus and the persons as one-membered species or even as individuals, given his de-

The Father is God, the Son is God, and yet by the same proclama-
tion God is one, because no differenceeither of nature or of opera-
tion is contemplated in the Godhead.[49]

If one adds Gregory's "inness" or "compenetraition" prin-
ciple (lv   for Father, Son, and Spirit [50] and his insist-
ence on the " of " or " from " relation (of the Son and Spirit
from the Father) , the total picture of trinitarian unity that
emerges shows the imprint of John's gospel even after three
centuries of trinitarian reflection. There is the same refusal to
use "God" in the plural of Father, Son, and Spirit even
though the three are all divine and distinct. There is the same
accent on unity of will, word, knowledge, love, glory, and espe-
cially works or operations. And there is a similar refuge in
the primordial, mysterious, and ineffable oneness these ex-
press-the reality John marks by the coordinate use of " one "
 (lv) and "in" (£v), as at 10:30 and 10:38. In these respects,
ait least, Gregory's theory looks like a plausible, even if Platon-
illied,extrapolation from the fourth gospel.

Assessment of Gregory's Strong Trinitarianism

But if so, why do certain historians of doctrine show uneasi-
ness or apprehensiveness about such Cappadocian thinking,
whether in Gregory of Nyssa or in Basil or Gregory of Nazi-
anzus? Prestige complains that Basil's association of the *owna*
with the common and the *hypostasis* with the particular
(Epist. 214) is "not as clear as might be desired: his formal

materialization of Aristotalian primary substance. Thus Peter, James, and
John as individuals of the common species *man* compare with Father, Son,
and Spirit as sui-specific individuals of the divine generic *ousia.*

[49] *Three Gods* (p. 336). Following fourth century custom, Gregory often
makes trinitarian points using only the examples of Father and Son. But
see his *On the Holy Spirit* for a similar "nature and operation" argument
re the Holy Spirit. As Jaeger notes, *Gregors Heilige Geist,* p. 15, even the
Ad Eustatkium, ostensibly a trinitarian treatise, is really another extended
argument for the divinity of the Holy Spirit.

[50] *O. Eun.* I. 39; 2. 2; 10. 4. The term *7rep•xwp7llr•s*does not appear till Pa.-
Cyril in the sixth century. Prestige, *God,* p. 283.

definitions are abstract and unsatisfactory." [51] He admits [52] that the Cappadocians and others did use *ousia* in a generic sense, but adds remarkably that this is no evidence they ever conceived of it thus. [53] They only did this" when pressed" and then only " inadvertently." The fact is, says Prestige, we may be assured that Basil has in mind " an identical single *ousia,* which is concrete," and that the Cappadocians in general mean by *ouma* "a single identical object." [54]

J. N. D. Kelly, who often follows Prestige in these matters, similarly asserts thrut the Cappadocians give the impression, at least linguistically, of tending toward tritheism because of their " unfortunate comparison of the *ousia* of Godhead to a universal manifesting itself in particulars." [55] All unfortunate comparisons aside, however, tritheism was actually " unthinkable " for the Cappadocians because of their doctrine of divine simplicity and their very fundamental conviction that "the *ousia* of Godhead is not an abstract essence but a concrete reality." [56]

These are important considerrutions and lead us now to reflect on some possible complications in the Cappadocian scheme, taking Gregory of Nyssa as representative. Four of

[51] Prestige, *God,* p. 228. Cf. pp. 215-16, 242, 264, 269-77.

[52] Ibid., pp. 264-65.

[53] Which leads one to wonder what *would* count as evidence that they conceived *ousia* this way-perhaps their denying that they do? See also Claude Welch, *In This Name: The Dootrine of the Trinity in Contemporary Theology* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952), p. 301, for the bolder claim that the Cappadocians never used *ousia* in a generic sense.

[54] *God,* pp. 230 (cf. 235), 242.

[55] Kelly, *Early Dootrines,* p. 267.

[56] Ibid., pp. 268-69. By "tritheism" Kelly apparently means a doctrine according to which three particular divine subjects each have all the essential divine properties. If so, this definition differs significantly from that used by Gregory of Nyssa. For him, as noted above, the tritheists are *Arians*-Eunomius as prime example. In this judgment Gregory lines up with both the *homoousion* and the anti pluralist verses (4, 6, 8, 10, etc.) of the *Quiounque.* In these latter cases the illegitimate pluralism in view is not belief in two or three divine subjects, but rather in one fully divine subject and one or two quasi-divine ones.

these may be distinguished, including several of Baillie's men-
tioned at the beginning of this essay.

First, though Gregory uses his three-man analogy over and
over, he also has at least one important psychological analogy
in the opening chapters of *The Great Catechism.* As we have
word and breath, sa.ys Gregory, so God has *logos* and *pneuma.*
And if that were all Gregory said about the matter, we should
have to conclude that (taking this with his three-man anal-
ogy) he has a pair of remarkably incompatible illustrations.

But he says more: mainly, Gregory takes pains to distin-
guish our word and spirit from God's. [57] Contrary to the case
with us, God's Word is eternal and has life, soul   and
intellect *(T6 110Ep611).* Indeed, the suggestion that God's Word is
itself anhypostatic is blasphemous. For, warns Gregory, let no
one think that God's Word has life from another by participa-
tion. The Word is rather "autozoetic "-itself alive. Further,
the Word has power of choice (*δvvaμ,i"*   and plan
(Gregory uses forms of *ʄ3ov)wμ,ai).*

This Word, then, unlike ours, seems to be a person-a sub-
ject with distinct, non-parasitic life; with soul, mind, choosing,
and willing. And Gregory conceives of the Spirit similarly. [58]
Gregory's psychological analogy appears, then, not to rival but
to reinforce his three-man analogy.

Second, it is sometimes said that Gregory's or the Cappado-
cians', use of "modes of being" *(Tp67roi*   for the three
prosopa importantly qualifies any pluralism he or they might
otherwise fall into. [59] This expression, so it is claimed, shows
that Gregory sometimes thought of God more along the line of
a single person in various roles than along the line of a com-

[57] A distinction Gregory thinks is lost on Jews. *The Great GateohiBm* 3.

[58] *Cat. Orat.* 1, 2. Joseph Barbel notes that Gregory also uses *6vv&.μeis* for
the three, but that this term "in der damaligen Zeit meist personlich
aufgeta,Bt wird." Barbel thinks in general Gregory holds to the personality
of Son and Spirit in *Cat. Orat.* 1 and 2 "im volle Sinne." Gregor von Nyssa,
Die gro,Be kateohetiBche Rede, trans. with an introd. and commentary by
Joseph Barbel (Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 1971), pp. 99, 101.

[59] So Welch, *Name,* p. 302, n. 21, and Baillie, *God Was in GhriBt,* p. 142.

pany of three persons, however tightly unified. Two comments
may be made: (I) If what has modes of being is the divine
essence or *ousia,* the expression "modes of being" could be
perfectly consistent with three-person pluralism. The one in-
effable *ousia,* on this view, would exist in three modes-pa-
ternal, filial, and processional-just as in Gregory's thought,
the one human *ousia* exists simultaneously and indivisibly in
(among others) three human modes-Petrine, Jamesian, and
Johanuine. But if in the latter case, each mode is clearly what
we would call a person; so perhaps in the former. Modal *lan-
guage,* even if misleading, needn't conflict conceptually with
strong trinitarianism. But (2) though this use of "modes of
being" fits well into Gregory's concept of trinity and tri-
humanity, in fact he does not use the phrase exactly this way.
The subject of a *rplnro<>* is not the divine *oitsia* or God in gen-
eral, but rather Father, or Son, or Spirit. It is each of *them*
that Gregory conceives of as an   It is along this line
that Basil speaks not of God's modes of being, but of the
Spirit's mode of being, a spirative generateness. 61 And Gre-
gory, for his part, insists that first we must establish our belief
in the Son's and Father's existence; *then* we can talk a.bout the
Son's generateness aml the Father's ingenerateness as their
"modes of being" (?rlW<> *forL* or *r6 ?Tw<> €lvaL)*•62 It is thus not God
conceived as a single subject who has modes of being; it is
rather each of Father, Son, and Spirit who has one of these
modes. Gregory's concept of modes of being is really equiv-
alent to his concept of the distinguishing idioms and thus poses
no final problem for the coherence of his theory.

Third, classic Latin statements of Trinity doctrines are com-
plicated (some would say muddled) at crucial places by sim-
plicity theory, i.e., by the notion that in God there really are
no distinctions at all-not even between the divine relations

---

so *Ad Graec.* (Jaeg. 3. 1, p. 30).

61 Basil, *De Spir. Sanct.* 46, cited in Kelly, *Early Doctrines,* p. 262. See
other examples in Prestige, *God,* pp. 245-48.

e2 *Tres Dei* (Jaeg. 3. 1, p. 56).

and the divine essence.[68] Can a similar idea be shown in Gregory? And, if so, does his simplicity theory work to counteract his pluralism? [64]

There can be no doubt that Gregory is committed to the doctrine of the simplicity of the divine being. He mentions it often, and often with warmth. [65] But as Archbishop Basil (Krivocheine) rightly notes in a helpful article on Gregory's simplicity, [66] Gregory rarely, if ever, speaks of *God* as simple. It is rather the divine essence or natUl'e that is simple and indivisible; i.e., not ;, *flEl>r;* but *r6 OEiov,*[67] This is the reason, I may add, why the places of firmest insistence on simplicity in Gregory are all *anti-Arian* places. Simplicity is compromised by those who divide the essence in Arian fashion, who multiply different generic essences in the Trinity, such that the second and third persons do not possess all the same essential divine properties (eternity, for instance) as the first.[68] Gregory's version of simplicity theo!"y is therefore entirely compatible with his own concepts of distinction in God:

for example, the distinction between the divine essence and the Trinity of *Hypostasei,s,* between the divine nature or essence and its ·energies or attributes, between the divine nature and that which is contemplated 'around ' it.[69]

For Gregory, then, the simplicity of the divine being is a modest and plausible doctrine according to which that nature

[63] See, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* q. 28, art. 2, where Thomas states that "relation really existing in God is really the same as his essence, and differs only in its mode of intelligibility." In fact, "everything which is not the divine essence is a creature."

[64] As suggested generally for the Cappadocians by Kelly, *Early Doctrines,* pp. 268-69, and Baillie, *God Was In Ohrist,* p. 142.

[65] E.g., *Against Eunomius* I. 19, 22, 37; 10. 4; 12. 5; etc.

[66] See n. 44 above.

[67] Basil Krivocheine, "Simplicity According to Gregory," p. 76. *O. Eun.* I. 22 is a good place to see Gregory's usage.

[68] *Against .Eunomius* I. 19; cf. 12. 5.

[69] Basil Krivocheine, "Simplicity According to Gregory," p. 80. The author means to cite three different distinctions here-not one distinction variously put.

is whole instead of fragmented (nobody has only part of it), permanent as opposed to transitory, unified against all contraries (as in Arianism), unlimited by space, time, etc., and finally ineffable. What is truly important to note is that though Gregory says the divine nature is simple and undivided, and that each *prosopon* or *hypostasi,s* is thus (because each is a particular, an *d.Top.ov)*[70] he does not say that Father, Son, and Spirit just *are* the divine essence.[71]

It should be remembered that in any case Gregory thinks of *human* nature as simple too-a simplicity Gregory clearly thinks is compatible with multiple exhibitions of it in personal hypostases. Human nature, though simple, can be multiplied. There are numerous cases or instantiations of it. So if Peter, James, and John *are"* the malll," they are thus only as distinct examples of it. So with Father, Son, and Spirit. Gregory himself could hardly make the comparison more explicit: "there are many *hypostaseis* of the one man and three *hypostaseis* of the one God." [72]

Hence Archbishop Basil's conclusion seems right: for Gregory,

simplicity and unity do not preclude ontological distinctions in the Divine. Simplicity understood as absence of distinction is an idea familiar to medieval Latin scholasticis, but is alien to the thought of Gregory of Nyssa .... For him these distinctions, although perceivable by an intellectual process *(l7rlvow.),* are not merely subjective, but correspond in fact to a reality in God.[73]

[70] *Ad Graecos* (Jaeg. 3. I, p. 23); *Against Eunomius* 10. 4 (pp. 225-27).

[71] I cannot find a single example of this sort of statement; i.e., that Father, Son, and Spirit are identical with the divine essence either as persons or relations. Cf. just below and Barbel, *Die gro{Je Rede,* p. 99: "Uber das Verhaltnis der Eigentiimlichkeiten der Hypostasen zu dem Wesen macht er keine Ausagen." In fact, Gregory says pointedly that the intra-trinitarian relations are *not* identical with the essence. Rather, the Son "shares in" the essence of the Father. *Against Eunomius* 10. 3 (p. 223), 11. I (p. 230). Contrary, therefore, to Donald Baillie's suggestion at the beginning of this essay, Gregory's simplicity theory is no real qualification of his Cappadocian pluralism.

[72] *Ad Graec.* (J aeg. 3. 1, p. 29).

[73] " Simplicity According to Gregory," p. 104. G. Christopher Stead, "Ontology and Terminology," p. 119, remarks that Gregory fails to work out

Fourth, Prestige, Kelly, and Welch make much of the claim that *o'U8ia,* however generic it may sometimes appear, is actually " concrete " for the Cappadocians--Prestige suggesting that the generic use was an oversight on their part, and Welch flatly asserting that the Cappadocians did not use *ousia* in a generic sense. What can be said to this sort of claim?

The relevant data so far as Gregory's theory is concerned are these: (1) *Ousia* is what Father, Son, and Spirit have in common. (2) Though it is itself an ineffable, unlimited core, what is indicated " around it " by operations are such properties as general infinity, omnipotence, love, life-givingness, etc. These are not the Godhead-though for the purposes of argument, Gregory will not dispute those who think they are. The impression he gives is that he himself imagines the divine *ousia* as an actually inconceivable spiritual stuff, a substratum. (8) Whatever the *ousia* is, it is related to Father, Son, and Spirit as "the man" or "manness" is related to Peter, James, and John. Human nature, as well -as divine, is " an absolutely indivisible unit " which retains its unity no matter how many individuals " participate in it."

The question before us, then, is this: suppose we say with Prestige that for the Cappadocians " God is a single objective [or concrete] Being in three objects of presentation." [74] What are we saying?

We might be saying that the *Trinity,* the divine society, is one objective being or entity, though comprising three personal obj.ects. There are places where Gregory seems to use *b fh:6l1* thus, but few, if any, places where he uses this way.[75] *Of!ula* is rather a synonym for *8£ori}l1,* or for what is beyond it, and refers to the mysterious divine being or essence or substratum.

an adequate doctrine of divine simplicity "because his philosophical equipment is not handled with the seriousness which is needed in order to do justice to his theological and Christian intuitions."

74 *God,* p. 300.

75 Prestige, *God,* p. 234, confirms that for the Cappadocians "the Trinity was in a real sense a single Object."

No doubt Prestige's statement is about *this* essence or being. But if so, then it is entirely ambiguous. It could be taken as the claim that divine secondary substance (either the divine attributes as .a set of Gregory's ineffable spiritual substratum beyond it), i.e., wha.t more than one particular being have in common, is thrice presented in conscious, loving, active, distinct persons. " Fatherhood," " sonship," and " procession " would then be the differentiating characteristics of these three entities. Obviously, in this case, the three would have precisely the same (not merely a similar) generic essence, since all would have just the same properties of Godliness (or just the same ineffable core) .[76] Just as the same "objective being" is presented three times in Peter, James, a.nd John, so in Fa.ther, Son, and Spirit.

But Prestige's characteristic assertion could also be taken as the view that one divine person has three modes of presentation. In this case the *iiliomata* would be those modes: fatherhood, sonship, procession. One divine person--one thinker, lover, actor-is self-related according to his modes. Though one might discreetly refrain from saying it, this person is his own fa.ther, son, and spirit. For there is precisely no one but him, the single divine person, to be *in* the modal relations. God-as-Father is father to himself-as-Son, etc.

Though he would doubtless reject this latter implication of his view, it does seem t.hat Prestige interprets the Cappadocians along this second line. He thinks they believe in only one divine thinker, only one person. For in the passage quoted above, he interprets " single objective being " as " one centre of divine self-consciousness. As seen and thought, [God] is

[76] Hence it would make no sense, on this view, to talk of going beyond generic essence to " identity of essence " or " substantial identity" or "numerical identity of substance," as is done by Prestige, *God,* pp. 213, 217, 218 and Kelly, *Early Dootr·ines,* p. 234. Those who have the same generic essence have identically the same one (and are hence substantially identical). It is a weakness of Prestige's and Kelly's presentations that they keep opposing " same generic substance " and " identity of substance" as if these had to be alternatives.

three; as seeing and thinking, He is one." [77] It is the concept
of this "single objective Being" or "identical single *ousia,*
which is concrete " that Prestige thinks Athanasius won as a
novum out of his Origenist context and offered to the Cappado-
cians, who obligingly accepted it. [78]

One can see why this interpretation of Gregory is tempting.
That is because Gregory sees the Father as the *arche1* the
fount, source, progenitor of Son and Spirit. And what the
Father produces is *&>.Aov lavr6v,* "Another himself." One could
thus construe Gregory as claiming that God (a given person)
presents *himself* as Father, and again as Son, and once more
as Spirit.

However Gregory's typical analogy for this, as noted above,
is that of Adam generating "another himself" in Abel. Abel
is fully human as his father is. He is also "of" him or "from"
him. But he is a distinct person. Thus Prestige's modalist-
tending ' one centre of divine self-consciousness ' would not
seem in the end to be the most plausible interpretation of
Gregory's *ousia.*

Still, there is a subtle issue here. When Prestige has
Gregory's God as one seer and thinker though three as seen
and thought (cf. Donald Baillie's view at the head of this
essay), and when he further insists that Gregory's *ousia,*
despite acknowledged generic uses of it, is concrete and pri-
mary rather than abstract and secondary, he is alluding to a
genuine paradox at least in Gregory's general intellectual herit-
age. It hinges on a. central differences between the philosophy
of Aristotle and Plato. Gregory was a Platonist, [79] and for

[11] Prestige, *God,* pp. 300-1.

[78] Ibid., pp. 217, 230, 232, 234-35.

[79] As shown by the *Tres Dei* passage on humanity, quoted above, p. 21, and
many other places. J. Tixeront, *Histoire des dogmes dans l'antiquiU
ohretienne,* 8th ed., 3 vols. (Paris: Librairie Victor Lecoffre, 1924), 2: 86,
laments Gregory's "platonisme exagere qui semble compromettre d'abord
l'orthodoxie de son enseignement." For general studies of Gregory's Pla-
tonism and Neoplatonism, see Jean Danielou, *Platonisme et tMologie mysti-
que: Essai sur la dootrine spirituelle de saint Gregoire de N ysse* (Paris:
J. Vrin, 1944) and Harold Fredrick Cherniss, *The Platonism of Gregory of
Nyssa* {Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1930).

Plato (to speak anachronistically) Aristotle's "first sub-
stance" is secondary and Aristotle's "secondary substance"
really primary. Accordingly, when we ask how Gregory viewed
the divine *ousia,* we might suppose that he probably viewed
it paradoxically as a " concrete universal " or a " real abstrac-
tion "-just as he doubtless saw humanity as far more real
and more human than any individual human being. [80]

To see the subtle dialectic here between abstract and con-
crete concepts, we only have to know that Plato often refers to
the Forms not only by such abstract nouns as "greatness "
(P£yUJo>) "justice" *(8iKawcn!V'YJ),* but also by the use of a for-
mula that includes an adjective, the neuter definite article, and
often, *avr6.*[81] So the scheme *avr6 r6*   is used for "the
———— thing itself." Thus, in the case of, say, justice, Plato
may substitute for *8iKaw<TVV'YJ* the formula *avro TtJ 8£Kawv,* meaning
" the just itself," or " the just thing itself," or "the ideally
just thing."

From the *Phaedo* (74, 75, 78d) it is clear that what is spe-
cial about the just (thing) itself is tha.t it is the "unalloyedly
and unchangeably just (thing)." [82] For Plato, justice is itself
the best example of justice; justice and the ideally just thing
are identical. [83]

So it may be with Gregory's concept of divine *ousia.* It is
plainly what Father, Son, and Spirit-three   distinct partic-
ulars-have in common; in *that* sense it is a generic *ousia,*
Aristotle's second substance. But for Plato, and likely for
Gregory, this secondary and common substance is also first in
importance and concrete in nature: divinity is equivalent to
"the divine (thing) itself," just as humanity is both a generic
essence and also the most concrete of human things.

so Leys, *L'Image chez S. Greg.,* p. 79.

s1 Nicholas Wolterstorff, *On Universals: An Essay in Ontology* (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 264-65.

s2 Wolterstorff, ibid., pp. 268-69.

sa See the explicit acknowledgement of this doctrine in Augustine, *De Trin.*
5, passim. One might note that there are indeed some self-exemplifying prop-
erties (e.g., "being a property"), but that the notion of rareness, for in-
stance, being itself quite rare, or even medium-rare, seems piquantly odd.

But is divinity alive? A thinker? Is it Prestige's "one center
of   divine   self-consciousness"?   Or Baillie's one "infinite
Person"?

Possibly.   At   least   one   might   speculatively   infer   from
Gregory's Platonism that if he thought of divinity and the
ideally divine thing as identical with each other, then he must
have thought of divinity itself as alive and conscious since he
thought thus of the ideally divine thing, namely, God.

The problem with this view is that it is poorly attested in
Gregory's own writing. For one thing, as already stated,
Gregory's doctrine of divine simplicity does not, or does not
typically, include the aggressive claim that God and *ousia* are
identical, or even the more general claim that God is simple.
For another, Gregory's language almost without exception
leads us in a strongly pluralist direction. Anyone who notes
his repeated attribution of personal acts to Father, Son, and
Spirit-usually   in contexts where one or two is distinguished
from   the   other (s)-would   naturally   suppose   Gregory   was
speaking of three actors and not just one. Thus, besides God
the Father there is also " the only begotten God " who
" brought all things into being " out of a " superabundance of
love " and who has immortalized human life by " taking to
himself humanity in completeness ".B[4] Before the incarnation
he talked to Moses and led the people of Israel.B[5] This Son or
Word has life, soul, intellect, and will in himself.Be

And so, though third in *taxis,* or order, does the Spirit.B[7] The
Spirit who chooses and wills is a proper object of faith and is
properly worshipped along with the Father and the *Son.*BB At
one place Gregory charmingly defends the Holy Spirit against
the Macedonian denial of his divinity by affirming his diligent

[84] *Against Eun.* 5. 4 (p. 179) ; *The Great Oateohism* 5 (p. 378).
[85] *Against Eun.* 11. 3 (p. 235).
[86] *The Great Oateohism* 1, 2.
[s1] *The Great Oateohism 2; On the Holy Spirit* (p. 320) . See also Jaeger,
Gregors Heilige Geist, pp. 31-32, 39.
[88] *On the Holy Spirit* (pp. 324-25)

participation in crea.tion. If only the Father and the Son had participated in creation, says Gregory, then the Holy Spirit would have been guilty of a kind of divine freeloading:

What was the Holy Spirit doing at the time when the Father was at work with the Son unon the Creation? Was he employed upon some other works ... ? [Was he] not employed at all, but dissociated himself from the busy work of creating by reason of an inclination to ease and rest, which shrank from toil? ... How was it that he was inactive? Because he could not, or because he would not, work? so

Gregory's conclusion to this line of speculation is an ardent prayer that " the gracious Spirit Himself " may " pardon this baseless supposition of ours." oo But the prayer and the supposition alike-the latter shorn of its rhetorical irony-plainly show Gregory's habit of thinking of the Spirit as an inseparable but unique personal agent with the Father and the Son.91

Against this pervasive tendency of Gregory to invite the conclusion that what is personal in God is each of Father, Son, and Spirit there are only a few places where he could be read another way.92 At most, if one insisted on taking these two Godhead-as-person references literally, and not as personifications, Gregory could be charged with a bizarre quaternarianism according to which Father, Son, and Spirit would be distinct

soibid. (pp. 319-20). See also Jaeger, *Gregors Heilige Geist,* pp. 35-38. Jaeger observes that Gregory's approach to the divinity of the Spirit here is more speculative and less biblical than that of his brother Basil!

90 *On the Holy Spirit* (p. 319).

01 See also John J. Lynch, *"Prosopon* in Gregory of Nyssa: A Theological Word in Transition," *Theological Studies* 40 (1979) : 728-38. Lynch points out that the only examples Gregory ever gives of *prosopa* are of "rational, or spiritual, or self-conscious beings. Nowhere do we find reference to *prosopa* of the *ousia* horse or the *ousia* rock" (p. 738) .

92 A few times Gregory uses personal language of the Godhead itself or the divine nature, e.g., at *Against Eun.* 2. 11 and 5. 4 ("The Divine nature . . . . [controls] all creation"; "The Godhead 'empties' Itself that It may come within the capacity of the Human Nature .... "). But since Gregory reverts at once to speaking of Christ doing this ruling and " The Lord of Glory" doing this emptying, he may mean only that the ruling and emptying is done by a genuine instance of the Godhead.

personal agents, but so would *theotes.* Even then, however,
there is no solid support in the texts for reducing such quater-
narianism either to Prestige's paradox (God is seen and
thought as three centers of consciousness, but sees and thinks
as only one) or to the similar interpretation of Donald Baillie.
Gregory's Platonism might in general suggest such a reading.
Gregory himself does not.

If one adds to the habitual tendencies in Gregory's use of
language his favorite three-man analogy, the case for seeing
him as a three-person pluralist is strengthened.   One must con-
cede that analogies are notoriously tricky and misleading if
stretched to make points of comparison unintended by their
authors. In Gregory's case one might initially suppose, for ex-
ample, that though the three-man analogy shows ho-w one
"manness" or one "ideal man" could have three distinct ex-
hibitions, it does not entail anything further. In particular it
doesn't entail anything about the personhood of the three in
the divine analogue.

Perhaps.   But if we recall Gregory's *Tres Dei* solution to
Ablabius's dilemma. this narrow reading of Gregory's analogy
becomes much less likely. For the problem Ablabius set is this:
either we deny Godhead to Son and Spirit or else we concede
that there are three Gods. Gregory ignores the first horn of
the dilemma. It is simply " impious and absurd." What he
rather wants to consider at length is *three who are divine but
only one God,* i.e., " not three gods." And he does this by argu-
ing that among the three there is complete sameness of nature
and unity of work.

How does the three-man analogy fit in? Of course Gregory
believes that one nature can have distinct manifestations.   But
he does not use his analogy to show that. He rather uses it the
other way around-to show how three divine persons can yet
together be only one God. Gregory does this by adducing an
analogue: three human persons are, despite appearances and
our unfortunate use of language, only one man. So, similarly,
the three divine persons are-despite appearances and seem-

ingly logical language considerations-only one God. In neither case is the personhood of the three at issue. What is at issue in both cases, and what emerges as the point of comparison, is oneness of nature and the resultant legitimacy of saying " one God," just as we ought to say " one man."

Gregory's three-man analogy thus supports, and is not merely consistent with, his habitual use of personal language with respect to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. His language suggests that he conceives of them as personal agents distinct from one another. His analogy tries to show how they can still be one God.

Conclusion

In judging the degree of continuity between these fourth century ideas and contemporary social analogy theories one must, of course, exercise proper reserve. Gregory does not speak of " centers of consciousness " or of " personalities." He does not call the Trinity a " society." He shows little interest in developing the sorts of mutuality and intersubjectivity themes that are regnant in a part of the twentieth century tradition. And expectably he has nothing to say to the particular interest of liberationist trinitarians in grounding a redeeming political praxis in a social view of God. In fact Gregory says very little generally about the broader implications of his view.[98]

Still, though Gregory presents no full-blown social analogy he does set a direction and make a contribution. First, he pretty clearly thinks of Father, Son, and Spirit as persons in the kind of full sense of " person " required for a social analogy. He does not use the phrase "center of consciousness," but he does consistently depict Father, Son, and Spirit as distinct ac-

us Gregory's doctrine of the image of God is pluralist-or, at least, not merely individual. Leys, *L'image chez 8. Greg.,* pp. 64-78, 93, 120-21, observes that for Gregory the image of God is not merely the human individual, with his various faculties, but also humanity (" le pier6me" de I'humanite); i.e., the whole *genre.* Gregory also thinks the Church is the image of God in a particular way. But he does not develop either of these ideas as clear implications of his trinitarianism.

tors, knowers, willers, and lovers-what *we* would call centers
of consciousness whether Gregory did or not.

Second, Gregory's use of the three-man analogy offers a logi-
cal and theological base on which a fuller social theory could be
built. Again, he does not call the divine analogue a "society,"
but he does conceive Father, Son, and Spirit to be related to
each other in some ways comparable to those within a human
society. There are, first, the quasi-genetic "of " or " from"
relations of fatherhood, sonship, and spirithood that at once
distinguish and link the three. There is also such unity of work
and, as in the case of three men, unity of nature as to protect
our right to speak of " one God." Altogether Gregory offers a
relatively consistent and coherent account of how three per-
sons, though several members, can yet be one body, one act-
ing unity, one God in nature and work-what we would call a
divine society whether Gregory used the phrase or not.

Surely Gregory did not see Father, Son, and Spirit as *sepa-
rate* or *a.utonorrwus* persons a.long the lines of Cartesian indi-
vidualism.94 There is for him no individual independence with-
in the divine life even if God the Trinity is infinite and *a se*
over against the world. But neither, on the other side, can
Gregory be charged (or credited) with so muddling (or quali-
fying) his theory with perichoretic, modalist, and simplicity
concepts as to render it paradoxical along the lines suggested
by Baillie and Prestige. Gregory's notion of God's transcend-
ence lies rather in the area of the infinity and sheer ineffability
of the divine nature and the unthinkable unity of the divine
work. For our belief in the three divine persons this is an ex-
quisite mystery, but not an incoherence, and Gregory is wise
enough to preserve the difference.

CORNELIUS PLANTINGA, JR.

Galvin Theological Seminary
Grand Rapids, Michigan

94 Indeed, most contemporary social analogists take pains to distance
themselves from such a view. See, for example, Moltmann, *Trinity,* p. 145;
Bracken "Trinity as Community," p. 179. See also Migliore, *Freedom,* pp.
66, 74.

'TO BE' OR 'TO EXIST': THAT IS THE QUESTION

T HE LATIN *esse* of St. Thomas Aquinas is rendered by
n amazing variety of terms: the verb ' to be,' the noun
r present participle 'being,' 'to exist' (or the noun
' existence ') or the Latin *esse.¹* The purpose of this article is
to re-examine the original meaning of *esse* for Aquinas and
show that its translation by the term ' existence,' as this no-
tion is understood today, often obscures and even distorts the
meaning attached to *esse* by Aquina.s.1•

Aquinas does, however, also use *existere* and its derivatives.
At the outset, three points must be noted. First, without ma.k-
ing an exact numerical count, we can see easily that the fre-
quency of *existere* is completely overshadowed by that of *esse.*
Moreover, when it really counts, Aquinas's reasoning is based
on the use (and meaning) of the precise word *esse.²* So we

2 By way of illustration: the ' existence of God is discussed in terms of
An Deus sit and *Deum esse,* in *Summa Theologiae,* ed. P. Caramello (Turin:

1 By way of illustration: Etienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St.
Thomas Aquinas* (London: Victor Collancz, 1957), after stating that *esse* is
best translated by 'act-of-being' (p. 27), writes on one and the same page
(p_ 38): "the existence *(esse),"* the untranslated *esse* by itself, "any object
that *is"* (in the absolute and therefore, as we shall see, now archaic use),
and (n. 23 on p. 447) " act-of-existing."

·1a The basic ideas for this article were developed in Alabama in the 1970s
and written out in Zimbabwe in the early 1980s, so that in the view of
parameters of time and space the *Index Thomisticus* was out of reach. The
Index gives overwhelming support, as far as frequency of use is concerned,
for my main thesis that Aquinas writes a metaphysics of being, not of
existence. The total occurrence of *esse* is close to half a million, that of
existere a little over 4,000; of the latter, more than 3,000 are participles
which, with a few exceptions, function as the participle of *esse,* whose noun
ens, again, with a few exceptions, functions as a noun. In the authentic
works the noun *existentia* occurs a meager 68 times. The *Index* does not
have a specific listing for several incidental occurrences of *existere* in the
original, etymological sense, viz. accompanied by *a, de,* or *ex.*

353

must say that Aquinas presents a metaphysics of *esse,* not of *existere* (and even less of 'existence').   *Existere,* as we shall see, serves mainly as some kind of auxiliary verb to *esse.*

Second, the Latin word *existere* has had a curious history of its own, a fact which has received remarkably little attention. [3] In classical Latin, it had basically the strong meaning of *ex-(s)istere* (often with the extra ' s ') , viz., 'to come out of.' But in early medieval Latin, *existere* began to be used seemingly as a synonym for *esse.*[4] Several centuries later a. similar process can be observed in our West European languages.

Third, without deciding for the moment whether for the scholastic philosophers after Aquinas *existere* was indeed synonymous with their *esse* and also without deciding for the moment whether Aquinas attached a specific meaning to *existere* in contrast with *esset* we can see that two things are certain: first (and I repeat), Aquinas presents a metaphysics of *esse,* not of 'existence'; second, the intended meaning of Aquinas's *esse* is obscured, if not distorted, by the term 'existence '-and I stress: as this notion is understood today.

Let me begin with a few linguistic forays into the meaning and use of' exist (ere)' and some related issues.

Marietti, 1952), I, q. 2; this work will hereafter be abbreviated as *ST.* Cf. *Summa Oontra Gentiles, Editio Leonina Manualis* (Rome: Leonine Commission, 1934), I, 10-13; hereafter abbreviated as *OG.* A second example is the ' real distinction ' which is always discussed as one of *essentia* and *esse;* cf. Cornelio Fabro, *Participation et Oausalite* (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1961), p. 282.

   s Helpful in this respect has been an article by A. C. Graham, " ' Being ' in Linguistics and Philosophy: A Preliminary Inquiry," *Foundations of Language,* Vol. I 1965), pp. 223-231; see the references on p. 223, n. 4. E. Gilson, *L'Etre et l'essence* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1948), pp. 13-15, sees some 'mysterous process' at work in the introduction of this new word (but, as we shall see, *emistere* was not a new word but was beginning to be used in a broader sense than in classical Latin.

   4 The question whether one must speak of a ' (conceptual) synonym ' or '(linguistic) alternative' or '(linguistic) substitute' will be haunting us throughout the article but, as we go along, a satisfactory solution, I trust, will be found.

I. FROM ' EX (S) ISTERE ' TO 'EXIST (ERE) ' ='TOBE THERE'

1. *'To exist' as' to be there'*

'To be'   In today's West European languages, such as English, good usage requires that, apart from a few exceptions, the verb ' to be' be followed by some kind of complement. [5]   These complements can be divided into two groups. The first group consists of nouns and adjectives, so that ' to be ' functions as copula: "He is a doctor"; **"I** am ill." The other group, which is more interesting for our immediate purpose, consists of various kinds of locative phrases: "He is in the room," "She is outside," and, generally and basically, "They are there (here) ."

But this has not always been so. There was a time for the English language, when the so-called 'copulative ' and ' existential ' functions were expressed by the one and the same verb ' to be.' The ' existence ' of God could only be expressed as, ' God is,' and not as, ' God exists,' because, as we are about to see, the verb' exist' was not available for this purpose. [6]

An interesting example is Hamlet's famous line, "To be or not to be: That is the question." [7]   Most of us are so familiar with this statement that we hardly notice that its absolute use of 'to be,' i.e., without a complement, is an archaism. [8]   This may perhaps become clearer if we rearrange the words in the statement into something like, " The question for me is to decide: to be or not to be." Most men and women in the street (but not perhaps most philosophers!) would feel such a state-

---

[5] I speak of ' good usage,' which is rare among philosophers, as we have already seen inn. l ("any object that is"). The reason is that philosophers often discuss philosophical problems raised by Plato and Aristotle, by Anselm and Aquinas, who could indeed use *einai* and *esse* without a complement.

[6] Yet 'God exists' is a more meager statement than Aquinas's *Deus est* (cf. *ST* I, q. 2, a. 1) .

[7] *Hamlet* III, 1. 56, written ca. 1602 according to *The Complete Works,* ed. W. J. Craig (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1957, reprinted).

[8] The term is used by Graham, op. *cit.,* p. 230.

ment to be incomplete and wonder, 'to be or not to be *what?* '

But in Shakespeare's time the verb 'to be' was still the appropriate word to express what we now call the ' existential ' function, simply because the verb ' to exist ' was not yet in general use. *The Oxford English Dictionary* seems at a loss to understand this: "The late appearance of the word is remarkable." [9] And when 'to exist' finally made its appearance, it was used initially in the strong sense, and therefore sparingly. The verb occurs only three times in the whole of Shakespeare's works. An example of the strong and etymologically suggested meaning is, " The orbs *from* whom we do exist." [10]

'To be there'   The verb 'to exist,' not only in the 'strong' sense but also, as we shall see, ma.inly in the ' weak ' sense, is thus a relatively new phenomenon in our West European langua.ges. The situation today is that in the actual practice of the English language the verb ' to exist ' is basically the equivalent of, or convertible with, ' to be there.' Thus, in speaking of the existence of God, we can either say, 'God exists ' or' There is a God.' [11]

This linguistic practice is consonant with what modem philosophy holds about the meaning of ' to exist,' which is said to be a ' locative ' one: " Existential sentences might be described as implicitly locative," and: "The primary sense of 'to exist' may perhaps be ' to be somewhere," [12] ultimately in the world.

[9] See under 'EXIST.' The same dictionary does list examples of older uses of derivatives of ' exist,' such as the noun 'existence' (ca. 1384, Chaucer) and the adjective' existent' (1561).

[10] *Lear* I, 1, 112. The other two occurrences are *Othello* III, iv, 112, and *Measure for Measure* III, 1. 20.

[n] The locative 'there' is an unfortunate byproduct in our English language, suggesting that God exists somewhere; this is not the case in French and German with their *il y a* and *es gibt.* For some reservations about the complete interchangeability of 'to exist' and 'to be there,' see Jonathan Barnes, *The Ontological Argument* (London: Macmillan, 1972), p. 61.

[12] Quoted in Barnes, *op. cit.,* p. 63, and Barnes's own formulation, p. 64, respectively. The issue is treated at length by Milton K. Munitz, *Existence and Logic* (New York: New York Univ. Press, 1974), for whom the meaning of existence is: "what is 'out there'" (p. xiv and *passim)* ; cf. n_ 20

That is why I call existence an ' all-or-nothing' notion; something is either in a place or not there. Once we accept this, we begin to see that speaking of degrees of ' existence,' as many Thomists do, might not be such a felicitous expression after an.1a

The question is: How, or when, did *existere* in its weaker sense make its appearance in Latin?   And also, how did 'to exist,' mainly in its weak sense, enter on to the scene of English, German, and French?   As is obvious, I shall have to limit myself to a few soundings.

2. *Latin: From ' exSistere ' to ' existere '*

There is clear evidence for the Latin language that there has been a transition from *exsistere* in the strong sense, as may be indicated by the extra ' e ', to *existere* in the weak sense. One example of the classical, strong sense may suffice: *vivos existere vermes stercore de tetro.* [14]

Another instance, precious for our purpose, occurs in Boethius's *De Hebdomadibus,* which is even the only instance of *existere* in that work: *Actu non potuerunt existere, nisi ea quod vere bonum est produxisset.* Curiously enough Aquinas, in his commenta.ry, while practically rewriting Boethius's sentence, replaces *existere* by *esse: non potuerunt esse in actu ...* [15]

below. (It is perhaps ironic that the Existentialists, in describing existence, place the emphasis on that other time-honored element, viz. time.) Some current English phrases containing ' to be ' in its absolute use, such as ' cease to be' and 'he is no more' are perhaps implicitly locative, viz. cease to be 'in the world; and he is no more 'with us.'

[18] Cf. Barnes, *op. cit.,* p. 65: "[E]xistence cannot be a *differentia* since all things exist " (cf. also pp. 45-50) .

[14] The statement is by Lucretius and figures prominently in Latin die· tionaries, under "E.x (s) isto." These dictionaries list other, weaker or broader meanings of *ea::(s)istere,* such as 'appear, to be, exist,' the first of which can be regarded as signifying the consequence of *ea::istere* as 'to come out of' (cf. the English 'ex-ist' and the Dutch 'be-staan ').

·[15] *In Librum Boetii De Hebdomadibus Ea::positio,* in *Opuscula Theologica,* Vol. II, ed. R. Spiazzi (Turin: Marietti, 1954) II, lect. 5, pp. 406-407; hereafter *In De Hebd.* The 'existere' in the text must be understood as 'come into being.' The text of Boethius is taken from Migne, PL 1314 A; Aquinas's commentary is in # 66.

Middle Ages   It is to be expected, given the specific meaning of *existere,* that this verb would not be used with any great frequency. Some centuries later, however, a curious change appears to have occurred, or rather, to be occurring. The first ' s ' is now constantly being dropped and, with this new look, the word is used with much greater frequency than in classical Latin. When we study the context, it begins to look as if *existere* now functions as an alternative for *esse.*

I limit myself to one work only, but one which is again significant for our present purpose, viz. the Latin translation of *De Divinis Naminibus/6* made around 1150 and used by Aquinas in his commentary upon this work. The verb *exiatere* and its derivatives occur there with great frequency. When we study how this *existere* is used, we make an important discovery: it a.ppears that the plural noun and participle *onta* is translated by *existentia.* and the noun and participle *on* by *existen.Y.* On the other hand, *esti* as a copula is rendered by *est,* it seems.[17] From the fact that the identical Greek *einai* in its various forms is translated by both *existere* and *esse,* it seems safe to conclude that the two words are regarded as synonyms or at least as linguistic alternatives, close enough in meaning to render the identical Greek *einai.*

Anselm   It might be useful, in view of the popularity of Anselm's ontological argument, to see whether, or how frequently, he uses *existere.* Many students of Anselm may here be surprised. In the *Proslogion* itself the precise word *existere* is found only once, in the concluding sentence of the much-discussed chapter two: *Existit ergo procul dubio aJ,iquid quo maius cogitari non valet.*[18] Anselm's entire reasoning is there-

---

1a *[n Librum Beati Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus l!Jwpositio,* ed. C. Pera (Turin: Marietti, 1950), p. xv and p. xxii. Hereafter *In De Dw. Nom.*

1.7 It would take us too far afield to undertake a lexicological study of both the Latin translation and Aquinas's commentary to see whether there is any precise criterion for their choice of *ewistere* or *esse.*

18 The text (Latin and English) is in M. J. Charlesworth, *St. Anselm's Proslogion* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), p. 116. In this precise sentence,

fore based on the precise verb *esse,* a fact which has hardly
been noticed by writers on the subject. This is enough reason
to wonder whether this simple linguistic fact has any bearing
on the interpretation of what Anselm intended to say. As we
shall see, this might well be the case.

Aquinas   Coming now to Aquinas, we find him using *existere*
alongside *esse* with greater frequency than, say Anselm in his
Proslogion.. But, as stated above, Aqurinas writes a. meta.-
physios which is based on *esse,* not on *existere.* The only occa-
sion when Aquinas will constantly use *existere* is when he
writes a sentence in which the present participle of *esse* is
needed; he then writes *existens* whereas *ens* seems to function
as the noun of *esse.*[19] But, wha:tever the case may be, my thesis
enunciated in the opening paragraph stands. For, if Aquinas's
existere were identical with his *esse,* then, given the specific
meaning of this *esse,* as definitely understood by him, a transla-
tion in the terminology of existence, as this notion is under-
stood today, is most inadequate.

3. *West European languages:* ' *to be* ' *and* ' *to exist'*

When we study the writings of some of the great philos-
ophers of the 17th and 18th century with respect to their use
of 'to exist,' we notice two things. First, there is a certain un-
easiness in their use of 'to exist,' which must be attributed to
the newness of this word, as we have shown for the English
language. This uneasiness shows itself as follows: 'to exist,' a
clear word to us, is found to be in need of being explained or
circumscribed. And this explanation is done in a way which

the strong sense of *existere* might still linger in the background, in the sense
that 'something-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought'   is something 'out-
side ' the mind.

[19] It appears that Aquinas uses *existere* with (much) greater frequency
when he comments on a translation in which the word occurs with some fre-
quency than when he writes an independent work. This is most clearly the
case with *In De Div. Nom.,* where *existere* is perhaps used with much greater
frequency than in any other work.

we today would regard as clumsy, unnecessary, or tautological. Second, from the way in which ' to be' and ' to exist ' are juxtaposed and interchanged, there exists little doubt that the two are thought to be linguistic alternatives, if not conceptual synonyms. [20]

Thus Locke speaks of things that " exist, or have existence," where the addition 'have existence ' would seem unnecessary to us. [21] In a similar vein Locke explains that knowledge "of actual real existence " refers to an idea which " has a real existence without the mind." Note also the following juxtaposition, " ' God is,' is of real existence." [22]

We find a similar kind of hedging in Hume, writing some fifty years after Locke. The noun ' existence ' is tautologically defined as meaning, ' to be existent.' [23] Hume also interchanges 'to be,' in the absolute use (as Locke also did, in 'God is'), with 'to exist ' when in one sentence he speaks of " what actually is " and a few sentences later of what " may exist." A few pages later ' to be nowhere ' is interchanged with ' exist nowhere.' [24]

Crossing the channel, we find, no doubt to the surprise of most of us, that *Cogito ergo sum* is not exactly what Descartes wrote. For in both the Latin text and in the French transla.-

[20] *Esse,* as understood by Aquinas, is indeed a concept, but there is doubt whether ' existence,' as defined by the philosophers under discussion, can be termed a concept or, in Kant's phrase, 'a real predicate.' Cf. n. 99 below.

[21] John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,* Everyman's Library (London: Dent; New York: Dutton, revised ed., 1965), Vol. I, Book II, Ch. viii, # 1 (p. 101).

[22] *An Essay* .. ., Vol. II, Book IV, Ch. 1, # 7 (p. 135).

[23] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature,* Everyman's Library (London: Dent; New York: Dutton, 1911), Vol. I, Book II, Part Two, Section vi (p. 71) . In the same section Hume also speaks of ' being' and 'entity,' but these two words appear to mean the same as existence, which is described as a notion without ' content': "To reflect on anything simply, and to reflect on it as existent, are nothing different from each other. That idea [of existence], when conjoined with the idea of any object, makes no addition to it" *(ibid.),* We shall soon see Kant repeating the same idea, when he states that being (existence?) is not a real predicate.

[24] *Treatise* . . ., Vol. I, Book I, Part IV, Section v (pp. 222-225).

tion made under his supervision we find the addition, " or
exist." This is faithfully reflected in the Haldane-Ross trans-
lation in these passages: " I think, hence I am or exist," " I
am, I exist, that is certain," and " This proposition, I am or
exist, is necessarily true." [25] Speaking of the existence of God,
Descartes uses *esse* and *existere* in one and the same sentence:
*Nam quid ex se est apertius, quam summum ens esse, sive
Deum . .. existere?* [26]

Kant, writing as late as the second half of the 18th century,
offers an amazing example of interchanging and juxtaposing
sein and *existiren.* This can be established by analyzing the
famous passage where the ontological argument is rejected.
Here are some examples, side by side with the English trans-
lation by Norman Kemp Smith: [21]

Dieses oder jedes Ding ... existirt, ist.	This or that thing ... exists
Gott ist, oder es ist ein Gott.	God is, or " there is a God."
Gott ist nicht	There is no God. (God does not exist.) [28]
Dieses Ding ist .. ..: dasz gerade der Gegenstand meines Begriffes existire.	This thing *is* ... ; that the object of my concept exists.
Dasz ich diesen Gegenstand als slechthin gegeben (durch den Ausdruk: er ist) denke.	By my thinking its object (through the expression ' it is ') as given absolutely.

2s *The Philosophical Works of Descartes,* tr. by Elizabeth S. Haldane and
G. R. T. Ross (Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1967). The three quotations are in
Vol. II, *Reply to Objections,* II, Thirdly (p. 38) and in Vol. I, *Meditationes,*
II (p. 151 and 150) respectively.

2a *Oeuvres de Descartes,* ed. by Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (Paris:
Leopold Cerf, 1904), Vol. VII, *Meditationes de Prima Philosophia,* V (p. 69) .

21 The German expressions are in *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Leipzig:
Philipp Reclam, 1781), pp. 470-474 (A 597-600 or B 625-628). The English
translations are from *Critique of Pure Reason,* tr. by Norman Kemp Smith
(London: Macmillan, 1933), pp. 503-506.

2s The translation in brackets is from the Everyman's Library edition,
made by J.M. D. Meiklejohn (London: Dent; New York: Dutton, 1934), p.
348.

From this interchanging   and juxtaposing of *sein* and *exist-iren,* one must conclude that for Kant these words are not merely 1ingui,stic alternaitives but perfect synonyms.   The same conclusion must be dra.wn from the way in which both *sein* and *existiren* are defined as all-or-nothing notions: in the last sentence above, *ist* is described as something which is given 'absolutely,' in contrast   with being possible; in the preceding sentence *ist* and *existirt* refer to something which has in the terminology   of Aquinas   *esse in rerum natura,* which is Aquinas's way of saying that something is 'to be found in the world.' [29] Finally, the conceptual identity of *existiren* and *sein* can also be gathered   from two statements   of Kant's   ' fundamental metaphysical   (or rather, non-metaphysical)   policy,' where in the one case *Existenz* is used and *Sein* in the other. In the one statement,   Kant expresses the hope that finally somebody (read: Kant)   will give "an accurate determination   of the concept   *(Begriff)* of existence";   here we find *Existenz.* But in the other statement   that "Being is not a real predicate," the word is *Sein.* [30]

Of the latter statement,   famous as it may be, it must be said that it is the result of a colossal linguistic blindness. For Kant simply overlooked the fact, which is clear in contemporary English and German, that the ' is,' in ' God is,' has a different function from the 'is' in 'God is almighty.'   In the first case, the ' is ' has an existential function, as is obvious in today's acceptable formulation, 'God exists.' In the second case, the ' is ' has a copulative function, which function exercises, according to Aquinas, also a very ' metaphysical ' function.[31]

---

[29] I shall return to this phrase in a later section.

[30] Both quotations   are on p. 504 in the translation   by Smith.

[31] Cf. Graham,   *loo. cit.,* p. 230 on Kant.   For the ' metaphysical'   function of *est* in Aquinas, I refer to *In Aristotelis Libras Peri Hermeneias et Posteriorum Analyticorum Empositio,* ed. R. Spiazzi (Turin: Marietti, 1955), *In Peri Hermeneias* I, lect. 5, # 73 (22); abbreviated   as *In Peri Herm.*

II. AQUINAS: *ESSE* AS FULLNESS

Aquinas has been credited with having discovered, or rather, with having made explicit, that *esse,* as it was used and understood by him in the Latin language, signifies fullness, the total fullness of God and the partial fullness of creatures. Therefore this *esse* must be spoken of both in quantitative terms, such as fullness, content, and even quantity, and in qualitative terms, such as intensity, power, nobility. [32]

1. *Aquinas's' esse' defined, illustrated, textually supported*

It is Fabro's thesis that Aquinas's discovery of the meaning of *esse* has hardly been   I see two possible ex-

[32] The Thomistic origin of these terms will appear as we go on. In the meantime, here is one quotation and a few references. The phrase *Plenitudo essendi* is applied to God and creatures: *Solus autem Deus habet plenitudinem sui esse secundum aliquid unum et simplex; unaquaeque vero res alia habet plenitudinem essendi sibi convenientem secundum diversa (ST* I-II, q. 18, a. 1). The notion of 'intensive being' is illustrated and explained by Fabro in *Participation* ..., p. 253. n. 78 and p. 257, n. 26. A very explicit formulation of the 'quantitative' nature of *esse* is in John A. Peters, *Metaphysics. A Systematic Survey* (Duquesne Studies, Phil. Series 16; Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1963) : "The all-embracing nature of *being* means that it constitutes also all contents, all essences. An essence ... has value only because it contains more or less *being;* because it indicates the measure in which a being participates in *being,* which as 'to be' does not include any imperfection" (p. 108). Both Lotz and de Finance use quantitative phrases to refer to being (which, to my knowledge, are absent-and, in view of his understanding of being as existence, had to be absent-in Gilson). Thus Lotz speaks of being as *Fiille* (fullness) and *Inhalt* (content) and of *Inhaltliche FiUle;* creatures possess only *ein begrenzter Ausschnitt des Seins* (a limited 'section'); see Johannes B. Lotz, *Das Urteil und das Sein,* second ed. (Pullach: Verlag Berchmanskolleg, 1957), pp. 151, 156, and 152 respectively. De Finance writes that limitation affects a being "in a *quantitative* manner, so to speak, reducing it to realize only a certain *degree* or *quantum of perfection"* (emphases added) ; see de Finance, *Etre et Agir,* second ed. (Rome: Gregorian University, 1960), p. xii.

[33] See C. Fabro, *Participation* ..., pp. 280ff. Cf. Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers,* second ed. corrected and enlarged (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952), p. 108 and p. 154. Note the "Cf," however, because Gilson's alleged discovery that, for Aquinas, "existence" is "a constitutive element *of* being" *(op. cit.,* p. 154) finds no textual support in

planations for this failure. The first explanation concerns the
doubling of *existere* for *esse:* the scholastic philosophers tended
to think of Aquinas',s *esse* in terms of their *existere;* and be-
cause this *existere* was understood as a flat all-or-nothing no-
tion, very much along the same lines as today's existence, the
depth which Aquinas gave to *esse* became lost, or was perhaps
never seen at all.

The second explanation, the one to be pursued here, con-
cerns the difficulty of making concretely clear how *esse* can
and does signify a certain quantity and/or intensity. In what
follows I attempt to offer a concrete approach to what I see as
the meaning of *esse* as fullness in Aquinas.

a. Two' definitions'

My starting-point is two definitions or, better perhaps, two
clarifications, of what 'to be' *(esse)* meant for Aquinas. [34]

(1) To be= not not-to-be.
Admittedly, this is not a proper definition, because it repeats
the definiendum, and the definition is couched in negative
terms, even a double negative. But this procedure is unavoid-
able with this most basic and fundamental notion and, more-
over, it serves to make a contrast with the second definition.

This first definition is not the most apt one to express prop-
erly the meaning of Aquinas's *esse* because, as it stands, it
fails to indicate the depth proper to Aquinas's *esse.* For the
' not not-to-be ' simply denies non-being, nothingness, and can
therefore be said to apply both to the scholastic notion of
existentia and to the modern locative notion of existence,
which are both all-or-nothing notions. The definition would
gain in depth if we were to add ' in varying degrees,' an addi-
tion which is perhaps more spontaneously suggested by the
second definition.

Aquinas's writings taken as a whole. From this it also follows that the con-
trast 'essentialism-existentialism   ' does not faithfully   reflect Aquinas's
deepest metaphysical   concern.

[34] I am writing 'to be' in its absolute, 'archaic' use, because 'to exist'
would not do for the second definition.

(2) To be= to stand out of (be removed from) nothing-ness.35 This formulation allows us to see more concretely that one being stands out of nothingness more than another being, which is then less removed from nothingness. The various existing beings can be thought of as standing out of nothing-ness in varying degrees of height, for which the metaphysical explanation of Aquinas will be that they have received or possess being *(esse)* in different quantities or degrees of in-tensity. A higher being is further removed from nothingness than a lower being; or, with a different metaphor: a higher being is a fuller being than a lower being which is, so to speak, a thinner being.

Several passages in Aquinas define the status of being in the various creatures along the same lines, with this difference, that the yardstick is not the distance from nothingness but the nearness to God, who possesses, or rather is, the fullness of being:

> To the degree that a creature comes closer to God, to that extent does it partake of being; but to the degree that it recedes from him, to that extent does it partake of non-being. 36

> We can ascertain how much of the nobility of being is held by each of the creatures, by considering how close it is to God or how distant it is from him. 37

b. *Images*

In order to arrive a.t a more concrete understanding of *esse* as fullness, I devised several images. I used to be apologetic

---

35 It is perhaps a little ironic that this definition is couched in terms reminiscent of the classical *ex(s)istere,* which association is lost with today's 'to exist.'

as *Esse simpliciter et absolitte dictum, de solo divino esse intelligitur* ... *Unde quantum creatura accedit ad Deum, tantum habet de esse; quantum vero ab eo reoedit, tantum habet de non esse.* In *Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate,* in *Quaestiones Disputatae,* I, ed. R. Spiazzi (Turin: Marietti, 1953), q. 2, a. 3 ad 16. Hereafter abbreviated as *De Ver.*

37 *Ex hoc potest sciri quantum unumquodqiw existentium habeat de nobili-tate essendi, quod appropinquat Ei vel distat ab Eo.* In *In De Div. Nom.* IV, lect. 3, # 310; cf. *ibid.* II, lect. 5, # 203.

about using such concrete images in such an abstract field as
metaphysics, until I discovered that Aquinas, following the
lead of pseudo-Dionysius, uses images of a similar kind. [38]
Images of light and wa.ter Let us imagine the night sky
bedecked with thousands of stars. All the stars, as they **are**
visible to the naked eye, are equally there to be seen but, at
the same time, the various stars differ in brightness. This
image can be applied to illustrate the two definitions of being
given above by regarding the light of the stars as the symbol
of being and the dark sky as the symbol of nothingness.

The first application considers the stars as they are equally
there (to be seen) and disregards the varying degrees of
brightness. This gives us an illustration of the fact of exist-
ence, of existence as an all-or-nothing notion, along the lines of
'to be ' defined as 'not not-to-be.' [39]

The second application regards the stars with their different
degrees of brightness. These can be likened to the various de-
grees of ' to be,' defined as ' to be removed from nothingness,'
nothingness being represented by the darkness of the sky. **If**
we want to be very concrete, we can divide the stars according
to four degrees of brightness and thus obtain a vivid illustra-
tion of the four degrees of being: the stars which are barely

[38] William E. Carlo, " The Role of Essence in Existential Metaphysics: A
Reappraisal," *International Philosophical Quarterly* (Vol. 2, *No.* 4 [Decem-
ber, 1962], p. 588) also uses some metaphors, but in this case to illustrate
how essence limits *esse* (Carlo sometimes writes *esse,* sometimes 'existence').
The metaphors are pitchers with water and freezing liquid.

[39] This image could also be applied to the notion of *ens* (*esse) commune,*
because *omnia in esse conveniunt (CG* I. 42). However, it looks as **if**
Aquinas speaks about this common being in two different senses. The one
sense could more precisely be called 'unspecified' being, as when applied to
the notion of common animal: *... differens sicut determinatum ab indeter-
minato,* in *De Substantiis Separatis,* in *Opuscula Philosophica,* ed. R. Spiazzi
(Turin: Marietti, 1954), c. 6, # 72; cf. *ibid.,* c. 10, # 103; hereafter *De
Subst. Sep.* The other sense could be called 'basic' being, and often occurs
in the context of *esse* being something 'intimate,' as in *lpsum enim esse est
communissimus efjectus primus et intimior omnibus aliis effectibus,* in *Ques-
tiones Disputatae,* II, ed. P. Bazzi *et al.* (Turin: Marietti, 1953) ; *Questiones
Disputatae De Potentia,* q. 3, a. 7; hereafter abbreviated as *De Pot.*

visible represent the lowest degree of being, the material sub-
stances which *tan.tum sunt.*[40] Then, in ascending order of
brightness, we move up through the vegetative and animal
worlds to the human realm. Thus the brighter stars represent
those substances which have a more intense being, more being.

Once the principle behind the first image has been explained,
it will suffice to present briefly some other images and, to sim-
plify matters, apply them only along the second line of ' to be
removed from nothingness.'

A lamp which we assume to have four switches is turned on
in a dark room, and a weak glow of light appears. When the
switch is turned three more times, the light becomes brighter
and more intense. The initial glow can be regarded as the
lowest degree of being and the other three degrees of increas-
ing brightness as the other degrees of higher beings.

The following two images are related to water. A group of
small islands rises a.hove sea level; some islands barely appear
above the surface while others rise up to greater heights. The
islands according to their various heights represent the various
degrees of being.

The last image is one which I believe was also used by
Bergson for a similar purpose. Imagine a water fountain in
which some rays barely rise above the surface (inanimate mat-
ter), and other ra.ys rise higher ·and higher but then fall back
to the ground (plants and animals). We must now imagine a
powerful ray which stays up without ever falling back: human
beings who are immortal. In this particular image we can also
consider the subterranean source of the rays and liken it to
God, the Creator, who endows beings with different heights or
intensities of being.

There is perhaps one drawback to all these images: they all
represent material beings and therefore describe something
which is extended. Because of this, the idea of higher or lower
intensity (but not that of quantity) may become lost through

40 The notion of *esse tantu-m* will be further discussed below.

the prominence of the material, quantitative   extension. This
difficulty can be overcome by recalling that the higher a being
is on the scale of being, the more its vital organs ruling the
whole body are centralized, ultimately in the brain.   Such a
central point, then, can be thought of as the source of the in-
tensity of *esse.*[41] We shall soon see Aquinas adopting a similar
explanation.

Aquinas's images Aquinas used several images *(exempla)*
which he found in pseudo-Dionysius to explain the thesis that
the numerically different perfections found in creatures, and
signified by as many different names, are all one in God, united
as they are in, and named as they basically can be by, God's
infinite *Esse.* This perspective is therefore different from the
one in my images, in that these latter presented the partial full-
ness of *esse* in creatures, while the present perspective illus-
trates the total fullness of God's perfections, which can be sig-
nified by the one name and concept of *Esse,* without any addi-
tion.[42]

One of the images is that of numbers.   Every number higher
than **'I,'** say Dionysius and Aquinas, is virtually contained in
this number' 1 '.   This is said to mean that "all the properties
of all numbers are somehow present in the one number '1 '."
The number '1 ', then, represents the fullness of God's perfec-
tion, as this can be signified by the one word *Esse.*[48]

Perhaps a clearer example is that of the circle: the various
lines that can be drawn from the circumference to the center
represent the different perfections found in creatures.   These

[41] On the notion of centrality,   see J. Peters, *Metaphysics   ...* , p. 232. Cf. *ST*
I, q. 105, a. 5: *Forma rei est intra rem, et tanto magis quanto consideratur
ut prior et universalis.*

[42] On the notion of ' addition,' cf. *OG* I, 26: *Divinum autem esse est absque
additione non solum in cogitatione, sed etiam in rerum natura.* Cf. also n.
46 below.

[43]/n *De Div. Nom.* V, lect. 1, # 644: *Numerus uniformiter praeea:istit* in
*unitate,   quia wnitas virtute est omnis numerus   . . . Omnes proprietates
omnium numerorum aliquo modo inveniuntur in unitate.* Reference to the
same image in *op. cit.* V, lect. 1, # 627 and XIII, lect. 2, # 974.

various lines eventually converge in the center, where they can be thought of as forming an infinitely concentrated unity. This center can be made to represent God's pure and simple *Esse* which, as such, is of an infinite intensity (and, although this is less clear in this image, of an infinite quantity) .[44]

Another image is that of the soul, in which, " as in its common source, all the powers of the parts of an animal are rooted." [45] The intended application seems to be that, just as the soul is the source of the many different powers of an animal, so the one perfection called *Esse* contains and in the last analysis names whatever perfection is in God; but this one-and-infinite perfection of *Esse* is reflected, and must be named, by the many different qualities found in creatures.

o. Textual support from Aquinas for' esse' as (partial) fullness

My final task in this section is to provide textual support for the interpretation of Aquinas's *esse* as fullness, as content, or, to put it strongly, as the basic ingredient, a.s the stuff, that makes all existing beings into what they are; so it will not do to render this *esse* in the terminology of today's existence. *Esse,* by itself, is for Aquinas the most complete description of God, whereas creatures are what they are by having a specific kind of *esse,* which is only a partial *esse.*

God Perhaps one of the clearest passages, which affirms what wa.s stated in the last sentence, comes from the beginning of Aquinas's writing career:

Other names signify ' to be ' under some specific aspect; e.g., 'wise' means to be something. But this name, 'He who is,' signi-

---

44 *Ibid.,* V (Iect. I, # 645: *In centro omnes lineae quae deducuntur ad circumferentiam, simul existunt sicut in principio communi ... Sicut ab uno principio producuntur in multitudinem, ita eorum multitudo terminatur ad centrum, sicut ad terminum.* For the notion of quantity as applied to God, see *OG* I, 43.

45 *Ibid.,* # 647: *In anima, sicut in causa communi, praeexistunt omnes virtutes partium animalis, quibus toti corpori praevidetur. Omnes enim virtutes radicantur in anima sicut in communi radice.*

fies ' to be ' in the absolute sense, which is not specified by some addition; and therefore, says Damascene . . ., it signifies a certain infinite sea of substance, without any specification.46

I wish to stress that the idea of *esse* as fullness is present in fully developed state right from the start of Aquinas's teaching career. Thus we read in *De Ente et Essentia:* "God possesses all perfections in his very own ' to be.' " 47 The same idea is expressed in *In De Div. Nom.,* where this idea, as we have seen, is concretely illustrated by several *exempla:* " It is through his very divine ' to be ' that God possesses the fullness of perfection." 48

Creatures Consequently, creatures are creatures precisely because they lack the fullness of ' to be ' itself, which is only found in God: " That which is called 'to be ' is not found in its fullness in any of the creatures." 48 " Aquinas has various phrases to explain why, or in what way, creatures lack the fullness of 'to be': 'modes' of being, 'participation,' being 'received ' and therefore 'limited ':

46 *Alia autem nomina dicunt esse seoundum aliquam rationem determi·natam; siout 'sapiens' dioit aliquid esse. Sed hoc nomen ' Qui est ' dioit esse absolutum et non determinatum per aliquod additum; et ideo (dioit Damasoenus . . .) signifioat quoddam pelagus substantiae infinitum, quasi non determinatum.* In *Scriptum Super Sententiis Magistri Petri Lombardi,* ed. P. Mandonnet (I-II) and M. Moos (III-IV) (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929-1947), I, d. 8, q. 1, ad 4. Note that in these translations I often render *esse* by 'to be,' although in English, unlike Latin (cf. n. 122), one can recognize being as a noun by its being preceded by an article (or followed by an ' s ' when used in plural) and being as a verb by the participle 'being'; this latter rendering will also be used in these pages.

47 *Deus in ipso esse suo omnes perfeotiones habet.* In *De Ente et Essentia,* in *Opusoula Philosophioa,* ed. R. Spiazzi (Turin: Marietti, 1954), c. 5, # 30; hereafter abbreviated as *De Ente.*

48 *CG* III, 20: *Ipsum enim esse divinum omnem plenitudinem perfectionis obtinet.* This is clearly a Dionysian idea. In this respect, it is striking how often Dionysius is quoted in the first ten or so questions of *ST.* What Dionysius said, or rather perhaps, what .Aquinas made him say, has had a great influence on .Aquinas's notion of *esse* as fullness.

48• *Hoc autem quod est esse, in nullius creaturae ratione perfecte includitur (De Ver.* q. 10, a. 12).

There is pure ' to be' in God, because He is His own subsistent 'To Be'; in creatures however, there is received and participated ' to be.' [49]

God's ' To Be,' which is not received in something but is ' to be,' pure and simple, is not limited to some mode of the perfection of 'to be,' but contains the totality of 'to be' itself. [50]

To indicate the difference between the ' to be ' of God and that of creatures Aquinas will say, as a rule, that God *is* 'to be,' while creatures *have* 'to be': "Only God is his own 'to be,' c.veatureshave' to be' ... " [51]

When Aquinas speaks of ' modes ' of being, 'mode ' must be understood not only in the qualitative sense of a specific 'kind' of being, but also in the quantitative sense of a certain quantity of being, or a certain *mensura.* In the following passage I have rendered *perfectius* by' more fully':

It is not required that the same mode of being is found in everything that is said to ' exist' (*esse*) ; but some things participate more fully in 'to be,' other things less fully. [52]

[49] *Et sic in Deo est esse purum, quia ipse est suum esse subsist ens; in creatura autem est esse receptum vel participatum* (*De Ver.,* q. 21, a. 5).

[50] *Esse autem Dei, cum non sit in aliquo receptum, sed sit esse purum, non limitatur ad aliquem modum perfectionis essendi, sed totum esse in se habet* (*De Pot.,* q. 1, a. 2). Cf. *Infinitum esse non potest nisi illud in quo omnis essendi perfectio includitur . . . [Dei] essentia non limitatur ad aliquam determinatam perfectionem, sed in se includit omnem modum per·fectionis, ad quem ratio entitatis se emtendere potest* (*De Ver.,* q. 29, a. 3).

[51] *Salus Deus est suum esse; quamvis alia esse habeant, quod esse non est divinum* (*De Ver.,* q. 21, a. 4 ad 7). However, when Aquinas describes God's *esse* as fullness, he will also speak of *esse habere: Deus igitur, qui est suum esse •.. , habet esse secundum to tam virtutem ipsius esse* (*CG* I, 28).

[52] *Non est requirendus idem modus essendi in omnibus quae esse dicuntur; sed quaedam perfectius, quaedam imperfectiu.s esse participant* (*De Subst. Sep.,* v. 8, # 86). Although *modus* may not always have an explicitly quantitative connotation, such a connotation must, or can, be understood to be implicitly present. Thus some angels *inferiori modo a Deo esse habent* and even others *habent esse a Deo, extreme, idest infimo modo (In De Div. Nom.* V, lect. 2, # 656). The term *mensura* is used in: *Oum autem creaturae non sint suum esse, oportet quod habeant esse receptum; et per hoc eorum esse est finitum et terminatum per mensuram eius in quo recipitur* (*De Ver.,* q. 21,a.6).

It is therefore perfectly consistent for Aquinas to speak of de-
grees of being, degrees of *esse* or *entium,* because *esse* as un-
derstood by him iiis not " existence," the all-or-nothing notion
of most scholastic philosophers, of modern non-thomist philos-
ophers, and of non-philosophic men and women everywhere. [53]

esse tantum Aquinas is less consistent, however, when he ap-
plies exactly the same phrase of *esse tantum* to God, the most
High, and to the lowest of creatures, which is the " completely
inanimate body." [54] Here are two passages, the first of which
oomes from Aquinas's earliest work, where *esse tantum* is at-
tributed to God-which, I believe, is metaphysically the more
correct way:

Although (God) is 'to be' only *(esse tantum),* He has all per-
fections in a manner which is superior to anything found in crea-
tures. This is possible because in God these perfections are all the
one perfection of 'to be,' whereas in creatures these perfections are
numerically different. [55]

Those things which have the lowest degree of being *(tantum
sunt)* are not imperfect because of an imperfection of 'to be' as
such; but they do not possess ' to be ' according to its total 'force,'
but participate in ' to be ' according to a most imperfect mode. [56]

---

[53] " *[Dionysius] distinguit gradus entium, diaens eos esse a Deo (In De
Div. Nom.* V, lect. 2, # 654 (but cf. *gradus ea:istentium, ibid.,* IV, lect. 16,
506; for the latter use, see the final section). Similarly Aquinas speaks
of degrees of' perfection' *(De Ente,* c. 5; # 32) and of degrees *in rebus (ST*
I, q. 2, a. 3) .

[54] *Corpus penitus inanimatum,* in *In Librum De Oausis Jila:positio,* ed. C.
Pera (Turin: Marietti, 1955), I, # 20. This commentary looks like a rich
source for *esse commune* understood as ' basic ' being (cf. n. 39) . Hereafter
abbreviated as *In De Oausis.*

[55] *Quamvis [Deus] sit esse tantum* **...** *, habet omnes perfectiones* **...**
*modo ea:cellentiori omnibus rebus, quia in eo unum sunt, sed in aliis diver-
sitatem habent (De Jilnte,* c. 5, # 30). To speak of God as *esse tantum* seems
metaphysically more correct; Aquinas may have been led into speaking of
esse tantum for the lowest creatures by Dionysius's notion of *ea:istentia*
(plural noun; seen. 58 below). Also in the indicative: God *solum est (In
De Hebd.* II, Iect. 5, # 62).

[56] *Illa vero quae tantum sunt, non sunt imperfecta propter imperfeationem
ipsius esse absoluti: non enim ipsa habent esse secundum to tum posse, sed
participant esse per quendam particularem modum et imperfectissimum* (*OG*
I, 28).

Intensity   In the above passage, Aquinas spoke of 'to be ' as a force *(posse)*. Other similar terms occur in the same context, such as 'nobility,' 'power' *(virtus),* and again force *(potestas)* :

If there exists something (viz., God) to which belongs the total power of being, no nobility which is found in any other thing can be absent from it. For something which is its own ' to be,' must possess 'to be' according to the total force of being. [57]

These dynamic terms can be thought of as expressing the qualitative or intensive aspect of *esse,* understood as fullness.

esse-vivere   My final attempt to make clear what Aquinas means by *esse* being the stuff of all things consists in reviewing the relation between *esse* and *vivere.* *Esse* is indeed a higher and more comprehensive notion than *vivere.* There are some statements which might seem to contradict this, as the often quoted thesis, taken from pseudo-Dionysius: "Living beings are nobler than those things that possess the lowest form of being *(nobiliora quam existentia)* ." [58] But one could say that this is trivially true because we are talking of a living *ens,* which is obviously a higher being than an *ens tantum,* as Aquinas states in the *Summa:* " A living thing is more perfect than something which has only the lowest degree of being *(ens tantum)* ." [59]

But when Aquinas passes from the level of *em* to that of *esse,* there is a radical change in outlook. Aquinas felt very comfortable with Aristotle's *vivere est esse viventium,* which Aquinas understands as, " Life is, and is the name for, the being of living things." [60] Aquinas also tries to make clear this

[57] *I gitur si aliquid est cui competit tot a virtus essendi, ei nulla nobilitas deesse potest quae alicui rei conveniat. Sed rei quae est suum esse, competit esse secundum totam essendi potestatem (CG* I, 28).

[5]*SDe Pot.,* q. 7, a. 2 ad 9. Cf. also: *Viventia supereminent existentibus (In De Div. Nom.* V, lect. 1, # 614).

[59] *Vivens est perfectius quam ens tan tum (ST* q. 4, a. 2 ad 3).

[00] Aquinas does admit that a correct understanding of what is higher can be tricky: *Si autem intelliganfor secundum quod verba sonant, falsum continent intellectum: vivere enim viventi est ipsum esse eius (In De Causis*

thesis, which is so dear to him, in the following way: "Life means a certain kind of ' to be,' which is specified by a special principle of being *(essendi)* ." ᵢ.ᵢ And in this wide-ranging pass-age we read:

'To be,' as such *(esse simpliciter),* which includes all the perfec-tions of being, is a higher thing [and notion] than life, and what comes after life [to be sentient, rational]: for, when thus under-stood, ' to be' includes in its meaning everything else.₆₂

Thus, life, and whatever " comes after it," must be thought of as special kinds of 'to be,' because whatever 'exists' does so by being a certain limited manner or mode of be-ing. Aquinas never speaks of pure existence, of existence as such, but of 'existents-which-are-something.'   I shall veturn to this essen-tial and vital issue in a later section.

Q*. The metaphysical methodology of Aquinas*

In this brief but crucial section I shall present what I see as the metaphysical methodology of Aquinas. His starting-point is twofold. On the one hand, Aquinas appears to have con-siderable sympathy for the position of Parmenides, for whom all being is one, or there is only one being, which is infinite. Aquinas writes, " Being itself, understood in its absolute sense, is infinite." ₆₃ If one thinks of God as Infinite *Esse₁* one could indeed be tempted to conclude that God is the only Being possible.

On the other hand, contrary to what seems to have been Parmenides's position, Aquinas accepts the testimony of the

XII, # 278). Aquinas comments on Aristotle's dictum in *In Aristotelis Librum De Anima Oommentarium,* editio tertia, ed. A. Pirotta (Turin: Marietti, 1948). II, Lectio 7 # 319.

₆₁ *Vivere dicit esse quoddam specificatum per speciale essendi principium,* in *Quaestiones Quodlibetales,* ed. R. Spiazzi, editio VIII revisa (Turin: Marietti, 1949), IX, q. 2, a. 2 ad 1; hereafter abbreviated as *Quodlibetales.*

₆₂ *llJsse simpliciter acceptum, secundum quod includit in se omnem per-fectionem essendi, praeeminet vitae et omnibus subsequentibus: sic enim ipsum esse praehabet in se omnia (ST* I-II, q. 2, a_ 5 ad 2).

₆₃ *OG* I, 43: *lpsum esse absolute consideratum infinitum est.*

senses, which show us the factual existence of a plurality of beings.[64] This raises the fundamental metaphysical question: How is this *de facto* existence of a plurality of beings possible?

I must interject a remark on terminology. It will have been noticed that I am somewhat wary, when dealing with the metaphysics of Aquinas, of using the term 'exist (ence)' at all. Let me clarify, then: When I speak here of ' existence,' I take this existence in the modern sense of ' being in the world,' a notion rendered by Aquinas as *esse in. rerum natura.*

The methodology of Aquinas can be seen reflected in a phrase where he uses the participle *existena,* although this is for him in fact the participle of *esse: esse cuiuslibet existentis* (CG III, 66). The problem :mised here by Aquinas was the origin of the ' to be ' of every ' existent,' and the answer is that this 'to be' ultimately derives from God. The process by which this happens is called 'participation,' as is stated in the above text about the infinity of 'to be': "For it *(esse)* can be participated by an infinite number and in infinite ways." [65]

The Platonic notion of participation was adopted by Aquinas to explain how it is possible for there to be creatures which as creatures possess partial *esse.* There is no need to ex- amine this notion here any further. [66] It is more fruitful for our present purpose to find out what kind of use Aquinas makes of the Aristotelian pair of act and potency.

3. *'Esse' as act, as (in) act, as' actualitas'*

Some Thomistic writers distinguish two senses of *esse* in Aquinas by contrasting *esse* as ' fullness ' with *esse* as ' posi-

[64] Cf. Cornelio Fabro, *La Nozione Metafisica di Partecipazione,* rev. ed. (Turin: Societa Editrice Internazionale, 1950) speaks of *l'esistenza di fat to del molteplice* (p. 207) and *invece di un unico essere ne troviamo molti* (p. 208). In *Participation* ..., p. 268, he refers to the "unity of being required by Parmenides."

[65] *Nam ab infinitis et infinitis modis participari possibile est.*

[66] The issue has been examined at length by Fabro in the two books quoted here. (fn. 64).

tion' and by contrasting *esse* as 'fullness limited by an essence' with *esse* as 'existential actualization.' [67] I have no quarrel with the first of these characterizations, viz., as 'fullness,' because this is exactly what I set out to describe earlier. But the second characterization does not seem to accord with my view of Aquinas's *esse,* which has basically only one sense. Moreover, both the term 'position' and (to a lesser degree) 'existential actualization' seem to suggest an all-or-nothing notion of ' existence,' as the word ' existence ' nowadays does. But existence, as we have just seen, is for Aquinas not the solution but the starting-point, from which he proceeds to explain how a plurality of beings is possible.[68]

We can grasp this better by undertaking a careful examination of how Aquinas relates *esse* to *actus, (in) actu,* and *actualitas.* We shall then discover (perhaps to our surprise) that all three notions have a quantitative meaning or connotation, including *actualitass* which for Aquinas does not have the all-or-nothing connotation suggested by our English 'actuality.' So just as *esse* has for Aquinas, always and necessarily, a quantitative connotation, so the *actus, (in) actu,* and *actualitas* notions, which might suggest a merely 'existential' meaning, refer in fact always to *esse* as fullness, whether this reference is explicit or implicit.

a. Act(us)

Aquinas states in a laconic manner what it means for *esse* to be (called) an act: "We speak of ' act,' when something has

---

[67] Lotz, *op. cit.,* p. 156, and de Finance, *op. cit.,* p. x.

[68] Lotz describes his ' position ' as meaning *that* something ' is ' (*dasz ein gewisses Was ist)* and tries-in vain, I believe-to relate the 'that' to the 'what' *(ibid.,* p. 151 and p. 156). De Finance, on the other hand, sees the Thomistic *esse: non plus comme position, mais comme un acte (ibid.).* Yet, by also speaking of 'existence' (*cette seconde notion de l'ea:istence),* he no more than Lotz seems to have seen that Aquinas is primarily interested in *esse* as determined by an essence, not in the given fact of actual existence, which is for him merely the starting-point of the metaphysical enterprise.

(comes into) being *(est)* ." [69] Following Aristotle's example, he then explains what an act is by referring to a statue, which is first ' in the potency ' of the wood, but once it has been carved out, " the statue is said to be in the wood *in actu."* [70] It thus appears that act refers in the first place to the coming into being of something (except in the case of God, who is *actus purus)* and, as a consequence, to the constitution of creatures, who are a mixture of act and potency. Here are a few phrases or sentences, which clearly indicate the quantitative connotation of *act(us),* first as applied to God, then as applied to creatures. We shall then see that the adjectives used to indicate the kind of act found in God and in creatures parallel the adjectives in which we have seen Aquinas describing the *esse* of God and creatures.

God is infinite act because He possesses in Himself the total fullness of being. [71] God is also totally act because as a pure act there is no potency in God. [72] And, when Aquinas writes that the divine nature is act in the greatest and purest sense, we can see here a reflection of *esse,* described in quantitative terms ('greatest') and in qualitative terms ('purest') . [73] Finally, just as God is the first being, so He is also the first act. [74]

[69] *Actus est, quando res est,* in *De Duodecim liibros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Empositio,* ed. M. Cathala (Turin: Marietti, 1950), IX, Leet. 5, # 1825; hereafter abbreviated as *In Met.* It is interesting to note that the Index refers to this statement as *Actus proprie est quando res* existit (emphasis added).

[10] *Dicimus enim in ligno esse imaginem Mercurii potentia, et non actu, antequam lignum sculpatur; sed si sculptum fuit, tune dicitur esse in actu imago Mercurii in ligno (ibid.,* # 1826).

[71] *Primum ens, quod Deus est, est actus infinitus, utpote habens in se totam essendi plenitudinem,* in *De Spiritualibus Oreaturis,* (in *Quaestiones Disputatae,* II), q. I, a. 1; hereafter *De Spir. Oreat.* Cf. *OG* II, 8: *Deus autem est actus ipse.*

[12] *Ipse autem Deus est totaliter actus (De Pot.,* q. 3, a. 1).

[73] *Natura autem divina mamime et purissime actus est (De Pot.,* q. 2, a. 1).

[74] *Deo autem convenit esse actum purum et primum (De Pot.,* q. I. a. 1). Cf. *Ens autem primum, quod Deus est, oportet esse actum purum (De Pot.,* q. 7, a. 1).

Creatures, on the other hand, are a mixture of act and po-
tency. [75] Aquinas even speaks of degrees of act, as when he
writes that creatures are distinguished from ea.ch other ' ac-
cording to their degree of potency and act.' so that the higher
beings are a mixture of 'more act and less potency.' [76] And,
just as we have seen Aquinas measuring the degree of a being
according to its closeness to or distance from God, so he does
the same here by referring to a being's' a.ct': "Although every
ca.used act is imperfect," nevertheless " the more perfect an
act is, the nearer it is to God," [77] and; " (The separated sub-
stances) differ from each other in their degree of perfection ac-
cording to their distance from potentiality and their nearness to
the pure act." [78]

b. Esse (in) actu

There is first a minor question of terminology. We find
Aquinas writing interchangeably *esse in actu* and the shorter
esse actu. We also find *(in) actu* with the participle *existens,*
which, however, functions as the participle of *esse.*[79]

---

[75] The term 'mixture' is found in *(Deus) est actus purus non habens po-
tentiam permimtam (De Pot.,* q. 3, a. 1).

The notion of *Actus limitatur per potentiam* of the Thomistic Theses is,
to my knowledge, not found in Aquinas, and one could hardly expect this.
For, as Aquinas thinks, in order to be engaged in the 'act' (!) of limiting,
the potency needs to have some power, which, by definition, it has not: *Quod
est in potentia, nondum est: unde nee agere potest* and *Unumquodque, sicut
natum est agere inquantum est actu, ita natum est pati inquantum est po-
tentia* (CG I, 16). See, however, the very thoughtful article "Saint Thomas
Aquinas: Limitation of Potency by Act, A Textual and Doctrinal Analysis "
in *Atti dell' VIII Oongresso Tomistico Internazionale, V Problemi Metafici*
(Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1982), pp. 387-411.

[76] *Hst ergo distinctio earum ad invicem, secundum gradum potentiae et
actus; ita quod intelligentia-superior, quae magis propinqua est primo, habet
plus de actu et minus de potentia (De Hnte,* c. 4, # 29) .

[11] *Omnis actus causatus est imperfectus. Quanto tamen aliquis actus est
perfectior, tanto est Deo propinquior (De Spir. Great.,* q. 1, a. 1).

[78] *Difterunt ab invicem in gradu perfectionis, secundum recessum a po-
tentialitate et accessum ad actum purum (De Hnte* c. 5, # 32).

[79] An example of each: *Si aliquid fit quod prius non erat in actu . • . (De
Sub8t. Sep.,* c. 6, # 70). *Secundum hoc unumquodqiu; cognosC'l"bile est, in-*

Esse (in) actu must also be understood in some quantitative and intensive sense. For God is said to be 'in act in the most perfect way,' [80] and is 'the first of those who are in act.' [81] And just as God's *esse* can be described as *esse tantum,* so it is also said that God "is act only, and not in any way in potency." [82]

Creatures, on the other hand, are not perfectly *(in) actu.* [83] The following statement implies that there are also degrees of 'being in act': "Those (substances) which are more in act have more being." [84] And if the 'form' of a thing is "a certain [quantitative, intensive] participation of the image of the divine being, who is pure act," then, "everything is in act to the degree of its form." [80]

It is perhaps at this point that the question can be raised as to the metaphysical order, in which a being must be thought to have come into being. Must we say that something must 'first' exist *in order to* receive being, or must we say that something exists *because* it has received being? There are two complementary answers to this question or dilemma: (1) Aquinas definitely adopts the second position, and (2) the question itself raises a false dilemma.

quantum est actu (ST I, q. 5, a. 2) .... alicui emistenti in actu (De Subst. Sep., c. 6, # 71). . .. nee de aliquo emistentium actu praedicatur (ibid., # 70).

[80] *Primo agenti ... competit esse in actu perfectissimo modo* (*OG* II, 52). The exact phrase *quantitas actus* occurs in *De Pot.,* q. I. a. 2.

[81] *Illud ergo ens quad omnia entia fecit esse actu ... oportet esse primum in actu (De Pot.,* q. 7, a. 1).

[82] *Oportet devenire ad aliquod quod est tantum actu et nullo modo in potentia* (*OG* I, 16).

[83] *Res autem particularis est particulariter in actu (De Pot.,* q. 3, a. 1).

[84] *Magis autem entia sunt, quae sunt magis in actu,* in *In Octo Libras Physicorum Aristotelis Empositio,* ed. P. M. Maggiolo (Turin: Marietti, 1954), I, Iect. 1, # 7; hereafter abbreviated as *In Phys.*

[85] *Omnis forma est quaedam participatio similitudinis divini esse, quad est actus purus: unumquodque enim in tan tum est actu inquantum habet formam (In Phys.,* I, Iect. 15, # 135). The *intantum* with *est actu* makes clear that Aquinas thinks of *est,* not as the mere fact of existence, but as having being to some degree. More about this in what follows.

To begin with the latter: this is a false dilemma, because its first horn would be unintelligible in Aquinas's climate of thinking and this for two reasons. First, that things 'exist' *(esse in rerum natura)* was for him the starting-point of his metaphysical enterprise. Second-and this also explains why Aquinas simply had to adopt the second position-because of his use of *est* in the absolute sense, he could not speak of the mere fact of something existing, but only of the fact of some existing thing being something. [86] His *est* signifies an *est (in) actu,* whether the *(in) actu* is added or not. Keeping in mind that *existens* is the participle of *esse,* we read: *(Per) hoc qiwd habet esse efficitur actu existens.* [87] This means: "Something becomes a being, possessing some degree of act, by its having its corresponding degree of being." The phrase *esse habere* is the technical expression for the fullness pole of an existing being, while the *esse (actu)* signifies the *actus* pole of the same being. I speak on purpose of poles because the *esse* of *esse habere* and the *esse* of *esse (actu)* refer to the same *esse,* are the same *esse.* When Aquinas says that a thing *est,* he is not making a purely existential statement, but is stating that this thing not only *est in rerum natura,* but that it also actu-ally is-what-it-is. [88]

My contention about the more-than-merely-existential   value of est-statements is supported by the following two passages. In the first one, Aquinas examines how existing things have come into being:

---

ss Gilson, *The Oh1·istian Philosophy .* ... , p. 38-39, seems to be saying the opposite: "We do not say of any object that it *is* because it is a *being,* but we say, or should so conceive it, that it is a *being* because it *is."* However, Gilson is here 'saved ' from making an unthomistic, merely 'existential ' statement by his use of 'is' in the absolute, archaic sense, so that it in fact means, " it is a being because it *is* something or to some degree.

87 *In De Div. Nom.* V, lect. 2, # 659.

88 The word 'actu-ally' has been thus split up, so as to show its quantitative connotation by referring it back to *actu(s).* It must be admitted, however, that in some statements of Aquinas the 'existential' sense is predominant, as when *Socrates est* is said to mean, *per hoc nihil aliud intendimus significare, quam quod Socrates sit in rerum natura (In Peri Herm.,* II, lect. 2, # 212; note the *in rerum natura).*

... not only the' to be,' but the essence itself is said to be created: because, before it (the essence) has 'to be,' it is nothing, except perhaps in the mind of the creator. [89]

An existing *ens* is made up of *essentia* and *esse.* This *esse* is both that by which this *ens* came to take up its place *in rerum natura* and that by which this *ens* came to be what-it-is, as specified by the essence. This passage delivers a crushing blow to the ' metaphysicians of possible essences.' [00] Aquinas takes as his starbing-poinit essences which are found in *rerum natura* and which are in *entia;* tho,se who speak of possible essences literally speak of ' nothing,' he implies. A possible essence lacks the value of being, and the study of that which is possible be- longs, in the words of Aquinas, to the realm of logic. The study of possibles is a study of the comprutibility of concepts and therefo1-.e cannot serve as the starting-point of actu-al exist- ence.91

The next passage also implies that we can properly speak of an *ens* only when and where we are faced with a being which ils found *in rerum n.atura.* I haV'e added in brackets the inter- pretation which brings out the quantitative (and specific) na- ture of *esse:*

' To be ' itself therefore has the nature of the good. Hence, just as it is impossible for there to be some being which does not

[89] *Ex hoc ipso quod quidditati esse attribuitur, non solum esse, sed ipsa quidditas creari dicitur: quia antequam esse habeat, nihil nisi forte in intellectu creantis (De Pot.,* q. 3, a. 5 ad 2; cf. *ibid.* q. 3. a. 1 ad 17).

[00] The champion of the possibility metaphysicians is Christian Wolff, who in his definition of *ens* leaves out that an *ens* might 'exist' after all, as most scholastics are willing to admit, but mentions only its possible exist- ence: *Ens dicitur, quod existere potest, consequenter cui existentia non re- pugnat* (as quoted by Fabro, *Participation .* **...** , p. 39).

[91] *Similiter in logicis dicimus aliqua esse possibilia et impossibilia . (In Met.,* IX, lect. 1, # 1775). All our cognition has an existential basis: *Omnes cognitiones sunt de rebus existentibus; objectum enim cognitionis est ens (In De Div. Nom.* I, lect. 2, # 75; *ibid.* VII, lect. 4, # 728). Cf. Barnes, *op. cit.,* p. 45, quoting Quine: "To say that *something* does not *exist,* or that there *is* something which is *not,* is clearly a contradiction in terms" (em- phasis in the original) .

possess ' to be,' so every being is good according to the [degree or amount of] being it has. [92]

The following passage is an apt summary of the last two sub-sections because, in it, both *(in) actu* and *actus* are presented as being ' measured ' by the amount of being which, in tum, constitutes the amount of a thing's perfection:

Every being, to the degree that *(inquantum)* it is a being is in act, and has some measure of perfection *(quodammodo)* ; because every act is a certain degree *(quaedam)* of perfection. [93]

In the final section I shall return to the ha.voe caused by ' existential' translation of *inquantum (intantum)* sentences.

c. *Actualitas*

Textual support for a quantitative connotation of *actualitas* is surprisingly strong. This notion can therefore in no way be rendered by the English ' actuality ' any more than *in actu* can properly be rendered by 'actual.' For both ' actuality ' and ' actual ' are what I call all-or-nothing notions, which do not allow of degrees of, or comparison of, quantities.

Just as we have seen for 'act' and 'in act,' the same adjectives which qualify *esse* are also applied to *actualitas.* After referring to God as 'act only,' Aquinas continues: "God, who is pure act, is infinite in his *actualitas."* [94] In the following passage, with its Dionysian flavor, *actualitas* is juxtaposed with ' perfection,' which latter, as the context implies, is infinite: "(God), in his *a.ctualitas* and perfection, contains all the perfections found in creatures." [95]

Creatures, on the other hand, are more or less perfect, and

[92] *lpsum igitur esse habet rationem boni. Unde siout impossibile est quod sit aliquod ens quod non habeat esse, ita neoesse est quod omne ens sit bonum ew hoo ipso quod esse habet (De Ver.,* q. 21, a. 2).

[93] *Omne enim ens, inquantum est ens, est in aotu, et quodammodo perfeotum: quia omnis aotus perfeotio quaedam est (ST* I, q. 5, a. 3) .

[94] *Relinquitur quod Deus, qui est aotus purus, sit infinitus in sua aotualitate* (*OG* I, 43).

[95] *lpse autem [Deus] sua aotualitate et perfeotione omnes rerum perfectiones oomprehendit* (*OG* II, 15).

their degree of perfection depends on their degree or amount of *actualilas:*

The lower bodies possess less *actualitas* than the heavenly bodies ▪▪▪▪ But the separate substances are more perfect in *actualitas* than even the heavenly bodies.[96]

And here we again ha.ve an *inqu,antum* statement, this time referring to *actualitas: Nihil enim ha.bet actualitatem nisi inquantum est.*[97] From many similar statements, one must conclude that the *inquantum est* has indeed a quantitative connotation, which can be brought out by the following interpretative translation: " Something has *actualitas* to the degree that it has being."

Lastly, Aquinas writes: "Something is good to the degree that it is a being; for 'to be' is the *actualitas* of everything." [98] The implication is that ' to be,' as *actualitas,* determines the degree of a thing's being and, hence, of its goodness.

Summary   A comparison of the metaphysical meaning of *esse,* as (uniquely?) understood by Aquinas, with today's understanding of' exist (ence) ', whose equivalent for Aquinas is *esse in rerum natura,* can be made in two brief statements: (I) *Esse* is a. concept which signifies a content of some quantity, degree, or kind; existence denotes a fact which is simply given (primarily to the senses); (2) *Esse* has a quantitative and intensive meaning, while ' existence ' has a locative meaning or, rather, denotation. [99]

[96] *Corpora autem inferiora minus habent de actualitate quam corpora coelestia . . . . Substantiae vero separatae su.nt perfectiores in actualitate quam etiam corpora coelestia (De Pot.,* q. 5, a. 1).

[97] *ST* I, q. 4, a. 1 ad 3.

[98] *Intantum est autem perfectum unumquodque, inquantum est actu; unde manifestum est quod intantum est aliquid bonum, inquantum est ens: esse enim est actualitas omnis rei (ST* I, q. 5, a. 1). There are several other *actualitas* statements but they need a closer examination than is possible here.

[99] For the difference between ' signifying ' and 'denoting,' see my dissertation *The Structure of the Judgment According to Aquinas* (Rome: Univ. of St. Thomas, 1971) ; cf. n. 20 above. Fabro, *Participation* ▪▪▪ describes the 'existence' as presented by most scholastics as *le 'fait' (immediat, emperi-*

III. FINAL CONCLUDING AND INCONCLUSIVE POSTSCRIPT

In this final section I wish to make a few remarks on trans-
lating Aquinas's *esse* in the terminology of existence; then ex-
amine the implicit genius of a one-word language; thirdly,
make a few remarks on *esse* and *existere* in scholastic philos-
ophy; and, finraJly, and tentatively, determine whether *existere*
had a specific meaning or use for Aquinas.

I . *On translating ' esse ' by ' to exist ,*

There is one specific area where the translation of Aquinas's
esse in the terminology of ' exist (ence) ,' as understood today,
distorts the original thought of Aquinas. I am referring to
those many passages where through the linguistic device of
clearly quantitative constructions Aquinas makes clear that he
wants his *esse* to be understood in the quantitative sense
proper to his 'being,' for which 'existence' would not do.
Two such passages have already been discussed and given an
interpretative translation.

The first one stated, *Omne enim ens, inquan.tum est ens, est
in actu et quodammodo perfectum.* Let us see what we get
by an existential translation: "For everything, *inasmuch as*
it exists, is actual and therefore in some way perfect." [100] The
dictionary tells us that ' inasmuch as ' can be used in two
meanings, the strong meaning of ' to the degree that ' and the
weak meaning of ' in view of the fact that.' But taken either
way the translation will miss the point made by Aquinas. If
the meaning of the translator were 'to the degree that,' then
it makes Aquinas speak of degrees of ' existence,' not of *esse.*

---

*mental) d'etre, qu'on peut designer du doigt, non l'ESSE de saint Thomas
qui est* ID QUOD PROFUNDIUS INEST (P· 289). Fabro further writes that, for
the ' formalistic and nominalistic' scholastics, essence and existence are two
' states,' and not two real, constitutive ' principles.'

[100] *Summa Theologiae,* Vol. 2 (I, 2-11), tr. Timothy McDermott (London:
Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1964), I, q. 5, a. 3.

On the other hand, if the meaning were ' in view of the fact that,' then *esse* is reduced to the mere fact of existence, which is Aquinas's starting-point, and the *esse* of *ens* has lost its quantitative and, therefore, meta.physical meaning.

The second text was, *Nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi inquantum est.* Here are two translations: "Nothing achieves actuality unless it exists," [101] and: "Nothing has actuality ex-cept *insofa.r as* it exists." [102] The first translation has reduced *esse* to the fl,at all-or-nothing fact of existence; the second one suggests by its quantitative ' insofar ' that existence comes in degrees.

We get a new twist in the translation of *Secundum hoc enim aliqua perfecta sunt, quod aliquo modo esse habent,* as, " For it is the *manner* in which a thing exists that determines the manner of its perfection." [103] The quantitative connotation of *aliquo modo,* which is suggested by *esse habere* which, as we have seen, refers to *esse* as some fullness is absent and instead we have Aquinas speaking of 'manners ' of existing. One can indeed speak of manners, ways, or modes of ' being,' but it makes no sense to speak of manners (in the plural) of 'exist-ing,' for there is only one manner of existing, in today's loca-tive sense of the word, and that is ' to exist.'

Yet another new twist is found in the translation of the fol-lowing statement, dear to Aquinas: *Nam omnia existentia, in-quantum, sunt, bona sunt* a.s, " For *insofar* a.s it is *'teal,* each [existing] thing is good." [104] The translator, perhaps fearing

[101] *Ibid.,* I, q. 4, a. 1 ad 3.

[102] *An Aquinas Reader,* tr. Mary T. Clark (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Image Book, 1972), p. 61, The references to Aquinas are often erroneous, as in this case.

[103] *BT,* tr. McDermott, I, q. 4, a. 2. Cf. *An Aquinas Reader,* p. 61 (wrong reference again) : "in some way have existence" and p. 89: "as they have some kind of being."

1048umma Theologiae, Vol. 5 (I, 19-26), tr. Thomas Gilby (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1967), I, q. 20, a. 2. The same idea in *In De Div. Nom.* IV, lect. 16, # 506 *(Omnia entia ...),* *In De Hebd.* I, # 7 *(8ub-stantiae oreatae ...),* *Quodlibetales* II, a. 1, where the idea is attributed to St. Augustine *(in quantum sumus, boni sumus).*

the tautological specter of "an existing thing existing," had
recourse to ' real.' But by combining ' real' with the quantita-
tive 'insofar,' he makes Aquinas speak of degrees of 'reality,'
an idea which is, certainly for non-thomists, as unacceptable as
the idea of degrees of' existence.'

The genius of one-word languages: Augustine, Aquinas, Aristotle, Anselm

The last *inquantum sunt* statement was taken by Aquinas
from St. Augustine, who also appears to understand the *sunt*
in some quantitative   manner. [105] This gives rise to the question
whether, as is claimed, Aquinas was indeed the first to describe
esse as follows, as signifying some content or quantity .[105].

The answer, I believe, must be thought in the following di-
rection. As A. C. Graham has pointed out, there are what I
call 'one-word languages' and 'two-word liannguages.' [106] Our
present-day West European languages are, as we have seen,
two-word languages in that they have two different words to
express the copulative function and the existential function, as
in "God is almighty' and "God exists.' But other languages

---

[105] *De Doctrina Christiana,*   sectio XXXII or 35, *Corpus Christianorum,*
Series Latina, XXXII (Turnhout: Brepols, 1926), p. 26. As I shall pre-
sently say, Augustine, like Damascene as quoted by Aquinas, had an implicit
understanding   of *esse* as fullness.   This also transpires from *In quantum mali
sumus, in tantum etiam minus sumus,* and God *summe ao primitus est . . .
Qui est (ibid.)* .

[105•] Subsequent research has unearthed for me that Aquinas's notion of
being, as I have it presented here, is basically that of Plato and the Neo-
platonists,   and has also been adopted by Augustine and Anselm, among
others. This could be material for a follow-up article:. "Triple A: The No-
tion of Being in Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas." See Cornelio Fabro, in
Tomismo e Pensiere Moderno (Rome: Universita Lateranense, 1969), pp.
436-437, and in *Esegesi Tomistica* (Rome: Universita Lateranense, 1969), p.
127.

[1oa] Graham,   *loo. cit.,* p. 223ff. A source for the misunderstanding   of
Aquinas's *essentia-esse* might be that the Greek philosophers   were some-
times first translated   into Arabic, " which sharply separates the existential
and copulative   functions " (Graham, *ibid.,* p. 226), so that Aquinas's one-
word language *esse* came to be understood   as ' existence ' in a two-word
language.

have, or have had, one and the same word to express these two functions. Some such one-word languages are classical Greek, classical Latin, and basically also Aquinas's Latin.

Now, it is my contention that it is the genius of a one-word language that its 'to be' *(esse),* when used in the absolute sense, does not exclusively indicate the bare fact of existence but, as we have already seen for Aquinas, signifies that the thing in question is-what-it-is. A one-word langua.ge is thus unable to speak, or think, of the existence as such of a thing, as if its existence were something 'apart from' the thing's being-what-it-is. One could say that, in a one-word language, the fact *that* something ' is in the world ' (exists) is a ' function ' of what-it-is. [107]

Aquinas Let us briefly review a few statements by Aquinas, statements where one might think that the mere ' existence ' of things is at issue, but where further analysis shows that the *esse* in question is a thing's   E.g., *lpse autem Deus est per essentiam suam ea.usa essendi aliis.*[108] The *essendi* does not exclusively refer to a (future) existence as such of things or to their mere coming-into-' existence,' because the phrase *per essen.tiam suam* makes clear that God, whose essence is the fullness of being, could not be thought of as the *exemplar* of mere existence only.

The word *exemplar* occurs in another passage, where Aquinas is speaking of things which *non sunt nee erunt nee fuerunt.* A non-existential translation is: "Things which have no being nor will have being nor ever had being." It is in this context that Aquinas writes that the *esse* which " each (existing) thing has in itself" is *exemplariter deductum* from the divine essence.[109] Again, God's essence could not be said to serve as a

[107] As a German would say, a one-word language is unable to make a pure *Da-sein* statement, but can only make a combined *Da-sein* and *So-sein* statement; for some reservations, see n. 88 above.

[108] "God himself is, by his essence, the cause of the being of others" (*OG* I, 49).

[109] *Esse etiam cuiuslibet rei quad habet in seipsa, est ab ea [essentia] exemplariter deductum* (*OG* I, 66) .

model for the mere fact of the existence of something, but for the ' being ' which each existent has.

Aristotle   The article by A. C. Graham, in its discussion of Aristotle's *eino,.i,* confirms my thesis tha.t 'to be' in its absolute use has an implicitly ' copulative ' force. In discussing the notion *hoti esti* (that it 'exists')   Graham writes that it "embraces not only the existence of X but its being in fact what it is defined as being." Applying this to the definition of a circle, he writes that *hoti esti* " implies both that something described as equidistant   from a centre exists and that it is in fact a circle." 110

Anselm   Let us now return to Ansielm and examine his terminology and the terminology of his translators and students. 111 As we have seen, Anselm's basic word is *esse₁* not *existere.* Several statements   suggest that Anselm had also an implicit understanding of *esse* as fullness. Perhaps it is most explicit in *maxime omnium habes esse.* It will not do to translate this as " possess existence to the highest degree." Nor will it do to translate   *aliud est non sic vere, et idcirco minus habet esse* as "anything else does not exist as truly, and so possesses existence to a lesser degree." 112 For the 'truly ' placed with 'exist ' introduces some 'manner' of existence which, as we have seen, makes no sense; and the phrase 'to a lesser degree' makes Anselm speak of degrees of ' existence,' whereas Anselm, just as Aquinas, thinks of *esse.*

To be or to exist?   This brings me to a sad story. It appears

---

110 Graham, *loc. cit.,* pp. 224-225. Cf. *In Met.* VII, Iect. 17, # 1651: *Oum quaeritur quid est homo? oportet esse manifestum, hominem esse,* viz., as man.

111 Norman Malcolm, "The Ontological Argument," originally published in *The Philosophical   Review,* Vol. 69 (1960), reprinted in David Berlinsky, *Philosophy,   The Cutting Edge* (Port Washington, N.Y.: Alfred Pub!. Co., 1976) tells us that he has consulted the Latin text (p. 297, n. 1). Yet he missed the implications of the fact that Anselm's entire reasoning rests on the word *esse,* not *emistere* (existence).

112 The translation is by Charlesworth   (seen. 18), c. 3 (pp. 118-119).

to me that practically all students of Anselm (but I am refer-
ring to two in particular) have overlooked the plain linguistic
fact that his reasoning is based on the precise word *esse,* not
existere. So they simply translate Anselm's *esse* by exist (ence)
and understand and treat existence, as is done today, by iden-
tifying it with 'reality.'   The next logical step is to accuse
Anselm of holding that existence is a ' perfection,' [113] and that
there are 'degrees' of existence. [114] The writers of this line of
criticism see hardly any need to explain or prove their critique
much further, except for saying that it is obviously nonsensical
to regard existence as a perfection or to speak of ' degrees ' of
existence or of reality. [115] This, then, is the sad story for the
students of Anselm, whom they falsely regard as a philosopher
of existence.

But an even sadder story concerns the followers of Aquinas.
I am .thinking of the existentialist Thomists but also,
more generally, of an those who indiscriminately translate
Aquinas's *esse* in the terminology of exist (ence).   This latter
group, unwittingly to be sure, incriminates Aquinas by making
him seem to say things which he did not say, as we have seen
for the *inquantum* statements.   Moreover, the existentialist
Thomists praise Aquinas to the skies for having made the dis-
covery of the millenium: Existence is a perfection; there are
degrees of existence and/or reality; the highest existence is to
be found in God; one thing can be more real than another. [116]

[11a] Malcolm, *loo. cit.,* p. 284, with a reference to Descartes.

[11.4] Milton K. Munitz, *The Ways of Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan,
1979) describes Anselm's reasoning as **if** there were a question of "degrees
of reality or existence," thus equating Anselm's *esse* with existence, and this,
in turn, with 'reality,' an idea which could not figure in the climate of
Aquinas's metaphysical thinking (pp. 121-122).

[115] Malcolm, *loo. cit.,* p. 285: " The doctrine that existence is a perfection
is remarkably queer." Munitz finds it a ' point of weakness' in Anselm to
assume "that it makes sense, philosophically, to distinguish degrees of reality
and existence" *(loo. cit.,* pp. 123-124).

[116] A frequent 'crude' use of the term 'existence,' for the non-Thomists,
that is, is found e.g. in W. Norris Clarke, "What Cannot Be Said In St.
Thomas' Essence-Existence Doctrine," *The New Saholastiasim,* Vol. 48, No. 1

This is truly an Augean stable of linguistic and metaphysi-
cal confusion: one group taking it for granted that everybody
knows that existence cannot be regarded a perfection a.Ilowing
of degrees, another group praising Aquinas for having dis-
covered and said that it is a perfection.

3. *The eclipse of ' esse' in the Thomistic school.*

It might be of interest to bring up a few points made by
Fabro in his historical study of what he calls *l'obscurcissement*
of Aquinas's *esse* in post-thomistic *[sic]* philosophy. He begins
by mentioning how Aquinas's pair of *essentia-esse* wa.s first re-
placed by *esse essentiae-esse (actualis) existentiae* and then by
the simpler *essentia-e-:cistentia.* His conclusion is that ' [t] aking
existentia for *esse* [gives] rise to an ambiguity of terms and
problems which still exists today" m-and we have just been
in the middle of it.

It is curious to note, however, how some of these scholastic
philosophers explain their *e-:cistentia* in terms reminiscent of
the classical *existere.* The word *e-:cistentia* is variously ex-
plained as signifying that an 'essence' [sic!] is placed *extra*
possibilitatem et extra causas, extra nihilum et extra causas.
This is further illustrated by pointing out that, thus, essences
have become *extra sistentia. 118* It thus appears that existence
is the result of a process by which a possible essence becomes
'real.' But, a.s we have seen, the *esse* of Aquinas's *essentia-*
esse refers, both and at the same time, to the content specified

 (Winter, 1974), pp. 35-36. He praises .Aquinas for his "breakthrough to
existence as a perfection."   Existence is " the total source and ' residing
place ' of all the positivity and perfection in the being," and is "the whole
inner core of all the perfections a being contains "-but how can existence,
as it is commonly understood today, be regarded a ' residing place' and an
' inner core'? Non-Thomists would also be puzzled by God's being qualified
as " the pure unlimited Act of Existence " and other similar phrases. De
Finance, *op. cit.* speaks of *un degre moindre de realite* (p. 105) and *toute sa*
realite (p. 112).

   111 Fabro, *Participation* ... , pp. 280-315. The sentence quoted is on p. 284.
   11s *Jbid.,* p. 245, quoting Banez.

by the essence and to this content's actu-ally being-what-it-is, in the world *(in rerum na.tura)*.' *Essentia* is fundamentally re-lated to *esse,* to an *esse* which *est in rerum natura.,* and vice versa, but, when *esse* became replaced by *existentia,* this fundamental relation became obscured or simply disappeared.

The terminology of Suarez in this respect is quite revealing, if not puzzling. On the one hand, Suarez states categorically, *Esse enim et existere idem sunt.* [119] Ou the other hand, he still feels the need to explain that *Adam est* means *ipsum exis-tere,120* as if some people might still not have discovered that *existere* was a. word that now could be used alongside *esse,* per-haps even as a synonym for it. But on this seeming assumption of the identity of meaning of *esse* and *existere (existentia)* ,[121] Suarez fails to see that this frequent talk of *esse existentiae* can be nothing else than a tautology.

4. *A specific meanin(J or use of' existere 'in Aquinas?*

Does Aquinas have a specific meaning or use for *existere,* and its derivatives, as distinguished from *esse?* From my ob-servations during the study of the present subject I believe that, on the whole, the answer must be in the negative. **If** we assess the issue from the viewpoint of *esse,* it looks as if *existere* is definitely not a synonym of *esse,* as seems to be the case with most scholastic philosophers, but merely serves as some kind of linguistic alternative for *esse.* Here are a few se-lective observations:

1) Aquinas writes a metaphysics based on the precise word *esse,* not *existere,* and even less *existentia,* as I shall not tire of repeating. Numerically, *esse* greatly outnumbers *existere.* And when it counts, Aquinas prefers to speak of *esse,* not of *exis-*

---

[119] *Disputationes Metaphysicae,* in *Opera Omnia.* Vol. 25-26 (Paris: L Vives, 1S77), Disp. II, sectio 4, # 1. Suarez adds: *ut ex communi usu et significatione horum verborum constat.*

[120] *Op. cit.,* Disp. II, sectio 4, # 3.

[121] For occurrences of *esse existentiae,* as also of *esse essentiae,* see the the Index at the end of Vol. 26.

tere, as in the various discussions of the composition *essentia-esse.*

2) There is no doubt that *existens* serves as participle of *esse,* whose participle *ens* functions as a noun.[122] The participle *existens* is thus a conceptual synonym of *esse.*

3) In most other cases, however, *existere* is used as a merely linguistic alternative for *esse.* Thus Aquinas speaks of *esse a. casu* (CG II, 39) and *(a) casu existere* (CG I, 17) . The plural noun *entia,* in Aquinas's favorite borrowing from St. Augustine aboot the parallellism of being and goodness, appears as *omnia entia* in the commentary on pseudo-Dionysius (although as a rule the plural noun *existentia* is there the favorite; *In De Div. Nom.* IV, lect. 16, # 506), but in the relatively *existere-free Summa* we find it rendered as *omnia existentia (ST* I, 20, 2) . In one and the same chapter in the *Summa contra Gentiles* we read, *Deus rector existat* and *Deus ... est rector* (CG III, 1). Finally, we find the locative phrases *In Ipso ... sunt omnia* and *(omne esse ...) existit in Eo* (In *De Div. Nom.* V, lect. 2, # 661).

4) As to the linguistic behavior of *existere,* it sometimes be-haves as if it were a substitute for *esse,* in that it is followed by a noun or adjective, but at other times it beha.ves as an independent verb, in that it is accompanied by an adverb. Thus the above phrase, *Deus rector existat,* must be translated in English as, " God exiists *as* ruler," although the Latin *existat* seems to function as copula, just as in *Deus est Rector.* [128] Similarly, the participle is often found to be accompanied by an adjective, as in *mutabiles existentes (In De Div. Nom.* III lectio unica, # 242) and *sinqularis et una existens (ibid.,* V, lect. 3, # 671). However, when Aquinas uses the indica.tive, we often find an adverb, as in *immutabiliter existunt (ibid., X,*

---

122 For *ens* as noun in Boethius, see Graham, Zoe. *cit.,* p. 227.

12sThis is the translation   (with emphasis added), which is in fact found in *Summa Oontra Gentiles,* Book Three, Part I, tr. Vernon Bourke (Notre Dame/London: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1956). The *est* statement is rendered as "is the Ruler."

lect. *3,* # 874-875) and (Deus) *maxime eristit (In de Trin.,* lect. II, q. 1, a. 4). From all this, one can again conclude that Aquinas regarded *existere* as a handy linguistic alternative to *esse,* sometimes treating it as if it were a copula, at other times as an independent verb.

5) One may perhaps suppose that Aquinas was familiar with a statement by Alexander of Hales, who had observed that *existere* is *ex alio sistere,* which amounts to saying that " [t] he word ' existence ' signifies essence with reference to its source." [124] Bearing this in mind, the most one can say about Aquinas's use of *existere* is that on some occasions he may have had this originally etymological meaning in the back of his mind. Here are two sentences where this could have been the case: *Quidquid in rerum natura invenitur, actu existit* [1] and *Materia prima non existit in rerum natura* ... [125] But at the same time, as we have seen, Aquinas appears to have no ob- jection to applying *existere* to God, where there is no question of *ex alio sistere;*[126]

Conclusion

Let me now lay aside all the worries and doubts about the exact meaning and use of *existere* in Aquinas, and regard *existere* in the following texts as a perfect synonym of today's existence, indicating that something is in a place, ultimately, in the world (in *rerum natura)* and perceived by the senses. Here, then, are a few statements,   all from *In De Div. Nom.,* out of the many which exactly describe the metaphysical methodology and solution adopted by Aquinas: " All existing things possess being," which has been made possible because God *dat esse existentibus.* [121] For "it is only through the di-

[124] Graham, *loc. cit.,* p. 22!).

[125] *De Pot.,* q. 4, a. 1, and *ST* I, q. 7, a. 2.

[12a] *Deum, qui superessentialiter   existit omnibus existentibus (In De Div. Nom.* XIII, lect. 3, # 992).

[121] *Omnia existentia esse habeant (ibid,* XIII, lect. 2, # !J75) and *ibid.,* XI, lect. 4, # 932.

vine *esse* that *omnia existentia sint/'* which latter phrase must
be understood as meaning, "All existing things have taken up
their position in the realm of being' in their several kinds'." ₁₂₈

Once we have grasped the hidden depth of Aquinas's *esse,*
we understand the world to be populated by beings of different
degrees of quantity   and/or intensity.   Only then is true onto-
logy (onto-logy) possible. 'To be *what,* to be *to which degree,*
ito be *how much,'* these must be the questions.

JOHN NIJENHUIS, 0. CARM.

Houston, Temas

₁₂₈ This is the interpretative   translation   of *Omnia emistentia sint (ibid.,*
XI, lect. 4, # 932). This translation   contains an allusion to *Gen.* I: 12.

RELIGIOUS CERTAINTY AND THE IMAGINATION: AN INTERPRETATION OF J. H. NEWMAN

HROUGHOUT HIS unpublished writings on certain-y, Newman makes a number of tantalizing observations n the role of the imagination in belief; in fact, in a paper dated July 1895, he comes to the conclusion thart ceT-tainty ' does not come under the reasoning faculty; but under the imagination.' [1] However, in his *Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent,* which is his major work on the problem of certainty, Newman does little to explain the relationship between cer-tainty and the imagination. The first part of that work is de-voted to his distinction between notional and real (or what in earlier versions he called. imaginative) assent; the second, to his discussion of the relation of evidence and certainty. The di-vision seems to be so clear that many commentators have claimed that the work is really two-that each pa.rt is philo-sophically independent of the other. To be sure, Newman does not draw the connections between certainty and imagination that we might expect in the *Grammar of Assent;* indeed, there are a number of places where he virtually denies that there should be any connection. Even so, there is enough, particular-ly in his examples, to suggest the view that he might have been working toward. It is this that I should like to explore.

I

To begin, let me distinguish two different dimensions of the problem of certainty, the epistemological and the psychologi-

[1] *The Theologiaal Papers of John Henry Newman on Faith and Oertainty,* Archaval and Holmes, eds. (Oxford, 1976), p. 126.

cal, which correspond roughly to Newman's use of 'certainty'
and ' certitude '. Like many distinctions, it is not exact, and
in the final analysis I would agree with those philosophers who
insist that much of what is psychological is epistemologically
significant. Still, for all this, the distinction is useful.

   Epistemologically, 'certainty'   describes a relationship that
exists between a proposition and the eYidence that supports it.
In this sense the problem of certainty is to determine how
much or what kind of evidence one must have to be entitled
to claim that he is certain. Psychologically, 'certainty'   (or
what Newman calls certitude) describes a specific attitude to a
proposition-perhaps   the feelings and behavior constitutive of
feeling sure about it. In this sense, the problems of certainty
are these: can we describe this state of mind more exactly?
And how is it won, or lost or sustained?

   On the view that Newman is arguing against, roughly that
of Locke, these two dimensions are brought into the closest
correlation: one's cognitive attitude to a proposition is to be
neither more nor less than the available evidence warrants. So
insistent is Locke about this that he argues that certainty as
well as assent admits of degrees.[2] Accordingly, the highest de-
gree of certainty is that which we should have about intuitive
or self-evident propositions; a slightly lesser degree about be-
liefs that are the conclusions of demonstrative arguments; and
a somewhat lesser degree about beliefs sustained by immediate
sense experience. In addition, Locke talks about a kind of
practical certainty that is appropriate for beliefs that are very
highly probable. These claims about assent and certainty are
made in some contexts as psychological generalizations: the
human mind, or at least the epistemically well-disciplined
human mind, naturally reaches a state of conviction propor-
tioned to the available evidence. At the same time, they are
asserted more strongly as fundamental principles of the ethics
of belief. On those occasions when our passions incline us to

        Odegaard, 'Locke on Certainty   and Probability', *Locke News*
11 (Autumn, 1980), pp. 77-88.

believe more or less than the evidence warrants, we must exercise epistemic self-control. Locke's view of the passions, then, is largely that they induce us to believe what we ought not to. Assent, he argues, ' can receive no evidence from our Passions or Interests; so it should receive no Tincture from them '.[8] Thus, though strong passions ma.y impel us to certitude, the only legitimate means of reaching that state is by an examination of the evidence.

Though Newman rej.ects Locke's position, it is by no means clear exactly which portions of it he disagrees with. On the issue of certainty, perhaps his disagreement is limited to Locke's definition of ' sufficient evidence '. Or to put it in terms of my distinction, perhaps the disagreement between Newman and Locke is largely epistemological.

This is, I think, the usual view; it is also roughly the view recently argued by Jamie Ferreira. [4] Drawing on the work of Toulmin, Wittgenstein, Wisdom and others, Ferreira argues that Newman is rejecting an unreasonably high epistemological standard for certainty, which she calls the analytic ideal, that would limit our certainties largely to the immediate deliverances of the senses and to beliefs that are either self-evident or supported by demonstrably conclusive argument. To the contrary, she argues, Newman's views suggest that we are and should be certain of beliefs if they are not subject to reasonable doubt. However, what constitutes reasonable doubt is not at all clear. It is not simply the recognition that the falsity of a belief is not self-contradictory; nor is it merely the recognition that there could be evidence to disprove it. Rather it would have to be some actual evidence thBt gave one a reason to doubt-and more precisely a good reason to doubt. Beyond this, Ferreira does not go; perhaps she would agree with those philosophers who claim that 'reasonable doubt' is so contextual as to elude any universal definition. At any rate, on her

a *Essay Concerning Human Understanding,* IV, xix, I.

4 *Doubt and Religious Commitment: The Role of the Will in Newman's Thought* (Oxford, 1980).

interpretation of Newman, certainty is the product of reasoning (rightly understood), not of a decision to believe beyond the evidence.

There is certainly a. great deal in Ferreira's analysis to commend it; and it is not open to a certain kind of criticism since she claims that it represents only a 'neglected side of Newman's thought '.[5] My disagreement with her interpretation is largely that if taken by itself it involves something of a distortion of Newman's position. She seems to attribute to Newman (wrongly, I think) a rationalism of informal reasoning [6] tha.t apparently makes no room for what is more correctly called the passional element in religious belief. As a result, there is need to come to a different, and I should think complementary, interpretation of Newman's position.

The reasons I have for this are both textual and more broadly philosophical. First, the interpretation Ferreira offers seems to work much better as a general epistemological theory than as an account of religious belief. There are many beliefs of which we are certain because we ha.ve no reason to doubt them; as Wittgenstein put it, 'Everything speaks in [their] favor, nothing against [them]' .[7] A perfect example is the one Newman discusses: tha.t Great Britain is an island. But it is by no means clear that the same analysis applies to religious belief, or indeed that Newman thought it did. I do not really know if Newman would allow that religious belief is open to reasonable doubt. He clearly denies that it is for a believer. Then again, he does not portray the difference between the theist and the a.theist as being that the former is in some sense reasonable whereas the latter is not.[8] Second, Newman discusses the way in which religious believers are subject to non-evidential or what are called groundless doubts, a:nd I find

[5]]bid., p. 14.

[a] See William Fey, *Faith and Doubt: The Unfolding of Newman's Thought on Certainty* (Shepherdstown, W. Va., 1976), pp. 38ff.

[7] *On Certainty,* .Anscombe and von Wright, eds. (Oxford, 1969), 4.

[s] *An Essay in Aid of A Grammar of Assent* (Westminster, Md., 1973), p. 413. (This work is hereafter cited by placing page numbers in parentheses in the text.)

nothing in Ferreira's analysis that would help us make sense of these. Third, there are a number of statements in the *Grammar of Assent--some* of which I shall discuss shortly-that suggest another view.

In view of all this, I venture that Newman's disagreement with   pertained ·rut least as much to the strict cor- relation between the psychological and the epistemological. Clearly Newman has no intention of dissociating the two; rather, he seems to be arguing for a somewhat looser relation between them. This seems to be one of the points of his dis- tinction between assent and inference, where he implies that ' in matter of fact they are not always found together ', that ' they do not vary with one another ', that ' one is sometimes found without the other ', that 'one is strong when the other is wea.k ', that ' sometimes they seem even in conflict with each other'. (166) Newman makes this same point more forcefully when he says:

deductions have no power of persuasion. The heart is commonly reached, not through the reason, but through the imagination, by means of direct impressions, by the testimony of facts and events, by history, by description. (92)

In suggesting that our certainties are based on something more than inference or reasoning, Newman wants to avoid the sug- gestion that reasoning is therefore unimportant. Hence, hav- ing made the distinction between assent and inference, he goes on a few pages later to qualify his remarks by saying:

Of course I cannot be taken to mean that there is no legitimate or actual connection between (assent and inference), as if argu- ments adverse to a conclusion did not naturally hinder assent; or as if the inclination to give assent were not greater or lesser according as the particular act of inference expressed a stronger or weaker probability; or as if assent did not always imply grounds in rea- son, implicit, if not explicit, or could be rightly given without suf- ficient grounds. (171)

What Newman seems to be asserting is that, though arguments and their evaluation have an important place in reaching cer-

tainty, they are not the sole source of our deepest and most
important connections.

   This interpretation   of Newman has some interesting implica-
tions, some of which square nicely with other aspects of his
position, others of which offer some different but illuminating
ways of looking at his work. First, without a strict correlation
between the epistemological and the psychological, it is by no
means clear that the sort of demonstrative   argument for the
existence of God that philosophers and natural   theologians
have sought (and sometimes claimed to have) would produce
certainty.   Newman certainly did not think so. Even of mathe-
ma6cs he asserted that, 'Argument is not always able to com-
mand our assent, even though it be demonstrative'   (169/70).
He makes a similar point in relation to religious belief: 'logic',
he says ' makes but very sorry rhetoric with the multitude;
first shoot round corners, and you may not despair of convert-
ing by a syllogism"   (94).   This would also make sense of the
rather curious fact that at several points in the *Grammar* New-
man hints at a proof for religious beliefs that is logically or
philosophically stronger than the one he actually gives. Clear-
ly part of the *Grammar* is an attempt to persuade, and one
would think that Newman would therefore marshall his best
arguments.   However, Newman seems to believe that what
may be logically or philosophically a stronger argument may
be less persuasive.   Second, what this suggests is that if we
want to study the epistemology of religious beliefs concretely
as Newman did, perhaps the question to ask is not what makes
proofs valid, but what makes arguments persuasive. Newman
never describes his purpose clearly as this, but it may not be
too farfetched to suggest that in a number of passages that
was what he was really after.   Third, turning our attention to
what makes arguments persuasive, we can more easily see how
evidential and passional elements, or what might be called
reason and emotion, combine, rather than thinking of the non-
evidential element in belief simply as a brute decision of the
will to believe in the face of insufficient evidence.   Indeed, my

suggestion is that the imagination served exactly this func-
tion in Newman's understanding of religious certainty.

II

Before we can explore this suggestion further, we must look
briefly at Newman's view of certainty.

Unlike other philosophers and theologians, Newman does
not rest his claim for religious certainty simply on the experi-
ence of religious emotions or on the allegedly self-authenticat-
ing character of certain types of religious experience-though,
as I shall argue, religious emotions do figure in his account.
Rather, he understands certainty as a state that is the result
of reasoning, albeit informal reasoning. In fact, both examin-
ing and having reasons are necessary conditions for certainty.
Now Newman does distinguish another type of certainty, what
he called ' material certitude ', to cover the case of those reli-
gious believers who, having but little intellectual training,
' have never had the temptation to doubt, and never the op-
portunity to be certain' (211). Though Newman does not
make the relationship of this type of certainty to others very
clear, the purport of his discussion is that it is a lesser form.
At any rate, in what follows, I shall confine myself to what he
might have called the paradigmatic case.

The certainty that Newman claims for religious belief is de-
scribed variously as ' speculative ' or ' moral '. Though the use
of both terms is a bit confusing, it does not, I think, indicate
any important confusion in Newman's views. Religious be-
lievers, he claims, have sufficient warrant not only to act in
terms of their beliefs (what he calls practical certainty), but
also to have complete confidence in their truth. This confi-
dence, however, does not rest on demonstrably conclusive argu-
ments. Thus, as Newman understands it, certainty is a pre-
dicate not of propositions but of persons. What he offers as a
definition of certainty is primarily a description of this state
of the person-what I have termed the psychological aspect

of certainty-and,   more ambiguously, an indication of the kind
of supporting evidence necessary to achieve it.

Though the broad outlines of Newman's view of certainty
are clear, the details are rather more fuzzy. To be sure, he
does offer something of a description of the state he calls cer-
tainty; however, it is not very complete and it raises nearly as
many questions as it answers.

The essential feature of certainty for Newman is that it is
a. 'reflex or confirmatory assent '. In other words, if certain of
p, A must hold the conscious belief' *p* is true '.[9] Furthermore,
in believing that *p* is true, *A* must have examined reasons for
it and found some of them satisfactory.   In fact, *A* must be-
lieve that, all things considered, the reasons for *p* are sufficient.
What we cannot do on Newman's view is to define' sufficient'
with any precision.

For Newman, certainty also involves feeling sure, which in-
cludes both a feeling of confidence and the absence of doubt.
If certain of *p, A* will experience a certain calm, confidence, or
'repose of mind ' about it-more particularly one that follows
the struggle of investigation.   Conversely, in being certain of
p, A will be free of any doubt or anxiety about its truth.   Since
most feelings admit of degrees of intensity, we might naturally
assume that feeling sure would as well. Occasionally, Newman
seems to recognize this. He readily admits that there are de-
grees of conviction that fall short of assent. And many of the
examples he gives of real assent are precisely those cases in
which feelings of certainty are most intense. For example, in
speaking of real assent as being vivid and strong, and as being
the experience of believing 'as if I saw' (102), Newman is
really describing very strong feelings of certainty.

In addition to these emotions, there are some behavioral dis-
positions that Newman believes essential to certainty. For ex-
ample, if certain of *p, A* will be free of the desire to defend it

---

[9] Newman often describes certainty as 'knowing that we know'. What I
offer in this and the following paragraph is, I hope, a faithful but clearer
interpretation   of what he means.

compulsively; when apparently adverse evidence appears, he will investigate it fairly and patiently, confident that the truth of *p* will be vindicated. Finally, and most controversially, *A's* certainly of *p* will prove indefectible. Clearly these dispositions involve largely what you might call intellectual behavior. It is somewhat surprising that Newman does not mention that acting in terms of a belief is an important part of being certain of it. Clearly he believes that the rigors of the life of faith could only grow out of certainty (220) and many of his examples suggest ways in which behavior strengthens or erodes certainty. But, curiously, Newman never makes any of this explicit.

Even more puzzling is whether Newman thought certainty admits of degrees. Clearly he denies that assent does and, since certainty is a form of assent, one would infer that it too is all or nothing. And occasionally Newman asserts exactly that. However, as is often the case with Newman, there is evidence of a different view. For example, to explain the difference between *fides humana* and *fides divina.,* Newman resorts to degrees of certainty. [10] Also, in his unpublished papers, he asserts that certainty is both a state and a habit; as a state it does not admit of degrees whereas as a habit it does.[11] Though I find this latter observation very suggestive, it is not at all clear what Newman meant by it. Quite often when he denies that assent admits of degrees, he h8Js in mind the conscious judgment,' pis true'. It is easier to see what Newman is getting at here because arguably ' *p* is true ' and ' *p* is not true' are disjunctive. Possibly what Newman means in saying the habit of certainty admits of degrees is that the appropriate feelings and behavior may vary. In a somewhat surprising passage where he discusses the sources of doubt in the religious life, Newman allows that:

even what in some minds seems like an undercurrent of scepticism, or a faith founded on a perilous substratum of doubt, need not be

10 See Ferreira, pp. 130-139, for a fuller discussion of this distinction.
11 *The TheologicaZ Papers,* p. 122.

more than a temptation,   though robbing certitude of its normal
peacefulness.   In such a case, faith may still express the steady
conviction of the intellect; it may still be the grave, deep, calm,
prudent assurance of mature experience, though it is not the ready
and impetuous assent of the young, the generous, or the unre-
flecting. (220)

Apparently Newman is willing to concede that one can be firm
in his conscious belief ' *p* is true ' without being free of anxiety
and indeed lacking 'the normal peacefulness' of certainty.
And, though Newman does not mention it here, perhaps he
would admit something analogous about the behavior char-
acteristic of certainty. [12]

   In view of all this, I see nothing wrong with attributing   to
Newman the view that certainty admits of distinctions of more
or less. Not only does Newman recognize degrees of convic-
tion that fall short of assent; in the passage I just quoted, he
seems to claim that one may give a conscious, constant,   and
firm assent to the truth of a proposition and in this sense be
certain of it, and still vary in his feelings of conviction.   To be
sure, to be faithful to Newman, we would have to say that such
a state is a lesser degree of certainty   and that a religious be-
liever can attain,   and should aspire to, something more reso-
lute. In attributing   this position to Newman, I fully admit
that there are passages which clearly seem to deny it. My
guess is that Newmain was led illlto confusion on this point
because to make much of degrees of certainty too easily sug-
gests degrees of assent. However, unless we do recognize these
distinctions of more and less as fully a part of Newman's posi-
tion, we will most likely fail to appreciate the role of the
imagination.

III

   What Newman has to say about the imagination in *The
Grammar of Assent* is presented principally in his discussion

_____

[12] Following   this strand of his thought further, we might be able to re-
concile Newman's views with some notion of degrees of assent.

of real and notional assent. The distinction is as important as
it is elusive. Without entering into the scholarly debate over
its various meanings, I simply suggest that for the most part
real apprehension was for Newman an imaginative grasp of a
statement such that what is stated affects the person as though
it were a reality in which he is involved. Put more simply, I
think real apprehension is a certain kind of imaginative self-
involvement. It is properly called imaginative, not because it
necessarily requires mental images, but because it is what we
try to elicit when we use the verb' imagine'. For example, we
say, ' Imagine what it would be like to live through a nuclear
war'. Or we may say to an older child, 'Imagine what it's like
to be the youngest one in the family'. What we are inviting
here is a serious consideration of a certain state of affairs, pos-
sibly from the point of view of someone other than ourselves.
If we have the powers of imagination to respond to the invita-
tion, we shall begin to think and feel in ways appropriate to the
imagined state of affairs.

Newman insists that real apprehension is person-related be-
cause it requires a certain knack that people have to different
degrees and also because it is dependent on our beliefs, our de-
sires, our personalities, our past experience, and our knowledge
of ourselves, others and the world. There are many situations
that are too remote, too foreign for us to enter into. But real
apprehension is not only person-related. it is also facilitated by
the use of language in specific ways. According to Newman,
history, stories, narrative, and the description of facts and
people's experiences more readily involve us than do concepts,
theories, and abstract ideas.

For my purposes, the central question for Newman's account
of real apprehension is that of its bearing on certainty.

His clearest, most explicit statements on the issue are curi-
ously in the spirit of Locke, and to the effect that it should
have none. He writes:

The fact of the distinctness of the images, which are required for
real assent, is no warrant for the existence of those objects which

those images represent. A proposition ever so keenly apprehended,
may be true or false ... we have no right to consider that we
have apprehended a truth, merely because of the strength of our
mental impression of it. (80)

In the same passage, Newman goes on to observe that at times
' impressiveness does produce belief, but only accidentally '
 (82) and then he admonishes the reader of ' the danger of be-
ing carried away'. Thus, though real apprehension may tempt
us to believe a proposition, the temptation must be resisted.
Accordingly, the importance of real apprehension is complete-
ly motivational: it stirs our emotions and thus inclines us to
act, making our assent, as Newman put it, ' energetic rather
than languid '.

   Obviously there is a great deal to what Newman is arguing
here. It is not difficult to give examples of a vivid, imagina-
tive grasp of what is clearly false. Vivid dreams and night-
mares are perhaps the most obvious cases; and in reading good
literature, we are often caught up in the lives and fates of
people we firmly believe never existed. Moreover, for many
beliefs we hold, an imaginative grasp adds absolutely nothing
to our certainty.   For example, I am certain that I lived in
Cambridge for four years. Were I to return I should see again
sights and places once familiar and thereby give a real assent
to the proposition ' I lived in Cambridge'.   But obviously this
would not make me any more or less certain.

   While there is considerable truth in this strand of Newman's
thought, [13] it is not the whole truth.   Thus we see evidence in

___

   [13] Many interpreters have too easily accepted this strand of Newman's
thought as though it were the whole truth. Consequently, they have failed
to understand the relation of the imagination to religious certainty. John
Coulson, for example, who does understand something of the relation, can
give only a very confusing statement of it because he accepts uncritically
Newman's distinction between real apprehension and proof. In an attempt
to make the contribution of each clear, Coulson says, 'But to be convinced
is one thing; to know for certain that there is a reality to correspond is
another.' ('The Meaning and Function of Imagination according to J. H.
Newman, and Its relation to his Conception of Conscience and the Church',
Newman-Studien 11 (1980), p. 55; see also his, *Religion and Imagination*

the *Grammar* of a different account of the relation of certainty a.nd the imagination. While we find fragments of this account throughout, the most solid evidence of it is found in Newman's discussion of informal inference. Having given a number of examples, he concludes his analysis by saying:

Here then again, as in the other instances, it seems clear that methodical processes of inference, useful as they are, as far as they go, are only instruments of the mind, and need, in order to their due exercise, that real ratiocination and present imagination which gives them a sense beyond their letter, and which, while acting through them, reaches to conclusions beyond them and above them (316).

What Newman is suggesting here is that the imagination is involved in our appraisal of informal arguments. What he has in mind ,is best understood by looking at some of his examples.

Perhaps the best example of a religious argument that in-volves the imagination is Newman's quotation of the last words of the 'poor dying factory-girl':

"I think," [she says] " if this should be the end of all, and if all I have been born for is just to work my heart and life away, and to sicken in this dree place, with those mill-stones in my ears for ever, until I could scream out for them to stop and let me have a

(Oxford, 1981), pp. 53-54.) What Coulson seems to be saying is that an imaginative grasp convinces us of the truth of a proposition, but we must have rational proof that there is a reality that corresponds to the proposi-tion we believe to be true. If this is what he means, it is certainly a puzzling distinction. If, for example, I am convinced that there is a God, what sense does it make to say that I must also prove that there is a reality that cor-responds to my belief? Being fully convinced that there is a God is exactly to be certain that there is a reality that corresponds to ' God'. The best con-struction I can put on Coulson's remarks is to say that an imaginative grasp may produce a degree of conviction; a rational proof would then add the further degree of conviction necessary for certainty. If this is what Coulson is getting at, he is headed in the right direction. But of course to go very far in this direction we must deny what Newman often clearly asserts: that the effect of real apprehension is simply motivational. What I am arguing is that to understand the full significance of the imagination for Newman, we must do exactly that and recognize that in many cases real apprehension generates some degree of conviction about the truth of the proposition ap-prehended.

little piece of quiet, and with the fluff filling my lungs, until I thirst to death for one long deep breath of clean air, and my mother gone, and I never able to tell her again how I loved her, and of all my troubles,-! think, if this life is the end, and that there is no God to wipe away all tears from all eyes, I could go mad" (312).

Newman comments that this is an argument for the immortality of the soul. It is also an excellent illustration of the different ways in which the imagination is involved in our appraisal of informal arguments.

Perhaps the first thing that we should note about the argument implied in this passage is that to be understood it requires a real apprehension of the passage itself. Unless we can enter imaginatively into the girl's experience and feel some of the frustration, disappointment, despair, and injustice of her last days, we have here just an interesting piece of fictional autobiography with no larger implications. If the passage is to affect us and if the argument implied in it is to carry conviction, we will have to achieve a real as opposed to a merely notional apprehension of it. Curiously, in his discussion of informal inference, Newman never discusses the importance of real apprehension. However, his analysis of some of the examples he adduces hints at it without calling it by name (e.g. *305,* 314-315).

Another thing to notice about the example-and this is most often what Newman has in mind in speaking of the role of the imagination-is that, regarded as an argument, it has a number of interesting logical features. First, the argument in the passage is ' more or less implicit ', the reasoning, ' instinctual'. We sense that the girl's account of her life supports the conclusion that there is 'a God who will wipe away all tears' without being able to formalize the argument. One who was persuaded by the passage would have in it reasons for his belief; still, most likely he would not be able to formulate those reasons clearly. Second it is not altogether clear that the argument in the passage can be formalized. As Newman observed,

many patterns of reasoning implicit in everyday life ' baffle
our powers of analysis'   (301).   Of course some people have
greater powers of analysis than others and what may prove im-
possible for one man may not be so for another.   But New-
man believes that it is especially the skilled who are inclined
to overestimate thaeir own acumen. At any rate, he would in-
sist that the force of the argument is not dependent on further
analysis and that one who is convinced without such analysis
is rightly convinced.   Third, Newman believes that we can-
not formalize the argument for other reasons. In the example,
there are important quantitative factors that cannot be fac-
tored into a syllogism. What is moving about the girl's last
words is that they portray a degree of injustice, despair, and
frustration that we do not find in other lives, and it is this
degree that makes it a powerful argument.   But, as Newman
argues, considerations of degree cannot be fitted into syllo-
gisms. They are rather what he unfortunately calls 'probabili-
ties '. In informal reasoning, he argues, certainty is achieved
not by means of a demonstrably conclusive argument, but by
a conviction growing out of a ' mass of probabilities ', meaning
in this case the various aspects of the girl's life, which together
makes us see more clearly the force of a belief in a 'God' who
will 'wipe away all tears'.   Fourth, if it cannot be formalized
and if, as Newman claims, we do not have the 'logical statis-
tics' (301) to measure the' probabilities',   the argument is sub-
ject only to a rather impressionistic appraisal.   This is what
Newman means when he says of informal arguments that we
'feel, rather than . . . see' (317) their cogency. In other
words, informal arguments inspire in us degrees of confidence:
we describe them .a;s compelling, tempting, weak, etc. We can-
not measure their force with any greater precision. What is
more, because we have no precise measure of them as argu-
ments, it may be impossible to distinguish their imaginative
force from their logical force. Perhaps the best we can do is to
weigh them against counter arguments.   Fifth, suppose that
none of this is true; suppose that we could formalize the argu-

ment satisfactorily and even that it is a valid argument.   The
argument we could distill from this passage would not prove
that God exists or that there is a life beyond death in which
he will 'wipe away all tears', but only that life is senseless
unless these beliefs are true.   But it may well be that life is
senseless. This argument, like many others that have proven
to be persuasive, shows us only that believing in God satisfies
our needs. Newman is quite clear that some of the religious
arguments he found persuasive prove nothing more than this
 (488) . But he also believes that even so arguments of this
sort lea.cl us to certainty about the truth of belief in God. And
I think that this is a feature of a number of persuasive re-
ligious arguments.   Perhaps this is an added sense in which,
as Newman claimed, the conclusion reaches beyond the letter
of the evidence. [14]

   Another important factor in the example-one that New-
man typically neglects-is the role of the emotions.   What
makes the story of the dying factory-girl into a powerful argu-
ment is the emotions it stirs in us. Now Newman does not
discuss, and does not often acknowledge, the role of the emo-
tions in persuasive arguments.   However, when he gives ex-
amples of religious arguments, it is almost always clear that
their role is important.   What his examples suggest is that the
contribution of the emotions is twofold.

   First, it would seem that the strength of conviction pro-
duced by arguments that appeal to the imagination is in part
derived from the strength of the emotions they evoke. To take
our example, the feelings of injustice and hopelessness and
the sense of satisfaction afforded by the conclusion spill over
into a conviction about God's existence-perhaps into an in-
tense feeling of certainty, if the passage moves us deeply. Of

   [14] Given all the logical features of arguments that appeal to the imagina-
tion that I have enumerated, it is something of an oversimplification to
assert, as Coulson does, that Newman is simply advocating the logic of legal
reasoning as opposed to that of scientific research. ('The Meaning and Func-
tion of the Imagination ', p. 56.)

course this is not uniquely true of arguments that appeal to the imagination. For example, my feelings of certainty about o and p spill over into a feeling of certainty about q once I see that it is entailed by them. However, arguments that appeal to the imagination are distinctive in that the degree of conviction they inspire is in excess of the logical force of the argument. What is more, arguments of this sort continue to inspire conviction when we come to recognize their logical limitations and even, in the case of religious arguments, when we recognize that even at their best they establish far less than the truth of religious beliefs. What seems to explain this is that, to a considerable extent, the force of these arguments is that of the emotions they evoke and the needs they satisfy.

Second, the emotions contribute to a feeling of certainty by lending a sense of reality to the conclusion of the argument. As others have observed, it seems to be a fact of our nature that that which touches our feelings and answers our needs carries with it a sense of reality. Insofar as ideas strike us at this level we are inclned to believe that we are dealing not with mere ideas and empty abstractions, but with the stuff of reality. In the example of the dying factory-girl, the emotions of despair, injustice, etc., and the way in which believing in a' God who will wipe away all tears' answers the needs behind these emotions argue very powerfully that we are here dealing with the realities of life. This in turn lends a greater sense of reality to the conclusion. This is in pal't what Newman was getting at in calling an imaginative grasp of a statement a real apprehension.

Finally, our example involves the imagination in the sense that it provides us with what Newman called an image, or more accurately, a narrative. The function of the narrative is to show very clearly the relation of the emotions experienced by the girl, the beliefs implicit in them, and the conclusion about God. And it is this narrative that conveys the implicit argument of the passage. The narrative also provides us with

a clear, compelling analogy. No doubt almost everyone has experienced to some degree the emotions evoked by the narrative, perhaps without seeing the relation between these emotions and belief in God. The narrative makes this relationship clear by giving us a very obvious example of it, whose logic is not that of syllogisms but the rich, implicit logic of lived experience. And it is in part the clarity of the example and its form as narrative that impel us beyond the letter of the evidence.15

There is one function of the imagination in religious arguments that is not illustrated by the example of the dying factory-girl. Consequently, I should like to look briefly at another example we find frequently in the *Grammar:* the argument from conscience. Newman discusses this argument in a number of different contexts: as an informal argument for the existence of God, as an example of real assent and as an example of how real assent is necessary to understand and appraise philosophical discussions of the nature of God.

For Newman, conscience is essentially the experience of 'a magisterial dictate'. The argument from it to the existence of God is summarized by Newman as follows:

from the perceptive power which identifies the intimations of conscience with the reverberations or echoes (so to say) of an external admonition, we proceed to the notion of a Supreme Ruler and Judge, and then again we image Him and His attributes in those recurring intimations, out of which, as mental phenomena, our recognition of His existence was originally gained. (104)

The argument here is somewhat different from that in the narrative of the dying factory-girl; still it includes many of the

---

15 Ferreira draws a distinction between 'the compulsion of a logical deduction and the constraint of a rational evaluation' (p. 60), suggesting that for Newman the force of persuasive religious arguments is the latter. If my interpretation is correct, however, there is also what might be called a compulsion of the imagination that results from the suggestive images of an argument and the emotions it stirs. Consequently, I would claim that the 'constraint' of persuasive religious arguments is not simply that of 'rational constraint', but also to a degree that of the imagination.

same general features. The argument is implicit; it does rely on certain emotions, in this case those of moral obligation; and it does provide us with a suggestive image, that of 'a Supreme Ruler and Judge'. It requires real apprehension not in the sense that we must enter imaginatively into another's experience, but we have to enter fully into our own moral experience, and we must have a real apprehension of ' a Supreme Ruler and Judge'. The major difference between the two examples is that the argument from conscience has a different logic. It is not based on 'probabilities ' and it probably could be construed as an argument for God's existence and not merely for the meaningfulness of his existence.

The distinctive feature of this argument is that, if we enter into it imaginatively, it can lead us not only to a feeling of certainty about the existence of God, but also to what is called a sense of his presence. For Newman, believing in God is not simply being certain of the truth of the proposition 'God exists'. It is also having the sense that this God is a 'Living Person ' and that we ' are able to hold converse with Him, and that with a directness and simplicity, with a confidence and intimacy, *mutatis mutandis,* which we use toward an earthly superior' (118). In saying that this sense of God's presence is the result of the imagination, Newman, of course, is not suggesting that it is merely imaginary. Rather it comes in and through the feelings and images that are part of a real apprehension of 'a Supreme Ruler and Judge'. For Newman, the sense of God's presence is the highest degree of religious certainty-what he sometimes describes as *fides divina.*

IV

What I am arguing, then, is that for Newman persuasive religious arguments involve the imagination in a number of ways. This is partly the reason they produce conviction; it is also partly the reason that arguments that are less than conclusive can produce certainty. Though I have examined only two arguments, there are several others in the *Grammar* that

fit the analysis. In fact, I suspect that a similar analysis could
be made of most theistic arguments-and of many anti-theistic
arguments.

Many of Newman's observations about imagination and cer-
tainty are concerned with the role of the imagination in ap-
praising arguments. This is understandable, since on his view
having sufficient reasons for a belief is a necessary condition
of being certain about it. However, for Newman the way
we achieve certainty is not exactly the way we sustain it. At
some point in a. believer's life certainty must be achieved by
making serious inquiry into the rational justification of his
beliefs. However, once achieved, certainty is vulnerable on a
number of fronts. A thoughtful believer may have to contend
with what Newman calls 'objections and difficulties ' (216f) .
While Newman does believe that the rrutional justification for
religious belief is sufficient for certainty, he does not believe
that it is sufficient to answer all questions and counter aII ob-
jections. Though a believer's evidence for his beliefs may
justify him in ignoring these difficulties, Newman recognizes
that that might not be as easy as it sounds. What is more,
Newman recognizes thait believers are also subject to non-
evidential doubts. If a believer's beliefs begin to strike his
imagination in a certain way they may appear odd or strange
to him, making them seem unreal and questionable   (219£).
But religious certainty can also be weakened and lost when
what are to be 'living realities' in a believer's experience be-
come 'mere concepts', when they are not held with that im-
aginative grasp that Newman called real assent. To be sure,
Newman does not often call this doubt, but he might as well
have; for its effect is to weaken certainty and open the door
to doubt by depriving religious beliefs of that sense of reality
that is the product of the imagination.

So a further question of Newman's position is how certainty
is sustained-and,   more importantly,   sustained at the level
Newman thought necessary for a unhesitating religious faith.
Given the importance of indefectibility in Newman's view of

certainty, this question should have received far more atten-
tion than Newman gave it in the *Grammar.*

From the fact that Newman presents arguments in the
Grammar that he himself continued to find persuasive, we
would have to conclude that arguments must have some place
in sustaining certainty. **It** would seem that arguments that
once carried conviction will have to continue to do so; other-
wise to maintain his certainty a believer would have to find
new ones that did. However, while arguments do have some
role to play, Newman does not believe that certainty is sus-
tained simply by reviewing and rehearsing proofs, even in-
formal proofs-especially given the fact that many religious
doubts are non-evidential. Rather, Newman suggests that cer-
tainty is sustained only by living the life of faith. Consequent-
ly, we must consider a final dimension of the relation of reli-
gious certainty and the imagination.

For Newman, one important effect of living a religious life
is that it schools the imagination. Here he is thinking primarily
of the practice of personal devotion. He observes:

the firmest hold of theological truths is gained by habits of per-
sonal religion. When men begin all their works with the thought
of God, acting for his sake, and to fulfill his will, when they ask
his blessing on themselves and their life, pray to Him for the ob-
jects they desire, and see him in the event, whether it be accord-
ing to their prayers or not, they will find everything that happens
tend to confirm them in the truths about Him which live in their
imagination, varied and unearthly as those truths may be. (117)

What Newman is suggesting here is that the devotional prac-
tices of the religious life serve to impress religious images deep-
ly on the imagination. These images are used by believers in
subtle but effective ways to interpret their experience. Quite
simply, a believer sees his life in light of God and thereby
' sees ' God in his life. The arguments that were at one point
in a believer's life made more explicit and serve as the rational
justification for his beliefs are, through the schooling of the
religious imagination, made more implicit, more ' instinctual '.

Thus, a believer's experiences serve to confirm his belief with-
out the consciousness of an argument. And for Newman it is
this continual and implicit confirmation provided by experi-
ence that sustains certainty.

   But, for Newman, it is not enough just to train the imagina-
tion. A believer must also live in a way that does not destroy
but enhances his capacity to experience the emotions out of
which the religious imagination grows. Newman observes:

> It is more than probable that, in the event, from neglect, from the
> temptations of life, from bad companions, or from the urgency of
> secular occupations, the light of the soul will fade away and die
> out. Men transgress their sense of duty, and gradually lose those
> sentiments of shame and fear, the natural supplements of trans-
> gression, which, as I have said, are the witness of the Unseen
> Judge. (116)

What Newman asserts here about the feelings of conscience
would presumably be true of other emotions. What he is sug-
gesting is that for certainty to abide, the passions out of which
it grows must be properly nurtured. So in the last .analysis it
is not to proofs but to personal wholeness that Newman en-
trusts religious certainty.

                                        RoBERT HoLYER

   Converse College
        Spartanburg,   South Carolina

THE STRUCTURES OF PRACTICAL REASON: TRADITIONAL THEORIES AND CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONS

HIS ARTICLE sets out to establish some grounds or dialogue between what may be called the "basic uman goods " method of moral reasoning and some other opposed theories. A fundamental point is the way in which practical reason is construed. In exploring this matter, particular attention will be given to the ground-breaking work of Professor Germain Gri,sez. The proposals of this author will be investigated against the background of traditional accounts of practical reason. The clarifications which emerge will suggest openings to dialogue with authors such as Bruno Schueller.[1] I shall take up the following issues.

[1] For a valuable collection of relevant studies see *Readings in Moral Theology, No. 1, Moral Norms and Catholio Tradition,* ed. by Charles E. Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.J., (New York: Paulist Press, 1979). For Grisez's own theory see *Contraoeption and the Natural Law* (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1964), pp. 46-75; and· also, "The First Principles of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the *Summa Theologiae,* 1-2, Question 94, article 2," *Natural Law Forum* 10 (1965) : 168-201. It is not clear how much of this article should be taken as an expression of Grisez's own ethical theory. It should, at least, not be taken as a summary of Grisez's own ethics. See John Finnis and Germain Grisez, "The Basic Principles of Natural Law: A Reply to Ralph Mclnerny," *Amerioan Journal of Jurisprudenoe* 26 (1981): 21-31, p. 21. However, it serves admirably to raise the important issues, and in this respect it will be referred to in the present article. The other source for Grisez's basic theory is to be found in, *Abortion: The Myths, the Realities and the Arguments* (New York: Corpus Books, 1972), c. 6. But this does not explore the basic structures of practical reason. The theory is also outlined in Germain Grisez and Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., *Life and Death with Liberty and Justice: A Contribution to the Euthanasia Debate* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), pp. 358-371. The two basic sources will be referred to henceforth as CNL and FP.

1) What is the specific truth of practical reason?

fl) What is the nature of the requirement of practical rea-
son?

8) Does the requirement of practical reason ha.ve an im-
perative quality? Where it is appropriate, I will seek to explain
the wider implications of these questions for ethical theory.

What is the Specific Truth of Practical Reason?

The meaning of this question could be expressed in other
words as follows: what is the criterion of truth of practical
reason? This could lead to a fuvther question: does practical
reason have its own peculiar " logic " and if so, what is this
"logic"? ² The question could also be related to a further
matter which is dealt with 'specifically by Grisez, namely, the
proposal that the knowledge of the natural law at the pre-
philosophical level is an altogether special kind of knowledge.
This issue is not of central importance, hut it will serve to clear
the ground before we take up the more fundamental points.

Maritain argued that this " ... kind of knowledge is not clear
knowledge through concepts and conceptual judgments; it is
obscure, unsystematic, vital knowledge by connaturality or
congeniality, in which the intellect, in order to hear judgments,

---

² This question arises in the context of the modern debate about "ought "
and "is." Some have suggested that besides the deductive and inductive
logic with their respective canons of inference, there may be a third kind of
logic for use in reasoning about normative matters. Cf. William K.
Frankena, "'Ought' and 'Is' Once More," in *Perspectives on Morality,* ed.
by Kenneth E. Goodpaster, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,
1976): 133-147, p. 138.

During the 1950's some invoked the distinction between the truth of the
speculative intellect and the truth of the practical intellect to argue for a
form of situation ethics, i.e. an ethic rejecting the deductive application of
universal objective principles to particulars.

Cf. J. Naus, S.J., *The Nature of the Practical Intellect According to St.
Thomas* (Rome: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1959), p. 11. Naus him-
self argued that a sound theory of practical reason would lead to the kind
of ethic proposed by Karl Rahner and later developed as " a formal existen-
tial ethic."

consults and listens to the inner melody that the vibrating strings of abiding tendencies make present in the subject." [3]

Grisez has provided a cogent criticism of this particular aspect of Maritain's explanation, arguing that, at least for Aquinas, bhere is no non-oonceptual knowledge (FP, p. 172). Thus we could agree that practical reason is not a peculiar kind of knowing of this type. It is some kind of conceptual knowing.[4] However, the knowledge with which we are concerned here, while it may not be a knowledge by connaturality, *per inclinationem,* is related to or based on the basic human inclinations. Does this give the knowledge 'a peculiar character and structure, and if so, what is this structure? [5]

In pursuing this inquiry, it will be helpful to compare the account of practical reason given by Grisez with some other accounts. This will be done with a view to detecting any significant differences. If such are present, they may provide clues to the basic issues which have to be resolved. The intention is not so much to argue for one theory as against another, as to clarify and explore these issues. Since Grisez himself has developed his theory within a oorntext marked out by the natural law tradition it will be best to take points of comparison from within the same oontext. [6]

[a] Jacques Maritain, *Man and the State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 91-92.

[4] It may be as defenders of Maritain have argued, that he is concerned here with the unreflected knowledge of the natural law had by the "man in the street," as distinct from that of the philosopher. But this does not answer the difficulties raised by Grisez. Such "primitive" knowledge would still be conceptual, even if undeveloped, rather than the non-conceptual knowledge by connaturality. Maritain did not, of course, hold that the entire range of practical knowledge was to be subsumed under this type.

[s] I have been unable to find an author who provides a completely adequate account of what the "inclinations" are. Are they some kind of movement in the pre-conscious mind, as Maritain proposes? *Op. cit.,* p. 92. Or are they "ein konkretes Strebeerlebnis?" Thus, Johann Schuster, "Von den ethischen Prinzipien," *Zeitschrift fuer Katholische Theologie* 57 (1933) : 44-65, p. 56. Grisez speaks simply of "tendencies " or "inclinations" as some kind of psychological events or psychic facts, (CNL, p. 64).

[6] Studies dealing expressly with practical reason in this context are not numerous. The following will be referred to as useful for our present pur-

a) The areas of agreement between "traditional" and more recent theories of practical reason.

If we compare the theory of practical reason developed by Grisez with the account of the " traditional " theory as exemplified by the work of Labourdette, a range of basic agreement is evident. For Labourdette, speculative knowledge and practical knowledge differ essentia.Ily by reason of their ends.[7] Speculative knowledge has no other end than to know; practic.al knowledge has another end than knowing; it is essentially ordained to regulate the production of a work or the direction of an action. It does not attain its object only to know it, but also to pface it in existence.

Thus, the object to be realized pre-exists in knowledge according to the character of practical knowledge, i.e. as something to be done or directed. So far, in general outline, Labourdette's account seems to be basically similar to that of

poses: Felicien Rousseau, "Loi naturelle et dynamisme de la raison pratique de l'homme," *Laval TMologique et Philosophique* 32 (1976) : 165-188; *Idem.,* "Aux Sources de la loi naturelle," *Laval TMologique et Philosophique* 30 (1974) : 279-313. An older article, M.-Michel Laoourdette, O.P., "Connaissance pratique et savoir morale," *Revue Thomiste* 48 (1948): 142-179, provides a good account of what I will call the "traditional" theory. This study is influenced by the work of Jacques Maritain, especially his *Les Degres du Savoir* (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1932), pp. 879-896. Cajetan dealt with the question in his commentaries on the *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 1, a. 4 and I-II, q. 57, a. 5. These commentaries seem to provide a basic statement of the " traditional " theory.

Cf. also *Somme TMologique, La Prudence,* I-II, qq. 47-56, translation, notes, and appendices by T. H. Deman, O.P., (Paris: Editions de la Revue des Jeunes, 1949). For an analysis of the concepts in Aristotle see, Georg Picht, "Der Sinn der Unterscheidung von Theorie und Praxis in der griechischen Philosophie," *Zcitschrift fuer evangelische Ethik* 8 (1964) : 321-340.

An opening to the wider questions associated with the matter is given by N. Lobkowicz, *Theory and Practice: History of a Ooncept from Aristotle to Marm* (South Bend, Indiana: Notre Dame Press, 1967). **It** would be a further, but urgent task to relate the issues discussed here with the wider debate on theory and practice; cf. Matthew Lamb, *Solidarity with Victims: Toward a Theology of Social Transformation* (New York: Crossroads, 1982), pp. 61-99.

[1] *Art. cit.,* p. 143.

Grisez.[8] The truth of speculative knowledge is its conformity to an object which measures it. The truth of practical knowledge, as practical, is quite different. The operable object, that which is realizable, is measured by knowledge which directs its realization. Knowledge is not measured by the object to be realized, but the other way around; the object to be realized is measured by practical knowledge.[9] The truth of practical knowledge is to be rightly regulative, that is, to be conformed to the exigencies of the end at which the realization is aimed.[10] Thus, there is here .a new finality for intelligence, a finality which is secondary and derived, but inevitable, given the exigencies of ends to be attained by aetion. In itself ordained to know, intelligence is now engaged in knowing to enlighten action, to direct action. This is a finality of the knowing itself and not only of the knower, even though it is in order that the knower attain her or his ends, the particular ends of her or his operations, or the supreme end of life, that intelligence becomes practical.[11]

b) Differences between the "traditional" and more recent theory.

For Labourdette, reason's operation in this way is possible only if the object offers itself to be made real to the one who

[8] Cf. FP, p. 176.

[9] Cf. Ralph McInerny, "The Principles of the Natural Law," *American Journal of Jurisprudence* 25 (1980) : 1-15, p. 9. McInerny charges Grisez with a "... somewhat unusual sense of practical reason" in that in Grisez's theory "... in theoretical thinking the world calls the turn, in practical thinking the mind calls the turn." Finnis and Grisez have rebutted this charge. See "The Basic Principles of the Natural Law," p. 25. They argue that Grisez is making the same point as Thomas makes in the Prologue to his commentary on Aristotle's Ethics; that in contrast with the order of nature, which reason finds and does not make, there are orders which reason itself makes, in the case of morally practical knowledge, in the acts of the will and what is consequent upon them. This point seems to be correct. Cf. *In I Eth., lect. 1,* no. 1. Labourdette takes a similar position. Cf. *art. cit.,* p. 144.

[10] Labourdette, *art. cit.,* p. 144.

[11] *Art. cit.,* p. 146.

knows it and, therefore, from the beginning interests another faculty of the knower besides intelligence, namely the realiza- tive faculty, appetite or will. There can be practical knowledge only of something of which there can be desire. So, in practi- cal knowledge intelligence moves beyond itself; in a sense, it constitutes itself the directive light to the appeal of desire; it becomes the measure of action, the realizing idea.[12] Thus, in this theory of practical reason, the role of appetition or desire is essential and constitutive to the notion of practical reason itself. Similarly, the truth of practical reason is defined in terms of its relation to appetite. For Labourdette, since the end is the proper object of the appetite which presides at its " birth " (i.e. of practical reason) , its truth is in being con- formed to the end. Thus, the truth of practical reason is con- formity to right appetite.

This seems to be an impovtant point at which the two ac- counts diverge, namely, the place of appetite or will in the constitution of practical reason.

Cajetan explained the "traditional" theory at some length. He argued that something is related to truth as it is to being. Therefore, the act of direction, proper to the practical intellect, depends on the appetite for its existence and for its truth. [13] According to Cajetan the practical intellect and the specula- tive intellect correspond in the act of knowing, but differ in the act of direction. The difference between the practical and the speculative intellect is considered in terms, not of knowing, but of directing. The truth of the speculative intellect consists in knowing; t'he truth of the practical intellect in directing. And so the truth of the speculative intellect consists in this, that the knowing is adequate to the thing known; the truth of the prac- tical intellect consists in this, that the directing is adequate to the directive principle, which is the appetite. Since, therefore, something is related to truth as it is to being, the act of direc-

---

12 *Art. cit.,* p. 144.

13 Cf. his commentary on *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 57, a. 5. (Padua: 1698), vol. II, p. 281.

tion, proper to the practical intellect, depends on the appetite for its existence and for its truth.

In this context, then, the "traditional" theory does not hold for an absolute primacy of theoretical reason. Rather, there is a certain primacy of inclination, appetite, desire. However, this appetite is interpreted in terms of a particular theory of the real. The basic human conative inclinaitions ·are interpreted as a part of the ordered, rational, real world which is central to the classicist view.

The same basic theory is reflected in more recent writing on the matter. Thus, Gregory Stevens wrote:

The practical intellect sees the normative nature of its own act in its first object. Seeing this, it sees its correspondence to an order of reality-the order of action, discovered in the vision of the will and its object. The intellect manifests its truth formally, and commands it as true, for its own goodness is seen to consist in a conformity to the natural object and inclination of the will.14

Grisez makes explicit reference to Steven's article and rejects this interpretation of the role of the will, (FP, p. 193). He pursues this critique in his discussion of how practical reason forms its first principles, challenging such authors as Odon Lottin with tending "to compensate for the speculative character they attribute to the first principle of practical reason by introducing an aot of the will as a factor in our assent to it," (FP, p. 193) .15 Similarly, he criticizes the "mistaken" view for seeking to bolster the practical principle with the will and so turn it into an imperative, (FP, p. 194) .

This line of criticism seems to suggest that a speculative or theoretical statement is somehow deficient or weak and needs to be supplemented by the extra force of willing. This debate is somewhat confusing in that authors do not always make

14 Gregory Stevens, O.S.B., "The Relation of Law and Obligation," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 29 (1955) : 195-205, p. 202.

15 Odon Lottin, O.S.B., *Principes de Morale,* Tome I, (Louvain: Editions de L'Abbaye du Mont Cesar, 1946), p. 23.

clear whether they are considering the metaphysical structures
of knowing and willing and propositions about this, or whether
they are talking about the psychology of knowing and willing.
Nevertheless, the basic differences are clear: according to one
theory, in the basic role of practical reason, the will is neces-
sarily involved; in the other theory it is not.

There is a further issue here which merits some attention,
namely the notion of speculative or theoretical reason. Servais
Pinkaers argued some years ago that modem debates often re-
flect an inadequate and attenuated conception of the classic
sense of speculative. According to this view a. "speculative"
understanding is not weak or somehow deficient in force.
Rather, it is a kind of understanding moved by an intense
effort or interest in grasping the truth. 16

However, a reading of Lottin or Labourdette, or others who
support a similar view, does not reveal a concern for" bolster-
ing" or compensating for a weak theoretical understanding.
Rather, they are concerned with the interrelationship of
theoretical and practical understanding. Thus, they posit an
initial grasp of the good, as the object of appetite, i.e. a grasp
of a reality, namely the appetite seeking the good as fulfilment
and the good calling to the appetite, as that which fulfils. A
grasp of that which is real, as true, is proper to the theoretical
understanding. In response to that which is grasped, under-
standing becomes practical. Practical reason, thus, does not
abandon the theoretical structure of reason. Rather, it sub-
sumes it in its own specific finality of directing towards the
realization of the good known. 17

The central issues, thus far for the" traditional" theory, ap-
pear to be: (1) The notion of "practical reason" cannot be
constructed or understood without reference to the appetite or
will. (2) Practical reason and theoretical reason, while they

16 Servais Pinkaers, O.P., *Le Renouveau de la Morale* (Tournai: Caster-
man, 1964), pp. 93-113.

11 Cf. Maritain, *Degres,* pp. 879-896. The issues are analysed in great de-
tail here.

have essentially distinct finalities, are nevertheless intrinsically related to each other. The concepts of practical reason and theoretical reason point to distinct but related moments in the process by which reason responds to the true and the good.[18]

If I understand Grisez correctly, he seeks to develop a theory of practical reason such that practical reason, in itself, can be understood-must be understood-without reference to the will, (FP, p. 193). Further, he places such stress on the distinct way of knowing proper to practical reason, that he implies that the two (practical and theoretical reason) are quite disparate. These distinctions, I would suggest, are too sharply drawn.

What are the implications of these different theories of practical reason? The most important concerns the conception of the proper truth of practical reason. For the sake of brevity, I will refer to those theories of practical reason which include the will as " inclusive " theories; the theory which excludes the will, I will call the "exclusive" theory.

c) Some difficulties in the "traditional" theories.

While there are important differences between authors, " inclusive " thories usually designate the truth of practical reason in terms of conformity to right appetite. As this frequently brings difficulties, some clarifications are called for.

As a first step we could recall the classic difficulty raised by Aquinas himself. He states it as follows: If the truth of practical reason is determined by comparison with "right appetite " and the rectitude of the appetite is determined by its conformity to right reason, we seem to have a vicious circle.[19] He replies that the appetite is related to *the end* and that which is *for the end.* The end is determined for us by *nature;* that

[18] Labourdette, *art. ait.,* 146. Naus, *op. ait.,* p. 179, argues that St. Thomas himself accorded the will a close association with the intellect in constituting knowledge practical. It is not suggested here that practical knowledge is some kind of amalgam of reason and will; but that practical reason becomes practical through relating to the will.

[19] *D[n VI Eth.,* lect. 2. no. 1131. Cf. also Rousseau, "Loi Naturelle," p. 179.

which is *for the end* is not determined for us by nature, but is to be discovered by *reason.* Thus, the rectitude of the appe- tite with regard to the end is the measure of the truth of prac- tical reason. In this sense, the truth of practical reason is de- termined by its conformity to right appetite.   But the same truth of practical reason is the rule of the rectitude of the ap- petite in regard to what is *for the end.* Accordingly, that ap- petite is said to be right which follows what true reason dic- tates.

We must, then, distinguish two forms of practical reason; prudential reason, which applies the ends to particulars,   and natural   reason, which discovers the ends.[20] Aquinas argues that the ends pre-exist in reason. Just as in speculative reason there are certain principles which are naturally known, so also in p:mctical reason. These are the ends of the moral virtues because ends in the area of operations are like principles in the area of speculation.   The ends are established by *natural rea- son* or synderesis, not by prudence. [21] The content of synderesis is constituted   by the principles, *per se nota,* of the natural law.[22]

If we relate this analysis to Grisez's theory, it is clear that he is concerned with natural reason which grasps the ends.[23] There are at least two forms of practical reason which must be distinguished: reason grasping the ·ends, and reason which ap- plies the ends to particular contingent actions (prudence) .[24] Both " inclusive" and "exclusive " theories concur in holding that the particular form of truth proper to practical reason, in all its forms, is directing, [25] (FP, p. 191) . But the ways in which this is explained differ according to the distinct accounts of the basic constitutive structures of practical reason.

[20] Cf. Rousseau, *ibid.,* p. 180; Deman, *La Prudence,* p. 435.

[21] *Summa Theologiae,* II-II, q. 47. a. 6.

[22] *Summa Theologiae* I-II q. 94, a. l. ad 2.

[23] Cf. FP, p. 193.

[24] Labourdette,   *art. cit.,* p. 148. There are other forms of practical   reason, see Maritain, *Degres,* p. 885. But these are not our immediate concern here.

[25] Cf. Labourdette,   *art. cit.,* p. 149.

d) The constitutive structures of practical reason; the rela-
tion between practical reason and the will.

According to Labourdette, the process of practical reason be-
gins with the grasping of the first principles of practical rea-
son.26 From the very beginning it has a directive function.
This seems to mean, that reason, in grasping the ends, has a
directive function and so can be said to be functioning in a
practical way; it grasps the ends to be realized. But, at the
same time, reason has a. reality grasping function; the reality
being the inclination of the appetite towards good. In this lat-
ter capacity, reason retains a theoretical or speculative func-
tion. A more recent author, Felicien Rousseau, holds a similar
view. He argues tha.t, in practical reason's formation of the
precepts of the natural law, the precepts are not based on in-
vented chimeras or abstract games. The principles are the
fruit of the competence of practical reason, which does not face
an empty void, but objective reality. 2l That is, they are
grounded on a basic function of this same reason, a specula-
tive function, whose role consists in the aptitude to assimilate
reality as faithfully as possible.

To clarify the issue at hand it may help to distinguish the
" form " of truth from the " criterion " of truth. Those who
hold for inclusive theories, hold that the form of truth of prac-
tical reason is in direction. But they posit as the criterion of
truth, the real, which means, in the context, the inclination of
the appetite or will as a constitutive factor in the basic struc-
ture of practical reason. If Grisez eliminates the will as a con-
stitutive factor of practical reason he eliminates that " reality "
which was the basis for the objectivity of the " inclusive "
theories, and also the criterion of truth. He would, however,
agree that the form of truth of practical reason is direction.
What would he supply as the criterion of truth?

Grisez states clearly that " Practical reason . . . presupposes

26 *Ibid.*
21 " Aux Sources," p. 304.

good." This he explains to mean that " In its role as active principle, the mind must think in terms of what can be an object of tendency" (FP, p. 178). Here, again, we meet the notion of good explained in terms of object of tendency. The significance of this point is explained in a further passage.

Using the primary principle, reason reflects on experience in which the natural inclinations are found pointing to goods appropriate to themselves. But why does reason take these goods as its own? Not because they are given, but because reason's good, which is intelligible, contains the aspect of end, and the goods to which the inclinations point are prospective ends. Reason prescribes according to the order of natural inclinations because reason directs to possible actions, and the possible patterns of human action are determined by the natural inclinations, for man cannot act on account of that towards which he has no basis for affinity in his inclinations (FP, p. 180).

For the inclusive theories, at least as far as I have understood them, the underlying structure to which all is ultimately referred is the structure of reality; the rational world order which is pre-given to reason. For Grisez, on the other hand, the underlying structures are the inner structure of practical reason itself, ·and the structure of intelligible actions. Underlying this exposition is the question: what are the conditions of possibility of actions? Reason, in grasping the inclinations as directed to goods, has an interest, so to speak, in those goods as providing the necessary conditions for actions.

As I have suggested earlier, the traditional theory is bound up with the classicist view of the world. This move in Grisez's theory ma.y enable him to move away from this. He does seem to suggest a certain turn to subjectivity, with his emphasis on the inner structures of reason itself.

However, tht theory seems to contain a difficulty in the way in which it construes "the good". Thus, practical reason has an interest in grasping the goods as providing the necessary objectives for intelligible actions. Similarly, it is concerned with " affinity " as the basis of possibility of intelligible actions. But does it account sufficiently for the good as appeal-

ing to, as moving or attracting?   Does it account adequately for affinity as embodying response or love of the subject for the good?

Consistently with this theory, Grisez argues that the very first knowledge of the good must be the work of practical reason exercising its function of prescribing, (FP, p. 193). This function of prescribing does not presuppose any operation of the will, (FP, p. 193). He argues, further, that we may not posit a " natural movement of the will " prior to directive knowledge, because this natural movement of the will would be without any directive, intelligible, guiding principle, (FP, p. 195) . This poses .a ·real difficulty for the ·account given by the "inclusive " theories and calls for special attention.

e) A further difficulty in the" traditional" theory.

The point raised above appears to indicate a problem for the "inclusive" theory. This theory seems to propose that there is an appetition, which exists as a reality, prior to its being known by reason. Yet, this appetition has in itself a teleology or end-directedness. If I understand Grisez's point correctly, he argues that this appetition, or natural movement of the will, cannot have such an end-directedness unless it is provided by a. *prior* directive knowledge. This is surely correct.

However, the theory represented by Labourdette would reply to this difficulty that there is a directive, intelligent guiding principle of the natural movement of the will, namely the creative, guiding intelligence of God. [29] This would provide a solution on the ontological level, but what of the psychological level? Before I can accept the inclinations as end-directed, rathe1· than, let us say, chaotic bursts of affectivity, or confused

[2s] Labourdette, *art. cit.,* p. 146. He explains that this truth of tendency must have its own "light;" the light of the creative and ordering knowledge of God for all natural determinisms or spontaneous tendency, but also the light of personal knowledge in every being who has responsibility for his or her actions.

[20] *Ibid.*

drives, must I have some knowledge of a creative, guiding God? ao

This would not necessarily be a knowledge that God willed or forbade certain orientations in human action or appetition. It would not require recourse to the divine will theory, which Grisez so resolutely, and rightly, opposes (FP, p. 193). But it would require an awareness of God, in some way, as the ground of the truth, or trustworthiness, of reality, of which the basic human inclinations are a part. The structure of the " inclusive " theory ultimately requires some kind of knowledge of the creator. Grisez's theory can stand without it, although it does not, of course, exclude such knowledge. It takes its stand on the given, necessary structures of practical reason itself.

In whatever way these basic differences may be accounted for, the more immediately obvious divergences between the two theories can be set out with some degree of clarity. The " inclusive " theory has a goal-directed appetition prior to the directive practical reason (of the human person). Grisez's theory has the directive, practical reason prior to the goal-directed appetite. There is a problem, as Grisez has indicated, in proposing a prior act of the will. But is there not also a difficulty in proposing a prior, directive, practical knowledge? In this case, would we not have a directing knowledge, but nothing which is being directed?

Perhaps, the suggestion of a temporal sequence conveyed by " prior " is a source of confusion, in that it suggests that one aspect precedes or follows the other in a temporal sequence of psychological events. It is a matter of an intelligible structural account of the inter-relation between knowing and willing, rather than .an account of a psychological series of events, with which we are concerned here.

so In our modern culture, we have, because of the influence of psycho-therapy, ceased to regard spontaneous tendency as, itself, an opening to the truth. For an illuminating analysis of this problem see Raymond Duval. "Le desir ou l'enigme humaine de l'eveil," *Rev. Sc. Ph. Th.* 64 (1980) : 169-196.

Perhaps, too, the distinction between knowing and willing, while valid, is a source of difficulty. It can lead us to, as it were, reify these aspects of consciousness and conceive of them as distinct ontological entities. An adequate account must somehow explain the inter-relationship without such a reification and misleading suggestion of temporal sequence. At least within the terms of the standard terminology, De Finance seems to me to have given such an account. He explains that right *reason* a.s practical reason, is *right* by being faithful to its own law, which is openness to the absolute; right reason as *pmctical* i's right by its conformity with *right appetite;* the rightness of *appetite* is assured by reason; right appetite gives the order constituted by reason its *moral* character. The will is right when it follows right reason, but the order of right reason is moral only because it renders the will good.[31] This explanation would hold, of course, only within the " inclusive " theory with its presupposition of the interaction of knowing and willing in the very basic constitution of practical reason.

In this account, it is not a *decision* which makes reason practical-a view Grisez rightly rejects, (FP, p. 195). But to avoid this mistaken proposal, it is not necessary to develop a theory of practical reason which is practical apart from and prior to *any* activity of the will. This is what Grisez sets out to do; it is also what tht " inclusive " theory claims cannot be done.

f) The structure of the " exclusive " theory.

According to Grisez, practical reason, as such, does not presuppose any operation of the will. But practical reason does presuppose " good," (FP, p. 178). In what sense is this to be understood? According to Grisez, the mind must think the known under the " intelligibility " of " the good " if the mind is to function practica1ly. The practical mind knows things according to "good" in knowing them as objects of tendencies or possible objects of actions," (FP, p. 178). Further, in know-

[31] Joseph De Finance, S.J., "Autonomie et Theonomie," *Gregorianum* 56 (1975): 207-235, p. 213.

ing in its own proper way, the practical mind conforms what is known to itself, rather than the reverse. The "good" here seems to be something like a pre-given category of the practical mind according to which it knows things. Further, the sha.pe or form of this category is given in terms of possible objects of ·actions. It is in accord with this, its own inner structure, that the practical mind knows.

If we ask then what is the proper truth of practical reason, it would seem that we would have to say, the conformity of practical reason to its own inner requirements, i.e. to itself or its own directive structure.

If the foregoing analysis is correct, what Grisez does seems to be the following: (1) Elaborate a theory of the structures of practical reason itself, apart from the will. These structures indicate the way in which practical reason, as such, understands. It understands things insofar as they are ends, i.e. things to be realized or possible objectives of operations. On the basis of these structures, practical reason understands in the mode of " requiring to be done" i.e. gerundively. (2) This gerundive element is expressed in the first principle " good is to be done and pursued and evil avoided." (3) Using the primary principle, practical reason turns to experience. Here it finds natural inclinations pointing to goods appropriate to themselves, i.e, it recognizes the goods to which the inclinations point as prospective ends. (4) Reason thus takes these goods" as its own," because it recognizes the goods as prospective ends, i.e. as corresponding to its own inner structures or categories. (5) The intelligibility of "good" is thus construed in terms of the necessary conditions for intelligible action.

g) The implicwtions of the theory: the incommensurability of goods.

If the criterion of truth of practical reason is conformity to its own directive structure, then a proposition of practical reason is true, i.e. intelligible as a genuine proposition of practical reason if it is intelligently directed, i.·e. directed to a good.

Since all the goods to which practical reason may direct are intelligible in this way, and this is the only available point of reference for their intelligibility, there can be no intelligible basis for any ordering or preference of one good or complex of goods to another good. However, if there is another point of reference besides the directive structure of practical reason itself, this may not necessarily be the case. Is there such another point of reference?

In an ea.rlier article on this subject, I argued that practical reason, in its most basic operations in forming the first principles, must be concerned not only with good as intelligible object of operation, but with good as true good, i.e. as truly perfective of the subject. [32] In this article I have argued more specifically that there are good reasons for taking seriously the " traditional " theory that the criterion of truth of practical reason is right ·appetite, i.e. appetite ordered to the true good of the subject.

Thus, it might be argued that if a particular good or complex of goods is more truly perfective of the subject than another good, or complex of goods, there may be intelligible grounds for some form of an *ordo bonorum* or hierarchy of goods, and thus a basis for some form of preference. At lea.st, the issue may not be closed and further exploration is called for.

h) Acting and producing.

There is a further difference here which may be important. Labourdette points out that practical reason is concerned with two domains: that of making something and that of acting. In both cases reason is essentially practical; it exercises its regulative function in both but it does so in different ways. In the first case (making or producing) it does so by conforming operations to the particular end of the operation, i.e. what is to

---

[32] A good may be intelligible in the abstract as a perfection of the human, but it must also be asked whether the good is perfective of this human *subject* in its concrete reality.

be made or produced. In the second case (acting) it does so
by conforming human actions to the final end of human liv-
ing.[33] The distinction between making and acting would re-
quire special attention.   However, in his brief remarks on prac-
tical reason in CNL Grisez does not make the distinction.
Sometimes he seems to be concerned with acting, but he does
not differentiate it clearly from making.[34] At other times he
seems to refer more to making.[35] Nor does the matter appear
to have been clarified in the much more extensive treatment
of FP, (FP, p. 175-178).

    Does the lack of this clear distinction have any significant
consequences? It could be argued that it does. In the first
place, Labourdette's conception of the proper regulative func-
tion of practical reason, as applied to acting, requires him to
point to the ultimate regulative principle of acting as conform-
ity to the *ultimate end* of human living. Although Grisez oc-
casionally refers to the ultimate end (FP, p. 183; CNL, p. 59)
the concept has no real place in his theory; indeed he seems to
set it aside explicitly in some passages.[36] Perhaps one of the
        for this is his concern thwt, if we posit an ultimate end,
this would imply a hierarchy of goods and thus the possibility
that one or some ha.sic goods could be subordinated to others.
This, Grisez clearly wants to reject.

    The difficulty, as I see it at this point, is that it is prob-
lematic to exclude a reference to the ultimate end and still re-
tain an adequate concept of the truth of practical reason a.s ap-
plied to acting. For the truth of practical reason, as applied
to making, there is no need for a reference to the ultimate end.
In this case, the truth of practical reason consists in the con-
formity to the particular end. Could it be that the omission of

---

[33] Labourdette, *art. cit.,* p. 145.

[34] CNL, p. 61. "... practical reason shapes action from within."

[35] CNL, p. 62. " The objective which practical reason requires therefore,
need only be some form of intelligible good." Grisez makes the clear dis-
tinction between acting and making in ·another article, see, " Towards
a Consistent Natural Law Ethics of Killing," *American Journal of Juris-
prudence* 15 (1970): 64-96, p. 80.

[36] Cf. Mcinerny, *art. cit.,* p. 7.

a clear distinction between making and acting has led to a transposition to aoting of the mode of truth more appropriate to making?

The Requirement of Practical Reason

Grisez's position is stated thus: " One cannot act deliberately without orientation ... " (CNL, p. 62). The argument is developed further: the general norm of practical reason and the other basic prescriptions are not in any sense imperatives received from without. Here a primary concern of the whole theory becomes clearly evident again, namely, to eliminate the extrinsic imperative ,associated with legalistic, volunta.ristic types of natural law theory. This is surely a legitimate and commendable aim.

But what is to take the place of these extrinsic imperatives? He goes on to explain this in his acoount of the naiture of the basic prescriptions: " They express the necessities which reason must determine for itself if intelligent action is to be possible." " Good is to be done not because God wills it, but because one must do something good if he is to act intelligently at all," (CNL, p. 62). This last point seems to express a key point in the argument and thus it calls for further examination.

The conventional voluntaristic theory might have proposed: one must do something good, if one is to obey the will of God. It would then have supplied the condition expressed by the " if " clause, by proposing that one must obey the will of God, since to refuse to do so would involve incurring the sanctions imposed on such a refusal. Thus, it could argue: One must obey the will of God, since to refuse to do so would mean the loss of the reward and the incurring of the pen:a}ty aittached.

Grisez argues in a quite different way: " one must do something good, *if he is to act intelligently at all,"* (CNL, p. 62) .[37]

[al] We must remember that the "requirement" at this level is not a moral requirement in Grisez's theory. The distinction between an "ought " on this level and the special kind of "ought" which is moral obligation is clearly explained in his work *Abortion,* p. 314.

The same point is taken up later in Grisez's exposition. Let us
suppose that ". . . practical reason were simply a conditional
theoretical   judgment   together   with   a   verification   of   the
antecedent by an act of appetite,"   (FP, p. 195). How would
this be spelled out? Perhaps we could express it thus: if he
or she is to be happy, or attain the object of appetite or at-
tain his or her end, then he or she must do X. But he or she
desires to be happy, to attain the object of desire or end.
Therefore, he or she must do X.

   Grisez's objection to this would be that the "act of the ap-
petite " would lack a rational principle, i.e. the desire would
be nothing but an *arbitrary decision;* it could be revoked with-
out any irrationality being implied. Let us examine this prob-
lem more closely. How might it be possible to move beyond
the merely conditional necessity expressed in the " if " clause?
There are a number of ways in which this might be done and
I will now prooeed to examine some of them. [38]

   First, by introducing an awareness of *God as the moral legis-
lator.* Vernon Bourke has argued that if we bracket the exist-
ence of God as moral legislator, then we must reduce our mean-
ing of moral ought to the notion of utility for a certain end. [39]
So the argument would be structured as follows: if I am to
attain happiness, or well-being, or self-perfection according to
my nature, then I must do X. The "must" in this proposi-
tion expresses an obligation based on the utility of X for at-
taining the end proposed. But, Bourk"' argues, no-one is forced
to work for happiness etc. Any person may reject the whole
concept of working for an end suitable to one's nature. [40]
Hence the need for invoking the divine legislator. [41]

[38] As Servais Pinkaers points out, it would be a mistake to attribute to
St. Thomas a theory of obligation which was expressed in the form: " If
you wish to attain beatitude, you ought to do X." Cf. *Le Renouveau de
Moral,* p. 55. However, we can scarcely avoid this way of framing the prob-
lem if we are to attend to the terms of the present debate.

[39] "Natural Law, Thomism and Professor Nielsen," *Natural Law Forum* 5
(1960) : 112-119, p. 118.

[40] In so doing, Bourke argues, he would reject the only basis on which a
moral ought can be given a workable meaning apart from the divine law.
So ". • • without God in one's view, the moral ought can only represent a

Second, by an appeal to the inner exigencies of practical reason, understood as reason directing according to its own truth which is conformity to the end of the rational will. In this context de Finance argues that a reference to the absolute is necessary to found the *requirement* or obligation of practical reason. But he does not consider it necessary to invoke an explicit awareness of God as legislator, or even an explicit awareness of the existence of God.[42]

A third ·approach would be to argue: if one is to attain the good, then one must *<lo* something good.[48] The reason for this is that good is not possessed by knowing it, but only by attaining it through action, through doing. How do we move beyond the "if" clause in this theory? The answer is that one necessarily seeks the good; and thus the merely hypothetical character of the proposition is removed.[44]

conditional necessity." Grisez might argue, how could this act of rejection be intelligible unless it was directed to a perceived good of some kind, e.g. that one would be somehow better off for rejecting this concept. One cannot reject the claims of intelligibility without lapsing into the purely arbitrary. Such a person must be seeking a good if the act of rejection of this idea is to be intelligible at all. One is thus choosing from within the field of goods, or possible objects of intelligible choices. Given this, one could develop a theory of obligation, namely that one may not directly choose against the basic goods which came to light within this field. Thus, there is a way to establishing moral obligation without recourse to the " divine law."

[41] Bruno Schueller, S.J., "Sittlicher Forderung und Erkenntnis Gottes: Ueberlegung zu einer alten Kontroverse," *Gregorianum* 59 (1978): 5-37, discusses at length theories requiring a divine legislator and argues against them. One of the supporters of the theory was Johann Schuster. In his *Philosophia Moralis* (Freiburg: Herder, 1952), he argues that an absolute prohibition of some act would be unreasonable, if that act did not injure the supreme good, but only compromised some other good of great moment. p. 51. This argument leads to the conclusion that all goods, other than God, can found only a relative, non-absolute obligation. Compare this with the recent proposal by Franz Boeckle that the goods with which human choices are concerned are all relative and contingent, only God is absolute good. Cf., *Fundamental Moral* (Munich: Koesel Verlag, 1977), p. 307.

[42] "Autonomie," p. 223.

[48] D. O'Donoghue, "The 'rhomist Conception of the Natural Law," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 22 (1955) : 89-109, p. 101.

[44] Cf. Jacques Leclerq, *Les Grandes Lignes de la Philosophie Morale* (Louvain: Institut Superierur de Philosophie, 1946), p. 266.

Fourth is another •approach suggested by Bruno Schueller.
He would agree with Bourke in regarding a hypothetical im-
perative (if X, then one must ...) as limiting the meaning of
" ought " to the requirement of utility for a further end. But
where Bourke seeks to move beyond the hypothetical by in-
voking the divine legislator, Schueller makes this move by
positing the unconditional demand of moral goodness itself.[45]

A fifth approach would be to propose that we move beyond
the conditional " if " by an appeal to the inner exigencies of
practical reason itself, understood as practical reason con-
formed to its own structures as practical, prior to any refer-
ence to the will, and without any necessary reference to the
divine legislator. This is the view which Grisez adopts. The
argument seems to be:

a) It is required necessarily that practical reason direct or pre-
    scribe. Why is this so? Because that is the inherent structure
    of practical reason; it cannot be other.
b) Practical reason prescribes (human) goods. Why is this so?
    Because (human) goods are what is prescribable, i.e. because
    they are the possible objects of intelligible human operations
    (FP, p. 182).

Thus, in Grisez's theory, the requirement of practical reason
does not arise from any external factor at all, but solely from
the nature of practical reason itself.

We could schematize the results of this comparison accord-
ing to the different ways in which these authors found the re-
quirement of practical reason: all focus in some way on two
basic approaches:

I) A condition, together with a fulfilment of the condition. If I
    am to attain my end, I must (i.e. ought) do X.
    a) But that I desire the end is a matter of fact.
    b) But the divine legislator prescribes that I attain my end.
    c) But I *necessarily* seek the end (good).
2) An exclusion of the conditional by reference to an uncondi-
    tional factor.

[45] Schueller, *art. cit.,* p. 11.

a) The unconditioned demand in moral goodnessitself.
b) The unconditioned demand in reason as referred to the absolute.
c) The unconditioned requirement in the nature of practical reason itself, i.e. the necessity that it prescribe.

It would be beyond the scope of this article to pursue the significance of these basic differences any further. Instead I will return to the basic question, but in a more particular context.

Does the Requirement of Practical Reason Have an Imperative Character?

This question is discussed with particular reference to the first principles or precepts of practical reason. It raises once again the fundamental problem of the relation between reason and will in the constitutive structures of practical reason, but focuses on one particular aspect.

Why is this question important in Grisez's analysis? The reasons have already been indicated implicitly, but it would be useful to summarize them again: (a) Grisez wants to move away from a theory which has its basic foundation in an imposed imperative (the will of God). Thus, he states that the principles are not imperatives whose rational force depends on an assumption laid down by authority, (CN, p. **61).** (b) He also wants to move away from a theory which takes its foundation in merely theoretical statements. This, of course, brings in the difficulty discussed previously, namely, the problem of moving from a theoretical "is" statement to a practical "ought" statement. Thus, he argues ". . . the first principle does not have primarily imperative force, but it is still a "precept" and not merely a theoretical statement" **(FP, p.** 190).

To avoid problem (b) he must give the principle the status of a precept; but to avoid problem (a) he may not give that precept the status of an imperative. This seems to presume that if we accept that the first principles are imperatives, we must also accept that they are ultimately imposed by an external authority. This does not appear to be necessarily the

case; could there not be an imperative arising from the moral
consciousness of the autonomous person? Nevertheless, the
above indicates the boundaries of the problem he sets out to
tackle.

   This raises again the problem which was discussed in the
previous section, namely, if it is difficult to account for the in-
telligibility of practical reason itself without reference to the
will, it would seem to be even more difficult to account for a
precept of practical reason without reference to the will. The
"traditional"   theory, at least in one of its forms, explained the
matter as follows. Reason can intimate a direction in two
ways: in one way it does so absolutely, i.e. when the intima-
tion is expressed in the indicative mode, as when someone says
to another, "This is to be done by you." In the second way,
reason intimates something to someone, *moving* him to do it.
This kind of intimation is expressed in the imperative mode:
" Do this! " [46] In this case the imperium of reason participates
in the preceding act of the will and in this way has the power
to move.

   Grisez takes this into account in forming his own argument.
The imperative is essentially an act of reason which presup-
poses an act of the will.[47] But "... the operation of our own
will is not ,a condition for the prescription of practical reason,
the opposite rather is the case " (FP, p. 192) . He continues,
"... but our willing of ends requires knowledge of them, and
the directive knowledge prior to the natural movement of our
will is precisely the basic principle of practical reason " (FP,
p.193).

   In this view, practical reason somehow constitutes, or grasps
itself as directed towards a good. *Then,* when the good is
known, being known by an inherently directive reason, it is
known .as a good to which practical reason directs.

   In the " traditional " view, as represented by Labourdette,
practical reason, in itself, cannot be understood without refer-

   [46] *Summa Theologiae,* I-II, q. 17, a. 1.
   [47] Cf. *ibid.,* q. 90, a. 1, ad 3.

ence to the will. The good appeals to desire from which arises
the dynamism of operation towards the end. But the dyna-
mism of operation towards the end calls for its own truth.
That truth is brought about by practical reason conforming
the operation appropriately to the end. [48] Of course, the good
must be known (apprehended) if it is to exercise the appeal
to the will. *(Nihil volitum nisi praeoognitum).* The good is
apprehended as something desirable, something calling for op-
eration to attain it, but this apprehension does not have the
character of a. prescription of practical reason. Practical rea-
son *as prescriptive* is concerned with directing operations to
the end. That is, the prescriptive function is derivative and
subsequent to the awareness of the attraction of the good; it is
not prior to it. Practical reason is inherently and always di-
rective to ends, but not all directing is prescribing. [49]

The problem with the notion of the imperative character of
the first principles arises when that imperative is interpreted
in the mode of the voluntarist theory. What happens then is
that the extrinsic, imposed character of the imperative of law
is transferred uncritically to the practical reason operating in
the moral consciousness of the person. This would give an
authoritarian cast to moral consciousness which is alien to the
" traditional " theory I have outlined here.

But, if we keep in mind the explanations given above, and
remember that the notion of " imperative " can be applied only
analogica.Ily to the structures of practical reason this problem
does not necessarily arise. Thus, the moving role implied in
the notion of the imperative expresses the movement of the
will in response to the movement from the appealing good. It
does not connote an extrinsic, heteronomous mover. The will,
as such, would appear extrinsic in this way, only if we adopt
the " exclusive " theory of practical reason, where this reason
has a certain autonomy in itself. It is not reason (or will)

[48] Labourdette, *art. cit.,* p. 150.

[49] Cf. Mc!nerny, *art. cit.,* p. 11. "Grisez tends to want to restrict practical
discourse to gerundive concepts."

which is autonomous, but the personal moral subject, in whom reason and will inter-relate to form moral consciousness.

Other authors who have explicitly dealt with this question, generally refer to the first principle as an " imperative." It must be admitted, however, that they have not raised the problems which Grisez addresses, nor do they advert to the possibility of a distinction between imperative and precept. Wolfgang Kluxen, for example, interprets the first principle, not as a definition, but as an imperative. In his interpretation, it is the most general imperative, and thus the first principle of moral consciousness as such. As such it is the basis for the unity of ethics. [50]

In Grisez's account, however, the first principle is not the first principle of *moral* consciousness, but the first principle of *directive* consciousness. (It includes all directives and pre-scriptions, whether to true goods or ·apparent goods, whether to moral acts or immoral acts.) It is thus, not the basis for the unity of ethics, but the basis for the unity of prescriptions. What then is the basis for the unity of ethics and moral con-sciousness in Grisez's theory? I find it difficult to discover what this might be.

The alternative interpretation would have to face the diffi-culty that the first recognition of the good by the intellect takes the form of a " theoretical knowledge," which would be

[50] Wolfgang Kluxen, "Ethik und Ethos," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 73 (1965/66) : 339-355, p. 340.

Michael Crowe, *The Changing Profile of the Natural Law* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), gives two formulations: "Do good and avoid evil," (p. 176), and "good ought to be done and evil avoided," (p. 177). He refers to both as precepts, which he does not distinguish from imperatives. These statements are not exact, and would probably be criticized by Grisez.

Schuster also argues that the first precept is formulated as an imperative, but in an indicative form. See "Ethischen Prinzipien," p. 58.

Wilhelm Korq, *Norm und Sittlichkeit: Untersuchungen zur Logik der normativen Vernunft* (Mainz: Matthias-Gruenewald Verlag, 1973), p. 51, uses the expression *"allgemeinste 8ollensprinzip"* rather than "imperative." For the reasons I have suggested, it may be better to avoid the latter ex-pression because of certain authoritarian associations carried by the word.

expressed in such theoretical statements as: X is a good, or X is a good for humankind, or even X is a good for me. It would then have to solve the problem of explaining how a practical " ought" proposition could be derived from a theoretical "is " proposition. I suggest that the way in which this might be approached is to recall what these statements are about. While the first recognition of the good may be expressed in the form of ·a theoretical statement, it is a proposition expressing the subject's being drawn to the good. That consciousness of being drawn and the response of the subject is what is present in awareness and what is expressed (abstractly) in propositinal form. For the " traditional " theory, it was not a question of deriving an " ought " from an " is " as if the whole matter were located in the field of abstract logic. The " ought " arose, not from a proposition, but from the exigencies of the real good, a.nd the awareness of this grasped by a moral consciousness where rea.son and will intimately inter-act.

On the other hand, Grisez would have to face the problem of appearing to fragment moral consciousness and fragment the moral subject into sharply separated aspects. Ca.n this do justice to the unity of the moral subject?

CONCLUSION

From the preceding analysis and comparison we are now in a position to distinguish sev·eral different models of the structure of practical reason. In view of the limitations of this study, the following proposals must remain tentative.

There appear to be several fundamental structures which occur, in some form, in most of the proposed models. In the particular theories, their presence or absence; the way in which they are related to each other; and the particular form

---

51. The rigid distinction drawn between "ought" and " is" which was once taken for granted is often called into question in more recent writing. Cf. Mcinerny, *art. oit.,* p. 8. In the article cited above (note 2) Frankena seeks a way of moving beyond this rigid distinction. He proposes that a judgment of value is an expression of the *oonatus* in question, *(art. cit.,* p. 145). Although I would not claim that this would correspond to what I have suggested here, there is sufficient similarity to provide a basis for discussion.

they are given, seem to constitute the specific model of prac-
tical reason assumed by each theory. The fundamental struc-
tures are:

I) The structures of " reality " or some form of replacement.
    The distinct structures   of operation: " acting" and " produc-
    ing" (making).
S) The distinct structures of consciousness; knowing and willing.
4) The distinct structures of knowing: theoretical and practical.
5) The distinct structures of the functioning of the "good;" ap-
    pealing and moving; terminative of operation.

(a) In the "traditional"   theory, the structures of reality
are taken to be those of the given, unchanging, rationally
ordered world, ultimately ordered by the divine intelligence.

The focus is on acting rather than producing or making. [52]

The question is whether a particular mode of acting or
choosing corresponds to and reflects the order of reality. It is
not what is produced tha.t is decisive, but rather whether the
inner form of the whole oot reflects reality.

The structure of pr:actical reason itself is worked out in
terms of a subtle inter-relationship between theoretical and
practical reason; knowing and willing; good as moving ·and as
terminative of operation.

Practical reason, in the moral context, is directive of acting.

(b) In the " wluntarist " theory the basic structure be-
comes that of commanding will, rather than rational order.

The question is whether a particular act conforms to that
will or not. A choice or action is wrong because it is for-
bidden by the oommanding will.

Thus, the source of command stands over against the sub-
ject; it is heteronomous. There arises an authoritarian cast in
the interpretation of moral consciousness itself. [58]

[52]H. Richard Niebuhr, *The Responsible Self* (New York: Harper & Row,
1978), in terms of his symbol of "man the maker," tends to interpret this
tradition wholly in terms of " making." This seems to pass over the basic
distinction between " acting" and "making."

[53] Cf. *ibid.,* p. 74. He develops the ramifications of setting the source of
one's obligation in another than oneself. The model of moral consciousness
becomes the juridical court.

Thence comes the exaggerated concern with will; law; sanction; limit obligation, which Grisez has so· well criticized.

 (c) In Grisez's own theory, the basic structures, at least as relevant to the construction of moral theory, seem to be the inner structures of practical rea.son itself, together with the intelligible structures of operation. Thus the question becomes whether, in particular choices or actions these intelligible structures are preserved or not. A choice directly against a basic good is excluded, since such a choice would depart from the intelligible structures. There cannot be any intelligible basis for choosing against a basic good.

This theory moves beyond both the preceding proposals: it is neither hound to the particular view of " reality " which is presumed by the first, nor based on extrinsic command or law, which is fundamental to the second.

However, there may be some difficulties in the way in which the theory is worked out. In particular, does it adequately preserve the unity, which the " traditional " theory, despite its limitations, sought to maintain?

 (d) Whait is to he said of " proportionalism? " It has been argued that the theories which may he grouped under this heading, derive their model of directing from productive rationality or technique. 54

Thus, a particular choice or action is significant in terms of its contribution to the maximum production of good. However, the productive concept of practical reason is not the only factor operating in this theory. Thus, it is argued that productivity, in terms of consequences, is not the only factor to he considered in these theories. 55

Nevertheless, it does play some role. The model of produc-

---

54 One of the most recent articles to raise this objection is Servais Pinkaers, " La question des actes intrinsiquement mauvais," *Revue Thomiste* XC: LXXXVII (1982), 181-212.

55 Cf. Charles E. Curran, "Utilitarianism and Contemporary Moral Theology," in *Readings in Moral Theology, No. 1, Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition,* ed. by Charles E. Curran and Richard McCormick, S.J., (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), 341-362.

tivity determines what is to be counted as relevant in the
assessment of the rightness or wrongness of actions. Or, if
there is some other factor also· operating here besides produc-
tivity, it does not seem to be clea.r what this is. Thus, authors
argue that proportionalism, as it is expounded in contempo-
rary deba.tes, is a "mixed" form and not outright consequen-
tialism.56

The other factor involved is, then, some kind of deontologi-
cal reference. But this must refer us to some basic structure
besides productivity. **If** that structure is not that of command
or will, then what is it?

Is it the inner structures of reasoning itself, for example, in
the form of rational consistency? Or could we consider other
possibilities such a.s the fundamental structures of communica-
tion,57 or the structures of narrative, 58 or the structures of in-
volvement with the victims of oppression with an impetus
towards changing reality? 59 I am inclined to believe that the
last is the most promising suggestion. But to argue this case
would be the task of another study.

BRIAN **V.** JOHNSTONE, C.SS.R.

The Oatholio University   of America
Washington,   DO

56 *Ibid.,* p. 356.

57 Cf. the exposition and critique of this proposal by Franz Boeckle, *Funda-
mental Moral,* p. 69.

58 For example, Alasdair Macintyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theol-
ogy* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 202. Macintyre
links narrative closely with " character " a form of inner " structure " of the
personal subject. This notion has not appeared in this essay, but it should
be remembered that in the "traditional" theory practical reason was in-
timately related to the kindred concept of "virtue."

59 Cf. Matthew Lamb, *op. cit.* Curran adverts to this aspect, *art. cit.,* p.
356, but he proposes the structures of " responsibility" as fundamental.

DOES GOD CHANGE? MUTABLILITY
AND INCARNATION:

A REVIEW DISCUSSION

((**THIS** BOOK ",1 Dr. Weinandy tells us in his Preface,
" basically treats two concerns. The first concern is
the relationship between the immutability of God
and the Incarnation. How can God, remaining immutable, be-
come man? The second concern is the passibility of God as
man. . . . Is it true to say that God is born, suffers, dies, loves
as man? These two concerns are studied historically, i.e., as
they were treated in different periods throughout the history
of Christology. _!Iowever, this is not merely a historical study.
It is also speculative because I wished to formulate a viable
and enriched theological answer to these Christological prob-
lems on the basis of careful historical study" (xvi f) . Later
on he explains that this involves three elements: " To uphold
the truth of the Incarnation, one must maintain that God
truly *is* man, that it is truly *God* who is man, and that it is
truly *man* that God is"   ; and in dealing with any hereti-
cal position he is usually at pains to demonstrate that its error
consisted in denying one or more of these elements, or, more
frequently, in distorting it in order to make it appear more
easily reconcilable with the others. For it is no part of Dr.
Weinandy's case to argue that the mutual compatibility of the
three elements can be seen at a glance; and the title of his
book is itself a reminder that one of the more popular ways of
evading a fully orthodox belief is to tamper with the profound-
est reality of God. Furthermore, because Christianity is a radi-

cally historical religion, announcing that God has performed certain acts and not merely that he has certain attributes, its assertion is not simply that God *is* man in some timeless meta- physical sense but that he *hWJ become* man at a particular time and place as the individual Jesus of Nazareth: *ho Logos sarx egeneto,* "the Word has become flesh " (John i.14) . It is the strength of Dr. Weinandy's study to have grasped the centrality of the notion of" becoming" in Christology. It pro- vides the leading motif for his critique of the main movements and schools of Christology down the ages and in the light of it he has produced one of the most constructive and synthetic works in the field today.

Pre-Nicene speculation on the Trinity and the Incarnation is seen by Dr. Weinandy as not so much a study of the immut- ability and impassibility of God as an introduction to its later history (xxxii). In this the key figures are Arius, Athanasius and Apollinaris, with its culmination in Nicaea and the *homo- ousion.* What they failed to realise, says Dr. Weinandy, was " that Nicaea, in proclaiming that the Logos was fully God, ha.d rendered the Logos/Sarx framework unworkable." "Be- come" in that framework always implies change, and " to un- derstand the concept of ' become ' as only expressing an onto- logical union, without at the same time expressing a distinc- tion between the Logos and what he has become, namely man, destroys the subjects of which 'become' is predicated" (31). The full implications of *Homoousion* only appear when the Church has lived through the Nestorian and Monophysite con- troversies and reached maturity at Chalcedon. These, and especially the part played by Cyril, are discussed in detail, and the Chalcedonian understanding of " become " is char- acterised as "personal/existential", "denoting that the Logos has taken on a new mode of existence, that the Logos *has come to be man* ". " There is no confusion or change because the ' becoming ' does not pertain to a union of natures, but to the mode of existence of a person. Thus Christ is God the Logos existing as man, and his mode of existing, his two na-

tures, remain unchanged and unconfused .... Thus the Logos as God remains impassible, but since he is also man he is truly passible. Moreover, while the natures exist without confusion or change, they nevertheless are neither divided nor separated but concur in one person. Thus one and the same !.<>gos can truly be said to thirst, hunger, suffer, and die ·as man" (65f).

Dr. Weinandy adds that" Cyril's and Chalcedon's explana.-tion of the meaning of ' become ' does not in any way destroy the mystery of the Incarnation. One can still ask, either in doubt or amazement: 'Who ever heard of such a notion of ' become? ' Who ever heard of one person existing as God and as man?" (66). And indeed nothing more needs to be said about Chalcedon for his immediate purpose, though, as he rightly mentions, Christology went on developing, with the Second and Third Councils of Constantinople and the Second Council of Nicaea. Indeed we may well recall that the Council of Chalcedon left one serious lacuna in its own Definition which had to be clarified by Constantinople II.1

Eight hundred years, Dr. Weinandy remarks, lay between Chalcedon and St. Thomas Aquinas, though his subject had already surfaced anew with St. Anselm and the Scholastics; and for Anselm, like Chalcedon and Cyril, "become" meant "come fo be" (71). For Thomas, God is pure *esse,* and "it must always be remembered that *esse* is act, that *esse* is a verb " (77) . God, therefore, is immutable, " not because he is static, inert, or inactive, but precisely because he is so supreme-ly active and dynamic ... , so dynamic, so active that no change can make him more active" (78f). Nevertheless the question arises: Is not God in situations which demand that he change ' and are not these situations themselves caused by God? " Is not God's creation and conservation of the world a situation which demands change in God? Moreover, is not the Incarna-

1 Namely, whether, granted that the two natures of Christ had a common *subject,* the pre-existent Logos, that subject was rightly to be described as a *person* before their union had taken place. Cf. my *Whatever Happened to the Human Mind* (London, S.P.C.K. 1980), 32.

tion ·such a situation?" (81). St. Thomas is clearly shown to follow the lead of Cyril and Chalcedon and not the contemporary *assumptus-homo* and *habitus* theories. The Incarnation means that the divine Logos acquires a new, a human nature, but how can this be without a. change coming a.bout in the allegedly immutable God? To answer this raises St. Thomas's doctrine of relations, and it is here that Dr. Weinandy makes one of his major contributions.

For St. Thomas the relation between two terms can be either *real,* if it expresses something in the reality of the terms themselves, or *logical (relatio rationis),* if it merely expresses something in the way they are conceived. It is however possible, for a relation to be real in one term and logical in the other; the classical examples are those of knowledge, which implies a change in the knower but not in the object known,[2] and creation, which implies a change in the creature but not in the Creator. The Incarnation also is such a "mixed relation", with the divine Logos as the logical and the human nature of Jesus as the real term. But Dr. Weinandy draws attention to ·a serious ambiguity in St. Thomas's use of the expressions " logical term " and " logical relation." " One can say that while God is the logical term of a mi:imd relation in that he does not change, nor does he establish the relation by some mediating act, but by relating the creature to himself as he is, he nevertheless is actually related to the creature because the creature is really related to him" (94). But St. Thomas " never explicitly distinguishes the difference between being a ' logical term' in a mutual logical relation and being a 'logical term' in a mixed relation" (94). Nevertheless-and this is what St. Thomas failed to emphasise--" in a mixed relation a further note is added to the concept of ' logical term ', that of actually being related to the second term because the second term is really related to it" (95). In spite of this imprecision, " looked at now as an instance of a mixed relation one can see

[2] Dr. Weinandy, by a slip, gets this the wrong way round, on p. 90 1. 10 and p. 96 1. 5.

the exact na;ture of the 'becoming.'" The real effect in the manhood is both that it comes to be, not by way of change, but more dynamically that it comes to be or exist, and that it is united to the Logos .... The humanity is not united to the Logos by some mediating act, but is united to the Logos as the Logos is in himself, in what Aquinas calls his *esse personale.* This makes it possible to maintain that it is really the Logos *as God* who is man." But also: " because the Logos as the logical term remains unchanged, and thus in turn makes it possible for humanity to come to be and unite to the Logos as he is, one can grasp how in the Incarnation it can really be *God* who is man and truly man that God is" (97).

In summary Dr. Weinandy insists on the concrete character of St. Thomas's Christology: "Only if Christ is truly God who thirsts, hungers, suffers and dies as man in time and history, are time, history, and every human life changed and made new " (100) .

Passing now by a brief but careful discussion of Luther, whom he summarises in the statement " the existential reality of Jesus is God as God in a substantial and dynamic union with a man as man, but God never *is* man nor does he exist *as man"* (106), Dr. Weinandy discusses Kenotic Christology under the rubric "'Become' as Compositional." As the most important representatives he takes not the more radical Teutonic figures but the highly respected Anglican bishops Charles Gore and Frank Weston, who, both by their own declaration and their share in the ecclesiastical politics of their time, were generally accepted as unyielding champions of catholic orthodoxy. For neither of them is the Logos seen, as by the German Gess and Godet, as losing his cosmic functions during the Incarnation, but for Gore there is ,a real self-emptying. For Weston, on the other hand, "the Logos in no way abandons his divine attributes, but merely restrains them in his incarnational refation with the humanity. He is then better able to guarantee that it is really *God* who is man" (114). However, Dr. Weinandy argues that, whatever their intention, both

Gore and Weston in effect deny the immutability of God: " In Kenotic Christology the Logos, as he is himself as God, is not man but always ·Some reduced ' species ' or expression, and therefore one cannot truly say that it really is God who is man, nor then that it is man that God is " (115) . I believe that Dr. Weinandy has pin-pointed the real weakness in l(:eneticism and that it is increased rather than diminished by the attempt of both Gore and Weston to discuss Jesus's human nature almost entirely a•s a problem about his human con-sciousness. " The Logos *as incarnate* in Kenotic Christology is never *homoousi,on* with the Father, for in Kenotic Christology the Logos *as incarnate* is always 'self-emptied ' "(116) . And the reason for this is that " the Kenoticists presume ·that the nature of the incarnational union-' the becoming '-is com-positional" (118). And, taken with the identification of per-sonhood with psychological selfconsciousness, this means that the Logos as man must lose his divine self-consciousness and knowledge (120). However-and here I will quote Dr. Wein-andy at length, for this passage embodies the heart of his Christology-

As soon as one sees the incarnational act, the "becoming", not as the substantial compositional union of natures forming a new be-ing, but as the person of the Logos taking on a new manner or mode of existence, of *coming to be, coming to exist* as man, the questions and problems as seen by the Kenoticists disappear. The " becoming" no longer threatens the immutable divinity of the Logos, nor the integrity of the manhood, but just the opposite. It establishes and guarantees that it is the Logos, in his *unqualified* divinity, who now is and exists *as man.* Thus *as man* the Logos, without any change in his divine nature, possesses a human intel-lect and will, and thus human consciousness and knowledge. It is only because the Kenoticists understood the union as composi-tional that they believed the duality of wills and intellects, as sanctioned by the Councils, demanded the obliteration of one or the other. It is only in a compositional framework that they be-come mutually exclusive [119].

If Kenoticism was the fashionable theology of the last cen-tury, Process Theology might be described ,as that of the pres-

ent, but in opening his discussion of it Dr. Weinandy remarks
that in it the questions with which he has been concerned im-
mediately vanish. " To confront a. process theologian with the
question how God can remain immutable in becoming man and
be passible as man is to ·ask him a non-question " (rn4) , for
he denies that God is immutable and holds that God's nature
is one of change. All that can be done is to analyse the reper-
cussions caused by the absence of the questions! And Dr.
Weinandy does this under three heads: first he deals with the
process theologians' critique of classical theism, then he ex-
pounds the main features of process theology and Christo logy,
and lastly he ex·amines the philosophical and theological viabil-
ity and the position. "Philosophically," he tells us, "process
theologians follow the lead of A. N. Whitehead and C. Hart-
•shorne, [whose] philosophy grew out of the basic principle that
change is the universal element of reality " (rn9) . And Jesus
is " the chief exemplification . . . of those ' principles ' which
are required to explain, make sense of, and give the proper
setting for whatever goes on in the entire process of God in
relationship -to man and man in relation to God " (134, quot-
ing from Norman Pittenger). However, Dr. Weinandy argues,
it is impossible for process philosophy to account for why any-
thing *exists,* even God; ·and process theology neither grasps the
evil of sin nor understands the radical nature of man's salva-
tion in Christ. I doubt very much whether many of the ad-
herents of process theology have grappled thoroughly with its
metaphysical presuppositions as they are, for example, ex-
pounded in Whitehead's formidable work *Process and Reality;*
but I think they are attracted by the warmth and sympathy
of his description of God as " the great companion-the fellow-
sufferer who understands." Nevertheless, Dr. Weinandy main-
tains, it is in classical Christology that the truth is maintained
"that God is supremely dynamic and intimately related to the
world and man, and that in the Incarnation God really does
become man and act as man in time and history. While
Process Christology expresses the same desire, it fails in its at-
tempt " (152) "

Dr. Weinandy concludes his investigation with a chapter on Contemporary Catholic Christology, for which the rubric is "'Become' as Dynamically Present"; he selects for discussion Hans Kling, Karl Rahner and Jean Galot. He sees Kting's movement from the earlier *Menschwerdung Gottes* to the later *Christ sein* (" On Being a Christian ") as marking a metaphysica1 decline: "The Christology proposed in *On Being a Christian.* no longer contains the question of God's immutability and becoming man. The Christology here appears to be solely adoptionistic and functional " (162). In contrast, while admitting that Rahner's writings are complex and often difficult to understand, Dr. Weinandy argues that his true position is in complete conformity with the Catholic triadition. Rahner' s view of man as the " grammar " of God means that *"man* is defined as that which God *becomes* when he reveals himself *as he is in himself* in time and history" (164). And this, it is urged, is the personal/existential notion of "become," ascribed by Cyril, approved by Chalcedon and clarified by Aquinas, and a spirited defence (and careful interpretation) is put up of the phrase of Rahner which many, including Schoonenberg, Donceel and Trethowan, have seen as denying the divine immutability, that "he who is not subject to change in himself can *himself* be subject to change *in something else."*

On Fr. Jean Galot, S.J., Dr. Weinandy remarks that, although" he is not a well-known theologian in English speaking circles, [nevertheless] his Christology is one of the most refreshing and clear statements of the Catholic tradition to appear in recent times" (174). With this estimate I fully agree, and I devoted 'a large section to its discussion in the chapter on " Christology Today " in my work *Theology and the Gospel of Christ.* [1] Dr. Weinandy endorses Galot's judgment that the Christology of Chalcedon is thoroughly dynamic: "The Incarnation is not only the revelation of God in a man;

[1] London, S.P.C.K. 1977, 15lff.

it is the involvement of the divine person of the Word who has become man " (175, quoting from Galot) . For Galot, " the greatness of the Incarnation lies in the mystery that the eternal Son of God now relates to man as a fellow man" (177) . And "his divinity is not diminished in so becoming man, but he remains fully God.... However, the Logos' immutability in becoming man ' does not prevent a true becoming.'" (177) . Dr. Weinandy is worried tha.t Galot seems to imply some manner of change in the Logos becoming man, though he recognises that Galot rejects firmly a mere identification of God's immutability with his moral faithfulness. I am rather surprised that he relegates to a footnote the distinction which Galot makes in his book *Dieu souffre-t-il?* between the necessary order of God's being and the free order of God's will, with immutability and impassibility belonging to the former but creation and redemption to the latter (181). He applauds Galot's doctrine of the divine persons as subsistent relations, which derived from St. Augustine's *De Trinitate,* but he suggests that Galot might have worked it out even more fully than he did. He warmly appreciates Galot's determination to give full weight to the testimony of Scripture to the love and compassion of God and to the fact that God truly acts in time .and history and produces real consequences outside himself. However, he finds two specific " flaws " in Galot's position: first that Galot treats God's immutability and almighty power as " accidents " in the schol·astic sense, whereas God's immutable nature enables him to be active in time ·and history *without* change; secondly Galot assumes that if God had simply a " logical " relation to the world he would not be really concerned with it (here of course there is an echo of Dr. Weinandy's amplification ⊲f the Thomist doctrine of "mixed relations".) And Dr. Weinandy gatheirs up his own thought on the Incarnation in the following terms:

The Logos being a fully actualized subsistent relation does not have to overcome some potential in order to become man and subsist as man. He does not, as Galot proposes, have to change his

immutable being or newly express it as incarnational. The Logos ... has no relational potency and thus has no need of new mediating actions on his part in order for him to establish an incarnational relation. The potency lies solely in the humanity. It must be related and united to the Logos in such a way that the effect in the humanity is nothing other than the Logos subsisting in it as man.

So Dr. Weinandy concludes,

The immutability of God as expressed in the Person of the Son as a fully actualised subsistent relation is the prolegomenon to and presupposition for the Incarnation and not a stumbling block to it. It is not an attribute of the Son which is dialectically opposed to the Incarnation nor one that must be overcome in order for the Incarnation to take place. It is rather because the Son is immutably perfect in his relational being that he can become incarnate [185].

What, then, is Dr. Weinandy's actual achievement a:s a result of his wideranging and representative survey? It is to have shown quite clearly tha.t the immutability of God, and in particular of the Logos, is not an impediment or an embarrassment to the Incrurnation but. its necessary foundation and that to accept it fully results in an enhanced understanding of the dynamic character of the enfleshment of the Word. Fundamental to this is the insight that *beooming* does not necessitate *change,* and ancillary to it is his deepened ,analysis of the notion of *mixed relations.* His condemnrution of kenoticism as "essentialistic and compositional " is fully justified (189) , and in dealing with Process Christology he fastens on to the root weakness of process meta.physics that in it " all reiations are constitutive relations of prust to present to future and not personal contemporary relations ", so that in it " God and man are never contemporaries and never personally related" (189). I would, however, suggest that Dr. Weinandy's ·argument would be much strengthened (and indeed for its fulness needs) to be supplemented by some reference to the divine infinity and timelessness. Fm- without this, although it may be convincingly argued that the assumption of manhood by the di-

vine Logos does not involve any augmentation or diminution of the divine nature itself, the objection may still be made that when he has become man the Logos has become the subject of something, namely the human nature, of which he was not the subject before, and that this meam that he has" changed"; he has become greater by the precise amount of the human naiture. If we remember, however, that the Logos is simply identical with God and therefore enjoys the attribute of infinity, we shall also recall that it is the property of the infinite to surpass everything finite, however grerut that finite thing may be; the finite and the infinite just do not "add up." We do not need therefore to minimise the human nature of Jesus or to treat it as unreal or merely phenomenal in order rto prevent it from competing with the infinite splendour of the divinity. It is to be welcomed as having all and more than all of the rich and living beauty and v;ariety that human nature has as we know it in our experience; only then can we say that it is as nothing in comparison with the glory of God himself, and only in comparison with the Glory of God can we say that it is " as nothing."

With this completion Dr.   work is, in my judgment, one of the most outstanding and constructive contributions that have been made to the theology of the present day. It is significant that, by his own testimony, his resea.rch led him to a more living relationship with Christ and that he is now living and working with a community that arose out of the charismatic revival. I consider myself fortunate to have been the official supervisor of the academic thesis on which this work was based.

E. L. MASCALL

BOOK REVIEWS

Toward a More Natural Science: Biology and Human Affairs. By LEON
KASS, M.D. New York: Free Press, 1986. Pp. 370 **✚** xiv; $23.50.

'l'he capacities of modern science and medicine to cure, remedy and
palliate diseases and their abilities to manipu'ate physical, animate nature
are well known. This has been seen most recently in the power of modern
science and medicine to generate life in a laboratory setting, significantly
alter the genetic character of human beings and to generate human life
without coition. The new science and medicine have developed new forms
of human generation: *in vitro* fertilization, surrogate parenting, gene
splicing, sperm banks, suppression of undesirable genes, freezing of human
embryos and trait selection. Dr. Leon Kass, M.D., notes that we are
probably on the verge of asexual reproduction of higher animals, for
mice can now be generated to the blastocyst stage.

In this important new book, Dr. Kass urges that these new tech-
nologies be adopted with caution and counsels serious consideration
of the wider "risks " that are involved in the use of these technologies.
Caution is needed because we are at the point where we can create man
in our image through these technologies, and Dr. Kass wonders if we
have the wisdom to do this without seriously harming ourselves. He points
out that we are marching down the road to the brave new world and this
road has been paved with sentimentality and love. Thousands have not
made it to this world because of abortion and it now appears that thousands
of elderly will not make it to the brave new world because of the eugenic
practices that this new technology could spawn.

Kass objects that producing babies in the laboratory setting is de-
humanizing as it divorces generation from lovemaking and the human
clements that are not accidental, but essential to human generation and
rearing. In his mind, we have paid a high price to conquer nature, and
we might have to pay a higher one, for new technologies and medicine are
now striking at the very core of our human relationships, existence and
generation. The new science and medicine are challenging the biological
foundations of marriage and the family, and Kass wonders whether we
should allow this to happen.

With the rise of techniques to generate and alter human life in the
laboratory, we are on a slippery slope, in Kass's mind. He believes that
there are slippery slopes, and he argues that the slippery slope principle
is valid because a principle that validates one form of action can often
be used to validate other actions. Kass is as concerned with principles as

he is with the morality of particular actions. The new scientific and medical techniques are now divorcing generation from sexuality, are undermining the natural foundations for marriage and the family, and are eliminating human generation from the confines of our human bodies. Kass believes that this is particularly dangerous because our identities are bound up with our families and ancestry, and the new forms of generation are challenging our very identities. Rather than being partially defined by our ancestry, it is quite likely in the future that many will be partially defined by the scientists or processes involved the their laboratory generation. He argues that much depends on biological parenting: family, marriage, ancestry, our deep sense of human, personal and familial honor.

Kass wonders if the desire that parents have for children gives them a right to use these new laboratory methods of procreation. He objects to experimentation on laboratory generated embryos by invoking Paul Ramsey's principle that there should be no experimentation on incompetent patients if the subject derives no therapeutic benefit from the experiment. Kass believes that embryonic human life is protectable humanity and he objects to discarding laboratory generated blastocysts at later stages. He reminds us that Dr. Edwards, who was responsible for the *in vitro* birth of Louise Brown, exclaimed of her " She was beautiful then and she is beautiful now!" Discarding embryos is not identical to abortion because these embryos are wanted while fetuses are usually unwanted. This is eugenic killing of nascent life, and is immoral even though it is different from abortion because these embryos are wanted but are rejected because they are genetically unacceptable. He also objects to destruction of laboratory manufactured embryos judged to be defective because doing this kills the patient in order to cure the genetic disease. The status of "extracorporeal" life is at stake in laboratory generation and manipulation of life. In the laboratory production and alteration of human life, Kass claims that biologists are creating life knowing that some of it will be destroyed, and they will destroy it if it is not up to their standards of perfection.

Kass is correct in arguing that laboratory generation of human life should not violate the demands of physical nature, but, even more importantly, it should not violate the moral precepts of the natural law. It should seek to enhance forms of human reproduction that are natural to the human species rather than substituting scientific and nonhuman forms of human generation. To put it simply, genetic manipulation of human life should only enhance naturally existing forms of human life and scientific interventions should only restore the naturally existing forms and functions.

In his criticisms of surrogate parenting and laboratory generation of

human life, Kass has failed to see one important point. One of the sources
of the malice of these actions is the fact that children have a right to
their parents, to the love that nature engenders between parent and child
and to the natural bonding that flows from this love. This is the primary
reason why surrogate parenting and the freezing of human embryos is
immoral. Even if there was no risk involved in these procedures, these
actions would still be immoral because they deprive children of their
parents for no good purpose. Surrogate parenting and freezing of human
embryos are thus analogous to the removal of children from their parents
to have them politically indoctrinated.   Doing this might not impose any
risks on the children, but it is still immoral because it deprives them of the
presence of their families.

Kass holds that the restraints on embryo research should be as strong
as those imposed on fetal research. He denies that the federal govern-
ment should promote laboratory production of life for the reasons that
so doing would greatly disrupt family life, it would give infertile couples
a right to public aid for fertility and it would involve people in activities
through their state that they object to on moral grounds.

He discusses the landmark Supreme Court decision in the *Chakrabarty*
case that allowed patenting of new forms of life. Kass criticizes this
decision which held that Chakrabarty had created new life and therefore
had a right to obtain a patent on it because Chakrabarty was only a
bacterial matchmaker. **If** Chakrabarty had in fact patented new life,
then the person who first made a mule had a legal right to all other
mules. The *Chakrabarty* decision implies that new forms of life can be
owned because they result from engineering, which Kass finds legally
and ethically objectionable.

In his discussion of medicine and medical ethics, Kass argues that the
end of medicine is to promote health. But if health is an objective, why
does he not permit direct abortion to protect the health of the mother?
He says nothing about that, even though he appears to be opposed to
abortion for all but the most serious reasons. He rejects the idea that
medicine is to prolong and promote life and impede death. And because
of this, he denies that prolonging the life of a persistently vegetative pa-
tient is a value. This notion that medicine is to promote health but is
not concerned with impeding death and prolonging life is a phrase that
is commonly used by euthanasia advocates, and Kass apparently does
not realize that he is mouthing their slogans. He admits that most physi-
cians believe that their objective is to save life, but he does not try to
reconcile this with his views of the true nature of medical practice.

Kass rejects the pure patient autonomy model and its claims that the
patient should make all medical decisions, as this would violate the obli-
gations of medical professionals in some instances. He is correct in re-

jecting this model not only because it might involve physicians in conceding too much by adoption of the pure patient autonomy model but also because this model is at the heart of the " rational suicide " movement. He affirms that we are responsible for our actions, and he wants to find ways of bringing individuals to care for themselves without imposing a tyranny.

The traditional medical ethic has made physicians wary of fixed codes of ethics or laws. Kass clearly wishes that medicine should be left to follow its own lights and he intensly dislikes anyone outside the profession determining medical practice. But he does admit that the abuses of medical practice in recent decades have probably warranted some regulation of practice. He affirms that the health of the patient is to be the first consideration of the physician.

Kass has a general sense that such actions as genetically engineered human life, *in vitro* fertilization, surrogate mothering, sperm banks and other forms of laboratory production of human life are unethical. But he lacks the disciplined and formal ethical training required to see their precise moral malice. The malice of these forms of manipulation rests in the fact that they separate procreation from marital love. Similarly, he does not see the nature of the moral malice in direct abortion. He judges most of the actions he considers from consequentialist principles, such as their impact on family life and marriage, but he lacks the philosophical understanding to see their deeper evil. This is regrettable, because he is a very insightful, creative and imaginative scholar.

Kass's insight into the ethics of technological manipulation of human life is inadequate because his concept of nature is not fully adequate as he only studies animate nature and is not enough of a philosopher to see that there are laws of human action based on human nature that are normative. He has fallen prey to the mistake of Ulpian, who identified moral norms with what is the standard for animate physical nature. There are laws governing the behavior of all animals, of which the human being is one, but these human moral laws are not identical to those which govern the rest of the animal kingdom.

According to Kass, evolution is in fact teleological and he argues that Darwin admitted purpose and teleology in nature. He notes that animals, species, and nature itself are teleologically oriented. Individual animals do in fact exist for the species, and different· species exist to promote their own existence and the existence of other spec.ies. And the entire natural kingdom exists to promote the existence of the highest forms of souls. By a higher soul, he means a soul which is capable of experiencing more of and higher levels of existence. It is remarkable that a prominent physician would speak of souls, much less their existence, even to consider the soul to be important.

From my perspective, the most imaginative part of this book is his

analysis of animal forms and the natural foundations of human ethics.
Very interestingly,   he claims that animal bodies are expressive of their
souls and of their social functions and abilities.   He suggests in light
of this principle that the entire human body is naturally designed for
sociability as it is upright and constructed for social interaction.   The
human limbs are not constructed for mere motion or fighting, but for more
important and constructive tasks.   He sees the human body is an imple-
ment of the human will and intelligence.

His analysis of animal life and the relation of physical nature to ethics
is most interesting.   He points out that the coloration of animals reveals
something of their sociability.   He suggests that the colors of birds and
animals reveal their social life.   And in light of this he contends that
human blushing is a unique coloration that only appears when we are
ashamed which shows our concern for self-presentation,   our self-attention
and our concern with appearance.

Kass is trying to do something very new and interesting in his analysis
of' animal sociability, evolution and "animal looks".   He is pointing out
that there is a biological and physical orientation given us by our animal
natures toward what we would call ethical conduct, conduct that makes
us "look good".   He is suggesting that there is a natural basis of morality
and ethics as these are the human sciences of "looking good".   Our human
actions are part of our natural animal desire to appear good and to
maintain shamelessness and integrity in our lives and action. All humans
have a desire to "look good" in that they wish to avoid situations which
cause them shame. Another expression of this concern for self-presentation
is clothing which covers more than nakedness.   Clothing expresses a desire
to cover what is vulnerable and shameful in us. This natural desire in
humans to present ourselves well, expressed most perfectly in blushing,
is the natural basis of our concern for ethics.

In the past two decades, we have seen the ethics of eugenic medicine
prevail in our country. Contraception and abortion have been accepted as
legitimate forms of birth control and to prevent undesired or unwanted
children.   Serious attempts were made to apply eugenic standards to the
treatment of handicapped children so that children judged to be eugenically
unacceptable could be eliminated.   Quality of life standards, legally ac-
ceptable when applied to the unborn since *Roe v. Wade,* were applied to
the newborn handicapped, but the Child Abuse Prevention Act Amend-
ments of 1983 prevented this.

At the present time, attempts are made to legalize mercy killing by
lethal injections given by physicians to terminal patients.   Attempts are
also being made to legalize removal of food and water from chronically
ill, handicapped or severely brain damaged patients when a judgment is
made that their lives are not worth living.   All of these new forms of

" medical practice " are eugenic in nature because they assume that it is legitimate deliberately to destroy certain forms of innocent human life. The rise of technological attempts to control eugenically human reproduction shows that eugenic medicine is now coming full circle in America. It shows that attempts are now being made to apply eugenic standards to human life in all of its forms. Kass is quite right in objecting to applying eugenics not only to human reproduction, but to all forms of human life.

Congress has recently enacted the Health Research Extension Act of 1985 which provides for the establishment of a Biomedical Ethics Advisory Board. This board will appoint a committee that will study the ethics of various forms of genetic engineering, laboratory reproduction and artificial reproduction. In general, the views presented by Dr. Kass should be taken seriously by this body, but caution should be the watchword as he has said many things in this book which will operate to promote euthanasia, abortion and infanticide and thus undermine legal protections for innocent human life.

ROBERT BARRY, O.P.

NEH Fellow
Dominican House of Studies
Washington, D.C.

Die Metaphysik des Thomas von Aquin in historischer Perspektive, I. Teil Salzburger Studien zur Philosophic, Band 16). By LEO J. ELDERS. Salzburg/Miinchen: Verlag Anton Pustet, 1985. Pp. 256. DM 39, 80.

Leaving to a future volume the problems about the first being, God, this initial part of Elders's projected work presents a comprehensive and illustrative picture of the Thomistic enterprise during the present century in the field of *das ens commune* (pp. 5; 21-22; 133). Translated into German from the original Dutch, the book offers the fruit of the author's research and teaching on the topic over the past twenty years. But instead of remaining hermetically sealed within the Neo-Thomist tradition, the work aims at pushing its roots into the broad culture of contemporary philosophical language and viewpoints. In this way it intends to achieve with deeper insight and in more acceptable fashion its dominating purpose, namely to make manifest to the minds of contemporary readers the metaphysical doctrine of Aquinas himself. Pursuing that course in historical perspective, it endeavors to spread out in verifiable detail a definitive answer to the query whether Aquinas has anything to say for today's world. The answer envisaged is a straightforward " yes " (p. 7). With

that incentive the book hopes to serve as "introduction and guidance" (p. 7) for those who wish to penetrate more deeply into the thought of Aquinas.

In the book's Introduction (pp. 11-37) the history of the term and notion "metaphysics" is carefully reviewed, with attention given to the significant breakup of the subject matter in the seventeenth century into "ontology" and "natural theology." The extensive survey purposes to show that man in seeking truth is by nature an *animal metaphysicum* (p. 37). The ensuing chapters (pp. 39-246) cover in detail the Neo-Thomistic discussions on what exists *(das S eiende),* together with the transcendental aspects it involves. These are the aspects of thing, unity, truth, goodness, and beauty. The distinction between essence and existence, and the topics of participation, entitative order, substance, accidents, and causality are then discussed. Indexes of names (pp. 247-251) and of topics (pp. 252-256) are provided. But a bibliography, important for this type of work, is presumably left for the completing volume.

The interesting and informative coverage of Thomistic writers and their problems during the flourishing period of the present century can hardly help but evoke nostalgic memories in the minds of readers who took an active part in the enterprise, as names like Gredit, Descoqs, Geiger, Phelan, De Raeymaeker, Louis Lachance, Regis, Forest, Carlo, and numerous others come up in the dicussions, a.long with the trail-breaking work of Gilson, Maritain, Fabro, and Pegis. Some who exercised great influence upon students in America, such as Gerard Smith, are not mentioned, and transcendental Thomism is given but brief treatment (p. 20), with refer-ence *(ibid.,* n. 73) to Henle's critique of Coreth and (pp. 52; 113) to Marechal's position regarding human certitude and the principle of con-tradiction. However, Elders is not aiming at a complete overview of Neo-Thomistic tendencies, and is deliberating trying to avoid the text-book tradition. His selection suffices for his purpose of "introduction and guidance" (p. 7) to the doctrine of Aquinas as he sees it. Usually he does not take sides in intramural Thomistic controversies. Rather, he merely reports the situation. The possibility of genuine pluralism within authentic interpretation of Aquinas is not explored. For instance, Elders *(* p. 162) seeks to bring into a certain harmony the divergent positions of Fabro, Gilson, and Maritain upon the concept of existence, without reference to the intransigent final exchange of views by Maritain and Gilson on the topic. Likewise the question of Thomistic " realism " is broached (pp. 43; 62) without note of the radical differences among the leading Thomistic commentators. Similarly the critique of Cajetan's notion of being is played down (p. 149), with no direct mention of Gil-son's trenchant article " Cajetan et !'existence." On the other hand, Phelan's stand that existence "formally constitutes" (p. 27, n. 14) the

object of metaphysics seems taken to mean that existence *tout court* is
the object of the discipline, as though there were difference between Phe-
lan's view in this regard and Elders's own interpretation   that for Aquinas
existence is *das formelle Element*   (p. 133) in the concept of *das Seiende.*

   Notwithstanding   these observations, however, Elders's coverage is amply
sufficient for its stated purpose of an introduction   to a deeper study of
Thomistic metaphysics,   and its use of illustrations   from modern philosophy
can serve as an incentive for further exploration of problematics   that are
common to Aquinas and to present-day   thinkers.   The volume is neatly
produced,   and is remarkably   free from typographical   errors.

<div align="right">JOSEPH OWENS</div>

   Pontifical Institute   of Mediaeval Studies
          Toronto,   Canada

Meaning, Truth, and God, edited by LEROY S. ROUNER. (Boston University
       Studies in Philosophy and Religion, Vol. 3.) Notre Dame, Ind.: Uni-
       versity of Notre Dame Press, 1982. Pp. 240.

   Meaning,   Truth,   and God, edited by Leroy S. Rouner as the third
volume in the series Boston University Studies in Philosophy and Religion,
is a collection of essays, by various contributors,   supposedly having to
do with the topic indicated by the title. As the editor informs us in the
Introduction,   the volume is intended to express a multifaceted concern
that extends to (1) the logic of religious language, (2) the effect of social
context on religious meanings, and (3) the reinterpretation   of major
nineteenth century thinkers. Regretably,   with the exception of perhaps
two essays, one by Hartshorne,   the other by Burrell, scant attention is paid
to the most fundamental   concern of philosophical   theology, viz., the truth-
claim regarding God's existence and the question of His nature. What the
reader is presented with instead is a theological tower of Babel whose
various essays contribute little if anything to one's understanding   of truth
or God. In the review that follows I discuss the first eight essays of the
volume and omit any discussion of the last three, the ones appearing in
Part III entitled " The Reality of God." I have ignored these essays not
because they are in any way inferior to those which precede them but
because of the obvious limits of space and, to be more candid, to protest
their failure to address the title of their section.

   In his essay " believing in God's Existence," Charles Hartshorne in-
cludes in summary form his well-known revised version of the ontological

argument as well as two additional arguments for God's existence also found in his writings. One is based upon the premise that cosmic order requires a divine orderer (according to Hartshorne's meaning of the word "divine"), the other, upon the concept that a supreme purpose for things requires as " the happiness or welfare of the creatures whether (as I think) in this life alone, or as, in some case at least, individually immortal but all somehow permanently enriching the divine life and its happiness" (p. 27). Consistent with his Whiteheadian process philosophy Hartshorne reiterates certain claims about God that would not be acceptable to classical theism (which he rejects because of its apparent inability to allow for the freedom of the creature or for a solution to the problem of evil) and which seemingly conflict with orthodox Christian teaching: e.g. **(1)** God, in his "concrete actuality," is constantly changing, (2) his knowledge is variable and he lacks infallible knowledge of the future, and (3) he is in nowise the cause of the creature's actions. Throughout this essay Hartshorne offers numerous value observations about philosophers with whose thought he is presumably familiar (among the ancients Aristotle seems to be his favorite, and among the moderns Peirce and Whitehead). 'Vhile such off-the-cuff remarks make the essay more interesting fare, unfortunately they are sometimes accompanied by highly questionable assertions concerning the doctrines of these philosophers (e.g. *Aristotle* held that for the concrete there are only approximately or probabilistically sufficient conditions and *Hume* assumes that all events are causally completely determined by their predecessors).

In the essay that follows, "Verification in Matters Religious," David Burrell investigates the rational basis for belief in such a proposition as *God is the creator of heaven and earth.* He claims that while there is no direct philosophical argument for the truth of such a belief as it is an article of faith (he apparently rejects Aquinas's view that such a proposition is *not* an article of faith but a preamble thereto and something which ean be philosophically demonstrated), there *ai·e* means of verifying it. According to Burrell, "we count a revelation as true as it . . . continues to realize them [aspirations] in a super-eminent way" (p. 40). However, Burrell then goes on to say that the aspirations that set us seeking will inevitably alter (in what way he neglects to mention but presumably for the better) and the phrasing for the requirement that aspirations be realized in a super-eminent way is " deliberately ambiguous." In responding to Kai Nielsen's objections against God-language as saying things which are either unverifiable in human experience or too attenuated in meaning or even conceptually meaningless, Burrell counters by arguing that such a statement that God is creator can be affirmed as true "as wp note the difference it can make in the ways a community can be related to the world. **If** the credal statement is offered as warrant for the prac-

tices, the perceived rightness of the practices, especially by contrast with current alternatives, can warrant one's assenting to the statement" (p. 45). Apart from the apparent circularity of this argument (which Burrell attempts to avoid with the explanation that "in an archaeological sense, the statement grounds the practices; in a constructive sense, the practices ground the statement), Burrell fails to explain what it is that makes one perceive the practices to be *right*. He also argues against Nielsen (and here he appears on more traditional grounds) that personal predicates like "love " or " create " do not suffer any attentuation but rather an enrichment of meaning when they are applied to God and that such theologians as Augustine and Aquinas have been successful in showing how a being which is incorporeal, or " outside " space and time, *is* conceivable and can thus stand as the subject for known predicates.

In the next essay, "Hegel and Schleiermacher," Robert Williams offers a spirited if somewhat illogical defense of Schleiermacher against Hegel's well-known attack upon the farmer's concept of religion. Among other things, he argues that when Hegel ridiculed Schleiermacher's definition of I'eligion as " a feeling of absolute dependence " he either failed to do justice to the importance of emotion in religious experience or else, by implication, contradicted his own view of the role of feeling in the immediate apprehension of truth. He also suggests that Hegel small-mindedly exploited an ambiguity in the term " feeling" to portray Schleiermacher in the worst possible light and further contends that the latter held the same concept of feeling as general perceptual consciousness that Hegel himself defended. According to Williams, there is no such thing for Schleiermaeher as a feeling of absolute dependence understood as a purely private experienee. Rather this description was meant to designate an intentional structure in all religious consciousness, not a natural theology or religion, which Schleiermacher rejected as abstractions. Finally, Williams would draw the following eontrast between these two religious thinkers : Whereas Hegel regarded religious feeling as the original mode of apprehending religious truth, viewing it as the first but poorest form of truth, Schleierrnaeher surrenders the truth question about Christianity to a view of its essence as an historic.al life-form. Thus, according to Williams, Sehleiermacher, as though anticipating Husserl, considered religion a modification of feeling or life-world consciousness and the underlying foundation of science and eulture.

In his essay " *Vorstellung* in Hegel " Paul Ricoeur seeks to emphasize the central position of *Vorstellung* (representation) in Hegel's philosophy of religion. Noting that for Hegel religious thought is essentially figurative even though *potentially* conceptual (i.e., a preliminary stage directed to the differentiated appearance of philosophical thought), Ricoeur proceeds to determine to what extent in Hegel's thought the conceptual does

succeed in overcoming the :figurative. His conclusion, based upon an analysis of Hegel's discussions of religion in the earlier *Phenomenology* and later *Berlin Lectures,* seems to be for a :final retreat on Hegel's part from his initial position which viewed religious *Vorstellung* as inadequate and proclaimed its disappearance for the sake of conceptual thought.

In describing Hegel's assessment of the nature and development of religion Ricoeur notes the proximity for Hegel between art and religion, so that, in the *Phenomenology,* Greek religion is treated as art-religion and, in the *Encyclopedia,* religion is placed between art and philosophy. Ricoeur also notes how Hegel also viewed both the Greek and the Hebraic r6ligions as preparations for revealed or absolute religion, i.e., Christianity, the religion in which God reveals himself as immediately and sensuously present in the Incarnation and :figuratively becomes self-conscious of Himself in the death on the cross and in the Resurrection and Ascension witnessed by the community of believers. According to Ricoeur, Hegel's grading in the *Phenomenology* leads to the conclusion "that the :figurative element raised in Christianity is both the ultimate degree of transparency that religious symbolism may offer and the ultimate resistance of its residual opacity" (p. 74).

Ricoeur then goes on to observe how this opposition for Hegel between the figurative aspect of religion and the conceptual thinking of philosophy becomes somewhat more attenuated in his Berlin Lectures. So much was this the case according to Ricoeur that he understands the last pages of these 1831 Lectures in the following sense: "... becoming more and more aware of the mutual reliance of religion and philosophy, Hegel had to overcome his own distrust for picture-thinking in order to secure the future of philosophy itself" (p. 86). For his part, Ricoeur would interpret Hegel's thought less as a final stage than as a process in which all stages remain thoughtful. As a result, Ricoeur believes, " we have the possibility of reinterpreting the hermeneutics of religious thinking as an endless process thanks to which representative and speculative thought keep generating one another" (p. 86). In this sense, he observes, " a hermeneutics of religious discourse consonant with Hegel's philosophy of religion is the circular process which (1) keeps starting from, and returning to the immedia.cy of religion, be it called religious experience, World Event, or kerygmatic content, (2) keeps generating stories, symbols, and interpretations applied to them in the midst of a confessing and interpreting community and (3) keeps aiming at conceptual thought without losing its rooting in the initial immediacy of religion in the mediating shape of figurative thought" (pp. 87, 88).

In his discussion "Origins of Process Theology," John B. Cobb, Jr., focuses upon the more important members of the group of American thinkers of the past hundred years who merit the title "process theol-

ogians." Given special recognition are, not unexpectedly, Alfred North Whitehead, whom Cobb acknowledges to be " the greatest philosophical influence in the present phase of this tradition," and Shailer Mathews, whom he regards as the dominant figure in the formation of the "Chicago School" (the group of scholars who constituted the University of Chicago's Divinity School faculty in the 1890's). While it would be plausible to con-jecture that nineteenth century thinkers, particularly Hegel and Darwin, would have had a ma,jor impact upon this movement, Cobb informs us that such was not at all the case. According to his account, one of the authors of modern process philosophy and surely its more imposing rep-resentative, Hegel, had little if any influence upon Whitehead (whom he quotes as saying "My problem is I could never understand him! ") and, while Darwin did exert some influence upon the Chicago School, it was more through the general concept of evolution than through the bio-logical theory itself.

Cobb then proceeds to note two positive points about process theology in the Chicago School: (1) its roots grew in the soil of the social gospel in whose movement it participated and (2) it attempted to interpret the Bible according to modern critical scholarship and in a manner relevant for the times. Thus, according to Cobb, this School would have us under-stand the Bible, not, as some would expect, as informing us of timeless truths about God and man and of how Christians throughout the ages should live in and respond to the world, but " about who we are and how we came to be what we are " as well as " how our ancestors in the faith responded to the challenges of their time," thereby calling us "to be equally creative but not to repeat their responses" (p. 99). Concerning the problem of the *identity* of the Christian community through time, Cobb quotes Mathews as saying " that the permanent element of our evolving religion resides in the attitudes and convictions rather than in doctrines " and, in the same passage, "theology changes as banner-words change, but Christian experience, conviction, attitude, prayer, and faith will continue " (pp. 99, 100). To the question how there can be convic-tion, prayer, and faith without doctrine, or at least an implicit theology, Cobb provides no answer. Indeed, presuming to speak for Mathews, he tells us that "we cannot state exactly what those attitudes and convictions are which provide continuity as doctrines change" (p. 100). What all this means, admittedly, is that Christianity has no unchanging essence and Mathews is quoted as saying that "all the various conceptions of the object of worship are relative to the conscious needs and dominant social mindsets of various times and civilizations. The meaning of the word God is found in the history of its usage in religious behavior" (p. 102). But need this view support the roncept of a changing God as opposed to a concept of God as the product of a changing human consciousness **T** As

though in response to this question, Cobb notes that Mathews is convinced of an object of worship which, for him, was "the personality-evolving and personally responsible elements of our cosmic environment with which we are organically related " (p. 102).

The remainder of this essay is devoted to a brief consideration of other prominent members of the Chicago school and to Whitehead. In concluding, Cobb expresses his belief that Whitehead's philosophy, even given its theoretical side, can provide an intellectual climate that will aid in the achievement of the aim of the social-historical school which, he says, today is represented by liberation theology!

In "Weber Revisited " Howard Clark Kee seeks to examine the actual and possible impact of Max Weber's thought on the historical study of Christian origins. His approach to this issue is made from the vantage point of four themes or categories which some readers might think overlap, namely, (1) methodological, (2) conceptual, (3) epistemological, and (4) hermeneutical. (1) *Methodologically,* Kee points out, Weber's contribution lay in the development and refinement of his notion of *ideal types.* Kee quotes Weber as describing an ideal type as " a conceptual construct which is neither a historical reality nor even the 'true' reality . . . it has the significance of a purely ideal limiting concept with which the real situation or action is compared and surveyed :for the explication of certain of its significant components" (p. 119). Kee cites as the best known example of Weber's ideal type the "charismatic leader," i.e., the natural leader, lacking official credentials or formal training, who arises in times of psychic, physical, economic, ethical, religious, or political distress and whose gifts of body and spirit are believed to be supernatural in origin. (Perhaps other readers than myself will also find this description of a "charismatic leader" at once too broad and too narrow.)

(2) *Conceptually,* Weber is credited with introducing to historians of Christianity the bipolar scheme of charismatic leadership and *institutionalization.* In this connection Kee quotes one early historian of the twentieth century as phrasing this distinction as follows: " Jesus foretold the kingdom, and it was the Church that came" (p. 126). Kee discusses, in this context, how *Bultmann's* reconstruction of early Christianity employs, though not overtly, Weber's bipolar scheme, even though Bultmann would reject Weber's description of the charismatic leader, even Christ, as a miracle worker and would refuse to regard the institution of the Church as in any way a positive continuance or extension of the initial charismatic leadership. (3) *Epistemologically,* Kee sees Weber as contributing to the intellectual enterprise known as the sociology of knowledge. In this connection the concept of the "world image " or the "life-world" is discussed, something to which *Wf*eber reportedly would acknowledge the charismatic leader as making a major contribution. Kee himself views

the concept of the life-world, as this concept rs described by *Schutz* (himself under the influence of Weber), as profoundly important for the historical reconstruction of early Christianity ("for persons were being converted to the new faith from a variety of social worlds" p. 130). Finally, (4) *hermeneuticaUy,* Kee notes that Weber has indicated that human action in the world can truly be understood when one asks, not what it means to the observer, but what it meant to the actor, or (with Schutz) conceives of it as the means through which human beings respond to other human beings' intentions (p. 131).

In his essay, "Royce: The Absolute and the Beloved Community," John E. Smith undertakes to discuss how Royce, in his own philosophical journey, came finally to substitute for his earlier doctrine of an Absolute Consciousness apprehending *totum simul* all individuaJs as well as all truth and error a doctrine of the " Beloved Community," a community of metaphysically distinct individuals bound together by a common pur- pose. However, even though the last section is devoted to Royce's concept of community, much of this essay focuses upon the earlier, idealistic phase of Royce's thought. According to Smith, Royce's fundamental conviC'- tion was " that the meaning, truth, and purpose of any fragment, whether it be a momentary thought, a physical object, an event in one's history, are to be found only by appeal to a whole which is, for a finite knower, out of reach" (pp. 136, 137). Thus, Royce was captivated by a God's-eye view of things, or, in the words of Smith, "by the vision of an Absolute Experience wherein what is apprehended by finite individuals only frag- mentarily and discursively is grasped all at once ... with nothing omitted " (p. 137). As Smith suggests, however, this doctrine that what is, is already there was to give rise to the difficulty of reconciling the *totum simul* Absolute with Royce's theory of the individual self " as a purpose to be realized and a task to be performed.

In summarizing Royce's argument for the existence of an Absolute Knower based upon the possibility of error, Smith starts with the premise that error can only be known as such (as error) where there is an includ- ing consciousness which compares the false judgement with what one knows to be the truth. In response to the question, Why would such a procedure require an absolute knower?, Smith takes Royce's answer to be as follows: "Error is possibly *[sic]* only as actually included in a higher thought which provides the judgment with a completed object; for example, the object in its whole truth, by comparison with which the error is judged to be error" (pp. 141, 142). Continuing this explana- tion, Smith remarks "No finite knower possesses that object; we can intend it and find error about it, but we do not have the object available to us for comparison with our isolated judgment" (p. 142). (If this is the argument, however, we may well wonder how Royce could claim

that *we* know error!)   Smith offers another version of Royce's argument which seems more plausible, viz., since the possibilities of error are infinite, there must be an infinite thought to expose them through comparison with the truth about these objects. Yet this argument would seem to assume that there is an infinite knower or, at any rate, that all error and truth must be actually known.

Smith next proceeds to raise difficulties about Royce's concept of an absolute knower-difficulties, Smith suggests, that Royce himself keenly felt. In *The World and the Individual,* Royce had set forth a view of reality according to which what exists represents the will or purpose of the Absolute Self who intends this world and no other. In this view, as Smith points out, each individual being has its own unique role to play in the world and indeed its individuality is to be explained in terms of the Absolute's plan. But such an outlook, Smith notes, was gradually seen by Royce to conflict with his own conviction of the individual self as a reality forming its own purposes and shaping its own future. The last section discusses how Royce ultimately came to replace his doctrine of the Absolute with a doctrine of community as offering a better solution to the problem of the one and the many and presents in summary form the main features of Royce's concept of community.

In "Feuerbach's Religious Materialism" Marx Wartofsky appraises the value of Feuerbach's explanation of religion as expressing the implicit recognition that *homo homine Deus est.* While Wartofsky will argue that, so long as it remains at the ahistorical level, Feuerbach's theory is a failure, he nevertheless contends that it opens up the possibility for an adequate theory of religion and even paves the way to a salvaging of theoretical philosophy. According to Wartofsky, the fundamental question raised by such a critique of Feuerbach, namely, whether there can be a viable materialistic conception of religion (which Wartofsky sees as tantamount to asking whether there is a viable theory of transcendence) is partially answered in Feuerbach's concept of man as a "species being." Hence in discussing Feuerbach's own assessment of traditional Western religion, notably Christianity, Wartofsky will dwell upon the farmer's well-known interpretation of religion as entailing a confusion of man in his " transcendent " or universal or species character with a separate (or " separated ") being called " God."

During the remainder of the essay Wartofsky first poses, then answers, the question whether Feuerbach's religious humanism is anything more than an identification of Hegel's Idea with human self-consciousness. His answer involves a further examination of Feuerbach's materialistic conception of religion, one which, according to Wartofsky, features man's social existence. In this connection Wartofsky sees Feuerbach's religious materialism as providing on two grounds an approach to a materialistic

theory of transcendence: (1) the transcendent object of religion is now viewed as the living human community and (2) the method by which religious consciousness achieves its recognition of the transcendent object is by a praxis of belief or faith. In developing his explanation of this last-mentioned point, Wartofsky indicates how Feuerbach saw the method of transcendence in an act of fellow feeling or love. In conclusion Wartofsky will note how Marx criticized Feuerbach's materialism as being a praxis of belief and as ahistorical, as though man did not historically create his own social being. Nonetheless, he has argued for what he evidently considers due recognition for Feuerbach's contribution to a materialistic theory of transcendence and, for his part, proposes a theory of hope as active practical efficacious belief in human possibilities and which sees the " divine " within the grasp of man's own creative activity.

Part III, entitled " The Reality of God," seems to this reviewer a gross misnomer since the God discussed in the essays by J. *N.* Findlay, E. L. Fortin, and T. F. O'Meara on Hegel, Nietzsche, and Schelling respectively is not only *not* the God of Revelation or of traditional Christian philosophy but a finite god, a god of pantheism, or finally (and logically) an explicitly denied one.

By way of concluding this review I must again register my disappointment with a volume bearing such a promising title. (Here, I suppose, as in the case of so many other books, the title transcends the content.) For reasons perhaps best known to the editor, the volume, instead of presenting a philosophical discussion of meaning, truth, and God, has offered us simply a number of disconnected essays the net effect of whose reading could prompt the philosophically less stalwart to ask with Pilate, what is truth T Indeed, one has the uneasy feeling that this book has clearly spoken its answer, viz., really that is unimportant. Finally, the book is not only one-sided in emphasizing nineteenth century thinkers (as though, contrary to fact, their contributions to philosophy and religion constituted truth) but it is also unfair to the long-standing traditional Christian view of God as an infinitely perfect being Who is the *alpha* and the *omega* of all.

<div align="right">THEODORE J. KONDOLEON</div>

Villanova University
Villanova, Pennsylvania

I-Man: An Outline of Philosophical Anthropology.   By MIECZYLAW A.
     KRAPIEC, O.P. Translated by Marie Lescoe, Andrew Woznicki, Theresa
     Sandok, et al. New Britain, Conn. : Mariel Publieations, 1983. Pp.
     502. Cloth.

   This translation of Krapiec's *Ja-Czlowiek* affords Catholic intellectuals
in the Free World a rare look at Thomistic philosophy as it is being
taught in Eastern Europe. Being of Lithuanian extraction, I know the
plight of religious believers and free thinkers behind the Iron Curtain.
It is somewhat intimidating and incongruous to critically review from
the security and comfort of the West this courageous witness both to
the Catholic faith and to the pursuit of truth.
   As Fr. Francis J. Lescoe explains in the foreword, the translation's
purpose is to provide a Philosophy of Man text for American and Ca-
nadian seminaries. The text comes from a fifteen-volume series highly
successful in Polish seminaries. The series is the fruit of " Lublin Thom-
ism." Lescoe (p. v) characterizes this Thomism as a striking synthesis
of two disparate components: (1) Thomistic realist metaphysics, as in-
terpreted by Etienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain, and (2) the best
insights of contemporary phenomenological existentialism and herme-
neutics. Besides Krapiec, authors include: Tadeusz Styczen, Zofia Zdybicka,
and the present Pope. Other translations from this series are planned.
   Acquaintance with the series stems from a summer 1978 visit to
Poland of various officers of the American Catholic Philosophical Asso-
ciation (Vd. Lescoe's, *Philosophy Serving Contemporary Needs of the
Church,* Mariel Publications). The translators hope that these works
will remove the disarray in seminary theological education. The root of
this disarray is the dismantlement of the philosophical curriculum.
   I-Man begins with an historical survey of theories about man. The span
of the survey is from Biblical notions, through the Greeks and medievals,
and to contemporary existentialistic perspectives. Noteworthy is Krapiec's
clear demarcation between Aquinas, who is the flowering of classical
philosophy, and Descartes, who is the initiator of the great current of
thP philosophy of the subject (pp. 20-1). In Aquinas man is approached
in the light of being; in Descartes being is approached, if at all, in the
light of man. Krapiec explicitly eschews the Cartesian approach for the
Thomistic.
   Chapter 2 presents the pre-scientific knowledge of "the human fact."
This viewpoint cannot be gainsaid. It shows man to be a highly developed
vertebrate animal who, thanks to his intellect, transcends the whole of

nature. This transcendence is exemplified in tools and technology, community, culture, language, science, art, religion, and reflection on death.

Drawing mainly upon continental thinkers, Chapter 3 presents various deficient interpretations of "the human fact." These interpretations are two-fold. The first reduces the human to the biological. Exponents cited include Huxley, de Chardin, Marx, Freud, and Levi-Strauss. The second reduces the human to spirit. Proponents considered are Descartes, Hegel, the existentialists, and Scheler.

Chapter 4 begins Krapiec's own interpretation of "the human fact." Through an increasingly penetrative analysis of what is "mine" and "I," Krapiec presents the self as grasped in immediate inner experience (pp. 89-94). Since some instances of "mine," e.g., physiological and psychical functions, are inseparable from " me," these will indicate not only my existence but my nature (p. 91).

Krapiec further defends the reality of the self (pp. 94-8). Points include : the " I " is given in every experience, hence no experience can disprove it; self-consciousness is considered part of normal psychic life; as accidents psychic functions presuppose a subject; J aspers's reflections refute Hume's denial of the self; categorization of the self as a substance is not reification as Heidegger claims.

The remainder of Chapter 4 neatly integrates the self with Aristotelian talk of soul. Aquinas's position on how the soul is the form of the body and yet subsistent is clearly described and its novelty duly noted (p. 102). After a clarification of "immateriality," the immateriality of the human soul is argued (pp. 111-16). Arguments include: identity of the self over time; intellection-both conceptual and judgmental; volition, especially in acts of love; and self-mastery. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the soul's immortality.

Chapter 5 discusses human knowledge. In clear opposition to Marxist economic reductionism, Krapiec's delineates the immateriality of knowledge. This view serves as the basis for subsequent treatments of culture (ch. 6), human freedom (ch. 7), society (ch. 9), religion (ch. 10), and death (ch. 11). Cognition means "the understanding of a concrete thing under the aspect of a grasped meaning" (p. 120). Noteworthy is Krapiec's discussion of the notion of being *(ens)*. It is thoroughly *aposteriori.* The correct understanding of being squarely rests upon the judgmental grasp of the "act" of being-what Aquinas called *esse* (p. 134). This " act" is the " existence of the concrete thing of our sensible perception." The chapter also clearly presents the functions of agent and possible intellects (pp. 143-56). The chapter concludes with a lengthy survey of the traditional areas of intellection: Theoria, Praxis, and Poesis.

As mentioned, Krapiec's understanding of human cognition is a basis for subsequent chapters. Culture is the creation of man as rational (p.

170). Man's freedom, accepted as a fact of internal experience, has its explanation in the limitation of all goods as set against the " analogously apprehended good " (pp. 205-6, 355). The openness of man to being is the basis for a dialogical relationship with a person that in turn leads to society (p. 244).

Chapters 10 and 12 comprise the most original material. Chapter 10 discusses man and religion and is authored not by Krapiec but Zdybicka. Religion is an "I-Thou" relationship in which the "Thou" is the Absolute (p. 302). Philosophy of the classical type explains the ultimate ontic sources of a religious relation. These sources are subjective and objective. Noteworthy is Zdybicka's analysis of the subjective source. Basic here is the " natural desire " for God. Zdybicka explains that the desire follows the grasp of our existence as contingent and hence dependent upon the Absolute.

> Because the experience of this contingency is a trancendental, since it is the lot of all people, the religious act which arises from this very awareness of man's own existential situation in the world is a common phenomenon (p. 301) .

The desire for dialogue with the Absolute is called forth in us by being itself. Since being so easily does this, no *apriori* categorizing of the desire is necessary. Everything remains thoroughly *aposteriori.*

The full realization of the religious relation also requires God's action. Zdybicka describes this divine action as necessary " in some sense."

> Since God created man out of love and since he is Love, the Fullness of Goodness and Truth, he cannot not love us, that is he cannot not *desire* the fullest development of the hum-n person. And since the human person attains the fullest development through union with God, then God cannot not desire this union because he himself is the 'Author' of man's nature. (p. 302)

In Chapter 12 Krapiec resumes his authorship. The topic is " The Human Being in the Perspective of Death." Especially noteworthy is Krapiec's delineation of an "active" notion of death. Passively, death is the decomposition of the human organism. Actively speaking, death is the moment enabling man to make "... an ultimate decision concerning the meaning of his existence, that is to say, first and foremost, the acceptance of God " (p. 350). Krapiec elaborates this notion in a number of ways (pp. 354-60). One way draws upon our knowledge of the Absolute from contingent existence. This knowledge demands a further more adequate knowledge in which God is "in some sense intuited" (p. 354). The more adequate knowledge is also described in this fashion : " when God, although still not in a supernatural vision but as a concrete and intellectual-volitive experiential good, will stand before the human spirit"

(p. 356). Otherwise man would be an unnatural being. The whole course of human nature would be a pursuit never fulfilled (p. 354). Also, " out the appearance of God-this should be stressed-human nature would not have a rational ontical structure, since the pursuit of nature would be objectless. And an objectless pursuit is not a pursuit of nature" (p. 356). Since God cannot appear so in this life, then only in the moment of death can the pursuit be fulfilled. Krapiec concludes, " Death, then, experienced actively, becomes the factor ultimately making human life meaningful" (p. 359).

I-Man shows an author with a wide-ranging mastery. Krapiec moves easily within both Thomistic and contemporary philosophical circles. He has obviously taken to heart the injunctions of the post-Conciliar Church to present a Thomism in dialogue with the philosophical currents of one's society.

Philosophically, the strength of the book is its unmitigated *aposteriorism.* As mentioned, the formation of *ens* follows the judgmental grasp of the existence of sensible things. The desire for God and the desire for happiness are elaborated as outgrowths of this. Hence, Krapiec can handle many of the phenomena Transcendental Thomists have cited in behalf of their position. No philosophical need exists to turn to an *apriori* to explain man's knowledge of analogous being and his desire for God. The human intellect can be led to both by reality itself.

Unfortunately, I find the philosophical weakness of the book to lie in its original material-chs. 10 and 12. Zdybicka must explain how the necessity of the Loving God to bring man to union with him is compatible with *Humani generis.* Krapiec, too, needs to elaborate a number of points in his interesting active conception of death. First, how can the "intuitive " presence of God to the soul at death be distinguished from the Beatific Vision '/ Second, Krapiec's claim that an objectless pursuit is not a pursuit of nature does not seem to be shared by Aquinas. Anton Pegis, "Nature and Spirit: Some Reflections on the End of Man," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Asociation,* 23 (1949), argues strongly that "the nature of man is naturally endless" {p. 73). Finally, Krapiec seems to assume that Aquinas's arguments for the soul's incorruptibility are arguments for its immortality, i.e., its continued activity and operation. Joseph Owens, "Soul as Agent," *The New Scholasticism,* 48 (1974), questions the identity :

> On the philosophical level the soul is shown to be indestructible and forever existent. But to show how it can be an agent apart from the body, in the sense of actually thinking and willing, seems beyond the reach of cogent metaphysical reasoning. The problem is left in a state of philosophical aporia, and handed over to religion and sacred theology. (p. 70)

I also wonder about the suitability of *I-Man* for American under-graduate seminarians. Stylistically the book is inappropriate. Sentences are too lengthy and replete with distractive relative clauses and paren-theses. Also, the earlier historical chapters repeatedly use technical terminology without any clarification. This manner vitiates their value for students. The editors seem sensitive to these stylistic points, for they promise an abridged edition for use as a student textbook (p. xi).

What the translators of Krapiec's *I-Man* have given American Catholic intellectuals is not so much a text to be used as an example to be followed. Krapiec reminds us all of what we should be striving to accomplish: a presentation of Aquinas eager to synthesize new conquests of human thought and taking into particular account the type of problems and characteristics proper to the various cultures and regions. (G. Garrone, *On the Study of Philosophy in Seminaries).* For this example we should be deeply grateful.

JOHN F. X. KNASAS

University of St. Thomas
Houston, Texas

Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Application. By ALAN
 GEWIRTH. Pp. 366. Paper :

Some issues are never settled. One such issue is whether there are or are not universal moral norms. Alan Gewirth's *Human Rights* and his earlier volume, *Reason and Morality,* constitute an elegant defense of universal morality. Gewirth, who is Edward Carson Waller Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago, joins the argument as one who stands in the tradition of Immanuel Kant. Gewirth seeks to prove that, because all people are agents who act to bring about or attain certain goods, they are all, regardless of cultural or historical circum-stances, *logically* constrained to say that everyone has certain basic rights. Gewirth articulates his own version of Kant's Categorical Imperative, what he ea!ls the Principle of Generic Consistency or the PGC, accord-ing to which every moral agent must "act in accord with his recipients' generic rights as well as his own."

Gewirth's project is to forge a *logically* necessary link between human rights and the necessary conditions of human action. He seeks to accom-plish his end by considering all agents apart from any particularizing characteristics they might have. His work is a major achievement and must be taken account of, particularly by anyone interested in natural law theory. His argument is one that applies to all people in all cul-

tures and in all times. It concerns moral agents as such and so stands in interesting contrast to the position of Michael Walzer in his recent book *Spheres of Justice.* It is Walzer's view that justice, and so human rights, cannot be discussed in a meaningful way apart from given cultural and historical circumstances.

Gewirth takes an opposite tack. The course of his argument is long and complex but Alasdair Macintyre is right to say that the heart of Gewirth's position lies in this claim which he makes in *Reason and Morality.* " Since the agent regards as necessary goods the freedom and well-being that constitute the generic features of his successful action, he logically must also hold that he has rights to these generic features and he implicitly makes a corresponding rights claim."

Human Rights is a collection of fourteen essays (to which Gewirth has added a helpful introduction) which further state and defend this thesis or apply it. Of particular interest are the final eight essays in which the PGC is applied to certain basic moral issues. The essays, among other things, discuss health care, starvation, military obligation, civil disobedience, and civil liberties.

Gewirth's moral theory is well known and has already generated a considerable secondary literature. The basic objection to his position is this. It is one thing to say that one needs or wants or will be benefited by something and quite another to say that one has a right to that thing. (See Alasdair Macintyre, *After Virtue,* p. 64.)

Those who defend a more relativist view of human rights and moral obligation obviously must deny that such a connection exists or claim that, even if it does, the " rights " generated are as empty of specific content and as inapplicable as Kant's Categorical Imperative.

The argument between foundationalists like Gewirth and coherentists like Walzer will certainly continue. This review will not, however, attempt to repeat or comment upon the many objections and replies Gewirth's work has elicited. It will focus instead on his attempt to apply the PGC to specific cases.

In the eighth essay of this collection, "Starvation and Human Rights", Gewirth notes that starvation is one of the most pressing moral issues of cur time and that the basic test of the adequacy of any moral philosophy is its ability to deal with the conflicts of interest and moral criteria that appear in conjunction with this and similar basic issues. It seems right, therefore, to assess Gewirth's theory at the point he himself suggests.

He begins the essay by asking if people threatened with starvation have a strict right to be given food by those who have it in abundance. His answer is yes. The PGC demands, on pain of self-contradiction, that agents not be denied freedom and well-being. Food is so necessary to well-being that we have a right not to have our access to food interfered

with and we have a right to be given food out of the surplus of another if all other things are equal.

Gewirth tries to show that this conclusion hold.s for both individuals and nations. He does not deal with the relief of starvation as a duty for other social institutions like businesses or voluntary societies (among which are numbered the churches.) It would be interesting to explore the implications of the PGC to see what moral responsibility such institutions might have to starving people but we can only note that Gewirth has not done so.

What of the case he does make? It is strongest when applied to individuals. If Ames is starving and Bates has a surplus of food and all things are equal, then Ames has a right at least to some of Bates's surplus and Bates has a duty to supply Ames's lack. The question is whether it is the case, as Gewirth says it is, " that Ames, as a rational agent, is aware of and is subject to the moral requirements of the PGC." Gewirth's method of "Dialectical Necessity," by means of which he arrives at the PGC, assumes that we think of ourselves as rational agents divorced from particularizing circumstances and so perforce must recognize a fundamental equality between all rational agents.

But need Bates indeed see Ames as a rational agent of equal value to himself? Does this perception of moral agency depend upon a system of moral belief not derived from the generic features of agency? Has not Gewirth packed a moral belief relative to his own culture and time into an account of the foundation of morals that purports to be free from such beliefs? This is one question the critical reader certainly must press.

Other questions hover about Gewirth's treatment of the rights and duties of nations in respect to starving people. He is well aware of how complex an issue he touches upon. Nations and individuals are not the same and even if one can establish rights and duties between Bates and Ames one has not thereby established that they exist between nations.

Gewirth believes that such rights and duties obtain because nations are composed of rational agents. Thus, because of the PGC, law ought to have certain contents which are instrumental toward pe.rsons treating one another with the mutual respect for rights directly required by the principle.

Groups as well as individuals have rights and duties and it is a duty for a people to see that the laws by which they are governed facilitate effective recognition of both their rights and the rights of other peoples. Neither politics nor law may rightly be reduced to the defense or pursuit of interest.

Gewirth seeks to establish moral as well as political relations between nations and peoples. His attempt is of enormous importance for in respect to a host of issues we stand at the moment in desperate need of establishing that such a relation indeed exists. Coherentist theories of

justice show their greatest weakness at just this point. Foundational theories like Gewirth's seem to promise a way ahead. But do they work? That is the question.

Gewirth himself admits that his theory, though the most adequate, still leaves unresolved certain tensions between the right to liberty and the right to well-being which he accords to all rational agents. Thus, for example, what limit is to be placed on the interference with political liberty that may be necessary if one nation is to undertake to see that the rights to food of the starving population of another nation are to be honored T Gewirth gives greater weight to well being than liberty but does not this weighting again contain a hidden value judgment not derived from his analysis of agency but from a particular value system relative to culture and historical   And do not the conflicts between liberty and well-being that Gewirth identifies point to limitations on the abilities and duty of nations to ensure the rights of other peoples that Gewirth does not reckon with? These and other questions like them will be debated for some time but it is certain that within the debate *Reason and Morality* along with *Human Rights* will provide a constant point of reference. Together they constitute something of a classic.

PHILIP TURNER

The General Theological Seminary
New York City, New York

The Embers and the Stars: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Moral Sense of Nature. By ERAZill:l Kon.AK. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984. Pp. 269. $17.50.

It is hard to put this profound book into a category. Despite the author's criticisms of Thoreau, it is more like *TValden* than any other book I have read. But, whereas Thoreau forced the reader to work hard to see through the homespun disguise to the body of learning buried beneath, Kohak's book is explicitly philosophical. Some readers will concentrate on the author's idiosyncratic approach, which relies heavily on his experiences living on a New Hampshire homestead in the woods; others will learn a great deal from Kohak's familiarity with Czech philosophy and East European thought generally. And Husserl plays a significant role in the book.

Yet more than anything else I think the book is an extended attempt to defend the Augustinian and Thomistic thesis that *esse qua esse bonum est* (being is good simply because it is, to the extent that it is). This thesis is defended (or better, illuminated) philosophically and poetically,

with particular reference to nature-not nature in general, but *this* por-
cupine, *that* hemlock, etc. The book makes great strides toward bringing
the best insights from medieval philosophy and from contemporary en-
vironmental ethics together. Anyone interested in both of these areas
must read this book. Have those familiar with medieval philosophy yet
done full justice to the notions of *Deus sive natura* (God, that is, nature)
or *vis mediatrix Dei in natura* (the healing power of God in nature) *'l* I
think not. But Kohiik at no point avails himself of a syrupy Franciscanism
(not that Franciscanism   *has* to be syrupy).

   Kobak is convinced that many of the problems in contemporary phi-
losophy, and in contemporary   society, are due to the egocentrism which
has infected the West ever since the decline of the medieval synthesis.
Nature, and hence God, can best coax us out of this egocentrism. (This
well-written book must be read to see why.) Oddly enough, the title to
the book alludes to Kant's famous line about the moral law within and
the starry heavens above. Kohak has no argument with Kant's descrip-
tion of the respect due to beings that are ends in themselves, but he dis-
agrees with Kant's restriction of the category of ends to human beings.
All of nature, as it is God's creation, deserves respect, albeit in varying
ways. Playing freely and insightfully with a familiar Augustinian theme,
Kohiik says that being is holy precisely because it is characterized by the
intersection of eternity and time.

   Kohiik's defense of (or better, metaphorical evocation of) nature should
not be construed as a diminution of human value, but as an enhancement
of it. Human beings hurt themselves by abusing the rest of nature, or
by objectifying it in a purely materialistic or utilitarian way. Kohiik's
personalism is allied to that of American personalists like Borden Parker
Bowne, as well as to that of Max Scheler. (Karol Wojtyla is obliquely
mentioned; in that Kohak comes out of the Czech Protestant tradition,
one of the more interesting features of the book is its ecumenism.)

   The five chapters of the book are designed as an orderly whole *(Theoria,*
Physis, Humanitas, Skepsis, and *Credo).* The purpose of this orderly
whole is to help us escape the stranglehold of *techne,* without leaving the
city, so as to make room for *thaumazein.* Through wonder we might come
to realize that " the moral sense of nature is that it can teach us to cherish
time and to look to cherish it."

                                      DANIEL A. DOMBROWSKI

   Creighton   University
         Omaha, Nebraska

Modern Philosophy: An Introduction.   By A. R. LACEY. Boston, London,
     and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982. Pp. vii + 246. $20.00.

   The blurb announces that *"Modern Philosophy ...* will provide an in-
troduction to the subject for intending students, first-year undergraduates
and interested laymen such as academics from other disciplines." If
"modern philosophy " is restricted to philosophy as it has been done in
the last forty years or so in the English-speaking world-too restrictive a
scope, I think-then this book starts out well enough. Lacey begins by
proposing to give his reader, first, a "tour of some run of the mill prob-
lems" of philosophy, such as " Freewill", "Mind and Body", "The
Basis of Morality", "Works of Art " (all chapter headings in Part One),
and then, in Part Two, " to survey by helicopter the course we have hacked
with the machete, and map out the landscape into its main regions " (p. 12).
I think Lacey's proposal to engage the nonphilosophical reader in philo-
sophical problems and then to discuss the nature of philosophy by reflect-
ing on the way in which philosophical problems arise, are developed, and
(one hopes) clarified is a useful way to introduce interested and intelli-
gent lay people to philosophy. Lacey fails to implement his proposal as
well as he might have done, however, in part because he misses his audi-
ence. By this I do not mean that Lacey overwhelms his reader with
terminology (or jargon); nor does he write obscurely or ponderously.
'l'o his credit, Lacey consciously minimizes technical terminology, and,
when technical terms seem useful, Lacey is usually careful to explain and
illustrate their meaning and relevance. Indeed, his chapter on " Some
Philosophical Labels " (chap. 13) could be very useful for beginners in
philosophy.
   Yet, for all his clarity and care to avoid technical language, Lacey seems
to forget who his intended audience is. He starts off well enough in the
opening chapter on "Freewill". Lacey begins by evoking the feeling
that many people have at least some of the time that events are not in-
fluenced by human desires and actions but are determined by God, or
Fate, or Nature. He then leads the reader to the problem, first posed by
Aristotle, of the truth or falsity of future statements (Can I say truly
or falsely today that tomorrow California will have a major earthquake,
since there is not at present any ' reality' to which the statement may
truly or falsely correspond?). In turn, the problem of the truth or falsity
of future statements leads to the general question of the nature of truth,
which is the subject of the second chapter. The transition from the chapter
on freewill to the chapter on truth, by the way, illustrates one of Lacey's
strengths : showing the logical connections between issues. A good start,

especially if one is willing to set aside one's qualms about Lacey's restric-
tion of " modern philosophy " to English-speaking   philosophy in the last
forty years or so. Unfortunately,   by the time Lacey gets to implication
(chap. 4) and meaning (chap. 6), he has left the beginner behind. The
arguments and distinctions in these chapters are, save for the exceptional
beginner, far too subtle and sophisticated.   I think asking the novice to
grasp the arguments of a Donald Davidson, a Dummett, a Kripke and a
Putnam-all in one chapter !-is too much. The difficulties attendant upon
the subtleties and sophistication of these chapters is intensified by Lacey's
increasing *allusions* to the works of Quine, Frege, Chomsky, and the like.
The middle chapters of this book read like articles from *Mind* or the *Pro-
ceedings of the Aristotelian Society.*

   Although *Modern Philosophy* is not a book for beginners, as the blurb
claims and as Lacey himself suggests in his Preface, some of the chapters
in this book might well be used in a course on analytical philosophy or
Wittgenstein or contemporary philosophical problems. For example, in
chapter 8, on scepticism and language, Lacey carefully and clearly shows
how Wittgenstein's interest in ordinary language was stimulated by his
attempts to overcome the forms of scepticism which derive from the
egocentric predicament. Lacey avoids overwhelming his reader with Witt-
genstein exegesis. The value of his approach is that it highlights the
philosophical significance of Wittgenstein's work; all too often writers fail
to do this for their readers, especially beginners.

   Modern Philosophy, then, has some features which commend it to cer-
tain types of readers, but it does not work as an introduction to philosophy.
And, unfortunately,   simplifying the middle chapters in a subsequent edi-
tion will not make it work either. For the subtlety and sophistication of
those chapters is, I think, evidence of a more basic flaw: pedagogical
solipsism. The book fails to convey to the beginner how philosophical
problems arise out of extra-philosophical or non-philosophical experiences.
The roots of philosophy, it seems to me-its lifeblood-are in the aesthetic,
religious, scientific, and historical experiences of peoples, as well as their
(perhaps   underdeveloped)   philosophical   experiences. A symptom of
pedagogical solipsism is a failure to play upon the particular sensibilities
of one's audience; the writer writes for those who have rather developed
philosophical sensibilities. Thus, when Lacey comes to write of works of
art (chap. 10), he does not even hint that there are interesting and diffi-
cult philosophical problems inherent in doing art and in judging art. The
chapter is not concerned with works of art at all; it is concerned with the
problem of universals. Lacey discusses works of art merely to illustrate the
problem of universals; he does not attempt philosophically to illuminate
works of art themselves. Or suppose you are an historian and you read
the following from Lacey: " ... the point of making a promise, or of

having promising among our social institutions at all, may well be that it is useful " (p. 15). On the basis of your experience as an historian, might you not ask, how does Lacey's view of promising as a social institution comport with the historical fact that the roots of the institution of promising are found in feudal Christianity, in the oath of fealty sworn before God, an oath whose violation imperiled one's immortal soul '/ Does not the sense of the inviolability of promise-keeping as a social institution derive from ' the form of life' of the Middle Ages rather than its utility'/ And if you are an historian with some familiarity with the history of philosophy, might you not ask: Why do Plato and Aristotle scarcely discuss iU Would you not begin to suspect that philosophy is a-historical and does not speak to you '/ That it speaks only to philosophers or phiosophers-to-be'l If Modern Philosophy speaks only to philosophers or philosophers-to-be, has it not failed seriously as an introduction to philosophy'/

Providence College   PAUL TRAINOR
Providence, Rhode Island

The Authority of the Bible and the Rise of the Modern World. By H. GRAF REVENTLOW. London: SCM Press, 1984. Pp. xx+ 668. £25 (cloth).

This is an impressive study of the developments in thinking about biblical authority and the political order that took place in seventeenth and eighteenth century England. The author, a well-respected German biblical scholar, spent ten years researching a vast array of important and unimportant writers who took up the cause for and against the Bible as regulator of the political order. (His index of thinkers surveyed extends over forty pages!) Contrary to common opinion, Reventlow maintains that England and not Germany was the seedbed of modern historical skepticism about the role of biblical authority in public life. While the rest of Europe still largely clung to more traditional respect for biblical models, England went through two succeessive crises that shook permanently the place of the Bible as final arbiter of political thinking.

The first was the Puritan challange of the late sixteenth and first two thirds of the seventeenth century. The struggles between the Puritan thinkers and the leaders of the Church of England over the role that government should play in the control of the Churches severely weakened the alignment that had grown up in England by which Church and State were nearly identified under the King. The legacy of the humanism of Erasmus and other pre-Reformation thinkers led to an odd juxtaposition of rationalism and spiritualism that effectively destroyed the medieval sense of unity between church and state, and prepared for the rise of deism.

The second major crisis was the flowering of the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century which challenged the very foundations of special reve-- lation claimed by the Bible. Deism emphasized instead the powers of reason and the moral intuition in humans. The deists wanted to break clown the authority of Scripture, and they largely succeeded in the in- tellectual world by falling back on a kind of " natural law," which they supported with the help of newly developing theories of natural science as an independent discipline.

All of these intellectual and philosophical struggles were intensified by constant infighting within the Church of England itself between Whig factions who were strongly attracted to rationalism and the High Church Tories who appealed to Scripture for the traditional relationship of Church to political order in England. The end result of all this was a prevailing attitude of ethical and scientific rationalism by the end of the eighteenth century. Meanwhile, the Bible had lost its base in philosophy and politics. Biblical criticism as we know it was born at this period. Interestingly enough, it was taken over by German scholars at the beginning of the nineteenth century and developed along the lines we see it today, while England settled down into a period of intellectual quiet for the first half of that century.

This is an important study of many people and movements that have been under-researched until now. Philosophical deism in religious debate has been neglected. The strong religious involvement of such prominent philosophers as Newton, Locke, and Hobbes in the question of biblical authority has been overlooked. Reventlow gives special attention to the influential role that scientific rationalism and moral theory had in re- ligious questions. At the same time he clearly shows how philosophical systems were influencecl by theological considerations (Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Boyle, to name a few). Reventlow offers substantial evidence that this debate and particular development could only have taken place in the unique conditions of England at the time. He not only argues his case logically but documents it copiously. The end notes alone take up 212 pages of the book. **If** the book has a fault, it is overkill. It can be hard to read about one complicated philosophical and political theorist after another in any book, but here the English translation is often denser than necessary. One paragraph extends for four pages (pp. 42-46) ! At times, too, the unique bias of each thinker brings in a wave of subsidiary considerations that distract from the main line of development. But those are small complaints compared to the benefit that Professor Reventlow has provided by gathering so much and analyzing it so judiciously.

LAWRENCE BOADT, C.S.P.

Washington Theological Union
Silver Spring, Mai·yland

The Coming Great Revival: Recovering the Full Evangelical Tradition.
    By WILLIAM ABRAHAM. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1984. Pp.
    120. $12.95.

   This, Abraham's most recent book, provides a very helpful introduction
to the dynamics and tensions within the modern evangelical movement.
By " evangelical " Abraham is referring specifically to a movement that
emerged in the 1950s as a group of young scholars and church leaders
like Carl Henry, Bernard Ramm, and Billy Graham self-consciously dis-
tanced themselves from their fundamentalist roots. In particular, these
" evangelicals " sought to purge fundamentalism of its more bizarre asso-
ciations and then graft on to its core of doctrines (the famous five funda-
mentals) a social conscience, learned scholarship, good manners, and a
less schismatic view of the church.
   Abraham writes as one within this modern evangelical tradition who
is concerned about the obvious tensions and problems within the tradi-
tion that are preventing it from making a full and healthy contribution
to the life of the church. As examples of these problems and tensions,
he notes the recent defections of one-time evangelical leaders like Harold
Lindsell and Francis Schaeffer, who have returned essentially to a funda-
mentalist stance. He also points to a developing evangelical scholasticism
evident especially in the recent five-volume *opus* of Carl Henry. Finally,
he reviews critically what he considers to be a cosmetic, and therefore
inadequate, attempt to revise the evangelical movment by Robert Webber.
While not mentioned by Abraham, one could also include here the ten-
sions created for evangelicalism on the other side of the spectrum by what
Richard Quebedeaux has called the " young evangelicals." These would
include figures like Ronald Sider and Jim Wallis, who critique evangelical
orthodoxy from the anabaptist perspective. This critique was one of the
forces that led to the polarization of the movement that Abraham de-
scribes.
   Abraham is more than a chronicler. His primary concern is to deter-
mine the root causes of the current problems in the evangelical movement
and suggest a way to overcome them. He argues that these causes are
essentially expressions of the fact that evangelicalism has still not ade-
quately separated itself from its fundamentalist roots. In particular, he
notes four areas where he believes evangelicalism has retained undesirable
aspects of its fundamentalist roots.
   In the first place, evangelicalism has continued in the fundamentalist
tradition of being overly " cerebral." That is, it tends to define faith
as a set of beliefs that must be accepted and to stress orthodoxy as more

important than orthopraxis. Abraham does not illustrate this aspect, but it could be easily done.

Secondly, evangelicals, like their fundamentalist parents, place a high priority on establishing, defining, and defending *authority.* As might be expected, the particular emphasis is on having or creating an absolutely reliable authority to determine matters of (intellectual) belief. The development of detailed confessions of faith is an example of this concern. However, the example Abraham emphasizes, and has discussed at length in previous works, is continuing evangelical concern to defend views of biblical inspiration that usually translate into defenses of inerrancy.

The third major characteristic of fundamentalism that Abraham detects still residing in evangelicalism is a lack of openness to the diversity present within the movement. Several sources have contributed to the evangelical movement-Pietism, revivalism, classic Lutheranism and Calvinism, Methodism, etc. Obviously, such divergent sources could not merge without some willingness to learn from each other and find compromise solutions to some historic debates. Unfortunately, this has rarely happened. Instead there have been numerous attempts to defend the *true* evangelical position against " pseudo-evangelicals."

Finally, Abraham notes that evangelicals as a whole are as prone as their fundamentalist mentors to overlook or deny the fallible human character of theology. Their confidence in the human intellect often leads them to transfer the inerrancy they ascribe *to* Scripture to their doctrinal systems.

For Abraham, each of these characteristics must be overcome if evangelicalism is to make a vital contribution to the life of the church. His book is a call for a revival among evangelicals that will enable them to make this move. To suggest he is not simply a utopian dreamer, he recalls a model of such a revival and a resulting theological expression that he feels evangelicalism would do well to emulate-that associated with John Wesley. Abraham devotes a helpful chapter to detailing the positive aspects of Wesley's unde.rstanding of Christian life and his approach to theology. Particularly highlighted is Wesley's openness to experience, tradition, and reason in addition to Scripture as sources of theology and Wesley's catholic spirit.

One must be careful at this point in understanding Abraham. He is not another of those claiming his tradition is *the* correct evangelical tradition and all others should come join him. Rather, he uses vVesley as a model of one who refuses to make such narrow claims, opting instead to learn from all Christian tradition and then critically revise one's own life and thought in that light.

In this light, it is only right that Abraham devote the last chapter of his book to a critical analysis of his own evangelical Wesleyan tradition

in light of the model of Wesley and the contribution of the larger church. As he notes, evangelical Wesleyans have been as prone as all other evangelicals to retain or develop a fundamentalist perspective. Abraham cites several convincing examples of this and then calls upon his own tradition to follow the example of their founder.

The Coming Great Revival is a sensitive and insightful book. It will be of benefit to those both within and outside of the evangelical movement. Its call for openness to the views of others within a " contested tradition " is particularly appealing. However, this reviewer was left wondering if Abraham was familiar with the psychological studies of cognitive development which suggest that the change in perspective he is calling for is really a call for a move to a higher level of cognitive development. Such a move is desperately needed. Unfortunately, it will not be effected by simply writing or reading one book. The task that lies before all of us concerned about the theological renewal of the church is a long one of persistent modeling of the stance Abraham describes so well.

RANDY L. MADDOX

Sioux Falls College
Siou.,,; Falls, South Dakota