# SCRIPTURAL   GROUNDS  FOR CONCRETE MORAL  NORMS

## *1. Is JJloral Theology  Really  Theology?*

0  BE CHRISTIAN  theology moral theology ought  to be firmly grounded  in the Bible as understood  in the living tradition  of the Church.  Yet the moralist  who asks help from the biblicist  today is        to be met  with  a host cf objections. [1]  l will mention  eight I have encountered:

l) Attempts  to develop a biblical theology  unified by some central  concept  such as          *promise        fulfillrnent, salvation history,*  or *liberation* have all broken  down. The Bible contains  many diverse, even contradictory,  or at least dialectically  opposed  theologies and ethical           To harmonize  them is to distort  them. [2]

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[1] See Charles  E. Curran  and Richard  A. McCormick,  S.J., eds., *The Use of Scriptures  in Moral  Theology*  (Readings  in Moral  Theology  No. 4. New York:  Paulist,  1984) for a representative   selection  of essays,  and Robert J. DaLy, S.J. in cooperation  with .J. A. Fischer,  C.M., T. J. Keegan,  O.P., A..J. Tambasco,  L. J. Topel,  S.J., and F. E. Schuele,  *Christian  Biblical Ethfos Ji'rorn Biblical  Revelation  to Contemporary   Christian  Praxis,  Method  and Content* {New York:  Paulist,  1984) for a more systematic  argument..  In these notes these will be referred to as US and CBE.  See also William  C. Spohn, S.J., *What  Are '!'hey Saying  About Bcriptiire  a,nd Ethics?*  (New York: Paulist,  1983) ; David Kelsey,  *Uses  of Scripture  in Recent  Theology*  (Philadelphia:  Fortress,  1975); and Bruce C. Birch and Larry Rasmussen,  *Bible and Ethics  in the Christian  Life* (l\finneapolis:  Augsburg,  1976). Valuable hermeneutical   suggestions  ·will be found in Rudolf Schnackenburg,  *The Moral Teaching  of the New Testarnent*  (New York:  Seabury,  1973) and the two works of Pierre  Grelot, *Sens Oh1·etien de l'Ancien Testarnent*  2nd ed. (Paris: Desclee,  1962) and *Problem es de ilforale  JJ'ondarnentale:  Un eclairar1e biblique* (Paris: Cerf, 1982) and the essa\)'s in :M:. Gilbert,  J. L'Hour and ,J. Scharbet, *Morale et Ancien  Testament,*   (Universite  Catholique  du Louvain,  1976).

[2] See H. G. Reventlow,  *Problems  of Old Testament  Theology  in the Twen·tieth Cent·ury* (Philadelphia:   Fortress  Press,  1985, pp. 44,65;  125-133,  and

2) The predominant  literary  form  of the  Bible  which  holds
it together  is *narrative*. How then can we draw moral principles
from such narratives?  To treat them as cautionary  tales  with
an obvious  moral  does  great  injustice  to their  psychological
richness and moral ambiguity. [3]

3) The Bible primarily  uses not a literal but a symbolic type
of language appropriate  to the mysteries it reveals.  These sym-
bols or images can mold ethical attitudes  and affections but
they cannot be reduced to literal concrete moral norms with-
out danger of distortion. [4]

4) Granted that both Testaments contain   many prescriptive
statements,  they are so embedded in their  historical  contexts
and so related to situations  that are now obsolete, that it is
impossible to believe they oblige us today.  Can we really be-
lieve that women must be veiled  (I Cor 11: 10) or that slaves
should obey their masters  (Ti 2: 9) ? [5]

5) The early Church, and perhaps Jesus himself, expected
the *eschaton* within a lifetime.  Consequently, the New Testa-
ment provides  only an " interim ethics " which is useless as a
guide in a continuing  sinful world. [6]

6) We read in Ephesians 2: *15* that Jesus "in his own flesh

John H. Hayes and Frederick Prussner, *Old Testament  Theology:  Its Nature
and Development*  (Atlanta:  John  Knox,  1985), especially  pp. 254-279 for a
discussion  of the search  for a unifying  concept  for the Bible and its present
status.

[3] James  A. Fischer,  C.M., "Story  and  Image",  CBE, pp. 156-169.

[4] CBE,  pp.  289-295.

[5] Thus James M. Gustafson,  in an influential  article,  "The Place of Scrip-
ture  in Christian  Ethics:  A Methodological  Study"  (US, pp. 151-177) dis-
tinguishes  the uses of Scripture  as moral  law, as moral  ideal,  as moral
analogy,  and finally  what he calls its "loose"  use to inspire  reflection on
current  problems. He is especially  critical  of the first method and gives pref-
erence  to  the  last.

[6] "To put the matter most sharply,  Jesus does not provide  a valid ethics
for today. His ethical  teaching  is interwoven  with his imminent  eschatology
to such a degree  that every attempt  to separate  the two and to draw out
only the ethical  thread invariably  and inevitably  pulls loose strands of the
eschatology,  so that both yams are ruined." Jack T. Sanders, US, p. 62. See
also his book, *Ethics  in the New Testa.ment*  (Philadelphia:  Fortress,  1975).

abolished *(katargesas)* the !,aw with its commands and pre-
cepts, to create in himself one new man." Is it not the whole
tenor of St. Paul's teaching that the Gospel frees us not only
from the Old Law but from every ethical system in order that
we may follow Christ in spontaneous gratitude for what he has
done for us? [7]

7) Liberation theology, feminist theology, and deconstruc-
tionism are all making us aware the Bible must he read with a
"hermeneutic of suspicion " which exposes the political and so-
cial biases of the biblical writers and of the church officials who
canonized their works. Consequently, we must look for a
"canon within the canon" which expresses the essence of the
original Gospel as Jesus taught and lived it and frees it from
many of the precepts which reflect institutionalizing distortions
of that Gospel.8

8) Are we not making a mistake if we read the Scriptures as
prescriptive rather than as *parenetic?* Are they not really in-
tended to motivate us sincerely to follow our own consciences?
**If** so, then does it not seem that the scriptural precepts only
represent the common ethics of New Testament times, and to-
day must be replaced by the equivalent ethics of our own
times? [9]

[7] See James M. Gustafson, *Protestant and Rornan Catholic JJJthios: Pros-
pects for Rapprochrnent* (Chicago: University of Chicftgo Press, 1978), pp.
1-29.

[8] Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza, "Towar<l a Feminist Biblical Interpreta-
tion", US, pp. 354-382 and *Bread Not Stone: The Challenge of Ji'erninist
Biblical Interpretations* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985). On deconstructionism
see Hugh J. Silverman and Don Ihde, eels. *Herrnene·utics & Deconstruction*
(Albany: State University of New York, 1985) and Mark C. Taylor, *Decon-
strucUng Theology* (Chicago: Crossroads, CA: Scholars Press, 1982). On
liberation theology hermeneutics see Jose Miranda, *Marx and the Bible*
(Mary knoll, l\'"Y: Orb is Press, 1974) and Jose Severino Croatto, *Exodus: A.
H errneneutics of Freedorn* (same, 1981).

[9] See article of Bruno Schiiller, S.J., in DCE, pp. 207-233, followed by the
criticism of J·ames Gaffney, "On Parenesis and Fundamental Moral Theology",
*Journal of Religious Ethics,* 11 (1983) : 23-24, and discussion of Richard A.
McCormick, S.J., "Notes on Moral Theology", *Theological Studies,* 45 (1984):
80 ff.

**If** these  objections  are  sustained,  what  becomes  of  traditional  moral  theology,  which  aimed  to  provide  concrete  moral  norms  for  the  ·assistance  of  preachers  and  confessors  in  guiding  the  consciences of Christians?

## 2.  Jesus and the Torah

What  is  odd  ·about  the  objections  I  have  listed  is  that,  while  today  we  constantly  emphasize  the  *historicity*  of  the  Scriptures,  we  so  often  neglect  to  ask  ourselves  whence  Jesus  and  Paul  historically  derived  their  own  moral  teaching.  Did  they  present  is  as  simply  new  or  as  the  culmination  of  a  long  tmdition?

Most  moralists  concerned  with  the  revision  of  moral  theology  are  in  agreement  today  that  the  fundamental  principle  of  Christian  ethics  must  be  Jesus            teachings  and  his  exemplification  of  his  own  teachings. [10]  Christian  ethics  is  an  *imitatio  Christi*  in  the  fullest  and  deepest  sense  because  Christian  life  is  an  incorporation  in  Christ,  a  participation  by  grace  in  his  life  and  the  life  of  his  Body,  the  Church.  St.  Paul  urges  us  to  live  *in  Christo,*  and  to  imitate  Paul  as  Paul  imitates  our  Lord  (2 Cor : 17; Q Th 3: 7-9; Gal 6: 14-17).  Thus  the  fundamental  norm  of  Christian  ethics  is  not  an  abstract  ideal,  but  an  existential,  historical  person.

How  then  did  Jesus  live?  **If**  the  *imitatio*  is  to  be  truly  practical,  something  more  than  pious  jargon,  it  must  be  based  on  a  concrete  pattern,  a  way  of  life  which  excludes  certain  kinds  of  action  and  promotes  others.  Of  course  the  Christian  today  cannot  copy  the  life  of  Jesus  in  a  absolutely  literal  manner  (although  saints  like  Francis  of  Assisi came  pretty  close) .  Nevertheless,  in  adapting  themselves  to  the  conditions  of  modern  life  Christians  must  still  walk  the  same  road  that  Jesus  walked,  a  "straight  and  narrow  way"  (Mt  7: 13-14).  In  fact  the  early  Christians  were  first  identified  as  those  who  were  " living  according  to  the  new  way"  (Acts  9: 1).

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10 See  Louis  B.  Gillon,  O.P.,  *Ohrist  and  Moral  Theology*  (Staten  Island:  NY:  .Alba  House,  1967)  and  the  theses  of  Heinz  Schiirmann,  in  the  report  '·The  Actual  Import  of  the  :Moral  Norms  of  the  New  Testament",  US,  pp.  78-104.

The picture given us in the Gospel of this " new way " of Jesus is, of course, incomplete. But one thing is certain: Jesus was a faithful Jew whose life was shaped by the observance of the Torah, as well as by the rest of the Old Testament. [11] Hence in trying to place before us the figure of the Incarnate Word as the goal, the model, and the source of Christian life we must began with the fundamental fact that Jesus is the summation of the Old Testament, the realization of all the values of the Law, the prophets, and the writings. He is the New Adam-the True Human, *Ecce Homo!*

Of course the teachings of Jesus as recorded in the canonical Scriptures do not provide us with a detailed system of ethics. Even the Sermon on the Mount in its Matthaean version does not claim to be a complete moral code. Nor do the other New Testament writings supply such a code. Instead they interpret the "Scriptures", which for them meant the Old Testament centering in the Torah, which comprises a complete, detailed code of life in which the rabbis came to discern no less that 613 precepts, *365* negative, 248 positive. [12]

For the Jews this Torah ("instruction" rather than "law") was and is the heart of the canonical Scriptures. The prophets and writings, including the wisdom literature, serve as a kind of context and commentary for the Torah which has only to be completed by what is thought to be the oral tradition recorded in the Talmud. Thus from a Jewish point of view the unity of the Scriptures is to be found in the Torah. [13] Of course the Torah itself contains many varied strands of tradition but its

11 On the Jewishness of Jesus see Samuel Sandmel, *We Jews and Jesus* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1967); also E. P. Sanders, *Jesus and Judaism* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985).

12 See Moses Maimonides, *The Commandments* (Sefer Ha-Mitzvoth) 2 vols. trans. by C. B. Chavel (London/New York: Soncinco Press, 1967); and *The Guide of the Perplexed,* trans by Shlomo Pines (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963) III, 25-50, pp. 502-617, for the medieval systematization of the Torah.

13 On the role of the Pentateuch in the Hebrew canon, see the dissertation of Daniel Patte, *Earlv Jewish Hermeneutic in Palestine,* (:Missoula, :Montana: Society of Biblical Literature and Scholars Press, 1975, pp. 19-30.

editors   intended   these  to be ta.ken synthetically   and this proc-
ess  of  synthesis   has  been  continued   in  the  oral  tradition   of
interpretation.

Jesus  was  a Jew  preaching   to Jews  and  so in large  measure
were  the  other  New  Testament   writers.   Thus  the  New  Testa-
ment  confinns  the  permanent   validity  of the  ethical  system  of
the  Torah  *as  interpreted    by  Jesus.*  Jesus's   criticism  of  the
Pharisees   was  not  aimed  at their  fidelity  to the  Torah.   He says,
" The  scribes  and  Pharisees   occupy  the  chair  of  Moses.   You
must  therefore   do what  they  tell  you  and  listen  to what  they
say."   (Mt  23: 3) [14]   He  criticized   them  for  hypocrisy,   for
scrupulosity   about  the  lighter  matters  of the  Law  while  neglect-
ing  its  weightier  commandments   or distorting  them  by legalistic
interpretations,   and  for  their  contempt   for  the  common  people
ignorant  of the  Law;  but  not  for  defending  the  Law.

Since   there   were   various   schools  of interpretation,   Jesus
could  give  his own  interpretation   of the  Law  from  *within*  the
Law.   Moreover,   attentive   examination   of  the  occasions   on
which  Jesus  is accused  of breaking  the  Law  reveals  that  accord-
ing  to his  own  interpretation,   not  necessarily  discordant   with
that  of some  other  rabbis,  he was  always  careful  to observe  it
even  to the  letter. [15]

What  was  special  to Jesus'  interpretation   of the  Law,  as is
clear  from  the  sayings  on  divorce  (Mk  10: 2-rn;  Mt  5: 31-32;
19: 3-12))  is that  he regarded  the  Law  of Moses  as an imper-
fect  law  given  by God " because  of your  stubbornness"   (Mt
19: 8)  and  declared  that  with  the  coming  of the  Messianic  age
which  he  was  announcing   the  original  law  of  God  given  in

[14] See  B. Lindars,   " Jes us  and  the  Pharisees  " in *Donuin  GentiUcium:*   New
Testament   Studies  in Honor  of David  Daube,  ed. by E. Bammel,  C. K. Barrett
and vV. D. Davies  (Oxford:   Clarendon   Press,  1978),  pp.  51-63.

[15] See  the  massive  work  of .J. D. M. Derrett,   *Law  in  the  New   Testament*
(London:   Darton,   Longman   and  Todd:  1970),  especially   the  Preface,  pp.
ix-xlvi.  Recently  Malcolm  Lowe  and  David  Flusser,   "A Modified  Proto-Mat-
thean  Synoptic   Theory",   *New  Testament  l'!tudies,*  29  (1983):   25-47  have
poinwd  out  how  carefully  Jesus  avoidecl  breaking  the  Sabbath  when  he asked
the  cripple  to  stretch  out  his  hand  but  did  not  stretch  out  his  own  to  touch
him!

creation was to be restored. **It** was this mode of Torah inter-
pretation that warranted St. Paul's later contention that the
Gentiles were not bound by the particularities of the Mosaic
Law, while at the same time Paul continued to instruct Chris-
tians in a more universal and perfect morality. [16]

Thus the first, second, and sixth difficulties respectively con-
cerning the unity of biblical moral teaching, its narrative form,
and its abolition of the Gospel can be resolved by taking the
Torah, interpreted and perfected by Jesus, as a divinely ap-
proved system of concrete ethical prescriptions which is per-
manently valid because it reflects the original intentions of God
which are now once again binding on those who would enter
His Kingdom "on earth as it is in heaven " (Mt 6: 10) .

This suggested solution, however, makes all the more acute
the third and fourth difficulties about the historicity and
escha.tological context of this New Testament ethics. The
Torah itself is a product of historical development and has been
subject to constant reinterpretation. Nevertheless, this neces-
sity of reinterpretation does not invalidate its prescriptive force
or the genuine continuity of its ethical truth. Valid interpre-
tations, like those of Jesus and Paul, demand that such precepts
be taken with complete seriousness, although not with blind
literalism. Rather, the interpreter should try to uncover the
true purpose of God (as Jesus did with the divorce law and
St. Paul with the circumcision law (Rom 4: 11) , freeing this
from its conditioning by particular historical circumstances so
as to give it a more universal formulation. [17]

For example, the correct way to deal with those directives of

[16] See W. D. Davies, *.Jewish and Pau.line Studies* (Philadelphia: Fortress,
1984) c. 6, "Pau**l** and the Law: Reflections on Pitfalls in Interpretation",
pp. 91-122 gives a very balanced          (cf. also pp. 2'78-288 on "The
Moral Tearhing of the Early Church").

[17] Cf. W. D. Davies, *'l'orah in the* J*f* *essian-ic Age and/or the World to Come*
(Philadelphia: Society of Biblical Literature, 1952). Davies shows that some
of the Jews believed the Law would be perfect and universalized in the Mes-
sianic Age. See also E. P. Sanders, *Paul and Palestinian Judaism* (Philadel-
phia: Fortress, 197'7) and *Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People* (same, 1983).

St. Paul that seems to derogate from the equal dignity of women is not to dismiss them as obsolete or as a mere reflection of sexist patriarchal culture, but rather to seek in them the perennial ethical principles to which Paul gave a particular application which may no longer be appropriate in our times.[18]

Thus in St. Paul's *Epistle to Philemon* sending a runaway slave back to his master, an action which today would be rightly considered unjust, we discover Paul's permanently valid teaching on human brotherhood: " that you might possess him forever, no longer as a slave but more than a slave, a beloved brother " (Phlm 16) .[19]

The sixth and seventh difficulties concern a similar hermeneutic issue. To the question about the need for a " hermeneutic of suspicion " I concede that it is important in reading the Scriptures for moral instruction, as in reading any text, to consider the biases of the author and to read between the lines, because what is not said is sometimes as important as what is said. But the Scriptures are not only the work of human authors, they are the work of God as principal author. The notion of a " canon within the canon ,. cannot be received except in the very qualified sense that some portions of Scripture are especially clear and provide clues to interpret the more obscure.[20]

What must be especially avoided in studying the ethical

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[18] If we accept the restricted view of the corpus of authentic letters of Paul, his supposed anti-feminism is largely eliminated except for I Cor 14:34-45 and this may be an interpolation; see Jerome Murphy-O'Connor, O.P., "Interpolations in I Corinthians", in *Catholic Biblical Quarterly,* 48 (Jan., 1986): 81-94. Nevertheless, sueh interpolations and the rest of the Pauline letters are canonical and authoritative.

[19] For a recent discussion of the Epistle to Philemon in its sociological setting see Norman R. Petersen, *Redisco1,ering Paul: Philemon and the Sociology of Paul's Narrative World* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985, who in his conclusion suggests that behind Paul's rhetoric is also a threat of excommunication (p. 302).

[20] Bevard S. Childs, *The New Testa.ment as Canon: An Intt·oduction* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1!l84), pp. 3-47, discusses current views on the theological significance of the canon.

teaching of the Scriptures is to refuse to subject the pre-under-standings we necessarily bring to reading them, including our political and ideological commitments, to *correction* by the Scriptures. Unfortunately  some writers today  seem to begin with a conviction that they are on the side of the oppressed so that anyone who disagrees with them, even St. Paul, is an op-pressor. Rather, it is necessary to listen to God's judgments through the Scriptures. The God of justice and mercy alone has the wisdom to define justice.

The third objection that scriptural language is symbolic, metaphorical, parabolic and therefore loses its rich meaning if reduced to literal norms neglects the plain fact that the Bible contains both metaphorical and literal modes of language which complement each other. In the law codes of the Pentateuch there are scores of concrete, literal prescriptions, yet in these same codes it is obvious that many of the liturgical precepts as well as curious taboos such as the thrice repeated " You shall not boil a kid in its mother's milk" (Ex 23:19; 34:26; Dt 14:21) must also be interpreted metaphorically.

Jesus of course expressed much of his teaching in parables for the sake of the crowds, but we are told that he interpreted these parables quite literally to the Twelve (Mk 4:1-20). Moreover, very plainly some of the parables illustrate concrete moral norms, such as the Parable of the Sheep and the Goats (Mt 25:31-46) which clearly enforces the commands to care for the poor, the stranger, and the prisoner, or of the Rich Farmer (Lk 12:16-21) which condemns avarice, or of the Pharisee and the Tax Collector (Lk 18:9-14) which inculcates humility. [21]

Finally, the thesis that the Scriptures are not prescriptive but parenetic empties them of any prophetic power to correct the accepted morality of our or any other culture. Surely the wisdom literature teaches us that discernment of the true way of life is a divine gift not a merely human ethics. [22] Recently

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[21] See Pheme Perkins, *Hearing the Parables of Jesus* (New York: Paulist, 1981) on their ethical role.

[22] On meanings of "Wisdom"  see Roland E. Murphy, O.Carm., *Wisdom Literature and Psalms* (Nashville:  .Abingdon, 1983), pp. 29-36.

there has been much controversy among moralists as to whether there can be a specifically Christian ethics.[23] It is argued that the biblical precepts can be duplicated in other religions and philosophies. But ethics as a practical discipline is not specified by its concrete precepts which concern the means to the end of action, but by the end itself. The biblical goal of life is eternal life with the Father through the Son by the gift of the Spirit (Rom 8: 16-17), a goal unique to Christian ethics.

### 3. The Virtues

The precepts of Scripture, however, do not of themselves constitute a complete ethics without considering the virtues or character which they form and express, because as Jesus teaches, "A good tree brings forth good fruit" (Mt 7: 17).[24]

In the Old Testament we find emphasis on such key virtues as righteousness *(sedeq),* mercy *(hesed),* and fidelity *('emet);* but it is clear from Jesus' teaching on the Great Commandment (Mk 12: 28-34) and from Paul's discourse in 1 Cor 13 that *love (aqape* equivalent to *hesed)* is the supreme Christian virtue extending to both God and neighbor, and even to enemies (Mt : 44). Directly related to it are *faith* and *hope.* These three, traditionally called the theological virtues, have always been regarded in the history of moral theology as providing the specifying form of Christian ethics and with full biblical warrant.[25]

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[2a] For a selection of essays on this questions sec Charles E. Curran and Richard .A. McCormick, S. J., eds., *The Distincti-venes of Ohristian Ethics* (Readings in Moral Theology, No. 2), (New York: Paulist, 1980) which will be referred to as DCE. See also Germain Grisez, *The Way of the Lord Jesus,* (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1983), vol. 1, pp. 606-609 and the bibliography in his notes pp. 624 f.

[24] Stanley Hauerwas in *Vision and Virtue* (Notre Dame: Fides, 1974) and *Oharacter and Ohristian Life* (same, 1975) criticized the tendency to reduce Christian ethics to the decision-making process and since then .American moralists are giving more attention to the topic of the virtues. The best treatment of them remains C. Spicq, O.P., *Theologie Morale du Nouveau Testament,* 2 vols (Paris: J. Gabalda, 1965) which, however, has never been translated into English.

[25] *Ibid* I, 29-380; II, 481-566.

More problematic are the traditional four cardinal virtues: *temperance, fortitude, justice,* and *prudence* derived from Plato, reinterpreted by Aristotle, and transmitted by the Stoics.[26] They are referred to in the Bible only in one verse of Wisdom (8: 7) in which it is said that Wisdom "teaches temperance and prudence, justice and fortitude, and nothing in life is more useful than these."; but this one reference in a very late work marked by Greek influence is hardly enough to give them capital importance in biblical tradition.

Nevertheless, the traditional use of the four cardinal virtues as organizing principles for ethics can be justified, I believe, by the following considerations. *Prudence* is the equivalent of the "wisdom" constantly praised in the Old Testament as a gift of God without which a righteous life is impossible. Jesus and Paul add that in the Messianic age such wisdom is given even to " the little ones " by the indwelling Holy Spirit. "On one occasion Jesus spoke thus:' Father, Lord of heaven and earth, to you I offer praise, for what you have hidden from the learned and clever you have revealed to the merest children " (ML 11: 25), St. Paul writes to the Corinthians (1 Cor 1: 26-27), "Not many of you are wise, as men account wisdom, not many are influential; and surely not many are well-born. God chose those whom the world considers absurd to shame the wise " and goes on to say (2: *15)* " the spiritual man ... can appraise everything, though he himself can be appraised by no one,"

*Justice* is, of course, a central theme of both the Old and the New Testament and is necessarily included in the very notion of "love of neighbor ", especially as this is formulated in the Golden Rule, "Treat others the way you would have them treat you: this sums up the law and the prophets" (Mt 7: 12). Thus the Bible constantly exhorts and guides us to respect the

[26] In Plato and the Stoics they are general qualities of a virtuous person which qualify all his acts. For .Aristotle they are specific virtues facilitating those acts which deal with the major difficulties of human life. See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa. Theologiae,* I-II, q.61, aa.3 and ,l.

rights of others and to do so with a practical wisdom (prudence) which exceeds mere legalism.

The mystery of the Cross illumines the central place among the Christian virtues of martyrdom and the patient endurance of suffering for the sake of Jesus, that is, of *fortitude,* and with it of non-violence rather than the aggressiveness which predominated in the Greek notion of the virtue. Finally. the celibacy of Jesus, his teaching on marriage and divorce, as well as St. Paul's celibacy and his pastoral instructions (e.g. I Cor 6: 12-7: 40) make clear that *temperance* in the form of chastity, whether married, virginal, or celibate, has a special Christian character.

Still more problematic is the traditional view originating with St. Augustine that the theological and cardinal virtues are completed by the *gifts* of the Holy Spirit, the *beatitudes,* and the *fruits* of the Spirit (Gal 5: 22-23). According to Aquinas [27] the fruits are acts of the virtues and the beatitudes are perfect fruits that proceed from the virtues operating under the influence of the gifts. The gifts, which are to be distinguished from the special gifts of ministry *(gratiae gratis datae)* mentioned by Paul in I Cor 12, are prophesied in Isaiah 11:2-3 (cf. Rev 5: 6) as proper to the Messiah. They are, again according to Aquinas, [28] shared by all Christians through baptism so as to facilitate the other virtues by rendering the Christian docile to the guidance of the Holy Spirit in order that he or she may act in a divine, rather than a merely human mode, since only a divine way of acting can lead surely to the divinization of eternal life with God.

This theory of the gifts is of considerable importance in the history of spiritual theology. [29] To neglect it would be to reinforce the disastrous separation of moral from ascetic and mysti-

[21] *Summa Theologiae,* I-II, qq.69 and 70.

[2s] *Ibid.* q.68.

[29] Article "Dons du Saint-Esprit" by G. Bardy, F. Vandenbroucke, A. Rayez, M. Labourdette and C. Bernard, *Diationnaire de Spiritiialite,* iii, cols. 1579-1639 gives the history of the theological role of the Gifts and is of the opinion this should not be exaggerated.

cal theology which took place in the post-Tridentine period. The biblical foundations of the theory, however, appear weak, especially as to the number seven of the gifts which is not found in the Hebrew text where only six are enumerated.

Nevertheless, this difficulty is not insuperable. There can be no doubt that in promising the Paraclete (Jn 16: 4-16) Jesus also promised that the outpouring of the Holy Spirit which had been prophesied as a feature of the Messianic Age (Is 2: 2; 44: 8; Jl 8: *I-5;* Acts 2: 14-86) was about to begin. The early Church experienced the distinction between the observance of the commandments in the human mode of dutiful obedience and the Spirit-inspired and facilitated fulfillment of them with profound insight and joy. St. Paul constantly urges his flock to grow to Christian maturity and docility to the Spirit (Rom 8-17; Gal. 8: *2-5,* etc.) Thus the numbering and classification of the gifts is less significant than the fact they are given in the plenitude symbolized by the number seven. Actual reference to the various qualities of action and insight assigned to the tradi- tional seven names of the gifts can be found scattered through both Testaments.

These virtues which the scholastics classified, but which are already present in less systematic form in the New Testament (with a grounding in the Old), are of course existentialized in Jesus as the New Adam. The *imitatio Christi* should not be conceived as a mere Pelagian effort to copy a model, but con- sists in a participation through the Spirit in the very life of Christ as Head of the body, the Church (I Cor 12; Jn 15: 1-17). The New Law, as Aquinas says, is nothing other than the Holy Spirit moving the Christian from within to live *in Christo.*[80]

## 4. *The Natural Law*

How then is this pneumatic Christian ethics to be related to a philosophical ethics? Protestant theologians usually make no attempt to develop this relation, although Luther and Calvin

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so *Hurnma Theologiae,* I-II, q.106, a.l.

thought  that  the  Scriptures  acknowledge  such  a  law.[31]  Catholic
moral  theology,  however,  has  put  great  reliance  on  natural  law,
not  only  in  order  to  dialogue  with  non-believers  on  moral
questions,  but  also  to  complete  its  system  of  concrete  moral
norms  in  the  face  of  new  moral  problems  that  arise  in  every
age,  and  especially  in  our  rapidly  changing  technological
society.

The  question  here  does  not  concern  the  role  of  grace  either
in  the  subjective  recognition  of  God's  wisdom  in  visible  nature
or  in  accepting  it  as  a  guide  to  one's  life,  but  whether  or  not
God's  wisdom  and  will  are  objectively  accessible  to  human  rea-
son  from  the  observation  of  creation,  as  well  as  from        re-
vealed  Law  and  the  Gospel.

The  Scriptural  foundation  for  the  concept  of  such  an  objec-
tive  natural  law  is  not  really  obscure.  In  the  two  halves  of
Psalm  19  a  comparison  is  made  between  the  glory  of  God  mani-
fested  in  the  visible  creation  and  the  Torah,  and  this  theme  is
found  throughout  the  wisdom  literature  of  the  Old  Testament.
Sirach  (42: 15-50: 23)  compares  the  wisdom  of  God  manifested
in  creation  with  the  history  of  the  great  Hebrew  saints  who
have  kept  God's  commandments;  and  Baruch  (3: 9-4: 4)
mingles  his  thanksgiving  for  the  gift  of  the  Torah  with  the
praise  of  God's  works  in  creation.

St.  Paul  in  Romans  1,  basing  himself  on  this  Old  Testament
teaching,  declares  that  both  Jews  and  pagans  are  answerable
for  their  conduct  to  God,  because  the  Jews  have  the  Torah  and
the  pagans  "who  do  have  the  law  keep  it  as  by  instinct,  these
men  although  without  the  law  serve  as  a  law  for  themselves,
They  show  that  the  demands  of  the  law  are  written  in  their
hearts  "  (2: 14-15) ,[32]

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s1 See  Paul  Althaus,  *'l'he  Ethics  of  lIfartin  Luther*  (Philadelphia:    Fortress,
1972)  and  Ronald  S.  Wallace,  *Galvin's  Doctrine  of  the  Christian  Life*  (Grand
Rapids,  Mich.:  Eerdmans,  1959)  pp.  141-147  for  many  references  to  texts.

s2 Ernst  Kasemann,  *Commentary  on  Romans*  (Grand  Rapids,  Mich.:  Eerd-
mans,  1980),  pp.  61-68  gives  a  detailed  discussion  on  the  distinction  of  Paul's
teaching  from  Hellenistic  concepts.  See  also  A.  Viard,  O.P.,  *Saint  Paid:
Epitre  aiwi  Roma1is*  (Sources  Biblique)  (Paris:  Gabalda,  1975)  pp.  'l'7·8L

Granted there is such a natural law comparable to the re-
vealed Law, what is their relation? For the Bible they seem to
be largely identical, as the quotation from Paul seems to indi-
cate. Thus he declares that the pagans are inexcusable for their
practice of idolatry and homosexuality (Rm 1: 18-32) which,
of course, he knew were also condemned by the Torah (Dt
12: 2-3; 23: 18) . On the other hand Paul saw no reason to oblige
Christian Gentiles to obey the Law as regards circumcision or
diet (Gl 1: 12), yet he exhorts them to obey those moral norms
which were common both to ‚Jews and Gentiles (1 Cor *5:* 1);
" Circumcision counts for nothing, and its lack makes no dif-
ference either. What matters is keeping God's command-
ments" (I Cor. 19) .

Therefore, the distinction, made so clearly by the great Jew-
ish student of the Torah Moses Maimonides and taken over by
Aquinas, between the moral, judicial, and ceremonial precepts
of the Law seems entirely justified by the Scriptures them-
selves.33 But does this mean that all the revealed moral norms
are accessible to reason    that reciprocally all the content of
the natural law has been revealed? The Scriptures do not seem
to make any such claim. What is clear is that there is a very
considerable overlapping so that much of what sages in all the
cultures of the world have proposed as norms accessible to
human reason and experience can be found more or less ex-
plicitly in the Torah. 34

V\Thy, then, not proceed directly to philosophical, natural
law arguments in developing a Christian ethics rather than
struggle with the rabbinic complexities of the Torah? The
answer, of course, is that a *theology* of Christian life must be

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33 *Summa Theologiae,* I-II, q.99, aa.l-4. For Maimonides see references to
*Guide* in note 12 above. Maimonides distinguishes 14 classes of commandments,
but these group easily into Aquinas's three.

34 This is the empirical reason that many deny the specificity of Biblical
ethics, cf. the article of Charles E. Curran "Is There a Catholic and/or
Christian Ethic? ", DCE pp. 60-89; but the theoretical reason seems to be
the influence of Karl Rahner's theory of the universality of grace, see the
article of Joseph Fuchs, S.J., DCE, pp. 3°19.

grounded not in human reason but in revelation.  The Torah is
the product of the historical experience and ethical reflection of
the Jewish people just as the *Nicomachean Ethics* is the product
of Greek experience and reflection culminating in the genius of
Aristotle.  Yet the difference between the Torah and the *Nico-
machean Ethics* is that the wisdom of the Old Testament is
guaranteed by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit and con-
firmed by Jesus Christ himself and then by his Church under
the guidance of that Spirit.  Although the material content of
the ethical teaching of the Scriptures may be largely identical
with the natural law, it is known by us under a different
formality-that of faith.

Moreover, since the natural law is known through human
experience, and since the Jewish-Christian experience culminat-
ing in the encounter with Jesus Christ is the historically unique,
integral, and ultimate self-revelation of God, the insight which
this experience has given into what it is to be truly human
surely must also be uniquely complete.  The natural law is
based on an understanding of human nature, but in a world of
sin human nature is nowhere perfectly exemplified except in
Jesus and his holy Mother.

The Magisterium, therefore, has not been mistaken in using
natural law arguments in arriving at certain concrete ethical
norms.[35]  While magisterial authority directly extends only to
conserving and developing revealed truth, yet indirectly it can
sometimes discern that revealed ethical truth is also accessible
to reason: for example the Old Testament command against
incest (Lev. 18:10, etc.) can also be supported by natural law
arguments.  Hence it can use such arguments to defend teach-
ings more firmly founded in revelation.

The Magisterium also has the authority to specify revealed
principles of morality so as to meet new ethical problems by
the use of accumulating historical experience and natural law

35 See Josef Fuchs, S.J., *Natural Law: A Theological Investigation.* (New
York:  Sheed and Ward, 1965) pp. 155-162) and Grisez, *The Way* (note 23
above)  p. 198 f.

analysis. For example, magisterial documents since the last century have condemned human slavery, although in the New Testament frequently slaves are urged to be obedient to their masters (Phl; 1 Tm 6;1-4; Col 4: 22-24; Ti £: 9-10) .

It would seem that such cases of development in Christian moral teaching should be explained according to the same principles used in explaining dogmatic development. I would opt for the view that in these cases the Magisterium is not *deducing* a new nonn through a syllogism in which one premise is known only by reasson, but rather is using new human ex-perience and reasoning as a help in expressing explicitly what was already formally and implicitly contained in explicitly re-vealed principles. 36

Thus through historical e1'.vperience and theological dialogue Christians gradually came to see that if they were bound by St. Paul's teaching to treat their slaves as brothers (Phl 15-16) they could no longer enslave them. Although this reflective process can be expressed syllogistically, its theological force comes not from this process of human reason but from faith seeking to explicitate the full meaning of God's transmitted Word.

### 5o New Knowledge frorn History and the Sciences

Thfost recent writers on the revision of moral theology stress the need to take into account the great current progress in the historical and scientific disciplines. 37 For some this progress

36 I here follow the view that doctrinal development takes place by explici-tation of what is *formally, although implicitly,* contained in Scripture and Traditiono For opinions on nature of doctrinal development see Jan Ho Wal-grave, *Unfolding Revelation* (Theological Resources) (Philadelphia: West-minster, 1971) ppo 162-1780

37 For an autobiographical statement of concern for such an expansion of resources for moral theology see Charles E. Curran, "On-Going Revision: Personal and Theological Reflections " in *On-Going Revision* (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides Press, 1975) ppo 260-2940 For examples of my own concern see my essay "A Theological Overview on Recent Research on Sex and Gender " in Mark F. Schwartz, Albert S. Moraczewski, and James Ao Monteleone, ed, *Sew and Gender: A Theologiccil Scientific Inquiry* (Sto Louis: Pope John

has rendered the notion of natural law obsolete and requires a new approach. They argue that natural law theory is based on the notion of a static, fixed, substantial, metaphysical, universal human nature known by deduction from a simplistic definition of what it is to be human, while the modern disciplines emphasize the processive, dynamic, evolutionary, historical, personal, and self-determining character of human existence known from one perspective by the objective, behavioristic methods of science and from the other by phenomenology centered in the subject in relation to his or her perceived world.[38] How, then, are we to integrate this vast fund of knowledge, so different in form from either Biblical thought or classical natural law philosophy?

But are the Biblical, the classical, and the modern understanding of what it is to be human really so heterogeneous? The Bible provides us with an inspired understanding of humanity as created in God's image, disciplined by God's Law, and perfectly realized in the New Adam, yet it does not present this understanding as a timeless Platonic idea, but through historical narratives, codes of law repeatedly rewritten, and a fund of practical wisdom accumulated through a long dialectical process.

A philosophical conception of natural law need not, as we have seen, neglect the historical development of our understanding of that law and its application to new problems under the guidance of the teachings of Jesus and the Magisterium of his Church in the light of his Spirit. Why, then, need we assume that new knowledge about human origins, the human body and psyche, the diversification of cultures, and the interaction of social forces must stand in opposition to past knowledge? If the Holy Spirit guided God's people in the past to profit from their historical experience, why can we not trust in his guidance now to make use of new truth wisely?

Center, 1984) pp. 1-47 and my book *Theologies of the Body: Humanist and Christian* (Braintree, Mass.: same publisher, 1985).

as The survey of Richard M. Gula, *What Are They Sayin,g About Mo'l'al Norms?* (New York: Paulist, 1982) seems to be based on this polarization.

Moral theology must be built on a faith which guarantees that Jesus understood, with a wisdom that cannot be surpassed, God's intentions for humanity. This understanding confirms the Old Testament and is transmitted to us without essential distortion in the New Testament. So grounded, moral theology can be open to all that the modern disciplines offer as ways of explicitating and deepening our understanding of Jesus' teaching and applying it practically to current problems. But the moral theologian must also subject this new knowledge to a critical analysis both in terms of its own methodology and assumptions and in terms of its consistency with revelation.

What can we hope from this critical employment of modern scientific knowledge in moral theology? I hope for manifold gains, but I would like to indicate one kind of help which may at first seem (and in fact be) risky, but which could bear much fruit. Moral theology, if it is to free itself from voluntarism, must constantly seek to found its norms teleologically (but not by the methodology of consequentialism or proportionalism [89]) in sound arguments based on what really helps or harms integral human fulfillment. [40]

Yet if we look at the classical arguments for many moral norms we find that they are based on what to the modern mind appears to be mere impressions or loose generalizations from common experience that has never been verified. For example, we forbid masturbation, but give little evidence to prove that it does anybody any harm. We prescribe fasting but give no evidence that it does most people any spiritual good. Today when such assertions are made people rightly look for objective, scientifically controlled evidence to verify them, because we are well aware how such assertions can be rooted only in prejudice, old wives' tales, ideology, or manipulative propaganda.

[39] On proportionalism   see Benedict M. Ashley, O.P. and Kevin D. O'Rourke, O.P., *Ethics of Health Oare* (St. Louis: Catholic Health Association, 1986) pp. 81-85 and Grisez, *The Way* (note 23 above) I, pp. 141-172 with references to literature.

[40] *Ibid* I, pp. 184-189.

Why then do we moralists not cooperate with scientists to subject our practical norms to objective tests? If we were to do so our teaching would certainly be more credible to the modern public. Thus more women have been convinced that contraception is wrong by the evidence of the dangers of anti-ovulant drugs than by a.bstract arguments.

The risk of subjecting our traditional moral norms to empirical verification of course is high. It will be valid only if such studies are well planned through cooperation between theologians and scientists, if the limitations of the scientific method are well understood, and if the publication of the results is free of unwarranted claims.

To take the example already given: it is common to read today that masturbation is physically and psychology harmless. When one inquires of medical and psychological experts, however, one discovers that they have not asked themselves the questions which are theologically relevant. A moralist wants to know what effect the practice of masturbation has (I) on the freedom of the agent; (2) on the dispositions of the masturbator toward the use of sex in marriage as the expression of unselfish love. It is such questions that must be subjected to empirical research (insofar as this is technically possible), before we can answer the question as to whether masturbation is truly harmful in a way convincing to our contemporaries. [41]

Of course some will say that moral values are of a totally different order of reality from those which are subject to scientific observation. They wish to found ethics on an ontology or phenomenology which completely abstracts from outward experience or the pragmatic consequences of moral action. Such an attitude, however, is difficult to reconcile with the down-to-earth, practical attitude of the Bible, or even with the better versions of classical natural law theory. St. Thomas Aquinas gives as his sole reason for considering fornication morally

[41] See my essay, "A Theological Overview", note 37 above.

wrong the simple fact that it runs the risk of begetting children deprived of the protections of marriage. [42]

## 6. Conclusion

I have argued that if moral theology is to take as its first principle the faith that Jesus Christ is the supreme norm of Christian morality, then we must turn to the Scriptures as authentically interpreted in the living tradition of the Church for an account of him and his way. Although the Bible contains a great variety of literary forms and of historically conditioned theological perspectives, some of which are in dialectical rather than synthetic relations to each other, as canonical, inspired Scripture the Bible finds its unity in Christ. The moralist, therefore, must take into account all of the voices of Scripture, none of which are to be neglected as irrelevant to our times. Hence the foundation of Christian morality in Jewish morality should be gratefully acknowledged and fully utilized. This means a much more serious study of the Torah than has been usual.

Jesus, and after him Paul, accepted and presupposed the Jewish way of life as the framework for Christian life, although they saw no reason that its liturgical, governmental, and dietary customs should be imposed on non-Jews. Hence Christian moral theology if it is to have a concrete normative character and not be reduced merely to exhortation to follow one's personal conscience or to a philosophical ethics, must begin with the system of moral norms of the Old and New Testament, universalized, interpreted, and exemplified by Jesus and the apostles.

Moral theologians in their work of universalizing and systematically analyzing this Biblical ethics and applying it to new problems rightly make use of natural law arguments because the Bible itself acknowledges and confirms their validity as rooted in the order of creation and the gift of human reason

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[42] .'*Summa Theologiae* II-II, q.154, a.1 c.

and free will. To have theological force, however, such natural law reasoning must always be subjected to theological criticism in the light of revealed principles and norms. Today it is important that this natural law argumentation should not rest merely on common experience but should be verified by the objective and controlled methods of the secular disciplines (within the limits of these methods) both in order to further its intrinsic development, and also to make it more understandable and credible to the modern public.

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## INTELLIGO   UT   CREDAM:
## ST.   AUGUSTINE'S   *CONFESSIONS*\*

**B**APTISM INTO the Catholic Church ended Augustine's Odyssey through the intellectual and spiritual seas of late antiquity. His *Confessi.ons* tells us how he joined the Manicheans, became attached to astrology, imbibed Aristotle, was attracted to the Academy, learned Epicureanism, discovered the Platonists, and finally came home to Christianity. [1] From the first moment he read Cicero, then, Augustine became a seeker of wisdom; few of humanity's questions and concerns failed to move him. His initial conversion to Manicheanism, indeed, was prompted by its alleged ability to give a satisfactory response to the questions raised by human experience. In the same way, his initial aversion to Christianity in part arose from its alleged inability to provide such an account.

Still, the nature of Augustine's ultimate conversion to Christianity is not entirely clear. He certainly indicates that a properly tutored biblical faith is the only solution to those questions and concerns which so vexed him: " credo ut intelligam," as Anselm formulated Augustine's understanding. But what is the role of philosophical reflection in this? Does reason work *only* within the context of faith? Is it merely the scullery maid for explicating the understanding of divine revelation? Or does Augustine say or at least show that unaided human reason has another sphere of operation? Can human reason understand

[1] All references to the *Confessions* are from J. Gibb and W. Montgomery, *The Confessions of Augustine* (Cambridge, 1927).

anything about God, human beings, and the universe before the advent of faith?  While Augustinian scholarship has tended to stress the way in which philosophical thought. especially Neo-Platonism, operates *within* Christian faith, I hope to show that Augustine conceives the " faith and reason " relation in broader terms. [2]  More specifically, in this paper I hope to show that the *Confessions* presents reason itself, without revelation, as capable of assaying the *possibility* of any religious claim to

[2] The  problem  of  "faith  and  reason,"  or " authority  and  philosophy,"  in Augustine's  thought  has  a  history  of  critical  analysis  reaching  back  to  the last  century.  The  early  discussions  of  this  question  have  been  traced  by  Sister Mary  Patricia  Garvey,  in *Saint  Augustine:   Christian   or  N ea-Platonist* (Milwaukee,  1939),  pp. 3-40,  and  more  briefly  by  J. O'Meara,  in *St. A.ugustine, A.gainst  the  Academics,* "Ancient  Christian  Writers,"  XU  (Baltimore,  1950), pp. 19-22.  The  more  recent  discussions  have  failed  to  produce  any  consensus. H. A. Wolfson,  in *The  Philosophy  of  the  Church  Fathers,*  I  (Cambridge,  1956), pp.  127-140,  sees  Augustine  as  illustrating  the  patristic  "double  faith" against  Manichean  credulity.  R. Cushman,  in  "Faith  and  Reason  in  the Thought  of  St. Augustine,"  *Church  History,*  19,  1950),  271-294,  awards  the primacy  to  faith  on  the  basis  of  the  perversity  of  the  will.  P. Courcelle,  in *Recherches  sur  les  Confessions  de  Saint  Augustin*  (Paris,  1950),  pp. 251-255, understands  Augustine  to  progress  from  Neo-Platonism  to  Christianity  with-out  abandoning  the  former.  R. Holte,  in *Beatitude  et  Sagesse:   Saint Augustin  et  le  probleme  de  la  fin  de  l'homme  dans  la  philosophie  ancienne* (Paris,  1962),  pp. 373-386,  considers  the  cooperation  of  reason  and  authority in  Augustine's  use  of  Christianity  to  confront  the  philosophic  problems  of his  age.  J. O'Meara,  in *The  Young  Augustine*  (New  York,  1965),  pp. 196-197,  admits  a  clarification  in  Augustine's  thought  but  no  basic  change  in  his understanding  of  the  primacy  of  faith  over  reason.  R. O'Connell,  in *Saint Augusti.ne's  Confessions:  the  Odyssey  of  a  Soul*  (Cambridge,  1969),  insists on  a  strong  N eo-Platonic  influence  on  Augustine's  understanding  of  the human  being  as  the " fallen  soul."  A. H. Armstrong,  in " St. Augustine  and Christian  Platonism,"  *Plotinian  and  Christian  Studies*  (London,  1979),  Ch. XI,  1-66,  argues  that  the  designation  "Christian  Platonist"  is  insufficient  to characterize  Augustine;  the  way  in  which  Augustine  takes  up  and  transforms Platonism  in  light  of  his  Christianity  is  critical.  Alfred  Matthews,  in *The Development  of  St. Augustine  from  Neo-Platonism  to  Christianity*  (Washing-ton, 1980),  holds  that  Augustine's  understanding  of  Christianity  matured,  so that  its  tension  with  Neo-Platonism  became  more  apparent  to  him.  M. Sciacca,  in *Saint  Augi1.st·in  et  le  Neo-Platonisme*  (Paris,  1956),  pp. 15-19, holds  Augustine  to  have  tried  to  establish  an  integral  understanding  of human  nature  by  Christianizing  Neo-Platonic  themes.

be the divinely revealed truth. 3  While faith alone may be able to give wisdom, reason of itself can discover :folly. There are rational criteria against which not only every philosophic but also every religious claim must be measured. Reason, in short, provides a *norma negativa* for faith. I intend to explore these criteria as 'Stated or implied in the *Confessions'* critique of Manicheanism especially, but also of the natural philosophers and the astrologers.

Augustine himself gives warrant for considering reason as a yardstick for measuring the claims of religion. In the context of his long-awaited discussion with Faustus, Augustine compares Manichean doctrine with the teachings of the natural philosophers and astronomers. After noting that the astronomers explained many things about the heavens which the Manicheans did not, he adds: " But I was ordered to believe [Faustus's] writings, and belief did not agree with the accounts discovered by mathematics and by my own eyes, but was very different." 4 Augustine had to accept " on faith " what contradicted the evidence of his senses and reason. This failure on the part of Faustus to resolve Augustine's difficulties on these points played a crucial role in his later rejection of Manicheanism. 5 Human reason can discover certain truths at least about the world around it. A religious claim that con-

a Among the very few studies devoted to the actual criteria of a rational faith are the following. F. E. Van Fleteren, in "Authority and Reason, Faith and Understanding in the Thought of St. Augustine," *Augustinian Studies,* 3 (19'72), 33-71, uses the "phenomenological method" to establish that for Augustine sanctity of life is a criterion of authority and catholicity is a sign of the true Church (cf. *Confess·ions* V:3, 6, and 9; and VI:8). W. G. von Jess, in "Reason as Propaedeutie to Faith in Augustine," *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion,* 5 (1!!l7 4), 225-233, sees reason as being for Augustine prior to faith in questions of certitude, of the origin of the soul, and of natural theology. F. J. Crosson, in "Philosophy, Religion, and Faith," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association,* 52 (1978), 168-176, sees understanding operative in the diverse contexts of myth, history, and philosophy. In different ways Augustine finds God in all three.

4 See V, 6: "ibi autem credere iubebar, et ad illas rationes numeris et oculis meis exploratas non occurrebat et longe diversum erat."

5V, 13.

tradicts  what  reason  truly  knows-with  mathematical  certainty,  no  less-cannot  be  true.  Since  neither  Faustus  nor  anyone  else  could  give  an  account  reconciling  Manichean  doctrine  with  astronomy,  nor  give  an  account  showing  the  astronomers  wrong,  there  was  a  head-on  conflict  between  faith  and  reason.  The  first  element  of  Augustine's  negative  norm  thus  comes  to  light:  religion  may  not  contradict  reason  but  must  be  in  harmony  with  it.  Augustine  leaves  no  room  for  a" double  truth"  approach  to  religion  and  philosophy. [6]  That  which  is  accepted  on  faith  cannot  be  religiously  true  and  philosophically  false; if  natural  philosophy  and  astronomy  teach  rationally  knowable  truth,  no  true  religious  belief  can  contradict  them.  Hence  consistency  with  reason  and  the  compatibility  of reason  and  revelartion  are  basic  for  any  religious  claim  to  be  valid.  A  religion  that  denies  a  truth  possessing  $7 + 8 = 10$  certainty  cannot  be  truly revealed. [7]

It  is  important  to  understand  precisely  what  Augustine  is  and  is  not  claiming.  He  is  not  saying  that  all  truth  must  be  discovered  by  reason;  nor  is  he  saying  that  a  religious  claim  must  be  proved  by  reason.  Either  of  these  assertions  would  involve  the  unexamined  assumption  that  the  human  mind  is  fully  commensurate  to  reality.  Still  less  is  he  claiming  that  the  mind  is  utterly  incapable  of  attaining  any  knowledge  of  reality.  Reason  can  find  no  grounds  within  itself  for  either  rationalism  or  skepticism.  Rather,  he  is  saying  that  the  human  mind  can  know  certain  things-e.g.,  the  heavenly  bodies'  motions-and  know  that  it  knows  them.  Further,  he  is  saying  that  no  revelation can  be  true  which  contradicts  or  is  incompatible  with  what  reason  truly  knows  of  itself.  This  and  this  alone  is  the  claim

[6] By  the  use  of  the  term  " double  truth,"  no  anachronistic  reference  to  the  later  so-called  "Latin  Averroist"  debates  is  intended.  Rather,  the  term  is  used  only  as  a  foil  for  Augustine's  understanding  of  the  proper  response  to  the  *perennial*  " faith  and  reason"  question.

[7] Cf. VI, 6. While  Augustine  moves  from  the  belief  that  he  must  have  " $7 + 3 = 10$"  certainty  in  order  to  have  faith  to  the  understanding  that  " $7 + 3 = 10$ "  certainty  is  a  consequence  of  faith,  he  never  denies  that  true  faith  must  be  reasonable.  In  this  sense  "$7 + 3 = 10$"  truth  *remains*  a  criterion  of  faith.

of Augustine's  principle of the noncontradiction  of reason  and religion.

Why, then, did Augustine  not abandon the Manicheans  and become  a natural  philosopher?  By his own account the natural philosophers  discovered truth  where the Manicheans  imagined falsity.  A clue may  be found in what he resolved to do after meeting  with  Faustus.  "But my  every  attempt  by  which I had resolved  to advance  in that sect [Manicheanism]  collapsed as I came to know  that man [Faustus].  Not that I altogether separated  from them,  but as if unable  to find anything  better than  what  I had  in  some  way  blundered  into,  I meanwhile resolved  to be content  with  it, unless perhaps  something  more worthy  of choice  should  chance  to show itself."  [8]  Manifestly, then, the natural  philosophers  did not seem to be " anything better"  or" something  more worthy  of choice."

The natural philosophers  gave  the right answers but did not ask the right questions.  They could explain solstices, equinoxes, and eclipses; but they could not explain God, the soul, freedom, or evil. They knew  the creation  but were unconcerned  both with the Creator and-what  is in some respects even more im- portant-with  their own minds, by which they knew the crea- tion.[9] Augustine's  point is not only that the natural  philoso- phers did not *find* the true God. It is more that they did not

s See *V,* 13: "ceterum  conatus omnis meus,  quo proficere in illa secta statueram,  illo homine cognito prorsus intercidit,  non ut ab eis omnino sepa- rarer,  sed quasi melius quicquam non inveniens eo, quo iam quoquo modo inrueram,  contentus  interim  esse decreeram,  nisi aliquid  forte, quod magis eligendum  esset, eluceret."

9 Cf. the whole of Augustine's  discussion  and critique  at *V,* 3-5, *passim.* Note especially  this point: "sed non nouerunt uiam, verbum tuum,  per quod fecisti ea quae numerant  et ipsos qui numerant  et sensum,  quo cernunt quae numerant,  et mentem, de qua numerant"  (V, 5). The most exact astronomy gives knowledge  neither of God nor of self ("ipsos qui ... sensum quo ... mentem de qua").

The importance  of self-understanding  for understanding  anything  is itself a central  theme of B. J. F. Lonergan's work. A fairly  recent attempt  to read the *Confessions*  through Lonergan's eyes is David Burrell's "Reading the Con- fessions of Augustine:  an Exercise in Theological  Understanding," *Journal* of *Religion,* 50 (1970), 327-351. Burrell criticizes  the reductionistic  interpre-

*seek* Him. In failing to examine the very power by which they, knew the heavenly motions, they cut off the very possibility of searching for Him. The questions they asked could be answered without reference to God and the soul; their answers did not provide a springboard for these other questions.

This brings to light Augustine's second criterion for evaluating any claim to wisdom: reason demands the explanation of *every* area of human experience, of the *whole* range of human phenomena. *No* system of thought can be adequate which fails to shed light on all the questions of specifically *human* existence. A system of thought which fails even to ask reason about reason-its source, activity, and goal-is not 'rational." Systematic obliviousness to the questions of good and evil, the soul and freedom, God and human beings, is not wisdom. This principle operates as an instrument of critique against both religious and philosophical claims. As the first principle is a concretization 0£ the principle of noncontradiction, so the second principle is a concretization the principle that the whole is greater than any part. An explanation of any part, no matter how careful, which ignores the other parts, to say nothing 0£ the whole, cannot claim to be wisdom. Augustine's criticism of the natural philosophers is on just these grounds: they confused an account of the motions of the heavenly bodies with an account of the totality of being. Their explanation, in short, was not " comprehensive."

It is to be noted that this criterion posits no particular answers to the questions involved. Augustine's point is *not* (or not only) that the natural philosophers had some uncongenial answers but rather that they had no understanding of the relevant questions. Thus Augustine's rejection of natural philosophy is to be contrasted with his rejection of Academic skepticism.10 The Academics asked the relevant questions but did

tations of Augustine by certain psychologists who fail to appreciate the way "Mother Monica" functions in the *Confessions*. See also Crosson, cited in Note 3 above.

10 V, 19.

not answer them.  With the  natural  philosophers it is the con-
verse.

During  his  Manichean  phase  Augustine  was  taken  with  the
astrologers.  Unlike  the  natural  philosophers,  they  did  not
ignore  vast  areas  of  human  experience.  Indeed,  astrology  at
once  enabled  him  to  deny  responsibility  for  his  evil  actions,
since  they  were  written  in  the  stars,  and  to  exercise  a  measure
of  foresight  over  his  own  courses  of  action,  since  it  seemed  so
often  to  predict  the  future.  Still,  there  were  doubts  and  hesi-
tations  about  it.  Vindicianus  from  the  first  tried  to  dissuade
Augustine  from  an  interest  in  the  occult,  saying that"  chance"
and"  instinct"  accounted  for  the  accuracy  of  astrology. [11]  But
the  authority  of  astrological  literature  held  him  in  check.  As  he
writes:  " I  found  as  yet  no  certain  proof  ... that  the  true
things  predicted  by  the  man  consulted  were  spoken  by  fortune
or  chance,  not  by  the  stargazer's  art." [12]

The  proof  Augustine  was  looking  for  came  first  in  Firminius's
story  of  his  own  father  and  his  father's  slave.  Each  conceived
a  child;      children  were  born  at  the  same        on  the  same
property,  yet  their  lives  were  as  different  as  the  conditions  of
their  births.  Again,  Augustine  himself  reflected  on  twins  he
had  known  and  saw  how  their  lives  differed.  The  biblical  story
of  Jacob  and  Esau  merely  confirmed  what  was  open  for  all  to
see.[13]

Astrology  attempted  to  provide  a  comprehensive  account  of
life  in  terms  of  the  time  and  place  of  birth.  But  whatever  other
true  predictions  astrologers  made,  they  could  not  explain  the
divergent  lives  of  twins.  Astrology's  failure  in  this  crucial  test
case  meant  that  it  was  incapable  of  explaining  fully  the  phe-
nomena  it  was  supposed  to  explain.  This  led  Augustine  to  re-
ject  it  and  to  accept  chance  and  intuition  as  the  suitable  ex-
planation  of  any  accuracy  the  astrologers  might  claim.

[11] IV,  5.

[12] See  IV,  6:  ".  .  .  nullum  certum  quale  quaerebam  documentum  adhuc
inueneram,  quo  mihi  sine  ambiguitate  appareret,  quae  ab  eis  consultis  uera
dicerentur,  forte  uel  sorte,  non  ante  inspectorem  siderum  dici."

is VII,  8-10.

By implication, then, the *Confessions* lays down a third cri-
terion by which reason may evaluate the claims of any authori-
tative system. Any philosophical or religious system must have
within itself the elements necessary to explain all the facts
which it claims to be able to explain. Augustine's third prin-
ciple is based on the analysis of what rational explanation is to
begin with. An explanation is nothing more than an arbitrary
hypothesis or unexamined opinion unless it shows that it can
render intelligible all of the facts falling within its compass.
Even if, of course, an alleged revelation, a religious belief, or a
philosophical system can explain all the facts, that does not
establish its truth; perhaps an alternative hypothesis could do
so as well. But if it cannot do so, it is certainly false. Rea-
son's demand £or an explanation of each and every fact within
the entire range of human phenomena emerges, then, as Augus-
tine's third criterion by which any system of belief may be
evaluated. Religion's acount of life must be" complete."

The principles of " comprehensive " and " complete " expla-
nation are related but by no means identical. The former ex-
cludes the error of confusing an explanation in one area of in-
quiry with an explanation of the whole of reality. The latter
excludes any explanation in any area of inquiry which fails to
explain all the data of that area. By the former Augustine
criticizes the natural philosophers-not  because their explana-
tions of the heavenly bodies are false, but because their in-
quiries are too narrowly based. By the latter Augustine criti-
cizes the .astrologers precisely because their explanations  in
themselves fail to account for all the relevant facts.

Augustine treats Manicheanism and astrology as standing or
falling in close proximity. Book III recounts his conversion to
the former and Book IV his embrace of the latter; similarly,
Book VI recounts his abandonment of Manicheanism and Book
VII his repudiation of ·astrology. Still, however closely the two
are related, they are not identical. A rational critique of
astrology is different from a rational critique of Manicheanism.
The three principles of rational thought so far brought to light

do not of themselves account for his rejection of Manicheanism. However necessary, they are not sufficient for this. After all, " something more worthy of choice " or " anything better " had not yet showed itself.

In the fifth book of the *Confessions* Augustine sets forth in a systematic way the principal tenets of the Manichean doctrines of God, freedom, and evil. In a considerable part of the latter books of the *Confessions* these ·same points are discussed from the perspective of Catholic doctrine. The Manicheans held that God is an expanded mass of lightsome matter and that the human mind is a particle of this mass; they held that evil is a contracted mass of corporeal matter; and they believed that the real, inner self is not responsible for the evil deeds done by the contracted mass of a person's physical nature.14 The intermingling of the two masses and the liberation of the good particles from the evil mass characterizes the Manichean solution to the problems of God, freedom, and evil. Augustine, as we know, came finally to accept the Catholic solution to these problems. God is completely good, and everything He creates-down to the lowest particle of almost formless matter-is good.10 Evil, far from being physical matter, is the utter absence of being; were something completely evil, it would cease to be.16 And the single human will, in turning away from the fullest Good to incomplete creaturely goods, is responsible for its own evil.17 What is it, then, that opened the way for Christianity, properly understood, to become attractive to Augustine? What did he see as the failure of Manichean dualism?

In the first place, even if Manicheanism could offer a consistent account of the whole range of phenomena ·and individual facts, it could do this only by failing to "save the appearances " of things. Augustine introduces his readers to the

14 V, 18-20.
10 VII, 6-'7; cf. XII, 8.
1svn, is.
11 VII, 22.

Manicheans  by relating  the delightful  little  story  about  the figs
eaten  by the elect.  When one of the elect  plucks a fig, both  it
and the "mother  tree "shed  milky  tears;  and when  he eats  and
digests  that fig, he breathes  forth  bits of god.[18]  Augustine  tells
this  story  in such  a way that  it evokes  a chuckle;  but there  is
a deadly  serious  point  at stake.  The Manicheans  failed  to re-
spect  the fig *as a fig;*  they  anthropomorphized  and divinized  a
member  of the vegetable  kingdom.  Thei:r  dualistic  materialism
enabled  or compelled  them  to introduce  the principles  of a
higher  genus-human  o:r divine-to  explain  the reality  of a
lower  genus.  By introducing  "particles  of god " into the fig,
they  explained  away  the appearance  of the fig.  A simple  fruit,
which  should  be explained  by principles  applicable  to the vege-
table  realm,  was now made a "god-bearer"  requiring  a divine
principle  of explanation.  A system  which  introduces  elements
from  a higher  genus  to explain  that  which  can be explained
without  them. fails  to respect  the appearances  of things.  Thus
a fourth  criterion  of the rational  analysis  of religion  emerges:
no principles  beyond  those  necessary  to account  for the phe-
nomena  may be part  of a            explanation  of reality.

The Manicheans  sinned  against  this principle  of thought  by
raising  a lower  thing  to a higher  level  but equally  they  sinned
in the other  direction  as well:  they  explained  higher  things  in
terms  of the lower  principles.  Not only did they  raise  the fig
to the level of a divine  prison,  but they  reduced  God and the
human  mind  to a level  beneath  that  of figs-Le.,  to pure
matter.

In explaining  why he could  not escape  from  Manichean
dualism,  Augustine  notes  that he could  not conceive  of spiritual
substance.[19]  Indeed,  he cites  this  as the key element  which,
when  finally  understood,  broke  the stranglehold  of Mani-
cheanism  on him.[20]  Until  he broke  through  to the notion  of
spiritual  substance  he was unable  to give  an adequate  account,

[18] III,  18.
[19] V, 19-20.
[20] VII,  20 and 26;  cf. III,  12.

as he tells us, of his own mind. [21]  The problem lay in the fact
that mind was not given to him in the way that physical, ma-
terial objects were. Augustine did not come to a knowledge
of his own mind by sensing it; his mind was not another ob-
ject to be understood, but rather that by which he under-
stood.[22] Through memory, the mind's storehouse, all the sensed
objects were reviewed and then thought through. [23] The *mens,*
in other words, had to be explained as the subject which knows,
not as an object which is known. [24] But this required a non-
material mode of existence on the part of the mind.

Augustine's critique of Manichean dualism is reminiscent of
his critique of the astronomers. The astronomers and natural
philosophers understood some aspects of the cosmos but failed
even to seek understanding of themselves, let alone God. The
Manicheans did attempt to understand themselves and God,
but in terms derived from the material cosmos. Because the
physical cosmos manifestly differs from     by which the elect
are knowers, they tried to account for the difference by posit-
ing different kinds of matter. But no matter how Iightsome or
expanded the matter of mind or of God might be, it would
still be matter. As such it could not explain the activities of
mind, which require an immaterial principle or power.[25]

This reduction of mind to matter was echoed by the reduc-
tion of God to the same status and nature as the human mind.
God as expanded mass, rather than as the archetype of which
the human mind is the image, would have to be finite and
limited by evil mass. Not only, then, did Augustine in his
Manichean phase fail to understand the human mind, but

[21] VII, 2; cf. V, 13.

[22] VII, 2. Book VII has a density of references to the " acies mentis"
which "sees" rather than "is seen." Cf. VII: 1, 5, 12, 16 (" oculum animae
meae "), etc. The importance of the "menR" as knowing subject rather than
as object known has been stressed by Lonergan, *Verbum: Word and Idea in
Aquinas* (Notre Dame, 1!l67), pp. xii-xv.

[23] X, 17-18.

[24] X, 9 and 25.

[20] VII, 2 and 20.

equally  he failed  to understand  its divine  source  and  origin.[26]
In recounting  all of this, Augustine  subtly  brings  to light  the
principle  of thought  or reason  which  enabled  him  to reject
Manicheanism:   all the principles  sufficient  to account  for the
phenomena  must  be present  and  active  in a credible  religion.
Activities  consequent  upon ·a higher  genus  of being  cannot  be
explained  by 'a lower  genus.  A mental  reality  cannot  be ex-
plained  by causal  principles  derived  from  the inframental  order.
This  fifth  criterion  is the natural  complement  to the fourth:
the appearances  must  not only  he saved;  they  must  also be
sufficiently  explained.

   Augustine's  breakthrough,  by this principle,  to his own  mind
as the key  to understanding  God enabled  him  to see the super-
fluities  of the Manichean  system.  Because  they  had  not under-
standing  of the God  Who  Is Above  the Cosmos,  the Mani-
cheans  had  to invent  "five caverns  of darkness"  and postulate
a complex  cosmology.[21]  None  of this, of course,  had the slight-
est empirical  or rational  basis;  neither  the astronomers  nor the
natural  philosophers  had •any knowledge  of these  things.  Nor
was any  of this  necessary  for Augustine's  pursuit  of religious
truth;  astronomical  or cosmological  truths  are part  of astron-
omy ·and cosmology,  not of true  religion.[28]  Indeed,  by a kind
of early  version  of Ockham's  razor,  Augustine  slashes  away  at
the  " caverns  of darkness "  and the  " five elements."  These
have  been  introduced  superfluously,  both  as cosmological  facts
and as religious  principles.  On neither  ground  can they  stand.
Augustine,  then,  indicates  a sixth  criterion  for the rational
evaluation  of a religion:  assertions  about  the facts  of the physi-
cal world  must  have  an empirical  foundation.  Claims  about
the make-up  and constitution  of this world,  the world  available
through  human  experience,  whose  only  basis  is the internal
logic  of the religion  itself,  must  be dismissed  as fictions.  The
proper  principle  for the discerning  of facts-as  distinguished

   20VII, 3.
   21IIII, 10-11.
   2sv, S.

from the outpourings of uncontrolled imagination-is not superfluity but empirical economy or simplicity.

In criticizing the Manicheans, astronomers, and astrologers, then, Augustine has developed certain implicit but real criteria by which to evaluate any religion. Let us recapitulate these six criteria. (1) Religious belief must be in harmony with, not in opposition to, what reason knows for itself. This may be called the "principle of the noncontradiction of faith and reason." (Q) Religious belief must address itself to the entire realm of human life; it must 'avoid taking an explanation of one limited set of observable facts for a successful account of reality as a whole. This may be called the "principle of comprehensive explanation." (3) To be credible, a religious faith must be con- sistent with each and every fact of human experience; if any fact contradicts the belief, that religion becomes incredible. We may call this the" principle of complete explanation!' (4) To explain the appearances of things, a religion may introduce *no* principles beyond those necessary; this is especially true in the case of anthropomorphism, We may call this the "principle of necessary conditions of explanation." (5) To be credible, a religion must possess *all* the principles sufficient to account for the varied phenomena of human life. This is especially cogent against any reductionism. This may be named the "principle of sufficient conditions for explanation." (6) Finally, a credible faith must introduce no fictions into the world of experienced phenomena; the experienced phenomena of human life, which religion attempts to explain, are the same for the believer and for the non-believer. This may he named the "principle of empirical discernment of facts!'

These six principles, though, must be understood aright; that is, they must be understood both in their unity and in their diversity. Their unity lies in their being multiple dimensions of a single norm governing the rational evaluation of religious claims. These principles arise from and return to a unitary un- derstanding of the requirements for rational faith; they a:re not separate, discrete, and isolated precepts. On the other hand,

neither ·are they  six  manifestations  or  modalities  of one  prin-
ciple.  Their  differences  from  each  other  are  revealed  by  their
being  irreducible  to  each  other.  Every  one  of them  brings rto
light  another  facet  of religious  belief  for rational  evaluation.

   This  diversity  in unity  appears  in  the  fact  that  these  prin-
ciples bear  on  different objects.  In  the  broadest  terms,  they
bear either  on  the  character  of the  phenomena  which require
an explanation  or on  the  character  of the  religious  belief  which
claims to be  the  explanation of the  phenomena.  More specifi-
cally, three  of these  principles  function  -as criteria  by which the
integrity  of human  experience  may be  secured;  they  prevent
the  corruption  of life experience both  by  including all  facts  and
excluding  all :fictions.  The  other  three  principles  function  as
criteria  by which  the  explanatory  power  of the  religion may
be  tested;  they  stand  watch  over  the  claim  of any  religion to
be  the  truth,  the  explanation of reality,  by demanding  of that
religion coherence  with itself  and consistency  with the  facts.

   Concretely,  Augustine's  three  criteria  which  have  been called
here the  principles of comprehensive explanation,  complete ex-
planation,  and the  empirical  discernment of facts  bear on the
experienced realities of human  life.  These  principles  are  in-
tended  to  ensure  the  integrity  or wholeness  of experienced
reality  as the  object of religious  explanation.  The  astronomers
ignored vast areas of human  experience, and so  their  very  index
of reality  was not  " comprehensive."  The  astrologers  failed to
reflect upon  the  divergent  lives of twins,  and so  their  inventory
of facts  was not" complete."  The  Manicheans  dreamed up an
imaginary  cosmos,  and so  their  universe  was :fictional rather
than  " factual."  By the  first  two  of these  three  principles
Augustine  secures  the  inclusive  character  of the  whole:  no in-
convenient fact  or range  of facts  may be  excluded  from  the
reality  which religion is supposed to illuminate.  By the  third,
Augustine  ensures  the  exclusive  character  of the  whole:  the
whole  of reality  is not only " whole " but also " real ";  imagined
ingredients  constitute  no part  of this whole.  By the  first  two
of these  three  principles,  then,  Augustine  demands  of any  reli-

gion that it encompass *all* the facts; by the third he demands that it encompass *only* the facts, The three principles together secure the whole of reality and all things within it, A rationally credible religion accounts for this reality *om,ni et soli,*

The three principles herein named the noncontradiction of faith and reason, the necessary conditions of explanation, and the sufficient conditions 0£ explanation address the *intelligibility* of any religion's account of human life, Securing the whole of reality is one thing; adequately accounting for it is another. These three principles exclude ways *of* inadequately accounting for the whole. The Manichean explanation of the cosmos was mathematically false, and so it contradicted reason. The Manicheans divinized figs, and so they introduced "unnecessary" principles into their religious account. Finally, they reduced mind to matter, and so they failed to have principles "sufficient" to account for the reality. The first of this group of Augustine's principles safeguards the credibility of religion by insisting that it be at least a rational *possibility.* The second protects the explanatory character of the religious account of reality by insisting that it not negate the very facts it is supposed to explain: the fig must remain a simple fig. The third of these principles secures the explanatory character of a credible religion by demanding that it actually account for the phenomena it claims to be able to explain: matter is no explanation of mind at alL A religious account of life which either (l) is not a rational possibility, (2) "explains away" the reality it is supposed to explain, or (3) fails to explain the facts of experience is ipso facto incredible; a credible religion passes all three tests,

By these six criteria, then, Augustine puts forth a unified program for examining religious claims by reason alone. His two-pronged investigation tests both the facts which any religion claims to be able to explain and the explanatory character of any religious account of the facts, Only by meeting these criteria can a religion claim credibility. Of course Augustine is far from claiming that mere credibility is sufficient .to com-

mand the assent of faith; that demands a healing of the will
by grace. But Augustine does understand rational credibility
to be a *praeparatio evangelica.* He derives his criteria from rea-
son alone; they do not follow from but pave the way for his
acceptance of baptism. Moreover, while it would take us too
far afield to show how the Catholic religion fulfilled Augustine's
criteria and thus passed his test, for present purposes it suffices
to recall that Ambrose's preaching cleared up his misconcep-
tions of Catholicism, just as Faustus in his own way had cleared
up his misconceptions of Manicheanism.

   To conclude: religious claims are subject to rational investi-
gation.29 Reason is a tool not only for articulating faith but

   29 Augustine's understanding of the relation of religion and reason may
illuminate more than one question asked by contemporary scholars in the
philosophy of religion. In particular his understanding seems relevant to the
question of the verification and falsification of religious statements. A. :Flew
denies meaning to religious statements which lack any criterion by which
they may be proved false; God as the " invisible gardener " is simply an
" imaginary gardener." On the other hand, R. Hare accuses Flew of con-
fusing a "blik" with an explanation. (See A. Flew and A. Macintyre, *New
Essays in Philosophical Theology* [London, 1955], pp. 96-103.) Augustine's
six principles do, nevertheless, answer Flew's call for criteria of falsification.
In particular Augustine does falsify the claims of the Manicheans and the
astrologers. Similarly, his understanding of the role of reason in religious
assent safeguards such an assent from being a mere "blik." Hare's lunatic,
who believes that all Oxford dons are intending to kill him, does not satisfy
Augustine's criteria. While the gentility of the dons need not contradict a
homicidal intent, such a suspicion as the lunatic's is neither necessary nor
sufficient to explain the dons' lives, manners, and behavior. The insanity of
the lunatic lies in the fact that his suspicion is as unnecessary for explaining
the dons' behavior as is the divinization of figs for explaining their nature,
ᴁs well as in the fact that the dons' behavior is as insufficient to express a
murderous intent as matter is to account for mind. In short, the lunatic's
insanity is revealed by the fact that he "explains away" rather than ex-
plains the dons' gentility.
   Similarly, Leo Strauss claims that the relationship of philosophy and
revelation is one of primordial and unresolvable conflict. Each claims to be
the right way of life simply while neither can refute nor be refuted by the
other. In particular, Strauss argues that the personal experience of the
prophet, allegedly validatecl by miracles, gives no rational basis for credence;
on the other hand, philosophy has failed to achieve that "true and adequate"
account of the whole which alone disproves revelation by rendering it super-

for criticizing it as well; it stands as a *norma negativa* against which every religious claim must be measured. And only to the extent tha:t religion passes reason's test is it truly credible. Reason's test of religion is that it be able to give an account of the whole of reality:  an " account " is an *account* only insofar as it is noncontradictory,  necessary, and sufficient; and the " whole " is the *whole* only insofar as it is factual,  comprehensive, and complete.

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fiuous. (See Leo Strauss,  "The  Mutual  Influence  of Theology  and Philosophy",  *The  Independent  Journal  of Philosophy,*  (3: 1979)  pp. 111-118.  See also Michael Platt,  "Leo Strauss:  Three  Quarrels,  Three  Questions,  One Life"  in *The  Crisis  of Liberal  Democracy:  A Straussian  Perspective.*  ed. K.Deutsch and W. Sofer  (Albany:SUNY  Press,  1987)  pp. 17-28).  Augustine's six principles,  however,  anticipate  Strauss's  difficulty;  they  look  not merely  to the prophet's  " personal  experience"  but to the revelation's  power to provide  a "true  and adequate  "  account  of the whole.  Hence,  while  revelation  goes 'beyond"  reason,  it is insufficient  to say therefore  that it fa "possibly  true, possibly  false  or possibly  good,  possibly  bad"  (Strauss,  p. 115).  Augustine's principles  are designed  to separate  the "false  and bad"  from the "possibly true  and good".  In short,  Augustine  claims  that the Christian  revelation answers  the philosopher's  demand  for a "true  and adequate"  account  of the whole.

# THOMISTIC METAETIDCS AND A
# PRESENT CONTROVERSY

*X* OOD STARTING point for understanding the recent controversy regarding the Grisez-Finnis interpretaition oi St. Thomas Aquinas's ethical theory is Finnis's claim that "by a 'Simple act of non-inferential understanding one grasps that the objeot of the [natural] inclination which one experiences is an instance of a general form of good, for oneself (and others like one) ." [1] For here Finnis is denying an inferential process by which one moves from a theoretical understanding (" understanding this nature from the outside, as it were" [2]) of what inclinations humans ,as humans have to the conclusion that the object oi the particular inclination in question is ·a human good. Instead, he is asserting that it is in a practical context that one understands an object of an inclination to be a human good, and thus generates, *via* the practical reason, ·a practical, prescriptive principle. An example of such a principle is " Knowledge is something good to have " which, for Finnis, is the same logically as " Knowledge is a good to be pursued " [3] which, in turn, is equivalent to "Knowledge ought to be pursued ",[4] which is a prescriptive ("normative") rather than descriptive (factual) utterance. [5]

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[1] *Natural Law and Natural Rights* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980; hereafter *NLNR),* p. 34. Cf. Fundamentals of Ethics (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1983; hereafter *FE),* pp. 20-22.

[2] NLNR p. 34.

[s] *Ibid.,* p. 63.

[4] *lbid.,* p. 42, note 56; "The Basic Principles of Natural Law: A Reply to Ralph Mclnerny," John Finnis and Germain Grisez, *American Journal of Jurisprudence* 26 (1981), pp. 21-31 (hereafter Reply to Mcinerny), pp. 23-24. See also Germain Grisez's well-known article "The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the *Summa theologiae,* 1-2, Question 94, Article 2," *Natural Law Forum* 10 (1965), pp. 168-201 (hereafter *FPPR),* p. 194.

[5] See, e.g., *NLNR,* pp. 44-45; Reply to Mcinerny, p. 23. Grisez and Finnis attempt to distinguish imperatives and prescriptions, which I argue against in

Finnis  and  Grisez,  then,  argue  that  practical  principles,  which
encompass  value-judgments  about  human  goods,  are  arrived
at  through  the  practical  reason  and  thus  are  prescriptive
("normative  ")  utterances,  as  opposed  to  descriptive  or  theo-
retical  truths  "of  metaphysical  anthropology  ".[6]  Hence  these
principles  cannot  be  derived  from  metaphysical  claims.[7]  To
argue  for  such  ,a  derivation  would  he  to  hold  that  prescriptivity
or  normativity  can  emerge  from  pure  descriptivity.  Such  a
derivation,  of  course,  would  not  account  for  the  appearance  of
the  prescriptive  or  action -guiding  element.

An  alternative  position,  to  be  returned  to  below,  is  that
value-judgments  about  human  goods  are  descriptive  in  them-
selves. At  the  same  time,  owing  to  the  natural  inclination  to  do
what  we  understand  to  be  morally  or  humanly  good,  human  be-
ings  could  prescribe  to  themselves  the  pursuit  of  such  human
goods,  once  they  are  understood  to  be  human  goods.

**It**  should  be  noted  that  for  Grisez  and  Finnis  the  basic  prac-
tical  principles  are  not  moral  but  pre-moraL[8]  Still,  Grisez  and
Finnis  consider  that  they  direct  to  ends  completive  of  human
nature.  Hence,  although  these  authors  reserve  the  characteri-
zation  of  "'  morally  right  choices  "  to  those  that  are  not  simply
harmonious  with  one  or  another  basic  human  good  but  rather
to  those  that  also  do  not  run  counter  to  any  other  human  good,[9]

my  paper  "Is-Ought:  Prescribing  and  a  P1·esent  Controversy,"  *The  Thomist*
49,  l  (January,  1985),  pp.  1-23  (hereafter  Schultz),  esp.  pp.  10-Hl.

[6]  Reply  *to*  Mcinerny,  pp.  23-24.

[7]  *Ibid.;*  see  note  13  below.

In  the  paper  mentioned  in  note  5  above  I  point  out  that  Finnis  seems
to  allow  for  the  possibility  of  arriving  at  value-judgments  through  theo-
retical  reasoning,  since  he  says  **"I**  assert  that  judgments  [about  man's
natural  goods,  about  what  man  should  be]  are  primarily  *(though
perhaps  not  exclitsively)*  judgments  of  practical  reason  **....** "  ("Natural
Law  and  'Is'-'Ought'  Question:  An  Invitation  to  Professor  Veatch,"
*Catholic  Lawyer*  26,  4,  1981,  p.  272,  my  emphasis.  This  article  is  sub-
sequently  referred  to  as  Response  to  Veatch.)  But  he  doesn't  explain
this,  and  in  Reply  to  Mcinerny  and  in  other  places  he  argues  against
any  move  from  speculative  to  practical  principles.

[8]  See  Schultz,  p.  8,  including  note  37.

[9]  *Ibicl.,*  including  note  38.

they  would  seem  to agree that  the  basic  practical  principles  are
the  starting  points  of  moral choices.

   The  alternative  position  to that  of  Grisez  and  Finnis  could
allow that  acting  morally  well implies not only  pursuing  human
goods  but  also  not  acting  directly  against  any  human  good.
Still, the  prescription  arising  from  the  combination of the  grasp
of  human  good  as  such  and  the  inclination  to  do  what  one
understands  to be  morally  good  would  be  considered  to be of a
moral  nature.   And  then  the  prescriptivity  of  moral  principles
would  be  seen  to  be  due  to  human  nature,  while  value-judg-
ments  about  human  goods  could  be  understood  to be  descrip-
tive  in  themselves. [10]

   As  already  noted,  Grisez  and  Finnis  would  argue  against  this
possibility,  inasmuch  as  for  them  the  humanly  good  aspect  of
an  object  of  inclination  is  seen  in  a  practical  context  which
yields  formulations  of  value-judgments  or  principles  as  already
prescriptive. [11]  However,  without  realizing  it,  at  least  Finnis
seems  to  recognize  vialue-judgments  about  human  goods  to  be
inherently  descriptive.   He  says,  for  example,  that  the  basic
human  goods, or basic forms of human flourishing are  (natural-
ly)  understood  to be  desirable  and  reasonable  and  *thus*  to-be-
pursued.[12]  Now  if  something  is  grasped  as  to-be-done  or  pur-
sued  *because*  it  is  seen  as  desirable,  "desirable"   must  have  a
descriptive  formulaition,  which represents  qualities  to which one
is  attracted   (or committed)   and  which, when understood  to be
present,  move  one  to  action.   Perhaps  Finnis  believes  this  de-
scriptive  meaning  (to be  elaborated  upon  below)  is  extracted
from  the  prescriptive  formula.   Still,  an  important  consideration
emerges  here:  if  value-judgments   about  human  goods  are
basically  descriptive  rather  than  prescriptive  or  normative,  they
appear,  by  Finnis's  own  reasoning,  to  be  from,  or  are  part  of,

[10] *Ibid.,*  p.  20.

[11] As  noted  above;  see  also  Response  to  Veatch,  p.  272.

[12] Schultz,   pp.  18-19.  For  basic  human  goods  as  basic  aspects  of  human
flourishing,   see  *NLNR,*  pp.  23,  67,  87,  144;  Response  to  Veatch,  p.  269.  Finnis
also  states  that  value-judgments    can  be  true  or  false:     *FE*  pp.  3-4,  23,  30.

"metaphysical speculations", *even if* such judgments are some-
times formed in a practical context. [13]

Consider the formula " Knowledge is a human good ". Re-
gardless of how arrived at, this can be analyzed as descriptive
in itself: for " human good " can be substituted its descriptive
*ratio* (to be discussed below), although the prescription to pur-
sue knowledge may arise immediately owing to a concomitant
natural inclination or decision to pursue what is understood to
be a human good. Further, it is reasonable to argue that a full
assessment of an end as a truly human good not only presup-
poses a descriptive understanding of " human good ", hut also a
checking process through which one compares one's own judg-
ments with those things to which all humans, as humans, in-
cline. This combination of " insight " and checking process re-
quires the use of theoretical (descriptive) reason. [14]

A few comments on rthe nature of practical reason according
to St. Thomars Aquinrus may help to illustrate this point. Prac-
tical reason is operative insofar as one is being attracted to an
object either by vintue of a decision or inclination; in the light
of this good the practical reason urges (prescribes) the pursuit
of it. [15] Now Aquinas considers prescription or commanding to
be the primary act of the practical reason; it is also the chief
act of prudence. [16] Thus a brief treatment of Aquinas's analysis
of a human act governed by prudence is in order. Aquinas holds
that, prior to the issuing of (self-)imperatives by the practical
reason regarding what is to be done in a concrete situation
(presupposing an adherence to a right end), one must take
counsel about the means to the end, and, if there is more than
one appropriate means, judge one best, or select it. [11] Assuming

[1s] Schultz, p. 17. Again, I say by Finnis's own reasoning because of what he
says, for example, in Reply to Mcinerny, p. 23, where he associates normative
principles with practical reason and theoretical principles with truths of
"metaphysical anthropology." Cf. *FE,* p. 22, "descriptive and theoretical."

[14] For Finnis on "insight", see *FE,* p. 51.

[15] Schultz, pp. 6; 10-15.

[16] *Summa Theol-Ogiae* (hereafter ST) 2-2, 47, 8; Schultz, p. 11. For *im-
perare* and *praecipere* used interchangeably, see also 2-2, 104, 1-5.

[11] See ST 2-2, 47, 8; 1-2, 57, 6; 1-2, 15, 3; Schultz, p. 13, note 51.

the continued  effect of an end already embraced,  command fol-
lows.18 Now counsel and selection  are, in a sense, in the realm
of theory .19  More precisely,  they  are said to correspond  to acts
of the speculative  intellect  which are inquiry  and judgment. 20
So they are within  the domain of practical  reason because they
a.re occurring  in a situation  in which practical  reason, as direct-
ing truth  to operation,  is operative. 21  But the determination
about the appropriate  or best means, or the right  act in the
situation,  is formulated  descriptively.

Similarly,  if in the pursuit  of an instance  of a human  good
(e.g., knowledge)  one recognizes it as a human good, the cor-
responding  formula  (" Knowledge  is a human  good ") is de-
scriptive.  And if the good is attracting  because it is first under-
stood to be a human  good, this could be owing to a commit-
ment or a natural  inclination  humans have toward  acting in a
way that is understood  to be morally  good-that  takes into ac-
count human  goods as such, as conducive  to the development
of all humans,  and hence as within  the mo:ral domain.  In this
case, the notion ' human  good ' is first understood  descriptivelyo

According  to this analysis Finnis is mistaken  in radically
separating  "evaluations"  and "descriptions",  or "ought"
and " 022 Thus he is mistaken  in claiming  that on *logical*
grounds,  i.e., owing to the impossibility  of deriving  normative
from descriptive  utterances,  theoretical  or non-prescribing  rea-
son cannot  arrive at basic value-judgments. 23  Indeed,  as has

18 Consent  and choice are sometimes  one: ST 1-2, 15, 3 ad 3.

19 ST 2-2, 47, 8. The similarity  of this situation  and a speculative  one can
he gleaned  from the seconcl ancl third  kinds of speculative  knowledge  de-
scribed  in ST 1, 14, 16. In this paper these types of knowledge  ani con-
sidered  simply as speculative.

20 ST 1-2, 57, 6.

2,1 E.g., ST 1, 79, 11 and ad 2; 1-2, 5, 7, 6. They  are also about  operable
matters.  An analysis of descriptive  " ought "-judgments  in a practical  con-
text forms part of my article "'Ought '-Judgments:  A Descriptivist  Analysis
From  Thomistic  Perspective",  *The New f:foholcistiaism,* 61, 4 (Autumn,
1987).

22 *l!'l!J,* p. 22;  note  6 above.

2s See note  7 above.

just been shown, the operation of this reason is essential to the
understanding of evaluation regarding human goods, whether
or not the characterization of such activity is accurately con-
veyed by terms such as " metaphysical speculations ". Integral
to the total reasoning process in question is reflective activity
on the notion of terms .such as " human good ", and the under-
standing of human nature through the objects of universal in-
clinations, arrived at through experience and analysis.[24]

Parallel ,to Finnis's conflating the descriptive formula iden-
tifying a human good and the prescription to pursue such a
good is the inclusion in the notion of " human good " the notion
of something's actually attracting or being desired. Perhaps
the latter bears on the former; that is, perhaps one might in-
cline toward Finnis's analysis through an association between
the notion of an object-as-attracting and its resultant prescrip-
tive " pull ". Indeed, there is evidence that Finnis himself
adopts a view of the general notion of " good " as including
this attracting or desired element. In this paper I shall present
such evidence, based both on an interpretation of Aquinas's
*De veritate* offered by Ronald Duska, which Finnis apparent-
ly accepts, and on Finnis's recent work, *Fundamentals of
Ethics.* I shall argue that principles faithful to Thomistic anal-
ysis require a revision of Duska's position, as is suggested by
Aquinas's discussion in the *Summa Theologiae.* I shall then
propose as the appropriate descriptive *ratio* of a " good X "
"an X suited to the desire anyone might have for a complete
X ". (By analogy, a non-rational, non-cognitive being "has
a desire " for the goods toward which a natural dynamism
drives it). This discussion will then turn to an analysis of the
notion ' human good ' as a subordinate use of " good ", but
also as descriptive. It will be seen that even a *ratio* of " good "

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[24] On p. 21 of *FJJJ* Finnis discusses the procedure of grasping inclinations
through grasping objects. He says the principal objects of human life are
the concern of practical reason, but he omits reference to the need for verifying
objects of truly human inclinations through reflection upon what all humans
incline toward.

that  does  include  the  notion  of  an  elemenrt of actual  attraction
can  be  descriptive  through  and  through,  and  hence  is  com-
patible  with  purely  theoretical  reasoning  about  human  goods,
A  distinction  will  then  be  drawn  between  the  *notion*  of  " a
good-as-attracting"    and  goods-as-attracting.    I  shall  explain
that  just  as  no  *ratw* of" good"  discussed  can  support  the  claim
that  value-judgments  are  inherently  prescriptive,  neither  can
an  analysis  of  singular  prescriptions  based  on  attracting   ob-
jects.  Finnis's  theory,  then,  cannot  be  grounded  in  such  con-
·siderations;  consequently  ·it  remains  perplexing,

### Finnis,  and  Dusika's Interpretation   of" Good"

In  his  book  *Natural  Law  and  Natuml  Rights*  John  Finnis
refers  the  reader  to  Ronald  Duska's  article" Aquinas's  Defini-
tion  of  Good:  Ethical-Theoretical   Notes  on  *De  Veritate,*
Q.21 " [25]  for  a  discussion  of  the  "relation  between  desire,  the
desirable,  and  the  perfective  in  Aquinas' s  notion  of  good ", [26]
In  the  chapter  preceding  the  note  in  which  Finnis  does  this,
he  relates  attraction  to  (or  desire  of)  an  object  and  its  good-
ness.  Finnis  says,  for  example,

> I  will  ...  use  the  term  ' good '  to  signify  both  the  particular  object
> of  a  particular  person's  desire,  choice,  or  action,  and  the  general
> form,  of  which  that  particular  object  is  (or  is  supposed  to  be)  an
> instance.   For  there  is  typically  some  general  description  that
> makes  manifest  the  aspect  under  which  a  particular  objective  has
> its  interest,  attracts  desire,  choice,  and  efforts  and  thus  is  (or  is
> considered  to  be)  a  good  thing. [27]

Again,  Finnis  describes  the  judgment  " Knowledge  is  some-
thing  good  to  have"  "a's  a  practical  principle  .. ,  [that]  fornm-
lates  a  want  , , .",  contrasting  it  to  "a  straightforward  factual
judgment ". [28]  In  this  quotation  Finnis  is  offering  his  interpre-
tation  of  value-judgments  •as  prescriptive,  while  the  first  ex-

[25] *The Monist*  58  (1974),  pp.  151-62;  hereafter  Duska.
[2s] *NLNR,*  p.  79.
[21] *Ibid.,*  p.  61.
[28] */bid.,*  p.  63.

cerpt reveals that Finnis's formulation of the notion of" good" includes the notion of actual desire, for when an object " attracts desire, choioe, and efforts " it *thus* is considered to be " a good thing ".[29]

Of course there is a long tradition of associating goodness and actual desire. Ronald Duska, referred to by Finnis, offers an interpretation of Aquinas's notion of " good " based on the *De veritate,* according to which ,a necessary condition for applying "good" to an item is that it actually be desired and/or enjoyed.[30] Duska holds that this notion of being desired is part of the very sense or *ratio* of the term" good", as is the notion of" being perfective ".[31] He arrives ·at this conclusion by pondering Aquinas's *ratio* of " good " in the *De veritate:* ". . . the essence of good consists in this, *that something perfects another as an end . .*. Now two things are essential to an end: it must be sought or desired by things which have not attained the end, and it must be loved by things which share the end, and be, as it were, enjoyiable to them ".[32] Again, "First of all and principally, therefore, a being capable of perfecting another after the manner of an end is called good ".[33]

It is important to realize that according to Duska the term " perfective " indicates what is objectiviely completing for an item according to its nature. He says, for example, that according to Aquinas "... man's nature gives him a specific function to fulfill if he is to become perfected . . . [theories compatible with Aquinas hold that] .there simply are . . . some things which cannot be perceived as perfective and there are others which must be perceived ,as perfective ".[34] Duska then argues that since Aquinas's primary *ratio* of " good " includes the notion of being objectively perfective as well ,as being enjoyed, a

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[29] *Ibid.,* p. 61.

[30] Duska, p. 153.

[31] *Ibid.,* pp. 152ff.

[s2] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate* (hereafer De ver.) 21, 2; Duska, p. 152.

[38] Dever. 21, 1; Duska, p. 152.

[H] Duska, pp. 155-56.

thing's being desired is not independent of a thing's being per-
fective: ". . . What is perfectible in the case of man needs be
that which he *does* in fact desire and enjoy." [35]

### "Good ": *De V'eritate*

Yet a careful reading of Aquinas's early formulation of the
*ratio* of " good " reveals that " perfective " need not carry the
connotation of " objectively perfective ". For Aquinas says
" Inasmuch as one being by reason of its act of existing [*esse]*
is such as to perfect and complete another, it stands to that
other as an end." [36] In other words, to be an end for something
*is* to fulfill or perfect or complete it inasmuch as the end meets
the desire of the thing tending toward it. Hence Aquinas then
says " First of all and principally, therefore, a being capable of
perfecting another 1afterthe manner of an end is called good ".[37]

This notion is more appropriately considered that of *a* good,
an object of desire, following the Aristotelian characterization
of the good as "that which ,all things desire ".[88] Indeed, when
Thoma;s offers the above *ratio* of (a) good he refers to this
Aristotelian description.

Alongside this Aristotelian tradition is the Neoplatonic one,
according to which being and good are transcendentals-the
same in reality, differing only in concept. Aquinas also affirms
his adherence to this view.

Good must … either add nothing to being or add something merely
in concept *[ratio].* For if it added something real, being would have
to be narrowed down by the character *(ratio)* of good to a special
genus. But since being is what is first conceived by the intellect …
every other noun must either be a synonym of being or at least add
something conceptually. The former cannot be said of good, since it
is not nonsense to call a being good. Thus, good, by the fact of its
not limiting being, must add to it something merely conceptual. [89]

35 *Ibid.,* p. 158.

as De ver. 21, I.

31 *Ibid.*

as Aristotle also holds that desire follows upon something's seeming good,
but "good" in this sense seems simply to convey the notion of an object that
holds promise of satisfaction and hence is desired: *Metaphysi-Os* 1072a29-30.

as *De 'lier.* 21, 1.

Every being is good simply by its act of eristence *(esse)*    In a move that apparently reconciles the two notions of " a good " and "good" as just explained, Thomas points out that the existence of each thing is desired inasmuch as everything seeks to preserve its being.[41] Hence" ... by the mere fact that ... [things] ... share .in the act of being they are perfected by the good ".[42] Thus all things seek to sustain their being, and the act of being itself completes or perfects them with respect to this desire by fulfilling it; continued existence is the most fundamental end.

However, this notion of goodness as substantial being sug- gests no criterion for distinguishing good X's, good beings of a kind, from not-so-good X's, or not-so-good members of a kind. Every creature, says Aquinas, desires its continued existence. And, Thomas remarks, " Although *good* expresses a special status, that of an end, nevertheless that status belongs to any being whatsoever and does not put anything real into being ".[43]

Yet it cannot be doubted that for Aquinas ·at least natural beings are subject to objective evaluation, as Duska himself recognizes. And indeed, in Article *5* of Question    of the *De veritate* Aquinas takes this into account. There he points out that something is considered a being in the absolute sense *(absolute)* owing to its substantial, not accidental, act of exist- ing *(esse).* "But just the opposite is true of good. From the point of view of its substantial goodness a thing is said to be good in a cert·ain sense (*secundum quid)* but from that of its accidental goodness it is said to be good without qualification

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[40] *Ibid.,* 21, 2.

[41] *Ibid.*

[42] *Ibid.,* 21, 3. Aquinas also says that things that do not yet participate in the act of being tend toward it "by a certain natural appetite." (De ver. 21, 2). But since these are only potential beings, they are only potentially good.

[43] De ver. 21, 1 ad 10. This point is applicable not only to the notion of (a) good as an end, but also as something capable of being an end even for others. In fact, Aquinas uses both interpretations, as some of the above quotations indicate. Below I again discuss (a) good as perfecting others.

*(simpliciter)* ." [44] Although Aquinas uses the term" goodness"
*(bonitas)* here, the context makes it clear that he is referring
to the accidental *being* of a thing, since he has written  at length
about  the  convertibility  of  goodness  and  being.  In  the  First
Part  of  the  *Summa  Theof,Ogiae* he  writes  about  the  accidental
being  that  renders  a  creature  good  in  the  absolute  sense  as  its
ultimate  actuality  *[ultimum  actum];*  later  he  rephrases  this  as
"fullness  of  being  *[plenitudo  essendi]* ". [45]

Here  is  the  basis  for  considering  something  that  is  a  fully
developed  one  of  its  kind  as  good  in  the  proper  sense.  What  is
of  particular  interest  is  the  reasoning  of  Aquinas.  He  returns
to  the  basic  notion  of  (a)  good  that  is  concerned  with  perfect-
ing  others,  for  he  contends  that  something  cannot

stand  *[se  habere]*  as  it  should  *[debito  modo]*  in  relation  to  every-
thing  outside  itself  except  by  means  of  accidents  added  to  the
essence,  because  the  operations  by  which  one  thing  is  in  some  way
joined  to  another  proceed  from  the  essence  through  powers  distinct
from  it.  Consequently   nothing  achieves  its  goodness  absolutely
unless  it  is  complete  in  both  its  essential  and  its  accidental  prin-
ciples.46

At  first  glance  it  seems  peculiar  that  Aquinas  should  argue
that  only  an  X  that  is  (to  ,a  high  degree)  complete  can  stand
in  relation  to  other  things  as  it  should.  Analysis  of  what
"  standing  in  relation  to  other  things  as  it  should  " might  mean
supports  this  uneasiness:  if  Aquinas  is  holding  that  only  com-
plete  X's  can  satisfy  any  desires  of  other  beings-i.e.,   that  only
complete  X's  are  ends  for  other  beings-this   seems  patently
untrue.  For,  in  faot,  some  beings  may  desire  immature  mem-
bers  of  a  species  for  one  or  'another  purpose.  **If** Thomas  is
claiming  that  only  complete  X's  help  to  complete  objectively
other  beings-which   would  involve  satisfying  *natural*  desires

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[44] Dever.  21,  5.

[45] ST  1,  5,  1  ad  1;  1-2,  18,  1:  " **...**  since  this  same  fullness  of  being
*[plenitudo  essendi]*  is  of  the  very  *ratio*  of  good,  if  a  thing  be  lacking  in  its
due  fullness  of  being,  it  is  not  said  to  be  good  absolutely,   but  in  a  certain
respect  **...**  "

[46] Dever.  21,  5.

or inclinations of creatures-this, too, seems false, by similar reasoning.[47] The immature members of some species of plants and animals may very well be more healthy for humans to eat than mature, fully developed members.

The connection then, between complete X's and the perfecting of other creatures does not seem to be established by Aquinas here.[48] This may be the reason that .in the *Summa Theologiae* Thomas shifts his focus with respect to the object to be completed. Still he maintains his view that an object that is good *simpliciter* is one that is complete. Indeed, even if Aquinas did succeed in establishing a connection between, say, a complete X and the objective perfecting of Y, he would be operating on the ·assumption that X was *good* for Y. This notion of " good for" is subordinate to the notion of " a good Y ". For to say that X is good for Y is to say that X makes Y a good Y, that is, •a Y that is complete, in some respect, as a Y or according to its nature. [49]

## ·Good: *Summa Theologiae*

In the *Summa Theologiae,* a work written later than the *De veritate,* Aquinas repeats some of rthe points ·articulated above. Goodness and being ·are the same, differing only conceptually: the *ratio* of " good " is that something be desirable

47 These arguments were presented in my unpublished doctoral thesis *Thomas Aquinas and R.M. Hare: The Good anii, Moral Principles,* for the State University of New York at Buffalo, 1978, pp. 164-77.

48 It cannot be cogently argued that the proper goodness of creatures is inextricably linked with their being desired inasmuch as God wills them to be good members of their kinds. For, strictly speaking, God's will is not an appetite or desire, since that implies imperfection: Dever. 22, 2 ad 4; 22, **1** ad 11. Hence inasmuch as an end is completive of another, nothing other than God himself can be an end for God, since He is all-perfect: ST 1, 4, 1 and 2. Creatures, then, are not really ends for God; rather He is their end, since He directs all things to Himself: De ver. 22, 2; ST 1, 19, 1 ad 3; 1, 19, 2.

49 Aquinas explicitly argues that when something (A) is said to be the cause of goodness (or some other state or quality) in another being (B), the *ratio* of the term "good" (or the other state or quality) as applied to B is the primary notion, and the term is applied to A secondarily and analogously: ST 1, 13, 2; 1, 13, 6.

*(appetibile)* .[50] Here, however, he writes of the connection be-
tween desirability  (goodness)  and  being perfect,  rather  than
perfective.   A thing is desirable insofar as it is perfect  *(per-
fectum),*  "for all desire their own perfection.  But everything
is perfect  so far as it is actual  *[actu].*  Therefore  it is clear that  a
thing  is perfect  so far as it has being  *[est ens];* for being [*esse]*
is  the  actuality  *[act-ualitas]* of everything  ... Hence  ... good-
ness and being are the same really  ... "  [51]  True,  there  are two
kinds  of  completion  or  perfection,  substantial   and  accidental,
corresponding  to substantial   and accidental  being.[52]  And,  as
in the *De veritate,*  Aquinas  holds  later in the *Summa*  that
creatul'es  do  desire  to  preserve  their  (substantial)   being.[53]
But here, in his discussion of the *ratio* of "good",  this notion
of substantial   being ,as  an end, fulfilling  the basic appetite  of
self-preservation,  is      but ignored.  Again,  Aquinas  reaffirms
his position that something is       to have being absolutely  by
its substantial   being but goodness *simpliciter*  by its accidental
being or actuality.   Thus a fully developed        of a kind
is called "good " in the proper sense.  But this proper applica-
tion of the term " good " is not grounded  in the role of a being
as perfective  of another.  Rather,  Aquinas  simply says "... that
which has ultimate  perfection  is said to be absolutely  good
[*bonum simpliciter],*   but that  which  has not the ultimate  per-
fection it ought to have  *[debet habere]*  ... is not said to be ...
good  absolutely  [*.simpliciter],*  but only relatively  [*secundum
quid]* ".[54]  As in the  *De 'Veritate,*  then,  the goodness of some-
thing  is correlated  with its completeness,  but *here* there is no
reference to the relation of the complete thing and other beings.
   Aquinas  elaborates  on complete  or perfect beings, which he
initially  identified  as good,  by holding  that  " a thing  is said to
be perfect  if it lacks  nothing  according  to its mode of perfec-

[50] ST 1,  5, I.
[51] *Ibid.*
[52] *Ibid.*
[52] *Ibid.*
[54] ST 1,  5, I.  Cf. the  notion  of "order"  as in Dever.  21, |:| and ST 1, 5, 5.

tion. But since everything is what it is by its form . . . in order for a thing to be perfect and good it must have a form, together with all that precedes and follows upon that form ".[55] This passage underscores points that the goodness of a natural being, properly speaking, depends upon its development according to its natural potentialities and that a thing need not be referred to anything else to be denominated " good ". Yet, as has been suggested, and as Aquinas reiterates, in the *Summa Theologiae* he retains the connection between goodness and actual desire.[56] From the above it seems clear, however, that the goodness with which he is primarily concerned is goodness in the proper sense, and that the desire he writes of here is not in another object, so that the item in question perfects *it* as an end, but rather is within the creature considered good. In short, in the *Summa* Aquinas stresses the identity of completeness and goodness, attempting to include in the *ratio* of " good " or " goodness " itself some suggestion of the inclination or desire all beings have to fulfillment or completion as members of their kinds.

There are problems even with this attempt. For to the extent that a thing desires its completion not yet attained, the sought goodness is only potential being, not the being convertible with goodness. However if the state of being good were actualized, then it would no longer be desired in the strict sense. Even in the *De veritate* Aquinas remarks that though enjoyment (possession of the object sought) is not properly called appetite, seeking and enjoying are in the same genus.[57] In other words, as desired it is not yet existing; as existing it is not, strictly speaking, desired.

Beyond this, if the *ratio* of the " goodness of X " included not only the notion of X's completeness (or X's being-complete) but also that of this completeness being desired by X, then to say that an (undeveloped) X desires its goodness (or

[55] ST 1, 5, 5; Cf. 1-2, 18, 1.
[56] Kg., ST 1, 5, 4; 1, 6, 2 ad 2.
[57] De ver. 22, 1 ad 11; see also 21, 2; cf. S'l' 1, 5, 6; 1, !!2, 4.

its being-good) would be true by definition.  Now in very many
places Aquinas 'argues that all things desire the good.[58]  Al-
though v1arious interpretations  can be given to this saying-in
one place Aquinas himself says it means that whatever is de-
sired  has  the  *ratio*  of  (a)  good [59]–it  is  certainly  consonant
with Thomas's thought  to hold one explanation of that dictum
to be that  all beings naturally  desire to be m a state of good-
ness  (or a strute of being-good);  they seek to be good members
of their kind.  Indeed,  as has  been seen, Aquinas explicitly
states  that everything desires its perfection.[60]  The question here
is:  can  one  thing  of  this  ·completeness  or  complete  state  in
terms  of  goodness  and  still  consider  as  substantive   (or non-
analytic)  the claim  that  everything  in  nature  seeks its state  of
being-good?

There is an interpretation  of the *ratio* of " a good X " that
would  (1)  maintain  the  conceptual  connection  of  desire  and
goodness; (2) be compatible with the substantive  assertion that
all natural  beings desire to be good members of their kind  (i.e.,
desire to be in a state of goodness);  (3) allow for the applica-
tion of " good ", without  a change of meaning,  to man-made
objects.  (But one example of Aquinas's use of " good " to
such items is his discussion of good and bad artifacts. [61])  Be-
ginning  with an  analysis of " ,a good X " rather  than  simply
"good " conforms to Peter Geach's observation that " good "
is  an  attributive  rather  than  predicative  adjective.  That  is,
" A is a good X " does not legitimately  split up into " A is an
X  and  A  is  good ".  Hence one correctly  predicates  good of an
item, A, by saying that  A is a good X:  " there  is no such thing
rus being just  good or bad, there  is only being a good or had
so-and-so ".[62]

[58] E.g.,  De ver.  22,  1;  ST 1,  5,  1;  1,  5,  5;  1,  19,  3;  1-2,  8,  1;  1-2,  9,  2;  1-2,
16, 4.

[59] ST  1,  6,  2 ad 2.

so ST  1,  5,  1;  De ver.  22,  1.  In ST 1,  60,  3 he says that  both angels and
humans  naturally  seek their  own good and perfection.

s1ST1-2,  21,  2 ad 2;  1-2,  57,  4 and ad 3;  1-2,  57,  5 ad 1.

s2From  "Good and Evil,"  *Analylli8* 17  (1956),  pp. 33-42;  rpt. in *Theories
of Ethics,* ed. P. Foot  (London:  c. 1967),  p. 65.

I propose that it is consistent with Thomistic principles to explicate the proper *ratio* of " a good X " in this way: ' an X suited to the desire anyone might have for a complete X ' or, more briefly,' an X suited to any desire for a complete X '. In other words, good Xs are (to a high degree) complete Xs, but the *meaning* of " ia good X " includes a relation to possible, rather than actual, desire. More, however is being said than that X is capable of being desired. What is claimed when one calls item A a good X is that it in fact would answer to the desire anyone might have for lan X •ws an X-an X that has what belongs to it. 68 Of course according to Aquinas, that which belongs to a natural being is determined by its nature. However, the criteria of good functional items are also objective: inasmuch as these items are designed to perform a particular function, they can be said to be good if, in fact, they have, to a high degree, the structure that enables them to perform the task they were designed to do.

This *ratio* of " good " can be applied to the notions of both the substantial and accidental (proper) goodness of a natural being. To the extent that such a creature is, it is a member of ·a species, land hence ,is " complete " insofar as it belongs to that kind. As such it would answer to the desire anything might have for a member of that species. But, again, the creature's substantial being is goodness only in the way that every member of that species is equally good. On the other hand, to the extent that a being has (to high degree) that which enables it to function according to the operation belonging to it by its nature, it is a complete one of its kind. Anything desiring such a fully developed specimen would desire a good specimen, and the *ratio* of " good " as applied to this specimen conveys that, by virtue of its completeness, it is suited to such seeking.64

68 This *ratio* of the term " good " is presented in my article " The Ontological Status of Value Revisited," *The Modern Schoolman* 63, 2 (January, 1986), pp. 133-7.

64 In 1-2, 19, 1 ad 1 Aquinas distinguishes what is truly good from what is apparently good. Although here he is not speaking of good specimens, but rather actions, he does identify the truly good as what is *suitable* absolutely to· be desired *[simpliciter convenientis ad appetendum].*

As real, the state of being (to a high degree) complete, constituted hy different characteristics for different beings, is already present or possessed, and thus cannot be desired by that being as not possessed. So the desire aspect does not primarily concern the actual desire of the subject itself-nor even that of other creatures. Consider: when a particular item is viewed as *a* good, as an object of desire, it is considered as a good whatever-kind-of-thing-is-desired, as having what belongs to the kind of thing required by the desire, and so as suited to any desire for it as having this completeness. When the aspect under which something is desired, or the " kind " of thing desired, is determined only by the desire of the one seeking and not by the nature (or, in the case of functional items, the design) of the thing, the item is complete or good as the kind of being established by desire, although not as what it is by nature or by function. But the logic of "good" does not change. Of course, if something does desire, say, a complete natural or functional X, then a complete X becomes *a* good with respect to the desire of the one seeking. As Duska claims, according to Aquinas the state of perfection of a natural being is what it desires-i.e., its being-good is a good for it. But this is true not by virtue of word-meanings, but rather owing to the dynamism of nature. [65]

The *ratio* of " good " offered above is descriptive, not prescriptive, expressing a conceptual relation which is not simply that between an item and the desire for it. Rather it conveys first, the relation a particular thing has to the totally developed or complete state of a thing of that kind and, second, the relation the particular item would have or has to an appetite for a thing of tha;t kind that is to a high degree developed or complete.

### Finnis, Aquinas, and Human Goods

Finnis does not confine his remarks to good Xs, but rather speaks of human goods. As mentioned in the first section of

es Again, this is implied in, e.g., ST 1, 60, 3.

this paper, he identifies human goods with basic forms of human flourishing, as good for humans inasmuch as they make us more fully *to be* ,human. [66] Above it was pointed out that to say that X is *good for* Y is to say that X makes Y ,a good Y, complete as a Y. In other words, the notion of "good for" is subordinate to the notion of" a good Y ". Thus human goods, understood as aspects of genuine human flourishing, are most appropriately described as those objects or activities the possession of which completes human beings as such. They fulfill humans according to their nature, making humans to be good humans. [67] This is the notion that involves that which, when present, makes something to be in a perfected state, a state which perfects the object. Still, as the notion of " a good X " is descriptive, so, too, is this notion of " human good ".

It is true that in speaking of goods rather than good Xs, it is very easy to confuse the subordinate notion of " good " as described above with the notion of a simple object of desirea good. But the discussion here is concerned with a good not simply as something desired but as a means for achieving a good X; hence the term " human good " indicates not (by meaning) actual objects of desire for all humans, but rather objects that complete all humans, that make humans good. Aquinas's claim that such objects are in fact desired by humans adds to the confusion about the meaning of "human good ".[68]

[66] See also *NLNR,* p. 103; Schultz, pp. 3-4.

[67] There are, of course, various kinds of human goodness, such as physical, emotional, moral. The last involves possessing what belongs to an intellectual being according to its faculties of intellect and will-i.e., virtue, which is concerned with promoting the flourishing of humans. For a morally good act has what belongs to *it* according to what belongs to the being performing it.

es In ST 1-2, 94, 2, as well as in the earlier part of the *Summa,* .Aquinas seems to maintain that "good" considered as "human good" includes the *ratio* 'being-desired ': " Since, however, good has the *ratio* of end ... " This does not affect the main argument of this paper. However, it might be pointed out that in ST 1-2, 94, 3 Aquinas also considers human goods to be conducive to well-being. (Here Thomas is speaking of things other than the objects of inclinations) .

It is possible that Aquinas's argument in 1-2, 94, 2 is elliptical. (Finnis himself notes that Thomas does not always spell out his theory fully: *NLNR,*

Since, according to Aquinas, human beings (as all natural
beings) do by nature desire the characteristics and states the
possession of which complete them, one way for each of us to
*begin* to identify human goods is to be aware of the objects of
our own inclinations. Within this process, however, we can
justify considering these objects as human goods only because
we believe that what we as humans incline to is what completes
us as human-and what completes us as human is good for us,
is a human good. That is, we understand the notion ' human
good' to be descriptive, as ·already indicated. And again, even
*if* in grasping something which is in fact a human good we are
drawn to it, even *if* our practical reason urges us to pursue it
as that to which we are attracted, [69] we can assess the appro-
priateness of this attraction and self-prescription only by con-
sidering whether or not the object to which we are attracted
*really* .is a human good, understood in the descriptive sense of
"human good ".[70] This is not to deny that we may also be
attracted-even naturally inclined to-acting in a manner we
understand to be conducive to the flourishing of ·all persons,
i.e., to acting in a morally good way. But the subsequent com-
mitment or decision to act in this way must follow a basic
descriptive understanding of what " acting in a morally good
way" means, which, of course, involves promoting the comple-
tion of human beings through human goods. And, as ·already
discussed, undertaking a realistic assessment of what really is

p. 46.) Human goods may be seen as morally attracting *via* the inclination to
do what one understands to be humanly or morally good-i.e., conducive to
human flourishing, completive of human nature. These goods can be identified
through the universal human inclinations. Without the prescriptivity of the
inclination to do what one understands to be morally good, how can, e.g., the
individual inclination to seek to preserve one's *own* life become the prescrip-
tion to seek to preserve *all* human life? For even *if* human life were in a
practical context immediately understood to be a human good, the relevant
inclination Aquinas speaks of *seems* to be concerned with the self ("every
substance seeks the preservation of its own being": ST 1-2, 94, 2). See also
ST 1-2, 56, 6 where Aquinas notes that the ability to seek the good of one's
neighbor is due to virtue, and is not therefore immediately due to nature.

[69] Cf. Schultz, pp. 19-20.

[10] Cf. Schultz, pp. 18-19.

a human good involves a checking process, an investigation of the objects of human inclinations.

The role of theoretical reason in this regard was treated in the first section of this paper, where I also pointed out a possible relation between conflating the descriptive formulation of the identification of a human good and the prescription :to pursue such a good, and including in the very notion of " human good " the notion of something's being attracting or desired. I have attempted to show that Finnis appears to accept an interpretation of Aquinas's *ratio* of "good" that encompasses this attracting element, but that such a view runs into difficulties in the context of Aquinas's mature thought.

Moreover, to the extent that ' good ' would be considered to contain this being-desired element, it would be true by definition that all things desire their goodness, or their state of being-good. If the discussion is confined to the notion of "(a) human good", and if it is said that this includes the notion ' being-desired (by humans) ', then it would be true by definition that all humans desire human goods. Both these conclusions seem out of step with the way we speak or think, especially when a human good is understood to be objectively completive of human beings.

But even if it were granted that " human good " *meant* something like 'that which completes (perfects) all human beings and which is (naturally) desired by them', it clearly would not follow that judgments about human goods are prescriptive. The *ratio* proffered is descriptive, and so also would be any value-judgment about X being a human good. Ronald Duska understands the role of theoretical reason here, for in suggesting a " decision procedure for determining whether certain designations of things as good are warranted" according to Aquinas's principles, Duska says" some things do ·appear to be *universally* desired or pleasing, or not pleasing ".[11] He adds " According to Aquinas what man is will *cause* some things to be revoked as not enjoyable, others to be revoked as not de-

[11] Duska, p. 159, my emphasis.

sired.  ·As  a  result  of  what  is,  some  things  cannot  be  seen  as
perfective  ". [72]

Interestingly,  Finnis  directs  his  readers  to  only  the  first  part
of  Duska's  article,  the  section  prior  to  the  points  Duska  makes
that  are  noted  in  the  previous  paragraph. [78]  This  is  consistent
with  his  rejection  of  "metaphysical   speculations "  as  intrinsic
to  the  identification  of  human  goods.  I  shall  not  attempt  to
show  that  Finnis  himself  coUrupses description  and  prescription
owing  to  an  interpretation   of  a  word-meaning.  More  plausible
would  be  a  confusion  arising  from  the  fact  that  an  object  itself,
once  desired,  is  understood  as  the  source  of  normativity  or  pre-
scriptivity.  As  Finnis  says,  "it  is  those  conceptions  [of  attain-
ing  some  form  of  good]  that  provide  your  reason  for  acting;  it
is  not  merely  that  they  guide  you;  they  also  motivate  you  ...
This  conception  of  something  as  desirable  provides,  typically,
sufficient  motivation  to  act."  [74]

Here  Finnis  does  not  distinguish  clearly  between  something
thait  is  desired  and  something  considered  desirable  as  good  ac-
cording  to  some  criterion.  He  says,  for  example,  "...  practical
reasoning  begins  by  identifying  *something  wanted*  (or  desired) ,
i.e.,  something  considered  *(practically  considered)*  desirable  ...
And  practical  reasoning  goes  on  to  seek  satisfactory  ways  of
getting,  realizing,  or  otherwise  participating  in  this  'object ';
this  thing  wanted."  [75]  But  he  denies  that  a  desirable  thing  is
desirable  according  to  " ' an  independent  desire ' ";  rather,  -as
a  possible  object  of  action  it  appears"  in  a  favourable  light  ...
as  somehow  good  to  be  getting,  doing,  having,  being  ... "  [76]

What  is  meant  here  by  "good  to"?  Why  would  an  object
appear ,in  a  favorable  light,  as ,important,  or  as  an  opportun-
ity [77]  when  recognized  as  a  certain  kind  of  thing?  It  is  difficult
to  see  how  Finnis  can  ignore  a  basic  orientation  of  will  (rational

[72] *Ibid.,*  p.  160.
*nNLNR,*  pp.  78-79  (note).
[74] *FFJ,* pp.  34-35.
[75] *Ibid.,*  author's  emphasis.
*76Ibid.*
*n Ibid.,*  p.  41.

appetite, desire) as the condition for the possibility of all ac-
tivity, as grounding the natural inclinations which render
human goods human ends, and how, therefore, he can say that
practical activity can take place " for some reason which can
be fully specified without referring to a desire ". [78] Indeed, in
another place F'innis seems to allow for     role of a desire:
" Will is simply the capacity to act in order to preserve or re-
spect, realize or participate in, goods which may at the time of
action be apparent only to intelligence ... the desire [here]
is simply that of rational ·appetite ... [which] is not the less
effective or real for being intellectual." [79] Perhaps because
Finnis, unlike Aquinas, sees such a desire as *in* our reason, he
would deny that desire as such, as underlying the natural in-
clinations themselves, is the condition for the possibility of
praotical ·activity. [80] But his use of "desire" here is enough to
support the claim, articulated above, that according to him,
the notion of " good " includes the notion of something's being,
in some sense, an object of desire. Further, undoubtedly Finnis
understands human goods as attracting-in-being-grasped, as,
when grasped as what they are (" under a description ") , exert-
ing normative force. [81] It is possible that this acoounts for his
formulation of value-judgments as prescriptive, or "intrinsical-
ly action-guiding ". [82]

However, in the context of *any* attracting object the prac-
tical reason may issue a simple prescription or imperative to
pursue the object. But such a simple prescription need involve
no value-judgment about the object as a form of human good;
it is quite appropriate to relegate the directive to the realm of
the "pre-philosophical ". [83] On the other hand, the grasp of

rn *Ib·id.,* p. 35; cf. Schultz, pp. 13-lfi.

79FE, p. 47.

so *Ibid.* In ST I, 80, I Aquinas argues that the will is a special power of
the soul.

Cf. Schultz, pp. 14-16 and ST 1-2, 1, 6.

s1 *FE,* pp. 45, 51, 35.

82 *Ibid.,* p. 27.

83 E.g., *Fl!J,* p. 18.

something *as* a human  good  and *therefore* attractive  requires
logically  distinct  moments:  an  understanding  of  a  descriptive
notion  of  " human  good ",  and  the  subsuming  of *this*  good
under  the  description; and  an  orientation  toward  this  good
 (owing  to  natural  orientation  or commitment)  based  on  the
correlativity  of  such  orientation  and  a  grasp  of  a  human  good
as such.

   Hence  value-judgments  ·about human  goods remain  descrip-
tive.  Such  utterances  neither  encompass the  notion  of  actual
desire,  nor  express  simple  responses  to  attracting   objects.
Neither  metaethics  nor  an  analysis  of  the  apprehension  of
human  goods substantiate   the  thesis, advanced  by  Finnis, that
basic  value-judgments  are prescriptive,  and  that  fact  and  value,
"is"  and  "ought",   are  radically  distinct.

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# BEING IS BEING-PRESENT-TO-SELF: RAHNER'S KEY TO AQUINAS'S METAPHYSICS

## I. *Beisichsein: An Initial View*

WHEN CORNELIUS ERNST introduced the first volume of *Theological Investigations* into English, he took note of Rahner's guiding philosophical intuition, citing and translating a passage from *Geist in Welt.*

What I take to be the foundation runs as follows: ' Erkennen ist Beisichsein des Seins, und dieses Beisichsein ist das *Sein* des Seienden ', ' knowledge is the being-present-to-itself of Being, and this being-present-to-itself is the *Being* of any entity' (p. 82) .[1]

Fr. Ernst :found this formula a bit hard to take, especially its second part. Lt begins by saying what the ontological structure of subjectivity is. To know is not just to have bumped into something or gotten hold of some information. All this presupposes something more primordial as its condition of possibility: a self-relaiting, self-present act of Being. "Intellect reflects upon itself," Aquinas says *(S.G.G.,* 4, 11) .[2] Hence knowledge is the being-present-to-itself of Being. But then the formula concludes: this being-present-to-itself (or subjectivity) is the Being of any entity. Apparently, Rahner is saying that subjectivity is the mode of Being not just of *some* but *all* beings. Taken as a whole the formula says, in effect, that being is subjectivity-presence is self-presence.

Now while it is obviously true that subjectivity is a mode of Being and that all subj.ectivities are beings, the converse-

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[1] Karl Rahner, *Theological Investigations,* Vol. I, trans. Cornelius Ernst (New York: Seabury Press, 1974), p. xiii, footnote 1.

[2] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Oontra Gentiles, Book Four: Salvation,* trans. Charles J. O'Neil (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), Chapter 11, p. 81.

that ·all Being is a mode of subjectivity ·and all beings are sub-
jectivities-does   not register so easily, especially when many of
these  beings  are not only devoid of consciousness but devoid of
life a:s well. One sympathizes  with Fr. Ernst's  perplexity.  "Put
in colourful terms," he says, " this amounts to saying that every
entity  (every material  entity  too)  is a more or less deficient
angel." ³ *Deficient angel,* Ernst  says, because  in  Thomas's
hierarchy  of Being the angel is essentially and immediately  a
self-conscious being and so is the paradigm of subjectivity  in
the created order. But even under the best of conditions and
in the best of times one does not normally look upon the cocker
spaniel or the philodendron  or the inanimate  material  substance
as a deficient angel!

   On the other hand, Fr. Ernst might have said more.  For the
drift of his remark  invites illustration  by way of something
higher still in Thomas's  hierarchy of Being.  Instead of saying
every being is a deficient angel he might  just as well have  said
every being (the angel too) is a deficient God. Every being, in
other  words,  is a deficient  imitation  of God " in  whom,"
Thomas says, " understanding  is not other than being " (S.*C.G.*,
4, 11). This slight shift of perspective, which bids us consider
the Being of every creature  no longer from the point of view of
the highest creature's  mode of Being (angelic subjectivity)  but
from that of the ground of Being itself, puts Rahner's  formula
in its .true light.  Now instead of absurdly and arbitrarily  as-
signing the highest creature's  mode of Being to all the rest–
without .sufficient regard for the analogy of Being-the  formula
radically  gra:sps and expresses  the implications of analogy for
the first time.  For analogy is not ultimately  about  how one
thing may be simultaneously  like and unlike another thing in
some respect.  This secondary application of analogy is rooted
in a more fundamental  metaphysical  truth:  every finite being
must  really approximate  its absolute, ground while  nevertheless
falling infinitely  short of it.  Or put in another way, the com-
plete transcendence  of the absolute ground does not make it

   ₃ *Op.  cit*

any less immanent to the ent,ities it grounds, but in fact makes for this very immanence. **If** the interior indebtedness of the created being to its ground is taken seriously, if a created being is not just imagined as some already established in-itself with an extrinsic though necessary tie to some First Mover, if in short we have noticed with Thomas that Aristotelian causality veils the deeper question     creation, then it will be seen that the *esse* of the existent must be a limited and defident but real participation     absolute *Esse.*

In this connection it must be remembered that in Thomas's metaphysics of participation the ontological possibility of the lower mode of Being is always grounded in the highest: the Divine *Esse* is not only cause but exemplar of all finite beings. Or as John Caputo writes in a recent study of Heidegger ·and Aquinas, all beings are like God ". . . not in the sense of shadowy imitations but in the sense of being intrinsically and imperfectly what He **is** intrinsically but perfectly." [4] And what is God intrinsically and perfeotly?        **is-to**        it awkward-**ly-the** inner character or content of Being in absolute *Esse ?* **In** God" being and understanding are identical," Thomas says, "understanding is not other than being" *(S.C.G.,* 4, 11). From this thesis, which is central to Thomas's understanding of Being and his theology of the Trinity, it follows that every limited, participated esse'--precisely to the extent that it shares in *esse'-must* be a real though imperfect approximation of Being as presence-to-self.

## II. *Beisichsein* as Hermeneutical Key

This much only suggests the direction we must take in oI1der to reach a suitable understanding of Rahner's formula. Before

4John D. Caputo, *Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay on Overcoming JJfeta-physias* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982), p. 142. I am greatly indebted to John Caputo's book for my mvn formulation of the difference between the Rahnerian and neo·Thomist understanding of Being, although I disagree with the conclusions Caputo reaches in his comparison of Thomas's metaphysicR and Heidegger's *Seinsdenken.* See Robert L. Hurd, " Heidegger and Aquinas: A Rahnerian Bridge," *Philosophy 'l'odcty* 28 (Summer 1984) 105-137.

pursuing  the  matter  further  let  us  underscore  the  fact  that
this formula [s Rahner's  hermeneutical  key to Aquinas.  By
*hermeneutical  key* we mean a guiding intuition  or insight which
opens up an understanding  of what a text explictly ,says. The
very  idea  of  suoh  a  hermeneutical  key  presupposes  that  the
*thought*  of a text is always strangely  more than the *words,* so
that  one  who  would  really  enter  into  this  thought  must  do
more  than  repeat  or restate  what is explicitly said by the text.
Obviously there  must  be a dialectical reciprocity between *ward*
on the one hand and *thought*  on the other.   These two are not
to  he  hypostatised  into  separate  independently  constituted
items.  But  at the same time  neither is their  distinction  to be
collapsed.  With this distinction  in view, we can differentiate
*narrative  restatement*  from *philosophical interpretation,*  even
though every narration  always involves some philosophioal in-
terpretation  and  every philosophioal interpretation  always in-
volves  some narration.   The point ,is that          " net"  appro-
priation of a text can range from a mostly narrative  retelling
of what the text explicitly says on the one hand  to a more
philosophical thinking  through  of what lies behind  the explicit
words of the text on the other.

   A more concrete description of these two ways of relating  to
a  text  could  be  put  as  follows.  As narrator,  one  sees  the
thought  through  the wol'ds  of the text.  The words .come in
between the narrator  and the thought  they disclose like hints
or clues.  But the philosophical interpreter  sees the words of
the  text  through  the  thought.  Having  become thoroughly  en-
gaged  with the thought  of a thinker, the philosophical inter-
preter  understands  why an Aquinas says  the things  he does
and  can even anticipate  what Aquinas will say in response  to
various  questions.  Not  only  that-admittedly   what  follows
sounds presumptuous  and  yet it is perfectly true-the   philo-
sophical ,interpreter  knows wihat the thinker *ought* to say and
thus  can identify  where  an Aquinas, for example, has become
inconsistent, has lost his grip on his own original insight and
fallen back into an Aristotelianism or Platonism  which the rest

of his thought has already transcended. So much of what Thomas writes in his various commentaries on Aristotle is to all appearanoes simply narrative restatement of the text. But when Thomas comes to explaining such matters as what Aristotle had in mind by speaking of the separable and imperishable part of the soul we know that we are in the midst of genuine philosophical interpretation. Although Thomas seeks textual support and confirmation of his interpretation, we know that it is his understanding of what Aristotle "has in mind " that allows him to see what he sees in the explicit words of Aristotle's text. Let us say, then, that to the extent the philosophical .interpreter has grasped the guiding threa<l of a great thinker-'has •actually re-lived and re-thought this intuition-she or he has come into possession of what could be caUed the *hermeneutical key* to the texts in question.

What is the significance of these hermeneutical reflections for our present study? Only this: If Thomas saw and interpreted the te:x:ts of Aristotle differently than did the Arab commentators, and if it is not simply'assumed foom the outset in an *ad hominem* fashion that he did so dishonestly to make Aristotle conform to Christian dogma, then Thomas apparently had a different hermeneutioal key to Aristotle than the Arabs and their followers did. And if in the present oase one does not find in Rahner Thomism as that is usually understood and conventionally taught, that is because Rahner has a different hermeneutical key to Aquinas than the conventional neo-Scholastic does. The key in question has to do with nothing less than the meaning of Being in the metaphysics of Aquinas.

At this point the interesting critical question arises: Who's got the right key? For the view of conventional Thomism is itself also an interpretation-it too brings a horizon of understanding to its reading of the texts and so possesses its own hermeneutioal key. In this more usual understanding of Thomas, *Esse* as " the actuality of all acts " and " the perfection of all per£ections " is ontologically prior to knowledge or presence-to-self, which is ta.ken a.s a subsequent and further

perfection.  Thomas himself explicitly says that *"Esse,* as such, is nobler than everything  that follows upon it" and " this act is nobler than the act of understanding   (I *Sent.* XVII, 1, 2, ad. 3) .5 This way of reading Thomas, ais we hinted  at earlier, finds immediate  support  in a common-sense  view  of things. After all, there are many presences which are not self-present— there are many beings which are not lmowers. Something can really be without for all that being present-to-self.  But some- thing can't be present-to-self  without first being. Obviously, then,  to be is not the  same thing as to be present-to-self  and to be is ontologically  prior  to presence-to-self  or knowing.

Now if *Esse* ,is in this manner  shorn of any further  char- acteristics, because these are understood  in advance under the guise of secondary  and subsequent  perfections, then the pri- mordial  and  paradigmatic   meaning  of Being  can only  be thought  of in one way: sheer existence or actuality.  What does existence or actuality  mean here? What is it that the partici- pated,  finite *esse* is participating  in? What exemplar is it an imperfect  copy of? Something  like the fol1owing: really exist- ing as opposed to not existing, really being " there " as opposed to being only a figment of someone's overactive  imagination, real presence a.s opposed to absence.  Of course, those who un- derstand  Thomas's  notion of Being in this way also know that as self-subsistent  being itself God cannot lack any perfection. And so of course God's Being involves life and wisdom as well as mere existence  *(S.T.* I, q. 4, art. 3, ad. 3) . Nevertheless,  the *Esse* that is communicated  to the creature, the *Esse* in which the creature  has a limited and imperfect share, oontinues to be thought  of as the power to be actual or present.  Out of this power to be present other things may follow in some oases, but the fundamental   meaning of *to be* is *to be actually  present.* All further  metaphysical  formulas,  distinctions   and elaborations notwithstanding,   one is really understanding  Being according  to the  brute  presence  of the merely physical object.  Herein lies

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5 Trans.  James  F. Anderson  in *An Introauction   to the Metaphysics  of St. Thomas Aquina.s* (Chicago:  Regnery,  1953), p. 23.

the supposed objectivistic bias of Thomas's metaphyscis, ac-
cording to some c:ritics.6

   As brief and oversimplified as this sketch is, it perhaps serves
to illustrate how different the two approaches to the meaning
of Being in Aquinas are: for Rahn er Being is presence- to-self
,and every finite being is an imperfect and analogous approxima-
tion of presence-to-self; for the neo-Thomist (or at least my
pedagogically motivated Platonic archetype of the neo-
Thomist) Being is sheer actuality in the sense of an unre-
stricted power to be " really " present and every finite being is
a limited actuality since its power *to* be present is :received.
These, then, are the two hermeneutical keys about which we
pose the question: Who's got the right key

   Perhaps this way of posing the question sounds too restric-
tive. Is it not more likely that just as there are many influences
on Thomas, so too there alle a number of different and even
competing approaches represented in hris understanding of
Being? Would it not follow that there are accordingly a num-
ber of keys to the thought of Thomas? While all this is to
some extent true, what really matters philosophically speaking
is precisely what Thoma's makes of the received tradition with
all its diverse and even conflicting currents. For example, in
Thomas's understanding of the soul-body relationship the in-
fluence of Plato is no less prominent than that of Aristotle, **if**
only because both Aristotle and Aquinas are replying to the
Platonic formulation of the issue. Not only Aristotle's way of
understanding the soul but also that of Plato will help us un-
derstand what Thomas finally comes up with. And although
Thomas's own understanding :represents an option for Aristotle
against Plato one can still find in this Aristotelian option a
Platonic residue. None of this, however, should obscure the
fact that on this specific question of the soul-body relationship
and despite the Platonic influence and residue, Thomas is de-
cidedly Aristotelian. **It** is not the case that the Platonic view
and the Aristotelian view are equaily *key* for Thomas's final

   6 See Caputo, *op. cit.,* Chapters 1!'ive and Six.

understanding  of  the  soul-body  relationship.  A  similar  situa-
tion obtains  with regard  to Thomas's  understanding  of Be,ing.
Granted  that  one can  find  the  notion  of Being  as sheer  act  in
Aquinas,  in  which  act  is  taken  in  the  sense  of  objective  real
presence,  does  this  represent  the  deepest  reach  of  his  thought
on  the  matter?   Or  is it  the  residue  of an  inherited  way  of think-
ing which Thomas  is in the  process of surpassing? However  one
answers  this  question-whether    one  opts  for  the  key  marked
"  Being  =   sheer  actual  presence  "  or  the  key  marked  "  Being
=presence-to-self   "–it  does not  seem tenable  to  hold  that  both
are  equally  key  for  Thomas's  understanding  of  Being.  In  the
end,  unless  one  is going  to  maintain  that  Thomas  is  funda-
mentally  inconsistent,  one of these pivotal  intuitions  about the
meaning  of Being will have  to be subordinated  to the  other:
either  presence-to-self  is  one  of  the  derivative  modes  that
Being as sheer  real presence  can  take  or sheer  real presence  is a
derivative,  analogous  mode  of Being  as presence  to self.  And
this  means  that  in  the  end  one  must  still  face  the  question:
Who's  got  the  right  key?  Which  key  represents  the  primordial
and  paradigmatic  meaning  of  Being  in  Thomas,  in  light  of
which all other  metaphysical  formulations find their  sense and
coherence?

   Within  the  scope  of  the  present  essay  we cannot  answer  this
question  in  a satisfactory  way but  we can  make  a beginning  by
trying  out  the  Rahnerian  key.  If,  as  Rahner  contends,  the
primordial  and  paradigmatic  meaning  of Being  in  Thomas  is
presence-to-self-because    in  God,  the  prime  exemplar  and
efficient cause, Being and understanding  are identical-then    we
ought  to find more indication  of this in the ontological  structure
of each  mode  of creaturely  being.  To be sure, only  in the  Di-
vine *Esse* is the  equation  of Presence  (Being)  and presence-to-
self  (knowing)  absolute  and  simple.  But  the  imperfect,  limited
and  less  integral  creature  ought  to mirror  in  some  *ana'logous*
fashion  this  original  unity  of  Being  and  knowing.  What  is  at
stake  for  Rahner  in  exploring  the  original  unity  of Being  and
knowing  and  the  implications  of this  unity  for  the  participated

*esse* of the creature is not only a more profound understanding of the ontology of the creature hut also a truly metaphysical account of the possibility of knowledge. Only if primordially Pure Act ·and Intellect are strictly one can the Intrinsic community of Being and knowing, even in its imperfect manifestation in creatures, find adequate metaphysical explanation. Why, after all, should it be the case that to the extent something *is* it *is knowable?* What is the metaphysical basis of the convertibility of intelligibility and Being?

### III.  *Beisichsein* and *S.C.G.,* 4, 11: *Emanatio*

We begin, then, with a statement from *Spirit in the World:*

The knowability of an existent is not first of all the possibility of being known by others **...** but is originally being-able-to-be-present-to-self (and only then derivately also a 'being-able-to-be-with-others'), and this being-able-to-be-present-to-self as an intrinsic determination of the essence of being itself varies with being's intensity of being.7

The statement says that actuality or presence in the sense of " really being there for a possible observer " is first of ·all act a:s self-relation of the object. **It** is because the being exercises this self-relation or presence-to-self that it can also "really be there" for another. But to say this is to say that act as presence-to-self is not merely a subsequent perfection that might be realized in some beings and not in others. Act as presence-to-self precedes and makes possible actuality in the sense of "really being there for another." Our normal habit of thought, of course, goes in the opposite direction: since a thing may be there for others without being present-to-itself-that is, without being *self-conscious-Ease* in the sense of bare existence is taken as what is foremost. But this habit of thought is based upon a univocal concept of presence-to-self. Presence-to-self is assumed to mean simply conscious being. And then it follows

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*1* Karl Rahner, *Spirit in the World,* trans. William Dych (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), p. 73. Hereafter *Spirit.*

that since some beings *are* but *are 1wt* consciousnesses, *Esse* cannot mean primarily self-presence.

If one looks to Thomas's hierarchy of Being for confirmation, ,all the while thinking of presence-to-self univocally as self-consciousness, then the situation appears as follows. On the face of it, Rahner's formula, *Being is Being-present-to-self,* seems cogent enough so long as we confine its application to those beings in the hierarchy which are intellectual. For the formula basically says that the impetus hy which any being *is* is presence-to-self or, more simply, Being is subjectivity. And there is a well known hierarchy of subjectivities in Thomas's picture of veality, stretching from the human knower (which is only present to itself thvough the mediation of sense experience) through the angel (which knows itself by itself) to the absolute identity of knowing ·and Being in God. This range of intellectual life clearly illustrates the principle cited earlier: finite *intellectua,l* beings are intrinsically hut imperfectly what God is intrinsically and perfectly-the identity of Being and knowing or Being as Being-present-to-self. But how can this formula he carried any further down the hierarchy and applied to non-intellectual beings, beings which are not in fact consciously present-to-themselves? At this point the formula seems to falter and become ontologically uninstructive: it does not seem expans·ive enough to take in the entire hierarchy of Being. For now we cross over into that mode of Being which is merely *in-itself,* not *for-itself.* And yet this *in-itself* surely *is.* The in-itself, whose only act is " to be really there " would seem to return us to the view that *Esse* as actual objective presence is the foundational meaning of Being. By comparison, *Esse* as presence-to-self is a more restrictive notion.

But if we ave to understand Rahner's equation of Being with Being-present-to-self correctly, we must first resist the tendency to forget the analogous character of Being precisely as presence-to-s,elf. To equate presence-to-self with self-consciousness is to think presence-to-self univocally. In fact, not only are there more or less perfect modes of self-consciousness, of which

*human* self-consciousness is only one expression-there    are
more or less perfect modes of presence-to-self, of which rational
self-consciousness is only one expression. **"If** being," Rahner
says," means being-present-to-self, and if there are existents of
different intensities of being, then there are different degrees
of being-present-to-self." [8] Accordingly, one misunderstands
Rahner in advance if the *self* in the formula *presence-to-self* is
not allowed an intrinsically analogous and variable meaning, if
this *self* is taken univocally to mean personal self-consciousness.
Only at higher levels in the hierarchy of Being does the *self* of
*presence-to-self* take the form of personal self-consciousness. At
lower levels *self* simply designates the individual as a distinct
identity, the thing itself. When Kant, for example, refers to the
*thing-in-itself* he does not thereby mean person or personal
self-consciousness just because the word *self* occurs in the
formula.

With this in mind, let us reconsider the merely *in-itself* of
Thomas's hierarchy of Being and the impasse which this in-
itself-which is not for-itself-apparently poses for the inter-
pretation of Being as presence-to-self. The impasse seems in-
surmountable only so long as one assumes without further ado
that there is an utter ontological discontinuity between the *in-
itself* and the *for-itself.* Thomas's own assumption or funda-
mental intuition in the matter runs in the opposite direction.
When he seeks to illustrate the principle that " the higher a
nature is, the more intimate to the nature is that which flows
from it " he begins not with the lowest rung of intellectual life,
nor even with the lowest rung of sensitive life, nor, finally, with
merely living things: he begins instead with inanimate material
substances which "hold the lowest place of all" (S.C.G., 4,
11). In other words, without attributing either life or con-
sciousness to inanimate material substances, Thomas neverthe-
less places them under this sign: *the more perfect the being
the more perfect its self-relation.* Even the being of the merely
*in-itself* is essentially, though imperfectly and primitively, an

s *Spirit,* p. 73.

expression or form of presence-to-self.  Even the merely in-itself
has or is a self-relation and only on this basis can it he present
in the secondary objectivist sense of being present for another
as a possible object of encounter or knowledge.  What is this
ontological self-relation or presence to self, since it can he
neither the rational self-consciousness of the intellectual soul,
nor the sensitive self-consciousness of the animal soul, nor even
the vital though non-conscious self-relating of the plant soul?

   First of all, the self-relation that we are investigating here is,
in the technical language of Aquinas, an instance of the power
of emanation intrinsic to every being.  In the famous passage
just alluded to from the *Summa Contra Gentiles,* Thomas plots
out the hierarchy of Being by reference to the successively
more perfect power of emanation displayed at each level of the
hierarchy.  Within the unity of every being there is what is
unfolded (the emanated) and the origin or ground out of
which the unfolded flows (the emanating or the principle of
emanation) . This identity-in-difference of the emanated and
the emanating is supremely illustrated in the Trinitarian pro-
cessions in which the diversity which emanates is simply and
absolutely one Being with the principle of emanation.  The
Word which emanates from and whfoh constitutes the self-
knowledge of God *is* God.  In all other beings the power of
emanation is displayed in a less perfect modality.  For example,
the word (i.e., the thought) emanated by the human knower is
not the substance of the knower but an accidental determina-
tion of that substance.  Thomas's hierarchy of Being, then, is
a hierarchy of emanation and he assigns to inanimate material
substances the lowest rank within this hierarchy.

   About these substances he says: " there can be no emanations
in these except by the action of some one upon another one."
One must note that the first part of the statement (i.e., " there
can be no emanations in these ... ") is qualified by its second
part (i.e., "... except by the action of some one upon another
one ") . In other words, Thomas is *not* denying emanation to
inanimate material substances but rather locating the emana-

tion proper to these substances in " the action of some one upon another one." But such an emanation does not seem at first glance to be of much help to us since we are looking for emanation in the sense of a self-relation, a relation of the emanated to the emanating *wi,thin* a substance. Now Thomas appears to be speaking of emanation in a quite different sense: no longer the self-relation of a being but the relation of one being to another, " the action of some one upon another one." Can the action of one substance upon another be understood precisely as an extension of the self-realization of the agent-substance? Can the emanation of the agent-substance into the patient-substance be understood as a further elaboration in the material potency of the patient of what the agent already is in its own actuality, in its own intrinsic constitution? This would mean that the agent-substance is already an emanation, a relation of the emanating and the emanated, in and of itself, and it is just this unfolding actuality that is communicated to the receptive potency (the matter) of the patient-substance. Unless something like this is the case, it is hard to see how the transient causality of one substance upon another can count for Thomas as a real though least perfect instance of that emanation which is displayed throughout the rest of the hierrachy of Being. **If** emanation in the sense of the causal influence of one being upon another has nothing to do with emanation in the sense of the intrinsic self-constitution of a being, then Thomas's analogy of emanation turns into equivocation with respect to the inanimate material substance, the merely in-itself, which supposedly holds " the lowest place of all."

In light of these reflections we can reiterate now, from the perspective of Thomas's theory of emanation, what was said earlier even the merely *in-itself* (the inanimate material substance): has or is a self-relation and only on this basis can it be present in the secondary objectivist sense of being present for another as a possible object of knowledge or encounter or as a causal agent. In particular, the causal influence of one substance upon another is its emanation, the extension of its own

unfolded  actuality   out  beyond  itself  into  the  medium  of  the
patient-substance.     Our  only  question  now  is how  to  understand
the  ontological  self-relation,  the  emanation,  intrinsic  to  the  in-
animate  substance  even  aside  fllom  its  further  expansion  into
the  medium  of  some  other  substance.    How  is  the  emanative
causal  efficacy  that  the  *in-itself*  is  able  to  have  in  relation  to  a
patient-substance    a  further  unfolding  of  the  emanation  that  it
already  is  in  itself?

Rahner  discerns  in  various  commonplace  doctrines  of  Scho-
lastic  philosophy  the  intrinsic  though  to  be  sure  imperfect  and
primitive   (analogous)   self-relating  that  constitutes   the  ap-
parently  undifferentiated   and  static  being-there  of  the  *in-itself.*
The  *in-itself*  of  the  inanimate  material  substance  is  not  in  fact
a  simple  static  unity  that  is,  as  it  were,  placed  into  existence
by  the  addition  of  the  ontologically  more  important  principle
of  *esse.*  The  only  way  for  *es'se*  to  make  real  the  meagre  *in-itself*
is  through  the  dynamic  relation     form  and  matter  in  which
" **...**  the  substantial  form-'  pouring  itself  out '-gives  itself  to
*materia  prima,"*  realizes  itself  in  the  other  of  matter  while  at
the  same  time  retaining  this  otherness  to  itself  as  its  own  self-
e),_rpression and  self-realization. [9]  That  the  form  is  the  act  of
matter  and  nothing  more  than  this  in  the  case  of  the  purely
material  substance  does  not  abolish  the  distinction  and  rela-
tion  of  these  two  ontological  principles.  The  form  of  the  mere-
ly  material  thing  is  completely  diffused  in  matter  and  cannot
rise  above  this  diffusion;  but  one  must  remember  that  this  dif-
fusion  in  which  the  form  completes  its  own  reality  by  actualiz-
ing  the  empty  potency  of  matter  is  also  simultaneously  a  *hold-
ing  sway,  a  stru.ctu.ring*  on  the  part  of  form  over  against  the  pull
of  matter  in  its  receptive  potency  to  new  forms  and  new  be-
comings.  In other  words,  the  complete  diffusion  assigned  to  the
merely  material  form  cannot  be  understood  as  though  this

[9] Karl  Ralmer,  "The  Theology  of  Symbol,"  *Theological  Investigations,*   Vol.
IV,  trans.  Kevin  Smyth  (New  York:  Seabury  Press,  1974),  p.  233.  What
follows  is  a  very  brief  summary  of  the  material  Rahner  treats  in  this  essay,
especia.lly  pp.  222-35.

form loses all act and becomes purely passive. If it did so it would not be form but matter. The actual being is one-not in spite of hut precisely in virtue of the tension between form and matter. And so without contradiction this one being is also spoken of as *composite* in the traditional terminology. Even in this lowest mode of Being the form as formal cause is and re- mains ontologically (though not temporally) prior to the form- matter result of its causality. It is for this reason, ultimately, that the form-matter result of formal causality, namely, the quantitative spatio-temporal thing capable of bearing further qualitative determinations, is really distinct from the essence as such and the substance as such. In Rahner's words:

This quantity, which today we would call the given, concrete spatio-temporality, or spatio-temporal figure ... is, according to St. Thomas, to be definitely taken as the ' species,' the outward form, aspect and figure, which the basic substance provides for itself, to fulfill itself, to ' express ' itself and to manifest itself thus.[10]

It is clear, then, that an intrinsic relation obtains between the essence and that which flows forth from this essence as its own self-enactment in space-time or materiality. This relation is a self-relation because the form is both the being of the formal cause and the being of the form-matter result of this causality in a radical unity which is also truly plural or diverse. On the basis of such considerations, Rahner concludes that the *in-itself* of the inanimate material being is intrinsically an emanation-in-relation-to-itself first and on this basis then also a spatial-tempoml physical presence for another. The emana- tion so considered is ontologically so " weak " in its intensity of Being that it does not rise to the status of an emanation in the sense of vital activity, or sensation, or intellection; its emanation can only complete and elaborate itself in being for and at another in the mode of transient causality. In Rahner's words:

Because in something purely material there really is no longer any interior because of the ' total dispersion of the form over the

10 *Ibid.*

matter,' its ultimate self-realization is an expansion of its own essence into the other (i.e., the matter)\* of the other, is thus transient causality, which is only a deficient mode of emanation in the proper sense, which as self-realization takes place in the interior of an existent.11                                   \*(parenthesis mine)

Imperfect and primitive as this lowest mode of emanation is, St. Thomas nevertheless understands it as a deficient mode of higher possibilities. And these higher possibilities'-the self-relation of vital being, the self-relation of sensitive being, the self-relation of rational consciousness-are themselves deficient and imperfect analogies of that power of emanation or *procession* which unfolds the Trinitarian relations of the Godhead.12

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11 *Spirit,* pp. 357-8.
12 See, for example, *8.T.* I, q. 14, art. 2.

# DOES GOD HAVE A QUIDDITY ACCORDING
# TO AVICENNA*

I N THE NEW critical edition of Avicenna's *MemphyS'ics* by S. Van Riet at Louvain (I, 1977; II, 1980; III, 1983), Gerard Verbeke states that according to Avicenna, "L'Etre necessaire n'a pas une essence qui est distincte de son existence" (II, p. * 42, at note 159), i.e. that the Necessary *Being* does not have an essence that is distinct from its existence. One looks in vain for a precise reference to an Avicennian text.

On the other hand, in a three-part study, Albert G. Judy, O.P., "Avicenna's *Me1taphy8'ics* in the *Summa contra Gentiles,"* published in *Angelicum,* part I: *52* (1975) 340-384; part II: *541-586;* part Ill: *53* (1976) 183-226, states quite clearly that

the "First" does not have a quiddity but only an "anity" (*anitas*) . . . (546),

and that

Avicenna ... finds that the absolutely necessary being cannot have what every other reality has, namely, a quiddity, a "whatness " distinct from its" whether-ness" or *anitas* (547-548).

Moreover, the first appendix of Judy's article contains a redaction of the 1495 and the 1508 Venice editions of *ltletaphyiscs* 8.4, which differs chiefly in punctuation from the excellent Van Riet text based on five Latin MSS.

A slightly more nuanced position is found in Etienne Gilson's *Elements of Christian Philosoph;y* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1960), p. 127: "... such exactly had been the con-

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clusion of Avicenna: the first has no quiddity  (*quidditatem non habet)* ," a claim that cites  (305, note 28) secondary litera- ture which one can trace  as far back as Father M.-D. Roland- Gosselin's edition of the *De ente et essentia.*

What is at stake in this dispute? What if God does not have a quiddity?  It would seem that He should be utterly  unknow- able, if quiddity  or essence is a principle of knowledge as well as of being.  Such would be plausible consequences of Gilson's and Judy's position. What, on the other hand, if God does have a quiddity?   One possible inference, if we happened to have ac- cess or insight into the divine quiddity,  is that we could have a sort of mystical union with God, perhaps  even in this life; or again, one might  draw pantheistic  conclusions. Verbeke does not follow such paths.  His inference points toward a *rawroche- ment* between Avicenna's doctrine  and that of St. Thomas Aquinas, who maintained  not only that  God is His own essence  (and therefore  that it is reasonable  to speak of a divine essence) but also that  God's essence is no other  than  His *esse,* His *being* or existence. Accordingly,  for scholars  to have  such opposed views about  so important   a topic  even  at the  hermeneutical level of Avicenna's position  points  to a serious difficulty.

Since Judy  does offer texts  in support  of his interpretation, let us consider the evidence, using his section numbers  and Van Riet's pages and lines:

Judy,  section 4=Van Riet 398.83-399.84 goes thus  in Latin:

Redibo igitur et dicam  quod primum  non habet quidditatem,  nisi *anitatem,*  quae sit discreta  ab ipsa.

This text he renders, "The first does not have a quiddity,  ex- cept an 'anity,'  which is distinct from it" (549). The other text in Latin (Judy,  section 13=Van  Riet  401.31-32) goes thus:

Igitur  necesse esse non habet  quidditatem  nisi quod est necesse esse, et haec est *anitas,*

which he renders, "Therefore  necessary being  does not have a quiddity,  but only  the fact of its necessary being, and this is

'anity'" (559). We wonder, however, why *nisi* should be translated "except" in section 4 and "hut only" in section 13. One would have expected a *sed solum* or a *sed tantum* to justify the rendering "but only." Accordingly, the translation should be corrected to read, " Therefore the necessary being has no quiddity except that it is necessary being, and this is anity ." It would seem to follow then (a) that the necessary *being* has a quiddity and (b) that this quiddity is none other than anity, whatever anity might mean.

Ought we then to reconsider Judy's section 4, as well? For, as we have seen, it was taken to mean that "the 'First' does not have a quiddity but only an 'anity '" (546), even though the correct translation from the Latin was given: "the first does not have quiddity, except an 'anity'" (549). Accordingly, here too we would infer (a) that the First has a quiddity, and (b) that this quiddity is none other than anity, again leav-,ing the meaning of ' anity ' open. But, we may well share Father Judy's perplexity at the phrase *quae sit discreta ab ipsa,* since it would seem odd to claim that "the first does not have quiddity except for an anity whioh is distinct from it." For how would a thing's own essence be distinct from it? Is Avicenna contradicting himself? Something is clearly wrong, and the difficulty lies, as Judy rightly suggests, in a garbled text. The Arabic underlying Judy's section 4

wa-na'udu fa-naqf1lu: inna al-awwala la mahiyyata la-hu ghair al-anniyya; wa-qad 'arafta ma'na al-mahiyya, wa bi-madhii tufariqu-hu fl iftitahi tibyani-na. hadha ... (Cairo ed. 1960, 344.10-12)

may be rendered as follows:

Now we shall return to our topic and say that the :First has no quiddity other than anity, and, in the opening of this exposition of ours you have learned that meaning of quiddity and through what it is distinguished.

presumably from anity. The internal reference to a semantic distinction between quiddity and anity has dropped from the Latin text. Accordingly, there is no reason to reject the real identification of quiddity and anity (whatever that may mean)

in the case of God, Who, in Avicenna, also goes by the name
The First.  One may have some compunctions and even say,
" We must not try to understand  the meaning of the Latin
Avicenna by a reference to the Arabic text"  (Judy, *550).*  Yet
can we not reconsider the corresponding Latin  text

Redibo igitur et dicam quod primum  non habet quidditatem  nisi
*anitatem*  quae sit discreta ab ipsa  (398.84-85)

more closely, noting that the troubling clause *quae sit discreta
ab ipsa* is in the subjunctive  not the indicative,  and render it

Therefore I shall return  and say that the First does not have a
quiddity  except anity, which *may be* distinct from a quiddity

in some circumstances, not necessarily the present ones?

It would a;ppear, then,  that God has a quiddity  and that His
quiddity  is anity.  If 'anity'  could be shown to mean *being,*
Professor Verbeke's position  would seem at least reasonable.
Here it will be sufficient to note that ' anity ' is our translitera-
tion of the Latin  word *anitas,* which in its turn  seems to have
been a transliteration  of the Arabic word *anniyya,*  which was
used by Astat in his version of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*  to trans-
late the Greek word *einai,* to be. M.-Th. d'Alverny's rich article
*"Anniyya-anitas"*  in the *Melanges offerts a Etienne  Gilson*
 (Toronto: P.I.M.S.; Paris:  J. Vrin, 1959) is helpful in this con-
nection.  It is not clear what sort of being-term anity is in an
Avicennian context.  Hence Verbeke's claim, though plausible,
is not yet disoharged.  Perhaps  a few hints from Avicenna's
*Introduction*  to the *Logic* of the *Book of Healing* may help.
 (see appendix)  From the uses of the term  anity in logic, one
may infer that anity,  as opposed to quiddity,  seems to refer to
a thing  as distinguished  in its individual  *being.*

Accordingly, in a preliminary  way, we may accept Verbeke's
suggestion that for Avicenna the essence of God is the same as
His being  in the sense of anity.  Moreover there is an Arabic
text, noted  by the indefatigable  Van Riet at 401.82, that is not
preserved  in any of the Latin  MSS.:

 (Between Judy  sections 13 and 14:)  And we say that if the anity
and *being* were accidental  to the quiddity,  then it is either  (a) a

necesary concomitant of it by the essence of the quiddity, or (b) something extrinsic. Now it is impossible for it to come about owing to the quiddity. For the consequent is not a consequent of anything except a being; for (otherwise) it would necessarily follow that the quiddity have a *being* before its *being,* and this is impossible (Cairo 1960, 346.13-15).

Here anity *(anniyya)* is explicitly yoked with *being (wujud).* Does this mean that          is right and Gilson is wrong to claim that " the conclusion of Avicenna " is that " the First has no quiddity" *(Elements* 127)? Can Gilson's position be rescued?

Let us continue the immediate sequel, as the Latin version continues (Judy, section 14 ff.):

Again I say that, whatever has a quiddity aside from anity, is caused. (15) Moreover, you already know that out of anity and *being* a quiddity which is aside from anity is not constituted in the sense in which something is constituted out of a constituent; they will therefore be among the concomitants; (16) and then it can only be the case that either they will be concomitants of the quiddity precisely because it is the quiddity itself, or they will be concomitants of it owing to something else. The meaning of what we say ' are concomitants ' is to follow in *being* and that *being* follows not *being.* (17) If, however, it were the case that anity should follow the quiddity and be a concomitant of it (402 Van Riet) through itself, then it will be the case that the anity in its own *being* will follow *being;* but (with respect to) whatever in its own *being* follows *being,* that after which it follows has *being* through essence prior to it; therefore the quiddity through essence will be prior to its own *being,* which is unfitting. (18) It remains, therefore, that *being* belongs to it from a cause. Hence everything having a quiddity is caused; and all the others, except for the necessary *being,* have quiddities which are through themselves (instances of) possible *being* (mumkinat al-wujud), to which *being* does not occur except extrinsically.

The first therefore does not have a quiddity, but rather *being* flows from it upon the things having quiddities; (19) He Himself, therefore, is pure *being* (*esse ex.<?poliatum;*Arabic *mujarrad al-wujUd)*, in a condition denying privations and other properties of Him. Then all the others that have quiddities are possibles, since they have *being* through Him (20) (Van Riet 401.33-402.51).

In the first part of this text (13-17) it appears that the proof establishes not that God has no quiddity, but that He is, as the Necessary *Being,* self-identical; that the Necessary *Being* is the Necessary *Being* seems to be taken in the sense that the individual designated for consideration is the self-same as its own quiddity. This seems to constitute its anity. The quiddity of the Necessary *Being* is not in any way other than the Necessary *Being.* If it were, then what we had under consideration would not really have been the Necessary *Being.* The Necessary *Being* has, or rather *is,* a, privileged quiddity free even from the necessary accidents which proceed from a quiddity. In other things, the anity would arise frmn the attendant accidents; in the Necessary *Being,* the anity is no other than the quiddity itself. Otherwise the consequent would as such be prior to its own principle, which is absurd.

How then is it that some have held that Avicenna denies that the First Principle has a quiddity? It would appear that Avicenna in fact holds that, in the case of the Necessary *Being,* the quiddity is the *being* or anity, whereas in other things, the quiddity is not the same as the *being* or anity. In them, their *being* does not seem to be derived from the intrinsic principles of the quiddity, but from a cause. Earlier Avicenna said that the First has no quiddity other than anity (*inna al-awwala la mahiyyata la-hu ghair al-anniyya,* Cairo 1960, 344.10); now he says that everything possessed of a quiddity is caused *(fa-kull dhi mahiyyatin ma'lul)* and all things other than the Necessary *Being* have quiddities *(wa··sa'ir al-ashya' ghaira al-wajib al-wujud fa-la-ha niahiyyat,* 347.8). Avicenna claims that everything which has a quiddity other than anity is caused *(wa-naqillu inna lwlla ma la-hit mahiyya ghaira al-anniyya fa-huwa ma'Ull,* 346-:-Hm. From this starting-point he *concludes* from the fact that the first has a quiddity, namely, to be necessary of *being,* that He has no quiddity; "hence, the First has no quiddity, and *being* emanates from Him upon the possessors of quiddities." Gilson was relying upon Roland-Gosselin's quotation (from section 18, Judy) of Avicenna's conclu-

sion, that since God is the quiddity that He is, namely Nec-
essary *Being,* He has no quiddity. The juxtaposition of premise
and conclusion is paradoxical, but seems to be founded on the
text.

*Conclusion.* In his early magisterial *Commentary on the
Sentences,* St. Thomas seems to have summed up our laborious
results rather pithily:

Quidam enim dicunt, ut Avicenna, lib. *De intelligent.,* cap. 1, et
Rabbi Moyses, lib. I, cap. lvii et lviii, quod res ilia quae Deus est,
est quoddam esse subsistens, nee aliquid aliud nisi esse, in Deo est:
unde discunt quod esse sine essentia (1,        q.1, a.3, sol.; ed.
Mandonnet I, 67).
For there are some who say ... that the thing which is God is a
subsistent *being,* and there is not anything else except *being* in
God: this is why they say that He is *being* without essence.

One is struck by what this text does not say as much as· by
what it says. If Avicenna, who would seem a plausible exemplar
of such a position, were in Aquinas's mind, why does Avicenna's
favorite divine name *'necesse esse'* disappear? Why does St.
Thomas use instead the formula ' *quoddam esse subsistens* ',
"some subsistent *being"?* Here may we speculate that for
Aquinas, *being* is so much the central issue of metruphysics that
*being,* prior to any modalities or any transcendental features, is
what all metaphysical study must be reduced to. *Esse* is more
basic than *N ecesse Esse.*


## APPENDIX

## TEXTS FROM THE LOGIC ILLUSTRATING THE USE OF THE TERM 'ANITY'

Text 1. *Madkhal* (Cairo        I 5;
But the reality of its *being (wujud)* is through humanity,
and so the quiddity of each individual is through its
humanity, whereas its individual anity arises from a qual-
ity, a quantity, etc.

*MadkhalI7;38.13-16:*

(Other logicians) do not make the one thing fit for being related to the things ' anity ' and • quiddity ' in such wise that, inasmuch as they have something in common, they have a quiddity, and insofar as through it a thing is distinguished from other things, they have an anity, so that the thing said of a multiplicity will, insofar as the multiplicity shares in it, be a genus or a species, and will, insofar as it is distinguished *(yatamayyazu)* through it, be a difference.

Text 3. *Madkhal* I 8; 44.5-9:

The essential term for the thing which does not designate the quiddity of something to which its essentiality is considered to belong either essentially or properly, cannot be the most general of the common essentials. And if not, ithen it designates in some way the common quiddity and so is more proper than it; hence it is good for distinguishing *(tamyiz)* some of its inferiors from others; hence it is suitable for the anity, and so every essential term that does not in some way designate a thing's quiddity designates the anity .

Text 4a. *Madkhal* I 8; 46.1-3 (cf. Logyca Venice 1508; fo. 6ra) :

So we say that the thing said in answer to the question " what is it? " is what is said of the essential term signifying the quiddity; the thing said in answer to" what sort of thing is it in its own right? " or " which what is it? " *(ayyu ma;* Latin *quale quid)* is said of the essential term signifying the anity .

Text 4bo *Madkhal* I 8; 46A-8:

As for the accidental, it may perhaps be (1) something proper to the nature of that of which it is a predicate and not be the accident of anything else, in the way in which laughing and writing are accidents of man, and such an

accidental term is called a property; or it may be (2) an accident both to it and to something else, in the way in which white is accidental to man and to other things, and such an accidental term is called a general accident. Every essential universal term, however, designates either (1) a more general quiddity and is called a genus, or else    a more proper quiddity and is called a species, or else (3) designates an anity and is called a difference.

Text *5. M adkhal,* I 13: 72.13-15:

As for the first imposition of the term, they named every notion by which a thing is rendered distinct from a thing, whether it be individual or universal, a difference; then they transferred it after that to that by which the thing is rendered distinct in itself.

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# RESPONSE TO DONALD KEEFE ON LONERGAN

ONALD KEEFE'S "A Methodological Critique of Lonergan's Theological Method " in a previous issue of *The Thomist* is one of the most challenging and thought-provoking articles I have seen recently. [1] He appears to mount a sophisticated and devastating critique of Lonergan's theological method. I would like to suggest lines along which a Lonerganian might respond.

Many points call for challenge, but I read Keefe to be making two central affirmations: (I) I,onergan holds to a distorted understanding of the nature-grace distinction, by which nature is the prior and determining reality, and grace an accidental and extrinsic a.fter-thought: Lonergan continues to hold to the out-moded natural-supernatural distinction. I believe Keefe is half-right in both cases.

The two theses I attribute to Keefe are distinguished by the words "distorted" and "out-moded." The first assumes (at least for the sake of the argument) there is such a thing as the nature-grace distinction, and claims that Lonergan misconstrues it. The second, more radical thesis is that this distinction was current in the Middle Ages as the natural-supernatural distinction, but is now to be abandoned. In other words, it is possible to misunderstand a tradition, and it is possible to belong to a mistaken tradition. I take Keefe to be accusing Lonergan on both counts: Lonergan misunderstands the nature-grace distinction; but further, that distinction is itself erroneous and so Lonergan, holding to it (with whatever misconceptions), stands doubly condemned.

I believe Keefe is half-right in both cases. In the first instance, he is right on the substance, but incorrect in his read-

[1] Full reference: *The Thomist* 50:28-65 (1986). All internal references to Keefe will be to this article.

ing of Lonergan. That is, there is indeed a valid distinction be-
tween grace and nature; but Lonergan understands it correctly,
not incorrectly. In the second case, he reads Lonergan correct-
ly, but is mistaken on the issue. That is, Lonergan does indeed
espouse the nature-grace or natural-supernatural distinction;
but that distinction is not out-moded, but perenially valid.

Point I. Thesis: "Lonergan holds to a distorted version of
the nature-grace distinction, by which nature is the determin-
ing reality, and grace an extrinsic after-thought." This is my
wording, but I am attributing the thought to Keefe. The fol-
lowing quotations from his article are intended to justify and
expand this thesis. "Lonergan's thought on the nature-grace
relation is finally moored to the supposition that created grace
(being in love with God) is a contingent modification of a pre-
existing natural entity ... " (Keefe, 33). Translated into
epistemological terms, this means that reason is the controlling
reality, faith an adventitious late-comer. A theology based on
such a notion is inescapably rationalistic. "To refuse such ac-
countability ... is to suppose interiority to be self-validating
and autonomous: this is Lonergan's supposition, and it reveals
a rationalism little at peace with a gratuitous intellectual hori-
zon, the horizon of faith " (Keefe, 34) .

Further, this transcendental method, as self-validating, is in-
escapable, and therefore deterministic. " Such a consequence is
the very hallmark of determinism" (Keefe, 36n). As such it
has no openness to history; the method thus in advance ex-
cludes the proper content of theology. "It carries an emphasis
upon fallenness and the need for redemption which, as has been
said above, is curiously absent from Lonergan's anthropology"
(Keefe, 41) .

In sum, Keefe outlines here the kind of extrinsic, two-
layered theology of a self-enclosed natural world into which
grace penetrates adventitiously as a strange and foreign in-
truder, an awkward after-thought-the very understanding
that Rahner was attacking in his early writings on grace.[2]

2 Karl Rahner, "Concerning the Relationship Between Nature and Grace."
*Theological Investigations* !:297-317. Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1961.

My response:  Keefe is quite right to reject  such a conception of  the  nature-grace  relationship.  Unfortunately  for  his  case, Lonergan  never  held  any  such  thing.  Though  Keefe is obviously familiar  with  a  great  range  of Lonergan's  writings,  he has missed  the  point  of  a  whole  number  of  crucial  passages.

As Lonergan  says very dearly,  "But  it would  be a anthropomorphic  blunder  to  transfer  this  succession  to  God.  There are  no  divine  after-thoughts."  [3]  In  the  concrete,  there  is  one historical  world,  and  it  is,  and  has  always  been,  a  graced world.  Lonergan  never  envisions,  as  Keefe  implies  (Keefe, 50), a  temporally  prior  world  of  pure  nature.  This  is precisely  why Lonergan  insists  " nature "  is but  an  intellectual  " line of reference."  [4]

In  other  words,  if there  are  no  divine  after-thoughts,  then God could not have envisioned first a world of pure nature,  and then,  in  a  second  "moment"  (in  Lonergan's  strict  notion  of eternity,  of  course,  there  are  no  "moments "  in  God's  life, but only  the  *tota  et  simul  perfecta  possessio)*,  a  grace  to be  given to that world.  No, the divine plan is one, and envisions  simultaneously  nature  and  grace,  with  nature  perfectly  ordered  to grace  as  to  its  finality. [5]  Consequently,  there  at no  time existed a world  of  pure  nature.  It  is  only  what  *would  have  been*  had God  created  the  world  without  grace.  As  such  it  is  only  a theological  concept,  a  hypothetical  construct,  what  Rahner properly  terms  a  *Restbegriff.*

Epistemologically,  Lonergan  stands  in  the  tradition  that theology is faith seeking  understanding;  it is not reason  seeking faith.  This  is why Foundations,  in Lonergan's  theological method,  the  point  where  the  systematic  expansion  of theology begins,  is  based  on  religious  conversion,  not  on  reason  or  the inevitabilities  of  conscious  interiority.

[3] Bernard  J.F.  Lonergan.  *Insight:  A  Study  of  Human  Understanding.* London:              Green  and  Co.  Ltd.,  1957,  p.  695.

[4] Bernard  J.F.  Lonergan.  *Grace  and  Freedom.*  New  York:  Herder  and Herder,  1971,  p.  16;  *Method in Theology.*  New York:  Herder and Herder,  1972, pp.  339-40.

[5] See  Bernard  Lonergan,  "Finality,  Love,  Marriage."  *Collection.*  New York: Herder  and  Herder,  1967,  pp.  16-53.

   More fully, Lonergan envisions eight theological specialties,
organized into two phases: a first phase of listening to the past,
appropriating the tradition: Research, Interpretation, History,
Dialectic; and a second phase of speaking a creative theological
word to the present and future: Foundations, Doctrines, Sys-
tematics and Communications. [6] Lonergan allows that the first
four specialties may be properly performed by a person without
religious faith. But the second phase begins with Foundations,
which is an explicitation of religious conversion. Therefore con-
version is of the very essence of the creative and systematic
phase of theology for Lonergan. This is but a contemporary
restatement of the classical Augustinian-Anselmian-Thomistic
conception: theology is *fides quaerens intellectuni,* where the
faith is always presupposed to the understanding. Consequent-
ly it is inaccurate to term Lonergan a rationalist.

   True, Lonergan points out that theologians have minds, and
use them, so that what is true 0£ mind remains so also in
theology. But this in no way limits theology, because the mind
is an open structure. Its object is being, which is whatever can
be intelligently understood and reasonably affirmed, and this is
to be understood not narrowly, but in a way wide enough to
include the small but precious understanding of which Vatican
I spoke, and the affirmation 0£ faith and the creeds. [7]

   Again, the claim that Lonergan's approach is a-historical is
belied by the texts. Lonergan makes a massive attempt in
chapter 7 of *Insight* to accommodate the Aristotelian-Thom-
istic tradition to history. [8] In *Method in Theology,* three of his
central categories are progress, decline and redemption. [9] Prog-
ress is the upward thrust of the pure desire to know, the tra-
jectory the human race would traverse if it always followed the
guide of intellect, and never sinned against the light. Decline
is the obverse: the descending and contracting series of inte-

   [6] *Method  im Theology,*  125-45.
   [7] *Met hod,*  307,  321.
   [8] *Insight,*  207-44.
   [9] *Method,*  291.

grations that follows upon bias and the deliberate flight from understanding. Left to itself, this direction would tend to a human entropy of chaos, anarchy and absurdity. But a third motive force in human history is God's work of redemption, which has the power (if responded to) to lift man from the counterpositions and bias and restore him, now in a higher way, on the road to knowledge and freedom. Progress, decline and redemption are, consequently, nothing other than the historicization of the medieval metaphysics of nature, sin and grace. To say that Lonergan's thought is a-historical is to miss entirely its dynamic and finalistic sweep.

Keefe also misses the structure of *Insight,* the implications of its moving viewpoint. The viewpoint of each chapter is superseded by the one following it, so that the ultimate viewpoint is that of "a believer, a Catholic, and, as it happens, a professor of dogmatic theology." [10] Again, reason does not dictate to faith, but faith subsumes reason and its structures, as the fourth level of decision sublates the first three levels of experience, understanding and judgment. Lonergan also points out the normal occurrence of the three conversions: first religious, then moral, then perhaps intellectual. [11]

In sum, Keefe reads Lonergan inaccurately on this point.

Point 'f.hesis: "Lonergan persists in holding to the natural-supematural distinction, which contemporary theology should abandon." Again, this is my wording of Keefe's intent, and needs to be justified by his own words:

On this showing, the whole weary business of the Thomistic anthropology of human nature or substance as *potentia obedientialis,* and of grace as a pure nominal *accidens,* disproportionate and unowed, entirely incapable of eduction from that potency, may finally be laid to rest, for grace is now no longer accidental, but substantial ... (Keefe, 44).

My response: Keefe is accurate here in his interpretation of Lonergan; but I believe he is wrong on the issue. Lonergan

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[10] *Insight,* 732; see also 731, xxiii-xxvi, 695.
[11] *Method,* 243.

does indeed hold to the natural-supernatural distinction; but, I would maintain, that distinction, so far from being outmoded, hr a perennial staple of Catholic thought. What should be noted is that Keefe's quarrel is at this point not merely with Lonergan; it is also with Rahner, with the hulk of the Thomistic tradition, with Thomas Aquinas himself and, I am convinced, also with the doctrine of Vatican I.

Undeniably the distinction of nature and supernature, which Lonergan envisions as a crucial and brilliant breakthrough of the high Middle Ages,[12] has lost much of its attraction in today's theology. But Rahner points out the key reason why it cannot be abandoned: with it would fall the gratuity of gra.ce.[18] If grace is so essential to the human essence that the latter cannot even be envisioned without it, then God can only create humankind in a graced condition; which undermines the free graciousness of redemption. Keefe is here tilting with practically the whole Thomistic tradition, and with Thomas himself, who clearly distinguishes nature and grace, reason and faith, philosophy and theology. Keefe's suggestion that some later, refined Thomas would have pursued a trajectory ending in Tillich's position (Keefe, 30) is quite unconvincing. Further, Vatican I clearly affirms the distinction. "... duplicem esse ordinem cognitionis non solum principio, sed obiecto etiam distinctum ..." DS 3015. To pretend that this is a Thomistic understanding *imposed* on Vatican I (Keefe, 33) is to fail to understand how much that Council is based upon Thomas's thought, often following him almost distinction for distinction, as with the text on the absolute and conditional necessity of revelation (DS 3005). To suggest that nature should be understood here in an Augustinian rather than a Thomistic way (Keefe, 54) is whistling in the dark. Ultimately, Keefe is himself forced to say that Vatican I cannot be read as a " literal statement" when it affirms grace to be an accidental change of the human reality (Keefe, 54-55).

12 <*hace,* 14-1.5.

1s K. Rahner, *Foundations of Christian Faith.* New York: The Seabury Press, 1978, p. 123.

Keefe refuses to accept that grace is related to human na-
ture as accident to substance.  That may be superficially con-
vincing: but the alternative  is that  grace is of the substance
of the human,  a necessary and intrinsic property.  This means
that the world of pure nature  is not only non-existent, but also
impossible: for God to have created man without grace would
have been to bring into being a mutilated  human nature.  But
this means that  grace is not a free gift: if God is to create
humanity  at all, then  he *must;* create a graced humanity.  What
then  becomes of" God's gift"  (Rom. 3: fl4, Eph.  fl: 8)  given to
us in Christ Jesus?

There is another  implication  to the collapse of grace into na-
ture,  so that  grace is of the  substance  of the human: if a per-
son falls from grace, then  he or she also falls from human na-
ture.  In the Protestant  tradition  to which Tillich belongs, of
the  total  depravity  of human  nature,  this result  is not uncon-
genial; but it fits poorly in the Catholic tradition.  This is the
nub of the  problem: Keefie is reading Lonergan  (and Rahner
and Thomas  and  the Thomistic tradition)   within Tilli0hian
presuppositions: (Keefe, 38) .

I may summarize my basic thesis as follows: Lonergan is a
'Jihomist, whereas Keefe is a Tillichian.  That puts Lonergan
in the  Catholic tradition,  and  Keefe-though   Tillich  had
more respect for philosophy and reason than many Lutheran
scholars-in  the Protestant-Lutheran  tradition.  As Keefe tries
to read  the Catholic tradition,  he inevitably  does so with  a
jaundiced  or misconstruing  eye. I think he is very ingenious
in his attempt  to read Thomas this way, but in the end it won't
wash: no amount  of wishful thinking  is going to turn  Thomas
into  a Lutheran.

Keefe aspires to a creative  interipretation  of the Catholic
tradition;  what he overlooks is that the Thomistic tradition
has become so thoroughly  entwined in the Catholic. For ex-
ample, Vatican I is practically  a pastiche of Thomist texts and
theology.  That is why Keefe finds Vatican I so embarrassing,
and almost literally seems not to know what to do with  it-be-

cause it enshrines, not the mythical Thomas he is trying to read out of the texts, but the real Thomas who stood very clearly for the nature-grace, natural-supernatural distinction.

Keefe's ecumenical effort to join Protestant principle and Catholic substance [14] is laudable. It must be noted, however, that both Jansenius and Nikolaus von Hontheim (Febronius) made a similar attempt, out of the same worthy motives. In either case the decision of the Catholic Church has been unfavorable. I am not convinced that Keefe will be any more successful in his own attempt to bridge the two traditions.

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[14] Donald J. Keefe, SJ. *Thomism and the Ontological Theology of Paul Tillich.* Leyden: Brill, 1971, pp. 334-45.

# A BRITISH COMMONWEALTH DOGMATICS

HE APPEARANCE of a new dogmatics is always ause for hope, hope sorely needed in Anglo-Saxon ountries where the tradition of systematic theology is an especially delicate growth. In the lands of the British Commonwealth, whence all the contributors to the series which I shall discuss have so come, the cultural and educational tone has been set very largely by the English, and England, for reasons bound up with the peculiar development of Anglican theology, has never put forth much the way of a dogmatic-theological shoot.[1] Thus Dr. Alister McGrath, in his recent *The Making of 11/Iodern German Christology,* has opined that the last great English theologian was William of Ockham.[2] Although McGrath's reviewers have made out a case in this regard for S. T. Coleridge and J. H. Newman, it must be admitted that the writing neither man could really be called systematic. How, then, has Catholic theology in these countries preserved, if at all, that dogmatic systematicness which is an accepted aspect of the coherence of Christian teaching in the Catholic tradition? Either, it may said, through creating the institutional enclaves of its own seminaries and religious *studia;* or ,by participating in foreign, largely clerical, faculties of theology; or by entering into contact with the mainstream, largely Anglican, academic theology of the Universities and hoping for the best, in the knowledge that here at any rate is an expertise in biblical studies, patristics and Church history whose use can

[1] See S. IV. Sykes, 'Germany and England: An Attempt at Theological Diplomacy', in *ibid.* (ed.), *England and Germany. Stttdies in Theological Diplomacy Frankfurt* am-Main and Berne 1982), pp. 158-159, for an explanation of this phenomenon.

[2] A. McGrath, *'l'he iliaki:ng of Modern German Ohristology* (Oxford 1986), P. 5.

only be beneficial.[3] The volumes which have so far appeared of the new Chapman *Introduction to Catholic Theology* bear marks of all three types of influence.

The foreword to the new series, setting the tone for what will follow, is by Canon Michael Richards. For many years the editor of the pastoral monthly *The Clergy Review,* now re-named *Priests and People,* Canon Richards is currently a parish priest in that opulent district of the West End of London dis-tinguished for the elegant *jeunesse doree* known as ' Sloane Rangers'. As general editor of the new dogmatics he does not, however, allude to the institutional background which I have sketched, with its particular conjunction of limitations and possibilities. Instead, he chooses to help the reader locate what is being offered in terms of the call for a renewal of Catholic theology made in the documents of the Second Vatican Coun-cil. The Council, Richards sugests, ' provided the Church with a fundamental revision of its way of life in the light of a tho-rough investigation of Scripture and of our history, and with fresh guidelines for studying and reflecting upon the Christian message itself.[4] Without citing chapter a.nd verse of the Coun-cil documents, Richards spells out these ' guidelines' in the fol-lowing terms. Post-conciliar theology should:

(a) maintain scientific or scholarly rigor;
(b) succeed in expressing the Catholic tradition;
(c) utilise the contributions of other religions, and other churches, to an understanding of God and the world;
(d) report on the insights made possible by drawing on a number of different philosophical and methodological approaches.

At the same time, Richards promises, the books that compose the series will each supply the appropriate quantity of informa-tional material and reflective stimulus that might reasonably

a For a discussion of the cultural context of theology in Britain, and espe-cially England, see J. Coulson (ed.), *Theology and the Unwe'rsity. A.n lilau-menioal Investigation* (London 1964), *passim.*

4 *M.* Richards, "Forword ", reprinted with different pagination, in each volume of the series.

be assumed  for any book purporting  to be a text-hook  in the area which it covers.

This amounts  to a very tall order, and two questions  at once suggest themselves.  First,  *are* these the *desiderata* of theological method  suggested  by the Council?  Secondly,  are they actually  realised  in the books before us? I shall return  to the first of t:hese questions  at the end of this review.  The second will be dealt  with, in effect, in the course of my remarks  on the individual  volumes,  I simply  note  at this juncture  that a certain gap between  the intentions  of the editor  and the work of the contributors  is already  apparent  if we compare  the *material* program  set forth  in the general  foreword  to the  titles  of the hooks that have so far appeared.  What the Editor originally promised  was: a theology of revelation  followed by a Christology,  a theological  anthropology  and a pneumatology.  This sequence indicates  a definite theological vision: the economy of the Father  reaches its climax in that of the Son; the two economies, in their interrelation,  reveal, by the light of theology, the human  pole of a covenant  dialogue whose medium is the Holy Spirit.  Unfortunately,  it seems that somewhere  along  the line a spanner  has been thrown  into the works. A *de Deo* and a trinitarian  theology  have intervened,  and the pneumatology has not, so far, seen the light of day. Thus, the scheme proposed  by the editor  'has come to naught,  something  0£ serious consequence  for any dogmatics,  which must  have a well-thought-out  structure,  and especially important  for a collaborative enterprise  of this kind which can so easily collapse into a series of monographs,  deprived  of explicit connections  with each other and limited by the personal interests  proper to each contributor--not   to speak of possible attacks of myopia, or the riding of hobby-horses.  I shall return  to this question  of overall planning  and theological  method,  once more, at the end of this article.

A_ *Theology  of Revelation*

Fr. Aylward Shorter's  study was begun while the author  was teaching African  Christian  theology      Tanzania,   and com-

pleted at Downside Abbey, near Bath (England) [5] The author's
bias is drawn from these two poles: a concern with cultural
anthropology and a theology suited to mission lands, on the
one hand, and, on the other, the native English Catholic tradi-
tion, notably as mediated by Newman.

The book is carefully structured. An opening chapter con-
siders revealed religion as we find it embedded in the world
around us, namely, as a social reality. From there the author
moves on to consider revelation in the Old and New Testa-
ments (somewhat disproportionately, there are two chapters
on the Old, one on the New), with a marked Christocentric
emphasis reminiscent of the preamble to *Dei Verbum,* the
Council's dogmatic constitution on divine revelation. Next, he
considers the transmission of the revelation      the Church, and
the possibility of speaking (synchronically) of the existence of
divine revelation in other (contemporary) religions. Two con-
cluding chapters deal with the act of faith, as the receiving of
revelation, and various practical (largely, missionary) ramifi-
cations of the theology of revelation as it has now been set
forth in the book as a whole. Fundamentally, this book deals
with four issues: revelation, and its anthropological pre-condi-
tions; the Church; Christianity and other religions: these will
be considered in this order in what follows, and first, then,
*revelation.*

Shorter opens with a largely anthropological preamble, which
packs a huge amount of material into a somewhat confined
space, inducing a certain claustrophobia in the reader accus-
tomed to more leisurely exposition. A short history of world
religions follows on a *precis* of the development of anthropologi-
cal theory and is continued into an account of the Church's
place in the Western intellectual tradition, itself seen as a
further chapter      the saga of the vicissitudes of religion.
Such condensations are inevitably distorting: the question is,
whether the information offered is sufficiently more correct

[5] A. Shorter, *Revelation cmd its Interpretation* (London 1983). Cited hence·
forth as 'Shorter'.

than incorrect to be worth the candle. In cases where I felt confident in judging this, I sometimes doubted the value of the summaries offered. The claim that in Kant, for instance, the ' Absolute ' is the moral imperfative, and in Schelling ' nature ', overlooks the fact that in both these philosophies, unconditioned reality is predicated of *God:* in Kant, as the *ens realissimum,* in (the later) Schelling as the creative' **I'** of transcendent freedom.[6] Nor do I find the statement that Neo-Scholasticism was isolated from theological and political involvement a convincing one.[7] The first part makes no sense: whatever one's assessment of the value of Neo-Scholasticism as a mode of practising Christian theology, it can hardly be denied that it *was* such a theological form. The second part is simply untrue: through a figure like Jacques, Maritain, Neo-Scholasticism played a considerable part in the Church's eventual acceptance of pluralist democracy in Southern Europe and Latin America. Contemporary Catholic writers are too prone to take easy swipes at the Neo-Thomists, as one may perhaps be forgiven for pointing out in a journal founded from within that movement of Scholastic *ressourcement.* Admittedly, the wellnigh universal animus against Neo-Scholasticism in Anglo-Saxon countries does have one reasonable source: the attempt by the Papacy to impose a single theological style in all Catholic teaching institutions. Yet this was hardly the fault of the Neo-Thomist divines themselves. The unreasona;ble ground of hostility lies in a prejudice against propositions in the sphere of revelation, dogma and theology. But as Dr. Julius Lipner of Cambridge has recently reminded us, " it is the glory of human consciousness that its tacit dimension can come to fruition in propositions, in articulated meanings which can be true or false ".[8]

Such an espousal of propositions as what makes possible the

[6] Shorter, p. 19.

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] J. Lipner, review of P. Avis, *Ecumenical Theology and the Elusiveness of Doctrine* (London 1986), in *New Blaokfiars* 68. 804 (April 1987), pp. 203-204.

distinguishing of falsehood from truth, and the deepening of
the latter, in no way need deny the importance of imagination,
which is Shorter's privileged epistemological category in the
theology of revelation. Imagination, is, as Professor John
Mcintyre has argued in his recent study thereof, the most im-
portant cognitive form taken by our grasp of the revealed reli-
gion socially incarnate around us.[9] Imagination plays a vital
role in our grasping the ' it ' of revelation, and as such is nec-
essarily prior to the rational interpretation and, in part, justifi-
cation of that revelation. Nevertheless, the theologian's final
aim, as Scotus pointed out, must be the greatest possible de-
gree of rational explication of the mysteries--even though he
knows, and since the First Vatican Council, by divine faith,
that the reasoning intelligence can only approach the heart of
the revealed mystery in asymptotic fashion. More attention to
the relation of imagination and reason here would have enabled
Shorter to carry out more fully his evident intention to avoid
the Scylla and Charybdis of Modernism and its mere antithesis.

Shorter is, at any rate, encouragingly brisk on Christian
claims to *have* a revelation-something occasionally denied,
partly hecause of the infrequency of the vocabulary of ' revela-
tion' in the New Testament, partly from the desire to safe-
guard the autonomy of human truth-finding. Over against
secular and death-of-God theologies (insofar as time has not
blown these ·quite away) , Shorter insists that Christianity is
only meaningful *as* a revelation. In the fact of the current con-
ventional wisdom which ascribes the Church's lack of impact to
the moral mediocrity of its members, notably ministerial,
Shorter claims that what really counts in the last resort is the
capacity of Christian truth to enter a mind, inhabit it and be-
come its very form.[10]

His account of the .symbolic vectors of revelation concludes
·by saying that the product of the divine revelatory activity is
a narrative memory that carries with it an eschatological

[9] J. Mcintyre, *Faith, Theology and Imagination* (Edinburgh 1987).
[10] Shorter, p. 28.

burden, and hence is more world-transforming than world-ac-
commodated. A story, in other words, about the ultimate, with
the power to change the world. Although this conclusion is
chiefly indebted to Johann Baptist Metz and his ' political'
theology, the account of symbol which undergirds it derives
from many sources. Thus we find set to work here an anthro-
pological account of symbol, drawn mainly from Clifford
Geertz; an ontological account, culled from the part-Scholastic,
part-Idealist  source of Karl Rahner; a psychological account
taken from C. G. Jung; and finally a literary account, harrowed
from another Downside-connected scholar, John Coulson. It
may be that all of these concepts have important connections,
but on the other hand such an eclecticism *could* just be inco-
herent.

   I shall deal much more briefly with Shorter's chapters on
*the Bible,* for these are relatively unproblematic. He sees the
history of Israel as, from the viewpoint of revelation, the pre-
history of Christ. Confidence is not secured at the outset, when
we are informed that ' the Bible ' means ' the Book '. *Ta biblia*
signifies, of course, ' the books ', thus indicating, oddly enough,
precisely the plural and varied character of Scripture which
Shorter, at this point in his text, wishes to convey.[11] Not that
he allows the unity of Scripture to dissolve into a welter of
competing and irreconcileable theologies. He offers, rather, a
bold interpretation  of the totality  of Israel-in-its-Scripture,
along the lines of the 'biblical  theology ' movement associated
with G. v:on Rad, W. Eichrodt and J. L. Mackenzie. Revela-
tion in Israel is primarily God himself, but God in the process
of his self-manifestation, a manifestation which is both the crea-
tion (' election ') of a personal relationship, and the communi-
cation of a meaning or message. This revealing activity was
soteriological: both positively, as redemption, and negatively,
as judgment. All these elements were found concretely in the
four forms Shorter sees as constitutive for the making of Israel's
distinctive religious existence: covenant, cult, prophetism and

   11 *Ibid.*  p. 35.

wisdom. Much of this is familiar reportage, nor is originality to be over-prized in a textbook. But there are occasional genial insights of an illuminating kind as in the statement that 'the geography of the Holy Land was a mystical geography, a map of the nation's collective religious experience ".[12] But references, perhaps inadvertent, to the God of the Old Testament as 'a person ' suggest a certain *insoucianae* towards the idea that this pre-history of Christ is itself incipiently Trinitarian. Shorter's account of the Old Testament concludes by stressing the emergence of a universalist hope-something which is not simply a pre-supposition of Christianity, but particularly appeals to his own concern with mission and inter-religious dialogue.

   The central christological section is conservative on the historicity of the Gospels at large, though not to the point of claiming untroubled access to the *ipsissima verba Jesu.* Shorter, aware of the stubborn persistence of oral traditioning in an African context, is the more open to the blandishments of the Swedish school of     Testament exegesis to the effect that the original disciples were trained rememherers. Although he has comparatively little to say about the Atonement as a revelatory form he is good on the Resurrection, which he describes as manifesting Jesus as not simply source and object of revelation but its goal. This comparatively short discussion ends with the suggestion that, as between the original apostolic preaching and the later christological reflection of New Testament writers we have an example of ' derived' or 'participant ' revelation which can serve as a model for the sections on the transmission of revelation which now follow.[13] Unfortunately, the effect of this suggestion is quite to obscure the distinction between the unrepeatable Origin and its mediations: as the existence of the Canon of Scripture ever reminds historic Christendom in every tradition, there is a difference in kind, and not simply in degree, between the interpretative work of later erations and that of the unique springtime when the charisms

   [12] *Ibid.* p. 61.
   [13] *Ibid.* p. 135.

of inspiration and inerrancy played. As Charles Journet put it, the Church raises Scripture above herself, just as she raises up Christ above herself during the procession of Corpus Christi.u

We thus move on to the picture offered by Shorter of revela tion as now found in the *Church.* An interesting prologue affirms that the promise of such different philosophical or quasi-philosophical readings of the world as Platonism and Structuralism that the essence of finite reality is participation can be realised only by reference to Christian revelation, as signalled in the doxological confession of St. John in *his* prologue: "From His fullness we have all received, grace upon gra.ce".¹⁵ This is the sign under which Shorter wishes to place his account of revelation in the Church: ecclesial faith is itself participant revelation, just as ecclesial teaching authority is participant apostolicity. Though I am happy with the idea that the root metaphysical concept for an ontology of the finite (whether in nature or grace) is that of participation, I am less convinced of the particular manner in which Shorter works out this theme in relation to the revelation" once for all given to the saints ".¹⁶ Mol"e *nuance* is necessary here, else Catholics will rightly be charged by Anglicans and Protestants with eliding the distinction between the development of revelation and the development of its understanding. In this respect, some unguarded phrases in *Newman's Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine* have given hostages to fortune, as Owen Chadwick pointed out many years ago at the close of his great survey of the idea of development, thus starting a controversy among Newman scholars which is by no means concluded.¹¹ What is at stake here is nothing less, indeed, that the self-identity of the essence of Christianity over time. This becomes acutely notice-wble when Shorter *identifies* the concept of the ' signs of the

14 C. Journet,  *What is a Dogma?*  (ET London 1964),  p. 51.

1.5 John  1, 14.

16 Jude,  v. 3.

110.  Chadwick,  *From Bossuet  to Newman.  The Idea of Doctrinal Develop·ment*  (Cambridge  1957),  p. 195.

times ' as found in pontifical, conciliar and synodal utterances from John XXIII onwards as "the signs of the participant revelation ". [18] Here the tension between general history and the special history peculiar to the Gospel is collapsed in a seemingly undialectical fashion. Despite the author's evident intention to avoid a sheer relativism, his insistence that the hermeneutic commended in the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith's 1973 declaration *Mysterium Ecclesiae* is *au fond* indistinguishable from the historical situationism of Avery Dulles, [19] appears to overlook one major factor, which his consideration of 'organic' theories of doctrinal development could have brought home to him. The principal value of the metaphor of organism lies in the notion of the irreversibility or perduringness of doctrinal ' features ' once these are acquired by the body of the Church. Though development in the understanding of revelation is often staccato and discontinuous, its fruits in magisterial definition, once they have appeared on the tree, can never justifiably be ignored. Though they may at the conscious level fall into neglect their rediscovery is always a call for their re-appropriation in study, preaching and worship. It is situationism's failure to grasp this truth which distinguishes it from the (very necessary and legitimate) recognition of the historicity of doctrine *comme telle.* However, these difficult matters of background assumption do not by any means destroy the value of what Shorter has to say-briefly enough-on such matters as the inter-relation of Scripture and Tradition, the interpretation of Scripture, and the roles of episcopate and laity in the making of Church doctrine.

Mention of the pluralism of contemporary theological schools at the end of his chapter on revelation in the Church leads Shorter on to the topic of *Christianity and other religions:* the issue of pluralism writ large for any would-be theology of revelation. Shorter's fundamental argument here is that, since Christ is the source, object and goal of (all) revelation and sal-

[18] Shorter, p. 143.
[19] Ibid. p. 169.

vation,   and   since   (as   may   be   alleged   on   grounds   both   of   Scrip-
ture   and   Church   teaching)   he   is   active   outside   the   Church,   it
is   legitimate   for   us   to   discern   ' Christian'   elements   in   various
cognitive   aspects   of   the   non-Christians   faiths.   Following   the
Indian   theologian   Raimundo   Pannikar,   Shorter   proposes   that,
if   the   heart   of   Christian   truth   is   the   Trinity,   itself   disclosed
through   reflection   on   the   mystery   of   Christ,   then   the   world
religions   constitute   so   many   *disjecta   membra*   of   Trinitarian   be-
lief   which   only   Christianity   can   re-integrate. [20]   Buddhism   in   its
apophaticism   represents   the   unseen   Father;   the   iconomorphic
or   personalist   theisms   of   Asia   and   Africa,   Judaism   and   Islam
the   eternal   Son,   and   the   non-dual   divine   reality   of   Vedantic
Brahmanism   the   Spirit   who   ' fills   the   whole   world '.   That   this
theory   is   ingenious   can   hardly   be   denied;   but   it   forces   its   own
data   into   a   strait-jacket   which   faith   does   not   demand,   nor   ra-
tionality   approve.   However,   my   principal   objection   to   this   ac-
count   of   the   relation   between   the   Church   and   the   non-Chris-
tian   world   faiths   is   rather   to   what   Shorter   frankly   calls   the
abolition   of   the   'separate   historical   "furrow"   of   'special'
salvation   history '. [21]   Instead,   the   Church,   by   laying   hold   of
the   justifying   grace   found   in   the   Cross   of   Christ,   enters   into   the
movement   of   his   representative   and   substitutionary   atoning
work,   in   such   a   way   that   her   existence,   as   Christ's   body,   is   a
condition   of   the   gift   of   salvation   to   those   outside   her   visible
communion.   By   eliminating   the   salvific   function   of   the   Church
and   replacing   it   with   an   (admittedly,   fascinating)   noetic   func-
tion   of   unifying   the   cognitive   contributions   of   other   religions,
the   author   departs   from   any   philosophy   of   history   which   could
claim   a   secure   New   Testament   foundation.   Though   generous-
ly   meant,   this   is   in   danger   of   becoming   a   new   *gnos£s,* that   is,   a
speculative,   rather   than   gracious,   unification   of   human   experi-
ence.

The   final   two   chapters   of   the   book   deal   with   a   *pot-pourri*   of

[20] *Ibid.*   p.   202;   ef.   R.   Pannikar,   *The   Trinity   and   the   Religious   ]i]xperience
of   Man*   (London   1973).
[21] Shorter,   p.   192.

practical ramifications on culture and liturgy, development and catechesis, much of which is eminently marked by pastoral good sense. The work ends, as books on revelation should no doubt do, in the contemplation of heaven, understood in Gregory of Nyssa's sense of an unending *epektasis,* or reaching-out, towards the vision of God.

*A philosophical theology*

Fr. Brian Davies's *Thinking about God* is a very different kettle of fish, coming as it does from the pen of an Oxford Dominican whose own background is in the Anglo-Saxon philosophy of religion.[22] Davies's structure is, like Shorter's, well-conceived. Part One considers arguments .for God's existence; Part Two explores the concept of God; Part Three deals with the specificity of the Christian form of belief in God, concluding with a chapter on the philosophical problems raised by the Church's practice of petitionary prayer. This is a much cooler, more academic book; religious only in the sense that the exercise of rationality can itself be the service of God, and characterised by the typical exempla of modern English philosophical discussion, sometimes amusing, but irritating if over-employed. References to rum-punch and strip-clubs certainly enhance the readability of the prose, but is it pompous to suggest that the fit of style and subject should indicate a spot more *gravitas?*

Part One resumes a great deal of discussion of the possible grounds .for asserting God's existence: arguments from the existence of the cosmos; from design and from miracles; from putative experience of God, and of the moral life; finally, from the concept of God: the ontological argument. Davies plunges into his subject here with little or no indication of the *concept* of God he is initially supposing. Apparently, this concept is that of a creative ground to the world, a ground to which there intrinsically belongs unconditional autonomy or *aseitas.*[28] In

22B, Davies, *Thinking about God* (London 1985). Cited henceforth as 'Davies'.
2a Davies, p. 30.

other words, at the opening of this book we find ourselves not
in the realm of Christian revelation charted by Shorter, but in
that of a philosophical theism which has submitted a religious-
ly derived concept of God-that drawn from Judaism, Chris-
tianity and Islam-to a sheerly rational purification. The
establishment of the claim     such a rational concept of God
is instantiated in reality is indeed an aspect of the ' preamble
of faith ' as practised in Catholic theology in much of the
modern period: but it is not quite what is going on in the
*Prirna Pars* of the *Summa Theologiae* of St. Thomas, beneath
whose intellectual patronage Davies considers himself to be.
As the late Dominique Dubarle put it, in questions 2 to 26 of
that treatise, ' the Christian religion is constantly present ' in
the elaboration of Thomas's thought, as both the authorities
cited and certain of     issues raised make clear. [24] The divine
essence in its unity is simply that which is common to the
Father, Son and Holy Spirit of biblical revelation, though, once
in possession of this divine revelation, and taking seriously the
fact of human religiosity (which supplies us with the sense of
' what all men call God ') , :rational intelligence can repossess
the thought of the *unitas        essentiae* in ontological terms
of its own. As Etienne Gilson approvingly cited Lessing in this
regard, certain religious truths were revealed so as to become
rational. [25] It was Hegel's error to think that what is thus true
of some must be true of all.

   However, Davies certainly adheres closely to Thomas in his
preference for approaches to the existence of God of a broadly
cosmological kind. Thus while, as he rightly says, he presents
sufficient argumentation for and against various positions to
enable the reader to attempt an independent evaluation of the
points at issue, his own defence of the existence of God-effec-
tively, as Creator-would   aippear to be by way of three moveso

   [24] D. Dubarle, L'ontologie du mystere chretien chez saint Thomas d'Aquin,
in *Dieu avea l'J!Jtre. De Parmenide a saint Thomas. Essai d'ontologie theologale*
(Paris 1986) , ch. 5 and especially here at p. 268.
   [25] E. Gilson, *L'Flsprit de la philosophie medievale* (Paris 1932), p. 20.

In a first step, he discusses the so-called 'Kalam' argument, a designation drawn from the mediaeval Islamic schools, to the effect that only personal choice could have started up the world. Here Davies hesitates when faced with the claim that persons must be bodily, a point of view which he associates with Thomas who, though, describes *persona* as *distinctum subsistens in natura intellec"tuali*[20] However, Davies's main point here is that, while the Kalam argument is probaibly valid, its proof of an initiator of the world is not that of the Creator 'in the full traditional sense '.[21] And so, by a second step, he turns to the body of reasoning for which the universe requires a first Cause in a sense not restricted by temporal reference. The argument from design then functions in a third move to corroborate the conclusion of the First Cause argument. Just as the existence of the universe and its order cannot be prized apart, for the universe is, precisely, a *cosmos,* so the First Cause must be thought of integrally as a designing creator.[28]

Reasoning to God's existence from religious experience, moral practice and in the 'ontological' manner classically expressed in Anselm's *Proslogicm*receives much shorter shift, though not shorter coverage. For Davies, there can be no argument to God from religious experience, for it is impossible to say how an experience of the Creator could be identified: 'there seems to be no distinguishing property or activity that something must have or display if it is, indeed, the Creator of the universe '.[29] This difficulty would, no doubt, be dissipated if one selected a di:fferent root metaphysical concept of God than that of creative Being. Should one regard the key notion here as all-holiness, say, or the active power to satisfy the human capacity for infinitude in intellect and will, the problem would hardly present itself in such acute terms. And indeed, if no experience

[26] C. I Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a. 4c, p. 566; De Pot. q. 9, a. 4; Ia. q, 29, a.3, ad and q. 30, a 2 c.
[21] Davies, p. 17.
[2s] *Ibid.* p. 50.
[29] *Ibid.* p. 69.

of God can ever he identified, and *we* are permanently  restricted
here to the  mode  of  inference,  no  theological  epistemology
proper  to  the  Christian  mystery  can  ever  he  established,  and
the *visio facialis* of  heaven  would  be  impossible.  I entertain
doubts,  too,  a;bout  Davies'  dismissal  of  the  claim  that  moral
(and  not  just  religious,  or  mystical)  experience  provides  us
with  materials  for affirming  God's  existence.  He seems  to think
that  an  ethics  of  the  *virtues*  such  as,  following  the  tradition  of
Thomist  Aritsotelianism,  he  wishes  to  embrace,  excludes  an
ethics  of  *values*  wherein  forms  of  the  good  might  be  described
as  posited  by  the  Supreme  Good.  And  yet,  as  Jacques  Mari-
tain  put  it,  ' in  the  eyes  of  Aristotle  the  good  of  the  virtues  is
at  the  same  time  *bolllUm lwnestum*   (good  worthy  in  its  own
right)  or  good  in  itself  and  through  itself,  *and*  the  means  of  at-
taining  happiness  '.[30]  And,  as  Dom  Illtyd  Trethowan  of  Down-
side,  an  early  inspiration  in  Da.vies's  work,  would  then  com-
ment,  ' God  is  involved  in  this  (first)  meaning  of  the  word  as
the  absolute  standard  of  reference  '.[31]  As  to  Anselm's  *unum
argumentum,*  I  have  suggested  elsewhere  that  it  offers  an  in-
vestigation  of  the  unique  grammar  of  the  word  ' God '  which
we  can  accept  as  informative  about  reality  if  *we*  hold,  with
Anselm  himself,  to  the  'fiduciary'  character  of  language.[32]
Davies'  judgment  that  these  approaches  to  God's  existence
must  be  excluded  from  the  club  of  successful  arguments,  and
his  neglect  of  other  potential  members,  though  decisions  to
which  he  is  entitled,  are  inevitably  bound  up  with  the  some-
what  thin  concept  of  God  which  Part  One  of  the  book  in  dif-
ferent  respects  both  presumes  and  delivers.  I  also  thought  it
a  pity  that,  in  a  series  entitled  *'Introducing   Cathol,ia Theol-
ogy '*  no  attempt   was  made  to  establish  the  historical  contours
of  the  Catholic  tradition  in  these  matters,  something  which

[30] J. Maritain,  *Moral  Philosophy.  An Historical  and  Oritical  Survey  of  the
0.reat 8ystems*  (ET  London  1964),  p. 35.

[a1] I. Trethowan,  *Absolute  Value*  (London  1970),  p. 209.

[3:2] A. Nichols,  "Anselm  of  Canterbury   and  the  Language  of  Perfection",
*Downside  Review*  (July  1985),  pp. 204-217.

would have enriched the largely Anglo-Saxon tonality of the whole.

In Part Two the idea of God is, by contrast, more deeply explored, largely thanks to Davies's e:Kploitation of Thomas's notion of the divine simplicity. His crucial chapter on this subject, which he has subsequently refined, [33] then leads into a discussion of certain divine attributes, and of the problem of evil. Unfortunately, Davies is not an entirely reliable reporter of Thomas on the *siniplicitas Dei* which, were it to turn chiefly as Davies leads one to suppose, on God's immateriality, would also characterise the angels. The angels are not individuated by matter, being subsistent forms, but nevertheless-and here is the point at which the divine uniqueness appears to reason for Thomas-they are still related to existence 'as a potency to its actuality '. [34] The divine simplicity consists, by contrast, in the absence of distinction in God between *esse,* existence, and *quod est,* that which is [35] Though, to be sure, Davies mentions this, he seems too wary of putting more than a toe into the deep waters of the Thomist metaphysics of being to do it justice. This is a Thomism from which nearly every trace of Christian Platonism has been relentlessly expunged, and Gilson's discovery of Thomist 'Existentialism' de-potentiated, its metaphysical exhilaration reduced to a study of those relationships in which the Thames Valley is most at home, since they belong to, and are not simply reflected in, the logical and linguistic order.

A forthright defence of the divine unchangeableness follows under the rubric of God's eternity. Though I am fully sympathetic to Davies's rejection of accusations that the classic notion God as *actus purus* is static (of all things!) , something more needs to be said about what the *kenosis* of the Word In-

[33] B. Davies, 'Classical Theism and the Doctrine of the Divine Simplicity', in *ibid.* (ed.), *Language, ιﬀeaning and God. Essays in honour of Herbert ]}foOabeOP* (London 19S7), pp. 51-74.

[s1] Ia q. 50, a 2, ad iii.

[35] J. F. Wippel, *Metaphysiaal Themes in Thomas Aquinas* (Washington HJ84), p. 138.

carnate's  earthly  ministry  represents  in  the  eternal  Godhead.
While  a  more  theologically  sophisticated  account  of  the  founda-
tion  in  the  divine  nature  of  the  Son's  self-emptying  than  any
mentioned  in  Davies'  discussion  is  that  of  Claude  Bruiare,  who
sees  it  as  'God's  right'  to  be  free  even  in  regard  to  his  own
absoluteness,[a6] a  version  which  Davies  might  be  better  able  to
accept,  in  line  with  his  own  account  of  the  divine  attributes,  is
that  of  Hans  Urs  Von  Balthas·ar,  who  locates  the  eternal  source
of  the  suffering  and  death  of  Jesus  not  in  the  divine  nature,  but
in  the  procession  of  the  divine  persons.  Just  as  for  the  media-
eval  Scholastics,  the  internal  divine  processions  are  the  condi-
tion  of  possibility  for  the  creation,  so  for  von  Balthasar  the
*'super-ken0sia'*  of  the  self-giving  of  the  Father  in  generating
the  Son  pre-contains  all  the  modalities  of  divine  love  found  in
the  history  of  salvation. [31]  Davies'  discussion  of  God's  omni-
science,  though  again  more  philosophical  than  theological,  as
appears  from  the  removal  of  the  Molinist  *soientia  media*  from
its  context  in  the  doctrine  of  grace  and  predestination,  may
nevertheless  be  recommended  as  a  clear  guide  in  a  conceptual
minefield.  On  the  problem  of  evil,  a  topic  to  which  Davies  has
contributed  several  times  before,  the  combination  of  a  priva-
tive  concept  of  evil  and  the  claim  that  it  is  absurdly  anthro-
pomorphic  to  ascribe  to  God  'moral  obligations'  (yet,  surely,
the  divine  goodness  is  a  rule  for  the  divine  action?)  seems  to
lead  to  the  conclusion  that  theodicy  is  a  pseudo-problem.  This
would  appear  to  prove  too  much  by  rendering  a  religion  of  re-
demption  otiose.

Further  confirmation,  if  such  were  needed,  of  the  fundament-
ally  non-theological  character  of  this  book,  is  provided  by  the
sections  on  the  credibility  of  the  distinctively  Christian  doc-
trine  of  God.  On  the  rational  component  in  such  credibility
Davies  does  not  take  into  account  the  more  existential  view  of
what  should  count  as  rationality  here  as  that  is  found  in  Cath-

[36] C. Bruaire,  *Le Droit  de  Dieu*  (Paris  1974)

*al* H.  U.  von  Balthasar,  ' Preface ',  *Pltques:  le  mystere*  (Paris,  1972),  pp.
9-10.

olic apologetics or fundamental theology since the time of Maurice Blonde!. Moreover, he reduces the act of faith to the same level as the (justified) entertaining of beliefs that we practise in other areas of life. Though there is an *analogy* here, as Newman pointed out in the *Essary in Aid of a Grammar of Assent,* to leave matters at this rpoint is effectively to discard the supernatural character of the act of faith, and therewith its value as the inchoate but foundational form of Christian mysticism. The chapter on the non-contradictoriness of Trinitarian and Christological doctrine confirms my basic view of the whole: it is a useful intervention in the Anglo-Saxon philosophy of religion, exceptionally lucid and full of common sense, but hardly theology. Readers will not be surprised to learn that it is rounded off by a disquisition on the philosophical problems connected with petitionary prayer; yet how much more than this might a title like " God and Prayer " properly evoke.

## *The Trinity andMan*

My hunch is that it was awareness of the limited character of Fr. Davies' undertaking that encouraged the publishers to seek from his *confrere,* Fr. Edmund Hill, an Augustine scholar who for many years has worked in clerical formation in Southern Africa, a Trinitarian theology as well as the originally announced investigation of the Christian doctrine of man. Hill's *The Mystery of the Trinity* and *Being Human* may reasonably be taken together since his preferred Church father, as is well-known, regarded the first as the key to the second, and vice versa. [88]

Hill's basic position is that the mystery of the Trinity has been revealed to us in a complex of mediate and immediate experience: mediate, through the Church's appropriation of the apostolic witness, and immediate, through each believer's response of faith to God revealing. [811] The *enuntiabilia* of ecclesial

[38] E. Hill, *The Mystery of the Trinity* (London 1985), cited henceforth as 'Hill MT'; ibid., *Being Human* (London 1984), cited as 'Hill BH'.
[s9] Hill MT, p. 12.

tradition  are so heard  and  received that  they  terminate  in the
*res* of  the  divine life  itself.  Derived  originally from  Christian
experience  (a hornets'  nest of  a term,  of course,  and  Hill does
not investigate  its meaning  in the  manner  attempted  by,  say,
Edward  Schillebeeckx in  his *Christ*  or even  in an  older,  but
epistemologically  no  less  sophisticated   writer  such  as  Jean
Mouroux)  ,[40] Trinitarian  faith  must re-find its moorings in  our
present  version of  such experience today.  Else  the doctrine of
the  Trinity   will be  reduced  to  a  magician's  'esoteric  rig-
marole '.[41] Yet,  Hill insists,  this interpretative   scanning  of  ex-
perience  cannot  be  made  to  bypass  the  authoritative   truth-
claims  of Scripture  and Tradition  which  provide  it  with  its
canons  and  its keys.  Here  Hill strikes  out on  a *via  media*  be-
tween Shorter's  tendency  to flee propositions  and Davies'  pro-
pensity  to  practice *proskunesis*  before  them.  Essentially,  Hill
maintains,  and  in this  the  authentic  tones  of  a  disciple  of
Augustine  become  audible,  the  divine Trinity  did  not  choose
to disclose their  constitutive  inner  personal reJationships  ex-
cept 'in terms  of, and  in the  context of,  our relationships  with
them '.[42] This is  not only  neatly put:  it is finely  put.

   But  frankly,  the  book  as  a  whole  is misnamed.  It should
have  been  entitled 'An Augustinian  Theology  of the  Mystery
of  the  Trinity',  rather  than 'The  Mystery  of  the  Trinity'
*tout oourt,* since  what it offers is, fundamentally,   an *expose* of
Augustine's  thought,  with  brief  preludes  and  postludes  ap-
pended.. Thus fifty-four  pages of  prelude  invite  us to consider
the  biblical evidence for  a Trinitarian  concept  of God;  the
'economic'  theologising  of  selected  ante-Nicene  fathers,  and
the  new agenda-the  need  to write  an ' absolute ', ' immanent '
or, as  Hill prefers  to say 'transcendental   ', theology  of  the
triune  God-forced  on the  Church  by the  Nicene  resolution of

   40 E.  Schillebeeckx,   *Christ.  The  Christian  Experience  in  the  llfodern  World*
(ET  London  1980),  pp. 30-79;  J. Mouroux, *L'Experience  chretienne.  Introduc-
tion a une theologie*  (Paris  1952).
   41 Hill  MT  p. 6.
   42 *Ibid.*  p.  16.

the Arian crisis, with its systematic preference for the language of being over against the language of willing. (That poor old nag 'transcendental ': how much more can it be expected to carry?) There then follow no less than eighty-nine pages of exposition of Augustine's thought, much of it effective, all of it readable. Finally, after a mere five pages on Abelard, Peter Lombard and Aquinas, who however, obtained an occasional earlier look-in as a student of Augustine himself, the author pulls out his final stops for a concluding twenty-none pages of postlude in which he passes judgment on the Trinitarian content of a variety of manuals, textbooks and catechisms. Whilst I find myself in fundamental agreement with his chief *desideratum,* namely, that both the eternal processions and the invisible missions should be approached from the starting point of the visible missions in the public saving economy, I cannot think that the literary structure of this book qualifies its author to be such an astringent critic of other men's work. It *may* be that the significant history of all Trinitarian theology since August 28, 430 is simply Augustine with footnotes-though the almost complete ignorance or neglect of Augustine's writings in the Eastern tradition until the nineteenth century Russian patristic renaissance renders this *prima fa,cie* unlikely. [43] Yet a book which, whilst not claiming to be a history of the doctrine of the Trinity, possesses nonetheless a fundamentally historical structure cannot possibly proceed as though this questionable hypothesis were certainly true. In this regard, a work like Walter Kasper's *The God of Jesus Christ* is much to be preferred as an introduction to the theology of the Trinity. [44] From the Victorines to Barth and von Balthasar, there are voices well worth listening to but given no chance to speak in these pages.

*En passant,* it may be remarked that, while Hill is surely right to regard the Nicene crisis as the fundamental matrix of

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[43] See my ' The Reception of St. Augustine in the Byzantine-Slav tradition ', forthcoming in *Angelicum* 64, (1987), 437-452.

[44] W. Kasper, *The God of Jesus Christ* (E,T London 1984).

Augustine's Trinitarian  thought,  his discussion reflects an ear-
lier generation of patristic scholarship.  The debate  sparked  off
by the remarkable  revisionist  work of Robert  Gregg and Dennis
Groh  might  never  have  been,[45]  nor is Professor  Christopher
Stead's  penetrating  investigation  of the chosen idiom of the
Nicene party in *Divine Substance* exploited. [46]  Yet despite these
criticisms  it is quite  an achievement  to have  made  not only
the manner of composition  of the *De Trinitate*  but also its sub-
ject  matter  so readily  intelligible.  In effect, Hill  has made
available  to a wider readership  the interpretation  of that work
which he put forward in a major article      the *Revue  des etudes
augustiniennes* some twelve  years previously.  [47]

   *Being Human*  takes further  the anthropological  reflections
which exploration  of Augustine's  psychological model (s) of the
Trinity  had suggested.  The book approaches  the theology of
man  as ' the study of the drama of the relationship  between
God and the human race, and all its members  from the begin-
ning to the end of time '.[48]  This offers the               of writing
an ontology of man, partially  illuminated  by the salvation-his-
torical divine action  and partially  constituted  by that action.
In this way, Hill would recreate  the classical patristic  anthro-
pology, which sees man both as in the *image* of God, a state of
affairs given with his creation, and in God's *likeness,* a project
to be achieved throughout  the history of grace. This attractive
program  is indeed pursued  through  the course of the book
whose main sections are: man's origins, and notably  his original
righteousness  and sin; his body-soul unity;  his being-towards-
death and towards-resurrection;   man as person and community;
man as male and female; the unity and pluriformity  of man-
kind; and finally man's transformation  by grace in the light of
the great theological realities of God, Christ  and the last things.

[45] R. C.  Gregg  and  D.  E.  Groh,  *Jilarly Arianism:  a View  of  Salvation*
(London  1981) .

[46] C. Stead,  *Divine Substance*  (Oxford  1977),  especially  pp. 223-266.

[47] E. Hill,  'St.  Augustine's  *De Trinitate:*  the doctrinal  significance  of its
structure',  *Revue des etudes  augustiniennes*  19 (1973).

[48] Hill  BH  p. xvii.

The execution of the program is by and large well done, being carried out within a framework which is formally Thomistic, but fleshed out with material content from a variety of biblical theologies within the Canon, notably those of the Pentateuch as identified on the Wellhausen hypothesis, and St. Paul. Unfortunately, the text is marred by a number of flaws which, taken together, considerably reduce the value of the book. First, and least seriously, there is a recurrent idio-syncracy of tone whose origin appears to be an English nursery in the reign of George V: characters like Ole King Cole, Alice in Wonderland, Winnie-the-Pooh, Albert and the Lion, float in and out of these pages in a fashion which will be, one imagines, as bewildering in Little Rock as in Lesotho. This is all the more remarkable, in that the 8/uthor frequently warns against the blandishments of purveyors of colonial culture, Eurocentrists, *et hoc genus omne.* Secondly, there are some disappointing *lacunae:* thus, for instance, the account of the body-soul rela-tionship in the European philosophical tradition ' from Des-cartes to the present ' confines itself to Gilbert Ryle's somewhat intemperate attack on Cartesianism. [49] But if we are *not* to be enlightened as to the opinions here of Schelling or Merleau-Ponty, our expectations should not be raised and dashed so precipitiately. Thirdly, in a volume designed to introduce students to a specifically *Catholic* approach to anthropology, Church doctrine is sometimes treated in very cavalier fashion: we are told that the immortality of the soul is not as such Christian teaching [5Q]-but what should we make then of the efforts of the fathers of the Fifth Lateran Council? Over against the paganising Neo-Aristotelianism of Pomponazzi, they taught that in the formula *anima forma corporis* Christian revelation has enabled human rationality to acquire a just view of the soul for the first time: the soul belongs to the body as its form, yet the form of the body is nevertheless spirit. [51] Again,

[411] *Ibid.* pp. 96-97.

[50] Ibid. p. 104.

[51] D.-S. 1440; cf. G. Bianca, *PomponlU':zi e il problema deUa persona.Uta umana* (Catania 1941),

Hill rejects the indissolubility of marriage, and the necessity of its monogamous character for all the baptized, on the gorunds that it is unthinkable that' Jesus Christ came to make laws '.[52] Hill's claimed insight into the thinking of the Deity is not shared, as he alleges, by St. Thomas: for the angelic doctor, whilst the primary content of the 'New Law' is indeed the grace of the Holy Spirit, that Law also contains albeit in secondary fashion, those things ' de quibus oportuit instrui fideles Christi et verbis et scriptis, tam circa credenda *quam circa agenda* '.[53] And it may be suggested that this indifference to positive dominical determinations could underlie Hill's assumption of the evident rightness of liberal positions on such matters as the ordination of women. Surely, in a textbook of this kind, the teachings of the ordinary magisterium on such issues should be presented intelligently and sympathetically with the full range of their argumentative and evidential basis fairly deployed. This is the very least that can count as theological responsibility towards the tradition ' in possession ' in the wider Church. But perhaps such self-restraint is too much to ask of a writer who confuses the identification of moral norms with moral motivation, both affirms and denies soteriological universalism, in general manifests a warmer heart than postlapsarian clarity of mind can easily survive, and finally disarms all criticism by telling us that something or other is probably in Philo but that he is much too old to start reading him now!

## A Christology

Father Gerald O'Collins, an Australian by birth and presently Dean of the theological faculty of the Gregorian University in Rome, must surely be the best known of these four writers as he is certainly the most prolific. He is an extremely experienced teacher, a fact reflected in the mellifluous pedagogy of *Interpreting Jesus.*[54] With its numerous sub-divisions, each

[52] Hill  BH  p. 153.

[58] ST  la  Hae  q. 106, a. 1.

[54] G. O'Collins, *Interpreting  Jesus* (London 1983). Cited henceforth as IJ.

supplied  with  carefully  tabulated  main  points,  the  book  guides
the  student  in  painless  fashion  across  five  great  tracts  of  the
Christological  countryside:  the  ministry  of  Jesus;  his  death;  his
resurrection;  Jesus  as  Redeemer,  and  as  Son  of  God.  An  in-
troductory  chapter  explains  the  method  the  author  proposes  to
:follow, whilst  an  epilogue  considers  the  relation  between  fajth
in  Christ  and  the  experience  of  the  non-believing  world,  thus
traspassing  somewhat  on  the  domain  already  claimed  by
Shorter.

In  the  introduction  O'Collins  evokes  the  richness  of  the
Christologist's  *sources.*  Through  a  threefold  schema  of  the
Christ of past  memory,  the  Christ  of  present  experience  and  the
Christ  of  future  hope,  he  or  she  is  able  to  press  an  enormous
variety  of  material  into  service,  ranging  from  traditional
iconography  to  contemporary  film.  In  practice,  however,  O'Col-
lins'  chief  tool  is  a  dogmatically  aware  biblical  exegesis.  In-
deed,  he  holds  that,  by  integrating  biblical  scholarship  into
Christology  modern  theology  has  recreated  the  distinctive
Christological  approach  of  St.  Thomas  as  found  in  the  account
of  the  *mysteria  Christi*  in  the  *Tertia  Pars.*[55]  As  O'Collins's
earlier  books  would  lead  us  to  expect,  this  is  a  Christology  cen-
tred,  like  the  Christian  Liturgy  itself,  on  the  events  of  Good
Friday  and  Easter  Sunday. [56]  Those  events,  and  the  account  of
the  post-existent  '  and  'pre-existent  '  Son  which  they  not  only
permit  but  require,  are  seen  here  not  just  as  Christological  fact
but  as  soteriological  meaning.  They  are  the  divine  response  to
human  existence  as'  a  radical  quest  for,  and  experience  of,  life,
meaning  and  love  '.[57]

On  the  historic  *ministry*  the  author  holds,  rightly,  that  the
earthly  Jesus's  understanding  of  his  own  misission  and  identity
must  be  regarded  as  laying  some  basis  for  subsequent  Chris-
tian  belief  in  him  as  Savior  and  divine  Son:  an  extreme

[55] **IJ**  p.  23.
ssG.  O'Collins,  *The  Calvary  Christ*  (London  1977);  *The  Easter  Jesus*
(London  19802) .
[57] **IJ**  p.  30.

kenoticism that would so circumscribe the human intellect of
the Incarnate Word as to leave that mind with no grasp of its
personal subject's ultimate identity or mission would, frankly,
generate a monstrosity. Backing off from use of the first-person
addresses of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel-despite the recent at-
tempt of Pere Fram;ois Dreyfus to revive use of that Gospel as
a genuine source for our Lord's self-description, [58] O'Collins
finds in the Synoptics sufficient evidence that Jesus saw himself
as enjoying a unique relation to the Father, in virtue of which
his person and fate would be the means of the final in-breaking
of salvation upon the world.

On the *death* of Jesus, the author concentrates on Jesus's
own prior interpretation of his forthcoming death, leaving to
the later chapter of Christ as Redeemer a discussion of the the-
ology of the Atonement. A brief section on Calvary as Trini-
tarian disclosure is too thin to be satisfactory: a pity, since the
best dogmatic Christology both Catholic and Protestant, of the
last hundred years has contributed much to developing M. J.
Scheeben's insight that Christ's sacrifice was 'the highest ex-
pression of the Trinitarian relations and the most perfect vehi-
cle of their extension to the outer world '.[59] O'Collins shows
himself to be a firm believer in the Shroud of Turin which he
regards as the pictorial equivalent to the kerygma of the
Crucified. Though I agree with the late J. A. T. Robinson
that the onus of (dis) proof now lies on the Shroud's critics,
I think its going a *little* far to paraphrase John rn, 32 as 'When
I am lifted up in death and resurrection, I will draw all sciences
to myself-through the relic I will leave behind, my burial
cloth '.[60]

On Christ's *resurrection,* O'Collins persists in the unblush-
ingly objective line of thought which has gained him, in some
Catholic quarters, the sobriquet of 'fundamentalist': a wound

[58] F. Dreyfus O.P., *Jesus savait-ii qn!il etait Dieu?* (Paris 1983).

[59] M. J. Scheeben, *The Mysteries of Christianity* (ET London 1947), p.
445.

[60] **IJ** p. 102.

of honor, perhaps, in the contemporary climate. Over against the account of the resurrection appearances found in Edward Schillebeeckx, O'Collins argues courteously but firmly for the category of embodied encounter, tracing the Flemish Dominican's scepticism about both empty tomb and the veridical quality of the appearance narratives to a prejudice against any empirical grounding to the assertions of faith, as well as an embarrassment over any strikingly ' special ' acts of the revealing and redeeming God within his creation. And yet, as O'Collins soberly sums up, ' It would seem appropriate that this corpse which was the means of universal salvation should share in a glorified existence and belong to the enduring work of redemption carried on by the risen Christ through the Holy Spirit '.[61]

On the *redemption* itself, the author suggests that to the human condition as, characteristically, oppressed, contaminated and interiorly wounded, Christ offers a redemption which is, correspondingly, liberation, expiation and transformation by love. By combining the soteriological approaches of Aulen, Anselm and Abelard, O'Collins is able to offer a satisfying picture of the benefits won by the *redemptor hominis.* And in :Something of a *tour de force,* he points to a possible Trinitarian foundation for this triform salvation. For the Father is the mate source of all life, the Son is limitless meaning and truth, and the Spirit the inexhaustible power of love. My only vation in this section concerns the fact and manner of the author's insistence that Christ in his sacrifice was a representative victim, but not a substitutionary victim. The danger of the language of representation, when taken by way of deliberate and exclusive preference to the claims of the language of substitution, is that, whereas the relation between Christ and sinners is clearly a:ffirn1ed, the :relation between Christ and the Father is left in shadow. The combination of the two types of discourse, on the other hand, in permitting us to speak of the

al **IJ** p. 128.

divine substitution  of an all-encompassing representative  agent allows us to maintain  the reality and primacy of the divine in-itiative  vis-a-vis  the consent of human  beings to be so rep-resented  by the new Adam, their Head. [62] This is, however, no *penal* substitution,  but the expression of the love and concescen-sion which marks the Trinitarian  *periohorem*  and is freely ap-propriated  by the human  will of Christ.

A meditation  on Christ as personally the *divine Son* brings the substantive  part of the work to a close. Full-bloodedly Chalcedonian,  O'Collins' account of the union of the two na-tures in the single hypostasis of the Word  appears to be in-debted to Pere Jean Galot's re-working of the concept of per-son as *,etre relationnel.* [63] On the much-disputed  topic of whether it is appropriate  to ascribe to Jesus the theological virtue of faith O'Collins takes  up what is, to the  best of my knowledge, an original position:  he holds that  whereas that aspect of the *fides quae* which is the *New* Covenant  was known intuitively by the human mind of the incarnate Lord, the confessional con-tent  which that Covenant presupposes, namely, the history of revelation  and salvation in the *Old* Covenant  was believed by him in the same manner as by other Jews (or Christians  since). It is only under this second aspect that the author  would, then, ascribe to Christ the *fides qua,* the act of faith.

All in all, this is an admirable  textbook  which is, 1 am sure, already proving the answer to prayer for many  hard-pressed teachers,  and for those students  who are seeking clear orienta-tions in this  (in every sense) crucial area of Catholic  belief.

### *Corwlusion*

The Editor  of this series did not, curiously, spell out two vital requests of the Second Vatican  Council for the theological life of the Church in the future:  that the Bible should be the

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s2 Cf. the objections  raised by various  critics  to the 'scapegoat  soteriology of Rene Girard,  considered  and responded  to in R. Schwager S.J., 'Christ's death and the prophetic  critique of sacrifice',  *Semeia,* 33 (1984),  pp. 109-123.

es J. Galot S.J., *La, Personne du Ghrist* (GemblolL'l:·Paris 1969).

soul of theology, and that Thomas should retain his classical status as the exemplary theological mentor of the Church. [64] To varying degrees, his elected authors have made good this deficiency, though they manifest no common mind on theological method as such. There is no clear advantage in reading these books as a serial unity, since they possess none. The Editor and publishers have thereby missed a golden opportunity to set forth a vision of Catholic dogmatics for the English-speaking world. The project really requires sustained reflection on the scope, articulation and tools of a systematic theology. Within such thinking, two major questions would be: In what way should the biblical witness enter into the texture of Christian theology? and,      does it mean to say that the theological tradition, at least in the Church of the West, finds a classical 'moment' in the work of Thomas? Though these questions do not by any means exhaust the content of reflection on the practice of theology, they would have helped the authors to identify, in terms consonant with the conciliar call for renewal, the particular contribution which this specific dogmatics was meant to make to the present pluriform universe of Catholic thought.

AIDAN NICHOLS, O.P"

*Black friars*
        *Cambri,lge,   England*

[64] *De,i Verbum* 24; *Optatam totiw;* Hi.

# RECENT  SACRAMENTAL  THEOLOGY

HIS ARTICLE continues and complements an earlier scussion of contemporary sacramental method pub-hed in October, 1983, based on a review of eleven books published in English on the sacraments from 1975 to 1983.[1] That article dealt specifically with approaches to "contemporary systematic reflection on the Christian sacraments, the relation of sacramental theology to other areas of theology, the impact of liturgical studies on sacramental studies, and aspects of pastoral practice." [2] The final section described the elements that should be included in a contemporary approach to a systematic study of sacraments. [3]

The present article assesses seven more recent works in English on sacraments in general,4 again from the perspective of method. In this connection the words of Stephen Happel are helpful:

[T]he coalescence of historical data on the development of sacra-ments, emerging consensus on some general frameworks within which to ask sacramental questions, and the need to provide text-books for those who cannot wade through the jungles of .critical

[1] See Kevin W. Irwin, "Recent Sacramental Theology: A Review Discussion," *The Thomist* 47 (October, 1983) 592-608.

[2] *Ibid.*  592.

s *Ibid.*  605-608 for a summary.

[4] The books discussed here are: Bernard Cooke, *Sacraments and Sacramentality* (Mystic: Twenty-Third Publications, 1983); Gerard Fourez, *Sacraments and Passages Celebrating the Tensions of Modern Life* (Notre Dame: Ave Maria Press, 1983); Joseph Martos, *The Catholic Sacraments,* Volume One in *Message of the Sacraments* series edited by Monika K. Hellwig (Wilmington: Glazier, 1983); David N. Power, *Unsearchable Riches: The Symbolic Nature of the Liturgy* (New York: Pueblo Publishing Co., 1984) ; John P. Schanz, *Introduction to the Sacraments* (New York: Pueblo Publishing Co., 1983); James F. White, *Sacraments as God's Self Giving: Sacramental Practice ana: Faith* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1983) ; Patricia Smith, *Teaching Sacraments* (Wilmington: Glazier, 1987).

monographs have begun to produce new general theories of sacra-
mental life. This is a vital move in the postconciliar church. It is
as though we feel that we have enough sense of the shifting sands
of time to use them in an hourglass to mark our age.5

Each of the books discussed here can be understood to propose
a new general theory of sacramental life or a new approach
to the systematic study of sacraments.

The works by Cooke and Schanz are clearly intended as texts
for college courses in sacramental theology. Martos's book
offers an interdisciplinary approach to sacraments. James
White offers a fresh look at the traditional dictum *lex orandi,
lex credendi* on a level useful for pastors and seminary students.
Gerard Fourez approaches sacraments from a social science per-
spective. David Power deals with symbol in liturgy and the re-
lationship between sacramental study and contemporary cul-
ture. Patricia Smith offers a way of dealing with how to teach
about sacraments in the contemporary context of evolving
sacramental theories. Each book can be understood as an at-
tempt to chart a path through the shifting sands of theological
method, liturgical reform and the varying approaches to sacra-
mental theology in the past two decades.

Well known for his books *Christian Sacraments and Chris-
tian Personality* (1965) and *Ministry to Word and Sacrament*
(1976), Bernard Cooke presents an .approach in *Sacraments and
Sacramentality* that is grounded in human experience and
everyday life. The first six chapters demonstrate how Chris-
tian sacraments are grounded in human life; the remaining
chapters discuss individual sacraments and sacramental grace.
Cooke states that Christian sacraments are "specially signifi-
cant realities that are meant to transform the reality of the
human by somehow bringing persons into closer contact with
the .saving action of Jesus" (8). Intent on broadening the no-
tion of sacramentality Cooke writes that his work concerns
" the sacramentality of Christians and their everyday

5 From Happel's review of Colman O'Neill's work *Sacramental Realism* in
*Worship* 58 (May, 1984) 276-77.

lives" (4). He clearly succeeds in placing the seven sacraments in this wide framework and in demonstrating the essential relationship between sacraments and human life.

Cooke begins his discussion of individual sacraments by arguing that marriage is the basic sacrament (chapter seven). He states that there is " good reason for seeing human friendship as the most basic sacrament of God's saving presence in human life" (93) and that marriage is "the sacrament of human love and friendship" (81). While this unique thesis is intriguing we must assert that this predication skews the essential foundation of both Christian community and Christian sacraments which is common conversion to the gospel in a church whose self-understanding stretches beyond an intimate understanding of community and sacrament. Christian conversion is based on commitment to the gospel and to a lifestyle reflecting the values proclaimed and lived by Jesus and the church. Cooke's approach sees baptism as initiation into a community based on intimacy, friendship and personal relationships, rather than into a specific community that is part of a communion of believers in varying contexts and places. The foundation of such a communion is a commitment to the Lord that includes being related to others in a local church as well as to others in the universal church. Here sacramental initiation marks and enters one on the journey of conversion. Cooke's approach is based on a notion of marriage that is more oriented to fulfillment in relationships than to living as a sign of God's prior and foundational covenant love. It also serves to ghettoize Christian communities rather than to stretch them to include wider notions of church and sacrament. Such an understanding of church and sacrament would include notions of solidarity, mutual interdependence and *com,munio.*

Cooke emphasizes human reconciliation and forgiveness as the foundation of the sacrament of penance rather than grounding the sacrament in God's continual offer of forgiveness and reconciliation through Christ (190-198). While he appropriately emphasizes the notion of social sin          his treatment of the sacrament of penance is ultimately not sufficiently

theological. Cooke stresses formal and informal ways of seek-
ing forgiveness in "liturgies of reconciliation" (213-219) but
he neglects important aspects of the revised rites of reconcilia-
tion in which penance is seen as communal prayer and com-
munal liturgical experiences.

Despite his insistence on human community, Cooke's treat-
ment of sacraments is ultimately individualistic-for example
his treatment of infant baptism and original sin (Ill, 117).
His discussion of adult initiation takes the Rite of Christian
Initiation of Adults only as a preparation for and celebration of
initiation rather than a vision of church life revealed and fost-
ered from the precatechumenate to the postbaptismal period
of mystagogia (HO-UH). This example applies to Cooke's
treatment of the liturgy of sacraments as well where he be-
trays a certain extrinsicism. Unfortunately he ignores the
liturgy as a theological foundation on which to develop sacra-
mental theology.

While Cooke is to be credited for amassing a great deal of
data on sacraments and related issues in a relatively short
space, at times his encyclopedic approach results in superficial
treatment of some topics. For example his discussion of minis-
try leaves out presidency at liturgy and the role of the ordained
deacon; his treatment of the historical evolution of ministry is
superficial (221-224) .

Cooke's notion of grace neglects the dimension of divine
efficacy. His treatment of eucharist as a covenant sacrifice
(104-UO) and covenant decision (160-167) recalls his earlier
work on eucharist as covenant renewal. [6] However, more recent
studies on eucharist as eschatologically-oriented or as grounded
in the variety of meals shared by the earthly Jesus and the
risen Lord are conspicuously absent. [7] This reflects a some-

[s] See Bernard Cooke, "Synoptic Presentation of the Eucharist as Covenant
Sacrifice" *Theological Studies* 21 (1960) 1-44.

[7] See, among others, the helpful work of Xaxier Leon-Dufour, *Le partage
du pain euaharistique selon le Nouveau Testament* (Paris: Editions du Seuil,
1!!82).

what dated approach to sacraments, which is revealed in the sparse and dated bibliography at the end of the book.

This work could be used effectively in college courses on sacraments if supplemented with other more specifically theological works on sacraments. As it stands it is a helpful corrective to a view of sacramentality limited to seven sacraments. Cooke succeeds in asking important questions and in providing a popular summary of an intriguing approach to sacramentality. Unfortunately most of this work summarizes studies by other authors on sacraments, hence it is disappointing in that it breaks no new ground.

Joseph Martos's *The Catholic Sacraments* is divided into two parts: part one (" Sacraments Transformed ") relates psychology, sociology, theology and history to the study of sacraments; part two (" Sacraments Transforming,") relates sacraments to personal, communal, ecclesial and global spirituality. Part One is more thoroughly researched, logically argued and carefully documented. Part Two is more speculative, thought-provoking and programatic. This volume is superior to Martos's earlier book *Doors to the Sacred* with regard toquestions of method. [8] While not a unique or creative approach to sacraments, the book summarizes the state of the question based on the work of others over the past two decades.

Martos's treatment of psychology and sacraments (Chapter One) deals with the notion of the "sacred" and the function of symbol and ritual both in human life and in sacramental events. He uses the work of Eliade, Turner and Erikson especially and the result is an adequate presentation of these key aspects of sacraments. The relationship of symbol, myth and ritual to Christian sacramental practice is clearly exposed.

Chapter Two on sociology and the sacraments deals in a more functional way with myth and symbol as constitutive aspects of human culture. Unfortunately Martos's approach is ultimately too functional and extrinsic to allow for adequate probing of the role of myth and symbol in Christian sacra-

[8] See "Recent Sacramental Theology," 598.

ments.   The author  is insightful  when emphasizing  how cul-
tural  shifts a.frect religion  and religious practice  (70-83) . The
issue of the relationship  of rites of human  passage and Chris-
tian sacraments  is touched  upon and positively  treated  (63-66).
However,  given the controversy  surrounding  this issue among
liturgists  and theologians  alike 9,  more cautious  treatment  of
this issue would have been in order.

Chapters  three and four, the most complete in argument  and
documentation,   relate  history  and theology  to  sacramental
theory  and practice.  The historical  overview  of liturgy  and
sacramental  practice is understandably   brief and generalized
given  the space limitations  of the work.  However,  the section
on medieval  developments  is particularly  ambiguous  and over-
simplified  (97-100). Martos  understands  our present situation
as one which understands  sacramentality  as *pltlralistic* in the
sense that "it both acknowledges  the sequential  pluralism of
the past and looks forward  to the simultaneous  pluralism of the
future " (106) . While he understands  sacramentality  as much
wider  than  the seven  sacraments,  Martos  provides no criteria
for determining  what actions are truly sacramental.

The  treatment  of theology  and sacrament  is the most fully
documented.  He presents  seven ways of studying  sacraments:
from  a scholastic,  Vatican  II,  existential/phenomenological,
process,  charismatic,  liberation,  and models a.pproach. The
existential/phenomenological   approach  uses Schillebeeckx and
Rahner  and is a fair summary  of their important  contributions.
His treatment   of the liberation  model relies chiefly  on Se-
gundo's book *The Sacraments Today.1°* The result is a useful,
though  general,  summary.  The sections dealing  with the proc-
ess and charismatic  approaches  are comparatively  weak; his
almost  total  reliance  on Lee (process) and Gelpi (charismatic)
mar this  important  chapter.  The weakness  of the models ap-

9 See David N. Power,  "The Odyssey of Man in Christ,"  in Luis Maldonado
and David  Power, eds., *Liturgy  and  Huma-n Passage,*  Concilimn Vol. 112 (New
York:  Seabury  Press,  1979),  pp.  100-111.

10 For a discussion  of Segundo's  work see " Recent Sacramental  Theology"
603-604.

proach to theology in general is revealed here in that Martos
provides a summary of different ways of approaching sacra-
ments but does not choose from among them. Thus he leaves
the impression that each model is adequate. What is absent
from this chapter are theological and liturgical approaches to
symbol and sacramental theology. Also absent is a considera-
tion of praxis as grounding and guiding theological reflection on
sacraments. [11]

Part Two, dealing with sacraments and different " spirituali-
ties," is more provocative than fully argued. Here Martos is
particularly careful in describing *ex <Ypere <Yperato* and *sacra-
mentum et res* aspects of sacramental theology. When discuss-
ing sacramental symbols he asserts that sacraments are eccle-
sial, prophetic, kerygmatic, redemptive, eschatological and
liturgical symbols (206-07). It would have been more useful
if Martos used examples from the present liturgies of sacra-
ments to support this discussion. The book concludes with a
brief treatment of sacraments and global spirituality, based on
the prevailing notion of the importance of doing theology
within a " world church " perspective. Issues of justice and the
need to face oppression in society are noted but not considered
at length. Martos offers an overview o:f areas that need to be
addressed in a contemporary systematic approach to sacra-
ments, but his treatment is so brief that it disappoints as an
example of how to execute such an approach.

John Schanz's text *Introduction to the Sacraments* is divided
into six chapters. The first locates study of the sacraments in
the study of religion and worship in general; the second places
the study of sacraments in an explicitly Christian context.
Chapter Three presents the New Testament evidence for ritual
sacraments, specifically baptism and eucharist-an important
discussion weakened by reliance on dated exegesis. In this

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u See Henri Denis, *Les saorements de la foi: La Pague dans ses signes*
(Paris: Editions du Centurion, 1975) and Raymond Vaillancourt *Toward A
Renewal of Sacramental Theology,* Trans. Matthew J. O'Connell (Collegeville:
The Liturgical Press, 1979).

chapter Schanz offers his definition of sacrament: "a sacra-
ment is (I) a saving symbolic act      arising from the ministry
of Christ (3) continued in and through the Church (4) which
when celebrated in faith (by adults) joins us to Christ's wor-
ship of the Father in his Church and (5) forms us in Christ-
likeness, especially in the pattern of the paschal mystery" (47).
Unfortunately this definition omits any reference to creation
as symbol or as the basis of sacramental symbols, as well as
any reference to communal activity in sacraments or to sacra-
ments as eschatological actions performed in the power of the
Holy Spirit.

Schanz moves the discussion away from effects of sacraments
(reflected in his earlier work *The Sacraments of Life and Wor-
ship)* to the role of effective proclamation and appropriation of
the World (chapter four), to actualization of the paschal mys-
tery in present sacramental actions (chapter five) and to the
role of celebration as an appropriate way to deal with how
liturgy influences sacramental theology and practice (chapter
six). Schanz acknowledges his debt to many continental and
American authors and is especially careful to summarize the
groundbreaking contributions of Casel and Semmelroth (136-
147).

Among the authors on whom Schanz depends for his treat-
ment of proclamation are Karl Rahner, Peter Fink and William
Shea.[12] He quotes the following from Rahner's essay on "The
Word and the Eucharist: "

The supreme realization of the efficacious word of God, as the
coming salvific action of God in the radical commitment of the
Church (that is, as the Church's own, full actualization), in the
situations decisive for the individual's salvation, is the *sacrament*
and only the sacrament (37).

To make this same point more forcefully, t,o argue it more
fully and to offer ecumenical possibilities for sacraments based

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[12] He relies on the following in particular: Peter Fink, " Three Languages
of Christian Sacraments," *Worship* 52 (November, 1978) 561-575 and William
Shea, "Sacraments and Meaning," *American Ecclesiastical Review* 169 (1975)
82-89.

on the theology of the Word (conspicuously absent from this book) Rahner's essay "What is A Sacrament?" would have provided a more fruitful starting point. [13]

Schanz discusses sacraments as actualization (98-127) in order to overcome limitations of the scholastic and modern treatments of causality and effects of sacraments. He relates sacraments to Christ, the church and the human person and by discussing the interrelationship among them offers an informative approach to the notion of actualization of the paschal mystery in sacraments. However, his limited notions of liturgical ministry (priest only) and of the church (self-enclosed) betray a preconciliar outlook throughout that needs to be adjusted in light of contemporary sacramental practice. Specifically with regard to the notion of " actualization " it is clear that Schanz wants to overcome reified notions of grace or effects in sacraments. However, how well he succeeds is questionable since he apparently assumes that " actualization " is a substitute for these terms. More recent studies reveal some inadequacies with this term and point to " memorial " as a multi-dimensional reality. [14] More fully explored and systematically studied, the notion of " memorial " could prove more central to sacramental theology than Schanz suggests-possibly providing an integrating and comprehensive notion for the theology of sacraments.

His final chapter deals with a celebration model of sacraments. Here the author relies on important liturgical studies from the earlier part of this century. However, even when summarizing easel's theory of "mystery presence" Schanz is apparently unaware of critiques of Casel that demonstrate ways in which he was as objective in his approach as was the

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[13] *Worship* 47 (1973) 274-284.

[14] See Fritz Chenderlin, *Do This As My Memoriai.* The Semitic and Conceptual Background and Value of *Anamnesis* in 1 Corinthians 11: 25, Analecta Biblica 99 (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1982), as well as C. Giraudo, *La struttura ietteraria de/.la preghiera euoaristica,, Saggio sulla genesi Utteraria di una forma. Toda veterotestamentaria, Be-raka giudaica, Anafora oristiana* Analecta Biblica 92 (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1981).

liturgical  theology  he attempted  to surpass.  For example, some
have  pointed  out that  while Ca.sel deals  with the presence  of
mystery  in the liturgy  he does not link this (objective)  pres-
ence  with the involvement  or response  of the church  community
to this presence. [15]

When  dealing  with  the model  of celebration  Schanz  relies on
the  work  of Fransen,  Worgul  and  Vaillancourt   (147-158).  He
asserts  that  sacraments  are celebrations  of faith, celebrations  of
the paschal  mystery,  of the inner  presence  of God in grace, of
self-realization,  of ecclesial  identity  and  of  a  new  world  of
meaning  for sacraments   (157-165).  Schanz  ends this  chapter by
criticizing  the celebration  model  and  by offering  pastoral  ob-
servations  derived  from  it.  A more  explicit  linking  of sacra-
ments  to the paschal  mystery  would  have  been  desirable  given
the importance  Schanz ascribes  to this point.

*Sacraments  and  Passages*  by Gerard Fourez  is a popular  work
that  treats  of sacraments  as activities  that  help celebrating
communities  deal  with  conflicts  and  tensions  of modern  life.
As a social scientist, Fourez  focuses  upon  the contexts  in which
Christian  sacraments  are celebrated  and  the dilemmas  which
people  face in contemporary  society.  Hence  this  work  is not
a comprehensive  approach  to sacraments  but an effort  to un-
derstand  the  role sacraments  play  in the lives of participants.
Chapters  one, two and ten  deal  with  these  issues  specifically;
chaptern  three  to nine  relate  these  factors  to  the seven  sacra-
ments.  Overall the book is thought-provoking   and  stimulating.
**It** is valuable  for those who spend  much of their  pastoral  minis-
try presiding  at or celebrating  sacraments.  Its inductive  ap-
proach  to theology,  its orientation  to practice,  its use of soci-
ological data,  and  its integral  understanding  of the Christian
life with sacramental  actions  as constitutive  of that life make
this work  important.   However,  it is not without  over-simplifi-

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[15] See, among  others,  T. Filthaut,  *La theologie  des rnysteres,  ea:pos'e de la
controverse*  (Tournai:   Desclee,  1954),  L Dalmais,  "La 'doctrine  des
mysteres'  (Mysterienlehre)  de Dom Casel,"  in A. Martimort,  ed. *L'Eglise  en
Prwre*  (Paris:  Desclee,  1984, ed. nouvelle)  275-281, Raymond  Didier,  *Les
sacrements,*  pp. 12-14.

cations and overly-facile conclusions. While not intended to be
a complete theology of sacraments, the outline and scope of
the work make it appear to contain more than it actually does.
The absence of documentation and bibliography is regrettable,
especially since much of the history of religions and sociologi-
cal material is treated so summarily as to be confusing £or the
non-specialist. At times this translation from the French orig-
inal is inaccurate.rn From a liturgical point of view the book is
severely flawed since there is little reference to the liturgical
rites either as .sources for theology or as indications of what is
contained in the rites the church celebrates. Where the liturgy
of a sacrament is referred to the author's ignorance is clearly
betrayed. This is especially clear (and disappointing) in his
treatment of the eucharistic liturgy (66-72).

Fourez's interest in the liberative power of sacraments is
seen most clearly in his treatment of baptism and penance. He
explicitly cites the Exodus and the Red Sea as paraidigmatic
of the liberation offered in baptism (70); unfortunately he £ails
to discuss any link between baptism and Christ's resurrection.
When dealing with the sacrament of penance Fourez adopts a
rather functional approach by stating that we need penance to
relieve oppression and injustice in our society (11). He does
not speak of sin, redemption, identification with Christ or
sanctification through grace in this connection. What is posi-
tive in this liberation approach is how Fourez carefully ex-
plores notions of social sins, which have paralyzing effects on
the oppressed (110-113). When discussing forgiveness (113-
114) the author does not addl'ess the difference between ex-

is The French original is entitled *Les sacrements reveillent la vie. Oelebrer
les tensions et les joies de l'emistence.* A particularly disturbing misquotation
is found on p. 141. The author cites the *Didaohe* 10, 7 "Let the prophets
say the eucharistic prayer as they wish." This is clearly to take liberty with
the text which actually states "Iet the prophets pronounce the blessing as
they like." Such a translation leaves open the important question of whether
this section of the *Didaohe* is a eucharistic prayer or not. See, Allan Bouley,
*From Freedom to Formula. The Evolution of the Eucharistic Prayer from
Oral Improvisation to Written Texts* (Washington: The Catholic University
of America Press, 1981) pp. 90-99.

pressing forgiveness in human apology and the reality of for-
giveness effected in the sacrament of penance.

Fourez understands confirmation as a rite of maturity for
adolescents nearing adulthood (95). He understands the need
for this sacrament because of changing social relationships and
the tensions inherent in moving from childhood to adulthood
(87-89, 95-96). There is no reference to confumation as an
initiation sacrament or to the role of the Spirit in the sacra-
ments of initiation. The sacrament of marriage is understood as
an expression of fidelity; it is based on God's fidelity to us and
to our expressing fidelity to each other through marriage vows
(ms). While Fourez argues that Christian marriage parallels
marriage as a societal institution (117-121), he does not deal
with more specifically theological aspects such as marriage as a
covenant, as an eschatological reality, or as a sacrament based
on mutual commitment for mutual fulfillment and the raising
of children in the faith. Most unfortunate is the approach to
ordination that sets this sacrament within the context of power
in human groups (130-182). His descriptions of power held by
the ordained are superficial and open to misunderstanding
(137-140). However, in speaking of the context of ordination
Fourez does discuss the church community and that ordination
is for the service of the church. The treatment of anointing of
the sick is too closely tied to the situation of the terminally ill
and of those near death. The important role of this sacrament
and funeral rites for the individual and for the family as a rite
of passage is clearly stated.

Theological weaknesses mar this book. While Fourez begins
and ends his treatment by referring to symbol, any further dis-
cussion in the intervening chapters remains superficial. Classi-
cal elements of sacramental theology are absent here, specifical-
ly divine initiative in sacramental activity and how grace op-
erates in the community that participates in sacraments.

James White's *Sacraments as God's Self Giving* is written
from a Protestant perspective of how sacraments work and
what sacraments mean. The title of the book contains its main

thesis:   that  God  acts  in  sacraments  in  acts  of  self-giving.
White  asks  throughout  about  the  required  and  appropriate  re-
sponse  of  those  who  celebrate  them   (27) .  White  calls  his
method  a  " liturgical  circle "  based  on  the  traditional   axiom  *lex
orandi, lex credendi:*

W·e  begin  the  circle  by  observing  what  the  church  says  and  does
in  its  gatherings  for  worship.  These  experiences  are  considered  very
significant  expressions  of  the  faith  of  the  church.  On  the  basis  of
such  observation,  we  then  move  to  theological  reflection,  as  to  the
meaning  of  the  faith  thus  expressed.  We  complete  the  circle  by
using  such  reflection  as  the  basis  for  suggesting  worship  reforms  by
which  the  faith  can  be  expressed  in  more  effective  ways.  Practice
leads  to  theology,  which  then  returns  *to*  practice  (10).

This  method  reflects  the  approach  of  many  liturgists  to  sacra-
mental  theology.   The  advantage  in  this  formulation  is  that  it
takes  liturgical  texts  and  rites  seriously,  and  allows  for  further
development  in  them.   He  ca.re£ully argues  for  a  theology  de-
rived  *from*  the  sacraments  rather  than  a  theology  imposed  on
the  sacraments  or  a  theology  *about*  the  sacraments   (27).

    White  begins  by  discussing  the  " humanity  of  the  sacra-
ments "  in  chapter  one.  He  states  that  he  is  concerned  to  ex-
plore  " the  human  experience  of  self  giving,  which  the  sacra-
ments  reflect  through  their  use  of  words  and  actions.  We  shall
also  see  how  sacraments  operate  in  the  context  of  the  com-
munity  of  faith  known  as  the  Church"   (13-14).  White  avoids
using  the  term  "grace"  to  describe  God's  operating  in  sacra-
ments   (27).  He  prefers  to  speak  of  God's  self  giving  as  deter-
minative  in  sacraments.   We  use  spoken  words  in  worship  in
order  to  speak  to  God,  for  God  and  to  each  other  in  God's
name   (17) .  Sacraments   provide  the  setting  in  which  this  is
done.  White  reiterates  a  definition  of  Christian  worship  he
wrote  in  *Introduction  to  Christian  Worship* [17]  when  he  states:
"If,  by  words,  we  speak  to  each  other  in  God's  name,  in  the
sacraments  we  often  *touch  each  other  in  God's  name.  We  act*

    [17] See  *Jntroduoti-On  to  Christian  Worship*  (Nashville:   Abingdon,  1980),  p.
22.

for God in acting to each other"  (21).  The material contained
in this first chapter  describes the phenomenological approach to
sacraments  argued throughout.  While clearly provocative  and
challenging,  there  is  a  certain  functional  approach  to  sacra-
ments  betrayed  here.

   White's  treatment  of baptism  in chapter  two is particularly
insightful  for  Roman  Catholics  because  he  discusses  the  place
of both infant baptism  and confirmation  in the process of initia-
tion.  The author clearly opts  for the propriety  of infant  bap-
tism because of all the sacraments  infant baptism demonstrates
the priority  of God's sustaining  love.  It is only after  God acts
in sacraments  that we can speak of comprehension  and human
response in faith  (45-49).  White calls confirmation  separated
from  infant  baptism  a  fractured  initiation  rite.  His  thesis  is
that initiation  is a lifelong process begun with water baptism
and chrismation  performed at the same time.  This is a helpful
corrective  to  much  Roman  Catholic  popular  writing  that  sees
adult initiation  as  the  norm  of baptism [18] or  that  calls  for  an
end  of infant  baptism  to  solve  the  contemporary  problem  of
how  to  deal  with  baptized  non-believers.  Such important  pas-
toral problems call for more than tactical adjustments  for their
solution.

   In chapter  three  White  deals  with  eucharist.  He is particu-
larly insightful when treating eucharistic memorial  *(54-55)* and
faithful  to Brilioth's  work when dealing  with  New  Testament
images of the eucharist. [19] He proposes that we ought to under-
stand  eucharist  as  joyful  thanksgiving,  commemoration,  com-
munion,  sacrifice,  presence,  action of  the  Holy  Spirit and fore-
taste  of  the  final  consummation  of  things.  (53-60).  While
these  are  decidedly important  understandings  commonly  as-
sociated  with  the  eucharist,  one  could  fault  White's  liturgical
method  since these seven ideas are not all equally clearly pre-

   [18] For  a  clear  presentation  of this  position  see .Aidan  Kavanagh  *The Shape
of Baptism*  (New York:  Pueblo Publishing  Co., 1978).

   [19] See *Euoharistio  l!'aith and Praotice,  Evangeiioal  and Catholio:*  Trans.
A. G. Hebert  (London:  SPCK,  1930) .

sent in the eucharistic  prayer,  the chief source for eucharistic
theology.  In fact, White neglects the anaphora  as a source for
his eucharistic  theology.

Chapter  four deals with what White terms "apostolic  and
natural sacraments."   Apostolic  sacraments  include healing, re-
conciliation  and ordination;  natural sacraments  are marriage
and burial.  This chapter is the briefest of the book and clear-
ly demonstrates  White's unease with granting  these rites equal
status  with  baptism  and eucharist.  Yet this chapter  does
pose some important  and interesting  questions  for Protestant
readers  regarding  an  ongoing  relationship  with  the  dead
through  prayer  (91) .

White offers a direct challenge to Protestant  as well as to
Roman Catholic readers about many liturgical  and sacramental
issues.  This is most clearly  seen in chapter  six where he offers
thirty-five  suggestions  for reforming  Protestant  sacramental
practice  (rn5-l34).   Here he discusses regular Sunday celebra-
tion of the eucharist,  uniting  water baptism  and chrismation
into one initiatory  sacrament,  the importance  of symbol and
the sign-value  of celebrations,  and rigorous  preparation  by
those entering  the sacrament  of marriage.

In chapter  five White offers his approach  to a. much discussed
contemporary  issue: the relationship  of sacraments  and justice.
While  his definitions  of justice  are decidedly  non-biblical,  his
overall approach  is based on baptism  as the fundamental  sacra-
ment  which establishes  and initiates  one into experiencing
God's justice.  Most compelling  is his understanding  of justice
from global and eschatological  perspectives.  The celebration  of
eucharist  and reconciliation  is an essential  means to challenge
and to strengthen  communities  in their sense and experience of
justice  (108-113) . White states  clearly that some sacramental
practices  of the church themselves  reinforce  injustices  and
ought  to he avoided  (100-105).  Unfortunately  White's dis-
cussion of ordination  here is weak in that he does not link no-
tions of leadership  by the ordained  with liturgical  presidency.
His functional  approach  to ordained  ministry  seems to ignore
other important  notions  such as "oversight."

The next book to be assessed, *Unsearchable Riches* by David Power, is clearly the most thought-provoking and challenging of those considered here. Careful reading and reflection yields much insight into the present crisis of vision and hope regarding sacraments. The crisis of vision concerns the expression and interpretation of " a sense of being in time and a sense of the holy that are pertinent to contemporary fact and contemporary models of reality" (1). The crisis of hope concerns the present when " humanity [is] continually compelled to consider whether there are any hopes by which it is possible to face the future ,; (1). Far from offering depressing answers to these questions Power argues that a helpful model of sacramental practice derives from a careful consideration of symbol as the foundation for liturgy and sacraments.

In his analysis Power uses the tools provided by hermeneutical theory and contemporary systematic theology. The names Gadamer, Ricoeur, Langer, Rahner, Schillebeeckx, Geertz, Metz, Turner and Eliade abound in the text and footnotes. Many in the English-speaking theological world have come to expect insight, proV'ocation and challenge from the pen of David Power.[20] This work offers all of these. While a series of articles in *The Way* provides the basis for what is presented here [21] Power has made important changes in his thinking which enable him to state that the book is effectively a new work. It is clearly based on the new cultural context that has evolved in the intervening years.

In chapter one Power reviews the " state of the liturgy " and its " symbolic crisis," arguing for a retrieval of a consciousness of symbol and a liturgy sustained in historical consciousness.

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[20] An example of how Power's thought has evolved and of important insights he offers on liturgy is seen in his works on ministry: *Ministers of Ghrist and His Church: The Theology of the Priesthood* (London: Chapman, 1969); *The Christian Priest: Elder and Prophet* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1973); and *Gifts That Differ: Lay Ministries Established and Unestablished* (New York: Pueblo Publishing Co., 1980).

[21] See, *The Way* 13 (1973) 310-325; 14 (1974) 57-66; 15 (1975) 55-64; 15 (1975) 137-146.

He maintains  that  today  a dynamic  and communitarian   under-
standing  of reality  and of the universe  replaces the ordered  and
hierarchical  approach  that  sustained  understandings   of the
liturgy  from  the  neo-Piatonism  of Pseudo-Dionysius     (18) .
This  careful  critique  leads  to an awareness  of the  need  for a
reinterpretation    of liturgy      various  cultures  given  the dy-
namism  of contemporary  thought  and culture. Since  the style
of the  chapter  is synthetic,  much  is left underdeveloped.

   Chapter   two  (" Historical   Interlude  ")  " indicates  factors
from  history  that  are pertinent  to present  need  and that  help
to better  understand  liturgy's  symbolic  nature"  (35).  Among
the  more  helpful  sections  is that  dealing  with  the  shift  from
patristic  usage about  symbol, representation,  sign and reality
to the  vVestern  medieval  approach  separating  sign and reality
 (46-57) . Power'.s thesis is sustained  here  and the  evidence ad-
duced  is clearly  presented.   However  some  of the  complexity
and nuance  owed  to each  period  reviewed  may  well  be lost  in
such  a brief  review.

   Chapters  three,  four  and five  provide  the  key  to understand-
ing Power's  thesis.  Chapter   three  is entitled  "Symbol  De-
scribed,"  in  which  the  author  discusses  three  approaches  to
meaning:  ordinary,  scientific  and  symbolic  (64-65).  Power
prefers  to use  these  approaches  rather  than  to argue  for one
definition  of symbol; however  he uses  Vergote's  description  as a
way  to initiate  this  discussion  (61).  He concludes  the  chapter
by indicating  two  approaches  to symbols  of the holy.  The one
gives importance  to the  word and"  to the  church's  ability  in a
poetics  of word  to express  the  contemporary   encounter  with
Christ"  (78).  In such  an approach  a teleological  and eschato-
logical understanding  of time and history operates.  Here many
sacramental  elements  are open  to change  and cultural  differ-
ences  are considerable.   Power  clearly  chooses  this  approach
over one which gives emphasis  to "the iconic ... the holiness
of place  and time, to the  aura  of the  mysterious  and numinous,
and  to permanent  and unchanging  elements  in ritual  celebra-
tion "  (79) . While  Power  discusses  each  approach  it remains

doubtful  whether  he  has  presented  the  merits  of  the  " iconic ,,
approach  as  fully  as  he  might.  Some  aspects  of  the  iconic  ap-
proach  have  formed  the  foundation  of  much  legitimate  sacra-
mental  theology  and  practice.

Chapter  Four  on " Ritual  and  Verbal  Image " is  an  intriguing
and  stimulating  essay.  In continuing  to  argue  that  the  holy
is  found  " in  places  distinctive  of  a  historical  revelation "
rather  than  " where  cosmic  ritual  looks  for  it "  (105) Power
discusses  rites  of  purification,  passage  and  mimetic  rites  as
these  understandings  help  us  interpret  Christian  liturgy  (90-
96) .  He  offers  six  propositions  about  the  verbal  image  and
symbol  which  are  then  applied  to  how  we can  understand  and
interpret  redemption  in  Christ  (108) .

Power's  thesis  continues  in  Chapter  Five  about  myth,  narra-
tive  and  metaphor.  Both  the  A.damic  and  cosmogonic  myths
undergird  much  of  what  is  understood  and  celebrated  in  Chris-
tian  liturgy.  The  concluding  sections  of  the  chapter  help  to
explain  what  the  author  means  by  a  "generative  poetics"
 (1£8).  This  fresh  look  at  the  Adamic  and  exile  myths  is  es-
pecially  useful.   The  conjunction  of  narrative  and  ritual  in
memorial,  the  notion  of  metaphor  as  a  " yoking  of  unlikes "
and  the  discussion  of  confession  as  metaphor  are  especially
helpful  and  insightful  (180-189) .

In  Chapter  Six  Power  states  a  thesis  that  dominates  the
rest  of  the  book.  He  states  that:  " the  liturgy  is  an  action
wherein  the  testimony  of  God  is  heard  and  appropriated,  the
experience  of  the  community  is  transformed,  and  a  godly  ex-
perience  disclosed"  (146).  Clearly  avoiding  terminology  of
sacramental  efficacy or  sacramental  ontology  as  conventionally
understood.  Power  offers  insight  about  what  occurs  in  sacra-
ments  as  transformative  of  the  human  community  or  person
and  as  disclosive  of  the  divine  (147).  Here  he  considers  the
importance  of  blessing  prayers  as  ways  of  communicating  the
community's  appreciation  of  symbol  and  narrative  in  sacra-
ments                  . He  speaks  about  the  context  for  addressing
God  in  the  liturgy,  especially  the  Abba  and  Father  images

(161-164) .  He  concludes  by  combining  lamentation  and  thanksgiving  (164-168) .[22]

In  chapter  seven  Power  applies  his  discussion  to  liturgiology  (175-180)  and  to  ontology  in  sacrament  (180-196).  He  maintains  that  there  are  four  ways  that  symbol  changes  human  perspectives.  Thl'ough  symbol  we  move  from  objects  to  meaning,  from  utilitarianism  to  human  values,  from  the  external  to  the  inner  world,  and  from  image  to  imagination  (186-196) .  The  practice  of  liturgy  helps  us  see  reality  from  a  totally  new  perspective,  historically  conditioned  rather  than  hierarchically  ordered.  Power  summaries  much  of  his  argument  by  stating  that  ontology  is  retained  as  a  category  of  sacramental  thinking  provided  that  efficient  causality  is  replaced  by  symbolic  causality,  that  divine  self-communication  takes  place  within  history,  and  that  a  Spirit  christology  offers  a  preferred  basis  for  sacramental  symbolization.  This  approach  has  the  advantage  " of  not  appealing  to  a  hierarchical  vision  of  church  and  universe  or  to  a  hierarchy  of  sacramental  causes.  Instead  it  appeals  to  a  creative  and  redeeming  presence  in  the  world,  which  shows  itself  in  history  through  event  and  symbolization"  (206) .

Power  concludes  by  speaking  about  " the  truth  of  sacrament:"

When  .  .  .  due  to  a  retrieval  of  both  collective  and  individual  subject,  sacraments  are  considered  in  terms  of  consciousness,  intentionality,  and  appropriation  of  a  world,  their  truth  becomes  the  issue  of  their  meaning  and  of  their  fidelity  to  the  gospel  tradition  (US).

He  cites  three  criteria  for  validating  sacramental  practice  which  are  " fulness  of  language,  adequacy  to  experience,  and  celehration's  relation  to  the  o:rthopraxis  of  gospel  freedom  and  solidarity  with  the  suffering"  (213) .

What  David  Power  offers  is  one  approach  to  a  contemporary  understanding  and  reinterpretation  of  elements  discovered  in

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[22] See  David  N.  Power,  "Forum:  Worship  After  the  Holocaust,"  *Worship*  59  (September,  1985)  447-455  which  contains  a  prayer  te:x;t for  "a  eucharist  in  an  age  of  abandonment."

every liturgical action: myth, symbol, language and metaphor. This is an important work. However, some points need further precision and elaboration. Whether sacramental efficacy can be adequately treated when sacraments are analysed from Ricoeur's writings can be debated. [23] Whether an historically conscious approach to sacraments could lead to a relativism in theology and meaning remains to be clarified. Whether Power should have used" ontology" to develop his approach to sacraments because of this term's important place in traditional sacramental theology can be questioned. However, Power himself states that his aim is not to settle issues. " My desire is more precisely to offer room for thought and to allure those who wish to think more deeply about liturgy and its symbolic nature, knowing full well that they may disagree with me on some points and find my work inadequate on others" (vii) . Power's contribution lies in his providing an alternative context within which to consider sacramental questions, one sensitive to the crisis of vision and hope he outlines at the beginning of his work. Of the works discussed here Power's will likely stand the test of time. His understanding of symbol will likely remain (in Happel's terminology) an important general theo.ry of sacramental life.

The final book under review here, *Teaching Sacraments* by Patricia Smith, is influenced among others by Power's method in general, and specifically by his approach to symbol. The author admits that her work is not a new book on sacramental theology as such, but " a book about sacraments *teaching* and about *teaching* the sacraments" (9). Each chapter begins with sample questions and exercises for students (for example, :reading p:reconciliar and postconciliar treatments of some aspect of sacramental theology) and concludes with (generaUy well chosen) recommended :readings to supplement her discussion. The bulk of each chapter is text drawn from the author's reflections used in class presentations. As such it is a useful tool for sacramental pedagogy on an adult education level.

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[2a] See Regis Duffy, "[Report on the] Seminar on Sacramental and Liturgi·cal Theology" *O.T.8.A. Proceedings* 40 (1985) 207-208.

The book opens with a chapter on " setting the context " in which the author describes how and why sacramental theology is undertaken today and how this relates to the contents of this book itself. The next :five chapters deal with the anthropological, theological, Christologica.I, ecclesiological and eschatological foundations of sacramental action. The book concludes with a consideration of "teaching sacraments," which is a useful summary of the author's basic approach in this work and could well have been included in chapter one to underscore Smith's objective in writing this book. Here the author argues that sacraments " teach " through the imagination, participation and the Word. Smith describes a dialogical approach to teaching which can form, reform or deform the participants. For her the educative process leads to manifestation-disclosure and to covenant-dialogue. The goal of education is transformation and the result of the process is lifelong lea.ming. '\Tith these as her premises it is possible to appreciate both the structure and contents of this work,

In chapter one the author uses Power's thesis about the contemporary symbolic crisis [24] and Vaillancourt's division of Christian sacramental understanding into three part.s, comprising the first millenium, the second millenium to 1960 and from 1960 to the present. [25] Smith clearly asserts the characteristic Roman Catholic understanding of creation as symbolic and sees this recovery as crucial for appreciating what sacraments are and do, She maintains that in the first millenium liturgy was a " focused moment," a " principal teacher, a fonnative moment in the faith." (22) This was unfortunately lost in the second millenium when the church came to emphasize sacramental rites as opposed to the ·wider notion of sacramentality which held sway in the first millenium (to use Vaillancourt's thesis and terminology). She asserts that the present

[24] See *Unsearchable Riches* Chapter One, "The state of Liturgy: Symbolic Crisis," pp. 5-34.

[25] Raymond Vaillancourt, *Towa.rd a Renewal* pp. 11-27. See, K. Irwin "Recent Sacramental Theology" 593 for a critique of this work.

stress  on  the  sacramental  nature  of  the  church  is  a  positive
thing  in  order  to  allow  a  unification  of  liturgy  and  life.  This
phenomenon,  she  argues,  is  a  result  of  the  return  to  the  sources
of  theology  (largely  influenced  by  Vatican  II) ,  to  an  apprecia-
tion  of  modern  philosophy  and  to  contemporary  pastoral  need.
While  this  treatment  is  somewhat  sketchy  and  oversimplified,
this  chapter  can  be  a  useful  tool  to  help  adult  education  groups
appreciate  the  rationale  for  some  of  the  liturgical  renewal  in
sacraments  after  Vatican  II.

In  treating  the  anthropological  foundations  of  sacrament
(second chapter)  Smith  reviews  some  of  the  familiar  territory
traversed  in  the  other  works  reviewed  here  (as  well  as  in
Vaillancourt's  book)  including  the  importance  of  the  human
roots  of  ritual  activity  and  symbolic  expression  (41-51).  Her
critique  of  ritualism  is  influenced  by  questions  raised  by  the
turn  to  the  subject  in  contemporary  theology  (55)  as  well  as
by  challenges  to  sacramental  practice  raised  by  liberation  the-
ologians  (59-60) .[26]  When  dealing  with  the  theological  founda-
tions  for  sacramental  activity  (third  chapter)  Smith  discusses
Judaeo-Christian  images  of  God,  language  about  God  and  some
pastoral  implications.  When  discussing  grace  in  this  chapter
Smith  relies  on  some  key  insights  from  Rahner  about  the  re-
lationship  between  grace  and  how  one  experiences  God  (79-
80).  Despite  her  reference  to  Rahner,  however,  the  author  ap-
parently  has  chosen  not  to  reflect  the  precision  of  his  thought.
Not  unlike  Cooke's  treatment  of  grace  noted  above,  Smith's  is
unfortunately  too  horizontal.  She  does  not  emphasize  suffi-
ciently  how  grace  works  through  sacraments.

In  discussing  Christology  and  sacraments  (chapter  four)
Smith  deals  with  what  she  calls  the  sacramental  significance  of
traditional  Christological  doctrines,  specifically  the  incarnation
as  well  as  the  death  and  resurrection  of  Christ.  She  argues  that
these  doctrines  function  well  when  they  incorporate  us  into  the
mystery  of  God  and  that  sacraments  function  as  moments  of

[20] For  a  critque  of  Segundo's  work,  *The  Sacraments  Today.*  see,  "Recent
Sacramental  Theology"  603-605.

transformation   in  Christ   (103).   While  her  thesis  is  accurate
and  her  argument  clear,  reference  to  the  liturgy  of  sacraments
in  which  this  is  explicitated  would  have  been  useful.

Chapter  five  on  ecclesiology  and  sacraments  contains  much
more  material  than  the  chapter  heading  indicates  (in  fact  it
summarizes  many  themes  of  *De sacramentis in genere)* and  is
not  well  argued.  In  addition  to  asking  whether  the  author  has
done  full  justice  to  Rahner's  thought  on  the  church  (she  states
that  he  maintains  that  the  church  is  " a  partial  though  power-
ful  expression"  of  God's  self-revelation)  one  would  have  to
question  whether  her  understanding  of  sacramental  character
is  totally  accurate  (118-120) .  It  is  curious  that  when  present-
ing  " official  Roman  Catholic  magisterial  teaching "  on  sacra-
ments,  Smith  only  discusses  (1)  the  morals  of  the  minister,
 (2)  matter,  form  and  ecclesial  decision,  (3)  sacramental  char-
acter  and  (4)  recent  directions  (including  *.Lt!ediator Dei,*
*Mystici  Corporis* and  *Sacrosanctum  Concilium).*  While  she
asserts  that  "official  statements  [of  the  magisterium]  are  im-
portant  for  setting  ' bottom  line '  beliefs,  they  may  lead  to  a
deficient  understanding  if  they  are  taken  out  of  context  or  if
they  are  presumed  to  provide  a  foll  picture  of  sacramental
thought"  (131).  Unfortunately  Smith's  own  presentation  is
liable  to  just  such  a  criticism.

The  chapter  on  eschatology  (six)  is  an  interesting,  if  not
fully  developed,  approach  to  this  classical  category  in  the  un-
derstanding  of  sacraments.  Here  Smith  discusses  ecumenism
and  the  relationship  between  eschatology  and  the  concems  of
liberation  theologians  about  sacraments.  While  one  can  legiti-
mately  question  why  the  ecumenical  dimension  is  only  intro-
duced  at  this  late  stage  in  the  book  and  why  the  Lima  state-
ment  on  *Baptism,  Eucharist  and  Ministry* is  the  only  ecumeni-
cal  agreed  statement  on  sacraments  to  be  noted  and  discussed,
nevertheless  it  is  important  that  these  matters  are  noted,  if  not
fully  discussed,  in  a  work  like  this.  Most  useful  is  the  author's
linkage  of  eschatology  with  issues  of  justice  since  all  too  often
these  are  separated  so  that  eschatology  comes  to  mean  teleology

and justice concerns are regarded as added to sacramental theology rather than essential components of the sacramental experience.

In general this work is more useful as a pedagogical tool than as a work on sacramental theology. The title *Teaching Sacraments* is misleading because the work is actually a summary of other authors' work (principally R. Vaillancourt and D. Power) in contemporary sacramental theology. This information, however, is presented in a way that facilitates how it can be taught. As presented this structure is very useful.

While the seven works discussed here reflect differences in approach, when taken together they attest to the truth of Happel's contention that at this point in the postconciliar church we may well be at a stage where we can sketch the contours of an " emerging consensus on some general frameworks within which to ask sacramental questions .... " [21]

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[21] S. Happel, review cited above, 276.

# BOOK REVIEWS

*Aquinas, Calvin, and Contemporary Protestant Thought: A Critique of Protestant Views on the 1'hought of Thomas Aquinas.* By ARVIN VOS. Washington, D.C.: Christian University Press (a subsidiary of the Christian College Consortium and William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company), 1985. Pp. v + 178, with bibliography and index. Paper, $9.95.

The author, profesRor of philosophy at \Vestern Kentucky University, has presented a work that is admirably structured and written with both clarity and an impressive command of the subject matter. The work examines Protestant views and St. Thomas Aquinas's thought in three areas: the meaning of faith, the relationship between natural theology and sacred theology (which entails the larger issue of faith and reason, philosophy and theology), and the theme of nature and grace. In his Introduction Professor Vos presents his own organization of these topics: "In Chapter One I compare Calvin's definition of faith as 'a firm and sure knowledge of God's benevolence toward us' with Aquinas's account of faith as 'thinking with assent.' ... In Chapter Two I address the issue of implicit faith and the distinction between formed and unformed faith. . . . In Chapter Three I begin to evaluate contemporary Protestant views of Aquinas. Since the matter with which most Protestants are familar is Aquinas's natural or philosophical theology, the obvious task is to show how it relates to his view of faith. In the process we will consider various views on the nature of this relation and attempt to clarify Aquinas's own view of the matter .... In Chapter Four I consider the role of the preambles (of faith) and examine the Rtatus of the proposition 'God exists' and its implications as both a starting point for sacred theology and a conclusion for the theology of the philosophers. In Chapter Five I give an account of how Aquinas relates the existence of God as it is known in theology to the existence of God as it is known in philosophy. Chapter Six is devoted to enlarging the discussion by setting the relation of faith and reason in the context of nature and grace (pp. xiii-xiv)."

The themes and the language in which they are discussed would seem to indicate that the author speaks to those who remain concerned with traditional, substantive issues of theology, both Protestant and Catholic. This review will call attention mainly to the author's able choice and interpretation of texts from the works of Saint Thomas. Of the three main areas covered, the first is the meaning of faith. The misperception argued

against  is that  St. Thomas  stands  as the  diametrical  opposite  of John
Calvin. Vos quotes Calvin's description of faith  as a firm and  certain
knowledge,  whereas  St. Thomas  makes  faith  and  knowledge  *(scientia)*
mutually  exclusive  (see ST, 2a2ae. 1, art.  4 & 5). The  author  reconciles the
two views by showing  that  both theologians  were attempting  to describe
the character  of faith  as a unique response  to God, the *substantia sper-*
*andarum, argumentum non apparentium.*  Calvin's  explanation  means that
faith  consists  more  in assurance  than  in understanding  or comprehension;
it is more  of the  heart  than  of the  mind. Believers  are persuaded  of what
they  do  not grasp  because  the  Spirit  has  changed  their  hearts.  For  St.
Thomas's  view Vos turns  to the  exposition  of a definition  of belief, the
act  of faith,  deriving  ultimately  from  Augustine:  *cum assensione cogitare,*
to ponder  with  assent  (ST, 2a2ae. 2, 1). Vos explains  that  for  St. Thomas
"to  be imperfect  as knowledge  is of the  very  essenee  of faith"  (ST la2ae.
67, 2), because  faith  is of the  unseen,  but  the  assent  of faith  has  its
firmness  and  assurance  throug·h  the  influence  of the  will. Because  belief is
assent  to the  truth  it is essentially  an  act  of the  mind, but  as motivated
by the  will this  assent  is part  of a total,  loving, trusting  response  of the
person  to God. As St. Thomas himself  put the  matter:  " God is the  end of
faith  in that  he  is the  unique  good,  who  by  his  eminence  transeends  the
capacities  of man, but  by his  liberality  offers  his own  very  good  to be
shared  in  *(seipsum communicabilem praebens; 3 Sent.*  23.2, 1)."

   On the  relationship  between  natural  and  sacred  theology, Vos faees the
charge  that  St. Thomas  subordinates  faith  to reason,  gives precedence  to
natural  over  sacred  theology. The  authenticity  of his  argument  can be
seen from  the  texts  he uses to refute  this  misconception. St. Thomas  recog-
nizes the  possibility,  perhaps  even  the  existence,  of a natural  theology
simply  by his recognition  of metaphysics  in the  schema  of the  theoretical
sciences.  But by quoting  *In Boethium  de Trinitate,*  5.4 that  a natural
theology  deals with  divine  realities  "not  as subject,  but  as principle  of the
subject "  he  explains  St. Thomas's  presentation  of the  superiority  in
subject,  principles.  and  certitude  of sacred  theology  over the  theology  of
the  philosophers.  The key issue  in the  relationship  between  the  two the-
ologies  is the  proposition  " God exists."  It is refreshing  (and, of course,
reminiscent  of Thomas  de Vio Cajetan)  to read  the  following  interpreta-
tion  of the  status  of that  proposition  as St. Thomas  explicitly  handled  it
within  sacred  theology.

>   In light  of Aquinas's  distinction  between  the two  ways that  God can
>   be known,  something  should  be said  with  regard  to the  philosopher's
>   proofs  for  God's existence. When  we look closely  at what  Aquinas
>   says in the  Five Ways and  in the  proofs  given  in the  *Summa  Contra*
>   *Gentiles,*  we discover  that  he does  not  say  that  philosophers  have
>   proved  God's existence,  but  rather  that  they  have  proved  that  we
>   must  posit  some unmoved mover-which   we call God.  Whether  he is

referring  to a separate  first mover, a first efficient cause, something
that is supremely being,  or a being by whose providence the world
is governed, Aquinas always adds the phrase:  " this we call God "
 (see *BOG* 1.13, *passim).*   The same can be seen in the Five Ways of
the *Summa  theologiae.*  In essence, he is taking  a series of conclusions
that the philosophers  have gained  by a study  of things,  and he is
saying  that each of these  identify an aspect  of the being  whom Chris-
tians  also know in another, higher way. This is why, then, belief in
God's existence does not have the same meaning for unbelieves that it
has for believers. **It** is one thing  to grasp  that there must be a
separate, immaterial  unmoved mover;  it is quite another  to know
God himself  (p. 104).

The  mention  in this paragraph  of a distinction  between  the two ways
of knowing  is a further  indica,tion of Vos's perceptive  reading  of St.
Thomas,  for he refers  to a text that  is crucial  to interpreting  both the
structure  of the *Summa*  and the overall  theological  vision  it embodies.
After  quoting  the well-known  response  in the Summa,  la. 3, 4 ad 2 on
the meaning  of *est* in the proposition  *Deus est,* Vos quotes  the following,
perhaps  less well-known  or examined  text on the presence  of God:

God is said to exist in things  in two ways. First, as an operative
cause, and in this way he exists  in everything he creates.  Second,
as an object attained  by some activity  exists within the acting sub-
ject, and this applies  only to mental  activities  where the  known
exists  in the knower,  and the desired  in the one who desires.  In this
latter  way, therefore,  God exists in a special  fashion in those reason-
ing creatures  that are actually  knowing  and loving  him, or are dis-
posed to do so. And since we shall  see this  to be the result  of grace
to the reasoning  creature,  God is said to exist  in this way in holy
people by grace  (ST, la. 8, 3).

Even  the proposition  " God exists " stands  before  the mind of the be--
Iiever as meaning  far more than a conclusion  deriving  from God's causal
presence  could  signify,  apropos  of which Vos quotes  another  key text:
" even though the natures  of things  themselves  were known  to us, we can
have only  a little knowledge  of their order,  according  as divine  Providence
disposes  them in relation  to one another  and directs  them tO the end, since
we do not come to know the plan of divine Providence"  *(SCG* 4. 1, 3).
This text coordinates  with  the following  on why the existence  of God is
professed  in the Creed:  " By faith  we hold to many things  that philoso-
phers  could not fathom,  for example,  the truths  about his providence,
ominipotence,  and sole right  to adoration.   All such points  are included
in the article  **'I** believe in **God'"**  (ST, 2a2ae.1,  8ad1).

In this same context  Vos makes the following  cogent remark  about the
*praeambula  fidei,* which  he correctly  notes are presuppositions  not to the
act of belief  but to the content  of faith  surpassing  reason,  the properly
*ct·edenda.*

In response to Protestant criticism we have been trying to show **both** that Aquinas has a place for natural theology and that he keeps it strictly subordinate to revealed theology. He holds that what the philosophers can grasp is properly speaking a preamble to faith—and by a preamble he does not mean something that is necess·arily or even normally prior to the knowledge of faith, indeed he argues that it is far more typical that one will *believe* that God exists before coming to *know* that he exists (if indeed, one ever proceeds to the stage of knowing). Only a few philosophers ever manage to arrive at the point in metaphysics at which they can with confidence affirm the truth that God exists, he asserts, whereas " God exists" is an article of faith known with certitude by all believers (p. 112).

The third main area considered by Vos is the relationship between grace and nature. His concern is to show that a traditional Protestant view accuses St. Thomas of diminishing the meaning and need of grace: it becomes an accidental addition to a nature already capable of attaining its connatural end. Vos explains two possible sources of this misperception: one is that its proponents have simply repeated the view without investigating St. Thomas's text; the other is that the concept of "pure nature," introduced most explicitly by Cajetan (in his commentary on ST, la2ae. 109,2) came to be identified as the position of St. Thomas. Vos rightly corrects this ascription and reviews key texts of the *Secunda Pars* on the distinction between the natural and infused virtues and on the loss of the " goods of nature " caused by sin. In explaining that grace presupposes nature " just as all perfections presuppose what they perfect" (la. 2, 2, ad 1), he develops that theme of man's natural desire to see the divine essence in order to establish that grace is not a superfluous addition to a self-perfectible nature, but necessary to the fulfillment of that connatural desire. One might have hoped that in this discussion of the theme *homo capax Dei* (ST, la2ae. 113, 10, which Vos rightly cites) he would also have included St. Thomas's explanation of the " obediential potency " as the grounds of the truth that " only the rational creature has an immediate order to God" (2a2ae. 2, 3). St. Thomas explains this as " potency toward those things surpassing nature which God is able to effect in man" *(De veritate* 8, 4 ad 13, and parallel places). But, as the author acknowledges, it would not have been possible to treat the topic of nature and grace comprehensively, and his main objective was to correct misrepresentations of St. Thomas's position.

The final paragraph of the work states its objective: " Most contemporary Protestants look only to the Reformers for a model in their theology, either ignoring Aquinas or using him as an example of how not to think theologically. I have tried to show that the assumptions on which this approach is based are mistaken. **It** is my hope that calling into question certain misperceptions of Aquinas's view of faith will clear the way to a

new appreciation of his thought. The differences between thirteenth-century and Renaissance humanism complicate the problem, but a more accurate and sensitive understanding of Aquinas's thought is by no means impossible. It is high time that Protestants put the old division behind them, high time they reclaim this part of their heritage-and they can rightly claim Aquinas as part of their heritage, since he did live and work in the context of a still undivided Christendom. He is one of the teachers we can ill afford to do without as we attempt to meet the challenges of our own day (p. 174).'

Whether Professor Vos achieves this objective can only be judged by those to whom the work is primarily addressed. Many of the misperceptions pointed out can be traced to misuse of St. Thomas's works in the era when he was the mandated author for Roman Catholic studies in philosophy and theology. Those who value the genuine thought of St. Thomas and regret the continuation of these misrepresentations by so-called Catholic traditionalists will welcome the contribution made by this book.

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*Christian Dogmatics.* By CARL BRAATEN (editor), GERHARD O. FORDE, PHILIP J. HEFNER, ROBERT \V. JENSEN (editor) HANS SCHWARZ, and PAUL R. SPONHEIM. Two Volumes. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984, xxii + 569 (Vol. 1) and xvii+ 621 (Vol. 2).

Recent years have seen the proliferation among American Protestants of a seemingly odd genre: group dogmatics. For whatever reason, the present generation of systematic theologians has not produced a dogmatics or systematic theology text that the theology teachers of America seem to be happy with. So, a variety of groups have banded together to divide all theology into so many parts ,and as a team produce a usable theology text. The best known of these group texts is *Christian Theology: An Introduction to its Traditions and Tasks,* edited by Peter G. Hodgson and Robert H. King (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982), but there have also been Methodist and Conservative Evangelical versions.

*Christian Dogmatics* is the latest example of the genre, and an ambitious one. While the authors are all teachers at American Lutheran seminaries, their audience is the entire Christian Church. Their goal is to produce a " complete dogmatics " which will serve as " a textbook in theological instruction and a resource for those who practice the arts of ministry." (!,xvii-xviii). The volumes are organized in twelve *loci,* where a *locus* is " a point at which the historic teachings and theological investigations of

the church are brought into focus" (I, xix) : Prolegomena to Christian Dogmatics (Braaten, 78 pp.), The Triune God (Jenson, 114 pp.), The Knowledge of God (Sponheim, *76* pp.), The Creation (Hefner, 94 pp.), Sin and Evil (Sponheim, 104 pp.), The Person of Jesus Christ (Braaten, 104 pp.), The Work of Christ (Forde, 100 pp.), The Holy Spirit (Jenson, 78 pp.), The Church (Hefner, 70 pp.), The Means of Grace (Schwarz and Jenson, 142 pp.), Christian Life (Forde, 80 pp), and Eschatology (Schwarz, 116 pp.). Each *locus* consists of 4 to 7 chapters, each chapter beginning with a few summarizing sentences. The authors sometimes organize the *loci* "systematically" (e.g., the knowledge of God is organized according to questions that parallel Aristotle's four causes); more often the author's combine the systematic and the historical, moving through Scriptures and tradition and modernity as well as providing a conceptual frame for their topic. A lengthy index of names and subjects in volume two (II,591-621) helps the reader track the overlap between these *loci.*

A variety of threads tie the disparate contributions together. The six authors share a common outlook on contemporary theology, which might be called a theological version of "the radical middle." Decisive for this outlook is the conviction that there is a doctrinal core to the faith which it is the central task of dogmatics to explicate (I,5). Although the problems and conceptualities of the modern world are addressed throughout the text, they are not allowed to set the interpretative agenda. In keeping their eyes fixed on this interpretative task, the authors avoid both the left and right. Liberation theology, process theology, feminist theology are appreciated here, but not espoused. The most important doctrines of the eommon tradition are affirmed without compromise: creation must be understood as occurring *ex nihilo* (I,311); the resurrection is an event in space and time (I,550) ; "the Christian faith claims to represent the ,absolute, ultimate, unconditional, and everlasting truth of God in the once-for-all event of self-revelation in the person and history of Jesus Christ' (I,23). Conversely, fundamentalist approaches to the Bible are clearly rejected (I,66.) and there is no tmce of an attempt to repristinate the theology of Lutheran scholastic orthodoxy.

The middle ground the authors occupy, however, is not the safe middle ground of an unimaginative traditionalism, but a radical middle. In each case (although, of course, in some more than others), the topic at hand is rethought from the ground up. Fundamental principles and criteria are sought within the tradition by which the tradition itself can then be judg·ed and reshaped. This immanent rethinking of the tradition produces some highly imaginative proposals for theology and church life and some sharp critiques of much that is said and done in the name of the faith.

The commonalities connecting the essays are not just those of outlook. In chapter after chapter, a decisive organizing role is played by the

doctrines   of  eschatology   and   the  Trinity.    All  of  the  authors   see  the
Christian   message  as  oriented  toward   an  eschatological  goal  that  colors
all  that  comes before  it. This  goal  is  an  opening  of  God  to  humanity  that
can  only  be  understood   in  trinitarian   terms.  Surprisingly   enough,  these
two  doctrines,  and  not  an  explicit  doctrine  of  justification,   are  the  ma-
terial  threads  that  run  throughout   the  book.

The  prev;alence  of  these  doctrines  raises  a  question  about  the  book's
background.   Trinity   and   eschatology  have,  of  course,  been   important
themes  in  theology  for  the  last  twenty  years,  but  much  more  in  the  Ger-
many  of  Pannenberg,   l\foltmann,  and  Jiingel  than  the  America  of  Tracy,
Cobb,  and  Frei.  Although  the  Preface  confesses  the  desire  for  a  textbook
that  would  "reflect  the  American  context"   (I,xvii.),   the  discussions   in
much  -0f  the  text  calTy  more  echoes  of  Munich  and  Tuebingen  than  of
Chicago  or  New  Haven.  (Emerson,  Bushnell,  and  Jonathan  Edwards  each
have  only  one  entry  in  the  index;  compare  the  three  lines  of  entries  under
such  German  Lutheran   figures  as  Paul  Althaus,  Werner  Elert,  or  Hans-
J oachim  Iwand.)   This  European  orientation  is  particularly   evident  in  the
sections  written  by  Braaten,  Forde,  and  Jenson,  much  less  evident  in  the
other  sections.  This  orientation   may  be  for  the  best,  but  we  are  left
wondering  how  the  authors  see  the  connection  between  their  Lutheranism
and  "the  Amerie an  context."

We  cannot  hope  to  provide  here  an  evaluation  that  will  do  justice  to
each  and  all  of  these  essays.  In  lieu  of  such  an  evaluation,  we  offer  com-
ments  on  these  volumes  first  as  an  exercise  in  Christian  *Dogmatics*  and
then  as  an  exercise  in  *Christian*  Dogmatics.  How  well  do  these  volumes
carry  -0ut  the  tasks  tha,t  all  dogmatics  texts          How  well  do  they  deliver
on  the  claim  to  do  Christian,  rather  than  simply  Lutheran,  dogmatics?

As  dogmatics,  the  main  strength  of  these  essays  is  the  way  each  is
thoroughly  informed  by  Scripture  (particularly  Paul),  Tradition  (par-
ticularly  Luther,  Aquinas,  Augustine,  Schleiermacher,  Calvin  and  Kierke-
gaard  as  well  as  classic  creeds  and  confessions),  and  contemporary  theo-
logians  (particularly   Barth,  Tillich,  Bultmann,  Pa.nnenberg,  and  Molt-
mann)  and  philosophers  (where  the  preferences  are  too  eclectic  to  high
light  any  one,  although  there  is  a  consistently  negative  treatment  of  Plato
and  a  qualified  acceptance  of  Hegel).  This  is  not  simply  a  fine  review  of
the  alternatives  with  some  constructive  suggestions,  as  is  the  volume  by
Hodgson  and  King  mentioned  above;  each  essay  is,  in  fact,  scrupulously
devoted  to  the  constructive  task,  wagering  that  dialogue  will  most  pro-
ductively  occur  as  each  unfolds  his  own  position.  The  chapters  are  not
simply  introductory   overviews  but  carefully  elaborated  and  relatively  in-
dependent  essays.  Anyone  interested  in  any  of  these  *loci*  will  find  all  these
chapters  informative,  imaginative,  and  challenging.  Indeed,  each  chapter
could  well  be  published  on  its  own  for  those  interested  in  a  single  topic.

This constructive strength may well be what yields a weakness of these volumes. The authors suggest that there are differences, "consequent inconsistencies," and even disagreement " to the point of contradiction " in these volumes. And yet they "leave it to the readers " to discover such differences (I :xvii). It would be interesting to have the participants' reflections on these differences appear in some form, for questions abound. The disagreements are sometimes sharp between the authors. Need we posit a primordial perfection from which humanity fell? Hefner says no (I,356) ; Sponheim says yes (I,390). Do we straightforwardly assert a twofold outcome of judgment, as Schwarz does (II,578) or instead move toward a Barthian "universalism in hope" as does Braaten (I,568)? Is God's aseity a matter of Church dogma (Jenson) or a matter of" speculation" (I :259)? The discussions of ordained ministry by Hefner and Jenson move in quite different theological worlds.

More troubling than the unmarked disagreements between *loci* are issues that remain unclarified throughout. Can a text which so often appeals to Tillich avoid Tillich's criticism of the notion of God presumed throughout (rightly, we think), viz., God as personal agent? Is Braaten's discussion of the role of the Bible in theology adequate to clarify the quite different ways in which the other authors appeal to the Bible's authority? Sometimes the appeal is to a theologically normative canonical text (II,347) ; sometimes to a theologically normative tradition history reconstructed from the biblical text (I,277). Sometimes the appeal is to the te:x;t as a set of symbols (I,475,545; II,555.); sometimes to the text as a set of narratives (II,11). We are left wondering whether a consistent understanding of biblical authority is at work here.

A final ambiguity is found in the question of the Christian (as distinct from merely Lutheran) character of the text. The authors do not seek a lowest common denominator approach to catholicity. Rather, "each communion best serves the interest of the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic church when it remains true to the substance of its own confession and humbly calls on other communions to listen to its witness in a spirit of dialogue and mutual service" (I,53). This attitude is bolstered by interpretation of Lutheranism as a reform movement within the universal church, rather than as a refounding of the faith. All of the authors seem to write from the perspective Braaten states in the Preface: the "Lutheran commitment inherently bears an ecumenical significance when it is true to its original nature" (I,xviii). The ecumenical goal here then is not to produce a text that could be used by all traditions. (These texts will in fact be difficult to use far from the Lutheran tradition.) The goal rather is to make a contribution to the wider catholic tradition from out of the specificity of the Lutheran perspective. On the whole, we think the

authors  have  succeeded.  Christians  of  all  major  denominations  will  find
their  common  Christian  heritage  illuminated  by  these  volumes.

   The  ecumencal  stance  varies,  of  course,  among  the  essays.  Catholic
readers  may  be  surprised  by  the  openness  evinced  by  Jenson  on  the  ques-
tions  of  eucharistic  sacrifice  (II,310,353)  and  ordination  (II,382).  Braa-
ten's  discussion  of  the  relation  between  Scripture  and  tradition  (I,22),
while  clearly  different  from  the  views  of  most  Catholics,  is  open  to  new
perspectives  that  can  perhaps  overcome  some  of  the  old  disagreements.
What  may  most  surprise  Catholic  readers  is  the  consistent  aversion  to  the
Reformed  or  Calvinist  tradition,  which  Braaten  calls  "  in  many  ways  the
polar  opposite  of  Lutheranism"    (I,36).  Again  and  again,  the  authors
find  themselves  more  at  home  with  Anglicans  and  Catholics  than  with
other  "Protestants".

   Of  course,  all  is  not  perfect  here.  Schwarz's  discussion  of  purgatory
(II,573)  tends  toward  caricature.  Too  often  throughout  the  text  the
Council  of  Trent  is  taken  as  the  last  word  on  Catholic  teachings.  One
wonders  whether  the  plot  would  thicken  in  interesting  ways  if  more
analysis  were  made  of  Vatican  II  (the  major  conciliar  policy  now  in
effect  for  Roman  Catholics).

   The  most  important  ecumenical  judgment  on  the  volumes,  however,  must
focus  on  how  the  authors  deal  with  *the*  Lutheran  issue,  justification  by
grace  through  faith  for  the  sake  of  Jesus  Christ.  As  BraatEC>n  states,  this
article  has  been  "the  special  principle  of  Lutheran  theology."  He  dif-
ferentiates,  however,  between  two  ways  of  using  this  principle.  **It** can  be
seen  as  a  compendium  of  the  gospel,  from  which  the  entirety  of  dogmatics
is  to  be  deduced.  This  use  he  labels  a  "reductionistic  error "  that  "has
produced  a  particularly  inhumane  form  of  Lutheran  sectarianism."  Or  it
can  be  seen  as  a  critical  principle,  a  question  to  be  placed  before  all  that
the  church  says  or  does  (I,xviii).  This  critical  use  is  followed  by  all  the
authors.

   But  how  is  the  critical  quest.ion  to  be  stated'  Braaten  puts  it  this  way:
"Does  this  particular  act  of  ministry  lead  people  to  find  their  life's  justi-
fication,  their  reason  to  be,  in  the  fact  that  the  crucified  Jesus  lives,  or  are
people  left  on  their  own,  to  depend  on  themselves  for  the  ultimate  mean-
ing  of  life¥"  (I,xix).  Unfortunately,  the  two  sides  of  the  disjunction  do
not  constitute  a  true  either/ or.  In  fact,  the  ambiguity  reflects  two  different
ways  of  explicating  the  Reformation  doctrine  of  justification.  On  the  one
hand,  one  may  stress  that  we  are  not  justified  by  our  own  unaided  efforts.
We  must  not  depend  on  ourselves,  but  on  grace.  This  interpretation  is
broadly  Augustinian  and  is  in  keeping  with  Catholic  teaching.  This  inter-
pretation  is  reflected  in  the  second  half  of  Braaten's  question.  On  the  other
hand,  one  may  stress  that  grace  allows  Christians  to  find  their  justification
not  in  themselves,  not  even  in  themselves  transformed  by  divine  grace,  but

only in Jesus Christ. This interpretation is more specifically Lutheran and is perhaps not in accord with Catholic teaching. This interpretation is reflected in the first half of Braaten's question. Which interpretation, the broadly Aug-ustinian or the specifically Reformation, does one find here '/

Forde's explicit discussion of the question in the *locus* on the Christian Life unashamedly opts for the more specifically Reformation interpretation. (For the most part, this choice is reflected throughout the text, although one wonders how Forde reacts to Schwarz's emphasis on the human response to grace.) This choicH may seem to be ecumenically regressive. Nevertheless, such is not the case. Forde rescues justification from the purely legal images that have left Catholics with the well founded worry that justification has become an event totally extrinsic to the Christian. Instead, Forde interprets the doctrine through images that were important in its original formulation, images of death and resuITection. We are justified only as we die and rise with Christ. If the question is asked, what must I do to be justified, the answer is, Nothing. If the question is what must happen to me for me to be justified, then the 'answer is, I must die and rise with Christ. But I cannot " do " death and resurrection, even with the aid of grace. I can only suffer them. They must be the work of the Spirit through the Word.

Forde's formulation is not without problems. As he admits, the implications for the continuity of the self who must truly die and of the God who slays and then redeems are disturbing. Nevertheless, ecumenical progress will not come through a discussion of watered-down versions of the assertions that have divided us. Forde has succeeded in presenting the Reformation understanding of justification in a way that does not compromise its innovative critique of much of VVestern theology and piety and yet also lays bare the roots of the Reformation in catholic piety. The ecumenical problem raised by the Reformation is here posed with all its ambiguity.

Unfortunately, the text does not give us many tools to solve this ecumenical problem. Questions of the relation of dogmatics and dogma receive little attention. What here is dogma and what adiaphora 7 Hefner devotes a few paragraphs to the dogma/adiaphora distinction, but says contradictory things. (Compare the comment on II,237, that Lutherans should "resist the temptation to judge other bodies' insistence on specific organizational forms as an implicit denial of the primacy of grace" with the statement on II,239f. that "it is a violation of faith to insist that adiaphora be accepted as a condition of unity.") vVhat are the conditions of ecumenical agreement? Do Lutherans demand only the freedom to preach the gospel as they hear it or a full agreement on the nature of the gospel 1 Such questions deserve fuller discussion in a Christian dogmatics than they receive here.

What *Christian Dogmatics* offers then is an impressive attempt  by theologians of one tradition  to think through  the catholic faith  they have inherited  and  which  they wish to pass on  to the following generation of students.  What  they have produced  is not just a pedagogically useful tool,  but a collection of essays that rise well above wooden surveys, a compendium of theology  from which students of theology in and out of school and in and out of the Lutheran  tradition  can profit.

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*The  Church With  .A.  Human  Face.*  By  EDW.ARD  SCHILLEBEEOKX.  Trans-
    lated  by John  Bowden.  New  York:  The Crossroad Publishing  Com-
    pany,  1985.  Pp.  xii  **+**  308.  $19.50.

This  work  is  an  expansion  of  Edward  Schillebeeckx's  earlier  book, *Ministry,*  published  in  1981.  Although  *The  Church With  .A.  Human  Face* is  twice the length of the earlier book, the concerns remain the same. Those concerns  can be summarized in five points :  first,  the  local  church com-munity  (parish)  has a right to ministers (priests);  second, the fact that we  today  face  a severe  shortage of priests in so many parts of the world is  a  strong  indication  that  something is  wrong in the Church herself;  third, since  the community  has a right to ministers (priests),  steps should  be taken  to correct this shortage, that  is, to correct  what  has gone wrong; fourth,  the  fact that there  are so many  women  and  married  men involved today  in  various  levels of ministry  (apart from the priesthood)  gives us a  strong  indication  that  the shortage of priests  stems  not from a lack of interest  in  ministry  per se, but rather  from specific barriers  which  now attach  to priestly  ordination,  namely,  maleness  and  celibacy;  fifth,  we should  therefore  eliminate  those  barriers,  given  the  fact  that  they are not intrinsic  to the priesthood.

The  author  proceeds by way of an historical analysis of ministry  in the Church,  beginning  with  "Jesus  Christ  and  His  Messianic  Communities" and  proceeding  through  to contemporary  " Complaints  of  the  People " regarding  the priesthood  as it is understood today. Employing  the notion of "models",  Schillebeeckx  attempts  to demonstrate  that different models of  the  priest  have  prevailed  at  different  periods  in  the  history  of  the

Church, each arismg out of historically-conditioned circumstances which forced a change from the previous model employed. Schillebeeckx believes that circumstances today require another shift in our understanding of tlw priest and henee another working model, so to speak. Although he notes the "normative significance of the New Testament model," Schillebeeckx believes that it cannot be understood as supplying the " last word " in ministry (p. 207).

Although this book, as the earlier *Ministry,* has fatal shortcomings, the author makes two important points which require a good deal more consideration than they have generally been given in theology today. The first has to do with the relationship between ministry and ecclesiology. Schillebeeckx no.fas that too often theologians have developed a notion of the priesthood which builds directly upon Christological foundations that contain "a suppressed and even concealed ecclesiology" (206). Hence, no explicit attention is given to the relationship between ministry and community, beyond the axiom that there can be no church without priests. As a result, ecclesiology becomes simply a sub-heading under ministry, nothing more than an extension of any given theology of the priesthood. The temptation to reduce ecclesiology to ministry is one which theology should avoid, although Schillebeeclor's own view that community be given priority over ministry (p. 257) is equally problematic.

Second, Schillebeeckx points. out that theologians have often introduced into theology non-theological notions drawn from Neoplatonic thought. Primary among these is a suspicion and even dislike of the human body, especially with regard to sexuality. As a result, false arguments regarding sexual " purity " have been employed in the service of the notion of priestly celibacy, producing that mentality which supposes that the priestly calling is a higher calling than marriage, because the priest is uncontaminated by those physical impurities which are presumed to be a necessary component of sexual intercourse. Such a notion of celibacy is, of course, quite outside the New Testament concern with celibacy " for the sake of the Kingdom," and Schillebeeekx quite rightly notes that such non-theological criteria ought to be purged from our theology of ministry and indeed from theology altogether.

Unfortunately and ironically, however, the two great flaws of this book are precisely those which Schillebeeckx locates in his theological predecessors, namely, a theological method which is quite Platonic and the absence of anything even approximating a substantive eccesiology. Indeed, it is the Platonic character of his method which precludes his developing an ecclesiology; hence we must examine the former before looking at the latter.

The single most striking feature of this book is the difficulty the reader has in loeating anything normative in history. We are fairly warned of

this early  on, when Schillebeeckx tells us, " one can never give an absolute
cut-and-dried  formulation  of what is specifically normative for Christians,
since this can only be found in changing historical  forms"  (p. 2).  Not
only are there no unchanging  forms,  there are also no unchanging  facts,
since facts are always " interpreted  " within the framework  of particular
theories and hence change from theory to theory.  And there are, of course,
no unchanging  theories but only " changeable theories which we make our-
selves"  (p.  40).

   Not only history in general, but also Church history in particular,  pre-
sents us with this same phenomenon.  There are no unchanging  forms of
ministry in the Church.  The forms shift according to historical circum-
stances.  And, as we have already seen, although we can appeal to the
New Testament  experienee  as in some sense normative, it nevertheless
provides us with no final word on the subject.  Nor can we appeal to the
Church, as unchanging,  inasmuch as changes at the level of ministry
necessarily  produce  changes  at the level of ecclesiology.  Schillebeeckx
quotes Bishop Damert  Bellido of Peru as having recognized a fundamental
truth when he said, "Any attempt at changing an infrastructure   (in this
case the priesthood)  within a greater  structure  (the church)  without
changing this greater  structure  is a utopia."  Schillebeeckx goes the bishop
one further,  claiming that such thinking  is not just utopic, but ideo-
logical  (p. 218).

   If nothing in history is unchanging or unchangeable,  then what con-
stitutes the bottom-line criterion by which the theologian  can make any
judgments  about ministry  or ecelesiology or, indeed,  any area of our faith
                On one level, the answer Schillebeeckx gives would appear to
be sociology.  The book is replete  with sociological rules of thumb by which
judgments  regarding  the Church and ministry  become not only possible
hut even transparent.   To cite just one example, Schillebeeckx, in criti-
cizing the Church for having failed to recognize the historically-conditioned
and hence changing  character  of her own existence, concludes by saying,
"This is true, even sociologically, of any system in society, but perhaps
in a special  way of the institutional  church which, rightly understanding
itself as a ' community of God/ often wrongly shows a tendency to identi-
fy even old and venerable traditions  with unchangeable divine ordinances  "
(pp.  210-211).

   On another  level, however, Schi!lebeeckx is careful, in words at least,
not to reduce theology to simply a branch of sociology.  What is given to
us "from below" (i.e., out of historically-conditioned  circumstances)  is
also experienced  as " from above " (i.e., as a product  of grace).  Hence,
theology  can never he just sociology.  There must be some specifically
theological  norm, and Schillebeeckx thinks this norm can be located in
what he calls the Christian  ' Logos ' or reason.  This identification  of the

Logos with reason is the basis for Schillebeeckx's characterization of the theologian, who always comes after church practice (praxis) is already in place and operative, as " extremely necessary and irreplaceable, especially when it comes to demonstrating in a rational way whether this practice is authentically Christian" (p. 11).

Here, however, the entire theological method upon which the book is based unravels completely, and for obvious reasons. The 'Logos.', understood as theological r.eason, cannot be understood as normative in itself, since it cannot stand on its own. It can only be applied to something other than itself. But there are, if we are to take Schillebeeckx seriously, no facts, apart from interpretative frameworks (.theories), to which reason can be applied, and these theories are not only changing but made up by the theologian. Since the theory gives rise to the facts, theories clearly cannot be based upon facts. How the theologian is, in the absence of facts, to construct his theory is never made clear. What does clearly emerge, however, is that the ultimate criterion of Schillebeeckx's theory is his own constructed theory as to what constitutes an authentic Christian community (and, by extension, ministry). As a result, Schillebeeckx has no qualms about saying, "no practice of any kind is legitimated solely by itself. Only theological theory can demonstrate whether the direction of the practice is *orthos,* right (*orthopraxis),* in the light of the inspiration and orientation of the great Christian tradition, even if this practice should be completely new " (p. 11) .

" Only theological theory can demonstrate." This is an extraordinary statement coming from a Catholic theologian who wishes to repudiate Neoplatonism. To place the concrete material and historical order at the mercy of such non-material and non-historical realities as changing, fabricated theories goes far beyond anything Plato himself ever dreamed of by way of relativizing the world we live in. At least Plato understood material forms to participate in reality by participating in real immaterial formal entities. SchilJebeeckx, on the other hand, not only refuses (as did Plato) to locate permanent, unchanging rea.lity in the world; he supposes (unlike Plato) that the relative (i.e., ehangable) reality (i.e., authenticity) of any Christian practice lies in its ability to conform to something a good deal Jess real than itself, namely, the made-up theories of Schillebeeckx. The fact that Rome has problems with this should surprise no one. The fact that a theologian of the status of Schillebeeckx has no problems with it should not only surprise, but stun, us all.

The central flaw of the book, which nothing else within the book anc begin to overcome, lies precisely in the relationship between fact and theory which Schillebeeckx supposes to exist. As he put it, "there are no such things as ' facts ', even the 'hard facts ' which soociologists are fond of posting. There are only interpreted facts. We can only arrive at

facts  within changeable theories which we make ourselves"  (p. 40).  Apart
from the irrationality  of asserting as fact that there are no facts (which
assertion, in point of fact, is itself a theory, not a fact),  this statement
fatally  flaws  the  book  in a number  of ways.  First,  it  requires  the  reader
to put theory above practice, which is an entirely Platonic way of going
about  things.   Second,  it  requires  the  reader  to  place  Schillebeeckx's
theories  above  Catholic  practice  in  order  to  agree  with  Schillebeeckx's
conclusions.  Third,  it  makes  criticizing  Schillebeeckx's  historical  analysis
of  ministry  impossible  at  the  outset,  since  the  " interpreted  facts "  he
offers are,  by his own accounting, not real in themselves but only pr-oducts
of  his  theory  (they  are  quite  liter-ally  "theor-etical  facts").   In  short,  it
makes  a  serious  r-eview of  the  book  very  difficult.

   That  task  becomes  all  but  imppoisble,  when one  sees  how such  a notion
of  the  relationship  between  theory  and  fact  actually  affects  facts.  Until
r-ecently, for- example,  most Chr-istians accepted as undoubted fact that
Christ  was  born  in  Bethlehem.   The  only  two  infancy  narratives  we  have
in  the  New  Testament,  Matthew  and  Luke,  agree  on  this  " fact".   Schille-
beeckx,  however-, tells us that  "He was pr-obably born in Nazareth"   (p.
18).   This "probable  fact",  of  course,  is  an "interpreted  fact",  i.e.,  a
fact which arises from  and conforms to Schillebeeckx's theological theories.
And,  of  course,  according  to  this  method  of  reckoning,  Christ's  birth  in
Bethlehem  is  also  an  "interpr-eted  fact",  arising  from  and  conforming  to
the  theological  theories  of  Matthew  and  Luke  (theories  which  are  no
longer  relevant;  hence  Christ  can  no  longer  be  understood  as  having  been
born  in  Bethlehem) .  The  unwary  Christian  who  asks,  "Well,  where *was*
he  born 'f ",  is  asking  an  unreal  question,  because  what  he  seeks **is** an
" uninterpreted  "  fact,  and  there  are  no  such  things,  according  to  Schille-
beeckx.

   There  are  other,  even  more  striking,  instances  of  this  method  to  be
found  in  the  book.  This  reader,  for  example,  was  amazed  by  Sehille-
beeckx's  exegesis  of  Gal 3.28  as  applied  to  Gen 1.27.  As  regards  Gal 3.28
("there  is  neither  male  nor  female"},   Schillebeeckx  says,  "The Greek
literally  reads,  'the male  and  the  female  no  long.er exist '–a  clear  refer-
ence  to  the  Septuagint  translation  of  Gen. 1.27, ' male  and  female  He
created them'·  In  this  line  of  thought  the  baptism  of  the  Spirit  is  the
eschatological  restoration  of  an  order  of  creation  with  an  equality  which
was  destroyed  historically  and  in  society-it  **is'** new  creation'  (Gal. 6.15).
The  baptism  of  the  Spirit  removes  historical  discriminations"   (p. 38}.

   One  hardly  knows,  at  least  at :first glance,  what  to  make  of  this.  Our
CTeation  in  Gen. 1.27  as  male  and  female  is  linked  there  to  our  imaging
of  God.  **It** is,  furthermore,  a  part  of  the  pre-fallen  creation  {the fall does
not  occur  until  chapter 3)  which  Catholicism,  like  God,  has  always  under-
stood  to  be  " very  good "  (Gen 1.31}.  Genesis 1.27  cannot,  therefore  (or

so one would suppose),  be linked to "historical   discrimination".   Nor
(one would also suppose)  could the " new creationg ", understood as " res-
toration",  be interpreted  as an annihilation  of that sexual differentiation
which, as Genesis tells us, is intrinsic  to the original  good creation.  And
yet that seems to be precisely  what Schillebeeckx does intend us to under-
stand as having happened  "in Christ".

·when  one later discovers,  however, that facts, for Schillebeeckx,  arise
out of theories, not only can one see that he does indeed intend  this
reading  of the facticity  of our "new creation " in Christ, one can also
see just how such an interpretation  is given legitimation.  For Schille-
beeckx's theory i·egarding the Church includes the notion  of an ⁶ egali-
tarian"  community  (pp. 39, 47).  An egalitarian  community obviously
requires  an egalitarion  reading  of Gal. 3.28, which in turn requires  some
sort of overturning  of Gen. 1.27.  What we see here, in short, is not a
theology  which serves the Christian  revelation,  but a revelation  which
serves theological  theorizing.  (It should also be noted that Schillebeeckx's
identification  of "democratic'  with "egalitarian"  [p. 47] betrays his
assumption  that " equal" means "undifferentiated".   Hence, his theory
of sexual equality  also requires  that sexual differentiation  be eliminated).

This process of interpretation,   where our creation as male and female
is concerned,  culminates  in Schillebeeckx's  view that "maleness"  is an
"untheological"  concept and therefore  has no application  to the priest-
hood (p. 257).  This, of course, is an obvious and even necessary con-
clusion,  once one accepts that our new creation in Christ destroys  that
sexual differentiation  which was intrinsic  to the human community  in the
Genesis 1 creation  account.  That which had theological  import to the
author of Genesis no longer has theological  import to Schillebeeckx,  be-
cause the interpretative   framework  (theory)  he employs supplies  no
categories  by which the Genesis account  of our creation as male and female
can be understood  as theologically  significant.

Schillebeeckx tells us that the actual  practice  of Christian  communities
"must be justfiied in theory"  (p. 10).  Not only does this principle  place
the Catholic theologian  just about as far from Magisterial  authority  as he
can get (Schi.llebeeckx's statements  to the contrary  notwithstanding),   in-
asmuch as it hands that authority  over to the theologian,  whose theories
now become the basis for determining  whether  or not any given practice
is authentically  Catholic, it is also effectively  distances the theologian  from
theological  realism.  A brief comparison  with scientific method makes this
immediately  apparent.

In science, hypothesis  (theoretical  science)  does not justify  practice
(experimental  science).  Quite the reverse is true.  Scientific hypotheses
are tested by direct observation  and experimentation.   Scientific method is
                precisely  because theories  do not give rise to facts (ex-

perimental results); theories arise out of experimentation and are tested by new experimentation. While it is true that theories determine the types of experiments which are done, theories do not control the results of those experiments. There always remans an objective, experimental base, beyond the control of the theoretical scientist, which can call, and, to date, has called every major scientific hypothesis into question. The hypotheses can be questioned, and even abandoned, with no harm done to science itself. Science is only harmed when the hypotheses are given priority over the data of experimentation, so that experiments are done solely to confirm hypotheses. When that happens, the "realism" of experimental science is abandoned for the " idealism " of the theoretician.

Much the same thing is true in theology. Theological theories (as Schillebeeckx correctly notes) are creations of the theologian and are therefore subject to change. Theology is not harmed when such theoretical constructs are questioned or abandoned. For our faith as Catholics is not a matter of theory and it requires no theortical justification. Just as scientific theory arises out of the facticity of experimentation and functions to demonstrate how the multiplicity of experimental data (facts) might be seen to relate to one another, so theological theory arises out of the facticity of Catholic worship and tradition and function to demonstrate how the multiplicity .of revealed truths (facts) might be seen to i·elate to one another. To suppose the reverse, that theories give rise to facts, is to engage in a form of idealism which out-Plato's Plato.

This ultraplatonic (for lack of a better word) approach to reality, which relativizes all things historical, including the Catholic faith and practice, in the name of theological theory, is incapable of producing a defined or indeed definable ecclesiology, since the Church (like all other historical entities) is, by such an account, changeable and hence incapable of being authenticated apart from some particular theological theory which can demonstrate her legitimacy. Furthermore, since both the form the Church takes and the authenticity of that form are temporary and contingent, no theory formulated today can speak to the historical circumstances of tomorrow (or yesterday). As a result, all ecclesiology is temporary and contingent, no more capable of assuming some definitive shape or form than is the Church herself. Hence, to seek in Schillebeeckx's work a substantive ecclesiology is to seek precisely that which his own particular theory about reality will not permit. It is therefore not at all surprising that one cannot be found in this book.

In the final analysis it would seem, according to Schillebeeckx, that only change can be viewed as normative. The statement which concludes his historical analysis of ministry in the Church suggests some sort of rift between theologians and the Magisterium on precisely this issue of change. " For better or worse, then and now, this ongoing history

of the church regularly  gives renewed expression  to inspiration  in con-
stantly  new existential  contexts.  There the Christian  churches have some-
times done well, and sometimes less well, leading  to disillusionment.  We can
regard  all  this  as  a  generally  accepted  consensus  among  contemporary
theologians,  though  the  instruments  of  the  church's  teaching  authority
often have a tendency  to dwell on ' the letter ' of earlier  statements  and
to underestimate  their historieal  and hermeneutical  dimensions"  (208).
Those in the Magisterium  who dwell on 'the letter ' believe, erroneously  in
Schillebeeckx's  judgment,  that history  can and does give rise to nonnative,
enduring  facts and forms.  Theologians  who attend to historical  relativizing
and hermeneutical  theorizing,  correctly in Schillebeeckx's  judgment,  know
better.  His book is clearly  designed  to demonstrate  this point.

   There is one sense in which his hook docs not, and indeed cannot, fail,
given how the facts  which he presents  for the reader's  judgment  arise
out of the theory with which he begins and necessarily  point to the con-
clusion  which his theory  already  presupposes.  This is a fail-safe  method
for getting  to where one wants to go. Unfortunately,  it gets there by way
of an enormous detour  around  the facticity  of the Catholic faith  and
practice, a facticity  which, despite the efforts of some of our best known
 (if not finest) theologians  over a two thousand  year history,  has con-
sistently  refused to submit to the hypothetical  and the theoretical  reason of
rationalist  theologians.  Our faith  is centered on the Christ, the *incarnate,
historical Logos* of tradition and Scripture,  not on the disincarnate,  un-
historical  *logos* of theoretical  theology.  Schillebeeckx is not the first, nor
will he be the last, theologian  intent upon reducing the Catholic faith to
some hypothetical  methodology.  Happily,  however,  and perhaps  even
miraculously,  the Church always manages to survive her theologians, a fact
which cannot  but offer solace to many of the readers  of this book.

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*The .Argument  of the "Tractatus :"  Its Relevance  to                Theo-
    ries of Logic, Language.  Mind, and Philosophical  Trust.* By RroHARD
    M. McDoNOUGH. Albany:  State  University  of New York Press, 1986.
    Pp. xii + 311.

   This book attempts  an analysis of the *Tractatits  Logico-Philosophicus*
based on taking  Wittgenstein's  professed  "fundamental  idea' as the her-
meneutic  key. *Tractatus*  4.0312 states, in part:  "My fundamental  idea is

that the 'log·ical constants' are not representatives." McDonough believes that previous interpreters of the *Tractatus* have either ignored or down-played the importance of this statement, and he writes in the conviction that taking it seriously produc&s a reading of the *Tractatits* that is friend-lier toward philosophical language and argumentation than " the strong nagativ& views ... which have been hastily claimed " as the import of the book (p. 11). In order to establish this "fundamental idea" as an inter-pretative device McDonough reminds the reader of links among three ideas. The first is the idea that the logical constants are not representatives. The second is the idea that the sole (real) logical constant is the general propo-sitional form (T 5.47). The third is the fact that the status of the propositions of logic as tautologies exhibits the logic of their constituents, and hence, the logical properties of language and the world (T 6.12). By developing the relations among these ideas, and extending them to the interpretation of the *Tractatiis* as a whole, McDonough aims to show that Wittgenstein is committed to an explicit, only "technically nonsensical," philosophical doctrin& concerning the derivation of general metaphysical facts about ontology from general facts about the philosophy of logic. This doctrine he characterizes as "the argument of th& *Tractatus."* By attributing to the book an *argmnent* or *doctrine* (in the sense just men-tion&d) he contradicts those commentators who have understood Wittg·en-stein to be earnestly requiring real silence about philosophy and to b& asserting seriously that the *Tractatu,s* is a self-refuting treatise, to be kicked aside. once its lessons are learned.

   J\1foDonoug·h begins with vVittgenstein's understanding of negation and th& problem wheth&r there are negative facts. McDonough discusses Rus-sell's attempt to sort this out, and claims that Wittgenstein diagnoses Russell's mistake in this remark; "For it is difficult not to confuse what is not the case with what is the ease instead of it" (p. 24). Wittgenstein's view is that "negation does not enter into the representational content of the proposition" (26). Rather, negation is the *denial* of the fact repr&-sented in the proposition's sense. But this interpretation requires that we find an ambiguity in 'Wittgenstein's notion of tlrn "sense" of a propo-sition: one sort of sense is the same in either affirmation or denial, while another sort of sense is that in which affi.rmation and denial are opposed. Th& status of logical propositions ean also be construed as an outworking of "the fundamental idea." Again McDonough sets up the problem through a treatment of Russell's 1918 lectures. He finds Russell's account dehilitnted by the assumption that "the logical propositions are about facts in some sense" (p. 49). " The fundamental idea" insures that th&y cannot be about a class of *logical* facts. Furthermore, tautological propo-sitions of logic are about the means of representation itself, not about facts of any sort. Getting from this point to th& claim that the tautology

shows the general form of a proposition  involves McDonough's distinetion
between "presentational  symbols," whose truth conditions are internal  to
the proposition  itself (e.g., tautologies),  and "representational  symbols"
(e.g., empirical  propositions)  which are about something external  to the
symbol. McDonough regards  this as the basis for the distinction  between
"symbols  which 'say' and symbols which only 'show'"  (p. 61). But
this claim-that  different symbols say and show, and that they are, re-
spectively, representational  and presentational-is  inconsistent with Witt-
genstein's assertion that a single symbol-the  proposition-both  "shows"
(its sense) and ",gays"  (that things so stand) and with the elaim that a
proposition  represents  what it shows and presents,  in its general form;
i.e., what it "says" (T 2.221, 4.022, 4.5). McDonough does acknowledge
that propositions  both say and show (p. 59). But how is that consistent
with his claim that these functions  belong to different "types " of symbols?
However attractive McDonough's  account of "saying"  and " showing'"
may be, such a striking inconsistency makes it implausible  to claim that
it is an interpretation   of the *Tractatus.*

   The absence of a Wittgensteinian  tenor in McDonough's work can be illu-
strated further from the same stretch of text. In discussing the distinction
between signs and symbols, he writes: " Only the sign of a symbol is per-
ceptible.  There is a component of the symbol which is in some sence im-
perceptible "  (p. 63). He                this idea by claiming: " Signs  are
perceptible entities.  Thoughts are imperceptible  entities which are paired
with them"  [to make up symbols]  (p. 64). This interpretation  is a classic
instance of a Rylean category  mistake, and it is McDonough, not vVittgen-
stein, who makes it.  The form of the mistake is to postulate  an unob-
served *entity* to explain  the *function*  of an observed one. Wittgenstein  is
clear in stating that the syrnboHc function  of a sign is tied to its use with
a sense (T  3.326) ; nowhere does he suggest that a thought  is another
entity whose presence paired  with a mere sign creates a symbol.  One
must compare "A thought  is a proposition  with a sense" (T 4), with
l\foDonough's  claim that  " The thought  is the meaning component of a
symbol" (p. 64). This is the difference between a keen insight  into the
distinction  of entity and function,  and an iroEic lapse into the very
reification of functions  that Wittgenstein  himself took such pains to ex-
pose as a chief source of philosophical  confusion.

   Unfortunately,  MeDonough's account of the autonomy  of logic is vitiated
by its dependence  on this notion of a "thought."  He appeals to the
thought as the "meaning  component of a symbol "-presented  in it--as
the explanation  of what makes the tautology autonomously  self-guaran-
teeing. He sees this eonstrual  as rescuing Wittgenstein  from the posi-
tivist notion that the symbolism itself does that work, but he fails to see
that on this reading logic does *not* take care of itself, as Wittgenstein

insisted it must. Rather, thought takes care of logic, and what takes care of *thought* we'd better not ask. Fogelin has given proper attention to one of Wittgenstein's  healthiest philosophical habits:  stopping explanatory regresses before they start. This is a fundamental  instinct of the author of the *Tractatus:*  explanations  have to stop somewhere, and they need to stop in some medium that offers an alternative  to appeals either to self-evidence or to convention.  Logic in its application  to the world is such a medium, and Wittgenstein's  gestures toward function and application  show how he can avoid those appeals  (T  3.262, 3.263, 2.15, 3.326-3.328).  Mc-Donough's  account  of the way thoughts guarantee  their own status is‐ as it had to be‐a disguised appeal  to self-evidence.

If signs require an added substantive  ingredient to link up with reality, how does McDonoug·h account  for statements  of the following  sort: "Logic  is not a field in which *we* express what we wish with the help of signs, but rather one in which the nature of the absolutely necessary signs speaks for itself" (T  6.124). It is clearly the view of the *Tractatus* that logic pertains  to signs which in their application  become symbols, not to imperceptible  relations  among  occult entities  somehow  asosciated  with signs.

Applying  "the fundamental  idea" to ontological matters, McDonough attempts  to show the identity of logical form with the form of reality (T  2.18).  He does so by inquiring  into the question how propositions show that they are *about* something external to themselves.  They do so, he claims, through the "proxy" relationship  of symbol and object.  But he misleadingly states, repeatedly,  that "the genuine propositional  symbol mmit contain a proxy for [its] subject matter" (p. 98).  Now, the propo-sition contains proxies for the object composing .the fact it depicts.  But it does not contain as one of its elements, a representative  of the fact it de-picts.  Indeed,  if it did, it wouldn't depict that fact, since it would have an extra ingredient,  i.e., another depiction  of the fact itself imbedded in the depiction  (T  2.15-2.1515; 2.172). What McDonough means is that any g·enuine proposition  must stand in a pictorial  relation  to a possible fact (T  2.1513- 2.1515). It does so in its possession of logical form (T  2.16-2.182).  To speak of logical form as something the picture *contains,* rather than as the way its elements are *arranged,* is to invite the kind of reifica-tion discussed above as a category mistake.  That McDonough does not in-tend this invitation is shown in his correct statement that "genuine propsi-tional symbol does not contain a proxy for the contingent state [i.e. possible fact] involved"  (p. 103).  Oddly, though,  he calls this doctrine, which .everyone recognizes under the name "the picture theory of the proposi-tion" as one of the two or three central notions of the book, one of the "most nnderemphasized  views of the *Tractatus"*  (p. 105). It seems curious to call a doctrine underemphasized  when all major commentators-

Anscombe, Biack, Stenius, Fogelin, et al.-give it a central role in their expositions of the text. McDonough states correctly, at length, that in the proposition no proxy stands for the representational relationship or for the pictorial form that makes it possible. Rather, the form itself expresses (in Wittgenstein's sense, "shows") the possibility of that relationship.

The distinction between signs and thoughts, introduced earlier, Mc-Donough puts to work to explain how everyday language, which does not manifest logical form, is nevertheless *language,* i.e., a system of depictions of possible facts. The account is this: the sign itself, lacking logical form, is not by itself a symbol. But it becomes one when coupled with a thought. The conjoined *thought* possesses logical form, and since it is, McDonough says, the " meaning component" of the symbol, it furnishes the link-the " something in common "-between the signs of everyday language and the facts. This argument, which occupies McDonough's fifth and sixth chapters, cannot get off the ground for reasons given above. And while McDonough postulates a reified thought to show how everyday language links up with reality, Wittgenstein makes plain that there is no linking *ingredient,* but rather a *use* (LT 4.002, 4.011-4.016; 3.328). He says: "What signs fail to express, their application shows. What signs slur over, their application says clearly" (T 3.262). In the same regard one can consult T 3.328, 4.002, and 4.011-4.016. Contrary to McDonough's idea, Wittgenstein clearly thinks-rightly or wrongly-that expressions in ordinary language already *have* logical form but don't manifest it perspicuously. From the discussion of the possession of pictorial (i.e., logical) form by gramophone records, musical notation, and sound waves (4.014) it is incredible to impute to Wittgenstein the view that perceptible signs are merely amorphous associates of meaningful thoughts. It is the genius of the *Tractatus* to insist that the signs *themselves* really depict (see T 4.016), and any interpretation which loses sight of this point has lost its way in the text.

Let us explore more fully MeDonough's notion of a thought, as he attributes it to Wittgenstein. The thought has, he writes, "an essential mental dimension" (p. 145), and the ancestry of the concept runs through Russell to Brentano. To his credit, McDonough raises the obvious question that attaches to the postulation of meaning-conveying mental entities as mediators between language and the world. The question is this: If the relation of sign to "the objective " (MeDonough's phrase) requires a mediator, then why aren't mediators required to relate the mediating thought to the          And as he might have gone on to ask: Why not a mediator between sign and thought, and between *those* mediators and the things they relate, and so on *ad*          McDonough has claimed that Wittgenstein postulates one mediating entity and sees that, having done so, he must stop the regress. How does he¥

McDonough says that Wittgenstein's " thought" is developed in a way parallel to Russell's adaption of Brentano's notion of the mental as denotative of an entity "which contains an object or state of affairs within itself," or "is intrinsically related to that object or state of affairs" (p. 151). Plugging this doctrine into his idea that (according to Wittgenstein) the thought is the "meaning component" of the proposition, McDonough is able to say that the thought is intrinsically related to " the objective" since it shares logical form with it, and is thus in a logically determined relation to it without an intermediary. McDonough summarizes : " The argument of the *Tractatus* warrants the view that the propositional symbol involves a particular version of the notion of the meaning locus which is more highly articulated than Brentano's or even Russell's best formulations" (p.165). Of course, if one eschews McDonough's construal of the thought, as has been urged above, one can stop the regress a step earlier, avoid introducing occult mental entities, and say with Wittgenstein that it is the proposition with a sense that is directly related, without mediator, to the possible fact it depicts. " *Tha.t* is h°'w a picture is attached to reality; it reached right out to it" (T 2.1511). But McDonough has the picture correlated with a thought, and then the thought reaching out to reality. Why fly in the face of the texU

The answer lies in McDonough's wish to relate "the argument of the *Tractatits"* to contemporary issues in psycholinguistics and the theory of meaning. He links his reading of the *Tractatus* with hints of mentalistic theories of meaning in Malcolm, Nozick, Kripke, and others. He credits Wittgenstein with establishing " the notion of the mental" on a firmer foundation by deriving it from " the concepts and views which pertain to logic and the tautologies" (p. 171). He then brings his reading of Wittgenstein into contact with the theories of Chomsky, of Fodor, and of Dummett. In this discussion McDonough's aim is to improve '[1]the poor condition of the theory of meaning " by advancing inquiry into the mental entity called " the meaning locus" (p. 182). Coordinately, he aims to initiate a reinterpretation of Wittgenstein's work " as a basis for a rethinking of the philosophical foundations of the theory of meaning and of the field of psycholinguistics" (p. 183). If McDonough's work does spark a revisionist reading of Wittgenstein, in which the *Tractatus* and *Philosophical Investigations* appear as treatises written in defense of the postulation of mental entities, this event will be a supreme irony in the history of philosophy. Wittgenstein wrote in the latter work: "Nothing is more wrong-headed than calling meaning a mental activity! Unless, that is, one is setting out to produce confusion" (p. 693). And had the author of the *Tractatus,* despite his nearly perfectly scrupulous care to abolish mentalistic considerations from logic, not used the term *Gedanke* as a tag-word for " a proposition with a sense " a scant dozen times in his

text, McDonough's eccentric reading would have lacked even the slimmest toehold.

The fundamental point at which McDonough differs from virtually every other reader of the *Tractatus* surfaces late in his commentary. He attributes to Wittgenstein the view that one can construct explicit logical argumentation, constituting a philosophical system, leading from "the fundamental idea" to certain explicit, systematic conclusions about ontology, mind, meaning, and so on. He disparages the reading demanded by the passages he discusses as "dogmatic " or " mystical." But Wittgenstein's views really are-for better or worse-in certain senses dogmatic *and* mystical. In myriad important passages in the *Tractatus,* he appeals to what logic, or the world apprehended as a whole limited by logical form, *shows.* And "what *can* be shown, *cannot* be said " (T 4.1212. See also 4.121c). Whatever we think of the truth or plausibility of Wittgenstein's ideas, McDonough's attempts to save him from himself are the weakest strands in an often tenuous skein of interpretation.

Wittgenstein expressed grave doubt whether his work would be understood. In *Zettel* (＃314) he diagnosed " a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in philosophical investigation," namely, the impulse to press past the solutions to our philosophical problems toward something further, something like an explanatory theory. He connected this impulse with "our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the solution of the difficulty is a description." McDonough's project of grafting large theoretical branches on to the truncated descriptive body of the *Tractatus* is an instance of this tendency. Of such projee.ts Wittgenstein wrote (in the same passage) : " The difficulty here is: to stop."

In McDonough's final chapter he faces the greatest single textual obstacle to his reading of .the *Tractatus,* the famous conclusion: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." His unconvincing argument is that Wittgenstein didn't really mean it, and that though in *one sense* philosophical propositions are inexpressible, " there is another sense in which one *can* say them " (p. 215). It is important to note that McDonough is not merely making the familiar true remark that the *Tractatus* is nonsense by its own criteria and that therefore there does seem to be *some* sense in which one can say these things. *That* remark points to a deep inconsistency in Wittgenstein's system; it takes him at his word and offers criticism. But McDonough's move is to try to make his system consistent by wriggling him out of the plain sense of what he wrote-and out -0f what-if his behavior following the book's completion is any indication-he really meant. What a shame it would be if McDonough were correct. Instead of seeing Wittgenstein as a sharp, a:ustere thinker, terse in his elegance, and willing to grasp the nettle of a self-refuting philosophical discourse, we should have to see him as a weaseling meta.phy-

sician, hiding the most important elements of his thought in obscure passages, burying the central concepts of his theory of language, and offering a sly *double entendre* (l\foDonough's reading of T 7) without giving the reader the slightest clue. But McDonough's account does not persuade; so we are not obligated to make this reassessment.

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*The Nature and Limits of Authority.* By RIOHARD T. DEGEORGE. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1985. Pp. 305 with index.

Richard DeGeorge has produced a very thorough analysis of the nature and limits of authority in general as well as of authority in such specific domains as the family, political society, the labor place, religious bodies, the domain of knowledge in general (epistemic: authority in general), and the university.

DeGeorge draws some very useful distinctions among different kinds of authority. His working model is: "someone or something (X) is an authority if he (she, it) stands in relation to someone else (Y) as superior stands to inferior with respect to some realm, field or domain (R) " (14). On his analysis authority is sometimes a power and sometimes a right. He divides authority most basically into executive authority and non-executive authority. Executive authority is the right or power of someone to *do* something in some domain. *N*onexecutive authority, on the other hand, concerns knowledge or example. *N*onexecutive authority can be epistemic or exemplary (i.e., the authority of one who sets an example to follow, as in art or morality). DeGeorge discusses all of these with patience and clarity.

DeGeorge's justification for epistemic authority is that: 1) people are not equal in knowledge (or competence), and 2) the reliance on epistemic authority allows many more people to benefit from some people's knowl-edge than just those who directly know (38). There are criteria by which rational acceptance of epistemic authority can be distinguished from ir-rational acceptance. For example, Y must have good reason for believing that X has knowledge in the relevant domain.

DeGeorge takes seriously the challenge of anarchism, discussing in some detail arguments by Bakunin, Marx, and Robert Paul Wolff as examples. DeGeorge defines various types of freedom and concludes that, *pace* the anarchists, the exercises of various kinds of authority, and, in particular,

of political authority,  can enhance, rather than limit, free choice and "teleological freedom"  (i.e., the ability of persons to conceive of and to attain their goals). Thus he justifies political authority,  not on the basis of consent, but on the basis of its necessity in order to preserve and increase effective teleological freedom.  Consent is not the foundation  for political authority's  legitimacy, but, if I understand  DeGeorge correctly, a necessary condition  of its legitimacy.

DeGeorge argues  that there is no such thing as executive moral authority. That is, there is no one who makes something morally right simply by commanding it. In another chapter he distinguishes among various kind of religious authority:  delegated divine authority  (e.g., to preserve revealed truths handed  down), operative authority  within the church organization (i.e., authority  to represent  or act for the church body, and religious epistemic  authority.

In a very enlightening  chapter on university and authority,  DeGeorge defends the value, both intrinsic and instrumental  to all of society, of what he calls the objective-knowledge  university.  " The objective-knowledge university  has as its primary end the traditional  trio of discovering, preserving,  and transmitting  objective, systematic,  and unified knowledge"  (251) .

DeGeorge often takes a very non-dialectical  approach,  which sometimes inadvertently  hides how controversial  some of the issues are and how significant the positions  are which he calmly sets out. The book is extremely thorough; it brings analytic clarity to issues on which there has been surprisingly  little philosophical  work done. It should be consulted by anyone doing philosophical  or theological work on any of the several topics that demand clear thinking  about the nature of authority.

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*The Logic of Deterrence.* By ANTHONY KENNY. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. Pp. 101. .$6.95 paper.

Professor Kenny should have entitled his book "The Logic of Nuclear Deterrence ", for that is the subject he discusses. For Kenny the logic of nuclear deterrence cannot meet either the *jus ad bellum* or the *jus in bello* criteria of the just war tradition. It can fulfill neither the former criteria because " there can be no hope of victory " nor the latter because implementation of the deterrent threat can be neither proportionate nor discriminate. Kenny does recognize a just cause for war; however, for him the death and destruction caused by the use of nuclear weapons in a just cause would be immoral.

Thus, on the one hand Kenny states :

> The defence of the independence of the nations of the West against aggression from the Communist bloc would in itself provide a just cause for war. Leaving aside for the moment the nuclear issue, it would be right to risk our own lives, and to take those of enemy combatants, to preserve our independence and our traditions.

On the other hand, he does not believe that there could he any actual use of nuclear weapons in defense of this just cause that would not involve the massive destruction of population areas. Thus Kenny concludes that the use of nuclear weapons can never be materially or morally proportionate. They can never be materially proportionate for :

> (T)he differences which at present exist between the United States and the Soviet Union would be insignificant in comparison with the difference between the United States as it now is and the United States as it would be after absorbing a full-scale nuclear attack, or the difference between the Soviet Union as it now is and the Soviet Union as it would be after such an attack.

And they could never be morally proportionate:

> ... for it is necessary to keep reminding people of what the world would be like after (a nuclear war) in order to bring home that there is no desirable goal which can rationally be pursued by launching such a war.

For Kenny, the material and spiritual costs resulting from the use of nuclear weapons would always be disproportionate, whatever good was being protected :

> Respect for innocent human life and for international law is as much a part of what gives us a right to defend the values of Western democracy as is freedom of speech or rights against arbitrary arrest. To the extent to which we forfeit our respect for life and law we forfeit our claim to have any moral superiority to defend against communist threat. As for democratic institutions, few of these are likely to survive a war in which both sides suffer nuclear devastation.

Kenny's view about the disproportionality of the use of nuclear weapons, it should be noted, is a function of his belief that limited nuclear was is not possible, and so the just war criteria of " probability of success" *(not* " hope of victory", to use Kenny's formulation) cannot be met. For Kenny, "war is justifiable only if it can be limited".

Concerning the use of nuclear weapons in a "limited war" context, Kenny holds that there are two principal questions to be asked:

> The first is whether, on the assumption that the war remains as limited as the strategists envisage, it would be in itself a morally acceptable option.
> The second is whether it is likely that a nuclear war, once begun, could be kept under control and remain within the limits which were planned at the outset.

It appears that Kenny has already answered the first question by denying that it is possible, in practice, for any use of nuclear weapons to be either discriminate or proportionate, even in a " limited war" context. Perhaps Professor Kenny should have read what Fr. John Courtney Murray, S.J., had to say on this subject:

> First, there are those who say that the limitation of nuclear war, or any war, is today impossible, for a variety of reasons-technical, political, etc. In the face of this position, the traditional doctrine simply asserts again, " The problem today is limited war." But notice that the assertion is on a higher plane than that of sheer fact. It is a moral proposition, or better, a moral imperative. In other words, since limited nuclear war may be a necessity, it must be made a possibility. Its possibility must be created . .And the creation of its possibility requires a work of intelligence, and the development of a manifold action, on a whole series of policy levels-political (foreign and domestic), diplomatic, military, technological, scientific, :fiscal, etc., with the important inclusion of the levels of public opinion and public education. To say that the possibility of limited nuclear war cannot be created by intelligence and energy, under the direction of a moral imperative, is to succumb to some sort of determinism in human affairs.

With regard to the second question, after citing former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown's view, as contained in the U.S. Catholic Bishops' Pastoral Letter on War and Peace, and Paul Bracken, author of *Command and Control of Stategic Forces,* Kenny concludes that nuclear war cannot be controlled. However, Kenny apparently is not aware that the U.S. Catholic Bishops quoted Harold Brown out of context:

> First, I remain highly skeptical that escalation of a limited nuclear exchange can be controlled, or that it can be stopped short of an all-out, massive exchange. Second, even given that belief, I am convinced that we must do everything we can to make such escalation control possible, that opting out of this effort and consciously resigning ourselves to the inevitability of such escalation is a serious abdication

of the awesome responsibilities nuclear weapons, and the unbelievable damage ·their uncontrolled use would create, thrust upon us.

Also, what is one to make of Kenny citing Bracken ias an authority on the inevitability of escalation when elsewhere Bracken has stated:

> How many 'doves' understand that although a first-strike attack poses great uncertainties for the Soviets, the uncertainties about our own ability to strike back with untested weapons after receiving such an attack are probably greater?

Even if nuclear weapons were discriminating and proportionate, Kenny believes that American policy is not interested in using nuclear weapons discriminately and proportionately.

Concerning targetting, Kenny believes that the U.S. Government has been disingenuous at best, lying at worst, in asserting that in recent years cities have not been targeted as such:

> The ultimate threat of wiping out a large part of an enemy society has remained the bedrock of American strategy from that day (1950s) to this.

One wonders if Kenny has read the *Challenge of Peace* in full, or if he has forgotten the following exchange between the bishops and the government:

> Particularly helpful was the letter of January 15, 1983, of Mr. William Clark, national security advisor, to Cardinal Bernardin. Mr. Clark stated: "For moral, political and military reasons, the United States does not target the Soviet civilian population as such. There is no deliberately opaque meaning conveyed in the last two words. We do not threaten the existence of Soviet civilization by threatening the Soviet cities. Rather, we hold at risk the war-making capability of the Soviet Union-its armed forces, and the industrial capacity to sustain war. It would be irresponsible for us to issue policy statements which might suggest to the Soviets that it would be to their advantage to establish privileged sanctuaries within heavily populated areas, thus inducing them to locate much of their war-fighting capability within those urban sanctuaries.

The bishops themselves acknowledge that the U.S. does not directly and intentionally target noncombatants.

When he discusses the just war criteria of discrimination, Kenny either ignores or excludes as irrelevant the distinction between primary use of nuclear weapons and their indirect effects. This is a very important distinction for determining whether acts meet the proporitionality and discrimination criteria of the just war theory, and his failure to take it into account significantly weakens his analysis of the criteria. As a result of this he is unable to distinguish between doing "justifiable deadly deeds " and culpable acts of killing in warfare.

After defining those who may become the legitimate targets as "only

those who are engaged in making war, or in supplying those waging war with the means to do so", Kenny considers that possibility of retaliatory use of nuclear weapons on military targets is permissible, but he rules it out " **if** military targets are in the centres of population." Notice this is not an objection to the use of nuclear weapons on the grounds of proportionality, but on the grounds of discrimination which does not distinguish between direct and indirect effects.

Kenny's views, of course, represent his prudential ,judgments, and, like anyone's prudential judgments, rest upon information which may or may not be accurate, and which may or may not be complete, and conditions which are subject to change over time. **It** would be worth examining in more detail, if we had the space, the information which led Kenny to make the prudential judgments he has made about the compatibility of the use of nuclear weapons with the just war criteria of discrimination, proportionality, and the "hope of victory".

Because, for Kenny, the use of nuclear weapons is not morally permissible, he argues for a radical reduction in arms by the West to induce the Soviets into reciprocal disarmament. He says that the West must:

1. renounce explosive use of nuclear weapons;
2. cancel future development of weapons;
3. dismantle land and airborne nuclear systems;
4. dismantle theater nuclear weapons;
5. maintain a submarine-based arsenal as a bargaining chip for the Soviets.

Kenny contends that the only morally acceptable form of arms control would be unilateral dismantling of all American strategic nuclear weapons with the exception of the submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), for this, he alleges, would provide a strong incentive for the Soviets radically to reduce their arms. But this proposal fails to see that such weapons are the least accurate weapons in the nuclear triad, and that abolishing the other bomber and ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) might not leave the United States with a credible nuclear deterrent.

His proposal for virtually unilateral nuclear disarmament is fl.awed because he fails to see that the presently invulnerable SLBMs could readily become vulnerable if the airborne and land-based legs of the triad were dismantled. **If** these two legs were to be dismantled, it is quite likely that the Soviets would plow the tremendous resources they now use to defend against American ICBMs and bombers into anti-submarine warfare and would concentrate all of their efforts on detecting and neutralizing the submarines. He fails to see that relying solely on SLBMs would also be ethically questionable because our deterrent would then rely entirely on an indiscriminate system for attacking population centers, but with virtually no capability to attack hardened military targets.

Even when American SLBMs begin to acquire a capability  against hardened  targets  at the end of this decade, we would not only be putting all om· deterrent  eggs in one basket,  but we would also be creating  other problems.  Jl'or example,  what Soviet hardened  targets. could American SLBMs        Certainly not many of the hundreds of mobile Soviet ICBMs spread  across  the eleven  time zones  of the Soviet  Union.  (Some  75 such missiles m·e already  deployed  today.)

What  of the  political  i•amifications  for  extended  deterrence?   Our .Allies  believe  we will  defend  them  bi>cause  our  force  deployment  decisions,  e.g.,  ICBMs  in the  United  States  "coupled"  to American  Intermediate  Range  Nuclear  Forces  in Europe  put  our  territory  at risk.  If we " decouple " this  connection,  what  message  does  that  send  our  Allies?  It sends  a clear  mesage  that  we are  willing  to fight  a nuclear  war  in their countries,  but are  not  willing  to expose  our  own  territory  to nuclear  attack.

The  key  issue  of the  debate  on  deterrence,  which  Kenny  rightly  identifies, is what  is to be done **if** deterrence  fails.  Since  Kenny  believes  deterrence  will  fail  catastrophically,   any  response  to  nuclear  agreession  would be  simple  murder  and  therefore  ethically  intolerable.   We  would  hope that  this  is not  true  with  conventional  aggression,  for  then  all who  sought to  prevent  the  reign  of Nazism  were  merely  murderers.   He  argues  that retaliating  against  a nuclear  first-strike  could  not  be  morally  justified  because  so doing· would  not  prevent  aggTession  and  to  retaliate  would  therefore  be  murderous.

But  what  if we created  not  only  the  possibility,  but  the  probability,  that deterrence,  *if* it fails,  will  not  fail  catastrophically?   Indeed,  is there  not, as Fr. John  Courtney  Murray,  S.J. asserted  more  than  twenty  years  ago, a moral  imperative  to work  at this'? For  example,  what  if variable-yield weapons  were  used  against  strictly  military  targets  and  sueh  weapons could  be  specifically  calibrated  to  yield  only  enough  force  to  destroy  the target?   What  if such  weapons  were  used  not  to  destroy  the  target  completely,  but  only  to destroy  some  of its  key  components. to  render  the target  inoperable?   V\tnat  if only  a few  key  installations  in  an  entire  industry  were  targeted?   What  if conventional  weapons  could  be substituted for  nuclear  weapons  against  some  targets?  What  if some  legitimate  targets were  on  a "withhold"  list  because  the  collateral  damage  which  would result  from  striking  them  would  *not*  be deemed  proportionate  to  t.he destruction  of the

These  possibilities  show  that  a failure  of nuclear  deterrence  need  not  be "catastrophic",  1Uld that  the  strategic  deterrence  resulting  from  a lessthan-catastrophic   failure  of deterrence  need  not  be  morally  disproportionate  nor  indiscriminate  always  and  everywhere.  All  of these  uses  of nuclear  weapons  might  cause  less  death  and  destruction  than  the  use  of other  more  conventional  means.  **It** could  be credibly  argued  that  such

uses of nuclear weapons would not involve more noncombatant deaths than would the use of conventional ones. These situations, about which Kenny seems unaware, either obtain today, or could exist before the end of the century.

Eveu further, if a nuclear response would prevent a grave violation of the order of justice from succeeding, it is conceivable that such a respons.e might be morally obligatory. In making the point that responding to an unjust nuclear attack would not deter aggression, Kenny fails to see that deterrence aims not only at preventing aggression from breaking out, but also at preventing it from attaining its objectives.

Kenny claims that present deterrent policies of the West are murderous and immoral because they aim at preventing aggression by threatening murder on a massive scale. However, deterrence does not aim at preventing the outbreak of aggression by making murderous threats, but by persuading an adversary that aggression will not attain its. objectives. Kenny argues for a " no first use" policy. But in proposing this, he fails to see that successful deterrence must not only eommunicate to a potential aggressor the capability of preventing the aggression from succeeding, but it must also communicate the will to prevent it from succeeding. Because of the nature of deterrence, it is impossible for a nuclear deterrent to be credible if a policy of "no first use " or "no use " of nuclear weapons is adopted.

He rejects pacifism because it is a policy that leaves its citizens vulnerable to aggression. While this is a valuable insight, he fails to develop it and see that when the use of nuclear weapons against military targets is the last and only reasonable means of defending an innocent nation against unjust nuclear attack, the use of nuclear weapons against strictly military targets would not be unjust or immoral. To fail to do so would be to accede to injustice and to fail to protect the order of justice and to abandon the duties of the state to its citizens.

It is true that turning the other cheek is morally praiseworthy, but when the turning of one's cheek also turns the cheek of another who wants to protect the order of justice, renunciation of arms might be unjust. We can refuse to use force to defend ourselves, but it is not clear if the renunciation of force is moral when it prohibits others who may have a right to defend themselves from so doing.

There is also the possibility, as the Catholic bishops of Germany point out, that failing to join with others in legitimate defensive activities may provoke injustice :

> Those who refuse to perform military service for reasons of conscience have also to live to an equal extent with another strain: If everyone were to follow their example, this would create a vacuum of power which can lead to vulnerability to political blackmail,

> something  which they  certainly  wish to avoid.  Moreover, the military
> services  which they  themselves  cannot render  may possibly  permit
> a peaceful  settlement  of disputes  which they too support  in freedom
> and  for  which  they  perhaps  also demonstrate.

These show that Kenny  does not see that  an action  which  would be in-
herently  immoral  in some circumstances  becomes  ethically  acceptable  in
others.  Thus, removing  the uterus from a pregnant  woman would be
murderous  in all circumstances  except  where the woman suffered  from
cancer and  where so doing  would be the last  and  only reasonable  means
available  of saving  her life. Similarly,  if the use of nuclear  weapons be-
came the last  and  only reasonable  means  available  to prevent  a grave
violation  of the order of justice  it might  not only be ethically  unobjection-
able, but also morally  obligatory  to use them.

For a war to be considered  just, Kenny  demands  that there  be a "hope
of victory " but the traditional  just war theory  only demanded  a "prob-
ability of success."  This classical  standard  would mean  that  a deterrent
would be acceptable  if it could  prevent  an unjust  aggression  from suc-
ceeding.

Kenny  believes capitulation  by the West  to a nuclear  threat  or attack
by the Soviets  might  very  well be ethically  acceptable  because  it might
involve nothing  more serious  than a humiliation.  It is possible  that the
West might  be treated  like Romania  or Finland.  If there  were some
assurance  that "humiliation  " would be the only outcome,  that could cer-
tainly be unobjectionable.  But it is also quite  possible  that we might  be
treated  like the Cambodians  under Pol Pot. The difficult  question,  which
Kenny  does not confront,  is whether  capitulation  would be ethical  in that
circumstance.  Many  sincerely  believe  that Marxists  would not bypass  an
opportunity  to eliminate  a weakened  and demoralized  Western  alliance  that
alone  had prevented  the realization  of the Marxist-Leninist  dream.

The German  Catholic  bishops  do not share  Kenny's  view on the con-
sequenc,es of Western  capitulation:

> ... war is just for the purposes of Marxism-Leninism  when it bene-
> fits the advance  of the revolutionary  process.  This applies  in par-
> ticular *where the "bourgeoisie"  has to be eliminated* and "socialism"
> introduced.  The abolition  of class domination  will lead to the dis-
> appearance  of all wars.  The collapse of capitalism  after the end of
> class warfare  will be followed  by the inception  of world peace. (Em-
> phasis  added)

Kenny  implies  that Marxist  victories  over countries  devastated  by a
nuclear  war would be hollow  victories.  Many  would not see it that way,
particularly  if victory  meant  the abolition  of the major  threat to Marxism
in the future.

In conclusion,  this remains  an important  and intelligent  book for the

reason that it provides the best arguments available to date against nuclear deterrence, but ultimately the arguments fail because the author takes as an apodictic premise what is actually a prudential judgment that no nuclear weapons could ever be used in a moral and ethical way. Professor Kenny is not only an Absolutist, but also a Determinist. The present reviewers are neither.

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*Art  and  Beauty  in  the  Middle  Ages.* By UMBERTO  Eco.  Translated  by Hugh Bredin. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1986. Pp.  131.  $12.95.

   This is not a new work. As Umberto Eco himself states in the Preface of this book, the text was written in 1958 and published in 1959 as a single chapter of a four volume handbook on the history of aesthetics, written by various authors *(Momenti  e  problemi  di  storia  dell'  estetica,* Milano, Marzorati, 1959, vol. 1: *'Dall'antichita  classica  al  barocco,* pp. 115-230). No doubt it was due to the recent popularity in Europe and America of Mr. Eco's novel, *The  Name  of  the  Rose* (which subsequently inspired the film of the same title) that Yale University Press saw fit to translate and reissue this seminal work of the author. He wrote it when he was 26 years old and serving in the Italian army. Hugh Bredin, a senior lecturer in scholastic philosophy at Queen's University, Belfast, has simplified in the translation what the author claims was the "tortured syntax" of his impressionable youth. Nevertheless, one suspects that the style and context of this slim volume will appeal primarily to philosophers and not art historians, despite its ubiquitous presence in art bookstores and museum giftshops.

   The scope of Mr. Eco's work enables the reader to gain an overview of aesthetic problems which developed in Europe in the period between the sixth to the :fifteenth centuries, when the classical tradition inherited by the medieval world no longer provided adequate solutions. A thousand years of artistic and philosophical history are barely penetrated in so few pages, but Mr. Eco forthrightly proceeds to catalogue ideas and thinkers in chapters devoted to such topics as Transcendental Beauty, Symbol and Allegory, and the Aesthetics of Proportion and Light. As

was evident in *The Name of the Rose,* the author has an encyclopedic knowledge of both classical and medieval sources (he gently chides Maritain for his ignorance of one of Bonaventure's  definitions of beauty,  p. 24). As professor  of semiotics his understanding  of words and images is impressive (he takes a whole page to explain the visual applications  of Vitruvius's  use of the word euritmia,  pp. 65-66). But after repeated eitings of relevant quotations  from various  medieval works-some  in outright  conflict with one another-the  reader has no satisfying  sense of what was the "medieval " view of art and beauty.  Rather a mosaic of interesting  and diverse facts emerges in the thematic  structure  of the book which cuts across chronological, geographical,  and cultural  boundaries.  Thus, for instance, one learns in the chapter  on the Aesthetics of Light that St. Augustine  preferred  equilateral to scalene triangles, Hugh of St. Victor considered  green to be the most beautiful  of colors, the Limbourg brothers in painting  miniatures  had no use for *sfiirnatura* just as Chretien  de Troyes had no use for it in literature,  and the Christian image of God as Light traced its pedigree to the Semitic Baal and the Egyptian  Ra with heavy doses of Plato and Arab pantheism  thrown in as contributing  influences.  This dizzying effect of so much intelligent trivia, forcibly pieced together in an effort to arrive at a persuasive conclusion, backfires and ultimately  works ag:iinst *Art and Beaiity  in the Middle Ages* in much the same way that the plot in *The Name of the Rose* suffered from a surfeit of scholastic argumentation.  Mr. Eco, in an attempt to bedazzle his readers  with facts,  merely blinds them to the point.

Other authors have written  about art in the Middle Ages, and they were successful in their  approach  because they narrowed  the focus of their consideration.  J<"Jrwin Panofsky  *(Gothic Architecture   and Scholasticism),* Hen.ri Focillon  *(The Art of the West),*  and Otto von Simson  *(The Gothic Cathedral)*  concentrated  on architecture  and came to reflect on medieval society by what they perceived in stone. Mr. Eco's book has no illustrations, although  he does refer to works of art throughout  the text. What was merely a chapter  in a previous  work does not stand  up well as a book in its own right without  the aid of visual maforial.  A book purporting  to deal with the subject  of art in the Middle Ages needs to have pictures. Had Mr. Eco expanded  his work with an added dose of art historical  evidence, his philosophical  musings on beauty  would not seem so divorced from material culture.  Both Gilson  *(Painting    and Reality,*  Pantheon, 1955) and Maritain  *(Creative  Infaition  in Art and Poetry,*  Pantheon, 1953) benefited  when tl1eir words about  art were wed to artistic  works.

While the structure  and style of this book are deficient,  its content is not without  value. For instance, Mr. Eco points out how the Dominicans, Albertus  Magnus  and Thomas  Aquinas,  developed  a theory  of beauty which was rigorously  objectivist,  scientific,  intellectual,  and utilitarian-a

radical move in the direction of humanism. Calling Aquinas's *Summa* a "medieval computer" with logical concepts and implications exceeding even its own author's awareness, Mr. Eco interjects that while Aquinas ·did not deliberately set out to develop his own theory of beauty one certainly gets the impression that he did so by the way he synthesized his material. Few authors have written directly about Aquinas's aesthetics (a 1947 Ph.D. dissertation, *A .Theory of Esthetic according to the Principles of St. Thomas Aquinas,* by Leonard Callahan, 0.P., of Catholic University of America, lists only a handful of scholars who have dealt specifically with Aquinas's aesthetics since 1800), but it should be noted here that Mr. Eco himself has penetrated the subject in an untranslated work, *Il problema estetico in Tommaso d!Aquino* (2nd edition, Milan, 1970), which would make up for the haste with which he treats the Thomistic synthesis in this present volume.

The functionalism inherent in Aquinas's aesthetics would not appeal to modern sensibilities about art, just as anonymous medieval craftsmen are far removed from the personality cults of the contemporary art scene. In his own day Michelangelo was called *"Il divino!'* The Scholastic theory of art, which ignored the personal imprint of the artist upon his work and treated "making" as inferior to pure intellectual thought, found fewer adherents during the artistic explosion of the Renaissance. As Mr. Eco shows us, more modern ideas about art and artists have their roots in other schools of medieval thought: Christian mysticism contained in its soulful outpourings the seeds of an aesthetics of inspiration and intuition while the Franciscan emphasis on love formulated the nucleus of an aesthetics of feeling.

This brings us back to the original observation that one cannot find in the Middle Ages that strict homogeneity that the term " medieval " often implies. By the time the scholastics had perfected their image of a political and theological order in their *8ummae,* that order was collapsing under the growing influence of secularism and the operative principles of a society undergoing change. In Mr. Eco's thought-provoking book we gain a glimpse of the dynamism of that complex era, but only a glimpse.

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