"EVERY MARITAL ACT OUGHT TO BE OPEN TO NEW LIFE": TOWARD A CLEARER UNDERSTANDING

I. INTRODUCTION

ONE FREQUENTLY encounters misinterpretations of the statement "Every marital act ought to be open to new life" and similar statements in recent Catholic teaching concerning contraception.[1] There are two common misinterpretations. One is: No couple may engage in marital intercourse without the intention to procreate. The other is: No couple may engage in marital intercourse at times when they think procreation is impossible. As interpretations of the Church's teaching, these must be mistaken. For the Church teaches that contraception is always wrong and that natural family planning (NFP) is not always wrong. But NFP facilitates intercourse without the intention to procreate at times when procreation is thought to be impossible. Moreover, the Church has never taught that marital intercourse is good only if the couple desires to procreate; indeed, couples known to be sterile have never been forbidden to marry.

We think that the only plausible interpretation of "Every marital act ought to be open to new life" is: **It** is wrong for those who engage in marital intercourse to attempt to impede the transmission of life which they think their act otherwise might bring about. For if they do try to impede that to which their act of itself might lead, they choose to close it to new life.

[1] The proposition is formulated somewhat differently by Paul VI, *Humanae vitae*, 11, *AAS* 60 (1968), 488 (with references to *Gasti connubii* and to Pius XII's .Allocution to the Society of Italian Catholic Midwives); and by John Paul II, *Familiaris consortia*, 29, *AAS* 74 (1982), 115, following proposition 22 of the 1980 session of the Synod of Bishops. Moreover, the different formulations also are translated diversely. We do not think these differences matter for our present purpose.

Un.derstood in this way, "Every marital act ought to be open to new life" expresses the same proposition as " Contraception is always wrong." Nevertheless, the affirmative formulation helps to clarify what contraception is, for it indicates the precise object of the contraceptive act. "Contraception" signifies only the prevention of *conception,* but the contraceptive act seeks to impede *the beginning of the Zife of a possible person.* The distinction is only conceptual, but we think it important, for the explicit reference to new life calls attention to the fact that contraception is a contralife act.

The characterization of contraception as a oontralife act is one major element of the unbroken Christian tradition condemning contraception as always wrong. For example, a canon, *Si aliquis,* concerning contraception was included in the Church's universal law from the thirteenth century until 1917: " I£ anyone for the sake of fulfilling sexual desire or with premediated hatred does something to a man or to a woman, or gives something to drink, so that he cannot generate, or she cannot conceive, or offspring be born, let it be held as homicide." [2] This canon does not say that contraception is homicide; the tradition made no such mistake. The canon rather says that contraception sihould be regarded as homicide is regarded. To regard contraception as homicide is regarded is not only to make it clear that .contraception is wrong, but also to point to its being contralife as the reason why it is wrong.

When contraception is regarded as contralif e, it is seen as evil outside marriage as well as within. Historically, contraception probably was more common among the unmarried than the married, and much of the tradition condemned contraception without distinguishing between its uses in and outside mar-

[2] *Deoret. Greg. IX,* lib. V, tit. 12, cap. *v; Oorpus iuris oanonioi,* ed. A. L. Richter and A. Friedberg (Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1881), 2, 794: "Si aliquis causa explendae libidinis vel odii meditatione homini aut mulieri aliquid fecerit, vel ad potandum dederit, ut non possit generare, aut concipere, vel nasci soboles, ut homicida. tenea.tur." Some transla.te "ca.usa explendae libidinis," which is broad enough to cover all motivation by sexual impulse, "to satisfy lust," which unnecessarily limits the motive to habitual vice.

riage. But. *Casti oonnubii* dealt with contraception only within marriage, for marriage was that encyclical's subject. The argument in the Church in the 1960s dealt with contraception only within marriage, because those who were arguing for contraception said that they wanted only to justify its use in marriage, not to replace the whole traditional sex morality.

Recent Church teaching, focusing on the use of contraception within marriage, condemns it with specific reference to marital acts and distinguishes it :from NFP rightly practiced by married couples.

Opponents of this teaching almost always claim that contraception is moraUy indistinguishable :from NFP, since, they say, both propose to prevent pregnancy. Confronted with this argument, one defending the tradition either must show that contraception differs morally :from NFP precisely in its relationship to the value of life, or must avoid grounding the immorality of contraception in its contrali:fe character.

Apparently, recent Church teaching takes the latter alternative. For although the tradition pointed out contraception's contrali:fe character, recent Church teaching focuses almost entirely on contraception's wrongness in relation to other values, especially chastity, marital love, and the sacred character of virtuous sexual activity in marriage.[3]

s Still, recent Church teaching does not entirely ignore contraception's contralife character. Paul VI, Homily on the Feast of Sts. Peter and Paul, 29 June 1978, *AAS* 70 (1978), 397; *L'Osservatore Romano,* Eng. ed., 6 July 1978, 3, refers to *Humanae vitae* as a defense of life "at the very source of human existence," recalls *Gaudium et spes,* 51, on abortion and infanticide, and adds: "We did no more than accept this charge when, ten years ago, we published the Encyclical *Humanae Vitae* (25 July 1968; cf. *AAS* 60 1968, pp. 481-503). This document drew its inspiration from the inviolable teachings of the Bible and the Gospel, which confirms the norms of the natural law and the unsuppressible dictates of conscience on respect for life, the transmission of which is entrusted to responsible fatherhood and motherhood." Also John Paul II, Homily at Mass for Youth, Nairobi, Kenya, 17 .August 1985; *Insegnamenti di Giovanni Paolo II,* vol. 8, part 2 (Rome: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1985), 453; *L'Osservatore Romano,* Eng. ed., 26 .August 1985, 5, points out that the fullest sign of self-giving is when couples willingly accept children, quotes *Gaudium et spes,* 50, and adds: "That is

We think, however, that while contraception is wrong for several reasons, it is wrong primarily and essentially because it is contralife. In this paper, we shall try to show bhat contraception and NFP fundamentally differ precisely in that contraception necessarily is contralife and NFP need not be. We also shall explain how other arguments against contraception are related to the one we consider fundamental. We hope that these clarifications will help to overcome some of the confusions occasioned by certain formulations in *Humanae vitae* and *Familiaris* consMtio-formulations not of their central teachings, but of their explanations both of why contraception is morally wrong and of why NFP can be morally acceptable.[4]

why anti-life actions such as contraception and abortion are wrong and are unworthy of good husbands and wives."

4 While the treatment in the present article supersedes our previous treatments of the precise points considered here, certain elements useful to fill out the present account of the morality of contraception and related questions can be found in some of our previous publications: Germain Grisez, *Oontraception and the Natural Law* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1964); "Marriage: Reflections Based on St. Thomas and Vatican Council II," *Oatholic MVnd,* 64 (June 1966), 4-19; "Contraception and Reality," *Triumph,* in three parts: February 1968, 21-24; March 1968, 18-21; .April 1968, 27-30; *The Way of the Lord Jesus,* vol. 1, *Ohristian Moral Principles* (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1983), chaps. 35 and 36; Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., "Human .Action, Natural Rhythms, and Contraception: .A Response to Noonan," *American Journal of Jurisprudence,* 26 (1981), 32-46; John Finnis, "Natural Law and Unnatural .Acts," *Heythrop Journal,* 11 (1970), 365-87; *"Humanae Vitae:* Its Background and .Aftermath," *International Review of Natural Family Planning,* 4 (1980), 141-53; "Personal Integrity, Sexual Morality and Responsible Parenthood," *Rivista di Studi sulla Personae la Famiglia: Anthropos,* 1 (1985), 43-55; William E. May, *Sem, Marriage, and Ohastity: Reflections of a Oatholic Layman, Spouse, and Parent* (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1981); *Oontraception and Oatholicism,* Common Faith Tract No. 5 (Front Royal, Va.: Christendom Publications, 1983) ; *Oontraception, "Humanae Vitae," and Oatholio Moral Thought* (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1984); Ronald Lawler, O.F.M. Cap., Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., William E. May, *Oatholio Swual Ethics: A Summary, Explanation, and Defense* (Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday Visitor, 1985).

II. CONTRACEPTION: ESSENTIALLY CONTRA.LIFE

It is clear that the moral act of contraception cannot be defined in terms of any specific pattern of behavior. For there are many different ways to contracept, and there are many outward performances which could, but need not, be ways of contracepting.

On the one hand, the uses of barriers, drugs, and withdrawal are different behaviors often chosen to contracept; they are more or less effective. Many people mistakenly rely on contraceptively useless techniques and engage in the behavior such techniques require; any such behavior, too, is chosen to contracept, and so morally speaking is a way of contracepting. [5]

On the other hand, outward performances which usually are ways of contracepting can be chosen for other reasons. For instance, to treat some pathological condition, women who never engage in sexual intercourse sometimes have been given drugs usually 'prescribed for contraception. Fertile married women engaging in sexual intercourse sometimes have taken the same drugs without contracepting, although the therapy had as a side effect that they could not conceive.

In not being defined by any specific pattern of behavior, contraception is like many other acts, such as apologizing. There are many w:ays of apologizing, and performances which sometimes count as an apology can have other and even opposite meanings. And in this respect contraception is unlike many other acts, such as shaking hands. To engage in the act of interpersonal communication which we call " shaking hands," one's hand must make contact with the other person's hand.

Sexual acts, such as fornicating, are more like shaking hands than like apologizing. In this respect, sexual acts are unlike contraception. Assuming contraception is a sin, it is not a sexual sin, such as masturbation, fornication, adultery, homosexual behavior, and so on. A dictator who wanted to control

o This is why Paul VI in *Humanae vitae,* 14 *AAS* 60 (1968), 490, formulates the rejection of contraception in terms of "any act ... which intends as an end or a means to impede procreation."

population might contracept by having a fertility-reducing additive put in the public water supply. He would engage in no sexual behavior whatsoever, and might not will any such behavior. He might also exhort people to abstain, but reason that if they did not, the additive in the water would prevent the coming to be of some of the possible persons he did not want.

Contraception can be defined only in terms of the beliefs, intentions, and choices which render behavior contraceptive. To contracept one must think that (1) some behavior in which someone could engage is likely to cause a new life to begin, and (2) the bringing about of the beginning of new life might be impeded by some other behavior one could perform. One's choice is to perform that other behavior; one's relevant immediate intention (which may be sought for some further purpose) is that the prospective new life not begin. (Here and in what follows, " begin " and " come to be " refer both to the initiation of the life of a possible person and to the continuing existence of the person. Thus contraception aims to impede both the initiation of life and the being of the individual whose life would be initiated if not impeded.)

This definition makes it dear that contraception is only contingently related to marital intercourse. For the definition of contraception neither includes nor entails that one who does it engages in ,sexual intercourse, much less marital intercourse. Therefore, if someone both engages in a sexual act and contracepts, the two are distinct acts. A young couple tempted to fornicate has two choices to make, not one: whether to fornicate or not, and whether to contracept or not. They may decide to fornicate and not to contracept, perhaps agreeing that if pregnancy occurs they will get married. Many married couples who do choose marital intercourse never contracept; they may be infertile, or no more fertile than they care to be, or ignorant of contraception, or absolutely opposed to it. Thus, those who do choose to contracept plainly do so by a choice and by performances entirely distinct from the choice to engage in marital intercourse and the carrying out of that choice.

Nevertheless, contraception often is thought of as if it were a sexual act, and the morality of contraception treated as an issue of ,sexual ethics. The reason is that contraception presupposes and is closely related to sexual acts, since there is no occasion to practice contraception unless someone is likely to become pregnant, and pregnancy mrely occurs apart from some sexual act.

Since contraception must be defined by its intention bhat a prospective new life not begin, every contraceptive act is necessarily contralife. Those who choose such an act often also intend some further good-for example, not to procreate irresponsibly with bad consequences for already existing persons. But in choosing contraception as a means to this further good, they necessarily reject a new life. They imagine that a new person will come to be if that is not prevented, they want that possible person not to he, and they effectively will that he or she never be. That will is a contralife will. Therefore, each and every contraceptive act is necessarily contralife.

l\'foreover, in and of itself, a contraceptive act is nothing but contralife. For, being separate from any sexual act which occasions it, a contraceptive act cannot be considered part of that sexual act. Thus, contraception in marriage is not part of any marital act. Contraception is related to marital acts only instrumentally, inasmuch as contraception lessens the likelihood of pl'egnancy, which can be a motive to avoid marital intercourse.

This being so, one cannot argue: Since marital intercourse is good, contraception *involved in it* can be acceptable. If the contraceptive act and the marital act were one and the same human act, that argument might succeed, since that one act could be analyzed as an act with two effects. However, the principle of double effect is not correctly used to justify what is done in one act by the good features of another, distinct act.

III. CONTRACEPTION: EVIL BECAUSE CONTRALIFE

In reading this section, many will think that our argument proves too much if it proves anything at all, for it will seem to them that NFP does not differ from contraception in any way that would allow NFP to be morally acceptable if our argument concerning contraception is sound. However, rather than attempting to do everything at once, in this section we deal only with contraception and leave until section VI the explanation of how NFP differs in a morally significant way from contraception.

Insofar as contraception is contralife, it is similar to deliberate homicide. If contr:aception is similar to homicide, the first queston is: What is wrong with homicide? In sketching out the answer to this question, we are not concerned with killing which may he justified, such as killing in war, but with the intentional killing of the innocent, which certainly is wrong.[6]

Part of the reason why deliberate homicide is wrong is that it is wrong rto harm people, and love does no harm. Killing people is an extreme case of harming them. Moreover, in this case the harm to the person is direct and sure, unlike harms which one does to people when-for example, by stealing-one violates certain of their other rights, only indirectly harming the person. One's life is one's very reality. Thus, laying down one's own life for another is the greatest sacrifice one can make.

However, killing someone is not morally wrong only because the person who is killed loses the good of life. If that were the case, it also would be morally wrong to kill anyone by accident, since accidental killing also results in loss of life. An essential condition of the immorality of deliberate homicide is that it involves a .contralife will. Although the goodness of the life is destroyed provides the reason why deliberate killing is wrong, the moral evil of killing primarily is in the killer's heart.

[6] For a fuller treatment of the ethics of killing, see John Finnis, Joseph *M.* Boyle, Jr., and Germain Grisez, *Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism* (Oxford and New York: Oxford U. Press, 1987), chapter 11.

The New Testament makes it abundantly clear, against false, legalistic conceptions, that morality is in the heart. A man can commit adultery without ever touching a woman. And he need not wish to commit adultery with some real woman. Perhaps there is no real woman in the world with whom he wishes to commit adultery. But if he imagines an ideal play mate and freely consents to his wish that she were real so that he might commit adultery with her, he commits adultery. Indeed, any sin is in one's heart before it is in one's deed, and one's sinful deed is wrong because of one's evil heart. Therefore, deliberate homicide is immoral primarily because the contralife will which it involves cannot be a loving heart.

Usually when people contracept, they are interested in sexual intercourse which they think might lead to conception. If they did not think that, they would have no reason to contracept. They look ahead and think about the baby whose life they might initiate. Perhaps for some further good reason, perhaps not, they find the prospect repugnant: " not want that possible baby to begin to live." the very definition of contraception makes clear, that will is contralife; it is a practical (though not necessarily an emotional) hatred of the possible baby they project and reject, just as the will to accept the coming to be of a baby is a practical love of that possible person.

Confusions between feelings and will tend to obscure the moral significance of " desiring," " loving," " wishing," " wanting," " hating," " not wanting," and so on. All these expressions can be used to refer either to emotions or to volitions or to both simultaneously. In very many cases, will and feeling oppose one another, and in very many other cases strong feelings occur quite independently of any relevant willing, and vice versa. Hence, while it may seem shocking to speak of " practical hatred" in referring to the will to contracept, the expression is accurate and must not be misunderstood to suggest emotional animus.

In short, contraception is similar to deliberate homicide, despite their important differences, precisely inasmuch as both in-

volve a contralife *will.* Our thesis is that the contralife will which contraception involves also is morally evil, although we do not claim that it usually is as evil as a homicidal will.

To establish this thesis, we begin with two basic premises which no one is likely to challenge. First, morally right choices must conform to reason and not be contrary to it. A second basic premise is: In itself the coming to be of a new human person is a great human good. To say this is not to say that this good may not be accompamied by many evils which in the concrete can render realizing it repugnant, but only that, nothing else considered, the prospect of a new person is a reason to act for his or her coming to be, and in itself offers no reason to try to prevent that.

Given these two premises, a contraceptive choice certainly cannot be justified if one does not have a reason for making it. (For the moment we set aside the question whether a contraceptive choice can be justified even if one does have a reason for making it.) For the prospective coming to be of the new person offers some reason *not* to choose contraception. So, to choose to contracept without having a reason clearly is to choose contrary to reason, not in harmony with it.

Although some people do choose to contracept without having a reason, they do have an emotional motive. One such motive is that some people find the prospect of the possible person's coming to be unacceptable in itself. Their motivation is like that of murderers who kill someone not for any reason but simply out of emotional hatred. Their attitude clearly is immoral. The canon *Si aliquis* mentions this motive when it refers to those who contracept out of "hatred."

If those who have this motive did not see a reason not to contracept, they would have no morally significant choice about whether to contracept or not. In particular cases, they might be inhibited by aesthetic, economic, or other considerations, including the Church's teaching against contraception. But such inhibitions are accidental to contraception as such, and so we set them aside. Those motivated by emotional hatred of the

possible new person, if they lacked any reason to the contrary, would contracept without even considering what for them. would not be a possibility: not doing so.

The last point is important not only in the case of emotional hatred but in the other cases to be considered. Choices are made only when some alternative to doing as one chooses-at least the alternative of not choosing-has some appeal. If one has a reason to do something and no motive not to do it, no alternative to doing it has any appeal. In such a case, one has no choice to make and one acts according to the reason without choosing to do so. For example, one notices something which arouses curiosity, thinks of a way of trying to satisfy it, has no motive not to act to do so, and so without having to choose acts to satisfy the curiosity.

However, someone who finds the concrete prospect of the beginning of a new life unacceptable and who thereby is emotionally motivated to reject that possible person's coming to be nevertheless can appreciate the intelligible goodness of a new person's coming to be, see that as a reason not to choose contraception, and yet choose to follow the emotional motive against the reason. Precisely in being thus against reason such a choice to contracept is immoral, and this immorality is not accidental, but essential, to that choice of contraception.

But few people are motivated to contracept by emotional hatred of the possible person who might otherwise come to be. Generally, people have an extrinsic motive. Sometimes the extrinsic motive involves genuine and even very weighty reasons, but sometimes it is merely emotional.

Those who ·consider the prospect of a new person's coming to be and find that prospect emotionally repugnant, not because of hatred of the possible person but because of other elements of the total prospective situation, might say: " In some ways we would like to have another baby, and we are good parents, but considering everything else we want, we simply don't want to have another baby." (Here and throughout the remainder of this paper, " another baby " should be read to

mean " a baby or another baby," and " don't want " should be read to mean" don't want, whether now or never.") Such people can admit that choosing on this basis to practice contraception is contrary to reason and amounts to plain selfishness. But they can be frankly unconcerned about this fact: " We choose to take care *of* ourselves, and don't see anything so wrong with that."

Many people today, especially the affluent, contracept because *of* such selfishness, whether or not they are fully aware *of* its immorality. For them, moral considerations only become significant when nonrational individual behavior has social consequences. While they freely act contrary to reason when they think it hurts no one other than themselves, their conscience awakens when justice toward others comes into play. Seeing no injustice in contraception, they see no immorality in it. However, serious Christians, and many others as well, reject that mistaken conception of morality. For them, the choice to contracept could be justified, if at all, only by some genuine reason.

Reasons vary.[1] F'or some, the reason is that the responsibilities involved in caring for another baby would interfere with career commitments. (Here and throughout this paper, "reason " should be read to mean " reason or set of reasons, however complex.") Othern judge that they have their hands full or cannot afford another baby. Those with either of these and various other reasons perhaps rightly judge that having another baby would be morally irresponsible.

Naturally, those who choose for some reason to contracept invoke that reason to justify their action. However, they also know that there is a reason not to contracept, namely, the good of the prospective new person's life, which contraception prevents. (Again, we set aside the reasons accidental to contra-

[7] Pius XII, Allocution to the Society of Italian Catholic Midwives, *AAS* 43 (1951), 846, provides a list of the kinds of reasons which serve as indications for practicing periodic abstinence: medical, eugenic, economic, and social factors. These same factors provide reasons for those whose choice to contracept is motivated by something more than mere emotional motivation.

ception which inhibit some from choosing it.) For, if they were simply unaware of contraception's contralife character, they would have no need to make a *choice* of contraception, since they would see no reason not to contracept. (They might well need to make choices *about* contraception, insofar as they might see reasons not to choose certain contraceptive techniques which have bad aspects or side effects.)

If they could choose contraception without choosing contrary to any reason, they could choose it uprightly. But they realize that to contracept is to choose contrary to the beginning of a possible person's life, which in and of itself is a reason to choose not to contracept. Thus, they are aware that they choose contrary to a reason, but they may think that they are not choosing immorally, for they are likely to suppose that their reason to contracept somehow justifies choosing to do so.

However, the mere fact that they have a reason to contracept does not justify their choice to do so. For it does not eliminate the reason not to contracept-the prospective new person's life.

While morality requires that one always act in harmony with reason, it does not-and it cannot-require that one always act on every reason one has for acting. People normally have reasons for doing many more things than they can possibly do. They must choose between or among the things which they have reasons to do. Moreover, immoral choices very often are made not without a reason but for excellent reasons. For example, people often do injustices in order to secure real benefits for those they love. Thus, whenever there is a reason to do something and a reason not to do it, one chooses in harmony with reason by choosing not to do it, but chooses contrary to reason by choosing to do it, unless the reason to do it is *rationally preferable* to the reason not to do iL[8]

Thus, if the choice to contracept is not to be immoral, inas-

[8] With respect to the theoretical foundations of the point we make briefly in this paragraph, see Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, and John Finnis, "Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends," Part Two, section VII, *American Journal of Jurisprudence,* 33 (1987), 121-25.

much as it is contralife and so far forth contrary to a reason, the reason to contracept must be rationally preferred to the reason not to do so, namely, that in itself the coming to be of a possible person is a great good.

To establish the rational preferahility of the reason to choose to contracept, the two reasons must be rationally compared. To do this, one needs a standard by which to compare the two reasons precisely inasmuch as they are reasons for acting. But there is no such standard nor can there be. (We have argued this point at length elsewhere and will explain it only briefly here.) [9] Therefore, the attempted justification inevitably fa.ils, and so the choice to contracept is contrary to reason, and therefore is immoral.

If there were a rational method of estwblishing the rational preferability of the reason *for* making a choice to the reason *aga.inst* making it (or vice versa), then the reason which the use of that method showed to be less rationally preferable would, by that very fa.ct, cease to be a reason in respect to that situation of choice. But in that case, the situation would cease to be a situation of choice between rationally appealing alternatives, and so there would remain no choice between these alternatives. If the reason for making that choice and the reason against making it were the only motives at work in that situation, one simply would act in accord with the now unopposed reason. (Of course, there often are other appealing possibilities. Among them can be the option of abandoning reason and following some merely emotional motivation.)

[9] For the full argument against rational commensurability of the instantiations of goods offered by alternatives available for free choice, see Finnis, Boyle, and Grisez, *Nudear Deterrence,* 249-67, with the notes on 268-72 and the works cited there. The argument against rational commensurability establishes the truth of one proposition signified by saying "The end does not justify the means." Rational commensurability of goods as reasons for acting would be necessary to justify using a means contrary to one good to achieve an end which instantiates another. "It is not licit to do evils that goods may come about" can express the same proposition. Whether or not it does so in St. Paul (Rom 3:8) is disputed. It clearly does so in *Humanae vitae,* 14, *AA.S* 60 (1968), 491.

The preceding abstract argument that there can be no rational method by which to establish the rational preferability of the reason to contracept is, we think, conclusive. But many people who aoknowledge that it is good to initiate the life of a new person nevertheless think that a choice to contracept can be rational. They are convinced that the competing values must be rationally comparable, somehow or other, since people do in fact compare them.

To do so, people think of and compare two possible futures: one in which the baby lives and one in which it does not. And they think that the future in which the baby does not live is better. It certainly seems so to them. They *feel* that the future without the baby will be better than the future with it. But can they *know* that the future without the baby will be rationally better? Clearly, they cannot. To know that, they would have to know what God knowsc-not only the immediate, or short term, or other this worldly possible futures with and without the baby, but also the place of that possible baby and of everyone else concerned in God's plan for his kingdom. Human providence does not begin to reach so far.

If the comparison of these two possible futures is not rational, what is it? It is an expression of the feelings of those who make it. The possible future without the baby *seems* better only because that is the future which they want more strongly. Their wanting need not be merely selfish, but it cannot be rational. That the possible future without the baby will be better (something which they cannot know) cannot be what makes them not want the possible future with it. However, their not wanting the possible baby and all the consequences of that baby's coming to be and being can and does make them feel that the possible foture without the baby will be better. Therefore, the supposed reason sufficient to establish the rational preferability of contracepting simply is an emotional motive.

Inasmuch as the choice to contracept is contralife and so far forth contrary to a reason, this emotional motive provides no

justification at all. The choice to contracept is not only contrary to *a* reason, but contrary to a reason which cannot be rationally outweighed. Therefore, it is contrary to *reasion itself,* and so it is immoral.

But do not people who make rational judgments to do this rather than that sometimes begin by comparing possible futures and considering which will be better: the future to be expected if they do this or the future to be expected if they do that? Yes, in two kinds of cases people do compare possible futures as the basis or part of the basis for making rational judgments to do this rather than that.

1) In one set of cases, such a comparison does establish the rational preferability of a certain reason for acting. But by doing so, it eliminates the alternative consideration as a reason for acting otherwise (or for not acting at all). Unopposed, the rationally preferable reason for acting leads of itself to action, and choice is precluded.

For example, if a pilot of a plane about to crash thinks that he can come down in either a more densely or a less densely populated area (and he sees no other difference between the two) , his comparison of possible futures establishes the :rational preferability, in terms of saving human lives, of steering toward the less densely populated area. But with this rational preferability established (and assuming no other motive is at work), the pilot will have no reason to steer his plane toward the more densely populated area. Thus, choice will be unnecessary, and so the rational preferability-of endangering fewer lives-established by the comparison of possible futures will preclude choice and lead of itself to action, rather than provide a reason for choosing to come down in the less, rather than the more, densely populated area.

One sometimes embarks on deliberation, assuming a choice will be necessary, but discovers that presupposed standards of evaluation and limits on the possibilities to be considered make it easy to establish the rational preferability of one possible course of action and so eliminate the need for choice. For

stance, if one is house hunting, and is concerned with only three factors-say, price, size, and proximity to school-one may find houses that are better than others in one or two of these respects, but not in all three; none of the reasons for purchasing any of these houses can be judged rationally preferable to the reasons favoring the alternatives. But if one finds a house which is cheaper, bigger, and closer to school than any other house on the market, the rational preferability of the reason to buy it will be established. Moreover, unless one then becomes interested in some additional factor-for example, the character of the neighborhood or the soundness of the structure-one will no longer have any reason to choose to buy any of the other available houses. And thus one will have so unchallenged a reason to buy *this* house that no choice of it will be necessary.

Rational judgments in the technical sphere-judgments of the most efficient means to reach definite ends-typically are made in this way. moral judgments regarding free choices always concern what is truly good for human persons, and no one can make in a technical way rational comparisons concerning what is truly good for persons as such. Such comparisons are out of reach, because persons are openended, and any person is more than the particular goal of any and every human action.

2) In the other set of cases, possible futures are compared and their comparison does not preclude choice, but neither does it establish the rational preferability of a certain reason for acting. Instead, it contributes in some other way to the rational appraisal of the alternatives between which a choice remains to be made.

For example, one thinking of doing something which will have side effects harmful to others can assess the seriousness of those side effects by asking: " How would I feel if these side effects were impinging on people for whom I cared? " In answering the question, possible futures are compared, not rationally, but on the scale of one's feelings. To the subjective ap-

praisal of the significance of the side effects, one can apply the Golden Rule and so reach a moral judgment, for if one's feelings would preclude one's doing the same thing to people for whom one cared, one can judge that the unfairness of accepting the harmful side effects is a good reason not to accept them. Yet one can be tempted-that is, see a reason-to act contrary to that judgment, for one's comparison of possible .futures does not establish the rational preferability *in every respect* of the future in which one forgoes acting to the future in which one acts and unfairly accepts the side effects harmful to others.

In neither the first nor the second kinds of cases does the comparison of possible futures establish the rational prefembility of the reason for making a choice to the reason against making it (or vice versa). Therefore, these ways in which people do compare possible .futures in making rational judgments to do this rather than that cannot be used to show that the reason for making a choice-such as the choice to contracept-is rationally preferable to the reason against making that choice.

Finally, what about those cases in which the couple's reason for choosing to contracept is that they judge that it would be morally wmng for them to have another baby? Certainly there are cases of this sort, and they constitute the most plausible argument to justify the choice to contracept.

But the earlier argument which showed that there can be no rational method for comparing reasons for and against making a choice applies whether or not both of the alternatives are supported by moral considerations. So, the reason which makes it morally irresponsible for some coup:f.es to have another baby is not rationally comparable with the reason which makes it morally wrong for anyone to contracept. To choose contrary to either reason is to choose contrary to reason, not in harmony with it, and so is immoral.

Does it follow that such couples are in genuine perplexity, forced to do evil whether they choose to contracept or not? No. Since contraception is one act and marital intercourse another, they can escape this perplexity by abstaining from marital in-

tercourse. In doing that, they can avnid choosing to contracept, and so avoid the contralife will contraception involves and also faithfully serve the values underlying their moral obligation not to have another baby. They can act in complete harmony with reason and in no way act contrary to it.

However, it may be objected, marital intercourse, inasmuch as it serves marital love, can be good even if it is certain to be sterile (during pregnancy, after menopause, and so on). Abstinence prevents intercourse from serving marital love. Therefore, some argue that some couples are obliged to practice contraception for the sake of their marital love. If so, the choice to abstain, too, is contrary to a reason. They conclude that married couples who have a moral obligation not to have another baby cannot escape perplexity unless the choice to contracept somehow is in accord with reason in that situation.

How might the choice to contracept not be against l.'eason in that situation? Only if there is, after all, a rational method for comparing the reasons for and against making a free choice. But we have briefly indicated why there can be no such method.

Yet someone will object that in *this* case free choice must be compatible with rational comparison of reasons. For couples certainly do choose to contracept in this situation. And, it will be argued, t·he reasons also are clearly commensurable: The service to both love and life rendered by contraception is a better reason than the disservice to life involved in it, since love and life are a whole of which life is only a part, and, as everyone knows, the whole is greater than its part.

The answer to this objection is that the prospective new baby's life, which the use of contraception would be chosen to prevent, is not part of the total set of goods'-pertaining to both life and love-to be served by that possible baby's not coming to be. The value of the possible person whose life a contraceptive choice seeks to prevent remains rationally incomparable with the value of the possible benefits to love and life which the argument claims can be achieved only by contraceptively facilitated marital intercourse. Thus, the reasons for

choosing not to abstain and not to contra.cept remain rationally incomparable.

We shall explain in section V why the choioe to abstain from marital intercourse by a couple who ought to avoid another baby is not really against reason, and in section VI how the choice to abstain can be put into practice with the help of NFP without the nonrational contralife will which contraception essentially involves. But before dealing with these matters, we shall reply to objections which call into question the seriousness of the reason which prospective new life provides for not using contraception to prevent it.

IV. ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS

Insofar as the preceding argument depends upon taking seriously the life to be of a possible person and likens preventing it to homicide, those who defend contraception's moral acceptability will point to disanalogies. The validity of the argument we have given does not depend on establishing the analogy with homicide. Still, it is appropriate to answer the objections to the analogy, since it both is part of the tradition we are trying to clarify, and makes manifest the gravity of the choice to use contraception-gravity to which the tradition also attests.

First objection: Contraception does not attack a real person; it only prevents a merely possible person from coming to be. So, the contralife will which contraception involves is not homicidal.

The answer: We do not say that the contralife will essential to contraception is homicidal. Still, it is contralife, and more like homicide than one might at first suppose. AU human acts affect only the future. Homicide does not destroy the victim's entire life; the past and present are beyond harm. Homicide only prevents the victim from having a future. So, the homicidal will, like the contraceptive will, is only against life that would be, not against life that is.

Next objection: But when people are killed, and their future cut off, those people are wronged. For they did exist, and were

deprived of the lives they had. Contr:aception, however, does not cut off the life it prevents. There is not yet a person to be wronged. Therefore, contraception does no injustice. In this respect, it is very different from homicide, which plainly does the victim a great injustice. Therefore, contraception can be morally acceptable although homicide is not.

The answer: It is true that contraception does no injustice to the possible person whose life it prevents. But it does not follow that contr:aception is morally acceptable. For homicide is wrong not only because it involves an injustice, but also because it carries out a nonrationally grounded, contralife will-a will that the one killed not he. That is why deliberate suicide is wrong, even on the assumption that it does no injustice to others. Thus, even if does no injustice to anyone, it is wrong beoause it necessarily involves a nonrationally grounded, contralife will-the same sort of will which also is essential to the wrongness of deliberate suicide and homicide in general.

Moreover, the fact that contraception does no injustice to the possible person whose life it prevents does not mean that one who chooses to contracept does no injustice. For there are two ways in which those who choose to contracept can be acting unjustly.

First, every method of contraception, even sterilization, has a failure rate. When the attempt at ,contraception does not· succeed, an unwanted baby comes to be. Today, aborting the baby is likely to be considered. But perhaps the baby will he accepted and loved. Even so, the baby began life as an accident, as someone unwanted. Choosing contraception with the knowledge that it might fail and a baby come to be *as unwanted* is being willing to put another in a position no reasonable person would wish to he in. Tiherefore, choosing contraception is an injustice, even if it succeeds and the harm remains in one's heart.

Second, some of the most effective and widely used methods of birth control-the various kinds of pills and intrauterine de-

vices (TIJDs)- sometimes have their effect *after* conception has taken place, by preventing the implantation and/or the development of the early embryo. In such cases, birth control is achieved by very early abortion. That is not contraception but homicide. Thus, those who choose such methods of "contraception" do the precise injustice of homicide, even if through ignorance they are not guilty of it.

Next objection: But those who believe abortion is wrong might consider these problems carefully, decide to use some form of contraception which they are sure is not abortifacient, realize they are running some risk of conception, but make up their minds at the outset to accept any ba,by they conceive by accident. Such people avoid doing any injustice, and their wills are not contralife.

The answer: Their wills certainly are not contralife to the same extent as the wills of those who do not care whether or not their method of birth control is abortifacient and/or who never commit themselves to accept babies conceived by accident. But they still want the possible baby whose life they seek to prevent not to begin to be. If a conception occurs, they may keep their good resolution, accept the baby, and not even consider aborting it. But the baby who came to be by accident still would begin life precisely as an *unwanted* person.

Next objection: The claim that very early abortion is homicide assumes that the new individual is a person from conception. But nobody can be certain of that. Even St. Thomas thought that the individual at first is subpersonal, and that a personal soul is infused only some weeks after pregnancy begins.[10]

[10] For a more extensive answer to this objection than we offer here, see the excellent analysis by T. V. Daly, S.J., "The Status of Embryonic Human Life: A Crucial Issue in Genetic Counselling," *Health Oare Priorities in Australia: Proceedings of the 1985 Annual Conference on Bioethics,* ed. Nicholas Tonti-Filippini (Melbourne: St. Vincent's Bioethics Centre, 1985), 45-57. .Also see Germain Grisez, *Abortion: The Myths, the Realities, and the Arguments* (New York: Corpus, 1970), 25-27; Germain Grisez and Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., *Life and Death with Liberty and Justice: A Contribution to the JJJuthanMia Debate* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979)' 229-41.

The answer: St. Thomas was working with the biology of his time, which was in error in supposing that new living individuals come to be from nonliving material. (That is how it seems if one has no microscope to look more closely.) He was aware, of course, that whatever persons are, they are alive, not nonliving material. So, St. Thomas had to suppose that the personal soul is infused at some time after the beginning of pregnancy. Today, one knows that each new living human individual comes to be from living bits of the bodies of his or her parents. One knows that at conception there is a new living human individual, and everything one observes shows that the very same individual (unless death intervenes) lives and develops continuously until birth-and on to subsequent death.

On some occasions, the new individual splits into two or more-identical twins, triplets, and so on. Perhaps, on rarer occasions, two or more individuals combine into one. Nonetheless, from conception onward, there is nothing but a living human individual or individuals.

But, except in arguments a;bout the status of the unborn and those who will never or never again be able to function in specifically personal ways, everyone today equates " living human individual " with " human person." Of course, some will insist on the logical-metaphysical *possibility-which* we aidmittedly have no argument to exclude-that an unborn human individual at some early stage is not yet a person or that the others are no longer persons. That possibility, however, provides no ground for judging beyond all reasonable doubt that living human individuals in either of those conditions are not persons. If there were no motive to kill or otherwise gravely harm them (for example, by experimenting upon them or using their organs), no question about their personhood would be raised.

Therefore, to judge that they are not persons on the basis of the mere possibility that they are not persons is to license killing or harming them *even if they are persons.* The choice to make that judgment against the unborn at some early stage or

those who will never or never again be able to function in specifically personal way;s is not only a contralife but a homicidal will.

Next objection: In practice, contraception may involve injustice. But according to the argument which likens it to homicide, that injustice is not the basic reason why contraception is wrong. The basic reason is that it involves a nonrationally grounded, contralife will, similar to the will involved in suicide. But an important difference remains, for when ,someone commits suicide, that existing person's life is destroyed. When people contracept successfully, a merely possible person's life is prevented. That difference remains important even if contraception and suicide are alike in some ways.

The answer: Granted, contraception differs from suicide. A possible person is not an existing person. But this difference is not such that, while suicide is wrong, contraception is morally acceptable. For the difference between contraception and suicide does not take 1away their similarity. Both involve ,a nonrationally grounded, contralife will.

Moreover, the possible person whose life is prevented is no mere abstraction, but an absolutely unique and unrepeatable individual who would exist if he or she were welcomed rather than prievented. For each one of us, merely being allowed to come into existence was a great gift. The beginning of our lives, which contraception perhaps could have prevented but did not, is continuous with the life by which we are now alive. One must bear this fact in mind when one says that contraception only prevents a possible person.

Also, the similarity between suicide and contraception is closer than at first appears. Whenever a baby comes to he from a couple's one-flesh communion, the new person is as it were an emerging part of his or her parents. Although contraception intervenes before any new person emerges, still it is a choice to interfere with existing human life. For, in preventing the baby they project and reject, those who choose to contracept attack their own lives as they tend to become one

through their sexual act. By contracepting, they as it were commit limited suicide-they choose to cut off their human life as they are about to hand it on, precisely at the point at which the new person would emerge.

People who do not believe in an afterlife and a provident God generally deny that there can be anything wrong with deliberate suicide, provided that no injustice is done to others. Christians generally are acutely aware of the wrong of deliberate suicide, because they think of what God had in mind for the person who knowingly and freely commits suicide, and how he may view that person's self-destructive act.

But is contraception really so different? The projected and unwanted person is envisaged as a real possibility. No one can know what God has in mind for that possible person's life, and how he may view those who prevent it. If, as has now been argued, contraception is wrong because it necessarily involves a nonrationally grounded, contralife will, that wrong is aggravated by the irreverence of this will toward God, the Lord of life, with whom human beings can only cooperate, or refuse to cooperate, in responsibly procreating new persons for his kingdom.[11]

A final objection: If contraception is always wrong because it involves a nonrationally grounded, contralife will, is it not wrong to try to prevent a conception which otherwise might

[11] John Paul II, Address to Participants in a Study Seminar on "Responsible Parenthood," 17 September 1983; *Insegnamenti di Giovanni Paolo II*, vol. 6, part 2 (Rome: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1983), 562; *L'Osservatore Romano*, Eng. ed., 10 October 1983, 7, points out that each person comes into existence through God's personal creative love, and that married couples only share in God's work, and adds: "When, therefore, through contraception, married couples remove from the exercise of their conjugal sexuality its potential procreative capacity, they claim a power which belongs solely to God: the power to decide *in a final analysis* the coming into existence of a human person. They assume the qualification not of being cooperators in God's creative power, but the ultimate depositaries of the source of human life. In this perspective, contraception is to be judged objectively so profoundly unlawful as never to be, for any reason, justified. To think or to say the contrary is equal to maintaining that in human life situations may arise in which it is lawful not to recognize God as God."

follow from rape? Those who do this also project and reject the baby who might come to be.

The answer: One choosing to prevent a conception which might follow from rape could be choosing to contracepL Plainly, this is so when an administrator of an institution housing men and women incapable of giving consent to sexual intercourse makes little or no effort to prevent their copulation but supplies contraceptives to prevent pregnancies. However, rape is the imposition of intimate, bodily union upon someone without her or his consent, and the one who undergoes rape has the right to resist so far as possible. No one doubts that someone who cannot prevent the initiation of this intimacy is morally justified in resisting its continuation-for example, that a woman who awakes and finds herself being raped need not permit her attacker to ejaculate in her vagina if she can force him to withdraw. On the same basis, without ever projecting and rejecting the baby who might be conceived, women who are victims of rape (or those trying to help them) who cannot prevent the rapist from ejaculating close to or in the victim's vagina are morally justified in trying to prevent the ultimate completion-namely, conception itself-of the wrongful intimate bodily union.

The measures which are taken in this case are a defense of the woman's ovum (insofar as it is a part of her person) against the rapist's sperm (insofar as they are parts of his person) . By contrast, if the intimate, bodily union of intercourse is not imposed on the woman but sought or willingly permitted, neither she nor anyone who permits the union is conceptually able to defend against it. Hence, rape apart, any contraceptive measures must be chosen to prevent conception not insofar as it is the ultimate completion of intimate bodily union but insofar as it is the initiation of a new and unwanted person.

V. MARITAL INTERCOURSE: NOT OBLIGATORY

We considered the argument that, because marital intercourse is necessary to serve marital love, couples whose reason

to avoid having another baby is morally grounded are justified in using contraception. We showed that, even granting the assumption that marital intercourse is necessary to safeguard and promote marital love, the use of contraception is not justified. But we promised to show that marital intercourse is not necessary to serve marital love. In now showing this, we shall also clarify the concept of chastity, especially marital chastity.

One must frankly admit that sexual abstinence can have the bad effects often attributed to it. Vatican II teaches: " Where the intimacy of married life is broken off, it is not rare for its faithfulness to be imperiled and its quality of fruitfulness ruined. For then the upbringing of the children and the courage to accept new orres are both endangered." [12] In plain language, the husband and the wife become irritable with one another and express their feelings by treating the children badly; they may be tempted to commit adultery, at least in thought; their love cools, and they are unlikely to welcome another child; the marriage may even end in divorce.

However, these and other bad effects of abstinence from marital intercourse do not follow from abstinence as such. Most married couples sometimes must abstain for reasons other than family planning-necessary separations, illness, and so on. Many people abstain for longer or shorter stretches without becoming irritable, being unfaithful, and so on. In times past many couples abstained £or years at a stretch because they judged that they should not have another baby. Many couples today abstain for ten to twenty days each cycle-and sometimes for longer stretches-for the same reason, and many such couples bear witness to the benefits to their marital relationship of their practice of periodic abstinence.

Couples who abstain £mm marital intercourse without incurring bad effects are able to do so only because they learn that most of the benefits of their most perfect acts of marital intercourse can be sought and enjoyed in other ways. For example,

[12] *Gaudium et spes,* 51.

they can communicate by conversation, gestures, writing notes; they can please one another by giving little gifts, making compliments, planning surprises; they can enjoy being together by playing games, listening to music, going out to dinner; they can express affection by words and touches, even with a certain degree of limited sexual arousal.

What none of this provides, however, is the satisfaction of the sexual urge. Plainly, sexual frustration is the only factor essentially related. to intercourse which causes all the had effects some people 'suffer due to marital abstinence. This raises the question: Precisely how is the satisfaction of sexual desire related to marital love?

Clearly, marital intercourse is essentially related to marital love. This essential relationship plainly calls for marital intercourse on three kinds of occasions.

1) Marital love begins with the mutual commitment which constitutes marriage and is fulfilled by the marital intercourse which consummates it. That act of sexual intevcourse realizes the husband and wife as two in one flesh, and provides them with the experience of being married. But this marital intercourse, which serves marital love by consummating marriage, has nothing to do with the regular dynamics of sexual desire and its possible frustration. A single act of marital intercourse consummates marriage, and that act need not have to do with sexual desire. As an experience of sexual satisfaction it may leave much to be desired.

2) Marital love also is fulfilled by marital intercourse on the part of those who desire children and are prepared to welcome them.

8) Of course, there are other occasions-such as anniversaries, special times together, and so on-when marital inte:r:-course is particularly appropriate to recall the significant reality and renew the essential being one in marital communion-of that marital intercourse which first consummated marital love. However, there is little correlation between the periodicity of 1spontaneous and undisciplined sexual

desire, on the one hand, and, on the other, the calendar of each married couple's special occasions.

Someone will object that the calendar of each married couple's special occasions unfortunately also has little correlation with times of infertility. So, the objection will continue, for couples who ought not to have another baby, marital love must remain unserved by marital intercourse on many such occasions unless the use of contraception is justified. Therefore, the objection will conclude, the use of contraception often is necessary quite apart from any urgent need to satisfy sexual desire.

The answer is that marital intercourse is indeed appropriate on such occasions, and certainly serves marital love, provided that there is no reason not to engage in it. However, couples who ought to avoid another baby can celebrate such occasions without having marital intercourse, and an important part of their expression and experience of marital love in such cases is their very abstinence from marital intercourse for the ·sake of the common good-their marital friendship and children-which they are celebrating. Therefore, although marital intercourse would be appropriate, marital love does: not require it even for such celebrations.

If anyone thinks such a notion of celebration unreal, that is only because of an underlying assumption that unsatisfied sexual desire would spoil it.

Therefore, while marital intercourse is either required or appropriate on the three preceding kinds of occasions, if one sets aside the factor of urgent sexual desire and its frustration, the requirement that married couples engage in intercourse for the sake of their marital love is very limited. Abstaining from sexual intercourse at times for various good reasons, including the a.voidance of pregnancy, is compatible with serving marital love by engaging in intercourse on those occasions when marital love truly requires marital intercourse. And the had effects of marital abstinence on marital love cannot be attributed to the lack of that marital intercourse which marital love really

reqmres. The had effects of abstinence-other than those which could he forestalled by appropriate activities not leading to orgasm-are caused by one and only one thing: the urge is there, is powerful, and is not subordinated to the goods of marna;ge.

True, marital intercourse, even if not required by marital love, often can serve it. A married couple do not need a reason to engage in marital intercourse. Any normal married couple at times desire to engage in marital intercourse and, if there is no reason not to do so, spontaneously act on that desire, often even without deliberating and making any choice. However, a choice always is necessary when they are aware of some reason not to engage in marital intercourse. A couple's moral obligation not to have another baby is a good reason not to engage in marital intercourse.

Still, many people today think that the satisfaction of sexual desire is in itself an important human good, and that one irreducible aspect of marital love simply is the decent satisfaction of this desire within the bounds of marriage. But this widespread view is false for three reasons.

First, in itself the satisfaction of natural desires is not a good of human persons. Desire satisfaction contributes to human goods only insofar as it is integrated within a wider framework determined by reason and morally upright commitments. Such .integration is not achieved merely by locating the satisfaction of desires within a context in which it can be legitimate. Rather, integration requires that desire be satisfied only in harmony with all the purposes of the framework within which doing so is legitimate, and that desire not be satisfied whenever satisfying it would conflict with any of those purposes.

Second, the deliberate use of marital intercourse simply to satisfy sexual desire does not serve marital love, because that use of marital intercourse ha,s features which are at odds with marital love itself.

One can see this by considering the question: Does the marital act express and nurture marital love, even if the couple's

motive for engaging in it simply is their sexual desire? (I) If they engage in intercourse in response to the urge and contrary to a reason not to engage in it, then it cannot express and nurture love. But (Q) if they do not engage in intercourse when there is a reason not to, then, when there is no reason not to, their intercourse motivated simply by sexual desire can express and nurture marital love.

(1) Intercourse in response to the urge, engaged in contrary to a reason not to engage in it, cannot express and nurture love, because actions are expressive and communicative precisely insofar as they .are free. If a man has an uncontrollable nervous condition such that from time to time he blurts out "Yes, yes! " everyone soon realizes that his " Yes, yes! " is quite meaningless. If his wife wants his agreement about anything important, she asks him to put it in writing. To be able to give oneself in marital intercourse so that it means something, one needs self-control sufficient to he able to choose not engage in intercourse when there is a reason not to. So, for those who do not abstain when there is some reason not to have intercourse, marital intercourse motivated simply by sexual desire cannot be expressive and communicative of marital love.

Participating in marital intercourse can have the significance of self-giving only if one has sufficient self-possession-one cannot give what one does not have-to be able to resist sexual desire when there is a reason to do so. Therefore, engaging in marital intercourse motivated simply by sexual desire, not habitually ,shaped by reason, cannot express giving oneself to one's spouse. Rather, it expresses taking one's spouse for oneself. For, in interpersonal relationships, goods received from another which are not truly given are simply taken. In marital intercourse which falls short of mutual self-giving, the taking can be mutual and voluntary, but what is received is not given, only willingly yielded, since the freedom necessary for giving is absent. The couple satisfy one another's desire, but their intercourse does not express and nurture their marital communion as it would if they were free enough to give themselves

to one another rather than constrained to take their satisfaction from one anothero

(2) If couples (for example, during the first months of their marriage) are prepared to practice abstinence when they have a reason not to have marital intercourse-whether that reason is their obligation not to have another baby or some other reason-their acts of marital intercourse are never chosen (despite a contrary reason) simply to satisfy sexual desireo When such couples do engage in marital intercourse, even if sexual desire is their only motive and their behavior is spontaneous rather than deliberate, they can have a genuine experience of their marital communiono As time goes by, their emotions gradually will become integrated; their marital intercourse more and more will come to be fully free and meaningful, less and less mere spontaneous behavior, and so will conform more perfectly to the ideal of mutual self-giving.

Furthermore, in their acts of abstinence, freely chosen despite their sometimes urgent desire to have intercourse, the couple also realize and experience their marital onenesso For they choose to abstain for a reason, and the reason must be consistent with and can be rooted in their mutual faithfulness to their marital commitment: to be exclusively one with one another in this aspect of their lives, to accept children as a gift, and to fulfill their responsibilities to these children.

There is a *third* reason not to accept the widespread view that sexual satisfaction simply as such can be a reason for choosing to engage in marital intercourse, Because of the importance of this reason, we shall explain it at some length,

Married couples are not alone in experiencing desire and suffering frustration when they do not satisfy it. Very many people have the urge to satisfy sexual desire at regular ,and rather frequent intervalso So, many children masturbate, many boys and girls engage in sexual play with one another to o:rgasm, many of those homosexually inclined do what homosexuals do, and many young couples fornicate. When people who have enjoyed such experiences marry, they often continue

to engage in sexual activity merely to satisfy sexual desire, even if they limit their sexual activity to marital intercourse. However, being married, they mistakenly think they are justified in satisfying sexual desire whenever they find it agreeable to do so.

But is not the sexual activity of such married couples morally acceptable provided that it is limited to or ·always culminates in completed marital intercourse? Yes and no. Since they are married, their marital intercourse is appropriate and not wrong as are the ways of satisfying the sexual urge apart from marriage. But if they are not prepared to ·abstain whenever there is any good reason not to have intercourse, their marital intercourse used merely to ·satisfy desire remains in that respect like extramarital sexual activity chosen for that purpose, and so is not all it morally should be, as we have shown.

Today, very many peopfo accept the principle that all sexually mature individuals are entitled to regular sexual satisfaction and may get it in any way which pleases them provided that they do not hurt anyone. Now, what is wrong with this position?

The view that one may satisfy sexual desire simply because doing so is enjoyable and not doing so is frustrating overlooks what such sexual acts do-do *in and of themselves-to* the acting person. The desire-satisfying person becomes the sensory-emotional subject who ex:periences the urge and its satisfaction; the reasoning and freely choosing subject is disengaged unless put to work in the service of the sensory-emotional subject; and the body becomes an extrinsic object, an instrument for avoiding frustration and replacing urge with satisfaction. The person is dis-integrated. In thus dis-integrating themselves, however, desire-satisfying persons act inconsistently with what they inescapably are: unities of body, sense, emotion, reason, and freedom. The effects of this self-dis-integration of the person are great. For example, communication becomes a problem, since communication is by bodily commun-

ion, but persons now are alienated from their own bodies. This self-dis-integration is an essential element of what is morally wrong with any sexual activity which is mere desire-satisfaction.

Moreover, engaging in sexual acts simply in response to a sexual urge cuts sexual activity off from its very important relationships with the rest of one's life. Sexual behavior does have something to do with the coming to be of new people. It also has somet,hing to do with health and disease. And it has much to do with deep personal relationships. Even masturbators imagine themselves relating to others, and their fantasies affect their relationships with real people. People who merely satisfy their sexual desire with one another are often deeply affected emotionally, yet their shared activity does not really make them one. Each enjoys a private experience and satisfies an urge, but they are not committed to any common good transcendent to their individual selves as a basis for real friendship.

In sum, to many people the satisfaction of sexual desire in itself is not a human good. Hence, it cannot be an irreducible element of marital love, insofar as marital love is an authentic good of marriage. Sexual behavior motivated by the mere response to sexual desire and the wish to rid oneself of sexual frustration does not become humanly good by the simple fact that it occurs within the framework of marriage. For such sexual behavior is bad for those, married or not, who engage in it. Therefore, sexual desire and its satisfaction by marital intercourse must be subordinated to and integrated with the goods of marriage: the love constituted by the bond of marriage, the communion actualized and experienced in mutual self-giving, and the vocation to serve new life.

Vatican II, in a passage quoted earlier, expresses a clear awareness that breaking off the intimacy of married life can occasion serious harm to both the procreative and the unitive goods. In this section, we have shown that the full service of

sexual intimacy to the goods of marriage is compatible with the practice of abstinence when appropriate to avoid pregnancy. Thus, it is clear why the Council does not conclude from the difficulties married couples experience that they are justified in using contraception. Rather, with :fidelity to the Church's constant and most firm teaching that contraception is always wrong, Vatican II calls for the practice of chastity. The relevant moral norms, it states, " preserve the full sense of mutual self-giving and procreation in the context of true love. Such a goal cannot be achieved unless the virtue of conjugal chastity is .sincerely practiced. Relying on these principles, sons of the Church may not undertake methods of regulating procreation which are found blameworthy by the teaching authority of the Church in its unfolding of the divine law." [13]

VI. NFP: NOT CONTRALIFE

Ethical considerations apart, NFP can be described roughly but sufficiently for our purpose here as a practice adopted by couples who rubstain from sexual intercourse at times when they believe conception is likely and engage in sexual intercourse only at times when they believe conception is unlikely. (The techniques of NFP are equally valuable for increasing the likelihood of conception; couples then choose to engage in marital intercourse when they believe conception is most likely.)

Many argue: How can NFP be chosen without contraceptive intent? Couples using NFP studiously abstain on the "baby days" and have intercourse only during the "safe" periods. It certainly seems that they do not *want* to have run-other baby and are doing what is necessary to avoid having one. Thus, the argument will go: Those who choose NFP must have exactly the same contralife will as those who choose to contracept. So, the argument will conclude, if contraception really is morally unacceptable, NFP is no less unacceptable.

1s *Gaudium et spes,* 51; also see *Humwnae vitae,* 21, *AAS* 60 (1968), 495-96.

We concede that NFP can be chosen with contraceptive intent.[14] But we hold that NFP also can be chosen without the contralife will which contraception necessarily involves. To understand the second point, it will help to understand the first.

To see that NFP can be chosen with a contralife will, imagine a married couple who rightly judge that they should not have another baby. But they feel they are entitled to regular satisfaction of their sexual desire and so are not willing to accept long-term abstinence. They choose to use some form of birth prevention. Looking into methods, they find something they do not like about each of them. IUDs and pills can be dangerous to a woman's health. Condoms and diaphragms interfere with the sexual act and pleasure. Jellies and lotions are messy and often ineffective. And so on. Then they hear about NFP. They will have to abstain for a longer stretch than they would like, but still will be able to have intercourse during a week or ten days each cycle. Even the abstinence will have its advantages from their point of they it increase desire and intensify their pleasure. So they decide to use NFP as their method of contraception.

For them, choosing to use NFP is not essentially different from choosing any other method of contraception. They project the coming to be of .another baby, want that possible baby not to come to be, and act accordingly. Their will is contralife and no less against reason than if they had chosen some other method of contraception. If pregnancy occurs, the baby will be unwanted.

In our example, the couple rightly judge that they should not have another baby. Of course, couples who have no reason to avoid pregnancy also can choose NPF with contraceptive intent. But the opposite is not the case: No couple can

14 See John Paul II, General Audience, 5 September 1984; *Insegnamenti di Giovanni Paolo II,* vol. 7, part 2 (Rome: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1984), 321; *L'Osservatore Romano,* Eng. ed., IO September 1984, 10; Giovanni Paolo II, *Uomo e Donna lo Oreo: oatechesi sull'amore umano* (Rome: Libreria Edih-ice Vaticana, 1985), 474.

choose NFP without contraceptive intent unless they have a reason not to have another baby.

Now, if a couple's reason not to have another baby e:xdudes contraceptive intent, that could be so only because their reason does not include the very not-being of the baby. It must include only the burdens which having another baby would impose with respect to other goods, and/or the benefits which might flow from avoiding those burdens.

Thus, the :first step in the deliberation and choice which leads to a morally acceptable practice of NFP is to become aware of a reason not to have another ha,by. Recognizing that intercourse during a fertile time might lead to having another baby, contrary to such a reason, one judges that intercourse during that time is to be avoided. Thus, abstinence is chosen.

This :first step plainly is different from a :first step toward a choice to contracept based on merely emotional motivations either of hatred of the prospective baby or selfishly not wanting another baby. For here there is a reason.

But the reason not to have another baby when NFP is chosen to avoid the consequences of the possible baby's coming to be might equally well be a reason to choose to use contraception. a couple who otherwise would welcome another baby might for that very reason choose contraception with a view to preventing the consequences which the couple who choose NFP equally are trying to avoid. How, then, does the practice of NFP differ from the use of contraception in such a case, when the reason not to have another baby is exactly the same?

They differ not in the *reason* for the choices which are motivated, hut in the *choioes* which that reason motivates and in those choices' relationships to the benefits and burdens which such a reason represents. When contraception is chosen, the choice is to impede the baby's coming to be, in order that the goods represented by that reason be realized and/ or the evils represented by it he avoided. When NFP is noncontraceptively chosen, the choice is to abstain from intercourse which would

be likely to result in both the baby's coming to be and the loss of goods and/or occurrence of evils represented by that same reason, in order that the goods represented by that rea;son be realized or the evils represented by it be a,voided.

Even when based on good reasons, the contraceptive choice by its very definition is contralife; it is a choice to prevent the beginning of the life of a possible person. It is a choice *to do something,* with the intent that the baby not be, as a means to a further end: that the good consequences of the baby's not- will be realized and the bad consequences of the baby's coming to be will be prevented. The noncontraceptive choice of NFP differs. It is a choice *not to do something-* namely, not to engage in po,ssibly fertile sexual intercourse- with the intent that the bad consequences of the baby's coming to be will be avoided, and with the *acceptance as side effects* of both the baby's not-coming-to-be and the bad consequences of his or her not-coming-to-be. In this choice and in the acceptance of its side effects, there need be no contralife will. The bruby who might come into being need not be projected and rejected.[15]

In general, those who consider choosing to do something for a certain good but decide *not to do it* in order to avoid bad side effects do not thereby reject the good which they do not pursue. True, not choosing to realize that good-and, indeed, choosing to avoid the burdens one anticipates if one were to realize it-means *not willing* that the good *be realized,* but it does not mean *willing* that the good *not be realized.* In other words: the will's not bearing on the realization of a good is not the same a;s its bearing on the nonrealization of that good, even if in both cases the will bears on the nonrealization of side effects anticipated if that good were realized.

Not to choose to realize a good-such as the coming to be

15 For a fuller treatment than we offer here of the distinction between choosing and accepting the effects of one's choice, see Grisez and Boyle, *Life and Death with Liberty and Justice,* 381-92; Grisez, *Christian Moral Principles,* 233-36, 239-41.

of a possible person-which offers of itself a reason for its realization can be in harmony with reason. The choice precisely of such a good's nomealization necessarily is contrary to a reason.

Because the contraceptive choice is contralife, it is in itself contrary to a reason, and only seems reasonable insofar as it appears possible to establish that the reason not to have a baby is rationally preferable to the value of the baby's life. But, as we showed, that preferaibility never can be rationally established.

Because the choice of NFP need not be oontralife, that choice need not be contrary to a reason. There is a reason to choose to practice NFP: the baid side effects, which one wills to aVioid, of having another baby. There also is a reason to choose to go on having intercourse during fertile and infertile times alike: the prospect of having the baby with all the goods associated with that and/or the bad side effects of his or her coming to be. Whether one chooses the pr:actice of NFP or not, one chooses to act for one reason and does not choose to act for the other, but in both cases one can choose in harmony with both reasons, and need not choose contrary to either. Thus, the choice of NFP need not be immoral. It is merely a case of something common in human life: choosing not to realize something one has a good reason to choose to realize, but whose realization would conflict with avoiding something else one has a good reason to avoid.

Couples who choose to practice NFP do consider what the future will be like if they have another baby. They foresee certain bad effects-for example, they will not be able to fulfill both their present responsibilities and their new ones, and so judge that they should not assume new ones. So, they choose to abstain. But they do not have to judge that the possible future without the baby will he rationally preferable to a possible future with it. For their choice to abstain need not be contrary to any reason, and so, assuming it is not, they need not try to justify it by reasoning that their reason for abstinence is rationally preferable to the reason to have another

baby-namely, the inherent goodness of a possible person's coming to be.

Apart from the choice to abstain during fertile times, the noncontraceptive practice of NFP involves only two other morally :significant elements: the choice to engage in intercourse during infertile times and the choice to adopt a systematic policy of periodic abstinence and intercourse. Neither of these elements need involve a eontralife will. The choice to engage in intercourse by those who think they are naturally sterile, permanently or temporarily, cannot involve a contralife will; thinking they are sterile, they cannot choose to do anything whatsoever to impede what they believe to be impossible-the coming to he of a possible person-and so they cannot choose to engage in intercourse with that intent. The adoption of the policy of periodic abstinence could be made to implement a contraceptive choice, as the earlier example showed. But if the adoption of the policy of periodic abstinence does not implement a prior contraceptive choice, the systematization of choices-none of which is contralife in itself-to abstain and to engage in intercourse does not require any additional choice that would be contralife.

Those who defend the morality of contraception will object: The preceding abstrad argument simply tries to obscure NFP's obvious moral identity with eontraception. It has been admitted, they will point out, that people can have the very same reason for choosing both, and that the reason in some cases can constitute a strict moral obligation not to have another baby. Moreover, in both cases, the purpose is identical: to av;oidha.ving that baby. Therefore, they will continue, those who choose NFP and those who choose contraception when NFP would be justified necessarily want the same thing. In either case, the couple does not wan:t to have another baby. And in either case, they will conclude, if pregnancy occurs, the baby is unwanted.

In reply, we agree that there is a sense in which the wanting and the not wanting are the same in both cases. The couples'

emotional motivations can be very similar. People practicing NFP often fear pregnancy, and, when they think an unexpected pregnancy has occurred, react with acute feelings of sadness toward the prospect of the new baby. They may hope and pray that a menstrual period will come, as welcome evidence that no baby is coming. It is fair to say: They do not (emotionally) want that baby. But feelings and wishes are not morally determinative. The wanting which counts morally is willing: choosing, intending, and accepting.

What the abstract argument makes clear is that the willing which relates to the prospective baby's not-coming-to-be is not the same in (1) the choice of NFP with contraceptive intent or any other method of contraception as in (2) the noncontraceptive choice of NFP. In (1), the intention precisely is the will that the possible baby not-come-to-be. Even when their intention that the baby not-come-to-he is for some :further end, those who make this choice do *not want the baby,* in the precise sense that, as a means to their further end, they choose the possible baby's not-coming-to-be. But in (2), the noncontraceptive choice of NFP, the choice is to not-cause-the-side-e:ffects-of-the-baby's-coming-to-be by abstaining from causing the baby to come to he. Those who make this choice precisely do *not want to cause the baby,* but they do not choose the the baby's not-coming-to be, although they do accept that not-coming-to-be as a side effect of what they intend.

This fact makes a great difference if pregnancy does occur. Since couples who practice NFP noncontraceptively never will a prospective baby's not-coming-to-be, they do not have to change their will toward the new baby to accept or love him or her. They may find the new baby's coming to be emotionally repugnant but, whatever their feelings might be, the baby is not unwanted in the sense that counts morally. For, using the word" want" to refer to volitrons rather than feelings, the baby does not come to be as unwanted. Thus, there is a real and very important difference between *not wanting to have a baby,* which is common to both (1) and (2) above, and *not wanting the baby one might have,* which is true of (1) but not of (2).

Those who agree that there is a moral1y significant difference between the nonoontraceptive practice of NFP and the use of contraception, and find the preceding explanation otherwise acceptable might still remain unsatisfied with it as an account of wihat the Church actually teaches about the difference between NFP and contraception. For on our account, all that is required to make abstinence noncontraceptive is *a* reason not to have another baby other than one which precisely is or includes the baby's not-coming-to-be. But the Church's teaching is that the upright choice of NFP requires *a serious* reason.[16] Thus, the objection will conclude, the choice to practice NFP is not justified merely by having *some* reason other than the baby's not-coming-to-be to avoid pregnancy.

The answer: Any reason, other than the baby's not-coming-to-be, for not wanting to have a baby is sufficient to distinguish the choice to ·abstain from the choice to contracept. However, the choice to practice NFP requires more for its justification than that it not be contraceptive. In marrying, Christian couples who do not know they will be sterile undertake to accept parenthood and its responsibilities, for the •Sake of giving life to new members of the human community and the heavenly kingdom. If a husband and wife are physically or morally unable to carry out that undertaking, they do not fail morally in not carrying it out. But if they are physically able to carry it out and have no serious reason not to have another baby, yet choose to avoid pregnancy by practicing NFP, they fail morally to fulfill the vocation they accepted in marrying. Therefore, the Church teaches that a serious reason is necessary to choose uprightly to practice NFP. But this teaching is

16Paul VI, *Humanae vitae,* 16, *AAS* 60 (1968), 492: "If, then, there are serious reasons to space out births, which derive from the physical or psychological conditions of the husband and wife, or from external conditions, the Church teaches that it is then licit to take into account the natural periodicity immanent in the generative functions, for the use of marriage in the infecund periods only, and in this way to regulate birth without offending the moral principles which have been recalled earlier."

entirely compatible with our analysis according to which a less than serious reason can distinguish NFP from contraception.

The ethics of responsible parenthood is the same as the ethics of responsible care for the dying. Christian morality requires the same reverence for life in its coming to be as in its passing away. Just as the cherishing of human life its coming to he does not mean that one always must bring a possible person into being, so the cherishing of human life in its passing away does not mean that one always must keep a dying person in being. Just as abstinence from marital intercourse *can* be justified to avoid side effects of a possible person into being and of his or her being, so limitation of medical treatment *can* be justified to avcoid side effects of keeping a person alive and of his or her continuing life. Just as the contralife will involved in the contraceptive choice to prevent another person's coming into being never can be justified by any further end, so the contralife will involved in the choice to bring about someone's death never can justified by any further end. Just as the reasons for the upright practice of NFP and for the use of contraception can be the same, although in many cases they are not, so the reasons for limiting medical treatment and for euthanasia can be the same, although in many cases they are not. Just as one can choose NFP with contraceptive intent, so one can choose to limit medical treatment with homicidal intent-that is, precisely in order to bring about the patient's death. Finally, just as a reason other than precisely not wanting another baby is sufficient to distinguish the choice of NFP from the choice of contraception, although only a serious reason justifies the former choice, so a reason for limiting medical treatment other than the very ending of the patient's life is sufficient to distinguish nonmurderous letting die from euthanasia, although only a good reason for limiting medical treatment is sufficient to justify abstaining from possible life-prolonging treatment. }ior, just as a couple, without a contraceptive will, can fail to fulfill their responsibility to to give life to possible persons, 'so those care for the dying,

without a murderous will, can fail to fulfill their responsibility to sustain the lives of actual persons.

Before concluding this section, another important difference between contraception and NFP is worth noting. As the preceding section showed, the choice of contraception, besides being contralife, is inconsistent with marital chastity. Not only is the upright choice of NFP not contralife, it also is conducive to marital chastity and fosters marital love. In using abstinence to avoid having another baby, couples who uprightly choose NFP reject the assumption that they are entitled to regular and frequent satisfaction of their sexual desire. The result is that although they may find ten to twenty days' abstinence during each cycle difficult frustrating, they do not understand abstinence as some sort of arbitrary imposition.

Moreover, such couples' practice of restraint actually increases their cont:ml, and so their freedom, and so the meaningfulness of their marital acts. Their personalities become more integrated rather than self-disintegrated. Their communication improves. And their sense of the dignity of their bodily selves grows.[17]

VII. THE INSEPARABLE CONNECTION WILLED BY GOD

Someone who accepts the Church's teaching concerning contraception is likely to observe that even if the preceding argumentation does clarify matters some ways, not much is gained by it, since the immorality of contraception apart from marriage is not a very important issue, and it is hardly necessary to go to such lengths to establish that the use of contracept1on in marriage is always wrong. For this follows much

11 For an internsting psychological study of the difference between contraception and NFP, see Wanda Poltawska, "The Effect of a Contraceptive Attitude on Marriage," *International Review of Nat1tral Family Planning,* 4 (1980), 187-206. A sound and useful practical treatment of NFP: John Kippley and Sheila Kippley, *The Art of Natitral Family Planning,* 3rd ed. (Cincinnati: Couple to Couple League, 1987). (The address of the Couple to Couple League: PO Box 111184; Cincinnati, Ohio 45211.)

more simply and directly from the premise which P;ope Paul used: There is " the inseparable connection, willed by God, which man on his own initiative may not break, between the two meanings of the conjugal act: the unitive meaning and the procreative meaning." [18]

Moreover, they will point out, the relationship between the preceding argument and this important truth about the two meanings of the conjugal act remains opaque. Until this relationship is established, the usefulness of the preceding argument to clarify the Church's teaching is at best quite doubtful.

Admittedly, those who believe that the use of contraception in marriage is always wrong find that the inseparable-connection premise illuminates what they believe. And, for such persons, the contralife character of contraception perhaps is clear enough. But we do not think that every;one sees clearly enough that outside marriage, too, contraception is always wrong. And we believe that use outside marriage ought not to be tacitly accepted, for it remains a great evil and paves the way for the e¥en greater evils of abortion, infanticide, and other attacks on innocent life.

Moreover, nonbelievers and Catholic dissenters almost unanimously deny that the inseparable-connection premise is self-evident or that anything in the Church's teaching has so far established this premise. Thus, they reject as question-begging not only the argument of *Humanae vitae* but subsequent arguments using the inseparable-connection premise. Since we are trying in this article to clarify and defend the Church's teaching, it was necessary to proceed without assuming the inseparable-connection premise.

However, the independently established conclusion that con-

[18] *Hitmanae vitae*, 12, *AAS* 60 (1968), 488. By using the words, "non licet," the Latin of this passage makes it clear that the connection is inseparable in a morally normative sense. The English translation "inseparable connection ... unable to be broken" wrongly suggests that the connection is inseparable in some mysterious way, since this translation misses the normative meaning of *non lioet* but cannot reasonably be taken to mean that the connection is factually unbreakable.

traception is always wrong can serve as a premise to establish the inseparable connection which the Church teaches. Plainly, since contraception is always wrong, one may not break the connection between love making and life giving in marriage by using contraception.

But, of course, one also breaks the connection by engendering new human life .apart from marital love making-for example, by *in vitro* fertilization. Hence, to establish the inseparable-connection proposition, another independent argument is needed against producing babies apart from sexual intercourse. The full statement of that argument would require another article similar to this one, but we offer the following summary. [19]

The proponents of pcroducing babies argue: Desire for the good, the coming to be of a new person, leads to the choice, not wrong in itself, to bring the possible person into being. Granted, it would be preferable, if it were possible, to procreate the haby in the normal way. However, any disadvantage inherent in the generation of apart from sexual intercourse clearly is outweighed by the great good of new human lives and the fulfillment of the desire for children of couples who otherwise cannot have them. What can be wrong with this?

The answer: The project of producing a baby precisely is to bring a possible ba,by into being to satisfy the desire to have a baby, and the choice precisely is to *produce a baby.* So, a choice to bring about conception in this fashion inevitably means willing the baby's initial status as a product. Now, this status as a product is subpersonal, and so the choice to produce

[19] The summary we offer articulates one of the arguments-which we believe stands by itself-proposed by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, *Donum vitae* (1987), II.B.4-5. For a discussion rather fuller than we offer here: *In Vitro Fertilisation and Publio Policy,* Evidence submitted to the Government Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology by the Catholic Bishops' Joint Committee on Bio-Ethical Issues on behalf of the Catholic Bishops of Great Britain (England: Catholic Information Services, May 1983) ; William E. May, " ' Begotten, Not Made ': Further Reflections on the Laboratory Generation of Human Life," *International Review of Natural Family Planning,* 10 (1986), 1-22.

a baby il'.1evitablyis a choice to enter into a relationship with the baby as with something subpersonal. This initial relationship of those who choose to produce babies with the babies they produce is inconsistent with and so impedes the communion of persons endowed with equal dignity which is appropriate in any relationship aimongpersons.

Of course, those who choose to produce a baby make that choice only insofar as it is a means to an ulterior end. They may well intend that the baby be received in ·an authentic child-parent relationship, in which he or she will live in the communion which befits those who share personal dignity. If realized, this intended end for the sake of which the choice to produce the baby is made will be good for the baby ·as well as for the parents. But, even so, because the baby's initial status as a product is subpersonal, the choice to pvoduce the baby is the choice of a bad means to a good end.

Those who participate in producing a baby may only reluctantly choose that the baby be a *produot made.* Married couples who seek technical help to produce a baby probably would not choose that the baby come to be with a subpersonal status if they could attain their intended end by accepting a baby as the fruit of marital lovemaking open to new life. But some infertile couples so much want to have a baby that they seek the help of those who produce babies, and both the couples and those who try to satisfy their desires choose to bring babies into being ·as products, made to order to fulfill a demand.

Just as those who contracept overstep by not wanting babies, those who produce babies overstep by wanting them. In either case, the baby is evaluated, whether as an evil to be prevented or as a good to be produced, by relating the baby's very existence to the desire of someone other than God for a future which excludes or a future which includes that person.

When contraception fails, its contralife character means that the new person comes to be as unwanted volitionally, :and may well be disposed of by abortion. Similarly, in producing babies, if the product is defective, a new person comes to be *as un-*

wanted. Thus, those who produce babies not only choose life for some, but-can anyone doubt it?-quietly dispose at least of those who are not developing normally.

Since contraception is always wrong and since producing babies is always wrong, the only morally acceptable way to ;i:on-gage either in love making or in life giving is by engaging in sexual intercourse which is open to new life. Now, what is universally true of both contraception and producing babies is true of 'them when done the context of marriage. And God wills that human persons do nothing wrong. Therefore, there is an insepa.rable connection, established by God, which human persons on their own initiative may not break, between the two meanings of the marital act: the unitive meaning and the procreative meaning.

Those who accept the Church's teaching, however, will hardly be satisfied 'vi.th this interpreta:tion of the inseparable-connection proposition. They will make a twofold objection.

(1) The inseparable connection is more than the mere fact that both contraception and producing babies 'are immoral. It is a reality immanent in human persons' sexual make up-part of their God-given nature and sexual functioning.

The answer: There plainly is in human nature and sexual functioning a connection between the procreative and unitive meanings of sexual intercourse. Indeed, in all animals which reproduce sexually the coming to be of new individuals and the union of their parents are naturally inseparable. A copulating pair are biologically a single organism insofar a;s they function together to hand on their specific kind of life to new individuals. Among human persons, reproduction is human reproduction (the procreation of new persons), and sexual intercourse is human intercourse (an interpersonal :relationship) . Therefore, for human persons, there is a naturally inseparable connection between the pl'Ocreative and the unitive meanings of sexual intercourse.

However, this naturally inseparable connection both in lower animals and in human persons is not factually unbreak-

able by human choices and techniques. Breaking the connection in animals is common and beyond moral challenge vided that it is done with due regard for the value of animal lifo and in the interests of human persons. But breaking this connection in human persons-which is equally possible from a technical point of view-is morally wrong. The natural givenness of the connection plainly is not by itself the sufficient reason for this wrongness, since moral norms cannot be derived logically from entirely theoretical premises. However, given that contmception is always wrong and that producing babies is always wrong, the God-given structure of human sexual functioning does establish a connection which human persons may not break between the procreative and unitive meanings of human sexual intercourse.

(2) They also will object: The inseparable connection to which the Church's teaching calls attention is in marital acts, not in extramarital, although natural, sex acts such as fornication and adultery without contraception. This inseparable connection follows from the marital act's specific chamcter in such a way that contraception falsifies the truth of the marital act, not merely takes away its life-giving potential.

The answer: The morally inseparable connection between pl'ocreation and sexual communion can be fully respected only in marital acts. While natural, extramarital acts of sexual intercourse can respect its life-giving meaning by excluding contraception and while the production of babies need not involve sexual intercourse and so need not violate its love-making meaning, only marital acts can actualize the specific communion of two human persons as the procreator of new persons.

To clarify this point, we return to the question: How does marital intercourse express marital love?

Marital love primarily is the bond which is constituted by the mutual commitment ·which the couple make when they marry and which they nurture by mutual faithfulness. That bond makes them not simply one flesh but as it were one person in respect to that part life which involves genital acts.

Engaging in marital intercourse actualizes their oneness in this respect and enables them to experience it concretely: "We are one, really one, now!" The emotions which 'accompany this experience are a real and intrinsic part of marital love *only insofar a.s* they belong to intercourse as a realization of the marital oneness.

p,articular married couples may be sterile, and every married couple is sterile at times. Nevertheless, the marriage bond itself establishes the specific type of friendship whose pl'oper common good beyond the friendship itself is the fruit of one-flesh unity, namely, the coming to be, including the nurturing, of new persons. And so the acts which actualize and enable a husband and a wife to experience their unity must be-insofar as it is within their power-the sort of 'acts which are suited to initiate new life. Therefore, if married couples obtain sexual satisfaction to orgasm by masturbating one another, or by engaging in anal or oral intercourse, or by engaging in contracepted intercourse, they do not engage in marital intercourseo What they do in such cases cannot actualize their marital bond and enable them to experience it?[20]

Although the emotions they experience may include mutual emotional love, this love will be ambiguous and ambivalent, because it is not essentially related to the real and la.sting marriage bond between the oouple.

It follows that contraception falsifies the inner truth of conjugal love. The contracepting couple's intimate bodily union-their being two in one flesh-would find in conception a very special completion, because a baby is a unique actualization of a married couple's communion. But in carrying out the contraceptive act, they will to prevent this completion of their communion. In addition to oontracepting, they engage in a sexual act, but not one which expresses and allows them to experience fully what they are as a married couple.

20 See Elizabeth Anscombe, *Oontraeeption and Chastity* (London: Catholic Truth Society, 1975), for a powerful dialectical argument that contracepted sexual intercourse cannot be a marital act.

Someone will object: But a husband and wife who have interoourse during a sterile period cannot complete their communion by conceiving new life. How do they differ from couples who regretfully contracept because they rightly judge that they should not have another baby? Even H contraception is always wrong, the objection will continue, couples practicing it do not prevent conception *insofar as it would complete their oommunion,* hut only insofar as it would initiate the new life which they should not initiate. So, the objection will conclude, how can their use of contmception falsify the inner truth of their conjugal love?

The answer: The couple who have intercourse during a sterile period cannot actualize and experience their marital unity as fully as they would in fruitful intercourse, but they in no way falsify their oneness. In accepting the nonbeing of the baby as la side effect of abstinence on fertile days, they also accept the side effect of the limitation of their marital communion. But this acceptance is not contrary to their communion. Such a couple are like people who tell less than the whole truth but tell all the truth they can tell and tell no lie.

But the use of contraception, a,s argued above, necessarily does involve a contralife will. The contrncepting couple do not want the baby whose life they might initiate. Yet that baby would be a unique completion of their marital communion. Thus, in positively willing that another child not come to be, they also positively will that their marital communion not he fulfilled in this particula.r act. Thus, in choosing to contracept, couples also will that their acts of sexual intercourse not be acts of marital communion. They are like people who tell less than they know by telling a lie.

Thus, if ma.rriage is defined, as the Church does define it, as a human friendship whose specifying common good includes the procreation of children, it is Logically impossible for a contraceptive act to be a marital act.[21] This is 'an instance of a

[21] See *Gode of Canon Law (1983),* canon 1055, § 1, for the Church's definition of marriage. One need not assert the *primacy* of the procreation of chil-

general truth: actions directed against a benefit which a certain practice of itself serves logically cannot count aos instantiations of that practice. Those who regard a practice as morally good will consider such actions directed against a benefit which specifies it morally eviL But the Church holds as divinely revealed truth that God instituted marriage a:s a human communion to serve the great good of procreation, and that the practice of marriage as God instituted it is morally good. Therefore, the Church validly concludes both that contraceptive acts are not marital acts and that they are immoral.

But this conclusion presupposes a premise which nonbelievers and Catholic dissenters at least implicitly deny: that marriage as the Church defines it is morally good. They propose to redefine marriage in such a way that particular contralife acts within marriage can he marital acts. Since part of what they deny is faith's teaching about what marriage is, one can airgue effectively against their position on contraception only by independently proving the immorality of contraceptive acts. From the moral wrongness of confoaception, the wrongness of their conception of marriage then fol1ows.

When one considers both the logical relationship between contraception and the redefinition of marriage, 'and the existential connections between the practice of contraception and

dren to assert that it is included in marriage's specifying common good. Thus, *Humanae vitae*, I, *AAB* 60 (1968), 481, begins by speaking of the married couple's *munus* of transmitting life in cooperation with God the creator. (" Munus" can be translated "duty," but in this context is more adequately translated "role.") But Paul VI does not rest his reaffirmation of the Church's teaching concerning contraception on an assertion of the *primacy* of the good of procreation, although he equivalently asserts a certain primacy or ultimacy of procreation among the finalities of marriage in *Human,ae vitae*, 8 (in the sentence beginning "Quocirca"), 485-86. Some claim that Vatican II abandoned the Church's previous teaching concerning the ends of marriage. However, the Council incorporates that teaching by reference (*Gaudium et spes*, 48, note l) and also expressly teaches the truth we use as a premise: "By their very nature, the institution of matrimony itself and conjugal love are ordained for the procreation and education of children, and find in them their ultimate crown" (48), and: "Marriage and conjugal love are by their nature ordained toward the begetting and educating of children" (50).

the perversion of marital love, one can understand why the increase in use of contraception by Catholics since 1960 has resulted neither in happier and more stable marriages, nor in more truly responsible parenthood. On the contrary, divorce has increased, the indications are that infidelity has increased, many children and young people are freely engaging in sexual practices which cripple their capacity for meaningful sexual activity in any future marriage, many middle--"agedCatholics have had themselves surgically sterilized, and many Catholic couples have aborted one or more of their children.

For anyone who believes traditional Christian teaching concerning marriage itself, ,a rational argument against contraception, such as we have offered, is hardly necessary for conviction about the truth, but may be helpful to understand the meaning, of the Church's teaching that every marital act ought to be open to new life. The traditional condemnation of contraception was shared by all Christians until very recently. In reaffirming that teaching 1and calling for continued assent to it, the popes of the twentieth century have relied upon and invoked the authority of this unbroken tradition going back tQ the beginning.

J<Yhn Paul II a1so has provided careful analyses of the relevant scriptural data and driawn the conclusion that the moral norm excluding contraception " belongs not only to the natural moral law, but also to the *moral or<ler revealed by God:* also from this point of view, it could not be different, but solely what is handed down by Tradition and the Magisterium." [22] We iagree. It is beyond reasonable doubt that the Church's teaching that contraception is always wrong has been infallibly proposed by the ordinary magisterium. This teaching ought to be accepted by every Catholic as a matter of faith. [23]

,22 See John Paul II, General Audience, 18 July 1984; *Insegnamenti di Giovanni Paolo II,* vol. 7, part 2 (Rome: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1984), 102; *L'Osserootore Romano,* Eng. ed., 23 July 1984, 1; Giovanni Paolo II, *Uomo e Donna lo oreo: oateohesi suU'amore umano* (Rome: Liberia Editrice Vaticana, 1985), 457.

2a See John C. Ford, S.J., and Germain Grisez, "Contraception and the In-

VIII. SOME PASTORAL IMPLICATIONS

Among pastors *who accept the Church's teaching* that contraception is always wrong, there are four pastoral approaches to the use of oontraception which we believe to be disastrously mistaken.

First, some think that Paul VI and John Paul II have made a tactical mistake by insisting on this teaching. According to this view, although contraception is evil, it is a less serious matter than many others, and it is unfortunate that the popes have put too much emphasis on what would fall into its proper place if only quietly ignored.

We think that anyone who not only believes that contraception is always wrong but understands why it is wrong can easily see that Paul VI and John Paul II have made no mistake in treating this ,as 1a matter of great imporrtance.

The choice to eontracept, as we have shown, always involves an unjust will and an objective injustice to every child who comes to be a;s unwanted. Indeed, this unjust will and status puts every unwanted child in peril of his or her life. So-called methods of contraception which are actually a;bortifacient regularly kill the embryonic persons who are regularly conceived while these methods a11e used.

Moreover, one's free choices, once made, determine one's self unless and until one makes another, incompatible choice. Free choices made by two or more persons in communion determine their interpersona.l relationship with one another. Thus, by their free choices persons and groups of persons build themselves up day by day, for good or evil. Those who deliberately make the contralife choice of contraception and maintain that choice have oontralife hearts. Married couples who make this choice and maintain it do not merely commit iso-

fallibility of the Ordinary Magisterium," *Theological Studies,* 39 (1978), 259-61; Grisez, *Christian Moral Principles,* chapter 35; Germain Grisez, "Infallibility and Specific Moral Norms: A Review Discussion " (a reply to Francis A. Sullivan, S.J.), *Thomist,* 49 (1985), 248-87.

lated acts of contraception but have hearts which are not marital. Their very relationship with one another, perverted by their contraceptive commitment, is inconsistent with the sacramental bond which unites them. Rather than sanctifying one another they •slip together toward spiritual self-destruction.

Chaste marital intercourse serves marital love in several ways, all of them compatible with abstinence whenever pregnancy ought to be avoided. So, as we have shown, cont11.1aception is necessary, not to serve marital love, but to facilitate the satisfying of sexual desire insufficiently ol'dered by the goods of marriage. Precisely insofar as sexual intercourse responds to nonintegrated desire, such intercourse even within marriage lacks the significance of mutual :self-giving, and so neitheir expresses nor nurtures marital communion. Moreover, precisely insofar as people choose to satisfy nonintegrated sexual desire, they determine themselves in self-dis-integration.

Plainly, not all who use contraception become involved to the .same extent in its dynamism toward interpersonally meaningless and self-dis-integrating sexual behavior. Howeveir, to the extent that one does engage in unchaste sexual behavior, whether outside marriage or within it, such behavim· has further serious •consequences.

Very often, when people habitually engage in meaningless seXUJal behavior, their sense of what is real becomes: distorted: what satisfies or frustrates desire is real (" relevant ") , while unseen realities, such as God and heaven, •seem less real (" irrelevant ") . Moreover, the dignity of the fleshly dimension of the person is denied, -and any moral argument which calls attention to it is likely to be dismissed as "biologism." One effect of this attitude on Christians imbued with it is that they find it difficult to take seriously those many aspects of faith which involve bodiliness: Incarnation, resurrection, bodily presence of Jesus in the Eucharist, Virgin birth, original sin, and so on. " How could salv;ation depend so much on the biological?"

Thus, the deliberate choice to contracept not only attacks

human life in its beginning, but damages Christian marital love and personal integration. As a form of uncha;stity, the practice of engaging in intercourse mutilated by contraception tends to upset ·the Christian appreciation both of transcendent reality and of bodiliness, and so threatens faith and hope themselves. Plainly, Paul VI and John Paul II make no mistake in insisting on the Church's teaching on contraception, and their concern with it is true pastoral wisdom.

The second mistaken pastoral approach to the use of contraception is based on the thought that if a diversity of theological opinions on this matter were tolerated in the Church, the whole problem would be solved. According to this view, while contraception is evil, those who choose this evil in good faith commit no sin, and so leaving them in good faith would eliminate the evil of contraception insofar as it is a significant pastoral concern.

We think that, while it is true that those who practice contraception in good faith-if they truly are in good faith-commit no sin, it is, by no means true tha;t a policy of leaving everyone in good faith fulfills pastoral responsibility in this matter.

The choice to contracept, even if it is made in conformity to a sincere conscience, is a contralife will. Objective injustices remain: to every child who is conceived unwanted and to every embryonic person whose life is snuffed out. The contmlife self-determination remains, along with a commitment to non-marital acts which injures the sacramental marriage re1ationship. The trivializing of sexual activity remains, and even the danger of unchaste sexual activity to faith and hope. Without personal sin, the contraceptive activity of those left in good faith still involves that activity's objective evils.

Moreover, it is questionable whether all Oatholic couples who choose contraception truly are in good faith in regarding it ·as morally acceptable. Both the essential contralife character of the choice and its immorality certainly are knowable by reason. Moreover, this moral truth is clearly and firmly

asserted by the Church, in teaching of which everyone is aware. It is eB>sy to say that one sincerely considers oont:r:aception morally acceptable, but it is ·another matter for moderately well-instructed Catholics to be morally certain of that.

What is the condition of those not truly in good faith in choosing contraception? A conscience which is not in good faith in approving any fasting element of one's life is fixed in error through rationaliza:tion and self-deception. Those in thi1s condition cannot easily overcome their error. At time8 their conscience bothers them, but they are hardly likely to become clearly aware that their conscience and their way of life in accord with it are immoral. And so, all who are left in *this* kind of "good faith" in reality are left in obdurate sin, and their repentance, which ought to be encouraged, instead is made less likely.

Therefore, since a pastoral policy of dissent in order that people may be left in good faith not only ignores or complacently accepts the many objective evils involved in contraception but imperils the souls of those whom the policy was intended to save, John Paul II and the bishops who stand with him are exercising real pastoral care when they not only insist on the truth of Catholic :teaching in this matter but courageously work against dissent rather than tolerate it.

The third mistaken pastoral approach to the use of contraception is based on the thought that pastoral compassion and accommodation can bridge the gap between what the Church teaches about contraception and what the faithful do about it. According to this view, the faithful should be encouraged to accept the Church's teaching ·as an ideal and to strive by a gradual process to approximate this ideal. But they should not be required, as a condition for receiving absolution, to confess sins of contraception and have a firm purpose of amendment.

We think that ·any policy of gradualism which encourages the faithful to regard contraception as if it were in practice a venial sin or even a mere imperfection does in its bshion accommodate the moral truth the Church teaches to the wide-

spread practice of contraception. But the accommodation is made at the oost of coherence. For the truth which the Church teaches about the real and serious significance of *practicing* contraception is treated as if one could believe it in theory without taking it seriously in *practice.* Such incoherence is hardly ·a hwsi·s for authentic pastoral compassion.

The faithful encomaged to try by a gradual p:mcess to eliminate contraception do not eliminate it at once; meanwhile, they persist in the contraceptive choice. While they strive to approximate what they accept as an ideal, they continue to recognize that they live in sin. Although they act as if contraception were not a grave matter, the natural law written in their hearts and the Church's teaching tell them otherwise. Yet those who try to put gradualism into practice, with the encouragement of trusted pastors who seem faithful to the Ohurch's teaching, could only with great difficulty face up to their sin's seriousness and repent. Thus, the disastrous pastoral mistakes of the first two approaches are combined in a policy of gradualism of this so:rt.

Furthermore, those misled by the pastoral policy of gradualism internalize their pastors' incoherence. On the one hand, they condemn their own contraceptive acts but, on the other hand, they have a purpose, not of amendment, but of indefinite persistence in such acts.

But a will consistent with itself rs needed to overcome any sin. The sexual urge is powerful. Those who think that satisfying it will be no more than a venial sin are hardly likely to gain self-control. Thus, their inconsistent will is likely to achieve little or no progress toward virtue.

Still worse, the inconsistency almost certainly will spread to other matters. Under these conditions, the whole of a Christian's life is likely to become an incoherent and unstable amalgam of professed ideals, contrary practices, and duplicity of heart,

Therefore, since the pastoral policy of gradualism which treats contraception as if it were merely a venial sin nurtures

pharisaism rather than Christian single-heartedness, Paul VI and John Paul II have been truly compassionate pastors in rejecting this approach. They have urged the faithful to accept the truth about contraception and live by it. At the same time, they have emphasized the oorrect use of the sacrament of penance and the regular, fruitful reception of the Eucharist as the sources of God's mercy and love, which offer those who truly follow Jesus the power to overcome sin in ·their lives. They coherently insist: "To diminish in no way the saving teaching of Christ constitutes an eminent form of charity for souls." [24] Their true gradualism envisages " a progress that demands 'awareness of 'Sin, a sincere commitment to observe the moral law, and the ministry of reconciliation." [25]

The fourth mistaken pastoral approach is based on the thought that widespread education in the technique of NFP together with likely imp11ovementsin it will eventually eliminate the problem of contraception. According to this view, when married couples need ·abstain only a few days a month to avoid pregnancy, hardly anyone, believer or unbeliever, will be interested in using any other method.

Obviously, the hope that NFP will solve the pastoral problem is oonsistent with the truth which the Church teaches: that contraception is wrong and NFP morally ·acceptable. But we think that NFP as a mere technique will never solve the pa:s-

[24] *Humanae vitae*, 29, *AAS* 60 (1968), 501; *Famiiiaris oonsortio*, 33, *AAS* 74 (1982),121.

:25John Paul II, *Familiaris oonsortio*, 34, *AAS* 74 (1982), 124. Summarizing the same teaching, John Paul II, Address to participants in a seminar on "Responsible Parenthood," 17 September 1983; *Insegnamenti di Giovanni Paolo II*, vol. 6, part 2 (Rome: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1983), 564; *L'Osservatore Romano*, Eng. ed., 10 October 1983, 7, forcefully recalls Catholic teaching concerning grace: "To maintain that situations exist in which it is not, *de faoto*, possible for the spouses to be faithful to *all* the requirements of the truth of conjugal love is equivalent to forgetting this event of grace which characterizes the New Covenant: the grace of the Holy Spirit makes possible that which is not possible to man, left solely to his own powers. It is therefore necessary to support the spouses in their spiritual lives, to invite them to resort frequently to the Sacraments of Confession and the Eucharist for a continual return, a permanent conversion to the truth of conjugal love."

toral problem posed by contraception. For although technique is helpful, the problem is a moral one, and no technique makes the heart good. NFP, as we showed, can be chosen a:s a method 0£ contmception. A pastoral policy which puts too much :faith in the mere technique encourages this wrong choice.

Catholics who choose to contracept but out of fidelity to the Church's teaching adopt NFP as their method are truly in good faith. They choose as they do because they think their choice conforms to the truth which the Church teaches. Furthermore, since they choose to abstain, and abstinence need not mean that one wills that another baby not come to be, they easily overlook the contralife character of their underlying intention. Thus, they have a contraceptive intention, but lack sufficient reflection as to its moral significance. And, more important, they have, and realize the significance of, the intention to live acoording to the Church's teaching about marriage, the marital act, and its love making and life giving meanmgs.

Because their method of contraception cannot harm any embryonic life, what they do cannot lead to the grave objective injustice of supposedly contraceptive methods which in fact are ahortifacient. Still, their contralife will entails that unexpected conceptions are unwanted babies, and they might even be tempted to ,abort them. Yet their fidelity to the Church's teaching will help them to resist this temptation.

Although they do have an underlying contraceptive intention, this intention is carried out only by their choices to abstain. Consequently, their acts of sexual intercourse on days they believe are infertile remain marital in character. Insofar as they are marital, their acts 0£ intercourse can embody true marital love. And, because their dominant intention is to live according to the Church's belief about what marriage is, they are not tempted to try to redefine the very meaning of marriage.

Moreover, the practice of NFP, even when chosen as a method of contmception, does require 1self-cont-vol. This self-

control enables .oouples gradually to gain the freedom necessary :for self-giving, so that the meaningfulness of their marital acts as expre.o:sions of love can develop. And, because their activity is shaped by their fidelity to the Church's teaching, their increasing self-control is not merely a psychological power but ·a real Christian virtue. This virtue prevents their sexual activity from leading to their self-dis-integration, and so prevents the bad consequences unchastity has for faith and hope.

Thus, this fourth pastoral approach is not so disastrous as the first three. Nevertheless, even it is disaistrous because it fails to teach the faithful the complete moral truth which they need, and deprives them of the strubility which only truth can give to moral life.

If NFP is chosen, even by Catholics in true good faith, as a method of contraception, it p11obably will not " work." Choosing NFP in this way leaves untouched the false asisumption that people are entitled to regular sexual satisf.action. Those making this ·assumption are unlikely to find ten to twenty days of abstinence in every cycle acceptable. They will not see that by abstaining they are gaining more meaning and more truly giving themselves to one another than they ever could by responding regularly to their sexual urge. They will be tempted to cut corners, with an unexpected pregnancy the likely result.

In case of pregnancy, those who, even in good faith, choose NFP as a method of ·contraception will unfortunately be tempted to treat unwanted babies as unwanted. Only knowledge of the truth about new life and oonsistent willing of that good would enable them to welcome children ·and cherish them with all the generosity they deserve. Moreover, when unwanted pregnancies occur 1and t:he couple decide that NFP does not " work " as they had hoped, they will be strongly tempted to abandon their faithfulness to the Church's teaching and to adopt what they will fully recognize as contraception.

Therefore, since a pastoral policy which relies upon the mere technique of NFP to meet the moral challenge of contraception will provide only ·a partial and unstable response, John

Paul II is profoundly correct in insisting not only on the truth of the Church's teaching on contriaception but also on the truth of her teaching aibout NFP. "The *difference,"* he says, *"both anthropologiool and moral,* between contmception and recourse to the rhythm of the cycle . . . is a .difference which is much wider •and deeper than is usually thought, one which involves in the final analysis two irreconcilable concepts of the human person ·and of human sexuality." [26]

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:26Familiaris consortia, 32, *AAS* 74 (1982), 120.

THE ACTUAL INFINITE IN ARISTOTLE

Prolegomena: Philosophy and Theology Related

WHENEVER PHILOSOPHY is taken to be the handmaiden of theology, then the autonomy of reason is destroyed." Such a daim should be distinguished from a still 1stronger thesis. Compare: " A philosopher may not legitimately try to fortify an argument by bringing in new premises from another discipline which has a special aura of authority." Quite how Aristotle would have reacted to the first generalization, if it had been suitably translated for his scrutiny, is a question on which commentators might agree to differ. But Aristotle would have been as !'eluctant as Aquinas, or Maimonides, or later Monotheists who treasured the *Physics*, to leave the second general claim unquestioned.

Natural and revealed theology, like physics or mathematics, are domains where extremely subtle reasoner1shave studied and published widely for a very long time. So an elementary respect for induction suggests that philosophers should e:x;pect to benefit from ,applying some premises and some ways of arguing, which are found in theology, to their own issues. I speak of premises and ways of arguing that philosophers *qua* philosophers have not provided before. Thinkers in all four disciplines could thus profit from each body of work. Even the law of averages is set pitilessly against the second general claim.[1]

1 The late Father F. C. Copleston, S.J., covers many important topics regarding theology and philosophy in *Aquinets* (Baltimore: Peng11in, 1955), pp. 12-14, 19, 54-63, 65-68, 74, 116, etc. But the point put forward here about human power to strengthen intuition in one field seems to be partly missed. Copleston also fails to dwell enough on infinity in various passages. See John King-Farlow, "The First ·way in Physical and Moral Space", *The Thomist*

By focussing on some arguments of Aristotle's against the admissibility of an ,actual infinite, we shall find deeper, less obvims reasons for rejecting that second claim. Other philosophical points of intrinsic value should emerge as well foom the short investigation. But this one is especially interesting because of its curious pertinence to perennial disagreements among those who address the relations of theology, theism and philosophy. At any rate, the search for such deeper reasons will involve the application to Aristotle's texts of a somewhat modern way of using the term " intuition ".

Introduotion: A Relevant Kind Of Intuitive Thinking

Diss,atisfaction with modern Platonism in higher mathematics may be added to disenchantment with Platonism's modern opponents. Such opposition may seem too technical for issues of intuition or, indeed, of common reason. And so one is led back to consider certain rightly famous arguments of Aristotle. But before turning to Aristotle and his grapplings with ideais and claims about an actual infinity, let us 1ook at a few very ordinary uses of the sometimes charismatic word "intuition." *Webster's Dictionary* (1978) offers: "immediate and instinctive perception of a truth; direct understanding without reasoning." In his classic study *Evolution of JJ;Jathematieal Concepts,* Wilder writes at least once in the spirit of Webster: "Counting with fingers (and toes) clearly involves intuitive recognition of (1-1)-correspon<lence." [2] Yet later one reads: " What today we call real numbers and represent by, (ultimately infinite) , decimals, were still intuitively conceived as corresponding in some fashion to linear magnitudes. This was only an intuition and not a well defined concept ".[3] Again: "Mathematicians genemlly, however, we get along

XXXIX, 2, 1975, pp. 349-374; also William A. Wallace, O.P., "The First Way: A Rejoinder", *loo. cit.,* pp. 375-382.

2 Raymond L. Wilder, *Evoluti.on of JJlathe,matical Concepts* (New York: John Wiley, 1968), p. 4.

3 Wilder, p. 111. Cf. p. 112.

with the intuitive concept of number (rather than some kind of axiomatic basis) since it seems adequate for the purposes of the 'working mathematician'." [4] Wilder contrasts with Plato's view of the world of pure mathematics, the standpoint of his own book: "the only reality mathematical concepts have is ais cultural elements or artifacts." [5] He is happy so t:o conclude that human beings' variously demanding intuitions turn out to he tools or instruments of a psychological kind for advancing their scientific control over nature.

There is at least one valuable sense of " intuition " which is epistemically too weak to be equated with Plato's concept of perfect knowledge, or to be identified with Webster's notion of immediate knowledge of truths and objects. But this sense is also cpistemically too strong and metaphysically too important to be acceptable for a band of instrumentalists like Wilder's: he even takes questions about ultimate or' absolute' existence to be sins a.gainst modern enlightenment. One middle way is offered by the following account of what should feel like an intuition, an account we take to have much philosophical and mathematical relevance. A thought, lil\:e a belief or memory, that seems to a rational person to deserve the standing of basic knowledge; a which appears so close to being foundational and quite evident that the thinker could be miisguided either to question it or to try supporting it; a thought which should continue to prevail unless it comes to look much weaker or to be challenged to by a rival having similar authority; a thought that should be taken as a paradigm of what can be trusted_,of what may be wisely applied to criticizing or supporting most possible beliefs; a thought to be treasured (a,s a likely element of sanity) , but whose strong authority is still understood to be overruled if anything it opposed is clearly far more deserving of respect. Thus ha.ving such a kind of intuition is not an exercise in Faith or an example of the infa1lible.

[4] Wilder, p. 181.
[5] Wilder, p. 265.

PART ONE: SIX ARGUMENTS OF ARISTOTLE

Alpha: Aristotle, Intuition and External Appeals

By using this rather liberal account of what *should* feel like an intuition in the human mind, one can gain a still greater 'appreciation of Aristotle's attempts to foster the cause of reason in his discussion of actual and possible infinities at *PhysiCJs* III, 4-8. Although the passage belongs to a work on physics, Aristotle appea11s not to he primarily interested here in teaching .about the cosmic system of nature. He is more concerned to settle issues that may arise in connection with several domains of learning. He hopes to resolve them in favor of his own intuitions. These strike the intellect as being weaker than the best fruits of first principles or ' active,. reason, but far stronger than the usual appearances or the majority of the received opinions of most rational people. Aristotle strives here, in effect, to uphold and reinforce his somewhat vulnerable conviction that nothing may be both actual and infinite. The science of physics is repeatedly appealed to ·as .a guarantor. This is done in order to establish his intuitions' real strength or to defend them against attacks which are alleged to be made upon them in the name of reason. The working practice of mathematicians is discussed as well: Aristotle appeals, of course, to its respected character in the hope of gaining more respect for his intuitions. Emphatic mentioning of physics itself is found, for example, 'at 4/202h30ff; 4/203al; 5/204bl0. Partly scientific concepts like those of body or place (topos) are frequently employed to confer the authority of physicis upon one or more of Aristotle's premises which he finds most intuitively attractive. But this Stagirite type of reinforcing procedure, '3$ one can show ·against a critic like F. B. Miller, is intellectually impressive. It need not be circular and need not be a sign of desperation.

In Chapter 5 and 6 one finds what may well be Aristotle's most impressive arguments against the conceivability of an actual ·and infinite object in space, or such a series of finite ob-

jects, or such ·a sequence of numbers or geometrical points. The main kinds of reasoning to be considered very soon are these two: (i) In the first case the premise or premises will strike Aristotle as being plainly-(dews)-true; to enforce valid and cogent deduction of the conclusion. At least one e:x;plicitor implicit premise of ·an intuitive kind is held by Aristotle. (ii) In the second caise .a premise Looks plain enough or intuitive enough for Aristotle to believe that he is close to deducing the desired conclusion-both cogently and also convincingly to others. But some intuitive .and still needed premise does not appear to him to be sufficiently strong or free from opposition. Thus he wants a suitable principle or concept from a very respected external discipline to be allowed to carry the day. It is forthcoming. The matter is taken for a while to be a field of Aristotelian victory.

Beta: Some Commentators' Words as Possible Tools of Misunderstanding

Let us consider 1some other possible questions which might impede progress when one begins to ·analyze the six examples from the *Physics.* Here are some commentators' points which could be used or misused to lead one astray.

(I) *Richard Sorabji:* While likening Aristotle's main aims here and in several other works to those of modern finitist mathematicians, Sorabji has cautioned readers of *Time, Creation and Continuum:* "Quite apart from the *De Caelo* [especially 1.2] it may be wondered whether Aristotle holds consistently to this finitist analogies even *within* the *Physics."* [6]

Sorabji refers to *Physics* VIII.8,263b6 and *Physics* IV.12, 22lal7-18, 22fa26-80 and 22lb8-6, as places where Aristotelian thinking is found to be very different. He goes on to register further doubts, notably ones about the systematic coherence of Aristotle's claim that" we can traverse ·an infinity of *potentially* existing divisions." [7]

[6] Richard Sorabji, *Time, Creation a,nd the Oontintuum* (London: Duckworth, 1983), p. 212.

[1] Sorabji, pp. 212-213.

Comment on (I): The ·attraction for Aristotle of ideas which turn out to conflict with his finitist intuitions is disclosed in the passages cited by Sorabji. But, if this is <S0, it confirms and partly explains, the importance of the thesis that Aristotle found it *ratwnal* to appeal to other disciplines. He was reasonable in considering this a rational procedure. For he thought that an ever unstable approach, like a sceptical approach must lead one to accepting contradiction or to a denial of the known. He feared being driven to falsehood and irrationality. Consider his uses here and elsewhere of Modus 'Dollens.

(II) *David Furley:* Furley agrees, in effect, that Aristotle's intuitions about the infinite were weakened in force and authority. For, he holds, the ·analysis of discrete and continuous quantities offered earlier in the *Categories,* (as at 4b25-26), caused difficulties for his accounts of a continuum and a commorr boundary. Furley also claims that at *Physi,c;s* V, 3 a feebleness in the concept of contact undermines the distinction between oontinguity and oontinuity. As for Aristotle's account of *topos,* Furley writes: "Aristotle is caught in •a dilemma of his own making; he must deny that the extremity of a body has ·a place if he is to avoid the conclusion that nothing can be distinguished from its own place; but he must affirm it if he is to hold on to his own definitions of *together, in contact* and *continuous."* [8] (Cf. *Physi,os* IV.I, 209a7ff; IV.4 2Hal2; IV.4, 212ab).

Comment on (II): Furley's severest diagnoses may be accurate. Nevertheless, if they are accepted, Furley's points seem further to support the conclusion that Aristotle sometimes came to find his intuitions conflicting or blunted in dealing with the actual infinite. They do not, of course, serve to confirm any claim that he was often tmnquilly naive or an untmubled dogmati,st. Furley supplies yet another reason for

s See Norman Kretzmann, editor, *Infinity & Oontiwuity in Anoient and Medieval Thought* (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1982.) I cite David Furley at p. 23 of his "The Greek Commentators' Treatment of Aristotle's Treatment of the Continuum".

Aristotle's seeking external support from obher disciplines. He gives us more grounds for concluding that Aristotle worked reasonably in the context. Furley's mention of later criticisms from Simplicius ,and others points to additional 1sourcesof possible conflict in Aristotle's reflections. These sources also could bring Aristotle to turn in such heteronomous ways to other disciplines for help.

(III) *F. B. Miller:* "Philosophers typically fall into circularity because they try to prove too much and Aristotle could have argued that given our commonsense beliefs about the £aster and the slower, the oontinuity (or atomicity) of magnitude entails that of motion or time. . .. This would be to ·argue from *Ta pha.inomena* as Aristotle often does. But Aristotle tries to justify these commonsense beliefs ·a.bout motion on other grounds (resembling geometry intermingled with physics), and in this he falls into circularity." [9]

Comment on (III): Not so. For when commonsense beliefs ·and intuitions seem to conflict or to lack the needed weight for an intellectual task, Aristotle can very *usefully* appeal to the weight of well-tried principles in an intellectually admired discipline. Why is he accused of trying to prove too much? He certainly does need support. A contrary passage points to conflicting or weakened intuitions. Aristotle is likely to benefit as a reasoner from a means of avoiding the falsehood of contradictiions. At lea.st, he has a fair chance of so benefitting, provided that he does not appeal to what really conflicts with this other premise or his conclusion, and does not exploit something which he *semetly reinterpret8* without justification, in order to shore up his original a.rgument.

(IV) *Wilbur R. Knorr:* "It is irionic thrut Aristotle denies one 1specificsense of the infinite in which it *is* in fact indispensable for geometry: on cosmo1ogical grounds he maintains that no line can be infinite .... While this is purely a physical argu-

[9] F. D. Miller, "Aristotle against the Atomists ", *N.* Kretzmann, edito·r, *Infinity and Continuity in Ancient and Medieval Thought* (see my footnote 7), p. 106.

Aristotle carries it over into the abstract field of geometry." [10]

Cmnment on (IV): If Aristotle at the time of writing the *Physics* found some geometers' thoughts or his own geometrical intuitions inadequate or disunited, and if he were reasonably convinced that at least some sectors of physics were in far better order than some of current geometry, then his manner of proceeding would appear to be quite riational. He could appeal to the ·authority of physics *and* geometry, hut set the former at a still higher level.

Gamma: The First Two Aristotelian Arguments

(A) At III.5, 205a8-rn Aristotle writes: "The following arguments give a general demonstration that it is not possible for this bo be an (actual) infinite body. It is in the nature of each kind of sensible body to he somewhere, and there is a place appropriate to each, the same for the part and for the whole-for example, for the whole earth and for a single clod, and for fire and for a spark."

(B) " In general, the view that there is an infinite body is plainly incompatible with the doctrine that there is a proper pl·ace for eacih kind of body, if every sensible body has either weight or lightness, and if ·a body has a natural locomotion to the centre if it is heavy, and upwards if it is light. This would need to be true of the infinite also, but neither character can belong to it: it cannot be either as •a whole nor can it he half the one half the other. For how should you divide it? " (205h24-25)

With (A) and (B) one may contrast (C), (D), and, to a lesser extent, (E) .

[10] Wilbur R. Knorr, "Infinity and Continuity: The Interaction of Mathematics and Philosophy in Antiquity" in N. Kretzmann, editor, *Infinity and Oontinuity: The Interaation of Mathematias amd Philosophy in Antiquity* (see my footnote 7), p. 122.

Refieotions on (A) and (B)

Let us try to give these two arguments dearer expression. It will lead to exposing a problem that Aristotelians and Thomists sometimes tend to over-look.

(A) (i) Everything in nature has an essence 'and a proper place.

(ii) Thus everything in nature has a proper place, be it ,a continuing whole like the earth or a continued part like the position of a fire or spark.

(iii) [The uses above of "body", "place", "sensible body", "kind", "p1ace ", etc., are in keeping with the term's uses in physics 'and with what physicists say about such topics.]

(B) (i) ['Uhe science of physics exists and it could only exist if the cosmos were *intelligible* for rational beings who study it.]

(ii) There would he no intelligible cosmos and no science of physics, unless each kind of (actual) body had a pmper place in the cosmos, with a proper tendency to move in certain directions or to stiay still according to its heaviness or lightness.

(iii) If there were an actually infinite object or group in nature, it too would have to show intelligible ,relations between its own proper pface, the proper places of its parts, the proper places of neighboring substances, the proper directions of movements towards other things by itself a•s a whole and its parts.

(iv) But such •a supposedly actual and infinite body cannot he intelligibly spoken of as a single whole since it has no proper (actually divisible parts) nor as a group, nor as light, heavy, light-,and-heavy, moving up, moving to the center, doing both in part, etc.

Conoliwion of (A) and (B). [Therefore (A) and (B) demonstmte by deduction from obvious premises that both the understanding given by physics and our ordinary powers of reasoning force us to reject the idea of an infinite and actual body.]

Comment: To round out 1a<rguments (A) and (B) we need a tadt premise of a 'synthetic a priori ' kind. Aristotle would affirm (P) : it is true that we may often turn to physics very wisely for guidance about concepts and reasoning. Now it is not exactly a matter of definition for him that (P) is true. And, on the other hand, he does not hold that it just happens to be true, like "A Theban goat ate thirty-one figs last night." Aristotle's intuition seems neither ' *analytia'* nor ' *synthetic a posteriori',* but something approaching a ' *synthetic a priori* '. It is *ampliative.* And it implies (Q) : Anaximande:r and other champions of the actual infinite were violating the proper approach of true physicists.

But the reasoning behind arguments (A) (B) reflects a number of intertwining Aristotelian intuitions about teleology and nature, places and relations, intelligibility and essence, etc. These are not unfamiliar to readers of Aristotle, but it is worth extricating them under certain headings for our purposes here. For they too will lead one to exposing an important problem which Aristotelians and Thomists 'sometimes tend to overlook.

Delta: Some Bodies of Intuitive Premises

Comment: Let us present some *Intertwining Intuitions:*

I. *A teleological intuition about topos.* What exists or happens ,according to nature at places in the cosmos is, generally speaking, what ought to exist or happen in those places. (Generally speaking what happens to something *kata physin,* in accordance with Nature, is due and p11oper.)

I.1. *A related intuition.* Hence objects and bodies of stuff in the sublunary sphere have a proper place to occupy both in relation to each other and in relation to the higher spheres.

I.Q. Another related teleological intuition about topos. Hence objects and bodies of stuff not only do have certain positions in the eosmos, but also, belonging to Nature, ought to have and he thought by rational animals to have those due and proper positions in the cosmos.

I.3. *A related intuition.* Since intelligibility calls for our being able to grasp the essence of a complete whole, it ·also requires the finitude of any actual whole.

I.4. Physics being one study of the intelligible, the proper places of the actual objects and bodies of stuff studied in physics are found at finite distances from each other in a finite cosmos.

I.5. Nature's being the realm, generally speaking, of what is and w:hat *ought* to be, a natural thing or body of stuff has its own essential end or purpose *(telos)* which is reflected partly by its proper place in the intelligible cosmos.

I.6. Physics is the very study of what is and ought to be so– the study of essences, proper ends, proper places, and proper relations, and of, also, the claims of the intelligible upon empirieal talk. (Physics is a paradigm of rational investigation.)

II. *A relational intuition about topos.* Nature is intelligible to rational beings because they can make sense of the co-existence *oi* numerous natural objects or bodies of stuff through their having proper places *in their proper relations* to one another of finite distance a finite cosmos.

III. *An intuition about rnagnitude.* Considerations of intelligibility requires us to postulate numerical finitude or size of any group of actual entities.

III.I. If something is intelligible then it must have an essence to be grasped.

III.fl. If something is not only intelligible but actual, then it must essentially be *this* rather than *that* and must be finite, since its essence can be grasped and its nature defined.

III.3. The essence of an intelligible and actual object which we contemplate must be that of something with a :finite number of elements or oonstituents.

III.4. When I say "This" and speak knowingly of something actual (as actual) , to show that it is actual, my word is clearly meaningful and has a pa.rticu1ar referent-but I cannot say " this " in such a way of something which has infinitely many elements.

III.5. Nature, as is dear from human knowledge, is intelligible, and so must have finitely many constituents in their proper places.

III.6. To balk of an *actual, material object of infinite size* is to talk of something requiring an actual infinite number of units of measurement.

III.7. An infinite magnitude cannot intelligbly he assigned to something considered aictual, be it a number, or an object in space or a series.

IV. *An intuition about multitudes.* Talk of an actual and infinite multitude is unintelligible since understanding it would require the impossible: making sense of something and violating the basic conditions of making sense in assertion.

IV.L The intuitions III to III.7 can be obviously used against the idea of an infinite and actual multitude, since the ideas of magnitude and multitude are so closely connected.

Comment: The most important question seems to be whether III and other basic intuitions about magnitude and multitude can be made less like Procrustean beds when juxtaposed with Aristotle's teleological intuitions about place. Above all, cannot we preserve many salient features of *topos,* while allowing the number of actual things in the universe to be infinite? Let us say that the size of the universe is finite, in keeping with Aristotle's requirement for intelligible talk of something's extension. Let us add that everything has a purpose, point and value. Let us add again that the universe consists of (finitely many) finitely sized macroscopic objects all of which have proper places and havce proper relations of finite distance to one another ,and the outer spheres. But within each macroscopic object there is an infinity of microscopic particles, each arranged from one side to the other in an infinitely diminis:hing

order of size so as to fit in the finite size. Why could not Aristotle grant that the finitely many mac:mscopic objects (o'l." bodies of stuff) have their propeT places, their purpose, forms, bases of intelligibility, natural essences, etc. He might be reminded of Zeno of Elea and his supposed paradox: Achilles is trying to pursue the tortoise across an infinitely divisible finite g:vound. But Zeno's 'paradox', so restated, does seem to make sense. *'Macrosco])i,callyspeaking',* all obseTVableobjects could have an essence, proper place, etc., could they not? Suppose that Aristotle is not satisfied. Let one part of the earth contain a vast, but finite accumulation of rolls of cloth, each occupying a cubic yard. Every roll is infinite in length, but as the rolls of cloth turn inward they become far thinner and thinner as they coil towards infinity. Could not such rolls, (or sheet-like-plants-which- are-almost-like- the-rolls-in- magnitude-and-distribution), have proper places, purposes, essences? Aristotle would ·apply that the number of inches in their length would have to be numerable, which would entail the ·absurdity that an infinite quantity could be traversed by a finite measurer. But if a meaisurer, who occupied a finite place in space, had two hands exactly formed in a way exactly isomorphic to the shape of the rolls, he could measure the roll as a unit isomorphic to his hand and equally long. Then he could use his other equally long isomorphic hand to measure the first hand.

We need not conclude that Aristotle, the finitist must be wrong about actual, infinite multitudes and magnitudes. We do suggest that when a finite spatial model is given for an infinite multitude or magnitude, the Aristotelian concepts of *cosmos, topos, telos,* etc., look to he much less obviously incompatible with the world described. Again, one at least *seems* to have taken an impressive step forward in terms of intelligibility and avoiding conflict with several major human intuitions. Note that for many, of course, the greatest objection to speaking of an *actual infinite* series or an *actual infinite* number is that Aristotle in the *Metaphysi,cs* and others with a similar ontological temperament have made them doubt that any

mathematical series, *set* or *number-a* finite one as well as an infinite one-,should be called *actual, existens in re* and the like.

Epsilon: The Last Five Arguments

So (A) and (B) tend to confuse *some* matters of intuition about magnitude and multitude with others about teleology, place and physics. In further ways, it is the clear and very reasonable intention of Aristotle to ally explicitly his intuitions about number with related intuitions which are cherished by good physicists. \7\fe return to examples.

(C) " **If** ' bounded by a surface ' is the definition of ' body ', there cannot be an infinite body either intelligible or sensible."

(D) "Nor can number taken in abstraction be infinite; for number or that which has number is numemble. **If** then the numerable can he numbered, it would also be possible to go through the infinite." *(Physics III.5,* 204b6-9).

(E) "The infinite exhibits itself in different ways-in time, in the generations of man, in the divisions magnitudes. For generally the infinite has mode of existence: one thing is always being taken after another, and each thing that is taken is always finite, but always different." *(Physics III.5,* 206a26-Q9).

Comments: (C) offers us what Aristotle considers the proper or correct definition of " body ". Of course, Aristotle holds that a finite body must first be adequately grasped by sense perception for the sensible form and then the intelligible form to be abstracted. But basically we are offered what is taken to be a deduction from 'analytic' premises of an evident kind: A body must essentially satisfy requirement R. An *infinite body* of one relevant kind or the other cannot satisfy R. So there can be no such thing. Compare (D) which is similar, but double. One might thus say: " A number can be counted and so can a group's elements be counted. An infinite number could not be counted. So there is no such number. *Next,* if there were an actual infinite number that could be actually counted, then we could in reality do what cannot be done-

actually 'traverse the infinite'. So no such numbers could exist, since absurd consequences would arise." In (E) the appeal is to the evident, but not to the ' analytically ' evident. Aristotle reminds us in (E) and (F) , r:ather like the later Wittgenstein, of what is *familiar* and instructive, but whose significance is too often overlooked. Certain points about infinity are evident to rational beings if they just confront what experience of life and Nature has shown them in a vivid and powerful way. Infinity, such experience has made undeniable, lucidly disclosed to be connected with coming into being and passing away, and thus with *potentiality.* What is actually affected at any time by change, such experience shows, is always finite. So the infinite always belongs to potentiality.

Note, also, that at *Physics III.5* Aristotle uses seven words in close proximity: "impossible" (three times); "cannot" (seven times); "must" (three times); "plain/evident" *(delos-twice)*; " plainly " *(deli5s)*; "clear "; " obviously "; "absurd". The insistent use here of such words suggests a feeling of strong confidence, then a feeling of doubt which must be argued and even preached out of existence.

(F) " Our account does not mb the mathematics of their science, by disproving the actual existence of the infinite in the direction of increase, in the sense of the sense the intravers-·able. In point of fact they do not need the infinite and do not use it. They postulate only that a finite straight line may be produced as far as they wish." *(Physics III.5,*

(F) is reminiscent of (A) and (B):

(F) accepts the following interpretation easily: " There may appear to be too little fo11ce to the intuition that an actual thing in space is always finite. There may, also, be some further doubts about the rejection of the actual
arising from misunderstandings of what mathematicians do. When the misunderstandings are removed, we see plainly that my philosophical intuitions about infinity, the actual and the potential are not at all awkward. In fact they are buttressed by leading principles in the rigorous domains of orthodox

arithmetic and geometry." In (A) and (B), as has been found, he draws rather similarly on the views and standing of another body of experts.

Such uses of physics and mathematics by Aristotle, in support of intuitions about the actual infinite, might be viewed as the moves of a crude instrumentalist, or a sophisticated holist, or a cautious realist. As an instrumentalist, Wilder writes: " Whether infinite totalities exist in the physical universe has nothing to do with the question. What matters is, do the concepts lead [as once with calculus] to fruitful developments in mathematics [and science]? " (207) . The pragmatic holism of \V. V. Quine, which was best expressed in his essay "Two Dogmas of Empiricism ", gives priority to one clashing belief or concept over another where the agent's whole structure of beliefs and activities in the world will benefit from making such a change. The objective approach of the entire *Nicmnaohaean Ethios* shows that Aristotle would reject Quine's denial that such cognitive and objective values as Truthfulness and Fidelity to Absolute Truth are the best bases for selection. Like the Plato of *Republic* I-IV, he would stand against those who abandon a realistic approach to truth in order to chase the expedient (To *sump heron)* .

Let us stress again, therefore, that we do not criticize Aristotle for using a rational strategy which is thoroughly truth-seeking, yet innocuously imitates pragmatism and holism to advantage. His thinking resembles partly that of a mathematical logician who gives a proof of relative consistency between S^1 and S^2, so as to raise confidence in S^2 through tapping the respect already accorded to S^1. Many other highly rational uses of analogy will occur to reflection, though rhetorical abuses of an Appeal to Authority may come to mind, as well, on a less pleasing occasion.

Conduding Remarks

Think of an aristocratic father who tries to be abundantly loving and generous to each of his four sons. He wishes, all the

same, to give his first son, his heir, the special place of favor. For he assumes that this is in keeping with rights of primogeniture. Somehow, he insists, he must ,arrive at the Mean. Such ideas of an old-fashioned aristocrat may evoke insight more than sympathy. So think next of 'a kindly modern father whose eldest son is blind and who treats the son for this reason with special favor. Yet he tries to show abundant warmth and generosity to his other two sons .and his daughter. He seeks to arrive at the Mean.

If the "Mean" is interpreted mechanically here, then both fathers will aim at avoiding dispmportionate fondness for any one child at the expense of the other three. Whatever is be-s-towed on each one should be, approximately *9l5%* of what is bestowed upon all four together. 'fihis principle conflicts with its mechanical cousin: one must find some positive number n, such that one's kindness towards the special child is almost always greater by n.

Perhrups the most glaringly mechanical approach to looking for the Mean between two extremes is to reach a point which stands exactly half way between them. As< Richard Bosley ha;s recently •stressed, the search for any such unvarying, quantitatively decidruble point *as* the Mean is unhappy. [11] The Mean, when taken ·as an ideal place to take between *this* ex>treme, excessive gene:msity, and, *next,* irion unwillingness to give ·anything to others, lies usually much closer to the first extreme. Between utter recklessness and self-paralyzing caution the Mean may oscillate in relative distance, according to the demands of the context. Near recklessness may offer the only means to win one kind of battle and a stubborn refusal to move may be needed for the nex>t victory. By pursuing such a nonmechanical and variably positioned *ideal* of a Mean, a really wise father usually oould show special favor to one specially deserving child in some ways and some contexts, yet generally show very satisfying love to a;ll his children.

11 Richard Bosley, " What Is a Mean? The Question Considered Compara·tively and Systematically." *PhiloB<Y[lhy East and West* XXXVI, 1 (1986), pp. 3·12. I am indebted to Bosley for many related discussions.

Whether the subject be the *endechomena* or *phainmnena* of Physics or those of Ethics, Aristotle hopes to 1some extent to save as many intuitions as possible. If he suffers from the pull of seemingly opposed intuitions about bodies in space or weakness of will, he believes he will show how much proper consideration should be given to each. But Aristotle, as critics like Sorabji help to indicate, is not a consistently good father. Sometimes he even acts as if only one of his intuitive offspring were alive and relevant, sometimes as if only a few were of any interest at aU. But when he seeks to give an intuition its proper due, we are often placed in his debt. As I suggested in the Prolegomena, and sought to show in discussing the arguments on an actual infinity, even those cherish traditional issues about Philosophy in relation to Theology may profit from casting a fresh glance at Aristotle's uses of mathematics and physics to do most justice to the case for an intuition. The very idea that, in doing pure philosophy, we may *never* appeal to the authority of an excellent theologian, or an excellent scientist is a very mischievious idea. Then there are those who would complain of one philosopher's ever appealing to the authority of another *philosopher*. They complain, but do not specify distinct senses of " authority ". Such critics talk as if no human being or no human society could usefully compare intuitions with another.

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DULLES AND AQUINAS ON REVELATION

1. Beginning the Dialogue

RESPECT FOR Avery Dulles' achievement in *Models of Revelation* [1] need not oonsist entirely in "enthusiastic recognition of its many merits " [2] even though it is " the mature reflection of an experienced teacher " and " as of now ... the most comprehensive treatment on revelation in the English"'speaking world ".[3] Learning from it involves recognizing the " worthwhileness of dialogue with **Dul**les' work ".[4] In this questions ,are essential to advancing the discussion.

This article will proceed in appreciative dialogue by means of critical questions and wiH move in the direction of modifying aspects of Dulles' basic principle in *Models of Revelation.* Dialogue, according to the hermeneutical work of H.-G. Gadamer, [5] is not first of all a genre for organizing ,and presenting themes and ideas already attained. **It** belongs to the act of understanding itself, occurs in reading a text, always takes place in and through tradition and is one of the ways in which interpretation enters into every experience. In this light, the *Summa Theologiae* [6] of St. Thomas Aquinas belongs to a read-

1 Avery Dulles, *Models of Revelation* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1983).

2 Bernard Cooke, " God Revealing in Symbol", *OommonweaZ* 110: 308, May 20, 1983.

3 Dermot Lane, "A Review Essay: Dulles on Revelation", *The Living Light,* 21:74-76, Oct. 1984; p. 74.

4 William Loewe, review in *New Catholic World,* 226:185, July-August, 1983.

5 Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth wnd Method* (New York: Crossroad, 1982); pp. 325-341, 345-351.

6 St. Thomas .Aquinas, *Summa Theofogiae,* Vol. 45, *Prophecy and Other*

ing of *211odels Of Revelation,* despite the absence of evidence that it influenced Dulles' theology of revelation. It does not belong to it, that is, because it served as a source for *211odels of Revelation.* Nevertheless, the *Summa* is within, and has significantly changed, the theological tradition shared by *211odels of Revelation.* Reading Dulles' book in light of its tradition, then, brings Aquinas into the dialogue [7] in a way that would not be appropriate for a strictly historical-theological analysis of influences upon Dulles' theology of revelation.

The *Summa* stands as a classic [8] work in the Catholic theological tradition. The inescapable magnitude of Aquinas' achievement makes it pertinent to every part of that tradition. Karl Rahner judged that, " Thomas Aquinas is to be immbered among the great figures of theology with whom any contemporary theology must engage in a genuine dialogue ".[9] Rahner observed, too, the way in which attitudes toward Aquinas have changed. He noted, "From being *the* teacher of theology in the theological schools themselves, Thomas has acquired the status of a Father of the Church ".[10] In this new and somewhat reduced condition, Aquina:s' text's can assume their true proportions as theological classics whose claim upon generation after generation arises not so much from official sanction as from their self-evidencing power to speak about subject-matter whose intr:insic significance brings it before a succession of eras and to a variety of cultures. It is easy

Charisms (2a2ae, 171-8), Latin text; English translation, Introduction, Notes, Appendices & Glossary by Roland Potter, O.P. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1969). English translations and Latin text will be from Vol. 45 through-out this article; references will be to parts of Aquinas' article.

7 M.-D. Chenu's *Toward Understanding Et. Thomas,* translated by A-M Landry & D. Hughes (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1964), it is true, places the modern reader in dialogue with medieval texts through careful recovery of their contexts. But the relationship tends to lead into Aquinas's texts and their meaning rather than back from them to contemporary themes.

s H.-G. Gaclamer, pp. 253-258.

9 Karl Rahner, "On Recognizing the Importance of Thomas Aquinas", *Theological Investigationg* Vol. XIII, translated by D. Bourke (New York: Seabury Press, 1975); pp. 3-12, 6-7.

10 Rahner, p. 4.

enough to see that dirulogue with Aquinas inspired the work of Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan as well as the early writings of Edward Schillebeeckx and Johann Baptist Metz.

Yet this is not to propose that Dulles likewise constructed *Models of Revelation* under the inspiration of Aquinas even if not from direct use of Aquinas. Nor is it to presuppose that Aquinas' teaching needs to be regarded as " the one great ocean into which all conceivable streams of wisdom and knowledge flow and converge, so that it is from *this* ocean alone that we must draw our knowledge and inspiration, all other sources now being superfluous ".[11] Rather, it is to set forth in preliminary manner the kind of relevance obtaining between a classical and a contemporary theology of revelation. It is to indicate in the briefest fashion that a common tradition and a subject-matter central to it constitute an initial justification for inquiring into *Models of Revelation* with the help of the *Summa Theologiae.*

Still, Dulles' critique of neo-Scholastic theology of revelation in Chapter III, " Revelation as Doctrine " could be read as preventing this dialogue. Far from offering insight into revelation, Aquinas' theology might be thought to be the prototypical case of revelation-as-doctrine, in which revelation is God's word manifesting and communicating divine knowledge " in the form of words having a clear propositional content." [12] And, if such a superseded Catholic neo-Scholastic version of propositional revelation looked back to Aquinas in some respects, does this not end the possibility of fruitful dialogue with him?

Allaying that suspicion will be the first moment in the dialogue. Does Aquinas fall under Dulles' critique of revelation-as-doctrine? To the extent that this model attributes an objectionably high degree of conceptual clarity and precision to revelation, almost as if God were at pains to abide by Cartesian norms, Aquinas' theology of revelation simply does not

11 Rahner, p. 10.
12 Dulles, p. 45.

fit within the model Chapter III outlines and rejects. As long ago as 1949 Victor White [13] showed tha:t for Aquinas clear and precisely defined concepts were not essential to revelation. He pointed out that " SL Thomas describes the typical revelation as ' quaedam oognitio obumbrata et oscuritate admixta . . .' *(De Veritate* HU2) ".[14] For Aquinas, prophetic perception of the divine was "everything of which the controlled, orderly, logical and scientific reason is most suspicious ".[15] Aquinas recognized, said White, that in prophetic revelation " the typical vehicle is not the rational concept, but the concrete image, the phantasy, the dream, the hypnogogic uncontrolled imagination *(De Ver.* 12.7.8; 2-2 173.2, etc)".[16] White pointed out that Aquinas' commentary on Hebrews 1: 1 "stresses the extraordinary variety to be found in the methods which God has devised to make his saving ways known to men-even in the Old Testament alone" .[17] And among those ways, it was especially " the immense richness and variety of symbolism which revelation has employed for its medium ".[18] Aquinas, through familarity with the Old Testament, saw that, as White said, " imagination is par excellence the vehicle of prophetic vision (De *Ver.* 12.7) ".[19] Moreover, he recognized that the images seen by the pI1ophets were not " mere signs for what is otherwise knowable, but true *symbols* for what wholly transcends sense-perception or rational comprehension ".[20] White's distinction between sign and symbol and his locating the essential role of symbols in Aquinas' idea of revelation opens up an affinity with Dulles' distinction between indicators and symbols as well as with his emphasis on symbolic mediation.

In fact, Dulles begins Chapter IX, " Symbolic Mediation ",

1s Victor White, O.P., "St. Thomas's Conception of Revelation", *Dominican Studies,* Vol. 1, No. 1, Jan. 1948; pp. 3-35.

14 White, p. 7.

15 White, p. 6.

rn White, p. 7.

17 White, p. 11.

1s White, p. 11.

19 White, p. 20.

20 White, p. 20.

with an introductory comment on transcendence and symbolism that comes close to White's definition of what symbols do. Dulles remarks: "The poets have long been familiar with the connection between symbol and revelation. Samuel Taylor Coleridge affirmed very simply: 'It is by Symbols alone that we can acquire intellectual knowledge of the Divine' ".[21] Yet a difference between Aquinas and Dulles also emerges from White's further exposition of Aquinas. White joins to symbols something that Dulles, and arguably Coleridge, omit from knowledge of the divine. There is no escaping, that is, the central role of intellectual judgment in Aquinas' theology of revelation, and White does it some justice. For he states that in Aquinas there " is no apprehension of truth or falsehood, nor of veracious vision as opposed to hallucination (cf. 1-2,77.2; *De Malo* 3.3, 9) without a judgment or its equivalent (I.16.2) ".[22] In White's view Aquinas has room for both symbolic knowledge of the divine and for the judgment affirming its truth.

Does the important role for symbols mean that for Aquinas God revealed through obscure, and symbolic, messages instead of by means of clearly conceived formulae? Rene Latourelle's *The Theology of Revelation* [23] suffices to exempt Aquinas from the anthropomorphism that imagines divine communication taking place essentially through delivery of verbal statements, transparently clear or runic as the case may be, to a prophet who then gives assent. Latourelle remarked that Aquinas saw that " between the human word and the divine word there is an *analogy* ".[24] The divine word of revelation was not just like the teacher instructing a pupil through spoken discourse. Aquinas said that God revealed to the prophets by means of an inner word, and that this inner word " is merely illumina-

21 Dulles, p. 131.

22 White, p. 24.

23 Rene Latourelle, *Theology of Revelation* (Staten Island, N.Y.: Alba House, 1967); pp. 159-179.

24 Latourelle, p. 166.

tion of the mind "[25] so that the prophet can perceive something of divine 'things. In this regard, it can be said that the word of God comes into being in the mind of the prophet, as well as that it comes to the prophet, since what " comes to" the prophet is illumination essentially and not primarily verbal statements.

There are no less than four principles in 173,2[26] in particular that inhibit attributing the objectionable model to Aquinas. First, Aquinas strictly limited the teacher /pupil analogy for divine/human communication. This analogy lay at the root of the revelation-as-doctrine model, according to Dulles. The likeness between God reveailing and a teacher instructing is in the giving of representations or ideas to another. God can do this directly by infusing them into the mind of the prophet, to whom God, therefore, is immanent.[21] The teacher can do this hy speaking or writing; he " furnishes his pupils with realities through word-symbols"[28] in propositions or statements. However, although it is not the point Aquina's made directly and

[25] Latourelle, p, 177, note 93: "Perceptio divinae locutionis, qua prophetam alloquitur interius, quae nihil est quam mentis illustratio" *(De Ver.,* 12, l, ad 3),

[26] Question 173 takes up " the manner of prophetic knowledge " in four articles. Article 2, while only a fraction of Aquinas' theology of revelation, gives clear exposition of one principle: the act of revealing is an act of enlightenment, and the gift of divine light is the formal characteristic of prophetic revelation. *Prophecy and Inspiration,* Paul Synave, O.P. and Pierre Benoit, O,P. (New York: Desclee Co,, 1961) pp. 33-38 analyzes in detail 173, 2 in regard to the several ways the prophet's mind could be engaged by God.

Some other *loci* for Aquinas' theology of revelation, in addition to 2a2ae, 171-178 are: *De Ver,* 12; S,C.G. L III, c,154; IVc, 25; *Expos. in Joannem; Ad Hebra,eos; In Boet, de Trin.* 2, 3, ad 7; *Summa Theologiae,* I, l; 2a2ae, 1-7; la2ae, 1, 6.

[27] 173, 2 *Responsio:* "In this second respect [conferral of species], not in the first [conferral of light], human teaching can be likened to prophetic revelation, for a man furnishes his pupil with realities through word-symbols, but he cannot illumine from within as God does."

Cf. also, 172, 6, ad 2m: " Demons manifest to men what they know, not by enlightening their intelligences, but by giving them imaginative vision, or even by addressing them in terms of sense-impressions."

;2SNote 27.

explicitly, God communicates not through statements but through infused species. New knowledge or new images can also come from divine [nfluence upon the prophet's imagination stirring familiar images to a new arrangement, or from new sensible objects known in an ordinary way. The very fact that divine delivery of propositions to a prophet does not occur in every case demonstrates that it is not essential to, and is not formally the character of, revelation, should it occur.

Second, every analogy labors under the law of incommensurability according to which every similarity between the created and the uncreated contains a still greater dissimilarity. Without formal reference to this, Aquinas nonetheless respected it in regard to the teacher/pupil analogy. The major difference between God revealing and a teacher discoursing to pupils lay in the fact that the teacher " cannot illumine from within as God does ".[29] Despite the most earnest efforts by students, no teacher can communicate more than intelligible signs, leaving the illumination of them-or not-to the light of the student's own mind; the light itself in the teacher grasps and judges an argument cannot be communicated. God, on the other hand, can and does give precisely the light enabling the prophet to perform the judgment in that light; God communicates not only-in some cases•-fatelligible species, but also the light within which to judge their divine meaning and truth. And this is part of the uniqueness of the way in which God, and no creature, can communicate to and in a human mind.

Third, did not present each and every act of judging taken into account in 173,2 as an instance of judgment acting upon a pre-formed proposition. In this article, and according to P. Lee,[30] in Aquinas' whole theory of judgment, there is

29Note27.

so Patrick Lee, in "Aquinas on Knmvledge of Truth and Existence ", *The New Scholasticism,* Vol. LX, 1, Winter, 1986, pp. 46-71, argues convincingly that the position John of St. Thomas held on judgment is mistaken. According to John of St. Thomas, the first act of mind apprehends or forms a proposition which the second act of mind judges to be true or false. Lee considers the act of judging to be identical with composing or dividing a proposi-

no reason to think that the second act of the mind consists essentially in assenting to a pre-formed proposition offered to the prophet for a divinely assisted consent and subsequent proclamation to others. Instead, in 173,2, and in Aquinas' theory of judgment, the operation of composing or dividing is precisely that which forms and pvoposes. For the prophet, the word of God forms in the judgment.

For example, the case most able to be thought of as an instance of propositional reve1'ation in 173,2 concerns the words written across the wall of Belshazzar's hall in *Daniel 5.* It might be possible to construe them as an elliptical sentence declaring in cryptic manner the political fortune of Belshazzar.[31] If this were the case, and if Aquinas conceived revealing as an act of divinely enlightened assent to a divmely formulated and tra;nsmitted sentence, then Daniel's prophecy would amount to decoding the words in ·a first act that formed a proposition and then, by divine enlightenment, affirming its truth on the hasis of its divine origin and authority in a second act. But, in fact, it is otherwise in 173,2. Daniel interpreted the words in an act of revealing that simultaneously apprehended their meaning and affirmed it as God's verdict on Belshazzar. That Aquinas explicitly saw Daniel's prophecy as an act of judging and not as apprehending is clear from the way he argued from this case to the conclusion that prophecy consists essentially in the con-

tion. " Proposition " here "refers not to the sentence, a linguistic entity but, to what a declarative sentence typically signifies, viz. a complex object of thought which is true or false, and which has, at least typically, a subject-predicate structure," Lee. p. 48.

In respect to the act of judging, as distinct from the content previously known, Aquinas' theology of revelation does not involve propositions, but primarily the inner word of enlightened judgment and only secondarily an outer word communicable to others. It is helpful to note, in this regard, the difference between the act of revelation, formally characterized as enlightenment, and the transmission o.f it to others by speech, which Aquinas identified as a distinct charism, in 177.

a1173, 2, *Responsio:* "And so if anyone is favored by a God-given representation o.f certain realities through imaginative images, as with Pharoah and Nebuchadnezzar; or through bodily images, as with Belshazzar-such are not to be considered prophets, unless their minds are enlightened for judging."

ferral of new light for judgment. In that argument Daniel's interpretation exemplified the distinction between receiving new species (the words seen by all) and the gift of new light (which Daniel alone received) . In this judgment, Daniel was not considered to be doing what pertains to the first act of the mind, apprehending the ideas conveyed by the words, but what pertains to the second act of the mind, asserting the truth. That is what ma:de him a prophet. It is not the case, that is, that Daniel first apprehended the words in their meaning formulated into a proposition, then secondly, judged that these are true words. Aquinas did not treat enlightenment as an act upon a proposition formulated prior to and apart from judgment then subsequently given over to judgment. This would be what the revelation-as-doctrine model would expect Aquinas to teach if he adhered to that idea of revelation.

Fourth, what is common to prophecies is the giving of new light for judging. That is what Aquinas affirmed fo order to move to the conclusion that the multiplicity in prophecies derives not from that light but from new species. In 173,2, however, Aquinas did not equate the gift of new light with the reception of a new proposition, as if the new light had a new proposition for its formal object. Three cases of prophecy, for example, do not even in¥olve words: Joseph interpreting Pharoa:h's dream; Jeremiah seeing a boiling pot facing away from the north (Jer. 1: 13); Daniel interpreting Nebuchadnezzar's dream. Yet all of these are a-0ts of revelation. Therefore, the act of judgment in revelation does not necessarily have verbal statements as its object. Priophetic judgment is not a matter essentially of ratifying verbal messages received from God. It is also true that Aquinas did not exclude this, and in *In Joannem, c.5,* lect. 6 ·referred to divine spoken words in Jesus' baptism in the Jordan and at the Transfiguration.

Thus, Aquinas in 173,2 does not fit neatly under the model of revelation-as,.-doctrine. Because of this, there still remains open the possibility that there can be further dialogue between Dulles and Aquinas. What differences or conflicts there are can

he understood in a context other than that of the inadequate model of revelation,....as,..,doctrine.

2. *Summa Theologiae,* 2a2ae,173,2 as Counter-point to Chwpter IX, " Symbolic Mediation "

In Chapter IX Dulles argues the pr>incipleessential to the theology of revelation expounded in Part Two of *Models of Revelation.* Revelation, he proposes, is "always mediated through symbol ".[32] In diverging from models treating revelation as doctrine, as event, as inner experience, as dialectical presence, and as new awareness, he does not deductively apply ·a general theory of symbol to revelation since his ideas on symbol are themselves influenced by revelation and faith.[33] And his focus falls on the mediation of revelation, not so much on its content, though the two are inseparable. How does God reveal? God's self-manifestation is "always mediated through symbol". This means, he adds, that revelation is mediated by means of " an externally perceived sign that works mysteriously on the human consciousness so as to suggest more than it can clearly describe or define ".[34] This principle will enable Dulles to retrieve and to incorporate into a symbolic theology elements from the five models analyzed and set aside in Part One. Did Aquinas, though, teach anything like symbolic mediation?

In general[35] Aquinas conceived divine revelation as an act of divinely enlightened knowledge and as one of the three ways in which human beings know something of divine things. The other two are rational ascent from knowledge of the objects of experience to some limited knowledge that God exists, is one, is first cause, is wise, etc., and beatific vision, which is vision because not mediated by created realities and their intelligibilities. Beatific vision is direct participation in divine knowledge,

a2 Dulles, p. 131.
as Dulles, p. ix.
34 Dulles, p. 131.
35 Cf. Latourelle, p. 159, ff.

but not with a comprehensive grasp of the divine essence. That which is revealed, the content of revelation, [36] is some part of divine things. Divine things are what God lmows, whether these be human or divine, past, present or future according to created existence and knowledge. In the act of revealing God let the prophet know what is, but is far removed from human knowledge. God lifted the veil of ignorance preventing the mind of the prophet from perceiving what is real but above human comprehension. Such prophetic revelation was a charism for the common salvific good of humanity, not solely for the personal good of the prophet. Its social destiny brought a secondary charism to the prophet, the ability to communicate what had been given in the act of revealing. [37]

Also, though an extra-ol'dinary gift, and in no way due to a person's capacities of des>ires,[38] the act of enlightenment by God was not the gift of faith nor was revealing received in an act of belief or faith. Rather it was divinely conferred and actuated knowledge for communication to others, who did receive it in an act of faith in God and in the content. The prophets were obviously people of faith but what made them prophets was not the faith they shared with their fellow Israelites but the charism of knowledge given by God for Israel, and beyond.

In the *Summa,* 2a2ae,173,2 presents with unmistakaible directness the principle essential for understanding how Aquinas conceived the way in which God revealed. In 173,2, Aquinas inquired " whether in prophetic revelation God infuses new species in the mind of the prophet, or simply grants a new light ".[39] The central argument is over how God revealed what was given to a prophet. Was it exclusively "new light" so

[36] On the questions pertaining to content, cf. also the discussion on "sacra doctrina": James Weisheipl, 0.P., "The Meaning of Sacra Doctrina in Summa Theologiae I, q. l *",The Thomist* 38: 1-2, Jan.-Apr. 1974; pp. 49-80.

[37] *Summa Theologiae,* 2a2ae, 177-178.

[38] *Summa Theologiae,* 2a2ae, 172, 3, 4.

[39] *Summa Theologiae,* 2a2ae, 173, 2, "utrmn in prophetica revelatione imprimantur divinitus menti prophetae novae rerum species, vel solum novum lumen". The Latin text will be given selectively, not regularly.

that a prophet understood in new and divine perspective matters already learned from human experience? [40] or had God also sometimes given "new species", that is, new lmowledge not gained from previous experience? Aquinas argued that God's gift cannot be restricted to the conferring or infusing of new light for judgment, though ·sometimes God did just that. Sometimes, Aquinas pointed out, God had also given new content to knowledge. For example, the words written across the wall in Belshazzar's banquet hall in *Daniel 5* were new sensible objects. In Jeremiah I: 13, God gave Jeremiah a new fantasy, that of a " boiling pot facing away from the north ". Moreover, if God haid given only new light for judging what had already become part of the p:vophet's human knowledge and experience, there would be no basis for the diversity and multiplicity of prophetic revelations, since all would consist in the same thing, new divine enlightenment, which was what formally fulfilled and characterized prophecy. What was common to aill would be also, then, the basis for their multiplicity as well.[41] The div·ine light alone cannot be taken as the sole source for new and diverse knowledge of divine things received in prophecy.

But the main element in germane to *Models of Revelation* is not so much the conclusion that " in prophetic revelation there is a new infusion of species and not simply an intellectual light " [42] as the exposition of the role judgment plays in prophecy. The act of revelation on its human side respected the structure of human knowledge while it fulfilled and elevated it. Because prophecy was an act of knowledge, divinely

40 The :first objection proposed that "in prophetic revelation God impresses no new species of realities on the prophet's mind, but merely a new light" because prophets "use images of objects with which they are familiar".

41. 173, 2, *Sed contra:* "But the multiplying of visions is not the work of intellectual light, which is common to all prophetic vision, by *[sic:* but] only according to the diversity of species, according to which there comes about an assimilation.".

42 173, 2, *Sed contra:* "Videtur quod in prophetica revelatione imprimantur novae species rerum, et non solum intelligibile lumen."

given to be sure, it can be eX!aminedin its human activity. So, Aquinas stated, " Two points arise as regards the knowledge of a human mind." [43] He proceeded to ,analyze prophetic revelation according to the two aspects present in all human knowing. In prophecy, too, there was both "the acceptance or representation of things and then the judgment about what is presented ".[44] Revelation involved one or the other or both. The full case of prophecy involved both because knowledge or understanding (apprehension) prior to the act of judging remained incomplete. But there wais no parity between reception of new species, the re-arranging [45] of familiar imgaes or ideas, and the act of judging. The gift of new species: by itself was not yet revelatory since their truth and meaning had not been grasped. Just ais the act of judgment in general. was the " full fruit of cognition " so too the gift of new ideas or images came to its fulness in the divinely given enlightenment enrublingthe prophet to discern the meaning and truth of what he had received.[46]

For this reason, the divinely enlightened judgment "looms the farger in prophecy ".[47] In fact, the judgment by the prophet wa;s, according to Aquinas, the revelation. **It** was the full revelatory act. The divine knowledge by itself was not revelation. There was no communication of it until the act of enlightenment in the mind of the prophet. Aquinas adhered to

43 173, 2, *Responsio:* " Circa cognitionem autem humanae mentis duo oportet considerare, scilicet acceptionem sive repraesentationem rerum, et judicium de rebus repraesentatis."

44 173, 2, *Responsio* (as above in n. 42) : " acceptionem sine repraesentationem rerum, et judicium de rebus repraesentatis."

45173, 2, *Responsio:*. "Just as the different ordering of the same letters of the alphabet produces different understandings, so too different dispositions of images bring out different intellectual species in the mind."

46173, 2, *Responsio:* "Now by the gift of prophecy something is conferred on the human mind over and above the powers of its natural faculty in both respects, namely in respect of judgment by the infusion of intellectual light, and in respect of the acceptation or representation of realities which is done through certain species •.. Of these two aspects of knowledge, the first looms larger in prophecy: because judgment is the full fruit of cognition."

47 Note 45.

Augustine's st,atement, which he quoted in the first sentence of the *Res-ponsio,* " Prophetic knowledge most of all relates to the mind ",[48] and he filled in the content of that throughout the article.

Aquinas' analy1sis implies that Dulles' theology of symbolic mediation is incomplete to the extent that it does not explain how the mediation of revelation occurs in the mind of the recipient. Acoording to Aquinas nothing was actually revealed outside the mind of the prophet, and so no reality, no symbol can mediate revelation apart from the act of knowledge culminating in judgment, divinely enlightened. In Aquinas there can be no medium of revelation that pre-existed the act of judgment because there was no revealing outside it. There was no mediating of divine knowledge, intent, truth, guidance, love, :fidelity, etc. except in the divinely enlightened judgment of the prophet. An event, person, action, sign may have been potentially revelafory outside the act of judgment, but it did not become actually revelatory until it became the content judged. So, to the extent that there is a tendency in *Models of Revelation* to describe the symbolic mediation of revelation as if it was actually symbolic and revelatory rupart from the mind of a recipient, Aquinas' posi1tion recalls the indissoluble link between symbol and knowledge of the symbol. The link does not appear forcefully and systematically enough in Dulles' exposition of the role and nature of symbol in mediating and expressing God and His will, above in and through Christ.

3. Ghrist as Revelato,ry Symbol in Ohapter X: Maximum Difficulty

It can be argued that Aquinas did not plan and organize the *Summa Theologiae* Christocentrically; it is obvious that Aquinas took up the theme of revelation primarily under the heading of prophecy; and it is sometihing of a problem that

[48] 173, 2, "Dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, cognitio prophetica maxime ad mentem pertinet" *[Super Gen. ad Iitt.* xii, 9. PL 34, 461].

he had little in bhe way of Christological revelation. Both White and Latourelle, it is true, adumbrate the Christological implications contained in the few powerful principles Aquinas did teach in the Sa. But, with the Christocentric approach to revelation now firmly established, what is unexpected is ·an omission of part of that Christocentr:ism from *Models of Revelation.* Dulles states in Chapter IX that" no clear dichotomy can be drawn between the symbolic ,and the non-symbolic ".[49] But Chapter X, " Christ, the Summit of Revelation ", allows this to happen.

There, dividing the symbolic fa-om the non-symbolic leads straight into the consequence thrut Ohrist the revelatory symbol did not interpret himself in non-symbolic judgments which would be central to his self-revelation. Christ, the supreme revelatory symbol, seems to exist without a human self-understanding. In Chapter X there is no role for that which modern Christology has come to think of as essential to ruppreciating the humanity of ChriiSt: his self-unders1tanding or self-consciousness or human subjectivity. The affirmative and negative judgments of self-definition, self-affirmation, and identity by which Jesus expressed and mediated himself do not figure into Dulles' theology of the revelrutory Christ. Christ indeed is the fullness of revelation, reveals the Logos and, in that, the Father. And his human response to the Father is the revelation of the full human response to God. But apparently all of this is revelatory without the help of Christ's human mind interpreting himself in acts that Aquinas would have identified a.s judgments. Christ's words do have a small place in Dulles' 1theology. While" no doubt revelatory ",[50] they simply do not receive express attention insofar as they express and mediate selrf-understanding. It seems that because his interpretative judgments that, for example, he is the Son of Man, or that some judgments made ·about him by others were acceptable and others, such as miracle-worker, were not fully

[49] Dulles, p. 132.
[50] Dulles, p. 161.

symbolic, they do not have a role in Chapter X. Acknowledging that Jesus was a teacher, Dulles insists that" Jesus taught by preference through parable and paradox ".[51] This, in light of Dulles' view on revelatory words, means that Jesus taught symbolically only. This view of Jesus' teaching holds, above all, that "it ils misleading to speak of Jesus as an authoritative teacher according to the schematization of the propositional model ".[52] Little is offered by Dulles to compensate, however, for the absence of any role for Christ's self-interpretation as part of the content for, and as operative within, his teaching and preaching.

The problem has a Christological aspect, of course, insofar as Christ the revealer and the revealed seems not to engage in the affirmation of truth except insofar as this means being symbolic, and acting and speaking symbolically. This would seem to delete the Johannine "I am" declarations, for example, or not to read them as due in any way to Christ's own self-interpreting judgments. But the fundamental-theological aspect is that revelation in and by Christ seems to take place without any act of judgment by Christ on who and what he is. This may be due to the faet that symbolizing is conceived first of all ontologically and in terms of formal causality. Although this is a way of understanding how being is symbolic, it does not by that also succeed in showing how symbolizing is communication between beings. The symbolic ontology, but not the full Christology, of Rahner informs Dulles' approach 'hereo The result, down-playing the role of Christ's self-understanding, re-directs fundamental theology to the revelatory a:spect of the Incarnation. But at the same time iit fails to bring into account significant elements in Christ's activity before and after the Resurrection. The Synoptic version of Jesus' preaching, for example, summed up in Mark 1: 14 as " the Kingdom of God is upon you; repent, and believe the gospel " contains a profound act of judgment. The does not consist solely in

[51] Dulles, p. 161.
[52] Dulles, p. 161.

symbolizing througih a likeness between God's and a king's reign, but asserts that something .is so: not just " the kingdom of God" but" the kingdom of God *is* upon you". And Paul's revelation on the way to Damascus was the gift of light to know who it was that con£ronted him, a person *Aots* 9:*5* reported to have said" I am Jesus whom you are persecuting". These are judgments, affirming something to be so. Some of the content may be symbolic, but the symbolic representations alone are but an essential part of wihat is revelatory.

4. An Unexpected Conver.gence

Nonetheless, Aquinas' principle thrut judgment is primary in the act of revelation does converge with *Models of Revelation* in two specific respects. First, it is not far removed from the way Dulles connects the revelatory sign-event to the discernment of its meaning by an observecrwith an orientation to God and His plan. One of the merits Dulles incorporates from the revelation-as-history model [53] is tha.it it holds that certruin events have an inherent divine meaning. However, he insists that this meaning does not appear to academic or scientific research but to, and only to, a person with the appropriaite ·religiious disposition. So he argues: that "a revelatory sign-e¥ent, to the religiously disposed observer, can convey a divine meaning that truly belongs to the event" .[54] Tthe revelatory meaning does not evacuate the e¥ent of its own meaning nor ·add to it something extraneous; it identifies the divine meaning wiiithin it.[55] The Exodus would probably be as good an example of this as possible, though not one explicitly cited. Perhaps more important for the convergence with Aquinas than the religious disposition of the observer of the event is the fact

[53] Dulles, Chapter IV, "Revelation as History" and in sections by that title in Chapters IX-XVI.

[54] Dulles, p. 146.

[55] Dulles disagrees with W. Pannenberg's contention that rational analysis by itself can interpret the revelation in history, and that no special illumination is needed to interpret the meaning in the events; cf. "Pannenberg: Revelation as History", pp. 58-60 in Chapter IV.

that the event remains incomplete as revelation until the observer interprets its meaning correctly. In clarifying this facet of a revelatory sign-event, he states that the "revelation, then, is not situruted outside the interpreter's mind, as though it were a physical object, nor is it something added on to the event, coming from the subjectivity of the interpreter ..." [56] Without denying thrut the event has meaning, objectively as it were, Dulles refuses to isolate the event from the act of its interpretation.57 Aquinas' analysis would a;dd that knowledge and interpretation of that event comes to its own fullness in the judgment interpreting it in divinely given light.

Yet it would do some violence to Aquinas to say that his theology of revelation concurs with Dulles in regarding hisrtorical events as symbols mediating divine meaning. To the contr,ary, the primacy of judgment in prophecy implies that that which constitutes the full act of revelation, judgment, does not so much mediate revelation as illuminate contents which, by that illumination alone, become revelatory. It is the contents (hurt not propositions) known prior to and then in judgment that have a role closest to that given to symbols by Dulles. If anything could be said to mediate revelation for Aquinas it would be the representations or species (sensed, imagined, or thougiht) nort the judgment. The light given for judgment could not mediate because of itself it is not content but power to reach the truth in what is known. Whether the ·light be uncreated or created, it could not mediate anything because it does not add new species to the content of what the prophet is given to know. With this said, there need he no difficulty in accepting White's view that Aquinas recognized that it is " the immense richness and variety of symbolism which revelation has employed for its medium ".[58] The" symbolism which

[56] Dulles, p. 146.

[57] He grants, with Pannenberg, that the event is meaningful. However, Pannenberg considers the linguistic element something prior to faith that belongs to the event, and is a matter of rational analysis. Cf. Dulles, p. 59.

[58] White, p. 11.

revelation has employed .for its medium " is that which is known, the ·species. And the truth is in the judgment on what is known..

Secondly, 178,2 and *Models of Revelation* converge insofar as each understands revelation to involve creatures. Aquinas did not neglect the essential role of the representations, the species or knowledge in the revelatory judging. Even in the cases in which God gives only new light for judging what the prophet already knows in an ordinary way, something is judged, and this is some created reality grasped in new and divine perspective. In cases where God gives new knowledge as well as new light for judging it, the created realities known have ·an indispensable roJe as the contents in which the prophet begins to perceive something of divine things. Similarly, Dulles' whole theology of revelation depends on the principle that " revelation never occurs in a purely interior experience or an unmediated encounter with God ".[59] He criticizes the model of revelation-as-inner-e:xiperience[60] precisely for conceiving divine self-manifestation as ineffable mystical nearness: and no more.

But, again, for Aquinas the created realities known and judged in prophecy need not be verbrul statements. And, the knowledge of created reality to be judged could come in everyday fashion from other human beings. Joseph and Daniel, for example, lea.med the contents of Piharoruh's and Nebuchadnezzar's dreams through oiial communication of an ordinary sort. Yet, neither the drreams nor the verbal statements reporting them constituted the prophecy. The knowledge gained foom propositions was of images which were not yet revelatmy until the Lo:vd enlightened Joseph and Daniel. Those cases, along with that of the new understanding the Apostles received allowing them to grasp the truth in the Old Testament in new fullness, exemplified how prophecy was essentially judgment. For in these three cases, the revelation did not consist in

59 Dulles, p. 131.

60 Dulles, Chapter V, "Model Three: Revelation as Inner Experience."

the realities known and communicated through human means but in new judgment. divine light, the prophet could "pass judgment on those realities which have been seen by others as was said of Joseph and as appears with the Apostles, 'The Lord opened their minds so that they should understand the Scriptures' ".[61] The means by which the knowledge came into the act of judgment was not what constituted prophetic revelation. Rather the judgment in divine light that affirmed and assei'ted the truth in what had been received was the formal cha1racteristic of p:rnphecy.

An unexpected turn in the dialogue between Dulles and Aquiims happens when Dulles re-admits something like judgment hack into his theology in his final Chapter. In Chapter XVI, "Revelation at its Present Value", Dulles briefly considers the objection that the very idea of divine revelation presumes an identifiable demarcation between revealed and acquired knowledge.

He asserts that " the reality of revelation in no way depends on a clear line of dema,rcation "[62] between revealed and acquired knowledge. This might seem to run counter to Aquinas' theology but it actually does not, because for Aquinas prophetic revelation did not always involve revealed knowledge in the form of div,inely conferred species. It sometimes was a matter of new light for judgment upon acquired knowledge. In these cases, the content for judgment would be acquired knowledge while the act of judging would be enlightened by God and would make the whole act revelatory. In the one revelatory judgment, therefore, acquired knowledge became divinely revealing due to the judgment interpreting it. This principle does not fully answer the objection, nor does it make Aquinas completely compatible with Dulles' response. It does

61 173, 2, *Responsio:* " But a prophet is he whose mind only is enlightened to pass judgment even on those elements which have been seen by others in imaginative forms ... God sometimes infuses an intellectual light into the mind of man so as to pass judgment ... ".

a2 Dulles, p. 273.

indicate an area in which Dulles and Aquinas do not stand as far apart as might easily be ,thought.

Dulles goes on to acknowledge that " it is true that all revelation is acquired by the subject who receives it ".[63] In this respect, there can be corruple:teconcurrence with Aquinas' locating of revelation in the mind of the prophet. And when Dulles proceeds to identify revelation as "knowledge or awareness gained through the special assistance of God " [64] he holds a view in close proximity to Aquinas on the special assistance by which God gives eiither new species or, and frequently, new light. He does not go into detail on the nature of the special divine assistance but indicates that the content so known is how God "freely manifests himself through tangible clues." [65]

5. The Role of Interpretation:

Models of Revelation and 173,2.

Both Dulles and Aquinas locate an act of interpretation within ,the occurrence of revelation. When analyzing the merits of the revelation-as-history model, Dulles spells out that role. He qualifies the interpretation of the revelatory sign-event by distinguishing academic or historical inrterpre<tationfrom religious interpretation. Only the " religiously disposed observer" is capaible of discerning the " divine meaning that truly belongs to the event ".[66] In that religious interpretation, the meaning does not come from the observer but from the event. And in that act of discernment there occurs the revelation given by means of historical event. The role of the interpreting act also plays a part in his examination and sublation of the revelation-as-dialectical presence model. He points out that any non-verbal symbol through which God manifests Himself needs an accompanying word to interpret it.

The word itself, however, is the most spiritual of symbols.

63 Dulles, p. 273.
64 Dulles, p. 273.
,65 Dulles, p. 273.
66 Dulles, p. 146.

The word "is the sign which articulates meaning ".[67] Dulles does not ,divide nonverbal from verbal revelation. Rather the word is " a necessary complement to revelation through any other kind of symbol ".[68] Any other symbol (e.g. nature, deed, artifact) "becomes revelation only when interpreted and interpretation never occurs without a linguistic component ".[69] Dulles refuses to accept, that is, a conventional division between deed and word, and in seeing both as complementary to one another he moves along the path outlined by Vatican II in " Dei Verbum ".[70]

Dulles gives this view an unusual nuance consistent with the principle that only symbols mediate revelation. He identifies the verbal aspect of revelation as symbolic, not as explanatory or as doctrine. While there is the need for "external words, capable of being heaird or seen " within public relevation, they share the symbolic character of what they attest. These words hav;e the purpose of bringing into statement the preverhal meaning symbolized in an event, person, deed, etc. But the words have a symbolic nature themselves and are" necessarily symbolic, for otherwise they could not be conducive to a salvific union with the divine ".[71] The words, therefore, do not perform the same .function as doctrines, which also derive from symbolized divine meaning. Doctrine, however, arises in crossing over f11om the symbolic to the non-symbolic. For Dulles, words as part of revelation remain on the side of the symbolic.

Aquinas held a different view. located revelation in the aict of divinely enlightened judgment in the mind of the prophet. This tied the non-verbal and verbal inextricably together. For example, Jeremiah's non-verbal imaginative vision

67 Dulles, p. 152.

6B Dulles, p. 152.

'69 Dulles, p. 152.

10 Austin Flannery, O.P., Editor, *Va,tican Council II: The Conciliar and Post ConciUar Documents,* pp. 750-765, "The economy of Revelation is realized by deeds and words, which are intrinsically bound up with each other," p. 751.

n Dulles, p. 152.

became that which was grasped and then proclaimed in words to Israel. The communicat1on is extrinsic to the revelation but the pmphecy has an orientation toward this public declaration by the fact of its being part of God's salvi:fic plan as well as by the public scope of its content.

But, more to the point, Aquinas also saw the symbolic and the non-symbolic as indissoluble from one another within the act of revelation. It was not Aquinas' objective in 173,2 to expand on precisely that point. Yet his account of p;rophecy permits that conclusion from t'he analysis he gives. Four Old Testament p:mphecies in this article are essentially interpretations of symbols. In each case, the act of revelation was the event of interpretation in the mind of the prophet. In none of these cases was revelation located primarily in the knowledge prior to judgment. In every instance, that act of prophetic judgment had symbol·ic species or knowledge as its content which the divine gift enlightened. Because the content and the judgment aJ'e inseparable f,rom each other in any act of judging, for Aquinas' analysis in 173,2 at least, the symbolic species and the non-symbolic affirmation are likewise indivisible from one another.

In the case of Jeremiah's vision of "a boiling pot facing away fr:om the north" (Jer. 1: 13), the revelation was not given by the conferring of this image or the re-arranging of familimr images to produce this one. The grasp of its meaning in the act of judgment completed and formally constituted the prophecy. The uninterpreted image was not yet the word of the Lord. Jeremiah's grasp of its meaning in the act of interpretation saw the forecasting of Judah's affliction by armies advancing from t'he north. This was the word of the Lord (Jer. 1: 14ff) .

In the three cases mentioned a.hove, kom *Genesis* 41, *Daniel* 1, and *Daniel 5,* it was not the representations of a symbolic sort that were the In fact Aquinas introduced each to support the exact point that the judgment alone was the revelatory act. In each case, judgment was nothing other than

an act interpreting symbols, whether they were P:haroa:h's dreamed images, Nebuchadnezzar's towering figure in the t11oubling dream, or the eerie spectacle of words written across Belshazzar's wall. In none of these cases was the symbolism self-evident or self-interpreting. The symbolic images, given by God indeed, remained enigmatic and perplexing until the revelatory act occurred in divinely enlightened interpretation. In these prophecies, the symbolic images formed the content of the prophet's judgment while the judgment itself provided their meaning in a non-symbolic judgment. Moreover, it can be noted that the symbolism was not so rich in meaning that it was unable to be grasped in its meaning. To the contrrury, the meaning was precise, definite, and divinely causative upon events. Aquinas considered the symbolic and non-symbolic to be as closely and indivisibly joined together as the content and the act of judgment were elements in one act. Symbol and interpretation not be, on this view, considered in isolation from one another. representations became actually revelatory not by their presence in someone's imagination but by their meaning's being grasped and affirmed within the gift of divine illumination.

Interpretation has, then, a different nature for Dulles amd for Aquinas. In *lJ!lodels of Revelation,* the interpreting word belongs within revelation as a symbolic statement of non-verbal, symbolized meaning. In the *Summa Theologiae,* 173,2, the revelatory act of judgment in four cases is precisely ,an act interpreting 'symbols, and it is the transition from the symbol to the non-symbolic. Dulles reserves such a transition to the passage from revelatory symbols into doctrinal propositions, a helpful adjunct to revelation, but not part of it. **It** would be difficult, on this count, for Aquinas' theology to separate symbolized meaning from doctrine. [72] H would be more consistent to link symbol and content of judgment as symbol and doctrine, both indivisibly within the act of revealing.

12 Might it not be possible that a divinely enlightened judgment by a prophet, or by Christ, or by an apostle could contain more truth than any single statement could express and convey?

6. Inquiry Arising From *ModelS' of Revelation*

Dialogue involves questions in two directions. 173,2 has served to raise the question about the truth in revelation and about the l.'ole of judgment in it. But *Models of Revelation* can also become the source for inquiry into the *SUJnrna logiae.* Can it evoke something new from a classical theology of revelation?

The answer is positive. Dulles' stress on the symbolic nature of divine revelation draws an incontrovertible yet unnoticed fact into view. In 173,2 brought a number of individual instances of prophecy into his analysis. Four have symbolic imagery as their content, their species. And since there is no reason to think that pil'ophetic judgment has a nature separate from any human judgment, in its human aspect, what is true of prophetic judgment is true of human judgment generally.[73] And something remarkable is true of prophetic judgment in 173,2.

Joseph, Jeremiah, and Daniel perform acts of judgment tha:t do not manifest the plain, straight-forwa:rd simplicity usually cha,racteristic of judgments in the "X is Y" form. The acts of revelation do not take place in direct predication affirming what or that something is or is not. Rather, and precisely because their content is symbolic, their judgments have an "X means Y" structure. Their function is to inte:rpret symbols. The dreams of Pharoah and Nebuchadnezzar, the image seen by Jeremiah, the writing on Belshazzar's wall are symbols because they are more than glyphs indicating something outside themselves. These images, on the contrary, in some way make present what they mean, they embody what they signify, they

[73] Denis Bradley, "Aristotelian Science and the Science of Thomistic Theology", *Heythrop Journal,* vol. 22, April 81, 161-171, emphasizes that "revelation, as St. Thomas understood it, is fundamentally circumscribed; it alters *what* we know but not *how* we know", p. 168. But his comment that "divine grace can strengthen the intellect" in revelation does not also note that in revelation the way divine grace acts is precisely as divine enlightenment for judging, p. 168.

are the presence of that meaning. They belong to that kind of sign Dulles defined as a symbol-" an externally perceived sign that works mysteriously on the human consciousness so as to suggest more than it can clearly describe or define ".[74] Dreamed imagery can be included among external signs both because it has sensible qualities and because these dreams were regarded as coming from outside the dreamers. However, the meaning of the imagecy was unavaila.ble until the prophetic enlightenment interpreted it.

The revelatory acts by prophets in four cases in that is, are acts grasping the meaning in symbols. Their judgments did not have the purpose or form of affirming, for example, that these were only ima.ges, not realities, or that God acts in the lives of people. They did not affirm directly and simply what or that something is. Instead they grasped and affirmed what something meant.

Bemuse of this quality in the judgments, what Aquinas considered to be instances of intellectual judgment seem able to be considered under the heading of interpretation. The prophets were enlightened by God to give full and just interpretation of symbolized meanings.[75] This implication links Aquinas' theology of revelation and the theory of judgment within it to hermeneutics. This does not locate a fully hermeneutical approach in the *Summa Theologiae*, not least of all hecause for Aquinas judgment has an interiority prior to (but insepara,ble from?) language. But there is some ba:sis here for regarding 173,2 as both exemplifying and adding to Aquinas' theology in a way that invites further analysis of the hermeneutical aspects in his theology and philosophy.

Such analysis would be the optimal context within which to place a propositional element in Aquinas' theology of revelation. Not that verbal propositions are formulated by God,

74 Dulles p. 131.

75 Cf. I, I, 9 on the suitability of symbols and metaphorical language in the Bible; and cf. Regino Cortes, O.P. "Biblical Foundations of St. Thomas' Treatise on Prophecy", *Phillipiana Sacra*, 10, 1975, pp. 7-29.

triansmitted as such to a prophet, then received in an affirmative judgment, but that the act of enlightened judgment can have an interpretative element, namely the judging itself. Then, the inner word of truth could be understood to be an interpreting judgment. In that context, the propositional element in the act of revelation is the interpretative element.

And then, if Dulles wishes to keep an interpretative element entirely outside symbolic revelation, the question arises, how can an uninterpreted symbol be revelatory? Is there an uninterrupted, unbroken circle of symbolic communication in :revelation, or anywhere? As D. Lane wondered, "is a theology of revelation as symbolic not a starting-point for further consideration rather than an end-point as it seems to be in *Models of Revelation?"* [76] One suspects that Dulles might well answer, "yes."

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[76] Lane, p. 76.

PRZYWARA AND VON BALTHASAR ON ANALOGY

ERICK PRZYWARA'S major work is entitled *Analogia Entis: Metaphysil:,, Ur-Struktur und All-Rhythmus.* [1] As we will explain, it is especially the subtitle, " Basic-structure and Overall-rhythm", which is important in understanding the type of metaphysics he proposes. An explicit treatment of analogy by Hans Urs von Balthasar may be found in a se:des of two articles, " Analogie und Dialektik " and " Analogie und Natur ", both of which carry the subtitle, " A clarification of the theological principles of Karl Barth " (1944-1945).[2] They later become the basis of two important sections of *Karl Barth: Darstellung und Deutung Seiner Theologie.*[3] The first becomes part of Balthasar's demonstration on Barth's "turn to analogy ".[4] The second becomes part of presentation of Catholic" thought-form": "The concept of nature in Catholic theology". This context, the dialogue with Barth and Catholic theology in relationship to Barth, is essential for understanding Balthas,ar's views on analogy-as well as his relationship to Erich Przywara, anotheT dialogue partner of Barth. The "one concrete order of salvation", as

1 *Anafogia En-tis.* (AE) Einsiedeln: Johannes-Verlag, 1962. Second edition. The first edition (Munich: Koesel & Pustet, 1932), however, lacks this subtitle. It is called: *Analogia Entis. JJfetaphysik.* I. *Prinzip.* The new subtitle is a response to a "misunderstanding" (e.g., Barth's accusation) that analogia entis was *only* a metaphysical principle. Przywara also clarifies the sense in which analogy can be called a "principle" in the new forward to the second edition (p. 5), as well as in a new ending on p. 210.

2Both in *Divus Thomas:* the first in #22 (1944), 171-216; the second in # 23 (1945)' 3-56.

3 Cologne: Jakob Hegner Verlag, 1951.

4Cf. "Die Wendung zur .Analogie", 93-123; as well as "Die Vollgestalt der Analogie", 124-180. Balthasar acknowledges his indebtedness to Przywara in the enlarged treatment of analogy in Barth: cf. p. 10 ancl p. 404 n.3 (for the section on the" concept of nature in Catholic theology.")

the place where analogy thinking must begin and end, is typical of both Przywarn and Balthasar-and reflects undoubtedly the influence of Barth on bot1h of these Catholic and (at the time) Jesuit theologians.

To start at an earlier stage, however, the real issue of analogy, in both Przywa;ra and Balthasar's writings is the God question. How can *we* maintain God's transcendence as a true ' other ' in relation to immanence-the one concrete order where Jesus Christ is already present?

This is first of all a prroblem for any theological method. The starting point and language which proceeds from this starting point must allow for transcendence within immanence. Thus Balthasar's aibove-mentioned work on analogy discusses the problem using the rubric of the time, a " concept of nacbure" in relationship to *Ubernatur.* His question is: what concept of nature is able bo relate to *Ubernatur,* while remaining truly a *creaturely* concept of nature? His thesis is that nature cannot be abstract or "pure " in an 18th century, secularized philosophical sense (e.g. Baius), but-in conformity with the whole tradition of the Ohurch Fathers, where nature means the whole human condition-the concept of nature is always already analogous, since ' rnan ' as creature can never stand aside from his already given, concrete nature within the order of salvation. [5] Przywara had already prepared the way for this by insisting on a creaturely metaphysics leading to a theological metaphysics, where analogy is the adequate method.

Besides the theological method, however, there is the problem of transcendence within one's understanding of Christ and the biblical revelation of the New Testament. Is there really a place for what can only be revealed and received? Or, to state the question in Balthasar's terms: how is the "one, concrete order", where Jesus Christ is already pa,rt of our history,

[5] Cf. "Der Begriff der Natur in der Theologie ". Eine Diskussion zwischen Hans Urs von Balthasar und Engelbert Gutwenger. ZKTh vol. 75, 1953. 452-461. In this debate, Balthasar further clarifies what he had said in *Durstellung,* in response to Gutwenger.

to be represented adequately and discussed by theologians? The New Testament community confessed Jesus as the Messiah, both Son of God and Son of man. Yet how do we translate this confession of faith into our language? How de *we* receive the message within our concrete situation? Do we merely repeat biblical language? What do we say about our human nature, divinized because of Christ? Is therre now a universal of human experience which ena.bles us to look deeply into the transcendent? Balthasar especially, but also Przywara before him, offer one possible solution to this problem by speaking of analogy.

Finally, anticipating the last section of this article, what is the relations:hip between revelation (seen in the concreteness of Jesus Christ and christian faith) and theology (as "faith seeking understanding ", as analogous thinking, or as " aes,. thetic ")? Donald Keefe's understanding of (systematic) theology as " hypothetical " in relation to revelation, as well as his clarifications on Thomistic and Tillichian systematic theology as correlation to revelation offer a possible way of viewing Balthasar's project.[6] If an "aesthetic theology" (as well as a "Theodramatik" and eventually a Theo-logik) begins with the "form", where transcendence is already visible, how then do we distinguish this transcendence from the concrete forms in which it is visible? Is analogy the essential key to this relationship? Is Balthasar's " theological phenomenology" a *system* in correlation to revelation, at least insofar as the whole " concrete order " is the one possible way and place where faith finds an adequate understanding? Is P:rzywara's " final analogy " of God ever-greater in relationship to all that is revealed (the one, concrete order) saying the same thing: namely, that there is an analogous :relationship or a correlation between all that the human mind can say (a "similarity")- including all that systematic theology can-and a God " ever greater " and mysterious?

a Cf. Donald J. Keefe, S.J. *Thomism and the Ontological Theology of Paui TiUioh. A Oomparism of Systems.* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1971).

In the following sections, we begin by recalling the main facts concerning Przywara's and Balthasar's work on analogy: first by presenting the circumstances which brought the two together and some possible reasons their" thought-form" is so similar. Then we take up the problematic of analogy in relationship to their theology, since both see it as the key to dealing with the God question in relationship to human searching.

I. Historical background

While the first direct influence of Przywara on Balthasa:r can be traced to the summers of 1935-1938, when Balthasar was working at the Jesuit writer's house for the periodical, *Stimmen der Zeit* (where he assigned in 1922), the first *direct* influence was much Indirectly Przywara's many articles and books were undoubtedly influential on Balthasar because of their style and range. They covered a broad range of topics from to theology, from Scheler to Newman, Augustine, and the as ,well as religious and intellectual trends. In other words, Przywara's range of interest was similar to Balthasar's, a fact which can be seen in the bibliography of latter's works. Even before entering the Society Jesus in 1929, Balthasar completed a doctoral work Zurich, *History of the Esehatological Problem in Gerrnan Literature.*[7] His early interest in Przywara is seen in one of his first articles, " Die Meta:physik Erich Przywaras" (1933)[8], a presentation and critique of Przywara's major work, *Analogia Entis I.* Summarizing this early influence, Jean-Marie Faux notes that it is "important, although it cannot be called the influence of master to disciple." "Przywara ", he continues, "was the first contemporrary

[7] For this and other historical data on Balthasar, cf. Jean-Marie Faux, "Un Theologien: Hans Urs von Balthasar ", in Nouvelle Revue Theologique 10 1972) : 1009-1030. Cf. also Werner Loeser, "Das Sein-Ausgelegt als Liebe" in *Internationale Katholische Zeitschrift Oommunio* # 4 (1975), 410-424.

s in *Schweizer R,undschau,* 489-499.

thinker who furnished Balthasar the tools of his reflection." (p.1014)

lmportant mutual assessments of these two fellow Jesuits (Balthasar rema!ined a Jesuit until 1951) can be found, first in Przywara's "Reiehweite der Analogie" in the second edition of *Entis.*[9] he commends Ba1thasar's *Apokalyptik der Deutsche Seele.* He :finds throughout Balthasarr's work the "deeper form of analogy", or "the mystery of the cross that overcomes the ' no matter how great a similarity ' by means of ' even greater dissimilarity ', so that the greatness of God can be participated in." Balthasar's work presents a "double accent: the (existential) participation in 'this-worldly' movements, along with an (essential) hovering *(Schwebe)* image." He further characterizes Balthasar's existential aspect as "·the Dionysian in Origen" (This is "Origen, interpreted as ' spiritual ascension '-rightly corrected by Balthasar.") The *essential* is the mythical, the 'hovering' that can be found within the Dionysian, which Balbhasar r,ightly assents to. It is (for Balthasar) "Origen's Dionysianism, interpreted as ' life of the earthly.' "

Already we can see how the ba;sis of their agreement and mutual influence will be something more than mere s1imilarity on analogy. What we have rather is an app:rnach to metaphysics hy way of the living :figures of the past. Analogy for Przywara is a way of typifying this relationship of opposite tendencies and tensions. Balthasar accepts th:is view of analogy and therefore when he characterizes Ptzywara' s work, he describes its "opposite tendencies", its balance of an "irrational and unsystematizahle element, with the systematic elements of a metaphysical system. Przywara obviously a,grees with this, since *Entis,* as we saw, is "metaphysics", but also ":Basic-rhythm and Overall Structure "-of the living tradition. He was continually preoccupied with sensing and understanding the deeper significance of contemporary movements and their intellectual underpinnings.

[9] AE, p. 250.

Beyond this harmony of a1pproach, however, a lateT disharmony develops over the exact nature of analogy, especially when made into a univer:sa1 dynamic principle which encompasses natural theology and faith.1°

However, to continue with Balthasar's article on P:rzywara, "Die Metaphysik Erich Przywaras ", what is Przywara's *Denkform,* which Ba,lthasar approves of, since he says that understanding this" will enable us to get to the heart of *Analogia Entis-a* work which although *150* pages long, corresponds to what would norma1ly be a 1000 page philosophical epic"? (p. 489). He answers that Przywara's thought is "a rare balance of two normally opposed styles". On the one hand a rationalistic-systematic a,spect, which is " his virtuosic, formalized and ordered presentation which reminds one of Hegel in the way it brings every imaginable book and a,rticle into a clearly conceived cosmos". On the other hand, the "irratfonal-unsystematic " is seen in his method of allowing " ·the purity of thought and the immediacy of truth to be upset by a theocentrism which relativizes all that is human."

Next, he goes on to summarize the argument of *Analogia Entis* and the relationship of Przywara's metaphysic:s to Blondel and Marechal, Hegel and Heidegger. Przywara is working out the ontological dynamism or tension of being, the fact of a real non-identity of essence and existence which precedes the school divisions of Neothomism and Suaresianism (p. 496) , rather than tihe psychological dynamism of Blonde! and Marechal. (p. 496) Przywara, does not, however, neglect the epistemological or the act of thinking, but rather sees the same tension in thought (between noesis and noema) as he

10 Of. Baltlrnsar, *Herrliohkeit,* Band III, I (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1965), p. 37: "The tendency today is towards a suspension of the form (*Aufhebung der Gestalt)* : Bultmannians, anthropocentric transcendentalists, philosophical functionalists, pure rhythm (as Erich Przywara) ..." Of. also Bernhard Gertz, *Glaubenswelt als Analogie.* (Dusseldorf: Patmos-Verlag, 1969), 270-274. Here Gertz shows that Balthasar comes to agree with Barth that analogia entis is part of natural theology, not, as Przywara would claim, a universal dynamic principle which encompasses both natural theology and faith.

finds in the object of thought. "Just as being is a tension between *Sosein* idea) and *Dasein* (existence) -so too there is a tension between consciousness (as identity of thought and being) and that which exists beyond consciousness." (p. 498). He also points out that *Analogia Entis,* with its Augustinian tendency, should be read along with *Karmel* (a collection of religious poetry) and *Homo* (essays on anthropological and theological topics), in order to do justice to the living problematic which underlies its metaphys.ics, for the basis of both and poetics is the same: "The mathematical shorthand of *Analogia Entis* is easily translateable into poetry. Prayer and thought are connected. This, a,coording to Balthasar, has significance for the philosophical problematic: " *sub specie aeterni* need not be hostile to the world, but can be the most concrete nearness of total reality ... The difficulty of explafoing meanings in philosophical language frequently overlooks this." (p. 494). In this appraisal, Balthasar already reveals his own lifelong p11oject of overcoming the " *diastasis"* between theology and sanctity. [11]

Finally, another point of agreement between the two is the integration which Balthasar finds in *Analogia Entis.* Integration not only as an integrated system, but also at the level of

11Cf. Balthasar, Auf Wegen Christlicher Einigung. (Munich: Koesel Verlag, 1969), p. 36ff. "From Herrmann to Bultmann the former *diastasis* between theology and spirituality has reappeared in a new, virulent form: 'objective' theology, insofar as it is interested in the objective (or dogmatically objectivizecl) 'facts of salvation', becomes for believers irrelevant; only the existential relation between the promised kerygma and the self standing under the judgment of this word is meaningful for the christian. Theology has entered into and been submerged by the 'historical-critical' method on the one hand and the spirituality of the relation between the word and existence, on the other" (my translations throughout). Cf. also p. 37: " Here (i.e. in the various efforts to return to "God's revelation in the Old and New Testaments which is an event: and must be answered not by faith-science, but with life) there will be laborious work on the unity of theology and spirituality." The themes seen here-integration of theology and spirituality and the importance of the Event of salvation or the "life" of the christian as the only appropriate answer to biblical revelation-will be important in understanding what Balthasar *intends* when he dis· cusses analogy, as we will see below.

the irrational and unsystematic. Przywara's philosophy is " the Arohimedian fulcrum: radical formal unity, on the one hand, and dissolution of system on the other. He uncovers forms which annihila;te form, in order to lay open and make recognizable the geographical fault at the basis of all that is created. . . . Vertical and horizontal, Augustine and Thomas, are held together so that the whole problematic is returned to its basic starting point. But from this starting point flows the unaltered structure which encompasses the unfolded whole." (ibid.)

Furthermore, this integration is *ontological* rather than epistemological. " Metaphysics, not epistemology, is the *prima philosophia,* and within the sta.rting point of this whole philosophy there is already a re1igious relationship . . . Metaphysics at its very foundation cannot be purely theoretical and mtlnterested, but already has an ethical ' decision ' character without becoming alogical." (p. 492) [12]

'.Dhe last point will be important in Balthasar's own view of analogy, developed as a corrective of Barth: both the ontological basis for a concept of nature, and an analogous concept of nature, and an analogous concept of nature a,s something concrete, not abstract. *Analogia entis,* therefore, is essential to Balthasar, as both De Schr:ijver and Schmid have demonstrated, [13] even though Balthasar will later transpose the terms it encompasses in Przywara's synthesis. In *The Glory of the*

[12] Of. however Andre Hayen, ' Analogia entis. La Methode et L'Epistemologie du P. Przywara" (in *Revue Neosoolastique de Philosophie,* 1934, 345-363) for a good critique of Przywara's *lack* of attention to the epistemological demonstration: "Analogia Entis supposes that the meaning and implications of the ontic and the noetic are given in advance". "Does this coherent system developed from this starting point," (without considering the critical viewpoint of the transcendental method) "have absolute value? Przywara's response to this problem (discussed above) seems insufficient unless we interpret it in the sense of an ontologism." (357-358)

[13] Of. Johannes Schmid. *Im Ausstrahl der Sohoenheit Gottes.* (Munsterschwarzach: Vier Tuerme Verlag, 1982), pp. 7, 167-174. Georges de Schrijver, "Die Analogia Entis in der Theologie Hans Urs von Balthasar ", in *Bijdragen* 38 (1977), 249-281.

Lord,1[14] for example, the "primal phenomenon" (p. 20) is God's glory, the beautiful, as a property of being. This offers itself as "new light from God known visibly in the incarnate word" and cannot be equated with other kinds of aesthetic radiance." Yet, this mysterious splendor "is not beyond any and every comparison." (ibid.)

II. The dynamic context of *analogia entis* in Przywara and Balthasar.

Even before the second part of *A.nalogia Entis* I (explicitly called "analogia entis")[15] the *first* part of *A.nalogia Entis* constructs a complete "general metaphsycics." Przywara demonstrates that all human (metaphysical) thinking inevitaibly ends up in a polar tension, whether the questions are the tension between a starting point in meta-noetics or meta-ontics, the transcendentals in relation to being itself, or philosophical in relationship to theological metaphysics. One pole of the tension can never eliminate the other. Thus he concludes that "every metaphysics is a creaturely metaphysics." (27-28). One never attains either pure being as the object of knowing ("even knowing is oriented to a ground, end and meaning in being") or pure knowing ("even though knowing is a necessary starting point in viewing being"). This law of a "one to another" or "balance in tension" is itself, therefore, a new problem for metaphysics. In fact, it is the "most formal basis of a creaturely metaphysics". Later this law is identified with analogy-and specifically *analogia entis.* Metaphysics is there-,fore "creaturely" both with regard to its formal object: the tension-as-hovering seen between consoousness and being (there is no "absoluteness of a self-identity, either from the side of consciousness or from the side of being"); as well as

14 *The Glory of the Lord* I: .Seeing the Form. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982). Translation of *Herrliahkeit.*

15 .AE, 99-210. Cf. esp "Begrundung der .Analogie", 99-141, where Przywara first demonstrates that analogy, not logic or dialectics, is the key to a creaturely metaphysics; then that analogy of being is bounded in the principle of non-contradiction.

with regard to its method: it hovers and looks both backwards and forwards (and does not divide tits subject matter into self-sufficient units) . Finally, this "to and fro" relatedness is itself a *Sosein* (essence or" being-thus "-ideal being) which is both " in " and " above " *Dasein* (existence) . According to Przywara, the saying, "become what you are" illustrates that what you are *tending towards* in your present becoming is already present *in* the act of becoming, although it is *above* it as its finality. Even without a complete presentation of Przywara's metaphysical demonstration, we already see what he means by a "balance-in-tensiion" which penetrates all metaphysics and makes it creaturely. This especially is important in understanding how he reads the scholastic principle of *analogia entis.* There is a concreteness-the *creaturely* of contemporary and past movements---ias well as an intelligibility: viz., an attempt to understand the tensions or balance-in-tension. Both of these together oonstitute *Lebendigkeit,* aliveness, the true heart of Przywara's analogy, He concludes by spelling this out as a formal principle: *Sosein in-above Dasein.*[16]

But, how does Przywara understand the scholastic principle of analogy? To understand both how traditional Przywara is and yet how far beyond the traditional discussion he goes, we may consider in detail the culmination and last section of his development on analogy, the "decisive analogy-the one which defines the final relationship of God to the creature: . . , the relationship of the intra-creaturely analogy and the ' between God and creature' analogy." (p. 124). Before this last section he has already demonstrated that analogy stems from the principle of non-contradiction (104-IQ3), and shown that only analogy, not logic or dialectics, *adequately* represents this. Analogy is the relationship between the "i:intra-creaturely " and the "between God and creaturely" (121-123) , and in this

16 AE, p. 28. "This formal principle, since it is 'creaturely', is clarified insofar as it is grounded in the balance-in-tension of the relationship (in the object) and the 'to-and-fro' oscillation of becoming". In other words, Pryzwara's formal demonstration calls for living examples.

sense is" potentiality for God" (p. 124). The positive nature of this " final analogy " corresponds to the potentialities of the creature in relation to God (p. 135) . But, what are these " potentialities"? The Thomistic teaching on *potentia* contains four negative characteristics, leading to five positive characteristics, for " the possible nothingness of the creature has a positive aspect, *potentia obedientialis."* (p. un) It is this " potentiality " which is the ground in the creature of *analogia entis,* which " measures out " (in the etymologiml sense of *attributio-w1hich* Przywara finds in *analogia attributioniS',* the moment within analogy *aS' creaturely.* Cf. p. 135). However, what does it measure Przywara answers: " an area of service." That is, analogy with its ground in the creature maintains a relationship to God as mystery or God "ever greater." The God whose "greater dissimilar:ity is always beyond every similarity that can be noted between creature and Creator." It is indeed analogy, but analogy with *mo*ments-including the creaturely moment of " being measured out" in a final *a.nalogia attributionis.*

As we read *Analogia Entis,* Przywara.'s most concise statement of his overall thought structure, the first thing we realize is that, although Przywara is using scholastic texts from SL Thomas, he is actually putting together a v.ision of metaphysics and theology which could only with difficulty be assigned to particular texts. It may indeed be Thomas' s analogy clarifying Augustine's implicit analogy, as Przywara claims. However, there are many " steps in between ". Thomas' *analogia proportionalitatis-1his* decisive analogy (p. 136) , according to Przywara-did not intend merely to maintain a hovering between God and creature, as though it would set up some proportion between the two. Rather it aimed rut a "positive unity" or a common term-God's being as God's "greater dissimilarity." 'Iihis is the Areopagite's "luminous darkness". between equivucation and univocity; analogy is not a new, third term, but the " final *pi·ius* of God." (p. 137) ']}his is the reason that, as we saw in the previous para;graph there is effec-

tively another, final *anal,ogia attributionis* as a "third moment " in the dynamism of analogy: analogy as a measuring of the being and distance between God and creature ends up depending on another analogy of ,attribution. This one, he remarks, " is not as in the first from below towards an a;hove, hurt from above to below: from *Deus Semper Maior* an area of service is measured out." (p. 139) .

Beyond this transformation of the scholastic problematic, a second fact gradually becomes evident in the way Przywara discusses analogy. His attention to the dynamic, living creaturely dimension of life has remained his primary concern. In the end we realize the importance for Przyw3!ra of the dynamic movement of life itself, the creature's thrust towards God. 'l\hus, for example, the last secton of *Analogia Entis* I, describes the living tradition of analogy: Plato, Aristotle, Augustine and Thomas: the scope *(Problembre:ite)* of analogy. By this he means the dynamism of life and more especially the historical fact that analogy as dynamism is human thought itself confronted with its necessary horizon of mystery. Also, the new second part of the revised work [11] presents many disparate themes, all of which spell out this living heart of what analogy is. *Analogia entis,* therefore, cannot be a principle- at least not in Przywara's sense. Instead it is the *Ur-Dynamisohe.* It is a rhythm: " Ontically, as being; noetically, as thought, it is *principial,* as the mystery of this musical rhythm -just as the fugues of Bach's Arl of the Fugue are interwoven towards a great silence." (p. 210)

III. Analogy in Balthas,ar's thought.

First we may summarize the themes from Przywara which have already appeared and which pertain to Balthasar, either because they are held in common with Balthasar or because

[11] AE, Part II. *All-Rhythmus* 213-522. The originally projected second part was never completed. Instead a collection of articles written from 1939-1959 was added to the slightly revised first edition.

they correspond to Balthasar's thought-style.[18] Then we may go on to present an expHcit treatment of analogy by Balthasar, esp. in relationsihip to dialectics and nature, following two articles of 1944-45 (" Ana1ogie und Dialektik " and " Analogie und Natur: Zur Klarung der theologischen Prinzipienlehre Karl Earths"). We will see that, although the context and concerns are different from Przywara's (he is defending analogy in relation to Barth) nevertheless Przywara's analogy is important and not only because Balthasar cites Przywara at key points, but more especially beca;use of what analogy really represents for Balthasar. Finally we will suggest ways in which this explicit discussion of analogy can be criticized and widened.

A. The *Vollgestalt* of 1analogy: Przywara ·and Baltihasar.

themes from Przywa;ra which appear important here (going beyond their importance in the mutual assessment of the two-thinkers above) may be found in Przywara's emphasis on and explanation of the living structure within the already given concrete order of creatureliness in relation to the revealing God of mystery. **It** is living. **It** is a structure--"or "Ur-Struktur ". **It** is akeady present within the one, concrete order of God in Christ in the Church.

" Lived " *ior* Przywara means the dynamic of ongoing movements, as well as all of human prenccupation with the God-question. Above, we say that every metaphysics must be creaturely and that this creatureliness is at the heart of the movements Przywara studies. For Balthasar ·a like concern may be seen in his studies of the many " figures., within the Tradition, as well as his monographs and essays on living issues in Christianity. Finally it is behind the pmject of expressing theological truth through a theological aesithetics and a *Theodrama;tik.*

18 Cf. *Herrlichkeit.* Band II. *Ji'aecher der Stile.* The two parts of this treat " Clerical styles" and "Laic styles" in a series of monographs on the figures within history which manifest the Glory of the Lord in their work.

Secondly, "structure" means a dynamic balance of tensions, since the creature cannot but be related to a creator and finds itself ailready defined as tending towards or coming from God. Analogy for Przywam is the "one to another " of this created order, ultimately pointing to an "other" beyond itself-the mystery of God. No amount of intellectual clarity into pure possibilities of thougiht or being can avoid creatureliness and its pointing beyond itself. The creature is already situated in a "middle". For Balthasar, the structure of a revealing God to a creature who can receive this revelation is his reason for both critizing early Barth and defending Barth's later "turn to analogy". The only valid structure is therefore analoigy-including analogy in the concept of nature-since this alone a¥oids the extremes of univocity and equivocation, implied by various t;heologies and philosophies in their thinking on God.

While the previous two dimensions of Przywa,ra's basic project adequately summarize analogy, there is a third point which must be taken up separately from the previous two, though not distinguishable from them: the " one concrete order". This implies tha:t creatures are already involved with God and that any analogy thinking must begin here. Przywa:ra and Balthasar *begin with* a revelation in history and then explain how it was possible or how it is safeguarded within creaturely thinking. Only this makes understandable their way of talking about analogy. Thus they cannot talk about analogy as merely philosophical, or about *natura* as "pure ", since this would imply an absolute viewpoint which is impossible for the creature who is situated in the " middle ". Analogy would then he susceptible to Barth's polemic against it. **It** would he a device by which the human mind reaches up to God. However, both Przywara and Balthasar believe that if we begin with the already existing concrete, revealed order in Christ as a prior as already revealed in Christ-then the theologian or believer's reflections cannot but reflect on the lived polarity within this situation of creature to Creator, or human understanding in relation to its terminus in mystery.

With these three aspects of the overall analogy teaching of Przywara and Ba1thasar in mind, let us now focus on Balthasar's own understanding of anaJogy in one important area where he discusses it and uses it explicitly in relation to Barth: vfa., as a way of combatting Barth's "dialectical theology" and of demonstrating that dialectics must be situated within analogy. Balthasar's two articles with analogy in their title axe a good place to start, since they are an eairly version of his work on Barth, *Darstellung,*[19] and in addition they were submitted to Przywara for commentary before being included in *Darstellung-as* Balthasar himself explains in the introduction to this latter work. Here Balthasar considers that he is Przywara's "disciple". (Despite the later distancing from Przywara) . These two articles. also offer a valuable glimpse of his thinking on analogy at a stage when he was specifically preoccupied with it, before it became so muoh part of the fabric of his thought (as in *Herrlichkeit)* that its individual threads are seen only with difficulty.

B. Balthasar's "AnaJogy in .the concept of nature."

The above-mentioned articles on analogy by Balthasar are subtitled " a clarification of Barth's theological principles ". He begins. the first of these (" Analogie und Dialektik ") with a reference to Przywara's *analogia* entis--condemned by Banbh as "a finding of the Anti-christ "-but also recaJis Przywara's counterchairge that Barth's "dialect,ical theology" is a titanic attempt to " leap over " the gap of the creature to God. The rest 0!f the article considers mainly Barth's dialectics: its methodological dimension, and the question of whether it expresses an " ontic contradiction " or is really only understandable when situated within analogy. " Every ' contra-' presupposes relationship, thus a minimum of common ground in order to be truly 'contra-' and not simply unrelated other. Also, only on the basis of an analogy is sin possible" (A/Dial. p. 196).

19 Cf. note # 3, above. We abbreviate this *Darstellung.*

Thus when considers especially the fact that it " lies in the act of the creature, not in his nature " (p. , he finds himself obliged to his treatment of analogy *(analogia entis* and *analogia cognitionis et volitionis),* in order to show that sin disturbs the order of consciousness, not the order of being. Thus, the very of his thought pushes him towards a concept of nature, since first, if it is the act of sinning, not nature of creature which upsets the creature-creator relationship (or at least to) and secondly, if this act (or: *agere)* being *(agere seqiiitur es:S'e)*- and the being the sinner negates is his creaturely being: " The sinner negates what he *is* cannot but be: a creature "–it follows that, " in order to be lost, he needs his nature, which remains creaturely." (p. Therefore, concludes Balthasar (in the section," Die Gestalt der Analogie "),"the structure of analogy is the needed middle between identity and contradiction between God and the creature." Analogy (here Balthasar cites Przywara.'s presentation of its dynamic relationship, *p.* 210) is thus the dynamism towards Barth's whole thought aspires. It is the authentic expression of the greater distance of the creature God. (p. Qll) .

A final section of this first article considers Barth's objection that analogy is a "grip on God " (p. 9.13:ff) and shows that at most Barth is objecting to misuses of analogy, and that a true "theological a.na.logy" (p. 9.15) i.e. "the concrete relationship of a self-revealing God to a sinful and graced creature", is needed not just in the order of salvation, but as an expression of the relaHonship between God and creature. When God creates, the creature is necessarily neither nothing nor a second God." There is for the creature therefore-necessarily-analogous being from God and towards God, which lies outside the non-necessary (contingent) facticity of the order of nature. But this is the very problematic and necessity of analogy and "the possibility of a philosophical analogy." (p. 216).

Balthasar's second article, "Analogie und Natur ", will then

show two things: I) that what is lacking in Barth's thought is a proper concept of nature-¥iz. one which is analogous"-and that the *analogous* concept of nature maintains the Creator-creature relationship as both "non-necessary" (in its respect :for God-revealing) and necessary (insofar as analogous being is always *being___,a* basis for a philosophy of being) .

Despite later criticisms that he is not successful in achieving this (e.g. Gutwenger, cf. below), Balthasar, on the one hand, holds out £or a phenomenology of what is revealed (later: an aesthetic theology). As he says in "Der Begriff ", (p. 457) : " It is undoubtedly true that a long theological tradition of rationalism, if not contentually at least methodologically, has become trapped, and that the specificity-not to be confused with the gratuity-of grace *has not been suffi,-ciently described by means of a theological phenomenology* ". Here, the one concrete order of salvation is something freely given and botih philosophical and theological. On the other hand, nature within this one concrete order is analogous.

Another way of viewing the content of these articles is to see that what is really at stake is, on the one hand, the defense of Przywara' s (and Catholicism's) analogy of being and natural theology. (Balthasar undertakes to sihow that Barth's thougiht tends towards this position.) [20] But, on the other hand, this defense implies that he is taking seriously Barth's claims. In doing this he is following in the wake of Przywara who was, as we saw, a pioneer in reaching out beyond scholasticism to a whole range of thought-systems and cultural movements, including notably Protestantism and early Barth. Balthasar goes further than Przywara by presenting not only the weaknesses of Barth's positions, but also its strengths or helpful correctives. He also points out a possible common ground between Barth and Catholic analogy, and claims that Barth's excesses can serve as helpful warnings. [21] Barth's analogy of faith is a corrective of 19bh century Catholic notions of *natura pura.*

:io *Darstellung.* pp. 9-10 and p. 404, n. 3.

21 Cf. " Analogie und Dialektic ": 179ff. " Analogy as warning."

Barth's christocentrism returns Catholic theology to its own center. [22]

But with this background and in order to limit our topic for the purpose of this essay on Przywara's influence on Balthasar, we may ask the one question which remains of utmost importance in understanding Balthasar's position at this time: what really is this analogy whic1h is *so* important for Balthasar and the common ground with Przywara? How does it succeed in maintaining Vatican I's "dual order of nature and grace"? How does it maintain God's freedom in revealing and a natural order--or a concept of nature which is analogous?

The answer-already contained in all that has been presented so far and leaving aside the whole question of a" minimum " and a "maximum " of analogy [28]–is that analogy for Balthasar is, at all levels and in all theological discussions, esp. the discussion of a concept of nature (since, properly, nature is intended to maintain immanence coming from and open to *transcendence)* the only adequate way theology can treat the relationship of the creature to God (as we saw above): " The concept of analogy between God and creature touches upon what is most proper to the relationship, i.e. so that God remains God and creature creature: the incomparability and special dynamism of this relation lies in the fact that an absolute is related to something relative. The creature is nothing outside its relation to God. Here analogy itself is analogous (and not absolute). The knowledge of analogy is comprehensible only analogously. In itself it is not adequate knowledge." It is also essential for Balthasar that this whole relationship be situated in the factual order. "The factual order between God and creature is, from the first moment of Adam's creation on ... the relation between a freely revealing God and a creature graced within this revelation. Sin and revelation in Christ are moments within this o:rder of grace . . . If we look for a

[22] Cf. *Darstellung,* 335-372, "Christozentrik ", where Balthasar presents Catholicism's own christocentrism.

[2s] Cf. ".Analogie und Dialektik ", I74ff.

philosophical analysis a:s something ' other ' than this theological analogy, thi:s'other ' can never be an 'otherwise ', but must always he a moment for and in the factual relation that already is." (176-177) .

How does this apply specifically to the analogous concept of nature? Balthasar answers: "This analogy will maintain a middle between a (necessarily pantheistic) metaphysics, which does not distinguish between philosophy and theology, and a 1radica1-protestant dialectics, for which the concept of nature falls into two differentiated concepts. Chalcedon's notion of *physis* therefore was already an analogous concept. It expressly spanned divine and human nature, as did T:rent and Vatican I . . . If the concept of nature were not analogous then there would be a univocal point from which to view and regulate philosophy and theology and bring them into a univocal relation. Tihey would then be built into and absorbed into one metaphysics (as in Hegel) . Tihen theology would cease being knowledge of faith and revelation would no longer be relevant. From the postulate of an analogous concept of nature we enter into the problem of the very analogy between philosophy and theology. In order to avoid a complete system, only one way is open: the one which does not dissolve the relation into theology or philosophy. A theology which contains and deduces philosophy would not be a *theologia gloriae* but a *theologia Dei* ... gnosis. It would not be a science of faith. On the other hand it is impossible for theology as science of the order of the world to allow philosophy to stand outside itself or next to itself. Theology must not absorb philosophy *(theologia supponit philosophiam),* but elevate it and give it meaning *(elevat et perfecit)* ." [24] "The irreducibility of philosophy and theology to a system is the expression (and necessary expression) of analogy." (ibid.) .

Whatever else may be said on analogy in Balthasar (and much else could be said!) , we may now summarize what is important here for our discussion. First, BaJthasar's overall

[24] " Analogie und Natur ", p.8.

project, just as p,rzywara's, encompasses the living tradition- a phenomenology of the created order. Secondly, he is at pains to break out of the abstract, potentially rationalistic use of analogy. He is doing" the opposite of a systematic closure." [25] In his book on Barth, *Dars'tellung,* he says he was presenting the openings which demonstrate that any system is impossible. " This is especially true of the *approxdmations* to human nature which come from philosophy and theology and which basically cannot end up as *disooveries* (i.e. a total metaphysics), because then *fides quaerens (intellectum)* would end up as *intellectus inveniens;* grace and nature would both be dissolved into necessity. But the openness is not an agnosticism. It is only the exact methodological expression of the creatureliness of our thinking." (Ibid.)

Within these passages there is a three-fold claim: the need for maintaining the concrete order (a phenomenology of salvation history) , the polemic against rationalism, and the need to structure the dynamism of Creator to creature. This for him is analogy, including analogy in the concept of nature. of these three points are held in common with Przywa.ra, as we see foom the way he (Balthasar) cites Pryzwara at key points in the two articles discussed above. Balthasar, however, does not merely cite Przywara, but presents his own convictions- independently, forcefully and skillfully. Przywara is the great teacher and inspirer, not the master thinker whose synthesis must be slavishly repeated or commented on.

C. Critical evaluation.

On the one hand, Balthasar's (and Przywara's) project of integrating (rathe'!:"than just analyzing or dividing) the living tradition of christianity and especially of allowing the biblical data of revelation to remain whole-accepting them and their claims for what they themselves say they mean: the good news of Jesus Christ, Son of God, son of man-is certainly a breath

[25] "Der Begriff ", p. 452.

of fresh air for theology. This "phenomenology of the Tradition " or " aesthetic theology " or *Vollgestalt* that brings together what is revealed with the vehicle of revelation, the " one concrete order " is a needed corrective to 19th century scholastic theofogy. It is a return to the center, or to" (God's) love which alone is worthy of faith." It wais helpful for theology rto be reminded that it was first of all *faith* which was seeking understanding and not understanding setting itself up as a new tower of Babel to reaoh up to God. The faith of converted reason-at one with prayerful contemplation and holiness'-was seeking the very conditions and language which would allow faith to be faith (an acceptance of a revelation) and reason to be reason: the creaturely act of self-understanding that sees not in its own light, but enlightened from a source beyond itself.

On the other hand, both Przywara's and Halthasar's projects are not exempt from criticism. We would like to present two critics: Puntel's criticism of Przywara's analogy [26] and Gutwenger's criticism of Balthasar's notion of nature, [21] as well as a clarification on the 11elationof faith to theology which could pave the way to a possible solution of some of the problems raised. This final section will also serve to review and summarize our topic of the analogy of being as a common ground between Przywara and Balthasar.

Puntel, who critiques Przywara, shows that while his ambitious project of analogy (which encompasses the whole history of thought [28]) refers back to a basic difference as its starting point, on the one hand he never explains what this difference is-and indeed, he cannot explain it, because for him analogy is an endless oscillation: Aristotle's other-to-other without any

2s L. Bruno Puntel. *Analogie und Gesahiahtliahkeit.* (Freiburg: Herder, 1969). Cf. ch. 11: "Kristisches zu E. Przywaras Auslegung der Analogie als formaler Polarisierung der Differenz ".

21 Cf. "Der Begriff der Natur in der Theologie ". ZKTh 1953. Gutwenger's contribution to this debate is found on pp. 461-464.

2s Cf. Puntel, op. cit., ch. 6: "Analogie als 'Ur,Struktur ': Erich Przywara, p. 149ff.

common term or concept as a reference point (Aristotle's *kcah'hen)* .[29] Thus in effect, says Puntel, Przywara'.s analogy cannot succeed in doing what it wa;s intended to do: viz., define the relationship of the creature to the Creator in language which is conceptually coherent and applicable to both finite and infinite realities, those it can grasp and those it can know of only indirectly. Puntel's own solution to this dilemma [80] is not to set up his own ver:sion of analogy with some new basis for the difference, but to introduce the category of historicity- the history of analogy itself and the necessary limitations which this imposes in the human mind's efforts to grapple with God. Historicity as part of the human condition is both a constantly changing element and yet one which continually sights and is aware of a goal or terminus: " lE at the end of our investigation we now see that the essential difference, i.e. the analogous 'being' event, still remains in darkness, this does not mean that our previous thinking has clarified nothing or was in error. On the contrary, we have sought to show that the history of thought must he viewed as the *event* of differentiated being's unfolding, (a relation) and an event which always returns to what is more original. This means that any end-point ... is a utopian abstraction which the essential historicity of differentiated being's analogy radically contradicts." (p. *555)*

Assuming a viewpoint within philosophy and exempt from any correlation to revelation, this critique corrects Przywara's perhaps over-.facile, intuitive use of Aristotle in demonstrating what analogy is. But if we grant Przywara the freedom to discuss a " theology of theologies " or a theology " beyond the schools of theology "-which, however, is interrelated with the scientific methods of various of theofo•gy;[31] and further allow that this for:m of theology seeks to represent a freely re-

[29] Puntel, op. cit., 533ff.

ao Puntel, op. cit. cf." Rueckblick und .Ausblick ", 553-557.

a1 Cf. Przywara. *Ringen der Gegenwart* II. (.Augsburg: Dr. Benno Filser Verlag, 1929), "Neue Theologie ", 669-728. Esp. p. 707.

vealing, transcendent God who has chosen to be immanently present (Przywara sees this as present in ecclesial dogmatic decisions), and :finally that this revelation thus sets itself up in a real relationship with the creature who is recipient of this revelation-granted all this, we see that Przywara's vision of analogy encompasses something different from Puntel's. It summarizes not only the creaturely tensions with the limits of historicity, but also the essential relatedness of the creature to Creator as similarity and dissimilarity.

Similarly, in considering Gutwenger's criticism of Balthasar, we can accept Gutwenger's criticism that Balthasar's explanation of " analogy in the concept of nature " is faulty, without thereby nullifying the main thrust of his demonstration: viz., that nature as used by the Tradition is a richer and a more integrated concept than the *natura pura* of Baius and 19th century scholasticism. Gutwenger convincingly shows that a concrete (as opposed to abstract) nature as analogous, as explained by Balthasar, tends to end up as a *substantia supernaturalis,* since either grace is reduced to something within this "nature " or nature is left without any possibility of receiving grace. In the context of the article (" Der Begriff ") , it must be remembered that Balthasar has been borrowing the concept of a "supernatuml existential " [82] as one way of giving a modern account of what " concrete nature " might mean. This is the precise point Gutwenger is criticizing. Still, whatever way Halthasar clarifies his " 'approximative " and concrete nature, he will have difficulties explaining how to avoid the stark dicihotomies of nature and grace of scholastic theology, which Gutwenger holds to as the only way of preserving the autonomy of philosophy. The problem of properly defining the l'ole of nature as a helping-concept *(Hilfsbegriff)* is delicate and complicated-since it extends to every statement or experience which involves the creature in relation to the Creator .

s2 Balthasar refers to Karl Rahner's development of this notion. Cf. "Der Begriff" p. 453. He also treats Rahner's notion of nature in *Darstellung,* 308-309, criticizing it on p. 310.

However, Balthasar's chosen pat:h of overcoming this pT'oblem is already becoming appairent here in this strictly scholastic discussion (conducted in great detail in *Darstellung)* with Gutwenger over natural and supernatural: viz., to maintain the wholeness of the living tradition, starting with biblical revelation, continuing with the Fathers of the church and brought into the present by means of emphasis on holiness and the *lex orandi,* ,a " theological phenomenology " [33] or aesthetical theology (and theodmmatics) .

Coming to the end of this study we see that while the analogy-discussion is only one aspect p,rzywara's and Balthasar's work, it is an important one, since it defines the God-creature relation, as well as setting down rules for entering into this living structure. Both Przywara and Balthasar following Przywara use it this way, redefining its parameters to make this application evident.

Allowing the living to manifest the basic creator-creature tension (or difference) might be called a (theological) phenomenology. Subordinating scholastic theology or philosophy to revelation theology, or the creaturely to the revealed, might be termed a correlation of theological method-as hypothetical-to revelation or faith. This, in any case, is a viewpoint based on D. Keefe's work on Thomism and Tillich. [34] According to Keefe: " 'llhe immanent dynamism of method whether dialectical or logical can be worked out independently of christian fait,h. The structure of ontological understanding thus arrived at in abstraction from the revelation may be called philosophy, as distinct from theology. This philosophical understanding will relate, in either system, to the theological understanding, as method apart from any correlation relates to the method as correlated to the revelation ... But neither system is philosophical in this sense" (i.e., for Thomas, " philosophy as potentral, not actual theology ... For Tillich, philosophy in dialectical tension with theology") . " In neither

33 "Der Begriff ", p. 456.

34 Donald J. Keefe. *Thomism and the Ontological Theology of Paul Tillich.*

does the method of oorrelation operate except as in correlation with the christian revelation. In both, philosophy is a reflex construct or an abstract methodological derivative of theology. Truth is expressed by the correlation of method with the revelation, not by method in isolation from the faith." (p. 4)

In this descfliption, it would be the *correlation* between a philosophical or theological method with christian revelation which Przywrura intends in his *final* " analogy of analogies ".

Keefe further develops this correlation in describing Thomism as a "questioning theology": "Theology as Thomist is therefore a construct, totally dependent on the causality of its method. Its systematic understanding is by hypothesis in oorrelation with the revelation as potency to act. Tihis systematic understanding enters into the communication of the Church as the question of the believer whose continually potential faith-understanding e:xipresses its potentiality in questions. These questions are the dynamic, potential aspect of the believer's participation in the revelation, but they are only questions. The work of explicating these questions, demands the structuring of a hypothetical affirmation of faith, is the work of Thomist theology . . . In the Thomist system, it is revelation, present in the Church, which answers, and because the question comes from faith, the answer of the Church is given to faith, not to theology. The Chuch does not teach theology in giving doctrinal answers." (p. 54)

If Kee.fe is correct in describing the role of Thomist theology in correlation to revelation in the Church, it offers a valuable insight into Przywara's p11oject of *analogia entis* (or Balithasar's "aesthetic theology"), wthich attempts to integrate the philosophical principle of analogy into the *Ur-struktur* of the creator-creature relation as also "analogous", though in a more general sense of "in a liv,ing relationship."

Before claiming that Keefe's view of correlation is the same as Przywara's analogy, however, one final citation should be considered: " Because Thomist theology can neveil." rise above its hypothetical method, it rema1ins a negative theology, con-

tinually milldful that the correlation of its affirma,tion to the reveJation is not a necessary, but only a pos1sibilityof thought, a question. Mystery can be a;pproached in no other way, for when the hypothesis is mistaken for doctrine, the mystery must give way to the implications of method-to ' necesisary reasons'. In this connection, it should be remembered tha:t the ·analogous predication of being is a logical predication, and partakes of the necessities of logic within the Thomist system; it is therefore at one with the necessities of the Thomist system. Mystery is not saved by the analogy of being; could it be so saved, there would be no obstacle in principle to a systematic proof of the Trinity compamble to Anselm's, for within the Thomist system, all reasoning about God is by analogy, without ceasing to be logically and systematically necessary. 'J)homist theology is negative because it is hypothetical and therefore a question, not because it employs analogical reasoning." (p. *55)*

In this clarification we now see that Przywara's analogy, which includes in its vision all of christian revelation, is in fact Keefe's " hypothetical " system in relation to revelation itself. Mystery, for Przywara-the mystery of God "ever greater", the "greater dissimilarity" in relation to every dissimilarity, however great (Lateran IV's formula)-is the result of a correlation between a living God revealed in Christ with the whole history of thought. Also, Balthasar's theology (especially his whole "system" of an aesthetic theology)-although not claiming to be a vast working out of analogy-would benefit from this clarification; viz., that a freely revealing God is free, or *correlated to,* what is seen as his " glory " (manifested in the one concrete oil'der).

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NOTE ON THE IDEA OF RELJ!GIOUS TRUTH IN THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION

HE FOLOWING PAGES claim to be no more than provisional attempt to define a problem of considerble complexity within the Christian tradition. In this introductory note I shall meTely outline how the notion of the truth conveyed by faith soon ,after it was established in the New Testament, developed a synthesis with Greek philosophy, at first Platonic, later Aristotelian. In the nominalist crisis this synthesis broke down and two modes of " religious truth " emerged: one *within* faith with relatively little support from reason, and one *of* faith within a philosophy henceforth detaiched from theology. Since the nineteenth century we notice that philosophy and theology are moving towards a rapprochement while maintaining their relative aiutonomy. Philosophy appears more inclined to accept religious truth on its own terms without reducing it to an unsuccessful formulation of truth as defined in modern philosophy from Descartes to Kant. Theology, from its side, has increasingly stressed the unique experience implied in faith itself, thus allowing philosophy to include it in its own, general reflection on experience. In a more comprehensive study, to appear in a collective work edited by Daniel Guerriere, I intend to review actual and possible overtures in recent philosophical theories of truth which would rendeT such a rappmchement fruitful.

First a word about the biblical context in which the New Testament idea emerged. The earliest articulation of truth in the Bible basically consists in a relation of faithfulness *(emet)* or :firmness-1a moral quality. Not surprisingly, truth also appears as a correspondence between word and fact-a relation that even to the uncritical mind appears problematic from the start. Thus in *Proverbs* rn, 17 we read: " He who utters the truth affirms that which will stand; but a lying witness that

which will bring dis1a.ppointment."[1] But the more fundamental truth consists in God's steadfastness toward his people and in their participation in it by fidelity to a divinely revealed law.[2] In some of the Psalms (such as Ps. 119) the correlation between the law and truth appears particulady clear: the *law* reveals to *us* God's fidelity (His truth) and its observance enables us to share in that [3] With the idea that truth requires entrusting one-self to a higher authority, a cognitive quality joins the moml one. *We* remain in the truth to the extent that we heed the revelation of God's truthfulness as expressed in His commands, and that our deeds, values and attitudes *correspond* to that divine disclosure. The idea of *correspondence,* then, which came to dominate the later cognitive discussion started out as a morral-practical one. The same could be said about the idea of *coherence.* Trust in God's providence and obedience in the Covenant unite all aspects of communal and individual exfatence. The sapiential literature in particular stresses the harmony of a life guided the law. The emphasis upon trust, obedience, and receptivity in the attainment of truth distinguishes the biblical conception from that modem one according to which truth originates in the knowing subject.4 Yet more and more tihe idea of truth as *disclosure,* that

1 Of course, some of the olcler wisdom literature appears to have consisted of a series of maxims considered useful for promoting a career in Court administration-a relatively" secular" affair.

2 Martin Buber identified the original meaning of faith as steadfastness-even more than trust in a person. He sees this symbolically represented in the story of Moses' prayer during the battle with Abimelek. As long as his hands remained steady Israel retained the upper hand, but the hands of faith always grow weak and need support.

a Ignace de la Potterie relates truth and law in a causal way.

> "La verite est un concept plus large, plus enveloppant; elle clesigne la r·ev·elation meme de la volonte divine et du mystere de Dieu; par contre la loi, les commanclements, les paroles de Dien, sont autant cl'expressions concretes de la volonte divine."

La verite dans Saint Jean (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1977), p. 152.

4 Even when revived in the Reformation the older concept assumed a subjective quality that had been absent from the Hebrew notion of trust. Luther's explanation of the first commandment reads:

> **"It** is the faith and trust of the heart which makes both God and

is, as based on a divine revelation gained significance. The Septuagint tmnshtion which facilitated an exchange with the Hellenistic, more cognitive approach may have contributed to this shift in emphasis. Still, it was not until the final period of canonical writing (most explicitly in *Daniel* 8, 26; 10, 1; 11, 2) that *emet* acquired the precise meaning of *revealed truth.*

The New Testament adopted this emphasis on the *revealed* quality of truth. The Pauline notion of a *mystery* hidden in God and revea,led in Christ, must be understood more in continuity with Hebrew sapiential and apocalyptic literature than with Greek mystery cults. Particularly noteworthy is the absence of the modern opposition between knowledge and faith. "Truth " has been revealed, disclosed by divine power rather than by human wisdom. Yet once received in faith revelation brings an internal evidence that renders its truth compelling 11he source of evidence here springs not in the self, but in God: certainty derives from being grasped, not from grasping. [5] The idea of revelation itself attains a new significance when Christ brings it to fulfillment in his own person.

The idea that divine truth has disdosed itself in a physical person dominates the Johannine writings. This personified truth, mostly presented as a light, transforms those who believe in Him. The truth of Christ consists in a new way of being, more than in a new mode of knowing. Only he who *does* the truth will become enlightened by it. Divine illumination becomes truth *for us* only when assimilated in our existence. The same divine Word that, according to *Genesis,.* called creation into being has now come *to dwell* in it. Those who ac-

idol. If your faith and trust are true, then your God will be true as well; and again, where trust is false and baseless, there is no true God."

Quoted in Wolfhart Pannenberg, *The Apostles' Creed* (Westminster Press, 1972), p. 33. .An echo of this we hear in Kierkegaard's statement that to know God truly is not to know the true God, but to achieve a true relation to God. *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* (tr. David F'. Swenson and Walter Lowrie, Princeton University Press, 1941), p. 178.

[5] Jacques Dupont: *Gnos·is* (Bruges: Desclee de Brouwer 1949).

cept its light gain access to truth as it exists in God himself. In faith the believer internalizes that truth so that it becomes his own. Yet he never acquires possession of the source of this truth, *ais* he does with worlidlylearning. The Word has become totally manifest *(ephanerothe* 1 Jn 1, 2) and yet it remains invisible until the "Spirit of truth" (Jn 14, 17; 15, 26) illuminates the believers by his inner testimony. In John truth continues to flow from a transcendent source. Indeed, the very term " true " often serves to distinguish divine from ordinary reality, as when Christ is declared to be "the true light" (Jn 1, 9) or "the true breaid" (Jn 6, 32). Here *true* stands for what fully *is.*

Considering the radicalness with which the New Testament has transformed a terminology borrowed from Hellenistic culture, one may be surprised how early Christian thinkers came to accept the Greek *gnosis.* Already in the third century theologians in Alex;andria (Clement, Origen) viewed faith itself as the fulfillment of philosophical insight. Yet the new *gnosis* is not a philosophical rationalization of faith, nor an extension of philosophical understanding: it consists in the self-understanding *of* faith. The gnostic Christian is one who fully *appropriates* what he believes, not one who besides being Christian, has been educated in philosophy. In insisting that the act of faith contains its own understanding, the Alexandrian and Cappadocian Fathers clearly ruled out the kind of opposition between faith and understanding that lies at the basis of much modern thought. [6]

Initially the Latin West had misgivings not only about mixing worldly wisdom with revealed truth, but even about accepting faith itself as a supreme mode of understanding. Tertullian bluntly opposed one to the other *(Credo quia absurdum).* The great turning point came with Augustine-and not without reservations. He also, after his Neoplatonic period,

Hans Urs von Balthasar, *The Glory of the Lord. A Theological Aesthetics.* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, and New York: Crossroad Publications, Vol. I transl. Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis, 1982), p. 137-40_

considered philosophical learning conducive to *impia superbia.* [1] Nonetheless, he judged the search of truth *intrinsically* good and salvific. Had 1Cicero's *Hortentius* not spurred him on towards the quest of eternal wisdom *(Conj.* III, 4)? Though Augustine excepts certain *subjects* from that virtuous search, branding the pursuit of them mere *curiositas,8* he attributed a divine, revelatory quality to *as such.*

Yet Augustine's major innovation in the conception of religious truth consists in we might caH its interior quality. While originally the understanding had come with the faithfol acceptance of the Gospel, now God teaches each individual soul, though always *in consonance* with the objective testimony of Scripture and ecclesiastical tradition. The divine light that informs the mind, or the interior voice that addresses it, enlightens the believer not only in regard to Scripture but to profane learning as well.[9] The very source and condition of truth becomes thereby sacred for Augustine. the idea of the interior Ma,ste:r Augustine achieves a new synthesis between faith and understanding. for }'"athers had consisted essentially in a process of explication, now becomes an illumination *simultaneously* derived from two different sources (objective and subjective) . By subjecting all understanding to a divine illumination which only faith properly identifies, Augustine tightened the original unity of faith 1and understanding.

With the immanence of divine truth comes the mandate to

1 *Confessions* V, 3. The reason is eloquently stated in *De vera reUgione* 52. "There is no lack of value or benefit in the contemplation of the beauty of the heavens, the arrangement of the stars, the radiant crown of light, the change of day and night, the monthly courses of the moon, the fourfold tempering of the year to match the four elements, the poweTful force of seeds from which derive the forms of measure and nature in its kind. But such a consideration must not pander to a vain and passing curiosity, but must be turned into a stairway to the immortal and enduring."

s Not until the high Middle Ages did Western theologians clearly accept *aU* knowledge as intrinsically goocl and destined to find its fulfillment in God.

9 *De magistro* 38-46.

explore it interiorly, but also the risk of reducing a transcendent message to an acquisition of reason. Augustine always remained aware of both the need and the limits of a rational exploration. With him the emphasis remains on the " intellectus quaer,ms :fidem" and faith never ceases to be the ultimately decishe a,rgument. Thus his daring speculations about the Trinity are always accompanied by a spirit of a healthy skepticism. about their final success and a cavalier lack of concern conceming their ultimate compatibility. With Anse1m the quest of truth takes a new turn. His " faith seeking understanding", despite its Augustinian tone, moves in a different direct.Ion. There is no reason to question a loyalty to St. Augm:tine which he explicitly professes the *M onologion* (preface) . Augustine had written: " There a.re those things which are first believed and afterwards understood. Of such a character is that which cannot be understood of divine things except by those who are pure in heart." [10] Anselm echoes: " right order requires that we believe the deep matters of the Christian faith before we presume to discuss them rationally." [11] Yet the very revelation in whioh we believe urges us to reflect on its implications and to draw its conclusions. Now, one such conclusion consists in the *necessa:ry* character of God's Being. This in turn influences God's relation to his creation (another revealed datum). On the basis of these *data* Anselm develops a logic of immanence and transcendence that encompasses even the historical event of Christ's Incarnation. Since God is necessary in his very Being, his redemptive activity must also result from an inner necessity.

Yet in deducing the inner necessity of God's dealings with the historical contingencies resulting from human decisions Anse1m goes in fact well beyond the limits of what a consistent explication of the data of revelation aHows. Thus he reduces God's choice after the fall to the following: " To deal rightly

[10] *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, 4S.

[11] *Our Deus Homo?,* transl. Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson in *Anselm of Canterbury,* Bk. I, Ch. 2 (Toronto: Edwin Mellin Press, 1976).

with sin without satisfaction is to punish it. Not to punish it is to remit it irregularly." In attributing the need for satisfaction to divine nature itself Anselm makes such fundamental assumptions concerning divine freedom that are neither stated nor implied in the revealed text that his theory can no longer be called an explication of that text. Indeed, it contains the seeds of all future religious rationalism. It certainly surpasses what revelation assisted by reason enables one to say about God's disposition to the world. An Aristotelian logic of propositions has manifestly impelled Anselm to give an *exhaustive* account of the relations between God and creation. Thus a project proclaimed to be based on the *data revelationis* in an unambiguous profession of faith, changed its nature in the course of its execution. [12]

Still, Anselm's rationality remains throughout a *devout* rationality, illumined by a monastic vision, that never consciously deviates from the principle stated in the *Proslogion: Quaero credere ut inteUigam, non autem intelligere ut credam.* Faith remains the basic presupposition of all genuine understanding. Yet a trend was set and the rationalism that emerged with Abelard wa.s far less pious. No theological knowledge of Scripture was needed, he thought, to investigate the truth of religious mysteries. Logic alone sufficed to understand even such recondite dogmas as the Eucharist or the Trinity. The reception of Aristotle's systematic works made the study of theology itself something it had never been before, namely, a *science* in the Aristotelian sense. With it came the epistemic distinction between two orders of knowledge: a philosophical and a theofogical one.

In the very beginning of the *Summa Theologiae* (article 2) St. Thomas raises the question: Whether sacred doctrine is a science. Of particular interest is the purely Aristotelian definition by which he supports his affirmative answer, namely, sci-

12 On the ambivalence of Anselm's attitude, cf. William Colling, *"Mo·* nastic Life as a Context for Religious Understanding in St. Anselm" in *The American Benediotme_Review* 35:4 (1984), pp. 378-88.

ence progresses from self-evident p:rinciples. The principles "known by the natmal light of reason" appear on an even footing with the principles " established by the light of a higher science, namely, the science of God and the blessed." To us such an equation may appear surprising, since it proves by means of what has to be proven. Need the so-ca11ed " science of God and the blessed " not itself first be established as a science? But St. Thomas takes the epistemic solidity of the manner in which we gather the " first principles " of sacred doctrine for granted. A little later he fulJy admits that they are *articuli fidei* (articles of faith), hence direct objects of Revelation. "As other sciences do not argue in proof of their principles but argue from their principles to demonstrate other truths in these sciences, so this doctrine does not argue in proof of its principles, whioh are the articles of faith, but from them it goes on to prove 'Something else." [13] The higher " science " then turns out to be revelation-an interpretation of his text which Aristotle would have found surprising. Since Thomas is concerned only formal procedure from principles (however certified) to conclusions, he unhesitatingly transplants the method from one to the other.

Such a scientific definition of religious truth differed too obviously from the one advocated by St. Augustine and the entire Greek Christian tradition that preceded him to remain unchallenged. The Paris condemnations of IQ77 as well as the nominalist development in theology profoundly shook it. Still in the end St. Thomas's "scientific" presentation of religious truth may not be as far removed from the Augustinian tradition as it seems. In themselves the articles of faith are only "external" principles: to be convincing at aU they must be accompanied by an " interior ligiht that induces the mind to assent." The principles themselves function like sense dat'a which do not become intelligible until the mind illumines them. The light of faith provides the formal element that converts the ob-

[13] *8. Th.,* I. 1, 8.

jective data of faith into religious truth.[14] For Aquinas as for Augustine what ultimately determines the act of faith is God's own internal witness. The truth about God can only come from God, and in faith man responds to God's witness about Himself. Aquinas moves within a welil. established tradition initiated by the Fourth Gospel: :religious truth derives its constitutive evidence from a divine illumination. The external object of belief (the "principles") reveals itself as *true* only within the act of faith.

Nominalism soon undid the synthesis of faith and reason Thomas and his followers had achieved. Henceforth religious truth, though still possessing the intrinsic evidence of experience, could no longer count on the concomitant support of reason. Henceforth, there would be two separate conceptions of truth. The one of reason eventually found its basis in the remarkable harmony between mind and nature; the one of theology came to rest exclusively on an authority beyond nature. The different attitude of what hencefo11th was to be called philosophy appears its to establish the *truth of religion,* clearly distinct from faith's own truth. These attempts gave birth to an intellectual exercise that had never existed before: arguments for the existence of God based upon reason alone. Of course, St. Ansdm and already St. Augustine had construed some rational formulation of the mind's ascent to God. But medieval writers had never intended to do so independently of the religious sources (including the sources of revelation) had provided the idea of God in the first place. They wanted to show that this idea, far from conflicting with reason, fully agreed with that of an infinite Being which they considered to be necessary for supporting the finite.

In the modem age the purport of the arguments was to *prove,* independently of any intrinsically religious evidence, the

14" F'or Thomas, neither Christian doctrine nor the miracles that attest to it would say anything to man without the *interior instinetus et attractus doctrinae (In John* c. 6, 4, n. 7; c. 15, 5, n. 5; *In Rom.* c. 8, 6), which he also calls *inspiratio interna* and *experimentum."* Hans Urs von Balthasar, *The Glory of the Lord* I, 162.

existence of a particular being called God, The " truth " of religion must hereby eme1'ge from a process of reasoning from the finite to the necessity of an infinite principle. But even if the proof succeeds in establishing the independent existence of a principle *beyond* the world-a most difficult task indeed-it still has to establish that this principle coincides with the God of religion. Aquinas, Maimonides, or Avicenna did not face such excessive challenges, since they started by accepting the God of faith, and then proceeded to show that to do so is not irrational. Once the :finite's need of the infinite was estahlished, they did not hesitate to identify infinite with their religious idea of God, since from theological reflection they knew already that, among other things, the God in whom they believed must be infinite necessary. This procedure often leads to careless thinking. Since the authors knew the outcome beforehand, they were anxious to reach the goal and have it all over with. But in principle the method is unobjectionable.

In contrast with this method, arguments by a process of sheer reasoning pretend to at full-fledged religious conclusions assume the phenomenal vwdd capable of yielding positive information about the nature of what transcends it. To conclude to a transcendent ground or to postulate such a ground in order to make the real intelligible, is not yet to attain the idea of God as religious faiths have traditionally conceived it. Is the absolutely intelligible, which many philosophers require to found the intel1igibility of the real, the perfect Being intended by the religious act? Karl Jaspers's philosophy of transcendence is there to prove that one does not necessarily imply the other: the philosophical idea of transcendence, though it invites further investigation, leads by itself to no specific religious content. Only from a religious confrontation with the divine in " revelation " " grace " can transcendence acquire such a content. An autonomous study of being or consciousness can state the problem: it cannot provide the answer.

In the arguments for the existence of God, modern thought

reveals most clearly its attitude with respect to religious truth. It assumes that there is no specifically *religious* truth. Religion has been allotted a specific field of consciousness ruled by methods of its own, but the final judgment on truth has been withdrawn from its jurisdiction and removed to the general domain of epistemic criteriology. Revelation may "add" to what we " know " by natural means, but it remains subject to the general rules of truth and credibi,Iity. These rules did not originate in religion's native land: they are a creation of the modem mind, a mind unwil1ing to have the criteria of truth established by any source outside itself. Until the beginning of this century theofogy maiinly followed the axioms of this rationalist epistemology *either* by reducing religion to a moral attitude or a mode of experiencing (as in liberal Protestantism), thus abandoning truth c1'aims altogether, *or* by formulating its doctrine in a set of propositions which, if not strictly provruble, were, on the sole ground of their high probability, thought to impose t!hemselves upon the reasonable mind (as in Catholic scholasticism). *Truth,* if still granted to religious affirmations, no longer springs from within faith but is extrinsically conveyed to faith. In the traditionail view religious truth originated in some sort of participation in the revealed mystery of divine Being. The human subject, later the source of truth, was then no more than a receptacle endowed with a divine potential for apprehending the truth as divinely revealed.

With this separation from faith, and perhaps as a cause of it, goes a gradual separation of experience *from* faith. While in early centuries faith, far from being opposed to experiential evidence, was never considered to be complete without it, later it came to occupy an order of its own with a minimum of experiential content. Experience was more and more reserved to a small segment of believers. My,stical schools-sixteenth century Spanish Carmelites, seventeenth century German Pietists and French devout humanists, eighteenth century Quietists, and nineteenth century Russian spiritualists'-oontinued to upihold their own form of religious truth. Quite typi-

cally, these movements became more and more marginalized with respect to official theological thought.

By the middle of the eighteenth century the rationalist interpretation of religious truth began to show its serious deficiencies. They were twofold. First, it was becoming increasingly clear that the synthesis itself was faulty. Religion proved unable to "add" to the self-contained truth that originated in the subject. Truth conceived as a coherent epistemic structuring of the real by an autonomous subject is not receptive to additions derived from a di:fferent source. The existence of a necessary Being might still qualify as a necessary axiom in the mind's intellectual and moral ordering process, but a historical revelation proved to be an indigestible item. Lessing's objections against historical facts establishing necessary truths are well known. But from a religious point view it became equally obvious that faith had nothing to gain by adopting an idea of truth so foreign to its origins and so impoverishing its effects. Early in the nineteenth century a reaction carried by the general revolt against rationalism set in. The leading figure in this theological *re0onquista* was undoubtedly Friedrich Schleiermacher. One should not dismiss his a.ttempt to estwblish religion outside the battle zone of what his Kantian contemporaries called *truth,* as an abandonment of truth claims. His efforts to rescue t!he proper identity of religion aimed at nothing less than at regaining a firm foothold for a truth proper to religion. The term "feeling", so loosely used in Schleiermacher's early work, signals in fact an attempt to escape from the kind of scientific objectivity or philosophioal rationality to which truth claims had come to reserved. What Schleie1'maoher really pursued was a more fundamental truth that anteceded the subject-object split. He perceptively reailized that once this dualism (with the constitutive primacy of the subject) is accepted as decisive, chances for recognizing the proper identity of religious truth have vanished. The entire realm of transcendence comes then to be drawn into the immanent circle of self-constituted truth.

Whether the term *feeling* was appropriate for defining the new ground of truth may be questioned. But to Schleiermacher goes the lasting credit of having broken with the rationalist tradition.

A number of Catholic theologians, especially those affiliated witJh the Tubingen school, likewise moved away from a rationalist conception of religious truth toward one in which the *experience* of faith played a more important part. That experience, the *experimentum fidei,* (2 Cor. 13, 3-9), far from being an exceptional mystical privHege, belonged to the very core of faith itself. Indeed, until the late Middle Ages faith without experience would have been inconceivable. Since the inhabitation of God's Spirit inevitably manifests itself in the attitude and consciousness of the believer, all faith results in experience.

The return to experience begun by the theologians of the romantic epoch holds a particular significance for the believer who shares the subjective attitude of modern culture. To him or her, the *experience of faith* provides the decisive test of its truth. But while formerly that experience was linked to the message itself, now the connection between experience and the objective merssageof revelation has become much looser. What Augustine posited as a *distinction* between the subjective enlightenment by the inner Master and the objective message now tends to become a *separation* between content and experience. More precisely, the experience justifies the content only in a general way while omitting surbstantial aspects of it from consideration, if not explicitly rejecting them. Clearly such a reliance upon an experience that is no longer solidly attached to the objective message may endanger the specific *truth* of religion. Has it not replaced a transcendental message by an immanent experience? All here depends on the manner in which experience relates to content. If the two become fully separated with only a vague moral or sentimental sympathy to connect them, the specific quality of relig,ious truth is lost. But such a full separation does not usually occur. The act of

faith in intending its transcendent object is experienced as a *being gras'ped* by a higher reality rather than as an autonomous *grasping* or a self-enclosed feeling. Thus an intrinsicaHy religious truth has generally succeeded in maintaining its transcendent ciharacter, even while adopting a specifically modern *(i.e.,* subjective) form.[15]

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CAN THEOLOGY BE CONTEMPORARY AND TRUE?

A REVIEW DISCUSS10N [1]

IT MAY BE symptomatic of the times that *The Ratzinger Report* (1985) received a more deferential hearing in *The Soottish Jom-nal of Theology* [2] than in *Horizons*.[3] The former, which is not without its criticisms, describes Ratzinger's theology as having "a character, massive, systematic and integrated that is enviable" . The latter, whicih compares Ratzinger's report to Segundo's *Theology and the Churoh* (1985) by describing them as "dericalist soul brothers," dismisses both in favor of "the people's Church which the Roman Catholic Church in the United States has become" (393). Given the multiplicity of theologies today can we simply assume that the Roman Catholic Church has now *become* "the people's Church" because it "enhances their movement toward liberation" (393)? Is it mot possible that such thinking can easily slip into the very dogmatism of which Ratzinger himself sometimes has been accused? I begin this analysis of Ratzinger's new work on Fundamental Theology with this observation in order to stress that unless theologians speak honestly with ea.ch other in the Church about the meaning and content of the faith, the danger of factionalism based on misunderstanding and mistrust threatens. It is hard

1 *Principles of Catholic Theology: Building Stones For A Fundamental Theology.* By Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger. Translated by Sister Mary Frances McCarthy, S.N.D. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987). Pp. 9-398. $24.95. This volume has no index.

2 The Rev. Professor J. K. S. Reid, *Articie Review: The Ratzinger Report* in *Scottish Journal of Theolo.gy* vol. 40 (1987), no. 1, pp. 125-133.

3 Robert Kress, *The Ratzfager Report.* By Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger with Vittorio Messori. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1985). *Theology and the Ohuroh: A Response to Oardinal Ratzinger and a Warning to the Whole Church.* By Juan Luis Segundo. (Minneapolis: Winston, 1985). In *Horions,* vol. 14, no. 2 (Fall, 1987), pp. 391-393.

to see how such a discussion can even begin if a serious attempt to understand that faith is cavalierly dismissed. **And it** is just such a serious endeavor with which we are presented **in** Ratzinger's new work.

Before analyzing *Principles* it is important to note that the kind of Catholic reaction cited above is tempered to a considerable extent by a newly published work on Ratzinger's theology by Aidan Nichols, O.P.,[4] which presents a remarkably sympathetic collection of Ratzinger's reflections. Tracing Ratzinger's thought from its foundations in Augustine and Bonaventure to its theologioal development of the present day, makes it clear that even the Ratzinger of the 1980's still is shaped by the thought of both of these Church Fathers. Perceiving both extreme negative and positive reactions to Ratzinger, Nicihols' intention is to int:voduce his " principal writings " hoping to " broaden " the discussion and educate himself and his readers (Nichols, 1-3). While this book carefully av:oids any possible difficulties in Ratzinger's theology, it is nonetheless an excellent introduction to Ratzinger's own im-

4 *The Theology of Joseph Ratzinger: An Introductory Study.* By Aidan Nichols, O.P. (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1988. Pp. vii-338. This twelve chapter volume contains a name index and an extended bibliography. Chapters include: stimulating treatments of Augustine and Bonaventure; a tedious but informative history of the Bavarian Church; Christian Brotherhood in which Ratzinger here appeals to both Meister Eckhardt *and* to Karl Barth; an excellent treatment of The Council; The Creed; Ecclesiology; Eschatology, which are variously excellent, factual, reflective and instructive; a practical chapter on The Preacher which never lacks dogmatic foundations; The Liturgist which is informative and practical as well as controversial, especially in the suggestion of a possible return to Mass in the eastward direction; Back To Foundations which includes a treatment of *Principles;* and The Prefect where Nichols notes that criticisms of Ratzinger's exercise of his office are "not without value" but that Paul VI's "reform of the Congregation" expressly requires it to encourage "good theology " and discourage bad theology, to guard " the unity and continuity of the faith," and to encourage a *"plurality* of theologies ... [which] contribute to the harmonious performance of the same piece of music". Readers familiar with Ratzinger's *Introduction to Ohristianity* (Herder and Herder, 1970) will find that Nichols' work repeats and develops many themes initially treated there in a very competent way. An editorial note: on the bottom of p. 264 there is an obvious omission of text.

pressive theology and a :fine introduction to theology itself. The book is demanding because Ratzinger's own thought is exacting; yet this should not dissuade readers from the work We shall draw attention to Nidhols' study throughout this review where it seems appropriate.

Introducing *Principles,* Ratzinger insists that this collection of articles and talks which spanned the decade of the seventies should be seen exactly as building stones for a Fundamental Theology and not as a ":finished structure" (11). The book jacket describes the work as an " aid to ecumenism " in which Ratzinger speaks as a " theologian and as a scholar ". Indeed the work is a thoughtful theological and scholarly endeavor that demands serious attention. The writing is clear; the thinking is rigorous, incisive and very well organized. The author oonfl'onts practical pastoral questions as well as the most difficult questions facing contemporary theology under three headings. 1.) Formal Principles of
View: This studies the relationship between the structure and content in Christian faith, and between Scripture and Tradition and Faith and History. fl.) Formal Principles of Christianity in Ecumenical Dispute: This includes relations between East and West and between Roman Catholic and Protestant theology, the question of apostolic succession as it relates to the priesthood, to Christ and to the tradition. 3.) The Formal Principles of Christianity and the Method of Theology: This entails an examination of the nature of theology and of the relation between Faith and experience. There is also an Epilogue which assesses the function of the Church in relation to the world with a measured and intelligent critical appropriation of some key insights of Vatican II.

This book is not for anyone who is unwilling to work; it is difficult but rewarding and demands critical reading. There are innumerable interesting and stimulating questions skillfully raised throughout concerning such issues as the nature of the Church, the role of priestly office, the connection between the local church and the universal Church, the concepts of word

and sacrament, the relationship between philosophy and theology, reason and revelation, the function of the bible in theology, the canon, ·salvation history, " scientific" theology, the Eucharist, catechesis, baptism, and Christ as mediator. Historical issues such as Gnosticism, Docetism, Donatism as well as the developments before and after Nicaea and the role of Patristics in the study of theology are all discussed. There is even some interesting diafogue with the thought of Hans Kling and Edward Sclii:llebeeckx. Just from this selective overview of themes it is clear that this book is a major positive contribution to the discussion of theoilogy today.

In the limited space available I hope to provide some small flavor of Ratzinger's thinking with a view toward enticing readers to study the book and be drawn into the critical theological questions of our time. I shall focus therefore on several themes tha.t seem crucial to the development of Ratzinger's thoug1ht, i.e., theological method, scripture and tradition, and the relation between philosophy and theology. I believe that by selecting these themes we shall see references and applications covering all sections of this book; thus, they are not arbitrarily chosen.

Theologioal Method

In certain respects this book represents an interesting methodological shift in Roman Catholic Fundamental Theology itself. Instead of constructing phifosophioail, existential and anthropological foundations for the possibility of Revelation and Faith Ratzinger asks: " Is there a truth that *remains* true in every historical time because it *is* true?" On the one hand, Hegel's solution to this question is rejected because Hegel identifies being ·and time: "Truth becomes a function of time ... it is true for a time because .it is part of the becoming of truth ..." (16). On the other hand Ratzinger rejects the Marxist solution to this problem since, instead of assimilating being and time,

truth comes to be regarded as an expression of vested interests of a particular historical moment . . . the ' true ' is whatever serves progress, that is, whatever serves the logic of history. Vested interest on the one hand and progress on the other lay claim to the legacy of truth; the' true' ... must be sought at every step of history because anything that is designated as enduring truth is in direct contradiction with the logic of history, is but the static vested interest of a given moment (17) .

Without evading the question Ratzinger begins his answer by turning to Rom. 10: 9-10 to find what exactly constituted the truth o[" Christianity in its *very beginning* " (17) . What constitutes the content of faith? " Alongside the *confession* of faith: Jesus is Lord, stands, then, the *oontent* orf faith, which is .formu1ated in the sentence: Qod raised him from the dead " (18). Thus, although the resurrection is a past event "it reveals what is here and now valid: Jesus is the Risen One, God's power present in a man, or, as Origen expresses it: ' Even to the end of the wol'lld, the day of reconciliation is now'" (20).

Here the trinitarian self-revelation *alone* safeguards the *credo* from deteriorating into a " ' catalogue ' of the the contents of faith, such as was formulated in the Middle Ages" (21). This is no merely gratuitous statement by Ratzinger. In consideration of Scripture, tradition, baptism and creed he sincerely wishes to avoid an "abstractly doctrinal view" as well as 1a "cultically ritualistic view " (102. Compare 36) . "Far from nullifying salvation history, it is precisely this 'believing in ' which shapes the inner oneness of faith, that confers on it its true meaning" (21).

What gives faith its meaning? The words mean what tJhey say. While Ratzinger himself both recognizes and advocates a theological pluralism (124:ff. and Nichols, 287:ff.) he also appropriately insists that man cannot be the measure of truth (NichoJ.s, 290). Insisting that a Catholic theologian cannot select a teaching he " prefers " (285) and that apologetic theology goes " beyond all traditions, and becomes an appeal to reason itself, in complete openness to truth " (283) Ratzinger says faith gives reason a new orientation; after a superb

analysis of how culturally conditioned human discourse relates to a literal reading of scripture, he concludes that, in Nichols' words: " Many theologies exist at the service of common traidition" Accordingly, Nichols concludes that there is a " divine power which the Tradition holds" (296) and systematic theology finds new language for this. Now, of course, that is exactly where the problem of contemporary theological pluralism enters. For the question is: how ex:actly can contemporary theologians conceive of tradition (whicb. is not God) without denying God's freedom on the one hand and the .divine-human constitution of the Church as the Body of Christ on the other. Here we have a theological problem of the first magnitude which can never be answered, let alone discussed, as long as it is assumed (as above) that one can know what this church is without asking exactly what it is-beyond its own drives toward enhancing makes it the true Church. To his credit Ratzinger asks this question tenaciously. For example in his excellent critique of "short formulae" *(Principles,* 124-25) Ratzinger is led to the positive assertion t!hat " conversion to the faith is not, obviously, simply a turning to the shelter of a community but a purposeful turning to the truth that the community has received and that is its distinctive characteristic ..." (128). Therefore "Truth is not a product ". It is not suibject " to the legalism of consumerism" (123). It cannot be packaged and sold in short formulae that attempt to make the faith coincide with contemporary Here Ratzinger recommends a return to a method of instruction similar to Luther's *looi:*

> It is assuredly worthy of note that Luther, for instance, based his Catechisms, not on a carefully considered system of proofs, but quite simply on what are called the *loci,* the principal deposits, of faith, which he gathered together and explained: the Ten Commandments, the Our Father, the sacraments, the confession of faith .... To be honest, I do not understand why we are no longer capable of such moderation today but must insist on basing our textbooks on the most sophisticated structural systems, which are as transitory as their authors and the intricacies of which are, for the most part, not comprehensible to our students (UH).

These 1are certainly not the words of a blind advocate of traditionalism. Yet, as the words above already indicate and as we shaH see below, Ratzinger is not always consistent in subordinating tradition to the living God; to that extent there remain questions about whether and to what extent his own understanding of the tradition identifies the kingdom of God with the visible Church.

Ratzinger clearly intends to see the triune God as the sole answer to the question of truth; he argues brilliantly that today's Church can be saved by faith in the Holy Spirit (ml) and that Christ, as the Head constitutes the Church in the midst of all change (131-Q). Thus, "[the Church] continues to be a unified entity only by his grace " (132) . Indeed faith means "standing-firm in Christ" (62) . And Ratzinger writes:

> The core of the gospel consists in the good tidings of the Resurrection ... of God's action, which precedes all human doing ... when revelation is fulfilled in the Resurrection, it is thus confirmed once again that he [the biblical God] is not just one who is timeless but also one who is above time, whose existence is known to us only through his action (185).

This analysis leads Ratzinge:r to a pertinent critique of " a purely existential version of the gospel message " because such an interpretation obscures the " primacy of the ' in itself ' over the 'for me'" (185) . The error of such existential theology, which Ratzinger sees originating with Luther, is captured perfectly in the words of Oscar Cullman: " We should not say: Christ is Christ ' for me ' because is Christ. We should say, rather, that he is Christ because he is Christ 'for me'" (186) . Feuerhach could not have said it more clearly. And Ratzinger's own tiheological development led him to question the theological foundations of *Gaudiu11iet Spes* by stressing tha:t " what is proper to theology, discourse rubout Christ and his work" cannot be left to the side if the proper meaning of salvation for us is to be seen. " Either faith in Christ :reaches into the heart of human existence so that whoever has that faith can only describe the human on its basis, or it belongs to some other

world " (Nichols, 100). While Ratzinger sought a "non-authoritarian" form for presenting the faith to the world he correctly objected to the "vulgarised *Teilhardisme* for which human progress and Christian hope, technological liberation and Christian redemption could stand in linear continuity, if not simple identity" (Nichols, 101). Yet, it appears that Ratzinger himself has not broken completely from Teilhard, at least in his eschatology (Nichols, 180) .

While Ratzinger's more biblically Fundamental Theology is intriguing his do not always reflect that same truth. Relying on De Luihac he \¥rites: "The mystery of the Trinity has opened to us a totally new perspective: the ground of being is *cornmunio"* (22-3) . Thus, it is not God *alone* who is truth and the guarantee our apprehension of that truth in historical circumstances are ever new. The " *communio Ecclesiae* is the mediator between being time " (23, 260-61, 311 329-330). This leads Ratzinger to conclude that " The seat of all faith is, then, the *memoria Ecclesiae* . . . Church as memory ... [the Church] can bring about the unity of history because God has given it memory" (23) ; in relation to the bible he concludes that, " books fulfill their function as books only when they point to the community in which word is to be This living community cannot be replaced or surpassed historical exegesis; it is inherently superior to any book ... [thus] the inner nature of faith the Church's claim to be the primary interpreter of word" (329-30) . Is there no difference between exegesis which takes place within the Church's living faith and the claim the itself is subject to the Church's interpretation of it? Do the books point to the community or to the God forms is the basis, meaning and goal of the community? will be said about this below.

In answer to the question of guarantees *truth* Ratzinger says that it is the risen Lord made present in and through and by the Holy Spirit but he also maintains that it is the

visible Church itself both in its memory and in the form of its " apostolic succession " which *guarantees* the validity both of the *form* and the *oontent* of faith (e.g., 244 and 290). In an in-

discussion of the notion of community and its " right " to the Eucharist Ratzinger cleady recognizes that the point at issue concerns the very nature of the Church and the sacraments. Does the Church's being come from individual communities within the Church which can confer on themselves priesthood and eucharist or from the " priesthood that can be bestowed only by ordination in the *successio apostolica* " (287)? While, for Schillebeeckx, the answer to tJhis question appears to be that this being comes from the community, for Ratzinger, it comes from the Church in the form of the apostolic succession. Here Rahner is viewed as treating the concept of community as a " Protestant concept " (288) while Ratzinger concludes that communion with the bishop is not simply the historical form of Christ',s body but is a " theological element" which together with the "apostolic succession", " the bishop guarantees" (290). In another context Ratzinger writes: "The community can do nothing of itself. It can be pneumatologica:l only if each member of it is imbued with the Spirit. On the other hand, however, the community of the whole Chmch, the community of the visible form of her link with her beginning, is, for the individual, the place of the Spirit and the guarantee of union with the Spirit" (244).

Ratzinger's intention to place the risen Lord at the center orf the faith cannot be minimized hut unless the *oommunio Ecclesiae* is dearly suibordinated to the living Christ, his uniqueness is in danger of being supplanted by the visible Church. The real problem therefore of validating one's perception of " true being " in time which ever changes is ascribed by Ratzinger to a community which itself exists in time and changes. How then can the Church be the "mediator" of a truth not *subje()t* to historical change? As long as tJhe Church is conceived as the mediator as Ra:tzinger has conceived it, there will always remain the question of whether there is any

real rnom for the one mediator by whom, in whom and through whom the Church can be and actually is the locus of God's love as manifested in history in a way which precludes identifying or merging God's love with history.

This problem also surfaces in connection with ecumenism. Ratzinger is immensely knowledgeable and positive assessing Rome's relations with Eastern Orthodoxy (194ff.) ,and much less positive about relations with Protestantism and in particular with Lutheranism. Still, he proposes that some sort of joint Eucharist among Catholics and Protestants might be feasible under certain conditions (304-5) , that in mutual dialogue "the two sides he sensitive and responsive to each other", and that Catholic theology "must not ... agree with whatever is currently the strongest position . . . hut must rather look, in its own way, for whatever common ground there may he and, in doing so, not be afraid to learn from its partner" (180-1). In another context Ratzinger asserts that " Catholic teaching . . . does not in any way deny that Protestant Christians believe in presence the Lord also share in that presence " (236) that " ' participants are concerned with truth, vvhich suffers no compromises' ... Truth alone provides a firm ground for our feet" (236). There are, according to Ratzinger, two obstacles to Christian unity, i.e.,

> on the one hand, a confessional chauvinism that orients itself primarily, not according to truth, but according to custom ... on the other hand, an indifferentism with regard to faith that sees the question of truth as an obstacle ... Because we have confidence in the power of the Holy Spirit, we hope also for the unity of the Church and dedicate ourselves to an ecumenism of faith (5W3).

Nichols also notes: "A vital precondition of successful ecumenism is waiting on God's will ... " (272) .

Ratzinger',s consistent argument is that we today cannot bypass the Church in order to grasp truth. Were we to do so, we would have either a "'timeless truth '-an eternal idea hovering independently over a realm of changing facts " (26) or a reduction of truth to individual fancy (30, 100-101) . There

can be no confession of the triune God without the *Church* and any confession of the triune God must bring individuals together " without depriving them of their individuality " (26). Ratzinger correctly asserts the communitarian nature of faith; Ohristians are part of the body o[Christ and not simply individuals perceiving timeless truths conceivable apart from the Church's faith; he wisely indicates that any such thinking is Gnostic and Docetic (182-3, 330£.). Nor are we individuruls who can see and describe the truth without the preaching and teachings of the Church. For God has indeed revcealedhimself in Christ and his witnesses, i.e., the prophets, the apostles and their successors.

But the fact that God himself and he alone is the guarantee of all this is not consistently maintained. Ratzinger clearly insists that we should do whatever f1aith in Christ requires (62) and that " Christ, who is the truth, is in this world the way precisely because he is the truth" (63). Thus, truth is not always oom:fortable-yet it alone can make us free (78-93) ; love and truth go together for joy and tJhe Cross is seen as the center of tJhe glad tidings (80-1). Still, because of the above mentioned function of the aipostolic succession Ratzinger tends to displace Christ in favor of the authority of tradition on several occasions, (e.g., 93:ff. and 329). When criticizing both the new rite of baptism for providing no context of faith and the idea of short formulae of the faith (108ff.) Ratzinger is led to conclude: " the act of faith can take p1ace . . . in no otJher way than by referring itself publicly to the Churoh and ... letting itself be buried, immersed, made one with the one subject of the credo: Mater Ecclesia" (111. Compare 293). For Paul baptism meant to be buried with Christ (Rom. 6: *3-5,* Gal. 2: 20-21, Gal. 3: 27 and *5,* Eph. 4 and *5,* Heb. 11) and in that way for individuals to be incorporated into the as the community of believers. Here it appears that by being buried witJh the Chmclh one is thereby and as such constituted in the Christian life. It is havd to see how or why Christ or the Holy Spirit would remain actively necessary on this view. When

speaking aibout the Holy Spirit Ratzinger writes: "For the Church is most present not where organising, reforming and governing are going on but in tho·se who simply believe and receive from her the gift of faith tihat is life to them," (Nichols, 132) . Fiaith described in thi,s way leaves no room for the Holy Spirit as the one who gives this gift. In addition, Ratzinger seems to have constructed a Christology from below (96-101) based upon Jesus' relationship to tradition more than on his inner trinitarian relation with the Faither and the Spirit. He is certainly not unaware of tihe need to ground the validity of the tradition in the immanent trinitarian relations [e.g. Nichols, Chaip. 6, " Reflections on the Creed "]; but there are times when these relations are not the determining factor in his own reflections. Thus, "Jesus did not present his message as something totally new, as the end of all that had preceded it ..." (95). He reinterpreted the Old Testament traditions

knowing the fullness of power that resided in him . . . and willed not only to create tradition but also to provide an interpretation that would become the heart of tradition ... Jesus' criticism of tradition was the expression of his specific awareness of mission and of the unique fullness of power that had its source therein ... His relationship to the fundamental ground of being is a relationship of real union with the fundamental truth-that is, 'Sonship ': in this relationship to God, the very letter becomes flesh . . . It is obvious, then, that there is no question, in Jesus' case, of an arbitrary liberalism: rather, both his freedom and his strictness proceed from a common source: from his prayerful intercourse with the Father, from his personal knowledge of God, on the basis of which he draws the dividing line between center and periphery, between the will of God and the work of man. Jesus has spiritualized the letter-which explains his freedom toward tradition; but he has spiritualized it, not in terms of an arbitrary and general enlightenment, but rather in terms of his relationship with God (97-8. See also

Adapting Kasemann's argument rubout Jesus ias pious and liberal Ratzinger understands it only in terms of the Ohalcedonian "both God and man", (99) and as foUows: "On the basis of his intimate communion with God, however, Jesus

has given us a new interpretation of tradition, has opened its inmost depths for us and has thereby given us access to tradition . . . the Christian sees *in Jesus a point of access to the center of tradition,"* (99, emphasis mine). From here Ratzinger concludes that the Church is the " bearer of tradition " and is thus " the *sine qua non* of the possibility of ,a genuine participation in the *traditio* orf Jesus." Indeed " The Church is tradition ..." (100). The question rema,ins: is it his eternal sonship which, then and now, determines the meaning of all tradition or is it tradition and his "communion with God", which gives us the meaning of his eternal sonship? Is he *a* point of access or *the* point of access to the center? As in all Christologies from below the risk of re-defining the immanent trinity *by* the economic trinity is ever present.

Interpretation of the Bible

On the principle *Sola Scriptura* Ratzinger's presuppositions about the function of the Church's *memo1ia* cause him to misconstrue the Reformer's own principle by supposing that Luther and other P:mtestants had transferred authority *from* the *Church* to Scripture in order to re-appropriate a vision more in accord with their personal preferences. Yet this is not what was thought. They knew as well as Ratzinger that a theology based on a preference and not on truth was meaningless. Interesting and instructive though it is, Ratzinger's analysis does not address the real question of the *Sola Scriptura* simply because scripture *cannot* be conceived by him, at least in this context, as the Word of God in any distinct way, for it too is the product of *tradition* (91:ff. and IOO:ff.) which tradition is subject to the community rather than the unique *object* of the scripturail faith, i.e., the one Mediator, (98-4, IOO:ff., 198, 219, 222, 244) for its validity [Of. Nichols, 226, 280:ff., *258,* and 280]. I hasten to add that this occurs when a;ddressing this particular issue. For treatment of the historical critical method, the canon and the Fathers makes some crucial points that no ·serious theology can avoid (85:ff. and 185:ff.).

Some ·:further analysis of Ratzinger's understanding of .scripture in relation to tradition might be helpful here in grasping his view of theological truth.

Ratzinger expbins that Arius proposed a " Christianity of accommodation " by explaining " Christian belief as monotheism in the strictest sense of philosophical thought" (114); thus " Christ could not be God in the true sense of the word " (116). Why was this philosophy rejected? "The Nicene Fathers . . . insisted that the Bible could and must be taken literally ... If it says 'Son,' it means 'Son'" (114). When, therefore, the Son was described as " one in Being with the Father ... a philosophical concept was thus joined to biblical words" in order to say" that the Bible is to be taken seriously in its literal meaning and is not to be modified by philosophicrul accommodations to a mode of thought that is more widely acceptable" (114-15). Whatever problems there may be in Luther's *Sola Soriptura* (Cf. Nichols, this very point is what he intended to uphold.

Philosophy therefore served the Council Fathers to clarify "the belief that is the essence of Christianity" (115). Ratzinger clearly indicates that the norm for theology is not "enlightened understanding" [to his credit this position is con-,sistently held throughout] but understanding which is enlightened *by* the belief of Christians as conveyed in the Bible. Yet a critical question arises here, i.e., !how exactly are we to conceive a literal reading of scripture without becoming what T. F. Torrance [5] labels Fundamentalists or Liberals? While Ratzinger clearly 1wants to avoid both of these extremes, the question concerns exactly *what* constitutes the truth of scripture.

Ratzinger notes that Constantius later rejected the Nicaean " one in Being " hy arguing ·that " Christ was ' like ' the Father in accordance with Scripture'"; thus in 360 A.D. the Nicene Creed was formally annulled. As both Nicaea and Constantius

[5] *Reality and Flw;ngelioai Theofogy,* By Thomas F. Torrance. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1982) pp. 17-20.

referred their thinking firmly to Vhe Bible both argued " Christ is as the Bible say,s he is " (115). Yet, Rrutzinger regards Constantius as an early of *Sola Sc.riptura:* " An apparently pious solution was thereby reached that based ,faith solely on the Word of Scripture ..." (115); this enterprise however is an " escape into hiblicism " (115). But what makes the Nicaean "literal" reaiding of scripture more than mere biblicism? Ratzinger answers: " For Nicaea had not ranged itself against the Bible; on the contrary, it had officially expounded the Bible in terms of the universal :faith of the Church, thus making it effective in its full strength" (116). Granted. Yet there is still a further question here, namely, what makes either the bible or the universal faith of the Church true and what makes the emperor Constantius wrong? Was the Nicaean faith correct simply because it came from authorities in the Ohurch rather than from the state as Ratzinger implies, e.g.,

> [Theodosius] clearly rejected both the purely political and the biblicist norms by declaring as normative the faith of the pope in Rome and of the bishop of Alexandria. By this action, the Church was again recognized as the maker of her own decisions and the source of the universal and binding interpretation of the Bible ... the bishops of Rome, Alexandria and Antioch were the authoritative guardians of the universal faith of the Church (116ff.)?

Yet Arius, whose heresy has been called "a common-sense heresy," [6] did not represent the state; he too claimed to speak from and for the Church. Was the Nicaean faith correct because it was faithful to the biblical faith which in turn was true heoause it rested on the fact that Jesus was what he was professed to be, i.e., God from God? Was Constantius wrong therefore because he used the bible to deny the biblical faith which the Church believed to be true? Or was it the universal belief of the Church, as interpreted by the "guardians" of that faith, which conferred upon the bible a viailidity it would not otherwise have had? According to Ratzinger's perception of

[6] *Ohristianity and Olassical Culture: A Study of Thought and Aotion From Augustus to Augustine.* By Charles Norris Cochrane. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 233.

tradition he opts for this lasrt answer to the question. The Church, in the person of its bishops, is "the source of the universal and binding interpretation orf the bible" (116, 828. Cf. also Nichols, 259ff.) Thus, the truth of the Creed of Nicaea-ConstailJtinople was ":formulated on the episcopal level to serve as a clarification for the whole Church and revealing in its entirety the mark of this linguistic bearer ... This does not mean, of course, that the *symbolum* concerns only the bishops. By its incorporation into rthe eucharistic *eredo,* it also became the immediate *c.redo* of an the :faithful" (125). If not linguistically, at least in reality, was this not the immediate *c.redo* of the faithful even before the c1ari:fications of the Council of Nicaea?

Here a :form of traditionalism replaces hiblicism and unfortunately neither view .answers the questions raised above. For that very reason it appears that Ratzinger, contrary to his own desires, is Ieft in exactly the same position as contemporary liberal theology which he rejects. Contempomry liberal interpreters of the bible ask why should we read scripture " literally" as Nicaea apparently did and conclude that Jesus is one in being with God? With this question, they, like Ratzinger, refuse fa grant a normative status to scripture based on the]act that it is ·a direcrt witness to the events of revelation and as the Word of God it continues to function canonically in the Church as the risen Lord continues to guide those who read it in faith through ithe Holy Spirit. Ratz.inger comes very close to granting this: "the Church cannot ·be saved by compromise ... but only by self-reflection and a depth of .faith that opens the door to the Holy Spirit ... the unity o:f the Church is not to be brought about by human effort but can he effected only by the Holy Spirit" (121). And he implicitly and explicitly turns to the authority of •scripture to viailidatehis own positions on numerous occasions. Thus, " Scripture and the Fathers belong together as do word and answer. The two are not identical ... do not possess the same normative power. The word is always first; the response second-the order is not

to be reversed" (147; also 134, 321). But by contending that scripture is a tra:dition which receives its validation *from* the Ohurch (91, 116) his thinking causes him to appeal for his authority rto an historically and culturally conditioned universal church rather than to an historicaMy and culturally conditioned bible. The liberals (on historicist grounds) reject the bible as the sole norm for truth just because it is so conditioned. The ·appeal to the Church as ·authority in these circumstances will not solve this proiblem. Even the appeal to the early Fathers as authentic interpreters of scripture and as teachers of the ancient Church who "!'epresent a common past that, precisely as such, may well be la promise for the future" (140) wiH not solve this problem. For ·the question remains: Can the differences between Catholics .and Protestants simply be explained by saying that !'eads scripture " under the tutelage of different Fathers" (143)? What makes these Fathers "the theological teachers of the undivided Church" (147)?

While Ratzinger's solution is far more theologically relevant than historicist approaches, it would have been stronger had he held consistently that what makes scripture the Word of God (i.e. holy) is God Himself in his action *ad extra.* Then we could say that .scripture is normative for traditions which claim authority and that the Nicaean bishops spoke authoritatively because their thinking was determined by the God of the bible in a new historical moment; Constantius distorted the bible by using scriptural texts to say what the bible does not in fact say. Thus, it is neither rt:he Church nor experience which detel'IIIlinestruth. So, while contemporary liberals might .accuse Ratzinger himself o[*biblicism* (as he properly insists the bible must be read litemlly); he charges Constantius with biblicism and never realily explains why .scripture is normative in a way which solves this problem.

Philosophy and Theology

The relationship between philosophy and theology surfaces several times in *Principles* and in Nichols (cf. *QQ5ff.* and Q79ff.);

it is especially interesting in Ratzinger's analysis and critique of Karl Rahner's thought.

Ratzinger insists that there must be an ontological continuity that embraces the differences of history and believes that contemporary Protestantism misses the point here (161). He assesses Protestant theology by grouping Moltmann, the early Barth and Bultmann together claiming that all three make history itself the answer to the problem of being and time (161). In fact, of course, Barth rejected Bultmann and criticied Moltmann for doing just this. Still, as Nichols indicates, Ratzinger' s own view that Jesus *alone* is the Christ because "the person *is* the office and the office *is* the person", was influenced by Karl Barth as he ·Was introduced to his writings by Hans Urs von Balthasar (Nichols, 123). Ratzinger's own perception of Barth's doctrine of ana.Iogy as " sheer paradox ", (Nichols, 281-82. Cf. also *Princ.iples,* 267, n. 51 and 173ff.) and as an apparently unsuccessful attempt " to shake off philosophical concepts", disregards the fact that Barth never attempted to eliminate philosophical concepts from his theology but instead argued that the *method* of theology was dictated by the God of scripture and not by ·any philosophical concept of being derived apart from faith in the triune God.

Ratzinger's search leads him to wonder about the correct relationship between the general and the particular. Turning to Rahner's *Hearers of the Word* as "·the most effective and surely the most penetrating " attempt to solve this problem (163ff.), he ·asks: "Can a particular history justly claim to be salvation not just for a particular historical period but for man *qua* man?" (163). Ratzinger accepts the first stage of Rahner's answer to this question which perceives "man as a hearer of the word . . . who by reason of his nature, keeps watch for what can come to him only in freedom and from without ... Christian history thus loses its extrinsic character " (163). The second stage, however, which became " the principal motif " of Rahner',s later work" becomes problematic" (163) because Rahner *identifies* salvation *history* with " the human race as a

whole " and makes Christianity itself co-extensive with human history in accordance with the universal idea that Christianity is what is universally present in the realm of reflection (164ff.). For Rahner " 'He who ... accepts his existence ... says ... Yes to Christ,'" (165). Thus, "To be a Christian is to accept one's existence unconditionally" (165£.). Ratinger asks: " Is it true that Christianity adds nothing to the universal but merely makes it known?" Whifa Rahner could answer that his point of departure is "that :which is inconceivably new, the *Event* that *is* the Savior" (166), Ratzinger leaves open whether this analysis solves the conceptual question of the particular and the universal Christology. Instead he criticizes the resultant spirituality by noting that this thinking leads to "self-affirmation. To he a Christian is to accept oneself" (166). In a brilliant analysis which cannot he captured here Ratzinger holds that Rahner has freed Christianity from the "burden of Christian particularity" and "is led into the freedom of universal philosophy and its rationalism ... The weary Christian who groans under the Christian history and ecclesial bonds is also freed by these theories. Self--acceptance-just being human- is all that is required" (167). This leads to "pseudo-liberation" (167). Ratzinger replies: "Just to accept one's humanity as it is (or, even, 'in its ultimate unconditionality ') -that is not redemption; it is damnation " (167). The comHary of this insight is later expressed in the statement that learning without truth-which comes from God -is death (341).

There is nothing shallow in this critique of Rahner's thought. Ratzinger firmly rejects any attempt to ground "the core of Christianity" in "reason" because when that occurs Christianity always becomes co-extensive with the affirmations of human reason and Christ becomes unnecessary. Recognizing that Rahner is not responsible for the general arguments of liberation theology Ratzinger notes, however, that those arguments are based on insights ,perfectly compatible with Rahner's presuppositions.

Ultimately, Ratzinger regards Rahner's key error as follows:

> a synthesis that combines being and history in a single, compelling logic of the understanding becomes, by the universality of its claim, a philosophy of necessity, even though this necessity is then explained as a process of freedom ... In relation to the concept of God, human freedom seems actually to have been absorbed into divine freedom . . . (170) .

Ratzinger argues that the corrective here can only be the person of Christ as the " Event of the new and unexpected " (170-71) . This section is followed by an anailysis of the notions of salvation history, metaphysics and eschatology and then by a masterful presentation of the necessity and function of the resurrection in theology. Here Ratzinger suggests his own answer to Rahner's IdealiSllll lies in the power of the Resurrection which faith acknowledges (184-190); yet this analysis is not without its puz22lingstatements, i.e., "The sentence ' Jesus has risen ' thus expresses that primitive experience on which all Christian faith is grounded; all further confessions are interpretations of this original one" (184). It is certainly quite true that a11 iurther confessions are bound in this way, hut is faith grounded on this experience or on the God revealed to the disciples in that experience? In view Oif Bultmann's well known interpretation of the resurrection, greater precision seems called for here. also states that Christian theology " must be la theology of Resurrection before it is a theology of the justification of the sinner; it must he a theology of Resurrection before it is a theology of the metaphysical Sonship of God" (184). Is it not the case that the mystery of redemption (justification) began with the incarnation, included Jesus' entire life history and was complete with the resurrection? In light of Pannenberg's Ohristology it is at least conceivable that this kind of thinking could lead to the idea that Christology today cannot presuppose Jesus' divinity; [7] this led

[7] *Jesus-God and Man.* By Wolfhart Pannenberg. Translated by Lewis L. Wilkins and Duane A. Priebe. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1977), pp. 34-5.

Pannenberg to conclude that" Apart from Jesus' resurrection, it would not be true that from the very beginning of his earthly way God was one ,with this man. That is true from all eternity because of Jesus' resurrection." [8] A note which Ratzinger added to the end of his treatment of the resurrection shows an awareness of this problem.

> I would stress more strongly today than I have in these pages the irreplaceability and preeminence of the ontological aspect and, therefore, of metaphysics as the basis of any history . . . The fact that the first article of faith forms the basis of all Christian belief includes ... the ontological statements and the indispensability of the metaphysical, that is, of the Creator God who *is* before all becoming (190).

Here once again we are at *the very heart* of theological inquiry. If Rahner was led to confuse the freedom of God with the necessary self-affirmation of creatures because he failed to note that the limit of reflection and of Christian existence was Chdst *alone,* then the door to a self-grounded philosophy or spirituality be closed to Ohristians principle.

But Ratzinger clearly has not closed that door tight enough. For, though he appropriately insists that" man finds his center of gravity, not inside; but outside himself" (171) he does not hold this insight consistently and concludes that "the tension between ontology and history has its foundation in the tension within human nature itself, which must go out of itself in order to find itself; it has its foundation in the Mystery of God " (171) .

But is it not true that one can folly accept the insight that we must go *out* of ourselves to find ourselves without ever being converted to the Christian God? And if that is a possibility then, at least to that extent, Ratzinger has accepted Rahner's presupposition which Ieads logical:ly to the very criticism he makes of Rahner's viewpoint. Thinking this way Ratzinger believes the answer to this problem is to be found in a "spirituality of conversion of ec-stasy *[Elcstase],* of self-tran-

s Ibid., pp. 320-321.

scendence, which is also one of Ra:hner's basic concepts, although, for the most part, he loses sight of its concrete meaning in his synthesis" (169). His own intention is to explain that God's action is "the true formula of human existence, which has its 'in-itself-ness' outside itself and can find its true center only in *ex-is>tere,*in going-out-from itself ... Thus it implies, of necessity, that ' is ' that faith soon formulated explicitly: Jesus *is* Christ, God *is* man" (190).

The *real* probJem then see!Ills to be that Ratzinger claims that the tension between ontology and history is grounded both in " human nature " *as well* as outside human nature and in God. But if we know 'that human .self-acceptance can neither he the starting point nor the conclusion of Christian self-awareness, then it is just because we recognize our *constant need* to turn from ourselves to God. In this case the mystery of God cannot be found *in human nature* itself or even as the logically necessary result of such experience; thus, any study of conversion or self-transcendence cannot disclose it. Ratzinger thinks it can (169) while he criticizes Rahner for solving the problem of being and time according to Hegel's basic error which lay in assuming that there is a " spiritual world formula" (169).

Because of the enormous scope of Ratzinger's work we must limit these final remarks to the relation between philosophy ·and theology and between experience and faith as they relate to Ratzinger's critique of Rahner. Ratzinger argues that although philosophy is not revelation, God cannot be known *only from revelation* (316). Here he seems to want to avoid the idea that creatures (who engage in philosophy) are not really related to God by God precisely as creatures. They reason and philosophize about God both before and after revelation. Thus, for Ratzinger, the object of theology is God and not salvation history or the Church (316-17). " Christian faith is not to be divorced :from reason" and faith" cannot fall under the absolute power of enlightened reason and its methods" Yet his assumption that *theology* and *philosophy* in some sense :mutua1ly condition each other (316)

subverts the strength of his initial insight. For if God is the object of theology, then for philosophy to avoid solving the question of truth in an Hegelian or Marxist way, one would have to argue consistently that God *alone* determines the truth of creaturely thought and experience. If, however, the objective referent ·of philosophy, i.e., universal being, (360) [which being we all agree need not be seen as deriving its truth from the pru·ticular history of Christ] can *mutually* oondition the objective referent of theology, i.e., the triune God, then, to that extent, we do not *need* the particular revelation of Christ except as we can see him verifying the we already defined without him. But then Ratzinger's very method would lead once again to the conclusions he criticies in Rahner.

A few brief examples must suffice to illustrate this point. Speaking of parables as " reality itself " Ratzinger argues that " it is the parable that gives [religious] e:hperience its proper depth and reveals what is hidden in things themselves" (345). "Reality is self-transcendence" (345). Thus knowledge of God resides in " existential experience " " to say that God is trinitarian means ... to confess that he is self-transcendence, 'unselfishness ', and, consequently, that he can be known only what reflects his own nature ..." Knowing God, then refers to ·a "comprehensive process in which man becomes transparent ... in which he learns to give himself" (350). This structure of religious experience is supposed to reveal that" the Cross redeems " (350) .

All of this analysis leads finally to the conclusion that "one must know oneself as one really is if one is to know God . . . Admittedly ... it could be said that it is only by first knowing God that one can properly know oneself " (354) . And finally "Catechesis must lead to self-knowledge ... Its goal is *conversion,* that conversion of man that results in his standing face to face with himself. Conversio ('conversion,' metanoia) is *identical* (my emphasis) with self-knowledge, and self-assertions are incompatible with Ratzinger's own statement knowledge is the nucleus of all knowledge" (355). Yet these

that to accept oneself as one really is is not redemption but damnation. Here we have a developed definition of conversion in which God, repentance, faith and the kingdom play no determinative role. These conclusions then ,are factually identical to those which Ratzinger criticizes in Rahner. And they follow logically from the presupposition that there is a "genuinely supernatura1 experience" (35£) by which we can assume a knowledge and experience of God by positing an identity of revelation, grace and faith with our self-transcending experiences and then with our self-knowledge. In other words Ratzinger really believes that" the question about oneself becomes a question about God" (354).

From where then do we learn the way we " really" are? If it is from our self-knowledge then there is no real need for God who comes to us from without. If it is from God alone then *conversion* simply would make no sense without *first* acknowledging that the kingdom was and is revealed in Jesus and through his witnesses. *Conversion* would only disclose truth to the extent that we freely admitted our need for God and knowledge of him *first* and then, in light of revelation, proceed to the knowledge of ourselves as reconciled sinners. This is not to overlook the fact that earlier in the book he described conversion *[metanoia]* in terms of obedience and faith (60) . And appealing to Dietrich von Hildebrand he further describes this as " standing-firm in Christ," and as "identical with *pistis* (faith, constancy), a change that does not exclude constancy but makes it possible" (62). But here and Ratzinger's equation of philosophical self-transcendence with a movement toward " eternal Being " which he then equates with the biblical God saying that in the Old Testament " wisdom reveals itself as man's constant openness to the whole" and finally that "Only experience of God can yield knowledge of God " (360) he seems to presuppose exactly what he criticizes in Rahner. Moreover, Ratzinger writes "The inner precondition for penance is precisely the affirmation of oneself, of reality as such" (372) and stresses that penance does not require" the destruc-

tion of one's identity, but the finding of it" (373). Still, what comes first, affirnnation of self as the condition of repentance or acknowledgement of grace as a pre-condition for finding one's identity? It cannot be gainsaid that only experience of God can yield knowledge of God. But if fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom then that means we cannot begin to speak of an experience of God without first believing in the God revealed in scripture and this God cannot in fact be equated with eternal being which we may know and describe apart from such revelation.

Whatever difficulties may exist in Ratzinger's method, his insistence that neither progressives nor conservatives " create " truth but can only receive it through scripture and the tradition (as the triune God encounters them in faith) is a much needed corrective to both liberal and conservative theologies which tend to make truth a construct of historical consciousness (ignoring the *regula fidei)* or a construct of tradition in a way that ignores the presence and action of God today.

It is fitting therefore to conclude these reflections on Ratzinger's challenging and admirable contribution to contemporary theology with his own words expressed in the Epilogue:

> Certainly we cannot return to the past, nor have we any desire to do so. But we must be ready to reflect anew on that which, in the lapse of time, has remained the one constant. To seek it without distraction and to dare to accept, with joyful heart and without diminution, the foolishness of truth-this, I think, is the task for today and for tomorrow: the true nucleus of the Church's service to the world ... (393)

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BOOK REVIEWS

Lex et Libertas: Freedom and Law according to St. Thomas .Aquinas. Edited by L. J. ELDERS and K. HEDWIG. Vatican City: Pontificia Accademia di S. Thommaso, 1987. Pp. 286. L. 30.000 (paper).

This 30th volume of Antonio Piolanti's *Studi Tomis-tici* contains the papers given at the fourth Rolduc Symposium (1986) on the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. Five of the papers are in French, and seven in German. The other eight, plus a "Preface" (pp. 7-11) with a brief summary of each of the papers, are in English. There is no point in duplicating the summaries. Still less is there possibility of giving an appropriate critique of each of the articles in a short review, since in justice each would have to be assessed against the individual writer's own background and in accord with his special intents. The most that can be done is to touch on some general issues brought to foe fore in the volume.

Of notable interest is Roberto Busa's paper on the methods and use of his *Index Thomistieus.* By direct investigation Busa (p. 36) finds that the ·combination *lex et libertas* is nowhere used in St. Thomas, and that its import is not indicated anywhere by the relevant conjunctions and prepositions in the *Concordantia altera.* Rather than being opposed notions "libertas est ecx: amore legis" (p. 36). Busa also notes "that in the works of Aquinas not a single instance of *conscientia dubia* or *conscientia incerta occurs"* (p. 133, n. 31). Jude P. Dougherty's "Aquinas on Punishment" (pp. 160-170) is a timely and solid article on that issue in .today's social circumstances. In regard to the death penalty the article concludes: " Given the views of Aquinas on punishment, it would be difficult to argue that Catholic social thought requires an abolitionist mindset" (p. 169). In this respecl Aquinas " remains unchallenged by the data uncovered by contemporary empirical study" (p. 170). Richly informative Scriptural and theological studies by J. P. *M.* van der Ploeg (pp. 185-199) and Johannes Stohr (pp. 219-241) deal with the Old Law and Aquinas's treatment of it. Four shorter articles (pp. 243-280) discuss Aquinas's moral doctrine in relation to the N.ew Law.

The rest of the papers are in the more professedly ethical realm, on sensitive topics of concern today in the field of Catholic morality. They maintain the currently accepted level of discussion for philosophical wo.rk in that area. A masterly article by S. Pinckaers (pp. 15-24) locates the background against which these discussions hav.e been articulated. In that setting "liberty" and "law" were projected as though they stood in sharp contrast to each other. The basic problem then lay in the struggle

to uphold on the one hand individual rights against encroachment on the part of law, and on the other hand to safeguard law against erosion by individual claims. Pinckaers shows how drastically this attitude is *opposed* to the mentality of Aquinas, for whom the liberty at stake may be called "quality liberty" *(liberte de qiialite-p.* 19), as contrasted with " liberty of indifference." In consequence no opposition of law to liberty is felt in Aquinas, but rather a tension that evokes continual progress in moral life. Possibility to sin has accordingly no essential place in liberty, for liberty is found in its fullness in God (p. 23). The two profoundly different moral structures, namely that of St. Thomas and that of modern moralities of obligation, have their roots respectively in these two *opposed* conceptions of libe11ty, the " quality liberty" of the virtues and the nominalistic "liberty of indifference" (pp. 23-24). But despite this clear delination of the problem by Pinckaers the other papers remain far from achieving a breakthrough in regard to the conception of freedom. One article giants that though some things are forbidden we have in the vastly greater number of our acts *(bei der uberwiegenden Zahl imserer Handlungen-p.* 245) the freedom to do or to avoid. Another paper concludes (p. 21) that today's complicated moral problems cannot be solved onesidedly on the strength of either a "virtues ethic " (*Tugendethik)* or a "laws ethic" (*Gesetzesethik).* At the root of this difficulty lies the tendency to base moral notions ultimately on objects of theoretical consideration, instead of upon radic.ally different starting points. From this angle the discussions do not escape the restraining clutches of the past four centuries as they cover the spectrum of moral issues under debate in Catholic circles today. The papers are sensitive to actuality (cf. *pp.* 7; 82). Yet even in the year and a half since ,the Symposium actuality has been pushing on. Homosexuality, which with its related problems is focused upon so painfully at the present moment, receives only a passing mention (p. 234). Dissent, long a sore point hut squarely faced in the recent papal visit to America, rates merely a couple of brief references (p. 236, nn. 64 & 65). Artificial insemination with its many consequent problems is not discussed. But apart from these lacunae the coverage of topics seems adequate.

What is noticably absent through these discussions is the use of the original Aristotle to elucida,te Aquinas's moral reasoning. Though Aristotle is listed more frequently than any other author (p. 281), with even more numerous references to Aristotelian doctrines, the Aristotle put to use is the neutral Aristotle of Scholastic tradition. Freedom is regarded as merely the *condition* of correct decision *(Bedingung des richtigen Vorsatzes-p.* 114), whereas in the text of Aristotle choice is the *source (arche-Metaph.,* 6.l.1025b18-26; *EN,* 6.21139a31) of moral conduct. The Stagirite is viewed as allowing that " natural law is in some way variable" (p. 180), while his own assertion is that no matter how fire may burn

the same in Greece and in Persia *aU* natural justice is variable *(E N,* 5.7.1134b24-33). Aristotle's radical difference of starting points for theoretical and for practical knowledge would render inadmissible the Humean problem of deriving· the " ought" from the "is," a problem that is nonexistent for Aquinas. There should accordingly be no question of derivation of moral principles from fixed na,tures, as in the assertion *"ought* ontologically depends on-and in that sense certainly may he said to be derived from-is,, (p. 47; cf. p. 202), or of any subalternation of moral to theoretical science as in Neoscholastic tradition, even though moral science continually makes use of theoretical knowledge. These Aristotelian considerations likewise obviate the difficulty encountered in " the surprisingly minimalistic appraisal St. Thomas gives of the cognitive value of moral science " (p. 140), or his "lack of concern to distinguish *philosophia moralis* from *prudentia"* (p. 49, n. 22). They locate the source and nature of moral obligation in the *lcalon,* the ever-changing high point of excellence that without theoretical rigidity keeps murder, theft, and adultery absolutely wrong as circumstances incessantly change. They show why the free person is bound by regulations even in the small details of conduct, whereas doing one's thing at random is the hallmark of the slave or beast.

Aquinas's moral reasoning was steeped in Aristotle. No matter how much Aristotle in important matters may become mute without Thomas, it is not too much to say conversley that without Aristotle the vocal culmination achieved in Aquinas's philosophical procedure cannot be understood. True, Aristotle had no doctrine of natural law or of con-s,cience, yet even here his help is required for understanding why the concept of natural law cannot be derived immediately from things but only throug·h participation in an antecedent eternal law (cf. pp. 69; 81; 137; 173), .that is, from something already in the practical order. Similarly Aristotle is required for understanding the contrast between right reason and conscience (*recta ratio imd individiiellem Gewisseii-p.* 147), and for seeing why *christianitas* (p. 154) is needed to explain the supremacy of conscience. Moreover, his doctrines of deliberation and of correct habituation as the measure of practic.al truth will assure a practical bearing for conscience, against the interpretation of its role as "purely speculative" (p. 127). "Purely speculative" does no.t at all follow from Aquinas's statement that the judgment of conscience consists "in pura cognitione" *(De ver.,* 17.1.ad 4m; Leonine ed., XXII,517.335-336), for cognition can be practical as well as speculative. Nor need " legislative conscience" (p. 127) be regarded as "unfortunate." Aquinas is willing to acknowledge that conscience can be a law *(De Ver.,* 17.1.ad lm in contr.; XXII, 518.378-379). Finally, Aristotle's notion of practical truth provides the basis for judgment through connaturality and affectivity {*compassio-p.* 75).

The volume has indexes of names (pp. 281-283) and of topics (pp. 284-286). It is neatly edited, though a considerable number of typographical errors could have been caught in the proofreading. It is especially welcome today as a living instance of the spirit in which wholehearted and appreciative immersion in the teachings of ,the ecclesiastical magisterium (cf. pp. 238-240) can go hand in hand with *Glastnost* openness to philosophical and theological scholarship. Its discussions are interesting, lively, and thoughtcprovoking from start ·to finish. Nevertheless the overall impression left by the volume may be described in an observation made in the "Preface" (p. 7) about its lexicographical study but applicable also to the general understanding of its topic. It indicates " how much work still lies ahead of us."

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Richard of Cornwall and the Tradition ·of Oxford Theology. By PETER RAEDTS, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1987.

While the efforts of scholars such as D. Callus, A. G. Little, F. Pelster und W. A. Hinnebusch prepared the framework for a study of thirteenth century theology at the University of Oxford, the last decade has contributed much to fill in the details of this history by careful research and critical editions. New contributions by scholars like the late B. Smalley and the late 0. Lewry, by J.I. Catto and R. Southern, as well as editions of various works by Robert Grosseteste and Robert Kilwardby have added to our knowledge of philosophical developments at Oxford in the generations before Scotus and Ockham. These newer studies have been eomplemented now by the Dutch Jesuit, Peter Raedts, in his well documented book on "Richard Rufus of Cornwall and the Tradition of Oxford Theology"·

The first part of the work seeks to sort out information and opinions on the life and work of this mid-century Franciscan theologian. Although the sources are sparse, Raedts presents a plausible picture of Richard's character and career, including the reasons for his at first delayed, then abrupt return to Paris. Raedts' arg·uments are convincing for the authenticity and priority (ca. 1250) of the *Commentary on the Sentences,* preserved chiefly in Balliol Ms. 62, and for its relationship to the "Abbreviation" which Richard began of Bonaventure's *Commentary on the Sentenoes* some six years later. Readts can show how, in the points where the *Abbreviation* disagrees with or supplements Bonaventure, Richard

often has drawn upon his own earlier work as a source. The author masters the difficult problems arising from the excessive attribution in recent years of minor works to Richard and argues convincingly for the authenticity of some six disputed questions and one treatise, all quite early works, most of which are preserved in a famous manuscript of the Sacro Convento in Assisi known to have been used by Bonaventure.

The second part of the work seeks to examine Richard's relationship especially to Robert Grosseteste, whose close ties to the Franciscans remained strong even after his election to the episcopacy ended his teaching apostolate to the Friars Minor. While Grosseteste opposed the development of systematics outside the immediate context of biblical exegesis (as in a Summa of systematically ordered questions or in a Commentary on ,the Sentences of Peter Lombard), Richard seems to have been the first Franciscan to compose a Commentary on the Sentences, though perhaps with somewhat less conviction of the advantages of this method than the Dominican Richard Fishacre had shown shortly before in his own Commentary. Raedts contrasts Rufus with Grosseteste and (unfortunately to a much lesser extent) with Fishacre not only in the question of theological method, but also in the areas of creation and the motives of the incarnation, as well as in the related problem of the freedom of will in God and humankind. Raedts sees in Rufus a concern for the arbitrary freedom .of God and the contingency of creation and redemption, which foreshadows the positions of Ockham.

One .of the few weaknesses of this valuable work is the excessively negative judgment about the lack of influence of Richard Rufus on subsequent theology (p. 10). In the preface to his edition of " Robert Kilwardby: Quaestiones in Librum Primum Sententiarum" (Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Kommission fiir die Herausgabe ungedruckter Texte aus der mittelalterlichen Geisteswelt, Bd. 13, Miinchen 1986), Johannes Schneider indicated how much the Dominican's work had benefited from Richard's Abbreviation of Bonaventure. Should Schneider's findings be confirmed by the comparison with Richard's original Commentary and with the better manuscript tradition (Vatican and Assisi) of the *.Abbreviation,* then the significance of Raedts' topic would be all the mor.e evident. Certain features, however, which the author considers to be so uniquely characteristic of Richard Rufus as to be of use in the text critique, e.g. a difference or explicit indecision in systematic questions (pg. 49, 56, 67), might prove to be rather itypical of a certain scholastic habit held by many theologians, perhaps especially in Britain. Certain parallels can be found for example in Kilwardby, though expressed with somewhat more reserve, as in the frequently used formula : "Vel forte votest dici . . ·".

Raedts' work underlines once again how valuable it would be to pro-

vide critical editions of the contributions by Richard Rufus and·-even more important-Richard Fishacre to the theology of Oxford and the continent

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The Logic of Being: Historical Studies. Edited by SIMO KNUUTTIL.A and J.A.AKKO HINTIKK.A. Synthese Historical Library, 28. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985. Pp. xvi + 300 pp. $54.00 (cloth) .

Unlike many examples of the genre, this collection of articles on the concept of being from Parmenides to Frege should and will be profitably consulted by philosophers of various stripes. Whether read piecemeal or straight through, these investigations carry on an open-ended dialogue in which historians of philosophy, philosophers of logic, and semanticists can participate equally. The editors are to be commended for presenting eleven articles (about an equal number of previously published and new studies) that are generally complementary to one another. What makes the collection so useful and interesting·, however much one disagrees with the thesis, is its concentrated focus on the difficulties of attributing to philosophers from Plato to Kant the Frege-Russell view that verbs for being are multiply ambiguous.

It will perhaps be useful 'to begin with the concluding essay,· L. Haaparanta's study " On Frege's Concept of Being," where the ambiguity thesis is discussed in greatest detail. She presents Frege's well-known articulation of the meanings of the verb ' to be ' as follows :

(1) the is of identity
(2) the is of predication
(3) the is of existence, expressed by means either
    (i) of the existential quantifier and the symbol for identity or
    (ii) of the existential quantifier and the symbol for predication
(4) the is of class-inclusion or generic implication

Two points are worth noting. First, most of the contributors explore the ambiguity with reference to the *is* of identity, predication, and existence. Sceond, while ithe verb has several different *meanings* for Frege, most of the other philosophers discussed distinguish, at most, different *uses.* Many of the arguments against applying Frege's ambiguity thesis to earlier philosophers depend on this distinction between meaning and use; I will assess its cogency in specific contexts as they arise.

In Frege's analysis the crucial distinction is between the first-order copulative *is* and existence, a second-order concept. Since in Frege's view existence is a property of a first-order concept, it must lack all content. Haaparanta sums up the position well: "We *presuppose* the existence of objects; we do not *say* that they exist. For Frege, every predication carries with itself the claim of existence" (277). Influenced by Kant's argument that *u* existence is not predicate of a thing itself," Frege is willing to regard it as a proper concept, but not a first-order concept. This superordination of existence sounds reminiscent of Aristotle's focus on predication and identity at the expense of existence (here it is better to speak of subordination, as the studies of Dancy and Hintikka on Aristotle indicate), but Frege's sharp distinction between concepts and objects is much closer to the Kantian position that we cannot know the essence of things in themselves. Thus, existence is a conceptual property though applicable to the instantiation of an object's properties; and identity statements, since they concern objects in themselves, are beyond the ken of reason. Certainly, Frege's thesis is " epistemologically motivated", as Haaparanta observes, but one is tempted to adopt a stronger conclusion: that the shift from an Aristotelian, or even Thomistic, ontology to Kantian epistemology contributes greatly to the emergence of the ambiguity thesis and renders it inapplicable to ancient and medieval metaphysics, even if, as Hintikka argues ("Kant on Existence and Predication"), Kant does not clearly distinguish different meanings of *is*·.

The first four articles present a multi-faceted assault on the contemporary penchant for reading the Frege-Russell ambiguity thesis into the Greek philosophers. C. H. Kahn's "Retrospect on the Verb ' To Be' and the Concept of Being " is a useful precis of his indispensable work on the Greek verb for being. His particular concern is to further the "campaign against the uncritically ' existential ' interpretation of *is* in Plato and Aristotle." The systematic subordination of existence to predication reflects, on his view, the nature and structure of the Greek language itself, particularly in the archaic, pre-philosophical focus on the copulative use of *is.* Though considerably more complex, Platonic usage grows out of this pre-philosophical soil. Thus, he sees in Plato a convergence of three uses: (i) the definitional copula (whatness), (ii) veridical being, and (iii) stative-invariant being. Further, and it is this tendency that confounds the modern interpreter, the copulative, existential, and veridical usages are often interchangeable, at least in the middle dialogues. I find nothing to quarrel with here, though I think there are dangers implicit in Kahn's analysis which come into the open in his discussion of Parmenides. The ambiguities in Parmenide's speculation on *to on* derive in Kahn's view from the category shift from the veridical to the existential

notion of being, a tendency he finds in Plato and Aristotle as well. Once the shift is diagnosed as logically untenable, the way is open (and well-traveled) to reduce substantial realities to propositional objects. If, therefore, as Kahn argues, the " shifts and ambiguities" of *is* in Parmenides do not require us to discern the precise distinctions of the Frege-Russell thesis, then we have strong grounds for doubting his designation of the veridical use as primary.

In "Identity and Prediction in Plato " Benson Mates focuses on the di:fficulities commentators have had with self-predication and the Forms. Mates claims that neither attacks on self-predication (on the grounds that it displays a colossal logical error) nor defences of the Platonic position (that self-predication is an identity statement) are well founded. His argument is simply that !there is one primitive sense of *is* in all Platonic statements. Hence, the predicate 'is beautiful' in the *Symposium* must be used in the same sense of beautfiul things. as in the case of beauty itself. Maintaining this position in the face of Platonic acceptance of degrees of existence, however distasteful the theory is to modern philosophers, seems to me difficult at best. Moreover, self-predication for the Forms must be understood as some sort of definitional identity, otherwise it will be impossible to distinguish predication for the Forms and predications made of particulars. Rejecting Mates's position of self-predication does not, however, force us to import a distinct existential use of *is* into Platonic texts.

The contributions of R. Dancy ("Aristotle and Existence") and J. Hintikka ("The Varieties of Being in Aristotle") both wrestle with the famous Aristotelian doctrine of *pros hen* ambiguity: i.e. that being is said in many ways but with regard to one thing-ousia (substance). For Dancy /a separate existential use of *is* (even in the case of essential predication) is ruled out *(contra* G. E. L. Owen) because" to be simply" means "to be something" (Kahn makes the same argument). Hintikka discusses several texts which clearly establish that Aristotle does employ the purely existential is, but he adds, convincingly I think, that the existential and predicative uses are absolute and relative uses of same notion. This position accords better with *pros hen* ambiguity than Dancy's attempt to distill Aristotelian usage to the predicative alone. Also appealing is Hintikka's argument that Aristotle presents different uses, but not different meanings, of the verb 'to be'. The Frege-Russell ambiguity thesis is thus not applicable to Aristotle because radically different ontologies are at work: in the former facts and particulars are distinguished, whereas Aristotle treats them on a par. Hintikka then ventures to argue that Aristotle may have been a better semanticist of natural languages than Frege and Russell, primarily on the basis of the analogy he discerns between game-theoretical sematics and Aristotle's categories. This is perhaps the most valuable and stimulating article in the collection, though Hintikka left

me unconvinced that essential predication in Arsitotle is an identity statement.

The four remaining pieces address the logic of being in medieval philosophy. Stan Ebbesen's entertaining "The Chimera's Diary" takes the reader on an extended tour of the views of philosophers, from archaic Greece to Ockham, on non-existent things, narrated in the first person by the chimera. There is nothing really new here, but the abundant discussions of ancient and medieval philosophers on this interesting problem are quoted liberally with witty comments from the chimera, who concludes his diary in these words " after the proposition which states my self-identity has been declared false I feel too tired to fake up the discussion." Klaus Jacobi demonstrates that the reason why the ambiguity thesis is irrelevant to Abelard is his focus on the function of the copulative *is* in theories of predication, and particularly why and how ' to be ' can be substituted for inflected verb forms.

Two articles address the problem of being in Aquinas, but are rather disappointing. Herman Weidemann rightly observes that the actuality sense of being is its focal meaning, but he fails, in my view, to stress adequately the importance of the distinction between essential and existential being in Aquinas. However, his survey of the other uses of being is valuable: he finds a tendency to assimilate the predicative and identity uses of *is;* the copulative use refers to the existential; and, :finally, Aquinas's *aeqitivocatio entis* is not true ambiguity. In "Being *qua* Being in Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus," Simo Knuuttila provides a more accurate account of the analogy of being and the distinction between essence and existence, but this and the discussion of Scotus's univocal concept of being break no new ground; moreover, he does not address the relevance of the ambiguity thesis. For the same reason I will pass by Lilli Alanen's penetrating study of Descartes's argument for dualism and its medieval antecedents. One wonders why it was included.

The book is handsomely produced, though "typos " abound. The bibliographies appended to each article make the book especially valuable for further study of this central problem in the history of metaphysics.

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On Moral Character: A Practical Guide to .Aristotle's Virtues and Vices. By JODY PALMOUR. Washington, D.C.: The .Archon Institute for Leadership Development, 1986. Pp. 348. $24.95 cloth, $13.95 paper.

During the last two decades many moral philosophers have made a "turn to the virtues." Perhaps we should call it a "return" to the virtues, for these philosophers emphasize the role of virtues and vices in moral theory in ways reminiscent of ancient Greek and Roman, and pre-modern Judeo-Christian moral philosophy. What began with a trickle of pub-(lications in the 1960s has grown in the last few years to a flood of monographs, journal articles, and papers at professional meetings. Why all of this renewed interest in character .ethics, or virtue One reason is the belief that within the virtue tradition there is a more adequate moral psychology and grounding for moral education than can be found in modern theories focused on rights, contracts, or preference-satisfaction.

It seems odd, given this professed reason for the scholarly interest in character ethics, that few professional philosophers write introductions to virtue theory for an audience of undergraduates, secondary students, or the general population. Dr. Palmour attempts to remedy this with *On Moral Character*. He writes for "anyone trying to work with people and ibring out what is best in them in [the fields of] education, training, management, counseling or writing" (p. 12).

As the subtitle indicates, this book is an introductory survey of the virtues and vices which Aristotle treats. In eight chapters with practical titles like "Handling Painful and Destructive Things" and "Handling S.elf-Respect and Status" Palmour comments on the catalogue of individual traits of character which .Aristotle discusses in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, books III and IV. Each section begins with a quotation from Aristotle, and the author's commentary follows. As he does not wish to intrude on the reader's confrontation with .Aristotle, Palmour generally limits his comments to restatement and illustration. There are two exceptions. First, in a few instances he quotes one of Aristotle's philosophical opponents in order to show that on the particular topic Aristotle is clearly correct. For example, a philosopher's comment ,that .Aristotle was a " supercilious prig " for saying that we should become indignant at the morally undeserved good fortune of others is shown to be off the mark when Aristotle's view is read in context (p. 317). Second, Palmour suggests, but does not develop, interesting correlations with psychoanalytic thought. For instance, he compares .Aristotle's account of generosity and related vices to character types identified by Freud (genital, anal, and oral), Fromm (productive, hoarding, exploitative, and receptive), and Ericson (pp. 157-158).

To enrich the material from the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the author weaves in Aristotle's analyses of emotions from the *Art of Rhetoric*. The account of fear and confidence *(Rh* II,5) becomes a preface to the discussion of courage *(NE* III,6-8); and similarly a discussion of anger and calmness *(Rh* II,2-3) introduces gentleness *(NE* IV,5), and comments on kindness and friendliness *(Rh* II,7 and 4) introduces friendship *(NE* IV,6). In the most ambitious and successful use of the *Rhetoric*, Palmour substitutes the analyses of pity, indignation, envy, spite, and contempt (Bihl II, 8-11) for the complicated *NE* account of justice *(NE* V). Palmour makes the point that a just person cares that each gets what he deserves, and so the just person is disposed to feel a range of emotions: pity when others suffer undeservingly from a distribution, and indignation when they prosper at someone else's expense in a distribution, etc.

Because Palmour limits his commentary to cautious restatement of Aristotle's views, there is very little in the body of the book with which I can disagree without taking on The Philosopher himself. And from disagreeing with Aristotle I will (mostly) refrain. The long (62 pp.) introduction is another matter.

A major theme of the introduction is that " Aristotle and his heirs opened and settled in this philosophical territory [the virtue tradition]" and " Aristotelian philosophers have a special responsibility as the keepers of the first principles and causes of this tradition" (p. 20). This gives too much credit to Aristotle and to his followers. Plato, the Stoics, Judeo-Christian scripture, Augustine, early medieval Christianity, Jane Austen, Barbara Pym, and Iris Murdoch, to name just a few, offer rich non-Aris.totelian reflections on the virtues and vices. The theme of Aristotelian ownership of the virtue tradition recurs when the philosophical community is divided into three parts-realist (Aristotelian), rationalist, and positivist-and the two non-Aristotelian groups are said to be morally unable to develop the tradition (pp. 55-64). Such a broad accusation goes beyond the evidence.

Palmour assumes that all moral virtues are the same sort of disposition, namely a " disposition to make choices based on one's own deliberations about what is required to promote the prop.er wish for human development in ourselves and others" (p. 52). In other words, each virtue is a preservative against desires, temptation, or emotions which might deflect one from making and implementing wise decisions. This strikes me as being too simple. Only some moral virtues, like courage, patience, self-control, and endurance, are preservatives. These are not motivational: we cannot be motivated by self control to do anything, but we are enabled by self-control to keep to our previously established goals in situations tempting us to easy or immediate pleasures. And these are not morally substantive: self-control is just as valua.ble to the selfish as to the moral person. Other moral virtues, such as justice, honesty, kindness, generosity,

and friendliness, are both substantive and motivational. Having the concerns central to these virtues is part and parcel of being moral, and these concerns motivate us. to establish goals and to act: we can be moved to by our sense of justice. (For more on the distinction between preservative virtues .and substantive and motivational virtues, and arguments why both types should be called "moral" virtues, see Robert C. Roberts, "Will Power and the Virtues," *The Philosophica:t Review* 93 (April 1984) : 227-47).

The author uses the terminology of Aristotle's do0trine of four causes to state that a moral virtue is a disposition : something in the environment is always the initial efficient cause, and the virtues (and vices) are the material cause on which the efficient cause acts to produce behavior (formal cause) aimed at a goal (final cause) (pp. 25-30). Understanding this schema is crucial for interpretating the texts throughout the book in which symbols represent .the four causes, as here: "Another characteristic of a courageous form of response (F) is that it is a *faoing* of not only the *threatening agent* (A) but also, by implioati-On,the person's own *wish, goal* or *purpose* (T) that is being threatened" (author's emphasis, p. 108).

Finally, one risk in writing for a wide and diverse audience is that your book will appear non-traditional in format and style. *On Moral Chair-acter* is a departure from a philosophy textbook format: there are only a few of the teaching aids common in introductory texts (no discussion questions or teaching plans, and only two suggestions for further reading) and none of the scholarly apparatus of advanced texts (no footnotes or bibliography, some incomplete references to recent scholarship being noted in social science format within the text). The argumentative style of most textbooks is missing too : Palmour rarely explains and criticizes other interpretations of Aristotle, and is uncritical of Aristotle, never considering alternative accounts of the individual virtues and vices. The commentary would be strengthened by a fruitful dialogue with the wealth of recent scholarship on the *Nicomachean Ethics* and on the individual traits of character which Aristotle discusses. In the body of the book the author does not try to motivate the reader's interest in new •topics before launching into quotation and commentary. On the positive side, two unorthodox features, the chapter outlines and frequent parenthetical references to Aristotle's work, are very helpful. Each chapter begins with a fulsome outline, and the numbered and lettered headings there are repeated throughout the text. References to the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Art of Rhetorio* lead the inquisitive reader to the primary sources.

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Human Embryo Research: Yes or No?. By CIBA FOUNDATION. London: Tavistock: 1987. Pp. xv + 232. $39.95 (cloth).

In 1984 a governmental commission formed under the directorship of Dame Mary Warnock studied proposed legislation for experimentation on human embryos for research purposes. It concluded that such experimentation should not be permitted ·after the fourteenth day of gestation. This book records a symposium conducted under the sponsorship of the CIBA foundation, an international scientific and educational organization which promotes research into biomedical and chemical research. The purpose of the symposium was to determine whether the guidelines set forth by the Warnock commission were legitimate and whether new criteria for allowing embryo r.esearch should be established. The book consists of eleven papers presented at a symposium on the ethics of embryo research along with panel discussions about the papers.

Technically, embryo research only concerns experimentation with human products of conception after the fourteenth gestational day. The first seven papers describe contemporary embryo research dealing with the diagnosis and mechanisms of infertility, its ti;eatment by *in vitro* fertilization, the diagnosis of genetic disease, the causes and avoidance of congenital malformations, and the improvement of contraception. The final four papers deal with the issues of the status of the human embryo in d:ffierent world religions, the moral arguments against human embryo research, and public attitudes on human embryo research.

The scientific papers are quite detailed, and they provided a good deal of information about the contemporary state of embryo research. But the papers on the ethics of human embryo research are rather partisan, and they do not adequately approach the difficult human and ethical issues involved in embryo research. One gains the impression from this book that the conference was heavily weighted in favor of those who sought virtually unqualified and unrestricted moral and legal permission for human .embryo research. The scientific papers seemed to go out of their way to argue that there was an unbreakable continuum in the process of transmitting life such that it could not be determined when human life began. For example, Professor Teresa Iglesias's suggestion that a new and distinct human life began when the process of fertilization began, and when the newly formed genetic material came to govern the development of the organism, rceeived little acknowledgment.

No papers were presented rejecting nontherapeutic research on human embryos, and .the papers presented by J. W. Bowker and by Bernard Williams argued in behalf of the moral licitness of unspecified forms of embryo research. Bowker claimed that there was no consensus to be found

among the various world religions on the moral status of the human embryo. He surveyed various religions such as Buddhism and concluded that the arguments in favor of the humanity or personhood of the embryo were not strong or persuasive. His point should not be accepted without caution, however, for he did not consider the claims made by western traditions such as Catholicism in behalf of the personhood of the embryo. 'F:or the claims of an oriental religion such as Buddhism are not as persuasive with Western, rationalist, liberal minds as they are with orientals.

Bowker argues that religious claims about the personhood of the unborn ';are weak since we do not claim that larvae are full grown fish or that acorns are oak trees. This is true, but on the other hand, we do not say that horse embryos are vegteables or pigs. Implied in Bowker's claim that the embryo is not a human being or a human person is the assumption that at some point in the gestation process the embryo undergoes a "species-transfer" or "class-transfer" from the biological category of non-human or non-personal to human and personal. This is difficult to accept as there is no precedent in other mammals for such a species or class transfer. Equine, bovine, and canine embryos are not considered to be anything than other than of the species of horse, pig, or dog, and there is no reason to believe that they engage in some sort of species transfer. And he does not explain why the human case alone exhibits this class- or species-transfer.

Bowker, like others who argue that there is a transfer from a lower species to full humanness or full personhood, does not state what sort of being it is that exists prior to this class transfer. He does not attempt to pinpoint the time, event, or occasion in which the embryo transfers from the subhuman or subpersonal to the human or personal even though it would seem that this would be important, as it would seem to be a moment of greater significance than either conception or birth. Yet no culture has ever attempted to celebrate the "hominization " or "personification" of the embryo.

Bernard Williams argues in his article that the arguments. against permitting human embryo research can be reduced to slippery slope and consequentialist arguments. He characterizes slippery slope arguments as holding that a certain action should not be permitted because it is very close to other kinds of actions, so close as a matter of fact that they cannot be distinguished. The slippery slope argument holds that an action should not be permitted because permitting it would necessarily permit other unacceptable actions that are indistiguishable from it. Williams also claims that the arguments against human embryo research are thus consequentialist, and their validity is thus questionable.

However, Williams mischaracterizes the " slippery slope " argument. It seems the fundamental claim of such arg11ments is that the principle

that legitimates the first action also legitimates other actions because they are identical in morally relevant terms. For example, permitting mercy killing of the newly born handicapped is based on the principle that some innocent human beings can be deliberately killed for their own good. This principle legitimizes mercy killing of the elderly because age is not a morally relevant distinguishing factor. It is not so much that there is little to differentiate these actions; there is nothing of moral relevance to distinguish the elderly and the young. The first action permits the action, not because it is so similar that it cannot be distinguished, but because there is no morally relevant distinction between killing the newborn handicapped and killing the elderly.

Williams also fails to understand that the stronger arguments against nontherapeutic embryo research are not consequentialist or utilitarian in nature. Rather they are based on the principle that the conceptus or the embryo is a human person and that nontherapeutic medical procedures should not be performed on human beings without their consent. It should be operatively presumed that human embryos are persons because of the difficulty involved in holding that they become persons after fertilization. .And, because they should be considered as persons, they should be treated as are other human persons, which means that one should not do to them what one would not wish to have done to one's self; performing nontherapeutic .experiments should not be permitted.

Williams argues that nontherapeutic research on human embryos should be permitted because the reasonable person would want to permit that sort of research on himself or herself in a similar situation. He invokes the doctrine of " substituted judgment" to justify this position, even though it has been criticized by many philosophers and legal scholars as mythical for the reason that the actual wishes and choices of the agent are unknown. It is pure conjecture that anyone would consent to nontherapuetic experimentation on himself when in so fragile a state. The type of nontherapeutic .embryo research now being considered poses more than minimal risk, and it is simply speculation that others would consent to it, and there is no sound theoretical basis for arguing that the vicarious consent of others is legitimate.

Bowker also invokes the principle of vicarious martyrdom to justify embryo research. He argues that the highest action that some human embryos could perform would be that of giving themselves up for the sake of science, and this would justify unconsented nontherapeutic research on them. But in the Christion context this is a serious twisting of the moral doctrine of martyrdom, which held it to be a self-sacrificial act of love to witness to religious beliefs and to gain salvation. Using human embryos to promote scientific research is not comparable to true martydom because embryo research does not bring salvation to the em-

bryo, and because of this it cannot be invoked as a principle to justify nontherapeutic research on them. To argue that they are martyrs for science is akin to arguing that the victims of Nazi research were marytrs for Nazi science.

Williams suggests that nontherapeutic research on human embryos must be permitted so that progress can be made to cure infertility, genetic defects, overpopulation, and other conditions. But one must ask what the ground of this obligation might be. With the world allegedly overpopulated, why should such measures be taken to promote fertility? With infertility supposedly on the rise among women who use it most frequently, why should there be more research into If the moral foundation for such research is the imperative to promote personal choice, why should the future possible choices of the human embryo be certainly violated for the sake of enabling others to exercise their choices? With these reasons cast aside, one suspects that the reason why the presenters at this conference believed there should not be ethical inhibitions on human embryo research is that they do not want scientific " progress " impeded by ethical concerns.

A question raised by the authors was whether it would be morally acceptaible for scientists to create .embryos for the purpose of research. Some objected that so doing would be immoral because the intention would be to create them in order to kill them. But others argued that the intention was to use them for research and their deaths were a foreseen consequence. Neither of these views seems to be quite accurate, for physically entailed by the research procedures to which they are subjected is their death, which makes their deaths direct. Their deaths are thus directly intended by the research, even though the motive for the actions 1by which they died would be to promote science. If this were not so, then Nazi doctors who killed patients through their experiments could be subjectively exonerated.

This book points out a major problem with some of contemporary human research: it does not take human rights seriously. If human beings have rights not to be directly killed, then those rights should apply most strongly when human beings are most vulnerable. If rights protect anyone, they should protect the newly created, the incompetent, disabled, despairing, terminally ill, and dying rather than the competent, rights-asserting, interests-maximizing rational agents. For human embryos should be regarded either as human persons or as on an immediate trajectory toward full personhood. Actions that directly destroy their personhood or inhibit their attainment of full personhood should be regarded as a violation of their rights and prohibited. Thus, deliberately lethal actions or research that radically impairs the vitality of human embryos should be prohibited.

It was suggested that the rights of the conceptus and embryos to he protected from nontherapeutie research and direct killing should increase as they grow in age just as civil rights of other human beings increase with age. This is a doubtful way of resolving these dilemmas, for it is not all evident that the freedom from direct killing or from uncontested nontherapeutic research depends on one's competence or capae;ity for responsible moral action. Immature adolescents only acquire the right to drive when they gain the maturity to exercise that right responsibly. But the human embryo's freedom to live and not be subjected to research without explicit consent does not grow through time. This is a dangerous criterion because it logically commits one to giving the greatest protection to the strongest, most competent, and to those most able to defend their rights in the public forum. And, conversely, this criterion would give the incompetent, disabled, and terminally ill the least protection from deliberate killing or exploitation by others. The freedom to vote or control medical treatments depends on the use of reason, but freedom from direct attack or from nonconsented nontherapeutic research does not.

The primary value of this book is in the scientific presentations on the status of contemporary research on human embryos, but the papers discussing the ethics of this research are rather rudimentary and not terribly profound or insightful. If one is in search of information about. the latest developments in embryo research, this is probably a valuable book. However, it is of questionable value for those probing the difficult questions of the morality of this new research.

J. W. Bowker noted that the question of the ethics of these procedures has arisen in England, which was in his opinion the most secular of all the nations. This is an interesting fact, and it suggests that contemporary secular society views human life, the human person, and the rights of those who cannot participate fully as right-asserting, interest-maximizing social and economic agents in a different way than do other less secularized nations. Liberal secular society has been extremely successful in gaining due protection of the political, social, and civil rights of those who can assert these rights. But one wonders if it can equally protect the rights of the family or of those who are unable to give voice to their rights in political and judicial fora. Human embryo research poses a challenge to secular liberal society, for it must see if it can apply its principles even-handedly to the mentally handicapped, incompetent, disabled and unborn.

Using human embryos for nontherapeutic research should not be permitted because it violates the principle of informed consent. This principle holds that therapeutic actions can be taken without informed consent when they are for the physical well being of the subject. But, when the procedures are of no clinical benefit to the individual, explicit, informed consent must be obtained. Failure to acquire this consent constitutes the

actions ag'ainst the subject as battery. A further problem with creating embryos for research is that so doing violates the rights of ·the person or person-to-be to its parents and family. Crea.ting these embryos treats them as means and as nothing more than scientifically interesting material, but with no rights against harmful assaults.

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Evolution ana Creation. Edited by ERNAN MoMULLIN. Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame Press, 1986. Pp. 304. $24.96 (cloth).

This book offers a stimulating array of perspectives on the one thing about evolutionary theory that directly concerns Christian thinkers: its reconciliation with the Judeo-Christian account of creation. The essays were originally papers delivered at a symposium held at the University of Notr.e Dame. Besides bringing them together in a single volume, the editor, Ernan McMullin, has himself contributed a lucid introductory essay for the sake of historical context.

Still, at the book's end, I found myself left with the question that books on this topic always seems to leave me with: Where are the philosophical and theological problems posed by evolutionary theory? To be sure, the cultural and historical impact of Darwin's theory raised questions of reconciliation between biblical claims and scientific evidence, but the perceived philosophical and theological problems were more apparent than real. What gave them bite was the absence of a proper understanding of the difference between philosophical and scientific knowledge created by the collapse of the Aristotelian system in the sixteenth century. The insufficiencies of the Aristotelian science, rendered glaring by the steady emergence of the new science, not only led to the rejection of Aristotelianism *VN toto* but left an intellectual vacuum which the new science filled. Soon this science was enshrined as the standard of all knowledge. This state of affairs understandably conferred upon the scientific challenge to Christian doctrine an absoluteness that seemed to demand a scientific defense of the biblical account of creation.

When, however, the distinction between philosophical and scientific knowledge is observed (I speak here of a philosophy that is a realism), the challenge of evolutionary theories to Christian doctrine evaporates. What "challenges" remain are pseudo-scientific in that they are assertions of philosophical theories of materialism decked out in the clothes of science. Cases in point are the contributions to *Evolution and Crea-*

tion by John Leslie, "Modern Cosmology and the Creation of Life," James l!,. Ross, "Christians Get the Best of Evolution," and Phillip R. Sloan, " The Question of Natural Purpose."

Leslie attempts to cast the design argument in a form that creation scientists would accept. What inspires the project is his fear that the standard objections to design arguments jeopardize scientific development. His is a creative and at times brilliant approach ,to the defense of the design argument, which defense he unfortunately weakens, however, by failing to establish a clear line ,of demarcation between science and philosophy.

He argues that the emergence of life forms bespeaks a fine-tuning and delicacy of balance of nature's laws which demand explanation. He cites as the only plausible alternatives that either the universe is a product of design or there are multiple universes. For if you reject design in favor of proba.bility as the explanation for delicately balanced laws on which life depends, you must argue that this universe of ours is an occurrence of such and such a degree of probability, while other universes represent different probable occurences with different laws, etc. For example, " a 1 percent increase or decrease in the power of the strong nuclear force ruins stellar synthesis of carbon " and "for chemistry to be possible the mass of the neutron must exceed that of the proton, but by no more than approximately a tenth of 1 percent. . ."

But Leslie finds the plausibility of the many universes account weakened by the "serious horizon problems": [66] For as far out as our telescopes can reach, our universe consists of particles with the same relative strengths, and so on. Suppose that these masses and strengths and such were settled probabilistically at some early stage. How came they to be settled identically in 10^{83} regions which had no causal interaction with one another. When affairs *are settled in chance ways* in regions which are fully separate because they lie beyond one region or another, then the laws of chance suggest strongly that they *will be settled in different ways in different regions.* Could we then expect that r,egions now appearing on our ever-expanding horizon would have exactly the same life-encouraging characteristics as the region which we Most certainly not; yet this is what we do find."

Leslie is thus led to suppose the God-hypothesis to be more plausible than the many-universe hypothesis. However nonscientific it may be, it is at least not antiscientific. Those whose sense of scientific integrity leads them to reject God's interference with the common laws of nature cannot reasonably accuse God of interference just because He chose those particular laws. The latter are, moreover, the basis of all scientific explanation.

Now this kind of dialectical approach is effective as a defense of the

design argument, but only to a point. It successfully exposes the weakness of the probability account, when the latter is taken as the ultimate explanation of nature's operation's and thereby encourages serious attention to the design argument. But what limits its effeetiveness is the inability to reduce the probability account to absurdity. It could still be maintained that Leslie doesn't think big enough. For instance, in a universe billions of years old, billions of probabilities ·could have occurred, the most recent being the present laws of nature, which laws just happen to be congenial to the formation of living things. Indeed, the laws of chance very probably, as Leslie says, would have been settled in different ways in different universes, but-please note!-only *very probably.* On the premises of the probability account, it is not impossible and therefore is probable that the possibility of many universes obeying the same laws of nature was realized. (The question of whether or not this uniformity of law would make all these "universes " parts of a single universe only supports my objection to Leslie's approach.)

The only way to scotch the probability account was advanced by Aristotle in his defense of final causality wherein he established the certitude of the principle "Every agent acts for an end" and its corollary, "Nothing happens *per se* by chance."

Clearly Leslie's approach is an attempt to win the attention of the anti-design scientists by trading in their own coin. To that extent it has merit. But beyond that, I do not see how it can succeed insofar as the probabality and design accounts are mutually compatible within the context of the distinction between scientific and philosophical knowledge. From an operationalist viewpoint, it is eminently sensible to appeal to probability theory as the ultimate "explanation" (description¥) of natural phenomena if such appeal results in the most successful prediction. While this would do-and in fact seems to do-for scientific accounts, it would not stand as the ultimate explanation since the aforementioned distinction between scientific and philosophical knowledge belongs within the structure of a hierarchical organization of the branches of knowledge, the ordering of which is determined by each disciple's formal object of investigation. And this carries us to the heart of the problem: the anti-design scientists are committed to the view that science is the standard of all knowledge. This committment allows them no evidential basis for design in nature.

Ross's essay, "Christians Get the Best of Evolution," seeks to harmonize evolutionary theory with Christian ·anthropology, i.e., with the conception of man as a material yet immortal being. The problem, as he sees it, is not the reconciliation of man's creation with evolution but rather the reconciliation of the view that he is "a single, substantial thing" with the view that he is at once "a material corruptible thing."

" The special philosophical problem" is to understand emergence and in that way reveal "how psychic (re) organiation *constitutes* a different sort of being from the nearest prehumans." Evolutionary theories do not, therefore, cause or exacerbate the problem of reconciliation, for that problem, according to Ross, is intrinsic to any conception of man which acknowledges him to be at once immortal and material. On the contrary, evolutionary theories focus our thinking in .the right direction by "making us look, through intermediate steps, for the structures by which a unitary being, as man is, would have to exist, whether or not evolved.'

Does Ross succeed in his attempt at reconciliation? I do not think so. His emphasis on man as a unity causes him to undervalue him as a spiritual being, as witnessed by his rejection of even moderate dualism: " Spirit is not a substance but a form." Instead he argues for the emergence of man, energized by psychic rather than merely physical energy, from purely material sys.terns. When psycho-physical systems reached an optimum development, the beings in question became rational beings but not yet persons. How was that final stage reached f " The triggering experience by which unconscious rational cognition first organized into human selfhood was probably a polarizing encounter with God, by opposition to an external law-giving self, one that *focused* their consciousness into being ' self-aware' and *acting."*

It is unclear what Ross means by saying that a being can be a rational animal and yet not a person. Aristotle's *zoon logikon* is a knower in a sense different from those activities which allow us to apply the word " knower " to other animals. The sense in which man is called a "knower " involves an immanent activity, an activity .that originates. and terminates 1in a unique center of being, a self. Thus to be a rational animal is to be a person. But even if we grant Ross a sense of the term "rational " broad enough to apply to whales and porpoises, his argument still fails to address itself fully to the spiritual in man.

To say that personhood was educed from the unconscious of the-as-yet-to-be-person, as Ross contends, is either to speak nonsense or to embrace materialism or to presuppose an implicit dualism. **It** is nonsense to hold that spirit arises from matter. One might argue for the third possibility by holding that spirit was present with matter from the very beginning but only in a dormant state awaiting activation when conditions were ripe. But then Ross would be faced with a dualistic conception of man, which conception he rejects.. For the kind of substantial unity R.oss seeks to defend in man only a materialistic conception will do.

It is one thing to argue, as Ross does, that spiritual functions in man depend on material cognition, for example, presupposes a certain brain complexity-and that this integration of matter and spirit is compatible w1th resurrection but not with disembodied existence. But

it is quite something else again to argue, as Ross also does, that spirit in man is not a substance. The problem Ross grapples with here goes back at least to Aristotle and is intrinsic to any moderate dualism.. Once affirm man as an integral composite of matter and form and it becomes necessary to account for the interdependency of mind and brain. (Is this why Ross says that " Spirit is not a substance but a If mind cannot function apart from brain, then can spirit in man really be a substance in itself? What happens then to the integrity of human composite? Albert the Great gave the problem classic expr.ession by citing extreme and moderate dualism as the alternatives: if the focus is on the soul's immateriality, then Plato is correct; if it is on the union of body and soul, then Aristotle is correct.

But the position that spirit is a substance in man is a conclusion that follows from an analysis of his observable behavior. His rationality bespeaks an immaterial operation, knowing, which, because it is an operation that is in itself independent of matter, in turn presupposes a substance that is in itself independent of matter. Ross's concern to safeguard the integration of the psychic and physical aspects of man is sound. But, as Aquinas brilliantly argued, such integration is secured-in contrast to the Platonic and Averroistic positions-by the communication of the immaterial soul's act of existing to matter, not only thereby actualizing matter's potency *to be* but raising the latter >t0 its own level of existence. There is, accordingly, only one substantial ibting, only one existent, and that being is an integral composite of matter and spirit.

Contrary to Ross's supposition, therefore, the steps of emergence by which man arose from the nearest prehumans is not "the special prolem " at all, except for materialists and those who dismiss the dire0t creation of an immaterial soul in man. The *philosophical* problem is not " there regardless of how humans come into being." Given that the soul is an immaterial substance, emergent evolution simply will not work because the spiritual cannot be derived from the material as such. And the appeal to the coexistence of matter and spirit in things *ab initio* allows for emergence in a quite different sense, for it nevertheless requires the direct creation of spirit as such by God, as painful as this truth may be to those who strive to harmonize Christian anthropology with evolutionary theories by le,tting the advocates of the latter decide what cards are in the deck.

In contrast to Leslie and Ross, Phillip Sloan, "The Question of Natural Purpose," demonstrates a firm grasp of the distinction between scientific and philosophical knowledge, as is clear from the distinction he draws between the Christian understanding of creation as *"an existence-giving* act " and 'that of Greek philosophy as an ordering of material parts. Thus he sees no incompatibility between acknowledging that "neoselec-

tionist evolutionary theory remains the best scientific explanation of the range of natural phenomena that it seeks to deal with" and at the same time insisting that science's empiriological and hence descriptive account of the material world constitutes no threat to the Christian understanding of creation.

His response to Darwin's nonteleological view and that of modern biology furnishes an illuminating historico-philosophical context for the controversy between the creation and evolution accounts. For example, he warns against confusing the Judeo-Christian understanding of creation with "its Stoic look-alike." The Stoic view construes creation in terms of "material order, rationally evident anatomical purpose and demiurgie guidance," a view which is vulnerable to the attacks of Hume, Darwin, and contemporary advocates of evolution. For, given the methodology of the contemporary physical sciences, natural phenomena can successfully be accounted for by nonteleological principles.

Sloan properly emphasizes the source of the enormous difference between the Christian and Greek philosophical views of creation. The "central issue in 'the doctrine of creation is not the historicity of the creation event at some debatable moment in time, nor is it the establishment of intelligible order in a preexistent chaos." It is instead the aforementioned "*existence-giving* act." Thus the creation account is not rivaled by evolutionary biology, whose methodology enables it to investigate the material order without appealing to purposiveness. For this same methodology springs from a formal object of investigation which presupposes, but cannot address itself to, the "ontological existence" of the material order. "It is," says Sloan, "the *existence* of ... events in any order whatever that is at issue, and a decisive critique of the possibility of a larger purpose *in* creation would need to deal directly with this issue."

Unfortunately, it is impossible in a review of this scope to address all the contributions to *Evolution and Creation.* Besides those discussed above, the reader will find worthwhile essays by Fransciso J. Ayola, "The Theory of Evolution: Recent Successes and Challenges," Dianne Bergant, C.S.A., and Carroll Stuhlmueller, C.P., "Creation According to the Old Testament," David Kelsey, "The Doctrine of Creation from Nothing," William P. Alston, "God's Action in the World," William H. Austin, "Evolutionary Explanations of Religion and Morality: Explaining Religion Away7," Nicholas Lash, "Production and Prospect: Reflections on Christian Hope and Original Sin," and Christopher F. Mooney, S.J., "Evolution and Creation." This list shows the diversity of approach -each of them pertinent-to the topic. For example, Bergant and Stuhlmueller discuss the creation account in relation to Israel's sense of its own identity as a nation and the people of God and its sense of mission to other nations; Alston gives us a crisp and rigorous analysis

of the problem of free will and God's omnipotence- not a problem peculiar to evolution, to be sure, but one that nonetheless arises within the context of the emergence of living things, especially man, on earth and how that process relates to divine intervention; and Francisco J. Ayola starts everything off with a biologist's hardline defense of evolutionary theory.

It may be asking too much to expect original thinking on a topic that has been subjected to so much investigation and controversy over the past century. But it is reasonable to expect, in a book such as *Evolution and Crea.tion,* ways of approaching the topic which spark the reader's interest and furnish him with a competent and sometimes brilliant overview to it. The book fulfills this .expectation. I think it would be particularly useful as a source book and catalyst in graduate level seminars.

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God and Nature: Historical Essays on the Encounter Between Chris·tianity and Science. Edited by DAVID C. LINDBERG and RONALD L. NUMBERS. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986. Pp. xi + 516. $50.00 (cloth), $17.95 (paper).

The editors tell us at the outset of this important volume that it is the outcome of two convictions that they share: (1) "that the interaction of science and Christianity has been of profound imp@tance in the shaping of Western civilization" and (2) that the results of extensive specialist work by historians of science and religion in recent decades belie widely-held stereotypes and ought to be made generally available.

The most familiar of the stereotypes is of course the Draper-White [66] warfare" thesis, the origins and continuing influence of which the editors trace in the first part of their helpful introduction. The eighteen contributors to the volume find plenty of controversies-sometimes rising to the level of conflicts-among individuals, among theological schools of thought, among scientific schools of thought, and among social groups, but at no period do they find anything that could be called an overall conflict of science and theology. They find many instances of smaller- and larger-scale influences of theological developments on scientific ones, of scientific developments on theological ones, and of social developments on both. But no grand overall interpretative scheme appears in this respect either. Stanley L. Jaki's thesis, for instance, that modern science

was born of Christian theology and has prospered just insofar as it has remained faithful to its parentage, fares no better than the warfare thesis.

No sweeping unitary interpretation can be expected to emerge, Lindberg and Numbers sugg.est, from historical work that " shows the respect for the particularity, individuality and value of each people and age that the canons of historical scholarship demand" (p. 10; i:r).ternal quotation from Donald Kagan). Accordingly, each essay is devoted to a particular period-some longer than others, to be sure. Nearly all are by professional historians. One author is primarily a philosopher, and several have at least secondary philosophical interests ; none are primarily scientists or theologians. Nearly all were trained and teach at secular universities, though a few have formal training from religious institutions as well.

The coverage by periods is comprehensive, from Lindberg on " Science and the Early Church" to Numbers on "The Creationists" and Keith Yandell (the philosopher) on "Protestant Theology and Natural Science in the Twentieth Century." The last title calls attention, however, to one oddity in the coverage. Whereas in the essays on the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries both Protestant and Catholic figures and movements are treated, in those on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries attention is focused almost exclusively on the Protestant scene.

Clearly, eighteen substantial essays cannot be analyzed in detail in a review of reasonable length. I shall indicate the main topics and theses of each with a few comments where these can be made briefly. First, however, I should stress that the book is treasure-trove of information and ideas. All the essays are good; several are superb. Each should be highly instructive for readers who are not specialists in the topic and period it deals with; many will be richly stimulating for readers who are.

Against the claim that the early church stifled scientific inquiry, Lindberg points out that there wasn't all that much scientific inquiry to stifle. Certainly some of the disciplines ancestral to modern science existed in antiquity, but they were much more closely affiliated with philosophy than now, and philosophy in the first centuries A.D. moved in directions that denigrated inquiry into the natural order about as much as the church did, and for the same reason: salvation is more important. Nonetheless scientific learning had a handmaiden's role to play in the interpretation of scripture.

This role for scientific or proto-scientific disciplines continued in the early middle ages, but (Edward Grant observes) with the vast influx of reacquired ancient learning in the Europe of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the handmaidens revolted. The revolt was put down, but not without both science and theology being substantially .affected. The natural philosophers were firmly told that God in His omnipotence was

not constrained to run the cosmos in an Aristotelian way. Continuing to believe that in fact he did run it that way, they were nonetheless led to consider many hypothetical "thought experiments," their analyses of which were influential in the development of early modern mechanics. They were also led to abandon the ideal of demonstrative certainty and settle for probable knowledge. (Grant remarks on, without trying to explain, the return of Descartes, Galileo *et al* to the belief that certainty is attainable.) In theology, the use of scientific :findings in biblical interpretation continued to follow the rather spacious guidelines set down by Augustine, hut interpretations of God's relation to the world underwent a great transformation-in methodology though not in content-as *mathematical* techniques of analysis and formulation became prevalent. Grant does not pursue this development beyond the fourteenth century, but certainly it would be interesting to know when and why it died out, and whether it had any permanent impact on the way theology is done.

Naturally, several essays are devoted to the Scientific Revolution. Robert Westman examines the various interpretations and responses to the Copernican theory between its publication in 1543 and its condemnation in 1616, and William Shea takes a fresh look at tht case of "Galileo and the Church." Though both deal with much-discussed matters, both contribute greatly to our understanding of them.

l'Villiam Ashworth, in his essay on "Catholicism and Early Modern Science," chooses to exclude Galileo and examine the remainin, relatively neglected, :figures and movements to see what background pattern can be discovered. First he looks at individual scientists-Mersenne, Descartes, Gassendi, Pascal, Steno-and finds that in each case their Catholicism greatly affected their conception of science and the substance of their theories, but in such diverse ways and with such diverse results that no distinctive "Catholic pattern" can be found. He then considers the impact of the institutional church on scientific inquiry, and finds that the machinery of the Index and Holy Office, meant to root out heresy and magic, in fact caught up Cartesians and early chemists as well; Helmont was persecuted and imprisoned, and the Cartesian Rohault was forced to a recantation as abject as Galileo's. Both movements were subjected to vituperative attack in Protestant realms, but with little effect, because of the absence of an official repressive apparatus. Thus large-scale scientific theorizing in general, and chemisfa·yin particular, :flourished in Protestant areas and languished in Italy. Finally, Ashworth takes up the intriguing question of the Jesuits : why did they play so small a role in the major developments of the scientific revolution, despite their numerous brilliant achievements in exeperimental science? He offers several conjectures, and calls for a research program to test them.

Three essays are devoted to the Protestant scene, Gary Deason argues

that the Reformers' emphasis on the radical sovereignty of God, with no cooperative role for creatures, led to a stress on the passivity of matter that encouraged the growth of the mechanical. philosophy (with subtle but radical effects on the way the sovereignty of God came to be conceived). Charles Webster examines the relations among the developing scientific disciplines and the various types of Puritans and anti-Puritans in England between the accession of Elizabeth I and the Restoration of 1660. Margaret Jacob presses the thesis that, after the Restoration and especially after the Revolution of 1689, latitudinarian Anglicans used Newtonian philosophy, with Newton'.s active cooperation, as a bu1wark of an orderly mercantile society against the threat of revloutionaries from the Puritan left wing.

Richard Westfall, in "The Rise of Science and the Decline of Orthodox Christianity: A Study of Kepler, Descartes, and Newton," deals-powerfully-with a larger theme than many of the other contributors. His essay is a gem of concise exposition, as in his treatment of Newton's unpublished theological writings, and telling use of detail, as in the vivid contrast of Kepler's and Descrates's discussions of snowflakes.

Two essays carry the theme of mechanism. forward into the nineteenth century. Roger Hahn lays out the scientific and cultural backgrounds of Laplace's famous declaration that he had no need of the hypothesis of God, tracing it above all to Laplace's demonstration of the long-term stability of the solar system, to his nebular hypothesis for its origin and orderly arrangement, and to d'Alembert's argument that neither regularity nor irregularity in nature could enable us to infer the existence or properties of a Creator. Metaphysical systems, ancient or modren (e.g., the materialism of d'Holbach), were not a factor. Jacques Roger's discussion of " the mechanistic conception of life" is a valuable conspectus of the very various forms " mechanism " could take and their respective relations to religious thought. He defends the familiar but still persuasive and important thesis that theologians were unwise to ally themselves closely with particular scientific theories.

The two papers concerned with geology complement one another in several ways and share some key historiographical predilections, notably an emphasis on social and political. determinants of what is to count as knowledge and how it is to be used. Both are provocative in the best sense and merit careful consideration. Martin Rudwick interprets conflicting " theories of the earth " from the Middle Ages onward as rival cosmologies, in the sense in which anthropologists use that term. That is, the conflicts were " episodes in which people on both sides appealed to some aspect of nature, such as the origin and history of the earth, in order to support . . • their own view of the *meaning* of personal and social life and of the conduct appropriate to that life, whether that meaning was

fromulated in religious terms or not" (p. 297; italics in text). The story can be told in these terms up till the end of the eighteenth century, after which the new science of geology emerges via the self-conscious decision of practitioners to define the limits of their subject to exclude cosmological considerations. Their motive was to enable people of different ideological persuasions to work cooperatively on matters that were uncontroversial and economically useful. The independence of geology from cosmology was threatened in midcentury when questions of the origins of the earth and of humanity could no longer be excluded, but rescued when Darwin drew the cosmological crossfire into the domain of evolutionary biology.

" If science may be said to represent a special kind of politics, then the history of science can be nothing less than the history of the power blocs and interest groups who constitute society's knowledge" (p. 326). That is the premise of James Moore's investigation of "Geologists and Interpreters of Genesis in the Nineteenth Century." Francis Bacon, writing in 1605, laid out the terms of a *modus vivendi* that scientists and religious leaders largely observed for more than two centuries. The basis of the Baconian Compromise is the doctrine of the Two Books, Nature and Scripture, each of which is to be diligently perused for knowledge of God, all parties being careful to see " that they do not unwisely mingle or oonfpund these learnings together" (Bacon, quoted p. 322). Today (this is my observation, not Moore's) ·a reader of that admonition is likely to understand it as saying that mingling is unwise. That is not what Bacon, or the observers of the Compromise, meant. For them there was wise mingling and unwise mingling. Wise mingling was using the results of scientific (including philological) inquiry to aid in the interpretation of scripture; unwise mingling or " confounding" was to treat the Bible as an authority on scientific matters. The Compromise was threatened when geologists came to hold that the earth and living beings had been around n;mch longer than Genesis would suggest. Many scriptural interpreters were prepared to accommodate the new :findings, but many were not, and the scientific geologists, trying to establish themselves as a professional group, found themselves entagled in controversy with " Mosaic geologists." Charles Lyell responded by appealing to Bacon, interpreting him to mean that there should be no mingling at all : " The physical part of Geological inquiry ought to be conducted as if the Scriptures were not in existence" (Lyell, quoted p. 337). This meant a withdrawal from the Baoonian bargain ·as previously understood : geologists who followed Lyell would no longer consider it part of their job to assist in the interpretation of scripture or to show forth the providence of God. Such a proposal was unwelcome to qualified clerical geologists like Buckland and Sedgwick as well as to theologians of many persuasions. It could be sustained only when professional biblical criticism in the German mode

belatedly entered the British scene. Thereupon scientific professionals and professional biblical scholars, both concerned to gain independence (intellectual and :financial) from clerical control and the interference of amateurs, formed a cordial alliance. In the resulting settlement, "no mingling" was all of Bacon that remained. Each group was free to read its book in its own way, but the scientists were no longer expected to find God in theirs.

The nineteenth-century impact of Charles Darwin is the subject of two essays. A. Hunter Dupree examines the range of responses among scientists, focusing on case studies of Charles Dawson, Louis Agassiz, Asa Gray, and T. H. Huxley. Like most scientists in the English-speaking world at the time, they had strong religious interests, so Dupree considers the ways in which their religious as well as their scientific thinking was affected. Reflecting a historiography quite different from Moore's, he attributes the good humor of the debates over Darwin to a shared background of Christian culture and symbolism. Frederick Gregory surveys the responses of Protestant theologians, :finding the staunchly orthodox Charles Hodge the most acute of the lot, because he recognized that natural selection is the key element in Darwinism and that it is entirely incompatible with any Christian idea of divine providence. (There is an element of hindsight in that judgment, of course. Those who thought natural selection was only one of several mechanisms could find a good deal of justification in Darwin's text-whether because, as orthodox neo-Darwinians hold, Darwin was forced by arguments he couldn't answer to make concessions contrary to his own predominant inclinations, or because, as Stephen Jay Gould would have it, he :fovored a more pluralistic theory from the start.)

Three essays on twentieth-century topics complete the volume. Ronald Numbers describes the social and theological background (including some crucial controversies little-known outside the immediate circle of the combatants) of the "scientific creationism" movement, and tells the story of its recent flourishing. A discussion of theological responses to the movement, especially among those eviangelical Protestants who haven't joined it, would have been interesting. But no doubt it would have lengthened the essay unduly, and I"esponses are readily available.

The two remaining essays follow a pattern similar to that of the papers on Darwin. After concise survey of crucial developments in late-nineteenth and twentieth-century physics, Erwin Hiebert illustrates three ways in which physicists concerned with religion have understood the relations of the two by means of case studies of William Henry Bragg ("monism"), Pierre Duhem ("dualism"), and Charles Coulson (" pluralism"). Keith Yandell examines interpretations of the science-religion relation across the spectrum of twentieth-century Protestant theology

(with scarcely-veiled incredulity that anyone could ever have mistaken the likes of Bultmann and Tillich for Christian theologians). He concludes that the neo-orthodox have sought to build walls, the orthodox bridges; but on his showing some of the orthodox have been wall-builders too.

There is an extensive, "guide to further reading."

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The Thought of Paul Tillich. Edited by JAMES LuTRE'R .ADAMS, WILHELJll. PAuOK, RoGER LINCOLN SHINN with the assistance of Thomas J. S. Mikelson. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1985. Pp. xi + 404. $24.95.

Published in time for the lOOth anniversary of Paul Tillich's birth, which was celebrated during 1986, this collection of essays by scholars in various disciplines is an excellent tribute to the versatility of Tillich's thought. As Adams and Shinn point -0ut in the Preface, the very origin of the book stems frO!lll a request made by Vfotor A. Weisskopf, president of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (1976-1979) and one of the world's outstanding physicists, who said to Adams: "While I am president of the Academy I would like for you to do something to make the significance of Paul Tillich's work widely recognized among the Academy's membership of scholars in all disciplines." The result of this request is a book that is not another analysis and interpretation of Tillich's thought, but -0ne that seeks its meaning for contemp-0rary human issues, some of which were not raised in their current form during his own lifetime. And s-0 the contributors concentrate mainly upon his style of thought and imagination .as it appears to be actually or potentially influential in the interdisciplinary task -0f ·addressing human problems during our time.

The wide range of interesting and timely topics covered by the eighte.en chapters of this book may be divided into seven groupings. These are based upon Adams's own introductory chapter, which clearly explains the structure of the book and links up with the second chapter by Pauck to provide the reader with a very helpful summary of Tillich's thought and life. Both Adams •and Pauck n-0t only thoroughly studied his works, but were his personal friends and collaborated with him on several pr-0jects. Adams comments that in Tillich's view one cann-0t comprehend religion without

recognizing its inner tensions and even its ambiguity; that he used psychological categories as fundamental for understanding not only human existence but reality as a whole; that the terms used by him, *theonomy, kairos, demonic, boundary, the Protestant principle,* and *ultimate concern,* are delicately interconnected, understandable -0nly in relation to one another, and are based upon his ontology, epistemology, philosophy of history, and doctrine of God; and that in the context of his method of correlation-a way of uniting the Christian message with the existential situation-"The process of discovery is learning to listen for truth wherever it appears as a manifestation of grace" (p. 16). Pauck's essay emphasizes the autobiographical character of Tillich's theological work as well as his grasp of human history generally, and his deep desire to interpret the Christian message for twentieth-century persons living during a time that had lost its theonomous character. He singles out the special debt owed by Tillich to Kahler who inspired him to apply the meaning of justification by faith to the area of intellectual thought.

The second grouping contains three essays, chapters 3-5, which examine the implications of Tillich's world view, particularly his political theory and practice. "Tillich as Interpreter and Disturber of Contemporary Civilization", by Shinn, proposes that Tillich was convinced of the need for ontology to avoid superficiality and that his life-long concern was to explore the new possibilities of relating ontology and prophetic religiono His creative ideas about "theonomy ", "kairos ", etc., made outstanding contributions to the movement of " religious socialism " after World War I, but Shinn believes that he should have cheeked his intuitive sensitivities by relying more upon the empirical social sciences, which might have helped him become a more effective "interpreter" of the period following World War II and so a better " disturber " of contemporary civilization in our recent past. Next, Weisskopf's reflections focus upon Tillich's critique of "technical reason", which removed the intellectual, psychologciaI, and spiritual possibility of reasoning about ends, as that which aimed at overcoming the most serious crisis in Western culture. Dennis P. MeCann then makes an interesting comparison between Tillich's understanding of myth and praxis, faith and ideology, with Reinhold Niebuhr's Christian realism and Luis Segundo's liberation theology. He underlines as the most important aspect of Tillich's theory its attempt to be both ontological and historical. Unlike Marxism, his principle of prophetic criticism is able to transcend the historical process and so avoid atheistic immanentism. MeCann, however, seems to equate all of dogma with "ideology " and dogmatic Marxism in the sense that it is, according to Tillich inevitably the product of objectification. He believes Tillich would have charged both Niebuhr and Segundo with objectifying prophetic criticism so as to distort its basic meaning for the social struggle.

The two following essays by William Rogers and Ann Ulanov treat of Tillich's concerns with issues of depth psychology in their relationship to the task of theology. In Roger's opinion, Tillich's work influences the entire :field of pastoral psychology in America. His careful distinction between neurotic anxiety and ontic anxiety moved psychoanalysts towards a view of the fundamental and universal threat of nonbeing, which not only cannot be removed but even can be constructive in helping to raise the most ultimate questions of meaning. Ulanov's reflections, "The Anxiety of Being," develop such ideas further and she considers Tillich to be one of the :first theologians to insist upon the inclusion of a feminine element of being with our traditional masculine concept of God.

The fourth grouping consists of two essays by Nathan Scott and Robert Scharlemann, who look at Tillich's thought through the arts, particularly painting and literature, which were for him the surest signs of the spirit of the tinies. Scott looks upon him as rivalled only by Berdyaev and Maritain among the Christian thinkers of this century who paid such careful attention to literature and the arts. He considers Tillich's definition of a theonomous culture as one in which religion is the substance of culture and culture the forn1 of religion to be the "· .. principle that controlled his entire theological program" (p. 137). Tillich saw in the poems, novels, and dramas of major literature the sense of ultimate value (or disvalue) that opens them to religious analysis. Scharlemann further pursues this by showing that his interpretation of the religious dimension in culture is one of the most influential aspects of his thought. The religious interpretation of art relies upon the distinction between what a work of art can "represent" or depict and what it is able to " express". The .expression can be known only through the outward appearance of its representation, e.g., one's disapproval through a grimace. Similarly, the quality of the "holy" may be manifested or expressed but never depicted or represented. And so it is not surprising that the expressionist element of style assumed a very special significance in Tillich's religious interpretation of works of art. For him it was a question of truth in art, which differs from the truth of science as authenticity differs from correctness; i.e., he asked whether the meaning perceived in a work of art has a connection with a dimension of reality that is revealed or expressed through it. Scharlemann concludes his essay by pointing out the indications of how religious experience expressed in art today seems to have changed from the expressionism that Tillich analysed.

The :fifth grouping of essays in this book brings the reader three reflections upon Tillich's works in relationship to non-Christians and recent religious movements in America. In "Tillich and Jewish Thought" Rabbi Albert Friedlander finds that he becomes most interesting to Jewish thinkers precisely in his religious interpretation of the world, since Jewish

thought has always ignored boundaries between the secular and the sacred. The tensions of the polarities between both receive clear expression in Tillich's writings. Even though he was wrong about Judaism at times, he was courageous both in his thought and in his relationships with Jewish people, especially in Nazi Germany. And, although Christ is always at the center for Tillich, Friedlander believes that when he defines religion unpolemically there can be a meeting of Jews and Christians. According to Joseph Kitagawa's " Tillich, Kraemer, and the Encounter of Religions", Tillich toward the end of his life provided some useful ground rules of the dialogue between Christianity and the other major religions of the world. He came to a deeper appreciation of the spiritual values in the depth of all religions. Although both Tillich and Kraemer shared a profound interest in dialogue between Christian and Eastern religious traditions, they had very different perspectives which may still be regarded as two important options for a " theological history of religions" or a theological approach to comparative religions. In chapter 12 of the book, Jack Boozer proposes that Tillich would be in favor of the new religious movements when they challenge the aspects of the secular culture that are destructive, but would oppose their own demonic and neurotic tendencies. The new religions have been successful in filling a void that traditional churches fail to fill but Tillich would criticize the claim to absolute certainty made by most of them.

In the next grouping of three chapters (13-15), more direct attention is given to philosophy and theology. In his method of correlation, Tillich not only works from the experience of the existential situation in culture (political-social-economic) toward theology, but also then moves back toward the culture again from theology in order to provide the proper religious interpretations of it. John Smith, a philosopher, looks upon Tillich as an interpreter of religions in a post-Enlightenment world which he resists in its reduction of all reason to technical reason, but which he also welcomes in its rejection of heteronomy. His notion of religion as ultimate concern makes it possible for him to criticize much of conventional religion as well as to relate religion and science without a heteronomous imposition of religious beliefs upon science, and, at the same time, without awarding absolute autonomy to science. David Tracy's essay emphasizes the influence of Tillich upon all contemporary theologians through his mode of inquiry, especially as it is demonstrated in his method of correlation. Although there is no ongoing Tillichian school, Tracy believes that this method should guide today's theological investigation of such issues as global suffering and oppression.

Three theologians then address more specific theological questions in Tillich's thought. John Powell Clayton, in chapter 15, is of the view that his lasting contribution is not in providing a system but in a way

of doing theology with a profound sense of the contemporary *kairoi* or "signs of the times"· Thomas O'Meara, a Dominican theologian, reflects upon Tillich's formulation of Catholic substance and Protestant principle. He believes that three aspects of his thought have been appealing to Catholic thinkers : his recognition of the need for an ontology, his conviction that all eras of culture contain something holy, and his mystical search for an immediate experience of the presence of the Spirit in culture. 0 Meara also points out: "At a deeper level we see that Tillich's theonomy is similar to the 'sacramental' or ' mediative' essence of Roman Catholicism" (p. 296). According to Langdon Gilkey's " The New Being and Christology ", the central category or symbol for Tillich's theology is the New Being. Jesus is the Christ precisely because he brings the healing power of the New Being into history in order to save people from tragic experience of estranged existence. This is the basis for his ecumenically useful ecclesiology which holds that a church is a true church when it embodies both the Protestant principle of prophetic self-criticism that points beyond itself and the Catholic substance of the sacramental and mediating presence of divine grace.

The concluding essay of this collection, also by Gilkey, is chapter 18, " The Role of the Theologian in Contemporary Society". Gilkey rejects the simplisitic interpretation of Tillich's method of correlation as theological answers to philosophical questions since both questions and answers are theological/philosophical. The answers of a culture have as their deepest basis its religious substance and so the role of the theologian is cultural as well as ecclesiastical. The church must nourish the " Catholic substance" of culture as well as its own, and also must bring the Protestant principle to bear upon culture as upon itself.

A supplement to the 18 chapters affords to the the reader Paul Tillich's "Open Letter to Emanuel Hirsch", translated by Victor Nuovo and Robert Scharlemann. It is a document that has not been well known in our country, and is the most comprehensive criticism of Naziism by Tillich. It is also a devastating attach upon one of his closest friends, Hirsch, who became the most prominent Nazi ("German Christian") theologian. Finally, an appendix to the book provides a short chronology of Tillich's life.

The readers who should benefit most from this book are those who bring to it an understanding of Tillich's thought. It does not pretend to be an introductory analysis of his main ideas and of his method of correlation. At the same time, however, one who is interested in and concerned with contemporary theological issues may find it useful and indeed, may eve+i. be moved to make a study of Tillich's own writings. '

The origin of this volume of essays and the occasion for compiling them, as pointed out in the beginning of this review, have made it a very

positive evaluation of Tillich's thought, especially as it still has bearing upon contemporary theological issues. Even those statements that do indicate the limitations in his thought are very much softened in the context of this tribute to Tillich's memory as a theologian. But the careful reader does get the general impression that the contributors look upon the *method* of his theological inquiry as of more enduring value than the conceptual content of his system. This reviewer shares that opinion. Even when one analyses the content of his key categories or symbols, their contribution to contemporary theological thinking appears to be more on the level of formal than ma,terial principles. The notion of theonomy, for instance, as one of the central categories in his system, or of a theonomous culture as one in which religion is the substance of culture and culture the form of religion, seems to serve most effectively as a dialectical principle in resolving the tensions between autonomy and heteronomy. His doctrine of religious symbols causes one to wonder whether there is any real significance to their content as reinterpretations of traditional Christian teaching. Such theological concepts do bear meaning in the context of his system, but the question remains regarding their fidelity to the apostolic faith. This is a question that is not seriously addressed in the book, but is one that must be raised by any one who would be inspired to understand and communicate the Christian faith in accord with the reinterpretations found in Paul Tillich's thought.

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