FEEDING THE COMATOSE AND THE COMMON GOOD IN THE CATHOLIC TRADITION

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A A RECENT convention :sponsored by the Catholic Health Associaition in Boston, Laurence J. O'Connell, vice-president for ethics and theology, ma.de the following comments:

I am concerned that some of those who are legitimately alarmed by the potential abuses associated with the public policy that authorizes the withholding and withdrawing of mechanical means of nutrition and hydration are sometimes publicly misrepresenting the Catholic moral tradition. In other words, in their well-intentioned and perfectly legitimate efforts to avoid the slippery-slope--that is, the wrongful withholding or withdrawing of nutrition or hydration from vulnerable dasses of patients-those advocates are placing the Roman Catholic moral tradition itself on the slippery slope.

It is mistaken to say it is the church's teaching that we may never withhold or withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration. It is mistaken to uncritically refer to the removal of medically engineered nutrition in all cases as starvation-that is, the willful withholding of nutrition as morally obligatory. It is mistaken to say that the ethical standards of a single Catholic hospital are necessarily coextensive with the ethical standards of the Catholic Church. Just because an individual Catholic facility, for whatever reason, uniformly refuses to allow the withholding or withdrawing of technological feeding, does not mean that the Church itself disallows such withholdings or withdrawals.[1]

It is not clear how the Catholic moral tradition can be put on the " slippery slope " by opposing certain forms of with-

[1] "Church and State Overlap in Ethical Debate", *American Medicai News.* February 27, 1987. p. I.

drawal of feeding from specific classes of patients. Dr. O'Connell has misrepresented the thought of most of those who oppose the recent American Medical Association's new opinion which holds that artificially administered nutrition and fluids can be removed from terminally ill patients, even when they are not imminently dying.[2] There are no Catholic moralists who claim that it is always and everywhere morally wrong to withhold or withdraw feeding from patients. However, there are a number of moralists as well as bishops who now hold it to be wrong to withhold or withdraw feeding in those cases where the withholding or withdrawal becomes the fundamental and underlying cause of death.

O'Connell is p11obably correct in saying that the policies of one hospital do not necessarily deteJ1IDinethe moral doctrines of the universal Church, but neither does one national organization such as the Catholic Health Association with only a loose affiliation with the magisterial hierarchy of the Church necessarily do this either. The debate over the provision of ,aissistedfeeding is a debate over whether iit is morally legitimate ito withdraw feeding so 1tihat .t:he primary and fundamental reason why the person dies is that withdrawal. It is a debate over whether those with a certain " quality of life " can be permitted to be killed by omission. It is a debate over whether feeding provided by routine nursing measures that can significantly sustain the life is a medical treatment that should he governed by the criteria governing other treatments, or whether it is an

[2] "Withholding or Withdrawing Life Prolonging :Medical Treatment" adopted by the Council on Ethical and Judicial .Affairs of the .Amercian Medical .Association on March 15, 1987, In its pertinent parts, it stated:

> The social commitment of the physician is to sustain life and relieve suffering. Where the performance of one duty conflicts with the other, the choice of the patient, or his family or legal representative if the ·patient to act in his own behalf, should prevail.
>
> Life prolonging medical treatment includes medication and artificially or technologically supplied respiration, nutrition or hydration. In treating a terminally ill or irreversibly comatose patient, the physician should determine whether the benefits of treatment outweigh its burdens. .At all times, the dignity of the patient should be maintained .-.

aspect of normal care, like protection from exposure or hygienic care, that is to be accorded to all patients.

In this piece, I wish to review the thoughts of some of the classical Catholic moralists and show their reluctance to authorize withdrawal of life-sustaining nutrition and fluids. I also wish to show that, where they did permit food and water to be removed, their arguments were either flawed or open to severe criticism. And I will also show tha.t assisted feeding can be required of patients because of the demands of the common good. The overall purpose of this effort is to show that requiring assisted feeding when its rejection or removal would be the fundamental cause of death is not foreign to the classical Catholic medical-ethical tradition.

I. *Thomas Aquinas*

Aquinas did not write any treatise devoted specifically to providing food and fluids, but he did note in his *Super Epistolas S. Pauli* that:

> A man has the obligation to sustain his body; otherwise he would be a killer of himself . . . by precept, therefore, he is bound to nurish his body and likewise we are bound to all the other items without which the body cannot live.[8]

In this passage Aquinas affirms an obligation to take food and fluids because of a general obligation to sustain life, and he ,asserts that £aii1ingto take them could be momlly equiVtalentto self-killing in some cases. He aipparently would not say thrus about medical treatments, for he would hold it licit to reject medical treatments in some cases without being a self-killer.[4]

The passage implies that there are more circumstances in

s St. Thomas Aquinas, *Super Flpistolos 8.PauU* (Taurin-Romae: Marietti, 1953), II Thess., Lee. II, n. 77. Translation in Cronin, Daniel, *The Moral Law in Regard, to the Ord,inary and, Flrotraordinary Means of Conserving Life* (Dissertatio ad Lauream in Facultate Theologica Pontificiae Universitatis Gregorianae, Romae, 1958), p. 48.

4 Medical treatments that could be rejected without being a self-killer would be those which are rejected out of a due love for life and for the spiritual goods.

which one could licitly reject medical treatments than there are where one could reject food and water. Aquinas vaguely asserts a distinction between nutrition and fluids and medical treatments, and he imposes a stronger obligation to receive food and water than to receive medical treatments. The reason for this stronger obligation seems to be that food and water are ·seenas a means of sustaining life whether the person is sick or not, while medical treatments are therapeutic measures only to be used for those with clinical conditions.

Elsewhere, he says in a statement in the *Secunda Secundae* that should be balanced against the previous one that:

> [l]t is inbred for a man to love his own life and those things which contribute to it, but in due measure (*tamen debito proprio)* which means those things which permit attainment of the final goal. Thus, those things which permit attainment of the final end of man are to be loved, but only in due measure.[5]

In the previous statement, Aquinas warned against self-killing and a lack of respect for life, but in this one he warns against anxious concern for life and undue love for life-preserving measures. This statement imposes an obligation to have due respect for life and to have a moderate love for those things which sustain life. There is a duty to protect one's life by moderate means and he denounces an exaggerated fear of death which can cause an undue clinging to life. Aquinas has not defined what means of sustaining life are undue, and one must wait for later writers to deal with this issue.

What precisely "due love of the things that sustain life" would be is not clear from this passage. It would seem that Aquinas is objecting to demands for radically expensive treatments that would not hold out much prospect of prolonging life. If this is true, then it would be hard to see how he could object to tube feeding for a medically stable patient given by routine nursing procedures. This would not seem to be an uncommon or exotic means of preserving life.

[5] *Summa Theologica,* Blackfriars Translation, Anthony Rosa, O.P., and P. G. Wa.lsh. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), q. 126, a. 1.

What he might mean by medical treatments that can permit the attainment of the final end of many is not clear. He may have been referring to those treatments which enaible a person to act rationally and interpersonally. However, that interpretation is unlikely because it would imply that there was no duty to give even palliative care to those who suffered emotional or mental disabilities. What Aquinas probably meant was that treatments which could sustain either biological life itself or human life in all its dimensions had to be given because both of these permit attainment of the final end of man. If he did not mean thait, it would be hard to see how he could have objected that refusal of feeding in some cases was self-

In relation to our contemporary controversy on assisted feeding, his principle would affirm a duty to receive and provide readily available forms of assisted feeding when their denial or refusal would be the fundamental cause of death of a medically stable patient. It should be recalled that what is "common" is relative to a society, and in our society assisted feeding administered by routine nursing measures is simply a common mode of providing nutrition, and it should be provided when its withdrawal would cause death.

2. *Francisco Vitoria*

Francisco Vitoria requires patients to take ordinary measures to preserve life, and explicitly holds that a patient would have at least to use foods commonly employed by persons to conserve their life.[6] Vitoria affirms an obligation to receive food and water when they can be readily provided by a given society. Only the use of ordinary foods, and mot exotic dishes,

6 F. Vitoria, *Releotiones Theologioae,* (Lugduni, 1587), Relectio IX, de Temp n. 1, (Trans. in Cronin, *op. oit.,* pp. 48-49). .Atkinson notes that the obligation to take drugs is less grave than the obligation to take food because food is *per se* ordered to the preservation of life. See his "Theological History on the Catholic Teaching on Prolonging Life" in *Moral Responsibility m Prolonging Life Deoisions,* edited by Donald McCarthy and .Albert Moraczewski, O.P. (St. Louis: Pope John Center, 1981). p. 98.

would be mo:mlly required, even if this would shorten the life of the patient. In his own way, he affirms an obligation to give and receive only what are customarily and commonly available forms of care and feeding in a society.

He claims that it is one thing to destroy life ·and .another to cease to protect or prolong it.[7] One must never do the former, but he holds that it is not always necessary to do the latter. This formulation, however, is too vague and general to be useful, for failing to protect life in some instances is morally equivalent to destroying it. For example, permitting another to die by withholding protection from exposure is morally equivalent to destroying that person's life. Similarly, failing to sustain another's life by withholding life-sustaining food and water that can be provided by routine and customary means is morally equivalent to failing to protect.

Nowhere does Vitoria affirm that " common " feeding could 'be rejected, because this would be killing by omission. Unfortunately, he does not explain what constitutes "common" feeding. What makes feeding " common " would seem to be relative to one's culture and technology, but Vitoria offers no opinion on ithi:s. But he does teach that talring food is not obligatory if great effort is required, and he probably means great effort on the palt of the patient.[8] Taking food when great effort would be demanded of the patient would require a radical exercise of the virtue of fortitude, ·and Vitoria would not impose such a demand as a matter of justice. The term " common " is purely formal, but it must be assumed to mean what is routinely provided to a patient in a given condition; this criterion is highly relative to the means available of provmdingfood and wiater. And there is no hint in Vitoria's thought that " ordinary " medical cusfoms could be violated.

He discusses the issue of food and water under the aspect of the virtues, and affirms that failing to receive commonly avail-

7 See Atkinson, "Theological History of Catholic Teaching on Prolonging Life," p. 98.

ruble life-sustaning food and water would be against the **virtue** of fortitude, and :failing to provide it would seem to be against the virtue of justice.[9] Like Aquinas, he imposes a stronger duty to provide food than to provide medical treatments, **for** he holds that the obligation to take drugs is less seriqus than is the obliga;tion to take food. In order for medical treatments to be morally 'required in some circumstances, it would only be necessary for there to be some hope of returning to normal functioning or some form of recovery. But "common" food and water, or that by which regularly 'a man can live *(satis est, quod det operam, per quam horno regulariter potest vivere),* have to be given even if recovery is not possible, but if there is some hope of life.[10] And he makes no explicit distinctions between biological, psychological, and spiritual life, and this implies that food and water must be given if there is some hope of continuing biological or physical life. **If** there is moral certitude that food and water could hold out " some hope of life " being continued, then it would seem that he would hold it obligatory to provide nutrition and hydration.

There is no obligation to use the most expensive and costly treatments or foods to sustain life, but this should not be interpreted to mean that a person could be morally required to suffer destitution to pay for common feeding or ordinary medical care.[11] For Vitoria it is not necessary to use every means available to sustain life, hut only to use those means which are

9 *Ibid.,* p. 97. Vitoria discusses the taking of food under the aspect of temperance, but it would seem that denial of life-sustaining food and drink to an individual would not be against temperance as much as it would be against justice, while the refusal of life-sustaining food and water would be against the virtue of fortitude.

10 *Ibid.,* pp. 98-9. The failure to preserve one's life could be rejection of those things "by which regularly a man can live". This would seem to consist in food and fluids taken orally or what modern authors call "ordinary" surgeries and medical treatments. The modern criterion seems to be that of requiring not just food and fluids but ordinary surgeries as well.

11 *Ibid.,* p. 99. He affirms that expensive or exotic foods would not be required, and he does not hold that one would have to live in the most healthful climates either. See his *Oommentaria a la Secunda Seoundae de Santo Thomas,* (Salamanca, ed. de Hereda, O.P., 1952) in II-II, q. 147, a (transl. as in Cronin, p. 59).

of themselves intended for that purpose and which are congruent with that end.[12] And if there is a "kind of impossibility" in receiving food and water, Vitoria would not require their provision or acceptance. Thus, if there was profound revulsion to food, or a medical reason for rejecting it, he would not morally require it. It is not clear what he means by this, for food and water, hygiene and medicine all naturally aim at preserving life. On this point, Vitoria is ambivalent, for while he admits that food, water and medical treatments are naturally ordered toward life, he affirms a more stringent obligation to provide food and water than to provide medical treatments, implying that they 1are different in nature.[13]

This ambivalence in Vitoria's thought is important, for Fr. Edward Bayer, a contemporary moral theologian, contends that there is an obligation to provide food and water orally or" connatul'lally",but that this obligation ceases when a person needs assisted feeding.[14] For Bayer, the natural aspect of oral feeding imposes the obligation, but it is by no means clear that such a distinction was made by Vitoria.[15] It is not clear that Vitoria sees the mode of provision ,as being as crucial as the commonness of the mode of feeding. What is clear about Vitoria's thought, however, is that he believes that the provision of commonly avail3Jble,life-sustaining food and water is ethically obligatory.

Relative to the contemporary debate on feeding medically stable comatose patients, Vitoria's teachings would imply that food and fluids, provided as an aspect of basic patient maintenance, could not be withheld from comatose patients because they are now an aspect of" common" feeding. He would not require their provision if it was medically impossible to provide it, or if the person was unable to receive it for clear medical reasons. And he does not demand that r1JJdical or extreme ex-

12 *Relectiones,* Relecti X, de Homicidio, n. 35. (transl. as in Cronin, p. 50).

13 See Atkinson, "Theological History of Catholic Teaching on Prolonging Life", p. 99.

H[bid.

u "Foregoing Life-Sustaining Food and Water: 1900 Years of Catholic Thought". Unpublished :Manuscript, pp. 1-2.

pense be experienced to provide it. But if receiving or providing food or water is " common " in a given culture, he would hold it to be morally required. He considered food and water to be different in nature from medical treatments, and he established difierent criteria for their provision and acceptance. He admits that there are elective forms of feeding, but those that are common modes of feeding ·are morally mandatory. By asserting that there is a stronger obligation to take food than there is to take medical treatments, he is affirming the principle that if assisted feeding and fluids provided as an aspect of basic patient maintenance could meet the nutritional and hydrational needs of the patient, they should be given.

8. *Juan Cardinal de Lugo*

In the century after Vitoria, there was a widespread support among moral theologians for his teachings. Juan Cardinal de Lugo is important because he supported Vitoria's teachings, but he was also important because he drew clearer distinctions between morally permissible letting-die •and immoral killing based on the type of means being refused or withheld. He is noteworthy for being exceptionally liberal among his contemporaries for his view of what constituted an extraordinary means.[16] Because of this, Atkinson notes that he was so liberal in his views that he accepted virtually any reason whatsoever for removing a medical treatment. For instance, he .held that drinking wine or abstaining from it could be an extraordinary form of care in some cases.

With regard to the administration of extraordin·ary treatments, De Lugo claims that a person caught in a burning building would not have to use water to extinguish part of the fire, thus only delaying momentarily the time of death, because partially extinguishing the fire would be ·a futile attempt to preserve life.[17] This is strictly applicable to a patient

16 Atkinson, "Theological History of Catholic Teachings on Prolonging Life", pp. 101-2.

17 De Lugo, Juan. *Disputationes SckoZasticae et Morales,* (ed. nova,

who is truly dying and for whom assisted feeding would not substantially sustain life. In such a case, the removal of food and fluids would not be the underlying and fundamental cause of death as would be the fire, and it would therefore be permissible to remove them.

But whether these sorts of patients would have to be fed is not the issue today. The pertinent issue is whether the removal of .feeding should be morally permitted when its removal would be the fundamental cause of dearth. He holds that the only condition necessary for providing food and water is that there be " some hope of sustaining life" .[18] The term " some" does not mean that it be ,a,hsolutely certain that life will be sustained, but only that there be some prospect of it being continued by the provision of food and water. This requirement that feeding be given when there is some hope of 1ife being preserved would seem to require its rprov:isionin thait case.

He is one of the few classical moralists to give high priority to the judgment of a physician, and if a physician determines that a treatment is necessary he would require the patient to consent to the treatment. [19] De Lugo was primarily concerned with the morality of mutilations, and he held that they were obligatory if they could cure and if they did not involve great pain. If 'a mutilating therapy would be necessary for the health or well-being of the patient, but the patient rejected it, De Lugo would compel its acceptance. [20] De Lugo states that a patient:

must permit [a] cure when the doctors judge it necessary, and when it can happen without intense pain; not, if it is accompanied by

Parisiis, Vives, 1868-69), Vol. VI, *De Justitio et Jure,* Disp. X, Sec. l, n. 21 (transl. as in Cronin, p. 59).

1s Atkinson, "Theological History of Catholic Teachings on Prolonging Life", p. 102.

19 De Lugo, *foe. cit.*

20 It is likely that De Lugo held this to prevent patients from committing suicide by rejecting medically indicated, beneficial and nonburdensome treatments from being provided.

very bitter pain; because a man is not bound to employ extraordinary and difficult means to conserve life.[21]

According to De Lugo, the failure to employ reasonably aV1aii1able mea:ns of preserving Life could he equivalelllt to taking one's life, but he does not identify the conditions under which this might occur.[22] This principle applies when the means are not difficult to use and when death from the lethal cause could be easily .avoided. This would imply that assisted feeding would he required i£ it was rerudily;a-v;aiLableand if !Lts provision could prevent death by starvation or dehydration. Thus, De Lugo was deeply concerned about the morality of removing food and water from patients, and he clearly believed that some withdmwals were immoral.

4. *Fr. Gerald Kelly, SJ.*

A. *The Usefulness of Assisted Feeding*

Fr. Gerald Kelly is important in the history of contemporary Catholic medical ethics because of his development of the doctrine of ordinary and extraordinary means. He developed his views on the requirements to receive medical treatments, and in his later writings he established a clearer normative position on the duties to receive care and treatment. Kelly claims that families and medical professionals should be brought into treatment decisions because they have moral duties demanding respect.[28] In holding this, he laid a foundation for the contemporary " covenantal " theory of medical decisionmaking espoused by Paul Ramsey .[24]

21J. De Lugo, *Disputation.es Sohloasticae et Morales*, Vol. VI, *De Justitia et Jure,* Disp. X, Sec. 1, n. 21.

22 Atkinson, "Theological History of Catholic Teachings on Prolonging Life", p. 102.

Ulbid., p. 107. Kelly mentions this, it •seems, to affirm that families and health care providers have duties to provide care and that authoriza.tion of withdrawal of ca.re by either of these can constitute culpable killing.

2' See Paul Ramsey, *The Patient as Person* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979) and *Basia Ohristian liJthics* (Chica.go: University of Chicago Press, 1950), pp. 367·388.

In his advanced views Kelly provides us with the what has come to be 'accepted as the " classical " definition of ordinary and extraordinary means:

Ordinary means are all medicines, treatments and operations which offer a reasonable hope of benefit and which can be obtained and used without excessive expense, pain or other inconvenience.

Extraordinary means are all medicines, treatments and operations which cannot be obtained and used without excessive expense, pain or other inconvenience, or which if used, would not offer a reasonable hope of benefit.[25]

After making this distinction, he proceeds to ask if there could he a " useless ordinary " means of preserving life and if such a means could be morally required. Initially, Kelly argues that all ordinary means are obligatory, but this changes in his later works in which he replies that no one can be required to employ a means that is useless. He therefore declared some ordinary means to be elective because they were "useless ".[26] He writes:

[N]o *remedy* is obligatory unless it offers *a reasonable hope of checking or curing the disease.* I would not call this a common opinion because many authors do not refer to it, but I know of no one who opposes it, and it seems to have intrinsic merit as an application of the axiom, *nemo ad inutile tenetur* [i.e., No one can obliged to do what is useless]. Moreover, it squares with the rule commonly applied to the analogous case of helping one's neighbor: one is not obliged to offer help unless there is a reasonable assurance that it will be efficacious.[27]

Kelly argues correctly that a treatment is useless if it does not offer a reasonable hope of checking or curing a disease. In light of this definition, it would seem that provision of food and fluids by assisted means would be useful when it could prevent the person from succumbing to starv,ation or dehydra-

[25] G. Kelly, "The Duty to Preserve Life", *Theological Studies,* XII (1951), p. 550.

[26] G. Kelly, "The Duty of Using Artificial Means of Preserving Life" *Tkeologioal Studies,* XI (1950), pp. 218-9.

[27] *Ibid.,* pp. 207-8.

tion. For in that circumstance, it could " check ,, the " disease " of starvation.

Oddly, Kelly argues that there would be no obligation to provide fluids and feeding to a patient by assisted means if the patient was unconscious and was expected to die within a few weeks.[28] In this situation food and water should be provided because they could achieve their end of preventing death from dehydration or starvation and thus would not be useless because they could " check the disease ,,. Kelly does not hold that life-sustaining measures would have to" check disease for a certain period of time", but only that they have this power. It is thus peculiar that Kelly considers assisted feeding useless simply because its power is temporally limited.

Further application of his principle would imply that feeding which could only sustain life for short period of time is " useless,, would also seem to allow spoon-feeding to be withdrawn or withheld from a conscious termina1ly ill patient with even more time to live, because spoon-feeding is moil'e burdensome to others than is tube feeding. It could permit withholding insulin from a diabetic who was expected to live for a couple of weeks, even though its withdrawal would cause death, and it might even permit withdrawal of hygienic care or protection from exposure. Kelly's understanding of utility is correct, but it seems that he did not apply it properly in practice, for he did not see that feeding could fend off death for a limited period of time and was therefore useful. He is correct in saying that useless treatments need not be given, but he fails to see that some forms of assisted feeding were not useless when they could prevent death from dehydration or starvation even for a limited period of time by their mere provision.

Kelly's belief that there should be no obligation to continue feeding a patient expected ·to die within two weeks if the patient is unconscious is quite remarkable. He asserts that a conscious patient should be permitted to decide whether or not to

[28] *Ibid.,* P· 220.

receive feeding, but he holds there is no duty to give food and water to one in a similar state but unconscious.[29] This view would radically limit the obligations of health care providers to the unconscious terminal patient, and it implies the moral ;permissibility of abandoning provision of all treatment for them. It is also quite discriminatory because it implies that capacity for psychological relating is the ground for the possession of moral rights. KeHy would undoubtedly object to reeently enacted Baby Doe Regulations of :the Child Abuse Aot which prohibited the removal of food and water from comatose infants, despite the fact that strong approval was given these regulations by the disaibled community.[30]

Kelly's argument in favor of removing feeding from unconscious terminally ill patients is pertinent to the contemporary issue of providing feeding for the medically stllible comatose. F-0r, under some definitions of euthanasia, withdrawing food and wiruter from them would be mercy kiillingbecause the withdrawal would be done for the purpose of causing death to prevent a patient from experiencing severe pain.[31] Kelly correctly ·arguedthat the removal of some medical treatments in such cases was permissible, but feeding should not be withdrawn, since withdrawal of food and water would cause death as surely as would a lethal injection.

The withdrawal of food and water, provided as an aspect of routine patient maintenance and of normal nursing care, is not

29 *Ibid.,* p. 219.

ao *Non discrimination on the Basis of Handioap; ProceiVures and Guidelines Relating to Health Oare for Handicapped. Infants; Final Rule,* 49 Fed. Reg. 1622, 1623 (January 1983). HHS reported that after a period of comment, 16,739 comments were received, 96.5% of which were favorable. See: "The Emergence of Institutional Ethics Committees" by Ronald E. Cranford and A. Edward Doudera, in their *Institutional Ethics Oommittees and Health Oare Decision Making* (Ann Arbor: Health Administration Press, 1984), p. 5.

a1 Webster's Dictionary defines it as an "act or method of causing doo,th painlessly, so as to end suffering". *Webster's New World Dictionary* (Second College Edition, ed. David B. Guralnik. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1970), p. 889.

merely the " occasion" of the patient's death, but is its cause.[32] When one removes or refrains from throwing a life ring to a man who would drown without it, the remov;alor withholding is not the "occasion " of the man's death but is the cause. Similarly, the removal or withholding of these readily providable forms of feeding are the causes of the death of a patient who would be medically stable with their provision. He allows this withdrawal even though it would imply that death could be physically caused by removing a routinely available means of preserving life. Kelly ignores the issue of causation of death, and he seems to .feel that :there would be nothing wrong with causing death if death was expected in only a matter of days.

Kelly's endorsement of withdrawing feeding from a comatose patient who was expected to die shortly did not go uncontested, however, for Fr. Joseph Donovan argued that IV feeding was an ordinary medical treatment and that there was no impossibility in feeding the comatose.[33] He claimed that removing feeding in the instance where Kelly permitted it was morally equivalent to causing death, and he essentially charged Kelly with permitting mercy killing by omission when death was imminent.[34]

Kelly agreed that .assisted feeding was an ordinary medical treatment and he justified this position by making assertions that many would question today. He claimed that this form of feeding was an ordinary medical treatment in the speeulative order but that it was an extraordinary treatment in the practical order because it was clinically useless.[85] By admitting that a;ssisted feeding was speculatively obligafory but practi-

32 The claim that withdrawal of life-sustaining nutrition a.nd fluids that are readily providable does not kill the patient, but is merely the occasion on which the patient succumbs. See *The Medica.Z-MoraZ New8Zetter,* Vol. 24, *No.* 4, .April, 1987, p. 3.

3S Fr. Donovian's article appeared in *Homiletic and PMtoraZ Review,* XLIX, (August, 1949), p. 72.

HKelly, "The Duty of Using .Artificial :Means of Preserving Life", p. 210.

so .Atkinson, "Theological History of Catholic Teachings on Prolonging Life", p. 109.

cally elective, Kelly implicitly affirmed that there was something about assisted feeding that distinguished it from other forms of therapeutic, palliative or remedial medical treatment. But he was unable to ·see this difference precisely, and he did not impose obligations correlative to this difference. Kelly would have had no trouble teaching that a therapeutic procedure such as an ·appendectomy for a dying person was useless because the person would die from the other cause before he or she died from the appendicitis, and he seemed to think that assisted feeding could become extraordinary in exactly the same sense. What he did not see was that withdrawal of feeding creates a lethal condition, irrespective of the clinical picture of the patient.

The inconsistency of thought compromises his claims about the optional chal'lacter of assisted feeding for various classes of patients. Kelly's view that care and treatment can be speculatively ordinary hut pl'iacticallyelective is not tenable today, and his authority in the issue can be rightfully challenged. His distinction between the speculative and practical has never been widely accepted by medical ethicists, and it is of uncertain utility. It is interesting that Kelly's argument for withdrawing food ·and fluids was never accepted into the mainstream of Catholic ethical teaching, even though his conclusion was. And conversely, Donovan's arguments were logically sound and implanted in the tradition, hut they have been rejected in recent decades.

Kelly also did not f.ace the issue of causality squarely, for the withdrawal of feeding from such a person was not the mere occasion of death but was in fact the cause of death. It seems that Donovan was correct and that Kelly did in fact permit those near death to be killed by dehydration and starvation. Some contemporary right-to-die ,activists have charged that the Catholic trllldition has .allowed mercy killing by omission because of Kelly's views, and there seems to be support for this charge.[86]

ao See Gerald LaRue, *l!Juth111fU1,8i!J, and .Religion.* (Los Anglees: Hemlock Press, 1981). Kelly himself feared that his views might be interpreted as

Kelly was apparently unaware of ·a diHerence between ordinary medical treatments and what ·someethicists are now calling normal care or minimal care.[87] This category consists of hygienic care, protection from psychological support, feeding, and the maintenance of such devices as urinary catheters. Some now believe that to withhold these forms of care would be morally equivalent to killing by omission, but Kelly mentions none of this and it is not evident that he had a clear idea of what constituted killing by omission.

B. *Assisted Feeding and the Common Good*

More positively, Kelly is alniost the only moralist in the recent Catholic tradition to state explicitly that patients could be required to use extraordinary and *per se* elective measures if this was required by the common good or a higher value.[38] This is a superb insight, and it should be applied to protecting society from the emergence of socially and legally endorsed mercy killing. The common good can require a person to accept assisted feeding in order to prevent the social and legal endorsement of euthanasia by omission which would pose a clear threat to the handicapped, immature, unstable and medically vulnerable from mercy killing. Kelly holds that a civil leader can be required to receive medical treatments, •and that a father of a family could be morally required to receive them to protect his family.[39] If saving one's life is necessary for the weHare of family or the security of a nation, one must do so.[40] A common good exists where there is a common goal,

being "Catholic euthanasia". See "The Duty of Using Artificial :Means of Preserving Life", p. 219.

s1 See Smith, William, B. "Judeo-Christian Teaching on Euthanasia: Definitions, Distinctions and Decisions". *The Linaore Quarter"liu,* vol. 54, n. 1 (February, 1987), p. 29. Also see Barry, Robert "The Ethics of Providing Life-Sustaining Nutrition and Fluids to Incompetent Patients", *The Journal of Family and Culture.* Vol. I, No. 2 (Summer 1985) p. 27.

as Kelly, *The Duty of Using Artificial Means of Preseroing Life,* p. 206; p. 106.

a9 *Ibid.,* p. 216.

40 See Welty, Eberhard, *Handbook of Christian Social Bthios* (New York: Herde & Herder, 1963), p. 312.

and in the case of society, that goal is the well-being of all, and not just the maximization of individual liberties or rights.[41] The good of the community is prior :to private interest, and the individual is duty bound to strive for the common good.

The common good can place demands on individuals, but there are filmirts to whait lit oan reqmre. Fir.st, nowhere is an individual released from the duty to do what is morally good, and appeals to the common good cannot release from this obligation.[42] Second, the order of values must be preserved which means that higher values must be protected at the expense of lower ones.[43] Thus, morality can be promoted at the expense of •art or economic interest, for example. Third, in times of great crisis, higher values can be set aside for the attainment of lower ones.[44] For example, educational activities can be suspended in time of war for the welfare of the entire community. Extraordinary measures can be commanded by the common good, so that a person can be required to make personal sacrifices to save another's life if that can be done without putting one's self or family in the same danger. Thus, one can be required to forego certain material advantages to protect the lives of others.

Acting in behalf of the common good is required by justice, and is commanded by the virtue of universal justice which seeks to protect the well being of all by directing all actions toward the common good.[45] The virtue of universal justice de-

41 St. Thomas says that "[T]he community has necessarily the sa.me goal as the individual." "The good of the individual is not a final end but is sub·ordinated to the common good." "Individual well-being cannot exist without the welfare of the community . . . therefore it is judging correctly in the light of the common good that man must recognize what is good for him." See ·Welty, *op. cit,* p. 94. This principle is in harmony with what some moralists call "universal justice" for such demands to be made. Universal justice is the most important of the. natural virtues, according to Thoma.a. *Summa Theologica,* II-II 58, 6-7.

42 Welty, *Handbook of Christian Social Ethics,* p. 112.

4s *Ibid.,* pp. 112-3.

41 *Ibid.,* p. 113.

45 *Ibid.,* pp. 312-3.

termines what demands can be imposed on a community by the common good. Virtues can be required by universal justice so ,that coura;ge could be required. in war, just as temperance could be commanded in times of famine.[46] That extraordinary forms of care or treatment should be obligatory for the common good is in accord with the principles of universal justice because it is an act of courage for the benefit of the entire community. They can be set aside in specific circumstances so that the individual can pursue the common good.

Assisted feeding could be mandated for certain classes because allowing them to reject it or be denied it would place entire classes of handicapped, despairing, terminal and chronically sick patients at risk. Because there is so much imprecision in medical diagnosis and prognosis, feeding should be required. for all where it is medically possible so that those who should be justly given feeding are not denied it.

By way of summary, one must be careful about invoking Kelly uncritically on the issue of ·assisted feeding, for there were evident inadequacies in his thought. To his credit, he admits that his principles were inherently imprecise, and he argues that, if one is to err in ambiguous situations, it should be on the side of life. He gave us many of the fundamental concepts by which we understand medical ethics today, but some of his analyses were not ·adequately consistent or insightful. He apparently did not believe that it was possible to kill terminally ill patients by denial of assisted feeding, and he gave no evidence of medically stable but comatose patients or persons with disabilities wishing to end their lives by starvation or dehydration, and thus he is in some respects not the sure.sit of guides for today's problems. Some of his contemporaries, such as Fr. Donovan, saw this and were critical of his insights, but Donovan's thought has not been given the prominent place that was given to Kelly's in Catholic medical-ethical tradition. This rebuts claims that the moral doctrines of the Church

<16 *Jbid.,* pp. 32-3.

should not be conditioned by public policy considerations, for Kelly explicitly asserts that the moral teachings of the Church do take into consideration issue of public policy.

5. Daniel Cronin

Daniel Cronin :teaches that ordinary means hold out a hope of beneficial results, are commonly used, are p:voportionate to one's social position, and ·are not difficult to employ. Even though he does not say when it would actually become so, he agrees that feeding could become extraordinary if it was useless.[47] It could ·also be rejected if it was impossible to provide, required great effor.t to receive, caused great pain, was radically expensive, or caused intense revulsion.[48] For Cronin, the patient possesses the dominant right to decide what treatments are ordinary or extraordinary, and if the patient is incompetent the physician should provide only ordinary treatments.[49] Cronin demands that the physician not only avoid practicing euthanasia, but also avoid even giving the impression of practicing it.

Commenting on Vitoria's views on feeding patients, Cronin says the following:

> Food is primarily intended by nature for the basic sustenance of animal life. Food for man is basically and fundamentally necessary from the very beginning of his temporal existence. It is basically required by this human life and nature intends food for this purpose. That is why man has the right to grow food and kill animals. Furthermore, because it is a law of nature that man sustain himself by food, it is a duty for man to nourish himself by food. In the case of drugs and medicines, the same is not true. Drugs and medicines are intended per se by nature to help man conserve his life. However, this is not by way of exception. Drugs and medicines are not the basic way by which man is to nourish his life. They are intended by nature to aid man in the conserva-

47 Atkinson, "Theological History of Catholic Teaching on Prolonging Life", pp. llO·lll.

4B[bi/l,

49 *Ibid.,* pp. 112-113.

tion of his life when he is sick or in pain or unable to sustain himself by natural means. These artificial means are not natural means but they are intended by nature to help man protect, sustain and conserve his life. If man were never to be sick, he would never need medicines. If he is sick, however, it is quite *natural* for him to make use of *artificial* means of *conserving life.5o*

It is hard to ·S'ee how rthese conditions, woo.Id make asssllited feeding optional for the comatose patient because these patients apparently do not experience pain, and tube feeding is apparently less burdensome for others than is spoon feeding. Thus, it would seem permissible to conclude that Cronin would not permit assisted feeding and fluids to be withdrawn from a patient if so doing would be the fundamental cause of death.

6. *Joseph Sullivan*

Joseph Sulliv;an acknowledges cbhait there is a difference between feeding and medical treatments. [51] He argues that ordinary means of preserving life are required of all patients, hut he does affirm that there are two kinds of ordinary treatments. On the one hand, there are artificial ordinary treatments, such as surgeries, X-rays, transfusions and IV feedings.[52] On the other hand, he suggests that there are natural ordinary means of preserving life such as feeding, protection from exposure,

[50] *Ibid.,* pp. 113-114.

[51] J0<ieph V. Sullivan, *Oatholio Teaohing on the Morality of l.llutharw,aio,* (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1949), p. 65.

[52] Sullivan asserts:

> As artificial means, we may understand such means as major and minor operations, x-ray treatments, blood transfusions, intravenous feeding, radium treatments, psychotherapy, oxygen tents, iron lungs, all germicides and antiseptics and even the taking of prepared medicines. *Ibid.,* p. 65.

One would wonder if Sullivan would allow withdrawal of antiseptics if it was judged they were too burdensome or useless for the patient. This is asked because many would consider such forms of care as antiseptics as simply normal care, like intravenous feeding, and not artificial medical treatments.

exercise and ;regular diet.[58] He iargues that ,a natu;ral means of prolonging life is *per se* ordinary and yet it could become *per accidens* extraordinary.[64]

Sullivan argues that a cancer patient in extreme pain with a toleration for painkillers could have food ·and water removed, even if the patient could live a good while because of a strong heart:

1. A cancer patient is in extreme pain and his systems has gradually established what physician call a "toleration" of any drug, so that increased doses give only brief respite from the ever-recurring pain. The attending physician knows that the disease is incurable and that the person is slowly dying, but because of a good heart, it is possible that the agony will continue for several weeks. The physician then remembers that there is one thing that he can do to end the suffering. He can cut off intravenous feeding and the patient will surely die. He does this and before the next day the patient is dead.

!!. The case involves the principle that an ordinary means of prolonging life and an extraordinary means are relative to the patient's physical condition. Intravenous feeding is an artificial means of prolonging life and therefore one may be more liberal in application of principle. Since this cancer patient is beyond all hope of recovery and suffering extreme pain, intravenous feeding should be considered an extraordinary means of prolonging life. The physician was justified in stopping the intravenous feeding.[55]

These views can be challenged because it is clear that the intention of withholding the food and water is to effect death to end suffering. We should recall that euthanasia is "an act

[58] Sullivan holds that the following are natural ordinary means of preserving life:

> Among the natural means of preserving life would be included such means as proper clothing, housing, physical recreation, good food, regularity at meals, etc. *Ibid.,* p. 65.

[54] He writes that:

> *A natural mea-ns of prolonging Zife is, per se, a-n. ordinary means of prolonging life, yet per acoidens may be erotraordinary. .-- An artificial means of prolonging life may be a-n. Mdinary mea-ns or an erotraordinary means reZatwe to the physical condition of the patient. Ibid.,* p. 65.

[55] *Ibid.,* p. 73.

or method of causing death painlessly so as to end suffering ", iand the explicit purpose of removing feeding is not to remove a treatment ,which itself causes great pam 00 the patient, but to cause death 'so rthat ,suffering from the disease will cease.[56] If the means of delivering the feeding were the cause of the patient's pain, it might be justified to withdraw it. It is not clear how what he endorses is distinguished from mercy killing by omission.

It is interesting that Sullivan mentions nothing of Kelly's claim that even extraordinary means can be forced on a patient for the common good. And he does not discuss Vitoria's or de Lugo's claim that feeding should be given when there is "some hope of life". They saw not only a difference between feeding and other forms of medical treatment, but they also affirmed that different sorts of criteria governed their provision. Sullivan saw none of this, and simply affirmed that the same criteria governed the provision of food ·and water in all circumstances. He did not discuss the issue of causality with respect to feeding, and he did not say why the failure to provide or receive naturally or artificially ordinary means was immoral. Had he done this, he might have been more willing to establish a stricter criterion for the provision of natural and assisted feeding.

7. *Charles McFadden*

Charles McFadden believes that the temporary use of medical treatments, including food and water, is ordinary while their long-term use would be extraordinary.[57] This view is

[56] How one can withdraw readily providable assisted feeding from a medically stable patient without intending death is not clear. Death is as certain as if it were caused by a. lethal injection, a.nd death is not a. side effect of a.n act eliminating suffering, but the means by which the suffering was eliminated.

[57] McFadden writes:

> Routine medical practice today utilizes intravenous feeding in a. countless variety of cases. Certainly the physician regards this procedure a.s an *ordinary* means of conserving life. It is obviously able to be carried

questionable because it would seem to imply that the long-term use of insulin by a diabetic or spoon feeding of the senile would also be an extraordinary treatment as well. The difficulty is that it is no more burdensome to give assisted feeding than to give spoon feeding, and declaring assisted feeding useless would strongly imply that the long-term use of more burdensome forms of care or treatment such as wheelchairs, or even visual ·aids for the visually impaired, would be extraordinary. McFadden was apparently seeking to be compassionate to the terminal by articulating this principle, but in so doing he created a principle that could place many medically vulnerable persons in jeopardy.

Conclusicn

In light of these findings, it does not seem possible to hold that the Catholic medical ethical tradition would be subverted by ·asserting that feeding be provided when it is an aspect of ·basic patient manitenance. It cannot simply be said that without qualification the " tradition " permitted assisted feeding and fluids to be removed. It does not appear true that the Catholic tradition simply allowed feeding to be withdrawn from patients, for the majority of these writers prohibited the

> out, under normal hospital conditions, without any notable inconvenience. For this reason, we must regard recourse to intravenous feeding, in the case of typical hospitalized patients, as an *ordinary* and morally compulsory procedure.
>
> The above conclusion applies, as stated, to routine hospital cases where the procedure is envisioned as a *temporary* means of carrying a patient through a critcial period. Surely any effort to sustain life *permanently* in this fashion would constitute a grave hardship and not be normally compulsory.

Charles J. McFadden, *The Dignity* of *Life* (Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday Visitor Press, 1976), p. 152. One must question this judgment. Intravenous feeding is less burdensome than giving some .Alzheimer's patients spoon feeding. Does that mean that feeding those patients permanently would also be elective and not obligatory? Would the permanent use of colostomies also be elective if they were required for long term use? Many individuals now live with the aid of portable respirators. .Are those too elective, despite the fact that people can lead largely normal lives with them?

withdrawal of feeding when it was an a.spect of basic patient maintenance.

This does not appear to be true for three reasons. First, many in the tra.dition asserted principles that would not allow remov,al of life-sustaining food ,and water from patients, and many in the tradition who argued for its removal failed to provide adequate reasons for that judgment. Second, a number of recent official teachings on this issue have affirmed obligations to feed. And third, there is an emerging consensus within the Church that this sort of feeding is morally necessary. The Catholic social justice tradition affirms duties of justice to give food and drink to those in need.

Thus, Aquinas would not permit self-killing, and he required that commonly available feeding be provided and accepted by all persons. Vitoria demanded that feeding be given as long as there was "some hope of life". De Lugo, despite his laxity on many issues, affirmed that feeding be given and received as long as there was "some hope of life", and he held that the refusal of reasonably available means to sustain life would be morally equivalent to suicide.

Gerald Kelly demanded that extraordinary treatments be giv,en when required by rthe common good, and this would certainly include assisted feeding in some cases. When he did allow life-sustaining, re,adily available assisted feeding to be withdrawn, he defended that judgment poorly by arguing that feeding was speculatively ordinary but pmctically extraordinary. Kelly's critics were more consistent in their logic than he was, but they were not given the place in the " tra.dition " accorded to Kelly. Daniel Cronin admitted a difference between nutrition and fluids and medical treatments, but he did not draw out the implications of this difference. As a result of this he did not see that there should be different criteria governing the provision of food and water from the those governing the administration of medical treatments.

Joseph Sullivan admitted that there was a difference between feeding and other forms of ordinary care, but he per-

mitted feeding to be removed from a cancer patient who was in great pain but who would live a long while because of a strong heart. But, because the intention of the action was to end the life of la person in extreme suffering, his view is questionable inasmuch as it seems to be endorsing euthanasia by omission. He elided natural feeding into the category of ordinary medical treatment by requiring its provision according ·to the same standards as those governing ordinary medical care. Previous authors asserted stricter obligations to provide ordinary feeding, but Sulliv;an would not accept this. He recognized that there was a difference between natural and assisted feeding, but he did not see that a different type of obligation should flow from that difference. And Charles McF.adden allowed permanent assisted feeding to be removed because it was a burden, but he did not say how this was a burden to the comatose patent, the first individual to be considered in making these estimates.

Second, in the past decade, a number of important official statements have been issued on the provision of food and water to patients, and these have supported the view that quality of life judgments are not to be allowed determine if feeding is to be given. The *Declaration on Euthanasia* held that it was legitimate to refrain from using remedies when existence was precarious and painful, but it held that ordinary means had to be provided.[58] In *The Matter of Nancy Ellen Jobes,* the New Jersey Catholic Conference filed an *amicus curiae* brief arguing that this severely brain-damaged but medically stable young woman be fed.[59] The bishops argued that removing feeding would be morally equivalent to intentional killing and ·said the following:

> ... nutrition and hydration, being basic to human life, are aspects of normal care, which are not excessivelyburdensome, that should

[58] *Declaration on llluthanasia of the Sacre<}, Oongregation for the Doctrine of the Faith,* May 5, 1980.

[0 0] Brief, *Amicus Curiae,* and appendix, *In the matter of Nancy Iilllen Jobes,* on Behalf of the New Jersey Catholic Conference, #26, 041, p. 5.

always be provided to a patient. Nutrition and hydration are directed at sustaining life. Medical treatment is therapeutic; nutrition and hydration are not, because they will not cure any disease. For that fundamental reason we insist that nutrition and hydration must always be maintained. As the Pontifical Academy for Sciences noted in this respect in its report on "The Artificial Prolongation of Life and Its Exact Determination of the Moment of Death": If the patient is in a permanent coma, irreversible as far as it is possible to predict, treatment is not required, *but care, including feeding must be provided.*[60]

Immediately after the Judicial Council of the American Medical Association issued its opinion that considered removal of food and wa;ter from comatose patients who were not imminently dying, Archbishop Philip Hannan condemned the Judicial Council's opinion.[61] And after an .appellate court in California ordered caregivers and a hospital to remove a feeding tube which they gave Elizabeth Bouvia because ,they thought she was trying to starve herself to death, Archbishop Roger Mahony called the decision irrational.[62] Most recently, in the lead editorial in the Jesuit theological journal *La Civita Cattolica,* which is often ,a mouthpiece for the Vatican's thinking on issues, withholding " ordinary means " such as food, blood transfusions and injections" was rejected as immoml.[63]

flO[bid.

61 In a letter on March 16, 1086, Archbishop Hannan wrote the following:

> The Catholic Church has always held that families are not obligated to use extraordinary means-such as artificial life support systems-to sustain the life of a patient in a hopelessly irreversible coma. However, food and water are ordinary means of sustaining life. Therefore, the Catholic Church opposes the .American Medical Association position because it approves denying a person the normal nourishment that he or she needs to sustain life.

62 "Mahony Critical of Logic in Bouvia Case", *Swn Fernando Valley Daily News,* April 24, 1986, p. 1. In addition, Cardinals Law and Bernardin also criticized decisions to allow food and water to be removed from patients. See "Law Take Side in Coma Case", *The Boston Herald,* June 8, 1985, and "Cardinal Warns of Eutha.nasia", *Ohioago OathoUo,* April 16, 1986.

es *La Oivita OattoZioa,* February 21, 1987. The editorial cited the report of the Vatican Commission *"Oor Unum"* which stated:

> There remains the strict obligation to apply under all circumstances

These statements clearly show that a consensus is emerging in the official teachings of the Church on the moral obligation to provide assisted feeding when it is an aspect of basic patient maintenance. It is clear that through these official statements the magisterium is correcting deficiencies in the moral theological tradition of recent years ·and is teaching that withholding feeding is killing by omission.

Third, giving food and drink to those in need is in clear harmony with classical .Catholic social justice principles. There is an emerging consensus that those who have the :financialmeans and technological capability to feed the needy must put their means to that use. This percei¥ed moral obligation motivated recent efforts by Western nations to feed the starving in Africa through *Live Aid*, and major economic, scientific and agricultural efforts to promote the development of argiculture in the third world. This obligation has been repeatedly affirmed in recent Papal Encyclicals which have called on the rich nations to care for those nations which cannot feed themselves, and it is imposed on the rich nations as a matter of justice. The Encyclical *Populorum Progressi,o* e:x;pressed concern for the growing problem of hunger in the world and it saw despondency as a cons·equenceof this hunger.[64]

This issue of providing feeding to patients is part and parcel of this problem. Lack of food was viewed as posing hazards greater than were immediately apparent, and it considered lack of food ·and water an ancient scourge. The Holy Father simply asserted "No more hunger, hunger never again!" [65]

those therapeutic measures which are called 'minimal': that is, those which are normally and customarily used for the maintenance of life (food, blood transfusions, injections, etc.) .

The editorial also criticized efforts to withhold "ordinary means" of treatment such as food, blood transfusions or injections. See "Euthanasia Spreading, Jesuit Journal Warns" *The Boston Pilot,* March 6, 1987.

MPopulorum Progressio, Para. 45. See Joseph Gremillion, *The Gospel of Peace and Justice* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1979), p. 401.

65 "Address of His Holiness Pope Paul VI to the Participants of the World Food Conference," Rome (Nov. 9, 1974), para. 2. In Gremillion, *op cit.*, pp. 599·606.

He did not just say this about the hunger of the poor, but about hunger in general. The Holy Father said that the lack of prudent economic planning was one reason why some suffered hunger.[66] This point should be taken seriously with re-,spect to ·assisted feeding, for many have sought to justify its removal precisely for economic reasons. The Holy Father asserted that the right to satisfy one's hunger must finally be recognized for everyone, according to the specific requirements of his age and activity, and he called for vigilance and courage to feed the hungry.[67]

The obligation to feed the hungry seems to be based on the Gospel story of the Good Samaritan. The failure to give food and drink to the nameless victim is denounced as not just a failure of charity, but a loathsome failure of justice. The Samaritan does not stop to investigate the medical condition of the victim of brigands, but simply ·gives food and drink. Those who fail to do this are not depicted as merely being lacking in charity, but as being hateful and maliciously selfish and egocentric. The Good Samaritan is really a " minimally decent" Samaritan who simply does what common decency demand. He does not ask if the man will survive a long period of time, fully recover his capability for human action, or be able to act for human spiritual and affective ends. He does not ask if his actions will increase his sufferings, and he certainly does not " put the man out of his misery " by giving him a " quick and painless death "!

This general obligation to give food and drink does not cease when nursing techniques 'a.re needed rto pwvide them, for it is probably easier to give IV or NG feeding to a hospital patient in the United States than it is a starving person in the African or South American countryside, for instance. Thus, social policy of permitting food and water to be withheld from those who can live if these are provided could undermine this developing moral consensus that food must be given to all people by those with the capability.

oo *Ibid.,* pa.re.. 2, 3, pp. 602-606.
Ibid.

Food and water, irrespective of their mode of provision, are basic resources of the body and are not therapeutic measures. They are used by every cell, organ and system in the body to sustain its natural functions, and their natural :finality or teleological orientation is not therapeutic. Unlike medical treatments, all people require them whether they are well or ill. To remove them when .their mere provision is by routine techniques of patient maintenance is to kill the patient by omission through their denial. Removing them does not allow an underlying pathological condition to be set free, but sets the process of dying immediately into motion.

In affirming that life-sustaining assisted feeding provided by routine nursing measures is an .aspect of normal care and basic patient maintenance, classical doctrines that were obscure and not fully understood are made clearer. It is now clearer to many in the Church that withholding or removing these constitutes killing by omission. The Church is not getting on to a slippery slope by affirming this, but is making more articulate and clear an insight that has been present, though vague and ambiguous, for generations.

IMMEDIACY AND MEDIATION IN AQUINAS: "IN I SENT.," Q. 1, A. *5*

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Introduction

THE PURPOSE of the present essay is to provide an analysis of the dialectically related notions of "immediacy" and "mediation" in Question I, *5* of Aquinas' *Commentary on the Sentences.* "Immediacy" here refers to the non-mediated "light of inspiration" which Aquinas proposes as a principle for theology; while "mediation" refers to the problem of interpretation via sensible signs in an historical community. It is proposed that there are dialectical tensions unresolved by Aquinas, and usually overlooked by commentators and interpreters.1

1 The most extensive analysis published to date of the theological methodology of Aquinas in this Commentary is by M. Corbin, *Le chemin de la theologie chez Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1974). For his analysis of the text in question see pp. 273-290. The present essay seeks precisely to be even more "hegelian" and more "barthian" than Corbin, and to provide some documentation for the validity of such an interpretation of Aquinas. For a further methodological discussion, see my "Participated Trinitarian Relations: Dialectics of Method, Understanding, and Mystery in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas" (Leuven: S.T.D. dissertation, the Faculty of Theology, 1987). For basic points in the literature see P. Mandonnet, "Chronologie sommaire de la vie et des ecrits de saint Thomas," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques* 9 (1920), 142·152; G. Rossi, "L'autografo di S. Tommaso del Commento al III libro delle Sentenze," *Divus Thomas Oommentarium de philosophia et theologia* 35 (1932), 532-585; A. Hayen, "S. Thomas a-t-il edite deux fois son Commentaire sure le livre des Sentences," *Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale* 9 (1937), 219-236. See also the review of this by A. Donclaine, in *Bulletin thomiste* 6 (1940), 100-108. P. Vanier, "Theologie trinitaire chez S. Thomas d'Aquin. Evolution du concept d'action notionelle," *Publications de l'Institut d'etudes medievales* 13 (1953), p. 124.

The "Prologue" to the Commentary

The " Prologue " of Aquinas' Commentary consists of two parts, as did that of Albert the Great, and as was the custom of the time. The first part takes its point of departure from a biblical text, which is then interpreted in accord with the na->bure of theology and the project of commentary on the four hooks of the *Sentences.* The theme of Aquinas' biblical meditation is not *scientia* hut *sapientia.* The second part of Aquinas' "Pmlogue " consists, as did Albert's, of a question on the status and method of theology. This Question 1 is of particular importance in that it clearly states that sacred doctrine is not principally to he considered *soientia.*

After the biblical reflection-mediation, Aquinas presents an introductory question on the status and method of *sacra doctrina* in a more "scholastic" manner, specifying five articles that will be addressed: 1) its necessity; 9l) supposing that it exists, whether it is one or many; 3) if it is one, whether it is practical or speculative, and if it is speculative, whether it is wisdom, science, or understanding; 4) its subject; 5) its mode.[2]

For a critique of this position see the review of Vanier by J. Hamer in *Bulletin thomiste* 9 (1954-1956), 596-601. See also E. Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas .Aquinas* (New York, 1956); M. D. Chenu, *Toward Understanding St. Thomas* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1964); J. Weisheipl, "The Meaning of 'Sacra Doctrina'," *The Thomist* 38 (1974), 64-67; B. Mondin, *St. Thomas .Aquinas' Philosophy in the Oommentary to the Sentences* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975). Good arguments on the dating and circumstances of the work are to be found in J. Weishepil, *Friar Thomas d'.A.quino: His Life, Thought, and Work* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1974).

2Aquinas, *Soriptum Super Libros Sententiarum,* vol. 1, ed. Mandonnet (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929), q. 1 (p. 6). [It should be noted that there is as yet no critical edition of this work. All references here will be to this edition, which at least provides a basic text, which is fundamentally a reprint of the Vives edition, and thus differs at times from the Parma edition. The Vives edition, prepared at the end of the 19th century by Abbe Frette, consulted some MSS in the Parisian libraries, but according to current scholarship these MSS reflected a revised text in the MSS tradition. Current scholarship holds that Bruxelles 873-885 (Bx3) and Madrid 516 (Md) reflect the primitive MSS tradition. For the decisive analysis, see E. Booth, "The Three Pecia Systems of St. Thomas Aquinas's Commentary 'In I Sententie.r-

In this Commentary Aquinas already proposes three types of questions concerning *aacra doctrina: an sit* (Article 1); *quid sit* (Articles 2, 8, 4); and *de modo* (Article 5). Yet there are some logica1 problems with this early schema.[3] The question as to whether *sama doctrina* is one or many is proposed before a" what," a genus, such as" science," is established. Similarly, the question as to whether it is speculative or practical presupposes the untreated question as to what sort of thing it is. Aquinas will revise this early logical 'structure in his later Question 1. of the *Summa Theologiae.*

Article 5: The Mode of Theology

In his later *Summa theologiae* Aquinais will separate the concerns of this Article *5* into distinct articles on the senses and images of Sacred Scripture and the "argumentative status " (reasonableness) of sacred doctrine. But here these topic areas are combined in one Ar.tide. This Article does indeed appear to he either a very rough initial attempt that lacks Aquinas' customary logical organization and clarity, or the existing editions simply have included what were only partial and unfinished revisions. This final Article *5* of the " Prologue " is of particular interest because of the multiple dialectical relationships it has with the previous four a:r.ticles.

The four objections in Article *5* question whether divine science: 1) is *artificialis,* 2) has one mode, 8) uses poetics and metaphor, and 4) is *argumentativus* (reasonable). The complex corpus of the Article addresses the necessity of sensible

um," (late 1987) in *La production du Zivre universitaire au moyen b,ge. }j]11Jem-pZar et peoia.* The critical edition by the Leonine Commission is still several years from completion. However, for all quotations of the Latin text in the present article, the Leonine Commission Editor for Book I of the Commentary, Prof. Louis Bataillon, has graciously checked the MSS collation sheet which has thusfar been completed, and it has been found that there .are only three variations in the Mandonnet text from current MSS evidence, as far as the presently cited texts are concerned. These variations will be noted. There is no published English translation of this Commentary.]

s See discussion in J. Weisheipl, "The Meaning of 'Sacra Doctrina'," *The Thomist* 38 (1974), 64-67.

images, the narration of signs, the senses of Sacred Scripture, the ends of theology, and the "argumentative" (reasonable) status of sacred doctrine. One may expect that in a brief discussion of these complex themes, Aquinas will not be able to do them justice, and he may have felt" pressured" to attempt to do too much in his final methodological Article tin the " Prologue."

There are two terms in this Article that present particular and important problems for interpretation: *argumentativus* and *artificia.lis.*

In the response of this Article, Aquinas will state that the mode of sacred science is " *argumentativus."* The same term is later used in Question 1, Article 8 of the *Summa Theologiae.* In both works the shades of meaning and intended meaning of Aquinas have fong presented problems of interpretation for translators and commentators, ,and more strict Aristotelian " scientists " were often quick to miss the more subtle and complex significations. **It** is the case that " *argumenta,tivus* " does, at times for Aquinas, mean " proving the truth of something by a syllogism," demonstrating, " possible of being proven by a, syllogism," or iargumentative.[4] A " *probatio argumentativa"* is an apodictic demonstration. But an *"argumentatio"* has more subtle shades of meaning simply rus " a procedure of testimony," or "the presentation of evidence," [5] or " .a process of reasoning or being reasonable." [6] This is a point of great importance for an accurate understanding of the status and method of theology for Aquinas. When Aquinas describes sacred science •as " argumentative " the use of the term is analogical ,and is itself *ex convenientia.* In the response to the fourth objection in the present Article, Aquinas

[4] See R. Deferrari and lv.l. Barry, *A Lericon of St. Thomas A.quiina8* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1948), vol. I, p. 82.

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] Jt is the judgment of the present author that the best translation here is simply "reasonable," "being engaged in a proce.ss which involves reasoning." While acknowledging that, for Aquinas, sacred dootrine is "beyond" the range of reason, Aquinas also proposes that is has "reasonable" aspects.

himself will state, *"argumenta tolluntur ad probationem articulorum fidei."* Since these " first principles " of theology differ in status and mode of being known from the first principles of philosophical sciences, it is simply erroneous to think that Aquinas predicates " argumentative " of rational sciences and sacred science in the same manner, or that sacred science can literally be "argumentative" in the strict sense of the term.

The term *"a.rtificialis"* used in the initial objection has also long presented complications for translators and commentators. However, the term is present in all known manuscripts, and thus Aquinas obviously intended something by this term. The problem is that the use of this term in this text is unique in the entire corpus of Aquinas. It is also complicated by some strange historical events. It seems that the expression *"artificialis"* for a mode of theology came from a mistake in John Scotus Eriugena's Latin translation of the *Celestial Hierarchy* II, fl of Ps. Dionysius.[7] Ps. Dionysius actually uses the term *atechnos* [8] when speaking of *theologia.* In the mystical negativity of *Ps.* DionySli.1Us,he would s:tress rthe blinding br:illiiance of divine revelation, as overpowering finite intellect, and there could be no question of an artistic construction in theology. By the term *atechnos,* Ps. Dionysius clearly meant "artlessly," "in an unsophisticated manner," " without craft or skill." However, John Scotus Eriugena translated this term as *artificialiter.* And thus one hais .a very clear instance where the meaning of P:s. Dionysius was reconstructed precisely into its opposite, with resulting contortions in theological ,aerobics in attempting to explain how it could be that theology has a mode which is *artificialis.* In aiddition fo being influenced by this :translation of P,s. Dionysius, Aquinas was also likely influenced hy ,a 18th century Franciscan theologian, Eudes Rigaud (Odo Rigaldi), whose *Quaestio de scientia theologiae, pars II* had as its Question 1: *"Utrum modus procedendi in*

1 See R. Roques, *Libres sentiers vers l'·erige'7llism* (Rome: Ed. dell'Ateneo, 1975), Chapter 2, esp. pp. 46-50.

s *Oelestial Hierarchy* II, 2. PL 122, 1040A.

theologia mt artificialis vel non." [9] The approach of Odo Rigaldi was to distinguish two modes by which something could be *artificialis.* One according to human reason, and the other according to divine wisdom, especially as pertaining to salvation. The first mode is found in all sciences, but the second is found in theology, as it is concerned with salvation, piety, and human affect. Thus, for Odo Rigaldi, it was appropriate that theology be *artificialis.*

Now, regardless of the mistranslation of Ps. Dionysius, all the MSS evidence indicates that Aquinas did use the term *"artificialis"* in his own Article *5.* And the question then becomes not what Ps. Dionysius meant by *atechnos,* but what Aquinas meant.

In the initial sitaitement of Aquinas' Artide, the quesrt[on posed with regard to the mode of the science of theology is that it seems to be *"artificialissimus."* This is not accurately understood as meaning " most artificial." [10] Here the context of the term is *"modus artificialis"* which refers to the way or manner of a scientific mode. This is made clear in the response to this first objection in Article 5: *"modus artificialis dicitur qui competit materiae; unde modus qui est artificialis in geometria, non est artificialis in ethica; et secundum hoc modus hujus scientiae maxime artificialis est, quia maxime conveniens materiae."* In the context of *"modus artificialis/'* it is best to understand " *artificialis* " as meaning a skillful ordering, as in scientific argument, in the sense of the term " *artificiose* " (in an orderly manner), or *"artificiosus"* (skillfull, accomplished in a.rt), or *"artificium"* (skill, knowledge, ingenuity). And at the same time the term does mean a skillful ordering of artistic

[11] For the text see L. Sileo, *Peoria della 8cienza teologica: Quaestio de 8cientia theologiae di Odo Rigaldi e altri testi inediti (1230-1250).* 2 vols. Facultas Theologica-Sectio Dogmatica, Thesis ad doctorarum n. 277 (Rome: Pontificium Athenaeum Antonianum, 1984). The text for this Question is found in vol. 2, pp. 54-59.

[10] *"Artificialis, e"* does mean "artistic" or "artificial" at times for Aquinas. See R. Deferrari and M .Barry, *A. Leroicon of St. Thoma8 Aquina8,* vol. 1, p. 88.

images or similitudes, and it is here related to the term *"artifex"* (master of an art, artist, craftsman) .[11]

In Article *5* the first objection is also complicated by variant texts between the Parma and the Mandonnet editions:

Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1) [Parma ed. *"Videtur quod modus procedendi non sit artificialis."] Nobilissimae scientiae debet esse nobilissimus modus. Sed quanto modus est magis artificalis, tanto nobilior est.*[12] *Ergo, cum haec scientia sit nobilissima, modus ejus debet esse artificialissimus.*[18]

Now, in context, the initial statement of the Parma edition actually makes more sense. But the fact is that the MSS evidence at present favors the Mandonnet version. The Parma variant is found also in the 16th Piana edition, but nowhere else.[14] Obviously, one cannot combine the Parma and Mandonnet editions here, for to do so would make no logical sense, especially in light of the response to this objection, as will be seen. **It** does not make sense to combine these editions so that the objection would read: **"It** seems that the mode of proceeding [for this science] is not *artificialis.* . . . Therefore, since this science is the most noble, its mode should be *artificialissi-*

11 Because of the interplays of these meanings impossible to concisely render into English, in the translations which follow the term will simply be presented in Latin.

12 Here the Mandonnet edition does read *"tanto nobilior est,"* but L. Bataillon has informed the present author (Letter, June 25, 1987) that the majority of the MSS actually have *"quanto modus es magis artificialis, nobilior est,"* without *"tanto"* :and this elimination does make for a smoother reading.

13 Q. 1, a. ·5, ob 1 (p. 16). [Parma ed. **"It** seems that the mode of procedure for this science is not *'artificiaUs.'* "] For the most noble science should be of the most noble mode. But insofar as a mode is more *'artifioialis'* it is also more noble. Therefore, since this science is the most noble its mode should be *'artifioialis'* to the greatest extent.

14 For L. Bataillon, the Parma variant "seems to be an unhappy tentative to unify the presentation of the articles by inserting th.is *'Videtur quod modus prooedendi non sit artificialis.'* So the text is surely the Mandonnet one and there is no correction to be made to it" (Letter, June 25, 1987). But the question remains as to why, in these printed editions, the need was sensed to insert the phrase.

mus." The point here is that if one combines the Parma and Mandonnet editions, one has statements that the mode " is not *artifioiaUs,"* and that it "should ·be *artifioialissimus."* Now, since the Parma addition is not reflected in the MSS evidence it can be eliminated. But then what one has is an *objection* stating the thesis which is argued in the corpus of the Article, .and which is also basically argued in the particular response to the first objection. This would not be the normal, logical procedure for Aquinas. Normally, the thrust of the objection is reversed in the corpus and in the response to the objootion. In order to get some sense of what the logical structure of the first objection iat least should be, it is helpful to look at the response to the first objection:

Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod modus artificial,is dictur qui competit materiae; unde modus qui est artificialis in geometria, non est artificialis in ethica: et secundum hoc modus hujus scientiae maxime artificial,isest, quia maxime conveniens materiae.[15]

Thus, if the response to the objection is holding that sacred doctrine is maximally *artifioialis*[1] then the logical objection must be that sacred doctrine is *not "arlifioialis."* In this regard, at least the Parma edition begins in a logically correct manner. But both the Parma and Madonnet editions then also state in the First Objection, *"Ergo, oum haeo soientia sit nobilissima, modus ejus debet esse artifioialissimus."*

The hypothesis of the present •author is that the first objection should actually read,

Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1) Nobilissimae scientiae debet esse nobilissimus modus.[16] *Sed quanto modus est magis artificialis,*

1s Q. I, a. 5, ad I (p. 18). To the first objection it is to be said that the mode *'artificialis'* is said to pertain [to sciences] according to their subject matter, hence the mode which is *'artificialis'* in geometry is not *'artificialis'* in ethics, and according to this the mode of this science [sacred doctrine] is maximally *'artificialis,'* because this mode is maximally in harmony with *["conveniens",* fitting] its subject matter.

1s Again, from the MSS evidence, the later Parma ed. addition of *"Videtur quod modus prooedendi. non sit artificialis"* should not be in the text.

non [17] *nobilior est. Ergo, cum haec scientia sit nobilissima, modus ejus non* [18] *debet esse artificialissimus.*[19]

What is clearly the case is that in Aquinas' response he argues that sacred doctrine is " *artificialis,"* and whether or not one accepts the above hypothesis for how the first objection should rea,d, the question remains as to how one can understand Aquinas' meaning in the response of the Article.

The following interpretation may be suggested. Sacred doctrine is maximally *"artificialis"* because its ultimate "subject matter " is impossible to conceptualize or adequately represent in .any finite medium. What is implied here in Aquinas is the importance of the constructive imagination of the theologian, in attempting to find at least moderately satisfactory similitudes. The tension in such a view of the theological process is that it is not completely clear how what the theologian treats is the inexpressable reality " behind " the similitudes, rather than the similitudes themselves, as products of the constructive imagination. It is because of the inexpressability of the ultimate " subject matter " of sacred doctrine that it is *ex convenientia* for the "treated " subject matter to be " *artificialissimus."* But it is, of course, the manner of this transition from that which cannot be conceived to that which is " *artificialissmus* " which is particularly difficult, or impossible, to explicate. Aquinas gives some indications of the problems in his response:

Responsio. Dicendum, [20] *quod m.odus cujusque scientiae debet in-*

17 The hypothesis of the present author is thus that what came to be transscribed as *"tanto"* in many MSS should have been *"non."*

1s Here again, the hypothesis is that this *"non"* was somehow eliminated in the MSS traditions, but there is not one known MSS where either this *"non"* or another word is present.

10 [A. 5, ob 1.] The most noble science should be of the most noble mode. But insofar as a mode is more *artificialis,* it is *not* more noble. Therefore, since this science is the most noble, its mode should *not* be *artificialis* to the greatest extent [emphasis added].

20 The Mandonnet edition does have *"Respondeo dicendum,"* but all the MSS read *"Responsi-0. Dicendum* . . ." And this is more in keeping with other critical editions, and the forthcoming Leonine Edition of this Commentary will certainly have the latter reading.

quzn secundum considerationem materiae . . . Principia autem hujus scientiae sunt per revelationem accepta; et ideo modus accipiendi ipsa principia debet esse revelativus ex parte infundentis, ut in visionibus [Parma ed. *"revelationibus"] prophetarum, et orativus ex parte recipientis, ut patet in Psalmis.*[21]

What Aquinas was trying to express in this text is not fully clear. It seems that he is trying to indicate that the orientation of one concerned with divine truth should be an orientation which searches for, intends, and is open to that which is beyond the merely "natural" realm of the created order. He seems to be dealing with the idea that the mode of reception of divine principles is itself a divine mode. It is not only the principles themselves which have ,a divine status. It is also notable that his example here of such a mode of reception is not that of a calm, Aristotelian science, hut the " visions of the prophets." There is clearly something in Aquinas' intention here that is far removed from merely professional, academic theology.

It should be recalled that Aquinas' point of focus in this final Article *5* is the " mode " of theology, and that the mode of any inquiry has to be in accord with its subject matter, which was the topic of Article 4. The problematic in Aquinas' view of the subject matter 0:f theology is that it has been said to be " *ens divinum cognoscibile per inspiration.em."*[22] The dialectic here is that *ens divinum* is not directly knowable by finite consciousness and yet, for many reasons, Aquinas wants to in-

21 Q. 1, a, 5, resp. (p. 17). The mode of any sort of science should be investigated according to a consideration of its subject matter .. The principles of this science are, however, accepted by means of divine revelation, a.nd for the same reason the mode of accepting these principles themselves should be as revealed by God, from whom revelation flows, as in the visions of the prophets, and the mode of receiving these principles should be in an attitude of prayer, as is clear in the Psalms.

[Here the MSS evidence favors the Mandonnet reading of *"visionibus"* rather than the Parma reading of *"revelationibus,"* but the Parma reading may be taken as an indication of the difficulty of understanding the present text, with a possible meaning of the revelation given to the prophets being received prayerfully.]

22 Q. 1, a. 4, resp. (p. 16).

sist on some knowability of God for finite consciousness. In the present response, Aquinas appeals to divine action, even using the dmmatic example of the visions of the prophets to express what it is like to receive the principles of this sacred science. The difficulty, of course, is how this divine light of inspiration, which ultimately is a revelation of the first truth, so high above human reason that it cannot be conceptualized or adequately represented, is yet communicated, partially, in the finite. There can be no complete, demonstrative apologetics for this, yet Aquinas attempts to trace a path.

For Aquinas, the divine light of inspiration gives a habit of faith to the believer, and it is this habit of faith, as a participation in God's own Self-Understanding, that enables a metaphysical, participatory link between the believer and the First Truth, and also enables the believer to interpret the articles of faith and the preaching of the Church in order to reach *through* the sensible expressions to the First Truth.[23] What is sensed " through " language is something beyond language. Aquinas attempts to trace a link between the "original revelation " of the divine light itself and the expression of revelation in the finite symbols of Sacred Scripture:

modus istius scientiae sit narrativus signorum, quae ad confirmationem fidei fa,ciunt: et quia etiam ista principia non sunt proportionata humanae rationi secundum statum viae, quae ex sensibilibus consuevit accipere, ideo oportet ut eorum cognitionem per sensibilium similitudines manuducatur: unde oportet modum istius scientiae esse metaphoricum, sive symbolicum, vel parabolicum.[24]

There are two problems in phrasing for interpretation and translation here. Aquinas initially states simply *"modus*

[23] Cf. a. 5, resp. (p. 17).

[24] Q. 1, a. 5, resp. (pp. 17-18). The mode of this science is the narration of signs, which are given for the confirmation of faith, and because the principles of the faith are not proportionate to human reason in its state in this life, since human reason is accustomed to sensible things, it follows that our knowledge of these principles of faith will be led by sensible similitudes, and hence it follows that the mode of this science is metaphorical, or symbolical, or parabolical.

istius soientiae," and the final phrase is also simply " *modum istius soientiae."* Both of these could be understood as either " *the* mode of this science," or " *a* mode of this science." The distinction is impor:ant, even ias what may he the intentional ambiguity on the part of Aquinas here is important. But if Aquinas meant the phrase to mean " *a* mode," or " *one* mode," it would be his custom to indicate this with *"unus, a, um,"* which is not done here. This would indicate that he means *"the* mode." For the present interpreter-translator, either " *a* " or " *the"* is actually a correct interpretation of the tert, as long as one understands these in a proper context. In the present section of the Article, Aquinas is talking about the " spiritual ·senses" of Sacred Scripture, and *the* mode of theology is here by means of metaphor, symbol, and parable. But in Aquinas' view there is another mode of theology, which is •according to the " literal sense," and it is only in this mode that theology can be " .argumentative." It is the case that " a mode " of this science is through the sensible order by means of metaphor, 1symbol,and parable, and that the access to " content" for theology is at least principally in this manner. It is 1also the case that " a mode " for the reception of the principles of this ·science is the divine light of inspiration. But such "light" has no content.[25] Thus, "the mode" for receiving "content " is via the •sensible order. And this sensible order can be according to the " literal sense " or the " spiritual senses," but the latter cannot provide a basis for " argumentative" theology. Of comise, m twentieth century terms, ithere is far more of the " symbolic order " in the Sacred Scriptures than could possibly have been recognized by Aquinas in the thirteenth century.

But aside foom this problem of the possibility of a " literal sense," a major tension must be noted here. Previously in this very Question 1, Aquinas has insisted on the" immediate" na-

[25] For further discussion see our "Participated Trinitarian Relations," especially on the transformation of Dionysian mysticism by Albert the Great a.nd Aquinas.

ture of divine inspiration, which, as " immediate " would seem to circumvent the sensible order, with a direct infusion of divine light. However, here in the final Article *5,* Aquinas is clearly talking about a mediated mode through the sensible order, where the constructive powers of human imagination have .a siigruificantrole. In 'such an 1approach,the process of interpretation is one at least proximally directed to the products of human, constructive imagination which, at least in the eyes of faith, have been guided in their construction by divine inspiration. While the ultimately hoped-for "object" may be the First Truth, beyond all adequate mediation, the interpretative process here is definitely medi,ated.

One faces here a profound, fundamental, and dialectical tension in Aquinas' formulations. There is a sense in which divine inspiration is immediate, ,and •a sense in which the truth will .always be mediated in its parti,al expressions by means of constructive imagination in a particular historical community. And this mode of construction will then directly influence the reception of the truth.

In Article *5,* Aquinas is trying to address how the "principles" of theology are received. His main concern in the final Article *5* is not with the productive processes of theological reflection, but the starting points. However, a circle becomes .apparent, for the starting points for one generation's theology can be the products of the constructive imagination of previous generations of theological reflection. What is important in Aquinas' final Article *5* is his shift to a more " down-to-eart:h" view of the theological process, rather than one which has at times ,seemedto be modeled on the intellectual processes of separate substances. His qualification .is clear: *"ista principia, non sunt proportiona.ta humanae rationi seoundum statum viae."* But if there is a lack of such proportion (or proportionality), :the problem remains as to how such principles can possibly be received. The appeal to the mediation of the First Tl'Uth through the articles of faith, which can be articulated, does not" solve" the problem, for if ,these articles

point beyond themselves, one still has the problem of how the human subject can sense the further meaning, behind the mediation. An appeal to the " literal sense " of Sacred Scrip-- ture also does not " ·solve" the problem, for the " literal sense " is still in finite language which cannot contain the First Truth. The dialectical tension should be clear: there is an insistence on immediacy, and the rather ·independent, *a priori* status of theology, at least in the reception of its principles, and with this status comes the assertion that theology should *direct* the other sciences as inferior sciences, as if theology were self-constituted without recourse to the natural order. But here in the final Article 5 there is a return to the natural order, not merely for the convenience of " utilizing" it, but for access to the meanings, or " principles " of theological reflection. In this return to the natural order, it is not the case that theological reflection has a prior constitution; rather, it enters into the processes of constructive imagination and interpretation in order to start to be constituted at all. In this approach, the "content " and " subject matter " of theological reflection is *in* the natural order, but-mysteriously-what is dialectically intended by theological consciousness is something which cannot be contained "in" language, or in any aspect of the natural, created order, no matter how artistically and imaginatively constructed.

The nert point in Aquinas' rather involved response in this Article, also presents some difficulties. Aquinas has recognized that :there is ·a reception of biblical truth via metaphor, symbol, and parable, but this will not suffice for the production of "argumentative" theology. In an important transition, Aquinas then presents his own understanding of the three " theological tasks " presented by Sacred Scripture:

Ex istis autem principiis ad tria proceditur in saCll'a Scriptura: scilicet ad destructionem errorum, quod sine argumentis fieri non potest; et ideo oportet modum hujus scientiae esse cuandoque argumentativum, tum pe'T' auctoritates, tum etiam per rationes et similitudines naturales. Proceditur etiam ad instructionem morum: unde quantum ad hoc modus ejus debet esse praeceptivus, sicut in

lege; comminatorius et promissivus, ut in prophetis; et narrativus exernplorum, ut in historialibus. Proceditur tertio ad contemplationem veritatis in quaestionibus sacrae Scripturae; et ad hoc oportet modum etiam esse argumentativum ... [26]

The first point of interest here is that Aquinas does not now base the " argumentative " status of theology 1simply on the " literal " sense, but on the appeal to " authorities " and in the use of "similitudes" (or analogies). The second point of interest is that Aquinas lists the "contemplation of the truth" last, and one may therefore consider it as being stressed as the most important function. Of additional interest is the fact that Aquinas describes this goal as " *contemplationem veritatis in* quaestionibus *sacrrae Scripture* " (emphasis added) . *Qua.estwnibus* is used here as a technical term of mid-18th century theology. **It** does not mean .a " reading " or a " commentary " on Sacred Scripture, but a process of mtional investigation and exploration. This "questionibus *sacrae Scripturae"* (emphasis ,added), differs £rom ;the "immediate" corutemplaition of God presented in Article 1. Here in Article *5,* this albeit brief phrase presents a much more" realistic" and "down-to-earth " mode of contemplation, although it may be a less perfect mode in that it is more (not completely) an "acquired" mode of contemp1rutionthrough study. It is not completely an acquired mode of contemplation through study because this " *quaestionibus sacrae Scripturae"* begins with the act of faith which is an " infused virtue " inaugumted by divine action, but it is also an acquired mode of contemplation in that it involves

[26] Q. 1, a. 5, resp. (p. 18). From these principles there proceed three things in Sacred Scripture, namely, the destruction of errors, which cannot be accomplished without reasonableness, and for this reason it follows that this science is in some way argumentative, by appeal to the authorities or even by means of reasons and nautral similitudes. Secondly there is the instruction of morals, and insofar as this doctrine has this mode it should be prescriptive, as in law, threatening punishment and extending promises, as the prophets, and providing exemplars in narrative, as the historians. Thirdly .there is the contemplation of truth in the questioning *[quaestionibus,* "investigation," "rational examination"] of Sacred Scripture, and for these reasons it follows that the mode of this science is reasonable.

the very human process of "questioning," inqmnng into, analyzing in order to understand, and making dialectical clarifications in order to in part the meaning of Sacred Scripture as divine revelation.

It may he recalled that in Article 1 of this "Prologue," Aquinas has stated that the end of human life is the contemplation of God, and that the contemplation of God is of two types: the rational contemp1ation possible in philosophy and a contemplation in which God "*videtur immediate per suam essentiam,*" and that this perfect contemplation of God constitutes the vi,sion of God in heaven.[27] Compared to this "immediate" contemplation of God, Aquinas then tries to state in Article 1 how the theological contemplation of God in this life is imperfect compared with the vision of God in heaven, and yet the imperfect contemplation possible in this life is led rto the more perfect contemp1ation by means of the divine light of inspiration. It may be recalled that what Aquinas stated in Article 1 was:

Unde oportet ut ea quae sunt ad finem proportionentur, fini, quantenus homo manuducatur ad illam contemplationem in statu viae per cognitionem non a creaturis sumptam sed immediate ex; divino lumi,ne inspiratam; et haec est doctrina theologiae *[emphasis added].*[28]

This is problematic, limit-discource, for many reasons. First, it is not conceivable how any being except God can attain the perfect contemplation of God to which Aquinas refers, a contemplation *per*, i.e., "in," or "through," God's own Essence. Secondly, it is not clear how there can be an "immediate" knowledge of God by means of the light of divine inspiration. How this "light" can ·actuate "knowledge" is not specified.

·21Q.1, a. 1, resp. (pp. 7-8).

28 *Ibid.,* (p. 8). Hence it follows that even as those things which are directed to an end are proportioned to that end, in order for the human subject to be led to that [perfect] contemplation [of God] in this life [it is necessary that] there not only be a knowledge [of God] through the created order but also an immediate [knowledge of God] by means of the divine light of inspiration, *and this is the doctrine of theology* [emphasis added].

All that Aquinas says is that philosophy offers an imperfect contemplation of God, while the divine light of inspiration, in this life, offers a more perfect contemplation of God, and it is this more perfect contemplation which *is "dootrina theologiae,"*[29] the purpose of which is to lead one to perfect contemplation. If this " divine light " can have no " content " for human intellect, it can only function as an intentional principle for the interpretation of sensible content in human experience.

Within Aquinas' more mature systematic thought further qualifications could be added. What Aquinas attempts in this early tert is a treatment of how the human subject can be proportioned to ,an end (the immediate contemplation of God) which is beyond the naturail possibilities for finite human nature to acoomplish. This is the theme with which Aquinas' introduces his treatment in Article 1: *"ut ea quae sunt ad finem proportionentur fini."* It is then the divine J,ight of inspiration which proportions the human subject to this end. It should be noted that if the function of .this " light " is to " proportion " the human subject, then its function is not properly one of providing "content," but of enabling the subject to reach "content," through the created order, because of the changed horizon, intentionality, or "proportionality to meaning," that the "light" of inspiration p11ovides. This· divine " light" of inspiration " proportions " the human subject. by providing a higher participation in God's own Immediate Self-Knowledge, which is beyond "content" and which i'S Pure Intentionality. The higher participation a:ffio11dedby the divine "light" of inspiration does not in 1and of [rtsel:fy[eld formal " content." Here the *doctrina theologiae* which *is* the " divine light of in spimtion " can, in ,a fully consllistent manner, only mean that such inspihl.-.a;bionis the principle of thoolog.iml.mtentionially in the processes of tinteripretrution;not thrut thtis "iimmediaite divine light of inspimtion " the content for theological

[29] This very strong statement is in all of the MSS which L. Bataillon has collated to date for the Leonine Commission edition.

reflection. But ·the problems in Aquinas' formulaition, and genena.tions of interpretation, iis that it.his "iimmeclirutedivine light " cou1d itself be seen 1as providing " content " rather ,than merely making it possible for the theologian to interpret the sensible order in a way that then provides " limit-content."

If this inspiration itself is thought to provide " content," then one must observe that there is a profound tension between Arl:icle 1 1and the concluding .Article 5. ANicle 1 can at least give the impression that theology is constituted on an independent, *a pri,ori* basis, simply because of the divine light of inspiration, and rbhen :it is because of this <tha.t it is aible to· direct the other sciences, without, seemingly, even having Ito eniter into rthe empiriical study of the other sciences. But if theology were completely an infused, " immediate" knowledge of God, then there would, of course, be no need for dialectical disputations such ·as Lombard's *Sentences* and Aquinas' own Commentary. One could expect, then, that Aquinas would attempt to link ms discussion of the " immedia.te" knowledge of God and ithe necessity of dialectical theology, and this *is* exactly whra.t he does as he describes the ithi1rd fonobion of theology:

Proceditur tertio ad contemplationem veritatis in quaestionibus sacrae Scripturae; et ad hoc oportet modum etiam esse argumentativum, quod praecipue servatur in originalibus sanctorum et in isto libro qui quasi ex ipsis conflatur.[80]

The " questioning " of Sacred Scripture, then, occurs in an historical community in which some interpretations (e.g., of the Fathers [and teaching mothers!]) have a certain primacy, and even in this one can encounter dialectical differences of interpretation. Here the mode of theology as contemplation is realistically Linked wi:i.rth the hisitocical condition of the one seek-

[80] Q. I, a. 5, resp. (p. 18). [Sacred science] proceeds, thirdly, to the contemplation of truth in the 'questioning' of Sacred Scripture and from this [these three ends] it follows that the mode of this science is 'argumentative,' which mode is particularly served by the collection of the works of the saints [Fathers] which are provided in this Book [of the *Sentences]* which- has, to a.n extent, arranged them.

ing contemplation of the truth in a community of interpretation and misinterpretation.

In a very interesting manner, the next complex theme addressed by Aquinas in the response of this Article is the relationship of the senses of Sacred Sccipture to the tasks of sacred science:

Et secundum hoc etiam potest accipi quadrupliciter modus exponendi sacram Scripturam: quia secundmn quod accipitur ipsa veritas fidei, est sensus historicus: secundum aute quod ex eis proceditur ad instructionem morum, est sensus moralis; secundum autem quod proceditur ad contemplationem veritatis eorum quae sunt viae, est sensus allegoricus [Parma ed. *"et secundum quod proceditur ad contemplationem veritatis"]; eorum quae sunt patriae, est sensus anagogicus. Ad destructionem autem errorum non proceditur nisi per sensum litteralem, eo quod alii sensus sunt per similitudines accepti et ex similitudinariis locutionbius non potest sumi argumentatio; ende et Dionysius dicit in* Epistult ad Titum [col. 1103, t. I], *quod symbolica theologia non est argumentativa.81*

s1 Q. 1, a. 5, resp. (p. 18) . .And according to this one is able to accept four modes for the exposition of Sacred Scripture, for that which is received as the very truth of the faith is the historical sense, and that which is for the instruction of mroals is the moral sense, and that which is for the contemplation of the truth [of God] 'on the way' [in an earthly manner, for human beings in this life] is the allegorical sense, and that which pertains to [the fulfillment of contemplation] in heaven is the anagogical sense. The refutation of errors, however, does not *proceed* by any sense except the literal, in that the other senses are received according to similitudes, and it is not possible to engage in argumentative discourse based on similtudes of speech; and hence Dionysius says in the *Epistula ad Titum* [PG, col. 1101, t. I], that symbolic theology is not argumentative.

[Here the Parma addition has not been included in the translation since it is not supported in the MSS evidence. .Also, here *"argumentatio"* and *"argumentativa"* have been translated as "argumentative" in that the meaning of .Aquinas here is stronger than "reasonable" and yet one should bear in mind the previously mentioned cautions when understanding and translating .Aquinas' use of .this term. Also here, .Aquinas' phrase *"contemplationem veritatis .•. viae .•. patriae"* is being interpreted in accord with .Aquinas' later use of *"contemplatio viae,"* meaning "earthly contemplation," "contemplation in this life," or "contemplation on the way;" and *"contemplatio patriae,"* meaning "heavenly contemplation," "the contemplation of God in heaven," or "beatific contemplation," as expressed in the *Summa Theologiae,* II-II, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1; q. 180, a. 7; and q. 189, a. 7.)

Of course, in the present context Aquinas does not mean that the anagogical sense of Sacred Scripture and the " .anagogical mode of questioning 1and e:xipoundingSacred Scripture " enable the interpreter to attain .beatific contemplation in this life. What Aquinas means *is* ,siimply ·that the anagogioal sense has a symbolic, eschatological referential value which enables the interpreter in this life to anticipate *oontemplatW patriae.*

The meaning of Aquinas here with regard to the modes of contemplation merits .further consideration. Earlier in this response Aquinas has stated the three ends of theology ·as being the refutation of errors, instruction of morals, and the contemplation of truth. In the present section he links two senses of Sacred Scripture to the contemplation of truth: there is an allegorical and an anagogical mode of contemplation. Both of these modes of oonrtemp1ation are in the " quesrtioning" of· Sacred Scripture, as has been earlier clarified in the response: *"contempla,tionem veritatis in quaestionibus sacrae Scripturae."* The contemplation which investigates and "questions " the meaning of Sacred Scripture is, in part, an acquired mode of contemplation. It is only partially acquired in that it presupposes the infused light of which is received ias a result of divine, initiating action, and yet this results in the dialectical and symbolic process of interpretation, leading to contemplation, in an historical community of meaning. When Aquinas states in this response that symbolic theology is not "argumentative," he means "argumentative" not in the weaker sense of merely " reasonable," but in the stronger sense of being probative, as is clear in his response to the fourth objection:

argumenta tolluntur ad probationem articulorum fidei; set ad defensionem fidei et inventionem veritatis in quaestionibus ex principiis fidei, oportet argumentis uti . . .[32]

s2Q. 1, a. 5, ad 4 (p. 19). Arguments are in no way used to prove the articles of the faith, but for the defense of the faith and for the discovery of the truth in the investigative process of questioning based on the principles of the faith, and hence it follows that 'arguments' are utilized [in this science] ...

Conclusion

There is a certain dialectical rtension thus reflected here in the "Prologue" on the status and method of theology. The tension is not completely articulated as such, but is more below the surface, as one compares Aquinas' various other statements with his notion of " *contemplatwnem veritatis in quaestionibus sacrae Scripture,"* in Article 5. Again, in Article 1, Aquinas has made the hold proclamation that there is a type of,

Contemplationem .. . in statu viae per cognitionem non a creaturis sumptam, sed immediate ex divino lumine inspiratam; et haec est doctrina theologiae.[38]

This appears rto differ from the mode of contemplation discussed ;in Article 5 which is a " *quaestwnibus sacrae Scripturae."* They are not, however, completely different, in that they both require the fundamental, initiating action of the light of faith, which is 1an infused virtue. At the same time it must be ,acknowledge that there is at least a dialectical tension in Aquinas' manner of expression, when he strongly insists, in the first place, on a " *contempla,twnem in statu viae ... immediate ex divino lumine"* and then later speaks of a *"contemplatronem veritatis in quaestionibus sacrae Scripture."* In order to stress that there is real, understandable content in divine revelation and that faith attains to God himself, Aquinais must stress its immediate nature. But if this were the full extent of the theological process then there would be no need of dialectics in interpretation, which is precisely the task of the *Sentences* upon which Aquinas is engaged in commentary.

This dialectical tension in Aquinas' own view of the status and method of theology is reflected in other contrasting texts in the five articles of the " Prologue," which may here be noted:

[38] Q. I, a. I, resp. (p. 8). Contemplation ... in this life by means of a knowledge [of God] which is not based on the created order [for its starting point] but on an immediate knowledge [of God] by means of the divine light of inspiration; and this contemplation is the doctrine of theology.

[1] *divinum lumen, ex cujus certitudine procedit haec scientia ...* [34]
[2] *virtus quam considerat, non est ab opere nostro; immo eam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur.* [35]
[3] *ista scientia ... magis dicenda quam metaphysica, quia causas altissimas considerat . . . per inspirationem a Deo immediate acceptam ..* .[36]
[4] *theologia articulos fidei quae infallibiliter sunt probati in scientia Dei supponit, et eis credit, et per istud procedit ad probandum ulterius illa quae ex articulis sequuntur ..* .[37]
[5] *ista doctrina habet pro principiis primis articulos fidei, qui per lumen fidei infusum per se noti sunt habenti fidem, sicut et principit naturaliter nobis insista per fomen intellectus agentis.* [38]

In these examples the stress is on the certitude and scientific status of theology, the immediacy of divine revelation, and the scientific ability of theology to engage in the demonstration of some truths (though not the truth of the articles of faith themselves. The stress is on theology an immediate, infused, and certain contemplation of God. In the final example above, the statement is a strong one, not sufficiently qualified to make it clear that Aquinas is using an analogical and *ex convenientia* argumentation. The literal statement here is that the articles of faith " are " *per se nota* principles known by the light of faith " *sicut* " (" as," " even as," " in a way like ") natural selves). The stress is on theology an immediate, infused, and principles .are known by the light of reason. The " *sicut* " ex-

34 Q. 1, a. 2, ad 1. (p. 10). Divine light, from whose certitude proceeds this science ...

85 Q. 1, a. 2, ad 3, (pp. 10-11). The virtue that the theologian considers is not a result of our work, but is [the result of] an [initiating movement] of God in us without our own operation.

36 Q. 1, a. 3, sol. 1 (p. 12). This science ... is more to be called wisdom than metaphysics, because it considers the highest causes . . . by means of inspiration which accepted immediately from God ...

37 Q. 1, a. 3, sol. 2 (pp. 13-14). Theology presupposes and believes in the articles of faith which are infallibly proven in the science of God's own knowledge of himself, and theology proceeds by means of these to the demonstration of other things that follow from the articles of faith ...

as *Ibid.,* (p. 14). This doctrine has for its first principles the articles of faith, which are infused by the light of faith as *per se nota* principles in those having faith, even as the [first] principles [of reason] are naturally instilled in us by means of the light of the agent intellect.

press the analogical qualificaJtion, but in the previous pl:mase, the language is " flat ", *"per lumen fidei infusum per se noti sunt habenti fidem."*

Aquinas is here using a complex series of analogies·. To speak of the "light" of the ,agent intellect is already an analogy, a metaphor, in the natural order. To speak of the "light" of faith or of divine revelation is an extension of that analogy. When one then speaks of the light of faith being ,similar to, *"sicut",* the light of the agent intellect, one is using a double analogy *ex convenientia.* The statement may seem at first to have a great deal of content, but its logical structure is far more symbolic and poetic. More attention to this aspect of Aquinas' structure is needed. For the moment it •suffices to observe that in the five ·articles of the "Prologue " Aquinas repeatedly makes very bold .and confident proclamations, which can give the nnpression that theology flows effortlessly, and without the tensions of historical dialectics, into ·an immediate contemplation of God.

In contrast to the themes of the above examples, in the concluding Article *5,* Aquinas professes a mode of theology that is *"quaestionibus sacrae Scripturae* ": a mode of contemplation and interpretation in an historical community concerned with very human processes of reasoning and inquiry. It would seem that the underlying structures of Aquinas' " Prologue " here i·s his own struggle with the mysterious " fact " that aspects of theology that are more properly called infused contemplation and aspects thae are more properly called acquired contemplation are inevitably in a constant, dialectical process.

This structure is brought more to the surface in the concluding Article *5* of the "Prologue." Aquinas has repeatedly stated already that the ultimate end of theology is contempl·ation. In his discussion of the senses of Sacred Scripture and the tasks of theology he has linked the " historical " and " literal " sense with the theological task of the refutation of errors, for it is this " literal sense " that contains the *ipsa veritas fidei.*[39]

so Q. 1, a. 5, resp. (p. 18).

In the moce a,cquired contemplative mode of interpreting Sacred Scripture, the allegorcial and anagogical senses have primary importance. But these senses of Sacred Scripture, " *aunt per similitudines accepti et ex similitudinariis locutionibus non potest sumi argumenta.tio . . .*" [40] The importance of this " non-argumentative" and more contempl,ative sense of theology emerges in dialectioal tens1ion with other themaitics in the "P.rologue" in the response to the third objection in Article *5,* which concerns poetics and metaphor. In the third objection it was stated:

scientiarum m.axime differentium non debet esse unus modus. Sed poetica, quae minimum continet veritatis, maxime differt ab ista scientia, quae est verissima. Ergo, cum illa procedat per metaphoricas locutiones, modus hujus scientiae non debet esse talis.[41]

The 11esponseto this objection may he somewhat surprising:

Ad tertium dicendum, quod poetica scientia est de his quae propter defectum veritatis non possunt a ratione capi; unde oportet quod quasi quibusdam similitudinibus ratio seducator: theologia autem est de his quae sunt supra rationem; et ideo modus symbolicus uttrique communis est, cum neutra rationi proportionetur.[42]

Even though Aquina:s is directly addressing the "spiritual senses " of Sacred Scripture here, his statements are broad enough to impact on the status of the entire theological

40 *Ibid.:* are by means of similitudes which are based on similitudes of speech which cannot be used for argumentation . . .

41 Q. 1, a. 5, ob 3 (p. 17). The sciences which are maximally differentiated should not have the same mode. But poetics, which minimally contains the truth, is maximally differentiated from this science, which is the most truthful. Therefore, since poetics proceeds by means of metaphors of language, the mode of this [divine] science should not be the same.

42 Q. 1, a. 5, ad 3 (p. 17): To the third objection it is to be stated that poetic science is of this mode [of metaphor] on account of a defect [in the human mind] because of which the human mind is not able to attain the truth by reasoning as such; and hence it follows that poetics in a way alluringly leads reason by means of certain similitudes. But theology is concerned with those things which are beyond the range of res.son, and thus the symbolic mode is common to both poetics and theology, since neither of them is proportioned to reason.

prise. In the previous articles of the " Prologue," Aquinas has claiimed that the articles of faith are infused, *per se nota* principles !instilled by the Itight of fia.ith, even ·as :bhe naturally known first principles are instilled by ithe light of the agent intellect. But now, the additional qualification is that the mode of ·existence of the recipient is 'significantly limiting the divine revelation that is creceived. Here, rather than an "immediate " revelation of God, revelation procedes through the mediation of .symbols. This may not he the only mode of !revelation for Aquinas, but from the content and tone of this response one would judge that it is at least an important one. In dialectical tension with the position that the principles of faith " are " *per se nota* propositions, Aquinas is here stating that the weakness of reason makes it incapable of grasping the truth, and hence reason must ·be alluringly led, " *seducatur,"* by the similitudes and symbolics of poetics. Ultimately, since contemplation *supra rationem* is the highest task of theology, and since e"\"ell with divine revelation reason remains unable to attain the fullness of truth, the theologian is here pictured .a;s patiently waiting for the alluring invitation of the symbolically mediated God. The further implication is that even theological self-consciousness in contemplation will be symbolically mediated.

These dialectical themes, and their implications, are certainly not brought to the surface and articulated as such by Aquinas in this "Prologue," but an analysis of the structural relationships of the articles cannot help but come to these critical conclusions. With the interpreted •stress of the "Prologue" as being in the final Article, particularly in the final response concerning poetics, Aquinas dialectically qualifies his previous statements with a view of theo1ogical methodology that is most properly considered .as ·at least open to some problems of historical consciousness in a community of dialectical misinterpretation, open to the constructive role of imagination, and open to a view of revelation as providing an intentional principle for the dialectical interpretation of sensible content, but not the content as such.

THE QUEST FOR AN ADEQUATE PROPORTIONALIST THEORY OF VALUE

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EDWARD VACEK shrewdly observes that proportionalism attempts to synthesize the crucial insights of both the teleologist and the deontologist.[1] Indeed, Vacek provides a fine summary of this achievement. However, he reflects that the most underdeveloped feature of proportionalism is its value theory by which we are enabled to know how to resolve conflict situations.[2] Richard McCormick, among others, has attempted to meet this deficiency by ·adopting John Finnis' notion of associated basic goods. In this essay, I will show how such an ·approach fails to remain true to the basic aims of proportionalism. Nor should this come as a surprise, since Finnis is himself indebted to one of McCormick's arch-opponents, Germain Grisez. Moreover, I will attempt to outline the elements involved in a non-hierarchfoal theory of value which I will argue to be the only adequate alternative to McCormick's attempted solution.

Deontologists argue that certain acts are right or wrong regardless of the ·consequences. Proportionalists, however, are opposed to such notions as an " intrinsically evil " act or an "absolute" duty, since they recognize the existence of moral dilemmas. A moral dilemma arises whenever there is a situation in which pre-moral values •are in conflcit, i.e., whatever choice one makes will result in the omission or harm of one or other of the values at stake. According to the proportion-

1 Edward Vacek, "Proportionalism: One View of the Debate," *Theological Studies* 46/2 (June, 1985), 289.

2 Va.eek,302.

alist reformulation of the principle of double effect, the permission or oausrutionof ontic evil is not necessarily a moral evil as long as there is a proportionate reason justifying ,such an action, e.g., when a father shoots an !intruder threatening to harm his family.

McCormick's initial description of the requirements of proportionate reason [s ias follows: "a) a v1alue at least equal to that sacrificed is at stake; b) there is no less harmful way of protecting ithe value here and now; c) the manner of *its* protection here and now will not undermine it in the long run." [8] McCormick argues that it simply will not do to claim that the ontic evil permitted or caused in a conflict situation is always only *indirectly* intended. [4] For, in many instances, this simply is not true. Moreover, he would argue that to intend an end is not necess1arilyto desire it as deontologists suppose. What justifies the ontic evil resulting from such actions, then, is solely the proportionate reason for which it is allowed or caused.

There are some obvious criticisms that have been hurled at this proportionalist proposal for resolving conflict situations: I) that it leaves itself open to the practical, if not theoretical, difficulty of weighing different values; !2) that it results in the possibility of many resolutions that could go counter to our normal moral intuitions; 8) that there exists an inherent fallibility in the calcul,ation of long-range consequences; and 4) that this uncertainty might easliy promote an undesirable attitude of skeptical relativism.

It is perhaps the onslaught of these and other criticisms which prompted McCormick to adopt Finnis' theory of associated basic goods. Lisa Cahill ,argues that this new theory constitutes an "abandonment" of McCormick's prior proposal.5 To understand how this new theory leads to inevitable

s Richard McCormick, ".Ambiguity in Moral Choice," *Doing Evil To Achieve Good: Moral Choice in Oonfiict Situations,* eds. R. McCormick and P. Ramsey (Chicago: Loyola U. Press, 1978), 45.

4 McCormick, 35-38.

5 Lisa Cahill, "Theology, Utilitarianism, and Christian Ethics," *Theologica,I Studies* 42/4 (Dec., 1981), 618-24.

inconsistency for McCormick, we must first examine Finnis' position itself.

Finnis' Theory of Basic Goods

By "value," Finnis refers to any " general form of good that oan be participated iin or realized in indefinitely many ways on indefinitely many occasions." [6] Basic values, moreover, refer to ·intrinsic goods that are desired for their own sake (NL, 62, 65) . They are good not because they are desired, but they are desired because they are good (NL, 70). Indeed, according to Finnis, that such goods are v·alues is self-evident (NL, 64-69) .

Basic values constitute the fundamental aspects of human flourishing. According to Finnis, a careful survey of human culture will reveal, not sheer relativism, but the evidence for asserting the existence of *seven* basic values: li.fe, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, friendship, practical reasonableness, imd religion (NL, 81-92). He argues ·thait we will find such a list to be not only exhaustive but irreducible if we make sure to attend to the differences between general values and particular goals as well as between ends ·and means. Moreover, he 1aptly pomts out the infiIJJitediviersity of ways in which we can ·actualize these values as well as the diversity that exists in the extent to which individuals can respond to such values. Finnis prefers to say that we " participate in " instead of " pursue " or " realize " basic values (NL, 96) . This is because a v;alue is never fully realized nor is it the mere end result of some act. Furthermore, pleasure is not considered by him to be itself .a basic or supreme value, smce it iis that which accompanies our participation in all of these values (NL, 96) .

Finnis admits that we inevitably weigh the consequences of alternative decisiions (NL, 11-18). eXiample, he contends thait we must always prefer basic goods to merely instrumental ones. Thus a co\Sit-;benefitanaJlysiis [s desiirable in many prac-

e John Finnis, *Natural Law and Natural Rights* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 61. Hereafter, all references to this work will be cited within the text itself, e.g., (NL, 61).

tioaJ operations. However, he draws the line at a consequen-6alist ethics because of his claim that basic values are " incommensurable," that there exists no objective hierarchy among them (NL, 92-95). Not only would the weighing of such values be impractical, but it would al,so undermine the very dignity of human nature. A calculative mentality that uses basic goods as commodities to be compared makes the human person ,itself 1a mere tool 1to he used (NL, 120-28). To weigh incommensurable values is thus to destroy them. It follows that a fundamental principle for Finnis is that " every basic value he at least respected in each and every action " (NL, 120). It 1is permissible and inevitable that we "indirectly impoverish, inhibit, or interfere " with the realization of some values when we pursue some course of action and thereby omit others. What is not permissible is " directly and immediately dama;ging a baisic good " as in certain conflict situations, e.g., when killing an innocent person to save the lives of hostages. This is because such a killing damages the very value of life we are trying to promote.

McCormick's Use of Finnis' Theory

McCormick's list of basic human tendencies is extremely similar to that developed by Finnis.[7] As does Finnis, he argue:s that when merely instrumental and basic goods are in conflict we must compare and weigh their relative v:alue:[8] He a:dds, however, that this is not pos,sible for ·oonfiicts between basic goods. As in Finnis' logic, McCormick is contending that, since such goods are "associated," rto hurt one undermines all the others including the v;alue to be promoted.

One might wonder if this is simply a different way of expressing the fact that certain actions have long-term consequences detrimental to the original value one attempts to p110-

[7] McCormick, "Bioethics and Method," *Theological Digest* 29/4 (Winter, 1981)' 305.

[8] McCormick, "Notes on Moral Theology 1977," *Theological Studies* 39/1 (1978)' 112.

mote. Cahill, however, suggests that this is not the ca:se in McCormick's (and Knauer's) claim that certain actions are of themselves "disproportionate ,, or "counterproductive." [9] She notes that Knauer compares such •self-defeatingactions to the class of deeds outlawed by Kant's universalizability criterion. If this is the case, then an empirical survey of probable future oonsequences is not what is called for .to show an .action to be " disproportionate." Rather an *a priori* (deontological) analysis of the nature of such acts should be sufficient to reveal their "couniterproductivity." It siimply is not clear if this is what McCormick has in mind. However, if this does reflect the direction of his thought, then Cahill would be right that McCormick's proportionalism appears to have been modified by his adoption of Finnis' notion of associated basic goods.[10] For the net result is the placing of a certain class of values -in a speci.al protected category and thus guaranteeing proportionalism more objectiviity in its resolution of moral conflicts.

Even Cahill, however, realizes that McCormick does nort really intend to enter the deontological camp. For she adds to her discussion no,ted a;bove thiat McCormick is opposed to suppressing basic values " except in cases where necessity requires it." McCormick himself argues elsewhere that he is in agreement with deontologists that we must never choose against a basic good: " What is to count as ' turning against a basic good ' is, of course, the crucial moral question. Certainly it does not mean that there are never situations of conflicted values where it is necess.a.ryto cause harm as we go about doing good." [11] If this is McCormick's position all along, then he seems to have gained nothing by adopting Finnis' theory of basic goods. For such a theory was intended by its deontologioal proponent to eliminate the very possibility of conflict situa-

s Cahill, 618-20.

lo Cahill, 624.

11 :McCormick, "Does Religious Faith Add to Ethical Perception?" ed. John Haughey, *PersonaJ Values iin Public PoZioy* (NY: Paulist Press, 1979), 165.

tions involving basic vialues. Thus Vacek is correct when he argues that McCormick's theory of basic goods faces the same difficulties encountered .by all other deontological maneuvers to protect basic values.[12] It remains for us to consider what these difficulties are and why proportionalism should abandon ·altogether any notion of a hiem11chy of basic ·goods.

Criticism8

There are many prOlblems which confronit Finnis' theory of basic goods. The first one is simply a conceptual difficulty: how i·s one to distinguish basic v;alues from all others? Mc-·Cormick sometimes speaks as if that which constitutes a value as basic is that it is not rut .all instrumental, i.e., a means.[18] Finnis is more precise in his acknowledgement that, since basic values are themselves interdependent, they can be used as instruments in the pursuit of other basic values (NL, 92). But .they are not *merely* instrumental since they also possess intrinsic worth themselves. Moreover, Finnis adds that a basic value must be incommensurable wiith the others, must constitute a fundamental .aspect of human flourishing, not be ultimately self-defeating (NL, 91) or reducible to an aspect of any of ,the others (NL, 92), and be distinguished from the *means* by which it is to be achieved as well as from the *ways* :in which it is to be participated (NL, 90-91). The former category refers to those activities, e.g., £arming and procreation, which collectively help achieve a basic v·alue, e.g., life. The latter category ref·e:vs to the moral virtues such)a.is cour-.age, generosirty, moderation, and gentleness. Thus it follows that a basic value, as conceived by Finnis, is .a concrete universal (.a whole) resulting from :instrument·al activities and virtues (the parts). Basic values, in turn, are the parts that make up the ultimate whole of human flourishing.

As nuanced as it is, Finnis' definition of a basic value leaves more questions than it answers. First, there is the ·ambiguity

12 Vacek, 309.

1s "Notes on Moral Theology 1977," 112.

as to whether a non-fundamental value is necess·arily thereby an instrumental one :for the realization of the seven basic values. That would seem to be Finnis' intended interpretation. However, itlris may be true 1as a criterion for the adeqUJacy of Finnis' theory. Yet it does not guarantee *a priori* that we shall never encounter a v:alue which is neither one of the seven baac goods nor one that is instrumental to their realization.

.Another ambiguity to be noted is that Finnis' basic values do not distinguish between their individual and communitarian dimensions. For example, the basic value of 1ife includes both the own life and that of all others as well. The basic value of friendship can refer to those relationships valued by the person himself or to the v•alue of friendship in general within society ws a whole. Thus this ambiguity contains the seeds for possible oonflicit between rbhe needs of the individual and society which Finnis seems ·intent to ignore.

His requirement that basic values not be reducible to ea.ch other also deserves some consideration. For it is not perfectly obvious, for example, why we are to oonsider " play " and " aesthetic experience " as categories tha;t are ·somehow *lJld generis.* Gadamer's classic analysis of aesthetic experience as play is sufficient reason to question Finnis' claim that they are irreducible to each other.[14] Moreover, it is also not totally obvious why Finnis distinguishes " knowledge " from " practical reasonableness" or" religion" from" friendship." His contention that he is not absolutely wedded to his own list (NL, 92) does not dispel the argument that *any* list whatsoever will be hardpressed to keep its categories irreducible, so inte:rrtwined are all features of human experience and language. For example, Finnis indicates that one of rthe requirements for realizing the basic value of pmctical reasonableness is " community " (NL, 127). How one is to distinguish this requirement from the basic value of friendship is problematic. Thus this is one more reason for questioning the feasibility of maintaining the

uHans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (NY: The Seabury Press, 1975), 91-119.

criterion of irreducibility. Moreover, the fact that Fmnis claims that practical reasonableness is the one basic good which can never be excluded, even tempomrily (NL, 100), a1so makes problematic his criterion of the incommemsurability of basic V!alues. For it would seem that, for him, p11actical reasonableness has priority over the others in so· :Ear as it is the virtue by which one shapes one's participation in the other basic goods.

The final problems with Finnis' definition of a basic value result from his desire to distinguish it from the means and ways by which it is to be realized. Proportionalists have genemlly argued that moml virtues ought not to be considered somehow *sui generis* as mFinnis' analysis. Rather, they ought to he included within ,a complete list of pre-moral goods to be weighed in a conflict situation instead of distinguished from basic goods and their instrumental means for realization. Finnis undercuts his own position, in fact, by including a moral Viirtue, p11acticalreasonableness (the skill by which one integrates all the other basic V'alues), in his catalogue of basic goods. Indeed, the requirements (instrumental means) for its realization are themselves moral virtues. Moreover, there also seems no reason to deny the intrinsic worth of instrumental means as Finnis intends as a way of distinguishing hasic and instrumental goods. For the experience of a meal, for example, can he savoured for its own sake as well as for the fact of its contribution ;to the pursuit of friendship and life. And even money can be valued for its own sake if you happen to he a coin colloobor.

Besides ,the conceptual problems involved in his definition of necessary and sufficient criteria for " basic values," there are other difficulties with his theory as well. A major one concerns his epistemological justification for ,asserting the " exhaustive " nature of his list of seven basic values. He admits that his list is the result of an empirical survey of many human cultures and one to which he is not necessarily wedded (NL, 81-92). One would have expected from him, on the contrary,

an *a priori* deontological analysis of human flourishing. Without 1such ·an ·analysis. moreover, there is no way he can avoid the fallibility of his conclusions. Other lists of basic values are possible because of the existence of different frameworks of initer:p:retrution. There 1are many rnfferent ways to categorize the saime experience •as well as many different cultural ences to consider. Even if v;alue theorists can achieve agreement on the essential elements for human flourishing *today,* tomorrow might reveal ·ever new facets of human .authenticity. Moreover, with his own admission that there is potentially an infinite number of instrumental means with which to realize basic values, it follows that the majority of our moral decisions will involve the cost-benefit weighing of such instrumental values. Indeed, such decisions are, by his own admission, more ambiguous than those involving the conflict between basic and instrumential values. Thus Finnis is hardpressed to maintain the kind of objectivity in his ana:lysis required by deontologists to avoid the relativism they ascribe to proportionalists.

The fundamental flaw in his theory, however, lies in his requirement that basic values are never to be used as the means to attain some lower instrumental end. He would permit one to choose the opportunty to make money over the chance *:to* ·gain knowledge *if one is in extreme ']XYVerty.* But this is only because the basic value of life requires .a certain degree of wealth, thus permitting the omission of the complementary basic value of knowledge. However, if it is true, as we haive maintained already, that instrumental values have intrinsic worth in their own right, then there seems no reason to mainta;in an ·aibsolute hierarchy of values. After all, the dialectic of whole and part :implies, not only the iinterdependence of parts, but the mutual neces•sity for both part and whole as well. Thus the part is an instrument :for the flourishing of the whole. But the reverse is true as well: the whole is the means for the flourishing of the part. Indeed, the very distinction between means and ends is problematic. For is ia making of ·a meal a means to the fostering of or is a. friendship a means

to the making of ia delicious meal? This fund!amenbalinterdependence of values is not at all demeaning to what Finnis considers the higher value, friendship. For to love food is not to love friendship less. R:ather both are necessary elements rto human fl.ourishing. In some circumstances one will be more important than the other. But it simply is not true to ·say that one is *always* more important than the other which is what Finnis wishes to contend.

It is for this reason that Peter Coming argues that to invert Maslow's hierarchy of needs, as he does, is not to demean our view of human nature.[15] Corning is :simply acknowledging by this reversal the polarity which exists between the physical ·and spiritual :factors in our make-up, neither set of factors being more fundamental than the other. Indeed, it follows thait we shou1d rega11d Finnis' value *hierarchy* as rather a *network* of values, each of which is of intrinsic worth and able to serve as the instrumental means for the attainment of other values as well. After all, this is the way Finnis understands the network of hasic valrues itself. Each of the seven basic goods is of intrinsic value yet able to serve as the means for our participation in the others as well. I have simply suggested doing away with any notion of one value being more " basic " than any other by acknowledging the irutrinsic worth of Finnis' instrumental means as well as the fact that his brusic goods can be actually the means for realizing instrumental goods. This revision, moreover, is of great value, since it will allow us to affirm, for example, that the individual in a friendship is of as much value as the friendship as a whole.

Indeed, this admission implies that we need to consider not only ·the conflict between rival means for realizing v;alues but the conflict between means and ends as well. For, as we have seen, the end of friendship can serve as the means for making a meal which, in turn, can also be the instrument for cementing a friendship. Thus just ais oomplementa;ry means can each be

11 Peter Coming, *The Syn&rgism Hypothesis: A Theory of Progress-We !lJ'Volution* (NY: McGraw-Hill, 1983), 198.

in conflict as part to part (e.g., having to decide whether to feed myself or my child first to enhance the well-being of my family as a whole), so too can a whole and part be in conflict as rival values (e.g., having to decide whether to participate in the Neighborhood Watch Patrol this evening for the good of the community or just watch television for the sake of needed personal relaxation). Finn.is' theory is defective, however, in its way of handling such conflict situations.

He admits that even among his " incommensurruble" basic values one cannot help but omit one while participating in another. But, as noted earlier, he conrtends that we may not directly harm or sac:rii:fice one basic good to realize another. Proportionalists, however, argue that, *ais* finite creatures, we cannot avoid either omitting or harming one value for the sake of ·another in tr:agic conflict situaitions. Some proportionalists imagine such moral dilemmas to be quite rare in the ethical enterprise. Indeed, they take great pains *w* reassure the deontologist that our acceptance of the evil effects that accompany the ,attainment of greater good is only a *regrettable* necessity. They rargue thait it is simply because we do not live in an " ideal " world that ithe tragic necessity of confliict situa--tions must be tolerated.

Unfontunately, such well meaning reassurance goes too far. It seems to presume that the existence of moral dilemmas is but the result of original rsin. On the contmry, Louis Janssens .argues thrut, though the majority of ontic evil in the world may be due to human sinfulness, still our creaturly finitude alone necessitates that *all* our actions not only indirectly but directly cMise ontic ev:il.[16] Janssens claims that because of our "temporality " every act includes an omission and, hence the indirecrt causation of ontic evil. His originality lies in his additional claim that it is because of our " spatiality," i.e., our materiality, thait we necessarily directly create ontic evil in

1!8 Louis Janssens, "Ontic Evil and Moral Evil," *Reaaings in MMal Theology No. 1: Moral Norms and the OathoUo Tradition,* eds. C. Curran and R. McCormick (NY: Paulist Press, 1979), 40-93,

our actions •ais well. And this is because that, while our body enables us to communicate with others and to act upon things of this world, it is at the same time subject to the laws which govern matter. Our body is consequently also an impediment to ·action in so far as it is subject to the wear and tear, fatigue and sickness of ordinary living. Therefore, simply because the performance of any moral act requires an expenditure of physical and psychic energy *ais* the price for its possi1bili:ty,ontic evil is created. Moreover, Janssens also ·adds that because we are :finite our knowledge of this material world always remains limited. Consequently, our moral deeds which transform our enviwnment can result in unforseen and undesired side-effects in the long run.

Therefore, :though it is only proper for proportionalists to " regret " the ontic evil caused in our actions, it is quite another thing to regret having to make such decisions at all. Rather, I would •suggest we learn to accept ontic evil as a species of entropy itself. We need to realize :that there can be no evolving order in the un1i:v:ersewithout the creation of some diso11der as .the price to he paid and the stimulus for further growth. If deontologists are suspicious of the implications of proportionalism, I would ·suggest that this is one of the key points of controversy.

Finally, even if Finnis were able to maintain his notion of •a hieriarchy of basic goods as a way of fending off the dangers of relrutivism, there is one final weakness in his theory which undercuts this very quest for objectivity. He has continually maintained the incommensurability of basic v:alues and our need .to respect each ·and every one of them in all our actions. However, he admits that each of us inevitably has our own subjective order of priority in the way we live out our life in different w;ays. But he would contend that this is merely due to our own personalities, upbringing, talents, and opportunities rather than to a difference in the intrinsic worth of the seven haisic goods. If a dedicated scholar, for example, requires " a degree of concentra.tiion . . . at the expense, temporarily or

permanently, of other forms of good," this is just a feature of our finitude, according to Finnis (NL, 105). He argues that it would be unreasonable for the scholar seeking knowledge to deny in his plan for life that other basic vulues are just as intrinsically good as knowledge.

These admissions on the part of Finnis, however, are devastating for his position. First, a scholar may not simply omit other basic values in his plan for life. He may also directly harm them as we have argued aibove to be inevitwble. For e:x;ample,if the only way the scholar can keep himself warm is by burning a painting or a book, he cannot avoid either harming the basic value of knowledge or aesthetic experience. Second, it is true that a dedicated scholar need not himself be an artist or appreciate art ,and yet can still affirm the value of art for other people. But should he not choose to do so, by what right can Finnis call him unreaisonable? Indeed, should some culture refuse to ·appreciate the value of religion, by what right can Finnii.s call it lacking in the proper elements for human flourishing? For Finnis himself claims to have derived his list of basic values for human flourishing from an empirical survey of cultures. If some culture lacks one of his seven basic values, it thereby e1iminates such a value from being considered as basic according to Finnis' own methodology itself. Thus Finnis' theory, to be consistent, would seem to require that no one can choose not to participate in all seven of his basic goods. This is because, for him, the .alternative would he the sheer relativism deontologists 'attribute to proportionalism.

aonclusions

I have examined the inconsistencies and weakness in Finnis' hierarchical theocy of value which highlights the importance of basic goods. Moreover, implicit in this discussion has been a rival non-hierarchical ,theory of vafoe. It remains for me to make more explicit the key elements of such a theory and defend it from ithe inevitable charge of relativism.

I have argued 1above that ·all values ,are of intrinsic worth

as well as capable of serving ,as the means for the participation in all other values. It follows that. I am committed to the view that human flourishing requires the proper *balancing* of existing values. To dtiscover what value to prefer in a particular conflict ,situation involves, not .the ,appeal to some absolute hierarchy, but the determination of which conflicting value has been unduly neglected thus far. The ideal of proportionality is .therefore the quest for balance among the competing goods in our values network. Such a network, moreover, is necessarily open-ended. The more experience we gain ,ag individuals and as 1a society, the more aware are we of newer facets of genuine human flourishing. HoweV'er, there ·are obvious objections to this aibove1sketchthat need to 1be considered.

Some will object that what has been propo1Sedis impractical. How do we manage to halance a potentially infinite array of values? How could we ever pin..point accurately the value or v.a1uesbeing neglected in •a particular situation? How could .we even begin to .analyze our open-ended network of values if we are not permitted :to assert a manageable number of basic goods? My reply is simply :thait, just •as common sense allows us ·to choose the proper course of action out of an infinite set of possibilities when confronted with the daily tasks of survival, ·so too, our practical wisdom *(phronesis)* can enable us to perform the necessary balancing 1act proper to the moral enterprise. This does not imply that we are utterly dependent upon moral *intuition* ialone. On the contmry, the rational •analysisof moral dilemmas needs to complement and be critical of our currently developed practical wisdom. But such analysis is itself falliible since it cannot help but abstract from the real complexity of our values network those goods which are considered to be most relevant in a particular situation. Reason can come up with rules of thumb to guide our moral intuitions :but it cannot replace them.

Another objection might be the clruim that proportionali1Sm is just as vulnerable •as Finnis' theory when it comes to justifying its judgments that certain values are being unduly

neglected in certain situations. In reply, a proportionalist would first applaud Finnis's observation that not everyone can be expected to participate in every possible value. People and cultures as a whole do indeed differ in terms of their genetic endowments of personality, interest, and talent as well as in terms of their experiential backgrounds. In so far as the human community is functionally interdependent, people and societies can be expected to complement each other in terms of their contributions. Not everyone needs to be a writer or an artist or a plumber nor does every society have to produce the same goods as every other society in order to flourish.

Nevertheless, there do exist certain values which each person and culture as a whole must not neglect but maintain in the proper balance if it wishes to flourish in its humanity as such. Finnis fails to distinguish between the gifts and talents that people will not all have equally and those values that all must equally participate in to be authentic human beings. Any proposed list of such values will of course be open-ended and subject to ongoing criticism. But it will not be based solely on some empirical survey of human cultures. For such a descriptivist approach confuses the realms of "is" and "ought." Proportionalists tend to prescribe their own proposals for human authenticity and allow the test of time to be the ultimate judge. Thus, though even proportionalists cannot require that a dedicated scholar become an artist as well, they can have grounds for arguing that this scholar needs to address his defective affectivity (perhaps even through art therapy) if he is to flourish as a human being.

The critics of this proportionalist theory of value will argue, however, that we have not thereby avoided the problem of relativism. It is true that we can offer no a priori validation of any proposed list of necessary values. Indeed, we cannot even guarantee that the list we abstract for analysis from the infinite set of values which exists in principle will be at all relevant for resolving our moral dilemmas. We cannot even outlaw the possibility that two responsible proportionalists

will achieve a proper balance in different ways when confronted with the same conflict situation. In fact, our analysis has opened up a crucial loophole by distinguishing between those values proper to all authentic human beings and those values (based on talents) which differ from person to person since they are the result of the functional interdependence of the human community. For it is possible that a person, when asked to participate in a protest march against racism, might selfishly respond that his talents are for writing against racism and not for active protest.

Our acceptance of a healthy pluralism, however, need not imply the inevitability of relativism. The fact that there is no guaranteed method by which proportionalists can all arrive at the same assessment of a moral dilemma does not mean that just any resolution of a conflict situation is thus valid. For any proposed solution must demonstraite that some value (or values) has been disipropomionatelyneglected to the ongoing satisfaction of the moral community. Moreover, the fact that even people isharing similar values can resolve conflict situations differently is only a testimonial to the flexibility of the human species; there is always more than one way to achieve the same end in the long run. Nor is the fact that my theory allows for the possibility of people ignoring their obligations by arguing these duties belong to others in the wider community a devastating indictment. For we should expect such differences and value them if our quest for consensus is not to turn into a stagnant reaffirmation of the status quo.

However, I have saved to the last the most serious criticism of a non-hierarchical value theory. Such a theory will be claimed to be self-referentially inconsistent. For authentic human flourishing requires the proportional balancing of *all* values according to this theory. If so, then it should follow that "authenticity" itself is no "basic " value but rather complementary to all others. Consequently, there should be circumstances in which it is permissible to omit or harm this value. Thus, critics argue, a non-hierarchical theory of value,

if it is to be consiistent, must admit that the proportional balancing of all values is not *always* necessary. In fact, inauthenticity must sometimes be permitted in order to be faithful to the value of ·authenticity. And this is a contradiction according to the critics of this value theory. Indeed, it is the same dilemma that Finnis faces in his claim that practical reasonableness can never be omitted or harmed.

One possible solution might be to distinguish between the contrariety of opposing lower-level values and the contradictory nature of the ultimate values of good and evil. But this would be to admit that there are some values which are " basic " which must never be violated. And the deontologists would have their victory after all. Most proportionalists would probably concede that it is fooHsh to try to go " beyond " the basic categories of good and evil. After all, what harm is there in acknowledging that there is one fundamental law that cannot be "ha1anced off" against any other: do good and avoid evil..

The harm, however, lies precisely in our failure to ·acknowledge the open-ended nature of the moral enterprise. We constantly want to give in to the temptation of the deontologist that we possess the ultimate framework for understanding human flourishing, tha.t our current wisdom of what does and does not constitute the proper balance [s necessarily correct. On the contJJary, I would contend that a non-hieJJarchical theory of value is not self-referentially inconsiis:tent siince it anticiprutes the ongoing re-evaluation of our basic categories of good ·and evH, of authenticity and inauthenticity. It anticipates that our current " art " of balancing values must itself always be changed if we are to maintain our moral balance. This does not imply that rbomorrow we must champion the holocaust of the Jews. It ·siimpJ.yimplies that we must be ever critical of our way of making decisiionssince they will inevitably betray a pattern of hieJJarchioal values that must continually be reversed in order to maintain a proportional balance.

In this essay I have .attempted to examine the recent debate over the role of basic goods in resolving conflict situations. I explored the inadequacies of Finnis' theory and proposed a non-hierarchical theory of value as an alternative. I have admitted, moreover, that such a proportionalist theory of value will not eliminate the pluralism inherent in moral discourse .today. Rather, I am in agreement with Richard Bernstein that we need to get "beyond" the categories of "objectivism and relativism." [17] For underlying both schools of thought seems to be a ·shared commitment to ·a free and open dialogue through which it is hoped we can create ·an authentic human community.

11 Richard Bernstein, *Beyond Objeotivism and Relativism: Science, Her·meneutios, and Prawis* (Philadelphia: U. of Pennsylvania Press, 1983).

WHAT IS INTELLIGIBLE MATTER?

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AER ST. THOMAS' commentary on Boethius' *De Trinita.te,* another discussion on the nature of intelligible matter might ·seem unnecessary. In question five, article three of that work he argues that mathematics is the study of quantity and since no accident can be understood apart from substance, one must understand mathematics to have some substrate. This he calls intelligible matter.

But what is intelligible matter? St. Thomas, along with Aristotle, recognises only two kiinds of substance: natuml composites ·and pure forms. Neither of these could be identified with intelligible matter.

One could also ask what does the term " intelligible matter " mean. In a couple of plaices St. Thoma.s appears to call the substrate of mruthematica1lsintelligible matter because it is substance and substance can only he grasped by the intellect.[1] Yet, manother text he explains that it is because mathematiooals are held in the imagination, and rthe ·imagination is sometimes: referred to as intellect, that the matter of mathematicals is called intelligible.[2]

And then there are the te:x;tsin which both Aristortle and St. Thomas refer to this same subjecrt ais the continuum; iis the continuum the same thing as substance? We should further note thart several modern Arisrtotelian commentators describe

1 Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Ewpositio Super Librum Boethii de Trinitate,* Q.5, a.3, pg. 184, n.16-18. (Bruno Decker) E. J. Brill, 1959, a.nd also *Summa Theoloqiae,* Prima Pars, Q.85, a.I, ad 2. (Texts of St. Thomas are taken from the Marietti editions unless otherwise indicated.)

2 Cf. St. Thomas, *In Metaphysicorum,* L.VII, l.X, n. 1495.

intelligible matter as the continuous, or as space or extension; are all these positions consistent? These, then, are some of the problems ·associated with the doctrine of intelligible matter.

It tis important to determine what intelligible mrutter is for a few reasons. If one undel"stands it as the substance that is found in :the natural o;rder then mathematics will become a branch of physics, a consequence that is untenable for a Thomist. Whereas iit is ridiculous to think that the substance that is separa..te from ,sensible mrutter, viz. pure ,furms like angels, *is* the subject of mathematicals. Furthermore, there are other A:cistotelian-Thomist doctrines that could be implicated if one were to dismiss the traditional posiition on intelligible matter. For example, both these great thinkers recognise that every accident ·is dependent on substance for its being and its definition, but iif intelligible matter iis not substance, ais might seem to he the case if there ·are only the two kinds of substances mentioned before, then this assertion is not universal. A synthesis of St. Thomrus'position will, therefore, be valuable.

The mathematician (at least the classical mathematician, if not all his modern counterparts) may consider this question irrelev;ant. all, the mathemartician does not stop to wonder about the kind of matter that composes mathematical figures. More than that, he could maintain that the notion of matter in mathematics is repugnant. For the marthematician, as Aristotle himself says,[3] studies rthe figures of quantity and their properties and does not treat of that which is quantified. (The modern mathemartician does not even appear to grant this supposition, for him the mathematical object is relation not quantity.) The investigation into the nature of the subject of mathematical beings is not in the mathematician's domain. No science questions its own principles since to do so would require these very same principles. A more universal discipline will seek the answers to the questions we have raised; that discipline is metaphysics.

a .Aristotle, *Metaphysics,* Bk. I.3, 106la29-36.

Although the notion of matter seems at first to have no place in mathematics, reflection reveals that some 'SON of matter is required in O['der to fully explain mathematical entities. For instance, how does one account for the many individuals of the same species that one finds in mathematics?

Seveml triangles do not differ from each other because of what they are, ,all are equally called triangle, but they are in fact distinct individuals. It is because this triangle is made from these lines 1and that triangle from other lines that one differs from another. Even if two triangles are coincident they are nonetheless distinct, for the mind can conceive of each .triangle, composed as it is of its own particular lines tha.t the mind alone has designated, a;s a distinct individual although these triiangles do not differ in posiition. This is ,also the ca1Se in arithmetic, though it is not as evident. For when one conceives of two numbers of the 'Same numerical value, as for ex-,ample in the equation $2 + 2 = 4$, it is evident that the first two cannot he disrtinguished from the next as regards its form-both are esserutially two-yet they must be different individuals otherwise the equation would make no sense. It is because the mind can designate that this number two is composed of these uni.ts and the nert of these other units that the first number is different from the second. In short, irt is necessary tha.rt one account for the individuality of mathematical beings. This cannot be done by :appealing to the form of :these things since that is what unites the members of the species. Individuality is explained in terms of matter, a matter that is appropriate ;to mathema;tical things: the continuum in the case of geometry and the unit in arithmetic.[4] The fact of mathematical indi-

therefore, indica.tes that some notion of matter is appropriate to mathematical entities.

[4] The application of the doctrine of intelligible matter to arithmetic is more difficult than its application to geometry. Consequently we shall consider its nature and role in geometry in this paper and not deal with arithmetic explicity. However, it is our contention that this doctrine applies equally to arithmetic and geometry.

An analysis of St. Thomas' doctrine on intelligible matter must begin with his teacmng on abstraction. This is because it is the act of abstraction that gives mathematicals their proper character. And since we 1are ·approaching this issue metaphys:ically, it is necessary to justify the act of abstraction in general and mathematical abstraction in particular. Obviously :it not up 'to the mruthematician to defend the aJbstraction proper to his science. It suffices for him that such an act is possible. That is, that the mind can consider quantity apart irom sensible matter. But the metaphysician must show what abstracbion is, how it is. possible and that it involves no falsity, thereby defending the mathematician's a.bstraction.

Abstrootion, ·as the name suggests, is the driawing away of one thing from another. More particularly it is the understanding of one thing without the other things that belong to iit :in reality. Hence, abstraction belongs to the first act of the intellect; not the second act which inV10lvespredicating an rut-tribute of 'a suhject and, therefore, truth and f1alsity. Abstraction can only occur if one thing does not depend on another to be understood. For in.stance, one can abstract the nature of man from Socr:atesbecause to be the individual Socrrutesis not essential to whrut iit :is to be a man. But one cannot aihstract Socrates ,fromhis humanity since to he Socrates is to be essentia1ly a man; that is, it is impossible 00 think of Socrates without seeing that he is a man. Moreover, ithe act of abstraction can only take place when things 1are joined acco11dingto !l.'eality. One would not say that to consider animal without conceiving of a stone would 1be to abstract the notion of animal from stone since 1a srbone1and .a.n animal ·arenot joined *secundum rem.* Con-.sequently, it is only when things :are joined in nature, and when ithe understanding of one does !involve that of the other, that 1abstraictioncan take place.[5]

There are two kinds of abstraction according to the two ways in which things are joined.

[5] Cf. S. Thomas, *In Physicorum,* 1.2,3,n. 161.

Since there cannot be abstraction, properly speaking, except of things joined in being (in *esse),* then according to the two ways of conjunction . . ., namely as part and whole are united or as form and matter, there is a twofold abstraction: one in which form is abstracted from matter, the other in which the whole is abstracted from its parts. [6]

The abstraction of a whole from its parts corresponds to the abstraction of a universal from particulars. This kind of abstraction is presupposed to all science since science is of the general not the singular. But the abstraction of form from matter, later to be made more precise as the abstraction of an accidental form from sensible ma.tter, is proper to mathematics.

Not every :llorm can he abstraicted from its matter, but only ,that form which does not depend on its matter for its definition. As St. Thomas puts it, " form can be abstracted from some matter when the *ratio* of !its essence does not depend on that matter." [7] Furthermore, all accidents are to substance as foNU :to maitter. And no accident can be abstracted from subsitance since an accident ,is necessal'lily conceived of as a determination of *something:* that something being substance. However, quantity can be considered apart .from particular kinds of sensiible subjects. One ,oan, for exampJ.e, conceive of a circle without it being 'a wooden or bmnze circle. To unaerstand quantity apart from its va11ious natural subjects is rto abstract it from sensible matter. This is the a.1bstractionproper to mathematics and is that which is ,.signifiedby " the abstraction of form from matter."

A difficulty immediately surfaces with this formulation of mathematical abstraction. The reason quantity oan be abstracted from sensible maUer, St. Thomas explains, is that

6 *Unde oum abstraotio non possit esse, proprie foquendo, nisi coniunctorum in esse, secundum duos modos coniunotionis praedictos, scilicet qua pars et totum uniuntur vei forma et materia, duplex est abstraotio, una, qua forma abstrahitur a materia, alia, qua totum abstrahitur a partibus. Super Librum Boethii de Trinitate,* p. 184, n. 2-6. (All translations of St. Thomas are my own.)

7 *Forma autem illa potest a materfrt, a!iqua abstrahi, ciiius ratio essentiae non dependet a tali materia. (Ibid,* n. 6-7)

quantity is in •some way prio'l" to quality.[8] Colour, for example, is necessarily understood as an ·accident of an extended body whereas length or number do not depend on colour, or any other quality, to be known. (It may be true that quantity as a common sensible depends on quality to be perceived; yet once known quantity is freed from any dependence on quality for the understanding of what it is.) Granted then that quantity is logically prior to quality, how does it follow that quantity can be conceived of apart from sensible matter? As we saw earlier, abstraction can only occur when the *ratio* of one thing does not depend on another. Therefore, St. Thomas' argument seems to conclude that quantity can be thought of without quality, not without sensible matter. Yet geometry, to take a concrete example, is not about taible tops or the like considered apart from their colour and texture, which would be the case if quantity was said to ·be abstracted from quality and not from .sensible maitter. Thus, in oroer to understand mathematical abstraction .we must 1see how the priority of quantity over quality allows us to abstract quantity from sensible matter.

The solution to this difficulty wiill be made ea:s[er by a brief explanartion of what " sensible matter " meains. Both Aristotle and St. Thomas recognise that things are sensible in two ways: either *per se* or *per accidens. Per se* sensibles are divided into proper or common. A proper, *per se* sensible such as colour or sound affects the senses in virtue of itself and it affects a particular sense. It is called *per se* because it is sensible due to itself and ibo· no other. And it is called proper because it is the object of a pamcular sense £aculrty, as sound is the proper object of hearing, and colour of sight. A common, *per se* sen-1sible is not the proper oibject of ·a particular sense £acuity. Lt can be attadned by more than one sense power. Shape and motion are examples of common, *per se* sensibles. Shape can be gmsped by sight and touch, while motion can be recognized through sight, sound and touch. Common sensibles are *per se*

s Cf. *ibid,* n. 12-16.

sensibles because they affect the senses in virtue of themselves; a bigger shape affects the senses differently than a smaller one, for example.

A thing can also be sensible *per cwcidens.* A *per aooidens* sensible is ,that which is an incidental object of the senses. One such *per acciden.s* sensible is the incidenta.Ily sensed subject of *per se* sensibles. Socrates, for example, is sensed *per accidens.* For when one senses a certain shade of colour, various sounds of voice, a certain size and so on, one recognises that this [s Socrates. However, Socrates is not sensed iais ii.s his colour, nor as are his shape and size. He affects the senses in virtue of another, that is, in virtue of hls colour, shape, and the like.[9]

Charles De Koninck describes the way in which the *per aooidens* sensible is grasped in this way:

> Knowledge of an incidentally sensible object ... must accompany every sensation, since all per se sensibles are at once perceived as belonging to something that is not per se sensed; . . .[10]

St. Thomas calls this incidentally sensible subject of the *per ae* sensibles sensible matter: " corporeal matter according as it underlies sensible qualities iis called sensible matter." [11] "Matter " genevally signifies that of whii.ch a ithing is composed, or the underlying suhstl"ate of things. Sensible matter, therefore, will be the incidentally sensible substvate of sensible qualities; and is, in fact, a cause of these *per se* sensibles.

Now that ,we have seen whait "sensible matter" means, let us return to the difficulty that arose earlier. That difficulty is agaii.n: how does quantity's priority over quality justify the

9 Cf. Aristotle, *De An.ima,* Bk. II.6, and St. Thomas, *In De Atlinw,,* 1.2,13. Note also that there is another sense of *per accidens* sensible: that which is the proper object of one sense, but *per acciden-8* object of another-this distinction is not important for our present purposes.

10 Charles De Koninck, "Abstraction from Matter, I", p. 172, *Laval PMologique et Pkil08ophique,* Vol. XIII, t.2, 1957.

11 *Materia en4m 88'11-8ibiU8 dicitur materia. corporali8 8ecun.dum quod subiacet quaUta.tibu8 8en&ibiUbus,...* St. Thomas, *Summa Theoloqiae,* Prima Pars, Q.85, a.I, ad 2.

mathematical abstraction of quantity from sensible matter? Clearly the *ratw* of quantiity is not dependent on quality, as quantity can be undel'IStood apart from quality. But quality, ais we have just seen, makes known sensible matter. That is to say, without quality the *ratio* of sensible matter is unattainable. How could one conceive of bronze or of Socrates without their colour, size, and so on? The very definition of sensible matter is in terms of *per se* sensibles. If quantity can be understood apart from quality it can *ipso facto* be understood apart from sensible matrber :which is knowable rtihrough qualiHes. It is in this way that quantity's priority over quality can be seen ·as·a justification of mathematical abstraction.

We can now state more precisely what mathematical abstraction is. It is the conceiving of quantity apar:t from sensible matter, the incidentally sensible subject of per se sensibles. The subject of mathematics, therefore, is a pure, simple ·and immobile quantity, freed from the mutability of natural things. Mruthematics is not about bronze circles, or wooden triangles; its subject is abstracted £rom all such matter.

Having clarified tihe notion of abstmction it is necessary to treat of the nature of the definitions of substance ·and accidents. This must be done because it yet apparent why the ·ahstmction of quantity from sensible matter requires that it be underatood as the quantity of some substance. lndeed this conclusion seems strange, :since the study of maithematios does not deal with any kind of substance, but concerns itself with the figures of quantity. Is it really essential, therefore, to identify intelligible matter with substance?

Aristotle devotes part of his *Metaphysics* to the question of the definitions of both srnbstance and ·accident. And St. Thomas comments on this discussion as follows:

> Substance ... which has an absolute quiddity, does not depend on another for its quiddity. An accident, however, depends on a subject, although the subject is not of the essence of an accident; . . . so that it is necessary that an exterior essence is put in its definition. But accidents do not have being except insofar as they

are in a subject; and therefore the quiddity of these accidents is dependent on a subject, on account of this it is necessary that a subject is put in the definition of an accident; . . .[12]

Since substance exists per se and *in ipse* it can be defined absolutely. An ·accident does not have this same mode of being nor, consequently, this same mode of definition. The being of an accident upon the being of substance. Even if an accident is other than substance, havmg a nature proper to itself, it is nonetheless 1a determination of substance and musit be understood ;as such. Yet ·all accidents are not the same, a point that St. Thomas developes in his oommentacy on the *Metaphysics*.

. . . certain accidents are simple, and others are coupled *(copulata).* Accidents that do not have a determinate subject are called simple, [this subject] is put into the definition of them, as for example curve and concave and other mathematics. However those ail.'e called coupled that have a determinate subject, without which they cannot be defined.[18]

To use Aristotle's example, "snubness" is a shape found in a determinate suhjoot-.a nose. This is a " coupled " accident, for snubness signifies not only ·a certain shape, but a shape found in a definite subject. On the other hand, if one were

12 *Substantia . . . quae habet quidditatem absolutam, non dependet iin sua quidditate elD alio. Accidens autem dependet a subieoto, lioet subieotum non sit de essentia aooidentis; . . . ita quod oporteat wteriorem essentiam in eius definitione poni. Aooidentia vero non habent esse nisi per ho·o quod insunt subieoto: et ideo eorum quidditas est dependens a subieoto: et propter hoc oportet quod subieotum in aooidentis definitione ponatur, . . . In Metaphysioorum,* 1.7,4, n. 1352. St. Thomas uses the word "subject" here *not* to distinguish that which enters into the definition of an accident from substance. "Subject" is the prope·r term for that which underlies accidents, hence substance can be called a subject. Cf. St. Thomas' *De Priincipiis Naturae, Opuscula Omnia,* Vol. I, p. 8. (Mandonnet edition, 1927) In this text St. Thomas also points out that the subject that underlies accidental :forms can be called "matter".

13 · · · *quaedam accidentia sunt simplicia, et quaedam copulata. Simplicia diountur, quae non habent subiectum deterrninatum, quod in eorum definitione ponatur, sicut curvum et ooncavum et alia mathematica. Oopulata autem diountur, quae habent determinatum subiectum, siine quo definiri non possunt. In Metaphysioorum,* 1.7,4, n. 1343.

to .ask what specific subject underlies mathematical forms,- Do table tops underlie planes? Or is the sun the subject of the circle?-it would be impossible to name a determinate subject. Clearly tha.t *is* what St. Thomas means by simple accidents since he gives mathematica1s ·as examples.

We have seen that mathematical abswaction is the separation *of* quantity from sensible matter and that quantity cannot be abstracted from substance since aU accidents depend on substance. Mathematical quantity, therefore, does not depend on sensible matter to he understood, yet it does have to be. understood as the quantity of •some indeterminate substance. " Quantity can be undersitood without the mrutter that is subjeot 00 motion and s·ensible qua1ities, but not without substance." [14]

In light of these two principles St. Thomas proceeds rto draw the conclusion that, despite their .a;bstract chamcler, mathematical forms •are understood as .the determinations of some kind of •substance. This sulbstance he calls " intelLigible matter." "And thus according to the notion of its substance quantity does Illot depend on sensible matter, but only on intelligible matter." [16] But what kind of substance is intelligible ma.tter since it is neither ·a natu11alcomposite nor a pure from?

In the *Summa Theologiae,* St. Thomas gives his most precise statement as to the nature of intelLigiblematter. He says that " intelligible matter is truly called substance according .as it is subject to quantity." [16] This short formula holds the key to the clifficultiesraised at the outset.

14 *Pot est igitur intelligi quantitas sine materia subiecta motui et qualitatibus sensibilibus, non tamen absque substantia. In Pkysicorum,* 1.2,3, n. I61.

15 *Et sic secundum ra.tionem suae substantiae non depend.et quantitas a materia sensibiZi, sed solum a materia intelligibU. Super Librum Boetkii de Trinitate,* Q.5, a.3, corpus, p. 184, n. 16I8.

16 *Materia 11er0 inteUigibiUs dicitur substantia secundum quad subiacet quantitati. Summa Tkeoloqiae,* Prima Pars, Q.85, a.I, ad 2. Cf. also *In Pkysicorum,* 1.2,3, n. I6I; *Scriptum Super Sententiarum* IV, I2, Q.I, a.I, n. 44-45; *Summa Tkeoloqiae,* Tertia Pars, Q.77, a.2, ad 4.

The definitions of mathematicals do not require a determinate 1subject or substance. Rather the substance of the mathematical figures has simply the notion of that which underlies these figures and that upon which they depend. Intelligible matter, then, is not ,a kind of substance as is bronze or wood. Not even the notion of substantial form iis proper to this substance. The *ratio* of intelligible matter is much like the description of suhstance that is given in the *Categories:* substance is that which is neither said of another nor exists in another.[17] In the *Categories* Aristotle is giving ,a common, not a developed, explanation of what "substance" means. The notion of substance that is proper to intelligible matter is very much like this confused notion of substance. Intemgible matter is not a particular kind of substance having a nature apart from abstract figures. That is why St. Thomas defines it as substance ·according 1as it is subject .to quantity. Consequently intelligible matter is neither substance tin the sense of a natural composite (though the notion of substance is gathered from natural things) , nor in the 1sense of pure form.

Intelligible matter is also called the continuum.[18] Rather than posing a problem this name further illuminates what intelligible matter is. There is no ·difference between substance according as it is subject to quantity and the continuum. " Continuum " signifies that which iis .able to be divided without end and thait the parts of which have a common boundary. Therefore the word " continuum" designates 1a subject having quantity, which subject is conceived of only in that regard, namely, as underlying quantity. The continuum in one dimension is line, in two dimensions surface, and in three dimensions ·,solid. Because it signifies:an indeterminate subject that stands under quantity and i.is a.ble to become the different mathematicals intelligible matter can reasonably be called the "continuum". Some modern commentators have described intelli-

11 Cf. Aristotle, *Categories,* ch.5, 2all-13.

18 Cf. St. Thomas, *In Physioorum,* 1.1,41, n. 360; *In De Anima,* 1.3,7, n. 714; *In Metaphysicorom,* 1.7,10, n. 1460; *De Veritate,* Q.2, a.6, ad 1.

gible matter in other ways too. Hippocrates Apostle, **for** example, says that the matter of mathematicals " is the continuous." [19] While W. D. Ross and Thomas Heath refer to the intelligiiblemalbteras" space ".[20] Do these niames ·shed any further light on the nature of intelligible matter?

One ought not confuse the continuous with the continuum. The continuum signifies quantity with a suhjeot, but the continuous is a kind of quantity-it *is* an accident. As an accident "continuous " may imply that there is a subject underlying it yet it does not designate a 1subject. " Continuous:" is akin to "red", both imply a subject, neither expresses it directly. This is not the case with "continuum"; it refers directly to a substrate, hawng no other character than that of an underlying recipient of quantitative forms, but ·a subject nevertheless. Thus it would seem that " continuous " is not an appropriate name for the mwtter that is subject to mathematicals, and it is not at all synonomous with" continuum".

Neither is " space " a particularly good name for intelligible matter. (In fad, " space " could ev•en be a very misleadiing term if one thought that it signified physical extension. Intelligible matter is ·in no way a physical thing.) What Ross and Heath mean by " space" is ·a substrate that is devoid of sensible attributes, free from all things properly physical. Heath, in fact, equates: "1space" with "pure extension ",[21] which is 1a sign that "sp111ce" means the subject that remains after the abstraction of sensible matter. However, " space" is still not a fortunate expres1sionin that it suffers from the same deficiency as does " continuous ". " Space " does not represent the ·SU!bjectthat undeTliesmathematical figures •and so it is not of help in coming to understand what intelligible matter is.

Finally we must consider the signification of the name "in-

19 Cf. Hippocrates Apostle, *Aristotle's Philosophy of Mathematics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), p.17.

20 Cf. W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), pp. 203£; Thomas Heath, *Mathematics iin Aristotle* (Oxford: Cla.rendon Press, 1949) , p. 224.

21 Cf. Heatl1, *Ibid.*

telligible matter ". This appears to be the most perplexing problem since St. Thomas gives two quite different reasons for the use of this expression. In the commentary on Boethius' *De Trinitate,* his most elaborate work on intelligible matter, St. Thomas says that quantity does not depend on sensible matter for the notion of its substance but on intelligible matter. And then .to explain the name "intelligible matter" he adds: " for substance, when the accidents have been removed, remains intelligible only to the intellect in that the sensitive powel1S do not attain a comprehension of substance." [22] However in •another place St. Thomas s.tates that " intelligible " when referring to mathematicals signifies that these things are grasped by the imagination. "[The imagination] is called intelligence here, because it conS1iders things without the senses as does the intellect." [23] If that is so why do we not call the matter of mathematicals imaginaible matter (which is •akin to the name St. Albert uses: *quantitas imaginabilis*[24]) ? It seems that the name " intelligiible" *is* used as a concession to Aristotle who called the imagination the corruptible passive intellect.[25] Whait then is the proper signification of the name "intelligible matter"? Does it refer us 1to the intellect which alone seizes substance, or to the imagination which properly grasps mathematiools?

· A solution to this difficulty will best be found by returning to Aristotle who was the first ito speak about the subject of mathematioal:s ·and then to reflect on the te:ds of St. Thomas that seem problematic.

Aristotle uses the expression *VATJ VOTJnl* to designate that

22 *Substantia enim remoti8 aooidentibus non manet nisi intellectu comprehensibili8, eo quod sensitwae potentiae non pertingunt usque ad substtJJn.tiae oomprehensionem.* St. Thomas, *Super Librum BoethU de Trinitate,* Q.5, a.3, p. 184, n. 18-20.

2s *[lmaginatio] quae hie intelUgentia dicitur, q'Uia res oonsiderat sine sensu, siout inteileotus. In Metap1vysioorom,*1.7,10, n. 1495.

24 Cf. St. Albert, *Physicomm,* 1 (Parisiis: Vives, Bibliopola.m Editorem, 1890),p.2.

2s Cf. St. Thomas, *In Metaphysicorum,* 1.7,10, n. 1494.

which we have been calling intelligible matter.[26] Now *vv.11,* which first :signified,a forest, ·and then lumber, later came to designate ,thart of which .anything is composed. And *vo'1Jri1* describes 1somethinginsofa!l'as it is gr.asped by an interior knowing faculty of the soul. The adjective *vo'1Jri1* and the noun *vovs* comes from the verb *voloo* which designates the act of perceiviing,of thinking and of conceiving. Both the adjective and the noun a wide range of knowing powers, either diTectly or indirectly, though ·all,these powers are interior mental faculties. A good translation of *vovs* would be " mind " since " mind " can be .applied to <imagination,intellect, and even the emotions, among other thing.s. Hence *vo"1ri1* could best ·be translated as "minded". Consequell'tly *VA'1J vo'1Jri1,* especially when contrasted with 1sensible matter, ·refers to that matter that is .attained by some iinterior power.

Charles De Koninck confirms this understanding of the name "intelligible matter".

> . . . we call the matter of these mathematical individuals 'intelligible', in the sense that it can be reached only by mind, and is not the individual matter of external sense experience.[27]

Now that Aristotle' s original phrase has been clarified we must return to the texts of the Angelic Doctor that seem to give distinctly different explanations of what " intelligible matter" signifies. In the commentary on Boethius' *De Trinitate,* St. Thomrus claims that intelligible matter is .so called because it is substance ·and substance is only knowable through the intellect. This <interpretation would appear to aooord with the use of the phrase *VA'1J* by Aristotle because *vo'1Jri1* can signiify the intellectual. And since 1in this particular context St. Thomas wants to show that quantity is abstracted from sensible matter but not from substance *simpliciter,* it is plausible that St. Thomas gives this justification of the name "intelligible matter " to stress the very £act that it is substance.

2t1Cf. Aristotle, *Metapky&ic&,* Bk. VII.IO, 1036a9-12; Bk.VII.11, 1037a4-5; Bk.VIII.6, 1045a34-36.

21 Charles De Koninck, "Abstraction from Matter, II" (Emphasis added), *Laval TMoZogique et Pkilo&opkique,* VI, t.l (1960), p. 64.

But this explanation is problematic, as was seen by Frere Augustin-Gabriel. He notes that ,sensible matter can ·also be identified with substance, and therefore would merit the name " ·intelligible matter " [28] It would seem, then, that the argument propo1sedby St. Thomas to clarify the name " intelligible " as said of the matter of mathematicals can be applied equally to the matter of natural things. Accordingly, St. Thomas would be giving ·an .argument that does not why the subject of mathematfoals deserves to be called intelligible ·any more than any other .subject. However, ·after raising the difficulty Frere Augustin-Gabriel offers a solution.

> . . . intelligible matter is prior to sensible matter. This latter, in fact, implies the presence of sensible qualities. Consequently, quantity is situated at a higher level of intelligibility than corporeal matter; thus it is closer to that which can only be the proper object of the intellect, that is substance. For these reasons, one appropriates the name of intelligible matter to the subject of quantity rather than to sensible

Although sensible matter ms only ·sensible *per accidens* and although it can be identified with substance insofar ·as it is the subject of sensible accidents, nevertheless it implri.es sensible attributes. Initel1igihle matter, on rbhe other hand, iJs the suJbject rbhat underlies mathemartical figures and so is free from •ainy referrenoe to sensible qualities. Therefore the notion of intelligible matter is prior to that of sensible matter. Even if both can be considered as subs:tance, .intelligible matter might -appropriate the name " intelligible" becaiuse of this priority, while the matter that implies sensible attributes is rightly called sensible.

2s Cf. Frere Augustin-Gabriel, "Matiere Intelligible et Mathematique, III", *Laval Theologi,que et Philosophique,* XVIII, t.2 (1962), p. 194.

29 --- *La matiere intelligible est anterieure a la matiere sensible. Oelle-ci impUque, en effet, la presence des qualites sensibles. La quantite se situe, en consequence, a un niveau d'intelligibilite plus eleve que la matiere corporelle; ainsi, elle se rapproche davantage de ce qui ne peut etre objet propre que de l'intelligence, c'est-ii-diire de la substance. Pour ces raisons, on approprie le nom de matiere intelligible au sujet de la quantite plut()t qu'a la matiere sen.8'ible.* Frere Augustin-Gabriel, *Ibid.* (Translation is my own.)

However, when St. Thomas argues in his commentary on the *Metaphysics* that "1intelligib1e" designates the imagination, .his claim is not in con:ili.ctwith his interpretation of " intelligible matter " in the commentary on Boethius. For *vo'Y/rli* can also refer to 1thait which is grasped by ithe imaigination. Since it is clear that mwthematical bcings .are iseized by the imagination it is indeed corcrectto call the matter that underlies them intelligible matter i:f one clearly understands by this the matter that is subject to entities held in the imagination. Now the term" imaginruble matter" might be better to signify this aspect of intelligible matter, but "imruginable " would not refer us to anotheir .aspect of intelligible matter-its substance. So, too, the description that St. Alber:t gives is co:rrect up to a point. Nevertheless " *quantitas imaginabilis* " likewise suffers mom the deficiency of not 1signifying intelligible matter as substance.

The £act that mathematicals are gra;sped by the imagination-which can be called inteUect-seems to be the fundamentail reason w:hy the subject of mathematicaLs is called intelligible matter. In £act, one can see here a proportion between the name sensible matter and the name intelligible matter. For just as the subject of physical things is cailled because the sense's seize these physical things, so too the subject of mathematical things should be named from the faculty tha,.t gnasps them. To 1some it may be true that " intelligible matter " is .an unfortunate name because the English word " intellect " is so attached to the faculty of reason that its application to the iimaiginarl:fonseems forced. To that extent " mind " matter or " mental mrutter " could be more faithful translations of Aristotle's phrase. " Mind " can designate the imagination readily while leaving itself open to the further signification of mtelligible mrutter as substance since " mind " can also refer to the intellect.

In short, the two accounts of the meaning of " intelligible " that St. Thomas offers .are not contradictory, rather they are complementary. They signify two different facets of intelligible

matter. It is the substance of mathematical quantity and the matter that under1ies beings grasped properly by the imagination.

This brief analysis serves not rbo answer all the questions about the doctrine of intelligible matter, but to illustrate that it is a profound doctrine involving many difficulties. The solution of these difficulties lies in a careful study of ,the texts of the Aristotle amd St. Thomas.

EOONOMICS, WISDOM AND THE TEACHING OF THE BISHOPS IN THE THEOLOGY OF THOMAS AQUINAS*

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WHEN IN 1985 the American bishops came out with the first drait of thcir pastoiral letter on the economy, and ithen a year Later when they the final text,[1] they drew fire from groups both within and outside the Church. Much of the criticism, on the popular front at least, seemed to concern the impropriety of religious leaders involving themselves in seoular .affairs (1and technical affairs at that). But while ithe bishorps were quick to admit their Lack of technical expertise, they claimed for rthemselvesa special authority to teach regarding the principles tha.t underlie a just economic life. Far from sitepping outside their proper sphere, it is their obligation, they sruid, to speak on these issues, and to a.ddress not only membel'ISof the Ca.tholic Church in America, 1but the nation as a whole. It *is* a requirement of their ofHce that ithey be concerned with the weHare and security of all individuals, ,and they effectively promorte this end iby setting forth the word of God recorded in Scriipture and handed on by the Church's tramtion. [2]

There ,are two points in prurticu1arthat are implied by this statement. F1irst, knowledge of revelation is an aid to estab-

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i "Economic Justice for All: Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy," *Origins,* vol. 16, no. 24 (November 27, 1986), 412-455..

2 Pastoral Message to accompany the letter, sections 4-9, 12-19, 29; Pastoral Letter, sections 5, 22-27.

lishing peace and justice in the community at large because of the iin.sight into 1the good for man that the Gospel offers. Second, reason alone will not suffi,cethe community ·as a guide in interpel'lsonal activity, even in the area of economics, so it makes great sense for the citizen to ·attend to rthe bishop, who in his teaching expresses the Church's foilith. The bishops' letter on economics does not fully draw out either of these points. And Aquinas nowhere expressly deaLs with the authority of the bishop in economic matteiis. But he does have something to say about rthe nature and soul'lceof episcopal authority, and of the need in the community for moral teachers.

Priv.ate property, commercial trading, the use of money-for Thoma.s ,aJl o[these institutions or practices were devised by communities for the sake of individual and general well-being. They conform to right reason, they are products of right reason, and they are governed by the virtue of justice. It would seem that practical rea:son,,all by itself, is sufficient in their regaOO.. Take priViate propecl;y a:s an Thomas offers three arguments in irts defens·ein his *Summa theologiae*. First, people work more diligently when they own the product of their lrubor. Second, if people work in the first instance for their own sake, roncentrarting on their own needs, there .WJill be less confusion than if everyone has responsibility for the group. Thiird, to quote Thomais, "quarrels arise more frequently where there is no division of the things possessed."[3]

Note that Thomais iS not .arguing for the rubsolute necessity of private property. He defends private property as a social institution without prejudicing eiither:the right of specific individuals to hold property in common, or the good of their doing so. After all, Thomas himself belonged to a religious order whose members take a vow of poverty. All he iis claiming is that the institution of private property makes sense.[4] If pri-

a 2-2, q. 66, a. 2, c.

"Odon Lottin writes that Thomas was unusual in regarding human nature, even after the Fall, as indifferent to the institution of private property; the natural la.w neither commands nor prohibits it. Rather, men cross-cul-

vate ownership is so common, Aquinas might say, it is because it all things considered, a reasonable way to provide for human well-being. And to whatever extent the institution does not promote the welfare of ,the indiwdual ·and the community, reason will dictate that it be limited. Thus, Thomas distinguishes between the prhnate ownel'IShip of properly and the proper manner of its use, namely for the good of all.

Now Thomas has based this discussion on what reason shows to be the good for man. In foot, much of what Thomas says, including ms distinction between the possession of property and its use, may he found in Book two of Aristotle's *PolitiCJJ.* There Aristotle writes: "It is clearly better that property should be priViate,but the use of it common." Notice, ·however, what Aristotle then adds, "and the special business of the legislwtor is rto create an men this benevolent disposition." [5] What this amounts to, he explains, is that men be led to broaden the affection of friendship to mclude 1all their fellow citizens. Certainly such general benevolence is reasonaible 1since the pofot of the ,state *is* to be a true community of individuals. Al'lsitotle's statement that the citizens must be brought to this conclusion by the community's leaders will be taken up by Aquina:s. The principles of morality, he contends, even if they 1all pmceed from reason, are not equally grasped by all. There is need in the community for moral teachers, individuals whom Thomas in the *Summa theo'logiae* calls *"sapientes,"* the wise men.

It was common among medie¥al writers ro propose an analogy between speculative reason ,and practical reason. Thomas hmiself makes a comparison, although the parallel he draws is

turally simply have found private ownership to be a beneficial social arrange· ment. See Dom Odon Lottin, *Le Droit Naturei ohez Saitnt Thomas* d'*Aqmn et 8e8 pred.eoes8Wr8,* 2nd ed. (Bruges: Charles Beyaert, 1931), p. 89 and n. 4. There are, however, those authors who believe that Thomas considered private property to be a consequence of sin. See Josef Fuchs, S.J., "The 'Sin of the World' and Normative Morality," *GregoriwMJ,m* 61 (1980), 51-75, in particu· lar p. 54 and n. 4.

5 *PoUtio8* 2. 1263a38·40.

iactually two-fold. Just 1as the first principles of speculative reason .aJI'e the ·starting poirut in rany scientific demonstration, he writes, the precepts of p11aicticalreason---iandhere Thoma;s is speaking of .the precepts that all people arrive at when they consider the !SO!l'lt of actions that will ;protect the ends of the person----iare:the ·stwting point for mor:al thinking.[6] Before I can decide whether oT not I should perform a particular act, I must :fust be aware of these p11actical dictates. Making the decision :i:s a matter of applying rthe principles of morality to specific cases, and ithus ra matter of prudence. What makes deciding difficult, .and prudence so important, is that the principles do not .aJ.ways hold. The stock example Thomas gives is the unreasonableness of following the general rule that one return entrusted prope!l.'ltyto its owner in a case where you know he might use it against your country.[7] Really, most mortal questioDJS iin.volv:e decisions of this 'SON. Judgmenits of temperance, for example, rall require tha;t one have uppermost in one's mind rthe peculiaiities of one's own personality and cireumstances. And to return to the issue of economics, it is one thing ,to call for a jusit 1scheduleof prices in the marketplace, but how does one determine what price is just? There a;re f·ar too many variaibles rto allow for a unive11sallybindillg rule. Tms is why Thomas grants such ra 1arge role in morality ,to people of genuine prudence. Their experience and acuity, in public matte11s such as economic justice am.d personal matte11s such as temperance, are indispensable to the community.

Yet ithese cannot be the guides that Thomas refers to as the wise men. Prudence, Thomas writes, is concerned with putting moral principles into 1action. Wisdom is concerned with the fi11st causes of all things, rbhe principles of all the sciences.8 So if one is gomg fo ·speak of wise men in the moral life, their role will have to concern the principles of mor:ality. Now there *is* a place in morality for ·Such a function, as we can

s 1-2, q. 94, a. 2, c.
7Q.94,a.4,c.
S2-2, q. 47, a.2, ad I; aa. 5 and 7, c.; cf. 1-2, q. 57, a. 2, !c.;' a. 4, c;

see if we look at the second ·analogy 1that Thomas makes between specu1rutiveand practical rea;son. Just as in specu1rutive reasoning there is a move from first principles to specific conclusions, ·So in pl'lactical reasoilling we move from first, most general, principles to more determinate principles that are arrived •at -like conclusions, and which we then apply to our given situation. One can take as an the command "Do not steal," or mare precisely, "Do not take another's property without the owner's permission." It follows from the principle that one should do no harm to another. [9]

Apart, then, from rthe mrutter of applying a rule to a concrete case, which ·belongs to the virtue of prudence, there is the problem of going firom rthe basic principle to its derivative, or from primary to secondary precepts as Thoma:s calls them. [1◇] The first, most general, precepts seem ito form a rather narrow category of principles that :are iimmediately known by all people a;s soon as ,they begin fo reason about practical affairs. Like 11ationalityitself, they are never entively absent, ·although their operation may be anesthetized by the force of passion. [11] The secondary precepts comprise ·a much broader category, from principles that even the untutored can axrive at with just a Httle reflection (the prohibition of stealing, for example), .to rules thrut require the teaching of the wise men (such as the :admonition to respect the elderly). It seems to be a matter of just how clearly one gl'asps the goods on which

s The prohibition of stealing offers an example of how a determinate principle concerning a relative good, such as private property, may not hold in every instance. As Thomas points out, it is not immoral in a situation of grave necessity to take in secret another's property and use it; because material things exist for everyone's sake, and the personal possession of property remains a good only so long as it works to relieve the needs of both yourself *and* your neighbor (2-2, q. 66, a. 7).

1'01-2, q. 94, aa. 5-6. Note that this is how Thomas speaks of primary and secondary precepts in the *Summa theologiae.* See R. A. Armstrong, *Primary and Secondary Precepts in Thomistic Natural Law Teaching* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966) for a discussion of how Thomas' use of these terms changes from his early to his later work.

111.2, q. 94, a. 2, c.; a. 4, c.; a. 6, c.

the moral precepts are based. The primary precepts simply point out these goods, .such a.s human life, to which we are inclined by nature. The secondary precepts, however, refer to these goods iin. greater detail, indicating more and more specifically the sort of :actions rthat will promote, 1and the sort that will injure, ·a prurlicular good. For the individual who fully understands the nature of these goods, hoth the primary and the •secondary precepts :are iSelf-evidenitlytrue.[12] But for those who cannot, do not, or simply refuse to reflect long enough Ito see the greater detruil of these goods, these secondary rules might very well appear false.

Wirth rbhis in mind, the role of :the wise men becomes pretty clear. They have the job of educating those who are less in-1sightful about the nature of human goods. And what is even more important, they can stem ·the development of evil haibits into community-wide evil customs, dispelling by ·their teaiehing the clouds tha;t egoism can crusrt over the citizens' practical reason. There is only one problem: Thomas writes that the aicquired virtue of wisdom is strictly a 1speculaitivev•irtue; !it is not concerned with moral action.[13] So what is one to make of the repeated references to the wise men? Irt is possible that Thomas is using the title " wise " in the broad sense of anyone who has the responsibility of ordering and governing others, after rthe mainner of Aristotle's good legislator. The idea of wisdom as ordering principle was an important one to Thomas.[14] Yet Arisrtortledoes not use wisdom *(sophia)* in this way, reserving for the legislator's virtue the name *phronesis.*[15] And even though one can find evidence for the view that Thomas himself was not ·so scrupulous, this answer still does not su:ffice![16]

12 1-2, q. 100, a. 1, c; q. 94, a. 2, c.

13 2-2, q. 45, a. 3, obj. and ad I.

14 See Lawrence Boadt, C.S.P., "St. Thomas .Aquinas and the Biblical Wisdom Tradition," *The Th-Omist* 49 (1985) 575-611, especially pp. 592-96, 603.

15 *Nicomachean Flthics* 6, 114la20, 114lb23.

L6 Boadt, in the article cited above, shows how Thomas parallels the biblical wisdom tradition in regarding wisdom in the highest sense as both

Thomas is rtoo insistent that prudence or practical wi:sdom, even mthe unconditioned ;sense of in-aotical wO.sdom, the human good mgeneral, is not ·about momll principles. What is more, in spealcing of :a divinely revealed morial 1aw, and thereby opening up the possibilirty of ia much larger role fm one who would teach morial principles that are not self-evident to all, it is very difficult for Thomas ito get away with characterizing this teacher 1as having the virtue of the legislator, whose chief business is applying the means of .good Laws to the end of a virtuous community. And it is precisely in conjunction. with the divine law that Thomas speaks mosrt orfiten of the wise men. Despite all this, 1a less than precise use of the term "wise" might in bet be what is at work here. But there is another possibility. It could be that Thomas is referring ito that form of wisdom that is both speculative and active, namely the wisdom that is a ,gift of the Holy Spirit.

speculative and active. Thus, one commonly finds in Thomas the idea that wisdom (and the wise man) orders all things. Yet Boadt goes on to argue that Thomas derived this notion in part from .Aristotle; and this is a point that must be qualified. If Thomas in fact believes that .Aristotle considered the activity of ordering to be proper to the wise man, it might be because his Latin translation will sometimes render *phronesis* as *sapientia* (e.g., 2-2, q. 47, a. 5, obj. I). More likely, however, is that Thomas was so imbued with the biblical tradition (both Old and New Testament) that he read into Aristotle a connection between wisdom and action that the Philosopher did not have. A prime example of this is the statement "It belongs to the wise man to order." It occurs, among other places, in the opening of his commentary on the *Metaphysios,* and Boadt writes that it is taken from the first book of .Aristotle's *PoUtios* (I. 5). Yet .Aristotle does not speak there of wise men at all, but of natural rulers and natural slaves. It is Thomas who in commenting on the passage shifts from Rpeaking o.f rulers *(prinoipantes)* to wise men (*sapientes),* and this because of a passage from the book of Proverbs: "the foolish man will serve the wise" *(In Pol.* I. 3. 68). Revealing, too, is a passage in 2-2, q. 45, a. 6, c. where Thomas cites Aristotle *(Metaphysics* I. 982al8-19) to the effect that the wise man establishes order. Actually, though, what .Aristotle says is that it is commonly held of the wise man that he gives rather than receives orders, and Thomas seems to be aware in his commentary that .Aristotle is regarding this as only an opinion *(In Met.* 1. 2. 41-42). Note that when it is a matter of establishing prudence as a distinct virtue, concerned with action, Thomas will quote Aristotle against the wisdom tradition, as in 2-2, q. 47, a. 2, obj. and ad 1.

Of this wisdom Thomas writes, " it considers them (divine types) in so for as *it* contemplates divine things in themselves, and it consults them in so far as it judges of human acts by divine things, and direots human acts according to dvine rules." [17] The understanding wisdom has of divine things is due, not to the effort of reason, but to a " connaturality " with them that is an effect of cha;rity; beoause charity, Thomas notes, "unites us with God-a1s it is said in 1 Cor. 6: 17, 'He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit.' " [18] Why would Thomas, who follows Aristotle so closely in his discussions of wisdom, breaks with the Philosopher in speaking of the highest wisdom as both contemplative and active? The answer appears at the very beginning of the *Summa contra gentiles.* Since the end of the entire univierse i,s truth, it is with truth that the wise man must primarily be concerned. And so, he continues,

> divine Wisdom testifies that, in order to make truth manifest, he assumed flesh and came into the world, saying 'For this I was born, and for this I came into the world, in order that I might give testimony to the truth' (Jn. 18:37) .[19]

Wisdom for Thomas *is* not merely some humanly acquired habit thait enables one to contempl,ate a divine and transcendent cause. The highest wisdom in this life comes of a personal union with >the divine Wisdom, who is also the divine Truth

17 Thomas is commenting on Augustine's statement that wisdom *"indendit 'rationibus supernis,' scilioet divinis, 'et conspiciendis et oonsulendis ;' oonspiciendis quidem, seoundum quod divina in seipsis oontemplatur; oonsulendis autem, seoundum quod per divina iudioat de humanis aotibiis per divinas regulas dirigens aotus humanos"* (2-2, q. 45, a. 3, c.). The Latin text of the *Summa theologiae* quoted here and following is the Ottawa edition, 1941-1945.

18 *Huiusmodi autem oompassio sive oon1iaturaUtas ad res divinas fit per oa1·itatem, quae quidem unit nos Deo, secundum illud 1 ad Oor. 6:17, 'Qui adhaeret Deo unus spiritus est'* (2-2, q. 45, a.2, c.).

19 *Et ideo ad veritatis manifestationem divina Sapientia oarne induta se venisse in mundum testatur, dioens, .Jn. 18:37, 'Ego in hoc natus sum, et ad hoc veni in mundum, ut testimonium perhibeam veritati'* (1. I. 4). *Summa contra gentiles,* 2 vols., ed. by Pera, Marc and Caramello (Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1961), vol. 2, p. 2.

(Jn. 14: 6). And this divine Wisdom., who deliberately made man, bound himself to m.an by taking hum.an flesh, in order that m.an might bind himself to him. The gift of wisdom must be active, because God is ootive, working to draw man into the divine life.

Since man is essentially ·an ragent, and a cooperative agent, moving as a member of a community toward union with God, it makes sense for Thomas to speak of the wise man as an orderer. Since man moves toward his end by fostering the goods of his nature, and since his end consists in the union of his own nature with thart of God, one can see where there would be need for a teacher of secondary or derivative moral principles concerning these goods, just because the deepest significance of these goods :is that they image the unseen God (though Thoonas is none too explicit rubout 1this particular need) . And who better to :fi]l this role of teacher than the man gifted with wisdom, who by virtue of his connaturality with divine things ·oon best unde11standthe goods of our nature, and the sort of actions that promote or injure them.

But now another difficulty 1arisers. The gift of wisdom belongs in some degree to ·aill who have .grace, and it may be received in ·a special degree by any individual, since it is one of the " gratuitous grares which ,the Holy Spriit dispenses as he wills." [2Q] As such, rthe wise men would consist of those individuals who are reoognzied in the community for their holy perspioocity. But rus Thomas 1Speak!s of :the wise men, they occupy 1a form.al, public position, rand have their authority by their office. Thus, in one of the plaices where he most clearly describes the function of the wise men, Thomas refers to the role Moses and Aaron had in Israel, .acting as teachel'!S by virtue of their divine commission to give God's law to the peopfo.21

[2·0] *Quidam autem altiori gradu perficitunt sapientiae donum. • • • Jjjt iste gradus sapientiae non est communis omnibus habentitbus gratiam gratum facientem, sed magi& pertinet ad gratias gratis datas, quas Spiritus Sanctus 'distribuit prout vult,' secundum illud 1 ad Oor. JS:B, 'Alii datur per Spiritum sermo sapientiae,'* etc. (2-2, q. 45, a. 5, c).

211-2, q. 100, a. 11, c.

The need for divinely revealed law-the Law of Moses and the Law of grace-stems from man's vocation. It teaches of God's nature and guides human .action. It is, in fact, the neces·sary precondition for the possibility of the gift of wisdom. Wisdom in the perfected sense is an effect of the outpouring of the Spirit that constitutes the New Law. It presupposes faith in Christ, and acceptance of whatever precepts are associated with the reception and right use of. grace.[22] Wisdom as it existed in Israel presupposed membership in the holy people formed by God. It seems, then, that whether one is speaking of wisdom in Israel or in the Church, a distinction must he made between the quality as it is possessed as a personal gift, and ais it is held in virtue of one's office of proclaiming the law that is the fundamental bond between the community and God.

If it is co-rrect to say that the wise men spoken of in connection with the Old Law were the successors to Moses and AaJron, namely, the Levitioal priests, the elders, and to some extent the prophets, then their counterparts under the New Law would be those who succeed to Christ, the High Priest in whom all these roles have their fulfillment. These, of course, are the bishops. Thomas considers the bishops to be the premier teachers of faith and morals in the Church. Teaching is their special duty, he writes in his commentary on Ephesians.[28] It is, in fact, their most important duty, he states in the *Summa theologiae;*[24] mosrt impo·rtant because knowledge

22 1-2, q. 108, a. 2, c.

2a Writing on Ephesians 4:11 (which in Thomas' text reads, ".And indeed he gave some to be apostles, and some to be prophets, other evangelists, and others pastors and teachers, . • ."), Thomas interprets "pastors and teachers" as referring to the successors of the apostles, who in having the responsibility of watching over the Lord's flock also have the responsibility of teaching it. He states: *"Quantum vero ad curam Eoolesia,e subdit: 'A.lios autem pa,stores,' oumm soilioet dominioi gregis habentes: et sub eodem addit, 'lilt dcotores,' ad ostendendum quod proprium oflioium pastoris Jiloolesiae, est dooere ea, qua,e pertinent a,d fidem et bonos mores"* (In. *Flph.* 4, 4) St. Thomas Aquinas, *Opera Omnia,,* 24 vols. (Parma: Ficcadori, 1852-1873; reprint ed., New York: Musurgia Publishers, 1948-1950), vol. 13, p. 479.

24 *Dicendum quod utrumque offi,cium, sciUcet docendi et baptiza,ndi, Dominus*

of the truth and the practical expression of it in right conduct are the beginning of one's par:ticipation in the life of God, which is perfected through the sacmments. This duty belongs to .the bishops by vil1tue of their aipostolic succession, :in which they share the apostles' representiation of Christ, for Christ initiated the full offer of gmce by his teaching and in his sacrifice.[25] Thus, Thoma,s says of Christ:

> First, he taught the truth by inviting and by calling to faith; and in this he completed the will of the Father .... Second, he brought the truth itself to completion by opening up in us through his passion the door to life, and by giving the power to persevere to the perfected truth. [26]

That the bishop succeeds to Chrsit's role as teacher and 1sanctifieris also shown when Thomas writes of Pentecost:

> The Holy Spirit descended upon the apostles, first in the form of a wind, in order to indicate the propagation of grace which is accomplished in the sacraments, of which the apostles were the ministers, and for this reason, Christ has said: Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them .... A second time, the Spirit was communicated to them in tongues of fire, in order to signify the propagation of grace which is accomplished through teaching, and for this reason, in chapter two of the Book of Acts, we read that, having been filled with the Holy Spirit, they began to speak.[21]

Especially in his commentaries on the letters of St. Paul, Thomas emphasizes that Christ, the Son through whom we have received the Spirit, is the source of all grace. And as the

Apostolis iniunmit, quorum vioem gerunt episcopi, aliter tamen et aliter. Nam offeoium dooendi oommisit eia Ghristus, ut ipsi per se illud emoeroerent, tanquam principalissimum; unde et ipsi Apostoli dixerunt, Acts 6:2, 'Non est aequum nos relinquere verbum Dei et ministrare men.sis' (3, q. 67, a. 2, ad 1).

25 l-2, q. 99, a. 2, c.; *Summa contra gentiles* 4. 74. 2; 76. 1.

26 *Primo doouit veritatem, invitando, et vocando ad fidem: et in hoc complevit voluntatem Patris. . . . Secundo consummavit ipsam veritatem, aperiendo per passionem suam in nobis januam vitae, dando potestatem perveniendi ad oonsummatam veritatem .-. (In Jo.,* 641). Latin text quoted by M. J. Le Guillou, *Ghrist and Ohuroh,* trans. Charles E. Schaldenbrand (New York: Desclee Company, 1966), p. 283, n. 59.

2r *In Jo.,* 2739. Quoted by Le Guillou, *ibid.,* p. 287.

head, he gives of his fullness to his entire body. If, then, the bishops have a special authority to teach, it is because in representing the hea;d :they make present the guidance that the Spirit offers ito ·all the Church.[28] In preaching the word and celebrating the sacraments, which together constitute their teaching, the bishops express the faith that cannot fail.

We conclude that Thomas' !reference to wise men in the moral life is ultimately :a reference to individua;1swho possess the gift of wisdom conferred by the Holy Spirit, indeed a special £orm of this gift, one that under the Old Law proceeded from one's role in conducting the divine worship, and under .the New Law proceeds .fl'lom o:ne',s full sacramental conformity .00 Christ, the one, true :sacrifice of which the Levitical offerings were but ·a type. This rorm. of wisdom is foundational, originative, but not entirely pel'lsonal. One can .and must distinguish betwieen those who are specially blessed with this gift iand those who :fill the role that malres this gift possible, recognizing that the two groups will seldom overlap.

Such a distinction would be absurd if applied to wisdom in any other sense. The one considered best able to pass on wisdom would be the one who had ·acquired the most. But the giift of wisdom is nort :a;cquired. It comes to the Chureh as one body joined to Christ, and Christ remains with his Church through those consecrated as his successors. As individuals they may not be the most wise. But they are the most certainly wise, because so long as they intend to carry out the apostolic ministry, ·they represent infallibly the wisdom of Christ. And they are :the most importantly wise, because by

[28] *Si vero consideretur divina providentia, quae .Ecclesiam suam Spiritu sanoto dirigit ut non erret, sicut ipse promisit (Jn. 10:26) quod Spiritus ad'Veniens doceret omnem veritatem, de neoessariis scilicet ad salutem; certum est quod iudicium .Ecolesiae universalis errare in his quae ad fidem pertinent, impossible est* (*Quodl.* 9, q. 8, a. 1). *Quaestiones Quodlibetales*, 9th ed., edited by Raymnod Spiazzi, O.P. (Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1956), p. 194. See also *Quodl.* 3, q. 4, a. 2; *S.T.* I, q. I, a. 8, ad 2; 2-2, q. 5, a. 3, c; q. IO, a. 12, c.

their entry into Chrsit's ministry they continue Christ's offer of participation in his life. And to enter his life, Thomas states, is to enter that of Wiisdom begotten. [29]

The vibrancy of the Church's life depends upon those who have been specially gifted by the Spirit. Yet at the center of this life will be the bishops. Which is not to say that the bishop is without any personal wisdom. Since wisdom is pal't of all sacramental grace, there can never be a complete break between peirisonal wisdom and that of his office while a bishop remains fully a part of the Church. Still, Thomas was careful to encoura-geamong bishops the nurturing of infused wisdom through a life of prayer, as well as acquired wisdom through the discipline of study. [30]

The light of wisdom comes through prayer, and irt comes through study, but both prayer and study must center on that which summarizes the truth of revel.ation: the Incarnation, recorded in Scripture and handed on in the Church's tradition. The understanding of the faith and of human morals in light of faith is a corporate activity that draws upon the contributions of saints and scholars. But it is the bishops, in union with the pope, who establish the context for this quest. [31] And as the search for understanding broadens in the realm of morality to include all men of goodwill, it is still the epis-

[20] 2-2, q. 45, a. 6, c.

so In his commentary on Titus, Thomas writes that the bishops must adhere to the *"sermo fi-deli.s," "ut custodiant contra haereticos, et ideo dicit; 'et eos qui contradicunt arguere,' id est c01Wincere, et hoc per studium sacrae Scriptu.re." In epistoiam ad Titum* 1. 3, Barma ed., vol. 13, p. 648. In the next line Thomas notes that such refutation pertailli! *"ad opus sapientis,"* though he clearly means "wise" in the sense of learned. Le Guillou, referring to a passage from *In 1 Oor.*, 222, writes that it is the duty of a prelate to assist his people "in developing their Christian life under the influence of the Spirit, through a living communion in the Eucharist, and through a life of service to their brothers. For this reason, the prelate must live a life of contemplation, and must grow in the knowledge of the Wisdom of God, in order that he might be an authentic mediator after the heart of God (Jer. 3: 15) ..." *(op. cit.,* p. 289).

n Summa ocmtra·gentiles, 4. 76; *In Symbolum Apostolorum scilicet "Credo in Deum" eropositio,* a. 9; *Ocmtra errores Graeoorum,* pars altera, cc. 32-33. ·

copacy that, in its teaching of the divine law which contains the natural Law,[32] provides the definiiitiveguidance.

Although it is possible to cite specific examples in Thomas of moral principles, secondary precepts, :that can be clearly arrived at only in the light of revelation (one would be the indissolubility of marriruge), nothing like that is involved in the American bishops' prustora1. The principles underlying their letter-the responsibility of a community for its poor, for example-do not strike the typical American reader as surprising, though perhaps uncongenial. Aristotle says very much the same thing, with regard to citizens anyway, in the passage from the *Politics* we noted before. What the bishops are responsible for doing, and what in fact they do, is initiate and guide debate on central economic issues among those who have the prudence necess,ary to correctly apply the letter's principles to the American situation.

However there is something more to the bishops' role. Thomas was simply commenting on Aristotle when he wrote, "... man is naturally part of some group through which he receives help in living well." [83] But it was his Christianity which added in the *De Regno:*

men form a group for the purpose of living well together . . . and a good life is one lived according to virtue. . .. Yet by living according to virtue man is ordained to a higher end, namely, the end of delight in God.... Consequently, since society must have the same end as the individual man, it is not the ultimate end of an assembled multitude to live according to virtue, but through a virtuous life to attain to the enjoyment of God.H

s2 Thomas writes that all those things which belong to the natural law are fully handed down *("plenarie traduntur")* in the Law and the Gospel 1-2, q. 94, a. 4, ad 1.

sa *In Ethic.,* I. I. Quoted by Robert J. Giguere, *The Social Value of Public Worship According to Thomistic Principles,* The Catholic University of American Philosophical Studies, vol. llO (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1950), p. 50, n. 12.

84 *Ad hoc enim homines congregantur, ut simul 'bene vivant ... 'bona autem 'Vita est secundum virtutem . ••• Sed quia homo vivendo secundum virtutem ad ulteriorem finem ordinatur, qui consistit in fruitione divina, supra iam*

More recently Rans Urs von Haltha;sar made the same point when he wrote, " Human beings were created not rto he satisfied with themselves but that, deaid to self, they might, in Christ's possesism, possess all things mhim." [35]

What the hi.shops add ,to the principles gained by reason in their preaching of our creation in Christ ,and for Christ is an ,awareness of rthe depth of the community we are all called to form; it is, in £act, to add everything, and it is why their vocation extends to the civil realm. For even if the concern of the State is i00 provide for rthe material well-being of its people, this can never be done unless they realire how deeply they are tied to one ,another. What the bishops ,add by their sacramental role is the ,actual strength to bring about that communion that reason and faith perceive. In his *Commentary on Colossians,* Thomas indulged in a long but helpful metaphor. He remarked:

> Upon Christ depends the entire good of the body, that is, of the Church. For there are two goods in the body: the cohesion of its members, and its growth. And these things the Church receives from Christ .... In the body, there is a twofold cohesion of the members; in the first place, that which arises from contact, as the hand is joined to the shoulder, the shoulder to the chest, and so on. A second conjunction is that of the nerves, and for this reason, Paul says: 'the joints and ligaments.' And so it is that the Church draws its cohesion from faith and knowledge: 'one Spirit, one faith, one baptism' (Eph. 4:5). But this is not sufficient unless there is also the cohesion of charity and of the sacraments, and for this reason, he adds: organized by the nerves, because through charity each provides for the wants of others. [86]

dia:imus, oportet eumdem finem esse multitudinis humanae, qui est hominis unius. Non est ergo ultimus finis multitudinis congregatae vivere secundum virtutem, sed per virtuosam vitam pervenire ad fruitionem divinam (De *Regno* 2. 3). The Latin text is taken from *Aquinas, Selected Political Writings,* ed. A. P. D'Entreves, ed., trans. J. G. Dawson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1948), p. 74. It is actually the text of *De regimine principum* 1. 14.

[85] *Das Weizenkorn,* p. 25. Quoted in *The Von Balthasar Reader,* ed. Medard Kehl and Werner Loeser, trans. Robert J. Daly and Fred Lawrence (New York: Crossroad, 1982), p. 57.

[86] *[n Ool.,* 129. Quoted by Le Guillou, *op. cit.,* p. 279.

What Thomas 1says:here of the Church is equa,lly true of the State; which [s why it.he papaJCy since Leo XIII has taught repeaitedly that in the drive for social justice, justice itself is nort enough; thait chaciity drawn rrom Christ will. alone ,succeed.[81]

[81] Thus, Pius XI in *Qua&regesimo Anno* (n. 137) stated: "For justice alone, even though most faithfully observed, can remove indeed the cause of social strife, but can never bring about a union of hearts and minds. • . . Then only will it be possible to unite all in harmonious striving for the common good, when all sections of society have the intimate conviction that they are members of a single family and children of the same Heavenly Father, and further, that they are 'one body in Christ, and everyone members one of another' (Rom. 12: 5), so that 'if one member suffer anything, all members suffer with it' (1 Cor. 12:26)." Cf. John XXIII, *Pacem in Terris*, nn. 37-8.

CATHOLICISM, PUBLIC THEOLOGY, AND POSTMODERNITY: ON RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS'S " CATHOLIC MOMENT"

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HAT CATHOLICS should assume .their rightful place m the task of forming a culture, and indeed shaping a public philosophy in and for a pluralistic, dernocrwtic society, is ia suggestion which has not often been heard in the history of American culture, and certainly not from. non-Catholics. It is a suggestion thrut Richard John Neuhaus, a Lutheran pastor, nonetheless makes with eloquence and wit in *The Catholic Moment.*[1] The book makes for enjoyable and even exciting reading. It is difficult for a Catholic, even of a non-itriumphalistic sort, nort rto be moved by his suggestion: not to be stimulated into rserious upon the meaning of Catholic identity, particularly now in the pT"esent cultural situation in America and indeed the West, which seems-note the subtitle of Neuhaus's book-aptly described in terms of a modernity giving way to posrtmodernity, a modernitysearching for genuinely postmodern patterns of thought. Neuhaus is insistent-and the insistence is refresb.ing-,that this reflection be carried through with integri,ty (cf., e.g., p. 150): the Catholicism. for which our-a postmodern-culture [.g ripe is and must be ·a Caitholicisrn which *is* fiaithful to the Gospel and to tits own tradition. This double intention of Neuhaus to speak on behalf of a Catholicism which is in and for a postmodern world sets .the context for .the questions I wish to pose in the present inquiry.

The meaning of Neuhaus' s Catholic moment is twofold:

1 *The Catholic Moment: The Parado11J of the Church in the Postmodern World,* by Richard John Neuhaus (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987). All references in the text are to this book.

[It] is the moment in which the Roman Catholic Church in the world can and should be the lead church in proclaiming and exemplifying the Gospel. This can and should also be the moment in which the Roman Catholic Church in the United States assumes its rightful role in the culture-forming task of constructing a religiously informed public philosophy for the American experiment in ordered liberty (p. 282).

In .the light of this and indeed of the overarching context md[ca;ted by the suhbitle of his book, I wish to direct attention in whait follows to three issues: what Neuhaus takes to be an authentic Catholic Christianity ·and Catholic Christian rtheology (tha;t is, a Christianity which iis f.aithful in" proc1aiming and exemplifyiingthe Gospel") ; what he takes to be the proper sense (the sense required by Ca.tholic Christianity) of the itask of forming ·a culture and " constructing a religiously informed public philosophy" in and for a plumlistic, democrrutic society such as that of America; and finally what he takes to be the ·appropriate sense of this fask in a world which he distinguishes as postmodern. Now Neuhaus develops his response to these issues in terms of wha;t he calls a paradoxical relation between the Church and the world. My purpose in what follows, therefore, will be to e:x;amine the meaning he accords " Catholic, " public," ·and "postmodern," m terms of this central notion of " paradox."

I.

In his discussion of the relation betwen rthe Church and the world, Neuhaus provides a sketch of the five types proposed by H. Richard Niebuhr (pp. 16ff.). These are: the Church against the world, the Church of the world, the Church above the world, the Church and the world in paradox, and the Church as the transformer of the wor1cl. The first, "the Church against the world," iis what is often identified as a sectarian model, evident for ex;ample in monasticism and in such communities ·as the Hutterites and Mennonites. The second type, " The Church of the world," can be exemplified in nmeitrenth century l.iberial theology 00:d its promotion of a

" cultural Protesitantism," wherein " rel[gion W18iS to be placed at the service of the besrt in the evolution of society" (p. 19). The model which views: the- Chur'Ch ia;S a transformer of the world "smacks of triumphalism" (p. 20), formerly of the Right, now in the post-V,aJtioanII era more commonly of the Left: the goal of the Church, perhaps even its exhaustive purpose, "is the estab1ishment of a Just Social Order" (p. 20). The fourth type, that of " the Church above the world," is exemplified in a theologian Hke Thomas Aquinas, who " aimed at ' synthesizing ' Christ and culture, Church and world, faith and reason, grace 1and nature" (p. 21) .

Neuhaus's reasons for rejecting-even as he sees import.ant values in-the first three types can be put simply. While it is the case that Christians must always in some sli_gnificantsense be agai111Stthe world, they must also and at once be " for " the world: the relationship is always one of *sic et non.* Again, while the " Churich of the world" model legitimately emphasizes " the cosmic dimension of redemption " (p. 19), the problem is that model all too easily removes any dissonance between the Chmch and the world, and slides off into " talk about ' the secular city ' in which ' man come of age ' would <lireotreligion to do its duty by going out of business " (p. 19). And the model of the Chmch '8JS transformer of the world or culture seems finally not to be thait different from the " Church of the world " model. Furthermore, the triansfonnational model (discussed rut length by Neuhaus in ,terms of the project of theology) seems "·to iassure that there is a known direotion in which culture, or the world, should be moving" (p. 21) .

Neuhaus is more qualified in his aissessmentof the " Church above culture " model, even as he is ,briefest in the ch&'acleriiJation of its meaning. This is because he thinks that what he suggests is a Thomi1Stic-model, at leaist!in its stereotype, is often perceived to be antithetical to the paradoxical model of Church-world relation which he wishes to defend. Neuhaus .thinksthat in point of fact this is not the case: that,

on the contrary, the two models may be comprumble. (Indeed, although Neuhaus never returns to the issue in the thematic way which seems required by his argument, the entire weight of that argument as subsequently developed implies that there are no significantly pertinent differences between the [Thomistic] "Church above culture" model and Neuhaus's paradoxical model. This is a point to which I will have occasion to ·return.)

Now it should be made clear that Neuhaus recognizes that these types are " ideal," which ·is to say that they ·are often intermixed in the concrete historical order. It is nonetheless legitimate to say that a given church or tradition is, on balance, " more like this type than like another type " (p. 17). Having offered the four above types, then, Neuhaus turns to a description of the model he favors: the paradoxical-what Niebuhr calls .the dualistic-model of Church-wo:rld relation. Since the term " paradox " is in fact the linchpin term in the argument of the book, we need to be clear about its meaning.

In the section where Neuhaus firist indicates the role that the term " paradox " is to play in his argument, he begins. wli.th ·an appeal to Thomas Aquinrus and the work of John Courtney Murray on behalf of a " ' public theology ' that takes the world up on its task to he, above 1all else, reasonable " (p. 7) • Against the romanticisms of the Right, which are on behalf of a church *aga,inst* the world, and the romanticisms of the Left, which are on behalf o[•a church *of* the world, Neuhaus proposes his alternative: " we will examine a Catholicism of reason that is *for* the world" (p. 8). But of course "a measure of ' againstness' and ' ofness,' so to speak, is necessary in being effectively *for* the world " (rp. 8). And thus emerges a kind of riddle that gives way not to neat resolution but to pariadox. Now "pal'ladox" in its conventional meaning refers to " statements that violrute received opinion, or an apparent contl'laidiction that contains :an important " (ip. 8). In saying that the Church's manner of being in the world is paradoxical, Neuhaus intends these meanings, but he also intends something else.

I mean that paradox is closely related to promise. The existence of the Church, and indeed of the world, is premised upon a promise, and that promise has not yet been fulfilled in historical fact. The Church is a community ahead of tmie. It is saying these things about itself and about the world that are paradoxical because it is speaking in present time from a point beyond present time (p. Sf.).

The key to what Neuhaus means by paradox, then, lies in the Church's esohatological h0irizon. The Church is a community premised upon a pl'Omise, and s;pe,aks to and a,bout the world " in present time from a point beyond present time." Now of course the Church must be understood eschatologically: from a point beyond the wOTld and its history. But what Neuhaus's intention nonetheless commits him to-his intention, that is, to defend " a Catholioism of reaison rthat is *for* the world "-is some sense of a Church which is also *in* the world: which speaks also *from within* the world. But it is just this sense of a Church speaking truly *from within* the wodd that Neuhaus's appeal to eschatology does not yet suffice to give us.

The difficulty to which I wish to direct attention here can be seen by following Neuhaus further in his development of the meaning of pwadox. Thus he ·saysthat, in the pa,l'ladoxica.l model of Christian existence, " the Chris:tian lives, ias it were, in different worlds, different realities. Nature, reason, law, culture-all these mean one thing in relation to one reality, and qmte .a.northerin relation to another " (p. 22). Such a statement seems to express a dualism which on the :liace of it would 1ruppear to run directly counter to Neuhaus's intention. In a book whose pmipose is to show us a Catholicism which is both reasonable and *for* the world, iand which is thus able to give us a theoJogy which can speak in and for the public order, his paradox emphasizes the *dif]eterwe* between the worlds in whfoh the Christian lives. Now to be sure any authentic Christianity would seem to have to defend such a difference. But the point nonetheless is that an aippeaJ. to difference aloo.e leaves us with a dualism of worlds-of g11ace and nature and of faith and is inadequate: that ri\s, for a Chrcis-

tiooity which would (also) be for the world. Apparently recognizing such a difficulty, Neuhaus is quick to point out 1that, ·although paradox is inescapa;ble for the Christian, that paradox should not be underistood simply in terms of a conflict between the worlds in which he or she lives:

> The paradox that is inescapable is not the product of conflicts between nature and grace or between revelation and reason. Paradox is not irrational. Paradox, rather, is the product of careful and relentless reason; we arrive at the paradoxical situation when we discover that the things that we think we know do not :fit together. Truths that, as rational beings, we are convinced are true do not jibe. Between them are tensions and apparent contradictions. We cannot in intellectual conscience, we cannot in good faith, trim the truths in order to produce a cognitive consonance that denies the dissonance between pieces of what we think we know.
>
> Put differently, escapable paradox is the product of faulty reasoning. Inescapable paradox is the result of the incompleteness of the world in which we reason. That is why it is said that paradox is directed toward promise. It is one of the greatest obligations of the Church to remind the world that it is incomplete, that reality is still awaiting something (p. fl3).

On the one hand, then, Neuhaus is clear in his intention that paradox not be understood in terms of a simple conflict of worlds, of a simple dualism of gr.ace and nature, faith and reason: in terms of an understanding of grace and naJture as simply outside of each othea-, extrinsic to each other. On the other hand-and this iis the critical claim I wish to introduce-if we press Neuhaus's statements for some *a.ccount* of how such a dualism is to be ·avoided, we find language which stresses only that grace (the Church) is outside of or beyond nature (the world) : "The Churrch is a community ahead of time"; it speaks" in presenit time from a poiint beyond present :time"; " pariadox is directed. .towarid promise " and "is the result of the incompleteness of the world iin which we ;reason"; and so on. My claim is not that these statements do not say something essentially true of the Church and the supernatural order. The claim :raither iis that the statements ·sufficeto give

us *only* a sense in which grace (the Church) is *beyond* nature (the world), is thus just so far *outside of* and *not in* nature. To be sure, Neuhaus wa:ubs to insist that grace is *in* nature, hut precisely *paradoxically* 1so. But that is just the problem: his ,account of pwadox proceeds simply by way of pointing us to the eschruton,which is to say, by way of pointing us precisely *beyond* nature (this world).

The difficulty to which I ,am drawing attention here can be shwrpened further in relation to the following statement:

> The classical Christian view is that the order of creation has its own God-given worth quite apart from the order of redemption. Or, as Thomas Aquinas would say, while grace fulfills and transforms nature, it does not deny to nature its integrity apart from grace (p. 57).

I take Neuhaus to mean what he says here: namely, that the created ,and/or natuml order ms its integrity and worth *apart from* the redemptive and/or gr.aced order. Neuhaus, in other words, conceives the relation between the two orders as extrinsic: the .two orders are understood (however tacitly) as first constituted and complete outsti.deof each other, such that they then relate .to each other after the manner of what comes simply from without. But what comes simply from without is and can only be related by way of (simple) *addition,* or by way of (dialectical) *opposition* and *reversal.* My suggestion is that it iis just these features of addition and opposition which are primary in Neuhaus's understanding of the grace-nature relation-however much they are left unthema.tized in his argument. Indeed, it is these features alone which make sense of, ,and justify, Neuhaus's notion of paradox. But the question, of coul'!se, is how this view of the grace-nature relation might be seen to differ from that of the Oaitholictradition.

That difference I take to 1ie in a nuance which at first glance may seem to be trivial but is in fact of crucial importance: namely, that on ·an ·authentically Catholic understanding, the *distinotion* between the order of redemption and the order of creation, between girace and nature, is *never* a *separation.*

There *is-de facto,* not *de jure--one* in<liv1isiblecosmic order wherein grace and nature are really even as narture is ordered *f1mn the beginning,* and hence oriented radically *from within,* to God as revealed in Jesus Christ through his Chureh in the Holy Spirit. Indeed, I take this to be the very point of the Tetrieval undertaken in this century by Catholic theologians such 1as Henri de Luibac, Hans Urs v10n Balrthasar and others: to overcome the eXJtrinsicismchamcteristic of much of *modern* (e.g., post-Tridentine) Catholic theology, and to do so in terms of a recove1ry of the more orgianic perspective of the prutristic (or indeed pre-modern) period. Their insistence has been Hmt this organic pe11speotive,1wherein the order of creattion 1and the o.l'der of redemption, and nature and grace, are seen in *a unity which is simultaneous with their distinctness,* is in fact the deepest and truest interpretation of classical Christianity and of Thomism. [2]

To he sure there is much tha,t needs to be 1arguedhere. What I nonetheless wish to insist upon in the present essay-it is the fundamental presupposition of my c11irticism of Neuhaus'-is that this orgianic perspeotivce is nort simply a ma.tter of one "school" of Caitholic theology over another. On the cont.Dary, it is-I .take it to be-rather an integral parl of the received tlJ.'aiditionof Oaithnlic Chris.tianity. [3]

[2] Cf. *inter alia:* Henri de Lubac, *The Mystery of the ffopernatural* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967); *idem, Augustinianism and Modern Theology* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969); *idem, A Brief Oaechesis on Nature and Gt·aae* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1984); Hans Urs von Balthasar, "The Concept of Nature in Catholic Theology," in *The Theology of Karl Barth* (New York: Doubleday/ Anchor Books), pp. 202-227; *idem,* "The Achievement of Henri de Lubac," *Thought,* vol. 51 (March, 1976), esp. pp. 24-29.

a Cf. *inter aUa* the references in my "Catholicity and the State of Contemporary Thoology," in *Oommunio,* vol. 14 (Winter, 1987), 432, n. 7; the discussion by de Lubac of various contemporary Catholic theologians in *A Brief Oateohesis,* pp. 33-53; and the statements by Pope John Paul II referred to inn. 26 below.

It is of course the Christocentric character of the created world and of man which sets the context in which the problem of grace must be considered.

It bears emphaisis: affirmation of 1a unified cosmic order does nort entail a denial of the distinctness between gI'ace and nature; irt simply entails 1a di.fferent w.ay of conceiving such ms-tinctness. Which is to say further that this affirmation does not entail a denial of the utterly l'ladical transcendence of the order of grace ;to naiture-again, even '8.iS. it forces a different way of undeES!t.andingthat :trian:scendence. Indeed, this is juSlt the problem with Neuhaus's argument. In his (rightful) concern ;to defend the :transcendence of ·the order of grace (and hence the distinction between grace ·and nature), he seems to essume :that there is only one way finally to conceive such rtr:anscendence (and distinction); .and that way is the way of a kind of Reformation or indeed dialectical or " crisis theology" (cf. especially m this connection his :references to Krurl Booth •and Emil Brunner and, to a lesser e:xtent, Reinhold Nwbuhr [p. 189]; or again, to· Kierkegiaiard ·and Bo:nhoeffer [p. **106]).**

In this connection, see St. John 1:1-2, 12-32; 17:21-23; and St. Pa.ul: I Cor. 8:6; Eph.1:9-10, 21-23; Col.1:15-20; 3:4.

Finally, see the summary statement in the *Encyclopedia of Theology: The Concise Sacramentum Mundi,* edited by Karl Rahner (New York: Seabury Press, 1975) :

> The nature of man cannot be given a definitive end and goal except in the vision of God. But it is not itself ordained towards that vision. It is only grace which begins the divinization of man and ordains him effectively to immediate union with God. Thus all dualism between nature and grace is eliminated. Man does not exist except as intrinsically ordained by grace to the vision of God as his end, which is the only absolutely final end of that very nature. There are not and cannot be in man two definitive finalties merely juxtaposed to one another. The notion of the nature of man as capable of attaining its definitive fulfilment by its proper dynamism is radically excluded. On the other hand, the transcendence of grace remains intact. The created spirituality of man does not necessarily imply ordination to the vision of God, since of itself it cannot give itself an absolute end (p. 1035, col. 2).

If I may put the matter in summary form, what the Catholic tradition (despite the differences among its "schools of theology": cf. the work of Hans Urs von Balthasar on the one hand and of Karl Rahner on the other) sees it as necessary to avoid is at once (a) a collapse of nature into grace, which would result in pantheism; and (b) a dualism of grace and nature, which would result in a secularization of nature-secularization in its most profound sense.

Irt is just this assumption that seems to me to warmDJt challenge-precisely in the DJame of Catholic Christiianity. On this latter understanding of Chmstianity, the ol'der of grace is never col1apsedinto the order of naiture, even as the Te1ationbeitween these ol'ders is (de faoto) diirect (grace establishes from the beginning an *ontologioal* orienta.tion in nature), that is, rather than extrinsic or dialectical Oil' inverse in the way indicated in " crisis theology " and in Neuhaus's undersrbanding of pamdox.[4] By diroot here I do not mean intrinsic in the 1sense involved .lD a *de jure* re1rution, which would imply that God wrus not absolutely free in his decision to share his nruture with *all* of creation in and through Jesus Christ and his Church. I mean l'lrutherthat, having decided freely so to share his nature, that nature *truly penetrates,* becomes *immanent within* or *interior to,* creation, truly ol'del'S creation *from within.*

Again, these claims require much more development and argument than can be given here. **It** will have to suffice simply to oa11 attention to .their significance re1ative to Neuhaus's pariadoxical model of the Church-world relation. That significance can be seen by returning to the statement quoted above, wherein Neuhaus (rightly) says that Aquinas's view is that "grace fulfills and transforms nature" (p. 57). What we should now be able to see, however, in the light of the sug-

[4] **It** should be pointed out that the term "paradox" has a long history in Catholicism, and thus should not be associafod only with "crisis theology." **It** is in fact a prominent term in the works of de Lubac. What a study of the term in Catholic works-for example in the work of de Lubac-would reveal is nonetheless a rather different sense of paradox from that of "crisis theology." In the Catholic tradition represented by de Lubac, paradox is founded first on a direct rather than "additive" and/or inverse relation between the distinct terms of relation. Thus, for example, the transcendence and immanence of God are directly and not inversely related: God is not the more transcendent of nature the less he is immanent in nature; God is not transcendent of nature by way of dialectical opposition to nature. On the contrary, God's unspeakably great transcendence *of* nature is *exactly coincident* with God's utterly profound immanence *in* nature. (As the saints constantly remind us, God is more interior to me than I to myself.)

gestion I have introduced, is the ambiguity carried in the term " fulfills." This term can mean a completion which is by way of simple addition: that is, after the manner of what comes simply from without and which remains external; or which is-more " paradoxically "-by way of (dialectical) reversal, which itself presupposes the externality (and thus closure) which makes possible the opposition signified by reversal. But this (external) meaning-either of simple addition or of opposition-is ruled out when and insofar as one truly recognizes the link between "fulfill" and "transform": what this latter term requires is that what is distinct truly penetrate the other (that into which it enters into rel'ation) by ordering that other *from within.* This ordering from within does not do violence to, but, on the contrary, exactly brings nruture to its perfection *(perfacio:* brings all the way through) . In a word, grace does not reverse or destroy or merely add to nature: on the contrary grace precisely trians-forms nature--again, even as it always and essentially transcends naiture.[5]

In this connection, then, my suggestion is simply this: that Neuhaus's paradoxical model of the Church-world relrution entails exactly the understanding of grace as either extrinsic to or reverser of nature--or indeed of .grace as *both* extrinsic to *and* reverser of (dialectically opposed to) nature-which is ruled out by the understanding of grace as properly transformative of nruture. Or rather: did Neuhaus not so understand the grace-nature relation (however unconsciously) in this extrinsicist and/or dialectical manner, he would have to be open in principle to the Church of the world and Church as transformer of the world models. And he would have to be open to the Church *above* the world model, now interpreted 'as requiring transformation and thus-in this sense--rus more

5 That is, the supernatural truly assimilates and transforms na.ture, even as the supernatural does not merely prolong the momentum of nature: the infinite does not merely prolong the finite. On this, cf. de Lubac, *A Brief Oateohesis,* pp. 48 fl:'. and 81 fl:'. The centrality of the term "transformation" in the Catholic understanding of the relation of the superna.tural to na.ture is discussed at length by de Lubac on pp. 81-99.

like the cosmic and transfocmational models rthan like his paradoxical model.

In sum, then: on the more understanding of the grace-nature relation suggesrted here, Catholic Christianity has an intrinsically cosmic dimension. Grace establishes an ontological odentation in the cosmos: orders every entity from within to God in Christ. 1t follows that Catholic Christianity haJS an intrinsic mission truly to enter into, to penetmte, all of human being and activity and hence all of cul-.ture: to help carry through this ordering of all of being to God in Christ. The Catholic Churrch, as a matter of its own inner essence, must in this way be *of* the world and a transformer of the world, that is, even (precisely) *as* it is-and must remain-above (transcendent of) the world.

Two additional comments will illuminaite fur.ther the direction of my criticism of Neuhaus here. First, in his description of the models of the Church of the world and transformer of the world, Neuhaus acknowledges something to ·be true of each model: to w.it, the cosmic dimension of Chri.stianity, and the need for Christianity :to form 1a cu1ture. But note how he nonetheless argues with respect to the models: *bevause* a Christianity which takes its cosmic dimension seriously *van* s1ide off into *Kulturprotestantismus* or some version of the "secular city" (and hrus ofrten done so), and *bevause* a tm.nsfo!raillationalChriSltianility*can* become (and has often done so) 1a triumphalism (formerly of the Right, now more commonly of the Left) which identifies the Ohuroh too closely with a culture or specific cultu11aJprojects .and institutions, we should *therefore* set the "of-1the-world" and tl'lansformational models of Chl'listianity aside, in favor of a. pamdoxical model. This •sort of argument is .at once question-begging and indeed a kind of (political-culturrial) " oorusequentialism." The fact that a cosmic Christianity can be-and often has been-interpreted to justify the " secuJ.arcity " does not mean that Christianity f00' all that does not still carry an intrinsically cosmic dimension. The fact that a rt11aooformationa1isrtChristianity has

·sometimesidentified Christ's purpose too closely with this prur-·ticu1arculture or cultural project does not mean that Christ is not truly and in a fundamental ·sensethe finaliityor end of ia11 human-cu1tur.aJ1activities.

What I wish to lSuggesthere, then, is that anyone who, like Neuhaus, would set ·wside .the cosmic and tr.ansformarbionial model·sof Christianity, must .give a properly *theological ac*-count of the issues raised dn and by .those models: must give an account of the cosmic dimension of Christianity, of the finality of Cfil-ist, in terms of wh3Jt these imply *intrinsically, as a matter of theological principle,* the Christian's relation to the world. That such models have m fact been aissociated :with £alse notions of secularity and libeTlationdoes no.t mean that the models do not CaJ111'Y an essentiia;land indeed crucial *theological* truth. It may in £act well be the oase---and indeed .thds is what I mean to suggest--that, when that essential .theological truth is properly gmsped, these models themselves will be seen to entail a challenge of certain prevalent versions of the "isoou1rurc:iity" and of liberation theology.

But be that ·as it may, .the point in any ca:se is ·that Neuhaus'1s (political-cultural) oonsequentia1ist argument for rejecting the cosmic and tr.ansformationialist models of Christianity does not yet suffice for a. properly thelogical argument-that is, of the •sort required by his own intention to defend Catholic theology in *its* .integrity, as faithful to the Gospel and to its own tradition. Indeed, it is only slightly too cynical to say that the warr.ants for Neuhaus's argument in its present form rest in a fundamental way a noo-conserviativepolitical-cultural agenda: the pamdoxioal model is embroced (and the cosmic and trans£ormartional models ·arerejected) ·because the par:adoxical model serves better to justify the neo-conservative reading of the particular political-cultural project called the American experiment. I do not say that Neuhaus finally intends this priority of political-cultural warrants. I do say that his argument fiai1s to show in properly theological terms that the Church's :trlanscendenceof the world, which he

rightly sees 1a;s essential to Christianity 1and which to be sure iis affirmed in his pariadorical model, might not and for all that be affirmed also, and indeed in ·a more Catholic-and cath- in the cosmic 1and traD!sformational models.

Secondly, and more briefly, then: as we have seen, Neuhaus offers John Courtney Murray as a representative of "a tradition of ' public theology ' that takes the world up on its claim to be, above all else, reasonable " (p. 8) , of a tradition which takes the mission of Roman Catholicism " not to be a refuge from the world nor a crusade against the world, but a wisdom for the world " *(Ibid.)* . And he does this in the context of appealing to Mul"l.'lay's work thmughout his book as a kind of paradigm of his own vtision. But then, curiously, in the final pages of his book, Neuhaus :refers approvingly to Murray's " ' transformationalist ' vision of .an authentic Roman Catholicism" (p. 280). The sense in which this reference is curious seems to me evident in filght of the foregoing: if Murray's vision is in fact accurately described as " transformaitionalist " -and I think at least in some significant sense it is-there tis just so far r:aised, now from within Neuhaus's own argument, the question of whether that vision, which Neuhaus identifies as that of the Church *above* the world model, might not involve essential elements of the cosmic and t:mnsformational models of Christianity: might just so far be more 1ike these latter than it is like Neuhaus's paradoxical model. Which is to say, there is raised once again the properly theological question of the grace-nature relation, now relative at once fo Murray's work and to the cosmic and transformational models of Christiantity. This question nonetheless gets left unengaged--iin 1an explicit and thematic way-by Neuhaus.

II.

Analogous to the difficulty described here in terms of the content of theology as understood by Neuhaus is a difficulty with the form of theology as he proposes it, that is, as appropriiate foir Catholicism in a postmodern age. This form Neu-

haus calls "positliberal," as distinct from the "preHberal" and " liberal " forms or models of theology. Largely following George Lindbeck's *The Nature of Doctrine*,[6] Neuhaus char-·aoterizes these three models respectively ws "cultural-linguistic," "cognitive-propositional," and "experiential-expressive," and describes them briefly rus follows:

> Preliberals assume that doctrines are propositions that express revealed and therefore unchanging truths. Liberals assume that doctrines are symbolic expressions of universal and unchanging religious experiences. Postliberals incline to the view that doctrines are essentially "rules" reflecting the "grammar" of specific religious traditions (p. 151).

Postliberalism, then, adopts a " rule-theory " approach to doctrine: doctrines are unders.tood as church tooching, and their purpose in this context" is .to set the *range within which* theology goes about its busines1s of propositional statements and symbolizing activities" (p. 151). What Neuhaus means is that doctrinal statements have their propeT meaning and truth within ·a given oommunal grammar, within the limits set by the" rules" of a given linguistic community. In the interpretation of these doctrines, then, "the regulating accountability ils to the community and its tradition " (p. 153) . In sum, the emphasis in Neuhaus's postliberal approach to theology is upon the *"verbum externum* ": theology begins from within .the "externals" of a language, .a community, an authority, a rtmadition which is 1alw:ays the anterior presuppo·sition of our inner experience .and internal word. Above all, in agreement with " one of it.he great mtellectual shifts of our time " (p. 153) , po•stliberal theology reoogn[zes " that significant diiscourse is shaped by community and tl'ladition" (p. 154).

Perhaps what is most imporla:nt .about a post1iiberal aipproach to theology, then, is its emphasis upon the " parrticu1ar":

e *The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a PoatUberal ..!ge* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984).

> Talk about theology as a cultural-linguistic enterprise accents limitation. It reminds us that this Christian way of speaking and thinking and acting is one way among others. Gone are the heady universalizing :flightsin which we thought the Church encompassed everything and encompassed it now (p. 158).

The postlibe:r:alapproach recognizes " that the seM"Ch for the ' universal ' p1ace to -stand---0.n Archimedean point to which particu1arisms can be brought to judgment-is elus1ive and finally illusionary" (p. 154).

Now an obvious question which emerges in connection with this postliberal emphaisis upon the rehabilitation of community and triaclition :as essential for the integrity of Christian (Catholic) theology-is whether it does not force a collapse into relativism and fideism. Raving denied that there ,j,g ,any " Archimedean point " to which " parlicularisms can be brought .to judgment," the question then is whether there remains any ,significant sense in which we can nonetheless still judge normatively between pail'lticulartmditions. Are the doctrinal truths affinned in a given-e.g., Catholic Christian-.religiious tradition exhamstively a function of its peculiair communal giiammar, such that these truths make no claim upon those who operate from wi1thin a different grammar, a different linguistic community? Is there no 1sense in which there is, as it were, a " trans-communal " grammar: no sense for e:x:ample in which Crutholic Chri:srbian speech is or can be *catholic,* can make a claim to truth which is universal in its reach?

It is impoTitanitrto norte tbhrut Neuhaus is aware of these questions and is explicit in his intention to avoid what I have called relativism and fideism. Thus he says approvingly:

> With Karl Barth, among others, Joseph Ratzinger insists that the Christian Gospel is not one symbolic ·expression among others of the universal phenomenon of religion, but is the controlling statement of truth by which all reality, including the phenomenon of religion, is rightly understood (p. 158).

Again, Neuhaus insists that postliberal " particularism " does not mean " that we have license to assert any truth claims whatsoever, no matter how ·arbitrary, in complete :freedom foom reasolliWblediscourse" (p. 154). The question, then, is not whether Neuhaus intends to relativism and fl.deism, but mther whether his appeal to paradox ias a way of meeting this irutention is successful-that is, re1'ative to his concern to offer us a form of theology which is authentically Catholic.

A good summary indication of how Neuhaus undeTstands pal"adox to establish the form o;f Cluistian theology a.s normative can, I believe, be found in the following:

> The Christian vision is now challenged and contested by other visions. These other visions are not, as traditionalists [preliberals] would have it, simply false. Nor are they, as liberals would have, simply different versions of the same vision. They ail'e different ways of knowing, short of that time in which we will know even as we are known. We have decided for the Christian way of knowing, because we believe that 'God has made a decision.' Children of the City of God, we are "alien citizens" of the City of Man (p. 158).

> Our specifically Christian way of knowing and being in the world stands in a relationship of paradox to other ways of knowing and being in the world *in which we also participate (ibid.).*

The key features of this statement rare its emphasis on eschrutoLogy (" that time in wbicih we will know even as we are known"), decision, and belief. Neuhaus's point, in other words, is not that the Chrisman vision is not true-and ibhus oormrutive--reLatiive to other visions. His point !"ather is that that truth-and normativity-is paradoxical, and this means that .it can be seen and aidequartelystated only by pointing to the eschaton; by emb:vacing the vision ·as ia matter of beLief and decision; by believing thrut "'God hias made a decision'," whose truth will properly be known 1amd comprehended by us only in the End Time.

Now of ooul'se ithe Christian vision is a matter of decision and belief, and iis essentially ordered to the escha.ton in terms

of the fulness of its truth. But saying this leaves precisely unanswered the sense in which that vision is *also a matter of knowledge and intelligence, here and now, in and for this cosmos:* that *is,* relartive to competing-non-Christian-visions. To say that the Christian vision is true, but th111t its truth is a function of belief, decision, and eschatology, is precisely not yet to show how that " itruth " is other than of a :6.deistic or voluntaristic sort: not yet to sihow how ·that vision iis not simply ra function of, and in this sense simply relative to, one's historically situated linguistic community and triarlition.

The difficulty to which I wish to draw attention here, then, is analogous to that sketched earlier, to wit: just as Neuhaus's paradoxioa.l understanding of the grace-nature distinction entailed an " ertrinsicist " understanding of grace in relation to nature, so now can his pariadoxical oir postliberal understanding of the faith-reason distinction be seen to involve an "extrinsici:st" understanding of rthe relation of faith to reason. Or, to put it another way, just as the content of Neuhaus's theology entailed a "supernaturalistic" understanding of grace (the transcendence of the wder of grace is a trianscendence first .by way of exterrnality •and hence of simple addition and reversal), so now can the form of Neuhaus's theology be seen to involve a :6.deistic,hence just so far relativistic, understanding of faith. Of oou11se the meaning of these assertions must be clarified in reLaitionto the Catholic :tradition, and here once agaiin I musrt be oonitent with trying to record a central principle of that tradition.

That principle has already been :indica.ted. On the more organic un<leristandingof rthe grace-nature relation (which I take to be) affirmed in the Catholic tradition, grace can be said, as it were, to " contain " nature: thrut is, in the sense th3it griacetruly penewaites naiture (because nature is " inside " grace) even as the order of g11ace utterly tmnscends the order of nature.[1] What thls means is that nature-and hence rea-

[1] Cf. the constant teaching of the tradition according to which God is said to "contain" the world: for example, Athanasius, *De Incamati<me,* nos. 8

son-has only one end or :finality, and that end or :finality is God. Not some v1ague, geneMl, or deistic notion of God, but precisely the God revealed in Jesus Chriist through his Church in the Holy Spirit: the God of griace.

The point in the present conte:rt, then, is rthat the order of grace and of faith, even *ias* it transcends the order of nwture and reason, oarri.es within it 'a meaning for nature and reason which is diroot: that *is*, and not a meaning ·which is first by way of simple 1addition or indeed reversal. Another way of putting the ma;tter is tha;t the order of faith intends precisely an onto-logic: claims to carry from \Wthin itself the final meaning and truth of all of being. Indeed, it ·is just this ontological intention of which provides the deepest warrant for the traditional Catholic concern for what is called " propositional truth." However badly rthis concern is formulated in what Neuhaus calls the "cognitive-propo·sitionalism" of preliberal theology, .that concern seems nonetheless to he one which the Catholic cannot relinquish. The Catholic claim to speak-directly-.the truth ·about being, rubout the being of man and of the cosmos, is inextrioobly linked with the Catholic understand of the grace-nature relaton.

The Catholic position I wish to defend here can be further illuminated by the following statements by Joseph Rwtzinger and John Courtney Murray, theologians whose woirk plays a large role in Neuhaus's

The doctrine of the Trinity "passes over into a statement about existence." [8]

The dominant line in St. John's Gospel can properly be termed a "theology of being as relation and of relation as a mode of unity." [9]

Theology concerns "the truth of our very being itself." [10]

and 17; Augustine, *Confessions*, Bk I, chs. 2-3; Thomas Aquinas, *8.T.* I, 8, 1 ad 2. Cf. also in this connection the statement by Hans Urs von Baltha.sar cited in n. 23 below.

s Joseph Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity* (New York: Seabury Press, 1969), p. 135.

s *Ibid.*

10 Ratzinger, "The Church and the Theologian," *Origms*, 15:47 (May 8, 1986), p. 765.

Paul and John were "interested in the fundamental truth of our being." [11]
"Faith does not eliminate the law of analogy." [12]
The Nicene definition (i.e., the *homoousion)* "formally established the statute of the ontological mentality within the Church." [13]

To he sure in today's theological climate, and indeed against the backdrop of the postlibe:ml approach to theology as outlined by Neuhruus (following Lindbeck) , the meaning and internbion of such statements !is hrurdly U1100ntrnversiał[14] What I nonetheless venture ;to suggest, while recognizing the need for further argument which cannot be met here, that, however one interprets the statements, interpretation must include recognition of the following: that, for the Catholic tradition, as reflected here in R.atzinger and Murray, Christian faith carries within it a meaning and reference which is intrinsically and fundamentally *ontological.* What Christian doctrines are,

u *Ibid.,* p. 766.

12 *Ibid.* For further references to and discussion of Ratzinger's thought pertinent to the present context, see my "Is .America Bourgeois?," *Oomm'Wnlio,* vol. 14 (Fall, 1987), 267-271; and "Once .Again: George Weigel, Catholicism, and .American Culture," *Oommunio,* vol. 15 (8pring, 1988), 111-118, esp. 116-118.

13 John Courtney Murray, *The Problem of God* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 51, (and cf. further the whole of ch. 2). In connection with Murray, cf. also my "Once .Again: George Weigel, Catholicism, and .American Culture," p. 119.

14 The theological climate to which I refer is that set, more generally and radically, by "decon.structionism"; and, more i=ediately, by the "anti-foundationalism" in theology represented, for example, by George Lindbeck and (on the Caitholic side) David Burrell. On "deconstructionism," cf. Reiner Shiirmann, *Heidegger on Being and Aoting: From Principles to Anarchy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987) ; *Deconstruction in Oonte1JJt,* ed. by Mark C. Taylor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986); and *After Philosophy: End or Transformation?,* ed. by K. Baynes, J. Bohman, and T. McCarthy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987); Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). For Lindbeck, see *The Nature of Doctrine.* For Burrell, see his "Religious Belief and Rationality," in *Rationality and Religious Belief,* ed. by C. F. Delaney (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), pp. 84-115, and his interpretation of .Aquinas in *Aquinas: God and Action* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979).

in and of their essence, is precisely articulations or unfoldings of the onto-logic *of* faith. They intended to reveal, *directly,* something true about being, first and above all about the being of God, and then in turn, and in the light of God as revealed in Christ and his Church by the Holy Spirit, about the being of man and the entire cosmos.

Ii, then, we return to Neuhau_s's (rightful) c1ruim that Ratzinger sees thrut " the Christian Gospel ... the oontriol1ing statemenrt by which all reality . . . is rightly unde.l'stood" (p. 158) , we should now be ;aJble to see the difference between Raitzinger',s understanding of that claim and Neuhaus's. For Ratzinger, the Christian Gospel carries the meaning of all reality *directly,* that is, rather than fir.st merely e:xitrinsically and/or by way of rever;sal,;as is indicated in Neuhaus's understanding of paradox. To he sure 1the gmsping of that meaning entails belief and decision. To be sure that meaning comes to us through a " paooicular" [15] linguistic community (,indeed thart iis ra.lready!impliedin ;an understanding of ia God who has become incairnate in the " parrbicular " person Jesus Christ) . To be sure, that meaning is transcendent, in the sense that it essenmally requires an eschatotogical horizon £or its fullness and final oomprehension. But the point is that, for the Cath-

15 The conventional sense today of the term "particular" seems to me problematic: the sense, that is, wherein "particular" is understood in (what I take to be) a nominalistic fashion as excluding relation to the universal, or making that relation merely extrinsic. **It** is just such a nominalistic understanding of "particular" that leads Neuhaus (however unwittingly) always to slide the meaning of "particular" off into "particularistic": that is, such that any universal claim made (or mediated) by such a "particular" (person, community) can only be made paradoxically (in Neuhaus's sense) and not directly.

In connection with the various theloogical-ontological issues raised here, cf. the following: Kenneth L. Schmitz, "Neither With Nor Without Foundations," *Review of Metaphysics,* vol. 42 (September, 1988) 3-25; *idem,* "Community: The Elusive Unity," *Review of Metaphysics,* vol, 37 (December, 1983), pp. 243-265; my "David Bohm on Contemporary Physics and the Overcoming of Fragmentation," *International Philosophical Quarterly,* vol. 22 (December, 1982), pp. 315-327; and my "Catholicity and the State of Contemporary Theology."

olic :tradition, .as reflected in the of Rrutzinger, the relation indicated hexe between belief and decision and reason, between the "particular " lingwistic community and the universal meaning, between a tr.ansoendent meaning (a meaning which goes beyond .the cosmos) and .an immanent meaning (a meaning which is in and for the cosmos), is direct, and lit is this directness of rel1ruti on which !is given expression in, and iindeed &ally justifies, the intrinsically ontological meaning and reference of ,faith as undersrboodin the Catholic tradition; even as it is an extrinsic 1and/or dialootical rel.ation which is given ill, and indeed .alone finally justifies, the denial o[ian intrinsically ontological meaning and reference of faith as understood 1m N postliberiaJ. aipproach to theology.

III.

Having considered Neuhaus's par.adoxical-postliberal theology on its own terms, then, we turn now to what happens when that theology, as it were, goes public.

As we have seen, Neuhaus's fundamental concern is that the Roman Caitholic Church 1should now assume its rightful role "in rtihe culiture-forming task of constructing a religiously informed pub1ic philosophy" (p. 283). As we approach the meaning of this strutement, we recall that Neuhaus (rightly) insisrts upon 1a Ch:riis1tianitywmch is trianscendent: so that it can ·always stand in judgment of a given society and its structures (" we have not here a liasting city "). But he is fearful of 1tmnsformation, of ;a Ohristiianity which seeks to transform society 1Mlid its ·struCJtures: beoauise such ·a ·always threatens to hecome " immanentfaed," 1rubsorbedinto an earthly society, and thereby ibo lose its power to judge (rund indeed to :Liberate in the deepest sense). And :thus he is led to hls understanding of 1a Christianity rus pa:riadoxicallyrelated to rociety. Our task here will be to consider how Neuihaus's paradox shapes the meaning of the ierucial terms which describe the task to which Neuhaus :takes Oatholiies to be called in a special way today: to wit, that of formirng a culture, by way

of constructing a religiiously informed puhliic philosophy. Specifically, my concern is wmth Neuhaius's paradoxical meaning of " forming " .and " religiously informed," ill rterms of the consequences of that meaning for how we ;are to understand "public."

Drawing on what we have already said, we can be brief. Put simply, on Neuhaus' s unde11sit;andingof paradox, " fo!l'mi.ng" and " informing " can only be indirect, external, or by way of dialectical reversal: which is to say, can never be direct, interna1, or by wiay of ordering or bringing to fulfillment from within. Agiaiin, the issue is thrut 0!f rthe grace-nature relation: on Neuhaus's paradoxical unders;baniding, grace is (however tacitly) understood "supematumliisrtically " :and faith is consequently underrstood ":fideis.tioally." Or, iagain, f1allith is understood "particu1arisrticially." The result, pertinent rbo the present context, is rbhrut the meaning of failith is thereby precisely privatized.

Bwt note then what this iimplies: if Christian faith is, ias it were, to go public, it must do so now :precisely in the name of a reason from which Christian faith has already and just so far been removied. And indeed this is exactly what I .take to be the meaning entailed (however unwiittingly) when Neuhaus insisrbs on a " duai1istic" relation of the Christian to society.[16] When the Chcis:tian speaks in 1and for the public order,

is Cf., for example, *The <Jatholic Moment,* pp. 193-195, 253, 255. In opting for dualism, Neuhaus insists nonetheless that the relation of religion and politics is one of distinction and not of separation (p. 254). The question I am pressing therefore once again is one which bears, not on Neuhaus's intention, but on his execution. Neuhaus sees monism and dualism as exhaustive alternatives (p. 254), and construes these alternatives in terms of a relation between the "now" (this world) and the "not yet" (the eschaton) (pp. 193£.). Monism (of Right or Left) collapses (in different directions) the "not yet" into the "now," while the dualist lives in and with the tension between the "now" and the "not yet": lives as an "alien citizen" in this world. Now I agree that any authentic Christianity must insist that we live this tension. The problem is that Neuhaus thinks that the only way truly to aecept the tension is in terms of his paradox-it is the only alternative he offers us. But the difficulty with paradox as Neuhaus understands it--if what I have argued above is accurate-is that it gives us exactly no sense

he or she mwsrt do so in the name of a reason to which faith iis extrinsic, a reaison which is thus "outside" of fraith and which is thereby common to, like that of, those persons who do not share one's faith. To put the matter in iibs most radfr:ial terms, Neuhruus's pariadoxical understanding (of grace-nature and fa.ith-reaison) entails 'a priv,rutizingof :liaith which is s[mulrtaneous with a " " of naiture 1and a " rationalizing " of reason. Tha;t is, Christmanity ,can_ go public, can speak in and for rthe public orider, but only in the name of ,a nature just so far unpene:tmted by grace 1and a reruson just so far unaffocted (internally) by fraiibh.[11]

of being really *in* the "now," that is, in a way which is truly simultaneous with being open to the "not yet." The worlds of grace ,and nature have only an external relation, even if the dialectical character of that relation suggests that it is a dynamic one. If and insofar as this is true, Neuhaus's paradox in fact gives us, not genuine tension-which would require a unity ,simultaneous with distinction-but only and exactly fragmentation: a faith which is fl.deistic (simply of ,the world beyond) joined to a politics which is secularized (simply of this world). Eor a contrasting view of the relation of faith :and culture, see Henri de Lubac, *A Brief Oateckesis,* pp. 92-3.

11 Cf. in this connection Neuhaus's essay, "From Providence to Privacy: Religion and the Redefinition of America," where he makes the statement that the Catholic tradition "has . . . consistently asserted that there is no truth pertinent to human gorvernance that is not accessible to human reason. That is among the reasons why I believe that this should be ..• 'the Catholic moment' in the history of culture-forming religion in America" (in *Unsecular America,* ed. by Richard John Neuhaus [Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1986], p. 65). There is to be sure much truth in this statement; but it nonetheless harbors an ambiguity which is crucial relative to his proposal and in the face of the Catholic tradition as understood in the present essay. It should be evident from what we have already said that, on Neuhaus's notion of paradox-of a paradoxical relation between grace and nature-this statement can only mean that there is a *separation* of truths: those proper (simply) to faith on the one hand and those proper (simply) to reason on the other, the relation between such truths thereby being external (by way of simple addition or dialectical reversal). But the question raised by the present argument, in its insistence-in the name of Catholicism-on a direct and internal relation of grace to nature, is precisely that of whether the truths of reason can be so *separated* or *detached* from the truths of faith. To be sure Catholicism (as I have defended it) affirms a *distinction* between the two orders. But the point is that "disinction" (which presupposes a unity which is anterior) and "separation" (which does not) just so

The upshot 0£ which, then, is that the Christian can never speak in and for the public order *qua* Christian. To be sure, Neuhaus would counter that the Christian can indeed speak *qua* Christian, but only in a way .that is paradoxical. **But** that is just the the paradoxical way is eXjactly the way which pcrecludes the rsort of direct relation 0£ the Christian to society 1that the terms " form " rand " rinform" properly suggest. Or better, the paradoXjica.lway of a Christian's being in society exactly rules out the direct or transformational way 0£ being in society which indeed is carried in the term " in " ·as understood in the Oa.tholic tr:adition-<that is, in terms of how it sees grace ras *in* nature. In sum, what there is not, and can never he, on Neuhaus's pamdoxical understanding, is a Catholicism whi!ch can rea.lly and truly form a culture and inform (directly enter into) a philosophy which would be publirc:[18]

far give rise to diffNent senses of the "autonomy" of the natural-rational order.

Developing the nature and implications of this difference is of course a profoundly difficult task, well beyond our purview here. My concern is only to point out once again that the meaning of statements such as that by Ne1ihaus recorded above is inextricably linked with an understanding of the grace-nature relation. And indeed Neuhaus himself links his understanding of the autonomy of the political order, his appeal to natural law, with his understanding of the grace-nature relation: see, for example, *The Catholic Moment,* p. 216, where he links that appeal to the claim that "grace does not destroy but crowns nature." But the point is that he seems unaware of the crucial ambiguity in the term "crowns," an ambiguity which is just that discussed above relative to the term "fulfills."

18 In an earlier work in connection with the use of the term "public,"-with the idea of thevlogy as a "public" enterprise-Neuhaus acknowledges an indebtedness to the work of David Tracy and Wolfhart Pannenberg (cf. Neuhaus's *The Naked Publia Square* [Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1984], p. 265, n. 6). In the present work Neuhaus then goes on to defend the public character of theology in terms of "paradox," and in the course of so doing, he appeals for support to an array of theologians including Luther, Barth, Brunner, Lindbeck, Aquinas, Murray, Pope John Paul II, and Cardinal Ratzinger (among others) : that is, in the context of suggesting that all of these theologians support the essential thrust of his argument that the nature of theology is best conceived in paradoxical terms. **It** is not the number of theologians noted here to whom Neuhaus appeals in the course of his hvo studies that I find troubling. **It** is rather the manner

IV.

But we musrt press further. The view we have put forwaro as rt.he Catholic view entails ,a trans£ormational presence of the Christian in society. But this gives rise to an apparent dilemma, that in terms of Neuhaus's ,argument on behalf of a Catholicism well-suited to provide a public philosophy for American. ·socierty,which i,s .to say a society which i:s pluralistic and democratic. The difficulty this: on the one hand, Neul11aus's paradoxical view, which entails .a "rationalist" appeal to :veason, an appeal rto what is reasonable in a kind of neutral or " pure " sense of reasonable-that is, insofar as the Christian intends to be spe,aking in aind for the public order-would seem for 1all of its theological difficulties fo be nonetheless priactica1ly necesSJary: that is, given the pluralism of modern society. On the other hand, what I have called the Catholic view, which entails a "faithful" 'appeal to reason, an appeal to reason ias "finalized" from the beginning in faith and hence .as requiring ongoing transiformaition in the light of faith-again, precisely *as* the Christian intends .to be speaking in and for the public order-would seem for all of its intrinsic theological correctness nonetheless to .give rise to insuperable practical difficulties: :again, given the plumlism of modern society.

of that appeal. The differences among these theologians, this is, *relative to the notion of "paradoro" understood in a way consistent with "crisis theology,"* are, *prima facie,* so significant and manifest that surely some prolonged and systematic attention to such differences is warranted. (It is just not, *prima facie,* clear to me that, say, David Tracy, Karl Barth, Thomas Aquinas, and Cardinal Ratzinger could be said to be in agreement regarding the sense of the relation of faith and reason in theology, except in the thinnest of senses and on the barest of surfaces.) Nonetheless, Neuhaus does not see fit to give us any systematic account of these *prima faoie* differences. Indeed, he gives no indication of an awareness that such an account may be necessary.

I bring this matter up simply because I think it points to a kind of eclectic character in Neuh.aus's work which is seriously problematic. Neuhaus would likely respond by claiming (something like) that he follows (say) Barth when speaking as a Christian (to and for Christians) and (say) Tracy when speaking publicly. But that illustrates just what I mean by eclecticism.

In short, if Neuhaus's proposal is theologically inaidequ:ate, is it not for ·all tha.t politically necessary? And if the Catholic proposal as I have 1sketched it !is theologically correct, is it not for all that seriously problematic in its political implications?

I l'!aise this question for the purpo.se of drawing attention to a final difficulty in Neuhaus's Tha.t difficulty concerns the term which sets the ovemrehing context for his proposal and is indicated in the subtitle of his book," The Paradox of the Church in the *Postmodern* World" (emphasis added). The context of Neuhiaus'.s proposal, in other words, is understood to be that of a worrld which is, or is becoming, postmodern. My final question, .then, hears on whether Neuhaus's undersrt.anding of what is to count as public in and for a pluralistic, democratic society like that of America has in fact been ·sufficiently penetl'lated by genuinely postmodern, as distinct from modern, patterns of thought. In a word, does Neuhaus' s view gert us beyond a modern and into a postmodern understanding of politics: in terms of what counts as a public use of l'!eason by a Christian in and for a pluralistic society?

Now I follow Neuhaus here in linking what oan be called modern patterns of thought with those patterns identified as Cartesian and of the En1ightenment. And it must he noted immediately th.at Neuhaus means to •l'leject these. Characleristic of an" Enlightened" :appeal to reason is the daim on behalf of a kind of neutr:a1ity: as though one could avoid speakring out of a particular tradition, or ·rugain, could speak in a manner which, as were, is context-free. As we have seen, Neuhaus makes expliiciit an intended rejection of this view of !Veason: indeed, such rejection iis a major intention of the book.

Simi1arly, in his discussiion of the preliberral, liberal, and posUiiberal models of theo1ogy, Neuhaus says: "The point cannot he maide too of.ten that what !is descr!ibed as prelllibeml!ism is really 1a relatively modern, pos:t-Cartesian, undersrbanding of truth" (p. 156). It is just this modern, post-Cartesian understanding of .truth, rin other which must be gotten beyond and replaced by My concern then is not

rto cal,l into question Neuhaus's intention of getting us beyond Enlightened and Carrtes:iianpatterns of thought; it is rather to ques,tion whether his notion of paradox really succeeds in doing so.

By Oarlesianism, for the present context rand indeed in its fundamental meaning, I mean a pattern of thought which understands distinction iafter the manner oif S'erp.airation: that is, in the ·sensethat, where *x* and *y* are taken to be distinct, they 1a,re jUJst so fiar undoosr!Jood1as first simply of ea,ch other, such thait any (subsequeillt) relation or :influenceof one upon the other comes .after the manner of what is simply external. Thia.it is, re1aition alwiayis .aind properly extirinsic, something made by way of addition or indeed opposition. In shor:t, a Oair:tes[ianunderstanding of ws:binotionenfails a dualistic unde11srtandingof relation (the terms of relation).

Thus a Oartes[ain understanding of distinction, when it informs understanding of the faith-11ea:sonrelatioo, forces a dualistic unde11standiingo;f that relation: £aith rand realS'On ·are understood a1s simply outside of ea.ch other, and .their (consequent) relation in tum is understood as either extrinsic (by w1ay of simple ,addition) or opposing (e.g., dialectical) . And it is just this dualistic under:standing of the faiith-rea,sonrel.aition which ia1one and in turn makes possible the Enlightenmffilit claim on behalf of a neutral reason: a "pure " reason, a reason, that is ;to 1say, from which all influences (e.g., "bithful" influences, presuppositions of ,a given "particular" tradition) have been removed. On the "Enlightened " view of reruson, such influences can he seen only as extrinsic matters which *eo ipso* ;threaten the integrity of rooson.

It should of oourise already be evident that this dualistic undersrbanding of the faiith-rea,son refo,tion informs Neuhaus's nolbion of pamdox: that notion embodies exactly the extrinsicist undeirsibandingof .the faith-reason relation which undergiirds his sense of :an appeal, when :Speakingin and for the public order in a pluralistic society, ito a or reasonaJbililitywhich is commonly 1accessible,thait is, accessible in prin-

ciple to all knowens insofar a.JS they remain uninfluenced (i.e., *not directly or internally informed)* by any " particular" religious faith orr traidition. My concern is merely now to make explicit the fact that Neuhaus's understand.ing of what thus counts ais public in a plumlis:tic society does not challenge the patterns of thought which chamcterize modernity. On the contrary, his understanding offers us ·a pamdigm of rt.hose patterns. In the name of paradox, Neuhaus offers us yet one more instance of the dualism of modernity: the Christian can enter the public/political orderr, but only inso.far as he or she permits faith to have only an external (because merely paradoxical) influence on his or her thought and praictice.

To be sure there 1should be no illusion regarding the ma;gni-1fmde of the task involved in working out 1an 1alternative to Neuhaus's modern ·view of po1imcs 1MJ.d pluralism. But even here it 1should at lea;st be noted how the 1alternatives which Neuhaus sees 1a;s exhaustive in .this context themselves both express modern patterns of thought. Thus, Neuhaus opposes what would be a itransformatiolJllalview of f·a;ith in relation to reason. Such a tr:ans.formatiollJ3Jview entails for Neuhaus a reduction :simultaneously in two di.reotions: on the one hand, faith tends to be absoobed iinto reruson, and there thus results a secularizing of frailith and the (eventual) emergence of a " seculiar city "; on the other hand, reas001 tends to be absol'lbed into fmith, ·ood tbhere thus results the loss altogether of the secular character of reason and the tendency simply to collapse the" eal'lthly city" in-00 the" heavenly city." In shoN., on understanding, a trians.formatioDJalview of faith in relation to rea:son entails some form of monism (a kind of "integraMsm," in the name either of reaison--e.g., secula-rism- or of faith--e,g., Iillbemtionrtheology); and to thiis monism he opposes his paradoxical hmnd of " dualism," because he sees this rus the only 1avaiLablealterna!bive. (p. "The alternative to ibeingdualis:tic is to be monistic.")

Whait I wish to suggesrtis that the a;ssumption ithat the ailternatives available to us here are exhausted in monism and

dualism is itselif an exact expression of in the sense outlined above. A mutual internal relation between *x* and *y* (e.g, faith and reason) entails an absorption of *x* into *y* (or vice-versa), or a confusion of the distinctness of *x* and/or *y,* only insofar ·as one h81s conceived *x* and *y* as first separate from or closed to each other, as complete each unto itself and apart from the other. Monism and dualism, in other words, are merely the opposite sides of the same Cartesian coin. On the Catholic understanding of the faith-reason relation defended in this article there is a third alternative. And that third alternative begins by challenging Cartesianrsm (and hence the paradigmatically modern pattern of thought) in its very roots. That is, Catholicsilli understands the disrtinciness of faith ruid reason from the beginning from within their *de facto* unity: in terms of their *de facto* one finality. That distinctness, in other wocds, is understood from the beginning ri.n terms of (their) *relation.* It follows that the disrtincrtnessof faith and re31son is not of a dualistic sort; and that the *(de facto)* unity which is given wiirth, *ais* alllte:ciorto, thrut disrtincrtnessiis not and cannot be of a monisrtic sort.[19]

In sum, then, my intention here has been to suggest that Neuhaus's understanding of what is necess•aryto qualify as a public use of reason by a Christi.an in a pluralistic, democraitic society, fails to challenge the modern-Ca:ritesian, Enlightenment-understanding of public and thereby of pluralism (of what suffices, because :it is public, 1as legiitmiately plura1isrtic). Or rather my intention has been to .show that Neuhaus faces a dilemma: on the one hand, if he continues to defend what counts as public-iin-a-pluralistic-society in terms of his present, pariado:ici:calunderstanding, he musrt ·accept that he i:s offering us a world which is still-and indeed pa;radigmrutically-

19 On the specifically political implications of this third-Catholic-alternative suggested here, that is, in terms of the question of religious liberty and a confessional state and in the light of *Dignitatis Humanae,* cf. my "Once Again: George Weigel, Catholicism, and American Culture," esp. pp. 105-109.

modern, r:ather than helping us to move into a genuinely poSJt.. modern world. On the other hand, if he does really wish to realize the intention, carried in the subtitle of his book, of offering us a new, precisely postmodern, .approach to the world, he must 11ev:ise ms paradorical undersitanding of what counts as public-in-a-pluralistic-society. In short, the dilemma which Neuhaus must face 0.s thris: if a pwadoxtical understanding of the reLation of Chmstiamty and politics, then an understanding thrut is modern; if 1a genuinely postmodern understanding of the rela.tion of Christianity .to politics, then not a pamdo'Xlical understando.ng. .Agiain,in msisting on the importance of facing up to this dilemma, I have no illusii.ons a:s to the difficulty in developing an a1ternrutive-genuinely Ca:tholic-oonception of that re1a.tion which wouLd cut through the dilemma.[20] **But** the dilemma for all thrut must be faced.

V.

The argument presented here tlms challenges Neuhaus on each of his central concerns, and it does so in terms of his conception of pariadox. (I) In the name of ·a Catholic understanding of the Gospel, Neuha.us offers us a pa.mdoxical view of the grace-nature iaind faith-reason relations. But if what I have argued above is correct, tihis pamdoXiical understanding is proper to something much mme like the " crisis theology " of Protestant Neo-Orthodoxy. (2) In rthe name of a Christianity which would form and indeed inform culture, he gives us a Christianity which forms or informs only ·extrinsii.oallyor indirectly: that is, by way of a paradorical as dist.inertfrom the direct and transformational relation which the terms " form " and " inform " more properly intend, and which is indicated in the Catholic understanding of the grace-nature relation. (3) Finally, in the name of postmodemity, Neuhaus gives us a dualistic conception of faith and reia,son which expresses emclly the Cartesian pattern of thought which makes possible and

20 Cf. the discussion referred to in n. 19.

indeed alone justifies the neubral or "pure" rationality proper to the Enlightenment. But it is e:x;ruotly this dualism and this neutral sort of rationality which underpins the *modern* undersitanding o.f what counts as" publ.ic" and thereby as legit.imate in and for ,a democratic society.

In sum, then, whrut Neuh1JJus offel'ls us is neither a truly Catholic moment, nor a truly public philosophy (that is, *qua directly* Chris1tian), nor a truly postmodern world. On the contvary, what he gives us is a new version of an old Protestant moment, a philosophy which is at once fideist/private *(qua* Christian) and rationalist *(qua* public), a philosophy therefore which meets the requirements 0£ "public" and " p1u:rialistic" in 1a wor1d which is understood precisely in a modern w:ay.

ln saying 1this, m challengiing Neuhaus in till:s fundamental way, I wish to stress that I do not thereby deny the v:alue and impoil'ltanceof his book. The book iis bci.mmmg with insightful pe11ceptiollisinfo the s1bate of contemporary theology and culture. WbJrut the rubove all serves to do, it seems .to me, is .to focus attention in the right diirection: Neuhaus is fundamentally correct, I think, in insisting that the time has come for Catholics to appropriate their tradition and bring its resourees to bear on the task of forming and informing the public life and thought and culture of America.. And he is funda,. mentally correct, I think, in urging us to move forward, in our patterns of thought and behavior, into what can be called a "post-modern" [21] world. But the problem of course is that we must get clear about the meaning of Catholicism and post-

21Perhaps it should be noted: by "postmodern" I mean (.a) "non-modern," but in a way (b) which is not (simply) restorative, that is, of a pre-modern period. To put it another way, I take postmodernity to entail retrieval of pre-modern (what Neuhaus calls pre-preliberal) patterns of thought: for example, those developed in the patristic period (interpreted in a classical rather than in Neuhaus's paradoxical sense). But this retrieval must be conceived in terms which are analogous: in terms that is, which take account of and indeed truly integrate the difference(s) introduced in and by the intervening history.

modernity. If I might conclude with a summary suggestion in this connection, that is, at once relative to the meaning of Catholicism and postmodernity, and in the light of Neuhaus's proposal, it would be that the fundamental issue which needs adjudication *is* thrut of the gmce-nruture relation: 1an issue which is at once ia maitter of gr.ace rand nature and of re1a.tion (irut once of theology and ontology, or, more eJrootly, of a theology understood in the classical sense a:s always already carrying within it ,run ontology) .

Regarding postmodernity and ;reLaition,then: if what I have •argued1aihoveis coITOOt,it follows thrut modernity can accurrutely be oharaoterized by 1a prubtern of thought which cannot affirm a simultaneity of unity-and-distinctness. As we have seen, this is the essence of Cartesianism, wherein *x* and *y,* inso£ar 1as ithey are unde,l'!stood to be distinct, 1are conceived ias external to one another, which is to say, a:s simple identiities constituted first in ithemselve.s,1apant from each other (" separate") . Any relation between *x* and *y,* then, either remains external and by way of ,simple ,addirtion,such th.rut there is no ,real re1a.tion at 'all; or, if .that ,relaition becomes, real, which is to say, if *x* and *y* really penetrate each other, then there just 1so £ar results' confusion, and thus the 1oss of the (distincl) integrity of *x* and *y.* In short, given a Cartesian pattern of ,thought, unity ialways1 collapses into some form of monism or reductionism, and distinction inito some form of dualism. In eiitherrcase whirut is lost is precisely the *reality of relation,* which presupposes the 1simu1taneity of unity and distincmess----and thereby affirms both reail unity 1and real 1disrtinctness, even as *it* ooan:ges the chara.cter of bo1th. Jn a word, seeing monism and dualism as exhaustive 1a1tematives exactly preempts the thrut relation (s) may be real, and indeed primary. If Hlli.s characterization of the modern pattern of thought is acouriate, then rthe task of po,srtmodernity must be that of dev:eloping ·a w:ay of seeing relation (s) as real and indeed prnmary.

Secondly, then, regiarcLing Cablro1icismand the gmce-nwture

relation: the sense of thait relia.tioncan perhrups:best be seen m tihe Nicene frn."Illulationof rthe Creed, that is, in :the *homoousion.* Neuhaus I ;think quirte vighrt in pomting to AthlammsrilliS and Nicaea .ais examples of the sort of " p;re-pre1ibe:tial" pattern orf thought w:hich is needed dior .a Oarbholicismtin a poSltmodern WOTlld (cf. pp. 156) . But rwhalt must be on: once ragain, contrary to Neuhaus, is thart the Crutholi.cunderSitlanding of Nfoaea (rthe *homoousi,on)* !involves first ian onrtological rather than "rule-rtheiory" undel'ISrtanding of Christruan doctrine: [22] that is, affirms: a ·c:lirrectand real raJther than paracLorioal (in Neuhaus"S sense) *relation* of God .and man in the being of Jesus. The unity of Jesus's person is simulibaneolliSmth the disrt:tiniatnerssof d.rivii.ne and human. Which is to say, tha.t-divine--unirty is such that irt tiruly penetrates: •and thus trans£orms Jesus's humanity: Jesus iis div·ine *in* his very humanity, ev;en·as the distinction ·heitweendiwne ·and hum.an is not thereby ·el:iminalteobr coin.fused.

Now of courise t:here only one *homoousion:* one hypositaitic union. At the same time, however, and rthis is a point seen much more dearly ·in the patristruc peciod rthan in the modern peciod, the direot and real relation of divine ·and human in Jesus is med.riaited by Jesus (in and through his Church by means of the Holy Spiiriit) :to 1a11 of created being-.to all of the human and naturial being of rthe cosmos---,fromthe beginn.ringof created being's exiisitence.[23] Thws what Jesus Christ is by natuve all else rUn the cosmos in some signmcant sense both is

[22] Here I again follow Ratzinger *(Introduction to Christianity)* and Murray *(The Problem of God)* rather than Lindbeck *(The Nature of Doctrine).*

[23] See n. 3 above. Cf. also in this connection the summary statement by Hans Urs von Balthasar:

> If the cosmos as a whole has been created in the image of God that appears-in the First-Born of creation, through him and for him-and if this First-Born indwells the world as its Head through the Church, then in the last analysis the world is a 'body' of God, who represents and expresses himself in this body, on the basis of the principle not of pantheistic but of hypostatic union *(The GW1';1J of the Lord,* Vol 1, *Seeing the Form* [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982], p. 679).

and iis to become by rudoption and pamci.paition.[24] '.Dhe poiint, then, :is that neirther Jesus nor, ias a result of Jesus, anything else iin the oosmos, can be properly understood except, and £rom the beginiliing, in ,terms of relation. Jesus'·s beiing, that is, a:s Son 1and rus W&d, iis' essentially relalbion to, God ithe F.ather.[25] The beiing of all else in t:he oosmoB becomes ij,tsel[in turn, th.lat is, in and through the mediation oif Jesus as ithe Incarnaite Word, iwteimialJyreLated to God: is ordered to God *from within* its v:ery diistincrlness ;aJs human 1and natumL[26] In shorit, if tih.e ontologoal interpretation indroaited by the itierm *homo<>USi.on* of the rela1tiionof God 1and man rin Jesus Christ, and in ,turn of the relation of God and rbhe enrtire cosmos as mediated by Christ (ilhilough the Church in the Holy Sp[rit) , is rtrne, tihen :Lt follows rthat no enitirty or aspect of any enrbity of the OOSIIDOS is simply closed. No entity or iaspoot oif any entity ha:s iits proper idrotiity e:xiCept rel,rutively, iand hence as *open from within:* :a re1wbivity iand an openness, ith:rut is, which can only :be understood properly and finally in terms of the God of Jesus Ohriist ·and hence rthe tr.inibaa.iianGod of Christianity.[27]

Tthe summairy questions which I wouJd piurt before Neuhaus, then, wiiith respect to the meaning of Catholicism and post-modernity, are the following: how is one to understand the graice-nruture relation in the light of the Nicene *homoousion?* Cain one undersrband thrut re1artion properly wirthourt under-standmg it in terms of the onto1ogiieal intention suggested by

.24 See my "Catholicity and the State of Contemporary Theology," pp. 430-434. It is crucial that the "already-not yet" character of the relation of God and the cosmos, established by God in Christ, be maintained, a.s well as the central role of human being in helping to realize this relation (on this, see especially the references given in nos. 6 and 7 of this article) .

25 See the beautiful and profound development of this theme in Ratzinger's *Introduotion to Ohristianity,* especially pp. 127-82.

26 In connection with my outline here of the meaning of the *homoo'U8'ion,* cf. the recent statements of Pope John Paul II: "The Christological definitions of the Councils and the Church's f.aith today," *L'Osservatore Romooo,* Eng. ed. (April 18, 1988), esp. p. 11; and the encyclical *Dominum et Vivifi.oantem,* esp. n. 50.

21 Cf. Walter Kasper, *The God of JesiM Ghrist* (New York: Crossroad, 1984).

the term *homo<>usWn* (" one iin being ") , and rindeed ias interpreted in the classical tradition? Does this term not indicaite a *real simultaneity of unity and distinctness* in Jesus: which is to say a 1'eal-'-direct, internal-relation of divine and human in Jesus? And if so, what then does ,it mean in turn to affirm that all of creation is created in and through (Jesus as) the Word, has its being in :the Woird? Does this ·affirmrution not mean that the real re1aJtion of God and man which !is Jesus's essentiially or by nature !is tin £11Jci mediilllltedby JeS1Us (through hls Chureh in the Holy Spirit) to aU of creation, ,and rthait all of creation thereby shaxes in thrut real relation parrticipaitively or by ·adoprtion? That all of creation thereby mum be understood in ter:ms of *this* relation-and thus in terms of reLat!i.on? Whait then does this imply further in terms of rthe cosmic or :Wani.siformaitionalsense of Chr!i.sti1an!i.ty: in terms of the need borth to recognize and to help bring about this oivdering of ,all of be!i.ng to God (m Christ through his Church)? What does this need suggest for the Christi.an as he or she takes up the task of .fol'Illiing.and informing the culrturial .and polit!i.oallife of society?

,Jt bears empihrusiziingone final time thrut one can be under no il1usions .as to the diifficulty of .worlcinigthrough adequate an-s;weirs to these queis:bioos: there is: of course an essential trut:h to Neuhaius's ins!i.stence thait a fully comprehensive vision will be ours only iin the End Time. And there should be no musiions as if:o the rirudieal nature of the questions. But in an important ,sense ithrut ii:s the rpotill.lt of cris!i.s: properly undeTstood, it sends us, or sihou1d send us, <back in search of the roo:ts of a problem. It seems to me that Neuhaus is quite right in seeing that America (rthe modem West) is 'in 1a strute of oris!i.s: :ait a turning point which requiires deliberative assessment and judgment. And irt seems to me further th.wt he is quite right in seeing the Catholic trrladfutionas hearing wiithin it the resources for meet!i.ngtlmt crisis. But I fea:r that ithe proposal he makes will in £act serve merely to ertood ithe crisis. We do nort need yet another version of modernity.

Neuhaus rightly-in my judgment-challenges the various monisms (of the Right :and peThaps more commonly of the Le£t) which a.re often put forward todray. But in response we do not need another dualism, indeed oo.e which precisely continues the secul.arized paibterns of thought which have characrterizedmodernity: which gives us exiaotlyno sense of a need for an *ontological penetration* of nature ·and cosmos and culture by gl'laice:[28] We do not need the sort. of which Neuhaus calls parrudox, whim makes it iimpossible ito under-·stand the !!.'elationof grace .and na.ture (Church •and world) in ally•thing other than .an indirect, e:xiternial, and dialectical manner. Wb.rut we need riather is •a sern:se of nature and the cosmos as penetl"ated, .and .as needing ongoing penetration, iby groce (by the life M:d love of God ,as medi!aitedby JesUtS Chcist through his Chmch iin the Holy Spil"it); a sense therefore of a re1aition between grace lfill!d niabure which is di'l'eat:and internal and real. **It** is jusit this sense of nature :and of the grace-nature relation iB affirmed in and ·by Orutholicism.When this is undel'ISltood-burtonly then-can we agree with Neuhaus that ithe present cu1tu11al situirution provides us with whrut is, or oou1d he, .a truly moment.

2s It is interel!ting in this connection to note Neuhaus's repeated assertion that contemporary American society is not secularized (cf. for example, *The <Jatholic Moment,* p. 82; or indeed the title of the recent book edited by him: *Uns.eoular America). N*euhaus's point is that recent empirical evidence shows that a persistently-and increasingly-large number of Americans believe in God, go to Church, and the like. The implication of the argument developed in the present essay is that such-precisely wternaZ--evidence suffices to demonstrate religiosity in America only **if** and insofar as one fails to under·stand religiosity as requiring ontological penetration, and just so far genuine interiority and incarnation. When this deeper, Catholic, requirement for true religiosity is taken into account, and indeed when the corresponding need is met for evidence which is distinct from the quantitative and hence external sort proper to public opinion surveys, I believe American culture is shown, contrary to Neuhaus's judgment, to be significantly and indeed pervasively secularized. On this question of the religiosity of American culture, and the nature of the evidence therefor, cf. roy articles, "Is America Bourgeois?," and "Once Again: George Weigel, Catholicism, and American Culture."

BOOK REVIEWS

At the Origins of Modern Atheism. By MICHAEL J. BucKLEY, S.J. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987. Pp. viii+ 445.

Writing ostensibly a history of the philosophical origins of 18th century atheism in 17th century theism, Michael Buckley, S.J., has contributed a learned, subtle, and provocative hook whose length is significantly increased and whose focus is considerably enlarged by a running commentary about the metatheory (Richard McKeon's philosophical semantics) that structures his reading of the chosen theists and atheists. Buckley provides the best summary of his own historical conclusion: "... theology generated apologetic philosophy and philosophy generated Universal Mechanics, and these in turn co-opted theology to become the foundations of theistic assertions . . . [But] when the contradictions between Cartesian and Newtonian mechanics were further negated ... god became a *deus otiosus"* [pp. 358-359]. This conclusion rests on a philosophical principle whose elements are taken from Plato's *Seventh Epistle:* " The name, the definition, and the instance for the atheistic negations are all set by the current theism " [p. 15]. In turn, this principle is justified by a cluster of meta-theses that are not easily summarized, although one stands above the rest: " Much more may he involved in such a process of ideas [from 17th century theism to 18th century atheism] than their· own internal necessity, hut internal necessity remains and governs inherently " [p. 334].

The latter meta-thesis asserts that there is a dialectic of ideas and it is from this point of view that Buckley reads the conceptual history of modern atheism. Dialectical necessity is a bugbear for many contemporary philosophers, hut Buckley argues, convincingly I think, that some kind of conceptual necessity links theism and atheism. Atheism is, essentially, the negation of a particular form of theism. In Hegelian terms, atheism is a determinate negation which draws all of its conceptual content from what it negates. Buckley, however, puts an even greater Hegelian spin on the same point. If the theism carries within itself a contradiction, it negates itself and, thereby, dialectically generates its contradiction-atheism [cf. p. 17]. " Modern atheism took not only its meaning hut its existence from the self-alienation of religion" [p. 359].

A theism that believes in the existence of an intelligent, personal God, Who creates and orders the universe, but that attempts a rational

justification of this belief apart from the religious experience that alone can embody such a faith contains exactly the kind of inner contradiction that generates the negation of itself. Buckley focuses on the poignant contradiction of a Christian theology abandoning "the religious figure of Jesus as the principal evidence for the reality of God" [p. 41] in favor of some philosophy (whether that of Descartes, Malebranche, or Newton) which provides a different and allegedly more certain kind of evidence for God's existence. This theology, or more precisely the theistic philosophies it spawned, are the sources of modern atheism because, if Descartes and Newton are consistently combined, philosophy can do quite well without God. Laplace's famous reply to Napoleon, although it was not originally an atheistic slogan, captures what Diderot and d'Holbach thought: God is an unnecessary hypothesis in a truly universal mechanics which needs to presuppose only matter and motion.

The historical story, of course, is more complicated than this skeleton dialectic can suggest. Buckley richly details the story but I shall rehearse only its opening chapter. Buckley begins with the Jesuit theologian, Leonard Lays (1554-1623), usually known under his Latin name, Lessius, whose *De providentia numinis et anima immortalitate* (1613) set the pattern for subsequent Catholic theology. Lessius, who was convinced that atheism by eliminating the eternal judge destroys morals and sound politics, revived Stoic arguments, numerous variations on a theme, which show that the universe is everywhere imprinted with a divine design. Lessius's intent, although he referred only to ancient philosophers, was not to replay the classical battle between the Stoics and the Epicureans but to combat the atheism, silent and disguised in contemporary Europe, that Lessius thought to be the inevitable outcome of the wars of religion and theological fights.

Lessius, however, paid scant attention to his own insight into the religious and cultural origins of atheism. Lessius recognized that the dissolution of a common religious authority was the matrix for modern atheism, but his fatal mistake, according to Buckley, was to treat atheism as a philosophical question to be solved by philosophical answers. A second theologian, the Franciscan Marin Mersenne (1588-1648), took the same tack but with one notable difference. Mersenne battled contemporary enemies (mainly the renaissance philosophers Charron, Cardano, and Bruno) who embraced, so he thought, versions of ancient scepticism and naturalism.

Why did Lessius and Mersenne follow this course and abandon, in practice at least, theology for philosophy in order to defend belief in the existence of God? Buckley provides two interesting explanations: to avoid legitimating the Pyrrhonian scepticism of a Montaigne who

"pushed revelation at the cost of the soundness of reason" [p. 66] and to follow, albeit in misguided fashion, Aquinas who proved the existence of God through philosophy. I shall return to this latter issue at the end of my review. But, first, I want to note a certain exclusivity in Buckley's argument.

Buckley adverts to the plethora of non-philosophical factors from which atheism arose, hut he insists that one should not turn atheism into an "epiphenomenon "–a by-product of social, psychological, or political events, forces, or milieus. Instead, Buckley continually stresses the conceptual dialectic that generated atheism " whose existence is accounted for in terms of the ideas which preceded it " [p. 16]. By his own standards, however, this is an overstatement that is difficult to reconcile with what Buckley also quite clearly acknowledges. Just as faith is rooted in religious experience, so too must atheism reflect the absence or negation of religious experience. But who would argue for any religious experience-or lack of-that does not reflect even as it transcends its psychological, social, and cultural milieu? There is no way of talking about faith and, consequently, atheism without talking about culture. If that is the case, can the existence of atheism really he explained essentially in terms of " its own argument in the history of ideas" [p. 31]? Buckley has chosen, and perhaps he should have explained this more fully, to narrow the field.

Of course, ideas have consequences and to reconstruct philosophical theism and philosophical atheism is to display the philosophical interconnection and consequences of those ideas, whether or not one uses dialectical negation to make the connection. Buckley has effected the latter procedure with *eclat.* Yet, Hegel's warning remains apropos, lest we readers fall into a play of concepts, a bloodless dialectic that explains only the philosophy of atheism hut not atheism: philosophy is the owl of Minerva that flies only at dusk. Put in less metaphorical language, Hegel knew that philosophers reflect and conceptualize only what has already occurred in pre-philosophical life.

In fact, Buckley seems to he grappling, although it is not made explicit, with a profoundly Hegelian problem throughout this hook. What is the relationship of pre-philosophical life (history in the largest sense of the word) and the philosophical reconstruction of that history? Hegel thought that history both led to the categories of his Logic (pro·viding what he called the ladder to the absolute standpoint) and that the Logic alone gave sense or allowed one to order what would otherwise he an ultimately senseless history.

The importance of the problem has not escaped Buckley; it is what motivates him to rely on the categories of McKeon's philosophical semantics to make sense of a particular stretch of philosophical history.

Buckley writes *la grande* not *la petite histoire.* But is there one sense or many senses to history? McKeon's categories, so Buckley claims, avoid both Hegelian and relativistic traps; they do not reduce " every philosophy to a single true philosophy " or regard " all positions as of equal worth" [p. 21]. On this score, though, McKeon himself is hardly so reassuring: " There is no pre-established priority of being, cause, or rule among things, thoughts, actions, and statements; each in turn may he made fundamental in deliberation or judgment or demonstration" ["Discourse, Demonstration, Verification, and Justification, " in *Demonstration, Verification, Justification: Entretiens de l'Institut International de Philosophie* (Editions Nauwelaerts: Louvain, 1968), p. 45]. McKeon's meta-theory about the history of philosophy, to put it benignly, is resolutely pluralist.

As he presents them, Buckley's conclusions about the dialectical origin of modern atheism are fundamental; nonetheless, the meta-theory which directs his approach to that history can reasonably he taken to provide the basic plot of the book. Buckley himself notes [cf. p. 21] that his inquiry into atheism amounts to a progressive clarification of his (i.e., McKeon's) philosophical semantics. This promise, I think, is not quite fulfilled; especially for someone not versed in McKeon's own writings, the theory remains recondite. Buckley makes a conscientious effort to sketch McKeon's four coordinates of intelligible discourse: " *selection* " (what is selected to he the suhject-matter), " *interpretation* " (how anything can he said about the subject matter selected), *"method"* (how one proceds in making discoveries) and *"principle"* (the ultimate source of the unity, truth, or value of the discourse). Yet, he does not explore the logical status of this theory itself. Of course, Buckley would have had to write two hooks-one historical, the other methodological-if he had attempted to answer all of these meta-theoretical question. Still, Thomists might well wonder whether a meta-theory that first focuses on discourse is really a neutral instrument through which to examine other theories that start elsewhere. In any case, it should be noted that the arguments needed to sustain the meta-theory are quite different and need careful delineation from the arguments that are needed to support the dialectical method that Buckley uses to generate modern atheism from modern theism.

In fact, the dialectical method is hut one of several, irreducible methods: other universal methods, each of which has been proposed as *the* " pattern appropriate to all serious discourse " [p. 23], include the logistic, problematic, and operational methods. One could anticipate, then, that the choice of any of these other methods would generate a different kind of history of atheism. So there is a kind of partiality,

if one is consistently following McKeon, about approaching atheism from the standpoint solely of the dialectical method. To quote McKeon again: "There is no reason *a priori* why any starting-point should provide better principles than any other or why any method adapted to the scope and intricacies of a universal subject should he preferable to any other" ["Philosophy and Method," *The Journal of Philosophy,* 48 (1951), p. 672]. There, however, are meta-issues, and I do not want to tax Buckley with every objection that can be raised against or from within McKeon's theory. Any history that is not a mere sequence of philosophical propositions (if such is even possible) incorporates some hermeneutic; it is a merit that Buckley has been so explicit about his own skillful use of McKeon.

In a book so expansive, it is to be expected that readers, here and there, will contest details. Especially in this journal, I should like to quibble about Buckley's remarks about Aquinas and Gilson. The quibbles open upon a large issue that is central to Buckley's argument. Aquinas's philosophical demonstration of the existence of God occurs -as Buckley states-within the context of Thomistic theology. But, contrary to what he suggests [cf. p. 55], these demonstrations are-at least, for Aquinas-" intrinsically theological ": the existence of God, which Aquinas attempts to demonstrate rationally, is still considered in the *Summa Theologiae* " *sub ratio Dei,"* i.e., as *revelabile.* As Aquinas puts the matter in *De Trinitate, Q. 2, a. 3, ad 5,* the theologian who uses philosophy changes the water of philosophy into wine of theology; he does not simply mix the two. No one among recent interpreters has understood this better or emphasized it more than Gilson who, at the same time, drew attention to the originality of Aquinas's philosophical principles. To attribute to Gilson, as Buckley does, the idea that " religious experience or Christianity as such posseses nothing with which to engage this issue of the existence of God" [p. 342] is vastly wide of the mark. Gilson said exactly the contrary: " The God Whose existence we demonstrate is but a part of the God Whose existence we hold to be true on the strength of our faith in His words ... the God of rational knowledge is, so to speak, included within the God of Faith " *[Elements of Christian Philosophy* (Doubleday & Company: Garden City, N.Y., 1960), p. 54]. In fact, Gilson held to a line that I would suppose to he parallel to Buckley's views. In his essay, " Historical Research and the Future of Scholasticism, " Gilson strongly advocated that "scholastic philosophy must return to theology." Only in a theological context will philosophy, presumably, he sufficiently respectful of and able to elucidate the Christian faith that, in all of its experiential aspects, supports and structures belief in a personal, provident God.

What role Athens has in Jerusalem raises questions, especially about the role of philosophy within the theology of Aquinas, that go far beyond and, indeed, may contradict the historical examples of Lessius and Mersenne. Anton Pegis asked: "If St. Thomas incorporated his philosophy within his theology and intended it to he a part of that theology, how do we read it as he meant it unless we read it as theology? And if we read it as theology, what are the conditions under which we then venture to think of it as philosophy? " *[St. Thomas and Philosophy* (Marquette University Press: Milwaukee, 1964), p. 34]. These are questions that lead Gilson and Pegis to a quite different reading of Aquinas than Buckley offers. But on the general theme, how philosophy should function in relation to theology, I look forward to further reflections from Father Buckley.

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Christology in Conflict: The Identity of a Saviour in Rahner and Bath, By BRUCE MARSHALL. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987. Pp. ix + 210. $45.00.

This is an extraordinary hook, perhaps the best book on the con·flicting shape of christology in the academy in recent years. It makes a major contribution to the logic of christology as well as to the con·versation between Barth and Rahner-and Aquinas. In brief, Marshall argues that Barth's christology (honed by Aquinas' logic of reduplica·tion) is more adequate than Rahner's to the shared assumption that the particular individual Jesus Christ is of universal significance.

But this might make the book sound too scholastic-as if it were another in a long line of revised dissertations convincing us that we will be better off siding with one theologian rather than another. **Jn.** stead, Barth and Rahner and Aquinas become test-cases for a problem that has a particular " historical shape " (c. 1). In the Middle Ages, says Marshall, " it seems to have been taken quite for granted, in popu·lar as well as learned or ' high ' culture, that the function of that which is ultimately ' significant ' or ' most important ' in human life belonged uniquely and solely to Jesus Christ, the particular person whose story is told in the Bible" (p. 1). This presumption was undercut in modern·ity when " the inextricable tie of all that is ultimately meaningful to Jesus Christ as a particular person ceased to be completely obvious in Western culture" (p. 2). Some persisted in dogmatically asserting the

particularity of Jesus Christ; others abandoned this particularity in favor of seeking what ought be ultimately meaningful for us all. Still others attempted to mediate between these alternatives. Marshall here uses " mediate " in a technical sense: we mediate when some immediacy has been lost by finding another putative immediacy as a sort of launching pad for the first. Thus, the mediator's christological strategy is 1) to discover or construct "logically general criteria" of meaningfulness and 2) explicate (not prove) how these criteria can be predicated of the particular figure Jesus Christ.

I think it would help Marshall's story to point out that the insistence of the Enlightenment and Romanticism on universality was not merely an outsider's challenge to the particularity of Jesus Christ but a challenge to Christians to do justice to the universality of this particular One. It is important to remember that, although classic Christians rightly agreed on the " *ultimate* significance" of this particular figure, they were frequently wrong on Christ's *universal* significance. We need only think of Barth's criticisms of his tradition on double predestination and Rahner's criticisms of the eschatology of his tradition. On some issues, perhaps the world (against its wishes) continues to understand Jesus Christ better than some Christians. The story of our treatment of the particularity of Jesus Christ would perhaps provide the instance of those respects in which the turning of the world from the Church is the condition of the turning of the Church to the world *(Church Dogmatics* IV/3,1 :21) .

In any case, Rahner is one kind of mediating theologian focused on developing logically general criteria of a specific sort (i.e., transcendental). But (Marshall argues) Rahner fails to explicate how these criteria identify the particular individual Jesus Christ. For example, Rahner contends that how *Jesus Christ* is significant for salvation *(heilsbedeutsam)* depends on how *anything* can be so; but, even if we grant Rahner's theology of the latter, how does this help us describe the former? Indeed, Rahner's strategy seems to make it logically impossible for Jesus Christ to be of ultimate significance *in his particularity.* Marshall offers a careful analysis of "particularity," trading on a contrast between "positive individuality" and "particular individuality" (or, in Aquinas' lexicon, "vague individuality" and " individuality *determinatum distinguens* ") (p. 45). Note :that Marshall does not challenge Rahner's " transcendental theology " as a whole, only its application to the issue of the particularity of Jesus Christ. Chapter 2 makes this case; Chapter 3 responds to a number of objections to criticisms of the " logical indispensability " and " material decisiveness" of Jesus Christ in Rabner. The upshot is that, since Rahner intends to come to terms with both general criteria of meaningfulness

and Jesus Christ's particularity ("I" and "2" above), Rahner's christology is inadequate *on its own terms.*

The main accomplishment of this book is the way it clearly, thoroughly, and non-polemically devastates this essential phase of Rahner's christology. Of course, Rahner's christology has been criticized previously by traditions like Thomism, movements like liberation theology, and individuals like Balthasar. But the criticisms have never been carried out on Rahner's own terms by such a close reading of the texts. I ought to mention that Marshall's criticism are carefully qualified. He does not argue that this provides the clue that unlocks all keys in Rahner; he does not deny that on other issues Barth and Rahner may be more (or even less) comparable. It would not be inconsistent with Marshall's claims to agree with his criticisms of Rahner, while counter-arguing that transcendental christology plays only a minor role in Rahner's theology as a whole. But I think that Marshall's execution of his criticisms will make a counter-argument difficult to sustain on the issue Marshall explores. Certainly much of Rahner's pastoral advice, his analyses of doctrines, and even his insistence that we embrace as much of the transcendental self as the Gospel permits and requires-certainly this and more will abide. But, unless mediating christologies can mount clear, thorough, and non-polemical responses to Marshall on his terms, Rahner's position on the issue of Jesus Christ's particularity will continually qualify his position on other issues.

Barth, says Marshall, proposes an alternative in which logically general claims about redemption and redeemers " are themselves finally meaningful, intelligible, and existentially accessible *because* and in so far as they are appropriately applied to Jesus Christ as a particular person" (p. 118). The name Jesus Christ is inseparable from a particular history, and Barth's many descriptions of this One are descriptions of this One's "narrated pa11ticularity" (p. 129). However, Barth runs into problems because his " ontological descriptions " of how Jesus' history is God's own (especially his account of the *anhypostasis* and *enhypostasis)* become " an increasingly technical descriptive account " which " seems dwarfed by the amount of explanation the description itself needs" (pp. 175-76).

It is at this point that Thomas Aquinas' " logico-sernantic explication of ' This man is God' " becomes helpful. Marshall's analysis at this point seems to suggest-I am not entirely clear on this point-that Aquinas takes account of three sorts of ways of speaking of Jesus Christ: the *modus loquendi* of Scripture, of the church and its councils, and ontological descriptions. The last have " a derivative place " (pp. 179, 182). Indeed, in the *sui generis* case of the hypostatic union ontological descriptions are " ill-suited "; modest "logico-grammatical

analysis" of claims such as " This man is God " are preferable (pp. 181, 183). By book's end, there is a suggestion that the key issues have less to do with issues such as how Jesus is " incarnation of God " (recall the debates in England over" the myth of God incarnate") than with the grammatical rules embedded in teaching that this particular one is God incarnate.

These criticisms of Barth are less devastating than the criticisms of Rahner. This is perhaps because Marshall has felicitously circumscribed his problem so as to distinguish Barth's stand on Christ's particularity from other stands Barth takes-for example, on election (pp. 122-23), the "subjective appropriation" of reconciliation (pp. 148-49), or the *Extra Calvinisticum* (where Barth exhibits "a virtually constitutional unwillingness to disagree with the Reformed theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when *they* disagreed with the Lutherans" [p. 191, note 9]). But it is also because it is puzzling to have a book on the logic of belief in an incarnate God worry a great deal about "technicality." To this reader, the criticism of Barth seems to amount to a charge that Barth's christology often does not adequately distinguish christological "doctrine" and "theology." This, I think, is true. Certainly Barth rarely makes a systematic distinction between dogma and theology, as does Rabner. (This, by the way, makes Marshall's criticism of Rahner all the more cutting. Certainly Rabner would agree that mediating christology is not dognatically required of Catholics; here Rahner consistently outdoes many Rahnerians. But Marshall's argument implies that it cannot even be theologically permitted-perhaps in the name of christological pluralism-without undercutting essential christological doctrine.) The sociological reason for this difference between Barth and Rahner may have to do with the different role of the theologian in Reformed and Roman Catholic communities. But the logic of the difference may have less to do with terminology such as *anhypostasis* than with the options Barth considered (or was handed) for ontological description. For example, let us grant that Barth's ontology aims to describe " what reality must be like given the belief in question" (p. 170). But the problem here may not be primarily the technicalities of some of these descriptions. The problem may be the monistic illusion that there is a *single* thing called " reality " which "must" be; and this problem may be tied to Barth's reading of Anselm and Hegel-a considerably different tradition of " logic " than Marshall (rightly, I think) presumes.

In sum, I can only recommend Marshall's argument-and hope that Marshall goes on to apply his remarkable logical acumen to issues of God's triune identity and theological anthropology. " Particularity " (Marshall would insist) is not a key to unlock all christological doors.

But his analysis shows how it can distinguish as well as relate opposed positions, and so shows how theology contributes to our hope for a common community in and with vigorous dissent from each other.

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Religion and Artificial Reproduction: An Inquiry into the Vatican "Instruction on Respect for Human Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of Human Reproduction." By THOMAS A. SHANNON and LISA SowLE CAHILL. New York: Crossroad, 1988. $17.95 (cloth).

This volume supplies a great deal of useful information on this instruction which it prints in full in an appendix. Chapter 1 supplies an up-to-date survey of available reproductive technologies. Chapter 2 summarizes the Catholic tradition on sexual morality. Chapter 3 analyzes the Instructions, and 4 compares this to the regulations of the American Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (1979), the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (1983), the American Fertility Society (1986), the British Medical Resarch Council (1982), the British Medical Association (1982) the Warmock Report (1984), the Australian National Health and Medical Research Council (1982) and the Victoria Government Committee (1982, 1983, 1984). Chapter 5 reports American reactions including those of Cardinal Bernadin and Archbishop Daniel E. Pilarczyk, theologians Richard A. McCormick, S.J. and James T. Burtchaell, C.S.C., and the columnist Charles Krauthammer.

In Chapter 6 the authors draw their own conclusion. They think the Instruction has performed a service in calling attention to the need to set reasonable limits on the use of reproductive technologies, but they believe " The Vatican's call for legal prohibition of all reproduction technologies that eliminate sexual intercourse extends further than is morally necessary" (p. 138). They show, correctly, *Humanae Vitae's* principle of the inseparability of the unitive and procreative meaning of the marital act is the guiding principle by which the Instruction limits technological reproduction, but they reject this principle and propose in its stead that it is " the committed love relationship of the couple in its totality that gives the moral texture both to their sexuality and to their subsequent role as parents ", since " it is from the wholeness of the relationship that their specific physical acts of sex and

conception take their moral purpose. " Hence they would only exclude technologies that use gametes from donors other than the married couple. They omit discussion of another important principle proposed by the Instruction, namely the right of the child to be born of legitimate parents in a normal manner.

They themselves seem to admit that the principle they propose to limit permissable techniques is not very helpful since after excluding donor methods they add, " although the authors recognize that further discussion may be necessary to clarify this point" (p. 138). In fact, couples consenting to insemination of the woman with a donor's sperm or contracting with a surrogate mother can easily justify their action as contributing to the wholeness of their loving relationship. Theologians who use this principle without further specification are logically forced to accept homosexual marriages and the artificial production of children for such marriages. This book simply ignores such obvious objections to their proposal.

Indeed it does not seriously address in any detail the problem which the Instruction faces frankly and honestly, namely, what kind of reproductive acts are consistent with the totality of a committed loving relationship. Certainly, as the authors admit, some kinds of acts are not consistent with such a relationship, but they do not show critically how the principle they want to substitute for that of the Instruction can determine which reproductive technologies are not morally acceptable.

The Instruction, on the contrary, took the necessary responsibility of proposing such a specification, by defining the structure of the marital act which is essential to this relationship. This does not mean that it defines it merely in its physical character, but in its specifying moral intention (its moral object) as an act which keps intact the intrinsic relation between the expression of love and the transmission of life. Since the authors never explain why this principle, so deeply rooted in the Catholic tradition, is false, nor refute the many arguments in its favor put forth since *Humanae Vitae*, their exposition of the Catholic tradition and the Instruction is largely beside the point.

The authors also state that:

> At stake here is the claim, dear to the current magisterium, that it is in fact possible to formulate absolute moral nol'llls about specific physical actions, so that these can be decided in advance to be morally excluded, no matter what unforeseeable circumstances may come about.
>
> A ·contrasting viewpoint, argued by many theologians working within the broadly Catholic tradition, hut called " dissenters " by the official teachers, is that acts, especially sexual acts have to be evaluated in light of human relationships and the circumstances within which those relationships have their actual texture. This contrasting approach does not represent a cohesive " school of thought, " but is rather represented by many thinkers who raise questions about the best contemporary interpre-

> tation of the Catholic natural-law tradition of moral theology! . . . They ,are called-usually by detractors---" proportionalists." (p.109, 110)

At the expense of being thought a "detractor," I must point out that it is not just the " current magisterium" but the consistent teaching of the magisterium from St. Paul and St. Augustine on that their are *concrete* exceptionless ("absolute") moral norms and that the "dissenters", although they have tried, have not been able to put up a good historical case to the contrary. But, these absolute norms are not about " physical actions " as such, hut about the moral evil of the *intention* to perform actions which have specific physical results. While it is true that those who deny such exceptionless norms and maintain that the decisive moral principle is simply "proportionate reason", i.e. the balance of positive and negative premoral values, do not form a " cohesive school ", this only evidences the fact that while agreeing on a common methodology they have not found any single defense of it which has been able to withstand critical analysis. The present work is another example to prove that this approach with its talk of " the texture of human relationships " and " proportionate reasons " becomes hopelessly vague and arbitrary when faced with the real problems of our day, since it supplies no workable criteria hy which to decide among the new technologies, and thus leaves society open to the uncontrolled employment of them which these authors rightly deplore.

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Madonna: Mary in the Catholic Tradition. By FREDERICK M. JELLY, O.P. Huntington, Indiana: Our Sunday Visitor Publishing Division, 1986. Pp. 210. $7.50 (paper).

Madonna is a hook that is, in this reviewer's opinion, long overdue. There is an abundance of theological material on the subject of Mary available to the " theological public " but much of it is found in scholarly journals and relatively little is in English. Fr. Jelly has done English-speaking Catholics (and probably many others) a real service hy producing a solid, fluid, and readable book on the Woman of Faith who is still attractive to multitudes of people while remaining ohjec· tively an integral part of Catholic biblical and theological traditions. Not only can we not avoid discussing Mary when in dialogue with our non-Catholic brothers and sisters, but also our Catholic understanding

and appreciation of Mary's place in our faith lives needs to be continually nourished. This book contributes much to fulfill this need.

In the book the author gives a good historical background to each of the issues raised: Mary's Motherhood, Virginity, Immaculate Conception and Assumption. His chapter on Private Devotions and Apparitions is a good analysis of the facts and gives some good insights into a particularly delicate aspect of our Marian heritage.

Throughout the book the author displays a familiarity with the latest scriptural developments regarding Mary and these are blended well with theological reflection which help to clarify and deepen our grasp of the mystery who is Mary. It will serve as an excellent introduction for those who are interested in pursuing further certain Marian themes. It sets up clearly the " state of the question. " And for anyone wishing to have a clear and intelligible understanding of the Catholic position on Mary, this is a book to read.

This book is well structured; one's interest is captured and maintained throughout. The reviewer's hope is that this is but the first of several works on Mary by Fr. Frederick Jelly.

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The Risk of Interpretation: On Being Faithful to the Christian Tradition in a Non-Christian Age. By CLAUDE GEFFRE. Translated by David Smith. New York/Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1987. Pp. vi + 298. $12.95 {paperback).

Several years ago, M.-D. Chenu described himself, in his preface to Claude Ge:ffre's *A New Age in Theology* {New York: Paulist, 1972), as " one who, not without some boldness and certain risks, has reacted against decay in theology and envisaged opportune breakthroughs in historical and speculative method. " In the present work, Geffre shows himself likewise willing to take the risk involved in the work of theology. Since theology is a hermeneutical task "from beginning to end," it involves "the risk of distortion and error," but unless theology is willing to take that risk by presenting a creative interpretation of Christianity, it runs the no less serious risk of "simply handing on a dead past" {pp. 1-2).

The present work comprises a collection of fifteen articles and lectures, three of which were previously unpublished, eight of which have been reworked, and all of which have been organized into a consistent

presentation. The hook is divided into three parts, concerned respectively with theological methodology, certain "fundamental realities of Christian revelation, " and Christian praxis in face of the new historical, social, and cultural conditions of our non-Christian age.

The author begins with a lucid presentation of the shift that has occurred in the last twenty years from a theology which understood itself as " constituted knowledge " to a theology of "pluralistic interpretation " (i.e., from " dogmatic theology to hermeneutical theology") (p. 11). Under the influence of such thinkers as Dilthey and Gadamer, theologians have become aware of the critical importance of the present situation of the interpreter or speaker in establishing the meaning of a text or articulating a speculative truth. This new awareness of " a certain kind of dogmatic theology that is offered to us as the only authentic way of interpreting the christian message" (p. 14).

In Chapter II, Geffre takes up the structuralist critique of hermeneutics. He responds to their contention that the meaning of a text can he found only in " the structures of the text and the mechanics of its functioning" by making judicious use of Paul Ricoeur's notion of the " world of the text, " and thus separates himself both from the position of the structuralists and from the sort of hermeneutics which pretends to find the meaning of a text by discovering the intention of its author. He thus shows how theology may employ much that is valuable in the method 0£ the structuralists without falling victim to their criticisms.

Geffre contrasts the hermeneutical model for doing theology with what he calls the " dogmatic model, " characterizing them as " two paradigms of theological study . . . separated by an epistemological revolution " (Chapter III) . While the dogmatic model, which was characteristic of theological work from the Council of Trent until Vatican II, was excessively nominated by the strict formulations of the magisterium, the hermeneutical model is open to constantly new interpretations as it seeks to correlate "the fundamental Christian experience to which tradition hears witness and contemporary human experience" (p. 50).

What separates the old dogmatic model most fundamentally from the new hermeneutical model is an " epistemological revolution " involving a new understanding of the nature of Christian truth. When truth is viewed as a matter of judgment (as *adaequatio rei et intellectus),* theology tends to become simply a matter 0£ repeating a " dogmatic knowledge which has been constituted once and for all time " (p. 54). When truth is seen from the perspective of Heidegger as coming to us in a language that itself interprets us (p. 54), the historical aspect of truth is recognized, and theology is seen as serving the truth most

faithfully not when it simply reproduces "a dead past" (p. 56), but when it produces something that is always new ·• in response to the permanent coming of the original truth that was revealed in Jesus Christ" (p. 62).

In Chapter IV, Geffre considers the freedom of the theologian in the new hermeneutical model. All theology must begin with a " revealed datum " or " deposit of faith . . • handed down from apostolic times " (p. 67) and embodied in texts, each of which is itself an historically conditioned act of interpretation. In its reformulations of that original interpretation, theology is kept from being arbitrary or subjective through its reference to a " rule of faith " which is " not a created authority, but God himself" (p. 71). God works, however, through created authorities which include the authority of " the believing people of God, " " the body of bishops in communion with the Bishop of Rome," and "the community of theologians." The latter enjoy a freedom informed both by a love of the truth and by a certitude that " the mystery of Christ transcends all the statements that the Church can ever make about it " (pp. 71-74) • In his treatment of authority here, Geffre seems to he retreating from the sort of " non-authoritarian theology" be outlined in his *A New Age in Theology* (pp. 8, 40-41) as a response to " the modern rule of reason which will not agree to submit itself to a truth in the name of an authority-even that of God. "

It is curious that Geffre should here employ the notion of a" deposit of faith •.. handed down since apostolic times " (p. 67) when a few pages earlier he asserted that " Christian truth .•. is not an unvarying datum that is handed on from century to century in the form of a fixed deposit" (p. 62). Geffre clearly maintains that there is a "permanent content of truth" in any given dogmatic definition (p. 62), hut the precise nature of that " permanent content " is difficult to pin down. Although it cannot he identified " with a past period in tradition-not even with the New Testament corpus" (p. 40), still Scripture remains "the soul and vital principle of all theology" (pp. 167, 51). Although it cannot he equated with " a dogmatic confession of faith " (p. 71), and although we have to "demystify" both "the illusion of a meaning that is believed to he concealed behind every text . • . or even within the text itself " (p. 3) and " the idea that the content of faith is an unvarying factor underlying many varying theological translations" (p. 68), still ·there is a "truth of the affirmation of faith that is [any dogmatic] formulation" (p. 74). Perhaps such ambiguities are unavoidable in a theology which seeks to discard " the logic of propositions based on the principle of non·contradiction" (pp. 58, 56, 123, 136) and yet maintain that " hermeneutical theology does not cease to exercise a rigorous logic with regard to the truths of faith" (p. 59).

Regardless of such ambiguities, one must agree with Geffre that that truth which is the object of theological knowledge is not so much a "co:qi.plex of conceptual truths" as "a mystery, the act by which God mad{! himself known to men" (p. 60). "The deposit of faith is ... the testimony ... brought about by the event of Jesus Christ," written down in Scripture, and inseparable from "the experience of faith of the early Christian community" (p. 67). We are in contact with that permanent content in that, by the gift and guarantee of the Spirit, we are in continuity with that original comm.unity (pp. 16, 18, 75, 166).

In the second part of the hook, Geffre looks at the resurrection of Christ as interpretative testimony (Chapter V), the theme of "the Son of Man" in the atheistic hermeneutics of Ernst Bloch (Chapter VI), the notions of the "crucified God" and the "Fatherhood of God" in contemporary theological discourse (Chapters VII and VIII), and the meaning of the "Lordship of Christ" for the contemporary believer (Chapter IX).

In his discussion of the crucified God, Geffre reviews the "protest against the God of metaphysics" and the protest against the "social function" that is often assigned to God. In both cases, the immutable God of absolute Being is cast in the role of the villain who either rules out all possibility of "man's becoming himself" (p. 114) or acts as the "ideological guarantee of a conservative social order" {p. 117). Geffre's own failure to "protect against" these facile simplifications of the theological tradition is disappointing. He does, however, make good use of the thought of Karl Rabner in suggesting that the transcendence of God might reconcile "unchangeability and becoming" (p. 123). Weaving together elements of Moltmann, Bonhoeffer, and Varillon, he then shows quite beautifully that this transcendence is a transcendence of love by which God is in solidarity with his suffering creatures. It is regrettable, however, that the transcendence which Geffre here envisions is not "transcendent enough" to allow divine love to he united with absolute Being in the reality of an unchanging God of love: "I have insisted on God's transcendence, hut only after having made it clear that that transcendence was one of love and not one of absolute Being" (p. 124).

In the final section, Geffre considers the role of Christian praxis in the contemporary interpretation of Christianity. Here, he reviews such themes as the pluralism of our age (an age in which Christianity can still function prophetically [Chapter X]), the phenomenon of secularization (which, he argues convincingly, should not lead us to adopt a "theology of secularization" along the lines of Bonhoeffer or Gogarten [Chapter XI]), the dilemma of the primacy of orthodoxy

or orthopraxis (which is revealed insightfully as a false dilemma [Chapter XII]), and the Church both in its struggle for human rights (Chapter XIII) and in its missionary activity (Chapter XIV).

The translation of the work is quite adequate, though there are some places where it misses the nuance of Geffre's text, as when it asserts that "there is no knowledge ..." (p. 14), instead of saying that "it [discourse] is not a knowledge" (French edition, Paris, 1983; p. 23). It can also tend to render the text unintelligible, as when it speaks of "our habit of judging ... the exclusive place of theological truth" (p.54), instead of "our habit of making judgment ••• the exclusive place of theological truth " (French edition, p.76·77). Then, there are moments when it simply says the opposite of what the author intends. Thus Thomas Aquinas is presented as one of those who tend to replace the authority of Scripture with the authority of the magisterium (p.48) instead of being distinguished from them (French edition, p.68), and scientific exegesis and historical method are credited with helping to " bridge the gulf " between exegetes and theologians (p.13) , instead of being criticized for helping to " dig the ditch (*creuser le fosse)* " that separated them (French edition, p.21).

Geffre concludes his book with an epilogue where he comments both critically and hopefully on the recent history of Catholic theology in France. In this he is able both to review the major themes of the book and to establish a challenging program for future work in hermeneutical theology. Despite the reservations I have mentioned concerning some of his views, I think it can be said that Ge:ffre's careful scholarship and insightful arguments, combined with is penetrating grasp of the contemporary theological scene which is evident in his copious notes and references, may represent one of the first flowers of the " new theological spring " of which he speaks.

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Life and Faith: Psychological Perspectives on Religious Experience, by W. W. MEISSNER, S.J. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1987. Pp. xviii + 302. Bibliography. $24.95.

Fr. Meissner is continuing his career-long research into the overlaps of psychoanalysis and religion, and in this book is broadening his perspectives to embrace several other areas of contemporary developmental psychology, in a wide.arching synthesis of broad generaliza·

tions. His underlying thesis is that psychoanalysis, especially in its later ego-psychology and object relationships developments, has insights to contribute to the psychology of religion, and, along with other psychologies of development, clarifies and concretizes the understanding of religion-as-lived, counterpointing the contributions of theology.

The book has three sections. In the first section, the author reflects on a psychology of grace, and sets up a developmental schema of the steps toward spiritual identity, paralleling Freud's psychosexual stages and Erikson's psychosocial stages. He conceptualizes the psychospiritual stages in terms of the theological virtues, partially subdivided into Gospel virtues, and two of the cardinal virtues. Thus his eight stages emerge as faith/hope, contrition, penance/temperance, fortitude, humility, love of neighbor, service/zeal and charity. Prudence, presumably, would relate more to a Piagetian schema, although prudence would certainly also be affected by areas of psychological conflict, while justice would probably be considered a superego derivative.

The second section of the book deals with faith/hope, the first stage of psychospiritual development. The author uses Kierkegaard's analysis of faith as his theological standard. Whether this understanding of faith, in which the formal motivation is absurdity, is preferable to a faith whose formal motive is "because nothing is impossible for God," is debatable. In any event, Kierkgaard's faith would seem to belong more to a stage of final purification than to any earlier developmental phases.

In presenting the stages of faith development, Meissner uses Fowler's schema, based on -Piaget's and Kohlberg's studies, (cognizant of Rothman and Lichter's criticisms in terms of the influence of sociopolitical ideologies, but making no reference to Loevinger's critique from women's perspectives), along with his own contribution of Stage 0, undifferentiated. Moving into the hope dimension of the first stage, he draws on contemporary theologies of hope (Moltman, Metz, Block, etc.), and, having implicitly traced the stages of hope in the faith dimension, examines their psychopathology and psychotherapy. The third section of the book deals with psychology and religious values. After a broad survey of the concept of values in sociology, anthropology, ethics and psychology, the author relates values and grace and concludes with comments on the pathology of value conflict, i.e., alienation.

In sum, the thrust of this book is toward synthesis rather than analysis, towards interrelating the conclusions of large perspectives of research and reflection. It does not present new results of empirical research, but invites and points the directions of future research. It tends to be repetitive but that is perhaps to be expected in a study in which concepts are converging rather than expanding.

There are fairly frequent typographical errors in the text; most of them harmless hut one of them reverses the meaning of the sentence-" institutionally prescribed means " for " institutionally proscribed means" (p. 279), and a couple of them are comical-" In a previous part of this discussion (pp. 000-000) ", (p. 265); see also p. 274.

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Rhetoric and Praxis: The Contribution of Classical Rhetoric to Practical Reasoning. Edited by JEAN DIETZ Moss. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1986. Pp. 168. $24.00 (cloth).

The six essays on classical rhetoric which constitute this collection were first presented at a conference entitled *Classical Rhetoric and the Teaching of Freshman Composition* held October 6-8, 1983, at The Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C. In her excellent introduction, Jean Dietz Moss, the editor, indicates that the purpose of this collection of essays is " to retrieve from the classical age of rhetoric some methods of practical reasoning-methods of stimulating and ordering thought about matters of common concern-that might inform our teaching of writing today" (p. 1). This particular theme runs throughout all of the essays. Professor Moss informs us that the basis of these studies is the conviction that the act of reason has not changed since the time of the Sophists, Plato, and Aristotle, even though its forms have. The reasoning process is the same for us today as it was for those of the past. Armed with this conviction, the authors of these essays attempt to recover from classical rhetoric some means which will assist in the teaching of freshman composition.

In the initial essay, Professor Schoeck gives the background and history of rhetoric, thus setting the stage for the essays which follow. These essays take up in turn five classical concepts: *topoi, enthymeme, kairos, aitia* and *telos.* The first two concepts are the more familiar and are derived from Aristotle's *Rhetoric;* the other three, while less familiar, are discovered throughout the writings of other philosophers and rhetoricians of the classical period. Professor Hairston focuses even more sharply on the cause of the present problem in writing among students. Hairston explains that early in the twentieth century rhetoric as an academic discipline was separated from the English

departments, and then, within a brief period of time, was dropped from the curriculum altogether. In the absence of rhetoric, the teaching of writing was left entirely to literature departments, and according to Hairston, this was a serious mistake. The romantic view held by most literature departments at that time led them to deal with writing as a nonrational activity. The papers in this collection put forward the view that composing is a cognitive task and training in rhetoric can assist in its development. Schoeck reflects the attitude of all the contributors when he proposes that what is needed now is a rhetoric for our times. " One of our purposes in these essays is to insure that there will be a renewed presentation that will keep pace with contemporary literary production" (p. 38).

One must applaud the effort both to improve the writing of compositions by students and to recover a part of classical rhetoric for our day. This particular effort to recover some of the riches of the past appears to be a part of a growing trend which the reviewer heartily endorses.

By and large, this collection of essays is very good. However, a teacher of composition unfamiliar with rhetoric might find its usefulness limited. Although the terminology is defined within the context of the articles, it is my judgment that the essays would be found difficult to understand by one who had little or no previous familiarity with rhetoric. The usefulness of these essays would improve exponentially for someone who came to them equipped with some knowledge of classical rhetoric. None of the articles deals directly with the problem of teaching writing or communication. The participants at the conference at which these essays were originally presented had the advantage of ongoing discussions from which they were able to develop tactics to be implemented in the classroom. While the papers, of themselves, do not give a completely coherent picture of how they might be applied to the actual teaching of freshman composition, nevertheless, they would be found worthwhile by someone interested in this task. A Select Bibliography for Further Reading is appended to the collection which should be found useful by both the expert and the not-so-expert alike.

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Thomas Buckingham and the Contingency of Futures-The Possibility of Human Freedom: A Study and Edition of Thomas Buckingham, De contingentia futurorum et arbitrii libertate. By BARTHOLOMEW R. DE LA TORRE, O.P. University of Notre Dame, The Medieval Institute Publications in Medieval Studies, Vol. XXV. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987. Pp. xii +394.

In this volume, Fr. Batholomew de la Torre offers the text and an extended study of Thomas Buckingham's *De contingentia futurorum et arbitrii libertate,* which is the first of six questions of this scholastic's *Quaestiones theologicae,* more properly entitled *Ostensio meriti liberae actionis.* The six questions are found in their entirety in two English manuscripts, namely *Oxford New College 134* and *Oxford Merton 143.* The *New CoUege* (late fourteenth century) manuscript is earlier and superior to *Merton* (early fifteenth century), and accordingly the editor adopts it except in cases where the Merton reading makes better sense.

The author, Thomas Buckingham, born in the early days of the fourteenth century, was an Oxford scholar at Merton, chancellor of Exeter, and died, very likely a victim of the Black Death, in 1348. The work edited here probably formed a part of Buckingham's exercise prescribed by University statute for those incepting as Masters of Theology. In the editor's view, this inception took place sometime between 1341 and 1346, when Thomas departed Oxford to take up duties at Exeter.

There is some reason to believe that Buckingham may have been a student of Thomas Bradwardine (p. 7); irt is certain, however, that the present work "is a sustained attack on Bradwardine's notion that all future contingents come about by antecedent necessity relative to the first cause, God" (p. 103) • Bradwardine presented his view regarding how we must reconcile God's universal and immutable causality with human freedom in his magnum opus *De causa Dei contra Pelagium.* De la Torre describes Bradwardine's position this way: "For Bradwardine, God is the universal cause of all things, including future contingents. Future contingents are determined by divine antecedent necessity, for God's will concerning them is omnipotent and unimpedible. Such futures nevertheless remain contingent because only man as a secondary cause-and no other secondary cause-is responsible for his free choice. The theory that, once God has determined what a future shall be, He can still determine otherwise, is patently untenable

for Bradwardine because it predicates mutability of God and nullifies all inspired prophecy, including that of Christ" (p. 101).

Bradwardine's exposition here outlined corresponds in its essentials with what Thomas Aquinas had taught in the previous century. The freedom or contingency in man's will act is to he understood in terms of its relationship to secondary or proximate causes. Unlike those events which are determined to come about by virtue of necessitating proximate causes, will acts in this respect remain totally undetermined. Along with this, says Aquinas, we must allow that God, because of His eternal knowledge, knows all futures-determined, as well as contingent-as present. His knowing future contingents, however, does not take away the condition of contingency, since the latter condition rests solely on their mode of occurrence as they relate to secondary or proximate causes.

Thomas Buckingham finds this explanation inadequate. In order to safeguard future contingents or human freedom. Buckingham insists there must be a sense in which the ultimate cause, God, is casually contingent with respect to the human will act. Though his exposition is different in many details, Buckingham's fundamental direction is in accord with what certain predecessors, especially Scotus and Ockham, had argued regarding the problem of divine foreknowledge and future contingents. Indeed, in view of the way Buckingham cites Scotus, the editor considers it reasonable to suppose that he regarded himself a disciple of the Subtle Doctor (p. 132). There is at least one instance where Buckingham exhibits a markedly Scotistic and anti-Ockhamist analysis. This occurs in connection with the explanation as to how in one and the same instant, because of the different moments of natural priority and posteriority, the divine will can both will and not will the same thing.

The editor points out some significant resemblances between Buckingham and the Dominican, Robert Holcot. On the assumption that God's knowledge of future contingents is itself contingent, Holcot concludes that revelation could be false: " (1) Scripture could be false; (2) Abraham could have merited by means of a false faith, and so can any believer; (3) the soul of Christ could have been deceived; (4) Christ could have preached something false; . . . The similarity between Holcot and Buckingham is obvious" (pp. 134-35). These paradoxical theological statements are logically required corollaries flowing from the eternal contingency in God's will respecting all things *ad extra*. We must bear in mind, however, that in the so-called "composed sense", on the assumption God wills *A*, it is impossible that God not will *A*. In the "divided sense", however, it is possible that God wills *A* and that God not will *A*.

The editor also points out how Buckingham may have been influenced hy the Franciscan Adam Wodeham, who was a disciple of Ockham. Adam proposed the following hold conception: " Since a man is free to act or not to act despite God's foreknowledge, John Doe can hy his own free choice make God know from all eternity that John Doe will do a particular thing and similarly John Doe can make God know from all eternity that John Doe will not do that thing" (p. 136).

The student of fourteenth century philosophy and theology owes de la Torre a debt of gratitude for making available the hitherto un· edited *De contingentw futurorum* of Thomas Buckingham. Although, as he readily admits, this work had only a modest influence on later scholasticism, Buckingham does serve as a clear witness to the Scotistic school of thought at Oxford in this important matter.

The edition is well prepared, and the editor deserves special credit in that he had no more than two manuscripts to serve as a basis for his text.

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A Catalogue of Thomists, 1270-1900. Compiled by LEONARD A. KENNEDY, C.S.B. Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1987. Pp. 240, with index.

As a one-time editor of *Theological Studies* pointed out a number of years ago, "it is not easy to judge whether bibliography has served theology well," since the vastness of the latter and the complexities of the former have made progress in this field slow and hesitant. This is particularly true in the area of Thomistic studies where one would expect to find extensive coverage.

The Mandonnet-Destrez-Chenu *Bibliographie thomiste,* a restrospec· tive classified list covering the period from 1800 to 1920, includes some 2,219 entries. Bourke's *Thomistic Bibliography (1920-1940)* continues the record in a carefully organized volume with a remarkable number of 5,666 titles (the numbering begins with serial no. 1001). The Miethe-Bourke *Thomistic Bibliography* updates the record from 1940 to 1978 with some 4,079 items, including the many special issues devoted to St. Thomas on the 700th anniversary of his death in 1974. The *Bulletin thomiste* supplemented the above from 1924 until 1965 when it was superseded hy *Rassegna di letteratura tomistica.*

This *Catalogue of Tkomists,* compiled by Leonard A. Kennedy, C.S.B., of the Center for Thomistic Studies at the University of St. Thomas, has now set for itself the ambitious goal of listing Thomists from 1270 to 1900.

The Introduction states certain limitations: " A decision was made to be tolerant of incomplete source material. " Sources .not available " in an excellent library, and difficult to obtain by interlibrary loan, were not consulted unless they seemed likely to yield more than minimal new information. " Only a minimum of information is given for each entry, hut authors are listed even if some of this " minimal information " is lacking. The terminal date of 1900 was selected because most of the later names are available in the above-mentioned bibliographies and lists. According to the author, these decisions on scope were made because " a full account would require years of research, and result in a several-volumework. "

In the body of the *Catalogue* names are arranged chronologically, but where numbers warrant it entries have been grouped within a century by religious congregation and by country and subarranged chronologically up to 1800, after which date an alphabetical arrangement has been followed.

No effort has been made to include all the works of an individual Thomist. If only one or two titles are given in the sources, they are recorded, but if many are listed only the most significant are included here. The actual number given sems to run from one to :five with a few names having none. Printed works are given preference over manuscripts. These titles, moreover, have been largely abbreviated and give date and place of first publication only. The source of the information, however, is coded in square brackets after the title.

According to the compiler, the most difficult problem was to determine who was a Thomist. Since " there are no criteria universally agreed on," the selection was made with fairly liberal guidelines: an indication in the title of the work, the nature of the work, or a statement of alleged Thomism by an author himself or one of his historians, unless evidence contradicted this.

The Introduction includes a table listing by century the number of Dominicans, other religious, .and non-religious included. This categorization reveals that of the total number of 2,034 entries more than half of the Thomists in each century were Dominicans, except for the nineteenth century when only eleven percent were members of the Order. Of the other religious listed, only Jesuits are represented in large numbers and their peak contribution was reached in the seventeenth century.

The table also shows that around A.D. 1400 there was a noticeable

drop in the numbers of Thomists. After that date, the number increased until the eighteenth century when another significant decrease occurred. In the nineteenth century the number again increased dramatically, though not among Dominicans. Publication of Leo XIII's encyclical *Aeterni Patris,* issued in 1879, would not alone account for this he· cause a large number of publications had already appeared before that date.

There is great need for a good reference work covering this early period of Thomistic bibliography hut this *Catalogue* is not the answer. The only library listed in the acknowledgments is that of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies (Toronto). Under the heading "Works Referred To" eighty·one sources are given hut many major general references are omitted. There is, for example, no indication that Chevalier was consulted nor is there any reference to the classified list of theologians in the *Enciclopedw Cattolica.* Specific titles are also lacking, as, e.g., Paul Wyser's *Der Thomismus.*

The four and one-half page Introduction does not give a clear state· ment of purpose, nor does it give any orientation or historical setting for the material on Thomism and Thomists. The statistical table is a good overview hut lacks adequate interpretation.

The arrangement and information given under each entry are in accordance with the criteria set up by the author, hut it is unfortunate that more information was not given when it was readily available. Many of those using this handbook will not have access to most of the sources used. This means that anyone who is searching for information will find limited facts since each entry gives only name, dates (if known), source, and a selection of abbreviated titles of publications. In a few cases only the name is given without any qualification.

Any author dealing with the medieval period faces more than the· ological problems. Medieval names are among the most difficult to index. The author states that " because of the large size of the index (24 p.) it has not been possible to have more than one entry per per· son " and decisions have therefore been made on " an *ad hoc* basis." If all persons who lived before 1400 are entered under their anglicized Christian names, cross-references are essential from the Latin or vernacular form. Likewise, those who ordinarily had a Latin name in the Renaissance period need a cross-reference from whichever form is not used. In a work of such importance as a catalogue of Thomists from 1270 to 1900 a good index is of prime importance.

Is is only asking for trouble, for ·example, to find Robert of Orford (De Colletorto), whose variations of name include Tortocollo, Here· ford, Orphordius (c. 1300), listed under Robert of Tortocollo with no cross-references from the other forms and no reference to the con·

fusion that exists with William of Macclesfeld (d.1303). Another case in point, among many, is the entry of Harvey Nedellec (Hervaeus Natalis) under " Natalis, Harvey " with no cross-reference from the other forms. Perhaps scholars can handle this situation but certainly not aspiring students. A number of names seem to have been omitted hut one hesitates to say that they are not here because they may be under some obscure form of their names. It is even difficult to recog· nize Jacques Benigne Bossuet under "Bossuet, James B."

The popes are another problem. Most popes are not known by their family names; e.g., to list Pius IX under "Mastai Ferretti, Giovanni Maria, " without a cross-reference from Pius IX, or to find Leo XIII listed under "Pecci, Joachim," without a corresponding reference only confuses the reader. And the farther hack one goes the less familiar will the family name he, as in the case of "Roger, Peter," with no reference from Clement VI (1291-1352). Even "Roger, Pierre " would have been more helpful. Including the name of the pope in the body of the work does not solve the problem.

There are also a number of typographical errors in the spelling of even common names (e.g., Savanrola instead of Savonarola), and there are many errors in simple filing. This tends to destroy one's confidence in the work.

The shortcomings in this book are partly due to the relative brevity of the work, granted the vast range of areas it covers, but even more basicly because of a lack of awareness of the problems involved in doing bibliographical work. Readers who consult the *Catalogue* will no doubt evaluate it in terms of their particular purposes. Librarians, however, will find it most confusing for reference and bibliographical work.

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ERRATA

IN THE GENERAL INDEX, VOLUMES 1 TO 50

Page 183, line 23 ff., should read:

Anderson, James F. *The Bond of Being.*
(Smith, R., O.P.) 16 (1953) 135-137
--*The Cause of Being.* (Thomist Staff) •••...•••. 16 (1953) 595-596
--*Reflections on the Analogy of Being.*
(Mcinerny, R.) 32 (1968) 276-277
Anderson, James *N.* D. *Christianity and Comparative Religion.*
(Rebeiro, M.) 35 (1971) 522-524
-*Morality, Law, and Grace.* (Milmore, A., O.P.) •• 37 (1973) 392-393

Page 185, line 8, "Bachelor ••.[11] should read:

Batchelor, Edward, ed. *HomoseX'l.laZityand Ethics.*
(Barry, R. L., O.P.) 45 (1981) 490-493

(entry should appear on page 186)

Page 190, after line 11, insert the following:

Brandon, S. G. F. *The Judgment of the Dead: The Idea of Life after Death in the Major Religions.*
(Cenkner, W., O.P.) 33 (1969) 591-593

Page 196, line 28 ff., should read:

Collins, Gary R. *Effective Counseling.*
(Nessel, W. J., O.S.F.S.) .....••••••.•••••• 37 (1973) 262-263
--*Fractured Personalities: The Psychology of Mental Illness.*
(Nessel, W. J., O.S.F.S.) •.....•.....•..• 37 (1973) 790-791
--*Man in Transition: The Psychology of Human Development.*
(Nessel, W. J., O.S.F.S.) •••••••••••••••••• 37 (1973) 262-263

Page 198, line 9, "Copelston •••" should read

Copleston, Frederick C., S.J. *Aquinas.*
(Thomist Staff) 19 (1956) 283

(entry should appear after "Copi")

Page 204, after line 36, insert the following:

[Dupre, **L.]** *Transcendent Bel/hood: The Loss a·nd Rediscovery of the Inner Life.* (Marsh, M.) .•.•.•••.•.•.•...••.. 43 (1979) 674-675

Page 221, line 12, should read :

Hudson, Wayne. *The Marxist Philosophy of Ernst Bloch.* (Him.es, K. R., O.F.M.) •.•.••••••.•••••••••. 49 (1985) 660-662

Page 233, after line 31, insert the following:

[Maritain, J.] *Dieu et la permission du mal.* (Heath, T. R., O.P.) 28 (1964) 533-534

Page 238, line 35, "Millet •.." should read :

Milet, Jean. *God or Christ'I* (Johnson, E. A., C.S.J.) ••••••••••••.••••••• 47 (1983) 623-625

(entry should appear after "Midgley")

Pog.e 270, line 3, "VandePol •.."should read:

Pol, W. H. van de. *The Christian Dilemma: Catholic Church-Ref-0rmation.* (Pater, T.) .....•••..•...•••. 16 (1953) 585-591

(entry should appear on page 249)

Page 290, after line 12, insert the following:

Marsh, M. 43 (1979) 674

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VOLUME *58* (1989)

ARTICLES

REVIEWS