THE MEANING OF VIRTUE IN THE CHRISTIAN MORAL LIFE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR HUMAN LIFE ISSUES

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RECENTLY, AN International Congress of moral theology convened in Rome brought together some three hundred academicians. They participated in an open forum devoted to current questions in moral theology and bioethics. Held at the Lateran University, the Congress, *"Humanae vita,e: 20 Anni Dopo,"* was divided into two parts. Although a majority of the presentations concerned the relevance of the Church's teaching on artificial contraception, the membership did devote the second part of the Congress to a sustained discussion of some new issues raised by *Donum vitae* (1987), the recent instruction of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith on " Respect for Human Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation." To be sure, both documents emphasize the Church's constant teaching concerning the providence of God in human life and the dignity of the human person. Nevertheless, procedures such as GIFT (gamete intra.-fallopian transfer), LTOT (low tubal ovum transfer), TOT (tubal ovum transfer) provide the moral theologian with new challenges to interpret the Church's position which insists on identifying the procrea.tive and unitive aspects of Christian marriage. The following article discusses the papal documents from the perspective of a realist moral theology.

First of all, I would like to recall a principle which Paul VI, however obliquely, enunciated in the course of *Humanae Vitae,* for I consider the principle an axiomatic one in the present discussion. At the beginning of section 8 entitled "Pastoral

Directives," we find a statement of theological purpose which should guide all Catholic moral practice. Hence, I would like to quote this text as a way of introducing the meaning of virtue in the Christian moral life.

> The Church, in fact, cannot have a different conduct toward men [and women] than that of the Redeemer: she knows their weaknesses, has compassion on the crowd, receives sinners; but she cannot renounce the teaching of the law which is, in reality, *that law proper to a human Zife restored to its original truth* and conducted by the Spirit of God.[1]

I am especially struck by the phrase " that law proper to a human life restored to its original truth," for I believe it actually describes the kind of life which develops in those who practice the virtues. Yet, before speaking about the implications of a virtue-centered morality for the difficult issues of bioethics, I would like to remark briefly on the way certain contemporary theologians misinterpret what Paul VI calls the " law proper to a human life restored to its original truth." In order to do so I have divided this paper into three parts. Thus, the first section of the paper examines several themes in contemporary moral methodology. The second section provides a general statement about the relationship between moral theology and the *sa,cra domrina.* Finally, the third section briefly considers why the life of virtue remains the only legitimate means for fulfilling the " law proper to a human life restored to its original truth." First, then, to contemporary themes.

I

Proportionate Reason and the Ethics of Personal Responsibility

In an earlier draft of this paper, I titled this section "St. Ignatius, St. Alphonsus, and St. Elsewhere." I had considered actually outlining the moral methodologies of two Roman theo-

[1] Paul VI, *Humanae vitae,* n. 20.

logians, the German Jesuit Josef Fuchs [2] and the Redemptorist Bernard Haring. [3] These authors have influenced most leading revisionist moral theologians in America, especially Charles Curran.4 One could argue, therefore, that they figure among the principals in the current debate over bioethical norms. Upon reflection, however, it seemed rpreferable simply to signal two or three basic themes which appear in most revisionist moral theology, especially as it has been developed in the United States. In brief, these themes focus principally on (1) the freedom of the individual, and (2) the consequences or end results of an action.

Revisionist moral theologians receive their name from the fact that their announced purpose includes a radical revision of pre-Conciliar casuistry. [5] Nevertheless, the revisionist project, at least as it has developed up to this point, actually exhibits some marked similarities to the casuist model of moral theology. As a result, we can signal at least two features of casuist morals which hold a central place in the revisionist project. First, casuists placed a great deal of emphasis on the function of conscience in the moral life. Secondly, they developed a quite complex principle of double effect as a means for resolv·ing difficult moral cases. Traditionally, then, moral theologians have recognized the importance of a person's freedom and an actions's consequences in moral discourse.

All in all, the revisionists treat these same issues. But re-

2 For a representative sample of his work, see Josef Fuchs, S.J., *Personal Responsibility and Christian Morality,* trans. William Cleves *et al.*, ('iV'ashington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1983) and a second collection of essays, *Christian Morality: The Word Becomes Flesh,* trans. Brian McNeil, (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, Press, 1987).

a His three-volume *Ji'ree & Faithful in Ghrist* (New York: Crossroad, 1982) presents the most comprehensive statement of Haring's outlook on morals.

4 See Charles Curran, *Directions in Fundamental JJ!oral Theology* (Notre Dame, Univ<msity of Notre Dame Press, 1985), for a general overview of the author's current positions.

5 Servais Pinckaers provides the best theological analysis of the ettsuist model in *Les souraes de la morale chretienne. Sa methode, son eontenu, son histoire* (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1985), esp. cc. 10, 11.

visionist moral theology employs these elements which would form an integral part of any moral theory in an altogether different way. In particular, revisionists of the" free and responsible " school focus on the immanent act of choice or decision, whereas revisionists of the " consequentialist " school focus onto the results of a transient action. Thus, we frequently hear theologians argue as if human freedom or an act's consequences themselves constituted self-contained and free-standing arguments to determine an action's moral value. Curran's theology of compromise, for example, simply asserts that the conscientious exercise of personal liberty frequently requires that one not conform to the moral norms which embody the original truth of human life.[6] And *Donum vitae,* in fa.ct, refutes the common claim that certain actions are morally justified simply because the conception of a child results. Revisionist moral theology, in short, confuses immanent and transient actions.

First, consider the ethics of personal responsibility. One of the most common appeals made against observing moral norms, including those set forth in *Donum vitae,* rests on the supposition that the principal moral good for any human individual always remains the freedom to choose. To cite an obvious example, consider the fact that abortion advocates describe themselves as "Pro-Choice." To be sure, freedom, as St. Thomas Aquinas reminds us, remains one of the promised effects of Christ's redemptive death. Nonetheless, New Testament freedom always orders the human person towards choos-

6 Curran actually argues that the presence of sin in the world requires such a " theological reality." Thus he writes that the "presenee of sin may force a person to do something one would not do if there were no sin present. . . . A theory of compromise does not give us a blank check to shirk our Christian responsibilities. However, there are situations in which the value sacrificed [read: "original truth of human life "] is not proportionate to the demand asked of the Christian." See his essay on natural law in *Directions,* p. 124. In a later essay, "Utilitarianism, Consequentialism, and Moral Theology," Curran acknowledges that "it was a mistake to use the term the 'theory' of compromise . . . . " *ibid.,* p. 193. Rather, he changes the proposal to a theological reality.

ing the infinite ·goodness of God.7 Indeed, the political concerns of the free world and liberal democracy do not always help us remember this essential truth. Notwithstanding this cultural obstacle, the Christian tradition offers no support for the view that the ability to choose among the largest number of alternative options constitutes a normative value for directing the moral life. Only when moralists separate human life from the truths of revelation do we find human *praX'is,* shaped by the virtue of prudence, degenerating into *techne.*

Of course, Christian theology does consider the role of intentionality in the life of the individual. The Church, moreover, as numerous doctrinal controversies witness, rightly upholds the authentic role of the human person's created freedom in pursuing the goals of the moral life. Still, the Christian theologian values free choice not as an end in itself, but as a means whereby the human person engages in the prudential process of attaining God. Since Christian freedom never means simply self-determination or self-realization, the Church sets forth moral teaching to insure that the exercise of free choice always includes the basic choice for "human life restored to its original truth " and Beatitude. As the Fathers of the Second Vatican Council have declared, man is the only creature that God has desired for himself.[8]

1 Commenting on the last request of the Our Father, St. Augustine wrote: "We pray to be delivered from evil, for this liberation makes of us free beings, that is, sons of God, in such ·a way that, thanks to the ·spirit of adoption, we cry out to God: Father, Father!" *De Sermone in monte,* II, 11, 38 (PL vol. 34, col. 1285). Ceslaus Spicq, O.P. explicates this point in *Oharity and Liberty in the New Testament* (New York: Alba House, 1965). On the other hand, some theologians argue as **if** committed love alone suffices to establish the moral character of a given action. For example, Thomas A. Shannon and Lisa Sowle Cahill, *Religi<ni and Artifioial Reproduotion. An Inquiry into the Vatican "Instruotion on Respeot for Human Life,"* (New York: Crossroad, 1988), p. 138: "**It** is the committed love relationship of the couple in its totality that gives the moral texture both to their sexuality and to their subsequent roles as parents. **It** is from the wholeness of the relationship that their specific *physical aots of sero and oonoeption* take their moral purpose " (emphasis added) .

s Cf. *Gaudium et spes,* c. 2, no. 24 *in fine* makes this remark with reference to the *imago Dei* and Trinitarian indwelling. " This likeness reveals

Thus, even in the face of ubiquitous criticism, the Church remains faithful to her own identity and mission. As a sign of salvation and an instrument of the divine will, the Church remains Emmanuel for all of us. Consequently, the Church sees no alternative to rproviding specific directions on what concretely constitutes the economy of God's love. In doing so, the Church is essentia.Ily following the norms given by Thomas Aquinas. He, in fact, gives us three arguments why the Church must take her teaching authority seriously. He tells us, first of all, that every.body and not just a few have a right to know the truth about moral matters. Secondly, since morals pertain to personal salvation, they have to be learned quickly. And finally, dependent upon the wisdom contained in revelation, the Church can present sacred doctrine "without admixture of error." Needless to say, his arguments presuppose the divine assistance that we call grace; for, in the last analysis, we are measured not by human norms but by those proper to God alone.

To be sure, certain revisionist theologians take sharp exception to this view of personal freedom and responsibility within the Church. Indeed, many argue that " the law proper to human life restored to its original truth "-especially in matters of reproductive technology-constitutes an infringement on the exercise of persona.I freedom.[9] Consequently, we are not surprised to discover tha.t today the People of God remain inclined to accept, at least, srpeci:ficmoral instruction as the hard price one pays for being Catholic. To tell the truth, many Catholics prefer to minimize any understanding of Church teaching, rather than choose to recognize it as authentic means whereby the human person can discover union with God. Thus, the mora.I law, rather than serving freedom, becomes its enemy.

that man, who is the only creature on earth which God willed for itself, cannot fully find himself except through a sincere gift of himself."

a For example, John Mahoney, S.J. argues that since couples remain free to express married love in ways other than intercourse, conception need not occur only as a result of the marital act. See " Test-tube Babies," *Tablet* 232 (1978), p. 734.

Accordingly, in order both to favor human initiative and to promote personal responsibility, the revisionists have sought ways to provide a flexible interpretation of the New Law's normative character. In so doing, they have paid little attention to the proposal of *Donum vitae* to speak about the " purposes, rights, and duties which are based upon the bodily and spiritual nature of the human person." [10] In addition, they have practically ignored the place of virtue in the moral life. Rather, the ethics of personal responsibility so emphasizes the exercise of freedom that respect for the God-given finalities of human nature-what Paul VI calls the " law proper to a. human life "-receives scant, if any, notice in the formulation of moral argument. In effect, the revisionists frequently prescind from our supernatural call to holiness.

Furthermore, the revisionists' project to make the exercise of personal responsibility an ultimate moral norm requires the theoretical construction called pre-moral/non-moral/ ontic evil as an essential component of its scheme. As Louis Janssens puts it, " Ontic evil and moral evil •a.re not the same." [11] In brief, this theory supposes that every action, even one adequately defined and constitutive of a complete moral species, still maintains a sort of independent and morally neutral status until subjective factors, such as the personal motive or intention of the agent, definitively determine its moral character. In other words, it denies any moral status to a given act such as blasphemy, lying, suicide.

Obviously, those who would make human autonomy the principal criterion of the moral life find this division between evil as a moral category and evil as a kind of quasi-ontological existent helpful for e:x;plainingtheir point of view. Why? Because the category of pre-moral/non-moral/ontic evil provides

10 *Donum vita.e,* Introduction, 3.

11 See Louis Janssens, "Ontic Evil and Moral Evil," in *Reading in Moral Theology.* No. I. *Moral Norms wnd Catholic Tradition,* edited by Charles E. Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S.•T. (New York: Pauli st Press, 1979), p. 67.

the theoretician with an excuse for ignoring the nature of an action in itself. By this phrase, " the nature of the action in itself," I intend the particular shape of moral being which a properly defined action necessarily embodies. All in all, there exist general statements in morals, founded on the nature of human activity, that have meaning which can be verified without being bound up with an example. And, of course, only in this context can one begin to defend absolute moral norms.[12]

Consider, for instance, a case which commentators on *Donum vitae* find difficult to comprehend. The distinction between the kind of homologous artificial insemination which substitutes for the conjugal act and the kind which serves to facilitate it clearly means little to many revisionist theologians.13 The distinction, moreover, also provides one of the most difficult challenges for those who must explain the Church's position on AIH. In addition, the Church agrees that general statements about these two kinds of actions can serve the purposes of moral instruction. So we can expect that moral theology will defend the validity of this pra.ctice. Of course, since most people wssume that any form of AIH simply assists nature accomplish its purpose,[14] it should come as no surprise at all that few recognize the validity of these general statements or the moral truths which they embody.

Of course, the ability to formulate general statements in

12 Thomas Gilby, O.P., *Principles of MoraUty. (Summa theologiae* Ia2ae. 18-21), Vol. 18, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965), provides a succinct explanation of this concept in Appendix 11, "Moral Objectives," as a commentary on Aquinas's q. 18 of the *prima-secundae.*

1s Thus, Andre E. Hellegers and Richard A. McCormick, S.J., in "Unanswered Question on Test Tube Life," *America* 139 (1978), pp. 74-78 argue that artificial insemination (AIH), and to that extent *in vitro* fertilization with embryo transfer, "cannot be analyzed in a morally decisive way by exclusive appeal to the design of the conjugal act." Also Edward V. Vacek, S.J. "Notes on Moral Theology: 1987," *Theological Studies* 49 (1988), pp. 110-131 even quotes the archbishop of Rennes to the effect that the rejection of AIH is " not easy to understand."

14 For example, Rabbi Seymour Siegel in the *Washimgton Post,* July 28, 1978, noted that " if nature played a trick, as it has in this case, if we can outsmart nature, that is theologically permissible."

morals which are not bound up with a particular example of an action implies the existence of what realist moral theologians call moral objectives. In other words, the act of artificial insemination, for example, embodies a specific moral nature or moral objective. Therefore, forms of AIR which substitute for the conjugal act actually constitute a specific kind of action-what the theologians sometimes call a moral "object" (or objective)-different from the "object" of those forms which simply facilitate sexual congress. As a result, in the former case, because the technique constitutes a complete separation of procreation from the conjugal act, one can measure to what extent the action in itself falls short from fulfilling " that law proper to a human life." In this instance, of course, the law appropriate to matrimony or wedded love applies.

Admittedly, which techniques actually constitute a complete separation remains a matter of dispute. But, since this issue forms part of another discussion, the question need not detain us here. In addition, why " human life restored to its original truth" requires that procreation remain united with the conjugal act also belongs to another area of theological investigation. Actually, Christian anthropologists should set forth the theological implications of the conjugal union between man and woman. On the other hand, the moral theologian may affirm that a given action (for example AIR) can be defined in such a way that any realization of the action already possesses a moral nature as real as the nature of any other created thing. For the realist moral theologian, then, moral being belongs to the whole order of creation. To take a simple example, auto-erotic behavior already brings about its deleterious effects on personal development and virtue before one considers the motives of the unchaste person or the consequences of the unchaste act. Masturbation and prurience, for instance, have a way of dehumanizing the Christian condition, even if revisionists dismiss them in the interests of some kind of technical nominalism.[15]

15 See, for example, Charles E. Curran, " Sexual Ethics: Reaction and Critique," *Lina.ere Quarterly* 43 (1976), pp. 147-64.

By this I mean that revisionist moral theologians advance the view that actions, such as the standard non-facilitating techniques of AIH, masturbation, and so forth, simply con'-sidered in themselves, as actions, amount to nothing more than " physical " reality. For instance, one could purport to de-scribe AIH as the morally-neutral removal of semen from the husband and its insertion in the womb of the wife. Of course, even revisionists must recognize that this particular form of begetting a child does not conform to the measure of natural intercourse. Thus, to account for the fact that artificial in-semination entails something defective, they propose the phi-losophical fiction of pre-moral, non-moral, or ontic evil. I call it a fiction because, in fact, evil can only result from the ab-sence of some perfection which ought to exist in a created thing. To consdier evil a positive reality actually amounts to an illusion. To put it differently, the revisionist construal of AIH ignores the rupture of the " one flesh " of man and woman in marriage inherent in the very action itself. Obviously, such a. position clears the way for a moral analysis focused on the creative dispositions, such as the good purposes, of the indi-vidual. Nevertheless we see once again their preference for *techne* over virtue ..shaped *praxis.*

Besides, the Christian tradition acknowledges only two ways of looking at evil. These include the *malum poenae,* or the punishment suffered as a result of sin, and the *malum culpae,* or the actual fault itself which constitutes the defect of sin.[16] According to Catholic teaching, both varieties of evil, if you will, remain metaphysica.Ily related to the existential state of original sin. Indeed, the Church holds that the sin of Adam is communicated to every person horn into the world. To he sure, certain of these "punishments" result from personal moral agency only in a derived wa.y, for example, earthquakes, famines, or other natural disasters. Nevertheless, all natural

1s See T. C. O'Brien, *Effects of Siln, Stailn and Guilt. (Summa theoZogiae* la2ae. 86-89), Vol. 27, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1974), pp. 99-109.

disorders remain clearly connected to the siillul and broken condition of the human race which results from the sin of Adam and find restoration only in the New Adam. As a result, only theological faith which invites the human person to share in the redemptive suffering of Christ provides whatever rational apology one can give for such evils. As you know, *Donum vitae* recalls this truth in the case of infertility.[11] On the other hand, there exists nothing within the theological tradition which speaks a,bout pre-moral/non-moral/ ontic evil in the way that the revisionists have employed these categories. Although one author does speak about "creative regret " when personal initiative or circumstances requires the performance of an ontic evil. Still we perceive the unnecessary distancing in this regard from the Christian tradition.

It is interesting to note that this is not the first time in the history of moral theology that theologians have sought to carve out large ·area:sof moral neutraHty hy recourse to mental constructs ·and hypotheses. For instance, Blaise Pascal's *Fourth Provincial Letter* provides a good example of how something similar occurred in the Church during the 17th-century. Then, French Catholicism, tortured by conflicts between Jansenist and orthodox Catholics, witnessed a curious attempt on the part of, yes, Jesuits, to ease the rigorist moral standards presumably promoted by those holding extreme Augustinian views about virtue, sin, and redemption. **If** Pascal can be trusted, it seems that certain writers even advanced the theory that in order for a sinful action to matter, a complete set of subjective conditions had to be met. The theory apparently developed to the point that among the subjective conditions some included the requirement that a person fully recognize that the disordered action directly opposed God's law. Pascal retorts:

> Blessings on you, my good Father, for this way of justifying people! Others prescribe painful austerities for healing the soul; but you show that souls which may be thought desperately distempered are in quite good health. What an excellent device for

[17] *Donum vitae,* II, 8.

being happy both in this world and in the next! I had always supposed that the less a man thought of God, the more he sinned; but, from what I see now, if one could succeed in bringing himself not to think upon God at all, everything would be pure with him in all time coming. Away with your half-and-half sinners, who retain some sneaking a:ffection for virtue! They will be damned every one of them, these semi-sinners. But commend me to your arrant sinners-hardened, unalloyed, out-and-out, thorough-bred sinners. Hell is no place for them; they have cheated the devil; purely by virtue of their devotion to his service![18]

Obviously, Pascal's (imaginary?) Jesuit opponent fails to distinguish between a moral good in itself and the subjective disposition of the moral agent. To be sure, the view that one can actually know the "law proper to a human life restored to its original truth " does not mean that the subjective side to morality does not exist.

Moral realism does not amount to a form of philosophical essentialism. Indeed, from the side of the subject a range of dispositions from the swift upsurge of lust to the highly personal intentions which direct acts of self-sacrifice can certainly affect the complete moral analysis of whatever moral objective. In the former case, unruly passion upsets the voluntary, as Aristotle termed the basic source for moral action in the human person. And although the disordered activity, for instance, sexual assault, still embodies its own punishment, involuntary or non-voluntary behavior does nevertheless disqualify the agent from further moral scrutiny. In the latter case, on the contrary, personal intentions can transfomi otherwise purposeless events, such as undergoing unjust punishment, into expressions of virtue. Nevertheless, in both instances one can identify a moral objective, for example, rape or martyrdom, whose basic goodness or badness derives from the action's conformity to the authentic goals of human and divine flourishing. Rape obviously diminishes the good of sexual congress whether the rapist be sane or not. On the

[18] Pascal. *The Provincial Letters,* trans. A. J. Krailshemier, (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1967), pp. 64, 65.

other hand, martyrdom furthers the good of the Church by its witness to the truth about God and a godly life, even if both martyr and politcial prisoner suffer the same physical torments. Act and intention combine to make the difference.

Furthermore, the various schools of casuistry, as the different casuist models were called, also shared a common philosophical conception about human freedom. The casuists spoke about the "liberty of indifference."[19] Thus, they defined human freedom as the ability of the person to remain indifferent towards the judgment of reason about a particular good to be done or evil avoided. They held that a person should maintain this free "indifference" even when reason recognized a particular moral objective as insufficient for a life of human and divine fulfillment. Casuist freedom, then, principally refers to choosing between contraries, that is, between what the intellect presents as a reasonable moral action and its contrary. To be sure, such a conception of freedom results in the construal of free choice as exclusively the work of will or the rational appetite. As a matter of interest, this explains why in certain Roman Catholic circles we frequently hear reference made to grace and "free will." The implica.tions of this d.Uection for Christian doctrine, however, are serious and longreaching. They include principally a divorce between the cognitive and the volitional powers and the subsequent limitation of right reason on human choosing. Still, the separation that the casuists make is essentially grounded in a fractured anthropology.

Thus, the casuists do not recognize either reasoned appetite or appetitive reasoning, but only naked free will choosing.

10 Even the Dominican author, Dominic Prfunmer, felt obliged to include reference to the liberty of indifference. He concludes a brief discussion of the difference between the free and the necessary: "*E11J quibus declara.tionibus da.tis sequitur,* ut omne liberum sit voluntarium, sed non vice versa omne voluntarium sit liberum. *Ad koc etia.m, ut voluntarium sit Uberum, omni.no requiritur, ut a.ccedat* libertas indifferentiate." *Ma.nuale Tkeologia.e Moralis secundum princi,pia 8. Thomae Aqufuatis.* Tomus I. (Fribourg, 1923), p. 39.

Historians of philosophy generally agree that the roots of this conception of freedom lies in the *via moderna*, especially, in the teaching of the nominalist William of Ockham. In fact, the theory does reflect the nominalists' suspicion about the intellect's ability to possess any kind of universal moral knowledge and the consequent ineffectiveness of *recta ratio* for pointing the wa.y towards moral good. On this point there exists the sharpest similarity and strongest comparison between casuist views of freedom and the conception of freedom which undergirds moral theories of personal responsibility and freedom. The New Testament, however, reminds us that in order for one to enjoy the freedom and fidelity of Christ, we must put on the mind of Christ. In this context, then, we recall thait Paul VI urges us to follow the " law proper to a human life restored to its original truth." All in all, free choice involves knowing what we want as much as wanting whait we know. As the theologians remind us, we find our wholeness, not in philosophical disputes hut in the Lord.

A second theme associated with moral revisionism considers the consequences or end results of an action as a principal determinant in moral reasoning. A generic version of the principle of proportionate reason runs like this: Desired good results can provide legitimate grounds for performing an action, even if it does not conform to a good moral objective, provided there exists a discernible proportion between the disordered action and the good result.[20] As you know, many theologians and ethicists use some form of this argument to promote AllI, IVF and, even, AID. Thus the report of the Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society states: " In specific instances, the use of heterologous gametes (in AID) may protect the offspring, for example, when a serious genetic disease would be conveyed by the gametes of one of

[20] Cf. Brian Johnstone, C.Ss.R., "The Meaning of Proportionate Rea.son in Contemporary Moral Theology," *The Thomist* 49 (1985), pp. 223-247, for a survey of the various models employed by revisionist moral theologians.

the parents." [21] Obviously the focus on good results coming from bad actions makes the theory of non-moral/pre-moral/ ontic evil an attractive companion theory for the principle of proportionate reason. In the example of AID, one simply regards the rpre-moral ·adulterous conception with "creative regret." [22] Some may even complete the inversion of the moral order by calling the donation of a gamete to an infertile couple an a.ct of charity. [23] In this connection, one recalls Nietzsche's wish that philosophers become legislators and invent new values!

Before closing this first section I want to stress that good moral theology must consider both the personal intention of the moral agent as well as the circumstances in which he or she acts. In fact, the traditional norms for formulating a moral analysis include reference to what the manualists called "object, end, and circumstance." [24] My purpose in simply concentrating on the role of moral objectives derives from the fact that ordinary moral discourse today pays very little attention to them. As a result, the revisionist platform does not easily include a plank for virtue. We should not find this surprising. As the philosopher William M. Sullivan recently remarked, " The moral problems of a predominantly utilitarian self are simply strategic or technical problems." [25] Virtue, on the other hand, insures that the whole person, " *corpore et anima unus,"* as the Council put it, embrace the good ends of human life embodied in moral objectives. [26]

21 The American Fertility Society, *Fertility and Sterility,* Supplement I, 49 (1988), p. 2S.

22 See A1bert R. Di Ianni, S.M., " The Direct/Indirect Distinction in Morals," *The Thomist* 41 (1977), pp. 350-380.

2s *Fertility and Sterility, loo. cit.*

24 For example, see the excellent study by William E. May, "Aquinas and J anssens on the Moral Meaning of Human Acts," *The Thomist* 48 (1984), pp. 566-600.

25 William F. Sullivan's address, " Religous Communities of Memory and Hope," to the 1988 assembly of the Conference of Major Superiors of Men, *Origins,* September 22, 1988 (Vol. 18, no. 15).

26 *G-attdium et Bpes* c. ·1, no. 14 as quoted in *Donum vitae,* Introduction, 3.

II.

Christ, Moral Theology, and the Blessed Trinity

By definition, Christian theology results from intelligent reflection upon the revealed Word of God. As such, it embraces within its range of concerns everything which has to do with God himself and the real world which he created. However, because the human person possesses the capacity for a personal relationship with the blessed Trinity, men and women hold a privileged place among theology's interests. Moral theology, in particular, comprises that part of theology which studies human action as ordered to the ultimate Goal of human existence. Only the loving vision of God, the only true and comrplete Beatitude, satisfies both the personal desires and the natural capacities of each human person. All in all, this kind of moral life finds its specific detail and achievement only through divine grace, which includes the exercise of the moral and theological virtues as well as the practice ·of the Gifts of the Holy Spirit. In addition, the biblical Beatitudes contained in the Sermon on the Mount assure that the moral life of the new dispensation goes beyond the casuistic minimum sometimes suggested by forms of moral positivism.

To the extent that its development depends upon the light of divine Revelation, moral theology constitutes a science formally distinct from natural ethics. Nevertheless, moral theology, since it forms a constitutive part of the *sacra, doctrina,* must adapt to human ways of knowing and speaking. Thus, the moral theologian relies upon the structures and categories of moral philosophy for the articulation of his science. Still, the starting point of moral theology always remains the words and deeds of Jesus Christ as they have been recorded in the canonical Scriptures. These *aota et gesta Christi,* as Aquinas calls them-the words and deeds of Christ -hold a unique place in the life of the Christian Church.[21]

[21] See his introduction at *Summa theoZogiae* IIIa q. 27 where he enunciates the principle that all the mysteries of Christ's life compose the one act of divine salvation.

The reason is simple. Although Jesus remains a man, one like us in a.ll things but sin, yet he also remains hypostaticly united to the divine Logos. His words, then, embody both wisdom and life.

The Christian vocation always entaiils the following of Christ. Nevertheless, both Christian life and theology begin in the very depths of God's own Being. For only there does the Eternal Father speak his personal Word which perfectly reflects the divine nature and the intelligibility of all creation. In fact, Jesus himself bears witness to this truth when he tells his disciples "Now they know that everything that thou hast given me is from thee; for I have given them the words thou gavest me . . . . " (John 17: 7, 8) . Accordingly, when the Dominican theologian, Cardinal Cajetan (1469-1534), defined *sacra doctrina* as all knowledge taught us by God's grace, he affirmed something very important about Christian theology.[28] In particular, Cajetan teaches that theological wisdom forms part of the *reditus,* that is, the return of the human creature to God. Thus, *Donum vitae* rightly reminds us that " no biologist or doctor can reasonably claim, by virtue 0£ his scientific competence, to be a.ble to decide on people's origin and destiny."29 No, the origin and destiny of the human person constitute subject matter for theology.

This conception of theology as derivative from the *sacra doctrirz.a* allows us to make some general observations about the nature of theology and the place bioethical concerns hold in theological discourse. First, theology, as Aquinas reminds us, remains formally a single discipline. As a result, only purposes of organization require that one distinguish between mo:r:al and dogmatic theology. In order to provide a complete theological argument for the Church's teaching on natural

2s See Cajetan's commentary on *Summa theologiae* Ia q. I printed in the Leonine edition. Special attention to *Summa theologiae* Ia q. I, a. 5, ad 2 provides a clear statement concerning how *saora dootrina* relates to the other sciences.

20 *Donum vitae,* Introduction, 3.

family planning or any issue related to the use of reproductive technology, the moral theologian remains obliged to address so-called dogmatic issues, for example, the blessed Trinity, the pa:ssion of Christ, the Immaculate Conception •and other mysteries whereby we live our]ajth. Christ not only teaches us the truth, but he also makes it possible for us to live it. The living out of moral truth belongs to the economy of salvation. As St. .Augustine 1suggests,he who does the truth does so in virtue of him who is the Truth. [30]

Secondly, although the so-called "specificity of Christian ethics " debate once again has raised the question of the relationship which exists between rational ethics and moral theology, all authentic theological discourse remains a science of faith. In brief, this means that God-not the Church-ultimately guarantees the truth of divine ,instruction on morals. For the Christian, then, there does not exist a separate realm of moral wisdom-what some refer to as the " categorical level " of morality-which remains independent of the First Truth who is God. *Donum i:itae* makes clear that judgments about reproductive technology can only stand " in reference to the dignity of the human person, who is called to realize his vocation from God." [31] Indeed, the difficult questions of the proper use of reproductive technology make it abundantly clear that attempts to identify neutral rational precepts within moral theology simply miss the point of *sacra doctrina.*

Thirdly, the *sacra doctrina* must concern itself a.bout a kind of thing called natural law, just as it is concerned about the five ways of "proving" God's existence. However, the theologian's primary interest in natural law will be its functions

[80] The celebrated conflict between Abelard and St. Bernard on this point underlines the impor.tance of setting forth moral teaching within the context of the Mystical Body. At least in his *Ewpositio in Epistolam ad Romanos,* Abelard seems to intimate that Christ provides only example and encouragement for the moral life. Cf. Richard E. Weingart, *The Logic of Divine Love: A Oritical Analysis of the Soteriology of Peter Abailard* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), esp. pp. 139-44.

[81] *Donum vitae,* Introduction, 3.

in fide, or in the Faith (not before the Faith) a.s actually permeated by divine grace which alone establishes our supernatural and only final end. Such a situation requires the presence of Christ. In other words, by some ecclesiological arrangement, Christ makes it known how, concretely, union with the blessed Trinity is to be worked out in everyday ethical matters. Indeed, the Beatitudes indicate that he is not proposing any kind of casuistic minimum but criteria acceptable to God himself. One of the tasks for the theologian lies in discovering the humanistic values implied in the Gospel message. This will not be just for the sake of persuading non-believers that Catholic morality is also human morality. The theologian himself needs to discover the humanistic praeambula (natural law principles) because the Gospel ethic of love remains a bit vague when it comes to details of life in the
Thus even natural law thinking points to the truth that only a supernatural end exists for the human race.

Indeed, this realist conception of moral theology requires a strong teaching on virtue in order to implement and complete its vision of the moral life. Those who are familiar with Aquinas' *Sunirna theologiae* know that the largest section, the *secunda pars,* comprises a. treatment of nearly three hundred particular virtues which concretely describe the moral life. Virtue, for Aquinas, puts flesh and blood onto his God-centered teleology. Modern forms of ethical idealism, however, have accustomed us to think that moral practice always begins and ends in the head. As the philosopher Dilthey observed: " There is no real blood flowing through the veins of the knowing subject constructed by Locke, Hume, and Kant, only the diluted juices of reason, a mere parade of thought." [82] But only a person's complete participation in the moral life measures up to the concerns of Christian anthropology.

According to the classical scheme, the cardinal virtues address the moral formation of the whole person. Since virtue

s2 W. Dilthey, *Seleoted Writings,* trans, and ed. H. P. Rickman (London, 1976)' p. 162.

engages us with the good ends of human fulfillment and divine beatitude, the virtuous man or woman exhibits all the characteristic marks of a happy person. The final section suggests ways in which the Thomist teaching on the infused virtues can serve as a practical instructions for those who take *Donum vitae* and other moral matters seriously.

m.

Virtue and Bioethics

We have already remarked that the project for renewal carried on by the revisionist moral theologians does not include a strong emphasis on the development of virtue, but a reductionism to *techn.e.* Yet, for the better part of the Christian era, except during the ascendancy of casuistry, the principal way in which the Church encouraged men and women towards a godly life was by the practice of virtue. Aquinas, for example, accepted a definition that has its remote origins in the writings of St. Augustine. Virtue is a good quality of mind, he wrote, by which one lives righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God works in us without us.[33] This definition supposes that virtues embody a pattern of human behavior ordered towards the achievement of particular good ends (moral objectives) which the human person requires for human fulfillment. The philosophical term for this pattern is *habitus.* These qualities of soul constitute specific kinds of ability. developed in an individual either by repeated practice or received directly from God as part of the life of grace. And in the Christian dispensation, it always remains the *"gratia Christi/'* the grace of Christ.

When we refer to virtue as a quality or a *habitus* we understand that virtue shapes or modifies the various capacities of the human person in a way that allows them to operate in a

sa The definition actually represents a collation of texts from the writings of St. Augustine, probably first formulated by Peter of Poitiers in his *Sentences* II 1 *(PL* 211, 1941). See Aquinas's use of this definition in *Summa theologiae* Ia-Jae q. 55, a. 4.

certain way. The Christian tradition usually refers to four cardinal moral virtues, prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. Thus prudence, for example, conforms the intellect to the original truth of human life and also directs the appetites towards their proper ends. Justice shapes the rational appetite or will towards embracing the right order established for common life in society. The virtues of personal discipline, as theologians call temperance and fortitude, give a definitive shape to the sense appetites so that our emotional life fits into the whole complex of goods ends whose pursual involve human passion. The saints, of course, look upon these virtues as so many different ways of experiencing conformity with the person of Jesus Christ. So in each area of human life, then, virtue enables a person to choose the moral good in conformity to right reason. All in all, this amounts to what St. Paul taught when he urged his disciples to put on the mind of Christ. Although St. Thomas Aquinas defends the legitimacy of the acquired virtues in Christian theology, the practical
of our discussion require a consideration of the infused virtues.

In a special work, the disputed questions *De virtutibus in communi,* St. Thomas explains the function of the infused virtues.

In order that we might perform acts ordered to eternal life as their proper end, God first infuses grace into the rational creature. This provides the soul with a certain [participation] in the spiritual or divine being. Then he infuses faith, hope, and charity. Faith enlightens the mind concerning supernatural truths which serve as principles for their own order in the same way that naturally known principles serve as the foundation for natural actions. Hope and charity provide the will with an inclination to the supernatural good to which the human will simply by its own natural operations remains inadequately ordered.

In addition, besides the natural capacities which man possesses, the human person also requires virtuous *habitus* in order to achieve perfection in the created order. Thus besides the supernatural principles, God also endows the believer with certain infused vir-

tues which perfect men and women in ordering [moral] actions towards their proper end which remains eternal life.[34]

Admittedly, Aquinas makes it clear that the human person does not require the infused moral virtues for any activity other than that which the moral law dictates. But he also insists that the infused moral virtues account for a more perfect performance of the same activity. In other terms, the infused moral virtues make it possible for one to accomplish the good ends of human life through conformity to Christ. In this context, infused virtue spells out the "law proper to a human life restored to its original truth and conducted by the Spirit of God." Only the union of the believer with Christ makes it possible to live in accord with the truth of the moral law. To be sure, the difficulties of disordered passion, especially in the case of the virtues of personal discipline, will still be felt. But the infused virtues insure that emotional tugs and pulls will not frustrate the dynamic of virtue's goal. Actually, Aquinas himself held the opinion that God permits these remnants of disorder to remain in us for a purpose. In fact, they serve as reminders about the relationship which between union with Christ and the strength to accomplish the good. Actually, the unity that is Christ is capable of integrating everything.

Thus, since the infused virtues remain totally supernatural in form, they constitute a thoroughly new ordering and shaping of human activity, even if seated within the natural powers of mind, will, and appetites. This new informing of human activity derives from the conscious consent of the believer to God's revealed mysteries. We might say that the virtues prepare us for heaven, since they direct our lives towards implementing the New Testament Beatitudes now. The Christian character, caught between this world and the next, remains at once .incarnational and eschatologica:l. So we expect that the Beatitudes give a degree of specificity to the moral virtues.

34 *De virtutibus in commune* q. 1, a. 10.

In this wa.y, one understands better how the mysteries of salvation remain part of moral theology in the same way that moral truths constitute an essential part of the *sacra: doctrina.* The moral virtues infused by God lead the powers of the soul from their pursuits within the earthly city to a fellow-citizenship with the saints in heaven.

Virtue, then, prov,ides a constant disposition or *habitus* for living the life of Christian faith. As a result, all the powers of the soul acting through the body become stabilized in morally good objectives. They prevent us from acquiescing to any isolationism or negative attitude. This shaping pertains principally to the psychological powers of the soul such that right reason operates effectively in the accomplishment of a good life. Virtue also produces promptness and facility in action. When our capacities conform to good moral objectives, a second nature develops. This means that the virtuous man or woman accomplishes the good in a way that may appear effortless, but actually results from a disciplined life suffused with the grace of the Holy Spirit. In this Trinitarian embrace, the Christian faithful realize their wholeness and as a result experience the joy of virtue. The saints, in fact, witness to the same.[35]

Of course, *Donum vitae* does not make direct reference to the role virtue plays in the Christian life. It seems to me, however, that issues in bioethics usually require the exercise of all the cardinal virtues in order to conform to the good objectives set forth in the Instruction. Of course, it would require a separate discussion to explain the way in which prudence directs the other moral virtues. But, suffice it to say that once prudence accepts moral truth as a concrete manifestation of the Eternal Law, the very wisdom of God himself, the other virtues take their cue, as it were, from this principal virtue of the moral life. So particular moral truths, such as those given

:15 See *Summa theologiae* Ia, q. 1, a. 6, ad 3. There .Aquinas explains the wisdom given *to* the sa.ints *on* the basis *of* a comparison with the way the virtuous person acts.

in the Instruction, reflect how God knows the world and the order of human life to be. In turn, the virtues of personal discipline conform the appetites to embrace this truth. In particular, temperance restrains those desires which make the truth difficult rto accomplish while fortitude strengthens those emotions required to support whatever suffering doing the good entails. Thus as the Church contemplates the mystery of the Incarnate Word, she also comes to understand what it means to be human. *Donum vitae* continues, " by proclaim- the Gospel of salvation, she reveals to man his dignity and invites him to discover fully the truth of his own being." [36]

Finally, the Christian gospel refrains from disclosing the full dimension of human fulfillment. Rather it affirms that what we shall be has not yet appeared. Still, our faith confirms that we shall ,be like God because we shall see him as he is. The dangers of reductionism lead to the narrowing of consciousness implicit in any ideology. A narrow view of human fulfillment, such as technology promotes, can only result in an eventual compromise between the authentic freedom of God's children and the illusion of liberty represented by choices made available through ever-developing *t:echne.* On the other hand, the ability to perceive the relation between end and appropriate means constitutes a function of holy wisdom grounded in the vision of faith. It remains a Gift of the Holy Spirit given to all those ready to receive God's Word.

[36] *Donum vitae,* Introduction, 1.

DE ORDINE CARITATIS: CHARITY, FRIENDSHIP, AND JUSTICE IN THOMAS AQUINAS' *SUMMA THEOLOGIAE*

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IS IT POSSIBLE to identify the :lioundational or characteristic content of Christian love? According to Gene Outka, the normative content most often ascribed to Christian neighbor-love, or *agape,* is equal rega.rd.[1] On this aiooount, *agape* commits us to aot at all times out of a regard for the neighbor that is stable and independent of a particular response from the other. Each individual is to he valued simply as a human person, and not on the basis of his or her particular merits, attractiveness, or functional value to others. In short, the qualities of the other that are of primary significance in determining how that person should be treated are those that he or she has in common with everybody else, and not those that set him or her apart. This view is well expressed by Kierkegaard:

> The category neighbor is just like the category human being. Every one of us is a human being and at the same time the heterogeneous individual which he is by particularity; but being a human being is the fundamental qualification ... No one should be preoccupied with the differences so that he cowardly or presumptuously forgets that he is a human being; no man is an exception to being a human being by virtue of his particularising differences, He is rather a human being and then a particular human being.[2]

An Outka describes it, the claim that Christian ethics is grounded in a commitment to equal regard is a substantive

1 Gene Outka, *Agape: .4.n Ethical Analysis* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 260.

2 Quoted by Outka, p. 15.

claim, in that it is meant to identify the core content of a particular ethical tradition. But this substantive claim raises an historical question: Has Christian neighbor love actually been understood in this way, at least by some major Christian thinkers? Obviously, the substantive aµd historical questions raised by Outka's normative analysis of agape are interrelated. At least, it would be difficult to defend the claim that Christian neighbor love enjoins equal regard in the face of evidence that great numbers of Christians ha.ve not actually understood their fundamental commitments in this way. By the same token, the ca:se for interpreting the second great love commandment as enjoining equal regard would be strengthened if it could be shown that some segments of the Christian tradition, or some of its leading expositors, have held substantially the same view. Nonetheless, I do not know of any attempt to examine in detajl the ethical thought of an important classical figure in light of Outka's searching normative analysis of the different interpretations that have been given to agape.

This essay is a modest attempt to begin to fill that gap through an examination of Thomas Aquinas' account of charity in the *Summa Theologia.e.* But my purpose in this essay is not limited to answering the question," Did Thomas understand charity as equal regard?" As we will see, that question can be answered all too quickly. Once it has .been answered, however, it provides an unexpected entree into Thomas' remarkable concept of charity. And by spelling out some of the implications of this concept, we learn something, not only about Thomas, but about the nature of Christian neighbor-love as well.

I. *De ordine caritatis*

At the outset, it will be helpful to summarize the main points in Thomas' acoount of charity. Along with faith and hope, charity is one of three theological virtues that directs the human person to God as the supernatural fulfillment of human life *(ST* la2ae 62.l, 3; 110.3. All further references to Aquinas

are to the *Summa Theologiae)*. It is the greatest of the theological virtues because it directs the human person to friendship with God (2a2ae 23.1), That is, it directs him or her to union with God as he is in himself, and not simply as the source of a.II created good, or even as the author of revelation and future blessec1ness (fa2ae 62.3; 2a2ae 23.6). Its most fundamental precept is the first great commandment to love God above a.U things, and this oommandment implies that the individual should refer aJI his or her actions to God in some way. The command to love the neighbor, considered as the second precept of charity, enjoins us to love each person for the sake of God, as one who is called to fellowship with God along •with us, and for whom we wish the fulfillment of that call as each of us wishes it for himself or herself (2a2ae 25.1; 27.8; 44.2,7; also see la2ae 100.10). Bec&use all persons are in fact capable of salvation, charity and its obligations should he extended to all (2a2ae 25.6). These obligations include all the naturally derived duties of justice, together with duties specific to charity, to adopt special attitudes of joy, peace and mercy towards all, and to actively promote others' well-being through material aid and spiritual counsel (2a2ae 27-33,44). If Thomas has a commitment to equa1 regard at all, here is where we would expect to find it articulated. After all, Christian moralists have argued that it is our equality before God that is morally decisive, not any natural equalities that we may or may not enjoy.3 And others before Thomas had drawn precisely this conclusion; Thomas himself quotes Augustine's dictum in *De DoctrinJe Christina,* that " One ought to love all persons equally " (2a2ae 26.6).

It is startling, then, to learn that Thomas denies that charity as neighbor love requires each of us to love all our neighbors equally (2a2ae 26.6). To the contra;ry, Thomas explicitly says that a certain order should ·be observed in charity. God should be loved above all else, of course (2a2ae 26.2,3). More surprisingly, each person should love himself or herself more than

a Outka, pp. 154·164.

his or her neighbor (2a.2ae 26.4). Moreover, we are bound to love some neighbors more than others (not permitted, hut *obliged* to do so-again, see 2a2ae 26.6), and Thomas goes on to spell out in disconcerting detail who should be loved more than whom (2a2ae 26.7-12). In the same question, he explicitly rules out the tempting option of reading these as obligations to give appropriately different expressions to what is at heart an equal love for all. Not only the expression of love, hut the degree of inner affection, ought to vary from one neighbor to another. And what about the words of Augustine (whom Thomas would never· have directly contradicted)? Thomas reinterprets Augustine's words to mean either that we love everyone equally in the sense of wishing everyone the same good, i.e. salvation, or that we love everyone equally in the sense that it is equally true of each person that we do in fact love that person to some degree (2a2ae 26.6 ad 1). And ho.w does he justify these remarkable claims? In the body of the ·same article (2a2ae 26.6), he explains that the order of charity is not less reasonable than the order of nature, since both spring from the divine wisdom (2a2ae 26.6, 44.8). Accordingly, charity is ordered both with reference to its end-God himself-and with reference to the individual that is its subject. We are to love more those who are more holy (and therefore closer to God), and we are also to love more those who ·are more closdy connected to us by ties of consanguinity and marriage. Furthermore, we are obliged to love those who are closely connected with us more than those who are pre-eminently holy, although in the lire to come, this priority will be reversed (2a2ae 26.7,12).

In other words, Thomas' rationale for setting forth the order of charity in the way that he does is both moral and theological. On the moral side, Thomas asserts that human duty and inclination ought to follow the ordering set by the primary human relatfonships of marriage and consanguinity (compare lalae 100.5). Grace and charity could never contradict this reasonable ordering of human life. (And that is, of course, a

theological assumption). To the contrary, Thomas even says that it would be an injustice if one were to attempt to love someone out of charity less than that individual ought to be loved (2a2ae 44.8). His primary theological rationale actua.Ily contradicts what Outka identifies ·as the theological founda,.. tion for a commitment to equal regard, namely the claim that all persons are equal in God's eyes.' Of course, in one sense, Thomas does not deny this; all persons are equally situated before God, in the sense of being radically dependent upon him for whatever gifts of nature and grace they may possess, to say nothing of their very existence. But in another sense, according to Thoma;s, persons are importantly unequal in God's eyes. Some are manifestly holier, more God-like, than others, and this, Thomas insists, is due .solely to the fact that God bestows different degrees of charity on different persons, without any predisposing differences a.t all on the part of the persons themselves (lalae 112.4, cf. I 12.6). In other words, for Thomas some persons are holier than others *because* God loves them more; it is not the case, as we might expect, that God loves some persons more because of their greater holiness. And he concludes that our charity should follow the order of God's own charity by loving more those who are holier because God loves them more (although in this life we are obligated to love our relatives and countrymen most of all).

At first glance, these explanations seem reasonable enough. But on further reflection, they are not fully persuasive. Take Thomrus' appeal to the natural order of the affections. Just because charity cannot contradict the rational ordering of human life, it hardly follows that it must follow it exactly. We might just as well say that charity transcends and supercedes the natural affections without destroying them, admitting perhaps with Augustine that proximity will naturally largely determine the degree to which we express charity to others. Neither is Thomas' theological rationale wholly convincing. It depends on a selective emphasis; he places ·greater weight on the fact

4 Outka, pp. 158-159.

that God bestows different degrees of grace on different individuals, rather than emphasizing the absolute equality of neediness .before God that we all share. These considerations do not imply that Thomas' account of charity is necessarily defective, but they do press us to look for a deeper rationale underlying his explanations in 2a2ae26.6.

2. *Non dicam vos servos, sed amicos meos*

One possible explanation for Thomas' cheerful acceptance of inequality in charity may be found in his appropriation of Aristotle. After all, Aristotle was not exactly egalitarian, as is well known. This hunch gains in plausibility when we realize that the political and religious tradition of the medieval West, nearly up until Thomas' own time, was *not* Aristotelian-it took its primary philosophical cues from Cicero and Roman Stoicism-and it *was* committed to the fundamental equality of all persons.[5]

And it is my contention that this hunch is correct-but not in the way that our knowledge of Aristotle would lead us to expect. For whatever else he may borrow from the Philosopher, Thomas never, to my knowledge, appropriates his claim that some persons are :fundamentally and categorically inferior to others in their capacities for reason and virtue. He comes dangerously close to asserting the natural inferiority of women (la 92.1 ad 2), but what he seems to mean here is that women are generally less prudent than men, and not, as Aristotle claimed, that we lack practical reason altogether. Elsewhere he flatly asserts what Aristotle denied, namely that men ·and women are equal with respect to possession of an intellectual nature (la 94.4 ad 1). He also asserts that women and men are equals in the act of marriage 32.8 ad 2), a claim that Aristotle would never have made, even with qualifications. In any case, Thomas' enumeration of the order of charity does not in any way follow Aristotle's tripartite divi-

5A, J. Carlyle, *A History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West,* vol. 1 (of 6), 3d ed. (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, Ltd.), pp. 1-13.

sion of the human race into superiors and inferiors (masters and slaves, fathers and children, men and women; see the *Politics,* rn59a 35-1259h 20) .

So the importance of Aristotle for Thomas' account of charity cannot be found in the *Politics,* or at least not in the infamous first book, where we might at first have been inclined to look. But when we examine the beginning of Thomas' treatise on charity (b2ae 23), we find another aspect of Aristotle's thought on prominent display. Thomas begins that question by asking whether charity is a form of friendship, and aJ:ter setting forth the obvious objections, he affirms that charity is indeed a form of friendship, as the words of Christ indicate: "Now I do not call you my servants, but my friends" (John 15: 15) . Hence, Thomas concludes, charity is essentially friendship *ivith God.*

It is tempting to take this statement as a metaphor for a relationship that cannot he expressed otherwise than by poetic allusion. And this conclusion would seem at first to be reinforced by insistence that friendship presupposes equality and mutuality. That friendship which is based on the mutually acknowledged virtue of both parties " is perfect both in respect of duration and in aU other respects, and in it each gets from each in all respects the same as, or something like wha.t, he ·gives; which is what ought to happen between friends" *(Nicomachean Ethics,* 1156b 30-35) . But the inferior kinds of friendship also imply equality and reciprocity *(NE* 1158h 1-10) . A kind of friendship *is* possible between superiors and inferiors, hut only on the basis of a proportional equality, within which each is loved and valued in proportion to his or her merits *(NE* 1158h 10-30). And if there is a very great gap between two parties, friendship between them is not possible at all; most certainly, we cannot enjoy friendship with the deity *(NE* 1158b 30-1159al0) .

Nonetheless, for Thomas, the claim that charity makes us friends of God is no metaphor; he means it literally. In spite of his strong sense of the infinite gap between creature and

crea!tor (and no one has a higher doctrine of God), Thomas takes the Aristotelian conception of friendship as the framework for his account of charity. In 2a2a 23.1, he assures us that charity is true friendship because it is based on mutual communication between God anQ. the justified (cf. 2a2ae 24.2). The friendship in charity that we enjoy with other persons is grounded in our primary relationship with God, since neighbor-love in charity is based on an actual or potential sharing in communion with God (2a2ae 25.1, 6,8,12). Of course, the friendship of charity is: unique, not least because one party alone creates the very possibility for the friendship; that is, God creates friendship with the justified by so transforming the human soul that it becomes, in some sense, connatural to God (2a2ae 23.2), and united to him without ooy intermediary (2a2ae 23.6. 27.4; la2ae 66.6). Elsewhere, Thomas speaks even more strongly. Through the theological virtues (faith, hope, and charity), we become partakers in the divine nature (lalae 62.1). Through charity, we enjoy "a certain familiar colloquy" (*qu<tedam familiaris conversatio)* with God (lalae *65.5).* Still more strongly, the grace of God, by which faith, hope and charity are bestowed, can be said to deify *(deifioet)* us (laflae 112.1). In short, charity can 'be described as the friendship of men and women for God, because charity itself transforms its subjects into participants rin the very mind and will of God.

It follows that for Thomrus, charity functions as the supreme organizing principle in the personality of the justified, by which not only all of their actions, but all their desires and impulsies, are directed to God (2a2ae 23.3,7). Through charity, the individual is enabled to participate in the very mind and will of God, not in order to apply a predetermined set of injunctions, but to grasp intuitively what God's will for that individual is in any given situation (2a2ae 45.1,2). In short, charity transforms not only the behavior, but also the motivations for behavior in the justified. And so, we would expect that charity is especially characterized hy the ·attitudinal and

affective status that it brings about in its subject, as well as by the kinds of actions that it requires. Thomas' treatise on charity indicates that charity is indeed characteriz;ed by attitudes of joy, peace and compassion as well as by the exterior acts of mercy and fraternal correction (2a2ae 27-:30).

Once we see that for Thomas, charity necessarily transforms the whole personality, including the affections, his remarks on the order of charity become more intelligible. As was noted above, Thomas explicitly rejects the suggestion that the second precept of love enjoins that all be loved equally, but permits differential of love in accordance with persons' differing circumstances. Of course, as Outka notes, even the staunchest egalitarians will admit that expressions of neighbor-love can and should vary in accordance with persons' special needs, their proximity to us, and so on.[6] The fact that Thomas rejects this interpretation indicates clearly that he does not conceive of charity as equivalent to equal rega;rd. But then what *does* he mean when he refers to different degrees of love? Apparently, he is referring in part to the different degrees of emotional responses that different persons should generate in us, responses of joy in their life and happiness, peace in their presence, and mercy for their misfortunes and shortcomings. In other words, Thomas seems to he ,saying that it is natural and right that we should feel greater love for our intimates, and for those who are more lovable to u.s because of their holiness, than for strangers and scoundrels. Because charity essentially includes felt responses as well as exterior actions, a difference in the degree of felt love *is* a difference in the degree of charity itself.

But at the same time, Thomas recognizes that affective responses are nothing but sham sentiment, unless they are expressed in action. The primary act of charity is of course to love (2a2ae 27) . Beyond that, Thomas discusses other kinds of actions that are specifications of this primary act with respect to our neighbor, including the so-called corporeal and

e Qutka, PP· 19-go,

spiritual acls of mercy, together with fraternal correction (2a-2ae 27, 31-33). And Thomas' analysis of the order of charity informs the account that he gives of these precepts.

In order to appreciate the normative role that Thomas' analysis of the order of charity plays in his discussion of the exterior acts of charity, it is necessary to realize that most of the exterior precepts of charity that he identifies are positive precepts; they 'enjoin us ·to *do* something. Burt positive precepts involve a special problem, because taken literally, they enjoin ceaseless activity unless carefully delimited .Thomas is well aw::tre of this problem. He is therefore careful to specify the positive precepts of charity as precisely as possible, so as not to risk leaving them so general that we might well give up on trying to obey them at all. And hy and large, he specifies these precepts by reference to the order of charity. And so we read in his discussion of beneficence that while we should be prepared to help out anyone at all, " if we have time to spare," charity does not require that we try literaUy to do good to each individual person. Rather, the strict obligations of beneficence are specified by the requirements of time, place, and circumstance (2a2ae 31.2). He then goes on (in 32.8) to explain that the obligations of beneficence ·are specified by reference to the different degrees of proximity of the persons whom we might help; and these degrees are specified in turn by the different kinds of connection ,and proximity that persons have to one another. In other words, the order of charity determines (roughly) the concrete circumstances in which positive promotion of ·another's good is obligatory rather than supererogatory. (He also recognizes that the prior claim that intimates have on us can be overridden by the claims of anyone, even a stranger, in extreme and urgent need.) Similar considerations help to fix the circumstances in whcih we are obliged to perform material or spiritual acts of mercy (2a2ae 82.9; cf. 26.8,82.5).

Thomas' claim that love of self takes priority over love of neighbor calls for special attention in this context, because it

is in his discussion of the a.cts of charity that this surprising claim reveals its normative cash value. Unlike later authors who hold that self-love ·and *agape* ·are radically opposed,[7] Thomas asserts that self-love precedence over every other obligation of charity except the love of God (2a2ae 26.4). He seems to regard this priority 1as a kind of conceptual necessity; one's own union with God, on which charity is based, is necessarily more immediate and compelling than the unity in common blessedness on which love of neighbor is based. But necessary or not, this priority has some important consequences. First of all, the individual should not let anything, including concern for another's spiritual well-being, lead him or her to destroy through sin the friendship that he or she has with God (2a2ae 43.7). Moreover, he or she should not even forego spiritual goods above and beyond what is necessary to salvation in order to prevent .scandal, although in such a case, he or ,she might be required to postpone these goods or to enjoy them in secret (ibid.). Ev;enwith respect to material goods" no one is required to undergo great hardship, or to give up the standard of living customary to his or her station in life, in order to benefit another (except in the case of the other's extreme and mortal need; 2a2.ae 32.6). Finally, the individual should rejoice in himself or herself and in the union with God that he or she enjoys; sloth and envy would seem to be sins against self-love, because they consist in sorrowing over one's ·own spiritual or material gifts as inadequate (9la2ae *35.1;* 86.1).

Clearly, charity taken in itself cannot be equated with equal regard for Thomas. **It** more nearly resembles what Outka describes ·as mutuality, in its emphasis on the affective and relational components of Christian love.[8] Even so, charity does include many of the recurrent features of Christian neighbor love as equal regard. For Thomas, no one is excluded from charity, or from the scope of the perpetual willingness to serve

7 Outka, pp. 55-62.
s Qutka, p:p. 34-4i,

the neighbor that charity includes. This attitude of ready concern for the other follows from what charity is, and therefore it is independent, both of the neighbor's attractiveness and of the presence of a response from him or her (2a2ae 25.8). (And in the latter respect, charity is different from mutuality as the authors examined by Outka understand it.) It is important to note that while charity is ordered on the basis of special relations for Thomas, these special relations themselves are defined by the exigencies of justice, and their natural and supernatural demands do not depend upon the inclinations or the personal relationships of the persons involved. Thus, neighbor love is stable and permanent for Thomas, ·as it is for proponents of equal regard; the degree of love appropriate to a particular person may change, if the relationship to that person is legitimately changed; hut love should remain in some degree through all the vicissitudes of inclination, offense and change in the other.

3. Love a,nd Justice

It is impossible to have .an accurate idea of Thomas' conception of ChrisHan love, without taking 1aooountof ,the relationship between Christian love and justice as he sees it. And that relationship is difficult to sort out, because for Thomas, the ideal of justice *does* approximate a notion of equal regard. For him, the central tenets of justice are non-maleficence and the fulfillment of special obligations (la2ae 100.5). When these tenets are spelled out, in the treatise on justice 57-122), it becomes apparent that for him, all persons ·are owed equal regard at lea1St in the sense of equal immunity from serious hal'!Ill and certain kinds of coercion, and equal claim on the necessities of life in situations of dire need. These immunities can be forfeited through acts of agression against the community or its members. Even in such cases, however, private individuals do not have the authority to punish the malefactors; only the state, which represents the community as a p:iay do SQ 64.3). Hence, eve!!. crimin1:1<ls, who

forfeit their claim to immunity ·from harm, still do not lose their fundamental equality with other individuals.

Certainly, there is at least a *prima facie* incongruity between the egalitarian thrust of Thomas' analysis of justice, and the sharply inegalitarian delineation of the order of charity. And yet, it will not do to assume that Thomas anticipates those later Christian thinkers who claim that justice and Christian love are finally opposed. Not only does he insist tha:t charity is the form of all the moral virtues, and that it requires them for its own exercise (la2ae 65.2,3), he explicitly says that the virtues that regulate external actions (including primarily justice) are necessary to prevent the impediment to charity that would he rpresented by ·an aversion to God's justice (2a2ae 44.1). Elsewhere, he upholds the order of charity by arguing tha:t its violation would be an *injustice* to those to whom we owe special duties (2a2ae 44.8); in other words, he assumes that justice places constraints on the proper exercise of charity. Further complications are introduced by the fact that apparently, charity and justice have the same first precepts, that is, the two great commandments (la2ae 100.3 ad l; 2a2ae 44.1-3). This •would seem to suggest that charity and justice axe somehow equivalent, or ·at least that justice is not possible without charity. And yet, we find repea:ted instances in which Thomas says or implies that moral virtue, and justice specifically, can he attained without charity or divine grace. At la2ae *65.2,* he asks whether moral virtue can exist without charity, and he replies by distinguishing ·between perfect virtue, which cannot exist without charity, and imperfect virtue, which can. It is important not to be misled by Thomas' terminology. By perfect virtue, he does not seem to he referring to a purer or more complete morality, but simply to a morality that is directed through charity to the final, supernatural end of human life. Imperfect virtue is quite adequate to direct us to the natural happiness that is proport·ionate to human life, in accordance with what our destiny would have been if God had not in fact called us to union with himself; moral virtue on this level can

be and sometimes in fact is attained without charity (cf. la2a.e 62.1, 2a2ae 23.7). Hence, the acquired moral virtues are regulated by natural reason (la2ae 58.2,4; 61.2; 62.1,2, cf. la2ae 18.5, 100.1, 110.3), and they remain as dispositions to goodness even after mortal sin 63.2). Undoubtedly, the capacity to carry out the naturally known precepts of morality has been weakened as a result of sin, and no one can do so *perfectly* without ·grace (la2ae 109.2,4). But these texts do not say that without grace, we are incapable of fulfilling the precepts of morality *a:t all,* and Thomas says elsewhere that sin does not completely destroy the capacity for moral judgment (2a2ae *33.5;* cf. 2a2ae 85.1). Finally, he specifically says that the fundamental precepts of justice, for example the norm of non-maleficence, are self-evident to the natural reason (la2ae 100.3). These remarks indicate that for Thomas, justice is neither equivalent to, nor derived from, charity.

Or at least, *acquired* justice is not derived from charity, nor does it require grace for its exercise. For Thomas makes a general distinction between acquired and infused moral virtues that illuminates his conception of the relation between Christian love and justice. In order to understand this admittedly difficult distinction, it is necessary to recall that charity, like the theological virtues generally, differs from the moml virtues precisely in that the former direct their subjects to direct union with God, whereas the latter direct their subjects to ways of flourishing that are proportionate to our human nature (lalae 62.1). As such, the latter can be acquired by our own powers, through habitual behavior directed by a reasoned conception of human flourishing. But Thomas also insists that charity integrates all the components of the ·subject's personality by directing them to the individual's true end, union with God (2a2ae 23.8; cf. 2a2ae 45.1). Correlatively, true charity cannot exist unless the diverse inclina.tions and desires that make up the human psyche are habitually oriented in some way rtowards union with God (lalae *65.3,* 2a2ae 44.1). These considerations lead Thomas to say that in addition to the theo-

logical virtues (including charity), the justified possess virtues that parallel the ordinary (acquired) moral virtues, but differ from ordinary moral virtues in that the dispositions and actions that they generate are directed to union with God (ct la2ae 63.4). Because these virtues are directed towards a supernatural end, they cannot be acquired by human action (even by the justified) and must be infused in us directly by God (la9lae 63.3). All those who ha.ve charity also possess all the moral virtues in this way, even though bad habits prevent many from exercising their infused virtues consistently or easily (2a2ae *65.3,* esp. ad. 2,3).

As a theological psychology, Thomas' discussion of acquired and infused moral virtues is both fascinating and problematic, but we cannot go into its complexities here. The significance of this discussion for our purposes lies in its relevance to the question of the normative content of justice as it is informed by Ohristian love. For while Thomas argues that the infused virtues belong to a different species than the corresponding acquired virtues, in that they ·are directed to different ends (J.a2ae 63.4), he also seems to say that the corresponding infused and acquired virtues have the same normative content (9la2ae 23.8). Nonetheless, Thomas' conception of the relationship between the central norms of justice as presented in the Decalogue, and the two great love commandments, appears to shift as he considers justice in itself, or justice informed by charity. At la2ae 100.3, he does say that the norms of the Decalogue are derived from the love commandments, but he is clearly thinking of justice .as either infused or acquired, since he remarks that these precepts are evident to everyone *either* through nature or through grace. He goes on to specify that the way in which natural reason grrusps the second love commandment, is through its apprehension that we ought to fulfill our special obligations and not to harm anyone. In the treatise on justice, he is more exact; the norms of the Decalogue are not *derived* from the two great love commandments ·(which in this context refer to the precepts of charity specifi-

cally), hut they are directed to them-at least, in the justified (flaflae Ufl.1). In the same article, and subsequently in that question, he refers to the same principles of non-maleficence and folfi.llment of obligation that he equates with natural love in laflae 100.5. On the other hand, the precepts of Christian love that are specifically associated with charity include far more in the way of obligations of positive promotion of others' well-being than do the precepts of bare justice. Thus, in Outka's terms, infused justice serves as the guardian and check on the special relations generation by charity, even though it is not their direct inspiration. [9]

Conclusions

At the beginning of this essay, it was ,suggested that an examination of Thomas' account of charity could pay off in a deeper understanding of Christian love, as well as of Thomas' own thought. Let me conclude by suggesting two points on which Thomas can instruct us today.

First of all, he reminds us that it is impossible to give an adequate account of Christian neighbor-love without also giving a careful account of love for God. That is, the second commandment cannot he spelled out except in terms of its relationship to the first commandment. Not only does the love of God give Christian neighbor-love its context and point, and possibly its justification (as it certainly does for Thomas), it can also substantively affect its content.

Secondly, Thomas reminds us that our agenda and the categories generated by that agenda cannot he applied without remainder 00 the thought of those who worked out of different concerns. We have already noted that Thomas' conception of charity cannot be characterized neatly in terms of either mutuality or equal regard-though as Outka obser¥es, these distinctions are not maintained sharply in contemporary thought [1]

o Outkit, p. 2H,

either.[10] More interestingly, the current distinction between virtue-based ethical systems and rule-based ethical systems cannot be applied to Thomas, either. :For him, true moral rectitude is necessarily grounded in the orientation of the whole personality that charity creates; and yet, charity cannot be exercised, or even exist, unless the moral rules generated by right reason are observed. The scope of this essay does not permit a fuller exploration of this issue; I raise it here to indicate that even now, Thomas' moral thought can be brought to bear on present-day discussions in unexpected ways.[11]

10 Outka, p. 36.

11 I am indebted to Margaret Farley, Gene Outka and William Werpe· howski for their comments on earlier drafts of this essay. Douglas A. Witt, a student in the Graduate Department of Religion at Vanderbilt University, prepared an invaluable bibliography on this and related subjects.

HAPPINESS: THE NATURAL END OF MAN?

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I

ONG THE QUESTIONS the philosopher considers, none perhaps ris more important than that of ' the good life.' This question looks for the distinguishing marks of a. life which is fully human and which constitutes the actualization of one's uniquely human potential. For the ancient philosophers, such a life was considered the highest good that one could achieve, the end and the *raison d' etre* of one's activity. This end was known as happiness.

As a Christian theologian well versed in the writings of the ancients, Thomas Aquinas also had occasion to reflect on the nature of happiness. His inquiry possessed a dimension which was completely lacking to the ancients, namely, the belief that man is destined to enjoy the ' face to face ' vision of God. Thomas left no doubt that this, man's most ultimate end, was to be possessed after death through the gifts of grace. On the other hand, in his *Sententia Libri Ethicorum* he gives Aristotle his due, commenting with approval on many 0£ Aristotle's conclusions. In his discussion of happiness in the *Summa logiae,* one can also find the Philosopher's doctrine of happiness, here distinguished from ·supernatural beatitude as imperfect from perfect beatitude.

Are we to assume then that inquiry rinto the nature of happiness is twofold, admitting of a. theological and philosophical dimension? A philosopher would, on this showing, be concerned ·with the natural, albeit imperfect, end and the theologian with the supernatural end of man.

Many philosophers within the Thomistic tradition have

been comfortable with this assumption. Recently, for example, John Finnis has stated,

> St. Thomas very plainly says, the task of 'considering and determining the ultimate end of human life and human affairs' belongs to the principle practical science; Aristotle called it ethics and Thomas *moral philosophy*.[1]

Others do not share Finnis' confidence in this regard. Alan Donagan, for example, argues to the contrary that Thomas' final word on the end of man was that Aristotle was simply mistaken. According to Donagan, Thomas

> saved Aristotle's thesis that the ultimate end of human life is *eudaimonia* by two drastic amendments. First, he reinterpreted *eudaimonia* as what he called *beatitudo:* the total satisfaction of desires of an intellectual creature by a vision of God's essence.... Secondly, he denied that human beings could either attain *beatitudo,* or even learn what it really is, except by grace.[2]

If Donagan is correct, then the philosopher is clearly not competent to discuss the end of man, since the consideration of supernatural beatitude lies beyond the power of unaided reason.

Finnis recognizes the distinction between perfect and imperfect beatitude, and his position need only entail that it is the latter which is the concern of philosophy proper. However, although the notion of 'imperfect beatitude' served well Thomas' purpose of integrating the thought of the Philosopher within the framework of Christian theology, the fact remains that Thomas did not disengage this notion from its theological context. That is to say, he did not carry out 'an explicit treatment of imperfect beatitude as the natural end of man. In itself, this need not imply that such an inquiry is impossible or ill-conceived. Nevertheless, the notion of 'imperfect beatitude' (construed as some sort of natural end of man

1 "Practical Reasoning, Human Goods, and the End of Man", *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Society,* v. 58, 1984, p. 26.

2 *Human Minds and Human Actions* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1985), p. 38.

amenable to philosophical treatment), is still quite problematic; and Finnis himself has recognized the difficulty.

Happiness signified, even for Aristotle, a good which is perfect and in every way final.[3] Finnis observes that "the 'perfect,' the 'fully satisfactory,' is what the concept of *eudaimooia/bemitudo* is about; an 'imperfect beatitude' is, by definition, a state which is not ' adequate to the aspira.tion of human nature '." [4] Thus, the very concept of ' imperfect happiness' appears at best to be paradoxical, at worst self-contradictory-at least to the philosopher. This is not to say that it is absolutely meaningless; for it makes perfect sense within the oonrtextof Thomas' theological synthe,sis. In this caise, however, Thomas' use of the phrase ' *beatitudo imperfecta'* appears bound to its original theological context inaismuch as its meaning depends upon an implicit reference to ·a, beatitude which is perfect and truly final. The only appropria.te and meaningful response to the question concerning the end of man, it seems, is theological in nature and dependent upon Revelation. Must one, then, return to Donagan's position? Does Thomas save Aristotle's doctrine of happiness, hut only in such a way tha.t " the thesis ceases to be a philosophical one?" [5]

II

The principal intention of the following essay is to defend the legitimacy of developing a philosophical doctrine of happiness construed as the natural end of man. Conflict over the status of the natural end of man is not confined to very recent thinkers within or responding to the Thomistic tradition; so I will first review the case against this position a;s it developed

s" *eudaimonian de telos kai teleion titkemen pante pantos." (Nicoma,. ckean Ethics,* Bk. I. 10, llOla 18-20.) The Latin translation that Thomas used reads: *"felicitatem autem fin.em et perfeotum ponimus omnino modo." (8ententia Libri Etkicorum,* ed. Leonine [Rome: 1969], v. 47, prt. 1, p. 58, 11. 18-19.)

4 Finnis, p. 26.

5 Donagan, p. 39.

throughout the mid-1900's, at which time the possibility of man's having a natural end was strongly attacked in both theological and philosophical quarters. I will then respond to this attack, and my strategy is threefold. First, I will show that the concept of a ' purely natural end ' attacked during this period is not the concept of the natural end of man which is :found in the Thomistic corpus. Secondly, I will ·attempt to clear away the confusion this caused by arguing that Thomas uses the terms ' haippiness' and ' end ' in an analogical·as opposed to a. univncal mode of signification. Finally, I will attempt to give some content to the analogical use of these terms by articulating proper proportionalities which hind together their use in :both theological and philosophical contexts. In this way, I hope to have defended the possibility and defined the subject matter of philosophical account of happiness along Thomistic lines, to have indicated both its distinctness from and compatibility with its theological counterpart, and to have shed some light on more recent controversy.

III

In the late 1940s and early '50s, the compatibility of speaking about a natural end for man with Thomais' theology of supernatural beatitude received considerable attention. In-.terest in tills •topic was revitalized by Father Henri de Lubac. In his work entitled *Surnaturel,* de Lubac developed an extensive critique of the notion of the 'supernatural ' in the history of Christian theology. He observed that for the past four centuries theologians had become accustomed fo considering the possibility of being ordel'ledto a purely ill'atural end. In their eyes, the beatific vision was ·a supernatural end to just the extent that it fell outside or 1above orientation to ·an otherwise natural end. Although all maintained that this natural ·end had been replaced in rthe course of man'.s historical relationship with God, its existence as an hypothetical possibility was •consideredquite significant for a proper understanding of man's acquired destiny; for without it, the significance of the term ' supernatural ' would become unintelligible.

De Lubac sharply criticized this understanding of the supernatural, claiming that it was at odds with the more traditional teachings of the Fathers of the Church. More to the point of the present discussion, de Lubac argued that Thomas Aquinas himself had never allowed for a purely natural end of this sort. Distilled to its essential premises, de Lubac's ·argument proceeds as follows: Man has a natural desire for the vision of God; and his natural desire will not rest until he actually possesses an intimate knowledge of the divine essence. But a natural desire is not in vain. Therefore, the end of man lies in the ' face to face ' vision of God, and nothing short of the vision of God. Man has, therefore, no natural end, only perfect heatitude.[6] According to de Lubac, perfect beatitude is supernatural only in ·as much as a) its object is the transcendent .being of God, and b) the means of its attainment lie beyond the capabilities of man's own efforts;[7] but this does not imply that man could have been created with any other end short of the vision of God.

Thomrus' discussion of the end of man in the *Summa Theologiae* lends support to de Lubac's position. He ·argues that man naturally desires to know. But perfect knowledge requires that one know the essence of the object known. Now from his knowledge of the world man can arrive at a knowledge of the existence of God as cause. Nevertheless, in knowing that such a cause exists, man naturally desires to know its essence. In this way man naturally desires to know the divine essence. However, this knowledge is impossible in the natural order; for God can not he known through any created species. Human desire can not, then, come to term until man is immediately united with God. Therefore, man's happiness and end is to be found *only* in the' face to face' vision of the blessed.[8]

6 *Surnaturel* (Paris: .Aubier, 1946), p. 469.

1 de Lubac, p. 454.

s *"Si igitur intelleotus humanus, oo·gnosoens essentiam aZioujus effeotus oreati, non oognosoat de Deo nisi an est, nondum perfectio ejus attingit sim· pZioiter ad oausam primam, sed remanet ei adhuo naturaZe desideriilm in· quiriendi oausam. Unde nondum est perfeote beatus• .4.d perfeotam igitur*

In 1949, three years after the publication of de Luhac's study, another argument against the legitimacy of positing a natural end of man appeared on the North American continent. Joseph Buckley claimed to have demonstrated the non-existence of .a natural, determinate end for man in light of Thomas' fundamental presuppositions concerning the formal object of rational appetite, or the will, and of the characteristics of the end adequate to this faculty. Buckley argues that any last end " must adequa•te the nature and exhaust the capacity of the will." [9] However, there is no one good or collection of goods in the natural order which are fully adequate to the universal and infinite potency of the will, which, according to Thomas, is ordered to universal goodness, the *bonttm ttniversale.* While the infinite being of God is adequate to and even surpasses the formal object of the will, this is the case only when He is seen in His essence. Naturally man knows only *that* God is infinitely good, he does not know .and enjoy God formally *as* infinite goodness. Therefore, there is no natural end for man.

Buckley also argues that every end must be decisively terminative. " It is that at which .intention begins and with the attainment of which the progressive desire of limited, concrete goods, as well as execution stops." [1◇] Simply put, any end worthy of the name must so completely satisfy desire that nothing is left to be desired or pursued in action. This is the case, ·according to Buckley, only when both "the human intellect in the face of Truth itself, and the human will at the contact of Goodness itself, are necessarily and totally ar-

beatitudinem requiritur quod intellectus pertingat ad ipsam essentiam primae causa. Et sic perfectionem suam habebit per unionem ad Deum sicut ad objectum, in quo sofo *beatitudo hominis consistit." (ST* la2ae q. 3, a. 8, c.) The La;tin text for citations from the *Summa Theofogiae* is taken from the Blackfriar's bilin.,"'Ual edition. (London: Eyre and Spottis:woode Limited, 1966)

9 *Man's Last End* (St. Louis and London: B. Herder Book Co., 1949), p.165.

1-0 Buckley, p. 170.

rested." [11] But again there are no determinate goods in the natural order capable of terminating that desire whose object is the *bonum universale.* Buckley concludes that man's end in the natural order is nothing more than the vague and abstract good, happiness in general, which is concrete and determinate only to the extent that it can be indefinitely realized in a plurality of finite goods. To this extent it is neither final nor complete; it is not an *end* at all.

Buckley's position also finds textual ,support. In the *SurnmuJi ThJeowgiae,* la2ae q.1, a.5, Thomas asks whether it is possible that man have several ultimate ends. He argues that each thing desires its ultimate end as that which perfects and completes it. ultimate end must therefore he complete in the sense that it completely satisfies this desire. If two such ends were desired, then neither would be truly ultimate; for each would possess something that the other lacked. Consequently neither would alone completely satisfy desire, which is the mark of an end which is absolutely ultimate. In the eighth article of this same question Thomas argues that the natural object or end of human willing is the universal good. Therefore, nothing can completely satisfy man's desire which does not comprehend universal goodness. But this is found only in God; for all creatures possess goodness only by participation. Only God is Goodness simply and *per se.* The true end of man is therefore one and consists in nothing less than the attainment of God Himself.

Both Buckley and de Lubac agree, then, that man has no natural end, though they do so for di:fferent reasons. Buckley denies de Lubac's central premise, namely that man has a natural des,ire or positive ordination to the batific vision.[12]

11 Buckley, p. 218.

i2Buckley, pp. 89-95; p. 180 n. 20. Following John of St. Thomas, Buckley argues that man has only an obediential capacity in regard supernatural beatitude. .An obediential capacity is merely non-repugnance to elevation. There is no positive ordination to this end; rather, it is only the case that God's elevating man to a vision of Himself involves no inherent contradiction. Man's natural desire, according to Buckley, is only for the good as

Nevertheless, the disproportion between the formal object of willing, the *bonum universale*, and any good obtainable within the natural 011der, is sufficient to show that whatever goodness man can achieve naturally will leave his desire unsatisfied. If the notion of an end implies the complete satisfaction of desire, then there can be no natural end for man. According to de Lubac, on the other hand, man does possess a natural desire for the vision of God's essence, though he can not attain it on his own. If a natural desire for an ultimate end implies that such an end must be proportionate to the nature in question, then it is simply the case, according to de Lubac, that for Thomas man is not a thing of nature: " *C'est ootte ouverture a un ordre qui le depasse, qui temoi,gne de la noblesse de la na.ture humai,ne et la differende radicalement de 'choses naturelles* '." [13]

The notion of a ' pure nature' had a special value for theologians defining and defending the supernatural character ,and the gratuity of God's gift of the ,beatific vision. If the state of pure nature is an impossibility, it would appear that God, though free to crea.te such beings as man, is bound to confer upon them a necessary ordination to personal and intimate knowledge of Himself. The great majority of the opposition to Fr. de Lubac's position from theological corners, including Buckley's, turns on the issue of divine freedom.[14] De Lubac

such an unspecified yet indefinitely specifiable object (p. 192). From its inception, controversy concerning the natural end of man was closely associated with a discussion of man's natural desire for God. See E. Elter's *"De naturaZi hominis beatitudilne ad mentem antiquioris"* (*Gregoriam;wm,* IX, pp. 269-306). This was also the case in the late 1940's and early 1950's. See, for example, William O'Connor's *The Eternal Quest* (New York: Longman's Green & Co., 1947). Tracing the precise relationship between ·these independent, yet closely related, discussions is well beyond the scope of the present study. Here it is sufficient to have shown that there is good reason to suppose that there is no n111tural end of man whether one holds (with de Lubac) that man has a natural desire for God, or (with Buckley) argues to the contrary.

1a De Lubac, p. 454.

14 For an extensive introduction to the variety of theologcial responses which de Lubac's work evoked, see Philip J. Donnelly, "Discussions on the Supernatural Order," *TheoZogicaZ Studies,* 9 (1948), pp. 213-249.

contends that this gratuity can he explained on other grounds. Whether his defense is successful or whether one adopts Buckley's position instead, a purely philosophical suspicion remains given their common conclusion, namely, is there not in Thomas at least the formal necessity that man have a natural end, a necessity which can be demonstrated ,by appealing to the role which the concept of nature plays in his metaphysics, epistemology, and moral philosophy?

There is no need to belabor the centrality of the notion of nature in Thomas' philosophy. Suffice it to say that nature serves as a primary principle in the structure of created being, as the principle of its development and operation (including all causal activity), as the foundation of its intelligibility, and as the measure of what is appropria.te or inaippropriate for any given being. Without the concept of nature, it is difficult, if not impossible, to account for the limitation of *esse* in creatures, the reality of secondary efficient causality, the intelligibility of the objects within experience, and, in the case of man, the possibility of a natural morality including such notions as natural virtue, law, and state.[15] But the concept of nature is unintelligible apart from the notion of an end proportionate to that nature. The intelligibility of natures is dependent upon this finality because we know natures from the fact that they constantly and regularly tend to definite acts and objects.[16]

15 See W. Farrel and M. Adler, "The Theory of Democracy Part III: The End of the State-Happiness", *The Thomwt,* 4 (1942), pp. 121-181. Adler and Farrel argue that if there is no natural end of man which is genuinely final and distinct from both the common good and supernatural beatitude, then the inequalities of various forms of government in regard to political justice become unintelligible (pp. 127-128). Their proof that such an end exists turns precisely on the "naturalness" of the state (pp. 132-136). Although its publication preda.ted that of *Surnaturel,* it spoke directly to the issue and still remains one of the most comprehensive studies of the specific implications of the doctrine of the natural end of man for political philosophy.

16 See Gerard Smith, "The Natural End of Man," *Proceedings of the American OathoUc Philosophical Association,* 23 (1949), pp. 47-61. De Lubac's work raised so much controversy that discussion of the end of man was chosen as the central theme for the meeting of the American Catholic

Causal efficacy depends upon finality, because every agent acts in view of its proper end.[11] Natural morality obviously depends upon such finality, for the moral order depends upon a right perception of the end.[18] From the perspective of Thomas' philosophlcal 1acoountof the matter, it seems necessary to posit both natures and ends proportionate to these natures. There is not, however, any proportion between man's nature and the vision of God as He is in Himself. Therefore, since no creature is without a nature, •and no nature without a proportionate end, man must have some natural end fitted to his innate powers and caipa.bilities. Here lies the philosopher's confidence that Thomas' philosophy not only allows for but demands an analysis of some natural end of man; £or without it, creation would, as it were, no longer be metaphysically intact.

Commenting upon this line of argument, Anton Pegis remarks ' those who dream of a natural end of man find here the occasion of their moment of triumph.' But in defense of de Luba.e's position he offers this description of man's proportionate end, his destiny if he were to be left to his own powers:

" If man had been created without elevation, what would stretch before him for all eternity is an endless existence as a disembodied soul, a soul whose understanding has been relieved of the disturbances of the body, yet a soul whose knowledge is subject to the confusion arising from its inability to be an adequate knower."[19]

Philosophical Association in 1949. Smith was invited to oppose de Lubac's position, and he implies that he is simply playing the role of devil's advocate rather than giving his own position {p. 47). Nevertheless, he develops a powerful argument for the necessity of positing a natural end in light of Thomas' broader metaphysical and epistemological position. Smith developed his own position four years later in "Philosophy and the Unity of Man's Ultimate End," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Associa·tion,* 27 (1953), pp. 60-83.

i1 Smith, pp. 58-59.

1s See James Mullaney, "Man's Natural, Terrestrial End," *The Thomist,* 18 (1955), p. 391. Mullaney also argues for an analogical use of the term end though he does not develop the twofold analogy of proper proportionality for which I argue here.

:1.9 "Nature and Spirit: ,Some Reflections on the Problem of the End of Man," *Proceedings of the AOPA,* 23 (1949), pp. 77-78. Anton Pegis defended

Death is the inevitable end of man. Without the body, the soul will drift in a perpetual state of confusion beyond the grave burdened not only with the awareness of its dissatisfaction, but also of the necessity that it will be forever frustrated as well.

According to Pegis, Thomas' recognition of the soul's immortality shattered any neat proportion between nature and natural ends, at lea:st in the case of man. In the Aristotelian cosmos, the developmental dynamism of material natures was circumscribed by their constitutive forms. As nature, form functioned as an intrinsic principle of motion and change which directed the course of the composite's development. As end, form functioned as the ultimate terminus of that development. Material substances reached the limit of their perfection when their matter had been fully actualized by form.[20]

de Lubac at the 1949 .A.CPA meeting, and remained in large part in agreement with de Lubac in subsequent work on the issue. Pegis' insistence on the inability of the soul to be an adequate knower in the state of separa,tion from the body responds directly t-0 proponents of a ' purely natural end' of man to be enjoyed in the afterlife. See, for example, Michael Cronin's *The Science of Ethics* and. Henry Grenier's *Oursus Philosophiae.* Similarly, Sestili, Rousellot, aJld Hugueny spoke of a purely natural end belonging to the separated soul consisting in a knowledge of God possessed in virtue of its knowledge of itself or infused species. (See *Surnaturel,* pp. 449-451.) .Although there is some evidence in Thomas' earlier writings that he considered the .soul to be capable of clear and adequate knowledge when separated from the body, Pegis has shown that Thomas changed his position sometime after his reading of .Aristotle's *De Anima.* See "The Separated Soul and Its Nature" in *St. Thomas Aqumas 1'274-1974: Oommemorative Studies* (Toronto: Pontificial Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), v. 1, pp. 131-158. Pegis adopts a position similar to Donagan's assessment of Thomas' stand towards .Aristotle's account of happiness in " St. Thomas and the Nicomachean Ethics: Some Reflections on' Summa Contra Gentiles' III, 44, 5 *",Mediaeval Stud.ies,* 25 (1963), pp. 1-25. See also "Creation and Beatitude," *Proceeding of the American Philosophical Association,* 29 (1955), pp. 52-62.

20 Gilson observes that ".Aristotle's metaphysics was already a thorough dynamism, but it was a dynamism of the form. The form of the being-still-to-be was there, acting as both the formal law of its development and as the end reached by that development. .Aristotelian beings were self-realizing formal types, and the only cause of their individual variations rested with the accidental failures of matters completely to imbide forms. Individuals

For Thomas, however, man is not simply informed matter. He is incarnate spirit. As a spiritual and intellectual being, he desires to know; and knowing that God exists, he desires to know His essence. Man is not a thing of nature, then, if by nature one signifies a being whose finality is wholly self-enclosed. However, Pegis contends, self.-enclosure is not the mark of nature as such:

> Natures *qua* natures are closed only in the sense that they are not subject to more or less. There are, to be sure, closed natures, but they are closed, not because they are natures, but because they are material. If there are creatures with spiritual natures, then they are open because they are spiritual.[21]

There is no inconsistency, then, in maintaining that man has a nature and in maintaining at the same time that he has no natural end.

The philosopher's confidence that there is a legitimate domain of philosophical inquiry concerning human happiness would thus be completely unfounded, were it not for the fact that it is quite evident on textual grounds alone that Thomas does allow for a determinate form of happiness which both a) corresponds to human nature and b) is an end proportionate to its native potencies. In the closing paragraph of his argument for the necessity of infused virtue in the *De Virtutibus in Commwni*, for example, he makes the following comparison:

> Thus, just as, in addition to the natural principles, habits of virtue are required for the perfection of man in the order connatural to him, so also, by way of divine influence, man acquires ... certain infused virtues by which he is perfected for ordering his operations to the end of eternal life:[22]

then were little more than abortive attempts to be their own forms; none of them could add anything to its species; rather, there was infinitely more in the species than there was in the whole collection of its individuals." *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952), p. 185.

21 Pegis, p. 69.

22 *"Et siout praeter ista principia naturaZia requiruntur habitus virlutum aa perfectiooem hominis secunaum moaum sibi connaturaZem ... ita eaJ ai-*

The function of the infused or theological virtues is here clarified by an analogy to the function of man's naturally acquired virtue in promoting a *connatural* mode of perfection.

Thomas often has occasion, in hoth his earlier and later writings, to describe this connatural perfection in terms of finality. He speaks of a twofold end of man: *"Finis ... communis et ultimus . . . est duplex."* [28] " *Est duplex hominis ultimum bonum."* [24] " *Ultima perfectio ra.tionalisnaturae est duplex."* [25] James Mullaney has observed that "whatever problems the fact may create, it is 'a fact that Aquinas speaks ... of man's twofold ultimate end; of his twofold felicity; of his twofold ultimate good; of his twofold happiness." [26]

Two points are of interest heve. First, Thomas does not argue that man has two ends, the one natural and the other supernatural. Rather, he speaks of ,a single end which is twofold, which is realized at both a natural and supernatural level, and which he describes in the *Summa Theologiae* as imperfect and perfect beatitude respectively. As a natural end, then, the imperfect beaJtitude of the *Summa Thevlogwe* is dearly not a 'purely natural end ' which man may have had at one time prior to his *de fac;to* elevation to a supernatural end. Thus, one might very well accept de Lubac's position that there is no 'purely natural end' of man, ,and yet consistently maintain that there is a natural end of man; but it would be in-

vina influentia c01!8equitur homo • • • aliquo,s virtutes infuso,s, quibus per·ficitur ad opero,tiones ordinandas in finem aeternae vitae." (De Virtutibus in Oommuni, 10. c.; Parma, v. 8, p. 567.) All subsequent citation to the *De Virtutibus in Oommuni* are taken from the Parma edition (New York: 1949).

2s *In II Sent.,* dist. 41, q. 1, art. 1, c.

:H *De Ver.,* 14, 2.

25 *ST* la2ae q. 62, a. 1. There are other examples as well: " *Oonsiderandum est autem, quad est duple11J hominis bonum: unum quidem quad est propor·tionatum suae naturae, aliud autem quad suae naturae facuZtatem wcedit!' (De Virt. in Oom.,* 10, c.; v. 8, p. 567) "•-• *per virtutes acquisito,s non per'Venitur ad felicitatem oaelestem, sed ad quemdam felicitatem quam homo natus est acquirere per propria naturalia in hac vita* •-•." *(Ibid.,* 9, ad 6; v. 8, p. 564.)

26 Mullaney, p. 395.

cumbent upon one holding such a position to provide *some* content for the term 'natural' which is not conceptually dependent upon the notion of 'elevation'. This brings me to my second point.

Thomas does not define the proportion to nature which serves to distinguish natural from supernatural happiness in terms of a natural desire distinct from some desire to know God in Himself 1subsequently acquired through elevation. According to Thomas, man does not have two ends, so he does not have two desires for two distinct ends. Imperfect as well as perfect beatitude both respond to man's desire for goodness as such, though in differing degrees of completeness. Imperfect beatitude is said rto be proportionate to human nature only in the sense that it constitutes the most ultimate degree of perfection that man can reasonably expect to obtain by virtue of the exercise of his unaided capacity for development. Thus, in the *Summia Theologiae,* Thomas distinguishes the happiness promised in Scripture from the happiness of which Aristotle had spoken in the *Ethics* on the grounds that "the imperfect beatitude man can have in this life can be acquired by his natural powers, as can virtue, which is the activity in which happiness consists.. Man's perfect happiness," on the other hand, "is .beyond the nature of not only man, but every creature." [21]

Even granting the 'naturalness' of imperfect beatitude in this fashion, a most pressing problem remains for the philosopher. In what sense can imperfect beatitude be said to constitute an end, if it indeed it is imperfect? By what right can it be called happiness at all? This problem is also, at bottom, a conceptual one. It remains insoluble only so long as the terms 'end' and 'happiness' are taken to be univocal in their mode of signification.

[21] *"Dicendum quod beatitudo imperfecta quae in hao vita haberi potest ab homitne acquiri per sua naturalia, eo modo quo et virtus, in oujus operationem oonsistit . • .Sed beatitudo hominis perfecta .•• est supra naturam non solum hominis, sed etiam omnis oreaturae." (ST* la2ae, 5, 5, c.)

If the concept of ' end ' is construed in its most literal sense as the terminal point in a certain series, then clearly there is no natural end of man save, at best, the disembodied state which Pegis describes. As long as 'happiness' is defined univocally as the complete cessation and satisfaction of all desire, then no other end is open to man, deserving of the name, save the vision of the blessed. On the other hand, should such terms as ' end ' and 'happiness ' he analogical in their mode of signification, to speak of a natural, albeit imperfect felicity would be just as consistent as speaking of a natural, albeit imperfect instance of being.[28]

Thomas defines happiness 'as the fulfillment of a rational agent who is master of his own actions and is capable of recognizing or ,giving intellectual consent to his own· perfection.[29] Man oomes into being in need of many things. Although in

28 De Lubac's commentary on Thomas in the fourth part of *Surnatwrel* apparently proceeds in light of a univocal notion of happiness and :finality. All ends, simply in virtue of being ends, must be terminative in the strict sense of the term, as de Lubac sees it. Because of this, the natural beatitude under discussion, should there be any such thing, is conceived as an end which, though possible, has now been replaced with another end; for it is just as impossible that there should be both a natural *and* supernatural end as it is impossible that a line should be terminated at either end by more than one point. Thus, for de Lubac, the question becomes, " *Oonnait-il* [St. Thomas] *deulll ordres de choses, l'un, realise et fait, qui est l'ordrt surnaturel, l'autre, qui eut ete possible* en droit, *et qui serait un ordre ' purement naturel '?* " (p. 449) The doctrines of his opponents presuppose a univocal notion of beatitude as well. Victor Cathrein writes: *'In praesenti ergo ordine supernaturali, in quo de facto summus, non da,tur finis ultimus et beatitudo mere naturalis."* (*Gregorianum,* v. 11, 1930 p. 399.) This *de facto* termination has completely replaced what otherwise would have been a purely natural end, which presently possesses only the status of a hypothetical possibility. In addition, had man not been elevated to this new term, his natural beatitude would have had necessarily to satisfy completely all man's desires: *"Illa, beatitudo, quae esset ultimus in statu naturae purae deberet perfecte quietare appetitum naturalem hominis, secus non esset finis ultimus naturalis."*

29" *Nihil enim aliud sub nomine beatitudinis intelligitur nisi bonum perfectum intellectualis naturae, cujus est suam suffecientiam cognoscere in bono quod habet, et cui competit ut ei contingat aliquid vel bene vel male, et sit s.uwum operationum dorp,ina." (ST* la 'l· 26, a. I, c.)

full possession of the essential principles in virtue of which he is man, he lacks many of the qualities and attributes required if he is to .become fully human. He must refine his moral sense. He must share himself with others in friendship and participate in political community. He must develop his mind by learning about himself and his world, and so forth. Because these subsequent perfections actualize what was already inchoately or virtually present in the initial possession of human nature, they may be considered the due end of that nature; for according to Thomas *potency is ordered to aot as to an end.*

Although no man can exhaust his potency for development, or even his desire for improvement, he may be considered happy to just the extent that this development has been freely realized through the exercise of reason and of the virtues, which perfect its operations and those of the appetites. This end is not literally terminative in the sense that it comes at the end of a certain progression of activities, or at the end of one's lire; rather it consists instead in *aotually* living one's life a:s a free, rational agent. It is therefore terminative only in the sense that a power or potency can be said to he terminated in its proper act and operation. Nevertheless, a certain proportion or likeness exists between absolute beatitude ·and man's natural happiness; for each *is* related to the rational agent as act is related to potency ·and as a perfection to the ·subject of perfection.

From the point of view of its object, however, it is inadequate to define the end of man simply in terms of his own activity or operation. Even in the order of nature, Thomas a.rgues, the end of man is not man himself.[30] Rather, as is the case with all natural agents, his ultimate objective lies outside himself and is properly identified with God Who, as the first creative cause of all being, is also the ultimate term of the activity of all secondary agents.

Absolute beatitude is distinguished from all other creaturely perfections inasmuch ·as God is possessed immediaitely in His

110 *8'f* la2ae ◁· 3, a. 5, ad 3,

essence. Should man's activity fall short of the divine essence, it is not absolute beatitude.[81] Thomas argues, however, that created natures can also attain God mediately through the exercise of their native faculties. Whatever ,goodness they possess is an image or reflection of the divine goodness; and the end of any image *qua* image is to mirror as perfectly as possible its source. Therefore, in completing themselves in their own natures, creatures participate more fully in the divine goodness and to this ,extent attain God as their final end.[82] In living a life that is fully human, man fashions himself in the image of the divine in the order of nature. Thomas argues, for example, that in the arts man shares a certain likeness to God's creative wisdom.[83] In moral and political activity he shares in the providential governance of God by providing for himself and his In speculative activity man participates to some degree by way of likeness in God's knowledge of Himself and His creation.[35] Man differs from other created natures inasmuch as his rationality enables him to trace his own perfection back to God as his first cause and final end.[36]

31 *ST* la2ae q. 5, a. 3, ad 2.

32 *"Res omnes creatae sunt quaeclam imagines primi agentis, scilicet Dei: agens agit sibi simile. Perfectio autem imaginis est u.t repraesentet suum ell!emplarper ad ipsum: ad hoc enim constituitur. Sunt igitur res omnes propter divinam Militudinem consequenclam sicut propter ultimum finem." (SOG* 3, 19.4; v. 14, p. 43, 11. b 4-11.) Thus, imperfect or natural beatitude differs from supernatural beatitude in that in the former man attains only an image of the divine in accordance with his natural abilities, whereas in the latter he attains God himself. Natural beatitude differs from the perfection of other subsfances, on the other hand, because man can recognize explicitly that he is an image of the divine. This element of reflection is lacking to non-rational natures for which reason they can not strictly be said to be happy, in keeping with the definition of happiness. See note 29 *supra.*

33 *BT* la2ae q. 5, a. 3, ad 2.

34 *ST* la2ae q. 91, a. 2, c.

35 *SOG* 3, 25.8.

36 *"l!Jt ide:o siout Deus propter hoe quod est primum effi,ciens agit in omni agente, ita propter hoc quod est finis appetitur in omni fine; sea hoc appetere ipsum Deum implicite: sic vi.rtua primae causae est in secunda ut etiam in cqnclusionibus; resolvere autem coocJu,sionelJ*

In this way, he is free to assent to his own natural perfection precisely as an image of God. In this way, even his natural perlection is rightly called happiness.

IV

Natural beatitude, so conceived, is a real and intrinsic good corresponding to man's dynamic tendency toward the complete actualization of his nature and the goods aippropriate to his nature, and towards God ·as the :final end of the created order. Its :finality is principally a function of the relationships of potency to act, nature to its proper opera.tion/perfection, and of creature to creator; and in this way man's terrestrial perfection is legitimately described as his natural *end.* As an intrinsic good, it may he desired for its own sake; but its attainment need not entail the complete satisfaction of desire. Indeed, the disproportion between man's natural desire for goodness as such ·and any natural, participated good precludes such satisfaction. Natural beatitude remains imperfect beatitude. Any account of human happiness along Thomistic lines must, therefore, remain in much the same situation as Aristotle's. It is possible to conclude man can be happy, but happy only as man. This conclusion is theologically significant, but it is not for this reason meaningful only within a theological context.[87] The fa.ct that philosophical reasoning can not of its own resources establish the possibility iand nature of perfect beatitude in no way overturns its conclusions concerning whatever portion of happiness man can attain in this life. On the other hand, the fact that happiness and perfect contentment are not coincident in this life need not indicate that Thomas'

1'ɲ principia veZ secundas causas in primas est tantum modo virtutis rationaZis: unde soZum rationaUs natura potest secundarios fines in ipsum Deum per quamdam viam resoZutionis deducere, ut sic ipsum Deum ea!pZicite appetat." (De Veritate, 22, 2, c.; ed. Leonine, v. 22, prt. 3, p. 617, 11. 54-66.) Note again the element of reflection. See note 32 *supra.*

s1 *"Homines reputant 1'ɲ hao vita esse aliquam beatitudmem propter aliquarn simiUtudinem verae beatitudinis. JiJt sic non* 6(1) *toto in sua aestim<Jtiqne de"{iciciunt," (ST* la2ae ‹J· 5, a, 3, 11-d 3,)

philosophical doctrine of happiness *is* inherently flawed, but only that Thomas refuses to identify happiness simply with a state of the satisfaction of subjective interests.[88]

This lea.ves open, of course, the precise definition of man's terrestrial end and its relationship to desire and satisfaction. Is happiness to be defined primarily in terms of its constitutive activity or in terms of the objects to which this activity is directed? Does happiness consist solely in contemplation, the goods of the practical order, or both? Does pleasure belong to the essence of happiness, .or does it :simply accompany any operation which is perfective of an agent? Can the virtuous man be called happy even in the face of the hardships of ill fortune? The answers to these questions are beyond the scope of the present essay and require careful consideration of Thoma:s' moral philosophy, philosophical anthropology, and metaphysics. Here it ,suffices to have shown rthart these questions refer to a. subject matter amenable to a properly philosophical investigation.

as The notions of satisfaction and happiness are closely related in Thomas' thought (the beatific vision is posited as the end of man prooisely because finite goods fail to satisfy man's natural desire) ; but Thomas does not simply identify happiness with satisfaction and contentment. Though hindered by misfortune, the vil'tuous activity in which happiness essentially consists can not be destroyed by material or psychological adversity, unless such adversity be so great as to destroy the use of reason. For both Aristotle and Thomas, the truly happy man can easily bear such misfortune; for it is the mark of virtue to make good use of a bad situation. (See *Nicomaokean l!ltkios* 1. 10 and *Sententia Libri l!ltkicorum* I, 16, Leonine v. 47/1, pp. 57-60.) There is then a profound difference between the Aristotelian/ Thomistic account of happiness and its modern counterpart, especially as epitomized by Kant for whom happiness signifies " the condition of a rational being in the world in whose whole existence everything goes according to wish and will." (*Oritique of PraoticaZ Reason,* Bk. 2, ch. 2, prt. 5. This difference is too often ignored, and the precise relationship between satisfaction and happiness in Thomas' account of the terrestrial end of man demands a more thorough analysis than is possible in this study. Here it suffices to note that one of the principal reasuns why Thomas' notion of ' imperfect happiness ' may strike the modern reader as counterintuitive lies in the faliure to distinguish between the older Aristotelian understanding of happiness as an activity of reason in accordance with virtue and the more modern notion of happiness as simple satisfaction of desire.

It is only this natural analogue to absolute beatitude that serves as the subject matter of the philosophy of natural felicity. The philosophy of natural felicity is therefore to be carefully distinguished from theological inquiries into the hypothetical end of man in the state of ' pure nature '. It is mistaken to ,suppose then that 1a philosophical elaboration of human happiness must inevitably conflict with the claims of theology or the aspirations of faith. It is one rthing to claim that there is an activity which constitutes man's natural perfection and that man is capable of attaining to such activity through nature alone. It is quit1e another to claim that man's nature is self-enclosed and self-·sufficient,requiring nothing other than itself for its ultimate completion, excluding all reference to transcendence. Natural felicity by definition remains within the ,sphere of man's natural activity. It lays claim to being man's ultimate perfection only within this sphere. The discovery ·and articulation of this end is of great philosophical moment. The reality of man's natural efficacy is safeguarded, and the intrinsic intelligibility of his activity is guaranteed. A measure for the appriopriateness of his .action is accessible to natural reason.

With this in mind, it must always be remembered that Thomas himself spoke of the twofold *(duplex)* end of man. The term ' *duplex* ' indicates that a real distinction is ·at hand, but implies tha:t this distinction must ultimately give way to a more fundamental unity. There is a determinate form of happiness corresponding to man's tendency towards growth and development, a happiness which he is naturally 'able to achieve. The twofold is nonetheless necessarily one; and therefore, a philosophical treatise on human happiness can never claim to have offe11edan exhaustive account of its subject.

GROUNDING THE HUMAN CONVERSATION

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Introduction

SINCE THE APPEARENCE of Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* [1] the so called "rationality debate " has been conducted at a high pitch in Anglo-American philosophy. Concurrently, this debate has occupied some of the luminaries of Continental philosophy: Gadamer, Habermas, Feyerabend, and Derrida. Now that the *Sturm und Drang* associated with it has to some extent subsided, we would like to offer a partial analysis and critique. of the insights that this controversy has proffered.

In this essay our fundamental thesis is twofold: I) At the heart of the rationality debate is a longing to deconstruct narrow and restrictive methodologies .for acquiring knowledge, thereby creating the possibility for a free and open " human conversation," unfettered by the dogmatisms of the past; The " deconstructive " phase of the deba.te now requires an essentially "constructive " complement: further conditions necessary to ground a free and open " human conversation " need to be specified. In this latter ta.sk we will suggest that the work of the contemporary analytic philosopher, A. C. Grayling, and that of the fa:ther of Transcendental Thomism, Joseph Marecha.I, can be particularly helpful.

I ncommensurability

The most radical claim to emerge from the recent rationality debate is that of" incommensura.bility ": namely, two or more awropriations of reality can be so utterly diverse that we can-

[1] (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

not adjudicate between them as to their respective truth or falsity. Take at face value, for example, Paul Feyerabend's proclamation:

> that the views of scientists, and especially their views on basic matters, are often as different from each other as are the ideologies that underlie different cultures. Even worse: there exist scientific theories which are mutually incommensurablethough they apparently deal " with the same subject matter." [2]

Underlying :this claim is the belief that there is no *a prori* limit to the number of independent ways in which the stuff of reality can be conceived. Furthermore, since there is no atemporal or ahistorical standpoint beyond the fray of contending worldviews, no one view can legitimately demand absolute cognitive priority on the grounds that it more faithfully captures the " essence " of things than any other possible alternative. In effect, then, " reality is entirely reconceivable. . . . Our experience of the accidents of objects has no more direct claim to being veridical than our judgments about the nature of things." [3]

Even a partial list of the factors contributing to the genesis of the notion of radical incommensurability would be impressive: the rise of historical consciousness and its assertion of the historically conditioned nature of all world views, the emphasis in the sociology of knowledge on the socially constructed nature of all visions of reality, the contention in the philosophy of science that .all scientific observation and appraisal is ineluctably theory-laden, a:s well as the Marxist critique of theoretical positions as intellectual supports for vested class interests.

Without gainsaying the significance of these and other possible factors in the evolution of the notion of incommensurability, we would argue that a proper gra:sp of its apparent plausi-

[2] *Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge* (London: NLB, 1975), p. 274.

[3] Victor Preller, *Di·vine Science And The Science Of God* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 69.

bility and consequent appeal can best be attained if we unearth its foundation in ·a relativist reading of Kant's Copernican Revolution in philosophy. Kant's connection with this notion turns on a particular development of his basic distinction between " our " mode of conceiving reality and reality-in-itself *(Ding-an-Sich).* In Kant's view, we can only know the appearance of reality as filtered through our conceptual scheme; thus, the thing-in-itself-reality in its pure nature or aseity-is opaque and impenetrable. For Kant, however, there was only one conceptual scheme: namely, the scheme structured by the presuppositions of Euclidean geometry and Newtonian physics. Kant believed that one of his great contributions to our theoretical life was to demonstrate that this scheme was coterminous with the powers of human conceptualization as such.

It is precisely the assertion concerning the uniformity of human conceptual powers that the notion of incommensurability calls into question. Kant was certainly correct in pointing out the role of the" subject" in the construction of human experience, but the proponents of incommensurability balk at the claim that there is only one human conceptual scheme. Haven't the developments since Kant in mathematics, physics, and the social sciences demonstrated the rich and multiform nature of human conceptualizing and, consequently, the parochiality of Kant's view? Hence-so the argument goes-we must recogni7,ea multiplicity of conceptual schemes, each with its own distinctive historically •and culturally conditioned appropriation of that mysterious *Ding-anrSich* that continually confronts us. Since the thing-in-itself is unavailable to us as an absolute benchmark by which to evaluate the veracity of contending conceptual schemes, what remains at our disposal is the relative, timebound measure of intraschema.tic coherence.

In his artful essay, "On The Very Idea Of A Conceptual Scheme," [4] Donald Davdison attacks the notion of incom-

4In J. W. Meiland & Mihael Krauz, eds., *Relativism* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982), pp. 66-80.

mensurability *au fond.* His argument centel's on the incoherence that infects the claim that two or more views of reality can indeed be incommensurable or incompara.ble. Such putatively incommensma.ble views could only flow from genuinely alternative conceptual schemes: reality-in-itself would have to be organized by thinking agents through the prism of such radically divergent conceptual frameworks that all mutual comparison and comprehension would be impossible. If with Davidson we identify conceptual schemes with languages-a move that adds some precision to an otherwise fuzzy and slippery notion-then failure of translation would appear to be at least a necessary condition of truly alternative, incomparable, or incommensurable conceptual schemes. However, when we l'eflect on the conditions that ground the age-old art of translation and interpretation, we realize that we would not even be in a position to recognize a purportedly untranslatable language as a " language" at all unless we share enough in common with its creators to take their sounds or jottings as in some way related to our language or conceptual scheme. As Davidson asserts:

> We must conclude, I think, that the attempt to give solid meaning to the idea of conceptual relativism, and hence the idea of a conceptual scheme, fares no better when based on partial failure of translation than when based on total failure. Given the underlying methodology of interpretation,. we would not even be in a position to judge that others had concepts or beliefs radically different from our own.[5]

Davidson's point is certainly not to deny the fact that there are, and ha.ve been, numerous different systems for interpret-

[5] Davidson, p. 79. In a similar vein, while arguing against the complete malleability of human nature, Maurice Mandelbaum asserts that "unless we can assume common modes of feeling and thinking, regardless of differences in culture, we have no right to assume that we can understand the nature of any culture othei: than our own. In short, the evidence which allegedly proves how different others are from ourselves rests on the assumption that there are fundamental respects in which they are *not* different, but similar." *History, Man, and Reason* (Baltimore: ,fohns Hopkins Press, 1971}, p. 478 n. 25.

ing the same external reality. Furthermore, there is no *a priori* reason to assume thait wondrously novel inte:vpretative models might not spring up in the future. We can cite the magical systems of our primitive ancestors, the Ptolemaic, Aristotelian, Euclidean, Newtonian, and Einsteinean pictures of the world, or we can well imagine some grand megatheory of the future. However, Davidson is forcing us to raise the following questions: Do such admittedly diverse theo1-etical approaches to reality bespeak alternative conceptual schemes? If they did, how could communication (or translation) between them be possible? Davidson's main contention is that the entire hermeneutic enterprise requires, as a ground, some matrix of intellectual commonality that cuts across the boundaries of divergent theoretical systems.

As impo11tant as Davidson's argument is vis-a-vis contemporary philosophical debate, it is by no means novel. More than two centuries ago Giambattista Vico proclaimed:

> There must be in the nature of human institutions a mental language common to all nations, which uniformly grasps the substance of things feasible in human social life and expresses it with as many diverse modifications as the.se. same things may have diverse aspects.[6]

Centuries earlier, the scholastics sought to account for the intertranslatability of the world's languages by making a distinction between the *terminus conceptus* (concept) and the *tenninus prolatus* (spoken or written word). Although words for objects might differ, there must, in their reckoning, be commonality at the conceptual level or else the evident fact of successful translation and cross-cultural communication would not be possible. To reiterate: Davidson's point is not new, but its reassertion against the background of the current rationality debate is both necessary and instructive; the undeniable reality of effective communication across historical, cultural, linguistic, and theoretical ;boundaries requires the as-

[6] *New Science* (On Elements) par. 161.

sumption of a common conceptual scheme as the ground or necessary condition of its possibility.

In *Beyond Objectims-m And Rela.tivism,-a* book that offers a comprehensive overview of the current rationality debate- Richard Bernstein attempts to extract a more nuanced notion of incommensurabliity from the writings of theorists such as Jacques Derrida, Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyera.bend, Peter Winch, and Richard Rorty that effectively circumvents Davidson's critique. According to Bernstein, a proper understanding of " incommensurability " as enunciated in the work of the aforementioned thinkers does *not* imply the " incomparability " of beliefs and practices of differing historical or cultural provenance. Ra.ther, as he puts it:

> What is sound in the incommensurability thesis is the clarification of just what we are doing when we do compare paradigms, theories, language games. We can compare them in multiple: ways. We can recognize losses and gains. We can even see how some of our standards for comparing them conflict with each other. We can recognize-espe:cially in cases of incommensurability in science- that our arguments and counter-arguments in support of rival paradigm theories may not be conclusive. We can appreciate how much skill, art, and imagination are required to do justice to what is distinctive about different ways of practicing science: and how 'in some areas' scientists 'see different things.' In underscoring these features, we are not showing or suggesting that such comparison is irrational but opening up the type:s and varieties of practical reason involved in making such rational comparisons.[7]

In practice, then, the incommensurability doctrine should not lead to our isolating ourselves within the confines 0·f our inherited way of seeing things; it in no sense rules out the possibility and desirability of cros1s-culturalconversation. Rather, in Bernstein's view, it should liberate us from the strictures of ethnocentrism, scientism, fundamentalism, or any form of dogmatism that erroneously enshrines .a particular, historically conditioned perspective as authoritative and definitive. Purged

[1] Richard Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivi8m A.ml Relatfoism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), pp. 92-93.

of dogmatic presuppositions, we can then enter openly into a free and unencumbered dialogue with the rich and multiform sets of beliefs and practices by ,which human beings have struggled to malrn their way in the world. It is their common moral commitment to enhance "freedom" and "openness" in the human conversation that Bernstein adjudges the constructive side of the otherwise iconoclastic projects of the authors he analyzes. Though they may admittedly be given to occasional binges of hyperbole in pursuit of their purgative ends-a fact that has brought on charges of " irrationalism " and " relativism "-beneath the surface rhetoric Bernstein finds in their work a reasoned protest against our ever present tendency to ahsolutize our beliefs and prnctices, thus inhibiting rather than promoting genuine dialogue. Specifically of Rorty, Bernstein asserts that he:

> is calling for a clear recognition of what constitutes our historicity and finitude and for giving up the false metaphysical or epistemological comfort of believing that these practices are grounded on something more fundamental. We must appreciate the extent to which our sense of community is threatened not only by material conditions but by the faulty epistemological doctrines that fill our heads. The moral task of the philosopher or the cultural critic is to defend the openness of human conversation against all those temptations and real threats that seek closure. And for Rorty, too, this theme is universalized, in the sense that he is concerned not only with European intellectual's form of life but with extending conversation and dialogue to all humanity. [8]

Seen in the irenic light of Bernstein's analysis, the notion of incommensurability appears a lot tamer that at first glance: one can, in fact, endorse it as a welcome--albeit somewhat melodramatic-antidote to the surfeit of reductionism, scientism, or verificationism in philosophical circles that sought to structure all human inquiry on rigid and restrictive mathematical and physical models. However, the legitimate passion to disavow ourselves of myopic and imperialistic cognitive criteria, with a view toward creating a more " inclusive " circle

s Bernstein, pp. 204-05.

of conversation; must not blind us to the fact that our very ability to engage in conversation at all implies a conceptual commonality that, for the sake of the conversation, ought to be made explicit by something akin to transcendental analysis. In fact, the call for open-ended dialogue-,-eschewing the twin ills of dogmatism and relativism-that Bernstein so heartily endorses, requires just such a transcendental grounding if it is to be more than just naked assertion. Unfortunately, in line with the authors he treats, Bernstein seems convinced that any renewed search for foundational principles grounding the human conversation .would only represent another vain attempt to evade the inherent contingency of all human intellectualizing. Rorty is of like mind and, consequently, asserts that " to accept the contingency of ,starting points is to accept our inheritance from, and our conversation with, our fellow humans as our only source of guidance." [9] This necessitates our abandoning the age-old quest for ·some sure foundation on which to erect our theoretical systems.

> Since Kant, philosophers have hoped that it might be fulfilled by finding the a priori structure of any possible inquiry, or language, or form of social life. If we give up this hope, we shall lose what Nietzsche called " metaphysical comfort," but we may gain a renewed sense of community .... In the end, the pragmatists tell us, what matters is our loyalty to other human beings clinging together against the dark, not our hope of getting things right. [10]

Now we can readily agree that "philosophically" our only source of guidance resides in human creativity and resourcefulness without preemptorily dismissing the need to uncover the principles or structures underlying these capacities. If we maintain that, say, *modus ponens* or the principles of non-contradiction and sufficient reason are not indispensible criteria of intelligible human discourse, then how could we at all distinguish "sense" from "nonsense," meaningful conversation

[9] *Oonsequences of Pragmatism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), p. 166.

[10] Rorty, p. 166.

from mad and incoherent ravings? And isn't the hope of "getting things right "-not perfectly but in some incremental fashion-the very reason .for engaging in serious conversation in the first place? If concern with rectitude is not a primal intellectual imperative, then would we not be hard pressed to justify our predeliction for a society in which free inquiry reigns rather than the purposeful obfuscation and manipulation of an Orwellian state?

The " deoonstructive " side of the project of. a thinker like Rorty can contribute to a more vibrant and inclusive human conversation by helping to clea.r the philosophical ground of narrowly conceived, dogmatic canons of rationality. However, as far as specifying the acceptable rational standards that ought to guide us now is concerned, aU Rorty provides is the vague assertion that only continued coversation, not some illusory metaphysical support, can direct us. Certainly the conversation needs to be protected from the stultifying effects of dogmatism, but the point of the above questions is to indicate that some further specification of the preconditions of, and the standards for, the venewed conversation envisioned by Rorty, Bernstein, and others of like mind is still required to shield it from the opposite ill: the spectre of relativism. in other words, a. theoretical groundwork needs to be laid for " constructive " work in philosophy, possessed of greater solidity than the simple call to keep the conversation going in hopes that somehow progress will be made in an utterly *ad hoc* fashion. With this latter end in mind, the time would appear ripe for a return to Kant to see what, if any, of his attempt to provide a rational ground for our cognitive experience can be fruitfully appropriated for our current situation.

Kant Revisited

In proposing his Copernican Revolution in philosophy, Kant suggested:

Hitherto it has been assumeyl that all *out* knowledge must conform to objects. But all attempts to extend our knowledge of ob-

jects by establishing something in regard to them a priori, by means of concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in failure. We must the.refore make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge.[11]

It is not that Kant is asserting that the mind creates its objects, as it were, *ex nihilo.* He always maintains the discursive or non-intuitive nature of the ·intellect: it requires a material or sensible contribution from without. However, Kant does wish to cla.im that nothing can become an object of knowledge for us unless it necessarily conforms to certain conditions imposed by the mind.

Against the continental rationalists-with their emphasis on intellectual intuition and their concomitant denigration of sense experience-Kant defends the indispensable role of sensation in the cognitive process. With the empiricists Kant oould proclaim: *Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu!* Nonetheless, Kant, saw that, on strictly empiricist analysis, the cognitive experience we actually possess would be impossible: •such an analysis cannot account for the unity and apparent necessity of our knowledge in fields such as mathematics and physics.[12]

Kant's major goal in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is to extract and elucidate the a priori element in our knowledge that reason itself supplies. He is engaged in what he calls "trans-

11 B xvi. We are employing Norman Kemp Smith's translation of Kant's *Oritiqite Of Pure Reason* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1958).

12 "Experience is, beyond all doubt, tbe first product to which our understanding gives rise, in working up the raw material of sensible impressions .... Nevertheless, it is by no means the sole field to which our understanding is confined. Experience tells us, indeed, what is, but not that it must necessarily be so, and not otherwise. It therefore gives us no true universality; . . . Such universal modes of knowledge, which at the same time possess tbe character of inner necessity, mlli!t in themselves, independently of experience, be clear and certain. 'rhey are therefore entitled knowledge *a priori;* whereas, on the other l1and, that which is borrowed solely from experience is, as we say, known only *a posteriori,* or empirically." A 1-2,

oendental " analysis: one which seeks the grounds or necessary conditions for the possibility of the knowledge we actually possess. In sum, the empiricists had convinced Kant of the sense-dependent nature of human cognition, but he, in turn, saw the futility of conceiving the mind as a *tabula rasa,* functioning as a merely passive receptor of external stimuli. In Kant's view, .the mind, *via* the senses, is certainly a receptive organ, but it "actively" shapes what it receives according to its own internal structures. The content of our knowledge stems from sense experience, but its form is imposed by the mind: this form represents the *a priori* element in knowledge. Thus all knowledge is a synthesis of sensible and intellectual elements.13 As A. C. Grayling writes:

> Kant's central question was about the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge. Answers to this question rest upon answers to a more inclusive question: the whether there are conditions necessarily presupposed to coherent and intelligible experience in general. ... In arguing for the Categories, and for space and time as the pure forms of sensibility, Kant is arguing that there can be experience only under certain conditions: and this is the point of inte.rest.[14]

Coming out of the Thomistic tradition, Joseph Marechal credited Kant with having shown a way through the thicket of conflicting arguments generated by the long debate between dogmatic rationalism and empiricism. His Copernican Revolution highlighted anew the need to view human cognition as a synthetic process in which the senses and the intellect play complementary roles. Hence, according to Marechal:

> The upshot was at least a partial solution to the fundamental antinomy of rationalism and empiricism. Since the two opposing tendencies had by then developed their most extreme consequences, Kant was able to reconcile them only by returning uncon-

1a "Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind." A 51 .. B 75.

11 *The Refutation of Scepticism* (LaSalle: Open Court, 1985), p. 81.

sciously to a synthetic viewpoint which had been overlooked by the ancestors of modern philosophy. [15]

Thus both thinkers are of the opinion that one can endorse the fundamental *elan* of the Kantian program, and search for those concepts that shape or make possible our cognitive experience, without necessarily subscribing in defail to all the ofttimes highly obscure arguments of Kant's first *Critique.* One can, as Grayling puts it:

> take; seriously the spirit, but not so much the detail of Kant's enterprise, and attempt to find out what if any concepts are indispensably presupposed to our making judgments or to our thinking of the world as a system of spatio-temporal particulars. [16]

Grayling, Transcendental Arguments, And The Hu,man Conversation

Grayling points out that Wittgenstein used transcendental-style arguments-arguments that emulated the spirit rather than the letter of Kant's formulaitions--1n the *Philosophical Investigations* to demonstrate the impossibility of private languages, and in *On Certainty* to demonstrate the possibility of knowledge. [11] He also refers to Stra.wson's transcendental-style reasoning in *Individuals* showing the logical necessity of our belief in other minds. [18] The goal of these transcendental arguments is to show that our beliefs about the public nature of-language, the possibility of knowledge, and the existence of other minds are so basic to our conceptual scheme that we cannot coherently conceive the world without them:.

Hence, the renewed human conversation that Rorty, Bernstein, and others wish to inaugurate-though ideally shrived of the restrictive, dogmatic rpresuppositions of the past-must, nonetheless, hold these beliefs as " foundational," for they at-

1sLe Point de Depart de la Metaphysique III (Paris: Desciee, 1964), p. 11.

16 Grayling, p. 81.

11 Grayling, p. 81.

1s Grayling, pp. 79-80.

test to elements so fundamental to our conceptualizing power that we cannot call them into question: they ground the very "possibility" of thought, disco'l.lrse,or conversation as such.

In his own attempt to elucidate certain foundational features of our conceptual scheme, Grayling first strives to show that we cannot coherently doubt that our descriptions of experience refer to independently existing spatio-temporal particulars "not just because it is merely natural to describe our experience by talking about the objects it is experience of, but because there is no other way of doing so." [19] Purportedly more basic accounts of our perceptual experience in terms of "sense-data" or "raw-feels" turn out to be parasitic upon the fundamental object-reference language .. Hence, Grayling concludes:

> to argue that one's sensory states cannot be described except by me,ans of terms whose literal function is to describe objects is to say that description of experience carries essential reference to its possible objects, which is to say there is no possible characterization of experience which is made without essential use of the concepts and terms by means of which the objects of experience are described. [20]

At this point a sceptic might concede that "realist" presuppositions are necessary to "our" conceptual scheme but retort that they may riot be necessary to other imaginable ways of organizing experience. Grayling counters such an objection by seeking to substantiate "the claim that all conceptual schemes have the same specifiable fundamental structure with respect to the nature and organization of empirical experience." [21] He does so by marshalling Davidson's arguments against the possibility of our coherently conceiving a conceptual scheme so radically different from our own that realist presuppositions were dispensable. Thus, in Grayling's words:

> certain transcendental beliefs (in particular the assumption of objects) are necessary to the coherence of conceptual experience (the

19 Grayling, p. 15.
20 Grayling, pp. 15-16.
21 Grayling, p. 41.

sensefulness of language) and . . . anything recognizable as such de.pends upon the same set of transcendental beliefs.[22]

But there is a paradoxical twist to Gra.yling's argumentation. It stems from a distinction he makes between option A and option B transcendental arguments. Option A TA's would prove the existence of an independent world of objects corresponding to our perceptual statements. This would purportedly represent a full-blooded demonstration of philosophical realism. However, option B TA's (which Grayling claims to be employing) can only show that " realist assumptions " are necessary to our experience of the world: our conceptual scheme-the only one of which we can coherently conceive-simply demands them. In effect, then, we must "think " as philosophical realists, but this necessity does not entaiil that reality-in-itself, as it exists independently of our thought, necessarily corresponds with our conceptions. In this context Grayling asserts:

> a belief in the existence of objects is a necessary condition of our thought and talk. To say this is tantamount to saying that realist assumptions are necessary to our conceptual that, in effect, we are bound to be epistemological (or ontological), realists, if our thought and talk is to be coherent. But saying ' we are bound to be realists ' is thus to make an anti-realist point; for the claim is not a claim as to the *truth* of a realist view of the world, but a claim to the *necessity of taking* a realist view, with nothing following, because nothing can follow, as to the truth or falsity of such a view.[28]

Thus, in regard to the fundamental distinction between reality-in-itself and reality as it appears to us, Grayling remains securely within the ambit of Kant's critical philosophy. To become part of our experience, reality must pa'SS through the filter of our conceptual scheme. We can employ transcendental analysis to say what is necessary to that scheme and,

[22] Grayling, p. 76.

[2s] A. C. Grayling, *An Introduction To Philosophical Logic* (N.J.: Barnes & Noble, 1982), pp. 287-88.

therefore, what shape reality must take if it is to be coherently conceived; but we can know and say nothing of that same reality as it exists apart from our conceptual scheme.[24] With his updated Kantian view of reality, Grayling believes he has grounded the ongoing human conversation in the only available sure foundation: one that enunciates a middle course between uncritical philosophical claims for a human capacity to assume a quasi-divine perspective on things *(sub specie aeternitatis),* and untenable relativist claims that reality is essentially reoonceivable depending on which conceptual scheme--among the many supposedly open to human
to be employed.

Thus Grayling leaves us with a cognitive situation that is paradoxical indeed: it is necessary for us to " think " as epistemological realists, but we can say nothing as to the " truth " of the realist view. Furthermore, Grayling's metaphysics of anti-realism does not, he claims, argue for relativism because reflection (i.e., Davidson's arguments) indicates that there is no conceivable conceptual scheme in which realist assumptions would not function as necessa.ry conditions. Hence, extrapolating from Grayling's account, the human conversation we are seeking to ground can confidently proceed, wedded to the notion that we simply must operate intellectually " as if " our language is reality-related, and this necessity effectively secures us from the corrosive impact of relativism, without thereby committing us to an uncritcial and unwaranted leap to a full-blown metaphysical realism.

24 As to the clOt!e affiliation of his views with the spirit of Kant's enterprise, Grayling asserts: "For a grasp of perceptual discourse is tied to knowing the empirical conditions of application for perceptual terms, and being able to recognize that a given set. of experiences warrants use of given expressions; sense cannot accrue from experience-transcendent conditions .••. It is in this sense that to make the point that we must be epistemological realists is to make an antirealist point about sense and the coherence of experience; it exactly parallels Kant's view to the effect that empirical realism is a. transcendental idealist thesis." *Refutation,* pp. 110-11.

Marechal's Critique Of Kant'

Like Grayling, Marechal seeks to appropriate what is valuable in the Kantian enterprise with a view toward making a contribution to contemporary philosophical debate. Of course, Marechal is writing in the first forty years of this century and comes at Kant from the perspective of the Thomistic rather than Anglo-American tradition. However, we believe that valuable insight can be garnered from his work and fruitfully applied to the current concern with finding ra;tional criteria for grounding the human conversation.

Marechal credits Kant with realizing that the only egress from the stalemate that beset modern philosophy was to elucidate the complementary roles of sense and understanding in the cognitive process. According to Marechal, this ·solution, to some extent, marks an unwitting return to the Thomistic doctrine of abstraction. "On both sides a contingent multiplicity, that *is* empirically acquired, is comprehended and universalized by a non-intuitive a priori of the intellect." [25] Both emphasize tha:t, as embodied and finite creatures, all our knowledge begins ·with sense experience. Both assert that the mind is not merely a receptor of sense impressions but an active partner in structuring the data provided by the senses into an intelligible whole. Finally, both see that only if the joint contributions of sense and intellect are recognized can we avoid stumbling into rationalist or empiricist caricatures of cognition.

However, Marechal is critical of Kant for failing to integrate the "organizing " function of the understanding (V*erstand)* with reason's (V*emunft)* primal drive or quest for the absolute foundations of knowledge. What lies behind Kant's failure in this regard? In his analysis of the a priori structure of knowledge Kant identifies a hierarchy of transcendental conditions that are the logical prerequisites of the "objects " of our cognitive experience. Then, as Marechal writes, he aprpends to this hierarchy:

[25] Joseph Marechal, "Au Seuil de la Meta.physique: Abstraction ou Intuition," in *Melanges Joseph Jlarechal* I (Paris: Desclee, 1950), p. 147.

by a necessary correlation with the transcendental unity of the " Ego," the pre-categorial affirmation of the " thing-in-itself," which represents, in the content of knowledge, an undetermine,d absolute, a negative noumenon, a genuine limit of the phenomenon, necessarily posited along with it, and theyeby the true contact point *(point d'attache)* for the objectivity of our concepts.[26]

Thus, f:vom Kant's perspective, to abandon the thing-in-itself or noumenon as the necessary correlate of the transcendental unity of apperception and the phenomenon as appearence would be to transmogrify his critical philosophy into an absolute idealism. Our sensibility endows us with the capacity to be ·affected by external reality under the *a priori* forms of space and time. Our experience is, thus, an experience of something external to us, and cannot be reduced to internal states. Hence, the doctrine of the "thing-in-itself" has a twofold function in Kant's system: I) It anchors our experience in external reality; amd 2) It forbids an uncritical identification of " our " experience of reality *qua* phenomenon with an experience of this same reality's absolute character *qua,* noumenon or independent object.

Marechal points out that, like Kant, the Thomistic tradition maintains the empircia.lly based, discursive nature of the intellect. Consequently, it also rejects the various forms of rationalist metaphysics that claim to produce apodictic knowledge on the basis of direct, intellectual intuition that bypasses the vagaries of the senses. But, unlike Kant, it does not thereby discount the very possibility of constructing an intelligible metaphysics of the noumenal realm. In fact, Marechal holds that Kant need not have reached an agnostic conclusion in this regard.

What does he [Kant] lack to rejoin metaphysics in the full sense of the term? He obviously lacks the capacity to apply certain formal deteyminations to the " thing-in-itself" besides its mere phenomenal expression; in other words, he lacks the capacity to construct a system of positive noumena determined according to their own internal structure *(en soi)*. This inability is the resuit

2a" Au Seuil de la Metaphysique," p. 147.

of the analysis Kant makes of the intellectual a priori which he places in synthesis with the empirical diversity. Kant did not see how the very a priori that makes the object of experience intelligible (by surrounding it with logical properties and projecting it toward a real absolute) must, in this objective function, ascribe to the absolute certain formal determination at least of an analogical nature. [27]

Kant dismisses any theoretical determination of the nature of noumenal reality because he cannot conceive of its possibility except when linked with direct, intellectual intuition. In this regard, Marechal feels that Kant does not totally escape the rationalist influence against which he was reaoting.[28] Marechal's goal is to expunge this rationalist remnant from Kant's thought, thereby completing his *rapprochement* with the Thomistic tradition.

To this end, Marechal strives to demonstrate that a thoroughgoing transcendental analysis of the *a priori* element, operative in the functioning of a discursive intellect such as ours, reveals that a " necessary " affirmation of the noumenal absolute enters into the very constitution of every object of experience, without reliance on a non-sensuous mode of intuition. Knowing (or, better, learning) is a fundamentally dynamic process by which we encounter, not merely appearances, but things-in-themselves precisely through their myriad appearances. Of course, our knowledge of things during our earth-

21" Au Seuil de la Metaphysique," pp. 147-48.

2s "If the former disciple of Leibniz and Wolff had detached himself from Cartesian Platonism to the point where he recognized the reciprocal causality of matter and form at the heart of our objective knowledge-which leads him closer to Aristotle-he nonetheless preserves, in the hypothetical conception he has of all ontology, something of the Platonic prejudice in favor of intuition." "Au Seuil de la Metaphysique," p. 148. At the heart of the Platonic prejudice is the belief that sense knowledge is relative and changing, and can at best achieve the level of opinion (*doa:a)* . Only pure intellectual intuition could attain to a certain and immutable knowledge of reality (*episteme).* Marechal's point is that Kant did not liberate himself from the Platonic notion that only non-sensuous, intellectual intuition can give us a " true" insight into the nature of reality: namely, provide us with a vision of the "thing-in-itself."

ly sojourn can never be exhaustive; such total comprehension would involve an immediate *visio sub speoie <teternitatis* ha.t is beyond unaided finite intelligence. But our finite cognitive status, or the fact that our knowledge is always partial and open to revision, does not justify the Kantian phenomenon-noumenon split, and the ,accompanying assertion that we can know the former but never the latter. [29]

For Marechal, the dynamism that animates our endless search for knowledge is the continuous human quest for the absolute. In his view, transcendental analysis reveals that in every cognitive act we are implicitly seeking the ultimate, necessary ground of reality, in terms of which all finite, contingent beings are finally intelligible. Such an analysis, Marechal believes, uncovers the true source of the Thomistic doctrine of the analogy of being. The analogical knowledge of the absolute, which is the highest level to which metaphysics can ascend by natural means alone, is grounded in the very dynamism of the intellect. Furthermore, our explicit knowledge of everyday objects is only possible against the ,background or horizon of our implicit and primordial grasp of the absolute. The subject-object duality that is necessary to a. discursive intellect, our capacity to categorize our experience in terms of universals, as well as our continual drive to render that experience ever more unified and intelligible are all based on our primal dynamism toward the absolute. [80]

In sum, Marechal affirms that, when transcendental analysis is pursued to the very core of cognition, we see that our funda-

29 In this context, the following remarks from Marjorie Grene are quite instructive: " The reality to be known, the thing-in-itself, is for Kant not a limiting concept but a limit-concept, in that it is outside the sphere of intelligence altogether. For us, on the other hand, it is a limit to be asymptotically approached, though never fully or certainly attained. The knower is the knowing person, in hazard, gambling on making contact with reality, and the reality he Beeks contact with is the real world, though forever eluding his ultimate self-sufficient, systema.tic grasp." *Tke Knower And The Known* (London: Faber, 1966), p. 152.

ao For a fuller discussion of Marechal's thought see Anthony M. Matteo, "Joseph Marechal And The Transcendental Turn in Catholic Thought," Diss. Temple University, 1986.

mental intellectual orientation toward absolute being gives rise to, and dominates, the process by which we come to know finite things. We recognize these .beings ·as "finite," and transform them into objects of our knowledge because of our pre-apprehension that the being they possess does not embody the totality of being toward which the intellect i:s tending: they represent a partial and limited expression of that fullness of being which alone could satisfy our pure desire to know. As Marechal wrote in his essay, *"A propos du sentiment de presence chez les profa,nes et les mystiques":*

> The absolute has placed its mark on th<:: fundamental tendency of our intelligence, so that this tendency constantly transcends particular intellections: the mind, through its internal dynamism, is driven from intellection to intellection, from object to object, but as long as it remains in the realm of the finite it strives in vain to equal its own internal movement .... And this unevenness ... is the very condition of reasoning, the catalyst of that always disrntisfied curiosity in which the scholastics of old rightly discovered the principle of all speculation. Thus the human mind is a faculty in search of its intuition (*une faculte en quete de son intuition)* , that is, of assimilation with being, with pure and simple being, supremely one, without restriction, without distinction as to essence and existence or possibility or actuality. [31]

Conclusion

Grayling's retrieval of Kant in contemporary analytic categories successfully grounds the human conversation to the extent that it shows the necessity of realist assumptions, and points out the incoherence of conceptual relativism. However, on Grayling's analysis, the "truth" of those assumptions is unattainable, and even to demand it bespeaks a faulty understanding of the epistemological constraints under which we, as humans, labor. Hence Grayling ends by promoting "anti-realism ": a variant of idealism necessarily dictated by empirical epistemological considerations.

s1 In *J!:tudes sur la Psyohologie des Mystiques* I (Paris: Descllie, 1938), pp. 120-21.

Anti-realism is an attitude to language which takes epistemology, and in paiticular empirical epistemology seriously; it is for this reason that some form of idealism, minimally conceived of as the idea that the conception of the world's existing independently of any experience of it is unintelligible, appears to be a natural consequence of it.[82]

Marechal, however, can be seen as grounding the human oonversation through a defense of critical realism that takes seriously the Thomistic distinction between *modus intellectus* and *modus* rei.[83] This distinction points out the fact that " our " grasp of reality is necessarily limited or :filtered by our powers of sensation and conceptualization. However, the fact that our knowledge is inescapably structured by our perceptual and intellective capacities does not ·imply that it represents a disto.rtion of " what is." Certainly the fullness of reality exceeds O'llr grasp, but this does not entail that we cannot accurately appropriate some aspect of this fullness. Furthermore, in Marechal's view, we recognize the partial nature of all our appropriations of !'eality, and continually strive for ever more comprehensive vistas, precisely because we are impelled by a drive or dynamism toward a comprehension of reality's fullness: a *viS'io sub specie aeternitatis* which is the very lifeblood of all our cognitive operations.

We could, with Hilary Putnam, fairly define realism as the view that:

> the world consists of a ... totality of mind-independent objects; ... there is (in principle) one true and complete description of the 'way the world is,' (and) truth involves some sort of correspondence relation between words or thought-signs and external things.[34]

s2 Grayling, *Introduction To Philosophical Lo,qic,* p. 281.

sa " For it is quite true that the mode of understanding, in one who understands, is no<t the same as the mode of a thing in being, since the thing understood is immaterially in the one who understands, according to the mode of the intellect, and not materially, according to the mode of a material thing." *Summa Theologiae* I, 85, 1, ad 1. See also *S.T.* I, 85, 2, ad 2.

34 *Reason, Triith And History* (Cambridge: University Press, 1981), p. 49.

For Grayling, such a definition is an apt description of " how we must think," but our empirically based mode of cognition bars us from ever possessing the" truth" that is realism's goal. For Marechal, on the other hand, the final truth of the universe a:t the heart of the realist's vision is a horizon which we implicitly, yet nonetheless ineluctably, ·strive for in every cognitive operation. Once we recognize the compelling influence of this horiron on the entirety of the cognitive process, we can no longer rightly advert to possessing the " truth "; rather, to put the matter paradoxically, we must speak of " truth" possessing us. As John F. Haught has written:

> It seems that in the case of truth we are dealing . . . with an " horizon" that evades our efforts at intellectual control and adequate definition. If anything, truth would define us more than we could define it. The encounter with truth is more a case of being grasped by it than of our actively grasping it.[35]

As a critical realist, Marechal freely admits that we do not possess truth in the final sense, but recognizes that the continual desire for its possession-if only in infinitesmally incremental stages-is the hallmark of the human intellect, it's very *raison d'etre.* To abandon this desire would, thus, sap our intellectual inquiries of an seriousness, precipitating a tragic atrophy of the mind's magnificent powers.

What, then, are the implications of our analysis of Grayling and Marechal for our concern to ground a free, open-ended, yet critical human conversation? We would contend that such a conversation entails the following necessary conditions: 1) Thought (or language) is ineluctably "reality-related," and not a subjective aHair; 2) there is one human conceptual scheme, capable of myriad variations, that makes communication or translation possible; 8) truth, as horizon or goal, must be the ultimate motivation for engaging in conversation.

We have tried to show that, drawing on both the spirit of Kant and the work of some contemporary philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition, Grayling mounts a convincing argu-

What Is God? (New York: Paulist Press, 1986), p. 94.

ment justifying conditions 1 and 2. However, we also claimed that Grayling fails to arrive at condition 8-instead seeing himself forced to enunciate a metaphysical antirealism-because of his inability to move beyond the Kantian rift between reality-in-itself and our empirical mode of grasping this same reality. It is our contention that Marechal-likewise in dialogue with Kant-effectively draws upon the thought of Aquinas to transcend that rift, thus offering a rationale for condition 8.

The underlying motif of Bernstein's *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism* is the claim that recent debates in philosophical circles are converging on the insight that the search for truth is not to be conceived as an algorithmic, unidimensional process: we have no irrefragable Archimedean poinrt from which to initiate our e:fforts.[86] However, we have suggested in this essay that our liberation from past dogmatisms, which have shackled the human conversation, does not imply that it can now proceed on an entirely *ad hoc* basis. We have argued that there are certain if you will-that govern its effective conduct.

In sum, we must not only recognize a plurality of points of view in an authentic conversation, but we must also be attentive to the commonality the participants in the conversation share. Furthermore, if the conversation is to have a direction and serious purpose, its participants must also be servants of the truth ·for which they must strive, and to which they must submit, when it 'is revealed to them, in whatever preliminary way, as a result of their patient probing. To do otherwise, would amount to bartering one brand of debilitating intellec-

86" At the beginning of this study, when I raised the question ' Why is it that in our time the battle between objectivists and relativists has become so dominant and obsessive? ' I suggested that a primary reason is the growing sense that there may be nothing-not God, Philosophy, Science, or Poetry-that satisfies our longing for ultimate foundations, for a fixed Archimedean point upon which we can secure our thought and action." *Be·'IJO'll4 Objetivism and, RelatWism,* p. 230.

tual arrogance for another: more precisely, that of restricting the pathways of human discovery to some purportedly privileged methodology, for a position that holds that the human mind can function effectively without an unswerving commitment to search for an evcer more comprehensive grasp of being or "that which is," as its fundamental imperative.

A COMMENT ON POLANYI AND KUHN

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FOR SOME TIME NOW we have noted tha:t the names Michael Polanyi and Thomas S. Kuhn are frequently mentioned together in articles and books dealing with specialized topics in the philosophy of science. And if we genera.Ily accept what is said in these publications, there appears to be a belief afield, which is broadly shared amongst students of scientific thought, to the effect that the philosopher of science, Michael Polanyi, and the historian of science, Thomas Kuhn, are in some fundametal manner in accord with one another as to the chara.cter and nature of scientific thinking. In fact, there seems to be no disputing this question amongst some of the most prestigious philosophers of science, nor does there seem to be even the slightest suspicion that maybe Polanyi does not belong to the same school of thought as Kuhn. We are told explicitly, or we are led to believe, that PoJanyi and Kuhn are in lea;gueto do battle against empiricism and empiricists, and that as a result they share a number of perspectives on scientific thinking. This is taken to mean tha;t they broadly hold the same point of view when it comes to thinking about various issues. Now, it is largely true that both are opposed to empiricism, and to the understanding that empiricists have about the way that scientific knowledge is advanced. However, this does not mean that Polanyi and Kuhn are in *fun<lamental* agreement with each other about the basics, nor should we understand it to imply that they can be said to espouse essentially similar points of view.

As we interpret this putative association of Polanyi with Kuhn in the literature, it does not seem improper to suggest

that it is in part based upon the assumption, which is often insinuated when not stated explicitly, that both men are subjectivists and relativists. While they may not advocate exactly similar theses, many believe that they are at one as regards the role played by man's subjective proclivities in the acquisition of scientific knowledge, ·and that, in some important sense, this leads each of them to undermine the very possibility of science. But is this really the case? Do Polanyi and Kuhn truly agree with one another about the nature of scientific thinking? Are both of the belief that science is not concerned with the truth, and that judgments in science are arbitrary and biased? It seems to us that they aJ.1e not in accord on these issues, or, indeed, on a number of other questions on which they are said to be of one mind, and that frankly little or no attempt is made to focus on the very obvious opposition that exists between Polanyi's position on the one hand, and that of Kuhn and his associates on the other.

I

Before we explore the difierences between these two thinkers, we should perhaps dra.w attention to a few of those passages in the literature which seek to associate Polanyi with Kuhn. This will enable us to obtain a clearer appreciation of the focus of the somewhat troubling remarks made by various commentators. We read the following types of statements and we cannot help but conclude, if we are not completely familiar with the subject matter under discussion, that Polanyi and Kuhn, along with perhaps Feyerabend, Hanson, and Toulmin, are supporters of a basically similar point of view. The Popper scholar, Imre Lakatos, writes:

. . . one cannot simply water down the ideal of proven truth-as some logical empiricists do-to the ideal of ' probable truth' (The main contemporary protagonist of thi:: ideal of ' probable truth ' is Rudolf Carnap.) or-as some sociologists of knowledge do-to 'truth by [changing] consensus'. (The main contemporary pro-

tagonists of the ideal of 'truth by consensus' are Polanyi and Kuhn.) [1]

The Kuhn/Polanyi portion of this quotation is of interest to us, and it seems reasonably accurate in as much as it bears on the thinking of Thomas Kuhn. To a large extent Kuhn is open to the charge that he is a relativist, and that according to him, truth in science, and perhaps elsewhere, is what the prevailing consensus says it is. But, is this what Polanyi believes? It has always seemed to us that for Polanyi, truth in general, and in the natural sciences in particular, is understood to be a fundamentally correct insight into the *real,* as it is independent of human thought processes. This means that the prevailing or "changing oonsensus" amongst scientists has absolutely nothing to do with wha.tis "true," except in as much as Polanyi advises that the judgment of some leading members of the scientific community is perhaps more experienced in seeking out the *real* than that of the neophyte. But, of course, this does not signify that, in Polanyi's view, the leaders in science will always be correct and the neophyte wrong a.bout where the truth rests. Truth, for Polanyi, is not to be found in the collective aspirations of the community of scientists, ·or of its leading members, as seems to be the case for Kuhn. It resides in the judgment of a scientist, who, because of his feel for a particular subject, *correctly* claims that *here is the real.* But more about this later, when we have had an opportunity to show that Polanyi is a philosophical realist, and not a radical relativist like Kuhn.

For another expression of the supposed subjectivity and relativism behind all of Polanyi's thinking, we note the following observation, which is again a remark made by Imre Lakatos:

> In the Polanyiite view, in each individual case of rivalry between two scientific one has to leave it to the inarticulate *Fingerspitzengefuhl* . . . of the great scientists to decide which theory is better. The great scientists are the ones who have

[1] Imre Lakatos and A. Musgrave, eds., *Oritioism and the Growth of Knowledge* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 92.

' tacit of the way things go. . . . But of course, this *foreknowledge-unlike* a simple conjecture-cannot be articulated and made available to the layman outsider. Toulmin seems to have a similar view .... So does Kuhn. [2]

In this quotation, the emphasis seems to be on subjectivism, namely, on the personal judgments of great scientists, whose decisions are deemed to be ultimately mysterious and unquestionable. But here again, it appears, there is a misreading 0:f the Polanyian argument. The point which Lakatos seems not to appreciate fully is that Polanyi is drawing attention to the importance of experience in science, as in other domains. But it is not the voice of '·experience' as such that settles the question of where the truth resides. Ra:ther, it is experience in dialogue with the real that decides the matter 0:f where truth is to he found. In short, it is the *cortect* rendering of where the real is to he found that resolves the issue. Imre Lakatos' failure to appreciate this point is all the more surprising, :for we read the :following in Laka,tos:

... let us propose tentatively that, *if a demarcation criterion is inconsistent with the basic appraisals of the scientific elite, it shoUld be given up.* (This approach, of course, does not mean that we *believe* that the scientists' 'basic judgments' are unfailingly rational; it only me.ans that we *accept* them in order to criticize universal definitions of science. [If we add that no such *universal* criterion has been found and no such *universal* criterion will ever be found, the stage is set for Polanyi's conception of the lawless closed autocracy of science.]) [3]

Evidently, Lakatos dO'es understand that the leaders of the scientific community ha.ve an important role to play in the advancement of knowledge. But then, why does he speak critically of the "... *Fingerspitzengefuhl* ... of the great scientists ..."? Moreover, what are we to make of his observation which explicitly mentions the name Polanyi, but which refuses to recognize that Polanyi is also guided in his search for the

[2] J. Worrall and G. Currie, eds., *The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 176.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 145f.

truth in science by a universal criterion, namely, reality? Why point to the "... lawless closed autocracy of science," when it appears that Polanyi does not counsel against *lawfulness.* Rather, lawfulness is consequent upon a, scientist's concern for rendering explicit the *real.* For Polanyi, it is committment to the real (to the universal criterion) that serves as the reference point, that keeps scientists within the straight and narrow, a.nd not *arbitrary* decision-making by sanctioned authorities. What Lakafos and others seem not to appreCiate is that following an approved procedure in scientific thinking is not without reliance upon personal discretion and judgment, nor is it synonymous with submission to a universal criterion. Approved pl'ocedures of themselves do not decide when their essential conditions for being implemented have been realized. It is *the scientist* who decides this sort of thing. Likewise, it is *the scientist* who determines the future course, when approved procedures are themselves in dispute. This is Polanyi's point ail along, and to the extent that scientists are committed to reveal the real, there is absolutely nothing lawless, arbitrary, mystical or autocraitic here. Nor is it fair to say that Polanyi believes that decisions in science are taken by ". . . changing consensus." Truly, there is nothing susceptible of being viewed as a " mystical affair " in all of this, as we will soon see.

Finally, mention perhaps should be made of Israel Scheller. In his work *Science and Subjectivity,* Scheffler, although in no sense a follower of Karl Popper, detects a penchant in Polanyi's thinking that is similar to the one noted by Imre Lakatos. He writes:

> Kuhn ... argues ... that before the proponents of differing scientific paradigms "can hope to communicate fully, one group or the other must experience the conversion that we have been calling a paradigm shift. Just because it is a transition between incommensurables, the transition between competing paradigms cannot be inade a step at a time, forced by logic and neutral experience." . . . And Michael Polanyi, emphasizing the " intuition of rationality in nature," argues,. on the basis of his interpretation of scientific history, that knowledge in science is personal, commit-

ting us "passionately and far beyond our comprehension, to a vision of reality." ... The general conclusion to which we appear to be driven is that adoption of a new scientific theory is an intuitive or mystical affair, a matter for psychological description primarily, rather than for logical and methodological codification:'

Again, there is confusion. We believe that Scheff:leris essentially correct inasmuch as his observation bears on the thinking of Thomas S. Kuhn. However, has he misread and mistaken Polrunyi's interest in the tacit dimension in the knowing process, and the fiduciary basis on which all knowledge of the *real* rests, for Kuhnian subjectivism? It appears to us that he has. The tacit is not synonymous with the subjective, nor the explicit with the objective, as we will have an opportunity to see later.

II

In the interest of fairness, and in order to some of the bewilderment which surrounds the rela.tionship of Polanyi and Kuhn, it is undoubtedly worth noting that Michael Polanyi may have inadvertantly contributed to the confusion. Having spent a good part of his life struggling against the very school of thought which was to offend Kuhn and his associates, and forced, in a manner of speaking, to accept help and support in this struggle from wherever he could find it, Polanyi may not have been as careful as he should have in mainfaining the separation between himself and his comrades-in-arms. As we all know, when someone has been battling for a long time, he is inclined to believe that his is the only war that is going on. And if, in the course of the conflict, he should discover that he is not alone in this struggle against a seemingly very powerful opponent, it is always painful for such a person to dissociate himself from his new found friends, despite

4 Israel Scheller, *Science and Subjectivity* (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill *Co.,* Inc., 1967), p. 17f. See a.lso John Watkins, *Science and Scepticism* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 28-30. See also Jack W. Meiland, "Discussion: Kuhn, Scheftler, and Objectivity in Science," *Philosophy of Science,* XLI, 2 (June 1974), pp. 179-187.

the fact that he nuty not fully agree with them. Furthermore, while the battle is still raging, one tends to think that it is the all important event, and that there will .be time enough later to clear up the differences between oneself and one's allies. For the moment, one tells oneself, it is not one's allies that are a problem; it is the opposing point of view, which always seems more threatening than perhaps it is.

w·hatever the true reason for Polanyi's failure to distinguish his position from that of Kuhn a,nd his associates, the fact is that there inevitably comes a time when things must be put straight and clarified, and it seems to us that now is the time. We simply cannot continue to pretend that Polanyi is in complete agreement with Kuhn, or with Feyerabend, Hanson and Toulmin *et al.*, on a number of fundamental points.

The question is this: Is it correct to view Michael Polanyi as an associate of Thomas S. Kuhn and those other Twentieth Century *consensualis"ts,*if we may be allowed to borrow Imre Lakatos' term? Is Polanyi really a relativist and a subjectivist in the sense in which these terms may be appropriately applied to Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyeraibend, and the others? Or, are not Michael Polanyi's views about how scientific thinking takes place fundamentally different from those of the •oonsensualists '? In a forthcoming book, we will be ,arguing that it is not right to group Michael Pofanyi with Thomas Kuhn and the other modern relativists and subjectivists mentioned above. If we may pr:eview briefly some elements of the argument which we will be making in this book, permit us to observe that Michael Polanyi is without a doubt not associated with the relativist ·schoolof thought of Thomas S. Kuhn, for the following reasons:

A) Thomas S. Kuhn and his philosophical colleagues hold that there is no such thing as *1'eality,*that is to say, an entity which subsists in the world beyond the knower and is independent of the knower',s capacity to reason ·and think. This claim is repeatedly made in his work *The Structure of Scientific Revolution,'!.* There we learn that, for Kuhn, what is *real* is

strictly a function of the creative and imaginative ability of one who is presumably a great natural scientist. Kuhn constantly expresses this point of view in his early writings. Indeed, it is what characterizes, we believe, the 'Specificity of Kuhn's position, despite his seeming need at times to argue in favour of the importance of discovering a point of reference beyond the knower; a requirement which he appears to have felt he had to acknowledge explicitly in the 1969 postscript to *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.*[5] We hardly need a quotation from Kuhn to support these observations. However, if one is necessary, we note the following in Kuhn's well known work:

A scientific theory is usually felt to be better than its predecessors not only in the sense that it is a better instrument for discovering and solving puzzles but also because it is somehow a better representation of what nature is really like. One often hears that sue-

5 What we are referring to here is the seeming loss of nerve which Kuhn experienced after being severely challenged by empiricists, who asserted that he did nothing less than undermine the entire scientific enterprise. In "Postscript 1969," Kuhn appears to back away from his earlier belief that *facts* a.re " theory-laden," when he says: "The men who experience such communication breakdowns must, however, have some recourse. The *stimuli* that impinge upon them are *the same.* So is their general neural apparatus, however differently prograimmed. Furthermore, except in a ,small, if all-important, area of experience even their neural programming must be very nearly the same, for they share a history, except the immediate past. As a result, both their everyday and most of their scientific world and language are shared. Given that much in common, they should be able to find out a great deal about how they differ." (Italics mine.) See, T. S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962, 1970), p. 201. Note that Kuhn is speaking of *stimuli* being the same. But surely this cannot be so if Kuhn's general thesis is accepted. Kuhn's main point all along was tha·t there is absolutely nothing that allows for the commensurability of two or more paradigms in science, nor is there anything that maintains its identity when the Gestalt-like-shifts take place. Then suddenly in the 1969 postscript, we learn that stimuli the same. Could empiricists have asked for more by way of capitulation? It seems to us that Kuhn rejects his original thesis in "Postscript 1969." However, we take no account of this for the purposes of our argument, otherwise we would have to say that in the end Kuhn gives in to empiricism, and maybe even becomes an empiricist.

cessive the,ories grow ever closer to, or approximate more and more closely to, the truth. Apparently generalizations like that refer not to the puzzle-solutions and the concrete predictions derived from a theory but rather to its ontology, to the match, that is, the entities with which theory populates nature and what is " really there."

Perhaps there is some other way of salvaging the notion of ' truth' for application to whole theories, but this one will not do. There is, I think, no theory-independent way to reconstruct phrases like 'really there'; the notion of a match between the ontology of a theory and its "real" counterpart in nature now seems to me illusive in principle.[6]

This is no afterthought with Kuhn, nor is it a course correction which he may have felt was required when he wrote "Postscript-1969," for we read the following in the main part of his *magnum opus*[1] in which there are many similar passages:

> We may, ... have to relinquish the notion, explicit or implicit, that changes of paradigm carry scientists and those who learn from them closer and closer to the truth [and to the real].[1]

Clearly this is not Michael Polanyi's point of view on this matter. Polanyi may not be an empiricist, but he is by no means a relativist either, radical or otherwise. He is simply not prepared to deny the existence of reality, or to claim that it is nothing more than a fabrication of the creative imagination of practicing natural scientists, great though they ma.y be. He repeatedly makes it very clear that natural scientists investigate what is real-what exists independently of themselves, in the world 'beyond their minds-and not some subjective entity which is a construction of their minds. It is true that Polanyi believ,es that it is very difficult to establish beyond a doubt that this is what the natural scientist investigates, but the fact is that at no point does Polanyi sa.y or even imply that the natural scientist is exploring, either in an arbitrary or reasonable manner, his imaginative constructions. For Polanyi, scientists are simply not engaged in the exploration of

s Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Btruoture of Boientifio Revolutions,* p. 206.
1 *Ibid.,* p. 170.

imaginative constructions which are resident in the mind. They are involved in the exploration of what is *other* and of what is *real.* He makes this point in many ways and on a number of different occasions during his career as a philosopher of ·science. For example, in the following paissage from his work *The Tacit Dimension,* which was published in 1966, we read of Polanyi's .conviction that scientific knowledge places the scientist in contact with *reality*[1] rather than with the empirical world, as mainstream thinkers believe, or with some subjective imaginings, as consensualists hold:

> Modern arose claiming to be grounded in experience and not on a metaphysics derived from first principles. My assertion that science can have discipline and originality only if it believes that the facts and values of science bear on a still unrevealed re;i.lity, stands in opposition to the current philosophic conception of scientific knowledge.[8]

And agaiin, in an article entitled" Science and Reality," which he published in *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* in 1967, Polanyi writes the following by way of an introductory comment:

> The purpose of this essay is to re-introduce a conception which, having served for two millennia as a guide to the understanding of nature, has been repudiated by the interpretation of science. I am speaking of the conception of reality. Rarely will you find it taught today, that the purpose of science is to discover the hidden reality .underlying the facts of nature. The modern ideal of science is to establish a precise mathematical relationship between the data without acknowledging that if such relationships are of interest to science, it is because they tell us that we have hit upon a feature of reality. My purpose is to bring back the idea of reality and place it at the centre of a theory of scientific enquiry.[9]

And yet on another occasion, Polanyi writes in an aipproving manner about what it means to speak of something being real. He·says:

s:Michael Polanyi, *The Tacit Dimension* (New York: Doubleday-Anchor, 1967)' p. 70.

s Michael Polanyi, " Science and Reality," *The British Joumal for the Philosophy of Science,* XVIII (1967), pp. 177-196.

> To say that an object is real is to anticipate that it will manifest its existence indefinitely hereafter. This is what Copernicus meant by insisting that his system was real. Copernicus anticipated the coming of future manifestations of his system, and these were in fact discovered by later astronomers who had accepted this claim that his system was real.[10]

There is no doubt about where Polanyi situates himself in regard to this matter. Polanyi holds that science and scientist are, and always have been, interested in knowing the real, and not the empirical world of the mainstream school, nor, for that matter, the imaginative order fahricated by a particularly creative mind, as seems to be the view of Thomas Kuhn and his associates.

Early on in our reading of Polanyi, we learn that nea.rly all (if not, indeed, all) great naitura.ilscientists can be shown to be of the conviction that what they, as practising scientists, are engaged in investigating is the real, and not the empirical or the ima.gina.tive. Polanyi's favorite example, although by no means his only example, of the correctness of this belief is provided him by Copernicus. Copernicus, he informs us, and, of course, we already know this from the study of the early history of astronomy, did not see heliocentricism as a mere computational matter; that is to say, in the faJShion in which Ptolemy saw geocentricism. Rather, he along with his followers recognized heliocentricism to be true, to be a reality-a. picture of the way things are. Polanyi writes in his· article " Science and Reality ":

> The great conflict between the Copernicans and their opponents, culminating in the prosecution of Galileo by the Roman hierarchy, is well remembered. It should be clear also that the conflict was entirely about the question whether the heliocentric system was real. Copernicus and his followers claimed that their system was a real image of the sun with the planets circling around it; their opponents affirmed that it was no more than a novel computing device.[11]

[10] Michael Polanyi, " Genius in Science," *Encounter,* XXXVIII, No. 1 (January, 1972), p. 44f.

[11] Polanp, " Science and Realit;v," :p. 177.

Examples \Such as this from the history of science ,abound, Polanyi argues, and in his principal work, *Pe!fsonal Knowledge,* Polanyi repeats many times the sort of statement which has just been quoted.

But precisely what does Michael Polanyi mean when he claims that science and scientists are in search of the true and the real? This is, alter all, the fundamental question. If he means \Something that is essentially similar to what Kuhn means when he asserts that scientists are involved in the exploration of paradigms, then in truth there is no major distinction to be drawn hetween Kuhnian and Polanyian thought concerning wha:t is involv;ed in thinking scientifically. Howev;er, if it can he demonstrated that Polanyi does not mean what Kuhn means, and it is our contention that he does not, then there is ,a major difference between the two thinkers, and they are not in agreement with one another over fundamentals.

On a number of occasions, Polanyi very clear what he has in mind when he states "... the scientist seeks to know the *real."* For instance, he writes the following in the article from which we have just quoted above:

> What we mean is that the thing will not dissolve.like a dream, but that, in some ways it will yet manifest its existence, inexhaustibly, in the future. For it is there, whether we believe it or not, indepe.ndently of us, and hence never fully predictable in its consequences. The anticipatory powers which Kepler, Galileo and Newton revealed in the heliocentric system, were as many particulars of *the general anticipations that are intrinsic to any belief in reality.*[12]

He immediately goes on to say:

> This defines reality and truth. If anything is believed to be capable of a largely indeterminate range of future manifestations, it is thus believed to be *real.* A statement about nature is believed to be true if it is believed to disclose an aspect of something real in nature. A true physical theory is therefore believed to be no mere. mathematical relation between observed data, but to rep-

[22] *lbid.,* p. 191,

resent an aspect of reality, which may yet manifest itself inexhaustibly in the future.[13]

In making this point, Bolanyi is drawing attention to the fact that *if and when* a theory is viewed a:s being nothing moJ.1e than a man-made computational device, and as having oonventional significance, then it is *not* ". . . capable of a largely indeterminate range of future manifestations." And this is so because it has nothing more to manifest. A computational device is what its manufacturer made it to be, ·and it cannot, with the pa1ssageof time, reveal itself to be more than was intended by its creiator. It is exactly what it wais CJ.1eatedto be, and nothing more.

However, this cannot 1be the case if it is held that a particular theory peers into the *real.* The claim here is completely di:fferent,says Polanyi. In thi's instance, what is being asserted of theory and theoretical knowing is that it is capable, in time, of unmasking more than has been hitherto revealed of the hidden order. It is susceptible of giving a fuller acoount of what is out there, and it does this because its content is not the pmduct of man's creative genius, but rather the consequence of the attentive communication that takes place between man and the *other than man.* Obviously, for Polanyi, rthe philosophical realist, a theory is not a model, 1a. schema., or a conceptual framework invented by ,a scientist to save the appearances. A theory is the product of insight, however imperfect, into order, and into the real. To the extent that this insight is truly about what is real, it is a wager that the insight in question will uncover more of that order than is presently known. And, if mol'e of the order i's uncovered, then it is held that the original contact with reality was true, and the wager in the ·endwas worth making; since it eventually brought more of the true order, existing independently of man, into the ken of men. This, in brief, is what Michael Polanyi means when he asserts that scientists search out the true the rea,l,

[13] *Il;id.,* p. 191,

We cannot avoid drawing attention .to the fact that, for Polanyi, man the scientist does not *experierwehimself* as being in charge of the constituents of his insight. He is not an inventor of his vision, as inevitably is the case for Thomas Kuhn. Rather, he comes upon it, *so* that it might be ,said that he is responding to the beckoning of the real. Clearly, this is a very Platonic vision, yet, we believe, it accurately represents Michael Folanyi's conception of how scientists reason .and scientific knowledge is advanced.

GiV'en .all of this, how can :anyone claim that Polanyi is ontologically a relwtivist? **It** seems to us that he is one o:f the few philosophers of science in the Twentieth Century who is precisely *not* a relativist.

B) This brings us to the question o:f subjectivism in Polanyi's thinking. Polanyi is understood by many to have been a subjectivist, and as having had a. 'mystical message ' in relation to how scientists come to know what they claim to know. This is so, it is held, because of the prominent role which he assigns to what he calls *subsidiary knowledge* :and the *tacit dimension* in the knowing pr:ocesis. However, is it right to assert that Polanyi is a subjectivist, if what we mean by subjectivist is ". . • one who is concerned with matters that originate in and exist only inside of the mind, and which have no external referent?" By this standard, it is undoubtedly correct to identify Kuhn and his colleagues as subjectivists. But what about Michael Polanyi? Polanyi, we :feel, is much too concerned with reality and with what is *othler,* as it exists independently of the mind, for this label to be appropriately applied to him. Throughout his writings, he invariably directs our attention to what is outside the mind, and he asserts, in a classically Platonic fashion, that truth and objectivity reside in the approximation of the mind with what is, as we have had occasion to note above. Indeed, he even alludes to the old-fashioned character of this conception of true knowledge, ,when says very early on i:q *Personal Kriowledve;*

To say that the discovery of objective truth in science consists in the apprehension of a rationality which commands our respect and arouses our contemplative admiration; that such discovery, while using the experience of our senses as clues, transcends this experience by embracing the vision of a reality beyond the impressions of our senses, a vision which speaks for itself in guiding us to an even deeper understanding of reality-such an account of scientific procedure would be generally shrugged aside as out-dated Platonism: a piece of mystery-mongering unworthy of an enlightened age. Yet it is precisely on this conception of objectivity that I wish to insist. . . . I want to recall how scientific theory came to be reduced in the modern mind to the rank of a convenient contrivance, a device for recording events and computing their future course, and I wish to suggest then that twentieth-century physics, ... demonstrate on the contrary the power of science to make contact with reality in nature by recognizing what is rational in nature. [14]

The important point in all of this is that the distinction between what is objectivism and what is subjectivism in epistemological thinking is not equivalent to distinction between explicit ·and tacit knowledge. Put very simply, what is objective is not synonymous with what is explicit, and perha.ps even more importantly, with what is empirical, and what is subjective is not synonymous with what is tacit. The expres-1sions *tacit knowledge* •and *explicit knowledge* relate to how man e:x!periencesthe activity of knowing, wherea;s the words *objective* and *subjective;* bear on the question of where the content of our knowledge is deemed ito be located-outside of our mind, or within our mind. It is not inconceivable, therefore, that man can have explicit knowledge of what is subjective (Cartesian thinking :for the most part unfolds within the realm of a highly explicit, yet subjective order), and a tacit knowledge of what exists objectively, namely, outside of the mind. In fact, this is precisely how we are to understand the distinction between, on the one hand, what Kuhn proposes, and, on the other, what Polanyi advances. Kuhn, as far a;s he

[14] Michael Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Oritical Philosophy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1962), p. 5f.

goes, gives us a highly explicit reading of the subjective worlds which he claims are fabricated by the fertile and imaginative minds of great scientists, and Polanyi, for the most part, gives us an insight into the role of the tacit component in the knowing process as it hears on the exploration of what is real and objective.

We see from this that while both Kuhn and Polanyi may be agreed in their opposition to empiricism, they are a.Iso in point of fact not engaged in the investigation of the same questions, nor do they have the same perspective on those issues which interest both of them. At no time is Kuhn an objectivist, and Polanyi exhibits no inclination towards subjectivism when addressing issues of scientific significance. Of ·associated significance is the fact that Kuhn 'Shows no indication that he is interested in exploring the role played by the knower in the acquisition of knowledge, except in as much rus he speaks of gestalt-like shifts taking place in the mind of ,a scientist. Thus, he indicates his desire always to remain within the realm of the explicit and intellectually transparent. The reference to gestalt-like shifts only serve to mask his disinterest, since the langua,ge of gestalt-shifts: prevents .any furthex investigation of the import and role of the knower from taking place; and in the end, everything flounders on the rock of psychological obscumntism. Note that in this respect, Kuhn is not all that much at odds with the mainstream empiricist view, which likewise fails to understand the role of the personal in the acquisition of knowledge. Polanyi, on the other hand, draws our attention to the fact that all knowledge is essentially human knowledge, and that it is imperative that we explore the tacit and experiential recesses of our person if we are to understand the source of our intuitions of other, of order, and of the real.

At this point, it may be argued by some that we have not confronted the problem of subjectivism in Michael Polanyi's thinking as directly as we might havie. Indeed, it may even be claimed that we hav;e sidestepped the question. Thwefore, let us see if we can address the matter in a fashion that i:s more a:pt to satisfy.

If some understand by the term *subjectivism,* 1any !l'leliance upon criteria. for judgment which are profoundly personal in character, and ·are thus maybe not susceptible of full explicitation, then it is perhaps not surprising that they may want to view the Polanyian position as a subjectivist one. Epistemological •studies for some two hundl.'ed years have been particularly concerned by the need to make knowledge as rigourous as possible, and there has been ·a generalized fear of the intervention of human biases into the knowing P'rocess-biases w:hich, it is felt, might distort the reliability of knowledge. Now, all of us appreciate that rbhis is a fear that is not to be dismissed lightly, for we understand that we gain absolutely nothing if we allow for the free reign of our biases when making a decision which aims at the truth. As a result, we are rather .accepting of the systematic attempts, which have been made over the years, to eliminate all human interference in the development of knowledge, and we look upon any suggestion that man inevitably does and ought to play ·a role in the knowing p11ocess with a certain scepticism, if not outright horror.

It is in this ·context of ·concern for the reduction of bias that Polanyi is accused of being .a subjectivist, and by implication an opponent of ohjectivism. But we ought to be extremely careful here before we brand Polanyi a subjectivist. If we approach the question *of* Polanyian subjectivism from this direction, then we should be aware that what we are really saying is that we fault Polanyi for not being a *neutralist,* for the opposite to subjectivism thus understood is not objectivism (although many would have us believe that it is), but epistemological neutralism.[15] And, of course, Bolanyi is not a neutlla.list; and to the extent that he is criticized by his opponents

15 There is a tendency for some present-day thinkers to name what we hav:e called "epistemological neutralism" *objectivism.* Although we do not wish to argue over words here, it appears to us as more reasonable to indentify this modern stand as *neutralism,* and reserve the words "objective" and "objectivism " for the traditional man-centered scientific outlook on the world.

for not being one, they are correct.[16] But this does not make him a subjedivist either. *He is an objeativist* in the original sense of the term-in the manner in which the word was understood prior to the rise of posiitivist thinking in the field of epistemological studies. Let us explain.

The doctrine of *neutralism* in the field of epistemology studies is a view which first ma.de its appearance a11ound the time of the Enlightenment, and it has been mistakenly believed ·sincethen that ,all it represents is a concern for the pursuit of the unbiaised or unvarnished truth. In fact, the consensus is that it ,is simply the expression of an interest in a high degree of objedivity in all types of disciplined research. Now, if we could take this at face-value, few of us would 1be in disagreement with the merits of such a doctrine, or with its objedive. But unfortunately we cannot . .&s a view, this doctrine is founded upon the erroneous belief that the only reliable sort of knowledge that is available to men is that which arises out of an "extra-personal" articulation and implementation of a logic or procedure, the objectivity and unbiased nature of which is guaranteed by its methodologically trans-personal character. One might have faith in the obj-ectivity and verity of knowledge pursued in this manner, it is held, because it is unaffected by ·any human intervention, and hence potential for bias or distortion. It is the product of nothing more than the enadment of an impersonal pmcedure. Clearly, what we are dealing with hel'e-assuming that it is possible for us to have this sort of knowledge in the first place-is a knowledge that is thoroughly impersonal, sanitized, and devoid of all human residue. Now, so-called" neutral knowledge" of the sort we have just described must not be confused with ohjedive knowledge, nor with objectivity in all forms of discursive reasoning. Ob-

16 Michael Polanyi is never *e1JJplicitly* criticized for *TU>t* being a neutralist, although this is the implied criticism which follows from his being accused of subjectivism, since mainstream philosophers of science do not distinguish between neutralism and objectivism. In the view of most contemporary philosophers of science writing in the empirical tradition, everything that is not objectivist *qua* neutralist is subjectivist.

jectivity does not preclude the personal, nor does it place an embargo upon human residue in any knowing activity. It is rather the ca;se that the truth issues out of the acceptance that all knowing activity is fundamentally rooted in man, and that what makes knowledge objective is man's bias in favour of " getting it right." A knowledge is worthy of being called " objective," not because it is the product of the implementation of some impersonal methodology or pmcedure, but because it accords with the reality of a situation, which can only be known as a result of the knowing's rootedness in man.

Polanyi never believed that it was possible for man to know in a way that did not actively engage the knower in the knowing process, ·which is what is sought by epistemological neutralism. But if P:olanyi did not think that it wais possible to know in a neutral manner, this should not be interpreted to mean that he believed that objectivity was impossible. It was very much possible, and without it, science and the search for the truth was impossible, as we have had ample occasion ·to observe, given his belief that the object of knowledge in science is real. As we see it, the problem is that many modern epistemologists and philosophers of science confuse objectivism with neutralism, and when they encounter a thinker who is not .a neutralist in epistemological matters, they believe him to be a subjectivist, or one who would make scientific knowledge a hostage to hios persona.I fortune in that he is unduly given to allowing for the entry of personal proclivities into the decisional and knowing process. But, obviously this is not necessarily the case, and especially is it not likely to be the situation if ithe thinker is ia philosophical realist, rus is Michael Polanyi.

We should recall here that it is claim that the activity of knowing has two poles, namely, *attending from* and *attending to.* When man claims to know something, Polanyi informs us, he is actually aware of a great deal more than the ' something ' which he says he knows. This ' ·something' srbands in the forefront of his mind, in all of its otherness, and man is

said to know this in a focal fashion or ,explicitly, says Polanyi. This is generally what most of us mean when we speak of our having knowledge 0£ something, and it is what Polanyi understands when he speaks. of knowing by *attending to.* However, Polanyi a;sserts that there is more to having knowledge than this. Man not only knows in an explicit manner, but his very possession of explicit knowledge is dependent upon his way of being in the world. In order to know explicitly, man must be anchored somewhere; after all, it is human lmowledge that we are talking of here. And, this somewhere in which man is anchored is nothing other than whaJt he calls " his experience ", and ultimately his body. It is on his experience that man draws in order tbo know explicitly. Polanyi speaks of this knowledge as a form of knowing by *attending fram.* Now, man cannot be rtotally transparent or articulate 'about ,this realm called' experienoe '. Try as he ma,y, there is always some element of realm which eludes his grasp. Hence, its designation ,as tacit by Polanyi. But norbe, claiming that man relies on his way of being in the world (experience, body and all) in order to know the other is neither illegitimate nor dalliance with subjectivism. It is not illegitimate, since how else can man know? As a disincar:nate spirit? And it is not flirting with subjectivism, because man is not relying on his way of being in the world and his experiences in order only to explore his interiority, or the inner workings: and constructions of his mind. Rather, he is relying on his experiences in order to know the objective and the real. Therefore, tacit or subsidiary knowledge issues, for Polanyi, out of that range 0£ experience and of being from which we humans depart on our
in quest of the real and the objective outside of the mind, or, as we are reminded by Michaiel Polanyi in *Personal Knowledge:*

> The enquiring scientist's intimations of a hidden reality are personal. They are his beliefs, which-owing to his originality-as yet he alone holds. Yet they are not a subjective state of mind, but convictions held with universal intent, and heavy with arduous projects. It was he who decided what to believe, yet there is no

arbitrariness in his decision. For he arrived at his conclusions by utmost exercise of responsibility. He has reached responsible beliefs, born of necessity, and not changeable at will. In a heuristic commitment, affirmation, surrender and legislation are fused into a single thought, bearing on a hidden reality.[17]

Clearly, Michael Polanyi is neither a relativist nor a subjectivist. He is a realist and an ohjectivist who understands the human and fiduciary character of all knowledge oriented towards the real.

11 *Ibid.* p. 311.

RECENT SACRAMENTAL THEOLOGY III

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THIS ARTICLE is the third in a series of reviews on contemporary works on sacramental theology. The first, published in October, 1983,[1] reviewed eleven books published between 1975-1988 on sacraments, and considered issues of method. The concluding section delineated the elements to be included in a contemporary systematic study of the sacraments. The second article, published in January, 1988,[2] reviewed seven books published between 1988-1987, also from the perspective of method. This article completes the survey of recent English language works on sacraments by reviewing the books on individual sacraments in the *Message of the Sacraments* series edited by Monika Hellwig.[3]

In a preface reproduced at the beginning of each volume in the series, Monika Hellwig describes the scope of the project. She then describes five aspects of sacramental life dealt with in each work.

1 See, Kevin W. Irvin, "Recent Sacramental Theology: A Review Discussion" *The Thomist* 47 (October, 1983) , 592-608.

2 See, Kevin W. Irvin, " Recent Samramental Theology," *The Thomist* 52 (January, 1988), 124-147.

3 The books discussed here are all volumes in the *Message of the Sacraments* series under the general editorship of Monika K. Hellwig, publisih.ed by Michael Glazier (Wilmington). They are: Thomas Marsh *Gift of Community: Baptism and Confirmation* (1984); Ralph Keifer, *Blessed, and, Broken: An Fl«JPlorationof the Contemporary Fl«JPerienoeof Goa in Flucharistio Celebration* (1982) ; Monika K. Hellwig, *Sign of ReconciUaticm and Conversion: The Sacrament of Penance for our Timl36* (1984, revised edition); David M. Thoma!!, *Christian Marriage: A Journey Together* (1983), Nathan Mitchell, *Mission and Ministry: History and Theology in the Sacrament of Order* (1982); James L. Empereur, *Prophetic Anointing: Goa's Cail to the Sick, the Bl<lerly, and the Dying* (1982).

These are: first of all, the existential or experiential meaning of the sacrament in the context of secular human experience; what is known of the historical development of the sacrament; a theological exposition of the meaning, function and e.:ffect of the sacrament in the context of present official Catholic doctrinal positions; some pastoral reflections; and a projection of possible developments in the practice and catechesis of the sacrament.[4]

The :seriesis directed to those involved professionally in sacramental ministries, to educated Catholics, and to Christians of other churches. While each of the authoifs may be sa,id to be faithful to the scope of the series as outlined, there is an uneV"ennessin the series, as most authors have tended to emphasize only one or two of the ·aispects outlined. For eJrample, Thomas Marsh deals exfonsively with the tradition and gives little attention to contemporary experience or to future projections about initiation, Alternatively, Ralph Keifer refers continually to the contemporary liturgical experience of eucharist as a way to deal with tmditional ,themes of eucharistic doctrine. Not suprisingly, Hellwig's own volume on penance is the clearest example of the method and scope enunciated for the series.

Thomais Marsh's work entitled *Gift of Community* deals with the initiatory sacraments of baptism and confirmation. The (very brief) first chapter introduces the subject by referring to the importance of allowing our present experience and understanding of these sacraments to be evaluated by a study of how the church has experienced and understood these sacraments throughout :history. The (longer) last chapter deals with the practice and theology of initiation. These chapters frame the rest of the material presented. In fact they ·appear to be ·appendages to a work devoted to New Testament foundations in Part One ('almost half of the book), and to the evolution of the liturgical practice and theological explanation of these sacraments in Paxt Two.

In chapter two, Marsh distinguishes between two kinds of

[4] Monika K. Hellwig, "Editor's Preface," in T. Marsh, *Gift of Oommumty,* P· 5.

New Testament sources having to do with initiation: narrative texts (.thait describe what happened) and doctrinal texts (that describe the meaning of what happened) . While what follows is an interesting way of :summarizing the New Testament evidence, nevertheless most exegetes today would not try to separate ·these, as though the meaning of what happened is not already contained in texts that describe what happened (to use the author's distinction). He discusses these texts in some detail in chapters four (narrative) and five (doctrinal), after an ·intervening chaipter on the Judiac roots of initiation, specifically the Old Testament understanding of water and the Spirit, and the practice of prosely·te baptism. Unfortunately, his comments about proselyte baptism are too facile and can be argued against on the grounds that such practice has not been proved to exist before the Christian era (38-39). The author is on firmer ground when discussing the ministry of John the Baptist (40-42), and the new age ushered in by his unique admini.gtra:tionof baptism as a moral ·and spiritual renewal that purified those washed as they looked to its fulfillment in Christ and in the coming of the Spirit. Marsh understands that the early Christians separated two rites: baptism "in the name of Jesus Christ" for sin-forgiveness, and the imposition of hands for the coming of the Holy Spirit (64). Thus he separates the event of Christ and that of the Spirit; yet boith are requiT·edto make individuals into the Christian community (65-66). Baptism .thus represents the event of Christ ·and hence has a Christological understanding; the imposition of hands represents the outpouring of the Spirit, the pneumatofogical aspect of initiation (66). While this aissessment is clear and helpful, ·bhereremains a doubt *ais* to how clearly the texts in Acts, on which he bases this presentaition, separate these two realities. Marsh may well be reading into texts that are deliberaitely idealized or ambiguous.[5]

5Among the texts of Acts discussed here are Acts 2:37-41, 2:42ff, 8:12-17, 19:1-17; however, the intriguing text of Acts 10:44-48, where the S.pirit is given after the hearing of the gospel (before any baptismal bath) is not discussed.

The more successful chapter on New Testament foundations is chapter five dealing wirth the doctrinal understanding as presented by St. Paul, chiefly in Romams 6. Marsh presents a careful exegesis of Paul's understanding of baptism as that which incorporates one into the very dying and rising of Christ (73). Marsh 1skillfully links Chrisrtology .and Pneumaitology, when combining Romans chapters 6 and 8 as pivotal in Paul's understanding of initiartion. Similarly his discussion of the church as the body of Christ in Romans 12, 1Cor.12, etc., provide the requisite ecclesiological a:spects of Paul's baptismal doctrine (9Q-94). This is appropriately developed into a consideration of the implications of baptism for leading the Christian life (Rom. U: 1, 8: *13-15,* Gal. 5: *Q5,* among other texts) and the need to renew the initial conversion signified in initiartion (94-100). This is clearly required in Paul's understanding since baptism involves one in a life of discipleship which is " a participation in Christ's divine state of being in the ' betweentimes ' and also a pledge of full participation in Christ's risen glory in the future." (100). Marsh' s ·appreciation of the eschatological aspects of Paul's teaching on baptism is clearly presented and carefully nuanced.

When discussing the history of initiatory rites (chapter six), Marsh emphasizes the evidence from Hippolytus and the "claissical :flowering" of initiation in the fourth and fif·th centuries. He discusses thoroughly and carefully the place of the posthaptismal anointing with chrism in initiation, the understanding of anointings in eastern and western rites, and separates Christofogical and Pneumatological aspects in initiation ceremonies (1Q7). His comments about *quamprimum* infant baptism in Augustine deserve mme elaboration and precision.[6] The "adaptation and disintegration" of initiation from the sixth to the ninth century is treated briefly (134-35), as is the separation of communion from initiation (135-37).

s Others interpret Augustine's teaching as saying that the common practice of infant baptism is es·pecially fortunate because original sin exists, not that infant baptism should be practiced because of original sin.

Readers axe better served by consulting Marsh's source (J. D. C. Fisher's research) for this section for a better explanation of this important period (through the eleventh century) of dismemberment and iseparation.[7]

After reviewing the history of the separation of baptism from confirmation and communion, Marsh notes that rthe decree of Pope Pius X on early and frequent communion adjusted the primitive sequence of baptism, confirmation, communion to first communion between baptism and oon:firmrution, He then .goes on to add the much too facile conclusion that " Roman approval for this sequence was finally given, implicitly at least in the new Rite of Confirmation issued in 1971, which allows episcopal conferences to approve an age later than seven for conferring oonfirmaition" (136-37). In fact, the *General Instruction* on the Rite of Confirmation states that adults and children who are old enough for catoohesis " should ordinarily be admitted .to confirmation .and the eucharist at the same .time they receive baptism." [8] With regard fo children not maiture enough for catechetical instruction, the *Instructdon* says that " the administration of confirmation is generally postponed until about the seventh year," however, .for pastoral reasons the age may be defeTred " so that the sacrament is given at a more mruture .a;ge after ·appropriate formation." [9] The instruction ·then asserts that " the necessary precautions should be taken ·so that children will be confirmed at the proper time, even before the use of reason, where there is danger of death or other serious difficulty. They should not be deprived of the benefit of this ·sacrament." [10] Thus, a careful reading of the actual document offers a much more precise position on the

1 Set, for example, J. D. C. Fischer, *Christian Imtiation: Baptism in the Me1Uevai West* (London: SPCK, 1965), pp. 101-140.

s See, *General Instruction* on the Rite of Confirmation, no. 11, in *The Rites of the Cathoiic Church as Revised by the Second Vatican Councii* (New York: Pueblo Publishing Co., 1983) p. 321.

9 *Ibid.*

10 *Ibid.;* see also chapter four, " Confirmation of a Person in Danger of Death" (nos. 52-56), in *The Rites,* pp. 344-345.

age of confirmation and the sequence of initiation than Marsh indicates.[11]

When discussing the " theology and doctrine " of initiartion (chapter seven) Mal"Sh considers both Eastern and Western sources. His treatment of Aquinas is particulairly helpful, considering the brevity of the volume. Unfortunately he only notes and does not discuss the Eastern doctrines of baptismal ,regenera.tion, illumination and adoption, which are particularly useful to complement 'an overly Western understanding evident throughout the book.

On the topic of confirmation, Marsh's earlier writing is more cogent and carefully argued.[12] He a;sseritsthat while the early evidence of a developing theology of confirmation separa.te fmm baptism saw the intrinsic connection between two endowments of the Spirit at baptism and through the laying on of hands (for example in Augustine, pp. 164-66), it was no long before Western theologians separated these gifts 'and under-,stood confirmation as endowing the gift of the Spirit *ad robur*, whereas baptism endowed one with the Spirit for the gift of eternal life (166-172). To his credit Marsh reviews and quotes texts from Faustus, Alcuin, and Rabwnus Maurus in this connection and avoids oversimplification.

The same is true for his treatment of the Middle Ages, particula11lyhis treatment of Peter Lombard ,a;nd Thomas Aquinas (172-74). The issue for them wa;s how the strengthening given in confirmation is to be understood (173). Unfortunately this section of the book betrays a flaw running throughout. Marsh argues on the basis of New Testament and theological sources; rarely does he argue from liturgical evidence or pra.otices. A review of the practice of confirmation in the early medieval and medieval periods could have helped his interpretation and

11 See below, review of chapter eight.

12 See, Thomas Mairsh, " A Study of Confirmrution," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 39 (1972), 140-63, 319-336; 40 (1973), 125-147. See also, "The History and Significance of the Post-Baptismal Rites," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 39 (1972), 175-206.

presentation of how a separate theology of confirmation became necessary.[18]

·In chapter eight Maivsh offers observations on " christian initiait:iontoday," clearly the weakest and most disappointing section of the work. While he posits that the aim and goal of initiaition is to develop a. "mature member of the church," Marsh never explain:s what he means by this phrase; in fact one could argue that this obscures his very useful treaitment of the ongoing nature of initiation when he discusses the Pauline understanding of baptism in chapter five. When discussing the present rites of baipti.sm and confirmation the author offe:rs no critique,[14] and when discussing the practice of first eucharist before oon:firmation (193-97), he goes •against his own thesis thait eucharist should be seen as the climax of initiation. Given the present sta.te of development of the rites of christian initiation for adults, and the importance which the catechumenate has for communities which initia;te adults (or infants whose parents go through a catechumenal experience), the absence of any reflection on these liturgical rites is serious. Where Marsh seems to argue from conventional practice of infant baptism, communion, and a later age for confirmation for the young, other theologians now probe the meaning of the unified rites of baptism, confirmation, eucharist for adults and the V'alue of this chronology or a theology for children.[15] Umor-

1s See, Nathan Mitchell, "Dissolution of the Rite of Christian Initiation," in *Maile, Not Born: New Perspeotives on Christian Initiation anCl the Oatechumenate* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976), pp. 50-82; and Gerard Austin, "Appendix 5: Confirmation and Liturgical Development," in *Summa Theologiae,* Vol. 57, Baptism and Confirmation (3a. 66-72), trans. and ed., James J. Cunningham (New York: McGraw Hill, 1975), pp. 244-248.

14 Curious is the absence of any critique of the rites of both infant baptism and confirmation. Among others see, Herman Wegmann, "De romeinse orde van dienst voor de kinderdoop," *BijClragen* 35:2 (1974), 129-147; Gerard Austin, *Anointing With the Spirit* (New York: Pueblo Publishing Co., 1985), pp. 41-64.

15 See, Mark Searle, "Issues in Christian Initiation: Uses and Abuses of the RCIA," *The Li'Ving* 22 (March, 1986) , 200-203.

tunately Marsh also skirts the sensitive yet pastorally pressing issue of prepar.artion for initiation and the faith/sacrament problematic (it is given scant attention on pp. 198-200). Throughout the volume Marsh emphasizes the individual who is initiated, and the implications of baptism and confirmation for this person. He does not develop :an understanding of the eoclesial significance of initiation commensurate with his review of St. Paul's understanding of .the ecclesial implications ·and significance of h111ptism (chapter five).

Ovcerall this volume is strongest in New Testament foundations for initiation and good in its presentation of ;the evolution of the theology of baptism and oonfirmaition. It is very weak when interpreting liturgical rites as sources fm theological reflection. Its gre111testflaw is that it does not adequately describe the contemporary context in which initiation theology and practice is developing ·and what strengths and weaknesses an understanding of the church's tradition of initiation can offer to tha.t context.

Ralph Keifer's work *Blessed and Broken* is subtitled "An Exploration of the Contemporary Experience of God in Eucharistic Celebration." This subtitle reflects Keifer's preoccupation rto ground an understanding of the eucharist in terms derived from and pointing to contemporacy experience. In the Introduction he asserts that modern people experience God in ·a radically different way than did their ancestors in the faith. This " post-1scientific" approach means that people tJoday " are much more inclined to want to know how something works than why it is or wha.t its metaphysical nature might be" (5). Keifer calls this a " profound change in the experience of faith" rather than a "change in faith" (2). Thus he bases his treatment of the eucharist on our " present experience of eucharistic celebration and our present experience of the world " (4) . Keifer contrasts an undel'\Standing of God as Other and " interventionist " with a more attractive notion of God as immanent ·and continually present in the church community and in the world. Within these parameters Keifer offers

a provocative and stimulating understanding of many areas of eucharistic theology and practice.

A:s a. liturgist, the author often critiques both what happens liturgically, and 'seeks to draw out the meaning of what happens in the eucharistic liturgy. Unfortunately, too often the observations are on the liturgy in general and not the eucharist specifically. Also, insights .are often scaittered and not developed ·ais cogent arguments. His own prejudices come through so strongly, that .too often what he offers is a defense of his own positions.

In chapter one Keifer contrasts the " old " (medieval and Tridentine) liturgy with the " new" liturgical changes and meanings derived from Vatican II. For Keifer, the presence of adult lay ministers, the use of the vernacular, the variety of euchairistic and prefaces, the option of receiving communion in the hand (and in two species), and :the location of the priest facing the people in :the po1stUTe of a partner in dialogue with us to God (14-16) have changed our eucharistic practice and piety. The reformed liturgy, Hke any liturgy in the history of the chuvch, does not speak by itself (11); rather it speaks from a set of presuppositions about what the eucharist and life are about. Unforluna:tely, his insight that changed rites involve changed theological meanings and a change in the way one relates to God is marred by too facile a separation between eucharis:t as " 1a sacrifica.Iaction " versus " a welcome to the eucharisHc table" (9), between "this is my body/blood" and" take and eat" (QQ).

In chapter two Keifer argues for liturgical language that is more evocative than the sober expressions classically found in the Roman rite. For Keifer the work of contemporary authors like Annie Dillard and Elie Wesiel exemplify this lrind of lan·guage. He asserts that the " sacred 'and profane aire not readily distinguished from one ;another, just as God is no awesome invader from without, but a mysterious presence within" (81). Certainly Keifer is onto something with regard to language, however his separation of the old and the new 'Seems as clear as

that which he wants to overcome between the sacred and the profane.[16] Appropriately, Keifer cauti>ons against sentimentality in composing new liturgical terla (88), and calls for a new sense of God as present in the splendor and tragedy of human existence (41) . This, he maintains, will open up a new "sense of [the] mystery" of God.

In chapter three Kei£er deals with the phenomenon of a divided Christianity celebrating eucharist •sepairately. He discusses primary metaphors for the eucharist and (again) oontrasts two difierent approaches: the medieval understanding of Christ's atoning sacrifice as atonement for sin (43-47) and the contemporary metaphm- of Christ's identification with humanity (48). Rather than rinterpret "sacrifice,, as meaning "to give up " or " to kill," Keifer sees the notion of "holocaust " 'as evncative and immediately understandable for our culture.17

Two key insights which the eucharistic liturgy offers in orrder

16 Here Keifer criticizes the hymn *Vea:illa, Regis* for being militaristic and triumphant; however this is to misunderstand the full meaning of Christ's kingship commemorated during the Paschal triduum. The proclamation of the passion from St. John on Good Friday reveals significant royal images of the crucified Christ, the king who freely ascends the cross in order to reveal his glory from the throne of a tree. Frequently in liturgical texts kingship is linked to the lamb of sacrifice •and to the altar of the eucharist. The present revisions in the Mass formula for the Solemnity of Christ the King, specifically its preface, indicate that kingship is linked to the reign of God and less to militaristic images:

> You anointed Jesus Christ ..•
> as the eternal priest and universal king.
> As priest he offered his life on the altar of the cross
> and redeemed the human race
> by this one perfect sacrifice of peace.
> As king he claims dominion over all creation,
> that he may present to you, his almighty Father,
> an eternal and universal kingdom:
> a kingdom of truth and life,
> a kingdom of holiness and grace,
> kingdom of justice, love and peace.

17 For a more insightful understanding of the import which the Holocaust has for Christian worship see, Michael Downey, "Worship Between the Holocausts," *TheoZogy Today* 43 (1986), 75-87.

to interpret Christ's presence and sacrifice are *anamnesis* and epiclesis-remembering and invocation (56). Keifer describes the meaning and draws out the implica.tions of eucharistic memorial and invocation by describing how the eucharist brings contemporary communities into communion with God, with one another, and with each individual's personal history. The author then discusses eucharistic sacrifice on the basis of memorial and invocation, the same bases which contemporary ecumenical dialogues use to interpret this particularly knotty problem.[18] Keifer interprets the Council of Trent's position that the eucharist is a "propitiatory sacrifice" as meaning that it is more than a sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving, and that when the eucharist is celebrated Christ's sacrifice is' present in its saving power (58). An essential component of a liturgical understanding of sacrifice is the fact that it is the sacrifice of the Church (,as stated in the *General Imtruction* on the Roman Miss'al nos. 1-3). Furthermore, with regard to ecumenical dialogue, the liturgy provides wide understanding of Christ's pre,sence in the eucharist; it includes his presence in the assembly, in its prayer, in the ministers, in the proclamation of ithe Word and in bread and wine (61).[19] Many insights offered here are useful, yet they deserve more thorough explanation.

Chapter four is perhaps the best chapter of the whole book; it presents a 'simplified introduction to a liturgical theology of the eucharist. Here Keifer joins together the scriptmal language about meals with Jesus to the meaning of the deaith of Christ (70) and maintains ·that the language which best describes this is a language not of oblation or of suffering. He

18 A particularly insightful and unique approach to this thorny issue is in David N. Power, "The Sacrifice of the Mass: A Question of Reception and Re-Reception," *lilcclesia Orans2* (1985), 67-94.

19 Keifer's delineation of the presence of Christ in the eucharist is taken from the *Instruction on Eucharistic Worship* of Paul VI (1967), no. 9. The original text speaks of Christ being present "in the person of the minister the same now offering through the ministry of the priest who formerly offered himself on the Cross" not "in the ministers of the assembly" as Keifer states (p. 61).

states that" sacrifice is an interpretative category .... [W]hat makes an action sacrificial is not what is done, but what the action means" (68). He argues this rthesis on the ba:sis of the servant text from Is *52: U-53:* U and an understanding of the paschal meal as a basis for understanding what the eucharist means (71-2). Keifer sides with Jeremias in interpreting eucharistic memorial a:s meaning that God will remember, and thus act on behalf of rthe community (73).[20] While he uses the word " oblation " when referring to the eucharistic memorial, Keifer merely states that " to do something ' in memorial ' gives it the character of an oblation, an offering ..." (73). Unfortunately he does not develop this any further and rthus leav;es vague his interpretation of obligation as a factor in eucharistic understanding. is faithful to the liturgy when he describes the Jewish *berakoth* 1as the prayer form that should be undel"Stood as the bwsis for meal prayers in Judaism and during the formative period of Christianity (76-7).

The thesis of chapter five is that liturgy and life should interconnect, and that there should be a relation in life to what is celebrated in the cult. Unfortunately, too many generalizations mar this section, and the reference to liturgy in general, rather than to the eucharist, weakens its cogency as part of a book on the eucharist. Keifer makes a number of important points here: rthat liturgy is not for the like-minded or ,the already committed only (84-5), and that the eucharistic community is not predicated on 1specialinterests; rather it is ba,sed on human concern for one another. Keifer states that while some question whether infant baptism has any meaning, for him the real issue is whether baptism makes any discemable difference in one's life (90).

·20 Jeremias' interpretation of *anamnesis* ("that God may remember .. .") is not universally held. For a variety of interpretations see, Fritz Chenderlin, *Do This As My Memorial: The Semitio and Oonaeptual Background and Value of Anamnesis in 1 Oorinthians 11:24-25.* Analecta Biblica 99 (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1982), pp. 228-266. See also the position of Lothar Lies, " Okumenische Erwagungen zu Abendmahl, Priesterweihe und :Messopfer," *Zeitsahrift fii,r kathoZische TheoZogie* 104 (1982), 385-410.

In chapters six and se¥en Keifer continues to deal with issues that are tangential to eucharist, specifically that symbols "speak,, when they resonate with our own experience (97), thart one should empha:sfae symbolic actions in liturgy rather than verbal expression alone, ·and that Catholic sacramental worship in¥olves familiar things in life such a:s assembling, bathing, dining and embracing (108-115).

Chapters seven and eight are theologically thin and liturgically weak. The issues discussed a.-epeat points Keifer made earlier in the book about the liturgy in general. They are a disappointment in a work about the sacrament of the eucharist.

When evaluated against the criteria :set forth in the editor's preface to this series, Keifer's *Blessed and Broken* does not measure up to what was promised. When it deals with the tradition of eucharistic liturgy •and theology it does •so in •a spoUy way. The issues raised have no apparent order OT coheTence. While the liturgical insights into eucharistic theology are usually sound [21] (for example in chapteris three and £our), any real appreciation of the patristic, early medieval and medieval undersitanding of the eucharist is conspicuously ahsent. The book ma.y be useful for an adult education group which is taught by someone who can supplement it with material of more depth and precision. For ·a college, university or seminary audience the work is not recommended because it lacks the requil'ed substance of material and .cogencyof argument.

A·s already noted, *Sign of Reoonmliation and Conversi,on: The Sacrament of Penance for Our Times* by Monika Hellwig is very faithful to the aims of the series. In the Introduction the

21 Interestingly, Keifer offers no critique of the present eucharistic rite in this work as he had done elsewhere. In fact he seems to have changed his opinion on the value of the prayers said at the presentation of the gifts. Compare "Preparation of the Altar and the Gifts or Offertory?" *Worship* 48 (1974), 596-600 with *Blessed a.nd Brokoo,* pp. 18-19. Much of what Keifer argues in "Our Cluttered Vestibule: The Unreformed Entrance Rite," *Worship* 48 (1974), 270-277, has recently been more carefully researched historically and argued liturgically by John Baldovin, " Kyrie Eleison and the :i..:iite Qf the :iioon,{tn *Worship* 60 {1986)1 334-341,

author states that she will treat the sacrament with three contemporary questions in mind: (I) what is an appropriate sense of sinfulness and conversion for our times; (2) how does ecclesial mediation function today (including both the priest's role and lay persons' roles in penance); (8) what arie the central elements in the rites and what is the sign value of the rites as celebrated (8-10). Additional issues which appear alongside these include the relationship of nature and grace as interpenetrating and as experienced in the single reality of human experience (6), and images of God that operate in the penance process (6) .

Hellwig addreses the first of these questions in chapter one entitled " Sin, Repentance and Conversion." Here the author discusses the pervasiveness of God's love in all human life, and repentance as the result of God's initiaitive (25). Preferring the Hebrew notion of turning one's dfoection toward God, as opposed to the Greek notion of changing mind, Hellwig maintains that the fundamental issue a,bout sin and sinfulness resides in self-assertion and independence from God, as opposed to individual sinful acts. Sin is a fundamental attitude whereby one sets oneself apart from God; the author argues thait for Christians, Jesus embodies God's reconciliation. The church is the embodiment of Jesus to continue God's offer of salvation. Here Hellwig reflects an approach to morality based on the fundamental option theory. The cautions about this theory by momlists and the unresolved issue of what role individual actions have in expres1singor determining one's option should be recaUed when assessing the import of this chapter.

Chapters two to five consider the history of the practice and the theology of penance. While the author has compressed a large amount of material into these pages, she writes so clearly that the threads of develpment and change are evident and well explained th110ughout. Unfortunately her review of history is marred by too greait 'a .relia;iice on the research Qf

Oscar Watkins.[22] She asserts that in ,the first two centuries there is no record of a standard rite by which reconciliation was handled (32). The first such indication. comes from Tertullian at the beginning of the third century. Hellwig correctly terms the process *exomologesis* and notes the involvement of the whole community in rthe process whereby penitents acknowledge 'Sinfulness,perform penainces to express sorrow, and ask the prayers of the community for them. Unfortunately, Hellwig misses the essential part of *exomologesis* as declaring praise and thanks to God evident in the subapostolic age. At this time "confession" meant the praise of God, thanksgiving for mercy as well as seeking pardon from those offended and reconciliation with the church.[23] The church saw herself as the community of salvation. To be welcomed into its gathering was to receive the blessing of salvation and that in turn evoked the pTaise and blessing of God *(berakah* and *exomologesis)* .[24] In line with this understanding, it is not surprising that for Tertullian " confession " meant first a confession of faith and of praise, and then of sins. Hellwig seems to have missed the point that essentially *exo,mologesis* was a declaration and a public acknowledgment of God's greatness.[20]

·22 Hellwig's source for much of the history is Oscar D. Watkins, *A History of Penance, being a Study of the Authorities, Vol. I: The Whole Ohurch to A.D. 450,* and *Vol. II: The Western Ohurch from A.D. 450 to A.D. 1218* (London: Longmans Green, 1920). Conspicuously absent are the more recent and highly regarded works: Cyrille Vogel, *Le Peoheur et La Penitence dans l'JfJglise anoieniie* (Paris: Cerf, 1966), and *Le Pecheur et La Penitence au Moyen-Age* (Paris: Cerf, 1969), as well as Karl Rahner, *Frune Bussgescnickte in Jilinzelnuntersuonungen, Sonriften Zur Tneologie XI* (Einsiedeln: Benziger, 1973), which appeared in English as *Tneological Investigations Vol. 15, Penance in tne Jilarly Onuroh,* trans. by Lionel Swain (New York: Crossroad, 1982).

2s See, James Dallen, *Tke .Reconciling Community: Tke .Rite of Penance* (New York: Pueblo Publishing Co., 1986), p. 20.

24 *Ibid.,* p. 24.

25 *Ibid.,* p. 32: " Tertullian uses the Greek *womologesis* to name the public ritual manifestation of repentance. While this word is often translated as confession, it does not mean what we usually understand by the term. It is confession first of faith, then praise, and only then of sins. *JiltDomologesis* ii.<*nowledge.sGod's greatness, a greatness shown through merc;y leading tQ

Toward the end of the chapter the author sketches the advainta.gesof " once in a Jifetime " event and some of the disadvantages that led ·to a change to private penance be.ginning in the seventh century. This is taken up in. chapter· three, where the inevitability of the shift from public to private penance is skill£ully summarized (45) . Hellwig cites the influence of monasticism here, particularly the contribution of the Rule of St. Benedict and its forebears in the writings of the desert fathers and of John Cassian. Her·e the author seems so preoccupied with the penitential ·aspects of this way of life that she skirts the thoroughly eschatological character of the life, for penance was one among other important means utilized by monks in their search for God.[26] On the other hand Hellwig correctly cites the leniency found in monastic rules about excommunciation and reentry inrto the oommunity.[27]

The practice of confessing sins to a layperson is raised on occasion;[28] in this chaipter the issue concerns confession to a woman. Hellwig repeaits Kenneth Leech':s assertion (in *Soul*

repentance, and breathes ithe same spiritual atmosphere as the Jewish *berakoth.* It is not primarily the acknowledgment of sins . . . . " See also, Jean Leclerq, "Confes.sion and Pr.aise of God," *Worship* 42 (1968), 169-176. This understanding is important since one of the significant restorations to the reformed rite of penance is the " proclamation of praise for God's mercy" in each of the three forms. See, Rite of Penance, nos. 47, 56, and 63.

2a Central for an understanding of Benedictine monasticism is an understanding of the place of the Abbot, monastic formation and profession as these relate to its regimen and penitential discipline. See, the essays by Claude Peifer on " The Abbot" and ":Monastic Formation and Profession," in *RB 1980: The Rule <>f St. Benedict* (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1981), pp. 322-378, 437-466.

27 A thorough presentation of such disciplinary measures within the context of the monastic life is detained by Kenneth Hein in "The Disciplinary Measures in the Rule of Benedict," in *RB 1980,* pp. 415-436.

2s This issue is raised in connection with the present context for discussing the sacrament (p. 8), in observatons about the Celtic tradition and the (doubtful) examples of Brigit and Ita serving as confessors (p. 54), medieval discussions of the role of the ordained confessor (p. 74), Aquinas' comments on the matter (p. 98), present examples of this practice which foster a more fraternal role for the confessor (p. 135), and future prospects of includill$' laypersons in this minist17 (p. 157),

Friend) that this occurred from the seventh century onwards; but she readily admits the lack of precise documentation from this secondary source.[29] It is one thing ·to affirm the benefits of the contemporary practice of acknowledging sins to a lay director outside s·acramenta.l penance (8); it is quite ·another to try to indicate historical precedent where evidence for it is so sketchy as to be unsound.

Chapter three ends with a description of the system of tariff penance and the development of penitential practices engaged in by the whole church during Lent (55-60). Chapter four reviews the relative advantages and d:isadvanrtagesof public and private penance, noting especially the severity of the former and the lack of ecc1esial sense in the latter (62-64). The system of ·tariff penance involved a loss of the important mle of the confessor in discernment,[30] which role was sacrificed in favor of recourse to penitential books to determine the requisite penance to perform (65). Hellwig argues that in the medieval period the practice (derived from mon11Jsticism) of manifostaiting one's conscience and of admitting sins in the context of spiritual direction was reversed.[31] At this same time the practice of penance became very individualistic, as did the common understading of sin. This, Hellwig argues, led to an emphasis on acrts rather than on attitudes in acknowledging sin and the need for conversion (83).

The author's explanation ·and assessment of the new rites of sacramental penance comprise the ooncluding pages of this chapter (84-87), and are very superficial. Nowhere does Hell-

29 Hellwig herself makes the following comment in n. 21 on p. 54: "This assertion is frequently made but without documentation, e.g. by Kenneth Leech in *Soul Friend: A Stud.y in Spirituality* (London: Sheldon Press, 1977)' p. 50."

ao See, Raymond Studzinski, " The Minister of Reconciliation: Some Historical Models," in *The Rite of Penance: Commentaries. Background and Directions,* ed. by Nathan Mitchell (Washington: The Liturgical Press, 1974), pp. 50-61.

st Hellwig cites her indebtedness for this insight to Thomas Clarke, and she distinguishes between this as a way of interpreting the past and as an avenue for future developments. Its usefulness for the future is not debated here.

wig mention the importance of ritual in penitential celebrations, the roJe of laying on of hands or the sign of peace in history or in the revised rites, or the importance of the litany and thanksgiving prayers that are found in communal forms of penance.[82]

Chaipter five contains a hisrtocy of the theology of penance. Hellwig emphasizes the period from the twelfth century on, since she 3Sserts that this is the time when the theology of penance began (96). The first part of this chapter, though very brief, deserves attention because of the way the author argues about patristic notions of God, and which images predominate. The shift from absolution as a prayer that God would forgive, accompanied by a declarative absolution from penances 1and penalties, to emphasis on a declarative formula whereby the priest seems rto forgive 'Sins as well •as remit penalties takes place in the era of the Victorines (97). Both Hugh and Richard of St. Victor placed the priest at the center, ias the one who f&gives in the proper sense of the term because God has given him the power of the keys (97). This argument will remain as part of the church's explanation of penance through Tl.1ent. Limitations of space do not ·afford the author MI opportunity to explore the teaching of Aquinas (98-99) or of Trent (99-100) more thoroughly.

Chapter six offers an intriguing evaluation of the present state of use and non-use of sacramental penance. The author is clearly sympathetic with those who prefer other ways than the sacrament of penance to achieve a sense of forgiveness and integration in life. Three factors which have contributed to this dissatisfaction include the medieval shift from contrition to satisfaction (117), the problem of assigning penances (118), and the shift away fvom penances as ascetical practices that helped the penitent to look fo the future, rather than to com-

a2 For an appreciation of the role of such gestures as the laying on of hands and exchanging the sign of peace in the development of this sacra· ment see, James Dallen, "The Imposition of Hands in Penance: A Study in Liturgical History" *Worship* 51 (1977), 224-247.

pensate for sins committed in the past (119). Unfortunately, Hellwig seems not to appreciate the emphasis on contrition, as evident in the *General Instruction* on the rite of penance.[88]

In chapter seven, Hellwig deals .with the commonly unexplored issue of indulgences. She traces ·an important ·distinction between inner conversion and the " residues of sin " (127) from patristic evidence, to the medieval uneasiness with the concept of indulgences. She asserts that a convenient way. of dealing with the distinction was the medieval understanding of merits and the treasury of merits dispell'sed to ·those in need (125). She prefers to interpret indulgences as having to do with the residue of sin, rather than making up for the "punishment due" to sin .as found in Trent (128). In order to avoid a " bargain " notion of indulgence and ·to assert a dynamic understanding of indulgences the author start.es that the granting of an indulgence simply underscores what is happening all the time, that the saving grace of Christ's redemptive death and resurrection ·anticipates and welcomes our conver·sion at every step of the way (128-29). Whether such a description of indulgences would suffice for all who try to interpret the Tridentine teaching today is doubtful.

When discussing the role of the confessor in chapter eight, Hellwig offers some helpful things for those who serve in this ministry. She argues for a fraternal, as opposed to a paternal, role •and 1asserrts that one who hears confessions should do so in such a way that his vulnerability ·and sinfulness is also acknowledged in the sacramental encounter (185-86). When treating this role it is unfortunate that the author does not rely more heavily on the revised rites of penance, which deal with the proclamation and exposition of the Word of God as

33 Most noticeable is the fact that Hellwig did not use the *General In·str'Uotion* on the revised rite of penance in this regard. No. 6 describes the four parts of the sacrament: contrition, confession, act of penance (satisfac·tion) and absolution. Contrition is deliberately placed first. The *Instr'Uotion* states: " The most important act of the •penitent is contrition, which is heartfelt sorrow and aversion for sin committed along with the intention of sinning no more." *(The Rites,* p. 365).

that which invites pe:nitents to repent. In addition, a flaw in Hellwig's understanding of the new rites (in chaipters four and nine) is a minimalistic of appreciation of the role of the proclamation of the Word in all three rites of penance. When she discusses the "wordly dimension" of penance (in chapter nine), she lays great stress on how a homily can be used to instruct congregations about the justice aspects of penance (148). This can lead to 'a didacticism in preaching, precisely a.t a time when other aspects of the homily given at penance 'services are noted in the *Instruction,* including the Word 'as that which invites the church to repentance. [34]

This last chapter is a most moving analysis of the relationship between the liturgy of penance and real life. The lack of integration and the suffering in modern life can he healed through rites of penance thait emphasize gentle images of God and the reassurance of God'.s presence with his people precisely in the midst of their suffering and pain. Hellwig clearly emphasizes social sin and the need for justice as essential parts of penance. This is coherent with the emphasis found in the revised rites of penance and in recent church teaching on penance.85

This volume is a fine example of the kind of sacramental theology promised in Hellwig's preface to this series. Her treatment is insightful, challenging and balanced. While the book is not without flaws (especially in the historical and liturgical sections), it is especially useful precisely because it faces the problem of the contemporary non-use of penance and the

[34] Where Hellwig emphasizes the educative function of the homily in communal celebrations the Introduction to the Rite (no. 25) states that in the homily "it would be good to recall: (a) the infinite mercy of GOO. • • • (b) the need for interior repentance ... (c) the social aspect of grace and sin . . . (d) the duty to make satisfaction for sin." *(The Rites,* pp. 373-374). On the importance of emphasizing positive scriptural images of God, who invites to conversion, and the importance which liturgical texts and the homily can play, see, David N. Power, "The Sacramentalization of Penance," *The Heythrop JOt1if'MJl*l8 (1977), 5-22.

[35] The *General Instruction* on Penance itself is clear on the importance of acknowledging social sin: nos. 5, 6, 25.

cultural climate in which one tends to affirm and assert oneself, rather than to admit sinfulness.[36]

In his work *Chnstian Marriage,* David Thomas intends a theology of the sacrament based on the twin foundations of love of God and human marital love. He accepts Cardinal Basil Hume's assertion that the experience and statements of married couples themselves should be probed as a rich *fons theologiae* for this sacrament.[37] Thomas seeks a unified approach that integrates the sexual, creative, unitive, community-building and spiritual aspects of marriage. As such it is a helpful tool for adult education and programs for on-going formation in marriage. The titles of the book's eight chapters provide the author's main thesis that marriage is charted in theology, founded oo love, expressed in sex, celebrated in ritual, sewsoned through change, blessed with children, deepened in spirituality, and experienced as sacrament. In marked contrast to the other books in this series, Thomas' work utilfaes quotations from papal documents on marriage, including those of Pope John Paul II. The l:ack of other theological and liturgical sources is notable, especially when compared with the rest of thi'S series. Perhaps one of the reasons is thait much that passed for a theology of marriage was the canon law on marriage. In many respects, the ·theology of marriage is still in its infancy and recent popes have been in the forefront of moving this question along.

When reviewing theological descriptions of marriage the author notes the importance of a covenant as opposed to a contract theology of mamage, as called for in Vatican II *(23,* 103). While he notes that ,a covenant theology of marriage should be the beginning of the development of richer theologies of the sacrament, he does not indicate the areas which others have already to transcend the contract/covenant

[86] Brief but insightful observations a.bout the non-judgmental climate of our culture are made in the "Introduction: Questions We Have Today," P· 2.

[s1] See text of Basil Cardinal Hume, quoted in *Okrist«m Marriage,* p. 11.

limitations.[88] His chapters on marital love and sexuality are well presented and offer important insights into how the daily and ordinary happenings in marriage should be seen in relation to the way the sacrament functions, and what the sacramentality of marriage means.

In chapter four, Thomas presents the evolution of the rite of marriage and how it came to be focused on consent (84-94). His argument about the importance of a church rite of marriage is disappointingly weak (94-100), ·although his assessment of the issue of baptized non-believers who present themselves for a church wedding is well done (106-108). When Thomas discusses planning a wedding ceremony he prefers to discuss the meaning of the vows exchanged (100-102), rather than what the scripture readings reveal about the theology and spirituality of marriage. This reflects his limited use of scripture as a basis of a theology of marriage throughout the work.

Chapters five through eight deal with developing marital love throughout one's marriage. Thomas discusses " enrichment skills " for couples and techniques for improving communication (rn4-34); the link between these and gospel values is in the author's emphasis on forgiveness as the key to marital communion (131-34). His discussion of the important place which children have in marriage emphasizes the essential move in marriage from self-absorption to self-transcendence. Wisely, Thomas bl!oadens this section to include other expressions of self-giving: extended family, friends, people outside the family unit (154-56) – a discussion that can be pastorally helpful for the childless couple. A more cogent argument about fol!ces within our culture tha.t go against such self-transcendence for family members would have been welcomed.[39] In

as See the insightful and probing approach by Tibw Horvath, "Marriage: Contra.ct? Covenant? Commuity? Sacrament of Sacraments ?-Fallible Symbol of Infallible Love, Revelation of Sin and Love," in *The Sacraments: God's J,ove and Mercy Actualized,* edited by Francis Eigo (Villanova: University of Villanova Press, 1979), pp. 143-181.

39 On the necessity of a family pen<peetive in society to offset current pro-

chapter seven the author discusses marital spirituality and again offers practical ways that married couples can incorporate spirituality inrto their marriage. He emphasizes acceptance of. the other, the avoidance of judgment and (again) the importance of forgiveness (160-166) . His treatment of "ministry" here is superficial, both theologically and practically. His treatment of marital fidelity is more practical and useful than theologically grounded (172-75). He does not stress a basic foundation of all commitments, that our fidelity rests on God's being ever faithful to us, and that it is God"S faithful love rtha.t sustains us in our freely chosen commitments to one another.

Thomas's final chapter deals· with the specific issue of the sacramentality of marriage. Here he bases his argument on a theology of creation that emphasizes t:he importance of symbol in human life and communication (177-80). He stresses an incarnational approach to sacraments, as each is a " sacramentaliza.tion "of God's love (182-187). Only under the theme of the ecclesial nature of marriage does he treat of divorce and second marriages (196-201). Again, his approach is largely practical and not sufficiently theological.[40]

Overall rthe volume would be more useful a:s a. tool for individuals entering marriage, or already married, .to help them explore the ramifications of married life in concrete terms. As a source for a sacramentality or spirituality of marriage the book is severely fla.wed.

Nathan Mitchell's *MisWYn. and Ministry* on the " history and theology of the sacrament of order " is a fine example of clear writing, insightful theologizing, and nuanced argumentation. Although it is not without weaknesses, it stands as an outstanding volume in this series. The author startes that a primary goal " is to make a.vailable to the nonspecialist the re-

individual and post-institutional biases in society see Bishop Howard Hubbard, "Developing a Family Perspective in Society and in the Church," *Origins* 15 (1985), 313-321.

40 See, Theodore Mackin, *Divor06* wnd *Remarriage* (New York/Ramsey : Paulist Press, 1984).

sults of recent biblical research as these affect our understanding of the world into which the Christian movement was born and out of which .the Christian ministry grew" (18). This statement helps :to explain why fully half of the work deals with scriptural material. The liability in such a presentation *is* the brief treatment given to the evolution of orders and to a theology of holy orders.

In chapter one, Mitchell discusses the complex origins and history of Israelite priesthood, noting the difference in various epochs. He traces the understandings of priests as· " oracular consultants and sanctuary servants ,, (eM'ly period) to " professional priests " who made their living at sacred sanctuaries through to the "high-priesthood" as a post-exilic development. He ends this chapter by emphasizing the role of the Temple and priesthood in Israel in the first century C.E. The major difficulty with this section is that Mitchell relies so heavily on Aelred Cody's work that the reader is often better served by cosulting the original.[41]

In chapter two the author places his discus·sionof the New Testament evidence in the context of varying movements in Palestine at the time, including the Jesus movement (73-98). His presentation dr.aws on much of the recent work on a sociological interpretation of the New Testament, and from these sources Mitchell draws much that is .insightful about leadership in the early Christian community.[42] New Testament terms such as the Twelve, deacon, priest, bishop, p:resbyter, apostle, etc., should be understood in the light of the

41 Aelred Cody, *A History of Ola Testament Priesthood.* Analecta Biblica 35 (Rome: Pontificial Biblical Institute, 1969).

42 Examples of authors on whose work Mitchell relies are: Abraham Malherbe, *Social Aspects of Early Ohristianity* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977); James D. G. Dunn, *and Diversity in the New Testament* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1977); Bengt Holmberg, *Paul and. Power: The Structwre of Authority m tke Primitive Okurch as Re'flectecl m tke Pauline Epistles* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980); Howard Kee, *Okristian Origin.a in Sociological Perspective* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1980); Gerd Theissen, *Sociology of Early Palestmia Ohristianity,* trans, by John Bowden (Philadelphia; Fortress, 1978).

New Testament itself, not on the basis of later interpretation (108-17). Clearly :at home with redactional critical studies of the New Testament, Mitchell relies on the work of Dunn and Kiisemann (among others) rto illumine what the New Testament texts say about leadership and ministry.[43] The chapter ends with a useful. summary of conclusions reached in the chapter (133-85).

In chapter three, Mitchell addresses the evolution of kinds of ministry in the New Testament communities[44] ·and discusses the issue of whether we can determine whether ordination existed in this period 'and what the relationship was between leadership and liturgical presidency. He sees the laying on of hands:

> as a "commissioning" gesture [that] has very restricted significance in the New Testament. **It** seems linked to the special circumstances of people who are designated for missionary work (e..g., "apostles" like Paul and Barnabas, a "deacon" like Timothy. the "Seven" Hellenist-missionaries of Acts 6: 6). Nowhere are bishops describe,d as having hands laid on them for their ministry in the local church. Nor do presbyters appear to receive their status in the community through a ritual laying on of hands, though the presbyters themselves may employ this gesture on some occasions (1 Tim 4: 14). (1965-66)

Mitchell affirms that we do not know how someone acquired the position of leading the community at the Lord's Supper (citing Raymond Brown's *Priest and Bwhop,* among others) but he clearly asserts that in the New Testament ministry organizes itself around building up the communtiy's life and not the liturgy (167). That these ought to be seen ·a;s separate and not OOT'l'elativeis debatable. The author grants the possibility

[43] For an important observa.tion about how Kiisemann and others separate office from charism and thus distort some important New Testament evidence see, Thomas O'Meara, *Theology of Ministry* (New York/Ramsey: Paulist Press, 1983), pp. 60-71.

[44] Mitchell relies heavily on the thorough and insightful work of Richard J. Dillon, "Ministry as Stewardship of the Tradition in the New Testament," *Proceedings,* C.T.S.A. 24 (1969), 10-69.

tha.t presiding at the eucharist may not have been exclusively a male prerogwtive (168) .[45] He indicates that it is likely that not just anyone from the community presided a.t the liturgy, and he cites Schillebeeckx who states ·that " anyone competent to serve the church in matteJ.18 of public responsibility would, *ipso facto,* be competent to preside at eucharist ... [and] that no' separate authorization' (e.g., 1a laying on of hands) would have been needed in order to legitimate the ministry of leading the church at the Lord's Supper" (169). His helpful summary at the end of this chapter asserts that there is no uniform pattern of ministry or leadership in the later New Testament literature and there is no unambiguous evidence for "ordination" (198). The tightness and precision of this summary reflects the way Mitchell addresses most issues: his style is clear, precise, and irenic throughout.

In chapter four Mitchell discusses ordination liturgies as well as ways of ordering ministry and consolidroting.the bishop's authority. He guides the reader through a wealth of ordination rites and liturgical data and thus discloses his expertise as a liturgist.[46] His documentation of liturgical sources is detailed. Unfoiitunrotely his. summary of doctrinal statements on ordination in this same period (from the *Apostolic Tradition* to Trent) is superficial at best. Except for his presentation of Aquinas' theology of orders (248-256), Mitchell presentation of other theological sources is derivative and too brief.

In the last chapter, Mitchell develops " a theology of holy orders." Starting from the premise of a " discipleship of equals " [4,7] the author considers factors that are involved in

[45] At this point Mitchell cites Edward Schillebeeckx's work *Miinistry: Leadership iin the Community of Jesus Christ,* trans., John Bowden (New York: Crossroad, 1981), pp. 30, 41. For another interpretation of the New Testament data on this issue see, Tibor Horvath, " Who Presided at the Eucharist?" *Journal of liJcumenical Studies* 22 (Summer, 1985), 604-607.

[46] The method of arguing about the theology of the ordained ministry from the ordination rites themselves is a hallmark of Vogel's research on ministry.

[47] Mitchell cites Elisabeth Schiissler-Fiorenza., "The Biblical Roots for the

delineating such a theology: discipleship and apostolic authority (269-274), charism and church order (274-78), the priesthood of Jesus (278-288), :and the priesthood of Christians (288-285). He then considers the church's right to ministry (289-295),[48] ordination as process (295-806) and the permanence of orders (806-818). When discussing the communitarian roots of the ordained ministry Mitchell carefully asserts that " bishops, presbyters and deacons did not ... receive their ordination from ·the local church; they were not merely its ' representatives ' and thus, though they could be deposed, their ordination could not be revoked through a popular referendum " (296).[49]

Mitchell bases his argument about the permanence of ordination on three principles: the permanence of Christian baptism, the permanence of the apostolic community's right to ministry, and the permanence of Jesus' priesthood. He ooncludes the volume with the following statement.

> Every believer has a gift of ministry (a' charism ') to offer others, hut not all possess the charism of leadership. Those who do may be called to serve the unique priesthood of Christ. Ordained ministry is thus a permanent condition of servantship, through which the minister seeks to unfold the priestly activity of Jesus among his people and to strengthen that bond of the Spirit which imparts holiness and unites believers to the Lord. (814)

Discipleship of Equals," *Journal of Pa8toraJ OouMeZZing* 14 (1979), 7-15; this position is argued more thoroughly in Fiorenza's more recent' *In Memory of Her: A Feminist Re00n8trnction of Christian Origins* (New York: Crossroad, 1985), pp. J40-151, 226-236.

48 Schillebeeckx's approach to this issue i.s argued in "The Christian Community and Its Office Bearers," in *Oonoilwm* Vol. 133, *The Right of the Community to a Priest* (New York: Seabury, 1980), pp. 95-133, and more fully in *The Church With a; Human J!'ace* (London: SOM Press, 1985).

49 Legrand notes that since Nieaea (325), it has been necessary that all the bishops of the province be present at the ordination of another bishop. At least three from among them must be present because they represent symbolically the whole church, and by their participation it is the entire church that witnesses to the apostolocity of the faith of the one to be ordained bishop.

Mitchell has provided a clear and insightful work on the ordained ministry. The scope of the work (carefully delimited as already noted) and the wealth of sources utilized to argue Ms positions are admirable. However, the book is not without flaw. The absence of any discussion of ontology with regard to orders mars an otherwise useful review of the tradition, especially because this has been ·so central so many debates over ordination. In addition, the presentation of the ·sacriamentalcharacter of ordina.tion (another charged term) is ooo brief to be useful (807-08). Some will argue that the use of feminist ·and sociological critiques of early Christianity do not allow for opposing positions to be presented as fully. On the whole, however, Mitchell has accomplished his task well. What is not considered here can easily be added in university or seminary course bibliographies and lectures where this work deserves a place.

The l•ast book in the series on .sacraments is James Empereur's *Prophetic Anointing.* The author is faithful to the aims of the series as Hellwig enunciated them, even if his book is not structured in that fashion. Empereur's first chapter deals with the history of the sacrament of anointing in which he discusses the use of oil in civil ceremonies, the New Testament roots of ·the sacrament, and then anointing from the first century to the present, with special emphasis given to the period around the Council of Trent (62-68; 79-83). Thios survey is helpful but deriviative since the author uses secondary sources exclusively.

In chapter two the author di·scusses the theology of the •sacrament first as it appears in Trent and Vatican II, and then under the conventional headings of institution, effects and administration (where he discusses the present reformed rite of anointing). However, despite the conventional outline, what Empereur presents is far from conventional; it is illuminating and often insightful. Unfortuna.tely some sections a;re unclea;r, such as the following example under the section on " effects ":

What happens in anointing is that the Church commends the sick person to God and in so doing makes the person's illness a source of grace. This is possible because illness is more than a mere physical phenomenon. It entails a change in personality. (95)

Chapter three is a pastoral approach to anointing, aimed at providing pastoral ministers with helpful material for catechesis and preaching. Here the author discusses the classical text on anointing (James 5: 13-16) in some detail (lU-181) .

In chapter four, Empereur presents what is the most insightful and creative part of the book. Entitled " Anointing: a Sacrament of Vocation," the chapter deals with the crucial isisuesof how sacramental anointing relates to the lived experience of the ill and aged. Empereur argues that the sick have a ministry (also called a" vocation": hence the cha;pter title) to reveal to the church by their witness that life means more than productivity and competence. The sick reveal to fellow Christians that life on earth is a preparation for eternal union with God (143-59). In developing this argument the author relies on the seminal work of David Power and Jennifer Glen.[50] Empereur notes that even the very elderly must feel that there is usefulness in .their old age." The sacrament of anointing can point to the importance of transcending individual life cycles. . . . It *is* the sacrament of anointing which can articulate the hope that one's caring efforts are caught up in the ·activity of God and so transcend their human orioain" (163). He argues that the "ministry of the elderly [is] to close life well" (169-181). Here he critiques contemporary American society for prizing wealth, yourth and power. These two sections on illness and old age are essential reading for anyone involved in health care or pa:storal care of the sick.

The section of this chapter on anointing and social justice contains some ·important insights; however it is rather ideologi-

so Empereur relies on the particularly insightful articles by David N. Power, "Let the Sick Man Call," *The Heythrop Journal* 19 (1978), 256-270, and Jennifer :M. Glen, "Sickness and Symbol: The Promise of the Future," *WorBhip* 54 (1980), 397-4U.

cal in its stance and does n()t flow from what .precedes it.[51] The last section of the chapter on anointing and the body discusses the obvious importance of the laying on of hands and the anointing with oil in this sacrament. Here the author could have henefitted from a fuller use of the research of Godfrey Diekmann on the laying on of hands and :the responses to Diekmann's work by Joseph Powers and Edward Kilmartin;[52] Empereur returns to the chapter's thesis when he states that health is more than physical well being; it is the wholeness of the whole person, of which sickness and old age are components. The restored health that is proper to anointing is the enabling of the person ,to accept his/her state and in such acceptance to find peace and reconciliation with God and community (197).

In chaptel"s five and six, Empereur discusses pastoral perspectives on the rites of the sick, the elderly and the dying. He maintains that the end of liturgy is liturgy itself; liturgy should not he utilitarian or ideologically bound (210). Unfortunaitely, he does not explore what he by this cryptic statement, which, as it stands, can he understood to correct an overly utilitarian and effect-oriented iapproach ito sacraments. However, Empereur himself comes dose to an ideological approach to sacraments when he discusses the social justice dimensions of anointing. Whether Empereur is saying something about how to treat the efficacy of sacraments remains unclear.

As for the future directions of this sacrament, the author states that two areas include extending the meanig of the minister beyond the ordained, and integrating the charismatic renewal in the contem of this sacrament (249). Once again the author leaves the reader with an idea that is not fleshed out or explored fully. (Readers should he advised that the :final English edition of the Rite for AnOinting and the Pastoral Care

[51] Empereur discusses "Anointing and Social Justice" on pp. 181-191.

[52] See, Godfrey Diekmann, " The Laying on of Hands: The Basic Sacra.· mental Rite," *Proceedmgs O.T.S.A.,* 29 (1974), 339-351, and the critiques by Joseph Powers, 353-356, and by Edward Kilmartin, 357-366.

of the Sick was only issued in 1983, hence references to the rites in this volume may need some adjustment and correction.)

What Empereur offers is at times insightful, challenging and stimulating; however, the work is larrgely derivative and a summary of the positions of many others. *Prophetic Anointing* would be good background reading for pastoral ministers involved in ministry to the 'Sick and elderly, and for college level courses in sacraments.

Before concluding this assessment of the Hellwig series, three comments are in order. (1) It should be pointed out that while each volume deals with a particular sacrament, very often authors comment on other sacraments, or on sacraments in general. Keifer's book on eucharist contains some interesting comments on initiation and lay ministry,[53] Hellwig offers some insightful thoughts on the reality of salvation as experienced in sacraments,[54] aJll:d Empereur offers a useful (if summary), way of dealing with Trent's teaching on the domincial institution of seven sacraments.[55] Thus, these volumes should be appreciated in relation to each other.

(2) With regard rto method in general, these six books can be said to be strong on theology, liturgy, history and pastoral practice. What is clearly absent is a due regard for ,an approach to sacraments that relies on ·sociologicalor anthropological sources. For example, while Mitchell deals with sociological interpretations of the New Testament, he does not use a sociological approach to the phenomenon of ordained ministry in the church today. Empereur's thesis that anointing is a sacrament of vocation is elaborated with some insights from the social sciences, however this is done in a rudimentary way. This lack of appreciation for how 'social science can help

53 See, *Blessed and Broken,* pp. 125-128 (initiation order) and pp. 12-16 (ministries) .

54 See the insightful and evocative comments on salvation by Monika Hellwig in *Bign of ReoonoiUation and Oon11ersion,* pp. 121-123.

55 See the explanation of the institution of seven sacraments by James Empereur in *Propetio Anointing,* pp. 87, 92.

illumine the meaning of sacraments is all the more disappointing because in the introductory volume to the series, *The Catholic Sacraments,* Joseph Martos a.rgues that this ought to be an essential component of :sacramental theology today.[56]

(3) Some traditional categories of sacramental theology are conspicuously ignored or undeveloped in many contemporary works on sacraments generally, and in these volumes. For example, expositions on how grace operates in sacraments, including sacramental grace, are largely absent.[57] Where these authors clearly opt for an existential approach to salvation and to sanctifica;tion, the traditional language about grace is missing. In addition, notions of sacramental efficacy and causality are also conspicuously absent. While one would certainly not want to repeat the extremes of the former system tha,t almost predetermined the efficacy of sacraments, it would be unfortunate if the Roman Catholic tradition on efficacy a;nd causality should disappear due to an overreaction to exaggerations (real or imagined). As Mark Searle notes, the term "sacramental causality ... was used to express some convictions about the nature of sacramentality that are now in dranger of being lost. These convictions ... are an indispensable part of our Catholic Christian tmdition ·and we ·surrender them at our peril ... Whatever else we may want to say :about sacraments, we must find ways of continuing to speak of them as acts of Christ in the community and not just as acts of the community." [58] Finally, the notion of sacramental validity, while admittedly a late term to evolve •as part of sa;cramental itheory,[59]

[56] For a review of this book, see "Reeent Sacramental Theology," *The Thomist* 52 (January, 1988), 1281f.

[57] The work of Monika Hellwig is a clear exception to this.

[58] See, Mark Searle, "Issues in Christian Initiation," 206-207, and Searle, " Faith and Sacraments in the Conversion Process," in *Oonveraioo and the Oateahumenate,* ed. by Robert Duggan (New York/Ramsey: Paulist Press, 1984)' 71-72.

[59] On the evolution of this term and its role in the history of sacramental theology, see John Gurrieri, "Sacramental Validity: The Origins and Use of a Vocabulary," *The Jurist* 41 (1981), 21-58.

should not he lost in our age, that .appropriately emphasizes commitment to and appropriation of the sacramental event by individuals and the community.

In an article on a contemporary understanding of sacraments in 1978, Monika Hellwig maintained that sacramental theology had to be influenced by contemporary notions of grace, by rediscovery of the wider historical and cultural context of the theological enterprise, by inquiry into the theological ·and liturgical meaning of the rituals themselves, by developments in ·the understanding of ministry, by recent advances in ecumenical dialogue, and by questions about the relation of sacraments to the lives. of participamts.[60] The *Message of the Sacraments* series attests to the validtiy of her statement and to ithe wide expanse which sacramental theology should encompass.

so Monika Hellwig, "New Understanding of the Sacraments," *Commonweal* 105 (June 16, 1978), 375·380.

PIDLOSOPHY OF ART: A POSTSCRIPT

An essay of mine entitled " Outline of a Philosophy of Art " was published by *The Thomist* in January 1940 (Vol. II, No. I). It still seems to me thoroughly valid, and a useful touchstone of literary criticism. But a shortcoming was evident from the beginning: it is readily applicable to literary art, hut not so readily to music or painting or sculpture. It had always seemed to me that an extension of the theory to these arts offered an inviting subject for a doctoral dissertation, although it does not appear that the invitation-or challenge-was ever taken up.

But at length it seems possible to propose such an extension: a "unified field" theory. This is the name applied, I believe, by Einstein to an explanation which would account for disparate elements-for example, space and time-in the same terms.

As a preface to the investigation, it should perhaps he suggested that no unified field theory can ever he complete: some aspect of reality must he withheld. This is a presupposition dictated, I think, by religious modesty.

The 1940 "Outline" considers the analogy between art and mysti· cism, hut concludes that they are not the same thing; poetic experience is not intuitive vision; immediate knowledge of a whole and singular thing. Nevertheless the analogy provides a key to the nature of beauty.

The " Postscript " begins with the definition proposed in the original " Outline ": Beauty is the special quality of concentrated truth; on· tological truth, that is-Being *(Ens)* as the object of the intellect. This definition is developed in the " Outline " as follows:

> ."It is not sufficient for beauty ••• that a work of art should he richly charged with truth. The truth must he brought to a focus, and strike on the mind as a simple and luminous unity. Suppose we figure the truths of ordinary knowledge as a sort of daylight, general and diffuse. Poetry, then, would he like the lens which gathers this light to a point.
>
> "Note how literally this account of poetry corresponds with the classic definitions of beauty; Plato's *splendor veri,* and St. Augustine's *splendor ordini.s.* Order is a kind of unification, a focusing. And where you have rays of light focused on one point, you have a *splendor."*

Let us apply these ideas to an example. Here are a few casual lines from Cardinal Newman:

> " No man is given to see his work through. Man goes forth unto his work, to his labor, until the evening, but evening falls before it is done. One Person alone began, and finished, and died."

On analysis this passage yields an almost endless content: a rueful philosophy, the theology of the Incarnation, a landscape, Vergil's *lacrimae rerum,* the biography of the human race.

But such analysis is possible only for a work of literary art. This is a representational or discursive art; by definition literature consists of what can be put into words; what can be described and known. We are able to identify the truths which are expressed in words. But what are the cognitive elements in painting and sculpture and music? What do we *know* when we look at a painting or statue, or hear a symphony?

There is of course some representational content in all the arts. Most painting ar.d sculpture has a recognizable subject, and even in music there are passages that imitate the rhythms of life or of our environment. But the specific forms of these arts overshadow and far outweigh the representational or imitative elements.

What, then, are the specific forms of these arts? What kind of order do we observe in them? Painting and sculpture are obviously arts of space; and, where color is present, they are arts of time also, since color is determined by the frequencies of light. Music is essentially an art of time, since time measures both the flow and intensity of sound. Our senses observe these forms, but our response is not only sensory; our intellect understands them. But what do we understand? What ontological truths are ordered and focused by the non-literary arts?

I would begin by suggesting that our analysis of the contents even of literary art tends to be superficial. In the Newman passage, for example, we find a brilliant focus of ontological truths--of Being as proposed to the intellect. We have mentioned man, philosophy, theology, landscape. But each one of these elements is already, and in itself, a focus of intricate order. See how much Being, how much reality, is implicit in the idea of "man", whose facets include spirit and matter, religion, philosophy, history, anthropology, art, and even chemistry and physics. And each of these in turn is a sort of universe.

But analysis *must* be superficial-one can never reach the end. We are reminded of the notion formerly held by physicists, that the fundamental unit of matter was the atom, a word intended in its source meaning of" indivisible". Now we have learned that there is no atom in this sense.

And it is clear that analysis is endless in all of the arts. We see at once that the organization in music is of a vast complexity, since it is based on the unlimited divisions and relations of time. As for paint· ing, an artist of my acquaintance told me he was accustomed to carry in his pocket a hook containing reproductions of the work of Giotto; he would look at the pictures from time to time, and continually found designs not observed before.

So we return to the original question: What is the cognitive basis of these arts? What are the truths, the elements of knowable Being, which the work orders and focuses? Is there a common ground-a unified field-for the literary and non-literary arts?

The answer obviously is not infinite analysis-a process without a term. But we observe that there is one element common to all the arts; that is, Order. What if Order itself is the fundamental constituent of created Being: the ontological truth which the mind grasps; Order, whose antonym is the Greek word *chaos,* meaning the void, or nothing-ness? [1] Here we pause; reflection does not lead to demonstration; but we note that our solution has the virtue of giving an absolute meaning to St. Augustine's definition of beauty, *sp"lendor ordinis.* Moreover, it avoids the anomaly of supposing that created being, in its ultimate constitution, could be simple.[2]

But is there an element excluded from this solution? In the preface it was suggested that no unified field theory could ever he complete. Some aspect of reality would be withheld. So we ask, What is the excluded element in the proposed theory?

The answer is supplied, it appears, by the Aristotelian and Thomistic doctrine of Matter and Form. Matter in this sense is of course not the opposite of spirit, hut only of Form. Form makes a thing this *kind* of thing: say, a rock, a tree, a man. Matter (*materia prima)* makes a thing *this* individual thing. It is Form alone which the intel-lect apprehends; Matter itself is not intelligible, but is only indirectly apprehended as the subject of Form.[8]

St. Thomas held that *materia prima* enters into the composition only of physical bodies, but the Franciscan school held that all creatures, even spirits, are composed of Matter and Form; only God is pure Form.

[1] The association of emptiness and disorder in ancient philosophy is per-haps a literary coincidence, not susceptible of strict interpretation in this context.

[2] ST la.3, 7.

[8] See authorities cited on pages 19 and 20 of the "Outline."

So we have the excluded element: Matter, the reality forever outside a theory concerning Being as the object of the intellect. How important the exclusion appears in this context!-since the *thisness,* the individuality and distinctness of created things, which Matters provides, is the ultimate ground of order. [4]

The search for a " unified field " appears as an effort to find simplicity [5] in creation, reflecting the Simplicity of God. The solution, since it is philosophical, must venture into the region of ultimate causes. But it is offered diffidently, with reverence for mysteries which may he both fascinating and sacred. Perhaps it is ambition enough to identify the place where the mystery resides.

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◁ If one does not accept the Franciscan extension of Hylomorphism to all creatures, bodily and spiritual, the significance of this point is accordingly limited.

5 (relative, and by analogy)

WITTGENSTEIN: AN EXCHANGE

In his review [1] of my *The Argument of the 'Tractatus': its Relevance to Contemporary Theories of Logic, Language, Mind and Phil,osophical Truth,* [2] John Churchill claims that my "eccentric" (C 171) [3] interpretation "does not persuade" (C 171). My interpretation is eccentric for, as Churchill himself stresses, there is a "fundamental point at which McDonough differs from virtually every other reader of the *Tractatus*", namely that "one can construct explicit logical argumentation, constituting a philosophical system, leading from [Wittgenstein's] 'fundamental idea' to certain explicit, systematic conclusions about ontology, mind, meaning, and so on" (C 171). In opposition to my program Churchill writes, "By attributing to Wittgenstein an argument or doctrine (in the sense just mentioned) he contradicts those commentators who have understood Wittgenstein to be earnestly requiring real silence about philosophy and to be asserting seriously that the *Tractatus* is a self-refuting treatise, to be kicked aside, once its lessons are learned" (C 166). My mistake, it seems, is to "make [LW's] system consistent" since, if we "take [LW] at genstein's "self-refuting treatise", that I sought an escape from this his word" it is "deep[ly] inconsistent" (C 171).

Churchill regards himself as expressing the standard interpretation of "the plain sense of what [LW] wrote" (C 171). However, Black reports that Wittgenstein felt that the *Tractatus* "was misunderstood by Russell, Moore, Frege . . • and even Ramsey" [4] and so is even led to say that" there can he no question here of any definitive reading." [5] More recently, Pears has even said that the ideas in Wittgenstein's

1 Churchill, John, *The Thomist* 52, no. 1 (January, 1988).

2 McDonough, Richard M., *The Argument of the 'Tractatus': its Relevance to Contemporary Theories of Logic, Language, Mind, and Philosophical Tr1ith* (State University of New York Press, 1986).

The Thomist incorrectly stated the title of my book, substituting "Trust" for "Truth" in the subtitle.

ain the text of my reply I have used the notation (Cai) and (My), respectively, to designate p. *ai* and p. *y* in Churchill's review and my book.

4 Black, Max, *A Companion to Wittgensttin's 'Traotatus'* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974), p. 1.

s *Ibid.,* p. vii.

books do not even appear to "repeat the familiar patterns of Western thought ".[6] Similar comments abound in most of the serious commentators.

It is against this background, rather more pessimistic than Churchil's cheery vision of the universally acknowledged "plain sense" of Wittgenstein's "self-refuting treatise", that I sought an escape from this interpretative deadlock. If a definitive interpretation is to be established, then instead of indulging in the common practice of selectively removing remarks from the *Tractatus* to suit one's own fancies, one must found the interpretation on the remarks which Wittgenstein himself identified as its "fundamental ideas". Accordingly, the interpretative burden of my project falls on the plausibility of attributing this argument to the text. Churchill only mentions this 200+ page argument in the one dismissive sentence quoted above. But is it legitimate to dismiss the argument on such grounds?

Let us assume that the *Tractatus* enjoins "real" silence "once its lessons are learned." The question is, when are its lessons learned? Churchill makes his own interpretative claims, and then insists (conveniently) that one must he thereafter he silent. But perhaps its lessons are learned in digesting the argument of the *Tractatus.* The point is that one must still decide the correctness of the interpretation independently. Any interpreter can invoke the injunction to silence with equal justice, namely none, to enforce his own view. My interpretation is as consistent with such an injunction to silence as any other.

Similar remarks apply to Churchill's dismissal of my interpretation on the grounds that it attributes a " doctrine " to Wittgenstein. Just as Churchill chooses not to view his own interpretative pronouncements as violations of the silence doctrine, while mine are violations, he also chooses not to view his own ascriptions to the *Tractatus* as doctrines, while, again, mine are. This kind of verhalism has infected far too much of the commentary on *Tractatus.* If it is to he avoided, then it is necessary to determine precisely what is meant in saying that philosophy " is not a body of doctrine " (T 4.112). I devote considerable space to this major interpretative issue. I explain the non-doctrinal character of philosophy in terms of the holistic character of philosophical propositions (VII.4), the fact that philosophical propositions are elucidations of the empty tautological symbols (VII.6 & 7), and

6Pears, David, *The False Prison,* vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 3.

in VIII.2 the interpretation culminates in the view that " the significance and truth of philosophy is not embodied in true representations, but in a ' true ' life, a life in harmony with the logic of the world " (M 235). (See also my Introduction, pp. 8-12). My interpretation is consistent with a non-trivial account of the sense in which the *Tractatus* is not a body of doctrine. Churchill nowhere even mentions this account.

Though Churchill does not address himself to the argument of the *Tractatus,* he does argue against some of its conclusions. Perhaps his major objection to my interpretation is that the genuine propositional symbol has an imperceptible meaning component, the thought or "meaning locus". This objection is made repeatedly in various forms, and occupies the hulk of the review. Churchill writes, "This interpretation is a classic instance of a Rylean category mistake, and it is McDonough, not Wittgenstein, who makes it. The form of the mistake is to postulate an unobserved entity to explain the function of an observed one" (C 167). Churchill argues that Wittgenstein does not make this mistake: " Wittgenstein is clear in stating that the symbolic function of a sign is tied to its use with a sense (T 3.326)" (C 167). Now it is just this kind of vagueness that I wanted to avoid. Who would deny that the symbol's symbolic function is "tied to" its use with a sense? But tied in what sense? In the remark to which Churchill refers us (T 3.326) Wittgenstein is only concerned with the epistemological issue how we " recognize " the symbol by the sign, not with the logical or metaphysical " tie " between a symbol and its meaning which I am addressing.

Churchill continues this theme: " And while McDonough postulates a reified thought to show how everyday language links up with reality, Wittgenstein makes plain that there is no linking ingredient hut rather a use (T 4.002, 4.011-4.016; 3.328) " (C 169). How Churchill sees the notion of use of signs, rather than the notion of a reified meaning in the reference in to " the form of thought beneath language ", which is compared to " the form of the body " beneath our clothing, is beyond me. And in the series of remarks from 4.011 to 4.016 Wittgenstein does not refer to the use or application of signs even once, hut discusses only the sense in which perceptible signs can he pictures. Finally, 3.328 is the only one of the remarks cited here which seems to support his view: **"If** everything behaves as if a sign has meaning, then it does have meaning." But the context of 3.328 shows that Wittgenstein is there discussing " logical syntax ", so he is, by definition, discussing that part of his account which does not concern the imper·

ceptihle thought. That is why Wittgenstein goes on in the subsequent remark (3.33) to write," In logical syntax the meaning of a sign should never play a role . . .: only the description of expressions may he presupposed." So none of these passages support Churchill's view, and 4.002 undermines it.

There is one selection of Churchill's points which displays his real presuppositions quite clearly. In the first of these he writes, "This is the fundamental instinct of the author of the *Tractatus:* explanations have to stop somewhere, and they need to stop in some medium that of. fers an alternative to appeals to either self-evidence or convention. Logic in its application to the world is such a medium, and Wittgenstein's gestures towards function and application show how he can avoid those appeals." In the second he writes, "If McDonough's work is to sponsor a revisionist reading of Wittgenstein, in which the *Tractatus* and *Philosophical Investigations* appear as treatises written in defence of the postulation of mental entities, this will he a supreme irony in the history of philosophy. Wittgenstein wrote in the latter work, 'Nothing is more wrong-headed than calling meaning a mental activity! Unless one is out to produce confusion ' (Pl p. 693)" (C 170). In the third Churchill writes, " Wittgenstein expressed grave doubt whether his work would he understood. In *Zettel* (#314) he diagnosed . . . the impulse to press past the solutions to our philosophical problems toward something further, toward something· like an explanatory theory. McDonough's project of grafting large theoretical branches onto the truncated descriptive body of the *Tractatus* is an instance of this tendency " (C 171). In the first of these remarks Churchill ascribes to the *Tractatus* a view taken from pg. 1 of the *Philosophical Investigations* (that explanations must come to an end somewhere). In the second he quotes one of the passages from the *Investigations* which oppose positing occult mental entities. In the third he uses a quote from *Zettel* in like manner. Churchill seems to have forgotten what book it is that I am interpreting. When I choose to offer an interpre· tation of those later works I will say so.[7] I agree, of course, that in these later works Wittgenstein is opposed to the positing of such en· tities. But, as I see it, what he opposes in those later works is precisely the tendency which he had earlier endorsed in the *Tractatus* (see M 279-81 n74).

This makes clear that a major motivation behind Churchill's ohjec•

[1] Set my "Towards a. Non-Mechanistic Theory of Meaning," *MIND* 98, no. 389, (January 1989), 1-22.

tions to my interpretation is his mere assumption that the *Tractatus* and the later philosophy are similar in the relevant respects. Since there is a place for use and application in the *Tractatus* it is possible to cite passages in which these are mentioned. But the issue is not whether there is a place for these notions, but what place it is. I argue that as far as the logic and metaphysics are concerned, that place is peripheral, that the phenomena of signs in use are "the mere epiphenomena of meaning" (M 144). It would be customary for a reviewer to deal with that argument, but Churchill does not to do so.

Churchill makes numerous other criticisms which could be as exhaustively treated as the above, hut as I am under a constraint of brevity I will only list of a few of them and make brief replies. 1.) Churchill writes, "Oddly, .•. [McDonough] calls this doctrine, which everyone recognizes under the name ' the picture theory ' . . . one of 'the most underemphasized views of the *Tractatus'* (M p. 105). It seems odd to call a doctrine underemphasized when all major commentators . . . give it a central role in their expositions of the text " (C 168). This is typical of Churchill's casual way with a text. On p. 105 I do not say that the picture theory has been underemphasized, but only that the specific doctrine " that the genuine propositional symbol has pictorial form " is underemphasized. The doctrine which Churchill describes as the picture theory is that the " propositional symbol does not contain a proxy for the contingent state" (C 168), and that is not the doctrine of pictorial form which I claim is underemphasized. By his own failure to identify correctly the doctrine of pictorial form Churchill has only further illustrated my point. 2.) Churchill writes, " If one eschews McDonough's construal of the thought .•. [one can] say with Wittgenstein that it is the proposition with a sense that is directly related, without mediator, to the possible fact it depicts. ' That is how a picture is attached to reality; it reaches right out to it' (T 2.1511). But McDonough has the picture correlated with a thought, and the thought reaching out to reality. Why fly in the face of the text?" (C 170) But I do not say that this sort of picture (which satisfies the conditions of pictorial form described in the 2.15's) is correlated with a thought. The view in Chapter VI is that the thought is itself this special kind of picture, so it, " without mediator" reachs right out to reality. 3.) Churchill asks, "If signs require an added substantive ingredient to link up with reality how does McDonough account for [T 6.124] : 'Logic is not a field in which we express what we wish with the help of signs, hut rather one in which the nature of the absolutely necessary signs speaks for itself'? " This is

easy. 6.124 is a remark about the logical propositions, and the notion of the mediating thought is only invoked in the account of the connection of " fact-stating " propositions with the world. 4.) Churchill says that "it is incredible [for McDonough] to impute to Wittgenstein the view that perceptible signs are amorphous associates of . . . thoughts. It is the genius of the *Tractatus* that the signs themselves really depict" (C 169). But I nowhere claim that perceptible signs are "amorphous" associates of thoughts. Quite the contrary, in Chapter V I define several senses in which the perceptible signs are articulated pictures. The point of that chapter is that they are derivative kinds of pictures, not that they are amorphous or that they do not themselves depict. 5.) Churchill writes " [McDonough] disparages the reading demanded by the passages he discusses as " dogmatic " or "mystical". But Wittgenstein's views are ... in certain senses dogmatic and mystical " (C 171). But I do not deny that some of Wittgenstein's remarks are mystical. In Chapter VII I write, "It is not my purpose to deny that there is a mystical, or a personal, dimension, to this remark [that one must throw away the ladder], but rather to emphasize that there is a logical dimension which has not been recognized" (M 208-9). And in my Introduction I say that "the [positivist] tendency is to put showing, mysticism and non-sense in a sphere which is completely removed from the sphere of logic, sense, and the language of natural science. But this interpretation is far too simple " (M 9). This is not only the admission that Wittgenstein's views are sometimes mystical, but is the far more radical view that one cannot even cleanly separate logic and natural science from the domain of the mystical! 6.) Churchill writes, " [McDonough's] unconvincing argument is that Wittgenstein didn't really mean [his view]: ' Whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent ' " (C 171). But I nowhere say that Wittgenstein did not mean this. What I regard as interesting is what he meant by it. My non-trivial interpretation of that famous conclusion is that it " means that there cannot be a common language of philosophy in the sense in which there can be a common language of matters of fact" (M 238). Chapter VIII is devoted to clarifying this view. 7.) Churchill writes, "McDonough's account of the autonomy of logic is vitiated by its dependence on [his] notion of a thought, but he fails to see that on this reading logic does not take care of itself. Rather, thought takes care of logic, and what takes care of thought we better not ask" C 167-8). But one may ask. The answer is in my section VI.2e "The Logical Status of the Notion of the Mental". For a hint as to what is in that section, note that Churchill's objection

presupposes that thoughts are not themselves, as Lliey are in Frege, logical ' entities '.

Finally, since Churchill believes that my interpretation "flies in the face of the text " (C 171), he must explain why I do so: " The answer lies in McDonough's wish to relate 'the argument of the *Tractatus'* to contemporary issues in psycho-linguistics and the theory of meaning", specifically to such philosophers as Malcolm, Nozick, Kripke, Chomsky, Fodor, Dummett, and others (C 170). It is true that whereas Churchill seems to see Witt:genstein's work as rather insular, I see him as making a clear and important contribution to contemporary philosophy. If one of the criteria of greatness in a philosophical work is how much of the future is anticipated in its text, then the *Tractatus* is great in this sense. So it is that the contemporary world of ideas advances slowly to make explicit its own presuppositions, many of which Wittgenstein laid out in schematic form seventy years ago. My aim in my hook is to increase the pace of this process of self-understanding. Second, Churchill errs in his assumption (C 170) that I endorse the views of the *Tractatus.* My aim, which I repeat at several places in the book, is to expose the philosophical foundations of certain contemporary views, not to endorse them: "The present book is neutral with regard to the soundness of the argument of the *Tractatus* and the truth of its conclusions" (M 183). However, I do not think that the results of this exposition are conservative. Quite the contrary, I believe that the clearer grasp of the philosophical foundations of the *Tractatus* undermines some of the most cherished of contemporary dogmas, and I indicate this too in several places of my book. (See M 252-3, 272-3 nl8, 276-7 n32, and 279-81 n75.)

For Churchill, my book is refuted in its title. Since there can be no argument of the *Tractatus* there is no need to consider the one which I propose. So Churchill doesn't. His primary strategy is to dismiss the argument of the *Tractatus,* rather than face it. But the excuses for doing so are verbal. There is still no way to fault an interpretation without considerint>;that interpretation. And in his discussion of perticular issues, he consistently misrepresents my views. Churchill is clearly fearful that my hook will " spark a revisionist reading of Wittgenstein " (C 170) . But if he wishes to refute my reading then he must respond to the book which I wrote, not to the one which he reviewed. I would welcome any such serious response.

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A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR McDONOUGH

Professor McDonough's response to my review of his book on the *Tractatus* consists of six main points. I will respond to them in sequence.

First, Professor McDonough believes that I have ignored the central point of his hook: namely, the contention that the *Tractatus* embodies a philosophical argument built around certain " fundamental ideas." I have not done so, though an ambiguity in his idea of what that argument is explains why he thinks that I have. By " the argument of the *Tractatus* " Professor McDonough may mean the pattern of remarks in the text concerning the non-representational status of logical constants, the idea that the sole logical constant is the general propositional form, and the idea that the tautological propositions of logic exhibit the framework of possibility for language and the world. In his interpretation of the links among these ideas Professor McDonough neither advances nor strays from the sorts of interpretations other commentators have offered. So in my review I dealt principally with the other side of the ambiguity, in which "the argument of the *Tractatus* " means an attempt, which Professor McDonough attributes to Wittgenstein, to establish a philosophical discourse about logic, the world, and mind, a discourse not covered by the injunction to silence. It is here that Professor McDonough's reading-as I think we both agree-is eccentric, and it was to this most interesting, though mistaken, aspect of *hi,s* argument that I have directed my attention.

Second, P1ofessor McDonough seems to suppose that I believe that the import of proposition 7 is that no one can consistently offer interpretative discourse about the *Tractatus,* and that I, in my remarks, seize special, unfair advantage by offering interpretation and then invoking silence. He charges that I " [make my] own interpretative claims " and that I ·then insist " (conveniently) that one must thereafter he silent." By no means. It is only Wittgenstein (or one who endorses the Tractarian doctrines) who is open to a circumstantial *ad hominem* charge of inconsistency if he offers interpretations. For those of us who try to understand the Tractarian perspective without precisely sharing it, the question of consistency with proposition 7 is not an issue. What *is* an issue is construing *Wittgenstein's* doctrines in

such a way that they are consistent with proposition 7. It is here that McDonough's reading is, as I have said, both most interesting and least convincing. Further, in suggesting that I have paid attention to the "conclusions" of his argument but not its substance, Professor McDonough does not do justice to the coherence of his own work. Those aspects of his interpretation to which much of my review is directed-for example, his interpretation of the thought as a "meaning locus"-are essential to the structure of his argument. By focusing my attention there I have shown, I believe, how these elements of his interpretation contribute to his central claim that the *Tractatus* is built around an *argument.*

Third, he attributes to me the implausible idea that there is a "standard interpretation of 'the plain sense of what Wittgenstein wrote'" throughout the *Tractatus.* But I allude to a "plain sense" only in commenting on the injunction to silence about philosophy in proposition 7. Of course there are many interpretative difficulties in the text. Professor McDonough supposes me to be denying that by ignoring the fact that, in the line he quotes from my review, I refer only to proposition 7 and to his attempt to interpret it.

Fourth, Professor McDonough takes exception to my use of allusions to some of Wittgenstein's later works to illustrate shortcomings in his interpretation of the *Tractatus.* He is quite right in detecting my own underlying assumptions of continuity throughout Wittgenstein's philosophical work. If space to articulate those assumptions was lacking in my review, it is scarcer here. I will simply say that one of the strongest continuities, the concern to see how philosophical inquiry *comes to an end,* is precisely the thing that Professor McDonough's "argument of the *Tractatus*" misconstrues.

Fifth, Professor McDonough provides a list of seven points at which, he contends, my criticisms miss the mark. I cannot respond to these points individually in this space, but it is worth pointing out that they fall into two groups, one having to do with the problems of depiction and one having to do with silence and the mystical. Professor McDonough's list thus sketches in brief those two areas of interpretation in which his reading of Wittgenstein is most innovative. The two groups converge on the concept of a "thought," so it is puzzling to me how he can believe that my review, which highlighted his treatment of that concept, somehow missed the book's main thrust.

Finally, Professor McDonough implies at least three times that my review fails, in some way, to he *about* his hook, and closes his com-

ments by insinuating that my review is not serious. He concedes that he ofiers an unorthodox reading of the *Tractatus.* Can he then be sur· prised at critical comments which bring his own ways of dealing with the text into question? I do not know what is entailed by the vague charge that my review is not serious, but I am quite willing to acknowledge that Professor McDonough's perspective on the *Tractatus,* though often mistaken, is serious enough. It is important to attempt to find points of critical contact between di:ffering philosophical perspectives, and important, too, to refrain from maligning perspectives with which we disagree, even while we argue against them.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Substance and Modern Science. By R. J. CONNELL. Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, U. of St. Thomas (Distributed by U. of Notre Dame Press), 1988. 280 pp., Bibliography, Index. $30 (cloth), $17 (paper) •

This is a work in the philosophy of nature, more Aristotelean than Thomistic in orientation. The author's particular interest is in the existence, nature, and multiplicity of natural substances. The text is divided into a Preface, 23 relatively short chapters, and an Epilogue emphasizing the importance of " substance " as a natural rather than as a metaphysical consideration (p. 236; cf. pp. 33-34). The metaphysical consideration of substance can only come later, after the existence of non-physical entities has been established. There is also an Appendix summarizing Aristotle's three principles of change. In the Appendix he states:

> To summarize, then, we may say that coming to he requires three distinct principles: subject, term, and privation. Stated in the words we employed in the earlier chapters, coming to be requires a material, a structure, and a privation of the structure that is acquired (p. 242).

The author's intention is to present the position of Aristotle in contemporary dress, using Aquinas's commentary on the *Physics* as an aid in understanding Aristotle (p. v). Near the end of the work he states, " But apart from the difference in language, the position we have defended here was that of not only Aquinas but Aristotle before him" (p. 210). Given the widespread acceptance today, largely under the influence of modern science, of mechanistic, reductionistic, and even monistic, doctrines concerning nature, the question of whether or not Nature is an orderly collection of natures is an extremely important one. Is reality divided into a multiplicity of separate and semi-independent substance-things or is it only a collection of insubstantial property-things?

Part I, chapters 1 to 5, discusses the reality of substance. Everyone admits that properties, that is, the various observed traits which qualify things, are real. The real is " *that which exists;* " and for the purpose of distinguishing intramental from extramental reality we can add *"Outside the mind and imagination"* (p. 11). A property is defined as *"that which exists in another as in a subject"* (p. 12). The "as in a subject" part is important because " One reality can be in another

in many ways" *(loc. cit.)* and it is significant that a prope.rty is in. a subject in a certain way, namely, as dependent on the sub1ect for its existence.

A substance is defined as " *that which exists in itself* (or by itself) *and not in another as in a subject"* (p. 13). As an example of what a substance is, we ourselves are the most obvious cases of such rela·tively independent things. I recognize myself as the stable foundation for properties. However, being a substance does not mean having an unqualified permanence and independence. Substances are not absolute. Neither are they necessarily absolutely simple and uncomposed.

> Although a truly elementary particle is undoubtedly a substance, from what we know so far, any statement that claims substance is necessarily simple is gratuitous; whether this is or is not so is one of the principal issues to be considered in this book (p. 14).

The main villain in modern philosophy when it comes to an attempted elimination of substance is David Hume. Hume's position, however, which attempted to dissolve all substantial unities into mere bundles of properties somehow existing all on their own, and which formed the basis for later process philosophies, cannot stand up to the evidence of ordinary experience. Hume cannot explain how one property can modify another or how a mere collection of properties can constitute the unity of a natural thing such as an individual plant, animal, or man.

When considering whether the world is composed of substance·things with properties, or property-things all on their own, we must take into account both observation and logic. In any philosophical approach to reality ordinary experience must he given the basic and primary role. Starting with the reality of properties, and realizing that they cannot go on inhering in each other or in something else *ad infinitum*, we come to see that at least one subject or substance *must* exist. This is not an assumption or an hypothesis, insists the author. Having defined property on empirical grounds and having inferred the existence of substance from the definition, the existence of sub·stance is proven. "Either we have established them [it?] apodictically or we have done nothing" (p. 34).

Part II, chapters 6 to 20, takes us into a discussion of the differences between natural things and artefactuals, the various mechanistic doctrines in biology, the body-mind problem, sensations, the classification of species, and the role of properties and sub-systems as the instrumentalities whereby substances carry out their activities. Whether one takes a radically pluralistic (atomistic) or radically monistic *(e.g.,* Einstein, Heisenberg) view of reality, the results are the same with respect to the reality of many different substances in the

world. In either case, all observed substantial unities are reduced to property-things. Substances lose their status as the basic units of reality. The restoration of substances in the plural is the main aim of Part II.

This restoration can be achieved by examining the relationship he· tween properties and substance. We see, first of all, that there are great differences between natural entities and machine-type things, so that any mechanical-aggregate-type model is inadequate to describe sub· stantial unity. The appearance as adequate of analogies between natural substances and machines can only be achieved by equivocating on key terms and concepts (p. 72). Furthermore, if everything were merely an aggregate of property-things, the coordinated and predictable changes which occur in the world, and which are described at great length in biology, chemistry, and physics, could not be explained. If properties were not rooted in a subject, hut were instead directly re· lated to one another, there would not be any constancy in the natural world.

But we know that such unity and constancy does exist. The fact that new physical properties and new behavioral capacities show up in the world within well-defined contexts proves that the exclusively property-thing view must be wrong. This leaves us with the only other alternative, namely, that the world is composed of substance-things which are the centers for, and root causes of, the observed properties and activities.

In chapter 14, on the body-mind problem, the author very nicely outlines the three forms of the mind-body (brain) identity theory: Frege's sense and reference (different names, same referent) view; the reductionist view which says that mental states are brain states in the same way that heat is molecular motion; the formal identity view which most closely identifies mental and bodily acts parallel to talking about water and H20. In all three cases though, the author shows quite well that there is not and cannot he a strict identification of the two. There will always he some distinction between mental and physical acts, even in the third case where one term (water) signifies obscurely while the other (H20) signifies more precisely (p. 127).

Likewise for sensations and bodily states and changes. What I rec· ognize as a sensation in myself, and what the physiologist describes as electrical and/or chemical impulses propagated along and among bodily tissues and cells, will always show a discrepancy to one degree or another. This precludes the possibility of any formal identification of the two. This irreducibility of one category to another is generally true across the hoard with respect to the basic property-thing cate· gories, as well as to the relationship of property-things to substance·

things. Based upon ordinary experience, where all scientific and philosophical theories must begin and end, we find that no theory of simple interactionism among physical parts can account for the existence of properties in subjects.

With respect to organisms, it is possible to maintain the existence of natural types, to attain to " permanent classifications of organisms," yet without maintaining a doctrine of immutable essences, " whatever that might mean " (p. 178). Biological entities are ultimately told apart via their operations. This is how we distinguish both individuals and species from one another. Thus, in the case of Siamese twins, for instance, if there are two heads, two distinct sets of mental and physical operations, and so on, then there are two individual human beings. In general, where there is a unity of operations all stemming from one central core there is a unity of form.

Not so, though, with respect to inanimate species. Inanimate substances, such as those studied in chemistry, do not have a nature in the same full sense as do living units. Relative to animated things inanimate species are indeterminate. We know they are di:fferent from each other because they have different properties, but our knowledge of their inner nature is even more limited than our knowledge of organisms. The author states:

> One can understand why inanimate substances should he indeterminate in comparison to those that are animate, for the former provide material for the latter as well as an environment common to the organisms of an ecosystem (p. 180).

Part III, chapters 21 to 23, deals with substantial form, prime matter, and the meaning of "the In any organism there is an internal structure which guides all its activities. This structure is within the substance of the thing, and it is a " unified unextended ordered multitude of operational roots or causes that directs the operations and subordinate activities" of the organism (p. 200). It is this internal structure, that cannot be directly observed, which makes the substance to be what it is, that is, the *kind* of thing that it is.

In a similar way, the substantial material, which also cannot be directly sensed or measured, is that by which one substance can become another. This material is *both* a part of the actual substance now and potential with respect to future substances. This matter cannot possess any properties of its own (except potentiality) " for every property reqmres an *actual* substance as a substratum in which to exist " (p. 280). In an analogous way, artefactual property-things are also composed of structured matter, but with the all-important difference that they do not possess a nature as do natural kinds of substance-things.

By viewinl,? the differences the reidm of artefactuals and the realm

of natural kinds we can now come to a clearer understanding of what it means to be natural. The author lists five traits of the natural: regular, predictable changes and movements; changes leading to a predictable state of final determination and rest; spontaneous changes coming from within the substance; sets of behavior which are " first nature," that is, which are proper to the kind of thing it is, and which are convertible with the class of things to which it belongs (e.g., the diffusion of gases, sensation in animals) ; all changes as divisible into essential and accidental, with those that are essential being *per se* or directly relevant to the class, so that " nothing that is incidental is truly natural in any proper sense of the term" (p. 233).

What this last point means, in part at least, is that some things which may be innate to an individual, such as skin color in humans, are not really natural to the species. They cannot be a part of the definition of the species. Now it is also true that none of these five traits can be applied to artefactuals in an unequivocal way, hence reinforcing the lack of analogy between substance-things and property-things.

I find myself in basic agreement with the author's general position. Aristotle's hylomorphism is by no means an impossible, anti-scientific view today, and it deserves to be treated as a viable alternative to both mechanistic and vitalistic positions. I do, however, have some reservations about some aspects of the work. Although he does often speak of the substance as the root and cause of the properties of the thing (cf. pp. 89-100, 193-4), the author also sometimes gives the impression that properties have a reality and existence of their own.

It can be misleading, though, to talk about properties being real or inhering in a substratum, especially if the listener is in the reductionistic camp and attuned to interpreting any such talk as indicating an aggregation of parts. In fact, in Aristotle's hylomorphism and psychosomaticism, properties have no reality of their own at all. The properties exhibited by a subject derive *all* their reality from the subject. This goes for all quantitative as well as qualitative attributes, accidents, and so on. It's important to emphasize this and avoid the " pincushion " imagery so often associated with the Aristotelean position.

I must also wonder about the author's view that a minimum amount of something definite is not a real substance, or is incomplete in species (cf. pp. 102-3, 167, 179-80). Surely a particle of gold, for instance, even down to the molecular and atomic levels, is a true species of something, even though inanimate. If it isn't, what can we say about other levels in the *sca'la naturae* (cf. p. 172) ? Are plants incomplete substances relative to animals, and so on u:p the scale? Wh&t about

subdivisions within the major divisions? Are some plants incomplete substances relative to other plants, and so forth?

This sort of reasoning could lead us into a situation where the only true and complete substance is the ultimate or top entity in the scale of reality. In Aristotle's system, for example, *only* the Prime Mover would be a really real being. Anything less would then be a being only by attribution. Consequently, just as we would say that only this organism is healthy, but that this medicine may also be *called* healthy because of its relationship to health in the organism, so we would say that the only true and complete substance would be that one which resides at the top of the scale of reality, wherever that may be, even though we might continue to talk about this mineral, plant, animal, or man as a substance because of its relationship to something higher up the scale. The author does not actually say this, but I think that it is something which might he read into his view as stated.

Aquinas avoids this problem by his emphasis upon an existential metaphysics and an analogy of proper proportionality. This allows him to preserve the full reality of each individual thing at all levels of reality even though the beings are certainly not God nor any part of God.

Also, someone might suggest as some possible chapters in a second edition, some discussion of some more contemporary issues in this area. For instance, how does one's sexuality fit into the substance-attribute scheme of things? Is one's sex part of one's nature? Are male and female different in nature? Are there any philosophically significant differences between men and women?

Another area of interest today, especially with respect to the present possibilities of genetic engineering, is the question of whether or not humans can artificially create a natural nature. This sounds contradictory, certainly, but is nevertheless something worth discussing. If some scientist does succeed in manufacturing a new bacterium, for example, would it then be a natural type? Would it he a permanent species with its own definition?

In addition, the Bibliography, brief as it is, leaves much to he desired. Several authors quoted in the text are not even listed, including Aquinas himself, while many of the entries are incomplete, missing such things as volume and page numbers. There are also some cases in which the publication date given in the footnote reference does not match that given in the Bibliography. A good copy editor should have cleared up all this sort of thing before publication.

Overall, though, this is a well-organized work, with short chapters and frequent summaries and recapitulations, thus making it suitable as a textbook or corollary reading in a philosophy of nature course. It

could also be useful in a science course as an outside reading for those interested in expanding their intellectual horizons in an inter· disciplinary way.

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Die Metaphysik des Thomas von Aquin in historischer Perspektive, IL Teil. Salzburger Studien zur Philosophie, Band 17. By LEO J. ELDERS. Salzburg/Miinchen: Verlag Anton Pustet, 1987. Pp. 331. Paper, DM 54.

This is the second half of Elders' metaphysical study as promised in the prior volume (reviewed in THE THOMIST, 50 [1986], 463· 465) on common being. The present book centers on God, in contrast to *ens commune.* But it strongly renews {pp. 7, 24) the insistence that no Wolffian separation of ontology from philosophical theology is *Summa theologiae* in showing first that God's existence is not immedi· ately evident to us but needs to be demonstrated (pp. 28-88). It then presents the " five ways " for demonstrating the divine existence, with Latin text and German translation side by side {pp. 89-137). It re· duces other suggested " ways " to some one of the five, or else sets them aside in one manner or another (pp. 137-142). After that it treats the divine attributes according to the ways of negation, causality and eminence {pp. 143-187), and then the naming of God (pp. 189· 221), God's knowledge, life, truth, power and will (pp. 223-275), and :finally the divine action upon creatures (pp. 277-315). This treatment proceeds strictly in the order followed by the *Summa theologiae.* The book concludes (p. 317) that the philosophical theology of Aquinas is a coherent whole, based upon everyday experience yet for that very reason on principles that are metaphysically evident and ad· mitted by "common sense" (see also pp. 15, 200). The treatment is neatly addressed to the problems that have been under lively discus- sion during the past few decades, such as the " death of God." These are dealt with against an extensive and admirably detailed historical background stretching from the Greeks to the present day, with wide coverage of secondary literature, thoroughly justifying the book's designation of itself as a study pursued "in historical perspective."

However, the advisability of the *Summa's* order of treatment for a work meant to explain the metaphysical thinking of Aquinas is open to question. Elders (p. 8, n. 3; p. 13, n. 4) is acquainted with the vigor·

ous protests of Gilson and Pegis against reading as philosophy what Aquinas wrote as theology. Yet Elders (p. 8) allows the stand that on the ground of its intrinsic rationality Aquinas would have adhered to the *Summa's* order even if he had been writing a purely philosophical theology. In the present case, one may strongly object, the result is a way of thinking that dulls sensitivity to the core position of existence in Aquinas' metaphysical thought. The long and checkered history of the notion " common sense " in western philosophy should be enough to dissociate that concept from Thomistic metaphysics, and here the appeal to " everyday experience " as a support calls first for careful analysis of the radically different ways in which existence and nature are originally attained by human cognition. The book finds (p. 101, n. 61), for instance, that in the demonstration of God's existence from motion Aquinas is employing without radical distinction the same principles as Aristotle but is applying them more strictly. The pro· foundly distinctive character of Aquinas' metaphysical acumen is thereby missed.

This may be aptly illustrated by one example. The pointed assertion of the *Summa contra gentiles* (1.9.Inter) that without consideration of the proof for God's existence " *omnis consideratio de rebus divinis necessario tollitur,"* is understood by Elders to mean "*- - - ist jede philosophische Betrachtung des Seienden letztlich grundlos"* (p. 89). Yet granting without hesitation that the proof of the divine existence is necessary for understanding metaphysically " that which exists " (*das Seiende*), one may, against Elders, take the statement of Aquinas at its face value as much more finely pointed. It means what it literally says, namely that things *divine* cannot be understood apart from consideration of the proof for God's existence. That proof shows why one can know that God exists, without knowing *what* existence, even though quidditative in God, is. In the same vein, one can know that all the attributes and perfections are in God without knowing what these are when really identical with the divine existence. In this regard Elders expressly asserts his opposition to *"Gilsons Theorie"* (p. 220) about human cognition of existence.

While gladly allowing with Elders (p. 15) that the internal coherence of Aquinas' thought is too strong for acceptance of one part with rejection of another part, one may well insist that the core existential doctrine unifying Thomistic metaphysics is more pointedly expressed in the *De ente et essentia* and in passages from the commentary on the *Sentences* that it is in the section of the *Summa theologiae* used for the present study. This situation helps show why the order of the *Summa theologiae*, taken just alone, can hardly be satisfactory for bringing out the cogent metaphysical sequence in Aquinas' doctrine

on God. Rather, leads towards tracing the authentically metaphysical development of Aquinas' thinking are more readily found in those earlier works.

Yet no matter what disagreement there may be with the procedure of Elders' book and its conception of Thomistic metaphysics, the value of his indefatigable labor in deftly locating the philosophical problems about God in the contemporary situation is beyond doubt. The book in its detailed coverage will be a welcome help for anyone approaching these problems in their present-day context. For course work it will provide an excellent introduction to the " First Part " of the *Summa theologiae.* It is equipped with indexes of names (pp. 319-326) and of subjects (pp. 327-331), for convenience in consultation. But even with these indexes the book would have been enhanced by addition of a general bibliography providing the reader with a bird's-eye view of the copious literature hovering in the background, though the task of preparing it would have been Gargantuan.

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The Philosophical Assessment of Theology: Essays in Honour of Frederick C. Copleston. Edited by GERALD J. HUGHES, S.J. Washington, DC, and Turnbridge Wells: Search Press, Ltd. in association with Georgetown University Press, 1987. Pp. xii +215, including index and bibliography of Copleston's principal writings.

It has been a genuine pleasure to read and to review this elegant collection of essays dedicated to Father Frederick Copleston, S.J., on his eightieth birthday. Each of the ten essays submitted merits warm recommendation on some point and several on many. They are technical enough to interest the student of philosophical theology hut lucid enough for beginners.

Naturally I cannot claim to agree with every thesis defended or advanced, hut neither can I fault any contributor on scholarship, clarity, or style. For example, Professor Swinburne, in his essay, "Analogy and Metaphor ", revives the view of Scotus that terms like ' wise ' or ' powerful ' admit of univocal predication to both God and man. I am unhappy with accounts of univocity of this sort in general; I think they breed their own antitheses and land ultimately in a position of radical equivocity on the very ground they aim to cover so carefully. Still the theory proposed is clearly an able one and Swinburne haiil

stated his version of it with about as much economy and precision as his format allows.

Occasionally a contribution offers nothing really new-as in A.H.T. Levi's "The Breakdown of Scholasticism and the Significance of Evangelical Humanism". But the piece is well written, concise and synoptic in form-easily a competent introduction to its topic-and memorable on these grounds apart from any others. Sometimes the tone grows a little arch and patronizing, as in the essay on Transubstantiation by D. J. Fitzpatrick; but here, too, the author's skillful assembly and use of texts and opinions offsets the irritation of his manner.

There is one essay, however, which might well bear the book's title as its own subtitle: "Philosophy and Theology", by Basil Mitchell. This essay raises the fundamental question: of what relevance is philosophy to theology, apart from the various historical connections and disconnections the two have suffered? Mitchell proposes the following as positive theses: that the Christian tradition, epsecially as regards its doctrines, has a supra-historical identity and validity-even if problems of doctrinal identity and doctrinal development are very close to Hume's problem of personal identity and, hence, personal develop· ment; that philosophy, in relation to doctrine, can exercise a salutary influence for clarity and for plurality among legitimate interpretations of the central Christian Mysteries; that the message of the New Testa· ment is inexhaustible, so that we should expect to see differences in the conversation between philosophy and theology corresponding to differences in times, cultures, and needs, none wholly fixed and inalterable, all valuable in proportion to their service to the greater Christian tradition.

I have no quarrel with these views. Even the notions of ecclesial infallibility and doctrinal irreformability can meet this thesis about the relation between philosophy and theology with equanimity. The larger issue, it seems to me, lies in the consequences. If theology and philosophy do sustain something like the relationship proposed by Professor Mitchell, then there must be some guarantor of authenticity, one which determines and decides between those interactions which are legitimate within the Tradition and those which are spurious. It comes back, as I see it, to Newman's problem of fidelity in development; and by Professor Mitchell's own canons, history alone is not the guarantor nor time, in and of itself, the sieve of orthodoxy. What this characteristically modern view of philosophical theology calls for, I think, is the recognition of a teaching authority which acts to regulate normatively for any given time and, at length, for all times, the interpretation of the Gospel best suited to those times, however painful the

message may seem, however clearly at odds with the *Weltgeist.* What Professor Mitchell's position calls for-to the delight I am sure, of Fr. Copleston-is a universal, unified, sanctificatory, and legitimate teacher of the Christian message: a Church which is one, holy, Catholic, and Apostolic.

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Morals as Founded on Natural Law. By STEPHEN THERON. European University Studies. New York: Peter Lang, 1987. 218 pp. $32 (cloth).

This is a hard book to read, though it need not be. The author assumes a knowledge of other writings that few (apart from himself) are likely to have, and his English is sometimes tortuous in the extreme. A little more polishing of the sentence structure and a little more explanation of references would have made the book immeasurably more readable.

There would still be flaws in it nevertheless, flaws that concern the content of the book and not its form. Theron's aim is to establish morality on an external authoritative law, namely the authoritative law of God. Towards achieving this he devotes the first chapter to criticizing R.M. Hare, since Hare has a theory of autonomy in morals, or a theory where the prescriptiveness of a law or moral norm is self·imposed and not derived from something outside the autonomously choosing individual. Theron's criticism of Hare, apart from the obscurity of several of the references (obscure, that is, unless one already knows Hare's work more or less inside out), rests on distortions or unsympathetic interpretations of what Hare says. To say that, for Hare, " all that is essential to good living is the extrinsic, fortuitous character of its being commended" (p. 31) is to misrepresent Hare's whole point about the mea,ning of good, for which the a.ct of commending is of the essence and cannot be something extrinsic. And to say that, apart from what can be derived from logic, the rest of Hare's theory is "all a matter of who commends the loudest" *(ibid.)* is so gross a distortion that one can only wonder if Theron has paid any attention at all to what Hare has written about the nature of moral reasoning.

As for Theron's own theory, he says that morality is grounded on a divine legislative authority to which, like children with respect to parents, we just ' find ' ourselves bound. But how are we bcmnd, or

what persuades us that we should submit and obey this authority? Theron denies the applicability of this question, since he says that to seek a ground for this authority is to fall into an infinite regress. Yes indeed if authority can only be grounded by appeal to some other authority. But why should this be so? Because 0£ the nature of reason, says Theron, or how do we justify our acceptance 0£ and obedience to reason? Reason itself cannot do this. "... reason only has the authority of law and even truth if God gives it that authority," and "as one cannot appeal to reason to invalidate reason one cannot appeal to it to validate it" (p. 161). For Theron, what is :first for us. is not reason but divine authority, which is just somehow an ineradicable given. This would make morals, to say nothing of philosophy simply, dependent on divine law, not, as his title declares, on natural law. That title is indeed misleading since it is clear that, in Theron's eyes, natural law, or the law of our natural reason, is derivative and secondary, dependent for its lawfulness on the prior recognition of divine law.

But all this must be false. Our recognition of divine law and of its binding force presupposes the validity of the workings of our own reason, for only by reason can we have this recognition. But if we could only admit the validity of our own reason *after* we have recognized the divine and reason's dependence on it, then we really are caught in an infinite regress, for this recognition would itself have to presuppose the prior validity of reason. And so on and so on.

What is first for us, if not in time then certainly in nature, is not God, or law, whether divine or otherwise, but reason, and it is by reason that we come to see the validity of some laws and not others or to recognise the divine and the authority of the divine. For reason is self-validating or nothing at all is valid.

There is more in Theron's book than this thesis and the argument for it, notably an extended critique of Donagan. About this critique I would only note that one has not refuted a conclusion by refuting the reasons for it, since the conclusion might still be true though the reasons someone gives for it are all invalid. But the substance of Theron's book is his reduction of everything, in philosophy as well as morals, to a legalistic theism. That reduction, apart from being wildly in conflict with classical philosophy and indeed classical theology (which should be a cause for concern for Theron at any rate, if not for those who have little regard for the classical tradition), is and must be false for the reason I have stated. As a result, and all the more so in view of the other faults I mentioned at the beginning, this is not a book that I can commend to the attention of others.

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A Critique of the New Natural Law Theory. By RUSSELL RITTINGER. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987. Pp. vi +232. $26.95.

Dr. Hittinger's book causes us to remember how genuinely delicate and refined is the balance between reason and faith in St. Thomas' view of human knowledge and its relationship to reality. This enabled St. Thomas to develop with discernment his notion of the natural law, because St. Thomas understood that an act of genuine intellection distinguished in order to unite, not separate. Therefore, there was an intrinsic unity to truth and a unity to philosophical experience which reflected reality-something which has gotten lost in the contemporary morass of interminable dialectics.

Have the contemporary attempts to retrieve a notion of the natural law succeeded in maintaining this balance? If such attempts have not succeeded in maintaining the requisite balance, what are the consequences of the loss of this balance for the success of their endeavor?

When in the history of philosophical experience this balance cannot be maintained, one is forced to move in one of two directions. The first is towards a kind of fideism in which the fundamental questions raised by reason are only resolvable by the faith; thus philosophy is absorbed into theology. The second is towards the claim that reason can answer all that is answerable (which may be very limited) and thus faith becomes subordinate to reason. The latter either leads to rationalism or a variety of positivism.

For Rittinger what appears to be a contemporary attempt to retrieve natural law moral philosophy has proven itself unable to avoid a fideistic solution to moral philosophy; for faith in the end resolves all the fundamental issues raised in regard to moral philosophy.

The beginning of the discussion of moral philosophy and man as the author of his actions was very carefully placed in the writings of St. Thomas. It is only after St. Thomas had established certain fundamental truths and principles in natural theology and the philosophy of human nature that he begins to discuss moral philosophy. St. Thomas first established the existence of a personal God, who is both the efficient and final cause of all finite being. God's being is also discovered to be identical to truth, goodness, and beauty. God is recognized as that which all men seek even though only the beatific vision will present this to the intellect and will with an all-consuming necessity. "Beings" are ordered in two ways, as parts of totality, and as things to an end. The ordering of things to an end is the most important, since the final cause is the cause of all the other causes. Therefore an identification of the final cause makes all the other causes and the

order in things intelligible. Also it is only after a great deal is known about human goods, and human nature, and the ordination of human goods that St. Thomas is ready to begin a discussion of the first principle that states the good is to be pursued or the good is to be done. St. Thomas has also established, through reason, that man by nature desires and should desire in justice to give God his due. Therefore religion properly understood is natural to man. The above provided St. Thomas with the knowledge prerequisite for the development of a natural law moral philosophy.

If one perceives that we are at a juncture in the history of philosophy where one no longer can develop or defend the kind of knowledge that is a prerequisite to the successful development of a natural law ethics, then this must he faced with all its consequences. Is a natural law ethics still viable? This is true even if one believes that any attempt to establish such knowledge would drag the ethician into an interminable debate in regard to the is-ought dilemma announced by Hume or the positivist rejection of metaphysics and the philosophy of nature. Is the direct or indirect avoidance of dealing with these issues acceptable?

The inventors of the new natural law theory attempt to replace the knowledge required for the development of moral philosophy described above by hypothesizing a wealth of premoral intuitive knowledge. They appear to he trying to do by intuition what Thomas did via metaphysics and the philosophy of nature. If one finds as a result of such a process that one cannot demonstrate that religion is a basic good, or that one can not escape from a solipsistic ordination of human goods without positing the content of faith, then to what exent is the new experiment a success? Has not the very notion of natural law become ambiguous and equivocal? Further if man only discovers his end *qua* man through faith, then inefficacy of the practical intellect becomes certain. The practical intellect in the concrete order becomes worthless in the absence of faith. Finally, if only through faith one comes to realize that happiness is a real possibility and that principles of morality are genuinely obligatory, then moral philosophy can be buried and put to rest forever. This I might add appears closer to recent fideistic moralities of modern and contemporary times than anything related to the Thomistic natural law tradition, which must also be distinguished from Suarezian casuistry.

Rittinger suggests that there are two ways to have a moral philosophy remain open to positing religion as a human good and avoiding fideism. The first is the road of St. Thomas; the second is a road similar to that of Kant where, in Hittinger's view, one sets the foundations of morality independent of the faith but one implies or leaves open

the possibility of faith becoming morally significant. However, in my view the latter offers only a logical possibility, hut not a really workable possibility in the concrete order.

The critical question is whether either of the two ways of avoiding fideism is open to this new way of employing the notion of the natural law. Rittinger concludes that Grisez-Finnis have not succeeded by either path because they want to hold that religion is a basic good at the foundation of morality but they have to posit faith to maintain this position. There are several other difficulties pointed out. For ex· ample, is the distinction between the premoral and the moral, that is so important to the new approach, a real distinction? Rittinger states that in practice it is a distinction without a difference. What normative role can the concept of human nature have in a moral philosophy that does not deal directly with the problems related to the development of a philosophy of human nature? Rittinger makes a good case for an inconsistency in the way nature reappears as a ghost from the past to solve concrete problems such as contraception. It can also he asked, aside from Grisez' fideistic resolution of moral philosophy, if he has genuinely overcome utilitarianism?

In his defense, Grisez might insist that he never intended to use nature as a normative concept or develop a natural law ethics-in which case, it becomes unclear just what his intentions were aside from coming to many of the same conclusions as the Thomistic natural ethics without affirming the premises of the tradition. How Grisez' moral philosophy might be reinterpreted, in light of such a defense, is not very clear at all.

Finally it must he stated that Grisez-Finnis' desire to get beyond the morass of contemporary dialectics is a pious, noble, and worthy project; however, the method they chose did not provide a means by which they could succeed. Therefore there is a tragic and fundamental flaw in their results. A small mistake in the beginning becomes a very great one in the end. Dr. Hittinger's hook is a well researched and worth reading. However, I have my doubts as to whether the second alternative to fideism is as viable as he suggests.

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Marx's Socwl Critique of Culture. By Loms DUPRE. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983. Pp. ix + 299. $30.00 (cloth) and $9.95 (paper).

Modernity has produced in equal measure material abundance and critical disdain. Its critics may he roughly divided into two groups. Negative critics deny all value to modernity and long for a glorious past or a perfect future; the romanticism of an Othmar Spann or the utopian anarchism of a Mikhail Bakunin provide excellent examples of this type. Of more interest to political theory, however, are the dialectical critics who both affirm and deny the modern project; Rousseau and Marx are the greatest thinkers in this category. Louis Dupre is certainly a critic of modernity. The nature of his complaint remains to he determined.

I should begin by saying that Dupre's hook neither condemns nor worships Marx. From the start he sets for himself the unfashionable task of understanding his author before passing judgment on his ideas. Hence, Dupre explicitly distinguishes interpretation from critique and devotes most of this hook to elucidating Marx's ideas. Some readers would perhaps agree with Hahermas that interpretation is always critique, hut I find that Dupre generally maintains this distinction in these pages. I turn first to his reading of Marx.

This is not a hook about what might he called high culture, a civilization's achievements in expressing the human spirit. Dupre relies little on Marx and Engel's scattered reflections on art and society, and he spends relatively few pages on the Frankfurt School and their critique of contemporary popular culture. Dupre is rather a philosopher using Marx to think about culture in a fundamental way. His subject is modernity itself and particularly Marx's criticism of the essentially modern separation of culture and activity.

The first part of the hook focuses on Marx's conception of alienation. For almost half a century questions about the unity of Marx's early and late writings have accompanied explications of *Entfremdung.* Dupre sides with those who see a unity of purpose in the works of the young and the old Marx. Although the idea of alienation appears rarely in *Das Kapital,* Dupre argues that Marx continually attacked bourgeois society for separating subject and object. Culture thus becomes in capitalist societies an object of exchange value that stands in opposition to its producers, a commodity like all others. The second chapter pursues Marx's belief that alienation must he understood socially and historically. Here Dupre provides a subtle interpretation of Marx's conceptions of base and superstructure. He concludes that Marx rejected the logical extremes of determinism and voluntarism

in history. Instead, the rational will of the proletariat was viewed as the culmination of social development. Yet, as Dupre notes, Marx's belief in the general principle that history is progressive turns on his specific analysis of the spread of capitalism; the generalization about history depends in the end on unproven assumptions about the development of capitalism.

Dupre devotes his third chapter to a broad and learned discussion of the role of the dialectic in Marx and Marxist political theory. Marx himself did not provide a complete and clear account of dialectical contradiction; any tension that might lead to the destruction of capitalism fell within Marx's understanding of contradiction. Dupre's conclusion that Marx ultimately founded his dialectical method on an undefended teleology will, I think, ring true to most students of the subject. His discussion of the realist interpretation of the dialectic will occasion controversy largely because Dupre believes Engel's methodological ideas in *Anti-Dukring* can he legitimately associated with Marx's views. This is an important and damning link, for, of course, the scientism enunciated in *Anti-Dukring* took Marxism a long way toward both the relatively benign orthodoxy of the German Social Democrats and the horrible monism of Stalin. For Marx, however, the dialectic was more than anything else a way of positing the loss of social and culture unity and of foreseeing their reintegration.

His exposition of Marx's atempt to unify economic and social activity contains a thoughtful reconstruction of the concept of value in classical economics. Dupre emphasizes that Marx criticized capitalism for turning labor, the subjective source of value, into labor power, an objective source of exchange value; the reification critique thus appeared in Marx's economic analysis. At the same time, Marx believed that the individualism of the classical economists was historically limited to their age; productive activity was in truth always a social undertaking. Hence, Dupre concludes that " Marx, from his earliest writings on, sought to establish a society that would reintegrate individual needs with social concerns ". Yet, for all his antipathy to Smith and Ricardo, Marx agreed with the classical economists that economics was the primary sphere of life.

The question of the scope of economics returns in a chapter on ideology. Dupre discerns in Marx both a casual and an organic relation between the economy and the ideas of an age. The former conception presents the familiar argument that ideas reflect material conditions; the ruling ideas of an age, Marx noted, were the ideas of the ruling class. More interesting is Dupre's discussion of the organic theory of the relation of society and thought in Marx; here subject and object are integrated and interdependent. The evidence that Marx clearly constructed such a concept of ideology or that he attached

much significance to it is not convincing. Nonetheless, I do find value in Dupre's discussion of how this tension between determinism and interdependence has complicated the cultural writings of Marx's successors.

Clearly Dupre approves of much in Marx's critique of modernity. For example, he believes that the reification of culture has continued to our day producing both vulgar art and snobbish elitism. I also take from this text the feeling that Dupre sympathizes somewhat with Marx's critique of individualism and the divisive tendencies of modern culture. Yet his disagreements with Marx are enormous.

Dupre worries that Marx in the end allowed the economic too much say in human life, a mistake that precludes social and cultural integration. By accepting the priority of material life, Marx merely generalized the conditions of high capitalism to all of human existence. Praxis itself, Dupre concludes, may he an aspect of high capitalism. In sum, " Marx's critique and his attempt at cultural reintegration remain party *within the ideological horizon of the modern age* " (emphasis in original).

What then does Dupre wish to affirm in this hook? The rejection of Marx suggests that a proper theory of culture must see beyond the modern horizon. Early on, Dupre notes that disengaged reflection is " indispensable for the pursuit of wisdom and the good life ". The last section presents a tantalizing critique of Marx's idea of praxis which adumbrates the importance of guiding principles and higher ideals. Just at the moment the reader is about to conclude that Dupre is retreating off into the speculative mists, the final page avows that " this study by no means advocates a return to ancient theoria. Even assuming that it were possible to bracket the entire experience of modernity, it would he extremely undesirable to do so." Dupre affirms in the end the modern hope for the " universal development of freedom " and the expansion of the democratic ideal.

This is a good hook written with great care and learning. I particularly admire the author's willingness to embrace complexity through subtle and exhaustive reflection. For that reason, he must he counted among the dialectical critics of modernity. Unlike Rousseau and Marx, however, Dupre offers no clear path to unity from contradiction, no easy reintegration of culture. Perhaps that task will he taken up in another hook. Having read this prolegomenon, I eagerly await a complete postmodern theory of culture from this thoughtful author.

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Wittgenstein: From Mysticism to Ordinary Language: A Study of Viennese Positivism and the Thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein. By RUSSELL NIELI. SUNY Series in Philosophy. Albany; State University of New York Press, 1987. Pp. xvi + 261. $39.50 (cloth) ; $12.95 (paper).

In his original and thought-provoking hook, Russell Nieli offers a well-documented interpretation of Wittgenstein's philosophical development from mysticism, which supposedly dominated the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1921), to ordinary language philosophy, as expressed, for instance, in the posthumously published *Philosophical Investigations* (1953). According to Nieli, Wittgenstein's rejection of traditional metaphysics and theology in the *Tractatus* was grossly misunderstood by the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle, who missed the main point, namely Wittgenstein's emphasis on the mystical ascent toward higher reality (God) which "lay outside and beyond the world" (p. xi). Metaphysics was rejected by Wittgenstein-Nieli claims-because it leads to " God-debasing profanation or impropriety" (p. 83); it attempts to say what cannot he said hut only shown. The logical system of the *Tractatus* is then " a precise delineation of the profane world which is left behind in the transcendental encounter with the Sacred" (p. 98). Allegedly, such mystical, *ekstatic* experience cannot he articulated by any however perfected linguistic medium, which hopelessly remains an " inner-worldly " phenomenon. Of course, this application of *via negativa* must have been totally alien to the Humean-empiricist philosophy of Wittgenstein's teacher, B. Russell, as well as to any positivistically oriented philosophers operating in the tradition of the Enlightenment. Nieli supports his claims and comparisons by very rich documentary material drawn from the history of mystical experiences and doctrines, just as from the recent philosophical and psychological sources: from St. Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius, St. John of Cross, Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, W. James, R. Carnap, Heidegger, Sartre, R. D. Laing, and many others. In addition, he follows closely Wittgenstein's personal and intellectual history, as it has been revealed by various relevant memoirs, notebooks, and recollections. As expected, Wittgenstein's alleged mystico-religious experiences are given prominent coverage.

Wittgenstein's puzzling transition from the Tractarian logical atomism and picture theory of language to the ordinary language philosophy is treated by Nieli through the analogy of the prophet turning into a rabbi (this is already suggested by the title of his Preface) . According to this characterization, the early Wittgenstein-the prophet- " has descended the mountain to join the priests and rabbis below, as

the immediate pastoral needs of society have come to overshadow the former concern with maintaining the truth and purity of mystic theophany" (p. 183). Nieli draws an interesting comparison between the development of Wittgenstein's later philosophy and the actions of the Jewish council of Jamnia in 90 A. D. which declared the end of the age of prophecy and canonized sacred writings of the past as models for the prescribed way of living. Regarded as an accumulation and expression of life-experiences and life-attitudes of common people, ordinary language acquired for Wittgenstein a new status as scripture. After the devastating experiences of the First World War Wittgenstein made remarkable steps in an attempt to help common people as a teacher in small Austrian villages. He gave away his fortune and even thought about joining a monastery. Nieli persuasively reports on Wittgenstein's affinities to L. N. Tolstoy as well as on Wittgenstein's deeply troubled soul, for which hard physical work and communication with plain folks were cherished means for escaping the threat of mental insanity. The late Wittgenstein's concern with language-games, rule following, his quasi-behaviorism and emphatic rejection of the so-called private language-all of this is then explicable, Nieli believes, by Wittgenstein's search for and endorsement of the normal, sane, standard, commonsensical. Is it possible that Wittgenstein's struggle with the "dark side" of his tormented soul, reflecting almost a Manichean-Gnostic position, played such a decisive role in his production of a highly influential therapeutic linguistic philosophy? Nieli's affirmative answer seems plausible, yet it would need further elaboration, in particular with respect to Freud and depth-psychology.

Nieli's sympathetic treatment of Wittgenstein's philosophy comes to a rather abrupt end in the final sections of Chapter IV, where he criticizes what he calls "linguistic tribalism" (pp. 237-246). He sees in both the *Tractatus* and the later philosophy "an inability to maintain a proper balance between self and society" (p. 239); in the *Tractatus* the mystical silence remains incommunicable (and thus easily misunderstood), while in the ordinary language phase, "the sell, weary of its estrangement from society, throws itself headlong into the linguistic stream of social life, losing in the process, the inner dignity of its private sphere" (p. 239). In this context, critical charges are raised against Wittgenstein's conservative and naive apotheosis of ordinary language and common people-against an attitude which may dangerously lead to the relativism of values and an endorsement of antihumanistic ideologies. Although the concluding chapter of the book (Chapter V), which deals with Wittgenstein's conception of a language-game and playfulness in general, moderates the negative impact of the aforementioned critical remarks, the damage caused by them will be hard to repair (in the attentive reader's mind). Or do we

treat Wittgenstein's honest failure as our own too-as the failure (honest or not) of our entire modern culture?

To sum up: Russell Nieli produced a very interesting, however hold, contribution to the ever-growing literature on Wittgenstein's philosophy. He wrote his hook in a refreshing way, avoided unnecessary technicalities and utilized a remarkable wealth of supporting documentation, frequently based on very unusual sources. The quotations and footnotes are sometimes too long (especially in Chapter I), and his emphasis too one-sided (he is overlooking, for instance, the utmost importance of logic in the *Tractatus),* yet he pursues the goals of his interpretation with admirable consistency. Readers interested in other aspects and interpretations of Wittgenstein's philosophy will, of course, have to consider other sources, such as the hooks written by G. E. M. Anscomhe, M. Black, S. Cavel!, P. Engelmann, K. T. Fann, **J.** N. Findlay, R. **J.** Fogelin, P. M. S. Hacker, G. Hallett, W. D. Hudson, **J.** F. M. Hunter, A. Janik and S. Toulmin, A. Kenny, F. Kerr, N. Malcolm, D. Pears, R. Rhees, E. Stenius, G. Vesey, P. Winch, and G. von Wright. Nieli's hook might then he put into a much richer perspective.

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