AQUINAS AS POSTLIBERAL THEOWGIAN

BRUCE D. MARSHALL

St. Olaf Oollege
Northfield, Minnesota,

THE PURPOSE of this essay is to discuss the relation between Thomas Aquinas' account of religious and theological truth and a "posrtliberal" one sruch rus that sketched in George Lindbeck's *The Nature of Doctrine.* Most reviewers assume that Lindbeck's .app:voachis on this point incompatible with the mainstream of the tmdition, and Colman O'Neill, writing :in *The Thomist* symposium on Lindbeck's book, thinks it oontradicts Aquinas in particular. This paper presents the case to the contr:ary. Afte'I." outlining O'Neill's problem, it argues thart he mis11eads Lindbeck 'and, .at greater length, that Aquinas"S views on t:ruth :are, as Lindbeck affirms, compatible with postliberal emphases.

I

O'Neill's basic problem with Lindbeck's: "cultural linguistic" understanding of truth is thwt Lindbeck "would clearly have us puTify [Christi.an] language by ridding it of extra-linguistic accretions-in particular the intrusion of reference to objective reality. In the end the only thing that matters is scriptural discourse verified by action." [1] Lindbeck may not intend this "purification," [2] but whatever the intention, his

[1] Colman E. O'Neill, "The Rule Theory of Doctrine and Propositional Truth," *The Thomist* 49 (1985), p. 422.

[2] So Lindbeck writes: "The great strength of a cognitive-propositional theory of religion is that •.. it admits the possibility of [ontological] truth claims, and a crucial theological challenge to a cultural-linguistic approach is whether it also can do so." *The Nature of Doctrine: Religion a,nd Theology in a, Postlibera,l Age* (hereafter *ND),* (Philadelphia, 1984), pp. 63-4.

view of •religioustruth entails a raidical rejection of 1any claim that Christian beliefs !are onto1ogioally true, in other words, tha;t they rre£er or correspond •to reality.

The reruson rllor this putative entailment lies in Lindbeck's manifest oontention (to be explained below) that truth claims in any l'eligion, including Christianity, are subject to la two-fold criterion of coherence: they must fit wirth the wider linguistic (especially scriptural) paradigms of the 11eligion, and also with a range of practices appropriate to the belief the truth of which is being claimed. But, says O'Neill, Christian beliefs are not true because they cohere with anything, they are true (like all true propositions) "because of their reference to the real." [3] By introducing ;an irreducible element of coherence into his interpl'etation of Christian truth claims, Lindbeck inevitably " attaches to the ·term ' propositional truth ' .a purely pra.gmatic signification," so that " a quite precise philosophical option has: been ma.de in faV'or of the moral or pragmatic definition of truth." [4] O'NeiiH'is point is that " ontological " or " propositional " truth has here been equa,ted with nothing more than the con£ormity of one's life to the patterns narrated in the !biblical story (O'Nei1l's "·scriptural dis·oourse verified by 1action") , •such tha;t " no claims to objective truth" need be made for the story or any a.ssociated beliefs.[5] Tihis, O'Neill alleges, is ·a " novel definition of ontological truth." [6] We ought to !'eject this novelty in favor of the under•standing of Christian beliefs and their truth articulated by 'Ihomas Aquinas, whel"e it is firmly maintained against " the moral or pmgmatic definition of truth " that " propositions are true because of their I"eference·to .the real."

In order to undevstand the issues ·raised by O'N eill's criticism, it is important to bear in mind the distinction-often made but often overlooked ais well-between truth :and justi-

[3] O'Neill, "Propositional Truth," p. 430.
[4] O'Neill, "Propositional Truth," p. 429.
[5] O'Neill," Propositional Truth," p. 420.
[6] O'Neill, "Propositional Truth," p. 431.

fica.tion. The very isisue of what it means to say that propositions are true can be distinguished from the issue of ho,w one justifies, warrants, or tests the truth of propositions. So, for example, one might maintain that in regard to propositions, "true" should be defined as "oorresponds to reality," or perhaps "fitly expresses experience," or perhaps "is inoorporated into an appropriate form of life." By contrast, one might maintain that pmpositions are "justified" (to mention a few familiar e:x;amples) when they ave logically tied to self-evident truths, when they are supported hy •experienoes of one kind or another, or when they cohere with other assumptions or beliefs. In making rsense of theological and philosophical accounts of tmth, it is useful to distinguish in this fashion be"' tween the way truth is defined and the way truth claims (however defined) a:re jusitified; this is especially so since the two might varry independently of one another, ,such th8Jt a given definition of truth might not necessarily he coITela,ted with any single view of justification.[7]

If truth and justification are thus differentiated, it turns out that O'Neill's ohj·ection is not to Lindbeck's definition of truth *per se,* since Lindbeck says he wants to ·allow for the claim upon which O'Neill insists, namely that Christian beliefs. are ontologically true or correspond to reality. Rather, his objection appears to be aimed art Lindbeck's account of justification: since Lindbeck maintains that the truth of Christian beliefs must be warranted by their coherence with a, wider range of beHefs and 3ippropriate practices, it is simply impossible, so O'Neill 1seems to suppose, for him to maintain that these .same beliefs are ontologically or objectively rtrue. In other woTds,

[7] It can be argued, of course, that the definitions of "truth" and of "justification" should not be different, so that, e.g., in the final analysis truth simply *is* justification. This is the view of many pragmatists, and of some contemporary anti-realist philosophers (such as Michael Dummett) who would not classify themselves as pragmatists. But this is not to deny the importance of the distinction (in fact these writers ordinarily insist on it), it is to make a claim about how the two should properly be related. My purpose is to see how Lindbeck and Aquinas construe this relation.

coherentist account of justification cannot be re-mnciled with :a definition of truth as correspondence.

In this way, objection is move radical than the charge of " fideism " which is often brought iagainsrt Lindbeck by theologians with strong revisionisrt commitments. While also aiming primarily at 1account of justification, critics like David Tmcy and Ja.mes Gustafson do nort seem to question whether Lindbeck can even make ontological truth claims consistently, but whether there is any point in making them unless one is prepared to defend them on "public" grounds which are in some •sense universal.[8] Since Lindbeck's account of justi:fica1tion sharply curtails rthe possibility of this kind of" public" defense of Christian beliefs, these writers object that Christian o:r other religious truth claims must on his account vemain fundamenta.Iy unpersuasive.

I will here atrbend mainly to O'Neill's more radical objeotion that la view like Lindbeck\s makes it impossible to hold that Christian beliefs are ontologically true, with the accompanying claim that this view is an eminently dispensable novelty. It will be useful first to make some observations on why Lindbeck maintains his twofold criterion of linguistic and performative coherence, :and on how he 11elatesr that criterion to the issue of ontological truth. The purpose here is simply ,tJo suggest that his view is a plausible and consistent account of the conviction that Christian beliefs can be ontologically true. After these preliminaries, it will be argued •at greater length that his •account of truth is not at all novd in substance, however fresh rthe perspective from which it is articulated. Thomas Aquinas also maintains tha.t utterances of Christian belief are ontologically true only if they cohere with specific linguistic and practical paradigms internal to the religion itself, and indeed that this coherence is an adequate justification of their ontological

s See David Tracy, "Lindbeck's New Program for Theology: A Reflection," *The Thomist* 49 (1985), pp. 460-72; James M. Gustafson, "The Sectarian Temptation: Reflections on Theology, the Church, and the University," *Proceed.ings of the Oatholic Theological Society* 40 (1985), pp. 83-94.

truth. In order to see how the understandings of religious truth in Lindbeck ,and Aquinas 1share at least this fundamental feature, it will be necessary to look at the view of epistemic justification ingredient in Thomas' account of faith, and to see how he relates this view to ontological truth claims. Within the confines of a, single article, it will not be possible 1to address in detail the distinctively revisionist objection to Lindbeck; this will have to be .a matter for another day. But it can at least be .shown that if Lindbeck is a fidei:st or irrationalist on truth, so is Thomas Aquinas, with whom such labels are not usually associated.

II

In *The Nature Of Doctrine,* Lindbeck uses the word" truth" in three explicitly distinguished senses: he speaks of categorial truth, intrasystematic truth, and ontological truth. An adequate reading of Lindbeck hinges on tracing the connections between these senses of "true," but tha;t is not always easy to do. Part of the reason for this is that his discussion of truth is imbedded in a treatment of a brnader issue, centering on the complex question of which theory of religion is best able to account for the claims to unsurpassability ma.de by many religions, while 1also maximizing the possibilities of nonpmselytizing inter-reHgious dialogue 1and the salvation of persons outside a given religfon.[9] Despite these difficulties, the best way to unde11standLindbeck's view of the nature ;and justification of religious (especially Christian) ibruth claims is rbo see how !he distinguishes and relates these three senses or kinds of "truth."

Of :all the elements in Lindbeck's discussion of religious truth, none is more .standard and widely familiar than his

[9] Cf. *ND,* pp. 46-7. While the rationale for treating the problem of religious truth in this particmlar context is substantial, it has the unfortunate result of locating the discussion of categorial truth (pp. 47-52) in a different stretch of text from that of intrasystematic and ontological truth (pp. 63-9). This makes it hard to see the crucial role of categorial truth in the overall view Lindbeck outlines.

definition of" ontological truth" (for which t,he phrase" propositional truth" is in most contexts a synonym). When Lindbeck speaks of "ontological truth," he means " thaJt rbr:uth of correspondence to reality which, according to epistemological realists, is .attributable to first-order propositions." [10] This " correspondence to reality " is ·attributable not only to :first-order propositions, hut also, indeed primarily, to the human being .as a whole. Thus Lindbeck speaks of the way in which "human beings linguistically exhibit their truth or falsity, their ·correspondence or lack of correspondence to the UltimaJte Mystery." [11] This correspondence of the whole self to 'reality necessarily includes a " mental isomorphism of the knowing 1and the known " by means of p11opositions,for which Lindbeck employs the medie¥al expression *adaequatio mentis ad rem.*[12] This definition of " ontological trwth " is clearly quite close to 1some traditional characterizations of " truth " as .an *adaequatio, correspondentia* or *conformitas* of the mind and reality. According to Thomas Aquinas, :for example, " truth is defined by rthe conformity *(oonformitatem)* of the intellect 'and reality (rei) ." [13] The general notion of *cornformitas* can be extended to apply to the ;specificrelation between the mind and the divine rea1ity. Thus Lindbeck mainta:ins that the relation of the self rto God " can . . . be piotu11ed in epistemologically realist fashion as involving a correspondence of the mind to divine

10 *ND,* p. 64.

11 *ND,* p. 69.

12 *ND,* p. 65. The language of "isomorphism" is Lonergan's; cf. *ND,* p. 47.

13 *Summa Theo'logiae* I, 16, 2, r (This and all other translations from the Latin are my own). *S. Thomae Aquinatis Summa Theologiae,* ed. Peter Caramello (4 vols., Turin & Rome, 1948-52). I will cite the *Summa Theologiae* by part number only (I, I-II, II-II, or III) followed by question, article, and location within the article. Cf. also *de Veritate (de Ver.)* 1, 1, r: ".All knowledge *(oognitio)* is completed by the assimilation of the knower to the reality known ... The first relation of being to the intellect is that being corresponds to the intellect. This correspondence is called the equation of reality and the intellect *(adaequatio rei et intelleotus'),* and in this the notion of the true is formally completed." *8. Thomae Aquinatis Quaestiones Disputatae,* ed. Raymond Spiazzi *et al.,* 2 vols., (Turin, 1949), Vol. 1.

reality." [14] ALI kinds of questions can of mur:se be raised a.bout how this notion of correspondence or *adaequatio* should be understood more precisely, and about whether this notion can support a feasible :account of human kno.wing. But the question xwised by O'Neill and others is simply whether Lindbeck's overall view of truth can possibly include ·this notion, which .seems .to express a basic Christian oonviction that in some deep sense, the faith is true to reality. Clearly the crucial issue is not, as O'Neill suggests, what Lindbeck *means* when he speaks of "onrtological truth"; his definition of this term is anything hut novel. The key issue for Lindbeck is· raither to specify the *conditions* under which propositions: can be ontologicaillytr:ue, and the mind conformed to .rearlity,in the religious domain. This requmes clarification of .further senses of the term "truth."

On Lindbeck's account, " categoria:l truth " is one indispensable pre-condition .for ontological truth. Categorial truth is essentially the fitness or adequacy of an ordered set of categories to describe reality. "Adequate categories are thotSe which can ·be made to apply rto. what is taken to he real, :and which therefore make possible, though they do not guarantee, pmpositional, practical, and symbolic truth. A religion that is thought of as having such crutegoriescan be said to be 'categorially true.'" [15] Oartegoriail truth can thus he described as potential ontological truth, and a religion (or other comprehensiv;e worldview) h:rus this kind of truth when its "categories " are *capable* of being used to describe what is ultimately ·real. By " categories," Lindbeck ;appe:a;rsto· mean noit only the vocaJbulary of a religion, but its syntax as well, that is, the

[14] *ND,* p. 66. It is essential to note that I will not be discussing in this article what this correspondence of the mind to divine reality is like, i.e., the manner in and extent to which it obtains. Lindbeck articulates the "how" of this correspondence by employing .Aquina.s's distinction between the *modus significandi* and the *res significata* of terms, but my present concern is only with *whether* any correspondence obtains for Lindbeck ·and .Aquinas, and on what grounds.

[15] *ND,* p. 48.

paradigmatic or nOTmative patterns according to which the terms in the vocabufary are combined:[16] In Christianity, as to ·some degree in other world religions, these normative patterns have 11eached.a high level of fixilty by being " paradigmatically encoded" in a canon of sacred 1texts![11] Unde11stood as rt.his capability to refer to •what is in faot ultimalbely real, ca:tegorial truth chariacterizes (or, of course, f·ai1s to chamcterize) a religion Oil' other semiotic system, especially in its textually encoded form, quite apart from tih.e way the system is used in practice. In at least this 11espect,the" truth" of a religion belongs ito the language itself of rthe religion and is not a:ffected by •appropriate or inappropriate performance on rthe part of the speakers of the language. In Lindbeck's "cartogmphic simile," rthe categorial truth of la religion is something like the relation of ·a more or less .adequate maip to the space it depicts. A map of the way from Northfield to Jer1usalemcan be "accurate ... in itself "; it does not become a. map Of that particular space only when someone 'actually uses it to find her way to Jeru- But 1the fact that a map is 1accurate in itself does not 1ensurethat anyone will actually use it so as to succeed in finding Jerusalem, a point to which I .shall return momentarily.

Understood .in this way, categorial .truth is clearly a necessary but not sufficient condition for ontological tru:th. It is a necessary condition, in that the mind cannot be conformed to reality by means of propositions unlesis the categories or idiom of the sentences in which the propositions are uttered are them•selves suited to describe 11eality. If ·a religion has suitable or .adequa1becatego•ries, it is possible to ·sfate p11opositionsin that religion which :a;rle oDJtologicallytrue. But in mo•sit religions, including Christianity, the categorial idiom includes irreducibly particular aspects, such as realistic naITatives, which are taken

16 Cf. Ibid., where Lindbeck begins his characterization of "categorial truth" by saying that "attention ..• focuses on the categories (or 'grammar' or ' rules of the game') in terms of which [ontological] truth claims are made and expressive symbolisms employed."

11 Cf. *ND,* p. 116.

1sND, p. 51.

,to be essential to any description of what is in fa.et ultimately real. For example, "many Christians have mainrbained that the stories abourt Abraham, lsaac, Jaoob, and Jesus are part of the referential meaning of the word ' God ' lus this is used in biblical religion .and have therefore concluded that philosophers and otheTs who do not 1adviert to these narratives mean something else iby ' God.' " [19] Given the irredudble particularity ingredient in their categorial schemes, different religions may be fundamentally incommensurable, ,even though they may ov;erlap to some degree at a relatively high level of generality. The story of Jesus' death and resurrection in Christianity, and the ,story of the inevitably triumphant struggle of the proletariat in clrus·sical Marxism cannot, as descriptions of what is ultimately real, be translated into one another, any more than " redder " in the .scheme of colors can be translated by "larger" in the scheme of sizes.[20] In light of this inoommen-·surn.bility, Lindbeck argues, it is logicaHy possible "that there is only one religion which has the concepts and categories to refer to the religious objeot, i.e., to whatever in fact is more important rthan everything else in the universe. This religion would then be the only one in which any form of propositional, 'and oonceiviably .also ex;p:vessive,religious truth or falsity could be present." [21] On this ,account, ontological trurth claims formulated in a religious or other categorial idiom which 1ackced the crutegories essential to describe reality would not strictly speaking be false, but meaningless. One cannot make either true or false statements about reality rif one lacks the categories to describe it in the first pla;ce. Compa,red to the categorially true religion, " otheT religions the degree they lack the appropriate categories] might ,then he called categorially ,false, but propositionally and expressively ithey would be neither true nor false. They would be religiously meaningless just as talk

[19] *ND,* p. 48. It is at just this point that Lindbeck cites in support of his view an important Thomistic tecxt (II-II, 2, 2, ad 3) to which I shall return.

[20] For this latter ecxample as an illustration of categorial incommensurability, cf. *ND,* p. 48.

[21] *ND,* p. 50.

about light .and heavy things is meaningless if one 11acks the concept 'weight.'"[22] Thus, 1assuming that the Christian religion i·s in £,act categorially true, Lindheck's view of truth, far f:vom ca.sting the truth of Christian belief in doubt, seems to suggest an extraordinarily :striong version of the claim that Christianity is ontologically true: ontological truth in any other religion or worldview is not even conceivable. Of course, mos:t religions include the formal claim thrut their idiom is categorially true in Lindbeck',s sense. Row one might justify such a claim in the case of Christianity is •an issue to which I will briefly return later.

Yet, while it ris a necessary condition, categorial truth is not a sufficient condition for ontological truth. In order for religious uttemnces rbo conform the mind to reality (and thus ha,ve ontological or pmpositional truth) , they must not only use the right categories, but must 1also use these categories in the right ways; they must have what Llndbeck calls "intrasystematic truth." This is where Lindbeck inrtmduces a twofold (that is, lingui·stic 1and practical) criterion of coherence, to which I have already alluded, 1as a neoess:ary condition for religious truth. " Uttemnces rure !intr:asystemartically:true when they cohere with the total relev:ant mntext,. which in the case of a religion when viewed in cultural-linguistic terms, is not only oibher utterances hut also the correlati\i;e forms of life."[23] Religious utterances hav·e intrasystematic truth, not only when they fit with the linguistic paradigms hy which the religion indicates how its categories should be combined, but also when 1they are made in the context of practices which the religion sees as appropriate to that kind of utterance. Lindbeck explains what the force is of his fo " intriasystematic truth," and of the distinction between its linguistic and practical aspects, by us[ng an illustra.tion which has become somewhat no:torious. " The crusader's battle cry '*Christus est Dominus/*" he says, "is false when used to authorize cleaving

22 Ibid.

2a *ND,* p. 64.

the skull of the infidel (even though the same words in other oorubexts may be a true utterance) ." [24] As used by the crusader, *"Christus est Dominus ,,* has partial intrasystema.tic truth, since it coheres with ;the Christian linguistic parr-adigms for .the use 0£ the categories " *Christus"* and *"Dominus,,* (unlike, for example," *Petrus est Dominus"* or" *Judas est Dominus* ") . But it does not have ·sufficient intra.systematic truth, sinoe the aotio:ns of the crusader do not cohere with the r:ange of practices which the religion defines •llls aprpl'IOpriateto such an utterance. Therefore, on the lips of the crusader, *"Christus est Dominus* " "false."

Characteristic a:s it is of his notion of intra.systematic truth, this last remark 1seems to be at •the heart of many reserv:ations about Lindbeck's overall acoount of religious truth. These objections result, I think, largely fmm misunderstandings of the point of appeal to practical coherence a;s a criterion for the truth of religious statements. Such misunderstandings are clearly due in part rto the highly compressed and programmatic (indeed, sometimes runic) character of Lindbeck's discussion of trurth. But part of the problem a.l.so lies with the failure of many interpreiters and critics to trace with adequate care the relationship of intrasystematic truth, especially in its practical :aspect, lto· cwtegorial truth and onrto1ogical truth. O'Neill, :llo·r example, seems dislturbed more than anything else by Lindbeck's claim that it is possible £or the utterance, *"Christus est Dominus,"* to 1be false, ;and that the pmctices correlaited with the use of this sentence necessarily contribute to its truth or fal.sity. This is ·equivalent, O'Neill apparently 1believes,to daiming that the very reality of Lo'Vdship depends upon the practices and dispositions of believers, a claim manifestly incompatible wi!th the conviction (to use Lindbeck'.s own words) that " Christ's Lordship fa objectively real no ma:bter what the faith or unfaith of those who hear or say the words." [25] It is in this sense, .according to O'Neill, that

24 Ibid.

25 *ND,* p. 66. See O'Neill's discussion of this remark in "Propositional Truth," p. 431.

Lindbeck has reduced the meaning of the term "true" in Ohristian theology to "scriptmal discourse verified by action," without any onitologiioalreference.

But 1the rea;son O'Neill Lindbeck in a w:ay :so starkly at odds with the 'latter's stated iaims *is* rthait he fa.ii.ls to see the basic point of Lindbeck':s discussion of intrasystematic truth, as dis1tinguished from categor.ial and ontological truth. The point of intr.oducing the notion of intrasystema:tic truth is not, 1as O'Neill supposes, to state the basic *meaning* of the term "true" in the religious domain. That iha:s already been ac-,oomplished ill discussion of ontological truth as ,oorrespondenoeto reality. The point is rather to clarify one of the essential *oriteria* of truth in the religious domain. When Lindbeck uses the criusa;der's *"Clvristus est Dominus"* to illustrate rthis criterion, the issue is not at all whether "Christ's Lordship is objectively rieal," or correlatively whether sentence1s in Christian discourse (for example, *"Christus est Dominus* ") can :be ontologically true. On the contracy, the basic aim of his entire" Excursus on Relig,ion and Truth" is to account for the legitimacy of such claims to p!I'opostional truth, in .a way congruent wirth his cultural-linguistic 1approach to religion. Thus the issue here !is nort whether there are (onto-fogically) true propositions, but what the conditions are under which one can state 1a sentence which is a true proposition. In Christianity (and other religions rus well), Lindbeck maintaiins, one :such condition is rthe intmsystematic coherence of statements with :a irange of appropriate praJCtices.

The sense in which ,oofierence with appropriate practices functions as ia condDtion for religious rtruth on Lindbeck's account is not ail .all mysterious. The problem with the crusader's use of the sentence, " *Christus est Dominus,"* is simply that, uttered as a for splitting people's heads open, it lacks the *meaning* which the religion insists it must hav;e if it is to be a true proposition, one which corresponds to, reality. By using " *D01ninus* " in this context, the crusruder,shows that what he means by the term is a mediev;al knight errant, much like

himself. But raooordmgto the normative patterns of Christian speech and action, Christ is not thrut kind of Lord; when the predicate *"Dominus "* has that meaning, it is not 1aipplicable to :bhe su!bject " *Clvristus,"* ,that is, " *Christus est Dominus"* becomes initrasystemrutically false. Lindbeck clearly if briefly :sfates: that the intmsystemrutic falsity of the crusader's battle cry lies precisely in the meaning the utterance has iin this pr:ac- tical oonrtext. " When thus employed, it contradicts the Chris'- tian understanding 0£ Lordship as embodying, for suffering ·servanthood." [26] J\tloreover, hecaiuse the utterance is false in this sense, lit cannot be onto1ogica:l- ly ·true or conform the mind to reality; it has failed one of the tests that deternrine, within Christian discourse, when utter- ances have ontological truth. On the lips of the skull cleaving crusader, Lindbeck rargues, *"Clllristus est Dominus"* is pre- cisely not an on'tologically true proposition from which the crusader dl'laws inappropriaite pr:actical conclusions. This is one o.f the primary differences between his own account of reli- gious truth and the views he labels "propositionalist." In a,greement with the mainsitream of modem Anglo-American philosophy (especially under the influence of Wittgenstein) , Lindbeck holds that the meaning of a. rterm must be ascertained :from the way it is used, which requires attention to what Lind- beck calls " the total relevant context," practical a;S well as linguistic. The propos:irbionJalist £ails to note the imporlba.illce of pvactice for meaning, especially in religion, and so mak!es rth.e misleading decision that the crusader's cry is ontologically true. Lindbeck's account of intrasystematic truth is designed to 1avoid tills problem. But Hnguistic and practical coherence are not barriers to ontological truth; by establishing when ha"Ve appropriate mean:ings, they ia;re conditions fror it.

·To summarize: 1) CartegoriaJ truth iis ·a neces·s•ary hut not sufficient condition iloc ontological truth. It is a necessary con- dition because ref rbo rewlity requires the right ca:tego'.Vies,

2a *ND,* p. 64.

ones which are at foast in some degree ,adequate rto that reality. It is not a isufficient condition, because having the right crute-gcnies is no guarantee that they will be rightly used in any given utterance. fl) lrutrasysrl::ematic truth is 'also a necessary but not sufficient condition for ontological truth. It is a nec-essacy condition because in any coherent network of belief, categories can only refer to reality when they 1are rightly used, that is, when their meaning :is consistent with the shape and requivements of the wider network of belief. lit is not a suffi-cient ooodition, because ,internally consistent utterances can he made in a :system of belief which lacks categories adequate to rerfer to reaJity. 3) Categocial and intrasystematic truth together are the necessary and sufficient conditions of ontologi-cal truth. Lindbeck is ,quite cleair about this. "An intrasys-temrutically true statement is ontologically false-or, more ac-curately, meaningless-if it is part of a system that lacks the concepts or categories to vefer to the relevant vealities, but iJt is ontologically true iif it is: part of a system that is itself crul:e-goria1ly true (adequarte)."[27] If the Christian categories are true :and they are used in a iway which coheres with :the lin-guistic 1and practical paimdigms of the veligion, the sentence thereby uttered succeeds in referring to 1amd describing that which isl in fact the most imporltant thing in the universe-the God who is the Father of our Lord Jesus Ohrist (however in-adequa1te 1and merely analogical the description may be to its transcendent refevent). The proposition thus expressed en-genders :a genuine *adaequatio mentis ad rem,* what Lindbeck

[27] *ND,* p. 64-5. Lindbeck here describes this relationship in terms of nec-essary and sufficient conditions. It is important to stress that this remark states the truth conditions for "ordinary religious language," which Lind-beck sharply dis,tinguishes from both " technical theology " and " official doctrine"; the former is :first-ordex speech, while the latter two are (in different ways) essentially second-order speech (cf. *ND,* p. 69). The condi-tions under which "technical theology" might have ontological truth on an account like Lindbeck's, are more complex, and thexe is not room to go into them here. However, I think Lindbeck's own remarks on this issue some-times sound a good deal more restrictive than the logic of his account re-quires (e.g., *ND,* pp. 106-7).

cal1s :a " mootal isomOTpihismof the knowing 1and the known," which is no less real :£or being " part ,and parcel of a wider [pl'lactica.1]conformity of the self to God." [28]

Understood :in this way, Lindbeck's argument meets O'Neill's radical objection ;squarely. His ,account of religious truth does not at rail exclude the claim that Christian beliefs are onrtologically true. On the oontxrury, reli.giousprorposit:ionsare true" because of their reference rto the real" (to use phrase); on Lindbeck's account, this is precisely what *means* to say that a religious proposition is " rt:me." But Lindbeck is a:liso oonoerned ito give an ruccount, consisterut with his larger view of religion, doctrine, rand theology, of the *conditions* under which true propositions can be uttered in the religious domain, and specifically in Christianity. In other words, he wants to give 1a.n :account not only of the *truth* of Christian beliefs (" correspondence rto reality ") but also of their *justification* (adequate categories used in w;ays that are intrasystematioally true) . O'Neill fails rto observe this distinction. Consequently, he takes Lindbeck's discussion of categorial and int:rasystematic truth as ra. purrposeful reduction orf the meaning of " true " in a religious context to " scriptural disoou.vse verified by action," thaJU whrut it really is----;an account of the conditions under which ,religious utterances succeed in conforming the mind rbo objective reality .[29]

2s *ND,* p. 65. The kind of .argument presented by Lindbeck needs to be developed further at this point. It needs to be made more clear how, given a definition of truth as correspondence, ad.equate categories and intrasystematic coherence are not only necessary, but sufficient conditions for the truth of religious utterances in this sense. But it seems crucial to the kind of position .articulated by Lindbeck to hold that this is in fact the case, such that if these conditions are known to be met, no further step is necessary in order to ascertain that a given utterance is true (in particular, the step required by the now widely rejected foundationalist claim that in order to make true s,tatements about the wodd, there can and must be privileged representations, or states of affairs to which we have unmediated access, which alone are sufficient to guarantee the correspondence of mind and language with reality). As we will see (below, note 49), Aquinas makes a move similar to Lindbeck's at this point, on more explicitly theological grounds.

29 In my analysis of Lindbeck, I have been using "justification," "criteria," and " conditions " for truth as, if not identical in meaning, mutually

Lindbeck's compact treatment of these issues raises,ia number of important questions, one of which is that posed by Tracy 1and Gustafson, :to which I alluded earlier. To these and other theologians of revisionist or libeml disposition, Lindbeck's account of the justification (as distinguished from the truth) of Christian beliefs !is hound to seem like la :flagrant eviasion.'110 :say thart we are justified in :a given proposition to be (ontologically) true because it ooheres with the nJOrms of Christiian belief and practice is, so the objection goes, to beg the decisive question: how can these l'.l!orms themselves be jusrtified?Lindbeck is fully a:ware of this challenge, and *The Nature of Doctrine* culminates with his response to it,so but heI"e I can only draw attention to .a few central The problem can be seen :a.is thart of explicating how rbhe whole in:ternaHy normed scheme of belief and praiotice called " Christianity" ca:n be justified. Lindbeck's: argument, in brief, is it.hat if individual utterances within the ,oomprehensive scheme are justified by rtheir coherence with internal criteria, then the soheme as a whole must include criteria of its own truth; if tihe justification of Christian ·belief (or other kinds of belief about ultimate meaning and value) is ooherentist on the micro level, it is holistic on the macro level. This is just the point ait whfoh, for writers like Tracy and Gustafson, Lindbeck's account of justification 1seems to degenerate into £.deism and relartivism. But the charge of £.deism seems rooted in the assumption that basic Christian beliefs (and :thereby the Christian scheme rus a whole) can only he jus:ti:fied•adequa.tely by an appeal to criteria of truth which a,re "p1Ublic," in the sense that they ,a;:ve significantly if not wholly external to Christianity (or

implicative in .practice; when a belief meets the categodal and intrasystematic conditions for truth, the criteria have been satisfied which justify holding that belief. I think this use of the terms reflects the logic of Lindbeck's argument (and, I will argue, of Thomas's), but the conditions which when met make a belief true, and what gives one the right to hold a belief (i.e., justifies it), might be different, a.nd in some theories of truth they clearly are.

so Cf. *ND,* pp. 128-35 for Lindbeck's discussion (under the rubric "Intelligibility as Skill").

any other comprehensive hut community-specific network of belief), 1and mie 1ait least implicitly urnivers1al,that ri.s, 'Sharied at some level by 1a;ll Eational people. Lindbeck finds this as1sump- tiorn unpensurusiV'e: " The issue is not whether there a;re uni- versal norms of reasonableness, but whether these can be fol'llllrulated in some neutral, framework-independent lan- guage." [81] In raigreemenrt with Wittgenstein, Kuhn, Mitchell, and others, Lindbeck maintainis thrut we can identify some of the univel'\Salnorms easily enough (he devotes particular at- tention ;to the norbionof " assimi1ativ;epower ") , but we cannot 1apply them 00 make decisions .about truth *between* compre- hensive systems of belief the way we regularly rupply various criteria fo make decisions *within* such schemes. The reason for this is that each 11eligion or worldview will shape and fill in iSUch norms in its own way, so tha1t each will have ri.ts own materially specific notions of what ccmstitutes adequate and appropriate "assimilrutive power" (for example) . This means, in turn, tha;t a shared norm or value like " assimilative power " only becomes materially definite enough to guide dear deci- sions 1aboUJt trurth when it becomes cO!Ilcretelythe assimila;rtive power of (for example) Christianil.ty, that is, when it is no longer a norm external to ·a given ,system of belief and prac- tice, but internal to it. [32]

The persuasiveness of Lindbeck's sugges·tions abou,t justi:fi- crution, .and of their re1rution to his correspondence notion of itruth, can only be addressed by a. much mo1le extensive explo- ration of the tissues imi;olved. I shall, in the remruinder of ibhis paper, look simply ;at charge of novelty. Lindbeck suggests that lli:s accourut of truth ·and justificrution is deeply

s1 *ND,* p. 130.

a2 For more detailed discussions of this holist aspect of justification, both as an alternative to the questionable search for universal criteria and an effective reply to the charge of relativism, see William C. Placher, " Revision- ist and Postliberal Theologies and the Public Character of Theology," *The Thomist* 49 (1985), pp. 302-416, especially Placher's argument that Lindbeck is in some ways *more* "public" than (e.g.) Tracy; see also Ronald F. Thie· mann, *Revelation am4 Theology,* (Notre Dame, IN, 1984), pp. 72-91.

,oonsistenrt with a. range of traditional rtheo1ogical views, not least that of Thoma.s Aquinas, a. suggestion O'Neill several rtimes repudiates. By testing Lindbeck's suggestion in regard to Aquinais, a further investigation of some cenrtml problems 'about theological trurth and justification will be possible, and perhaps more light will be <Shed on Lindbeck's own position.

III

As I ih:ave 1a.lready mentioned, Aquinas defines truth as a *correspondentia* or *adaequatio* of ibhe mind and reality, a definition with which Lindbeck explicitly 1agrees. My concern here is Il!Ot with defimtion of truth, nor with the w:ays Aquinas develops and qualifies it when he discusses rthe limiited correspondence that can obtain between our minds and language and divine reality. Rather, the question I will consider is how Aquinas understands :the justification of Christian beliefs, given thfus definition of truth. To put the question in Lindbeck's ;terms, in the religious domain, under what conditions for Aquina;s oan one :assert a proposition which is true, that is, which 1oornforms the mind to reality? The decisive issue is whether Thoma,s utilizes something like Lindbeck's criteria, of linguistic and practical coherence when he deals with questions of justifioartion. Such questions come up regularly in Thomas' disCUJssion of faith, although of cou1.1se not e:xdusively there. The lineaments of Thomas' arccount of faith al1e reiasoniably familiar, and will nort he trea.ted systematically here, but some preliminary comments will help illuminate the bearing of his discussion specifically on rthe justification of Christian belief.

Recaisting the iam:gu;age of Heb. 11:1, Thomas defines faith ia:s the "disposition *(habitus)* of the mmd by which eternal is begun in us, and which leads the intellect to assent to what is not seen." [33] By siaying that through faith eternal life is hegun in us, Thomas issues ,a reminder. :Fiaith is one of the theologica;l virtues, one of the divinely given dispositions which

ss II-II, 4, I, r.

"have God £or their object in thart we rare ri.ghitly ordered towards God by them." [a4] As this definition further indicrutes, the act which the habit or disposition 0£ fiaith enables us to perform is a certain kiind 0£ initeHectual assent; faith is rooted in 1the inrtellect, 1although it has a. complex relaition to .the will 'as well. Thus "faith" designa:tes the intellectual side 0£ a rightly ol'dered human relation to God. By describing more pl'ooisely the .sense in which God is the "object" 0£ faith, Thoma:s 1aimplifies his diamcterization 0£ the rightly ordered relation 0£ rthe human being fo. God.

It is eissential, Thoma1sia,rgues,to distinguish from the outset two differont way;s in which God is the ohject 0£ faith: he is both faith's material object and its formal object. Like a:ny cognitive habit, faith not only knows various thing;s, but knows them [n a distinctive way. These are what Thomas speaks of as, respectively, the material and formal " objects " of a given cognitive habit. So fiaith embmces both "·what is known, which is as it were the material object, and that rthrough which irt is known, which is the formal object *(formalis ratio obiecti)* ." [35] Thomas uses a variety of examples to explain this distinction between " wha1t" is known a:nd " that through which" it is known. Perhaps the clearest of those first occurs *is* ;a context closely re}arted to the present discussion of :faith, namely the development of ithe notion of *sacra doctrina* in tl!.e opening question 0£ the *Summa Theologia,e.* " '.Bhe unity of a power 1and habit must be discerned with regard to the object," Thomas remarks, "but nort the object materially considered, raither with regard to a :formal 'aspect *(rationem)* of the object. For example, 1a man, a donkey, and a stone all share in the :formal .ruspect of bffing colored, which is the object of Slight."[36]

84 I-II, 62, I, r.

35 II-II, I, I, r.

36 I, I, 3, r; Cf. I, 59, 4, r. When he distinguishes the formal and material objects of faith in .the pa.ssage I am now considering (II-II, I, I, r), Thomas uses a different and more complex example, according to which the middle term of a. demonstration in Aristotelian science is a formal object in relation the conclusion of the demonstration, which is a material object; this

Just ,as the "formal object" of the visual power is color, so rthe "formal object" of :any cognitive power or habit is: the particular ·aispecit under which irt considers or ,apprehends rthings, and which is oommon to everything the power or habit is oapable of :aipprehending. By contrast the "material object " of vision could be anything :at all, as long ras it shares the common feature (viz., beting colored) in virtue of whrioh things a:ve rapprehended by that power; the same holds for the material object of any oognitiv;e power or habit. This implies that the v:arious powers and habits: ,are defined and distinguished from one ranother by their formal objects rather than their material objects; it [s nort what they consider, but the w:ay ,they consider it, which is decisive.[37] The reason for this is obvious: not only can a single power or habtit consider a virtually endlesss supply of material objects, but ra single material object (such as the donkey of Thomais's illusrtmtion) can be considered in a varierty of way;s (not only as having color, but as something to be ridden, ·something to, Laugh at, and so forth) .[88]

How then is God the formaI object of faith, 1as " that which is colored " ris: of Slight? God iis rthe " first truth," replies Aquinas, :and irt is in thi,s distinctive respect that God is faith's

is because the middle term is the *medium* (i.e., the means) by which the con· clusion is known. Cf. I-II, 54, 2, ad 2, for a more detailed development of this example, also I, 1, 1, ad 2. This will become important later on, when Thomas distinguishes between different means by which we can hold beliefs about God. In reading these passages, I have bene:fi.tted from the discussion of Thomas on formal objects in Michel Corbin, *Le ohemin de la tMol-Ogie ohez ThomlJ,8 d'Aquin,* (Paris, 1974), especially pp. 735-8.

sr Cf. I, 1, 7, r: "Properly speaking, the aspect *(ratione)* under which all things are referred to a power or habit is designa.ted as the object of that power or habit." Cf. also I, 77, 3, r.

as Thomas's talk of "formal object" and "material object" may easily sound puzzling to modern ears, since we tend to use " object" as roughly equivalent to "particular," so that "material object" sounds redundant and "formal object" suggests some separate and obscure particular alongside it. As the foregoing discussion indicates, Thorn.as uses " *obieotum* " in a much broader sense, which typically has the force of "subject matter" or "con· tent."

formal object. " The formal obj,ect of £airth is nothing other ,than the fkst truth *(veritas prima),* for the £ruith 1about which we are speaking does not wssent to someithing exceprt because it has been re¥eaJed by God (a *Deo reveliatum)* ." [39] I will deal with the crucial link ,bertween *prima veritas* iand *a Deo revelatum* momentarily. Fil'st, it is important to see that iby characterizing God 1as *prima veritas,* Thomas means that the divine intellect is the mea;sure or •standard o[:all truth. Ultimately, to ibe "true" is to he in harmony or -agreement with God'·s creative knowledge.[40] Since God as *prima veritas* is the formal object of faith, whatever faith apprehends is necess•arilyin acco:vd with God'·s own definitive knowledge; faith is distinguished from other intellectual dispositions iby mnsidering ,things under the aspect of their •agreement with the *prima veritas.* [41] Consequently, it is impossible for faith to involve •an :admi:xlbureof :falsity; this would be inconsistent with the very notion of £aith 1ais defined by its formal object. [4z] Any number of things might ·count as material objects of firui:th. Not only God himself, but created realities in their relation to God can " come under ., fa:ith.[43] BUrt. ithey do so· only insofar :as 1they fit with the cri-

39 II-II, 1, 1, r.

40 "If we are speaking about the truth insofar as it is in things, then all things are ' true' by one first truth, to which every single thing is likened according to its own being *(entitatem)"* (I, 16, 6, r). Cf. *ff. Thomae Aquinatis Liber de Veritate Oatholicae Fidei contra errores Infidelium seu "Summa contra Gentiles* " (hereafter *80G),* ed. C. Pera *et. al.,* 3 vols., (Turin, 1961), I, 62, (# 519) : "Divine truth is the standard (*mensura)* of all truth . . . The .truth of la thing is measured (*mensuratur)* by the divine intellect, which is the cause of things."

41 Faith is ,also distinguished by the fact that its formal objeC"t is at once certain and *non visum,* a point I will take up later.

42 Cf. II-II, 1, 3, r: "The formal object of faith is the first truth. Thus nothing can ,come under faith except insofar as it s.tands under the first truth. But nothing false can stand there, just as non-being cannot have a place under being, nor evil under good." Cf. *de Ver.* 14, 8, r.

48 " If we consider the material objects to which faith assents, it is not only God himself, but many other things as well. Nevertheless, these only come under faith insofar as they are ordered to God in some way" (II-II, 1, 1, r).

terion which oonstitutes faith'.s formal object, namely God as *prima ventas.*

By itself the notion of the " first truth " facks any definite contellJt, and rso is of no use for distinguishing what genuinely belongs to :faith from whrut does not. But as the linking of *ventas prima* to *a Deo revelatum* :already ,suggests, Thomas ascribes la quite specific ·Content to the formal object of faith: the ·creeds, understood .as a summary of Scripture. In ovder .to make connection between the *veritas prima* and the creeds, Thomas fil'lst argues that the formal object of faith must be linguistic rin character. This is due to the nruture of our knowing, la;s isuggested by the principle, " things known are in the knower in a way <appropri.ateto the knower." We only know thingis "by oomposing and dividing," that is, by fonn-ing propositions 1about them. Thus a distinction must be made: the formal object of faith, 1the *prima veritas,* can be oonSJidered in two ways:. "In one way, r:vom the side of the reality believied in *(ex parte ipsius rei ereditae)*; in this w1ay the object of faith is something simple *(incomplexum),* name-ly the very reality concerning which we havie faith. In an-other way from the ,SJide of the believer *(ex parte eredentis);* in this respect :the object of f,aibh is something composite (oom-*plexum),* in the form of :a proposition *(enuntiabilis)* ." [44] Only that can be *prima veritas* for us *(ex parte credentis)* which is Hnguistiicallyembodied. A:s la result, rthe forma1 object of takes the s:ha;pe for us of an assortment of mutually fit propo-

[44] II-II, 1, 2, r. O'Neill cites II-II, I, 2 ad 2 against Lindbeck, apparently as a Thomistic rejoinder to his own mistaken assumption that Lindbeck denies any correspondence between the intellect and reality in faith (cf. "Propositional Truth," *p.* 434) : " The act of the believer does not terminate in the pro·position (*enuntiabile),* but in the reality. For we do not form propositions except in order that through them we may have knowledge *(oognitionem);* just as this applies in demonstrative science *(soientia),* so also it applies in faith." But O'Neill's own discussion, with its sharp dis-tinctions between thought and language and between the dynamism of the judgment towards reality and the imperfection of concepts, seems. to over-look the central point of this remark: the mind can corres,pond to reality only by linguistic means.

,sitions, which Thomas calls the 1articlesof faith.[45] Thomas distinguishes fourteen such ar:tic1es, 1allowing for differences in numbering, :and groups them under rtwo heading:s that together enoompa1ss all that the believer longs to see .and enjoy in eternia;llife, of whfoh fa:irthiis the beginning: "some [of the mattel'ls of Christian faith] pertain to the divine majesty, some pertain rto the mystery of the humaDJity of Christ." [46] The rartic1es of faith in turn function as the lingu,istic embodiment of faith's formaJ object only iinso£ar:a:s they express ,the oentral content of Scripture, ,whiah is itself the *regula fidei.*[47] Thus rthe "object " or subject matter of faith, precisely on its formal slide, hrus a definirte rand distinctive content: God the '[Yfima. *veritas,* as revealed in the lranguage of Scripture rand creed.

Thomas's 1acoount of the object of faith bears drirectly on questions regarding the justification of Christian belief. In fact it :suggiests a view of epistemic justification in rthe ·religious domain which is not inoonsfustentwith Lindbeck'!Sappeal to the criterion of liinguistic coherence within .a religion.[48] As we have

45 " Matters of Christian faith (*credibiUa fidei Ohristianae)* are said to be distinguished into articles insofar as they are divided into certain parts having a mutual fitness" (II-II, 1, 6, r), Here again Thomas underlines the point that while the formal object of faith is indeed God himself as first truth, it is only by linguistic means that God can actually be first truth in our thinking and knowing: "The formal object of faith can be taken in two senses" (II-II, 1, 6, ad 2; cf. II-II, 1, 2, r) . .And: "it is from our side ..• that a distinction of articles of faith is made."

46 II-II, 1, 8, r. Thomas's different way of distinguishing the *prima credibilia* in II-II, 1, 7, r ("that God exists and has providence over human salvation ") seems to be the equivalent of this in content and function.

47 On Scripture as the rule of faith, cf. *In* 6 *Tim.* 1, (# 237) : "The teaching of the apostles and prophets is said to be canonical because it is a kind of rule for our intellect" (*S. Thomae Aquinatis super JJJpistolas S. Pauli Lectura,* 2 vols., [Turin, 1953], Vol. 2). Cf. also II-II, 1, 9, ob I. While insisting on the need for a creedal summary, Thomas agrees in reply that the creed "is not something added to holy Scrpiture, but rather is taken from Scripture." Like the other theological virtues, faith is marked by the fact that "virtues of this kind are transmitted (*traduntur)* by divine revelation alone in holy Scripture" (I-II, 62, I, r).

48 I am for the moment concerned only with the issue of linguistic or propositional coherence; .the issue of practical or performative coherence will be treated separately.

seen, Thoma;s says that the material objecrt of faith (i.e., *what* is known in faith) is God, 1and ·ainy creruted reality in relation to God. Given the dependence of our knowledge upon language for Thomas, our access to God and to crerutures in rela•tion rto God must be through 1assent:to propositions about God and creatures. But Christian faith only 1affirms propositions .about God and creatures when these propositions are in acoord with :llaith's formal object, namely the langwage of Scriprture and the creeds unders.tood as the self-·communicaition of God, the *p'lima ve'litas.* This suggests that for Thomas coherence or agreement with the linguistic paradigms of the 1leli-.gion, especially key ones enunciated in the creeds, ils for Chris'-tians a necessary condition for any sentence 1about God or creatures in rela.tion to God being a true proposition (however difficult :and complex it might be to eonfirm or deny this eoherence in practice). Moreover, it seems that ·£or Thomas this coherence of propositions with one ,another *is* not simply a *sine qua nons* hut at leaist on rthe linguistic side is a sufficient condition for the rtruth of what Christians believe .about God 1a;nd crerutures; any proposition which "comes under" or accords with Scripture and creed cannot be false, but must rather he 1true (given Thoma.s's aoceprbance of the excluded middle with regard to truth, i.e., of bhnalence). That is, since God as *pri,ma veritas* is the >source 1and measure of all truth, and since God'1s self-rev;elrutionin Scripture 1and creed is the linguistic embodiment of his own being as *pri,ma veritas,* whatever propositions cohere with Scripture 1and c:veed must be true, that is, must co·rnespond to rea:lity.[49] So it seems plausible to suggest that for Thomas, rbhe criterion of truth for Christian belie£s is their coherence with other beliefs, especiially cel.'lbaiin central ones (when complemented by coherence with appropria.te practice, rus we shall see); Christian beliefs are justified in other words, by meeting this criterion of coherence. In-

49 If this reading of Thomas is correct, then he has at least this explicitly theological way of dealing with an issue which, we have mentioned, is not fully resolved by Lindbeck, namely, how intrasystematic coherence is sufficient to yield ontological correspondence (cf. note 28).

deed, ffit seems as though this is the *only* way Christi1anbeliefs can be justified, since faith 1ru1one, understood as the disposition rto .affirm propositions about God 1and creatures which cohere with Scripture 1and creed, ,jg the virtue by which the illitellect is " rightly o-rdered" to God-1that is, which entails the *correspondentia* .by which truth is defined.[50] My proposa:l then is that for Thomas, Christianity is a complex and variegated network or web of belief, ,in which the truth of any one aspect is measured by its coherence with the others. The unit of oorrespondance would thus not be the isolaited proposition, but the rwhole weh of belief; in order for 1any one proposition to engender the *adaequa.tio mentis ad rem,* one would have to believe, 1at least implicitly, a viast number of others as well.

One initial test for this coherentist reading of Aquinas is to consider some possible counter-ex;amples. Two cases would seem to count very ,strongly against this reading if Thomas allows for them: 1) 1acceptingsome ·central Christian .beliefs burt denying others; 1acceptingone central Christian belief without reference to others, because that belief seems justified on independent grounds. But if Thomas denies that any *adaequatio mentis ad rem* oan be achieved under these conditions, then the claim that fur him Christian belie£s 1are justified by their coherence wiith other beliefs would be grerutly strengthened.

1) Discussing the question of who has faith and who does not, Thomas 1asks whether ·a person (whom he calls *haereticus)* who does not believe one 'article oif faith can really believe any of the others, even after the !fashion oif unformed faith (faith not roonjoined with love for that which is believed, to which I will return). The ranswer is no. "The heretic who denies *(disc.redit)* one .article of :faith does not have the habit of fiaith, either formed or unformed." [51] In order to explruin why,

[50] Cf. I-II, 62, 1, rand above, note 34.

[51] II-II, 5, 3, r. Ignorance, confusion, perplexity and so forth do not count as heresy for Aquinas, but only the willful and persistent denial, from within the community, of central Christian beliefs. Cf. *de Malo* S, 1, ad 7 (*Quaestiones Disputatae,* Vol. 2).

Thoma;S makes la now familiJa;r.appeal. " The formal o of faith is the first truth, laooordingias it is made manifest in rthe holy Scriptures land the doctrine of the Church." [52] Precisely booause the " oibjeot" which giv;es foith its distincbi.ve character tbakes the form of .a network of interrelated propositions, it *is* imposisibleto believe some of these propositions in isolation from the others:. Tihe central tenets of the faith are aV1ailable as a coherent whole (and as such the *regulae* for believing other things) or not ,a;tiall. Thomas is quite clear that affirming !Some of the a:rticles of faith .aparit f11om others decisively changes the epfustemic srtaJtus of the articles which one does affirm. " Someone who is :an unbeliev;er with regard to one article does not have with regard to the others, buit a kind of opmion in aocord:a;ncewith his own will." [58] And Thomas is also quite clear that propositions about God affirmed under these conditions (without what Lindbeck would call intl'lasystematic truth) lare incapable of briinging :about any *adaequa.tio mentis ad rem,* even when the sentences used are identical with articles of fa:i.th. On the cont:mry: " A person is maximally .sepamted from God hy unbelief *(infidelitatem),* ibeca;use he does not have true knowledge *(oogitionem)* of God. Through false cognition •a.bout him one does: not draw near to him, but mther is more greatly sepamted from him." [54] The reruson 'I1homas gives is crucial to understanding his view of justification and truth in the religious " It cannot be thaJt someone who ha;s :a false opillion about God knows (*cognoscat)* him in any respect a.t all (*qwantum ad quid)* , ibecause what he or she thereby imagines (*opinatur)* is not God." [55] The person whose discourse does not cohere writh the b:r:oader norms of

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid. Cf. also *de Oaritate* 13, ad 6 (*Quaestione8' Disputate,* Vol. 2).

54 II-II, 10, 3, r. The *infideUtas* of which Thomas speaks here includes *haeresis* in the sense of II-II, 5, 3, r; cf. II-II, 11, 1.

55 II-II, 10, 3, r. Cf. II-II, 5, 3, ad 2: "Faith .adheres to all the articles of faith by one means *(propter unum medium),* that is, by the first truth proposed to us in the Scriptures, rightly understood in accordance with the doctrine of the Church. Therefore someone who does not rely on this means *(ab hoc medio'decidit)* entirely lacks faith."

Christian belief is not even talking about God, and so cannot possibly know or refer to him. In order to understand what Thomas is getting rut here, a. dose look ·at rthe second proposed counter-example is needed.

2) In .several discussions of the act of faith Thomas considers the case of the person who 1a:ffirms certain statements about God which Christians also .hold, not because these statements cohere with .the description of God articulated in Scripture .and the creeds, but because they :a:re justified by a demonstl'lative argument. Acts lime habits are distinguished and defined by their objects, Thomas argues, so the ·complete aot of faith will have three aspects, each" hav;ing 'a different relation .to the object of faith." [56] Considered simply as an act of the intellect, faith has .a twofold relation to its object. With rega:rd fo its material object, the act of faith is *credere Deum,* " to hold beliefs .about God." [57] With regard to its formal object, the act of faith is *credere Deo,* " to believe God." This is the act by which one adheres .to the first truth •as manifested in Scriptwe and creed, "in order that on .account of [t one may assent to ilia;t which is believed." [58] When the intellect in the 1act of '.faith is considered as moved iby the will, a third aspect emerges: *credere in Deum,* to love the self-revealing :fir:st truth and to desire union with him •as the goal of one's e:iciistence.[59] Given these distinctions, the question for present

[56] II-II, 2, 2, ad I. On the necessity of all three aspects for the complete act of faith, see *In III Sent.* 23, 2, 2, ii, ad 1 (# 150), *(S. Thomae Aquimatis Scriptum super Sententiis Magistri Petri Lombardi,* ed. P. Mandonnet and M. F. Moos, 4 vols., [Paris, 1929-47]); *de Ver.* 14, 7, ad 7.

[57] On the correlation of *materiale obiectum fidei* and *credere Deum,* cf. II-II, 2, 2, r. The ·phrase *credere Deum* in Thomas is hard to translate well. It is often rendered "to believe that there is a God." While it captures an essential concern Thomas has here, this is much too narrow, since *credere D1mm* is correlated with the material object of faith, which includes not only a wide number of affirmations about God, but about crerutures in relation to God as well.

[58] II-II, 2, 2, r.

[59] I have so far bracketed the role of the will in faith, although it is of course crucial in Thomas's wider account. It will come up at several points below.

purposes concerns the epistemic status oif .a person (such as a pre-Ohristian philosopher) who holds beliefs about God (in particula:r, the belief that thel"e is a God) on the basis of a demonstmtive argumeTIJt, but withowt reference to Scripture ·and creed. Is someone who believ;es God exists under these conditions jru:stifiedin so doing, with ;a resulting correspondence of mind ·and reality?

Thomas takes urp this question when he considers an objection which 'argues that *credere Dewm* ,should not be considered a pal"t of the distinctive act of Ohristian :faith. After all, people without Christian faith also hold beliefrs about God; for example, " to !believe that God exists is something unbelievers also do." [60] And sometimes unbelievers have good reasons, in the form of demonstrative arguments, for believing .thirut God exists.[61] But Thomas l"ejoots this whole line of reaisoning, because it is based on a false assumption. Unbelievers, even those with demonstrative arguments, do not in fact believe that God exists, or hold any other beliefs about God wh:ich Christians hold: *"nee vere Deum credunt."* [62] This is obviously not a l"emark 1about the psychology of the unJbeliever; nothing prevents the unbeliever foom uttering sentences in which "God" is the subject, and from affirming that these sentences are true. It is ·l'la1ther a l"emaJ."k about epistemic justification. Unbeliev;ers do not really *(vere)* believe that God exists, or

60 II-II, 2, 2, ob 3.

61 In the passage I am here considering (II-II, 2, 2, ob 3 and ad 3), Thomas does not refer specifically to the unbeliever who has a demonstrative argument for God's existence, but simply to the *infidelis* in general. However, parallel discussions in Thomas of the threefold act of faith indicate that it is precisely the claim to demonstrate God's existence which is Thomas's primary concern when he considers *credere Deum* outside of faith. Cf. *In* 4 *Rom.* I, (# 327) : "If someone believes that God exisb by various human reasons and natural indications *(signa),* he or she is not yet said to have faith" *(Super Epistolas Pauli,* Vol. I). When the act of faith is considered in the *Scriptum super Sententiis,* the objection just outlined is stated this way: "That God exists is proven demonstratively by philosophers. Therefore to believe that God exists is not part of the act of faith" *(In III Sent.* 23, 2, 2, ii. ob 2 [# 131]).

62 II-II, 2, 2, ad 3.

whatever else they may say about God, precisely because " they do not believe that God e:icists under those conditions which faith determines (*determinet)* ." [63] The "conditions " of which Thomas speaks here are simply all the other interconnected belfofs which constitute that Scriptural and creedal network of 1belie£ by which faith is defined (and .00 which the aot of faith is rela;ted as *oredere Deo)* .[64] The problem with the unbeliever'1s *oredere* is that it takes place apart from *oredere Deo,* and thus iapart :from the web of belief in which it properly belongs, fitness with which establishes the truth of beliefs about God. There iis 1a ilaiek of necess1axy coherence with other beliefs in the unbeliever's *credere*, and this entails that persons without faith are not in £act justified in helieving that God exists (ias Thoma;s puts is, they do "not really believe" it), no martter how strong the grounds they may have for holding the belief. Thus the *credere Deum* of the believer and the unbeliever iare not the 1same act, 1a:s the objection supposes, but differ in kind. " Unbelievers do not befileve that God exis,ts *(oredere Deum)* in the sense in which *(sub ea ratione)* this is parit of the act of faith." [65]

The relation ibetween coherence a;nd correspondence in Thomas'1soocount of religious truth is particularly dear at this point. At least with regard fo God, correspondence is the result of coherence; 1a given utter.anoe rubout God (e.g., "God exi:srts") only engenders 1an *adequatio mentis a;d rem* when the perison who makes it hoJds 1a number of other specifically Christian beliefs :about God. Where this kind of coherence between beliefs is absent (i.e., apar.t from " the conditions £aith de-

63 Ibid.

64 This is explicitly stated at *In III Sent.* 23, 2, 2, ii, ad 2 [# 151], in connection with the explicit denial that there is genuine *oredere Deum* with someone who has a demonstration of God's existence outside of faith: "Although the existence of God by itself *(simplioiter)* can be demonstrated, that God is three in one, and other things of this kind which faith ascribes to God (in *Dea credit),* cannot be demonstrated. But it is in accordance with these things that it is an act of faith to believe that God exists *(credere Deum)."*

65 II-II, 2, 2, ad 3.

fines ") the11e is no correspondence at all-even fo:r the person whose a;sserb:ion that God exis1ts is the ,oonclus[on of a sound argument. Thomrus makes this claim ,about the connection between coherence ,and correspondence by introducing ia technical Aristotelian point regarding the knowledge of " simple" things: " In simpJe things any failure of knowledge *(defootus cognitionis)* is in fact la total lack of knowledge." [66] God ii:s " simple " £or Aquinas in that he transcends the metaphysical distinctions which .apply fo. Cl'eated realities (especiially material ones), ,and which structure all of our knowledge. This is true in pa1.1ticu1arof ,fue distinc'bion between ,an individual substance and its essence: " In simple sUJbstances the thing *(res)* and its essence 1are rbhe same." [67] The notion that in " simple things " the essence *is* the parbicula.r leads Thomas to reflect on our ordinary knowledge of essences, which forms an analogy

66 Ibid. It might be argued here and in regard to what follows that Thomas's appeal to conditions of coherence for knowledge of God is dependent on and motivated by a prior commitment to a notion of metaphysical simplicity. If this notion is rejected as implausible or incoherent (as it often is), then it would seem that the need to talk about conditions of coherence would be obviated. I think, on the contrary, that his use of the notion of simplicity here and elsewhere is dependerut on and determined by his theological commitments, so that in this case he employs the notion of simplicity because he thinks the mind's correspondence with God takes place only " under the conditions faith defines," and not *vice versa.* It would take a complicated te:8Jtual argument to establish and explicate this claim about the function of appeals to simplicity in Aquinas, but two points ma.y be mentioned here. 1) Thoma.s's use of Aristotle in II-II, 2, 2, ad 3, as is usually the case in directly theological contexts, seems to be primarily illustrative rather than justificatory. 2) When applied to God, "simple" is not primarily a metaphysical description for Aquinas, but rather a metalinguistic stipulation rooted in the conviction of God's transcendence. It serves to qualify the application of all creaturely discourse to God, who is, so the faith maintains, the beginning and end of creatures but not himself a creature (cf. I, 2, pro.). On this point David Burrell's textual arguments seem persuasive; cf. his *Aquiinas: God and Action,* (Notre Dame, 1979). If this is correct, then it would be beside the point to reject Thomas's appeals to divine simplicity because they seem metaphysically unpersuasive.

67 *In 9 Met.* 11, (#1907), *(S. Thomae Aquiinatis in duodeoim Libros Metaphysioorum Aristotelis JJJwpositio,* ed. M.-R. Cathala and R. M. Spiazzi, [Turin, 1964]).

for the knowledge of " !Simple things." For Thoma:s, eiit:her we have the idea of " *homo"* as " *animal, rationale"* or we do not have it; tJhe:ve is no partial griwsp of essences. Similarly there is no partial knowledge of simple rthings; " For the mind to grasp *(attingere)* them 1and speak ,about them consrti,tutes truth, but nort to gria:sp these simple things is to he entirely ignorant of them."[68] In this our knowledge of " s:imple things " is quite different £rom our knowledge of ,fue "composite " objects of our sense experience. " Whoev,er does not grasp the essence of a s:imple thing does not know it ,at 1aH; it is impo1ssible to know one .thing about it, and not to know something else, since it is not .a, oomposirte reality."[69]

We cannot know God'1s essence, but ':Dhomws thinks these ideas ahout the knowledge of " 'simple rthings" can be used to explicate the w:ay in which the intellect oomes: to correspond to God in :liaiith. The tmnscenderut *prima veritas* has revealed himse1f, not simply in a concept or in isolated, 1a1bomic propositions, but in 1a complex body of propositions which are mutti1ally necessary for the knowledge of him. These propositions a.re related in .a manner analogous to the relation between the oomponeI1Jts of 1a definition; if one component is missing, 1bhe definition is not gria:sped, or perhaps something else is defined. Someone who could say in all seriousness, "My pig is a per·SOn " would show the11eby thait he or 1she had 1simply not grasped the meaning of " per:son."[1◇] Even le1ss, Thomas argues, does someone who s1a.ys "God exists" but does not iaffimn implicitly or explicitly that " God became incarnate in Jesus Christ" the reality of God.[11] This lack of coherence, the

[68] *In 9 Met.* 11, (# 1905). The analogy, is should be stressed, is between our grasp of the *meaning* of a definition and our grasp of the *reality* of a transcendent "simple thing" through whatever propositions constitute a minimally adequate description of it. In both cases there is an *adequa,tio mentis:* to the essence expressed by the definition, and to the "simple thing" described by manifold propositions.

[69] *In 9 Met.* 11, (# 1905).

[1◇] Thomas uses a similar example in *SOG* III, 118 (# 2904).

[11] Or, in regard to the Old Testament, who does not say "God will be-

defectus cognitionis of which Thomas speaks in II-II, 2, 2, ad 3, entaii1snot a parti,al, but a total lack of ool'l"espondencebe- tween the mind .and God. " God is maJcimally simple. There- fore whoever is mistaken about God does not know *(cognoscit)* God. example, someone who 1believesthat God is ia body does nort know rGod in any way, but .apprehends 1somethingelse in place of God." [72]

It will he reca:1led that Lindbeck iapperuls to the Thomistic passa;ge I have been .analyzing here .as .a precedent for his own account of intrasystematiic truth. [73] Lindbeck daims that the *meaning* of religious uttemnces is determined by rthe " total relevant context," necessarily including the speaker's other u:ttemnces 1and belie:lis,1so that a person who believes tha.t God exists without believing (for example) that this God has be- come incamate ii.n Jesus Olrnist does not mean by " God " whrut Christians mean, and ·so cannot refer to .the self-manifesting *prima veritas* who is the Christian God. Lindbeck's claim 1seems to sum up very nicely the force of Thomas's argument in II-II, 2, 2, !ad *3.* Indeed Aquinia:s·says as much when he opens the discussion there by mruintaining that the unbeliever's *credere* does not take plaice" sub ea *ratione* " of .the believer- one does not mean the same thing as the other when they " be- lieve thrut the:veis a God."

So £ar the discussion of Thomrus hrus focused entirely on linguistic ·coherence ·a;s a, necessary condition for ontofogical tru.th. The:ve iare 1a;lso parallels in Thomas to what Lindbeck regards ias the complementary condition of practical coherence, that of the :fitness of religious famguage wllith appmpciate prac- tices. The parallel, while it oould be developed a:t length, is .an obvious one. Recall that for Thomrus, the complete iact of faith engages the will ,as well ,a,s the intellect; the aspect of *credere in Deum* is [ntegl1al to the act itself. But *credere in*

come incarnate." On the different senses in which faith in Jesus Christ is necessary for right speech about God before and after his coming, cf. II-II, 2, 7, r.

12 *SOG* III, 118 (# 2904).

73 Cf. above, note 19.

Deum means precisely to believe out of *caritas,* out of that love which returns to God his own friendship il:JOward us and is rooted in God's gift of himself to us. " *Credere in Deum* exhilbits the orde1lingof faith :to its. end, which happens through 1ove *(per ca.rita,tem).*"[74] As -an iaspeot of the act of faith, *credere in Deum* describes the will moving the illitellect to assent to the articles, ·and to whatever coheres with the 1articles. The will moves the intellect to assent because it clings to the *prima veritas* manifested in the .articles and presented to it by the intellect rus the uLtimaitely fu1filling goal of the whole human being.[75] The diwne gift o[*caritas,* moreover, is the supTeme virlue, which order:s aH of our inward 1and outward acts towards the rewlization of *beautitudo* in union with the very God who is manifested in the articles of faith. So for Thomas the £aith by which the intellect is conformed to :vea1ityis impossible without the disposition to .a;ot in ways appvopriate to what is helieV<ed. " Our mind is borne towards God alone ,as its end ... Tu believe in God *(credere in Deum)* 1as one'ls end is distinctive *(proprium)* to faith formed ihy ,Jove. Faith formed in this way *is* the principle of all good works, and to that '.to believe ' is itself ca:lled the work of God." [16]

[74] *In 4 Rom.* 1, (# 327). Cf. also II-II, 1, 9, ob 3. On *caritas* as mutual love founded on God's sharing of his own blessedness with us, cf. II-II, 23, 1, r; I-II, 65, 5, r.

[75] Cf. *In 11 Heb.* 1, (#553): "The first truth is the object of faith, in which indeed the aim (finis) of the will consists, namely blessedness" *(Super 1iJpistola,s Pauli,* Vol. 2). On the *prima veritas* as both *finis* and *obiectum,* cf. Benoit Duroux, *La psychologie de la foi chez Saint Thomas d'Aquin,* (Paris, 1962), pp. 45-6.

76Jn *6 Ioannem* 3 (#901), (S. *Thomae Aquinatis Super Evangelium S. Ioannis Lectura,* ed. Raphael Cai [Turin, 1952]). The role of *caritas* in the act of faith is complicated by Thomas's use of the standard medieval notion of " unformed faith," i.e., of faith without *caritas.* The passage just cited from the *lectura* on John might suggest that for Thomas only the utterances and act of formed faith involve a conformity of the mind to divine reality, and that unformed faith fails to engender any such conformity. But Thomas does in fact hold that *fides info'T'mis* involves a genuine *adaequatio mentis ad 'l'em.* Formed and unformed faith are numerically the same *habitus,* such that there is no specifically cognitive difference between them: "The distinction between formed and unformed faith has to do with what pertains

fior Aqu;i.nasis thus more than intellectual assent based on the irutrasystemaitic coherence 0if explicit beliefis; it requires a specific practical and dispositional context a;s well. The con-

to the will, that is, to love (*oaritatem),* and not with what pertains to the intellect" (II-II, 4, 4, r).

It might seem as though Thoma.s's ascription of a genuine correspondence between the intellect and God even to *fides informis* is evidence that Thomas rejects a view like Lindbeck's, in which utterances using Christian categories must meet conditions of practical coherence in order to be true (cf. O'Neill's brief remarks in "Propositional Truth," pp. 431-2). But here it is necessary to distinguish different ways in which speech and practice can cohere (or fail to cohere). Lindbeck's crusader does not have what Thomas would call unformed faith; his act and utterance are better analyzed in terms of *infidelitas,* Thomas's account of which we have already discussed. The person who has unformed faith grasps the practical norms and paradigms of the Christian religion, which means that he grasps the way a complex range of practices and beliefs is supposed to fit together. But he himself fails, perhaps dramatically, to conform to these norms or apply them to himself in specific cases, and so is aware of a distressing gap between the practical requirements of the faith and the shape of his own life. Thus, to use Thomas's examples, that person has unformed faith who grasps with the clarity of faith that adultery is a mortal sin, but nonetheless commits adultery, or who rightly believes that there is forgiveness of sins. in the church, but fails to grasp that this applies in his own case, and so despairs of his own salvation (cf. II-II, 20, 2, r). Thomas explicitly contrasts such cases of unformed faith with *infidelitas.* The person in *infidelitas* does not gr.asp the practical structure of the religion while failing to conform to its paradigms, but rather substitutes a paradigm of his own devising, "a kind of opinion in accordance with his own will" (II-II, 5, 3, r; cf. above, note 53; cf. also II-II, 44, 1, r.).

Thus for Thomas, *fides informis* and *infidelitas* are two fundamentally different ways in which our practices and dispositions can fail to fit with the norms and paradigms of the universe described by the creed; the former does not preclude a genuine *adaequatio mentis ail rem,* but the latter does. Lindbeck makes a cognaite distinction: some practices. render the religious utterances associated with them false (thus the crusader), but a great deal of practical deficiency is compatible with ontologically true uses of Christian language. " Even mature Christians," Lindbeck writes, have only begun " to speak the Christian language " rightly and to be conformed to Christ in word and deed; "they have not yet learned to love God above all things and their neighbors as themselves, for this is what comes at the end of the road in eschatological fulfillment" *(ND,* p. 60). The parallel between Aquinas and Lindbeck regarding two different ways that practice can affect the truth of religious utterances is, to be sure, a formal one. Lindbeck's account does not require him to accept Thomas's distinction between *fides formata* and *informis* in detail.

formity of the intellect to God through ia network of p:mposi-tions is, to use Lindbeck's phrase, "par:t and parcel of a. wider ·conformity of the self to God," in which through *caritas* "our mind is borne towards God alone as its end." [77] It seems rthat for Aquin•as religious utterances (*credere Deum)* become prop-ositions conforming the mind to God under two conditions. 'l'\hey must cohere wiith the wider linguistic context defined by Scripture and the creeds (*credere Deo)* , 1and they must cohere wiith a range of ia.pp'l)opriate practices *(credere in Deum).* These two conditions are not only necesisary, but .together are ·sufficient; when they a.fie met the act of faith is complete, the mind is rightly ordered-that is, corresponds-to the divine :reality, insofar ·as that tis possible in ,this life.

IV

Despite the fact that ·a ooherentist reading of Aquinas on the justification of Christian beliefs iappears .to have srnbstan-tial textual suppo·rl, .this reading faces an obvious difficulty: Thomas sometimes seems fo reject it outright. Especially puzzling for this ·ooherentist re·ading is Thomas's frequent in-sistence ,tJ:rata person cannot .at the same time have both faith and knowledge *(soientia)* concerning .a given reality. "There cannot be .:faith and knowledge ·concerning tihe same thing." [78] *Fides* •and *soientia* a:re dii:ffe1lent mental acts for Thomas be-. cause they 1affirm:a given proposition by different means, and thus have di:ffe1lentformal objects. But Thomas insis1ts that the two .acts a,re nort only diffeTent, they arie incompatible. *Soientia* occu1ls when we affirm propositions .to be true on the basis of principles whose truth is self-evident to us *(principia per se nota,* as Thomas calls them). When this happens, both the principles iand the conclusions are said to be " 1seen" (*visum)* , and to compel 1the mind"s assent. [79] Faith Jacks this "vision"

11 *ND,* 65 (cf. above, note 28).

78 II-II, I, 5, r. More precisely, "the same person cannot have faith and knowledge *(saientia)* concerning the same thing" (II-II, 2, 3, ad 2).

10 Cf. II-II, 1, 5, r: ".All *saientia* comes through certain principles which are self-evident *(per aliqua prinoipia per se nota),* and consequently are

of what it 1a:ffirms. Yert what it affhms is certain, being rooted in the *prima veritas,* so " faith is a mean between knowledge and opinion," ha.ving the certa,i:nty of *scientia* but, like *oi>i,nio$* tacking the compelling cha11acter of self-evidence.[80] Now, Thomas dearly supposes that it is possible to have *scientia* (by way of demonstrative 1arguments) concerning at least some of those propositions which the believer affirms by .adhering to God's ·self-revelation in Scr.iptu11eand the creeds. Since he insists .thart one cannot have .both *soientia* 1and *fides* concerning the same proposition, the availability of demonstrative arguments leads Thomas to distinguish between those beliefs about God ("material objects" correlated with *credere Deum)* which .are a:1.1ticlesof faith in the strict sense, because they oannot be demonstmted, and those which are articles of faith only in la, limited sense, because they can be demonst:tiated (such as God':s erisrtenoe and unity). Indeed, Thomas underlines the point that regarding these latter ·beliefs one oan have *visio* in this life (since that is what *scientia* involves), even though most people may be limited to faith: " It can happen thart wh!ait is seen or known by one person, even in this life *(in statu viae),* is believed by another, who does not know *(novit)* it demonstratiV'ely."[81] One can hold these beliefs because one dings to God revealing himself *(credere Deo),* or because one ha:s a demonstration based on (for example) putatively self-evident principles of Aristotelian togic and physics, but one oannort, it seems, do both.

Thomas's disjunction between *fides* and *soientia* has suggested rbo nume:mus oommenmtors that the justification of any specific Christian belief in Thomas ihas nothing to do with 1ingwisticand practical coherence with the wider web of Chris-

seen *(visa).* Therefore whatever things are known (*scita)* are seen in some way (*aliquo modo)* ." As will become clear later on, the qualification *aliquo modo* is crucial here. Cf. also II-II, 1, 4, r: "Those things are said to be seen which by themselves move our intellect or sense to know them *(ad sui cognitionem)* ."

s-0 II-II, 1, 2, sc; cf. II-II, 1, 5, ad 4; II-II, 2, 1, r.

s1II-II, I, 5, r; cf. II-II, 5, 1, r; *de Ver.* 14, 10, r.

tian belief. lndeed, the possibility that this might be the case is usually not evien considered. With regard to those beliefs not explicitly exduded hy Thomas from *scientia*, the ultimate and proper criiterion of truth iis often assumed to be the aviail- :ability of syllogistic a:rgument based on principles naturally evident to the mind. Where la valid .argument of this kind (e.g., for God's exis:tence) is grasped, rthere is necessarily an *adaequatio mentis ad rem,* regardless of whether the person who grasps the 1argument shares in the wider network of belief .and practice (as, e.g., the rpre-Christiianphilosophers who made such arguments did not.) [82] Gilson speaks illor a host of others when he says concerning those Ohristian beliefs whic:h are " purely rational " that, " sinoe these do not presuppose faith, they can be extraoted from their theological context and judged, from the point of view of nrutuml l'lea:son, as purely philosophical conclusions. This is an erlremely important point !in that it enables us to undoostand how strictly meta- physical knowledge can be included in :a theological structure without losing its pmely philosophical nature." [83] Not only is .the jusrtification of Christian beliefs iby " natural :ve1a;son" (viz., isyllogisms) independent of the specifically Christian context of those beliefs, it is qualitatiV'ely superior ·to :any jusbificrutionthose beliefs can have through faith. The believer (or, pvesumahly, the unbeliever) who has a demon- strativ:e argument for (e.g.) God's existence ihas gvasped if:Jhe truth of that in a better way than is ·aviailableby faith, so that (allowiingfor occrusionalrelapses) he or she can leave faith rbehind,at least where that pa:vticu1arbelief is concerned. So Gilson glosses Thomais's disjunction of *fides* and *soientia* in this way: " Abstractly and absolutely speiaking, where reason

[82] After all, so the argument goes, Thomas frequently concedes claims like, "Some things which are part of the faith *(in fide continenter)* have been proven demonstratively by philosophers, for example that God exists, that God is one, and other things of this kind" (II-II, 1, 5, ob 3; cf. II-II, 1, 8, ob 1).

[83] Etienne Gilson, *The Ohristian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas,* tr. L. K. Shook, (New York, 1956), p. 9.

is able to understa;nd, faith has no further role to play." [84] All of this seems diametrically opposed to the ooherentist reading of rbhe *credere Deo* suggesrted by pa.is.sages such as those in which Thomas denies. thtat the unbeliever with demonstration in hand really believes that God exists. Can a ooherentist reaid-ing of the *credere Deo* be reconciled with Thomas's disjunction between *fides* and *scientia?*

To begin with, Thomais significantly qualifies the notion of *scientia* by distinguishing between *scientia* before and a.fter faith. This distinction is central, for example, to the way Thomas handles the question whether having ·reasons for what one believes reduces the "merit " of faith. Faith is meritori-ous for 11homas on ;account of the role the will plays in it, lead-ing the intellect ·bo •aicceptla network of propositions which axe not evident rto the 1intelleot. If someone requi1les convincing reasons he[ore that person is willing to believe, his act oif belief 1aicks merit, just because " he or she would not be readily will-ing to believe (or would not be willing •at •all) unless a com-pelling argument *(ratio humana)* were introduced." [85] But when a person seeks the support of *ratio humana* after £.aith, not .in order to believe, but because he or she clings to the self-revealing God, then the merit of faith is increased. " :for when .someone is readily willing to believe, he or she loves the truth which is believed, meditates on it, and embmces any reasons which can be discovered for it." [86]

Two things a1le suggested by these remarks. First, *fides* and *scientia* regarding a given article of faith (that is, one of the preambles) do not absolutely exclude one :another; there is a sense in which ·they ·are compatible. To be sure, " demonstra-tive :rea:sons" ádlter faith " diminish the sense in which faith is present *(diminuant rationem fidei)*, ibecause they cause what is proposed for belief to be evident *(apparens)*," .and the fomia.l object which defines faith *is* the *yrima veritas* precisely

[84] Gilson, *St. Thomas Aquinas,* p. 17.
[85] II-II, 2, 10, r.
[86] Ibid.

as *non visa.*[187] But while the relation of the intellect to one of :bhe preambles is changed by having .a demonst11ation after faith (we wiH see how sb:o:dly), the will's .adherence to the *prima veritas* remains what it w:as ;in faith prior to the demon- 'stmtion. And so the will continues to dispose the intellect to believe .all the articles (including the preambles) simply be- cause they are the 1self-disc1osureof the *prima veritas*, even when the believer hrus a demonstration-quite apa11t from the fact that <the demonst:mtion might ,always turn out to be Hawed. " Demonstrati¥e reasons ... do not diminish the sense in which love is present *(ra.tionem caritatis),* and in love the will !is IJ.'eady to believe these things even if they were not ev!i- dent (*si non apparerent)* ." [88]

Second, the distinction between the applioaition of *ratio humana* before and ,after :faith indicates that :the epistemic £01100 of demonstrativ<e syllog,isms is significantly different in the two different contexts. So Thomas says that in relation to God, *sc.ientia* is only possible iafter faith. " It is necessairy that a:ll who learn [from God] believe, in 011der that they may attain perfect kno,wledge *(scientiam)* ." [89] The *perfecta scientia* 0£ which Thomas speaks here the vision of God, ,tJhe unsurpruss- ab1e and 1absolutely fulfilling conformity of mind to reality. Aooo·rdingto Thomas's definition, faith is the beginning of the journey by which this supreme *correspondentia* !is realized; by faith "eternal life is ibeg.un in us." I:f faith is the necessary beginn!ingof the p:mcess whioh ends in complete *scientia,* then there simply is no *scientia, Dei,* no correspondence of the mind ito God, outside of faith. " In order that a person may attain to the perlect vision of blessedness, it is required *(praeexigi- trwr)* that he believe God *(c.redat Deo)*, just as ·a disciple be- lieves the maister who teaches him." [00] The rea1sonwhy genuine

87 II-II, 2, IO, ad 2; on *prima veritas* as *non visa* and faith as *non ap- parentwm;* cf. II-II, 4, 1, r.

88 II-II, 2, 10, ad 2.

s0 II-II, 2, 3, r.

110 Ibid. Cf. *In de Trin.* 3, 1, r, where the point is made even more clearly. " Since the aim of human life is blessedness, which consists in the full knowl-

scientia rega:rding God ca:n only come after £aith is by now fiamili:ar: only the believer means by "God" whrut one musrt mean in order to refer ,to God at a:ll. Thus Thomas insists, for example, that the unity of God must be reckoned among the artiicles: of fraith, even though it has repeatedly heen demon- hy philosophers. defines the " oond[tioll!s under which" one oan "truly believe" that God is one. "We h01ld many belie£s about God by fai,th which philosophers arie not able to, investigate by natura;l reason, for example concerning his prowdence and omnipotence, aind that he alone is to be worshipped. But ;all these things are !included under the article concerning God'·s unity." [91] This is not to deny that a person outside faith cain have a formally vrulid argument, based on valid principles, which concludes with the proposli:tion," God is one." The meaning tms proposition can have " under the conditions" of nrutural reason is, however, quite limited. T. C. O'Brien puts the point nicely. "The only na:tuml theology po,ssible epistemologically is a metaphysics: that can ,attain an oiblique, knowledge of ' the principle of its ·subject,' a knowledge, i.e., of the dependence of heing on a unique source." [92] But the Christirun who oonfosses that God is one, with or without la demonstl'lation, is never 1speak:ing of a remote and opaque unitary sorurce of being. The Christian and the philosopher both say " God a.s: one," but .because they do so under dillerent " conditions," ibhey in fract hoM difierent belie:lls ahout God.[93] Clea:rly, the implication. is that while rt:he

edge *(oognitione)* of divine things, in order for human life to be directed towards blessedness, it is necessary from the very beginning *(statim a prinoipio)* to have faith in those divine things which one expects to know fully when this ultimate perfection is reached" *(.Sanoti Thomae de Aquino Ewpositio super Librum Boethii de Trinitate,* ed. Bruno Decker, [Leiden, 1955]). Cf. also *BOG* III, 152, (# 3245).

91 II-II, I, 8, ad I.

92 T. C. O'Brien, *Faith,* in: St. Thomas Aquinas, *.Summa Theologiae,* 60 vols. (London, 1974), vol. 31, p. 44, note 1.

93 This difference is ,already adumbrated in the distinction between philosophy and *saora dootrina* which opens the *Summa Theologiae.* There can be *theologia* in both philosophy and *saora doctrina,* indeed in some cases

philosopher's demonstraition outside of faith is formally valid, !in the philosopher's own hands it is incapable of yielding any *adaequati,o mentis* ad *rmn* with regard to God. In the hands of .the believer, the same demonstration can indeed yield *adaequatio mentis ad rem,* bwt it can do so only because it takes place in the wider context of .faith. It appears that Thomas's disjunction of *fides* ·and *scientia* does not imply that *scientia* regarding God is possible independently of :faith, that is, apart from conditions of coherence defined by faith.

However, ·the fact remains that *scientia* is a different sort of mental .act £rom *fides.* The distinguishing feature of *scientia* also seems fo make it a kind of knowledge which is superior to *fides:* it is brused on or ,self-evidence, while £aith is not. If my reading of Thomais up to this point is baisically correct, then 1it will clearly be impossible for the believer who has demonstr.ation:s for the preambles simply to lea.ve f allith behind, as a ·reading Like Gilson's suggests; the efficacy of the lheliever's demonstmtion in conforniing his or her mind to reality depends upon its pla.ce in the who1e Christiam web of belief. But does the believer who h!as la demonstration of one of the airticles nonetheless know God in <a higher or better way (at least with respect to that article) than the believer who lacks such a demonstration?

Here 1agiain, Thomas qualifies the disjuction between *fides* and *scientia* by introducing a cr:uci.rul distinction. To have *scientia* is to be ·eer:bruin of whait one affirms, specificwlly of the conclusion of an iargument.[94] In *scientia,* cerbainty comes from

both may make the same statements about God (*"de eisdem rebus ... traatwnt* "). But they do so in different ways and on different grounds, philosophy "by the light of natural reason," *sacra doctrina* "by the light of divine revelation." As a result, the two statements differ in kind (have different formal objects) ; even when they use the same words, philosophy and *sacra doatrina* are not saying the same thing. " The theology which belongs to sacred doctrine is of a different genus from that theology which is proposed as a part of philosophy" (I, 1, 1, ad 2) .

04 In the broadest sense for Thomas to be certain of what one believes is simply to be firmly convinced of it. " Certainty is nothing other than the adherence *(determinatio)* of the intellect to one thing" *(In III Sent.* 23, 2,

" vision," that is, from the compelling clarity with which human reason igrasps self-evident principles *(p!Jincipia per se nota)* a;:nd follows a valid logicail form to reach ,a conclusion on the basis of 1those principles. *FUles* lis distinguished from *scientia,* precisely 1booauseiit lacks this " vision," yet Thomas insists that *fides* is more certain than *scientia,* not less. " A person i:s :much moire certain rubout what he hears from God, who cannot he deceived, than rubout what he sees hy his own ['eason, which can ibe deceived." [95] Properly speaking *(aimpliciter,* as Thomas 'says), faith is a higher r.fornn of cognition than *scientia,* because faith apprehends the *pri,ma ve!Jitas* itself. In God's self-revelation, we 1appl1ehend the source and measure of all truth, which .as such is intrinsically absolutely centaiin,.and so is oapable of producing the greartest cei"tainty tha,t any intellect can possiibly-attain.[96] There is ·also a derivative and secondary sense *(secundum quid,* in phrase) !in which *scientia* is a higher form of ·cognition than faith. As we have seen, the object which defines *scientia (p!Jincipia per se nota,* gathered through sense experience) is more evident ;to the

2, iii, sol. [# 155]). In this genera.I sense certainty is quite compatible with mistaken belief; "Certainty of adherence ••. belongs not only to true faith, but also to false faith." *Quodlibetum* VI, 4, 1, r *(S. Thomae AquinatiB Quaestiones Quodlibetales,* ed. R. Spiazzi, [Turin, 1956]). This does not mean, of course, that beliefs held in *fides vera* or in *soientia* might turn out to be false, but rather that certainty in this sense is not the criterion for determining whether ,a belief is held in *fides vera* or *soientia.*

[95] II-II, 4, 8, ad 2. Remarks of this kind about the fallibility of human reason, which Thomas often makes when contrasting a belief about God held by supernatural faith with the same belief held by demonstrative argument, indicate that while in principle *soientia* is based on a kind of vision, in practice that vision may prove extraordinarily difficult to obtain. Thus, " The habit of faith •.. is indeed more capable of bringing about [assent] than a demonstration. Even if the demonstration does not yield a false conclusion, nevertheless people often mistakenly suppose something to be demonstrated which is not" *(In de Trin.* 3, 1, ad 4).

[96] " That is said to be more certain which has a more certain cause." Therefore faith is more certain than the intellectual virtues (*intelleotus, soientia,* and *sapientia,* as distinguished from the *dona Spiritus Sanoti* of the same names), "because faith relies on divine truth, but these three virtues rely on human reason" (II-II, 4, 8, r).

mind in its current state than the self-manifested *prima veritas,* which infinitely e:X!ceeds our intellectual caprucities?[97] Thomas nicely summarire.s the distinct senses in which *fides* and *sdentia* can each be said to be " higher " than the other when he says, " Objecbively, *fides* more e:x:ceUent than *sc.i-entia,* since its object is the first tmth. But *smentia,* involves a more perfecrt manner of knowing (*11Wdum oognosc.endi)*." [98]

1t appears that the only form of knowledge qualitatively superior to :liaith would be one which like foith had ihe *prima veritas* as its objecrt, but which appvehended the *prima veritas* in its intrinsic 1seU-evidence,so that the *prima veritas* became the content of a *visio.* At first glance Thomas appears to aS1ccibe such a form of knowledge to the believer who demons:brates the preambles, when he speaks of those truths about God which can be " ,seen . . . even in this liife."[99] But the only form of knowledge in which :liaiithis actually surpassed ·and the *prima veritas* becomes self-eviident is the beatific vision itself.[100] Syllogistic demonstrations do not cause the eristence or unity of God to be " seen " in this sense at 1all, but only in the sense that these beliefs, already certain for us on oocou.nt of God's self-revelation, become tied in a logically tight Wray ito beliefs :arising from our eX!perienceof the natural world, beliefs which '.Dhomas are undeniable for us.[101]

97 "In another way," Thomas writes, " certainty can be considered subjectively (*ero parte subieoti)* ; in this sense that is said to be more certain which the human intellect grasps more fully" (II-II, 4, 8, r). The greater subjective certainty of the principles of *soientia,* however, is due to the *weakness* of our intellect: "Nothing prevents that which is more certain by nature from being less certain to us, on account of the weakness (*debilitatem)* of our intellect" (I, 1, 5, ad 1).

os I-II, 67;3, ad 1.

119 Cf. above, note 81.

100 As we have seen, the beatific vision is the goal of faith, the end of the journey which begins (and must begin) with faith. Only when the goal of *beatitud<J,* is reached does there arise a vision in which faith is no longer necessary (Cf. I-II, 67, 3, r; I, 58, 7, ad 3).

1il1 Of. II-II, 180, 5, r: "In no way is our contemplation in the present life able to attain to the vision of God's essence." Cf. also I, 12, 11; I-II, 5, 3. Thomas is also explicit that *soientia* through demonstrations does not

Making these connections does not bring the believer any closer to the *prima, veritas* than she or he would be without the demonstrations; only the vision of God in eternity can do that. *Scientia* is not necessary in order to a.ttain the *visio Dei,* which is begun in this 1ife 'by :faith, and would seem to make no oon-it:riibutionto 1attaining it. *Fides formata* is sufficient, to wlhlch God in aU believers .adds his own gifts of *intellectus, scienti,a,* 1and *swpientia,* sealing the certainty of £aith in preparation for its perfection in ·the *visio* Dei.[102] On Thomas's own account, he enjoys no grea;ter intellectual *corrrespondentia* with God, *ceteris paribus,* than does the unlettered charwoman who cleans up a.fter him, even at thoS'e points where his *corrrespondentia* differs from hers because he hrus demon:st1 1rutive arguments.

This does not preclude the claim that there is a. sense in which *scientia* alter faith is la higher form of cognition thian faith itsel£. In order .to understand this, it ii:s necessary to consider rthree 1aspects of cognition, according to which cognitive •acts and habits can be distinguished, related, and graded. Cognition can be considered with regard to its subject matter or mntent *(ex pa,rte obiecti),* with rega.rd *to* the means by

bring the *visio Dei* (and thus *beatitudo)* which is the goal of faith; cf. I·II, 3, 6; I, 12, 12; *SOG* III, 39, (# 2167). Interpreters of Aquinas regularly overlook this important point. In a recent article, for example, Nicholas Wol·terstorff rightly argues that Thomas's account of the justification of reli·gious belief should not be confused with later " evidentialist " accounts {of which he takes Locke to be typiool) ; believers do not need " evidence " (specifically, demonstrative arguments) as a condition for holding beliefs about God. But despite Thomas's explicit denials, Wolterstorff assumes that when someone does have such "evidence," he has attained the highest possible level of human cognition, namely the vision of God. Thus, he claims, if the arguments for God's existence turned out to be unsound, the result would be that the believer's " longing to ' see' the truth about God will lack ful·fillment in his earthly existence" (" The Migration of Theistic Arguments: From Natural Theology to Evidentialist Apologetics," Robert Audi & Wil·liam J. Wainwright, eds., *Rationality, Religious Belief, and Moral Commit·ment,* [Ithaca, NY, 1986], p. 80; *ci.* pp. 71-5). Thomas differs from "evi·dentialism" a good deal more dramatically than allows.

[102] On the *dona Spiritus Sanati* and the certainty of faith, cf. II-II, 8, 8, ad 3. On the difference between infused and acquired *soientia,* cf. II-II, 9, 1, ad 1.

which the content is known or affirmed *(ex parte medii),* and with regard <to the ,epistemic condition of the subject who knows *(ex parte subieoti)* .[103] The highest form of cognition, by which ,all others are measured, is the vision of God *in patna.* Here God as first truth is both the content and the means orf ·cognition; in the *visio Dei* we will know God directly th:voughhis own essence. As a. result the *prima verita.s* will be utterly self-evident to us. We will be in :a subjective condition of absolute cerllainty 1about,the content of our knowledge, siince our mteRect will be moved by the intrinsic clarity and luminosity of the *prima veritas* itself. Fa,ith too has the *prima veritas* not only for its subject matter, hut also for ii.ts means. "Faith ... relies upon divine truth rus the means *(medio)* ." [104] As we have seen, this makes £a.ith *simplioiter* the highest form of cognition we can have *in via;* it has "the more certain cause." But the *prima veritas* is the *medium* of faith indirectly, through its linguistic ,se1f-ma:nifostation,rather than directly, through its essence. In ii.ts lingmstic form, the *prima veritas* is not seM-evident to the intellect, and so does not compel the illtehlect to accept the content 0£ £aith. It is insitead the grooed will which moves the ,intellect. Thus the believer is in a subjectiv;e condition of certainty produced by the *prima veritas,* without the self-evidence the *prima veritas* will have for iher or him *in patria. Scientia* of the preaimbles a,lso has God as lits 1subject mwtter, .and like faith is dependent on famguage. Biut the means by which *soientia*,assents to the preambles (e.g., " *Deus est")* is principles which impress us 'M undeniable in the coul"Se o[our experience of .the natuiiai world (such as " ev;erything which is moved ,is moved by another " in .the *prima* via) . '.Dhese principles are capable of moving the intellect to certainty a.bout what it affirms, although the subjective condition of certainty generated by our interaiction. with the

[103] I-II, 67, 3, r. Here "content" is equivalent to "material object," and "means " to "formal object."

[104] II-II, I, 1, r. This reliance upon God's self-revelation as the measure of truth is, of course, *oredere Deo.* Cf. above, note 36.

natu1 1al world is tenuous and evanescent compared with that produced by the *prima veritas* itself. Thus the sense in which *scientia* of the preambles is a higher form of cognition than faith in them. With regard to the epistemic condition of the subject *scientia* is a bertter analogy to the final *visio* than faith is, since it inv;olves ,a kind of self-evidence, while faith does not. *Scientia* of the preambles p1 1o·Viides the believer with a famt :taste of what i,t will he like for the mind to be over-1w:hei1med by the intrinsic lighrt and self-evidence of the *prima veritas.* So Thomas describes the believer's quest for *soientia* of the prieambles as an experience of joy, rooted in love for tJhe itruth believ;ed![105] But fruith is the better .analogy with regaird to the *medium,* since we believe *in via* by the same means th:rorugh whlch we shall know *in patria,* when the *prima veritas* becomes self-evident to us. Thus *scientia* is a llinited analogy to .the final *visio,* 1aild not at all a parrtial possession of it, nor .an 1adv;ance towiards it, wh!ioh can only come by means of the *prima veritas* itse1£.

A oontempor:ary paxa.illel to .the Thomistic preambles may help to clairify the respective senses in which *fides* ·and *scientia* Call each be considered the higher form of knowledge. One can accept .the truth of the proposition, " Jesus of Nazareth exiisted," because it is imbedded in the web of belief arlicrulaited in Scripture and creed (:f.aith in the proper sense of *credere Deo),* and one can a1so ·accept it on histovical grounds (sci-entia-assuming that Jesus' exiistence is historically "demon-strable") .[106] A be1ieving hist<M.'ian is likely to be plea;sed at historical evidence tha.t Jesus eristed, in a way that a non-believer, *qua* historiail, might not be. Further, the community needs competent historians and philosophers, even though only a few of its members will ever become expert in these crafts. But having historioa.:1 knowledge does not make the believer

lo5 Cf. II-II, 2, 10, r.

1oa It is important *to* recall that we continue to deal with *soientia* after faith, so that what one means by "Jesus" is the proposition "Jesus existed" necessarily includes descriptions like " is God incarnate" and "is my re-deemer." For these there can be no historical demonstration.

more certruin o£ Jesus' existence than he oil' she already is in faith. Noil' would it seem to contciburte to the fulfillment for which the believer hopes, where " we shall be like him, for we shall ·See hiim :as he is " (I Jn. 3: 2) . That ifuture vision perfects the relation :to Jesus Christ begun by faith, but it supercedes .any merely historical knowledge of Jesus that we may haV'e.101

Thoma.s's disjunction between *fi<les* and *scientia* of the preambles does not, it seems, have the implications .that standard 1readings find in it. 1n fact the two 'are :finaLly incompatible only 1afonga very naril'owf,ront. They *differ* because they have difforent rormal obj·ects, that is, rthey hold beliefs by different means. But this does not itself make them incompatible. 1t is possible, Thomas siays, fo:r a pel'son to- the same belief by two fonnally different means.[108] *Fides* and *scientia* are *incompatible* !insofar :a:s rthe way certainty acises in each ca:se excludes the simu1taneous presence of the other. In £aith certainty aimses i:from the graced will mo-ving the intellect; in *scientia* self-ev.ident principles move the intellect to ce1J1ta:inty without the direct action of the will. 'Dhe will cannot both act and not act at rth:e same time regarding the ·same belief, so to that extent *ft.des* and *scientia* are incompatible. But .the will clinging to the first truth 1oontinues to support the intellect even when ·the fatter bias *scientia;* in faith a person is continually ":reaidy to 1believe" even those things which ,rure demon1stmted, ruIJd j,t requires no- new act oi:f ·will to 1believe should the demonst1 1a:tions lose their power to iconvince![09]

101 This is not, of course, to be confused with the view that faith has no interest in whether Jesus of Nazareth actually existed, or in historical facts more generally (as Tillich, for example, is sometimes taken to have held). The point is rather that faith does not require technical historical grounds in order to be certain of Jesus' existence, yet it will nevertheless naturally seek such grounds.

10s "It is possible for one person .to know *(cognosoere)* the same conclusion by a probable means and by a demonstrative means," i.e., to have both opinion and knowledge about the same thing at the same time (I-II, 67, *8,* r).

109 Cf. II-II, 2, 10 ad 2 and above, note 88.

To recall the 1,anguageI have used to interpret both Lindbeck and Aquinas, .in faith one holds beliefs about God and c:veatures *(credere Deum)* precisely because they cohere with the wider web of Ghrisitian belief, and especially with those centml, often Cll'edallyal'iticulated beliefs which strnoture and define a Clwisti1an u;nderstanding orf .reality *(oredere Deo).* When the believer acquires *scientia* at one or another point within the web of ,belief,even at that point she or he continues to hold the belief in question only *insofar as* it coheres with the wider network of belief, including much which cannot be demonstrated. Only in this way does any ,sentence have a ·definite meaning mvmue of which any *adaequatio mentis ad rem* possible. However, the believer who has *scientia* does not 'accept certaiin pil'Opositions (for eXJample, "God exists," " Jesus existed,") only *beca:use* orf their rpla.ce in the pattern of central Christian belie£s, but also because they cohere with other beliefs which seem persuasive to us, although they are not distinctively Christian ones (fur example, about the nature of motion or the history of early first century . To attaiin *soientia,* of this kind is not to .attain a higher relatiion-s:hip with the object of one's bel1ief, much less to lea,ve the network of Chriistiran belief behind or to provide an external foundation for it. To seek *scientia* !in Thomas's sense is to praictice what Lindbeck oalls "intratextual theology," in which one " Tedescmbes realirty within the scriptural framework mther than translating Scripture into exfu:-asoriptural categories. It is the text, so to speak, which absorbs the world, rather than the wo:rld the text." [110] *Soientia* aims to establish that what we think we (and others) know fits with the network of belief articulated in Scripture ·and creed (1and not the re'"erse), which is rto say that what we think we know has a place in the one real world of 'the God who mrukes himself manifest to us thvough Scripture iand creed. When we seek *scientia,* in other WOJ:'ds, we try to " take every thought oap-rbive to obey Christ" (II Cor. 10:5). Thomas ms quite clear

mJ *ND,* p. 118.

iabout :bhis. ffis commentary on this P1aulineepigram consii.sts of :a single sentenoe: "'llhis hruppens when la pel"Son subjects *(supponit)* what he kno.ws (wit) entirely to the ministry of Christ .andof faith." [111]

As with Lindbeck, so also with Thomas, I have 1attended to the justification of Christian belle£ .at the micro level rather than the macro level. But if, as I have argued, Thomas sees Christianity as a complex netwo['k of beliefs and practices in which any one be1ief can only be undersrtood ,and affirmed in its connection with a variiety of other beliefs and p;ractices, it is to be expected 1tha:the will see the justification of the entire Ch:ci:sti1anscheme hoJistically. Here I will simply mention one imporitant respect in which this is so. The Christian web of belief is *c<miprehensive* for Thomas; there is no practice or p11oposition which cannot be understood and evaluated in Christian terms. As we have just obseil'vedin the ease of *sci-enti,a1* this is ,a complex and on-going process, in which the be-liever must come .to grips with powerful claiims to truth from other communities of belief and practice. But the comprehen-sivce character of Christian belief implies that there is no ex-ternal standard of truth, no v;antage point, from which the truth or falsity of the Christian 1schemeas :a whole ooruld be decisively assessed. On the contrary, it is pant of the 1ogiicof Christian belief for Thomas to see the criteria of truth as internal to the Christian scheme. So he says that *sacra doctrina,* orienrted,around the iar:ticlesof £aith, is the high-est wisdom; " it does not pertarin to it to prove the principles of the other sciences, but solely to assess *(iudicare)* them, for whatever in other sciences is found to be opposed to- ithe truth of this ·science is entirely rejected a:s false." [112] In Thomas'

111In10 *II Oor.* 1, (# 352). *Super JJJpistolasPauli,* Vol. 2.

112I, 1, 6, ad 2. The student of *sacra doctrina* simply strives for a con-ceptually precise and argumentatively explicit form of the *sapientia* given to all believers as a *donum Spiritus Sancti* (cf. I, 1, 6, ad 3). So Thomas says that " the person who knows that which is the highest cause simply speaking (*simpliciter),* namely God, is said to be wisest of all (*sapiens simplioiter),* since he is able to assess and to order all things according to divine rules" (11-11,*45,* 1, r).

day, the :prtime candidate :for an external sta:ndaxd of truth was the philosophy of Artiistotle. But Thomas's treatment of Aristotle iis m fact a powerful e:x;ample of how a signrifi.cantly different ;sy;stemof beiliefcan be put to theological use by being understood and ev<aluated in Christian terms, or .to use Lindbeck's language, by being dl'lawn into the bib1ical world. In particular the eprisitemicstatus of &-istotle's philosophy is by ,its assimilatiOIIIinto a Christian understanding of the world. Confronted with the demonstrative aJ.'gumentsof the philosophers, " *Sacra <loctrina* uses authorities of this kiind •as extrins:ic .and pil.'Ohableargumell!ts."[113]

In order fo be fully oonvincing, the reading of Thomas on the truth and justification of Christian belief that I have outlined here would have to be tested <againsta wealth of relev<ant Thomistic texts. Indeed, there are few areas orf Thomas' thought whfoh do not heail.'in ·some way on this nest of issues.[114] There is also ,a wide ,11ange of !interpretations of Thomas which needs to be taken .into account; here I have been able to deal directly only with the sort of reading proposed by O'Neill. And the •argument presented here mises numerous questions about the persurasiveness of the position that I have mainrbained Lindbeck 1and Aquinas basically share, however differently rbhey articulate it. Hut I have attempted to show at least that Lindbeck's proposal ·about ·religious and theological truth is neither implrausiblenor novel.[115]

[113] I, 1, 8, ad 2. This change in the epistemic status of "natural reason" and "philosophical authorities " is here described by Thomas precisely in terms of II Cor. 10:5.

[114] For an argument that Thomas's Christology evinces the pattern of intrasystematic coherence as the primary condition for ontological correspondence, cf. Bruce D. Marshall, *Ohristology in Oonff,iat: The Identity of a Saviour in Rahner and Barth,* (Oxford, 1987), pp. 176-89.

[115] In addition to George Lindbeck, whose response to this article follows, I would like to thank Kathryn Tanner and Frederick Stoutland for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts.

RESPONSE TO BRUCE MARSHALL

GEORGE LINDBECK

There is an abundance of il'iches in Bruce Marshalrs essay. He makes me understand hoth myse1f and Aquinas hetter than I biaid done hefore; and, interestingly, it is chiefly hy his exegesis of St. Thomas that he does :bhis. If I had referred more to the Thomistic ideas he elucidates when I wirus writing *Natrure of Dootrine,* it would have !been a better hook.

What he calls the " somewhat notorious " example of the crusadeT"s *Christus est Dominus* is a good oase in point. It would ihave helped if I had made dear that I was thinking in medieval [ashion of a an individual rutterance, the product of a pa•riticular:second 1aJct of the intellect, the ·acl of composing and dividing, of judging ·such and such rto ibe rthe ca,se. In Aquinas' intellectual setting, judgments, not sentences in ·ab-straiction from acls of affirmation, were propositions capruble of being true or f.a1se. Many of my ·rerudershad a more modern or "Platonic " understanding of rpropositions, and therefore missed the force of the e:xJam:ple·as Marshall so carefully and rightly explains it.

Among his contributions, the major one, however, is system-•a1tically to introduce into the disCUJssion the distinction be-tween the " truth " and " justification " of beliefs or pI'oposi-tionS.- Once the point is made, it is evident that " alethiology" and " epistemology " (to mention a cognate, though not tical distinction) ·are, at least in some contexts, partially inde-pendent variables. There is no one-to-one relation between different meanings or theories of truth and the v:arious views as to how we know such ·and such is true. It was my failure to make this point explicit which confosed Fr. Colman O'Neill, of blessed memory, ias well as a good many other readers (1as Bruce Marshall quite rightly notes, though, with excessive

kindness to me, he !blames the ,readers rather than the 'author for the misunderstanding) .

Once iclarfiied, as it has lbeen done hy Mr. Marshall, the issue turns on ·whether ,a classical " correspondence " theory of truth can be ioombined ,with, to empfoy O'Neill's terminology, the use of "coherentist" and " pragmatist " epistemological criteria in justifying rbelieis. I ·am not sure ·that this is possible for those who e:xdude any reference to an idea.I observer or knower (whether real or hypothetical) when defining truth, hut for any theist r.for whom God is *prima veritas,* as he was for Aquinas, the answer is dearly in the affirmative. In God, and only in God, are knowledge and reality, not only in correspondence, hut directly known to correspond. Only in him do truth ·and knowledge of truth, aleth:iofogy and epistemology, ooindde. In 1human knowledge *in via,* in contrast, there is always a gap. Our ibe1ieTs may correspond to reality, hut we are justified in holding that they do so, not by directly seeing the correspondence, 1but by some other means. That those other means might in part or w:hole be coherentist or pragmatist cannot :be e:xduded *a priori.*

It is true that in the caise of an Aristotelian 1such 1as Aquinas, coherence •and rpmctise 1are not explicitly accorded major roles in the epistemological justification of natural kno·wledge or *scientia,* yet even here they are not e:xduded. Nothing can quali[y ais 1an item of knowledge unless it coheres with all other *scientia,* and right pra.ctice (i.e., training in virtue) is indispensible :llor ethical kno,wledge. Nor need one cease fo be an Aris,totelian, 1as far ·as I can see, if one accepts the contempOO'ary oommonpJaice that sense experience itself is heavily dependent on linguistic and non-linguistic pmctices which are in part ·acquired rthrough variaible forim:s of aicculturation and not simply through the actualization of 1genetically encoded propensities. One could still, despite this increased emphasis on prwctiice.and on coherence with webs of 1belief,ibe 'able to affum in good Aristotelian ,fashion tha;t the knowledge naturally accessible to ra:t]onal animals such ,as we a.re is primarily justified

iby reference to sense experience in conjunction with principles *per se nota* (as philosophers such as ffi}ary Putnam or Philip Alston seem to me in effect to do) .

Mr. Marsha1l's thesis, needless to ·say, is not in the least dependent on this suggestion rbhat .a " cultural-linguistic" account of natuml knowledge (which would have place for a "descr1ptive metaphy:s<locs," to use Strruwsons term) is compatible with Aquinas' Airistotefia.nism. llis concern, like mine in *Nature of Doctrine,* is with religious knowledge, the knowledge of faith. Here Aquinas is unequivocal: sense experience in conjunction 1with .self-evident rprinciplesrplays no role in the justification of religious beliefs. Christians, to be sure, affirm iby faith that what is naiturally knowruble does not contradict and they may spend muoh time, as Aquinas did, in showing .by means of reaison that this is the case; ibut this coherence with natural knowledge, as Marshall reminds us, is at most supplementary aTIJd non-necesisairy.The necessary and sufficient pU!blicly :ruccessible criteria for what is true in the realm of are entirely what we would now reall uoherentist and pragmatic. Once stated, it is hard to see how this could he denied. 'nhe 1beautyof Marshall'.s piece is that he has had the wit to see this point, and document it felicitously.

In rereading that documentation under Mr. Marshall's guidance, I !h.a.ve found myself thinking that my "cultural-linguistic " account of religious belief is in ipart a clumsy rendition in modern philosophical raTIJd sociological idioms 0£ what Aquinas often said more fully and more precisely long ·ago. I mean this quite Hterally. It is not simply that some of the contemporary intellectual developments on which I have drawn ihappen rto 1converge with some Thomistic ideas, hut rather that my utilization of the contempora1ry developments has lbeen heavily influenced by rtihe reading and teaching of St. Thomas that I have drone since my undergraiduate days four decades aigo. Aquinas was a constant, even if background, presence while I wrote *NafJure of Doctrine.* I intended what I wrote to he read in la :way congruent 1with the interpretation

of him which Marshall here presents. Thus :by showing how St. 'Ilhomas can he understood in la way consistent with *Nature of Doctrine,* Bruce Marshall has explained the view of truth which I had in mind heUer than I explained it myself. Authors ·are rarely ihlessed with such 1.'eade:ns,,and I am not only grateful hut delighted with the result.

AQUINAS AND HEIDEGGER: THE QUESTION OF BIDLOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY

VINCENT GUAGLIARDO, O.P.

Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology
Graduate Theological Union
Berkeley, Oalifornia

IN IDS BOOK, *Hediegger and Aquinas: An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics,* John D. Caputo recommends a " deconstruction" of Aquinas' philosophical theology in order to let .the true ·element orf his thought, mysticism, come to the fore. Caputo argues persuasively that Aquinas' thought, expressed ·as .it is in the garh of metaphysics, cannot escape Heidegger':s critique of met:aiphysfos as "onto-theo-logioal ". Aquinas, no more thoo .any other thinker of the West, has succeeded m avoiding this iorgorttenness. Those Thomi:sts who have tried to argue that Aquinas .is an exception rto this critique, Caputo oontends, have not succeeded in presenting their case. The verdict o.f Heidegger stainds. The on:ly reoourrse left is thart of deconstruction, which Capurto presents ais gaining mther than losing the true Aquinas precisely because deconstruction .allows us to move from the said (the metaphysical dimension) fo rbhe uil!said (the mystical dimension) of Aquinas' thought. The uns1aiid is the kernel, the center a;ro:und which whatever Aquinas says moves. It is the true dimension which his thinking il'eally seeks: union with God, in both the union and God 1are themselves rineff1a;ble.

There is, however, .a disturbing problem which I find wti:th Capui;o's conclusion. This problem does not have to do with his oonte!lltion that the true kernel of St. Thomas' thought !is mysticail. Ra.ther, the problem concerns what is being disen-

[1] See John D. Caputo, *Heidegger and Aquinas: An }j}ssay on Overcoming Metaphysics* (N.Y.: Fordham University Press, 1982), pp. 211 & 247-8.

gaged and put out of play tin the deconstrrucrb.ion,namely: philosophical thoology.[2] What are the iimplicatfons of such a movie? Are they desirable for theology? Ought we and oan we, la;s Caputo suggests, disengage ,and leave behind St. Thomas' philosophical theology because metaphysical without there being any true loss? Might we be facing a;n impoverishment of another kind: in a moI"e " radical " seeking of the dii.vine might we not be losing something m 'a foI"getfulness of ourselves as, .after all, omy human? Is not this something precisely the ,realm of the *humanitas* of the *homo huma,nus,* which Heidegger's thinking seeks Ito point out and draw us closer to, where *humanitas* refers to our necessary trelation to Heing, from whlch relation we as humans cannot detach ourselves so long as we are " auf die Erde " ?[3]

The

In beginning our inquiry I would like to distinguish three different regions of human engagement in which the overlappii.ng of one onto the other ii.s not .always easy to discern: philosophy, phl1osopihioal theology and mysticism .. I want to say "iphilosophical theology " and not simply " theology " because I think that it ii.s not possible to thoologize without at the same time also philosophiizing. I 1think St. Tihomas thought this as well. 'l\hat is why his theology was always philosophioa;l, lin dialogue wiith :the philosophers: Aristotle, the Platonists, and the Ail1abs. In saying this, however, I do not mean to ,say that philosophy 1and theology are the same.

Now the altemativce which Caputo would ha,ve us embrace, because presumably not onto-theo-logioal, is that of a "reli-

[2] See Caputo, *op. cit.,* 11 & 283.

[3] " *Die Wahrheit des Seins denken, heisst zugleich die humaniitas des homo humanus denken* " (" Brief iiber den Humanismus," in *Wegmarken* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978), p. 349). This Latin expression is a.lso used by St. Thomas in *De ente et essentia,* III, to designate the formal principle (rationality) by which. the whole (an individual human being) becomes a whole. Also see *In Met.,* VII, Leet. 5, nn. 1378-1380.

giious 1alerthi0Jogy" of mysticism.[4] One is .then led to ask whether and if ,so, how, the same person could ibe hoth a philosopher and 1a mystic, i.e. both !a thinker and a person of [aith. Do they remain " existentially " opposed, ,as Heidegger maintained in his essay, *Phiinomenologie und Theologie,* or is this, a;s; in his *Einfuhrung in die M etaphysi,k,* a case where the person of faith cannot ask the question of Being exceprt in an "as if" way?[5] Is it fair to say that in his deconstruction of Aqumrus' metaphysics Caputo has let theology slip away as well so that only mysticism remains?[6] Does" onto-itheo-1ogy" now remain only a p:voblemfor philosophy, where, as Heidegger reminds us, the word" theologiia." is norta term found in Scripture but in Greek philosophy?[7]

While the above references in Heidegger seem to support the view that philosophy and Ch:vistian theology ought to be kept strictly apart, rthel1e are other te:x;ts one can tum to in Heidegger which question the poissibility of this, suoh as, "All theology of faith is possible only on the basis of philosophy".[8] So, one wonders whether or not Heidegger himself is speaking on two levels which ought to be distinguished and kept strictly 1aprurt. We have already alluded to .the *humanita.s* of the *homo humanus* as the reason why theology entailis philosophy: if we •are he-esseincedthrough our relationship to Being such that

4 See Caputo, *op. cit.,* p. 283.

5 See Heidegger, "Phanomenologie und Theologie," in *Wegmarken,* p. 66, and *Einfuhrung in die Metaphysik* (Tiibingen: Max Niemeyer, 1976), p. 5.

6" For just as Heidegger wants to make the step back out of metaphysics, so there is in St. Thomas a tendency, ·a *desid.erium naturale,* to divest oneself of the concepts, judgments, and ratiocinations of metaphysics in order to enter into the simplicity of *intellectus.* To Heidegger's *Seinserfahrung* I offer the mystical *pati divina* in St. Thomas" (Caputo, *op. cit.,* p. 271).

7 See Heidegger, *Schellings Abhandlung uber das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit* (Tiibingen: Max Niemeyer, 1971), p. 61.

s *Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom,* trans. Joan Stambaugh (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1985), p. 51. *(Schellings Abhandlung,* p. 61; also, see p. 62). Also, "... *alles Existieren ist schon ein Philosophieren" (Metaphysische Anfwngsgrilnde der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz* [Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1978], p. 274; also, see p. 202).

we are *Dasein,* a:s Heidegger contends, then no human as human stands outside this relationship. This relationship is what makes ou;r thinlcing human and not divine, for it is we as temporal 1and finite, and not God,[9] who stand in this relationship to Being such ibhat through ,it we are. We think *huma.nly,* even if about God, and this because of our relation to Being :as finite. Thus it is that Heidegger tells us in the *Brief uber den Humanismus:* only *from* the truth of Being do *we* think God.[10] Thus what I want fo argue here is that there are two contentions mt issue in Heidegger which are *not* the same :and that Caputo, has glossed over one of them.

The first contention involves the history of metaphysics as in which a double forgottenness has oc- ouNed: 1) the internal d:cive of metaphysics to ground Being in *a* being, namely God. But metaphysics can just as well ground Being in another being which does not itake the "place" of God, which remaiins empty, hut corresponds metaphysically to that place, as has happened 1in modern philosophy, according to Heidegger.[11] The question of Being as that which !be-essencesus is Torgortten.2) The forgottenness of the dif-ference *(Austrag, Unter-sohied)* between Being and beings, the *es gibt,* in which the difference !between Be[ng and

[9] *"Denn Ontologie is ein Indea: der Endlichkeit. Gott hat sie nicht"* (" Davoser Disputation," in *Kant unit das Problem d.er Metaphysik* [Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1973], p. 252).

[10] See *Wegmarken,* pp. 347-8. .Also, see pp. 327-8. Joseph S. O'Leary in *Questioning Back: The Overcoming of Metaphysics in Christian Tradition* (Minneapolis: Winston Press, Inc., 1985), pp. 18-19, quotes Heidegger as saying in a dialogue with students in 1951: " I believe that being can never be thought as the ground and essence of God, but that, however, the experience of God and his revealedness (insofar as it encounters man) takes place in the dimension of being, which never means that being can be accepted as a possible predicate for God. Here we have need of quite new distinctions and delimitations." Nor is this inconsistent with .Aquinas' view: "... *hoc nomen* Deus *est nomen appellativum, et non proprium, qu.ia significat naturam divinam ut in habente ... Nomina enim non sequuntur mod.um essendi qui est in rebus, sed modum essendi secundum quod in cogni tione nostra est" (ST,* I, 13, 9, ad 2).

[11] See Heidegger, "Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot,'" in *Holzwege* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1972), p. 208. Also, see pp. 235-6.

beings *as* diffe:r:ence rema,ins unthought. Thus metaphysics shows itself to he, from the viewpoint of Heidegger';s questio'Illing, the history of the thoughtlessness about both Being aind the dif-:ference. But for Heidegger this a:lso im olves a third result: 3) the *Fehl Gottes.* T:his is not surprising, if God !is to he thought from Being (in the *theion* of *theologia)*.[12] If Being " remains out," then it can indeed follow that God, too, becomes "missing" ,and ,indeed "missed" as a oonoomit:ant occurrence in the drive of metaphysics, which is: to say Western thought. The drive of this thought eventuates in " nihilism," where rit is " nothing " with Being and God is " dead ".[13]

The 1second of Heidegger's contentions speaks about our necessary relation to Being suoh rthat God lis to he thought *from* Being, which is *not* to say *as* Being. The very beginning of philosophy from the ,time of t:he ancient Greeks shows the attempt to think ,highest being, i.e. the *theion,* in the attempt to, u:nde:r:sta.nd beings as a whole. Heidegger's concern is .to think orut .the meaning of rthis *for philosophy,* especially since what ha.s oome to pass for God in philosophy is, according to Heidegger, not " diviine enough." In this Heidegger attempts to drraw closer rto that opening which is " perhrups closer to the divine God " rand " :freer for him tha.n oillto-:theo-logy would like to admit." [14]

Now in this second contention Heidegger is oe:r:tainly not proposing a religious mysbioiism which presupposes Christian faith, the life of g.vace, etc. Nor ris he proposing ,a secular mysticism which seeks ito replace Christian faith. Rather, what he is pmposing is something thrut sounds very philosophical: the

12 See *Scheliings Abhanillung,* p. 61.

1s See Heidegger, "Wozu Dichter?" in *Hoitzwege,* pp. 248-51, and "Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot,'" *ibid.,* pp. 239-45.

14 See Heidegger," Die Onto-theo-logische Verfassung der Metaphysik," in *ldentitllt unit Differene* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1978), p. 65. Heidegger is speaking here of a dimension in which, " *Wiirde Sein nicht scheinen, dann glibe es keine Gegend, innerhalb deren allei"n ein ()egenuber sich ansiedeln kann,"* and in which it may be pos.sible to say, *"Wiihrenil Gott spielt, wird Welt" (Der Satz vom Grwnd* [Pfullingen: Neske, 1978], pp. 111, 186).

clearing of Being such that the God is present for us :in la thinking which has ovei'come metaphysics and thus both *Seinsv'ergessenheit* and the *Fehl Gottes.* It also relates .to tha;t strange, if not paradoxical, fragment from Heraclitus which says: "The One [Being] .is ready and yet not ready to be called' Zeus' ".[15] In 1another way, however, .it relates .to what Aquinas isa.ys when he speaks of being as first known, as transcendental, which Heidegger alludes rto in the opening pages of *Sein und Zeit* as one of the three !historical piresuppositions about Being. Now of this being las first known St. Thomas has this to say:

> For the first object envisaged by the intellect is being *[ens],.* without which nothing can be apprehended by it ... Thus all the other [divine names] are somehow included in it, unitedly and indistinctly, as in their

St. Thomas then goes on to make a further statement, which, as we have seen from Heidegger's appvoaoh ·to the above fragment of Heraclitus, Heidegge:r himself was reluctant to make:

> And for this reason,. too, it is fitting that *being* should be the most proper of the divine names.[17]

Now in trying to compare Heidegger and St. Thomas, Caputo sides with those Thomists who relate Heidegger's notion of Sein to St. Thomas's metaphysical notion of *esse* rather than with another group of Thomists who relate Heidegger's notion of *Sein* ito St. Thomas' notion of *ens ut primum cognitum1* ais we have done, a.nd consequently with only the *esse* of *ens intentionale.* Where Caputo differs with the fornmr group of Thomists is that he, unlike them, concedes to Heidegger that Aquinas, .too, falls under the critique of the for-

[15] See Heidegger, "Logos," in *Vortrage und Aufsatze* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1967), III, p. 18-20.

1a St. Thomas, *I Sent.,* Dist. 8, 1, 3, c. The translation is from James F. Anderson, *An Introduction to the Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1969), p. 44. I shall have cause to comment upon this translation later.

11 *Ibid.*

gottenness of Being, especially in !l'egard to the difference between Being and Wings. Hence the need to deconstruct Aquinas' metaphysics.

In oontmst, I am .going .to suggest, along with the latter group of Tihomists, that Heidegger's *Sein* oan be more fruitfully compared with Aquina:s' heing as first known (which is not to ,say that they are the same) .than irt can be with *esse.* I propose to do .this through a retrieved notion of *ratio* in St. Thomas so tha:t philosophy and theology are seen to belong together, enabling us rto speak of " philosophical theology". In such a oase I am not speaking about a. " theological philosophy," but rather .about a theology which is, in Heidegger's WO'rds,

> ... a thinking and questioning elaboration of the world of Christian experience, i.e. of faith. That is theology.[18]

1and which seeks to avoid

> . . . the disastrous notion that philosophy can help to provide a refurbished theology which will satisfy the needs and tastes of the time.[19]

Ratio as the Human Coming rto Knowledge

In his book Caputo attempts a reticieval of *intellectus* in St. Thomas. He w:ants to disengage *intellectus* from 1any kind of representatioll'al or ca1culative thinking, such ias *ratio,* which Heidegger criticizes, as well as ·foom any kind of " opticaJ." presencing of something ,before an iatemporal seeing, which Heidegger also criticizes. Caputo describes his retrieved notion of *intellectus* in terms o[the mystical, where the emphasis is upon union and openness, in the way in which, Caputo contends, Eckhart himself interpreted St. Thomas. .A<gain, we a:re concerned with wha:t Caputo lets d1lop out: *ratio.*[20]

For St. Thomas *ratw* characterizes ian inemdicable condition

18 Heidegger, *An Introduvtion to Metaphysics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 7. In *Einfuhrung in die Metaphysik,* p. 6.

19 Jbid.

20 " Reason *(ratio)* is a form which metaphysics would shed *en route* to becoming *mtelleotus"* (Caputo, *op. oit.,* p. 265).

us so long as we a:re "in this life," or, in Heidegger's rterms, "auf die Erde ". It reflects our Being-in-tJhe-world 11ather than our being in God, the *humarnitas* of the *homo humanus* rather than our ;being *in divinis,* which 11rutter term Eckhart uses to describe mysticism.[21]

When we tum rto the concept of *ratio* in St. Thomrus, we encounter a variety of meanings. Sometimes *ratio* means the act or power we oall " reason ". At other times :iit names .a reality understood, such as la " principle " or " ·cause," which serves as the ".ground" or "basis" for someithing else. At othea.- times it may mean ".argument" or " proof". It may mean "name" or "definition" or even "nature" in the .sense of essence. Sometimes it may mean .simply the " aspect " or " r:ationale " :from which something can .be viewed or considered. :Finally, it may mean just" discourse". Now wha,t •all of these meanings have in common as the "center " f.mm which they take their meaning is that *ratio* .is not an absolute brut a relative term: it relates *to* the ii:ntelligibility of something (as the " name of an intention ") for :a being that ha;s inteil1gence in a, certa.in way (1ais " that which is in the one reasoning") .[22] As such *ratio* bespeaks a twofold source: things and intellect.[23]

21 As C. F. Kelly argues in *Meister Eckhart on Divine Knowfodge* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 37-40, Eckhart's mysticism presupposes Aquinas' *scientia Dei,* in which the orientation of theology, God to creatures, is the reverse of that of philosophy so that theology ".•• est perfectior: utpote Dei cognitioni similior, qui seipsum cognoscens alia intuetur" *(8umma contra Gentiles,* II, 4) .Now Eckhart's mysticism is rooted in our uncreated being in God as He is and knows Himself through one Word, the Son (see Sermon 35 in Josef Quint, ed., *Meister Eckehart: Deutsohe Predigten und Traktate* (Munich: Carl Hanser, 1978), p. 319). St. Thomas' theology, however, treats of God as He reveals Himself to us as creatures (see *8umma 0-0ntra Gentiles,* IV, 1) and is thus expressed through the many conceptions which we form of Him, representing Him only imperfectly (see *de Veritate,* 2, I, c). Also, see *I 8ent.,* Prol., 1, 5; *ST,* I, I, 8-10.

22 Aquinas defines *ratio* in a twofold way: "... *quandoque enim ratio dicitur id quod est in ratiooinante, scilicet ipse actus rationis, vel potentia quae est ratio; quandoque autem ratio est nomen intentionis, sive secundum quod signifioat definition-em rei, prout ratio est definitio, sive prout ratio dicitur argumentatio"* *(I 8ent.,* Dist. 33, Q, 1, 1, ad 3).

2a" *.Rationes autem intelleotae habent duplicem firmitatem: scilicet firmi-*

In the fashion of the so-called "tr:anscendenta:l turn," we ca:n ask what iit is that makes it po·sS1iblefor us rto know things. The answer cannot be exclusively in terms of the things them-1selves, which is to say, in Heidegger's terms, the ontical as 1such. Rather, the answer must also lie in the ontological realm, in a kanscendent1al determinaition of our being in advance of our knowing any par:ticula1rbeings.

Now for St. Thomas *ratio* relates precisely to intelligence as it is in us. There is, according to the tradition which Aquinas receives, 1a *ratio superior* and a *ra.tio inferior.* The former might morre simply be called *intellectus* and the liatter *ratio.* But St. Thomas is quite clear that we should not consider these a,s two sepa:rate powers in us but one power, which he chooses to denomina:te *intellectus'.*[24] Now *intellec-tus* can be either active or pa:ssive. A purely active intellect would know all that it knows th:mugh turning to itself; it would know a: *priori.* Such is angeLic and divine intelligence.[25] But in us knowledge is acquired, which means that the intellect must turn to something other than itseH to know. For this rea,son intellect in us is *primarily* passive.[26] While we do possess an aJctiive intellect, rthe agent intellect, the acbive intellect in us is nort that wherein knowledge resides or concepts get formed hut only the active power whereby we know. If there a;re two intellectual powers in us, the distinction between these powers for St. Thomas is not one between *intelleotus* and *ratio* but one between active and possible intellect, in which intellect in us as priimarilly

tatem sui esse, et hana habent ab intelleotu, sioiit alict aooidentia a suis subjeotis; et firmitatem suae veritatw, et hano habent ea: re oui oonformantur" (I *Sent.,* Dist. 2, Q, 1, 3, ad 5).

24 See Aquinas, *ST,* I, 79, 2, 8 and 9.

25 See *ST,* I, 14, 1-3; 55, 1 and 2. There is, of course, a difference between divine and angelic knowledge for St. Thomas: God knows through His essence; angels through intelligible species received from God.

26 "... *inteUigere nostrum est quoddam pati, seoundum tertium modum passionw* [i.e. *id quod est in potentia ad aliquid, recipit illud ad quod erat im potentia, absque hoc quod aliquid abiioiatur]. Et per oonsequens intelleotus est potentia passiva"* (*ST,* I, 79, 2). Such is the possible intellect, which is not a sense power (see *ibid.,* ad 2).

passive peritains :to *ratio* mthe!I.' than to pure *intellectus.*[27] To argue otherwise for St. Thomas would be either to " am.gelize" or " divinize " human knowing, las the Plaoonists did, rathe!l' than to understand it ,a;s entirely Being-in-the-.wor.ld, or in Rahner's terms, as *Geist in Welt.* In St. Thomrus' terms, it would be to .forget that the humam soul is in substantial union with the body and that any power which emanates from that soul, such as rea:son, is ineluctably bound to .the senses and what they receive. For this reason, the p1loper object of our knowing lso long .as we lare "in this life," i.e. en.souled body, is the quiddity of *ma,terial* things.[28]

Now for St. Thomas to say that irnrtelleotin us is primarily passive is to say that our nature is *a.nimal rationa,le---a* definition of .the human Heidegger seriously questioned.[29] But for St. Thomas this " definition " of the human is not one which signifies a" ccypto-dua:lism ".[30] .Ais a. *de-finitio* it seeks to stipulate the bounds, the limits of humam being and human knowing. Much las in Kant, it is a *critique* o[human knowing as limited by this-worldly conditions, in contrast to the Platonic view.

But, uniliike Kant, it also says .that what the human knows is always *acquired.* 1t says that £or uis to know is *to come to know.* We do not always and ailready know .in an *a priori* fashion, as do purely intellectual beings. In some sense, Kianrt,

27 See- *de Veritate,* Q. 10, 6.

28 See *BT,* I, 84, 7; 88, 1.

.29 See Heidegger, *Bein und Zeit,* p. 165 and "Brief iiber den Humanismus," *Wegmarken,* pp. 319-20. In both cases Heidegger maintains that the expression is "not wrong" *[nioht falsah]* but in the former "... *sie verdeakt dem phanomenalem Boden, dem diese Definition des Daseins entnommen ist,"* reflecting the interests of the early Heidegger, who is seeking to lay the foundations of metaphysics; in the latter, the reason is "... *sie ist durah die Metaphysik beiUngt,"* reflecting the interests of the later Heidegger, who is seeking to overcome metaphysics.

ao See *de Ente et Essentia,* III, n. 2, where St. Thomas refers to the body and soul as the two principles, not two parts, of the human in which the individual is .a " *tertia res."* So, too, " animal " and "rational" are two concepts in which "rational animal " signifies a third concept and not just the juxtapositioning of two concepts.

too, ,admits this when he says that intuimon for us is not originary hut derived. But on this score what St. Thomas and Kiant mean by "derived," i.e. "experience," is not only different but mdiorullyopposed: for St. Thomas it means abstraction, wherie the intellect stands in a dependency upon the senses and the senses upon material things for the initelligibility of the materiaJ. things which it comes to know; for Kant it means a 1synthesi'S between understanding and sensibility, where understanding constitutes knowledge by applying some *a priori* category to la maruifo1dof sensibility, which is not due to absrt:vactionbut to some inner which submits itself to understanding for intelligibility. In sum, all knowledge for St. Thomas is ultimately due to ahstraction; for Kant it is due to construction.

Now Heidegger himself saw that this vie1w of human knowledge as construction is really modelled .after the *scientia Dei.* As a matter of .fact, the whole Geil"illanidealist tmdition patterned ,itself after this view, as Heidegger s:aw it, from Leibniz down to Kant ·and Hegel. Heidegger identified as a source St. Thomas' own explanation, not of how we know, but "how God knows" in Question 14 of the *Prima Pars* of the *Summa Theologica.*[81] In Kant, for ex;ample, human knowledge is creative, not ontica;lly (i.e. of the thing-ii.n-it'Self),but ontologically (i.e. of meaning, mteUigibility). Abst:mction can be dispensed with, if we entertain the hypothesis, as Kant does with ms " Copernican Revolution " in the *Critiqiie of Pure Reason,* that we already possess in our understanding the categories by which we render sense encounter intelligible. In this regard, reason in Kant, whether of *Verstand* or *Vernunft,* as *pure* i'S really a form of Leibnizean monadology. It is *reddenda ra.tio,* which the later Heidegger takes to task in *Der Satz vom Grund.* As *reddenda ratio* human reason finds itself rather than things to be the ground of knowledge, for when the subject turns to examine what it knows it finds only ,the intelligibility

a1 See Heidegger, *Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Logik,* pp. 53-62.

which it has put there in adv;ance as the expression of its own being. In knowing, :reruson returns to ibse1f,[82] receiving hack what it in the first place gave. The influence of Leibniz, then, is not something from which Kant escaped in his " Copernican Revolution " hut only became more thoroughly enmeshed in in his version of " critical philosophy ". For this reason, the later Heidegger could indeed say that the " thing " was annihilated long 1before the hlast of any iatornic 1bomb, for with the concept of knowing as *reddenda ratio* it no longer makes sense to talk about " things " apart f:vom our constituting them, as is evident in Husserl's phenomenology, which as "monadology" is the logical outcome of this kind of transcendental philosophy.

The first " gain " of our retrieval, then, is. not to understand by *ratio* a. *reddenda ra.tio,* which idea corresponds more to a pure intellect, i.e. ain ·active intellect alone, than it does to a passive intellect. 1£ *ratio* relates to intellect as it is in us, then it expresses how that intellect is in us: primarily passive, where to know humanly means to learn. Such is to put a limit on human knowing 1as *Being-in-the-world.* In the thought of St. Tlhomas .the formula *animal rationale* does not indicate a questionable dualism. But neither does it indicate a questionable monism. Rather, it indicates that soul *is* throughout the body and consequently intellect knows through the senses.[83] As :a result what we know when we know is worldly, ·aind not " srupraworldly" or even "innerworMly" (i.e. our- ·selves). It is the quiddity of material things.

s2 See *Der Batz vom Grund,* pp. 45-47. For St. Thomas pure intelligences return to themselves in knowing in a *reditio completa.* But this is not possible for the human, who must turn to phantasms to know anything. Hence, a *reditio completu,,* much less a *reddenda ratio,* is not possible for the human. See *In Librum de Oausi$,* Prop. 15, Leet. 15, n. 313.

as See *In de Anima,* III, Leet. 11, n. 758. This is not to deny that for St. Thomas there is a proper activity of the intellect apart from the senses in the formation of concepts. See *de Dnitate Intellectus contra Averroistas,* I, nn. 27-28; III, n. 84. For St. Thomas' treatment of how we come to know the human soul as immaterial, see *BT,* I, 87, and of how we know immaterial beings only imperfectly through comparison with material things, see. Q. 88.

Ratio as the Index of Human Finitude

tf knowing in us means coming to know, when it comes to *ratio* this means" discuvrendo de uno in aliud ".[34] It is to kno,w discmsively one thing through ·another, to move in our consideration foom one thing to amother, from one "aspect" *(ratio)* of a thing to another "aspect," to look for a "defimtion" *(ra.tio)* of something whose "nature" *(ra,tio)* we are seeking to know, to seek the "p:voof" *(ratio)* of wJ:ra,t we know, as thinking moves from a fact to the "reason," "ground," "basis" *(ratio)* for .the fact, as from effect ·to "cause" *(ratio).* Fillally, discursive thinking is, of course, discourse (ra,tio), involving "naming" *(ra.tio)*, i.e. Janguage.

Now it seems to me thmt we cain compare some of these facets of *ratio* to elements 0£ Heidegger's own philosophy. For instaince, let us recall Heidegger'.s treatment of the ,ready-to-hand in *Sein und Zeit,* where the" items" of equipment srtand in an" in order to" *(um ..• zu)* rela.tion to one another such that they ·are ,all "for the sake of" *(um-willen) Dasein* as what 'assigns them their significance in the totality of references.35 Here *Dasein* "runs through" them in ra pre-reflective way in the seeking of its own being as possibility. What this movement resembles is practical 1reason in Aristotle and St. Thomas,[36] which deals with particularrs in a means/end fashi0JI1, involving the use of imrugination, memory and the cogitative power. P.ractical reason is also sometimes l'leferred to as "calculative " reaison, in distinction to speculative reason, which deals with uni¥ersals and beings " for their own sake ". Practical ;reason, then, is not to be confused with theoretical reason, which the " trained " mind has learned 1to develop for

34 *BT,* I, 59, 1, ad I.

35 " *Das ' Um-wiiien' betrifft aber immer das Sein des* Daseins, *dem es in seinem Belm weserihaft* um *dieses Bein geht" (Belm unu Zeit,* p. 84; also see pp. 86-87, 143-147, 236 & 297.

36 See Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Philosophical Hermeneutics* (Berkeley: University of California Pres,s, 1976), pp. 201-202, where he refers to the influence of *phronesis·* and *actus exeroitus* upon the early Heidegger.

Ariistotle and St. Thomws. Rather, it is what " everyone" has tin 'Some sense acquired in terms o£ their human invulvements in the of evceryday living. In similar fashion, *Dasein* " reckoDJs" with its everyday wo!l1ld through a kind of pre-reflective " running through" the equti.pment "f·mm one ito ·an-other ". Ultimately, *Dasein* "·reckons," ·aooording to Hei-degger, ·because *Dasein* is temporal.

But what is found in Heidegger, but i$ *not* found in Aristotle and Aquinas, is that the reference for the meaning of the equip-ment is ultimately *Dasein* lrus what assigns them their place, order and significance. Here the early Heidegger himself seems to be under the influence of *reddenda ratio,* for what the anal-ytic of *Dasein* "discovers" as the meaning of inner-worldly entities as ready-to-hand is only the meaning *Dasein* has put in them in the first place. Heidegger' s move here is to explain the " whatness " of things in terms of the prior " how " of *Dasein,* much as in Kant's transcendental approach, with this difference: the tmditional " apophantic ' as ' " of asseTtion, i.e. the correspondence view of truth, becomes a derivative mode of the "hermeneutical 'a1s,' " where the ontological basis now is *Dasein's* temporality rather than timeless logic and reason. When something "switches" for *Dasein* from 1being ready-to-hand to merely present-at-hand, as in conspicuousness, ob-trusiveness and obstinacy, its" place" in the order of *Dasein's* ·assignments is lost, so that *Dasein* no longer understands it. It becomes something "als Nicht-mehr-verstehen ".[37] With truth and meaning no longer defined Wtith rega!l'd to things but only with regiard to *Dasein* •as that " £or the sake o[which," [38] Heidegger introduces into *Sein und Zeit,* wittingly or not, a modified form of *reddenda ratio* thinking. The " name of an rrntention" of which Aqurrnrus speaks no longer refers to the possible intelligibility of a thing hut to the understanding of

[37] *Sein und Zeit,* p. 149. Also, see the "Davoser Disputation," in *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Kloster-mann, 1973), pp. 253-254.

[38] See *Sein und Zeit,* pp. 151-152 & 226-273.

Dasein as possibility. *DaiSein* 1becomes the *firmitas* af hoth the *esse* a.ind the *verita,s* 0£ things. Here the " aliud " is not thing·s themselves hut *Dasein* 1as a kind of ontologciail "Causa sui," •where the " Being," or meaning, of thlngs is the " effect " af *Dasein,* ".for the sake of " (*um-willen*) which they " are " as a " means " to *Dasein* as " end ".

One can see how Heidegger is led to this analysis through his questioning of traditional "present-at-hand" thinking as theoretical, in which such thinking needs to be grounded by a prior, more active "ready-to-hand" dealing with the environment. Thus, in his analysis of the world of average everyday *Dasein* Heidegger speaks of equipment as "pragmata," whether "·artificial," like a hammer .and nails, or " natural," like the wood from •a tree. Both are ready-to-hand in their Being .such that in our philosophical interpretation the "natural" as something present-.at-hand is not pl'ior, in contra.st to the " artificial " as something later whlch presupposes the "natural":

... one should not hold to the things as things, following the tradition that nature or wood or stone really comes first. It is not the case that wood and stone are there first and then are furnished with a sign-character. [89]

Dasein's ciroumspective concern with equipment, then, does not involve any signifying of things in >themselves. Rather, *Dasein* is :both the ontological " cause" of their meaning (Being) and the " end " for whose sake they " are ". In short, the sign-clm11ader of the equipment does not involve formal signs but only instrumental signs, where such signs are instituted signs, taking their rise and meaning from the Being of *Dasein.* Like customairy signs, they :reflect a world already constituted hy *Das·ein* 1and thus the wo:vld with which *Dasein* is already familiar.

In this priority of idealism over 11ealism,[40] one could argue

[89] Heidegger, *History of the Oonce'pt of Time* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), p. 208.

[40] See *Sei!n und Zeit,* pp. 207-8.

that Heidegger has missed 'the very being of the sign in his 1analy:sis:of the o[things. John of St. Thoma.s, fo:r e:x;ample, attempting to develop the notion of sign-theory in St. Thoma1s,credibly argues that the very being of the sign is relation, in .an indifference a;s to whether the re£erence of the sign is real or ideal, whether it is formal or instrumental. [41] In this way he offers a semio,sis which, thanks to the indifference, or neutmlity of .the being of the sign as relation, is ·as open to the real as it is to the ideal and which can ,also a.ccount for the oompenetration of 1both in the constructs *of* culture.

Now the circumspective concern of reckoning Dasein, as we have said, resembles pmctical ·reason in Aristotle ·and St. Thomas. St. Thomas notes:

> ... *ratio specvlativa et practiva in hoc differunt, quod ratio speculativa est apprehensiva solum fl'erum, ratio vera practiva est non solum apprehensiva sed etiam causativa.* [42]

But with modern phil0:sophy speculative reason ,begins to attain :an a.ctive, causative role as *a pri,ori.* By the time of Kant reason, including understanding, is aictive, oir spontaneous, throughout. But speculative reason must now be limited, .for in acting beyond understanding, speculative reason enters " naturally " into illusion, giving rise to the dialectic that is metaphysics. Only pmctical reason as active avoids illusion because it does not daim for its bas[s knowledge hut only itself as mtionaJ. Now the 'early Heidegger, it could be argued, gave priority to an a.ctive, p'I"actioa.l kind of " reason " temporally rooted in contrast to timeless speculative reason, whether a.ctive or passive. But with the later Heidegger the association of active, pra.ctical "reason" (which characterizes much of *Da,sein's* understanding in *Sein und Zeit)* with will shows itself to be nothing move than the outcome of *reddenda*

[41] See John PoiilSot (John of St. Thomas), ed. John Deely, *Tractatus de Signis* (Berkeley: University of California, 1985), p. 119. In more technical terms, the relation is *secun<lum esse* and not *secmulum <lici.*

[42] *ST,* II-II, 83, 1, c.

ratio.[48] .Active "reason," whether speculative or practical, amounts to the 1same thing: the self-certifying of the subject as will in its drive to master the earth. The lruter Heidegger, in contmst, pursues ·a more passive ·aprproaichto thinking which is still temporally rooted, as in *besinnliches Denken.* The lines of his criticisms are redraiwn: it is *ra,tio* a,s active, whether speculative or practical, that is now the subject of Heidegger's critique rather than a questionable speculative reason which needs to be founded upon a more " practical reason " expressive of Daesin as end. If in Aquinas " speculative re3Json" means that our understanding is both temporal and passive, then it seems that a closer of that reason in re- to Heidegger is what is caJled for rather than a deoon-•struction of it. In short, something like speculative *ratio* in St. Thomas and *besinnliches Denken* in the later Heidegger may not be as opposed as they initially appear to be.

It is interesting to note that the later Heidegger no longer offers the analytic of *Dasein,* where, if Bein.g is transcendence, *Dasein* is the "transcendent" aJS the "neutral isolation *of* man" .[44] At this stage Heidegger wa:s still seeking to ground metaphysics through founda.tional ontology rather than to overcome it. Heidegger tells us that " metaphysics " got in the way of his completing the project of *Sein und Zeit.* But would it not be more accurate to say that it is the *reddenda ratio* of modern metaphysics which got in the way and that Heidegger was still under the influence of Kant and Husserl, themselves under the influence of Leibniz, in those portions of *Sein und*

43 In this context the later Heidegger's critique of *reddenda ratio,* as in *Der Satz vom Grund,* finds its place. The above quotation from St. Thomas ·seems to gainsay Heidegger's contention (pp. 166-168) that cause and *ratio* are necessarily linked to one another through the invisible influence of the Latin language. For Heidegger and Caputo, St. Thomas' thought is not an example of *reddenda ratfo* but falls in the *"Incubationszeit"* prior to the articulation of the principle by Leibniz. See Caputo, *op. cit.,* p. 250.

44 See *Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Logik,* pp. 172 & 176. Also, see *Die Grundprobleme der Ph,.ii,nomenologie* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975), p. 460.

Zeit, :such as the one cited above? [45] The problem is not one of the relation between *Daseiln* and temporiality, and thus finitude, but that of the relation !between *Dasein* and the modern notion of transcendence, which stands under the stamp of *reddenda ratio.* When the 1a.ter Heidegger turns to an analysis of the thing, it is in terms of the fourfold that Heidegger speaks, where *Dasein* ·as mortal is only one of the four, rather than in terms of the *Um-willen* of *Dasein,* where *Dasein* as transcendence is the source and end.

But there is another sense of the " aliud" which both Aquinas :a:nd HeideggeT share and it is this element of the " transcendental turn " which we would like to preserve: if *ratio* .as "Umwegigkeit " [46] bespeaks a Being-in-the-world, the " aliud " we speak of here means first and foremost Being as that through which beings ·are for us, in ·a lighting that is temporal. The relation that Being is (and it is la relation and not a being) bespeaks a tempo'11a1 knowing such that, if " discursivity " is .the index of finitude, then Being is the source of that finitude in the sense that we shall see 1ater.

We are now in a position to state the seoond " gain " of our Tetrieval: *rat.Vo* as " discur:rendo de uno in 1aliud" need not be understood in such a way that the theoretical always takes precedence over the practical and certainly not in a way that the ".subject" takes precedence over the "object". *Ratio* expresses a " practical " •aspect because it has to do with the seeking of ourselves as possibility in terms of inner-worldly entities. Here *ratio* bespeaks temporality, not just because it "takes time," but because it expresses our finitude, that is, our

[45] Gadamer remarks: "Although *Being and Time* criticised the lack of ontological definition in Husserl's concept of transcendental subjectivity, it still formulated its own account of the question of being in terms of transcental philosophy." For this reason, "We must even admit that Heidegger's project in *Being and Time* does not completely overcome the sphere of the problematic of transcendental reflection" *(Truth and Method* (N. Y.: The Seabury Press, 1975), pp. 228 & 226.)

[46] For Heidegger Kant's derived intuition means "Diskursivitat" and "Umwegigkeit" for the human as "der scharfste Index seiner Endlichkeit." See *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* {Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1973), p. 28.

But we should realize that *ratio* rus prac-.tica:l is causative as well as apprehensive, in the compenetration oi the real ;and the At this level our knowing and being, though not a simple one as they are in God, are almost bal'ely distinguishable. And >this not by any apriority of specu-1a:tive knowledge, ,as *reddenda ratio* would have it, hut by something which does not chamclerize anything at all like *scientia Dei,* namely temporality. Here the index of :finitude, and not infinity itself, appears a;s the horizon within which our heing ,and knowing ,seem to " coalesce," rwhere knowing iais " know..Jhow" in dealing with inner-worldly entities is for the sake of our being a:s Being-in-the-world. Here our knowing/ being does not bespeak anyithing like a *principium rationis sufficientis,* which befits only divinity as the principle of resolution, but a *principium rationis insuffioientis,* in which the principle is one of lack, in our temporal dispersal *(Zerstreuung)* among worldly beings, and not their ontological resolution in us.[41]

Ra.tio as Questioning 1and Thinking

When St. Thomas speaks of *ratio* a:s " discurrendo de uno in ialiud " he unde.l'!stands *ratio* as primarily speculative and it is in this context that *ratio* :finds its place in his theofogy. As we have seen, St. Thomas defines speculative *ratio* a:s only apprehensive. But since knowledge in us is ia coming to know, we discover that

> ... our intellect understands by discursion, and by composing and dividing: namely, that in the first apprehension of anything newly apprehended it does not at once grasp all that is virtually contained in it. And this comes from the weakness of the intellectual light in us ...[48]

[41] For the concept of *Zerstreuung* in Heidegger, see *Metaphysische An·fangsgrunde der Logik,* pp. 173-175. That *Dasein* is not ontically the principle of any *reddenda ratio* is clear from what Heidegger says in *Vom Wesen des Grundes* (in *Wegmarken,* p. 160, note 59). So for St. Thomas our knowing involves temporal dispersal *(In peri Hermeneias,* I, 1, Leet. 14, n. 194). In *Summa contra Gentiles,* I, Cap. 57, Aquinas calls *ratio* "defectivus quidam intellectus."

[48] *ST,* I, 58, 4, c.

Consequently,

> . . . there is no one special power in man through which he gets knowledge of truth simply, absolutely and without movement from one thing to another *[absque discursu]*. ... there is no power in man separate from reason which is called understanding *[intellectus]*.[49]

St. Thomas proceeds further to relate faith to *ratio. Cogitatio,* or thinking, as the discursive movement of reason, is the ;same as the sea,l'ch for truth.[50] Now we know that Heidegger criticizes the notion of *cogitatio,* especially las it occurs in Descartes' philosophy in his foundational principle, "Cogito, ergo ,sum".[51] But for St. Thomas *oogitare* does not involve a foundational principle capable of securing ahsolutely whatever other truths the human can know. Rather, *cogita.re* as the activity of *ratio* presupposes *intellectus* as its starting point and strives to attain further or deeper understanding. As 'Such it designates inquiry prior to the ,attainment of some truth.[52] St. Thomas distinguishes between a *cogitare* with regard to universals, which pertains to the intellect, and a *cogitare* with regard to particulars, which relates to the cogitative power. The latter involves that aspect of *ratio* discussed earlier as "reckoning," i.e. pmctical reason as both apprehensive and causative. But the former invnlves *ratio* as " deliberatiV'e," i.e. speculative reason as apprehensive but not causative. Now it is .this sense of *ratio* which also expresses the nature of faith for St. Thomas: "... in hoc intelligitur tot:a ratio hujus actus qui est credere."[53] In faith the intellect is determined by the will to adheve firmly to one object, as in understanding and sci-

·49 *de Veritate,* Q. 15, 1, c.

50 See *de Veritate,* Q. 14, 1 & *ST,* I, 34, 1, ad 2.

51 E.g., see "Der Europllische Nihilismus," *Nietzsche,* II, pp. 148-168. For Heidegger the meaning of *cogitare* in Descartes is not thinking but the representing subject so that *"Im Herrschaftsbereich dieses subiectum ist das ens nicht mehr ens creatum, es ist ens certum: indubitatum: vere cogitatum: ' cogitatio'"* *(ibid.,* p. 166).

s2 See *ST,* II-II, 2, I. Also, see *ST,* II-II, 83, 1.

sa *ST,* II-II, 2, I.

ence, but without the intellect terminating in a full understanding of that object, as it does in understanding and science. Faith, then, for St. Thomas has its own unique phenomenological structure to which *ratio* as *cogitare* and *quaerere* necessarily belongs: "... et per hoc distinguitur iste actus qui est credere ab omnibus actibus intellectus qui sunt circa verum et falsum".[54] This is Aquinas' appropriation of Anselm's *fides quaerens intellectum.* Because faith is not simply *intellectus* there is the movement of *cogitare* and *quaerere.* If theologizing is, as Heidegger contends, "a thinking and questioning elaboration of the world of Christian experience, i.e. of faith," then *ratio* is a necessary element of theologizing. But what *cogitare* comes to mean from Descartes to Husserl is *ratio* shorn of *intellectus* as both its *terminus a quo* and *ad quem,* a *reddenda ratio* become *Wissenschaft* in the absorption of *Verstand* into *Vernunft,* the object into the subject. It becomes the activity of the "representing I" of modern intentionality, which became increasingly causative as it became decreasingly apprehensive.

But for St. Thomas *ratio* means "discourse," for the word "discourse" comes from the word *discurrere.* Here *ratio* is linked to *logos,* where *ratio* is through *logos, verbum,* language. As such it is linked to "dialogue," in which a twosome is preserved "de uno in aliud," where thinking is always "unterwegs". The dialogue that true thinking is is always with *die Sache* through *logos* (Being) in a way that does not preclude other humans from thinking through the matter but includes them as a moment of its questioning. Here we see *ratio* as St. Thomas himself practiced it: the *quaestio,* which seeks to be on the trail of the *die Sache,* not resting contented with what others have said but going through the matter itself. The medieval *quaestio,* as Gadamer remarks, is a genuine hermeneutical dialectic.[55] In the "to and fro" of such dialogue the

[54] *Ibid.*

[55] See Gadamer, *Truth and Method,* p. 328. Also, see pp. 325-341, for his discussion of "the hermeneutical priority of the question."

fusion of horizons and effective-historical consciousness take place. Here *ratio* as a tempom.I condition shows our historical being as it dialogues with tmd!ition, as well as contemporary discussion, in the seeking of :£urthffl'possibility. But the answer itself, while it may come through the tradition, is itself 'an " ·event " of 1appropriation, where questioning ,and thinking 1are for the sake of undersfanding, *ratio* for the ·sake of *intellecfius*.[56]

Ra,tio, we see, then, is not an end in itself (as a *reddenda ratio* would have it) but, as "unterwegs," is for the sake of understanding. But neither is *ratio* the source, *Grund.* It does not take its rise from itself (as a *reddenda ratio* would have it). Rather, its source lies in anotheil'place (Ort), in the relation between Being..knowing that *Dwein* is tin the hermeneutical circle as ontological, as we shall see. But there is another sense of source which is ontical, bespeaking, not the ontological difference, hut the " theological difference ".[57] If *Seinsdenken* seeks to be closer to the source of the ontological diffe:rience,then theology as *fides qua:erensintellectum* seeks to !he closer to the source of rthe theological difference.

Our thi,rd g.ain in the retrieval of *ratio* is that speculative reason shows itself to be the phenomenon of questioning and thinking, primarily aipprehensive nather than causative, *needing* Being •as " other," through which beings are for us. In this the "openness" which Caputo says pertains to *intellectus* l"eally pertains to *ratio* in relation to *intellectus.*[58] For *intel-*

56 Reason is to intellect as motion is to rest (see *ST,* I, 79, 8, c). In this regard, "... supremum in nostra cognitione est non ratio, sed intellectus, qui est rationis origo" *(Summa contra Ge:n,tiles,* I, Cap. 57).

57 See Max Miiller, *Ewistenzpihilosophie im geistigen Leben der Gegenwart* (Heidelberg: F. H. Kerle, 1964), p. 67, in which he speaks of *"die 'transzendente' oder theologisohe Differenz im strengen Sinne: Den Untersohied des Gottes vom Beienden, von der Seiendheit und vom Bein"* which he claims the early Heidegger planned to treat in the third portion of Part I of *Sein un4 Zeit* .as. one of the three ways we can speak of transcendence (p. 66).

ss It can be argued that insofar as Caputo describes his deconstructed concept of *intelleotus* as " openness " such an *intelleatus* would be formable and thus still in some sense the passive intellect which for St. Thomas expresses itself conceptually through *ratio.*

lectus as :such ·char:acterizes active and not passive knowing, and consequently a being that already knows all that it will ever know. It does not characterize a being that comes to know. Neither does ,it characterize the theologian as one standing in faith. Pure *intelleetus* is a knowing which is "closed " (" windowless " .as Leibniz put it) in the sense that it is a " filled" and " fulfilling " knowing *a priori.*[59] Only a being which comes to know can be " open " in tha;t it can seek to be ever closer to tha;t which grants it understanding, the " other," whether that other be Being or God. For *ratio·* as *expression* is not the :sou:rce of huma;n being which we seek in either the ontological or the theological sense. Rather, it shows itself :to be the " index " of finitude. It is now to that ontological source of human finitude for both Heidegger and Aquinas to which we turn.

Being and Knowing: *Ens* and *Intellee;tus*

Thus £air we have looked at the human intellect only insofar as it is p11imarily pas'Sive in a discursive coming to know, in the sense in which St. Thomas, following Aristotle, &ays " anima est quodammodo omnia ". But in order for knowing to be for us there must also be a;nother transcendental relation of knowing to beings to which the active and not just the po·ssible intellect stands in relation. In order for the possible intellect to become " anima quodammodo omnia " in regard to beings, there must be a tmnscendental relation of the active intellect to Being as the prior disclosure for understanding, where understanding presupposes understanding.

In considering the Platonic solution to the paradox that in order :to know we must in ,some sense already know, St. Thomas offers a modified view which makes! *ana.mnesis* unnecessary. First, Aquinas agrees that knowing does not involve going from the unknown to the Jmown but from the kno-wn to the unknown.[60] In this ·sense *ratio* presupposes understanding.

[59] See *In Librum de Oausis,* Prop. 10, Leet. 10, n. 244.

[60] See Aquinas, *In Post. Anal.,* I, Leet. 1-3; *Summa oontra Gentiles,* II, 83, nn. 27-32.

But how is this possible, since Aquinas, unlike Plato, does not hold for innate ideas? As we have .seen, while to be and to know are the same for God, for us they are not. This means tlmt knowing for us is not " twough itself," i.e. tWough ourselves alone, but twough another, i.e. being, *ens* ·as transcendental, *through* which everything else which we know is known. This transcendental relation to being directs us in advance to beings (as *Sein* to *Seienden* in Heidegger) as whrut we propeT'ly know when we know. Eckhart tells us that God speaks only one Word, the Son through Whom creation is, but we as creaturres hear two words, i.e. the Word of God always comes to us *through* being *(Sein)* as what is fir.st for u:s.[61] Thus, for Eckhart, the transcendental relation we have to being indicates precisely our finitude, our creatureliness, hy which we are other than God. It indicates for Eckhart *exstasis* (our being outside God) rrather than *instasis* (our being inside God). God in His own ibeing is ever *instasis,* creation *exstasis*.[62] For Heidegger, ·as we know, our Heing-in-the-wollld is one of ecstatic temporia1izing. So we see that both Eckhart and Heidegger link our 1being-outside, our Being-in-the--world, our temporalizing, -with *Sein.* But on this score, I think, Eckhart is also really in consonance -with St. Thomas as well, which I 1will now ·attempt to show.

In the *Kantbuch* Heidegger attempts to relate *Sein* to Dasein's temporia1izing. Here Heidegger is pursuing the conclusion of *Sein und Zeit,* which say;s: " Does *time* itself manifest itself a:s the horizon of *Being?*" Now we know that the early Heidegger tried to find the relation between time •and Being in the transeendental imagination, in which schematism occurs in which Kant designates Being here as the unknown X of an *ens imaginarium.*[63] But, •according to Heidegger's £amous interpretation, Kiant " rreeoiled" from what was pheno-

[61] See Kelly, *op. oit.,* 122.

[62] Eckhart, *Die deutschrm Werke* (Stuttgart, 1938:ff), III, pp. 315-317. Also, see *Deutsche Predigtoo '1.llnd Trakt<J,te,* p. 197.

[63] See *K<J,nt und dM Problem der Met<J,physik,* pp. 116-119 & 138-139.

menologically opened to h[m to take refuge in the security of his inherited [64] ultimately the *reddenda ratio* of Leibniz. Heidegger's :retriev;a,l of Kant involves pe11sistently thinking out the foundational disclosure: Being-imagination-temporality.

But what might all this have to do with Aquinas, who, we might suspect, deals with " eterna.l verities " which have not yet been removed :flrom our philosophizing? [65] In his *Commentary on the Sentences,* Aquina,s rather unaccustomedly tells us:

Primum enim quod cadit in imaginatione intellectus, est ens, sine quod nihil potest apprehendi ab intellectu ... [66]

Now this is the same passage from Aquinws which we quoted eail"lier,using the tmns1ation given by Anderson. Here, I would sugge1St, is a reooil of an equal kind which Thomists make in reading St. Thomas! trans1ation of *in imaginatione intellectus* as " envisaged hy the intellect" simply " rationalizes" the text. Likewise, his insertion of the wo'l.'d "object" to refer to *ens* prepares us for a *reddenda ratio* interpretation of St. Thomas. Students of St. Thomas, who after all live in a modem and not a medieval world, 1are wont to read, and that

64 See *ibid.,* p. 155:1i.

65 See *Bein und Zeit,* p. 229.

66*[Sent.,* Dist. 8, Q. 1, 3, c. St. Thomas also employs the expression "in imaginatione intellectus " in *I Sent.,* Dist. 19, Q. 5, 1, ad 7; *de Veritate,* Q. 14, 1, c; and in *de spir. Oreo,t.,* 9, ad 6. St. Thomas refers to the Arab philosophers as the source of the term " *imaginatio"* (*tasawor),* as well as the equivalent term *"formatio,"* applied to the forming of a concept by the intellect. Tracing the progeny of this term, M.-D. Chenu, in "Un vertige du stoicisme," *Revue i£es sciences philosophiques et tMologiques,* v. 27 (1938), pp. 63-68, remarks: *"Il s'agit en realite de la tMorie fondamentale des Stdiciens, integree, avea tant d'autres elements, dans le systeme des neoplatoniciens ou la puiserent les A.rabes"* (p. 65) and *"Ainsi, dans la langue philosophique du XIle sicale, du moins en aertains milieux,* imago *reaouvre les deU!l! sens d' 'image ' et de ' aonaept* '; *et sans aucun doute est-ae avea ce sens general d'actilvite* de *ooiinaissance, applique a la premiere operation de l'esprit, que St. Thomas emplove* imaginatio *dans la formule fameuse: 'Primum quod aadit in* imaginatione *intellectus est ens' ... (]'est le vocabulaire et la doatrine d'Aviaenne"* (p. 66).

meains *interpret,* St. Thomas in *certain* ways. But one might respond that the mo,re frequently quoted and later-but only by two years-version of being ·M first ,and transcendental irn the *de Verita.te* is less problematic and "m0:re traditional":

Illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quo omnes conceptiones resolvit, est ens ... [67]

But here we must ·aisk, what does every human *concipere* involve? As Rruhnerr's *Geist in Welt,* as an elaboration of the *Summa Theologica,* I, Q. 84, A. 7, makes amply clear: every *concipere* is through la phantasm. Hence, " in imaginatione intellectus " does make good sense after ;all.

Let us now take adv;aintage of the polyvalent interplay of the terms *imaginatio (phantasm)* , *intellecfas* and *ens* and offer an interpretation of St. Thomas which, in Heideggerirurnfashion, a.ttempts to loosen and thus free the texts so that they might speak anew to us. The purpose of such an interpretation is not to enter the intentionality of St. Thomas, claiming to understand him as well or heUer than he understood himself, but, again, in Heideggerian £ashion, to seek to enter the unstated site from which St. Thomas' texts arise and thus make sense.

Now when Aquinas sa.y1s " in imaginatione " we should not understand him to be saying that we " imagine" being as some kind of indispensable fabrication any more than Heidegger should ·be understood in that way in the *Kantbuch.* For *ens* " faUs " in, not into, the imagination, i.e. happens there for us as an ontological determination of our being.[68] In 111ddition,

[67] *de Veritate,* Q. 1, 1, c. *In Librum de Oausis,* Prop. 6, Leet. 6, n. 174, Aquinas speaks of *ens* as *"acquiritur."* *ST,* I. 5, 2, c. has "in conceptione;" *ST,* I-II, 94, 2, c. has " in apprehensione;" *In I Sent.,* Dist. 19, Q. 5, 1, ad 2 speaks of *ens* as " *conceptio inteUectus* " and ad 8 as *"intentio intellectus."* *De Potentia,* Q. 9, ad 15, gives us an accusative construction: *"Primum en4m quad in inteUectum cadit, est ens ..."*

as Aristotle, as St. Thomas is aware, calls imagination "passive intellect" *(de Anmia,* 430 a 25) and relates the word *phantasia* to *phos (de Anima,* 429, a 3). Heidegger etymologically relates *physis* and *phainesthai* (from which *phantasia* come.s) to one another (*JIJinfuhrimg in die Metaphysik,* p. 54); so is Being *phainomenon (Sein und Zeit,* pp. 35-36).

being as fust known cannot be understood in St. Thomas as the result of an ;abstraiction, for in that case it would no longer be first but at most " second" as the abstraction of something priorly oonorete. How, then, might we understand St. Thomas here? Being as first cannot be derived; it must remain a source in terms of which all else (beings, i.e. material things, Aristotle's *ta physi,ka)* gets understood so that the possible intellect correspondingly can be potentially *quodammodo omnia.* But, if being as fast cannot be derived, it can *finitize,* not in the sense of the categories, which delimit beings and which St. Thomas calls " oontr:acted," i.e. p:redicated of some but not all beings.[69] Rather, being as finitizing can be understood in terms of our Being-in-the-world such that being for us is *physi,s.*[70] Being phenomenologicailly constricts us, then, not merely through categoria.I determinations but through a transcendental determination which is prior and through which we are as we are: " in this life," " auf die Erde " so that, las Being makes beings accessible to us, it at the same time limits our understanding as propo:rtioned to them.

But does not St. Thomas say being "as most known" *(quasi, notissi,mum),* while Kant (and Heidegger following him) says " .an unknown X " (*ein unbekanntes* X) ? First of all, when Aquinas says " quasi," the point is not that *ens* is known like beings, having a proper definition. *Ens* as transcendental does not submit to strict definition because, as Heidegger himself quotes St. Thomas in *Sein und Zeit,* " definitio fit per genus proximum et differentiam specifioam ".[71] Only categorial, i.e. pl'edicamenta.I, beings admit of definition. By *ens* as trans-

[69] See *In Met.,* V, Leet. 9, .n 890.

[10] " --- *quia, neo primum obieotum intelleotus nostri, secundum praesentem statum, est quodlibet ens et verum; sed ens et verum oonsidera,tum in rebus ma,terialibus* ... *ew quibus in oognitionem omnium a,liorum devenit" (ST,* I, 87, 3, ad 1) . Also, " *Ens a,utem dicitur id quod finite pa,rtioipa,t esse et hoo est proportionatum intellectui nostro, ouius obieotum est* ' *quad quid est' ut dioitur in III* de Anima" *(In Librum de Oausis,* Prop. 6, Leet. 6, n. 175). In what sense we can be s.aid to know the infinite, according to St. Thomas, see *ST,* I, 86, 2.

[71] *Sein und Zeit,* p. 4.

cendental we are to understand neither a difference nor a genus. Seoondly, when Aquinrus·SaJ"S " notissimum " we are not to understand *ens* a.s what is entirely under our understanding. Rather, it is our unde.rstanding which is under it as proportioned to it. As a pr!inoipleit is that beyond and beh!ind which we ourselves cannot go to understa.nd;[72] it is a *prinoipi,um,* where we begin. As ·a ·souroe it is that in which all our understanding of beings is naturally resolved, to which we are led back ":by nruture" as to an ontological source. On this level it is .indeed ·an abyss, an *Abgrund.* [73] Here *ens* .is "ni:hil," in the face oif things which exist for us.[74] Ens is also the transcendental "one," i.e. being under:srtood negatively, in which " difference" *(divisio)* already occurs, without which nega.tiving and diffeTing beings could not p;resence themselves nor world be for us.[75] As both the nothing and one of difference, *ens* as transcendental is unique rus tha:t con-dition which conditions

[72] Unless, of course, God grants a light superadded to the natural light of the agent intellect, e.g. the *lumen gratiae* or the *lumen gloriae.* See *BT,* I, 12, 2 and 5.

[73] In this regard my interpretation of St. Thomas' notion of being as first differs from that of Lonergan, who speaks of *ens* solely as a concept, putting the act of our intellect over *ens.* (See Lonergan, *Verbum,* pp. 43-45). True, as a concept the concept of being is formable and not innate, as all human concepts are for St. Thomas. But being as transcendental *signifies* as a "nomen intentionis" the prior relation of the human intellect to reality in which the human intellect is "be-thinged." Th.is, I think, is relatable to Heidegger's notion of *Be-dingnis* (see *Gelassenheit,* pp. 53-54).

[74] *In peri Hermeneias,* Leet. I, v, n. 71, St. Thomas remarks: "· .. *sed neo ipsum* ens *signifioat rem esse vel non esse. Et hoc est quod [Aristotefos] dicit,* nihil est, *idest non sigiiificat aliquid esse ... quia* ens *nihil est aZiud quam* quod est." In Heidegger's terms, *ens* conceals itself as *nihil,* nothing, no-thing, in its very revealment of the things which are (*quod est).* According to St. Thomas *ens* here signifies a thing only when I i;ay " *quod* " and existence only when I say *"est."* In this regard *ens "consignifies"* (con*significat)* what a judgment principally signifies: *"rem habentem esse" (ibid.).* As we can see from this text, St. Thomas acknowledges the ontological difference between *ens* and " *things* having existence," in the face of which *ens* is *nihil.* He does not, however, think the dif-ference itself, which Heidegger does in his "step back" from metaphysics.

[75] See St. Thomas, *de Potentia,* Q. 9, A. 7, .ad 15; *In Boeth. de Trin.,* Q. 4, 1, c.; *BT,* I, 11, 1 and 2.

us. This is not to say that Aquin:as poses the question of the *Nichts* and thus the dif-ference exactly the way Heidegger does but that Aquina:s' thought is not necessarily unamenable to Heidegger on this score. Thus, because of *ens,* and not just human *intellectus* by itself-for it is being that specifies our intellect and not our intellecit tha.t specifies actual human knowing *is* constricted to the quiddity of material things. In this regiard *ratio* cam be more deeply understood as

> . . . *quaindam obumbrationem intellectual,is naturae . . . quod statim non offertur sibi veritas, sed per inquisitionem discurrendo invenit.76*

This " shadowing" and thus " concealment" of intellect means that we are not pme intellect in an *a priori* relation to pure being hut intellect which is finite in its necessary relation rto Being as *physis,* as" unknown X," in the necessary turning of the human intellect to the imagination. *Ratio,* then, involves and does not dispense with a clearing through our Being-there: intellect-physis-imagina:tion, so that in all our know;.. ing there is ,concealment (Being) as we11 as revealment (beings) and that we must therefore go 'bhrough the detour *(Umwegigkeit)* of questioning and thinking to know.[77] Knowing :£or us, then, according to St. Thomas, presupposes a prior concealment, a shaidowing, an *obumbratio.* Just ias it is not the ·agent intellect but beings that we know when we know, so too it is not being (ens, *Sein)* hut beings that we know when we know, so tha,t both the agent intellect and *ens* stand "·between " beings and the possible intellect, " there " before the ima;gination, where *ens* provides, in Kant's te·rms, a" schema," i.e. a possibility, for an image, a phantasm, making it pos.sible for us fo. know .beings, "there" where being (ens, *Sein)* "dears" as the clearing *(Liohtung)* and the agent intellect

76 *I Sent.,* Dist. 25, Q. I, I, ad 4.

77 So Lonergan in *Verbum,* p. 38: "Already we have seen from the fact that human understanding had its object in phantasm, Aquinas deduced that human intellect was mostly reason; one should not be surprised when he goes on to affirm that we have to reason in order to form concepts."

"lights up" as the light *(Lfoht)* . *Ens* as relation is not a material image hut the "•schema" for .all [maiges ·and thus the hasis of their enoountenahility for us,[78] for *ens* as first known does not "exist" entirely umelated to the agent intellect but a;s ":6..rst" attains a priority over the agent intellect as the worlding principle, determining the possible intellect tra:nscendentailly as the *firmitas sua,e veritatis,*[79] directing our unders•tanding foward heings, just as for Heidegger *Sein* does not "exist" apart from *Dasein* hut iboth designate .a relation in which the priority goes to *Sein* as what be-essences *Dwein.*

Firom the point of view of the theologica:l source *ens* for St. Thomas is finite because it is *creatum,* as Heidegger likes to point out.[80] But can *ens* be finite for St. Thomas solely from a con.sidera,tion of it as ·an ontological source? Heidegger rejects Aristotle'1s notion (and seemingly St. Thomas') that Be-

[78] St. Thomas r.efers to phantasms as "praeter materiam" *(In de Anima,* III, Leet. 13, n. 792), for *ens* designates being *formally* as that through which all beings are understood *as beings,* the "clearing" in which they are for us. But the formality "beiug," the "clearing" must be "lit up," i.e. *understood.* Although a phantasm is "praeter materiam" as a sign, it is not a being of the intellect but of the imagination, itself a sense power. For this reason St. Thomas also says: "... formae sensibiles non possunt agere in mentem nostram, nisi quatenus per lumen intellectus agentis immateriales redduntur, et sic efficiuntur quodammodo homogeneae intellectui possibili in quern agnnt" *(de Veritate,* Q. 10, 6, ad 1). So in Heidegger, Being "needs" *(braucht)* the human. The relation between *ens* and *intellectus,* then, is twofold: *intellectus* is transcendentally proportioned to *ens* such that in "enduring" Being we are be-essenced, be-thinged, receiving that through which we are mMl.e to dwell on the earth; being, in turn, must be brought to word, concept, language in our response to being. The *esse* of *ens* as t.ranscendental is real relation; it is not intentionality itself (as Heidegger also says of *Sein)* but in the "step back" the ontologfoal basis of intentionality.

[79] See note 23. In this regard ens *ut primum cognitum* as a transcendental relation naturally orients all understanding to the extramental, so that "... *Res cognita dicitur esse cognitionis obieotum, seoundum quod est wtra cognoscentem in se ipsa subsistens"* *(de Veritate,* Q. 14, A. 8, ad 5). St. Thomas also adds: "... *quamvis de re tali non sit oognitio nisi per id quod de ipsa est in cognoscente"* *(ibid.),* in which the *firmitas sui esse,* the agent intellect, is also presupposed. Concepts express this double transcendental source or relation insofar ,as they refer to things known while t.heir being is of the intellect.

[80] E.g., see *Der Satz von Grund,* p. 136.

ing is too bright for the " eyes " of our understanding to behold and thus comprehend and for that reason we must say thrut finitude lies in us and not in Being. Instead Heidegger wants to place finitude in Being itselif, in the clearing, before ,the light of our illuminates anything like beings.[81] Hut it is only *esse,* not *ens,* which is actually infinite for St. Thomas. Since *ens* as transcendental directly discloses to us only that to which our intellect is proportioned, the na,- ture of material things, Aquinas' position describes only what *is* phenomenologica:lly accessible and on this level does not depend on a theological .argumentation which goes beyond the phenomenological, or ontological, level. So, too, with rega.rd to the agent intellect, the case tis the same:

... the agent intellect is not a separate substance but a power of the soul, extending itself actively to the same objects to which the possible intellect extends receptively ... Therefore, both intellects, according to the present state of life, extend to material things only,. ,[82]

It thus makes sense to say with Heidegger, in a. wiay that is not at ·all inimical with St. Thomas, that tempora.lizing is the horizon within which Being is for us because it " is there," with *intellectus* turmed toward the imagination, that we beingly are such that " there is " Being as first through which .beings are for *us.* Because *intellectus* f.rom the beginning turns to the phantasm, knowing is primarily passive. But this is only to say that " there is" Being and we are *ratio,* i.e. thinking and

s1 See *ibid.,* pp. 112-113.

82 *BT,* I, 88, 1, c. For St. Thomas the agent intellect as the *lumen naturale* is theologically a participation in the *lumen divinum* (see *ST,* I, 12, 2), Heidegger does not equate this natural light with the clearing of Being (see *Zur Saohe des Denkens* (Tiibingen: Niemeyer, 1969), p. 73), even though he had earlier spoken of it as the " ontically figurative way of speaking" of the "Da " of *Dasein* (see *Sein und Zeit,* p. 133) . Still, it is not something totally dismissed by the later Heidegger: *"Es soheint, wir haben bis heufo noch nioht genugend dem naohgedacht, worin das Sonnenhafte des Auges besteht und worin des Gottes eigene Kraft in uns beruht; inwiefern beides zusammengehort und die Weisung auf ein tiefer gadachtes Sein des Menschen gibt, der das denkende Wesen ist" (Der Satz vom Grund,* p. 88).

questioning beings, the *Warum-Frager,*[83] in which, because of the *obumbratio,* which applies not only to our knowing hut to Being as well, we can be in both the truth and the untruth and "err.ancy" *(Irrturn)* is ever po\S!Slible for us. The realm here is an ontological one in Heidegger's terms 1and intentional in Scholastic terms, where *anirna est quodammodo omnia* as potentially a.U thing thanks to the prior possibility in which we heingly are, in which rea.Im, as Heidegger says, possibility is higher than ,aictuality, for" possibility" here indicates the gift of Being by which we are he-essenced, in which ·all actuality in ternns of what we do know is the further playing out of that possibility.

But here Heidegger's quest after Being may have to take a humbling hlow, for as St. Thomas says, when our being/knowing is known something great is not known,[84] for our being/knowing is itself a twofold and thus finite, as all hermeneutica] ibeingis, and not utter simplicity. But if there be •a ,being whose knowing/1being were an utter oneness, it would not :be *Dasein* but being ise1f and knowing itself, in which "to be" and "to know" would be the same. It would he divine being, which in its own being would not depend on the condition ",aus. Sein ... Gott ". For Chris1tiantheology it would be the theological, and not the ontologioal, source. It would ibe the 1being which is its own Word and not the word that is Being. To be in the direct presence of such would ,be, in Eckhart's words., to be in the *Tempel Gottes,* .before the being thart is *instasis,* and not to be in the *Vorhof des Seins,* in which we as *exstasis* are.

Conclusion

In this article we !ha.ve examined only the ontological source of our Being-in-the-world, which is philosophioa.l and which Aquinas acknowledges and utilizes in hi;s theology a:s a philosophical theologian. The ontological source concerns the how of ourr being a:s the *humanitas* of the *hmno humanus,* the *ra-*

[83] *Metaphysisahe Anfangsgrii,nde der Logik,* p. 280.
[84] See *ST,* I, 14, 4, ad 2.

tU:malitas o[the *animcil rationale* where mtionality is not the difference hut the principle of a difference. We are neither *intellectualitaa* nor *animalitas.* The former is "too high" for us, the latter " too low ". Only *rationalitas* names the human by the principle of ·a difference. The *humanitas* of which both Heidegger and St. Thomas speak is for St. Thomas the same as *rationalitas.* It may he questioned whether the same can be said [or Heidegger ;[85] But for St. Thomas *ratio* is tihe expression o[*rationa:litas* and to "rubjure" it for the sake orf *intelleetus* in this life would be tantamount to abjuring our relation to Being for "pure thinking". Thus we have proposed a retrie\Cal of *ratio* ·as involving a proper understanding of our *humanitas* in which *ratio* is ontologically rfounded upon the more relation *ena-intellectus,* which relation designates *ra.tionalitas.* The existence of such a being, ourselves, St. Thomas calls *substantia rationalis* .[86]

We have sought to compare (and not reduce) the relation *ens-intellectus* in St. Thomas to Heidegger'·s relation, *Sein-Dasein.* In hoth cases the relation bespeaks onologicailly ourselves as a being in finitude, Being-in-the-world, temporality, a,s well as Being, a finite dearing thait is a, concealment, a shadowing, ·Bill abyss. In aiddiition, from our examination of St. Thomas we have concluded that *ratio* and philosophical theology cannot be deoonstructed .in their totality in a retrieval of Aquinas' thought as mysticaL This is not to deny that the true kernel of Aquinas' thought is my;stiml. But it is to deny

85 I have not made a strict analysis of what Heidegger means by *Denken* an object of this article. Nevertheless, for Heidegger *Denken* remains close to *Sein* and world. True, it is meditative but it is questionable whether Heidegger would recognize in Caputo's deconstructed *intelleatus* what he means by *Denken.* Heidegger criticizes Eckhart's notion of *Gelassr:mheit* as still metaphysical, determined in its passivity by activity and thought *"innerhalb des Willensbereiahes"* (see *Gelassenheit* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1977), pp. 33-34). Caputo does not allude to this problem when he turns to Eckhart's concept of *Gelassenheit* as the proper understanding of *intelleatus* and in terms of which "transformation ... the bridge is built from Heidegger to Aquinas" (Caputo, *op. cit.,* p. 277.)

ss *ST,* I, 108, 5, c.

that the mysticism of Aquinas ought to be advanced in theology ap3111t from his commitment to philosophical theology. For St. Thomas *ratio* (questiomng iand thinking) as the index of finituJde (the *ens-intelleotus* relation) descmbes in a fundamental, and thus undeconstructible, way the how of our Being-in-the-world. This, we conclude, makes commendable sense and can he related to Heidegger's philosophy in a positive ("retrieved ") and not just a negative (" deconstructed ") way.

I do, however, agree with Caputo that Aquinas acknowledges a deconstruction of philosophical theology (and Heidegger's notion of *Sein* would be included along with it) .[87] But I disagree with Caputo over how such a deconsta:uction is to take place. It is not through our act of " openness " seeking 1a transient share of the Beatific Vision in this life,[88] but through God acting on us, where, *prosopon pros prosopon* (I *Cor.* 13: 12), the hiddenness of Being, *en aignimata,* gives way, not to the comprehensibility of God, hut to the unfathomable light of God's glory.[89]

But the theologian *qua* theologian, as the one who questions after, [90] does not dwell in the *Tempel Gottes,* but only in *Vorhof des Seins.* Theology, then, Temains incamational,

87 In *Seim und Zeit,* pp. 198-199, Heidegger interprets the cum parable as referring to only our *"zeitlichen Wandel in der Welt."* On pp. 247-248 Heidegger asserts that his analysis says nothing in principle about the possibility or imposibility of an afterlife.

88 See Caputo, *op. cit.,* 271. Caputo's resort to mysticism, it seems to me, evokes the traditional Neo-Platonist "deconstructive" approach (e.g. St. Bonaventure's *Itinerwrium Mentis ad Deum),* with which St. Thomas was quite familiar. But St. Thomas' approach. to theology, as I am arguing it, seeks to remain in the tension, with philoso•phy and construction, in an acknowledgement of the human condition of one standing in faith.

s0 See *ST,* I, 12, *1;* 86, 2, ad 1.

·90 I distinguish here between " questioning " in the skeptical sense and "questioning after" which accepts belief and seeks to appropriate it better in terms of a *fides quaerens intellectum:* "... *ad aliquam rem dupliciter inducitur ratio. Uno moda, ad probandum suffecienter aUquam radioem* .•. *Alia moda inducitur ratio, nan quae sufficienter probe·t radicem, sed quae radici jam positae ostendat congruere cansequentes effectus* . • . *nan tamen*

through creation and the creature. This means that the theologian remains in the following tension:

... in faith, the assent and the discursive thought *[cogitatio]* are more or less parallel . . . Howeve.r, since the understanding does not in this way have its action terminated at one thing so that it is conducted to its proper term, which is the sight of some intelligible object, it follows that its movement is not yet brought to rest. Rathe;r, it still thinks discursively and inquires about the things which it believes, even though its assent to them is unwavering.[91]

St. Thomas expresises the fmilty and tentativeness o:f theology when he rather startingly says of our theologizing (rea:soning) over the revealed things of faith, "... they might just ,as well be explained by some other position ".[92] Our recognition of theology as *also* philosophiml, then, keeps the finitude of the enterprise in view: it is humans who theologize, not God. It tells us that no theology can itself be a " timeless revela·tion " but only a time and again, 1and thus renewaible, quest to appropriate the il"I'educibility of the ·religious dimension for ourselves and our world.

Caputo's deconstructed interpretation of St. Thomas' enigmatic "non possum" threatens to leave this tensive, human side of theology on the wayside.[03] Is another interpretation

ratio haec est sufficienter probans, quia etiam forte alia positione facta salvari possent ... per fidem venitur ad cognitionem, et non e converso" (ST, I, 32, 1, ad 2). But St. Thomas does not exclude the possibility of doubt occurring (see *de Veritate,* Q. 14, 1, c.).

91 St. Thomas, *Truth,* trans. James V. McGly:nn, S.J. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952), v. 2, p. 211. *(de Veritate,* Q. 14, 1, c.).

·92 *HT,* I, 32, 1, ad 2. Thus, theology is "artificialis" *(I Hoot.,* Pro!., Q. I, 5), involving narrative, metaphor and argumentation. Any specific theology involves interpretation and as such is " deconstructible." But that theology involves construction is itself not deconstructible. The two assertions, that the human intellect is primarily passive in a discursive coming to know and that theology involves construction, are not inconsistent but tensive for St. Thomas in light of the perfectibility of human knowledge and the subject-matter of theology.

98 See Caputo, 252-256. It also leaves the impression that *ratio* and its attendant "logic" are to blame for many of the problems in theology today.

possible? Heidegger tells us: "... eV'ery philosophy fails [*scheitert],* that helongs to its concept ".[94] But such describes for Heidegger not the inanity of philosophy but its grea,tness. Must we not say the same all the more, not about faith and God, but about theology? Might not St. Thomas have experienced this as well in his "non pos'sum "? In acknowledging such, however, theology loses neither its motive nor historica,l 1and thus tempoml (" tensive ") character :but finds them in the openness it needs for continuing its questioning. Heidegger goes on to say:

For only by truly remaining in questioning does it [philosophy] force what is worthy of questioning to appear. But by opening up what is most worthy of question, it helps bring about the open- of what overcomes and transcends from the very bottom nothingness and what is naught ...[95]

Heidegger, who was no stranger in his study to the phenomenon of great who endured >breakdowns, e.g. Schelling, Nietzsche, Ho1derlin-,and St. Thomas-further remarks:

But this ... great breakdown of great thinkers is not a failure *[Versagen]* and nothing negative at all-on the contrary. It is the sign of the advent of something completely different, the he.at lightning of a new beginning.[96]

But Heidegger, interestingly enough, remarks: *"Das Religiose wird niemals durch die Logik zerst-Ort, sondern immer nur dadurch, dass der Gott sich entzieht" (Was Heisst Denken?* (Tiibingen: Max Niemeyer, 1971), p. 7).

[94] See *Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom,* trans. Joan Stambaugh (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1985), .p. 98. In *Sahellings A.bhandlung,* p. US.

[95] *Ibid.* In *Summa contra Gentiles,* I, 2, n. 2, St. Thomas describes the motive for theologizing as ·an act of religion, or piety, in tension with the acknowledged human limitations of such an enterprise.

[96] *Ibid.,* p. 3. In *Soheliings A.bhandlung,* p. 4.

THE REDUCTION OF ESSENCE IN THE THOUGHT OF THOMAS AQillNAS AND EDMUND HUSSERL

MARTIN T. WOOOS

Loyola, Marymount University
Los .Angeles, California

THE PURPOSE of this article is to address, first of all, the iissue of whether St. Thomas anticirp1atedthe phe-omenological in both an epistemological and metaphysica,l sense, and subsequently articulated its solution he:£ore the investigations of modern phenomenofogists began.

The secondary purpose of this writing is to reveal the anom-rulies :£aiced by the phenomenologist Edmund Hussel'll, who, in noting the same problem earlier ·addressed by Aquinas, at-tempted to discover the narrow bridge between reality and knowledge and £ailed to find it. This effort will he amply documented from his Gottingen lectures published as *The Idea of Phenomenology* late in his career. Thomas, on the contrary, seemed to find this bridge with relative ease .and went on to clarify with admira:hle lucidity the steps to be taken in travers-ing it, paxticularly in the latter part of his little work *On Being and Essence (De Ente et Essentia)* , written for the Dominican students 1at Naples rubout *U55.*

Aquinas and Essence Absolutely Coniidered

After analyzing in some detail the notion of species, genus ·and difference Aquinas states in his work *On Being and Es-sence* thaJt sruoh universal notions could not be said to belong in .the strict sense to real existent individuals, an in·sight the Blatonists had highlighted from antiquity by assuming that universals exist independently of thought. "In this way"

Aquinas says, "the genus a.nd species would nut be predicated of individual; for ,it cannot be said that Socmtes is what is separated from him," [1] n.a.mely, the universal natures of man and animal. However, in .spite of the pmblem of ontologism the Platonists eventually CTeated, they were the first to clarify the distinction tha.t still sepa,rates sense experienoe f·rom universal notions in the thinkiing of philosophers today. In order to close the yawning epistemologiorul chasm that resulted, Plato, the architect o[this separation, had gone on to claim that the world of ideal forms or unive'l's·al notions somehow i11uminedthe wodd of sense appearances a;nd gave them meaning. It is ;at this point that Aquinas, unlike his master in philosophy, Aristotle, parts company with the Platonists and goes on to question the immediate relation of formal universals to the understanding o[parlicula!'.s. "Nor further, would this sepamted something (e.g. the species *man)* be of any use in knowing this singular (i.e. Soorates the individual man) ." [2] This somewhat unexpected statement of Aquinas seems to put him at odds with the position of Aristotle on whom he relied so heavily for his classic analysis of predicrubles. Why this striking deviiation from the ·authority of the philosopher who states quite specifically in the *Categories* that while the univerrsrulis not in any way *present* in things, it ·is nevertheless *predicable* of them? Aqumas on the contmry seems to suggest that his notion of a " predicable " is a bit more ahstmct than Aristotle's. It was at this point in the *De Ente et Essentia* that Aquinas laid a firm basis :for trhe ela:bo.oo-tion of a phenomenological reduction without lrubeling it as such.

In order to accomplish this purpose, Aquinas decided to clarify .an important distinction between the essence conceived as " *a universal* " iand the " *essence absolutely considered."*

[1] Thomas Aquinas, *De Ente et Essentia* (52) trans. by Joseph Bobik, *On Being and, Essence.* Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965. p. 119.

[2] *Ibid,.*

" Now a natlliVeor essence signified as a whole," he states, " can be considered in two ways. In one way it can be considel.1edaccording to its proper content, and this is an absolute oonsidemtion of it. And in this way, nothing is true of it except what :belongs to it as such. For e:immple, to man as man belong rational animal, and whatever else falls in ills definition." [3] Regarding this *first* me8!Ilingof essence, he then goes on to say, "1and it is the nature so considered which is predicated of all individuals. Yet it cannot be said," he adds, "that the notion of a universal belongs to the nature so considered, ·because oneness 1and commonness are of the notion of a universrul. Neither of these belongs to human nature considered absolutely for if eommonness were of the content of man, commonness would .be found in whatever thing humainity is found. And this is false, for in Socrates there is not commonness but whatever is in him is individuated." [4] He then points out in a brief example that essence a1bsolutely .considered includes nothing which is outside the content of humanity 81s such: "... whence if one should ask whether the nature so considered can be said to be one o'r many, neither should be allowed, because ea.oh is outside the content of humanity, and either can be added to it." [5] *Epistemologically,* then, Aquinas ilays a groundwork for a suitable phenomeno'1ogioalreduction by excluding from the essence " rubsolutely considered" both unive•rsality in thought .and ind1ividuality in fact without excluding its po.ssible relation to either. The epistemological status of the EAC (henceforth used for " essence absolutely considered ") is disoovera1ble precisely in the act of prescinding .from unity in essence and p1urralityin f.act. Consequently, everything that belongs :by definition to the nature so ·apprehended is predicable of it whether that " it " happens to ibe the " man in general " or "SoCJ'iates in pa:vticular", the cfass or the individual. Thus "Man is a rational animal" and "Socrates is a mtional 'animal" are both equally true statements.

a *Ibid.* (54), p. 122.
4 *Ibid.* (57), pp. 123f.
5 *Ibid.* (54) , pp. 122f.

However, Aquinas is not satisfied to leave his clarification of the EAC to ,an *epistemological reduotion.* He continues in the same vein to accomplish .a *metaphysical reduction* of equal importance. "In the oither way, an essence is considered according to the eristence it has in this or that. When the essence is so considered, something is predicated of it 1accidentally, by reason of thaJt in which it is; for e:x;ample,it is s1aid that man is white hecause Socrates is white, although to ibe white does not belong to the man as man." [6] This second reduction is of a metaphysiool order in that the EAC prescinds from the independent e:ris:tence of the object Socrates who happens in a contingent sense to he white, and likewise prescinds from the independent eristence of the concept " man " which is .a modification of the thinker's consciousness. Yet rthe EAC *qua known,* .represents the possibility of judging the correspondence of what *man* is both essentially and incidentaHy (because *man* is incidentaJ.ly white with respect to Socrates while remaining essentially "r:ational animal " with respect to hoth the univer-1sality of its own nature and the individuaility of Sociiates.) Thus the EAC itself becomes the principle of identity by which the utterly divergent differences between the two ontofogica;l realms of knowledge and being can he recognized. As Aquinas 1Says, "This natune (the EAC) has ,a twofold existence, one in singul·ar things, the other in ·the .soul; and a;ccidents follow upon the nature according to either existence. In singulfil' things it has a multiple existence in acco['d with the diversity of these singular things; yet the existence of none of these belongs to the nature considered in .itself, i.e., mbsofote-ly. " [7] The EAC, then, is capruble of being recognized, even in things. The EAC may in tfacl be recognized ,as "of the essence" of each ontological status with respect to the being of *this* man -and the knowledge of *what* man is, but neither status determines the nature of the EAC as such, Aquinas pointed out, for these aspects ·are what is laicking in the con-

[6] *Ibid.* (55), p. 123.
[7] *Ibid.* (56), p. 123.

tent of the EAC as such. It is in fact the EAC itself that determines the possibility of reoognizing both the essential identity and the existentia[di:fferences between knowledge and its object. (Had Aristotle anticipated this more precise distinction ·between the EAC and the universal form.any conceived, the early medieval (lOntroverrsies·about the ontology of the universal itself might have been far less 1acrimoniorusand much more enlightening.)

conclusion of all this was 1stated quite simply by Aquinas: "And it is the nature 1so considered (i1e., the EAC) which is predica;ted of all. individuals." [8] He then goes on to f()ll'esta.11the likely objection, a schofastic one at that, that the !formal unive!l'sal is itself P'redieated of its "inferior" individuals. In contradiction to this, he states (and it hears repeti- ·tion in this new oontext), "Yet it cannot he said that the universal ;belongsto the nature so considered (the EAC), because oneness and commonness 1are oif 1the notion of ·a u.n.ive11sal Neither of these belongs to human nature considered absofotely, for if commonness were of the content of man, commonness would he found in whatever thing humanity is found. And this is false, ibecruuse in Socrates there is not commonness, but whate¥er is in him is individuated." [9] Thus, the formal universal :is depicted hy Aquinas ;as .adding to the EAC the " note" or notion of class universality, for example, the definitional chamcter of a species or genus. Such universal essences quite oibviously are not predicable of individuals without contradiction. On the contrary, there is absent any explicit reference to a class concept when the *content* of a genus or species (namely, the EAC) is predicated oif individuals. Thus, it makes pe:rtfectsense to say that Socrates is a man without saying that Socmtes himself is a species of ·animal. Aquinas therefore ooncludes that the " notion of the species is not among the things which belong to the nature absolutely considered . . . Rather the notion o.f the species is .among the accidents which

[8] *Ibid.* (57), pp. 123f.
[9] *Ibid.* (57), p. 124.

follow upon the natuve oooording to the existence it has in the intellect; and it is in this way too that the notion of the genus and the difference (e.g. "animality". or "rationality") belong to it." [10]

Sev:eml oibservations should be made at this point:

(1) Aquinas is guilty neither of an epistemological no!r a metaphysical correspondence of a naive order, as sometimes claimed. From his metaphy:sica.l perspective, class notions ·are quite different £mm individual things, while relations of universality 1and relations of particular facts ,a;re !recognized to possess a quite divergent epistemological status, clearly reoogni2la.ble to David Hume, example.

(2) The objection that the EAC is in a. sense " the last thing known " in this analy·sis, and therefore incapable of representing the prior " known linkage " ·between particulrurs 1and class notions, is not wirurranted. Aquinas alw:ay.s ifollowed the Aristotelian principle that "we must begin with whait is more knowable to us " and progress " to what is more knowable in itself", i.e., from the perceived effects to the causal principles 'that explain them. The EAC belongs to the latter class while the divergent £acts of knowledge .and reality belong, episte- at least, to the former. The :£act that even after much reffootion ·we do not understand the precise function of the EAC does not render its use hy us any less effective than the ignorance of motorists ahout the operation of differential.s imperils their ability to turn corners. 'Iihe term "known link1age" is misleading here, because the EAC is known primarily in the sense that it reveals " contents " and only seconda.rily in the 1sense that it reveals its own nature to us. H is in this sense that the authoil' in his classes occa;sionally refe1ls to the " mirror pruraidox" wherein one recognizes a friend in a dall"k restaurant without at first noticing the mirror or phy,sical medium in which he or she is reflected.

(S) While Aquinas ·attempts to achieve the fruits of *dual (YfJOOhe,* or the reduction of essence, by prescincling from empi-

[10] *Ibid.* (65), p. 126.

ricism and psychologism (iand he did this long ·before " phenomenological !'eduction " was proposed hy HusseTtl and his disciples), nevertheless, Aquinas eschews any forma;l reduction, :such as the ahsolute "transcendence" of the empirical object familiar to phenomenology. Instead, he adheres to established epistemological .and metaphysical paradigms that .uphold the integrity of the cognitive act. It is this point in particular that will be discussed later relative to Husserl and his employment of the *dual epoDhe* which turned out to he one of the central principles of his epistemology and ontology.

A final note in summary of Aquinas' insight: it is in the EAC that the meaning and being of what *man* is, for example, lose their separate identities in the indistinguisha;ble content of what is found to belong to :both. The next question is whether the same result will actually be accomplished by the phenomenological reduction developed ,by Husserl in his " Idea of Phenomenology."

Husserl and the Phenomenological Redu<Jtion

Husserl begins by delineating a, distinction between the *natural* mode of reflection and the *philosophical* mode of reflection. The ifoJ.'IIller consists of thinking activities that investigate *a priori* connections in their formal 1generality. Such connections are said tby him to be ibrused on " *a primi* principles which belong to objectivity a:s such." [11] In consequence of these activities " 1there comes into being a, *pure grammar* and ·at a higher stage a *pure logiD* " from which emerges " a practical logic ... especially of scientific thinking ".[12] From this, it becomes apparent that Husserl ,believesthat the *"natural mode of refieDtion"* deals only with the forms of thought, not its contents. This is the point at which phenomenology must come into play, a method designed to discover the essential *oontents* of thought by means of the OOl1l'eot aprpmach to wha.t he cirulls

[11] Edmund Husserl, *The Idea of Phenomenology,* trans. by William P. .Alston and George Nakhnikian. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964. p. 15.

[12] Jbid.

the *philosophical mode of reflection.* Husserl w:ws well aware of the danger of relying exclusively on the Kantian transcendental analytic as a total solution to the pmblem of knowledge. The remedy of ·this philosophic endangerment is discoverruble in la new rupproa;ch," ... the positive task of the theory of kno·w'1edge is to solve the prO'blems of the relations among cognition, its meaning and its object, by inquiring into the essence of cognition." [13] As is well known, Husserl explicitly eschews ·all reliance on metaphysical and psychologistic assumptions, and the critiques that presuppose these, and limits his " purified " epistemologiical approach to the mode of *philosophic<J!lrefieotion* clarified as follows: " If then we diSl'egard any metaphysical pmipose of the critique of cognition and confine ourselves purely to the task of *clarifying the essence of cognition to and of beJing an object cognition,* then this will be *phenomenology of oognition and of being an objeot of cognition* and will be the first and principal part of phenomenology as a whole." [14] Where does this foave us vis-a-vis Aquinas' approach to the problem? While Aquinas begins with what he takes to be the essential content of cognition *qua* content, it becomes clear that Husserl launches his investigation into a vaguely similar or analogous content of cognition, but *qua cognized* or" as being lan object of cognition." Thus far, one difference becomes sufficiently obvious: cognition's "immanence " to knowledge is .a basic given.

Husserl then faces his second pl'oblem: " How can the critique of cognition get underway? " He first falls hack upon the :fundamental Cartesian insight, " ... that cognition itself is a name for a manifold sphere of being which can be given to us absolutely, and which oan be given us abSOilutelyeach time in the pa.rtioular case." [15] Husserl is referring obviously enough to the essential " cogito " of Descall'ltes. However, he then goes on to :broaden that insight to the following, recapitulating in

lSibid., p. 17.
14 *Ibid.,* p. 18.
15 *Ibid.,* pp. 22f.

a sense the whole history of early modern philosophy: " I can speak vaguely a.bout cognition, perception, imagination, experience, judgment, inference, etc." [16] But for Hus:serl all these have something in common. " The thought processes which I .really perform .are giv.en to me insofar as I reflect upon them, receive them, and set them up in a pure ' seeing ' , namely, an act orf eidetic intuition." [17] Aquinas hrud likewise with respect to the EAC cairefully avoided involvement in a plethora of cognitive modalities and had restricted his discussion to their *common* contents amd the role of these contents in predication. Perception in Aquinas's concept was "of the individual" and wa:s unlike intellectual cognition, which was universal. Perception simply grasped individual things *qua* perceptible through the senses. In this respect, perception ·as such needed no special epistemic treatment. We see certainly .that Husserl simplified and broadened the overall " mode of seeing " as common to all cognition even irf the contents themselves appear to he both phenomenal 1and universal. " Every intellectual process," 'sayis Husserl, " and indeed e-\i;ery mental process ·whatever, while beiing enacted, can be made the object of a pure 'seeing ' and understanding and is something absolutely given in this ' seeing '." [18] He emphasizes this point further by describing cognition as " immanent " by definition when taken within the context of epistemoiJ.ogical explanation. " It remained to be shown thait the *immanence* of this cognition makes it an appropria.te prnint of departure for the theory of cognition: that, furthermore, beca;nse of this immanence, it is kee of the puzz;lement which is the source of all sceptical embarrassment. Finally, it remained to be shown that immanence is the genemlly necessary chariacterist!ic of all episrtemologica.l cognition." [19] Thus, epistemologically :at least, a combined •subjectivity and orbjectivity (givenness) is the •starting point

1e *Ibid.,* p. 23.
11 *Ibid.*
18 *Ibid.,* p. 24.
19 *Ibid.,* p. 26.

for Husserl who must now " ireduce" his phenomenon in order to pursue hris investigations further. PJainly, Aquinas on the other hand constitutes neitheir "subjectivity" nor "objectivity" as a necessary ingredient of his analogous EAC, while in the ,same breath he recognizes its potential knowa;bility as the content of either a cognitive or non-(iognitive existence.

In orrder to accomplish the reduction and to isolaite exclusiv.ely on the object of phenomenological method, it is necessa;ry, Husserl finds, to ,avoid " ... on the one hand, the bas:irc e:rooil'of psyichologism, on the other that of anthropologism and 1bio1o,gism."[20] This he attempts to accomplish by what he calls the " *dual epoche* " (or reduction) , a kind of metabasis that e:xdudes both psychological and empirical explanations in principle, for accepting such bases uncritically would, from his point of view, he to beg the question of how knowledge is possible, by accepting it *tout entire.* Husserl insists on going straight to the cause without an analysis of phenomena commonly associated with knowledge: " And that goes not just for the beginning but for the whole comse of the critique of cognition, so long as there still remains the problem of *how cognition is possible."* [21]

Aquinais' 'Specificreaction to this approach would be at best speculative becaJUse of the historical limitations of anticipating the entire career of Oartesian rationalism that :finally gave rise to the "myth " of whait Gilbert Ryle called " The Ghost in the Machine." Suffice it to say that Aquinas held ,a principle that would preclude such an approach to· pure possibilities without a relationship to some actual cause. This wa1S a metaphysical :firrst principle, which he found to be based on actU!al experience: It reads, "Potencies are kno,wn (only) in their

He also held its converse (often quoted in o1d ,scholastic textbooks): *"A posse ad esse non valet illatio."* (From possibility to existence, there is no via;lid inference). Fmm the s,tandpoint of Husserl's Cartesian and Kantian backgrounds,

2-0 *Ibid.,* p. 31.
21 *Ibid.*

such strictures WiOUld not hold water. Here, possibiHty is rbhe only basis for oonceiv:a.bility: and it must be the possibility of 1aicti¥e knowaibility as a property of cognition, not potential knowaihility attrihubable to experience *apart* from cognition. But the swmd of reduction here unsheathed hy Husserl outs in a way he intend. The act of separating the psychological and empirical from the activity of cognition interferes with the :veoognized integrity of the knowing act; and it also begs the question by introducing the presupposition that the elements of the psychological ,and empirical are *by nature* distinct from the alleged immediacy of " seeing " in the essential aict of oognition. Indeed, if the integrity of the cognitive act does not include them at least implicitly, how do we ever come to know their contribution to knowledge? Let us look again at Husserl's writings in order to see how absolutely this distinction is formulated.

In his Third Lecture, Husserl ,searches for what he calls the " rpure phenomenon " hy first ",macketing out " questions of "1real existence." at this point he say;s, "we speak of such absolute data even if these data are related to actuality by their intentions. Their intrinsic character is within them; nothing is assumed concerning the *existence* or *Mn-existmwe* of actuality. And so we have ,<:Wopped anchor on the shore of phenomenology." [22] An example of this shows up in hi·s Fifth Lecture where he speaks of a" fantasy-phenomenon" namely, " St. Georrge killed the dil'agon:" which " he,re represents something transcendent" but it is so in fact. [23] "Then the perception which is thereby graisped and delineated in ' seeing is :an absolutely given, puil'e phenomenon in the phenomenological sense, renouncing anything transcendent." [24] It i's this area of tr.ascendence that must be bracketed out by the phenomenological reduction, says Hussel'll. Whether a " house-phenomenon " signifies a real house or not is an issue to be

[22] *Ibid.,* p. 35.
2a *Ibid.,* p. 57.
[24] *Ibid.,* p. 34f.

dealt with outside the pale oif epistemology. " Every postulation oif a non-immanent actuality of any,thing which is not contained in the pihenomenon, even if intended by the phenomenon, and which is thare:fore not given in the seoond sense (ais it is in itself) is hmcketed, i.e. suspended." [25]

At the outset Husserl invites one major disagreement from Aquinas over this fir:st phase of his bipolar reduction. The hasic issue is thait, for Aquinas, the EAC which prescinds from existence 1and individuality is definitional and intellectual, while the " pure phenomenon " of Husserl is descriptive and perceptual. " Can I not make an evidently true judgment," Husserl, " on the ba:sis of the appearance or in the content of this peroeption, the house is thus and so, 'a brick building, with a sl,a:te roof, etc.? " [26] Thus, the phenomenon, as pure as Hussed makes it out to be, does not prescind from a quasi-empmca:l description, even though it is said to prescind completely from empirical existence. Therein comes into pla;y Husserl's notion of *intentwn* .already mentioned, which represents an "objectification" of the data in the pure phenomenon. "Cognitive mental processes (and these belong to the essence of the phenomenon) have an *intention;* they refer to something, they .ave related in this or that way to an object. 'r.his activity of relating itself to 1an object belongs to them even if the object itself does not." [27] Thus, the eidetic essence may embody incidenta.Ily perceptual detail that is *intentioncil* rather than specifically emrpiricrul.

Is, then, the "pure phenomenon" to be confined without qualification to the data that directly intend particu1'ars which either may or may not " transcend " knowledge hy virtue oif their real existence? Not at all. "That cognition which can .bring by ahsolute self-givenness not only particulars, hut s,lso universals, universal objects, ,and uni\i;ersal states of affairs, is more easily conceivable, a,t lea:st for anyone who can assume

25 *Ibid.,* p. 35.
26 *Ibid.,* p. 57.
21 *Ibid.,* p. 43.

the posiition of pure ' seeing ' and can ho1d all natural preju-dices at ail"ill's length. This cognition is of decisive significance for the possibility of phenomenology." [28] Now we come to core issues of similarity and c:lifference between " *essence absolutely considered*" ·and " *essenc;e a priori*" in the alternative epis-·temologies of Aquinas ,and Husserl. For Husserl, ais for Aquinas, universal·s conceived as essences became tihe touch-stone of authentic knowledge. But included in a given essence for Husserl ais a result of what he caHs "general analysis" is (1) the nature of " absolute sel,f-givenness" which is an a,b-,sence of tmanscendence or definitively empirical status, and (2) a ,second notional aspect, his specific meaning of a *priori.* The fi11st notion, the exdusion of transcendence, really the fil'St fog of the two-fold reduction, has already been clarified; but this second aspect of *a priorism* requires exemplification. As Husserl states it, " Analysis of essence is *eo ipso* general analysis ... in terms of cognition which is directed to universal objects. It is here that bhe talk of the *a. priori* has its legitimate place. For whait does *a priori* cognition mean except a, cognition which is directed to gene:rial essences, and wh:ich entirely bases its absolute vialidity on essence, at least in so far as we exclude the discredited empiricist concept of the *a priori?*" [29] 'I1hus, essences, as conceived by Husserl, are not unrelated to Humean natuiial impressions, but also eschew the role of synthetic a; *priori* Kantian categories imposed on experience in orde!l' to render it phenomenal. " If we concentrate herre on the first concept of the *a priori* [namely Husserl's own], then phenomenology wiH have to do with the *a priori* in the sphere of origins and of absolute data, with species grasped in general ' seeing ', and with the *a priori* truths. which these species render immediaitely ' seealble'." [30] Granted the vagueness. of this formulation, Husse111 does tell us what we need to know rubout his. meaning of es.sence. (a) It originaites in knowledge,

2s *Ibid.,* p. 41.
29Jbi(/,.
so *Ibid.,* pp. 4lf.

not in the empirical world. (b) It is intuited immediately without the mediation of synthetic categories or empirical impressions or pwceptions (although percerptual pa!J.'lticul,arity o:f the phenomenon does seem to raise a question here). (c) Everything ,attributaible to this essence is immediately deducible from it.

Analysi,s and Evalua:tion

How then would Aquinas critique this account of " general essence" with reference to his EAC? With respect to (la) the origination of knowledge, the abstmctive power of mind (for him, " a1gent intellect ") is indeed a *neoessary* explanation of the origin of the EAC, but not a sufficient explanation. For Aquinas, mind is the *efficient* cause of knowledge in the sense that it carries on the activity of abstracting or clarifying the content "man " from the perception of Socrates the individual. Aquinas does not, as does Husserl, choose to ca.st off the lines from the " 'Sphere orr origins." Husserl retains actual *immanence* for his general essence while oaitego,rically denying transcendence to it. For Husserl, essence is in its radical sense essentially *immanent* to thought and non-identical with any empirical object that is said .to transcend thought. Man by definition is an object orf knowledge whose only refation to the empirical is that of a general formula to the particular " phenomenon " previously addressed. This phenomenon in its turn shares with the "general essence " an absolute " givenness " whose derivation from the empirical world is not presupposed. The road to the empirical world therefore stops at the threshold. However, "intentionality" does ·suggest an object, but in no sense validates the existence of such an oibject. Indeed, exactly how this "objoot " could possibly be utilized as a medium for ·a validating judgment of external existence is not discussed by Husserl. " And just here lie the puzzles," says Hussel'll," the mysteries, the proiblems ooncernmg the ultimate meaning of the objectivity of cognition, including its reaching or failing to reach the object, if it is judgmental cognition, and

5.ts adequacy, if it is evident cognition, etc." [31] Plainly, Husserl hais no plaJCe to go, having hmcketed transcendence completely. On the other hand, Aqmnas stipulates that whether in thought, imaginaition, or empirical fact, some " object of knowledge " must aict in concert with the *efficient* causality of mind as a *"final"* or specifying caJuse, providing ·a "pib.antaism" or "species" (something like the " phenomenon " of Husserl) by which rthe nature or natural properties of such an "oibject " .are *potentially* inteJligible to the knower on the level of generality. The *actual* knowledge of an object ·at an intellectual level is consequent upon this process of abstracrbion, an act :by which potentially knowruble particulars in perception a.re rendered actually known on the universal level. Even the "empirical man" in Socrates is in the ·act of perception simult•aneously know;aibleat the universal level of specific genemlity. The EAC, then, ws AquinalS .states it, is a little like " what wowd :be true of :a corporeal statue representing many men: the image or form of the statue would have its own, or individUJal, existence .according ais it exists ·in *this* mrutter, ·and it would have the char:acter of commonness (universality) according as it is the common representation o[many ." [32] By ana1ogy to the latter part of the example, Aquinas g:oes on to point out thait ". . . because it belongs to human nature absolutely consideTed (the EAC) to be predicated of Socrates, .and because the notion of the species does not belong to it ah·solutely considered, but is among the accidents which follow urpon it acco11dingto the existence it has in the intellect, one can see why the word ' species ' is not predicated of Socrates; that is why it is not said that ' Socrates is a species.' " [33] This brings us back to the fact estrublished earlier, namely, that Aquinas avoids the 1oategorical attributions of both formal class universality and empirical individua1ity to the EAC, yet the way remains open to both modes o.f the ooncep-

[31] *[bid.,* p. 43.

[32] Thomas Aquinas, *On Being and Essenoe.* (62), p. 125.

[33] *Ibid.,* (63), p. 125.

tuail las well as the individual. Para.doxically, we 13Jre 'able to !recognize that a thought concerning the species of man as a universa.l category can he entertained even a.s we recognize that there e:xcist many individual men who exemplify this ca.tegory without being identical with it in the universal sense. However, this iis not to say thrut the EAC is *temporaUy prior* in our conscious knowledge as a, principle from which we inrfer both the existence of real men and aC'bual thoughts a.bout man as a category. This would indeed be a quesbion-ibegging exercise of conceptualiism which Aquinas consistently avoids. The EAC lis rather a principle which makes possible the knowledge of hoth terms and their re1ationsihip to each other. The knowledge of the essence of wha.t man is becomes equally possible either in Socrates the *individual* or in his *olass derfinition* as man. It is only by -an act of secondary reflection that we would grrusp the EAC by prescinding rfrom either type of existence (a duaJity Aquinas might have woadened to include perceptual existence as suggested by Husserl in the category of St. George and his d:vagon). !n conclusion, the views of Husseril expressed as (a) namely, that the "generial essence" originates in knowledge aione (a *priori)* and not in the empirical world, would not he rucceptwble to Aquina:s who holds on the contriary that, aithougih it is .the intellect which in a sense *causes* univer:srulity in things, it is still the singular potentiailly objects of perception that render universal knowledge specifiable. Thus, the real order of e:xiperience retairns ais its own the definitive represenfotional role in the etiology of knowledge.

With respect to (h), which is the immediacy of the intuition of essence, we can srtate three points: (1) Aquinas. would agree with Husserl that the intuition of " simple essences " is noit mediated .by prior intuitions o[the same char:acter; but (2) he w:ou1d disagree with Husserl with respect to his views regavding the tortal tl"anscendence of empirical causes. In his etiology of knowledge, the *object* of knowledge, whether real or phenome111ail, is always the *primary* specifying cause o[knowledge,

since for him knowledge is .by nwture a relation o:f known content to that which iiS acluwlly known to possess it, regiardless o:f its mode of existence, empirical, psychologicrul, or otherwise. Furthermore, (3) AqwiTIJas would deny the essential *a priori* aJttrihution o:f cognitive immanence 00 the EAC, because this would mean that whatever was attributed to the *mental* conception o:f the essence o:f say, man, would also be required to be attil'ihuted 00 each individual who is claimed :\Jo be a man. This" cognit,ive immanence" would itsel:f Uh.en be attributa;ble to Uhe essence o.:f individuals. " And this is :false," to recall Aquinas' statement ;vegarding the cognitively i!lllllanent notion o:f universality," because in Socrates there is no commonness (uTIJiversaliity) but whatever is in him is individuated." [34] Undoubtedly he would hold the same to be true o:f "cognitive immanence."

The ans,wer to (c) with respect to the deducible character o:f knowledge from the "gene11al essence" attests to Husserl's total dependeTIJce on an *a priori* linkage to the " pure phenomenon " for the farther deducibility o:f ;1miveT1Sa1l knowledge. Aquinas, on the oontraey, is not similarly so dependent. Subsequent events of empirical perception that represent a furrther study o:f individual natures also cmrry with them the potential o:f new universal knowledge as an amplification and corrective o:f the old. Thus in a tempoml :frame man can be £ound to ,be white, tblack, or brown in terms of the further related attributes discoverruble through sense perception. These too all'e "essences" even i:f they are "accidental" ra;ther than " substantial."

It should be clear, then, thait to restrict knowledge either to the ideational or the empirical *per se,* oil.' even their mutually eXJclusiv;e opposites, is to :force the a;bandonment o[any genuine correspondence theory of knowledge as such. To forestall in this fashion the possibility o[a viable correspondence ;theory o:f knowledge by the Husseirlian primacy o:f oonsciousness is to restrict knowledge 1and knowwbility to immanence, and suhjec-

84 *[bid.,* (57), p. 124.

tivity in its struggle for the oibjectivity of whait it knows is now left to- disoover ·only a modicum of correspondence in externalized linguistic and logical mndels which :are in their turn derived from pe11ception 1and conceptualization, rendering ·these very oons:brucrbsof "oibjectivity" seoond order products. It then follows that philosophy is reduced to a study of meaning related externally to logioail and linguistic models found all too frequently in neopositivism and linguistic 1analysis; or, on the other hand, philosophy is resrtricted to internalized coherent, rather than correspondent, models of thought that hlend together phenomena and universals as: instiooced in phenomenological studies 1such as Husserl's. It is here then that Aquinas' "essence 1a;bsolutely considered " ibecomes the necessary propaedeutic to the understanding od: knowledge. Without it, the justifiable iba:sis for the presuppositionless correspondence of knowledge ·with its object is in dire peril.

The author hopes thart it is now possible to launch a determined rescue effort that may bring to the sun.face of the tides of history a presently submerged principle neither psychological nor empiriological *per se,* namely, a more ample formulation of the " essence aibso1utely considered " of St. Thomas Aquinas that may :reflect the content of hoth ibeing.and knowledge with equal graice.

OBJECTIVITY AND RELIGIOUS TRUTH: A COMPARISON OF WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH AND BERNARD LONERGAN

DENNIS M. DOYLE

University of Dayton
Dayton, Ohio

WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH •and Bernard Lonergan both propose a new agenda for theology n response to ;the same basic cultura.I developments.[1] Both Smith and Lonergan pinpoint the crux of the current siturution !aJs the convergence of various cultures in a world where Western culture had .been heM by its pwrticiipants to be univers•al .and normrutive. The majo'l" problem concerning religious truth :that larises out of this situation concerns universality. Formulrutions tha:t were once taken for granted are now seen to he relative to their context. Concepts that it.T1anscend particular formulations are themselves recognized irus indigenous to la culture. T·ruth itself is questioned as to whether it too is not !l'elative to eaich oontert.

The responses of Smith and Lonergan to this situa:tion are remarkably ·similar in structure. In the midst of these similarities, lhowever, arise some differences with important implications concerning oibjectivity, itruth, and theology in a global context.

Objec:tivity, Method, and Human Knowledge

Smith and Lonergan both 'address rthe issue of human knowing before establishing their programs for theology.[2] For botih,

1 Smith's proposal is put forth in *Towards a World Theology* (Phila.: Westminster Press, 1981) • Lonergan's proposal can be found in *Method in Theology* (N.Y.: Herder and Herder, 1972).

2 Smith's reflections on human knowing are in "Objectivity and the Humane Sciences," in *Towards a World Theology,* pp. 56·80'. Lonergan's

a major problem in wayis of conceiving human knowing in recent centuries has heen an ohjectivism according to which knowledge was iheld to he absolute without regard to human SUJbjectivityand without an openness to other cultures. Both find a £acile cultural remtivism to he .an unsatisfactory reaction to this problem. In response, :both Smith and Lonergan try to re-root human knowing in a human conte:rl. Lonergan does ·this hy establishing the ground of knowing in an analysis of human intentionality. Smith does this by estaiblishing the ground of knowing in a mutual interchange between persons who participate in some traditions and who are observers of other traditions. Smith la.belssuch knowing ·a" 001·iporaitecritica1 self-iconsciousness." What emerges from such consciousness is "humane knowledge."

Although some major di:ffevencesarise at this point, the context of istructul'lalsimilarities must he noted.[3] For hoth Smith and Lonergan, hruman knowing is intrinsically connected with :the quality of living both individually and oommulllа1ly.Eiach in his own way stresses that knowing is vitally linked to the consciousness of individuals. Each in his own way stresses that knowing takes place within ·community, and that the breadth and quality of the community affects the breadth and quality of the knowing. Smith •and Lonergan both, furthermore, envision the taisk of theology as the conceptualization and articulation in a new context of wihat was once known in a strictly objective, theoretical f:vame;work. Both, finailily, 'lay ouit the

major work on human knowing is *Insight: A Study of Human Understo;nding* (N.Y.: Philosophical Library, 1957). For a summary view, see chapter one of *Method in Theology.* For Lonergan's position on objectivity, see "The Origins of Christian Realism" in *A Second Collection* (Phila.: Westminster Press, 1974), ·pp. 239-61.

a For an earlier comparison of the methods of Smith and Lonergan, see Walter E. Conn, "'Faith' and 'Cumulative Tradition' in Functional Specialization: A Study in the Methodologies of Wilfred Cantwell Smith and Bernard Lonergan," *Studies in ReligiOn/Soiences Religieuses* 5 (1975/76) : 221-46• .Although this article was published before several of Smith's major works in the area, the methodological similarities unearthed by Conn still hold true.

problem specifically in terms of tmnscending false subject/object :dichotomies.

At this point, however, differences between Smith and Lonwgian begin to emerge, foir each attempts to transcend false .suibjoot/oibjectdichotomies in a different way. Lonergan holds that objectivity is the fruit of authentic ;subjectivity.[4] 1t is intended hy the self-transcending subject who loves God, who values what is truly good, and who tmly desires to know. Objectivity is reached in true judgment, and, although this judgment takes plaice within a particular context, what is ·reached achieves an essentirulthough not existential detachability from borbh the subject and the oonitext.

Smith, on the other hand, wants his " humane knowledge " fo replace objectivity. By "objectivity" Smith means the limited kind of knowledge aUained 1by an ourtside observer of human activities. By " subjectivity " ·Stmith means the limited killd of knowledge available to a participant who does not ·admit the pm:spective of the outsidffi'. "Humane knowledge" is knowledge that results 1rom a coalescence o[the perspectives of participanrts and observers. Although humane knowledge !reaches beyond "objectivity," its aim rema;ins ever the approximation 00: truth.

Before the reail differences between Smith and Lonergan can ·be rooted out here, the semantic differences must be sorted out against the background of their istructural simifaci:ties. Whart Smith means by " Oibjectivity" is close 'to what Lonergan means by "o.bjectivism." Likewise what Smith means by "subjectivity" is close fo 'What Lonergan would call "subj.ectivism." Whart Smith means by "sulbjective" knowJedge can he coo:nparedwith Lonergan' s realm of meaning called the WOil"l:d of theory. It is a il"ealmin which things are known only

·"' For an in depth study of Lonergan's position on the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity, see Nancy Carol Ring, "Doctrine Within the Dialectic of Subject and Object: A Critical Study of the Positions of Paul Tillich and Bernard Lonergan" (Ph.D. dissertation, Marquette University, 1980).

insofar ars they re1'ate to oneself. Whrut Smith means iby "objective " knowledige can be compared rwirtih Lonergan's realm of meaning mlled the world of commonsense. It is a realm in which things are known not ias they relate to oneself but as they relate 'among themse,lves. Whrut Smith means iby going heyonrda šrnbject/object dichotomy to esta;blishhumane knowing :as the coa1escenceof the eonsciousness orf 1both participants and observers can be eomparerd with Lonergan's move to the realm of interiority in which commonsense and theory can be reconciled as expressions of two different types of consciousness.

Out of such a oomprurison, though, ·arises the rea:l difference that Lonergan goes beyond šubject/object dichotomies in terms of the interiority of the self-transcending subject, ıwhereas Smith finds it necessaxy to. bring in tihe testimony of outsiders. This difference ,aligns with other rpositions and emphases of Smith 1and Lonergan. For Lonergan, the knowledge that a subject aittains is rproportionaite to the context within which it was attained; nonetheless, it is in itsel,£ knowledge. For Smith, the knowledge thrut a subject attains is the most ,adequate understanding that is 1aviailahle within a pa:rrticular context; knowledge is limited by its ,context, and can always be expanded by the addition of new contexts wd new perspectives. For Lonergan, what is expanded is one's u:ndersfanding of a known 1truth, not, strictly speaking, one's " knowledge " of that truth. Lone!l'ganholds thait the key fo knowing lies in the self-imanscendenceof the subject. Smith hoMs that the key to kno,winglies in the ,ruttainment of the highest availaible per1spective.

Smith ends up in a metaiphysical quagmi,re. Although what he attempts is in many respects similar to what Lonergan is aibout, he is unable to talk ruoout truth on 1an analytic oc sy;stematic level with ·any grerut consistency. Smith himself is aware of this. He claims rto be " an historian o.f the Orient, not a, philosopher of the West." [5] He simply insists that ,as an his-

[5] *TQWards a World Thoology,* p. 179.

'torian he does have a contribution to make to the issue of truth, specifioaJ.Jy,that truth finds its locus in persons.[6] Smith riskiscontradicting himself in the interest of questing for truth: "I mu • . . less interested in clarity than I am in truth and goodness." [7]

In srpite of ,sounding at times like a perspectivist, Smith clearly holds that human ,beings can .lmow things. He defines "to know" as ">to have an opinion that is correct, and to be ,aware tih:at it is so." [8] Smith further !holds that wha,t one knows is not simply true for oneself hut is true ahout the universe. Umortunateily, Smith laicks the metaphysical tools for maintaining these positions oonsistently. In the end, though, Smith offers his positions tentatively <and humbly. He sincerely calls out for intellectual clairifioation concerning the issues he sets forth.[9]

It might ibe said that Smith is an ihistorian of ,religion in need of a metapihy;sics.'Iihe issue of metaphysics is the question of what it is that we know when we know something. Do we know 1the !l.'eail? Do we know only our own ideas? Smith seems to want to he a realist, hut he finally dr.aws back from such a position out of fear of sounding like an objeetivist. He courts the language of realism 1and the languaige of idealism witihout committing himself to either. When he comes too close to being 'a realist, he stresses the transcendence of trutih and the . limitations of oirnr knowledge. When he comes too close to being an idealist, he claims that what religious persons know is truth aibout the universe. Tlhe result is at times exhilerating, yet in the end Smith emphasizes the limitation of truth as known within a limited context. TJmt is,. for Smith, what we know when we know is the tr:uth, hut the kuth that we know

[6] "A Human View of Truth," *Studies in Religion/Scienaes Religieuses* 1 (1972)' p. 13.

[7] "A Human View of Truth," p. 14.

BBelief and History (Charlottesville.: University Press of Virginia, 1977), p. 59.

[9] See *Faith and Belief* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 128, 172.

is limited to the context in which we know it and always awaits revision from a. higher perspective.

In Lonergan's position on truth can be found an answer to Smith's call for intellectual dari:fication. Like Smith, Lonergan painstakingly rootis the question of truth in the lives of pe1,sons. He dearly and emphatically distinguishes his own position from ·any objectivism or naive realism that equates knowing with the taking of a look by an outside observer. In a more eleair and consistent manner than Smith, however, Lonergan distinguishes his own position from .any subjectivism or ideailism that places the real beyond the grasp of human beings. Lonergan equates the real with being. It is intended in questions for reflection and known through judgment. What is known is known in proportion to the context in which it is known. 'Uhe truth that is known, however, is true in a way that goes beyond both the particular context and the pairticu1a.r subject.[10] For Lonergan, it that tmth thia.t is known by the knower, and not some lesser truth.

Lonergan calls his position a. "eritiical realism."[11] The ohjectivistic position from which he distinguishes his 01wn position he calls a "naive rea.Iism." The position that what we know are ideas, that the real is ever beyond us, Lonergnn caHs " idealism." Through his critical rea1ism, Lonergan is able to be a realist and eonsistently to use the language of realism without fa1ling into an objectivism. Lonergan is also crupruble of articulating the question of religious truth within a situation 01f cultural and religious pluralism without sacrificing or playing down claims to truth. For Lonergan, rather than truth changing, one's understanding of truth must change as lal'ger contexts emerge.

10 For a development of Lonergan's position on this issue, see T. V. Daly, "Some Basic Questions of Context: Can a Religious Message Pass from One Context to Another Unchanged?" in *Toward Theology in an Australian Context,* ed. Victor C. Hayes (Bedford Park, South Australia: The Australian Association for the Study of Religion, 1979), pp. 38-45.

11 See "The Origins of Christian Realism," in *A Second OoUeetion,* pp. 239-61.

'nhis important distinction between knowledge and understanding is not present in Smiith's "ico11poratecritical sel:f-consciousness." For Smith, it is the higher pm-spective that will yield the greater .truth. For LoneTgan, in contrast, it is the better judgment that will yield the greater truth.[12] What the higher perspective will yield is a greater understanding. Without this distinction, Smith at times opemtes with a relativist notion of truth that he himself finds inadequate.

Smith's functionally relativist metaphysics stems from his assumption that truth is finally attained only £rom la universal, unlimited perspective. AU other truth is pairtial, relative to its context, and subject to revision as a higher pell':spective beoomes av:aifable. What Smith facks ihere and what Lonergan pl'ovides is a theory of proportionate knowledge. F:or Lonergan, ·truth is known in pmporlion to the context in which it is known. What is limited, ho·wever, is human unde11standing of the truth, not the truth that is known. Lonergan's method in theoJogy itself demands oollaborrution that leads to higher viewpoints, greater knowledge, and greater understanding. Tihe truth of what is known in a lesser context, however, does not thus heoome any less the truth.

Although Lonergan's ontology of tmth. is here being presented as an answer to Smith's call for intellectual o1airification, this is hy no means to suggest that Smith would agree with that answer. All that can be said is that Smith rejects a facile realism and a .faciile idealism, that he operates with a metaphysics that he himself finds inadequate, and that he seems to be calling out fur a critical realism that he has not yet himself heen aible to artioulate. Smith might well maintain that his own "corporaite critical self-consciousness" folfiUs the .same pmctiioal function as Lonergan':s notion of objectivity, iand thait the metaphysical contradictions must for

[12] For a discussion of related issues, see Joseph .A. Bracken, ".Authentic Subjectivity and Genuine Objectivity," *Horizons* 11 (Fall 1984), 290-303. Bracken uses Lonergan for the starting point of a discussion that argues for truth as known from a particular standpoint over against the fallacy of the universal viewpoint.

now remain contmdictions. The only response to that position would be to say that one must look to what it is that one is doing when one is knowing, and, in finding that out, one can arrive at an ontology capable, withoUJt contradiction, of sorting out issues of truth in a gloibal community.

The Content of Belief

'Tihe differences beween Smith and Lonergan concerning objectivity crurry over to their iJ.'esipootive concepts 0£ religious belief. For Smith, :a belief in iitse1£ has no set content. Basically a belief is a formufation that takes on different meanings as it is 'appropriated hy different persons. Even when considered as a concept or an idea, a :belief for Smith means something at least slightly 1and in some cases greatly different for each individual person. When a 1belief takes on a specific content, that is, when a belief is appropriaited hy a person, the meaning of that belief is a conceptualization that .approximates to the truth that that person is 'apprehending.

For Lonergan, on the other hand, a 1belief is a formulation inclusive of its meaning. Thll!t is, a belief is what is believed, not just a group of words or just an idea. Lonergan holds that the content of a belief is a judgment. A judgment is a claim to truth that eilitails what Frederick Crowe caills " a minimal community of meaning." [13] This minimrul community of meaning is a heuristic ·structure within which highly degrees of understanding are possible. Lonergan by no means denies that other than their heuristic structures beliefs a.re understood differently by different people. Lonergan, moreover, affirms that meaning exists only within a context, and that meanings cannot be ontologically sepaJ'lated from persons. Lonergan further affirms, however, that meaning is essentially detachruble from any individua:l who holds it. It is because oif this " essential detachability " that meaning is in principle communicable. [14]

1s Frederick Crowe, *A Time of Ohange* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1968), p. 166.
1.4 For an elabor.ation of this point, see *Insight,* pp. 378, 707.

Lonergian thus holds that a truth can be the same truth even though it is apprehended by different people on different levels of undeirstanding in different contexts. This is not to be confused with the objectivistic position that truth is absolutely detachable without :regrurd to context. Concretely, each truth is manifested differently a:s it is appropriated in different contexts. A minimal community of meaning ·is not fo be exaggerated. Without it, however, no (lOIIllmunioationwould be pos- s:iJble. With it, Lonergan is able to speak of beliefs as consisting in judgments of fact and judgments of value.

Smith does not positively deny the concept of " essential detachrubility." In fact, ibis position ooncerning the possibility of humane intercultural scholarship implicitly affirms the potential for fruitful communication across barriers of context. When Smith is addressing the issue of whait constitutes a belief, however, he is mustering all of his forces to atta;ck objectivistic p<Ysitions by which beliefs are held to be impersonally and historically true. As a result, in obliterating the opposition, Smith does not attend to the need for any " essential detach- 1ability."

Where Lonergan means by "belief " a formulation inclusive of its meaning, Smith maintains a isharp distinction between a. " .belief" and " what a belief means." What Lonergan means :by " belief " is close to what Smith means by " what a person means by a belief." What Smith means by " belief " is what Lonergan would mean by " ·a particular group of words that can take on different meanings within different contexts." To Smith, Lonergan's use of "belief" would be seriously open to misinterpreta;tion, in that the modern tendency is to think of ·a " belief " as something that can be written on a blackboard. To Lonergan, Smith's use of " ·belief" would 'he reductionist.

Smith and differences here go beyond terminology. At issue is the question of whether there are "trurths" .being handed dorwn in a .religion such as Christianity and whether" rbeliefs" have anything to do with them. Smith does not admit to any essential, parti!cu1ar body of truths: heing

handed down. Ra;ther, the tradition ha;s served as a tool for mediating the truth about the universe. Beliefs are conceptualizations of .the trruth aibout the universe that has been reoognized. Fo:r Smith, to say that a belief is " true " is a kind of shorthand for that what has been meant by a belief by a parlic:u1ar person is true.

For Lonergan, in contrast, la belief oan be considered true. A belief consis1tsin a fonnu1ation inclusive o[its meaning. The content orf a belief is a judgment of f.aicl or a judgment of value. When emphasizing the dimension of formulation, Lonergan says that beliefs are approximations to truth made within particulatr contexts. When emphasizing the dimension of content, though, Lonergan is able to hold that a belief itself can be true. That is, the judgment of fact oir the judgment of value that constitutes a belief can ,be true or false.

Smith's insistence that "belief" be limited to the levels orf formulation and conceptualization •as opposed to including an 1aduial •affirmation of reality is related to his denial of an essence in any " religion " and to his lack of an adequate metaphy;sics. 1£ ·there is no such thing as a "·religion " that has an essence, then there can be no essential t:rubhs that are being passed down firom genemtion to generation. " Belief,s" cannot have as their content a judgment iliat goes beyond a particular eultural 1context,.for then there would be a "ibody " of truths being handed down, some of whi!Ch would be essential to the " :religion." Smith'•s point that to talk aborut the truth o[" beliefs " is to misplace the locus of the question of truth is thus an interlocking piece in an overaU consistent p:rogram.[15]

[15] Donald Wiebe outlines many inconsistencies in Smith's concept of "belief " in " The Role of ' Belief ' in the Study of Religion: A Response to W. C. Smith," *Nu.men* XXVI (Dec. 1979), 233-48. In ,a trenchant response, however, Smith demonstrates how elusive his o1WII positions are in relation to conventionaI philosophical criticisms. See " Belief: A Reply to a Response," *Nu.men* XXVII (Dec. 1980), 247-55. Wiebe's conclusion, though, that it would be better to hold a critically constituted concept of "belief" mther than to dismantle a reductionist notion of it is in harmony with the basic argument of this article. Where Wiebe does not do justice to Smith, perha.ps, is in abstracting the philosophical contradictions of Smith's concept

This is Smith's program of response to ahistorical, impersonal modes of 1oonceivingthe question of religious truth.

Unfortunately, Smith associates bhe objectivistic conception of truth that he is attacking with the language of realism. He thlliS cuts himselifoff from the possibility of speaking with any pilri1osoiphicalconsistency rubout the tr:uth of beliefs. J,£ Smith would foll.ow Lonergan in distinguishing his own realism from any naive, ohjectivistic misconceptions, then he would not have to make metruphysical conces•sionsin order to insist that beliefs are tools for conceptualizing and tha,t they are understood differently in different contexts. The tmth that underlies this insistence would already be included in his positon. If Smith wou1d foHow Lonergan in making a sharp, technical between understanding and knowledge, then he would he a:hle .to talk rubout truth that is known that remains true as it is understood differently in di:fforent contexts.

Smith's ma,in point about the truth of "beliefs," that it is a great mistake, indeed one of the major intellectual aberrations of recent centuries, to isolate the gist of a " religion " and then expect to "believe" it, is weU taken. l1onergan's position concerning belief and the original message of Christianity, however, does not come under Smith's objections. Lonergan haJs himself approvingly quoted Smith's statement, "All religions are new religions, every morning. For religions do not exist in the sky somewhere, elaborated, finished, and static; they exist in men's hearts." [16] Lonergan's position is

of ".belief" from the total context of what Smith is trying positively to achieve. See also Wiebe's segment of " Three Responses to *Faith and Belief:* A Review Article," *Studies in Religion/Sciences Eeligieuses* 10 (1981), 117-22. For an appreciative presentation of Smith's program for religious studies in a manner that highlights the challenge that he poses to conventional ·Scholarship, see David Burrell, "Faith and Religious Convictions: Studies in Comparative Epistemology," *Journal of Religion* 63 (Jan. 1983), 64-73.

16 Smith's original statement is in "The Comparative Study of Religion: Reflections on the Possibility and Purpose of a Religious Science," in *McG,ili University, Faculty of Divinity, Inaugural Lectures* (Montreal: McGill University, 1950), p. 51. Lonergan quotes Smith in *The Way to Nioea: The*

distinct from the one tha;t Smith rejects in several ways. :First, Lone!l'ganmeans hy " believe" something quite different from 1any of the meanings, either aicceptable or non-acceptable, outlined by Smith. Second, Lonergan does not boil down Chris-,tianity into its essence. For Lonergan the kerygnrntic cognitive dimension of Christianity is one of many dimensions, a.nd it does not exist apart from concrete Christian lri.ving. Third, Lonergan hoMs that Ohiristian belief as fom:nrulatedis at some remove an approximaite articu:1ation of the " original message " of Christianity, which as such consists in truths revealed by God that are beyond any final formulation. Fourth, Lonergan does not identify Christianity absolutely with its original manifestation, for he recognizes rea.l deveilorpmentthroughout various cultuml and historical contexts.

Where Smith and Lonergan disagree is precisely on the point of whether there is an originail body of truths that maintains its identity throughout these ,real deve1opments. While Lonergan himseilifrejects ohjectivistic timeless formulllitions, he does refer to the "original message " o:f Christianity. This " mess-a1ge " is capable of constituting a world. **It** takes shape concretely among persons in v:arious cwltural contex;ts. Although it is no substitute for the experience of Christian living, it consists in truths that have heen revealed by God. Smith does not acknowledge any such body of truths. Ellich Christian's 1beliefs are at le!list sligihtly and in some oases greatly different from any other's. Smith maintains that what Christians "have in oommon lies not in the tradition that introduces rthem to the transcendent, not in their faith by which they personally respond, !but in that to which they respond, the transcendent itself." [17]

Smith's position on belief is therefore divorced from Lonergan's position concerning truths that are being passed down

Dialeotioal Development of Trinitarian Theology (London: Darton, Longman, and Todd, 1976), p. vii.

11 *The Meaning and End of Religion* (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1963); reprinted with an introduction by John Hick (N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 192.

through the Christian tradition that are world-oonstitutive and effective of a. way of life. For Lonergan, heliei:fs are approximate articulations of these truths as they exist at various levels of remove from the original doctrine and that develorp througihout history. For Smith, beliefs as formulations a.ire fools for mediating the transcendent. Even as conceptiu.alizations they have no set content in themselves, hut if used properly may be instrumental in helping one glimpse truth ·about the universe. Lone11ganwould agree with Smith when he says, "ideas a;re par:t of this worild, of its tmnsient flux; they are human constructs." [18] Lonergan might add, though, that the content of a belief is not just an idea but a judgment, and in a coorect judgment one reaches the rea.l.

Smith and Lonergan, it should be remembered, are addressing the same problem of belief 8is oibjectivistically misunderstood. Smith, in obliterating the opposition, undermines the real substance of belief and the essential identiy of, in one partiou1ar case, the Christian message. Lonerigan also obliterates the opposition, but he leaves room for talking rubout the truth of ;beliefs in la sophisticated, non-objectivistic manner and for talking rubout the Christian message without in any way reifying it or divorcing it from Christian living.

Truth a.nd the Global Community

Both Smith an:d Lone11ganenvision the task of theology as the and articul.ation in a new context of what wa;s oTIJce known in a strictly objective, theoretical framework. Both see this new context as the convergence of cultuires. Both move far beyond the impersonailism and the defensiveness that il:ia.s :become .associated with the old apologetics. For both, the question of religious truth is no longer simply one of proving the truth of one's own tradition, but invoJves on a deep level the personal appmpriation of truth.

Crudal differences, however, concerning the question of reli-

[18] *Faith and, Belief,* p. 167.

giorus truth la;rise when one examines what happens to the meaning, role, and status of "helief." At issue, both terminologically and really, is in what manner and to what extent the question of religious truth involves the truth of beliefs. In the background, rhut no less important, is the question of the adequacy of any one religious tradition as a f.r:amework for posing the question of religious truth.

For Lonergan, the question of religious truth fundamentally involves the appropriation of truths that have been pa;ssed down througih a living tmdition. These truths are not simply ahstractions, hut rathe'I.' they constitute a world and inform a way of life. Beliefs are approximations to truth in that they are cformulated within a, limited r00ntext. The truth to which beliefs .approximate, howe¥er, is not limited to that context, but maintains an essential detachability in that it is communicable to other contexts. The truth of beliefs can be better and better understood as it progresses through different contexts, but it is stirll the same truth that is being understood. Of most importance here is that for Lonergan there is ,being handed down an essential content that consists in part in judgments of fact and judgments o[value whose claim to truth, though not whose fornnulation, reaches beyond the pairticular context in which they are foiimulated.[19]

For Smith, in contrast, there is no es'Sential content of meanings being handed down in a tra.dition.[20] What the things

[19] This point in Lonergan, which I consider to be one of his greatest strengths, is frequently found objectionable by critics. See, for example, James Mackey, "Divine Revelation and Lonergan's Transcendental Method in Theology," *Irish Theological Quarterly* XL (Jan. 1973), 3-19. What Mackey fails to grasp is just how critical Lonergan's own use of traditional religious language is. Walter Henry Guth also objects to the above point in Lonergan. His major argument, though, consists in asserting that the position is not acceptable to Protestants. Guth offers Pannenberg's eschatological ontology as an alternative to Lonergan's realist ontology. See "Knowledge Claims and the Intelligibility of Theological Method" (Ph.D. dissertation, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1978).

[20] Langdon Gilkey criticizes Smith on this point. Gilkey laments the lack of a place for "special revelation " in Smith's thought. He argues that the existence of a " definitive center for the knowledge of God does not neces-

of a.ny cumulative tiiadition have meant to people over the centuries V'ruries significantly from place to plruce, foom generation to generation, ,and even from person to penson. The primairy focus of the question of religious truth is not " truths" being handed down hut the truth that each person can ·recognize a;bout the universe through his or her own experience of the transcendent, though most often with the aid of formulations and coil!cepturaliz:ations that constitute a. cumulative tradition.

Where Smith most markedly departs from Lonergan on the question of !l'eligious truth is at the point that he places the question within the context of the gloibal community. Smith ihold:s that the emergence of the globaJ. community has fo11ced the question of religious truth to be posed in a radically new way. No longer can persons of a.ny one part:Ucu11ar tradition speak of the tr:uth of their own conceptualizations without a sensitive awareness that there exist other .ancient revered traditions whose participants also speak of the truth of their own conceptualizwtions. Although no presumptions are to be mrude that -a.ny tradition is either more or less adequate tihan any other tradition, the assumption must be made that the truth a;s known through any one tradition is necessariJy partial and limited. No one tradition can claim either complete or exclusive knowledge of the ultimate. Rather than trying to prove that one's tl'adition is true, one should be discovering what truth can he apprehended by means of one's tradition. More folly, the question of religious truth involves a coUruborative seareh fo!l' the that a11 can potentially recognize, the truth that subsumes and goes beyond the relatively limited truth that can be grasped through any one particulrur tradition.

Smith offers three basic rea;sons why religious trruth cannot

sarily imply an *emclusive* revelation." "A Theological Voyage with Wilfred Cantwell Smith," *Religious Studies Review* 7 (Oct. 1981), 303-04. For a criticism of Smith along a similar vein, see Peter Slater's argument that Smith's emphasis on transcendence leads him to overlook the sacramental-incarnational dimension of Christianity. " Three Views of Christianity," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 50 (March 1982), 99-100.

be considered the exclusive property of any one tmdition. For one thing, Smith elaims, such a position is arrogant, laicking, in humility, immoral. another thing, such a :position is intellectually untenruble in that it rests upon insufficient data and upon an inooITect interpretation of revelation. We can know that our own faith is true because it proves itself in our lives and because hundreds of millions of people have borne witness to it. When we say that another's faith *is* false, however, we a:re doing so only by a logical inference or a theological implication. Smith observes: " The damnation of my neighborur is too weighty a matter to rest on a syUogism."[21] A third 1argument against any form of exc1usivism is that it runs counter to the experience that religious persons from various traditions have of each other as being muturully involved with the same transcendent reality.

Smith's position on this issue is dramatic and powemul. It is true, too, that his arguments suecess1fullyput to !l'est1any exclusivist claims. It is at this point, however, that problems arise in Smith's metaphysics of truth. Smith asserts that truth as grasped thvouigh a pa1 1ticulairtradition must be partial and limited ·relative to truth ·as ·a:ttainruble within the lavger context of the eme:riging global oom:munity. Like the exclusivists against whom he argues, however, Smith arrives at this position by logica1 inferenee: I expe1 1ience poorple of other faith t:mditions as being involved with the ·same transcendent reality as il am; therefore, my own faith triadition must ,be partial and limited. 'Eo parruphrase Smith, though, the truth status of ibelie:fs is too weighty a matter to rest on a syllogism.

One who takes Lonergan's position, in contrast, does not have to say that the truth known through one's own religious tradition is parlial or limited in order to embraice the possibility of v:alid religious truth being known through other religious traditions. If Christians in the past have held e:relusivist positions becruuse of their interpretation of scripture and doctrine, it is possiible to say that those Christians misinterpreted the

21 *The Faith of Other Men* (N.Y.: New American Library, 1963), p. 135.

implications of scripture .allld doctrine because of the lack of understanding availruble to them within their limited context. It is not necessary to say that the truth orf scripture or doctrine is limited or partial. Religious persons of .a;ll traditions shouM in principle ibe ready to discard that whiJOh they find to be false, even if it has been held to ·be true for millennia. At the same time, though, religious ·persons should be ready to acknowledge the fullness of truth in their own traditions, even as their understanding of that truth enlarges.

Lone11gan's method of dealing with the global community ha;s been to estaiblish that the claims of a religion can be articulated within vairious cultural contexts and to offer ·a case for religious experience as a basis for dialogue among the religions of the world. His distinction hetween faith and belief presumes the existence of v:alid religious truth in many traditions. Lonergan himseM may or may not personally have held some form of what Smith might consider an exclu:sivist position concerning the finality or superiority of Christianity, but either way 1such a position is not intrinsic to his foundational theology. The most that can be said a.bout Lonergan's method in this regard is that it is open to the possibility of religious truth being found sufficiently in one tradition. Beyond that, Lonergian's method has already proved itself highly vai1uaible for ecumenical dia1ogue.[22]

Fi!om Lonergan's work one can g.lean how :he might address the issue of how claims to the finality and universality

22 For Lonergan's own suggestions concerning religious dialogue, see "Prll"" legomena to the Study of the Emerging Religious Consciousness of Our Time," *Stud.ies/Soienaes Religieuses* 9 (1980), 3-15. The implications of Lonergan's work for interreligious dialogue are studied in Vernon Joseph Gregson, "Bernard Lonergan and the Dialogue of Religions: A Foundational Study of Religion as Spirituality" (Ph.D. dissertation, Marquette University, 1972). In James Robertson Price, "The Objectivity of Mystical Truth Claims," *Tke Tkomist* 49 (Jan. 1985), 81-98, Lonergan's thought is used to develop a concept of objectivity grounding the culturally diverse claims of mystics. For an example of interreligious thought carried on with reference to Lonergan's work, see William Johnston, *Tke Inner Flye of Love* (N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1978). See also Johnston's *Tke Mirror Mind* (N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1981).

(though not exdusivity) o[religious truth can be ma.de from within a human and thereby highly limited context. Besides being made with fear and trembling, such claims aa.-e made with admittedly little understanding. For Lonel'lgan, it must be remembered, less undei;standin:g does not mean less truth. Human knowledge is proportionate to the context in which it is known, hut the tru.th of what is known is essentially detach-la:ble and :so in a sense rbeyiond the context in which it is known. For e:x;ample, when one knows something true, one knows that truth in the particulair language and *Denkform* of one's context; the truth of what one knows, however, goes beyond that context. The truth of Christianity is as much about a particular event as it is aibout universal realities, but the truth of Christianity is potentially available to a.11 human beings no matter what their cultul'al context.

Smith holds that it is a misconception to speak of the "truth of Christianity." Nor should one speak of the "truth oif Buddhism " or of any other religious tradition. Rather, argues Smith, one should speak of the truth of the universe that the Christians have come to know in their Way, the Buddhists in their way, etc. Smith's reason for doing this is to point out that religious truth cannot he confined to any one tradition, and tha.t religious persons of various traditions ail.'e involved with the same transcendent reality. These points are valuaible .and true. As Lonergan's position demons:tmtes, however, one can attest ·to these points and still talk about the "truth of Christianity." The only qualification is that one must clearly do so in a non-objectivistic manner.

The issue here concerns both the person who would enga:ge in religious diailogue and any person whose regard for the religious traditions of the world leads to serious reflection. What attitude is one to take toward one's own religious tradition? On a practical level, Smith and Lonergan would surely agree rbhat it wouM he one of the great reverence. On a more technical level, though, can one believe that the fullness of truth is contained in one's own tradition, even though it may be in-

:finitely beyond one's under:standing? Or must one hold that one"S own traidition i'S necessarily limited, and that a higher truth awaits in the convergence of wol'lld traditions? Smith's program for theology calls .for the latter option in the interest of sincere and open dialogue. Lonergan's program for theology leaves room for the former option while still remaining sincere and open regarding the possibility of valid and even ultimate, final, 1and universal truth bein:g availruble in other traditions.

COlfldusion

In a oomparative examination of two sicholairs, a single important difference may stand out like a sore thumb. Such has ibeen the case in this article. The same difference manifested itself in several fornns: the issue of whether there can he a particular, essential content of truth in religion; whethe1r beliefs can be called true; whether knowledge that requires subjective participation can be called objective; whether a religious tradition can contain a fullness of tmth. It should be emphasized a:gain, however, that this difference occurs within a context of remarka;ble structural similarity. Both Smith and Lonergan are 1ruboutthe task o[establishing ground for religious truth within a context of cultural pluralism. They share the enemy of religious t:vadition undersrtood in an rubstroot, timeless manner. They both respond by rooting the question m truth in persons. On a practical level, Lonergan would not likely object to Smith's p11ogram for a corporate critical self-ronsciousness. He would simply disagree on a technical level regarding Smith's articulation of metaphysioal matters concerning knowledge and truth.[28] Likewise Smith, if he would

2a Lonergan has called Smith a rationalist. See Pierrot Lambert, Charlotte Tansey, and Cathleen Going, eds., *Oarilng About Meaning: Patterns in the Life of Bernard L-Onergan* (Montreal: Thomas More Institute, 1982), especially pp. 29-30, 175-76, where Lonergan comments about Smith. Huston Smith also says that W. C. Smith is a rationalist in very much the Enlightenment manner. See "Faith and Its Study: What Wilfred Smith's Againsot, and For," *RJeligious Studies Review* 7 (Oct. 1981), 310.

get over his antiip•athy for the word " method," would not likely object to Lonergan's generail proposal as to horw theology should be done.[24] He might perhaps feel that Lonergan is too systematic in dealing with issues thrut concern persons. In the end, thougih, Smith and Lone•rgan are about much the same thing when they are establishing their pil'ograms for theology. Their divergence on the question 0£ truth is at root a technical, metaphysical matter; like many such ma;tters, though, this one carries .significant implications for the religious person. Is my tradition inherently limited? Is what my forehea.rs have heen telling me true?

[24] Smith objects to contemporary academic usage of the words "methodological" and "foundational." See "Methodology and the Study of Religion: Some Misgivings," in Robert D. Baird, ed., *Methodological Issues in Religious Studiies* (Chico, Calif.: New Horizons Press, 1975), pp. 1-25.

ON THE BEARER OF 'TRUE'

JOHN PETERSON

University of Rhode Island
Kingston, Rhode Island

IN ANY DISCUSSION of truth, w:hat truth is must ,be distinguished ,£rom ,what things are true. The first concem'S the sense of ' true ' and the second the reference of ' true'. But though they are distinct, these ,two questions <aiborut ·truth are not unrelruted. How the one is answered affects whwt is or can he said .rubout the other. This becomes evident once it is seen that making timeless propositions, for example, the hearers of ' true,' ruins any plausible account of the correspondence theory orf truth. To the extent that they hold that ' corresponding to fact ' is what is meant by ' true ', therefore, proposition-theorists 1are ha11d-pressedto explain in what this relation orf correspondence consists.

But before .showinghow this is so, I ,tum first to beliefs and judgments. It should be clea,r from the start that, to avoid psychologism, the bearer of 'true ' is not to he identified with a belief in the sense of a particular act orf believing. Nor is the hearer of ' true ' to be identified with a believing together with its content. aprurt from the difficulty of specifying what is meant here by ' icontent ', this second possiibility is exduded by the fact orf lies. No liar *believes* the lie he tells and yet his lie is straigihtfovwa11dlyfalse. And so, if ' true' and ' false ' are predicated of the same sort of thing, the bearer of ' true' cannot be a belief in the sense of a believing together with its ioontent any more than it can he the believing itself. Mrn:'e-over, predicating ' true ' either of acts of judging or orf those '00ts together with their contents offe:r:s no improvement. The form.er invites psyicho1ogismagain and the latter is ruined by the fact that judging implies believing. When you judge that

·something is the case you assent to it and you cannot as·sent to it without believing it. On the assumption tha.t lies a.re straight£orwairdly false, therefore, if no 1liar believes the lie he tells and if judging implies .believing then no liar judges the lie he tel1s either. Thus, 'true' is no more predica.ted of the complex of an ruct of judging ;plus its content than it is predicated of an ruct of believing plus its content.

To oover the ca:se of lies, then, the temptation looms large to identify the bearer of ' true ' with the content of a believing rather than with a believing together with its content. This oontent or sense of a believing is commonly called a proposition. For exMiliple, it is one and the proposition which is expressed by the English sentence ' It is raining ' and the F.rench sentence 'II pleut '. Moreover, thi:s move has other advantages too. For one thing, it reflects the plain meaning of expressions like, 'What Jones believes (says, states, etc.) is true '. Here ' true ' is predioa.ted of *what* is believed and the word ' what ' means nothing in this context if it does not mean the content of what is believed. Second, if 'true ' is predicated of a proposition or the content of a belief we can understand how it is that one truth implies another truth. But on any other view of the bearer of ' true ' no account can be given of this simpJe fact. For suppose the bearer of ' true ' is either a 1believiingor the complex of a believing plus what is believed or even the complex of a sentence plus the sense which it expresses. Then, suppose that while someone believes or ·states P, *no one* either believes or states Q which is implied by P. In that case, 1as there is nothing true for P to imply, it cannot be said that P implies Q. Ho·wever, on the assumption that implication holds between the contents of beliefs or between what is expressed by sentences and not between either believings, 1believingsplus their contents or sentences plus what they express, such implication is not blocked. For on the view that ' true ' is predica;ted of the contents of statements or beliefs (propositions) and no1t of the statements or beliefs themselves, you do not need a statement or a belief to have something

which is true. These as well as other reasons have huilt the case for propositions as the bearers of 'true'.

But despite its initial appeal, the view that 'true ' is predicated of proposiitions invites a general skepticism a;s regards knowledge of :f.arcts. Not only that, hut it conflicts with the only ,sense in which it makes sense to say that truth consists in a correspondence to fact.

To take the first rpoint first, suppose the truism is granted that knowledge implies truth. This may be more formally expressed as,

(K) If a person S knows that something is the case then it *is* the case or is true.

If propositions are the bearers of ' true ' then '. . . is true ' in K is predicated of a pi!Joposition. But then K makes sense only if in K the object of S's knowledge is also a proposition. For grammatica1ly the pronoun ' it ' of wihich ' true ' is predicated refers hack to what is known. Therefore, if propositions are the bearers of ' true ' and if K is true then it follows that propositions are the objects of knowledge, or more exactly, of knowledge-tha.t. But then, whenever it is known that something or other is the case what is known is always a proposition and not a fact. And so, on the assumption of K, identifying the bearer of ' true ' with propositions implies that facts are unknown.

To meet this objection the may reply that a true proposition is just another name for a fact. In that case the foregoing argument fails to show that facts are unknown when propositions are the bearers of ' true '. For if facts are nothing but true propositions then in knowing a true p:voposition a person *would* be knowing a fact. The trouble with this defense, though, is that it flouts our intuitive belief that what is true is made true by some other kind of thing to which it conforms, namely, a fact. To the extent that we believe in propositions at all, whenever we think or s.ay that the simple proposition expressed by the statement, 'Jones is running' is tr:ue we always think and sometimes say that this is

because the proposition jibes with something else, a fact. But if a, fact is just another name for a true proposition, then a true p[1opositionis made true by a true proposition and not hy something else. Besides, while it can plausibJy be said that a true pvoposition corresponds to another thing, a fact, hy virtue of which correspondence, it, the proposition, is true, it cannot be said that a fact corresponds to another fact by virtue of wihich cor,vespondence *it,* the fact, is true. A bet does not correspond to a.nother fact in this way at all. Otherwise there is no sufficient reason for the truth of any fact.

To explain this fa.st point, suppose fact F, which *ex hypothesi* is a true proposition, depends for its truth on fact Fi to which it corresponds. Then to be consistent, Fi must depend for *its* truth on F2 to which it corresponds. But this invites an infinite regress. The truth of one fact is said to depend on a second and the truth of the second is said to depend on a third, and so on. In the end, the facts which are true resemble, colJectively, a string of hangers each of which hangs on another without there being any anchor or hook. As the hangers are suspended in mid-air without support, so would the truth of .facts remain ungrounded in the end if facts are identified with true propositions and truth consists in correspondence to fact. Unless, therefore, ihe cares to drop the correspondence theory, the proposition-theorist cannot answer our objection, i.e. that making propositions the bearers of 'true' implies skepticism, by identifying facts with true propositions.

But as was mentioned, besides implying a skepticism as rega1lds knowledge of facts, the view that ' true ' is predicated of rpropositions also p1revents any intelligible account of the correspondence theory of truth. The only sense of 'corresponds' in which it makes sense to say that something is true because it corresponds to a fact is identity-not, to be sure, numerical identity but formal identity. What this means is this: that though they are two things and not one, the hearer of ' true ' and the fact which makes it true share a common form. They aire two wholes which have a part in common, as Socmtes and Plato have humanity in common. Though he is referring to

meaning r:ather than to truth, Wittgensterin holds in the *Tractatus* that it is this same formal identity which ohta1ins between a logical picture and what it pictures. In order for an elementary statement to be a pioture, says Wittgenstein, there must he something common between the and what it pictures. But Wittgenstein aside, to say, fo.r example, that 'Socrates is wise' is because it corresponds to the fact that Socrates *is'* wise is to say that it is the self-s1ame state of affair1s of Socrates being wise which is shared by both statement and fact. There is thus a formal identity between the two and it is just this identity and nothing else whioh is meant hy ' correspondence ' in the phrase ' the correspondence view of truth'.

But if prorpos!i.tionsare the bearers of ' true ', ' correspondence' cannot he defined in this w;ay at a11. A proposition is not something which *shares* a state of affairs with the fact makes it true. It is no existent whole which shares its content with .another e:siistent whole a;s Socrates and Plato both share humanity or rus the statement' Socrates is wise' and the fact that Socrates *is* ·wise both share the s:ame state of affairs. R,ather, it simply *is* a state of affairs or tihe idea1l content of a statement and not something which shares a state of affairs with some other thing. By sayiing that a proposition corresponds to a fact, therefore, a proposition-theorist c1annot mean that proposition and fact share the same state of affairs or that they are terms in a relation of formal identity in the sense Wihich has just been explained. But as there is no other inteHtigihle sense in which it can be s1aid that true prorposit1ions correspond to facts, the proposition-theorist cannot consistently hold that propositions are the bearers of ' true ' and that truth consists in a, correspondence of truth-bearer to fact.

Nor can the proposition-theomst escape this objection by dropping the correspondence- theory of truth in favor of some other definition of truth, say the coherence or the pragmatic theory of truth. The coherenJCetheory holds that a statement is true if and only if it is a member of a system each member of which logically implies and is :implied by every other mem-

her. As stated, the ooherence theory implies that the truth orf every member of the system is made by its relation to every other member in the system. This hais the peculiair consequence that if any one statement is logically necessary then every statement is logically necessary. For if a startement Sis logically necess1ary ,and S either implies or is impl!ied hy another 'Statement T then T is also logicalJy necessary. But als p:rorposition-theorists commonly hold that there are lJOth logically contingent and ·logically necessary propositions they cannot embrace the coherence theo-ry.

Moreover, even for proposition-theorists who find the distinction between contingent and necessary p11Opositionsuntenable the coherence theory of truth iis unwelcome for another reason. For acoo'l.1dingto the proposition-theO"rist impliciation is defined in terms of truth. To say that P implies Q means for him that the joint truth of P and falsity of Q is contradictory. But the coherence view of truth defines truth in terms of implication. For a defender of the coherence theory, to say that Pis true means that P implies and is implied by every other element in the system. So for a proposition- theorist to embraice the coherence theory is tantamount to his saying that truth is simultaneously both conditioned by and the condition o[implication.

No more palatable to the rp·roposition-theorist is the pragmatic theory orf truth. HoweV'ermuch they may differ on some points as regards tmth, all pragmatists, old and new, deny ·that truth is eternal and changeless. Rather do they hold that truth is a function of human interests and purposes so that it is a necessiary i£ not a sufficient condition of a true belief that it satisfy or be useful to us as a community o[rrutionail inquirers. And what s.uoh a community finds useful to believe at one time it may .find useless to believe ·at another. But since for the proposition-theOirist propositions ail"e timeless, platonic

so too must be their truth or fa1sirty. I[time is a condition of change, prorpositions evidently do not, if they are timelesis, *become* true or false rucoordingto the V'ariable interests and goals of human investigators.

For alrl praot,icaI purposes that 1leaves hut one other possibility as to the beairer of ' true' and that is that ' true ' is properly predicated of a statement where by 'statement' is meant 1an oral or written sentence which is used by tihe speaker or writer to make an assertion. Since statements in this sense are not mental acts of a kind, no threat of psycholog1ism accompanies this answer. Moreover, if statements are the beairers of 'true', then it can he unde11stood how it is that lies are straight£orwa,rdly false despite the fact that there is on the part of the lia,r neither belief nor judgment. Further, making statements the heairers of ' true ' makes it possible to understand how it is that statements correspond to the facts which make them true. For both statement and fact share the same 1state of affairs. In 'Socrates is wise', it is the self-same state of 1affairs of Socmtes ibeing wise which exists in one way in fact and another way in language. And it is in terms 1alone of this relation of fomna11 identity between statement and fact that the fol'llller is said to correspond to the fact and hence be true. Fourth and 11ast, making statements the bearern of 'true' does not exclude knowledge of factis if it is aissumed, as it must be, that knowledge imrplies truth. For instead of being translruted as K above, this same dictum may he construed as follows:

(K') If a person S knows that something is the: case, then, if S or someone else were to make a statement to that effect, then that statement would be true.

Thus, if Plato knows that Socrates is wise, then, if Plato were to state that Socrates i$ wrse, then PI1ato's strutement would be true. And so, the dictum that knowledge implies truth takes the form of a complex conditiona11 statement in which the second conditional expresses a contrary-to-fact conditional ..

Rinally, spe1ling out the same dietum in this way in terms o[a complex conditional gives us a clue as to how to answer the p:mposition-theor1sts's .favorite argument for propositions. That argument, it will be recaHed, is that propositions are needed to e:x;p1ain the simple fact of implication, the fact that

one truth impLies aDJother. For suppose that ' true ' is predicated orf either beliefs (in the sense orf believings plus their contents) , judgments (in the sense orf jrudgings plus their contents) or statements. Suppose too that while someone believes, judges or states P, *no one* believes, judges or strutes Q which is implied iby P. In thlat case, rus there is nothing true for P to imply and as ' P implies Q ' denotes a dyadic relation, it cannot be s:aid that P implies Q. But Uris implication is easily explained if P and Q stand for subsistent propo:sitions rather ithan for either beliefs, judgments or statements.

But to answer this argument, recourse might once again be had to the contmry-to-£aot oonditional. For all thrut defenders of the view that ' true ' i;s predicated of statements need do is to construe ' P implies Q ' as a oomplex hypothetical in which, once again, the second conditional expresses a contrary-to-bct conditional. On this wew, to say that P implies Q is to say that if a person S asserts a true statement P, then, if S were to deny another statement Q, then S would be OOJUght ,in a contradiction. Thus we have the following definition:

(I) ' P implies Q' = df. if a person S asserts a true statement P, then, if S were to deny another statement Q, then S's assertion of P and (would-be) denial of Q would be self-contradictory.

Note that on the assumption of (I) the expression ' P implies Q • does not, as it appears to do, denote a simple dyadic relation. It is just one case among many in which the grammrutioal form of an expression hides its logical form. If ' P implies Q' is defined as it is in (I), therefore, it is *not* required that .the statement Q be actually made by someone in order to say, meaningfully, that P implies Q. But then the foregoing objection orf the proposition-theorist, namely, that predicating 'true ' o[statements fails to explain how it is that one truth implies another, simply goes by the hoard.

IN PRAISE OF PLURALISM *

RONALD F. THIEMANN

Harvard Diviinity School
Cambridge, Massachusetts

KCENTLY A GROUP of scholars at Harvard University met to discuss the question of whether the United States ha;d entered a. period of moral decline. Our conversations ranged over a wide spectrum of topics: the distinction between priva.te and public life, the relation of notions like mol'lality and justice, the issue of how a decline in morality might be dooumented. The discuS'sion was carried on with a sense of intellectual seriousness and passion but was also characterized by a degree of frustration, given the brea;dth of the topic and the diversity of the participants, who were drawn from the faculties of arts and sciences, 1aw, medicine, government, business, and divinity. Our approaches to the topic were diverse and consequentily our disputes were spirited. Whatever the disagreements among the group, however, we were united by a conviction tha.t such conversations a;re essential if we are to under:s.tand the moral complexity of our pluralistic society.

Tihis gathering of soho1ars at Harvard exhibits four important ohamcteristics of the current deba.te about moraility and public life. 1) The recognition that the moral issues we are facing cut a;cross traditional disciplinary lines and require a joint effort by scholar:s working in diverse fields and pl'ofessions; 2) an awaireness that the plurality of moral positions within pwblic and aicademic life threatens the possibility of consensus on issues of public importance; 3) the conviction, nonetheless, that joint scholarly refieob:ioncan have an impact

**Ethics After Babel.* By JEFFREY STOUT. Boston: Beacon Press, 1988. Pp. 338. $27.50.

on the moral issues currently vexing American public life: 4) the a;eknowledgement that religion has a role to play in the conversation about the future of momlity and public affairs.[1]

Jeffrey Stout'·s new book *Ethics After Babel* is an important and lively contiribution to the current discussion about mora;l-ity and public life. While the book focuses primarily on issues central to moral philosophy, its arguments have broad implica-tions for debate on topics of importance to public life more generally. Stout'.s work can be seen as an exemplification, ex-pansion, and justification of the four points identified in the previous pM"agraph. But the book is much more than that: it is an extended, sustained, and persuasive argument that plural-ism iin public discourse about moral issues need not lead to 1skepticism, nihilism, or relativism. Stout steers a steady oourse between the cultural pessimists who decry our current state as one of hopeless mor:al fragmentation and the intellect-ual foundationafists who seek to dispel our cultural malaise through some philosophical sleight-of-hand.

Ethics After Babel is divided into three major sections. The first," Spectres of MoI"al Diversity," tackles the issue of truth-claiming in moral discouvse and defends non-foundational ethics against the charge of relativism. The -second, " The Eclipse of Religious Ethics," deals with the relation between reJigion and moraJity, reruson and tradition, and with the ques-tion of the future of a public theology. In the final section, "Moral Discourse in P·lur:aiistic Society," Stout defends aver-sion of pragmatic liiberalism and distinguishes his own po.s:i.tion from that of Alasdair Maicintyre and Richaro Rorty. In the ·last chapter Stout shows how many of the concepts Macintyre has introduced into the philosopmcal discussion can be used in service of Li:beral social criticism. The reader gilimpses in

[1] It is unlikely that the Divinity School would have been represented in any such gathering as recently as five years ago. The fact that no one from the School of Education was invited to join this group is evidence of the continuing marginality of certain crucial professions within American higher education.

these final chapters the :beginnings of Stout's own constructive oontriibution to the issues of morality and pwblic life.

Stout seeks in this v:olume to move the discussion in poJitical philosophy and ethics beyond the "liberal vs. oommuntarian" issues that have dominruted the recent litemture. In opposition to the individualism and foundationalism that characterize the classic modern liberal position, Stout defends two "non-standard versions of lii:bemlism," one derived from Augustine via Gilbert Meilaende,r, the other derived foom John Dewey via R1iohard Rorty. Against the commutaria.ns' nostalgic longing for coherent communal moral discourse Stout o:fiers a hearty de<fense 0£ moral plumlism. " The p1Uira1ity of moral languages in our society is closely related to the plural- of social practices and institutions: we have reruson to affirm. Our moral languages exhiihit a diviision of oonceptuail labor, each doing its own kind of work" (7) .[2] The problem is not social or plural.ism but that" some languages, in particular those of the marketplaice and the bureaucracies:, creep into areas of life where they can do only harm. They tend to enguli or corrupt hrubits of thought and pa;tterns o[interaction that we desperately need" (7).

Stout begins his defense of moral plumlism by arguing that "the f.ructs of moral diversity don't *compel* us to become nihilists or skeptics" (14). In developing his case Stout depends heavily on Donald well-known 1974 article "On the Very J!dea of a Conceptuail Scheme." Genuine disagreement between two parties, Stout argues, implies a s,ignificant degree of common g11ound between the disputants. Without substa.ntiail agreement regiarding definition of terms, backgiround concepts, and basic beliefs the disputants could not understand the nature of their disagreement, nor even the fact that they were in dispute. Disaigreement thait "goes all the way down " would not be genuine disagreement; it would rather be a failure to C!Ommunicate,a mere verhal dispute. If

[2] This argument is similar to that offered by Michael Walzer in *Spheres of Justice.*

one grants thi:s Davidsonian ooncluision,then it follows that we should be skeprtica;lof proposals regairding both universal mOII'al principles and moral irrcommensurability. The former fail to acknowledge the sii.gnificanceof genuine disagreement; the latter extend disagreement hey;ond appropri•ate logical limits.

Having staked out this middle ground between forundationalism and •relativism, Stout then truckles the issue of truth in morrulity. Non-foundatiorralists, he argues, are not propelled by the logic of thcir critique of universal mo:rial principles to heoome relativists in the realm of truth. He states the issue in a number of ways. "The impomant point to understand here is that doubts about explanations or .criteria of moral truth are not necessarily doU1bts .ahout moml truth" (23). Or again: "Doubting Whether a Mo:val Law or Realm of Values is needed to give moral propositions something to be true Of in order to keep the bottom f.r'!om falling out of moral objectivity isn't the same as doubting thait morail propositions have truth-value" (24) .

The question of truth is both complicated and important so we will need to go slowly at this point in order to grasp the full imrpaiot of Stout's argument. The key distinction here is between justification or warranted assertibiliity and truth. Against those pmgmatists (including, on one reading, Richard Rol'ty) who want to claim that truth is nothing more than wal'llanted assert]bility, Stout wants to maii.ntain an essential difference rbetween the two notions, whiJe granting their close connootion. "[S]eeiking to hold or assert true propositions involves *neither more nor less* than seeking to hold or to assert mtiona.Uy justified or warranted propositions. We can a1Ccept this however, without aillowing that truth *is* warranted assertibility" [first italics added} (26) .

But if truth-holding is *neither more nor less* than holding warranted a;ssertions, how is the form.er to be ili:stinguished ifil'OIID. the latter? One might have expected Stout to claim that .truth..holding is *no less* than warranted assertibility, but he raises a puzzle when he claims that it is also *no more.* Indeed,

Stout irs much clearer when he shows the close connection between the two oonceipts. " The prrorpositionsI assert to be true, if I am being rea;sonable and candid, wtill be the ones I am wairranted in rus:s.erting. And the criteria I use for judging truth will be the ones I use for determining which propositions I am justified in holding true ... Truth, for us, here and now, is always wairranted asserti!bility" (26). The question remains: how then do they differ?

Stout appears primarily to be maiking a logiool point about the meaning of truth. Let me quote him rut length here. "I believe that slavery is evil. I hruve just told you what I believe ·rubout the morial standing of slavery. The proposition' Slavery is evil ' is true. Now I have just told you thait the truth-condition of a proposition obtains. That's not the same as telling you that the proposition is justified in my context or that I am justified in believing it or warranted in asserting it. If I went on tJo tell you that I am justified in believing that slavery is eviil or warranted in aisserting that the proposition ' Slavery is evil ' is true, these additional claims he false even irf my statement rubout the truth of the proposition is true (and vice vel"Sa). So truth does not *mean* justified ;belief or warranted i:ussertibility;even in •a restricted class of grammatical contexts"

Thus truth •and rwia.rranted ·assertibility, despite their close connection, are not be equated, nor is the meaning of one term to be reduced to that of the other.

This logical distin!Ction allows Stout further to affi!l'llll the relativity of justification while denying the relativity of truth. In drawing that distinction he defines justification ais " a normative relation that exists among a given proposition, the person who accepts it, and a cognitive context" (30). He denies, however, that this relativity caITies over to truth. "What we're justified in believing a.bout the evil of slavery varies ac-1aording to the evidence and reasoning availruble to us in our place in culture and history. But the truth of the proposition that slavery is evil doesn't vrary in the same way .... [S}lavery dri:dn':t become evil only when people discovered. what was

wrong with it" (80). Indeed Stout affirms both "the relativity of justification" and "environmental relativity " while defending ·a version of " 1rubsolutism" regarding truth, i.e., the position that" there is a single true morality."

This distinction between the relativity of justification and the rubsolutism of truth is crucial to Stout's entire argument. Much of the philosophical furor ·rubout moral plurailism, Stout argues, ha,s been generated by a confusion between justification and truth. Defenders of the relaitivity of justification have often allowed theill" positions to shift subtly into assertions of the relativity 00 truth, thereby becoming vulneraJble to their essentiaJi.st critics. On the other hand, those who decry moral pluralism see such diversity ais signalling an inevitaihle drift into morrul relativism, i.e., a situaition in which moral assertions are reducible to statements of persona.iipreference.[3] Both parties are oonfosed, however. It is possible, Stout asserts, to affirm the relativism. of jusrbi.:ficaitionwithout sliding down the slippery slope to the relativism of truth.

The logiiical clarification Stout has introduced into the philosophical deharte regairding relativism is very important; surely a good deal of the current debate rests upon a confusion between justification and truth. And yet his diSCJussion is likely to leave many readers somewhait unsatisfied. Wihile the conceptual distinctions are both important and valid, it is not clear how *useful* they are when one turns to the aclua.I disputes thrut charact&ize purblic life. Two problems cling to Stout's e:xJcellent argument: 1) his discussion of truth will appear to •SO!ffie as unnecessarily truncated; 2) his Davidsonian refutation of relaitivism may be oonceptuailly tidy but politioaily irreleviant. I will deal with eaich criticism in turn.

1), Readers will look in vain for an extended ofarification of the meaning of truth, akin to Stout's statement of the meaning of justification.. He stead.f1aistlyrefuses to off& his reaiders a *theory* 00 truth, preferring to rely on examinations of the

[3] This is, of course, the argument developed by Alasdair Maclntrye in *Aftur Virtue.*

particular contexts in which the term *true* is used. While that is a perfectly defensible philosophica.l position, the .fact that he does not proceed to offer such examinrutimrslea,ves one slightly dissatisfied. His discussion is an example of " thin " conceptual clarification that requires "thick" description for its exemplification. Unfortunately, Stout provides little such exemplification. No,r does he develop his acoount of the meaning of truth in any detail. Stout's airgument woru1d have been strengthened had he offered a reconstruction of the notion orf truth sirmila,r to the reconceptualizrution of " correspondence " developed hy Alasdair Macintyre in *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* Without ,such further explication we are left uncertain where the philosophically vailid distinction between truth and warranted aissertiibilityreally leads.

Stout's reticence in developing a more robust account orf truth-telling in moral discourse is based in pa,rt on his belief that " a theoretical definition of such a concept is: likely to cause more pr01blemsthan it solves and unlikely tlo be both informative 1and nonreductive" (28). Genuine ethical thinking involves moral *bricola.ge,* a selective, *ad hoc* retrieval and use of vairious cultural, religious, and conceptual resources in the creation of morail positions. Moral *bricoleurs* combine the insights of realists and constructivists. "To say that candidates for truth and falsehood in ethics can be brought into being by the creative human effort of moral *bricolage* is not to deny that the candidates thus brought into being really possess truth-value or can he discovered to be true or false .by raitional means" (77) . Imnica1ly Stout engages in very little of the moral *bricolage* he so strongly recommends. The problem of mora;l relrutivism ·oannot be fully addressed iby philosophical a.nd conceptual clarification. If the ultimate test of an ethical position lies in its a:hility to ruddress real morail problems, then it will be difficult to ev,alu:atethe success of Stout's re:fiutation of moral relativism until his philosophical reflection is put into practice.

Stout's Davidsonian rejoinder to relativism states that

.for genuine disa:greement to oocur some beliefs must be held in common between the disputants. Therefore " conceptual schemes " cannot be totally incommensurruble one with another. Indeed, the very notion of a" oonceiptual scheme" implies that such schemes organize something that liies " outside " them, whether facts or experience. Thus the belief in conceptual schemes becomes the " third dogma o.f empiricism " to be refuted. This reS1ponse overturns positions which affirm a "1oonceptual relativism " based on the mistaken notion of incoonmensuraibleconceptual schemes; it does not,. however, address the question of whether that which is held in common between two disputing parties is *sufficient* to reSblve their dis-.agreement. Every genuine dispute rinvolves large areas of o.f agreement, but whether those common beliefs are relevant to the adjudication orf the dispute can only be tested in praictice. 11 the parties disagree not only rubout a particular moral and political issue hut, e.g., upon the very notion of justice that ought to 1be applied to that issue, then theiir disaigreement may go " :flair enough down " to suggest not the incommensurrability o[schemes hut the *incommensurability of standards of evaluation.*[4] In light of the Davidson/St>out position the bwden orf proof will alwayis rest upon those who would assert incommerrsuvability;[5] but incommensurable standards o.f eva:l-

[4] This point has been argued at length by Macintyre in *Whose Justice'! Which Rationality?*

[5] I am using "incommensurability" here in a way that " splits the difference " between the two senses of the term Stout offers in his Lexicon. Stout defines "Rorty',s sense " of incommensurability as: "What obtains, under conditions of abnormal discourse, when nobody has yet thought up a way to achieve rational commensuration; not necessarily a bad thing, *depend.mg on how important it i8 to achieve agreement by rational means under the circumstances* " (294-5) [italics added]. The " bad sense " of the term is defined as follows: "What obtains when two or more groups assign different meanings to words, thereby (allegedly) causing their sentences to be about different worlds and opening an abyss between their respective conceptual schemes" (295). When political disagreement over a moral issue, e.g., abortion, reaches an impasse and the dispute become *de facto* inadjudicable, that disagreement becomes the practical equivalent of Stout's "bad sense" of the term incommensurability. For a helpful description of such

nation have not been ruled logically impossible. Therefore the fact of moml diversity *can* lead to a genuine problem of inrom-mensumbility.

What, then, hrus Stout demonstrated with his refutation of relativism? He has shown that the relativity of justification does not necesisarily imply the relativity o[truth. He has also refuted the conceptual relativity associated with incommensur-.able schemes. But he has not shown the notion of incommen-suraibility *per se* to be unintelliigiibleor inapplicable to our real moral disputes. Booause the book lacks the mora.I *bricolage* necessary for testing its conceptual proposals,[6] we remain un-certain whether his philosophically valid distinctions are prac-tically or politically useful.

;In the final section of *Ethics After Babel* Stout develops a picture of liberal society thrut differs from the one accepted by both l.iherals and communtariarrs, and he thereby presents a compelling ,defense of moral p1umlism and liberal polity. His own position is developed th:mugih an *auseinandersetzung* with Alasdair Moolnrtyre. Stout's chief criticism of the argument of *After Virtue* is that the author exaggerates the character of moml disagreement in our culture and thereby misconstrues the nature o[a lilberal society. Stout grants Maclntyre's point that our culture lacks agreement on the *telos* o[humankind, but argues that liberal institutions have been developed pre-cisely to allow us " to mana;ge collective life in the aibsence of perfect agreement on 'man-:as-he-would-:be-iif-he-realized-his-*telos*'" We do have profound disagr-eement in our lib-eral society, but our morail disputes (Davidson is once again

"practical incommensurability " see William Werpehowski, " The Pathos and Promise of Christian Ethics: A Study of the Abortion Debate," *Horizons* 12:2 (Fall, 1985), pp. 284-302.

[6] Chapter 7 " Moral Abominations," a most interesting exploration in philosophical and cultural anthropology, is as close to moral *bricolage* as Stout get in this volume. While Stout brilliantly describes the social con-ditions which must obtain in order for the notion of "abomination " to be intelligible, he does not argue that any particular human activity is in fact a moral abomination.

invoked) presuppose a broad backiground of agreement; indeed, Stout as1serts, "mosrt of us do agree on the essentials of what might he oaJled the pmvisilonal *telos* of our society " (212). That consensus represents an acknowledgement within liberal societies that "a self-limiting consensus on the good" is preforruble to the strife and waclare generated by those religious societies that have sought to enforce a broader agreement conoerning the good life.[7] This "overlapping consensus" is " 81.J!bstantial enough to do a lot of ordinary justificaitocy work" (213). In fact the "relatively presuppositionless language " of liberalism enables us to " describe disagreements with ea;se and precision," thereby giving us an aidvantage over the more rich but rigid moml languages of previous cultures. But finally, Stout argues, the continuities between liberal and prronodern cultures are far more s:ignificant than Maiclntyre is willing to grant. " Earlier generations were themselves produots of eelectic *bricolage,* on the one hand, and conceptua.l adaptation to new circumstances, on the other . . . If premodern language-users have been ruble to converse across culturial boundaries, change their minds in dialogue with strangers, and invent new moml languages out of apparently incompatible fragments, perhaps we can too" (9H8-9).

The danger of Macintyre' s description of the radicrul moml fragmentation oif our culture is that it can encourage a sectruri1an withdrawal foom public life and rob liberal polity of the citizenship of the " connected critic,"[8] i.e., the loyal but critical social commentator. Stout's more balanced a;ssessment of moral plura.lism prepares the way for his own aooount of the kind of social criticism to Hiberal society. Drawing upon Maclntyre's discuss:ion of the social :practices and the

[7] Stout writes, "Let us, however, be clear about one thing; even civil war carried on by other means is preferable to plain old civil war-the kind you get when one fully developed conception of the good, unable to achieve rational consensus, comes crashing down upon another, bringing about rather little good but much bloodshed, tyranny, and terror" (224).

[8] This term is used by Michael Walzer in *Interpretation and 8ooiai Ori.tioism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986).

goods internal to them, Stout argues that our society " is richly endowed with widely v;alued social practices and goes to remarkwble lengths to initiate new generations into them" (271). In so doing we have cultivated a rich repertoire of virtues appropriate to those practices. Thus the medical profession, for eX!ample, imbues the cardinal virtues of practical wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance. Other soci,al p:riactices instill those virtues a.ppropriate to their internal goods, but *we* often fail to recognize this nurtu:riingprocess because we lack a ca.retful " participant-observer " description of the practices of liberal society. Because these practices a,re diverse the moral languages and activities they yield are equally multifarious. This moral pluralism should not be decried but celebrated.

This rather positive description of liberal pluralism does not imply, howeveil', that our society is free of serious problems; it rather offers a different account of the plight of public life. Our variegated social practices are embodied in institutions that" necessarily trade heavily in external goods" (274). The external goods associated with the practice of medicine-wealth, status, power-can all too easily overwhelm the internal goods associated with the cail.'e of the sick. "[T]he social practice of medical eare hais been placed at grave risk by its own institutional setting and rclated social pmctices ... It is.in [this] uneasy relation between our social practices and our institutions that many of the most deeply felt problems 0:f our society lie " (275).

In response to this predicament Stout pmposes " a stereo1scoipic social criticism, one which brings social pmctices and institutions, intema1 and external goods, into focus at the sa;me time" (279). Such criticism would locate professional ibehavior of physicians, for example, " within a network of socia,l ipractices ·and institutions " that would allow the critic to construct "a dmmatic narrative-replete with moral appraisa1s, a coherent interpretation of his moral language, and a rendering of the mutual determination of chara:cter and cir-

oumstance" (281). Tihis form of social criticism would guard :against our tendency to reduce professional behavior either to a mere set of toohniques guided hy bureaucratic standards or to a romantic viision of professionals as altruists purely dedicated to those whom they serve. Rather we would be positioned to understand and evaluate the tensions that arise between internal and external goods in social practices that are embedded within institutions. Such immanent criticism will he grounded in a complex description o[social and institutional behavior, but neither the scope nor the power of its criticism need be curibed by its immanent character. The tensions within the practices of liberal institutions are sufficiently severe to assure a radical social criticism.

Liberal societies, according to Stout's depiction, represent a genuine advance in the construction of political institutions, an advance char.aicterized by "a widely sha.red but se1f-limiting consensus on the highest good achievable " within a pluralistic culture. While we have forgone an overreaching vision of the ultimate human *telos,* we have gained a great deal more. Our modest conception o[our society's end " justifies a kind of tolerance foreign to the classical teleological tradition. And it rightly directs our moral a.ttention to something our ancestors often neglected, namely, the injustice of exduding people from social practices because of their race, gender, religion, or place of birth " (292) . Libeml societies for all their difficulties allow for genuine cooperative activity while encomiaging the social practices and moral languages o[diverse population. To identify that pluralism as the source of our current moral difficulties is, Stout argues, a philosophical and political mistake. " Moral disoomse in pluralistic society is not threatened, then, hy disagreement among its members aibout the good. Neither is it threatened hy the confusion of tongues manifested in its various moral languaiges" (287). Rather moral pluralism is the inevitaible result of the cultural and social pluralism that makes liberal societies such interesting places in which to live. Rather than bemoan that pluralism we should honor it as the of liberal :societies' greatest achievement.

Clearly the debate between Stout and Madntyre aibout the nature of liberal societies and the solutions for their ailments will continue. It is unfortunate, however, that *Ethios After Babel* was ·completed before bhe publication of *Whose Justice? Whivh Rationality?,* because Madntyre's position in the latter book is not subject bo the same criticisms Stout directs against *After Virtue.* It is clear, for eXiample, that Macintyre does not view dispamte positions like the Thomistic and Humean moral trarntions to be incommensuraible conceptua.l schemes. He iiather argues that their conceptions of justice and rationality, and thus their standards of evaluation, are so different as to be *de facto* incommensurable. MOireover, Macintyre appears to· have drawn baick from his recommendation that persons retreat into their local communities of virtue, thereby ceding the public realm to the " barbarians " who akeady govern us. In fact his pl'IOposal concerning the aidjudication of disputes between traditions, requiring as it does careful attention to the social praictiJces of historically particulaJ."communities, is clearly compatible with Stout':s " stereoscopic social criticism." Still the two moral philoS10phers do differ decisively in their judgment aibout the achievement oif liberal societies. In oontrrust to Stout's modest celebration of pluralist liberal institutions Macintyre continues to argue "that only by either the circumvention or the subversion of liberal modes of debate" can particular tra;ditions of enquiry "challenge the cultural and politcial hegemony of liberalism effectively." [9] Interestingly this on-'going dispute about political liberalism reflects differing positions regarding the role of religious oommunities within public life. Macintyre, with his new-found appreciation of the Augustinian tmdition, is quite open to proposals from religious communities concerning the *telos* for our public life. Stout, on the other hand, remains ambivalent on this issue.

What role might religious communities and their theologians have in Smut's reconstruction of public life? Is there a future

o *Whose Justice? Whose Rationality!',* p. 401.

ifor public theology in a libeml society? Stout cleavly recognizes that the " religious languages of momls, . . . including theological inquiry, have moved to the margins of public life" . To some extent the marginality of religious communities reflects their failure to provide a framework for public life inclusive of moml pluralism. " What made the creation of liberal insbitutions necessary, in large part, was the manifest £ailure of religious groups of various sorts to estwblish rational agreement on their competing detailed virsions of the good. It was partly because people recognized putting an end to religious warfare and intolerance as m1011ally good ... that liberal institutions have been able to get a foothold here and there around the globe" . Attempts by theologians to re-en- the interest of the secular public is threatened by two limiting dangers: either theologians conform their position so closely to the secular *ethos* as to minimize any distinctive religious content or they cling to their distinctive religious message and thereby minimize their engaigement with the broader public worM. In neither case do theologians present themselves as interesting conversation partners.

What would it take for theologians. to regain a significant public voice? "[W]hether academic theologians can win a wide hearing even within the academy depends in part, it seems to me, on whether religious resu:vgenceproduces dramatic change, independently oif theofogy, in what most people, including intellectuals, take for granted rubout the nature and existence of God when they speak to matters of mor:al importance in pubilic settings. Such a change would shi£t the burden of proof in •a way thrut might make stome kind of theology central to the culture again" (186). While these comments are hardly encouraging to those of us concerned with the future of a public theology, they are a clear and vivid reminder tha.t a genuine public theology must raise the question of the significance of helief in God for prwblic life. While theologians may have important things to say a;boru:t human nature, the chamoter of political or the nature of po'wer, they cannot genuinely

fulfill their responsibilities ais public theologians unless they address the question of God's existence and nature.

Jeffrey Stout haJS written a thoughtful, incisive, and thoroughly challenging hook. Though he addresses .a num:ber of complicated philosophical issues, he writes with a style that renders his arguments accessible to a broad public. Even when I disagree with him, I fin:d tha.t the rigor of his thought elicits a new precision in my own fol'!lnulation of the issues. *Ethioo After Babel* takes the diSCU'ssionin moral and political philosophy to a new levd of clarity and sophist:icaition. It is o;f signal importance to philosophers, ethicists, theologians, and persons involved in the practices of public life. No one concerned with the issues of momlity and public affairs should fail to reflect upon Stout's powertful and persuasive position.

BOOK REVIEWS

Easter in *Ordinary: Reflections on Human Experience and the Knowledge of God.* By NICHOLAS LASH. Oharlottesville, Virginia: Uni·versity Press of Virginia, 1988. Pp. 313. $29.95 (hardbound).

Nicholas Lash sets out "to construct an argument in favor of one way of construing or interpreting human experience as experience of the mystery of God " (p. 3) , and to show that this awareness of God has nothing to do *with* analyses of " religious experience " or of theism. Recent attention to religious experience, such as that of the philosopher Riohard Swinburne or of the research unit established by the zoologist Alister Hardy at Oxford, relies on a conception of that experience as individualistic rather than communal and as a matter of feeling or sensation in contrast to thought. Lash aMrihutes ·this view of religious experience to the legacy of William James, and contrasts it with that of Frederick Schleiermacher. According to Lash, James identifies the personal the individual, contrasts thought with feeling, and regards religious experience as private in contrast to public, or " naked " with respect to language, institutions, and other cultural forms. Schleiermacher avoids these errors by focusing not on discrete, datable experiences that one can identify as religious, hut on a moment that pervades all human experience, to the source or object of which the grammar of Christian doctrine gives the name "God."

Lash acknowledges that Schleiermacher can he read in support of either of these two different ways of construing religious experience (pp. 112, 129), hut he does not realize that James can also he read in a way that blurs the dichotomy he sets up. Both James and Schleier·maoher provide uncommonly sophisticated accounts of the social character of the self and of the role of language and thought in shaping perception and feeling. In his *Ethik,* Schleiermacher locates the individual in social and cultural institutions, and elaborates the anthropology that informs his influential lectures on hermeneutics. Three of many notable contributions of James' *Principles of Psychology* are a chapter on the self that is the source of conceptions of the social self in American sociology and social psychology, a critique of classical empiricism showing that the distinction between sense impressions and ideas is an artifact of an erroneous psychological theory, and a famous chapter on the stream of thought in which he argues human experi-

enoe is not divided into ideas, sensations, and feelings, but is a continuous flow of consciousness. Toward the end of his career, he gave up the concept of consciousness as too closely associated with the mental in contrast to the physical, and spoke instead of the flux of experience.

Lash accuses James of Cartesi1an dualism, and attributes to him the view that there is a "little person," a Cartesian self imprisoned in the body. He admi,ts that the *Principles* contains no such view, hut suggests that Jaines becomes mo't'e and more Cartesian as he develops, his radical empiricism. In fact, there is very little in James that could accurately be called Cartesian, and nothing ei,ther in the *Principles* or in the late *Essays in Radical Empiricism* that would condone any such picture of an homunculus inside the body. Contrary to Lash's view, the idea of "pure experience" in the latter work does not refer to experience that is independent of language, culture, or institutions, but is rather a reminder that such distinctions as that between objective and subjective, feeling and thought, or perception and fantasy, are not girven in experience, but are products of our interpretations.

Despite their social views of the self, both Sohleiermacher and James focus on the consciousness of the individual when they come to examine religious experience or piety. James says .that he will stress the more extreme or devdoped reports of religious experience in order to examine the " ripe fruits " of ,tJhe religious life. Both share a Protestant bias toward personal piety as the heart of religion, and regard ritual and institutional forms as the communal context for that piety, and an insufficient appreciation for the value of the routine and conventional. But this is not to be identified in either with a Cartesian individualism or a separation of feeling from thought. Both were influenced by the Romantic paradigm of the person as artist. To study artistic creativity, they thought, one should look at the fullest examples, at genius, and not at the sohoolmen who never rise above the conventions of a particular place and time. They share this approach with Nietzsche, who employs the artist as the paradigm of the person, hut is acutely sensitive to cultural and traditional influences on character and emotion. And with Kierkegaard who, while decidedly more individualistic than Nietzsche, could not rightly he accused of separating feeling or passion from thought. Lash is wrong to interpret James' focus on religious virtuosi as evidence of an aristocratic neglect of the democratic. He claims that James attends only to " the pattern setters of religion, whose genius, like that of the New England gentry and faculty at Harvard, sets them apart from the coarsely physical unimaginative fidelity of the servants and disciples who constitute their environment" (p. 47). James' selection of examples is open to criticism, hut this characterization is wildly inaccurate.

Both James and Schleiermacher are also interested in the claim that religious experience or the religious dimension of experience is in some way revelatory, or has a cognitive component. Both search for some moment that points beyond the subject, toward " something More " in James' terms, and a " whence " of the feeling of absolute dependence in Sohleiermaoher's. It is at this point 1lhat James likens the cognitive component in experience to sensation, and Schleiermacher claims that the moment of absolute dependence in the religious consciousness shapes hut is not shaped by language and thought. Neither claims that these moments are ever found in their pure or naked form. Experiences always come in 1lhe concepts and beliefs of a particular culture and tradition. But both point to a moment that they take to he distinctive of the religious consciousness, and common to the various traditions. Here it seems to me that if either is more wedded to the notion of a moment in experience that is radioally independent of language and oulture it is Schleiermacher, who argues for, and whose program demands, an immediate self-consciousness, unmediated by words or doctrine. James likens the cognitive moment in religious experience to sense ,or sensation, hut his ,analyses of sense perception and feeling never allow for any kind of immediate, intuitive moment of the sort that Schleiermacher preserves through the several editions of the *Speeches* and *The Christian Faith.*

Schleiermaoher says that the paragraphs in which he describes the feeling of absolute dependence are borrowed from Ethics. Lash wrong·ly comments here that they are borrowed from *"Christian* ethics" (p. 120, original emphasis) . Ethics, for Schleiermacher, refers to the *Geisteswissenschaften,* and includes his philosophical anthropology; it is not Christian ethics. Lash wants to read Schleiermacher as an hermeneutical theologian operating entirely within the Christian framework. That is not inaccurate, hut the prolegomenon that he provides in the introduction to *The Christian Faith* is carefully constructed to he independent of any appeal to Christian life or doctrine.

The aspect of Schleiermacher's analysis of piety that Lash appreciates most is his view of religion as a moment of all human experience r,!lil:'her than a focus on particular religious experiences. Through commentary on the work of Newman, von Hugel, and Rabner, Lash elaborates on what he takes to he the features in human experience that point to what the Christian calls God. He finds those features in com·munal life, in the relation between persons in community that Buber describes, and the basic trust ,that is required for the occurrence of real community. Von Hugel describes the " sense of God " as an operative facto'!.' in all human experience, and stresses the triadic character of that experience. Buber provides a corrective to von Hugel by his at·

tention to the ethical component of community, to the social and political implications that von Hiigel had ignored, and his careful portrayal of the rela:tion that is possible between persons when community is achieved. Rahner tries to show that the drift of human experience points to features that the Cihristian would call God. The Christian dootrine of God can he interpreted to mean that community is permanently possible, and to provide a basic component of l:rust. Lash sees this as similar to Schleiermacher's feeling of absolute dependence.

In each of these figures, including Buber, Lash discovers a tripartite distinction that he interprets in trinitarian terms. The various triads are so different that their assimilation to one another is purely rhetorical. The point is to oppose the triadic structure of an interpretive approach to human experience to the Cartesian dualism that he attributes to James. (Lash would appreciate Josiah Royce's use of this opposition, and C. S. Peirce's theory of signs, in *The Problem Of Christianity.)* He is right to defend an interpretive approach, and to oppose the separation of feeling and thought, and of individual and community, but wrong to think that such an approach resolves or dissolves questions about the knowledge of God in human experience.

Lash portrays the rich complex of emotions, attitudes, values, and character that makes up the religious life of a community of persons, and rightly holds that ,any attempt to separate thought and feeling, or individual and community, is artificial. He appeals to that complex in order to show that a sense of God, knowledge of God, is a practical assumption that pervades religious life in a Christian or Jewish community. The emphasis on the practice of a community, however, is then invoked as a protecif:ivestrategy to preclude the kind of questioning of traditional assumptions that has always gone on. Peirce argued that inquiry is always triadic and communal, and that the road of inquiry must not be blocked. Lash is not alone in appealing to the priority of practical over speculative reason in order to block inquiry that might call into question some of the concepts and beliefs that inform our experience.

WAYNE PROUDFOOT

Columbia University
New York, New York

Adam, Eve, and the Serpent. By ELAINE PAGELS. New York: Random House, 1988. Pp. xxiii + 189. $17.95. (hardbound)

Elaine Pagels attempts to analyze early Christian readings of Gen. 1-3. In particular she argues that Augustine's reading of this text was such an idiosyncratic and radical break with Christian precedent that it amounted to a dismissal of more than three hundred years of unanimous tradition. As such, despite her closing disclaimer that there is no "pure Christianity" (p. 152), it is implied that Augustine's views are a distortion of the orthodox tradition, an aberration which caught on only because of its political expediency. The first four chapters present a view of pre-Augustinian Christian readings of Gen. 1-3, which is then used in chapter five as a foil for Augustine's views.

Except for the gnostics, Pagels argues that the Genesis text was almost universally read as "the story of human freedom" (p. xxvi). Christians from Paul to Jerome proclaimed their freedom from the Roman social fabric by their espousal of celibacy, and, until Constantine, were prepared to demonstrate their liberty from demonically inspired imperial persecution by their own deaths. Pagels claims that because of their defiant attitude toward the Roman social and political order, these Christians read the first three chapters of Genesis as a charter of liberty for all humans:

> • • . orthodox Christians of the second and third centuries, from Justin and Irenaeus through Tertullian, Clement, and the brilliant teacher Origen, stood unanimously against the gnostics in proclaiming the Christian gospel as a message of freedom-moral freedom, freedom of the will, expressed in Adam's original freedom to choose a life free of pain and suffering. (p. 76)

This is intriguing hut difficult to assess since Pagels does not tie it to particular readings of Genesis hy any of the authors she lists here, although there is one citation from Clement, given much earlier in the book (p. 39) which could serve to tie the above observation to an early Christian reading of Genesis. But there are no citations of readings of Genesis hy Justin or Irenaeus or Tertullian or Origen at all. Pagels draws the term *autexousia* seemingly at random from an unspecified text in Clement (p. 73) as indicative of the "power to constitute one's own being" (p. 73) or "the moral freedom to rule oneself" (p. 99) which Pagels claims summarized early orthodox readings of Gen. I.

Pagels makes the additional claim that the story of Adam and Eve and the serpent was not seen by pre-Augustinian theologians as the story of a moral fall which extended to all humanity:

> Most orthodox Christians agreed with many of their Jewish contemporaries that Adam's fatal misuse of ... freedom was so momentous that his transgression brought pain, labor, and death into an originally perfect world. Yet Justin, Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Clement also agreed that Adam's transgression did not encroach upon our own individual freedom: even now, they said, every person is free to choose good or evil, just as Adam was. (p. 73)

Again, however, it is difficult to assess this argument because Pagels provides only one slender citation from Irenaeus (and that out of context and without elaboration, from *AH* 4.17.1), to back it up. One wonders in any event whether it is begging the question to say that people in a world characterized by " pain, labor, and death " have a freedom to choose good or evil as perfect as Adam's was. Certainly for Irenaeus the whole of creation had to be " redone " by Christ because of Adam's sin, and while this may not be a doctrine of original sin in the Augustinian sense, there is clearly much more room for continuity than Pagels' formulation of the earlier literature suggests. Thus what Pagels presents in chapter 5 as an almost monolithic foil for Augustine's reading of Genesis is actually tied to pre-Augustinian readings of Genesis by two slender threads widely separated in the course of the first four chapters, and these are treated only summarily.

But even this picture of consensus is given an additional twist, apart from any further consideration of the sources, as Pagels moves in chapter five to a consideration of Augustine. What in the first four chapters had been a consensus regarding the moral freedom of Christions quietly modulates in the first chapter into a consensus regarding political freedom:

> Are human beings capable of governing themselves? ... Early Christian spokesmen, like the Jews before them and the American colonists long after, had claimed to find in the biblical creation account divine sanction for declaring their independence from governments they considered corrupt and arbitrary. (p. 98)

None of the texts Pagels cited in the first four chapters could be used to support the claim that the early Christians believed in the possibility of political self-rule. Justin, Tertullian, and Clement were in fact eager to point out how loyal and useful Christian citizens were and wanted to he (in texts which Pagels herself cited, pp. 46-49. Note that in chapter two Pagels had explicitly ruled out a comparison between the early Christian view and the later American ideal as a step the early Christians did not take, p. 55) . Augustine is thus made to answer a question which was not asked of any of the earlier texts, and therefore the link between his theology and a particular political agenda is accomplished almost by a sleight of hand. Since his teaching on original

sin is reduced by Pagels to an answer to the question, " Are human beings capable of governing themselves? " it therefore appears, before any textual work is done, to he a denunciation of any attempt at poli· tical self-rule:

> The traditional Christian answers to the question of power no longer applied by the later fourth century, when not only Constantine hut several others, including Theodosius the Great, had ruled as Christian emperors. Augustine's opposite interpretation of the politics of Paradise-and, in particnlar, his insistence that the whole human race, including the redeemed, remains wholly incapable of self-government-offered Christians radically new ways to interpret this unprecedented situation. (p. 105)

Pagels' actual treatment of Augustinian texts slips imperceptibly and without warning from a purely theological view of freedom to a more political view:

> As Augustine tells it, it is the *serpent* who tempts Adam with the seductive lure .of liberty. The forbidden fruit symbolizes, he explains, 'personal control over one's own will.' Not, Augustine adds, 'that it is evil in itself, hut it is placed in the garden to teach him the primary virtue ' -obedience. So, as we noted above, Augustine concludes that humanity never was really meant to he, in any sense, truly free. God allowed us to sin in order to prove to us from our own experience that ' our true good is free slavery '-slavery to God in the first place and, in the second, to his agent, the emperor. (p. 120).

For Augustine, of course, submission to God *gives* us personal control over our will for the first time in our lives, and in holding this view he aligns himself with Justin, Minucius Felix, and others whom Pagels had cited as examples of the defense of Christian liberty. For it was precisely the Christian's allegiance, and indeed "obedience," "service," and" yielding" (pp. 39, 46, 55, 119) to God that mandated the resistance to the Roman social order that Pagels so ably documented. Why then is Augustine's insistence that the true freedom. of humanity is service to God condemned as an indication that he teaches that " humanity never was really meant to he, in any sense, truly free," and thus as a deviation from previous orthodox Christian teaching?

Nor does Pagels cite any text which supports her contention that the emperor is the "agent" of God in the sense implied above, namely, as his representative on earth. We owe obedience to the political order, hut not one which accepts the emperor's decisions as God's own. It seems impossible, ll:oo, creditably to maintain with Pagels that Augustine differs from earlier theologians because he felt that the baptized as well as the unbaptized were in need of a political order. None of the earlier thinkers she cites treats the question comprehensively, and all, as we have seen, were anxious to demonstrate the loyalty and good citizenship of Christians. Paul himself required allegiance.

Pagels simply shifted the sense in which she is using the word "liberty " with reference to readings of Gen. 1-3-from the earlier discussion in which it had primarily a theological and moral sense, to the discussion in chapter five, where a decidedly political specification is introduced. The Augustine who in contrast to earlier theologians appears as little more than an ideologue for the Roman Catholic Empire is one which is engineered largely by this shi£t in term usage, and not by evidence from the texts. With considerably less trouble, Pagels could have found in Eusebius of Caesarea, or some other court theologian, a willing ideologue much more pliable than Augustine was. Her point that theologians and historians of ideas need to take more seriously the political agendas against which ideas arise is well taken. But by insisting that it was the political expediency of Augustine's teaching on original sin that caused it to catch on (pp. 99-100, 105, 118), Pagels skates perilously close to a reductionist reading of this theology despite her stated intention (p. xxvii) to the contrary.

JOHN C. CAVADINI

Villanova University
Villanova, Pennsylvania

Whose Justice? Which Rationality? by ALASDAIR MAc!NTYRE. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988. Pp. xi+ 410. $22.95 (hardbound).

One part of the Enlightenment project, for the past 300 years or so, has been to reach assured foundations for both thought and action. Thus Descartes, near the beginning of this project, insisted on starting with propositions which are clearly and distinctly true and on suspending commitment to any received wisdom. From this untainted beginning, the ,thinker could build the edifice of thought and culture securely. Ordinary people might not maintain such purity; but, so influential has this image been in Western history, that even today we take the scientist and the philosopher as critical inquirers unbound by ties of tradition. Alasdair Maclntyre's *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* is a brilliant challenge to this common understanding.

Maclntyre's title indicates the scope as well as the direction of his argument. When questions of justice arise, that is, questions about the relationships of people with each other, about the apportioning of the goods of society and so on, they cannot be answered without reversing the question, without asking about the society in which the question

arises. To a great extent, the deeper question can only he answered from within that society with all of its givens. Sorting out the claims and counter-claims requires us to put them in the context of tradition. The same must he said for the questions of truth and of inquiry which always flow though and around the arguments about right and wrong. There .too we must reverse the question. The standards of rationality, like those of justice, inhere in society, in an ongoing enterprise from which the thinker cannot separate himself if he is to proceed. Hence the question, "Whose rationality? "

The rejection of Descartes's pure beginning is not original with MacIntyre. C. S. Peirce and Ludwig Wittgenstein, to name just two among many, made the argument too effectively for rebuttal. What is different about *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* is that it focusses as much on the relative pronouns as on the substantives. It traces concern about justice and rationality through history. Macintyre takes it as "crucial that the concept of tradition-constituted and tradition-constitutive rational enquiry cannot be elucidated apart from its exemplifications." However, rather than attempting a universal survey, he attends to four exemplifications capable of supporting and clarifying the central thesis: ancient Greece from Homer to Aristotle, patristic and medieval Christianity with Augustine and Aquinas as the center points, the Scottish enlightenment beginning in the kirk and ending with Hume and Reid, and finally the very liberalism stemming from the enlightenment and challenged by the book at hand.

What unifies a tradition is not so much an idea as a problem and a preoccupation. The problem and its attendant preoccupation become the focus of struggle(s) within society in a way which forms its internal development, which establishes its intellectual and moral perimeter, and which sets it in relation to others. Macintyre sees Homer as setting the terms of debate and interaction for the Greeks. *Dike* and *arete,* justice and virtue, are not matters for philosophical debate in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey,* but marks of achievement in dealing within a natural and social order beyond question. What happened for Homer's successors was that two dimensions of achievement, the achievement of victory and the achievement of excellence, came to stand in evident tension with each other. Pericles, Sophocles, Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle, each found a different relationship between these achievements; and, as they did so, they came to different interpretations of justice and virtue, of politics and of thought. Yet, whatever their divergence, the over-arching unity of the Greek city-state, the *polis,* served as the background against which they could sort out the debate and because of which one can now identify an ancient Greek tradition.

To the world-view of the Greeks, Macintyre juxtaposes the vision of

patristic Christianity and in particular of St. Augustine. Here a different tradition formed, one which had the Hebrew Bible as well as classical philosophy flowing through it and which displaced the *polis* for the City of God. It reached its culmination in St. Thomas Aquinas' systematic effort to overcome the apparent conflict between the two currents and which had its proper milieu in the church and in Christian religious communities. The Bible and Aristotle also played a role in seventeenth and eighteenth century Scotland; but a new background, the system of local kirks and of church courts, gave a special meaning to debates about faith and reason, about law and property. These debates ended in David Hume's anglicizing secularism and in Reid's universalizing of common sense.

Experts in Greek thought, in Augustine and Aquinas, in the Scottish enlightenment may have objections to Macintyre's treatment of their familiar ground, but I can simply confess to having learned a great deal on these subjects. His presentation is so rich that one easily becomes submerged in the particulars to the point of forgetting where it leads. Not so with the discussion of liberalism. In this instance, MacIntyre involves himself in philosophical debate rather than historical elucidation. Perhaps he thinks *After Virtue* (Notre Dame, 1981) quite enough in the latter regard. In a sense, the whole of each book is negatively about liberalism since this anti-tradition is his *bete noire* throughout. The liberal takes himself to have finally purged politics and theory of every given, and it is precisely the claim of *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* that liberalism too has its roots and its taken-for-granted scaffolding and that its endeavor to have unsituated discourse is hopeless.

If Macintyre would do battle with liberalism, he is no less anxious to challenge relativism in the understanding of tradition. His reason for worrying should be obvious. Once one maintains that all moral life and all theoretical reflection depend on background beliefs of a thinker and that these background beliefs are a social matter, one easily concludes that each tradition exists in a species of self-sufficiency and incommensurability with others. In contrast, Macintyre maintains that traditions do meet, that people in one tradition do learn from those in others, and that self-criticism is possible from within them, and finally that it is possible to speak of one tradition as having greater intellectual and moral resources than another. *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* is certainly proof that it is possible to reach beyond the perimeters, and the author makes interesting use of the analogy of language learning to explain the bridging. In Aristotle and Aquinas, he finds a method for the internal justification of principles which moves up to premises (and criticizes them) rather than merely moving down

deductively. Lastly, he acknowledges some intellectuals and movements, St. Thomas Aquinas and Thomism in particular, as having developed a strategy and a synthesis of value beyond their original spatial and temporal locale.

My inclination is to cheer for Macintyre in his defense of tradition as well as in his attack on relativism. In the end, however, I am left dissatisfied as well as enlightened and stimulated. The case against pure beginnings seems perfect, but he makes the relativist problem too easy by the selection of traditions and authors. What if the Buddha or the Bhagavad Gita or witch doctors or even Jesus instead of Western philosophers and theologians had been in the mix? Then the discussion would have been more complex. From another side, the resolution of the epistemological puzzles involved in the defence of tradition is never quite complete. Macintyre needs to concentrate still more on the old-fashioned questions of truth and knowledge, but now in a way enriched by his sensitivity to the importance of roots and givens. It would he especially helpful to expand the discussion of Aquinas on these issues and to pick up on the passing remarks about John Henry Newman. Reading Wilfred Ward's biographies of Newman and of his father, William George Ward, makes it clear that Macintyre's interests are not new in the twentieth century. None of these thinkers makes the juncture of tradition and epistemology easy to negotiate, hut they do cast much light on the attempt. That is also Macintyre's merit in *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*

MICHAEL J. KERLIN

La Salle University
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

What Will Happen to God?: Feminism and the Reconstruction of Christian Belief. By WILLIAM ODDIE. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988. Pp. xviii+ 161. $9.95 (softcover)

The questions of the ordination of women Ito the priesthood and of the proper role of women in the Christian community have received much attention in the past few years, particularly within the Anglican and Roman Catholic communions. As obvious as that statement is, there have been few attempts to place these issues in a larger context than that of sociological or political development. Feminism as a whole, of which the movement for the ordination of women is only a part, has received little critical attention.

Fr. William Oddie's book is an attempt to focus that attention on

feminism in general, and on the effects of feminism on Christian belief in particular. This is not a hook about the ordination of women to the priesthood; nor is it limited to any particular issue on the feminist agenda. It is an informed challenge to feminism, hut it lacks the diatribe and vitriol of polemics. It is one of the few hooks to take feminism at its word and examine its presuppositions and its tenets.

The hook centers on three major areas in which feminism and feminist literature have attacked traditional Christian theology. First, in the area of Christian anthropology, Fr. Oddie examines the development of a " feminist consciousness " within the past twenty years. The anger in page after page of sources quoted from the feminist writers is frightening-its cumulative effect is stunning. Here the author first suggests that the purpose of the feminist critique is not inclusion, or even "inclusiveness", in the Christian tradition, hut rather the complete reconstruction of Christian belief. The way this is achieved is through a combination of ridicule and misrepresentation. Thus, the Jewish heritage of the Old Testament is dismissed as "misogynist," sociological and anthropological data are disregarded as " oppressive " or worse. The feminist critique is not, however, entirely negative: in the place of the old "sex roles" (taught by both the imprisoning authorities of culture and Church), there rises the "feminist consciousness " of equality and independence.

This equality and independence is established not as a positive force, hut as a reaction to patriarchal structures which imprison women in restrictive roles. Here Fr. Oddie begins his second area of consideration, namely, how feminism has taken the attack on male stereotypes and applied them to God. This is considered not only as the question of so-called " inclusive " language, hut the far more fundamental question of the Fatherhood of God. Liturgical documents produced by the feminist movement are studied here in addition to the writings of its proponents. They run from the texts which are slight changes of authorized documents, to the more radical rewritings which are awkward (at best) or humorous (at worst). "The perception of God as *Father* is a projection from a woman-denying patriarchal culture which Jesus saw himself as modifying-even, openly defying-so as to achieve the liberation of women, [so that] we would expect to see this shift reflected in his teachings and recorded utterances " (p. 104) . Since this shift cannot he found in .the record of the New Testament, feminists have been forced to make the battleground the liturgy, as an immediately available target. Examples abound. " One notable coup, achieved almost unnoticed, has been the optional omission of the verses referring to the headship in Christian marriage of the husband, from the passage in Ephesians (5.2, 21-33) which is an appointed epistle in the Roman Catholic nuptial mass " (p. 105) .

From liturgy, the author moves on to the third, and perhaps the most emotional and difficult area, that of the Bible itself. Here, in this third area, we see the most radical effect of "femspeak" in the redefinition of what has gone before (the Christian tradition, cultural consciousness, Biblical revelation, and liturgical practice) . The " hermeneutics of suspicion " is the cornerstone of this reconstruction. The author then catalogues the feminist critiques of the high demons of the tradition (Augustine, Aquinas, Barth, and, of course, St. Paul).

There are, however, at least two questions which remain for the careful reader at the end of the book. The first is a question concerning sources: the authors and texts cited in the book are quite extensive, hut are they representative? There is little distinction made between secular feminism, the "women's movement" of the seventies, such as Germain Greer, and what we might call theological feminism, such as Mary Daly and Elizabeth Schussler Fiorenza. Only in the chapter on liturgical revision does Fr. Oddie distinguish three classes of feminism (from "softcore" to "hard-core"). I suspect that there are many Christian feminists who would in no way accept rthe conclusions of Mary Daly (in her later non-Christian writings). All feminists cannot be tarred with the same brush: and yet, I do not feel rthat this is what the author is doing. One could call this either a domino effect, or a " trickle-down " effect, but one of the points which the new preface for the American edition brings home is that what had been radical and eccentric ten years ago is commonplace today. Feminism is not monolithic, but the thought of the " advanced " writers is in some way mirrored even by the less radical. What began as some rather laughable revisionism. at the Episcopal Divinity School in Cambridge is now standard fare for a new generation of the Episcopal establishment (cf. particularly .the *Liturgical texts for evaluation,* nicknamed the " Black Mass Book"). What was written in Oddie's book in the early eighties is no longer the preserve of " extreme " feminism, however extreme it might have been ten years ago.

The second question rises from the author's identification of the source of feminism. Is feminism really a movement of middle class American housewives? For all its Marxist language, and the rather free borrowing of the dialectic of the class struggle, feminism does, in fact, bear the marks of its American, middle class birth. But where did all of this come from? It cannot be dismissed as a fad-and Fr. Oddie does feminism the compliment of studying its documents very closely-but what does all of this have to say to the rest of the world, which is not economically or politically well off enough to indulge in .the luxury of this discussion? The hook could have been more compleil:e in its analysis if it had traced the genealogy of feminism more closely.

The hook is written by an Englishman, a priest of the Church of England, and although many (if not most) of the feminist sources cited are from Americans (and even from American Roman Catholic feminists), there are occasional passages which may not he clear to a non-Anglican American audience. The author has written a new in· ,troduction, aimed at updating the hook for an American (and largely non-Anglican) audience, and this does help. The election of a woman as bishop in the Episcopal Diocese of Massachusetts, less than three months after the publication of this American edition, makes understanding this hook all the more urgent, most particularly by all who count themselves inheritors of the Catholic tradition.

The task of a fair and temperate scholar, in treating of a school which has attracted so much scorn and praise, is a task of distinction; and Fr. Oddie, without resorting to advocacy or polemic, dispels much malevolent fiction by contrasting it with reality. The volume is an ample and trustworthy collection of facts, pointing out the nature of feminism's attempt at reconstruction of the edifice of Christian helief-and also how distant the foundations of feminism are from those of Christian belief. But this is not new, or even surprising. It is, in modern guise, Newman's famous distinction between liberal religion and revealed religion-between those who would correct the notebooks of the Apostles, and those who would allow the Apostles to correct our own. The contrast between feminism and revealed religion cannot be more sharply stated than the author does-" [Feminism] is, quite simply, the controlled manipulation of historical assumptions in the service of ideology: a technique not unknown to the twentieth century " (p. 145).

The story of the publication of this hook is also instructive, if only to show us the times in which we live. The hook was first published in England by S.P.C.K. in 1984, and sold out its first printing within a year. Fortress Press, which usually handles S.P.C.K. titles in America, refused (under pressure) to import this title. Its scholarship (couched in non-technical language) made it too controversial to handle. S.P.C.K. then refused to reprint the hook, claiming (after the first printing was sold out so quickly) that there was no demand for the hook. Ignatius Press is to he commended for bringing out this American edition so that an audience on this side of the Atlantic can read and ponder its message.

WARREN J. A. SOULE

Dominican House of Studies
Washington, D.C.

The Church: Learning and Teaching. By LADISLAS ORSY, S.J. Wilmington, Delaware: Michael Glazier, Inc., 1987. Pp. 172. $14.95.

This work develops (and repeats) some of the ideas in Orsy's article, "Magisterium: Assent and Dissent," *TS* 48 (1987), 473-497. One of the most neuralgic issues in the Church today is the relationship between the magisterium and theologians. This extended essay, notable for its irenic tone, broadens the topic to a consideration of the whole church in its activity of learning and teaching. Its stated purpose is to " clarify some of the foundational concepts and to present a framework in which the interplay between the teaching authority and the whole community can be understood."

In the heat of debate when lines are drawn, and each side is in danger of becoming myopic because of the intensity of focus on a given issue, each risks losing sight of the larger dialogic relationship between God and human person. To its credit, this essay counteracts this risk by describing the pattern of encounter between God and the human person. Orsy reminds us that the church in its teaching and learning responds to a mystery which always eludes absolute order and clarity even through both occur under the guidance of the Spirit. Within this dialogic interplay, the function of the episcopate is to witness to the word that God has spoken, a word always predominantly ineffable, while the task of the theologians is to penetrate into the meaning of the word through systematic theological reflection.

In the three remaining chapters, Orsy discusses teaching authority, assent and dissent, and Catholic universities and academic freedom. He calls for a new hermeneutic for the interpretation of encyclicals in order to differentiate between statements of doctrine universally held, opinions of theological schools, and statements that may later be found to he erroneous. He points out the ambiguities associated with the term "ordinary magisterium," citing texts where it is the equivalent of "non-infallible," and others where it simply refers rto the manner in which a doctrine is taught. Departing from Dulles' suggestion for a dual magisterium, Orsy sketches the problems associated with the concept of a magisterium of theologians. He then cautions us against an over-simplification of the difference between fallible and non-infallible teaching which fails to account for the organic unity of Christian doctrine.

As there is a dialogic interaction between God's word and human response, so is there an interplay between the bishops' witness to the truth in the Spirit and the recognition of this truth on the part of the people of God who then surrender in an act of faith. The exact nature of this *obsequium fidei,* however, is problematic. Orsy's identification

of *obsequium* as a seminal locution in *Lumen Gentium* circumvents the dispute as to whether it means "respect" or "submission."

Orsy attempts to defuse much of the emotional charge associated with the term " dissent " by noting that it is a much stronger dialectical term than such European expressions as *opinion dijferent* or *anderer Meinung.* He cautions that " to state simply that dissent from non-infallibly held doctrine is legitimate, is simplistic and incorrect " since one must note the relationship of the non-infallible doctrine to the infallible core. He concludes ,that the best climate for a healthy relationship between theologians and bishops is mutual trust, a reasonable margin for honest mistakes, a recognition of limits on the part of theologians with a corresponding resolution never to call a final truth what is in reality a hypothesis. Orsy notes that history witnesses to the perils of theologians being subject to correction by their peers only. He points out that theologians should perhaps return to the practice of investigating questions rather than defending theses. The dangers associated with dissent include the possibility of the propositional dissent of a theologian becoming a feeder to a deeper attitudinal dissent in others or in some other way threatening the peace or unity of the church. It is difficult to see how anyone can take issue with such a balanced approach to this sensitive topic.

In order to indicate how a university can he Catholic and receptive and responsive to the magisterium while retaining the academic freedom necessary to *be* " houses of intellect," Orsy outlines six models representing concrete relationships between a university and a believing community: (1) secular universities in a Catholic environment, (2) secular universities integrated with a Catholic academic unit, (3) universities nourished by Catholic traditions but with no formal institutional commitment, (4) universities with institutional commitment to Catholic ideals but without an ecclesiastical charter, (5) universities established by the church with a canonical charter, and (6) " Ecclesiastical Universities and Faculties " established by the church and dedicated to "sacred sciences." He finds that a Catholic university must uphold and promote human and religious values according to Catholic beliefs, be well-proportioned to its environment, and rely primarily on the internal disposition of its constituencies for its religious dedication. How this will he accomplished will vary according to the concrete existential order in which the university finds itself and therefore cannot he determined from an abstract conceptual ideal. Thus these six models and the principles which Orsy outlines offer a fruitful starting point for discussion on what makes a university Catholic, hut they do not and cannot offer specific criteria. In effect this throws the problem of Catholic identity back on the universities to work out in their own particular situation.

Orsy uses his six models to clarify the relationship of the hierarchy to the teacher and the university and to address the problem of what happens if a teacher is denied a canonical mission. He concludes that in the case of universities whose relationship is that of communion (the third and fourth types described above), the hierarchy needs to deal with dissent directly with the teacher. Because universities of this type are not persons before canon law, there is no way the hierarchy can oblige a university to hire only teachers possessing a *mandatum* or to declare that such a university is indeed no longer a Catholic university. Thus the impasse remains insofar as mutual trust fails. Orsy's appeal for recourse to the concrete existential situation of a university must account for situations where such trust fails, for to presume unfailing trust is itself to appeal to an abstract ideal. As conciliatory as Orsy's work is, this is perhaps the Achilles' heel: in spite of the requirements of academic freedom, there is something incongruous in the fact that the church has no control over the catholicity of a university that declares itself to he Catholic. The situation is different for those universities whose relationship with the church is one of legal incorporation (the fifth and sixth types), for there is a duty to ascertain that the canonical requirements in their teachers are fulfilled.

The great merit of this essay is its balance: it does much to outline issues, define terms, offer models, and in general suggest a perspective from which the controversial topics of assent and dissent can he addressed. The footnotes are as informative and interesting as the text itself. A brief annotated bibliography is given at the end.

Two presuppositions in the essay which invite further clarification and discussion are Orsy's notion of the evolution of doctrine and his tendency to place such doctrinal issues as scriptural authorship in the same category as moral questions. In the first instance, one cannot presuppose that doctrine evolves without referring to what remains constant. In the second, the relationship between concrete moral judgments and doctrine is inadequately addressed. These two points are at the root of the question of assent and dissent in the church. Orsy does much to elucidate the ecclesiological questions; many systematic and moral questions remain.

SUSAN K. WOOD

Saint Mary College
Leavenworth, Kansas

Essays in Ancient Philosophy. By MICHAEL FREDE. Minneapolis: Uni· versiy of Minnesota Press, 1987. Pp. xxvii + 382. $32.50.

For this impressive volume, Michael Frede has woven together a series of seventeen essays on themes from Plato's analysis of percep· tion to the principles of Stoic grammar. There are six sections of the hook, dealing with Plato, Aristotle, Stoics, Skeptics, Ancient Medicine, and Ancient Grammar, respectively. Though most of the essays have appeared in print before, not all of them were readily accessible. Three essays are new to this volume (Chapters 1, 6, and 13) and three appear in English translation for the first time (Chapters 2, 4, and 10). In addition, Frede has prefaced the book with a splendid introduction, ex· plaining with great care his conception of the study of ancient philos- ophy. Throughout the book the argumentation is thorough and persua- sive, the style clear, the conclusions subtle and profound. The experi- ence that Frede brings to bear on various problems discussed in the hook is remarkable.

The book may he read as a series of independent essays. There is no need to begin with the section on Plato, or to read the essays in any of the sections in sequence: no special knowledge of previous essays is presupposed by subsequent ones. Nevertheless, to suppose that the sug· gestions made and conclusions drawn in the course of the book are in· sulated from one another would be a serious mistake. To discern any precise connection between the essay on perception in Plato's *Theae· tetus* and the essay on the principles of Stoic Grammar is admittedly quite difficult. But the essays in the sections on Hellenistic Philosophy work together to flesh out the interrelations of the often complex and diverse views of that period, as well as to demonstrate the influence of earlier philosophers on these views. In this respect the essays in earlier sections provide a context for later essays. Within each section the essays generally exhibit a high degree of unity. This is especially true of the section on Aristotle. According to Frede, logic provides a unify· ing theme for all the essays in the hook. This is generally, but not al· ways, the case. Instead, it is Frede's consistent approach to the study of ancient philosophy that focuses and unifies the essays. His position is that we can understand a philosophical view only if we see how it fits into a [philosophical] history as a whole (p. xx, Introduction). There are, moreover, other histories that are relevant, or even crucial, to understanding certain views in ancient philosophy. Frede presents a clear formulation of his own approach to the study of ancient philos· ophy in the introduction, on which I comment below. The remainder of the comments in this review are intended to reflect, primarily, the interests of readers of this journal. Thus, most of the detailed remarks

to follow concern Frede's introduction and the sections on Plato and Aristotle. The other sections, however, are no less significant, and the arguments contained therein are as persuasive as any in the book.

Anyone doing research in ancient philosophy must consider how much emphasis to place on its historical and philosophical elements: the methods, arguments, evidences, and contexts that one employs are a logical outcome of the relation one establishes between philosophy and history. Frede attempts to work out this relation in some detail, a task which is rarely undertaken in print; his introduction contains more than a few insights as a result. Many important distinctions are clarified or introduced, among them are distinctions between ancient philosophy and the history of ancient philosophy, between philosophical and historical explanation, between the history of philosophy and histories important to philosophy, and between a historically important philosophical fact and facts important to the history of philosophy. The conclusion yielded by these distinctions is that it is an extraordinarily complex fact that a philosopher held a certain view-a fact which can be legitimately studied in many ways, but not in just any way one chooses.

In Frede's view, the study of ancient philosophy requires historical as well as philosophical approaches. For when we want to understand the reasons for which philosopher X held view Y we must determine what Y is, why X held Y, whether those reasons are good ones, whether what X thought was a good reason accords with our own view, and so on; and all of this involves philosophical and historical reflection. Thus, Frede argues, to consider the philosophical views of ancient philosophers as such provides a rather limited understanding of ancient philosophy. Frede's interest, rather, is in "ancient philosophy itself as it turns up in the various histories into which it enters and the way it actually enters these various histories" (p. xix, Introduction). The essays of the book are a case study in the application of this method.

Plato. One wonders at first why the section on Plato is included in this volume. It contains but one brief essay, on the meaning of the verb *aisthanesthai* (generally: "to become aware of something") in Plato's dialogues, especially the *Theaetetus.* The essay is not closely related to any other in the book (though one could argue that it is important for understanding Chapters 9-11, all of which concern impressions and beliefs). However, the lack of contextual continuity is more than made up for by the significance of the conclusion here. Frede argues that Plato is not already working with a precise definition of *aisthanesthai* in the *Theaetetus;* rather, he is just trying to clarify its meaning in the course of the dialogue. Thus, *aisthanesthai* only comes

to be understood as " to perceive by the senses " as a result of Plato's philosophical considerations.

Understanding the history of the meaning of *aisthanesthai* in this way makes some difficult passages in the *Theaetetus* immediately more intelligible. For example, in *Theaetetus* 184-187 Plato tries to show that no case of perception as such is a case of knowledge. Thus, his point in narrowing the meaning of *aisthanesthai* is to distinguish between the family of related concepts connected with the use of that term, viz., perception, appearance, belief knowledge. The philosophical and historical significance of distinguishing between these concepts is obvious. As a case in point, the Hellenistic Skeptics and Empiricists espouse the view that our beliefs are just a matter of how things appear to us. Plato, in the *Theaetetus,* is laying the ground for a tradition that rejects this claim, and does so by examining more carefully what we mean when we talk about "how things appear to us".

Aristotle. The five essays on Aristotle comprise the most unified and sustained treatment of a theme in the book. At first glance this may not appear to be the case: the essays range from "The Title, Unity and Authenticity of the Aristotelian *Categories"* (Chapter 2), which seems more important to the history of philosophical texts than to the history of philosophy as such, to " The Unity of General and Special Metaphysics: Aristotle's Conception of Metaphysics" (Chapter 6), whose interest is primarily philosophical. In fact, however, these essays are all closely related by the common themes of logic, grammar, and metaphysics; they are an example of the point made in the introduction about the importance of other histories to the history of philosophy.

The first essay, on the *Categories,* defends the view that the so-called *Postpraedicamenta* are part of the original treatise. Surprisingly, one argument in favor of the unity of the *Categories* is that chapters 1-9 and 10-15 differ so greatly in content that it is otherwise difficult to explain why an editor would construe these two sections as a single work. The differences of the two sections reveal that arguments for the unity of the treatise require the admission that the text is only a fragment of a work whose subject was not categories as such. Though the actual subject cannot be determined with certainty, a common theme of the treatise is the discussion of philosophically important synonyms. This suggests that the *Categories* is more directly concerned with language than some scholars have thought.

Chapter 3 ("Categories in Aristotle") offers evidence about the meaning of " category " in Aristotle's works that employ ,the conclusions of Chapter 2: In order to determine the meaning of " category " one should not turn to the treatise of that name, since it is doubtful that the *Categories* is actually about categories. Rather, one should examine the *Topics* (especially book I, chapter 9) , since it is

probably a contemporary of the *Categories* and is the only other treatise in which all ten categories are named. Ironically, this was also Porphyry's suggestion, though for somewhat different reasons. Frede considers the meaning of the plural noun *kategoriai* in the notoriously difficult passage at 103h25 ff., and concludes that categories, in the technical sense, are " kinds of predication ", as opposed to either " kinds of being " or " kinds of predicates ". The latter part of the chapter is spent working out the implications this view has for understanding the relation between the category of *ti esti* and substance. Frede argues that Aristotle does not have a category of substance (at least not in his early works). Curiously, Frede does not mention the passage at *Topics* 1.5 102a32, which could he significant to his thesis: " A ' genus ' is what is predicated in the category of essence *(en toi ti esti kategoroumenon)* of a number of things exhibiting difference in kind."

The investigation of substance in the latter part of Chapter 3 lays the ground for the next two chapters in the section, on Individuals (Chapter 4) and substance (Chapter 5) in Aristotle's *Metaphysics.* Frede works hard just to clarify the sense-of "individual" that Aristotle uses in the *Categories.* His conclusion is that " individual " indicates that part of a genus which does not have any subjective parts, i.e. parts that have subjects (p. 52). When, in *Metaphysics* Z 13 Aristotle denies 'the real existence of genera and species, he must also abandon this understanding of " individual". However, this reintroduces the problem of identifying the substance that underlies the properties of ordinary objects. Frede defends Aristotle's choice of the substantial form for this identifying role, where " substantial form " is understood as " the organization, and the history of organization, of changing matter " (cf. p. 66). This interpretation has numerous advantages. For example, it enables one "to distinguish between various forms of the same kind at any given moment on the basis of their histories" (p. 69). However, some ambiguities remain with the concept of the organization of an object as its substantial form. For "organization " is supposed to he logically independent of the properties and matter of an object; it is a "capacity for functioning in a *characteristic* way " (p. 66, emphasis mine). The term " characteristic ", however, is ambiguous and suggests a reliance on properties (or characteristics) in order to individuate objects. Be that as it may, the problems with individuation are problems for Aristotle-Frede provides persuasive reasons for his interpretation of the text.

The last chapter in the section on Aristotle, on the unity of general and special meaphysics, deals with the long-standing question of the relation between what Aristotle calls " first philosophy ", which investigates the being of separate substances, and the study of being *qua*

being. Frede's thesis here is that in order to understand being in general, one has to understand the being of separate substances. This is primarily what Aristotle means when he says at *Metaphysics* E 1026a 30-31 that first philosophy is universal because it is first.

Together, the essays on Aristotle form the basis of a persuasive, if not compelling, interpretation. And because Frede's arguments consistently span a wide range of Aristotelian texts and doctrines, they should be, if not accepted, challenged by equally comprehensive responses. Either way, our understanding of Aristotle is greatly enhanced.

Stoics. Anyone doing research on the Stoic philosophers in recent years will already be familiar with the highly original essays in this section. The arguments here are necessarily more speculative than those of earlier sections-for Frede's work on Stoic logic there has little precedent. The three essays on the Stoics include: "Stoic vs. Aristotelian Syllogistic" (Chapter 7), "The Original Notion of Cause" (Chapter 8), and "Stoics and Skeptics on Clear and Distinct Impressions" (Chapter 9).

In Chapter 7 Frede tries to account for the rejection of Aristotelian syllogistic by the Stoics and vice versa. At the root of the differences between these two schools is the concept of validity: what it means for a conclusion to "follow from" its premises. Whereas the Stoics found it necessary to be explicit about logically true assumptions that relate premises to conclusion, the Peripatetics felt no such compulsion. This is particularly clear in the case of certain hypothetical assumptions (e.g. "If, if p, then q, then if p, then q"), which the Stoics deem necessary for syllogism, but which the Peripatetics treat as assumptions about argumentation, not about the matter of an argument.

The chapter on cause is the most intriguing in this section, if only because it clarifies the history of a concept about which philosophers are still not always clear. Frede emphasizes the etymological distinction between *aition* (an entity that is responsible for something) and *aitia* (an account, i.e. a propositional item). He tries to show how the Stoics are primarily responsible for the modern emphasis on entities as causes, and does so by clarifying a whole set of Stoic causal concepts: *autoteleis aition, sunaition, sunergon, prokatarktikon, proegoumenon,* and *sunektikon.* Frede also shows how the Stoic emphasis on responsibility encourages treating entities, and primarily entities, as causes.

The final essay on the Stoics is an investigation and defense of the concept of clear and distinct impressions. Frede argues that the Stoic position can withstand the objections of the Skeptics, though not without considerably weakening Stoic claims to knowledge. On Frede's

view, however, the Stoics only claim that it is possible to have knowledge by means of clear and distinct impressions; they admit that they do not have any such knowledge (p. 170). One wonders why the Skeptics should not he much appeased by this admission.

Skeptics. The two essays on the Skeptics both concern beliefs, the first beliefs generally, and the second the Skeptic's kinds of assent and the possibility of knowledge. Frede defends the Skeptics against the familiar objection that their way of life is self-defeating. In particular, he argues that there is no reason why a Skeptic should not assent to many things, including how things are (the appearance/reality distinction is, after all, a theoretical one, not accepted by the Skeptics). Frede's point is well-argued and certainly correct. However, he does not address carefully enough the numerous passages throughout Skeptic literature that imply a radical sort of skepticism, which could he construed as self-defeating. Might it not he that here again, the Skeptics simply make no positive claim about the extent of their skepticism; that instead it is their opponents who draw distinctions about kinds of skepticism that require presuppositions a Skeptic cannot make

Medicine and Grammar. The last two sections, on Medicine and Grammar, contain investigations into histories parallel to, and influen· tial upon, the history of ancient philosophy. The section on medicine contains four essays: a very helpful introductory chapter on the relation between philosophy and medicine in antiquity, which yields to more properly philosophical essays on "The Ancient Empiricists", "The Method of the So-Called Methodical School of Medicine", and "Galen's Epistemology". Throughout Frede makes it clear how important the understanding of ancient medicine is to the study of ancient philosophy, and vice versa. Much the same can be said of the essays on grammar. Here the chapter on the origins of traditional grammar (Chapter 17) is particularly interesting. In Frede's view, a view shared by many contemporary linguists, traditional grammar (e.g. the Greek and Latin grammars of Kiihner-Gerth and Kiihner-Stegmann) is utterly confused. Chapter 17 traces the development and persistence of confusions about grammar to mistreatments of Stoic and Peripatetic views.

The last of the essays is followed by helpful notes and indices. The hook is extremely well-argued throughout, and should he invaluable to scholars and students alike.

E. E. BENITEZ

The Catholic University of America
Washington, D.C.

Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy. By HERBERT A. DAVIDSON. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. Pp. 428. $37.50.

In the Introduction to his book, *Proofs for the Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy,* Herbert A. Davidson proclaims his work " to be exhaustive as regards Arabic and Hebrew arguments; that is, I have undertaken to examine every medieval Arabic and Hebrew philosophic argument for eternity, creation, and the existence of God" (p. 7). In addition, he says, "In a number of instances I have pursued the penetration of Islamic and Jewish arguments into medieval Christian philosophy, and in a few instances into modern European philosophy. There, though, I make no pretense at exhaustiveness, and the citations are of a kind that are ready at hand in obvious primary and secondary sources" (p. 7). To a large extent Davidson's work appears to be what he claims it to be. At the very least, it is an impressive piece of scholarship which provides a wealth of source material for those wishing to do research into medieval Islamic and Jewish arguments for eternity, creation, and the existence of God. The claim that it is exhaustive, however, is a bit of an exaggeration. Even ten times the four hundred plus pages which he devotes to the topic is not likely to achieve the goal which he claims to have reached. An excellent source book it is; exhaustive it is not.

One of the reasons the text is not exhaustive has to do wih its current date of publication. The hook was completed in 1980, and many of the references to secondary sources are from the 1960s and before. While the work depends heavily upon primary sources, one would expect, nonetheless, that an exhaustive analysis of a subject would refer to current work by other scholars in the field. One would expect that even a work completed in 1980 would make reference to extensive scholarly research in the field close to the date of completion.

Another problem the work has is that terms such as "eternity," "creation," and "existence" rtend :to be used in very technical ways by medieval thinkers, but Davidson seems to ignore this fact in much of his discussion. Regarding the term "creation," for example, he says in a footnote, " I employ the term ' creation ' to mean the thesis that the world came into existence after not having existed, not the more specific thesis that a creator brought the world into existence " (p. 1). Such a use of the term " creation " is rather odd, but Davidson never gives a clear explanation why he would examine medieval Islamic and Jewish arguments for creation from this usual sense

of the word rather than from the way the word was commonly understood by the medievals themselves. In addition, a word like " eternity " is used ambiguously by many thinkers of the medieval period. On the one hand, it refers to a measure of the way God possesses His being as a perfect and simultaneous whole; on the other hand, it refers to temporal existence without end. One would assume that this same sort of distinction was to some extent present among medieval Islamic and Jewish thinkers studied by Davidson, hut he makes no reference to it; and even if it played no role in their discussions, Davidson's understanding of discussions of eternity in Christian and modern thought becomes seriously flawed by omission of this distinction. Similarly, the term "existence" has various meanings for different medieval thinkers, and the meaning of this term plays a significant role in understanding the notions of eternity and creation. Yet Davidson does not devote much attention to the role it plays in the various arguments he examines. Such attention, however, would have to paid by a thoroughly exhaustive study of these issues.

The hook consists of twelve chapters which reflect a great deal of painstaking scholarship for which studnts of medieval and Islamic and Jewish thought should he grateful. The first chapter gives a general introduction to the problem and a statement of purpose, and in the second chapter Davidson begins a formal presentation of arguments for and against eternity based upon a dichotomy, which he derives from Moses Maimonides, of categorizing proofs of eternity in a twofold manner: 1) arguments formulated by Aristotle which proceed "from the world," and 2) arguments extracted from Aristotle's philosophy which take their point of departure " from God" (pp. 10-11). Chapter 2 itself traces arguments for eternity from the nature of the world from their origin in Greek philosophy and their transmission to the Middle East by the Christian thinker John Philoponus. This chapter is particularly important because it not only presents the overall structure of Davidson's work hut also indicates how dominant is the role which he attributes to Philoponus in later medieval arguments regarding eternity, creation, and the existence of God. Indeed, Davidson's study of Philoponus, together with that of Maimonides and Proclus, seems to comprise the huh of his entire work.

That study continues in Chapter 3 with proofs for eternity of physical and non-physical creation proceeding from the nature of God. In this area Davidson identifies Proclus as the probable main channel for these proofs to medieval Arabic thought (p. 51). At the same time, for Davidson the main medieval arguments against the eternity of created being from the nature of God are derived from Philoponus (See pp. 68, 78, and 84).

In Chapter 4 Davidson gives a detailed analysis of Philoponus' proofs for creation. He distinguishes these into two sets: one set based upon the impossibility of an infinite number and the other set based upon the principle that a finite body can only contain finite power. According to Davidson, both sets of arguments "employ Aristotelian principles to draw the un-Aristotelian conclusion that the world is not eternal but had a beginning" (p. 93) ; and not only were Philoponus' proofs " accessible to readers of Arabic in the Middle Ages" but also " Philoponus became a most important source for medieval proofs of creation" (p. 94).

In Chapter 5 Davidson traces the influence of Philoponus' two sets of proofs for creation within Kalam writers, giving particular attention to the standard Kalam proof from accidents. In Chapter 6 he shifts his focus of attention from the Aristotelian influence exercised on the middle ages through Philoponus, and he concentrates on what he refers to as " particularization arguments " in Kalam writers, Maimonides, and Gersonides. He sees these as reaching the medieval period from Plato's *Timaeus* through Galen's *Compendium of the Timaeus.*

Chapters 7 through 12 of Davidson's text examine" medieval Islamic and Jewish proofs of the existence of God which are associated with the Aristotelian tradition" (p. 214). Chapter 7 concentrates on the argument from design, while Chapter 8 considers the argument from motion. Chapter 9 takes a look at Avicenna's argument for a necessary being from the necessarily existent by virtue of itself, and Chapter 10 focuses attention upon Averroes' critique of Avicenna. Chapter 11 stresses the impact which Avicenna's argument had upon medieval arguments against the possibility of an infinite regress and the relation of these arguments to demonstration of the existence of God. Chapter 12 treats of a short, subsequent history of the influence of Avicenna's argument from necessity upon Maimonides, Aquinas, and the West. The book ends with an appendix sketching the history of the principles of the impossibility of an infinite number and of a finite body containing only finite power, another appendix giving an " inventory of proofs " covered within the text, and a bibliography of primary sources.

Davidson's work as a whole is an excellent piece of scholarship which should prove to be a valuable research tool for students of medieval thought, whether they be interested in Judaism, Islam, or Christian areas. The work suffers from some accidental weaknesses, such as a bibliography which omits the name of editions of primary sources being used and a sketchy subsequent history which could have been omitted. In a sense, it is the excellence of Davidson's treatment of his

topic which makes these weaknesses stand out. They detract from the beauty of the work as a whole. Nonetheless, the work is an *opus magnum* meriting serious scholarly attention and applause.

PETER A. REDPATH

St. Johns' University
Staten Island, New York

Scepticism and Reasonable Doubt: The British Naturalist Tradition in Wilkins, Hume, Reid, and Newman. By M. JAMIE FERREIRA. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986. Pp. xii+ 255.

Professor M. Jamie Ferreira has written a major contribution to our knowledge and understanding of scepticism within British intellectual life from the late seventeenth century to the late nineteenth. Her cast of characters is at first sight an unusual, even an eclectic one: John Wilkins, an Anglican bishop and founder of the Royal Society; David Hume, himself often regarded as the chief of sceptics; Thomas Reid, the Scottish philosopher of common sense; and John Henry Newman, the most famous Viotorian convert to Roman Catholicism. In Ferreira's analysis what holds this group together is their varied attempts to refute scepticism through an appeal " to ' the natural '-to how we are constituted, to what we, as human beings, are and do in the arena of believing " (p. vii). In other words, the refutation of intellectually derived scepticism lies in an examination of practically lived human experience.

Ferreira seeks to describe three distinct modes of naturalism. The first is sceptical naturalism such as found in the clearly sceptical passages of Hume. The other forms of naturalism constitute replies to this sceptical position. These anti-sceptical positions are reasonable doubt scepticism and justifying naturalism. Advocates of the former contend there is no reasonable basis for doubt about fundamental beliefs of human nature. They contend that these fundamental lieliefs are more basic than other beliefs rthart are subject to justification. They are indeed the basis of our juslf:ification of other matters. For persons of ithis outlook, rationality and justification are mallters of practice. By contrast justifying naturalism does seek to provide some kind of justification that links what is natural with what can be justified. In effect, justifying naturalism rejects the argument that only one mode of justification can be regarded as legitimate. Reasonable doubt naturalism and justifying naturalism often closely approach each other, but the latter may reject scepticism on grounds other than those of practice.

Fundamental to Ferreira's argument is her interpretation of the position of John Locke in the anti-sceptical tradition. In contrast to Henry Van Leeuwen, she asserts that rather than standing as the culmination of an earlier liberal Anglican tradition associated with John Wilkins, Locke actually departed from that anti-sceptical position which had based itself largely on the concept of moral certainty. Locke based his rejection of scepticism on a distinction between kinds of certainty rather than upon human nature itself.

Whereas Wilkins and others had seen a close and sometimes identical relationship between the highest probability and certainty, Locke distinguished ,the two. For him, cel'tainty had to achieve more than probability. Locke distinguished kinds of evidence from degrees of evidence. He also proposed categories of probability and demonstrated certainty hut no category of proof.

This issue is crucial for Ferreira's interpretation of Hume. She contends that Hume understood this distinction in Locke and that he looked to the earlier anti-sceptical tradition. She argues that Hume thought it possible to offer a response to his own sceptical position that actually went beyond simply unavoidably accepting certain beliefs. Hume introduced a category of proof between Locke's categories of certainty and probability. According to Ferreira, he based this category on the previous seventeenth-century distinction between reasonable and unreasonable doubt. Ferreira does not claim a single unified interpretation of Hume, but urges the presence of tension in his thought that allows for the presence at least some of the time of a naturalist approach to scepticism.

Thomas Reid was regarded in his day and during most of the nineteenth century as the major critic of Hume. However, Ferreira examines that critique largely in terms of shared concerns. Reid sought to distinguish degrees of certainty in both demonstrative and probabilistic reasoning. His key metaphor was found in the suggestion of there being no reason to seek an iron bar when a rope would do. In that regard, he rejected syllogistic reasoning as a guarantee of certainty. This stance was part and parcel of his better known rejeotion of the representationalist theory of ideas. Both failed to provide an adequate account of human nature. Reid repeatedly, in differing philosophical and social contexts, appealed to universal practice to legitimize beliefs that lay implicit in social and linguistic practice. These truths were self-evident and served as illustrations of the natural. They are also exemplified in a philosophy grounded very largely in the doctrine of unreasonable doubt.

John Henry Newman was thoroughly familiar with Reid. He too pursued a naturalistic response to scepticism, most particularly in *The*

Grammar of Assent. Yet whereas Reid had urged a fundamental agree· ment on first principles on the intuitive basis of common sense, Newman thought such principles were discovered inductively and that there might he much disagreement. It was the disagreement itself that led to the need for a better understanding of the reasoning process. In place of common sense, Newman appealed to the illative sense. In l:his regard, Newman directly rejeots Locke's distinction between demon· stration and probability. Various kinds of probabilistic reasoning for Newman can lead to a certainty beyond reasonable doubt. Ferreira claims that in this regard Newman is following a strategy not unlike l:hat of Reid. Both Reid's common sense and Newman's illative sense are natural. However, the former can discover only self-evident 'truths while the latter is part of the process of reasoning itself. Ferreira pro· vides a very full discussion of the manner in which these outlooks led Newman into the tradition of a naturalistic response to scepticism.

Both philosophers and intellectual historians will find Professor Ferreira's volume useful and informative. In a very sprightly man· ner she has explored a tradition of British intellectual life that often has remained ignored. She has displayed very considerable daring in attempting to cover two centuries of thought. The most valuable sec· tions are no doubt those on Reid and Newman where she has care· fully illuminated a major intelleotual path not .taken hy most late nine· teenth· and twentieth-century British philosophers hut which exerted very considerable influence during the first three-quarters of rthe nine· teenth century. The volume also prepares the way for intellectual his· torians to examine what were the social and struotural reasons within British intellectual life for these particular anti-sceptical strategies.

FRANK M. TURNER

Yale University
New Haven, Connecticut

The Later Wittgenstein: The Emergence of a New Philosophical Meth· od. By S. STEPHEN HILMY. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987. Pp. viii+ 340.

This is a hook of extraordinary scholarly density. Its 226 pages of text are complemented hy 94 pages of notes, 6 pages of bibliography, and 14 pages of indices. A heavy texture of relentlessly documented argument, Hilmy's hook is neither for philosophical novices nor for !:hose whose interest in Wittgenstein is merely moderate. To profit from

this hook, the reader must share the intense concern that led the author to plough through Wittgenstein's vast *Nachlass.* But readers must also he willing to contend with a style of writing that is often forbiddingly and needlessly convoluted, and with a tone that is sometimes snide. More will he said about these problems below, after a discussion of the hook's purposes.

Hilmy believes Wittgenstein scholarship to he in a sorry state. The problem stems, he thinks, from blunders committed hy the literary executors. He writes, " The unhappy state of Wittgenstein scholarship is in large part due to the fragmented and ahistorical character of the potpourri of published remarks wirth which scholars have been work· ing" (viii). Indeed, his confidence in the published materials is so low that he often refers to them as Wittgenstein's "works" (in quotation marks) to signal his disdain for the editors' selections and arrange· ments.

The scope of this volume is intentionally limited; little or no assess· ment of Wittgenstein's conclusions is offered. But Hilmy does claim to he taking a necessary first step which, he says, "much of the volumin· ous literature ... has dismally failed to take" (3); namely, an exami- nation of .the historical development of Wittgenstein's later way of thinking *(Denkweise)* as chronicled in the *Nachlass.* His appeal to the manuscript material is based on his belief that rthe "conglomerated fragments" (9) in the published works are best understood in their original contexts and in light of later contexts into which Wittgenstein placed them in the process of revision. Much of the stylistic character of Hilmy's hook stems from .the necessarily laborious nature of trac· ing these origins and transpositions, and from his sense of getting Witt· genstein right for the first time.

After sorting through some preliminary issues concerning Wittgen- stein's compositional style, Hilmy produces an intricate argument de· signed to establish that a large Wittgenstein typescript (TS 213) should have been published instead of *Philosophische Grammatik,* that TS 213 was a major source of remarks for *Philosophical Investigations,* and that .the hulk of the remarks in TS 213 are traceable to original contents that date from the first year of Wittgenstein's return l:o philos· ophy in 1929. The burden of this argument would he to establish TS 213 " as a relatively reliable expression of his ' later ' approach l:o philosophy" (34), and hence to show that Wittgenstein's development of his later *Denkweise* preceded his return to philosophy, rather than having occurred in 1933-36. Few readers will he in a position to assess Hilmy's contentions about the origins of TS 213, as the evidence in· eludes suppositions about Wittgenstein's travels to Norway in the mid- 1930s, about the origins of certain notebooks, ahourt the meanings of

ambiguous intratexitual comments, and about the validity of previous judgments made by the literary executors and others. Most readers, however, will wonder what we learn about Wittgenstein from Hilmy's display of exegetical virtuosity.

Following these preliminaries, four main theses are argued in the book, along with a closing general claim. The first thesis is that Wittgenstein, in his early work, held a " me:talogical" view of psychological concepts; and, more generally, that he thought the explanation of language must involve " a hypothesized psychological substratum " (54) ; and that the emergence of his later way of doing philosophy involved a rejection of these ideas. Hilmy is correct in linking Wittgenstein's rejection of "metalogic" with his repudiation of the psychologistic reading of verbs such as "to mean" and "to understand." It is also safe to suppose that Wittgenstein himself once was tempted, at least, by the view that such verbs gain their meanings by denoting introspectively identifiable mental processes, and that his attention to the actual function of those and similar verbs in ordinary language correlates with a rejection of il:he idea that they compose a special domain " beyond logic." Hilmy provides ample documentation of these patterns of linkage. Unfortunately, though, Hilmy's contention that Wittgenstein's later way of doing philosophy had emerged before 1929 (40) obliges him to he very vague about just *what* metalogical view Wittgenstein may have held and when he may have held it. There is no discussion of the *Tractatus,* w1th its insistence that the topics of psychology must he either ineffable or uninterestingly mundane, or of what Wittgenstein may have been up to in his own comparartively brief pursuit of a "primary" or "phenomenal" language. Thus Hilmy's arguments on this point, for all their complexity and documentation, yield a disappointingly bland conclusion.

The second thesis is that Wittgenstein's thinking concerning "the ideal " shifted from an insistence on a simple ideal order already in all language to the effort to elucidate actual language by comparison with constructed ideal languages ("language-games"). He writes: "it is in their heuristic capacity as *Vergleichsobjekte* that 'exact' ('clear and simple') language-games serve to achieve complete clarity " (75) . Wittgenstein had rejected as an imposition the insistence that language must already possess, somehow, a precise, abstract, rule-governed grammar, and had adopted as a methodological technique the construction of artificially simplified linguistic practices which are designed to illuminate actual practices. In his presentation of this .thesis, Hilmy displays with great thoroughness one of the central functions of the concept "language-game" in Wittgenstein's later work: namely, its function as a label for the heuristic devices invented to aid in the

investigation of language. Still, Hilmy does not adequately explore the fact that in this development, the ideal shifts, not only in role, hut also in nature. The early Wittgenstein is some sort of *realist* concerning logic and grammar, while the later Wittgenstein is, for the most part, a *constructivist.* Hilmy's exposition does not make this profound aspect of this shift apparent.

Hilmy's third major claim is that Wittgenstein's rejection of a psychologistic understanding of language was a direct criticism of James, Russell, Ogden and Richards, and others; and that a single vision of language expressed variously as a " calculus," " language-game," or " system of communication," was formulated by 1930, and held Wittgenstein's a1Jtention thereafter. Hilmy convincingly argues that "during the ' lost decade ' Wittgenstein was in fact *aware* of the philosophical activity in England concerning ' the meaning of meaning ' " (112), and that his "calculus/game/system" view of meaning emerged as a reaction in theories that were developed in England in the 1920s. But Hilmy's eagerness to establish that Wittgenstein's later *Denkweise* preceded his return to philosophy leads him to write of "the post-1930 'calculus/language-game' conception" in ways that obscure important *differences* between the idea that language is a calculus and the language-game image. Hilmy shows some awareness of these differences, hut he minimizes them, and so glosses over the deepest implications of the concept " language-game." There is no recognition of the great likelihood that the apparent synonymity of " calculus " and " game " in Wittgenstein's writings of the early 1930s disappeared as the exploitation of the game image over the next two decades disclosed the central philosophical problem of the later work----1he "paradox" of rule-following which animates much of *Philosophical Investigations.* Any account of the emergence of the concept " language-game " that fails to give prominence to the themes that converge on *PI* # 143-315 cannot he regarded as adequate.

Hilmy's most curious thesis is the contention that Wittgenstein understood his new vision of language as analogous to relativity theory and that it involves him in something rightly designated as " linguistic relativism." Hilmy makes much of ithe fact that Wittgenstein several times referred to his later way of doing philosophy as analogous to relativity ·theory. Acknowledging that it is far from clear what the sense of this analogy is, Hilmy argues that " Wittgenstein proposes a sort of linguistic ' relativism ' which amounts to the suggestion that signs have meaning only relative to the language-games, systems of communications, or linguistic calculi, and that these are in effect a form of life constitutive to the meaning of the signs" (145). Wittgen· stein's references .to relativity theory in relation to his new way of doing

philosophy could hear any of a number of meanings. They might he designed to underscore his belief that his new *Denkweise* constituted a revolutionary shift away from old ways of doing philosophy. He could also have meant that his new way of doing philosophy reorders our grip on the relation of central concepts having to do with language and meaning, just as relativity does with the central concepts of physics. Or he could have meant, indeed as he said in one passage cited by Hilmy (146), that "in the 'not being able to go outside of itself' lies the similarity of my views and that of relativity theory" (146). Hilmy, however, gives emphasis to the comparison with relativity theory as a part of Wittgenstein's answer to the question "What gives signs their life?" That answer involves "a sort of 'linguistic relativity theory' of the significations of signs" (163). Anyone who knows anything about the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein knows that he deals with the problem of meaning through attention to the use of words in language-games embedded in forms of life. But Hilmy's laborious discussion of Wittgenstein's "linguistic relativism" asserts no more than this. To the extent that Hilmy has produced an accurate portrayal of Wittgenstein's handling of "the question of what constitutes the 'life' or meaning of signs" (165), he gives the reader nothing novel. And in using, continually, without close definition, the highly charged term "relativism," he raises the unfulfilled expectation of the demonstration of some sort of link between Wittgenstein and some one or another of the various philosophical positions that are called "relativism."

The general claim that in all these points Wittgenstein held "strong suspicion and antipathy . . . toward the dominant scientific current of our age" (193) is argued in Hilmy's final chapter. It is easy to show that Wittgenstein felt a sense of estrangement from the main currents of contemporary culture and that he passionately rejected the idea that philosophy should strive to produce scientific (or pseudo-scientific) *explanations* of meaning and language. Hilmy rightly links this rejection with Wittgenstein's expressions of distaste for philosophical theorizing and with his declarations that philosophy should be descriptive in nature and should not attempt to solve philosophical problems "by offering *discoveries* about the essence or form of language" (211). Hilmy's case, however, while laboriously argued, does not produce a conclusion worthy of the density and complexity of the argumentation. Hilmy alludes repeatedly to Wittgenstein's broader *Kampf* against metaphysics and against language (226), but he offers little clue as to the precise nature of that battle.

Hilmy closes this book with an allusion to another volume he is preparing, one in which "a host of further themes fundamental to [Wittgenstein's] *Denkweise*" (226) will be explored. Perhaps in that second

volume the thinness of his substantive conclusions concerning Wittgen· stein's philosophical thought will he corrected. Such a laborious and involved working of the *Nachlass* ought to enlarge or amend our grasp of 'the central struotures of Wittgenstein's thought. A major shortcom· ing of this hook is that it does not do so. When Hilmy is accurate, he is within the hounds of the existing understanding of Wittgenstein. Where he is novel, he tends to he inaccurate or unconvincing. Further, Hilmy's writing ,tends toward syntactical constructions so complex that they obscure his meaning. Throughout the text there are examples of such awkwardness. One memorable sentence on p. 177 runs to one hundred-fi:fity words, eighty-eight of which intervene between the sub· ject and the verb. That sentence contains three parenthetical interludes, including one nested within a clause which is itself set off inside a pair of dashes. Ten words in the sentence are flagged with quotation marks or italics. The sentence *does* make sense, and it is, in fact, true. But it is inexcusable to cloak one's meaning in such clumsy constructions. It is too bad that Hilm.y's editors at Basil Blackwell did not save him and his readers from this problem. Finally, it needs to be stated that this book has an ugly undertone. Convinced that no one before him has done Wittgenstein justice, Hilmy describes the efforts of his fel· low scholars in scornful language. Other commentators " spin tales " (18-19 and 40) ; are "reckless" (19) ; have made " shots in the dark" (vii); have committed" blunders" (92); have offered" numb· ingly vague illustrations" (180); and have given "feigned Wittgen· steinian reflections " (185) . Hilmy also sneers at Russell, telling his readers that "at Oxford in 1914, Russell was peddling what he called 'scientific philosophy' .... " (216) He says acidly of one commen· tator's interpretation that it "no douht expresses something terribly profound" (19). This sarcasm is well beyond the bounds of courtesy or good taste.

Who should read this book? It is hard to say. Anyone who has enough interest in Wittgenstein to bear with the author, and enough expertise to follow his analyses, will know the material well enough to be disappointed in Hilmy's conclusions, all of which can be reached less arduously in other works. On ·the other hand, anyone in a posi· tion to be enlightened by Hilmy's conclusions will almost certainly be disheartened by ,the labor of getting to them. This is a disappointing book, and it is l:o be hoped that its sequel will be an improvement both in style and in substance.

JOHN CHURCHILL

Hendrix College
Conway, Arkansas

ls There a Measure on Earth? Foundations for a Nonmetaphysical Ethics. By WERNER MARX. Trans. Thomas J. Nenon and Reginald Lilly. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987. Pp. 172. (Hardcover.) (Originally published as *Gibt es au/ Erden ein Mass? Grundbestimmungen einer nichtmetaphysischen Ethik.* Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1983.)

Is there a non-metaphysical earthly measure for responsible action? Marx takes his question from Holderlin and directs it at Heidegger, in whom Marx finds no explicit answer. It is not the case that Heidegger simply fails to ask or answer this question, but rather that the corpus of Heidegger's later work itself motivates the question and leaves us searching for the path to an answer which must, on Heideggerian principles, differ from the one embraced by Holderlin, Schelling, and the metaphysical tradition in general. Marx explores .the various possibilities offered in Heidegger's texts but fails to. find a definite answer with respect to a measure for responsible action. In his concise interpretation Marx is led in one inevitable direction--4:owards the concept of death.

How does death qualify as a measure for action? Before he addresses this question Marx attempts to understand 1the concept of measure, which, he contends, can be viewed as either a metaphysical or a non-metaphysical concept. He sets out the metaphysical concept of measure on the basis of his reading of Schelling. Schelling's onto-theological concept of measure is characterized as normative, transcendent, immanently powerful, obligatory, self-same, manifest and univocal (20). This conception is then taken to represent the traditional metaphysical position.

Here a number of questions could be raised regarding what Marx himself calls the "not completely satisfactory route" of his own analysis (17). One could certainly agree with his beginning assumption, "ithat our contemporary understanding of measure still contains certain residual traditional meanings" (17). But the stronger and genuinely operative assumption in Marx's analysis is more questionable. Why does Schelling's conception stand as .the representative of an entire metaphysical tradition? Although Schelling's conception of measure nicely facilitates Marx's projecl: vis-a-vis Heidegger, the reader might remain unconvinced that the full metaphysical conception of measure is reflected therein. Consider, for example, Marx's contention ithat 1the traditional measure is univocal and therefore leaves no room for ambiguity (42). On this basis he asserts that we cannot take Heidegger's notion of "the fourfold," which involves an "inner mobility" of play, as a .traditional measure. The ambiguity and "basic

instability inherent in playing and mirroring is irreconcilable with the traditional meaning of a measure" (42). By avoiding the more extensive analysis to which he makes reference, Marx neatly steps around an extremely important problematic involved in the concepts of ambi· guity and univocity.

The following question indicates this problem in the simplest way: Does univocity belong to the measure itself or to our perception or predication of the measure? We might say, for example, ,that there is no ambiguity in God, but that there is a high degree of ambiguity involved in our perception or predication of God. Certainly in the tradition, whether we take Arisotle's *spoudaios,* or God's eternal law, or Christian love in the model of Christ as our measure, we do not escape the ambiguity of our own finite interpretations. Thus Aristotle's caution about .the nature of ethics (N. *Ethics* 1094bl2-15), Aquinas's qualification about knowing the natural law with respect to details (ST 94,, 4), or Kierkegaard's acknowledgment of the paradox of Christ. This problematic is also to be found in Heidegger's writings where he indicates a play of concealedness-unconcealedness involved in Being or "the fourfold," and thus an ambiguity in the measure itself. But would Heidegger say that this concealing-unconcealing play of Being is something that happens in itself, outside of language, or independent· ly of the one who is looking after Being? (See Marx's discussion, 91-92, 123) . The difference between Heidegger and the tradition on this point is .this: in the tradition the " location " of ambiguity is unambiguous; it is found in human perception, language, and reason, hut not in the measure itself. In Heidegger, ·the location of ambiguity is itself ambiguous; the concealing-unconcealing is both concealed and unconcealed. So Marx is correct in saying that " the fourfold " cannot be a measure in the traditional sense. But the conciseness of his analysis makes it too easy to infer incorrectly that there is no room for ambiguity in taking a measure for responsible action according to .the traditional metaphysical conception. For example, associating ambiguity with the concept of mystery, Marx states: "It could be that the character of mystery is reconcilable with the essence of measure when the latter is conceived of non-metaphysically whereas it is not when measure is conceived of traditionally, i.e., metaphysically. However, .this certainly does not hold for the measure that we are seeking, i.e., for a measure for responsible action" (45; also see 94) .

All of this brings us back to ·the question of why Schelling should be taken to represent the tradition. Might not this modern and romantic thinker still be too much under the tacit influence of enlightenment categories when it comes to the question of ambiguity and human understanding? (See, e.g., Gadamer's remarks on romanticism, in *Truth*

and Method). By focusing on Schelling, does Marx accurately or adequately represent the traditional concept of measure? Marx's conciseness, which in many cases is a virtue, here seems to suggest an inadequacy. Marx intimates an awareness of this inadequacy when in several places he indicates that he is not telling the full story or supplying .the complete analysis (e.g., 17, 21).

What precisely is a non-metaphysical conception of measure? In one sense Marx assumes a negative interpretation, viz. anything that does not fit into the traditional pattern of .the metaphysical concept of measure (which for Marx is represented by Schelling) must be non-metaphysical. Positively he associates it with Heidegger's later philosophy, specifically .to •the extent that it involves a surmounting of modern subjectivism (74). He also tends to identify the metaphysical with the "otherworldly," the onto-theological thinking that derives its values from extra-worldly sources. Thus the non-metaphysical measure would be one that, in Nietzsche's phrase, remains "faithful to the earth." A measure on earth is one that would provide a foundation for a non-metaphysical ethics.

Two concerns motivate Marx's search for a non-metaphysical measure. One is explicitly identified: the " diminishing efficacy" of :the Judeo-Christian tradition (2). A non-metaphysical ethics "would provide measures or standards for ·those who, having lost ·their are no longer able to find a measure in religious doctrines" (3). The other motivation, not explicitly identified but clearly operative and near the surface, is his concern about the ertreme difficulty involved in finding any standard for responsibility in the later works of Heidegger. Here Marx is not alone. His book, originally published in 1983, enters the most contemporary of debates in France and America about the nature of Heidegger's thinking and its relationship to an ethics of responsibility. This is one reason the book deserves a reading. Marx shows in an extremely clear way how all determinations of freedom become, in the later Heidegger, absorbed into determinations of truth or man's relation to Being. Ethical determinations are subsumed under determinations of Being in a way that leads to the impossibility of finding a measure for responsible action in the traditional sense (e.g., 34) • But Marx insightfully undertakes a retrieval of a concept that is not only central to Heidegger's early work, but is still alive in his later works; the concept of death. Marx, however, is required to think *beyond* Heidegger's conception if death is to be interpreted as a non-metaphysical measure for responsible action.

Death, not in the objective sense as opposite to life, but as the Heideggerian existential being-towards-death which the individual must live in his or her self-experience, is not a measure in the traditional

sense since it cannot be characterized as either manifest or univocal (47). Yet Heidegger thought of death as a measure in some sense: " Death is the still unthought giving of a measure by that which is immeasurable, i.e., by the utmost play into which earthbound man is engaged, a play in which he is at stake" (cited, 48). For Heidegger death is subsumed under the determination of Being and loses any explicit ethical force. Marx, in thinking beyond Heidegger, wishes to re·store an explicitly ethical significance to death by showing " how death is a ' third force ' over against Being and nihilating Nothing " (48) . Such ethical significance, however, is to be found not in the relation between death and Being but in " the relationship of mortals to their death" (4,9). Marx, following the early Heidegger, characterizes this relationship as a special kind of "attunement."

If man is properly attuned to death then death will " unsettle " man from " accustomed habits and relationships " and will set man into a different order of life: "authenticity" in the early Heidegger, a" guardianship of Being " in his later thought. More importantly for Marx the proper attunement towards death will effect a transformation of the individual's "being-with-others." Thereby the proper attunement towards death constitutes a "healing force " that overcomes the *Angst* which is associated with death and which unsettles man. The movement from the unsettling character of death to the healing power of our experienced mortality involves at the same time a transformation in the way that we treat others, from an indifferent confrontation with others to a "being-together-with-one-another" (53). By showing how this transformation is possible Marx demonstrartes how the healing force of the proper attunement towards death can he considered a measure for responsible action and can be determined more specifically as love, compassion, or respect.

A problem, often raised in connection with Sar.tre's philosophy, is raised anew by Marx's thought. In Sartrean criticism rthe question is often posed whether one freely chooses the fundamental project which guides all further existential choices. In respect to Marx's analysis the question migh!: be put as follows: Is the proper relation to death the source or measure of responsibility or is it the case that one must be responsible for assuming .the proper relationship towards death? If on this point one follows the Heideggerian "rturn " away from the traditional metaphysical conception of the subject, as Marx seems to do, then the notion of responsibility for finding the proper attunement towards death is displaced. The proper relationship to death must be thought of as a donation, gift, or event that happens to man (57, 114·115). Suddenly we are again faced with the concern about responsibility that motivated Marx's thinking, although now .the question has

been pushed hack a step. For Marx, in contrast to Sartre, man is not the " ' subject ' whose ' power ' shows itself in the fact that everything happens according to. his ' project ' or plan " (62). Rather there are developments beyond the scope of subjeotive control: the modem changes associated with technological advancement, the impending ecological disaster, the possibility of nuclear holocaust. Marx implies that man cannot continue to avoid the recognition of what is happening to human existence. The transformation required for responsible action is something that is being forced on us. We will be called into the proper attunement towards death. As Heidegger suggested, citing Holderlin's lines, "where danger is, grows/the saving power also ... " We do not control, nor do we have responsibility for, the advent of the saving force. Rather, responsible action is action that is chosen under the measure of the saving force. Likewise, the " latitude " for freedom occurs only when man already dwells within the realm of measure (71). Responsibility only follows a " responding " that occurs under the guidance of the measure of the healing force. We would not be far from a secularized Pelagian-Augustinian interchange if someone (a Sartrean, perhaps) were to insist that we, as human subjects, are responsible and need to accept the responsibility for the technological " progress " that has placed us in need of a saving force.

Would it be difficult to resolve these antithetical positions concerning human responsibility if taken together they were viewed as expressing a basic feature of all moral experience? We are at once responsible and not responsible. Our relation to technology is similar to our relation to history. As a different Marx would say, we produce it and are produced by it. There is an essential ambiguity in all of this. But here again Werner Marx exhibits his distrust of mystery in the realm of ethics (see 42-43, 157). He seems unwilling to admit ambiguity, even though his analysis itself suggests it. The measure of the saving force is both metaphysical and non-metaphysical according to Marx. This measure is non-metaphysical because it is no longer transcendent (p. 59). But this same measure remains metaphysical in its other determinations. The healing force is absolute, obligatory, selfsame, manifest, and univocal (59-60). The difficulty again involves the univocity Marx claims for the measure. One might ask how the healing force, which "happens to us behind our backs" (63), is not transcendent with respect to man and yet is something larger than human existence. One can resolve this aporia only so long as one is willing to give up the claim to the univocity of the measure. To the extent that Marx is unwilling to do this the metaphysical thought concerning its univocity seems to undermine the non-metaphysical foundations for a measure on earth.

My remarks have been focused on the first part of Marx's book. The conciseness of his analysis makes it challenging and in the best sense provocative. There is also a great deal to be found in :the other parts of this rethinking of Heidegger. Marx is not afraid to venture into the most difficult and obscure passages of the later Heidegger, and to emerge with fruitful discussions of mortality, nothingness, language, and the measures for thinking and poetry. Measure for measure this is a work worthy of study.

SHAUN GALLAGHER

Can.isius College
Buf/a/,o,New York