THE *MUNUS* OF TRANSMITTING HUMAN LIFE: A NEW APPROACH TO *I-IUMANAE VITAE*

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'TIRE ONLY ACQUAINTANCE 1bhat most rea;ders have with the Latin of *Humanae Vitae* is the tit1le. It is likey that fow laymen and perhaps eV'en fow schofars make ire:ferenoe to the Latin text; indeed, it is ireported that *I-Iumanae Vitae* was originally composed in ltalian, and it seems that aH available translations of the text al'e based primarily on the Italian V'ersion. But since the official text of *Humanae Vitae* is in Latin and since translations are necessa1 1ily deficient, we shouild not be surprised that the ava:ilahle translations fail to convey a:M the nuances of the official text. (Latin, of course, is tihe langua:ge in which all official documents of the Church are written.) This study seeks to show that attenti¥eness to certain words fa the Latin text, most particularly the word *munus,* uncovers important eonnections between *Humanae Vitae* and pe['spect[ves of the Church, perspectives particularly highlighted in the documents of Vatican II. It also seeks to show that the La.tin provides greater philosophical precision for certain key teaohings of the text, most particularly section 11: "each and every maritail act must remain open to proc1 1eation."

It is ii.mportant to note that some of the crucial Latin words of the document cal'ry connotations tihat cannot possibly be captured ihy 1any one English word. Indeed, some of the words convey concepts and attitudes that are quite foreign to speak:iers of modern English; to convey the meaning of some terms requires a. fairly lengthy expl,ication of notions not immed:iate1ly and directly graspaible hy ail readers. Even to the reade[' of Latin, the text does not 'easily its secrets. The

Latin of the document has no identifiahle souTee of reliabJe deoipherment; it is a kind of " modern " or " Church " Latin, which is an odd of elassical Latin and the language the Ohurch ha:s deve1oped oveil.' the centuries. The method of translation employed here has involved consultation of classical and medieval dictionaries, reference to arguably rep!l1esentative classical and medieval authors, tracing of the word 'being ioonsidered through t1he documents of Vatican II, con'sideration of 1appearance of the word in other Church documents, cross-reference to other uses of the word within *Huma,nae Vitae* itself, and reference to the Italian" original." [1]

[1] In preparation for this article reference was made to six English translations: (a) the translation done by the NC News Service, made widely available by the Daughters of Saint Paul, *Of Human Life* (Boston, Mass.: Daughters of St. Paul, 1968), hereafter referred to as the "usual translation" and designated by HY; (b) the translation by the Catholic Truth Society printed in John Horgan, *Humanae Vitae and the Bishops* (Shannon, Ireland: Irish University Press, 1972), 33-53; this translation was modified and reprinted in (c) *The Pope Speaks* 13 (1969): 329-346, and in (d) the Vatican Press Office translation, " Encyclical Letter on the Regulation of Births " in *Vatican II: More Post-Conciliar Doauments,* ed. Austin Flannery, O.P. (Northport, N. Y.: Costello Publishing Company, 1982), 397-416; (e) the translation by Rev. Marc Calegari, S.J., *Humanae Vitae* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1978), which has undergone a further, as of yet unpublished, revision. 'There is one translation (f) that was made entirely from the Latin, by Rev. A. J. Durand, *Humanae Vitae: A New Translation* (Bethlehem, Pa.: Catechetical Communications; no date given); it is, though, not widely available.

Rev. Calegari, in private communication with this author, noted that the document was originally written in Italian, though the Latin text is the official text. He also stated that the modern language versions were made from the Italian text. My comparisons of the translations of *Humanae Vitae* with the Italian and the Latin versions indicate that Rev. Calegari is correct in saying that most modern versions are based on the Italian, though a few, most notably that by the Catholic Truth Society, have clearly made reference to the Latin. The Latin in several places does not completely correspond with the Italian; the differences are not of tremendous significance but nonetheless in nuanced ways shift the tone or focus. When the Latin diverges from the Italian, it seems proper to give preference to the Latin text, since it is the official text. It is, however, also true that some of the Latin phrases are extremely difficult to translate and that recourse to the Italian is most helpful for determining what the Latin is meant to say.

A more accurate translation iand £uHer understanding of a rfew key words should lead to a better understanding 0£ the teruchingsof the document. The word *munus* in parliculiar will receive detailed consideration; a few other anomalies will also ibe noted. Indeed, iif the views offered here a:borut translation are ·OOTTecl, lit wouM 1suggest that many inteirpreters of the document hav:e not fuLly realized the ioomplete framework of the document, which concerns not just the question 0£ " birth regulation" and natural ilaw hut ·also the very natrure of the Christian ,calling of marriage :and the place of " transmitting Jiifo" within that rcaJling. Interpreters have perhaps placed the emphaisis of the do,cument on natural laiw to the detriment of a srpecificaLlyChristian concern: commitment to a free .and responsiible participation in Christ'·s mission and a recognition ithrut the invita:tion to partiicipate in that mission is a gift that enta:ils ennobling !l'esponsiihilities.

The second portion of this study will show how more precise translrutions and understandings of some key terms in bhe text can provide]urther justification ifor some of the more controversial teachings of the document. Of :particular interest will :be the claim that each ,and every act of marita;l intercourse mrust (l.1emain " orpen" to procreation and the claim that the unitive and procreativ;e meanings of marital intercourse are inseparable.

A third and final section of this paper will explore what may ·be caHed the" interiority" of *munus.* There the daim will be made that fulfi1lingthe *munus* of transmitting human life or of having children is essential to the uJ.tima.te puirpose of mar:ria;ge: the sanctification of the spouses and their children and their transformation into the 1loving, generous, and self-sacrificing individuals all Christians are meant to !be.

The Meaning of "Munus ,,

The very fi:vst line of *Humanae Vitae-Humana,e vitae tra.dendae munus gravissimum-1presents* difficulties for the translator; !bhis line is usuwlly rendered "The most serious duty of

transmitting human lirfe .... " ':Dhe translation "duty" [s not incorrect but It is inaidequate, as is any to capture all the iimportant connotations orf *munus.* And it i:s important that we get this rword ri!ght, foc it appears at several crucial juncture's in the document. Indeed, its appearance in the first line carries no small weight. The chief prorblem with the translation ".duty" for *munus* is that for many modern E!ll!glish-,speaking people the word " duty" ihas a negative connota,tion. A duty iis often thought of a;s something that one ought to do, all.though SOIJllethingthat one often is reluctant to do; those wiho are re- :sponsiJble will perform their duties and may enjoy so doing, hut they are thougiht to tmnscenid what is negative ahout them. The word *munus,* though, truly seems to be without negative oonnotations; in rfad a *munus* is something that one is honored and, in a sense, privileged to have. " Duty " is more properly the English translation of *officiwm,* one of the possible synonyms of *munus.* [2] It seems fair to say that a *munus* often entruils *officna,* that is, when one receives la *munus* one is also then committed Ito certain duties. What, then, is la *munus?* (Throughout most of the fo:llowing anrulysis munus--plru.ral *munera-wii.11* he used, rather than ,any single English word or a multipllicity orf wo11ds; for the references to the documents of Vatican H the translation used in the .Abbott text will lbe given inparentheses).

The English deriviatives of *munus* are revealing of some meanings of the WO'.l'd that lare not oom-.;eyed by the word "duty." For instance, "municipaJl," "rpatr.imony," perhaps "matrimony," and" munificent" are lall derivatives of *munus.* " Municipal" comes from the Latin *municeps* which refers to a hoMer o[pulblic office who has significant responsiJbilities.

z.4_ Latin Dictionary by Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975 impression) gives *"officium," "mVwisterium,"* and " *honos"* as synonyms for *"munus* " but it also notes that it is a *munus* which confers or entails *officia* (" *munus significat offecium, cum dicitur quis munere fungi. Item donum quod officii causa datur* ") . Cicero uses the phrase *"munus officm,"* which clearly signals a difference between the two words.

" Patrimony " refers to the inheritance or *munus* rbhat one receh,,es from one's father *(pafJer)* or family; it too entails certain [1espons.i:bilitiesfor maintaining the family name. "Matrimony" is somewhat more difficult rto decipher; " *muwia,"* which mme strictly means " duty " than " munus " seems to he the etymofogical root of "matrimony." It means, then, the "duty of being a mother," which apparently is what marriage oon£ers.3 FinaHy, one who is munificent, is one wiho gives *(facere munera-or* gifts. Indeed a classicist encountering this rword would ,a;s readily translate it as ",gift," "wealth and riches," "ihonor," 1or "!responsibility" as weH as "duty." Other Eng1lish translations commonly rused are " role," " task," "m]s,sion," "office," and "functions." Indeed alil of these are on occasion Jegitimate translations, <and on a few occasiions the word embraces all of these connotations. It is the judgment of this author that *munus* in the first line of *Humanae Vitae* p1lov.ides such an occasion.

One common classica,l Latin use of the word wouild be in reference to bhe :bestowwlof a rpublic office or responsibility on a citizen. Be:ing selected for such an offioe or responsiihility rwou1d he considered an honor; the selection woutld entail certain duties, hut ones that the recipient willingly embraces. The word ,also often used synonymously for " gift " or " reward: " [4] it is ;something ireeily given by the g,iver and often, hut not ru1ways, with the iconnotation that the recipient has merited the gift in some sense; it is given ;as 'a means of honoring the recipient. In Virgil's *Aeneid, munera* are often the prizes won

s St. Thomas *(Summa theologiae,* III, q. 44, a. 2) asks the question, "Whether matrimony is fittingly named?" He gives a multiform answer; he notes that Augustine thought "a woman ought to marry for no other reason, except to be a mother " (Thomas cites *Contra Faus tum* XIX, xxvi). Thomas also notes that the upbringing of children is more often the duty (*munia)* of the mother. Then again, the source could be *"matrem muniens,"* which would refer to the husband's duty to protect the wife. He gives other possibilities but these have no connection with " *munus"* or *"munia."*

4 Roy J. Deferrari, *A Latin-English Dictionary of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Boston, Mass.: St. Paul Editions, 1960), lists only "gift" as a suitable translation for *"munus."*

at rgames (see Book V, 282 and 532). Men give *munera* to the gods *(Aeneid* Book IV, 217) .and gods give *munera* to men; r£or instance, Cice:J.10 ha:s the gods bestowing rthe *munus* of rpilrilosorphyon man *(Fam.* 15. 4. 16).

In. scriptu::re (the Vulgate), *munus* rulmost railways has the sense of " gift." Men offer gifts rto other men to win favors rfrom them (Gn 3: 15); they are 1rudvisedto give the gift of "first fruits" to God (Lv 2: 15); [5] and the Mrugi ibl'ling gifts to the Christ child (Mt 2: 11) .

Di<!tionaries ifor St. Thomas recommend tihe translation of "gift" [or *munus.* For Thomas, *munera* ·a:re both gifts that men 1girve to God, 1rus 1a ;part of their oblations and sacrifices, and gifts that God gives to man, such as an :integral nature, and gra:oe, and the >aihilityto prophesy. It ris in Aquinas's commentaries on the *Epistle to the Ephesians* and on the *Second Epistle to Timothy* that he int:mduces the use of *munus* that is frequent m Vatican II. In 1both works he uses *munera* to refer :to the different gifts with which men alI"e endowed to serve the ChUireh and God; in the *Epistle to the Ephesians* the reference !i:s to *diversi status et munera* (diverse positions and gifts), such as rbeing an 1apostle, prophet, or teacher. In his commentary on rthe *Sercond Epistle to Timothy* he is commenting on Paul's claim that the duty of admonition belongs to the priest; he states that this comes from a condition of *divinorum munerum,* or divine gifts, and is a *munus* that obliges one to serve God. On another v;ery :di:lforent, but perhaps irelated, ieveil ii:s the reference to the Holy Sp[rit as *munus;* in the *Summa Theologica,* I, q.39, a.8, Thomas appmrpriates fmm Hilary that God the F1a1theris eternity, God the Son is :image, rand God the Holy Ghost is gift, *donum* or *munus.* ThiS' associaition was continued in Chur.ch teaching. For instance Leo XJII's encyclical on the Holy Spirit was entitled *Divinum Illud Munus* (That Divine Gift/Office). *"Munus"* here refers fo the *munus* 0£ bringing men to ·salvation, w:hich Christ :received !from His

[5] In the Old Testament, gifts are at times understood to be bribes, e.g. Dt 10: 17.

Father and He transmitted for completion to the Holy Spi11it. Leo XIII speaks of the Holy Spirit in these terms: " Fo'l." He not only :brings to us His divine gifts *[dona],* hut is the Author of rthem and is Himself the :supreme Gift [*munuS'],* who, proceeding from the mutua11 love of the Father and the Son, is justly 1believed to be and called" Gift *[Donum]* of God most High." [6] He also mentions that the Holy Spirit is .invoked in the liturgy as the Giver of Gifts *(Dator Munerum)* .[7] The sense of then, is deeply em!hedded in the Church's use of the wo11d *munus,* which a1lso carries some sense of giftedness hy the Spirit. This sense becomes even clear:er in the documents of Vatican II.

" *Munus* " *in the Documents of Va.tic.anII*

The documents of Vatican II makce liheml use of the wmd *munus;* appearances are Hsted in the index.[8] The usage of *"munus"* in the documents is true to its classical and Christian :l:mrifage. A review of the pa:rticular employment of this word •in the document indicates the 1lofty, if comp1icated, sense that the word has.

The words " vocation " *(vocatio)* , " mission" *(missio)*, "ministry" *(ministerium)-wihich* seems often to be a :synonym for" apostolate" *(apostola:tus)-" munus,"* and "duty" *(offjicium)* are often linked and occasionaHy interchang1eable. The order of the list just given suggests a possibfo ranking of these words as far as comprehensiveness is concerned; i.e. all Christians havie the mission of bringing Cfilist to the world; they do so through different ministries or a:postolates that in-

[6] A translation of Leo XIII's *Divinum Illud Munus* is available in *The Papal Enayalicals* 1878-1903, ed. by Claudia Carlen, I.H.M. (Raleigh: MacGrath Publishing Co., 1981), 409-417. This passage is found on page 413.

[7] Ibid., 416.

[8] It appears 48 times in *Lumen Gentium,* 44 times in *Gaudium et Spes,* 40 times in *Ohristus Dominus* (on bishops), 21 times in *Presbytei·ionim Ordinis* (on priests), 12 times in *Apostoliaam Aotuositatem* (on the laity), 19 times in *Ad Gentes* (on missionary activity), and 11 times in *Gravissimum Educationis* (on Christian education), and elsewhere as well.

various *munera* and carry certain duties. The second section of *Apostolic:am Aotuosiwtem* (on the !laity) weaves these terms together; t:he foUoiwing passage i1lustr:ates one vari- ·aJtion of the interconnection of these terms:

The Church was established for this purpose, that by spreading the kingdom of God everywhere for the glory of God, she might make all men participants in Christ's saving redemption, and that through them the whole world might truly be ordered to God. All apostolic [*apostolatus]* activity of the Mystical Body of Christ is directed to this end, which the Church achieves through all of its members, in various ways; for the Christian vocation [*vocatio]* by its very nature is a vocation *[vocatio]* to an apostolate *[aposio- latus].* Just as in the make-up of a living body, no member is able to be altogether passive, but must share in the operation of the body along with the life of this body, so too, in the body of Christ, which is the Church, the whole body must work towards the in- crease of the body," according to the function and measure of e.ach member of the body" (Eph 4: 16). Indeed in this body the con- nection and union of the members is so great (cf. Eph 4: 16) that the member which does not contribute to the increase of the body according to its own measure is said to benefit neither itself nor the Church.
There is in the Church a diversity of ministries *[ministerii]* but a unity of mission *[missionis].* The *munus* of teaching, sanctifying, and governing in the name and with power of Christ has been con- ferred by Christ on the Apostles and their successors. But the laity, having been made participants in the priestly, prophetic, and kingly *rrvunus,* are to discharge their own share in this mission of the whole people of God, in the Church and in the world (AA .9

As this passage swesses, in 0:11der for the Christian mission to succeed, eaich member of the mystical !body of Christ must :ful- fili his or her apostola.te. Both " missrion" and " apostolate " rare closely linked with " vocation." As stated in the passage aibove, " The Ohristian votcation, lby its very nature, is also a caH to .an apoiStofate" (AA . The words "vocation" and

9 The abbreviations for the texts of Vatican II are standard. The transla- tion given here is my own, as are all the translations in this essay, unless ex- plicitly indicated otherwise.

" mission " .apply to two different aspects of the same reality; God *calls* us to be Christians and because of that caJl, we have a mission, ·a general assignment, *qua* Christian to transform the worild; 1the pairtic:ular way in which we are ca!llied to do this 1s our aposto 1ate or nnmstry. (Both " m1ssmn" and " apostola.te" have as their t:oot meaning " to he sent." The difference between an arpostolate and ia ministry is not dear, though perhaps a ministry usually involves a closer oonnection with ibhe sacramenta:l 'life and the institutionaJ Ch1.rnc!h, wherea:s an apostolate may •refer mo!l'e generally to any commitment to good •works. Along with the ministries •and/or apostolates that the Ch1 1istian mission spaiwns, there oome gifts *[dona* and *charismata]* that enable the l'ecipient to fulfill his or her duties *[officia]* (AA 8) .[10]

.11he genera:! meaning of *"munus,"* then,. is close to other words that carry the general meaning of something that the Christian is called to do·. *"Munus,"* while close in meaning to mission •and a.postolate;[1] seems both broader and more specific in its meaning; in certain passages " *munus* " seems to refer fo those gifts or ·charisms thrut enable one to carry out one's ministries or apostolatJe; in other passages " *munus* " seems to be a ibroader term than ministry or apostolate (one's *munus* would determine which ministries or apostola.tes one would engage in). *"Munus"* is oocasionally trianslated simply as "task,"

10 A passage from *Familiaris Oonsortio* connects gifts, charisms, and *munera;* "This [evangelical] discernment happens through the sense of the faith, which is a gift *[donum]* imparted to all the faithful by the Spirit, and is therefore a work of the whole Church according to the variety of the multiple gifts *[donorum]* and charisms *[oharismatum],* together with the *munere* [responsibility] and the duty *[officio]* of each and in accord with these, all working together towards a greater understanding and accomplishment of the word of God." (FO, 5)

11 "LG 20 speaks of the *munus·* (office) of those appointed to the episcopate being chief among the ministries entrusted to the early Church. LG 24 asserts that the duty *[munus]* of being witnesses to Christ which the Lord co=itted to the shepherds of his people is a true service *[verum ••. servi-ti·um]* and in sacred literature is significantly called *dialconia.* or ministry *[ministerium]* • .At LG 33 we find "The laity are called *[vooantur]* by God so that by exercising their proper function *[suum proprium munus]* ... "

ibut ro1Utinelythe tasks referred to have rthe natu1 1eof a solemn "a:ssignment." *"Munus"* quite regularly refers to a special assignment that is .entrusted to one, the completion of which is vital for the srtwcessful institution of the kingdom of God. It mnferred as ·an honor, often ·empo.wers one, and entaHs serious responsibilities and obligations. DraJWtingshrurp distinctions between these words is not possihle, but the above discussion. should serve to indicate art least loosely the association of these words.

Lumen Gentium lays out the *munera* of many of the participants in the Christian mission. This document, by no means uniquely, has as a theme the distribution of characteristic participation of different members of the Church in the triple *munera* of Christ, i.e., Priest, and King (LG 31). Christians, in their various callings, participate in these *munera;* they do so ihy fulfilling other *munera,* specifically entrusted to them. For instance, Mrury's *munus* (role) is being the Mother of God (LG *53* and 56), which 1also confe1 1son her a materna,l *mrunus* (duty) towa1 1ds all men (LG 60). Christ gave Peter several *mune1'a:* for instance Peter was given the *munus* (power) of ibinding and loosening and the *grande munus* (special duty) of spreading the Christian name- :whioh wrus also :giranted to the apost1es. The apostles were assigned the *munera.* (great duties) of "giving witness to the gospel, to the ministration of the Holy and of Justice for God's gilory" (LG 9l1). To help them fulrfill these *munera,* they were granted a speciad outpouring of the Holy Spirit (LG 9l1) . By virtilJleof his *munus* (office), the Roman Pontiff ha;s "£ull, supreme, and universal :power" in the Church (LG 9l2) and also, ·by virtue 0£ rhis *munus* (office), he is endowed with rinf.a.llibility (LG 43). Bishorps, by virtue of thei!r episcopal 1consecration, have the *munus* (office) of preaching and teaching (LG 21). The la;ity, too, .in the priestly, prophetic, and kingly *munus* of Christ, have their own mission *[missio];* they are pa;rrticulaJ.1lycalled *[vocantur]* to the *munus* (proper function) of "working, Jik!e Jeaven, for tihe iSanclilication of the world from

within, and espeoiailly:so by the 1w.itnessof their ilives. By shining :forth with faith, hope, and charity, they Mle to mani:fest Christ to others" (LG 81). *Munera* afle coru£erred by one superior in po,wer UipOn another. 1t is :important to note that Christ is routinely aclmowledged as the source of the *munera.* £or ,eruch of the above-mentioned 1groups![12] *Munera* are not man-made :but God..rgiv:en. It is also true, thorugh, that some apostolates can share their *munera* with others, for instance the !bishopssharre their *munera* (duties) with priests (LG 28).

Commentaries on the documents of Vatican II occasionally draw attention to *"munus "* ; it has heen oibserved that from the schema to the final dra:ft, ithere rwas la grrudual siubstitution of the word *munus* for *potesiJas* (power) .[13] A comment on one schema notes that *"munus "* il'e:fers to the sruocessionof ministries from Peter to the pope mrd hishoips;[14] an explanatory note on the *Lumen Gentium* 21 remairks that *"munus"* carries the suggestion of an onto1ogicrulparticipation in a divine office imparted :through Christ (as indicated iby liturgical language), whereas *"poiJestas"* (po1wer) J:ms mme direct il'eference to power related to action, a porwer juridicalily or canonically con- .feirred.15 One commentator concludes: "... the choice of the word *munus* rather than *potestas* rplaces the emphasis on the runctionaJ view of ministry with the proviso that the function must rest on ooclesial command." [16] Although the word *munus*

12 Christ is said to share his *munus* or *munera* with the .Apostles (e.g. LG 21, 19) with the bishops (LG 24, 13), with priests (LG 21, 8), and with the laity (LG 34, 7).

13 Einar Sigurbjornsson, *Milnistry within the People of God* (Lund: Gleerup, 1974), 121.

.14 Cited in Sigurbjornsson, 120, fn. 202.

15 The note reads, "In consecratione datur ontologic.a participatio sacrorum munerum ut indubie constat ex Traditione, etiam liturgica. Consulto adhibetur vocabulum munerum, non vero potestatum, quia haec ultima vox de potestate ad actum expedita intelligi posset. Ut vero talis expedita potestas habeatur, accedere debet canonica seu iuridica determinatio per auctoritatem hierarchicam." *(Nota expUcatioo* n. 2; cf. LG n. 21) cited in Sigurbjornsson, 121, fn. 203.

16 .Sigurbjornsson, 121. The differences between *"potestas"* and " *munus* " are also explored by Jean B. Beyer, S.J., *"De natura protestatis regimiinis*

can !l'eifer to any assigned task, it serons right to say that tmough the documents it becomes more fl"equently associated :with rta.sk entrusted to an agent hy God.

Specific documents have been issued by the Council to d.arify further :what is the natrnve of the *munera* of these dif- groups. For ii.nstance, *Chrisf:Ju.9Dominus* ha:s as :i.ts subtitle " Decree on the Pastorwl *Munus* (Office) of the Bishops in rthe Chul'ldh;" this. document explicitly designates the *munera* of :bishops; neru:dy half the sections iin this decree have rforms of the word *mun.us* in the first few lines. This pattern continues in many postconciHa!l'documents, for instance, the subtitle of *Familiaris Cooaorrtio*i:s *"de Familiae Christianae muneribus in mundo huius temporis"* (" Concerning the *Munera* of the Ohrastian Family in the World of Our Time") . In his preface to the new code orf Canon law, Pope John Paul JI specific reference to the intention of the Code to implement the commitment of Vatican II to the Chr:ist:ian life a:s a faithf.wlness to the rthreefoM *munera* of Christ, a:s Priest, 1\':ophet, and Ruler, and rto defining how difl'erent membel'!s of the Church are to exercise these *munera;* this commitment of the oode of Canon Law tro tJhe *munerra*ris reflected in two of the subtitles; Hook III is entitled *De EccleiMe Munere DoCJendi* (The 1leachin!g Office of the Church) and Book IV, *De Ecdesiiae MunerB SancmfWandi* (The Sanctifying Office of the Olmrch).

The worvd *munus* a;ppears, of collJ.l'se, in Church documents prior to Vatican H ·and *Humana,e Vitae.* rt appeaired fairily

seu iurisaictiowis recte in cocUce rmwvato ervuntianaa," PeriocUca ae re morali, canonica, liturgica 71 (1982) : 93-145. He concludes there: "munera non sunt potestates; potestas restricte auditur, munera latius intelliguntur. Munera docendi et regendi natura sua communione hierarchica sunt exercenda. Communio illa hierarchica, missione canonica legitime recepta, in communione apostolica episcopos constituit, proprium eorum officium definiendo et ad hoc officium potestatem exercendam, per missionem canonicam concedendo. Quae ultima connotatio, si probabilis videtur, neque stricte in mente Concilii exprimitur, neque a doctrina Concilii recusatur, sed ob totam et immutatam Ecclesiae traditionem melius perspectam, est tenenda.

frequently in the earlier code of Canon Law. One commentator noted that it refers to an elevated duty in the Cl:umch which ,either directly or indweotly was exercised for ·spirituailpurposes, and that it had iboth a wide sense in referring to Church offices and more nwrrow sense in referring to ·specificduties.[17] Of special interest to us here a.ire the eight appearances of " *wunus* " in *Casti Connubii.* It shows the typical mnge oif meanings there; it refers to the "Tole" or "noble office" of women (AAS 549, HV 15 and AAS 567, HV 38) and to the sacred office of the priesthood (AAS *555,* HV 23, and AAS *560,* HV . Its most frequent reference is to rthe duties of husband 1and wife within marriage (Ai.AS 554, HV [twice], oand AAS 561, HV 31); *munus* in wll these passages is more than *offic.ium.* For instance, one pa:sswge reads: "Nor must we omit to remark, in fine, that since the duty *[munus]* entrusted to pairents for the good of their children .is of S1Uch high dignity and of such great importance, every use of the faculty giv;en by God :for the procreation oif new life is the and privilege of the married state alone, .and musrt be contained within the sacred limits of the family " (AAS 546, HV 12) . Here, again, " duty " does not seem the p:voper translation of " *munus,"* heve " *munus"* seems to share .in the e:x;alted status of a divineJ.y .appointed mission rwe haive seen in Vatican II. This meaning is carried over to *Humanae Vitae.*

Tihe frequency and placement of the tel"lll *munus* m rthe documents of Vatican II •show it to he a very significant term; the documents speak about *munera* of Christians and rubout Christians fulfilling certain roles both in a general way and rulso more ·specificaUy. The use of this word, t!hen, while not unusual in pr:eoonciliru documents, seems to hav:e assumed a new importance 1with Vatican II and, in a sense, can lhe said to ibe indicative of the ecCilesiology and the understanding of the Christian mission that is ·a;dvanced there.

[17] See Richard A. Strigl, *Grundfragen der kirchUchen Amterorganisation* (Miinchen: Max Hueber Verlag, 1960), 61.

" *Munus" in Humanae Vitae*

The appearance of *"munus,,* in the first line of *Humaxna:e Vitae* helps link this ency!Clicalwith the documents of Vatican U. Indeed, the encyclical has such close alliances with *Gaudium et Spes* 47-51 that it seems hut a continuation of it. This should not he surprising, since Vatican II explicitly left the question of the pl'Opermethods for regwlating birth to the Holy Father, wiho, it is welil known, had set up a special commission to advise him on this matter (see footnote 14 to *Gaudium et Spes). Hurnanae Vitae* is the document that he issued to address this question. The most significant and suhst,antial link of *Humanae Vitae* with *Ga:udium et Spes* is sections 7-10, which follow closely sections 49 and *50* of *Gaudium et Spes* in the discussion of the meaning of conjugrul fove 1and of !responsible parenthood. Forms of " *munus"* appear ten times in the :five sections of *Gaudium et Spes* th.at speak about the role of married !peoplein the Church. There we 1leamthat spouses and parents have a *praecellenti ... munere* (lofty calHing) (GS 47) ; that conjugal fo¥e leads spouses to God and ,aids and strengthens them 1in their *sublimi munere* (sublime office) of being a mother and rfather (GS 48); that the sacrament of marriage helps them fulfiJll their conjugal and familial *munera* (oh- ; that 1spousesa:re blessed with the dignity and *rnunus* (office) of fatherhood and motherhood, which helps them achieve their duty *[officium]* of educating their ohildren (GS 48); that young people should ihe properly and in good time instructed about the dignity, *muniis* (duty) , and expression *[opere]* of ,conjugal Lovie (GS 49). The next occurrence appears in a paragraph that hrings together several of the terms of concern here:

> In the duty *[officium]* of transmitting and educating human life, which is the special mission *[missio]* of spouses, they understand themselves to be in cooperation with the love of God the Creator and, as it were, interpreters of this love;. Therefore,. with human and Christian responsibility, they will fulfill their *munus* (task) .... " (GS 22)

Later in the same section, there ,is mention of " the *munus* (duty) of procreating; " "those who fu1fiU this God-given *munus* (task, *commissio a Deo)* by gene1rously having a large family are particrulady to be admfred " (GS 50) . We are told that "It ought to he clear to aill that human life and the *munus* (task) of transmitting it are not [realities] restricted only to this world ... but that they always look to the eternal destiny of man" (GS 51).

Humanae Vitae so closely follo,ws *Gaudium e,t Spes* in its focrus on the *munus* of spouses that it would have been rperfect-[y consistent to have subtitled ithe ency;elical *"De munere coniugium* " (Concerning the *Munus* of Spouses) . F:orms of the word *munus* appear twenty-one times in *Humanae Vitae.* Reference is made to the *munera* of women (2.15), of the Church (5.1), of alll men (7.6), of hiologica,l processes (10.7), of the medical profession (27.2 and 9), of priests (28.2), and of bishops (80.10) . It <is used four times in reference to the *munus* of transmitting human life, three times to the *munus* of responsible parenthood, and once to the apostolic *munus* that spouses have to other married couples.

It 1seems rfair to say that the *munus* of " tmnsrriitting human life" and the *munus* of "responsible parenthood " ,are one and the same *munus;* the second phrase simply specifies and clarifies the first. Indeed, the Church has always linked together the begetting of lifo with the obligation to educate and guide the life begotten. For instance, St. '.Dhomas straightforwardly links the two when he asserts that " offspring signifies not only the begetting of children, but also their education, to which as its 1end is directed the entire communion of worb that exists between man and :wife as united in marriage, since parents naturally' Jay up for their children' (2 Cor. xii. 14)" *(Summa Theologica, Supplementum,* q.49, a.2, ad 1). And *Casti Connubii* also explicitly connects the begetting of children with the obligation to educate the children-not just for prosperity in this life, but with a view >to their eternal destiny: " ... Christian parents understand that they are destined not only

to propagate and conserve the human race, nor even to educate just ·any worshippers of the true God, but to bring forth offspring for the Church of Christ, to procreate fellow citizens for the Saints and servants of God, so that the worshippers devoted to our God and Savior might daily increase" (MS 454). *Gaudium et Spes* adopts the 1oustomary linking of procreation and education ,when it states that "Marriage and conjugal love aire by their nature ordained to the prncreating and educating of offspring" (GS 50). The document *Humanae Vita:e,* then, has as its purpose clarifying for spouses the Christian *munus* that is theirs, the *munus* of bringing forth children and of being responsible parents to them, with a view to guiding them to he worthy of eterna.I union with God.

The Christian caHing of marriage is one of the 1ways in which men and women may Jive out their Christian commitment. An essential part of this crulling is raising children. This is one of the most important ways in which men and women can serve God, can fulfil.I the call to sanctifying, prophesying, and governing. Raising children is a *munus;* it is an honor conferred upon spouses that brings with it certain obligations; it is the assignment that God gi¥es to spouses so that his kingdom of love might begin to prevail in this wo11ld. God created the world in orde1r to share His goodness with those He created. Spouses work with God ,in creating-pmcreating-the life that God seeks to bring into eternity. Theirs is a *munus* that is essential to God':s intention for His Creation.

W,ith this understanding of *munus* ,and of Christian marriage, '1et us attempt a translation of the fiTst line of *Humanae Vitae: "Humanae vitae tradendae munus gravissimum."* As we ha:ve seen, *munus* has so many connotations that it permits of severail Vialid translations; "duty," "gift," " task" aJ:le all legitima:te translations.[18] Perhaps a faithful translation of the first

1s As footnote 2 above suggested, it would have been natural to translate the Italian *"dovere"* by the Latin *"officium"* (and this was done later in the document, see section *HV* 10). In section 10 of *Humanae Vitae, "munus"* is used three times where the Italian uses *"missione"* (mission), *"ewer·oizio"* (exercise) and " *compito* " (task) . The selection of *"mun-us"* seems

line of *Hunianae Vitae* would be" the gift/duty of transmitting human life "-but since English does not have the freedom of German in concocting synthetic neologisms, it would be best to strive for one English word. We must also take into account that *munus* is ,a,ilso close in meaning to " vocation " a.nd "ministry" and " mission." A freer but mO!re faithful translation might be "God entrusted to spouses the extremely important mission of transmitting human life ... " The next line reads *"ex quo coniiiges liberam et consciam Deo Creatori tribuunt operam,"* whicth lis customarily trans1arted " for which [*munus]* ma11ried persons are the free and responsible coUrubomtors of God the Creatm .... " The transfation "collaborators " is based more on the Italian (*collaboratori)* than on the La.tin. " *Tribuunt operam* " rendered JiteraHy would be " offer oa- pay back a service." *"Operam"* .is the accusative for the :feminine noun *opera,* which means service; it is not a form of the wo'l."d *opus,* which means work.[19] " Collabor1afo'l."S' may conjure up an image of God and the spouses working side by side on tihe assembly Ene; it is certainly true that we are to understand God and the ,spouses working together here, but the sense of these lines seems to be thrut God gives the spouses a *munus* ,and thJ10ugh this, and in some sense in return for this, tihe spouses give a 'service to God. The word *consciam,* usually translated in this ,second line as "deliberate," aippears elsewhere in 'the document linked with *"paternitatem,"* translated " responsible parenthood." Perhaps the use of " *consciam* " here is meant to anticipate its linkage with *"piatemitatem"* later; this line, then, would be translated " by which spouses freely and responsibly ,render a service to God." [20]

designed to suggest a close connection with GS 49 and 50, upon which this section of *Humanae Vitae* draws. Thus, the choice of *"munus"* in the first line of *Humanae Vitae* seems to be accurate in the context of the whole.

19 Lewis and Short (see note 2 above) translates *opera* as "service, pains, execution, work, labor" and states that "opus is used mostly of the mechanical activity of work, as that of animals, slaves, and soldiers; opera supposes a free will and desire to serve."

2-0 There are other significant problematic translations of the text. *Hiimanae Vitae* has a tone of grappling with a question that is of press-

T:hese first lines, then, would mean that God :confers upon spouses the honor, the gift, of rtransmitting human life. They, in turn, freely aocept this extremely important assignment that

ing concern to modern couples. It is forthright about acknowledging the conditions in modern society which seem to make the Church's promotion of child-bearing problematic. Nonetheless it remains resolutely committed to recognizing parenthood as an elevated calling and is optimistic about the ability of spouses to understand and live by the Church's teaching. The translations are more successful at conveying the "worrying" tone of the document than at conveying its optimism. In certain instances the translations of some words seem to put the teaching of the document in an unnecessarily negative light. For instance, the second paragraph of the document speaks of the mission of transmitting life as "posing grave problema " to the conscience of married persons, but the phrase translated here is *"arduas quaestiones."* The word *quaestiones* appears frequently in the document and elsewhere is translated, properly, by its English cognate "questions; " here, then, the phrase should be translated; "raises some difficult questions"- which, it seems, is free from the negative connotations of "problems." .Again, the reliance of the translations on the Italian explain the translation, for the Italian use the word *problemi* and English translators would readily use the cognate "problems." Yet even from Italian the word more properly is translated as " questions." In English " question " means a query and is much more neutral than "problem," which connotes some difficulty.

The usual translation of the subtitle is true to the Italian, but somewhat different in Latin. The Italian reads " *Kulla regolazione della natalita"* and is usually translate.cl "On the Regulation of Birth." Some have spoken of the document as the encyclical " on birth regulation" or "on birth control," which is a possible rendering of the Italian subtitle. The Latin subtitle reads *"de propagatione hurnanae prolis reate ordinanda,"* which, translated literally, means "on how bringing forth human offspring ought to be rightly ordered." This is indeed an awkward English rendering but would better suit those who argue that the focus of *Humanae Vitae* is on responsible parenthood as much as it is on "birth control."

It is not only the subtitle that puts undue emphasis on "birth regulation" as opposed to "responsible parenthood." Several times phrases are translated as "birth regulation" which, in the Latin, refer only to "bringing forth children." .At the end of section three, the question is raised whether it is time for man to entrust to his reason and will (rather than to the rhythms of his body) "the task of regulating birth," but the Latin is *"tradendae vitae"* (the mission of transmitting human life) ; *no* mention is made of "regulating." The first sentence of section 7 starts with " *De propaganda prole quaestio;"* the usual translation renders this as "the problem of birth," when really it .should read "the question of having children; " even more preferable, perhaps, is the translation that reads "the question of human procreation."

brings with it certain responsibilities and duties, and they thereby offer a service to God. '.Dhis use of r!ihe word *munus* may have impHcations for one of the more controversial teachings of the document, the teaching that "each and every ma·rital act must be open to procreation" and that all contraceptive sex is intr:insicaJilyimmoral.

Per se destinatus

Another cont:mversiwl and proiblema.tic phrase in *Huma.nae Vitae* appeaEs in the fast line of section 11. Indeed, it is perhaps the most controversial sentence in *Humanae Vitae.* It deserivesou'l'close :attenrtion. A note ·aJborut is needed first, so that we might understand precisely what the text is saying. The Itwlian !'leads *"ohe qualsiasi atto matrimoniale deve rimanere aperto. alla trasmissione della vita."* The Latin suhstitutes the words " *per se destinatus* " (.in itseH destined) :forthe Itailian *"aperto"* (open) wlthough the Latin" *apertus"* would easiJy have :worked he1le. (It is, in fa.ct, the used in one of the pmpositions of the Sarcred Synod on the Family where reference is made by John P,ruuJ H to this text in *Humanae Vitae,* in *Familiaris Cons01'tio* 29). Tihe phrase" *per se destinatus,"* though, is phi1osorphicrullymore precise, and more !i.n keeping with the 1context. One tJransla.tionrenders this portion rather freely but faithfully: ". . . in any u:se whatever of marriage there must be no impairment of its *natural oarpaoity* to procreate human life." Another appearing in Horgan's text reads: "[it is] abso.Jutely required that any use whatever of mamage must *retain its natural potential* to procreate human me" (my emrphas!i.sin both translations) .[21]

The common trans:lation of this line that is based on the Italian and rspeaksof "each and every act [11emaining]... open to procreation" giv;es rise to some misunderstandings. Some mistakenly wgue that this fine means that when engaging in

[21] The first trans lati on given here is by the Vatican Press Office; the second by the Catholic Truth Society.

sexual intercourse, the spouses must be desiring to have a child. They this line to rule out sexual intercourse during the infertile periods ,and claim that the dooument is inconsistent in permitting sexual intemourse during these times.

Is there an inconsistency in permitting sexua1 intercom.·se durmg a woman's infertile period and ai1so insisting that" each and every marital act must remain open to procreation? " Arre not coupfos who confine their acts of se:imaJ intercourse to the :infertile periods "closed " to pmcreation? To ibe sure, they may ibe as determined not to have children at a given time as are couples who are oontracepting; thus, it must he granted that in the -subjective sense, they may be no more " open " to having children. But it is important to understand that the document is not speaking of the subjective " openness " o£ the spoul!les; it is -speaking of their objective *acts* oif sexual intercourse. One source of misunderstanding is that the woil'd "open" in English tends to have an ·association with a subjecti¥e state of mind rather than with objective reality; again, to some it suggests that the spouses must be actively desiring or ·at Jea;st quite receptive to ,a pregnancy. Some daim that the document is te!liching that the spouses must intend to beget a child with each ·and every act of conjuglllintercourse. But such has never 1been t:he teaching of the *Humanae Vitae* here is not ref&ring to the sUJbjective desires of the spouses; the Latin " *per se destinatus* " is directed towards the maxitaJl *acts* of the spouses. It is these *acts* that must remain" open" or *per se dest:inatus.* The spouses may do nothing to deprive the *act* of its ordination or destination to procreation. They may do nothing to "close off" the possibility of the act lllchievmg its naturail ordination. And here is the point. At certain times, procrea,tion is simpJy not available to spouses for reasons heynnd their ioontrol. Although their marital acts wi1l he no Jess infertile than those of a couple practicing contraception, their acts have not by their own will been deprived of theiil' pmper oruination. As RV 11 :states, " marital *acts* do not cease being riegitimate if they are foreseen to .be infertile *be-*

cause of reasons independent of the spooses . . " (my emphaisis).

Still, in spite of this important distinction ibetween surbjective desire and otbjective act, perha;ps all is not yet oleair. Another question must be raised. What can it mean to say the aots of sexurul intercourse during the infertile periods are "open to " or *"per se destinatus"* to procreation (which rthey must be if they are to 1be mor.al)? And if these "naturally " infertile acts !are ,still. oroered to procreation, why is this not ailso true of acts deliberiately made infertile, that is, contracepted aicts? The distinctions to be maide here are at times surbtile but they arie nonetheless rerul and important.

First, it must be understood that the ·sexurul<>*'l'gans* are natuil'aHy ordered to procreation and notihing can render them not ordered to procreation. This ordination or potential is inherent in them whether capruble of tbeing actualized or not. This is equivalent to saying that eyes that are being used to see, eyes that are closed, and blind eyes are still ordered to seeing; eyes tblind at birth and eyes blinded by some deliberate act are still ordered to 1sooing. "Being ordered to seeing" means that the eye has a natUJI'aJ function and 1specific work, even an eye that oaillllot perform its function. Onily eyes can 1be "given" or restored to the power of seeing because only eyes do that kind of worik; ears and noses do not. The siam.e is tr.ue of sexual organs; •sexual organs whether fertile or infertile, temporarily or permanently, by the choice of the individuail or not, are ordered to priocreation. They are o!l'gans of the procreative *kind;* i.e., reproductive organs.

Still, ·wlthough 011gans ·ailways in some :sense retain their na,tumal ordina;tion, is the:r:e not ·a difference between the situation where an organ cannot perform its function because of some defect and a situation where some agent deliberrutely deprives the o:rigan of its ab:iJity to perform its £unction? Does not being ,blind through a birth defect differ grea;tJy from being blind througih a delibemte wet of oi\Vll will? There is no shame in having an organ that cannot iachieve its £unctions,

but there may he shame and wrong invn1ved if one deliberately deprives an organ of the abil!i.ty to perform its proper functioning. To be hlind "independently of one's will" is not to have done something wrong. But to blind oneself deliberately wou:ld he to strike a Mow at the proper ordination of the reye. A deliberately blinded eye remains an eye. It is still the organ of s[ght and thus still ovde!l'ed to seeing, but the .act of deliberately depriving it of this a:bility is an act against its natural ordination. One has not a·1lowed the eye to retain its ability of achieving its *per Be* destinatiion.

The description of acts that follow £:mm the function of organs proceeds in the same fashion. It is tme to say that an act shares the ordination of the organ from which it pmceeds-rugain, whether or not the act is capahle of achieving its oridaiined end. Acts performed by the eye are acts ordained to seeing. If an ,individuail is in a dark room, or if some obstruction is put ovrer an eye, the aots of the eye are stiH ordained to seeing even if they are not able to achieve their end. Acts performed hy the se:imal organs are acts 011dained to procreation, whether or not they al'e able to achieve their ordination. The acts, as do the organs, retain their ordination, whether or not capable of achieving the end towards which they are ordained. But it is possiible tha,t ructs can he tampel'ed with and in a sense " lose " their It is possible ito thwart the *per se* ordination of action to its destined end. It is possible to prohiibit actions .from achieving their naiturailly ordained end. And this is pl'ecisely what *Humanae Vitae* disalfows: it disrullows p:rohibiting marital acts from aohieving their natumlly ordained end.

Let us use an analogy to clarify this point. The act of eating is hy natme ordered to nutrition. Take a woman whose digestive system is working well. This woman eats and achieves the end of supplying her system with nutritious vitamins, etc. Twfue another woman whose system is not working well. She ailso·eats nutritious food, hut, because orf a defeot in her system, she is not nourished by this food. The systems of both of them

are equally digestivcesystems, both systems are equally orderred to the specific work of digestion; both of their 1acts are equally ordered to supplying nutrition for the hody. But one woman is able to achieve this and the other is not. Now suppose the healthy woman deliberately tampers with her digestive system so rthat she might enjoy the the sensation of eating without achieving the end of nutrition. She thwarts the orrlination of her action; she attempts to prevent it from achieving the end toiwrur:ds whioh it is ordained. Her ,action does not retain its ·wbility to achieve its *per se* destination. Her ·system does not change in kind; it ·a digestive sy;stem, naturally ordained to a specific work: digestion. Nor reruHy does her *act* change .in kind. But she does not aHow her action to retain its ability to ,achieve its *per se* destination. Again, she acts in such a way as to depriv,e her act of its *per se* destination; her wet cannot do the work it is natmally ordained to do.

The parallel with se:xual intereou:rse is clear; the sexual organs of both the fertile and infertile are ordained to procreation, and thus in a sense, rbheir acts are too. In the case of those who rur:e :infertile, the inability to achieve the ordered end is independent of the wiH of rthe spouses; in the case of the fertile, the spouses can deJiberately tamper with their action and not allow it to *remain* orupaJble of ,achieving the end to which it is ordained.

Let us probe this analogy evcen further. The digestive organs are ordained to providing nutrition for the ibody. Acts of eating are ordained to nutrition. There .we occasions where the digestive organs may not be working correctly and thus one's act of eating wiM not achievce its end of nourishing :the body. So, too, if one is infertile, one's acts of sexual intercourse will not aehieve its procreativce end. In neither of these cases has one thwarted the natural ordination of the act; both organ and act retain their *per se* ol'dination. But one may eat a completely non-nutritious substance and thus, although one is performing an act of eating, one is not performing 'an ·aict that can ·achieve its mdination to nutrition. One ihas not alrlowed or as-

sisted one's a.cl to achieve its o:vdainedend. Homosex;ual acts of semal intercourse can 1be seen in the same !light. The reproductive orgian.sare ordained to procreation and 1actsof sexual intercourse aire o!'ldained rto proCTeation. Yet, although homo-'Sexuails peJ.'lfomn acts of sexual interoorurse, these are not acts that can achieve their ordained end of procreation. The same is true of contr:arept.ed acts 0£ intercourse; acts of sexual intercouTse .are perifomned!but they ihave ;been kept :from achieving the end of procreation to which they are ordained.

The above .analysis should help *us* understand what *Hu-'11U1.nae Vitae* means iby stating that every marital *aot* must :remain *per se destinatus* to procreation. It means that couples must not tamper with the natural ordination of their maritwl ·acts. It does not mean that couples must be desiicin.1gchildren w:ith each and every act of interoourse. Nor does it rule out sexual intercourse during a woman's infertile period, for acts of sexual in·ter:courseduring rbhese periods, as we have seen, do meet the criteria of iheing oruained tn pll'ocreation.[22]

:A caveat must be stated here. The intent of this discussion has not been to assess the morality of tampell'ingw:ith the natural ordination of organs or acts; the intent has been to clarify when it is true to say that the *per se* ordinaition of an orig.anor action has been thwarted. Indeed, althougJi much of the above :ana:lysiscamed the clear implication that tampering with the natur:al ordination of organs or acts ,be wrong .and perhaps is wrong for the most part, it is also certainiy true that not alJ tampering is wrong. For instance, there is little controve!l'sy about the moral permissi!bi1ity00: medical procedures necesS'ary

[22] For an excellent discussion of the difference between contraceptive acts of intercourse and ;acts of intercourse during infertile periods, see Brian J. Shanley, O.P., "The Moral Difference between Natural Family Planning and Contraception," *Linacre Quarterly* 54 (Feb. 1987) : 48-60. He uses the terminology of G. E. M. .Anscombe, "You. Can Have .Sex Without Children: Christianity and the New Offer," in Vol. III of her collected papers: *Ethics, Religion, and Politics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), 82-96. Shanley makes good use of .Anscombe's distinction between the intentionality of the immediate act and the accompanying further intentions.

for the health of an may result in blindness or sterility. The intent of such ·examples .as the" eating of non-nutritious food " was not to suggest that this action is morally wrong or that homosexual intercourse and contraceptive intercourse are on the same moral plane as "eating non-nutritious food" or on the same plane with each other. The point of the above discussion, again, was to clarify, by use of analogy, what it means to say that an organ or an act has a *per se* destination and what it means to say that that destination has been thwarted. The moral evaluation of this tampering is a separate issue. Traditionally the principle of totality and the principle of double effect have been employed to distinguish when tampering is justified and when it is not. Here let us go another route, and let us consider how the analysis of the meaning of the word *munus* may help us understand the necessity of respecting the ordination of marital intercourse.

"Munus" and "Each and Every Act"

Again, a *munus* is special assignment that honors the one who receives it, that brings with it duties and responsibilities ordered to bringing about some good both for the one who makes the assignment and for the one who receives it. Let us first use a rather mundane example to explain how the use of contraception would be a reneging on one's *munus* of transmitting human life, to explain why " each and every act of marital intercourse must remain ordered to procreation." Then an example with sacramental dimensions will be used to help clarify how it can be said that" the unitive and procreative meanings of marital intercourse are inseparable."

The first analogy requires that we imagine a good and generous king of a country who asked one of his worthy to help him build his kingdom. The king needs a responsible individual to perform this *munus* since it is important, indeed, essential, to the kingdom to keep contact with a distance borough. He chooses to honor his subject George with this *munus* of keeping contact with one of the outlying boroughs.

In 011der for George to perform this service, the king gives George the use of a fine horse and buggy that will enable him to travel to the distant borough. The king needs someone to sprellJd goodwill 1and cheer in this community and wants George to undertake this *munus.* He makes it clear that George should ney;er go to the borough unless he attends to the Icing's business when he is there. The king has another motive for providing George with the horse and buggy, for he also wishes George to prosper. The horse and buggy will ena:ble Gemge to attend to his own business when he traveJs to the distant borough. The king makes it clear that those who ilive in the borough and George himself Will fare better if George uses the horse and buggy as designated, for the king knows that it is quite im- for either to prosper without the other. So George achieves two ends ,by the use of the horse and buggy; he advances his own prosperity and that of the kingdom. The Icing also tells George that business is dosed in the outlying borough one week of every month and during that week George may oontinue freely to use the horse and buggy for his own purposes. Mocreover, since the horse and buggy are handsome and efficient, it ,is pleasurable for George to employ them, but pleasure is an added benefit to the use of tihe horse and buggy, not the purpose of the horse and buggy. The king more or less leaves it up to George how often and when he visits the borough; he asks George to be generous hut to use his own good judgment. Now, if George were to accept this *munus* and the horse and buggy that go with it hut refuse to drive to the outlying borough, then he would be reneging on the *munus* that he accepted. And if he were to go to the bovough but refose to attend to the king's business while there, he would again be failing to 1live up to t:he demands of his *munus.*

There are parallels here with the *miinus* of transmitting human life. God has given this *munus* to spouses because He wishes to shmre the goods of His kingdom with more souls and He has chosen to call upon spouses to share with Him the work of bringing new life into the wodd. This is an honor and

entrusted only to those willing to embrace the responsibilities of mlllrriage. Those who perform the responsibilities of marrilllgein accord with God's will benefit 1both themselves and the !l'est of society. The spouses achieve the good of strengthening their l"elationship through sexual intercourse, i.e., the good of union, and they achieve the good of having i.e., the good of procreation. Both goods also benefit God's kingdom, for He wishes love between spouses to flourish and He desires more souls with whom to share the goods of his kingdom. 'f.hus, seJrua:l is a part of the *munus* of transmitting human life, a *munus* that is intimately bound with other goods. Those who accept this *munus* need to respect the other goods that accompany it.

Still, in the same w:ay that the good king allowed George to use the horse and buggy even when 'business was not in session in the outlying borough, God has so designed human and human sexuality that humans are sometimes fertile and sometimes not. It is permissible for spouses to enjoy marital ,intercourse at any time, whether they ave infertile or fertile. God seems to have designed the human system this way to £oster union and happiness between spouses. But He has asked them to :be ll'eceptive to new life, generously but in accovd with their best judgment, and not to misuse the *munus* that He has given them. To choose never fo have children is like refusing ever to go to the outlying district. It is to renege on the *munus* that comes with mll!mage. To have contmooptive sex is like driving to the outlying borough ·llilld ignoring the king's !business. The oontrooepting corupJe is :vepudiating the *munera* of their own fertility and altering the :functioning of the body. They ll!re pursuing pleasme while emphatically rejecting the good of rprocreaition. They may not feel that they are engaging in :an act of emphatic rejection 0£ the good of procreation, hut in terms of their *munus* that is exaictly 'Wha:t they are doing. (It is also true .that the good they achieve, plea:sure, is not the good of union, which can he achieved only if the p1locreative good is also vespected. More will be said aibout this below.) But the

good king ·allowed George to use the hoirse and huggy ·when business was not in session, and that is exactly what the couple is doing who are having sexuaJ inte11courseduring the infertile period. '.Dhey are pursuing one good, the good of union *when another is not avail,a;ble.* Again, the oontrruoopting couple is 'l'epudiating .a *munus* tha.t they have accepted; the noncontracepting corupJeis cooperating with the complexity of the *mwnus* that God has entrusted to them.

The above analysis may help to clarify why each and every act of marital intercourse must remain ordered to procreation. Let rus raise another problem and offer another example that may shed further light on this norm. Many hav;e argued that as long a:s the wihole marriage is open to then it is not necessary that each and every marital a.ct of interoour:se be open. This .arrgument usuaJly employs what is ca11ed in *Humana,e Vitae* the" principle of totality," which maintains that for a proportionate ·good it is permissible to sacrifice the good oif .a rpart :for the whole. This principle is used, for instance, to justify the amputation of diseased limbs for the sake of the 'Whole :body. *Humanae Vitae* rejects the use of this principle to justify sacrificing the ordination of conjugal acts for the sake of the good of the marriage. In doing so it makes ref.erence to a speech by Pope Pius XII on oornea11transplants. [23] In brief he airgiues that the principle applies onJy to organic wholes. Marriwge is not an ovganic whoJe of which conjugal acts are organic parts, not even by analogy. marriage is an ontological :reality, that is, a relationship, a bond between spouses, not a whole with many rpiarts (conjugal acts) subservient to the :whofo. Without a clear definition of what constitutes a 'Whole and what parts are subservient to the whole, the application of the principle of .totaJity is rather :whimsical at best. Consider someone ·who had been told that it was his duty/

2s *Hwma1n.ae Vitae* makes references to the "principle of totality" in sections 3 and 17. Footnote 21 makes reference to two of Pius XII's speeches where he discusses this principle; "Address to the .Association of Urology," A.AS 45 (1953): 674-675 and "Address to Leaders and Members of the Italian .Association of Cornea Donors and Italian Association for the Blind," AAS 48 (1956): 461-462.

responsibility /gut (*mun1US*) as a go¥e!l"Il.lllent employer to fight racial discrimination. But .suppose he refused to keep each and every joib opportunity open to minorities by claiming that 'Overall it was his intention to fight racial discrimination, but he didn't see why he had to .apply this to each and every joib opening. Suppose he further arg1Ued tha:t it was for :the good of the whole that minorities be eX'elru:ded from some for the other workers would be less unhappy if this were the ca;se. Would the" principle of tJotaJity" justify his action? Not if the understanding of *rnunus* is oo:rroot here, for this would mean that in acoeptirrg the *munIUS,* a position of trust that brings with it certain obligations, he mu.st .fulfill that *munus* completely and not partially. (Again, if, of course, there were no minorities for a position, he wouilid not be wrong in not hiring a minority person-in the same way that having intercolEse when the 1procreative power is not availwble is morai1ly permissible!)

Although it is hoped that the ;aibove analog.ies .assist in clarifying how the *munus* of transmitting life fits into marriage, marriage differs significantly from receiving .an appointment from a king and from being responsible doing some deed •for the sake of the community. Marriage is a sacrament. So, perhrups an .example based upon the workings of a sacrament may .also help to clwrify the teaching of *Humanae Vitae* and partioolarly the claim that the " unitive and procreative meanings of marriage are inseparable, that oontraooptive sex is al•waysmtrinsically immoral."

Many have objected to the teaching of *Humanae Vitae* because it seems to put too much stress on .biological processes, on the lams of nature, and not to -appreciate sufficiently the value of conjugal interoourse for fostering oonjugrul love; it seems a return to the assessment of p!l'ocreation as being *the* purpose of marriage. Many theologians were :velievedthat *Humanae Vitae,* following *Gaudium et Spes,* spoke no longer of primary ·and secondary ends of marriage, for they felt thait this language w:as .antiqua:ted and did not sufficiently convey the

mo1le recently appreciated "personalist" v:a1ues of marriage. It is not the place of this essay to enter into the debate of the appropriateness of the language of primary and secondary ends, or of **the** :relative newness of personalist v:alues.[24] Again, it is **not** the purpose of this essay to evaluate the force of these objections to *Humanae Vitae.* Rather, this essay seeks to show the ii.mpo:rtanoe of the 'language of *munus,* which appears a1longside of arguments derived from the scholastic tradition and associated more with naturail law.

It has ;been ,a istrength of the Church that it teruches not only in the <languageof one discipline (or hut inter-mi:XJes and layers teI"minoJogy from several disciplines (and traditions); teachings do not :rest on one incontrovertible argument ihut aJ'e 1supported 1by oomplex and various principles and values, hoth those philosophically g11ounded and those theologicaJly grounded. Apparent tensions may sometimes exist between modes of argumentation, hut if they are in suppo1'tof the same truths, ultimately they must be complement-1ary. Let us oons1der an analogy of v:arious *munera* which may

[24] I believe it is fair to say that discussion of the "primary and secondary ends " of acts has generally become virtually extinct. In reference to marriage, the attempt to order the ends of marriage seems to offend many. The avoidance of this type of analysis does not, of course, suggest rejection of it. Still, properly understanding it requires such extensive orientation into a whole way of thinking that it is perhaps best to avoid it in a pastoral document. It is false to say that *Gaudium et Spes* repudiated this language, for it clearly states that God established the ends of marriage and then footnotes the very texts in Augustine and Thomas where they speak of the three ends (offspring, fidelity, and sacrament) of marriage (GS 48, note 1). Furthermore, when one hundred ninety o:f the Fathers at the Council requested that the traditional ordering of the ends of marriage be included in the text, the response (c) was that "in a pastoral text intended to initiate dialogue with the worId such legal language (*elementa illa iuridica)* is not required." Cross-reference is made to another portion of the response (f), which notes that the hierarchy of goods of marriage are able to be considered according to different aspects *(Acta SynodaUa Sacroscanoti Gonoilii Vatioani. II,* vol. 4, Part VII [Romae: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1978] 477-479). For an analysis of the ends of marriage in accord with the position of Vatican II, see Germain Grisez, "Marriage: Reflections Based on St. Thomas and Vatican Council II," *Catholic Mind* 64 (June 1966): 4-19.

assist us in understanding the insepruraibilityof the two meanings of maritrul interoourse.

Humanae Vitae porbrays " having children " or " transmitting life " less ais the primrury end or rpurpose of marriage than as an essential *munus* of maxriage. Again, it is an " assignment" entrusted to spouses and a service that they may perform for God. Wihat is needed he!l"e, ii:t seems, iis a better u1I1derstanding of the maritaJ vocaition 1which includes this *munus.* And what needs to he ,grasped is that vocations have a ,certain reality and make certain demands upon those embracing their vocation. *Humanae Vitae* 10 speaiks to this point:

> The :responsible parenthood of which we speak here has another dimension of utmost importance; it is rooted in the objective moral order established by God-and only an upright conscience can be a true interpreter of this order. For which reason, the mission *[munus]* of responsible parenthood depends upon the spouses recognizing their duties towards God, towards themselves, towards the family, towards human society, as they maintain the right hierarchy of goods.
>
> For this reason, in regard to the mission *[munus]* of transmitting human life, it is not right for spouses to act in accord with private judgment, as if it were permissible for them to define subjectively and willfully what is right for them to do. On the contrary, they must accommodate their behavior to the plan of God the Creator, a plan made manifest both by the very nature of marriage and its acts and also by the constant teaching of the Church.

By frreely and deliberately aocepting the caHing of marriage, they also freely and accept the *munera* tha;t go along with that calling, in the saime way tha.t a priest in re1Sponding to the caJling of the priesthood also aicoepts the *munera* of that " assignment." To he married hut not to accept the *munus* of trmnsmibti.nglife is ilike taking on an aiss:i:gnment but not taking on the fulJ responsibilities of that assignlllent-and not realizing the full goods of that assignment both for one's self and for others. For instance, a man may wish to he a priest but not wish to perform some of the saicraments; that would be a •repudiation of his caillingand the *munera* of his crulling. The following elabora;tion of this parallel with the

priesthood cannot he made exactly coordinate at all points, lbut if it is a correct parallel at some key po·ints<it should illuminate •why it is wrong to attempt to separate the good integrally united with a given act.

Participation in the Eucharist is parallel to the marital act in so far as it too conveys several goods, the good of sacramental grace, for instance, and the good of united community activity. It is possible that .a priest may wish to pursue the good of united community activity :without pursuing the good of sacramental grace. He may lbe facing a community that includes both Catholics and non-Catholics and not wish to exclude any .from receiving the Eucharist. Knowing that he should not distriibute the Eucharist to non-Catholics, he may do something to invalidate the consecration--'he may not say the proper formula or may use invalid matter for the eucharistic ibread and ma.y ·then distribute it to all ipresent. (Admittedly it makes the exampJ.e somewhat preposterous to speculate th.at a priest who would have qualms about serving the Eucharist to non-Catholics would choqse to invrulidate the sacrament, but ieit us suspend our disbeilieffor the sake of the analogy!) Thus he wou1d gatheil' the community together but not violate the norms for distribution of the Eucharist. But it should be clear that it amounits to a sort of deception or even sa,.c:rilege to pretend that one is distributing the Eucharist while having deliberately depriv;ed the act oi one of its essential--1and sacred--'tlimensions. The intention of the priest may be good, hut he could achieve the end of unifying the COiillmunity ihy some other ceremony; he need not violate the meaning of the Euchrurist to do so. Or, he could distr.ibute the Eucharist only to the Catholics present and tolerate the " imperfection " of a not fuilly united 1oommunity. But he ought not to seek the good of .a united community at the expense of the good of the sacrament. The ultimate irony, 0if course, is that he is not truly a:chieving the good of union if he eX'c1udes the good of sruC!l'amenta:ll grace,for it is precisely the sharing in saicrrumental grace which effects the truly meaningful union of the assembly; any other sort of union is superficial in comparison.

Spouses, too, may be tempted to pursue one good of eonjugal union and not another. Yet they are faced with the same reality as was the priest; to pursue one good without the other is to fail to achieve either. As noted, the priest who distributes a non-consecrated " eucha1rist" achieves at best only a superficial uniting of the community, for he <fails to effect the sacramental igrace that is ,the source of true unity achieved through the reception of the Eucharist. Simila,rly, couples achieve only a. superficial union through contracepted interoourse; they do not achieve the union appropriate to spouses. As *Humanae Vitae* ,states, the goods of union and procreartion are inseparaible. **It** is curious that whereas other periods may have had some itroub1e articulating the unitive significance of the seA'llal act, our age seems peouliarly resistant to appreciating the procreaitive meaning of the sexual act. Mention was made earlier of the persistent debate over the proper ordering of the goods of marriage .. Again, *Humane Vitae* short-circuits this debate by asserting that the unitive and procreative significances of the sexual act are knit rtogether in an indissoluble nexus. This means not just that spouses *should* not seek one without the other, hut that indeed, they *cannot* achieve one without the other. Indeed, to seek one without the other is to violate the very meaning of the act. Thus, for a conjugal act to be unitive it must in some sense by procreative as weU (that is, at least *per se destinatus* to procreation), and for it truly to be procrertaive it must ·also be unitive (hence one of the major ohjeotions of the Church to artificial insemination even for spouses).

Certainly couples may believe that they are achieving the good of union through contracepted sexua1l intercourse,. but their ructions do not co,rrespond to their intentions. The fact is that contracepted intercourse yields neither the good of procreation nor the good of spousal union. To be sme, some sort of union takes place, for shared activity nearly always produces some sense of union among the pa.rHciparnts. For instance, strangers viewing a sporrting event together ex-

perie1mea sense of union with eaichother, hut such is a fleeting and inswbstantiail union. Sexuail interoourse, being by its nature a very intimate activiity, undoubted!l.ycreates bonds even when engaiged in with strangers, hut these are not the bonds appropriate to the spousal relationship. (Indeed, se:rual intercornrse engaged in with strangers oil' with non..;spousesis not only a source of union [alibeit superficial union] huit it is rulso a source of alienation, fior the seruaJ partners know that they do not intend the depth of union inherently promised by the act of sexual intercourse. Tlhere£ore, rulthough they have achieved some ilcind of bond, it is not an authenitic, trustworthy, or spousal bond.),

Nor does sexual inter:cowrserobbed of its procreative meaning create the ibond that is p:voper to spousal intercourse, for spousal union requires that the spouses give fiuLly of themselves to one another. Theirs is to he a tortrul Burt by using contraception they are withholding their fertility and all that being open to child-bearing entails. Being open to child-bearing is an essential feature .to spousal intercourse. And "being open to child-hearing" does not mean that the couple must intend to have a child in ea;ch and every act of sexual intercourse. Rather, it means that the oouple has done nothing to deprive 'an act o.f se:imal intercourse of its bruby-maikingpossibilities. Thus, those who are in.fertile whether through age or physicail abnorrmrulityor through the periodic infertility all iWomen experience by nature have not negated the pil'Ocreativemeaning of sexual interoorurse. If engaging in se:rual inte11oourse in a spous1aJ way, they are still ,express,ingthe desire for a union appropriate for spouses, a union that would accommodate children if children were a possibility. The meaning may ibe present in sexua;lintercourse only symbolica;llyhut it is ithere nonetheless.

The irndissolub1enexus ,between union and procreation is rooted deeply in human intentionality. This point may he clarified by considering that conjuga;l loVoe, the love of spouses, is tha,t which intends a faithful, lifetime commitment, the type

of commitment that is uniquely suited to the raising of children. It is rare (surrogate motherhood notwithstanding) forr one to wish to have children by a person for whom one does noit have the intensity of love that is propel1ly spousal; that is, .a sign that one lov;es another a;s a ispouse is one's winingness to have and raise children with this individual, the wilJingness to interlock one's life together with another in the way that is ·rupppropriate rfor raising faithful Christians. 'llheTefo1le, WTitten into the desire .for union charaderistic of the spousal love of Oh:dstianrsis an ordination to having children.

Let us oonsider somewhat fu1lther the claim that being open to hruby-making, at least symholicrully, is essential to spousal intercourse. Consider the common description of contmcepted sew:a:l intercourse -a:s "rrecreational sex." It is sewal intercourse that is engaged in for play. Now such sexual intel'course obviously could be engaged in with a large number of individuals. That is, most individuals could easily find others with whom ·they would enjoy" a romp in the hay." But when we strurt thinking of the baby-making possibilities of sexurul intercourse and start thinking of those with whom we are willing to share the responsibilities of child-ll'earinrg,the list of potentiail .partners for such sexual aiotiv:ity becomes quite short. And this is became we kno1w .what kind of bond is appropriate for ibeing spouses, what sort of conditions we must have to perfol'!1Il. the prurental *munus* pil'ope:rly. It is, in ·fact, the bond characteristic of spouses, i.e., one that is faithful and exclusive >and committed to a lifetime of union with another. Thus, thorse responsibly engaging in noncontracepted sexual intercourse with another are engaging in an activity which expresses the kind of commitment or love that spouses should have for one -another. Indeed, a sign that one loves ainother as a spouse is one's willingness to interfock one's life together with another in the way that is]or raising faitihful Christians. 'llherefore, WTitten into the desire for union characteristic of the spousal love of Christians is an ordination to having chHdren. On the other hand, those who rob their sexual intercourrse

of its pmcreative meaning aire also severely diminishing its unitive meaning; indeed it no longerr expresses the kind of union that spouses are meant to have with one another. Truly, spouses using ioontraception are desiring p1easme more than union, for they have deliberately diminished the unitive meaning of theh- aat.

And finally, just as a priest can pursue community union effectively through means other than an invalid Eucharist (and truly more effectively when sacrilege is not present), so, too, there are many way;s that spouses ma.y expreiss their ilove and foster ;union rupart from intercourse. W!hat is rwirong is deliberately to deprive a act of the essential good of fertility, aill in the name of pleasure. To do so is to use one's *munus* improperly; it is to be selective about the way that one wi.rll serve God through the gifts and 'Vesponsibili.ties which He has entrusted to one. The wrongness of the use of contraception, then, can 1be seen not only ias ;a violation of natural laiw hut also ais a repudiation of a *munus* which one has freely embraced with a view to accepting a:ll the responsibilities entailed by the *munus.* Spouses have no obligation to en:gruge in ·sexual intercourse at any givien time, but when they do they not interfere with the divine mission entrusted to them.

In the fi.rst de£nition of conjugal love offered by *Humanae Vitae,* the ennobling il'esiponsihifity of parenthood is highlighted. Section 8 reaids:

> Truly, conjugal love most clearly manifests to us its true nature and nobility when we recognize that it has its origin in the highest source, as it were, in God, Who is Love and Who is the Father, from whom all parenthood *[paternitas]* in heaven and earth receives its name.
>
> It is false, then, that marriage results from chance or from the blind course of natural forces; God the Creator wisely and providently established marriage with the intent that He might achieve His own designs of love through men. Therefore, through the mutual gift of self, which is proper and exclusive to them, the spouses seek a communion of persons, by which, in turn, they perfect themselves so that in the procreation and education of new lives, they might share a service with God.

Moreover, for the baptized, matrimony is endowed with such dignity thrut it is a sa;cramental sign of grace representing tihe union of Christ and his Church.

The notion that the spouses make a mutual gift of themselves through procreation and that they achieve their perfection through parenthood deserves greater a.na;lysis ithan it has received. It needs to ibe mo1le folly app'l'eciated that children represent the most incarnational and eternal union of the love of spouses. '.Dhe child, heing the creation of the very genetic mixing of the spouses, is 1literailly one flesh come from two. The has an immortal soul and thus r:erpresentsas weill an eternal continuation of the love bet:ween spouses. In understanding, expl'essing, and ,being faithful to this love ordained to procreation and therefore 011dainedto eternal union, the spouses undergo what *Humana,e Vitae* calls the mutual peirfection of themselves as they attempt to he responsible parents to their offspring. Spouses regular1ly find themselves developing and S'eeking to develop certain virtues (e.g. generosity, pa,tience, tenderness, rigor) because they need them to be good pa.rents; they also Labor to help their spouses acquire these virtues and ultimately, of course, their children. The word *munus* also points to tihis phenomenon of married life.

The Interiority Of *"Munus,,*

To this po,int the discussion of *munus* has focused largely upon the external dimensions of *munus,* upon its status as a task bestowed as an honor on man by God. What is needed now is a consideration of the kind of intetrnal benefits gwined by one who eagerly embraces and seeks to £ulfiilil his or her vocation, mission, or *munus.* What we need to do is focus on the interior changes in the indiviidual who lives his or her married commitment faithfully. And we wish to place particular emphasis on the role of children in fostering these interior changes. When *Humanae Vitae* asserts that one of the defining characteristics of marri a,ge is its fruitfulness, it states:

[Conjugal] love is fruitful since the whole of the love is not contained in the communion of the spouses, but it also looks beyond itself and seeks to raise up new lives.

Humanae Vitae cites further fmm *Gaudium et Spes:*

Marriage and conjugal love are ordained by their very nature to the procreating and educating of children. Offspring are clearly supreme gift of marriage, a gift which contributes immensely to the good of the parents themselves.

This final portion of 1tb.e paper will, very briefly, elaJborate on this iclaim of *Gaudium et Spes* and *Humanae Vitae* that children contribute immensely to the good of the parents. The fundamental point is that having children and raising children is a source of great good for the parents, that having to meet the responsibilities entailed in the *munus* of transmitting human ,life woi'ks to transform individuals into more virtuous individuals-it works an attitudinal change that enables them to be better Christians.

He:ve we wiH be ,drawing upon the wo:vk of Pope John PauJ II, in particular £roim. passages in his book *Sources of Renewal,* which he wrote (as Kaml Woy;ty1a) ,a;s a commentary on Vatican II, and foom *Familiaris Consortia,* itself a marvelous commentary on *Hwmanae Vitae.* In these works, the Pope puts a. 1gfleat deal of emphasis on man's intern:wl life, on his need for .transformation in Omist. The '.focus on interiority is characteristic of P:ope John Paul II; it flows foom his emphasis on per'SonaJist vru1ues, from his inte:vest in the kind of self-transformation one wo:vks upon one's self through one's morrul choices. Porpe John P1aul II has labored hard to dra;w the attention of moralists to personwl]st values, the values of self-mastery and generosity, for instance, that are fostered by moral choices. He repeatedly depiots life as a continuous process of transformation. For instance, in *Familiaris Consortio* he states,

What is needed is a continuous, permanent conversion which, while requiring an interior detachment from every evil and an adherence to good in its fullness, is brought about concretely in steps which

lead us ever forward. Thus a dynamic process develops, one which advances gradually with the pI'ogressive integration of the gifts of God and the demands of His definitive and absolute love in the entire personal and social life of man." (FC 9)[25]

The task o[life, then, is to become ever more like Christ through fidelity to the demands of one's oaHing in life.

In book *Sources of Renewal,* Karol Woytyfa pfaces great stress on the " atti.tude od: participation " Tequiled from Christians in Christ's mission,. which he calls the " central theme of the Conciliar doctrine concerning the People of God." [26] There he makes reference to Christ's threefold power of *munus* as priest, p'I'ophet, and king in which Christians must participate. He maintains that sha1ring in this power of *munus* is not simply la matter of sharing in certain tasks; rather it is more fundamenta1lly a participation in certain attitudes. He tells us that man has the power of"' task' or' office' *[muniis in tria munera Christi]* together with the ability to perform it." He goes on to observe,

In speaking of participation in the threefold power of Christ, the Council teaches that the whole People of God and its individual members share in the priestly, prophetic and kingly offices that Christ took upon himself and fulfilled and in the power which enabled him to do so.... The Council teaching allows us to think of participation in Christ's threefold office not only in the ontological sense but also in the attitude of testimony and give it a dimension of its own, as it we.re an interior form derived from Christ himself-the form of his mission and his power.27

The claim that participating in a *munus* involves not just the power to act, nor s,imp:J.y the responsibility to complete an external act, hut ailso requires an internal atUitudinal change on the part of Christians adds another dimension to the complex-

[25] Translations for *Familiaris Consortio* are from *The Role of the Christian Family in the Modern World* (Boston, Mass.: St. Paul Editions, no date given).

[26] Karol Wojtyla, *Sources of Renewal,* trans. P. S. Falla (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1980), 219.

[21] Ibid., 220.

ity orf this wo!l'ld. In *Sources of Renewal,* Karol Woytyla outlines the different attitudinal changes !Vequired to be faithful participants in Olmst's *munus.* He identifies a certain aitirude associated ,with each of the three *mun.era* of priest, prophet, or king.

tt is possible to crystalize these attitudes in the following w:ay. In conjunction with the *munus* of *priesthood* shared by the faity, the attitude needed is ·a sacrificial one, whereby " one commits himself and the wodd to God." To explain this attitude, he cites from a. key passage in *Gaudium et Spes:*

> It follows, then,. that if man is the only creature on earth that God has wanted for its own sake;, man can fully discover his true self only in a sincere giving of himself (GS 24).[28]

Shwring in the *prophetic munus* of Christ requires that spouses work to bring the truth of Christ to the wol'lld through evangelization. And the *kingly munus* •is best exercised by man not in rule over the world but in rule o¥er himself. Thus, fo he a priest one must be ,self-sirorificing, to be a prophet one must evangelize, and to ,be a king one must govern--.and govern one's self above rull.

It is in *Fa.miliaris Consortia* that we find more detailed instruction aibout ihow spouses are to participate in the thl'eefold *munera* of Christ, how they are to be priests, prophets, and kings, or how they are to be self-sacrificing, evangelical, and self-mastering. *Familiaris Consortia* speaks specifically about the part in the threefold *munus* of Christ; it states:

> The Christian family also builds up the Kingdom of God in history through the everyday realities that concern and distinguish its *state of life.* It is thus in *the love between husband and wife and between the members of the family-a* love lived out in all its extraordinary richness of values and demands: totality, oneness, fidelity, and fruitfulness-that the Christian family's participation in the prophetic, priestly, and kingly mission of Jesus Christ and of his Church finds expression and realization. Thc::reforelove and life constitute the nucleus of the saving mission of the Christian family in the Church and for the Church. (FC 50)

2s Ibid., 223.

In the remainder orf *Familiaris Consortia,* he explains how the family folfi.Ms its. participation in Chmst"s threefold *munus.* He identifies the *praphetic* office with the obligation of the family to evangelize, especially evangeli:z;eits own members. The Pope reheaxses the obligation of pairents to be educators of their children, especially in matters of the faith. *Familiaris Consortio* refers to the evangelization of children ias an original and irreplruooableministry (FC 58). It states:

> The family must educate the children for life in such a way that each one may fully perform his or her role [*munus]* according to the vocation received from God.

For the family, the *priestly* office is fulfilled by engaging "in a dialogue with God through the sacraments, through the offering of one's life, and through praye'I.'" (FC *55).* And the *kingly* office 'is fiulfilled when the family offers service to the larger community, especially to the needy. Note this powerful passage:

> While building up the Church in love, the Christian family places itself at the service of the human person and the world, really bringing about the " human advancement" whose substance was given in summary form in the Synod's Message to families: " Another task for the family is to form persons in love and also to practice love in all its relationships, so that it does not live closed in on itself, but remains open to the community,. moved by a sense of justice and concern for others, as well as by a consciousness of its responsibility towards: the whole of society." (FC 64)

fl'he family participates in the thveefold *munus* of Ghrist by being true to its own *munus.* In the previous sections of *Familiarris Consortio* which laid the foundation for the discussion of the family's participation in the tffieefold *munus* of Christ, the Pope sketched out the interior changes to be gained when the family is true to its *munus.* What Pope John Paul II hopes for from marriage that ·it wi11 result in the formation of a new heart within the .spouses, the children, and ultima.tely within all of society. This heart wiH he one that is lovmg, generous, and self-giving (FC The family serves to build up the

kingdom of God insofar as lit is a school of fove; as the Pope rputs it, "the essence and role of the *munus* of the family ll!re ii.n. the fu1al analysis specified :by lov;e" (FC 17). He goes on: " Hence the family has the mission to guard, reveal and communicate love." *Fa.miliaris Consorti,o* states that:

> The relationships between the members of the family community are inspired and guided by the law of "free-giving". By respecting and fostering personal dignity in each and every one as the only basis for value, this true giving takes the form of heartfelt acceptance, encounter, dialogue, disinterested availability, generous service and deep solidarity. (FC 48)

'l1he text also states:

> All members of the family, each according to his or her own gift of *munus,* have the grace and responsibility of building, day by day, the communion of persons, making the family " a school of deeper humanity"; this happens where there is care and love for the little ones, the sick, the aged; where there is mutual service every day; when there is a sharing of goods, of joys and of sorrows. (FC

A key phr1ase for orur purposes is the next 1line: " A fundamental opportunity tfor tbuiilding such a communion *is* constituted hy the education exchanged 1betiween pruvents and children, in which each gives and receives ... " 1and "Family communion oain only be preserved and perfected through a great spirit of sacrifice. It requires, in fact, a ready iand generous openness of each and rull to understanding, to fo!l1bearance, to pardon, to reconciliation." These passa.ges suggest the kinds of virtues needed for aind cultivated hy good family life. Success[ully adapting to family life rosters love and the rubility to forgive, and a whole host of related virtues. Both the parents and the cihildren and ultimately the whoJe of society stand to· g110W in ,these virtues as the famiily attempts to he true to its nature.

J:he *munus* of transmitting life, of 1educating children, of being pairents, then, yield multiple goods. Creating a family where self-giving and a1l the virtues might ibegin to flourish is

an activity that has purposes. Certainly, it works towards achieving God's end of producing mo1le :souls to sh.are with Him eternaJ bliss. Hia:ving children also heilps parents mature and acquire many of the virtues they need to be .fully human and fully Christian. Furthermore, building families is to rthe good of the whole of society, for generosity :and fove should flow irom the family to ;the lrurger community, especially to the poor and needy.

What is key here for an understanding of *Humanae Vitae* is to recognize that to reject tihe p:mcreative ipo:wer of sexuiaJ1 tinteroomse is not 1s:imply to reject some ibiologioal power; it is to reject ;a God-given *munus* and aill that entails. The resistance to the procreative rpo:wer of sexual intercourse that accompainies the desfoe to use contraception predictably involves an underestimation of the value of the family-to God, to the spou:ses, and to the larger society. Ultimately spouses must come to reruliz.e that to reject the *munus* of transmitting life, to limit the number of bhey havce, is to !limit the ,ber of gifts and blessings that God gives :to them, it is to limit the gifts that they return to God, and it is to fonit their opporrtunities and abi,Jity to grow as Christians.

A FAOT ABOUT THE VIRTUES

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PHILIPPA FOOT remarks in *Virtues and Vices* that "with the nota;ble exception of Peter Gea;ch hardly 100.yone sees ·any difficulty in the thought that virtues may sometimes be di·splayed in bald ructions."[1] That a man may use his courage to deplorable ends; that 'a tea.ah.er ma.y show charity in igiving a miudent undeserved credit-these seem to ibe hardly problema.tic possibilities. Yet Aquinas upholds •a definition of morrul virtue as " a good quality o[the mind, by which we live rightly, of whioh no one cain make bad use, ... "[2] And Aristotle's conception of the man 0l:f p:riactica:l reason as the standard of moral virtue likewise seems to p!'lec1ude a virtue's being misused.[3] Times change, and rupparently eV'en virtue is not what it used to be. Nevertheless I mean here to survey the resour.ces of moral psyichology in the tradition of .Airistotle to see what sort of grounding can be found for the no-bad-use thesis.

Presumably Geach stamds wlmost afone today on this question, because the more traditional view would seem defensible only if it is taken as analytic. We could stipulate that an action wilil be called *virtuous* only if on balance it is the wisest alternative aivaifaible to the agent, but the utility of such a

1 Philippa Foot, *Virtues and Vices* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 15. In *After Virtue* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 216, Macintyre finds Hume, Kant, Mill, and Rawls taking virtues as dispositions to conform to certain rules. To the extent that rules are unreliable, the virtues will be too.

2 Aquinas, *Summa theoiogiae,* I-II, q.55, a.4.

a Aristotle, *Nioomaohean Flthios* 1106b36-7a2, 1113a30-31.

concept would be doubtfrnl, and 'virtue' would seem to name no real thing. The'1'eare, after aH, appwrently anomalous cases, as wihen a teacher is moved to indulgence by an undeserving student's plea and seems to show kindness to a fault. The de-ifense oif the no-bad-use thesis requires us to deny that real kindness is shown here. But if no better justification for the can be offered than that the action is wrong and so cannot be virtuous, the thesis wil:l express only an a11bitrary decision about how to use 'virtue ' and related terms.

But if such deni1alscan he justified by appeal to facts about human nature, then the no.:brud-usethesis itself may perhaps be taken a;s descriptive of certain realities constitutive of human life. After considel'ing some of the conditions of vir:tuous action and the possibility of *degrees* of virtue (section III), I shaill argue (IV and V) that the opening sentence of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* affords a bctua:l ba;sis for sustaining the no-had-use thesis as descriptive of virtues as we find them; that if "every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good " is perhaps an overstatement, still the humanness and *intelligibility* of an action would seem to depend on its aiming at some good; and that it is largely by trying to consider actions independently of the goods they aim a;t that we imagine virtues able to se1we unworthy ends. Payffig fuH re-ga11d to the purposiveness of human action and the desires expressed in it will also make it possible (VI) to avnid oonoluding with Aristotle that the virtues are inseparable from eaich other. I conclude (VII) with some brief refteetion on the meaning of my departures from Aristotle. Before offering my own interpretation of the Aristotelian resources, though, I briefly contend for the reality of moral virtues (as tiraditiona1ly understood) against conventioIJJa1istinterpretations ('section I) and then (H) consider an ailtemative account (roughly Geach's) of the nature of the virtues that would sa¥e the no-bad-use thesis.

I. *Virtues as Teleological Di8}Jositions*

Why indeed speak of vi1rtuesat a1l? Behavior would seem to be describahle and e:x:p1a.inahle--inthe sense of being suhsum-aible under "patterns" -without recourse to moraiIly evalua-tive language. Rather than describe one's behavior or char-acter as " courageous „. or "temper.ate," for instance, with the suggestion that such ihehavior is always admimb1e, ·We might either substitute moraiIly neutral terms like "·fea1rless" or (perhaps) "frugal," or agree to use the old words in a non-eva1uative way, as we already implicitly <lo in supposing that courage can he good or had depending on the circumstances. Alternative, non-prescriptive vocahula.ries a:re avaiilable, and it needs to be shown that there is any place in descriptions rfor evaluative terms naming virtues and vices as traditionally understood. At least these terms would seem to be eliminaJbfo in favor of non-prescriptive ones.

Briefly, the argument for the place of the virtues in the moral scheme of things rests on the claim ,that they are reali-ties without reference to which action is inexplicable. Trwdi-tionai1ly,virtues are said to have a rational, teleological aspect, being ordered to the happiness of the swbject, as the morally neutraJl qualities are not, and to the extent that hehavfor is in-deed teleologicrul we may expect teleologiml conoepts to de-1scribe and explain it better than ones. Con-sider, for instance, a:ltemativ;e explanations of a man's leaping into a raging river to save a drowning child. To attribute the action, in a morally neutral ·way, to a :fearlessdelight in danger is at least (roughly) to suggest that where dangerous e:x1Cite-ment is to be had, he tends to pursue it. To attribute it to the virtue of courage is to suggest (roughly) that where danger or pain (of some sorts, at least) must ibe faced to achieve a greait good, he will face it willingly. ConceivaNy, corresponding sorts orf peopfo exist, .the thril1l-seeking and ,the courageous, but they are not the same people, and to explain their behavior our vncabulary should reflect the difference hetween them. The

foarless thrill-seeker might just as readily have risked his life on a oasuail dare, whereas the icoura,geous man, who faces danger or pain only for the sake of an o'Verriding good, would eonsider that sort of risk pointless and refuse it. He does not faoe dainger:orusexcitement for its own sake, 'and ihis saving the ohi1d is explained badly if it is implied tihat he would.

Courage in this example counts as a virtue beca;use it is "ordered towa1d " a good life, resting as it does on reasonable or even generous concern for others a:s well as for oneself; indifference to the plight of others, or to one's 01wn plight so far as it goes, suggests a mean, sterile ,life, or a passive one. A predHection for risk or danger for its own saike, on the other hand, wiH be useful or not, depending on the circumstances. And so, to the extent that people a:re genuinely virtuous and aim to,ward a good life, there wi11 be a poor fit between a nonteleologioa:1vocabula.ry and human characte1r and action.

Indeed, a good l'eason to prefer tihe teleological vocabufa.ry of the virtues to a descriptive but nonevaluative vocabulary will be that the latter vocahulary does not describe anybody. T,wo paragraphs befotre this one, I conceded that oonceivrubly someone might simply seek thrills; oonceivruhly too one might he assertive *tou,t court.* Such cha.racters a;re perhaps (barely) oonoeivaible, though it is ha11d to ima1gine anyone's *always* disregarding considerations of prudence entirely. Indeed, if in fact Aristotle is right, and all action aims towa:rd some good, even imprudently adventurous or assertive action is at least a failed attempt at virtuous or sensihle living. A degree of judgmerrt, howe¥eɫ, inadequate, is therefore essential to any discernibly adventmous or assertive behavior at all, ail.ld to describe it in a nonevaJuative vocaibulruryis to treat it a:s beyond rational cont.ml, like a sneeze. Such a descriptive style may ha,ve its p1ace, as perhaps in the treatment of pathologies, but that will 1be not because it is generally more clinical or precise but because in such special :contexts practical reasonaib1enessis supposed to hav;e been short-circuited. For understanding ol'dinairy human character, rteJeo1ogica.1concepts of virtues would seem to be indispensable.

Understanding .of the moral virtues here has rested on the logically prior concept of *a good life,* OT *happiness.* For the purposes o[this paper that concept will have to ibe taken for granted and left unanalyzed.

II. *A No-Bad-Use Thesis*

It will not do to *stipulate* that actions are virtuous if and only if, a.11 things consideil'ed, they al'e prudent and wise, be-oaiuse the stipulative account, making the thesis analytic, forfeits the explanatory power of reforence to virtues. If teleological concepts lrure to be explanatory, a virtuous action shou1d be intelligible in light of the character and circumstances, and unless the action is thoug1ht to express that character, e.g. hy displaying a particular vill'tue, it cannot be fitted .into any sort of pattern and be to that extent understood. '.Dhe stipulrutive acoount wowd make the concept of a virtuous *a0tion* fundamental, inteUig.iible in itself; on such an account an action is virtuous 1becaiuse it is the right thing to do, and the charader of the agent is irrelevant. But philosophical literature is full of characters whose behavior is " correct" yet lacking virtue, beginning with the conventionaily just man described by Gfauoon in the *Republfo,*[4] and the citizen-soldier orf Aristotle's example, who stands his ground against the enemy from £erur of Jegal or sooiwl ipenalties.[5] We are to understand that the oorrect behavior of these characters does not express the intelligent dispositions in question and 1does not fit into an aH-round good 1life. Right actions, then, cannot be judged in themselves to be virtuous, rus .the " stipuJative" account requires.

Peter Geach understands virtuous actions as expressions of chruracter and so is in a good position to deny that virt.ues can ibe in had :actions. A had ,a;ction, after all, !however :admimhle it may be mom some abstract ;point of view, is sure

[4] Plato, *Republic* 359b-360d.

[5] *NFJ* 1116a16-20.

to manifest a deficient character, which a virtuous action presuma1bly could not do. 'Yet Geach too :finally seems merely to stipulate what will count 1as a virtuous deed. He writes that " endurance or defiance of danger in pursuance of a 1w1 1ong end is not virtuous 1and in my hook is not cou11ageous either." [6] There is he11e an implicit psychology: Virtues are dispositions engaged by circumstances that reveal ,the agent's chara:eter. But what w1 1l enable him to deny that a ceictain action really is virtuous win be an unsupported stipulation about " pursuance of a wrong end." In that case an apparently virtuous agent's unvirtuous ads (if the is allowed any a,t all) seem to demand an explanatfon, especially if virtues are thought of as unfailingly effectiive. One explanation, favored for the most part hy Geach, is to 1argue that such an agent's past virtue was unreal; Aristotle's explanation, tihat such virtue is not "eomplete" hut only" natural," 1w1H be considered in section IV.

In Geach's example, drawn :firom the novel *Ashes and Diamonds,* [7] 1a Polish judge has heen a model citizen and a pillar of justice. But ,when he finds himself in ;a Nazi concentration camp, he tortures fellow prisoners to save his o"l'm skin. On Geach'!s interripretation the judge's past virtue is thereby shown to have 1been only provisional, "and therefore was not virtue at all." [8] Furthermore, Geach concludes that " any 1ascription of virtue other than couraige may he defeated if 1a faek of cornrage is established." [9] The conclusion that provisional v,irtue is not real virtue at all apparently rests on the thesis that no action can he tmly virtuous unless it springs from dispositions neither too weak nor too strong; they must he so perfectly measured tha:t they could under no circumstances lead their possessor astray. Such a position may 1be ca1led a Measured Disposition Theory. It has the charm of preserving the purity

s Peter Geach, *The Virtues,* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977)' 160.

7 Geach gives no further information on this source.

s Geach, 161.

9 Ibid.

of truly virtuous dispositions, for 1any disposition that ever proves to he either eX!cessive or deficient turns out fo be no virtue. But it :seems excessively hrursh in tihat it implies that noibody can be recognized to be virtuous at aill until he has endu1 1ed the utmost testing. Virtue is either unconditional or nothing at aill and so would seem ·to he a praotica;lly unrealizable ideal. The advantage of tying the •assessment of action to the cha.racter is that Geach can now argue, with Aristotle, that an ascription o[virtue to an action may he defeated if under some circumstances the •agent would fail to show the virtue in question. But the implicit scepticism in his conception of the can say what past virtue has not been merely provisional?-is a high price to pay for that aidv:antage.

The rull-or-none character of such virtues, reminiscent as it is of Stoicism, is symptomatic of the neglect of the relationship 1betwieen action and ipurpo·se. Admittedly, the Measured Disposition Theory has in some .ways followed Aristotle. But al·though !both theories allow ascriptions of virtue to actions to be defeated in light of other ·aictions, Geach claims more than Aristotle. The courage of Aristotle's citizen-soldier can be out, a:s can the justice of Geach'.s Polish judge, and so of rboth men it might be •said that their doing the right thing was priovis.ionail: the •Soldier needs the threat of penalties; the judge needs the assurance of physical ·comfort. But we axe to suppose that the citizen-so1dier •stands his ground only to avoid penalties, while the truly courageoUJs one does 1so ".for a noble end." [10] (I suggest ,below that this 1will have something to do with loving his city as he ought.) The citizen-soldier might, for 1all .Aristotle says, not care a fig for eouraige or for his city, and so his doing the right thing is no indication of virtuous character. Tihe Polish judge, on the other hand, hrud presumably ·served conscientiously, eager to 1see justice done, at least until the personwl cost got too high. Prresumably some of his actions-turning down a "safe" hribe, for instance--could be

1-0 *NFJ* 1115hl0-13, 20-24; 1116al0-13; 1117b5-9. Aristotle's own unhelpful account of 'the noble' is found in *Rhet.* 1364b27-28, 1366a33-7b20.

only with reference to his love for justice. Unlike the citizen-soldier, then,. the judge did the right thing for the right reason, in the right spirit. To suppose that fove of justice never motivated ihim (because under severe conditions that fov:e [ailed) is Jike supposing that a man who stopped eating flounder when the pl.lice r:eached ten dollars a pound must never have ·liked it at ·all. In short, Aristotle is ready to recon- :sider ascriptions of virtue where the presumed motive turns out not to have heen operatiV'e; a Measured Disposition Theory withdraws the ascription wihere e¥en the best moti¥e is found to have 1been imperfectly cruliiooated.

III. *Some Conditions of Virtuous Action*

The ascription of an al·l-o·r-none character to the virtues can be a¥oided in a fairly natural way, I think, even if virlues are thought of as qualities "of which no one can make had use." For it does not follow from the thesis that a v·irtue cannot be put to haid use that one who has it can never faiJ with respect to it. The possibility of failure and of degrees of virtue can be made intelligible in light of Augustine's idea of virtue as " the ordel'ling of lmre." [11] Roughly, to lhe virtuous would be to love goods to tihe rproper degree and in the right way, where action is of course integrrul to the lo¥e. In Aristotle's •argument, following Plato, since virtues are concerned with p1easuTes and pains, they require us " to enjoy and he pained by the things we should" (1104h12-18). Now notorious1ly we can love persons and things without always treating them as we ought or :would wish. We may then say that we do not love as we ought oT that our love is imperfect, hut ·we do not necessarily oon- 1c1ude that the love is a :siham. In spite of seeing some failings, an observer may grant that we love someone, for instance, if OUT treatment of that person o¥er time makes 1best sense on the supposition that rwe do love him or her. As for virtues, I have been 'Supposing that to act virtuously is not merely fo do

u .Augustine, *On the Morals of the Catholic Ohurch,* I, 15.

a good thing, nor even to do it 1because:it i:s rt.he right thing to do, hut also to a;ct out of appropriate loves, concerns, and inclinations. (These will *include* a conoern to, "do the right thing.") Hut it does not follow that one must he utterly incorruptible, with loves in per.feet ooder, to have a virtue and act virtuously, any more than love of a person must he perlect .and unfaiiling to ibe love. Indeed, almost everyone has the virtues to 'Some degree. As Geach himself argues, for instance, one needs some courage even to learn to ride a bicycle; an excessive fear of taking a fa1l couM deter one f.rom evffi' heginning.[12] Ev,en the Polish jrudge,.then, must be Cl"editedwith some coumge, ·and similar arguments will_apply to other virtues. Admittedly it is by considering actions in trying cixcumstances that we distinguish between particularly virtuous persons and moml medioorities, hut still one may aict virrtuous!y ii: moved hy appropriate 1concernsand dispositions even if under more trying crncumstances he would have failed. And again, as in ascribing one's actions to love, it ·seems reasonruble to ascribe behavior to virtuous dispositions if it cannot be reasonahly e:x;plained away by less flattering interpretations or he understood as simply tJhe erusiest thing to do under the ciroomstrunces.

In keeping, then, ·with the rejection of the Measured Disposition Theory and for pvesent pUll'poses,I suggest that for an action to qualify as virtuous the following conditions are especially relevant:

1) The action must spring from concerns (a) most appropriate to the circumstances, (b) characteristic of the agent, and (c) valued by the agent, who must be committed to maintaining them.

2) The *degree* of virtue exhibited in an action seems to vary with the amount of "moral work " done, or the level of difficulty of the moral task. A worthy action shows the more courage, for instance, the more frightful it is to a reasonable person.

3) The action must not *display* these concerns inordinately. However, the motivating concerns need not be ordinate in themselves.

12 Geach, 152.

Some preliminary amplification in order. As I use the term, a concern is *inordinate in itself,* e:reessiv:e or deficient, if in some ciroomstances it would he exhibited inaippropriately (and so be oil" fail where it is needed ('and so prove deficient).

Condition I (a) is meant to disquailify characters like Aristotle's citizen-soldier from the claim to true virtue. For a soldier to stand his ground for fear of punishment may not be in itself a bll!d motive, but to qualify as virtuous the action must 1be cwried out, ais Aristotle says: *(NE* 11151b22-4, etc.), " for :a noble end," which in this case would seem to mean in part out of love for one's city. This is perhaps a most ruppropriate concern in that it is the sort of disposition ,which enriches life, and it seems to he just this life-enriching quality that makes the concern " noble." Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle :all seem to find a, [uJ.ly human life inconceivable without such loyalties. Moreover this concern, unlike the desire to save one's skin, is a significant mor:al achievement, and it can be counted on to motivate courageous behavior even where the threat of punishment is rubsent. Aristotle's requirement that virtuous actions must be intended i.for their own sake (1105a33-4) would not seem to require that actions be intended without regard for their intended results, as if, e.g., holding one's ground against a;ttaJckers were intrinsically worthwhile, hut only that one's act, conceived with its purpose so as to he recognizrubly virtuous, e.g., as deifending one's city against attack, be intended for its own saike and not out of some less praiseworthy concern.

The point of condition I (h) is that one's good deed, however we11 motivated, blls short of v:irtue if it does not spring from a firm disposition. A failed one disciplined act of does not spring from a settled disposition---0ne would hardly appeal to the dieterr's temperance as a factor in explaining the action-and so the virtue is not in evidence.

Condition I (c) requires that besides actually acting in accordance with a virtue one must value the dispositions in play to be acting virtuously. If he £nds tha:t his dispositions and

.concerns are becoming less admiraible, he must he the sort of person who resolves to discipline ihimself. A man who simply his whims in eating and would slide into gluttony if his appetites so Jed him shows no evidence of temperance, however wholesome his diet may be. Being uncritica1lof his desiTes, he is only a somewhat anaesthetized sensualist.

Condition *3* disqualifies well-motivated actions fu-om the claim to a virtue wihere under the circumstances they offend against other virtues and should not be undertaken. A teacher who raises an undeserving student's grwde out of commendable regard for the student's tender foelings may he committing an injustice against others. In that case the concern for the student's feellings presuma;bly should not lead him to raise his girade, ,and if it does, the action £ails to meet condition *3* and does not sho·wkindness.

The rider on condition *3* allows that a correct and properly motivated action may be virtuous ev;en if, ilike the Polish judge's justice, the concern and "love" motivating his deeds prove unequal to later tests.

A.rt uh.is po,int condition *3* can only be taken as a stipulation conv:enient to save the no-bad-use thesis, for it denies the virtuous chwraJcter of any action which on balance is unwise, where we are orften tempted to see a generally admfil.aibletendency in ·excess and conclude that virtues can be misused. The Aristotelian's different ·Way of tailking can be shown to be preferable and to refer to morail reailities only (if iat aH) hy the explanatory power of the concepts it underwxites. But if condition *3* can he shown to exprress a view of virtues uniquely ahle to illuminate action and our judgments about it, perhaps little more can be asked 0£ it.

I now try to show how condition 3 can he supported hy Aris- dictum on action's aiming at some good.

IV. *No Virtues in Excess*

At least it must be admitted that generally rudmimble *tenderwies* can be displayed in deploraible actions. Consider GeraJl'!d,

who daringly mces his car to a conference. He may be thought to show courage, even if he is speeding just for fun, needlessly endangering life and property. We might deny the virtue of this speeding merely by defining ' courage ' a:s applying on:y to mmmendable action. But can we disco¥er a better basis on which to do so? Conditiorn 3 for ,an 'act1on's heing virtuous seems p:mpitious. But at first glance it reads like an *ad hoc* stipulation to save the no-had-use thesis. To upihold this condition we wiH argue first for the intevdependence of practical reason *(phronesis)* and the moral virtues in one's character in general, then (section V) for bhe incompatibility of morail virtue and uncr'easonableness in particular actions. I assume that ructions displaying concerns inordinately are practically unreasonable.

H Aristotle is right in saying that " evcery action and pursuit, is thought to la1m at some good," then even Gerard must do what he does for the sake of some good, be it to reach his conference on time, amuse himself, impress his companions, or whatever. The action may :be foolish, being unwarranted by any sufficiently extenuat,ing circumstances, hut there must be some good and some corresponding love for it, which impels him to such action; and there must he a. corresponding relative indifference, we may suppose, to ioonsiderations of safety and legality or a lack o.f awareness of the risks involved. In fact, severa1l possible explanations of Gerard's speeding come to mind, each of which could ,be trrue to a. degree:

1) Gerard is unaware of the risks involved in his speeding.

Gerard is aware of the risks but finds them exhilarating and speeds for the thrill of it.

3) Gerard is aware of the risks but considers them outweighed by the urgency of his appointment or by some other good to be realized.

To the extent that (1) is true, there is no courage involved in the speeding, for though the action may spring from an appropriate concern (to reach tihe conference), it sho1ws no wiH-

ingness to face risks appropriately or otherwise for a worthy ;purpose and so is not virtuous. Condition 2 required that to he exerciised a virtue must do " work" against some resistance (e.g. fear of danger), and here there is no ;resistance to over-icome since Gerard does not see his speeding as dangerous.

To the exterrt that (9?) is true, Gerard may sound merely pathological. Perhaps he is, hut many activities skydiving and hu1lfighting are attractive to people who find the dangerr exhilamting, and 'We often speak of their feats as courageous. Of course Gerard's daring is less a;dmirable in that his speed-ing directly endangers othe;rs, as skydiving does not; hut we may ialso hesitate to think of such thrill-seeking as courageous fo;r a more significant łeason: to the extent that Gera:rd acts merely for the pleasure of eX!hilaration, he does not act out of any no:ble concern, such as to save a Jife or preserve a city. (Nohody contends that such exhilaration is tbasic to a good Hie, wihe1leas some have argued that pa!rticipation in the politi-cal 1life of the *polis* is) . And if Gera:rd is daring only for the eX!citement he can enjoy, there is no reason to think he will perform well, or even try to perform well, where courage is re-quired in ciircumsta1J.1ces that do not excite him. Indeed, Gera1rd's daring is unpromising precisely because he is not act-ing for " :a noble end ": his speeding is not the expression of any concern remotely necessary for a, good Efe, neither as exer-cising an va:lua;ble disposition nor as expressing a fove .for any good to be achieved.

To the extent that ,explanation (3) is true, Gerard speeds where a morre discerning person would not because of a false impJicit assessment of conflicting considerations. 'Do deny that courage is shown here because there is poor judgment will sound Jike :scholastic artificiality and apriorism; but for Aris-totle, the contention that virtue "in the main sense" (as op-posed to natura1l simulacm found in children ,and animals) "cannot come into iheing without *phr'Onesis"* (EN 1144hl 7-18) ocr that" :without *phronesis* virtues cannot erist" (ib21-22) is no stipulation hut the conclusion of an argument. He con-

tends that a sho1w of unintelligent daring, for instance, is evidence 0,£ only a capacity .for courageous hehavior, a "natural virtue " 1which must he educated to grow into virtue " in the main sense": "]for all men think that each part of one's character exists in him hy nature in some sense, since from the moment of birth we are in some sense just and temperate and 1brave and the like" (1144ib4-7). The full virtues are apparently folfillments of the natural virtues, those fulfi11ments being achieved hy one's acquiring prwctica1 reason.

But it is difficult to sray how practical reason and the natural dispositions are related without understanding the former merely to govern the latter, a:s judging *when* to he daring, *when* to be tempemte, etc. And this inter:pretation lea¥es the essential nature of the dispositions unaffected, still mere executive rapacities which can be misused. Nor :are Aristotle's imruges too help£ul here, for he compares the person of merely natural virtue to 'a strong body stumbling a;bout for lack of vision (1144bl0-13) . As vision would seem to ,guide strength without essentially changing it, so pra:clica:l Teason wou1d seem on.J.y to direct the natural dispositions without otherwise altering or educating them. In that case it can be only !by a sort of convention that we refer to these dispositions as virtues only when they ·are exercised reasonably, :for they wouM seem to be the same capacities however they are used. And it is undeair why virlues could not exist without *phrone:M,* as ,strength can exist without vision.

There is a point to :be gained, of course, 1by packing moral vision into the concept of the different moral virtues. To anticipate: :IT moral vision and the virtues can he shown to constitute naturail unities mther than arbitrarily associated quailities, then there need he nothing stipulative in the claim that moral :virtues cannot he misused. A fai1uire of moral vision to see what i:s good, temMe, etc., will he a !failure of the virtue (the ,lpves, concerns, etc.) to become engaged where it Sihould.

Aristotle's own comparison 0,£ natural and full virtue to blind and sighted st:vengtih seems to ovevlook the prurposi\"eness orf

action. Even " naturall couraige," for instance, must show some de1gree of judgment :about aippropriate circumstances for facing danger and pain. Clutching red-hot coals for no reason, forr instance, would not show any sort of courage at all, hut only idiocy, and would ihe uninteHigihle. To per£omn an ad a:t aH is to ha.vce an end which at some level one intends to achieve in acting as one does. Of course one's intentions are not always self-evident, and they wiH typically have more ultimate purposes fading off into the future. Still, the hasrc concept is not mysberi10us: a .soldier's intention in standing his ground, for instance, might he the avoidance of punishment 0'r tihe defense orf his city. Now generaJly ends are propedy choisen, Augustine might say, by those whose loves ave in order, who ha,ve the requisite moral virtues. (A soldier could love Athens and be a coward, perhaps, but his lov;e would certainly he impeirfect.) Thus " that which makes the intention rright is virtue" (1144a21); virtues direct us to noble ends. It is only virtues "in the main sense" that do so consistently, hut even the exercise of natural virtue is purposrvce. Natural virtues, then, are not comparaihle to blind strength.

Certainly Aristotle is clear thrut practical rewson and the moral virtues are irrterdepell!dent (1144a36-37, h31-33), and ihe wants to 1show how practical reason can enable us to per-.form noble and just actions. But vision and strength are not obviously interdependent as practical reason and the moral virtues are supposed to be, and without *desire* no amount of strength and vision wiH rresult in action. It may therefore be helpful rather to think of virtue as a sort of purpose-giving "lovce," which has an element of desire pa.eked into it. Having direction and an object, it wilJ at least be less blind than physica;l strength. This conception of moral virtue will also suggest how moral vision may he essential to it, for we can fove propel'ly only what we in some rneaisure understand. Natural virtue can lead one to do occaJsionally as one ought, hut it is not reliable beca1use it lacks practical reason. Now 'practical reason' embraces a great deal in the *Nicoma:ahean Ethios,* but one

of its more important aspects is an understanding of the place in life of diffe1 1entgoods, this unde1 1standing coming only with experience. A practically reasonable maa.1, Aristot1e observes, is thought to deliberate well about "the kinds of things which alle g1ood and e:xipedient for liiving 1we11 [in general]." [13] This aibility distinguishes the person of virtue " in the main sense " from the possessor of merely natura1l virtue. Natural courage, for instance, may he seen in an inexperienced person's facing a danger weM, hut ihe does not have courage in the full sense until he faces danger and pain wisely and out of appropriate "foive." Tihus Aristotle thinks that the truly courageous soldier in battle shows sound judgment aibout what circumstances warrant such risk-taking; I would add that the soldier also displays a depth of commitment to noble ends (the defense of his city, the maintenance of his integrity) that makes his action 1 1easona:hlein a way that la child's could not be, eV'en if the chi1d were induced to imitate the soldier. Lacking experience, a cihild cannot reasonably assess ends like the soldier's. Recognizing through Me •experience the place of such things as one's city and one's integ,rity is part of what pmctical reason is. As we come to recognize their place, we can come to love them as we ought.

On this view *phronesis* and the moral virtues will be interdependent, .as Aristotle requires. While ocular vision does not enhance physicail.strength, the vision that *phronesis* gives shows the place and worth of goods and so enables us to order our loves and deepen our commitments reaisonaibly. The directedness of moral virtues and their role in discerning loves, concerns, and oommitments explain their dependence on practical reason as no comparison of them to physical strength can.

Conversely, practical reason would he unattainable without ethical virtue. Had we no love for the things dimly seen to he

[13] *NE* 1140a27-28. *Phronesis* is also said to deliberate about means to ends (1144a8-9), but these assertions do not preclude its discerning means to the final end, *eudairnonia,* and that will require discerning what goods are to be pursued at all and what place these should have in one's life.

good for us, we woillid take no interest in coming to discern those goods more dearly. An untutored, natural love for goods such as the natural virtues expvess is therefore fundamental. Notoriously, one who is reluctant to swcrifice his immediate comforts for any good :purpose is unlikely to find much occasion to do so. Without some initial interest in goods worth acting for, it is hard to see the point of any morrul discernment at1all.

Practical reason and the mo1ral virtues are more obviously interdependent, then, than a comparison of them to vision and strength respectively 'would suggest. And A:rist.:oble'sconcluding dictum that " without *phronems* virtues cannot exist " (1144h21-22) can be made the conclusion of an argument from humrunnature and not simply a stipulation. A summary of the argument might go as follows:

AH human ruction ams ·at some good ('as productive of it or as itself constituti ve of lit), howeve1r untuto1red the virtues involved may rbe. But *good* .aim,directed towar:d and constitutive of a good life, requires at lea;st two things: (1) a clear vision of the worth of things and their place in a good life (part of practical reason); and (2) an apprropriate love for these things (:part of moral vi1rtue). Now a person who has appropriate foves for different goods may generally live well, but he cannot fo¥e things and e:x;erthimself as he ought if he does not clearly see their appropriate plaicein a good life; certainly he 1will not choose wen consistently. He cannot, that is, have moml virtues " in the main sense" without practicrul reason.

The distinction ,between practical reason a;nd the moral virtues in the ahove a:vgument a;dmittedly rests on a debata.ble understanding of the r:elationship 1betweengoods and desire for them. *Lf* .we suppose that being good for us just *is* oiur des.iring it, then we wilil not allow that "practical reason " has any meaning except as an ability to discern means e:x;peidiientfor achieving whatev.er ends we may choose. Noc will we allow that " a11 human action aims at some good," makes a facturul claim 01r is ·anything ibut a taiutology; for as

a factua1 olaim it means that we essentially aim .for and desire things that are in some sense seen as good, even though conceivably our desires and actions could be indifferent to our judgments of v;a:lue. '.Dhis thesris is reasonable in light of our aibility to assess and criticize our desires (we can reasonably ask, for instance, whether a vacation plan that sounds appealing really would be satisfying), though I do not oo:-gue the point here.[14] The argument rests, then, on taking Aristotle's opening sentence in a realist sense: goods are aimed 1at *becnruse* they are good (though they are not necessarily the best ends to pursue in any particlliaT circumstances) . Taking the thesis that iway, we can see ihow praioticail reason in one's character fu1fil1s natural virtues and is indispensable to moml virtues "in the main sense."

V. *Unreasonable Actions*

Even if moral v;irtues cannot be attained without practical reason, it might still he objected that reasonable people can 1suffer lapses of practical 1reason and yet exhibit moral virtues in sueh lapses. If so, then morll!l virtues can be misused. Hut if morial virtues depend on practical reason and have the directive function assigned to them here, then 'a fai1ure of judgment lilice Gerard's in speeding cannot he interpreted simply as :a failure of practical reason without 1impli:cationsfor one's hold on the moral virtues. Though Gerard's speeding, fo:r instance, shows that in certain circumstances he is wining to face and impose greiat dangers, it does not manifest a generic willingness to do so, where such a disposition might he identified with courage. The daring action is insepwraible in Ger:al'd's character from the concerns, loves, and indifference that make it intelli- and these may he dep1ora;ble. Similarly, ads of for:bear1ance and of gmtifying others are not irn themselves manifestations of temperance and kindness in the ahstrad. These are

[14] N. J. H. Dent argues the case in *The Moral Psychology of the Virtues* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), esp. 96-120.

not ·a:ll-purposeexecutive qualities at the 1service of whatever rprojects one may choose. Rather, the acts express partioolair purposes-workings and £ailmes of :practical reason-and cannot ibe understood ,apart from them.

Macintyre challenges this view in *After Virtue.*[15] We can see that even serious1lymisguided people can haV'e mora;l virtues, he says, 1by considering what woruild be inV'olV'ed in the moral re-educiation of a Nazi. Though humility and charity might he new to a foomer Nazi, temper:ance aind courage presumably would not. Indeed, it is because of tihis common ground between him and his reformers that reform would be possible at a;ll.

This argument too seems to overlook the purposiveness of action. Consider a Nazi wiho ,wa;s a "good so1dier" precisely because he believed in an exa.Ited thousand-year destiny for the Third Reich. (He must aim at *some* good in his soldiering). His visio!Il of it may be the o'Illly thing that ever inspired in him the least self-sacrifice. He may ha.ve eagel'lly srucrificed everything for this one cause onily because he rsruw little worth in anything else. His de-Nazification, then, in enlightening him about his past illusions, might restore him to his former indifference, foaving him with no puriposes at all, and consequently no virtues. In general, actions that one manages to perform only from neglect 0lf or indifference to mora1Jy relevant considerations do not exhiibit the virtues we seem to find there, since such oversight alterrs the very ciroumstainces which would normally make the deeds praiseworthy. Thus a soldier who is ruble to foave his xamily and risk his life 1because these mean nothing to him may be doing the right thing, hut hrs action does not show true corura.ge because it does not spring from appropriate loves .and concerns and because "moral work " is not being done.[16]

15 Macintyre, 167.

1a .Aristotle recognizes the inferiority of such courage compared to that of the soldier "for whom life is most worth living" (111 7bll) : "But it is quite possible that the best soldiers may be men not of this sort but those who are less hr.ave but have no other good; for these are ready to face danger, and they sell their life for trifling gains." (1117bl7-19)

A keen regard fo!r Ollle's own life and love for one's family, country, and comrades would be appropriate concerns :that such a must order if he is to rhe virtuous, for these are the sorrts of concerns that make ,a good life possible and which Aristotle might qualify ais " nohle." Similarly, the teacher who raises the undeserving .student's grade, thereby cheating the others, has not shown kindness " in the main sense," fo!r his relative indifference to ·the claims justice makes the "kind- ness " so easy that it is meaningless as .an indication of virtue.

VI. *L<wking* OJ *Virtue*

To •say that an action displaying neglect of or indifference to !relevant morrul consider:ations does not ex;hibit the mora:l virtues "in the main sense" is not to say that the agent lacks those virtues entirely. The indulgent teacher, .fo!r instance, may still ibe kind even ii his imprudent ·and unfair a:ctions do not show it. Even lacking a due rega1 1d for justice, he may on occasion act sacrificially for othel'ls simply became he is actively con- cerned to !l.'elieve suffering. His kindness will not be apparent on those occasions where, as we might be tempted to say, his kindness gets him into rt.rouble, hut it will still be there, ready to shine through in r£avmahle cimumstances. Where he goes wrong, the problem is not that he is too kind, hut that he is in- sensitive to the demands 00 jrustice.

Anistotle holds that wrtues " in the main sense " are insepar- a:ble from each other, that you cannot have one without having them all, since practical reason is iboth nece•ssary amJd sufficient for having any of them (1144b85-38). This thesis seems rto have devastating implielations fo!r anyone who lacks even one virtue or even fails one test, :for it seems to say that in such a person practical reason must be lrucking a:nd, there.fore, that any apparent virtue must be only " natural." Nonetheless, re- volting as it is, this conclusion seems to he neatly inescapable ior philosophe!rs who think of virtues as dispositions to act well, e.g. according to rules, without payijn.g sufficient regwd to the loves and ·concerns that motivate the ·acts. Thus Cicero's posi-

tion is not surprising: **"If** you a:drnit to not having one partioular virtue, you will necessarily not ha,ve any at all." [17]

Aristotle's 'rupiparent sponsorshi:p of this position, however, and Aquinas's qua1ified endorsement of it,[18] would seem to he avuidahle given the pr;ominent plaoe of desire in their thinking. To common sense there would seem to he a number of ways in which a practically reasonable per1son might fail in certain circumstances. An obvious example would he Geach's Polish judge, whose exemplary early life may be inexplicahle on any supposition except that the man has a real love of justice. That his love proves to be inadequate in his most sevel'e test is no reason to deny that it was genuine and in-.formed by pcractica1lreason, and so a1so his virtue. Recognition of the loves and concerns underlying both purposes and virtues enables us .to see how virtues can be imperfect hut still genuine and l'easonwble as f.ar as they go.

VII. *Degrees of Reasonableness*

I have emphasized the orientation of the moral vktues toward things loved and cared aibout. 'Dhese virtues enabJe us to act well, 1and as *NE* II.2 contends, this depends on our being ddighted and pained as we ought. Ha,ving the proper *educ:a,tion sentinientale,* we should choose our actions well. But action i's dependent for its character and inteJligiihility on its end. Pighting an armed opponent, for instance, can be vicious or virtuous depending on whether it is a robbery or the defense of one's city. Aquinas here is more explicit than Aristotle: " Human acts ... receive their species from the end." [19] Aris- insistence, then, that a virtuous aot must be done "for its own s>ake" (1105a33) does not exdu:de purpose foorn virtuous acts nor !'educe virtues to pointless tendencies to behave in a certain way; fighting, for instance, is not valued for its

11 Cicero, *Tusoulan Disputations* II, 14.

1s Aquinas quotes Cicero with approval, *ST,* I-II, q.65, a.I. His only qualification is to specify that it is true only of " perfect" virtues, not natural ones.

19 *ST,* I-II, q.l, a.3.

own 'sake hut as, say, the defense of one's city. The moral vir- 'tues, then, :rest at least in part on loves for goods beyond them- selves.

I ha:ve al:'gued furthermore that these loves can he effective only fo the e:irtent that one knows the 01bjectsof these loves 1and recognizes their p1aee in a good life; thi,s recognition I have seen as a function of practical reason. This conception of prac- ticwl reason and of the morail virtues has a number of haprpy consequences. First, it makes their interdependence inte1ligi!hle; " Without *phronesis* virtues cannot exist." Then the depend- ence of virtues on 1ov'e's allows us to recognize gradations of virtue just as we recognize gradations of love. Consequently, the compatibility of real moral virtue with moml frailty and vice also becomes intelligible. Finally, consideration of the place of loves and concerns in virtuous actions has suggested that imprudent deeds do nnt exhlbit the virtues they seem to. Part of what makes ,deeds virtuous is that they are carried out in ci:wumstarrces that make them difficult. If one is unaware of these ci,roumstances or does not appreciate their weight, then one's actions do not show the concern that otherwise might inform them, and they do not exhibit the V!irtues they seem to.

It may be objected that I have sa,ved virtues" in the main sense " only by viirtually reducing them to natural virtues, for the difference !between these is that the foll virtues are in- formed by practical reason as natu ral virtues a1le not, and I have imrplied that one may have virtues "in the ma.in sense" without per£ect practiml reason. *Some* reasona1bileness,I have argued, informs acts of even the most untutored human virtue, and *perfect* practica11reason being in short supply, it is ireason- able to see ,between natural and foll virtue a di:fference in de- gree rather than kind.

Indeed, the a,wkardness of Aristotle's support for the claim tha,t "without *phronesis* the virtues cannot exist," as well as his thesis of the insepara:bility of the virtues,, follows from an :implicit dichotomy between the (practically) 11easonable and unreasona:hle, the virtuous and person. Seeb:ions

III and IV construed moral1 virtues as ihaibits 1based on loves and concerns, practical reason heing (iamong other things) our recognition of the pfaoe of different goods in a good life. That .a:coount, I hope, showed the dependence of the moral virtues on practical reruson,in a natuiral way, it being difficult to love goods pl'operly when their place in life is unclear. Through experience we come to recognize life's goods and their respectiv;e places in life, and we come to love them mol.1e or 1ess 011dinately. Practical reason and moral viirtues are found, then, in varying degrees.

Why does Aristotle not argue this way? Why does he compare natural virtue to (<blind) strength and pmctical reason to vision? The eompm1ison, after aH, is ,facr from persuasive, since beside$ failing to illuminate the 1interderpendence of practioal reason and moral virtue, it faiils to account for action at all. Strength and cognition a1re insufficient to mnve us without *desire,* which "loves and ooncems " covers for nicely. (This is 1true even if the cognition is of the goodness of things. To perceive the goodness of something is not to desire it.)

I suggest tha1t to think here of naituml virtues as baised on concerns and loves rather than as 1being like blind strength might be unacceptable to Aristotle precisely because coniceirns and are found in va,ry1ing degrees in all human action and operate in way;s tha;t indicate v1arying degrees of practical reasonahlene1ss. But for Aristotle pmctical reason is, to put it harshly, the exdusive property of a single class of people: *"Phronesis* only is chartiJoterisitic of the ruler " *(Pol.* 1277h25) . Aristotle offers 1some more nuanced pronouncements on the suibject of the distribution of practical reason,[20] a:nd there a.re vrurieties :and levels of rule. But we can think of actions and agents of nrutur:aJ virtue aiB lacking practical reason altogether only hy accepting something like his comparison of natural virtue to strength and *phronesis* to sight.

20" For the slave has no deliberative faculty at all; the woman has, hut it is without authority, and the child has, hut it is immature." *(Pol.* 1260al2-14) For a milder statement on slavery see 1254b20-22.

POMPONAZZI'SCRITIQUE OF AQUCNAS'S ARGUMENTS FOR THE :IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL

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I. *lntJroWi.wtion*

IN 'JiHE COURSE of hls discussion on the immortality of the soul, Pietro Pomponazzi systematically critiques the Pfatonic, Avel'IJ'IOist, and Thomistic positions concerning this perennial problem iin the philosophy of human nature. Pomponiazzi's *Tractatrus de irnrmortalitate animae* [1] is inteirest-in!g from three methodological standpoints: (1) the criteria Pomponazzi uses to ev:aluate the various positions, (2) Pomponazzi's attempt to redefine the probtlem of immortality in fo:gica;l terms, and (8) his analysis of previous positions. In this Renaissance treatise one finds an excellent example of the infliuenceof method on the dev:elopment of an idea. This article wiihl eX'amine and ev:aluate Pomponazzi's analy,s:i.s of Thomas A:quiinas's aJ.'gument for the immortality of the soul showing how Pomponazzi"S irefo:rnnula;biorputs the Thomistic argument in a context completely differoort fmm whait Thomas himself intended. Although this ipaper treats a historical pr01blem, its mai:i.n oibject is to show how the fo:tmulation of phifosophical critema and ,questions influences how one handles a topic and

[1] The standard Latin text of the *Tractatus* is:
Petrus Pomponatus, *Tractatus de immortalitate animae,* ed. Gianfranco Morra (Bologna: Nanni and Fiammeghi, 1954). The English translations used in this article are from Ernst Cassirer et al., eds. *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948). A complete translation of the *Tractatus* by William Henry Hay II, revised by John Herman Randall, Jr., and annotated by Paul Oskar Kristeller, appears on pp. 280-381.

what one says about prewous solutions to a problem. This article, then, studies a rphi1osophica1lmethodology as much as it arppraises Pomrponazzi and Aquinas.[2]

Eady in the *Tractatus de immortalitate animae* Pomponazzi 'es'tia;bJishes the dual cr1iter:ia for judging the adequacy of au p!i.'evious arguments]or the of the ,soul. First, "Leaving aside revefaition and miracles, and remaining entirely within natmal limits,"[3] what can be said concerrning the immortality of the soul? Second, "what ... was Aristotle's on the same question "?[4] These criteria function as the limiting conditions that determine the adequacy of any argument :for immortality; Pomponazzi employs these criteria to test whether previious a1rguments are adeqU'ate.

Pomponazzi's attempt to l'edefine immo:rtality in strictly 1ogicailterms also influences his critique of pl'evious authoi's :and his own generail condusions. He picks u:p Fieino'.s notion that the human being is of an ambiguous nature, that is, part spirit 1and pa:rt oorporeal.[5] This, of course, is new neither with Ficino nor with Pomponazzi, for the concept of a twofold nature goes hack at least as ia1· as Plwto. Plomponazzi',suse of 1this concept of a twofold nature, however, is unique. He casts the whole

2 In his book *Renaissance Thought and Its Sources* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), Paul Oskar Kristeller says, "Among the many problems and concepts that have occupied the thinkers of the past, and especially those of the Renaissance, the doctrine of immortality seems especially remote from the discussions and concerns of our time" (p. 181). He argues in this essay that, "The problem is still with us, and we may hope that it may yet lead to new answers that are more in accordance with our knowledge and our sensibilities than those transmitted to us by the thinkers of the past, especially those of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries" (p. 196).

s "Prim um scilicet, quid, revela tionibus et miraculis semotis, persistendoque pure infra limites naturales, hac in re sentis." *Immortalitate,* p. 36 (p. 281). All references to the *Traatatus de immortalitate animae* will appear in this form. The first page reference is to the Latin text and the page number in parentheses is to the English translation cited above.

4 "Alterum vero, quamnam sententiam Aristotelis in eadem materiam fuisse censes." *Imrnortalitate,* p. 36 (p. 281).

5 See Marsilius Ficino, " Five Questions Concerning the Mind," in *Renaissance Philosophy of Man,* pp. 201-12.

pmblem in logical terms. A genuinely twofuid nature is an impossibility because ibody and spirit function logically as contraidictories.6 This means thait Pomponazzi must devise a wa.y in which the relationship of body and soul ca;n be explained without violating the principle 0£ contrrudiction.

He systematically outlines the rulternatives used to exp1ruin the union of body and soul. There axe two major subdivisions with three options unde'l' each. Schematically, ·all the possibilities can be enumerated as follows:

Presupposition: It is impossible for the same nature to be unqualifiedly mortal and immortal.

I. One nature rwhich is at once mortal and immortrul.

A. The nature will he unqualifiedly immortail and relatively morta;l.

B'. The nature wiill be relatively immortrul and unqualifiedly morta.I.

C. The nature wil.1 1be relatively immorlail and relatively mortal.

II. Two natures one of which is mortal and the other immortal.

A. CC'he number of morta;l and immortal natures will he according tJo the number of men.

B. In .aill men the'l'e will be assumed but one immortail nature, while the moctal ones will he distributed and multiiplied in each man.

C. In .all men the will be multiplied, hut the mortal be .common to ai1l.[7]

Pomponazm eliminates two of these six options immediately ibecaiuse no one has ever he1d the position. No one has rudvo-

a Caput Secundum, " in quo ponuntur modi quibus dicta multiplicitas humani naturae intelligi potest," sets forth the logic of Pomponazzi's discussion. *ImmortaUtate,* p. 42 (p. 283-84).

7 *Immortaiitate,* p. 42, (p. 283-84).

ca.ted that the immortal is mrnltip1iedwhile the mortal is common to all (II, C). In addition, no one says that a thing is !l'elattively mortal and immortal at the same time (I, C) . Pomponazzi's hasic 1aJrgumentationproceeds hy a disjunction. He shows in the foHowing chapters that none of the four remaining possibilities e:xplaiin the immortality of the souL He concludes, that since none of the options work, one cannot ip11ove the [mmortality 1of the 1soul 1by merely natural means. That is, only faith reveals immortality. Section IV of this article will examine whether this methodology p11ovidesan adequate means of solving a metaphysical problem such as immortality.

Although Pomponazzi expends much ene11gyon the positions of both Av;e11roes (II, B) and St. Thomas Aqruinas (I, A), we will examine the section on Aquinas. With respect to Averroes, Pomponazz:i is mainly concerned to show that the Aver1.101istposition is not in acco11.id with the texts of Aristotle. In Aquinas's argument, however, Pomponazzi sees a complex interplay of the problea:nof !1eason alone and the question of comp.Liancewith Aristotle. Jn Section JI we will eXJa:minePomponazzi's cmtique of Thomas and show ho,w he employs the two criteria to iillustrate that Thomas's position cannot be known iby reason a;lone and that Thomas is not in accord with Aristotle. Bemuse Pomponazzi provides such an ex;tended argument against ThomaJs, we must ailso ask what caJn be said in defense of Thomas and whetheT the Thomistic arguments withs1tanJd the attack (Section III) .

H. *Pomponazzi's Rejevtion of ThornxJJs Aquinas*

:Romponazzi's relationship to the thought of Tihoma;s and Aver110es is compfox and inftuenoes wihrut he sa;y'S rubout both men. Some fee'l that Pomponazzii was at one time a Thomist himself but mov;ed more and more to a. position of purre A:ristotelianism as his thought matured. This shift is due fargely to increasing availaibility of better Aristotelian texts which were not dependent upon either the Averro[st or the Thomistic in-

terpretation. In any event, by the time he composed the *Traotatus de immortalitate animae* he had rejected Thomas's posibion on the nature of the soul.[8] The critique of Thomas is far reaching in that it opens up the whole Thomistic position on the soul an:d not merely the protblem oif lifo rufiter death. As we have iseen in the introduct10ry section, immortality is really rooted in the way one wants to ve1ate body and soul (one immortal principle and one mortal priinciiple).

Pomponazzi summa.rizes the Thomistic position in the following five propositions:

I. The intellective and the sensitive in man are the samE: in existence; (Cf. *ST,* I, q.76, a.3 and 4) .[9]

Q. This soul is truly and unqualifiedly immortal, while relatively mortal.

3. Such a soul is truly the form of man and not only, as it were, the mover (Cf. *ST,* q.76, a.I).

4. This same soul corresponds in number to the number of individuals (Cf. *ST,* q.76, a.2).

5. A soul of this kind begins its existence with the body (Cf. *ST,* I, q.90, a.4); it comes from without and its produced by God alone, not indeed by generation, but by creation (a.Q and 3); however, it doe,s not cease to be with the body, but is perpetual from that time on (Cf. a.l-4).

A quick rlook at the reforences included with these five propositions shows that they can, indeed, he identified with various 1articlesin the *Summa theologiae.* The one e:ll!ceptionis Proposition Two. Although Thomas does not use the language of qualifiedly and unqualifiedly mortal and immortal, Pomponazzi

[8] See Paul Oskar Kristeller, *Renaissanoe Thought and Its Souroes,* ed. Michael Mooney (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979). Chapter 9, "The Dignity of Man," and Chapter 10, "The Immortality of the Soul," (pp. 169-196) give summary discussions of Pomponazzi's intellectual development.

[9] In this Pomponazzian summary of Thomas's position we have attempted after each of the five statements to provide a representative text from the *Summa theofogiae* in which Thomas actually does hold the position attributed to him by Pomponazzi. These Thomistic texts will become crucial in the next section where we attempt to provide a defense of Thomas.

feels that he is ieatching the spirit of Thomas'.s posiition without having a direct textual rerference for the proposition. In addition to the general Thomistic srpirit, this proposition aJ.so fits wiitih Pomponazzi's logic of mortality anid immOTtality: it is one of the four alternatives considered as a rtational explanation for immortality. Not only do we llack a direct textual xe:ferencefrom Thomas for .this proposition but e:xiaminationof Chapter Eight of the *Traotatus de immortalitate animae* a'1so show:s that this second iproposition aibsoribs most of Pomiponazzi's effort in refurtaition of Thomas Aquinas. If he can ·sho.w thrut it is impossible for the soul to he unqualifiedly immortal hut 1£'elatively mortal, he feels that he has defeated Thomas, for the remaining propositions collapse under the critique of this second one.

Pomponazzi ha·s no difficulties .with the fust proposition. He, •as a matter of £wet, depends on it to make some of his la.ter arigumentation wo'l"k. Basically, it states that the higher intellectual .bering of humanity includes a:ll the opell'rutionsof the lower, sensitive heing of the beast. There is a htieraoohica•lre- in .which the higher being aut:Jomaticahlyincludes aM attributes of the lower ibeings.[10]

When one turns to the second proposition, one finds Pomponazzi great energy to prove that the soul cannot possibly be unqualifiedly immortal and rela.tiV'elymortaJl (ihis iinteivpretation orf the Telationship o£ ,body and soul :according to Aquinas). Now the problem is that Thomas ·simply cannot say that the soul is truly anid unquwlifiedly immol'ltwl. This would mean either thiat rthe •sou[has no relationship whatsoever with the ibody or that, rut rbest, tJhe soul is the mover of the loody. The !basicpresupposition is that the soul must he Telated rto the rbody: that is the groundwork of the whole disoussion on iimmo!l'tality. In other words, to say that the soul is unqualifiedly :immortail·and yet to ,a morla[hody would woJate

[10] In primo igitur eius dicto non ambigo, scilicet quod re in homine idem sit sensitivum et intellectivum. Sed caetera quatuor sunt mihi valde ambigua. *Immortalitate,* p. 82 (p. 303).

the :principle of eontmdiction. In *ST* I, q.76, :a.l, Thomas specifically ,shows that tbhe 'soulI cannot lbe a Plrutonic mover of the lbody.[11]

So, !bhe issue rests in how we describe the il'elatiionshirpof the soul to the ibody. Pomiponazzi expresses the Thomistic position 'as unqualii.fiedly iimmorrtal iand relatively moTtal. Pomponazzi proviides fi¥e ,arguments against this proposition, and as ;a matter of fact this arrgumentation takes uip most of Chapter Eight of the *Traotatus de immortalifufte ammae.* In ,an ·arlicle of this length one cannot amaJyze eaoh of the arguments, and it will not lbe lreallynecessary lbecausethey into ce:vtain patterns. The mrguments can he 'SIUmmariized in the following manner: 1. lby using the same reasons ,employed hy Thomias one can p'I"oveex;actly the opposite (i.e., Thomas wants to :prove immoribality; one can use his Teasons to p:mve mortality); Q. iby enumerating qualities which are immorlal and those which ,are morlal one ean prove the soul is TeaMy mortal as against '.Dhomas,'spnsition of immortrulity.

Poil1llpona,zzinit:Ua;llysmnma;rizes Thomas's amgumentfor immorla;lity iby showing thrut with respect to the human soul there arre certain facts that must lbe ooknow"rledged An essence such as the human lsoul receives all material forms ,and rwhat is irecei¥ed in it lies known :actually; in this knowledge it does not u:se a.ny ibodily organ. Ailso, the soul ,strives £or ·eternity and things. From these facts Tihomas concludes that the

[11] Although Aquinas is directly refuting William of Auvergne at this point, his complaint is with all Platonic approaches to the relationship of body and soul as mover and moved. He gives four reasons why this cannot be the relationship of body and soul: 1. The intellect does not move the body except through the appetite, whose movement presupposes the operation of the intellect. 2. Since Socrates is an individual in a nature of one essence composed of matter and form, if the intellect is not the form, it follows that the intellect must be outside the essence. 3. The action of a mover is never attributed to a thing moved, except as to an instrument. 4. Although the action of a part can be attributed to the whole, it is never attributed to another part. All references to Thomas Aquinas as used in this paper can be found in the *Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas,* ed. Anton C. Pegis (New York: Random House, 1945), vol. 1.

soul is immortal.[12] But, says Pomponazzi, these same facts can be used to that the soul ris mortial ra:ther than immortal. "Vhenevier the soul operates materrially, as the vegetative soul, it does not receive :all forms. Whenever it operates as a sensitive soul tit uses a 1bodily ol'gan. It is common experience that the soul often strives d'.or tempora l and perisha:ble things. From these facts, claims Pomponiazz,i, one can conclude that the soul is morta:l. What Pompon:azzi ls doiing here is a:ctually taking the opposite of the fact s proposed by Thomas to prove that the soul is mortal, not the identica1l facts used by Thomas. At this point at simply seems to he a standoff between the two thinkers. Depending on which set of facts one Wiants to cons1der, 1one will think od: the soul 1as either immortal or mortaL Prn:nponazziidoes 1aHow that insofar as the soul knows, it will be *relativiely* immorta11. '11he general condusion is that " the argument for one conclusion seems to he no s'tronger than £01r the other."[13]

The second type of al"gument proposed ihy Pomponazzi to defeat Thoma.s's position enumerates qua,Iities that are mortal al1Jd immortal. If the preponderance of qu1alities are mortal, then the soul is actually mortwl rather than immortal. (The opposite would also ho:ld.) In order to a,void the 1accusation of deciding a philosophical issue :by counting, one must also Jook at each of the qualities and decj,de its reLative importance. What Pomponazzi trying to show is that the more preva,Ient

12 One must look at Chapter VII of the *Traotatus* in this context also. In a .preliminary exposition of the meaning of the second Thomistic proposition, Pomponazzi uses the standard Aristotelian argument as found in *De Anima* III, 4, 429a, 15ff. This is an argument he will criticize in Chapter VIII.

13 "Sed pariter, cum ipsa materialiter operetur, ut vegetativa, non omnes formas recipit, ut sensitiva, eadem organo corporali utitur, temporalia et caduca affectat, probabitur quod ipsa veraciter et simpliciter sit mortalis. Verum ex ea parte qua intelligit secundum quid immortalis erit, tum quia intellectus, non coniunctus materiae, est incorruptihilis, sed materiae coniunctus est corruptibilis; tum quia in tali opere non fungitur instrumento corporali. Sicut etiam ipse elicit quod taliter est per accidens et secundum quid materialis. Non enim maior ratio de uno quam de altero esse videtur." *Immortalitate,* pp. 82-84 (p. 303) .

qualities will he found to 1be mortal rather than Pompoll!azzi cites three instances where supposedly immortal powers ave outclassed by the mortal ones. 1. There a1re only two powers which 1a:ttest to immortaility, intellect and will; the!I"e a:re innumerable powers of the ,sensitive and vegetative souL[14] If one e:icamines 1the ha:bita:b1e regions, many more people resemble beasts than :rational heings__.indeed, rational ibeings are most rrure.[15] 3. An e:xJaminalion of knowing itseli leads one to tihe conolusion that it is so weak that it should be ca:lled a twofold ignorance of negation and disposition rather than knowing.[16] Pomponazzi's general conclusion to this enumerative style of :argument lis that by nature human " existence is mo1le 1sensuous than intellective, more mortal than immortal." [17] All of this, claims Pomponazzi, seems to come closer to the truth than the position of St. Thomas.[18]

There is one final aipproach Pomponazzii.uses to validate his iairgiument 1a:ga1inst Thomas: the rposition of Aquinas is not in :ruccord with the teaching of Aristotle .. He shows this by compruring and contrasting Aristotelian 1and Thomistic texts. Since one of the two criteria he set up at the very heginrning of the *Tractatus de immorta.litate animaer* was to test wihether a positfon is in accol'd with Aristotle, this is a 1legi:timate procedure for him. Thomas, of course, comes up deficient in this :respect. The following argument giiv;es an showing that Thomas's notions on imrnorta,1ity 'a,re not in ,accord with Aris-

14"Nam si in homine numerum potentiarum consideremus, duas tantum invenimus, quae attestantur super immortalitatem, scilicet intellectum et voluntatem; innumeras vero, tum sensitivae tum vegetativae, quae omnes attes· tantur super mortalitatem." *lmmortalitate,* p. 84 (p. 304).

15 "Inter quoque rationales si considerabimus, hi simpliciter irrationales nuncupari possunt, verum appellati sunt rationales in comparatione ad alios maxime bestiales ... "*ImmortaUtate,* p. 84 (p. 304).

16 "Verius utraque ignorantia, scilicet negationis et dispositionis, nuncupancla sit quam cognitio." *Immortalitate,* p. 84 (p. 304).

11 "Causa, inquam, est quia natura homo plus sensualis quam intellectivus, plus mortalis quam immortalis existit." *lmmortalitate* pp. 85-86 (p. 304).

1s" Si, inquam, haec consiclerabis, magis opposita pars viclebitur vero consona quam illa Divi Thomae." *Immortalitate* p. 86 (p. 304).

totle. Thomas uses as one orf his main proofs for immortality the fact that the soul, ,since it can know universals, is not al- w:ays dependent on a bodily o>rgan.[19] Pomponazzri, following Aristotle stricUy, takes the opposite position. If the human soul depends in :a11 its operations on some organ, it is material. But in all its operat,ions, it is dependent. Therefore, it is mate- :ria'1. To suihstan tiate this ihe uses a kind of p!roof text from Aristotle's *De anima.* "If knowing is imagination or is not W"ith- out imagination, it [s impossible for it [the soul] 'to he sepa- mted."[20] This ,divemity of opinions devdops :firom Aristotle's universal definition of soul: ". . . the ad of a physical and or- ganic hody."[21] The point here is that Thomas's position does not agree with the stated positions of Aristotle]n the *De anima,* and consequentrly Thoma,s to :be discounted on this !basis.

Thus far we ha.vce looked at Pomponazzi's critique of Proposi- tions One and Two. Tihe ,remaining three Thomistic proposi- tions are quickly dispatched hy Pomponazzi by showing that they can be hei1d, as 1in the case of P:mposition Three, if one holds that the soul iis mate;rial. Proposition Fourr and Five contradict the stated position of Aristotle 1and are to be discounted on that hasis.[22]

III. *In Defense Or Aquinas*

The final result of Pomponazzi' s extended argument against Aquinas's position on immortai1ity aprpewrs to conclude that Aquinas can neither prove immortality on the hasis of reason 1wlone nor remain in accord with Aristotle. In other words, Thomas viiola.tes hoth of the standards set forth at the very

[19] See *ST,* I, q.84, a.6, and q.85, a.I and 2.

[20] " Maior patet primo *De Anima,* dicente Aristotle: *si intelligere est phantasia, aut non sine phantasia, non conf'ingit ipsam separari. Immortalitate,* pp. 86-88 (p. 305). The Aristotelian reference is fa *De Anima* III, 7, 431al7.

[21] • , • ex diffinitione universali animae, scilicet *est aotus corporis physioi organioi. Immortalitate* p. 88 (p. 305). The Aristotelian reference is to *De Anima,* II 1, 412al9ff.

[22] Cf. *lmmortalitate,* pp. 96-100 (pp. 310-313).

outset of the *Traotatus de immmtalitate animae.* Can anything he said lin defense of Thomas at this point?

The extended discussion of Proposition Two hy Pomponazzi bolds the key to a possible Thomistic response. Pomponazzi summarfaes Thomas's doctrine on the relationship of body and soul by stating that ". . . this soul is truly .and unqualifiedly immortal while ,relatively mortaL" [23] One of the easiest things to say lruboutP])oposition Two is that Thoma's simply does not use the terms Pomponazzi attributes to him. Pomponazzi's comes out of the structure he has imposed in Chapter Two of the *Tractatus.* In order to include Aquinas's teaching on immortality in the ;generaildiscussion, Pomponazzi had to impose this Proposition on the Tihomistic doctrine of *Summa theologia,e*I, qq. 75 and 76. Granted that Thomas does not use the language of " truly .and unqualified !immortal " 'and "relatively mortal," is even the spirit of Thomas in these phrases? I think not.

Thomas is 'ooncemed with the relationship of body and sorul, and he certainly sees the problems surmunding the olaim thiat the soul is immortal and yet is related to a rhody. He does not want to accept the Pilatonic :answer that the soul is merely the mover of the hody. [24] He proceeds eX!perientialJy. He 'asks :first about the aictivities distinctive of the human being. On the ibasisof these activities, can one infer something 1about the na-tme of the soul? Thomas does indeed point to the activitie:s that figure in Pomponazzii's critiicism. Since humans have the oapacity to know nJll :materia1lforms, they have a soul that is essentially immaterial. Using the fiamous analogy with sight and color-sight itself cannot he co1med or dse we woruld not see a:11 cofors-Thomas says that since the intellectual soul know:s all 1bodies it cannot itself be la ibody. Hence, this soul must he immaterfa,1, and immateriality has a;s part of [ts im-plication the notion of immortaHty. [25]

[23] " Secundum quod tale vere et simpliciter est immortale, secundum quid vero mortale." *Immortalitate,* p. 74 (p. 300).

[24] Cf. *ST,* I, q.76, a.l.

[25] Cf. *ST,* I, q.75, a.2, ad 3, and a.6.

But there is still a problem here. This argument of Thomas seems to fall prey to P;omponazzi's first objection rtihat the soul and the body cannot ibe opposites. Thomais handles this difficu.Jty ;by showing that the intellecturail soul is united to the ibody as a. form is relruted to matter. Basring his argument on a set of metarphyiSical principles-that whereby ,anything acts is the form of the thing to which act is attri:buted, and the first thing by which 1a hotly Jives. is the soul-Thomas concludes that life arprpeara in di:ffieirent degrees th11ough the vairious operations of ·Living things. That which ·allowsihumans to perform these ·vita;l aJCtions is the souJ. The sow ris the primary principle of nourishment, ,sensation, focal movement, and understanding. Thi.s principle is the form of the body. And Thomas ends up hy stating thrut this is the demonstration used by Acistotle.[26]

Without using the :schema of Pomrponazzi, then, Thomas ·feels that he has proven that the soul ris an immaterial and, hence, immortal p!rinciple ha1viing the .status of the form of the ibody. The argument starts tWom the experience of human activities and is, acoo11ding to Thomas, in agTeement with the doctrine of Ariistotle. H one were to ask Thomas whether he had iobserved the two criteria set down hy Pomponazzi, his answer would certainly ibe affi.!l"mative. Section II of this rurticle noted that one of the chief arguments Pomponazzi uses against Thomas Aquinas is that the Thomistic position does not follow the docrnine of Aristotle. Thomas is certainly using Aristorbleinso£ar as he is aib1e. He is nm, however, repeating Aristotle slavishly. He does from the tea0hing of Aristotle on the question of ereiation and •specificallyon the tion of the creation of the hUIIllan sout Pomponazzi would say that this only goes to pl'Olve that the immoil."talityof the souI cannot lbe demonstrated iby ireason rulone, srince the doctrine of

[26] Cf. *ST,* I, q.76, a.I. Thomas has changed the notion of "form of the body" with respect to the human being, however. This is to make up for a lack of an account by .Aristotle for the uniqueness of the human soul and to clear up the ambiguities in the .Aristotelian text.

creation *iis* a strictly reveailed matter. Aristotle certainly does not have la theory of creation iin his wri:ting.[21] If there is no doctrine of creation in geneml, then therre certainly cannot be a doctrine of the creation of the indivridual human souil either.

Thomas, a;s is weH-known, appeals to a theological truth for the doctrine of genera1l creation of the runiverse.[28] Is he also forced to .a1ppealto the 1same truth for the creation of the individua,l soul? I do not think so. Once one has 1admitted the possibility of creation as opposed to geneiratiion, one can look rnround at tihe 1beings of the wo1lld and ask whether there are some ibeings who manifest hy their aJCtivitiesthe necess,j_tyfor creatiion a;s opposed to generation. Because of the status of human knowledge and the kind of being Thomas has discovered the soul to be, rits presence in the wior1d happens only :as a direct resu1t of creation by God. Thomas, knowing that he departs from Aristotle on this point, feels that AI'1istotlesimply did not ·reason the matter out sufficiently.

Wihat can he said to defend Thomas regarding the three argument types presented hy Pomponazzi in the exposition of Proposition Two? Initially, when PompOil'mzzicla:ims that the same facts can he used to prove both the mortalaty of the soul and the :immortality of the soul, he actmailly uses facts opposite from those employed hy 'Thomas. Although Thomas would have no p1'1obiemwith this (hecaiuse he never denies that there is a material element to the human ,being), he would oibject to Pomponazzi's daiim that this a1rgument is sufficient to show that the human soul is mortal. The enumerative style of argumentation can also be dismissed rather easily if one goes to Thoma.s's notion of the relationship of the viarious 1levefo of reality. Eaoh level has its own distinctive chamcteristics, and each superior level manifests an aprpropriate use of the capacities of the lower levels. In his hierarchical view of reality, [29]

21 *ST,* I, q.90, a.2 and 3.

28 See *ST,* I, q.46, a.l, for Thomas's reasoning concerning the necessity for general creation.

29 See especially Thomas's discussion of the relationship of the vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual in the human being in *S'T,* I, q.78-82.

Pomponazzi would introduce a major rupture into the levels of reality, loosening the relationship among 1levels significantly. Finally, ,the ,ola.im that the Thomistic position is not in accoro wii.th Aristotle must :be looked at each .time tit :appears. There aire times ,when Thoma;s follows Aristotle, times when he de-Jiiberately avoids A!l'istotle, and tiimes ·when he modifies the Aristotelian :approach.

The final :result of an investiga,tion of the Thomistic texts is to rewliize that Thomas is orpemtmg on an entirely different methodologica.l pfane from Pomponazzi. Thomas seeks to validate experience and to rea;son on the :ba;sis of thiat experience to the various :attributes. of the soul. H Aristotle is a help in this process, then he to 1be used and followed. If A'ristotle is ambiguous or ii.f his :conclusions do not come from expel'lience, then he must he adjusted or ignored. This procedure gives a condusio!U quite different from Pomponazzi's: the soul can be pmven to Jbe immortal from reason alone.

IV. *Matters of Criteria and Methodology*

We have ,been investigating a <Single pihilosopibica;l problem, the immortality of the soul; we have seen that Thomas and Pomponazzii. come to quite different (lonclusions concerning this matter. What ruooounts.for this radical difference? In this section we wiH look at Pomponazzii's method iand his criteria as a solution to our question. The1 1e three items that must be investigated: first, the two criteria themselves; second, the logic of Pomponazzi's rprocedme; third, the matter of outside influences on the philosophical enterprise.

For every ;rurgument Pomiponazzi investigates concerning the immo["ta;lity of t;he soul, he estrublishes "bWo ,criteria: Can the matter be known by reason alone? and Is the matter in accord with the philosophy of Aristotle? Whether a matter can be known ,by reason 1alone is :a trwdiitiona.l phi1osophica.l criterion distinguishing philosophy from theo1ogy.[30] Pomponazzi's cri-

ao Cf. Etienne Gilson, *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages* (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1938). Gilson has pointed out the motivation

terion, taken in itself, is not unusual. What makes his approach interesting is tihe ri.gOir with whlch he aiprplies the principle to questions orf immortality. Since he :f·eels that knowledge of iimmortality has mme .from scripturraJ sorurces and church tradition, these roots immediately make it suspect as a legitimate philosophical topic. If one adds to this the addition-a:l criterion that Aristotle does not ,speak of immortality except in the most 'ambiguous way, the topic ibeoomes even more douibtful las a legitimate philosophical problem.[31] Any argument, then, that pul'lports to reason to the immortrulity of the soul must meet the two criteria. As we ha:ve seen, Pomponazzi feels that the Thomistic arguments rliruil in this regard.

But we can question the adequacy of the criteria. The fust critel'lion is a reasona:bJe philosophical rule. Indeed, without it the whole enterprise of philosophy would disintegrate. There may be ,a possibility, however, that the truths oif philosophy and theology can ,coincide in some instances with one discipline helping the other. Thomas certainly thorught iin terms of a coordination of theologica:l truth and philosorphica:l truth rather than ·a confrontation orf the :two .truths.[82] The second criterion

for this distinction between reason and revelation and has provided an excellent survey of answers to the problem.

s1 Because of these two criteria, there are some who would accuse Pomponazzi of being an atheist. Paul Oskar Kristeller in *Eight Philosophers of the Italian Renaissance* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1964), shows that this is incorrect by claiming that "The statement made by many theological contemporaries of Pomponazzi, and by some modern historians, that he simply denied the immortality of the soul is obviously false. He merely says that the immortality of the soul cannot be demonstrated on purely natural grounds, or in accordance with Aristotle, but must be accepted as an article of faith" (p. 84).

a2 One could surmise that Pomponazzi is advocating a kind of double truth theory in his approach to the question of immortality. This is also inaccurate. By labeling the problem as neutral (i.e. equivalent to the problem of the eternity of the world), Pomponazzi simply says that this information is known to us by faith alone rather that through reason. There is no claim that there is one truth in theology and one in philosophy and that they might appear to conflict. Rather there is a truth available to us from theology which is not available to us from reason alone. Cf. *Immortalitate,* Ch. XV, pp. 232-239 (pp. 377-81).

is more suspect, for the &act that Aristotle says something does not necessarily make it true. The confl:ids !between the Ita1ian humanists ;and the Aristote1ians 1are well known a.ind need not 1be rehearsed ·at this point.[38] The .fact remains, though, that at the time Pomponazzi was writing, Aristotle w:as still the ackno-wledged authority in secular learning, and it w:as customary to ask ŀwhether Aristo-tle lhiad •anything to say on a matter and to put forth his conclusions as a reaisonruhle position. Even in philosophy one ·oonsuilts the best aJUthorities on a subject, and so P:omrponazzii's application of these two criteria has a certain legitimacy rubout it. One can fiault him, however, for heing too ready to· accept a position simply because Aristotle holds it.

We must now look at Pomponazzi's Jogical method. The six aJtemative formulations of the problem of immort:ality of the soul can ibe exipressed in .a ktind of ·extended disjunction. Pomponiazzi systematiciaJ.ly eliminates aH of the options. He first discaIDds ttro versions because no one had ever held the positions, and then he shows that each of the other four are faulty. Now any first year logic student knows that at least one sentence of a disjunction must :be true in 011der for the disjunction to ,be true. Since ,a,11 possiibilities .rure false, Pomponazzii concludes that .the immortality of the soul cannot be proven hy reason ailone.

The method 1wo;riks as long as Pomponazzi has eliminated a11 of the options. If we look at the ·w:ay the :a:rgiument is fornm-Jated, ·we see that he has iindeed ico·vered•all cases. The humain being is either of one nature or of two niatlli'es, and eiach option here ihas th'l'ee possiibi1ities.[34] None of these iis accep:t;a;hle as a purely rational a.rgiumentr for the immort:rulity of the souL

Pomiponazzi ihas: for:mufated the problem of immortality in a strictly manner and reaches a conclusion on this basis.

aa An exemplary case critiquing Aristotelian authority is found in Francesco Petrarca's " On His Own Ignorance and That of Many Others." Cf Ernst Cassirer et al., *Renaissance Philosophy of Man,* pp. 47-133.

34 Cf. Section I. *Introduction* for the complete schematic outline.

What can be said about this? In the first place, a careful reading of the text shows that Pomponazz[does not deny the immortality of the 'soul as such; ihe only rejects proof on the basis of reason alone. Since immortality does not yield to rationial explanation, in Cha:pter XV of the *Traotatus de immortalitate* he moves the discussion onto a whole different plane. He says that this is a neutra;l pr:mblem like the eternity of the world.[35] Since theology tells us that the souJ is ti.mmortial (and that the wodd is created), we must assent to it; hut there is no demonstration of these truths from reason.

V. *Conclusion*

The manner in which Pomponazzi iconstmcts ihis aiiguments aigainst ,a rationa!l p1loof for immortality and hris tmnsmutation of the Thomistic arguments to fit his own methodology is an instructive episode in the development of ian idea. Pomponazzi, using a purely iogieal method, comes to the 'conclusion that the soul cannot 'he found to, be immortal simply on the basis of il'eason alone. Thomas, stwrtirrg from a metaphysical standpoint 1based on experience, comes to the conclusfon that the soul is immortwl aind that this can he known from reasoning aibout the 1activitiesof the human 1souL

It is a philosophical truism that the way a question is formulated and the method one uses to answer the question will a:ffect the response to the question. In the case of Thomas and Pomponazz1i,this 1is certainly 1apparent. Both thinkers are discussing the same problem and one would hope that if both 1are :ration.ail they will m:irive at the same solution. Pomponazzi's reformula-

[35] Pomponazzi might even have conceived of this solution to the problem of immortality on the basis of what Thomas has to say in the *Summa theologiae,* I, q.46, a.I and 2. First, Thomas points out that Aristotle's argu· ments for the eternity of the world are demonstrative not absolutely but only relatively, that is, against some of the ancient philosophers. Then Thomas says that the truth that the world did not always exist is held by faith alone; the newness of the world cannot be demonstrated from the world alone. Pomponazzi would like to extend this type of solution to the immortality of the soul also.

tion of the Thomistic concepts of the relationship of body and soul into a discussion of relative and absolute mortality and immortality necessiitates his conclusion, contmiry to Thomas',s position. he does not have the synthetic metaphysics of Thomas as a background, he must rely only on that of Aristotile, and this proves to he deficient for handling the problem ihe is addressing. The strictness with which he arppHes the second of his two criteria forces him to conclude to the neutrality of the problem. This may ibe as far as one can get with some phrilosophical prorhlems, hut this is certainly never a satisfying for the philosophioa1 mind.

A historica,l exercise, such as the one we have just completed, can be most helpful 1in our own pursuit of truth. When we come upon a problem that does not seem to y1ield itself to an adequate so1ution, it is important to ask whether the criteiria we are using :and the 'way in :which we have constructed the loigic of the p:mblem 1wiU ever aJlow us to arrive at an adequate answer. We can avoid much comusion in our reasoning hy a wi1Engness to look at the method we have used to solve la difficult issue. E¥en though the issue of immortaility is on the back burner, so to speak, in today's ph:i1osophical disoossioiJ.1, the con£mntation between Pomponazzi and Thomas, Aquinas on this matter points to issues that a.re of major concern to us aU: what oriteria, are v1alid £orr judging an issue and what methods ail'e logical for reasoning a1bout a

RICOEUR, WNERGAN, AND THE INTELLIGIBILITY OF COSM.lC TIME

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Introduot:Wn

HE QUESTION OF TIME ihas entered into the work f ·every major philosopher s1ince Aristotle. As Heidegger (who is 1fond oif il'eco·vering these forgotten questions) has shown, time is not merely an ar.bitrary WJay of reckoning or calculating the fleeting moments of day-to-day life; rather, it is an exipressrion of our very mode of heing.[1]

One of the major philosophers who !has taken up this question rin our own day and has pfaced it at the center of his ·continuing work in rpib.ilosophical anthropology is Pia.JUI Ricoeur. He has ·shown how the ·symbols, metaphors, and narratives of time offer orientations to reflection: they not only point to the existential romplexities of human iftfe in its personal, social, and cosmic dimensions ibut also to its fundamental intentionrulities to.ward meaning that undergird these objectifications of time.

Beyond this, Ricoeur himself has set up the question of time on new foundations. In his own elaho!I'ation of this question, he ib.as identified two distinct objectifications of time: cosmic

[1] "Have we not, as Heidegger says, gained access, thanks to time, to the 'original phenomenological knowledge of the inner and unified structure of transcendence'?" Paul Ricoeur, *Fallible Man* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1967), p. 66. Besides Heidegger's classic *Being and Time,* see also his *Basic Problems in Phenomenology* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1982): "Dasein's basic constitution is grounded in Temporality" (p. 228). Also, *The History of the Concept of Time* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1985), especially pp. 140-141.

time ;and the time of the human spirit. When taken together these obj.ecbificationscreate ia paradox or pairadoxes (he names them "aporias ") for the general :intelligibility of time. They occur when ·oosmic time oonfronts existential time. Co.smic time, wihich :identifies the relationship between a;ny two arbitrarily chosen moments in ovder to measure a specific magnitude of time, is indifferent to eristentiail time, which is based on existentially, therefo!l.'e,meaningfully-detemiined categories of past, present, 1andfoture. [2]

Fail' from parrulyziinghis thinking, howevier,these apori.:asinvite Ricoeur not only to probe mo!l.'e deeply the
he is seeking to understand ibut also to seek &om different disciplmes a Jight which may he shed on resolving these aporias. [3]

In this article, I do not wish to address tihe question of the intelligibility of time '3.t the more general ihermeneuticaJ level that Ricoeur has identified for his own work. I wish ·rather to engage RicoeUT's:analysii.so[one s1ide of this question, namely, the meaning and mtel:1.igibility of cosmic ti.me. And f& this purpose the general :ftmmeworkthat Ricoeur has set urp in his discussion on the phenomenology of time in the thivd volume of ihis most rrecent work, *Time and Narrative,* is ru:t a;pproprri.ate starting point for our o.wn study.

2 Paul Ricoeur, *Temps et reoit,* Tome 3 (Paris: Cerf, 198·5), pp. 30 & 31. The other volumes in this trilogy are *Temps et reoit,* Tome 1 (Paris: Seuil, 1983) [Eng. *Time and Narrative,* Vol. 1 [trans. by Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer] (Chicago .and London: University of Chicago Press, 1984)]; *Temps et reoit,* Tome 2, *La configuaration dans le 1'ecit de fiction* (Paris: Seuil, 1984) [Eng. *Time and Narrative,* Vol. 2 (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1985)]; the English translation of the third volume appeared from the same publisher in 1988. For a good outline of Ricoeur's program in these three volumes see John Van den Hengel's review of Volume 2 in *Eglise et TMologie* 18 (1987) : 401-405.

a Note, for example, the three disciplines Ricoeur engages in dialogue in his recent three-volume work *Temps et recit:* literary works on narrative, historiography, and phenomenology. Earlier he wrote, "Finally, by carrying the debate to the level of language, I have the feeling of encountering other currently viable philosophies on a common terrain." "Existence and Hermeneutics," in *Oonfiict of Interpretations* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), p.15.

,'J'.he specific contours of Riooeur's discussion of time :are shaped hy traditions of thought whose origins may he identified lwith Augustine and .AristoUe. Ricoeur will hmng the insights of 1both these traditions into his own rrefleictiionon time and will ,J'efashionthe major p:roiblematicof time: How can I on the one hand have a reflection on time whose lba;sicpoint of reference is my immediate present, a present f1rom which I can refer intelligibly to the meaning of the past aJJid the future, while on the other hand develop 'a reflection on time, cosmic time, which is completely indifferent to such terms as present, past, and future :and ,which refers, in quite neutra:l to autonomous, successive instances?

It would seem at first sight tihat .AUJgustine has taken us most deeply into the mysterious complexities of our understanding of time. Most studies whlch take urp the question of time ibegin 1with his now famous expression of frustmtion: "What, then, is time? H no one asks me, I know; if I want to explMn it to someone ,who does ask me, I do not know" (*Confessions1* Ch. 14, Bk. 11). Just as weH-kno,wn are his subsequent refined and detailed a,ccotmts of the human spirit's prresence to itself tin its own activities. An elaboration of the structure of these activities, in the mind's attention to its act o[attending, to memory, and to anticipation, in short in the activity of intending (*intentio*) , W"iill ibecome the hasis upon which he is a:ble to account for a reference to the :rerulitiesof the present, the past, and the future. These :references will become distentions of the intentiona,l activity of the human spirit. And so Augustine will place at the center of his exposition of time the reference to the *distentio animi.*

I shall not describe once more bhe well-knnwn structure of Augiustine's refiectfon [4] nor Ricoeur's magnificent interpretation of the operations and dialectics that lea;d Augustine from

4 See Ricoeur, *Time* rma *Narrative.* Vol. 1, pp. 5-30.

one level fo the next. However, I would like to mention one important oihserv:a:tionmaide by Ricoeur. He finds a failure in .A!ugustine's reflection where the latter acknowledges a common opinion which identifies time with movement. Augustine dismisses this equation hut at ,the same time decidedly turns arw:ay from a consideration of more subtle interpretations of and insights into the nature of cosmic time.

For this reason Ricoem reoognized from the beginning that he would have to account for this dimension in developing his own study, hut he reserved discussion of it until he was pre- to undertake it within a far more extensive presentation of a genera:l phenomenology of t:ime in Volume 3.

When Riicoeur does pick up this issue, he argues that there is indeed an 0rbjective reaEty of time, linked to the reality of movement, :which resists being accounted for pu't1ely in terms of the "time of the human spirit." Jn Ricoeur's assessment, cosmic time, lbeing an expression of objective reality, is present before the activity of !human ,spi,rit, and thus human sipirrit cannot consider itself to :be at the origin of our understanding of time.

In order to :counterbalaince Augustine's approach, Ricoeur goes hack to A'ristotle. He sees !in Aristotle's "explanation " of cosmic time an intelligibility and objectification of the reality of time, an appropriation of cosmic truth, that cannot he taken up rpurely and simply within Aiugustine's 'reading of the tiime of the human spirit.

However, if it is one of the gains of Ricoeur's study to have caHed for a sohering to the reality of cosmic time, I think his treflections on the 1inte1Hgibi1ityof 1oosmic time can be pushed a hit furitiher and a more precise meaning of the oibjectivity of eosmic time developed. Jn view of this I shall be pursuing the ro1e that "ordering intelligence" plays in our apipreoiation of the meaning of objectiivity when referring to the order of the visible universe. In my view, implications of this role can he decisive for the relationship between cosmic time and the time of human spirrit, which privileges the v;alidity of !human action.

That Riooeur's account of the ohjectivity o:f cosmic time needs to he :fUTtherdeveloped can :be clarified :by Jooking at his reading of Heidegger.

-II-

Having gone through the ilong history of rrefl.eotionsand de-ibates ooncerrnillgtime and having :focused,i:in ;particuJar, on the works of Arugustine, Aristotle, Kant, and Husserl, Ricoeur turns to *Being arvd Time,* which, he argues, out a new foundation on which to carry for1w:airdour inteTpretation of time. If Augustine and Husserrl have wo:rked £rom a descrip-ti:ion of our innerr of time, and Aristotle and Kant lliuve worked :from a description 1of the "objectivity" o:f time, Heidegger 'Superseded these two starting points with la reflec-tion ihased on his :reading of *Da,sein.* Heidegger emphasizes our wkeady heing-the1 1e, our 1already having found ourselves as heing-in-the-wor,Jd and thrown .towa:vds death. The term which encapsulates this onto.logical existentiel experience of being-in-the-'world, thrown tow:ard death, iis *Care.*

:Altholll>ghHeidegger had su;perseded the polemic of cosmic and psychologica,l t:i!Ille, Riooeur still has misgivings about Heideggerr"s appropriation of the intelligihility o:f cosmic time within hiis new rperspectivieof understanding. For in Heidegger the popular oi time which corresponds, to om heing-in-the wor1d ,as cosmos is treated under the heading o:f within-timeness *(Innierzeitliohkeit)* . However, :for Heidegger, thiis is seen as an experience and expression oi:f time which is too super-ficirul; it (JOr,resipondsto tihe time of what is 1at !hrund, the thing-ness of the wor1d, and its artiifacts which mre manipulruble. Heidegger, who is a pioneer in the philosophy of 1anguage, could not yet draw out the full :implications of finguistic clues ;to our deeperr and more .complex of cosmic participa-tion. So much is this the case that Ricoeur ends up placing Heidegger'•s treatment, ibeginning as it does rwith Care, within the trrudition o[AJugustine's more psychologica:l 1readingof time and Husserrs perspectives on time.

But in so doing, rand this is where Riooernr reveals his own ranticipations, he still credits Heidegger with drawing our attention to the already-there of our 1being-in-the-world and with indirectly demonstnatinrg that time, the time :of the world, precedes **in** its objectivity the time of the human spirit, *or* precedes the of time for iwhiich the human spirit is responsible in its mode of being attentive to itself. In fact, I would suspect that, because he learned this from Heidegger, he wa;s awrare from the beginning of the need to read Aristotle' s insights into time along with Augustine's and to 1anticipate the corrective which a notion of eosnric time wou1d bring to our hermeneutics of time as an expression of self-underst:anding. [5]

However, in my view, this relationship to the already-there of our being-in-the-world, as evidence of the objectivity of cosmic time, does not yet take into account the fall truth of the meaning of the o:bjectivrity of cosmic time. :Ror it is one thing to say that realities such as movement make 1an impact on my senses and confirm the world's ibeing-there objectively hefore I hegin to think about it; it is quite another thing to identify these incontl'overtible impressions made on my senses by the visib1e world with the intelligibility of the world's **full** objectivity. There is the difference here :between (1) the sense of the oibjectiViederived from an experience of the" giivenness" of material reality and (2) the objectivity of the wodd, a knowledge which is the fruit of the research, for example, in natural sciences. The one is a question of appeia•rance, the other of an act of understa:ncHng.

Ricoeur is fully ruware of the significance of the intelligibilities which are the :result of our knowledge in the natural sciences. His work offers insightful inroads into a general theory of objectivity and the importance rof empirica1lresea,rch as an explanatory pole in a generail theory of hermeneutics. [6]

[5] See Ricoeur, *'.l'ime and Narrative.* Vol. **1,** pp. 60-64; *Temps et reoit.* Tome 3, pp. 90-144.

[6] Drawing on such studies as *The Discove1·y of Time,* by June Goodfield and Stephen Toulmin (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press,

But wha.t Ricoeur does not yet seem to hawe accounted for in the distinction between sentient experience of movement and the objective intelligibility of cosmic time is the role of human intelligence, especriaillyas this concerns the different f:rames of reference involved in 1identifying ooncrete time. A's a result, it appears that in his discussion of cosmic time he tends to place the emphasis on the ailready-there of movement hefore the engagement of the activity of the mind. He does this in order not to ,Jet the cosmic theory fall under the governance of psy;ohofogicaltheory of time.

This is evident when he himself continues to resist allowing human intelligence a. primary role in understanding the objective rewlity of eosmic time. He knows, as his rreading from Aristotle indicates, that intelligence is requirred to understand how we measure and number ("re1dmn," if you wi1l) our day-to-day cosmic time. But he maintains that even before there is this act of measuring time there is the 01bjective 1.'eality of what is measuraible. This 'objectivie order,' therefore, precedes and stands as la coTl'ective to the ad of human intenigence 1and understanding. [7]

I would not deny this, hut I do come hack to an eadier

1963), Ricoeur demonstrates the complex and stratified levels that are present in any account of our understanding of cosmic time. He refers to these in order to offer resistance to the all-too-quickly incorporatecl (and dismissed) notions of popular time taken up by Heidegger.

I refer the reader to the extremely important pages in Ricoeur's work *Fallible Man,* pp. 57-71, where he deals with the question of objectivity. He writes, " To know being is not merely to let it appear but is also to determine it intellectually, to order it, to express it" (p. 67). I am asking how the meaning of this statement is nuanced when we consider cognitional operations *as well as* the determination of language and speech in reaching the real.

[7] Our judgment on Ricoeur's approach finds even more support when he explains where he can anticipate the cosmological response to the aporias of the "time of the human spirit." He believes that they will be found at the level of a poetics, a narrative configuration of time *(Temps et recit,* 3, p. 31). In our view, this indicates that we still must address precisely how the ordering intelligence does lead us to an affirmation of the objectivity of time.

point: the objectivity of reality that comes from an impression made on my senses, that is, empiricrul,e:xiperienceand its images, is not the objectivity of an intelligibiliity like the notion of time itself. This latter is ia result of knowing, rand is, therefore, the oibjective as grasped and known. In this case, a, fuller elaJboration of the irole of human sp[rit in its acts of understanding is cmcia;l.

Furthermorrie, there is no direct experience of time even at the cosmic level of time. We must recall that the question of time ,was just as pil'ohlematic £or Aristotle as it wias for Augustine. Both began their respective keatises hy asking ho1w we can sipeak of something that logic telis us does not exist.

As far as the truth of cosmic :time is concerned, this pi!'oblem cannot be superseded unless we understand that the objectivity of cosmic time is reached only within a comprehension of how understanding ,gives us access to this intelligibility. It can only he understood in its inteHigihility as an act of judgment and only hecomes knowledge as something that is *krwwn.* This is achieved :by hringing into :focus rand to its end the entire dyna:mITc ,structure of mgnitiional operations in an act of judgment. This does not make knowJedge subjective; it simply recognizes that what is known to 1be true amd 01bjectiveis only known as such by a knower who knows this.[8]

This is why in the next section of this article we must retUII'n for a moment to Aristotle and re-Teaid his account of time. But in the course of our re-reaiding, we shall rbe drawing on the insights of thinkers who work within la philosophical tradition which places at the center of its approach an atitention to the

sSee Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (N.Y.: Herder, 1972). "Reflection and judgment reach an absolute: through them we acknowledge what really is so, what is independent of us and our thinking" (p. 35). .Again: "What is true is of itself not .private but public, not something to be confined to the mind that grasps it, but something independent of that mind and so in a sense detachable and communicable" (pp. 44-45). Note also the article by Lonergan entitled: " The Isomorphism of Thomist and Scientific Thought," in *OoUeotion,* ed Fred Crowe (Montreal: Palm, 1967), pp. 142-151, especially p. 149.

act of understand:inig and the operaitions of reason itseH. We shall see that it is the differentiated understanding orf this attention which sheds new 1i.ghton the meaning rand objectivity of rcosmictime.

The tradition of 1whichwe are thrinlcingis that orf St. Thomas Aquina;s. When speaking of time, he referred to Aristotle, yet when it came to grasping the structure of the visible universe, he was principally concerned with our acts of understanding. He thus orpened up a trrudition which W10uld eventuaUy set up ·the premises from which a more elaiborate account o.f time muld he developed.[9] In our judgment, this challenge w&s taken up most recently hy Bernard Lonergan.

study on time in Chapter *5* of *Insight* together with other reflections on time which ihave developed within the Thomistic tr&dition will he particufarly helpful as we pursue the question of the intelligibility of time.

I cannot promise to the .aporias which set Ricoeur's own reflection in motion, for there is truth to his ohservations. The very olanguaige of time itself ·will always serv;e to give rise to further thougiht. But the Teflections in the next section may shed mnsiderruble light on how to ohjectify and understand cosmic time.

[9] Note the recent historiography of this tradition, especially in the many articles of G. McCool (most recently in his "Neo-Thomism and the Tradition of St. Thomas," *Thought* 62 (June 1987): 131-146). I would identify in particular the following: " De Tempore" (a short monograph on the question of time, once wrongly attributed to St. Thomas but which can be found as Opuscule XLIII in *Opuscules de saint Thomas d'Aquin,* trans. M. Vedrine, M. Bandel, and M. Fournet (Paris: L. Vives, 1856-1858-Texte latin sur deux colonnes au bas des pages) ; Friedrich Beemelmans, *Zeit und lflwigkeit nach Thomas von Aquino* (Miinster: .Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1914); Desire Nys, *La, notion de temps* (Paris: Felix .A.lean, 1925) ; De Tonquedec, *La, Philosophie de la, nature: La, nature en general* (Premiere partie, troisieme fascicule) Principes de la philosophie thomiste, II (Paris: Lethielleux, 1959), pp. 66-90; Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Huma,n Understanding* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957), especially Chapter 5.

Time and Ordering Intelligence

– I –

Our ideas in this section rely on Lonergan's insights. He maintains that, even if a i!Wtion of cosmic time emerges only **in** app11ehension of concrete focal motion, there cannot be an adve11tence to time as the foll set of concrete durations without the " inter¥ention of ordering intelligence." Moreover **there** cannot he an invariant of time which persists aa:nong all instances of particular measures of time without attending to the " level of intelligence."

This affirmation goes st:might to the heart of Ricoeur's discussion on the relationship between Augustine's and Aristotle's viiews on time. Ricoeur, as mentioned rubove, has stated the importance of holding both theories together 1and yet argued that hoth cannot he held within one theory of time.[10]

Augustine's " psychO'log1ca:l' account of time does represent a definitive adv1ance over that of Aristotle, hut Riicoern· judges that Aristotle's ,theory resists hetter the imperia,l rule of the subject in an interpretation of the full intelligi!bility of cosmic time. **It** was Aristotle, mo11e than Augustine, who prroibed iin subtle fashion the complex features of cosmic time.

In his anwlysis of Arristotle's theory, Ricoeur 1dentifies three iphases: first, Aristotle's eJDp1anation that tia:ne is found in mov;ement but not identified with movement. (Here we must under:line that it is conc1'ete, local motion that is considered.) Apart from the apprehension of change there is no foundation cfor the genesis of the idea of time.

Secondly, regarding the movement of any object through a given space, time concerns the ,relationship of ' before ' 1and ' afteOC'', namely the identifia:hle beginning and end points of motion. There is no apprehension of time without an identification of these two points and their relationship to one another aJJJd in relation to the siame body moving through space.

[10] Ricoeur, *Temps ct recit,* Tome 3, pp. 29-30; 35-36.

.FinaUy, there is the measure of the interval, its length orr quantity *between the beginning and end points.* In this instance, human intelligence makes use of a convenient numbering system and determines (thy way of numbering) the quantity of this interval.

Given these phases 0£ Aristotle's commentary on time, we understand why time is defined as " the number of motion in respect of' hefore '1and' after.' "[11]

Augustine's failure in trying to substitute a psychological theory for a cosmological one is asserted hy Ricoeur through ·every major phase of his analysis oif ATistotle's theory. He will show that at every point where, from Augustine' s piresentation, the human spirit attempts to affirm its priority Aristotle's theory will resist this advance. In this way he attempts to bring to the surfrace the truth of our participation in the cosmos, which tends .to .be hidden, if not suppressed, in Augustine's formulation of time. I shall briefly describe Riooeur's position by referring to each phase 0£ Aristotle's theory and hy adding some remarks of my own.

First, Ricoeur underlines the fact that we aT'e " already circumscri.Jbed and enveloped " in time, for through mo'Viement 1and its successive moments we apprehend the already-there of the visible universe 1before we attest to our own presence on the scene. We experience the wol'11d and find "succession in things " before •We re-construct the world. I would add that while it !remains true that mov;ement makes 1an impact on our senses, this does not yet give rise to a notion of time; time is not ·an immediate and explicit experience.[12]

Secondly, for Ricoeur, in the relationship of 'hefore ' and ' after' we anticipate an intelligibility to the order orf the universe. Our whole discussion of time in the AristoteHan tmdition " proceeds by analogy from a relation of order which is in

[11] Aristotle, *Physics* 219a34-35.

[12] " II est dificile de savior ce que c'est que le temps " ("difficile est cognoscere quid sit tempus ") . "De Tempore " in *Opuscules de Bwilnt Thomas d'Aquin,* p. 31.

the world hefore being in the mind." [13] But I wou1d add that the meaning of "before" as used here must ,be submitted to ,some criticwl analysis. For, ii it is true that the order of the universe does not derpendon the human srpirit, it is nonetheless true that order is an intelligibility, not an immediate dakum of experience. Furthermore, any order which is discovered to exist independent of the human is a.in order only known as such hy the opemtions of knowing of the human sipiriit. This will he at the center of our discussion be1ow.

Finally, time *ultimately* relies for the purposes orf measure on a constant, ahsoilutely rregular movement. Even if the standa11d for this cannot be immediately identified, it nonetheless is attested to hy R1icoeur, "that the sea11chfor an a1bsolutelyregular movement l'emains the governing idea of every measure of time." [14] But I see further implications in this with regard to the prohlem o.f time. For implicit here is an assumption concerning simultaneity. If simultaneity is anticipated as the directing goal with regard to the universal measure of time, there results the confusion of identifying :a wncrete particular with an abstract principle. This is one of the fundamental 'sources of e11ror O'r at least blockages in our comprehension o.f time.

Nonetheless, these points ha.ving ibeing made, Riooeur recognizes in each of these stages the imperious weight of bhe presence of human intelligence. He TeaEzes that whether with rega11d to perceiving motion, or with regavd to identifying any point or instant which sets the 1boundarriesof :a specific motion so that it may he measured as a unit of time, or with regard to the possibility of applying a measure of time itself, one has to acknowledge the perceptive, discriminating, and comparative activities of thought.

However, for R:icoeur, this aetivity of the spirit never overrides the principal empha:sis of Aristotle's theorry. "Movement

1° Ricoeur. *Temps et reoit,* Tome 3, p. 25.

14 Ricoeur, *Temps et reoit,* Tome *8,* p. 20.

.remains the ·aooentua:tedterm .... " [15] And in order to re-affirm this, he maintains that the objectivity of the cosmological experience of time cannot he directly reached hy the human spiTit,[16] meaning, that it is not by an analy:sis or pihenomeno-1ogy of human consciousness of that we can comprehend without 'limits the meaning orf cosmoiloigicaltime.

Ricoeur would maintain that, even if in each phase of the cosmological theory there is 'allusion to the operations of the human spirit, there remains in this theory no *explicit* reference to the human spirit.[17] However, I would maintain that, despite the ifact that it may ibe true that there is !110 explicit reference to the operations O'f the human spirit in this theory, this should not lead us to de-emphasize the role understanding plays in our affirmation of the objectivity of time. It is the inattention to the role of understanding in the formulation of the objectivity of time that has led to some of foe major ·confusions in understanding cosmic t,ime itselrf.[18]

We shai11 see that hy attending to the operations of understanding rwe need not he '1ed surreptitiously ha,ck into Augustine's psychological theory; far from it, we can .be led more proioundly into the implications of the intelligibility and objectivity of ieosmic itself, quite distinct from psychological time. At tihis Jevel I am in complete agreement mth Ricoeur: we cannot comprehend within one theory both theories of time. Neveritheless, I iheliev;ethat it is still possible to disengage, within the theory of cosmological time, other formative elements in our understanding of this notion.

15 Ricoeur, *Temps et recit,* Tome 3, p. 23.

16 Ricoeur, *Temps et r6oit,* Tome 3, p. 21.

·11 Ricoeur, *Temps et r6cit,* Tome 3, p. 26. Beyond attempting to account for the intelligibility of time itself, Ricoeur also emphasizes another agenda that is at the heart of this section of his work, namely, "restituer toute sa profondeur a la *phusis,* ... " (p. 26) His appeal to objectivity is also a way of declaring that nature is the principle and cause of movement which "preserve la dimension plus qu'humaine du temps" (p. 26). It is worthwhile comparing this emphasis with those of Pat Byrne in his address delivered at the Lonergan workshop meeting in Boston, June 1987, entitled "Insight and the Retrieval of Nature."

18 See Lonergan, *Insight,* pp. 158, 160, 16·6, 170.

-II-

In order to develop these insights, it is important to come hack to tih.e assumption that there is no explicit account of the operations of the human spirit in Aristotle's theory of time. H the text of *The Physi(;S* itself does not give an account of these orpemtions, it seems nonetheless that subsequent tradition [19] has done so and has benefited greatly thereby. It has come to understand the full objectivity and meaning of Aris-rtotle',sdefinition hy appealing to the role of understanding in the .formulation of a definition of time and by identifying the stages or :phases in the conception of time that led to the definition itself.

Here is a case where we must 1aidvertto more than what is stated in the theory itself. This 'more ' is the way human beings understand the visible univ;e.rse itself. For me, this is one of the most important reasons for pursuing this question within the .Aristotelian tradition. This tradition has heen continued and enriched hy Aquinas and by modern commentators on Aquinas rwho have taken seriously his own call to understand understanding. We shall highiight in particular a hook written iby Desire Nys entitled *La notion du temps,* first published in 1898 with a third edition in In this brilliant study, Nys demonstrates why it is so important not only to dloHow,an arglllment of a texit but also to attend to how understanding, the activity orf reason, is operating in formulating the aiigiument of the ,text.[20] I sha11 the :referring frequently to this text 1by Nys.

F1ollowing this line of iinterpretation concerning the questions of cosmic time, ,we recognize that our knowledge of time is not just 1a question of the objectivity of the visible world over ·against the ructivity of the hruma.n spirit. It is also, as an affirmatiion of intelligibility of order, one of the hest to watch the processes of abstraction at work and to identify

[19] See above n.9.

[20] See, for example, Nys, *La notion du temps,* pp. 7, 11, 12.

the foundations of human understanding.[21] It is a unique instance of 1appropriating the objective and subjecthne complex iat work in judging the truth of order in the visible universe.

We must rupppropriate not only how the human miind in its operations is indirectly implicated hut also how it is impossible to comprehend pmperly the objective intelligibility of time -without ian attention to the operations of reason itself. The .Aristotelian theory goes bey;ond asserting that nature is there before human spirit is iat worrk; it shows !how both our participiation iin the visible unh,,erse 1and our understanding of this 1are subtly and simuJtaneously implicated.[22]

Let us druborate this 'by referring in more detail to these three phases identified hy Riooeur's ['eading of .Aristotle's theory of time. I shrull indicate at ,every stage how an underrstanding of the operations of intelligence is essential to an elabovation of the notion of time itseLf. In eruch phase I will a:lso accentuate the importance of maintaining the distinction 1betweenwhat is pemeiv;edto he objective and real ait the Jevel of first appearances, and what is known to be ohjecrtive and intelligible as a result of the activity of reflexive consciousness !itself.

1. Nys has written that the key to the entire understanding of the Thomistic aind Aristotelian notion of time is the identity of the objectivity of motion (focal motion) and the objectivity of persistence. Those familiar with Aristotle's theory recognize the important, if not essential, relationship between these two realities, i.e. time :and mo,vement. Without movement there :is no :genesis of the ,idea of time. So closely are these two notions interrelated that it is understood to be to develop 1a notion of time without an e:x1perienceof change.[23]

[21] Lonergan, *Insight,* p. 140.

[22] For this reason we would not agree with Beemelmans' expression: "Die Zeit hat einen halb subjektiven, halb objektiven Charakter" *(Zeit 1tnd lflwigkeit,* p. 21) • Objectivity is reached through knowing; it is not a component of knowledge independent of a consideration of the knowing subject. See, however, n.8 above.

[23] See Nys, *La notion d.u temps,* p. 23, 27. See also Friedrich Beemelmans. *Zeit un<l lflwigkeit,* pp. 13-14.

However, even with this identification there comes a swbtle distinction. Movement a.nd time are not .equated; time is found tin movement but is not movement itself. Thus, time is not perceived immediately by our senses, as is the appea!l"ance or apprehension of movement itself. So much is this the case thait, like .Augustine, Aristotle and Aquinas 'begin their reflections on time by affirming the rprohlematic charader of knowing what (it iseems) cannot logically "rbe."[24]

r.Dhe initial perception of time requires an ract of intelligence or !!'ea.son. Nys points out, for example, that the affirmation of time in movement 1and the distinction of time itself from movement require that we h1ling together both the fact that something is and thait this something persists in its existence tl:u:1oughsuccessive motion in a fixed frame of space. Movement implies " the persistence of the same act oif existence." [25]

But persistence is not the same as existence. To affirm that something is, and to affirm that it persists in mo'Viementin its a;ct of existence, these two .affirmations rely, first, on the fact that intelligence has formulated the idea of persistence and, secondly, that it has distinguished it fvom an ract of existence which is perceived in sll!ccessiv:estates of change.

Bven in this very :basic phase of the theory we have to be oare£uil.not to lump into one perception two distinct realities, one which can he described, namely, movement, the other which is an inte1ligibi:1ity,namely, persistence of some thing in its a;ct of existence. In relating time to movement, then, the distinction between the obdectivity of description and the objectivity of !intelligibility is introduced.

Before moving on to the second phase, naimely, the idea of the relationship of ':before' and 'after,' we should note that the identification of the act of e:xistenGe,which is distinct from persistence yet only apprehended in persistence, helps us to

24 Aristotle, *Physics,* in *The BMic Works of Aristotle,* ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941). Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1963).

25 See Nys, *La notion du temps,* pp. 12-13, 17.

understand something of the nature of time. That is, time is not the resuJt of a sum of successive moments in change; it is not the sum of separruble parts.

Thus we can srpeak of an infinite series of divisible magnitudes of time (an infinite series) without compromising our understanding of time. Were time, as a notion, pure1y material magnitude, then it would be an infinitely divis1rble magnitude, the full measure of which wou1d be aniv;ed at by adding these magnitudes.. But the notion of time, even if it applies only to concrete durations, is an abstract inte1ligibility and not identified with any specific magnitude. We shall have an opportunity to come hack to this point later when we speak of measure. But here, we simply wish to say that any is ly divis1ble, given our .aihiEty to identify any points for potentiwl measurement and subsequently to divide the magnitude at these points.

Q. The second phase of the themy concerns the relatfonship of 'before,. and 'after.' Even if the magnitude iidentified with the points of before and after objectifies an 011der inherent in the st11ucture of movemen:t and nature, nonetheless it is only the power of reason which makes possible the identification of this specific point as a boundary of what magnitude is to he measured by time.

Ricoeur himself admowledges the role of the human spirit in identifying the ihoundary point which identO.fies the limit of any particula;r movcement to he measured, yet :this activity of the spirit is still not emphasized. However, Nys has shown that without this act of reason there is no not:ion of time; there is oruy movement. if one of the major elements in the notion of time is the relationship of before and after, there exists, until this ' after ' ipoint is identified, 1only potential time in the material base of movement. Without this identification there is only successive movement and no reference to measure. In other wo.rids, the eme11gence of the notion of cosmic tiime requires the act of intelligence which suspends motion in motion and enables the interval :between these 'two points to be measured.

One ma.y counter the argument hy saying that there a:re, independent of an lact of human intelligence, many identifiahle movements in nature, e.,g. tihe hea;rt beat. These may suggest ohjectively identifiaible beginning and end points OJ' even regu-Ja;r ;rhythms whose sequences permit the applicrution of a measure of time. Yet the cosmic theory elaborated hy Aristotle, and then by Aquinas and such :eommentatovs as Nys, recalls that *it* is not just 'a question of identifying these points; it is a1so a question of I1ecognizing the *relationship* hetween the beginning and end points. Theve is nothing in nature itself as visible reality which can ho1d in relationship two independent points for the rpurposes of applying a measure; this remains an act of intemgence.[26]

Without the act of reason, time remains only potential, in movement. If this remains difficult .for our imagination to grasp, it is only because we ha,ve not yet 1rudverted to how om.· intenigenoe works in expressing the languaige of time itselI, We do not ,wish to say that inteHigence creates the st:mcture or 011der which time measures; we simply wish to highlight that a judgment :rubout that structure or order can he true only because this O'l'der is a rea:lity which can he reached by the operations o,f human cognition. We are not falling hack into a theocy of time based merely on the psychology of the inner experience of time.

The importance of recognizing the mle of reason in constituting the intelligihlity of cosmic time becomes more evident if we also comprehend the fact that these two points, the before and after, the structure of whose relationship is essential to the definition of time, are not iinoluded in the magnitude that is measured as time. They set the limits from which and to which a magnitude is measul'ed. Wel'e they included in the measure, this would imply two other points as the limit of the measure. When this insight is applied not only to local movements and their time ihut also to the wol'1d in its totality as

2a See Nys, *La notion du temps,* p. 33.

movement, we understand the futility of attempting to measure either the foll tiime of the world or to identify its chrono-ilogicalorigin.

Because of the Tefationship between the operations of reason and the measuring of time, it is impossible iby virtue of some other time to identify the end of the wo'l"ld. This is why Aquinas could entertain, at least in p1rinciple,the idea of the eternity of the world,[27] even if it is in £act finite. There is not only an in:finite number of divisions applicable to any magnirude by virtue orf its divisibility; there is also an infinite num-1ber of concrete extensions to any 1ocal movement.

Moreo·ver, since any measure requires as its limit a point that is not included in the measure itself, it is to identify an origin without implicating another pcior moment as limit. Once more, difficmlties and confusions .arise if we do not distinguish the objectivity proper to the intelligibility of time and the intelligibility proper to describing observed motion .

.Aigain,then, in this second phase, the structure of objective nature expressed in the notion of cosmic time can only be grasped and known by the operative and ordering intelligence.

3. The most complex aspect of time is the third pha.se of Ricoeur's analysis of a cosmic theocy of time. What is often not attended to here is that measure not onJy involves using a conventional " yardstick " .for determining magnitude but also implies 'all !intelligibility of what it means to measure. Forgetting this gives rise to a number of difficult aporias. For ex-

[27] Nys, *La notion du temps,* p. 157. See also A. D. Sertillanges, *L'idee de creation et ses retentissements en philosophie* (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1945), pp. 25-63. Also Beemelmans, *Zeit und Ewigkeit,* pp. 50-51. Beemelmans, Nys, and De Tonquedec refer in this context to the term *"aevum"* that was used ·by Aquinas. It is not " *aeternitas* "; nonetheless, as Beemelmans points out, "Es bedeutet eine Teilnahme an der Ewigkeit seitens des Geschi:ipfes" (p. 50) . .Sertillanges uses the phrase " ab aeterno " on p. 25 of his text. *Aevum* was also a notion that the medieval thinkers used to differentiate the "eternity" of non-corporeal created beings (pure spirits) from God's eternal existence (*aeternitas).*

.ample, a common but mistaken assumption is that, smce there is a unity to time, there is .ultimately a common standard, whether it he knowable or not (Kant), which can be the measure of an and total time or, if *you* will, the full magnitude of motion.

More concretely this is evidenced in the assumption that, independent of the positions observers occupy, all motion is simultaneous. It is the theory of relativity which forces us beyond this common sense notion with regard to measurement, even if this theory cannot itself olwrify what it has to offer towards understanding time.[28]

I cannot possiibly en.for into a description of this theory, let a;lone pretend that I fully gra1sp either its mathematica;l or its physicaJ aspects. But with regard ito our present discussion I wish to sibow ho1w it has furthered our understanding of the *notion* of time.

E1ven *Nys,* in his edition of his hook *La noti.on du temps,* knew he was up a;gainst a new phenomenon. Though he was mo:re awa;re than others of the role of reason and its developed distinctions in dea:ling with time, Nys felt that Tela-tiv:ity theory, by affirming d[fierent apparently contradictory measurements of similar points and their relationships,[29] was ·still comprehensible ·within an idea of infinite magnitudes of mea,surement and, furthermore, thait it did not touch the in-.telligibility of time itself.

But haiving said this, he knew that :somehow there :was more to it-here we see how perceptive he was in his day-even

[28] One way this is evidenced is by the search for the foundations of relativity theory. See Patrick Byrne, " Lonergan on the Foundations of the Theories of Relativity," in *Creativity and Method: Essays in Honor of Bernard Lonergan,* ed. Matthew L. Lamb (Milwaukee, Wis:. Marquette University Press, 1981), pp. 477-494.

[29] The standard example for posing the problem is the explosion of firecrackers on a station platform as a train is rapidly passing through the station. If you are on the platform and trigger the explosion of the firecrackers, they all go off, *for you, at the same time.* However, if you are a passenger on the train moving through the station, it looks as if they go off one after the other.

though he could not articulate what this was nor grasp what this imp;iied :for our £uture understanding of the visible universe. The reason for his blind spot on this point can be found i!l.l his own text. He iassumed that, since there was a universal and aJbso1uteintelligibility to time, there was an rubsolutemagnitude too. In other words, he did not arpply to the notion of measure the same analysis regarding reason tha;t he applied to the notion of time.

A ·Similar oversight can he found in a text like de Tonquedec's,30 which is in many ways a fine commentary on time in the Thomistic tradition. He too has avoided many of the common sense difficulties hy attending to the operations of reason. But when it comes to measurement, there is no similar attention to the oper:ations of understanding. So he says that, when two events occur simultaneously for one person but not for another, we should resolve this by considering the relationship between or among these events themselves, independent of the observel's. This solution assumes that there is a higher over:aH perspective from which we see things happening. But any motion that is accounted for from tib.is perspective leads us ha.ck to the prolblems of what is seen from one particulaT point of ohservation and how space is defined within thait perspective.81 And we are back to the same prioblem relatiiv1itytheory faoed, with its attempts to devise invariant laiws that held true across different, concrete, spatio-'temrporrulframes of :reference.

'.Do my knowledge the first creative solution to this perplexity is found in Lonerigan's chapter on " Space ,and Time " in Chapter Five of *Insight.* He !I"ecaJls something wihiich everyone since Aristotle has maintaiined about time, that is, that time

so De Tonquedec, *La philosophie de la nature,* p. 87.

s1 This is the oversight in the once used example of God sitting high up on top of a hill watching two persons or vehicles below moving toward one another at high speeds around a bend. The two vehicles, it was argued, are moving but God is at rest and so does not undergo the same experience of time as the two moving persons or vehicles. This is hardly a way of solving the problem, since all it does is place God within a specific, concrete, spatio-temporal frame of reference.

deals with co!l1crete local motion. But where we speak of concrete local motion in concrete space, things are perceived relation to a point of origin which is that of the observer. Thus, measurement takes into cons1deration, at least implicitly, the frame of reference within which points in time and space a.re said to relate to one another. The measure of these 'l'e1ationships is called a. geometry.

But here is where the problem .begins. For we still almost spontaneously don Newtonian hats, that is, we think of the universe or creation in terms of one geometry. But Lonergan has shown that there are di:fferent ways of measuring the same points in their temporal and spatial relationships and, thecrefore, different possible geometries, even an infinite set thereof. Consequently, there is not just one concrete standard of measurement. Given the intellig1bility of correlations within any specific way of measuring, we can anticipate an infinite num1ber of possible concrete ways of measuring.[32] ".AJhsolutes," writes Lonergan, "do not lie in the field of .sensible rparticulars .... "[33]

He reinforces this insight hy saying that simultaneity, which presupposes being able to bring two movements together witihin the same measureable quantity, really applies only at the concrete level. It speaks of a " now " in relation to a specific observcer. As such, then, this is not an intel1ig1hiEty either of time or of measure.

When we forget this, we apply what is true at a concrete level to an abstract inteHigibility of time, and therefore apply the truth of a particula·r situation as the standard for all. It is like saying one particular measure of time (e.g., an hour) is the standard of absolute time. But time is an aibstract notion, not a particular measure. Even Nys l'ecognized this last point.

s2 See Lonergan's remarks on Riemannian geometry in *Insight,* especially p. 147. See also his remarks on the meaning of geometry as a concrete stand" ard of measurement in "A Note on Geometric Possibility," in *Collection,* ed. Fred Crowe (Montreal: Palm, 1967), p. 112.

33 Lonergan, *Insight,* p. 170.

This tmth a.bout measure and the roJe of our intelligence in measuring eluded us as long as we did not J:iaive to deaJ with the p!l.'ohlem of measuring particles moving at very high speeds. But the data now force us in another direction. If we resist, it is not because we do not need the theory. Riather, it *is* heca,use we live fmm day to day with velocities of motion which do not 11equir:e it. We feel secure in our classical world view, even if there is mounting evidence for a statistical wodd view, which does not view the world in its totality in the same way thwt the classical does.

Lonergan admits that Aquinas thought within olassioal assumptions. But Aquinas did provide the principles for superseding them. By directing us to attend to how our understa:nding orper,a:tes when it understands the visrble univcerse, we were ahle to go !beyond the classical theory when new data for our understanding 1bemme available in the natuml sciences. This 1is the 1genius of Lonergan: he ihas attended to the new data available for "understanding understanding " that came with the new insights and methods in the natural sciences, and he !has been able to devcelop a world view that incorporates iboth the classical and statisticrul intelligirbilitiies. He has ca:lled this world view "emergent prorhability."

Within this view he has been able to focus in more precise way1s on what we understand when we understand cosmic time, and he has developed a definition which tak:es into consideration both the classical and the sitatistical inte1ligibilitires of the laws of the visible univcerse. He has defined the concrete intelligibility of time 1as " that [which] grounds the possibility of SU'ooesssivel'ealiza.Hons in accord with prolbaibilities."[34]

Furthermore, he has maide us awrure that world views are not just totaliziing images of what is 1already-out-there-now. He saw that wirth relativity theory we had in :fact gone beyond imagination in our ·efforts to understand and exp1ain the visible universe: "But relativity has eliminated the D:naginaihility of ·ScientificaUy conceived space 1and time; and quantum me-

[34] Lonergan, *Insight,* p. 172.

chanics has elimina,ted tihe imaginahility of ibas]c processes. Whether he Ekes it or not, the scientist has transcended imagination." [35]

A world view, therefore, wiH have to have a methodological reference; it will become a heuristic, anticipating specific kinds of and correfations. Lonergan calls this "emergent probaihility," a world view 1which is a heuristic according to which one is able to anticipate " the inteiligi:bHity immanent in world process." [36]

Once this is understood, the question with cregal1d to time and me:asurement can he aiddressed on the rbasis of different premises. Lonergan is aible to free us from the assumption of ,simultaneity in the notion of measurement. The unity of time is not one of ma.gnitude and there is no absolute particular standard of time. The same distinction between the particular and the intelligilble, even if the two notions cannot he separated, :applies to measurement. There is an intelligi:bility to measurement which is neither defined nor determined [37] at a purely " concrete " or descriptive level.

Conclusion

My purpose in this article was not to pcresent or discuss a new definition of time. Tlhe concern has been rather to focus more sharply on the role of "ordering inteHigence" in an understanding of the intelligibility of time. The activity of reflection (questioning, understanding, and judgment) is not a secondary element in our comprehension of a theory of cosmic time hut something essential to :recog-nizing why time is not only intellig1ble and universal but a1so objective.

These reflections do not pretend to eEmirrmte what Ricoeur has referred to as the a:porias of time. In our view there still

[35] Lonergan, " Isomorphism of Thomist and Scientific Thought," in *Collection,* ed. Fred Crowe (Montreal: Palm, 1967), pp. 142-151.

[36] Lonergan, *Insight,* p. 171.

[37] Some of Beemelmans remarks on measurement had, at least implicitly, suggested this. See his *Zeit und Ewiglceit,* p. 22.

are aporias which spur on our thinking aibout oosmic time, but they are not the same as the ones identified by Ricoeur.

For example, Riooeur spoke of the pamdox that a period of time is a unity e¥en though this period is made up of independent successive moments. A distinction between levels of objectivity can help resolve the tension between continuous time and discontinuous moments of ·succession in time. In the same way this kind of dist,inction can help clarify .the paradoxical use of the term " now" orr " instant." If any " instant " can be" now," what then does "now" mean? We have seen that one side of tJhe para:dox refers to the descripti¥e level while the other .refers to the intelligibility of time, the level of objctive intelligiilbilityof 011der.[88]

This helps us to understand, too, a basic distinction regarding the origin and fundamenrtal measure of movement that was &tandard to both Aristo,tle and Aquinas, that is, the distinction. between *primum mobile* and Unmoved Mover. Both thinkers, Lonel"gan teHs us, sought a cosmic sta:nda11dfor the measure of .all time. This standard was the fixed sphere; it met the qualities of regularity, ,simplicity, uniformity, and maximum speed.[89]

as Nys examines this problem by making a distinction between any moments identified as " before " and " after " (these are infinite in number) and the idea of the temporal present, which refers to the fact that creation "is", that is, it is always in its act of existence as creation and so is "now." See our remarks below on the distinction between the Unmoved Mover and the *primum mobile* and the significance of these terms for an understanding of time. Also, note that the medieval thinkers employed a distinction here which Ricoeur has not identified. For them, the term " instant" did not refer simply to any arbitrarily identified moment; it also referred to an experience which was timeless. (An example of such a timeless experience is an "instantaneous" act of understanding.)

89 See Antonio Moreno, "Time and Relativity: Some Philosophical Considerations," *The Thomist* 45 (1981) : 62-79, especially p. 78, where he refers to the qualities of time we have just identified. This article tries to argue that the speed of light as relativity theory has described it is "the ontological unity of time." Today, Moreno argues, the speed of light corresponds to what Aquinas speaks of in his. works as the *primum mobile.* Moreno's analogy might be right, but, if so, his theory suffers from the same weakness Lonergan identified in Aquinas, namely, the failure to distinguish between the abstract

But this standard does not y;et give us the ontological inteHigi-rbility of time. It remains a fixed measure in its own right, one which perhaps offers the outermost limit for any measuraJble magnitude of time hut nonetheless a limited one. Furthermore, this standard cannot solve the other prohlem of how there can he an ,infinite series of measurable magnitudes of time, while time, linked as it is to movement and crea;Uon,is finite.

Just as Augustine at the limit of his reflections turned to address the Eternal Orea:tor to identify the :finitude of time, so too in their own dist[nct ways did Aristotle a1nd Aquinas turn to an affirmation of the Unmoved Mover and of Being itself. as the tramcendental reference to the self-understanding of finite time. This is no Kantian a priori. 1t .is an understanding of the relationship :between our open and umestricted desire to know tbeingand Being itself.[40]

It is an insight into the intelligibility of Being itself, or, for Aristotle, nature itself, which is the object of my desire to know. But the notion of tihe Unmoved Mover, as the origin of all movement without being in movement, also p11ovides an insight into the finitiude of creation and of time. Only when time and creation rrecognize their re1a;tiionship to a higher origin do they Tecognize the truth of their own finitude.[41]

intelligibility of time and its concrete frame of reference. I do not see how the speed of light can in any way be the " ontological" unity of time. It requires an intelligibility of time to measure it as a concrete standard. This is why neither Aristotle nor Aquinas would include any sort of speed in their definition of time. For Lonergan's critique of Aquinas's reference to time, see *Insight,* p. 160. Regarding the *primum mobile,* Aquinas remained confined within an Aristotelian world view, in Lonergan's judgment.

40 Patrick Byrne's essays and articles are excellent elaborations of the significance of this point. See "Foundation of Special Relativity Theory" in *Oreativity and Method* and "Insight and the Retrieval of Nature," an address given at the *Lonergan Workshop* annual meeting (June, 1987) in Boston.

41 For this reason I think it extremely important to pay attention to the literary genre of creation stories. Most often they are either myths, narratives, or liturgical hymns. Ricoeur's later works on language and imagination shed considerable light on this. See, for example, his *The Rule of Metaphor: Miiltidi1;oiplinwry Studie1; of the Oreation of Meaning im Language*

We must also mention in this context how Gilson saw St. Thomas's view of the Unmoved Mover as a qualitative advance over the of Aristotle. I believce this advance was quite significant in the history of our inte1'pretation of cosmic time. Aquinas, unlike Aristotle, asserted the primacy of the act of existence (to exist) over essence.[42] In affi11ming the primacy of act, Aquinas was able to argue to the presence of Pure Act, i.e. the presence of God as Creator to every moving being immediately and not only a;s a remote cause, as in Aristotle's view 0£ the relationship between Unmovced Mover and moving beings. This set the stage for breaking with the notion of a fixed absolute maignitude of time, even if Aquinas himself was unable to realize this development in any exiplicit wa.y.[43] This is crucia,l in anticipatiing what later would he implied in the developments of relativity theory. St. Thomas's own breakth11ough at the level of understanding implied (400 years before Newton) that Newton's fixed magnitude (or space within

(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), especially Study 7, pp. 216-256. Regarding the relationship between mythic genre and the reference to beginnings see especially the works of Eric Voegelin: *Plato and Aristotle* (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1957), pp. 192-204; *The Ecumenical Age* (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1974), pp. 7-11; and most recently *In Search of Order* (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press 1987), pp. 13-47.

42 Etienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas* (New York: Random House, 1965), especially pp. 64-65; 78-79.

43 Lonergan does give Aquinas credit in spite of the fact that Aquinas's own solutions remained limited by his reference to the *primum mobile.* Compare *Insight,* p. 160, where Lonergan refers to the limits of Aquinas, and "Isomorphism of Thomist and Scientific Thought," p. 149, where Lonergan refers to how Aquinas has provided us with the insight to advance beyond these limited solutions. In addition to our reference to Gilson in n.42 above, for more information on the specific historical stages which led to the significant nuances in Aquinas's interpretation of Aristotle's theory of time, see Augustin Moncion, "La theorie aristotelicienne du temps chez Ies peripateticiens medievaux: Averroes-Albert le Grand-Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue Neosoholastique de la Philosophie* 36 (1934): 275-307. This article shows how the stage was set for resolving the problem of the unity of time by breaking with an assumption about magnitude. (Note: in 1940 *Revue Neoscholastique de la Philosophie* became *Revue Philosophique de Louvain.)*

which time was measura:ble) was not rubsofotely needed to explain either its intelligibility or its objectivity.[44]

However, even when someone li}(,e Lonergan takes up this understanding ,and aipplies it to our que>Stion of time, it does not resolve the ,aporias; rather it intensifies them.[45] For in my experience of dealfog with this question of the intelEgibility of cosmic time, relativity theory is one of the most puzzling things for the human mind to come to terms with. Quite simply put, it is the discovery that we have an inteHigibi1ity about the order of the world without any hope of devdoping a corresponding image. An .appro,aich which works with the complementarity (not dialectics) of classical and statistical ,intelligibilities of reality has left us with one of the most peculiar aporias: the constant urge to think of totality and its intelligihility, yet without having the possihility of forming an image of this.

At this point we must bring in the insights of Ricoeur on the use of Language itself to accentuate a peculiarity of this new aporia. For in speaking of this move beyond imagination, Lonergan has called it a world *view,* namely, "emer1gent probahility." In spite of the turn to methodology, there is still a testimony to the image-making capacities of langua1ge as a resomce kom which to dra:w augmentation of meaning and its intellig1bilities. In this terminological anomaly, which implies a " view" with no co'l'resrponding " image," we express the ,aporia of time at a new level, one whicih calls us to further thinking.

,44 From reading Lonergan one is able to see how the idea of simultaneity remains a stumbling block to higher viewpoints on time. It is a common sense image rooted in the particularity of a concrete spatio-temporal frame of reference. The abstract intelligibility of time can never be found at this level.

45 For Ricoeur, this is not a sign of the weakness of reflection but rather a motivation which intensifies the search for understanding. This can be traced also through Ricoeur's well-known reflections on "split reference" and "metaphorical twist"; *Rule of Metaphor,* pp. 216-256, and throughout his volumes on *Time and Narrative.*

AMERICAN OATHOLlC THEOLOGY AT CENTURY'S END: POS'I100NCIL!IAR, POSTMODERN, POST...THOMISTIC *

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IN *CENTURY'S END-.a* iascinaiting recent hook describing the decades at the turn of the centuries from the 990s throiUgh the 1990s-cultural historian Hillel Schwartz writes: "The millennial year has gravitamona11 tides of maximal reach. Its entire precedirng hundred years, our century, has come to he felt as a final epoch, a time of grotesque ·extremity. . . ." [1] Along with other modern intellectual inquiries, American Catholic theology has felt the pull of the ap-p:voachingmiHenium. Any interpretation of its current state-as well as of the 'l:"ole that the ·thought of St. Thomas Aquinas may continue to play in it--'ll.eeds to take account of long range intellectual and theological trends.

Clearly, the main currents in fate 20th century American Catholic theology result at least in part from the play of large tides reaching over the past hundred years and hey;ond. Among the most significant of these is Ohrist]anity's continuing endeavor to meet the pl'leS'sing surge of modernity. This endeavor engaged the energies of Catholics and Protestants for nearly two centuries, :before reaching 1someth:ingorf a climax in the Second Vatican C01Uncil. Assimilating the 1Work of several

*A version of this paper was presented on May 4, 1990 in Rome at an Angelicum University symposium on the role of St. Thomas in contemporary thought.

1.Hillel .Schwartz, *Oentury's End: A Oultural History of the Fiin de Siecle from the 990s through the 1990s* (New York: Doubleday, 1990), p. 239.

generrutions of ,bishops and theologians, the Council oombined a reaffirmation of the Catholic Christian identity of the Church with a positive, a:lbeit critical, approach to modernity. Now, just when disagreements about the conciliar stance to modernity preoccupy and divide eurrent American Catholic theologians, the advent of " :postmodernity " is being hailed in a1,chitecbure, literary oriticism, science, philosophy, and other fields. No wonder the decades ushering in the 21st century have seemed to many "a final epoch, a time of grotesque extremity " in theology an:d in Church life. The condition of late 20th century American theology is intelligible, I shall af'gue here, only when viewed in the perspective of the complex responses of Catholic and Protestant Christianity to the once swelling and now receding tides of modernity.

The fortunes of the study of Aquinas ha,V'e shifted in tandem with these :fluctuations. In both Aquinas's late 19th century 11evival and, at least in American CathoJic circles, his late 20th century eclipse, alternative Christian assessments of the challenge of moderniity figured prominently. But the situation is again in flux. There is a recovery of Aquinas underway, in connection with theological developments that encompass at least a measure of the refreshing postmodern agenda. It is here, I shall suggest, that we can identify some of the most creative currents at work in present-day American theology.

I

Although united in their appeal to the authority of Vatican II, rival American Catholic theological positions are divided by two opposed readings of the nature of the conciliar response to modernity and its implioataions for the theo1ogica:1a:genida. Acco1•ding to one reading, the Coundl is understood to commend ,a strong reaffirmation o.f Catho·lic Christian identity, taking the broadest view of its historic traditions, yet open to the cultural and religious pluralism characteristic of our times. But in the eyes of a numerous and influential group of American theologians, such a reading reverses the true priorities of

the Council. It was not resfomtion, ibut modernization, dialogue, a.nd social oommitment that V:atican IT chiefly sought to culti¥ate in the contemporary Church. To a. large extent, the state of theology in the U.S. (and perhaps elsewhere as well) refLects the predominance of the second interpreta.tion of the Council.

Ressourcement or *aggiornamento?* As the conciliar documents reveal, both of these progmms were ruddressed and embraced by Viatican II. But which of them has priority? The documents themselrves do not provide an explicit ans,wer to this question. A perceptive Lutheran observer of the Catholic scene, PI-ofessor A. Lindbeck of Y:ale University, has suggested that if one gives priority to *ressourcement,* then one will read the conciliar documents in the light of the Constitutions on Divine Revelation and the Church *(Dei Verbum* and *Lumen Gentium).* But if *aggiornamento* has p:riority, then the Constitution on the Church in the Modern World *(Gaudium et Spes)* is seen as p110viding the inte11pretrutive key for the rest of the dooomentss.[2] In .an effort aimed at *reaccentramento,* the Extram:dinary Synod of *1985,* under the leadeMhip of Pope John Pwul II and Oa.rdina1 Ratzinger, sought to resolve this question iby bwlancing trwdition--mindedness with modernization.[3] But it is a sign of the :ascendancy of *aggiornamento* in the American Catholic reception of the Council that such recentering efforts are routinely decried by theofogians as retrogressive ·and anti-conciliar.[4]

This disagreement ·about the naiture of the Council's response to modernity needs to :be set within the oontext of broad trends in 20th century theology. Throughout most o[the centucy, Catholic theologians saw the program of modernization ('later

2 George A. Lindbeck, "Ecumenical Theology," *The Modern Theologians,* ed. David F. Ford (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), vol. II, pp. 255-273.

s See Aidan Nichols, O.P., "Walter Kasper and His Theological Program," *New Biaakfriars* 67 (1986) : 16.

4 See, for example, the essays in Hans Kiing and Leonard Swidler, eds., *The Ohuroh m Anguish: Has the Vatiaan Betrayed Vatfoan II'!* (San Fran· cisco: Harper & Row, 1988).

to be termed *aggiornamento)* as possessing an important but subordinate value in comparison with that of the program of *ressoiircement.*

It *is* well known that *ressourcement* furnished a power£u:l impetus for theological work in hoth Catholi!c and Protestant circles throughout the first half of this century, and even more so in the period between World War II and the opening of Vatican II. The impulse arose not from historical or antiqua.rian interests hut from a determination to reaffirm Catholic Christian identity hy appeal to and creative reapproipriation of its principal formative sources. In part, and especi1ally in its late 19th century pha,se, *ressource:ment* involved the recovery of medieval and ·scholastic sources. But gmdually and more bl'oadly, a1ttention shifted to Scripture, liturgy, and the Fathers of the Church.

It became increasingly clear as the century wore on that moderniz1ation would be an important byproduct of *ressourcement.* The earlier l'eoovery of medieval and scholastic sources had heen so success£ul as to havie restored and reinforced a £undamentally post-Tridentine theological edifice, with at least deference to-if not actual adoption and promotion of-the positions of Aquinas as its cornerstone. This neoscholiastic and neo-Thomistic reviva1l supplied the means to refute the error's of modernity rather than to engage its challenge. But study of the :biblicail, liturgical, and patristic sources afforded theologians access to the 1immeasurahly more pluralistic pre-schol-lastic period. In a strategic deployment of *ressourcement,* the greater tra;dition was recovered in order to the nar:mwer post-Tridentine tradition enshrined by neoscholastic a:nd neo-Thomistic theology. For neoscholasitic theo1ogians, *ressourcement* had access to an arsenal; for biblically and patristicarlly oriented theo1ogians, it unlocked a. treasure. Thus, it transpired that the fater phase of the 20th century *resourcement* haid a powerfully modernizing edge. It cut into the neoscholastic hegemony through the fundamentally pJuraEzing introduction of hiblioaily and pa.tristica;lly ishwped theological

positions in diallogue with modern culture and philosophy. The passion at the core of the *ressouraement* progriam stemmed, nonetheless, from a tl.·adition-minded reaffirmation of Catholic Christian identity. *Ressourcement* theologians shared the confidence that the ·richness of the Christian tradition, once displayed in all its wonderful diversity and breadth, could not fail to win a favomble hearing in the modern world.

While this conception of the halance of *ressourcement* and *aggiornamento* rremained in plaice throughout the Council, it has not fared :well in the postconciliar period. In the popular American reception of the Tesults of the Council, it never even had a chance. Almost from the start, the program of *aggiornamento* was seen hy the rpluiblic and the media as providing the key to the conciliar deliberations and actions. Vatican II came rather qu[ckly to be viewed :as representing a sharp break with the previous centuries and as charting a new course for the Church as it entered the century. In part, ·this reception was fostered hy the early implementation of the Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy. This document, in addition to recommending the 1leform of the liturgy, was also understood to siginal a vast overhaul of Oatholic life. More crucia:lly for our purposes, veform and renewal were widely viewed as equivalent with modernization rather than with the reaffirmation of Christian identity implicit in the *ressourcement.* Modernization came to entail in practice a vigorous engalgement in diafogue and in sociaJ.lyrbransformaitive action.

I rehearse these familiar developments here in order to underscore the fact that the pm.gram of *aggiornamento* prevailed in American Oatholic reception of the Cornncil from the outset. This eventuality had an enormous impact on rpostconciliar Catholic theology in the U;S.

In theology, the priority 0£ *aggiornamento* over *ressourcement* has entailed more than simply the updating of foillls of and expression. It has often meant a readiness to appropcia:te the 1agendaoi modernity, especially in oorrelationist and reviisionist modes of rtheological reffection. In oo!t'Telationist

conceptions of the relation of .faith and modern culture, culture asks the questions to which ,faith rpro"\nides the responses. In revisionist conceptions, faith tailors its claims with an eye to rpl1evailing canons of reasonaibility and appliorubility. Both theofo,gical styles in v,acying degrees embody ·an accommodationiist appropriation of the modern agenda that has not ibeen favomble to the a:ffirmation of traditional Christirun claims rubout revelation, the st3Jtus of Scripture, the person of Jesus Christ, and meaning of human Hfe.[5] But even :where correlationism .and revisionism are not operative ·as explicit methodological oommitments, the priority of *a.ggiornamento* fosters a iclimate in which modem criteria of rationality are perceived to he in competition with fidelity to the Christian doctrinal traidition.

American Catholic theology iincreasingly displays a itypicrully modern profile. The characteristic concerns of modern theology, singly or in 1oombination, have gained prominence in theology over the fast two decades: the primacy of the category of .experience-'Whether religio:us or common human experience; the su!bjective turn, with its emphasis on the structures of human existence 1as affording the chief context fo.r theological affirmation; the centrality of theological anthropofo,gy; universalism in the doctrine of revelation; p1ma1ism in the attitude fo other religions; insistence on the historically mniditioned nature of [ormulations of the faith; the ascendancy of historicrul-critical approaches to the study of Scripture; antipathy ito doctrinal norms; the centrality orf critique ·and dissent with reference to the trruditio!Il·and magisterium; a preference :for procedural over thematic eoumenism; [n ethics, the centmlity of obligation and the :autonomous .a,gent. In addition

s On accommodationism, see Peter Berger, "A Sociological View of the Secularization of Christianity," *Journal for the ffoientific Study of Religion* 6 (1967): 3-16. .See also William J. Abraham, "Oh God, Poor God: The State of Contemporary Theology," *The .American Scholar* 58 (1989): 557-563. For a helpful discussion of revisionist and correlationist theological positions, see James J. Buckley, "Revisionists and Liberals," *The Modern Theologia'YIS,* vol. II, pp. 89-102.

to these familiar characteristics of modem theology, some current American Catholic theology draws from the-ology an emphasis on rpoliticail activism and the notion that certain experiences, especially those of the oppressed, ,afford a privileged access to the meaning orf revelation.

This profile emibits istriking affinities to 19th century Protestant strategies for 1appropri.ating modernity. As many Protestant observers have noted, the postrconciliar Catholic experience in effect rrepresents a compressed and accelerated recapitulation of the 19th 1and 20th century Protestant experience.[6] Not smprisingly, the Protestant experience may rpmve to be iinstructive for understanding developments in Catholic theology and in Catholic ,Life 1generally in the aftermath of the Council.

For one thing, it is significant that the polarization that divided the Protestant churches into conservative and Eiberrul ibranches ,at the turn of the century is emerging rus a factor in the postconcili.ar Catholic In both the Protestant and Catholic situations, issues turn on how to understand and deal with the chaJlenge of modernity. In an important recent hook, *The Restructuring of American Religion,* sociologist Robert Wuthno,w has ishown thiat in hoth Catholic and Protestant circles in the U.S., the 1conservative/1:i:be:mlsplit is ibecoming more significant than denominational differences. Thus, progressive Catholics allld Protestants find themselves allied against Catholics and evangelical Protestants.[7]

More to the point lis the £act that evangelical Protestantism is .growing rapidly, in comprurison with a long range decline in 1.iiberalProtestantism..[8] This trend tends to confirnn the predic-

6 For example, Richard John Neuhaus, *The Oatholio Moment: The Paradol1l of the (Jhuroh in the Postmodern World* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987).

7 Robert Wuthnow, *The Restruoturing of American Religion: Booiety and Faith sinoe World War II* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

s George Gallup, Jr., and Jim Castelli, *The People's Religion: Amerioan Faith in the 90's* (New York: Macmillan, 1989).

tion that Christian communities with a cleru- sense of their distinctive identity vis-a-vis the wider culture possess a competitive advanta,ge over those whose aocommodationist strategies have 1b1urred their distinctively Christian profile.[9] In combiniation with wider ourltura1 .and intellectual trends, these developments have produced a faV"or:ahle environment within Protestant theo1ogy for the emergence of vigorous pockets of ipostliberal and postmodern theology.[10]

There is reason to hope that American Catholic theology will drruw a, lesson from the Protestant experience. The waning of the modernizing accommodamonist strategies typical of modern Protestant theolo1gy (iand with them, the ·forms of institutional :adjustment they inspired) ·suggests that, over the Jong hauJ, *aggiornamento* cannot sustain a fully Catholic Christian theology and a vita.I ·Church life. The agenda of modernization by itself turns out to he ·an inadequate program for the prractice of Christian theology. Preva;iling trends within tihe history of Christian thought suggest that *ressouroement* supplies a more lastingly potent principle of theological energy. In fact, within American Catholic theology, there is a gmwing movement seeking to reassert the priority of *ressourcement* over *aggiornamento* in the appropriation of Vatican II .and in the theological enterprise genemlly. There is no question of reversing the tremendous gains-fa flexiJbi1ity, in collegiality, in Teligious freedom, in sociail and political awareness, in commitments to dialogue with other Christians, other religious people, and non-believers, in respect for diversity within the Church, and so on-achieved in the name :of *aggiornamento.* Rather, there is a recovery of the astute insight that fueled the work of the original *ressourcement* theofogi,ans: an uncompromising, unapologetiic hut open reaffirmation of the follness :and rich-

[9] See Berger, *art. oit.,* and George Lindbeck, " The Sectarian Future of the Church," *The God Hxperienoe,* ed. Joseph Whelan (New York: Newman, 1971), pp. 226-243.

[10] William Placher, "Postliberal Theology," *The Mod.ern Theologi<Jlns,* vol. II, pp. 115-128.

ness of the ,Christian tradition is in itself a porwerlul " motive of credibility." In addition, as some contemporary P:rotestant theologians hruve discove'.red and as I shall point out fater, the postmodern intellectuial dimate is £avorruble to just such an approach to theological affirmation.

II

How has the study of St. Thoma;S Aquinas fared in recent decades? Recently, a rprofessor of philosophy at the University of Seattle cremarked to me: " There :was a time when anyone who knew anything ,rubout St. Thomas had to be a Catholic. These days, anyone who knows anything about St. Thomas just *can't* he a Catholic!" His jest is not far from the mark as a description of the current situation. One is more likely to find the texts of Aquinas pored over in graduate theologi:ca1 claises at Yale University than in 1those iat many a catholic illlliversity. The renewed Protestant interest in Aquinas is a sign of the move torwa11d postmodern and postliher:a1 theology in some Prortestant the0r1ogioolcircles. But the question hefore us norw is: why was Aquinas eclipsed in postconciliar Catholic theology in America?

In the a:ftermath of the Council, under the impact of pressures generated iby iboth the *ressourcement* and *aggiornamento* programs, the noo-Thomistic and neoscholastic synthesis was all hut swept a;side in the U.S. ·as a framework for pursuing theological study. This development represented 1a widespre:a;d CathoHc cultura,l phenomenon ais well, since Thomism in some £onm had 'served not only as a framework for theology and for theological education in semina:cies ihut ,a;lso for philosophy and indeed for :American Catholic higher education itself.[11] In postconciliar Catholic tiheologica,l circles, interest :in Aquinas surrvived in the various versions of personrulist, ·existentialist, phenomenological, and transcendenta;l Thomisms that poured into the theological and philosophical 'Vaouum crea;ted iby the

[11] Philip Gleason, *Keeping the Faith* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), chapters 1, 7, and 8.

collapse of more classicail forms of neo-Thomi:sm.[12] Most influential 1were the modernized versions of Aquinas advanced in the worrks of Karl Rahner rund Bernard Lonergan. These were viewed iby many as the only readings of Aquinas that could mntinue to he viruble in tihe postoonciliar period.[13] It was widely believed that in tmnsoendental Thomism, typically modern philosophical 1and theological concerns were accorded the systematic prominence ithey deserved and in this way provided the ha.sis for a theology suited to the needs of the Church in the modern world.[14]

I can only hegin to sketch the complex cruuses of these developments in American Thomism.

For many Americ8i!Il theologians, Aquinrus came to 1be a:ssociated, rightly or 'Wrongly, with the forces of reaction at the Council. The conciliar figures who opposed the agendas of both *ressourcement* and *aggiomamento* were identified in the minds of many with classicrul forms of neo-Thomism. It iwas neo-Tihomism that seemed to supply the thought-forms that legitimated and supported .all that 1was seen to he in need of change and modernization m the Church. In the earlier century, it had :been neo-Thomistic construals of Aquinas's thought that had provided the arsenal with which rto demolish modernism and thus to delay the inevitruble creative engagement of Catholic Christianity with the modern era. More recently, neo-Thomistic criticism had been the source of the persecution of the very *ressourcement* theofogians who were exereising ship at the Council and whose previous work was daily vindicated in the course of Council's deliberations. Many Ameri-

[12] See Helen James John, *The Thomist Spectrum* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1966).

[13] See Gerald A. McCool, S.J., *OathoUa Theology in the Nineteenth Oentury: The Quest for a Unitary Method* (New York: Seabury Press, 1977), and *From Unity to PluraUsm: The Internal Evolution of Thomism* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1989).

[14] See Karl Rahner, "Theology and Anthropology," *Theological Investigations,* vol. 9, pp. 28-49; J. A. DiNoia, O.P., "Karl Rahner," *The Modern Theologians,* vol. I, pp. 183-204.

can theologians drew the conclusion that neo-Thomism was incorrigibly anti-modern and obscurantist, and that it had so far crippled the Chmch in its encounter with modernity. Indeed, a vigorous progriam of *aggiornamento* would require the abandonment or ma;rginailizrutionof neo-.Thomistic styles and conceptions. In plaice of these, the virtua1ities of newer styles of philosophioail reflection-existent:iiailist, phenomeno.fogical, and the like--iwould have to ibe exploited in order to generate explications of the Christian faith that .would he accessible to modern understanding.

Moreover, *ressourcement* theologians were understood to have rundermined once and for all the neo-T.homist and neo-1schofastic !hegemony in Catholic theology by exposing its neglect of the •scriptural, liturgica:l, 1and patristic sources of Christian tradition and affirmation. The arlleged .dogmatism, irrteHectualism, ,and propositionarlism of neo-Thomism seemed opposed to the pastoral, diiaJogical,and personalist emphases of pre...ischoliastictheology. And, ironically, it was precise1ly these more .ancient emphases that seemed to capture the interest and attention of modern Christians 1and thus rto supply the foundation for a renewed theology.

These difficultiieswere reompou:ndediby neo-Thomistic interpretations of Aquinas's theology thait ex:a1ggeratedthe role of its metaphysical component. It had ibeen part o:f the long-sbanding legacy of 16th century Jesuit interpreters of Aquinas to 1give priority to metaphysics and epistemology to the neglect of natural philosophy and rational psychology in the sequence of pihilosophical stud[es. This line of interpretation was reinforced throughorut the next two centuries, both ibecause .Aquinais'snatural pihirlosophyseemed hopelessly entwined with orutidated Aristotelian science and 1because of the prevailing epistemologioa,l and metaphysical interests of rationalist phifosorphy. Thiis mtionailistioally conceived Thomism :became the basis :for the 19th century revival of Aquinas and ·aahieved early prominence in neo-Thomistic construals of the theological works of Aquinas.. There was little understainding of the

Scriptural and patristic !bases of his theology. The ti!aEzed reading of Aquinas, p:rnmoted by Maritain and Gilson ·and their army of followers, reinforced a fundamentally metaphysical account of his theo'1ogy. This was especia1ly the case in Gilson's oonflation of theology with philosophy in his interpretation of the " Christian philosophy " of the great theological Summas. The cumulative impact of these met1aphysrcally and oriented readings of Aquinas's theology was to intensify neo-Thomism's I'eputa:tion for aihstrarction and excessiv;e systematization. In partioular, it confirmed the judgment of *ressourcement* theologians that in Aquinas the historical concreteness of Christian revelation had been subordinated to a philosophical system.

On more systematic grounds a.s well, neo-Thomism was perceived as inadequate. Fragmented into its various topical treatises rand ove1 1burdened rhy the detritus of centuries of interna1ly generated dirulectics, textbook theology seemed unable to foster a truly integrated, synthetic vision of the faith. It was felt that such theology could not transmit the kind of christocentrically and soteriofogically shaped conception of Christian revelation necessary in the modern day.

It lis beyond the scope of my paper to assess the accuracy of these judgments of neo-Thomistic theology. The history of 20th century Catholic theology still offers a rich field for research. Until this is done, it wil1 he hand to set tthe record straight. The fact remains that these widespread perceptions of neo-Thomism are now so deeply entrenched as to constitute a so:rt of oommon wisdom among legions of American Catholic theologians. This development has not been favorable to the creiative use of Aquinas in theology. Although Thomism remained a permanent fixture in Catholic philosophy and medieval studies, the postconciliar collapse of neo-Thomism :regrettarhly and unnecessarily involved the eclipse, at least in Catholic theologica1 circles, of Aquinas himself.

Can there be a Thomas 1rufter Thomism? Is there a post-Thomistic, or at lea.st a post-neo-Thomistic Aquinas? I shall

argue that there is a Aquinas, an Aquinas unencumbe:ved by the enormous weight of oommentary, debate, and systematization that has made his thought seem inaccessible to modern theologians and unusahle for the theological work, an Aquinais who spea;ks with pristine clarity to a host of urgently postmodern tlheo1ogieail questions. In :fact, a growing number of Protestant theologians, Chr:istian philosophers, and rphi:losophical ethicists me beginning to reaid Aquinas in just this way. The early results are exciting and promising.

If my analysis in the first section of this pruper is correct, then the Amemcan Catholic theological scene will he the setting for a vigorous reassertion of the *ressoutcement* agendar-and tihe ,subordination, though hy no means the abandonment, of that of *aggiornamento-in* the years to oon1'e. There are signs that this process is already underway . One such sign is the popularity of new editions of the writings of older generation *ressourcement* theologians like De Lubac and Congar, and of translations of the works of von Balthas1ar, Ka,sper, and Ratzinger. I shall mention other signs in the next section of this paper. There is every reason to believe that Aquinas will ihavce a significant and continuing role in these developments, particularly as *ressourcement* comes to terms with the advent of postmodernity.

III

" At century's t1urn," remarks Professor Schwartz, " there is always space, [t seems, for 1another New Age." [15] Wi1l the passage from modernity to postmodernity mean the dawning of a new age in theology? " There is a growing awa1renesstoday that the modern era, ushered [n hy Desca,rtes and the Enlightenment, is passing," write theologians Nancy Murphy 1and James ·McClendon. " That it is passing (or ha,s passed) in science, philosophy and theology 1seems clear enough; the contours of postmodern thought are iless dear." [16] Identify[ng certain de-

[15] Schwartz, p. 253.

[16] Nancey Murphy and James Wm. McClendon, Jr., "Distinguishing Modern and Postmodern Theologies," *Il:fodern Theology* 5 (1989) : 191.

vdopments in 20th century science and philosophy as important sources of the 1shift, James Miller rremarks that" the postmodern era may he far from midday, ihut it is weM past dawn." Acco11ding to Miller, fundamenta:l to the shift towards postmodernity are the scientific themes of evolution, relativity, indeterminacy and participation. Ma.tching these scientific themes are contextual accounts of language and holistic accounts of knowledge in recent rp!hilosorphy.[17]

Some of the most creative in:itiatives on the American theofogieal scene a:ve those that seek to transcend the agenda posed ,for Christianity hy modernity. Acknowledging their affinities with developments in art, architecture, literary criticism, science, philosophy and other fields, some theologians are prepared to label the new theological initiatives as postmodern. Others are reluctant to rally under the postmodernist hanner, particularly since deconstrucbionists have co-opted the term .for their own ultramodern and disitunbingly nihilistic uses. Whether or not one adopts the ilaibel, however, it is clear that a series of converging developments is pushing the frontier of theologica,l reflection beyond engagement with th:e chamcteristic agenda of modernity. What ris most interesting for our rpurposes is the irole that the Wl'itings of St. Thoma's are al1leady playing in shaping and promoting these developments. Since these developments are pvoceeding on a variety of fronts, it will be necessary to ,be selective allld suggestive, rather than emaustive, in my account of them here.

At 'the forefront of these developments is a loosely allied network of Catholics and Protes;tants, both British and American: the so-cailled " Yale School " of theology (George Lindbeck, the late Hans Frei, David Kelsey, Breva11d Childs, William Pfacher, Ronald Thiemann); evangelical theologians (Thomas Oden, Donald Bloesch, Wil;liam J. Abraham, Colin Gunton, David Fm•d); the Amerioan *Communio* group (David Schind-

17 James B. Miller, "The Emerging Postmodern World," *Postmodern Theology: Christian Faith in a Pluralist World,* ed. Frederick B. Burnham (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1989), pp. 8-12.

ler, Kenneth Schmitz, Glenn Olsen, Michael Waldstein) ; Christian philosophers (William Christian, Thomais Morri,s, William .Alston, Eleanor Stump, Rohert .Adaims, Nicholas Wolterstorff, Alvin Pfantinga, Peter Geruch, Basil Mitchell); and moral philosophers and theologians (.Alasdair Macintyre, Afan 'Don.agan, Stanley Hauerwas, John Finnis). Despite great dif- ,ferences among them, these groups orf thinkers, and others who ,share their perceptions, believe that the rpassing of the modern era entails new opportunities for Christian affirnnation as it is freed from the .strictures imposed hy characteristically modern presupposimons. In varying degrees, these thinkers turn to pvemodern and classicail ,souTces of philosophy rand theology- not in ol"der to repristinate t:he past as if the modern era had nevier occurred, hut in order to make these sources speak anew in the 'ITreversibly pluralized post-modem era.

Among 'severa] thrut could be cited, three elements impart a distinctively postmodern fla:\cOT to these new theological initiatives. In the first place, in the :service of a broader conception o[tratiolllality, postmodern thinkevs reject the modern (Cartesian) quest for a foundation £or all knowledge, modeled on mathematical or scientific paradigms of rationality. .As a 'I\homist might say, reasonaibility !and certainty are anrulogous concepts, applicarble to diverse domains of knowledge Lin ways that are dependent on the principles operative from one context to another. Scientific claims are truth-bearing in ways that 1are distinctive from claims in other fields like philosophy, ethics, relrigion.,history, literary criticism, and ,so on. In assessing elaims to rationality and truth, it ris :axiomatic for postmodern thinkers to :attend to the ,context in which these claims are embedded. Truth and r-ationality are far ibroa<ler notions than modern thinkers rwere genemlly prepared to acknowledge. In this connection :and in :sharp contrast to modernity, postmodern thinkers insist on the centrality of tradition and authority in legitimating and supporting truth and mtionality, not only in the religious hut in the scientific and philosophical fields as well.

Two other characteristic elements in postmodern thinking are its discovery of the role of texts and narratives in shaping thought and ·cultme, and its 1stress on the importance of relationships and community in fostering personal identity. These empha:ses challenge rntionalism and positivism in modern philosophy of language and epistemology, and individualism in modern moral and po1itica:lphilosophy. In part the postmodern insistence on the cu1ture- and identity-shaping Toles of language is the outcome of the so-called " linguistic turn ":__a series of developments in continental and Anglo-American philosophy stemming from the thought of Heidegger and Wittgenstein respectively. Postmodern thinlmrs seek to secure the oibjectivity and ·realism of knowledge 'with reference, not to the inner workings of consciousness (as in rationalism) or to their correspondence to objective fiacts (as in positivism), hut to a shared world of meaning and truth embodied in the ilinguistic practices of a community.. In addition, postmodern thought views personal identity, not :as an individualistically oultivated sense and performanoe of moral duty, hut in a communally and 1efationally shaped life of virtue.

Theologians whose thought 1s shaped by their reading of Aquinas will welcome the postmodern determination to overcome the of modernity's turn to the subject in epistemology and ethics. The modern !between consciousness and the true self i.s displaced by the postmodern insistence on 1bodiliness'--'and hence on 1immersion in a natural oosmic order and on pa.tterns of activity in 1a community of social and persocnal relations-as a constitutive element of persona,} identity. In postmodern thought, bodiliness, agency, and community 11eplacesubjectivity, consciousness, and the autonomous self as fundamental anthropological oategories. Read straight£or1wardly-rather than in bhe modernizing construal given him by tmnscendental Thomism-Aquinas supports precisely thi.s displacement of the Cartesian separations of mind and ma1tter, of spirit and body, of subject rand and of moral seH and mora:l agent.

More generailly, there are three areas in which we may brief-Jy note how chamcteristic elements of postmodern thinking have coalesced to produce an intellectual climate generally favoriable to the exigencies of theological affil"lilation. In eacli of these airea;s, post-Thomistic rerudings of Aquinas can and do pla.y·a·significant role.

Biblical ihernneneutios is one of the first .areas in which the impact of postmodern thought has :been felt, particularly its insistence on the interplay 1between the eommruna:l reading of rand their community-shaping power. Partly under the influence of Hans Frei's enormously important ibook, *The Eclipse* Of *Biblical Narrative,* theologians have begun to question the hegemony of historical-critical methodofogies for mediating the meaning of the Scriptures for theofogical, doctrina;l, a:nd other chmchly uses.[18] F\vei was criticaJ.of the modem theory and practice of hiiblical hermeneutics and persuasively underscored the va;lidity of pre-critical narmtional and typological hermeneutics, ·which had ii.lead the Scriptu11esas a ullified aooount of revelation and salvation with Jesus Christ •at the center. It is in the ·context of this doctrinrully and liturgicaHy structured rea.ding of the Scriptures that its explicit churchly uses come into play. Although historical-critioa.l approaches have much to contribute to Christian understanding of the Biible, these rupproac:b.es1are 1suhordmate to the :doctrinaHy and fiturgicailly •shaped reading of the Bible precisely as Scripture.[19] Aquinas's understanding of the appropriation of the rresults of other disciplines hy *sacra dootrina* in terms of the ,suJbalterna.-tion of sciences can 1be helpfol in 1sortingout the complex logic of the relation of historical and Htemry e:x;egesis to theology. Directly releviant to a :vea.dingof Aquinas on tihese issues is the fact that the movement]rom *lectio* to *quaestio* in his own theoiogical 'Wlork represented the cresting of one of the most potent

is Hans W. Frei, *The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).

10 George A. Lindbeck, " Scripture, Consensus and Community," *The C'ri8i8 of Biblical Authority,* ed. Richard J. Neuhaus (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), pp. 74-101.

movements of *ressourcement* ,in the history of Christian thought.

Another area in łwhich the impact of postmodern thinking has heen is in pb.Hosoipihicaltheology.]if in modem theology the basic question was, how can a modem person !believe this doctrine? then in postmodern theology the ibasic questii.onhas beoome, how can the deep intelligibility of this doctrine be exhibited? From the outset, postmodern appivoaches to philo-1sophical theology 1avoid posing skeptical questions wbout the Christian scheme. The assumption is not that rreligious claims inevitahly challenge and ibend .accepted canons of rationality. Rather, canons of rrationality in the religious realm have their own integrity and scope, 1and, 1ailthoughthey do not isolate the religious domain foom other domains, they nonetheless involve a distinctive logical 1structure. Philosophical theology in the postmodern ""ein hegins 1hy trying to discern and .exihibit this structure. The initial .a;ssumption is that a doctrinal scheme and the religious pattern of life it commends maike good sense rin theory and in practice. The task of Christian philosophical theology is to explicate the inherent intelligibility of a particular doctrine within the ,whole hotly of Christian doctrines. Again, Aquinas's vision of the fundamental :and integral intelligibility of the mysteries of the ·Christian faith hears directly on non-foundationalist postmodern 1appvoachesto the oation of doctrine. In his employment of metaphysical and other conceptions in the service of this explication, he w:as careful to a¥oid forcing the Christian scheme onto :a philosophical grid.

Finally, in postmodern theologica1 approaches and in marked oontraist to those of modernity, Ohri:stianity's particularistic claim to universality ,constitutes not an embarirassment but a necessary feature of *its* commitment to :and proclamation of the truth .aihout God's dealings with us in Christ. The postmodern emphasis on the narrational an:d communal sources and em-!hodiment of a community'1s claim to truth irenders the Christian insistence ion the uniqueness of Christ and, in-

cidenta1 1y, oomparruble fo· the partimlaristic claims of other !I'eligiouscommunities. Universal meaning is embedded in the partiioularistioally depicted and narrated ·story of the passion, death, resurriection, and glory of Jesus of Nazareth, delivered to us as Ghrist and Lord. The motto of von Balthasar's theology is pertinent here: " the ·greatest possible radianioe in the world in virtue o[the closest possiible£o1 1owingof Christ." The replication of the pattern of Christ, in the *imitatio Christi,* is not only the vehicle thmugh which Christian personal and communal identity is sihaped. It is .a;lso the particularistic medium in rwhich the umversailly applicable, though not universally ac- truth of Christ is made known to the whole wol'1d !beyond the visible •ambit of the Christian oo:rmnunity. The scandal of particularity is no scandal for theology practiced in the postmodern vein. Despite much well-intentioned defense of the interplay of history rand metaphy.sics in Aquinas, particuLarity is no ·scandal for his theology either. At the center of his theology is a doctrine of salvation, embedded !ill a christo.Jogica1ly shaiped narrative. The objective of theological explication is to provide as complete as possible an account of the principal characters upon whose agency the movement and action depicted in the nar:r:ative depends: God, angels:,humans, and Christ. The narrative is not universalized by the introduction of metaphysical concepts. Rather, ii.ts particularistic claim to universal relevance is secured hy -a web of exeget:iJCal,theological, philosophical, .and other pattems of argumentartion.[20]

The contributions of postmodern theology in these three wilJ ser:ve to suggest something of the virtualities of theology practiced in this vein.[21] The affinities between post-

[20] For a reading of the particularistic universalism of Aquinas's Christology in the context of a comparative analysis of the christological positions of Rahner and Barth, see Bruce Marshall, *Ohristology in Oonfiiat: The Iden· tity of a Saviour in Rahner and Barth* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), especially chapter 5.

[21] For a more complete picture of characteristically postmodern theological concerns, see William C. Placher, *Unapologetic Theology: A Ohristian Voice in a Pluralistic Oonversation* (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1989).

modern emphases and the *ressourcement* agenda are striking. Like *ressouroement,* postmodern. farvors tradition-mindedness over traditiona;lism, on the one hand, 1and revision-ism .and correlation, on the other. In mntrast to the program o[*aggiornamento,* postmodern ibheolO'gy sees systematic impm:t-:ance in the reaffirmatiion of ChTistian identity .as a means of promoting Christian fidelity and Clmistian procliamation. When acicorded primacy over *ressouroement, aggiornamento* ·looks to postmodern eyes as if always on the verge of running out of breath. Conceived simply as the updating of theofogy, *aggiornamento* is never :fini·shed catching 111:p; conceived more gmndly as modernizrution, it is aJready :f.ar iheihind.

Ressourcement has a ilot to learn mom Aquinas, however, if !it is to ·avoid the pitfalls of traditionaJ.ism. Often *ressourcement* has shown itself unable or unwilling to confront the conceptual problems-the *quaestiones---which* the sources themselves ,bequeathed to sUJbsequent theology. Aquinas p:mvides a •set of strategies tfor the disciplined :appropriation of the results of non-theofogical intellectuail inquiries--J.ike philosopihy, philosophical iethics, !history, and psychofogy-in 011der to advance the 1analysis and ·resolution of such pilloblems. For Aquinas, the results of such inquiries aire the theologian's friends. If •a theologian cannot deploy such reflective strategies, the results o[alien inquiries will often find their way into his proposals in forms that he neither cont.vols :nor shapes to his purposes. The vastly pluralized postmodern contexts in which theology is practiced today .accentuates the challenge. Whatever its other weaknesses, scholastic theology cultivated a ihealthy l:'espect for rigo:mus pmlosophicail analysis and sound patterns oif argumentation. These are intellectual skills that are much needed in postmodern theology.[22]

[22] For a discussion of the importance of Thomism for contemporary theology, see Avery Dulles, "Vatican II and Scholasticism," *New 011Jford Re·view* 57 (May 1990) : 5-11.

TAKING OTHER RELIGIONS SERIOUSLY: SOME IRONIES IN THE CURRENT DEBATE ON A CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY OF RELIGJ:ONS *

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HE QUESTION oi Christian attitudes to the world eligions is becoming increasingly important. *An lnterpretatwn of Religion* is emblematic of a growing trend, which runs across 1denominational lines, that attempts fo take other ,religions seriously. John Hick .argues that for most of its ihistory Christianity has hrud a rpolitioaUyand theologicrully imperialist attitude towards the ireligions of the world. Superiority :and uninformed arrogance have generally prev:ailed with the accompanying attitude that the religions of the world laire generally sinful and incapable of being salvific. The time has come foT a change of a;ttitude: the wol"ld reHgions must be taken seriously :and this means ·affil"ming them as alternative paths to salvation, possibly neither worse nor better than ·Christianity. This Hick cru1ls a "pluralistic" outlook. The agenda is irrudical and Hick's Vioice is not solitary.

Hick's hook !is a ma;gisteri:al 4rn paiges and is ibrused on his Giffol'ld Lectmes of 1986-87. It contains cons!i.derruble indological, philosophicail and theological material, hut in what follows I shall ,be dea1ing with one aspect oll!ly, his argument for p1uiialism. Hick is acknowledged :as a leading irepresentative of this pluralistic approach. Initially he began as a conservative ,and exclusivist Christian ,and has over the years enoompassed a wide !l.'ange of thoofogica1 positions now ,culminating

*John Hick, *An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).

in this p1lesentrbook[1] In :this review discussion I propose that many o[the most mdical strategies in the theology of re1ligions in 'Spite 0£ their wish to take other rreligions seriously have an il'!Onic tendency to do just the opposite! In attempting to be genuinely accommodating to the 1leligions 0£ the world, Hick, I will argue, unwittingly ends up in danger of accommodating none, including Christianity. This tendency, which il believe to 1be clearly illustrated in Hick's rrecent rbook, is shared in various degrees hy numerous theologians pursuing a, pluralist p1lloject similar to that of Hick's.[2] It would he foolish to assume they are " all the 'Saime," hut they certainly share common theological and philosophical tendencies which I wish to isolate and comment on. I should 1state dearly that iby such a critique I do not intend to discount the possibility that a:ll religions ma,y lead fo God, but that the stmtegies often employed to al1lg1le .for this are deepJy problematic.

put Hiok"s new rbook into :perspective it will he helpful to wace its genesis 1briefly. In 1973, using an astronomical analogy, Hick suggested a Copernican revolution in the Christian theology of rreligions whereby Christians should "shift from the

[1] He began, in his own words, as a "strongly evangelical and indeed fundamentalist " Christian: see *God Has Many Names* (London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 2. See also my analysis of his entire pilgrimage in *John Hick's Theology of Religions* (London/New York: University Press of America, 1987).

[2] For some of those on Hick's trajectory, see A. Race, *Olllristians and Religious Pluralism* (London: SCM, 1983); Paul Knitter, *No Other Name'!* (New York: Orbis, 1985); Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *The Meaning and End of Religion* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978); R. Ruether, *Pluralism and Ohristology;* the latter three and other influential co-contributors (including Hick) are to be found in *The Myth of Christian Uniqueness: Towards a Pluralistio Theology of Religions,* ed. J. Hick and P. Knitter (New York: Orbis, 1987). More recently, we can see the extremely thin line between pluralists and essentialist "inclusivists" in E. Hillman, *Many Paths·: A Oatholic Approach to Religious Pluralism* (New York: Orbis, 1989), who marries K. Rahner and W. C. Smith, divorces faith from history and tradition, and thereby provides an essentialist analysis. See the pertinent comments of K. Surin on Smith's essentialist project in "An Examination of the Discourse of John Hick and Wilfred Cantwell Smith", in *Religious Pluralism and Unbelief,* ed. I. Hamnett (London, Routledge, 1990).

dogma that Christianity is at the centre to the reiaHzation that it is *God* who is at centre, and that an ;religions ... including our own, ,serve and revolv;e a110und him." [3] The earlier "Ptolemaic " dogmas plwced the Church and Christ as the source of and means to sa1vation. A<coording to Hick, these dogmas became increasingly implausible in the light of the truth and hoEness evident in other religions, rand they ev;en seemed to contradict the Christian belief in a. God who loves aill people. Hence the Copernican ·revolution marked a shift from *ecclesio*-oentricism and Christocentricism to one of theocentricism, analogous to the monumental pamdigm shift in astronomy precipitated hy Copernicus. God, not Christ or the Church, shou1d rbe center stage. H1ck suggested that this paradigmatic shift wou1d facilitate a new understanding of religions whereby olaims to superiority and exclusivity would dissolve. [4] A new era of inter-l'eligious ecumenism would.da1wn.

To facilitate this theooentric move Hick had to de-center the incarnation. Basically, Hick's acrgument ha.s been that Jesus should not be seen as God incarnate, but rather the divinity of Christ shou1d rbe wewed mythologica1ly. Hick',s definition of myth is important and plays a major m1e in his later thinking. He has defined myth as" a story which is told but which is not literally tme, or an idea ocr :image which is applied to something or someone hut which does not literally arpply, hut which invites a particular attitude in its hearers. Thus the truth of a myth is a kind of practicail truth consisting in the appropriateness of the attitude which it evokes." [5] Hence, Jesus' divinity is la mythological construct that expresses the literal truth that " God has: been encountered through Jesus," which is " not an

aJ. Hick, *God and the Unfoerse of Faiths* (London: Fount, 1977), p. 131.

[4] Many of the theologians cited in note 2, such as Race, Smith, and Hillman stop at theocentricism.

[5] Hick, *God and the Universe of Faiths,* pp. 166-67. See C. Gillis's interesting critique of Hick's use of myth in *A Question of .Pinal Belief: John Hick's Pluralistic Theory of Salvation* (London: Macmillan, 1989), chap. 5-6, and G. Loughlin's penetrating remarks in "Myths, Signs and Significations", *Theology* 89 (1986): 268-75.

1assertion of unique 1savirng effectiveness in human life, hut a particular Tedemption-myth attached to one great historicrul way of sah,ation." 6 Hick seems to employ a purely instru- mentaiist view of re1igious diseourse, one in which language is seen as 1an eXipression of intentions, attitudes, or particular progr:am hut not eorncerned with making cognitive claims about any ontological analogically or otherwise. 7 Hick seems untmuhled by the "1iteral" statements that he uses, such as " God has ,been encountered thl'ough Jesus!' What is cant at this sfage is Hick's maintaining the reality of God at the oenter of 'salvation-,a1though whose God or whose under- standing of God this is remains unresolvied.

Hick's latest ,writings siigna:l a radical :shift away £rom *theo-* centricism to what he calls *Reality* centeredness. (A'11 subse- quent rpage 'references are to *An Interpretation of Religion).* He argues tihat all 'religions are salvific rpaths to the one Divine " Rea:l," none being lhetter or worse :and none with a privileged or exclusive revelation, despite what some o:f their adherents ma.y claim. The wo11d "Real " or "Reality " ibetter expresses the fact that the Div[ne oannot rbe ultimately l'ega11ded:as per- sonal (theistic) or impersonal (non-theisitic) . This move oc- curred as a rresult of dealing with the objection that Hick w:as a covert theist, for his Copernican revolution did not a{lcom- modate non-theistic 1religions. How could it, if he contended that all religions :represented different paths to the one aill- foving *God?*

'fo overcome this difficulty Hick proposes a Kantian type distinction ,between t:he noumenal, which exists independently and outside of human perception, and the phenomenal wvrld, which [s that world ais iit aippears to our human consciousness (pp. Q46ff).8 The varying phenomenal responses within the dif-

6Ibid., pp. 172, 177.

7 'TI1is point has also been made by others such as P. Griffiths & D. Lewis, "On Grading Religions, Seeking Truth, and Being Nice fa People," *Religious Studies* 19 (1983) : 75-80.

8 The Kantian epistemological foundations undergirding many pluralistic theologies are exposed and criticized by L. Newbigin, *The Gospel in a Plura- list Society* (London: SPCK, 1989).

ferent religious traditions, hoth theistic and non-theistic, are fo he viewed as authentic hut different responses to the noumenal Real. Hence, 1we cannot say that the " Real *an sick* [in itself] has the characteristics displayed hy its manifestations, such as (in the case of the heavenly Father) love and justice or (in the case of Brahman) consciousness and 1blis.s" (p. 247). So just what does this talk a:bout 1a hea.venly Father amount to? Once again, the notion of myth is utilized to deal with the problem, 1but now it is applied not only to the incarnation but to the very idea of God and is further extended to the ultimate real[-ties designated by the various religions, such '3JS the Hindu *Brahman,* or *Allah* in Islam, *Yahweh* in Judaism, and so on (pip. 343-61) . Therefore in Hick's view, speech about our " heavenly Father " is " mythological speech about the ReaL I define a myth as a story or statement 1which *is* not 1literaHy true but which tends to evoke an appropriate dispositional attitude to its subject matter. Thus t:he truth of a myth is a pract:iica:ltruthfulness: a tme myth is one which rightly relates us to a reality about which we cannot speak in non-mythofogical terms " (p. 248) . With his Kantian distinction Hick severs any ontological ;connection 1between our human language and the divine reality :and iniwoduces 1an entirely instrumental use of religious language. Accmding to Hick all the world religions encourage us to turn away .from the SeH towards the Divine Reality, engendering :love and compassion towards all people. The common ,soteriologicwl 1goal is there:by matched by a common ethical goal, which therefore eonfirms the pluralistic thesis.

Wha1t I now wish to show is tihe way in which Hick's pluralism actually, if unwittingly, undermines taking other rnligions serriously. Primarily a:nid ironically he fails to take the sheer plurwlity of their conflicting claims seriously. His proposa.ls :raise epi:stemoilogical, ontologica,l, ethical, and he11meneutical problems which concea1, ratheT than illuminate, some of the difficulties facing a Christian theofogy oif religions. Many of his stTategies are shared 1by other pluralists.

Hiok advances an entire exiplanatory *system* into which aill the rworld religions are slotted. Any such over-arching grand system shou1d give us caiuse £or concern, not only in its Olympian pretensions but a:lso because of its easy assimilation and homogenization of tihe religions. But what of the unique and particular nature of the various religions and their histories? Herein lies a central irony of Hick's plm1alism: one form of imperialism (so-cwlledtraditional attitudes) is replaced hy another (tihe system of homogenization) , which possibly does equa.I disservice to the world religions. The religions are fitted into this schema in a fashion that is often contrary to their own self-understianding. For example, they are interpreted and and ruppmpriated witihin a structure which denies them the possibility of any definitive truth claims. That the religions make some such claims is manifest.[9] To render impotent the definitive claims made by many of the religions is certainly an odd way in which to take them seriously.. The method iby which Hick relativiz·es truth claims is tihrough his mythologizing hermeneutic.

This mythofogizinig hermeneutic bears the mrurks of what Roland Barthes has called the " rrhetorical forms" of " bourgeois myth."[10] Underlying tihis myth, accolJ'dingto Barthes, is the attempt to turn history into " Essences," a restless drive which will not cease until it has " fixated this world into an oibject which can he for ever possessed, catailogued its riches, emhrulmed it, and injected into reality some purifying essence which win stop its triansformation" (p. *155)* . This tendency towards in the theology of religions ironically

[9] See the instructive work by W. Christian, *Oppositions of Religious Dootrme* (London: Macmillan, 1972); and his *Dootrines of Religious Communities: A Philosophioal Study* (London & New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).

[10] See R. Barthes, *Mythologies* (London: Paladin, 1983), p. 154 (subsequent page references in main text). I am indebted to Gerard Loughlin for drawing my attention to the possible use of Barthes in this way. See his own use in "Prefacing Pluralism: John Hick and the Mastery of Religion", *Modern Theology,* forthcoming.

hastens the closme of dialogue Tather than offering a illew 1begillln:ing. system has ailreaidy ibegurr the process of caJtaloging history and making the religions conform to the schema of plu:mlism ,so that they can he possessed iby the mytholo,gizer. Hut 1let me pursue Hick's use of myth (and Ha:rthes's analysis of it) to su1bstantiate my thesis.

The notion of myth is first applied to tihe incarnation to decenter it and facilitate Hick's mo¥e to theocentricism. But now Hick hais to de-center theocentrici:sm (God) in order to facilitate his move to 'the Real.' AH theisbic trruditions must undergo his mythofogizing hermeneutic, :as well .a,s the norr-rtheis1tic tmditions, for they too cannot claim ainy priviileged access to reality, exoopt on the terms stipulated iby the pluralist framework.]jf the adherents of the world religions aire not aHowed to make fundaimental ontological claims with their fuH force and implications, then harmony is 1arrivedat through the destruction and neutralizing of the "Other." Barthes writes that one rheto'rica1 form of :bourgeois mythology is that [t iis "unable to imagine the Other." If the p1ura1ist mythographer comes .face to bee with him, "he blinds himself, ignores and denies him, or 1else transforms him into himself ... ,rull oif confrontation are reverberating, any otherness is reduced to sameness" (p. 151). This is indeed the effect of Hick's mythologizing hermeneutic: it seems to ignore or deny the !l"erully diffioult, mnflicting tmth cla;ims hy in effect Teducing them to 1sameness: i.e. that they 'are all mythologicail assertions. All religious people should view their reHgions as does the mythographer.]jf they do not, then they cannot he ,accounted for in this schema and arre 1seen1as holding false views a1bout the :n.atruve of their doctvines and truth daims.[11] Underlying this rol'llll of plurailism is an impJicit epistemology (;an in-1strumentalist mythification) which T'efuses to take seriously the genuine rplumlity of epistemologies in the world religions.[12]

11 See further the comments by J. DiNoia, "Pluralist Theology of Religions: Pluralistic or Non-Pluralistic?", in *Ohristian Uniqueness Reconsidered,* ed. G. D'Costa (New York: Orbis, 1990).

12 See, for example, the differences in epistemology within just one tradi·

Barthes ·also notes that this type of myth" consists of 1stating tw10 opposites and halancing the one hy the other so as to reject them hath" (p. 153) . Here a.gain the analogue is clear. One oan see the way in which theism (as if this were one "thing" in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) and non-theism (simila:rly so for Buddhism, Humanism, and forms of Hinduism) are !balanced in Hick's schema only by, in fact, rejecting them lboth. The "balance" in Hick's schema amounts to something quite different from theism or non-theism; it amounts to agnosticism. Hick is led into 1agnosticism when he presses the distinction and severs the link between the Rewl *in itself* and its various phenomenal manifestations *in relation* to humankind. He writes: "It follows f11om this distinction between the Real as it is iin itself and as it is thought and experienced through our ·religious concepts that we crunnot apply to the Reia11 *an sich* [in itself] the characteristics encountered in its" vairi.ous manifestations (p. The outcome leaves Hick with no real access to " the Real." The ways of analogy and metaphor, ,for example, are rendered impotent. This ina1hrlity to speak of the Real *or* even ailow "it" the of self-utterance leads to the Real's redundancy. Ironically, any detailed and serious interest in the religions of the wo111d is suhv;erted as they are unable to furnish clues a1bout the Real. The color, diversity, difference, and detail are hlead1ed of their meaning, for the Real apparently resists all description and is inoapa:b1eof self-utterance. This outcome has a close analogue with Barthes's description of yet another rhetorical form of mythology. It is that "the accidental failure of language is maigicaily identified with what one decides is a natuml ·resistance of the object" (p. 151). This maneuv;er, which Barthes calls tautology, "creates a dead, ·a motionless wodd." Hick's system does this precisely :becwuse it has decided all things in advance; every :form of 11eligion is cataloged and encoded into

tion (Hinduism): E. Lott, *Vedantfo Approaches to God* (London: Macmillan, 1980); D. M. Datta, *The Six Ways of Knowing* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1932).

the structure. The history .anrd particularities of the various traditions are just icing on the cake, :already tasted, known, and digested. Many intractruble partieul1arities with their unique !historiesaire drained of their power.

It is precisely this absolute incomprehensibility regarding the na;ture of Reality that threatens Hick's whole
project, a project mystifying rather than illuminating the nature of the Real through his Kantian development. Kant also had to face the question of how he >Ciould claim to know that rtili.ere is a oorrespondence rbetween :phenomena and things in themselv;es and that the latter act upon our consciousness. Agnosticism is the inevitl!Jble outcome of the trajectory of Hick's flight from parlicularity: first from the particularity of the incarnation, then from the rparticularity of a theistic God, and then from the rparrticula:rityof any !religiousclaim, he it Christian oT non-Christian. The outoome of the escape from particularity can only be to nothing-in..particular, or, in Harthes's words, " history eviapourates " under the power of the myth (p. 151) . Underilying this form of rp1umlismis an implicit ontology (agnosticism) which refuses to· take seriously the genrnineplm.·ailityof onto·logical cla.ims in the wo['lld religions.

It would seem, then, that the Real'..sinvulnerrubility-lea;ds ailso to its redundancy. Only the human .activity of turnmg a.way from self is Jeft, .although 1with less and less theoretical foundation or revelatory grounding, or with any specificity of what this "turning -a1way from self" involves. Here, finally, we arrive at the ethical counteripart to this ontological essentialism.13 In the same way that aiil Teligionsare seen .as ultimately related to one 1and the same" Rea;l" despite their oonsidera1ble differences and intractruble particularities, 1so too is there an ethical oounterpart to this claim. We aire toM tlhat despite all the differences injunctions to act .and follow specific ·ways of life enjoined 1by each particular tradition, the Teligions·are ulti-

13 Such an ontological essentialism undergirds theocentric solutions that specify "God" to be the center of all religions, as is the case with the earlier Hick, W. 0. Smith, and E. to name a few. See also Surin, op. cit.

mately united ID putting fOI'IWlaird the same ethical principles tha.t ,will provide the ibasis to unite them in a new harmony. Hick :finds thaJt 1all the 1great traditions teach "Lo'Ve, compassion, 'self-sacrificing, concern for the good of others, generous kindness and forgiv·eness:" (p. 825) . It is perhaps not surprising tha.t Hick ha;s to ·sever these values from their revelatory grounding (surely quite for many forms of Judaism, Islam, and Christianity) m1d writes that the above ideal " is not an ,aJ.ien ideal imposed hy 1supernatural authocity ibut one arising orut of our human na;bure" (p. 825) and which happens to concur with the " modern liberal morail outlook " (p. 880). The rbasic criterion of judgffi,g sailvific 1religions is therefore a commonly accepted set of va:1ues which are rooted in " human nature " 1and not in the ,supernatural aiuthority of any or a;ll religions.

, There are two points that should be maide •aJboiut this ethical turn in Hick's wo1lk, 1a tum which is increasingly shared ,by rpluralists :under the aHeged influence of Ji!beration
The first is that the system, in Barthes's :wo:rds, "continuously transforms the products of history into essentia:l types " and when it has done this, deems them to he " Nature" (p. *155)* • One then p1loceeds to rcaH in Nature to adjudicate mattel'IS of controversy (e.1g., •as to which are salvific rreligions), and impamality is apparently achieved at the same time. This maneuver ,continues the iprocess of essentiaJ.ism, first noticed ID ontology mid now found in ethics, which seeks to divest the particularities of history and the uniqueness of religious traditions of their differences, intractaJbilities, and sometimes mdicai1ly exclrusivist rclaims. What of those religions, for example, which view ethics a;s inbrinsicaillyrelated to the me of the community in response to a particular revelation and which, therefo1le, place a significant emphas[s on the precise intentionality and modality of ethics, an emphasis not easily ireducible to descriptive ethical outcomes? They ,a;re marginalized by Hick's

14 See for example the essays by R. Ruether, *M.* Suchocki, P. Knitter and T. Driver in the third section of *The Mytn of Ohristia-n Uniqueneas.*

method.[15] Unde11lyinghis form of pluralism is an implicit view of ethics which rrefrusesto take seriously the genuine di:fferences 1betweenthe understanding of ethics within the world Te1igio!Ils, let alone within a single tradition.

Furthemiore, the specificity of the ethical agenda and its political and social hruggagego unnoticed, for it is believed that these values are followed universrully and if not, all people would *wish* to follow them. This ronoerulsthe very real ethical problems involved in making sense of such generali21edethical injunctions .. And when harnessed to the modern liberal mo,ral outlook, do- not such. values put forwacr.-d a merely 1bourgeois program.? Indeed, some recent critics of plur:alism ihave aillguedthat this is precisely the case, and in using Barthes I ha¥e tried to indica:te that it is not hy chance that Hick's mythologizing program shares the chamcteristics what Barthes calls ":bourgeois myth."[16] I do not hiwe tihe space to develop this point but simply wish to 'raise it in a tentative £ashio-n.

Without wishing to· far all plurialists with the same hrush, the a11gmm.entof this essay has .been to show that, imnically, radical p1ura;liststrategies such as Hiick'.send up by not taking other religions seriously on epistemological, ontO'logical, and ethical 'grounds. It has not ·beenmy purpose to argue that there is no -oommonalitybetween religions in these three areas or that Christians ought not to stri¥e to create inter-religious harniony. I have only wanted to show why the pluralist approach is in danger of sUJbvertingits intended goal by failing to take real religious pluriality seriously.

[15] In Christianity, for example, see the work of S. Hauerwas, *The Peaceable Kingdom* (London: SOM, 1984); and A. Macintyre, *Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory* (London: Duckworth, 1981) and *Whose Justice? Whioh Rationality?* (London: Duckworth, 1988).

[16] See J. Milbank, " The End of Dialogue," and K. Surin, " A Certain Politics of Speech: Towards an Understanding of the Relationships Between the Religions in the Age of the McDonald's Hamburger," in *Christian Uniqueness .Reconsidered.*

iA NOTE ON W. J. HILL'S "THE DOCTRINE OF GOD AFTER VATICAN II"

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GOD MAY NOT :be dead, hut certamly lany strictly philosophical, scientific, rational approach to God 'WIOuld seem to ibe derud today. Modern thought, even rumong deeply religious people, seems to J:nwe despaired of ever being ruble to pwve rbhe existence oi God to anyone, even to someone who *not* 'so willfully prejudiced against that he simply rrefuses to view the evidence in lan open-minded, calm, am.d rreflective iway. However, this does :not mean that our ,apip:voach to God must be strictly emotional and ir.rational. It may >still lbe *reasonable* rto believe in God, even though we cannot rprove his existence in 'Some strictly r:ationrul way. Rather ,than beginning with our ordinary human experience of the real exbramenrtail world and ,working our way up to a knowledge o:f the bet that God exists·, we might take a more inner.,directed, psychofogicail, humanistic, phenomenological, historical appıvoach to such knowledge. Such an aiprproach might even lbe *more* effective and *more* convincing rto un-lbelievers.

Reoent writers on the modern God-question halv;e
the notion that rational wgruments :for the existence (and na-tuire) of God may :be :a:ll lweH and :good hut only for ia oomputer or a rolbot. What modern man needs is not so much la krrmwl-edge of God as ;a personal relrutionshlp to God. And perhaps the hesit lw:ay to achieve this is not to throw out completely the role of reason in providing a .scientific support for God's exist-ence ibut to rev;errse the pmcess. We must *first* come to a per-sonrul ruwaireneiss of God and then proceed to v;alida;te rthfus

awareuess via scientific confirmation. After all, how can anyone ever hope even to 1begin the search for God unless he already hais some ·awareness of God's e:ristence?

According to John Hick, fo.r inst:mce, this is especially true in the Juda.eo-Christian tradition and, hy extension, in those other religious traiditions 1which derive f["om it, such as Islam. H " to kno·w" means " to be a1ble to prove hy syllogistic reasoning," then the Jews of the Old 'I1esbament did not know God. Instead of attempting to prove the existence of God they took his existence £or granted. " They thought of God as an experienced reality rather than as an inferred entity." [1] The ancient £aithful were as sure of the existence of their God as they we:ve of the material wo:rld which surrounded them. There was. no need to :become rationalistic rubout it.

In iaddition, even if they had turned ra:tiona1listicit would hav;e been of no use whatsoever to them. F11om the point of view of faith, all of the theistic proofs (none of which is v;ery oompelling or cogent an;}'iway) are completely ir:velevant. They can actually do nothing to move anyone to :feel and act in a religious way. AH such proofs are only for pedants who are content to 1live an empty ,and ·sterile rubstract life within their own minds rather than wailking in the living p:vesence of the divine.

Although there may well. he a place for the rational development of our intuitive sense of the living presence of God as expressed in revelation, once we are in full possession of such a revelation, it must always hold a place secondary to the experienced fact of £aith. Thus, even though modern religious thinkers reject natuira:1theology, "This modern theofogioal rejection of natural theology is not necessarily motiva:ted ·by an ir:vationaJi.stdistrust of reason." [2] There is a :vole :for reason, hut only so long as it comes: *after* we already *know* thrut God exists. Since reason ialone can never pirove the existence 0£ God, ·reve-

[1] J. Hick, *Philosophy of Religion,* 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1983), pp. 59-60.

[2] Ibid., p. 74.

lation and ·faith are the *only* means we have to find out rubout God.

A similar .attitude can ibe found in William Atbraiham. This aiuthor distinguishes among fideism, so.ft rationalism, and hard riationailism. Fideism ne5:bherseeks after nor needs any scientific or pihilosophioal rea:sons for what is maintained in its doctrine. Although not neeessa,rily irrational, it is ait lea!St non-rational. Soft rationalism differs from fideism in that it does seek after some sort of proof for the existence of God and the main doctrines of il'eligion. The arguments, however, need not he aibso1utely conclusive iand overpowering. The cruse for religion can 1be iba,sed upon a cumulative arrangement of evidence drawn mom any .and .all souroes which ·axe deemed pertinent by the thinker involved. In the end, the £na.il decision is hased 111rpon an ll<:veducibleappeal to intuitive and persona,} judgments concerning the truth orr falsity orf tihe rreligious ;propos·itions:involved.

Hard rationalism is devoted to the cainons of formal logic and rigorous thinking. This is a " " form of rrationalism. Abraham sees this app:voacli as 1being in the traiditioo. of classicail natural theology. Y:et it is not classical natural theology. li\.coording to .Aibr1aiham, *the most* that ha:rid ra.tiona;lism can ·achieve is a :rational ;appreciation of the [,act that the existence of God is mme p11.1ohable than ms nonexistence. Using Richa11.1d Swill:burne as his model, Abraham points out how all tihe olassical aiprpToachesrto God, none of which is a real proof :when ta;ken mdividua;lly, do 1in fact add up to a very good :rational argument .for the existence of God when vie1wed ooHectively.[8]

As it turns out, ihowever, hard :rationailism is not much ibetter than soft Tationalism 1when it 1oomes to proving itihe exiistence of God. Even granted that cumulative ia:riguments are 1better than unidimensional the cum1J.1lative apipmach still fails. Sooner OT ha11d rationalism is called

a See W. J. Abraham, *.An Introduction to the Philo8ophy of Religion* {Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1985), pp. 114-117.

hack rto soft rationalism and e¥en to ficleiism in 011der to make its oase. The1 1e are no t:mly objective, universal, and cogent arguments to prove the existence of God. TheTe is, of course, a:ll sorts of evidence pointing in God's direction. But there is a·l so evidence, such as the fact of evil, pointing away from God. This ibrings us hack 'to our i·diosyncratic selves all over ·again. " In the end we are all left 'to weigh tihe a.vailarb1eevidence for ourselves." [4]

This attitude is quite widespread today 1and can evcen be found within the Roman Ca:tholic Church, and in the highest places. In its Pastoral Constiitution on the Church in the Modern World *(Gaudium et Spes),* Article 21, "The Attitude of the Cihurch Towarids Atheism," Vatican Comrcil II :does not in any 'Way emphasize the rational or scientific path to a knowledge of God's existence. At the beginning of the :section we read that the Church must strong·ly criticize harmful teaching and ways of acting which are opposed to reason and common human experience. The chief error is atiheism, which must sooner or later lead people into desrpair.

When it oomes to answering atheism, howev:er, the main appeal is not to 'reason and science hut to human feelings, emotions, and hopes, las well as to the good example of ideal human beha,vciorwhich •should ihe set by the Churcih. The modern rappeal is not to the head hut to the " most secret des1res of the human heart." Apart foom the fulfiHment of the higher destiny of each ihuman ibeing, which is to he with God forever, "nothing is .ruble to satisfy the heart of man." As St. .Augustine says at the very 1beginning of his *Confessions,"* Thou hast made us for thyself, 0 Lord, and our heart *is* rrestless it rest in thee." [5]

In his rpost-Viatioan II commentary on this text, Joseph Ratzinger, 1who was made a Crul'dinal in 1977, and who became Prefect of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the

[4] Ibid., p. 129.

[5] A. P. Flannery, ed., *The Documents of Vatican II* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1975), pp. 920-922.

Faith in 1981, it dear that he creads it las .a move away rfrom the position. or Vatican Council I (1869-1870) on the demonstrrubility of God's existence, even though Vatican II does not cootr:aidict Vatican I. Instead of an emphll!sis upon what can or cannot ibe done in ·science land philosophy in a positive way, the •emphasis is plaood upon the history of religion. Insterud of repeating V1atican I on the demonstrahility of God's existence :by .alone, the £act that .atheists cannot disprovce God's existence is emphasized.

Ca11dinrulRatzinger's own view is that the whole question of God's existence or non-existence .staінds outside the realm of " demonst!'lative thought." In ol'lder to " appease " some of the fathers, however, who wanted to l'letain the main point of Vatican I on the demonst:ra;bility of God, the temi "rationa:l" was arlded <to the text. Acool'lding to Ratzinger, the term "rationaJ " was meant only to recru1l the position of Vatican I, while the rest of the phrase, that ieoncerned 1wi:th " common human 1experience," was meant to de-emphasize the " neo-scholastic rationalism " of Vatican I with ats static !llotion of ":natural reason" and the non-historical syllogistic mind-set of the perennial philosophy.

The background which the text thus adds to Vatican I is not so much the history of philosophy as the history of religion. In order to find confirmation for the thesis of Vatican I, one must not ask whether there were philosophers before the time of Christ who worked out an incontestable monotheistic conception of God, but rather whether mankind knew about God or not. It knew about him even when God encountered mankind obscured by the form of the gods.[6]

Ovcem11, Ratzinger is ihappy ·with the Councirs demand fo:r an open discussion with atheists on the e:ristence land nature of God .and Christ, "which here appears for the first time .in an officia1 document oi the magisterium," [7] even though he is not happy with its mtionalistic ·sounding tone due to the inclusion

[6] H. Vorgrimler, ed., *Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967-1969), vol. 5, Part I, p. 153.

[7] Ibid., p. 158.

of the word *ratio* in the text. Nevertlheless, the essence of the article should not 1be fost. iits main concern [s with humanistic atheism, and its main message is that " Faith does not diminish man hut leads him in the direction in 1which alone the endless irestlessness 1which impel,s him can find satisfaction. Man's measure is infinity, everytihing else is tboo little him. Consequently only God can ibe man's measure." [8]

On the .surface of it, thourgh, it seems to ihe a sorry state of aff1arirs when we cannot use our rational powers to know the divine cause of 1all rationality, especirully.in an ,age when science has given us so much knowledge. If God reailly does exist as the creator of *all* things, he must rbe rthe creator of our minds ais rwell. Why, then, can we not use our minds to krmw God? If the great glories of science rure open to us, including rthe pagians, atheists, Ml!d aignostics ·among us, why should not the even greater glory of God be ours to possess? It seems like a, very strange and unnaturra:l rthiing to ,say that we can know great aind distant gialaxies hut not the 1great Lord of 1aill. Can this be what the Council meant?

More recently, Fr. Hill has said mrnch the same thing as Cardinal Ratzinger. He thirnks that the march of spontaneously dialooticail histo:ry has ov;ertilivown dassica;l n:atural theology, that is, "of that understanding in which God is the Supreme Befog ,expJa:ining the existence of ev;erything else-a preunderstanding 'that precedes Tle¥e1ation and makes the latter credible." [9] Yet 1we cannot 1rubandon metaphysics alto.getber. Our language must have 1a meaning. "'\iVe must :be ,aible to relate our words and propositions, even faith rpmrpositions,to the real extr:amental :world. " T:he sole alternative to ola,ssical metaphysics need not be either linguistic anrulysi-sor ibiiblica1£undameutalism, nor may 1it mean roUrupse into uncriticail ,belief or into, action." [10]

s Ibid., p. 159.

9 W. J. Hill, O.P., "The Doctrine of God after Vatican II," *The Thomist* 51 (1987) : 396.

1-0 Ibid., p. 399.

What we must do, though, is give up our prejudice wgainst prej:urdiice. Thel'e is nothing philosophioa1ly wrong with being prejudiced in £avor of Jesus Christ. In effect, we must return to the idea of faith seeking understanding whioh, of course, pil"esupposes 1belief,:faith, .and religious assent to that which we are attempting to explicate. And tihe hest way to do this is to see the Christian reLigion a;s essentially ·an historicrul process of human-divine invo:lvement and ia faith enoounter rwith providential growth rund development.

This does not mean ,going whole hog for the !heretical position of process theology or for the ev;olutionary myth of necessary and continual progress in the world, even in human a:ffiairs. It means seeing God-in-the-Wor1d and M.an-in-God within an ever-aotive context of ,a personal love relationship which incorpoTates into itself all of the vicissitudes, ibacktrackin:gs, disappointments, :glories, and sufferings of :a Jove relationship. God the Father is :a " Daddy " who must put up with all of the stresses .and strains of his demanding toddlers, obnoxious teenagers, 1and cynical adult children. Nevertheless, God remains unchanged within his very nature, and ibis demand foT oo.d obedience continues to glow Ted-hot rus he incessantly interacts :with his ereation on its way to ii.ts divinely appointed culmination.

All this *is* weH-taken, as is the .emphasis on faith 1and :belief preceding scientific Teasoning as expressed iby the other authors mentioned rubove. What I must question, however, is Fr. Hill's statement that " The *quinque viae* then of Aquinas remain valid, not in the sense of proving God's existence from a sta:te of pure ;a.gnosticism, ibut hy way o[clarifying the question, pointing in the direction of its resolution, and giving 1ogiorul formulations to the answe:r:s ,surmized." [11] I don't think that this is the !basic meaning of V:atican Council H on the ibest approach to God when dealing with die-ha:r:d,humanistic atheists. At no time does the Council ,contrrudict Vatica.n ·Council I, and

[11] Ibid., p. 417.

indeed, Ratzinger's ,attempt to make it sound so, the Council 'seems to be making a ,speciall effort not to rule out a scientific argument :for God's existence which would be convincing to the honest and open-minded 1atheist or agnnstic. In fact, I don't see how a proof which does not ;proceed from a state of pure agnosticism with respect to the specific issue under investigation can he called a valid pvoof in a completely rational sense. If it does not start foom premises better lmnwn than the conclusion, it must then he circuilaJ.'and hence not a vialidprroof,a,t all.

How then can we !reconcile the Council's emphasis on *both* St. Augustine, trecommended as 1a;n antidote to modern existerrtia1l-1phenomenological atheism, which more feels than thinks its way th:vough life, *and* St. Thoma's Aquina,s, recommended as a wor1d-1wi:de model to all Christian intellectuals :because of his 1rubility to harmonize science, phi1osophy, and theology? I think this ean be done hy affirming that, yes, in pri:ndple at least one proof from 'S'cratch for the existence of God is certainly possible to unaided human reason, but that in practice, given our 011d[nary rubilities, inte!'ests, and day-to-day human problems in the wo111d, this is not the wa,y to go rin modern 'apologetics. It could even ihe affirmed, quite truthfully and accurately, that Aquinas himself did not fake that rroute in his own :rerul-life situation. He was, after all, not a *philosophus,* a pagan philosopher, hut a Christian who philosophized. Nonetheless, when he did philosophize he did it very well, and one of the things he may 1well have ,achieved was at 1least one proof for the exis1tence of God which would he cogent and convincing to the honest, open-minded 1Vgnostic![12]

Vatican Council II recognized itself as a continuation of Vatican Council I, which was out off prematurely by the Fmnco-Prussian War. But ,wihat was the main ooncern of the earlier conclave? Acoording to the ew11ly 20th century commentary of Vincent McNabb, O.P., it was nothing else than

[12] Further to this, see my "Logic, Aquinas, and *Utrum Deus Bit," Angelicum* 63 (1986): 213-226.

the everlasting problem of £aith. Its results were four basi1c proclamations: " That over men there is the Maker of me!ll; thaJt we have reason enabling us ito discover Him; faith ernabl- ing us to ibelieve Him; :and an mouthpiece of revela- tion to. decla:ve Him." [13] However, .a;lthough k:now:ableiby rea- son alone, we should not •eJq>ect too much <from this roa.d to God. " Moreover, Christian philosophy has the sanction of the Vatican Council :for ·suggesting thait, ais men .and methods •stand, these p:voofs :are not Likely to ibring conviction to the masis of men or even to the general :run of thinking men." [14] To my ear, this rpolSlt-V1aticanI comment sounds vecy much like some po•st-Vatrican II comments.

a 1living conviction which really grruhs us we require something more than mere syUogisms-much more. This can only he hriougJ:rtrubout hy a personal :response rto ·a personail ap- pea:l, 'by a fo.¥e which embmoes the whole person. " Yet how real ibecomes this conviction when we 1believe in the supreme intel1igence of Creation 1a;nd Providence, and the love and :self-sacrifice of Redemption. The C'I1oss indeed is not only the power of God, lbut His wisdom and .IE:s fov;e-overrooming all difficulties, answering a:ll doubts, realizing a;ll aspirations." [15] Well, as Fr. Hill points out, mayibe not *aU* problems of an emo- and intellectual nature, ibut the 1Perfect Mediator does at least provide us with a mntext for and does give us hope for s:uooess![16]

To conclude, I don't see anyhhing in Vatican II that would contmdiot the main pQints of ¥atican I. Starting with naJtural

[13] Vincent McNabb, O.P., *011Jforl1Oonferences on Faith* (St. Louis: Herder, 1905)' p. 18.

[14] Ibid., p. 55.

[15] Ibid., p. 58.

[16] Indirectly, Fr. Hill raises ·some interesting questions. If we do away with the prejudice against prejudice in philosophical methodology, can we also do away with some other taboos? For instance, should we insist that theo· logians maintain a personal loyalty to the pope, rather than simply to the Catholic Tradition, from which they select whatever is, to them, the best? Also, these days we are allowed to write about passion in philosophy, but we cannot write philosophy passionately. Should this be changed?

reason alone, exercised hy one hereft of Tevelation, it possible in principle to reason one's way to *Him Who ls,* to a God who is the Lo'.1.'d of all time, of our past and our future. Neither Council meant to say that for our belief in God to be reasonaible it is 'Sufficient that no one can dib1lrove ihis existence. If this were the ca:se, 'rather than the case being something much mol'e positive, we would iindeed 1be in a sad way, mtiona1ly speaking. I'm afraid 1t\hat it would lay us open to any critic who wants to say something like: "Since you can't prove that Jesus's disciples *did not* take his body from the tomb, *therefore* that is what must have happened." No, us agree instead that a positive pil'oof is possible hut that this objective fact in :no way guarantees a loving, personal, suhjective response on the part of the unibe1iev;er, eitheT ancient or modern.

BOOK REVIEWS

Albert and Thomas: Selected Writings. Trans., ed., and intro. By SIMON TUGWELL, O.P., preface by Leonard E. Boyle, O.P. Classics of Western Spirituality. New York: Paulist Press, 1988. Pp. xv + 650. $17.95 {paper).

In scope and size, *Albert and Thomas* is an unusually large work for the Classics of Western Spirituality Series-" really two books in one," as Leonard Boyle, Prefect of the Vatican Library, observes in his unusually brief but laudatory preface. Perhaps it is three books. Simon Tugwell not only provides lengthy critical introductions to the life and writings of both Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas but also translates the whole of Albert's commentary on the *Mystical Theology* of Pseudo-Dionysius, as well as providing a new translation of that short work itself (or rather the Latin version of it by John Sarracenus that Albert used with an eye to the previous translation by Eriugena) . Tugwell also provides first or new translations of several shorter works of St. Thomas and excerpts from longer ones: Thomas's Inaugural Lecture at the University of Paris, the Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, *De Veritate,* the Commentary on Boethius, the scriptural commentaries on Paul, Matthew, John, and Romans and the *Contra lmpugnantes,* as well as the *Summa contra Gentiles* and the *Summa Theologiae.*

Regent of studies of the English Dominican province, Simon Tugwell teaches at the House of Studies in Oxford; he is also on the faculty of theology at the University as well as at the Pontifical University of St. Thomas (the Angelicum) in Rome. He is a member of the Dominican Historical Institute and editor of Dominican Sources in English, and in the Classics of Western Spirituality series he previously edited the volume *Early Dominicans.* He brings to the present volume a wealth of scholarship that can truly be called prodigious, especially if measured in terms of documentation: the endnotes for the introductions alone number 1292!

Despite the encompassing scope of Tugwell's introductions, which account for more than one-third of the book, the focus of his work and of the texts he selected is spirituality rather than dogmatic or moral theology, exegesis, philosophy, or natural science-which is to be expected in a series of this kind. Of course, for both Albert and Thomas, " spirituality " can only mean " the theology of the spiritual life," not " devotional literature " of even a high scholastic tone. Thus a question

may legitimately he posed regarding the volume's intended audience. The overall length, the extensive critical apparatus, and the often seemingly remote and abstract topics favored hy Albert, Thomas, and Tugwell are likely to overwhelm the casual or novice reader interested in the spiritual teaching of these Doctors of the Church. Conversely, academic theologians and historians might consider a series on spirituality an unlikely site for such a major, probably epoch-marking study of these giants of scholastic thought and method, especially in so limited a context. Both readerships would be sadly mistaken. Although not beyond cavil in some respects, the present volume is likely to be regarded in coming years as the most important study of Albert and Thomas published in the last several decades. It also contains *spiritual* theology of immense richness and profundity for anyone patient enough to look.

The volume is divided unequally, two-thirds going to Thomas. Both parts are sharply, even narrowly focused (in respect to Thomas, I feel, narrowly enough to lead to some imbalance). The section on Albert centers on the *corpus Areopagiticum,* specifically on a single work. In light of Albert's role in generating a Christian Neoplatonic revival in the thirteenth century and the centrality of the *Mystical Theology,* this is appropriate, even necessary. Conversely, the influence of Dionysius on Thomas is passed over quickly, and instead of a single work, Aquinas is represented by a selection of chronologically-arranged texts covering his entire career, dealing with teaching, prayer, the contemplative life, and an assortment of medieval problems connected with the vows of obedience, poverty, the role of study, and rivalries between mendicant orders.

To the casual reader, Tugwell's much briefer treatment of Albert might seem to serve largely as a preface to that of Albert's student, Thomas. In fact, his introductory remarks comprise the most complete and exhaustive account of Albert's life, writings, and doctrine now available in English. Among other merits, it contains a brilliant synopsis of the central problem of early medieval theology, which is of immense importance for subsequent spirituality: how we can know God within human experience. Thus, Tugwell pays significant attention to Albert's exploration of the ways we know God, in particular the place of rapture in contemplative experience. Much of the contemporary relevance of Albert's teaching on spirituality undoubtedly lies in this area. Regrettably, the parallel, hut very different contributions of Thomas in this regard are again passed over quickly, at least in comparison with other topics (seep. 551).

Tugwell's introduction to the life and work of Thomas Aquinas is likely to he more controversial than his work on Albert the Great. It

is in this regard that the word " ruthless " appears several times, once in Boyle's preface, who refers to the "pruning, at times ruthless, of some traditional accounts of [the tangled sources of the life of] ... Thomas " (p. xv). Tugwell later applies it to his attempt to eliminate "fantasies ... hallowed by generations of historians" (p. xiii). He uses it of Thomas as well (p. 569), although chiding the Angelic Doctor for lacking sufficient ruthlessness to prevent misunderstanding. In Tugwell's case, the historian who receives the brunt of his ruthlessness is Pierre Mandonnet, whose dogmatic pronouncements " bewitched " a generation of modern biographers (see pp. 216-17, 221, 310 n. 166, 317 n. 249).

Tugwell departs more gently from James Weisheipl, the most recent major biographer of Thomas, on a number of historical points (see pp. 305 n. 130, 310 n. 166, 313 n. 206, and 322 n. 313), including the date of Thomas's birth and the allegedly mystical experience that ended his writing career. However, Tugwell is perhaps a hit too quick to credit Edmund Colledge for his insightful surmise that Thomas suffered a stroke on Dec. 6, 1373, all the while passing silently over (p. 266) Weisheipl's equally cogent suggestion that when Thomas struck his head against an overhanging tree (branch) en route to the Council of Lyons in February 1374, he suffered a suhdural hematoma that ended his life. With regard to the year of Thomas's birth, Tugwell plumps for 1225/26 against the currently accepted 1224/25 favored by Weisheipl (though without fervor). Considering the various accounts, it seems to me that the cumulative weight of evidence supports Tugwell's side. What is important, historiographically, is his grounds for preferring William of Tocco and James of Viterho over Bernard Gui and others and against Mandonnet and Weisheipl (who himself concluded that " It is unlikely that we shall ever know the precise day or year."). For Tocco notoriously confused dates in other respects, as Tugwell elsewhere observes with glee (see p. 309 n. 160). All things considered, however, Tugwell's dating of the events of Thomas's life and writings will most probably become standard.

The texts Tugwell uses to explore Thomas's spiritual teaching are restricted to three major areas: prayer, action and contemplation, and certain problematic issues in religious life. Tugwell does not detail his reasons for selecting these particular themes or texts, although in both cases historical importance and depth of treatment obviously played a dominant role. The translations of all the texts are generally excellent, despite an occasional tendency to breeziness ("link-up of ideas," "much-speaking,") and a certain penchant for English cultural references that could well he opaque to the non-British reader (e.g., " the Earl of Blanding's brother," London subway stops).

The selection itself, at least in Thomas's case, poses a problem, how· ever, in regard to spirituality. Because the issues and interests of the thirteenth century, especially among mendicant friars and university masters, are in most respects different from those of twentieth-century readers, the relevance of much of Thomas's teaching and Tugwell's masterful exegesis is likely to escape notice amid the welter of repetitious and sometimes tedious discussions of clerical preoccupations. (Scholars, on the other hand, will delight in Tugwell's mastery of his sources, even when disagreement occurs.)

A major disappointment concerns Thomas's discussion of active and contemplative " lives," which, as Tugwell states, is not only " muddled " (see esp. pp. 283-84) but inconclusive. For if, as Tugwell frequently notes but too rarely instantiates (see p. 568 n. 13, 584 n. 7), Thomas's notion of the differences between two " lives " is based on " tempera· mental bias" (as t<;>day we regard introversion and extraversion), arguing whether one or the other is better or more enjoyable" in itself" begs the question. And how does one apply Thomas's principles to the practical order, where for someone temperamentally biased toward the active life the repose of contemplation would be excruciating, and vice versa? Thomas's use of the terms " action " and " contemplation " is itself ambiguous, since in the received tradition going back to Plato, the sense of both terms waffied indiscrimately between epistemological/ philosophical and religious/theological meanings. What needs clarification is the meaning of both action and contemplation with respect to human experience in general and spirituality in particular, the choice of a personal life-style based on temperamental inclination, and the different character of active vs. contemplative religious orders. Obviously, this area warrants much more discussion than possible even in so large a work.

Similarly, while Tugwell does not devote much space to Thomas's treatment of the moral virtues as predisposing factors for contemplation, he at least recognizes this important connection and in this regard interprets the mind of Aquinas very accurately. The superb note on p. 575 concerning Thomas's attitude toward "mere austerity," and other passing observations on false altruism, pleasure, and self-seeking, open tantalizing windows to a wide and inviting range of Aquinas's spiritual theology that regrettably remained beyond the scope of the present work. (As Tugwell suggests, of course, one can-should-con· sult his earlier work, *Ways of Imperfection.)*

The long discussion of controversies in medieval religious life which concludes the selection of Thomas's texts, much of which is taken from the *Summa Theologiae,* seems even less relevant except for antiquarian interests. There is, for example, the dispute between the Franciscans

and Dominicans regarding absolute poverty or which was the " best " order. Despite its real merits, the latter argument (from *ST,* II-II, q.188, a.6) is more an embarrassment than a curiosity, not least he· cause of its implicit clericalism. It does, of course, represent the mind of Thomas on an issue of vital importance to the mendicants of his day, even if in an unflattering light. Here and elsewhere, however, Tugwell attempts neither to cover nor to apologize for the Angelic Doctor's weak points. But how much more valuable today would have been an ex· position of Thomas's spiritual theology of the active life, especially of lay persons.

Among lesser matters, Tugwell's use of inclusive language wherever possible {largely substituting " human being " for the generic " man ") is welcome and, I feel exemplary. Textually, the whole volume is remarkably accurate and exhaustively referenced, if, in minor regards, occasionally incomplete. This has the effect of teasing the reader un· necessarily and, more unfortunately, deprives us of the point of several of the author's more interesting and deft" asides" {see pp. 399 n. 560, 340 n. 575, 342 n. 605). Among the few errors of note, the second " negations " on p. 170 should surely be " affirmations." I also wonder if "James of Caiazzo" {p. 292 n. 3) should he "John of Caiazzo" (see pp. 230, 232, 235 and notes).

Leonard Boyle's remark about the number of volumes latent in this ambitious, richly rewarding, and persuasively argued study may have unintentionally identified its greatest achievement as well as its prin· cipal weakness. Tugwell's superb introductions, especially that to Thomas, are not yet hooks in their own right, hut they well could he. One can only hope that rounded out and filled in, they soon will he. In whatever form, of course, studies such as *Albert and Thomas* cannot provide the last word on their subjects, as Tugwell himself modestly avers {p. xiii). But the present volume offers far more than " a small step forward; " it is an outstanding contribution among the Classics of Western Spirituality. I am in complete accord with the final comment by Fr. Boyle: "As an introduction to the lives and spiritual teaching of two of the greatest Dominican authors of the Middle Ages, Father Tugwell's work here is easily the most clear-headed and stimulating in English, or indeed in any language " (p. xv) •

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D.e summo bono. Liher II, Tractatus 1-4. By ULRICH OF STRASBOURG, O.P. Edited by ALAIN DE LIBERA. Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi, Vol. I, 2 (1). Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1987. Pp. xliii + 162.

After the publication of works by Theodoric of Freiberg and Berthold of Moosburg, the *Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi* has been continued by the start of an edition of a third representative of the German Dominican School: Albert the Great's "favorite disciple," Ulrich of Strasbourg (+ 1277). The success of the series' previous undertakings gives every reason to expect the rapid completion of this project as well, which had defied earlier attempts at complete edition.

The extent and difficulty of the project made it necessary to distribute the text to several editors and to allow the volumes to appear in the chance order of their completion rather than according to the order of the original work. Simultaneously with de Libera's edition, Sabina PieperhofI edited Liber IV, Tractatus 1-2, 7 (Vol. I, 4 [1]) ; more recently (1988), the first book of the work has been edited by Burkhard Mojsisch: (I, 1). As the directors of the entire project, Kurt Flasch and Loris Sturlese, explain (I, 2 [1], IXs.), this necessary division of labor demanded that the work on the editions begin without the possibility of an exhaustive and :final judgment on the entire text tradition. The reader will certainly understand and accept the necessity of this limitation, agreeing however with the project directors that a final judgment on the text tradition must be reserved until more volumes have appeared.

De Libera and PieperhofI have given somewhat different interpretations of the text tradition. The general directors, judging both editors to be correct for their respective segments, are forced to the hypothesis (by no means impossible in itself) that the manuscript in the library of the university at Erlangen (Cod. 530/1 = E) witnesses to one hyparchetype in the second book and to another in the fourth book. The significance of this hypothesis is all the greater for two reasons: the construction of a second hyparchetype, just as independent and reliable as the first, is the principal innovation in the new edition's evaluation of the text tradition; and because this new hyparchetype is constructed on the basis of only two manuscripts-for Book II, R (Cod. Vat. lat. 1311) and U (Vienna, Dominikanerkloster Cod. 170/204) ; for Book IV, R and E-Mojsisch has now followed de Libera's interpretation in its postulating RU as an independent and older hyparchetype. It will he interesting to see if coming editions can support this new view of the text tradition or if these first two sections will have to claim exceptional status.

Although de Libera argues his case with conviction, the evidence for the originality and reliability of the hyparchetype RU must he viewed as tentative. Often, he has proposed the longer reading of RU as the more probable, against the principles espoused by the general editors ((XXXII; cf. XI) in accord with P. Maas, *Textkritik* {Leipzig, 1960). Although these general rules were never meant to he followed slavishly, RU is taken frequently to he the better reading, omitted by all others, where at least as good a case could he made for viewing the passage as an addition by RU. For example, " *vel audientis"* in II 1, 2, 9, interpreted by de Libera as original, is more likely to have been a later addition (cf. also II 1, 1, 37; 1, 2, 51; 3, 2, 135; 3, 3, 14; 3, 7, 25; 3, 8, 1; 3, 13, 316). In most other cases, a plausible enough argument could he made for the alternative reading, that the unique text of RU could he viewed as secondary; cf. II 2, 2, 75; 3, 2, 16; 3, 5, 106; 3, 7, 87. 173; 3, 9, 10; 3, 11, 127; 3, 13, 17. 65. 96. 174. 312. Only rarely does the unique tradition of RU seem to offer the singularly correct alternative (cf. II 2, 2, 32; 3, 6, 99. 130; 3, 8, 186). Presumably moved hy the alternative reading in R (" *mutationem* "), the editor (II 3, 12, 196) posits for the original text an *"immissionem,"* although the universal reading of all other manuscripts (" *imitationem* ") is quite cogent. Especially in light of Pieperhoff's close grouping of R and E for Book IV, it is interesting to note that, where RU does not offer the unique alternative for Book II, an affinity (though by no means an exclusive one) with some member of the subgroup ELM appears frequently. Mistakes common l:o both postulated hyparchetypes (e.g. *"Odivius"* II 3, 8, 38 in BDEMRU) must he attributed either to the original archtetype or to parallel hut independent corruption of the two traditions; in neither case an easy explanation, although not impossible.

Following de Lihera's interpretation, Mojsisch documents the undeniahly close relationship of RU for the first hook as well. It also becomes clear that this relationship extends in lesser intensity to B {Berlin, Staatshihliothek Preussischer Kulturhesitz, Cod. Theol. Lat. 233), hut also to members of the sub-group FDELM. Mojsisch accepts the theory that RU is an independent and the more reliable hyparchetype. Although criteria such as the *lectio difficilior* force him to follow occasionally the alternative archetype, Mojsisch prefers RU wherever possible, arguing that because R seems to be the oldest manuscript, RU will probably represent the original version most faithfully {I, 1, LXII). The guidelines articulated hy Maas and recommended by the general editors had warned against such a line of argument. Not the chronological distance to the original, hut the number and quality of mediating manuscripts along with the individual quality of the existing copy is

decisive for the question of greater and lesser fidelity. It also remains to be explained how the manuscripts BDLPU came to include a (com· mon?) table of contents for the whole work (I, 1, XXXIII). And yet, even should later editions lead to a revision of the *stemmata codicum,* especially as regards the primordiality of RU and RE, the changes in the text would not be so major as to impair significantly the value of these volumes.

According to the *stemmata* proposed by the editors, the frequent cor· rections, especially of B and N (St. Omer, Stadtbibliothek, Cod. 120), are neither the result nor the source of textual contamination. Daguillon had claimed in the preface to his edition of the first book (BT XII, 50*) that two separate sets of corrections in N can be distinguished from one another, with the later set of corrections corresponding closely to P. Had the new edition made the distinction visible for the reader, it would have been possible to evaluate Daguillon's claim and its consequence especially for the sub-group NVP.

De Libera reviews critically the earlier partial editions and analyses of the text tradition by J. Daguillon, F. Collingwood, F. J. Lescoe, B. Faes de Mottoni, and I. Backes, but he does not discuss in any detail (cf. XLis.) the *edition* of II 3, 4 by Martin Grabmann: *Des Ulrich Engelberti von Strassburg 0. Pr. (+ 1277) Abhandlung De pulchro: Untersuchungen und Texte,* republished in his *Gesammelte Akademie· abhandlungen* (Paderborn, 1979) I, 177-260). In fact, however, Grabmann intended to offer merely a "readable" text (pg. 74), utilizing only six of 'the nineteen manuscripts known to him. He was skeptical about the possibility of ever bringing the manuscripts into a helpful *stemma* with a defined achetype (pg. 73). A comparison of Grabmann's text with the new edition reveals that, in those cases of discrepancy where a consultation of the Munish manuscript (Bayerische Staatsbi· bliothek, Clm. 6496) could decide the matter, the new edition almost invariably provides the better reading of this manuscript. At II 3, 4, 219, the Munich manuscript (f.42v) should be added to the tradition in eluding the preposition *"in." "Et"* for *"id est"*/om. at 86 (M f. 4lr) and *"homine"* for *"hominis* " at 128 (M f. 41v) are presumably singular mistakes. Grabmann adds a few double variants (GAA, a.a.O. 252f, 253d, 255a, 256ad, 257h), which, even if verified in the manu· scripts cited, would not demand any changes in the main text.

The decision to exclude singular variants from the apparatus is un· derstandable, but it obviously makes independent confirmation of the new edition more difficult. Taking chapter II 3, 7 as an example, it is clear from M (f. 43v) that *"actum"* (1. 79) should read *"acutum"* (cf. also *Dionysiaca* II 838, 2; Alb. *De cael. hier,* c. 7, §4, Ed. Par. t. 14, p. 168b; and *Super De div. nom.* 4, n. 140, Simon 229, 9), whereas

it is uncertain from M alone (f. 47v) whether its reading of *noto* for *noti* (I. 18 of the new edition) is a singular variant or not. In I, 1, the negative style of apparatus, listing only the variants to the reconstituted text, makes it difficult for the reader to know when the partially preserved manuscript from Louvain agrees with the main text or is simply incomplete.

The date of composition is not explicity discussed in these first volumes, but the" *Index auctoritatum"* implies a date later than previously was assumed. Grahmann (op. cit., 206) argued, not without a certain plausibility, that Ulrich had written his work after 1262 (Albert's resignation as bishop of Regensburg, implied at IV 3, 9) and before the translation of Proclus's *Elementatio theologica* in 1268, a work so congenial to Ulrich, that its absence here seems significant. I. Backes, *Die Christologie, Soteriologie and Mariologie des Ulrich von Strassburg: Ein Beitrag zur Geistesgeschichte des 13. Jh.,* Trierer theologische Studien, 29 (II, 11), reasoned similarly with regard to the absence of all reference to Thomas Aquinas's writings after his commentary on the *Sentences* and *De veritate* 29. Following O. Lottin, Ludwig Hoedl has suggested recently a date around 1270 for Ulrich's work, seeing in it an awareness of the Prima pars of Thomas's *Summa:* " Die Wuerde des Menschen in der scholastischen Theologie des spaeten Mittelalters," in *De dignitate hominis: Festschrift fur C.-J. Pinto de Oliveria,* ed A. Holderegger, et al. (Freiburg i. Ue./Freiburg i. Br., 1987), 127.

In an article for the *Freiburger Zeitschrift fuer Philosophie und Theologie* 32 (1985): 105-136 ("Ulrich de Strasbourg, lecteur d'Albert le Grand "), de Libera attempts to show that Ulrich draws on a greater number of Albert's writings than earlier thought, including the second book of the *Summa theologiae* attributed to Albert (though not without quaestion: cf. the Prolegomena to the critical edition by D. Siedler, *Opera omnia,* Ed. Col. XXXIV, Muenster, 1978, V-XVI).

The second part of this Summa, which at least in its final form refers to the Second Council of Lyon in 1274, is alleged by the first two editors of *De summo bono* as a source of Ulrich's work; Mojsisch sees no such reference in Ulrich's first book. Although Ulrich's use of the second book of the *Summa* attributed to Albert would suggest a date of composition after Thomas's death, the editors-in contrast to Hoedl-do not draw any consequences for possible references by Ulrich to Thomas's middle or later works; indeed, the only alleged references to Thomas are in Book IV and refer simply to his commentary on the *Sentences.* In her article on (and edition of) *De summo bono* II 3, 13, B. Faes de Mottoni explored some parallels between Ulrich's tract on evil and the early and middle works of Thomas *(Medioevo* I (1975): 29-61; cf. by way of contrast: *Studi medievali* III (1979): 313-355).

Further parallels to Thomas's early works could he demonstrated easily. A comparison e.g. between Ulrich's II 3, 12 and Thomas's commentary on the *Sentences* (I 48, 1, 1-4) or especially his *De veritate* 23, 7-8 would reveal a detailed similarity in the formulation and success of arguments qualifying the required conformity of divine and human will. The far-reaching agreement does not exclude differences: E.g. Ulrich's "Cavendum" (1, 162-168) might well be a partial reaction to *De veritate* 23, 8, ad 2 (Ed. Leon. XXII 675, especially 160-170; cf. Bonaventure's commentary on the *Sentences* I 48, 2, duh. 1, Quaracchi I 860). By contrast, there is no apparent reason to assume that Ulrich's elaboration of the imago-character of the will (1. 1-12) presupposes a knowledge of the prologue and first question of *ST*, I-II. The important difference of Ulrich's position on the transformation of beatified human nature into the divine (1. 36-37) does not seem to be directed against any particular passage from Thomas's works (e.g. *ST*, II-II q.19, a.11, ad 3 and parallels) .

The new editors, alleging many borrowings from the first part of the *Summa theologiae* attributed to Albert, have demonstrated some impressive parallels (cf. FZPT, op. cit., 120, where the relationship to Albert's *Summa* is convincing, despite the unmentioned tie of *"anthropospathos"* to the passions in Albert's commentary on Isaiah, I 14; Ed. Col. XIX, 23, 59) . In themselves, such parallels are not yet decisive for questions of priority (and authenticity) . The first part of this *Summa* is thought by its editors (Ed. Col. XXXIV, 1, XVII) to refer to both Thomas's *ST* I (critically) and the translation of Proclus's *Elementatio theologica* (positively) , both completed around 1268. As these references seem to be the latest found in the first part of the *Summa* attributed to Albert, a final date of composition around 1269 would be conceivable. If Ulrich's work is dependent on this first part (and not the other way around), then the years between 1270 and 1272 (when Ulrich becomes provincial, presumably with less time for academics, although Bonaventure's literary production as Minister General should be a warning not to overrate this argument) would seem a likely date for Ulrich's own *De summo bono.*

The second part of the "Albert" *Summa* (final form after 1274) is alleged as a source in fewer and less convincing parallels. Several allegations include these references as but one possible source among many, less problematic citations. The concept of *creatio* as *communicatio boni,* on which the allegations at II 3, 7, 185 and 3, 8, 37 are based, is an idea common to Albert's commentary on Dionysius (Ed. Col. XXXVII, 1: 9, 51; 75, 22; 114, 52; 117, 10. 17; 164, 74; 169, 32, etc.) and neoplatonism as a whole. In Albert's *De bono* (Ed. CoL XXVIII, 12, 31), the good is described by the same paired *"diffusivum*

et communicativum " as in Ulrich, II 3, 8, 36s.: " *Diffunderet et communicaret bonum."* Ulrich did not need to wait until after 1274 for his formulation, as can he shown by citations of this neo-Platonic axiom in several texts undoubtedly prior to the 1270's: e.g. in Thomas's own commentary on Dionysius, IV, lect. IX (Marietti, Nr. 409), where several elements present in Ulrich's passage are to he found again: the Dionysian quotation on divine love, the paired concepts " *diffundere et communicare,"* and the inference of the limitations imposed on divine generosity by the limited receptivity of the creature. Admittedly, the source of Ulrich's views on pseudo-Aristotelian texts needs further consideration (IV 1, 8, 57s.). The coming volumes are likely to shed new light on the questions of date and sources. The later the date, the more likely the references and reaction to Thomas's works.

The question of the relationship between these two Dominicans is of interest not only because they possibly studied together at Cologne under Albert {1248-52, although the evidence is weaker for Ulrich), but because the later German Dominican School from Ulrich onwards developed its reception of Albert in partial opposition to the views of Thomas. The translation of Proclus's works and the "Averroist" controversies of the 1270s would lead especially in the years after Ulrich's death to an ever sharper accentuation of the divergent directions of Dominican theology, although basic differences surely were clear already by the 1260s. For example, Ulrich's thesis that the" *notitia Dei"* is *"per se nota,"* naturally inserted into the possible intellect "... in habitu lucis intellectus agentis, quae est Dei similitudo" (I 1, 3, 41 [pg. 10]), could he directed against Thomas even before his *ST.* In their joint introduction to I, 1 (especially XV-XXII), Mojsisch and de Libera make no mention of Ulrich's comments on the *intellectus agens,* possibly because of their attempt to criticize Ulrich from the alleged standpoint of Theodoric and Eckhart, whom they interpret along lines worked out by K. Flasch as propagating a purely rational, philosophical theology free of all revelation and mysticism. While the discussion of this interpretation is by no means concluded, it is clear already that Ulrich did belong to a phase of the Albert School, when the problematic which was to follow the reception of Proclus and Averroes was less defined. In contrast to this differentiation among Albert's disciples, recent studies on the attitude of the Albert School as a whole toward Thomas have tended occasionally to a certain antithetical simplification, neglecting e.g. the issues of the " Correctoria " controversies and the reaction of neo-Augustinians to Thomas's writings; there have yet to be articulated in any detail the differences in the attitudes of Albert's disciples toward Thomas and toward a theology more singularly conscious of salvific history. Nonetheless, the fre-

quent opposition of the German disciples of Albert to Thomas's thought is indisputable in itself and helpful in defining the " *novum* " of Thomas's theology. This does not rule out certain commonalities in method, sources, and content, some of which can he seen in the treatment of the theodicy problem in *De summo bono* II, as is clear e.g. in Josef Goergen's *Des hl. Albert Lehre van der goettlichen Vorsehung und dem Fatum, unter besonderer Beruecksichtigung der Vorsehungs- und Schicksalslehre des Ulrich von Strassburg* (Vechta, 1932), 115. This title would he a helpful addition to the bibliography provided by de Libera on pg. XLI-XLHI, along with W. Huebener: *"Malum auget decorem in universo.* Die kosmologische Integration des Boesen in der Hochscholastik," in *Miscellanea Mediaevalia,* Bd. 11, ed. A. Zimmermann (New York/Berlin, 1977), 1-26. Together with the earlier **vol**umes of the Corpus, the edition of *De summa bona* provides the most significant contribution of recent years towards understanding the rich diversity of Dominican theology in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

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Karl Rahner: The Philosophical Foundations. By THOMAS SHEEHAN. Series in Continental Thought, Vol. 9. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1987. Pp. xii + 320. $24.95.

Thomas Sheehan's work is without doubt the most sophisticated and detailed analysis in any language to date of Rahner's philosophical stance as expounded in his *Spirit in the World* (= SW). The author has also put to good use his exceptional knowledge of Heidegger, whom Rahner acknowledged as his "master" and "teacher" (see Preface, p. XI), focusing on Rahner's debts to and arguments against the thought of the philosopher of Freiburg.

The hooks is neatly divided in two parts. The first part traces the foundations of SW in the works of Immanuel Kant, Pierre Rousselot, Joseph Marechal, and Martin Heidegger (Chapters I to III). The second part is a chapter-by-chapter critical commentary of SW's three parts. Chapter IV, " The Problematic of 'Being' in Rahner," discusses SW's Part II, 1; Chapter V, "Towards *Spirit in the World,"* SW's Part I; Chapter VI, Bivalence as Abstraction," SW's Part II, 3 (on abstraction); Chapter VII," Bivalence as Conversion," SW's Part II, 2 (on sensibility) and Part II, 4 (on conversion) ; and the last chapter explores the possibility of metaphysics from Rahner's and Heidegger's standpoints (SW's Part III).

The heart 0£ the work is located in Chapter VI (on the agent in· tellect as the power 0£ abstraction) and in Chapter VII (on the possible intellect as the power 0£ conversion to the phantasm or sensibility as presence to the world). Central to Rahner's transcendental anthro· pology, in Sheehan's estimation, is the view that the human person is a " bivalent " and " kinetic " being, that is, a being intrinsically structured by a self-unifying dual movement, the one 0£ self-transcendence toward the asymptotically recessive *telos,* i.e. Absolute Being (Aristotle's *energeia* or *entelecheia)* and the other 0£ self-abandonment and essential openness to the world or matter. In epistemological terms, the first movement is interpreted as the act of abstraction, that is, 0£ " liberation " 0£ the universality or repeatability of the form in the particular instances, of being-present-to-oneself (self-presence), of anticipating-but-never-grasping the Absolute Being (*Vorgriff* or *excessus).* The second movement is interpreted as the act of returning to the phantasm, of being-absent-from-oneself (self-absence) both in sensibility (or the " cognitive sense") and in the *conversio ad phantasma.*

Sheehan underscores repeatedly the unity of these two movements in Rahner's anthropology. They are not two separate or successive movements; rather, the human person's self-presence intrinsically involves presence-to-other (self-absence) and vice versa. In Sheehan's words, £or Rahner humans are" press-ab-sence" (p. 7) (Incidentally, £or the sake 0£ orthography, is it not better to write " pre-ab-sence "?)

Sheehan speaks for all when he confesses that reading SW gave him an occasional feeling of riding a bicycle through sand dunes. His book, though not easy reading itself (the text is replete with Greek, Latin, German, and other foreign language terms), with its pellucid clarity, its extensive scholarship, and its elegant style, provides a much-appreciated help to those desiring an in-depth understanding of Rahner's philosophy. H the sand dunes 0£ Rahner's thought are not leveled, at least students are furnished with a powerfully motored all-terrain vehicle, and not a bicycle, to climb them.

Of the many virtues of this book I would like to single out the following for special commendation. First, it offers an excellent background to Rahner's philosophical thought, in particular its roots in the writings of Joseph Marechal and of the lesser known Pierre Rousselot. Secondly, it provides a detailed, and in my judgment, accurate assess· ment 0£ Rahner's indebtedness to Heidegger. Sheehan has convincingly shown how Rahner in his 1940 article on Heidegger ("Introduction au concept de philosophie existentiale chez Heidegger") and in the 1941 edition of *Horer des Wortes* has misunderstood Heidegger's notions 0£ *das Sein* and *das Nichts.* Rahner, Sheehan correctly holds, still remained in the "ousiological" tradition (see pp. 146-155), even

though he had carried out a radical interpretation of Thomas Aquinas's *esse* in his transcendental turn. Thus, Sheehan has brilliantly shown both Rahner's indebtedness to Heidegger (especially his notion of the human person as a bivalent and kinetic being; note the parallels between Rahner's cogitative sense and Heidegger's *Temporalitiit,* between Rahner's agent intellect and Heidegger's *Existentialitiit,* between Rahner's possible intellect and Heidegger's *Faktizitiit)* and Rahner's profound differences from Heidegger, especially in his understanding of being (see pp. 110-116; 280-291). Finally, Sheehan has provided the clearest exposition to date on Rahner's theory of " inner-worldly efficient causality " (pp. 244-255).

The book would have been much more helpful if an index of topics and a bibliography had been provided. There are two omissions. On p. 135, the last line should read: " Chapter VIII concludes the study by laying out the critical difference between Rahner's effort to re-establish the science of metaphysics on a transcendental base and Heidegger's attempt to overcome metaphysics." On p. 186, line 19: "In whatever way we read the content of predicate (Aquinas: quiddities) ." There are also a number of minor misprints. Strange that this book was published only in 1987, even though the research was apparently completed before 1982 (see p. 171, note 62). But its many assets will make Sheehan's work a permanent feature among the best Rahnerian studies.

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The World and Language in Wittgenstein's Philosophy. By GORDON HUNNINGS. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1989. Pp. xiv + 266. $34.50.

This book will not find a place among the distinguished commentaries on Wittgenstein's work. Aiming to cover the full sweep of that work, Hunnings devotes three of his eight chapters to the *Tractatus,* one to the" Notes on Logical Form" (1929) and *Philosophical Grammar,* one to the transitional material of *The Blue and Brown Books,* one to writings and lectures on the philosophy of mathematics, and just two to the central themes of the later philosophy. Indeed, of the book's 256 pages of text, 193 are spent before the reader finds himself dealing with *Philosophical Investigations.* So there is a problem of balance. For a book of this size and scope striving to cover the whole of Wittgenstein's

thought on representation and grammar, there is too much exposition of transitional detail and too little attention to the difficult but fertile work at the heart of the mature later Wittgenstein.

There are now many fine expository studies of Wittgenstein's work. This is not to say that all important matters of interpretation are settled. Indeed, there are significant areas of rival interpretation and there are varying assessments of the adequacy of Wittgenstein's views. There is contention over the degree to which his work is assimilable to the philosophical tradition. These facts suggest, not that there is no profit in further investigation of his work, but that new studies-particularly ones attempting a comprehensive survey of Wittgenstein's work from the *Notebooks* to *On Certainty*-should situate themselves in a well cultivated terrain of commentary and interpretation. But Hunning's work does little to inform prospective readers of the extent to which scholarly study of Wittgenstein's work has advanced. Eschewing a bibliography, Hunnings makes it somewhat difficult for the reader to discern his command of the scholarship. In construing the *Tractatus* he relies on Anscombe, Stenius, Griffin, and Black-all standard sources. But in dealing with the later philosophy and the much-debated transitional period between Wittgenstein's resumption of philosophical work in the late 1920's and the period of the *Investigations,* Hunnings simply does not scratch the surface of the huge body of secondary writing available to serious students of Wittgenstein's work. It would be pointless to list the important commentators whose works are ignored; suffice to say that Hunnings's book is apparently unassisted by a full scholarly command of the available literature. In this regard it suffers by comparison with A. C. Grayling's *Wittgenstein* in the Oxford University Press Past Masters series. Grayling's treatment of Wittgenstein's work, much briefer than Hunnings's, is both clearer and more fully informed by the relevant scholarship.

Judging by the allocations of attention in his text, one can conclude that Hunnings finds the early Wittgenstein more philosophically interesting than the later, or perhaps more amenable to expository treatment. His opening chapters on the ontology of the *Tractatus,* on language, and on the picture theory of meaning, offer a workmanlike but uninspiring survey of that book. Readers interested in a basic account of the philosophy of logical atomism in its application to language and the world will not be seriously misled by Hunnings's account of the *Tractatus.* These early chapters may, indeed, be the most useful portion of the hook, employing as they do a fairly substantial scholarly bibliography and delving relatively deeply into the issues of the *Tractatus.*

For example, readers of Hunnings will gain a far clearer vision of

Wittgenstein's early work than that afforded by a recent publication by the same university press, Richard McDonough's *The Argument of the Tractatus.* In contrast to McDonough's attempt to impose an alien mentalism on that work, Hunnings rightly states of the pictorial relation between propositions and facts, "that this relation is construed in spatial rather than, say, mental terms tells us something important about Wittgenstein's concept of the nature of the relationship, and the directness of the link, between language and the world" (49). What that relation tells us is that Wittgenstein from beginning to end saw that the modern tradition's vocabulary of mentality is profoundly problematic. Hunnings, to his credit, sees this in his work and displays that insight.

In his treatment of the later Wittgenstein, Hunnings focuses on the concept of grammatical investigation, listing two pages worth of instances that count as investigating grammar. (There are several such lists in the book.) His somewhat rambling, discursive account is, in the main, standard fare. Of the commonplace comparison of Wittgenstein with Kant he writes: "The transmutation of the Kantian attributes of the human psyche to the grammar of our language is one of Wittgenstein's greatest achievements. On the other hand, a consequence of this transmutation is that these problems lose their distinctive character of depth, persistence, and universality which are themselves only grammatical illusions" (202). This passage is typical of Hunnings's text. It contains an allusion to, but does not work out, a frequently made comparison of Wittgenstein and Kant. In it Hunnings rightly notes the importance of Wittgenstein's move and the profound change it works on the issues mentioned. But by ending his treatment of the topic with a reference to "grammatical illusions," Hunnings creates an unspecified negative judgment without explaining what might be entailed by this phrase. He goes on to discuss Wittgenstein's inquiry into rule-following, the use of the "picture analogy," the sense of the famous "meaning is use" dictum and the problems surrounding sense data, mental images, and inner states. Readers of Hunnings can glean a reasonably clear grasp of the range of issues handled by Wittgenstein and some notion of the manner of the handling. They will not, however, get a precise characterization of those issues or, really, an expert account of what Wittgenstein does in his discussion of them. Hunnings's treatment of the philosopher's sometimes intricate handling of pain, pain-behavior, and the language of pain is more precise and more sophisticated. He sees clearly that Wittgenstein is not a behaviorist and gives a good expository account of those topics.

Hunnings's closing chapter, "Grammar and the World," is a loosely structured scanning of the continuities between the early and later

work. He provides a rather interesting chart of " Features of Wittgenstein's Thought" that attempts a schematic comparison. Unfortunately, the perspective of this chapter, like much of the book, is distorted by a misconception of Wittgenstein's aim in practicing philosophy, a misconception epitomized in this remark: " If one had to sum up in a single sentence the point of Wittgenstein's philosophy it could be expressed as an investigation of the grammar of representation. Reality as mirrored in language was an obsessive concern throughout his life" (242). The author of these sentences has not grasped the significance of the fact that-as he himself states in this chapter-philosophy in Wittgenstein's view aims at the dissolution of conceptual confusions, not at the construction of a picture of reality, and *representation* is only one among very many uses to which language is put.

In his final chapter Hunnings attempts to hoist Wittgenstein on his own petard by charging that the concept of grammar in the later work is an illicit philosophical generality. He calls it "another chapter in the metaphysics of sense" (24.9) and writes that Wittgenstein's assertion " that (his) philosophy only demolishes houses of cards and in no way interferes with language but leaves everything as it is, is at best tendentious and at worst nonsense (250) ." He concludes this criticism by alluding to Wittgenstein's views as themselves "houses of cards." Now Hunnings is onto something here. There *are* unresolved problems in Wittgenstein's conceptions of (a) the aims of philosophy, (b) the character of the problems confronted in philosophical work, and (c) the nature of philosophical work itself, particularly the standpoint occupied by the philosopher. But the issues are more complex-and in fact more interesting-than is suggested by Hunnings's attempt at quick disposal through a charge of over-generality in the concept of grammar. Finally, this closing chapter also contains a superficial consideration of the treatment of "to know" from *On Certainty.* It has, however, no concluding summary. There is no wrap-up. Just as the hook begins without introductory material, so it ends abruptly, leaving the reader puzzled on a fundamental point. If Wittgenstein's work is as fatally flawed as Hunnings argues, why is it worth our attention? Or, to reverse the presumption, if Wittgenstein's work genuinely is worth our attention, how can we discover what is worthwhile in it while also recognizing and understanding the problems in it? In this hook Hunnings has managed to gesture toward some of the problems. But an answer to the fundamental question requires a more sophisticated treatment of that work than Hunnings has provided.

The publishers have appended a note to the author's preface indicating that Gordon Hunnings died in April, 1986, before the publication of this book. I celebrate the dedication to philosophical inquiry that

completion of this work represents. I trust that the best tribute to the inquiry he so evidently valued is a straightforward assessment of his text.

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Theology and Politics. By DUNCAN B. FORRESTER. Signposts in Theology Series. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1982. Pp. 182. $39.95 (cloth); $14.95 (paper).

Theology and Politics offers two things: a map of the" perennial possibilities" (p. 20) open to Christian political theology and a sympathetic introduction to liberation theology. In the first case, the map obscures as often as it guides; in the second, readers are led down an already well-trodden path.

In chapters 1-2, Duncan B. Forrester (professor of Christian ethics and practical theology at New College, University of Edinburgh) describes a "spectrum " of three Christian political theologies established in Graeco-Roman times and traces their recurrence down to the present. One political theology is represented by Tertullian, who claimed " there is nothing more alien " to Christians " than politics " and thus dissuaded them from taking direct " responsibility for power " (p. 20). Instead, they should challenge political society by witnessing to an " alternative way of ordering life" (p. 21). During the Reformation, this approach resurfaced in the Anabaptist movement.

At the other end of the spectrum is Eusebianism, a political theology advocating church-state complementarity. Its author, Eusebius of Caesarea, was an " apologist for imperial rule and the propagator of a Christian civil religion " during the Constantinian era. He saw " the earthly role of the emperor as a reflection of, and a kind of participation in, the kingly omnipotence of God himself" (p. 23). This approach predominated in medieval Christendom and recurred, in varying guises, during the Reformation. Luther advanced Eusebianism by default in his emphasis on individual justification by faith and the "two kingdoms" theory, wherein states are viewed as instruments of God's "left hand." His " depoliticizing" of Christian faith encouraged political passivity and uncritical obedience to state authority (p. 32). Calvinism advanced Eusebianism from the opposite direction. Its "theocratic emphases " absorbed the state into the church, blurring the "degree of autonomy" necessary for the political order (p. 34).

"Somewhere around the centre" is Augustine's political theology. On one hand, Augustine felt-against Tertullian-that the church had a "responsibility to defend peace and justice." On the other hand, he taught-against Eusebius-" that the Roman empire was, and always had been, corrupt." Thus, Augustine "affirms the theological significance of the political order" but "refuses to accord more than a heavily qualified endorsement to any temporal political order whatever" (pp. 24-25). This is the view Forrester endorses and under which he begins his discussion of liberation theology.

Forrester offers a routine treatment of liberation theology in chapters 3-6. In its deliberate "engagement" with the poor, liberation theology criticizes the comparatively abstract political theology of Metz and Moltmann (p. 60). In its conviction that the poor "have privileged access to the teaching of the Bible," liberation theology suggests that the social context of Western biblical scholars skews their scriptural interpretation (p. 96). By highlighting the radicalism of the historical Jesus, liberation theology challenges the "Domesticated Christ" of North American Christianity (p. 120). By viewing the church as a base community of the "poor, powerless, and oppressed," liberation theology exposes how the institutional church is "deeply implicated in capitalist society" (p. 136).

In the last chapter, Forrester summarizes the relationship between theology and politics by linking his three political theologies with those discussed in the 1985 South African Kairos Document. In this way, the "state theology" identified by the Kairos theologians (racist ideology of the South African government) is Eusehianism, "church theology" (reformist ideology of the mainline churches) is Tertullianism, and "prophetic theology" (radical ideology of liberation theology) is Augustinianism.

But two things are wrong here. The reformist struggle of mainline churches against apartheid-however feeble-is not identical to the Tertullian-Anabaptist approach as Forrester earlier defined it. The former challenges the state through public discourse; the latter witnesses to the state through a counter-cultural lifestyle. Second, insufficient evidence is given for the claim that contemporary prophetic theology reflects the political theology of Augustine.

Both problems stem from Forrester's initial assumptions. Suggesting medieval Christianity reflected no more than a Eusebian understanding of political theology misses not only the critical differences between Eastern and Western church-state relations but also the contribution of Thomas Aquinas. Indeed, Aquinas's thought (never discussed in the text) may represent a better "middle position" on the spectrum of Christian political theologies than Augustine's. If Robert L. Holmes's

recent discussion of Christian political theology in *On War and Morality* is correct, 1) Augustine was more Eusebian than we have generally thought, and 2) Luther was possibly his best exegete. Regarding Forrester's remaining political option, his leapfrogging from Tertullian to the Anabaptists misses the political theology of Western monasticism, which produced not only the witnessing cloister but also a brand of church-state theory (e.g. Gregory VII and Leo IX) quite unlike Eastern Eusebianism.

In short, Forrester's spectrum obscures more than it clarifies; the range of qualitatively distinct Christian political theologies is simply wider than he suggests . And while one appreciates a clear discussion of liberation theology, new paths to understanding are not opened.

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The Grammar of the Heart: New Essays in Moral Philosophy and Theology. Edited by RICHARD H. BELL. San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1988. Pg. 259 + xxviii. $24.95.

Grammar tells us what kind of a thing something is, and this set of essays addresses what Paul Holmer calls the " grammar of faith." This grammar has been traditionally seen, however, in two markedly different ways: as one essay puts the contrast, a grammar of ' rational belief ' as opposed to a "grammar appropriate to affairs of the heart" (Hustwit, 97). It is the second of these, the character of the grammar of the 'heart,' which these essays as a whole explore, and the sub-title of the 1987 symposium in honor of Holmer from which they are drawn-" Thinking with Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein "-indicates the two main avenues of exploration. Through these, we are told in the introduction, the authors intend to shift the concern of philosophy of religion and theology from questions of " epistemic credentials " to a construetive re-valuation of our age-an age which, arguably at least, is still as much " an age without culture " as it was when Wittgenstein first made the complaint.

The hook consists of two parts, and each part is introduced by an illustrative selection from Holmer's writings on faith and morality, then followed by a corresponding set of six original essays. The first set of essays, the editor tells us, are " more philosophical," analyzing "the grammar of our modern culture and of religious practices in general,"

while the second six are devoted to analyses of specifically moral and Christian concepts. Although the separation of the two may initially seem an artificial one, precisely against the " spirit of both Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard" which the essays are said to exemplify, it does in fact often result in the kind of overlap and repetition which are quite fruitful-for example, as in the mutually illuminating correspondence between the constructive philosophical suggestions about metaphor in the first part (Whittaker) and the presentation of the specifically Kierkegaardian understanding of the metaphorical ' language of love ' in the second part (Walsh).

The collection as a whole is indeed in the spirit of Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard by virtue of its imaginative diversity of perspective. Although there is the predictable (and admittedly useful) exploration of the ' grammar of the heart ' in terms of the standardly Kierkegaardian categories of " risk, passion, paradox, and duty " (95) , there are also proposals which are both unexpected and exciting. A glance at a few of these will reveal something of the particular character and value of this collection.

The centerpiece of the first part is the explicit proposal in two of the essays of an understanding of the grammar of the 'heart ' in which the role and relevance of the *private* (personal, individualistic) is challenged and rethought in light of the *public* (social interaction and practice) . The ' heart ' at issue is found at the heart of community; the grammar of the ' heart ' is a grammar of the activities of a life in common, rather than of privatized inwardness or interiority. Glehe-Mcf>ller, for example, examines the relation between two views of religion in Wittgenstein's writings-a first-person (Kierkegaardian) type of religion and a sociological view of religion as a shared phenomenon-arguing that, in the end, despite an explicit adherence to the former throughout his writings, Wittgenstein's intellectual commitments (especially his understanding of rule-governed practice) imply the dependence of the personal on the shared.

This challenge to traditional public/private dualisms is elegantly played out in the exciting essay by Rowan Williams in terms of the tension between the agenda of doubt and decoding (Freud, Ricoeur) and the agenda of a " suspicion of suspicion " (Wittgenstein and Bonhoe:ffer). The question is how to " reconcile the imperative of decoding with a recognition of the profundity of surfaces" (37)-the question, that is, is how to do justice to limits, the concrete, the particular. Williams imaginatively suggests the challenge of Wittgenstein and Bonhoe:ffer to those who are" obstinately discontented with finitude" (40) and desperately seek to uncover" what is discreditably secret" (41)- " what if the truth is that the interior self is in flight from the ' victory

already achieved ' of the visible person? " (43) . The conclusion to be drawn, however, is not a naive rejection of interpretation (for deception and self-deception are always possible); the irony goes deep, for given our fragmentedness, "we must be suspicious equally of the untruthfulness of what is offered us and of the untruthfulness of our own refusal of it (for we have no language or consciousness that has not been given us) " (46) . The rejection of the quest for an " unsullied interiority " or " impossible transparency " in favor of a " properly public life" is not, therefore, the rejection of all interiority, and the essay concludes with some suggestions toward an understanding of " inner life " which is neither naive immediacy nor the result of decoding.

The analysis by Whittaker of the shared denial by Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard that Christianity is a " doctrine " could also be seen as indirectly addressing the public/private issue. His view of beliefs as " construals " challenges such a dichotomy: they are " recognizably metaphorical" (72), yet they are claims put forth and held as "true" because they are capable of being " supported and communicated through a process of rational persuasion " (69) in terms of being "capacitating enough to be reasonably held" (72). Such a view at the same time challenges a simplistic understanding of ' heart ' as contrasted with ' head ' since it intends to locate the ' grammar of the heart ' within a cognitivist account of religious clamis.

Such a compatibility of ' heart ' and cognitivist orientation is also argued for from a very different direction in Sherry's analysis of the specific concept of 'inspiration' in the second part of the book. Sensitive to Wittgenstein's admonitions against essentialism, one-sided diets (of examples) , and picture-thinking about ' mental processes,' Sherry urges a widening of the concept of inspiration, developing the very suggestive analogy between religious inspiration and ' moral imagination.' Religious inspiration, delivered from its bondage to narrow models of Biblical inspiration, is paralleled with imaginative extensions of moral and emotional range and with the enhancement of capacity exemplified in aesthetic creativity and intellectual insight (177). Sherry's essay also illustrates the interweaving of themes between essays which is apparent in retrospect throughout the book-that is, such ' heart ' as Sherry construes as imaginative perception or vision may well be taken as an elaboration of suggestions in the earlier discussion by Mason of the status of moral principles in terms of a Wittgensteinian understanding of the way we learn empirical judgments and of the role of rules in our practices.

Still another kind of approach to the ' grammar of the heart ' is exemplified in Walsh's construal of it in terms of a 'grammar of love.'

While it may seem a commonplace that the 'heart' is a metaphor for inwardness, passion, and subjectivity, Walsh offers a fruitful unpacking of that metaphor by focusing on Kierkegaard's characterization, in *Warks of Love,* of the way in which love not only proceeds from but also "forms the heart" (234). While it may seem obvious that 'heart' and love are tied, there has been little, she suggests, in the way of a theology of love comparable to developments of theologies of hope, play, etc. In illuminating detail she considers the grammar of love in terms of selfishness, the other as neighbor, the relevance of special relations, and the tension between love as commanded and love as spontaneous. Acknowledging weaknesses in Kierkegaard's account (especially with respect to ambivalence about reciprocity and special relations), Walsh nevertheless argues that his account offers resources for moving beyond a "Sartrean conflict model of human relations" as well as beyond a "patriarchal framework of relations between the sexes" (249).

This collection does not entirely escape the problems usually attending symposium-based collections-namely, unevenness both in quality and in direct bearing on the development of the theme-but it suffers from them less than most. It succeeds, moreover, in the more important respect of forcing a rethinking of the issues addressed, and it does this in various ways. Sometimes the challenge lies embodied within the essays, as when some of the essays assume an opposition between a grammar of 'rationality' and that of the 'heart' while others seek to enrich one or the other side so as to diminish the contrast. Moreover, in addition to the simply appreciative examinations of Kierkegaard's thought (either alone or in comparison with Wittgenstein's), and the explicitly critical (yet constructive) assessments of his thought, some of the essays can be read as effectively, though not explicitly, offering a Wittgensteinian corrective to Kierkegaard. A critique of Kierkegaard's emphasis on transparency (both in Judge William and Anti-Climacus), for example, seems implied in William's general proposal and his endorsement of Stanley CaveU's criticism of the requirement of transparency (42). In this way it can be seen as indirectly offering a Wittgensteinian corrective, de-privatizing a Kierkegaardian understanding of inwardness. Such an essay, however, serves as an indirect illustration of how appreciation of Wittgensteinian insights can allow one to develop the potential in Kierkegaardian insights. Judge William's claim, for example, that "He who cannot reveal himself cannot love," could be read in line with William's own view of our task (at least in part) as lessening our "obscurity" to ourselves through skills learned and nourishment given (50), thus offering a non-privatized view of transparency. Hence it points the way to what could he a fruitful and

illuminating re-examination of the category of inwardness in Kierkegaard's writings. The majority of the essays in the hook are similarly suggestive and will prove rewarding and interesting reading-they echo the aim and gift, share by Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard, of "making their readers *thinkers"* (xvi).

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Let the Future Come. By WILFRED DESAN. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1987. Pp. 152. $9.95 (paper).

Toward a lust Social Order. By DEREK L. PHILLIPS. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. Pp. 434. $12.50.

After several decades of doldrum thinking, social ethics, i.e., personal and political ethics done on the same canvas, is undergoing a welcome renewal. Perhaps spurred by the growing awareness of the massive problems of our tiny planet, thinkers from diverse areas are beginning to offer what the social sciences call "grand theory." Both Desan and Phillips make valuable contributions to this project and represent the best levels of refleotion from the teleological and deontological perspectives respectively. Desan's essay is the final volume of three, hut may be read independently of the earlier studies, discussed by this reviewer in 1973 in *The Thomist* (Vol. 37, pp. 249-255). If Desan has a core concept for his thinking it is planetary peace and the human individual as gardener and guardian of this admittedly future state of affairs. Phillips, critically inheriting the Anglo-American rights tradition, focuses on the person, not the planet, on the distinctiveness of the part, not on Desan's projeotion of a whole *humanum* composed of parts (each a member of the human community yet only a member) . The metaphysical background here, then, is the whole-of-parts *versus* parts·of-a-whole dialectic. Read together the two works would truly stimulate a graduate ethics seminar, for we see the renewal of ethical ,thinking against some classical ontological themes.

For Desan, the person is *homo custos,* self-aware becoming other-aware; for Phillips, the person is the source and enactor of rights. He offers heavy criticism of the virtue/community school's orientation towards the common good of society, with subsidiary private rights located within that context. This is the weakest part of his massive survey of recent ethics. Phillips simply cannot see the reality of human community, which is exactly what Desan is determined to project as

our only possible future. Desan's combination of Thomism and Hegel stands to the far side of Phillips's Lockean stress on private rights as the base criterion for any future just public order. We will look first at Desan's final effort to summarize a notion of " planetary " existence that will be valid both individually and communally and then turn to Phillips's detailed, Rawls-like approach.

Desan's argument against the primacy of the individual over the world community was carefully nuanced in his two earlier volumes; he has no intention of denigrating the person in order to celebrate the planet, and he is no partisan of the " deep ecology " effort to elevate nature above the sub-category human nature. His planet is social and political, a cosmic existent dependent upon specifically human activity-not individual activity at either the personal or national levels but activity at the level of the total earth population. He is not so much detailing yet another agenda for a New World Order as he is striving to raise modern individualized consciousness to a height where the reality of interdependency is rationally undeniable. Desan's appreciative critique of Husserl's individualized consciousness in his first volume, *A Noetic Prelude to a United World,* displayed the plight of personalized consciousness as against planetary awareness. In this final panel of his triptych, he synthesizes that critique: "Where the individual Observer is the *magister,* there are as many worlds as there are *magistri."* This privatized existence is not to be denied but rather seen for what it is: a limit instead of a secure startpoint for either ethical or epistemological theory.

His second volume stressed that our very awareness of this limitation gives rise, perhaps in a Hegelian dialectic, to potential for participation in global existence. To resist this cooperative consciousness is to favor isolated determination of one's perspective for oneself. To open the border of private and sub-group consciousness and the prioritizing based upon these structures, Desan claims in his final volume, is to foster the new virtue needed for the future, what Nietzsche styled *Fernstenliebe,* or love of the distant. This virtue, instead of the classic justice of the traditional *polis,* will be the mark of the emerging World Citizen. Gone will be the autonomy and self-sufficiency at both epistemic and ethical levels that confined Cartesian man. Here now at the crescendo of his three volumes, Desan offers a profound alternative to the so-called anti-humanism of Derrida and the post-structuralists, who demand the West's obsession with the Subject cease. Desan calls for a self that rises knowingly from its uniqueness, from what he describes as the "angularity" of human vision in individuals and nation-states, to a height where the Cartesian self is suspended, or bracketed in a semi-Husserlian sense. The vision now is not self-interest, personal rights,

or the accident of enculturation; it is what humanity could he in the future. This vision is, ultimately, :the classic common good, detached from personal reduction to the good-for-me or for-us, where the " us " stands for any group less than the human community. Hence the self loses a viewpoint as such: there is a view of future humanity hut also a continual effort to detach this from a set perspective or point of vision. On this account, otherness defines selfness and we become a people living to belong, instead of living for belongings, rights, or privileges over others.

Desan's thinking will strike some as a Hegelian dissolution of human individuality in favor of a vague, future, planetary *polis.* His primary virtue is awareness of self-limitation, a humility to replace the arrogance of *hubris.* He cannot profile this new World Citizen for us, hut his effort over the past quarter-century surely should assist in curtailing the role of self and national interest in social and political theory. Rather than assign us to watch out for our own interests or those of the groups to which we each must belong, Desan calls for *homo custos,* a humanity in which each one serves as guard for the others' interest instead of defender of one's own. It is a profoundly religious vision rooted in love of neighbor rather than rare recognition of the neigh·hor's equality with the individual.

Phillips has great difficulty with the notion of human community at this level because he sees the cultural relativity of every less-than·global human grouping. What is needed, he claims, is a deontology, not a custodial democracy. Ethics must begin with concrete situations demanding principles of reasonability for just resolutions. We see again the distinction between telos·based moral reflection, whether the end he personal virtue or common good, on the one hand and rule-based reflection on the other. It must he granted that Phillips has moved far from his home base in sociology, which, he points out, hesitates to allow for normative theory "as to right and wrong or the justice or injustice of a particular institutional arrangement." He has also moved beyond that school of analytic ethics that would only treat of moral language. With Rawls and Nozick, he has crossed into normative ethics, and his hook ranges through most of the issues current in the ethical revival. His goal is a " socialization for a just social order " (p. 7). But he does not seem to see the circularity of rt:his goal in the same light as he sees such circularity of reasoning in Macintyre, e.g., he claims to catch Macintyre in just such a quandary when the latter writes:

> . . . the good life for man is the life spent in seeking for the good life for man, and the virtues necessary for the seeking are those which will enable us to understand what more and what else the good life for man is. (p. 110)

He especially reacts against Maclntyre's project of envunoning new forms of local community where the moral life can be sustained, "through the new dark ages which are already upon us," as Macintyre phrases it. Yet what basically aggravates Phillips is that " while the natural law theorists claim that there are correct moral principles, they have never managed to provide a rational justification for a particular set of such principles." Phillips sees his theory of a just social order providing " a *standard* against which we can evaluate particular laws and institutions from a moral standpoint independent of those laws and institutions." (p. 327)

Here we see goal-based and rule-based theorists locked in conflict. For the former, norms can only be projected in terms of the vision of outcomes; for the latter, including Phillips, the norm must be rationally detachable from the situation or institution at issue, and individual action or societal policy cannot he evaluated by reference to individual or common good. This is the present state of affairs, and one benefit of Phillips's book is his own version of a calculus that attempts to meet the rule-based camp's demands. This comes, as expected, in terms of distribution of goods and services to competing holders of right. It would seem all this is ultimately rooted in a principle he states in passing, without realizing, perhaps, that his whole theory begins from this interest: entitlement to rights and two conditions for action, well-being and freedom. His theory begins here rather than with the teleologists' search for the purpose of well-being and freedom. In the end, Phillips's context is the Rawlsian one: projected outcomes should determine present proportionality of benefits. In this sense, the new rule-based ethics may not be as far distant from the goal-based posture as the former's proponents believe. There must be a vision involved, either of common good or else peaceable division, either Desan's *totum humanum* or a *divisum humanum.* Ultimately it is with distribution of goods, not collectivity of life, that Phillips is concerned. This is evidenced in his inability to conceive of the common good as specifiable for the human community. This said, his book must still be considered a major contribution to recent ethical theory because of the range of issues and thinkers Phillips addresses and his willingness to offer judgments of his own, in addition to criticism of others' opinions.

In Part One, he critiques four of the dominant theories of social order: the classical private interest position, then situational analysis, then the consensus and conflict approaches. Somewhat detailed treatments of the recent work of Jeffrey Alexander and Anthony Giddens follow, which leads to the more favored deontologies of Rawls, Nozick, and Gewirth. Although Phillips takes exception to each of these postures, he still can argue for Gewirth's rights notion against Macintyre's

claim that this is a fairly late, i.e., Enlightenment, development. As a result, and as indicated briefly above, he concludes:

> Contrary to the arguments of Macintyre, Sullivan and Walzer, then, normative theories cannot rest on the elaboration of social arrangements as found in the tradition, community or society. Instead, we require the sorts of deontological theories that aim at rationally justifying those principles appropriate to justice in *any* society. (p. 113)

The alternative, as mentioned above, is to be Gewirth's stress on two " generic rights," well-being and freedom, and their configuration within social and political institutions. For Phillips these rights are mutually dependent, to be learned early, affirmed, and accepted by every individual. This position-that morality is learned in social interaction-leads to extensive discussion of many controverted issues in Part Two, and his treatment of these is consistently stimulating. Current theories of moral development, specifically Kohlberg's, the complex topic of privacy as raised by Ferdinand Schoeman, and a most valuable extended discussion of child and parent rights follows. A highlight of the whole volume is a fine validation of the notion of moral guilt and the distinction of this awareness from shame and from Freudian or neurotic guilt. Phillips argues for the need of "true guilt." In view of the present reviewer's attitude towards the author's right-based theory, it must he said that his discussion of guilt as a form of self-disappoint·ment, not rule violation, is a substantial contribution to the literature and another death-knell for emotive ethics in the A. J. Ayer tradition.

Part Three <takes up the current debate between legal theories, spe·cifically the natural law tradition represented by Fuller mainly, legal realism in its classic Holmesian version and in the newer versions of Frankfort School derivation, and Kelsen and Hart's legal positivism. But what really concerns Phillips is Dworkin's so-called " liberal theory " and its conclusion that, although there is a legally correct solution to any "hard case " situation, that answer may not he morally right. This autonomy of the legal from the moral order is unacceptable to Phillips, who seeks to confirm the former by means of the latter and finds his hoped-for "rational justification" outside or apart from the versions of this offered by the four current theories. To this end, Phillips offers his version of Gewirth's Principle of Generic Consistency; " Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well as of yourself," which is his foundation for the just social order. This state of affairs will he one in which " all people's actions are regulated by recognition and respect for everyone's rights to freedom and well-being and by the institutions to which those generic rights give rise" (p. 315). In this order, all citizens will (must?) first recognize and then "identify freely and rationally with its institutional arrangements and collec·

tive aspirations." Here the legal system would at last he "rationally grounded and will impose on everyone an obligation to comply with its dictates." In this context, Phillips cites with approval George Herbert Mead's vision of a commonwealth "in which each individual would carry out in himself the response that he calls out in the community."

Phillips takes Gewirth's " weak " version of a Kantian ethic and makes it into a " strong " version of the same. We see this at the crucial point when, after citing Gewirth's modified position, Phillips drives over the qualifications to reach his own goal line. The context, as might he expected, is the root issue for rule-based ethics, the relationship between morality and lawfulness. First let us hear the Gewirth weak version, and then the Phillips strong reconstruction. In his 1978 *Reason and Morality,* Gewirth is discussing the traditional *bete noir* of the rule-based school, the relation of morality and lawfulness:

> The basis of the obligation to obey the law, then, is not simply that it is the law but rather that the law is instrumentally justified by the PGC. Hence, indirectly, the obligation to obey the law is a rational obligation, in that to violate the law is to contradict oneself. (p. 300)

But Phillips's interpretation of this position is plainly much stronger:

> In other words, it is a *rational obligation* to obey the law when it can be *morally justified* in terms of protecting everyone's rights to freedom and well-being. There is, then, no rational obligation to obey the law when it cannot be morally justified in such a manner. In short, there is no moral obligation to obey unjust laws. (p. 319)

Here we have what Phillips holds to be a detached rational basis, superior to the norm of either personal virtue or common good, upon which to justify a social order. While Gewirth's basis for deciding to obey rather than contradict is clearly Kantian and subjective, Phillips is reaching for some universal norm of rationality whereby all will recognize the generic rights of all. In this reviewer's opinion, Phillips has not found such a norm of reason, nor is there one to be found apart from natural individual *arete* projected outwards as the necessary *arete* of the human society. As mentioned, sociologist Phillips finds notions of universal human nature and consequent projections of a universal human good faulty because of the diversity of human societies. Yet in his model, each individual is empowered by reason to determine, not the ideals of personal and common virtue, but rather generic rights as actualized or violated in specific situations, and not merely one's own but those of "everyone."

The problem here is enlarged in Part Four, where Phillips attempts to construct his version, *via* Gewirth's Principle, of a Rawls-

like reasonable rule for economic life. This effort is worthy of more attention than is possible here, but let it be noted that it must inevitably suffer the same fate as any ethical calculus: someone must decide for others what is their due and what is not. How much wealth, for example, makes for a concentration [of wealth] that would be " demonstrably detrimental to some people's exercise of their generic rights "? His is ultimately an entitlement or rights ethic, rather than an aitial ethic of goal-purposive fulfillment for the individual, projected outwards for a common good scenario. While his rejection of goal ethics's inability to detail principles for distribution of goods is noteworthy, it does not appear that a tightened version of generic rights theory will come closer to either of Phillips's *desiderata:* a justification of moral reasoning apart from any theory of nature or a calculus for its application.

Desan and Phillips wish to think against the limits of the human situation. For Desan, rising above limitation is a moral task and obligation facing us each, if there is to be a common future. His call is to be World Citizen in a Polis of Nations. Phillips's vision is more concrete, a distribution of benefits to benefit all with well-being and freedom. But this mundane task is no less difficult than Desan's transcendent one. Indeed, according to Augustine, even the Divine Mind must utilize an artifice in dealing with human creation: "He loves each of us *as though* there were only one of us." Both ethicists have striven to show us how we might think this vision for ourselves, i.e., for each other of us.

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Catholics, Anglicans, and Puritans: Seventeenth-Century Essays. By HUGH TREVOR-ROPER. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988. Pp. xiii + 317. $27.50 (hardbound).

Even to list the changes and events which occurred in seventeenth century England is a difficult task: the century spans the period from the death of Queen Elizabeth to the Glorious Revolution and beyond, through the Civil War, the accession and exile (twice) of the Stuarts, the rise of science, the transformation of the theological and religious issues of the English Reformation, to name only the most obvious. To conceive a book, in the form of occasional essays, which not only addresses these changes and events but does so by establishing the connections which were present with European currents at the same time surely tempts fate, even when it does not tempt reviewers.

But Hugh Trevor-Roper is a master, both of the period under survey and of the form of the essay. With one exception, each of these essays began as a lecture or seminar paper, and the pleasantly legible style in which they are written must bear some trace of that origin. The occasional flashes of wit, mixed with rthe fairly non-technical style, make the book a joy to read and a welcome escape from the usually constipated style of scholarly prose.

In his Introduction, the essayist clearly sets forth his thesis that English intellectual history does not exist apart from the currents of European intellectual history (a thesis for which Trevor-Roper has already staked a claim). That leads to what may very well be the major problem with these essays: its end is in its beginning. The list of names cited in these essays only partially coincides with the list of names in the index; the former is much longer than the latter. And while the style of the essay welcomes the reader to the period, it also throws up more names and places and events than can be explained or even annotated adequately. This occurs both on a large and on a small scale. The first essay, on "Nicholas Hill, the English Atomist" contains such a vast array of names that at times it becomes the prosopographical equivalent of a telephone book. On a large scale, there is the problem with a definition of Arminianism. No definition, at least no formal definition, is attempted-and this is probably wise. But, particularly in the case of the essay on "Laudianism and Political Power," when Trevor-Roper returns to the subject about which he wrote over forty years ago, he seems to side-step the issue of whether Laud and his party can accurately be called Arminiaμs at all. Quite a lot is presented about the personal connections between the Laudians (and more particularly their predecessors such as Andrewes) and Arminius himself, and a satisfactory answer to the question can probably be made from a distillation of these essays as a whole, but respect for Trevor-Roper inclines one to wonder what answer he would give in his own words.

Two themes of major interest run through these essays, however, and stand in even greater relief because of the comparatively smaller play they have been given in modern scholarship. The first is the place of the irenic movement, particularly in the England of James I. It is here that the combination of European and English intellectual history becomes most valuable. The picture which emerges is of a strong ecumenical period in which the possible reunion of Christendom is contemplated with more than idealistic speculation. The fact that this movement was torpedoed by the Synod of Dort, on the one hand, and the intransigence of reactionary Roman Churchmen, on the other, makes it none the less important. While it has been referred to more

regularly in recent articles and essays (particularly with regard to some of the movement's leaders and more colorful figures such as Marcantonio de Dominis, classified as a "reunionist" in these essays), there is a refreshing exposition of this group (in more than passing references) in a number of these essays. The position of James I is mentioned infrequently, possibly because more attention is given to others, theologians and political leaders, who have been even more neglected in this respect. But the position of James I stands out quite boldly in this international movement and has (by and large) been ignored by the more "insular" historians of the Stuart period. Trevor-Roper occasionally produces a defense of" what if" historiography, in which he indulges fairly infrequently, so one would have been glad to have seen some attention paid to the reasons why the irenic movement failed, beyond the obvious reason that it was buried under more numerous and more pressing events.

The second theme of interest is that of the "No Popery" school of English intellectual (and, at times, anti-intellectual) writing. This becomes most obvious in the essays on Archbishop Ussher and John Milton, not surprisingly, but it also is a major issue in the growth of the Laudian party. There are two areas of interest which these issues raise, in the theme of the anti-Papal polemic. The first is the relation between English "No Popery" and the manifestation of contemporary Gallicanism in France. While both of these are undoubtedly political forces, as well as religious movements, the linking of intellectual work in these two countries is fascinating. This runs from the English support for Richelieu's proposed Gallican patriarchate to the less noticeable but still significant exchange of hooks (most of which Trevor-Roper mentions by title, and then comments that they were not read by the recipients). More than this is the second area of concern, namely, the relationship between English anti-Papalism and current millenarian thought. David Brady, in his recent study *The Contribution of British Writers Between 1560 and 1830 to the Interpretation of Revelation 13:16-18* (Tiibingen: Mohr, 1983), has noted the amazing growth in the seventeenth century of literature on the hook of Revelation, but more specifically on the identification of figures (such as the Beast and the Antichrist) in this literature. Trevor-Roper recalls this literature in some depth and links it not only with the radical Millenarians but even with the more " moderate " party of Laud. The gradual retreat of Milton into apocalyptic unreality and his growing ingenuity in his exegesis of Revelation also stand out in Trevor-Roper's final essay, "Milton in Politics." That essay presents Milton as a whole, rather than as a writer, or political operator, or intellectual leader (in the manner of most other works on Milton). One does wonder whether

Milton was as totally dislikable as Trevor'Roper portrays him, and the essayist's occasional jibes about Milton's passion for divorce seem to be gratuitous. But, on the whole, Trevor-Roper presents the identification of the Papacy with the Antichrist in a fascinating way, a narra· tive which contributes not only to seventeenth century intellectual history hut also to the history of biblical exegesis.

This is certainly not a survey text, but it is a pleasant and occasionally entertaining introduction to the currents of the intellectual and religious movements which lay behind the Civil War and Puritan Revolution in England and Ireland-and by a master of the essay.

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