PHARAOH'S .MAGICIANS: THE ETHICS AND EFFICA:CY OF HUMAN FETAiL TISSUE TRANSPLANTS

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IN RECENT YEARS increasing attention ha;s been given to v:rurioustypes of scientific riese,archinvolving the human fetus. In the 1970s, :a tremendous amount of concern was expressed IJ.'egiaroingthe fetus ,a;.s a rSU!bject of In this debate, the announced " research impeiiat:i:ve' was pos,ed against other moral imperativ;es.[1] Following much soctiet:JaJldrebarte,protootlivemeiaisumeis ,WeIDe il!dopited1by oompireihensive regiutatiionsin 1975 estaiblishiingprotections *foT* a number of research sUibjects. These regulrutions protect the fetus from non-beneficiail experimentation. that iworuild pose more than minima;l risk rto the fetus.

Current debates in science and ethics now swirl arlOiunda new topic regarding human '.fetallife: the fetus as a sourrceof tissue for triansplaintation into other persons ais run thempy. It is an issue that is rapidly moving torward the same Jevel of" research imperative" as did the earlier debate on the

1 See Paul Ramsey, *The Ethics of Fetal Research* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975): "Today one often hears statements like' Fetal Research must be done,' or **'It** would be immoral not to do this research'" (P. xv). The validity of such opinions and utterances entirely depends on a net-benefits ethics, and the validity of that moral universe has been called increasingly into question in recent years.

as subject. Recently, ,a new level of intensity was added to this deharte rby the imposition of an indefinite moratorium on federal support for research on transplantrution experiments inv;olving human .fetirultissue and other !humans.

1Thls " :indefinite moratorium " w1as a result of a process that ɨbegan with research p110posaJsconsidered rby the National In-'stituites of Health (NIH) in October 1987. In Marich 1988 a momtorium wa;g plaioedon the r:eseareh, and an 1advisorypanel was summoned to consider the ethical issues involved. This panel presented 1a cveoommendationfor the procedures. However, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Ruman Se1wfoes (HHS), Dr. Louis Sullivan, decided against the research proposal on etmcal grounds. His decision w:as with the 'concU'l'Tenoeof the Assistant Secretary :f̲m.· Health of HHS, Dr. James Mason, who has for the NIH. Secretary SulliV1an'sdecision was oommumcarted to the Acting Director of the NIH, Dr. William Raub, in Nov,ember 1989. A :firestorm of criticism erupted from ,rudv;ocatesof this research, including the Council of Judicial and Ethical Affairs of tihe American Medical Association, which 5.n June 1989 called for an end to the:ban.[2]

In this article, we wish to question both the science and the ethics of the rproposedfotal tissue transplantation therapy. We !Will 1supportthe £edeml funding moratorium and surggestnew pmtections for the fetuses (whether po,ssibly living or de-

2" Medical Applications of Fetal Tissue Transplantation", *JAMA,* Vol. 263, No. 4, January 26, 1990, 'PP· 565-570. There has been a .great deal of public debate, not only in the U.S. but also in Europe over whether human embryo research should be supported with public funds. Many Catholic countries in Europe have prohibited such research, while a number of other nations have allowed it. Dickson, D., "Europe Split on Embyro Research", *Science,* Vol. 242, November 21, 1988, pp. 1117-1118. The most interesting controversy is in West Germany where there is a strong movement to prohibit it because many there believe such an experimentation requires judgments that there are certain forms of human life that do not deserve to survive. Ibid., p. 1117. Many Germans regard these sorts of judgments as too close to those made by Nazis, and there is strong sentiment to prohibit such research altogether. Ibid.

oea:sed) of elective a.bortfons. We will also describe new reseaooh directions in .for the diseases in which it is claimed that fetal tissue transplants we imperative.

First, there not 1been eno;ugh fong-te:rm the11aperutic Bll!coesses with human fetal tissue transplants to waLVrant federal if.unclingof further l.1esearch. The num1ber of reported sruccesses ha:s 1been ¥ery sma:ll .and their duration quite limited. However, the high media profile anid appeal of this wpproa.ch iha;s meant that ea.ch ip'Vomising experiment has heen highly publicized. The information gi¥en the public .a:bout these experiments ha;s heen chosen very oa11e£u.lly, and other research directions which show greater promise and ·effectiveness are still virtually unknown to anyone outside the research community.

Second, we hold that there are other procedUl"esand techniques that will offer at foast as much hope for long-term therapeutic relief foom Parkinson':s disease, dirubetes, and Alzheimer's disease, and possibly other conditions as well as do human fetal tissue transpla:nts. Because these a:ltemative p:votocols and techniques present few<er ethical proiblems than do human rfetal tissue transplants and are 1likely to 1be more ·effective with more control and flexibility, we urge federal funding £or their research rather than for human fetal tissue rbranspla:ntation. In recent years, progressive ·scientists and re1searehers ihave :regarded fotail tissue transplantation. as an unreliaible and unoonb.lollwble means o[treating certain clinical conditions, .and alternativ;e methods ha¥e iboon devefoped that ·should :be supported as a. more 81dvanced and effective method of dealing with these conditions. To support human fetal transplantation .a;nd ie:xperimentamon.at the present time ;would therefore 1be scien:tificaHy unsound, besides involving gra.ve medicail, ethical, and public policy problems.

Third, w:e wish to concur with the HHS moratorium on fedeiiaJ. funding of human fetal tissue transrplantation due to the etmcail problems involv;ed in it. There are serious issues· concerning infor1hud consent and the authority to offer tissue for

tmansplantation thrut we ,believe are violated hy human £ertal transplantahon, and ·forthis reaison we support the moratorium on fedeml funding of this research.

In this piece, we will make note of some of the technical de- which should .be promoted in place of human fetal tissue 1transplants. It is hoped that by doing this we will be ·ableto sho.w how unwise it would be to give prnblic ·support for further 1.'esearchin fetal tissue transplantation.

The Unproven Therapeutic Effectiveness of Feta.l Tissue Transplantation

For many deoades, 11esearchers have attempted to employ fet,al tissue transplants for va:rious conditions in mts, mice, and monkeys, and the11e haive been nota1Me successes in reversing the artificia1ly-induoed symptoms of Parkinson's .disease in tihem.[3] But fetal tissue transplantation for theriapeutic purposes in humans has 1been attempted for many decades, and it has consistently failed to show itself to he thel'apeutically effioacious.[4]

ssee Redmond, D. E., et al., *Lancet* (1986) p. 1125; Sladek, J. R., *Brain Research Bulletin,* 17, 809 (1986); Sladek, J. R., et al., in *Transplantation in the Mammalian CNS: Pre-OUnical and Clinical Studies,* D. *M.* Gash and J. R. Sladek, eds. (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1988). Also see Shoulson, I; ·Sladek, J., op. cit. infra, p. 1387. They wonder if one reason why there has .been such a rush to begin experimentation in humans is because of pressure from animal rights groups, for there is a reasonable animal model of Parkinsonism, but not enough research has been conducted on animals to proceed effectively to research on humans.

4 Sladek, J.; Shoulson, I. "Neural Transplantation: A Call for Patience Rather than Patients", *Science,* Vol. 240, 10 June, 1988, pp. 1386-1388. Also see McCullagh, P., *The Foetus as Tissue Donor: Scientific, Sooial and Ethical Perspectiv·es* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1987). For examples of failed attempts at fetal tissue transplantation, see: Willis, R. A. (1935), "Experiments on the Intracerebral Implantation of Embryo Tissues in Rats", *Proceedings of the Royal Society, B,* 117, 400-2. Willis summarized developments in the field of fetal research that year and he indicated that there was much research done at that time, for more than 20 references were found between 1880 and 1935. He reported that successful transplantation could be achieved, and he suggested that success was more dependent on the location of an " immunologically privileged site " than on any characteristic of

A report ,at the Ninth International Symposium on Parkinson'1s Disease in Jianruary 1988 indicated that two Swedish patients who reoeiV'ed implants oif human fetal ibrain tissue did not 1show notruble improv;ement.[5] Dr. Olle LmdvaH of the **Lund** Medical Cente r 1said that there was some temporary neurologica:l and neurorphys:in1ogicalimproV'ement in Parkinson'is patients who received human £etrul tissue t:ransp1ants that could have indicated a 3lo1w reeoV'ery was taking pla:ce, hut falter on the patients 1worsenedand ultimately they did not iimrp:rov;e .at a11.[6] And Dr. Anders Borkland, who participated in the experiment, declared the implants we11e oif no dinical significance.7 Dr. Lindvall, however, was not despairing and continued his :research, for he claimed thrut nrone of the patients

fetal tissue. W. A. Selle's " Studies on Pancreatic Grafts Made With New Techniques", *American Journal of Physiology* (Proceedings, American Physiology Society) (1935) 113, 118 spawned the notion of the therapeutic capacity of fetal tissue, an idea that persisted through the 1950s. In 1910 Shattuck reported on the transplantation of fetal rabbit bones as a possible therapeutic measure for cancer. Shattuck, S. C., Seligman, C. G., and Dudgeon, L. S., (1910) "Attempts to Produce Chondromatous or Osteomatous Growths by Grafting of Fetal Bones " *Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine (Pathology Section),* 3, 127-140. E. H. Nichol noted that there was interest in fetal tissue transplants in the 1880s when Leopold sought to implant fetal epithelium and cartilage. See Nichol, E. H. "Implantation of Tissue and Its Relation to Cancer" *Journal of Medical Research,* 13, 187-232. C. G. Leopold attempted implantation in 1880 "Experimentalle Untersuchungen iiber die Atiologie der Geschwulste" *Virchow Archives,* 85, 283 (1905), and F. Zahn tried a similar experiment in 1878, "Sort des tissus implants dans l'Organsime ", *Oong'l'es Periodique International de Geneve, Oomptes Rendus* (1878), p. 658.

Similarly, attempts to use fetal tissue to correct diabetes are not new with this generation of scientists, and many of the claims about the superiority of fetal pancreatic tissue can be doubted. When these tissues did manifest superior capacities, it was usually when they were implanted into immunologically privileged sites. See McCullagh, op. cit., pp. 45-63.

5 Lewin, R., "Disappointing Brain Graft Results", *Science,* Vol. 240, 10 June, 1988, p. 1407.

6" Fetal-Cell Transplants Show Few Benefits". *Science News,* Vol. 134, Nov. 19, 1988, p. 324. Since then Lindvall has claimed to have had some success with fetal tissue transplants, but he has not considered any of these experiments to be ultimately successful.

1 Ibid.

who reociv:ed implants were any worse off than they were berfore.[8]

Therie we11e neal'lly 100 aiutograft implants of adult adrenal medul1ary tissue for Pail'kinson's disease in tihe United States and *all* of them we11e unsucoessfol over the ilong-mn.[9] It is clear tha;t researchers havie not been able to translat e the successes rin animal tria:ls into 1therr:a.piesthat were dinicrully effective for Parkinson's disease in humans.[10] F;ollowing these failed adrena1l autograft attempts, 111esearchersattempted to graft embryonic dopamine nemo:ns in monkeys who suffered cfrorn artificially induced Parkinson's disease, and these monkeys experienced dramatic nearly eight months 1after engra;ftment.[11] But instead of continuing with forther anima1l trials, many a11e now pressing for <human trials, which has resulted in some tragic consequences. Dr. Ignacio Maidrazo attempted rudrenal mrtogmfts in pwtients suffering from Parkinson's disease, and they showed driamatic immedia;te improvement. However, a coupie of months mfter these grwfts, hoth patients died v:ery suddenly and without warning .[12]

There are a num;ber of p!rlofoundly difficult scientific proihlems confronting fota:l <transplants that justify further research on them in humans. Through animal 11esea11chit is h"lown that only aibout ten to twenty percent of transrplanted tissues s1mvive in the hrain, and this low survival rate cannot

s See" Latest Surgery for Parkinson's Is Disappointing", *New York 1'imes*, August 30, Hl88, C3, Col. 2.

s Shoulson, I. and Sladek, J., op. cit., p. 1387.

10 This has been frankly admitted by the AMA in its official paper.

> In the Mexican trial, the two patients receiving human fetal nerve cell transplants appeared to improve progressively following surgery; however, no reliable signs of symptom alleviation could be demonstrated. Similarly, the degree of long-term improvement in motor function in the American, Canadian, English, and Swedish transplant patients has not yet been ascertained.

"Medical Applications of Fetal Tissue Transplantation", p. 568.

11 Sladek and Shoulson, op. cit., p. 1386.

12 ABC Television, *20/20,* December, 1989. .Also see Shoulson and Sladek, op. cit., p. 1387.

justify expos:ing pa:tients to the risks involved in these pro-oedures:13 It now seems necessary to suppress totally the host immune system for the 1gra;fts to survive, and this is a risk too gl'eat for many to hear today.

When feta;l tissue is used to treat Pa.rkinson's disease, it is not even known if the tissue must 1be implanted in .both hemi-spheres orr only one or if the 5.mpJ,antsshould tar1get the n:igro-striata:l isystem.14A .further proiblem to he ov;emome concerns the growth of the implant ed fotal tissue. As immatme fetal cells H1ppear to he :best suited for transplanta1tion, they would p:vobaJblyg1101w significantly, and if they were graift1ed into the fluid-filled 1Sacs1 of the ventricular system, they could ex1pand to 1a ipoint where hyd:voicepha1usmight result. 15 It is also quite that !implants could giiow and influence neural systems beyond the implanted brain centers, causing changes in be-havior .16

The most common difficulty is tha:t they al'e efiedive for a short period of ,time (twelve months or '1ess) hut are unahle to provide relief for the patient over the long term, probably be-muse the tissue eventually dies. When it 1dies, the tissue iis enzymaticailly consumed, and the after-effect of this enzymatic priooess may ha;vie a harmful effect on .the patient. To prevent this disastrous consequence, techniques guaranteeing the long-term survival of these tissues must he <levefoped to cuub the ha:vmful consequences of tissue death on the recipient.

An equru1ly serious proih1em with fetal tissue transrp1ants is that even if the tissues could survive over the long term, it wou1d be difficult if not impossible to control their production of therapeutic and toxic surhs:bances. Because fetal tissues are :radicaMy complex, it is difficult to identify and collect a pure p;repa:ration of fetal cells producing only the desired therapeutic su:bstances, and contmlling the output of other substances can

1a Ibid.
14 Shoulson and Sladek, op. cit., p. 1387.
15 Shoulson and Sladek, op. cit., pp. 1387-1388.
1s Ibid., p. 1388.

he quite difficult.[11] Adrenal tissue, for example, produces other sU1bstancesrbesides dopamine, such 1as epinephrine and norepinephrine, and the presence of these other substances can complica;te attempts to determine the efficacy of other therapeutic wbsta'.ll!ces. If human !fetal tisS1Ue transpla:nts are to 1be sucoess-:llul, rpriO!l." to human trials, more precise means of oon.troUing the production of these nontiherapeutic substances must be found. (While this *is* ,a serious pro:b1em. for fetail. tl'lansplants, it is simply nort a rproh1em for the new :bioactive drug :releaise sysitems.)

M·any wdvncates of human fetail tissue tmn:splants call for support of transplants because the higher histocompatiibility of these tissues ;would bcilitate their successful implanbation.[18] However, .as we mentioned earlier, there have ibeen no reports o[long-term ,success or cures with **100** *autografts* (implants wheoo tis·S1Ue lS taken £Tom the patient and implanted in .another site), where histocomrpatibility w:as not ·a pro1blem. Can we expect :x;enografttransplants to S1Urvive and grow when re-lCelltreports have r:ather 1st11onglysuggested that even the more ,oompaJti!ble.autografts cannot S1Urvive:and grow over the long-run? These doobts are st1.1engthenedbooanse retal rat tiStSue ·tEansrplantedinto mature rats is rejected quite vigorously, and even it Ia.cks 131dequate .[19]

17 See:" Fetal-Cell Transplants Show Few Benefits", p. 324.

1s See: McCullagh, op. cit., pp. 48-52.

I.9 Garvey, J. F. W., Millard, P.R., and Morris, P. J., "Experimental Transplantation of Fetal Pancreas and Isolated Islets in the Rat: Studies of Donor Pretreatment and Recipient Im.munosuppression". They concluded that:

> •.. successful experimental transplantation of fetal pancreas in the rat is difficult to achieve. The fetal pancreas is no less antigenic than isolated adult islets, and indeed, is more difficult to enhance (that is to facilitate its acceptance ·after transplantation) than isolated adult islets.

Transplantation Proceedmgs, 12, Supplement 2, 186-9.

This view has been endorsed by Simeonovic, C. J., .Agostino, M., and Lafferty in " Control of Diabetes: Comparative Immunogenicity and Function of Fetal Pancreas and Isolated Islets", *Transplanta.ti-On Proceedmgs,* Vol. 16, (1984), pp. 106'1-1065,

Quite recently, human :fotal tissue was employed in an attempt to meet the cha11enge of the AIDS epidemic. Human £etal tissrue was implanted in an immunodeficient mouse and a working human immune syS'tem developed in the mouse. After the human immune syS'tem began to function, the mouse was injected with the human HIV-1 virus. The hope was that such mice ·wou1d serve as per£ect la1bomt0Ty models of human AIDS patients. However, ·in the Feibriuary 16, 1990 issue of *Science* ma;gazine, this early enthusiasm w.as disooveved to be without founda:tion:

Paolo Lusso, Robert Gallo, and their colleagues report that the AIDS virus can interact with a common mouse virus when the two come into contact in infected human cells. As a result, the AIDS virus ... acquires some new biological characteristics, including the ability to reproduce much more rapidly than it normally does and to infect new kinds of cells. *Similar findings are also being reported from other labs.* (emphasis added)

' The findings raise all kinds of questions about these: mouse-human models,' says virologist Howard Temin of the University of Wisconsin, Madison. So far the AIDS virus changes have been only seen in cultured cells. But if they occur in mice, the animals might produce viral variants that can spre:ad by novel routes, says Lasso, a member of Gallo's group at the National Cancer Institute. *One of these novel routes might be transmission through the air.*[20] (emphasis added)

Bieca;use it could ca;use the AIDS virus to ibeoome airiborne, it is not likely that there will he any foture significant attempts to use mioe with implanted humau fetal immune ,systems as mode1S'[or AIDS 11eseaJ.1ch. Further rreason for a:handoning the use of fetal tissue transplants for AIDS treatment is that mouse models are priocvingmore effecrtive:

Mike McCune, who was instrumental in mouse model development, and his colleagues at Systemix Inc., in Palo Alto, reported progress in this area, showing that the AIDS virus in infected mice

[20] " Concern Raised About Mouse Models for AIDS ", *Science,* February 16, 1990, p. 809.

responds to the antiviral drug AZT much as it does in human patie:nts .. The finding suggests that the animals can be used to assess AIDS drugs.[21]

Ira Shoulson and John Slwdek reported that ıll the 1940s procedures dev:doped to deal with Pa11kinson's disease were initia1ly suceessfol, and these we11e highly praised. These attempts in the 1940s ,generated much inte11est, but later transplants proved to be quite unsuccessful.[22] In these earlier ex- patients initially showed some temporary imrprovement, hut rufter a :longer period of time, :as is also the ease rboday with these transplants, the :patients' symprboms began to '.l1eburn, and they were often in wm."se oondition ,after the transplant than they were before.[23] By the end of the experiments, aJlmost ,all the patients who initiailly showed improvement were morre than they ,were ibefore the operations, and the procedure1s wie11e conside11ed by their discoverer, Dr. RusseH Meyers, to he a "rank failure ".[24] Dr. Meyers's judgment has 1been echoed for decades ,by 11esea1rcherswho have attempted fetal t:ranspfants, for !between 1950 and 1970 similar experiments in humans were attempted with virtually no success.

21 Ibid., p. 809.

22 These results were duplicated in some of the most recent attempts to implant fetal tissue. See "Latest Surgery for Parkinson's Is Disappointing", *New York Times*, August 30, 1988, C3, Col. I.

Dr. Joseph King's comments about these early transplant experiments showed the optimism of the era :

> It is to be hoped that none of my colleagues will attempt this operation- I am sure that I shall not .... It is a splendid operation, and I think that we should wait, watch, and learn until they are satisfied with their own results; otherwise, the operation may fall into disrepute as a result of being improperly done or carried out for the wrong condition.

Nearly a half-century has passed since this statement, and the claims of advocates of fetal tissue transplants are virtually the same. But after a half-century of failure, it is our belief that the public should not be called on to support them.

2a Ibid.

24 Shoulson and Sladek, ibid. Dr. Russell Meyers removed part or all of the caudate nucleus from three patients and their debilitating tremors ceased, but shortly thereafter the symptoms returned. In later years he attempted

Shoulsion and Sladek a11gued that it is time for " more patience .and £ewer patients" in treating Plaxkinson's disease.[25] W'e believe, hOJwever,that even this judgment is too optimistic anJd that there is so little prospect of human fetal tissue transplants being S1uooessful that they do not deserve public support. We believe that the11e a11e such serious scientific problems with fetrul tissue transplants that a ihan on further federal funding of them is warranted. Newer prooedures .and protocols 'are less ethically prob1emartic than are human fetal tissue tl'ansplants, and they will pTloihably prove to he at least as therapeutically effectiVie. It is our opinion that fetal tissue tr:ansplantatioo in humans is proving to be rubout as suocessful as the artificial iheairt, and frn:· tha:t reason it should not be supported.

The AMA Sta.tement on Fetal Tissue Transplantation

The use of human fetwl tissue forr tl'ansplants for medical applications received enthusiastic SiUpport from the American Medical Association'·s Council for Scientific and Judicial Affairs md Council on Ethics. The AMA's official statement "The Use oif Fertal '}issue for Medical Applica;tions" s1aid that this tissue is being used to rtreat five types o[conditions: 1) immunodeficiency condimons; Yl) hematological disorders; 3) diabetes; 4) 'Parkinson's disease; and 5) Alzheimer's disease;[26] Desrpite the claims rubout hopeful results, human fetal tissue transplants hruv;e shown success only in the t11ea1tment of immune deficiencies. In what follows, we will point out the dismaJ l'le0011d o[humatn rretiaJli rl:ma.a:usp1anibs1ais 1rucknio1w1edgiedci!bhe[' iiimplicitly or ,explicitly ihy the AMA.

1. *Irnmunodefi<Jiencydisorders.* The Council 11eporled that in a Il!umber of animal studies human fertal liver tissues were

similar operations on eight other patients which ended in failure. See Meyers, R., *Archives of Internai Medioime* (1940), Vol. 43, p. 455.

25 Sladek, J.; Shoulson, I., op. cit., pp. 1386-1388.

26 "Medical Applications of Fetal Tissue Transplantation", pp. 565-569.

successfw1lyengraited in:to a:dult humans where the'l'e was immuno,1ogicalfailme. The AMA noted the successful implantation of a human immune system in a mouse, but it did not note that this implanted system radica11y altered tihe HIV-1 vims making it even more dangerous than it now is. It can hardly he claimed now that the11e aJ.'e no serious complications invulv;edin using human fetal tissue to treat immunodeficiencies.

Q. *Hematological diso1·ders.* Ev;en though there have been a hundred attempts to engraft f.etrul tissue to treat aplastic anemia and 89 1a:tbempts to use human fetal implants for leumemia, not a single one of these engraJtments has been successful.27 The Council cited as the cause of failure the inability of these implants to escape the survieillance of the intruct and functioning immuno1ogica1system of these patierrts.[28] For these transplants to survive, the Council noted that the patients' immune systems had to 1be radica.Hy suppI'essed.[29] Howeverr, one must question the therapeutic wisdom of radically suppressing the immune system of these patients, for doing this would open the patients to a wide range of opportunistic, life-threatening infections in order to tl'eat a condition which is not ordinarily immediately life-'thl'eatening. One can ,reasonably ask why these patients should he put into a life-threatening condition in order to a:l1eviateone tha;t is only debilitating.

3. *Diabetes.* The Council de1clared that fetal tissue transplants had demonstrated the potential to *cure* diahetes.[30] Ha,ving said that, the Council then declared that fetal pancreatic

27 "Medical Applications of Fetal Tissue Transplantation", p. 566.

28 Ibid. "Therefore, the true efficacy of fetal liver transplantation for aplastic anemia cannot be evaluated until transplantations have been attempted following immunosuppressive therapy." p. 565.

29 Ibid., p. 567.

ao Ibid. "The potential to cure experimentally induced diabetes milletus in animals through the syngenetic transplantation of fetal pancreatic tissue has been documented." p. 567. Note that the fetal transplants considered had proven their potential to provide alleviation of the symptoms of diabetes but not to cure it. Claiming that a protocol can alleviate a condition is much weaker than claiming that it can cure it.

tissue tiiansptants were as unsuccess£ul as were hemrutological transplants. [31] Jn a hundred transplants, the11e were no successfol engraftments l'esulting in long-term freedom from insulin therapy. [32] However, one patient was ,a;b1e to find £reedom from insulin therapy for thirteen weeks.[33] One must ask if the expense, risk and pain of a tissue transplant is worth thirteen of f11eedom f11om insulin therapy. And one wonders if one patient 1n 1a hundred who finds some a1Leviation of symptoms can ihe considered as demonstrating potential for a cure of di:tbetes. It 1would rather seem to he the case that no cul'e has ibeen demonstrated 1anid that the alleviaition of symptoms the one person experienced was something of a chance happenstance rather than a medical breakthrough.

4. *Pa,rkinson's disease.* The Council stated that a number of posritiv:edevelopments haVie 1been reported in the treatment of Parkinson's di!seruse ltlhll4oug1h lthe use of thuman fotrul tDansplants.34 In February 1990 Lindvall claimed tihrut a transplant hrud apparently aided one patient, ibut that hal'dly pil'oves that

31 Ibid. "However, the application of fetal cell transplantations to diabetes is complicated by inadequate engraftment success in imnmuno-suppressed recipients as well as insufficient quantities of viable fetal tissue and storage arrangements for such tissue." p. 566.

32 Ibid. See Tuch, B. E., Osgerby, K. J., and Turtle, J. R., "Normalization of Blood Glucose Levels in Nondiabetic Nude Mice by Human Fetal Pancreas After Induction of Diabetes ", *Transplantation* (1988) Vol. 46, pp. 608-611.

33 "Medical Applications of Fetal Tissue Transplantation ", p. 567.

34 To bolster their claim, they cited a report by Olle Lindvall where he claimed that a patient had experienced relief of Parkinson's symptoms for a period of five months after the implantation of fetal nerve tissue into the brain of a patient. See " Fetal Nerve Grafts Show Promise in Parkinson's", *Science,* Vol. 247, February 2, 1990, p. 529; and Lindvall et al.," Grafts of Fetal Dopamine Neurons Survive and Improve Motor Functions in Parkinson's Disease", op. cit., pp. 574-577. It is astounding that *Science* magazine would publish the results of one successful experiment and declare those results to " show promise" when so many other similar experiments had ended in failure. Lindvall claimed that the results of this one experiment proved that the new techniques were clinically effective. One wonders how he can claim this when, for all we know, he did not attempt this procedure on any other recipients to see if the effects could be reproduced!

the procedure is therapeuticaJJ.y 1successfu[.[35] It is quite peculiar that these ieleven r:esearohers only reported the results of re-sear:ch on one patient. Ordinarily scientists conduct experiments on a number of suJbjects and not just on one individual, and one wonders what :may have haippened with the other irecirpientso[ihuman fetal tisisrue

Trransplainrbedtissues haive heen found to reverse some of the conditions <associatedwith Parkinson's disease for ·a five month period, hut it iis not oertam that the tmnsplanrts can srurvive over the Jong-run. We must recall that Dr. Meyers initirully hailed his transplants as successful, but over the long term his patients were acturully wio11se off than they were hefore the tmnsplants. And we should also il'ecrull that Dr. Madmzo's patients .showed much immedfate impmvement hefore they died o[mysterious ciroumstances. Reilief o[.symptoms for five months is no certain sign of .s1uocess.

The Council.13J1so ·admitted that the distant future will :bring the possilhility of .genetiorullyengineering neural cells, and thrut fetal nerurrul.grafts shou1d he regarded .as interim meiarsuresuntil those .aJ1e perfectred.[36] But i[genetic ·enigineermg can provide reliable, Jong term, and effective therapy for Parkinson's patients, why did not the AMiA call for giving it higher priority than fetrul tissue rtmansrplants? Beoaiuse of tills one can <m.ly speculate on the motiV1ation of the AMA, fo1l' it seems to overlook the most effectiVie and certain therapy paths for patients. Why should interim measures be srupported to the detriment of more effective therarpfos? Why :struggle with p.mblems of antigenicity ·and immunological ·surveillance when obher more e:ffiectiveoprtion:s we quite p:ractioaible?

5. Alzheimer's disea8e. The AMA Council made no claams whatsoever that there have :been any swccesses in the use of

35 See "Fetal Implant Is Said to Be Aiding A Parkinson Patient", *The New York Times,* February 2, 1990, Al, Col. I, and .A.12, Cols. 2-3.

36 ,j Medical Applications of Fetal Tissue Transplantation," p. 568.

fetal tissue for the treatment of Alzheimer's disease. After claiming that tr:ansrplants oould "cure" diaJbetes, even though there were no sucoess]ul engraftments of fetal pancreatic tissue, the silence about the efficacy of transplants for Alzheimer's is deafening. Fetal neura1 grafts are prurportedly less antigenic tham a1re other cells and they do not elicit the inimune !response thiait rpancrerubic1aJl1Jd Jiivieir cei11s: do. They pre-.sumably sitimU11atethe igrorwth of brain cells 1and have a high degree of plasticity which pmportedly rpermiitsthem to restore neural transmission in 1a V<ariety o[,situations. But in spite of these poiwers, we do not know how long these grrufts can survivie in the human hmin. Most neural implants frn' Alzheime!l'"s patients hav;e a, positiV<eeffect for only a short period of time, for 20 weeks or less, after which the symptoms return.

Despite the AMA'1s view that human fetal tissrue t11ansplamts shorw promise of \Slllcoess, the v:ast majority of iattempts have ·been disma;l failuves, ibut even the " successes" can 1be called into question. The reason for this has heen ibesrt stated by Shoillson 1md Blrudek rthellir commenlts 1rub00Jt]aJilruires to llm.-iplant tissues sucoessfu1ly to t11eat Parkinson's Disease (PD):

> Our points are that considerable time is needed for clinical evaluation and that early judgments can be fl.awed. A combination of effects that have little to do with dopamine release by adrenal cell grafts may have accounted for the initial striking 'success' reported by investigators from Mexico City. First, some improvement in PD signs and symptoms might be by even a small amount of injury or stimulation to the caudate, perhaps by means of the cavitation procedure for adrenal attachment. Second, the use and adjustment of medications for PD before and after surgery may greatly influence the clinical outcome and confound interpretation of experimental interventions. Third, surgical intervention or insertion of adrenal medullary tissue might stimulate regeneration in the remaining host dopamine systems, as has been reported in rats and monkeys; and fourth, robust placebo e.ffects continue to astonish investigators who carry out controlled clinical trials. The spectacular nature of this procedure and the heavy emotional investment by patient, family, and clinician could predispose to a major placebo effect. All of these factors combined might produce

some level of improvement, particularly in younger patients. That the dramatic results reported initially have not been replicated in the United States would support this suspicion.[37]

Thiiis. pass1ruge m!ak!es mt cleiair rlili:rut rbhere e1run. lbe moo.y possible ieauses of imprioV'ementin patients who receive fetal tissue transplants. One should not count one's chickens before they hatch. The enthusirusm of the AMA *£oT* human fetal tissue tria::nisp1antsis mcomprehensilble; it cannot ibe justified on scientific or mediool 1grounds.alone, the attempts haw shown little iherrupeutic promise. Irt is wlso incomp:vehensible that the AMA. does not ca11 for more support for the hiotechnical, pharmaceutical, a:nd genetic engineering .alte:matives which we will discuss next.

Recent Sdenufio Developments Relative to Feval Tissue Transplantation

There is good reason rbo believe that breakthroughs in the treatment of Alzheimer's disease, diabetes, and P.arkinsonism through means other than human fetal tissue transplants. will occur in oorning years. It is difficult to predict what these devielopments wiJ1 he ibecwusemuch research *is* done privately hy pharma.ceutical and biot:echnica.l companies who in the process of commeroiwl development guard their research V'ery closely. But .f:vom whart has 1been il"elea.sed to the pU!blic thus far, it does appear that significant breakthroughs will occur. In what follows, we will briefly describe some recently developed alternatives to human £etal tissue transplantation.

Fil:isrto[all, there hav:e heen neiw therapeutic substances developed recently wmch hold out clear promise of treating the symptomts of drusease, .Alzheimer's dliisease, and diabetes more oonv:eniently, safely, 1and precisely than was ever tihe 1caise hefore, :a:nd itlheiilruise d'()les not poise tihie serious ebhiaail prOiblems involving consent that :fetal tissue transplants pose. A Temarkalble discovery was made by J. WiJ.liam Langston and

s1,Shoulson, I., and Sladek, J. art. cit., p. 1887.

James Tetrud of the California Parkinson's Foundation. The most common of treatmelllt for Parkinson's disease has 1been L-Dopa, a modifiledamino acid, supplied in an ovail bolus tablet. However, this therapy has pvovided only relief.

But it has been known for many years that Parkinson's patients who received L-Dopa md the MAO inmbitor Deprenyl .survived longer than did those who received only L-Dopa.[38] Tetrud and Langston discovered that providing pa1tients with Dep11enyl alone stopped the degeneration of ibmin tissue associated with Parkinsonism.[89] This discovery was made in an experiment involving four men who had developed Parkinson's-like symptoms after using a heroin" found to be laced with MPTP, a neurotoxin known to cause Parkinsonism symptoms. In later studies with 54 patients suffering from Parkinson's disease 27 weve given Deprenyl rulone and 27 were given placebos, and the effectiveness of Deprenyl was confirmed. Tetrud and Langston concluded that Deprenyl was remarkably safe for humans, that it delayed the need for L-Dopa treatments significantly, and that it slowed the rate of progvession of Parkinson's disease.[40] Because of the discovery of the therapeutic action of this drug, it is possible to provide long-term therapy to Parkinson's patients. It may also be possible to prev;ent the deterioration of neurons that came the disease, for the appropriate provision of Deprenyl to potenrtial Parkinson's patients (prior to the onset of the disease and its symptoms) might prevent its commencement.[41]

Another promising discovery w.as made hy E11anz Hefti of

38 Birkmayer, W., et al. "Modern Problems in Pharmacopsychiatry ", Vol. 19 (1983), p. 170.

39" The Effect of Deprenyl (Selegiline) on the Natural History of Parkinson's DiseaBe", *Science*, August 4, 1989, Vol. 249, pp. 519-522.

4-0 Ibid., p. 521. Tetrud and Langston admitted that the initial study was limited in scope and that further studies were underway to verify their results. And other research is now investigating the possibility that Deprenyl and vitamin E might be effective in slowing the progress of P.arkinBOn's disease as well. Ibid., p. 522.

41 Ibid., p. 519.

the Univensity of Mliami and his associates who reported that deliV'ering neuml growth facto11s (NGFs) to the cholinergic nerve tract in the brain eonnecting the basal forebrain and the hiprpocamrpus prevented degeneration of the neurons of this al'ea.[42] This is an important :breafothrough because many be:. lieve that Alzheimer's Tesrults from the 'deter:ior:ation of the neural tissue in this area. The Na:tionaJ Institute r£or Aging appl'loV'ed administration of various neural growth factOJ$ for human trials in August 1989. Much vesearch is now focusing on enoapsu1ating NGFs 1for delivery or chemically attaching th1em to compounds oapab1e of crossing 'the hlood brain harrier lo deliver them to tihe brain in a precise and controlled manner.

Other p11omising deV'elopments have been revealed which could revo1uHonize the way in which we treat var1ous diseases. examp1e, new generat1ons of insulin and other substances 1ar:e rbeing developed which are not just compa<tiible with recipient tiissue:s ibut ev;en identical to their naturally produced counterparts, 1because they are genetically derived from them. Ailso, W. French Anderson disco,vered tha1t wrapping tisisues or organs in fine strands of Gore-Tex saturated ıwith collagen and he:parin-:hinding growth factor-I could cause cells to gr:ow along the strands.[43] These " organoids" were emip1oyed in rats to de:V'elop blood vessels in the li\1;er, causing them to produce proteins. The11e: is also the possibility that these organoids could 1be used to mgenerrute not only frver and pancreas tissue rhut neural tissue a,s ıwehl.[44] Thesie devices might he useful in lthe ltre1aitmen!tof diabe:te1s,1leuk!emi!a,1and v1a1s1ouLardiisea;ses.

[42] "NGF and Alzheimer's: Hopes and Fears", *Science,* Vol. 247, January 26, 1990, pp. 408-410. The *Chicago Tribune* reported that 16 experimental drugs designed to alleviate Alzheimer's symptoms partially or totally could reach the market by the mid-l990s. "Alzheimer's Studies Break New Ground", *Chicago Tribune,* February 11, 1990, p. A3, Cols. 5-6. (The article did not say what these new drugs are.)

[43] "Gore-Tex Organoids and Genetic Drugs", *Science,* November 10, 1989, pp. 747-750.

[44] Anderson noted that the growth not only of blood vessels along the fibers but of other cells as well, which he believes might be neural cells. Ibid., p. 748.

To tl1oot these conditions .adequrutely we need drug deliviery systems caprub1eof responding fleribly and relia;bly to the ever-changing demands of the piatient. New merbhods of delivering drugs to locations where their action would 1be of the greatest benefit to the patient need to be developed. A new generation of e:xdpients (sruhstanoes which carry themrpeutic materials to rtheir destinations) has been developed which are ihiodegradaible and can a'Void .the problems of !and degeneration that fetal tissue transplants haVie. These newly developed drug deHvery ,systems mimic the natu.r:al de1iwry sysrbems £ar moire closely than do human fetal tissue wansplants, !and they deliver the thempeutic materials more aippropriately and with greater contml anid flexi:hility than do £et:aJ. tissue griru£t:s. Thrus, some 11esea:l'lchscientists are now developing vmious suibstanoes that ·could be directly rtaTgeted,at specific areas of the brain and that have special affinities to certain tissues within the hraiin.[45]

For decades, resea;rohers have sought suhsrtances that could penetriate the blood-ibrain barrier. Recently developed mell!sures for ,selectively penetrating the ib1ood-hrain !hamer are ·both elegant and sophisticated.[46] Reseal'chers in Alabama developed a suhsrbam.oe:which w10ulid aillow dopamine to ;be conveyed with great and ooutroJ 'to the specific parits of the .brain where it would he of most. value.[47] It is not evident t.hait fetal

[45] Freudenheim, M., "Getting Vital Drugs into the Brain", *The New York Times,* August 31, 1984, p. 1; and Mason, D. W., et al., op. cit.

[46] "Breakthrough in the Brain", *Fortune,* March 28, 1988, pp. 116-24.

[47] Mason, D. W., MacRae-Degueurce, A., Dillon, D. L., Gilley, R. M., and Tice, T. R., "Biodegradable Poly (DL-Lactide-00-Glycocide) Microcapsules for the Controlled Release of Catecholamines to the CNS" *Proceedings of the International Symposium of Controlled Reiease of Bioaative Materials,* Vol. 15, 1988, pp. 270-1. These researchers reported that they were able to encapsulate dopamine in polymer capsules and they claimed that:

> ... the present data indicate that injectable biodegradable microcapsules ,appear to show promise in delivering drugs or other substances to specific areas of the brain.

They claimed that they have evidence suggesting that the "administration of microencapsulated dopamine (DA) directly into the brain provides a fea-

tissue transplants can do tJhis, prurtfoularly with Parkinson's patients. The ,severity of the symptoms of these patients varies :horn day rto day, .and ·an effective treatment mrmst be able to respond fte:ribly to the fluctuating demands of the patient's condition. Some of the more ,adv;anoodand elegant work done so far has been 1by Nicholas 8. Bodor, vicie president ·forresearch wt *Pharmateo* and a 11esearich professor at the Univiersity of Florida.

Taking advantage of the capillary walls' affinity for fatty molecules, Bodor's technique links a common fat-soluble carrier molecule with a drug molecule that it ferries across the blood-brain barrier. Once in the brain, two enzymes naturally present there act on the combined molecule. One changes the electrostatic charge, making it impossible for the molecule to exit through the barrier back into the blood. The molecule is thus trapped in the brain. Then the second enzyme goes to work, cleaving the drug slowly from the carrier and setting off a sustained release of the drug in the brain that can last as long as 30 days. This process also makes the drug molecule water-soluble, so it can't escape quickly through the barrier back into the bloodstream. The carrier, however, is expelled through the barrier back into the capillaries and Eitiminated from the body .[48]

There ail'e similar promising deivie1orpmentsin drug delivery for dirubetics. For example, there are many insulin-releasing mechanisms which will make tJhe delivery of insulin to diia;betics more precise, com/Cenient,and controllable. Jorge Heller et al. have developed a device containing a biocompatible ,1Jive bioerodib1epolymer along with a glucose oxidase. As blood glucose leve1s rise, the glucose di:ffosesinto the polymer and is comnerted into gluconic acid, lowering the pH level and triggering release of insulin f11om the polymer in propO!rtion to the ooncentrrution of gluoonic acid. Upon release, the insulin carries out its normal action of decreasing hlood g1ucose levels,

sible method for prolonged release of the transmitter into the striatal tissue to substitute for experimentally induced subnormal levels of endogenous DA." Ibid.

48 Ibid.

which iin turn reduces the relea;se of iTI1Su!lin. This tyipe of device thus as do hruman pancreatic beta. cells in the release of human insulin.[49]

New tyipes o[:implant.rublecapsules containing inSJUlin now rbeing devreloped will make it possible to deliver insulin to diaibetics in ra .controlled, precise, a.nd con'V!ement manner.[50] These devices react in ra simi!lar manner to .blood gluioose concentr:a;tions, and when these fovels rise, th!e capsules release the in:su1in.[51] It !is also quite possible that within a fow yiears diaibeticsrwitl he aJble rto wear skin patches (similairto hand-aids) containing insulin which will provide for the controlled and iev;en release of insulin, as is now heing done with ni.tmglyoorin patches for coronary patients.[52]

49 Heller, J., et al. "Release of Insulin from a pH-Sensitive poly(ortho ester}." *Prooeedmgs of the International Symposium of Oontrolled Release Bioaotive Materials'.* Vol. 16 (1989}, pp. 155-156.

5-0 Ishihara, K.; " Glucose-Responsive Polymers for Controlled Insulin Release", *Prooeedmgs of the International Symposium of Oontrolled Release of Bioaotive Materials,* Vol. 15, (1988}, pp. 168-169; Brown, L., Ghadsian, F., and Langer, R., "A Glucose Mediated Insulin Delivery System"; Ibid., pp. 166-7; Heller, J., Penhale, D., and Fritzinger, B., "A Bioerodible Self-Regulated Insulin Delivery Device", ibid., pp. 37-8; Seminoff, L., Olson, G., Zheng, D., Kim, ,S, W., and Kim, W., " Self-Regulated Insulin in Release", ibid., pp. 160-161; Siddiqui, 0., Shi, W., and Chien, Y., "Transdermal Iontophoretic Delivery of Insulin for Blood Glucose Control in Diabetic Rabbits", *Proceedings of the International Symposium of Oontrolled Release of Bio·active Materials,* Vol. 14, (1987), pp. 174-175; Kost, J., and Langer, R., "Externally Modulated Insulin Delivery Systems", *Proceedmgs of the International Symposium of Oontrolled Release of Bioaotive Materials,* Vol. 15, (1988}, pp. 162-3.

51. Iwata, H., Amemiya, H., Hatsuda, T., Takano, H., .A.kutsu, T., "Development of Novel Semipermeable Membranes for Self-Regulated Insulin Delivery Systems", *Proceedings of the International Symposium of Oontrolled Release of Bioaotive Materials,* Vol. 15, (1988}, pp. 170-1. This is exactly how insulin is released naturally into the system by the pancreas.

52 Huang, Y., Lee, C., Chien, Y. W., " Enhanced Permeation of Nitroglycerin from a Skin Permeation Enhanced-Releasing Transdermal Drug Delivery System", *Prooeedmgs of the International Symposium of Oontrolled Release of Bioaotive Materials,* Vol. 14 (1987}, pp. 176-177. The advantage of this delivery system ill that it would bring a steady delivery of insulin to the recipient.

Researchers are also experimenting with "osmotic pumps," which permit fluids <to ,enter but not exit the pump.[53] Within the center of the carpsule is a small chamber conbaining the drug which released evenly in response ,to osmotic pressm.·e. The "osmotic pumps" have been sucoessfully implarrbed subcutaneously without tissue damage £or long periods of time and can be ea,sily refilled with drugs. These devices 1wouM permit the regular, precise, iand even deliV'ery of drugs to control blood prvessure, for example, or evien dopaimine or Deprenyl.

Because of the developments in pharmacology, biotechnology, and bioengineering we now know of, and .also rbecause of breakthroughs which will probably be revearled in the near futme, we believe that these alternatives should he promoted rather than human fetal tissue transplants. We siay this prima:rily 1beca1usethese developments hold out a more cerfain promise of bringing converrient and long-term therapeutic benefits to the viJCtims of ,these diseases than do human fetal tissue transplants. But we also assert this heciause we ,believe that there are iser}ous ethical problems inv;olved in giving priority of support to human fet1al tissue transplantation rather than to rthese new biotechn:iJcal,pharmacologica1, and bioengineering solutions. In what 1fol1ows,the moral oase a1gainst public support for human fetal tis:sue transplants will he set forth.

53 Siegel, R., and Firestone, B., "Progress Toward an Implantable, Self-Regulating, Mechanochemical Insulin Pump", ibid., pp. 164-165. Also, injectable microcapsules have been developed which can be injected virtually anywhere in the body with an 8 or 12-gauge needle, for example. These devices are bioerodible ancl in some instances only have to be replaced every six months. Also, Jl1fedtronics Corporation of Minneapolis has developed a surgically implantable capsule which can give absolutely precise administration of therapeutic substances. One side of this device contains a silicon sheath. The capsule can be regularly refilled with insulin or blood-pressure medication through that sheath. And because the needle would not ha:ve to penetrate muscle tissue, this procedure would be much less painful than ordinary injections.

The Ethi.-08 of Human Fe.fJal Tissue Transplantation

Pllihlic support for ihuman fetal tissue transplant researeh for medical applica;tions sh.ould not !he for a number of reasons.

I. The ti..ssuestiruroenfvom aborted fetuses are not" donated" tissues, :as the feitus is not competent 1anrd never rw:rus competent to give free and informed consent to suoh a donation; they a:re rather harves1ted tissues. Consent for this !harvesting is given not by rthe fetus but by proxies. It is not clear that proxies have the moral right .to consent to this nontherapeutic donation pmoedure, especially m the wa:k!e of the decision to have an elective abortion. The decision for the elective abortion is unethical in itself and a violation of the mo::ra1l right of the fetus to development. The abortion decision vitiates any other right regia.OOingthe £uture disposition of the fetus that would 11equire p:voxyconsent hased on the 1hestinterests of the :fetus. Furthermore, redeption and use of these .remains would necessarily be :regarded ills .complicity in .the elective aibortion by the resea11chers. The souree of the ifetal [lemaiinscannot be overlooked :by those who w:isb. to perform researich based on it. The use of these already violruted human lives would niooessacilytaint the mor:a;l worrbh of srubsequen:til"esearch:findings. lit is ailso use.ful rto note that tissue tran'Siplants, like other transrplants, require carefol selection; not aH are suitaible for usie. .A!bortions performed with RU 486 would nort meet tihis istandard, because rl:he fetus would he fong-deaJd before expulsion; neither would abortiontS performed iby cm.1ettage. Only rubortions performed hy manual suction would hegin to meet the sitandard £or consi!derationfor tra;nsplantation.

It is not evident that proxies may etb.ioailly consent rto hwrvesting the tissues of .deceased human :beings who were never competent to 1give oonsent.[54] The aborted fetus is in a

[54] Sir Harvey Druitt, KCB, author of the British Medical Research Council's report *Responsibility in Investigations on Human Subjects* said that:

> the parent has no legal authority to consent to medical procedures being

.specialclass, fur it was once a living human being, hut it was unoertainJ.y personal and .was not iacoorded the full rights of human hemgs, making its legal and ethical statu:s unclear. Our concern is that permitting the harv;esting of a.borted fetus organs hy proxy conserutwooild facilitamehaJrVestingorgans from S1Uch as Dr. Willard "neomorls" or the congemtaJ,lyinoompeibenrt.[55] Whether one may legally and morally oon:senrt to the nontherapeutic remov.a;l of organs and tissrues from those rwi'th. congenital mentail handicaps is unclear, 'and one ca.in douibt that 1such an action should be permitted with an a:borted fetus..

Advocates of human retal :bissruewansp1ants seem to presume thrut parentrul 00t1sent is siufficient to justify the procedure ethically. But this minimalist 1comlitionplaces the inoompetent in griave danger, ais the hepatitis :riesearchait .the Willowibrook school in the 1960s showed. In that research, 750-800 children of the 10,000 children 1a.dmitteda]ter 1956 :werie infected with heprutitis in a norrthempeutic e:xiperimentand *only tJhose children whose parents or proxies consented to tJhe eaYperiments were infected.*[56] This .tragic case shows that merely providing parental IClonrsentfor iprocedures does not entaful the morwl permissibility of :ructions:. We are trouhled that the only criteria :being p!1oposed for permitting fetal tisisue rtransplant:s is that they hold out some v:ague and uncertain hope of benefit and that consent he obtained from proxies. There are complex and difficult issrues orf oonrsent, risk, ·and benefit, proportionality, and other ,issues involved in these procedures which make determining their ethical pr01blemrutic.

carried out on his child for the advancement of scientific knowledge or for the benefit of humanity if those procedures 'are of no particular benefit to' the child and 'may carry some risk of harm.'

Curran, W. J., and Beecher, H. K., "Ecx:perimentation in Children", *JAMA*, Vol. 210, (1969), pp. 77-81.

55 Gaylin, Willard, "Harvesting the Dead", *Harpers Magazine*, September, 1974, pp. 23-30.

56 Faden, R.; Beauchamp, T., *A History and Theory of Informed Consent* (New York: Oxford, 1985), p. 163.

Q. Human fetal tissue transplants rresearch is presently unethical because the fonited expected :benefits do not justify the gravie dangers they present to recipients. LindvaH et al. noted that the most suecessful recipient of human fietaJ tissue had his immune system suppressed two days prior to the surge1ry, ibut they did not say if t1he patient's immune function was reactiva:ted after the tissue1s were implanted.[57] It prohably was not, as they noted that their gmfts could ultimately fail because of ,immunological r:vej,ection. It appears that the resea11chersdid not 'reactivate his immune system from the time the procedure was initiated until their :report wa:s filed precisely to p11event the tissues from 1being rejected.[58] This means that for more than eight months, the recipient was made prey to a wide varrety of and potentially letha;J infections simply so that the engraftments could surviV'e. If it is true tha,t the immune systems of pa;tie:rrtswou1d hav;e to be entirely suppressed for fetal tissue transpl ants to survive, we would object vigorous,Iy that this risk is not proportionate to the 1benefitsreroeived. We do not believie it is ethical to threaten a life to s:ave an engra£tment. It is quite that if fetal transplants were practiced on a wide scale, then many of them would be done in hosp]fals whe11e there would rbe many patients suffering from infectious diseases sudh as hepatitis or even AIDS. We ihelieve exposing patiierrts to these risks solely to 01btain sucoess£ul transplants is unconscionruble.

Another pvoib1em with these :bmnspJants is that implanting the tetal tissue in the hrain can he qu'.iite risky. 1-io implant fotal tissue in bhe suhsbantia nigra, ,a canula must be inserted deep within bhe hrain to implant the tissrue in the aibsolutely iprecis1e location, and successfully accomplishing this is both dangerous and difficult. This is not the sort of operation that would 1be recommended for a patient more than once-no more than 1a second heart tramsplant is recommended. Hnwever, re-

57 " Lindvall, 0., et al., art. cit., p. 574.
58 Ibid., p. 577.

peated surgeries might become necessary due to the uncertain and problematic nature of this procedure.

At 1besrt, ithe e:fficaciorwsnes1sof :human ferl:irul tissue t:rians-pilants will ,be qruite ,Jimited in the long-run. FebaJ tissue trans-plants could alleviate the symptoms of disease at 1a giv;en.rpoint in. ·the disease':s progress, ibrut there is no guarantee that the could .aidapt to changes in the diseruse and continue to pmvide relief. In oonwast, a therrupy of controlled delivery of dopamine could respond to a wide variety of ohanges in the disease or the host. Fetal t1"ansp1ants fail to meet tihis criterion of pliasticity. Fetal tis,sue transplants would also be quite expensive in :all probrubiJity, £0.r the piJ:'looedureis quite risky and time-consuming, and transplanrts with long-term suooess would most plloiba:blycost severail thousand dollars apiece.

3. F1etal tissue wansplants havie the greatest chance of success if the tissue is perfused, which is most easily insured if the fetus is alive 1at ithe time the tissrues are extmcted.[59] The fetuses from which mruch of tihe tissue *oT* o'llgans would be tak1en might indeed he a1iV1e when the tissue is removed, rus determining fetal lbrain death can often 1be quite difficult. But when one extracts tissue f:vom a living fubus, one is dealing not with a cadaver but with a living, rights-bearing individual, and the entire ,etihioa1 picture surrounding the removial of its tissues changes. We would object to procuring fe!tal tissue if the fetus 'WIOuld proba:bly 'still :be ,rufiv<e, hecause the tissue extra.ction :would be ,a lethal .act. Rem01Va:lof tissue for transplantation is a nontherapeutic p:vocedure on the fetus, and we judge it mo:vallyobj,eotionruble.[60]

[59] .Salamone, D., " The Problem of 'Neomorts ': Ethicists Confront the Medical Use of Brain-dead Patients", *WP Health*, Nov. 11, 1986, p. 17.

[60] The use of fetal tissue is governed by HHS regulations prohibiting non-therapeutic procedures on aborted fetuses which increase the pain and suf-:liering of the fetus. Regulation 45 CFR 46.208 (10-1-89 edition) holds that:

> No fetus *in utero* may be involved as a subject in any activity covered by this subpart unless: (1) The purpose of the activity is to meet the health needs of the particular fetus and the fetus will be placed at risk

4. A further problem with human fetal tissue tmnsplantation Tesie1acrch is that the mo11e 1srupp01•t we giV1e to it, the 1ess we can give to other more promising ibiotechnicaJ, pharma-

only to the minimum extent necessary to meet such needs, or (2) the risk to the fetus imposed by the research is minimal and the purpose of the activity is the development of important biomedical knowledge which cannot be obtained by other means.

We would assert that the important biomedical aim of providing relief to Alzheimer's patients, diabetics, Parkinson's patients can be better met by the biotechnical and pharmaceutical alternatives described earlier which would obviate the need to use fetal tissue. Employing fetal tissues is not the only means available of bringing relief to these patients, and thus inflicting the grave harm of tissue sampling on possibly or probably living fetuses cannot be justified by this regulation.

,Sampling tissues from possibly or probably living fetuses which are the subjects of research is in violation of the Federal law which is the basis of the HHS regulation 42 U.S.C. 289g which holds that:

(a) The Secretary may not conduct or support any research or experimentation, in the United States or in any other country, on a nonvia,ble living human fetus *ex utero* or a living human fetus *ex utero* for whom viability has not been ascertained unless the research or experimentation-

(1) may enhance the well-being or meet the health needs [of the fetus] or the probability of its survival to viability; or

(2) will pose no addeel risk of suffering, injury, or death to the fetus and the purpose of the research or experimentation is the development of important biomedical knowledge which cannot be obtained by other means.

(b) In administering the regulations for the protection of human research subjects which-

(1) apply to research conducted or supported by the Secretary

(2) involve living human fetuses *in utero;* and

(3) are published in section 46.208 of part 46 of title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations or any successor of such regulation, the Secretary shall require that the risk standard (publishecl in section 46.102 (g) of such part 46 or any successor to such regulations be the same for fetuses which are intended to be carried to term.

For the purpose of being the source of tissue, the fetus may lack protection in Federal law and regulations. The unsettled state of the fetus as source for tissue might be reflected by 45 CFR 46.210, which refers to " activities involving the dead fetus" which will be carried out under "any applicable State or local laws regarding such activities." For the sake of ethical consistency and to meet current needs as it has clone in the past, it would be well for Congress to enact laws according fetuses used to donate tissues for transplantation the same protections accorded fetuses used as research subjects.

oo1ogical, and genetic engineering protocols aJil'd for:ms of re-,search. Financially ·suprportinigdletail tr:ansp1ants now would be uniehlrical ibecaruse it would ,entail denying .support for more promismg prrotoools,a,nd would dday deliV'eryof more effective therapy for those who so ibadly need it. It is morally imperative to support ibhe mosrt efl1ectiv;eand certain measures available 1and to withhold support foam ·those rwhich hold out Jess promise. When it oomes :to ,allocating public fund·s, contemporary hiotechnicrul, rphrurmacological,and genetic engineering aprproochesto Parkinson's disease, Alzheimer's disease, diaibetes, and other dii.sorde11s deserve priority ovter human feta.I tissue rtransplantation reseal1clh,;becarusethis r:anking of priorities is to the !benefitof those in need of rtihempy.

5. We rej1oot the argument tha:t fetial tissue transplantation is morally justified !because one ought to 1give one's organs to others. No one has a *duty* ito donate his 011gans, parlioularly when the donor receives no immediate ibenJefitfrom the donation, hecaruse these or:gans al'le proper to ourselves 1as persons, and society or the Slta:be has no proper title or claim to them. No one has a cla:im in strict justioe ito anotiher's ibodily organs. We do not believe bhe claim that public funding for human fetrul tissue fa1ansplanJtationresearch is justified because the fetuses hav;e an obligation to .society to allow :their organs ,and tissues to 1be harvested for the 1benefitof othe!I's. The fetus has no moral duties, and even if it rwere to live, it would be years before it would ha.ve m1y mom1l responsibilities.

Human fetuses rare living humain beings, ibut .because they cannot give free, knowledgeruble consent or act with knowledge and :freedom, one cannot imposie obligations on ·them. Just :as one cannot impose moral obligatfoil:IBon imibeciles, one cannot impose oihligaitionson human fetuses. Duties ru-e not imposed on felons to donate organs even though they might have a great rdeibt to pray. Hence ,we cannot say that those who have not even entered !fully into the life of society, such ias fetuses, have a duty to do this. The need for tissue cainnot justify everything, ,and we :do not justify harvesting o:rgans from the permanently comatose becamse o[this need. We do not justify

haaivesitingorgan:s from deoeased a,dults without their oonsent, and we shouM not justify haJ:vesting :£etail tis1sue. More specificially, if 1a fetus wou1d 1be delmbe['lait1ely1a1boil'lted foir oontheirapeutic reasons, it would dearly hruve no obJigations to a society which denied it any protection from such 1a lethal act.

6. In most instanoes, orrgan or tis:sue transplants have been piermitite:d only when they were tihe laist and only available meruns of saving a person's life, as wa:S the case with heart and kidney transplants. But the use of ,fetal tissues usually does not involve imminent and unavoida:ble tihreats to human life, and this makes their use more diffioult *io* justify. In human fortal tissue transplants, brain 1and pancreatic tissues are used to t11eat conditions that are not life threatening. Hence, we believ;e that such riadicail measures should not he allowed ,when tiherve a,re othe:r means to treat these -conditions.

7. Our society would ibeoome inv;olved in t11emendous proiblems of procurement and storage if human fetal tissues were to be employed for the treatment of Alzheimer's disease, Parkinson's disease, and diabetes. There are at least 1 million Americans suffering from Parkinson's disease, 2 million diabefics, 2 million persons with Alzheimer's disease, 300,000 victims of spinal injuries, and more than 10,000 suffering from hemophilia, muscular dystrophy, and Huntington's disease.[61] Related to this, Lindvall claimed in his reoent " successful " implantation of fetal cells that he used materiail from four fetuses to bring therapeutic relief to one patient. If this is true, it might well be necessary to procure tissues fvom as many as 20 million fetuses to treat all of the Parkinson's and Alzheimer's patients, diabetics, v;.idims of spinal injuries, hemophilia, muscular dystrophy, and Huntington's disease.[62] Even if human fetal tissue transplants could guarantee safe, convenient, and ce:vtain therapy for these patients, we would find it difficult to

[61] See: Weiss, R.; op. cit., p. 297.

[62] But the figure of 20 million might even need to be four times higher, for Lindvall may have sampled as many as four fetuses for every one he selected. Lindvall and his associates, however, did not provide any information about how they sampled.

justify ethically the use of tissues of so many fetuses without their consent. [63]

Proponents o[human ·£etaJtissue trans;p1an:ts claim th!lJt procumemenrt 1and !Sfborogie oou1d ibe rsolved hy cu:J.rtucing cells in massive numbers. This is true in part, hut to provide rtis:sue for the ilal1ge numbers who wowd he demanding transplants, it would he necessiary to culture millions of cells and ra great number of cell lines to meet this wemendous demand. W1e would ask what would ,be done with the cells that were not immedia.tely needed.

8. While the AMA ·is pleading for federal funding for fet!lJl transplantation research, it will tolerate no federal regulation of this research. Nobe that the Council on Ethical rand Judicia:l Affairs of the AMA said rthat:

> The acquisition of tissue from an aborted fetus is not governed by federal regulation. Instead, federal regulations leave the disposition of fetal remains to the state and local regulation: "Activitiey; involving the dead fetus, macerated fetal material, or cell, tissue, or organs excised from a dead fetus shall be conducted only in accordance with any applicable state or local laws regarding such activities." [64]

This me!lJnsthrut the FDA would pmrbrublynot 1be able to iregulaite the use of dead £ebal tissue for .transpilantatio1J1and that only lRBs would r:ev:iewt11msp1an:tprotocols. Regulrations of thiis type wiOll.l!ld result in ra :£ar Jorwer level of scrrutiny and protection than given to drug exipe11iments. We 1believe it would 1be unelthical for the government to ·aooede ito these '.[)Tessures and surprpott the widesp!l."earduse of procedures that

[6s] In the experiments reported by Lindvall and Borkland, fetal tissue from four aiborted fetuses was used to achieve therapeutic results. But it is con·ceivable that therapeutic effect might only be achieved by the implantation of tissue from ten -0r even twenty fetuses. How could such amounts of tissue be procured for the three to four million people in this country alone who might want them? See Lewin, R., "Disappointing Brain Graft Results", *Science*, Vol. 240, 10 June, 1988, p. 1407.

[64]" Medical Applications of Fetal Tissue Transplantation", p. 568. This passage is taken from "Activities Involving the Dead Fetus, Fetal Material, or the Placenta", 45 CFR 46.210 (1967).

are fraught with so many unce:rbamties and rwirth so many potential harms to sick, M"eak, and chronicailly ill persons a:nd 'l:tbandonthe well-<developed,careful, and close sCI"Utiny of the FDA OVIe[' these procedures.

Federrulfunding o[human [etaJ! tissue transplantation wouM short-cirurnit the devielorpmentof adequate regulirutionof these procedures by agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration, resulting in increased risk to implant recipients. To protect the public <better, ·we believe support <should be given to the pharmacological, biotechnical, and genetic engineering described here, lbecruusethey iwi11 onJy 1be permitted iiOlr widespmrudrpuhli:i!cuse iatliter riigoirorus:and tlrorough tesitim.g. Waiving the rigrn.·iou<s srtanda11ds for ther:apeutic effectiveness and safety norma:lly imposed by the F:ood and Drug Administration if human fetal tissue transplantation were to be federally funded would he unethical because this would not be in the interest of public safety.

Proponents of feta;l tissue transrplanta:tion claim that they wiould !be rto make l'lapid progress in the treiatment of Parkinsoni1smand diaJbetes,if given enough time, hut this claim raises an ethical pllotblem. The primary :veasonrwhy they would be able to make more progress is that they would not be subjected to the rigorou:s scr:utiny of the FDA.]jf human fetal tissue transrplantaition were placed under the strict requiremients of the FDA, its p:rogres1s would he much slor\V<er than it now is.

We have no douht 1but that thuman £etail tissue transplantation wouM ga;in ,some success oiver time, hut thrut in itself does not jusrtify supporting it. Phamruh's magicians rwere aible to rperfo1.1IDmany mairviels,tbut that did not make their deeds right, just, or 1good. Virtually any 1experimeD!balprocedure will show progress if enouigh resources are put at its disposal, ·and we w10uM not deny rthat progress in ::lieba;l tissue transplantation wou:1d occur ill more rresources were provided it. Hut om concern to deliv;ereffective, convenient, and safe therapies to the victims of Parkinson's disease, Alzheimer's disease, diabetes,

and other oonrlitions as swiftly rrus possible, :and 1we 1believethe devieloping plt'oposals of bioengineering, pharmaooJ.ogy, rund novel drug delivery systems ail'le to do this while feitial tissue transplants cannot.

Finally, the !prl'Oponents of feta:l tis,sue rvesearch, !including the media, have a Tiesponsibili!ty for ethical conduct in. the pulb-[iic policy discussion now underway. The 11elenrblesstrumpeting of their p'l.'eferred1ruveilueof resewch is maJde 1without any mention of its: draJW1brucks and limits. B:eyond these omissions is the !Still greater omission of recognizing aU the other types of research avenues. The result of this is tJhrut the 1aiveraige viewer of the mghtly national n!ews (as weH as the avemge purblic policy maker) tends to consideT fetal tissiue transplants ias the sole avellJUe of promise, :and fur the disea;ses considered "fetal tissue" lbeoomiesooexrtensivcewith research progress. These misimpressions add impetus :to the popular :arguments fo!r support of this reseiaroh. An honest dirulogue is ill:tpe:mtive for the p111blic's!11esolutionorf maroters of such 1great moml weight.

Conclusion

Fetrul tissue tmnsplrants ,are :being promoted as a simple 1and easy "cure" £or sucih conditions :a;s disease, PaJrkinson's disease, :all1!d diabetes. But they are not a rcure at this time 1and may never 1be. lif these oonditions are going to ;be " CUI'led", or evien successiully mana;gred and treated, it will ibe ar.S ia result of hard and patient scientific reseaJI"ch and not through procedures rt.hart do not meet tihe minimal standarrds of iha:sic :scientific 11esearch. Human fetal tissue tvan:splants are ·a:Ruring1becausethey appear to he simple ;and easy 'rund !because they iharken hack rto a mythical "fountain of youth". They a:re att:mctive 1becausethey create the impression o[power over life itself and of setting nature aright and " fixing" what nature cannot repair. B:ut ooncem for the well-being of the public would be cast aside if federal funding for this research were to be given now.

We 1believre that more legitimate therapies exist which re-

spect the limits and mechanisms of natme and even mimic and imitaite the therapeutic ,actions of nature. Tha:t is why we enoourage support for the sorts of advanced 11esearch we have described he11e. We belier\"e that :fetal tissue transpiarrta:tion ultima;tely will not ipro,ve to rbe fruitful and tha:t it should not ,be publicly supported :by the :federal government. If the fedeml government :iis to support any 'research it should support the other kinds orf :adV1anoedl'esearch described here, now being conducted hy private pharmaceuticaJ companies and university il1esearohcenters.

In the vast majority of cases, fetal transplants have been of no exben<dedhelp ;to recipients, have often harmed them, and in some instances have .aprparent1lykilled the Tecipient,s. Given the statistica1ly dim prospects they present orf bringing significant he1p, relierf, or cmes to patients .and ,giv;en the serious hal'ill they oan !bring,. it would rbe unethical to :support them. Beoause of the risk and proiba1hility 1tihat the engrafted tissue will !be of little or no therapeutic henerfit, we :believe public support for human fetal tissue transplants into humans is, in fact, immoral, until greater successes have been .accomplished with animal trials. The tragedies associated with Thalidomide p:voihahly could have heen averted if mo11e extensive trials of th:ait drug on amimafa haid iheen oonducted. We worry that in011eased p11essure hy 1animal rights :activists to cuflh resea11ch employing animals is forcing resemcihers to exrpieriment on humans without first doing adequate experimentation on animals.

Human fetail tissue transplanta:tion 11esear"ch on humans should]]JOt he 'supported when other prooedu11es or processes hold out mo11e promise of dinicial efFectiVJeneiss:and avoid the moral prohlems of fotal 'tissue rtransplanl::s. In comparison to the remarka1hly subtle 1aipproiad1esfor the 1t11eatmentof Parkinsonism, dia:betes, and A12'heimer's disease no1w rbeing developed, fotal tissue transp1anta:tfon is primitive and scientificaHy hackwamd. Th:eI'le *are* hetter ways ocf p11oviding thempy :for these oo:ndition:sthan: fotail tissue transpliaintattion.

MEISTER ECKHART AND THE NEOPLATONIC HERITAGE: THE THINKER'S WAY TO GOD

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IN BOTH HIS LIFE rand preaching, Meister Eokrhart's " way" was pre-eminently .a spirituality of the mind. The srpeoulat:ive inqui.rires.and p:roibingsthaJt animate his iSChD'l-·arly woliks 1also f!:>iervrude his sermons ·and treatisies, while a pastoral, homiletic inrberrtioniieciproca:1lypermeates the scholarly .worrks, particularly in regard to .the Meister'1s fascination with rthe Woil1d. Heinrich Deni:fle, 1who disonviered and first commented upon Eckhart's Laitin writings in the 1880s, concluded that the Meister faclmd the clarity of conception and precision of expression characteristic of the great scholastic figmes who preoeded him, partiou1ady Albert the Grea:t 1and 'lihomas Aquinrus[1] B:ut more reoent Eckhart scholars have increasingly •argued that Denifle's oonoern to :ve£ute uncritically inflated characteriz,ations of Eckhart's philosophloa:l genius, notrubly that of Wilhelm Preger, .led him to undel'V'alue and indeed misrepvesen:t•the Meister's ireal goal a;nd bme achievement. Indeed, tto the modern critical eye, aided :by a oontury

[1] "Eckhart ein unklarer Denker war, der sich der Consequenzen seiner Lehrer resp. seiner ausdruckweise nicht bewusst war. Gerade bei den schwierigen Lehrpunkten, wo Klarheit und Scharfe der Begriffe und des Ausdrucks mehr als je geboten ist, tritt dies zu Tage. Gerade in den entscheidenden Momenten verlasst ihn die Klarheit .... Eckhart besass aber nicht die geistige Begabung iiber die Scholastik hinauszugeben und doch innerhalb der Granzen der Wahrheit zu bleiben." "Meister Eckharts lateinische Schriften, und die Grundanschauung seiner Lehre," in *A.rahiv fii,r Literatur unCl Kirchengeschichte Cles Mittelalters,* ed. H. Denifie and Franz Ehrle (Graz: Akademische Druck u. Verlagsanstalt, 1956), vol. 2, pp. 482, 521.

of]urbher di:s:cioverieis1rund study, " the scholastic Eckhart is an original .and spooulaxbivietil:rintker,1and not only a <great [2] Firur ;1irom ibeiing COlll!siide!I'iedDemfl.e's "undeia;r 1til11imker,"ri.n re-1oont years: Eckhart (c. U-60-1328) has ibeen rfavoll'lalbly compaIDedwith Thomas: Aquinas, Fichte, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, and 8art11e[3]

Wthile 11eoognizmg speculative brilliance as well as his sp[ritiual 1gif:bs,and eloquence, howev:eT,mRilly commentatoos, including Dommica:IliSsruch as Gustruve Thery ·and Gundolf Gie.mths (and Denilie himself) ihavie found the Meister's il'lelioocieon Noorp1aitonicthemes philosorphically and rth!eo1ogically disco[]lciell'ft:ing.Moved rperh!aps1by s:entimenrt in of tl:ue charges of Ull!orthdoxy fa.id agia:inst Eckhart's doctrrme tan!d its subsequent coiil'denm:ationin 1329, !Some have gio:n!e so far •as to c1aim that Eckhart uttedy dis1a;voiwedNeoplrutonism.[4] Co!ll:V'm:sely,more careful scholamshave contended :that Eckhart wais not only ,a rprofound exponent of Christian Neopfatonism ibut ıwas tl:ue ioutstiandiTIJgrep11esentrutive of the Domwcan School of Cologne, founded iby his menttor St. Albert tihe Great, whlQlSJe ie:x1plicit·ag1e[lidiaw;as a :S!Weepinig synthesis of Platonic, Arisitotelian, and philosophy with Christian, Islamic, and Jewish theology.[5] The issue is thus

[2] John Caputo, "The Nothingness of the Intellect in Meister Eckhart's *Parisian Questions," The Thomist* 39 (1975): 87. Cf. also Karl Kertz, "Meister Eckhart's Teaching on the Birth of the Divine Word in the Soul," *Traditio* 15 (1959) : 327.

[3] On Aquinas, Fichte, Hegel, Husserl; and ,Sartre, cf. Caputo art. cit., p. 88. On Heidegger, cf. John Caputo, *The Mystica,l Element in Heidegger's Thought* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1978), pp. 140-217 and passim, and Reiner ·Schiirmann, *Meister Flckhart, Mystic a,nd Philosopher* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1978), pp. 192-210. On Eckhart and Fichte, cf. Ernst von Bracken, *Meister Flckha,rt und Fichte* (Wiirzburg: Verlag Konrad Triltsch, 1943. I am endebted to Fr. Philip McShane, O.P., for this reference.) .

[4] Cf. Matthew Fox, O.P., *Brea,kthrough: Meister Eckhwrt's C'rea,tion Spirituality in New Transla,tion* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Image Books, 1980), pp. 27-28, 40-42. But also see p. 41.

[5] Such is the underlying thematic, for instance, of Alain de Libera's study, *Introduction a la, Mysti<J.ue RlWMJne d'Albert le Grwnd a Ma,Ure Eckha,rt*

1whethe1rEckhart was an out-1and-out Neoplatonist, for like most mediev;aJ theologians he was edect1ic, hut to what extent his 1teaching, ho:th 1speou1a:tiV!e1and 'spiritual, 'WWS illl!dehted to 'the Neorplaiton:ictradition and what that means for us ,today.

Fragments of a: *System: An Eckhartian Overview*

Eokhrnr,tnev;er completed :a 1syrs1tema1tiic1aocoull't of ihis philo-1sophic1al and theologiciailteaching. The most eXJtensive source of his doctrine is the body of brief, elliptical German sermons hy his :listeners, and, iby his own admission, sometimes copied nonie too accur:ately. His occasio'!1Jalwdtingis, his com-meruta:ries on scripture, Latin sel'mons, anid rpro1ogues to the vas:t, projectied *Opus Tripartitum* pmvide materia1l for elaibora:tion, :interpofation, and conf11ontation.[6] Ultimately, howeV!er,a comprehensive account of his comp1ex, original, and chaJ,lenging systlem of thought remains beyond our 1grasp.[7]

Now, a<fter almost fifty years: in rp11eparat1on,the ten volumes of writings and 1an additionral vo1ume of indices tha,t make up the crit]ca:l edition of Eckhart's German amid L1a:tin works are

(Paris: O.E.I.L., 1984). Cf. also John Macquarrie *The Search for Deity* (New York: Crossroad, 1985) . For specific references to Eckhart's Neo-pla tonism, see notes 35 and 57 below.

6 The most recent and, with respect to inclusiveness, accuracy, and consistency, the most reliable English translation of Eckhart's German sermons and treatises is M. O'C. Walshe's *Meister Eckhart: Sermons and Treatises,* 3 vols. (Longmead, Shaftesbury: Element Books, Ltd., 1987) . .An excellent selection of both German and Latin writings can be found in Edmund College and Bernard McGinn, trans. and eds., *Meister Eckhart: The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises and Defense* (New York: Paulist Press, 1981), and Bernard McGinn, Frank Tobin, and Elvira Borgstadt, eds. and trans., *Meister Eckhart: Teacher and Preacher* (New York: Paulist Press, 1986).

7 For an incisive philosophical analysis of the metaphysical foundations of Eckhart's teaching, particularly the doctrine of consubstantial union between God and the human spirit, see Reiner Schiirmann, op. cit., esp. pp. 172-80. _A more recent and excellent study of Eckhart's philosophical and theological themes, as well as his language, is Frank Tobin's *Meister Eckhart: Thought and Language* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsyl¥ania Press, 1986).

1a:ll hut comp1ete.[8] Mruny of his works, including rporibionsof the *Opus Tripartitum,* are probably irrecoverably lost, although tJhell"e is a1wiays the chanC'e that more friagments will !Surface as schola:rs unoover manuscript materials still !hidden in v·arious C11anniesof Europe. Aftm- a11, the Latin wo'l.'ks rus a iwihole lay in obscurity for over fivie hundred yews until discovered by Denifle, !beginning 1a.t Erfurlt in 1880. Even .a;s late as 1960, Fr. Thomrus Kaeppeli cirume across aJmosit 600 sayings of Eckhart giruthered rrund preserved rby his brtethven in Cologn'e after his dea;th and the

In this v:rust congeries, Eckhart treated an immense numrber of topics. Familiar thetrnes have a way of 1appearing almost 1anywhrere, .but many of rbhem tfreqlUerrtly 1and consisben.tly renorugh to suggest major foci of Eokihart's thoughtt rrund teaching in both speculative theology and its correlative praiotical application, 1spirituaJity. Eckhart 1scholairsnow te!Il!d Ito rugree thart these major themes formed ibhe nucleus of .a projected mystica:l tbhoo1ogical ,and sipiritum1 system similar to that of Thomas Aquinas's *Summa theologiaie,* hut rulso 1bo1d in its depart;ures and originality. It was to be at onoe not only an outline of theology and a b1U1eprint of God's p:vogressive·seJ.f-reve1rution hut :aJso a mrup o[the human >spirit's itineriary .aJJJd ha:ck to its eternail. Sourioe-4hie Ohristian NoopLatonic schema th.at Eckhart im.heri'bedroom St. Albert tb!e Greait rund, 1behind him, Hugh and Richa;rid of St. Victo:r, Thomas Ga1lus, John Sarraoenus, John Soottus Eriugena, Diornysiius the Areop1aigibe,P!l.'odus, and, penultimrutely, Pilotinus !himself. For thls gre:art theo-

[a] *Meister Eckhart: Die deutschen und lateinischen Werke: Herausgegeben im Auftrage der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft,* 11 Vols. to date (Stuttgart and Berlin: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1958-). German sermons will be identified hereafter by their number in the Deutsche Werke and, for English translation, by the corresponding page number in the Walshe edition.

[9] " Eine Koiner Handscrift mit lateinischen Eckhart-Exzerpten," *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 31 (1961) : 204-12. In volume three of his edition, Walshe includes a translation of a fragment of one of Eckhart's sermons discovered by Prof. Kurt Ruh in 1967 and published in the *Zeitschrift fii,r deutohes Aitertum* 111 (1982) : 219-25. See ed. cit., pp. 131-35.

tradition, liecently examined in some detail iby John Macquarrie alllld Andrew Louth, stretches hack evoo £artlier to tbie Oappadocian Fraithe'I"s, Origien, Philo, :and at the source, Pilato.in

Smee the 1app1e1amance of Eoklhamt'1s more aoadiemic Laltin wiorrks, op;inion has heen divided as 00 their importance :velative ibo the more familiar German sermons iand tT1eatises for understarndmg the authentic tooching. Some recent commenibato'l.1s sti1l 1:Jend to favor the lattier aJ.moot enti'11ely, even wihile acknOW11edging t:hie impo'11tooceof the forn11er; some favor the Latin.[11] Critical opinion :seems 'bo have turned in the direction of remphrusizingthe importallliceof both .the Latin and the German :works in 01der 1bo unders:tand the *whole* Eckhart-the teacher *and* the p:veacheT.[12] But to understand to what extent Ed.mart ias ,a tlheologian, philosopher, arrd mystic was indebted to Obrisltian Nooplatmrism it is raliso n:ecess1acy to see him in the oonteJct of his ,w;orks, his method, and his scholarly and apostolic career.

The Scholar and His Temper

While Echltart had ra ik!een phi1osorphica1 temperament, he did not rus ,a rule compose racrudemic1weatises. Ratiher, he scat-ltJeTed inisights amid rpmsuppositiornsthroughout his theo·logical W1011kis, rscriptam1.1l commentaries, spiritual 1exbrn.'!tations, and rermons. It is .difficult ;bo :ves!i.st the imprtesrsion that he was impatieTIJt with rsY'stleimatization ,and !llla:rmw focus. He Wias rer-:tainly not munh :given rto :either, nor :wrus he ovel'lly fond of oonsistbency. iBut his mind wias not meTielyrestless. It wa,s, like

10 See John Macquarrie, *The Search for Deity*, and .Andrew Louth, *The Origins of the Ohristian Mystical Tradition from Plato to Denys* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981. Hereafter *Origiins).* See also .Andrew Louth, *Denys the Areopagite* (London and Wilton, Conn.: Morehouse-Barlow, 1989).

11 Reiner Schiirmann, for instance, criticizes Vladimir Lossky for neglecting the German works in favor of the Latin, although concentrating himself almost exclusively on the former. Cf. Schiirmann, op. cit., p. 263.

12 Cf. Bernard McGinn, "The God beyond God," *Journal of Religion* 61 (1981): 5-6.

1bhie Apo1s1tle's, ibciHiialll.it:and £ar-irlangiing, generous in iiJbs isoope and rb11eadth, if sometimes scanting the fine de'tail which delighbs 1the trwe inte11edtualist. F:or, :also likie St. Piaul, Eckhart nie¥er !lost sigih:t of the "hig picture," subordinating what he minor points to the hrurmonio1uscompos,ition of the whole.

He s1eemsto have :been an irrtuiti¥e rbhinker, orupaibleof either uitilizing 10T 1le1aping over logiical argumentation as itihe mood sitmuck him. His creativity was trait which, ooupled with his intuitive 1ruppeal:s, appaJ'ently sitruck his more inqufirs1ilbo1rs1a1s ti:rnarpproprirute and even imperrbinent.[13] In Germa:n sermons and ,srpirituarl t1.1e1aJtises, exubemnt irhetorica:l figm'es suit1rub1efor' emphasis and e:rlmrta:tion ioould :afao disitort the th!eo1ogicail-phi1osophiicapoints which Eckhart more clearly 1sta:bed in his Latin writings. A dose comparison instarrces iin which his in.quisitors we:l'le misled (perhaps not unwi1lmgly) :by such mannerisms of ;thie 1emphaiic vernacular" eXipI'ession, whereas the more detailed L1rutin ex:position. removies 1a:ny se1rious doubrt of Eckhart's orthodoxy. [14] Taken out of eontext, various sta:bements f19om borth sermons and trea:tises carr he made to show Eckha:rt seemingly oontriadioting himself, a foatu11e sometim:es to the diw1e1dticaJchar-,aJCber of his 'thought, a r'eia:l 1lack of clarity, or, 1as n'O'W seems mo'11e likely, the mep:titude of 1the trarrscribers. Considered as a :whole, however, his teachings 1exhibit 1a. remarkable coherence, especiailly if in:terp!I1eted diia1ectioally or acco:rding to what Bie!l'nrurdLonJergan 1orul1ed "a moving viewipoirrrt."[15]

1s Cf. Yves Cougar, O.P., "Langage des spirituels et langage des theologiens," in *La Mystique Rhenane* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963), pp. 15-34, Bernard McGinn, "Meister Eckhart's Condemnation Reconsidered," *The Thomist* 44 (1980): 403, 413 (Hereafter: "Condemnation"), and Schiirmann, op. cit., pp. 29-31, 60-64, 235 n. 4. On Eckhart's use of language, see especially Frank Tobin, op. cit., pp. 158-83.

14 Cf. Richard Woods, *Eckhart's Way* (Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, 1986), pp. 210-15, and especially McGinn, " Condemnation," pp. 390-414.

15 Cf. Lonergan, *Insight* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1970), p. xxiii: " .Any coherent set of statements can be divided into definitions, postulates, and conc;lusions. But it does not follow that between the covers of a

An Interrwpted Journey

'.Dhe problem of disentangling viario!ll:s elements in the Meisber'tStea;cihing i:s ioompounded ihy the bet of in1tJeTttJ.ittoot doctriinal devielorpinent. Eckhart's in hlgheil'1scbolarship w;as not !the .stnoo:th if lengthy series of aood!emilc ments enjoyed hy :some of his contemporaries·.i[0] It was, rrather, a ooqruently interrupted itinerrury r!Jha;t oovered a tottal period of •somre thirty-three yiears: iol1owinig his im.it]al studies as a Dominican.

Tb!e fuist ma;jor in:bermption. iatSted for iat least £our years when Eolcliart. was rolled rbo administraJtive oo.d pa;sto'l'laJ.work in 1294; during rt.his time he fulfilled fue demanding roile1s of prim- 1at Erlurt and vicar provincial of Thuringia. Folloiwing tlri1s .interi.fode, tihe no-Longer youthful friar, IDIO'W forty-two, re- •sumed his :studies, was 1ruwardredthe covieted degree of Master of Sacred Theology :rut fthe Univiers:ity oif Paris :in 1302, wr:i:d began his ttenrul'le:as regent mrusrter. Some of his most interesting philo1Sophioal work ·begam during this rperiod, stimulated partly 1hy a;ggressivre Flrrancisoan scholars such ais Master Gonsalvn of Spa1i:n, with whom he disputed in 1302 and 1308 and who would, in the following year, ibeoome Minister Gene11rul![1]

Aigirui:n, ihorwevier, Eokhrurtt wa;s ioail1ed rupoo. to undertake administra1tive duties. In 1308, 1rus he concluded his yteiar rus :cegent master, hie wa;s elected :to lewd the Il!ew province of Sax;ony, in

single book there must be a single coherent set of statements. For the single book may be written from a moving viewpoint, and then it will contain, not a single set of coherent statements, but a sequence of related sets of coherent statements." On Eckhart's dialectic, see also Macquarrie, op. cit., and Maurice de Gandillac, "La 'Dialectique' de Maitre Eckhart," in *La Mystique Rhenane,* op. cit., pp. 59-94.

16 .A good example might be Cardinal William Peter of Godin, born the same year as Eckhart and like him, a member of the Dominican order. See William Hinnebusch, *The History of the Dominican Order* (New York: Alba House, 1973), 2: 62-63, 309.

17 Gonsalvo died in 1313. For a brief biography and references, see .Alain de Libera, op. cit., p. 468. Cf. also *New <JathoUc Encyclopedia,* 6: 608-09,

which his home priory of Erfurt 1ay. Exiecutiv e atnd pastoral work occupied him until 1311, when his riedent election as Provincial of Teutonia was overturil!ed by the Dominican General Chapter of Nrap1es, and Eckhart was sent by 1the delegates back 'to Baris for his 'Second regency. He was now :fi£ty-one.

As indica1ted above, two philosophioa1l disputes date from this period, ,aJs do the pro1ogues and some of the extant sections of 1the *Opus Tripartitum.* Eckha:rt was not permitted to devote himself fo academic mattiers for long, however. For a third time, he was called from his scholarly pursuits to undertake a pastoral mission, oriie which wou1d not only prevent the completion of the 1ambitious *Opus Tripartitum* hut would set him on the path toward tria:l a:nd condemnation. Th:a:1t tragedy ooour11ed, ironically, as the fourth and final intierruption of Eckhart's schohrly oa:reer when the old man, now s1i:i...rty-sixor 'siix;ty-1seven,wa1s Teg1en1t maisrbe:r of 1the situdium a:t Cologne, enjoying an 1active hut '11ela1tivelyrpeaceful conclusion orf his many years of service to his order and the Church.

It is a minor .wondeT tha:t any of Eckhart's scholarly writings survivied such a, hapih!azard journey, much 1esis the tantaEzingly hrilliarrt works that ha1v;e come down to us. More, of course, may 1sibill he diseov;ered. EV!en more surprising is the complete tranquilliity 11e:flecte:d in the extant works, as ,if written at a 1eisru11ed pace over a long and untroubled career.

The Sources

Only a mo11e intensive textual analysis of Eckhart's works than any so far published can r1eveal the £ull soope of the sources on which he dvew to dev;elop 1and support his philosophical and theological dootrine. Often he only 'rulludes to them, ,sometimes he transfo11ms them. Rar1ely doeis: he bother 1to dispute, r1emaining content to acknowledge some "master," :taking from any quarter what furthers his arigument, lea.ving objections 1and con:tenJtions to others.

Eckhart's erudition w:a1s eomp11ehensiv:e. Like both A1berl and Thomas, he dmw from the wisdom of ancient pa,gan

thirulffi'\S,Jiewisih1and Muslim ·sclmlair:s,the long histiocy of eastern and western Cb:ristiamity, and, of course, the Biible. Yet even a crursory taibu1ation of the hi.md11edsof 'l."e]erenoesin the German and Latin worrks reveals a close similarity in 'them regalflc:linghoth the aiuthorities he cites a:nd the frequency with which he crulls urporn :them.

Signiificantly :aim<IDg his ancient sources:, pride of p1a,ce be·1ongsto Ari1s:totle,who is dbed mo:ve than four times' more frequently than any other source. Other 1aiuthor:s he uses rure, in dec11easing order of :frequency, Pla'to, Pl1odus, Macmbius, Cicero, Seneca, Homoe, and :even Aesop, among o.thers.[18] Neviertlhe1ess,rus de Libera, MoGinn, and others have 1argued, it is ·the philosophicrul myst:iic:ismof Plotinus that provides much of 'the structure rund somertimes the content of Eckhart's teaching, which is phi1osophicailly more Neop1a.tonic than Aris.totelian in :its fondrumental intent and achievement.

Eckhart's Jewish ,and ls11amic sources for both phi1osorphical and theological doctrine included Moses M·aimomdes, Avicenna, AV1erroe1s, Alkindi, 1and a<bov;e rull, the Neopla:tonic *Book of Causes.* Tradj[,ion haid 1assigned1th.is 1woirk to Aristotle, hut Thomas Aquinas -correctly identified it ais an Araibic pamphmse of Pooc1us written sometime in the twelfth century. [19]

Amoilig m1cient Christian aiuthorit:ies, Augustine w:a;s Eckhrures fav;orriite, being cited five times more wequenltly than evien Thomas Aquinas. Aquinais .aind Diorrys:ius the A:roopaigite ,a11e next, :fol1owed1by G111egoryithe G11eat, Eclillart':s old teacher Albert the Great, Hernwd, Jiemm!e, Origen, John Damascene, Boertili:iruis, PeiteT Lombard, John OhrY'so,stom, the *Ordinary*

[18] Cf. Josef Koch, "Meister Eckhart: Versuch eines Gesamtbildes," *Kleine Sohriften* (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1973), 1: 212-13. These are generally the same authorities Eckhart cited in his defense at Cologne. Cf. McGinn, "Condemnation," art. cit., p. 406. On the importance of Aristotle in Eekhart's thought, cf. Bernard Welte, "Meister Eckhart als Aristoteliker," in *Auf der Spur des Ewigen* (Frie burg, 1965) . Cited by Schiirmann, op. cit., p. 265.

[19] Cf. Koch, art. cit., pp. 212-13. For Thomas's identification of the Neoplatonic origin of the *Liber de O®sis,* see the edition by H. D. Saffrey (Fribourg/Louvain, 1954), p. 3.

Gl,oss on Scripture, 1and, 11ess :frequenitly, the *Lives of the Fathers,* Ambrose, Bede, John Soottus Eriugena., Anselm, Hugh of St. Viotlor, .AJialll ioi Lililie 1and otheir:s, mrnsrt of whom also, cited in his Cologne deieruse.[20]

Eckharl's souroes outrnumber aH others oombined, rus might 1be expected of 1a preacher .and theologian. 0£ the Jewish Soripibures, Eckiha:nt relies (in desciending order) on «Genesis (having written itwo 1oommentaries, on it) , Wisdom and Exndus (iha,ving composed commentaries on each), the Psalms, Simch (of which only 1a fragment of his com.mentary 1.survives),Isai1ah, the Song 0r Songis, Proverbs, Jeremiah, and Hosea. Less rfirieqruen1blycited ia!l'le Jo1b, Zeahami!ah, Qohelelbh, 1 1and 2 Samuel, Lame'O'tations,. Ezekiel, Daniel, Toibit, E,s:ther, and 2 Maiccrubees. Eckhart's fondness for the Wisdom liiter:a-lbure is important in light 0r his, irndebtedness: to the Christian Platonism of A,1exandr:Uafor his my:stical exegesis, and doctrine.

The Meis1beT's pl'lererenoos 1amon:g Christian scriptures :a;re no foss mdicrutiv:eof his mystical ·1eanmgs. Most foequ1enitly cited :is the Gospel of John, Eckhart's commentary on it being perhaips Iris grea,tJestsingle work.[21] The JohanninJe writings figure pre-emirnently ,]n other works ws well, ·followed in fr:equency hy lbh.e writings of Pa:ul (mc1uding tihe Pas:toml Epistles and Reibrews) , the Gospel 0r Matthew, itJhe Gospel of Luke, the Fi:vst Epistle of John, the Gospel 0r Mark, the Book 0r Revelation., the A1cts o[the Apostles, '8JI1id the Episrt1es of J,ames ru:id Peber.

Tihe 1ooation. and foequmcy of citations from common 'SOUI'ces provides onJy 1a skJeitchof the mtel1ootual pmvienance OI tholll'ght, ihowevier. Moi11e '.important for aill under-

20 Cf. Koch, art. cit., pp. 211-12.

21 From .a biblical perspective, Eckhart's mysticism was essentially Johannine. In the 592 Latin excerpts made by Eckhart's brethren at Cologne and rediscovered by Kaeppeli in 1960, 270 were from his commentary on John's gospel. Of the remainder, 97 were from the commentary on Wisdom, 74 were from the first commentary on Genesis, 69 from the co=entary on Exodus, 46 from the second commentary on Genesis, 21 from the commentary on Sirach, and 15 from other sources.

standing of the chamacber of ih:i.s rphil()ISl()rpihicaland theological " system " ,a;rie his m1Wsters, primarily those of the Dominican order who were :vespons:i!blefor ms 1eduoation iand development.

Eckhart, Albert, and Thomas

A rSpiriibu1a.I!aJJ.rd intellectuaJ. hoiild as well as. a fra.->temrul one oorunreted the rbhriee most WOOiilld-geireration FrillJ:'ISPiieaiohers. Borf:Jhdifferences ais: well 1a:s similarities among them •are significant, however. Albeit rand Eckihart were Germam, riesrp1ectivielyfrvom Bavaria 1and Thuriingia. Tihomas wais horn 1at Ro·ocaseccia in South Ceniir:al Ita.ly, rt:hen part of the Kfilgdom of Sicily. As a Dominican s.tU!dent, Thomas was nonethe1lessclosely 1a;s1sociatJedwith Albert alt Oologne and evien be£orie that wt Paris. Eckhart, too, .spent many yieara: in both places ,rug hotbh situdent and professor. All three irncerpted•at the of Paris. There Edma.nt had rulso reoeirved his bacoo1aooealbe. A:ll tJlwee the :so-ioalled chair of theology for extems, A1beirt 1be:ing th!e fIDst German to do so, Thomas rtb.e first Italian. AU thiiee espoused the newly introduced .a;nd 100ntro:vie!l."sia1 Arisrbot'efon philosophy, although viarying in 1theirmtierprreta:tion .and erliern.ttof depeilllldence. Simifa.rly, eia:ah variou'9ly .inoorpor:ated elements reintirioduced 1mto W'esbern sp:iriturul theology with the 1aprpearance of new trian:s1lrutionsof thie Pseudo-Areopagite and the *Liber de Ca.usi,s*.[22] All wierie renowned for their philosophy, theoJogy and p:veaching, ;rulthough it is Albert who is: ·besrt rememhel"ed for the first and Thomas: for the second, while Eckhart was considered the greatest preacher of his day.

The Master of Cologne

MbeEt of Lruuingen's influence on Eckhart ca:Imot, of course, ibe measured in terms of whatJevier living contact may ha.ve existed heitW'eenibhem, :and rbhiis is. all the more true m the cruse

22 Cf. Simon Tugwell, O.P., ed. and trans., *Albert and Thomas: Selected Writings* (New York: Paulist Press, 1988), pp. 10, 258.

of Thomas. 0£ the ttwio older Dominican!S, however, A1beirt evidently e:xiercised the greater intellectual influence, as seen espieciiaillyin the prooniinent Diony:sirun. Slbrand in hi:s and Eckhai:t's teach.mg; in 1both oases this is £a:r mme extooisivie in depth ood rsooperbhrun in rthaJt of Aquinas.[23]

Eckhart ,would haJVe met the old 1bishop on oOltiling to Cologne in 1280, when he began his studies rat the ihoUJse of studies ibuilt, as W!as the Dominicarn chmch, hy Albert himself thirty yea:rs reiarr1ier. But Albert :tlh!e Great only ,a .few months 1giving Eokhiaut 1at mosrt a very ibrief opportunity to heiar ithe oM dodtor speak rand rpiO!slSiilhlyIto joUn. him Mooilloquy 1Wiiltih the other students. Howrevier, Eckhart rwou1d haivre rboon rtaught by some of Albert'rs students, who h:ad formed with their great master ,a " siclmol" o[thought and myisticail rspririltuailitywhich rwouJd hruve in:flruenoethroughout the Rhineland.[24] This important tradition rw1as almost r00mpletely eclipsed, however, !by the more lbrilliant ,sohool of Alberit's OlbheT' great student, 'I'homa.s Aqumars:[25]

23 For an interpretation of Aquinas which is open to a greater Neoplatonic influence, see W. Hankey, *God in Himself: Aquinas' Dootrine of God as lJimpounded in the Summa theologiae* (Oxford University Press, 1987).

24 On Albert's revival of Neoplatonism and its influence on Eckhart, see Tugwell, ed. cit., pp. 10-11, 55-92; Alain de Libera, op. cit., pp. 25-58; Gundolph Gieraths, *Life in Abundanoe, Spirituality Today* 38 Supplement (Autumn, 1986): 3-5; Bernard McGinn, "Meister Eckhart: .An Introduction," *An Introduotion to the Medievai Mystics of Europe,* ed. by Paul E. Szarmach (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), p. 244 (hereafter: "Introduction") ; and Francis Catania, "Albert the Great," *Enoyolopedia of Philosophy,* 1: 66.

25 On Albert and the "Cologne School," see de Libera, op. cit., pp. 10-13, 31-41. On Eckhart and Albert, see B. Geyer, "Albertus Magnus und Meister Eckhart," *Festschrift Josef Quint anWssUche seines 65 Geburtstages uberreioht* (Bonn: 1964), pp. 253-54. On Eckhart's part in the Neoplatonic revival inaugurated by Albert the Great and his disciples, see de Libera, pp. 29-58, McGinn, "Introduction," p. 214, Hinnebusch, op. cit., 2: 156, and James M. Clark, *Meister Flokhart: An Introduction to the Study of His Works with an Anthology of His Sermons* (London: Nelson$_1$ 1957), pp. 71, 97-8.

The Sun of Naples

Next to A1bert, Thomas Aquinas eX!ercised the gflea.test intel1ectual influence on Eckhrurt. The Angelic Doctor himself died two or rthree years before his younger conteimpomry en-1llered the Order. But Eckib:art wras 1almosit cenbainly ,a student in rt.he faculty otf 1arts at Paris in 1277, when sevem! of Thomas's rpoorpo1SitioiThs1wer1e condemn!ed with those of Sigier of Brrubant, and iSho!I'ltly thereafter, when according to legend Albert gathered the hrearilien in 1tlbie *nudium generale* 'to eulogize his late ·student 1and icommend his doctrine in the strongest terms to the sa£elreepmg of the o!I'lder.[26]

Despite his Di.onysi1a1n 1and Augustinian enthusiasms, thel'le can 1be no doubt 1aibout fundamental foyalty ito the thought and teaching iof 11homrus, evien. :apart from the adherence :bo 'I\homas' *s* basic tenets which had 1beten. enjoined upon members of the 01ider ,at tihe Chapters of Moilltpellierrand P:aris in 1278 lan!d 1279.[27] Thrns, Eckhiarl's oooasiot:lllal depar-

[26] The story was related during canonization proceedings in Naples in 1319 by Bartholomew of Capua, who had heard it from Hugo of Lucca. For a full account, see James A. Weisheipl, O.P., *Thomas d!Aquino and Albert His Teacher,* Gilson Lecture No. 2 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1980), pp. 19-20. Cf. Kenelm Foster, *The Life of St. Thomas Aquinas: Biographioai Documents* (London: LongIQ.ans, 1959), pp. 112-13 and Sr. *M.* Albert, O.P., *Albert the Great* (Oxford: Blackfriars, 1948), p. 79. Tugwell supplies a critical corrective and plausible explanation of the story, ed. cit., pp. 26-27.

[21] The general chapter of 1309 and that at Metz in 1313 similarly legislated that Dominicans must conform to Thomas's doctrine. See Hinnebusch, op. cit., 2: 156f., Jeanne Ancelet-Hustache, *Master IJlokhart and the Rhineland, Mystics* (New York and London: Harper and Row/Longmans, 1957), pp. 36f., and Benedict Ashley, O.P., "Three Strands in the Thought of Eckhart, the Scholastic Theologian," *The Thomist* 42 (1978): 227 n.3. *M.* D. Knowles writes, "In 1880 Denifl.e discovered at Erfurt a string of Latin works which, when examined and analysed, showed Eckhart as holding and using all the metaphysical framework that Aquinas had created out of Aristotelian materials, and using exactly the same authorities as the schoolmen-Augustine, William of Auvergne, Bonaventure and Aquinas. There is still room for debate as to whether Eckhart was a mystic using scholastic terminology or a theologian adopting a Neoplatonist outlook, but of his radical traditionalism and orthodoxy there is no longer any doubt." " Denifl.e and Erhrle," *History* 54 (1969) : 4.

tures from ,Thomas 1are especially signi:l:ican1t.In his 11elianceon ithe PJ,atonic Christian traditiion, E1ckhart :wa.s in some vespects actually doseT tio Bon:avienture and Duns Soort:us than to the all-important e:x!ception of promoting :the irrbelilect1and knowledge ovierr the will 1and 1o·Vie in 1the spiritual hierarchy of human powers aa:rd a.cits. Even heve, Eck:ha11t on rarrlmd them equally or eV!en rrevie11sed himself (or, Il'laJtihier,his ıvliewp1oin1t), gma:nstmg1superioriltyibo ,the 1W!iH 1a:nd lovie, evie:n1as haid Thomas Aquin:a1s in a Limited friame of referenC'e:

> Nothing brings you closer to God or makes God so much your own as the sweet bond of love. A man who has found this way need seek no other. HE: who hangs on this hook is caught so fast that foot and hand, mouth, eyes and heart, and all that is man's,. belongs only to God.[28]

Elsiewlmrte, he sai.d, "The of hless1edness in both, knowledge and 101vie."[29] Agiain, "God 1and I are one. Through knowledge I tal;;;e God in:to· mys1elf, th110u1gh loV!e I enter into God." [30] U1timrutely however, in a splendid example of Eckhart' s dialectical synthesiis: of opposing viewpoints., he preached trhait "Some 'tieache'l"shold thait th1e spir1it finds :iits beatitude in lovie. Some mruk!e him find it in 1beholding God. But I say he dores not find it in 1ovie, or in gnosis or in [31] Rather, "I :say tha:t 1aibove these underst1anding 1and theire il's mericy: the'.11e God works mercy in the highesrt 'aind purest acts 'th:a1t God is capaible of." [32]

2s.Sermon No. 4 (Walshe trans., I: 47. This sermon is also found in Josef Quint, ed. and trans., *Meister JJJokehart: Deutsche Predigten und Traktate* (Miinchen: Carl I{anser, 1955), No. 59.

29 DW 70. Sermon *No.* 41 (Walshe trans., 1: 287).

aonw 6. Sermon *No.* 65 (Walshe trans., 2: 136.) Cf. also *Counsels on Discernment,* Colledge-McGinn, ed., cit., pp. 256-57.

a1nw 39. .Sermon 59 (Walshe trans., 2: 100).

a2 DW 7. Sermon 72 (Walshe trans., 2: 189). On Eckhart and Aquinas, cf. Ashley, art. cit., p. 232. On significant differences between the two Dominicans, see Colledge-McGinn, ed. cit., pp. 27, 32 .and 36, and McGinn, "Condemnation," p. 405, nn. 76-77. For Aquinas on relative priority of will: *Summa theologiae* I, Q. 82 a. 3. On charity and union with God, see II-II, Q. 24 a. 4; Q. 45, a. 4; Q. 172 a. 4; Q. 184 a. I ad 2; III, Q. 89, a. 6.

It is likewise norteworthy tha:t whil e Eckhart expli!citly " oo·r-rects. " Aquinrus on a number of points, he rarely-if eve:r-disagrees witih either Augus:tinie Oil" the AreopagitJe. In the light of 1such dif£ffi'!ences,rthe truist and 11espect with which Eckhart WialS ilfilliformly rega;rded in the order hy his oonfreres, his provincials, even the Master 1and his vicars, :i1lrustmtesthe latitude 1witih which the injrunctioru to suppoll'rtThomas were applied.

Ironically, propositions taken f:mm the works of !borbh Thomas 1and Eckhart, arud vie:ry n:eady Albert, were oondemned-srure-[y withollllt.came in the ease of Thomas ·aill:d vie:ry Iilrely 1so in that of Eckhart. Thoma1S, however, was exonerated; E1ckha'.rt wta:s nort.[33] Motreorver, hO!tih Thomas ood Albert were eanonized, the former in 1323, his mrusiter in 1931. Borth were declared doctors of the Church. Eckihart, whose integrity and holiness of '1i£e.were never impugned, even 1by ms' Dominican .aintiagonist Hermann of Summo, w:as consigned to olblivion, lbwt one that could not hold him fast.

Eckhart and Christian Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages

lit ·is clear that Eckhrurt's teaching drew heav.ily upon the spiritwaJ and doigma:tic resources of the Ohristian myisrtical tm-dition :from irts origins in third centrury Alexmdria until well into the M:iididi1e Ages. In Eckha:rt's iextoot writiDJgs there ,are feiw dtationis ·from Plato 1and virtually no diriect l'lediere noosto

On the absolute priority of intellect as highest of faculties, see I, Q. 82 a. 3 and II-II, Q. 83, a. 3 ad 1. On eternal happiness as an act of the speculative in·tellect (i.e., the beatific vision), see I-II, Q. 3 aa. 3-5, 8. Eckhart seems ultimately to have gone beyond the moderate intellectualism of Aquinas with regard to the nature of human beatitude and also the nature of God as sub·sisting intelligence. See also Woods, op. cit., pp. 48-55.

113 ".Etienne Bourret, bishop of Paris, revoked the sentence of excommuni·cation and condemnation attached to the Paris condemnation of 1277 from those propositions ' insofar as they touch or seem to touch the doctrine of the aforesaid Blessed Thomas.' This public declaration of Thomas' orthodoxy was issued on 14 February 1325, almost forty-eight years after the original condemnation." James A. Weisheipl, O.P., *Friar Thoma,s d'Aquino* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1974), p. 349. He continues, "In England, the archbishop of Canterbury did not even bother to revoke Kilwardby's con-demnation that was confirmed by John Pecham."

either Philo or Ploitin:u:s1. Yet the Christi.an P1atooism (i.e., Noorplrutornism) developed hy the Alexandrian theologians 1and Augustine 1eX!erci1S1edan influence over his thought that can be 1trurthfolly ,cihJa,mcterizedais formaltive. ks. norbed 1rubovie, he wais especiaiHy and profoundly infl:uenood, as were his Dominican contemporaries :and most siprntual iwriter:sof the period, by the manifestly Neorpilaltonic doctrine of 1tbie anonymous filth-cootury Syrian wr:iter who rstyJed himself "Dionysius the Areopagite." [84] A1s M. D. Knowles oibsrervied, whether Eckha1.1t's myistical rbempeT"ament fold him to adopt (and rudapt) a fromeiworrk or whether his to Christian Neoplatonism under Alberrt the GreiaJt .Jted him 1to ·a myst]cail spwiltu:ality is impossible to· decide. Witiliornt doubt, however, Eckhart eJlllbmcied the Noorp1atonic tmdition. as 1a whole, continuing rthe revival inruugur:alted by k1bert and !his im.medirute fol101wers.,including to some extelITtAquinas himself. [85] The oon-

[34] See *Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works,* trans. by Cohn Luibheid and Paul Rorem (New York: Paulist Press, 1987), .Andrew Louth *Denys the Areopagite* (London and Wilton, Conn.: Morehouse-Barlow, 1989), and Louth, *Origins,* esp. pp. 159-78. Cf. I. P. Sheldon-Williams, "The Greek Christian Platonist Tradition from the Cappadocians to Maximus and Eriugena," *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medievai Philosophy,* ed. by .A. H. .Armstrong, (Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 425-533; and Henry Chadwick, ed. and intro., *Alexand.rian Christianity,* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1954), "General Introductions." For a recent synopsis of the Neoplatonic revivals of the Middle .Ages, see Tugwell, ed. cit., pp. 50-57.

[35] On Eckhart as a Christian Neoplatonist, see (among other sources) .Ancelet-Hustache, op. cit., pp. 7ff.; .Ashley, art. cit., p. 232; Caputo, art. cit., p. 198; Clark, op. cit., p. 71; Colledge-McGinn, ed. cit., p. 27, 34, 40-44; Gieraths, art cit., pp. 163-65, 314, 322, Hinnebusch, op. cit., 2: 306; Kertz, art. cit., p. 330 n. 10; de Libera, pp. 242-50, 256, 265, 278-79, 290-92; Vladimir Lossky, *Theologie negative et oonnaissanoe de Dieu ohez Mattre Eckhart* (Paris: Vrin, 1960), pp. 22-26 et passim; Louth, *Origins,* pp. llOf.; Koch, art. cit., p. 214; Luibheid, ed. cit., p. 30; Bernard McGinn, "Meister Eckhart on God as .Absolute Unity," *Neoplatonism and Christian Thought,* ed. by Dominic J. O'Meara (.Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982), pp. 137-39 (hereafter: "God as .Absolute Unity"); Kurt Ruh, *Meister Eckhart: Theologe, Prediger, Mystiker* (Miinchen: Beck, 1985), pp. 55-58, 87-89; Schiirmann, op. cit., pp. 140-43 and passim, and Frank Tobin, op. cit., p. 62, 210, n. 81. Cf. also Evelyn Underhill, *The Mystics of the Church*

turning :and pell"Va1sive influence of tha:t tradition w:rurl'lants a closer if brief exploration of its origins a:nd as an aid to understanding .both the goal and !the ,a;ooomp1ishmentof the elusive MeiiSJterais a Christian Neoplatonist.

The Alexandrian Inheritance

The contribution of tJhe Alexandrian Church to the spmtual theology of rborth E·aiSrllernand WestJern Chrisitianity hrus often been overlooked in historicrul rucoounts-po,ssibly hooause of the pell"Vla;sive rant:i-Hellenic thrut dominruted late ninreteenth-century German rand still linrgiers among many Catholic m1d ProteiSbant sipiritural writers. It is impossible, ho·w-evier, rto continue to .ignore or dismiss it in of the deep in-debtedness of Albert, Eckhart, 1and otiheT impor1tant medi:ev:aJ .Ml'd renaissance writecr.-sto this ancient t:mdiition, ·a bond which oon:nects the Meister with the earHest stages of Cllirisrtianmys-rtical theology 1and spirituality. It is rulso onie whioh provides raa:i eoumenical rbrusis for spmtual ars well 1a,s theofogical dialogue heitweien Easbem and Western OhristiallJS as well as: between Roman Ca:tholics, witih their now 1axg.eJytacit Aristotelian bias, and Anglicians, for whom Blatonism ·rund Neop1atonism still ex-ercise 1a 1poweil'fulaJtJtractJ.ion.[36]

The Second City

The birth of Christian Platonism occurred in :the Egyprtian city of Alexandria and riep11esenitedthe last major conitrihution

(London: James Clarke, n.d.), p. 134. Before its appearance in the German Dominican school, Neoplatonic influence was most clearly present in the West in the dominant Augustinian tradition and in the Celtic-Dionysian tradition of John Scottus Eriugena and Richard of St. Victor. Cf. John J. O'Meara, *Eriugena* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), John J. O'Meara and Ludwig Bieler, eds., *The; Mind of Eriugena* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1973), and G. H. Allard, " The Primacy of Existence in the Thought of Eriugena," in O'Meara, ed. cit., pp. 89-96.

36 This was especially true of Dean William Inge, whose many works contributed significantly to the rediscovery of the English mystical tradition at the turn of the century.

of Judaism to the in£a:nt church. Philo, who livied from 30 **B.C.E.** to *45/50* C.E., ,attempted rbo 1bridgie'the chasm bieitween Jewi1SJh 1be1i.ef and pmcbice on the one side and Greek thought and culture on the oither, 1wguingthat faith 'waJS not in:lierinrto l.1easo111hut, in f;aACt, ,its :£011.mdaJtion[37] A oenrburylater, the Christia:n writer Clement of wrou1d use rtili!e same argumoot to periSUJaJde his (Joi.11bernpo11ruriesto enJber upon a new dialogue of :£aith.and mason. A millenium .afterwa:rds,Eckhart would rpmach and teach out of :the sru:netraidition.

To Philo, atS ito the earliest Christian rthinlrers, philosopihy meant Plato1I1i1Sm,a;s it 'Would urntil the redisoo1vteryoif Aristotle hy 'tihe Araihs in the elevienth 1and twielfilJhcenturies. WihHe he <lid not simply radopt the Middle...Plarbonismof the times, Philo WiaJS nOlt only ithomughly familirur iwit:h it, ih!e wias deeply infiUJenoodthy it, ,a;s well ,a;s hy 1aspeobsof Stoicism, iand Pythagiorie1a:nteaching-all of which would simifo.;rlyaffect Christian theology ·am.d mysticism in tihe centuries to come.

Phil.o's 1allegoricailmethod of scriptural interpretati001 would rbe even mol'e influen:ti:al. Pa:rtly Jewish, pa:ritly Homeric and Stoic, such rsymbolic or " mys:tical " e:regesis w:a;s believed il:o ptrovide access to thie hidden, rbrue meaning af oibscUJ.1epassages in ;scriipbure:[38] By 1Jhe tiime of Baul ,a;t tJhe it 'Wlas ,deeply estalb1isihiedin Christia:n ,and came to inftuence scriptmrul 1S1tudy until :the Reformation. [39]

Out o[rtibJe Wisdom 1brl.aidiJIJionof Afe·:xiandrianJudiaiimnortiher elemewts wiere over inrto Ob.rirstianthougiht ,a:n.rd praxis

[37] On Philo, see Erwin R. Goodenough, *An Introd!uotion to Philo Judaeus* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), Samuel Sandmel, *Philo of Alemandria: An Introduction* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), and Andrew Louth, *Origins,* pp. 18-35.

[38] For Philo's influence on the Book of Wisdom, see David Winston, trans., intro., and commentary, *The Wisdom of Solomon,* The Anchor Bible, Vol. 43, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1979), p. 59-61.

[39] " There are some cases where the similarities are too clear, both in vocabulary and in ideas, for us to exclude the hypothesis of a direct influence of Philo's writings· on the authors of the New Testament." Marcel Simon, *Jewish Seats at the Time of Jesus,* trans. by James H. Farley (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967), p. 140.

whillch wtou1d eV'enlln.Eru1lyiruppear tin. ,wrilW:igs: ltih.e pre-eminence of the Woird, the ptl'le-exisbence of the Ideais of .a;ll things in rbhe efomaJ.mind of God, the 1UnknoiWiaibility of God's essence, t:he effulgence or ib:cighmes:sof God, the primacy of ·the soul ovJer the hody, runJd tih.e doctrine of thre !human person IRIS rtihre imrugie of God. It also conltrilbuted iits myisbical vision. Bor Philo, as £or Paul, hy gmoe the Spirit of God takes the p1aoo of rthe hUJman srpir:iit in our pil.'layrer a.ind 1activity, finding itlS highest in tihe mind. Spiritual unioo with God thus resrnlts in a rl:ll'ue ecsrta;sy-.Jl!otof foieling, ibu.t the mental rravishm.ootof unk1mwlingbliss.

Ale-:vandrianChristiainity

The fo1Undillngof tih!e Church of 8.ISCri:bedt10 St. Mairk, itihe EViangelist tand cousin of HarnabaiS.[40] Academic Chcisrtiiantheology ibeganrthiereLa;te in the ·stecond,century when a catechelticaJ.:school .appeared ai11d 1addressed itself to the propagation of :the Ohris1main ifruith among the more cultured clrussesof tihe city. Aotually :a Chcisibi:angymnamU!lll,the sah.ool taiUght profane :sciences :ais wrell 1ais ·Ohriis:tiiaindoctrine under ·a succession of remarkrublteditectboll"s: Pantaenrus, who p.riobrubly founded the schooJ and rwho .died :rubout 190, Clementt (head from 190 to 202), and Origen (head from 202 to 231).

Lirtt1e is known of Ba1nitruenus,who 1le£t no writings. His disciple C1emwt, 'Who lived from 150 Ibo aibouit was 1p:mbrubly ·m Athenian. Among orthe.r rich themes mhis: many writings, th!e :firstrtrares o[Eckiharl'1S1dodtriine of rtJh.e " spark of the sorul" iean he found in 1a purely Chrisitian oorn:l:Jext[41] Detachment and

[!!D] Cf. Acts: 12: 25; 13: 5, 13, 15: 37, etc. and 1 Peter 5: 13.

41 For Clement, " The idea of God was implanted in man at Creation, breathed into Adam, and there is no known race that does not possess the notion. There is a spark of nobility in the soul, an upward inclination which is kindled by the divine Logos. Faith is an intuitive inward testimony to the highest and the best, a capacity for recognition. Therefore the task of the Christian evangelist is to penetrate through the hindrances of evil tradition and idle opinion imposed by the binding force of custom and prejudice and to evoke that latent faith beneath, which is gratitude to our Creator-' a kind 9f i:ent we pay God for our dwelling here below.' Man belongs to God and

modemtion were also prominent in rthe Alexandrian crute-clresis.42 As iW!Ould he tihe ca.se witth his remote spiritual de-sicendent in Ge:rmruny, Clement did not mean :that wie should squelch the emotional life but that we should regulate it in 011der to acquire tranqillity of mind *(ataraxia).*

At :rubout'tihe 1ruge of eighteen, the g11eat Origen (ca. 185-254) SUJccooded Clementi;, 1a£00r ithe Venie1111Jb1e director £Led tth.e ciity druni.ngitihe rperr!soowtionof in 202.[48] Not only did he s;yistematize (and :re1rutivize) aUegoricaJ melt.hod, like Clement he also taught 1a true mysticism o[the mind iin which rtruie knowledge *(gnosis)* 'Wia;s a participation hy rthe soul, puri-fied 1aind enlightened, in fthe Wisdom of tihe Wioro of God. Such lmowiledge,1as John ihrud taught, w1as :the way tiowaillds what rthe aa:ucient Chmch caMed "deification" *(theosis)* 1rund union with God in Ohri:st.4"'

Cel'!taiin works of Origen were known to 1and cited iby Eck-haJ:'it. In teTms: of influence, however, no figure in antiquity (1wi!thifue exception of .Augustine) so powetr:ful:a ,sway over Jbhe Meistrer as another Egyptiirun sa111ant, some twenty ;yiears Origern's junior, the last great pihilosoph'e'l'of t:he ra:ncient worrld and trhe fountainhead of what later came to be knorwn as Neoplartonism. [45]

is made for the contemplation of God." Henry Chadwick, *JJJarly Ohristian Thought and the Olassiaal Tradition* (Oxford and New York: Clarendon Press, 1966), pp. 39-40.

42 Clement held, for instance, that "The Christian life is a ceaseless conflict with the downward pull of the passions, and the disciple must learn to rise through the 'moderation' of Aristotelian ethics to achieve the passionlessness (*apatheia)* of the· Stoics, a calm tranquillity of silent worship which is a life of continual joy in prayer like that of the angels." Ibid., p. 63. Cf. pp. 61£. . ",

43 See Henry Crouzel, *Origen,* trans. by A. S. Worrall (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1989), Chadwick, op. cit., pp. 171-80, and Louth, *Origins,* pp. 52-74.

,44 Cf. John Dillon, "Origen's Doctrine of the Trinity and Some Later Neoplatonic Theories," in *Neoplatonism and Ohristian Thought,* ed. cit., pp. 19-23. For the influence of Origen on Eckhart, see Hugo Rahner, "Die Gottesgeburt: Die Lehre der Kirchenvater von der Geburt Christi im Herzen der Glaiibigen," *Zeitsohrift fiir katholisohe Theowgie* 59 (1935): 412ff.

45 For a concise history of this philosophical tradition, see R. T. Wallis. *Neoplatonism* (London: Duckworth, 1972). On Eckhart, seep. 169.

The Sage of Lycopolis

Pfotinus (205-270) 1was a vastly misunderstood figu11e in the centuries ,after hi1s de1arth 1a,nd ev:en today. His doctrine, even as eid:iitredrby discipJe Plorphyry, was highly fluid, just as his vision of :rieaHty was dynamic yet unified. Like that of Plato, *it* w:as 1afao es1sentiaHy tiheocentric, ione reason why it was appealing to Christian !theologi!ans of the fourth and fifth centuries. [46]

Opposed to 1all forms of dualism, Plotinu.s rejected iborbh Gnosticism and Christianity, though he had ,a;t best a nodding a:cquaintanc!e with the la:t:t1er. Deeply 1religious, he sought unity with God ("The One") through the cowbemp1aitfon of truth, goodness, 1a.nd beauty. Like Phi1o, Plortinus held that the intima,te life of God remained unknown and incomprehensible. For P:1otinus, 1all rea1lity reman1a;tred from God, Hims:el£ utterly .simple 1and self-sufficient, a ,process he described as " seething" or "boiling," 'a bubbling up of :being, 'lifo, 1and intelli-1gien!oe thait ibmfoe forth :into the world in 1succesiv:e silages. The1se were the intelligible World of Ideas *(Nous),* the World Soul *(Psyc:he)-whicrh* as rthe Demiurge crea.tred the wodd and ordered the universe-and, finally, JYfatter *(Hyle)* at the extreme limit of God's radiarrt expansion. [47]

lndiv:idua1l,souls werie srepmrated if.mm the World Soul by a rp'Dooessof incarn1ation. Immort1al hurt 1birupped in mart::ter, time, and spaioe, each soul capa1b1e of contempla:tion at iits highest ipoint. Through a process of moral and intellectual

[46] For a brief overview, see Louth, *Origins,* pp. 36-51. On Plotinus, see Wallis, op. cit., pp. 37-93 and Rufus Jones, *Some Exponents of Mystical Religion* (London: Epworth, 1930), pp. 44-76, who wrote, "no other single person outside the New Testament group ancl outside the group of early Christian Fathers contributed so much to the stream of Christian thought as Plotinus did." (p. 45.) The standard translation of the *Enneads* is that by Stephen MacKenna and revised by B. S. Page (London: 1969). A. H. Armstrong's *Loeb Classical Library* edition is now complete in seven volumes.

[47] The "boiling" metaphor is found in *Enneads* VI, 7, 12, where Plotinus says "There no indigence or impatience can exist but all must be teeming, seething with life." Cited by Sehtirmann, op. cit., p. 247, n. 140.

purification, it couJd r!Jherefore !1eturn to its origin1ai1. source. TU'l'IIling ruway from 00Illsib1e things iby recollection, so rthrut 1a1l memory, ,serusibility,1and l'leasoning·oeaised,the soul mounted until it felt the inefiaJhJie P!1esen1ce of God in an ecstasy of joy ;rund Plo:tin:us himself, acco'l'lclin:g to Pol''phyry, experienced eontemplaJtive union rwitJh ilie One on sevieval occrusri.0inJS1.DeS1pitelris rejection of Ohrisitiianity,he seems to have 'OOen a true my1stic and something of a pagan s:aint. He was oe'.l''bruin:lyso :regiax:dediby his laterr followem.

The Alexandrian Tradition

Not eviery spiri:tua1 writer w:a:s in pffiJo,sopbicalacooro with t:bie Christian Neop1aJbo111ricsrtr:uot'll.l''evolved dul''ing the fourth :alllid fifth oen!turies. But ibhie most irufluentiiia.J.wo:l'ks do sihrure 'Some and oiflben many Platonic and Plotinfuan pl'les1Uppositio111s. The 1swieepingtheo1ogiool moviemen:theig1un rby Philo and oontinru.ed hy Clement .and Origelll :riosie to new prominence in the 'WIOrk of ·the :three Cappadocian FaJthers, Sts. Basil the Great, his h110thier,Gregocy of Nyis:sa,1and their fl'liend, Gl'legory Nazianms. Far more my.sticaJ.in their :approach thrun Athan:a:sius, lbl:ue Caprpooooirur11se especiia1lyGregory of Nys1sa, developed the major themes of .A!lexmdrian .spiritua:lity in a morre sysitematic Amoing these themes, prurticularly in the writrings of Gre1gocy 0£ NYJSS'a, is :liOlllllld the notion. of the birth of the Worn of God in the oouils of tihe just, the keystone of Eckha:I1t's:S1piritu:alieidi:fice.[48] The C:appaidociian:s philosophical con.rt.ext waJS, 1almostrpalpahly P1ortiman.[49]

4.8 For a discussion of this theme in Eckhart, see especially Rahner, art. cit. pp. 333-418. Cf. also Kertz, art. cit., Robert S. Stoudt, "Meister Eckhart and the Eternal Birth: The Heart of the Preacher," *The Thomist* 50 (1986): 238-59, and Richard Woods, op. cit, pp.. 109-27.

49" For St. Basil, as for every Christian philosopher, the central theme is God, his dealings with the world, and especially with man. God creates the world, and sets in it his own image, man. But this is man's eternal, not his contemporary condition. Created in the intelligible order, he falls. into the sensible; designed for eternity, he is enmeshed in time, and in danger of a further fall into the total dissolution which is a concomitant of temporality, that is to say, into .absolute evil. The philosopher's task is to reverse this

:importa:nt tiheme of 'the Carppaidooians' apoplmtic or 'TI!egalbive' theology that 'wou1d !11earppear in Eckhart is *aphairesis,* ia Neoplaitonic term for "the progressive stripping 1away of e¥ery concept tha:t the mind can form 1ahout God in 1thie oertainty :tha:t ev:ery on:e win he illladequaite." [50] Such "negativie knowledge" of God, the heart of a:ll aipophaltic theology (including Eckharit'1s) has deerpeT mobs iin scripturie and tihe teachings of Philo. It would 1ruppeairin even gr1eafor sharp-1D1ess in the rw1riltings of Dionysirns the Ar1opagite, whose approad1 ito God, alongside tha:t of Augustme, de1termined the oonJtent orf mY'stical theo101gy forr t!h!e next ,thousand Y'ears.

Dionysius'1s writings wiere fimt briought to the atitention of the Wiest by the tran1sla1tion10£ the ninth century sichola;rJohn Soorttrns of I11e1and.[51] Furtiher tmnslalb]ons were made in the twelfth centrury by John Sarr:rucenus, and in the fol101wing cen-1tury a series of pamaphrtaises Wle'.De writbeill hy Thomas Gallus, the Ahbot of ¥ercelili. Tihese Dionysian writings had an enormous impact on Eckhart, who like A1hert :tihe Gmat ailld '.Dhomais Aqrninas worulld ha:V'ie compos1ed a commentary on sev--erail of the 1small hooks of the A:reopagibe 1ais part of his sicho-1as1tic training. [52] Eriugena also tmnsila.bed some of tihe writings of St. Gregory of Nyssa alld St. Maximus the Confessor, whose timcihangs wieil1e :ailsio known to Eekha1r1t.[53] All wetre Nieop1art:oni!c

trend, converting the descent into an ascent, first by a purification of the carnal passions, which leads to the First Heaven, the Firmament; then by the acquisition of wisdom to which the soul, no longer clouded by these obscurities, now has access, and by which she rises, illumined, to the summit of the intelligible world, which is the Second Heaven; from which she is finally drawn up to the Third Heaven of Deification." I. P. Sheldon-Williams, loc. cit., p. 438.

50 Ibid., p. 434.

51 Hence the epithet *Eri1igena,* "born in Ireland," the ancient name of that country being Eriu.

52 On the *N*eoplatonism of Dionysius, see Henri Dominique Saffrey, O.P., "New Objective Links between the Pseudo-Dionysius and Proclus," in O'Meara, ed. cit., pp. 64-74. For Scottus's influence on Eckhart, see Rahner, art. cit., pp .400-06, 416, and Rudolf Otto, *Mysticism East and West,* trans. by Bertha Bracey and Richenda Payne (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1960), pp. 273-74.

53 See Rahner, art. cit., p. 400.

in tihiefu.- thirnking, of oour:se, as was other gileat the-o1og1iorul and srpirituruI:Source, St. Augusbine of Hippo. [54]

The Medieval Revival

A century 1before Albert"s rievival of Neoiplatonism, elements of 1the ancient /beaching had already S1Urfaood in the writings of Christian scl::iolar:s,amoi!llg them Amaury of Bene, who died in IQ07, amd Gilbert of Poi!tiers (1080-1154). ReaclJi.on at the time, occasioned especially by the perceived pantheistic implications of Amaury'1s :aind Gilbert's teachings, rwas s!trongly Il!egative. Amruury's doctrine wrus ev;en:tua.Hy oondoomed rut the Lateran Council in IQ15. Gilbert wais summoned to dediend himself ibe£orie the Council of Rheims in 1148; it is nolt oerbain rthat an official condemnation resulted. Brut m Gilber:t'1s.aittiempts rto formulate the ·diversity within. God be-1tween the Trinity ;a;nd ltihe God;head were also oondenmed by thie Fourth La:bexan Council. Related doctrinies of Origen ailld Eriugena weve condienmed. To the mind of the Western ecclesiastics, unused to the speculative la:ngiuage of :the less tU'l'lbu1ent Eastern Church, these aill ·seemed Ito 1lead rto pantihcistic or subordinationist tendencies, tJhiat is, :idientifying God with creation or i1anking !the peIJsons of the Trinity in a descending order.

The School of Cologne

Despite the oondemnaJbions of itbJe previous century, Albe.rt 1and ihis early ·disciple!s, nHW equipped with neiw :ail!d better tmnslation:s :fvom the Gr:eek, included the main 1soruroe1s of ChristiaJl Neoplrutoillsm in their plan to unify thie major inlbellecbual and spiri1tual currents of :the WesJt. Et siuceeeded in 1some hut 1a1so occrus.ioned mi iDJteinse !l.1eactbion on the

[54] Cf. John J. O'Meara, "The Neoplatonism of Saint Augustine," in O'Meara, ed. cit., pp. 34-41. For Augustine's influence on Eckhart, see especially Rahner, art. cit., p. 416. Abundant additional references will be found in the articles and books by Colledge, Kertz, Lossky, and McGinn.

part of tihe sieculax Averroists (notaibly Sigier of Brabant) and the ooD!servativie (i.e., Augustinian) 1sichoolsof iboth F11anciscan and Dominican itheologians. [55]

Most rp11ominent1amon1g:the firsit generation of s1tudents who oontinU!ed Afhe11t's effo'l't to ,synthesize the major currents of Hellenic, Christian, Is1amic, 1and Jewish thinking we11e Ulrich of Strassburg--A1ber t's favlO'rite student 1and the most ardent proponent of Albert's "Neopfatonic reviva1l" in the l,a;ter thirteenth eentury--,and the [1emarkJaib1eDietrich (Theodoric) of Freiibnrg, whom Eokhialfltoer1t1aiinlyknew 1ait Cologne 1and Paris. Otiher nota:hle Domin:iioarrsof A1he11t'sschool ,weJJe the brothers Johann 1and GerhaJ1d Eorngin of Sit:erngassen, Johannes Picardi of Liah:t:enherg, Heinrich of Lubeck, Nichob:s of Strassburg, 1and Johannes of Fl'eiiburg-a:t least \Some of whom were personally known to Eokhairt. Aft:er his death, !noteworthy mem-,ber:s of this school included the Dominican Bertho1d of Moosibmg and Heime:rich of Eampen, 1who id.iJed m1460.

Nicholas of Stmsshurg and especiiaUy the brothers Korngin well.1e less 1i;ndehted to Albert's Neop1a1tonic l1evival than were Ulrich, Dietrich, and esipiecia:lly Eckhart 1and Berthold. The completion of the Cologne School's metaphysical ,synthesis of Aristotelian ;and Neoplafonic thought was in bet moJJe success-:£u1ly realized in Eckhairt.'1stbeaching 1and pDeaching than :in the works of :any of Alhe'1:1t'searlier studeITTits.[56] His aceompHshment seems to have had disastrous consequences, however, leading in s1everialinstances to 1the condemned p1'oposit1o'Ill!sof 13Q9.[57]

[55] Cf. Tugwell, op. cit., pp. 55ff., and Alain de Libera, op. cit., pp. 54-5.

[56] See de Libera, op. cit., pp. 234f.

[57] " Along with John the Scot and Nicholas of Cusa, Eckhart is arguably the most systematic of the Latin Neoplatonic dialecticians, and he is the one who suffered the most for it. The majority of the twenty-eight propositions from his works condemned by Pope John XXII in the bull 'In Agro Dominico' of March 27, 1329, involve or imply aspects of his appropriation of Neoplatonism. Three of them (articles 23, 24 and 26) relate directly to his doctrine of God . . . . " McGinn, "God as Absolute Unity," p. 129.

Eckhart' s Neoplatonism

!As .a philoooiphicrulaJttitudeor sensibility, Christian P1atonism (a:nd Neop1a!toniiSlll) mamriresitsrerba:in charrucberiSlticfeatures, moSlt if n!Olt all of rwh:ic:h;are evidenft in Eckhart's. ibea.chmg: a heJ:ie:fin the mtJelligib:ilityof rex;perienceand the veialityof ideal forms, inite:rpretJeda:s retemrulidea.sin. the mind of Gord; a notion of pa:rticipiaitiornin 1bcing om a scale; a oonviction of the prteieminenoeand in1tJe11dependooceof unity, truth, beauty, arnd goodnes:s; rarrrd ra oommitmerut rbo the sovimieign power of low. To these may ibe :added a. tendency towards pisychophysiical dualism, ra yiea.am.:in:gfor otihel'1W10111cHiiness;rand am ontological viiew of .the dregl1eiesm lewls of rerulity.

For the Christian P1aitomslt, the human mdividuail is primarily spmt, although invo·lrvedin earthly erisrbenJce1as a harmoniously :Nmcbioning.whole of hotly, mind, a:nd spirit. Our sipiritual and ibh1e11efo!l'letrrne home is not of tihe earth, however, :but lies in ra ffilJpl'laJSe111Jsorydimension ibeyond time, spruce, :and matter. Hiuma:nikilldhas no· !a.bidingcity on eartth. In rbhis respect, Eokhartt'rs philosophicrul;ancestry is part of 1an :anciernit txrudition,ra vitaJ component of classical Christian theology rand spliriituality.

Mo·re specifioaJly, tlre influence of P1otinus upon Eckhart's doal:cin!e,whetbherdirocrtor mediated through :thle oocient trrudirtiorn of Ohri.srti!arnmysticism, is manifold: from the "boimg" metaphor for the il[llllerIife of Gord, :to the vision of the 'created universie a.s ;an ,and contriacting emanrution from the Godhead, 'to :the irma1ge of the soul's journey hack to God tbnough tthe 01bsta.c1eisof time, srpiwe,1and multiplicity or oorpo·l'lrulity;[58] :the 1ancieirut Alex:a:ndrianideal of "disipa:sisionate equallJJi.miity" (*ataraxia)* rbecame a oorrnerstonJeof the psychologioa1 a1s1creticismEckhart i[)[1omorted:irn. his sermons.[59]

[58] ·See Woods, op. cit., 89-91, 128-31. For the influence of Proclus on Eckhart, see Schiirmann, op. cit., p. 248 n. 6 and p. 265 (under Schrimpf).

[59] Eckhart said, "when a man's heart grieves for nothing: *then* a man has the essence and the nature and the substance and the wisdom and the joy

To the pl'iogram of hJs, Dominican Nroplatonic predecessors, which ibuilrtupon tihe Neo-Arugusitiniantiheme of divine desc1ent iM!Jd retrul'!lllculminating in the inrtieUeciuaJvision rorf God, Eckhart diul'!thfil" added !tihe thematic of the ,birth of the Wo:rd in the :sool;and rthe dynamic vision of s:ucoossivie" ibmakthroughs " ;a;s :the soul ascends evier higher leviels of 1aw:areness and immediacy in ih& return rbo God. By th:ws ":internalizing" :the Albertine 1synlbhies[sma spiritual docl:rirueof immense scope and power, Eckhia:rrt aittmnrpibedto 1hring the work orf the Oologne Schoo[1to completioo, 1ailttil101Ughhe never finished his •aa.'1iculation of :thirut vii:siion.

Eckhart' s Divergence from Neoplatonism

As noted earliler, 1to l'!eg:aru Eckiha11t !Simply :rus: a medieval Neoplaibonist WiQlU1d lbe 1an oviersimplificaltion. Lilre ms great .OOIJ.fuieres Albert and Tihomas Aquinas, he W1a1S ooadenncally eclectic. The Neorplatonic striand in ihis te-achmg is only one ·among many elements in a complex, multiform system. lit is und!emaiblya major component, borth srl:ruotUI"aillyand 1subsbantially, hwt Olll!e already modified when he received it !by centiuries of Christtian inlteripreibatiion (and misinterpretation). Eckhar:t rbrlansfurmedit eviein more.

Desrpwe the ,SJimi1rucity of p:1otinU1s teiaching to Christian spiritualiity, especially !that of Eckhart, there 1are many importantt diffierienres. One of rllhe mostt siignificant concerns the rplaoo orf 1aotion. For Plotin'llls, 1any k:md of inVlo•lwment in the world weaken1edoontemplrubion,whicih he regiarded .rus the high-1est fOTm of human .activity. For the great Christian spirilbwal

and all that God has. *Then* the very being of the son of God is ours and in us and we attain to the very essence of God." (DW 76. Sermon 7 [Walshe trans., I: 67]) Here, Eckhart's emotional *abgeschiedenheit* or detachment, so akin to the ancient Christian *apatheia,* is not an attempt to smother sensibility or feeling but rather to achieve inner harmony: "You may think that as long as words can move you to joy or sorrow you are imperfect. That is not so. Christ was not so. . . - Therefore I declare that no saint ever lived or ever will attain to the state where pain cannot hurt him or pleasure please." (DW 86. Sermon 9 [Walshe trans., I: 87])

wciter:s without ,exception, hoiwevier, the !true 'i:Jes:t of authentic ICIOIIlitemp1ittionwas charita.b1e iservioe to those in need. This wa:s no foss true for Ec'.IDhart: "A.is I ha.ve odltein s1aid, eVien i£ a man rw:erie in a mptwe St. and knew 1a >Sliok man who needed some 1soup £rom him, I shoru1d tihink it far 1bcit1e:r you 1ert 1tlhe :rrupblll'le for ,Jovie 'a'Il!d would se:rrv;e tl:he needy man in greater lovie." [60]

Notr is iit to 1the o[pm1e speculation !Sought hy Pla-'tomst and Middle-PLatoi:niistmy,stics, much Jes1s the ecstatic uniOill of the 'later Neop1ato1UiS!bs,tthJaJt Eckhart summons us. Rather, he ibedmns us ,towall1ds the desie:rtt of unknowing dear to the Greek mystical tmdiJtion of A1exandria, who,se pioneer was Philo the Jew a:nd 'Whoise most eloquent ca:ribogl'!apher w:as St. Gregory of Nyssia.[61]

AltliObhermajor divellgenete (lonoorns tlre :role of griaoe. Cleaa:--ly, at least insofar as Plotinus was capable of articulating his own experience, conJtempLation of •the One wirus achiev:ed hy means of human effort, the unaided work of the soul. fu au-:thientic Christman spmrburulity, while the ,3JcihieV!ementof con-'bronplaition ihy self-:direcb.irn1is not only possible but in some degree neeessary, the 1oomp1ettionof rtlre ooul':s jourrm.eyrto God is only 1hy God'is 1gift of grace, when, iha:vingexhatusltedits orwn caip1acirti1es,humalll oonscioru:snes1s,now prus1sive and still, *is* filled wiith tJhe :inrush (or, in Eckhart's rw:ay, the" upsurge") of fuat Presence. Here too despite ,ailJ. his ooneurrence !With Neo-pla;tonic thorugJ:rt, Eckhart is solidly one wiith the orthodox Chrisrtioo.itmdition:

60 *Ooun8el8 on Discernment,* trans. by Hilda Graef, .Ancelet-Hustache, op. cit., p. 79. For discussion, see Woods, op. cit., pp. 144-47. Rudolf Otto noted that Eckhart's concept of love was not that of the emotional love-mystics. "Nor has his *agape* anything in common with the Platonic or Plotinian *eros,* but .•. is the pure Christian emotion in its elemental chastity and simplicity without exaggeration or admixture." Op. cit., p. 232. Cf. p. 231.

61 In some respects Eckhart's spirituality even more closely resembles that of Evagrius of Pontus. The resemblance is acute in another respect as well: elements of Evagrius's spiritual doctrine were also pronounced posthumously-and it now seems erroneously-heretical. Cf. Louth, *Origins,* pp. 100-13.

The grace which the Holy Ghost brings to the soul is received without distinction, provided the soul is collected into the single power that knows God. This .grace springs up in the heart of the Father and flows into the Son, and in the union of both it flows out of the wisdom of the Son and pours into the goodness of the Holy Ghost, and is sent with the Holy Ghost into the soul. And this grace is a face of God and is impressed without co-operation in the soul with the Holy Ghost, and forms the soul like God. *This* work God performs alone, without co-operation. [62]

Conclusion

Given the joSltling for dominrunce ramong philosophical sysr!Jems in the Midd1e Ages as well as in more 11eoonttt:imes, it is difficu1t !to concluding that no phi1osophy can claim prrivilegied ,sibrutus a;s the fmmework best suilbed to rarticu1aite :!Jhe ChriSJtia:nfiaith in 1a rerusonruhle malllller. For rrrudfoaJlydiffering syistems of tthorught have in faict fuootioned in that capacity, ISOllle more, some les1s srutisfaicrtorily1aicoorrdmgto rthe prairtioo1a:r eX!ige:nciesotf the day. Further, sevieTialof these riv;a;l cl.aimanrts tend to reappear disconcertingly as currents of thought shift and charngie. Thus, ne]tlrer PLatonism nor Aristotelianism, Kanrtian:ism nor Mrurxism, oor any oilier way of ithinking can he disqruali:fied:rus ra potential "handmaid (J·f 'theology" so 1ong as iit aidequaltely moots the 1chal1engreof irrterp11etinghuman experi-1mLC1e in its time.

Nevertheless, in much of ithe Wesit, ra certain *odium theologicum* still dings rbo E aiS1bern Christi.run itlmugihrt,induding its Noorpla;tonichexitaige. Yet tilris ancienlt tmclition is deiairly rerp1eibe with wisdom 1and depths of tr:rnth. And it siho:u1d theredione give us pause when, for ins:tance, R. T. WiaJlis ohseT'VeiS rthait "the dominairutrtIDend of Christian. theology, in horth its Platonic :and Aristotelian forms, hrus always heen Neop1at00Jic." [63] Moreovier, it i:s surely worrth noting rt.that when the grerut mystics of the Church a'btempted ito :Lay oiUJt tibJeir teach-

s2nw81. Sermon 64 (Walshe trans., 2: 125).
For discussion see Woods, op. cit., pp. 142-44.
63 Wallis, op. cit., p. 160.

ing, rbhey chamcteristica1ly gmwita;ted the P:laitornic-Neopla1tonic ,ooocrdina;beson :the phi1osophioal chart. Perhaps tnot !the griea1tes1t,hut hwrdly the Lea.sit aimong ,them wais Meis1ter Eckhart.

Ohris1t1ain Platonic 'and Neorplarn!ton:iicm:fluenoe rsurvived its condffillJ1Ja:tionin Amamy's, Gilbert's, rand Eck!hail'1t',steaichings, 1a:ppearmg hoth in its Dinn;yisian, sp:i:rti:tua1 expvession :in *The Cloud of Unknowing* a1nd in rsimifar wo1'1ks up 1to the masrterful itheology and poe1b'y of St. John of 1the Cross.]Jt arlso perdured 1m philosophical dlorm in the ₓwr!istingisof Nichofa;s of Cusia, Marsilio Ficino, Pico deHa .l\i[ir1ando1a,Giordano B11uno, tihe Cambridge Platonists, Descartes, Spinoza, Schelling, and Bergson, among other:s.[64] Only recerrtly, howevier, ha1s the immens1e treasmy of 1thi1s ancient Christian tradition once more begun to :find appmcia1tion amoug W'es1ter111 scholars and spiritual writers.[65]

Today, recovering this ovierlooked s1tmnd of Christian thought 1and 1i£e ca:n help to aidvianoe !bhe uudemtanding of Eckhart',s theology :and spiritualiity, a1s well 1as th:ait of Albeirt tihe Grea1t all!d his immedia1tie di!scip1es. The profound and rperv;a:siveemphrusis on the uniJty aJD!d intemgiihilirty of God, the "boiling" metaphoil1s,1the dynamic sbrucbU11eof emanatiion 1and return, and his chariaeterisitic in:terpre1ta:tionsof anafogicail rwttriJhut:ionrand par,ticipation can in :some insitance'She under-:s'tood *only* in 1the light of ancient A1e:x;anidria. Recirpmca.1ly, as Vlaidimir Lossky perceivied, 1a thomugh appropriaition o.f Eckha1rrt's rtiheologiea:lopiem:mss to the Earslt can as1sisrt ill1 ecumeni-(Jail diai1ogue.with Orthodox Ohrisrbians,much :as his worb have rfo,s1ler1ed d]a1ogue in J,apan and dsewhere.[66]

One w;a,y or another, for het1ter or wio'l.'se, tha1t Eekha:rit adopted a[!]ld adapted 1a, £undamenta:1ly Neoplwtonic s1tmcture

64Qf. D. P. Walker, *The Ancient Theology, Studies in Ohristian Platonism from the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries* (London: Duckworth, 1972). Cf. ,also Louth, *Origins,* pp. 179-204 and Macquarrie, op. cit., passim.

65 For an eloquent argument in defense of reappropriating the original philosophical tradition of Christian mystical spirituality and dogma, see .Andrew Louth, *Discerning the Mystery* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983).

66 See Woods, op. cit., pp. 200-01.

for his in'terrpreta1tion of the theological and srpirTtu1almysticism he rpromorbed cannort be 'Sieil.']ous,ly doubted. Ev<en so, it is important to rememberr that Eckhart wias far *more* than a medi-ev:al Neoplaibonist. Through the ,ages the 'temptation to fit him 1niti0 1some 1cons1tricibingsy:s1tem of thought hias :been powerful and pe:rviasivie.Yiet, unsurprisiingly, the aiuthority :and richness rof his words; have survivied efforbs to confine a!lJJd use him, 1b11e1akingthrough rbo 1awa:kenand enlighten sti11 ano,bher generia-1tionof listeners.

THE UNITY OF THE VICES

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W.E SOMETIMES describe someone 1rus "just plain mean, ·· or ·· Just plam d1shonesit, orr ·· JUSt pJam unW." Or we say" thaJt wrus ·a just plain ·stupid thing rto do.," from tlhese and lik!e descriiptions, we can ask, are there any "just plain" vices? By this I mean, are :amy vices pure, 1e.g., can rthere he Cl'llleltyhut nort injustice or in!t:Jempertance;intemperance hut no!t a £ailill'e orf pmctical wisdom, cowardice but not intemperance or injustice, and so on? Is therie perhaps a unity of the vices? Is each ;a col'l'IU!ptionthrat involves the coITUpitingctontriburtion of the othe'l'IS? If there is ,a, run:iityof the vicies,then 1be:inigra vicious individual is Il!Ort siinply 1a ma!bter o:f failing :across the dimensioill of one or rrunothe.r ·Cihaa:iae1becisltic.]t ms tan *extensi,ve* diaiilure,1a unified (:if l[JIOrt toit.al) failure, even if it is most evident 1and preVialent in one or another •specific respecit. 'f1his iis not to isay thrut .theiie is just *one* vice, .any moil'!e 1than '!Jo .endorse the unity of it.he virtues is to reduce tth:em to Ollle. There .are many woes OOlld many virrbues, eaiCh respeotively h!ruving to do with dillemnt 1and variously !l'le1aibedcrupacirties,motives, emotions, and tiiaiits. Yet, rut least with respect to the virtues a good caise can be mrude :that they .are unified, aind thrut ·AnisbotLewas oorrreot in concluding that practical wisdom :and viWtuesof cha;riacter mum occur <together. To rhe just requiIDes a right conception of wthirut to do rand the romage to earry :iJt ouit, without rbalcing more ;than onie',s share. Eivien tempemnce J1equires .a right .appreheTIJsionof goods, the

strength to ignore desire (a kind of courage), and a judgment of proporttion and fittingness (1a kind of jusrbice). One *does* do Ollleselfan injusitiicieby intemperiancie.

Exiamples such as rthese may s1eem a hit forced, or we may 1be ;aible rbo think of cases t:biatt appwenttly resist unifying interrpretations. But the oll!es thail:. can ,be ro in1lerpreted are not exceprti0111s or oon:tingiem coincidence of conoeiptua.l overlap. Eaich o.f the virtues J'leaMy *does* need the oibhers, or irt will be impei!IDoot,either mrtih.e object of the 13idt, iits q;U!aJityof perform-.a:nre, or the tEIUit thait *it* flows £mm. On the Olther hand, we lruo1w thalt unjust people oan be temperalbe, cowards can be wise, the initempe11a1tecan he 1braive and comp:ais:sionait:eand so on. How de we reoonci1e the claim of tbhe unities of the virtues or vices with these facts?

The exp1anat:ion lies :in the difference between naturial viil'ltues iand mo'l1al vil'lbues. As Aquinais notes:

> Moral virtue may be considexed as perfect or as imperfect. An imperfect moral virtue, temperance for instance, or fortitude, is nothing but an inclination in us to do some kind of good deed, whether such inclination be in us by nature or by habituation. If we take moral virtues in this way, they are not connected, since we find men who, by natural temperament or by being so accustomed, are prompt in doing deeds of liberality but are not prompt in doing deeds of chastity. But the perfect moral virtue is a habit that inclines us to do a good deed well; and if we take moral virtues in this way, we must say that they are connected [1]----

We taike tthis difference between impedoot 1and perfect vir<tue rbo liie chiefly .in the oo!ll!tri:bution of 1rugency tbo rthe 1ait:ter. A moliaJ viritue is DJolt a virtue one juistt happens 1Jo have. Some

[1] *Summa theofogiae* I-II., q. 65, a. I. This agrees with an even earlier expression of the opinion stated in Augustine's *De Trinitate* vi, 4 where he says: "If you say these men are equal in fortitude, but that one is more prudent than the other, it follows that the fortitude of the latter is less prudent. Consequently they are not really equal in fortitude, since the former's fortitude is more prudent. You will find that this applies to the other virtues if you run ocver them in the same way."

peorpLe ,are "n1atw11ally" or hy inclination phys]c1a;l cowards, .some aire not. But whether or not one is coumgeous in the sense of posses:sing th:e moral v:i,rtue i1$, as AriistoUe :says, .a matlter of lmow1edgie, choice, rand Cl."li:araciter. Of coume coming to have the virtues perfecitly inv;olves conscious :habituatfon, experience, guidance, iand perhaps even facto11soutside the range of one'1s choices. But it 1also es:sentially (if inJOit exdusively) involves imposing the chamaicteris1ticupon onesieilf, that is, intentionailly hringing it 1a1bou1t thait one is morally virtuous iand per£orming 1aobionsbemuse the .actions are of the right type.

':Dhe natur1a:l virtues a,11e *not* unified. An indiv1du:al's charitraJb1e nwture may ovie1rride oonside:mrtions of jusrtice or desert, thus is1sruingin an exagge!l.iaJtedwillingness to excuse the wrongdoing of oithers. An individurul'1ssense of jus1tice may motivate him bo 1act:ions tha:t put him .at un11ea:sonahlerisk:, 1a kind of merirtoriorus :riecldessnies:s.An individuars 'tempemnoe may ha¥e no relation fo. an undersibanding of her needs and goods. She may just not have par:tioularly :strong desi11es of any kind. :Ruirltheirexamp1es 1al'e eaisy to multiply.

l!n each 1mse the person ha:s a good qua1ity, and may or may not ihe tarnished hy the 1ahsernoe of some ot!her qwality. Someone could, we 1suppose, he a good per1son "aH a.round" trlniougrh natural vrntrue. But naiturial virtues ,are less than mor:a:l vinbu!es in thwt they liack mutual reinfol'leement and orienJtrution. As .such they a11e nJ01t competerut to deiwl wi-th "hard ioaises" or or oonft:icts. Which one preva ils will ibe 1a mrutlter of 1the rela;bive srtrength of chamcteris1tios, nort of right judgmelllt and exertion.

The momJ vii11buesdo oomp1emerut, complete, and dil'ect each other. They a11e not one, but they a1re unified. Arnd no one of them 1s pmperly ,a mo·ml viritue in ,the wbser11ce of the 01the11s. 1\lue cruel :aill!d thieving giang member who 1s'tops a bulleit for his buddy is brave huit is not an eXJampleof oom1aige1as a moral v:1rtuie. This is so ev:en if he performs the a1c1t knowingly, hy ohoioe, rand :from a fi:xJed cha11acberisitic.The rad is no1t guided by a time a1pprehension of :righitends; it is in ·service to injustice,

and 1bemg unjuJst inviolves (i:ntempe:r1arbely)violating pcinciples 0r.f deise:rit. The good :that he doe s his pwtner does nroit newtraHze m ovierride the w:riongfulness of !his :action as 1a whole.

In his 1book *The Virtue8',* Geach ·a::r:giues ®gainst the unilty of the virtues. In cha:rta.abei:rizing the vi!ew he :sbaites:

> There is a tacit assumption that if a man's habit of sound moral judgment is vitiated anywhere it is vitiated everywhere. This would follow only if men formed their judgments with vigorous consistency; but notoriously they do nothing of the kind, and we may thank God that they do not.[2]

Acoo[l'lding to Geach's viiew it is thaJt tihe coward, insofar rus he Lacks the virtue of ooumgie, also suffers imprudence in 1siJbu:a:tio11.1s1 whwe corumgie:iis oal1ed for; tbwt hooaase of an inoonsisbet:l!cyof character, the de£eot of impmdence mighit not •Carry over 1and 1affect his oither viritues.

We :agree thaJt this kind of inoonsisflle111cyis possible, but we do 1not think this in i!tself shorws tha:t ibhe mo[l'laJ virtues axe noit unified. T!here 1are obher plausible exp1aI11a.ltioilllS. One's *natural* vi:vtues could override dierects in mo'1"a:l viribue. For e:x;ample, :suppose ·an individuail is lacking in justice. Tills involv,es defedbs in the other moral virituies, £or ex;a:mpJeprudence. But iam *inclination* of his, say, E1be'.J.1ality may 1ruppiarerublycompensate fo[' ithe mo([']al failing. So while his moml character involves defects itha:t are extensive, tJhe defects are noit £ully or automaiticaMy ['leflected in raction. Whart in .fact he does and why he does it will ra1so·depend piaritly upon his other ohwa.oberistics. Or, consider ibhe case in which someone is 1a moral corw:ardhut is iby incli1I1:aitio111pmde:nt, has giood ,sense :abowt needs and ends . .A!s 1a resullt, while the vioe of 00Wiard:ice undermines his indinied virtue of prudence in situ11Jtions in which oourage called for, his inclination :to ·be pmdoot is DiOt undemmmed in situiartiionswheI1e other vil'ltues besides oouvage 1are more focally called upon. Most people 1are DJatumlly in some respects and .also narturally inclined lbo some vices. Much of

[2] Peter Geach, *The Virtues* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977)' pp. 164-165.

the 1time tihese inoonsisitencies of charaeteil.' can ooexi>st quite s1tably, even if '1llolt happily.

In any case, we ail"e in to:tal ag.rteemellltwith Geach when he 1sayis 1that ithaJt "If 1a man's ha1bit of sound moml judgme1J11tis virtiiafod anyiwhere, then :it is *at risk* eVierywhere; but not all dangel"s issue in disa1sit1e'f!s."[3] But 1thes1e dis1as!ters arie aV1eTted r.not because of ,any moml str1ength of characil:er th:ait the agent 1truly ihas bUJt heca:use of a me11e inc1ilJJaition<to behave in a eertain Wiay.

Besides the between the pierrfecitmoria11virtrues and the vir.tues of iinclinrution, anoither tha1t we think is !'e1evant he11e is the distinot1on between vice or evil *habit* .and sin or evil *act.* Lt 1seems pois1sible rtiha1t a man may perform an evil act even rbhough he does noit possess the col".l'esponding evil habit. As Aqu:inrus s1ays "for, jus1t 1a1s hrubiit is not engendered by one a1Clt, so neilther iis it des1tm;)liedhy on!e 1act."[4] So a man may mnceivahly commit 1a co1W1airdly :aClt, though ibeing no (loward. Hurt wb!rut distinguishes the mwa:rdly act of a cowa:rd and the corwardly 1act of 1the coufla,geous mau? The 1a.nswer is thrnt the cowial'ldly 1aot of :the courageous man is :an ,act which is, ,forr him, ouit of cha1racter and as such does no:t, unlike the act of the eo1ward, entail defects in the oHmr mm·al virtues. This may seem pamdorioal, foll.' how could 1any oowardly a;crt not also be, :llor example, imprudent? Cowardice, after all, is a v:ioe heoause we need tio maina1ge:fear dfecitively to giert on with what is necesis1aJ'yand ,wor1th doing. The answer is that for the couriageous man the cowia:rdly a.at is UI!!derstood to he *both* impmdenlt ia;nd out of cha,raeber. It is :not jusrt that he fee1s badly aibouit his ac1t; he a1lso appreciaites ilie va;rfous J.1espectsmwhich :i!t is 1a failme. And in seeing it as out of character, he 'has 'all the mofl'le ·rieaison rbo istrengithen his resolve 'bo 1aitta:in perfiect vil1bue and av10'id the 1tiendency to vice.

The morally virtuous individu1rul hrus arlJt,ained a right con- of ends and the pmper means to realize them; the

[3] Ibid., p. 165.

[4] *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 71, a. 4.

Il!aJtumJly vi11tuous individual has not. The conltra1st does nolt turn on inclinations being more labile or unreliable than moral vi:r>tues. 'Ilhe former may he very :firm ox srtable. Mo11eover the n:aituil'ally vi11tuous rindividual may giener1a1lyno1t he oornfused or .impeded maction by "b.ar:d easies" or nnvelty. Alt times he rmay, 1and lthien me may find his re1sourroes iinoompe1be!I1to'l.' un-oel'l:Ja1in in 1bhreir direetives. Hut the main rpo:inlt of co111iCT'last is thait mo11al virtues 11eflieot1a 1evel of 1agency wh1oh involves un-dersitanding 1and self-determin1ation engiaged to t:hat under-sltanding, 1a 1leviel tihJait tis 1ruhsen1t foom iinc1ination-grounded ac-tion. Na,tu11a1lvri:r1tues1a1rie ll101t to he despised, and 1aclts:thait fLorw 1f110m 1tJhem 1are not w:iithout moml Wiortlh. But, using the fan-giuiage of Fr1a:nk£u:rt,mom1l virtues are oha1racter]s,tiosthait re-fiecrt second order volitions.[5] The aiotis:thait flow fil1om them •are not H11e reis:ultof ways one just hrupens to be. And the undeil'-,starnding involvred in moml vrntues makes mo'ral misdireotion 1es;s li1"ely. Again, mnswder suoh t.lrings rus mis1applied oomprus-sfon, or paiti:errce,whioh can involve u1mairness1and imprudence.

P errharpis*it* .is heoausie rbhe mo:rial V1mtueis rare unified that it is 1so *hard* to rbe 1good. They invo1vie a complex reperrto:We of judgmenits, d1sposi!tiorrs, and moti¥es. No one of them can he oomp1ete on its own, and wie c1an't oome to have tJhem simply 1hy decis1on. One oan til.'y rbo he move coumgeous bU1t caill't ibring it rubout meriely hy init1emaleommanid. Self-imposrutiion in-

[5] In " Freedom of the Will and 'The Concept of a Person," H. Frankfurt writes, "Someone has a desire of the second order when he wants simply to have a certain desire or when he wants a certain desire to be his will. In situations of the latter kind, I shall call his second-order desires "second-order volitions" or " volitions of the second order." Now it is having second-order volitions, and not having second-order desires generally, that I regard as being essential to being a person." *Journal of Philosophy* 68 (1971) : 5-20.

The wanton is the individual who is not a person because he lacks second-order volitions.

The difference between natural virtue and moral virtue could be cast in the terms of Frankfurt's analysis. Moral virtue involves the sort of full-:fl.edged intentional agency of second-order volition. .Acting wantonly need not involve acting wrongfully. One's natural or first order inclinations may coincide with moral virtue, but they cannot constitute it.

vo1ves choice hut is not 1sirrnply choioe. The point here is not jusit " whart good is jrustiJCe if you're too much of ia, coward to do the jusit thing? w1ay of pruibti:ngit confuses rtihe is:sue 1a ibit. If y;ou *are* too much of a t00wa:rd rthen, whatever 1the quality of y;ourr judgmeiITt aJ:l!d undersfanding, you don't re1ally ihavie the vi11tuieof jus1ti<oe. Biu:t ac1ting justly or ooumgeousiy or wis:ely or whaibever may nJOt a1ways involve strenuous or ohvi-!ouis demands upon 01t!her vi11tues.

Suppose a firm has developed a new p:roduot and ·is ru:ix1ous 1to marikiet iit with high hopes of the11eihy recovie11ing a la:rger markiet ·siJ::ua,re r£or the firm. It is b11ought to the a:ttention of management 1thrut rthe devioe can be ea1sily misused and caus:e injury. Members of 1the engli'.JJJeeringderpartme111texplain thia:t 1the problem cannot he remedied wiltih juist a change in the in-1Sitl'luotionsfor use; a minm hut design change i:s needed. Thie herud of the firm considers the situaition and decides to delay in1trioduotion of the pmduct urntil the neces-s1a:ry oorredtion has ,been made. (This tiakes time and money and meains changing 1the p'11omotional oampiaign, 1and so forth.) There a,re many different pos siible ,reasons for :the decision, in-cluding .fea.r of legal a,otion or had public re1aition:s or consid-em1tion of the firm's long- term eoon:omic irrter est. Burt the hea.d of IJ:Jhe firm may he worried abornt mor e rthan jus:t the economic m legal He may he t1aking s1erinusly the relevant mom1l oonsiideraitions. If he i1s ,acting on them, then he is aorting pmden:tly, in 1the morwl 1and not just the narrowly economic sense, rand his ;prudence is connected with the other centrail virtues. If his under1standing is practical, rtiha!t is, if it really plays an aoti:on-guiding l'lole, 1then hiis dispo sitions to choose and 1acrt are engia"ged anid guided by prudenoe. Temperance, cour-age, and justice wlso figure in the choice and the act, and all are needed fo ca,rry 1the deci1siion thl'ough. His rpmdence con-sis1ts in a complete understanding of what 1s fair, rersponsi:ble, honeisrt,a.nd in a1coord with the interests of others. The act in-volvies his guiding lhis inte!l1es1tsand inclinartions in conformity with 1an of the moral The choiicie

amd !the 1action. iare fue T1esults of 1a complex o[ihrub.iit:s or tendencies tl:ua:t a1l contribute i3J11d oan jointly be well or ill ordered. Undersrtrunding is ·Cl"lJ!cial, but iit does IlOlt funatio'l1 on its own. And ;a, moral :llrurlurein th!is case wou1d *nm* simply he 1a failure of u:ndersitand:ing. Jn fact, e:xiaminaitiionrevea:Lsrt:l:ua:t it would 1be very hard to dirugnose any :liailureor 1ack of virtbue.ais " simple " or O'l1e dimensional. Moml :failures 1arr:e easily and often *described* thrut way because onie or 1anortiher foatu11e is ourbsibrund-1ing m o[main illlbel'est. Hut in fa.cl, 1a pmoson. is *not* just .plrnin. mean, or just p1ruin selfish, or just plain mW1ardly. Each of rthese vioe•s is a multiple tliaiilureor lack. Tiheir being identified 1rus this orr 1tJhrurt 1speoific vice is ·a mrubber of focus ·and the mo•rially doo:ninia1t1t£ea:tu11es of the aiet or situartiioo..

]jt is noit diffi·cu]t to see horw a pal'tioula;r vice can. undermine or oorrupt 1some ort:her vivtue. For exiample, rthe corwail"d may not he aible to get himself :to perform whrurt jlU'srt:ice demand:s. Or .the ·individual lacking in knowledge of goods and needs may not 'have 1a sound 1gmsp of whitt rbempemnoe would involve. It iis at lea.st pall'ltlyroocaiusehe doesn'it *know* what's igood for him that he acts immoderately, and not only because of inoontinence or delibemlte Wil'IOngful choice of the pleiaisurable over tJhe good. Burt the daim I .am ,arguing :£or is a hit di:ffie11ent fmm this. It i!S nolt thrut :tJhe preoonoe of ,a given vioe is likely ,to lead to other modes of corruption. Rarther, it is thrurt *any* vice 1already invol'Vles manifold corruption. Herie it might be oibjeated ithrurt a moral vioo does not e:xibeinsivielyinvolve Olther moml defeats hut that *it* just makreis rbhe ortiher virtues hiaroer to 1atbain and 1Susrbain. For exiample, it is noit tihat oo.w,ardice :involvies injustice. Rrurther, the oowiaiI'd, on. rrucooulllt of his oowiarclioe ;will find it hooder ito· perform (:alt lerust some) just acts. Miter ·all, many momlly :signifioant 1siiibuatiions make dema;nds upon more than one vi:rtbue.

We have a tW10-fi01d resipo!IllSe rto this sugges:tion. First, it 1see:ms clea:r thait prudence is involvied in .aill of the moral virtues .since without the orienbrution pmvides they cam1ot he effectively eX!e11cised. We need our .action-guiding chail".aclecisrticsto ,be engaged :to llight ends. Wihen Socvartres,in the *Meno* says

"All spiritual qualities in and by themselves are neither advantageous nor harmful, but become advantageous or harmful by the presence with them of wisdom or folly." *(Meno* 88 d)

he expresses what we a1.1e indicating here. But we do not distill ia11 of the virttues iillto just rthe iOOl!'e, wisdom.

Secondly, ilt is corned thrut one sorlt of mora:l drefoot does malre the orther virrrtuies harder. But one vice no1t only makes vintue h!arder, irt :veally does include defects aicross the other moral dimensions. OoWtaridice is nort just ran imped:ime!Illt to being just; injmtice is ingredient in cowardice, in that the lat- rbetr p11evients one from]acing reaisoilllableriskis rand :t:he seTVice of jlll!stioeorften 11equires'lihiat we do just that. To succumb to fear fa to disengage oneself from doing what is owed to others rand reven to oneself.

'Eo il.lrustxrute,let's oompare :the moml vi11tues wiith physical mbueis on ithe queis'tion of unity. An :athlete may have the inclination o'l.' natw:al vWtue of speed 'buit may very well lack the viitues of s\i::rlengt:h, sitruminia, or 1agility. Still, !through in<Dentional effort he oo1i1 develop his 1strengith, agility, and stamiIJJa, which in the end wrill also I'leillnforcehis rspeed and elllahle him to use it beitter. By vigorous ooniditiioill:mgand good hirubits, the athlete not only becomes stronger but also becomes faster, has more stamina, and is more agile. And if by laick of proper condiltioning and had 'haibits 1tl:ue a:thleite'1sphysical streD1gth deter- 'SO will '.his Olbher physical virtues. The whole phyisical ro11ganiismwill dete:riorare, and the unity of the deterio;r:aJtionwill he rp11opoT1tioiJJJaJtto rf:lhe severity of the deterioriation of !the 0I11e fooa:l oapacity. If the deteriomtion. of istrength is slight, :the effects on speed, iagility, and srtamina may well 'be rsligh:t or evien imperrerptib1e. Bwt a significant derteri011rutionin any rone ca11dmalcapacity will mevitia1blyresult in :am 1exibmtslivieiailrure of :pib.yisicalv:fil-.tue.

Don'it W1e find t!he 'Sirume11esultwith ,the moml virrbues? A de-,£eot in one oosipeot rexmends 1bhroughout a whole reper:toire of 'capacities and chwaiClbel'listics. Especirully when ra vice is p11eisent to ,a hlgih degree, rtib!e morial oha:riadtrerrus 'a complex whole is

degraded. The efieC1tof 1esser degrreiesof vioe may be ismall and reV1en .impell'oeptible. Thie geneTlrul:iiSLSure of 1specify.ing iboundaiI'lies 1betwteen vice 1rund virtues is 1a diffiou.Jt and iimpmecise one, a;nd can sometimes be difficuJrt:bo judge on the pl'lesence of a vice. Butt the 1al'lger danger ·is: rthart oine 11ooogniize 1a v:ice, regard it (evien if correCltly) as sJirght 1and ;aooepit rbe wllil:1mg to "live :itt." 'I"he problem :iis nott tlhat rnl!e is noit fiamaticwl enough mieTta:dioatingevrery trrace of woe--<we do;n'it mean *that.* Th.e problem, rather, is the idea that character can be compartmenrtialized, :and one or 1anoithrerferuture of it sa:fely ooiillfirnedrand kept out of triaffic wiJth 1the Consider tlhe mdiwdua1 :WhJo 1seems Ito e:xihibiJt jusitioe, OOIU1J.Uge, rand prudence, 1bu;t is lD-iflempeil'lrute. He regards his inrtemplel'lance etiither ras desiirrahfo or a1s tolerirubleiin 1tihe respect rtJhart :iJt dores not undermine this good chamcteicistfos. Butt itntemperianoe not :isoJ;ruhleiin ibhat way or :fi:xied Ito· only oe:rrtain abjrecitrs, suoh ,a;s drugs, :food, or what hruve you. There is 1a rtendency to tthink of virlue1s 1and vices as coi!."J1elaltedMith cenbmin typical objoots or hel::uaviors. To an extent this is correct, hut it is a mistake if this notion is elevated to the status of a universal truth or completely reliable generalization. There is, upon examination, something odd about saying for example," he's just, courageous, and prudent; he just drinks too damn much." I£ ihe dmn!kis 1boo much he 1rullows his iinttempemnce (through the aigrency of a1oohol) to degraide a;ll of his caprucities for right ,action. He is unfair to himself ruid othieTs 1hy :being wmnk 1when he should be iSoher, a:nd so ro'l.'1ili. ffis wealmess :ihr :alooihol is not a rtofoTtruhleoosit in the oonte:xit of the m1ue of his virtbues. It :ils in :ilbself 1a d.r.allm. on ,those 1assebs. To tolerabe L1.1a1ther than 1empfoy hiis other :oosomoos :lJo OV1ereome is rbo ·rullo1w irt Ito undermine his iviriituiesfUl'ther.

To say rtha1t 1any vice is extensiv:e, in rt:he isense thatt iJt iin-V!olviers other woes, is lJ1iOlt to Say ;that 1a pel'ISIOn:W1ho is viciOU'S at .aU is .a1togelthJervicious. A person can iha.ve one or 1runoitihe;rvioe in the 'Sense ithat his mor:rul :liailmgs ral'le ,typiorully of one oil.' ·another killd. So, iif someone is chamaciteri:srtioallyinltempe.r.ate, it doies not ful1ow that ihe iis 1a1m ciharactecistim1ly unjust, im-

prudernJt, 100rwardly, iand sio on, any mo!lle than thalt it follows that if someone is not qurck then he is a clumsy weakling. But 1the vice of init1empertanoe:i!nvohnes failures of 1the obher fundamernbal virtues.

Tihere is this 1rmportaillitrespect in which a viice differs foom 1a fault, lik!e e:mes1siv;e 1sihyne1S1s, iheing an inmh!Jen:thne ilstener, la,oking soei:al gmaces, or beiing image oonsdorus. These and a <long list of other qualities 1are gieITTerially "sruT£a1oe" feaituves, hav.Lng more to do wlitih persrn:lJaliJty1than with basiic ohamcrber traits. They 1a:11e also more Eke habits 1than re:flection1sof one's ends, via1ues, a:nJd pmetioal il'!easoning and judgmerut. They can be quite fia.-mly e111b.1enched and even prominent fea,tures of peop1e, hut they do not oonneot up wi!th oo:nce:rnisof eris1tic human needs and exceHences an ti.he 1W1ay the vices do. Thie :ail.'le 1oon!tT1aiciJeisof :those exceHenaes; rtihe '.former 1al'e (typically) blemishes on !them. Unles1s they 1arre symptomartic of some :uinderrlying char1aoterii:s1tfuothey 1tend to havie more to do wiith manners 1than with the vmtues. A ,oowa:l.'dly person may be shy, huit a shy person is not for that 1a cowiard. Simi-, 1ady, 1a v:ery image 1oonscious persion may :be scrupulously faisihioll!aMe,spend 1a 1g11ea:t deial of rtime 1and mon,ey on dothes, oaris, ["esbaura:ll!hs,1and 1bieing seen in ;bhe "right" p1aoes, but not foil."1all thrut he guility of vices. They may take " good rtasite" so .se1riouslythait othel'S Degard]t as bad t1a,slbe. HUit :had tas1be need not 11ef!ieet poor cham:eteir. Oer1t1armly had tais1t1e, poor mann!e['!s, 1and annoying do nort involv:e exrbensiive faiilures of the type iinvolved in moral vices.

1t is exwemely difficult to dm,w a. line between what is " mec!'ely" 1a maitber of manners and whart]s mor:aHysigrnificant. Cases ha1V1e to he judged individuia:lly. Audiibly muttering obscenities wh:ii1e impatienitly wiallting in 1a slow Hne may jrus1t he had mam1'ers. Villifymg and the per:son who is holding things up on account of his handicap is worse than 1that. lit may he hard rt:o 1see how co1wiawdice,foil' eX!ample, en:te:rs into tills. CortH1a1getiis gienemlly thought of 1as the vimtue having rlJo do wiilth thie manaigement of fo:rur. But ,the manag.emellit of

featr is aill especillaHy and :imporrt1ailltoa;se of mol'le widely undersitoord. It can rulso ta®e ooul'rugiein the sense of resolve or seM-oonitrol, otr to underrtiake and "see 1tJh:mugh" courses bha.t do nJ01t seem to involve Tisk or thr1eait. We generally 1ta,kJe ·temperance to have bo do with p1eaisures,and ooumigieto do wirth feairs. '.I'hey are not identical. Buit 1bo1th viirltuesconcern 1se1f-ma1srbeiry,1and tiit 1tiha1t whiicih the person ill. our eXJamp1e lacks. He is (in 1additionrtro heing imprudent and unjust) mtemrpem1te and cnw:a11dly. He la;cks or fails 1to eX1em'.1cis1ethe power of s1eM-oont110l.[6]

Agaiin, 1a di:aiginosissuch a1s ,tihis is no1t mea!llltto bfor the distinctions he1tw1eenthe viarious vfrtiue1s or vices1. Descriptions of 1aabionsitha:t pick ornt only one dha:ria1cteri:stic alt 1a time al'e perfectly in oxider. When we 1accuse1the man in line oif being" just plain mean" or of having done something "just plain mean," rbhe cha:r"geills and or1ed:iJh1e1as maJde. We do not need -to [ndiaarte the neitwiork of relaitionis between viaii1ous oa;pacirties 1a:nd mobiv;es and tmiits to uindcrrs1bamdand a1pply1siucha srtrnighlt-.forward judgmen1t. But there is such 1a nietwOirk, and following it W1ould reviml 1thart meanness is no1t simple !but hrus 1a heiberogeneous crua[J:'lacrfler.lit would he odd 1to t!he bounder with 1oow11Jrdice,Ito pick on 1thirut as 1bhe *main* bult of act. But ihis £aiu1tis not j1UJS1t,that he iJs mean or unfair; patl't of his meanness a:nJd unfairness is that he doesn't oom11ol himself. We can imaigine s1aying " Oan't you jus1t be paitient like the 1resitof us? " But perhtaips he is no1t just 1enriaged wiith impaitience, perhaps !he's 1am. o1UJt 1and out buHy and takes maficiouis pleia1sure in frus-1t:riatingand injurung 1t:he £eelings of others. Now we s1ee his action as a. refliec1tilionof a genuine vfoe and not just agitation or 1a holt rtempell.'.Being a hully is 1an foilui'e of ohruriaater 1sho1wmgiarl:.. least defeats of judgmoot, motivie, 1a[)jd a:ttiitude towiards othel)s.

[6] The importance of appreciating the difficulties in clarifying the distinctions between manners and morals was brought to our attention in private conversation with Professor G. E. *M.* Anscombe. She is not responsible for the way in which the issue is presented in this paper.

'lJhe igene11a1 olaim orf unilty can perhiaps he i11wsitriatedagain lby ,oo!ll'sidening rthe 1so1rtbs orf eX1e'l'\bionson:e mUIS:t maike in tbrying ;bo rid oneself of ,a mor:al vioe. Suppose Wt is oowia:rdice. One lthinks of oneself ra:s oowiardly, has fe:lit rthe rpam of cowardice, wnd has ia1Cltuially fia]1ed on. aoooun;t of]eiar rl:o wet in sfubuatio1rns ibhat did not inViolve Ullll'leasoi11aJbforisrk. An undeirs1tandingo f lbhis vioe which !is more .than just ang"er art onieself will involve iappreoiarting *why* it]s counted a vice, i.e., rut:s relaition lbo effec-1tive pursuit of ,oods 1rund needs, whrut is owed to oitihers and whiat one s:hould ibe ruble lbo experot of oneself, the ooi11trol of feelings and rthe rt.l'lans1a;tion of emotional responise i:ruto acrtion, 1and .so oill. In sum, an raittiempltto 01J11eself witih 1resrpect rbo this mo'l'lrul vioe involves calling upon a mixed and broaid repertoire of mo!l'lruHy 11.'eleivaillltjudgments, porweris, :a.nd tmirbs. Effol'lts 1a;t undoing one's mo!l'lal vices •and replacing them wilth virmuesis nort only I1J0it erusy. lit is 1also n!Olt srimple.

WAiINWRIGHT, MARI'.rAIN, AND AQUINAS ON TRANSCENDENT EXPERIENCES [1]

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WHAT COULD ALLOW thoo1ogiianis to s1ay that rbrtanJScendentexpmiences we, exiplicitly or implicitly, expenienoos of God? To ooswieir tMs question fully, one would ihavie lbo ooga;ge in :two d:iisltmotmqumi1es. Fiirsit, religious, moml, iand psyoho10giical icristeci:a 1are required in the evtalurution*of concrete oases.* They ctan he found in rthe grerut spi:ritUJal wriitings of humankind. Secood, one mustt have reOOUTISe to ep;iisttemo1ogiica:Ł and thieo1ogiaa1 foru.ndmbions if one wianits 1to 1an.swer tb.ie questtion *in. its generality.* In ,thJi:s a:riticle, I shall not preserut 1tihe religious, moral, 1and psychofogica1 criteria, because I sihou1dJrike to OOiilCelllb:iaJteon mrueillecrtUJalprohliems invohiimg tihe sooond kmd of ·consideration.

I shiaill use ais 1a ISl'bar:bing-pomt1a book on mys:ticism written by Wiilliiam J. W1ainwcight. Turr tihe purposes of ttihis ess:ay, "trlanJScenidellltexperiences" wiilil. mean whmt W1affin:WI"ightcalls " mystical experienoos " or " uniJtM"Y srbrubeis."[2] The phvase wi:ll. ailso inclUJde Otito'1s " nu:minoUJsetpeirieinces," Mrusforw's " peak expeme:nces" and, vecy hrorudJy, wll experiences that do not :focus on 1a, specific tidea :but afiectively open up to the mySltery wll:uich enoompas1seshruman li£e.

1 I am grateful to the members of the Boston Theological Society for their questions and comments on the initial version of this essay.

2See his definition, in *Mysticism: A. Study of Its Nature, Cognitive Value and Moral Implications* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981), I-S. The rest of his first chapter offers a good discussion of problems of typology as well as of the distinction between descriptions and interpretations of mystical experiences. Unfortunately I cannot take account of this interesting discussion in the limits of this paper.

In conrtending thrut my:stical experieTIJcesihav;e nnetic v:al,idity if they are ra speciiaI kind of perception, W tries to 'Settle an 1:epis1temo10-gicra1is1sue; ill downplaying "doctrina1l con-.sideration:s" and iJn rejeobing ",a thieo1ogical whioh cannoit he esbaiblished ihy philosoplhi1oalrea1s10n,"[3] he suggesit,s1bhat his oolJJ!teTIJtiioncan 1and should he 1supp01rtedonly by philosophioal a11gumelJJ!t1s.In thi'S esisay, I intend 1to ques1truon thi:s two.fo1d 1tlhesisof Wwinwrrtiight'1s1and to explore an albernartive.

Wa:inwright, whose manner of dea1ing wirbh iinitellectuaJ proh-1ems 1acoo,rdswith \the p11esent-day main lme in Ang1o-American philosophy of re1i§ion,[4] non:ebheless pays metiiculou:s a.trbention Ito neoscho1a1s1ticitheori!es of mys1tiioismin Chapter 4 of his hook. Such 1an a;t1t:empt1at serious diJalogue is of specia,l :intel'es1tsince :i:t illu:stria1testhe diffioulty of finding a mee1tingground for three qUJite different scho1w1·Jywo,rlds: the one, wihich I regard a,s W,ruinwr.ighit'·s,modern sohoilais1t1icrsm, and Thomas Aquinas. A1though W a1inwr1igh1tdoes not refer to the lat:ter's views on the .topic, these views nev:erthe1e:s,sde:serve examination bo1th 1a1s the sou11oe of neoscho:iJa,stic 1theorie1s and 1as conti:ia:sting in 1severa1 111espects wiith ,them.

The first of my paper will sketch three of the intellec-1tuaJ contexits in which triam:soendefll!texperi!enoes may be discussed. The second part will highlight some features of Aquinrus's episitmnology and theo1ogy of gmce which whll enable us fo dertel'ITl!iDJe at whait levels of cogn:iition experienceis of 1t11amiscendenceshould be s]tua1ted and in what 1s1ense they may rbe s1aid to he experielll!ceisof God. 'Iihe third rpart WIll presie111t how Thomais envisages the role of love :in 1the affective knowledge tha1t rbe1ievers i;eceiive of God. F1inailly, the fomlth pamt will indicrabe the of such lmowledge, namely, the dimect a1iva:renerssof orur aets and fee1ings of 1ove.

a Wainwright, 162-163 and 180.

4 Exemplified by such authors as John Hick, Stephen Katz, Ninian Smart, Walter T. Stace, R. C. Zaehner.

I. *Three lnterprretative Contexts*

Since Schleiermadher, moist German, BTrtish, arnd Amerioan 1thinike:rs ha vie studiied religious experience in !the context of a poslt-piertisit, mdividua1 isrbic, 1and largely *Weltanschauung.5* Henoe their on 1a:ffeotiive experie1me, on t:bie indiv:idua,l, and Oill evieIIts ,thait do not usually take plaice in ohurch. [6] The goa:l of the scho1a,11s who opemte within rthis Wes1terrr post-Enlightenment often 'to show tha:t opennes1s to a :transcendent dime1IIs1ion, which 1.iis manifested in :a perison's 11e1igious experiences, ,J.s :the crowning of 1a non-dogma1tic :huma,nism. To 1a cer:ta,m W1ainw:rghst 1espouses bhis thesis. I ha"\"e alrewdy mentioned, he rejects rthe rele-V'aJnoe of doctrinal co10:s1Cl!e:t1art110111s ment 1of myslbioal experiences. when ihe rrntroduees conoepits dmwn from 1nedievial Chris1tianity oir from Eastern 'l"eligions, he does not Situaibe them 1in their oommun:al, mterpretative setting. [7] Similarly, he does not present the basic concerns of the neoseholastic m.J1thor1s views he ·br,ies to a1ssess.

No:t:withs1tianding the limita,tions of tihis modern 1appmach ito religi:orn, exposed by 1s1triotures ag1ainst religious 1ibera1ism,[8] I even th:eologi:ans who place ithe 1srupecrna;h.walchaJ'!a£t1etr of Christiianiity a:t the center of 1tihieir rt:hougiht should take seriously mys1tic1al phe1nomen1a that ame dooumm11ted tine serttiing1s: of com-

5 .Already characteristic of the confession of a beautiful soul in Goethe, *Wilhelm Meister's Yea,rs of Apprenticeship,* trans. H. M. Waidson (Dallas: Riverrun Press, 1978), Books 4-6, 158-165.

6 In general, this threefold emphasis is most noticeable in liberal Protestantism. On the other hand, Catholic theologians such as Rahner and Lonergan, who have been influenced by it, underline the intellectual, corporate, and symbolic sides of Christianity.

7 On this problem, see Rowan Vvilliams, " The Prophetic and the Mystical: Heiler Revisited," *New Blackfriar&* 64 (1983) : 330-347, esp. 333-334.

s For a summary of his views on this issue, which he developed in several longer works, see his essay, "Evangelical Theology in the 19th Century," in *The Humanity of God* (.Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1960), 11-33.

munal WOil'!sihip[9] Tw10 reaisons support t:his orpition. Fiirsit, from 1a pa1Stoml point of view, it is to be observ;ed :that, owing to peop1e',sdiJspo1s,iJtions,such experiences lead eithe:r to conversion o;r to viaiiious s0OC1bs of ruberm1tion. It is there£011e,important to situate them WJith l.1<:lspe1ctito the resit of huma;n life aJ11d to ask how they inJtemct w]tih other :Jlaotor:s. Second, these experiences ooour not only in Chri.iis1tianwn1texitsibu:t a1lso in 1ort:ihe:r religions, 1ais well ais in 1seoular milieux. If ,iJt is true 1t:ha1t God's gmce is offe111ed in th!ese expe11ienoe1s prmvided tihey 1a,re momlly right, llhey 1should be discussed by any theo1ogy desi1rousof speaking wiJth some p111eciis1ionabout God's presence of the Christian environmeut.

11he 20th-century 1soholais1ticau1tihom whose v]ews Wainwright examines belol!lJg fo 1an 1a1together di:ffe11entiTilte11ectu:aJworld. They were French p6ests who, from applt10ximaitely1900 until 1940, s1tud1ed:the wriitings of g;:rieia;t Caitholic ly those of 1thie Cairmeliite1tmdiit:ion_,filorder to provide :run alitemrut¥e to the modemis1t iuterpretat1ion of religion and to bal-1WllJce the dry ;and aus1t1ere speculations of sclwl1arsrticiismwith an e:xp1oil'!a1t1'onof the 1affective side of embodied in the life of pmym. They were keen to rna.rk out ,tih!e succes1sivie pha1s:esof the spirit:wa1l,Jii£e.[10]

In 1this conitext, MaJ.'lifoin's contr1ihution, whi:ch WVainwrighrt disornsises, is no;t O!rigin:al. 1t merely :reflects the vieV\Cs of the Dominican •s1chooI, in particular thoise of Per:e Garrti.gou-Lagnange, who wais 1a disciple of 1the s1even.teenth-cen1tuirytheo-John of Saiint Thomas.[11] Havinig·:adopted John of Saint Tthoma1s'1s,tihies1is tihait "the Trinrnty pr1es1oot in rbhe just soul

9 For instance at the Religious Experience Research Unit of Manchester College, Oxford; see .Alister Hardy, *The Spiritual Nature of Man* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979).

10 The classic that resulted from all those years of fervent interest in the life of prayer is *The Three Ages of the Interior Life* by R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., trans. from the French (St. Louis and London: Herder, 1947).

11 See Jacques Maritain, *Distingu.ish to Unite, or The Degrees of Knowledge* (New York: Charles .Scribner's Sons, 1959), Index of Names, "Garrigou-Lagrange " and "John of Saint Thomas."

rus an oibject 1of exipe1l'limeruba:knuwledge :and 1oV'e,"[12] Garl'ligou-Lagmnge 1and Ma:ri:ba1inwia.ntedto ch:atl'lac1terizethe specific type of experime1rntal knowledge obba1med in rthe adv;anced stage of prayerlulneis s ciailled "infused contemp1a1tioi11." In oll.'der to do lSO, they !thought ·they could find support in the 'WI.1iltings of Aquli111ais. But, 1as John Dedek has shown,[13] they .rut, fo1asit pa;r-1tially mis!l'ep111eserutledwbia1t Aqurnrua1s israid on tihe <topic. They diid no1t rie1ruEze thait initeutioill, wihern \hie repeaitedly underlined the ra:ffootiV1e1s1ide of the Christian lilie, w1ais simply lto aoao1untfor onie of the SieV'emJ of 1a unified whole and hy no me1ans to eX!tol 1the 1so-caHedintuiitiV'e1wioil.'ithof love ex-perienoed hy tihe soul.

tA ·seoond diisc11epancyhe1tween M1a1ri:tain·and Thoma:s Aqui-Tl1a1s is the way ·they undeirs:troodthe he1tw:eenthe (lognitiive side 1a;nd rthe 1a:ffecitiv;e side of a pell.'son's; 1ife. For Aquina1s, it is in ithe 1s1aime human *(mens)* that inteHi-genoe a:nd will work in isyneli.'gy.[14] Foa.- Mrul'litrmim.,ron thre con-rbmry, knorw1edge, wheither nrutura;l or reve1a11ed, is a matter of pros1sies1siLngCOIJ]Cerprbs.[15] As .a co:nsequence of tills view, he pro-ceeds in two sbeps. Firsit, he maXJimfaesr1the emlitrtaisrtheibween and lo:v;e, wrhich hre thinks derive foom :s1trlictlysrep1a-mte iliaculbies; s1eco1DJd, he trie1s fo b11ing them togeitiher in 1a,n 1a,14bificia1lway. No wonder, ,thJen, thait W1a,inwrigihitiis ba:ffied hy Marirt:am'1smecih!anricialexp1ana1tionof what ha,ppens in the soul '3Js 1a r1ersrulJtof 1thie acit[on of the gift of wfusdom: it is pictured as :an :a.gem 001opem1t.ingwrntih tihe HoJy Ghosit .ailld il:mansformillngfoeliin:gsof 1Lovie into lmowiledge.[16]

12 As stated by John F. Dedek, on pp. 357-358 of *"Quasi Experimentalis Oognitio: A* Historical Approach to the Meaning of St. Thomas," *Theologicai Studies* 22 (1961) : 357-390.

13 In the article quoted in the preceding note.

14 *De veritate,* q. 10, a. 9, ad 3 in contrarium. This text makes it clear that Aquinas's faculty psychology is not a rigid one.

15 Which is a Scotist view. See Bernard J. Lonergan, *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1968), 25, n. 122.

16 See Maritain, 261 and 450. Moreover, throughout Ch. VI of *The Degrees of Knowledge,* to which Wainwright refers, Maritain's exposition, despite its verbal faithfulness to St. Thomas, gives evidence of extrinsicism, which is a

Boooorse of Mariibruin's o:bseurity, W1atinwright's re3Jding rus W1110ll!g on ;two cioru:nJtis. FID.-ist, he wri]tes itih3Jt for Ma['tibain ilie mnsaioillislyexperrenc:iedeffeats of charity both *are* rai1rd *are like* "species in 1t:he 1soose lin which 'CICIDooprbs, timaigeis1alll!d sense :impression!S we srpecies."[17] Hut never 1sayis thait they *are* 1.speaies; ibJe merely contends thart 1the infused love rp1ays a role "quite compiaJJ.1able1to that orf a £oil'Inal 1sign," ",a;s rbhe oonoepft iis."[18] Second, Wiainmrirght suggiesbs[19] rbhait Maritain miay ru1so haV'e *sensible* speoies in mind; ibuJt interip11etation !is rbotbrully orprposedIto the Viery lbe:xit ithiat he qu0iteis, 1alltihorughin a rt:runcated wia.y, whiicih taJ:ks aboo.1t " 1the gi£t orf wriisdom . . • :mis1in1g loving bo prlay (ais: does rthe Divine Essence rirtself in the ibeiaitificvision) a role 'ania1ogo:ws:to the one which 1an *species* orf rthe dleity would play."[20] It seems rtibJat Wruiniwright thirus been .by rt:he wiotrid " vision," whlch, mrthis oon;te:x:t,TS smctly ·analogicail.

II. *The Need for an Epistemological Framework*

tworo1d ·aim is to show J!iliat ceritruin mysb.iaa;l exipemenoes are n:oeitic and Ibo disouss ·thernr He siees th!emr [[]OeitJiC OOail'lacii:Jen1a1s 1a neeeSlsruryoondfub.ionfo[' !any poissiibi[e disoussio111of rthleir v:alidi,ty: "if theisit1icmyrstical consciousness its n01t noetic, rbhe qruesb.i.0111 0tf its doies ll!Oit arise."[21] Su:ch v:a1lidity oonsis1ts in rtih!e ·£act tha;t ia trn:rusoondent experience may mvolv:e a ufflbrury eognllition of somerthillg diffeoc-ent from t:he oibjects of thris WiO['ld, ihrnt real all. the \91Mll'e. W1aiinwrighit sums U!p ibh!e 1epistemol0rgioaiinrbent of hiis work ;a„s; [oltowis: "The prima1ry pur1pio1sieof Ibms hook *is* rto sihoiw ibhi3Jt there 1all'le good, if Il!Olt conclU1Sivie, rie1as0ll!s for thia:t some myisticail are vieirkliical,1and thrut the olaiims wihiicih ia['e 1buillt inlto :tbJean 1ai1e itriue."[22]

deficient understanding of Aquinas's natural/supernatural distinction. On extrinsicism, see Karl Rahner, "Nature and Grace," *Theological Investiga,.-tions*, IV (New York: Crossroad, 1982), 165-188.

11 Wainwright, 179.
1s Maritain, 261 n.3.
19 Wainwright, 179 and 195 n.76.
20 Maritain, 450.
21 Wainwright, 161.
22 Wainwright, xiv-xv.

He begins iby undierliill'ing the mystics' perceptualis1t vooabu - fairy and hy t:aking very 1seriiously "rthe fi1aim rthait t:heis;tic my:sitios pe11ceive God witih t1he 1siame immedruacy with whicih rthey pm1oeive 1sense daitia or their own meil1lt1aJ ioonitenrts."[23] Of oouTlse, he di:srtinguishes mysitieal 1experiences 1and sense e:irperi- noes. But far fmm 1sayiinghow they are he emphasizes their 1simiLa1rity.[24] ,a£ter a1t lengrth neorsoholas:tic theories, he iiejeets Ma,ritain's on rthe g:rounds 1t1ha1t "we mus:t ... elliterrtam the not1ion of an experimenrta:l intuition of God's :suhstianoe or presence o:r 1attribute whicih is rimmediiarte:in tihe 1sense rbhat inv:olves no m:edium."[25]

W1ainw'right',s advocacy of 1the my1sitioa,l experi- ence :r<aisies 1add1rreissed i£ wie sornt out, aeo0irding to

of s!eltlse pm'eepbion from aic1t1iv1ty. As foJ" a1s is coneerrned, he in the intel1ec- rbua1 rassen:t, two basic opem1tions: 1bhe 1t11U1tih" and " po1s1se1s:siing1a ·SUl"ie ln ,a very schemaitic mainner, we may 1siay iinclud:esthree lev;els of k!nowledgie: judging.[21] The level of sense, uc,•n,.K, contends in his treatise on happi- ness, is not constitutive the relationship between God and the believers, although will be associated with the soul's beatitude in heaven. "Sensitive activity cannot pertain to happiness essentially, for happiness essentially con- sists ... in being united to the uncreated good, his ultimate

2s Wainwright, 161; see xiii, xiv, 164, 165, 192 n.49.

24 Wainwright, 83, 84.

25 Wainwright, 184.

26 *Summa theologiae,* II-II, q. 8, a. 1 and q. 9, a. 1. I use the Blackfriars translation, with occasional modifications of my own. Unless otherwise indi- cated, quoted texts from Aquinas will come from the *Summa theologiae.*

21 See Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1978), Index, 'Experience-Understanding-Reflection '.

end, a union which cannot be achieved by activity on the level of sense." [28]

In itble neXit amo1e, Thom1a1S:ma.iD.rllainist that the beirubificvllisiion COD!s1isrbs 1D101t only :iin 1acts rof rtJhe will but more £ommilly in acts of rin!relligenre;to 1aiooourut :llor the :lla;et. tihrut God iis akbained, Aquma1STea1izieslili:ait ihe must haive reoooose to something Olt:iher rt:Jhrun·the ihW!l'it,iwhlch is mitself mertie deS!We, namely to acbs of mtbeJ!ligenice, in iWhiicli God 1beoomeis rpil"eS1ent. In colllllDaist to Wiamwrigihrt,:Aqwiniaisconioeiivesof God's noit in terms of "1ano1til:um-"kind of peroepftron (firat level) hull:. iaJS given to rthe human illlbe1loot (!Second:and tihivd levels.). Even in human relationships, a lov;er is happy not primarily inasmuch as she 1S100S 1and 'Loucih!eis the rbelorved but mostly beoauSle she understands and affirms the qualities, the unique worth, and the unreserv;ed self"'g1£tof tbhe belowd.

For God to. be preisem in rl:ihe mteHootianrd in ri:!lre hreamt, more rus requitred. Smoo our naitrrn.'!al·faculitti.escan us ne:iither ia pereep!lio111of God nor ,a grirusrp of what God iis, thwe is an oillltJo1orgica1a;bYISs bebwleen God and us. Therefore, "rais rt:he divine goodness: .in.rfiruiltely1surpasseshuman oapacilties, man needs il:o 1be srupernrutu!l.'iaillyhelrpred 1to rubbruin rt:Jillis good." [29] lit ri!s only by 1gmoo tlhat "God is saiid to he ptreselJJit.1as ithe known in tlre knower and thJe lov;ed iin rtihe loVle[:." [so]

!fl1iis'lllOn-pihyrSliicrubutt real presence ills mooe rthan the genern:l mode by wihicli God ills in 1all rtbiingis[81]]t hrus two sidies Ibo it: rthe enjoyed rp!lieSence of God ihimiself :and the ooorubed giift tih:rough:WmCih rtfhe ibeiliiiever00S ibrians£oomedmOll'de!I." rbo he oapraJble of :receiving God. On the olle ihiand, " man's ultimate end is uncreated good, namely God"; on rthe other hiaIDid, "man's ultbimaJbeend f0s Ia cmrutu1rreily,reru1i1ty in bim, f0tr whalt is iit but *his* •commg rto God and *his* joy 'Wlilbh God." [82] Such union wii1tih

28 I-II, q. 3, a. 3.

29 II-II, q. 175, a. 1, ad 2; see II-II, q. 24, a. 2.

so I, q. 43, a. 3.

s1 I, q. 8, a. 3.

s2 I-II, q. 3, a. 1; see I, q. 43, a. 3, ad 1. Thomas is very emphatic on the necessity of a created gift like, for instance, the virtue of charity (see *De*

God, which will :fl:ouriishill. tbhe reS1U:rirection,iis iail:rieiaidygmnrted rtlo itihie soul in :thls lifre of griace:[33] Charity tiis ia f'riendsihfupwhich is ron 1the £act :thwt God hias ,already givien us a sihrure *(communioati,o)* in his ihapiplineisis[34] Oluariltyis a disposition or hab:iit iW!hiicih musit rbe mused by the Ho,ly Spirit 1beciaJUise rut is ia rpall'lticipaitionall rthe 1lifte of the Holy Spiicit, who iis the love of tJre F\aiilieiriand of the Son.[35]

Acciorvdmgito tJhis itbleoiliogiiaalvisiion, i:s rt.here an "experience" of God? Aqumrus hias no quaJ1ms wthaJt:soeverrwih.en he tmnisrposeis worvds prorpevly used Ito iba1k 1rubowt sense knowledge to itlue level of initeil1ecituialkn!oiw1eidg1e.[36] Bwt he also 1e!ll!gagiesin ranorther k:i:nd of rbrainJSprnsiitilon,ruamely from sense knowledge to love: "laJ[J. 1acit of an arprpeitiitti.vepower is 1a Clfil'lbai:nmclinirutionto :a reailiityilbself,.and so by amJailngyfilts being jomoo 1and cleaving rbo tiluis rverulirty acquiire1stire [l!ame of sens[ng, as iit were e:xiperri-001cing it .by :fin1clin:gisaibisdiruotionin ilt. Thus ilt is wriittien,'Feel the Lord in 1goodness' (Wlisdom 1: 1) ." [37] F10Uo1wing sevie['lal ·early chw1xili1writens, whose doatrine orf rthe "spillrfutualsenises" 'Wlas well lmoMTTI. in the Middle he freely u:se1s tihe perceptiuirulistvooa:bu1ary of rblue my;sticis,huit he is rtihe fil'lSlt fthoologian to add qUJrulfufyingclamJSes, laJs, mrtilie pihmses, *quasi, experimentalis, quodammodo experimentalis, experimentalem qwandam notitiam.* Ais Dedek explains, Thomas did so· !heciau1se,as

caritate, 1, and II-II, q. 23, a. 2). The principal reason is always that God's light and love must become intrinsic to human life, to human operations. But there is also a metaphysical reason: the effects of God's action in the world cannot but be finite, even when a. participation in his infinite life is granted.

3BSee I, q. 95, a. 1, ·arg. 6: "glory, which is nothing other than grace consummated;" see also III, q. 56, a. 1-2.

s4 II-II, q. 23, a. l.

35 II-II, q. 24, a. 2. Thomas's theology of grace allows him to interpret texts such as Rom 5:5 and 6:23, which he quotes here, in a strong sense, that is, as stating that we have a sharing in the divine life. He does the same with other New Testament texts.

36 .See *De maZo,* q. 16, a. 1, ad 2, and Dedek's remarks, 384-385, n. 112.

s1 I-II, q. 15, a. 1; see ad 2.

38 See Henri de Lubac, *Flwegese medievale* (Paris, Aubier, 1959-1964), 4 vols.

1a philosopher of 1anguage, he was more rtheorertic:allyaw;a,re of 1thie than his p:redereesrsoris.[39]

Where1as Wra1mwrig1hit'slack of an ex:plioit episrt:emologypre-¥ernts him fmm grounding ms conrtellltion tJhalt myHW!eal experi-encle is ranorbherkind of :immedia1te percerprtfon, Aquinia:s's merta-phyis1ic1a1lfmmework (whircrh raiims a:t heing faithful hortih to m-bio1n1a1l 1seH-lmowledge,and ito ena1hles him 1bo 1ooaJtre the experience of God wi1th rrespieot to his overaH ac-oount of the v:a:riious human rela1tions rto realiJty. He irnberp11erts sprutiialmebap1hms ,in 1a way a1coo11ds wirth the me1t1arphysiieal prineiple t1hat God is the Crerator who, £a:r from iinvnlved in rspiace,eisll:1a1b1isihers space in the firrsrt place. T!here i1s no spati!al co1Jlit1inuitybe1tween God and 1the v1:0irild, only an onfo-1ogic1ail diisrtiance. Mo11eover, sii:nee the differelllt1mtion of the iaffocrtiive1i£e pamaUe1s 1the levels knowledge, the intrel1i-gerrt love with which God 1is loved mus1t a,t the "in-JbeUeotual" lev:erls.[40] And this considerraition 1eardis us into our nex:t o1us1t1er of querst1i1ons.

III. *The Role of Love in the Knowledge of God*

Thomas Aquina:s does not ·an exp11oiJt disrtincrbion he-rtween wiha1t W1ruilTW!rlig1htcans " sltrubes" and " 011din1ary J1eligiious feelings " fo hoith M.ariitain 1a:nd W:ahiwr:ight, for di:ffer:en1trea sons a:s wre ha,wo :seen, focus on objectless mystical consciousness-" objectless" in the sense that it is not an experience of worldly objects. Mari-tain provides an explanation this experience terms of a special kind of drawn from love. 'Wainwright takes exception to Maritain's theory on grounds that it is not faithful to the immediacy that is characteristic of mystical

[39] See Dedek, 383-385; David B. Burrell, *Aquinas: God and Action* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), chap. 1-5; J. F. Ross, *Portrayimg Analogy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), chap. 1, 4, 5 and 7.

[40] See I-II, q. 26, a. 1, where Thomas distinguishes between *amor sensitivus* and *amor intelleotivus.*

consciousness. Having indicated, in section one of this article, why Maritain's trerutment of this issue is unsatisfactory, I shall approach the topic by presenting how Aquinas envisages the role of love in the knowledge that believers have of God.

Thomas putts forward 1rus a, giener1ml pl'inciple th:a:t the lifie of. 1prayer, or "100'1.1it1empla1tiive Efo," :has a cogn]tive and an affec-tivie iside.[41] In our ea:nbhlyexistence, however, !the kmow11edge we hmve of God in aooompairnied by rthe desire we have of him in hope, pi1.1oceeds by way of 'arnru1ogy and thus riemainJS toibally ull!ruble to graisp wha1t God iis.[42] Heoawse f1a,ith relalbe:s to God 1rus and hope l'e1arteis 1to God ais unposses1sed, r!iliese two vii11t1ues imply a distance berbween us a:nd !the s1bill unknown Myis1berry.

On rthe orther hailll!d, d::uarriity is oloseil'rto]bs objedt [43] than 1and hope, beoause "chaJ.i:ty 1a;bta:ins God himself so alS to reis:t 1in :him." [44] .It "1iis of 1tha.t wilicih i:s already poss1es1sed, sinoe the :berlovied ii:s, in 1a manner, 1in the 1ovier, :and, rugiaiin, the lover is dmwn by desire to union w]th the heloved. HenJce it]s w:r:itten, 'Re tJ:uatt a1bide1th in cha,rity athiderth in God, and God in him' (1 Jiohn 4: 16)." [45] In comp1ar:i1son rwiilth charirty is an !i.mmediia:te 1adlhiestion to God: "lit is heCiaurse :the knorwledge of God IS medi1a1ted *(mediata)* ,tihait rnt is mllied da,rk, 1a.nd in heaven will pws1s 1aiw;a,y, 1a1s St. P1aul tells us (1 Coil'. 13: 9). But hie a1so 1say1s 1tiha1t '1ove never ends' (1 Co;r. 13: 8). Therefore :tihe cl:llal'ilty in 1this life deav:es to God withou1t 1any initermed]rury *(immediate Deo adhaeret)*." In this 11espeot, s1t1ands in oontira:s:t to knowledge, evien faiJth knowledge, whfoh :remains 1indiimect, "]t ,]s through 101ther things rthia1t we come to know God." [46]

41 II-II, q. 180, a. I.

42 See I, q. 13, a. 13, ad 1.

43 When Aquinas applies the word "object" to God in an analogical way, he means the non-worldly Reality to which any intelligent being is related by creation and grace.

44 II-II, q. 23, a. 6.

45 I-II, q. 66, a. 6.

46 II-II, q. 27, a. 4; see I, q. 12, a. 13.

Tues ibhiis entl:Jail. £or Aquina1s 1a heibween knowledge 1and rin rl:Jhe ·file? In oirder to a!lllSrwer this question, we muslt truk!e i11to considetrmbiorhliis wie11-k:nownviews on oornmialtum1irty. hiim, rtlworugh hotth :I'leruson a1nrl frruiith humans isay of God 1thaJthie iis tOltal Exi:ste1nce *(Esse)* rus weH as 1tJhieir Oruuse 1and ttheillr End. Hut itihie1.1e can a.Jiso he a!D.Olbher lcind of knowledge rwlhich d:eriives from a:flioobi:vie W{.enes1s. Aqui:ntrus rteiaiclhe!s:thirut !Slimi1arfutyis 1a oaJUJSe of loV'e in rt:he caJSJe o[1the slimiLanittyof rbwo rpersoDis wiho :poo1sesiSltib!e 1s1ame qualities. Such siimilmii!ty1gjives rise rto love-of-fmoodishiiipor iove-of-good-wilJ, wheireby OiD!e ·wiishieisthe giood of the beilorved (in conltl'lrusrt ibo wihiiah Aqulrn!rus does rnort exclude bult noneithe-Les1s IWS 1an mrecior kind of 1oviing).[47] He els1e-wlreriertbiait, ibhankis to ".a oomoil.'!Illii.rty *(conformitas)* of giriare," rtJhe ibelii.evierlis 1an imruge of tihJe Trtiniirty as someone who knO!W\S 1and Joveis God.[48] Beem.use rbhe will is ".adaplbed ibo irbs end (*ordinatur in illum finem)* ," 1thwec;anhe a " oonifrormingto the eD1d thrQlll'ghfove *(oonformatio ad finem per aimorem)*." [49]

In isev;errul rbeJ®s he disibingurushestwo s111ipemrutooalways of knowing tirwth: ,a sipecuLaltive one 13iill.d 1an 1affoobivie oiJlie. He rthe second pirutib. 1a1S fohlorw.s: " Tib.e oibhetr is afiec-Iflive 1and iexiperrimlenit1a1lknowledge of diV!i:nie goodnes1s and i:ng lcindnlelSls,1whierieby1a pe11son experiem:ieisrwilrtilim ih:imself rthe rtJaiste of God's 1sweetness1anid itJhe delighrt in lomg. Diony-sius 1sayrs thrut Hi:erortiheus ithmgs iby syrmpathy (*didicit divina ex compassione ad* ipro)." [50] The :firis:t iWlay is £ruibh; the seooD1d one tib.e gift otf tth!e Roly Spiirr>ilt called wis-dom. Aquinas views their 1.1ela:tionshipas follows: " Faith as-ISleDJtsfbo cliVirinetrutih TOil' !irbself; rtihe girllt otf wiisdomjudges thln1gs 1acoo!l1dii.ngrbo d!ivirne rbruths. HeD1oe bhe gifrt of wisdom poses dlruilbh, 1since ' 1a man judges wehl whrut he 1M11oody knows ' *(Nioomachean Ethics,* I, ." [51] WihtaJt£ruilbhms to infused

47 I-II, q. 27, a. 3.
48 I, q. 93, a. 4-5.
49 I-II, q. 62, a. 3, c, and ad 3.
50 II-II, q. 97, a. 2, ad 2; see I, q. 64, a. 1.
51 II-II, q. 45, a. I, ad 2.

wlisdom wihat *nous* (lthe g:ra:spmg of rue fasrt prcin-oiples) is 1bo *sophia* (1the rtheo11e1bioal1wiisdom tth!ait encompa1sseis bo1tih *nous* 1rund *episteme)* in A:rii;s1tot1e'1s *Ethics.* [52]

As ,a ,giJ£t of ithe Holy Spiir1i1t, rwisdom idi:ffor1s worn rthe philo-1Sophmoa1 and the ;t:heofog;ioailh:aJbirt,s 1acqu:iiried hy 1study. T,aking his oue friom 1 Cor. .2: 15 (" Tihe srp1iirfilbrnal man judges an :things"), Aqliimas 1observes 1tha1t :tihis supie:rnaltu:al :as1siis1tailliCJe piliays 1a l1o:1e s1lln!i1a;r 1to the na:tural vi11tue of wisdom, which, 13!0COil1ding :to .Acis1tJ01t1e, ClOlllJSiSIUS in the knowiledgte of ra first ieia:UJse (in :a genus) 1aIT1'd of every;tihing else below it. [53] Ch:ris1tfuan WJisdiom fus 1a:n 13.lpiplJ:'le>Ci>altiv;q(lOllitemp1altJiion of 1tih_e diVJi'll!e des1ign 1as ia whole, for whicth Aqiuinais finds su1ppo!rt in 1 Coil.". .2: 10 ("The Spikiilt1sea:rchesevery,thing, even 1tihe ,de:ptihs of God"). Jin alJ)!o1tihe!1"pa1s1s1aige,he adds :th!a1trthe gDlt of wisdom is ,a judging pe:clormed hy wia,y of 'inol1ina1tion,"ais when a pel'son who pos-1se1ssieis 1the ih!aibi]t of :a vi11tue judges mgiliitly of what should he doi!l!e in oonsornJaneewirtih &rt, because he is 1arlrieiardya'll 1sympalhy wiit[h [54] Sinoe i1t ihrmgs £oll'rth acts of judgmen1t, wiisdom re-s1ide1s in the mtelleic1t, hUtt ohamity ms tits caiuse.[55] fo:spired by Arisltortle,who w.I'orbe,thiait "the wiill is in rhhe ,re1a1son,"[56] Thoma.is CIOncludeis1thait, siinice "rbhe wi:hl ha.is ra ce:rbaiin1affinirty1w]bh 11ea-1s1Qln," "ehiairity ibeing lin rthe 1wriH is n!Olt tiheil'ieforea st::r:aillgeirlto l1eruson."[57]

IV. *The Awareness of Lovie*

For Aquina1s,!then, gmaoe :aind fove hriing aibowt But oan 1anyit1hii'I1gmoire p!redse be 1s1aiid a:bourt the a;w1a:rieneissof 1tlhis lovie? l!s rtiheii.'e an 1awia1reness:of chatl'!iity a1s a feeling? It all diep:nds on 'wne1ther lov;e may be s1aid to 1he a feeling *(passio)*.

52 *Niaomaahean l!Jthias,* VI, 1140b31-114lb8.

53 II-II, q. 45, a. l; see *Metaphysics,* I, 982a8.

54 I, q. 1, a. 6, ad 3; he refers to *Nioomaohean JJJthias,* X, II 76al 7.

55 II-II, q. 45, a. 2.

56 "Voluntas in ratione est." A more faithful translation of Aristotle's text would be: " the act of will begins in the rational part of the soul." See *De anima,* III, 9, 432b5.

s1 II-II, q. 24, a. 1, ad 2.

In ms view, *passiones* 1rure *affectiones* which 1belongto tbhe sensitive 1aippeti:be,hu:t he is nolt dogmrubic 1aibout thielse caitegocies. He wriites:thait feelings 1belong *m()ll'e* 1bo 1the appeititive tJham. to It.he ruppioohoosivepart ,of rnhe and *mor@* Ito '1:ibie appetlite than ,to the inrbeJ:lectuail.1a.ppetiite (ithie 1will).[58] Applying itheiseorutegoni.esrbo 1the1expeirienceof God, he norbestlre :facitithal, sIDOO reelii.ngs:beloilJlgto the :soosllitivepa1rit of the SOll.1!1, they are il1!ort oommooswrute wtitJh the diviIDer11eia1iitiies.He goes on to ask: iif fut is iimposisiiibleIto be 1touched by rtlhe divine realities in .tihe senistirtiviepart, why rthren does Dionysiius mention feelings wiitih respeot to God? " '!:he fooliing of which Dionysius is ispeaking is notmng hutt affootion (*affectio)* fiOT ,tih.e divine ooai!illtiies„whiicih. has molr'e of the chwaobeT oif 1a feelIDg :than mere appreihensiiion."[59] Such *affectio* .is the s;ame emoibionalsltrube a.s thrut whicih Thomais elisewiherecrul1s *unio affectus,* ian 1a:ffecti-\11eunion which includes ran 1altwaobionou movemoot towiwrds God (*movetur in ipsum)* .[60]

Aquinrus's 1ooinviictl:iiiontthait the11e are· ,feieilii.ngsco!D.'Ilecibedwith God is .confirmed hy other teXJbs. FOil' instance, \he :teoohes ithait on eairrl:honly Moses 'and 1saw God's; esrsienoe. Alith.oughdirectt, .sucli oogmtion w;as ;aichJievedwith the raStSillSlbanceof rupernrutunwll:ightt, *lumen gloriae.* This light hwdly differs :IIDom the one ,graIDJbedtJO ttihe bJ.essed in hea:vien. Whererrus the latibe!l' s·ee God :by f\Vlay o[a perrmanenrtOO!l"lll, Moisesand Paul rsraw God hy wtay of 'a lbr:ansient ieel:ing *(passio)* .[61] '.Dhe e:xibrlruOil'dinairy pri:vil!egegi1arnlbed.:to Mo1s1es :ruJlJd PiauJ iis not rtomlly fureiign to it:lre knowledge :by OO!D.JillatUTJailirtyth!a1tis given.rto those who wialk iin :failitih. Twio !l.'leasoniscam. he addruood tto support. ttihills oonibenrtion. FliTsrt,1as we havie seen, !the superniatuTlalll'e:Jirutionisil:riprthait is esitabliished beibween Gord ·and beJiievers rus oif rbhe :s1ame kind *ais* 1the iberutificvision. Second, il:ihe11e ffis 100 mteresitmg rse:nltence,in

58 I-II, q. 22, a. 2-3.

59 *De verita,te,* q. 26, a. 3, ad 18.

60 II-II, q. 27, a. 2. See also II-II, q. 23, a. 2, where, quoting Augustine, he writes that charity is "a mocvement of the soul towards enjoying God for his own sake, *motus animi ad fruendum Deo propter ipsum."*

e1 II-II, q. 175, a. 3, ad 1-2.

Thomas'1s oommooiba['yon Romanis 8: 16, whiClh iho1tih Gac1.migou-Lagrange 1and Mamita1inquote: "The Spirit beiams wiitnes!S with 10ur 1Sp:i:r:irt r!Jlwougih 1the effect of 1ovie, which he hirings 1ruboUJt ID_ urs."[62] This 1affoctivie ties1tiimony, which is aiddres1sed noit tio tihe s1oosiiltiiverpia:rlt of our soul Ibrnt to our srpiriJt (*spiritui nostro)*, ieon1imms tJhiaxt we ame indeed so'llls and daughtell'IS of God.

But is "e:fliect" 1tihe viimtue of charwty or :a £ee1ing of chamiity? Fbr Thomais Aquiin1a1s, a person can detect .sigllis thrut one hirus ibhe Wribuie iOf eh:uiiity 1a[l]ld rtiheise Clall legitima:tely leDJd to ia rieaisonJrublepro1ba1bi11ty. On rbhe otheT h:md, one can never be 1absolUJtelyce!J:1bruin hecaiuse, in 1o:rdeir 1to judge w'heibher one pos-1sies1ses 1the haibit, oiJJJe would hiave to know :irbs me1a1suve, tihait for rt:ihe s:wke of which the hahilt ris giivien, namely, rtihe inoomprrehen-si:ble God. Aquin!a:s nev;erthdess russumes thaxt chruri:ty hrings 1a1bou1t del1gbit in one'is 1a,ots. Bu:t iSinoe :the same foind of delight oould oome frrom ian :aicquiired ih!arhiit, oflie is nort swic1tly eI11t1itled !to deduce tihalt rit flowis born rtbe su1pern1altm1rulhabrut?[63]

Mo.sit of the time, ihowevier, he a1Sis:er:ts the fact of a diireot e:xperffience of God'rs 1o-ve. Fo'l' example, m:run ohjec1tion concern-ing crieated ich!arilty, he 1s1trurt1s off with a from 1 Coir. 6: 17, "He who is jomed to 1th1e Lord, is one in sp[l'it." Bult if theiie 1Well'le such a thing :a1s creaked chJa:riJty, ru1 WIOU1d oome ,3JS 1a 1rnedium between God and 1tihe 1souL In hiis reply, he argues tbialt the habiit 1of ohwrilty 1should be cregiarded mol'le as a prin-1criple of tihe act of 1ovie *(principium amationis)* rthan 1a1s a mediiium between the 1lover arnd the lov:ed, "forr rbhe 1acrt of love pais1ses rto God *(immediate tmnsit in Deum)* as to 1the :1ov:ed, hUJt immedi a1tely 1hJJto tihe hahiit of char:ity." Even though, along wirbh 1gmoe, *the habit* of dhia1rity :is :a medium 1that is requimd rbo make rthe 1bel!iev:er ha vie 1a 1siha1re in God's, own 1ilie, *the act* iof foive ms re1aited Ito God.[64]

A suihsieqwenltobjeotion in rbhe s1ame ques1ticon enun-

62 *Super epistolam ad Romanos leotura*, Marietti, # 645.
63 *De veritate*, q. 10, a. 10.
64 *De oaritate*, 1, ad 3.

1ai:ruteisitilre rpil'lincip1ethrut " God is mown 1tm1ough!the knowledge of the ih:ighesit Jove." Auguisiti:ne is quoted to tihiiis effocrt: "He lmoWIS rt:he fove w:ith wihiich bie 'loves, more :than the hroither whom he love:.s. So ill!ow ihe can know God more tbhan he knows ib.tis rbrother. Emooa,cte the love of God, and hy love embrace God." The treply notJeis rthiait Arugiursbi.D!e seems to be refor:rin:g rbo "rthie very adt of love." The exp1anrution the following: "Thererore wihien we peroeiive *(perciz>i,mus)* in om"selves a:n acrt of lovie, we feel *(sen,timus)* 1a certain ipruriliaiparoiom of God he-cruwse God Himself is Jove, not :becaiuise He tiis ithe very acrt of love whiich we peirceiive."[65]

This direcrt peircepitiiJOnof om a.obs of love, wJ:ricli Aquinas speal\ls,aJboiut m1seV1ffi'iaJoither ;bexlts;[66] may he re:f:leated upon a.rid :tihu1s 1becoirne the brrusis for 1an e:xipliaiJt13JWM1enJesiSof :tihe presence of God. This prrtincipleis 1aid down whe:n ithe question is asked, " Gan ithe an!tellootunide:risrtiand the 1act of tlhe wiill?" In hi1s answer, ,afite!l'dlistbingullis1hiing be/tween the ltwo kinds of hiuma:n inclinJrutions,i.e. :the 1s1en:siitive and the initellige:rnt,he remarks thait 1th.e lrutter 1be1ongs to each peirson 1as rto *one* linite11igenrtsubject, 1and ihe ·aigirui:nquoites A.riS1tJoit1e,to rthe effiecit thrrut "rthe will is in 1the reason."[67] It rfioilJoWIS iliart "rbhe 1acit of <the wiill is under-1srbood *(intelligitur)* 1by tlre mtelleclt inasmuch a;s one petl'ceives *(perciz>i,t)* ·thiart o:ne wills .and !irua1smuoh:a.is O!ll!e knows (*oognoscit)* !the lllalture of rtlb.rus :acrt 1rund, 1rus 1a :result, tlili.e naJture of ii.its prti.TI!ciple,whllich tis 1a hiruoot orr 1a [68] '.Dhis is ;tihe rea-1son wihy there is no medium ii.n rthe 1awarenesis we !hlavie of lovmg God. Eviecy iintJellligellltsurbjeci hrus 1a dri.Toot ruWial'enesi.s *(percipere)* of o!Il!e's,a;C/ts of the 1wiill; in ::riefleation,O[l)e arun unders:tand *(intelligere)* orr know *(cognoscere)* the nlaitureof this perceived .aotof the w.i1I.

* * * * *

65 *De caritate,* I, ad 7.
66 For example I, q. 93, a. 7-8.
a1 See note 56.
as I, q. 87, a. 4; see q. 16, a. 4, ad 1-2.

In oondu1s:ion,1Jert us fo W1winiwrigiht's1advocacyof the diil'lecitnessof 1theie.JIJPerienoeof God. Borth AquliTIJa:sand Mm·itiain w10u1d agree witih him to a cemtalin eXJtent, mrtihe sense ibhlrut fo!l' lbhem g'J:'lace reru1ly places ilie he1ieV'eir in 1the rp1t1eselil!oeof God. On itih!eoitheil'haJilJd,;they would 'be empihirutic thrut rt:he immediacy of myisrticiail ti:s :nnt rto 1be oonceiviedof 1a:libeir thie model of sensocy immed:iia:cy,:as arno1their kmd of pe1t1ceprtionihesti.des ordmacy perception.

:To clamifyithe maitite:r, I would suggeslt a beitween immediacy 1and unmedi.amdnesis. Jjt 1S1ooms to me 1tl:m.1t ho,tih Aqooas ,arrJJd Mirurilbainmaiil'.llbainlt.halt the experience of God is immedirute hut not UJUmedrnarbed. Their explanatbionis foir the medffirutedneSJsof myistiaal conscioru:sne1S1snevetrJl:lheJ.essdif:liell.". Because ovieiremphia:sizrestil:ue iio,le of the concept, he t11ies to gmoun:ditlre no1etic chrumater of infused oonrbe:mplrution hy ioompamng it to il:uils conoopibualiSJtamount of ordinacy k:nlowledge. The foetlings of infased love rtJ:m.s become Hooe oonoerprbsrthrougih which realiiity is known. Thti.s comparison wfutih ,a de:£eebive:aieoount of knowledge ohf usc1rutes rtarther :tihian rniumines whiait rthe mysbics sray aibout rtheiT ex:pmwce.

For Aqllllinirus,on tihe oonlbraJirY,:the direcrt 1a:Wiareil.leS1sof one'B 1ruots of fovmg God does n101t requi:ve a nre1dirub:ion oonoeived of iaf.ter the modiel of a oolJlleept. Since disibincibiion between ;the Vllliil'.iious facuLbies of rtlhe isoul does not entail the rigid £ac.ulty espo1Usedby M1runitJaiin,he does not sihairply oontra:st a [IJO!ll-OOUl(leprtruJaaffecitiviee'Xiperience of God with a ooncepitua.J-*ist* Vliew of £airth. k:nJo,wledge. F1oil' him, tihe same ihiumrun iTIJteilli-·genoe1s:ponrbaneous1lymo·VJes:boitih foom the ise:n:s!i:hleooa;J,ilti!eisto God rund from the oonisciousenjoyment of God'is Love to a judgmell!t of 1wti:sdioml'legiaJ"dffigevecyrthung ,i:J::u11Jt be1ongs to God. In :the case of knowledge iby CO!llllialtu:valiity,orne's oorrIBdouis acts 1and foelingis of lo·V!e rure the mediia1toll's that permirt Aquiruas to srpieak of tihe exvemooce of God. Gr1ruce, rtihe !infll'Sedv:irrtues,and 1tihe 1giifts of the Holy Spidt 1rure the oondirtions1of pos1sihi1isty of ithis meclirutedexperience.[69]

[69] Notice .Aquinas's rich precision, which I have tried to encapsulate in this paragraph. Rahner's and Schillebeeckx's notion of "mediated imme·

Aquinias, 1thel'lefoi1.1e, prowdes us wilth ia oo11l'edbive to Miaci-rtiruin's ·aa:ud :to ep]sibemofogicaJviiews. Moreove:r, \q)ltihiough it does ndt rpurrprnitiUo p!I'lOVle rbhe :faict of <the experience orf God, his 1theology nevierthele.sisofliers a differentiated aJoeouDJt of human in wihich ithe expemence of God crun he 1sirblmJtied and mrude intelligible by *fides quaerens intellectwm.*

diacy" is more general, albeit in line with the thought of .Aquinas. See: Karl Rahner, *Foundations of Christian Faith* (New York: Crossroad, 1984), 83-86 and 119-120; Edward Schillebeeckx, *Ghrist: The JJJmperienoe of Jesus as Lord* (New York: Crossroad, 1980), 804-817. However, whereas Rahner rightly rejects the immediacy of "an object immediately confronting us" ("The Experience of God Today," *Theological Investigations*, XI (New York: Crossroad, 1982), 153; see 149-165), Schillebeeckx considers religious faith to be "a particular form of *perception"* (his italics; *Ghrist*, 805; see 811), and thus would side with Wainwright in this respect.

THE BARTH LEGACY: NEW ATHANASIUS OR ORIGEN REDIVIVUS? :A RESPONSE TO T. F. TORRANCE

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I

IN A SERIES of papers, essays, and introductions reaching back some twenty years, T. F. Torrance has provided an interpretation of the place arnd of the importance of Karl Barth not only in the theological debates of the twentieth cent--bury but also and more importantly in the who1e of the history of doctrine. According to Torrance, Barth is not only the greatest theologian since Schleiermacher and the most important thinker of our own times, he is also the greatest theologian since Athanasius, the heir of the Reformers, and the thinker on whose insights our theological future must rest.[1] In these essays by Torrance, the characterization of Barthian thought as "neo-

1 Cf. Karl Barth, *Theology and Church: Shorter Writings, 1920-1928,* trans. Louise Pettibone Smith, with an introduction (1962) by T. F. Torrance (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1962), pp. 7, 9-10; T. F. Torrance, *Theology in Reconstruction* (London: SCJ'vf, 1965), pp. 99, 103-105, 111-115; idem, *ReaUty and Evangelical Theology* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1982), ,pp. 14-15; idem, *Transformation and Convergence in the Frame of Knowledge* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1984), pp. vii-x, 279-283; idem, "The Legacy of Karl Barth (1886·1986)," in *Scottish Journal of Theology,* 39 (1986): 289-308 and "Karl Barth and the Latin Heresy," in 39 (1986): 461-482. The latter two essays draw together themes from the earlier words. .Although the term "Latin heresy" does not seem to have been used by Torrance in any of his previous writings, it does represent a continuation of the attack on medieval and post-Reformation theology :first presented in his introduction to *The School of Faith: The Oatechisms of the Reformed Ohi1rch* (N.Y.: Harper, 1959), pp. lxx-lxxix, and elaborated in *Space, Time and IncM'nation* (London: Oxford, 1969).

orthodox" takes on a new meaning. Barth himself rejected the term, just as (we might guess) Calvin or Chemnitz would have !'ejected any claim that their great dogmatic projects were the proper basis for a new orthodoxy in the sixteenth century. Both Calvin and Chemnitz stood for right teaching, for ortho-doxy, but neither would have presented their own views-no matter how correct they believed their exegesis and interpretation to be-as a final ground for the establishment of future theological formulations. Both in the Reformation aind in the twentieth century, it has been the next generation, the generation of the students of the great teaicher, that has moved definitely from the system of the teaicher to the establishment of a new orthodoxy. And in all fairness to the Protestant orthodox of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, we must l'ecognize that they neither exalted the theology of the Reformation to the status of a new orthodoxy (ovcer against the faith of the church throughout the centuries) nor identified any single theological system, whether that of Calvin or that of Chemnitz or of a later, more fully "orthodox" and "scholastic" thinker like Polanus or Gerhard, as an exhaustive statement of theological Ol1thodoxyfor the chmch.[2] In the writings of Torrance, we encounter this second-generation sense of orthodoxy but, I believe, without the caution characteristic of the Protestant orthodox of the seventeenth century.

In the following essay, I propose to examine the origin and the subsequent trajectory of Torrance's views on Barth's relationship to the tradition, with attention to his view of Barth's patristic roots and of Barth's position over against the western theological mind. In the concluding sections of the essay, I will try to provide a corrective to Torrance's approach to the history of 1Christian doctrine and, on the basis of that correc-. tive, an alternative view of the lega1cy of Karl Barth.

Torrance's pronouncements concerning the role of Barth in

2 Cf. Richard A. Muller, " Scholasticism Protestant and Catholic: Francis Turretin on the Object and Principles of Theology," in *Ohuroh Historv,* 55 (1986) ; 19::!-205,

the history of Christian doctrine and, therefore, in its future development a11e based on an essay written by Barth in 1934 and published, together with several other essays or 3!ddresses from the same year, in a short volume entitled, *God in Ac#on.*[8] This volume, once ca.J..1ed by its translators the "Little Dogmatics," is now eclipsed not only by the complete translation of the *Church Dogmatics* hut also by such works as *Dogmatic8 in Outline, Credo,* and *Evangelical Theology,* in which Barth's approach to theology is set forth in a manageable short form.[4] Neglect of a volume does not, of course, diminish its intrinsic importance-in this case, not only its importance for our understanding of Barth but also for our understanding of the origins and the form of the Torrancian "legacy" of Karl Barth.

Barth's first address in *God in Action,* an essay entitled simply "Revelation," argues that the manifestation of God given to the prophets and apostles "is nothing less than God Himself." Much as he had earlier spoken of the divine promise of salvation as an "impossible possibility," Barth here speaks of revelation as "a reality the possibility of which resides absolutely within itself" and which cannot be substantiated "except out of itself."[5] This revelation is not only "God Himself," it is also, because of its divine identity, "grace to him who B!ooepts its ve11dict of condemnation as being God's right, condemnation to him who will not receive this grace" but stands opposed to it.[6] Characteristic of Barth's argument here is a rather 11eductionistic identification of God with the activity

a Karl Barth, *God in Aotion,* introduction by Elmer G. Homrighausen, trans. by E. G. Homrighausen and Karl J. Ernst (Manhasset, N.Y.: Round Table Press, 1936; repr. 1963).

4 Karl Barth, *Dogmatios in Outlilne,* trans. G. T. Thomson (London: SCM, 1949); *Oredo,* with a foreword by Robert McAfee Brown (N.Y.: Scribner's, 1962); *JJ1'vangelioal Theology: An Introduction,* trans. Grover Foley (N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963).

5 *God, in Aotion,* pp. 12-13; Cf. Karl Barth, *The Epistle to the Romans,* trans. Edwin Hoskyns (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1933; repr. 1968), e.g., pp. 141-142, 202-203.

e *God in Aotion,* p. 13.

of God that is known ;to us, a collapsing of God into his revelation, followed by an equation of revelation with grace. The latter point, the equation of revelation with graice, is possible for Barth only because of his prior exclusion of natural theology from the category of genuine theology and his denial, underlying that exclusion, of the existence of a natural revelation.[7] The former point, Barth's identification of God with the 11evelation of God, stands in ·a direct and substantive relation to the radical Christocentrism that Barth would shortly espouse as the underlying principle of his *Church Dogmatics.*[8] For the moment, however, it is sufficient to note that the presuppositions underlying the argument of the essay on " Revelation" are not made clear in the essay itself; Barth simply takes it for granted that God can be identified with or reduced to his rev;elation and that :vevelation can be equated with grace.

The next step in Barth's argument is to present the fourth century debate over the doctrine of the Trinity and the sixteenth century debate over justi:fication-Nicaea and the Reformation-not as they are usually presented in histories of doctrine, i.e., as soteriological debates, the first focused on the divine identity of the Redeemer, the second focused on the so1ely gracious charact•er of the redemption offered in Christ, but rather as debates o¥er the necessary identification of God with his revelation.[9] The Nicene doctrine of the Trinity is a chmchly expression of the fact that " believing revelation, the chmich believes God Himself; and she believes God Himself by believing re¥elation." This great truth of the identity of God with his :vevelation was at stake once more in the sixteenth

1 See Karl Barth, *Ohuroh Dogmatics,* ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, 4 vols. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1936-1975), **I/l,** pp. 238-239, 324-325; **I/** 2, rpp. 25-44.

s *Church Dogmatics,* 1/2, pp. 1-202. The addresses in *God in Action* were delivered in 1934, between the appearance of *Ohuron Dogmatics* **I/l** in 1932 and the publication of *Onurch1 Dogmatics* I/2 in 1938. The full identification of Jesus ·Christ with the revelation of God occurs first in I/2, as noted.

9 *God in Action,* pp. 13-15.

century in the Reformation debate over "Free Grace"-the Reformers contended for the identity of "the gift which is bestowed on the sinner . . . with the Giver of the gift." Thus, "Jesus Christ is and remains our only jrustification."[10] The gift, grare, is identical with the Giv:er, God in Christ, who is also "the deed of God," the Immanuel, the revelation itself.[11]

Once this rather unique oVierviewof the great events of the history of doctrine has been set forth, Barth can move on to the central point of his essay-that the "battle" over the truth enunciated by Nicaea and the Reformation, "God Himself is content of His revelation," haid in Barth's own time "entered its third stage."[12] The church, argues Barth, has become increasingly secularized and the "mystery, authority, and judgment" ·embodied in God's revelation have been forgotten. Barth concludes his aiddress with an appeal to the church of his time once more "to take up in alJ. seriousness the battle for the old truth," the :identity of God with his revielation.[13] Barth does not ever once note that this partioular way of stating the" old truth" arises not out of the history of doctrine as usually interpreted but out of his own dogmatic enterprise; his essay has, without stating the point explicitly, identified the Barthian theological program as the contemporary reappropriation of the two greatest events in the history of Christian thought.

The basic argument from *God in Action,* together with much of its actual language, is taken over and elaborated into an appreciation of the historical significance of Barth and his theology by T. F. Torrance in a lengthy introduction to the translation of Barth's *Theology and Church: Shorter Writings, 1920-1928.*[14] What was implicit in Barth's essay becomes explicit in Torrance's: the theological battle of the fourth and of the sixteenth century is again being waged in the twentieth anid Karl Barth is at its center, becaiuse it is he who understands that

10 Ibid., p. 14.
11 Ibid., p. 14.
12 Ibid., p. 15.
13 Ibid., p. 16.
14 *Theology aniJ, Church,* pp. 7-54.

"Revelation is God-in-his-revelation" and that the meaning of" the Nicene Christology is that God communicates *himself* in his revelation." Similarly, in the Reformation, Barth has recognized that the central theological point of the doctrine of justification is that " in Jesrus Christ and in the Holy Spirit God comes to us in Person and giv;es himself." Thus, " God himself is the content of his revelation, and himself the content of his saving grace." Nicaea, the Reformation, and Barth all recognized that revelation is the act of a person, that revelation is the Logos himself," God's: Being in Act." [15] Inasmuch as Barth so :fully recapitulates in his own theological insights the great doctrinal insights of the tradition, Torrance feels quite justified in stating

> Karl Barth is the greatest theological genius that has appeared on the scene for centuries. cannot be appreciated except in the context of the greatest theologians such as Athanasius, Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, Schleiermacher, Kierkegaard, nor can his thinking be adequately except in the context of the whole history of theology and philosophy.[16]

We reserve analysis of this overview of the history of doctrine and of this assessment of Barth's stature for a concluding section of our essay-because them is one further element in Torrance's presentation of the Barth legacy that demands our attention. There is a certain inconsistency in the picture that Torrance has presented thus far. We understand the ence of Athanasius, Luther, and Calvin in the list of great theologians leading to Barth. Barth has, apparently in his own and certainly in ToITance's view, recapitulated the battles of Nica;ea and the Reformation. But in drawing on the doctrinal insights of Nicaea and the Reformation in o:vder to explain his notion of the identity of God with his own revelation, Barth explicitly rejected as insufficient both pre-Nicene patristic theology with its trinitarian misconceptions and medieval theology in its failure to recognize the identity of God with his

[15] Ibid., p. 25.

[16] Ibid., p. 7.

grace.[17] These two rejections have the effect of isolating Nicaea and the Reformation from the rest of the history of doctrine, of making them bright lights in t!ie midst of surrounding intellectual and spiritual darkness. How then can Barth be placed in the company of Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas? Torrance did not answer this question in 1962, in his introduction to *Theology and Church,* but he moved rather quickly towa11d an answer in subsequent essays, particilllarly *Space, Time and Incarnation* (1969), *Reality and Evangelical Theology* (1982), *Transformation and Convergence in the Frame of Knowledge* (1984) and, most recently, three short essays, "The Legacy of Karl Barth," "Karl Barth and the Latin Heresy," and "Karl Barth and Patristic Theology." [18]

In the first of these essays, Torrance argueS'that the Nicene theologians were forced by their meditations on trinitarian and Christological problems to work out a solution to the debate over the relationship of God to man in Christ in which Aristotelian notions of space and time were overcome. This anti-Aristotelian solution was represented by the langlllage of the *homoousion.* Unfortunately, the medieval Latin acceptance of Aristotelian philosophy undid the new philosophical synthesis adumbrated by Nicaea; only the Reformation debate over the so-called *extra-Calvinisticum* was capable of bringing again into view the patristic ontology with its ability to overcome the Aristotelian notion of space as a container or receptacle. Again unfortunately, the rise of an Aristotelian Protestant scholasticism and of modern " Newtonian " science cut short the return of Nicene conceptuality. [19] We will deal, in the second part of this essay with the mistaken reading of history underlying these generalizations. For the p11esent, it suffices for us to note that in this argument Torrance has provided the

·11 Cf. *God in Action,* pp. 14-15.

18 "Karl Barth and Patristic Theology," in *Theology Beyond Ohristendom: Essays on the Oentenary of the Birth of Karl Barth, May 10, 1986,* ed. John Thompson (Allison Park, Pa.: Pickwick Publications, 1986). The other essays noted are referenced above, note 1.

19 *Space, Time and Incarnation,* pp. 13-16, 25-44.

answer to our question: Nicaea is now isolated from all. that went before it and aM that came after it, with the exception of the brief bright light of the Calvinistic "extra " of the Reformation.

In the four remaining essays Torrance rings the changes on this theme. Barth's theology is the great modern 11eminder, after the decline in Christian thought brought about by Aristotelianism and Newtonianism, of the Nicene and sixteenth century Reformation theme that " God is who he is in his self-revelation," that " divine revelation is God himself, for it is not just something of himself that God reveals to us but his v;ery own Self, his own Ultimate Being as God." As before, the statement arises out of the exhaustive :identification of Jesus Christ as God's revelation: Torrance argues "the identity in being between what God is toward us in his revelation in Jesus Christ and what he is in his living Being and Reality in himself." [20] In the thought of Athanasius, for a brief moment in the thought of Anselm of Canterbury before the onslaught of Aristotelian " dualism," equally briefly in the thought of Kierkegaard, and finally in the thought of Karl Barth, this insight into God and Christ and the nature of rev;elation brought about a 11ejection of "cosmological dualism and the notion of the Logos as a cosmological principle, for the Christian notion of the Logos or Son by whom God c11eated the universe and through whom he interaiets with it in redemption." [21] Over against this patristic logos-ontology with its emphasis on the unity of God's Act and Being, both medieval and post-Reformation dualism sever the act from the being of God. Typically, the " Latin " theological notion of the divine immutability and impassibility brought about a "deistic detachment of God from the world," long before the actual historical rudvent of Deism.[22]

Barth's theology now can be understood as a recovery of the

20 *Reality and I!Jvangeliaal Theology,* .pp. 14, 18.
21 *Transformation wnd Oonvergenae,* p. 277.
22 Ibid., pp. 3-4.

truth truught by Athanasius, glimpsed but not fully understood by the Reformation, and lost in all of the intervening ages because of an "Augustinian-Aristotelian" dualism built into the very linguistic structure of western theology, the Latin heresy. ,Against Athanasius's and Barth's recognition of the identity of God with the content of his revielation and the "Giver" with the "Gift," this Latin heresy created a false distinction between the Being of God in himself and the revelation in the Scriptures, between the uncreated grace that is God himself and the" created" grace that is God's gift to sinfiul man.[23] Scholastic theologies that identify " truth " with propositional statements participate in this " dualism " as does any theology that fails to be genuinely Christocentric-and both attack the underlying premise of the Athanasian *homoousios,* which is to say, "the. consubstantial relation between God's Self-revealing and Self-giving and the objective content of what he communicates in his word."[24] Barth's Christocentrism, therefore, stands for the truth embodied in Nicaea and the Reformation, and any rejection of Barth's view must be a reiecrtion of the creedal foundation of Christianity: " To have :vecourseto some alleged knowledge of God apart from Christ, therefore, is to reject the *homoousion,* and to import a deep split into the very concept of God." Any theology based on this " split" must lack "objective ground in God's own being" and must he unable to claim any genuine truth concerning the nature of God.[25]

Torrance makes a pointed contrast between the Athanasian, Calvinian, Barthian theology of the Word and the " Augustinian-Thomistic dualism" with its "deep split" in the concept of God. This split, this ontological and epistemological dualism, appears most dearly in the Augustinian teruching, in-

2a "Karl Barth and the Latin Heresy;" pp. 462-63, 478 with "The Legacy of Karl Barth," pp. 294, 299, 301; and cf. *ReaUty and Evangelical Theowgy,* pp.14-15.

24" Karl Barth and the Latin Heresy," p. 472.

2• "The Legacy of Karl Barth," pp. 303-304.

herited from Tertullian, that a distinction can be made between "'the internal mental word' or 'vision' in the mind of God, which as *Y.!*ord is 'fornable but not yet formed', and the "external Vvo1id' which assumed definite form as Word when uttered in the incarnation ...." This dualism was central to the whole medieval notion of God, as witnessed by Aquinas's ,distinction between the "wordless" communication by "vision" that takes place between God and heavenly beings, both angelic and human, and the communication by means of word that takes place between God and human beings in this life.[26] This dualism pervaded the whole of medieval thought about God, extending even to exegetical method. Only with the Reformation and Renaissance humanist i;evival of Hebrew studies was the error seen: the Latin language itself, with its inherent dualisms, had created the problem. The preeminent statement of the new Hebraic insight, argues Torrance, can be found in the writings of the great Renaissance hebraist, John Reuchlin:

> As John Reuchlin argued at the end of the Middle Ages, latent in the heart of Latin Christianity there was a rejection of the consubstantiality of the Word, a denial that what God is to us as a *Word* incarnate, and as he communicates it to us in the Holy Scriptures, he is antecedently and eternally in his own being as God. It is to that dualist conception of the Word that the medieval Latin tradition in oblique,, tropological or symbolic interpretation of the Bible must be traced .... [I]n Reformation theology the Nicene struggle was renewed for the ontological and dynamic wholeness of God's Self-revelation through Christ and in the Holy Spirit.[27]

In the theology of Karl Barth, the struggle is once again renewed-not only renewed, but brought to its systematic and dogmatic conclusion in a thoroughgoing Christocentrism that abolishes all of the remaining dualisms of Latin Christianity. The Reformation itself was unable to reassert fully

2s "Karl Barth and the Latin Heresy," pp. 468-69; cf. *Transformation and Convergence,* pp. 316-17, and "The Legacy of Karl Barth," pp. 300-301.

2r "Karl Barth and the LRtin Heresy," pp. 469-70; cf. "The Legacy of Karl Barth," p. 301, and *Transformation and Con,vergenoe,* p. 316.

the Nicene truth, and this led to a Protestant orthodoxy where the static and dualistic view of God, typical of the "Latin Heresy" reappeared on two fronts, the doctrine of Scripture and the doctrine of reconciliation. In its doctrine of Scripture, orthodoxy replaces a dynamic with a static word and "dearly operates with an epistemological dualism which ·outsoff God's Revelation in the Bible from the living dynamic being of God himself and his continual self-giving through Christ and in the Spirit." The result of this dualism is a view of Scripture "as a fixed corpus of revealed propositional truths which can be arranged logically into rigid systems of belief." [28] In its doctrine of reconciliation, this orthodoxy adopted a typically Latin juridical view of the saving transaction between God and man according to which Christ was merely" the intermediary or instrument of divine reconciliation." [29] Against these dualisms, Barth once again asserts the Nicene truth, the truth of the *homoousios,* of the identity of God with his revelation, of the Giver with the Gift. Thus, the revelation mediated to us by Scripture or, better, given to us as an immediate aiet of God in the event of reading and preaching on Scripture, is the divine word, God himself; the reconciling work of Christ is understood not as an act external to God but as God in Person, in Word, and in Act, present for us as the Reconciliation itself, as Redemption, as Justification. Nothing taikes plaice outside of Christ. To claim otherwise is to become enmeshed in dualisms. It is Barth's ultimate Christological victory over the dualisms of the "Latin Heresy" that manifests him not only as the greatest theologian since Athanasius but also as the theological future of Western Christianity. [80]

II

SUJCh, from the pen of one of the most eminent and prolific of contemporary Barthians, is "The Legacy of Karl Barth."

[28] "Karl Barth and the Latin Heresy," p. 472.
[29] Ibid., p. 475; cf. *Reality and Evangelical Theology,* p. 23.
[a-0] "Karl Barth and the Latin Heresy," pp. 461-465.

As we have seen, the theological and historical argument employed in the identification of the legacy has its own history: it arises directly out of Barth's own views on the meaning of Nicaea and of the Reformation in relation to his theological enterprise. Torrance has merely elaborated the idea and, more clearly than Barth himself, has identified Barth's theofogy as the new Athanasianism, the one way back to the truth of the Gospel as recognized by Nicaea and, therefore, the one legitimate way into our own theological future. Torrance's identification of the Barth legacy is, then, a genuine Barthianism at the same time that it is a massive misrepresentation of the history of the church and an egregious falsification of our theological heritage.

The scale on which this misrepresentation and falsification has been constructed is, moreover, so grandiose that the determination of a proper place to begin our analysis is itseH no easy task. Let us not mistake the issue: in order to announce the normative charncter of a theology in many ways at odds with the whole tradition of the church, Torrance has driven a wedge between patristic trinitarian orthodoxy and western, Latin Christianity; he has identified the theofogy of Athanasius as a rather lonely signpost on the way to the truth of Barthianism; and, on the basis of his presentation of the meaning of this lonely Nicene truth, has labelled virtually the whole of the fifteen-hundred-year history of the western church as heretical. Vincent of Lerins has been stood, like Marx's Hegel, on his head: the universal right teaching of the church has been identified as what has been believed in a few disparate places, sometimes, and by no more than three or four select theologians.

To bor:row a w011d from Barth himseH, we must say " No " to this version of the Barth legacy, and we must say it loudly in the name of the Gospel and of the church that has faithfully witnessed the truth of the Gospel for nearly two thousand years. We must resist this canonization of Barth and this Barthianization of history. We must even resist it for the sake

of a right understanding of Barth's own theology and its proper place in the history of Christian thought in the twentieth century.

The canonization of Barth provides a convenient starting point for discussion, since it is the motive behind the attack on tradition. By this phrase I mean the use of Barth's theology and particularly of those theological constructions unique to Barth as a norm for judging the his:torical course of Christianity and as a ground for any further theological construction. Here, the key issue is Barth's Christocentrism, the Barthian identification of God with the content of hi.s self-revelation as based on the twofold assumption that Jesus Christ, the God-man, is not only the revealer of God but also the entirety of the Revelation of God and that Jesus Christ is, therefore, the source and ground of all our knowledge of God. Professor Torrance has grounded this Christocentrism far too neatly on the Athanasian *homoousios.* In other words, on the basis of the canonization of Barth, he has engaged in a Barthianization of history.

In addressing the difference between Barth's Christocentrism and the theology of Athanasius, we must begin with a distinction of Christocentrisms-a distinction not made by Barth, but one which enables us to see just how different Barth's approach to the centrality of Christ is from Athanasius's theology and from the normative views of the whole tra:dition of the church as well. We can distinguish, in short, between the *soteriological* Christocentrism that belongs to any genuinely Christian body of doctrine and the *principial* Christocentrism that belongs to several nineteenth-century developments of the so-called " mediating theology " and to Karl Barth.[31] Soterio-

[31] Cf. Richard A. Muller, "Emmanuel V. Gerhart on the 'Christ-idea' as Fundamental Principle-A Study of Late Nineteenth-Century Christocentrism," in *Westminster Theological Journal,* 48 (1986): 97-117 and his "Henry Boynton Smith: Christocentric Theologian," in *Journal of Presbyterian History,* 61 (1983): 429-444. Note also the comments on Barth's nineteenth century roots in Alister McGrath, *The Making of Modern German Ohristology* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 99, 112.

logical Christocentrism is the historical Christ-centeredness of the theology of the church fathers (including, I would contend, not only Athanasius hut also Tertullian and Augustine) of the greatest of the medieval doctors, of Catholic theology generally, of the Reformers, and of the Protestant orthodox. It recognizes Christ allld Christ alone ais the sole ground of salvation to the utter exclusion of a Pelagian emphasis on the autonomy of human willing in the work of salvation. Following both Athanasius and Augustine this Christocentrism recogniz,es the eternal existence and the temporail. providential and revelatory function of the Word prior to and beyond the flesh it assumes. In other words, this soteriological Christocentrism acknowledges the truth of the doctrinal point rather oddly named the *extra-Calvinistieum,* the "Calvinistic 'extra'", during the contro¥ersies of .the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.32 Despite its name, this doctrine has an undeniable catholicity; it is attested to not only by Athanasius and Augustine but also by John of Damascus, Beter Lombard, Thomas Aquinas, allld the tradition of Reformed or Calvinist orthodoxy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.[33]

The point is beautifully made by Calvin, with characteristic "clarity and brevity":

32,See in particular Athanasius, *De Incarnatiane Verbi Dei,* 17 (in PG, 25.125) and Augustine, Epistula 137, Ad Volusianum (in PL, 33.517-518; idem., *De Civitate Dei,* IX. 15.2 (PL, 41.269); and cf. the excellent discussion on these and other patristic occurrences of the "extra-Calvinisticum" in E. David Willis, *Calvin's Catholic Christology: The Function of the So-Called Emtra Calvinisticum in Calvin's Theology* (Leiden: Brill, 1966), pp. 44-60. Willis also discusses the basic agreement of the medieval doctors with the fathers, both Greek and Latin, in their statement and use of the concept (cf. pp. 31-44).

33 Cf. John of Damacus, *De fide orthodoma,* III.7, in PG 94, 1011 B-C; Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae,* editio teria (Grottaferrata: Collegium S. Bonaventure ad Claras Aquas, 1971-81), III. mii.3; Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* (Madrid: Biblioteca de Auctores Cristianos, 1963), III, q.5, a.2, ad I; q.10, a.I, ad 2; Zacharias Ursinus, *Explioationes oatecheseos,* in *Opera theologioa* (Heidelberg, 1612), I, col. 187; Johannes Maccovius, *Looi communes theologici* (Amsterdam, 1658), cap. 57 (pp. 495-96); Francis Turretin, *Institutio theologiae elenotioae* (Geneva, 1679-85li XIII. viii.27-28.

They thrust upon us as something absurd the fact that if the Word of God become flesh, then he was confined within the narrow prison of an earthly body. This is mere impudence! For even if the, Word in his immeasurable essence united with the nature of man into one person, *we do not imagine that he was confined therein.* Here is something marvellous: the Son of God descended from heaven in such a way that, without leaving heaven,. he willed to go about the earth, and to hang upon the cross; *yet he continuously filled the world even as he had done from the beginning!* [34]

In other words, Christ, the God-man, the oenter of everything that we can say about the work of sailvation, is not the center of everything we can say about God, and not even the rule for everything that we can say about the Word in its work of c11eation, providence, and revelation. The *extra-Calvinisticum* allows, therefore, both for a genuine revelation of God in nature, accomplished by the Wor1d *extra Christum* or, as the fathers would have said, the *Logos asarkos,* and a special revelation of God *focused* soteriologically upon but not *restricted* to 1the person of Christ, the *Logos ensarkos.*

This insight into the work of the *Logos* before and beyond the union with the flesh led Athanasius to develop a broad and positive view of the role of natural theology in his great apologetic treatise, the *Contra Gentes.* The arguments present both in this treatise and in the treatise *De lncarnatione,* that forms the second half of Athanasius's apologetic effort, are clearly incompatible with Barthianism. The defender of the *homoousios* assumes the theological arguments typical of the apologetic Logos-theology of the second century defenders of the faith, Justin Martyr and Athenagoras of Athens. [35] Athanasius can, thus, not only identify a revelatory work of the *Logos asarkos* in and through the natural order, he can also speak (in what, in point of origin, are Aristotelian terms) of God, together with his divine VVord, as the eternal Mover who

34 John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion,* trans. Ford Lewis Battles, 2 vol. (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960), II.xiii.4, my italics.

35 Cf. E. P. Meijering, *Orthodoxy and Platonism in Athanasius: Synthesis or Antithesis?* (Leiden: Brill, 1968), pp. 7-8, 26-28, 33-35.

is himself "unmoved" *(akinetos).* In addition, he can couple this language with one of the most convincing statements of the cosmological argument for the existence and oneness of God prior to the *Sumrna theologiae* of St. Thomas Aquinas.[36] All of these Athanasianisms are as contrary to Barthian theology as the Thomistic *analogia entis.* Indeed, such concepts as these, in the heart of Athanasius's theology, demonstrate his essential agreement with the whole line of thought that Torrance would sevier from Nrcene orthodoxy, the "Latin heresy " of Augustine and Aquinas.

We may also note here that the " Nicene Christology " of which Torrance speaks does not exist in history-and unless we would fabricate for it a Barthian *GeschiGhte* distinct from the analyzable history of doctrine, it does not exist at all. The remarkable thing about Nicaea is that it does not approach either the issue of divine threeness or the Christological problem. The Nicene solution itself was incomplete and the language of divine threeness, almost excluded by the na]{;ed affirmation of the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son, was only made by possible by the Cappadocian fathers and by the Council of Constantinople in 381 AD. The Christological issue, the consubstantiaility of the Word Incarnate with our humanity, was only given confessional fomulation at the Council of Chalcedon in 451 AD. The history need not be elaborated here. Vve only need to note that Athanasius never so much as dreamt of applying the Nicene language of *homoousios* to the doctrine of the person of Christ.[37] In other words, the Barthian Chriso-

36 Athanasius, *Contra Gentes,* 42 (P:G, 25.85). Torrance's recourse to Greek/Hebrew dichotomies and to the claim that Athanasius somehow escaped the thought-world of Greek philosophy is not only quite .preposterous, it also goes against the general consensus of patristic scholarship, which recognizes both the biblical basis of Athanasius's theology and the essentially Platonic ontology underlying the language even of Athanasius's *De Incarnatione:* see Meijering, *Orthodoxy and Platonism,* pp. 114-122, 130-131, 146-147; and Christopher Stead, *Divine Substance* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), p. 161.

37 Cf. Stead's analysis of Athanasius's use of *homoousios* and its limits in *Divfoe Substance,* pp. 260-266.

centrism, particularly as set forth by Torrance, has absolutely no historical 11ecourse to the Nicene and Athanasian *homoousion,* inasmuch as that formula was not, in its basic intention, a Christological formula.

It was surely not, moreover, either the intention of Athanasius and the Council of Nicaea or of the fathers of Chalcedon to use the *homoousion* as an epistemological or heuristic principle for all theology. Rather, it was their intention to affirm a set of dogmatic boundaries for discussion of Trinitarian and Christological isS1Ues, strictly defined. The language of *homoousios,* as introduced by Nicaea and defended by Athanasius, does not at all militate against a doctrine of knowledge of God *extra Christum.* Rather it merely indicates that the Son or Word, in all his operations and acts, whether of creation or providence or l:'evelation prior to the incarnation (or revelation in the incarnation) is truly God.[38]

We can easily identify the positive legacy of Barth's attempt to derive all knowledge of God from Jesus Christ: it stands as the blunt and necessary swing of the theological pendulum away from the rationalizing anthropocentric, culture-Christianity of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. As such, however, it represents also an overstatement of the ca.se, pressed onward to its full systematic development. Instead of being simply used as a point of polemic against the problems of theological liberalism, the Christocentric proclamation of

[38] Cf. J. N. D. Kelly, *JJJarly Ohristian Doctrines,* revised edition (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1978), pp. 236, 244-247 with G. L. Prestige, *God in Patristic Thought* (London: S.P.C.K., 1952), pp. 213-222. There is no space here for a detailed exposition of the doctrine of the *homoousion:* we simply note the non-epistemological character of the Nicene language. Nicaea surely attempts to do justice to the biblical language of the Father and the .Son as both divine, but it never intended to express either the *identity* of God or of the Word *with* God's revelation or to pose the logical convertibility of such statements as "the Word is God" and "God is the Word" or "Jesus Christ is the Word of God" and" the Word of God is Jesus Christ"-indeed, the doctrine of the Trinity prevents convertibility of subject and .predicate in the first pair of statements and the Christology of Chalcedon prevents it in the second.

Barth becomes a " principial " Christocentrism, a use of Christ (instead of and prior to Scripture) as the *principium cognoscendi theologiae.* In other words, it becomes a Christological reductionism, a "Christomonism," as some ha¥e labelled it.

The Barthianization of history, the reading back of this overstatement into A.thanasius and (as the numerous Barthian studies of the theology of the Reformation demonstrate) into Calvin, endangers our ability to hear the genuine message of these great theologians.[39] Both Athanasius and Calvin teach us that there is a knowledge of God *extra Christum,* beyond the Christ, the earthly God-man, but none *absque Verbum,* without the Word. The Barthian view, extended into this history of doctrine, would also cause us to lose sight of the paradox underlying all discussion of natural revelation and natural theology: natural revelation, resting on the creative and providential activity of the Word, is God's truth and ought to point the human mce toward the true God-but in our perversity we refuse to observe this truth and are in need of redemption in Christ in order that our eyes may again be opened to the 11evelationof God. Natural revelation is given to *aill,* leaving us all without excuse. Valid natural theology belongs only to those who are regenerated in Christ. It is, paradoxically, nonetheless a natural theology and its source, natural revelation, remains *eajtra Christum.* As Athanasius wouM argue, our redemption and refashioning in conformity with Christ, the image of God according to whom we were first made, opens once again for us the manifoLd forms of divine 11evelation.[40] This view of natural l'evelation has been held, in common with

[39] For examples of the Barthianization of Calvin see Wilhelm Niese!, *The Theology of Oalvin,* trans. Harold Knight (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1956; repr. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1980), Ronald S. Wallace, *Oalvin's Doctrine of the Wora ana Sacrament* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1957); and J. K. S. Reid, *The Authority of Scripture: a Stuay of the Reformation ana Post-Ref01rmation Unllerstanding of the Bible* (London: Methuen, 1957); in all of these works, a thoroughly un-Calvinian wedge is driven .between" Word" indicating" Word Incarnate" and Scripture identified as a witness to the Word.

[40] *De Incarnatione,* 11-13 (PG, 25.113-120).

Athanasius, by Augustine,[41] by the medieval doctors,[42] by Calvin,[43] and by the orthodox Protestant theologians of the late sixteenth and the seventeenth ocntury.[44] Here again, Barth stands outside of the tradition and no amount of twisting of the materials of history can plruce him into it.

Indeed, Barth he'De stands so outside of the tradition of Athanasius, Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, and the Protestant orthodox that he would ultimately do away with the *extra-Calvinisticum* along with natural revelation and natural theology. Barth, in short, expresses a strong distaste for any notion of a *Logos asarkos.*[45] Instead of allowing this doctrinal

41 Cf. *De Oivitate Dei,* VIII.11-12 (on the availability of natural revelation to Plato) with ibid., XXII.29, *ad fin.* (on the fulness of the final vision of God, including the vision of God in nature) and with *Confessions,* VII.xx.26; X.vi.8 (PL 41.235-237; 800-801; with PL, 32.745-747, 783).

42 Although, arguably, the problem of sin does not enter as strongly into the medieval discussions of this point as it does into the patristic and Protestant discussions, the medieval doctors make clear that reason alone, operating apart from revelation, is prone to error and that even truths of reason are, therefore, containecl in the biblical revelation in order that they may be known with "unshakeable certitude ... by way of faith ": cf. Thomas Aquinas, *On the Truth of the <JathoUo Faith: Summa Oo1itra Gentiles,* trans . .Anton C. Pegis, et al. (N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955-57), I.iv.6-7. Cf. also Lawrence F. Murphy, " Gabriel Biel and Ignorance as an Effect of Original Sin," in *Arohiv fur Reformationsgeschichte,* 74 (1983): 5-23 and 75 (1984): 32-57.

43 Calvin, *Institutes',* I.iii.1-2; v.1-3, 10: the Barthian reading of these passages assumes a "purely negative" function of natural revelation and utterly disavows the possibility of a Christian natural theology: see, e.g., T. H. L. Parker, *Calvin's Doctrine of the Hnoivledge of God,* revised edition (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1959), p. 39. Calvin's comments, however, both in the *Institutes* and in the psalm that Parker cites (Ps. 19) point beyond the problem of sinners left without excuse in their ignorance of God to the non-saving but nonetheless genuine knowledge of God available to believers in their contemplation of the works of God in nature. On this point Calvin is at one with the fathers. There is also a continuity on this issue between Calvin and the post-Reformation Protestant theologians, as I argue at length in my forthcoming essay, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics,* volume I, *Prolegomena* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1987), chapter 5.

44 Cf. Heinrich Heppe, *Reformed Dogmatics Set Out and Illustrated from the Sources,* revised and edited by Ernst Bizer, translated by G. T. Thomson (repr. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1978), pp. 1-11.

45 Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics,* trans: G. W. Bromiley, et al., 4 vols. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1936-1976), 4/1, pp. 180-181.

ground for a wo:rk of the *Logos* prior to and beyond the incarnation, Barth would draw the human nature of Jesus eternally into the Godhead and to it as part of the inward and eternal *Geschichte* of the Trinity: [46] Such was hardly the intention of Athanasius or of the Council of Nicaea or of the fathers at Chaloedon. And, in the line of the fathers, it was smely not the intention of either the medieval doctors or of the Reformers of the sixteenth century.

If, as we have been arguing, there is a demonstrable line of theological development from the era of the fathers to the middle ages, to the Reformation and beyond-on such issues as the *extra-C alvinisticum,* the general work of the *Logos* distinct (though not ultimately separate or divorced) from his incarnate work, and the necessity for a soteriological but not a " principiaI " Christocentrism-what of the " Latin Heresy" ? Inasmuch as Professor Torrance has elaborated at length on this concept, we cannot dismiss it as a myth and go on to other things. fact it is a myth and such stuff as theological dreams are ma:de of needs to be pointed out as clearly and concretely as possible.

There appear to be two basic components to the Torrancian idea of the "Latin He1'esy ": the problem of the Latin language itself and the problem of theological and philosophical dualisms in western thought. The Latin language, according to Torrance, carries with it a certain conceptual framework that sets it apart from the Greek the Hebrew languages. Latin itself is legalistic, causal, oriented toward propositional thinking-and quite unlike the biblical languages. In order to be biblical, as Barth recognized, we must overcome this underlying linguistic conceptuality. Contemporary phiilology has thoroughly debunked this kind of arguments. As James Barr pointed out in his magisterial study of biblical semantics, a point such as that made by Torrance,

> Presupposes that the sense of words is determined predominantly by their metaphysical or theological usages .... [W]hat is lacking

[46] Ibid., 4/1, p. 215, 4/2, p. 94.

he.reis any idea of a word as a semantic marker, indicating an essential difference from another word and having the ability to mark that differentia in any one of a number of contexts; not becoming intrinsically infected by any particular one of these contexts, and having its sense as a marker sustained 1and de;termined not by metaphysical or theological usage but by a general social mileu, in which the language has its life.... The attempt to interweave theological and linguistic argument only produces an ignoring or a wrong assessme,nt of linguistic facts. [47]

At a later point in his ·essay, Barr notes, "We have seen tendencies to remark as something wonderful the £act that Hebrew linguistic structure does not coincide with the structure of Aristotelian logic, when in fact the linguistic structure of Greek or of English does not do so either." [48] To this latter point, we may also add the linguistic structure of Latin!

The fact is that in none of Torrance's examples of the problematic chara;cter of the Latin language do we find anything either inherently or necessarily Latin. Is. Latin legalistic while Greek and Hebrew are not? With such information we cou1d dispel the Apostle Paiul's profound worries about the character of Pharisaic Judaism. Or is it the case that the legalisms somehow inherent in Hebrew leaped over the non-legalistic language of the Greek New Testament and lodged themselves in the language of the Latin church? As for Latin being a causal and propositional language, we simply point to the curious historical fact that the philosophical issues underlying the causal argumentation and the propositional argumentation of the medieval Latin doctors of the church came to them from the thought of Aristotle, whose native Greek ought to have been quite antipathetic to such concepts. There is nothing

47 James Barr, *The Semantios of Biblical Language* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1961), pp. 188, 194. Barr is, in fact, ·arguing specifically against an essay by Torrance in which the latter claims that all NT references to "Truth" *(Aletheia)* ought to be interpreted in terms of a Hebraic concept of "Faithfulness" rather than a Greek notion of propositional correctness: Torrance perpetuates this false dichotomy in recent essays despite Barr's trenchant critique-cf. *Transformation and Oonvergen-0e,*p. 310.

48 *The Semantios of Biblical Language,* p. 292.

specifically Latin about legalism, causal argumentation, or propositional thought-and there is nothing in either the Greek or the Hebrew language that overthrows such concepts.

We now come to the issue of theological and philosophical dualism in the western theological tradition. My dictionary defines "dualism" as a "system founded on a double principle" or a "theory which considers the ultimate nature of the universe to be twofold, as mind and matter." [49] According to this accepted definition, a Zoroastrian or Manichaean notion of equally balanced good and evil principles in the universe can be identified as a theological dualism, while the Platonic notion of ,eternal ideas over against our lower world of things and of the soul as independent from the body can be identified as a form of philosophical dualism. Aristotle's view of the soul as the form or entelechy of the body and Thomas Aquinas's Aristotelian hylomorphic theory of substance are definitely not dualistic. In fact, it ought to be clear, as a basic fact of rational discourse, that the making of distinctions between ideas or the differentiation of two distinct things does not constitute a dualism. Thus, when Aristotle distinguishes soul and body, he is not a dualist, inasmuch as his philosophy does not establish soul and body as independent principles *over against* or in conflict with one another. The same point mus1t be made of Aquinas's distinction of form and matter in substance. [50]

There is, obviously, a very large world of opinion between a true dualism and an absolute monism. Between the theory

49 *Webster's Oollegiate Dictionary,* fifth edition (Springfield, Mass.: G. & C. Merriam, 1944), s.v. "Dualism"; also the *The Dictionary of Philosophy,* ed. Dagobert D. Runes (N.Y.: Philosophical Library, n.d.), s.v. "Dualism."

50 The philosophy of Aristotle is typically characterized as an attempt to correct Platonism specifically on the issue of dualism. 'Thus, Aristotle's concept of "entelechy" or " immanent substantial form " was intended as an alternative to the Platonic dualisms of Being and Becoming, form and matter, soul and body: see Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy* (Westminster, Mo.: Newman Press, 1946-1974), I, pp. 375-378, and Wilhelm Windelband, *A History of Philos<Yphy,* trans. James Tufts (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1893), pp. 130-133. On Aquinas's hylomorphism see Copleston, *A History of Philosophy,* II, pp. 325-329.

of two ultimate principles and the idea of a single, universal substance or between the theory of the inaccessibility of the object to the knowing subject and the assumption of the identity of subject and object, there lie numerous philosophical and theological positions each capable of affirming a plurality of substances and a olear distinction between mutually accessible subjects and objects. Even so, it is hardly dualistic (and certainly not monistic) to distinguish between an immutable, eternal creator and the contingent, created order, particularly when the created order, defined not only as created but also as contingent, is viewed as incapable of existing, in its distinction from the creator, apart from the continuing ontological support of that creator. But such is the perspective typical of the medieval scholastics. When the scholastics encountered the Aristotelian conception of an eternalJy potential material substratum standing over against the eternal actuality of the first mover, they rejected it in the name of a creation *ex nihilo.* Even when they sought to use the Aristotelian concept of a first mover and even when they assumed, with Thomas Aquinas, that the Aristotelian view could not be rationally disproved, they recognized that it must give way before the demands of faith and Christian philosophy-specifically before the demand that a distinction between creator and creature be affirmed at the same time that the intimate and necessary relationship between rthe creator as absolute Being and the creature as contingent being was recognized.[51]

Not only is it an incredible historical and philosophical gaffe on Torrance's part to attribute concepts of divine immutability

[51] Cf. T. F. Torrance, "Karl Barth and Patristic Theology," in *Theology Beyond Ohristendom: Essays on the Oentenary of the Birth of Karl Barth, May 10, 1986,* ed. John Thompson (Allison, Pa.: Pickwick Publications, 1986), p. 225, where Torrance argues that a "dualist disjunction between an immutable Deity and a transient world" is typical of medieval scholastic theology-with the rather contrary impression given by the medieval writers themselves in *St. Thomas Aquinas, Sig er of Brabant, St. Bonaventure: On the Eternity of the World,* trans. by Cyril Vollert, Lottie Kendzierski and Paul Byrne (Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1964).

and impassibility to "Latin " theology, when they are a part of the whole western philosophical tradition and belong to the teaching of the church from Ignatius of Antioch onward.[52] It is also a mistake to regard these concepts as indicating a form of dualism. Neither immutability nor impassibility has ever meant a distant, immobile, or inactive deity. Instead, the church has always assumed, perhaps somewhat paradoxically, that these concepts guaranteed the constancy of the divine power, aietivity, and love.[53] In fact, the medieval doctrines of divine immutability and impassibility were coupled with the concept of a providential *concursus* or concurrance of the divine willing with all acts, events, and wiH in the world-in other words, the concept of a constant and positive divine ontological support of the created order. A deistic notion of a distant God was utterly foreign to the medieval theological mind, particularly to the medieval mind as it adapted the Aristotelian idea of the divine " first mover " to the concept of creation and identified God as the first cause of all things, both in :terms of the *aict* of creation itself and, more importantly, in terms of necessary causal ground of all contingent being.[54] This is hardly a dualism. Equally so, the medieval language of "Act " and " Being," far from encouraging a dualistic separation of these concepts, identified " pure Act " with absolute Being, with the result that the divine actuality was identified with the recognition of God as the actualizer of all potency and as the source of all finit,e being. Again, we are not dealing with a dualism at all; we are dealing instead with a carefully made

52 Cf. Ignatius of .Antioch, A.ti *Polycarpum,* III.2 where the pre-incarnate divinity is termed *to'l'IJ achronon* and *ton apathe,* the "timeless" and the "impassible ": in *Patrum Apo·stolicorum Opera,* ed. Gebhardt, Harnack and Zahn, sixth edition {Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1920), p. 112. For a commentary on this text and for a fairly exhaustive citation of other texts from both Greek and Latin fathers on this issue, see J. K. Mozley, *The Impassibility of Goa: A Survey of Christian Thought* {Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1926).

53 See Richard A. Muller, "Incarnation, Immutability and the Case for Classical Theism," in *Westminster Theological Journal,* 45 (1983): 22-40.

54 See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae,* Ia, q.22, ,a.I, ad 1 & 2 and a.2, ad 3; cf. *Summa contra gentiles,* III.70.5-8.

distinction between the self-existent Being of God and the contingent order of created being-quite contrary to Torrance's contention that the medieval mind did not understand contingency and tended to neglect the Christian concept of creation out of nothing.[55]

Even so, the distinction made by Augustine between an internal or " mental " Word in God and the " e:x:ternal Word " as incarnate is hardly a dualism. It does not set one divine Word over against another nor does it indicate two separate Wo11ds, one immanently and genuinely divine and another e:x;eunt and somewhat less divine. The distinction only points toward the fact of trinitarian theology, recognized by Latin and Greek patristic thinkers alike, and inherited not so much from Tertullian and his Latinisms as from the Greek apologetic traidition of the second century, that a distinction can be made between the *Logos* as it is in God as the self-identical content of the Divine mind *(Logos endiathetos)* and the *Logos* as it is uttered forth by God *(Logos prophoiikos).* This language is typical of the *Logos* theology of Theophilus of Antioch (who cannot he cailled Latin!) and it has its origins in Stoic philosophy (which, to my knowledge has never been thought of as dualistic) .[56] We can easily find traces of the concept in Athanasius.57 Similarly, Aquinas's distinction between a "wordless" communication by "vision" and a communication by Word in revelation in no way introduces a " deep split " into the Godhead or threatens the *homoousios:* Thomas does not deny *Verbum,* Word, in the Godhead but only *vox,* sonic communication. We do not have any sort of dualism here but only a distinction, based on biblical texts like " blessed are the pure in heart for they shall see God," between our present mode of understanding of God, limited by the sinful flesh, and our fu-

55 Cf. *Transformation and Oonvergence,* pp. 2-3, 248-249, with the views of Thomas Aquinas, Siger of Brabant, and Bonaventure as presented in *On the JJJternity of the World,* as cited above, note 51.

56 Kelly, *l!Jarly Ohristian Doctrilne,* pp. 96, 99.

57 Athanasius, *JJJothesis (l!Jrcpositio Fidei),* 1; cf. *Orationes contra Arianos,* I.v.14; VII.24; II.xiv.2 (PG, 25.201; cf. 26.41, 60-61, 149, 152).

ture, hoped for understanding of God in the clear light of heaven.[58] In other words, Thomas is simply commenting on the fact that God does not have vocal chords and that our identification of the second person of the Trinity as Word does not make the mind of God into a noisy place.[59]

Nor is the typical medieval distinction between uncreated and created gra:ce a dua:lism. The medieval doctors are, with this distinction, simply making the point that God, by reason of the power he e:x:erts over sin in the work of redemption (uncreated grace), works in us a change, indeed, gives us a new capacity for the good (crea:ted grace). In other words, uncreruted grace indicates the divine power of the indweHing Spirit, created grace its effect in us. The point of the medieval teaching is that God's grace, which is of course God himself, brings about a change in human beings, and that change is not a mere indweHing of the divine (one that fails to alter our humanity) but is rather a genuine newness of life tha:t, as a result of God's gracious a:ctivity, now genuinely belongs to the renewed nature.[60] If we carry the point forward into the Re-

58 Cf. *Summa theologiae,* Ia, q.34, a.I with q.107, a.I; Torrance cites but misinterprets these articles: Thomas nowhere says that the Godhead is wordless or that heavenly communication is wordless but only argues that *Verbum,* considered as the un-uttered and non-sonic *interius verbum,* cannot be equated with *vow* or with an externalized *looutio.* The point made concerning the divine word in question 34 simply reflects the patristic distinction between the immanent Word and the Word sent forth and the fairly standard perception of 1the fathers ,that the divine Word "is not, ... after the likeness of human words, composed of syllables; but he is the unchanging image of His own Father" (Athanasius, *Contra Gentes,* 4, in NPNF, ser. 2, 4.26, cf. PG, 25.81). The same point is made by Augustine *(De Fide et Symbolo,* 3; in PL, 40.183). In view of Athanasius's comment, Torrance's attempt to make a distinction between an Athanasian theology and a Latin, Thomistic dualism is seen to be patently absurd.

59 *Summa theologiae,* Ia. q.34, a.I, where Thomas argues that "Word" is a " personal name" in God and neither a sound nor something as "unstable " as a thought.

so Cf. ibid., Ia Hae, q.111, a.2, where Thomas distinguishes between God's active assistance and the gift of a new disposition bestowed on the believer, with q.110, a.3, where he discusses the infusion of grace that brings about "participation in the Divine nature." Cf. A. Tanquerey, *Synopsis theologiae dogmatioae,* 3 vols. (N.Y.: Benziger, 1937), vol. 3, pp. 67-79.

formation and into Protestant orthodoxy, the language of reconciliation rthat identifies an objective work of Christ and its subjecth,,e effect in Christians, that identifies Christ not as my justification but as the ground of it, is again not a dualism but a distinction, a recognition of the very real between the universal gift of salvation in Christ and rthe application of that gift to individuals. Similarly, a closer look at the Protestant orthodox doctrine of the Word of God manifests not a dualism but a set of distinctions between the eternal Word or second person of the Trinity, the Word incarnate, the Word written, and the internal Word or testimony of the Spirit. The distinctions, moreover, indicate the way the living God still works through Scripture. Neither the propositional statements in Scripture nor rthe propositional statements in theological system stand in the way of a living relationship with God in Christ or in any way out God off from his self-revelation. Rather the Protestant orthodox fully recognize both a distinction between God and his self-revelation and a gracious accommodation by G-Od to human need in the forms of that revelation. [61]

There is no dualism inherent in Latin Christianity. Most of the doctrinal ideas that we have dealt with here are not even inherently or historically Latin. The best explanation for Torrance's accusation of" dualism" is that he applies the term loosely and without strict theological or philosophical definition to certain distinctions that stand in the way of the Barthian assertions that " God Himself is the content of his Revelation" and that the Giver is identical with the Gift. The Christian tradition, however, has always asserted rthe priority of the One who acts and reveals over the act and over the revelation. If this priority is not maintained, there can no longer be any language of the transcendence of God, even as there can no longer be any God apart from God's givenness in the

ei Cf. Richard A. Muller," Christ-the Revelation or the Revealer? Brunner and Reformed Orthodoxy on the Doctrine of the Word of God," in *Journal of the EvangeUeai TheoZogioal Society*, 28 {1985) : 183-193.

temporal and phenomenological order.[62] Traditional Christianity must, thus, resist the Barthian language. Rather than view his own mentor as heterodox, Torrance condemns the entire tradition. He creates an Athanasius who did not really exist in order to give Barthianism some solid historical foundation-and the western trrudition, which is perhaps better known and therefore not so easily bent, he sets aside as a heresy. The canonization of Barth has been oocomplished, but only at the expense of fifteen hundred years of Christian witness.

III

At the outset of this essay, we raised the issue of the meaning gi¥en to the idea of a new orthodoxy by Torrance's discussion of Barth's legrucy. We saw a parallel between this attempt to mo¥e from the teachings of a theological " reformer " to an" orthodoxy" and the similar attempt made by Protestant theologians of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century. But Protestant orthodoxy was, to begin with, a far broader and, if we may judge by present appearances, far more successful phenomenon. The similarity between the orthodoxy of the seventeenth century and the neo-orthodoxy of the late twentieth lies in the desire of students and followers to create from the theology of the founders a normative, churchly body of doctrine delivered and explained at the rather complex level of full theological system. From what we have seen in the preceding sections of this essay, however, even this similarity is superficial. Whereas the Protestant orthodox were profoundly concerned to draw the insights of the Reformers into a genuinely churchly system, in which the abuses of late medieval

62 There is also the very strong possibility here that Torrance's accusation of "dualism" levelled at simple distinctions in Western theology arises out of a fundamental monism on his part: Jesus Christ is identifie,d as the Word and as the Revelation, and Revelation is pronounced identical with God, identical with Reconciliation, identical with Justifica.tion. Since all occurs in Christ, all must be redeemed. We are moving, here, in non-philosophical language, perilously close to a pla.tonizing pa.ntheism or monism-from the vantage iJOint of which all else would look dua.listic.

theology and church were set aside while the universal truths held by the chmich's tradition were retained and cherished, the neo-orthodoxy of Tormnce affirms the views of the teacher to the detriment of the tradition. This Barthianism, if it can be called, in its lonely individuality, an orl:hodoxy, *must* be a *neo*-orthodoxy. It becomes " right teaching " by setting aside what has been viewed as" right teaching."

Even a brief glance at the Reformed orthodox dogmaticians demonstrates how unwilling these teachers of the seventeenth century were to play the game of personality. It is sometimes commented, rather perversely, I think, that the Protestant onthodox failed to make enough use of the writings of the Reformers: the fact is that they valued the contributions of their predecessors without exalting those contributions to almost superhuman status. We do not find, in the writings of the Protestant orthodox, any lists of the great theologians of the centuries, uttered in hushed tones, into which the names of Luther, Calvin, Bullinger, or Chemnitz are placed. Nor do we find the orthodox claiming for one of their number-even one with the stature of an Amandus Polanus von Polansdorf or a Johann Gerhard-that ·this is *the* theology in which the past is summed up and on which the future must be built. The Protestant onthodox were too immersed in the task of constructing a system of right teaching for the church to exalt the work of any individual teacher. Even so, we are struck today not by the individuality of these thinkers but by their similarity. It never dawned on them that it could be possible to construct a unique and individualized "church dogmatics." They sought the roots of their theology, of its doctrinal topics and of its broad architectural patterns, in the Scriptures first but after that, not in their personal genius, but in the collected wisdom of the fathers, the medieval doctors, and, of course, the Reformers.[63]

We say all this by way of contrast to the Barthian *Church*

[68] See Muller, " Scholasticism Protestant and Catholic," pp. 200-201, 204-205.

Dogmatics which, in its complexity, its convoluted obscurity, and its individuality fails precisely at the point of becoming what its title indicates. As the eminent historian of the Reformation, Wilhelm Pauck once commented, comparing sound theology to a telescope, meant to be looked through and not *at*, "Barth's *Dogmatios* does not help people to see; it is such a complicated, highly modern and yet very antique, instrument that one is simply *foroed* to look at it rather than through it.[64]

The great problem entailed upon the Barth legacy and imbedded irrevocably in the neo-orthodoxy of Professor Torrance is that it accepts the individualistic and e¥en idiosyncratic teachings of Barth as norms, as central tenets of the faith. For example, Barth's Christooentrism leads him to declare, in his exposition of the doctrine of predestination, that Jesus Christ is so the index for interpreting the doctrine of predestination ithat we must not only understand election as entirely effected in Christ (a primary tenet of Calvin and of the Reformed Tradition) but must also recognize Christ as the only elect and only reprobate man.[65] Torrance argues that this resulting universalism must be orthodox truth and any opposition to Barth's views must be the result of a lingering effect of the dualisms of the "Latin heresy."[66] Yet here, of all places in Barth's *Dogmatics,* we have evidence of the "principial" understanding of Christ drawn out, not in accordance either with the various texts of Scripture that deal with election in its individual and corporate dimensions or with the meditations of the Christian tradition on the subject of election and reprobation, but rather in a:ccord with its own inner logic.[67]

Granting this approach to the materials of theology, the

64 Wilhelm Pauck, *Karl Barth: Prophet of a New Christianity?* (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1931), p. 190, cf. p. 192.

65 Cf. *Clvurch Dogmatics,* II/2, pp. 94-145.

66 Torrance, "Kar1 Barth and the Latin Heresy," pp. 481-82.

67 See the analysis of Barth's doctrine of predestination in Colin Brown, *Karl Barth and the Christian Message* (London: Tyndale, 1967), pp. 106-110, and Fred H. Kooster, *The Significance of Barth's Theology* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1961), pp. 66-71.

analogy between Barth and Athanasius, that broke down on trinitarian and christological grounds, now also breaks down on attitudinal grounds. Even in his advocrucy of a new theological term, *homoousios,* Athanasius acted to uphoM the tradition of his predecessors in the faith. The modern reader of Athanasius is impressed not only by how well he makes his case against the" heathen" in his great apology, the *Contra Gentes* and *De Incarnatione,* or against the Arians in his series of doctrinally definitive *Orations* but also at how intentionally unoriginal he is. It was never Athanasius's desire to state a new truth; he sought rather to re-state expertly the faith of the chureh.[68]

If we look for a patristic parallel to the work of Karl Barrth, the obvious candidate is not Athanasius, either doctrinally or attitudinally. Instead we should look to Orig·en. Like Origen, Barth may well have been the most intellectually brilliant theologian of his time. Like Origen, Barth thought in terms of a highly individualized dogmatic synthesis. Also like Origen, Barth was given to highly fanciful and speculative flights of exegesis which, in their near disdain for the letter of the text, can only be classified as allegorical.[69] "Oblique" or "symbolic " interpretation of the text, we note in passing, is not a;t all an exclusive property of the Latin church of the middle ages! And finally, like Origen, Barth pressed one of his admittedly brilliant ideas to its non-traditional conclusion and produced, if not an explicit universalism, at least an implicitly universalistic soteriology.

If, then, the patristic parallel must be made, Barth is not a new Athanasius. He is an Origen *redivivus,* the author of a grand and at times highly insightful but also utterly nonnormative theological system. Just as the early church refused the gambit of uncritical followers of Origen like Rufinus and Gregory Thaumaturgus-the gambit of an origenistic system-

[68] Athanasius, *Epistula,e IV a,d Sera,pionem,* I.28 (PG, 26.593-596).

[69] See the rather pointed comments of Jerome Hamer, *Ka,rl Barth,* trans. D. M. Maruca (Westminster, MD.: Newman Press, 1962), pp. 119-124.

atization of the church's body of doctrine-so also we hope, and fully expect, that the church today in its wisdom will refuse the Torrancian gambit of a Barthian orthodoxy. If brilliance alone were the test of greatness, Barth might well find his place in the company of Athanasius, Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin. But the test also requires that the brilliant mind carry forward the great tradition of Christian witness with new insight into the meaning of its norms and with respect for the boundaries of formulation that it has established over the course of centuries. Inasmuch as Barth fails before this second criterion, he must be placed on a lower rank where, like Origen, he can insightfully press theology forward toward a synthesis of the truths of the faith that he himself could not attain. This much and no more is the legitimate legacy of Karl Barth.

ALISTER McGRATH ON CROSS AND JUSTIFICATION

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Any REGULAR reader of theological book advertisements has encountered the name of Alister McGrath. Since 1984, he has published a two volume history of the doctrine of justification, a study of Luther's theofogy of the cross, a general introduction to the thought of the Reformation, a study of the late medieval background of the Reformation, a history of German Protestant Christology from the Enlightenment through the present, and popular books on the cross, the Trinity, and Christology. All the while he has lectured in Christian doctrine and ethics at Oxford.

What is McGrath saying in this amazing flow of publications? Here I wiH look at three representative works. *Iustitia Dei,* which traces the understanding of the doctrine of justification from the Bible to Gerhard Ebeling, must be considered the centerpiece of his work to date.[1] *Luther's Theology of the Cross* can be taken as typical of his more monographic work.[2] Fina;lly, *The Mys.tery of the Cross* can exemplify his popular writings.[3]

I.

lustitia Dei has an obvious claim on our attention. As McGrath notes in the first sentence of the Preface, this has

1 *[ustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doct1·ine of Justification,* 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) .

2 *Luther's Theology of the Gross: Martin Luther's Theological Breakthrough* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985) .

a *The Mystery of the Gross* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1988).

been a history waiting to be written (except perhaps for the first volume of Ritschl's *The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation).* The Reformers stated that the doctrine of justification was the root of their movement. McGrath has chosen an ecumenically decisive topic to survey.

Although the length of McGrath's history (378 pages of text) may not justify its separation into two volumes, the division of the volumes follows a clear structural division of the work, a division McGrath finds in the history of the doctrine. After a definition of the subject and a six page discussion .of the tradition, the first volume rapidly comes to Augustine, the " fountainhead " of the Western discussion of justification. The tradition from Augustine to the Reformation is sufficiently unitary that it can be discussed topically under such headings as " the righteousness of God," " the concept of merit," and " the relation between predestination and justification." In fact, the topics are so arranged that something of a chronological progression is produced, with the problems that dominated the late medieval period coming last.

While the first volume deals with continuity, the second is structured by the major discontinuities of the Reformation and the Enlightenment. A major contention of McGrath is that the Reformation constitutes a break with a relatively continuous tradition. Another, even more radical break comes with the Enlightenment. Thus, the second volume is arranged chronologically and discusses developments from the Reformation through recent hermeneutically oriented interpretations of the doctrine.

This outline of the structme of McGrath's hisrtory should make clear its most important characteristic. It is a history of the discussion of justification in the West on the terms set by Augustine. After a six page leap from the New Testament to the late fourth century, the East is quickly dismissed, never to appear again. Even within the West, the history is selective. The six eenturies between Augustine and Anselm are passed over with only brief mention of the Semi-Pdagian disputes

following Augustine's death and the controversies surrounding Gottschalk rGodescalc] of Orbais. Well over half the book deals with the period between *1050* and 1600 in the West. Following the Reformation, attention is given only to selected figures from the German and English Enlightenment, to Kant and Schleiermacher as critics of the Enlightenment (though Schleiermacher's own doctrine of justification, which in important ways recaptures that of the Reformation, is ignored) , to Newman, and to the most prominent German Protestant theologians of recent times (Ritschl, Barth, Bultmann, Tillich, Ebeling) . Except for Newman, who is treated in the context of Anglicanism, no Roman Catholic is mentioned after the condemnation of Jansenism in 1713. In terms of whom he chooses to discuss, McGrath reproduces the standard Protestant outline of the history of the doctrine of justification.

While a history of the Western and Augustinian discussion of justification is a useful enterprise, the way McGrath carries out this enterprise is problematic. McGrath distinguishes between the *concept* and the *doctrine* of justification. The concept of justification " is one of many employed within the Old and New Testaments, particularly the Pauline corpus, to describe God's saving action towards his people. It cannot lay claim to exhaust, nor adequately characterise in itself, the richness of the biblical understanding of salvation in Christ." The doctrine of justificaition, however, " has come to develop a meaning quite independent of its biblical origins, and concerns the *means by which man's relation to God is established* " (I, p. emphasis in original) . The breadth of this latter understanding of the doctrine of justification jus,tifies McGrath's claims that this doctrine "constitutes the real centre of the theologica!l system of the Christian church,,. (I, p. 1) and" the essential form of the Christian proclamation down the ages " (I, p. xi).

McGrath claims to have written a history of the *doctrine* of justification. What he has in fact written is at most a history of the *concept.* He confuses concept and doctrine almost immediately after distinguishing them. " The history of the *doc-*

trine of justification has its sphere within the western church alone. The Orthodox emphasis upon the economic condescension of the Son leading to man's participation in the divine being is generally expressed in the *concept* of deification rather than justification" (I, p. 3, emphasis added).

This confusion of subject matter would not be so problematic if it did not reflect a deeper problem. McGrath reinforces Western tendencies to identify its theology with theology per se. At the beginning of his study, he says: " The church has chosen to subsume its discussion of the reconciliation of man to God under the aegis of justification " (I, p. 2) . At its end, he draws from "the development of the doctrine of justification " certain conclusions about " the general consensus of the church down the ages " (II, p. 189) . But *the church* did not subsume reconciliation under the category" justification"; the *Western church* did. Similarly, McGrath can viwlidly draw no conclusions about " the general consensus of the church down the ages " from a history that ignores so much.

A more inclusive sense of his subject matter would have giV'en McGrath more critical distance from the concepts and categories of the Western discussion. Like his choice of persons to discuss, McGrath's categories of analysis are those of handbook Protestantism. Early in the first volume, he states that, for Augustine, justification involves both event and process and an inherent rather than imputed righteousness. (I, p. 31). As McGrath notes, these are not Augustine's own terms but derive from the sixteenth century. "However, the importance of Augustine to the controversies of that later period make it necessary to interpret him in terms of its categories at this point." Showing what Augustine would have said if he had spoken in the concepts of the sirteenth century may be a useful enterprise. But it may also be useful to show how his own way of thinking does *not* fit those categories and thus perhaps opens up new avienues of thorught and analysis. This latter enterprise is what McGrath simply never takes up. Throughout his discussion, the categories of the standard Prot-

estant analysis of the issue al'e taken for granted. Unfortunately, these categories are not descriptively adequate.

Central to McGrath's analysis is the distinction between what he calls factitive and declarative understandings of justifiJCation. For a factitive understanding, " a real change in man's *being,* and not merely his *status,* is envisaged in his justification, so that he *becomes* righteous and a son of God, and is not merely *treated as if he were* righteous and a son of God,,. (I, . For the declarative understanding, " justification is defined as the forensic *declaration* that the believer is righteous, rather than the process by which he is *made* righteous .... A deliberate and systematic distinction is made between *justification* (the external act by which God declares the sinner to be righteous) and *sanctifica.tion* or *regeneration* (the internal process of renewal within man) " (II, p. 0.) • Of course, this way of typifying the Catholic-Reformation difference does point to an important divergence between the two traditions. For Luther, the righteousness of the Christian before God is always the righteousness of Christ in which the Christian participates through faith. Catholic theologians have understood grace to work merit in the Christian, so that among God's gifts is "the crowning gift of a merited destiny." [4]

Ne¥ertheless, significant problems are immediately evident in McGrath's statement of the distinction. Protestant theologians al'e said to understand justification as utterly extrinsic. Justification is *strictly* a legal declaration of righteousness which works no " real change " in the believer. The Catholic position is defined *only* in terms of internal change in the believer's being. These descriptions are too one-sided to be accurate. McGrath states-but seems immediately to forget-that for the Reformers there is only a notional distinction between justification and regeneration. There is no justification

[4] H. George Anderson, T. Austin Murphy, & Joseph Burgess, eds., *Jus#fication by Faith,* Lutherans and Catholics in Dialogue, 7 (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1985), p. 55, §112.

without accompanying regeneration. Justifica,tion was distinguished from regeneration in order to insist that whatever change occurred in the Christian, that change did not constitute the new self's righteousness. Righteousness was in the Christ with whom the believer was now one through faith. For every Reformation theologian I know, however, coming to faith in the justifying righteousness of Christ constitutes a momentous change in the believer. One no longer seeks a righteousness within the self, even a righteousness produced there by gra:ce. Faith in Christ unites the believer with Christ's death and resurrection so that the believer's o1d self dies and a new self is raised to life. Within the context of Luther's anthropology, a" real change" in man's being occurs when faith grasps the justifying righteousness of Christ. If a change that can only be described as dying and being reborn is not " real," then what change is?

McGrath's defense might be that he has: distinguished Luther's theology of justification from that of later Reformers. It is to these later Reformers that his description is meant to apply. But who are these later Reformers? McGrath sees Calvin as restoring Luther's emphasis on faith as a living union with Christ, within which Christ's righteousness is imputed to the Christian (II, p. 38). In addition, "Calvin may be regarded as establishing the framework within which subsequent discmss.ion of justification within the Reformed school wouLd proceed " (II, 39) . It must then be the Lutherans who are distinct from Luther. McGrath rightly notes that Lutheranism did not affirm the radical denial of free will and stern, if unsystematic, assertion of double predestination that can be found in Luther's writings of the early and mid-1520s. But did later Lutheranism also abandon Luther's placement of justification in the context of a community of the believer with Christ? About the later Philip Melanchthon, McGrath contends: "A sharp distinction ... comes to be drawn between justification, as the external act in which God pronounces or believe:r W be and regeneration as the

internal process of renewal in which the believer is regenerated through the work of the Holy spirit" (II, p. 24). Melanchithon does distinguish justification and regeneration, for reasons ready noted. McGrath is being misled by his categories, ever, when he says that justification for Melanchthon is silnply a divine declaration. The sinner is justified when this divine declaration is grasped *by faith.* In this faith, Christ and the Holy Spirit are at work in the believer, igniting the spark of the new obedience. Melanchthon's discussion of justification is different in important ways from Luther's. Melanchthon's extensive use of legal categories to describe the imputation of Christ's righteousness to the Christian is certainly open to McGrath's criticism. Nevertheless, McGrath is simply wr:ong when he says that for Melanchthon " imputation " meant " the purely verbal remission of sin, *without--as* with Augustine, Karlstadt and Bugenhagen-the prior or concomitant renewal of the sinner" (II, p. 81); and he gives no citations to support such a reading. One can simply read the discussion of justification in a late edition of Melanchthon's comprehensive *Loci Communes* to see the inadequacy of McGrath's comments.[5] Justification and regeneration are distinct but never separate. Similarly, the texts do not support McGrath's statement that the Formula of Concord, the last of the Lutheran confessions, "rejected or radically modified" Luther's doctrine of justification (II, p. 82), presumably by seeing justification as simply an external declaration that does not entail a transformation of the self.[6]

s For example, *OR,* vol. 22, cc. 322c,347; English translation in *Melanchthon on Ohristian Doctrine: Loci communes 1555,* translated by Clyde L. Manschreck, 1965; reprint, Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1982), pp. 150-174. Melanchthon unequivocally states that a change *(Veranderung)* occurs in the believer with justification (c. 325; Manschreck, p. 154). As the sun's light and its power to warm are notionally distinct yet inseparable, so are faith, love, and the new obedience (c. 337; Manschreck, p. 166). On justification involving a presence of Christ and the Holy Spirit at work within the believer, see cc. 328, 330, 332, 333; Manschreck, pp. 156, 158, 160, 162.

6 For example: " When the Holy 1Spirit has brought a person to faith and

I have concentrated on McGrath's depiction of the Reformers on justification because there his description is most misleading. His distinction between external declaration and internal transformation also does not do full justice to Catholic presentations, such as that of the Council of Trent. While Trent clearly speaks of a merit which can he ascribed to the Christian, this merit is dependent on the Christian's unity with Christ. " For Jesus Christ Himself continuously infuses strength into the justified, as the head into the members and the vine into the branches; this strength always precedes, accompanies and follows their good works which, without it, could in no way be pleasing to God and meritorious." [7] This statement does not erase the difference between Trent and the Reformers, but it makes one wonder whether the difference is as simple as McGrath makes it.

McGrath's considerable erudition in relation to the late medieval and Reformation periods is done a disservice by his misleading categories. The distinction between " factitive " and "declarative " doctrines of justification is too crude to illumine the distinctive interpretations of justification put forward in the sixteenth century.

When one leaves the late medieval and Reformation periods, McGrath's presentation is on occasion open to even more serious question. For example, he says of the anti-Pelagian Augustine: " According to Augustine, the act of faith is itself a divine gift, in which God acts upon the rational soul in such a way that it comes to believe. Whether this a:ction on the wiU leads to its subsequent assent to justification is a matter for man, rather than God" (I, p. . The understanding of the rela-

has justified him, a regeneration has indeed taken place because he has trans· formed a child of wrath into a child of God and thus has translated him from death into life, as it is written, ' When we were dead through our trespasses, he made us alive together with Christ' (Eph. 2.5)" *(Formula of (Joncord,* SD, III, 20).

1 Decree, on Justification, Chapter 16, DS 1546. English translation in *The (Jhristian Ji'aith in the Doctrinal Documents of the (Jatholic Church,* rev. ed., J. Neuner & J. Dupuis, eds. (New York: Alba House, 1982), 565.

tion between God and the believer in faith implied by this "rather than" is not that 0£ the later Augustine.[8]

Far more egregious is McGrath's discussion 0£ Barth. His presentation is predicated on the assumption that Barth is, without qualification, a universalist. "As all men will be saved eventually, apparently quite independently 0£ their inclinations or interest, it is quite natural that Barth's attention should be concentrated upon the resolution of the epistemological confusion with which the believer is faced" (II, p. 183). That there is a impulse toward universalism in Barth's theology is obvious, but any interpretation must take seriously Barth's steadfast refusal to draw the universalist conclusion. By transforming Barth into an unqualified universalist, McGrath is forced to ignore the complex ways Barth interrelates election and faith. McGrath gives us at best a caricature 0£ Barth.

Iustitia Dei is a disappointment. Too much is missing, and what is present is not discussed with sufficient care or with adequate categories. I must also note certain puzzling and irritating characteristics of the volumes. With the unexplained exception 0£ Albrecht Ritschl, quotations from foreign languages are not translated. The use 0£ the volumes by non-experts, e.g., by undergraduates who could profit from reading sections 0£ such a survey, will thus be restricted. More puzzling is McGrath's choice 0£ editions to cite. When citing Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre,* he does not cite the critical edition 0£ Martin Redeker, but the fourth edition produced soon after Schleiermacher's death. More aggravating, when citing Martin Chemnitz's *Examination of the Council of Trent* he does not cite the only modern edition, produced in Germany in 1861 and reprinted in nor the first edition 0£ 1566, nor the 1578 edition, the last produced during Chemnitz's lifetime. Instead, a 1646 Frankfort edition is cited. In addition, he does not give the paragraph numbers included in later editions and in the English translation. Thus, unless one can find a copy of

s See J. Patout Burns, *The DeveZopment of Augustine's Doctrine of Operative Grace* (Paris: :Etudes Augustiniennes, 1980).

this 1646 edition, the page numbers he gives are virtually useless. Why does a scholar with the Bodleian Library. at his disposal do this?

II.

McGrath's strengths and weaknesses as a historian are perhaps better shown in *Luther's Theology of the Cross.* The subtitle, *llfortin Luther's Theological Breakthrough,* gives a more accurate picture of the book than the title. Only the last quarter of the book discusses the theology of the cross. The first three quarters deal with Luther's background and early development and with the new understanding of the righteousness of God that he discovered between 1514 and 1519. Much of the material in these first sections is both insightful and strikingly dear. Luther's development is carefully reconstructed. That the early Luther is rightly understood only in a late medieval context is not a new suggestion, but it is elabo-. rated here in convincing detail. While reading, however, one inevitably asks how this material will illumine Luther's theology of the cross.

McGrath does not attemt to present a radically new understanding of what Luther meant by " theology of the cross." When McGrath seeks .to summarize what this phrase meant for Luther, he simply repeats the conclusions of Walther von Loewenich's 1929 study *Luthers Theologia Crucis* (pp. 149£.). What is new in McGrath's study in his attempt to demonstrate in detail that "far from representing a 'pre-reformation' element in Luther's thought, the *theologia crucis* encapsulates the very essence of his 'reformation' thought" (p. 178) .

That a theology of the cross is at the center of Luther's understanding of the gospel is a not unusual claim, but its truth is not obvious. On the one hand, Luther used the phrase "theology of the cross " in his writings on only five occasions, four of which date from the late winter and spring of 1518. Related phrases can be found in writing from the next two years hut then disappear. On the other hand, " pre-Reformation elements" can be found in some of the young Luther's comments

on the cross. As noted above, for the mature Luther, the sinner is justified by participation in the righteousness of Christ. At times the young Luther seems to understand the sinner to be justified by self-accusation: when I condemn myself, I am in agreement with the truth of God which condemns me, and this either is my justification or is the condition upon which my justification rests.

McGrath's tracing of the development of Luther up to 1519 is meant to "indicate the manner in which Luther's developing insights into man's justification *coram deo* are encapsulated in the concept of the' theology of the cross'" (p. 2). Not only does the theology of the cross allegedly encapsulate this. development, McGrath also sees the cross as an element driving the development to its conclusion: "There comes a point at which Luther can no longer be explained on the basis of his origins and his envfronment, and when he began to pursue a course significantly different from the thought-world of his contemporaries, as the cruciality of the cross of Christ embedded itself more an:d more deeply in Luther's theological reflections" (p. 26). Just what causal force is being ascribed here by the word " as " is unclear, but McGrath is at least saying that Luther's development is accompanied by a deepening role of the cross in his thought.

Does McGrath adequately demonstrate his thesis? He carefully shows that when the Luther of 1513-14 speaks of lowliness and humility, he is not presenting a new understanding of justification. Humility and self-accusation are the human condition, the " *quod in se est,"* that must be prior to the gift of justifying grace (pp. 89:ff.). "While Luther's understanding of what man must do in order to receive grace di:ffers from Biel's in its emphasis, the theological framework within which both operate is essentially the s-ame-that of a covenant, which imposes obligations upon God and man alike, which both must meet if justification is to take place " (p. 91). McGrath sees this structure collapse in Luther's wrestling with the meaning of the righteousness of God: " The origins

of the theology of the cross lie in Luther's initial difficulty in seeing how the idea of a righteous God could conceivably be good news for the sinful man " (p. 92) .

While MoGrath rightly insists ,that Luther's movement to a new understanding of God's righteousness is gradual, he sees a turning point in Luther's lectures on Romans of *1515-16.* While faith is still identified as humility, Luther no longer sees it as a human contribution to the process of justification but as a divine gift. The idea that the believer prior to justification must first do that which is in him is now rejected (pp. 130f.). With it is rejected any close analogy between human and divine righteousness. While human righteousness gives to eaich his or her due, God's righteousness justifies the sinner. McGrath links the new form of Luther's attack on human reason to this new understanding of the righteousness of God. Ruman reason, ,especially as described by Aristotle, is attacked because it seeks to understand divine righteousness on the model of human righteousness. In the same Romans lectures, McGrath finds the decisive shift from the idea of a righteousness which can be ascribed to the believer to the new idea that the righteousness which justifies a sinner before God is the righteousness of Christ.

How does this new understanding of justification as realized strictly by God's gmce and in the righteousness of Christ relate to a theology of the cross? First, Luther comes to see the cross, both in the life of Christ and in the *Anfechtungen* of the Christian, as the means by which God works humility in us. Concretion is thus given to the assertion that humility is not our work but the work of God in us (p. 154). Here the connection between Luther's new understanding of God's righteousness and the theology of the cross is direct. Second, a theology of the cross rejects human wisdom in favor 0£ the foolishness of God, contradicting our assumptions about God. McGrath finds in Luther's rejection of any close analogy between human and divine righteousness the pattern for his criticism of an understanding of God on the basis of nature or

universal history. The claim, however, is only that Luther's new understanding of the righteousness of God " foreshadows his critique of the predication of human concepts of qualities in general-and thus foreshadows the *theologia crucis* in this vital respect" (p. 160). Only parallel structures connect the two dusters of ideas.

The crucial issue, however, is the connection between the theology of the cross and Luther's insistence that the justifying righteousness of the Christian is and remains the righteousness of Christ. On this connection, :McGrath is much less clear. He does note how the theology of the cross for Luther means that faith must always believe against experience. It cannot depend on its own experience hut only on the promises of God. Here there is certainly an epistemological parallel to the insistence that the Christian never finds justifying righteousness in the self but always in Christ: "The correlative to *Crux sola* is *sola fide"* (p. 174). A correlation, however, is not what McGrath had claimed. He had claimed that the theology of the cross "encapsulated" Luther's development of a new understanding of God's righteousness. This claim remains undemonstmted.

:McGrath's emphasis falls on the epistemological aspect of Luther's theology of the cross. The cross is the true revelation of God. For Luther, though, the theology of the cross was about more than epistemology. It also emphasized the role of suffering in the Christian life. Suffering is the means by which the prideful okl self is slain. This suffering is not just or even primarily physical but is realized in *Anfechtungen,* assaults of doubt and temptation which can only be resisted by clinging to the promises of God. Two aspects of this side of Luther's theology of the cross must be noted.

First, Luther's emphasis on suffering as a necessary ingredient in the Christian life is part of his attack on indulgences. Penitential hmidens, rightly imposed, are a good and salutary part of the Christian Jife and should not be so simply avoided. If it takes ,away a needful burden, an indulgence does harm to

souls. In his *Explanations of the Ninety-Five Theses* of 1518, Luther distinguishes the theologian of the cross and the theologian of glory by their attitudes to indulgences: "Disagreeing with the theologian of the cross, he [the theologian of glory] defines the treasury of Christ as the removing and remitting of punishments, things which are most evil and worthy of hate. In opposition to this the theologian of the cross defines the treasury of Christ as impositions and obligations of punishments, things which are best and most worthy of love." [9] Indulgences reinforced the misconception that what Christ and the Church offered was immediate release from suffering. In his Hebrews lectures from this period Luther counters: "To bear Christ crucified in oneself is to live a life full of trials and sufferings, and for this reason He becomes for carnal men 'a sign that is spoken against' (Luke 2:34). Therefore one should resolve to receive with open arms every trial, even death itself, with praise and joy, just as one should receive Christ Himself." [10]

McGrath does an excellent job of placing Luther in the context of late medieval theology. He does not, however, place Luther's theology of the cross in the context of the actual disputes of 1517-19. It is no accident that most of the passages in which Luther speaks of a theology of the cross come in the midst of the indulgence controversy, even if they are not directly concerned with the argument over indulgences. [11] The theology of the cross crystallizes aspects of Luther's vision of the Christian life that are involved in the arguments set off by the Ninety-Five Theses. By ignoring this aspect of Luther's theology of the cross, McGrath gives us an overly private and merely intellectual Luther, struggling with concepts and in-

[9] *WA* 1:614, American Edition, vol. 31, p. 227.

[10] *WA*, 57/3:122; American Edition, vol. 29, p. 130.

[11] On the interrelation of the indulgence controversy and aspects of Luther's emphasis on suffering, see Martin Brecht, *Martin Luther: His Road to Reformation 1483-1521*, trans. James L. Schaaf (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), pp. 185f.

tellectual movements, rather than the public and polemical figure embroiled in arguments over concrete church practices which Luther had become by 1518.

Second, one can ask how well integrated are Luther's new understanding of jus,tification and his emphasis on suffering in the Christian life. What is the connection between the assertion that our righteousness is always in Christ and the assertion that the old self is always with us in a way that demands that we embrace the sufferings needed to slay it? The two assertions are certainly interrelated in the web of Luther's thought, hut the latter does not follow from or " encapsulate " the former. It reflects a belief about the place of the Christian in the pilgrimage from cross to resurrection, but this belief is logically separable from what Luther has to say about justification.

Not only is the emphasis on suffering logically separable from Luther's new understanding of justification, it continued to tempt him to understand justification as constituted by the Christian's humility and self-accusation, i.e., as a human achievement. In a devotional book of *Fourteen Consolations,* Luther says:

> If you suffer because of your sins, then you ought to rejoice that you are being purged of your sins. . . . The thief [crucified with Christ] was also a sinner, but by his patience [patientia] he merited [meruit] the glory of righteousness and holiness. Go and do likewise. Whenever you suffer, it is either because of your sins or your righteousness. Both kinds of suffering sanctify and save if you will but love them .... As soon as you have confessed that you suffer de;servedly for your sins, you are as righteous and holy as the thief on the right hand. Since confession of sins is truth, it justifies [iustificat] and sanctifies .... You are made righteous [iustus factus] by the confession of your deserved suffering and sins.[12]

Does the theology of the cross represent a" pre-Reformation humility piety" or the culmination of Luther's new understanding of the righteousness of God? No simple answer can be

[12] *WA.* 6: 117; .American Edition, vol. 42, p. 140.

given. McGrath is right that ,the theology of the cross reflects Luther's new conviction that the renewal and justification of the Christian is entirely the work of God. It is closely interrelated with Luther's assault on what he considers the natural preconceptions about God engendered by human reason. But MoGrath has not shown that the theology of the cross, as Luther understood that phrase in 1518-20, summarizes Luther's new understanding of the righteousness of God and the justification of the Christian.

Further, is reflection on the cross decisive in the development of Luther's new theology? Oddly enough, McGrath himself says in the book's last chapter: " The essential thesis of the present study is that Luther's theological development over the period 1509-19 is a continuous process, rather than a series of isolated and fragmented episodes, and that one aspect of this development-namely, his discovery of the 'righteousness of God ':...._is of fundamental importance within this overall process " (p. 176) . What McGrath has not shown is that the cross plays an important role in Luther's arrival at a new understanding of the righteousness of God.

McGraith has written a book whose parts are greater than the whole. The first three quarters of the book are informative, clear, and helpful. It is the thesis about the theology of the cross that remains insufficiently developed. The strength of *Luther's Theology of the Cross* is its clear exposition of aspects of Luther's development, not any ground-breaking new insights. The book will be particularly useful to the non-specialist. McGrath does accommodate the non-specialist here by translating citations from Latin and German. He does not, however, inform the reader whether English translations exist, either of texts from Luther or of secondary literature. Readers without Latin or German who want to get some sense of the context of certain quotations from Luther will thus ha¥e to hunt through the American Edition of Luther's Works on their own.

III.

Most writers of such scholarly books as those just discussed do not also write books for a non-academic mass audience. McGrath has written not one, but at least three: on the person of Christ, on the Trinity, and on rthe cross. McGrath is to be thanked for writing such books. The church needs its scholars to write for a wide range of its members. It is the last of these books that I will diS1CUss here.

In *The Mystery of the Cross* McGrath does not write as an historian but as a committed rtheologian. The claims are less descriptive than normative. He calls the church back to what he sees as its essential message about the God who is present in the cross aDJd resurrection of Jesus. This call is a call away from rt.he religion of the Enlightenment, from "Liberal Protestantism," and from a false iderul of a neutral, objective theology. The understanding of the cross he describes in his book on Luther is here at the center of Christian faith.

McGrath writes with clarity and verve. He knows, of course, that not all will agree with his commitments. The tone of debate permeates the book, but so does an obvious concern for the mission and integrity of the church. Here let me restrict my comments to an odd feature in McGrath's presentation that both undercuts his seeming intention and displays a particular danger in a theology of the cross in the tradition of Luther.

McGrath argues that the cross has a priority in understanding present Christian existence: "It is Christ alone who has been raised, and our resurrection remains in the future. It is therefore the cross, the culmination of the earthly ministry of Jesus Christ, which remains the key to our earthly Christian existence" (p. This priority has two bases. First, Christian faith looks for the presence of God within the contradictions, struggles, and failures of this world. These contradictions and failures are not simply to be endured until we meet God in glory. "We need reassurance that God rea.illy is pres-

ent *here and now,* in the contrwdictions and confusions of human experience .... And it is for reasons such as these that the Christian tradition, following in the paths indicated by Paul, has identified the cross, *interpreted in the light of the resurrection,* as the final, decisive and normativce locus of the revelation of God" (p. 107, emphasis in original).

The second basis is McGrath's insistence that the transformation that will occur in the resurrection is simpJy future: " The cross remains the present reality, with the resurrection as the future hope-a hope which breaks into the present, transforming our understanding of the situation, but not the situation itself" (p. 113) . The resurrection is present only in that we know it will occur: "We have to recognize the resurrection as being ' not yet ' and yet at the same time ' already present '-the 'there and then ' which breaks into the ' here and now ' and casts light upon the present situation without altering it *except in that we are allowed to view that situation in a new light"* (p. 108, emphasis in original) .[13]

This insistence is open to serious criticism. Most notably, it ignores major strands within the New Testament in favor of a one-sided reading of certain Pauline passages. In Romans 6: *5,* for example, Paul does refer to resurrection as future; but he continues in vss. IOf.: "the death he [Jesus] died he died to sin, once for aill, but the life he lives he livces to God. So you also must consider yourselves dead to sin and alive to God in Christ Jesus." Here there is a present participation in Christ's new life; resurrection is not simply future. A possibly Deutero-Pauline text such as Ephesians is mo!'e forceful: God " made us alive together with 1Christ ... and raised us up with him, and made us sit with him in the heavenly places in Christ Jesus" (2:5f.). Any attempt to he true to the New Testament can-

1s On occasion, McGrath seems to contradict himself. For example: "The same power or ,person who raised the crucified Jesus Christ is made available, or makes himself available, through the gospel, to be appropriated by faith. The empty cross, as much as the empty tomb, speaks eloquently of the power of God made available in and through weakness " (p. 115). " Power " here seems to be more than just the knowledge that resurrection lies beyond cross.

not make the resurrection a strictly future reality, however mUJch we must avoid the Corinthian heresy. In what sense the resurrection is and is not present in the Christian life is one of the ·central problems for a theology of the cross in the tradition of Luther. MoGrath in *The Mystery of the Cross* states an extreme position without adequate support.

As the quotations given make clear, McGrath's focus on cross to the exclusion of resurrection is part of a larger picture of the Christian life and its meaning. Any book about the cross must finally address the question: Why is the cross of Christ significant for persons other than Jesus? McGrath's answer is revealing. The proclamation of the cross is significant because "it identifies a pattern of divine presence and activity, supremely disclosed by the cross and resurrection, which both illuminates and transforms human existence. It invites its hearers .to reaid this pattern of divine presence and activity into their own existence, to make the connection between the death and resurrection of Jesus 1Christ and their own situation" (p. 126). The emphasis falls again and again on Jesus as revealing a pattern "through suffering to new life" which is then repeated in the life of the Christian. "The pattern which believers learn to impose upon their existence is that of journeying *through* suffering, rejection and death *to* eternal life and the glory of the risen Christ" (pp. 163£, emphasis in original). God is present not just at the end of the process, but within it: "Faith recognized in the crucifixion and resurrection a pattern of divine pl'esence and activity-and discerned this same pattern in the panorama of hruman existence" (p. 149). The cross and resurrection thus provide a "high peak" from which faith can view "the battleground of existence . . ., recognising in this battle precisely the same patterns as a battle once fought at Calvary, and interpreting it in that light" (p. 152).

MoGrath vigorously attacks what he calls exemplarist understandings of the cross. The soteriology implicit in McGrath's theology of the cross is, however, just as exemplarist as

any he atracks. Jesus' c11oss and resurrection reveal a pattern we can use to understand and live our lives. We find the saving God by 11epeatingin our lives the pattern revealed in Jesus'. The redemptive significance of Jesus' cross and resurrection seems to consist in this revelation:

> The Christian is expected to share in the cross of Christ, bearing sufferings and ultimately the death which he once bore. But in one important respect the Christian experience of the cross is transformed by the crucixion and resurrection of Jesus Christ .. We can view the cross from the standpoint of the resurrection, which allows us to see the bleakness of that cross in the aura of the resurrection. In this important way the cross of Jesus Christ is not identical with our cross-the resurrection transforms the experiences through which Christians share in the cross of Christ. . . . In this sense we could say that Christ's death upon the cross is substitutionary, in that he bore something in ordex that we might not bear it.... He experienced as sheer 'cross' what we now experience as 'cross leading to resurrection.' (p.

What Christ bears is our ignorance, so that we need not bear our crosses in ignorance but might know that God is present in them and that beyond them lies resurrection. The resurrection is present only as information because the significance of cross and resurrection is precisely in the information they provide about a redemptive pattern in life. In addition, resurrection must be future for us just as it w:as for the pre-Easter Jesus, for we do not so much participate in his cross and resurrection as repeat them in the pattern of our own lives.

Does McGrath intend such a soteriological reduction of the significance of the cross and resurrection? Almost certainly not.[14] He intends to call his readers book to Bible and tradition. Nevertheless, it is not an accident that such a reduction ooours in *The Mystery of the Cross.* In *Luther's Theology of the Cross* McGrath emphasized precisely the ,epistemological side of Luther's cross theology. I noted the temptation in that theology to 11eturnto humility as that which justifies the Chris-

[14] See his critique of Barth's alleged reduction of the significance of Jesus tom.ere information, *Iustitia Dei,* II, p. 183.

tian. The exemplarist understanding of the significance of the cross in McGrath's own interpretation is a modern version of this temptation. We can see in McGrath's presentation why the theology of the cross might well represent a pre-Reformation element in Luther's thought, •a return to a piety and theology that focus more on the imitation of the cross of Jesus than on justification through that cross.

* * * * *

If the books under review are representative, McGrath's writings are a mixed aichievement. His formidable learning is beyond question. Nevertheless, learning in itself is neither theology nor the history of theology. Both require an analytical ,care that is too often absent here. All the books under review abound in illuminating first thoughts. What they seem to lack are the second and third thoughts that test and refine.

BOOK REVIEWS

Summa Theologiae: A Concise Translation. By ST. THOMAS AQUINAS. Edited by Timothy McDermott. Westminster, Md.: Christian Classics, 1989. Pp. lviii + 651. $78.00 (cloth).

There are probably just a few of us familiar with Dominico Gravina's *Compendium rythmicum,* an ancient little book that summarizes the entire *Summa theologiae* in the same Latin meter as " Tantum ergo." But doubtless many are familiar with the experience Gravina must have had that led him to write such a book. It is the same experience that has led to a remarkable number of synopses, compendia, introductory translations, selections, and most recently to Timothy McDermott's *Concise Translation.* These attempt to present the doctrine of the *Summa* without the massive weight of syllogism and definition, unfamiliar style, and innumerable (sometimes obscure) references, which make it so daunting a task for the unprepared reader.

For example, Paul Glenn in *Tour of the Summa* excises every objection and response and summarizes only the bodies of the articles. Walter Farrell in *Companion to the Summa* does not attempt trans· lation hut instead rewords and restructures the *Summa* in the typically modern paragraph style. However, these works have their shortcomings. By neglecting the doctrine contained in the responses and by failing to provide any transition from the summary of one article to another, the *Tour* considerably weakens the *ordo disciplinae* which, as Thomas argues in his prologue, is essential to this work. In this regard, even Anton Pegis's *Introduction to St. Thomas Aquinas* tends to stumble along, despite being a close translation. The *Companion,* on the other hand, does preserve a continuity of thought, but in the final account it is Thomas's thought only secondhand.

The *Concise Translation,* however, masterfully combines the strengths of these hooks, while avoiding their weaknesses. For it achieves concision in a manner that respects the order and development of the *Summa,* " not by selecting out parts, hut by compressing and distilling the whole" (p. xiii). Yet at the same time it is a translation. It is essentially Thomas in a similar form, approximately one sixth the size. McDermott admits that he has made certain omissions (for example, some of the remarkably lengthy discussions of the ceremonial and judicial precepts of the Old Law), but in these cases he retains enough to give the reader a sense of Thomas's treatment. There are of course

many passages which would he impossible to make more concise (for example, the proofs for God's existence), except by adapting them to a modern format. Here McDermott's use of modern punctuation and sentence structure tends to smooth out the stacatto (though extremely precise) structure of Thomas's syntax.

At a glance, the *Concise Translation* appears as a thoroughly modern text, with paragraphs, titled sections, chapters, bibliography, and indices. Not surprisingly, it is divided into three main parts: God, Journeying to God, and The Road to God. Each of these is divided into chapters (numbered continuously through the parts) that correspond more or less to the so-called Treatises. For example, Part One, Chapter Five, entitled "Man's Place in Creation," corresponds exactly to the Treatise on Man. These chapters, in turn, are divided into sections which correspond closely to the major divisions that Thomas outlines in his introductions at the heads of various questions. The ohjec·tion/response format, however has completely disappeared, and the only evidence of the question/article format appears at the heads of certain paragraphs and in the margins. But this does not mean that the ohjections and responses have altogether vanished. McDermott's careful eye has picked out many of the important distinctions they con·tain and has skillfully incorporated them into complete and unified paragraphs. This holds true also with many instances of the *sed contra.* Finally, in streamlining his text, he has done away with most references, keeping just enough to indicate on whom Thomas primarily relied. This regrettably leaves the reader unaware of Thomas's extensive use of his predecessors. But all in all, McDermott's format makes the text eminently readable.

The translation itself is remarkable for its fidelity to the original and ease of comprehension. It almost always avoids sacrificing fidelity for comprehension or comprehension for fidelity-a rare virtue among translations. McDermott explains that when confronted with what he considers indispensihle technical terms, such as "matter" and "form," he uses modern turns of phrase. For example, instead of speaking technically of educing a form from matter, if possible, the translation speaks of matter taking on a new form. The hope is, according to McDermott, that by doing this " one can recover original meanings of terms long encrusted with technical barnacles " (p. xiv). We can get a fair sense of McDermott's style of translation by comparing it to Pegis's popular translation. The passage here is from the beginning of Thomas's *prima via.* Pegis's translation runs thus:

> Now whatever is moved is moved by another, for nothing can he moved except it is in potentialicy to that towards which it is moved: whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the

> reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality.

Here is the same passage rendered " concisely ":

> Now anything changing is being changed by something else. (For things changing are on the way to realization, whereas things causing change are already realized: they are realizing something else's potential, and for that they must themselves be real.

McDermott's rendering of Thomas's argument has· an accessibility that Pegis's does not, in addition to a more accurate translation of *movere.* True, some precision has been lost in the concise translation (for example, something can be both potential and real, strictly speaking), but does this seem too much to lose for a translation that introduces the reader to the *Summa* without frightening him away? The translations in common use today tend to give the sense that Thomas often concocted his own technical terminology, which the reader is forced to adopt if he wishes to understand Thomas at all. (Pegis's use of the word reduction or reduce serves as an example). McDermott's translation effectively dispels this false image.

Since McDermott is primarily concerned with translation he limits his own commentary to a comprehensive preface to the work as a whole and short introductions at the head of each chapter. The limitation is understandable, but still I was left wishing he had written more. In his comments, especially those in his preface " What the *Summa* Is About," McDermott argues the uncommon position that Aristotle's natural philosophy is an essential part of Thomas's effort to demonstrate the reasonableness of scriptural teaching. In stark contrast, for example, stands Pegis's assertion in his *Introduction* that Thomas's Aristotle " was never an Aristotelian " but rather existed " only in the mind of St. Thomas Aquinas." Pegis wanted to distance Thomas as much as possible from Aristotle and above all from Aristotle's "embarrassingly obscure points." This has become a common" Thomistic" attitude. McDermott is refreshing in his insistence, for example, on the validity of the proofs of God's existence and how Thomas, with Aristotle, has already responded to the essential arguments that modern science brings against them. " For modern science is in essentials a return to a way of thinking found among the earliest Greek philosophers, and a way of thinking which Aristotle and Thomas thought they had outgrown " (p. xxiv) . By modern science he means of course the prevalent modern conception of science which "grants objective status to only the lowest level of description of the world (that of physics and chemistry) " (ibid.) . This section of the preface develops into a very interesting restatement of the doctrine of natural teleology.

Yet for all this McDermott does hammer one wedge in between Aristotle and Thomas. Aristotle's God, he claims, differs vastly from Thomas's God. For Aristotle, God is the exemplar and goal of all the universe but not its efficient cause. For Thomas, he is much more than this-God is creator, the source of all being. But this position, which is by no means peculiar to McDermott, seems to be contrary to what Thomas himself said on this matter. For example, in I, q.44, a.I Thomas makes explicit reference to Aristotle as one who saw that there must be an efficient cause of all existence. I was disappointed to see that this article gets short shrift in McDermott's process of con· cision. Apropos of this, McDermott's description of God as the " doing of all being" (p. xxxii), which is meant to stress God's continuous creative act, is probably not the most felicitous. It sounds odd and is difficult to understand, since doing, as opposed to making, is an action the termination of which remains within the agent. Certainly the " doings " of God, for example, to know and love, which necessarily belong to his essence, should never be confused with his " making," that is, creation, an act which he need not have performed.

But the most forceful criticism should be directed at nothing less mundane than this book's price. $78.00 is very high to pay for what McDermott himself describes as " a useful translation for first reading " (p. xiv) . Since he does not intend this book to replace the *Summa,* but rather to introduce and entice, he is competing with the much less ex- pensive *Tour, Introduction,* and, to some extent, selections such as *The Pocket Aquinas.* If the *Concise Translation* is not published in a more affordable form, I doubt it will attract the readership it greatly deserves. That will be sorry indeed, for McDermott has written the finest and most faithful tour of Thomas's *Summa* thus far.

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The Church's Bible: Its Contemporary Authority. By DARRELL JoDOCK. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989. Pp. xi + 173.

In the Introduction to his book, Darrell Jodock suggests that its vari· ous claims and arguments be approached with an " appropriate sense of humor" (p. 4). This is a delightfully refreshing invitation to which, I suspect, one ought to do one's best to respond. But after reading this book I am firmly convinced, Darrell's self-deprecating suggestion not-

withstanding, that it ought to be taken very seriously indeed . . . seriously by anyone who *cares* about the Bible, for purely scholarly reasons or purely religious reasons or for any combination of reasons. It is a thoughtful and challenging book. This review represents my own modest attempt to respond to that challenge.

I would recommend *The Church's Bible* for a number of its virtues. Given the compactness of this book, it is remarkable how much the author actually accomplishes. He surely accomplishes his explicitly stated goals: in Part I of the book describing how the authority of the Bible became problematic in modern times, while also identifying the various strategies that have been executed to rescue its authority; in Part II articulating his own theory about what it means to say that the Bible is authoritative, offering a prescription for how the Bible ought to function for the Christian community in a postmodern culture. Yet the book does more than this, remarkably enough, providing brief but insightful analyses of such fundamental theological issues as revelation, inspiration, miracles, and the concept of God. Moreover, at the end of the book, Jodock moves beyond his account of biblical authority and into the territory of biblical hermeneutics. There he links his theory of authority to its practical implications for the project of "recontextualization," what he regards as the most fruitful way of interpreting and utilizing biblical texts. In the process of achieving these multifarious goals the book reveals something of its author's own complex identity, as Christian teacher, pastor, theologian, and intellectual historian.

The first three chapters of the book represent a thoroughly insightful piece of intellectual history. The six "ideal types" of response to the modern crisis of biblical authority, sketched in chapters two and three, will be readily and productively appropriated, I am sure, both by historical theologians and teachers, for both scholarly and pedagogical purposes. Jodock has made real sense out of some complicated developments, especially in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, while avoiding oversimplification. Moreover, this is no church history or history of theology, narrowly conceived, but an account thoroughly sensitive to the impact on biblical authority of various political, social, philosophical, and scientific happenings. One might quibble about some details of interpretation: the publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species* in 1859, for example, seems to me a more crucial event for understanding the modern crisis of biblical authority than Jodock's account suggests. But this is a matter of judgment and of emphasis; on the whole, his historical analysis is careful, lucid, and illuminating.

From my perspective, the crowning glory of this hook is its splendid chapter six, entitled "Biblical Usefulness, Biblical Authority." This is

the heart of the matter: Jodock's own proposal about what it shou]d mean, in a postmodern era, for people to talk about the Bible as authoritative. The entire chapter is laced with insight. A *functional* answer to the question about authority emphasizes its four-fold character as communal, contextual, relational, and tacit. In his own words,

> The Bible does not possess authority, nor is its authority based on some attribute that makes it utterly distinctive and absolutely different from every other writing. Its authority does not depend on its inspiration, in the sense that it would if the Bible were alone inspired, nor does biblical authority depend on Scripture's being uniquely error free. Indeed, the Bible does not possess authority at all, except in the context of community and relationship. (p. 110)

and again,

> Authority is neither ouly a matter of choice nor only a possession of the other. It is a kind of relationship, one that develops over time in the context of co=unity. It is the kind of relationship in which the other exercises a claim on the thinking and behavior of the participant. (p. 111)

Here is a dynamic account of authority in which it is conceived neither as the static property of a text nor as something arbitrarily imputed to it by an individual or community. The authority of the biblical text is realized when it functions effectively for, proves to be useful to, a community of believers. This account is clearly articulated and persuasive. But it is only half of the story. The author also supplies a *material* answer to the question about authority, one that accounts for not only the possibility but also the continual actuality of the Bible's being experienced as authoritative. It is because of its " capacity to mediate the identity-transforming presence of God" (p. 114) as well as to supply for the Christian community a living language of faith that the Bible is authoritative in this material sense.

The implications of such a rich conception of authority are numer· ous. Most notable for me is Jodock's conclusion that the authority of the Scriptures is a "derived authority," derived from their usefulness in mediating the divine presence. " They are not to *be* served," he argues "but to serve a task and a relationship" (125). Any temptation to idolize Scripture is clearly precluded by such a view.

This book does not deal with small or insignificant issues. And because I take its claims seriously, it is inevitable that I should find some of its arguments a bit problematic, less than completely persuasive. While I do find the main argument of the book, especially as articulated in chapter six, to be quite persuasive, I am still concerned about some of the details. Allow me to raise briefly a few of these concerns.

The first has to do with Jodock's ushering in the era of "post-modernity." He is not alone, of course, in announcing the arrival of a postmodern era. Most such announcements are utterly meaningless to me, that is, I really have no idea what it means to be postmodern, what sense the label is supposed to have. But Jodock does his readers the service of explaining its meaning from his point of view. The problem is that I remain unconvinced. Post-world war, post-Holocaust pessimism is a very real phenomenon, I agree, hut can the post-Enlightenment modem age truly he characterized as an era of continuous and extreme optimism? The neo-orthodoxy of Barth and the Niebuhr's was shaped, in part, by twentieth century pessimism, yet it is not clear to me that Jodock would want to label that particular theological move·ment as being "postmodern." (Or would he?) Nor am I convinced that television has had the effects that critics such as Jodock typically describe, e.g., a damaging reduction of " our sense of temporal se-quence " (73). Any generalization about television that is designed to embrace MTV, game shows, the movie of the week, and reruns of " Lassie " is, it seems to me, destined for failure. Finally, I would contend that scholars overestimate the impact of scientific theories like those of Heisenberg and Einstein on popular culture. Darwin's theory was somewhat unique in the popular breadth of its impact. Here was a scientific theory that seemed to the layperson to conflict sharply with the orthodox Christian view of creation, the orthodox Christian an-thropology. It was debated on streetcomers and in taverns. Its impli·cations were and still are being debated in courtrooms. The contem-porary Creationist controversy tells me that Christians are still wrest·ling with .the Enlightenment. I have trouble seeing this as a post-modern phenomenon.

Granted that a good deal of Jodock's discussion involves linking his theory of biblical authority to a postmodern cultural context, it does seem to me that the theory loses none of its coherence, plausibility, or power to persuade if that link is dissolved. His hook describes elo-quently one real sense in which biblical authority has historically func-tioned. He warns of the dangers and inadequacies of other concep·tions of authority. I would like to hear him say more about why this theory requires the postmodern setting. (Let me admit to a hidden agenda: my apprenticeship to Charles Peirce has encouraged an in-terest in the philosophy of Jiirgen Hahermas. Like Habermas, I re-main unconvinced that the Enlightenment project is completely dead, and need to know more about why Jodock and many others among my contemporaries are so anxious to kill it off.)

A second concern about the hook's argument is similar to the :first. I am equally confused about why Jodock feels compelled to jettison

"classical theism" and to embrace something like a process view. Again, it is unclear to me that his theory of authority requires this move. Why does belief in classical theism entail " passive acceptance " on the part of the believer (p. 87) ? I would argue that Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, Edwards, and many others defended a classically theistic conception of the deity without suffering a loss of the sense of God's presence, without abdicating moral or political responsibility, without being reduced to a helpless passivity. None of these genuinely "classical" theists modeled God's power on some crude notion of efficient causality; an emphasis on the divine power never precluded for them a powerful experience of the divine presence. Nor does a belief in divine immutability entail belief in divine impassivity, in a God who neither cares or feels. Jodock's articulate theory of biblical authority does not need the encumbering baggage of a process view of God.

I have a concern, too, about Jodock's theology of presence, his emphasis on the Bible as a text that reveals God's *identity.* I applaud that emphasis, in Jodock's theology as in the theology of the late, great Hans Frei (whose influence he cites) . But I would argue that " knowing who" (in Jodock's sense, p. 92-93) is often epistemologically parasitic on "knowing what" and "knowing that." Christians who want to make truth claims about the identity of Jesus Christ will have to make truth claims about more than that. The former will often depend on the latter. This is a minor worry, perhaps, about what a good theory of religious knowledge should look like. But I would need to know more about Jodock's perspective on this issue before I conclude that we are in genuine disagreement.

Finally, I have questions about the last, hermeneutical chapter. By Jodock's own admission in a footnote, he intends only to scratch the surface of some complex issues; this is a book about biblical authority, not biblical hermeneutics. But I suspect that his functional and material answers to the question about authority have some interesting implications for dealing with the issue of interpretation. Here I will conelude by worrying that Jodock's project of recontextualization, as he describes it, may prove to be a bit problematic. This is a Gadamerian worry about whether we are ever able to recover, in Jodock's words, "the intended effect of the original words" of Scripture (p. 129). Moreover, exactly why should those intentions be normative for contemporary Christians? Since I am seduced by the dynamic model that Jodock has sketched in chapter six, I resist the constraints that this project of recontextualization seems to impose. There must be numerous ways, fruitful ways for individuals and communities to interact with the biblical texts. Indeed, strong *misreadings* of the original

intentions of the biblical authors may prove to he quite theologically productive. Why the primacy of recontextualization? Is this a half-genuflection to the historical-critical method?

But here my comments are becoming *too* serious and beginning to distract from the wise lessons this book has to teach. I applaud Jodock's achievement, and I am grateful for it.

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The Sacraments of Initiation. By LIAM G. WALSH, O.P. London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1988. Pp. xii + 317.

This work faithfully reflects the intent of the new Theology Library series to present " post-Vatican II perspectives on the perennial concerns of Christian theology." Both by theological training in Ireland, France, and Rome as well as by teaching experience at the Angelicum (Rome) and now at the University of Fribourg, Liam Walsh is particularly well suited to have authored this helpful work. Many features will make this book most useful as a text for an introductory university or seminary course on sacraments: its clear outline, lucid style, bibliographies, and study questions.

While the book offers little that is really new about sacraments in general, two particular aspects of its contents are worth noting. The :first is Walsh's introduction about "rite, word and life." This methodological key offers a slant on sacraments that situates their celebration within the context of the human life of Ll-ie participant and relates them to life lived outside religious rituals and prayer. Here the author sets up the method he will follow later on in the book when he devotes two chapters to each of the initiatory sacraments: baptism, confirmation, and eucharist. In each case, the :first chapter discusses what the present rite of that sacrament discloses theologically (what he terms a " liturgical theology"); the second chapter recounts what "the word" discloses about the meaning of the respective rites (from the scriptures through to Vatican II). The chapters on particular sacraments are introduced by two chapters on sacraments in general (" Bjblical Orientations" and "Rites Called Sacraments") and are followed by an an Epilogue about relating sacramental theology to catechesis and preaching. The second characteristic to recommend this book is its irenic tone, especially when dealing with the impetus which the ecumenical movement has given to contemporary sacramental theology.

The Introduction offers a phenomenologically-influenced and anthropologically-grounded approach to studying the sacraments. It would have been more helpful if some of the insights offered here were developed more fully in the chapters following and thus showed the pertinence of these methodological approaches to the individual sacraments considered there. As it stands, the anthropological slant offered in the Introduction is rather isolated since the balance of the hook is a study of sacraments that is more faithful to the classical shape of sacramental theology, with revelation, ritual, and church teaching as its sources.

Words and terms that have been classically used in Catholic sacramental theology are used here with a frequency not found in comparable contemporary hooks on sacraments. Thus Walsh is unafraid to deal with notions of sacramental character, causality, and validity. In some ways these discussions remind one of sections from Bernard Leeming's *Principles of Sacramental Theology.* However, this is not to suggest that Walsh's work is fundamentally flawed or not contemporary. Throughout he faithfully cites Vatican II documents, the present liturgical rites of sacraments, and postconciliar documentation. One contribution that Walsh makes in this hook is to review classical tenets of Roman Catholic teaching, to examine and interpret them for their usefulness today, lest they reflect only a Tridentine appreciation of sacramental theology. At times, however, post-Tridentine language about " receiving " sacraments dominates over references to the assemhly's full, active, and conscious participation in the rites.

The hook is amply documented and its bibliographies are generally up to date. However, the author should have used and cited the second edition of the *Ordo baptismi parvulorum* of 1973, not the first edition of 1969. Since Walsh cites a number of English and French works, the paucity of German works is all the more noticeable. One area that is repeatedly skirted (except for the treatment of the eucharist) is the evolution of sacramental rites and the increasingly precise use of the term *sacramentum* in the early Middle Ages. Here the work of Josef Finkenzeller, *Die Lehre von der Schrift bis zur Scholastik* in the Herder History of Dogma series would have been extremely helpful (particularly concerning the adoption of the number of sacraments as seven). Since Walsh merely cites hooks and articles in the bibliographies without annotating the entries, one wonders whether all are to he recommended or are of equal value. For example, G. Macy's *The Theologies of the Eucharist in the Early Scholastic Period* has received important criticism, none of which is referred to here.

Related to this is Walsh's use of the term "sacramental character" which he asserts derives from Augustine and influences subsequent orthodox teaching on sacraments. In this connection the careful his-

torical study of Augustine's use of "character" and the early medieval evolution of notions of sacramentality by N. Hering in *Medieval Studies* would have enabled Walsh to he more accurate about the shades of difference in meaning which this term has had in the tradition.

Walsh's style is generally clear and engaging. Where this uniformly lapses is when the author describes Aquinas's sacramental theology. While one welcomes the thorough review of Aquinas by this Dominican author, familiarity with this scholastic mode of thinking should not be presumed. The clarity reflected in other sections of the book would be particularly welcomed here. However, since Aquinas's sacramental theology is receiving ever greater attention by sacramentalists today, we are in Walsh's debt for offering at least these pathways through it.

When treating of the eucharistic rite Walsh's overreliance on J. Jeremias's *The Eucharistic Words of Jesus* is marked, since the more recent works by Fritz Chenderlin and Cesare Giraudo are utilized more generally today to interpret the complex meaning of *anamnesis.* Since Walsh cites E. Kilmartin's essay on the "Lima Text on Eucharist" (from the hook *Catholic Perspectives on Baptism, Eucharist and Min· istry,* edited by Michael Fahey) after dealing with multilateral consensus statements on the eucharist, it is surprising that he does not utilize the source Kilmartin himself used (Lothar Lies's "Okumenische Erwagungen zu Abendmahl, Priesterweihe und Messopfer ") when describing eucharistic memorial. When treating the eucharistic theology of the patristic and early medieval periods, the author would have henefitted from A. Gerken's most helpful *Theologie der Eucharistie.* In addition the essays on eucharist by A. Duval in *Des sacrements au Concile de Trente* would have enhanced the book's careful treatment of the eucharistic teaching from Trent.

Some typographical errors (e.g. two errors in punctuation on p. 70 and p. 258 specifically), the misprint on the top of p. 151 (that repeats the last two lines from p. 150) , and the incorrect attestation of the *Apostolic Constitutions* to Hippolytus (p. 138) are among the more annoying printing errors. As it stands, this work offers a schema for a contemporary sacramental theology that is largely traditional in outline, scope, and purpose. But with its copious citations from theological sources, teachers can use this text fruitfully by placing it alongside examples of the church's liturgical rites of sacraments from the tradition. Then, a careful study of the present rites for baptism, con· firmation, and eucharist would he a natural follow-up after reading this hook.

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Mini,stry and Authority in the Catholic Church. By EDMUND HILL, O.P. London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1988. Pp. 142. £7.95.

Readers will not find in this book a serene, dispassionate, and impartial analysis of ministry and authority. The author, presently teaching theology in Lesotho, says that his book is a work of advocacy, a taking of sides, a forthright challenge to Church authorities. He writes out of frustration and exasperation. In short, he has written a brief for one particular view of authority and has condemned another. His trenchant opinions, at times caustic but not without the occasional humorous aside, are confrontational, not soothing.

Hill contrasts two views of authority in the Catholic Church: the " magisterial papalist " (MP) and, the one he supports, the " ministerial collegialist" (MC). The magisterial papalist approach is the product of the second millennium of Christianity, reaching its peak during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It is the ultramontane view with its excessive papalism and the concentration of all authority in the Holy See and the papacy. It identifies the Church with the papacy and affirms a hierachical, clerical view of Church and authority. The author calls this approach "unrealistic and counter-productive " and claims that its advocates are deaf to any criticism. Using a pyramidal conception of the Church that is Byzantine and juridical, Hill argues that the MPs hold that all authority descends from the hierarchical summit. Church authority, the exclusive possession of the hierarchs, is an instrument of control and is not to be questioned. The magisterial papalists oppose ecumenism and collegiality and are threatened by lay involvement in Church affairs. This view dominated Vatican I and is still in control. The author's purpose is "to criticize relentlessly " MP theology and to propose another model of ecclesial authority.

The " ministerial collegialist " position, according to Hill, is more faithful to the Gospel, the tradition of the first millennium, and the spirit of Vatican II. The MC school, as the name suggests, favors collegiality, a broad concept of ministry, and ecumenical openness. An MC himself, he considers the centralization of authority in the Holy See to be a historical development that has outlived its usefulness. He asserts that Christ did not bestow authority on the pope and the bishops alone; they share it with the entire People of God. The Church as a whole is the primary recipient of the sacrament of order. The Church is a Church of churches rather than a hierarchical, world-wide institution. Christian communities are united in common faith and hope with the Bishop of Rome. In contrast to the MP view, teaching au-

thority is not the exclusive prerogative of the hierarchy; many other Christians are also involved in handing on apostolic faith. MCs insist that authority is not domination but service or ministry. There is no need for Rome in every instance to appoint bishops for local Churches; they should ordinarily be chosen by their own clergy and people.

With the battle lines thus drawn, Hill marshalls evidence for the MC approach from the New Testament and Church history, concentrating on the meaning and development of authority, ministry, and magisterium. He devotes separate chapters to analyses of Vatican I and Vatican II and concludes with a utopian scenario of what Church authority ought to be in the third millennium.

Hill has some explanatory footnotes and refers often to scripture and Vatican II. But he rarely cites any individual theologians who support his position, nor does he often refer to his MP opponents by name. Yet he does say that the present pope, the Roman Curia, and Cardinal Ratzinger follow the MP theology. A list of theologians who adhere to the principles of the MP or MC positions and an index would have been useful additions to the book.

Resorting to the broad brush of rhetoric to construct a convincing argument may be an effective debating technique, but it can be misleading. As a result, some of Hill's comments need further clarification. The following appeared to me as typical.

First, he states that" he [the Pope] is an absolute monarch" (p. 4). This assertion needs qualification. The papacy may have trappings of monarchy and theologians in the past may have described the Church in monarchical terms, but the pope is not an absolute monarch. More correctly, if one wishes to speak of monarchy, and neither Vatican I or Vatican II used the term, the pope is a constitutional monarch. He is bound-to name but a few limits-by the constitution of the Church itself, by revelation, by divine and natural law, by previous articulations of dogmatic truth. No pope can remain a pope if he rejects the above. Undoubtedly, the author would agree with this, but his initial phrasing lacks the proper nuances.

Second, Hill writes that the sacrament of order is " the one sacrament that is in itself detrimental to the salvation of the individual recipient" (p. 51). Not only does it not help the individual toward salvation, he argues, but it is a positive hindrance. In his polemical enthusiasm, Hill overstates the "danger" of power corrupting those in the clerical rank. Of course, opportunities for abuse may possibly emerge also in the sacraments of baptism, marriage, and the Eucharist. His presentation of the sacrament of order is overly negative. A more positive and balanced explanation can be drawn from the rich Christian tradition and from the documents of Vatican II.

Third, Hill describes the synod of bishops as "really not much more than an august talking shop" (p. 116). Through 1989, eleven synods have been held, and most observers of these synods-myself included-would agree that in some respects they have been disappointing. Yet despite their shortcomings, the synods are visible signs of episcopal collegiality and actively engage the local Churches in their preparation and implementation. The synod of bishops may not be perfect, but it is a significant element in the Church's organizational structure. The synods have unrealized potential which must be developed.

Fourth, in his discussion of infallibility at Vatican I, the author states that when the pope defines something he is making a "final judgment" (p. 100), and "he deliberately utters the last word on some point of doctrine" (p. 102). This explanation is misleading. The doctrine of infallibility means that the pope, if he follows the conditions given at Vatican I, can define a doctrine and in so doing, with the assistance of the Holy Spirit, his judgment is free from error. Such teachings are irreformable: they are true, and they cannot be contradicted. Infallible definitions set limits, but they are not the "last word." The development and further understanding of doctrine must continue. As Rahner puts it: "Definitions are much less an end than a beginning" *(Theological Investigations,* Vol. 1, p. 10).

Fifth, it is strange that in presenting the MC position, Hill devotes so little space to the role of the Bishop of Rome. He is correct in saying that the local Churches are "united with each other in one communion under the presidency of the local Church of Rome and the primacy of its bishop" (p. 109). But he should explain it further. In the Catholic tradition the office of the papacy is an essential factor in the unity of the Churches. What are the functions of the papacy in a more collegial Church? What does "presidency" mean concretely? What authority does the pope have as he "presides in charity"? Hill does not tell us.

In the final chapter, Hill suggests several concrete steps that can and should be taken if the MC ecclesiology is to become an effective force in the next millennium. First, make the synod of bishops a deliberative body. Hill does not mention it, but, in fact, the pope can endow the synod with deliberative power (Canon 343). He has yet to do so. Second, turn the Roman Curia into a purely consultative and advisory organization. Third, discontinue the present curial appointments of bishops and allow for different methods of episcopal selection that would, however, still require papal confirmation. Fourth, give episcopal conferences greater legislative authority. They would become a modern version of the ancient synodal form of Church government. More

pointedly, what he is asking for is " the ' planned dissolution ' of the Latin Church into a considerable number of distinct, autonomous ' patriarchates ' " (p. 132). These suggestions, although not original, are intriguing. They deserve, however, more than three pages. What is needed is a detailed presentation of these changes, indicating their historical context, their advantages and disadvantages, and their practical implementation.

Despite the criticisms given above, there is much good material to be found in this crisply written book. I agree in general with Hill's judgment that Church authority should embody a collegial rather than a monarchical ecclesiology. He shows that the MC ecclesiology has a solid foundation in scripture and tradition and its cornerstone is the theology of the local Church. Furthermore, he is correct in insisting that the doctrines of collegiality and the priesthood of the faithful are urgent questions in contemporary ecclesiology and that they have broad ecumenical ramifications. He speaks convincingly of greater lay participation, local autonomy, consultation, and accountability. At the same time, his partisanship leads him to caricature the MP view. He will not persuade many MP supporters by criticizing their "high-handed authoritarianism and paternalism " (p. 53) and " ecclesiastical dishonesty " (p. 127) or by claiming that the Roman Curia " is neurotically obsessed with the matter of papal authority" (p. 114). Hill makes many valid and important points, but, on occasion, he weakens them by exaggeration. At times his partisan style overcomes his theological substance.

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Many Paths: A Catholic Approach to Religious Pluralism. By EUGENE HILLMAN. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1989. Pp. 95.

A Christian theology of religions raises fundamental epistemological and methodological questions. Hillman comes to the debate from what Lindbeck has called an " experiential expressivist " background, that is, there is a tacit assumption that reality is experienced and then expressed, that reality precedes language rather than being disclosed and shaped through language. When such an outlook is applied to the theology of religions, the outcome is often the " discovery " of a common experience underlying all religions, despite their different expressions. The latter can be seen to vary according to climate, history, temperament, and so on. Such expressions are loose symbols for a

greater reality, which takes on an increasingly vague shape with the demise of the signifier. History can offer very little resistance to such a model, and the conflicts, differences, intractabilities, and real problems of religious plurality are slowly silenced, almost numbed into a drowsy calm. That history refuses to play this role, while theologies of religion are often demanding it, is indicative of the difficulties with such a model.

Hillman's first book on this topic *(The Wider Ecumenism,* 1968) showed him to be a follower of Rahner. He stressed the universality of grace and its mediation through the historical and particular; he thereby argued for a wider ecumenism with regard to the world religions, in a model analogous to intra-Christian ecumenism. In this book, Hillman advances the same position, but now infused with a strong dose of Wilfred Cantwell Smith. He does not confront the theological criticisms made against either of his mentors.

The book is divided into four lucid chapters. The first considers the meaning and role of religion, and much of Hillman's discussion is helpful. However, as the chapter proceeds, one finds that the definition of religion is not controlled by the particularities and intractable differences presented by the subject matter but rather by an experiential essentialism. Hillman uses Smith's distinction between "faith" and "belief" to two ends, one descriptive, the other evaluative. However he, like Cantwell Smith, conflates description with evaluation. Furthermore, he is untroubled that the subject matter under inspection does not easily yield to such distinctions. Descriptively, "belief" or the "cumulative tradition" involves the "myriad historico-cultural particularizations" that go to make up a religion such as liturgies, doctrines, ethical systems, practices, histories, and so on (20). Faith is basically an experience of "the transcendent, which is presumably the same for every person," and can be distinguished from the "cumulative tradition, which is different for each people, nation or ethnic-culture group" (21). In a stroke a descriptive category becomes evaluative and ahistorical. We now know that the heart of religious experience is "the same for every person," or "consists at bottom in the experience of God" (20), despite the myriad historical differences. This is like saying that all languages basically convey the same information despite their surface differences. Such contentious and large-scale claims demand careful historical substantiation-something we do not find in this book.

Hillman also provides three criteria for discerning authentic and true religions. That he can do so in one page should put us on guard, as should the alleged neutrality of these criteria (and their subsequent vagueness). The first criterion says that a "given religion is true or

worthy or authentic insofar as it helps to give its followers an aware· ness of what is truly ultimate and most meaningful" (18). This truism begs the question and is incapable of application without some discus· sion of what the " truly ultimate " is. The next criterion is the extent to which the religion promotes " its faithful adherents in loving other human beings as they love themselves." Again, this definition begs many questions, just as the praxis of and reflection on the meaning of love take on radically different forms in different religions as well as within the same religion; let alone that " love " and " self " are not necessarily central terms in the major religions. The third criterion concerns the facilitation of confidence in an ultimate order of meaning· ful existence. One could, at a stretch, accommodate Nazism under Hillman's broad criterion!

The real problem with this exercise is the attempt to formulate neutral and universally acceptable criteria which allow for as wide an ecumenism as possible. Such a strategy resembles a form of global imperialism, trying to affirm all the religions within a framework not of their own making, which may even do disservice to them. Further· more, the question arises as to whether neutral criteria are even pos· sible, let alone available. Hillman's confidence in such universal gen· eralizations is again seen when he writes that " any ethical system, however intimately associated with religion, rests at bottom upon a secular foundation of common human experience" (19). This is man· festly controversial, and many orthodox Muslims, Jews, and a Chris· tian ethicist like Stanley Hauerwas would profoundly disagree with Hillman's assessment (not description) of trans-cultural natural ethics. That so much can *be* assumed with so little critical discussion and de· fence, all in a first chapter, is indicative of a weakness running through· out the book.

Chapters two and three review the history of God's proximity to his creation and suggest ·the universality of grace in creation and history. Here Hillman repeats his earlier book, but suggests Rahner's term " anonymous Christian " be replaced with " faith," a la Smith. While he defends incarnational language (in two pages), he also de-absolu- tizes Jesus Christ, in contextualizing the activity of theology in formu· lating Christologies. But some central Christological questions remain untouched, for example, the causal role played by Christ in salvation history, the Trinitarian implications of an incarnational Christology and their bearings on a theology of religions. At times Hillman makes wise observations and at times tantalizingly undeveloped suggestions, such as a brief flirtation with Paul Knitter's soteriocentricism.

The final chapter puts forward an engaging thesis that evangeliza· tion and dialogue are not incompatible and should proceed in creative

tension. He rightly argues that indigenization is mission and that only in dialogue can mission take place, while both are distinct from one another. Hillman's hook is full of promise hut requires more self-critical scrutiny, some sense of historical substantiation, as well as interaction with the specificities of the world religions. For a ' Catholic ' approach there are too many questions left unanswered and too many problems left unexplored.

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Religions and the Truth: Philosophical Reflections and Perspectives. By HENDRIK M. VROOM. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1989. Pp. 388. $23.95 (paper).

Hendrik Vroom announces his purpose in *Religions and the Truth* as " an inquiry into what people understand by truth in religion." What puzzles him is that religions commonly claim to provide an access to the truth and yet differ not only about the access and about the truth, hut also about what it means to achieve the goal. His basic strategy is to find both the common ground and the differences through a detailed study of five major religious traditions: Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. In this way, he hopes to find out something about each tradition and its peculiar concern with truth and then to work out a model for inter-religious conversation. It is thus a philosophical effort not depending essentially on any one of the traditions, hut it is also of theological relevance, as each of the traditions appraises its relations with the others.

Clearly Vroom works at the intersection of several major controversies. He starts with the philosophical debate about the concept *truth* itself. Immediately the strengths and weaknesses of the whole hook become apparent. Vroom is outstanding at posing the problem and at surveying the major positions in the debate. Yet, although he is willing to lay out the pros and cons, he avoids stating and defending a full position of his own. Later in the hook, this avoidance is a major drawback in the analysis. First of all, some inchoate theory of truth always lies behind the sorting out which goes with a descriptive analysis. Won't a decision about truth as correspondence or as coherence affect how one appraises different interpretations of this or that religious tradition? More importantly, the transition from the descriptive to the normative in the last two chapters absolutely requires such a decision.

Having explored the truth-debate and its extension into the philos· ophy of religion, Vroom embarks on his investigation of the traditions. His approach in each case is to look for some general notions which permeate the tradition and in particular for ways in which "truth " and " reality " come to the fore as concepts and as preoccupations. In this way, one gets not only a feel for the nuances of *satya, emet, aletheia,* and *haqq* in the various scriptures hut also for their place in a total world-view and life-orientation. It becomes obvious that these terms {roughly translated as *truth)* are neither completely univocal nor completely equivocal. The Moslem and the Christian arguing about (the) truth may indeed talk the same language about the same world, hut they {and we) should not be quick to think that they do so. Strangely, although I enjoyed this journey through the traditions greatly, I felt least satisfied with the depiction of Christianity, where presumably I am most at home.

The exploration of the five traditions leads hack to another general philosophical controversy, about religion taken generally. In this section, Vroom's method is more successful, since the close attention to diversity reveals how hard it is to zero in on some one element such as "the sense of the sacred." Vroom finds instead a conglomerate of in· sights and experiences with some reference to a transcendent under· stood (or not understood) differently in every case. How a tradition deals with finitude, responsibility, happiness, understanding, evil, and suffering makes for its own unity, and its connection to "the trans· cendent " marks it as characteristically religious. He has the greatest difficulty fitting Buddhism into this scheme, but he does so by stretching transendence to cover the nothingness of nirvana. To doctrine he gives a secondary yet important place, noting that it has had a much greater significance for Christianity than for any of the other great traditions and that even in Christianity it is not always the dominant matter. Throughout the whole book, the conviction grows that truth in religion must be more than a term of appraisal for religious proposi· tions.

Nevertheless, as I noted earlier, Vroom never works out his own theory of truth. It is in discussing "assessment and criteria" that the failure to do so becomes crucial. The focus of this discussion is mainly, but not only, doctrinal. He proposes three types of criteria: criteria derived from the nature of religion, criteria derived from universally valid knowledge, and criteria only accessible within a particular tradition. The nature of religion requires, for example, that religious beliefs deal with transcendence, that they integrate experiences, that they claim universal validity, that they help a person become truly human, and that they be rooted in basic experiences. Universal validity requires that

they he systematic, well-founded, inter-subjective, free, and critical. Unfortunately for the argument, such criteria require a theory of the good as well as of the true. No survey of the literature alone will yield these criteria; reasoned decisions about larger matters must be made.

Vroom's inability to decide the meta-questions about truth and goodness is less significant in his final chapter on inter-religious dialogue, where he looks for a schema of mutual understanding rather than for norms of successful communication. The stress on family resemblance helps him to avoid two mistakes. First is the idea that all religions are variations on one universal human activity, a position made untenable by the multitude of concerns embraced by every religious tradition and the absence of any one integrating feature. The second mistake he escapes is the belief that every religion is a unit having no overlap with any other and that consequently dialogue is impossible. *Religions and the Truth* traces the major world traditions so carefully that the overlap is obvious, hut it also makes clear that the overlap is various and fluctuating.

Vroom has made a major contribution to the understanding of religion and to the conversation of religious people. My one wish is that he had been brave enough to take a stand on the basic philosophical questions and that he had set in motion an interaction between these questions and his detailed analysis of religion. An investigation of these deepest and richest quests for the true, the good, and the beautiful would result in an even better view of religion.

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Persons and Personal Identity: A Contemporary Inquiry. Edited by ARTHUR PEACOCKE AND GRANT GILLETT. Ian Ramsey Centre Publication, no. 1. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987. Pp. ix + 222. $39.95 (cloth).

This hook contains thirteen papers given at a seminar series and workshop on " Conceptions of the Person and Their Ethical Implications " held under the aegis of the Ian Ramsey Centre in Oxford, England, in 1985-86. The Ian Ramsey Centre, founded in 1985 and based at St. Cross College in Oxford, is directed by Arthur Peacocke, one of the editors of this hook. The Centre has as its aim " the interdisciplinary study of both ethical problems arising from scientific and medical research and practice and the underlying philosophical and theological

issues" (p. vii). The range of contributions to this volume shows that this aim is being taken seriously. Five contributions are by philos· ophers, three by theologians, and one each by a chemist, a psychologist, a psychiatrist, a literary critic, and a legal theorist. In addition, some of the papers have appended to them a partial record of the discussions they prompted, and the participants in these discussions represent a still broader range of disciplines. One of the chief strengths of this collection is thus the unusually wide spectrum of iITtellectual interests it covers. This is also its weakness; diversity can easily become disjointedness.

The dominant tone of the collection nevertheless is philosophical, and the parameters of the philosophical debate are set by the first two con· tributions. In the first, Peter Atkins presents a radically scientistic materialism as the only possible view of what human persons are. Science, he claims, is omnicompetent and simple; purposelessness and chaos are fundamental in the cosmos; and physicalist reductionism. is capable of explaining everything. Atkins attempts to show, in the body of his paper, that these claims are true by offering a physicalist explanation of qualia and intentionality. Atkins's paper is remarkable both for the fervor of its rhetoric and the implausibility of its conclusions: any position that is not radically scientistic and physicalist is dismissed as sentimental wishful thinking (p. 13). But Atkins never establishes that nonphysicalist explanations of some phenomena are made less plau· sible by the fact that physicalist explanations can also be offered.

Richard Swinburne, in the second paper, gives us the opposite end of the philosophical spectrum. He argues that if it is logically possible that I, as a conscious person, can exist without a body, then it follows that I have a soul (see the argument on p. 47). He also explores the major differing theories of the relations between soul and body (epiphe· nomenalism, the moderate theory, and so forth), and argues for the "mental structure theory," according to which the soul just consists in a complex and interrelated web or net of beliefs and desires, some conscious and some not, and that it fa not identical with the body. Swinburne offers an interesting modal argument from the logical possibility of disembodied existence to the actual existence of the soul.

Atkins and Swinburne thus set the philosophical boundaries of the debate: either one is reductionist of the extreme type represented by Atkins or one is a suhstantivist dualist of the kind represented by Swinburne. The other philosophical contributions fill out the middle ground in a variety of interesting ways. David Wiggins, for example, provides a careful analysis of the different senses (and references) of the term " person " that come into play when we think of persons as objects of scientific enquiry, that is, as subjects of consciousness and

loci of value. He argues that any full and proper understanding of what persons are--of the 'sense' of the term in these three areas-is arrived at a posteriori through encounter with other human beings; and that there is thus a sense in which the concept 'person' is parasitic, in both its sense and its reference, upon the concept 'human being.' Wiggins's careful analysis has interesting implications for the somewhat crude alternatives posed by Atkins and Swinburne by proceeding with a subtlety and sensitivity not found in either of their pieces. Wiggins suggests that there are real problems in understanding what it might mean for a person to he non-human (and this includes disembodied persons, for all humans are embodied), and thus calls into question Swinburne's radical dualism without falling prey to the crass reductionism espoused by Atkins.

Grant Gillett and then Derek Parfit discuss the adequacy of the "bundle theory" of personal identity, according to which an account of personal identity is given in terms of some form of causal connectedness. Gillett impugns this account and calls into question the thought-experiments upon which its advocates typically base it. These thought-experiments, Gillett claims, are "described in such a way as to force a certain conclusion" (p. 81). Parfit's reply is in fact not so much a response to Gillett as a reiteration of the bundle theory of personal identity together with its ethical implications, already set forth in considerable detail in his hook *Reasons and Persons* (Oxford, 1984). According to this theory-and in the form defended by Parfit it is reductionist, though not necessarily physicalist-identity is not of much importance in considering the continued existence of a person over time, and the question as to whether a particular person at a particular time is 'the same person' as another person at a later time may often not admit of a determinate answer. The debate between Parfit and Gillett on these matters rehashes old questions and standard replies without advancing matters very much.

The philosophical positions enunciated and defended in the contributions discussed so far form the backdrop for the rest of the hook. But the remaining contributions rarely incorporate--or even show any direct awareness of-these fundamental philosophical options. This is not to say that the more or less nonphilosophical contributions are themselves theoretically unsophisticated; only that their theoretical perspectives are not engaged with those of the philosophical contributions, and that this fact contributes to the disjointedness and disconnectedness of the hook as a whole.

All that I can do here is to pass the remainder of the contributions in quick review. Rom Harre offers an analysis of the extent to which the self-understood as "a unified subjective organization of

memory, perception, agency" (p. 99)-is a socially constructed artifact rather than a metaphysically existent entity. Richard Tur offers an analysis of the ' person ' in law, in the course of which he concludes that "the concept of legal peTsonality is wholly formal. It is an empty slot that can be filled by anything that can have rights or duties . . . [it is a] cluster concept" (p. 121). William Fulford (pp. 130-149) calls into question the idea that medicine is an empirically-based science; he calls for a recognition that it is constitutively based upon ethical/evaluative judgments-this will enable the "patient-as-a-person " to be returned to center stage. Anthony Storr surveys the development of Jungian thought on the person and personality but does not directly address the philosophical issues that frame this collection. And Anthony Nuttall offers an interesting review of the parallels between the literary deconstruction of texts and the philosophical decon· struction of persons. He argues that neither persons nor texts are properly so treated; both should he seen as in some sense irreducible-but *what* sense is left unspecified.

Among these contributions those of Tur and Fulford are essentially neutral in regard to the philosophical options discussed at the beginning of this review. Those of Nuttall and Storr clearly run counter to Atkins's reductionism, and probably also to the bundle theory of Parfit: they may be more open to Swinburnian dualism. Harre's piece, by contrast, is probably more easily compatible with some variety of redutionist analysis. But none of t..liese contributions directly addresses this question of the philosophical underpinning and entailments of the position taken in it (with the partial exception of Harre) .

The last three pieces in the book are explicitly theological and may be of most interest to readers of this journal. John Macquarrie offers a "theology of personal being " according to which human persons are characterized as "beings-on-the-way," "beings-in-the-world," and "beings-with-others." These themes will he entirely familiar to readers of Macquarrie's work over the last three decades (see, especially, *In Search of Humanity* [New York, 1983]); Macquarrie leaves us entirely in the dark as to whether his analysis is most compatible with a reductionist or a non-reductionist analysis of persons. So also does Kallistos Ware, who describes the unity of the human person according to the Greek fathers. If the Platonism of these fathers is to be called into question as dangerous (p. 198), is it either possible or desirable to combine their analysis with (say) a Parfitian bundle-theory analysis? Ware does not tell us. Only Adrian Thatcher ("Christian Theology and the Concept of a Person ") is more explicit in this regard. He openly rejects any form of Cartesian dualism as inappropriate for a Christian view of either persons or God. This brings him into direct

conflict with Swinburne's argument for dualism. It is not surprising that Thatcher's paper seems to have provoked the most animated discussion (pp. 190-196) recorded in the hook.

In sum: the philosophical contributions to this volume provide an excellent review of the state of play in .the English-speaking philosophical world on the nature of human persons. They are not, however, detailed or sustained enough to advance that discussion significantly. The non-philosophical contributions, while often individually fascinating, are not sufficiently informed by or responsive to the philosophical problematic. This hook's promise as a genuinely interdisciplinary approach to the problem of what constitutes personal identity remains unfulfilled.

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